ll
"E.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION
HOUSE OF REPEESENTATIVES
SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
H. Res. 113
A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTERSTATE
MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING THE PRESENT
AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
MIGRATION CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE PROGRAM
PART 34
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
SEPTEMBER 15, 16, AND 17, 1942
Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE mVESTIGATING
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES
SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGBESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
H. Res. 113
A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTERSTATE
MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING THE PRESENT
AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
MIGRATION CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE PROGRAM
PART 34
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
SEPTEMBER 15, 16, AND 17, 1942
Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1942
SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING NATIONAL DEFENSE
MIGRATION
JOHN H. TOLAN. California, Chairman
JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama '' CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
LAURENCK F. ARNOLD, Illinois GEORGE H. BENDER, Ohio
Robert K. Lamb, Staff Director
CONTENTS
Page
List of witnesses V
List of authors vn
Tuesday, September 15, 1942, morning session 13055
Testimony of James P. Mitchell 13055
Statement by James P. Mitchell 13064
Testimony of Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey 13066, 13070
Statement by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey 13066
Wednesday, September 16, 1942, morning session 13111
Testimony of Paul V. McNutt 13111, 13121, 1312g
Statement by Paul V. McNutt 13113
Testimony of Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry 13125
Testimony of Wendell Lund 13145, 13161
Statement by Wendell Lund 13146, 13153, 13165
Testimony of Paul H. Norgren 13163
Testimony of Donald M. Nelson 13170
Statement by Donald M. Nelson 13202, 13222
Introduction of exhibits 13228
Exhibit 1. Executive order establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission 13229
Exhibit 2. Directives I-XII issued by the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission 13231
Exhibit 3. Statistical data on manpower submitted by War Man-
power Commission, Washington, D. C 13242
Exhibit 4. Area allocation of war supply -contracts according to
adequacy of labor supply; report released by War Manpower
Commission, Lidustrial and Agricultural Employment Divi-
sion, Washington, D. C 13255
Exhibit 5. Relation of manpower mobilization to procurement,
by John J. Corson, Director, United States Employment Serv-
ice, Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Washing-
ton, D. C 13258
Exhibit 6. Manpower functions of Civilian Personnel Division,
Services of Supply, War Department, documents submitted by
Leonard J. Maloney, Chief, Manpower Branch, Civilian Per-
sonnel Division, Services of Supply, War Department, Wash-
ington, D. C 13261
Exhibit 7. Placement of contracts in relation to labor supply, by
John J. Corson, Chief, Industrial and Agricultural Employment
Division, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C 13313
Exhibit 8. Statistical data on unmarried Selective Service regis-
trants submitted by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director,
Selective Service System, Washington, D. C 13314
Index 13315
in
LIST OF WITNESSES
Washington Hearings, September 15, 16, 17, 1942
Page
Hershey, Maj. Gen. Lewis B., Director, Selective Service System, Wash-
ington, D. C 13066, 13070
Lund, Wendell, Director, Labor Production Division, War Production
Board, Washington, D. C 13145, 13161, 13165
McNutt, Paul v., Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington,
D. C 13111, 13121, 13128
McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J., Director of Operations, War Manpower
Commission, Washington, D. C 13125
Mitchell, James P., Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of
Supply, War Department, Washington, D. C 13055
Nelson, Donald M., Chairman, War Production Board, Washington, D. C_ 13170
Norgren, Paul H., Acting Chief, Industry Consultant Branch, Labor Pro- .
duction Division, War Production Board, Washington, D. C 13163
LIST OF AUTHORS
Of Prepared Statements and Exhibits
Page
Corson, John J., Chief, Industrial and Agricultural Employment Division,
War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C 13313
Corson, John J., Director, United States Employment Service, Federal
Securitv Agency, Social Securitv Board, Washington, D. C 13258
Hershev,"Mai. Gen. Lewis B., Director, Selective Service System, Wash-
ington, D. C 13066, 13314
Industrial and Agricultural Employment Division, War Manpower Com-
mission, Washington, D. C 13255
Lund, Wendell, Director, Labor Production Division, War Production
Board, Washington, D. C 13146, 13153
McNutt, Paul v., Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington,
_ D. c._ - - 13113, 13231
Malonev, Leonard J., Chief, Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Di-
vision, Services of Supply, War Department, Washington, D. C 13261
Mitchell, James P., Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of
Supply, War Department, Washington, D. C 13064
Nelson, Donald M., Chairman, War Production Board, Washington,
D. c ' 13202, 13222
War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C 13242
vn
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGKATION
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1942
morning session
House of Representatives,
Select Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a. m,, September 15,
1942, in room 1102, New House Office Building, Washington, D. C,
Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman), presiding.
Present: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of Cahfornia;
Jolm J. Sparkman, of Alabama; George H. Bender, of Ohio; Carl T.
Curtis, of Nebraska; and Laurence F. Arnold, of Illinois.
Also present: Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director.
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Mitchell, will you come forward, please?
TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. MITCHELL, DIRECTOR, CIVILIAN PER-
SONNEL DIVISION, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Mitchell, I understand that you have an
appointment at 10, or a few minutes after, so we will move as speedily
as we can in order to release you in time for that appointment.
The committee this morning is starting a series of hearings for the
purpose of inquiring further into the manpower needs set-up in the
program that we are now engaged in.
We have prepared some questions to ask you. The matter in
which we are interested is one that has a lot of involvenients, a lot of
implications, and for me a good many confusing technicalities, so I
hope you will pardon the use of these formal prepared questions that
I shall submit to you.
It is our understanding from your press release of July 16 and from
discussions with members of your staff that at the present time, in a
number of tight labor markets, the Civilian Personnel Division has
sent representatives to study the utilization of manpower within the
war plants themselves. After such a survey, these liaison officers
contact the war contractor, the supply and material inspectors, a,nd
the local employment and training offices in order to obtain a solution
to the particular labor utilization problem which they have observed.
Do you consider that this is a key function of the Civilian Personnel
Division?
coordinating responsibility of services of supply
Mr. Mitchell. May I put it in another way, Mr. Congressman?
The Services of Supply is responsible for the coordination and super-
vision of eight major supply organizations of the War Department,
13055
13056 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
which include the Quartermaster, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance,
Chemical Warfare, and Signal Corps. All of these agencies operate
at a local level, and it is there that the liaison officers are most effective
in coordinating the labor supply needs of those procurement agencies,
and bringing to bear in the problems of those procurement agencies
the various facilities of the other governmental agencies which are set
up to assist the war contractors in solving their labor supply problems.
For example, the liaison officer, in his contact with the procurement
officer of Ordnance, may discover X plant is m need of additional em-
ployees or is having difficulty with its training program. In that
event, the liaison officer makes contact with the proper agency of the
War Manpower Commission or the War Productioji Board, such as
the Training- With in-Industry Agency, the United States Employ--
ment Service, and brings to these agencies our needs, that is, the War
Department needs.
Mr. Sparkman. From our own investigation we know that Govern-
ment plants are as greatly overstaffed as private plants. We know,
for example, that machinists are frequently ordered when machine
operators are needed, and that all-around machinists are frequently
employed at jobs which are really machine operators' jobs. Wliat
specifically does the Civilian Personnel Division intend to do about
overstaffing in the plants of war contractors?
Mr. Mitchell. It is making an assumption that they are over-
staffed, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Yes. I stated in the beginning that we had reached
a conclusion that many of them are overstaffed.
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE LABOR
Mr. Mitchell. I see. Well, that is both a labor supply and a pro-
duction problem. The War Department is concerned with the maxi-
mum utilization of labor. It becomes a problem not only of our
division, which is concerned with labor supply, but also of the pro-
duction divisions which are concerned with the availability of mate-
rials. I do not think you can separate the availability of materials
and the availability of manpower. As you may have noted, in some
war production plants, the jobs may be overmanned. Oftentimes,
management, in anticipation of materials, has hired men, and the
materials not being forthcoming they have held the men. We feel
that our responsibility as a procurement agency is to see that our
contractors make the maximum utilization of available labor and of
available materials. Our procurement officers are instructed to see
that plants are not overmanned, and are constantly bringing to the
attention of those contractors who are overmanning plants their re-
sponsibility for seeing that adequate but not too m.any people are
used on a particular operation.
Mr. Sparkman. Do they also try to see that the proper persons are
used in the proper jobs? "What I mean by that, take the example
that I just used, for instance, that machinists are not used simply for
machine operators' jobs.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Although we do not have the organiza-
tion to make a detailed inspection of the occupational skills and the
use of those skills of every employee in a war plant, we have insisted
with our contractors that our production requirements are met. We
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13057
do use whatever sanctions our contract permits us to see that contrac-
tors do not waste skills, and the use of a machinist as a machine hand
is a waste of skill.
Mr. Sparkman. Now, you say you use whatever sanctions are
provided by the contract. Just how far do those sanctions go?
Mr. Mitchell. Not very far, sir, except that the procurement
officer in the field is in very close association with his contractors.
He may have contractor A and contractor B both producing for him.
If contractor A is usmg skills wastefully, he has many ways of
calling that to his attention: Priorities in materials, priorities in
machinery, and so forth. There is nothing in the contract that
permits him to use sanctions, but the relationship is such that I
believe the contracting officer does and can help that situation very
much.
Air. Sparkman. Does that apply likewise to the matter of over-
staft'ing?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
MANPOWER problems IN COPPER INDUSTRY
Mr. Sparkman. In the development of the recent copper order, we
understand that the initiative for this order came from your office,
and that your office proposed that the Army should issue the order
subsequently issued by Mr. McNutt. Why was the order not issued
by the War Department to its contractors?
Mr. Mitchell. Of course, the War Department has been aware,
probably is in the position of being the first to be aware, of the shortage
of basic materials, and the copper shortage is one that has given great
concern for some months. Last June, at our suggestion, a meeting
was called of all of the agencies concerned with labor supply or man-
power, which included the War Manpower Commission, the War
Production Board, ourselves, the Army and Navy Munitions Board,
and the Navy, to examine the manpower problem so far as copper was
concerned. As the result of a series of meetings of those agencies a
program was drawn up in which each agency participated; that is,
the War Labor Board was concerned with the stabilization of wages
in the copper industry; the housing people were concerned with pro-
viding adequate housing; the Manpower- Commission, with the re-
cruitment of labor.
There were many factors which caused the lack of labor supply
in the copper mines. Subsequently the problem of the hiring away
of workers from the copper mines by war contractors presented itself.
That problem was discussed jointly by the Ai-my and Navy, the War
Production Board, the War Manpower Commission. It would not
have been of any benefit for any one agency to have issued an instruc-
tion by itself. It required the united action of all agencies and all
contractors in that area. That is the reason why it was necessary
for the War Manpower Commission, in order to get the united action
of all contractors, to issue that directive.
SURVEYS OF LABOR CONDITIONS BY WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION
Mr. Sparkman. It is our understanding that the Civilian Personnel
Division has already advised the contract services of the armed forces
on the availability of labor. In fact, as we understand it, several
13058 WASHINGTON iftEARINGS
contracts have already been taken out of tight labor market areas
upon the advice of the Civilian Personnel Division. Would you
describe several cases of this for us?
Mr. Mitchell. We have an arrangement with the War Manpower
Commission, with the Director of Operations, to keep us advised of
tight labor markets — critical shortages in various areas. That is a
periodic flow of information which comes to us from the War Man-
power Commission. Acting on that information, we advise our
procurement agencies of shortages and overages in labor in any par-
ticular areas. As the result of that advice some of the procurement
agencies have desisted from placing further contracts in an already
tight and short labor market. The Quartermaster, for example, has
recently refrained from placing additional contracts for certain types
of clothing in Seattle, which is very definitely a tight labor market.
Mr. Sparkman. Now, as I understand it, the Manpower Com-
mission makes the survey and furnishes the information to you.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. You do not establish the fact as to the condition
of the market, you depend upon the Manpower Commission for that,
and you simply transmit that information to your procurement
officers?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir, and to our liaison officers in the
field who coordinate or correlate the activities of all the procurement
agencies in the War Department.
Mr. Sparkman. Is that a general coverage of the whole country?
Does it cover the country fairly well?
Mr. Mitchell. Fairly well, where there are obvious shortages and
overages of labor.
Mr. Sparkman. It is our understanding that the War Manpower
Commission, tlu-ough the Labor Production Division and through the
Employment Service, performs" a similar advisory function to the
industry branches of the War Production Board. What do you think
is the need or the desirability of such duplication of work as this?
Is it necessary?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not clear as to your question, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. I stated that we understand that the Manpower
Commission performs a similar service, advising the industry branches
of the War Production Board along the same line.
Mr. Mitchell. I see. I should think that that would be highly
desirable. I am not acquainted in detail with the function of the
industry branches, but it would seem to me that any information on
labor supply would be helpful in planning curtailment programs or
concentration programs, or any other programs that the industry
branches may have as their function.
Mr. Sparkman. Of course, as I understand it from your state-
ment, the Manpower Commission gathers and places in factual form
the information.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. And that information, which is transmitted to
you, is used by you for advising the procurement officers of the Army?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Of course, the Manpower Commission probably
would gather information as to all of the armed forces and even
civilian forces as well.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13059
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Would that be your idea? I do not mean the
Manpower Commission, I mean the War Production Board. In
other words, yours would be a much smaller field than theirs.
Mr. Mitchell. I should think so. The information the Manpower
Commission gives us is used by us as one of the criteria in the allotting
of contracts for militarj^ items.
Mr. Sparkman. Of course, this thought occurs to me: Suppose
there is a certain area that has an overage of available labor and you
advised your procurement officers, and suppose the Navy advises
its procurement officers to the same effect, the Maritime Commission
so advises its officers, and the industry branches of the War Produc-
tion Board advise the people engaged in civilian production, then it
seems to me, unless you have got some kind of coordination
Mr. Mitchell (interposing). In the letting of contracts?
Mr. Sparkman. Yes. In that case, you are liable immediately
to create a tight labor market, are you?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know enough about it to comment
on it. The procurement agencies of the Government, of the War
Department, lets contracts. It seems to me that they should know
when they are letting contracts, so long as they are going to let con-
tracts, all the factors that might have a bearing on the production of
that contract. Labor supply is one of them.
Mr. Sparkman. I am thinking of these various procurement agencies
of the various services.
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Acting simultaneously.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Is there any clearing house from which they might
operate?
Mr. Mitchell. That I do not know, sir.
The Chairman. Don't you think there should be?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you get into the realm there, Mr. Congress-
man, of the whole' system of contract letting in Government. Very
frankly, I know so little about it that I would hesitate to offer any
opinion.
Mr. Sparkman. I might ask this question, which would be whoUy
practicable: Have you incurred any difficulty along that line?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. In connection with your own contracts?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.
SERVICES complementary RATHER THAN DUPLICATIVE
Mr. Sparkman. From the organizational chart and statement of
functions of the Army Civilian Personnel Division, it would appear
that your office duplicates in part the functions of the War Man-
power Commission. Do you think we are correct in believing that
your operations are duplicative at many points? What is your
opinion on the need for or desirability of such duplication?
Mr. Mitchell. I am not aware, sir, of any duplication.
Mr. Sparkman. It is your attitude that they are complementary
to each other?
13060 WASIJINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. As I stated before, we beheve
that the Services of Supply have an internal problem of coordination
of its various procurement agencies in this labor-supply problem.
The function of our liaison officers is that of interpreting to our pro-
curement agencies, so that we have a uniform policy, the policies and
procedures and practices and operations of the Manpower Commis-
sion, and in turn bringing to the Manpower Commission our needs,
so that the Manpower Commission has a central point at which it
can obtain the Army's needs for labor. I do not see any duplication
in that function.
Mr. Spaekman. Is the Civilian Personnel Division subject to di-
rectives issued by the War Manpower Commission?
Mr. Mitchell. Only insofar as those directives may be issued to
the governmental agencies as a whole. In other words, the War
Manpower Commission in its directives may direct — I do not know
of any occasion that it has, but I understand it may have the au-
thority to direct — action on the part of each and every governmental
agency concerned with this problem of labor supply. Insofar as that
is concerned, we are subject to the direction of the Manpower Com-
mission, as is the Navy and Maritime Commission, or any other
governmental agencies.
Mr. Sparkman. I wonder if you might give us a statement as to
what you consider to be the functions of the War Manpower Com-
mission which are separate from those that are now performed or can
be performed by the Civilian Personnel Division.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, the Civilian Personnel Division, that is, the
Manpower Branch of that Division, can only be concerned with the
procurement and production problems of the War Department. We
have no mechanism for national recruitment of labor. We have no
mechanism for the national training of war contractors' employees.
We have no mechanism for determining the total labor requirements
of the country. In fact, it seems to me that there is need, very
definite need, for an over-all agency which concerns itself with the
total labor-supply problem. Ours is an internal problem of what are
the needs of the War Department, which is only a part of the total
labor-supply need.
Mr. Sparkman. And that agency would be the Manpower Com-
mission?
Mr. Mitchell. I understand that agency is the Manpower Com-
mission.
AUTHORITY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIVISION
Mr. Sparkman. Does the Civilian Personnel Division, through
the War Department, have the power to require war contractors
to do all of their hiring either through the Employment Service
or through some other central placement agency?
Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; we do not so require. At present the
terms of our contracts do not require that a contractor hire from
any one particular source, the labor.
Mr. Sparkman. Could you do so if you saw fit to do it?
Mr. Mitchell. I suppose we could, sir.
Jvlr. Sparkman. Through the same means that you described a few
minutes ago?
Mr. Mitchell. I suppose we could; yes, sir.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13061
Mr. Sparkman. Does the Army, Civilian Personnel Division, have
the authority to require war contractors to set up training programs
of an adequate size and quality within the plant?
Mr. Mitchell. If you are speaking of legal authority; no, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Could you do that by the same means that you
described a few minutes ago?
Mr. Mitchell. I suppose you can write anything into a contract
that you wish, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. Well, you can always control it by the allocation
of materials and men; is that right?
Mr. Mitchell. And men; yes, sir. At the moment, I would say
that most war contractors accept with readiness the training-within-
industry idea, and are anxious and willing to accept the services of
any governmental agency that will help the contractor to produce his
contract or to meet his contract requirements. I doubt whether any
compulsory acceptance of either recruitment or trainmg withm indus-
try would have any greater benefit than the present system.
ON NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE ACT
Mr. Sparkman. There seems to be some difference of opinion over
the need for a national service act at this time. Some persons have
suggested that it is preferable to control labor demand of war con-
tractors rather than exert compulsion upon the individual worker at
this time. What are your views on the necessity for a national
service act?
Mr. Mitchell. My personal views?
Mr. Sparkman. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I would say that if a national service act were
adopted there might be very Httle occasion to use it. In other words,
the very existence of an act of that kind would make it unnecessary to
use its powers. I think that has been the experience in England and
other countries that have had that or similar parallel compulsory acts.
Mr. Sparkman. There has been very httle use made of it?
Mr. Mitchell. There has been very little use made of it. Al-
though it may be necessary that the act be adopted.
Mr. Sparkman. Have it ready, in case?
Mr. Mitchell. Have it ready, in case; that is right, sir.
Mr. Sparkman. There seems to be some difference of opinion be-
tween the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission
over the interpretation of directive 2 of the War Manpower Com-
mission which instructs the War Production Board to give the War
Manpower Commission a preference list of plants. I wiU describe to
you the impression we have of this difference. Some officials of the
War Production Board believe that this directive authorizes them to
instruct the War Manpower Commission on all phases of manpower
demand, both as to location, quantity, and quality. In fact, a War
Manpower Priorities Branch has been set up within the War Production
Board, regional offices are planned, and it has been suggested that
labor utilization inspectors should be employed by the War Produc-
tion Board to check on the need for labor and the use for labor within
war plants. The War Manpower Commission for its part also plans
to have labor utilization mspectors. If the War Production Board's
interpretation of directive 2 is taken, would this not reduce the
13062 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
War Manpower Commission to the status of a placement and recruit-
ing agency only?
Mr. Mitchell. I know nothing of the War Production Board's
interpretation of the War Manpower Commission's directive, in the
first place. I have no opinion on it, so therefore the question is lost
on me.
Mr. Sparkman. That gets back to the over-all picture, rather than
your restrictive part; is that right?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right; yes, sir.
INTEGRATION OF MANPOWER AND PRODUCTION PLANNING
Mr. Sparkman. Well, it seems that an integration of manpower
and production planning has to be developed. What is your con-
sidered judgment as to how this can best be done?
Mr. Mitchell. Well, 1 have no judgment or opinion on that. I do
not know enough about the larger issues which may be brought to
bear on such a problem.
Mr. Sparkman. Now, let me ask you this: In your own particular
field, do you think that has been very well done?
Mr. Mitchell. The integration of labor supply and production?
Mr. Sparkman. And production plamiing.
Mr. Mitchell. It necessarily has to be, because, after all, we are
interested in only one thing, the production that our contractors can
give us, and the only reason we perform this function of liaison with
our war contractors in the labor supply field is in order to insure pro-
duction. It seems to me that the adequate utilization of labor supply
is an integral part of production.
Mr. Sparkman. Do you think that that has been accomplished in
your particular field? It is a continuing problem, I suppose. Is it
being done?
Mr. Mitchell. We are integrating our activities very closely with
our own production people. Naturally, we are part of a production
organization.
Mr. Sparkman. Assuming that that is being done in each of the
services concerned with production, then is it your idea that the War
Manpower Commission coordinates the entire program?
Mr. Mitchell. Of labor supply?
Mr. Sparkman. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. I think that is its function, or one of its
functions.
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, that is all I care to ask.
The Chairman. Any questions, Congressman Curtis?
Mr. Curtis. With reference to your discussion of the waste of skill,
I take it by that you mean in a certain factory there are some men
who are highly skilled to do a certain job and they are assigned to
some task that requires much less skill. Is that your idea?
Mr. Mitchell. I gathered that that was the Congressman's
thought. I might add^ since the question has been raised again, that
in my opinion that type of wastage does not exist to any great degree.
Mr. Curtis. There has to be some of it in the natural course of
events?
Mr. Mitchell. In any organization that mushrooms in the short
time that these war plants have there is bound to be some of it, but
I do not think it exists to any great degree.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13063
Mr. CuRiis. To the degree that woukl justify pulhng them out of
one plant and moving tliem into another pLant?
Mr. Mitchell. To the contrary, m.ost plants do not have enough
skilled men in the particular jobs that they want, so I cannot imagine
any wastage of skills in that way. What I was referring to before
was probably the use of too many unskilled people in a given plant,
rather than a wastage of particular skilled men.
FIXING OF WAGE RATES
Mr. Curtis. Is it the intent of the Government that war jobs pay
higher wages than other work?
Mr. AliTCHELL. No, sir.
Mr. Curtis. In other words, is it set out as a policy that in order
to attract the needed labor that higher wages be used as an incentive?
Mr. Mitchell. I should say definitely not.
Mr. Curtis. You are speaking of the contractors of materiel, are
you not, primarily?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir.
Mr. Curtis. How about the construction program of the War
Department?
Air. Mitchell. The wages in the construction program of the
War Department are determined by the Department of Labor and
they are based, I understand, on the Bacon-Davis Act, which estab-
lishes that determination on the basis of pi-evailing wages in the com-
muxiit}'. Tliose wages are part of the contract.
Mr. Curtis. That is all.
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
Mr. Bender. I should like to ask one question: From your under-
standing of the persounel problems, how many women do you think
will be needed in war production work during the next year? Have
you any idea?
Mr. JVIitchell. I have no idea as to the figures, sir; but I would
say that more and more women must necessarily be employed in
war production, and the War Department, in its own establishments,
is definitely promoting and encouraging the employment of women
and developing ways and means in which they can be employed.
As an example, at the moment we have at Aberdeen Proving Grounds
women running tanks, assembling guns, firing guns. This is a testii^g
ground. We have used it more or less as an experimental laboratcry
as to those occupations in which women can be employed. We
believe most war contractors, too, must be encouraged to develop
and promote the employment of women.
Mr. Bender. That is all.
The Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, I understand you want to go early.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to, sir. I am at your disposal, how-
ever.
The Chairman. I just want to ask you one question.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know whether the Government, or any
agency of the Government, is undertakmg at the present time an
inventory of the manpower of the United States, of the skilled and
unskilled workers in the United States?
60396— 42— pt. 34 2
13064 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS
Mr. Mitchell. I do not know, sir.
The Chairman. Don't you think it should be done?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Otherwise, there is going to be an overlapping in
the different plants in the different States.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
The Chairman. Mow, when you speak to me about England, it is
not always comparable. There you have a nation that is compact,
that is smaller in area than is the State of Oregon, with one govern-
ment. Here, practically, we have 48 nations; haven't we? We
have really a different and more complex problem, haven't we, in a
lot of ways, than England?
Mr. Mitchell. I shopld think so. Geography makes it so.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Mitchell, for coming,
and for supplying us with a statement answering questions heretofore
submitted to you by the committee. Your statement, together with
these questions, will be inserted in the record at this point.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
STATEMENT OF JAMES P. MITCHELL, DIRECTOR, CIVILIAN PER-
SONNEL DIVISION, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Answer to question 1: "Will you briefly outline the functions of the Civilian
Personnel Division of the Services of Supply?")
In the General Orders issued by the Secretary of War on March 9, 1942, to
effect the reorganization of the Army, the Commanding General, Services of
Supply, was charged with the following mission in reference to personnel:
"The administration of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which
pertain to personnel as individuals, both military and civilian, to include pre-
military training, mobilization of industrial manpower, and labor relations."
The Civilian Personnel Division was created on his staff to carry out all the
phases of this mission with the exception of military personnel activities. This
division is divided into three branches:
(a) The Civilian Personnel Branch is responsible for the formulation of policy
and development of programs, together with supervision of the administration of
all civilian personnel matters concerned with direct employees of the various
agencies in the Services of Supply. This includes the supervision of the civilian
personnel branches in the individual supply services and service commands in
their development and supervision of programs for —
1. Appointment and placement of employees.
2. Job classification and wage administration.
3. In-service training of executive, supervisory, manual, and clerical per-
sonnel.
4. Employee relations.
5. Maintenance of personnel records.
(b) The Labor Relations Branch is responsible for the formulation of policy
and development of programs on labor-relations matters which affect production
of military items. It provides liaison with the National War Labor Board,
National Labor Relations Board, Department of Labor, and other labor relations
agencies which perform services for War Department contractors. It also makes
certain that the contracts for which the Services of Supply is responsible are con-
ducted in accordance with existing labor laws and the policies of the War Depart-
ment. It provides advice and guidance to War Department procurement agen-
cies on their responsibility for seeing that their contractors maintain proper
wage and hour structures.
(c) The Manpower Branch is responsible for the coordination of the labor
supply needs of the procurement agencies of the Services of Supply and for the
interpretation of those needs to the War Manpower Commission and the War
Production Board. It is also responsible for interpretation, to the procurement
agencies of the Services of Supply and its contractors, of the policies_of the War
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13065
Manpower Commission as it affects their operations and to Vjring to bear on the
problems of the procurement agencies and their contractors the pertinent service
which the War Manpower Commission renders, such as the recruitment facihties
of the United States Employment Service and the Civil Service Commission, the
training facilities of the Training- Within-Industry Section, the Apprenticeship
Training Section, and its other training agencies, etc. It is further the objective
of this division to supervise the administration of these policies within the estab-
lishments operated by and through the Services of Supply so as to insure an
optimum utilization of the manpower resources made available to the War
Department by the War Manpower Commission.
(Answer to question 2: "How man}' liaison officers are functioning in conjunction
with the War Manpower Commission to advise War Department agencies as to
the availabihty of labor, hoarding, and pirating of labor?")
There are 12 regional liaison officers operating in the field who have an addi-
tional 31 officers on their staffs. These officers are charged with the respon-
sibility for discharging the functions of the Manpower Branch as outlined above.
(Answer to question 3: "It is our understanding from a War Department press
release of July 16 that the liaison officers do not duplicate existing services.")
The service performed by these officers is a necessarj- part of the Services of
Supply responsibility and, so far as we are able to determine, cannot duplicate,
by'the very nature of its mission, any existing Federal service.
(Answer to question 4: "This committee has proposed in its fifth interim
report the creation of civilian labor utilization inspectors. These inspectors
would have authority to survey use of labor in war plants. Do the liaison officers
of the Civilian Personnel Division perform at the present time any such function
as that described in the committee's recommendation II 1. A. p. 37 of the fifth
interim report?")
I consider that responsibility for the proper utilization of civilian labor
rests with the management on any construction or production enterprise. The
Civilian Personnel Division has made every effort to see that the personnel of the
Services of Supply, responsible for efficient production, are thoroughly aware of
the labor supply problem and are constantly making use of their position with
relation to War Department contractors to see that the War Department con-
tractors and producers are doing everything possible to utilize labor to its miaxi-
mum. The function of labor utilization inspectors, if used, should be to review
existing conditions in plants visited and if these are not satisfactory to ask the
contracting agency responsible to take necessary action to improve these conditions.
(Answer to question 5: "Do you consider that the management-labor production
committees should have the responsibility for executing policies on upgrading,
training, and transfer of workers within war plants?")
It is our understanding that the management-labor production committees, as
set up in accordance with the recommendation of the War Production Board,
are established to do the following:
(a) Arrange in individual plants for production scoreboards.
(6) Increase plant efficiency by studying all physical working conditions.
(c) Arrange for handling suggestions.
(d) Arrange for production advertising.
I believe the determination of policies on training, upgrading and transfer of
workers must finally be made by management. Many managements, particularly
those which deal with their employees through collective-bargaining agencies,
make it a practice to consult with their employees on such policies and in some
cases policies and procedures in connection with training, upgrading and transfer
of workers are a part of collective-bargaining agreements. As far as the War
Department is concerned, in haaidling its own direct employees, policies in con-
nection with upgrading, transfer and training of workers are often governed by
statute or civil-service regulations.
(Answer to question 6: "Has the Civilian Personnel Division instituted measures
to utilize in war plants the workers in civilian industries, soon to be curtailed?")
I believe that the War Department has responsibility to encourage its con-
tractors to make maximum utilization of available labor in the areas in which these
contractors are operating. All decisions on the curtailment of civilian industries
and the availability of employees freed by such curtailment seems to be jointly
that of the War Production Board and the War ^Manpower Commission. As the
War Department is notified by these agencies of plans for curtailment and con-
centration, it will make such information available to its contractors and work
13066 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
with its contractors to bring about the maximum utilization of such labor freed
for war work.
(Answer to question 7: "What controls do you consider necessary to eliminate
labor pirating, to increase within-industry training, and to execute an orderly
transfer of workers from civilian to war work?")
In considering the controls necessary for the elimination of labor piracy,
for the augmentation of within-industry training, and for the execution of an
orderly transfer of workers from civilian to war work, it would seem that every
effort should first be made to plan in advance the amount, type, and location of
production to permit effective planned production. This planning should include
the obtaining of comprehensive and accurate information, in usable form, which
would indicate: The amount of skills currently needed and required in the future;
the amount of skills available, adjusted as the market is depleted by induction
into the armed forces; and the amount of skills that can be made available by
training and by induced entry into the labor market.
Before the institution of any control, by law or by regulation, an energetic
educational program should be carried on to educate all employers so that they
will themselves, through their own leadership, carry on desired programs. There
should also be, at the same time, a program of education for the Government
contracting agencies so that they may use the compulsion power inherent in their
contracts to bring reluctant employers into line.
It is, however, believed that, when civilian activities are curtailed, clearance
machinery should be set up through which freed employees must register, in order
that this force of workers, with their skills, will not be dissipated, and will be used
to best advantage in war industry. It would appear that the United States
Employment Service should be named to handle this clearance and that every
effort should be made to strengthen it administratively and financially so that it
will be able to discharge these responsibilities.
Mr. Mitchell. All riglit, sir.
The Chairman. We will take a recess for 5 minutes.
(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing
was resumed.)
The Chairman. The committee will please come to order.
General Hershey, will you be kind enough to take that chair there?
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY, DIRECTOR, SELEC-
TIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
The Chairman. I want to say on behalf of the committee, General,
we appreciate your coming here. We know you have a tremendous
responsibility, and we are just trying, through this committee, to
acquaint Congress as to how we are getting along. Congressman
Bender will ask a few questions here.
General Hersey. I am very glad to be here, Mr. Tolan. I remem-
ber with a great deal of pleasure the last time we met together. It
has been some months novv'.
The Chairman. Before you begin your testimony, General, I will
introduce into the record the very excellent statement that you have
furnished us.
(The statement follows:)
STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY, DIRECTOR,
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
In response to your letter of September 3, 1942, I am herewith submitting
answers to the questions raised in your letter.
Your first question inquires as to the. action taken by Selective Service in
response to directives addressed to it by the War Manpower Commission.
We have received two directives. One of them is referred to on page 21 of
your committee's fifth interim report of August 10, 1942, as directing the Selec-
tive Service System to instruct all its local boards located in a community served
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13067
by the United States Employment Service to secure the advice of the local public
-employment office before classifying or reclassifying an individual skilled in a
critical war occupation. Pursuant to that directive we issued State Director
Advice No. 59 on August 29, 1942, copy of which is enclosed herewith.'
Prior to issuing State Director Advice No. 59, the Selective Service System
had been maintaining contacts, not only with the United States Employment
Service, but also with the many other governmental, public, and private groups
and persons. You are already familiar with the coordination that has been main-
tained by Selective Service with the Department of Agriculture, the War Depart-
ment, the Navy Department, the Department of Labor, the Department of
Justice, the Maritime Commission, the Office of Defense Transportation, the
War Production Board, the Civil Service Commission, the Office of Civilian
Defense, and many other Government agencies and departments. You also are
familiar with our coordination with labor and management groups, and other
public and private organizations. I informed you generally about these contacts
on page 4 of the statement I submitted to you on February 3, 1942.2 I shall, of
course, be pleased to explain any of the aspects of such liaison more in detail
should you so desire.
The second of the two directives was issued by the chairman of the Manpower
Commission on September 7, 1942. Preceding the general directive provision
of the document was an order that certain types of miners in 12 western States
must rem.ain in their jobs unless released by the local United States Employment
Service office. The United States Employrrent Service office was also to be the
agency for appeals. The directive which followed the order stated as follows:
"All departments and agencies of the Federal Government are hereby directed
to take all steps which may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate these pro-
visions and to insure their observance."
On September 7, 1942, Selective Service issued a statement to the local boards
stating in effect that local boards should consider the classification of any of the
types of men in cjuestion should they leave their present jobs, and also stated
that such men should be reclassified out of classifications requiring certain occu-
pational status if the local boards determined it was more in the interest of the
war effort for the men to remain in their former jobs rather than in the ones to
which they had transferred or were planning to transfer.
Section 626.1 of the Selective Service Regulations, which in general substance
has been in existence from the outset of our operations, reads as follows:
"626.1 Classification not permanent. — (cr) No classification is permanent.
"(6) Each classified registrant shall, within 10 days after it occurs, and any
other person should, within 10 days after knowledge thereof, report to the local
"board in writing any fact that might result in such' regis! rant being placed in a
different classification.
"(c) The local board shall keep informed of the status of classified registrants.
Registrants may be questioned or physically or mentally reexamined, employers
may be required to furnish information, police officials or other agencies may be
requested to make investigations, and other steps may be taken by the local board
to keep currently informed concerning the status of classified registrants."
Under that regulation a registrant is required under severe penalty to report
any change in status that might cause the local Selective Service board to find
that he no longer was performing the requirements for deferment. For instance, if
a man were deferred because his grandmother needed him for support, and if the
grandmother died, then the registrant would be obligated to immediately report the
change in status and the board would determine in that case that the registrant
should no longer be deferred. So also, if a man were temporarily deferred because
of w'ork he was doing in the copper mines, and if he changed his job and went to a
shipyard, then he must report that fact to his local board, and the local board
would, after reviewing all the facts, decide whether it were more in the national
interest for that particular man to be in the mine rather than in the shipyard, and
would decide whether he still continued to be entitled to deferment.
As a result of this policy, many registrants realize that it is in the interest of the
war effort as well as to their own interest to clear with the local Selective Service
board prior to leaving their jobs, rather than doing so after leaving them and then
having to return to their former jobs and thereby disrupting the war effort and
themselves in the process. Most registrants, I believe, desire to do their patriotic
duty and desire to do anything and everything that they are reasonably convinced
' This material had not been received at time of publication.
2 Washington hearings, pt. 27, p. 10235.
13068 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS
they should do to win the war. In spite of lack of uniformity and other short-
comings of the Selective Service System's operations, the uncompensated local
boards have performed an honest operation in deciding whether registrants should
be selected for war or should be selected by deferment for civilian war work or
other endeavors.
In answer to your question, "Do you know of instances where employees have
been granted occupational deferment on condition that they remain in their present
location?", the effect of these Selective Service policies has been to cause men in
some areas to remain in their present location, provided, of course, it is found by
Selective Service to be more in the interest of the war effort for them to do so.
Greater application of this principle with the attending publicity will, of course,
extend and broaden the effect in that respect.
One of your questions concerns certain complaints from employers to the effect
that workers with essential skill are being drafted. I, again, refer to the state-
ment of February 3, 1942, which I heretofore submitted to this committee in
which I stated "the Selective Service System has been charged with the responsi-
bility of registering and classifying the entire manpower of this Nation between
the ages of 18 and 65, and with the further responsibility of determining which of
the men between 20 and 45 should be allocated to the armed forces and which of
them should be allocated to wartime production or other essential civilian activities
or responsibilities. As a specified amount of money must be so budgeted as to
obtain the best use, so also must the supply of manpower be budgeted and allo-
cated so as to obtain the most effective results."
The position of national headquarters of the Selective Service System is the same
as it was then and always has been, namely, that the Selective Service System,
as a result of comprehensive study and research and also as a result of 2 years
of actual operations during which it has had an opportunity to observe its plans
in operation, recognizes that this war cannot be won by placing every man in the
armed forces, but that a proper balance must be maintained as between the fight-
ing men on the one hand and materiel, including food and equipment for them and
the civilian population on the other hand.
During the peacetime operations of the Selective Service System when only
approximately 600,000 men were being inducted annually out of the 27,000,000-
men between the ages of 20 and 45, the Selective Service System could very easily
procure that type of men for the armed forces which would in no way interfere with
war production and which would not interfere to any great extent with civilian
activities. However, now that we are in a wartime operation which may require
10,000,000 in the armed forces, leaving 17,000,000 deferred out of the 27,000,000,
in lieu of a much different peacetime ratio, classification policies necessarily
have been revised and it was and is essential that, insofar as can be done without
disrupting the war effort, employers must train those who are of such status that
they should be included among the 17,000,000 deferred rather than among the
10,000,000 fighting men, or should train women and elder men, to replace those
employees who are of the status which the national interest and the war efi'ort
require should be in the armed forces.
As above indicated, national headquarters of Selective Service System very
definitely realizes that an orderly withdrawal from industry of men with temporary
occupational deferments can be accomplished by close cooperation by and between
the Selective Service and the governmental production agencies on the one hand
and the employers on the other hand. . For some time Selective Service has been
endeavoring to work out proper solutions for these problems so that replacements
will be trained and made which will free a number of the class II men for military
service but yet will not remove them at a rate which will leave irreplaceable
vacancies to the detriment of the war effort.
One of your questions reads as follows: "The committee has stated in its
Fifth Interim Report (p. 27), that 'Deferment practices applied on a plant-by-
plant basis are not only inequitable but strike directly at the objective of effective
manpower mobilization.' Do you agree with this statement?"
In checking with your staff to make sure I understood the question correctly,
I was informed that'the committee did not intend to give the impression that de-
ferment should not be based upon analsyis of individual plants, but on the other
hand intended to indicate that in its opinion occupational deferment should not
be conditioned solely upon a request for deferment made either by the individual
employee or by his employer. In this connection, although it is not necessary for
an employer or an employee to request deferment, it is most advisable and as a
matter of fact is a patriotic duty, for the employer to file a Form 42A or other
affidavit setting forth exactly what the employee does as well as other pertinent
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13069
and detailed information concerning the employee. For the information of the
committee a copy of Form 42A is attached hereto and made a part hereof.^ Some
employers, particularly the self-employer or those that are in a father-and-son
relationship, which is the case in many local farming and rural areas, acquired the
erroneous idea that they would not be considered as patriotic if they filed 42A or
suggested deferment. Selective Service has continually been endeavoring to
educate employers of all types in connection with this matter so that they will
realize that any such viewpoint is really a matter of false patriotism as it is most
certainly in the interest of the war effort for local boards to be furnished with full
and complete information, together with a recommendation from those best
qualified to furnish it.
In connection with this aspect of the farm labor situation, we have recently
met with governmental agencies interested in agriculture and also with members of
the national farm organizations in an endeavor to work out the best ways of dealing
with and solving the problem. We have also recently issued a release covering the
subject generally.
As to whether or not detailed deferment practices should be on a basis of
plant-by-plant analysis, I believe that such should be the case. The vast majority
of plants and businesses differ one from the other even in many instances where
they produce the same product. The method of operation and functions of em-
ployees differ as between plants, and there are other individual differences. Almost
everyone recognizes the need for local, decentralized investigations and determina-
tions as a basis for ascertaining the personnel structure of the various plants and
businesses in order to have a basis for classification. This, the local boards, aided
by all available local assistance, endeavor to do. Local boards are assisted by
our occupational advisers who operate out of State headquarters. Representatives
of the offices of the Under Secretaries of War and Navy who are interested in
materiel procurement along with Mr. Nelson's organization are of assistance to
our State headquarters and local representatives.
One of your questions inquires whether or not I know of instances where Selective
Service boards are receiving advice from labor-management production committees
in granting deferments.
This is a field which has very far-reaching possibilities. I have been very
well impressed with the splendid work being accomplished by the Labor-Manage-
rnent Policy Advisory Committee to the War Manpower Commission, and believe
that if local committees would be of the same quality, they would be a great
assistance to our local Selective-Service representatives and agencies on different
questions. They would, of course, have to operate long enough and efficiently
enough to secure inplant confidence comparable to that enjoyed by the National
Labor- Management Committee already referred to. I understand that some of
such committees are already in existence and are being formed in connection with
the functions of Mr. Nelson's War Production Board which is interested in the
production of essential mat6riel. Our contacts on all levels with labor, manage-
ment and all other elements of the communities, of the States, and of the Nation
have been of the best, and certainly the advice of any and all additional groups or
committees that may be established would be welcomed by us at all levels if they
would have any information or advice that would be of any possible assistance.
The Selective Service System is most anxious to cooperate with labor-manage-
ment groups to insure placement of all registrants where they may render the
greatest service in winning the war. If anything further is needed to supplement
our relationship with labor, with management or with any of the other elements,
Selective Service is most certainly interested in filling that need.
One of your questions is: "Do you know of instances where the drafting of
workers has resulted in replacement through migration from communities which
have been granted deferments to workers with similar skills?"
I know of no specific instances where that has occurred but such a situation
should most certainly be prevented insofar as is possible. Any instances which
are brought to our attention will receive prompt action. Field representatives of
national headquarters coordinate our State headquarters and coordinators of State
headquarters extend the coordination among the local boards. The appeal agents
attached to each local board and other local representatives of the Selective Service
System do through periodic regional meetings keep in close touch with the co-
ordinators and occupational advisers.
• This material had not been received at time of publication.
13070 WASHINGTON HEARINfGS
We in national headquarters of Selective Service have maintained very close
contact with Members of Congress and particularly with members of both Com-
mittees on Military Affairs. As a result, we have continuously received suggestions,
criticisms and recommendations based upon communications the various Members
of Congress have received from their millions of constituents or based upon obser-
vations the congressmen have acquired of their own knowledge and experience.
This has been another way in which we have attempted to undergo self-analysis
and improve our operations. It has been and will be our sincere intention to give
the most careful consideration to such suggestions, criticisms and recommenda-
tions and to maintain fluid and elastic policies which will be modified accordingly
should investigation disclose that our operations will be improved and the war
effort will be furthered thereby.
In conclusion I desire to say that I believe Selective Service must continue to
increase its exercise of powers heretofore unused to the fullest extent. The maxi-
mum use of manpower will require more and more management in particular
areas or industries. I believe that the basic Selective Service policy and organi-
zation is sound and capable of accepting its obligations as the control over indi-
viduals by the Government increases.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY— Resumed
Mr. Bender. General Hershey, is it your view that Selective
Service is the key agency in supplying the armed services with man-
power and through control of deferment policy likewise the key to
providing industrial users with manpower? If so, does this require
that Selective Service scrutinize the needs of both industry and the
armed services?
SELECTIVE SERVICE AS A KEY AGENCY
General Hershey. Well, sir, that is three or four questions. I
think that I could say, to the first part of it, that I believe the Selective
Service is the key agency in furnishing our men to the armed forces.
I realize that is subject to challenge, because at tlie present time we
are not directly furnishing men to one of the armed forces. I think
we are a very vital factor in furnishmg men even to the armed forces
that we do not directly furnish.
Now, as to the question of whether or not we are the key agency
in the occupational field, that is probably controversial. vSo far as
one individual goes, you cannot both induct a man and defer him,
except on a time relationship. Therefore the problem of who is left
behind will always depend very directly on whom you take.
The Selective Service System, as I understand it, is responsible
for furjiishing the luimber of men that we are called upon to furnish,
with the least disturbance to tne occupational set-up, consistent with
the accomplishments of the men.
]Now, if that be true, necessarily there has got to be an over-all
determination upon the basis of the type of war that we are going to
fight, on what the relationship has got to be between the supporting
populatian and the participating population. I am using "partici-
pating" to mean those participating actually in the armed forces.
ISiow, I think it is a question, first of all, of what we mean by
"key." As to whether or not we are the key in this question of
deferment, I would hesitate to say. Obviously, you cannot uiduct
a man and defer him, except you can defer him for 3 months or 6
moiiths or 9 months and then take him, but you never can decide
how many men you are going to have m the Army or Navy without
deciding liow many men that is going to leave j^ou.
XATIOXAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13071
I do not want to leave the impression, however, at least in the
individual cases, that you cannot take a man for the Army unless
everyone agrees that there is a replacement for him. That is not the
way, in our primitive day, that we replace the men in the firing line.
The enenw decides who is a casualty. That being true, the only way
you replace is from the rear to the front. If you are going to do it in
the other direction you are in retrogression.
I do not know that I have answered the question. If I have not,
I want you to pm me down and show me wherein I did not. I may
not be able to answer the last part of it, as to what extent the Selective
Service is the key in setting up the needs for occupational deferment.
'Sir. Bender. In your opinion, the Selective Service System does
not satisfy both needs?
General Hershey. Now, let us see. T\Tiom are we satisfying?
I mean: ^Miat are you talking about? What do you mean by
"satisfy"?
Mr. Bender. Well, you are not in a position to scrutinize the needs
of industiy as well as the needs of the armed forces?
OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENT
General Hershey. I think to date we have spent a great deal more
time on scrutinizing the needs of industry than of the armed forces.
That is to say, there are now more than ample people for the armed
forces and therefore, in case of doubt, we leave them m the factory.
Now, as the armed forces' needs grow, and until such time as there
are no longer any supplies to go to the factories, I think we have got to
begin to make our determinations more favorable to the armed forces.
Due to the fact that the total force is perhaps 60 or 62 or 65 million,
it makes some difference as to whether you take your 15- or 16-year-
olds as the productive lower limit and whether you go to 65 or whether
you go to 70. No matter where you go you will find yourself with a
definite number of people, and out of that you will have 20 or 25 million
women that obviously caimot be used except to a small degree in the
armed forces. Then, when you take out your old men, your cripples,
your less physically fit, you find that unfortunately you only have a
limited field from which you can take soldiers, but you .do not have
such a limited field from which you can take workers. I thmk that is
a fact that we have always got to bear in mmd.
Mr. Bender. Is it your view. General Hershey, that the occupa-
tional deferment powers of the draft S3^stem are limited in application
because you camiot control a man who is deferred for reasons of
dependency, who has been physicially rejected, or who is too young or
too old to be liable for service?
General Hershey. Let me dispose of the last part of your question
first. We obviously cannot control the men over 45 or the men under
20. Although he is registered, he is only registered for statistical and
occupational purposes and, therefore, let me wipe those out im-
mediately.
Mr. Bender. By the way, how many are deferred for occupational
reasons?
General Hershey. Approximately a million.
13072 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS
Now, let US go next to the man wlio is physically disqualified. The
only way that I can control what he does is by getting a waiver from
the War Department to take him regardless of his physical condition.
Now, let us go back to the man who is deferred for dependency.
There are ample powers now to make him do one of two things, pro-
vided he is acceptable either to the Army originally or on a waiver,
and that is he must comply with the National Selective Service Act.
If he does not, I think you can induct him, because the powers given
to the President to take men from 20 to 45 are only hedged in the
case of mmisters and certain Government and State officials. The
power of deferment otherwise is only discretionary with the President,
presumably in the national interest.
Mr. Bender. About how many men are subject now to the draft
who have not been classified or who have been deferred for other
reasons
NUMBER CLASSIFIED AND DEFERRED
General Hershey. Well, now, let me get your question.
Did you ask how many had not been classified or how many had
been deferred?
Mr. Bender. Both.
General Hershey. Well, the classification is now going to the
vanishing point. Between perhaps 5,000,000 at the last of June to,
I think, zero point on the 15th of October. Now, just where we are
in there, I would guess perhaps a million or a million and a half are
still unclassified, perhaps two million, not more than that. I believe
my instructions to finish classifications even to the 20-year-olds who
registered in June will be accomplished on the 15th of October.
Now, as to the men who have been deferred, you have got out of
this total group that we have classified approximately 18,000,000 that
will be either initially or eventually classified in the dependency classes.
You have, as I say, somewhere around a million that went into
your II-A and II-B, perhaps a little more than a million. You will
have at least 2,000,000 and perhaps 3,000,000 that will go into IV-F
by the 1st of this commg year; that is January 1, 1943. Now, that
does not mean the maximum number will go in IV-F. More will go
into IV-F as you continue to make physical examinations.
Mr. Bender. General Hershey, what is the basis for the estimated
need of an army of 13,000,000?
General Hershey. I do not beHeve that I am equipped properly to
say that we will have an Army of 13,000,000. I will tell you very
frankly I do not know what the size of the Army is, but I have seen
the actual demand during the last 5 or 6 months upped. Unfortu-
nately, I cannot reveal my responsibilities to the public until the day
that I go to take them. I realize there are many reasons why you
should not unduly agitate people, but you should not, on the other
hand, keep from them adjustments they may have to make. I do not
know, but if I would plot a curve of the last 6 months on what little
I do know it would be somewhat startling, perhaps, but, on the other
hand, I realize that somewhere we do get out to a celling. I do not
know what it is, because I am not in the councils to decide how many
people we should have. I am running a service station.
Mr. Bender. The general opinion up to the present time has been
that our goal is 9,000,000. Of course, there has been something said
recently about as high as 13,000,000.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13073
REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVY INCREASED
General Hershey. I heard mentioned the words "thirteen milhon."
I think we ought to remember this, that when we talk about an Army
of 9,000,000, even if we do not furnish them, the Navy has to come
from somewhere and it is out of this same man pool. The men that
man the ships, whether they are in the Navy, in the Maritime Com-
mission, or somewhere else, they have got to be obtained, the ships
have got to be manned. So, you always have several hundreds of
thousands, and as we grow, even millions, of men who will man the
ships. I think the President announced the other day that the Navy
already had reached 700,000, which is greater than it has ever been
before, and I do not believe anybody thinks we are at the end of
naval expansion.
Mr. Bender. In other words. General, there is no precedent for this
war, is there?
General Hershey. We have sailed beyond the place where our
charts showed. Now, we can look back at them to try to get some
plot of the future, but we have saUed beyond the last war. I will not
say the Army is larger than it was on the last day of the last war, but
we are taking in each day far, far more men, I think, than the public
normally realizes. The Selective Service System, being the agency
that operates between the public and the Army, has a tendency to be
blamed, as any go-between is, by the Army for some of the things
that the public does, and by the public for a great many tilings that
the Army does. That is natural; that is our business.
Mr. Bender. In other words. General, Russia, the way things look,
cannot lick Germany alone, and we will probably have to do it.
General Hershey. I am not a military man; I am not a war stu-
dent, and I know notliing about it.
NO PRECEDENT FOR PRESENT WAR
Mr. Bender. I am going to draw the conclusion from that that we
are working under different conditions, that there is no precedent for
this war.
General Hershey. Yes.
Mr. Bender. In other words, sitting here today we know that the
ultimate manpower will have to come from the United States to win
this war, don't we?
General Hershey. Yes. I think the thing we ought to always
keep in mind when we think of the last war is that in the last war we
fought in Europe, which we thought was quite a ways away, and now
we are fighting on every continent in the world. Not only that, in
the World War I happened to be a Field Artillery man, and there was
not a shot fired out of a 75-millimeter gun built by the United States.
Now, we have a war that is 5, 10, 15, or 20 times as mechanized as the
World War was, and we are not only furnishing the armies that we
raise but I have no idea what we will eventually have to do in furnish-
ing other armies with manpower.
Mr. Bender. For instance, in the last World War, General, we
did not fire a shot in the Pacific. We did not have the Pacific problem
at all, did we?
13074 WASHINGTON HEARINKiS
General Hershey. That is true. We had a few troops there, very
few. I do not happen to know. As I remember, there were 7,000,
but I am certainly not a historian; I think General Gray said there
were 7,000 troops'in Siberia. We had a few in north Russia, we had
a few scattered here and there, but our main force was in France.
SCHEDULING OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Bender. General, do you consider that an adequate occupa-
tional deferment policy must be based upon advance information
and a proper scheduling of manpower requirements for industry and
the Army?
General Hershey. Well, I would have to answer "Yes" to that,
because my whole experience in governmental things has been: How
well you plan is probably about 75 percent of how well you operate.
Mr. Bender. About how many men is the Army taking at the
present time, will you say?
General Hershey. If I should answer that, I think I should answer
it in executive session. Personally, I might feel very free to answer
it, in fact I would rather it would be told, because I think it helps my
task, but the Army exercises the right of censorship over numbers.
I am only allowed to publish to each community how many they want.
I will be more than happy to tell you in executive session. It is not
my censorship that restrains me now. I haven't control of that.
Mr. Bender. General, who decides at the present time what man-
power should go to the Army and what manpower should go to
industry?
General Hershey. Selective Service.
Mr. Bender. Selective Service decides that entirely?
General Hershey. That is true. The Congress gave the President
the power to defer people, but that did restrict his power to defer by
telling him how he would exercise that power. That is, he would
exercise it through the local boards. The local boards, I think, in a
very complicated field, are trying their very best to translate into
John Jones the manpower picture. That is, they are trying to put
him in a spot in this whole picture. They are doing it by what they
think is probably too much mformation, and I do not doubt it, but
the complications of modern warfare and the demands of all types of
industry probably drive us uito putting out more uiformation than
they can really assimilate, more than most of us can, I guess.
INTERRELATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE AND MANPOWER COMMISSION
Mr. Bender. To whom is the Selective Service System answerable?
To the Army or to the War Manpower Commission?
General Hershey. I thuds: we are on something that has not been
entirely figured out. I believe it is fair to say, first of all, that the
Selective Service System mider Directive 5 of the Manpower Com-
mission and under the executive order of the President is bound to
carry out the mstructions of the Manpower Commission as it has to
do with occupational deferment. I think that is a fair statement
that everybody will agree on. I thmk cooperation is the answer. We
have not yet had a clash. If it ever should come, if there ever came a
time when you could not carry out those directives and at the same
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13075
time provide the armed forces with the men that they call for, I do
not know what the answer is.
Mr. Bender. You think if the clash would come maybe it would
clear the atmosphere?
General Hershey. I am not, of course, a born optimist. I thmk
we are here trying to run a very complicated war. We have got a
great many agencies, and I think one clash is a natural thing. I would
not be so hopeful as to believe that everything from there on would
go without a clash. I meet around the table with quite a few of these
people at least once a week or oftener. I do not think it is good for
democracy for everybody to believe exactly the same, I really do not.
Mr. Bender. I agree with you, General.
General Hershey. We both come from the Middle West.
Mr. Bender. General, here is a question I wrote down because it
is a long one, and I am going to read it very carefully, because it deals
with something that has come to my attention many, many times.
Under the circumstances, I would like to give it to you very carefully
so we might have some answer to it.
Let us take the case of a local draft board. Let us say that they
have a quota upon the Selective Service System m order to
fill the needs of the Army. On the one hand they have a list of occupa-
tions which should be deferred, which you have received and trans-
mitted to them from the War Manpower Commission. If they fill
the quota, they are miable to make occupational deferments in line
with their instruction from the War Manpower Commission and the
Selective Service. On the other hand, if they defer workers for occupa-
tional reasons, they are miable to fill the quota. Who is to decide
the distribution of manpower between the Army and industry in
this case?
HOW QUOTAS ARE BUILT UP
General Hershey. Well, I think in this case at the present time
it can be done. Let me go into a little expression of what we are
attempting to do. I do not want to wear you out with some of our
troubles, but going back to the World War, we started with attempt-
ing to build our quotas on the basis of population, because that was
the only thing we had. Very soon there were a lot of reasons why
that would not work out — the presence of aliens, the presence of
the lack of men in the population or too many men in the population,
as you had in the West. Then, they went to registrations, which
was a little nearer actually what they had, but they soon found some
area had a lot of people in mdustfy, had a lot of farmers, had a lot
of something else, so they went to 1-A, that is, the men who were
classified and found not in either the dependency class or on a farm
or in industry. Now, the war quit about that time. That seemed a
happy solution, because they did not run long enough on this system
to find out that it had some shortcomings. We started back 2 years
ago somewhere near where the war left off in 1918. So we started
to try to fill our quota on the basis of 1-A. Obviously, when we
registered 16,000,000 in October 2 years ago and we had to fill a call
in November, we could not fill it on the basis of completed classifica-
tions, because they had not been completed. So, we had to make
an estimate, and we took the first 20 percent that would be 1-A. Very
soon, though, we began to get indications as to how many people
13076 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS
would be classified 1-A in each State in turn, so we began to project
our figures as to the number that would be 1-A. Now, however,
into that picture came two or three more age groups. Now, it does
not necessarily follow that the 21- to 36-year-olds were 50 to 75 percent,
or were a certain percentage that went in 1-A, or that will fill in tha<-
1-A group of those between 20 and 21, or those between 36 and 45.
Not only that, but we have several other classes. We have got
children writing checks on their father's bankroll and not any of
them are keeping stubs except one. Our problem was attempting
to set a quota. Now, in working ©n the Deceniber quotas, I am trying
to set them up on the basis of information which was available to me
about the 15th of July and which on the 1st of August seemed
complete, but are incomplete in that certain of the armed forr^'^
that have enlisted men have not yet given us the grades for them.
DIFFICULTIES IN FORECASTING
Now, I can think of one State where in the month of July there
were 400 more men enlisted than were inducted and many of those
grades are like some of the checks that the man forgets to cash for
6 or 8 weeks. When I am trying to forecast right now the number
of 1-A men there will be in Cleveland in December, on the basis of
incomplete information from the middle of July, not knowing exactly
how many people will enlist in all the different activities or how much
of a shift there will be in occupational needs between now and Decem-
ber, it just cannot be done, or it is an extremely difficult thing to do.
Now, those are some of the difficulties that we find ourselves in..
What we are trying to do is forecast how many people will be in 1-A,
in the State of Ohio, or any other State, on the 1st of Deceniber, not
knowing exactly how many will enlist m the several services, not
knowing what the changes in industries will be, whether they are
gomg to put men m 2-A or 2-B or take them out— not knowing even
now all of the numbers of people who enlisted in August.
Now, those are the things under which we allot the quotas.
Mr. Bender. In States?
General Hershey. The States in turn allot them in the local
boards. When the local board sends in and says: "I have no more
1-A men," necessarily what they have got to do is take them out of
other boards. For instance, we have told the local boards, in attempt-
ing to carry out what we believe, from the report, to be the intent of
Congress, not to take married men that have children. We have
mstructed the local boards to not take them and to notify us when
they run out of the 1-A men.
DIVERSITY IN APPLICATION OF ACT
Mr. Bender. In that connection, there is a wide diversity in the
application of the act?
General Hershey. Yes.
Mr. Bender. For example, in Illinois, generally throughout the
State they have deferred all married men, whUe in Ohio they were
taking them.
General Hershey. Let me call your attention to one of the reasons
for it. Now, I am not attemptuig to defend the fact that we lack_
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13077
uniformity. In this room are men who are all the way from 4 feet
8 up to 6 feet 2, probably. There is a difference in the divorce laws,
in the school laws. There is not anything in the United States that
is uniform. That is no excuse ; it is just one of the reasons why human
beings are different and why human beings in Ohio may be a little
tougher, as we call it, than in Illinois.
Let me give you one other reason why that is so: Section 15 (c)
of the old act prescribed that no person should make a claim for
dependency except on an economic basis. That meant that the m.an
who had a rich wife, the man who had lots of money of his own, not
earned — well, he might have earned it at some time buu I mean he
was not earning it at that time — or a working wife, all three of those
groups, if the board lived up to the law strictly, or with any degree
of strictness, the board would take them. Now, human beings being
what they are — and remember these 25,000 people work for nothing
and board themselves, and I do not mmd saying if everybody else in
the United States, any other citizen, had done as much to win this
war as not only the average but the below average local board men,
the war would be over. I have made the statement several times, and
I repeat it. Those fellows really take the gaff. But that is beside
the question.
Some of the fellows said, "We don't c^re to break up the family,
we don't care what the Congress said." The only thing I could do
was appeal it. When I go to appeal it to the initial agency, the mem-
ber of the board, probably a lawyer in the town, says: "What is the
use of taking the man away from his family when there are other young
men here?"
Now, however, out in Ohio, in some areas, some of the local boards
said: "That is the law and we are going to live up to the letter of the
law. Why should not they go?" "His family won't suffer." Some
even said: "His family is better off with him gone,"
I will tell you very "frankly one of the difficult things we get into is
that there are a lot of men, especially since the allotment law has been
passed, that the boards look at and say, "If that man's wife can get
$80 or $100, why keep him here?" I have got some States that have
had a great deal of difficulty with that very thing. No matter what
you order them to do, they say: "Why take a man off the farm, even
if he is not entu-elv necessary, when you can take a fellow who is
over here doing nothing and his wife can get $80 or $100?"
Now, the repeal of that law in July marked a turning point, be-
cause then instead of putting the emphasis on the economic factors,
your emphasis was on the family relationship, and we had to reeducate
25,000 local boards to the fact that the law does not compel you to
do this any more. We were caught on the 1st day of July with a call
that was 50 percent greater than in June, with 40 days being the
required distance that registrants had to travel. In the time he
received his notice, or sending out the questionnaire, his notice of the
right to appeal, his notice of selection, even if he did not take any
appeal — there is a 40-day lag between the time we start him through
this chute and the time we get him out at the other end. When we
got the call in July, with all our available system, having the married
mixed into it, we had to do one of two things: If we sent out the order
as Illinois did, and said, "Don't take any married men," they would
find themselves unable to meet the call. If you send out the order.
13078 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
''Take no married men," then you will find yourself short, and I do
not think that Congress has yet indicated that we were to short the
request of the Army,
Mr. Bender. In connection with this matter of occupational
deferment, the draft board had one set of instructions, the Selective
Service had another set of instructions that was different from the
War Manpower Commission. Now, who is to decide?
UNFORTUNATE PUBLICITY
General Hershey. I do not want to say that it is not so, but I
cannot admit the fact that the War Manpower Commission has
sent any instructions to the local board. If there were any 1 would
be glad to have it called to my attention. 1 do not think they have.
1 will grant that at the outset of the Manpower Commission in April,
there was very much misunderstood publicity on what the Man-
power Commission was going to do. I think the Manpower Com-
mission approached the whole problem correctly, but 1 do not think
the publicity which they received — which more or less said they were
going to blanket out whole groups of people — was very fortunate. I
think it was unfortunate, and I do not think it was justified by
anything that was said by the Manpower Commission.
The next thing that happened, I think there was quite a little said
that the Manpower Commission was coming into the field to take
care of the employers. 1 think that was an inference that was not
justified. 1 think the Manpower Commission had to find itself; it
had to go through many of the things that we have gone through for
2 years. 1 think the Manpower Commission is operating very true
to form. I think they are getting a full realization of many of the
factors involved.
1 also would like to call your attention to the fact that the situation
now and in April is vastly different. In April 1 was working under
the assumption that we would produce 3,600,000 by Christmas.
General Marshall, at West Point, when the graduation took place
about the 1st of June, said 4,500,000. I do not think there has been
any announcement since, but that is no longer the figure.
Now, you can see the situation that the Manpower Commission,
and all of us, faced in April. It was quite different than it is now.
I think we all realize, and I plead guilty for doing my full share for a
year and a half of putting emphasis on the fact that we must leave
behind everybody we possibly can. In the first place, you remember
industry was getting set. A lot of the industry is now up to their
plateau, and they have been up there for quite a while.
I would be the last person that would be critical of industry.
They have had their troubles, but in April I knew of several factories
that turned aside from their replacement policy because they thought
they were getting a breather. That is one of the things that the
publicity in regard to the Manpower Commission was unfortunate in.
Mr. Bender. Has any effort been made to correct the im.pression
that the draft boards have done that, and that the country generally
has, in that connection?
national defense migration 13079
industry's part in occupational deferment
General Hershey. I think for the last 2 or 3 weeks, if the things
that have been said to me as to what some of the newspapers have
said are correct, about some of the things I said, they either misinter-
preted what I was saying, or they are trying to create that impression.
I think industry is coming along. I have here a company, and while
I am not at liberty to disclose the details, this company has, during
the last 4 or 5 months, made a very careful study of their manpower,
and they have reduced it into patterns in order to decide whom they
will go out for, and they succeeded in 80 or 90 percent of the appeals
to the local appeal board since they actually were able to go and tell
what each man was doing. 1 have looked at several thousand appeals
•of one kind or another, quite a few of them occupational, and I have
been impressed with the fact that I got a two-page letter from an em-
ployer on how important the particular industry was, and sometimes
less than a paragi^aph saying what John Smith had to do with it. After
all, we have got to know whether John Smith is the fellow that is run-
ning the factory or whether he is a 22-year old boy that drifted in
there 18 months ago and is doing a machine operation that a week's
training will replace.
It is going to take time. I think industry is coming along, but I
think they have to be shocked, and I think you have got to take
somebody away from them, or they will never believe you are going to.
OCCUPATION AS A BASIC CONDITION OF DEFERMENT
Mr. Bender. General Hershey, Selective Service is now drawing
very heavily upon our manpower reserves and it may be expected that
if we are to have an army of ten to thirteen million men, that even
more drastic withdrawals will be made. It will .become necessary at
the same time to greatly increase our industrial manpower to service
this large Army. Yet we have only a limited amount of manpower,
particularly skilled manpower. Will it not become essential to make
occupation the basic condition of deferment rather than physical or
dependency conditions and dependency status?
General Hershey. That is a rather long question. Let me say
"Yes" very heartily to one part of it, that is I think we are very rapidly
going to the place where what a man can do for his country occupa-
tionally — and that means either go into the armed forces or into indus-
try— must transcend other things. No other country has had the
hardihood to attempt to handle the dependency question. We did.
Many people like to point to what England has accomplished, but
they never taclded dependencies. They gave them separation allow-
ances, and once in awhile they might leave a man behind, or increase
his amount, by and large, they only made a determination as to
whether he went into the armed forces or did not. Wliether he did not
depended on whether they needed him occupationally.
I do not want to say our system does not have some disadvantages,
even aside from breaking the family. I yield to no one in a desire to
give the maximum protection to the American home, but I do not
yield, on the other hand, to any one in a little long-range thinking.
The American home may have to be defended at some distance from
its location.
6039G— 42— pt. 34 3
13080 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS
The Chairman. General, may I interrupt you there?
England, as I understand, for the first 2 years, as you say, took
them ii-respective of dependencies; then, they had to recall hundreds
of thousands and put them back into industry. Did dependency
have anything to do with the question of whom they recalled?
RECALL OF CLASSES IN ENGLAND CONTRASTED WITH OUR SYSTEM
General Hershey. You see, England did not have to recall them
very far after Dunkirk. I think the last time I came before this
committee I said that our problem, if we ever have to recall people is
vastly different than England's. England had them within a reason-
able distance. If we get our people and our forces into the distribu-
tion that we are getting them now, recalling them will not be practical,
make no mistake about that. Therefore, it is most important that we
do use our very best judgment.
Mr. Bender. In connection with Dunkirk, some statements have
been made that as many as a half million men, skilled machinists in
industry, were recalled after Dunkirk in England, and other state-
ments were that the number was somewhere in the neighborhood of
50,000.
General Hershey. I do not happen to know. I should not be sur-
prised at the rather large numbers, because, after all, Germany and
England are m the situation where they can recall them for certain
seasons of the year, where they could locate the people on the farm or
in industry, where they are father near. You must remember at
Dunkirk they did lose great volumes of material and the coasts of
Britain were unprotected.
Mr. Bender. If we have 50,000, say, skilled workers in Australia,
or 25,000 in Egypt, it is no simple thing to recall them back home and
put them in industry.
General Hershey. You would simply be using the transportation.
Not only that, but of course if you fight in that far-flung field you have
got to have maintenance bases out there, where you have to have a
hioh percentage of skilled workers.
I would like to sav this, that our dependency arrangement has given
a great deal of incidental protection to industry. When you look at
the percentages we have deferred for occupational reasons at the
present time ard look at what England has, you are just lookirg at
two different things. Our World Wry experience shows us that for
every man that was deferred occupationaliy at least 10 men were
deferred for dependency, who could have been deferred for occupa-
tional reasons had they had to ask for it. So we have had a little bit
of an easier time by having a blanket on deferment. As we go into
the deferred classcsfor dependency we are going to have to work harder
to reclassify these men in 2-A or 2-B, if they have to go in them,
before we put them into 1-A. That is one of our very serious profclenis.
Another thir<r I would like to caU your attention to, the fact is,
I believe, we have done much better than England in breakirg down
our skills. I think we have been able to break them down, and I do
not mean to say that there are not kev men. Gentlemen, I believe we
have come to a place row where both in the Army and in the Navy
and in industry, your biggest demand is for somebody that you can
make into what you want him to be.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13081
Now, in tliis study here, we cannot take them out too fast, but if
the withdrawals from industry, even of the semiskilled, are reasonable,
well and good. As long as the supply of women, overaged men and
less physically fit remain available, they can be trained and must be
trained.
Mr. Bender. There is need, however, in your opinion, for a
uniform policy regarding this matter, isn't there?
General Hershey. I would not want to quibble over what you
mean by "uniform," but in the first place England has decentralized
about as much as we have. England hns quite an inspection system,
but, as I understand it, one of the most difficult things in the world is
to find inspectors that can really decide on the question of what a
factory can spare and what it cannot.
When you get down to it, I think we are going to have close coop-
eration. I think W. P. B., for instance, is going to have to say,
"Here is a drop-forging factory that has got to go," but just as soon
as there are 100,000 factories that have to go, then you cannot give
them must protection, because you cannot protect everything.
DISADVANTAGES IN SETTING UP TECHNICAL COMMITTEES
Air. Bender. General, at the present time we are told that local
boards having layman's knowledge of the needs of industry cannot
give proper weight to occupational status in deferment policy. What
do you think of the suggestion that technical boards be established to
decide or to review cases of occupational deferments?
General Hershey. Well, I would like to challenge that statement.
I will grant that the local board is a lay board, but I would like to
point out that operating even these factories from the management's
standpoint and trying to decide whether you can take out 2 or 10
percent is somewhat of a strategical question and it hasn't that
technique. I think these local boards have not only found that per-
haps they did not know every single process in the factory, but our
experience has been that management has not known very much about
who does what in their own factories. T do not think it is a technical
situation. I think you have got first of all to depend upon manage-
ment, and I am very much interested in the management labor
committee and how it develops. Until it has had a little more time
to develop, it is a question whether it can pass. If it can take the
responsibility for production in the factories, I think it can take som.e
responsibility in deciding what persons they can spare, and what
percentage of people they can spare. We are flexible enough, if that
advice can be given, to act on it. I have no fear of that. The thing
I have had fear about is the factory which wants to keep every man
when 60 percent of them are immediately replaceable — and an addi-
tional 15 or 20 percent if you give them 6, 9, or 12 months.
The technical committee, I have no particular quarrel with; I
think we have got to be very careful, though, that we do not get such
a succession of committees that we do not get anything done.
Mr. Bender. Your impression is that too many cooks spoil the
broth.
General Hershey. Unfortunately, I have seen some projects that
have been going along, during which time I have had to mobilize
over a million men. I just wonder what would happen if I had waited
13082 WASHINGTON HEARINlGS
until everybody had gone over the matter and was thoroughly satisfied.
I have been nothing but a battery commander most of my life, but
I generally left to the corporal as to how to run his squad. Even
though he makes a mistake once in awhile and shoots the wrong man,
he is better off than if he waits until he tells me and I tell him to fire,
because by that time he is captured and so am 1.
POSITION ON VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT
Mr. Bender. We know that you have gone on record several
times against the voluntary system of recruitment for the armed
services. Recent newspaper accounts have stated that the Army
and Navy will not accept voluntary recruits unless they have been
granted a release from their local boards or from employers. Do you
consider that the problems of voluntary enlistment will be solved by
these arrangements?
General Hershey. I would like to make one correction and then
say "No." The correction I want to make is that the Navy has only
obligated itself not to take 2-A, 2-B and 3-B, and then I still answer
"No." My answer is, until you close the avenues and put one valve
on the intake the valve will be buried and there will be leakages
there, but they will not be near as much as when you have a half a
dozen spigots running and you just cannot get around to watch them
all.
Mr. Bender. President Roosevelt observed in a recent press con-
ference that 18- and 19-year-old youths will probably not be drafted
for service this year. Do you care to express an opinion regarding
the necessity and desirability of recruiting youth of these ages?
General Hershey. Now, wait a minute. I would have to say
that recruiting anyone is not in accordance with the philosophy
that I was taught in becoming whatever I am on the question of
manpower. I am over 100 miles from home so I guess I am an expert,
but I do not believe that you should have recruiting anywhere. I
simply beheve that, because, first of all, in times like these, I do not
think the individual should be obligated to decide when he does
what he must do for his country. I think he is entitled to have that
decided for him.
Another thing is you cannot run a recruitmg system for any group
without affecting other people. Smiday night, for some reason or
other, I had a chance to turn on the radio and tuned in a program
that I listen to at times, and I found myself being told who needed
men for the armed forces. If I had not had some other ideas, perhaps
I would have been led to believe that there were certam things that
people needed that had opportunities to get them m other places.
I think any recruiting is unfortunate, but that is a personal opinion.
I have expressed it so many times and it has not accomplished any-
thing, so I have no particular hopes in it. Now, you asked me the
question, and that is my personal opmion.
Mr. Bender. You are trying to be nonpartisan between the Army
and the Navy, is not that it?
General Hershey. I have associated with the Navy for a long
time. Because I merely happen to belong to the Anny does not
mean I lean that way. I would probably criticize them as quickly
as the other branch of the service. I do think it is unfortunate that
we have not had a common method of increasing both of them.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13083
ESTIMATES OF AVAILABLE 18- AND 19-YEAR-OLDS
Mr. Bender. How many 18- and- 19-year-olds are there?
General Hershey. You mean left?
Mr. Bender. Yes.
General Hershey. Well, at the time we registered them, we had
about 2y4 million, but remember that this supply is bemg drawn upon
in quite a number of ways. That is, there are several kmds of
Reserves. There are enlistments in the different forces. I would
not attempt to estimate just how much that has been depleted in the
last 3 months, but I think it is quite a little. I think you should
remember this, that those who are m it will represent the residue
from which able-bodied people have been selected.
Air. Bender. How many would you estimate have already volun-
teered for service?
General Hershey, You mean, smce June?
Mr. Bender. Yes.
General Hershey. Probably not more than a quarter of a million.
That guess is very vague. I do not know. In the fij^st place, I do
not have access to recruitment, nor do I have figures for the several
Reserves that are in existence. I think my opinion would be quite
worthless on that.
Mr. Bender. On the basis of your experienpe, what would you say
as to how many of the remainder will pass the physical examination?
General Hershey. Of course, this group ought to rmi very high.
We hope that 'at least 80 percent of them would, but I do want to
point out to you that of the ones that are left, many of them have
already been rejected. In other words, the ones that have gone
probably represent the 80 percent, and we stiU have the 20 percent
rejected out of another perhaps half a million that have already gone.
So that is going to make quite a rejection rate in the residue, greater
than it ought to be.
Mr. Bender. How many do you think the draft would get?
General Hershey. While I am guessing somewhere around a million,
someone else would guess 500,000. Your guess I think is as good
as mine.
Mr. Bender. Do you think the estimate that has been made in
some quarters that there are 2,000,000 that could be drawn from this
group is way out of line?
General Hershey. I think that is 'way out of line. I thmk if I
could get somewhere around a million and a half it would be doing
very well . The more we need manpower the lower become the physi-
cal standards. That is another thmg that makes it very hard for the
manpower estimator, because he is figuring, first of all, on something
that is fluid. Even the yardstick sometimes has 36 inches one day,
the next day 28 inches, the next day 24 mches, and it keeps one on his
toes in making the measurements.
Mr. Bender. The claim has been made that the average age for
Marme enlistments is 19^ years; is that correct?
General Hershey. I do not know. I happen to have several
Marines on my staff. They have been with me so long that I do not
thmk that I can get any more information out of the Marme Corps
than I have already received. I was always curious when I asked
them whether they meant during the last year or the last 20 years.
13084 WASHINGTON HEARIXiGS
You see, statistics are a very peculiar thing, and you expand your
base on what you want to prove, that is, if it is favorable, and if it
is not, you elimmate it and try another base. So I don't. know.
Mr. Bender. Voluntary enlistments, in your opinion, tap mainly
youths below the age of 20?
General Hershey. No ; I would guess it is at least half. I do know
something about the number of men I lose between the day they get
their notice of niduction and the day they are supposed to be inducted,
and that somewhere around half of the recruiting in the months came
out of that group. I would have to presume quite a few were above
20, because I do not select for induction anybody under 20.
Mr. Bender. I have had more letters, and I assume that is the
experience of most of the Members of the House and Senate, regarding
this drafting of fathers in 1943. How are you going to do that?
POLICY ON drafting MEN WITH DEPENDENTS
General Hershey. Well, unless Congress has other intentions, I
think that we will, first of all, take those with secondary dependents,
those that are not fathers, those that are the fellows that have mothers,
fathers, grandmothers, grandfathers, grandchildren, brothers, and
sisters. You cannot take all the people, because there will be some
hardship cases that will just have to stay back, and the local board
will not take genuine cases where, even with the allotment money, it
will not take care of the case.
The next group are those who have wives only, and again you can-
not take the whole group, because the local boards simply will not
take somebody's husband because they believe even with the amount
of money involved that the case is unusual enough to warrant an
exception. I realize those exceptions will not be uniform, but they
would not be uniform if we made them from punchcards in Wash-
ington, and they would not be as prompt there, but that is another
story.
The next group, we pass into people who are presumably with one
child, and on up. Of course, the people that are rejected physically,
if they are married, remain behind the same as any other 4-F.
The men that we have got to have in industry, necessarily we have
got to reclassify each of these fellows, to be sure, to 2-A and 2-B. If
they are necessary men in Critical industries, we are going to have to
review them and we will have to revise them. Even though someone
says, "What is that 22-year-old boy doing up there?", he has been
able to convince somebody that they have been unable to get along
without him for 3, 6, or 9 months. Some of these studies we have made
of the men in the two classes, on the question of age or critical skills,
have exploded the theory a bit because of the fact that two of our
largest industries have mushroomed from 1939. They happen to be
the airplane and shipbuilding industries, and they had started out at
a time when there was a great supply of youngsters available for em-
ployment. Many of the youngsters came in. Perhaps they were
not too important, but they tried to make a case for them. Some of
them have actually, with the growth of the plant, come into positions
of some skin and some responsibihty, and it is going to take quite
some time to replace many of those. They are always a bad public-
relations problem, because the wife who is losing her husband is
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13085
saying, "Why is that young fellow over there not inducted?" If that
young fellow is the only man that can make a drop forging, or some-
thing of that kind, in the national need, as I think you brought out
a while ago, the occupational need may be there to keep him.
Mr. Bender. General Hershey, serious labor shortages in some
industries are the result of the out-migration of workers who seek
better-paying jobs in other industries. Notable examples, of course,
where labor shortages have arisen, are nonferrous metals, lumber and
agriculture. To what extent is deferment of workers in these occupa-
tions based upon their remaining in these occupations?
OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENT IN CRITICAL AREAS
General Hershey. In theory, we have always said an occupational
deferment is a coat that you wear while working at that job. When
you leave that job you should leave your coat. In other words, you
ought to be reclassified. You can see that during the time when we
have plenty of men it is very possible for a man to be working on a
farm in Iowa, get a 2-A deferment, and when next the board hears
from him he is out on the west coast, and they send a 2-A for approval
and they state that he is the most important man in the airplane
factory. He has been there only 3 months, but that is the way the
board feels. All right, he is keeping up the war effort, and they do
not change his deferment. This order which the Manpower Commis-
sion got out a few days ago on copper is some indication of the fact
that we have got to begin to manage our manpower on the basis of
critical areas. I think we have got to face the prospect of the War
Production Board saying: ''Here are factories that have just got to
run." I can visualize the Secretary of Agriculture setting up certain
areas where certain things are being produced and saying: ''That has
got to go on." When that happens, the Selective Service's job is to
give its full support to see that just exactly that happens. Then if a
man has a 2-A deferment, he has to remain in that area and work. I
do not thinlv it is any more than he can expect. He will lose his 2-A
when he leaves the occupation for v/hich he has been given the 2-A.
To that extent I think the occupational deferment tends to restrain
him.
I do not think we have done as much of that in the past as we will
have to do in the future, due to the fact that we felt we had quite
an abundance of labor. We have a philosophy of abundance and a
philosophy of plenty. That is what is hurting us now, because we
are going from that philosophy to one of scarcity, and it hurts us,
because the employers do not like to change. Men do not like to
leave their families. You cannot blame them, but you cannot
mobilize the whole Nation without dislocating both.
Mr. Bender. Do you think that a review of wages and working
conditions by a Government agency is necessary before such a con-
dition upon deferment is imposed?
General Hershey. That is a pretty big question and gets me into
something I do not know anything about. I came from a farm and
merely because we lived economically does not make me an economist.
13086 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
SOLDIER SUFFERS FROM THREE DIFFERENTIALS
I do know we have got in the Arm.y three differentials that are set
up against the soldiers. First of all, this differential of pay. It is
much better than it used to be, but just the same he does not think
he is getting as much money as he can get if he works at som.ething
else.
The next differential is comfort. He does not think he has as
good a bed to sleep in, he does not have a chance to eat as well.
The third thing, of course, is danger. Those three dift'erentials are
always against the soldier and tend to make the fellow who has
been in the Army any time feel that anything that tends to pay higher
wages and to afford much more comfort broadens the breach between
the soldier and the fellow who stays behind, and tends to make the
soldier a little less contented.
Coming back to the farmer again: When I see the people leaving
my neighborhood to go to Toledo, Indianapolis, and even Cleveland^
Detroit, and Chicago, I think something ought to be done so they
will not go off and leave the farm. Just how that is to be done, I
do not know. Wlien you get into the question of control of wages
and living conditions, you are getting into something on which it is
quite presumptuous for me to offer an opinion. I am just telling you
what I feel as a person who has been some time in the Army and a
quarter of a century on the farm.
DEFERMENT OF WORKERS IN LUMBER AND NONFERROUS-METALS
INDUSTRIES
Mr. Bender. You referred to the order of the War Manpower
Commission as issued recently in connection with the lumber and
nonferrous metals industries, where essential workers in these indus-
tries are granted deferments. Will you briefly describe what action
the Selective Service has taken to implement this order?
General Hershey. We sent a telegram to 12 States. What we
had to do was to call their attention to the fact that the men
The Chairman (interposing). Wliat 12 States do you mean?
General Hershey. Well, in general, about everything west of the
Mississippi River. I do not know that I could name them, but they
are the three coast States, most of the Rocky Mountain States, and
I think it includes New Mexico and Texas.
The Chairman. They are the nonferrous-metal States?
General Hershey. Yes, sir, the nonferrous-metal States.
We called the attention of the State directors to the fact that when
a man left the job for which he was deferred — perhaps the best way
is to read the telegram. It states:
On September 7, 1942, the War Manpower Commission took action to increase
the urgently needed war production of copper, critical nonferrous metals and lum-
ber in the twelve States of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming,
California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, New Mexico, and Texas. It called
for uninterrupted production and maintenance operations in all nonferrous metal
mining, milling, smelting, and refining and all logging and lumbering activities
carried on within those States.
So that the Selective Service System will give its full cooperation to the achieve-
ment of this objective, local boards are directed to reclassify out of class 2-A or
NATIONAL DEFENSE "migration 13087
class 2-B into a class immediately available for service or out of class 3-B into
class 3-A —
which moves them from the occupational into the straight de-
pendency—
subject to the usual rights of appeal, any registrant who leaves a production or
maintenance occupation in any of these activities without presenting satisfactory
evidence to his local board that his separation did not adversely affect the war
effort.
State directors in the 12 States listed above should give the widest possible
publicity to the provisions of section 626.1 of the regulations —
that is the regulation which all along has said that whenever you
leave the occupation you notify your local board. Those regulations
have been in effect for 2 years. (Contmuing):
section 626.1 of the regulations requiring that local boards be notified whenever
a registrant changes his occupational status.
Mr. Bender. When was that issued?
General Hershey. September 10, 1942, 3 days after the War
Manpower Commission issued the order. It was either on the 9th
or 10th.
Mr. Bender. Would you describe the order governing the non-
ferrous metals and lumber industries as a volmitary national service
act for the copper and lumber industries?
General Hershey. I am afraid whatever I would say on that would
not be worth very much. It is not entirely voluntary. It certainly
is very lightly compulsory. Whether it is national service under any
circumstances, I would not know. I thmk it is an effort to control
manpow^er, that is, it is a law to control the manpower — no question
about that.
views on question of national service act
Mr. Bender. Here is an miportant question, General. It is com-
mon knowledge that active consideration is bemg given by many
Federal agencies for formulation of a national service act. As we
understand it, there is a difference of opinion whether these controls
should operate through the Employment Service or tlu^ough the
Selective Service Admmistration. What is your view on this matter?
General Hershey. Well, I think if I answered very honestly I
would have to say that they haven't crystalized. I liave heard a
great deal about this discussion. I have been on a great many of the
discussions. I have never yet, either as Director of Selective Service
System or as an individual, come to the conclusion that national
service was indicated. Now, I mean as of right now. If you say:
Should we have it in January? I do not know — or any other time.
But I have never been convinced that a national service was mdicated.
Now, when it comes to how it is going to be operated, you have
gotten into the very reason that T have had difficulty in seeing it as a
national service, because I have not been able to visualize how you are
going to operate it. If you have it merely as sort of a threat that
you are only going to use when you have to, then I can say you need
very little machinery for it. On the other hand, if you get down and
actually manage 62,000,000 people, or some fraction of them, that is
going to mean a lot of machinery, and I have had a great deal of diffi-
culty in seeing it. Selective Service has felt that trying to mobilize the
13088 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
people that they have mobihzed and not mobilize the people they
could not mobilize has kept us fairly well engaged. We, of course, are
a govermnental agency, and whatever we are asked to do we will do,
but I do not believe that I have clearly enough in mind what a national
service law will be to express very much of an opinion on how you are
going to operate it. It depends a great deal on what kind of national
service law you are going to talk about, whether it is something that
tries to tell each human being what he does, or whether it is going to
be one that will straighten out those who refuse to do even what
public opinion feels they should do.
Mr. Bender. Of course, you have heard a great deal of discussion,
or have read in the newspapers or elsewhere, that there has been
considerable talk regarding such a move.
General Hershey. Yes.
Mr. Bender. Of course, we are vitally concerned about this whole
question, and because of your experience in the administration of this
matter, the committee is anxious to know just what your views are,
and of course you have expressed them.
General, is the mobihzation of manpower in England primarily
the function of the Selective Service or of their Employment Service
Administration?
General Hershey. They have one agency over there under the
^Ministry of Labor and Service that handles the mobilization of both
men for the services and -women for the services. They still have
some volunteers, but as fast as they are puttmg in the services, it is
handled by a single agency.
Mr. Bender. To whom in this country do you consider the func-
tions of the head of the Ministry of Labor to be comparable?
General Hershey. In this country?
Mr. Bender. Yes.
General Hershey. I do not believe we have quite gotten to the
place where there is any one person that is comparable, because at
the present time you still have several agencies that have the right
to draw without restriction on the labor supply. I am not talkmg
about the labor supply meaning the man that works, I mean the human
being that can do somethmg in this war, vhether he goes in the Army
or whether he goes to work.
Mr. Bender. This question is one that will hit us between the
eyes one of these days. Of course, these questions are not being
asked of you facetiously.
Let us assume for a moment that the Employment Service is em-
powered to carry out rigorous control measures over both employers
and employees. In the event that such controls were exercised hj
the Employment Service, how would the functions of the Selective
Service tie in with those of the Employm.ent Service?
General Hershey. Well, I visualize that if the Employment Service
is vested with the authority to move men any place they want to,
you would have to have some penalty, probably, for their not going.
Now, you can do that in two ways: You can make them amenable to
some court, or perhaps someone might want to use the induction as
another method. If they use the latter, then the Selective Service
would be ill a position where it would have to cooperate with the
national plan to carry it out.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13089
Mr. Bender. I have another question m that connection. As
you will recall from your previous appearance before this committee/
we are concerned with the mobilization of manpower to meet all the
demands of war. You told us that the Selective Service System had
the responsibility of registering and classifying the effective man-
power of the Nation and of allocating men eligible for military service
among the various users of manpower. How have these responsi-
bilities been affected by the establishment of the War Manpower
Commission?
ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER
General Hershey. I think at the time I was here before, we had
to try to determine the industrial needs and act on them. At the
present tune, I feel that when the Manpower Commission says
we have got to have men in a certain occupation, and prepares policies
which we put out, I feel it is the obligation of the Selective Service
System to carry out those mstructions. However, the question that
you can raise is what is going to happen if it gets to the place where
you cannot do both. My feeling, although I do not know, is that
self-preservation will take precedence and probably in a rather active
way, and I suppose we have gotten to the place where if there is only
one man left, I should say he would go to the Army. I do not want
to be misunderstood that we are going to check building the Army.
There are many people who can work in the factory, but there are
only a limited number that can work m the Army. I think back
in Boonesboro, or any other primitive place, as long as there are any
able men left they are kept on the walls firmg. Some put out the
fires that are burnmg, some do other things, but they do not call the
men away from the walls. When a man drops at the wall one of the
boys goes up, a 14- or 15-year-old boy; he picks up the gun and takes
the place of the man who has fallen. That holds true for the Army,
the mdustry, or anythmg else. You have got to come back to see
what you are doing. On the other hand, Boonesboro could not send
men to the west coast in those days. Thej^ had to put the men right
there where they coulc fight. You cannot be pulling the men back
from the line. England did, I realize that, but England did not pull
them very far, because they had them near at home.
Mr. Bender. In your previous testimony, General Hershey, you
expressed the opinion that if a national agency were set up to prop-
erly integrate and develop the allocation of manpower, both the users
and procurers of manpower should be represented in this agency.
You expressed the further, opinion that such an agency should be
civilian in composition . Do you consider that we have such an agency
in either the War Production Board or the War Manpower Commis-
sion?
General Hershey. Well, I think that we have an agency that rep-
resents the users and procurers of manpower. If you are going to
ask me if I visualize that they have accomplished all those things I
can quicldy say no. I do not know that it is humanly possible to do
so, but the fact is we have not integrated — ^we have not decided our
over-all picture the way, which at that time last spring, I perhaps
1 See pt. 27, p. 10235.
13090 WASHINGTON HEARIN1GS
hoped we would. There are many changes that have taken place,
but you have got to start with something before you can change it.
Mr. Bender. Your answer is "No" to the question: Do we have
such an agency at the present time?
General Hershey. I guess I can say no or yes, but it has not done
all the things I visualized. I don't care which way you accept the
answer. What I am trying to get at is I am not challenging the
statement that we have not got such an agency, but I do not think
we have gone far enough yet to accomplish all the things I visualized
last February. I think I have enough Irish in me to be a little
optimistic, and I see things a little rosy at a distance.
Mr. Bender. General, the committee has been given to under-
stand that the War Production Board is planning to set up a divi-
sion with regional offices to concern itself with manpower priorities,
specifying the types and quantities of labor needed and calling upon
the War Manpower Commission to fulfill these needs. If such a
division is actually set up, what do you consider would be the respon-
sibility of the Selective Service in regard thereto?
COORDINATION OF MANPOWER SELECTION
General Hershey. Well, of course, that comes into the question
of the relationship between manpower and the War Production
Board, and I perhaps have a little different idea than some. I think
that it is the War Production Board's responsibility to see that air-
planes— to take that as an example, which may not necessarily be
true — come before tanks, or tanks come before something else, so on,
and so forth. I tliink it is a good production business probably to
say that in the production of airplanes they need so many hundred
thousand men, and so many hundred thousand on each of the others.
Don't misunderstand me. That does not mean that they get them,
because when you add this all up the number is going to be greater
than they have got. Then, you have the adjustment proposition by
the person that controls the budget. I think the War Manpower
Commission has the budgetary control. That does not mean if the
War Production Board says they want 100 men that they will not
get them. It does not mean the advice on which the Manpower
Commission acts is not the advice of the War Production Board.
What we have got to do is when they set up a plant here — I do not
care what kind of plant it is — this plant must go on. We have,
between the War Production Board and the Manpower Commission,
our own occupational people who decide, what percentage and how
you are going to withdraw from that plant, and having decided that,
perhaps with the assistance of the labor-management group, or any-
body else that is connected with tile production there — the manage-
ment, after all, has got to be primarily responsible — then we have
got to take the coverage, and there is enough flexibility in our system,
I believe, to do it. Of course, you are going to make mistakes. In
one plant, you may be withdrawing 60 percent and in another 90
percent — it all depends on what kind of activity it is, and the War
Production Board has got to have the primary responsibility of de-
ciding whether the airplane factory is more important than the tank
factory, or between two airplane factories whether the fighter is more
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13091
important than the bomber, or vice versa. It is going to take, of
course, cooperation of each group in it.
The Selective Service's business is, once it has been decided, to
see where the manpower will go. We would go to the Manpower
Commission and say: "Do you want your men in the plant or do
you want them in the Army?" Even after a man gets in the Army
there still is a chance to call him back. If we make a mistake that
is too critical the Army can still furlough him out to go in the plant if
they want him there worse than in the Army.
Mr. Bender. General, if War Production Board controls the
material budget and War Manpower Commission controls the man-
power budget, and both are essential to production, who is going to
control the production planning?
General Hershey. Well, I suppose when you get down to the last
analysis, when cooperation between War Production Board and War
Manpower Commission is stopped, you are gomg to have to have a
decision, and the President is the one place where you can get that
decision. That is on a very broad basis. When that decision is
made, then there is not any conflict any more. I have been a staff
officer a great deal of my life. As adjutant I had to get along with
the quartermaster, and there w^as the question of who decides what,
and finally we wound up with the colonel deciding it. After that we
knew what had to be done.
RECRUITMENT OF DOCTORS
Mr. Bender. General, the committee observes that the War
Manpower Commission has undertaken an intensive campaign to
recruit doctors for the armed services. Do you know what principles
of selection are being used by the War Manpower Commission in this
regard? Wliat comment do you have as to the present manner of
recruiting doctors?
General Hershey. Well, the idea, of course, was to try to provide
the number of men that the Army and Navy had to have in doctoring.
The War Manpower Commission, through one of their agencies,
attempted to assist the Army in this particular. The Army attempted
to send out boards, generally two men, into these localities, and these
men, aided by the Local doctor committees, attempted to recruit, and
I think they have done a reasonably fair job. Selective Service has
had very little to do with it — at times a little more than Selective
Service cared to have, because it is quite easy to say, ''What we want
you to do we will tell the local board." We have a few agencies that
at times do that. The only observation I have to make is that that
has been done a little more frequently than I should like. I did
speak, however, to the American Medical Association last summer,
and I think Selective Service, so far as anyone understood our position,
realized if they did not accept these commissions when the time came
that we were called upon to furnish the doctors we would furnish
them according to the .way that Congress and the regulations laid
down; that we would choose anybody else, that is, on the basis of
general men who would not otherwise "be deferred, and on the basis of
the place that they were drawn in the national lottery.
13092 WASHINGTON HEARIMGS
DRAFTING OF 18- AND 19-YEAR-OLDS
Mr. Bender, Coming back to this matter of 18- and 19-year-old
youths, do you think the 18- and 19-year-old youths must be drafted
next year, or sooner, if Congress acts?
General Hershey. I think that in a mobilization of this size, regard-
less of which one we go to, or which of several we go to, I think we
either are going to take the 18- and 19-year-olds or we are going to
take a million or a million and a half, somewhere in there, out of
family people. That is the issue. Now, whether you take them in —
well, November would be as early as we could take them granting
we had legislation now, or whether you take them in January, or
whether you take them in February is probably not greatly material,
except the War Department probably has certain reasons why they
do want younger men. There are probably certain reasons why
industries are going to be disturbed less by taking the 18- and 19-year-
olds than by going into this older group, I do not think, on the basis
of any war we have ever had of any size, that we have had reason to
believe you could come anywhere near an all-out mobilization and
defer those groups.
Mr. Bender. Do you definitely think you have to take men with
dependents in 1943?
DRAFTING OF MEN WITH DEPENDENTS
General Hershey. I think we will have to take men with secondary
dependents m 1942.
Mr, Bender. 1942?
General Hershey. Yes; I have sort of hoped that the secondary
dependents and perhaps a moderate number of men with wives only
would be sufficient, but I cannot leave any impression that the calls
between now and January 1 are not very, very large. There'i^were
numbers that 2 years ago this summer you would have thought in
terms of a pretty big Army.
Mr. Bender. How soon do you think you will reach men with
children?
General Hershey. Well, in between being an administrator and a
prophet, I get in trouble at times, but I have thought, or perhaps
hoped, that the last quarter of next year would be the very earliest,
but I would like to hedge to the extent that I am not familiar always
with the demands, and I might have someone go up 40 or 50 percent in
demands for manpower and still have my prophecies good. I made
some prophecies when I was here the other time, and changing my
sights 60 or more percent disturbs my prophecies a good deal. If I
had to give advice to someone that had to have it, and I had to speak,
I should say the last quarter of next year, but it is subject, as they say,
to change without notice.
recruitment of doctors THROUGH RECRUITMENT AND ASSIGNMENT
SERVICE
Mr. Bender, Coming back to this matter of doctors, I had a call
about 11 o'clock last night from an Ohio doctor who said that he was
told in a rather firm letter to report down at Columbus for examina-
tion, and that some group of doctors had recommended him for a
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13093
certain branch of the service. He was the head surgeon in a hospital
and his job was essential to that hospital, and they said that if he
did not come through, why, they would put him on the noncooperative
list, whatever that is. Have the doctors been compelled, by social
pressure, to enlist rather than by any principle of selection?
General Hershey. The Selective Service lias had nothing to do
with procurement and assignment. They liave an association of
doctors and it has S3me connection with the Army and Navy and has
been effective in this recruiting. The thing you speak of is the thmg
which happens on occasion, in which Selective Service has been some-
what embarrassed at times. The assumption is if the local board is
notified they are going to draft him. That assumption is incorrect.
I will not say you might not have a local situation in which it will
happen. If 1 hear of it I shall appeal it.
I want to say wlien it comes to tlie time when we take doctors, we
will take tli^m, but when we take them it will be upon the basis of the
evidence submitted by the Procurement and Assignment Service, the
evidence submitted by the doctor himself, the evidence submitted by
anybody else, his hospital in that case, and others who are interested,
and when those things are valid and he is on the list, it will determine
whether he goes or not.
Selective Service cannot wholly give up its functions to any agency;
we are still responsible.
Mr. Bexder. Have the health needs of any communities received
any consideration b3fore the enlistment of doctors was accepted?
General Hershey. I am a little embarrassed trying to testify to
this, because I have felt I had such a casual connection with it. I
would say, "Yes, they have been considered." I think there is recruit-
ing from at least half of the States, because of the fact the quotas were
set up initially with consideration given to the number of doctors oer
thousand, not only in cities but within a region where the population
was badly scattered. The only thing, in any volunteer business is
the danger of "soft spots" recruiting. Remember you run into a doctor
who is out somewhere where distances are great, collections are diffi-
cult, and he will be attracted a great deal more by a captain's com-
mission than one in a residential district where the people in it are
well-to-do, and that sort of thing. It has been given consideration
in the setting up of the quotas initially, and sometimes, because doctors
were willmg and did find it easier to make more money, it was easier
to recruit than in some metropolitan centers where the income was
greater.
suggested method of recruiting doctors
Mr. Bender. General, if Selective Service had complete control
over the recruitment of doctors, how would you arrange their
recruitment?
General Hershey. As far as I know, there is nothing wrong with
the allotments set up on the basis of the number of doctors per thou-
sand in the rural areas, or the number of doctors per thousand in the
city areas by the Procurement and Assignment Service, which is a
combination of the American Medical Association, the Surgeon Gen-
eral's office, and so forth. I think I would apply against that the
number of men that have already been recruited, and give them credit
for it, and I would apply the quotas to the places that have not yet
13094 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
furnished their share of doctors. We would start with the first
doctor who comes to the local board, who is on the local board list.
If he would indicate that he was a necessary man in his community,
we would give him 2-A or 2-B, If he did not, we would put him in
the Army, and follow the order numbers on down.
INSPECTION OF LABOR UTILIZATION
Mr. Bender. That is a very direct answer.
The next question. General, we have received advices that there is
considerable hoarding and overstsaffing of labor in Government plants
as well as those of private war contractors. Do you think that effec-
tive deferment pohcy must be accompanied by some system of mspec-
tion of labor utilization in those plants? If so, what agency should
perform this inspection?
General Hershey. Well, I believe we are going to have to come
to it. I would disagree probably with some of the teclmicians on how
far down you would run for inspection. Not being a technician,
probably as a defense mechanism, I would tend to try to take a
general over-all picture of a plant. First of all, what are they pro-
ducing? How many people do they necessarily need? Then go to
management and say: "Look here, you are in for 20 percent. You
make up your mind which ones you are going to spare." This is my
personal opinion, but I think the training part of the Manpower
Commission — training and inspection both for hiring and for upgrading
and maximum utilization, and all that sort of thing, can go together
better than any other. That inspection service, however, has got
to be fairly well or closely coordinated, of course, with the War
Production Board and with the Army and Navy people who have
their inspections which are on the production basis. There is no
reason in the world why it cannot be done that way. In fact, that
is one reason why the inspection service does not have to be as large
as you think, because the Army people are already in there, perhaps
for another reason, but we use them now many times in determining
where we can apply deferment, because they are interested in produc-
tion. So, I think you will have to have some sort of over-all control,
and that is the very thing that Selective Service is very much inter-
ested in, because when it is decided the plants are absolutely critical
and under no circumstances must their production be interfered with,
then we are able to do something for them. But you cannot have
300,000 plants and all of them critical.
I am a field artilleryman, and I think in terms of the limited
amount of materiel, limited amount of men, and limited amount of
shells, and therefore you have got to pick out the vital point to shoot
at. If you put one shot every mile you will not do any good; you
have got to make up your mind on what is critical and expend your
energy on that. You just cannot be everywhere simultaneously.
RELATION OF LABOR UTILIZATION TO DEFERMENT POLICY
Mr. Bender. General, the committee is much concerned with the
problem of labor utilization within the plants and the relation of such
labor utilization to an effective occupational deferment policy. How
could labor utilization inspectors be of effective help in developing an
adequate occupational deferment policy?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13095
General Hershey. Well, we have been giving quite a lot of stiidy
for several months to different phases of what we call mannmg
tables. I do not know that the name is particularly descriptive. It
is an organizational table. "\Miat it gets down to, it says, ''Here are
2 percent of people; if we lose them, we are gone. Death will take
enough of them, perhaps. Here are 7 percent that are one-year or
two-year people. Here is so forth and so on." This happens to be a
Seattle corporation, and when you can accomplish somethmg like we
have got here, then no matter whether you are taking out 10 or 40
percent, you have got the order to take out and the plant knows just
exactly what will happen to them when they lose them. It is difficult
to get cooperation in every place to that extent, but that is what the
labor inspector has got to meet. The fellow inspecting the use of
labor has got to look at it as a whole, and he has got to be pretty
careful in not getting himself too much involved.
The technician, if jou do not watch him, is getting all interested in
something else. You can go mto the plants and when you see a good
deal of standing around, a group standing around not domg anything,
you can assume either that it is a bad day or else they are over-
staft'ed, and we have felt very definitely that they are overstaffed.
Mr. Bender. Do you think Selective Service considers that
management-labor production committees could be of any assistance
in developing an adequate occupational deferment policy?
General Hershey. Definitely, I do. If we could have a com-
mittee in each factory that would approach the things realistically, I
should be perfectly willing to say: "All right; tell us, what have you
got to have here and we will give it to you"; but the difficulty is to
develop such committees into a place where they will accept a very
heavy responsibility.
DISPOSITION OF OCCUPATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRES
!Mr. Bender. General, whatever was done with the occupational
questionnaires which were circulated by the draft system?
General Hershey. There were three chmiks of those. One smaU
tabulating number is coming in from the Census. I do not know
whether I have it here or not, but we are getting out reports by
States which show the tabulation of the skills that are listed. One
copy was turned over to the Employment Service, and one copy we
still have in the local boards.
Mr. Bender. Has an over-all occupational picture been made on
the basis of the questionnaire?
General Hershey. No; there have never been enough funds
allotted to the Employment Service for them to make their tabula-
tions. The initial plan was that they were to maks the survey. We
only acted as the gathering agency. We did later insist on keeping
a copy, because we were afraid some day the time might come when,
for some reason or other, they would not be available elsewhere, and
when we would be called upon to do somethitig in an emergency. We
have them, and we have them filed with the jackets. Up to date,
we have not used them, except in determining whether or not men
should be deferred, and not the Selective Service System itself,
except in the tabulations which we made through the Census; the
Selective Service System has not attamptcd to do this sort of thing,
60396—42 — pt. 34 4
13096 WASHINGTON HEARINiGS
and the Employment Service has not had enough funds, as I under-
stand it. In fact, I went before one of the subcommittees of the
Senate with someone else, the chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission, to try to get some funds for them to use, but we did not
succeed very well.
Mr. Bender. General, in order to straighten out the record, you
say you were misquoted on the 13,000,000 Army. Do you care to
" the comnnttee what you did say?
NUMBER INVOLVED IN MOBILIZATION
say
tell
General Hershey. What I said was, as I remember it, that in any
mobilization that mvolves ten to thirteen million people — now, mind
you, either figure would include not only the Army but the Navy,
and bear in mind always, regardless of the men called, the men that
sail our merchant marine, have got to come out of this great group,
because they cannot be too old, they cannot be cripples, they must
be active, like the men you normally have for the Army and JNavy.
Mr. Bender. I hold in my hand a newspaper that commented on
your statement and just quoted something that was only part of
what you said, and they proceeded to editorialize and treat you as if
you were a Congressman in the editorial.
General Hershey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bender. I will ask you this, in closing. General — and I
appreciate your frankness in answering questions: Now, I know that
you are not a politician, you are not running for President or justice
of the peace. Is it not your opinion that those people vested with
these various powars, in line with the questions I have asked you,
should not at the same time be running for some political office while
they are administering this job?
General Hershey. Well, I happen to come from Indiana. As you
say, we are Jiot politicians out there, so I would hav3 no capacity
whatever to answer your question.
Mr. Bender. That is all.
The Chairman. General, I think you have been mighty patient,
and, speaking for myself, tremendously interesting. I have just got
one or two questions or observations to make, and then the other
members of the committee are entitled to have some questions.
To me, the tremendously interesting thing that you pointed out
was that while England made a mistake in sending their skilled work-
ers into the Army and she had to recall them, the distance she had to
recall them is not comparable with the distance we have to
recall our soldiers. In other words, if we send them to Australia or
Egypt it' is going to take months to get them back, if we ever get
them back. That is a problem that the Congress should give deep
study to, and that is why these hearings are very useful, to anticipate
any possible solution.
Along that line, let me give you some figures. You probably know
more about that than I do, although I just received this report
(reading) :
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13097
LOSS OF AIRCRAFT WORKERS TO MILITARY SERVICES
The aircraft industry in California —
this is from Lockheed —
has lost more than 15,000 emploj^ees to military services since last January 1.
Of that total, 3,593 left the factories of 5 companies during the first 28 days of
August, according to data compiled by the Aircraft War Production Council.
During the first 6 months of 1942, an average of 1,390 men left factories of the
5 companies each month to join the Army, Navy, or Marines.
An increase of 158 percent over the 6-month average was recorded by the 5 com-
panies in the first 28 days of August when they lost 3,593 men to the armed
services.
Figures of the five companies represent a rate of turn-over for military service
of 1.91 persons for every 100 employees in August. This figure was doubled
between August 24 and 26 by at least two companies, bringing the rate to 3.82
persons for each 100 employees.
If that rate of 3.82 persons leaving for military service out of every 100 em-
ployees continues for the five southern Cahfornia companies for the next 30 days,
without any further increase in the percentage, a total of more than 7,000 aircraft
industry workers will be lost to military services. It should be pointed out that
many of these are in jobs essential to war production and are irreplaceable at this
time. The figure for eight companies will be considerably higher.
However, that rate is still increasing and unless the trend is checked effectively
and immediately, the aircraft companies of southern California will be denuded
of experienced workmen in the draft-age group by the end of 1942. Many of the
men now leaving are men who must be depended upon to teach new workers on
the job. Without sufficient experienced personnel to instruct new personnel, the
entire airplane production program of California plants, which represent a large
proportion of the Nation's aircraft production, will suffer a danger setback which
may disrupt schedules —
They give the figures, and I will be glad to see that you get this,
General (continuing) :
We have noticed a substantial increase both in number of men being drafted
from our company and the number of men leaving to enlist in the armed forces
which we attribute entirely to the newspaper publicity releases relative to the
induction into mihtary service of essential and necessary employees in industry.
I am just giving you those quotations to see what problem we have
in California.
General Hershey. I will be glad to comment on it.
The Chairman. I was just wondering what it is doing to the
aircraft industry now.
General Hershey. I do not want to take the Committee's time, but
I would be glad to comment on it. I am quite familiar with the
situation out there, and I know some of the factors in it. I would
like to call the committee's attention to one or two or three companies.
The Chairman. Maybe some of the other Congressmen would
want to ask some questions.
Mr. Arnold. I would like to ask the witness to comment on it.
General Hershey. We have got a very dehcate situation out there,
because remember that at the present time out in southern California
24 percent is the highest that any company has in women. In other
words, when Britain is running with 60 to 65 percent of women in
the airplane factories, we are lagging. We have got one company
out there that has only 5 percent women. There are a lot of reasons
for that. They started at a time when there were lots of young men
available. Not only that, but we all wanted them to be hired.
Don't think I am blammg the aircraft people, not the shghtest, but
they find themselves in a rather difficult situation because they have
13098 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS
got a lot of men that are under 22 or 23. In fact, we have got 125,000
in the State of Cahfornia in 2-B out of our million.
Now, what has happened? Well, this thing that they are charging,
I suppose no one else in the country is as much to blame for it as I
am, but let me call .your attention to this: Up to a little while ago
we had thought of this war in the sense that of course we are going to
have to lose rubber, we are going to lose cars, we are going to have
gasoline rationing, but the average man who had a wife felt that he
was not going to participate in it actively, and I think the man who
was deferred in 2-B, especially the one who had two or three defer-
ments, thought he was in there for the duration of the war. Now,
it was a rather severe jolt in August when it came to their attention
that they were only there until the Army took them out, and many
of those boys, I think, said: "Well, if I am going to leave, why don't
I leave now?"
QUIT KATE IN CALIFORNIA
I would like to mention one or two other things, and one is the
quit rate in California. I think it got around to 4 percent in the last
pai't of August, for 4 or 5 days. I think some did go back to work,
but the quit rate in the airplane factories has been over 5 or 6 percent
ever since the 1st of January, and of that number, until August,
only about 1.1 percent was due to military reasons.
Another thing, out of those who quit for military reasons, most of
the time over two-thirds of them enlisted, and even in the last 5 days
of August, the band of those being inducted rose, but only about 25
percent when it ought to have gone up 60 percent, because the call
over August in the United States was about that proportion to June,
for instance, and yet during that same time, when w^e increased the
call 50 to 60 percent in the United States, the numbers that were
actually inducted out of several of those firms out there fell off, but
the enlisted rate went up two or three or four or five times, of course
due to the fact that they had to let them enlist in the first place, and
I had said that the time would come when we were going to have to
make a determination on the really necessary men.
Now, certainly we do not want these people flowing out of these
airplane factories at a heavy rate, and I believe we are going to figure
out a way with them so we can replace them. As soon as you leave
places where your men go freely, you cannot tell where they are going.
The Chairman. You are not overenthusiastic about this idea?
General Hershey. Sir?
The Chairman. You are not overenthusiastic about this idea?
General Hershey. These airplane people out there are some of
the best supporters I have ever had on this recruiting. Some of the
figures I have had on recruiting have been furnished me by one of
the largest factories. Some of the best material I have had has been
furnished by the California airplane people on their relationships.
They have kept very close track of that for a good many months.
I am not being critical. They have a terrific problem, but they
will have to let go a great many of the boys. The thing is not to
have them go so rapidly that it will interfere with production.
Mr. Curtis. General, is it not true that the longer the factory
waits to hire women and men past 45 the greater the problem gets
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13099
and the more serious it is for them and the more serious for the
Nation?
General Hershey. Yes; they realize that now. I guess they did
not realize that last spring.
THE URGE TO ENLIST
Mr. Curtis. Referring to the boys that are enlisting, I have had
occasion to talk to a number of the boys, many of them farm boys,
and they are not enlisting because they fear they are going to be
drafted. I have talked to a young chap who had several deferments,
who was with the Martin plant, and he enlisted because he had the
urge to enlist. All his buddies, old friends, chaps he went to school
with, were joining the Army, willing to make whatever sacrifices were
necessary, and he did not want that job and he did not want that pay.
General Hershey. Yes.
Mr. Curtis. Is it not true that as long as industry can get a man
deferred they will not replace him?
General Hershey. That has been the tendency. I think something
has happened here in the last month or so. It is a little bad out there
for a few days; but I think we are going to get on top of that, and I
think it has done some permanent good.
Mr. Curtis. The agricultural regions, agricultural interests, have
not gone to the extreme in demanding deferments, have they?
General Hershey. No. I think we are faced with the time when
some of the critical areas are going to have to be in agriculture, and
they are going to be very critical.
Mr. Curtis. I think it has reached a point in a number of rural
areas where they look upon occupational deferment as draft dodging.
I am not commenting on whether it is good or bad, but it exists; is not
that true, General?
General Hershey. It is. That is one of the things we must meet
all the time in occupational deferment. Remember, gentlemen, we
are fighting a twentieth century war with human beings who have
still a sixteenth century complex: "When there is a war I am going to
do what 1 can in the Army, or d© a lot of tnings," and you are still
going to have trouble. When the pressure gets too heavy a man is
not going to stay; he is going on.
Mr. Curtis. The longer the war lasts the greater the need gets.
As you pointed out a bit ago, the kids, the women, the physically im-
perfect, the men past 45, might be able to take over the factories and
farms, but they cannot take over the piloting of planes or running of
tanks; is not that true?
General Hershey. That is right.
deferment policies
Mr. Curtis. The greater the occupational deferment program we
launch upon, the greater the danger point we are going to reach if the
war lasts a long time; is not that right?
General Hershey. That is true. The whole problem is how to draw
them out slowly enough to not disturb production.
Mr. Curtis. Do you know of any industry or any line of work that
does not consider that line of work the most important one in the war?
13100 WASHINGTON HEARIN-GS
General Hershey. Well, my experience in the last 2 years would
bear out your statement, I think.
Mr. Curtis. It does not even warrant a comment. As I under-
stand it, you do distinguish on the matter of deferment between mere
dependency and the family relationships.
General Hershey. Well, at the present time, the family relation-
ship is paramount. Now, when you get down to a place where you
have aU the men who have a wife only, I presume most local boards
would take the man with the wife who w^as fully able to support her-
self before the man whose wife had to live on his allotment, but the
manpower thing is moving so rapidly that even if they did take him
earlier he might still be on the same call.
Mr. Curtis. Take two men with an equal number of dependents,
one of them is a father of children of rather tender age, would you
disthiguish between that individual and someone who is supportmg
a wife and grow^n children?
General Hershey. I am hopmg we have not got to come down to
decisions between men with children, because we have told the local
boards not to take anyone with wives and children without further
instructions. That is going to be a little hard to carry out in areas
where, as I said a while ago, there is $70 or $80 or $100 waiting for the
wife and children, where he has not given them any more than $25
any time during his life, and we do get that in some parts of the
country.
Mr. Curtis. That is what you are hopmg you will not have to
come to a decision on in the last quarter of 1943?
General Hershey. That is right. In my own experience, having
brought up part of the way four children, I have a feelmg that up to
the time they are 12 years of age is the time that they probably
could use the father, and especially in the lower income brackets, and
that is where I had my experience, rather than after they get up above
it. My experience has been that a father has to do a great many
thmgs that are just called work, maybe washmg dishes, washing
clothes, or domg something else. When the family gets to growmg I
think the family can spare the father easier. When my youngsters
began to get over 12, 1 was not active enough to keep track of the fam-
ily probably as much as I was wdien they were small. That is why
we rather oppose taking the young, the 25- to 35-year-old father with
a lot of children, rather than the fellow between 35 and 45.
transfers of classification
Mr. Curtis. Local draft boards tell me that they get orders from
some place, I do not know where they get them. They have juris-
diction over a young man because he has registered in that commu-
nity, and when he is workuig some 2,000 miles away they do not pass
on the deferment, somebody else does. Who does it?
General Hershey. That is the case of transfer of classification from
the local board. Where the boy left the farm and went out to work,
well, we will say, in the shipyard or airplane factory, they transferred
the classification to the other board and the transfer is registered m
the uiitial board. They do not let go of the record. He still would
be classified at home. What it was set up for was to try to make it
so the man would not have to travel long distances m order to make
a personal appearance before the board. You see, both his physical
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13101
examination and his induction can be carried out when he is away
from home. It is a convenience, but it is % thing that the local board
does not have to grant if they do not want to. They do, because
they feel they do not want to brmg him so far, a thousand miles, what-
ever his destination may be..
Mr. Curtis. General, I have some five questions callmg for statis-
tics. If you do not have the information but it is available, you can
furnish the data for the record. I would like to read the questions to
the reporter, and you can supply the hiformation.
General Hershey. Depending on what they are.
Mr. Curtis. I am not very anxious to get mformation that anybody
should not have.
I would like to have the number of men who were unmarried when
they became subject to the draft law, who are now between the ages
of 20 and 45 and are not now in the service.
I would like to have that broken down into States.
General Hershey. You want the number of single men that were
single when they registered; is that the point?
Mr. Curtis. I said, subject to the draft law, because there was a
certain age group that were in and then they were out and then in
again.
General Hershey. We will do our best. That is a pretty good-
sized job.
Mr. Curtis. May I say this: If any of these figures call for a
break-down that you do not have, I do not want it.
General Hershey. We will do what we can.
Mr. Curtis. Then, I would like to have the number of unmarried
men and married men without children that are deferred from the
draft by occupational deferment.
General Hershey. Well, the men that could make a dependency
case would not come up for occupational deferment. The only
fellows that you will have will be the ones who either had wealthy
wives or working wives prior to the repeal of 15 (c), and the ones
who have been reclassified during the last few weeks, the 3-B. You
see, the 3-B is an occupational classification, it is a combination of
occupational and dependency.
Mr. Curtis. You do not have that separated?
General Hershey. Yes; we have the 3-B separately, but the fellow
that is in 2-B that is married, that is a little unusual.
Mr. Curtis. I want the unmarried.
General Hershey. You can practically take the whole million in
the unmarried. With the very occasional fellow in 2-A or the 2-B
that are unmarried.
Mr. Curtis. Do you have that broken down by States?
General Hershey. Yes.
Mr. Curtis. In that break -down can you tell me how many of them
were farmers?
General Hershey. I think we can give you some, at least in several
of these States around in the breadbasket, we have probably got more
in there than we have in some of the other areas. ^
Mr. Curtis. Do I understand that there have been no fathers with
minor children drafted?
See Exhibit 8, p. 13314.
13102 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
DRAFTING OF MEN WITH FAMILIES
General Hershey. No; of course that is not true in the first year
and a half. Several local boards carried out too strictly the con-
gressional injunction, they began to take the married men who had an
independent income, unearned income, or whose wife had an inde-
pendent income, or an earned income. It included not only the
wealthy wives but the working wives. There was one other thing,
and that is the date of marriage, because we have ruled administra-
tively certam marriages after certain dates are not marriages under
our rules. Of course, you have got men who will live apart from their
wifes, that even now, even if a man had a wife and six children, if he is
living apart from them, he cannot make a claim of maintaining a
bona fide relationship. I think I was telling you about the wife that
called me the other night and said her husband was in the Navy,
wanted me to do something about it, that she told the local board
she was not living with hmi but now she had changed her mind, but
he was gone.
OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Mr. Curtis. I would like to have the figures on how many Govern-
ment employees have received occupational deferment. Is that
available?
General Hershey. We can get something on that, because Senator
Tydings' committee took that up. We studied a thousand cases.
I think quite a share of them have gone into the service — before we
got through with the survey — but at least you will have some. As to
the number of people in Government employ, it is not necessary that
they be deferred, but regardless of whether they are men or women
they do come ou t of the pool, and they constitute some problems that
we have got to solve?.
Mr. Curtis. I would like to have the number of men between the
ages of 20 and 45 without dependents who are now employed by the
United States Government and are not in the armed services.^
DEFERMENT OF FARM LABOR
And further. General Hershey, I would like to read a letter which I
received from a member of the advisory board of the draft board in
one of the counties in my district and ask you to analyze the case given
therein and give me the answer. In this connection, I might say that
it is the opinion of a great many of us that the rural areas in America
are furnishing more than their share of the soldiers and that this is
because rural people ar slow to ask for deferment and labor and
industry are pressing their cases vigorously.
I will now read the letter:
Phil B. Campbell
attorney at law
Osceola, Nebr.
September 14, 1942.
Hon. Carl T. Curtis,
House of Representatives Office Building,
Washington, D. C.
Friend Carl: I have had a long talk this morning with the local chairman of
the draft board and learned that he wrote Senator Norris yesterday about the
matter which is on my mind and of decided importance to Polk County.
1 This material, not having been received at time of going to press, may be published in a later volume.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13103
The tentative call for October is substantially more than twice the one for this
month, and the board has been notified to prepare for a call of 50 percent more
than that for November. I am chairman of the advisory committee, and in close
touch both with the board and with men who are asking deferment of their sons
in order to enable them to get this year's corn crop out of the field. We have,
in the north half of the county, a good corn crop for the first time in years, and
they, of course, want to save it if possible. It is impossible to hire help when
they can go to Grand Island or Hastings, or any one of a number of other places
in Nebraska, and get 60 cents an hour for common labor with a lot of overtime
every week so that it brings their check up to around $50 a week. If the present
program of the Selective Service is carried out, it is going to mean that thousands
of bushels of corn in Polk Count}* will probably rot in the field, and it is going to
mean another thing on the meat and produce angle. I have just prepared an
affidavit asking for deferment of his son by a farmer in his 50's, who has 98 acres
of corn, and he tells me that if he is going to have to shuck it alone, the only way
he can possibly get it done will be to sell off all his milk cows except enough for
the family.
On the other hand, the draft board members tell us that when they try to get
a man out of an airplane factory, they get a flock of affidavits about how important
he is; that he is working 40 hours a week, and sometimes more, and things along
that line. Forty hours is just the start of a Polk Country farmer's week. I
recentl}^ talked to a young man who came back from California where he had
been working in an airplane plant since before the first registration, and he tells
me that most of the workers would be glad to put in longer weeks, but are limited
to 40 hours. From wiiat information he gave me, I am convinced that these
plants are attempting to keep at least three men to do two men's work, if the
two men v>ere permitted to work full time, while here on the farm one man is
expected to do three men's work and get it done somehow.
It is self-evident that a man in the factory or a man in the service must eat
before he can do his job; if our farms are to be absolutely denuded of our labor
except the aged, infirm, children, and women, then how long are the other fellows
going to be able to eat? Don't you think it would be wise for all of the Nebraska
delegation to present this matter to General Hershey along the line the Kansas
delegation did last week, and certainly sufficient pressure can be brought to bear
to, at least, let us get out the crop we now have practically matured.
Phil B. Campbell,
As I stated, I would like to have you analyze the contents of the
letter and give me the answer.
General Hershey. Mr, Curtis, our records disclose that approxi-
mately 23 percent of our registrants were working on farms, whereas
only 13 percent of registrants who have been inducted had been work-
ing on farms. Such statistics may not be entirely accurate, however,
and there are factors involved which should not be disregarded. In
this latter connection, it is common knowledge that there has been a
tremendous migration from the less attractive war-eifort jobs to the
more attractive war-effort jobs because of the differentials in pay,
comfort, danger, and other working conditions. In addition thereto,
the Navy and Army recruiting services by conducting campaigns m
rural areas have played a considerable part in disrupting the man-
power situation.
There is no question but that Selective Service should not sit back
and say that because it was not one oi the main causes for the migra-
tion that it should not do all in its power to remedy the situation.
Selective Service must not aggravate the farm manpower shortage by
denying deferment to farm workers who cannot be replaced and who
are working on essential farms.
In this latter connection it must be recognized that not all agricul-
tural activities are essential but that there are some nonproductive
units as well as some that may not be producing essential products or
products ot which there are or will be shortages.
13104 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Selective Service has been endeavoring to get the best information
avaihible from the Department ol Agriculture and from all other avail-
able sources, but the time has come when it is necessary for more
specific plans to be formulated on the basis of how much material,
equipment, and manpower is to be available for the agricultural phase
of the war effort after total war plans of all war-effort users are con-
formed with, and cut down to existing supplies of manpower, materials,
and equipment.
Present mdications are that something must be done in the near
future to clarify this situation. In the meanwhile the Selective Service
System will use its full powers and all available information to the
best of its ability.
Mr. Curtis. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Arnold.
Mr. Arnold. General, I just wonder if you know whether or not
the farm boys have been deferred in as large numbers as they could
have been?
General Hershey. Well, that is a very difficult question. I have
thought that we had a farm problem. I think for a lot of reasons the
agricultural areas have been stripped. They always have, to my
experience, whenever you have a shortage of labor. That was true
back in 1910 or 1911 in my part of the country when Ford started the
expansion of his plant. We not only lose the men to the services but
of course we lose them in every other place, because for some reason or
other, wages or manner of living, they want to go somewhere else, and
of course there are some voluntaiy enlistments. We have in the
agricultural States a very fair proportion of 2-A, but wdiether we have
enough or not T do not know. I don't know whether we will know
untilpcrhaps this year. We have got good crops in the first place, and
I think they will, somehow or other, get them harvested, but next
year is another problem, and I think it is one that has got to be given
quite a little study.
Mr. Arnold. Then, in deferring the boys on farms you might take
into consideration the fact that the country is depleted by men going
to defense work?
General Hershey. We have got to take that into consideration,
because the men who will go into the defense work will be in 2-B and
wili not be in the group on which we lay our calls anyway.
Mr. Arnold. For instance, in the little county where I live in
Illinois, last year 34 children w^ere in the grade school, and this year,
because the men have boarded up their homes and gone to defense
work, there will be only 14 children enrolled in that school. Those
men naturally will go without work and will be available for agricul-
tural occupations, seasonal occupations, but once they go to the de-
fense plants they are not available any more.
selection of doctors
Now, another question along a different line. Don't you think the
manner of selecting doctors by the Medical Association is likely to
be abused and doctors will be railroaded wdio are in competition with
those who have the authority, and a great injustice will be done in
that manner of selection?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13105
General Hershey. I think I would better content myself with
saying that that is always a possibility. I do not know that I can say
that I know of specific cases. I have had some come to my attention
that might be questioned. There are many reasons why it would be
better to have doctors chosen by some sort of voluntary method,
but all voluntary methods that require large numbers get into social
pressures and many other things that are very unfortunate. The
same thing happens in any other volunteer system; the same things
that are bad with the volunteer methods, no matter what you get
them for, do apply in the getting of doctors, and perhaps some of the
other things that you suggest, especially if you leave it to other doctors.
Doctors remain iiuman beings. That is the point I am trying to
make; they remain human beings even though they are doctors.
Mr. Arnold. That is all.
Mr. Sparkman. General Hershey, I want to ask you a few ques-
tions. The hour is getting rather late. I will probably get you when
you come before the Military Affairs Committee anhyow.
INDUCTION OF FARM LABOR
I have just returned from my district, and one of the principal
topics of conversation throughout that area, which is primarily an
agricultural section, was the working of the various draft boards.
The farmers tell me they are already confronted with a very serious
situation with reference to harvesting this year's crop. For instance,
in order to comply with the request of the agricultural program they
have planted thousands and hundreds of thousands of acres of peanuts,
something they had never grown before, and now they are threatened
with the possibility of letting the peanuts go unharvested because
of lack of farm labor. From nearly all of them comes the report to
me that there are no deferments for farm labor. In fact, I do not
know a single farmer in my home district that has been deferred by
reason of occupation.
I have a letter, since coming back up here, from some farmer that
told me that early in the year they took off two, I believe it was, who
were working for him and that now he had only one left, one man,
who had made a crop for himself and had helped him make his crop.
Now, he has been notified to report for induction, leaving the crops
unharvested and nobody to harvest them except this one man who is
75 years of age and his brother who is 83 years of age.
I talked to one member of a draft board who was a farmer himself,
and he told me that they were strictly ordered not to defer farm
labor, except in the most extreme cases. I just wondered what
comment you might have on that situation.
General Hershey. I think it is a little difficult to comment on
what might be true in a locality. I think that probably in your
State deferment is even less used, for one reason or another, except
one that is quite apparent, than in perhaps some other States.
Another thing is that you, in your State, have a great many defense
plants that have stripped quite a bit of your labor.
I do not know enough about the peanut crop business to make a
guess, but I do know in our farm program we did very much as we
have done in many other things, that is, we set up a pretty great
13106 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
program and there probably will be a shortage of labor, just like
there have been shortages in material.
I would be rather mterested to know just how these boards were
instructed on not deferring farmers. I would like to say this, that
we tried to get cooperation between the war boards and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to sort of help the men who had boys and did
not feel like going m to make any effort to get them deferred, because
they felt there was a social problem in not asking for his own boys to
be deferred, even though his own boys worked for him.
I do think in areas where the local boards are confronted with
registrants that are all farmers, some feel, "Well, if I defer one I have
to defer them all." That is one of the shortcomings of human nature.
Up in my part of the country, I know of some 40 's that have
two or three men on them and it would not make any difference if we
took them all. Not in the last 25 years have they grown much more
than they have eaten, and a great many times they have grown less.
On the other hand, I know a great many farms where a great
many tons of hogs have been produced. In order to get anywhere
with our selectivity, even though we are criticized, we will have to take
the poor fellow off the 40 that is domg nothing and leave the fellow
that has $200 in the bank perhaps, even though he owes a good deal
more than that, who has a larger place, or a better farm, something
which is producing definitely m.ore than he is consuming; we would
leave him behind.
Another thing, of course, is the crop. I do not know where the
peanuts stand, but we are going to have to decide what crops we are
going to need the most and produce those, and we should not have to
ignore certain crops that are too hard to do without.
" I do not think that gets anywhere toward answering your specific
question. It is too indefinite for me to do more than attempt to
evade, or talk about the thing in general.
Mr. Sparkman. I have simply mentioned peanuts incidentally.
General Hershey. There have been a great many peanuts grown
there. It is soybeans in my part of the country. We are into that
like we have never been "before. It was hard planting this spring
but it* is going to be very difficult to harvest them. We never har-
vested them before.
AUTHORITY OF LOCAL BOARDS
Mr. Sparkman. Is the matter of deferment of farm labor, for
instance, very largely up to the local boards, or do they receive specific
orders?
General Hershey. Of course, the local boards need not pay any
attention to 99 percent of the things which we send out. It is a
good thing they do not have to. We have tried to guide them, and
we have set up agricultural people as some of the people that can be
deferred. On the other hand, in the areas M^here they have nothing
else, when they leave one boy then everybody else feels, "Wliy did
you leave him?" They cannot lay it on Washington very well, and
reply that Washington said, "You should take the fellow on the 40
but don't take the fellow on the 60 or 70." I know one State where
they have set up the formula in which they put down certain factors,
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13107
and the answer they get decides pretty much whether the fellow is
prodiicino; quite a bit more than he consumes.
Mr. Sparkman. Has any study been made of this farm problem?
General Heeshey. I think I have now another occupational bul-
letin which the War Manpower Commission has evolved on farming.
It is about ready to be published. I am not so optimistic as to believe
that the publication of one or two or three more bulletins would help,
because the human-being element enters into it, and unless you get
a man to believe that this fellow should stay at homic and should not
go to war it will not help. I think the board member has got to be
able to defend himself when you say: "Why did you take the fellow^?"
He says, "Washington said so." As long as they are doing as good
a job as they are doing now, I do not care what they call me, or the
State headquarters even, or perhaps Congress.
Mr. Sparkman. General, of course you are simply the procuring
agency for the armed services; you do not set up the standards;
General Hershey. No.
RELAXATION OF ARMY STANDARDS
Mr. Sparkman. Is it true that recently the Army has relaxed to
some extent its rules w^ith reference to the taking of illiterates?
General Hershey. Yes; they have said they will take up to 10
percent of the illiterate in each induction in each State. Of course,
they do not have that many in every place, but unfortunately in
some places they are overstocked.
Mr. Sparkman. Do you think that will serve to absorb all of these
that have been left out by reason of illiteracy?
General Hershey. It will not absorb all of them, but the Army —
perhaps I am optimistic — is going to take more today; I do not know
when, but they are.
Mr. Sparkman. I noticed, too, that the Army has relaxed on some
possibly minor physical defects.
General Hershey. Quite materially. We did pretty well. Be-
tween August 1 and August 31, without changing standards we
lowered the rejection rate in the United States 8 percent — the Army
did. The Selective Service had some small part in bringing things
to their attention.
Mr. Sparkman. Well, it has not yet, though, gotten around to
taking persons that are suffering with venereal diseases, has it?
General Hershey. They have promised on the 1st day of October
they will start to taking them. The percentage they are taking is
not satisfactory, but I still have hopes that we are going to raise that.
As the manpower gets short, those things just must happen. They
make for bad public relations for Selective Service, the longer they
are delayed. I have some appreciation of what the Army is up against,
but the pressure that we have exerted in the last 5 or 6 months on the
Army has been bringing results. I think they are trying very honestly
to absorb them without destroying their efficiency.
Mr. Sparkman. Now, when you speak of the percentage that
they will take, is it going to be something in line with the illiterates?
General Hershey. No; unfortunately it is not. Here is where,
you see, in our negotiations, the Army was at a little disadvantage.
They took the national rate in dealing with me, and unfortunately
13108 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
that national rate does not help. Wlien they come on a national rate,
supplying it in one-third of the places, then we are only selling one-
third as rapidly as we must if we are going to overcome our bacldog.
I am optimistic. I believe in another month or two we are going to
force them to take in a very considerable number.
Mr. Sparkman. This probably belongs to the Army rather than to
you, but is there any reason why these persons should not be taken
and placed in detention camps and treated?
General Hershey. You are getting right into the heart of the argu-
ment. A person who has been away from the Army for 2 years has
different opinions about what facilities they must have to take care of
them than those who are responsibile for ruiming the Army at the
present time. It is a great deal easier, I suppose, to pitch the game
up in the bleachers than out in the field, and they are up there pitching.
I still think they could take more than they are taking. That is
what the discussion is about.
Mr. Sparkman. The Government is already paying for the treat-
ment through the various health services.
General Hershey. Yes; sometimes we pay for two or tliree treat-
ments, because we cannot get them back into the induction stations
before November.
Mr. Sparkman. Some of the health officers told me they were
rather alarmed at the increase in venereal cases and in the refusal of
those people to take the treatments voluntarily because it does give
them protection from the draft.
General Hershey. That is the reason why, when we get them so
that we are taking them in reasonably large numbers, the rate is going
to fall.
Mr. Sparkman. Just one other question. You mentioned about
this quitting rate in the airplane factories in California being about
5 percent, I believe j^ou said.
General Hershey. Between five and six.
Mr. Sparkman. It raised a little over 1 percent, I believe.
General Hershey. Of course, that was not in August. In August
it was getting up to 3.8, I think, as the chairman has stated, as I
remember it. The curve in August showed straight up. But the
the point I was trying to make was the selective-service band did not
widen much more than 30 percent, even with that upshot, whereas we
had a right to expect it to double over June.
Mr. Sparkman. I was just curious to know what accounts for the
variance.
General Hershey. The difference between 1 and 5?
Mr. Sparkman. Yes.
General Hershey. That, I could not say. As a farmer, I feel that
certainly they did not go back to the farm. There are only one or
two or three other industries that would be more favorable places to
work than where they are, therefore, whether they are stealing from
each other or some are going on vacations or wherever they go, there
is quite a little movement around with labor. That is one of the things
that disturbed me and made me thmk; we have got to, as rapidly as
possible, tighten down and see that every factory has got what they
need and has no oversupply, and try to get these fellows to stay where
they are.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13109
The Chairman. There is a certain psychology: "Well, I have got
to go anyway, and I might as well go now." I have received a few
letters along that line.
General Hershey. Yes.
Dr. Lamb. I have just got one question. General, if you assume
an Army of 10 to 13 milhon, you automatically assume a pretty large-
size production job. In fact, that also is raising our sights consider-
ably above where we have been before in production. "When you
match that with the rate at which you are now drawing them out,
you run up against a situation in which you see it from the point of
view of the individual drawn, and naturally your attitude is bound to
be that these people are needed and demanded by the armed services.
The armed services, themselves, however, are in the business of pro-
curing war goods. They are going to run up against the fact that they
are asking for men out of industry at the same time that they are
asking for production out of industry.
General Hershey. That is right.
Dr. Lamb. Does not that suggest that the real need m this situation
is a survey, particularly as you are saying that it is impossible to draw
them out much slower than they are now being drawn out, and maybe
we will step it up even more. Is it not that the real need is for a
survey such as you have described as coming from that steel com-
pany so that a much more orderly system of priorities as to the release
of men can be worked out and keyed into the production program in
the future? Then the burden does not fall particularly heavily on
the individual farmer or the plant to supply such information as that.
Then the development of a much more adequate training and up-
grading program in many plants would key into this plan. As 3^ou
take these people out on what is, for many plants at present, a hap-
hazard basis, you lack the training and leadership within the plant to
leave men enough to run the plant, or at least men enough to train a
new crop.
General Hershey. There is no question about that. I think you
cannot expect the Army and Navy to freeze what they need, but even
if you do not freeze it, you can take that as a basisfor your present
planning. I do not think there is any question about that, and I
might even say we are probably overdue. I would not be adverse
to admitting we are probably overdue on having set up what is our
maximum of accomplishment, as we look at it now. Then I think we
are going to have to give a great deal of thought to whether or not
any experience of any country can be applied to us in determining
how many workers you have got to have without, in order to main-
tain a man within.
The things I have said at any time are not based on the fact that I
thought or did not think that men should or should not go to war.
The only thing about it is if we commit ourselves to using certain
numbers, then it is going to be catastrophic if we do not go tlirough
with it. \Thether we commit ourselves is a problem that I do not
even attempt so solve. I only tried to execute what seemed to be a
survey, and I tried to get a final understanding on what they must
expect, otherwise they are going to find a very serious problem 6 or 8
months from now when I surprise somebody who did not expect to
participate in this war. I would rather have him think about it for
13110 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
6 or 8 months, to become accustomed to that thought, rather than
the contrary. If he does have to go then, I am not worried about
what he thmks of me, but if he has to go without warning, then I do
worry.
I agree with you wholly. You must set up these things, and you
must get these relationships. You cannot mobilize every man in this
country. I do not think the physical condition is the bottleneck. I
do not think you can mobilize every physically fit man.
Dr. Lamb. I can see in your statements certain salutary effects not
only upon the men but also upon the agencies which have got to rise to
this particular occasion. It seems to me that really is the problem.
The more you speed up, or the Army speeds up the goal, the more
rapidly you are going to be hit between the eyes with this particular
problem. The training and upgrading process is absolutely the only
way you can lick it, and that requires a much better organization than
I see on the horizon at the present time, planned or actual.
General Hershey. I agree with you wholly on the training. The
Army now is probably 15 times what it was a little over 2 years ago,
and tlie other fourteen-fifteenths had to be trained. Industry has
had the same problem. I think they have been a little slow in getting
to it. I think this thing here represents what for the last 2 or 3 months
we have tried to get industry to do.
Dr. Lamb. That is one of the reasons why the committee suggested
the last time the setting up of this equitable system. That means
connecting up all along the line the people who ought to know their
own business better and who ought to acquaint themselves more with
it. An outsider entering their plant is going to see a great many
thmgs; he is going to be able to bring experiences from elsewhere to
push this thing along.
The Chairman. General, I want to state to you, on behalf of the
committee, we are very grateful to you. You have given us a very
fair and valuable contribution for the record of the committee. You
have been very fine about it. We deeply appreciate the courtesy.
Thank you very much.
The committee will stand adjourned to 9:15 tomorrow morning, in
this room.
(Wliereupon, at the hour of 12:30 o'clock p. m., an adjournment
was taken until 9:15 a. m., of the following day, Wednesday, September
16, 1942.)
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1942
MORNING SESSION
House of Representatives,
Select Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10:15 a. m., in room 1102, New House Office
Building, Washington, D. C, Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman), pre-
siding.
Present: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of California;
John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; George H. Bender, of Ohio; Carl T.
Curtis, of Nebraska; and Laurence F, Arnold, of Illinois.
Also present: Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director.
The Chairman. The committee will please come to order, and
Governor McNutt will be the first witness.
I would like to say, on behalf of the committee. Governor, we Imow
what a busy man you are and that we appreciate you coming here this
morning.
The gentleman from Illmois, Mr. Arnold, will interrogate you.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL V. McNUTT, CHAIRMAN, WAR MAN-
POWER COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
The Chairman. Governor, will you please give the reporter the
names of your assistants, for the record?
Mr. McNutt. General Frank J. McSherry, Mr. William Haber,
and Mr. Alvin J. Roseman.
Mr. Arnold. Any questions which I ask you that you feel that
should be referred to your assistants, we will be glad to have them
answer.
It is our understanding that, under the First War Powers Act, you,
as Chairman of the War Manpower^ Commission, can direct either War
Production Board or the Services of Supply to require war contractors
to hire exclusively through the Employment Service. Is this correct?
Mr. McNuTT. I have not that authority. I can ask them to do it.
Mr. Arnold. But you cannot require it?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. Similarly, you can by directive through the Services
of Supply of the War Department require employers to set up ade-
quate training programs. Is this within your power?
Mr. McNuTT. We can issue the directive, but I have some serious
doubts as to any legislative authority to enforce it. We have had to
operate by persuasion and by agreement up to the present time.
Mr. Arnold. Have you been pretty successful?
60396— 42— pt. 34 5 13111
13112 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. McNuTT. We have had success in some measure and in some
spots.
The Chairman. How is it handled in England?
Mr. McNuTT. It is handled in England by a national service act
which gives the authority to do these things.
Mr. Arnold. If it were possible to control the labor market demand,
to control hiring and training through directives to the War Produc-
tion Board and the Services of Supply, woidd it be necessary to obtain
compulsory powers over the individual worker?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes; I do thinlv so. I will answer that categorically,
"Yes."
NATIONAL SERVICE ACT
Mr. Arnold. It has come to our attention that there are at present
under consideration at least two different drafts of a National Service
Act, one of which makes the Employment Service the key agency
through wbich control will be exercised. The other makes the Selec-
tive Service the key operating agency through which labor-market
controls will be operated. Which of these two approaches to this
problem do you favor?
Mr. McNuTT. Your premise is wrong. Who gave you that in-
formation, if I may ask that?
Mr. Arnold. I do not know myself; I will have to be frank.
The Chairman. If the premise is wrong, we want it in the record,
because the question does not amount to anything if the question is
not right.
Mr. McNuTT. That is right. You make an assumption which is
not based on facts. There has been no discussion of any details of a
National Service Act. Little study has been given to it. I am
interested from the standpoint of our efforts to do this job, as to who
made such a statement.
Mr. Bender. It has been made repeatedly on the floor of the House.
Members have discussed the National Service Act and some of the
departments have been talking about it, and because of the conflict
on the part of various agencies, of the Government, there has been
suggestion at times, and, in fact, quite recently, for such an act in
order that there might be better coordination between the various
heads of the departments so we will not go in so many different direc-
tions in handling this problem.
Mr. McNuTT. Mr. Chairman, in response to your letter, I have
prepared a statement in which I have endeavored to answer the ques-
tions that you put to me there. Don't you think it would be better
in the conduct of this hearing if you permit me to make the statement
and then you ask your questions?
Mr. Arnold. How long is the statement?
Mr. McNuTT. It is a rather long statement.
Mr. Arnold. Do you want to read it?
Mr. McNuTT. I think it would be wise. I think I will cover most
of the questions which the members of the committee have.
Mr. Arnold. Very well. W^ill you proceed and read that, and if
there are any further questions we will ask them.
The Chairman. It is preferable to you that way?
Mr. McNuTT. I think it would be better and more orderly, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. All right.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13113
STATEMENT BY PAUL V. McNUTT, CHAIRMAN, WAR MANPOWER
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. McNuTT (reading):
I want to begin by impressing on you my sense of the magnitude and urgency
of the manpower problem which confronts us. Between now and the end of next
year we must add about 5,000,000 workers in our war industries and probably an
equal number to the armed forces. In order to replace workers withdrawn by
the armed forces and to make the necessary shifts from nonessential to essential
work, we shall have to place about 18,000,000 workers in new jobs. About
11,000,000 workers must be trained, mainly for semiskilled production jobs, be-
tween now and the end of 1943. At this moment there are serious general labor
shortages in 35 centers of war production, including Los Angeles, Seattle, Port-
land, Oreg., Baltimore, and Buffalo. Each of these shortages must be met.
Labor shortages in copper mining and smelting have already cost several thousand
tons in this valuable war material and shortages exist also in other nonferrous
metal-mining industries and in logging.
Meanwhile, needless migration goes on and labor pirating remains unchecked.
In some areas acute shortages of housing and transportation facilities are pre-
venting an adequate flow of labor into critical war plants. In other areas arti-
ficial labor shortages exist because of discrimination against women workers
and members of minority groups. Workers already employed in war plants are
frequently utilized at much less than their full capacity. All of these problems
must be met wherever they arise.
BACKGROUND OF THE MANPOWER PROBLEM
During the first 2 years of the war production program we were engaged mainly
in taking up the slack in the labor force and shifting several million people already
employed to new occupations. In June 1940 there were 48.1 million people
in civilian employment and the armed forces. By June 1942 this figure had grown
to 57,000,000. 'Where did these 9,000,000 people come from? They came
^lainly from a reduction of almost 6,000,000 in the number of people unemployed.
In addition, the labor force increased by 3,000,000, about half of which was normal
growth and the other half an unusually large increase in the labor force during the
spring and early summer of 1942.
During this period manpower was not an important limiting factor on produc-
tion. Production and procurement plans could be made on the assumption that
labor shortages would be made up by migration, and that the flow of manpower
would follow the flow of contracts and materials. Acute shortages of a few scarce
skiUs have been met fairly satisfactorily by breaking down jobs and upgrading
workers. Potential shortages of semiskilled workers in some areas have been
averted by large-scale migration. Most of this migration has been from areas
close to the centers of war industry. More than half of the migrants into the
Philadelphia area, for example, came from other parts of Pennsylvania. The
average distance travelled was only 80 miles. Two-thirds of the migrants into
Seattle came from Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and western Montana.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this period of easy expansion in
employment is about ended. The sources of migration are beginning to dry up.
The manpower situation during the next year and a half will be much tighter
and will require advance planning and a positive administrative program to meet
manpower needs.
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES
The latest estimate of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Employ-
ment Security indicates that 62.5 million people will be required for industry and
the armed forces by December 1943. It should be pointed out that this figure
rests on a large number of practical judgments about military and production
requirements and about our probable success in organizing the labor market and
reducing the amount of unemployment. Specifically, this figure assumes that:
1. The armed forces will reach the level projected by the planning divisions of
the Army and Navy for December 1943. If present goals are raised, total labor
requirements must be raised accordingly.
2. Expenditures for war materials and war construction will be at an annual
rate of eighty to eighty-five billion dollars by December 1943.
13114 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
3. Plants in war industries will be used to the limit of practical capacity.
This assumes that raw material bottlenecks will be broken and production
schedules maintained.
4. Virtually all of the metal-working industry will have been converted to
war production. Many consumer goods industries will be cut back to the limit
set by raw material supplies.
5. Unemployment will be reduced to 1,000,000, which could result only from a
very high degree of success in organizing the labor market. The millions of
placements required in war industry during the next year and a half would have
to be made with very little lost motion and the amount of seasonal and casual
unemployment would have to be greatly reduced.
6. The volume of employment in agriculture will decline by less than 5 percent.
It is assumed that there will be a considerable outflow of male workers to industry
and the armed forces, but that most of this will be made up by natural increase
and by increased utilization of women and young workers in farm production.
7. Output per worker in the war industries will be 18 percent higher in December
1943 than in December 1941. This is expected to result partly from increased
efficiency and partly from lengthening of working hours.
Some of these assumptions — and they are assumptions — probably make for an
overestimate of labor requirements, while others make for an underestimate.
On balance, the figure of 62.5 million is probably as good a judgment of the future
as can be obtained at this time. It depends, however, entirely on the view taken
of the military situation and of production necessities. This may change very
rapidly. If it proves necessary to expand the armed forces beyond present goals,
to increase the production of raw materials beyond present goals, and to construct
additional fabricating capacity, labor requirements may be sharply increased.
It is not safe to count heavily on labor requirements geared to our present indus-
trial capacity when it may become necessary through force of circumstance to
stretch our capacity farther than now seems possible. In manpower planning,
even more than in production planning, it is the part of caution to set the sights
high. We should face the possibiUty that we may need a labor force of 65,000,000
or more by the end of 1943.
The labor force available in December 1943 would, on the basis of natural
increase alone, amount to about 57.5 million. If requirements of 62.5 million are
to be met, about 5,000,000 people will have to enter or remain in the labor force
who would not normally do so. If requirements turn out to be larger than this,
the number of workers to be added is still larger. These additional workers
will come from women not now employed, from young people still in school, from
older workers who can delay their retirement or come back to work from retire-
ment, and possibly from certain groups in the agricultural population.
There are about 4.5 million nonfarm housewives under 45 with no children
under 16. There are 9.1 nonfarm housewives under 45 with children under 16.
Availability of these women for employment will depend on provision of ade-
quate day care for their children. There are, finally, 9.5 million nonfarm house-
wives 45 and over. The actual reserve of woman power is smaller than it looks,
because many of these women live in nonindustrial areas where there are few
employment opportunities and cannot be expected to leave their homes to take
employment. Even where jobs are available near their homes, the willingness of
women to take them will depend on the extent to which they are convinced that
they are really needed, the attractiveness of the jobs, and the efficiency of the
recruitment and placement efforts.
There are almost 7,000,000 students aged 14 to 17 inclusive. Accelerating
the entrance of these students into the labor force by 6 months, that is, reducing
the average school-leaving age by 6 months, would add a million to the working
force between now and December 1943. Another half million workers could be
added by increasing the average retirement age by 6 months.
An additional industrial labor reserve of unknown size exists in agriculture.
It has been estimated that as many as 2,000,000 farm operators could be with-
drawn from marginal and subsistence farms, with a drop of only 3 percent in the
production of commercial farm crops. Even if one considers this figure too high,
there is certainly considerable slack here which could be taken up if we were
seriously pressed for labor supplies.
It is misleading to make a simple addition of the numbers in these various
groups and to label the result "the labor reserve." Such a total merely states
that there are so many million people in the population with characteristics which
do not bar them from gainful employment. But the important question is how
many of these people can actually be brought into employment. The answer
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13115
to this question depends on the kinds of inducements offered and the efficiency
of the recruitment and placement efforts.
Many additional workers would probably enter the labor market by the end
of 1943 even if we did nothing at all. To obtain a net addition of 5,000,000
people, however, will require a carefully planned recruitment, training, and
placement program. If sufficiently intensive efforts were made, the labor force
could probably be increased to at least 65,000,000. This would give us the
same percentage of the population, 14 years and over, as is now gainfully em-
ployed or in the armed services in Great Britain.
It is dangerously misleading, however, to look at national totals alone. We
do not have a national labor market, but a network of local labor markets. It
is quite possible to have acute shortages in some markets while adequate supplies
are available in others. This is in fact the situation in which we now find our-
selves. Shortages of labor in some occupations and localities are so severe that
they are testing our ingenuity to the utmost. They can be met only by the
promptest and most vigorous efforts. We are not faced with planning now for a
national labor shortage which may possibly come into existence a year from now.
We are required to plan and act immediately to meet specific labor bottlenecks
which already exist.
The heart of the problem is that our labor reserves are widely dispersed, while
the demand for labor in war industry is highly concentrated. The difficulty can
be met only partially by greater spreading of war contracts, because the produc-
tion facilities themselves are highly concentrated.
In July 1942, 35 of the local labor markets surveyed regularly by the Bureau of
Employment Security already faced general labor shortages, 81 expected shortages
to develop, and only 44 expected a continued surplus of labor. Almost all of these
areas expect to reach peak employment before July 1943, and action which is not
taken in the next few months might as well not be taken at all. The number of
people needed to reach peak employment is very large for the major war produc-
tion centers. It is estimated that the Philadelphia metropolitan area needs about
120,000 workers, the Detroit area, 200,000; the Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton area,
48,000; the Portland-Vancouver area, 90,000; the Baltimore area, 55,000; and the
Buffalo area, over 90,000.
While conditions differ in detail from one area to the next, certain common
elements are found in almost all the shortage areas. There has been little effort
to see that workers already employed are efficiently utilized. Some plants are
seriously overmanned and hoarding skilled workers, while nearby plants are in
urgent need of labor. In spite of persistent efforts by the War Manpower Com-
mission, there is still widespread discrimination against Negroes and minority
groups. Failure to use local labor reserves has necessitated heavy in-migration,
which in turn has caused acute housing and transportation difficulties. The
prospect of many thousand more in-migrants during the next year creates an
urgent need for additional housing construction. Labor turn-over is high and
rising in most areas, due partly to unsatisfactory living conditions.
Employers in most areas seem to be taking it for granted that in-migration will
continue in sufficient volume to meet hiring requirements. This rests on the
illusion that what has been true during the past 2 years will continue to be true in
the future. The large centers of war industry in the Pacific coast, Atlantic coast,
and North Central States have already exploited nearby sources of labor rather
thoroughly. Each city must now reach farther and farther afield until all are
trying to tap the same reserves. These reserves are located mainly in the South-
ern and Mississippi Valley States, amd must be moved over relatively great
distances.
It is fairly safe to predict that cities in the Pacific coast and Northeastern
States will find the flow of migrants beginning to fall off before the end of 1942.
There is a danger that labor pirating, which has thus far been confined largely to
skilled workers, will then be extended to semiskilled and unskilled labor. Labor
of all types will shift more and more rapidly from plant to plant. Labor turn-
over will be further accelerated by housing and transportation shortages.
Employers will eventually be forced to make greater use of local labor, but this
may not be done until several months after it should have been done. In the
meantime there may be serious retardation of production in many plants.
ORGANIZATION OF WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION
Faced with this possibility of a manpower crisis, the President on April 18,
1942, created the War Manpower Commission. The Executive Order No. 9139
creating the Commission directs the chairman, among other things, to "formulate
13116 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the most
effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in
the prosecution of the war; and issue such policy and operating directives as may
be necessary thereto * * * direct the several departments and agencies of
the Government as to the proper allocation of available manpower * * *
establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all Federal programs relating
to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of workers * * *
formulate legislative programs, designed to facilitate the most effective mobiliza-
tion and utilization of the manpower of the country."
As chairman, I consult with the other members of the Commission representing
the principal agencies concerned with manpower problems, on the plans and
procedures necessary to achieve these ends. A management -labor policy com-
mittee which includes seven representatives of management and seven of labor,
considers and advises the chairman on matters of major policy.
The Commission performs a number of functions formerly performed by
agencies which were transferred to the Commission at the time of its creation.
Among these are the labor supply and training function^ of the Labor Division
of the War Production Board, the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized
Personnel, the Procurement and Assignment Service of the Oihce of Defense
Health and Welfare Service, the Apprenticeship Section of the Division of Labor
Standards of the Department of Labor, and the President's Committee on Fair
Employment Practices.
Certain other agencies of the Government — the Selective Service System, the
Federal Security Agency, the Work Projects Administration, the Civil Service
Commission, the Railroad Retirement Board, the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, the Civilian Con-
servation Corps^ — that is, what is left of it, the Department of Agriculture, and
the Office of Defense Transportation — were directed by Executive Order No.
9139 to "conform to such policies, directives, regulations, and standards as the
chairman may prescribe in the execution of the power vested in him." Operating
relations with these agencies are maintained through divisions of the Commission
functioning under the Director of Operations. I am filing for the record a copy
of the organization chart indicating the present structure of the Commission.^
I might add that directives have already been issued to most of the agencies
mentioned above covering a considerable range of subjects falling within the
Commission's authority.^
Twelve regional offices, each headed by a regional manpower director, are
being established in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland,
Chicago, Atlanta, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Mo., Dallas, Denver, and San
Francisco. The structure of each regional office will resemble on a smaller
scale the organizational pattern of the headquarters office of the Director of
Operations. A joint management-labor advisory committee will be appointed
in each region.
It is intended also to establish several area offices in each region. Many of
these are already in operation. The number, and geographical coverage of the
area offices, will be flexible and will depend largely on the manpower problems
to be solved. The area manpower director will be responsible for coordinating the
activities of the various Government agencies concerned with manpower problems
in much the same way that these activities are coordinated by the War Manpower
Commission itself on a national scale. Within the limits of established Com-
mission policy, he will be responsible for developing a coordinated manpower
program for the area.
ACTIVITIES OF WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION
I am sure, however, that you are not so much interested in the structure of the
Commission as in what we "have been doing. It i«, of course, impossible to say
very much about this in a few minutes, but I shall try to cover a few of the more
important points. The central agency for recruiting and placing labor is the
United States Employment Service. A variety of special recruitment methods,
including a Nation-wide clearance system, has been in effect for almost 2 years
for the skilled occupations in which shortages are most acute. In localities such
as Seattle and Detroit, where labor shortages are serious and housing facilities are
inadequate to permit heavy in-migration, special efforts are now under way to
recruit women not normally in the working force. Efforts are also being made to
1 See chart facing p. 13138.
» These directives are set out in full in Exhibit 2, p. 13231.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13117
facilitate the entrance of women into the labor market by developing an intensive
program for the day care of young children. I have directed the Office of Defense
Health and Welfare Services to coordinate the activities of the various agencies
participating in the program.
The placement activities of the United States Employment Service are being
concentrated more and more directly on jobs related to the war program. Certain
types of work not directly related to war production, such as the placement of
domestic servants, have been discontinued in many areas. The occupational
questionnaires submitted to all Selective Service registrants are being analyzed
by the Employment Service as rapidly as its staff permits. Workers with scarce
skills not already engaged in war production are being called to the local emi^loy-
ment office for "interviews. This effort to persuade skilled workers to transfer
voluntarily to more important positions has thus far been successful in only about
10 percent of the cases. The main reason for unwillingness to transfer has been
loss of seniority and other accumulated rights in the worker's present job. It is
apparent that this objection must be met if transference of labor is to be carried
out on a large scale.
I shovdd like to point out that the work of the United States Employment-
Service is being carried on under very severe handicaps. The lack of clearly
defined authority of the national officers over State Employment Service directors
is a major problem. It arises mainly from the provision in the Department of
Labor-Federal Security Agency Appropriations Act for 1943, which requires
that the Employment Service shall be returned to State direction and control
at the conclusion of the war, and this results in a considerable confusion of authority
and objectives. State Employment Service directors in collaborating with national
policy often do not free themselves from emphasis on distinctly local and State
interests. This is war. We can have only one strategy and one authority in
dealing with these problems. The same appropriations act requires the mainte-
nance of salaries at State compensation scales, which are in most cases below the
salaries for corresponding positions in the Federal service. Relatively low
salary scales and lack of adequate funds to hire additional staff in the face of a
steadily rising volume of work, has resulted in serious demoralization of the
Employment Service staff and heavy resignations of key personnel. Until the
Employment Service is freed of these restrictions and provided with adequate
funds, we shall be seriously hampered in the recruitment, transference, and
placement work which is the core of our labor-market activity.
Increasing emphasis is being placed on the extension and development of train-
ing programs. Since June 1940 more than 3,800,000 workers have attended
training courses for war production workers and the pace is still increasing.
Training is being made increasingly available to women, Negroes, and national
minority groups. The training activities of the National Youth Administration
are now directed entirely to preparation for employment in war industries.
I regret that there is not sufficient time to describe the excellent work being
done by other divisions of the Commission. For example, the work of the
Housing and Transportation Service in accelerating provision of adequate housing
and commimity facilities in war industry areas, the work of the Negro and minority
groups services in breaking down discriminatory hiring practices, and the work of
the Professional and Technical Personnel Division in mobilizing the facilities of
our colleges and universities for effective participation in the war effort.
The first area manpower organization, in Baltimore, has been in operation for
more than 2 months. Steps have already been taken to recruit, train, and place,
large numbers of women workers, to utilize more effectively the labor force now
employed in essential industries by reducing turn-over and absenteeism, to transfer
skilled workers from nonessential to essential industries, through the voluntary
cooperation of management and labor groups, to secure the orderly in-migrstion
of such workers as can be accommodated in available housing facilities. These
steps are being given widespread publicity in the local press and are being carried
out in close cooperation with labor and management organizations and with all
related Government agencies.
In recent months employees have been leaving the nonferrous metal and logging
industries more rapidly than replacements could be recruited. Several Federal
agencies are cooperating to make employment in these industries more attractive
through wage adjustments, new housing facilities, and the provision of transpor-
tation facilities. Since these efforts cannot all be imm.ediately completed, I have
deemed it necessary to take steps to prevent the transfer of production and main-
tenance workers from these industries to other employment. This step has been
13118 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
taken in accordance with the pattern approved by the National Management-
Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission and after consulta-
tion with managers and labor leaders in these industries regarding the details of
the order. In accordance with this order, the Army, Navy, Maritime Commis-
sion, and the Procurement Division of the Treasury, have instructed their own
establishments and their contractors to refuse employment to any persons who
leave the nonferrous metals or logging industries since the issuance of the order,
unless the worker has obtained from the United States Employment Service a
certificate of separation. Such a certificate will be issued if the separation is in
the best interest of the war effort or if the refusal to grant it would result in
hardship and injustice to the individual.
I hope that I have conveyed to you a sense of the great variety and difficulty
of the problems which we face from day to day — and the problems are only
beginning. As the need for labor increases, labor already employed must be
used more and more efficiently. The men who are drafted or who enlist in the
armed forces must be replaced, the replacements must be trained, necessary in-
migrants to war production areas must be housed, local manpower programs must
•be coordinated with the activities of the Selective Service System, the War Pro-
duction Board and other war agencies.
I know that some of our problems are of special interest to members of this
committee and I would like to speak in some detail about three of them: The
problem of coordinating manpower planning and production planning, the prob-
lem of securing efficient utilization of labor, and the possible need for some type
of national service legislation.
MANPOWER PLANNING AND PRODUCTION PLANNING
The War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission are working
together toward the common objective of maximum war production. The suc-
cess of each agency depends on the efficiency of the other. Failure by the War
Manpower Commission to recruit, train, and place labor at the points of greatest
need will slow up the production program. Faulty scheduling of production
and an irregular flow of raw materials will waste labor time, require more men to
produce a given output, and thus make the job of the War Manpower Commis-
sion harder.
Increasingly close relations are being established between the agencies charged
with manpower and production planning. The chairman of the War Production
Board and the head of the Board's Labor Production Division are members
of the War Manpower Commission and participate in all policy discussions.
The Director of Operations of the War Manpower Commission maintains close
working relations with the War Production Board Industry Branches through a
staff of industrial requirements consultants. The program now under dis-
cussion for concentrating production of a considerable number of nonmilitary
products in fewer establishments is being worked out jointly by the two agencies
and manpower considerations are being weighed along with considerations of
raw materials and plant capacity. The Housing and Transportation Service of
the War Manpower Commission works closely with the branches of the War
Production Board concerned with priorities for construction materials. The
War Manpower Commission is represented on the Plant Site Board, the Purchase
Policy Committee, and the Manpower Priorities Committee of the War Production
Board.
In addition to these operating relations, a joint committee has been established,
composed of two representatives of the War Manpower Commission Planning
Service and two representatives of the War Production Board Planning Com-
mittee, to give continuous consideration to the need for integrating manpower
and production policies and to make recommendations for dealing with specific
problems involving both agencies.
This cooperative relationship must of course be extended downward to regional
and local levels if it is to be fully effective. It must exist within each community
and within each plant.
While manpower requirements stem from the requirements of the production
program, the relation is not so simple and direct as in the case of raw materials.
A given production schedule does not indicate the exact number of workers
required because labor productivity varies greatly from plant to plant and may
change rapidly over the course of time. Even more important, a given pro-
duction schedule does not determine the kinds of labor needed— the proportions
of skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, of male and female workers. All
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13119
sorts of different combinations may be used to achieve the same result. This is
true to some extent of raw materials, but in much less degree.
Another difference is that the raw material problem is mainly a prol^lem of
allocation. The labor supply problem is essentially a problem of utilization.
There is no evidence that our labor reserves are inadequate to meet the needs of
essential industries and the armed forces. The problem is not that too few-
people are available, but that too few people with the right training are available.
In skilled metal-working occupations there are scarcely any workers available
and, therefore, nothing to be allocated. The main problem is to break down
skilled jobs into semiskilled jobs, to train large numbers of inexperienced workers
rapidly to fill these semiskilled jobs, and to meet the minimum requirements for
skilled labor by training and promotion within the plant. If these things are done
effectively the need for allocation of labor wiU be greatly reduced.
SECURING EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF LABOR
It is one of the major responsibilities of the War Manpower Commission to
insure that employers make the best possible use of the labor available to them.
This is a problem which must be met and solved plant by plant. Some way must
be found to determine what each plant actually needs and to see that it gets no
more and no less labor than it can use to the best advantage. There is a natural
tendency for each employer to try to skim off the cream of the labor force. This
may have been all right 2 years ago when there was plenty of cream available.
It is not all right now when the market is tight, when millions of untrained people
must be brought into use and when skilled men must be conserved for the jobs
which only they can do. Employers must be required to pare down their labor
demands, to prepare for increasingly heavy Selective Service withdrawals by
substituting women and men beyond the military age, and to abandon any dis-
crimination which may have existed against Negroes and other minority groups.
Determination of actual l9,bor requirements is essential not only for efficient
distribution of manpower but also for effective operation of the Selective Service
System. As the pool of available manpower shrinks, and as the demand of the
armed services for men of military age increases, the Selective Service System
needs clearer guidance as to which men are really indispensable in industry and
which are not. Employers even in the most essential industries can no longer
count on retaining men of military age for production work. They will be able
to secure deferment for men only in skilled jobs requiring lengthy training, only
if the men are actually working at these jobs and only if there is no other way of
getting the jobs done. It is obvious that decisions are required which cannot be
left entirely to the einployer's discretion and which require the judgment of
experts skilled in occupational analysis and labor utilization.
Some progress has already been made by the United States Employment
Services through the development of "manning tables" indicating the average
occupational distribution of workers in shipyards, ordnance plants, and airplane
plants. These tables enable one to see whether a particular plant is far out of
line in its demands for skilled labor. This sort of work, however, needs to be
expanded and carried along on a continuous basis rather than by means of sporadic
surveys. There is a clear need for a system of labor utilization inspectors to
maintain continuous contact with plants in essential industries, to analyze the
need for labor and the utilization of labor in each plant, to advise the Employment
Service on actual labor requirements, to advise the employer on methods of break-
ing down production processes and substituting semiskilled for skilled workers, to
stimulate training programs and increased use of women workers on the jobs
which they are capable of performing.
A system of labor supply inspectors has been in effect in Great Britain since
the summer of 1940. In June 1942 there were 687 inspectors reporting to 44 dis-
trict manpower boards, which correspond roughly to our area manpower directors.
The British inspectors have been recruited mainly from production engineers and
from experienced trade union officials. Their main duties are to see that employers
make effective use of the services of skilled workers, to secure increased use of
semiskilled and unskilled workers, including women and trainees, and to advise
on the release of men for the services or for employment on other work of greater
importance. The inspectors work in ver}^ close cooperation with the local employ-
ment exchanges. Decisions by the local employment exchange on providing addi-
tional labor for a plant depend largely on the inspector's report as to how efficiently
the employer is using the labor he already has and whether a genuine need for
additional workers exists. There is also frequent consultation with production
officials. Where investigation reveals evidence of labor hoarding or a poorly
13120 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
organized labor force, production officers have cooperated with labor supply
inspectors by providing information on the production program and on the con-
tracts which a particular firm might expect.
It is not intended to suggest that the British pattern should necessarily be
followed here or, indeed, to discuss at all the administrative organization necessary
to secure efficient labor utilization in this country. Since men with the necessary
qualifications are hard to find, and take considerable time to train, action on the
subject needs to be and will be expedited. There are administrative problems
of how to tie in such an inspection staff with the regional and area manpower
structure and with the Employment Service. A clear division of function must
also be worked out between the labor utilization inspectors, the inspectors who are
being appointed by the War Production Board, and the field liaison officers of the
Army and Navy, in order to avoid duplication of effort and to secure maximum
cooperation from employers. These problems are under consideration at the
present time.
NATIONAL SERVICE LEGISLATION
I have frequently been asked, as you asked this morning, whether I consider
that additional legislative authority is necessary for an effective manpower pro-
gram. As you know, we have been trying thus far to do the job by voluntary
measures such as the local antipirating agreements, the provisions for voluntary
transfer of workers to essential industries through the Employment Service, and
special voluntary agreements such as the one just concluded for logging and non-
ferrous metal mining. There is good reason to doubt, however, whether such
measures will long be adequate.
We know that within the next 6 months the problem of supplying men to the
armed forces and workers to industry will grow much more difficult. Induction
schedules have been raised, the unemployed group is dwindling rapidly, shortages
of labor in particular localities and industries are becoming more acute, and turn-
over and absenteeism are rising. In the face of these problems, the continued
success of voluntary efforts cannot be assured, and we are moving rapidly into
a situation where the Government must intervene increasingly in the labor market.
We have before us the experience of other countries. Great Britain was forced
to adopt sweeping labor-market controls as early as 1940. Broad control meas-
ures were announced in Canada last month and have been adopted also in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. The manpower problems which we face are not essen-
tially different from those of our Allies, and it is unlikely that we shall be able to
avoid the controls which they have found necessary.
The War Manpower Commission would be derelict in its duty if it did not
study carefully the need for national service legislation, and if it did not have
plans prepared well in advance of actual need. The Commission has not yet
considered a specific bill, nor has it sent any bill or recommendation to the Presi-
dent. The problem has, however, been under study for some time by a subcom-
mittee of the Commission and also by a subcommittee of the Management-Labor
Policy Committee. Before any recommendations are made the matter will have
been discussed from every angle, and representatives of labor and management
will have been fully consulted.
The term "national service" often raises in peoples' minds the specter of a
dictatorial government, moving people about with no regard to their convenience,
and forcing them into jobs which may be contrary to their training and interests.
I should like to point out that this notion is entirely false and contrary to all
experience in Great Britain and other democratic countries. The object of a
universal service system is to answer the question which every patriotic person is
now asking himself: Where do I best fit into the total national effort? The in-
dividual receives conflicting advice from different sources, he does not know the
total manpower picture, he is confused as to the best use of his talents. He needs
counsel rather than compulsion, and this in general is what he would receive
under a system of national service.
In British experience, the great value of having compulsory powers has been
shown to arise from their mere existence. The fact that the powers are in the
background materially assists the work of voluntary transfer and resort has to be
had to the exercise of powers in only a limited number of cases. Up to date only
a handful of people have been prosecuted for failing to obey directions to go to
new employment or stay in their present employment. It is also important to
remember that under the British system any worker or employer injurionsly
affected by an administrative decision may present his case to an appeal board
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13121
on which management and labor are represented. It is obvious that similar
safeguards should be contained in any legislation which we may decide to adopt.
Compulsory ])owers, in short, must be held in reserve rather than kept in con-
stant use. If they have to be used constantly the whole system becomes unwork-
able. In a democratic country people must be mobilized by invoking their
free will in a cooperative enterprise. This fact is not changed in the least by
passage of a National Service Act.
To sum up: It is not yet certain how soon the Commission will recommend
legislation to the President, or what form the recommendation will take. It is
my considered judgment, however, based on the best available knowledge of the
manpower situation, that some type of national service legislation is inevitable.
You ma.v take it for granted that any legislation which may be recommended
will have been considered very carefully and will contain appropriate safeguards
for the interests of all parties concerned.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL V. McNUTT— Resumed
Mr. Arnold. Thank you very much, Governor. That is a very
very thorough statement.
Mr. McNuTT. It has been too long.
The Chairman. You have covered a lot of ground, Governor,
the Manpower Commission.
Mr. Arnold. It will be made a part of the record. I know, from
my experience, in a month out in my area of Illinois, that thousands
of people are wondering where they will best fit in, in this picture.
:Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. And they come to us for advice as to where they can
best fit in.
The questions that were prepared here were not predicated on such
a smooth-working organization as you seem to detail in your paper.
I think perhaps you would want to answer some of these questions,
to clarify the atmosphere as to rumored conflicts of authority and
perhaps jealousies over authority.
Mr. McNuTT. The Nation is at war, gentlemen of the committee,
and it is no time for conflicts over authority or any disputes about
jurisdiction.
Mr. Arnold. Some people seem to think that the authorities of
Washington are fighting among themselves instead of fighting Hitler.
I do not know whether that is true or not, but some of these questions
might bring that out.
Mr. McNuTT. All right.
The Chairman. The answer is, though, in a great measure, that
after all we are a great big democracy and it takes democracy some
little time to get under way. There is bound to be certain complica-
tions.
Mr. ]\IcNuTT. That is inevitable in a democracy.
agreement in copper and lumber industries
Mr. Arnold. You spoke of the order in nonferrous metals and
lumber. Did the War Alanpower Commission have distinct authority
in that?
Mr. McNuTT. Actually, that was the result of an agreement which
was reached after much travail but the agreement was there. That
was the basic fact. We had the agreement of the employers and of
the employees in both of those industries. HappUy, that could be
brought about because there were recognized representatives of both.
13122 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
But there are many industries not so organized. Then, we used
every power that we had to implement that agreement.
Mr. Arnold. Wouldn't you say that could fairly be described as a
voluntary national service act?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. Then, it would be fair to say that your experience in
arriving at an agreement on what was to be done about copper and
lumber has established a kind of model for other industries?
Mr. McNuTT, I hope that it will, but, as I pointed out, other
industries may not be so well organized on both sides of the line.
If they are, then of course, you can bring about an agreemeiit. You
can gather men about a table and bring about a meeting of minds, but
in many occupations that is not possiole. It would not be possible in
agriculture, for example.
Mr. Arnold. I do not laiow whether arything is possible in agri-
culture.
Mr. McNuTT. I decline to comment further upon that one.
NO real conflict between war production board and war
MANPOWER COMMISSION
Mr. Arnold. It has come to our attention that there has been some
difference of opinion over directive No. 2 issued by the War Man-
power Commission which requires the War Production Board to pre-
sent the Manpower Commission with a preference list of war plants.
As we understand it, the War Production Board has already set up a
manpower priorities branch and this branch plans to establish regional
offices and to employ labor utilization inspectors. Do you consider
that the War Production Board, under directive No. 2, should instruct
the War Manpower Commission as to the need for labor supply by
location, amount of labor needed, and quality of labor needed?
Mr. McNuTT. Any conflict of opinion there is more apparent than
real. Mr. Nelson and I, by exchange of letters, have, I thinJv, satis-
factorily, adjusted anything that might even appear to be a conflict.
I am to meet him as soon as I leave this committee here, to go over
the details.
There is not any real conflict between us. Mr. Nelson is a member
of the Commission, and I might sav to you that I thiniv, in the entire
existence of the Commission, there has only been a divided vote twice.
All other actions have been unanimous.
The Chairman. Governor McNutt, you straighten out everything
with him today, because he will be here tomorrow and then we can
report progress.
Mr. McNuTT. I think he will say precisely what I have said to
you, that there is not any real conflict.
Mr. Arnold. He has authority over materials?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right. We have authority over manpower,
whatever authority exists. We must work together.
Mr. Arnold. You must work together or there will be divided
authority over production planning?
Mr. McNuTT. And that goes for the whole war effort.
That is, I feel that it is not any time to be fighting about who
is to have control. The Commander- in Chief determines that. Let
every man do his job and work together the solution of the problems.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13123
Mr. Arnold. How is it possible to properly schedule manpower
unless we have advance information on the manpower requirements
of industry and the Army?
Mr. McNuTT. It is not possible.
ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER
Mr. Arnold. Who decides at the present time what manpower
should go to the Army and what manpower should go to industry?
We tried to get that yesterday from General Hershey, and he did
not answer.
Mr. McNuTT. I wish I could, and I know he could not. That is,
he gets his requirements from the military authorities. He has to
get his men. At the same time, he gets from us the requirements
on the other side, that is, for the production lines. We have authority
over the occupational deferments. That is, we can give the directives
to hun as to that.
The Chairman. Governor McNutt, General Hershey was very
much concerned about the different conditions prevailing in England
and this country. For instance, they had to recall, as you know ■
Mr. McNuTT. Forty thousand miners from the armed services
after they had been trained and equipped.
The Chairman. Yes. He was making the point anyway, about
recalling them to England from France, which was an entirely different
proposition from calling them from Egypt and Australia.
Mr. McNuTT. Precisely so. Let's not make the mistake so that
it has to be corrected.
The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. McNuTT. And a proper allocation would avoid anything of
that kind. Of course, ere long, we will be in the position of "Solomon
dividing the child."
The Chairman. How are you going to do it? Are you going to
do it under deferment?
Mr. McNuTT. I will get back to the point. I think a National
Service Act is inevitable with the authority some place to make this
allocation of manpower.
The Chairman. In other words, in the month of August, in 5
airplane factories in southern California, they lost 3,395 men.
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
The Chairman. Now, a certain number of those men were necessary
to instruct new men.
industrial production hampered by enlistments
Mr. McNuTT. There is no question about that. They lost sottip.
very good men. You are talking about the group they lost by enlist-
ment, not by induction. Only yesterday, I sat with the officials of
the Sperry Corporation, and I thmk you know how essential their
work is to this war effort. They showed me item by item, classifica-
tion by classification, what they were losing by enlistment, mind
you, and there is nothing in the world that can be done about it.
We have gone as far as we can. We have persuaded the Army and
Navy in their recruiting programs, before taking any man in 2-A, 2-B,
or 3-B, to get the clearance from the local selective-service board:
13124 ' WASHINGTON HEARINGS
but I also think that you realize the pressures that are now on those
local boards.
There was a State director in the office yesterday afternoon talking
about the manager of a plant which is entirely given over to war
production. Pressures in that small commimity are to take that man.
They say: "If my son went, he goes"; but it is a case where, if that
man is taken, I would not say that the plant will shut down but
certainly its efficiency will be impaired in the war effort, and the war
effort to that extent will be impaired.
The Chairman. Of course, Governor, there is no question of what
is sweeping over this country. The psychology is "Well, I have got to
go in sometime, so why not go in now?"
Mr. McNuTT. That is right, and don't forget we have 150 years
of thinking in this country that in time of war the only place to serve
is in the armed forces, but this is the first total war and it is not a
matter of sentiment; it is not a matter of desire, but this time every
person has to serve where he will contribute most to victory.
Mr. Arnold. In the committee's fifth interim report, there was
stressed the need for integrating manpower and production planning.
In the concentration of civilian industries, the need for such integra-
tion seems peculiarly evident, since, if possible, the remaining civilian
production should be concentrated in loose labor-market areas.
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
COMMITTEE ON CONCENTRATION OF CIVILIAN INDUSTRIES
Mr. Arnold. What part has the War Manpower Commission
played in the concentration of civilian industries?
Mr. McNuTT. We are represented on the War Production Board
committee for that purpose, on their Concentration Committee.
Mr. Arnold. And that has been planned?
Mr. McNuTT. They are at work now.
Mr. Arnold. It has come to our attention that Mr. Nelson, in
establishing a permanent committee on the concentration of civilian
industries, failed to place a representative of the War Manpower
Commission on this committee although the committee includes
representatives from the Office of Price Administration, the Services
of Supply of the War Department, and several other agencies outside
of the War Production Board. How do you explain this omission?
Mr. McNuTT. May I say in defense of Mr. Nelson, that whenever
a suggestion has been made that he utilize some of our staff in the
solution of any problems, he has always taken that suggestion most
cheerfully. There are no differences between the chairman of the
War Production Board and the chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission, and I say that publicly.
Mr. Arnold. The committee would like to ask your full views on
how labor utilization within the plants can be improved. In the
Fifth Interim Report the committee recommended the creation of
labor utilization inspectors to survey individual plants, with authority
to make changes in the utilization of workers within war industry.
Mr. McNuTT. I went into that at some length in my statement.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13125
LABOR UTILIZATION INSPECTOR TEAMS
Mr. Arnold. Do you think you have covered that?
Mr. McNuTT. I think I have covered that; yes. It must be done.
In other words, we cannot afford at this time to allow any plant to
hoard skilled labor. We cannot afford anything but utilization to
the highest degree of what they have.
The Chairman. You cannot rely entirely on the plants. One
might go 100 percent with you but another might not.
Mr. McNuTT. Precisely; they differ as persons differ.
Mr. Curtis. May I ask a question?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes.
Mr. Curtis. Wliat would be the qualifications of these inspectors?
Where would you get them? Would you draw skilled labor from
the plants and make them inspectors?
Mr. McNuTT. I would like to ask General McSherry to answer
the question, because that w^ill be his job in the event it is done.
The Chairman. That is a tough job.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. FRANK J. McSHERRY, DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, WASHINGTON,
D. C.
General McSherry. The inspector should have the qualifications
of an industrial engineer.
Mr. Curtis. Have you got plenty of those?
General McSherry. We have a considerable number in the
country, and they are utilized to a large extent by mdustry, and we
must go to industry to secure them. There are not many unem-
ployed. These men should have a production background as well as
be industrial engineers. They would be your key men. In addition
to that, we would send one representative of Training- Within-Indus-
try to go along with that industrial engineer, and we would send an
occupational analyst from our Employment Service, and if it is a
closed shop or if it is a union shop, we would have a representative of
labor go along.
These teams would go into those plants that are reported to be
hoarding labor or having ineffective utilization of labor or lack of
training programs, and would make recommendations to the manage-
ment on how to improve the over-all eft'ective use of manpower.
Mr. Curtis. How small a plant would you expect to include?
General McSherry. At first inspection it would be restricted to
the larger plants, but, later on we would continue until we covered all
plants. I presume when we got to the smaller plants we would not
need so complete a team, perhaps an occupational analyst could do
the job, or perhaps a training man would go in.
Mr. Curtis. How many such teams would you need?
General McSherry. I have asked that we have one for each region
at the present time, or rather I have asked for one industrial engineer
for each region and six for the national office. The training people
we have on hand at the present time. Of the occupational analysts,
we have a great number on hand, and, of course, we get the labor
representative from the local union.
13126 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
In England, they have some 660, as I recall, industrial engineers.
They vary from high-grade industrial engineers to men who come from
some small plant. They have a man at each of their local placement
services for that purpose. It may be, when we get along further, we
will have to have a much larger staff, but at the present time I think
that we could start with a relatively small staff.
Dr. Lamb. In that connection. General McSherry, what about the
team? We have heard some talk about a team composed of an
industrial engineer and a person who was experienced in occupational
analysis and some representative of a labor organization, if there was
one in the plant, and possibly that three-man team would be sufficient
for the purposes. Do you contemplate the development of such
teams?
IMPORTANCE OF IN-PLANT TRAINING
General McSherry. Yes. I would add a Training-Within-In-
dustry man because practically all personnel problems require some
sort of a training program to make effective the recommendations of
the industrial engineer or the occupational analyst.
Dr. Lamb. As a matter of fact, that would perhaps be the key to the
whole situation, particularly where you have the rapid induction that
you have going on now.
General McSherry. That is correct. As a matter of fact, one of
the biggest potential labor supplies that we have is the increase in
the productivity of the mdividual worker, and we have had certain
examples where that productivity has been increased as much as 50
percent. When we come to the tighter labor market that we now see
ahead, it is going to be essential we increase the individual's produc-
tivity through better arrangement of production lines, the flow of
materials, training, and integration of jobs.
Dr. Lamb. By using the word "individual," perhaps the emphasis
is off the pomt that I have in mind, and actually it is more a matter of
integration and of a reexamination of the uses made throughout the
plant, is it not?
General McSherry. That is correct, but the net effect is the indi-
vidual's increase in productivity; but that is accomplished through the
integration, training, and flow of materials.
Dr. Lamb. The committee has the impression that over a period of,
we will say a very short period, of a few months or even weeks in some
plants, a competent production engineer, acting as labor utilization
inspector, could transform the output of that plant.
General McSherry. I think that is a correct statement. I feel
confident that it is a correct statement, and, of course, it will become
more and more important as we get into labor situations, such as in
Portland, Greg., where there is a limited amount of housing, and there
is a big program for additional workers necessary to carry on the con-
struction of ships in the three yards of Kaiser's. If he should place
this new contract for airplanes there, it would increase the problem
tremendously. At that particular place, it would be well if we had
full utilization of the labor that they have on hand and every method
that we know of should be applied to secure the full utilization of
the individual's efforts.
Dr. Lamb. I think we would be prepared to predict, where your
skills are being effectively used and hoarders found on this type of
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13127
operation, that you can get your projected expansion in those plants
without tlie addition of workers from outside the plants.
General McSherry. That is true. Certain plants that I know of
have increased output, some 50, some 75 percent, with no increase of
personnel. That was definitely due to the application of what we
contemplate through the use of an inspector.
Mr. Arnold. Do you have any mformation on this subject?
It has come to the committee's attention that the Army Civilian
Personnel Division already has liaison inspectors in the plants of war
contractors and that these liaison mspectors already are working with
material and supply inspectors of the different services of supply.
As we understand it, these liaison ofj&cers survey labor utilization in
the plants and, working through the material supply inspectors and
through the local offices of the Employment Service and the training
programs, they are attempting to correct inadequate labor utilization
in the plant. We are told that as a result of their work, piracy of
workers by war contractors from each other has been greatly reduced.
Do you have any information on this subject?
Mr. McNuTT. There is no question about their being very useful
and they work with our own people.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES SERVE AS APPEAL BOARDS
General McSherry. May I amplify that remark somewhat? There
are, in many localities, agreements amongst employers to require a
clearance from_ other war employers before they will hire a man. We
have that in Philadelphia. We have it in Boston. We have it in
Charleston. We have it all over the country. That is an employers'
agreement. Now, the difficulty comes in having an appeal agency
for the individual worker, because many times he does not get his
clearance from his employer when he has perfectly valid reasons
to have clearance. As we set up our management-labor committees
in the local area, they act as an appeal board to eliminate friction
that has developed in certain localities. These agreements have been
worked out by manufacturers in many places, and are in effect at
the present time. The difficulty with them is that they do not
include all employers, and, of course, if you do not get all employers,
you have difficulty with the ones not included in the agreement.
The Chairman. General McSherry, I am informed that 70 percent
of the ammunition in England is turned out by factories employing
40 or less men. Why is that? because the factories are scattered
all over the country, or what?
General McSherry. I could not answer that question. I do know
that, ui some of the plants manufacturing artilleiy ammunition, they
utilize women entirely, and it may be that there are less than 40 men
in the plants, but some of these plants certainly employ more than
40 people. They have large numbers of women. In one plant manu-
facturing 6-inch shells, there is not a man in the plant. The forgings
come in, and the completed round of ammunition goes out packed.
There is not a single man in the plant, but I do not believe they have
plants with just 40 men and no one else.
I think the implication was that there was a large number of women
m those plants manufacturing the ammunition.
-42— pt. 34 6
13128 WASHINGTON HEARIN^GS
APPARENT DUPLICATION
Mr. Arnold, From the organizational chart and statement of func-
tions of the CiviUan Personnel Division of the Army, it would appear
that there is a complete duplication of the work of the War Manpower
Commission. What is your opinion of the usefulness of such
duplication?
Mr. McNuTT. I have never felt that duplication was necessary any
place. However, I do not know. That is merely rumor.
Mr. Arnold. Do you consider that the function of advising con-
tracting services on the availability of labor is primarily a function of
Civilitxn Personnel Division or the operating agency
Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Of the War Manpower Commission.
General McSherry. We have been advising the procui-ing a.gencies
of the War Department, Navy Department, and Maritune Commission,
of the labor situation for some time, as well as the War Production
Board. The greatest advantage of the Manpower Division of the
War Department is the fact that they can secure from the local in-
spectors or procurement agents of the War Department acceptance by
contractors of our policy. In other words, they have closer contact
with the procurement officers m the field than we would have, and
when we have difficulty getting a war contractor to carry out some of
our policies, the War Department's manpower representative assists
us. In fact, there is one representative of the Civilian Personnel
Division of the Army on each of our regional staffs for that purpose,
to assist us in carrying out our policies with the war contractors.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL V. McNUTT— Resumed
Mr. Arnold. Does the War Manpower Commission have authority
to issue directives to the Civilian Personnel Division of the Services
of Supply of the War Department?
Mr. McNuTT. The question has never arisen. That is not one of
the agencies listed, as I remember, on the Executive orders. Of course,
the War Department is represented on the Commission and ordinarily
in problems of that kind we would ask it to handle them.
Mr. Arnold. Some newspapers and civic organizations have as-
serted that the Fair Employment Practices Committee would be
hamstrung by its transfer to the War Manpower Commission. What
are your views on that?
Mr. McNuTT. Well, let me answer the criticism first of all. I
think the work of the committee will be strengthened because of the
help we can give them and the integration is commg along very
satisfactorily.
Mr. Arnold. How do you propose to enforce Executive Order No.
8802?
Mr. McNuTT. We will utilize everything we have to bring about
the purposes of that Executive order.
Mr. Arnold. How will the freezing order for Federal employees
operate?
Mr. McNuTT. First of all, I think the term "freezing" is unfor-
tunate. It is not that. If the committee desires, I will put into the
record the directive which was signed on Monday.^
• See p. 1S237.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13129
The Chairman. I think we would hke to have it, Governor, if you
would be kind enough to send it.
Mr. McNuTT. Yes; I will be very glad to. It is an effort to put
the Government's house in order, so that we will be best utilizing
what we have.
Mr. Arnold. I do not want to detain you too long, but I have a
few more questions.
Mr. McNuTT. All right.
POWER OVER CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Mr. Arnold. It has come to the committee's attention that the
Civil Service Commission makes no review of the job specifications
of orders for workers placed with it by Government plants — and I
understand that Government-operated plants are as greatly over-
staffed as private industry. Is it in the power of the War Manpower
Cominission to issue a directive to the Civil Service Commission in-
structing it to analyze the job requirements for all orders placed with
it by Government plants?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes; I would suppose so, but I want to say this
also, that the Civil Service Commission has cooperated in every way.
It is anxious to do a good job, and it likewise is represented on the
War Manpower Commission.
Mr. Arnold. Is it within the power of the War Manpower Com-
mission to instruct the Civil Service Commission to rmdertake labor
utilization surveys of Government-operated plants?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes.
Mr. Arnold. The committee has investigated examples of faulty
job specifications. For example, in one Government plant an order
was placed for 200 machinists. Upon review by occupational analysts
it appears that approximately 10 machinists were needed; the remain-
ing workers needed were machine operators. In general, it is our
impression that many private and public plants are tremendously
overstaffed and that labor is definitely not being used at its highest
skill or in the proper manner. This is why the committee advocated
labor utilization inspectors in the fifth interim report and why we
believe that manpower planning at the plant level is of prime impor-
tance at this tmie. Is it williin the authority of the War Manpower
Commission to require an occupational analysis of all employer orders
for workers through dnectives to the War Department and the War
Production Board?
_ Mr. McNuTT. Yes; without doubt. Of course, there are some
limitations. You must remember that whatever staff you use for that
purpose must be adequate. It would be futile to give an order if
there were no staft' available to carry it out.
The Chairman. But you are doing your very best?
Mr. McNuTT. We are utilizing everything we have.
The Chairman. But you are doing the best you can in the art of
persuasion?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. Did you say, Governor, that an appointment of
regional manpower directors was being made?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes. They have all been made but one, and that
very likely will be made this week.
13130 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
MUST ALSO BE OPERATING AGENCY
Mr. Arnold. What is your opinion of the proposal to transfer the
Employment Service by Executive order to the War Manpower
Commission itself?
Mr. McNuTT. I have asked for it.
Mr. Arnold. In your first press conference, you suggested that the
War Manpower Commission would have a minimum of operating
function and that it would be confined primarily to policy decisions.
Mr. McNuTT. I thought that was the case then. Experience has
demonstrated that we have to become an operating agency.
Mr. Arnold. And you think it has to be an operating agency?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. That is all I have.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Bender.
Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, in the beginning you seemed to
take exception or were rather concerned or distressed about a question
that was asked, and in your statem.ent you indicated the very thing
that question was about, that a national — —
Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Service act was necessary; that is
right.
Mr, Bender. So, there is no argument between us about that.
Mr. McNuTT. No; but I was objecting to gossip as to what differ-
ences of opinion might exist. I do not think that such gossip is
helpful at times like these.
Mr. Bender. We are not interested in gossip.
Mr. McNuTT. That is all it is.
Mr. Bender. We have had so much discussion about it, and we
turn on the radio and hear of it, and on the floor of Congress we have
had discussions about it, and in committee we have had discussion,
and among ourselves. Certainly, it emanates from some place.
Regarding persuasion and agreement, do you think that policy is no
longer effective?
Mr. McNuTT. Wlien it is all you have, you use it to the greatest
extent possible, but necessarily It makes for a piecemeal solution of
many problems and time is short.
Mr. Bender. You believe that the other method is more desirable?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
• Air. Bender. Governor McNutt, who is Mr. Rubicam and what
are his duties? .
Mr. McNuTT. Mr. Rubicam is the special assistant to the Chau--
man of the War Manpower Commission, and he has actually the
direction of all of our informational activities. He serves without
pay.
Mr. Bender. He is a dollar-a-year man?
Mr. McNuTT. He serves without pay.
Mr. Bender. You made a point in your paper about farm women
and how many of the women on the farms might be used in industries.
Mr. McNuTT. I was simply stating those totals. As to how many
could be used, that is a different problem.
Mr. Bender. You are not advocating taking women off the farms
and using them in industry, are you?
Mr. McNuTT. No.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13131
General McSherry. That statement was nonrural. All those
women listed were nom-ural. The only mention of rural people was
where the submarginal and subsistence farmers might be a potential
labor supply.
Mr. McNuTT. Both those were npnfarm housewives. The farm
housewives are needed on the farms right now.
Mr. Bender. That is my impression.
Mr. McNuTT. As are some of the farmers themselves who have
left their farms to go into industry.
POSITION OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICE IN PROGRAM
Mr. Bender. You made a point of the need for continuation of the
transfer of the State Employment Services to the Federal Govern-
ment, not for war manufacturing alone but as a permanent policy.
Mr. McNuTT. No; there was nothing said about that.
Mr. Bender. You indicated there was possibly a lack of coopera-
tion as the result of that undertaking, that that service was transferred
only for the war. I listened quite attentively to your paper, and
that was my impression. If I am wrong, I want to be corrected,
Mr. McNuTT. Very frankly, we want to get a job done in this war,
and I have been very much disturbed by attempts to point this
transfer out as an attempt at federalization of a good many of these
activities. Please believe me, I am honest in wanting to utilize the
Employment Service to the greatest possible extent. It is one of our
great operating arms, but we are suffering now by losses of our own
key personnel simply because we cannot hold these people due to the
limitation in the appropriations act. That is one thing. They are
leaving us to go and become personnel managers in plants at two
and three times the salary they have been receiving, and, frankly, I
cannot blame these people as individuals. You can appeal to them
to stay, that this is a patriotic duty to stay, but, after all, their own
economic status has something to do with it.
Mr. Bender. My State is Ohio, and, from my understanding of
the employment situation in Ohio, that is, the State Employment
Service, I understand that it is now wholly under Federal supervision.
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Bender. And there is no conflict there at all.
Mr. McNuTT. There is no conflict, except a very natural reaction
on the part of those who are members of that service. They under-
stand that the transfer is made for the period of the war. They are,
therefore, subject to such pressures as may be applied at the State
level. I am just talking about the natural reaction of a person.
Here is an important operating agency. It will become more and
more important as their activities go on in this war. It should be
brought to the highest point of efficiency.
Mr. Bender. Governor, is there a duplication of effort at the present
time in connection with the work that is outlined for the War Man-
power Commission and the Selective Service Commission and the
Army and Navy? Is there a cooperative spirit existing there alto-
gether, or is there considerable duplication at the present time?
Mr. McNuTT. No; I do not see any duphcation as far as Selective
Service is concerned, for one. How much is going on in the War
13132 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS
Department, I do not know; but, as I say, the War Department and
the Navy Department are both represented on the War Manpower
Commission, one by a special assistant to the Secretary of War, and
the other by the Under Secretary of the Navy; and we have been
reasonably successful in getting the desires of the War Manpower
Commission carried out.
PLANT INSPECTIONS BY ARMY AND NAVY
Mr. Bender. Governor, both you and the general made the point
of need for these inspectors in plants. Aly information from the
Cleveland plants, for example, is that the inspection is now being
carried, and very adequately, both by the Army and the Navy.
Is that your opinion?
General McSherry. The inspection of the Army and the Navy
which is carried on regularly is an inspection of materials. They are
interested in seeing that the specifications of an item are complied
with and that a certain quality of steel, for instance, goes into a given
item. That is the normal inspection that is carried on by the Army
and Navy.
As far as an inspector for the utilization of labor, that has not been
established by the Army or Navy in any degree. Of course, indi-
vidual instances always come to the top where maybe some man who
has had an industrial background is a commissioned officer and he
might make suggestions, but, as a planned proposition, the Army and
Navy are not making inspections for the determination of effective
utilization of workers in these war plants.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
Mr. Bender. Governor, if manpower planning is to be done on a
local level where the job, after all, is actually going to be done, will the
labor inspectors need the cooperation of management and labor within
the war industry and within the war planning, and what relationship
do you envisage between the management-labor production committee
and the utilization inspectors?
Mr. McNuTT. There is no question, we must have the help of both
management and labor, and our plan, of course, includes the setting
up of a labor-management committee in every area in which we oper-
ate. They will work in close connection, and in some instances, the
W. P. B. labor-management committee will have the same personnel
as our own.
Mr. Bender. Do you think that the management-labor production
committees, insofar as they do production planning within the plants
are also doing manpower planning within the plant?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes; of course they are. That is like a seamless
web, utilization of manpower and production. They are parts of
the same thing, but we work with them, they work with us. We have
gone to this extent: Mr. Nelson and I, by agreement, have made our
regions coextensive, and we, for example, have moved two regional
offices in order that they may be in the same place to avoid loss of
time, and wherever possible they will be in the same building. We
look upon this as partnership act,ivity.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13133
Mr. Bender. You feel, then, that the entire management-labor
production committee set-up should be a part of the War Manpower
Commission?
Mr. McNuTT. No. We are not asking for that. They represent
the War Production Board. As I say, our people work together in
the field. They are so instructed, and I have no reports of any failure
to cooperate at any level. .
Mr. Bender. Has any thought been given to the question of pro-
duction as it relates to manpower? For example, if a man is hired
and paid for 8 hours' work, that there be some standard set as to how
much work he should perform in that 8 hours?
Mr. McNuTT. Necessarily, you must consider a question of that
kind.
Mr. Bender. Is the standard of production on the basis of the
survey that you have made reached pretty generally by the employees
in the industry?
peak of INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVITY NOT YET REACHED
Mr. McNuTT. 1 should say not. In other words, we can do more,
and it is going to be necessary to do more. There have been some
other factors brought to bear upon that, supply of materials, for
example; the plant being unwilling to release its men because its
activities were hampered by lack of materials at that time. Of course,
you can appreciate the reason for that. Why destroy your organiza-
tion when you know that perhaps next week you have the material to
go ahead? The thing has not geared as well as anyone would like
it, but once again it has been due to a number of factors perhaps not
within the control of anyone.
General McSherry. When you consider the shipbuilding industry
had only 60,000 workers in 1940 and now has 700,000, obviously
the men working in shipyards have not reached their peak production
and their individual productivity is one of our largest sources of
potential manpower. That has not been reached in the aircraft
industry or the shipbuilding or the munition industry, because they
have all expanded from a very small productive force up toward a
million or more this year. Obviously they have brought in men who
have not had the chance to be trained and they have not reached that
point of productivity that you mentioned. There is a big field to
develop at the present time.
Mr. Bender. I would like to ask you. Governor McNutt, regarding
the recruitment of doctors. Is it your opinion that voluntary recruit-
ment of doctors is haphazard and the worst type of compulsion?
Mr. McNuTT. Well, it was the "great experiment." The medical
profession came in and said they could do it on a voluntary basis,
and I said: "All right. If you want to try it I will give you all the
help I can."
I do want to say that that service has been improved, remarkably
improved. Of course, I think you realize some of the difficulties
when you are dealing with professional men.
Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, what is your opinion regarding
this whole manpower question? Is it your opinion that your agency
is equipped to handle this whole problem in the event that there is
that single authority granted by a national manpower act?
13134 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. McNuTT. Well, it is indicated that that is where it belongs.
We need more help. For example, in asking for help from the
Employment Service, I went in with a letter from the President,
approved by the Budget committee, asking for $19,000,000, and I
got $2,400,000.
The Chairman. None of the members of this committee are on
that committee.
Mr. McNuTT. No ; I realize that.
Mr. Bender. I would like to ask this question. Governor, and I
am asking it in good faith. We are here because we are part of a
political system, and, of necessity, we are elected as a part of a political
system, either by one group or the other, and by the citizens generally.
I do not mind talking out loud about the fact that the country is
generally concerned about this manpower issue being on a nonpartisan
basis, that is, so that there cannot be any question raised as to some-
body, somewhere, using this as a vehicle, not only for the war efl'ort
but for some political purpose, and I am sure that is not in your mmd.
It is not m mine, but I feel very strongly about the need for em-
phasizing that point, and I think you should not resent my making
this statement so that the opportunity is presented for emphasis on
that basis, and so we are not confronted with the constant specter of
the issue of politics being raised at any time. Do you care to make
any comment on that issue?
Mr. McNuTT. First of all, to my knowledge, there has been no
criticism that the operations of the Manpower Commission have been
dictated by any partisan political considerations and, if such criticism
were made, it would have absolutely no basis.
Mr. Bender. I think that is all.
Mr. Curtis. I have a question or two.
BASIC CAUSES OF WASTE
What are the basic causes of waste of skill, the waste of labor and
the hoarding of the same? .
Mr. McNuTT. I tried to set out at length m a publication, last
Sunday in the New York Times Magazine entitled "Waste," some
of the things, and if the committee likes, I will put that in the record.
Mr. Curtis. There is a certain amount of waste that you can hardly
escape in going through an experunental period of expansion like the
General cited in reference to shipbuilding, employing 60,000 men and
going to 700,000 men.
Mr. McNuTT. And those instances are multiplied. I mentioned a
moment ago the Sperry operation. They have 10 times the employees
there, and that is a highly skilled operation.
Mr. Curtis. That is something time will cure, won't it?
Mr. McNuTT. Yes; time and attention.
Mr. Curtis. What are the other causes? Is it intentional on any-
body's part? Why would somebody waste skills
Mr. McNuTT. (interposing). It is perfectly human to want to keep
what you have now, anticipating future demands. Of course, there
have been some horrible examples. One firm had, I thmk, 240
engineers to do a job, which, even projected in the future, would not
have required it to exceed one-tenth of that number. That is
hoarding.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13135
Mr. Curtis. Was that a cost-plus job, or did the carrying of all of
those engineers cost the concern out of its own pocket?
Mr. McNuTT. It is not cost-plus. That is, as I understand it, it
is cost plus a fixed fee these days, so that the actual expenditure is not
reflected in the fee itself. That would not be the reason.
Mr. Curtis. It did not cost the concern anything to waste that
much skill?
Mr. McNuTT. I suppose not.
Mr. Curtis. Is there any other basic cause for the waste of skill?
General McSherry. There is one cause; that is in common practice
in certain machine-tool companies. Every man was a qualified tool
maker. Now, as a matter of fact, as necessity develops, you can
break jobs down so that machine operators can do many of the
operations normally performed by a tool maker. Some companies
have not done so. In other words, they are now having qualified
tool makers sit and watch a lathe, drill press, or milling machine
operation for a number of hours during the day. That is probably
one of the most common causes, and the reason for it was that there
were tool makers available to do those jobs. It has been a habit of
the companies, and, in agreements with the unions, it was stated
that there v/oukl be tool makers for those particular jobs. We have
such a case now. We are going out to Detroit next week to try to
break it.
SKILLED LABOR INSURANCE
Now, manpower insurance or skilled labor msurance, as we call it,
is another cause. A company that is expanding, particularly an
au'craft company, shipbuilding or munitions company, is asked at
regular intervals, I won't say regular but at varying intervals, to
increase their production, to start a new plant somewhere, or to take
over some converted civilian production plant. That means they
have to take key personnel from the home plant or parent plant and
place it in this new plant. Obviously, if they can get a backlog of
skilled workers and technical and professional people, it is much
simpler to start this new plant.
Mr. Bender. Is that a loss?
Mr. McNuTT. Of course, that is a loss.
General McSherry. Of course, if they do not get a contract.
Mr. Bender. Yes; it would be a loss if they did not get a contract,
but how much time
Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Failure to utilize skills presently is a
loss. It is bound to be a loss but
Mr. Bender (interposing). But how much of a loss in time are you
gomg to forego before you pull that man out of the factory and put
him in somebody's else's factory, and how many miles are you gomg
to move hun?
Mr. McNuTT. We have not the authority to do it.
Air. Bender. I mean, if you get what you are asking for. If here,
is a concern that has a certain skill and because they want to keep
him, they use him all the time and have him do something else — what
is going to be your measuring stick as to what to do about that?
General McSherry. Take the man out of there if there was no need
for that mm in the next 2 or 3 weeks. If you had tool makers in
Detroit during this conversion period not emploved as tool makers
13136 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
but on some other job in the plant, when Ford, Chrysler, Bri2-o:s, and
Murray needed tool makers, you would not allow the tool makers to
sit around doing some other job than tool making during a long
period.
Mr. Curtis. Of course, you have in Detroit a concentration of
industry tliere that you would not have in some of the other work that
is scattered over a wider area; isn't that true?
General McSherry. We have many places with concentrated in-
dustries. Philadelphia probably has much more than Detroit and
more need for tool makers. Of course, Detroit's problem came all of
a sudden. In February they cut out automobile production and
those plants had to be converted to war production. They all needed
tool makers to retool the plants, and we had to put out instructions
to various manufacturers in other cities j^ot to recruit tool makers
in Detroit. The.y thought there was an ample supply of tool makers,
and a good chance to recruit. They complied with our request and
got out of Detroit.
Mr. Curtis. To what extent is waitmg for needed materials a
factor in the waste of production?
WASTE THROUGH UNEVEN FLOW OF MATERIALS
General McSherry. For instance, the California Shipbuilding Co:
was short of materials and they had about 5,000 additional workers
over and above what they could utiUze. Now, they did not know
how soon they would get those materials. They had priorities for
them, and obviously the thing the company would do would be to
hold those men until such time as they did get more materials. Of
course, the Maritune Commission is reopening those contracts and
readjusting them, so that each company will know what materials
they will have in the future. That is, of course, a temporary proposi-
tion.
Another company, the Portland Shipbuilding Co. at Portland, had
28,000 employees and, under the readjustment, they will need 24,000.
What they will do is to transfer those men over to their Vancouver
yard.
We have no figures on all the plants that have been affected by
shortage of materials, and, of course, again, how many men there are
idle because of shortage of material and that are still held by the com-
pany is a very difficult figure to get.
IVir. Curtis. Well, does the answer lie in manpower planning or
in material planning?
General McSherry. Material planning must be such that there
will be a uniform movement of material to the plant. If you do not
have that, you are going to waste manpower. If you send into a
plant material enough to employ 4,000 men for 3 months and then
that supplv of material is cut off and you employ 1,000 men for
2 months and then you put in material for 4,000, vou are wasting
manpower because in that interval you cannot utilize those 3,000
men in another plant. You can hardly eet them placed and pro-
ducing in another plant before they are called back to the first plant.
To my mind, a uniform flow of material should be given to every
plant in order to conserve manpower. From a manpower viewpoint,
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13137
an even flow of material or increasing flow, but a predicted flow that
will be lived up to, should be given to every plant.
The Chairman: General McSherry, in England, as I understand
it, the way they handle it there regarding priorities and supplies, you
give a formal contract accompanying the priority for material; is
that correct?
Genernl McSherry. That is correct. From our viewpoint a
uniform flow of material to the plant would mean uniform employ-
ment, and uniform employment is the best way to conserve your
labor supply. If you have an irregular flow of material so there
would be irregular emplovment, you wDste manpower.
Mr. Curtis. That is perhaps one of the biggest factors in the waste
of manpower, wouldn't you say?
Mr. McNuTT. It would be considerable.
General McSherry. I think it would be considerable in manpower.
I think you are correct.
Mr. Curtis. I understand the number of regional offices is 12.
How many area offices do you think will be established?
WAR MANPOWER STAFF
Mr. McNuTT. It looks to us as if in the end we will need probably
200. We have appropriations for 25.
Mr. Curtis. Mr. McNutt, the four gentlemen with you, do they
constitute your entire staff in Washington?
Mr. McNuTT. No.
Mr. Curtis. About how many do you have as principal experts on
your staff?
Mr. McNuTT. One hundred and thirty plus the national roster
plus the procurement and assignment, a total of around 500.
Mr. Curtis. Is that your total number of employees?
Mr. McNutt. Here in Washington; yes. I made the division —
150 as far as the War Manpower Commission staff itself is concerned,
but the numbers are on the roster staff.
Mr, Curtis. Which roster is that?
Mr. McNuTT. That is the professional and scientific roster which
we maintain, and which is the pool to which all agencies go for
scientific personnel.
Mr. Curtis. Maybe I should not have used the word "staff." I
think perhaps we are using it interchangeably with "total employees."
If you have a staff meeting, how many people come? In other words,
I see you have four advisers around you this morning. I want to
know if that is all of them; or how many you have got?
Mr. McNuTT. The staff meeting would be about a dozen — the Chief
of Operations, and the heads of our various divisions.
Mr. Curtis. You do not need to do it now, but if you would have
someone submit a list of those dozen individuals, together with what
industry or department they are now with, we would like to have
that for the record.
Mr. McNuTT. We would be very glad to give you an organization
chart and make it a part of the record.
13138 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS
(The material subsequently submitted by Mr. McNutt is as
follows:)
Principal Staff Members of War Manpower Commission
Paul V. McNutt Chairman.
Fowler V. Harper Deputy Chairman.
Arthur J. Altmeyer Executive Director.
Alvin Roseman Assistant Executive Director.
Harold Dotterer Chief, Administrative Service.
Bernard C. Gavit General Counsel.
Raymond Rubicam Special Assistant to the Chair-
man on Informational Activ-
ities.
Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry, United States Director of Operations.
Army.
Joseph P. Tufts Chief, Housing and Transporta-
tion Service.
John J. Corson Chief, Industrial and Agricul-
tural Employment Division.
Brig. Gen. William C. Rose, United States Chief, Military Division.
Army.
W. W. Alexander Chief, Minority Groups Service.
Robert C. Weaver Chief, Negro Manpower Service.
Lawrence W. Cramer Executive Secretary, President's
Committee on Fair Employ-
ment Practices.
Edward C. Elliott Chief, Professional and Technical
Personnel Division.
Leonard Carmichael Director, National Roster of Sci-
entific and Specialized Per-
sonnel.
Frank H. Lahey Chairman, Procurement and As-
signment Service.
Philip Van Wyck Acting Chief, Training Division.
William Haber Director, Planning Service.
Frederick Stephan Director, Statistical Service.
Mr. Curtis. The job to be done caused you to change your sight
as to the type of organization you would have to have smce the War
Manpower Commission was formed?
Mr. McNutt. That is right.
Mr. Curtis. I gather from the stories that have appeared along in
the press, that it was the original intention that the Manpower Com-
mission would determine the policy. Has that been changed to
where your staff determines the policy and the Commission ratifies
or is an advisory group?
Mr. McNutt. Well, of course, these matters are submitted to the
Commission. You receive the advice of the Commission. The
authority is in the chairman. Matters are put on the agenda at the
suggestion of Commission members or they may be submitted by the
staff. It does not make any difference what the source is.
AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER
Mr. Curtis. As a former Governor of a great State, which State,
of course, has some submarginal land the same as the State I come
from, you mentioned it would become necessary to move these
farmers off submarginal land and to other occupations and perhaps
to better land. The submarginal farmers are paying taxes and
interest, or trying to pay interest, not the mortgageholder who owns
the land with the farmer as tenant: What provision should be made
OFFICE OF P»ESI»E»T
r^^^^
i HOUSING AKO TR*NSP0RT»TION I IHOySTRlAl OPERiSTIOHS 1
cnHSi'LTfli.T stavtce [ | comsulTi>wt service |
y4^
H^EE!^
Organization Chart of War Manpower Commission.
C0396 — 42 (Facep. 1313S)
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13139
if that has to be done to protect the landowner of this submarginal
land with respect to taxes?
Mr. McNuTT. Considerations of fairness would indicate that some
provisions should be made to protect him against loss and it does
seem obvious now that it will be necessary to utilize farm labor on
land which is productive. In other words, the submarginal, the
subsistence farm would, in the event change must be made, be the
first to go necessarily.
Mr. Arnold. The Federal Government is going to have to provide
taxes and interest?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Mr. Arnold. And investment?
Mr. McNuTT. That is right; otherwise it would amount to confisca-
tion,
Mr. Curtis. Does this Commission go into the field of agriculture
from the point of determining the needs for food for ourselves and
our allies and the number of men required for it?
Mr. McNuTT. No. Of course, that obligation rests elsewhere.
We get that information to determine what we need by way of man-
power for agriculture. It is production that is determined in the
War Production Board and the contracting agencies, and they let
us know what manpower they need, and we try to adjust that. We
get an over-all picture necessarily because we are dealmg with the
entire manpower supply.
Mr. Bender. I have another question, Mr. Chairman — before I
asked it, someone handed me this note. I think you have already
answered this question in your paper, but in any event this is the
question:
Governor McNutt, if we operated under a national-service act,
would that enable the Manpower Commission to compel employ-
ment of Negroes and stop the present and continued discrimination
which neither it nor the Employment Service Committee seem
to correct on a large scale? The Negroes have to keep waiting despite
400,000 sons in United States military service, and their parents beg
for jobs.
I think you covered that?
Mr. McNuTT. I think I covered that, and certainly we have given
our earnest attention in an effort to stop discrimination agamst
Negroes or other minority groups.
The Chairman. So has the President himself.
Mr. McNuTT. And I want to gay that great progress has been
made. You do not break down prejudice overnight. It has taken
persuasion and everything else we can bring to bear, but it is per-
fectly obvious, of course, that they will be utilized.
NATIONAL SERVICE ACT DISCUSSED
Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, if a national-service act is passed,
does that mean that the Army no longer determines its needs?
Mr. McNuTT. Of course, the determination of needs should be
based upon a consideration of all of the factors, for it is not enough to
say we wUl have an Army of a certain size. You not only consider the
military needs, meet them insofar as you can, but armed forces must
have supporting economy. You cannot destroy it and maintain
13140 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
armed forces. That balance must be kept, and the problena is being
studied, now, by those who are responsible, taking into consideration
our total manpower pool. I signed a letter this morning in response
to two questions.
Mr. Bender. Wliat about an occupational deferment policy versus
quotas, that is, how would you handle that? Quotas for the Army
as compared to quotas for occupational deferment?
Mr. McNuTT. It seems to me that such problems would have to be
determined by, well, let us say a committee consisting of representa-
tives of the armed forces, the War Production Board and War Man-
power. That is, in determining the size of the armed forces, certainly
those who make the call should take into consideration our productive
capacity and likewise our supply, our total supply, of manpower.
Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, is it your opinion that the Presi-
dent now has sufficient authority to establish what is discussed here
as a national-service act? Is it necessary for additional legislation to
be passed by Congress in order to establish such authority, or does the
President now have that authority?
Mr. McNuTT. Well, if I may revert to my former occupational
calling, you are asking me as a lawyer
Mr. Bender (interposing). I am not a lawyer, myself.
Mr. McNuTT. I am not so sure that I am any more, but I feel that
legislation is necessary, that is, to remove any doubt whatever. It is
so vital and it is something that the Congress of the United States
should give public expression to as representing the idea of the people.
I think the people are ready for it.
Mr. Bender. Thank you very much.
Dr. Lamb. Governor McNutt, you reassured the committee as
to the cooperation between the agencies involved with your work.
Isn't the question, however, one of effectiveness of procedures? I
would like to paint a picture as we got it yesterday from General
Hershey so you can see what seemed to be the proportions that are
now developing.
General Hershey did not say that a 13,000,000-man Army was
now in progress, but whether he did or not, there is a popular concept
that a 13,000,000-man Army is not inconceivable. General Hershey
made the statement that a 10,000,000-man Army is now m sight.
If we take that number of people, and we are taking them, as General
Hershey said yesterday, at a very rapid rate, out of civihan life and
particularly out of war production, the question of the effectiveness
of procedures is going to become overnight a much more serious
question even than it has been recently. I think we can all agree
it has been getting increasingly serious. Consequently, the problem
that confronts lis is that unless you have simultaneously an orderly
plan for withdrawals which is keyed into an orderly plan for utilization
of labor, not merely for the moment, but projected into the future,
how are we going to lick the manpower question?
I would like to say one more thing in terms of projection. A
13,000,000-man Army or 10,000,000-man Army is going to take a
great deal more production. 1 do not say a great deal more productive
workers, although it will, but a great deal more production than we are
getting today. The President himself said we are at 50 percent of
capacity, or something of that kind.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13141
Now, the problem, as it seems to confront the countiy at the
moment, is what comes first in the way of reorganization to meet
the occasion? The committee in its fifth interim report said that the
problem of compulsion was undeniably ahead of us, that the question
of timing was the fundamental question, so that between the timing
of compulsion and the institution of these particular reorganizations
and realinements, your judgment is, as stated in the paper which
you presented, and in your testimony this morning, that the National
Service Act comes first, at least I presume that that would be your
judgment?
Mr. McNuTT. Not necessarily first. I think if these things could
be as nearly simultaneous as possible, it would be well.
Dr. Lamb. I agree with you that it would be well if they could be
as nearly simultaneous as possible, although I am no politician or
judge of such matters, as the members of the committee are •
Mr. Bender (interposing). We resent that.
Dr. Lamb. But it would seem to me to be reassuring to the country
to feel that initial steps have been taken first, and the problem, as
stated in the fifth interim report on the question of the lack of meshing
between the flow of materials and the flow of manpower, is considered so
the emphasis is placed on the fact that until the flow of materials is
more properly scheduled and better arranged, your job— —
Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Becomes more difficult.
Dr. Lamb (continuing). Is almost insurmountable in terms of pro-
portion of the job now developing. In other words, that this other
thing has got to be licked first, or at least we have got to see our way
forward along that line first.
Mr. McNuTT. As I look at tliis effort, it must be a joint effort on
the part of those who have been given responsibility; in other words,
those who are charged with the armed forces, those who are charged
with production, and those who ai^e charged with manpower should
sit down and frankly review the facts. It will be our business to tell
them what the manpower situation is, and the military needs, of course,
feel the impact of the productive capacity and the supply of manpower
and all those factors must be considered in any of these determina-
tions^— what our commitments would be under lend-lease, and every-
thing else of the kind.
BALANCING MANPOWER NEEDS AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
Dr. Lamb. But, at the present time, is it not fair to say we are not
organized and equipped to match manpower needs of a military type
with military requirements for materiel which are, in turn, manpower
needs on the war-industry front? In other words, from here out we
are in a war economy,
Mr. McNuTT. That is right.
Dr. Lamb. And as you said at the beginning of your remarks, the
war economy requires that manpower for war industry and essential
civilian industries be recognized as a part of that war economy and
not something that can be done without organized plan?
Mr. McNuTT. You have these needs to meet; you have your armed
forces. _ You must supply them. You must feed them, and at the
same time you must have an economy that will support them. That
13142 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
is, it has to be a balance. You keep adjusting as you go along to ni
the needs as they arise.
Dr. Lam;b. In some of his remarks a few minutes ago, General
McSherry says it is a loss if they do not get a contract. This seems
to me to sum up, in the shortest possible space, what is wrong. The
present attitude of those in charge of war production is and has been
that whether these groups get a contract is dependent upon whether
or not they make a successful bid. Now, the fact of the matter is
that there are latent capacities, there is productive capacity, there are
workers, and whether or not they get a contract is a matter of the
location at which they find themselves on a list of bids. If we intend
to fully utilize these workers and these machines, we must have a
system for taking the workers out of plants where they are not to be
used for using them in the plants where they now find themselves and
not questioning whether or not that particular plant has come up to
the mark in some abstract particular. If we really want the goods,
we will ask for it.
I will give you an example from the committee's own experience
which I think illustrates this thing as well as I can. We had a pro-
ducer from Decatur, 111., who was a bidder in shell production. This
plant had been the mother plant for the retooling of a plant in Chat-
tanooga. This plant was affiliated with another corporation which
was practically identical in ownership and control in Canada. The
Canadian plant had been producing shells since 1937. The Decatur
plant had bid and been unsuccessful in its bid. As the committee's
investigation indicated, its bid was turned down not because shells
were not needed throughout the country but because the ordnance
district within which it found itself had met its particular quota.
Now, this situation has, since the entrance of the country in the war —
that was last November — -undoubtedly been improved, if not com-
pletely corrected, not necessarily in respect to this plant, but through-
out ordnance districts; but the approach prevails, the Chattanooga
plant gets the contract; its ordnance district has a quota and that
plant is able to meet the requirements and quota. The plant which
tooled it up, the plant that has the "know how," as people in Washing-
ton like to say, does not get it. The workers in that plant have a
choice of going to Chicago for a job, let us say, or sitting where they
are and waiting for that plant to be a successful bidder.
Now, that seems to be the nature of the problem. Would you
agree?
Mr. McNuTT. That is simply one of the problems.
Dr. Lamb, Isn't it pretty close to the center of the problems?
Mr. McNuTT. I would not put a finger on it and say that is the
whole problem. It is not.
Dr. Lamb. Well, let's state it this way: You have the contracts in
the services. You have materials controlled in War Production
Board and the manpower in the Manpower Commission. Each of
these is essentia] to the plan. How can we from here out plan produc-
tion as a whole around those three separate agencies and their three
operating functions?
Mr. McNuTT. By the three sitting down together. That should be
simple.
Dr. Lamb. It should be, but it has not been to date.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13143
ir. McNuTT. I am not here to argue with you on that. I do my
part of it, but the suggestion which you imply, I Ukewise put in writ-
ing, as I say, this morning.
The Chairman. Governor McNutt, you have certainly been very
patient and also the gentlemen with you.
Mr. McNuTT. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and members of the com-
mittee. If we can be of any further service, Mr. Chairman, you only
have to call I think as you well know.
The Chairman. We will adjourn until 9:15 o'clock tomorrow
morning in this room.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 9:15 a. m,,
Thursday, September 17, 1942.)
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1942
MORNING SESSION
House of Representatives,
Select Committee Investigating
National Defense Migration,
Washington, D. C.
The special committee met at 9:15 a. m., iii room 1102 New House
Office Building, Washington, D. C, Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of California;
John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; George H. Bender, of Ohio; Carl T.
Curtis, of Nebraska; and Laurence F. Arnold, of Illinois.
Also present: Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director.
Mr. Curtis. I think we might as well start.
Mr. Lund, we are ready whenever you are.
TESTIMONY OF WENDELL LUND, DIRECTOR, LABOR PRODUCTION
DIVISION, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Curtis. Mr. Lund, please give to the reporter your full name
and the title of your present position.
Mr. Lund. I am Wendell Lund, Director of the Labor Production
Division of the War Production Board, and I am also a member of the
War Manpower Commission.
Mr. Curtis. How long have you been with the War Production
Board?
Mr. Lund. Since the 1st of May, Congressman.
Mr. Curtis. With whom were you connected before that?
Mr. Lund. I was director of the Michigan Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission.
Mr. Curtis. For how long?
Mr. Lund. For a period of some 9 months.
Mr. Curtis. How long have you been engaged in personnel and
labor problems?
Air. Lund. For 9 years. Before that I was a member for some
years ot a large international union.
Mr. Curtis. What particular training have you had in that?
Mr. Lund. Training in labor problems and labor economics, and
then this experience starting in 1934.
Mr. Curtis. Mr. Lund, you may submit to the reporter whatever
brief statement you wish inserted in the record.
13145
13146 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
(The- statement submitted by Mr. Lund is as follows:)
STATEMENT BY WENDELL LUND, DIRECTOR, LABOR PRODUC_
TION DIVISION, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.
When I appeared before your committee in June,i I pointed out the change of
function that took place in the Labor Production IDivision when it ceased to be
the Labor Division. Until the estabhshment of the War Manpower Commission
in April 1942, the Labor Division of the War Production Board was responsible
for the national Labor Supply and Training Program. Under the Executive
order, these functions were transferred to the War Manpower Commission.
This transfer gave the Labor Production Division the opportunity to devote
itself wholeheartedly to the functions which I described to this committee in
June. At that time, as the committee will recall, I said, "The LaVjor Production
Division of the War Production Board * * * jg founded on two premises:
(1) That the implements of war cannot be turned out without full and intelligent
utilization of our democratic labor force; (2) that labor participation in the design
and management of the war production program is essential to maximum pro-
duction. The Labor Production Division is going to do everything possible to
insure labor's participation in the war production program, and to interpret the
problems of the war production program to labor groups."
This conception of our job in the Labor Prodtiction Division as one of service
to labor both broadens and narrows the interest of the Division in questions of
manpower. It is broadened in the sense that every one of the multifarious ways
labor is affected by the war production and war manpower programs of the
Government is our concern. It is narrowed by the fact that no longer is it our
responsibility to operate the programs, but only to promote the participation of
labor therein. An understanding of this change is important as the background
of this testimony, because I want to express what I believe to be labor's major
concern on questions of manpower.
It need hardly be said that the problems of manpower, of their relation to
production in wartime are extraordinarily difficult and complex. In the first
place, we are seeking to replace the peacetime mechanics of manning American
industry, which in ordinarv times have been left to the free play of economic and
personal motive, with an organized, directed flow of manpower into war activity.
In the second place, we are not only manning the most tremendous army in the
Nation's history, but at the same time, embarking on the most stupendous pro-
gram of industrial output ever undertaken in the history of the world. In the
third place, we are dealing not with tangible materials, but with men and women
And the relationships with which we deal are those that he at the very heart of
our society — those between man and family, between employer and worker,
between the individual and Government. Thus, the decisions we make in the
field of manpower, and the way we make them, may in large part determine whether
or not our kind of democracy will survive.
I beheve that three major aspects of manpower are of particular concern to
(1)" The creation of agencies which would guarantee the most eflTicient division
of available manpower between the fighting forces and the nonmilitary war and
civilian industries. j r ai, j
(2) the establishment of a working relationship between the needs of the armed
orces for war materiel, the production of that materiel, and the Nation's supply
of workers. ... ,,
(3) the most efficient division and utiUzation of the manpower outside the
arn ed forces for the maximum war effort.
With regard to the first, labor has long held the view that the basic manpower
problem is to divide the Nation's men and women between the armed forces and
everything else. The purpose of this division is easy enough to state. It is
simply that we want to create the largest and most efficient allied force we can,
on the one hand, and to equip it with the tools for victory. This means that
some authority has to make the decision that present strategic considerations call
for armed services of, say, 10 or 12 million, and that the remaining manpower
■can equip it satisfactorily.
1 See Washington hearings, pt. 33, p. 12503.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13147
Until the War Manpower Commission was created, at least a dozen different
Government agencies were splashing around in the pool of manpower with little
coordination. The Manpower Commission was provided as an instrument by
which the fundamental decisions of policy on manpower might be applied. As yet,
however, neither the Manpower Commission nor the other agencies involved are
equipped with the basic facts about the size of the armed services we now want
to create, nor the size of the production program necessary to equip our fighting
men.
The longer such a decision is delayed, the more serious danger we run of going
to excess either in one direction or another. On the one hand, workers may be
taken out of jobs into the Army in such a way as to cripple the production that
the armed services need for their maximum efficiency. On the other hand, there
is danger that the armed forces may be denied the men they need to operate the
war machine. I cannot see how either the War Manpower Commission or the
Selective Service can be expected to do their jobs the way they ought to be done
until they know much more exactly just what is required.
The present methods of recruiting manpower for the Army and Navy add to
the difficulties. Until very recently, we were faced with the fact that the Navy
was recruiting, without restriction, building up its entire force from voluntary
enlistments. The Army has been using both the Selective Service and a restricted
recruitment. In addition, both services have been recruiting commissioned men
and setting up a number of special commissioned reserves. Within the last few
days, the Army and Navy have announced their intention of restricting their
recruiting efforts somewhat, but these decisions were made independently, and
not inside the framework of a basic manpower machinery.
The net effect of this situation has been to make more difficult the orderly
withdrawal of manpower from civilian life, a withdrawal carried on in cooperation
with those responsible for maintaining production. In some cases there has been
vigorous competition between the services for manpower.
The result of this in many cases has been serious injury to industry, by the
loss of skilled men who are gravely needed for its operation. We recognize that
the armed forces need skilled men, but such men must be withdrawn in an orderly
fashion so that our industries will not be crippled. Furthermore, it is most
unfair to men in industry to demand, on the one hand, that they stay at their
work benches, and, on the other, to subject them to patriotic appeals to enlist
voluntarily in the armed' forces. American woi-kers are the most patriotic workers
in the world; and to face them with such a confusion of advices is wholly incon-
sistent with sound manpower policy.
Labor has clearly indicated its view in this matter. It has called for the end
of voluntary enlistments, and the supplying of manpower for the armed forces
through an efficient and enlarged use of selective service.
RELATIONSHIP OF MANPOWER TO PRODUCTION
Of special interest, too, is the relationship of manpower to production. It
should not be necessary to remind anyone that manpower is so integrally related
to production, that the man is closely related to the work of the machine, and that
the two can hardly be thought of separately. Yet, because the problems are
separated on an administrative chart, the subjects are sometimes considered to
be separate.
Early this summer, labor again raised this issue forcibly. Unions in the metal
fabricating industries were finding scattered instances of plant slowdown and
even shutdowns for the lack of raw materials. They have found that skilled men
were being made idle and machines stopped, men and machines which were in
the greatest demand for the war effort. They found themselves and their
membership gravely puzzled by being exhorted one day to work to the maximum,
and the next being thrown out of work by lack of materials or parts to work on.
The result of this concern was a request to the Labor Production Division for
a meeting with the operating heads of the War Production Board so that these
questions might be discussed. For 2 days, the major officials of the War Pro-
duction Board sat down with the labor men and discussed the problem. The
labor men were unrestrained in their demands that the necessary steps be taken
to insure that plants should no longer be necessarily shut down because of short-
ages of parts and materials. They emphatically called upon the War Production
Board to assume responsibility for the scheduling of production and of raw ma-
terials that might be necessary to accomplish this end. And they asked that
labor be given an opportunity to participate in accomplishing these ends. I
believe their propositions were wholly sound.
13148 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Before there can be established a reasonable relationship between manpower
and production, before the necessary decisions and steps can be taken to man
the Nation's industry, several things need to be done:
(1) A determination must be made of total production program, as accurately
as possible.
(2) This program must be translated into raw materials and component parts
and scheduled so that materials and parts are ready when and where they are
needed.
When these two things are done it will be possible to place American workers
where they are most needed in the war effort, and to use them to their maximum
capacities.
Just how far we are from attaining the goal of relating the allocation of work
to the availability of manpower was shown by a study of the War Manpower
Commission. That study showed that of a total of more than 6>^ billion in war
supply contracts, let between May 1 and July 31, 1942, only 12 percent went to
labor surplus areas; 53.8 percent went to prospective labor shortage areas; and
28.1 percent went to current labor shortage areas. This shows clearly that
little regard is being given by the contract-letting agencies to the problems of labor
supply.
A particular example of what can be done to relate manpower requirements to
the production job is provided by the steps that were taken in copper and other
nonferrous metals. It so happens that the Labor Production Division has
equipped itself with an especially competent staff in this field, and has been able to
work very closely with both the unions and the affected branch of the War Pro-
duction Board Materials Division. Following is a brief summary of the work
that is being done in this field. It must be realized, of course, that such problems
are extraordinarily complex, and that such a short document can barely scratch
the surface.
The Labor Production Division participated with the Office of Price Adminis-
tration and the Copper Branch in a report to the War Production Board on
February 19, 1942, and called for a labor-management production drive in the
copper, lead, and zinc mines to improve morale as a means of raising labor produc-
tivity. Underground mining is not a mechanized industry in the same sense as
a fabricating plant which runs on prearranged schedules. There is relatively
little supervision in an underground mine, and the rate of production depends
largely on the human element. Hence, we emphasized the necessity of the labor-
management production drive, pointing to the fact that a 1-percent increase in
labor productivity would result in an annual increase of 10,000 tons of copper.
In March 1942, following a resolution passed by the War Production Board
steps were taken to set up labor-management committees in the metal mining
areas. On June 13, Donald Nelson formally launched the war production drive
in the nonferrous metals industries by a radio address to a miners' day rally in
Butte, Mont. In the meantime, the Labor Morale Section of the Services of
Supply of the War Department in cooperation with the Labor Production Division,
arranged for continuous publicity programs to bring home to mine workers the
importance of their jobs in the war effort.
A study by this division indicated that expansion projects in copper mining
alone would require approximately 4,000 new workers in 1942-43. A heavy
demand for labor in aircraft and shipbuilding projects on the Pacific coast and in
huge construction projects in the Rocky Mountain States developed at this time.
Since the largest industries in these States, besides agriculture, are the mining,
logging, and railroad industries, it became evident that these huge war construc-
tion projects might draw heavily upon the existing labor force for labor.
In view of this possibility, the Labor Production Division took steps to procure
reports on labor supply and labor requirements at individual mines and made
arrangements to secure data through the reporting facilities of the United States
Employment Service and the Bureau of Employment Security.
The first fairly complete reports on the labor supply problem at copper, lead,
and zinc mines were procured by the Bureau of Employment Security in May
and reached us early in July. These reports indicated that a critical labor
shortage had developed, due to an extensive outmigration of mine workers seeking
more attractive jobs in war industries on the Pacific coast and in adjoining areas
in the Rocky Mountain States. Reports obtained in July from individual mine
operators indicate that there is a shortage of some 6,000 workers for the copper,
lead, and zinc mines and mills in the Western States. Between March and
August 1942 a substantial dechne in total employment took place.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13149
The production of copper for the first 6 months of 1942 was remarkably close
to estimates that had been prepared in advance. However, in July 1942 — a long
month — production dropped 5,000 tons below that of the previous month, and
from now on it will continue to fall unless the exodus of labor ceases and the supply
of workers is augmented. At the same time, mines which are short of labor are
transferring men from development work and from stripping overburden to actual
ore development in order' to keep mine output from declining. This cessation of
development work will make itself evident when present ore bodies will have
become depleted. Mine operators have sought to overcome the labor shortages
by hiring green and partially trained workers with the result that there has been
a drop in production.
The factors causing this outmigration are complex, the main one being wages.
Over a number of years a significant wage differential had existed between aircraft
and shipbuilding industries on the one hand, and mining industries on the other,
and this gap widened with the beginning of the war efi'ort. Other factors which
are causing the outmigration are poor housing conditions in mining areas, inade-
quate transportation, working conditions which are deemed unsatisfactory, and
the general fear of a post-war dechne in the production of copper, lead, and zinc.
Since the factors responsible for the exodus reach beyond the responsibilities
of the War Production Board itself and involve Government agencies dealing
with wages, with housing, with transportation, with the Selective Service, with
the hiring of workers for war construction projects, and with recruitment pro-
cedures, it became evident that some coordination would have to be achieved
before a concerted attack on the problem could be made.
With the data on out-migration from mining areas at hand, preliminary steps
were taken early in July to bring these agencies together. A meeting for this
purpose was called by representatives of various branches of the War Department,
the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Labor
Board. At this meeting a report on the responsibilities of the various govern-
mental agencies was prepared and submitted on July 8.
Meanwhile the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, which
had shown its interest in augmenting the production of critical metals in a pro-
gram presented to the Labor Production Division in December, had become
extremely concerned over this out-migration of workers and its effect on produc-
tion. On July 22, it presented a memorandum on the manpower problem to
Wendell Lund", Director of the Labor Production Division.
In order to establish a working committee which could coordinate the activities
and responsibilities of the organizations which deal with the various aspects of the
manpower problem, on August 4 Mr. Lund called a meeting of representatives
of the agencies which had attended the earlier meeting and also of the Office of
Price Administration and of Selective Service. A week later this committee
was established as a permanent working group under the chairmanship of Mr.
Harry O. King, chief of the copper branch. Since then, this committee has met
regularly once a week and has added to its membership representatives from the
Bureau of Mines and from the Army and Navy Munitions Board.
This committee acts as a clearinghouse for information on the manpower
problem and serves as a medium by which each of the agenceis represented can
keep abreast of the activities of the other agencies.
ACTIONS ON MANPOWER PROBLEM
Since its inception, as a result of its deliberations, the following actions on the
manpower problem have been taken:
(1) A series of letters from the heads of the War Production Board, the War
Manpower Commission, the War Labor Board, and the Selective Service have
been prepared for distribution to operators and unions in the mining areas.
(2) Statements from General Hershey, Selective Service, and from General
McSherry, War Manpower Commission, describing, respectively, procedure on
deferments of miners and on recruiting facilities of the Employment Service, have
been prepared and are ready for distribution to mine operators.
(3) Data on manpower aspects of the wage problem in the cases now before the
War Labor Board, as well as other reports to this agency have been prepared in
order to expedite their handling of this problem.
(4) General McSherry of the War Manpower Commission is taking steps to
introduce training programs into the mining properties. A member of his staff
is now working with the production drive crew in the western mining areas.
13150 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(5) The Interdepartmental Committee is now taking steps to see that the pres-
ent working force is more fully utilized through training and upgrading of labor,
by improving working and living conditions (including transportation to and from
the job) by lowering age and other restrictions on hiring, and by procuring high
priority ratings on mine equipment to increase labor productivity.
The War Labor Board has had some 40 wage-dispute cases before it. These
cases involve properties in Nevada, Utah, and Idaho; and also smelters and
refineries in other States. In view of the urgency of the problem, the War Labor
Board expedited its hearings, and a decision can be expected very shortly.
Meanwhile, the War Manpower Commission had become extremely alarmed
over the wide-scale out-migration which had taken place. It seemed that unless
immediate action weretaken to halt this movement of workers the labor shortage
would grow much worse. Accordingly, it called a meeting of representaties of
the mining companies and of labor, at which discussions were held on means of
curtailing the out-migration of mine workers. The urgency of the problem was
recognized by all the members present. An order, designed to curtail withdrawals
from the industry, was drawn up with the approval of the representatives both
from management and labor. This order was modeled on a plan approved by the
National Labor- Management Policy Committee of the War Manpower Com-
mission.
It is, however, recognized by all the Government agencies represented on the
Interdepartmental Committee, as well as by the representatives of labor and of
management who attended the meeting of the War Manpower Commission, that a
mere curtailment of out-migration is not a complete solution of the problem. It
is recognized that this measure in itself does not in any way meet the causes which
have been responsible for this withdrawal of workers. The wage problem, the
housing and transportation problem, and the unattractive working conditions
still exist. Mining is an unattractive and hazardous occupation. It is not the
intention of the War Manpower Commission to penalize the workers for happening
to be in that occupation. From the point of view of obtaining increased produc-
tion alone, i^. would be inadvisable to believe that this War Manpower Com-
mission order has solved the problem. This directive may harm morale and result
in a loss of production. Measures must be taken to overcome this possibility.
Since the mines are now short some 6,000 workers, it is extremely important that
efforts be taken to see that the working force is not only retained but augmented.
The Interdepartmental Committee on Nonferrous Metals now looks forward to
a curtailment of gold-mine operations as a means of freeing manpower which
could be transferred to the production of critical metals. An order to curtail
gold-mining operations is now being drafted by the War Production Board.
The drive to establish labor-management production committees in mining
properties has been going on all summer, and there is at this very time a field
crew from the copper branch and from the Labor Production Division setting up
these committees in Arizona. Representatives from the Apprenticeship Training
Division and the Training- Within-Industry Division of the War Manpower Com-
mission are on this crew and are trying to interest both labor and management
in training and upgrading programs.
An approach very much similar to this is being made in the lumber industry.
If this method of meeting critical manpower situations continues to prove success-
ful in these instances, I believe that we may find it used in a number of other situa-
tions, particularly those involving critical raw materials.
Another basic manpower problem is the concentration of production. The
concentration involves not only the release of facilities and of materials, but also
of manpower. Therefore, all three must be a consideration in the decisions. A
new Committee on Concentration, of which I am a member has just been formed
in the War Production Board; and it is devoting itself to consideration of these
various aspects.
LABOR-MANAGEMENT PRODUCTION COMMITTEES
The chairman of your committee has asked me to comment on the present status
of the management-labor production committees. I feel that these committees
have a real function on the plant level in helping adjust the available manpower
to the production job of the plant.
So far over 1,300 labor-management committees have reported to Washington
employing over 2,700,000 workers. Of these, some 246 are in plants producing
guns and ordnance equipment, 182 in iron and steel cables, 92 in aircraft and air-
craft parts, 90 in various types of synthetics, 77 in machinery, 69 in shipbuilding, 38
in engines, 20 in tanks, and 427 in various other war-materials industries, including
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13151
anthracite coal mines, copper mines, and lumber mills. These committees have
equal representation from management and labor, the actual number of members
depending upon the size and specific needs of the plant, mine, or mill involved.
Under these top joint committees most plants have found it advisable to have
specialized subcommittees, concentrating their attention on specific subjects
such as suggestions, conservation of material, publicity, production efficiency,
care of tools and equipment, health and welfare, etc. Over 72 percent of the
workers covered in those plants reporting to drive headquarters are in establish-
ments in which recognized unions are participating on the committees. Both
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
have given active support in promoting the drive objectives.
Problems handled by the joint committees fall, roughly, within two areas.
First, creating and retaining good worker morale through making the individual
worker feel his part in the whole war effort and giving him a better understanding
of problems facing management; and secondly, working to solve production
problems through direct suggestions. Each joint labor-management committee
adjusts its immediate functions to the specific problems facing its plant or indus-
try. For example, in this period of acute material shortage the committees have
served a valuable function in gathering suggestions on ways of conserving materials
reducing scrap and giving sufficient explanation to workers so that morale is not
completely broken through lay-offs or cuts in working hours.
To carry out their functions, committees must receive adequate information
from both Government and employer on those production problems. Mr.
Nelson has already indicated that the War Production Board would attempt to
supply such information. Unless these committees have accurate information,
they cannot hope to induce a cooperative understanding and constructive atti-
tude toward these difficulties on the part of the workers.
Committees have also served significantly in stimulating and channeling pro-
duction-efficiency suggestions, discovering new tools, improvements in equip-
ment and lay-out. and better use of machines and material. In many situations,
as a result of these activities, plants have broken all-time production records,
ships have been launched weeks before contract dates, men have found ways
of cutting in half the time necessary for their operation, together with important
savings in the vitally needed scarce materials. In some cases absenteeism has
been the greatest production bottleneck. Committees have been successful in
eliminating this through special campaigns, checks, and appropriate publicity.
Other committees have helped to solve the transportation problem through car
pooling. Problems of manpower conservation are handled through safety cam-
paigns, health and w^elfare activity and improved training programs. One of the
most significant results of the drive is the close cooperation it engenders between
labor and management through a better understanding of each others' problems,
thus eliminating unnecessary disputes and friction.
Experience has already shown that these joint committees have an enormous
potential contribution to make to our war effort through expanding production,
improving morale, and providing for w^orkers a feeling of participation in war pro-
duction. In initiating this program, Mr. Nelson has provided an opportunity
which, if fully developed, can make an enormous contribution to the winning
of the war.
The effectiveness of these committees is measured in direct proportion to the
effectiveness of labor-management relationships. At the same time that they con-
tribute to an improvement in working relationships, their w'ork is also dependent
on the ways in which management and labor have solved the problems that
mutually affect them. •
In those committees that already have been established, it has been found that
real acceptance of organized labor and wiUingness to give labor full opportunity to
participate are prerequisites for gaining the maximum success from the joint
production committees. Some employers have demonstrated their sincerity
toward eliminating all detriments to production by guaranteeing piece-work rates
for the duration, and giving out a statement that extra effort now until the end of
the war will not be used as "standard performance" thereafter. Others have
found that efficient handling of grievances helps to produce a willingness on the
part of workers to put forth the greatest possible personal efforts.
Though these 1,300 committees have already been established, the plan must be
extended to a far greater nuinber of war production plants before its tremendous
potential contribution to the war effort can be realized. Many employers have
been unw'illing to grasp the- significance of these committees as an aid toward
increasing their production. No amount of effort on the part of Government or
13152 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
the union has been successful in making these executives realize the need for tap-
ping the production reservoir of employee ideas and cooperation on production
problems. This, together with the lack of full labor participation on committees
in other plants, has done the most to slow down the expansion of this vitally needed
program.
EFFICIENT USE OF LABOR
The third aspect of particular interest to labor is the way in which labor can be
divided and utilized for the tasks that are to be done outside the armed forces.
I am a profound believer, with organized labor, that we should do as much of this
job of handling manpower in industries without coercion as is humanly possible.
That means that every device for adjusting the labor supply through democratic
and cooperative methods should be exhausted before further steps are taken. I
believe deeply in labor's patriotic desire to cooperate. I feel sure that every
American worker will do the job he is asked to do. In order to accomplish this,
we must be sure what we want, so that we can tell our needs clearly and directly
to every American worker in terms of what we expect him as an individual to do.
One of the big obstacles to the efficient use of our manpower has been the con-
tinued existence of habits of mind in management which grew up in the days
when there was extensive unemployment in the country. This meant that labor
could be used wastefuUy, that discrimination could be exercised against minorities,
against older workers, and against women. It meant that training and upgrading
programs were largely unnecessr„ry. These undesirable indulgences by manage-
ment are no longer possible. They must be eliminated forthwith. This I regard,
in concert with labor, to be one of the first obligations of the War ManpoAver
Commission.
The basic necessity for any manpower program is the machinery of a highly
efficient national system of employment offices. Our own system of employment
offices is most greatly handicapped by lack of appropriations and by restrictions
placed upon its operations by Congress. I would most strongly urge this com-
mittee to consider recommending to the Appropriations Committee of the House
immediate increases in the funds available for the operation of the Employment
Service, the appropriation of money for transporting workers to the places where
they are needed, and the wiping out of restrictions on the administration of the
Employment Service staff. I feel certain that you will find strong support from
both organized labor and management for such steps. As long as the Employ-
ment Service remains so crippled, it is impossible for the War Manpower Com-
mission to carrv out the functions necessary to our Nation's productive effort.
I would call the committee's attention to the excellent work of the War Man-
power Commission's Management-Labor Policy Committee. My own opinion is
that it has made an outstanding contribution not only to manpower policies, but
to the technique of providing Government with the constructive viewpoint of
both labor and management. Both of these groups have the greatest stake in
the operation of a manpower program and only their willing cooperation can make
it a success. I think the committee would do well to follow with closest atten-
tion the experience of the Manpower Commission in utihzing joint labor-manage-
ment committees on both the regional and local level where they will soon be in
operation. The experience of the national committee has indicated that both
labor and management, when given a place in the determination of policy with
Government, exercise close devotion to the national interest without partisanship
or self-seeking. These men have informed themselves most carefully on the issues,
and have devoted extensive time from their very urgent business to this work
for the public welfare. One of the management members faithfully commutes
each week from the Pacific coast to Washington to meet with this committee.
These men are not unusual men in their devotion to the war effort. Their
spirit lends strength to my conviction that the great and pressing problems of
production and manpower can be solved in the American way with labor and
industry standing together to do the job we have determined to do. It is Govern-
ment's urgent responsibility to create the mechanisms through which this common
aim can be accomplished.
Mr. Curtis. You have a portion of your testimony that you wish
to read at this time?
Mr. Lund. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Curtis. You may proceed.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13153
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT BY WENDELL LUND, DIRECTOR,
LABOR PRODUCTION DIVISION, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Lund (reading):
In addition to my prepared statement, I should like to discuss briefly with your
committee in an informal way some of the problems raised in my mind by Governor
McNutt's forthright and comprehensive statement given yesterday morning.
I wish to say in regard to Mr. McNutt's testimony that I want to corroborate
it and endorse some of the things he said and, on the other hand, make one
or two points that he did not make.
I am sure that we have all realized the tremendous task which faces the War
Manpower Commission, and if we were not already completely aware of it, Governor
McNutt's remarks must have made us all especially conscious of the terrific
strain to which our manpower resources will be subjected in the coming months.
It is the job of Government to allocate our limited manpower resources so as best
to keep our military and production programs in balance. It is equally important
for all agencies of Government to cooperate with the War Manpower Commission
to the utmost by holding labor requirements down. We must take every vigorous
step which may be necessary to reduce this strain upon our reserves of labor.
This job of holding down our requirements cannot be done by Governor McNutt
alone, though I believe he can play an important part. His customers, to speak
colloquially, must cooperate with him. And I should like to submit for the con-
sideration of your committee a few of the steps which, in the opinion of organized
labor and of those of us who have been working closely with labor, could be taken
to relieve some of the pressure on manpower.
EFFECTIVE PROCUREMENT POLICY REQUIRED
First, It is vitally important for us to have a clear and effective procurement
policy which recognizes the absolute necessity of distributing war-supply contracts
so as to utilize all of our untapped or partially tapped manpower supply. We see,
for instance, the great city of New York, with a half million idle and capable
workers, rapidly becoming the number-one ghost city of this war while other
communities are so choked with war work that boarding houses are operating on
a three-shift basis. On the one hand housing, transportation, and community
facilities are idle or only partially used in some of these communities, while in
others we are expending precious critical materials to build new dwellings, new
sewers, new schoolhouses, and new busses to care for .migrant workers.
This problem is serious not merely because of the social and economic disloca-
tions which occur as a result of inadequate procurement policies. Even if we dis-
regarded all the human factors involved, the fact would still remain that we are
wasting scarce natural resources because of our failure adequately to plan the dis-
tribution of our gigantic war-supply program.
This in particular should interest your committee, which has done such valuable
work in investigating the migration of workers. No single factor contributes so
largely to the unnecessary and wasteful migration of war workers as the lack of a
planned procurement policy.
UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF WAR CONTRACTS
Some of the details of this situation are set forth in my prepared statement
to which this is a supplement, but I should like to emphasize these facts again.
The War Manpower Commission has recently surveyed the distribution of war
contracts in relation to our total supply of manpower, and some of the conclu-
sions which it has drawn are startling and disturbing. The Commission sur-
veyed the distribution of more than $6,500,000 in war contracts let between
May 1 and July 31, 1942. Of those contracts 28.1 percent of the dollar volume
was put in areas where labor shortages now exist, and 58.8 percent to areas where
shortages are anticipated. Only 12 percent — that is to say less than one-eighth of
the total volume — was placed in areas containing a surplus of manpower.
Mr. Curtis. Alay I ask you a question at that point?
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Curtis. How much of the 58.8 percenji and 28.1 percent was
placed there because the tools and equipment were located there?
13154 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Lund. A fairly good proportion, Congressman.
Mr. Curtis. You have to send the contracts to the factories that
have the tools and equipment, is that not true?
Mr. Lund. That is true, although we have expanded some faciJities
in tight labor-market areas instead of putting production where
facilities already exist.
Mr. Curtis. I will not argue that. I have been fighting for the
decentralization of the defense program. Every reason under the sun
points to the fact that it should not be in one spot.
f' Mr. Lund. We have these tremendous unutilized facilities in New
York City, for example, and a good many other areas. We have just
begun to concentrate civilian production. That might have been
started earlier and facilities might have been released in various parts
of the country where we have housing and transportation and com-
munity facilities, so we would not have to create this tremendous
movement of people.
Mr. Curtis. You may proceed.
Mr. Lund (continuing):
We find large orders for textiles, for instance, flowing into such critical areas as
Seattle, Detroit, and Baltimore.
Organized labor, speaking both through the Labor Policy Committee of the
War Production Board and the Labor-Management Policy Committee of the
War Manpower Commission, has repeatedly urged the imperative necessity of
an adequate procurement policy. I should, like to see a vigorous, powerful pro-
curement policy board and I think an experienced representative of labor could
render real service on such a board.
If the other agencies of Government are to give to Governor McNutt and the
Manpower Commission the kind of assistance and cooperation to which they are
entitled, something must be done and done quickly to bring procurement under
control. We can no longer afford to see the skilled needle-trades workers of New
York City walking the streets while Mexicans are imported for agricultural labor
in the Southwest to take the places of workers drained off the farms to make pants
for the Army.
ACCELERATING LABOr's PRODUCTIVITY
Second. We must take account of and do everything possible to accelerate the
increasing productivity of our existing labor supply. We have always known that
American labor was the most efficient in the world and it is upon the basis of this
knowledge that we have summarized our whole experience and policy in the slogan
for this Labor Dav which has just passed — "Free Labor Will Win."
Most of you are familiar, I am sure, with the fact that when we commenced
our merchant shipbuilding program it was estimated that 700,000 man-hours of
labor were required to complete the single merchant ship. Today that require-
ment has been reduced to a little more than 400,000 man-hours per hull and it is
falling every month. Similarly, one of our bombers was originally estimated to
require 75,000 man-hours of work. Now we have it down to 18,000 and expect
it to go still lower.
The patriotism and skill and energy of American labor have already worked
miracles on the production line; and these miracles will not stop, but rather
multiply. This astounding record of efficiency and productivity that American
labor has established must be taken into account more fully in our future estimates
of manpower requirements.
I think that is one thing we have often failed to do. We see these colossal
figures of manpower requirements, and they are based upon a rate of productivity
that antedates the figures by 6 months or a year and does not take into considera-
tion the possibilitv of a progressively increasing production.
My own experience in Michigan has indicated that such estimates, often
based upon the individual guesses of particular employers, are apt to furnish a
somewhat distorted and exaggerated picture. We all know of one large and
experienced employer in Michigan who first estimated that one of his great new
plants would require 110,000 workers. Then he reduced his estimate to 90,000,
then to 70,000, and now we are told he will require only some 50,000 workers.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13155
In my opinion, we shall find it necessary in the future to revise downward our
estimates of these requirements.
Furthermore, we must frankly face the fact that a substantial number of our
war plants are overmanned. It is natural in a period of expanding employment
and impending labor scarcity for employers to hoard labor just as they want to
hoard materials. Reports which I have received, from officials of the War Man-
power Commission, from our own people in the field, and from my own personal
observations would indicate that a substantial saving in our manpower require-
ments can be affected if we institute the same sort of inventory controls in the
labor market that we have instituted and are instituting with respect to critical
raw materials.
LABOR UTILIZATION INSPECTORS
This, in my opinion, means that it will be necessary for the War Manpower
Commission to place in all important war plants labor-utilization inspectors, by
whatever name they may be called. These inspectors should be given authority
to see that labor is efficiently utilized, at maximum skills. Governor McNutt
suggested this yesterday, and I recall that the fifth interim report of your com-
mittee has also pointed out the desirability of this step. I concur most heartily,
and I am urging the War Manpower Commission to take immediate steps in
this direction.
An adequate and vigorous system of labor-utilization inspectors should be
geared closely with the labor-management production committees in the plants.
Experience has shown that nobody is so efficient at increasing the efficiency of
labor as labor itself. The labor-management committee is the tested mechanism
for affording labor a channel and an opportunity to make its distinctive contri-
bution to the increase of efficiency and effective utilization of our manpower
resources.
The labor-utilization inspector and the labor-management production com-
mittee should take an active part in the promotion of programs and plans for
training and upgrading unskilled and semiskilled workers into skilled occupations,
and for breaking down complicated jobs into simpler and more easily manned
occupations. Up to the present time, we have relied upon the voluntary accept-
ance of training and upgrading programs by employers. We can no longer, in my
opinion, rely only upon persuasion. Our resources are growing too scarce and
our needs too great.
Those methods of labor-utilization which have proved so successful in great
sections of the shipbuilding industry, for instance, should be extended to the
entire industry, and all Government "contractors should immediately be required,
as part of their obligation, to conduct efficient operations, to utilize the accepted
and proved training practices developed so successfully by the Training- Within-
Industry Division of the War Manpower Commission.
UTILIZATION OF MINORITY GROUPS
Third. We must not permit prejudice and caprice to deprive our war effort of
the services of a single qualified worker. We have in this country thousands of
Negroes, foreign-born Americans, and loyal alien residents. All of them are for
the most part" capable of carrying their "load on the production fine. They are
ready and anxious to serve. They and their families cannot understand why they
should not be permitted to render this service. Likewise, those of us who know
of the critical manpower shortage which prevails in many areas cannot understand
or condone the waste of this irreplaceable resource. Up to now, we have not
licked this problem. In my opinion, we must fight it through without appease-
ment or compromise.
We are all agreed with the President's excellent policy which forbids discrimina-
tion against any worker or prospective worker on account of his race, creed, or
national origin. Our real job is to enforce and effectuate this pohcy. The
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice has done a magnificent job
of education, and in pointing the light toward those black spots where the Presi-
dent's policy is openly or secretly defied. We must, however, supplement the
work of the President's Committee in the day-to-day placement of idle workers
throughout our great war industries. In other words, we must expect the United
States Employment Service to carry a heavy responsibility in the enforcement of
the President's antidiscrimination pohcy. The Employment Service is not, in
mv opinion, able to meet this responsibility today. From my own experience, I
can say that in many cases the local officials who are called upon to deal with these
13156 WASHINGTON HEARIN^GS
problems are too often subject to the powerful pressure of local prejudice and local
political influence. The power of this pressure is increased by the legislative
restrictions which the Congress has laid upon the operation of our newly federalized
Employment Service. I agree thoroughly with Governor McNutt and Mr.
Corson as to the immediate necessity of striking these shackles from the Employ-
ment Service and providing it with adequate funds so that capable, vigorous, and
able personnel may be obtained. If this is done, it is my opinion that under the
able direction of Mr. Corson and Governor McNutt the Service will be in a position
to obtain the acceptance of these basic manpower policies, and thus to secure the
utilization of labor resources which are now wasted.
PROPER SCHEDULING OF MATERIAL FLOW REQUIRED
Fourth, the War Production Board, through its control over the armed services,
should make certain that we do not lose valuable manpower through the inade-
quate scheduling of production and through lack of control over the flow of raw
materials. Nothing is so demoralizing to the morale of our labor force as shut-
downs and slow-downs caused by the failure of Government agencies to see that
our raw materials are put in the proper places at the proper times and for proper
purposes.
Recently representatives of leading international unions in both the Congress
of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor met to discuss
this problem at the invitation of our Labor Production Division. This conference
was called at the suggestion of our Labor Policy Committee and, as a result, a num-
ber of suggestions were submitted to the War Production Board. These labor
organizations expressed most vigorously their opinion that the War Production
Board should immediately institute a program for scheduling not only the flow
of raw materials, Vjut the production of component items and finished end prod-
ucts so as to achieve not only a maximum utilization of our limited supply of critical
materials but a maximum and uninterrupted use of our manpower resources.
Mr. Curtis (interposing). Now, I want to ask you a question right
there, if I may. Everybody knows when they haven't got material
they cannot run a factory.
We often read in the paper about them stopping, and they ask why
don't they have that material. Of course, we all agree that we have
got to get somebody to see that they get the material. Why don't
they get the material?
Mr. Lund. I would say that they do not get the materiil for the
following reasons: First, we probably have not sufficiently stressed the
raw-materials aspect of our program. Secondly, there has been an
inadequate scheduling of the raw materials gomg into the plants and
of the semifabricated and fabricated materials into articles that
become component paits. We have permitted some of the items to
get far ahead of other items and therefore they use up materials that
should not be used perhaps for 3 to 6 months later. Our program,
as Mr. Nelson puts it, has gotten out of balance.
Mr. Curtis. Have you got any specific cases? I do not Iviiow
whether it is true or not, but you hear accounts where airplanes are
all completed except they are waiting for a propeller, or something like
that.
Mr. Lund. That is right.
Mr. Curtis. Who is to blame? What is wrong?
Mr. Lund. Well, I should hesitate, Mr. Congressman, to fix blame.
I will tell you what I think may be wrong: There is certainly inade-
quate or improper scheduling, or things like that would not happen.
Mr. Curtis. Evidently.
Mr. Lund. The two things are tied in together. Somewhere along
the line the folks that are working with this thing have not done a
satisfactory job of scheduling this production, because if we did,
taking into account the time, these items should have been ready to
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13157
take their place with other items in a finished product. Under a
complete plan, let us say, we would not have that situation. It may-
be that, under the circumstances, a better job just could not have
been done. Another factor in the situation is the ever-changing
requirements because of changes in milita^ry strategy.
Mr. Curtis. It probably will be helpful to have somebody get to-
gether and talk about it, but I think somebody is going to have to be
specific to find out where and how and when and why somebody
failed.
Mr. Lund. That is right.
Mr. Curtis. But those things happen.
Mr. Lund. That is right. That ought to be done, certainly,
through a field force. The services have got men in many of the
plants and they certainly report to the services, and we have our men
out. Properly organized, they could be one part of the machinery
for furnishing information needed for adequate schedulmg of produc-
tion. I understand the reason, Mr. Congressman, that it was not
done, is that there was such eagerness to get maximum production of
all articles in all lines that the balance between them was UQt taken
suffi.cientlv into account.
Mr. Curtis. If we take the War Manpower Commission and give it
a service act, or anything it wants, it still will not have jurisdiction of
that problem?
Mr. Lund. No. That is essentially, I would say, the War Produc-
tion Board's job.
Mr. Curtis. That would go to the materialmen, to work it out?
Mr. Lund. Yes. ...
Mr. Curtis. It is one of our major causes of loss of utilization of
Mr. Lund. That is right, but it is a materials problem and belongs
in the War Production Board and services.
Mr. Curtis. You may proceed.
Mr. Lund (continuing) —
I concur most heartily in these suggestions, and the War Production Board is
now at work to set up such a scheduUng system.
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR DISPLACED WORKERS
It is clear, however, that we are not yet able to schedule our production pro-
gram tightly enough to prevent some operations from lagging and creating un-
eraplovment.
No decent manpower program can overlook measures for taking care ot the
workers thus unemployed. In the first .place, purely from the point of view of
morale, some adequate provision for benefits must be made for such workers and
their families. Secondly, we cannot hope to keep these workers where we need
them unless they have the means to keep body and soul together until work is
available. I would, therefore, strongly urge upon the committee the immediate
necessitv of instituting a special unemployment benefit program for workers
thrown out of jobs because of material shortages or plant change-overs, buch
benefits should not be less than two-thirds of the regular pay, exclusive of over-
time. I think we look on it as a loss, although that is important from the human-
itarian point of view or from the practical point of view of having labor supply
there when we need it
Mr. Curtis (interposing). Would you do that regardless of the
inability to get jobs for civilian enterprises?
Mr. Lund. No, sir. If some of them could, for a period of, let us
say, 3 months, while our conversion was going on, get a job in civilian
13158 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
industry in that immediate locality so as to make themselves avail-
able for war work when the plant is converted, I think they ought to
get that job, by all means. It seems to me, if properly administered,
this fund would not be a deterrent to .their finding jobs for the con-
version period. I found, when I was director of the unemployment
compensation commission of Michigan, that all of these incidents that
one was supposed to know about — cases where men would rather take
unemployment compensation than to work — were invariably un-
substantiated. A man would sooner make three-thirds than two-
thirds of his pay.
Mr. Curtis. When would you start that? Just as soon as they
were out of work?
Mr. Lund. Immediately.
Mr. Curtis. Would you proceed on the theory that the individual
should not look out for himself at all?
Mr. Lund. No; I would not. I would encourage him to get em-
ployment in civilian mdustry, but I would want him there when the
plant is converted.
Mr. Curtis. I thought that was the thing you wanted to avoid.
Instead of having him there resting on his oars, you wanted him in a
factory working for the war effort.
Mr. Lund. Congressman, that is all right if he can work in the
immediate locality, let us say, or if he can be transported somewhere,
moved somewhere where he is going to be needed immediately fcr any
productive work. Wliat we would find is that a lot of these people
would leave for a few weeks or a few months and then they would
be needed back there again, needed back where they came from.
Mr. Curtis. You are criticizing the employer for hoardmg the
workers?
Mr. Lund. Yes.
Mr. Curtis. Then, you just want to take them outside of the
factory and hoard them outside.
Mr. Lund. No; not at all, Congressman. We call that a planned
reservoir of workers for a particular purpose in a particular com-
munitv. What we are tryitig to avoid is the needless migration of
these families when they ought to stay where they are because in the
rather immediate future they could be in war production there.
Mr. Curtis. If I understood all the witnesses who have appeared
so far, that is the thing you do not want, people waiting around, not
turnmg theii- labor into war production while plants were being con-
verted and while you were waiting for materials.
Mr. Lund. My position is somewhat different. Congressman, than
theirs. If they are needed elsewhere, let us say on a war production
job for a continuous period, and can, profitably to the program, make
that shift to this other job, I would probably be thorouglily in favor
of their going. That is not always the case, however. It is fre-
quently advantageous to keep men where they are for a couple of
weeks so they will be available when the plant is ready for them.
Mr. Curtis. That is what they are criticizing the employers about.
We had witness after witness throw up his hands and say, "Wliy, they
are hoarding labor; they are holding a man until they can use him
next Tuesday."
Mr. Lund. I do not see any necessary inconsistency there. You
see, Congressman, many of these employers hoard employees for a
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13159
veiy improbable future use. If an employer were to keep an em-
ployee that he did not need for a month or two in a locality where
that employee has his home, frankly I do not see anything wrong with
that, unless there is a labor sliortage there. If the fellow could be
used in the next plant just as profitably, the employer ouglit not to
hoard Imn. In my view, if that fellow could get a job in the next
plant, we certainly would not want him paid anything for remaining
idle. It is when he would have to go, let us say, to a community 500
miles distant, or even 100 miles distant, or 200 miles distant, though
it might be a good deal more, and then he would be needed a month
later in the same locality in which he was living, where he was dis-
placed, where he lost his job, it would seem to me it is only using good
judgment to keep him there.
Mr. Curtis. The only difference I can see in your proposal and
the employer hoarding him is that you would pay him two-thirds of
his salary out of the unemployment fund.
Mr. Lund. On the other hand, the employer pays him his full
salary.
Mr. Curtis. Then, he would be doing something.
Mr. Lund. I tliink there is more real justification than that.
Dr. Lamb. May I ask a question?
Mr. Curtis. Yes, go ahead.
Dr. Lamb. I do not want to prolong this discussion because of the
number of prepared questions that you will be asked, and the neces-
sity of getting on.
Mr. Lund. Yes.
Dr. Lamb. D.oes not your proposal run along the lines of the one
made a year ago which resulted in the fiasco ol the $300,000,000
appropriation?
Mr. Lund. Yes, somewhat, though the administration of it would
be difi'erent.
Dr. Lamb. Is it not possible that they ran into trouble because it
was not connected with a plan for full utilization of labor but was a
form of hoarding, or whatever you please to call it, on the part of the
Government?
Mr. Lund. Of course, I think that plan ran into trouble not for
any rational reasons at all, but because certain State unemployment
compensation administrators and Governors were afraid of nationali-
zation of unemployment compensation.
Dr. Lamb. I agree with that, Mr. Lund; but I still think those
are just as important factors and have to be taken into consideration
as completely as these other considerations, and what is more, there
was a certain illogicality about the proposal.
Mr. Lund. I think it requires very careful planning, and there
would have to be safeguards against abuse.
Dr. Lamb. Does it not require more than planning?
Is not one of the fundamental lacks of the thing the absence, for
instance, of any connection with a training program, and is not the
training program the real key to this arrangement? If— instead of
attempting to increase unemployment compensation in order to give
these workers a somewhat larger sum of money under unemployment
compensation, still subsidizing them while not working — you were
directing their energies toward getting into a job, and you knew what
60396— 42— pt. 34 8
13160 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
the job was going to be, and you had the plans made for the forth-
coming production, would not joii be much further ahead of the
game and more likeh^ to get congressional support for your proposal?
Mr. Lund. Doubtless. Remember this proposal of mine addresses
itself to two aspects of the problem: One is the aspect wherein an
employee is out of work because his plant is being converted; in the
second he is out of work because of a slow-down or shut-down of the
plant due to a temporary shortage of raw materials. Really, I think
that that is the more important of the two.
Mr. Curtis. Do I understand you that you are recommending that
the moment some worker is out of a job because they are waiting for
materials you would pay him two-thirds of his salary?
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir; he is a casualty of the war through no fault of
his own, and it seems to me it is important and contributes to the
man's morale and also important to hold him there, available, let us
say 2 weeks later or a month later, when the plant takes up again.
Dr. Lamb. In other words, you would consider it is a penalty upon
the Federal Goverimient for the failure to plan?
Mr. Lund. Exactly.
Dr. Lamb. It is unfortunate, in carrying that out, that there is
not some manner of assessing the others responsible for that failure
so that they would make some contribution.
Mr. Curtis. The people are going to be amply assessed; but, to
be concrete, they have a war worker, let us say, drawing $100 a
week
Mr. Lund. Yes.
Mr. Curtis. If he has a temporary shut-down, you would start
paying him from the first day $66.66?
Mr. Lund. Per week?
Mr. Curtis. Per week.
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir; if that is two-thirds of his income exclusive of
overtime.
Mr. Curtis. Now, when the war is over, would you continue
that?
Mr. Lund. That is, of course, another problem. I think, however,
we might well be preparing ourselves for that eventuality when the
war is over by improving ovir* unemployment compensation set-ups
in the various States. I am not prepared to make a statement as to
how far I would go at the conclusion of the war. It is very probable
that that employee and many of the rest of us may take quite a licldng
when the war is over. I think, however, we want to avoid any immedi-
ate deflationary trend, and it may very well be better to pay him con-
siderably more than what he would be getting in most States at the
end of the war. In the average State he would wait a couple of weeks,
then would get $15 or $16 a week in unemployment compensation
instead of the much larger amount he was earning.
I do not necessarily say a worker who is laid off should get $66.66
a week; but I think he should be kept right there for a month or 6
weeks at at least two-thirds of his earnings exclusive of overtime.
Among other things I think probably that would be quite a spur on
the company to plan its work better and even on, say, the Federal
officials and others to schedule the operation more efficiently,
Mr. Curtis. I think we better go on with your statement. It is
-quite convincing.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13161
Mr. Lund [continuing]—
In conclusion, I should like to emphasize my belief that we should not wait for
sweeping legislation to set about this tremendous manpower job which faces us
today. Labor has no cantankerous or theoretical views as to the necessity of
legislation in this field, nor do I. I am for whatever is necessary, and it may well
be true that if we are to finish the task, it will be necessary to embody in legislation
those principles of manpower mobilization which have been tested and proved by
practical experience. But, if our legislation is to be soundly conceived, and our
operation of the legislation is to be effective, we must be getting that experience
now.
There already exists a powerful weapon in the hands of our Government with
which to institute a large measure of the necessary labor-market controls. Through
their power to direct the hiring practices of Government contractors, the various
agencies could, without legislation, compel the institution of labor-market controls
by the United States Employment Service. Whether the Manpower Com-
mission, under its Executive order, possesses the power to institute these controls
is a legal issue which I shall not undertake to resolve. But the fact is that the
power does now exist somewhere and I am sure that if there is any doubt as to
whether Governor McNutt possesses it, the President would be quite willing to
give it to him.
I should like to emphasize also the necessity, whether under legislation or under
an administrative program, for securing adequate participation by labor and
management both in the formulation of manpower policies and the administration
of our manpower program. Many of our most constructive and effective sugges-
tions for the solution of manpower problems have come from the ranks of organized
labor. I should particularly like to refer to the extraordinary assistance given to
the Government by the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers
in the solution of the vexing labor shortage in nonferrous-metal mines — a con-
tribution referred to at some length in my prepared statement.
Incidentally, I attended their convention on Tuesday in Denver and found
them working most wholeheartedly and constructively on manpower problems,
and patriotically, I will say, too, on manpower problems in that industry.
All along the line we must rely, here under legislation, upon the cooperation of
labor and management. We may at some future time substitute compulsion for
our present voluntary program, but these sanctions will not work unless they are
accepted by labor and by management and they cannot succeed unless every
provision is made for the fullest participation at every level.
With this participation, with increased cooperation on the part of those Govern-
ment agencies which have it within their power to reduce our manpower demands,
thereby easing the tremendous task of the Manpower Commission, and with the
immediate commencement of a vigorous manpower program, without waiting for
legislation I believe that we can solve this problem, and with its solution hasten
measurably the day of ultimate victory.
TESTIMONY OF WENDELL LUND— Resumed
Mr. Curtis. All right, Mr. Lund. I will try not to omit anything
vital in our prepared questions. There is one thing I want to ask
you before I go to the questions. .
Within the War Production Board, you have your agency, the
Labor Production Division, do you not?
Mr. Lund. Correct.
Mr. Curtis. What is the war production drive? What is that?
WAR PRODUCTION DRIVE
Mr. Lund. The war production drive is a project instituted last
spruig by Mr. Nelson which provides for the setting up of so-called
labor-management production committees in the various war-produc-
tion plants thi-oughout the country. Those committees, as the name
indicates, are made up of representatives of labor>nd of management,
and they address themselves to problems of war'production. •
13162 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Curtis. All right. Who heads that?
Mr. Lund. Presently, there is some confusion as to the authority
for the operation of the war production drive between the so-called
war production drive headquarters and the Division of which I am
director. It is in the process now of being resolved.
Mr. Curtis. Another question. The Ai-my has a Civilian Person-
nel Division in the Services of Supply headed by Mr, Mitchell, does
it not?
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Curtis. Does the Navy have anything of that sort?
Mr. Lund. No; I do not believe the Navy has a manpower section.
None has come to my attention.
Mr. Curtis. Now, of this war production drive and your agency,
the Labor Production Division, and the War Manpower Commission,
which one is the newer agency?
Mr. Lund. The War Manpower Commission and the Labor Pro-
duction Division were established by the same executive order.
Mr. Curtis. I imderstood Governor McNutt yesterday to say
that originally he thought the War Manpower Commission was a
policy-making board, they would have practically no personnel, but
he has changed his mind and it is going to be an operating agency,
setting up 12 regional offices, a couple of hundred area offices, and
they have their staffs, and they are going to run these labor mspec-
tors, and so on. Where does that leave your agency and this war-
production drive? Is there any need for them?
Mr. Lund. Yes, I would certainly say so. The War ^Manpower
Commission will not do anything with the war production drive per
se. It will certainly want to tie in with these labor-management
committees. I should say the war production drive committees are
on the plant level, and manpower problems are a problem mcidental
to production, but there are many others, too, for example, improve-
ment of production techniques, to which they devote themselves at
their meetings. These workers contribute numerous ideas as to better
processes for doing things and so forth. They help solve absentee-
ism, transportation, and other problems.
Mr. Curtis. You recommend the continuation of all three agencies
then?
Mr. Lund. Let us see. The three being what?
Mr. Curtis. Your own, the Labor Production Division
Mr. Lund. The Civilian Section of the Army.
Mr. Curtis. The war production drive, and at the same time the
War Manpower Commission has a huge operating organization.
Mr. Lund. I probably should clarify this point. The conduct of
the war production drive is one of the main fimctions of the Labor
Production Division. The war production drive headquarters is
only in charge of the publicity side of it.
Mr. Curtis. You recommend the retaining of all three?
Mr. Lund. By all means, sir. because I think each has a different
and distinctive and important function.
Mr. Curtis. You recommend the continuation of Mr. Mitchell's
division?
Mr. Lund. I do not have any comment to make on that, because
I do not fully understand their operation there and bow it fits in
with thfe war manpower question.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13163
CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION
Mr. Curtis. What do you mean by "concentration''?
Mr. Lund. Concentration is a method of putting civihan produc-
tion in certain plants so as to keep them busy on what is more nearly
a full-time basis, rather than to have that civilian production scat-
tered in a large number of plants that are working on a part-time
basis.
Mr. Curtis. To illustrate, to mean if you have got 10 factories
that make typewriters, instead of letting them all make 10 percent
that you would have one make them all?
Mr. Lund. Or two, that is right.
Mr. Curtis. Do you have any trouble with the companies?
Mr. Lund. Yes; we have some trouble with the companies. Ob-
viously, they all would like to continue to make typewriters.
Mr. Curtis. How do you go about deciding which factory receives
the concentration of work in that line, and which will you convert?
Mr. Lund. We will apply certain criteria, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Curtis. Tell us about that.
Mr. Lund. One of them is, which of these plants now making type-
writers, let us say, can be the most readily, completely and effectively
converted into war production. Secondly, which of them is located
in a tight labor area and which of them is located in a loose labor
area. The application of that criteria would be that you would per-
mit those plants, or that plant, to continue making typewriters that
is located in a loose labor area. A third factor is transportation;
and the fourth factor might well be power, and conceivably the fifth
factor might be housing.
Mr. Curtis. Wlio should make the decision?
Mr. Lund. We have a committee on concentration made up by
Mr. Nelson for the purpose. I am a member of that committee.
Mr. Curtis. You can enforce it by withholding material, can you
not?
Mr. Lund. Yes; it is very easily enforced.
Mr. Curtis. In reference to the typewriters, if you have not
covered it all, tell us, step by step, what you did in that regard.
Mr. Lund. I have with me Mr. Norgren from my staff; I should
have introduced him. I wonder if he could come up here and tell
you about that? He can do a much better job than I can.
Mr. Curtis. You might show, Mr. Reporter, that the chairman
has arrived at this meeting.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL H. NORGREN, ACTING CHIEF, INDUSTRY
CONSULTANT BRANCH, LABOR PRODUCTION DIVISION, WAR
PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Curtis. Mr. Norgren, do you want to briefl}^ state the con-
centration of the typewriter set-up? If we crowd you too much for
time, you can submit it in the printed record, but, briefly, I would
like to have you cover it.
Mr. Norgren. The procedure in typewriters was that our Division,
our branch of the Labor Production Division, conceived that the
concentration of typewriters was a desirable thing. It was deter-
mined first and agreed on by the various sectors of the War Production
13164 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Board that only a very small production of new typewriters was
necessary for the duration of the war. The branch that has line
jurisdiction over typewriters, the Services branch, did not appear to
be too anxious to push the matter of getting the typewriter production
concentrated, so our people who were acting as consultants to that
branch decided to take the initiative. They studied the productive
capacity of the various companies in the industry and came to the
conclusion that it would only be necessary to keep one small plant
operating out of the six or eight — ^I have forgotten the number of
total plants. The process from then on was simply a matter of
obtaining the concurrence of the various sectors and persons within
the War Production Board to procure the issuance of a limitation
order, or rather a concentration order, which is a type of limitation
order to order that type of concentration.
I do not believe there is any point in going into the details of how
that was done, but the end result was that a limitation order was
issued.
Mr. Curtis. What company got the concentrated typewriter
business?
Mr. NoRGREN. The Woodstock Company.
Mr. Curtis. That will be the only company that will make type-
writers?
Mr. Norgren. That will be the only company that will make new
typewriters.
OTHER CONCENTRATION ORDERS
Mr. Curtis. Have you tried this with the farm equipment busi-
ness?
Mr. Norgren. That is in the process of being worked out now.
Mr. Curtis. Did you have any success?
Mr. Norgren. It has not been decided yet. The concentration
committee of which Mr. Lund spoke has only begun to function
officiallv for the past few weeks.
Mr. Curtis. There you find a different problem. There are so
many different farm machines. After all, the typewriters are more
or less alike.
Mr. Norgren. That is right. That is one of the serious compli-
cating factors. The future requirements of new farm equipment
are another complicated factor.
Mr. Curtis. What would you say is retarding the concentration
of these industries? • • i
Mr. Norgren. Right at the present time, I would say it is the
general problem of securing the concurrence of a relatively large
number of branches and committees within the War Production
Board on a feasible, worRable and acceptable plan.
Mr. Curtis. Have any of the industries so far concentrated or been
concentrated in the tight labor market?
Mr. Norgren. There is a stove concentration order that covers
what is called the cooking-appliance industry that I think can be
called a concentration order, emphasizing the concentration of stove
production, cooking-appliance production, in loose labor-market areas.
Mr. Lund. I think you were asked about tight labor-market areas.
Mr. Norgren. That goes also there. I mean it is a concentration
of production, to a very considerable extent, out of tight labor areas.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13165
Mr. Curtis. How about the bicycle industry?
Mr. NoRGREN. The bicycle case is definitely not that type of case.
It is more rfearly the opposite, although I would not say entirely.
Mr. Curtis. Opposite of the stove industry?
Mr. NoRGREN. It happens to have come out so that the two com-
panies selected have continued production of, in this case, combat
bicycles for the Army and both are in areas of impending labor shortage.
TESTIMONY OF WENDELL LUND— Resumed
Mr. Curtis. Has the War Manpower Commission taken an}^ part
in the discussions leading to the orders to concentrate these industries?
Mr. Lund. There is a plan being worked out now for very close
cooperation between this committee and the War Manpower Com-
mission. The War Manpower Commission will assign a consultant
to the Concentration Committee to represent the mterests of the War
Manpower Commission. I have discussed that with Governor Mc-
Nutt, and he has named a man to work with the Concentration
Committee.
Mr. Curtis. It is our understanding that Directive 2 has opened
up the question of integration of production and manpower planning.
We understand that a Manpower Priorities Branch has been set up
in W. P. B. with plans for regional, offices and labor-utilization
inspectors. Why was this branch set up outside of the Labor Pro-
duction Division?
INIr. Lund. I think in order to tie it in very closely with the plan-
ning for the use of raw materials, which is done under the vice chair-
man, Mr. Knowlson, and this Manpower Priorities Section was placed
under Mr. Knowlson also.
Mr. Bender. Where did this directive come from?
Mr. Lund. The directive came from the War Manpower Com-
mission, sir, which has issued a number of directives.
Mr. Curtis. Could your Division perform the functions of this
Manpower Priorities Branch?
Mr. Lund. I would say, given the personnel to do it, it probably
could, although I think there is a lot of propriety in the present
arrangement because of the close relationship between materials
and manpower priorities.
Mr. Curtis. I believe you stated your connection with the War
Production drive is that you carry out what they decide.
Mr. Lund. No; as far as the actual operation of the committees is
concerned, we run the drive.
Mr. Curtis. Why has the responsibility for guiding the labor-
management production committees not been placed in the Labor
Division?
Mr. Lund. I am puzzled about that myself, sir.
Mr. Curtis. Do you think there is a little hoardmg of talent going
on in the W. P. B?
Mr. Lund. I do not loiow whether it is that. Congressman, or just
a difference of opinion as to where the drive should be.
Mr. Curtis. Dr. Lamb has a question or two.
13166 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
FUNCTIONS OF LABOR PRIORITIES COMMITTEE
Dr. Lamb. I would like to go back to the previous ^[uestioii and
ask whether it is not true that the people now employed in your agency
were not called in the Labor Division and subsequently responsible for
much of the work now being done by the Labor Priorities Committee?
Mr. Lund. Yes.
Dr. Lamb. So that, in effect, the Labor Priorities Committee has
superseded, let us say, the Labor Division in these matters?
Mr. Lund. Well, in those particular matters I would say possibly
to an extent. Dr. Lamb. Probably those matters were never as fully
developed as they should have been.
Dr. Lamb. But insofar as they were, you people were carrying them
on?
Mr. Lund. Yes. I think you will remember, as a matter of history,
the work on manpower was performed by the old Labor Division and
then certain responsibilities of the Labor Division were transferred to
the War Manpower Commission.
Dr. Lamb. But not to the War Production Board in some other
branch.
Mr. Lund. That is true.
Dr. Lamb. These functions are now being carried on by the War
Production Board outside of. your organization?
Mr. Lund. That is correct.
Mr. Curtis. In regard to labor utilization inspectors, what relation-
ship should they have to the management-labor production com-
mittees?
Mr. Lund. I should say, Mr. Congressman, they ought to work
most closely with them, because these labor-management com-
mittees will know very well what is going on in the plant in the way
of utilization of labor.
Mr. Curtis. According to your statement, the Labor Production
Division is designed to insure labor participation in the War Produc-
tion Board?
Mr. Lund. That is right.
Mr. Curtis. Do you consider this participation is adequate?
Mr. Lund. No, sir; I do not, and have repeatedly stated so. Or-
ganized labor does not consider its participation adequate. We do
not, in our division. We think labor ought to have a greater voice in
policy determination and also in operations.
Mr. Curtis. Wliat functions of the Labor Division have been
transferred already to the War Manpower Commission?
Mr. Lund. The function of labor supply and training, two of them.
Mr. Curtis. The labor supply and training?
Mr. Lund. That is correct.
Mr. Curtis. What have you got left?
Mr. Lund. We have left our industry consultant branch, which
devotes itself to representing, let us say, the labor point of view in the
various branches of W. P. B. We have the War Production Drive
which we have touched on here, and the major part of it is administered
by our division. We have a shipbuilding wage stabilization agree-
ment, the administration of that agreement.
Mr. Curtis. What functions does the Labor Division perform upon
the directive of the War Manpower Commission?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13167
Mr. Lund. Directive No. 2. None. I think probably this should
be pointed out. It is an operating job to make up these priorities
lists. It is done by the War Production Board, and then these
priorities are acted upon by the War Manpower Commission. The
Labor Production Division is not primarily an operating agency, it
is an agency that has as its purpose, its main purpose, getting labor's
participation at various levels in the War Production Board.
Mr. Curtis. Do you think that the function of production planning
and manpower planning should be done by separate agencies?
Mr. Lund. As an original proposition, no. I think there are many
good reasons, however, for having them done by separate agencies.
They are big jobs, each of them, and each requires a large agency to
perform them. I think sometimes there is perhaps a danger if you
get too much under one roof. Certainly, though, Congressman, they
ought to be very closely coordinated and many of the problems are
inseparable.
TRAINING OF MEN SUBJECT TO DRAFT
Mr. Curtis. I want to ask you one question about training, and
then I am through. Has it been done since the declaration of war
and is it being done now in this Traming-Withm-Industry? Are
they training men who would be subject to the draft? By that, I
mean of the proper age limit, physical fitness and unmarried, or
married without children.
Mr. Lund. Undoubtedly. Undoubtedly a good many men have
been trained and are being trained who are subject to the draft, that
is, who will be taken by the Services.
Air. Curtis. They are training them knowing they are going to
be taken?
Mr. Lund. Let me add to that this, that certainly attention should
be called to the fact that perhaps the largest number are those who
are likely to be deferred time and again. I think the reason that
many of them who were trained are perhaps now in the Services, and
will be in the Services three to six months hence, is because we have
not known, and do not know now, what the ultimate needs of the
Services will be.
Mr. Curtis. Don't you think the people you are training, at least
from here on out, should be women, men past 45, physically imperfect,
and the men with several primary dependents?
Mr. Lund. By all means. Congressman. I think the concentra-
tion m training should be exactly where you have stated that it ought
to be — women, and older men, men of over 45, let us say, and the
handicapped, and men with one or more dependents.
Mr, Curtis. Who is responsible for giving that training to men
subject to the draft mstead of first exhausting this other group?
Mr. Lund. What has been done of that nature — and certainly Mr.
McNutt and other officials of the War Manpower Commission would
be in far better position to discuss that than I — probably was done
mistakenly, but it was done before we had full realization of what
the demands for the services would be. I am not prepared to say,
Mr. Congresman, to what extent it has been done, because certainly
all along concentration has been on men who were more likely to be
deferred.
13168 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Curtis. But you have not exhausted the non military prospect
in your training program before you started to train those fellows?
Mr. Lund. That is correct as far as I know, sir.
Mr. Curtis. In all this manpower discussion and planning, who
is it that is looking after the agricultural interests to insure that we
have suflEicient men to run these farms and to harvest these crops?
Mr. Lund. That is the dual responsibility of the Employment
Service and the Department of Agriculture. However, as far as the
strictly employment phase of the job is concerned, the training phase
of the job would be done by the Employment Service, which is one
division of the War Manpower Commission.
Mr. Curtis. As far as you are concerned, you have nothinsr to do
with that angle?
Mr. Lund. That is right.
Mr. Curtis. That is all.
Mr. Bender. Mr. Lund.
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bender. Would you develop your views on the National Serv-
ice Act, which would operate through the existing employment
services?
Mr. Lund. I am not prepared, Mr. Congressman, to express my-
self on the National Service Act. I think probably other officials of
the War Manpower Commission ought to do that. I would want to
make this comment, however, that I believe we should exhaust all
voluntarv means of getting workers for jobs before we think of drafting
thom. In my statement here this morning, I stated that there was
still a good deal of discrimination against the Negro and against
loyal aliens.
Furthermore, we have not begun, of course, to utilize women to
the fullest extent, or to any considerable extent, in industry. It just
seems to me that all those things ought to be carried further, just as
far as we can, before we start talking about a National Service Act.
I thmk sometimes there is a tendency on the part of many of us to
have too great a respect for the miraculous results of legislation. I
personally am a firm believer in the sort of participation you can get
on a voluntary basis, if it is properly explained to people and properly
administered.
Mr. Bender. Would you favor a National Service Act to operate
through the Selective Service, providing the Selective Service strength-
ened its relationship in local States and national levels with manage-
ment and labor?
Mr. Lund. No, sir. If we are going to have a National Service
Act there would have to be the very closest cooperation between the
National Selective Service and the War Manpower Commission.
Mr. Bender. Mr. Lund, a large part of your functions were trans-
ferred to W. M. C?
Mr. Lund. Yes.
functions not transferred
Mr. Bender. Another large part has gone to W. P. B., the Priori-
ties Branch, and the whole problem of concentration is now in a
concentration committee. What basic functions are left to the Labor
Production Division?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13169
Mr. Lund. I reviewed that very briefly a few minutes ago. I
would say, No. 1, sir, the war production drive, which of course has
not been transferred out of this Division. I indicated there was some
confusion as to where the full responsibility for it belonged. How-
ever, the major part of the war production drive is still conducted by
the Labor Production Division. Then, a second branch is what we
call our Industry Consultant Service. In that we have consultants
who work with all of the industry branches of W. P. B., getting labor's
point of vi(>w into their deliberations and decisions.
Incidentally, labor has insistently and consistently taken a position
in the branches for all-out conversion to war production, and ^hat
is one of its major contributio7is in these branches.
Then, a third branch that we have is the Shipbuilding Wage Stabili-
zation Branch, which administers an agreement, a wage stabilization
agreement, affecting upwards of 500,000 shipbuilding workers.
Mr. Bender. Mr. Lund, one other question. Some testimony has
been offered here in these hearings about the productivity of workers
in these plants.
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bender. As union men.
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
NO FORMULA FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION
Mr. Bender. Do you thinlv a standard or a formula or a barometer
as to how much should be produced by an individual worker, say in an
8-hour shift, should be set?
Mr. Lund. You are asking me: Do we have that?
Mr. Bender. Yes.
Mr. Lund. No, sir, we do not. I do not know that anyone has.
I thinlv I should say, however, that the increase in productivity of
American labor has been little short of phenomenal. That is true for
a variety of reasons, one of them being that there pro'oably is in many
plants more labor participation, in giving ideas as to improving
production processes, than ever before.
Mr. Bender. Do you believe in the shop-steward idea?
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bender. You believe that is a good plan?
Mr. Lund. Yes, I do.
Mr. Bender. The reason I asked that question, I know what your
background is. I heard your name. Before you came into this
work you were an official of some kind of some organized labor group ;
were you not?
Mr. Lund. No, sir; I was not. I was director of the Michigan
Unemployment Compensation Commission.
Mr. Bender. I heard of you in some connection. I might say I
am not a labor baiter; I always enjoyed labor support in my own
State. However, this matter has come to my attention quite recently:
A man who carries a card in the Electrical Workers Union in my own
city — ^ui fact he has carried the card for 27 years — ^took a job in a war
plant during his vacation because he had one son overseas and another
one about to go and he felt he ought to make this contribution. He
was taken into a plant as an employee and he described this experience
that he had: He said the man in the front office had absolutely nothing
13170 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
to say; the foreman has nothing to say; the union has a shop steward
in that plant who runs the works, and he said that he was there to
receive an 8-hour pay for 8 hours work, and he was wilhng to give
more than that, in fact, he was animated by a desire to produce
because of patriotic reasons; when he was workmg too fast it was
called to his attention that he was doing too much.
As a matter of fact, the plant he worked in had a Navy "E" flying
from the flag mast. He said whenever some employee would work
too hard or too fast they would take some toilet paper and put an
"E" on and pin the "E" on this fellow, just as a matter of a joke.
Now, I am concerned about labor, I am concerned about labor not
losing its advantages in this country, and I am wondering if any effort
is being made on the part of your group to correct a condition of that
kind?
Now, this man was thoroughly incensed; in fact, he was not only
telling me about it but telling everybody he met. He was thoroughly
aroused. In fact, he made an issue of it on the floor of his union. I
wonder if you have anything to say about that?
Mr. Lund. Congressman, I would say that instances of the nature
you have mentioned are, in my opinion, very few and far between.
On the contrary; I know because instances come to our attention
every day that labor has made an amazing record in increasing its
productivity during this war and in going all-out in all respects.
Therefore, this instance would, in my opinion, be an extremely rare
exception. I can assure you that it is not geueral. I can be very
positive on that point. Where we find instances like that, of course
we do our best to correct them. I am not sure that we have found
any. I will amend that to say if we would find any we would cer-
tainly do our best to correct them, although there again the best
vehicle would be the labor-management committee in the plant, it
seems to me, for dealing with such a situation as you have described.
You asked me a question a moment ago, and I am not sure that I
gave a satisfactory answer to it. I said: If we were to have a national
service act it would be necessary for Selective Service and the War
Manpower Commission to work very closely together. Now, I do
not mean to imply that I would favor, or organized labor would
favor, placing the civilian phase of the administration of any national
service act in Selective Service.
Mr. Bendee. That is all.
The Chaieman. Thank you very much, Mr. Lund.
Mr. Nelson, have you assistants that you desire to bring with you?
Have them seated there with you.
The Congressman says you come from the State of Illinois and he
says you do not need any assistance.
Mr. Nelson. Thank you.
TESTIMONY BY DONALD' M. NEISON, CHAIEMAN, WAR
PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.
The Chaieman. Mr. Nelson, on any questions propounded to you
by members of the committee, we do not want to say for a minute
that there is anything critical in them, because that is not intended
at all.
Mr. Nelson. I am sure that is true.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AilGRATION 13171
The Chairman. We are just simply Members of Congress, and we
have to report back to the Congress certain facts, that is all. So,
there are no catch questions or any attempt to criticize you in any way.
We appreciate very much your coming here. The committee has
a few questions to ask you.
The first question I would like to ask you, Mr. Nelson, is this:
When you last appeared before this committee in October 1941/
you emphasized that planning war production required a full knowl-
edge of military requirements. At that time you told this committee
that the first action you had taken as Executive Director of S. P. A. B.
was to request this information of the Army and Navy and that you
expected to get it within 30 or 40 days. Have you, as yet, obtained
data on military requirements and developed a detailed war production
program? Have you been able to?
REQUIREMENTS OF GLOBAL WAR
Mr. Nelson. Oh, yes, Mr. Congressman. I think we have got to
view this question of military requirements as one where none of us
recognized at any time the complete necessities of tomorrow.
Now, let us stop and think what the condition was in 1941, when
I told you that. We did get requirements after a fashion. As far
as I am concerned I believe the military tried to do their best to give
their requirements, what they thought their requirements would be,
but as you get into a global war of the immense size of this one,
the question of requirements has now become a question of whether
or not they can be fulfilled, because the requirements are everything
that can possibly be had. We have got to look at our job and be
reconciled to that fact.
The Chairman. In other words, there is no such thing as a blue-
print?
Mr. Nelson. There is no such thing as a blueprmt.
Conditions change, the whole thing changes overnight. We have
got to be prepared and be flexible for those changes. That is war.
That is what war is ajl about. War is pitting our strength and our
brains against the enemy's strength and brains. They have strength,
and they have brains.
The Chairman. All over the world?
Mr. Nelson. All over the world, yes; any place they may attack
us. Now, I think, sir, that todny, as in the past j^ear, the Army and
Navy and the Maritime Commission gave us the best they had, but
this thing has changed to such an extent that the thing that we thought
was all-out effort in 1941 , and then m the early part of 1942, that which
we thought was all-out effort, is not. Now, it is necessary to do much
more than that. There is just no comparison between our job today
and our job 6 months ago.
The Chairman. In the World War, for instance, why, we did not
have to fire a gun m the Pacific, did we?
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
The Chairman. There was no trouble in the Pacific at all.
Mr. Nelson. That is right. We had production in France, produc-
tion in England, production in Italy, production in other places that
' See Washington Hearings, pt. 20, p. 8015.
13172 WASHINGTON HEARIN<iS
we could depend upon. Today, they depend upon us. We must
supply Russia with the needed things that she has to have as her
territories are occupied and certain strategic minerals or strategic
materials of one kind or another are taken by the enemy. We want
to keep Russia fighting, because they are killing Germans, and even if
it disrupts our program and they need certain things to make air-
planes or tanks, I think it is our job to give it to them. I know of no
way to plan that.
EXPANSIONS IN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
We have tried, sir, and are continuing to try to do the best job of
planning that can possibly be done. I would just like to cite you one
figure. I want to give you one part of this picture. Let us take the
aircraft industry, for example. You say, why cannot we plan that all-
out and have the thing done in fine detail so that everything moves
smoothly? If you will just look at this picture: In 1939 the aircraft
industry had 49,000 workers -and they expanded to 640,000 m 1942,
and they will go up to 1,200,000 in 1943, a multiplication of 24 times.
The value of the production will go up from $280,000,000 to
$21,000,000,000 in 1943.
I will just try to put down a homely illustration to show you what
this means, to expand the industry to that extent. Let us say you had
a city of 500,000 people and that city grew from that 500,000 in 1939
to 6,500,000 in 3 years, and to 12,000,000 in 4 years, and you had
to prepare the housing, the sanitation, transportation, and all of the
essential supplies for 12,000,000 instead of 500,000; you people who
have had a knowledge of what it means to administer city govern-
ment will get an impression of what it means to expand the aircraft
industry to that extent. Thousands and thousands of items have to
be expanded all over this country to do that. If we are going to have
mass production in the aircraft industry we have to assemble some
40,000 different parts. They all must meet at one time. The bomber
is no good unless these parts all meet at one time and they are put in
and the bomber moves out of the factory.
That is not an alibi. I am merely trying to give you the situation,
what it means to make a blueprint of this thing.
The Chairman. Another problem brought out by General Hershey.
You say you have to run to 1,200,000 aircraft workers before you finish.
Well, 3,895 quit their jobs there in August this year.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
The Chairman. That is another problem.
Mr. Nelson. That is a real problem.
The Chairman. As General Hershey pointed out, of course they
can recall them from France to England, that is a short way; but we
cannot recall them from Australia and Egypt very easily.
Mr. Nelson. It is very difficult to do that.
The Chairman. Do you think that war production can be organ-
ized eft'ectively unless there is a detailed production program consisting
of a monthly schedule of products to be manufactured?
materials and production control
Mr. Nelson. No, sir; I do not. Of course, that has been our
constant aim. We have reached the point where the demands upon
us are such that we have to produce the maximum. Now, the maxi-
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13173
mum is dictated by the maximum you can get out of certain materials.
We have got so much steel; we have got so much copper; we have so
much molybdenum, tungsten, vanadium, and so forth, and those
things determine the size of the program.
The Chairman. Do you know exactly how much you have?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir, as nearly as we can figure those things.
Of course, they are dependent upon a lot of things, too. Our quan-
tities are determined upon shipping and a lot of other things, all of
which may change the picture overnight.
The Chairman. A constant reference is always made to what
England is doing. England is not comparable with us. She is not
comparable geographically, and not from the standpomt of population
either. She has got a central government there. You met Williams
when he was here?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In England, what they do, of course, is to give a
man a war contract and attach to it his contract for materials at the
same time.
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. Don't forget this, Mr. Chairman, if they
cannot supply all of the materials they have us to call on to give the
materials to them.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Nelson. For instance, if they haven't got enough of a certain
material and we can ship it, the demand comes on us. We are
anxious to supply it; we are glad to. It may be ball bearings today,
it may be transmissions, it may be alloy steel, it may be ingot steel,
it may be anything. We figure we have got to keep the production
going. They have got a great, big reservoir that they can draw from
and get a regularity of flow. We want it that way.
The Chairman. I saw an article in Collier's last week wherein it
was stated that 37 airplanes out of 100 in England are built from
salvaged material from German and English planes. I could hardly
believe that.
Mr. Nelson. I think it depends on what you mean by "built," sir.
If a plane crashes, you can often rebuild it. Now, it may be merely
the repair of a plane. If a plane has a carburetor or somethmg goes
bad, all right, they can put another carburetor on, or anything of that
kind; they can repair, and should repair, and do repair it.
The Chairman. Of course, the words "rebuilt completely" were left
out. That is what you are getting at?
Mr. Nelson. That is what I am getting at.
The Chairman. Of course. It seems to me that if you want to add
a new type of war production to your current schedule, such as air
cargo planes, you could only do it efi'ectively if you deliberately modi-
fied your existing program in order to make room for the new schedule.
Since we are in a very rapidly changing situation and need a great
deal of flexibility in production, is it not doubly important that we
have a detailed program which we can modify according to changed
conditions?
IMPORTANCE OF PROPER SCHEDULING
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir; very definitely so. And I think that this
whole question of scheduling is probably the most important single
problem ahead of us. We have been working on it for some months,
13174 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
finding the right way to do it, have had the best brains from industry-
come in and advise us. It is not just a question of scheduUng a few
items, it is a question of scheduling thousands and thousands of com-
ponents all over this United States. The job of scheduling in this
picture is just the most gigantic job of scheduling that anybody under-
took, and the difficulty, sir, is in getting all your figures compiled.
The Chairman. Not only the war came upon us quickly, but we
are a democracy, too; we do not get under way so fast.
Mr. Nelson. Yes; it is rather difficult.
The Chairman. When we do roll, we roll pretty fast.
Mr. Nelson. Yes; we roll pretty fast. I think we are nearer to it
today than we have ever been.
In addition to the items we need to make for Army and Navy and
the Maritime Commission, we need to make articles for England,
Russia, Australia, for China, for South America; and for our own
civilian economy; that means scheduling practically everything that
is produced in the United States.
The Chairman. In your March realinement of the War Production
Board, you eliminated the contract review function which the W^ar
Production Board had formerly exercised, thus giving the military
services exclusive responsibility for contract letting and production
scheduling. Are you satisfied that contracts to date have been so let
as to maximize production?
Mr. Nelson. No; of course, no one could be satisfied completely.
The reason that was done is that our own people from our organiza-
tion were put right over there with the Army and Navy, who are
doing it and who are doing it according to the plans and policies that
had been laid out. It seems to me that the thing to do is to avoid as
much duplication and waste as possible. When Mr. Frank Folsom
goes over to the Navy and works at the right hand of Admiral Robin-
son and Mr. Forrestal I think right there Mr. Folsom can do a better
job passing on the contracts right in the Navy, and does it. Now, I
did not feel that it was necessary to have another group review those
same contracts. The whole question of policy, Mr. Chairman, is
tied in through the Purchase Policy Committee which Was set up at
that time, composed of a man from the War Production Board, one
from the Army, one from the Navy, one from the Maritime Commis-
sion, and the Air Corps, and the whole question of policy is set, and
then it becomes a question of reviewing the contract in terms of that
policy. I did not feel, I have never felt, that that was relinquishing
any authority, by the delegation of Mr. Folsom to review those con-
tracts right over there. I felt certain Mr. Folsom would do the job
for the Navy as he would do it if he were working in my own shop.
He would get speedier action there and avoid duplication, because
duplication is a waste, as you know. That was the purpose of it, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you. You have pointed out that effective
war production depends on the snnultaneous scheduling of materials,
facilities, and men in proper proportion. I gather from curreni news-
paper reports that there is a conflict going on as to whether scheduling
should be done by individual prime contractors, by the military serv-
ices, or by a production scheduling group within the War Production
Board. Which method do we now have and are you contemplating
any changes?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13175
Mr. Nelson. Well, I am amazed to read in the newspapers today
about all these conflicts going on. Some of them I never heard about.
Wlien you get a job of any size, you get men from all over the country,
you get differences of opinion as to how the job is going to be done,
differences of opinion during the formative period, and those things
are often regarded as conflicts. I do not regard those as conflicts.
To me the way to get a job well done is to take men of different walks
of life, different experiences, and have them get together to find out
what the best method is.
RECORDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
On that point, certainly it has to be done in two ways, it seems to
me. A job of scheduling, of course, has to be done by the manufac-
turer. No manufacturer can operate well without a schedule. On
the other hand, he has to be given a schedule within which to operate.
Then you get this thing into a regularized form.
Let me explain what I mean. In March, just to take the period
that you were talking about, no one could predict how much American
industry could do in any particular. Had we set a schedule at that
time, we could never have gotten maximum production, because of the
savings that have been made in man-hours and material through con-
stant repetition, through engineering genius, and tlirough this co-
operative work that has gone on all over this country, to try to pro-
duce more with less, and I think some of the records of accomplish-
ment and reduction in man-hours to manufacture a gun or airplane, or
this thing or that thing, has been perfectly amazing, and would be
amazing to you. I shall be very glad for somebody to check back. I
have prepared just the experience of one group of companies, and I
wiU show you what I mean, how by changing forgings to stampings
and stampings to something else, changing one material to another,
and as we get these things into production these changes are made.
The Chairman. Who supervises the changes? Is that carried on
through some sort of training?
^Ir. Nelson. In the main, of course, it is the Army and Navy who
supervise the changes. We have a conservation and simplification
division made up of some of the best experts we can get, who make
recommendations to the Army for changes of specifications, and things
of that sort. By getting the best engineering brains out of the steel
industry, for instance, and the American Society for Testing Mate-
rials, we have been making new specifications for steel which eliminate
some critical materials like nickel.
The Chairman. Governor McNutt testified yest erday that the
productivity of individual workers has really gone up, too.
Mr. Nelson. It has, sir. It has kept going up.
The Chairman. The sunplest example is in shipbuilding; 10,000-ton
cargo ships that formerly took 103 days are now being tm-ned out in a
relatively few days. What is the number of days now?
Mr. Nelson. Twenty-nine days now.
The Chairman. That is really remarkable.
Mr. Nelson. It is remarkable. It is the application ofmew meth-
ods of mass production, and managerial genius combined with pro-
ductivity of the workers doing a job.
The Chairman. In the old days, they used to start from the keel
and build the ship up from the keel.
60396— 42— pt. 34 9
13176 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Nelson. Yes; they built it by putting on plate by plate, and
today it is built in sections. Groups can be making sections all over
the big yard. Formerly a shipyard was a small plot of ground in
which you just had the inventory and keel, you put it on plate by
plate. Now, you have a big yard, with fabrication of parts going on
all over; the fabricated parts are put together and welded, and when
they are completed the whole superstructure has been built in the
meantime and can be picked up by a crane and put on the hull, and
the job is completed.
Mr. Bender. Congressman, would you mind if I asked a question?
The Chairman. Not at all.
Mr. Bender. Now, that you are on Mr. McNutt, I wonder if you
would care to express yourself regarding the National Service Act?
Do you favor the National Service Act?
Mr. Nelson. I really must say to you that I have not studied
that enough to be able to tell you anything about it. What I want to
say, of course, what I think we have to say, is we must have workers at
places where they are needed at times that they are needed. If that
can be done voluntarily, I think it is fine ; if it cannot be done volun-
tarily, then in some way it ought to be done. We have got to have
men in the copper mines who are producing copper, producing the
maxunum amount of copper, because every pouncl of copper we lose
today out of production is a pound of ammunition lost. We are short
of copper, we need copper, and every single pound we lose through
any reason whatsoever takes a pound of ammimition away from our
soldiers.
Mr. Bender. If such a national service act would be in order, do
you think it ought to be operated through the existing employment
services?
Mr. Nelson. That I do not know — I do not know enough about
either, sir, to express an intelligent opinion to you, because I have my
own problems.
The Chairman. I heard you have got quite a few.
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir.
WAR AGENCIES ALL PART OF ONE ORGANIZATION
The Chairman. Will it ever be possible to schedule production
factors properly if contract letting and production scheduling is
under the control and responsibility of the Army and Navy, the dis-
tribution of raw materials is centered within the War Production
Board, and the planning and manpower is centered in still other
agencies?
Mr. Nelson. Well, may I give you the picture as I see it? There
has been a great deal of talk about this question of one thing being
in one place and another thing being in another place. To me the
War Production Board, the Army and Navy, the Maritune Com-
mission, and all other agencies engaged in war production are part of
one organization, and each has its functions to perform. It can be
done in that way, sir; I am positive of that. I am positive that is
the only way it can be done.
The Chairman. Wlio has the final say?
Mr. Nelson. Sn?
The Chairman. Who has the final say, the board or you?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13177
Mr. Nelson. I have the final say. I have been given the authority-
over war production by the President, and I have the final say m any
particular, in anything relating to war production.
Now, you talk about the question of manpower. There, again, owp
job is to say how many workers we need in a certain place to do a cer-
tain job, and then it is the function of the Manpower Commission to
get those workers for us to do that particular job.
There was a question at one time whether the Manpower Commis-
sion ought to be under War Production Board or not. Well, you can
make a structure so big that no one person can do a job in adminis-
tering it. This job is so big that it takes more than one. There are
no superhuman people m this country; there are few geniuses, we are
all just average people; we can do just so much, and if you put all
the activities in one place you still have to delegate them to people
to administer. The question is where you delegate and how well the
people work together to do a job.
As far as Mr. McNutt and I are concerned, I was 100 percent for
Mr. McNutt's appointment. He and I can work together 100 per-
cent. There is no difficulty there.
The Chairman. He so stated yesterday.
Mr. Nelson. That is the fact, sir. We have a function to perform,
and the War Manpower Commission has a function to perform.
Its function is to take the total manpower of the country just as we
take the total material and decide how to get the best distribution of
that, in order to get the maximum impact on the enemy from that
number of people. That maximum impact may come through the
military services, through putting them on doing a job making war
material of one kind or another, or doing various other things that are
necessary to be done. This is a war economy today. It must be.
The only function of this country today is to win this war. It must
be that. Everybody has to work together to do that job of wmning
this war.
The Chairman. Mr. Nelson, according to information furnished us,
the Army and Navy have proposed through the Army and Navy
Munitions Board that the military services take over detailed alloca-
tion of materials for military products after allocation by the War
Production Board as between military and civilian uses. Do you
think the military should be burdened with such additional serious
responsibilities?
]\lr. Nelson. No; ^nd I do not think they are. I do not know
anythmg about the particular thing that you are talking about.
Under my executive order, the Army and Navy Munitions Board
report to the President through me. Now, it is a question of how the
thing can be done best. That is the only way I look at it, how the
thing can be done best. You say: ''Can this be done best that way?"
If it cannot be, sir, it will not be done that way. If you look at my
executive order, the Army and Navy Munitions Board reports directly
to the President through me, and therefore I do not understand this
newspaper talk that I am at war with the Army or that there is a
conflict of opiniori as to this thing, that thing, or the other thing.
Certainly, it is a question of trying to find the right way to do this job.
It is going to be improved every day. We will change it every day,
if necessary, until we find the right way to get the maximum war.
production in this country out of the material that we have or can get.
13178 WASHINGTON HEARIN'OS
By that "can get," I mean we constantly have to mcrease our pro-
duction of material. But on the other hand it takes material to make
material. It takes steel to make more steel, and there comes the
fine question of balances, as to how much you shall use to get your
maximum impact on the encmj^ now, how much you shall use in the
spring of 1943, how much in the fall of 1943, how much in the spring of
1944, because it often takes a year to 18 months to expand these
facilities. The material you use now in expanding steel will not come
in until the fall of 1943. If you start making a new expansion it takes
just that much longer. A lot of expansion is going on; we are expand-
ing in every direction.
We set July 1943 as the cut-off date. It was set as a cut-off date
for material that could be brought in by July 1943 and we went ahead
with that expansion. If it could not be brought in by July 1943, we
deferred the expansion, the only exception to that being a few things
like copper and a few critical materials that we knew we were going
to have to have.
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION — -STEEL AS AN EXAMPLE
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Nelson, our report of last March said
that the chief failure of procurement was due to the company-by-
company and item-by-itcm purchase of armaments by the separate
supply services. We also said: "Each of the major corporations have
been permitted to determine the extent to which it could subcontract
and to choose its contractors. With the best of will, the 50 to 100
corporations charged with production of virtually our entire program
could not individually have planned so as to secure the full use of our
industrial resources."
Now, Mr. Nelson, if the job of materials distribution were given to
the Services, would they not transfer the responsibility to the prime
contractors, just as in the past they have transferred the responsibility
for determining subcontracting and facility expansion? What have
you done in that regard?
Mr. Nelson. May I explam to you how this material is now being
distributed?
The Chairman. If you will, please; yes, sir.
Mr. Nelson. It is not anywhere near perfect yet, but we see ways
of improving it all the time, and have. This question of distribution
of material I have seen for a year was gomg to be a major problem.
I said so before a number of committees.
Now, let us look at the question of steel, for example. "Steel" is a
generic term for hundreds of different items that go to make up steel,
such as steel plate for the building of ships, steel plate of all varieties,
sizes, and thiclmesses, structural shapes of all kinds and descriptions'
each one of which is fitted for a particular kind of job to meet certain
stresses or strains ; alloy steels of all kinds or formulae for every sort of
thing. The airplane engine is really a metallurgical developrnent
rather than a mechanical development. It was done on the basis of
development of metallurgy of steel and various formulae are used for
different parts of that paTticular engine. We can go on to bars, rods,
rivets, nails, bolts, nuts, screws, and all of those things that are made
of steel.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13179
Now, tlio job is to assemble in one place all of the various require-
ments of all the claimants, seat them around the table with one man
given the authority to make that distribution. That man is the head
of our requirements committee; he has the complete authority from
the Chairman of the War Production Board to make the distributions.
The head of the steel division is chairman of the steel subcommittee.
The thing is perfected more every day. We know each day more
and more about what out requirements really are, because these people
represent literally thousands of individual consumers, so we know
each month what our demand is for all of the thousands and thousands
of items that are made of steel.
That demand comes in, the Army brings in its estimated demand as
well as it can — and it is perfecting its estimated demand each day —
not one of these are perfect yet, and probabl}'^ will not be until the day
we win the war. The Navy brings m its requnement or request, the
Maritime Commission makes its request, the Procurement Division
of the Treasury for lend-lease and others; our Division of Civilian
Supply for the absolutely essential things that are needed for the
health and safety of the people, the things that are needed for the fire
services, sanitation, running our cities, and so forth. That is brought
down to the bare essentials today, only the things that are absolutely
necessary for the health and safety of the people.
South America: It is necessary that we supply steel to South
America, because we are getting copper, molybdenum, and tin, and
all kinds of things from South America, which we have to have from
South America, and in order to do that they have to have their rail-
roads so they can bring that stuff to port.
For England, for lease-lend, for Russia, for Canada. Canada has
big production going. All of these people, we try to get in one place,
try to seat them around the table each month to find what their re-
quirements are. Then, we know the total supply; then it becomes
a question of where to whittle down and how to whittle it down, and
to do it as best we can in terms of strategy and necessity, and a lot
of other things to make your cloth fit your pattern.
The Chairman. What check have > ou, Air. Nelson? In other
words, the Army might fudec, or the Navy, or the Maritime Com-
mission. Do you check back?
Mr. Nelson. Oh, yes, of course, it is checked back. Don't forget
sitting around the table are the claimants, and they check each other.
The Chairman. They watch each other pretty closely?
Mr. Nelson. They v/atch each other pretty closely.
That is the s.ystem, sir. It gets better, better, and better, as our
requirements get better, as we know what we need. It is not perfect
yet, a long w\ay from it, but that, sir, is the method.
Now, when that is done the Army is allotted so much, the Navy is
allotted so much, and the Maritime Commission is allotted so much.
Just taking the question of steel plate for merchant ships, a program
has been set for merchant ships, so man}^ million tons the next 2 years.
All right, thai takes half the amount of steel plate. We have checked
with the Maritmie Commission, we know how much steel plate goes
to make up a vessel, and it is easy to check and it is checked, and
then the plate is allotted to all these dift'erent companies. The Mari-
time Connnission takes that plate and allots it to the various ship-
yards. They need so much plate each month, they can buy so much
13180 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
steel plate each month. Plate is allotted for pipe lines, plate is
allotted for shells, plate is allotted for gun carriages, plate is allotted
for locomotives — we can just go down the line and give you hundreds
of uses for steel plate. People say, "Why can't we have more plate?"
We can do any one thing, and can do probably any two things, just
carve them out and do them, but to do the myriad and multiple
things with that steel plate is a very difficult thing to do.
Then, again, we have so many ingot tons of steel. We have to
fabricate the ingot mto the various things. Steel plate is one of them.
Alloy steel: Ingot steel might be put to making alloy steel, bars,
shapes, nuts, bolts, rivets, nails, structural shapes of all kinds, de-
scription, and sizes. The amount of steel plate you can make is
determined by the total amount of other things you have to make out
of the total amount of ingot steel. The job is to try to increase the
total amount of ingot. If we can get more scrap we can increase the-
total ingot. All right, we have to conduct a scrap campaign. We go
all over the country to get in all the scrap we can in order to increase
the ingot, and when we increase the ingot we can get more shapes,
we can get more bars, we can get more nails, we can get more of all
the other things that I mentioned.
Am I making the picture plain?
The Chairman. Yes; I think so.
Mr. Nelson. Now, the job of scheduling is an exceedingly impor-
tant one, one that we have not perfected, and it has not been perfected
for one of the reasons as I stated to you previously, no one knew the
maximum of what any one factory could do. On the other hand, we
did not know just what you were going to need to accord with strategy.
Our strategy changes. It is necessary to move one thing ahead of
another. Maybe one thing today assumes great importance because
of its immediate necessity.
We have arrived at the point which one of your first questions in-
dicated, a very clear perspective. As you add anything to your pro-
gram, 3^ou have to subtract something from it.
The Chairman. Yes; I tMnk you are clear about that, absolutely
clear, about the fact that we did not know just what the individual
factories could produce. We had striking evidence of that. This
committee spent several days m Detroit over a year ago on the
conversion of the automobile industry.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
The Chairman. We had Ford's representative, we had General
Motors — we had them all, and they all agreed it could not be done.
So, we brought them back to Washington, which was Mr. Knudsen's
own idea, and it is being done.
Mr. Nelson. It has been done.
The Chairman. We did not know it could be done. They said it
could not be done.
Mr. Nelson. Yes.
review and scheduling of operations
The Chairman. I just have one or two more questions. Our
studies of some time ago show that 10 companies were awarded approx-
imately two-fifths of all military supply contracts and that 100 com-
panies were awarded more than 80 percent of the war contracts.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13181
If the War Production Board were to review the contracts and
schedule the production of, first, the 10 largest prime contractors,
and then the next 100, would not the bulk of the material and produc-
tion schedulmg be mider control? Is there any way to handle that?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. I think that is a very mtehigent question, sir.
It could be handled if we had some 700 different companies scheduled
and had a schedule made up for them from the services.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Nelson. You would have about 50 percent of the steel covered
by a schedule.
' The Chairman. That is right.
Mr. Nelson. That is the big job ahead of us that we are hard at
work on. We have got some of the best brams of uidustry down
here helping us to do that particular job.
The Chairman. I want to say to you that you are modest to this
extent, to admit the job is not done by you or by anybody so far.
You have got plenty of work to do yet.
Mr. Nelson. We certainly have. We have just started.
The Chairman. If the War Production Board were to review and
schedule the operations of the largest prime contractors, would not
you need a special division composed of uidustrial engineers and men
"directly from the production line and would not this enable you to
reduce the size of the remainder of your staff? Or have you got
them now?
Mr. Nelson. We have got them now, sir, and we have got them
in the Army and Navy. Don't forget, I consider if a man is working
in the Army or the Navy, and workmg on this particular problem, I
don't care whether he is working there or for us, we are all working
to the same end. The job is to get them together to work to that end.
There will be at the start differences of opmion as to the best way to
do it — there are bound to be, just as there are differences of opinion in
the legislature, and that is the best way to pass a particular kind of
law. You have these variations of opinion, because men have
different ideas, different experiences. After they have found what
they consider is the right thing, then it is a job that everybody pitches
in to do, and it is done according to that right way.
We have industrial engineers, the best in the country. Take Mr.
Ernest Kanzler who is with us. He is the man who did the whole
scheduling for Henry Ford. I think he is the principal exponent of
scheduling in the United States. He was with the Ford organization
when it was done — it was his responsibility to do it for the Ford
organization.
We have men from General Motors. We have got men from many
companies, all of whom are working in this direction, and have been
for months. This is not a kind of thing that has been stationary,
but perhaps it has not been going fast enough. Each day I know we
have not done as much as we should have done, and I know tomorrow
we will not do as much as we should do, but not because we haven't
tried.
The Chairman. Do you contemplate setting up any special division
of consulting engineers to work just the way you are doing now?
Mr. Nelson. The Division of Consulting Engineers — doing what?
13182 WASHINGTON HEARINlGS
The Chairman. Do you contemplate setting up such a special
division composed of industrial engineers, as you indicated, all by
itself? You will have them work with you, that is your idea?
Mr. Nelson. That is right. It works out much better than these
advisory committees.
The Chairman. There was one question handed up here by a
reporter, I guess, that we might as well find out about if we can.
CONTROL OF PRODUCTION FLOW
There have been statements published to the effect that your new
director general of operations, A4r. Ernest Kanzler, favors turning
large quantities of materials over to war industries, and let them, to a
large extent, control the flow of production. Do you favor this plan?
Would this not make it impossible for Kaiser to secure materials for
cargo planes? I understaDd you have already answered that.
Mr. Nelson. That question does not mean anything. We are not
turning materials over to anybody except on the basis of indicated
need. There must be some place where all these programs come from.
If we decide cargo planes are essential — I say "we," I mean the Gov-
ernment— the people who decide the question of whether cargo planes
are or are not essential are our chiefs of staff. Our chiefs of staft' are
fighting this war — it has been entrusted to them, and they must
determine the kind and character of airplanes they want; they must
determine the urgency of dift'erent items, or of the program; they
must determine bow much shipping is needed to take the men over-
seas. Now, we come back to them and point out certain things, and
it is a question of a constant flow back and forth to determine what
the total program will be.
Now, take this question of cargo planes. There are a lot of cargo
planes being made in the program, and big ones are in the program.
This is a particular kind of cargo plane that is bigger than anything
we have. I want to go ahead and build some of them to see whether
they fly, to see whether they are the thing we need. I am certain if
we are shown that they are, and that they are better than something
else in the program, the program can be arranged to put these into the
program.
The Chairman. Are you working on that now?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir; we are working on that right now.
Mr. Bender. I would like to ask Mr. Nelson a question here.
We, a few days ago, had a message dehvered to us from the President
of the United States regarding production. If we are encountering
shortages of materials today, how are you going to produce twice the
present war goods?
discussion of lead factor
Mr. Nelson. Well, sir, because we are today cutting up material
at the rate at which we are going to be making up material into
finished products next January. There is a big lead factor in this
thing. We are on this big upswing of production. It goes up like
that [indicating]. That is the way it is scheduled and planned. We
are cutting up material today into component parts of one kind or
another that are going to be up at this point [indicating], way up here
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13183
some place [indicatingj. It has not come out yet in a finished product.
It takes a long while for these pipe lines to fill up and turn out a finished
product. Take the airplanes, for example. The material is going
into the airplane factories now, or has been for the past few months,
that eventually will come out in January or February.
Mr. Bender. Dr. I.amb would like to ask you a question that he
has in mind.
Dr. Lamb. Sir, if your lead factor is, say, 6 months, what would be
your picture, and if so will the line continue to go up, and if so will the
materials increase proportionately — or don't they have to increase
proportionately?
Mr. Nelson. Of course, your whole question of lead factors de-
pends upon the time it takes to fabricate that particular thing. Some
things have a lead factor of 6 months, some 2 month, some 1 month.
Dr. Lamb. I am trying to strike an average.
Mr. Nelson. Say the average lead factor would be somewhere 3 or
4 months. At this particular time you are having to get into pro-
duction many of the things that are going into the schedule that comes
way up here [indicating]. Eventually, that has to be worked out. Ifc
cannot go on indefinitely, of course. The question where it stops de-
pends entirely on the total that we can do in this country. Nobody
knows wliat that total is. We thought, when the President made his
speech last January, it was 40,000,000,000 in 1942 and 60,000,000,000
in 1943. We are going to beat that considerably. We are planning
much bigger than 60,000,000,000 for 1943, because v*^e know we can
do it. Just how much more, we do not know as yet.
The Chairman. One question, and then I am through with my
questions. See if I have this clear: You say to this congressional
committee that no matter how much the Army's estimates are, or the
Navy's, or any other war program agency's estimates, they are still
checked, and you have the final say, after consultation with them;
is that the idea?
ALLOCATION OF MATERIALS
Mr. Nelson. That is right, sir. Somebody has to have that,
because you have all of these claimants for this material. You have
got two things that function now in this present program; One, the
materials that go into making up the materiel of war, which is under
the War Production Board, and then you have the Munitions Assign-
ment Board that determines where they shall go after they are made.
Now, we have nothing to do with that. The question of where they
go is none of my business. The question of who gets the material
has to be decided by some umpire. Some umpire has to determine
how much shall go to Russia, how much shall go to England, how much
shall go to South America, how much shall go to Australia, how much
shall go to China. In terms of making these things which they need
badly, strategic material, aluminum, magnesium, or whatnot, how
much goes to the Army, how much goes to the Navy, how much goes
to the Maritime Commission, how much goes to the railroads, how
much to communications systems, how much to health services, how
much to new construction, and all of these various things, all of which
are claims on the materials. War Production Board must be the final
umpire. If there is a greater demand than we can supply we say,
13184 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS
"You cannot divide what you haven't got; you can only divide the
material that you have." It has got to be divided according to our
best judgment.
In many cases we go back to the chiefs of staff in matters like steel
plate, where we cannot fill all the requirements, and they determine
the urgencies in all these things. You hear of priorities. Priorities
are really urgency ratings. They determine whether one thing is
more important than another. That importance varies at different
times. If, in order to get a plant into production, it is going to take
steel, but that plant is going to produce more steel, if you can give
them 100 tons now and 3 months, later get out a thousand tons a
month, then certainly you are justified in giving them 100 tons now,
even above a lot of other things. Individual items move up and down
in the scale of urgency as the program goes on.
The Chairman. In other words, as you explained a while ago, con-
ditions here are not comparable at all with England. Wlien she
enters into a contract the materials go with it. They can come to
us, but we cannot go to them.
Mr. Nelson. That is right, sir. If their steel production goes
down, they can come to us and ask us to increase the kind of steel
that goes to them, and we have done that. We have sent a mission
to England, made up of some of the very best men, with England's
full cooperation and consent. This steel mission did a magnificent
job and had full cooperation and support. There was complete
cooperation.
Now, we have today a mechanism through which the two produc-
tions, the production of England and the production of this country,
can be regulated and adjusted, so that the thing can be made in the
place where it is more desirable to make it.
Always remember our one objective is to bring the maximum
impact on the enemy. In England, if it can be made there out of
materials from here, we supply the materials to them. We have an
organization that we call the Combined Production and Resources
Board, appointed by the President and Mr. Churchill. It is made up
of Captain Littleton, who is in charge of production in England, and
myself. We make up this committee. We are designated by the
President and the Prime Minister to determine where these things can
be made best, according to shipping needs, shipping necessities,
necessities of the war and a lot of other things, and we work constantly
with the allied chiefs of staff in maldng these determinations.
The Chairman. Where does the responsibihty lie? For instance,
England needs 25 bombers, the Solomon Islands need 25 — where is
the responsibility?
Mr. Nelson. "That responsibihty is in the Munitions Assignment
Board appointed by the President and made up of the chiefs of staff
and Mr. Hopkins.
The Chairman. You have nothing to do with that?
Air. Nelson. No sir; I have nothing to do with that. That is not
my job, to determine where these things go after they are made up.
The Chairman. I will say to you, Mr. Nelson, speaking for myself,
that 3^ou have a man-sized job. You look well, though, under all the
circumstances.
Mr. Nelson. Well, we are still working at it.
The Chairman. Congressman Sparkman.
NATIONAL DEFENSE IVnCRATION 13185
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Nelson, I want to ask you a few questions.
I want to say "Amen" to what the chairman has just said, and I
further say I think you have done a fine job, and I think the country
is behind you and has confidence in the program.
Mr. Nelson. Well, I appreciate that, sir.
The Chairman. You left out one thing, Congressman, and that is
his ability to take it.
Mr. Sparkman. Yes, I think he has abiUty to take it.
Mr. Nelson. That, you have to have.
replacement of priorities by allocations
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Nelson, in October 1941, you were before us,^
and at that time you told us that 3^ou were dissatisfied with priorities
and were planning to allocate materials. Priority ratings did not
limit, either in time or the amount, the raw material that was obtained
by the individual manufacturer.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
Mr. Sparkman. I beheve you said that this resulted in dispro-
portionate production. For example, airplanes could not be finished
because propellers were missing, or machine tools were unfinished for
lack of spindles.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
Mr. Sparkman. Now, since that time, during the past 11 months,
when and how were priorities replaced by allocations?
Mr. Nelson. We have been constantly replacing them with allo-
cations as fast as we could get all the requirements together to do that
job. There is a confusion whether w^e are using priorities now or allo-
cations. We still have priorities, as I said, to indicate urgencies, but
all steel plate has been allocated now for months, allocated to. the
various uses directly. All nickel has been allocated; copper has been
allocated; molybdenum, vanadium, alloy steels are now being allo-
cated. As fast as we can we are moving one thing after the other
to make allocations. When we find, for instance, we need steel for
airplane propellers, the only way to get it is to direct a certain flow of
steel to do that. We do that.
Everything is not on a basis of allocation yet, because it has not
been possible. It just physically has been impossible for us to get all
of these requirements together at any one time. The work has gone
on steadily since that time, trying to get a mechanism set up that would
give us the requirements at any particular time, but they are changing
so rapidly, have been changing up to the present so rapidly, that by
the time we got them they were obsolete, they did not mean anything.
We might need a certain number of things today, and tomorrow need
thi^ee or four times as many, because of the urgency of the situation.
I think we are at a point now, where, by the 1st of January, all steel
will be allocated. When you say "steel" that means hundreds of
difi^erent varieties of steel, not just steel. Ingot has been allocated for
some time, to make the various things that are necessary to be made.
So much ingot is for plate, so much for alloy steel, so much for nuts,
bolts, rivets, and so forth, all the way tlu'ough this picture.
I think by the 1st of January we will be able to come to your com-
mittee and tell you we have got about 75 percent of the program under
• See Washington Hearings, pt. 20, p. 8015.
13186 WASHINGTON HEARIX/GS
allocation. I do not think we can get it all, because there are just too
many different things that you never can get together in one place,
because of the wide variety of things that are needed in maintaining
an economy and running even the machinery, because you have to
have tools of all kinds, new machine tools to replace the obsolescent
tools, new machine tools to do the job better, ball bearings of all kinds,
clips, just thousands and thousands of items.
If you stop to think of this whole question of allocation of material,
it has to move into nearly everything in the United States. That is
the nature of this problem. That is not alibiing, it is tryuig to do
the best you can, so you know what you are going to do, you know
what you are going to do it with, so you know when you are going
to do it.
Mr. Sparkman. It is a constantly moving program and you have
to move with it?
Mr. Nelson. You have to move with it. It will never be the set-up
of a particular time because always there will be something more
important to do than yesterday. It may be that bombers have to
be fitted out for a certain mission. They have to have different radios
for different parts of the country, they have to have difl'erent cowlings
for different parts of the country or different parts of the world,
perhaps different gas tanks for different missions. All of that has to
be accomplished.
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Nelson, this next question I believe you have
pretty well answered in some of the responses to Mr. Tolan's questions.
PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS PLAN
As I understand it, under the Production Requirements Plan, or
P. R. P. as you call it, the individual manufacturer makes a request
for the supply of raw materials which he thinks he needs for the
following 3-month period. These requests are then trimmed down
by the War Production Board to match the expected supply ; however,
the final allocation is still based primarily on the manufacturer's own
requests which to date are not a part of any scheduled production
program. How can P. R. P. prevent the unbalanced production we
now have?
Mr. Nelson. I do not believe it can, sir. I believe you have got
to match it with scheduling. Production requirements plan can do
a good job of inventory control. . It is an information thing. It has
already accomplished a good deal in getting a redistribution of these
inventories, because when you have to match an inventory, this lead
factor we are talking about would cut down the allocation. It has
done a very good job in the past 2 months of informing us where
inventories were excessive so when allocations were made they could
be made more in line with the realistic fact of what amount of work
that company is going to do and not what amount they thought tliey
were going to need.
Production requirements plan must be accompanied by schedid-
ing. Two months ago we arrived at the decision that we have got
to start scheduling. You may ask why we did not do it before. I
don't know that we could have done it before. Suppose you had
scheduled Henry Kaiser's shipbuilding yaid and said to Henry Kaiser,
"You can make only so many ships''. Your schedule would not
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13187
contain itself. Wo liave been making ships in 29 days that could not
have been made if they were schedul(^d. Schedules would have been
changed every week. If we Avent to manufacturers and said, "Make
everything you can," you would not know what the limit of this was.
You can see the application from Kaiser's shipyard. We have been
scheduling on 105 days. Now, when you get to the point where you
know pretty well what the limits are, it is comparatively easy to
schedule, such as tank production and machine guns, and all of the
various components, because we know pretty well today, within limits,
what the maximum reallj^ is that we can do. We did not know 6
months ago; we had no experience. Many of these plants are produc-
ing three, four, or five times as much as they originally planned for.
We know today, for example, that the air-frame plant, which was
originally scheduled, can make more, many more airplanes, assemble
many more, than it was originally built for. As fast as we can build
up the supply of engines, all the 40,000 diflferent items that go to
make up the airplanes, uistruments, landing gears, all sorts of varieties
of things, we will get a better airplane production out of the present
air-frame plants. We know pretty well what the Imiits are in various
things, because we have had bellwethers that taught us how much
could be done.
I decided 2 months ago on gomg ahead and developing a scheduling
program. Production requirements plan cannot work on a majority
of things without a scheduling program. It works well on all of
the thousands of miscellaneous items that can never be scheduled.
You can never schedule, for instance, ball bearings, because there are
too many wide varieties of sizes and formulae, and so forth, for ball
bearings, so the thing to do in the case of a ball-bearing factory is to
schedule them on an inventory basis, so many pounds of products
coming out each month, so many pounds of material needed to go in
to bring out so many pounds. Rather than to attempt to count all
of the endless variety of ball bearings, you do it on the basis of inven-
tory. P. R. P. works perfectly on a thing of that kind, many thou-
sands of items — nuts, bolts, rivets, nails — all sorts of things, but as to
tanks and airplanes, we have a scheduling unit in Wright Field for
airplanes for months, and it is being scheduled.
As those tlimgs are perfected and as we know better how to do
them the schedules will mean more, and are meaning more, every
day. This airplane thing has been scheduled for months. The new
thing each day is to learn how to do it, so that all of these wide vari-
eties of things, and all of the constant changes that have to be made
in strategic plans can be taken care of for the different Services.
To summarize, I might say this: I think P. R. P. has a very definite
place for informational value, in determining how much inventory
you have to do a certain kind of job and in certain places. It is not
of any value except for that purpose, unless a master schedule is made
and bills of material are set up. On this wide variety of miscel-
laneous things, I tliink P. R. P. is the only method. An inventory
control method, in other words, is the only method of controlling the
wide variety of small things.
Mr. vSparkman. The P. R. P. gives specific materials' quotas to in-
dividual manufacturers, })ut makes no arrangement for them to obtain
their materials. Will not tliere be a tendency for one raw material
producer to get a lot of orders and a large backlog and for another to
have very few orders?
13188 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Mr. Nelson. No. You see, if you had a situation of that kind you
would not need P. R. P. at all. You have got to divide up the thing
when the demand is greater than the supply. Now, if the supply is
greater than the demand, you do not need any regulations, aud, believe
me, I wish we had some things in that category, so we would not need
to worry about the condition you point out. That is, it is a question
of every supplier making the maximum he can possibly make and then
trying to protect, in the various places, that particular manufacturer
from every one of the others. We had the situation where a few sup-
pliers, we will say of copper, had a surplus, and there you would not
have the situation where you had to make such strict allocations.
Have I covered your question correctly?
Mr. Sparkman. In other words, all suppliers of raw materials are
taxed to their utmost already?
Mr. Nelson. All suppliers of raw materials are taxed to their ut-
most in nearly everything I know. There are very few things I Ivuow
of that are not taxed to the limit. Even lumber is taxed clear to the
limit.
Mr. Sparkman. Military inspectors and expeditors assigned to in-
dividual plants, to get out particular contracts, have contributed to
excessive inventories and disproportionate production. Do you feel
that these individuals should have the responsibility of checldng on
material requirement and use?
Mr. Nelson. If you refer to their issue of the PD-3 ratings, that
has been taken away from them and is now under the control of
W. P. B. It was wrong if an expeditor could send out material to
his particular plant. Today, he has to come to the W. P. B. and get
the approval.
Mr. Sparkman. That has been remedied?
Mr. Nelson. That has been remedied.
PROPOSAL FOR MATERIALS UTILIZATION INSPECTORS
Mr. Sparkman. A proposal has been made that each individual
plant designate an employee as a materials utilization inspector, and
that he be put on the Government pay roll to check materials require-
ments and use of this plant for the War Production Board. Would
you favor such a proposal as against a plan where the War Production
Board would assign its own independent group of industrial engineers
to act as materials utilization inspectors?
Mr. Nelson. I tliink if we could get good men, it would be better
than to get our own men. When you talk about industrial engineers,
there is a shortage of good ones in this comitry. We have hired aU
we could get, because there is certamly a place for all of them. The
question of whether you put a man in the plant or not, is more a
question of getting the men properly tramed rather than your having
to go to the work of trammg them and having the thing delayed.
For example, I believe in 90 percent of the cases if you have a man
picked by the company and appomted by us, sworn m as a Govern-
ment man, taking the oath of office, in time of war it would be trea-
sonable if he did not do his job well. We pick a man that has a
very good reputation. All of them have been drawn out of industry
because they have had experience in the schedulmg of this material.
The whole problem is to get experts in their profession, men who have
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13189
brains and experience. You can get a lot of brains, but it has to be
combined with experience or else you have to teach them. That is
your big- problem.
Mr. Sparkman. The bulk of critical raw materials is accounted by
less than a thousand plants. If you want to control material dis-
tribution and use, why not place War Production Board mspectors
in these key plants to check on material requirements, mventories,
use and production scheduling?
Mr. Nelson. That is, m answer to your other question, one of the
plans that has been suggested which I thmk has a great deal of merit.
It has a great deal of merit when combined with the scheduling, so
he knows what it should be.
jMr. Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, that is all I care to ask.
PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS CAN BE INCREASED
Mr. Curtis. I just want to ask one question, Mr. Nelson.
Can our production of raw materials, particularly metals, be
increased, or has the maximum been reached?
Mr. Nelson. No; of course it can be increased. For instance,
steel; we could increase steel, put up more blast furnaces, more open-
hearth furnaces, but when you do that there is a wide chain of things
which you have to do. You have to increase the facilities for unload-
ing and loading the ore. You have to have many more ore boats.
There is a wide variety of things which have to be done when you start
that increase. Now, there is a question, as I said to the chairman,
Congressman Tolan. You have to make a decision as to whether
you shall spend more steel to make more steel or whether you should
take the steel that you have got now and produce it into things which
you are going to throw at the enemy as soon as you can.
Mr. Curtis. That is rather typical of most of the metals?
Mr. Nelson. That is rather typical of most of them; sir. Many
of them can be expanded by various methods and without the ex-
penditure of critical material. In copper, for example, it is a question
of trying to get more miners mto the mines and do more work, be-
cause there is smelting capacity to handle more copper. It is a ques-
tion of getting ores from various fields and processing them where it
can be clone without great expenditures of critical materials. We are
trying constantly to expand every one of these things. We wUl get
more steel ingots if we get more steel scrap. If we can see our way
clear to send more scrap each month throughout the winter months to
the mills, we can get more steel uigots.
Answering your question directly, it is possible to expand many
things, and where it is possible we are certainly trying to do it at the
maximum.
manpower problems in three divisions
Mr. Arnold. I have a few questions, and I am sure, from listening
to you, that you can answer every one of them. At the present time,
there are within the War Production Board three branches concerned
with manpower problems in relation to production. I refer to the
Labor Requirements Committee, the war production drive with its
1,500 management-labor production committees, and the Labor
Production Division. Why are these three divisions separate?
13190 WASHINGTON HEARINiGb
Mr. Nelson. Because the function of each one of them is different.
The Labor Requirements Committee does exactly the same job in the
distribution of labor that our Material Requirements Committee does.
If you allocated so much material to make airplanes, for example, or
airplane engmes, you have to do the same for the manpower. If you
are going to produce something quickly in this program, changes may
occur in" it from time to time. If you are going to allocate steel for
landing gears, you must also have the people to make the landing
gears. This group of people are trained in requirements, working
with the chiefs of staff, and know constantly what the urgencies are.
They sit around the table and take part m figuring out the labor re-
quirements. There are exactly the same claimants for the labor as
there are for the material. You have here agriculture as one of the
claimants, and so forth. I think it is good organization to put the
Labor Requirements Committee right in with the Material Require-
ments Committee, so only one group works with the chiefs of staff
and two do not have to do it. That is the reason for the Labor Re-
quirements Committee being set up.
The war production drive is joint management and labor. Now,
it is exceedmgly important to us that that be kept absolutely on the
right track and go right down the middle and be neither totally manage-
ment nor totally labor, that it be done to increase production. As I
said constantly, it is neither to put management mto labor nor labor
into management.
It is to bring them together so the maximum productivity of the
two can be joined together to get the maximum war production.
I felt that it would be better for that committee to be reporting
directly to the chairman rather than to the Labor Production Division.
Maybe I am wrong. Whenever I come to that conclusion, I will
put" it in the Labor Production Division, I will put it anywhere.
It does not conflict, and it uses a great deal of the staff" of the Labor
Production Division.
Mr. Arnold. What plans do you have to increase labor participa-
tion in production planning?
LABOR PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCTION PLANNING
Mr. Nelson. Of course I feel you get the maximum production
when labor an(l management know what the problems are, that you
get more out of people in a democracy. As this program goes on,
there are going to be certain plants that will become more important
and certain plants that will become less important, because the
strategy may change, or the necessity for particular weapons may
change or assume much larger importance. Now, I feel definitely
that when labor and management both know why those changes
are made, insofar as it is possible to tell them in terms of strategy
without divulging secrets of prime importance to the military, it
would be better all around. Those employees in that plant ought to
know why that particular thing is heing done. If they can rely
upon our being frank and candid with them there will not be that
human tendency to make the job last as long as possible, always
feeling that some day it may shut down. That is a human tendency
and you cannot change it, even in time of war, because it is in all of
us. Now, the more they know, the more nearly they know, why
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13191
these things are necessary to be done, the more I beheve we will be
able to solve many of our problems. That is why it seems very
necessary to me that labor and management know why these things
are being done.
We arc sending this committee, the Labor-lManagement Policy
Committee made up of two representatives of management and two
representatives of labor w^ith an impartial chairman who will be able
to correspond with these labor-management committees, all over the
coimtry on production, to interchange ideas on how to do this job
better, to do a lot of things which can be done. We have every
evidence today, through the working of some of the committees,
that they can completely change the whole production picture.
Mr. Arnold. Perhaps you have answered this. What do you
consider the proper functions of labor-management committees?
Mr. Nelson. I have answered that. I consider the proper function
is to do everything they can cooperatively to improve production
without impinging upon either one, that is, not puttmg management
into labor nor labor into management.
Mr. Arnold. It is our understanding that there has been some
difference of opinion over directive No. 2 of the War Manpower
Commission. Do you consider that the Labor Requirements Division
of War Production Board should inform the War Manpower Commis-
sion where labor is needed, in what quantity and by what skills?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, I do, sir. There is — I would call it a difference
of opinion. I think two agencies working together, each should know
what its particular function is. That is, it is not a question of one
having any more power or anything else. Mr. McNutt and I have
determined we are not going to quarrel about any hypothetical thing
that may happen between that committee and the Manpower Com-
mittee. W^e are not going to worry about hypothetical differences
that may occur at some future date. That is the whole story.
Mr. Arnold. The committee would like your com.ment on its
recommendations for the establishment of labor utilization inspectors
in the War Manpower Commission.
POSITION on need for LABOR UTILIZATION INSPECTORS
Mr. Nelson. I thuik, sir, that is a very important thing to do. I
think as you get to a point where you get shortages of manpower you
want to be sure that there is a full utilization of your manpower in
any particular factory, just as we want to be sure there is a full
utilization of material. The two oi them go hand in hand.
Mr. Arnold. Do you think that labor utilization inspectors should
be employed by W^ar Production Board as well as by the War Man-
power Commission? Would this not result m wasteful duplication
of effort?
Mr. Nelson. No, sir; I would rather see it done by a single man-
power commission.
Mr. Arnold. It would probablv result in a wasteful duplication of
effort.
Mr. Nelson. It would, some.
Mr. Arnold. Until you are able to furnish the War Manpower
Commission with a production time schedule by items and plants,
how can the W^ar Manpower Commission schedule manpower re-
quirements for industrial needs?
«0396— 42— pt. 34 10
13192 WASHINGTON HEAEINGS
Mr. Nelson. Well, of course, they cannot do it perfectly. I do
not think it will ever be done perfectly. We can tell them within
certain areas what are the most important things to be done now and
I think get 75 percent of the job done. I think the scheduling, as I
have said in answer to several other questions — I think we have arrived
at a time when better scheduling needs to be done, and the Army and
Navy are in complete accord with that. There is no difference of
opinion. They are both hard at work today to try to get the schedul-
ing on a time basis. We have had a scheduling on quantity but not
on a time basis, because the problem was to get the maximum. Now,
it is being done on a time basis and there is complete harmony
among all of us on that problem.
CONSIDERATION OF MANPOWER IN PRODUCTION PLANNING
Mr. Arnold. Do you consider that manpower limitations are as
prime a consideration as materials in production plannmg? What is
your machinery for giving weight to manpower in production planning?
Mr. Nelson. Of course, they are important, but I say again today
no one can tell what the limit of manpower is in this country, because
you have still got untapped sources of manpower. I think this will
come about locally first rather than nationally. I think nationally
you probably will have figures that will balance pretty well on totals,
but there will be certain spots where they do not balance and where
it will be necessary that certain things be done.
The problem is one that we have to tackle jointly. Take for
example, Detroit. It may be necessary, and soon, to take out of
Detroit certain types of work which are now being done there and
move them into other spots where there is less stress on manpower.
Preparations have been made for that whenever it becomes necessary
to move the simpler things that can be taken out and put into other
plants.
Mr. Arnold. You are talking of war production?
Mr. Nelson. I am talking of war production; I am talking of
the essential civilian production. It is a problem of concentration
of our essential civilian production into a few sources, and that will
take into account the question of manpower in certain communities.
When we make stoves we will not make stoves in the places where
we need manpower for other things.
Mr. Arnold. If contracts are let by the armed services, if raw
materials are allocated by War Production Board, if the War Man-
power Commission controls the manpower budget, and yet all three,
contracts, materials, manpower, are equally essential to production
planning, how can the War Production Board or the armed services
or industry undertake over-all production planning at the present
time?
Mr. Nelson. I do not see any conflict in that at all. All you are
doing there is saying that this problem is very, very complex, and
that certainly is true 100 percent.
Mr. Arnold. I believe you answered that question wholly at the
outset. There is at present no final authority to decide what man-
power should go to the armed services and what manpower should
go to industry. For this reason, no one knows what manpower will
be available for industry 6 or 8 months from now. How can you
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13193
intelligently schedule contracts and production without knowledge of
this vital productive element?
Mr. Nelson. Well, of course, there is a final authority in the
President, but it can be done, I think, by better coordination, and
I think there is every desire to do it, as between the Manpower Com-
mission, War Production Board, and the chiefs of staff. Now, in
between those three agencies there is an interchange of ideas,
as to material that is available, from the standpoint of material,
the manpower from the Manpower Commission, the chiefs of staff
who have knowledge of strategy. I think the three of us, three
different agencies, can come to certain agreements, as nearly as it
can be forecast at present. If there is a difference of opinion between
any two of the three, certainly it is a very important thing for the
President to act on it. So I think there is authority there, it is merely
the question of Ivnowing the limits of all of these things, knowing how
to do them. We are learning every day how to do the thing better;
we are learning how this thing should be done.
Now, there has not been the coordination that there should have
been in many of these spots, largely because we did not know how to
go about gettmg it. As each day goes by, we are learnmg how to do
it better.
We have today close working arrangements with the chiefs of
staff. Wliere we could not be domg it in terms of strategy, we ask
the chiefs of staff. We say: "Here is the material we have; here is
what it is used for; what are the quantities?" Well, the plates go
into bombs, planes, all sorts of things in the country. The chiefs
work with our committee, and we work out a schedule, we schedule
out a million tons of steel a month so it gets the maximum impact
on the enemy.
Mr. Arnold. We were told yesterday by General McSherry that
there is a considerable wastage of manpower in waiting for materials,
as well as a loss due to inadequate utilization of men on the job.
What steps do you consider necessary to secure the maximum efficiency
of labor output?
Mr. Nelson. Better scheduling, sir, will bring that about. That
is all part of the job, better scheduling, so you know and the plant
loiows pretty well where it fits into the schedule and what its urgency
is in the whole question of strategy.
organizing the flow of manpower
Mr. Arnold. General Hershey'was talking about a total of ten
to thirteen million men in the armed services. The effect of such
a draft upon our productive manpower is not remote in view of the
current huge monthly draws of Selective Service. Meantime, the
plans for organizing our production program are undergoing further
reorganization, and we continue to be far short of the production
needed to equip such an army. What are your proposals for organiz-
ing the flow of manpower to war jobs, and the training and upgrading
of our reserves for replacing draftees as well as the further jobs now
projected?
Mr. Nelson. Well, that of course is a big question. I can answer
it briefly this way, that when the number of men is determined, that
has to be done, as I said, by a combination of three different factors,
13194 WASHINGTOX HEARIN'GS
tlie number you get fi-om the standpoint of the mihtaiy people to
do the offense and defense that is necessary; from the Manpower
Commission, the knowledoe of the total manpower and how much of
it is needed for agriculture, how mucli is needed to keep your com-
munities going, how much available there is to be replaced, and so
forth; the question of material for equippmg them, and productive
facilities, and all of those thmgs, from a (ime standpoint. Now, the
combination of the three working it out will eventually determine
what the size of the armed forces really should be. When that is
determined and we know definitely what the limits are with respect
to the times, then you can begin plannmg replacements, as you have
asked in your question.
Mr. Arnold. What is holding up the concentration of the farm
equipment mdustry which was proposed as long ago as last March
by the Labor Production Division?
Mr. Nelson. Merely the question of the size of the job, of deter-
mmmg how much we need and where it should be put. This con-
centration is new to us. We do not know yet'. I do not think there
is anything holding it up except the immense size of the job. The
whole question is getting the pattern, and eventually this thing fits
right into a groove.
Mr. Arnold. The same answer would apply, I suppose, to this
next question. What is holding up the concentration of the machinery
industry?
Mr. Nelson. That is the same thing.
Mr. Arnold. And the same answer would apply to what is holding
the concentration of the remaining essential civilian industries?
Mr. Nelson. Yes.
Mr. Arnold. That is all.
Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, this is not a question that may be as
orthodox as some of the others that we have been asking you. There
was a time in this country when we only felt a combination of letters
like AB, PC, TR had some significance; but in recent years we have
had a reshuffling of the alphabet and now we have WAVES, WAACS,
SPAB — all these things. I wonder what significance, if any, there is
to the combination of the letters BE and AE, as far as you are con-
cerned?
Mr. Nelson. BE and AE?
Mr. Bender. BE— "before election," and AE— "after election."
Does that have any bearing on any of the programs?
Mr. Nelson. Not a thing; sir. I pay no more attention to th(>
election than if it were never going to occur — we have got a job to
do — I pay no attention to it whatsoever. I can truthfully say it has
not interfered with a single thing we have been doing.
Mr. Bender. The reason I asked the question, reading national
periodicals and daily papers, they seem to place such a great signifi-
cance on that particular thing that I wondered if there was any act
on the part of the War Production Board that would give ground for it.
Mr. Nelson. It has had no significance, sir, no significance what-
soever with me or any of the actions of the War Procluction Board.
Mr. Arnold. Has "the President ever suggested that it misht have?
Mr. Nelson. Not once; sir. The President has never said a word
of that kind to me in any particular. I have never yet heard him say
anything about election in any way, shape, or form. I can truthfully
say that to you, sir.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13195
SIZE OF INVENTORIES
Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, I would like to go back to the discussion
of scheduling of operations as a means of tightening up production
and manpower utilization. Obviously, if a plant is using a certain
kind of critical material at a given rate, it must protect itself by having
a sufficier.t supply on hand so that it can schedule its operations on a
continuous basis. It must have at least a few days' supply. On the
other hand, there is such a thing as an excessive inventory where a
company has piled up enough steel or copper to cover 6 months'
operations or longer. What is your opinion as to what is a satisfac-
tory w^orking inventory?
Air. Nelson. Well, that varies, sir, with so many different things.
There are so many components that enter into it. I think I should
make one thing plain. When we talk about shortage of material,
we arc not always talking just about a shortage of raAv materials,
we are talking about shortage of components, because these com-
ponents come from all sorts of places today, and they must to do this
job. As you get more and more subcontracting these things fan out
in all directions.
You say "shortage of material." Wliat is material to one man is
an end product to the other. Now, the whole problem of how much
you have depends upon .how long it takes you to replace it, and what
a proper insurance factor for replacement really is, in connection with
time. We have got certain plants that are w^orking today on 15
da.\s' supply of certain components, where the two are linked pretty
well together, and we know we have got the production schedules
linked, and tliey get a certain number of transmissions coming through
every day. For instance, in the automobile industry they were, even
on m^nv things, able to work on a 2- or 3-d.ay inventory because they
had the thing pretty well scheduled, so they knew what the flow of
components into the thing was. As we get better scheduling the
length of time in your lead factor will come down. I think 3 months
ought to be a pretty good average inventory at the present time.
Some take 4, some take 5, and some take only 1. I thinJc by the
first of the year we can reduce that to 2 months.
As w^e reduce the lead factor, we increase the amount of flow that
we can get out, because that difference of 1 month's inventory can go
into the making of end products and be liquidated, just as in business
your inventory is liquidated in terms of cash. Today we think of
the||iiend products that can be made of that inventory.
CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE INVENTORIES
Mr. Bender. What is the War Production Board's organization
and procedure for controlling and recapturing excessive inventories?
Mr. Nelson. It has two different methods of doing it: One, the
P. R. P., by not scheduling in as much if there is apparently enough of
a supply there.
We have an organization that is constantly looking for inventory,
the requisitioning section. We have made arrangements with R. F. C.
This was not very easy to set up. There are a lot of involvements in it
for buying up frozen inventory where a curtailment order came
through, and we could not use it to make up any more particular end
13196 WASHINGTON HEARINfGS
products. We buy that up and bring it back into the picture through
the arrvingement with R. F. C.
We are trying to control this inventory in every direction. Of
course, it is aViolation of our priority order. A man is actually violat-
ing a law when he has an excessive inventory. We have not enforced
that yet, but I think we should. I have been thinking seriously of
starting a better enforcement on that particular part of our priority
regulation which requires that a company does not have excessive
inventories.
Mr. Bender. Have all idle inventories left over from curtailed
civilian production been recaptured, includhig inventories of semi-
fabricated parts?
Mr. Nelson. No. As I said, we have set up a corporation in
R. F. C. to buy those, and I have given you in the memorandum
the amounts of those that have already been recaptured.
Mr. Bender. What, according to your understanding, are the
largest outstanding inventories in terms of length of time it will take
to consume them, which are to be found either in the plants of private
contractors. Government arsenals, and navy yards for such critical
materials as copper, steel, magnesium, aluminum, nickel, and so forth?
Mr. Nelson. I am sorry, I do not understand the question. Will
you repeat the first part?
Mr. Bender. What, according to your understanding, are the
largest outstanding inventories in terms of length of time it will take
to consume them, which are to be found either in the plants of private
contractors. Government arsenals, and navy yards for such critical
materials as copper, steel, magnesium, aluminum, and so forth?
Mr. Nelson. I do not know what that question means. You ask
what are the outstanding things, and then you indicate them. I do
not know what you are driving at there.
Mr. Bender. The thing we are drivmg at is this: Have you any
record of the inventories on these various items?
Mr. Nelson. That is what P. R. P. gives us, you see.
Mr. Bender. That is on the basis of the time that it will take to
consume them?
' Mr. Nelson. P. R. P. gives us first a statement of what they
have. It gives us what they consumed in the past quarter, the
quarter preceding, and what they estimate they will consume in the
quarter following. Now, in the proper analysis of that you can get
a line on where there are outstanding inventories that look excessive.
Mr. Bender. That is m private plants, Government arsenals, or
navy yards?
Mr. Nelson. Anywhere.
Mr. Bender. Has any use been made of the inventories shown on
the P. R. P. forms for recapturing excessive inventories?
Mr. Nelson. I do not know the details on that, sir. I can get
that for you. I just do not know whether they have or not.
Mr. Bender. Last Thursday, I read in the newspapers about a
report of E. A. Tupper, chief of your Inventory and Requisitionmg
Branch, which says that out of estimated excessive inventories of
copper of 400,000,000 pounds only about 100,000,000 have thus far
been reported to the War Production Board, and that furthermore
only about 30,000,000 pounds of this have been disposed of by the
War Production Board. Copper shortage was already acute a year
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13197
ago, and, in fact, use of copper for civilian purposes was almost
entirely eliminated in 1941. Why has it taken so long to get under
way the recapture of excessive inventories of such critical materials
as copper and steel?
Mr. Nelson. Well, I cannot answer that. It has taken too long;
there is no doubt about it. It mvolved the setting up of a corporation,
involved trying to evaluate these different products. W^e have done
as good a job as we could have done on the recapturing of the inven-
tories. I cannot say anything except that it has taken too long.
Mr. Bender. Are the excessive inventories which have been re-
vealed on the P. R. P. forms being considered as part of the raw
materials supply in planning your material allocations? Could you
tell us what has been determined as being an excessive inventory in
processing the reports which are the basis of your Production Require-
ments Plan?
Mr. Nelson. Well, that, sir, is a detail I cannot answer for you. I
will be glad to get the answer for you by the men who do that; I can
keep ill touch with a lot of the details but not all of tliem.^
cooperation of ARMED SERVICES IN MATERIAL CONSERVATION
Mr. Bender. Are you satisfied with the extent to which the armed
services have been cooperating with the W. P. B. Bureau of Conser-
vation in the carrying out of recommendations to conserve critical
raw materials?
Mr. Nelson. Well, today, when you say ''Are you satisfied?" I do
not believe we can be satisfied with anything. I am satisfied with
this: that there has been an intent to cooperate. There have been
differences of opinion as to whether certain things could be done or
could not be done. Now, I have always taken the position that when
it comes to the determination of whether there shall be a change in
the specifications of a gun, or ammunition, or anything that is a
highly technical item, that the armed services should be the ones that
determine that. Certainly, from my standpoint, I think our job is
to produce the highest quality weapons we can, because quality means
as much as quantity in the matter of these weapons. We must have
weapons that are superior to those of our enemy. Now, there have
been differences of opinion as to whether the armed services were fast
enough in changing this or that or the other thing. We feel certainly
they should go slow in changing their specifications, and to be -sure
that the thing we are recomm.ending is a highly satisfactory thing.
Take the question of the substitution of steel for copper. It appar-
ently has gone along very slowly and still I know that the armed serv-
ices, both the Army and Navy, have energetically, because of us,
followed through in that particular matter and made these tests
rapidly.
We do not want to have a steel shell casing that will stick in the
gun at a critical time when somebody goes to use that gun to protect
his life, and we have to be darned sure, very, very sure, that steel will
do as good a job as copper and not jam. Therefore, there are differ-
ences of opinion. Some of them break out into the press because
people get heated and discussions occur.
• See supplemental statement of Donald M. Nelson, p. 13222.
13198 WASHINGTON HEARINIQS
The Chairman. And that was the only determunng- factor?
Mr. Nelson. That was the only detcrminmg factor. I am not
nrging them to go so fast that we have a poor quality of ammunition.
I want the best, I want to see it the best. Sometimes you are better
off with fewer of them and have them better than to have more of
them and not so good. That is why we have gone slowly in many
cases.
You can analyze different things and say they should have done
this or they should have done that. I am positively convinced that
there has been a spirit of cooperation at the top, as between Admiral
Robinson of the Navy and Frank Folsom who is our own man, who
are trying to do these things, and General Somervell in the Army, and
his particular man, Al Browning, and others working on that. There
is, and there has been, a spirit of wanting to do it and feeling the
necessity for doing it.
You asked the question as to whether I am satisfied that they are
going fast enough. I say, ''No," I am not satisfied, and I do not
know that I will be satisfied on anything. I am only satisfied that
there has been a spirit of wanting to do it the best they could.
Mr. Bender. Are you satisfied with the job that Mr. Rosenwald's
Bureau of Conservation is doing? Do you think it employs an ade-
quate number of technical personnel in order to cover the field?
Mr. Nelson. I do not know the answer to that, whether they have
an adequate number to cover the field. They have quite a few, and
of coarse they call on a lot of people. I do not think we can be satis-
fied with the job we are doing in any division of our show. I am
truthful. I cannot answer you yes on the question, "Are you satisfied
with any division of the show, that it is doing the maximum?"^ I
would say no. We have got to do more because of the size of the job
we are called upon to do, and there is going to be a constant improve-
ment in the character of the things we do, because of the urgency, the
necessity and need for it, the changes in organization that have to take
place all over our place in order that we do a better, better, and better
job.
Mr. Bender. Possibly I should not ask you this, and yet I do
respect you; I think the whole country does. They feel you are
trying to do a good job. I read in Collier's magazine an editorial
this week — no doubt you have read it
Mr. Nelson. No, sir; I have not seen it. I do not get time to read.
Mr. Bender. They pay you high compliments, but they say you
are too nice, you are not hard-boiled enough. Have you anything to
say to that?
Mr. Nelson. Yes; I would like to talk on that, because I can be
just as hard-boiled as anybody needs to be to do the job. I have
always preferred to be a gentleman in doing a job. I can be the other,
if I have to be. I have found that sometimes the fellow that breaks
up tables cloes not get it done any faster than the fellow who quietly
goes about the job of getting a thing done. All I can say: I can point
to my record, and I am not ashamed of my record in getting things
done' around the Government. When you get all of the different
agencies of government working together to do a particular job,
whether you can get them to work better with the fellow who cracks
the whip 'and cusses all the time or one that quietly goes about the job
of getting the thing done, you will have to determine. I will be tough
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13199
enough to do the job, because the war demands that I do, and this
emergency demands that 1 do. No man has a right to be so nice as to
stand in the way or let personahties stand in the way of doing any-
thing to get a job done. It is just a question of whether I can appear
before you, or you before m^ and answer questions in a gentlemanly
way or whether we have to be fighting all the time.
I think it gets the job done better by trying to get it done coopera-
tively. I will say this, I will be just as tough as anybody to get all the
job done that has to be done in my jurisdiction, except I do not rush
into print with it, and I do not intend to.
The Chairman. I think you still believe in the art of persuasion,
don't you?
Mr. Nelson. Well, sir, I feel there are all kinds of persuasions.
Mr. Bender. I think your answer is most satisfactory, and I
appreciate it. I should have not asked it. I am glad you answered it
as frankly as you did.
Mr. Nelson. I am glad to answer any questions.
ELIMINATION OF MATERIALS WASTE
Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, it would seem to me that there could be
very wide differences in the practices of individual plants as far as
scrap and spoilage is concerned. Has any machinery been set up to
see that a minimum amount of materials are used by war contractors?
Mr. Nelson. Yes. Of course that is the job of the Army inspector,
to try to see that that be done. I do not think we have done as good a
job in that as we could have done or should have done. Attempts
have been made to do it. We have brought in the engineering societies.
They have gone around and visited plants m cities all over the country
with the idea of getting everybody interested in doing that particular
job. One of the mteresting tlimgs these labor management com-
mittees are doing is eliminating waste, doing the job, making sugges-
tions as to how the job may be done better.
One that may stand out is relativelj^ small, but it has saved a lot of
aluminum. A man worked punching certain parts out of aluminum
and he figured out a way of changing the work and getting five out of a
particular sheet instead of four, and we will save just that much scrap,
save 20 percent. Those things are going on constantly.
As I was saying, we are trying to get these committees to do this
work. Take the tank people, they will meet any committee, or the
machine-tool people, or others, and exchange ideas as to how it can
be done with less waste, as the forging is dropped, and so on, so you
do not have as much waste in cutting it out. That is passed on to
others in the industry, and the art is just passed back and forth between
the engineers. I feel it is a very fertile field. We have not done
nearly enough in that.
Mr. Bender. Do you think any substantial progress can be made
in controlling the use of raw materials particularly with respect to
conservation, spoilage, and so forth, unless you have a War Production
Board representative assigned for this purpose in each of the major .
plants?
Mr. Nelson, Well, that of course would be one of the jobs of those
men we were talking about, putting them into the plant in charge of
inventories. Theirs would be the job of domg that. I think it can-
not be done unless there is a War Production Board man in the plant.
13200 WASHINGTON HEARINiGS
1 feel very definitely that that is a very important thing that that man
must do.
Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, I do not want to tax your patience.
Every Member of Congress daily receives letters or receives com-
plaints from individual plants, or from* insurance companies. This
one does not happen to come from this plant, but it has come to my
attention, and I think it deserves a moment or two (reading):
The Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co. has a subsidiary company under the name
of the Cleveland Pneumatic Aerol Co. which is building a plant at Euclid, Ohio,
for the construction of airplane parts.
Incidentally, this plant and the Bendix plant, I think, manufacture
most of the struts.
Mr, Nelson. Most of the struts are made by the two companies.
Mr. Bender. It is a vital plant (contmuing):
This plant is being financed by the Defense Plant Corporation, and the factory
building will cover an area 800 by 800 feet which will house the machine shop.
Part of this building will be separated by fire walls, and the separated section will
house the heat-treating and welding sections. There will be another building
which will house the office, covering 70,000 square feet, and then there will be
three separate utility buildings.
The building and machinery will be owned by the Defense Plant Corporation,
and the value of these will be about $22,000,000. The value of the stock and
work in process will be approximately $20,000,000.
The problem is this: That there is no insurance company or group of insurance
companies large enough to write the total amount of insurance which will be
required as it is too much of a hazard concentrated in one area. The only com-
panies which could even approach this amount are the Associated Factory Mutuals
which held the entire insurance on the parent plant.
The situation, therefore, is this: The insurance companies will not write this
risk unless a sprinkler system is installed, and the War Production Board abso-
lutely refuses to permit the installation of sprinklers, while with the Navy Depart-
ment it is immaterial whether the sprinklers are installed or not. The reason the
War Production Board turned down sprinklers is because of the shortage of steel.
Although the plant will be operated 24 hours a day and this will hold the chance
of a fire down to the minimum, the possibility of a fire still exists and if it gets out
of control it will burn down a plant which is of enormous size and, therefore, the
interruption of production in a plant of this size will be a great catastrophe from
the point of view of the war effort.
Incidentally, the National Bronze & Aluminum Co., a war plant'
burned down about a year ago, burned right down; the whole thing
was a total loss and many forms were lost.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
Mr. Bender. In this connection, they had a fire at this plant about
2 months ago and because of the sprinkler system the loss was very
slight (resummg):
It stands to reason that many small plants can eliminate the sprinkler system,
and if one burns completely no great loss is incurred because other plants can
make up the production. But with an enormous plant such as this, if there is an
interruption of production to anv great extent this cannot be made up by a large
number of small plants. Therefore, the elimination of the possibility of a great
hazard occurring will more than off -set the shortage which the Government might
feel in the steel which would be used in the construction of the sprinkler system.
Do you have any comment to make on that?
Mr. Nelson. Yes, I have, sir, because that just illustrates thede-
cisions you have to make through this whole thing. You have just
got so much steel pipe, and that pipe is used, as you know, for various
purposes among which is to bring water into houses, so you may build
a house that a family can live in.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13201
You also have the point that you would again take chances on.
Your judgment is sometimes bad, sometimes it is good. I think a
thing like that ought to be weighed and reweighed in the light of each
individual's particular case.
Mr. Bender. Incidentally, the War Production Board changed its
decision on another plant some time ago and approved installing a
sprinkler system after previously rejecting it.
Mr. Nelson. That happens. We would be glad to review that
case.
Mr. Bender. This is a plant, as I say, that is so vital because every
airplane produced needs these struts, and in the event of fire it would
have a bad influence on production. As you pointed out m the be-
ginning, there are more employees today m the airplane irdustry as
compared with the numbers that were employed in 1939.
Mr. Nelson. That is right.
The Chairman. Congressman, may I ask you, is that in your
Congressional District?
Mr. Bender. Very much, yes.
Mr. Nelson. We would be very glad to review it, sir. I thought,
as you read the letter, knowing this particular plant and knowmg its
importance, that perhaps somebody had not given it the proper
consideration. I will be glad if you send that letter to me, and it will
be reviewed in the light of the situation.
Mr. Bender. That is all.
The Chairman. You leave it to an Ohio Republican not to overlook
his district.
Mr. Nelson. We will be very glad to do that, because I think it
should be done. I think a thing like that ought to be reviewed most
carefully.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Nelson, you have been exceedingly
patient, kind, interesting and mtelligent in your whole remarks here,
and this committee deeply appreciates, especially your frankness, and
the observations you made in your statement this morning. When
do you sleep? Do you get any sleep at all?
Mr, Nelson. A little bit.
The Chairman. Not much, though.
Mr. Nelson. From about 1 to 7.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you, Mr. Nelson.
We appreciate very much your coming.
Mr. Nelson, It is always a pleasure to appear before your com-
mittee.
The Chairman. I have here a copy of the excellent memorandum
which you had prepared in answer to questions which I have sub-
mitted to you for the committee, and will place this memorandum,
together with the questions submitted, in the record at this point.
(The material referred to follows:)
Letter From the Chairman of the Committee to Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board
September 5, 1942.
Mr. Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Produclion Board, New Social Security Building,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Nelson: This committee, as you have been informed, plans to hold
hearings September 15, 16, and 17. As we understand it, you will be available on
13202 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Thursday, September 17, at 10 A. M. We will inform you at a later date the
location of the hearing room. '
Attached to this letter is a brief list of questions on various manpower mobiliza-
tion problems in which the committee members have expressed interest. These
questions are not exliaustive, and others undoubtedly will suggest themselves to
you and to the committee. It would be helpful if you would submit a summary
statement of your testimony, 3 or 4 pages in length, on or before September 12.
We have had many expressions of interest from management and labor in the
committee's recent fifth interim report published on August 10, 1942. For this
reason we are extending invitations to both these groups to send observers to
these hearings.
The comiBittee wishes to thank you for your cooperation.
With all good wishes, I am
Sincerely,
John H. Tolan, Chairman.
QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED
1. What types of problems have been encountered in the distribution of raw
materials?
2. Would you describe the distribution methods, reporting procedures and
other controls which have been recently introduced in order to improve the use
of raw materials?
3. What improvements have already resulted from the new methods or can be
expected to result in the near future?
4. What are the problems of maximizing and balancing over-all war production
and how do the new methods of raw material distribution contribute to the
solution of these over-all problems?
5. Would you illustrate the information furnished in answer to questions 1-4
with specific data for steel, copper, or other exemplary critical raw materials?
6. Would you describe the administrative organization and procedures by
which the War Production Board determines the type, amount, and location of
essential civilian production?
7. What factors dictate the use of concentration programs for essential civilian
production and for what types of industries and products are such programs being
developed?
8. What general criteria are used for deciding the plants and areas in which
essential civilian production shall be concentrated?
9. To what extent do the War Manpower Commission and other Federal
agencies participate in the formulation of the over-all policy with respect to con-
centration and the details of the individual concentration program?
10. The committee has heard a great deal about the difficulties of securing ade-
quate labor for copper and other nonferrous mines. Have there been any studies
of the potential productive capacity of mines and mills producing nonferrous ores
and metals? Have labor shortages resulted in less than capacity production of
any of these ores and metals?
il. What responsibility does the War Production Board have in cases where
labor shortages limit ]:>roduction? By what organization and procedures does it
exercise such responsibility? What has specifically been done in the case of
copper, zinc, aluminum, and other nonferrous metals?
12. What are the functions and objectives of the labor-management production
committees? Is there any organization within the War Production Board for
assuring proper contribution from these committees and for utilizing their sug-
gestions and other activities? How many labor-management production com-
mittees have already been set up and what has been their conlribution to date?
STATEMENT BY DONALD M. NELSON, CHAIRMAN, WAP PRO-
DUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.
I. Introduction
(Answer to the committee's fourth question [in part]: "What are the problems
of maximizing and balancing over-all war production?")
The committee has submitted questions which are very broad in their implica-
tions. The answers call for a substantial amount of impression and opinion. It
seems appropriate to lay a foundation for the more specific questions. One of
those submitted, to wit: "What are the problems of maximizing and balancing
over-all war production?" seems an appropriate point of dej)arture.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13203
The "problems of maximizing and balancing over-all war production" are those
which are inherent in the kind of situation in which we find ourselves. We are
dealing with an all-inclusive emergency, where all factors confronting us are
abnormal. The factors are abnormal even from the military point of view in that
plans carefully laid before the outbreak of war have had to be drastically revised,
in the very process of carrying them out, to meet the actual military necessities.
The situation is also one of an unprecedented dynamic nature, where the entire
normal production of the country is tending to go from 100 percent toward zero
at the very time that this new and abnormal production is going from zero toward
100 percent. The products to be made and the materials and plant used are in
many respects either completely new or completely different from anything
previously made.
Ihe scale of the operation is so enormous that no single human eye can view all
of the facets at any one time and place. The output of implements of war and
other products necessary to the war is greater by far than that we have ever
produced or than has ever been produced at any time in the past by any country
or group of countries.
Ihe shifts in the program that must be made are so kaleidoscppic that they
tend to defy organization and classification into simple terms which can he dealt
with in an orderly way. While the aggregate is rapidly expanding, the place in
the aggregate between item and item in the program is constantly changing as
strategy changes.
If the factors were all known, they could in due course be neatly harnessed.
However, our actual capacity to perform has constantly outrun our most careful
predictions. Unfortunately this has not occurred uniformly. The result is that
we find ourselves ahead of plans at some points, and behind expectations in others.
Therefore, balance has to be created after these developments show the places
needing attention.
Our objective is a complete harnessing of all of the productive forces and
resources of this Nation to the purposes of war, while at the same time developing
what those purposes are and the facilities with which to perform them.
There is no suggestion that we should not have to cope with a dynamic, gigantic
and flexible situation, but the "problems of maximizing and balancing over-all war
production" must be recognized as being incompatible with perfection.
The basic problem of scheduling production may appropriately be discussed to
some extent at this point. Scheduling production as an abstract exercise is very
simple. Total desired product is multiplied by the bills of material entering, into
that production, and the rate of material supply is permitted to establish the
rapidity with which the program is performed. As a practical matter, however,
complete bills of material for the hundreds of thousands of items and sub-
assemblies which need to be scheduled, many of them new and rapidly changing in
specifications, have not been available. This lack is being rapidly supplied by
gigantic efforts of the armed services and civilians cooi^erating with them.
Material supply has also been a fairly rapidly changing aspect of the problem
as we have rapidly expanded in some materials, which, as in the case of aluminum
and magnesium, are capable of enormous, rapid expansion, while other materials,
such as nickel, have not been susceptible to equally rapid expansion. When this
is compared with the fact above mentioned, that actual capacity to process and
fabricate material has not fitted predictions with any degree of smoothness, it is
■ apparent that a satisfactory schedule could only be evolved, and not created
instantly at the outset.
As we have now a current picture of all production requirements for every
calendar quarter coming in from all manufacturers or plants of any size, and since
the capacity to process and fabricate is settling down into fairly well established
rates of production, we are emerging steadily into a situation which can be and is
being scheduled. This scheduling, however, will never be static, and flexibility is
one of our primary concerns. We will seek greater rather than less flexibility.
But this will be under control so that we know what to flex and are in shape to flex
accordingly by having our fingers on the reins all the way out to the lead mules
in our 40-mule teams.
We have set up an office for program determination to lay out all production
into programs, and we have commenced introducing our field offices into the pro-
duction requirements problems of the plants in each region, looking toward
detailed sclieduling of production in all large plants.
It is a fair prediction that with the present rate of improvement in the aggregate
of scheduled portions of the program, we may expect to be reasonably well
scheduled by the first quarter of 1943.
13204 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
The problems of material and labor supply are more specifically brought out
by other questions and will be developed in subsequent sections of this
memorandum.
II. Problems in Distribution of Raw Materials
(Answer to committee's first question: "What types of problems have been
encountered in the distribution of raw materials?")
The ideal in the distribution of raw materials is the smooth flow of all essen-
tial materials to a decided production program. The problems in the distribu-
tion of raw materials are all incidental to providing this smooth combination of
raw materials in a total-production program.
In order to accomi^lish a smooth distribution of raw materials, the total demand
for each important material for some period of time, or the rate of demand that
would fit with the production program, would have to be reasonably accurately
known. This would enable the matching of supply and demand and adjusting
the program so as to be consistent with supply, or increasing supply within such
limits as might be possible to meet the demand.
Discussions of controls of distribution of materials imply a fixed supply to be
cut up and passed around. The problem of maximizing the supply to be con-
trolled is, however, a constant field of intense activity. One of the problems in
this connection results from the fact that important amounts of scarce materials
often must be diverted from immediate use in combat or other essential finished
items in order to expand the basic material supply. Other problems of maximiz-
ing material supply include the assurance of full labor supply, in proving efficiency
of operations, keeping all facilities in continuous use, etc.
One of the most difficult problems in the distribution of raw materials appears
at this point, due to the fact that strategic decisions as to size and type and
duration of operations must change constantly, as above indicated. Good deci-
sions in terms of efficient production and distribution of required materials would
have to be valid decisions for a considerable period of time. The creation of
manufacturing facilities for particular products and the creation of additional
material supply take periods usually in excess of 1 year. In the meantime,
strategic decisions as to the amount of the particular products planned a year
before and their nature and their rate of production will be drastically changed
by the urgency and nature of operations in the military theaters.
Our military program in general has been one that changed on the side of in-
crease, as was foreseen, but the proportions of the program and the required
materials going into landing equipment, aircraft, tanks, equipment for new manu-
facturing facilities, etc., have changed many times. _ ■ , .
The most drastic and sudden of changes take place in connection with the
export program, and it should be remembered at all times that we are endeavor-
ing to be the arsenal of democracy and the last resort for all essential supplies
that cannot be obtained by the United Nations at home from their own plants.
Accordingly, there are emergency exports of basic materials to Russia, to Great
Britain and the other theaters of war and of equipment to the same theaters which
cannot be predicted and which fall in very substantial amounts in the midst of
the plan of action previously decided upon and the commitments already made
for production and for the supply of materials to accomplish that production.^
The distribution of materials to the ■ manufacturers of essential civilian prod-
ucts should theoretically be one of the simplest problems in that the essential
civilian demands, such as necessary transportation, communications, sewage and
water systems, not to mention food, clothing, and shelter, are continuing demands.
In fact,' however, the variety of civilian requirements represents the entire spec-
trum of products normally made by industry. This demand represents a cross
section of our whole normal economy. It is true that a great many products
can be completely eliminated in time of war, but it is also true that there is a
continuing demand, small in amount, for a very large number of civilian items
that can never completelv be eliminated. Likewise, the process of reduction ot
demand for civilian products to the minimum and bare essential quantity pro-
duces a rapid change in the rate of production as the normal economy is pro-
gressively pared down. The planning of the distribution of materials and the
production program that is assumed, to which the materials are to be distributed
under the circumstances of enormous variety and a rapidly decreasing curve of
civilian production is almost as difficult as the converse situation in the military
program, with its equallv great variety on a rapidly rising curve of production.
The problem of distribution of materials to meet production requirements
is to a very large extent reflected in the problem of translation of requirements
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13205
for use into demands upon production, or the translation of the desired total
product in all its variety into the amounts of material that must arrive at factories
in the various kinds, on schedules appropriate to the desired rate of delivery of
final products.
The development of bills of materials for assembled products is a laborious
process of building up the material content of each part going into the assembled
product. The specifications of every part going into every assembled product
tend constantly to change, due to the fact that amounts of scarce materials con-
sidered necessary at one time are soon discovered to be subject to reduction or
substitution by less scarce materials when intensive work is done on spreading
available scarce materials as thinly as possible. Productive equipment being
adjusted to particular materials, changes are deferred as long as possible to avoid
the necessary changes in machinery and processes going with changed specifica-
tions. Therefore, there are constantly developing new changes at late dates
which were not planned for in the material-supply program.
Another problem in the distribution of materials arises from the constantly
changing relationships between capital construction, assembled product output,
and material supply. To provide a clear and dependable picture of the appro-
priate balance, month by month and year by year, between these factors would
necessitate the ability to stop the rapid fluctuation of each part of the program
long enough to balance the other parts of the program. This has so far been
impossible in view of the rapid development of the war.
A decision is made to expand an aircraft program beyond facilities at the
moment of the decision, whereupon buildings and machine tools are contracted
for in order to make good the decision on planes. The expansion of the supply
of aluminum and magnesium, in turn, calls for increased construction of supply
of productive equipment. Other decisions of Uke nature made on strategic
grounds indirectly produce an enormous number of expansion projects, where-
upon it is discovered that the aggregate diversion of materials into the projects
for expansion is in itself reducing the supply of basic materials that was assumed
in making the calculations in the first place. This sequence is never ended.
The problems of distribution of raw materials can, many of them, be referred
to the category of elimination of waste. Some wastes occur as above indicated
in using greater proportions of scarce materials in specifications than is subse-
quently found necessary as shortages become more acute. Essentiality of use of
a particular scarce material, such as nickel in armor plate, is found in subsequent
study to yield to alternate combinations of chrome and other alloys when the use
of nickel' for parts in aircraft exceeds previous calculations. Essentiality is
always a relative term.
Another waste in the use of materials develops from lags or too great accelera-
tions in the rate of delivery. If materials required are delivered too slowly, other
material already arrived at the point of production is immobilized, either in
raw-material form or in the form of incomplete assembled products or in the form
of parts which cannot be matched by their counterparts.
If, on the other hand, delivery of materials is too swift relative to the production
program, those materials first arriving will remain immobihzed until a balance of
required materials arrive at the point of production.
These principles have caused us from the start to prohibit by provisions, in
our forms and in our regulations, any deliveries ahead of requirements for usage
in production or construction. We realize, however, and plan, that individual
scheduling supervision must be provided in each major plant to make this rule
effective.
These problems, and many others, have led us to the new methods of distribu-
tion which are described in the following section of this memorandum.
III. New Methods of Distribution of Materials
(Answer to the committee's second question: "Would you describe the distri-
bution methods, reporting procedures, and other controls which have been recently
introduced in order to improve the use of raw materials?")
The report of the undersigned introduced in response to Senate Resolution 195,
developed methods and plans, actual and contemplated, as they existed in Decem-
ber of 1941 in the Office of Production Management. New methods referred to
currently are new in the sense of full application during recent or current periods,
but in another sense they are not new in that they have been evolutionary de-
velopments based upon plans in contemplation or in beginning stages as long as
a year ago.
13206 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS PLAN
The most generally extensive new method of distribution of materials, referred
to as the Production Requirements Plan, falls within the category just described
of plans which are new currently in the sense of first general application to the
production program but which have been in contemplation and in evolution
throughout the previous year.
This plan, as put into general application, requires every plant in the United
States consuming in excess of $5,000 worth of basic metal in its production during
a calendar quarter, to apply each quarter for permission to purchase its require-
ments of basic material, as called for by its own production schedules. Its
application shows primarily the products produced in the previous calendar
quarter and proposed to be produced in the next calendar quarter. Likewise, it
shows the materials used in production in the previous calendar quarter and those
required for the proposed production during the next calendar quarter. Inven-
tories of each material at the closing of the last previous calendar quarter are
shown so that allowances of new materials may take into account and require
the use of any excess inventories. The policy in connection with inventories per-
mitted has been steadily tightened down as our controls improve, so that a normal
allowance of 90 days inventory is tending to become 45 days. When deliveries
are undependable, inventories must be longer to prevent shut-downs due to
failures of delivery in one or another item. As we succeed in preventing excess
purchasing, and in scheduling deliveries more closely, the uncertainty of delivery
to those who are given permission to receive material will be reduced. Inventory
in greater amount than that which can be corrected by mere subtraction from
requests for new materials are being taken over by our Inventory and Requisi-
tioning Branch, as will be developed in a subsequent section of this memorandum.
The necessity for over-all control of materials required for production having
become apparent some time ago, an effort was made to expand the operation
of the only instrumentality previously 'developed in this war which covered in
its very nature the requirements for all classes of scarce materials required by
a particular producing plant, in direct relationship to the product to be pro-
duced by that plant and the materials on hand in the possession of that plant.
All other forms of control had been based upon an individual treatment of a
particular class of material and did not seem capable of extension in such fashion
as to provide a means of revealing periodically the entire material requirements
of all important producers for all scarce materials with relationship to production
and inventory as above.
Use of special controls, based on a careful distribution or supervision of ship-
ments of particular materials, has continued on a monthly basis in the case of
the most important scarce materials, and will doubtless continue for some time
to come, but the total allowances and permissible purchases for those scarce
materials are balanced and given general guidance once every calendar quarter
by the Production Requirements Plan.
Beginning with the third calendar quarter of 1942 under the Production
Requirements Plan, all manufacturers purchasing metal in basic forms for their
operations in excess of $5,000 per quarter were required to file their production
requirements under this plan. These larger producers, numbering, in terms of
individual plants having separate inventories, approximately 18,000, in fact
filed their requirements for the months of July, August, and September. _ All
such requirements were carefully reviewed and screened and authorizations given
to each such plant accordingly. This first effort on an over-all basis to screen
and reduce requirements to supposed minimums in terms of permissible produc-
tion constituted a sweeping experiment, was undertaken in view of the absolute
necessity of maximum effort to provide administrative control of the flow of
materials, but with considerable uncertainty as to the consequences. While the
experiment was not a perfect success, the tolal authorized purchases by all impor-
tant metal-consuming plants was, in fact, reduced for the first time within a
relatively small degree of excess over available supply. This had the effect of
reducing the amount of conflicting demands, as stated by the applicants, approxi-
mately 25 percent. If this entire excess of demand had been permitted to impinge
upon the short supply of scarce metals, it is fair to assume that the failures of
balanced completed assemblies of products which occasionally continue to develop
would have been much greater.
There are various necessary conditions for the satisfactory and adequate
performance of any general control of the distribution of materials which have
not as vet existed "but which are gradually being increased for the effective use
of the Production Requirements Plan or its successor forms of control.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13207
One necessary condition of success of such control device is the inclusion in
the control of all large portions of requirements on some adequate basis of knowl-
edge and control.
The greatest failure in this respect currently is the inability up to the present
moment of completely analyzing, summarizing, and controlling the requirements
for expansion of productive facilities. Most material requirements for inclusion
in construction projects in the nature of increasing facilities go into those facilities
indirectly in the form of productive machinery. However, directly and indirectly
there is a great need for increasing the adequacy of knowledge as to the total
material requirements in our present expansion program and the controlling of
those requirements. Steps are in process looking to this conclusion, but general
results are not available at the present moment.
Another necessary condition for satisfactory functioning of a general material
requirements control is accurate identification of the connection between pro-
duction requirements stated and the program of finished products to be produced.
The production requirements of the final assembler of finished products, for
direct consumption by the final assembler, consist to a substantial degree, in
fabricated subassemblies and parts and not raw materials. To the extent that
the final producer of the finished product, who enters into a direct contract with
the Government, requires himself to be supplied with raw materials, the appro-
priateness of his requirements as stated, in terms of his inventory on hand and
his output of product, can be readily checked by Government officers. To the
extent that the final assembler buys subassemblies, the accurate identification
of the material requirements that are comparable, to the programed finished
products directly purchased by the Government is, in many cases, difficult, if
not impossible, to establish. The producer of motors, bearings, forgings, etc.,
may be many industrial processing layers removed from the final assembler and
the Government.
Up until the present time we have been forced to rely, for identification of
requirements, on preference ratings received by producers of subassemblies and
parts. It has been true to date that preference ratings on final assembled products,
placed there by thousands of procurement officers of the armed services and
thousands of officials of the War Production Board and its predecessor organiza-
tions, has not been capable of aggregate quantitative control.
. The result of this has been that preference ratings, indicating supposed relative
urgency of purchase orders and contracts, have in the aggregate exceeded the
supply of products, fabricated and unfabricated, for which purchase orders and
contracts were placed.
Another new method, again merely evolutionary, but new to an important
degree, is the institution of a new series of so-called urgency-rating categories.
As the receiver of a bankrupt institution has been known to issue receivers'
certificates to come ahead of outstanding mortgages and debentures, in order to
be entitled to prime credit and low rates of interest, so AA urgency ratings have
been put ahead of the well-known previous preference ratings, but on a controlled
No AA urgency rating can be assigned to production or creation of facilities
except in accordance with the latest version of the program of production and
expansion. The Army and Navy Munitions Board has prepared a directive
covering the last 6 months of the year 1942, reflecting the strategic decisions of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the approval of the Chairman of the War Production
Board. It is this program which guides the entire placement of AA urgency
ratings on military products. The military urgency ratings for the first quarter
of 1943 will be ready to apply by next month.
The latest available program" for indirect military product and essential non-
military product has been inadequate up until the present time but AA ratings
are limited in this field, insofar as possible, to those minimum amounts and kinds
of indirect military and nonmilitary requirements. For example, no new AA
urgency ratings are permitted, in general, on expansion of productive capacity
except where basic material supply is thereby increased.
Likewise, high urgency standing is accorded to the minimum of repair and
maintenance of essential nonmilitary facilities, including manufacturing estab-
lishments and essential services, such as transportation, communication, power,
etc. The amounts of production of repair and maintenance items accorded this
status (described currently as AA-2X) is limited to a small proportion of non-
military production.
There are exceptions to the generalizations above but as the production pro-
gram becomes more adequately developed exceptions will be fewer. It is in-
tended that ultimately. there will be no exceptions except as the reservation of
60396 — 42— pt. 34 11
13208 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
a "kitty" of scarce materials, parts, equipment, etc., permits the meeting of the
exceptional requirement.
Another new method inaugurated with the recent "realinement" of the War
Production Board is represented by the determination of a "program" for every
requirement that is susceptible of being programed. We have created the Office
of the Vice Chairman on Program Determination, with a staff working exclusively
on program determination. Insofar as it is possible, no place in the most urgent
production program, and no distribution of scarce materials, is permitted except
as it accords with a program which has been balanced in terms of supply and
conflicting demands.
The mechanism for balancing conflicting demands against American productive
facilities is focused around the Requirements Committee, on which sit repre-
sentatives of the Army, the Navy, Maritime Commission, the Office of Lend-Lease
Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, State Department, and the Office of
Civilian Supply. When total requirements submitted by each such agency exceed
available supply, as is normally the case, the uses to which materials are to be
put, and the justifications ofl'ered by all claimants, are balanced and decisions
made at this point by the Vice Chairman on Program Determination.
Several of the individual material controls have recently achieved degrees of
development that distinguish them from previous control of these materials suffi-
ciently to be worthy of special mention. Among these is the control of steel plate.
At the present time a program of steel-plate production is set for every month,
determining the total of plate that can be produced without too greatly reducing
the supply of supplementary shipments of steel that have to be produced in order
to make complete ships, tanks, etc. When this plate-production program is set,
definite allocations are provided for the Army and Navy, Maritime Commission,
Board of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease, and civilian usage.
It is fair to say that if similarly tight control of the distribution of materials
were practicable for all scarce materials the material-control problem could be
considered in very good shape. In fact, such control cannot be applied to every
form of every scarce material and is possible for plate partly due to the large
concentrations of demand where identification of the use is satisfactory. The
usage of plate for naval and maritime construction, for tanks and artillery and
a few other classes of use, accounts for a large proportion of the total steel-plate
production.
Likewise, the control of copper has recently been extended, with the aid of the
production code hereinafter referred to, to represent a distribution in terms of the
ultimate use to which the copper is put to a greater degree than has ever been
possible in the past, and it is believed that the efficiency in the distribution of
copper has been greatly improved.
Controls of other specially important materials, such as aluminum, magnesium,
nickel, alloy steel, and vanadium, have been relatively satisfactory and highly
developed, partly due to the fact that their uses have been less widespread than
the all-pervasive steel and copper and their controls, accordingly, more within the
limits of administrative feasibility.
There are other new methods recently installed which have not had time to
affect the problems of material distribution which have been outlined. Among
these are the so-called Production Code, by which it is sought to transmit the'
information known to the ultimate user of a product as to the purpose for which
the product is produced, through the interinediate processing layers of industry,
turning out the subassemblies going into those products, to the supplier of the
raw materials and the controller of those materials.
Another of those devices is the so-called Contract Production Control, intro-
duced only on an experimental basis to ascertain whether a highly refined and
detailed control of the scheduling of subassemblies, parts, and materials can be
administered so as to supplement the broad control provided by the production
requirements plan. It is too early to tell whether this experiment will be
successful.
MATERIALS REDISTRIBUTED BY WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
It is quite evident that despite the grave shortages of vital war material, sub-
stantial quantities of such materials have been too long permitted to stay out of
war production and to remain in idle and excess inventory. To meet this problem
we have adopted a number of devices through which these dead stocks are now
being redirected into war production. The test of the effectiveness of these devices
will be the extent to which inventories will decline in relation to the volume of
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13209
production instead of mounting, as they have in the past. That test lies, however,
at least some 6 months in the future, and will be a test not only of our inventory
control and material redistribution devices but also of our ability to control the
whole flow of the materials needed for war-production purposes.
I have already told you about the methods we have instituted and are about
to institute for controlling the flow of materials. Let me now mention several
of the devices which we are using to redistribute materials that are in the hands
of people who should not have them, or should not have them in the quantities
in which thev now have them.
(1) We have instituted a regulation (Priorities Regulation No. 13), which makes
it possible for persons who have materials that they themselves cannot use because
of some War Production Board conservation or limitation order, to sell those
materials to others who can use them without having to come to Washington for
special permission. This regulation permits and urges the sale of idle inventories
through channels which are controlled by the War Production Board. Since such
sales of idle material are taking place without reporting each instance to the War
Production Board we cannot at this time present you with a measure of the effec-
tiveness of these regulations. We know, however, that the pressure on us to per-
mit special sales has been almost entirely removed since the promulgation of this
regulation, and we can therefore assume that the regulation is in fact effective,
(2) We have in addition set up what might be called a clearing house within
the War Production Board to which holders of idle and excess inventories can
come and be brought together with persons who are experiencing shortages of
materials. This "clearing house," acting as broker without fee, makes arrange-
ments for sales of these materials for approved purposes. The following is a
partial tabulation of quantities of materials that have thus moved out of idle
inventories into active war production:
Table I. — Voluntary sales consummated through Sept. 12, 1942
Commodity:
Babassu oil pounds.. 286, 000
Bolts and nuts do 4, 252, 992
Coconut ofl do 413, 734
Copper and brass— do 11, 866, 764
Corkboard do 160,965
Graphite electrodes do 261, 696
Iron ^ tons.. 1,273
Lead'- pounds.. 1, 464, 077
Locomotives _._. number.. 14
Lubricating oil gallons.. 909, 066
Machinery lots.. 78
Molybdenum concentrates pounds.. 119, 100
Molybdenum wire feet.. 3, 670, 000
Nafls kegs.. 11,788
Palm oU pounds.. 1, 246, 612
Rubber do 7, 224, 719
Steel tons.. 30,398
Tin do 1, 394
We could present a very much longer list of commodities and quantities but
even that list would be only a partial measi^re of the effectiveness of our Materials
Distribution Unit, since many of the parties brought together through this "clear-
ing house" do not and are not required to report to us, although sales have actually
been consummated.
(3) A much more formal mechanism has also been set up through officially
organized purchase programs. Through these programs, the Government, rein-
forced by its requisitioning power, redistributes idle and excess inventories of
specific materials by forcing the holder of these inventories either to sell them to
private users or to one of the Government's agencies, organized in conjunction
with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The tabulation below presents
again only a partial picture of the effectiveness of these programs since the
amounts allocated do not include the quantities redistributed voluntarily by the
holders in accordance with Priorities Regulation No. 13, which quantities have
not therefore had to be aUocated by the War Production Board.
13210 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Table 2. — Summary of programs through Sept. 12, 1942
Number of reports-
Total allo-
cated
(pounds)
Mailed
Received
Aluminum
2.594
2,604
698
1,300
79
94, 975
1,964
2,297
656
1,231
78
39, 698
23, 912, 974
1, 697, 090
94,834
1, 687, 397
Britannia metal - - .
204, 427
31, 200, 402
Moreover, this tabulation does not present any data on programs which
although organized, have not yet fully begun to function. Among these organ-
ized programs are the following:
A manila cordage program designed to pick up over 10,000,000 pounds of
manila rope in the hands of some 40,000 wholesalers and retailers who may not
sell the rope by virtue of a War Production Board order.
An iridium program designed to pick up iridium and other precious metals
vitally needed for war production.
A copper insect screening program designed to pick up 13,000,000 square feet
of copper screening in the hands of over 60,000 fabricators, wholesalers, and re-
tailers, who may not sell that screening because of a War Production Board order.
A tin anode program designed to pick up tin anodes and other tin shapes in
the hands of tin platers.
A tin oxide program designed to pick up tin oxide in the hands of manufac-
turers of ceramic enamels who may no longer use the oxide by virtue of a War
Production Board order.
A cadmium program designed to pick up cadmium in the hands of manufac-
turers who may no longer use that cadmium because of a War Production Board
order.
In addition, the War Production Board has organized a Steel Recovery Corpora-
tion in conjunction with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This Steel Re-
covery Corporation will, within a very short period of time, be ready to purchase
idle and excess stocks of all kinds of iron and steel materials.
To date we have had to exercise our requisitioning authority in 273 instances,
and through the use of that authority we are able to add substantial quantities
to the materials available for war-production purposes, including among others
7% million pounds of copper, 11 million pounds of wood pulp, 10% million pounds
of zinc concentrates, 1,700 tons of rubber, 17,000 bales of silk, 31,000 boxes of tin-
plate, and 274,000 gallons of toluol.
(4) As the above programs are set up, the War Production Board is put into
a position whereby it can, where necessary, purchase the idle and excess inven-
tories that are uncovered as part of the examination of data submitted to us with
requests for allocations of materials. We are at this time concentrating on the
most critically needed materials, and even then only on the significant quantities
of such materials. As our system of allocation becomes more fully coordinated
and as our redistribution mechanisim grows in size and experience, we expect to
be able to do a bigger and better and more effective job.
IV. Effects of New Methods on Production Program and Material
Distribution
(Answer to the committee's third question: "What improvements have al-
ready resulted from the new methods or can be expected to result in the near
future?" and to the committee's fourth question [in part] "and how do the new
methods of raw material distribution contribute to the solution of these over-all
problems?")
The major effect of the new methods above outlined on the production program
and the distribution of materials has been to reduce the proportion of demand
that cannot be satisfied, which impinges on the market in conflict with the balance
of demand. There is a positive gain in the production picture when material
to be received is relatively well known in advance, even though requirements
for full production cannot" be served. Programs can be adjusted and schedules
made to make best use of available material whqn prospective deficiencies are
known.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13211
The reduction of inventory accumulations has been greatly improved by the
new methods described. The reduction in stated production requirements over
authorized purchases for the months of July, August, and September was largely
accomplished at the cost of excess inventories reported under the production
requirements plan and subtracted from materials authorized.
Not the least among the effects of the recent methods above described is the
preparation for still further improvements made possible by the first stages of
these new developments. Since production requirements have been organized
by all important producers of metal products and reduced to a quarterly basis,
it becomes possible to move forward in the near future into an improvement of
the production program itself. One of the next steps in improving the methods
described involves the reporting of proposed production in classes of product
more adequately organized than available information in the past, so that permis-
sible production can be laid out for each calendar quarter for every class of product.
We expect that this next step will be advanced in the preview of the production
requirements for the first quarter of 1943 by having each important producer
state his requirements and proposed production for every one of a list of 500
products groups, so devised as to include all important products made of metal.
On this basis it will be possible, in effect, to produce 500 production programs
adding up into one master production program. This will never be perfect and
will constantly be subject to intensive development within each of the 500 classes,
but planning will be advanced to the extent that we can program our production
Several of the more important individual scarce-material controls are described
in appendixes at the end of this memorandum. This includes steel, copper,
nickel, magnesium, and vanadium.
(Answer to the committee's fifth question: "Would you illustrate the informa-
tion furnished in answer to questions 1-4 with specific data for steel, copper, or
other exemplary critical raw materials?")
Descriptions of the methods of distribution of steel, copper, nickel, magnesium'
and vanadium appear in supplemental statement. i
V. Essential Civilian Production
(Answer to the committee's sixth question: "Would you describe the adminis-
trative organization and procedures by which the War Production Board deter-
mines the type, amount, and location of essential civilian production?")
Essential civilian production has often been defined, the definition changing with
conditions. It is vitallv important that we all be clear in our minds as to what that
definition is today — and will continue to be until we are within sight of our goal,
which is victorv. Todav, essential civilian production can mean but one thing —
that which cannot be identified as directly consumed or used by the military, but
which is necessary to sustain civilian life and to the promotion of military opera-
tions. Most obviously in this category are food supply, rail, water, and highway
transportation of war materiel and its component parts and materials ; fuels and
electric power for industry, etc. Falling within the essential civilian category is
that segment of supplv devoted to preservation of the health and safety of the
civilian population, that definition is still valid but it means exactly what it
says, no more. Our civilian population will in time be engaged almost entirelyin
occupations contributing in one way or another to military operations. Main-
tenance of their health and safety is of course vital to the war activity — as vital as
maintenance of the fighting effectiveness of our armed forces.
The standard of reference is important, however. That standard is necessity
to the promotion of military operations. The effects of wartime supply condi-
tions upon the individual are important only insofar as they bear on the effective-
ness of our military effort. In practice, this means that the legitimate- demands
of the civilian population and civilian supplying industry upon our resources are
becoming more and more restricted. This restriction will progress very rapidly
until we are completelv "stripped for action."
General responsibilitv for representing the civilian interest and economy in the
formulation of War Production Board policv is vested in the Office of Civilian
Supply. In execui:in,<i this responsibility, the Office seeks to determine essential
civilian and indirect military requirements and to develop balanced and consistent
programs for allocatins scarce materials, facilities, and services among competing
demands, including allocations among broad categories of use, among different
industries and among specific end products. Such programs may cover anything
1 See p. 13222.
13212 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
from indirect military and civilian requirements for copper or chlorine to require-
ments for housing or farm machinery. These programs are prepared after con-
sultation with technical advisers from the various industry and materials branches;
participation in industry advisory meetings called by these branches; discussion
with other interested governmental agencies such as the Office of Defense Trans-
portation, Office of Petroleum Coordinator, Bureau of Mines, etc.; and analysis of
published data concerning the field in question. The information is evaluated and
consolidated within the Office of Civilian Supply, where standards for determining
the minimum requirements of both the civilian consumers and the industries sup-
porting the war program are developed. The completed programs are presented
by the Office of Civilian Supply to the Requirements Committee, the Standard
Products Committee and other interdepartmental committees on which the
various claimants for raw materials and finished products are represented.
At these committees the total stated requirements of all the claimants are com-
pared with total supplies and reductions made, if required. Where necessary,
the programs are then revised to conform to the reduced quotas.
When a decision is reached as to the amount of materials to be allocated for a
given purpose, or the quantity of a particular item to be produced, and when a
program distributing the quota has been approved, it is the function of the Director
General for Operations to implement this determination. Such implementation
may take various forms. Conservation and limitation orders, for example, may
be issued to restrict the use of scarce materials to specified purposes, force the use
of substitutes, limit or prohibit the production of particular items, or simplify
and standardize products. Within the framework of the conservation and
limitation orders and other regulations, preference ratings for specific amounts of
material for particular permitted purposes are assigned to different manufacturers
by various mechanisms, the most important of which is, at the present time, the
production requirements plan.
Until a short time ago, the major efforts of the War Production Board were
directed toward determining the type and amount of production to be permitted
rather than the locations at which such production was to be carried on. Recently,
however, much attention has been given to the possibilities of concentration of
production in particular plants and particular areas, as mentioned in replying to
other questions of the committee.
(Answer to the committee's seventh question: "What factors dictate the use
of concentration programs for essential civilian production and for what tj'pes of
industries and products are such programs being developed?")
A general answer is that concentration is considered when some or all firms in
the industry are required for and convertible to war production; when permitted
civilian production is so restricted as to prevent the economic operation of all
firms; when a significant part of the production is continuing in regions or localities
in which there are bottlenecks in labor, transport, power, or warehouse accom-
modation.
In most cases the existence of excess capacity in an industry which is con-
tinuing to produce an essential civilian product must be established before con-
centration of production is considered. At the present time special emphasis is
being placed upon the concentration of production in the metal-using industries.
Because the war requires the greatest possible conservation of metals, these
industries generally have excess capacity for the production of essential civilian
type products, and it is for this reason that attention is being devoted to these
industries first of all.
The Committee on Concentration of Production has decided not to consider
concentrating operations in the wholesale and retail trades for the time being.
(Answer to the committee's eighth question: "What general criteria are used
for deciding the plants and areas in which essential civilian production shall be
concentrated?")
No universal rules can be laid down for the selection of plants to continue
operation ("nucleus plants") at or near capacity. In drafting programs the oper-
ating authorities should be guided by the following criteria, but their relative
importance depends upon the circumstances of the industry and the conditions
which have made concentration necessary. The best judgment available both
within the War Production Board and the industries affected must be used in
deciding on the relative importance of the criteria in each case and in applying
them to the plants in the industry. In most cases the first and second criteria
wUl be by far the most important.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13213
(1) Suitability for conversion to war production: This will mean, as a rule,
although not necessarily, that small plants will be given nucleus status and large
plants, which are usually better equipped to handle war contracts, will be required
to suspend civilian production.
(2) The local labor markets: Civilian production should be suspended in areas
in which labor is urgently required in war plants, especially in cases where the
labor released by suspending civilian production would be directly transferable
to war production. Nucleus status should be given wherever possible to plants
in areas in which there is still a surplus of labor (e. g., New York and many rural
communities) .
(3) Economy of transport: The nucleus firms should be so selected that cross-
hauling is eliminated wherever possible and the requirements on the transport
system are reduced to a minimum, especially in areas in which regional transport
bottlenecks have developed.
(4) Power supply: Production should be suspended or restricted in regions in
which the power supply is, or is likely to become, inadequate.
(5) Requirements for warehouse accommodation: This is becoming a serious
problem, especially in areas surrounding important ports. By closing and con-
verting factories in these areas we can save the time, labor, and building materials
necessarv to construct new warehouses.
(6) Efficiency: To save resources and to protect price ceilings, production
should be concentrated in the most efficient nonconvertible plants. As a rule,
however, relative efficiencies will be extremely difficult to evaluate, and differ-
ences in efficiency are likely to be so small that other and more important criteria
should control. If the product is standardized when production is concentrated,
the suitability of plants to produce the standard lines must be taken into
consideration,
VI. Manpower
(Answer to the committee's ninth question: "To what extent do the W^^r
Manpower Commission and other Federal agencies participate in the formulation
of the over-all policy with respect to concentration and the details of the individual
concentration program?")
The Committee on Concentration of Production has asked the War Manpower
Commission to appoint a consultant to speak for it on questions of general policy.
The War Manpower Commission has been the source of all detailed information
on labor-market conditions necessary to formulate concentration programs. The
Office of Price Administration has been consulted on all programs considered up
to this time, and will be consulted on future programs.
Where other agencies such as the Office of Defense Transportation have definite
interests in a specific concentration program, they will be consulted by the Com-
mittee on Concentration of Production. In cases where power supply is impor-
tant, the Power Branch of the War Production Board will be asked to provide the
necessary information.
(Answer to the committee's tenth question: "The committee has heard a great
deal about the difficulties of securing adequate labor for copper and nonferrous
mines. Have there been any studies of the potential productive capacity of
mines and mills producing nonferrous ores and metals? Have labor shortages
resulted in less-than-capacity production of any of these ores and metals?")
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITT OP NONFERROUS MINES AND MILLS
The basis of all activity in the production sections of the commodity divisions
is the productive capacity of mines, mills, smelters, and refiners under the juris-
diction of the respective divisions. We have detailed production data of all
mines, mills, and smelters, by establishment. The Mining Branch has listed
over 8,000 mines, each of which is given a serial number which it is necessary
to have in order to obtain priority for materials and repair parts. Through
this control we obtain the production data.
DECLINE OF PRODUCTION DUE TO LABOR SHORTAGES
Nearly all the nonferrous-metal mines have been reporting a net loss of labor in
recent months and this has been reflected in a lower volume of production. The
mine production of duty-free copper fell off nearly 5,000 tons in July. Curtail-
ment of production during the month of August indicates that, with adequate
13214 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
labor, copper production could be increased 12 percent, molybdenum 15 percent,
zinc 20 percent, and tungsten 25 percent. At the time when supplies of these
critical materials are barely sufficient for the most important military uses we
have been losing production due to labor shortages.
Labor turn-over has been high in nonferrous mining owing principally to the
high wages paid in nearby construction and shipbuilding establishments. There
has been some loss through the operation of Selective Service but this has been
small in comparison to the losses to other industries. Also the mining companies
have been complaining that the replacements generally are not quite as efficient
as the experienced manpower lost and that this is resulting in a significant drop in
output per man per day.
In a recent survey of the Labor Production Division it was estimated that
6,150 additional workers would be needed in domestic mines and mills for the
balance of 1942 to augment the present employment of about 54,000. These
requirements are for additional labor for the balance of the year and do not
include replacement needs resulting from withdrawals due to out-migration, quits,
or any other cause. Another total of 2,220 net addition to the labor force would
be necessary for the copper, lead, and zinc smelters and refineries. Although the
labor requirements might appear to be comparatively small, they are approxi-
mately 10 percent of the present employment and a large number of fabricating
plants in many different industries employing many hundreds of thousands of
workers depend upon the output of the mines.
ACTIONS TAKEN TO RELIEVE LABOR SHORTAGES
From preliminary investigations of the manpower problem in nonferrous metals
in May 1942 it became apparent that the activities of several governmental
agencies outside of the War Production Board had to be coordinated if this complex
problem was to be handled successfully. Steps were taken to bring these agencies
together in a joint attack on the problem. A meeting for this purpose was called
by representatives of the various branches of the War Department, the War
Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Labor Board.
At this meeting a report on the responsibilities of the various Government agencies
was prepared and submitted on July 8. Shortly thereafter the International
Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers presented a memorandum on the man-
power problem to Wendell Lund, Director of the Labor Production Division. On
August 4, Mr. Lund called a meeting of the representatives of the various agencies
listed above and of the Office of Price Administration and the Selective Service.
A week later this committee was established as a permanent working group under
the chairmanship of Mr. H. O. King, chief of the Copper Branch. Since its
inception, representatives of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and of the Bureau
of Mines have been added to it. The committee has met regularly every week
and has served as a clearing house for information on the various aspects of the
manpower problem.
As a result of the deliberations of the committee, a series of letters from the heads
of the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, the War Labor
Board, and Selective Service urging miners to stay on the job have been distributed
to operators and miners in the mining areas; statements from General Hershey and
from General McSherry, describing, respectively, the procedure on deferments of
miners and on recruiting facilities of the .Selective Service have been distributed to
mine operators; the War Manpower Commission is taking steps to introduce
training programs into mining properties; steps are being taken to see that the
present working force is more fully utilized through training and upgrading of
labor, improving working and living conditions (including transportation to and
from the job), lowering age and other restrictions on hiring and procuring high
priority ratings on mine equipment; data on the manpower aspects of the wage
problem were presented to the War Labor Board, enabling it to expedite its con-
sideration of the cases now before it; an order curtailing gold mining as a means of
freeing skilled mine labor for more essential operations is being drafted and dis-
cussed before the committee.
I approve of the action taken by the chairman of the War Manpower Commis-
sion which attempts to stabilize employment in the metal mining, milling, smelting,
and refining industries in the critical labor area of the far West by making it
necessary for a production worker to obtain a certificate of separation from the
United States Employment Service before he can leave his job.
(Answer to the committee's eleventh question: "What responsibility does the
War Production Board have in cases where labor shortages limit production? By
what organization and procedures does it exercise such responsibility? What has
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13215
specifically been done in the case of copper, zinc, aluminum and other nonferrous
metals?")
Although primary responsibility for maximum war production is assigned to
the War Production Board, the President has given to the War Manpower Com-
mission responsibility for seeing to it that manpower in the necessary quantities
and with the necessary skills is made available for war production. Therefore,
the first and most important responsibility of the War Production Board is to see
that the War Manpower Commission is informed both with respect to production
which is immediately threatened because of labor shortages and with respect to
future production programs for which the War Manpower Commission must
provide labor.
The industry branches of the War Production Board and the regional offices
are aware of the responsibility of the War Manpower Commission and keep them
currently informed of labor shortages which are interfering with war production.
The War Manpower Commission is kept informed of future labor requirements
through its membership on the Plant Site Board of the War Production Board which
reviews all major facility projects. It is jjrimarily through expansions and new-
plants that the labor requirements of the war production program are increased.
The Procurement Policy Division has worked out with the services numerous
modifications in bidding rules and in conditions of contract awards designed to
distribute more supply contracts to areas of labor surplus and fewer to areas of
labor shortages.
In addition the War Production Board has established a Labor Requirements
Committee under the chairmanship of the vice chairman of the War Production
Board on Program Determination, which has as one of its functions keeping the
W^ar Manpower Commission informed with respect to program determinations
which will influence the labor requirements they must provide for. The work of
this committee is described in more detail below.
Although primary responsibility for meeting labor shortages is in the hands of
the War Manpower Commission," there are a number of ways in which the War
Production Board helps the War Manpower Commission to handle this problem.
For example, through the labor-management committees organized by the War
Production Board much effective work has been done in areas of labor shortages
to inaugurate and expand training and upgrading programs and to liberalize
hiring specifications.
Many of the regional directors of the War Production Board work m coopera-
tion with the War Manpower Commission in labor shortage areas to develop
programs for more extensive training and upgrading and for fuller utilization of
women, Negroes, and minority groups. They have, helped in many cases to or-
ganize communitv agencies and employer and employee groups behind such pro-
grams. In addition, they have frequently been able to work out with war
contractors wavs of subcontracting or of spreading out production through branch
plants which have assisted in reducing labor requirements in congested areas.
The program of the War Production Board for concentration and curtailment of
production described in some detail above is also worked out in cooperation with
the War Manpower Commission and with a principal objective of reducing the
seriousness of local labor shortages.
Recentlv, in order to carrv out its responsibilities under directive No. II of the
War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board has organized a War
Production Board Labor Requirements Committee, which, working under the
chairmanship of Mr. J. S. Knowlson, tl\e vice chairman of the War Production
Board on Program Determination, is charged with the function of providing to
the War Manpower Commission information which can be used by it in labor
shortage areas to see that the most essential needs of the war production program
are met first. This committee, on which are represented the War Department,
the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, the War Manpower Commis-
sion, the Civilian Supplv Division of War Production Board and the Director
General of Operations of the War Production Board, secures information from
all of these sources on the relative importance of various types of war production,
on products which have fallen behind schedule and products which are ahead of
schedule, on plants or industries whose rate of production has been cut or is
threatened with curtailment l^ecause of labor shortages, etc.
These data provide the basis for establishing a system of labor priorities which
should enable the War Manpower Commission to plan to meet labor shortages
in an orderlv fashion in conformance with the needs of the war supply program.
It is expected that, in order to provide the W^ar Manpower Commission with
prompt answers to their questions as well as answers which are based upon a
13216 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
familiarity with local labor market and war production conditions, the bulk of the
work of this committee will be delegated to similarly constituted committees at
regional and subregional levels.
It is clear that as the program expands and labor shortages become an increas-
ingly acute problem, additional measures will have to be taken for close cooper-
ation between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board
in insuring that the supply of labor and the flow of materials are so closely inte-
grated with each other and with the available facilities as to insure the maximum
production of the articles needed for a balanced war supply program.
(Answer to the committee's twelfth question: "What are the functions and
objectives of the labor-management production committees? Is there any
organization within the War Production Board for assuring proper contribution
from these committees and for utilizing their suggestions and other activities?
How many labor-management production committees have already been set up
and what has been their contribution to date?")
FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
The function and principal objective of the joint labor-management committees
is to increase war production by stimulating and channeling production ideas
from workers to the areas within management where they will be most effec-
tively utilized for achieving the utmost war production. This is accomplished
both by inspiring the workers to give greater individual efi"ort, and through
improving operating efficiency. The specific job of these committees varies
according to the immediate production problems facing the plant. Their duties
range from handling rallies and giving out publicity material for making the
individual worker realize his importance in the war effort, to organizing effec-
tive suggestions from workers, to improving production techniques, and further,
under present circumstances, to supporting worker morale through full explana-
tion of material shortages and other serious problems facing industry.
I have made it clear from the beginning that the war production drive is a
voluntary effort and that it is intended to increase the production of weapons
and services now and not to further the special interests of any group. It is not
a plan to tear down or add to the power or position of any union, nor is it a plan
to interfere with bargaining machinery where it exists or to undertake the func-
tions of such machinery. It is not a plan that contemplates a measure of control
of management l)y labor. It is purely and simply a plan to secure greater plant
efficiency through cooperation of both labor and management.
The war production drive has been organized through the production drive
headquarters and the Labor Production Division in the War Production Board
and has had the active cooperation of the armed services. Headquarters of the
production drive plans for and promotes the establishment of joint labor-manage-
ment committees in all plants, mines, and facilities engaged in war production and
coordinates and advises these committees in their efforts to achieve increased
production and eflficiency. In order to further strengthen the drive, we are in
the process of establishing an over-all top committee with labor and management
participation.
ORGANIZATION FOR ASSURING PROPER CONTRIBUTION FROM COMMITTEES AND
UTILIZATION OF THEIR SUGGESTIONS
The matter of increasing production and plant efficiency has been approached
in many different ways by the 1,500 joint committees now functioning. No
hard-and-fast rules were laid down in Washington as to the organization and
functioning of these committees. It was felt that the plants engaged in war
production were so varied as to the kind of production engaged in, the size of their
operations, their location, degree of unionization, and other factors that details
of organization and activities should properly be a matter for local decision by
each committee. We have insisted, however, that they be truly representative
of both management and labor in order to secure the full cooperation necessary.
Boosting production is not just a matter of enthusiasm. In addition to the
need for sound industrial relations, a big part of the job is using tools, machines,
and manpower as efficiently as possible. It was suggested that each committee
should give attention to such problems as breaking production bottlenecks, using
every machine to the fullest practical extent, adapting old machines to new ones,
preventing break-downs, maintenance and repair, good lighting, cutting down
accidents, taking care of tools, conservation of materials and elimination of
waste, and dealing with transportation problems of workers in the plant.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13217
The scope of these activities are in themselves considerable and involve almost
every aspect of production in a plant. Every plant can do more to increase
machine and tool utilization. Management wants to increase war production.
Workers in and out of trade unions also want to help to this end. Their sons,
brothers, and friends are out there in the firing line. They are anxious to provide
them with as many and as perfect weapons as it is possible to make. It was
important that every person in every plant be given an opportunity to participate
in all-out production and to submit and receive serious consideration for his or
her ideas for increasing plant efficiency.
IMPROVING PRODUCTION BY WORKERS' SUGGESTIONS
As a vehicle for such participation, we have urged that each committee inaugu-
rate a suggestion system in its plant. Over 500 committees are known to have
done so. There are probably many more which have not been reported. Sug-
gestion boxes have been installed at convenient places throughout the plant. Pads
and pencils have been put beside these boxes and workers have been urged to
submit ideas which will boost production, improve quality, cut down rejections,
or do anything else to increase that plant's efficiency. The knowledge and skill of
millions of workers have thus been harnessed in the interest of greater production
and efficiency. Their suggestions, growing out of close contact with work at
the point of the tool, of having to contend with the innumerable bottlenecks,
little and big, which tend to develop in any plant, are being submitted by the
thousands weekly. They are either adopted, rejected as impracticable for one
reason or another, or held for further investigation and research. While suggestion
systems are not new in} America, we know that the war production drive has
resulted in their establishment for the first time in numerous plants. Even in
plants where such systems have been in effect, the patriotic impulses stimulated
by the drive among war workers have multiplied by several times the number
of suggestions which are being turned in.
CASH AND MERIT AWARDS
To stimulate and encourage the submission of suggestions, by those whose
duties do not normally require them to do so, many committees are awarding
cash prizes in the form of war bonds which often amount to as much as 10 percent
of the estimated net annual savings accruing from the adoption of the suggestion.
Further stimulation has been achieved by the development of a series of Govern-
ment awards to suggestors whose ideas have been adopted and found useful.
These are the awards of individual production merit which are distributed by
labor-management committees themselves; the certificate of individual production
merit, awarded by production drive headquarters, and the citation for individual
production merit which is awarded by me for outstanding suggestions contribut-
ing to the Nation's war production. We have felt that something equivalent
to the military honors accorded to members of our armed forces should be avail-
able to the production soldiers who have made outstanding contributions to the
war effort.
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND MORALE BUILDING
In getting the drive under way in their respective plants, the committees have
undertaken" important public relations jobs with the workers in their plant.
Those of us who are close to the war effort here in Washington do not always
realize how remote from the war effort many workers in war plants feel. Many
are working away at the same old job of making nuts or bolts or rivets or washers
and do not realize that their products are now going into the assembly of ships,
planes, tanks, and guns. There are hundreds of thousands of workers who are
making parts of larger assemblies which they have never seen. Many have given up
jobs in plants or mines performing essential services to go to work in munitions plants
because, among other reasons, they believe that they are thereby contributing
more to the war effort than they were in the equally essential job they previously
held. Many are so little aware of the importance of their jobs as to remain away
from work without reasonable excuse. Some few even take it easy on the job.
For these and other reasons, it has been found necessary by the committees to
bring home to the work(^>rs in numerous ways their relationship to the war effort,
the urgency of the job they are doing, and the need for more production. There-
fore, subcommittees on publicity have been established by many joint labor-
management committees.
13218 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
These subcommittees see to it that appropriate posters and streamers are dis-
played in the plants, that information stands are set up throughout the plants and
kept filled with interesting and informative literature on the war effort generally
and on activities in the plant. They set up scoreboards showing the over-all
production goal and the daily progress toward that goal. They see to it that
transcriptions and recordings are played over the plant public-address system,
bringing the urgency of war production home to the workers, that motion pictures
taken a1^ the front and in other war plants are shown to the workers.
They also arrange rallies at which prominent speakers, war heroes, torpedoed
merchant marine men, and enlisted personnel are invited to speak to the workers
in the plant, to tell them how their equipment works in the field, how desperate
is the need for more weapons, etc. Representatives of labor and management
also speak at these rallies urging the cooperation of workers, foremen, and all those
responsible for the organization of work in the plant. Other meetings and rallies
are held for the purpose of making awards to individual workers, to promote the
sale of war bonds, to emphasize the importance of safe practices and to train
workers in first aid.
Publicity committees secure communiques from the armed forces at the front
to the workers in the plants, set up correspondence between former workers now
in the armed forces and their friends and coworkers in the factory, run plant
newspapers which contain war information, and set up displays showing the use
of the plant product in final assembly. These are placed where all the workers
in the plant can see them.
The sum total of these efforts is to help to produce an attitude in workers
favorable to making suggestions, to staying on the job and making extra efforts
to increase the quantity of production. The publicity program serves as a tool
of the joint labor-management committee in bringing the war home to the work-
ers, in explaining its objectives, and in informing the workers how they can play
their full part in the war effort. War production drive headquarters has sent
millions of leaflets, posters, streamers, and stickers to the committees to aid in
the work. We have also made available to the committees war films, transcrip-
tions. Army and Navy communiques, still photographs of war equipment, and
technical and procedural bulletins and booklets for the use and guidance of
committee members.
SAFETY AND HEALTH FUNCTIONS
With the rapid increase in war employment and the millions of green workers
being brought into mass-production industries for the first time, the problem of
providing for industrial safety has multiplied many times. While many plants
and mines have had safety and health committees for years, nevertheless even
in such cases present-day conditions have required the full cooperation of the
joint labor-management committees.
They have made safety surveys of their plants having in mind the safeguarding
of machines, the protection of individual workers by means of special clothing and
appliances, and the elimination of industrial diseases caused by poor ventilation,
dangerous fumes, contact with poisons and industrial chemicals. They have
organized special meetings to train workers to safeguard themselves and to teach
first aid. They have organized publicity campaigns through posters and plant
newspapers to foster safety consciousness among the plant workers. They have
encouraged workers to make safety suggestions through the suggestion system
and have arranged through the cooperation of management for the provision of
first-aid rooms, doctors, and nurses. The subcommittees have also secured
and distributed pamphlets on safety and health to workers via information stands.
War production drive headquarters has provided them with safety and health
posters, leaflets, and technical bulletins for both committee members and plant
workers. This has been accomplished in cooperation with the Division of Labor
Standards of the United States Department of Labor, and the LTnited States
Public Health Service. We have also arranged through the Division of Labor
Standards to make available to the joint labor-management committees the
consulting services and advice of almost 500 safety experts who will, on request,
actually call on and assist them in planning their work. We have suggested,
tried, and proved methods of accident record-keeping and methods for gaging
the effectiveness of their safety programs.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13219
TRANSPORTATION FUNCTIONS
Gasoline rationing in our Middle Atlantic and New England States and the
rationing of tires throughout the country have suddenly raised a new set of
transportation problems for workers in war plants. A high percentage of all
American workers have been accustomed to riding to and from work in their
own automobiles. During the last 30 years, the availability of automotive
transportation has worked a great change in our cities and in the average worker's
mode of living. Workers have moved out of cities into suburbs and the nearby
country. Industrv has also located plants at points sometimes a considerable
distance from centers of population. All this has been made possible to a large
degree because of the privately owned automobile. Also, for strategic reasons,
many of our new war plants have been placed at points remote from centers of
population. In spite of temporary war housing, increased bus service, and other
provisions, thousands of war workers still find it necessary to travel distances up
to 60 miles a day to and from their places of work.
Inability to transport war workers may result in serious curtailment of pro-
duction. With local restrictions surrounding the hours of operation of many
gasoline stations, war workers have found it increasingly difficult to obtain
sufficient gas outside of working hours. Those reporting to work before 7 a. m.
and working long hours, as well as those on night shifts have often been unable
to obtain g-asoline without taking time off from work or breaking into their
daytime sleep to go to gas stations which are open only between 7 a. m. and
7 p. m. These and other problems have been tackled by joint labor-management
committees in an effort to eliminate absences and time lost because of inadequate
transportation and to conserve all available rubber on tires as long as possible.
Manv committees have undertaken to make arrangements with gasoline stations
to adjust their hours of business to the working hours of the workers on various
shifts on their plants to eliminate the necessity for workers to take time off from
work to obtain needed gas.
Car pooling has been a major activity of many committees. Strenuous efforts
are being made to reduce the number of cars arriving daily at war plants. The
committees have undertaken surveys to determine the number of workers who
must travel by car and their place of residence. They have surveyed the condi-
tion of these cars and their tires. They have designed and issued questionnaires
to obtain the information necessary t6 aS"ect car-pooling among the workers in
the plant and with workers in neighboring plants.
Amendment No. 16 to the tire rationing regulations of the Office of Price
Administration has recognized the efficacy of these efforts and the desirability
of having joint labor-management committees serve as certifying agencies to
local rationing boards where war workers are in need of tires. A certain number
of grade 2 tires have been' made available to eligible war workers in plants haying
an organized transportation plan. Such a plan, as defined by these regulations,
must do more than provide for ride swapping. It must provide that a particular
worker volunteer to drive his car daily and to agree to carry with him, to and
from work, four other workers who either have no other mode of transportation
or who agree to forego the use of their cars in going to and from work. This
program has met with more resistance than ordinary ride swapping from workers
and has necessitated a considerable educational program to fully effectuate
it. It has become a responsibility and function of many labor-management
committees.
CONSERVATION'" FUNCTIONS
Shortages of materials and the increasing difficulty in many industries of
obtaining replacement of machines and tools have accented the importance of
conserving both materials and equipment in war plants. Numerous ways have
been found by committees to assist in this direction and many have established
subcommittees to work on this problem alone. Through the suggestion systems
many specific ways have been discovered and adopted in which actual raw ma-
terials can be conserved in particular plants. Campaigns to raise the quality of
production and to reduce rejects have been initiated by committees. Educational
programs on the use of machinery to prevent wear and tear are being conducted.
Reclamation of materials which were formerly thrown out has been carried on.
Salvage programs involving the installation of properly marked receptacles
throughout plants in which to segregate rubber, copper, tin, and other scarce
metals have been initiated.
13220 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
War production drive headquarters has bolstered this work of the committees
by circulating suggestions and photographs to the committees as to what they
might do on conservation and by distributing posters, leaflets, stickers, and other
materials to be used by them for educational purposes.
OTHER MISCELLANEOUS FUNCTIONS
In addition to the above functions, many committees have participated actively
in war bond purchase drives in their plants, in specific programs aimed to reduce
absenteeism, in educational programs to sustain plant morale when material
shortages and other unavoidable conditions necessitated temporary lay-offs or
shut-downs, in facilitating training programs, and in dealing with housing diflS-
culties of plant workers.
War production drive headquarters has cooperated with committees in these
functions by providing general morale-building materials, by serving as a clearing
house for workable ideas in the various activities, and by securing for all com-
mittees the best information available on material shortages to be used in educa-
tional work.
NUMBER OP LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES
Since the war production drive is a voluntary program, we cannot compel
reports from committees. However, before committees may obtain the complete
services rendered by headquarters and submit suggestions for higher awards,
they are required to register the name of the chairman of the committee and the
names of the labor and management representatives, as well as to give certain
other facts as to the number of employees in the plant and the type of war pro-
duction on which they are employed. From these registrations it is possible to
know fairly accurately the number of the joint labor-management committees.
In addition to the 1,420 committees which have registered with headquarters as
of September 10, 1942, it is estimated that there are between 350 and 400 com-
mittees formed and operating in plants which have not formally registered.
This is estimated on the known lag in registration as shown by experience to date
which ranges from 3 weeks to 2 months. Almost 3,000,000 workers are employed
in those plants which have registered.
These have included in greatest number plants producing guns and ordnance
equipment, next iron and steel mills, a'ircraft and parts, synthetic materials,
machinery and machine tools, shipbuilding, tanks, engines, anthracite coal,
lumber, and many other miscellaneous industries.
With increasing emphasis being placed in recent weeks on directing the drive
into the raw-materials producing industries, the number of new committees in
these industries is increasing rapidly. During August, 183 anthracite coUiery
committees registered their entry into the drive. A considerable number of
committees have also been established recently in the copper, lead, and zinc
mining and refining, lumber logging and miUing, and bituminous coal industries.
A. recent analysis showed that over 73 percent of the workers in the plants which
had established joint labor-management committees are known to be members
of trade-unions. The union affiliations of employees are not always reported
by committees and it is probable that the actual percentage of employees in
trade-unions is considerably higher.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE COMMITTEES
Your committee* has asked me to comment on the contributions which these
- committees have made. I think we have started something in American industry
of immeasurable value. I don't know just how you can adequately measure the
contribution of a program of this sort. Certain it is that a mere description of
the activities of these committees gives one the impression that they are busy
with a multitude of useful activities directly aimed at increasing production in
war plants.
We do not have a required reporting schedule, but we have received thousands
of reports from them on their activities. They write us letters. They send us
minutes of the business meetings. We have held a number of regional meetings
of committee members at which they have described their accomplishments
and outlined their problems to us. We have sent field men into some of the
plants to see what is happening. From all of these sources, we do have a fairly
good idea of what the copnmittees are doing.
But this is a different thing from actually measuring accomplishments in an
objective way. We have received many telegrams and letters from committees
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13221
reporting that they have broken production records, cut down cars arriving at
the plant to a certain percentage, reduced absenteeism by specific amounts, and
giving similar facts on other activities. However, we are conscious of the fact
that there are many factors, other than the war-production drive, operating in
the plants where our committees are functioning and we do not know just how
the effect of these other factors can be separated from the contributions of the
committees.
The following are some samples from among scores of statements made to us
by management and bv our committees:
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation, Dunkirk, N. Y. — "For the month of June
the Dunkirk plant has made shipments of 7 percent over the largest month that
we have ever had in the history of the plant."
Arma Corporation, Brooklyn, N. Y. — "Production throughout the plant is
reaching a new high and is continuing to do better."
Bemis Bros. Bag Co., Buffalo, N. Y. — "Our first week of production chart
sandbag production went over the top 16.5 percent."
National Battery Co., Depew, N. Y. — "Within 3 weeks after installing the war-
production drive for victory the increased volume of production had become so
noteworthy that commendation was received from the Assistant Secretary of
War."
Johns-Manville, Manville, N. J. — "Proposal from Miss Irma Tobias, head
asbestos yarn inspector for the inspection and control department, covers a.
special rack for checking measured lengths of yarn for test thus saving approxi-
mately 10 man-hours per week."
Watson-Stillman Co. Roselle, N. J. — "Production exceeded the quotas in both
plants for the month of June."
Westinghotise Electric Elevator Co., Jersey City, N. J. — "April 1, 1942, report
was that this company was approximately 25 percent above their production
quota at that time. Since that date their production has increased considerably
more and they are now approximately 36 percent above their production quota.
Noticeable increase in production since the winning slogan was posted."
National Tube Co., Elhvood City, Pa. — "Best production record ever achieved.
The hot-finish department, cold-draw department, cold-finish department, specialty
department, and tube-reducer department, broke all previous production records
and as a total represented the largest amount of finished material shipped (for
the present type of product) in the history of this plant."
Parish Pressed Steel Co., Reading, Pa. — "We can safely say that on an average
our plant has had a step-up on production output amounting to 8 to 10 percent
since our production-drive program has been in effect and we feel that the increase
in production will continue to rise as we get further along with the production-
drive program."
Vollrath Co., Sheboygan, Wis. — "Output increased from 3,000 pieces per day to
6,000 since establishing War Production Board labor-management committees."
RCA Mamifacturing Co., Inc., Indianapolis, /nd.— "Production output of
sound equipment for the United States Government during the month of June
was 26.8 percent greater than for the highest production output month since
Pearl Harbor."
SUGGESTION SYSTEMS
Of the 1,298 active committees reported through August 31, 486 had _ started
suggestion systems and installed suggestion boxes. Reports coming in have
shown that hundreds of thousands of suggestions have been turned in by workers
but no total is as yet available. Letters have been received from many plant
officials stating that the war production drive has acted as a great stimulus to their
suggestion systems and has resulted in manifold increases in numbers of sugges-
tions turned'in. To date, we have received over 12,000 requests for the Individual
Production Merit Awards forms. These are awarded by the labor-management
committees for suggestions of high merit which have actually been adopted.
The award forms have been available for only the recent weeks. It is not likely
that such awards will be made for more than one out of every 25 suggestions. On
this basis, approximately 300,000 suggestions have probably been received by
committees to date.
.TRANSPORTATION PLANS
Two hundred and twelve committees have reported the organization of trans-
portation plans. Actual accomplishments in terms of the reduced number of
cars transporting workers to plants are not available. Indications in reports
13222 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
received are that considerable success in this direction has been achieved by many
committees. There has been a substantial reduction in the number of cars
carrying no passengers or only one passenger and a similar increase in the number
of cars carrying two, three, or more passengers.
TRAINING PROGRAMS
Although, heretofore, training has been regarded in most plants as strictly
a problem for the personnel department, now in many plants, labor-management
committees have been cooperating in the formulation of plans and policies, and
have actually assisted in the training of new workers. One hundred fifty-eight
committees have actually reported such activity at the end of August.
MORALE BUILDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS
A considerable number of morale building activities have been carried on by
the joint labor-management committees. While all the facts have not been
reported the following will give some idea of the extent of this activity:
Over 890 committees have had bulletin boards installed in their plants and
have distributed and put up 441,000 posters. These were colored posters of the
themes of "More Production," "Better Quality," "Men Working Together,"
"Save Tires and Rubber," "Eliminate Accidents," "Work Harder," etc. In
addition 90,000 placards and 90,000 health posters have been distributed and
posted.
Five hundred and twenty-four committees have set up information stands
and distributed 6,167,000 leaflets to workers in war plants. These leaflets have
been written in simple language and directed at bringing home to workers an
understanding of the total nature of this war, and are pictures of the immensity
of the production job we have to face. They have also directed their attention
to the stake they have in the war. Other leaflets have been descriptive of the
purpose of the war-production drive, of necessary precautions to prevent accidents,
of simple health rules, of the part a particular industry is playing in the total
war effort, etc.
The committees have distributed over 2,500,000 stickers to be put on workers'
machines and on their cars. These stickers are directed toward obtaining greater
energy, efficiency, and interest in production.
Three hundred and sixty-three committees have designed and erected produc-
tion scoreboards to help workers visualize the production goal and their daily
progress toward that goal.
Four hundred and nineteen committees have conducted slogan contests in
their plants. Some contests have been held only once in a particular plant;
others maintaining a running contest with monthly prizes of war bonds and cash.
These contests have helped to concentrate the thinking of employees on the
objectives of the drive. Committees display the winning slogans throughout
their plants and in their plant newspapers.
One hundred and ninety-three committees have published or utilized house
organs and plant newspapers to further the drive and its objectives.
Six hundred and twenty-two joint labor-management committees have appointed
subcommittees to handle various aspects of their programs.
SUPPL-EMENTAL STATEMENT BY DONALD M. NELSON, CHAIRMAN,
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C.
I. Control of Inventories
The committee has asked that I cover more fully than in my memorandum
submitted at the time of my appearance before it on September 17, the War
Production Board's activities in controlling and utilizing existing idle or excess
inventories. Specifically, I have been asked to answer these questions: (1) In
analyzing Production Requirements Plan applications for materials, how do we
determine what constitutes an excess inventory? (2) To what extent have
materials been recaptured when excess inventories were located on PRP forms?
In this memorandum I shall attempt to answer the committee's specific questions
first and then discuss the present shortcomings of the inventory utilization pro-
gram which we recognize and are attempting to overcome.
The manufacturer reports on PRP, for each material item, his inventory on
hand, and the quantity he will withdraw from inventory (requirements). Re-
ported requirements are reduced if Prograin Determination arrives at the con-
clusion that there is not enough material available to allow for production of 100
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13223
percent of the contemplated program in which the material is to be used, or the
requested requirements may also be reduced whenever they seem inflated. Re-
duced requirements are then compared with his reported inventory. If it appears
that his inventory is greater than the minimum level, his receipts are limited to
a quantity which, when added to his inventory, provides for 3 months' consump-
tion plus a minimum stock. In other words, excess inventory is re'duced to the
minimum level by the end of the quarter. The minimum level is defined as
approximately 45 days for manufacturing plants, or one-half of the quantity
which will be withdrawn from inventory during the quarter. Only enough
materials are authorized to leave 45 days' inventory on hand at the end of the
quarter after meeting the quarter's production requirements. However, excep-
tions are made to this definition for special industries. For example, in the ship-
building industry, the minimum level for yards constructing ships is 60 days and
for yards repairing ships 120 days. It can be seen that inventory control exer-
cised under PRP consists of not allowing a manufacturer to receive quantities
from outside sources if his inventory is sufficient to take care of his production
requirements. It is believed that an inventory can best be used in the manu-
facture of the products for which it was purchased, and that over a period an
excessive inventory in an individual plant can be eliminated without wasteage
of material.
Whenever excessive inventories appear on PRP applications a report is made
to the Inventory and Requisitioning Branch covering inventories and quantities
to be used. An effort is made by the Inventory and Requisitioning Branch to
release these inventories to plants needing critical materials for the manufacture
of war products. The Inventory and Requisitioning Branch investigates cases
of apparent excessive inventories and obtains a detailed list of sizes, types, and
gages available for distribution. From this information obtained through the
PRP reports, detailed lists are made up showing available supplies of inactive
materials. Manufacturers requiring these materials write in requesting certain
items in the list. An investigation is made and the nearest supply located. Then
the prospective purchaser is placed in contact with the manufacturer who has idle
inventories.
For example, over 14,000 firms have reported a total of 111,000,000 pounds of
idle and excess inventories of copper and copper-base alloys. Much of the copper
reported has been offered for voluntary sale at the Government's prices. That
which the owner refuses to sell but which is nevertheless needed for war production
will be requisitioned.
Copper and copper-base alloys are now being allocated from idle inventories
into strategic war production at the rate of over 4,000,000 pounds a week.
Through the first week in September, 29,700,000 pounds of copper and copper-
base alloys had been allocated from immobilized stocks to war production channels
through the WPB's copper recovery program, instituted early in July. Of this
total, 2,400,000 pounds were allocated for stockpiling to meet future anticipated
demands for standard shapes and sizes of mill products; 6,300,000 pounds were
reported and allocated as scrap; 9,300,000 pounds were allocated, or known to
have been moved for use in existing form under Priorities Regulation No. 13, and
11,700,000 pounds were allocated to brass mills and ingot makers for remelting.
A special unit from the Copper Branch of WPB has been set up in the offices
of Copper Recovery Corporation, 200 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y., to
locate copper in the forms needed, and to redistribute it to war plants urgently
requiring it because of unforeseen material shortages, plant break-downs, receipt
of new war orders or other emergencies.- In most of these emergencies, the war
plant cannot wait for receipt of the needed shapes from its regular source of
supply.
At the present time, emergency requests for copper in various forms are being
received from war plants and the armed services at the rate of 500,000 pounds a
day. More than half of all these emergency requests are being successfully filled
from idle and excess inventories where the materials are located in exactly the
form needed, sales arranged and immediate shipments made.
For example, the Howard D. Foley Co., electrical contractors for a Philadel-
phia armor plate plant, were ordered to complete their work 4 months ahead
of schedule. They needed immediately 52,000 pounds of copper cable and copper
bar which was not scheduled from the regular suppliers for 90 days. They placed
their problem before the Copper Recovery Corporation, and within 24 hours, all
but 2,000 pounds of the material was located in the inventories of companies in
five different states. Sales were arranged and the needed copper delivered.
A tank production line was kept in operation when copper tubing, urgently
needed by the American Car & Foundry Co., was located at the Frigidaire divi-
60396— 42— pt. 34 12
13224 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
sion of General Motors in Dayton, Ohio, the Noland Co. in Newport News, Va.
and the Westinghouse Manufacturing Co., Mansfield, Ohio. All three firms
quickly cooperated by voluntarily selling the tubing from their idle inventories
and production was maintained.
A production line of aircraft instruments of P. R. Mallory & Co., Indianapolis,
Ind., needed brass in a number of forms, and could not wait for special shipments
from regular suppliers. The brass was located in the inventories of nine different
companies in seven nearby States, sales were arranged and the production line
was kept moving.
The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at Burbank, Calif., was in immediate need
of special copper cable to avoid a break-down on one of its welding machines,
which was working day and night. They appealed to the WPB Inventory and
Requisitioning Branch field office in Los Angeles. The material was located in
the inventory of General Motors of Southern California, a private sale arranged,
and the welding machine was kept going.
The Lee C. Moore Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., working on an important Navy con-
tract, had a crane break-down and needed a special type of trolley wire at once.
It would take 6 weeks to get it from the manufacturer. The Inventory and
Requisitioning Branch office in Pittsburgh located the wire in a plant 50 miles
away.
In Jacksonville, Fla., Army engineers sent in a hurry call to the Copper Re-
covery Corporation for 50,000 pounds of copper cable for completion of special
communications lines. The cable was located in the inventory of a firm in
Wilson, S. C, which voluntarily sold it direct to the Army.
The copper recovery program is one of a number of similar recovery programs
instituted by the Inventory and Requisitioning Branch of WPB in cooperation
with the Metals Reserve Co. and other WPB branches. In the copper pro-
gram, inventories of idle materials are being secured from approximately 100,000
firms and individuals. A master inventory is kept in New York, and inventory
sheets are regularly distributed to WPB field offices, so that whenever possible
material may be supplied from inventories of companies adjacent to the war
plants needing it.
The Steel Recovery Corporation, which will function in much the same way
as the Copper Recovery Corporation, is now setting up its offices in Pittsburgh
and will shortly institute a Nation-wide program to redistribute idle and e.xcess
inventories of steel and steel products.
Idle inventories frozen by limitation and conservation orders were released by
Priorities Regulation No. 13, issued July 7, 1942. Under this regulation rules are
set up which facilitate the transfer of excess inventories. Every manufacturer
who reports high inventories on PRP forms receives a copy of Regulation No. 13
together with a letter explaining its provisions and urging him to distribute his
excess inventories through these channels. Later a field representative of the
Inventory and Requisitioning Branch calls upon the manufacturer to collect
facts and arrange for the transfer. In addition, transfer of excess inventories
has been accomplished on a less formal basis by representatives of WPB making
compliance investigations in each plant. When an excess inventory is discovered
in a plant, it is reported to the WPB field office by the investigator. The investi-
gator then urges manufacturers in the district to contact the nearest field office
if they cannot obtain critical materials. In this way needs for materials are
satisfied from sources of supply in nearby plants.
There are still serious gaps in our system of inventory utilization. Most of
them are symptoms of the early stage of our experience with this very complex
problem. We are cognizant of the most serious gaps, and are aiming at closing
them.
The most serious gap at this time results from our inability to schedule closely
the delivery of all critical materials to all plants requiring them. Since the
function of an inventory is to cushion the consumer's production schedule against
variations in the rate of flow of materials to him, the size of the inventory he must
be allowed varies directly with the risk of an interrupted flow. Until we succeed
in refining our controls over materials distribution, two kinds of excess inventories
must be permitted manufacturers: (1) an over-all stock large enough to protect
their production schedules against uneven flow of material receipts, and (2) stocks
of some materials not immediately usable because of temporary inability to secure
individual "bottleneck" materials or parts.
Probably our largest recapture of inventories will result from the reduction of
working stocks which our improving material distribution controls will permit.
Included among inventories which can be reduced as greater assurance of an even
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13225
flow of materials can be provided, are those in the hands of Army and Navy
Establishments. The operating and field officers in charge of Army and Navy
installations are increasingly showing themselves to be aware of the need for keep-
ing inventories of raw and semifinished materials at as low a level as is consistent
with realistic military necessities. The Services are not only steadily improving
their procedures for keeping inventories of raw and semifinished materials down,
but they are also organizing to find ways to transfer materials from one use to
another wherever excessive inventories are found. A problem of considerable
magnitude still exists, but we are aware of it and are moving to work it out with
the aid of the operating Departments. As to finished m-ilitary items, it will be
necessary to continue to pile up inventories for some time to come in anticipation
of future strategic moves.
Our coverage of the locat^ion and ownership of inventories which may be use-
ful in war supply is not yet complete. The problem of wholesale and retail in-
ventories is one on which we have been working for some time. It is a difficult
problem, not only in the collection of factual data but, more important, in evaluat-
ing the adequacy of stocks on hand in individual cases. We are about to initiate
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers in the technique of keeping records of
inventories in relation to sales. The larger units in these businesses (those with
annual sales of $100,000 or more and inventories of $25,000 or more) will be re-
quired to keep records quarterly of their inventories and of the ratio of their
stocks to sales. They will compute their average ratio of stocks to sales in cor-
responding quarters of 1939-40, which will be used as standards against which t'o
measure current inventory turn-over. The keeping of these records by business-
men is intended both to educate them in evaluating their own inventories in
terms of sales volume, and to provide us with a basis for determining whether or
not tjie inequitable distribution of inventories m the marketing system shown by
our research to exist this spring and summer is being evened out. If, by a sample
check of these records, it is discovered that sufficient progress is not being made
toward a more equitable distribution of inventories and that inventories in the
hands of certain types of distributors and in certain areas of the country are stiU
disproportionately large and prejudicial to the interests of smaller operators and
consumers in other areas, we will take steps to remedy the situation. On the
basis of the information now at hand, it seems that various forces are working
toward a more equitable distribution of inventories. We do not, therefore, want
to set up elaborate administrative machinery to correct a situation which may
correct itself. By initiating a record-keeping system such as that outlined. above,
we expect both to learn the true facts and to lay the groundwork for adminis-
trative control if it proves necessary.
Our knowledge of inventories has evolved largely as a byproduct of our efforts
to control the flow of materials. In the rnain, we become aware of their existence,
therefore, in connection with a seller's request for permission to deliver, or a
buyer's request for permission to receive the material in question. There may
still be substantial quantities of critical materials owned by speculators or by
consumers who have not requested permission to buy or use additional amounts,
and whom we therefore do not control. The procedures under Priorities Regu-
lation No. 13, and the individual purchase programs described in chapter III-A
of my memorandum to the Committee, are designed to get at most of these im-
mobilized stores. We will have to do more.
There may be inaccuracies in the reports of inventories which we have received
from holders — specific data received in connection with PRP and the individual
material allocation systems, and the general statements that inventories are at
minimum working levels, required of all applicants for priority assistance. This
is a matter of compliance. We intend to become stricter in securing compliance,
and are strengthening our policing activities to that end.
We have been slow in invoking the requisitioning power to compel slow or re-
calcitrant owners to part with their holdings. This is partly because we believe
strongly that voluntary means should be proved incapable before compulsion is
resorted to. Also, however, the mechanics of requisitioning have been slow and
cumbersome, partly by nature, and partly because they are new tools in our hands.
In the future we will be quicker to use our requisitioning powers.
Because we have only just begun to tackle the job of redistributing inventories
we have hit the high spots first. The large and obvious accumulations have
occupied a substantial part of our time in the initial stages of the work, as is
desirable in the interests of efficiency. We will get down to the smaller and less
obvious stockpiles before we are through.
13226 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Our eflforts to date have been concentrated on redistributing stocks of raw
materials and those in early stages of fabrication. Our conservation and limita-
tion orders, as well as rationing regulations, have stopped a great deal of manu-
facturing in its tracks. Inventories of semifabricated materials, parts, and prod-
ucts therefore stand idle. Finished products, plumbing and heating equipment,
for example, have been manufactured but cannot be installed. This is a field
into which we have hardly ventured. We are proceeding cautiously in order that
existing inventories of partly and completely manufactured items can be used
most economically. In other words, we do not want to melt down as scrap any-
thing which can be used in war or essential civilian production "as is" or with
further processing. Neither do we want to destroy any frozen finished products
which we may need before the war is over. We do not intend, however, to freeze
in disuse any manufactured products containing materials useful in war production
merely because of the financial loss which would be involved in reducing them to
useful form.
Finally, the utilization of existing idle inventories poses problems not present
in utilizing "new" materials. In no single place is there a complete assortment
of grades, forms, sizes, etc., upon which to draw. Much of the material available
has been specially fabricated for a particular use, and is not readily adaptable
to other uses. We are meeting this problem partially by such devices as the
weekly catalog of available copper stocks distributed to field offices. Much of the
work, however, involves finding the right use for a particular lot of material and
will continue to be a slower job than that of putting to use an equal quantity of
new material.
II. CONTEOLLING THE FlOW OF MATERIALS InTO WaR AND ESSENTIAL
Civilian Production
The problem of controlling the flow of materials into war and essential civilian
production is a many-sided and extremely complicated one. I should like to be
able to report to you that this problem has been completely solved. Realism,
however, compels me to report that much more information must be secured,
that much more experience in using information must be gained, and that much
more skill must be developed in government, before we can say that all major
aspects of the problem of controlling the flow of materials are being satisfactorily
handled.
For this conclusion I feel no need to offer alibis. In my judgment the fact is
that since last December 7 the flow of materials into war and essential civilian
production has been steadily moving toward the national objective of maximum
utilization of all available resources.
It is not my intention at this time to attempt a detailed description of the
paper work now used or under consideration for aiding in our task of securing
maximum utilization of materials. On the other hand, I should like to point out
that there is one basic principle which should govern all paper-work systems used
in this connection.
That principle may be expressed thus: Flow of materials is a physical fact, and
is a part of the composite sets of physical facts which, taken together, go to make
up production of finished products. Labor, machinery, materials, and manage-
ment are what do the actual work. All these productive forces must be syn-
chronized and kept in good working balance. Shortages or overages in any one
productive element, at a given place and tihie, interfere with maximum utilization
of production facilities. The prime movers in getting production out of materials,
labor, and machinery are the innumerable plant managers throughout the Nation.
The principle which should govern paper-work aids used by Government is that
such paper work must so far as possible function to serve the production needs of
managements.
What Government must do, through whatever paper-work systems we may use,
is to inform industry, in effect, of Government's decisions on the following
questions:
(1) What kinds of finished products do we need to receive?
(2) What quantities of these finished products will be needed at stated
time periods?
(3) At what rates will scarce materials be available for the producers and
subproducers who are asked to combine their efforts in making the desired
finished products?
(4) By what mechanisms will producers and subproducers be permitted to
obtain the needed scarce materials at the appropriate times?
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13227
The answers to the first two of these questions tell industry what the demand
is for finished products in kinds, quantities, and times. The answer to the third
question describes the scarcity aspect of the materials-supply problem, and the
answer to the fourth question establishes the rules by which supplies of scarce
materials will be made available to producers and subproducers.
It seems appropriate to emphasize at this point that the need for Government
aid in controlling the flow of scarce materials does not imply a need for eliminating
production managers' decisions as to what is needed and when it is needed. On
the contrary, Government aid in controlling the flow of scarce materials is needed
only because there is a scarcity of materials, not because there is a scarcity of
managerial skills and talents. This point may be demonstrated readily by making
one assumption, i. e., the assumption that there is no scarcity of any material.
Such in fact was the case during the earliest stage of the rearmament program.
In that stage the flow of materials was allowed to operate normally. Industrial
planners in plants holding military contracts, whether private plants or Govern-
ment-owned plants, were expected to place ordinary commercial orders for delivery
of needed materials at such times as experience dictated to be correct.
As scarcities developed, because military demands began to overtake and then
to outrun the capacity to produce materials — raw, semifabricated, and fabricated,
to the point of subassemblies — then and then only were Government controls
called for.
There are two basic reasons for instituting governmental controls over the flow
of materials. The first reason is that Government alone can make the over-all
strategic decisions as to relative urgencies of the needs for finished products.
The choice, for instance, between directing the flow of steel into finished tanks, or
raflroad locomotives, or passenger automobiles, cannot be left to private judgment
or to competitive bidding in the marketplace. The second reason is that the
normal calculations of industry for determining amounts and delivery dates of
required materials are based on plant-profit factors, including prestige for reli-
ability in making finished-product deliveries rather than on maximum quantitative
utilization of all the Nation's productive resources.
The two primary objectives, then, of Government aids in the control of material
flow are: First, to assure direction of materials and programming of finished-
goods production into most urgent uses as dictated by military and economic
strategy; and second, to guard against excess purchases which would overinsure
against failures of delivery. The degree of strategic balance between end-product
programs, in the first connection, and of operating balance, or timing, in the use
of materials and production of components in the second, is a common test of the
quality of achievement of both objectives.
The first objective, of directing materials and programming finished-goods
production into most urgent needs, has been approached, at successive stages of
scarcity, by various devices, including voluntary priorities, limitation and curtail-
ment orders, compulsory preference ratings, allocations, allotments, and quotas.
These devices to date have served their strategic purpose fairly well. If there are
valid complaints to be made, I believe they should be directed against the slowness
with which certain strategic decisions as to kinds, quantities, and timing of pro-
duction have been made. There is still too large an area in which materials find
their way into goods which are on or even beyond the border line of essentiality.
On the whole, however, I am impressed with the success of the materials controls
in aiding the great bulk of our production efforts, and with the success of industry
in meeting the demands put upon it.
There is much more doubt, however, concerning our effectiveness in meeting the
second objective of Government control over the flow of materials, namely, getting
the maximum utilization of available scarce materials once they have been directed
into strategically urgent channels of production. There are large gaps in our
factual knowledge, concerning the myriads of needs which must be satisfied,
between the producing of raw materials and the final assembly of components into
finished products ready for use. There are large gaps in our experience in dealing
with shifting delivery schedules, with changing technological processes, with
peaks and valleys in the output or importation of primary materials.
The problems presented by our lack of information, of experience, and of final
determinations of essentiality are matters of grave concern, not only to the
War Production Board but also to the several procurement agencies responsible for
military victory. To these problems we long have been and still are giving full-
est consideration.
Our current efforts in this connection are to devise mechanisms which will
function more precisely and thus give greater aid to industry in its task of achiev-
ing maximum utilization of all productive resources in the shortest possible period
13228 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
of time. These more precise mechanisms should assure that enough, but only-
enough, materials will flow to the needed points at the proper times. Several
new mechanisms aimed at this purpose have been recently proposed and are under
intensive study. One is being tried out on a small scale.
All these proposals rely in the first instance on the skills of management — private
and in Government-operated plants — in calculating tonnages and delivery
schedules needed for maximum output on military schedules and on permitted
essential civilian goods.
In this brief review of the problem of controlling the flow of materials, I should
like to offer two general observations. The first is to reiterate and to emphasize
the vast scope of the task our Nation is doing. We are establishing the greatest
military production system in history, and I believe it no exaggeration to say that
the ultimate victory of the United Nations, military and economic, will be based
upon our capacity to outproduce the entire enemy production network. This is
so vast an undertaking that it requires a complete change-over from ordinary
competitive practices and management techniques, to a new kind of management-
thinking. Millions of new decisions must be made throughout the Nation as well
as in Washington. For these new decisions we obviously have very little basis in
past experience. We know but one thing surely: We must achieve maximum
production.
The other general observation concerns the speed with which this maximum
output must be reached. In ordinary times, new industrial decisions and tech-
niques evolve slowly, each typically requiring a period of several years or more.
In the present grave emergency there is no time for such careful, deliberate, and
time-consuming procedures. We must act just as rapidly as we can — learning at
the same time that we are doing.
INTRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS
Mr. Lamb. Mr. Chairman, I should like at this time to offer for the
record a group of exhibits which will serve to supplement the hearings
here.
Because of the necessity of making accessible to the Members of
Congress and other readers the Executive Order setting up the War
Manpower Commission and the subsequent directives issued by the
chairman of the War Manpower Commission we wish to prmt them,
together with other relevant material, as exhibits to this hearing.
The Chairman. The exhibits will be made a part of the record.
If tliere is nothing further the committee will stand adjourned.
(Whereupon, at the hour of 12:25 p. m., the committee adjourned.)
(The exhibits referred to appear on following pages.)
EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1. — Executive Order Establishing the War Manpower
Commission
Executive Order Establishing the War Manpower Commission in the
Executive Office of the President and Transferring and Coordinating
Certain Functions to Facilitate the Mobilization and Utilization op
Manpower
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes,
including the First War Powers Act, 1941, as President of the United States and
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and for the purpose of assuring the
most effective mobilization and utihzation of the national manpower, it is hereby
ordered:
1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the
Executive Office of the President a War Manpower Corr mission, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission. The Commission shall consist of the Federal
Security Administrator as Chairman, and a representative of each of the follow-
ing Departments and agencies: The Department of War, the Department of the
Navy, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the War Pro-
duction Board, the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, the
Selective Service System, and the United States Civil Service Commission.
2. The Chairman, after consultation with the members of the Commission, shall:
a. Formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to
assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the
Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war; and issue such pohcy
and operating directives as may be necessary thereto.
b. Estimate the requirements of manpower for industry; review all other
estimates of needs for military, agricultural, and civilian manpower;
and direct the several departments and agencies of the Government as
to the proper allocation of available manpower.
c. Determine basic policies for, and take such other steps as are necessary
to coordinate, the collection and compilation of labor market data by
Federal departments and agencies.
d. Establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all Federal pro-
grams relating to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of
workers to meet the needs of industry and agriculture.
e. Prescribe basic policies governing the filling of the Federal Government's
requirements for manpower, excluding tliose of the military and naval
forces, and issue such operating directives as may be necessary thereto.
f. Formulate legislative programs designed to facilitate the most effective
mobilization and utilization of the manpower of the country; and, with
the approval of the President, recommend such legislation as may be
necessary for this purpose.
3. The following agencies shall conform to such policies, directives, regulations,
and standards as the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers
vested in him by this Order, and shall be subject to such other coordination by
the Chairman as may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the
resiDonsibilities placed upon him:
a. The Selective Service System with respect to the use and classification
of manpower needed for critical industrial, agricultural and govern-
mental employment.
b. The Federal Security Agency with respect to employment service and
defense training functions.
13229
13230 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
c. The Work Projects Administration with respect to placement and training
functions.
d. The United States Civil Service Commission with respect to functions
relating to the filling of positions in the Government service.
e. The Railroad Retirement Board with respect to employment service
activities.
f. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor.
g. The Labor Production Division of the War Production Board,
h. The Civilian Conservation Corps.
i. The Department of Agriculture with respect to farm labor statistics, farm
labor camp programs, and other labor market activities.
j. The Office of Defense Transportation with respect to labor supply and
requirement activities.
Similarly, all other Federal Departments and agencies which perform functions
relating to the recruitment or utilization of manpower shall, in discharging
such functions, conform to such policies, directives, regulations and standards as
the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by
this Order; and shall be subject to such other coordination by the Chairman as
may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the responsibilities placed
upon him.
4. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the War Manpower
•Commission:
a. The labor supply functions of the Labor Division of the War Production
Board.
b. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel of the United
States Civil Service Commission and its functions.
c. The Office of Procurement and Assignment in the Office of Defense
Health and Welfare Services in the Office for Emergency Management
and its functions.
5. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the Office of the
Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, and shall be administered under
the direction and supervision of such officer or employee as the Federal Security
Administrator shall designate:
a. The Apprenticeship Section of the Division of Labor Standards of the
Department of Labor and its functions.
b. The training functions of the Labor Division of the War Production
Board.
6. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel transferred to
the War Manpower Commission and the Apprenticeship Section transferred to
the Federal Security Agency shall be preserved as organizational entities within
the War Manpower Commission and the Federal Security Agency respectively.
7. The functions of the head of any department or agency relating to the
administration of the agency or function transferred from his department or
agency by this Order are transferred to, and shall be exercised by, the head of
the department or agency to which such transferred agency or function is trans-
ferred by this Order.
8. All records and property (including office equipment) of the several agencies
and all records and property used primarily in the administration of any functions
transferred or consolidated by this Order, and all personnel used in the adminis-
tration of such agencies and functions (including officers whose chief duties
relate to such administration) are transferred to the respective agencies concerned,
for use in the administration of the agencies and functions transferred or con-
solidated by this Order; provided, that any personnel transferred to any agency
by this Order, found by the head of such agency to be in excess of the personnel
necessary for the administration of the functions transferred to his agency,
shall be retransferred under existing procedure to other positions in the Govern-
ment service or separated from the service. So much of the unexpected balances
of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available for the use of any agency
in the exercise of any function transferred or consolidated by this Order or for
the use of the head of any agency in the exercise of any function so transferred
or consolidated, as the Director of the 'Bureau of the Budget with the approval
of the President shall determine, shall be transferred to the agency concerned,
for use in connection with the exercise of functions so transferred or consolidated.
In determining the amount to be transferred, the Director of the Bureau of the
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13231
Budget may include an amount to provide for the liquidation of obligations
incurred against such appropriations, allocations, or other funds prior to the
transfer or consolidation. , , , , j_, .
9. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available for that purpose,
the Chairman may appoint such personnel and make provision for such supphes,
facilities, and services as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Order. The Chairman may appoint an executive officer of the Commission and
may exercise and perform 'the powers, authorities, and duties set forth in this
Order through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may deternnne.
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
April 18, 1942.
Exhibit 2. — Dieectives I-XII Issued By The Chairman of The
War Manpower Commission
Directive No. I
To United States Employment Service, to maintain lists of essential activities
and essential occupations.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission that the measures hereinafter set forth will promote the
effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prose-
cution of the war, it is hereby directed :
I. The United States Employment Service, after consultation or collaboration
with the War Production Board, the War Department, the Navy Department,
the Department of Agriculture and such other departments and agencies as it
may deem appropriate, shall prepare and keep current, for its own use and for the
use of appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, (a)
lists of essential activities; (b) lists of essential occupations; and (c) lists of critical
war occupations.
II. Each list of essential occupations and of critical war occupations prepared
by the United States Employment Service pursuant to this directive shall either
contain a simple description of each occupation therein listed, and the minimum
training time or experience required by an untrained individual in order to attain
reasonable proficiency therein, or shall make reference to a readily available text,
document or compilation of data wherein such description or required training
time or experience is recorded.
III. As used in this or any other directive prescribed under Executive Order
No. 9139, unless the context requires otherwise:
(a) Essential activities include (1) essential war activities, (2) any activity
required for the maintenance of essential war activities, and (3) any activity
essential to the mauitenance of the national safety, health or interest;
(b) Essential war activities include the production, repair, transportation or
maintenance of equipment, supplies, facilities or materials required in the prose-
cution of the war by the United States and by the other United N,ations:
(c) An essential occupation means any occupation, craft, trade, skill or pro-
fession, required in an essential activity, in which an untrained individual is
unable to attain reasonable proficiency within less than six months of training or
experience;
(d) A critical war occupation means an essential occupation, found by the
United States Employment Service to be one with respect to which the number of
individuals, available and qualified to perform services therein, is insufficient for
existing or anticipated requirements for essential activities;
(e) The United States Employment Service means the United States Employ-
ment Service in the Social Security Board in the Federal Security Agency.
IV. This directive may be cited as the "Essential Activities and Essential
Occupations Directive."
Paul V. McNutt,
June 24, 1942. Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
13232 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
DiEECTIVE No. II
To War Production Board, to furnish information as to relative importance of
critical war products.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpovrer
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War Man-
power Commission, that an insufficient number of available workers, qualified to
perform work in certain essential occupations, renders it necessary that the War
Manpower Commission be currently advised as to the relative importance, in the
effectuation of the national war supply program, of filling job openings in estab-
lishments whose products or services are required for that program, and that the
measures hereinafter set forth will promote the effective mobilization and utiliza-
tion of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The War Production Board, with the aid of the War Department, the Navy
Department, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Maritime Commission,
the Department of Agriculture, and such other departments and agencies as it
may deem appropriate, shall furnish to the War Manpower Commission, current
information with respect to the relative importance, in connection with the
maintenance and effectuation of the national war supply program, of filling job
openings in plants, factories or other facilities whose products or services are re-
quired for that program.
II. To that end, the War Production Board, with the aid of such departments
and agencies, shall take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to transmit
to the War Manpower Commission at its headquarters as well as in the field,
information pursuant to paragraph I hereof, in a manner which will assure close
contact and collaboration in all areas of operation.
III. The War Production Board, after consultation with the War Department,
the Navy Department, and the Maritime Commission, shall designate whether,
or the extent to which, any information furnished pursuant to this directive
constitutes confidential information and may indicate the manner in which the
confidential character of any such information shall be safeguarded.
IV. The War Manpower Commission shall observe and enforce, in every detail,
the instructions of the War Production Board with respect to safeguarding the
confidential character of any information made available to it pursuant to this
directive.
V. The War Production Board shall to the maximum extent practicable notify
the War Manpower Commission of any information made available pursuant to
this directive within such period prior to the date or dates when workers will be
required in connection therewith, as may be necessary to enable the recruiting
facilities of the United States Employment Service and other appropriate agencies
to be fully utilized.
VI. This directive may be cited as the "Critical War Products Directive."
Paul V. McNutt,
June 24, 1942. Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
Directive No. Ill
To United States Employment Service,- to accord certain placement priorities.
By virtue of "the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War Man-
power Commission that the war production program requires that priorities be
accorded in the recruitment of workers for and the placement of workers in essen-
tial activities and that the measures hereinafter set forth will promote the proper
allocation and the effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower
in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The United States Employment Service shall take such action as may be
necessary or appropriate to assure that:
(a) Each local public employment office exerts its maximum efforts, including
the utilization of all personnel, funds and facilities at its disposal, to expedite the
recruitment and placement of all workers required for essential activities in pref-
erence to undertaking or continuing to recruit or place workers for any other
activity; and
(b) Referrals are made to job openings for workers required for essential occu-
pations, irrespective of the location of the work, in accordance with the relative
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13233
need for filling such job openings under the national war supply program, as shown
by information made available by the War Production Board pursuant to the
Critical War Products Directive.
II. If the United States Employment Service, on the basis of its own mfornia-
tion or of authoritative information from other sources, has reason to believe, with
respect to any plant, factory, or other facihty, hereinafter referred to as an em-
ploying establishment, that:
(a) The wages and conditions of work are not at least as advantageous to a
worker referred to a Job opening therein, as those prevailing for similar work in
similar establishments in the industrial area; or
(b) Proper measures have not been or will not be instituted to reduce or
eliminate its use of or need for workers in critical war occupations by effective
utilization, through training, upgrading, appropriate personnel transfers and job
isimplification, of the workers employed in such establishment; or
(c) Its need for additional workers in critical war occupations can be reduced
or eliminated by the transfer of workers, employed in nonessential activities in
such establishment or in another employing establishment, under the same owner-
ship or control in the industrial area; the Director of the United States Employ-
ment Service may provide for excepting such establishment from the provisions
of paragraph I hereof, subject to such policies, conditions, and standards as the
Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may approve.
III. This directive may be cited as the "Placement Priorities Directive. '
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
June 24, 1942.
Directive No. IV
To United States Employment Service, to encourage transfers to essential activities.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War Man-
power Commission, that the national war supply program requires that increased
efforts be made to encourage each individual who is unemployed or is not engaged
in an essential activity but is capable of performing services in an essential occupa-
tion and is needed for such activity, to accept, through the United States Employ-
. ment Service, suitable work in an essential activity and that the measure herein-
after set forth will promote the effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's
manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The United States Employment Service shall, as expeditiously as possible,
complete an occupational classification of each registrant under the Selective Train-
ing and Service Act of 1940, on the basis of his Selective Service Occupational
■Questionnaire.
II. The United States Employment Service shall request each such registrant
whose occupational questionnaire indicates that (a) he is qualified to perform
services in an essential occupation and (b) he was not, as of the date of his filing
of such questionnaire, utilizing his highest skill in an essential activity, to report
to his nearest pubhc employment office. If, through its interview of any such
registrant or from other sources, the United States Employment Service finds that
he" is capable of performing services in an essential occupation and is not utilizing
his highest skill in an essential activity, the United States Employment Service
shall exert all reasonable efforts to persuade such registrant to transfer to suitable
work for which he is needed in an essential activity.
III. The United States Employment Service shall maintain a complete record
of and submit a full report to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission
with respect to (a) each case in which a registrant, after being offered suitable
work in an essential activity pursuant to paragraph II hereof, has, without good
cause, refused to accept such work, and (b) each case in which an employer or his
representative, has directly or indirectly, in any manner, dissuaded or deterred or
attempted to dissuade or deter, from so transferring, a registrant in his employ
who is requested by a public employment office to transfer to work in an essential
activitv pursuant to this directive.
IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Encourage Transfers to
Essential Activities."
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
June 24, 1942.
13234 > WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Directive No. V
To Director of Selective Service, concerning occupational deferments for indi-
viduals needed for essential occupations in essential activities.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission, that existing and anticipated labor needs for essential
activities require that consideration be given such needs, in connection with the
classification, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, of available
individuals qualified in essential occupations, and that the measures hereinafter
set forth will promote the proper allocation and the effective mobilization and utili-
zation of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The Director of Selective Service shall take such action as may be necessary
or appropriate to assure that :
(a) Copies of lists, including amendments and supplements thereto, of essential
activities and of essential occupations, transmitted to him from time to time by
the United States Employment Service pursuant to the Essential Activities and
Essential Occupations Directive, are promptly made available to all local boards
and boards of appeal in the Selective Service System;
(b) To the extent required for the maintenance of essential activities, indi-
viduals who are engaged in essential occupations in essential activities are tem-
porarily deferred from training and service under the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940 while so engaged;
(c) To the extent required for the maintenance of essential activities, indi-
viduals who are not engaged in essential occupations in essential activities but
who are qualified in essential occupations, are afforded reasonable opportunity,
prior to induction under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, to become
so engaged.
II. The Selective Service System and the United States Employment Service
shall establish and maintain close collaboration at their respective headquarters
as well as regional, State, and local levels to insure full utilization by the Selective
Service System and eflScient transmission by the United States Employment
Service of the labor market and occupational information currently available
through the offices of the United States Employment Service, and so as otherwise
to effect the purposes of this directive.
III. This directive may be cited as the "Essential Occupational Deferment
Directive."
Paul V. McNutt,
June 24, 1942. Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
Directive No. VI
To United States Employment Service, to expedite the recruitment and placement
of essential agricultural workers.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, estabhshing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission that the agricultural production program contemplated
by the "Food for Victory" goals prescribed by the Secretary of • Agriculture pur-
suant to the directions of the President, renders essential the conservation and
maximum utilization of available agricultural workers and the recruitment of
additional agricultural workers from every appropriate source and tliat the
measures hereinafter set forth will promote the proper allocation and effective
mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the
war, it is hereby directed:
I. The United States Employment Service, after consultation with such
bureaus, oflFiees and divisions in "the Department of Agriculture and with such
other departments and agencies as it may deem appropriate, shall prepare, keep
current and make available to the Department of Agriculture and other interested
departnxents and agencies, data reporting its best estimates with respect to the
available number of agricultural workers and the anticipated requirements for
such workers, by periods, areas and agricultural commodities.
II. If, with respect to any area, the United States Employment Service deter-
mines after consultation with such bureaus, offices and divisions in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and other departments and agencies as it may deem appro-
priate, that the available number of agricultural workers is insufficient for the
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13235
production, cultivation or harvesting of any agricultural commodity, essential to
the effective prosecution of the war, the United States Employment Service shaU
take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to assure that its maximum
efforts are expended in the recruitment and placement of the number of agricul-
tural workers required for such production, cultivation or harvesting, including:
(a) The estabhshment and maintenance of such agricultural labor recruitment
and placement services and facilities as may be necessary;
(b) The solicitation of all available workers, qualified to perform agricultural
work, in projects or programs maintained by the Work Projects Administration,
the National Youth Administration, the Department of Agriculture, and other
appropriate private or pubhc agencies or departments;
(c) The solicitation of qualified agricultural workers in rural and urban centers,
youth groups and educational institutions;
(d) The retention for such purposes of qualified agricultural workers who
might otherwise be recruited for placement in less essential industrial activities;
(e) The promotion, among growers, of the cooperative use of agricultural
workers ;
(f) The promotion of the maximum utilization of transient workers for such
purposes by directing and guiding their movement to those areas in which non-
local agricultural workers are required; and
(g) The submission, currently, to the Department of Agriculture, of all avail-
able information with respect to those areas in which and the periods and crops
for which the establishment and maintenance of adequate housing facilities will
promote the recruitment and placement of required agricultural workers.
III. The United States Employment Service shall not, pursuant to this directive,
recruit agricidtural workers for, or refer such workers to, any agricultural employ-
ment in which the wages or conditions of work are less advantageous to the
worker than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.
IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Expedite the Recruit-
ment and Placement of Essential Agricultural Workers."
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
June 24, 1942.
Directive No. VII
To Secretary of Agriculture, concerning adequate housing for transient essentia
agricultural workers.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Cornmission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission, that existing and anticipated requirements for agricul-
tural workers for the production, cultivation or harvesting of agricultural com-
modities essential to the effective prosecution of the war render necessary certain
movements of such workers between areas and crops, that such movements will
be facilitated if reasonable shelter is available for such workers, and that the
measures hereinafter set forth will promote the effective mobilization and utiliza-
tion or the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The Secretary of Agriculture shall, on the basis of data made available to
him from time to time by the United States Employment Service and on the
basis of such other data as he may deem appropriate, prepare and keep current,'
information with respect to the availability of adequate housing or other types
of shelter facilities in each area in which nonlocal agricultural workers will be
required for the production, cultivation or harvesting of any agricultural com-
modity essential to the effective prosecution of the war.
II. If, with respect to any area, the Secretary of Agriculture determines, after
consultation with the United States Employment Service and such other depart-
ments or agencies as he may deem appropriate, that existing housing facilities,
including permanent or mobile Department of Agriculture labor camp facilities,
are insufficient to provide adequate shelter for nonlocal agricultural workers
required in such areas for the production, cultivation or harvesting of any agri-
cultural commodity essential to the effective prosecution of the war, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture shall take such action as may ,be necessary or appropriate
(including the utilization of all personnel funds and facilities at his disposal
therefor) to assure that:
13236 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(a) All Department of Agriculture labor camp facilities, existing or hereafter
established in such area, are made available to and utilized by such workers be-
fore such facilities are made available to or are utilized by any other individuals;
and
(b) Such additional Department of Agriculture labor camp facilities are estab-
lished and maintained in such areas and for such periods as are necessary to
provide adequate shelter for such workers.
III. The Secretary of Agriculture, after consultation with the United States
Employment Service, the Office of Defense Tranpsortation, the Office of Price
Administration and such other agencies or departments as he may deem appro-
priate, shall take such action (including the utilization of all personnel, funds and
facilities at his disposal therefor) as may be necessary or appropriate to assure
that:
(a) Agricultural workers, required for the production, cultivation or harvest-
ing of any agricultural commodity essential to the effective prosecution of the
war, are provided needed transportation facilities, and
(b) Nonlocal agricultural workers and their families, transported or housed
pursuant to this directive are provided needed health and welfare services.
IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Assure Adequate Housing
for Transient Essential Agricultural Workers."
Paul V, McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
June 24, 1942.
Directive No. VIII
To certain Government agencies, concerning adequate transportation for workers
in essential activities.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission, that careful plans must be made to assure the availa-
bility of adequate transportation facilities for workers transferring to, moving
between, or engaged in essential activities and that the measures hereinafter set
forth will promote the effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's man-
power in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The United States Employment Service, the Department of Agriculture
and any other department or agency of the Federal Government having infor-
mation concerning workers transferring to, moving between, or engaged in essen-
tial activities, shall maintain, keep current and submit to the War Manpower
Commission, for transmission from time to time to the Office of Defense Trans-
portation, information with respect to each situation or area in which existing or
anticipated transportation needs of such workers are not or will not be adequately
provided for by existing and readily available transportation facilities.
II. In carrying out the functions and responsibihties vested in it by Executive
Order No. 8989, as amended, particularly as such functions and responsibilities
relate to assuring that adequate transportation facilities are available, as needed,
to workers transferring to or moving between essential activities and to workers
requiring transportation between their homes and places of employment in es-
sential activities, the Office of Defense Transportation shall give careful consid-
eration to the information submitted to it from time to time pursuant to para-
graph I hereof and shall consult with such other departments or agencies as it
may deem appropriate.
III. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Provide Adequate Trans-
portation for Workers in Essential Activities."
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
June 24, 1942. ]
Directive No. IX
To certain Government departments and agencies, to develop, integrate and
coordinate Federal programs for the day-care of children of working mothers.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Man])ower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13237
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission, that existing and anticipated requirements for workers
in essential activities render necessary the employment of large numbers of
women, that among such women may be found many mothers of young children,
that no woman responsible for the care of young children should be encouraged
or compelled to seek employment which deprives her children of her essential
care until after al' other sources of labor supply have been exhausted, but that
if such women are employed, adequate provision for the care of such children
will facilitate their employment, and that the measures hereinafter set forth will
promote the effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's
manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. The Office of Defense Health and \\ elfare Services, in consultation with
such departments and agencies of the Federal Government as it may deem
appropriate, shall:
(a) Promote and coordinate the development of necessary programs for the
day-care of children of mothers employed in essential activities;
(b) Determine, either directly or through such Federal departments and
agencies as it may designate, areas in which such programs of day-
care should be promoted, and the respective responsibilities of the
Federal departments and agencies concerned in the development of
such programs; and
(c) Take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to assure the
effectuation of all such programs.
II. The United States Employment Service shall prepare, keep current, and
make available to the Office or Defense Health and Welfare Services, data re-
porting its best estimates with respect to the number ot working mothers with
young children, and the anticipated requirements of essential activities for the
employment of such mothers, by periods and areas.
III. The Work Projects Admmistration in the Federal Works Agency, the
Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor, the Office of Education in the
Federal Security Agency, the Bureau of Public Assistance in the Social Security
Board in the Federal Security Agency, the Farm Security Administration in the
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Public Housing Authority in the Na-
tional Housing Agency and every other Federal department or agency carrying
on child day-care programs or programs related thereto shall make available to
the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services reports with respect to such
day-care programs or programs related thereto, carried on by such department
or agency, and shall take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to in-
sure the integration and coordination, through the Office of Defense Health and
Welfare Services, of all Federal programs for the day-care of children of working
mothers and otherwise to carry out the purposes of this directive.
IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Develop, Integrate and
Coordinate Federal Programs for the Day-Care of Children of Working Mothers "
Paul V. McNtjtt,
Chairm.an, War Manpower Commission,
August 12, 1942.
Directive No. X
To all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment, concerning transfer and release of Federal employees.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and by Executive Order No. 9243, and having found, after consultation
with the members of the War Manpower Commission, that the measures herein-
after set forth will facilitate the filling of the Federal Government's requirements
for manpower in the civilian service, and promote the proper allocation and the
effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecu-
tion of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall find that a civilian employee
of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government
can make a more effective contribution to the war effort in a position in some
other such department or agency, the Commission, with or without the consent
13238 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
of the employee or of the department or agency in which he is employed or to
which he is transferred, shall direct the transfer of such employee to such position.
II. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall find that a civilian employee
of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government
is qualified to perform work in a critical war occupation (as defined in the Essen-
tial Activities and Essential Occupations Directive) and can make a more efl"ec-
tive contribution to the war effort in an essential activity carried on by a private
enterprise, the Commission, with the consent of the employee, but with or with-
out the consent of the department or agency in which he is employed, shall, upon
request of such private enterprise, authorize the release of such employee to such
private enterprise for work in such critical war occupation in such essential
activity. An employee whose release has been authorized pursuant to this para-
graph shall be carried on a leave-without-pay basis from his Federal position for
the period of such employment with a private enterprise, except that such leave-
without-pay status shall not continue beyond six months after the end of the war.
III. The Civil Service Commission shall base its findings, pursuant to para-
graphs I and II of this directive, upon:
(a) the extent to which the skills, abihties, training, and experience of the
employee are required and will be utilized by the departments, agencies,
activities or private enterprise concerned; and
(b) the relative importance to the war program of the Government activities
in which the employee has been employed and to which he will be trans-
ferred, as indicated by, among other considerations, priority classifica-
tions established by tlie Director of the Bureau of the Budget pursuant
to Executive Order No. 9243; and
(c) the relative importance to the war program of the Government activity
in which the employee has been employed and of the private enterprise
to which he will be transferred, as indicated by priority classifications
established by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to
Executive Order No. 9243 and by such policies and directives as the
Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may prescribe.
IV. Any employee of a department or agency of the executive branch of the
Federal Government (other than an employee holding a temporary position) who
has been transferred pursuant to paragraph I of this directive shall be entitled to
thirty davs' notice from the department or agency to which he has been transferred,
prior to the termination of his services with such department or agency, unless
such termination is for cause. Upon the termination, without prejudice, of the
services of an employee (other than an employee transferred or released from a
temporary position) in the position to which his transfer or release has been au-
thorized or directed pursuant to paragraphs I or II of this directive (or in a
position which, for the purposes of this directive, is substantially similar thereto)
such employee shall be entitled to the reemployment benefits hereinbelow set
forth, provided he makes application for reinstatement therein within forty days
after the termination of his services with a department or agency of the Federal
Government and, with respect to an employee released to a private enterprise,
within forty days after the termination of his services with such an enterprise but
in no event later than six months after the end of the war:
(a) Reinstatement, within thirty days of his application, in the same depart-
ment or agencv and to the maximum extent practicable, in the same
locaHty, in his former position, or in a position of like seniority, status,
and pav, in such manner, to the maximum consistent with law, that
he does"^ not lose any of the rights or benefits to which he would have
been entitled had he not been transferred or released;
(b) If such a position, or if the agency or activity in which he was employed
is no longer in existence, and such person therefore cannot be rein-
stated, the placement of his name on the Reemployment List estab-
lished pursuant to Executive Order No. 6924 of September 20, 1932,
to be considered for certification to positions for which he is qualified
elsewhere in the Government service. Certifications from such list
shall be made by the Civil Service Commission prior to certifications
from all other lists maintained by the Commission.
V. Any department or agency in which is employed an employee whose transfer
or release is to be directed or authorized pursuant to this directive without the
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13239
consent of such department or agency, shall be afforded, prior to such transfer
or release, a fair opportunity to present to the Civil Service Commission evidence
as to the ej;tent to which such agency's or department's execution of its respon-
sibilities will be jeopardized by the loss of such employee and as to the extent to
which the employee's skills, abilities, training, and experience are being and will
be utilized in such department or agency.
VI. Any employee whose transfer is to be directed pursuant to this directive
without the consent of such employee shall be afforded, prior to such transfer, a
fair opportunity to present to the Civil Service Commission evidence that the
proposed transfer is inequitable or will impose upon him an undue hardship.
No employee shall, without his consent, be transferred to a position at a lower
salary than he received at the time such transfer is directed, nor shall any em-
ploj'ee, without his consent be transferred to a position beyond reasonable com-
muting distance from his home unless the department or agency concerned shall
reimburse the employee for the cost of transporting himself, his immediate
family, and his household goods, in accordance with Government regulations.
Vli. Whenever the filling of any positions by promotion from within for an
indefinite period is being considered by any department or agency, employees who
have been transferred or released pursuant to this directive and are entitled to
reemployment in such department or agency under this directive shall be given
the same consideration they would have received had they not been transferred
or released, and such employees may be selected for such promotion. In the
event of such selection, if such emploj'ee is not authorized to return to the position
to which promotion was made, the position in question shall be filled only for the
duration of such employee's reemployment rights under paragraph IV of this
directive and such reemployment rights shall be applicable to the position to
which promotion was made.
VIII. No request for the transfer or release of any civilian employee in any
department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall
be made by another such department or agency except through the Civil Service
Commission, and no civilian employee of any such department or agency shall be
released for transfer to another such department or agency except upon request
of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission shall not request or authorize
the transfer of any such employee who can make a more effective contribution
to the war effort in the position in which he is currently employed or whose
transfer would be contrary to the most effective methods of filling the Federal
Government's requirements for manpower in the civilian service or would conflict
with policies or directives of the War Manpower Commission.
IX. The Civil Service Commission is authorized and directed to adopt such
measures and take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this directive and to insure that the reemployment provisions set
forth in paragraph IV of this directive are given full force and effect.
X. This directive shall become effective on and after September 27, 1942.
XI. This directive may be cited as the "Directive With Respect to the Trans-
fer and Release of Government Employees."
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
September 14, 1942.
Directive No. XI
To all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment, concerning requests for the occupational deferment of their officers or
emploj'ees.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission, that the measures hereinafter set forth will promote an
equitable and uniform application to employees of the Federal Government of
the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended,
facilitate the filling of the Federal Government's requirements for manpower
in the civilian service, and promote the effective mobilization and maximum
utilization of the Nation's manpower, it is hereby directed:
60396— 42— pt. 34 13
13240 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
I. Not later than ten days after the publication of this directive in the Federal
Register, each department and agency of the executive branch of the Federal
Government shall have prepared and submitted to the Civil Service Commission,
and shall thereafter keep current, information, hereinafter referred to as the
department's or agency's list of key positions, with respect to each position,
directly concerned with the war effort or with essential supporting activities,
in such department or agency, the adequate performance of the duties of which
requires, (a) special skills or abilities and (b) a considerable period of training or
experience. Such list of key positions shall include with respect to each such
position, a description of the skills, abilities, training or experience required and
a description of the relation of the position to the war effort or essential supporting
activities.
II. On the basis of the information so submitted, the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission will designate those positions which shall be eliminated
from each department's or agency's list of key positions. In irxaking such desig-
nations, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission will base his determina-
tion with respect to each position (a) on the relation of such position to the war
effort or to essential supporting activities, (b) on the skills, abilities, training or
experience required for the adequate performance of the functions and duties of
such position, and (c) on the ability of the department or agency concerned to
secure from Government or non-Government sources, a replacement for such posi-
tion, consistently with such policies and directives as the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission may have prescribed. The Chairman of the War Man-
power Commission will promptly inform the appropriate department or agency
of such designations, and will thereafter from time to time make, and notify the
appropriate department or agency of, such new designations or revisions in former
designations as changing circumstances may require.
III. On and after the twentieth day after the publication of this directive in
the Federal Register, no department or agency of the executive branch of the
Federal Government shall directly or indirectly request the occupational defer-
ment, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, of any
officer or employee of such department or agency, unless such request conforms
with the following principles and procedures:
(o) Each such request shall be made only by the head of the appropriate
department or agency, or by the person or persons designated by such
head to take such action ;
(b) Ea-ch such request shall be made on the form or forms prescribed by the
Director of Selective Service;
(c) No such initial request for a Class II classification on occupational
grounds shall be made unless the head of the appropriate department
or agency or the person or persons designated by him to take such
action shall certify that:
(i) The officer or employee possesses special skills or abilities, abso-
lutely essential to the performance of his duties, which skills or
abilities have been acquired as a result of a considerable
period of training or experience;
and
(ii) The officer or employee is employed in a position which is in-
cluded in the department's or agency's list of key positions
as currently revised pursuant to paragraph II of this directive,
or though he is not employed in such a position, the officer
or employee is engaged in an activity which is directly con-
cerned with the war effort or with essential supporting activi-
ties and occupies such an extraordinary and unique relation-
ship to the conduct of that activity that the head of his
department or agency and the Chairman of the War Man-
power Commission have determined that his separation from
the activity would seriously impair, over a substantial period
of time, the effective functioning of that activity.
(d) No such request for an additional occupational deferment beyond the
initial period of six months shall be made unless the head of the
department or agency, or the person or persons designated by such
head to take such action shall, in addition to certifjing to the matters
prescribed under subparagraph (c) hereof, also certify that:
(i) The department or agency concerned and the Civil Service
Commission have determined that any effort to recruit a
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13241
replacement would be in conflict with the policies and
directives of the Chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission, or
(ii) Vigorous efforts have been made, subject to the policies and
directives of the Chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission, by the department or agency concerned and by the
Civil Service Commission to secure a replacement and
such efforts have been unavailing, or
(iii) A replacement has been secured but a further period of train-
ing is required before the trainee will be qualified to assume
the responsibilities of the position, or
(iv) The head of the department or agency and the Chairman of
the War Manpower Commission have determined that the
officer or employee is engaged in an activity which is
directly concerned with the war effort or with essential
supporting activities and occupies such an extraordinary
and unique relationshi]) to the conduct ot that activity
that his separation from the activity would seriously im-
pair, over a substantial period of time, the effective func-
tioning of that activity.
IV. If, pursuant to the requirements of the War Department or the Navy
Department with respect to the voluntary enlistment in the armed forces by, or
the offer or award of commissions in the armed forces to, civilian officers or em-
ployees of the executive branch of the Federal Government, any such officer or
employee presents to the head of his department or agency a request for a release
in order to so enlist or to secure such a commission, such release shall
be denied if the head ot .such department or agency determines that he would
have requested the occupational deferment of such officer or employee under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, pursuant to the pro-
visions of paragraph III (c) of this directive, unless the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission determines that the services tor which such officer or
employee is sought by the armed forces will constitute a more effective contribu-
tion to the war effort than the services performed by the individual in his position
in such department or agency. In the event of such denial, the head of the de-
partment or agency shall at the same time certify to the officer's or employee's
appropriate Selective Service local board that he had refused to issue to such
officer or employee a release which would have enabled him to enlist in or accept
a commission in the armed forces of the Nation, including therein a statement_of
the reasons for such refusal.
V. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission will exempt from the
provisions ot this directive, any civilian activity of a department or agency of the
executive branch of the Federal Government which he finds (a) is substantially
identical to an industrial enterprise and (b) has established and is maintaining
policies and procedures with respect to the occupational deferment, under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, of officers or employees
engaged therein, which are consistent with the policies and directives of the Chair-
man of the War Manpower Commission.
VI. Each department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment seeking a determination by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commis-
sion pursuant to paragraph III, IV or V hereof shall submit its request therefor,
together with such information in connection therewith as it may deem pertinent,
to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall submit its
recommendations with respect to such requests and with respect to each depart-
ment's or agency's list of key positions submitted pursuant to paragraph I hereof,
to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.
VII. The Director of Selective Service shall take such actions as may be neces-
sary or ^appropriate to acquaint all local boards and boards of appeal in the
Selective Service System with the provisions of this directive.
VIII. This directive may be cited as the "Directive With Respect to Requests
for the Occupational Deferment of Federal Employees."
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
REPTEMBEn 24, 1942.
13242 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Directive No. XII
To all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment, concerning the classifications of field positions in the Federal service.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No'. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War
Manpower Commission, that the measures hereinafter set forth will facilitate the
filling of the Federal Government's requirements for manpower in the civilian
service, effectuate the administration of Executive Order No. 9243 and War
Manpower Commission Directive No. X, and promote the effective utilization of
the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed:
I. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall have reason to believe that the
classification of any civilian positions in the field services of an executive depart-
ment or agency which are subject to the schedule of grades and salaries prescribed
by the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, are such as to result in (a) material
interference with the effective administration of Executive Order No. 9243 and
War Manpower Commission Directive No. X, or (b) undesirable competition for
employees among such departments or agencies, or (c) an impediment to the
effective utilization of the Nation's manpower in the war effort, it shall make a
fact-finding survey of the positions concerned or such other study as it deems
necessary, and shall, after consultation with the affected department or agency,
prepare and promulgate standards for the proper classification of such positions
in accordance with the schedule of grades and salaries prescribed by the Classifica-
tion Act of 1923, as amended. Any such fact-finding survey or study may be
made at the request of or in cooperation with an affected department or agency.
II. Upon receipt of such standards, each department and agency, having field
positions affected thereby, shall classify such positions in accordance with such
standards and report its classifications to the Civil Service Commission, together
with such additional information and in such manner and form as the Civil
Service Commission may prescribe.
III. The Civil Service Commission shall make such audits as may be necessary
to determine the extent of adherence to standards prescribed pursuant to para-
graph I hereof, and shall report its findings with respect to variations therefrom
to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
IV. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall have reason to believe that
the results described in clause (a), (.b), or (c) of paragraph I hereof are occurring
or are likely to occur with respect to positions in the Federal service for which
wage scales are fixed on a prevailing rate basis, it shall take such action as may
be appropriate to promote such adjustments of such wage rates or other action by
the departments or agencies concerned, as may appear proper or necessary to
effectuate the purjDoses of this directive.
V. The Civil Service Commission is authorized and directed to adopt such
measures and take such action as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this directive.
VI. The Civil Service Commission shall prescribe such rules or regulations as
may be necessary to assure that the incumbent of any position whose rate of pay
will be reduced by reason of any action pursuant to paragraph II hereof is pro-
vided, prior to such reduction, a fair opportunity to present to the Civil Service
Commission, his objections thereto.
VII. This directive may be cited as the "Directive With Respect to Classifica-
tion Standards for Positions in the Field Service of Executive Departments and
Agencies of the Federal Government."
Paul V. McNutt,
Chairman, War Mawpower Commission.
September 24, 1942.
Exhibit 3. — Statistical Data on Manpower
SUBMITTED BY WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
The following statistical information has been assembled in answer to questions
on employment, training, turn-over, labor shortages and discriminations, presented
by the Committee.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13243
I. Employment and Turn-over
Overall summary. — ^Statistics on employment and unemployment from the be-
ginning of the defense program to June 1942 and on anticipated requirements for
manpower to the end of 1943 are presented in Table 1. The assumptions under-
lying the estimate of requirements are set forth in Governor McNutt's testimony.'
It should be noted that the requirements for June 1943 are set at a level some
3,000,000 higher than by the end of 1943. This is due mainly to the seasonality
of operations in agriculture, where employment at the summer peak is from
three to four million higher than .during the slack winter months.
Emj)loyment of women. — Considerable interest attaches to progress made in the
employment of women because the projected expansion in the labor force is
dependent mainly upon an increased use of women as replacement for men
drawn into the armed forces. Summary statistics on employment and unem-
ployment of women are presented in Table 2. Employment of women outside
agriculture had risen in the two-year period ended in June 1942 by 2,000,000, or
over 20 percent, while the number of nonagricultural employees and the self-
emploj^ed increased by only 14 percent (see Table 1). In agriculture the use
of women is naturally subject to pronounced seasonal fluctuations, considerably
sharper than those for men. Nevertheless, the figures in the table clearly in-
dicate an increase of 300,000 to 400,000 in the first two quarters of 1942 as
compared with the corresponding periods in 1941. Unemployment among women
available for and seeking work declined steadily from 2,700,000 at the beginning
of the period to 1,000,000 at the end.
Although the increase in the employment of women was substantial over the
period, a relatively minor share of it was represented among wage earners in
manufacturing industries, the most important sector of the war economy. The
number of women factory wage earners as compared with the total is shown in
Table 3 for the period October 1939- April 1942. Separate figures are presented
for durable goods and nondurable goods industries, because employment in the
latter (including the apparel trades and canning) is subject to wide seasonal
swings. In durable goods the employment of women wage earners increased
from October 1939 to April 1942 by about 140,000, or nearly 42 percent; this
rise was smaller than in total employment which increased 52 percent. To avoid
distortion by seasonal factors, the gains in nondurable goods must be measured
either from October 1939 to October 1941, with an increase in the employment of
women of some 125,000, or from April 1941 to April 1942, with an increase of a
little more than 100,000. On either basis the relative rise in the employment
of women in nondurable goods factories was approximately 6 percent, about' the
same as the increase in total employment in these industries. In manufacturing
as a whole then tliere were about )■{ million more women wage earners at the end
of the period than at the beginning.
Employment of Negroes. — Interest in the employment of Negroes is second only
to that in the employment of women. If the large drain on manpower necessi-
tated by the expansion of the war economy is to be met, fullest possible use
must be made of all human resources and hiring specifications which have the
effect of discriminating against Negroes or other minority groups must be set
aside. The latest available data on the employment of Negroes are presented
in Table 4 based mainly upon the survey carried out by the Bureau of Employ-
ment Security in May 1942. This survey, one of the series of regular bimonthly
surveys designed to measure anticipated labor requirements against current
employment, is in the nature of the case limited mainly to the larger plants in
industries contributing significantly to the war effort. As the table shows, it
covered only 44 percent of the total employment in the industries listed in the
table. In the plants surveyed nearly 460,000, or a little over 5 percent of the
total number of employees, were classified as nonwhites. It is estimated that
approximately 95 percent of this group are Negroes.
Progress made since the beginning of the defense program cannot be measured
by the figures in Table 4, because no data are available which show the employ-
ment of Negroes by industry for May 1940 or a comparable date. However, in
the more important war industries definite progress has been achieved. Whereas
two years ago there were practically no Negroes employed in the aircraft industry,
at present most of the leading aircraft firms, in their plants outside the South,
hire colored workers in both unskilled and production capacities. There has
been a steady increase in the number of Negroes hired in shiobuilding and there
13244 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
is growing acceptance of colored workers in ordnance. In the latter industry
many Negroes are being introduced into production work.
More specific data on the efforts to eliminate discrimination are shown in the
appended report indicating the latest figures on Negro employment in firms and
membership in unions cited before the the President's Committee on Fair
Employment Practice. ^
Concentration of war employment. — Information on concentration of employ-
ment under the control of large corporations is difficult to obtain because employ-
ment statistics are generally maintained on the basis of industry or the nature of
product made rather than by type of ownership. However, a special compila-
tion prepared from reports submitted by plants in metal-product manufacturing
industries for June 1942 indicates that wage earners, in 631 plants of 94 largest
war contractors accounted for 60 percent of the total number of wage earners
reported for these industries. For 374 plants of 88 largest war contractors infor-
mation was also furnished on the scheduled employment of wage earners at peak;
the scheduled increase from June 1942 to peak was about 86 percent. It should
be noted that these figures are not complete since the reports did not cover plants
with 20 wage earners or fewer and plants engaged in the production of machine
tools, Government-owned ordnance plants, and the primary smelting, refining,
rolling and drawing industries in the iron and steel and nonferrous groups. Also,
within these limits reporting was not complete; for example, information should
have been furnished for 711 plants by the 94 contractors whereas only 631 plant
reports were actually received. Despite the incompleteness of the basic data,
it is believed that the percentages cited above are approximately correct.
Local labor markets. — The manpower problem is not as yet a problem of over-
all labor shortage, but mainly one of deficits in particular industries or crafts and
in specific localities. The analysis by the Bureau of Employment Security as of
July 1942 shows that shortages of male labor for use in industry existed in 35
labor market areas and that shortages could be anticipated in an additional 81
areas. The 35 areas of present shortage are listed in Table 5. Wherever possible
the local labor supply in each area and the amount of in-migration that will be
necessary to fill the estimated demand are listed. The extent to which full use
of the local labor reserve would modify the number of in-migrants needed is indi-
cated in some cases.
It is not possible to estimate the total amount of in-migration to be expected
in labor shortage areas on the basis of these data, since they represent only the
difference between estimated supply and war industry demand in each area and
take no account of the effect of competing demands from other areas.
Turn-over. — The problem of locating, training and placing in the right jobs
people needed for an expansion of production is complicated by turn-over, as a
result of which it is always necessary to have more than 100 people to keep 100
jobs continuously staffed. Monthly turn-over rates for representative establish-
ments in 135 manufacturing industries for the period beginning January 1941 are
presented in Table 6. The most important of the components of turn-over are
undoubtedly the quits and miscellaneous separations. Accessions include replace-
ments for the workers separated from the pay roll and additions needed to increase
production. For present purposes the figure on accessions is important only to
the extent that it is inflated by replacements for avoidable separations. Lay-offs
represent mainly the separation of employees from the pay roll because of the sea-
sonal or other contraction in the activity of the establishment, and discharges,
confined to dismissal of unsuitable workers, are numerically insignificant.
From the beginning of 1941, the quit rate has shown a pronounced tendency to
rise, and in the first half of 1942 was about 80 percent above the level of the corre-
sponding month of 1941. This phenomenon is the usual accompaniment of a
rising labor market with its increased opportunities for better paying and other-
wise better situated jobs. Thus in the first half of 1937 at the height of the most
recent period of predefense prosperity, the quit rate was 88 percent greater than
in the first half of the worst depression year 1932. Nevertheless, the quit rate
at present is considerably above the levels attained at any tune since January
1930, when systematic compilation of turn-over data was begun by the Department
of labor.
Miscellaneous separations, though only one-fourth as numerous as quits, have
also increased steadily since the beginning of 1941, with the relative rise being
larger than for quits. This, however, is traceable entirely to the expansion in
1 See p. 13252.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13245
the armed forces; separations immediately preceding military enlistment or induc-
tion are included in the miscellaneous category together with separations due to
death, permanent disability, retirement on pension, etc.
Special interest attaches to quits in war industries. Data for selected indus-
tries of this type for the period from 1939 to date are presented in Table 7. Some
of these industries were affected by the foreign orders as early as 1939 and by
defense preparations for this country in 1940. A very marked increase in the
quit rate over the preceding vear is shown for several of them in 1940 and for all
but aircraft in 1941. During that year, the rate of quits in some of the most
important war industries such as shipbuilding, aircraft, and copper snaelting was
greatly in excess of the average for manufacturing. The increase in quits in 1942,
while substantial for all but one of these industries, was not as large as for man-
facturing as a whole. However, the shipyards, where the rise in quits exceeded
80 percent, present an important exception.
Reasons for high quit rates. — In an inquiry mailed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics to plants with higher than average turn-over and quit rates during the
spring months of 1942, the management was requested to comment on the reason
for their situation. They were asked specifically to what extent inadequacies in
local transportation or housing were responsible, or whether other factors were
causing the excessive rates. Replies giving one or more specific reasons were
received from 50 establishments distributed as follows among ten industries:
Shipbuilding 12
Electrical machinery 11
Brass, bronze and copper products '
Machine tools 6
Aircraft ^
Aluminum 2
Foundries 2
Boots and shoes 2
Leather 1
Miscellaneous rubber goods 1
The most common reason for high quit rates is the workers' desire to secure
higher wages elsewhere, the reports indicate. Twenty-six out of the 50 replies
received gave better wages in other private or Government establishments as a.
reason for quitting. Inadequate local housing impelled employees to quit their
jobs in 13 plants, and in 10 plants, poor transportation facilities. Eight reports
mentioned the fact that for one reason or another, work was irregular or seasonal
and that the quit rate was high because employees left to obtain steadier work;
4 of the 12 shipbuilding firms gave this reason.
Only one firm mentioned pirating of its workers by other plants and this was
not a specific complaint.
The number of firms reporting specified reasons for high quit rates was as
follows :
Higher wages elsewhere 26
Inadequate local housing 13
Inadequate local transportation 10
Irregular and insufficient work 8
Enlistment in armed forces 6
Dislike of work 6
Better jobs for trainees elsewhere 6
Restlessness of youth . 3
Desire for draft-exempt job 2
Return to farm 2
Pirating 1
13246 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
II. Training
Vocational training. — Under the auspices of the United States Office of Educa-
tion, training for war production workers at the vocational school level has been
in progress since July 1940. During a period of two years, over 1,500,000 persons
have been enrolled in courses preparatory to war employment and nearly 1,360,000
in courses supplementary to employment, designed to make possible upgrading
(Table 8). New enrollments in pre-employment courses increased 60 percent in
the first six months of 1942 over the last six months of 1941. In supplementary
courses, the increase was considerably smaller^under 20 percent.
Relatively few women have enrolled in vocational school courses until recently.
Over the two-year period, only 8 percent of the enrollees in pre-employment classes
have been women, and only 2 percent of the supplementary trainees. However,
after Pearl Harbor, the number increased markedly and in June, women con-
stituted almost 20 percent of the pre-employment trainees; in supplementary
courses they were still only 5 percent of the total active enrollment.
Negroes have played an even smaller part than women in the vocational
school training program, chiefly because in general the local schools were required
to train for local needs, and in most areas Negroes have been unacceptable to local
employers. Only 5 percent of the pre-employment trainees have been Negroes
and 2 percent of the supplementary trainees. In the first six months of this
year, the number of Negro pre-employment trainees increased substantially, but
the number in supplementary courses dropped. . At the end of June, some 11,500
Negroes were enrolled in pre-employment classes, and less than 2,700 in supple-
mentary classes.
In addition to the regular vocational school courses, the Office of Education has
also provided training in simple mechanical and machine operations for out-of
school youth, chiefly in rural areas. Over 530,000 have enrolled in such classes
since December 1940. Less than 1 percent were females, and 17 percent were
Negroes.
Technical training at the college level is provided under the engineering-science-
management program of the Office of Education. Almost half a million persons
have enrolled in these courses of whom 36,000 were women and 3,800 Negroes.
The National Youth Administration also furnishes war production training for
out-of-school youth in its defense work program. During the first six months of
the fiscal year 1941-42, 208,000 different youth were employed on this program,
and in the second six months, 233,000 (Table 9). Approximately 20 percent of
these were girls, and 13 percent Negroes. Some of these workers also received
related training in the vocational school classes, and are included in the statistics
for enrollees in the pre-employment courses.
On-job training. — On-the-job training programs provided or sponsored by public
agencies include the in-plant-pre-employment program of the Work Projects
Administration and the training of civilians in the establishments of the War
and Navy Departments. The Work Projects Administration has paid the
wages of approximately 8,000 workers while they have received training in war
production plants. According to the latest available figures, the War Department
had on its pay roll 27,000 full-time trainees and the Navy Department 19,000,
learning the skills required for war production. In addition, the Navy Depart-
ment was giving less than full-time training to 39,000 persons. Compilation of
similar figures on other trainees is not yet complete for the War Department
establishments.
Private industry is also conducting on-the-job training which varies from the
usual instruction given by foremen to full apprenticeship programs. No data are
available on the number of persons receiving such training except in the case of
apprentices who were estimated to approximate 170,000 in June 1942.
NATIONAL DEFENSE JVOGRATION
13247
Table 1 — Estimates of employment and man-power requirements June 1940-
December 1943
[In millions of persons]
Total labor force...
.\rmecl forces
Nonasricultural employees
Manufacturing
Mining
Construction (contracf)
Transportation and public utilities..
Trade
Finance, service and miscellaneous..
Government
Self-employed (excepting agriculture) and
tic service
Agriculture
Unemployed
Estimated employment
Anticipated require-
ments
57.9
1.7
34.5
12.8
2!o
3.3
6.9
3.8
36.7
14.3
1.0
2.0
3.5
6.6
4.3
5.0
5.1
11.5
2.8
65.4
7.3
39.6
17.8
1.0
1.7
3.6
5.9
4.0
5.6
5.2
11.5
recem-
l:erl943
62.5
9.0
39.6
18.6
1.0
1.0
3.7
5.5
4.0
5.8
5.0
7.9
1.0
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Employment Security of the Social Security
Board.
Table 2.— Employment and unemployment of women, 14 years of age and over,
average by quarter, July 1940~June 1942
[In millions]
July-September..-.
October-December.
January-March
April-June.
July-September
October-December-
January-March.
April-June
Outside
agricu-
ture
9.9
10.1
10.0
10.2
10.8
11.7
In agri-
culture
Unemploy-
ment
Total in
labor
force
13.7
12.8
12.3
13.2
14.0
13.8
13.7
14.4
Source: Averaged from monthly figures released by Current Surveys Section, Bureau of the Census.
Table 3.— Total wage earners and women wage earners in durable- and nondurable-'
goods rnanufaduring industries, October 19S9-April 1942
[In thousands]
Period
Durable goods indus-
tries I
Nondurable goods in-
dustries '
Total
Women
Total
Women
3, 800. 5
4,343.9
4,917.2
5, 546. 0
5, 771. 8
329.0
351.5
403.7
453.1
471.0
4, 877. 9
4, 638. 4
4, 760. 4
5, 144. 0
4, 972. 7
1, 906. 5
^(UC.■ Ortnher
1, 798. 6
1941:
j^pril . .
1,797.5
2,03L4
1,909.0
1 Durable goods industries include the iron and steel, nonferrous metal, electrical and other machinery,
automotive and other transportation equipment, lumber and wood products, and the stone, clay and gia^
groups The nondurable goods industries include the food products, tobacco products, textiles and apparel,
rubber products, leather and leather products, paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, petro-
leum and coal products, and the miscellaneous groups.
Source: Census of Manufactures for October 1939, and U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for October 1949
and subsequent months.
13248
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Table 4. — Total employment in selected industries and total employment and
employment of nonwhites in selected plants, May 194^
[In thousands]
Total-. ---
Mining:
Metal mining
Bituminous and other soft coal mining
Nonmetallic mining and quarrying
Contract construction
Manufacturing:
Food and kindred products
Tobacco manufactures
Textiles and apparel
Lumber and lumber basic products
Fin-niture and finished lumber products
Paper and products, and printing and publishing. .
Chemicals and products of petroleum and coal
Rubber products
Leather and leather products..
Stone, clay and glass products
Iron and steel and their products (including ord-
nance and accessories)'
Transportation equipment (excepting automobiles) '
Nonferrous metals and their products
' Electrical machinery
Machinery (excepting electrical)
Automobiles and automobile equipment
M iscellaneous
Transportation, communication and utilities:
Interstate railroads ...--
Trucking and warehousing
Other transportation
Communication: telephone, telegraph and related
services —
Utilities: electric and gas
Total em-
ployment '
20, 033.
131.9
458.2
92.8
1,909.3
1, 313. 7
103.6
2, 386. 5
553.9
439.0
845^5
170.8
421.2
428.4
1,781.6
1, 440. 5
430.7
654.1
1, 205. 0
487.7
477.6
1, 403. 4
454.6
500.7
472.0
417.9
Employment in plants surveyed
52.4
8.7
540.2
123.6
12.8
468. 9
46.5
91.4
112.3
431.6
166.2
94.8
102.2
2, 234. 1
1, 506. 3
314.2
581.1
900.9
181.7
221.8
36.8
109.9
276.1
0.4
5.-6
1.3
99.6
10.4
6.8
14.4
14.4
5.1
2.3
26.6
3.5
1.3
135.6
51.8
25.1
4.9
21.1
3.0
2.0
2.1
4.1
11.0
1.2
1.4
Percent of
Total
0.6
10.7
14.8
18.4
8.4
53.6
3.1
5.8
3.7
3.9
4.8
2.7
1 The definition of industry for the total employment column is not strictly the same as for the employ-
ment figures given for selected plants. Moreover, the selected plants include Government-operated estab-
lishments, the employment figures for which are excluded from the column headed "Total employment".
This accounts for the fact that for the iron and steel and transportation equipment manufacturing groups
the employment in selected plants exceeds the total equipment for the industry.
Source: Total employment estimated by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on employment
in selected plants are from the bimonthly survey of employment and anticipated requirements by the
Bureau of Employment Security for May 1942.
Table 5. — Estimated supply of labor and estimated in-migration required in labor-
market areas with shortage of general male labor — -Jidy 1942 i
War industries
Estimated local labor supply
Estimated in-migration
needed to fill demand
Alabama:
Childersburg.
California:
Los Angeles.
Sacramento..
San Diego...
Connecticut:
Bridgeport...
Ammunition.
Shipbuilding, air-
Aircraft...
Air depot.
Aii'craft--.
Aircraft, machine
tools, ordnance,
communication
equipment.
Almost no workers available
June 1942.
Local supply qualified for
demand exhausted June
1942; women and Negroes
potentially available.
Information not available...
....do
Labor supply exhausted
July 1942.
About 11,900 available July
1942-July 1943, including
6,000 women in labor re-
serve.
2,300 by January 1943. Must,
move in or commute beyond
40 miles.
7,000 in-migrants by August
1943 unless local Negroes-
hired.
Information not available.
Do.
Minimum
mated a
July 1943,
in-migration esti-
; about 9,000 by
1 Estimates of supply and necessary in-migration take account of use of reserves of women and transfers
from nonwar industries on the one hand, and withdrawals for armed services, on the other.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
13249
Table 5.— Estimated supply of labor and estimated in-migration required in labor-
market areas with shortage of general male labor— July ^9^^— Continued
Connecticut:
Hartford.
New London..
District of Colum-
Illinois: Rockford-
Bcloit.
Indiana:
Indianapolis.
LaPorte-Michi-
gan City.
Iowa:
Burlington
Quad Cities, Il-
linois and Iowa.
Maine:
Bath.
Maryland:
Baltimore.
Elkton-Perry-
ville.
Mississippi: Pasca-
goula.
New Hampshire:
Portsmouth
Springfield-
Claremont.
New York:
Buflalo
North Carolina:
Wilmington.
Ohio: Ravenna-
Warren.
Oregon: Portland..
Pennsylvania:
Berwick
Harrisburg.
South Carolina:
Charleston.
War industries
Aircraft engines,
firearms, machine
tools.
Boat building and
machinery.
Federal Government.
Machine tools, tank
parts.
Air engines and
parts, bomb
sights, fire control.
Gun carriages, am-
munition.
Ordnance.
...-do
Shipbuilding.
....do
Aircraft, shipbuild-
ing.
Explosives.. -
Shipbuilding.
Shipbuilding, ma-
chine tools.
Aircraft, iron and
steel.
Metal work.
Shipbuilding.
Ordnance, steel
Shipbuilding, air-
craft, iron and
steel.
Tanks.
Airbase, ordnance..
Shipbuilding.
Estimated local labor supply
7,300 plus 9,000 women in
labor reserve. July 1942-13.
930 males available. May
1942-43.
43,000 available May 1942....
8,000 available July 1942-43-
35,000 available July 1942 to
end of 1943.
700 available July 1942-43.
Information not available...
10,000 available July 1942-43.
300 workers available July
1942.
About 1,500 available July
1942 and 3,500 transferable
from n on war industries
within commuting dis-
tance.
22,000 available September
1942-August 1943.
200 available August 1942...
6,000 available June 1942-.. .
1,500 available June 1942.
750 available July 1942.
47,000 available July 1942-43
4,500 available July 1942-
August 1943.
5,900 available July 1942-
August 1943.
Virtually no supply avail-
able other than recent in-
migrants. July 1942.
6,000 available July 1942-43.
Labor supply exhausted
July 1942.
Information not available . . .
5,000 available July 1942;
2,000 additional with
school graduates.
4,000 available July 1942
Estimated in-migration
needed to fill '
18,000-19,000 in-migrants
needed by July 1943 even if
all potential reserve of wom-
en used.
5,000 in-migrants needed by
July 1943.
55,000 in-migrants by Decem-
ber 1942.
In-migration probably not
necessary if local supply and
potential reserves are fully
utilized.
6,800 in-migrants by end of
1943.
Necessary in-migration may
approximate 6,000.
Information not available.
In-migration probably not
necessary if employers use
women to fullest extent.
Minimum of 1,000 in-migrants
■by January 1943.
6,500 in-migrants by October
1942.
Over 34,000 in-migrants by
August 1943 assuming full
use of potential supply.
5,000 in-migrants by June 1943.
2,500 in-migrants by June 1943.
About 2,000 in-migrants by
June 1943. In-migration
may reach 4,000 if commut-
ing becomes impossible.
1,000 in-migrants by July 1943.
Minimum in-migration of 6,000
if potential reserve of 42,000
women is used.
About 2,100 in-migrants
quired by August 1943, as-
suming use of 5,100 women
and 2,500 transfers from non-
war industries.
1,600 male workers by Augusi
1943 unless women are used
to greater extent by alum
inum companies.
9,000 in-migrants by May 1943
3,500 in-migrants by July 1943,
55,000-75,000 in-migrants by
spring of 1943.
Information not available.
3,500 in-migrants by mid-1943.
12,500 in-migrants by January
1944 unless local ^"
trained and used'
13250
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Table 5.~ Estimated supply of labor and estimated in-migration required in labor-
market areas loith shortage of general male labor — Jidy 1942 — Continued
Area
M'ar industries
Estimated local labor .<!upply
Estimated in-miaration
needed to fill demand
Texas: Beaumont-
Fort Arthur.
Utah:
Ogden
ShipbuOding-_
Ordnance depot
Ordnance, radio
tubes.
6,850 workers available of
whom 4,850 are men, July
1942.
None available except 600
housewives, June 1942.
2,500 men, July 1942, 5,000
potential women workers.
9,000 in-m igrants will be needed
by July 194.3 if employer
specifications remain un-
changed. Increased utiliza-
tion of women would serve
to reduce necessary iri-migra-
tion to 7,000.
18,000 in-miprants bv June
Salt Lake City.
1943, but housing is non-
existent.
3,000 to 5,000 depending on the
number of women workers
hired.
40,000 in-migrants by unknown
peak date, including 3,000-
4,000 Negro men.
Virginia: Hampton
Roads.
Shipbuilding, mili-
tary establish-
ments.
4,600 available July 1942
Washington :
Seattle.
Shipbuilding, air-
craft.
Local supply exhausted
February 1942.
At least 48,000 by January 1943.
Source: Local labor market reports and statements prepared by the Bureau of Employment Security.
Labor shortage areas are designated by the Bureau of Employmert Security by Ecpcrts and Analysis Di-
vision on the basis of employers' statements of labor needs to the USES and recent contract and plant site
actions. Only areas which contain a city of 100, COO or more and those in which there is a known demand
for 5,000 or more war production workers ,are included.
Tablil 6.- — Monthly labor turn-over rates of factory workers in representative
establishments in 135 industries i
Ckss of turn-over
and year
May
Sept.
SEPARATIONS
Quits:
1942 _.
1941
Discharges:
1942
1941
Lay-ofTs: 2
1942
1941
Miscellaneous sep-
arations: 3
1942
1941
Total:
1942
1941
ACCESSIONS
Rehires:
1942.. _
1941...
New hires:
1942. _.
1941...
Total:
1942...
1941...
5.10
3.41
1.41
1.45
3.02
1.70
5.36
3.40
1.18
1.24
5.81
4.38
1.11
L04
7.29
5.95
3.85
2.06
1.02
.36
6.46
3.71
7.13
5.41
8.25
6.31
1.05
1.40
4.96
8.28
6.00
2.81
Mi"
i.'io'
1.75
'"."29"
2.' is'
.52
1.11
4."32"
5."43"
.87
"4.'29
'5."i6
.79
3.I2"
3."9i"
.94
3."S2
■4.'76'
1.02
4.36
5.38
total separations, and
' The various turn-over rates represent the' number of quits, discharges, lay-i
accessions per 100 employees.
2 Including temporary, indeterminate, and permanent lay-oSs.
3 Military separations included.
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
13251
Table 7. — Monthly quit rates of factory wage earners in selected war industries^
1939- July 19 ^
Alu-
minum
Brass,
bronze,
and
copper
products
Electrical
machin-
ery
Engines
and
turbines
Machine
tools
Ship
build-
ing
Average 1939
" 1940.
1941.
1942:
January-.
February
March,,.
April
May
June
July,
1.15
2.24
2.51
2.82
2.68
3.70
3.79
4.06
3.60
3.76
.75
1.96
1.32
1.91
3! 14
3.48
3.88
3.51
2.23
2.30
2.45
3.02
3.48
3.41
3.15
3.81
2.05
1.78
1.88
2.34
2.26
2.27
2.36
1.21
1.55
1.72
2.07
1.71
1.50
1.67
.82
1.29
2.01
2.46
2.23
2.75
.3.50
3.17
2.86
3.02
.76
1.17
2.42
.3.25
3.27
4.27
4.29
5.20
5.71
4.67
> Includes miscellaneous separations caused by
' Not available.
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
death, permanent disability, retirement on pensions, etc
Table 8. — Training for war production workers under auspices of U. S. Office of
Education — new enrollment of all trainees, of women, and of Negroes, since inau-
guration of programs
Program
All trainees— new enrollment:
Pre-employment and refresher coui-ses
Supplementary courses
Out-of-school youth courses' _.,
Engineering -.science-management courses '.
Women— new enrollment:
Pre-employment and refresher courses
Supplementary courses
Out-of-sohool youth courses ,,_
Engineering-science-management courses >,
Negroes— new enrollment:
Pre-employment and refresher courses
Supplementary courses
Out-of-school youth courses '
Engineering-science-management courses ',
Total new
enroll-
ments
1, 501. 155
1, 359, 108
531, 505
497, 109
2 119. 573
2 23, 980
3, 564
35, 772
2 69, 477
2 19, 923
July 1940-
June 1941
420, 530
467, 614
254.511
119,293
1,039
770
(?)
34, 716
816
July 1941-
Dec. 1941
409. 369
410, 105
119,618
127, 959
15. 671
2, 168
23!)
18, 625
9, 323
27,211
661
Jan. 1942-
June 1942
671, 256
481, 389
157, 376
249, 857
101,918
20, 209
2. 289
31, 095
30, 488
5,007
29, 553
2,336
Active net
enroll-
ment
June 30,
1942
191, 898
153, 845
34,164
95,566
35, 543
7,647
1,015
12, 992
11,549
2,665
8,986
1,092
' Courses began December 1940.
2 Estimate.
' Not avaOable.
Source: U. S. OiFice of Education.
Table 9. — Other training programs for war production workers
1. Total number of different youths employed in National Youth Administration defense projects, number
of girls, and of Negroes— July 1941-June 1942
Number of different youths
July 1941-
Dec. 1941
Jan. 1942-
June 1942
Employ-
ment, June
1942
Total
208. 000
40. 700
26,800
233, 000
55, 400
29,000
Girls
29,407
' 13, 837
• Estimate.
Source: National Youth Administration.
13252
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Table 9. — Other training programs for war production workers — Continued
2. Number of in-plant pre-i
iployment trainees employed by Work Projects Administration, July 1940-
June 1942
In-plant
pre-em-
ployment
trainees
July 1941-
Dec. 1941
Jan. 1942-
June 1942
Employ-
ment, June
16, 1942
Total
7,952
2,596
5, 356
1,531
Source: Work Projects Administration.
3. Number of full-time trainees employed by War and Navy Departments
Type of trainee
War Depart-
ment
Navy Depart-
ment
Total -
27, 210
19, 310
1 2 25, 965
3 1, 504
Helper trainees - -
3 6, 114
3 1, 245
5 11,692
1 Includes other types of full-time trainees.
2 July 1, 1942.
3 March 1942.
Source: U. S. Civil Service Commission.
4. Estimated number of other civilian trainees in Navy Department— March 1942
Trainees in trades and occupation --
Professional, technical, scientific, managerial and clerical workers -
35,000
4,000
Source: U. S. Civil Service Commission.
5. Estimated number of apprentices, excluding War and Navy Department apprentices, June 1942. 172, 000
Source: Estimated by O. L. Harvey, Apprentice-Training Service, Federal Security Administration.
Report on Negro Employment in Firms and Membership in Unions Cited
Before the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice
According to our most recent information, the following is a rdsum^ of Negro
employment in certain firms cited before the President's Committee on Fair
Employment Practice:
BuiCK Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Melrose Park, Illinois:
Total Negro employment 350"! As of July
Negro production workers -- 50-75/ 1942.
Stewart Warner Corporation, Chicago, Illinois:
Total Negro employment 441 As of July
Semiskilled Negro workers 11/ 1942.
Majestic Radio & Television Corporation, Chicago, Illinois:
At the present time the plant is almost completely shut
down due to a lack of vital materials. It expects to
go back into partial production in October. There
are only 33 workers employed, of whom none are
Negroes.
Studebaker Corporation, Chicago, Illinois:
J-'^Mf'/Tfi^'" employment 188^^ of Aug.
Skilled Negroes 10 ^^ jg^g.^
Semiskilled Negroes 78J
AiiLis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, West Allis, Wisconsin:
Total Negro employment 1291 .<, ^f Tnlv
Skilled Negroes - ^f 1942
Semiskilled Negroes _ — 14j
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13253
Harnischfeger Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: C^^ ^^ j^2
Total Negro employment 0| 1942.
Heil Manufacturing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin:
Total Negro employment (apparently all in unskilled j-^^g ^^ j^^j
work) 140| 1942.
NoRDBERG Manufacturing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin:
Total Negro employment ^JAsof July
Semiskilled Negroes 5> 1942,
Unskilled Negroes 3J
A. O. Smith Corporation, Milawukee, Wisconsin:
Total Negro employment 237"! ^g ^^ j^^jy.
Skilled Negroes 6> 1942.
Semiskilled Negroes 35j
Sperry Gyroscope Company, New York City:
Total Negro employment 300]
Skilled Negroes lOOl As of Au-
Semiskilled Negroes 150f gust 1942.
Unskilled Negroes 50j
New Sperry Gyroscope Plant, Lake Success, Long Island:
Total Negro employment 60"1 ^^ ^^ ^^^
Skilled Negroes ln\ gnst 1942.
Unskilled Negroes 40J ^
Fairchild Aviation Corporation, New York City:
Total Negro employment 6| ^g^f ^^.
Skilled Negroes_..-. l^^^st 1942.
Semiskilled Negroes oj
Ford Instrument Company, New York City:
Total Negro employment 1101
Skilled Negroes 6l As of Au-
SemiskiUed Negroes 44r gust 1942.
Unskilled Negroes 6OJ
Carl Norden, New York City:
This company presented evidence to the President's Com-
mittee recently that caused the Committee to withdraw their
citation for discrimination.
Julius Kayser Company, New York City:
Total Negro employment 1 "^^"^^1 gust 1942.
Douglas Aircraft — 3 plants: Long Beach, Santa Monica, and El Segundo,
California:
This company has a fine record on the Pacific Coast. Approximately
300 Negroes are used in the administrative, technical, and production de-
partments. In addition, this company issued a forthright statement of
policy with respect to nondiscrimination.
Note. — Report on total employment not ready at this time, but will be
submitted at a later date.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding, Terminal Island, California:
Employment in general has not been very stable at this yard; there has
been a continuous fluctuation. Lay-offs, however, have not affected Negro
workers to the same degree as they have other workers. This results from
the fact that these lay-offs have hit the highly skilled hardest. Our relations
with this company have been good in adjusting any problem that has arisen.
On the whole, employment conditions for Negroes have been favorable.
;Hercules Foundry, Inc., Los Angeles, California:
This company was brought before the President's Committee on Fair
Employment Practice as an example as to how good employment policies
operate in the hiring of minority groups. The same good policies obtain
and Negroes are being given greater opportunity for promotion to skilled
jobs. The company did complain, however, that a large number of Negroes
had quit and gone to other jobs. It is anxious to eliminate this situation
if possible. Employment figures for Negroes show 36 skilled and 19 un-
skilled.
13254 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
North American Aviation, Inc., Inglewood, California:
Only 8 Negroes were employed at the time this Company was cited before
the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice. For the period
ending August 22, 458 Negro workers were employed. Since the company
has hired Negro female workers in production, employment has increased.
Up until several months ago, Negro male workers were confined to custodial
or maintenance jobs. Constant negotiations with the company finally re-
sulted in a change of employment policy, which permitted the use of Negro
women and the upgrading and initial hiring of Negro males for production.
Our relations with the company are harmonious and the policy of non-
discrimination is moving progressively.
Lockheed- Vega Aircraft, Burbank, California:
Combined employment for Lockheed-Vega Company total 602 workers.
Of this total, approximately 50 are women. Company policy with respect to
nondiscrimination has been satisfactory.
Atlas Imperial Diesel Company, Oakland, California:
Higher hourly wage rates and other opportunities at the shipyards have
caused Negro workers to by-pass this company when seeking employment.
Under the circumstances, we have not kept in regular contact with this
company with regard to employment of Negro skilled or other workers.
Poulsen and Nardon, Inc., Los Angeles, California:
Prior to hearings in October, 1941, this company refused to employ Negroes
in any capacity. Since then, it has lived up to its pledge to the President's
Committee. For the past 60 days new hires have been very few at this com-
pany. This has affected expansion of Negro employment. The company's
nondiscrimination policy is operating effectively.
Consolidated Aircraft, San Diego, California:
At the time of the Los Angeles hearings, this company was employing
about 210 Negro workers in custodial jobs. Conferences were held repeatedly
with the management in an effort to have it arrange to fully integrate Negroes
in all capacities. Progress in this direction was slow. It was not until W.
Frank Persons came in as Director of Labor Relations that the situation
began to improve. On or about July 10, procedures were effected for the
up-grading of Negro male and female workers. As a complete deviation
from its former policy of initially hiring these workers only as janitors or
maids, on the basis of previous experience or pre-employment training, they
are now hired for immediate production jobs. The company has apprised
the USES accordingly. Our present figures show 78 Negroes in skilled and
semiskilled capacities and 260 in unskilled. We are now awaiting a letter
from Mr. Persons giving new figures.
VuLTEE Aircraft, Downey, California:
Current employment conditions for Negro workers are completely reversed
from those existing at the time of the Los Angeles hearings. Up until May 8,
the company had not employed a single Negro worker. Since then, 129 have
been hired and on September 3, the company started employing Negro
women. This company is to be commended in that it did not attempt to
place Negroes in custodial jobs as a means of satisfying the requirement of
nondiscrimination; nor has its changed policy toward Negro workers been
representative of "token" hirings. It has employed Negro workers weekly
and the company has also carried out its commitment with respect to using
Negro women.
International Association of Machinists, Local 68, San Francisco, California:
As of September 2, one Negro machinist was working under this Local's
jurisdiction. This worker had been cleared for employment in the Bethle-
hem Shipbuilding Company on February 25.
International Association of Machinists, Local 751, Seattle, Washington:
There is one question that must be faced sooner or later in this union, and
that has to do with the $3.50 monthly permit fee charged Negro workers.
(This refers to the Boeing Aircraft Company.) As of September 3, 1942,
53 Negro workers had been cleared through Local 751 and are working at
Boeing.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13255
SniPYARD Workers Union, Local 802, San Pedro, California:
Wo have experienced considerable difficulty with this union. Negro
workers are not excluded from membership, but there is a definite policy of
limiting this membership. Repeated conferences have been held with officials
of the Laborers' District Council and labor members of the various WPB
committees in the interest of resolving this situation. According to a report
of Mr. James Anderson, Negro representative of the California State Federa-
tion of Labor, it appears that progress has been made. Lately, we have had
no complaints from Negro workers, indicating their inability to clear through
this local. Current information shows that some 500 Negro workers have
been admitted to this union in the past several months or since our last con-
ference with its officials.
Source: Compiled in the oflBce of the Chief, Negro Manpower Service, War Manpower ComnilssioD.
Exhibit 4. — Area Allocation of War Supply Contracts
According to Adequacy of Labor Supply
Report Released by War Manpower Commission, Industrial
AND Agricultural Employment Division
September 1, 1942.
introduction
This report analyzes war supply contracts awarded during May, June and July
and reported to the War Production Board up to July 31, according to the adequacy
of labor supply in the areas in which the contracts were let. This is the second
report on the allocation of war supply contracts. These reports are based upon
studies by the Bureau of Employment Security of areas of labor surplus, prospec-
tive labor shortage and current labor shortage; and upon tabulations by the War
Production Board of contracts issued by the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Com-
mission and the Treasury Department.
CLASSIFICATION OF COMMUNITIES
Communities to which war supply contracts have been allocated have been
classified into three groups.
"Labor surplus" areas are those in which the general supply of unskilled and
semiskilled labor is adequate to meet all known requirements. In these areas,
contractors have the best assurance of a stable and efficient working force large
enough to satisfy their labor requirements.
"Prospective labor shortage" areas are those in which the general supply of
unskilled and semiskilled male labor is sufficient to meet present demands, but
a shortage can be foreseen on the basis of actual contract commitments for war
production and approved projects tor plant construction.
"Current labor shortage" areas are those in which a deficiency of unskilled and
semiskilled labor is already apparent. Such areas face the danger of impeded
production because of difficulty m staffing plants and high turn-over.
The 222 most important labor market areas in the United States are divided
in the following way:
95, or 42.8 percent, are areas of labor surplus.
91, or 41.0 percent, are areas ot prospective labor shortage.
36, or 16.2 percent, are areas of current labor shortage.
DISTRIBUTION OF WAR SUPPLY CONTRACTS
The first report in this series, issued by the Industrial and Agricultural Employ-
ment Division on July 22, analyzed the area distribution of $2,499,963,000 in
recently awarded contracts. These contracts were distributed as follows:
$437,450,000, or 17.5 percent, into areas of labor surplus.
$1,407,394,000, or 56.3 per cent, into areas of prospective labor shortage.
$480,789,000, or 19.2 percent, into areas of current labor shortage.
$174,330,000, or 7.0 percent, into other areas of lesser importance.
60396— 42— pt. 34 14
13256
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
f Since the publication of the first report, additional contracts totalling $4,-
055,629,000 have been analyzed with respect to the labor supply in communities
where thej,work will be done. These contracts were awarded in June and July
and reported to the War Production Board between June 23 and July 31. Con-
tracts for which the location of the work is not definitel}^ known have been omitted
from the tabulations. The total of $4,055,629,000 was distributed in the follow-
ing manner:
$396,470,000, or 9.8 percent, to labor surplus areas.
$2,125,769,000, or 52.4 percent, to prospective labor shortage areas.
$1,355,388,000, or 33.4 percent, to current labor shortage areas.
$178,002,000, or 4.4 percent, to other communities of lesser importance.
For the period covered by both reports (May 1 through July 31), a. total of
$6,555,592,000 in war supply contracts has been analyzed. This total was
distributed as follows:
$833,920,000, or 12.7 percent, to labor surplus areas.
$3,533,165,000, or 53.8 percent, to prospective labor shortage areas.
$1,836,177,000, or 28.1 percent, to current labor shortage areas.
$352,332,000, or 5.4 percent, to other communities of lesser importance.
If a trend is to be found in these data, it is that allocation of contracts to over-
burdened areas was greater in the later period than in the earlier period. While
17.5 percent of contracts in the first period went to areas of adequate labor supply,
less than 10 percent in the second period were so allocated. Correspondingly,
while less than one-fifth of contracts in the first period went to areas of current
acute labor shortage, over one-third in the second period were given to suppliers
in such areas.
CONTRACT AWARDS BY THE RESPECTIVE SERVICES JUNE AND JULY 1942
War supply''contracts herein analyzed are awarded by four agencies: the Army,
the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and the Treasury Department. The Army
awarded approximately 63 percent of the contracts placed in June and July and
reported from June 23 to July 31; the Navy awarded 32 percent and the Maritime
Commission and Treasury Department awarded the remaining 6 percent.
There are significant differences in the area distribution of contracts by these
agencies with respect to the adequacy of labor supply. The dollar volume and
the percentage distribution of contracts awarded by the Army, the Navy, and
the Maritime Commission and Treasury (taken together) are shown below.
Dollar volume of contracts awarded, June and July 19^2
Contracting Agency
Army
Navy
Maritime
Commission
and Treasury
In Labor Surplus Areas
$151,131,000
1, 480, 737, 000
808, 859, 000
92, 098, 000
$222, 463, 000
539, 678, 000
452, 742, 000
69, 965, 000
$22, 876, 000
105, 354, 000
93, 517, 000
In Other Areas
16, 239, 000
Total
2, 532, 825, 000
1, 284, 848, 000
237, 986, 000
Percentage distribution of contracts awarded, June and July 1942
In Labor Surplus Areas
Percent
5.9
58.6
31.9
3.6
Percent
17.3
42.1
35.3
5.3
Percent
9.6
44.2
In Other Areas
6.9
Total - - - -
100.0
100.0
100.0
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13257
CONTRACTS PLACED IN CERTAIN CRITICAL LABOR SHORTAGE AREAS
Labor supply is only one consideration entering into the decision to place a
contract in one community instead of another community. Transportation, raw-
materials, power, vulnerability, speed of delivery, and the availabihty of produc-
tive facilities all must be taken into consideration. Among these factors, the
most significant in limiting the choice of communities is the availability of
facilities.
For many items the range of option in contracting is small. However, there
is a large and important group of contracts where the contracting agency has a
wide choice in selecting the supplier. These contracts are primarily for the
procurement of two types of commodities:
(1) Commodities regularly consumed by the civilian population during peace-
time, such as shoes, clothing, mattresses, towels, furniture, etc.
(2) Articles which can be manufactured through relatively simple processes
(such as stamping or casting) which require no great precision.
By and large, there is no shortage of productive facilities for commodities of
these types. Therefore, it is here that the contracting agencies have the best
opportunity to take labor supply into consideration when awarding contracts. _
A considerable volume of contracts for such items has recently been placed in
communities where shortages of labor, high turn-over, and pressure on housing
and other facilities threaten to impede production and delay dehvery dates. A
special tabulation has been made showing the volume of such contracts awarded
to five critical labor shortage areas.
(1) In May, June and July, contracts aggregating $4,087,389 were placed in
Seattle for the procurement of items such as sleeping bags, comforters, jackets,
auto covers, mattresses and mittens.
By January 1943, at least 50,000 additional workers will be needed in the
Seattle area, primarily for shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture. The housing
shortage makes it questionable whether the tens of thousands of outside workers
needed to fill out this total can be induced to come into the area. A recent re-
port by the United States Employment Service stated: "The textile industry in
Seattle has recently received contract awards in considerable volume and as a
result is now seeking to expand its employment. This situation has complicated
an already existing shortage of skilled textile workers. . . . These firms are un-
able to meet the wage scales of war production plants and have, therefore, ex-
perienced rising turn-over. One company, for example, hired 73 new workers in
the last 60 days, but had 60 quits in the same period."
(2) In Detroit, contracts aggregating $18,471,393 were placed in May, June
and July for commodities such as comforters, tents, gloves, suits, helmets, haver-
sacks and cartridge cups. Detroit must locate about 283,000 workers in order
to meet the peak demands of war production and to replace workers inducted
into the armed forces. Approximately 100,000 in-migrants will aggravate the
already severe housing shortage.
(3) In Los Angeles, contracts for pillow cases, furniture, sleeping bags, mat-
tresses, wiping cloths and similar commodities totaled $16,707,749 in May, June
and July. .
By the spring of 1943, approximately 100,000 new workers will be needed m
the Los Angeles area despite substantial in-migration of workers for the aircraft
and shipbuilding industries during the past few months. The supply of male
workers is virtually exhausted.
(4) Contracts for cotton webbing, ammunition- boxes and other products re-
cently awarded to Bridgeport, Conn., total $2,438,025. Virtually all of the
15,000 new workers required in Bridgeport by July 1943 to produce aircraft,
machine tools, ordnance and communication equipment must be drawn from
the outside. Here also, housing is the chief obstacle to recruiting and retaining
workers.
(5) In Baltimore, contracts amounting to $10,210,282 for commodities such as
cotton duck, tents, trousers, canvas, jackets, pajamas, overcoats and uniforms
were awarded in May, June and July.
Labor supply in Baltimore is inadequate even to replace Selective Service
withdrawals. The deficit of workers will exceed 60,000 by May 1943.
These five are typical of communities which are so crowded with the produc-
tion of primary war materials that they should not be asked to produce com-
modities which might better be manufactured elsewhere.
13258 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Exhibit 5. — Relation of Manpower Mobilization to
Procurement
Letter From John J. Corson, Director, United States Employment Service
Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Washington, D. C.
September 15, 1942.
The Honorable John H. Tolan,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Tolan: I have read the Fifth Interim Report of your Committee
with the greatest interest and find myself in substantial agreement with its anal-
ysis of the problems inherent in mobilizing manpower and in accord with many
of its recommendations. Particularly would I wish to endorse the thesis of the
report that "Any effective program for the mobilization of manpower must be
formulated in the realization that its full utilization cannot be achieved without
coordinating this program with the program of the procurement services."
The U. S. Employment Service has been keenly aware of this problem for
some time. Ever since the beginning of the defense program, we have been
urging the spreading of contracts so as to bring the work to the available idle
workers and plants rather than the reverse. You may not be aware of the fact
that the Employment Service, with precisely this end in view, has been providing
the contracting authorities, for many months, with detailed information on the
availabilitv of labor in the different areas throughout the country. Of course,
the United States Employment Service is in a position merely to provide this
information and to point out, as emphatically as we can, the undesirable effects
of continued concentration of production in areas of labor stringency.
In this connection, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in a
recent press release (August 20) pointed out that only 17.5 percent of the total
dollar volume of war production contracts awarded between May 1 and June
20, had been placed in areas of labor surplus. Nineteen percent, on the other
hand, went to areas where the labor supply was already inadequate to meet
current demands and 56 percent to areas of prospective labor shortage. In
view of the increasing number of areas reported by the Employment Service
as experiencing or anticipating labor shortages, the Chairman concluded that
"much more attention must be paid to the labor supply factor in deciding where
contracts are to be awarded." He added that transfer of civilian production
from labor shortage to labor surplus areas and further subcontracting of war work
will also help to bring about a better balance of manpower and production
requirements.
Your report also emphasizes the importance of studies of plant organization,
plant-wide training, upgrading of workers, dilution of jobs, transfer of workers
from less to more essential work and the development of hiring schedules — all
of which vou point out, quite correctly, are essential to the effective utilization
of the labor supply for total warfare. The United States Employment Service
has actually used each of these recommended measures in an effort to meet the
requirements of war contractors effectively and with the least possible drain on
the scarce suppHes of skilled labor. Far "from assuming that our function was
merely to provide a referral service for the individual worker, the Employment
Service, over a period of years, has developed a comprehensive body of industrial
and of occupational data, and a wide range of job analysis and worker analysis
techniques which are designed to meet the needs of major war production areas
with full regard for Nation-wide labor supply and production factors.
These technical services have been used by many of the largest employers in
the country and by various branches of the armed services. For example, pro-
grams for greater utilization of labor have been developed for the General Electric
Companv, Westinghouse Electric, Radio Corporation of America and other
firms both large and small. These programs have included job analysis, recom-
mendations for the use of workers in related occupations to meet shortages in
various occupations, and the development of aptitude tests and other technical
devices for the more effective selection and use of labor. Similar programs have
been developed for the U. S. Army and Navy, that for the Army Air Force being
especially comprehensive. The United States Employment Service has also been
very much concerned with plant organization and has developed "manning"
tables for various industries, the different kinds of occupations involved, and the
exact number of workers required in each occupation. These materials have
been invaluable to war contractors undertaking the manufacture of a new product
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13259
and are basic in any program of upgrading or transfer of workers from less to more
essential jobs. r . . i. j.
As you point out in vour report, these technical devices for msurmg the most
effective use of our labor could and should be applied generally in war produc-
tion. This can be accomplished through the kind of "plant inspection" program
you recommend. I should like to point out that the United States Employment
Service has presented a carefully developed plant inspection program for con-
sideration, with respect to both the need for such activity and detailed plans for
carrying it out. If funds were made available, we propose that plants in les3
essential as well as war industries be inspected to determine whether such plants
are using workers who could better serve the war effort in war production. We
feel that any such program would necessarily require the information and the
tools which the United States Employment Service has developed and is now
using, to the extent that this has been possible on a purely voluntary and pro-
motional basis. Our experience in this field over a period of many months
indicates that such a program would constitute a natural extension of the present
relationships of the United States Employment Service with employers.
We believe that a program of plant inspection might be of assistance in meeting
another of the problems you raise in your report — discrimination in employ-
ment because of race, color, creed, or national origin. As you know, the poHcy
of the United States Employment Service has been to serve all groups within
the population equally and to make placements of workers on the basis of their
qualifications for the job and that alone. The President's Executive Order No.
8802 was a formal enunciation of a United States Employment Service pohcy
which has obtained since the inception of the Service. In fact, one part of our
continuing program has been to develop techniques for increasing the employ-
ment opportunities of minority groups. It is true that progress has been slow
and sometimes individual staff members of the United States Employment
Service have themselves been guilty of the discrimination which we fight as an
agency. You recognize, I am sure, that discrimination against minority groups
is a long established tradition in many communities and sections of the country.
Members of our staff come from these communities as well as from those holding
quite different views on the question of discrimination! It is perhaps natural,
if not commendable, that staff members should reflect the undesirable attitudes
prevailing in their social group. We have undertaken a vigorous program of
education with our staff but this as yet has not been successful in all cases.
In dealing with a custom so ingrained, it may be necessary to use more than
persuasion to effect a change amiong employers or wprkers or the population
generally. Thus far, the only weapon which the United States Employment
Service has been able to use is persuasion. In certain instances our efforts to
persuade an employer to alter a discriminatory hiring specification have merely
resulted in the employer withdrawing his order entirely and continuing to hire
on the open market on a discriminatory basis. Certainly a program of plant
inspection would help to uncover many cases of discrimination which now con-
tinue unnoticed. It may be also, that the President's Committee on Fair
Employment Practice should be granted powers in dealing with discrimination
similar" to those held by the War Labor Board in dealing with stoppages of work.
In connection with problems of full and effective use of our labor resources,
we recognize that if our efforts in this direction are to be successful we must have
detailed and complete information on the demand for labor, the actual need for
labor, and the available supply in all parts of the country. As a matter of fact,
the United States Emplovment Service has pioneered in the field of obtaining
such data. Shortly after 'the inauguration of th^e defense program, we launched
a program of periodic surveys of labor supply and demand. These surveys
necessarily covered only the 'more critical occupations, but the list has been
revised from time to time as the needs of war production and conditions in the
labor market changed. The development of the most effective tools for analyzing
labor supply and demand is necessarily a slow process but we feel that con-
siderable progress has been made. The information which we have been gather-
ing, granting its shortcomings, has nevertheless been the major source of infor-
mation on the labor market that has been available and it has been extensively
utiUzed by a number of Government agencies, including these concerned with
war production and contracting, housing, health and welfare, transportation
and other problems. We recognize the need for continuously refining these
information gathering tools and are ready to take further steps to make them
more effective instruments in coordmating production and manpower
requirements.
13260 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
There is one further statement in your report on which I should like to comment.
It is stated that placements made by the United States Employment Service in the
first four months of 1942 were only 10 percent over the total for the same period
of 1941. The inference is that the United States Employment Service handles
only a very negligible proportion of war production placements. Elsewhere the
statement is made that the United States Employment Service has "traditionally
served as a referral agency for persons who are unemployed for longer or shorter
times" and has "characteristically worked closely with relief agencies." It is
true that clients of relief agencies and workers on WPA have from time to time
been required to register with the United States Employment Service. More
recently, since 1935, plaimants for unemployment insurance have also been
required to register.
Of course, workers finding jobs through the United States Employment Service
have come from all social and economic groups and it has been our traditional
policy to serve all groups in the community. Since the beginning of the war,
however, the United States Employment Service has gradually changed the
emphasis of its work until now service to war production employers and to workers
with skills needed by war industries takes precedence over all other activities.
Both U. S. Employment Service Operations Bulletin No. B-29 and a War Man-
power Commission Directive instruct employment offices to consider war produc-
tion needs above all else and in the order of their relative importance and indi-
cate in detail how the employment offices are to convert themselves to a full war
footing.
Entirely apart from these instructions, however, the effect of the defense pro-
gram and later the war, has been clearly reflected in the number and character of
our placements during the last two and a half years. An increasingly large pro-
portion of our placements have been of industrial production workers, and of
skilled and technical workers. Moreover, the statement that placements during
the first four months of 1942 were only 10 percent above the same period of 1941,
while true, does not adequately reflect the course of our activities. It overlooks
the fact that the placements in the first four months of 1941 were 52 'percent over
those made in the same period of 1940. The relatively smaller increase in 1942
as compared with 1941 must be understood in terms of this previous very substan-
tial increase and in view of the fact also that displacements as a result of production
and conversion factors were widespread during the first four months of 1942.
The trend of placements made by the United States Employment Service has
been continuously upward, with minor setbacks, since early in 1940. In 1941,
regular placements were j63 percent over the 1940 total; in the first five months
of 1942, they were almost 15"percent above the same period of 1941. Moreover,
in States with large war contracts, placements have increased much more than is
indicated by these national totals.
The above data is presented to the end that you may be apprised of progress
which has been made by the United States Employment Service but not clearly
reflected by statistical material to which you have had access. It was believed
that you would be interested in knowing the steps which have been taken to insure
the full assumption of responsibility by the United States Employment Service
to meet, to the greatest possible extent within its wholly inadequate financial
and staff limitations, the labor needs occasioned by the war program.
Very sincerely yours,
John J. Corson, Director.
national defense migration 13261
Exhibit 6. — Manpower Functions of Civilian Personnel
Division, Services of Supply, War Department
Documents Submitted by Leonard J. Maloney, Chief, Manpower Branch,
Civilian Personnel Division, Service op Supply, War Department,
Washington, D. C.
(A) Organization of Manpower Branch in Its Relation to Civilian
Personnel Division, Services of Supply
July 17, 1942.
Memorandum for all Liaison Officers.
Subject: Administrative Outlines.
1. For information and direction concerning the scope of responsibilities and
duties of the Manpower Branch and its field representatives, the following admin-
istrative outlines are made a part of the Administrative Manual.
a. Organization of the Services of Supply, March 9, 1942. (Circular 59).
b. Chart and organization plan of the Civilian Personnel Division.
c. Organization chart and statements for Manpower Branch and Sections.
(1) Organization chart.
(2) Description of the functions of the Manpower Branch,
(3) Executive offices — Manpower Branch.
(4) Outline of functions. Labor Supply Section.
(5) Outline of functions, Military Requirements Section.
(6) Outline of functions, Pre-Induction Training Section,
(7) Outline of functions, Reports and Analysis Section,
(8) Outline of functions, Liaison Officers.
For the Director, Civihan Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(G. 0. 24)
General Orders\ Headquarters, Services of Supply,
No. 24 J Washington, D. C, July 20, 1942.
Section
Reorganization of the Staff Divisions and Administrative Services, Serv-
ices of Supply I
Announcement of appointments II
I. Reorganization of the Staff Divisions and Administrative Services, Services of
Supply. — Effective July 20, 1942, the following changes in the organization of
the Staff Divisions and Administrative Services, Services of Supply, are directed
(see attached chart), and all previous instructions in conflict herewith are
rescinded:
1. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Resources is
abolished.
2. The following offices are established in the Headquarters, Services of Supply:
Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel.
3. The Office of the Director of Procurement is established in the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel.
4. The following transfers of functions, personnel, records, and equipment are-
directed:
a. To the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations:
(1) Operations Division, redesignated the Plans Division,
(2) Distribution Branch, Procurement and Distribution Division^
redesignated the Distribution Division.
13262 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
b. To the Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel:
(1) Requirements Division.
(2) International Division.
(3) Resources Division.
(4) Production Branch, Procurement and Distribution Division,
redesignated the Production Division.
(5) Purchases Branch, Procurement and Distribution Division,
redesignated the Purchases Division.
c. To the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel:
(1) The Military Personnel Division.
(2) The Civilian Personnel Division.
(3) The Special Service, redesignated the Special Service Division^
II. Announcement of appoiniments. — 1. Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay,
09318, U. S. A., is appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel.
2. Brigadier General LeRoy Lutes, 05413, U. S. A., is appointed Assistant
Chief of Staff for Operations.
3. Colonel Joe N. Dalton, 04785, General Staff Corps, is appointed Assistant
Chief of Staff for Personrrel.
4. Brigadier General William H. Harrison, 0909263, U. S. A., is appointed
Director of Procurement.
By command of Lieutenant General Somervell:
W. D. Styer,
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
Official:
J. A. Ulio,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
The Civilian Personnel Division
statement of organization
In the War Department Reorganization (Circular 59, Page 6, 7e(7), March 2,
1942) the Service of Supply is assigned the responsibility for "the administration
of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which pertain to personnel as
individuals, both military and civil, to include premilitary training, mobilization
of individual manpower, and labor relations."
Under this general assignment the Civilian Personnel Division has been
specifically authorized to represent the Services of Supply, and the War Depart-
ment in the formulation, supervision and execution of policies and practices in
labor supply and labor relations. The Division also represents the Services of
Supply in the formulation, supervision and execution of personnel standards,
policies and practices including jiremilitary training.
To carry out these responsibilities the Civilian Personnel Division operates as a
staff service under the Commanding General of the Services of Supply. Within
the scope of its responsibilities, the Civilian Personnel Director represents the
office of the Commanding General in its relationships with the chiefs of all the
Supply Services, the Corps Area Commanders and all offices, agencies, boards and
committees of the War Department coming under the jurisdiction of the Services
of Supply.
The Civilian Personnel Division, in addition to its executive officers and staff
services, maintains three operating branches: 1. Civilian Personnel Branch, 2.
Labor Relations Branch, 3. Manpower Branch.
Civilian Personnel Branch:
1. To be responsible for the formulation of policy, the development of pro-
grams and the supervision of administration of all civilian personnel matters
within the Services of Supply.
2. To review continuously existing practices with respect to estimating require-
ments, selection of applicants, assignment of employees, classification of jobs,
induction of employees, wages, hours of work, overtime compensation, promotion,
upgrading, demotion, rating of employees and relations with employees, and to
draft recommendations as needed for any changes.
ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY
ADMINISTRATIVE
UNDER
SECRETARY
OF WAR
3=T
COMMANDING
GENERAL
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
CHIEF OF STAFF
CORPS
SUPPLY SERVICES
I ■:°'"'"''^« I I "«'"'"" I I ':°» "»«" I I CCw'/aKEA I IcMirLaE,, | | CO.f?.RE. | I COKli°ABE. | | CORg°*REA | | CORp" .R£> [
'^^L^
80306— 42— pt. 34 (Pace p. 13262)
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13263
3. To institute a uniform system of job analysis and labor grading for ungraded
employees. To supervise the conduct of wage surveys and to make recommenda-
tions on such changes as_ may be necessary to bring into closer accord compensa-
tion of "ungraded" and "graded" employees of the Services of Supply.
4. To develop and supervise programs for in-service training of executives,
supervisory, manual and clerical workers and to provide assistance to the Services
of Supply in carrying out these programs. To arrange with other branches of the
Civilian "Personnel Division for such supplementary vocational training as may be
needed by employees. To prepare handbooks, guides and manuals for the use
of employees.
5. To assist in development and supervision of facilities and services to
employees.
6. In cooperation with the Surgeon General's Office, to develop programs for
industrial health and the safety of employees of the Services of Supply.
7. To provide necessary liaison with the Civil Service Commission in the
establishment and manning of jobs within the classified departmental service.
8. Continuously study problems aflecting the efficiency of employees and
develop ^\ays and means of overcoming them.
9. To perform such related functions as may be necessary for the proper prose-
cution of the Civilian Personnel Division program.
Labor Relations Branch:
1. To be responsible for the formulation of policies and the development of
programs on labor-relations matters and to supervise all labor-relations activities
within the Services of Supply, such activities to be carried on in close coopera-
tion with the Manpower Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division.
2. To provide a liaison with national and international labor organizations
such as the American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations,
and independent labor organizations.
3. To represent the War Department in all matters involving labor relations in
which the War Department has a direct interest and to i)rovide liaison with the
War Labor Board, the National Labor Relations Board, the Department of
Labor and other Labor Relations Agencies.
Manpower Branch:
1. To be responsible for the formulation of policies and the development of
programs for the effective utilization of civilian manpower, making plans for the
speedy mobilization of labor for the prosecution of the War Production Effort,
and to supervise all labor-supply activities within the Services of Supply.
2. In cooperation with other agencies and divisions to estimate manpower
needs for War Departm.ent operations and for war production and to assist in
the planning for recruitment and distribution for maximum war production, to
advise procurement and manufacturing agencies of the Services of Supply on
areas of labor shortage and labor surplus as a guide for the effective distribution
of war production contracts.
3. To develop programs for special nonmilitary training of civilians prior to
induction into the armed forces.
4. To represent the War Department on all matters dealing with manpower
and the utilization of labor, serving as liaison with the War Manpower Commis-
sion and its constituent agencies, the War Production Board, the Department
of Labor,' the United States Employment Service, the Selective Service Adminis-
tration and other Government agencies, if necessary.
Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Division
statement of duties and functions
The Manpower Branch, as a part of the Civilian Personnel Divison, has the
following general responsibilities:
1. To formulate policies and develop programs for the effective utilization of
civilian manpower for War Department production and military services by:
a. Active cooperation with labor supply and training agencies, and Selective
Service.
h. Direct action on behalf of the War Department in supplementing such
agencies.
c. Arrangements for appropriate training of individuals prior to entrance into
military service or employment by the War Department.
13264 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
2. To supervise all labor supply activities within the Services of Supply by:
a. Serving as the representative of the Supply Services in all problems of
labor information, labor supply, and the coordination of employment
programs of the Supply Services with the facilities of labor supply and
training agencies.
b. Providing technical supervision and guidance to Supply Services in labor
supply policies and practices, both on a national level and through Liai-
son Officers on local levels.
c. To serve as liaison on labor supply matters with the War Manpower Com-
mission, the War Production Board, the United States Employment
Service, Selective Service, Department of Labor, and other Government
agencies as necessary, on the national level and through Liaison Officers
on local levels.
(1) On the Federal level, Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of War, serves on the War Manpower Commis-
sion and represents the Manpower Branch as well as other
divisions of the War Department. The Chief of the Man-
power Branch and the chiefs of appropriate sections of the
branch maintain liaison with corresponding sections of the War
Manpower Commission and associated agencies.
(2) At regional levels the Liaison Officers of the Manpower Branch
will serve as Liaison Officers with the regional officers of the
War Manpower Commission. The Liaison Officers as repre-
sentatives of the War Department will not be under direct
supervision by the War Manpower Commission but will par-
ticipate in its work on labor supply problems within the area,
and will directly represent War Department interests in labor
supply. The same relationship will exist where War Man-
power Commission offices are established on subregional. State,
or local levels.
Executive Offices, Manpower Branch
statement of duties and functions
^.The Executive Offices of the Manpower Branch include the Chief of the Branch,
the Executive Officer, the Operations Section, and the Plans and Staff Training
Section.
1. The Chief of the Manpower Branch is responsible for the determination and
execution of policy and programs, and the coordination and direction of staff and
fine operations of the Manpower Branch. Under the Director of the Civilian
Personnel Division, he is responsible for representing the Manpower Branch and
coordinating its activities with the other branches of the Civilian Personnel
Division and with other agencies.
a. The Executive Officer is the Chief Administrative Officer of the branch and
also serves as Associate Chief representing the Chief of the Branch in his
absence or on assignment.
2. The Operations Section is responsible for the control and direction of the field
officers of the Manpower Branch.
a. The Chief of the Operations Section, under the supervision and direction
of the Chief of the Branch and the Executive Officer, will be responsible
for the development of a unified field program for the Manpower Branch.
h. The Chief of the Operations Section will exercise direct line authority over
the Liaison Officers on regional, State or local level.
c. He will be responsible for the receipt and handling of all reports and cor-
respondence with the field Liaison Officers.
d. He wiU be responsible for the proper execution, by the Liaison Officers, of
the estabhshed policies and procedures of aU sections of the Manpower
Branch.
e. He will refer to the Section Chiefs reports and correspondence for han-
dling and for preparation for signature.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13265
3. The Plans and Staff Training Section is established within the Executive
Office.
a. To assist the Section Chiefs and Executive Officers in preparing organiza-
tion charts and job descriptions, statements of pohcy, and operating
procedures.
5. To be responsible for collecting and maintaining current records of all
established policies and procedures of the Manpower Branch and pre-
paring suitable training materials based on these records.
c. To be responsible for induction training for all new staff members of the
Manpower Branch.
d. To be responsible for continuing training programs for the Manpower
Branch in all new or revised procedures and policies of the branch, and
in such policies and procedures of related services of the Civilian Per-
sonnel Division, the War Department and other agencies as directly
pertain to the work of the Manpower Branch.
e. To be responsible, in cooperation with the Executive Officers and Section
Chiefs, for the distribution to the Field and Staff Officers of informational
materials, publications, changes in personnel or organization.
/, To maintain liaison with training, information, and public relations sec-
tions and other branches of the S. O. S., and of related agencies.
Labor Supply and Demand Section
statement op duties and functions
1. To ascertain the manpower needs of War Department contractors, to evalu-
ate the factors such as recruiting methods, training methods, transportation and
housing facilities which preclude the satisfaction of these needs.
2. To formulate and recommend to the proper agencies for action, War De-
partment policies and programs for the orderly recruitment, training, transporta-
tion, and housing of industrial and agricultural workers.
3. To diiect the Supply Services and to advise war industries in all matters of
labor supply for war production.
4. To provide liaison on national and regional levels in all labor supply matters
with the War Manpower Commission and its constituent agencies, the War Pro-
duction Board, the Navy, the Maritime Commission and other agencies inter-
ested in labor supply and training; and to directly represent the Supply Services
in their labor supply problems and the coordination of their employment pictures
with other agencies.
Military Requirements Section
statement op duties and punctions
1. To maintain schedules of information concerning the miUtary needs for
manpower as far as they are now determined, and estimates of the probable
needs for future periods. Such information to be in the form in which it will
be of most use for labor supply and training activities.
2. To formulate policies and plan programs for the transfer to civilians of non-
combatant jobs with the armed forces ^hich can be satisfactorily performed by
women or by men not eligible for military duty. In cooperation with the Labor
Supply Branch to formulate policy on the fiUing of these jobs. To provide
general supervision for these programs.
3. To supervise all matters dealing with the deferment from miUtary service
of such civilian personnel as may be deemed essential to the War Department or
to contractors working for the' War Department, and to formulate plans and
execute estabhshed policies and procedures for the release from the Army of key
industrial personnel necessary for the War Production program.
4. To represent the War Department in the Army and Navy Munitions Board
and similar organizations on all matters dealing with manpoAver and mihtary
personnel in relation to labor supply problems, and the utilization of labor.
5. To represent the Civilian Personnel Division on problems involving internal
security and the protection of information when these problems are related to
questions of labor supply.
13266 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
6. To provide liaison:
1. On labor supply policies as they affect military personnel with:
(a) Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply.
(b) The Adjutant General's Department.
(c) The General Staff and other War Department agencies.
(d) Air force.
(e) Ground force.
(f) Navy.
2. On all matters with the Selective Service Administration.
Pre-Induction Training Section
statement of duties and functions
Policy and planning
1. Establish policies, plan, initiate, coordinate and supervise the necessary and
appropriate training of individuals prior to entrance into military service or
employment by the War Department, except for personnel specially trained to
perform functions peculiar to the air forces.
2. Recommend policies regarding the eft'ective use of trained manpower.
c. Propose effective relationships between pre-induction and post
induction training.
b. Propose improvements in practices of detecting and assigning skilled
manpower to military duty.
c. Propose methods of detecting and assigning men with substitute
qualifications for critical skills.
d. Propose improvements in methods of reassigning skilled men in
service.
e. Propose job classifications and standard qualifications.
Needs
In cooperation with the divisions and officers concerned and other agencies
determine:
1. Manpower needs and shortages in terms of numbers, skills and degrees of
skill required.
2. Training needs in terms of skills and when required.
3. Training facilities needed to^ meet training requirements.
Survey of facilities
In cooperation with the field representatives and other agencies, determine and
recommend :
1. Facilities available for training skills required.
2. The locations, character and suitability of such facilities.
3. The preparation of a check list of basic requirements, for equipment,
qualifications of instructors, courses of study and housing.
4. Necessary changes to adapt existing faciUties to effectively serve pre-
induction training.
Program
1. Determine courses of study appropriate to develop needed skills according
to Army standards.'
2. Survey and adapt courses of study, manuals and methods of instructions to
meet Army requirements.
3. Preparation of necessary instructional manuals as needed.
4. Investigate and recommend improvements in "instructional methods, equip-
ment and facilities.
5. Coordinate pre-induction training programs with the post-induction training
program.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13267
Reports and Analysis Section
statement op duties and functions
Functions
1. To collect, correlate, analyze, and interpret reports from ail establishments
of the various services of Services of Supply which will reveal:
o. Volume of current civilian employment, by occupation.
b. Anticipated hires and lay-offs by occupation.
c. Degree to which various labor needs of the Services may be considered
critical.
d. Whether or not special measures, such as special recruitment devices,
increased use of women, training, etc., will be necessary in order to insure
an adequate supply of labor.
2. To arrange for obtaining regularly from the appropriate Government agencies
and to have readily accessible information in the form of surveys, special reports,
etc., on condition of labor supply in all significant labor markets in the United
States which will show:
a. Labor market areas in which serious general shortages of manpower already
exist.
b. Labor market areas in which labor is currently adequate but shortages are
anticipated on the basis of contracts already awarded or new plant site
awards.
c. Labor market areas in which an ample labor supply is available currently
and in the foreseeable future.
3. To arrange for obtaining regularly from the appropriate Government agencies
and to have in readily accessible form lists of essential war occupations in which
critical shortages have developed or are expected to develop. These should be
available in form to reveal:
a. Occupations in which there are general national shortages.
b. Occupations in which shortages have developed only in specified areas.
4. To arrange for obtaining regularly from the appropriate Government agencies
and to have accessible, data revealing for specific areas the size of the available
labor force and known future demands for labor by monthly periods at least six
months in advance.
5. To promote, advance, and obtain periodically from the appropriate Govern-
ment agencies special studies of manpower problems in particular industries, such
as munitions, aircraft, tanks, etc., in which the S. O. S. may have a special interest.
6. To work in cooperation with other appropriate agencies of Government to
develop procedures and techniques for imi)roving and expanding the available
sources of information in the field of labor supply.
7. To initiate, promote, and help direct projects within S. O. S. and in other
related agencies which will provide more accurate information about and permit
more precise estimates of labor needs, by skill, location, and time period.
8. To be responsible for keeping the branch completely and continuously
informed regarding all information and data on labor supply available everywhere
in Washington and regarding any new or proposed projects to be undertaken in
this field so that:
a. The interests of the S. O. S. may be represented wherever it is possible to
influence the course of such new work.
b. The Manpower Branch is fully aware of all operations in this field and of
all potentially available information.
9. To keep the policy and operation sections of the Manpower Branch con-
tinuously informed regarding factual developments revealing problems requiring
special attention, and to analyze and present reports to such sections in such
form as to indicate lines of possible action or policy.
10. To be responsible for regular routing of selected data on labor supply,
critical occupations, etc., to the field liaison officers of the Manpower Branch.
11. To develop and operate a reporting system on labor supply from the field
liaison office to the Washington office to supplement local sources of data.
12. To gather such special information and data as may be requested by the
operating and policy sections from time to time.
13268 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Liaison Officers, Manpower Branch, Services of Supply
statement of duties and functions
1. General responsibilities: Liaison Officers, whether assigned to regional or
local areas, will be the representatives of the Services of Supply in all matters
of labor supply. They will assume appropriate responsibility for all matters
within the scop"^e of the Manpower Branch, and upon assignment may also repre-
sent and act for the Labor Relations Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division.
2. Specific responsibilities: All Liaison Officers have the responsibility, upon
direction from the Manpower Branch and in accordance with the labor supply
policies determined for the Services of Supply:
a. To recommend and to assist in the formulation of labor supply policies for
the Services of Supply.
h. To ascertain the n\anpower needs of the Supply Services and related war
industries.
c. To furnish labor supply information and to give technical supervision and
assistance to the Supply Services in meeting their labor supply needs.
d. To represent the Manpower Branch in providing lor the War Department
an official source of information as to the adequacy of labor supply to
meet War Department requirements, including information concerning
militarv requirements and the need for pre-induction training.
e. To serve "with Divisions of the War Manpower Commission and to directly
represent the Supply Services in clearing labor matters and in co-
ordmating their needs and activities with the War Manpower Com-
mission, its constituent agencies and related services.
/. To cooperate and if necessary to initiate community action with individuals
or groups in securing effective employment practices in accordance with
the policy of the War Department.
g. To secure action and final solution of local labor supply problems where-
ever possible and to make proper reference to the Chief of the Manpower
Branch of such labor supply problems as cannot be satisfactorily settled
locally.
3. Liaison Officers, according to the needs of the labor supply program for the
War Department, will be assigned on regional, State and local levels:
a. The Regional Liaison Officers will be located in the areas of the Regional
Offices of the War Manpower Commission and will have general super-
visory responsibility for the interests of the Services of Supply in labor
supply problems within the region. He will also have supervisory
responsibility over any other Liaison Officers, S. O. S., within the region
and will direct and coordinate the work for the Manpower Branch.
b. Within a region, subregional. State or local Liaison Officers may be
assigned to represent the Manpower Branch and to assist the Regional
Liaison Officer. Where so assigned, these Liaison Officers will have
corresponding authorization within the area to that of the Regional
Liaison Officer, except that reports and instructions, unless otherwise
directed, will be with the Regional Liaison Officer rather than with the
Chief of the Manpower Branch. Below the regional level. Liaison
Officers will be assigned only in. critical labor market areas where im-
mediate and continuing representation is dee)ned necessary for proper
service to War De])artment interests in labor supply. Because of
service to a smaller area, these Liaison Officers will be expected to know
more intimately and to serve more directly and completely the labor
supply interests, than may be possible for regional officers. They wiU
be expected to be familiar with and active in labor market studies,
problem analyses, employment policies, recruitment practices, training
facilities and all phases of labor market activities including housing,
transportation, and related problems.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
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13270 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(B) Inclusion of Army Air Forces Within Scope of Responsibility op
Manpower Branch
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 13, 1942.
Subject: Inclusion of Army Air Forces Within Scope of Responsibility, Man-
power Branch.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. The Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, has the specific author-
ity and responsibility for providing technical supervision and guidance in the
labor supply policies and practices of the Supply Services and for serving as liaison
on labor supply matters with the War Manpower Commission, the War Produc-
tion Board and other agencies. In addition to these responsibilities, which have
been formally assigned the Civilian Personnel Division under War Department
reorganization of March 9, 1942, the Civilian Personnel Division is also responsible
for these same services for the Materiel Command, Army Air Forces.
2. The inclusion of the Army Air Forces within the scope of responsibihty of
the Manpower Branch is set forth in the following letters and directives. The
Under Secretary of War delegated this function to the Civilian Personnel Division
in a memorandum for Brigadier General Styer, Chief of Staff, Services of Supply,
on May 19, 1942, which reads in part as follows: "The Civilian Personnel Division
[shall] take charge of matters bearing on manpower in the aircraft industry and
other industries in which the Army Air Forces are interested, in the same way
that this section deals with industrial manpower for production of other equip-
ment for the War Department." General Styer forwarded this memorandum of
May 19, 1942, to Brigadier General B. S. Meyers, Materiel Division, Army Air
Forces. General Meyers acknowledged and expressed his satisfaction with this
agreement in a memorandum dated May 22, 1942, to Brigadier General Styer.
3. Liaison Officers will clarify any misunderstanding which may exist and wiU
perform the same functions for and with the Air Corps Procurement Districts
as with the Supply Services.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(C) Resum:6 op Conference op Liaison Officers of Manpower Branch
MONDAY MORNING SESSION JUNE 22
The conference was opened by Lt. Col. James T. O'Connell, Executive Officer
of the Civilian Personnel Division. Colonel O'Connell welcomed the Liaison
Officers and introduced Mr. James P. Mitchell, Director, Civilian Personnel Divi-
sion. Mr. Mitchell outlined the functions and objectives of the Services of
Supply with particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the Civilian Personnel
Division and the Manpower Branch. He stated that —
Labor supply responsibilities are closely linked with Selective Service, and
the duties of Occupational Advisors are part of the whole labor supply func-
tion. However, demands for full time work in labor supply for war produc-
tion made necessary the reassignment of officers between Selective Service
and the Manpower Branch.
Labor supply is closely related to labor relations functions and Liaison
Officers may be assigned special responsibilities as Field Representatives of
the Labor Relations Section of the Civilian Personnel Division.
There is an increased need for reliable estimates of: the manpower require-
ments for the Army itself; the manpower requirements for Army contractors;
the manpower requirements for the Army Procurement Districts. Primary
responsibiUtity in labor supply is to adequately present labor needs to proper
labor supply agencies. Initial responsibility is with the Washington staff,
the remaining responsibility is with the Field Staff in liaison at national,
regional, and local levels with the Manpower Commission, War Production
Board, labor supply and training agencies.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13271
INIr. Mitchell later gave an illustrated talk on the importance of the manpower
function in production of materials necessary for the equipment and maintenance
of the Army —
The production of materials depends on the efficiency and morale of the
present ten million war workers and our ability to increase this force to
seventeen million war workers. Sound policies of labor supply and labor
relations are essential in meeting the responsibility for materials which rests
on the Services of Supply.
The War Department is one of the Nation's greatest employers of civilian
labor, employing more than 610,000 civilian workers. Four hundred thou-
sand additional civilian employees on cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts gives the
Army responsibility for sound wage and employment policies on the part of
contractors. The Corps of Engineers alone has cost-plus contracts which by
September will total five and a h.alf billion dol'ars.
The indirect employment of one-fourth of the Nation's labor force on jobs
for the Army makes Army production plans and Army policy on employment
standards one of the major determinants of national labor supply policy.
Only through an organization which can devote its full time to these prob-
lems can Services of Supply handle manpower problems adequately. Such
an organization is the Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, which
has three branches: (1) Manpower, (2) Labor Relations, (3) Civilian Per-
sonnel. The manpower functions include:
1. Supervision of Army's labor supply program;
2. Development of estimates on n anpowor needs;
3. Liaison with Manpower Commission, War Production Board, and Se-
lective Service System ;
4. Guidance to procurement officers on contract placement;
5. Utilization ol Nation's manpower;
6. Policies for effective use of minority groups;
7. Pre-induction programs for training in special skills for the Army.
There followed a discussion:
Q. Should Liaison Officers continue to contact Selective Service?
A. Liaison should be conducted, particularly in matters of labor supp'y>
but action should be in policy matters on the State level and not in indi-
vidual deferment cases.
Q. Is there a responsibility for handling Navy as well as Army needs?
A. Yes; upon any specific request of the Navy.
Q. Are needs of the air forces included in the responsibilities of the
Liaison Officers?
A. Yes; the same responsibilities as to the air forces as to the ordnance
plans.
Q. Will there be a field staff for the Labor Relations Branch?
A. Not at present and Liaison Officers will assist on specific cases as
directed.
The next speaker was Mr. Leonard J. Maloney, new Chief of the Manpower
Branch. Mr. Maloney congratulated the Liaison Officers on their past per-
formance as he had observed it as an Employment Service Director —
The jobs of Liaison Officers are interpretative, advisory, and based on
"persuasive guidance." Action .should be through existing agencies or in
supplementing rather than duplicating such agencies. Liaison Officers
should understand:
1. The labor supply problem on State, regional and national levels;
2. The needs of particular . individuals and employers in essential war
production;
3. The relative importance of needs of contractors in terms of produc-
tion schedules and critical war needs.
Mr. Maloney indicated the present and anticipated increased shortages of
skilled workers: the probable employment of 27 million persons in the war effort
and the accompanying problems of housing, transportation, and use of minority
groups.
Q. Will thespe be a Directive setting forth priority or preferences of m-
dustries in order of war importance?
A. Such a list is in process, listing types of production in three groups:
60396— 42— pt. 34 15
13272 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
1. Those considered most important and which are behind in pro-
duction immediately needed;
2. Industries on essential war production whose production is on
schedule but whose products are immediately needed;
3. Firms which are either ahead of production or whose products
are not of immediate demand.
Preference or priority lists are intended for Regional Directors with
adjustments or appeals made on the regional level.
MONDAY AFTERNOON SESSION JUNE 22
Mr. Maloney introduced Lieutenant Colonel Junius R. Smith, Executive Officer
of the Manpower Branch. Colonel Smith distributed organization charts of the
Civilian Personnel Division and of the Manpower Branch, and a booklet of
related materials. He then outlined in detail the functions and responsibilities
of the Labor Supply Section, the Military Requirements Section, the Operations
Section and the Pre-Induction Training Section —
Field force operations is centered in the Office of the Chief with the Adminis-
trative Sections performing staff services on the national level. Liaison
Officers are representatives of the Services of Supply with all its implied
powers. They will also become members of the Regional Boards of the War
Manpower Commission. They are to be concerned with labor supply
information and with the recruitment, training, transportation, housing and
other problems of labor supply. They are to aid the Procurement Services
in solving their labor problems by fully utilizing all agencies concerned with
manpower. They are to supply Manpower Branch Headquarters with
information on local labor supply problems and on matters of interest in the
formulation and execution of regional labor supply policies.
Colonel Smith then introduced Major George L. Webber, Chief of the Military
Requirements Section. Major Webber briefly reviewed the development and
work of the Liaison Officers as representatives of the Office of the Under Secre-
tary, the Resources Division, of Selective Service, and of the Manpower Branch.
He outlined the major duties of the Military Requirements Section as follows:
1. The job transfer study for the replacement by civilian personnel of officers
in certain types of duty;
2. The deferment of key personnel in industry and agriculture and liaison
with Selective Service in pohcy matters;
3. Representation of the War Department on the Army and Navy Munitions
Board and liaison with Military Personnel Division, Air Forces, Ground
Forces, and Navy on labor supply policies.
The next speaker was Major S. P. Coblentz, Liaison Officer for Manpower Branch
with National Selective Service Headquarters —
The interest of Liaison Officers in Selective Service is in the effect of
Selective Service operations on labor supply. Liaison Officers should main-
tain frequent and cooperative relationship with the State Directors of
Selective Service but should work on policy matters rather than on cases of
particular individuals. -They are also to assist employers with information
about deferment policies and labor Supply, and to advise Manpower Branch
Headquarters about Selective Service policy and operations effecting labor
supply.
The next speaker was Mr. M. M. Peake, Chief of the Pre-Induction Training
Section. Mr. Peake explained that his program was the newest of the Man-
power Branch, having been established ouly for about forty days. The functions
of the Pre-Induction Training Section are:
a. To determine pre-induction training needs;
b. To survey available training facilities and to determine appropriate
courses and methods of instruction to meet War Department
requirements;
c. To establish policies and to plan, provide, supervise and coordinate
necessary and appropriate training of individuals prior to entrance
into military service;
d. To maintain liaison with training agencies and to coordinate pre-
induction training programs with post-induction training programs.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13273
As an additional responsibility the Pre-Induction Training Section is
interested in providing facilities for a large number of Selective Service
registrants who cannot be inducted because they are unable to meet literacy-
tests or fourth grade requirements.
Liaison Officers have no present responsibility in the pre-induction
program but may be requested to perform specific assignments in determin-
ing training needs and training facilities.
TUESDAY MORNING SESSION — JUNE 23
The meeting was opened by Mr. Maloney, who introduced Dr. Douglas Brown
of Princeton University, Consultant for the Manpower Branch. Dr. Browa
spoke on current labor market responsibilities —
By December, 1942, there should be 15 million men and women in war
production. Additions will include approximately 2 million new workers,
y/2 million from the present unemployed group and 7.9 millions by transfer
from nonessential industry. Other workers will be drawn from agriculture
and other self-employed groups. The estimated potential reserve of women
44 years of age or less, who have no children under 10 years of age, approxi-
mates 4.3 millions.
From a qualitative standpoint the Armed Services will draw the younger
able-bodied and most adaptable workers, and industry will need to shift
toward older men and women. Careful consideration of the length of the
work week is needed, since longer hours do not always mean more production.
Some of the incentives to the movement of labor are assurance of continuing
employment and favorable wage differentials.
Retarding factors include inadequate or costly living accommodations^
transportation facilities, lack of opportunities for the second or third wage
earner in the family, and loss of benefits of seniority rights in present
employment.
Among the steps necessary for effective mobilization are coordination of
procurement functions and distribution of contracts to areas of adequate
labor supply.
Mr. Maloney then introduced Mr. Fred H. Harbison, Chief of Labor Sup^jly and
Demand Section. N r. Harbison outlined the major functions of the Labor Supply-
Section listing as a first function the recruitment and allocation of labor —
Piracy and raiding must be eliminated. Orderly recruitment must be
effected to avoid disruption of war production. Liaison Officers, representing
the N'anpower Branch and the Services of Supply, should point out the
necessity for orderly recruitment and then work toward that objective.
Employers' cooperation must be sought in the induction of women and
minority groups including prisoners and interned aliens. Full utilization of
training facilities also present an important source of new workers and
Liaison Officers should work toward the coordination of recruitment and
training programs. The Labor Supply Section will maintain close liaison
with the War Manpower Commission and the headquarters office of labor
supply and training agencies. The Liaison Officers are expected to work for
local solutions of labor supply problems and to forward information and
requests for action to the headquarters office in appropriate cases. liaison
Officers must be interested in the trasnportation and housing problems w-hen
they become obstacles to adequate labor supply.
In conclusion Mr. Harbison introduced three other members of his staff, Captain.
Russell W. Nauman, Field Service; Captain Daniel L. Boland, in charge of Housing
and Transportation, and Mr. Wilfred C. Leland, Minority Problems.
Mr. Maloney asked Dr. Brov^ai to make a statement on how Liaison Officers
can most eft'ectively assist in the job of labor procurement. Dr. Brown stated
that the Army, as the largest user of manpower in the United States, will have a.
tremendous share of the functions of the War Manpower Commission; therefore,
the Army must have full information as to its own labor needs and the employ-
ment policies and practices of its divisions as well as information about the general
labor supply picture. Dr. Brown closed by saying, "The chief objective on the
part of the.'Liaison Officers is to be fully advised about everything that concerns
the use of manpower in their area so as to provide the Army and war contractors
information about policies and changes of policies in labor procurement, so thati
by pulling together it will all add up to a job well done."
13274 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System,
paid a brief visit to the conference, complimenting the Liaison Officers on the
work they had done in their relationship with Selective Service and labor supply
and expressed his regret at losing from the Selective Service System those officers
present who were being transferred to full-time duty with the "Manpower Branch.
General Hershey stated that in the past relationship both Selective Service
and the Manpower Branch had benefited by the cooperative work of the Liaison
Officers and he recognized the necessity for separation and specialization of
functions at this time. General Hershey was then introduced to each of the
officers.
Llr. Maloney then introduced Lieutenant R. Mayne Albright, Chief of the Plans
and Staff Training Section. Lieutenant Albright summarized the labor supply
agencies —
Although war production schedules are being met there is still confusion
in labor market information, labor supply agencies, and employment pohcies
and practices.
Short of controls there are two principal objectives:
1. Full utilization of presently employed workers, and
2. Orderly recruitment and training of new workers.
To accomplish these objectives there is already established a complete
organization of labor supply agencies :
1. United States Employment Service and Civil Service Commission.
2. National Youth Administration, Vocational Education, Engineer-
ing, Science, Management Defense Training, Training within
Industry, Apprenticeship Training.
B. Unions, employer associations and private agencies.
These services are coordinated by State Councils of Administrators and
regional labor committees formerly of the Bureau of Employment Security
and now under the War Manpower Commission.
After sketching the history and development of the United States Employ-
ment Service, Lieutenant Albright stated as the chief problems of labor supply:
1. Inadequate needs data.
2. Wasteful employment practices.
3. Area shortages because of wages, housing, etc.
4. Total skill shortages in critical occupations.
5. Need for controls in hiring priorities.
To meet these problems of labor supply and to fully utilize labor supply
agencies. Liaison Officers have a primary responsibihty to effect good employ-
]uent practices by administrative supervision and persuasive guidance with
employment officials in local divisions of Services of Supply.
Liaison Officers have a second responsibihty (a) in interpreting labor
supply services, (b) in assisting in the regular services and in special prob-
lems, (c) in coordination of labor supply services and Services of Supply
3ieeds through War Manpower Commission, employer groups and individual
•employers.
The final speaker at this session was Captain Ira B. Cross of the Labor Relations
Section, Manpower Branch. Captain Cross made a brief report on the Coosa
•Ordnance Plant as an example of discriminatory practices and practical solutions.
The War Manpower Commission has a Negro Manpower Division to
supplement the work of the President's Committee. The purpose of both
groups is to see that in a period of labor scarcity full utilization is made
of all available manpower including Negroes and other minority groups.
Where misunderstanding can be avoided by early action, solution is made
easier in cases of discrimination.
TUESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION JUNE 23
Colonel Smith introduced Dean Barker, representative of the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy, who spoke on labor procurement for the United States
Navy —
Navy labor procurement is divided into three main areas:
a. Navy Yards.
b. Government7pwned plants.
c. Privately owned and operated plants.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13275
From 1922-37 Navy yards were doing little but repair work. Until
recentlj' labor supply has been abundant and recruitment has been easy.
In the last six months women have been placed in many jobs and on ma-
chines and in repair shops. A problem of particular difficulty is selecting^
the overseas staff.
In privately operated plants the Inspector in Charge works closely with
the contractor and tries to interfere as little as possible Avith his policies.
As the labor pool gets tighter relations between naval procurement and
Manpower Branch will become much closer.
Navy recruitment will probably continue on a voluntary basis but Selec-
tive Service will be used if and when necessary.
Colonel Smith then introduced Air. John H. Ohly, Chief of Labor Relations
Branch, Civilian Personnel Division. Mr. Ohly gave some background material
on problems of labor supply and indicated the functions that the Labor Rela-
tions Branch wishes to perform. The War Labor Board of the National Labor
Relations Board and other agencies are designed to settle temporarj^ disputes and
to act quickl}- in preventing or ending strikes, in which the Labor Relations Section
is interested as a consumer, that is, as the representative of the largest user of
labor. By its organization and position in the War Department, the branch is
in a position to get information quickly and impartially and to attempt to secure-
immediate action in avoiding or settling a dispute. The branch also works with,
these agencies in helping to determine the strike.
Power has been given the War Department to revise or renegotiate fixed-
fee contracts. Though these price adjustments are a matter of lalior rela-
tions, regulation of overtime and working conditions may also become a
matter ot labor relations.
The next speaker was Mr. Herbert Carey, Chief of the Civilian Personnel
Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division. Mr. Carey briefly outlined his talk
and gave full copies to each of the officers. He also explained the Civilian Per-
sonnel Policy Committee of the Services of Supply, consisting of the Staff Divi-
sions, Administrative Services, and representatives of each of the Supply
Services.
Colonel Smith then introduced Lieutenant Colonel Thomas LaJie of the Division
of Internal Security who spoke on "Alien Certification and Internal Security" — ■
The War Department distributes questionnaires to be presented by the
employer to the alien. The questionnaires are forwarded to the Division of
Internal Security, which takes immediate action except where further iii-
vestigation is necessary. There is no policy of the War Department pro-
hibiting the alien from entering war production employment. The Internal
Security Division acts for the Navy as well as the Army.
Colonel Smith led a discussion on the problem of employment where the
applicant is an American citizen but does not have a birth certificate.
The next speaker was Mr. Otis E. Mulligan, Chief of the Labor Relations Sec-
tion of the United States Department of Agriculture. Mr. Mulligan spoke on
the Farm Labor and Department of Agriculture War Boards. Mr. Mulligan gave
figures showing the value of agricultural production and the percentages used in
the war effort —
The United States has about 30 million farm residents with an additional
7 million persons living in rural areas but not on farms. The actual number
of persons working on farms in 1941 was 10,267,000. Although wage levels
are still a problem in securing farm labor, there has been an increase from
$43.64 per month without board in 1941 to $53.20 in 1942. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture works with the United States Employment Service for
finding recruits and replacing workers taken into the Armed Services and
war industries. Representatives of the Department of Agriculture, and the
voluntary Department of Agriculture War Boards supplement the efforts of
the Employment Service, particularly in rural areas not otherwise served.
There have been no serious losses in agricultural production to date but
next year there will inevitably be such losses.
WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION JI3NE 2-1
The first speaker on the Wednesday morning program was Mr. Arthur Fleming^
member of the Civil Service Commission. Mr. Fleming outlined the change in
operations of the Civil Service Commission in eliminating investigations and tha
13276 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
■establishment of registers to facilitate the recruitment and placement of workers
in the shortest possible time.
Mr. Fleming was of the opinion that wage stabilization in the near future
was not to be expected. Neither did he anticipate national service for the control
of civilian workers. The Civil Service Commission is represented on the War
Manpower Commission.
Mr. Maloney then introduced Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry, Chief of
Operations of the War Manpower Commission. General McSherry outlined the
past experience of the labor policy committees including the National Advisory
Committee, the Office of Production Management, Labor Division of the War
Production Board, and War Manpower Commission —
Practically every agency of the Federal Government that has anything to
do with manpower, training, labor supply, or the military service, is partially
or wholly under the direction and policy of the War Manpower Commission.
This includes the United States Employment Service, the Civil Service Com-
mission, the Selective Service Commission, Railroad Retirement, Works
Progress Administration, the training agencies, as well as representatives from
the War and Navy Departments, Department of Labor, and War Production
Board. There has also been established a Labor Management Polic}^ Com-
mittee to advise the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Under
Mr. McNutt as Chairmaln of the Commission and Mr. Fowler Harper as
Deputy Chairman, Mr. Arthur J. Altmcyer is Executive Director of the
program with respect to the direction of the technical stalT, including adminis-
trative services, planning, statistical analysis, and coordination services.
The Director of Operations, General McSherry, has direct supervision of the
operating agency following under the War Manpower Commission.
General McSherry then outlined the organization of the Regional Committees
of the War Manpower Commission and explained the relationship of the Liaison
Officers to these committees. He requested that a representative be designated
from the Manpower Branch to maintain liaison with the War Manpower Com-
mission on the national level, and offered to provide space and facilities for the
Liaison Officers in the Regional War Manpower Commission Boards. General
McSherry stated that the War Manpower Commission had no authority to put
the Liaison Officers under the regional staff but that he hoped and expected that
they would work in close cooperation with the regional staffs. The Regional
Directors of the War Manpower Commission will be Regional Directors of the
Federal Security Agency, thus reporting directly to Mr. McNutt and having direct
control over the field agencies of the Federal Security Agency.
There will be no State organizations since activities will be coordinated at the
regional level. There may be subregional offices, but generally the outline of the
present labor supply committee arrangements will be followed.
Mr. Maloney then introduced Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr, Assistant to the Under
Secretary of War and member of the War Manpower Commission. Mr. Dorr
impressed upon the Liaison Officers their responsibilities as representatives of the
War Department and offered his services in clearing particular matters which
could not be settled except by direct action between the War Manpower Com-
mission or War Department. " He urged that oflScers attempt to settle local pro-
lems through the regional offices of the War Manpower Commission and its
constitutent agencies. Mr. Dorr stated that now that organizational details had
been overcome, the War Manpower Commission would work rapidly on all fronts
of the labor sup])ly problem. He discussed the question of priorities among war
production plants and the allocation of manpower to such plants. It was indi-
cated that the final decision within broad policies would be made on the regional
or local level b.y Regional Officers of the War Manpower Commission or a subcom-
mittee thereof. It is important that there be a flexible system to meet conditions
which vary both by area and from time to time.
The final speaker on the conference program was Mrs. Clara Beyer of the Labor
Standards Section, Department of Labor. Mrs. Beyer spoke on the War and
adjustment of labor standards —
Originally there was a panicky approach to the labor supply problem and
consequent relaxations of laws which were not always necessary. The
Department of Labor agrees that there should be relaxation and adjustment
but no break-down of labor standards. Some employers have been too prone
to look for relaxation before exhausting other efforts to secure the necessary
production. The United States Department of Labor is cooperating with
State Department and a recent survey by the Department shows that the
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13277
States have been ready and willing to relax labor laws where sufficient justi-
fication was shown. On the other hand, long hours do not produce the
desired rate of production unless definite maxima are maintained. Forty-
eight hours appear to be the desirable limit. Seventy-eight percent of the
New York manufacturers reported that they secured maximum production
from women working 48 hours and from men working 54 hours. Both
Canada and England have ceased 60-, 70-, and 80-hour weeks and have
returned to 48 to 55-hour weeks.
The concluding session of the conference was devoted to a summary and
restatement by Mr. Maloney of the objectives of the branch and the responsi-
bilities of the Liaison Officers. Mr. Mitchell presented illustrated material on
the labor supply problem and responsibilities of the Civilian Personnel Division
and adjourned the meeting.
(D) Use of Labor Supply Directive
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Manpower Branch,
Washington, D. C, July £4, 1942.
Memorandum Jfor All Field Liaison Officers.
Subject: Temporary Use of Labor Supply Directive, August 28, 1941.
1. Pending developments in the reorganization of labor supply agencies, the
OUSW Memorandum to All Liaison Officers, dated August 28, 1941, remains in
effect.
2. The organizational set-up of the War Manpower Commission on the regional
level as presented by Brigadier General Frank McSherry to the Field Liaison
Officers in Washington on June 24, has not been completed. At such time as
the Regional or Area Manpower Directors are selected and appointed, a Directive
will be issued outlining in detail the relationship of the Regional Liaison Officer
to the War Manpower Commission organization.
3. Pending the formal institution of the new War Manpower Commission
organization, Field Liaison Officers will continue to attend meetings of the Regional
and Area Labor Supply Committees where such committees are still in existence.
A summary statement of the proceedings of the meetings, or a copy of the minutes,
or both, should be submitted to Headquarters.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(E) General Instructions on Staff Relationships
War Department,
Headquarters, ■ Services of Supply,
Manpower Branch,
Washington, D. C, July 24, 1942.
Memorandum for All Field Liaison Officers.
Subject: General Instructions on Staff Relationship of Liaison Officers.
1. what types of cases you should handle
a. In general, you are not responsible for solving the manpower problems of a
particular employer or particular individual. It is neither necessary nor desirable
to write a memorandum to Washington stating that some small employer needs
six toolmakers and another employer is having great difficulty in securing seven
machinists, or that James Jones of the X Company was inducted despite filing a
Form 42a. You should refer such cases to the Regional Director of Manpower
or to the constitutent and related agencies of the W^ar Manpower Commission
for appropriate action. You can be of help to individual employers by telling
them the proper agencies to contact. You will greatly fortify the operating
agencies of the War Manpower Commission if you make them, rather than your-
self, assume the responsibility for solving the routine, day-by-day problems.
13278 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
b. In some cases, of course, the problem of a particular employer may warrant
your personal attention and advice — if the problem is^ typical of problenis of other
employers and, therefore, is a "pilot case", if the company is a large and dominant
employer in a particular community or area, or if the company is of critical im-
portance to the war production program. It is obvious that you should have
personal acquaintance with the executives of leading firms in your area, and, of
course, you should make reports to Washington on significant and important
developments in such companies.
c. The Manpower Branch is concerned with all policies, procedures and action
involving the maintenance of a balance between military manpower and essential
industrial manpower. You are expected to keep this office informed of anything
which tends to upset the balance, either by depriving the armed forces of the
services of men not essential for war production or by taking essential men away
from war production. You should not be concerned with the administration of
Selective Service beyond this extent and are not expected to follow individual
cases unless they are of extreme importance to war production or are pilot cases
involving a significant matter of policy. You are not part of the Selective Service
System and must not interfere in its operations. You should have a thorough
knowledge of all activities involving military manpower problems in relation to
labor supply and should maintain close relations with all organizations concerned
in this field.
d. Always bear in mind that you will be held responsible for giving Head-
quarters an over-all picture of important developments. If you are so busy
with details that you haven't time to see over-all trends and problems, you can-
not be efl'ective in your job as policy adviser.
2. WHEN TO CALL ON HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON
a. When you need assistance in developing a policy or program, feel free to
call on headquarters at any time. Perhaps you may want to suggest a program
for the mobilization and employment of women for war industries — a plan to
induce nondefense workers to enter war employment — a drive to employ aged
workers — a program to prevent the pirating of labor. These are the types of
matters for which you can secure suggestions and instructions from Headquarters.
You will find that the Headquarters staff will be glad to give prompt consideration
to your requests for assistance. If advisable, Headquarters will arrange to send
a specialist to your area to assist you in drawing up programs and to acquaint
you with important aspects of national policies. Don't, however, ask us for help
on a lot of detailed minor cases. We expect you to see that appropriate agencies
handle these at the local level.
3. WITH WHOM YOU SHOULD HAVE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS
a. You should be in continual contact with the Regional Director of Man-
power in your area at such time as he is appointed. A formal or written arrange-
ment for clearance of problems is not sufficient. The Manpower Director will
clear broad problems and programs with you only if he learns to depend on you
and respect your counsel and advice on important matters. This requires con-
tinued and constant contact.
b. You should also have personal contacts with the State Directors of the
USES, the Directors and key personnel of the State Selective Service Systems,
the Board of Control for Vocational Education, the Regional offices of Training-
Within-Industry, and such other constituent agencies of the War Manpower
Commission which you think necessary. You should make it clear to the repre-
sentatives of these agencies, however, that you deal directly with the Regional
Director of Manpower, but that your relationship with the Regional Director
does not preclude cooperative and friendly arrangements with his subordinate
agencies.
c. It goes without saying that you must be consxilted and informed on every
important development in the field of manpower in your region or area. You
must be part of an inner circle of advisers to those charged with the responsibility
of administering the manpower program. You should not, however, attempt to
assume the functions of the operating agencies of the Manpower Commission.
You should always bear in mind that your responsibility is to stimulate thought,
to lend backing to action, and to be available for consultation and advice at any
time. As the representative of the War Department, you are responsible for
seeing that action is taken, but you are not responsible for taking direct action
unless other methods are inadequate or fail.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13279
4. WHAT ARE YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE SUPPLY SERVICES, AIR FORCES AND
ARMY CONTRACTORS
a. Your sole mission is to represent the interests of the War Department in
all action to assure an adequate supply of qualified labor for war production
without interfering with the orderly fulfillment of military manpower require-
ments. You are the channel for carrying the labor supply problems of the Army
and Army contractors to the proper agencies for remedial action. You are the
agent to represent Army interests with the other agencies and the interest of
these agencies with the Army and Army contractors.
h. It is fundamental that you have a well established basis of mutual under-
standing with the key officials of the Supply Service Air Force, and Army con-
tractors, subcontractors and supplies for whoin and with whom you should be
working. It is not enough to shake hands and say hello. It is incumbent upon
you to get to know these officers well, to know the conditions under which they
work, the objectives they must attain and the difficulties they face. It is equally
important to see that they know what you are there for, what you can do and
how you can do it.
c. A satisfactory working relationship must be built upon understanding and
confidence. Understanding can be built by educating the key officers. Con-
fidence can be developed by convincing them that you have a necessary function
and the means for carrying out that function and then by delivering the goods.
There is widespread lack of understanding regarding the system of labor supply
and training agencies and the Selective Service System, and the relation of the
Liaison Officers in the picture. Until this is cleared up you cannot expect the
responsible officers to come to you with their problems and work with you as
they should. You must make it plain that you are not there to supplant or com-
pete with their facilities, but are there to help them and represent their interests;
not to do their work but to see that they receive the service they may properly
expect from the respective agencies. Yon are not working unsupported. You
are backed by definite authority as specified in the directive of August 28, 1941,
and the corollary directives of the various Services, but the adequacy of your
job of salesmanship will determine whether you are used by your customers as
you should be. No one else can do that job but you.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(F) Instructions for Bi-Weekly Reports
Memorandum for All Liaison Officers, S. O. S.
Subject: Bi-Weekly Reports of Liaison Officers to Manpower Branch.
1. The following instructions wiU cover the submission of reports from the
Liaison Officers.
a. Repoits will be submitted on the 1st and 16th of each month beginning
August 1, 1942.
h. Three copies of the reports should be submitted to this office.
c. Repoits will be made on a regional basis and submitted through the Re-
gional Liaison Officers who will receive and combine reports from the
Liaison Officers within their region. Where any Liaison Officer feels
that immediate consideration is needed for any item of a particular
report, a copy may be sent directly to the Manpower Branch with a
covering letter.
d. The content and the form of this report may change with the development
of the program of the Manpower Branch. In its present form, the
report will be a general appraisal and analysis of the over-all develop-
ments in the areas; and specific analyses of significant instances of par-
ticular plants, projects, or labor shortages. The first report should be
as complete and detailed as practicable on all of the listed topics which
are pertinent to the area. Later reports will be based on the material
submitted in the first report plus new developments.
2. For orderly handling in the Headquarters office, Liaison Officers are re-
quested to follow the attached form, entering numbers and subdivisions whether
or not reports are to be made on each of the designated topics.
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch,
Civilian Personnel Division.
13280 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
War Department
headquarters, services of supply
Washington, D. C.
Period Covered to
Bi- Weekly Report, , Liaison Officer, Region
1. Reciuitment and Employment of Workers:
a. Areas of labor shortage or surplus. (Outhne briefly the situation,
mentioning principal industries and communities aiid the appartnt
extent of th( shortage or surplus.)
b. Labor shortage factors:
(1) Piracy. (Discuss extent of piracy and measures already
taken and those proposed for local or headquarters action.)
(2) Minority Problems. (Discuss lack or compliance with na-
tional policy on use of negroes, ahens, prison labor, aged
workers, handicapped persons and all minority groups.)
(3) Employment of Women. (Discuss employers plans and
labor's attitude, any significant instances of use or lack
of use of women in industry and recommendations con-
cerning methods for increasing the use of women.)
(4) Migration of Workers. (Discuss in-migration or out-
migration of workers and effect on local labor market
with action taken or recommended.)
(5) Agency Cooperation. (For the shortage areas, discuss com-
pletion of coordination of employment recruiting piogram
with United States Employment Service and other agen-
cies. Discuss extent and effectiveness of recruitment
programs by the United States Employment Service.)
2. Training Programs and Industrial Workers:
a. Pre-employment and supplemental tiaining. (Discuss effectiveness
of training programs; extent of utilization of training stations;
extent of acceptance by employers of trainees; and recommended
action.)
h. Tiaining Within Industry. (Discuss effectiveness of TWI Program
in fully utihzing present employed workers.)
3. Housing. (For shortage areas discuss housing problems where directly re-
lated to adequacy of labor supply, mentioning utilization of public transit systems,
pools, and sponsorship of transportation programs.)
Indicate definitely the I'elationship between lack of adequate transportation
facilities and labor shortages.
4. Transportation (Discuss transportation where it directly affects labor supply
in shortage areas. Outline plans and programs on construction of houses and
dormitories for war workers. Indicate facilities which may be available through
supply services, such as new barracks.)
5. Location of War Contracts (Outline briefly the situation in any communi-
ties in which it appears desirable for war contracts to be placed because of available
labor or from which war contracts should be shifted because of critical shortages
of labor.)
6. Civilian Production (Discuss labor shortage areas in which certain types of
civilian industries and occupations might be curtailed in order to provide addi-
tional manpower for the vital war industries.)
7. Military Requirements in Relation to Labor Supply:
a. Report policies, procedures and actions which tend to upset the
maintenance of a practical balance between the fulfillment of
manpower requirements for the armed forces and for war pro-
duction.
h. Report significant instances in which the present procedure for
protecting necessary men in industry has not prevented the
withdrawal from war production of necessary employees by
induction through:
(1) Enlistment
(2) Commissioning
(3) Selective Service
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13281
c. Report all instances in which it is believed that tlie procedure of
releasing soldiers classified as key employees in industry to the
enlisted reserve is being improperly used by employees or is
otherwise unsatisfactory.
(G) Procedures Covering Use of Declaration of Citizenship Form
July 25, 1942.
Subject: Use of "Declaration of Citizenship" Form.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Enclosed for information and use by the Liaison Officers are procedures
covering the "Declaration of Citizenship" form:
a. Copy of letter of June 11, 1942, to Chiefs of Supply Services, from Mr,
Mitchell, regarding distribution of forms from the Manpower Branch
to the Chiefs of the Supply Services and through them to the field per-
sonnel, contractors and subcontractors.
b. Copy of letter of July 9, 1942, from Colonel Dalton to the Chiefs of the
Supply Services regarding erroneous newspaper publicity and setting
forth the correct method of distribution of the forms.
c. The memorandum of June 4, 1942, addressed to all present and prospective
Army and Navy contractors and subcontractors on "Requirements for
Proof by Employees of their American Citizenship" with attached
copies of Statutes Restricting Employment of Aliens; and the "Declara-
tion of Citizenship" Form.
2. The Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in connection with
this procedure, except to interpret and assist in its fulfillment by the procurement
offices and contractors. In interpreting the procedure the following facts should
be noted:
a. Forms are distributed only through district procurement offices direct to
contractors and subcontractors on their lists and having war contracts.
They will not be distributed or filled out by the United States Employ-
ment Service, War Manpower Commission or other agencies. District
procurement offices will not duplicate the form but will request it from
the Chief of the appropriate Supply Services, who will secure forms
through Headquarters, Manpower Branch.
b. Forms may be used only at the place of employment and only at the time
application for woi-k is made.
c. Forms must be signed in the presence of an Army or Navy District
Procurement, Factor}- or Plant Protection representative and cannot
be signed in groups in advance of actual application for work.
d. Forms are recommended only. Their acceptance is not required by the
employer, and does not relieve the employer from the duty of making
further investigation whenever there is reason to doubt the truth of
the declaration.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, July 9, 1942,
Memorandum for: The Chief of Ordnance,
The Quartermaster General,
The Chief Signal Officer,
The Chief of Engineers,
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service,
The Surgeon General.
Subject: Distribution of "Declaration of Citizenship" Form.
1. Reference is made to memorandum dated June 11, 1942, (SPGC-M 014.33),
regarding distribution of a "Declaration of Citizenship" form which has been
recommended for use by industry in facilitating employment of those of American
13282 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
birth who are unable to produce birth certificates in situations where the submis-
sion of a birth certificate is a condition of employment.
2. Reference is made also to the unfortunate newspaper publicity which ap-
peared on Monday, July 6, 1942, which gives the erroneous impression that this
form had been evolved by the War Manpower Commission, and would be made
available to the public through the offices of the United States Employment
Service.
3. For purposes of clarity, you are directed to inform your field force that only
one method of distribution will be followed; namely, forms will be made available
to you for distribution through your procurement offices only to Army contractors
and subcontractors on their lists. The applicant can receive the form only when
applying for work at the place he is to be employed, and such form is to be filled
out at the place of employment.
By Command of Lieutenant General Somervell:
Joe N. Dalton,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Administrative Branch,
War Department,
Washington, June 4, 194^.
Memorandum for all Present and Prospective Army and Navy Contrac-
tors AND Subcontractors.
Subject: Requirements for Proof of Employees of Their American Citizenship.
In a inemorandiuii dated July 16, 1941 addressed to all Army and Navy con-
tractors and subcontractors, subject: "Requirements for Proof by Employees of
their American Birth", reference was made to the provisions of certain statutes
restrictijig the emplovment of aliens in connection with the performance of speci-
fied contracts (sec. 10, act of July 2, 1926, 44 Stat. 734; 10 U. S. C. 310; sec. 11,
act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 676; 50 U. S. C, App. 1), and a procedure was recom-
mended for facilitating such employment of persons who are unable to produce
birth certificates. That memorandum was concerned primarily with establishing
proof of birth in the United States in cases of prospective employees who are
imable, for one reason or another, to produce birth certificates. It has been the
experience of recent months that the securing of the delayed certificate of birth
Mentioned in that memorandum has, in some instances, been attended by con-
.siderable delay during which the services of the individual were not available in
■connection with the contracts in question. For this reason, it is deemed advisable
to rpcommend a revised procedure designed to fulfill the indicated requirements
of the statutes in question.
Accordingly, the previous memorandum is suspended and in l-ieu of the pro-
cedure set forth therein it is recommended that contractors and subcontractors
a-equire applicants for employment in the performance of any secret, confidential
•or restricted contract, or any contract for furnishing aircraft, aircraft parts,
or aeronautical accessories, to sign a statement in the presence of an Army or
Navy District Procurement, Factory or Plant Protection representative, to the
•effect that he is a citizen of the United States and that he has read and under-
stands the pertinent provision of the act. of June 28, 1940 (Public Law 671, 76th
'Cong.), as indicated by the inclosed form entitled "Declaration of Citizenship".
The foregoing recommended procedure does not relieve the employer from the
duty of making further investigation when there is any reason to doubt the truth
of applicant's declaration that he is a citizen.
Quotations from the pertinent statutes and a suggested form of declaration
of citizenship are attached hereto.
In els.
Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War.
FORRESTAL,
Under Secretary of the Navy.
Statutes Restricting Employment of Aliens in Connection with
Performance of Certain Contracts
"Sec. 10 (j) * * * no aliens employed by a contractor for furnishing or
■constructing aircraft, or aircraft parts, or aeronautical accessories for the United
States shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications or the work
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13283
under construction or to participate in the contract trials without the written
consent beforeliand of the secretary of the department concerned." (Act of
July 2, 1926, 44 Stat. 787; 10 U. S. C. 310 (j).)
"Sec. 10 (p) * * * and any person, firm, or corporation that shall, uponr
indictment and trial, be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this
section shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding $20,000, or to be im-
prisoned not exceeding five vears, or both, at the discretion of the court." (Act
of July 2, 1926, 44 Stat. 788; 10 U. S. C. 310 (p).)
"Sec. 11 (a) No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret,
confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access
to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate
in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government
department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who willfully
violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this
subsection shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both." (Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 676; 50 U. S. C., App. 1.)
"Sec. 11 (b) Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or.
restricted Government contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status,,
or who makes such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment,,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five j'^ears, or-
both." (Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 676; 50 U. S. C , App. 1.)
Declaration of Citizenship
I, declare that
I am a citizen of the United States, by reason of
I am applying for employment on classified Government war contracts on work
which may be secret, confidential, or restricted in character. I am declaring my
citizenship for the purpose of securing such employment. I have read the law
herein quoted and am aware of the penalties imposed for misrepresentation.
(Public Law 671, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, Chapter 440, Section lib)
"Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Gov-
ernment contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes
such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
I was born in date
Witness ^
Signed
(Title and Address)
(Name)
(Title and Address) ~ ~
(H) Procedure Covering Manpower Commission on Labor Piracy
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 26, 194^~
Subject: Manpower Commission Policy on Labor Piracy.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Attached is the policy statement of the War Manpower Commission, issued
July 16, 1942, on "Pirating of War Workers"; and the procedure for cooperative
plans under this policy. These bulletins are to be considered in connection with
the Labor Piracy Bulletin (LS-5) issued by the Manpower Branch on June 20.
1942.
■ If natural born, indicate whether by birth in the United States or by birth in a foreign country of Ameri-
can parentage.
If by naturalization, indicate whether by naturalization by court proceedings, by naturalization of parent
or by marriage to a citizen of the United States, including dates and names of places, persons and title of court
involved.
' One of the two witnesses must be an Army or N^'avy District Procurement, Factory or Plant Protection
representative.
13284 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
2. It should be noted that the War Manpower Commission's procedure is not
to be applied on a Nation-wide basis, but to specific areas according to need. No
."Specific procedures are issued by the Commission, but it is provided: (a) that the
appropriate regional representative of the War Manpower Commission shall con-
fer with representatives of labor, employers and governmental agencies concerned
for the purpose of securing a cooperative agreement to avoid piracy or other dis-
ruptive employment practices; or (b) if a cooperative plan is not satisfactorily
completed, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may give notice that
the area constitutes a critical labor area and make provision for restrictions on
employers' hiring practices in that area.
3. Liaison Officers continue to have the responsibilities outlined in the Man-
power Branch bulletin on labor piracy, and the additional responsibility of co-
operating with the War Manpower Commission representatives in accordance
-with the above policy and procedure. Although it is the responsibility of the War
Manpower Commission to initiate all actions under its policy, the Liaison Office
should be alert to pirating practices, particularly where they affect War Depart-
ment production; should take initial action to prevent piracy; and should take
necessar}' steps to bring any employment situations involving piracy to the atten-
tion of the Manpower Commission authorities.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
Manual of Operations, War Manpower Commission
Date: July 16, 1942 Title: III
Section: 2-1
Designation: Policy.
Subject: Pirating of War Workers.
policy to prevent pirating of war workers
In our rapidly expanding war industries, thousands of skilled workers are re-
quired. In certain occupations- there are not enough skilled workers to meet the
immediate and future requirements of war industires. This shortage of skilled
workers has created needless labor turn-over and uncontrolled migration of
skilled labor. Such turn-over and migration results in wasteful and ineffective
utilization of skilled workers, which is likely to impede the war production pro-
gram to an increasing extent in those areas in which war production is concentrated.
Having so found, after consultation with the members of the War Manpower
Commission, and having further found, after such consultation, that the measures
herein provided are necessary to promote the effective mobilization and maximum
utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, by virtue of
the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission by
Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Commission, I
hereby declare the following War Manpower Commission policy:
I. if the maximum utilization of the manpower in a designated area has been
or is likely to be impeded because of (a) the concentration of essential war pro-
duction in any such area, (b) the shortage of workers for designated occupations
therein, (c) an excessive rate of turn-over among such workers, or (d) the migra-
tion of such workers to other areas, the appropriate regional representative of the
War Manpower Commission shall confer with the representatives of management
and labor in such area and with such regional or local representatives of the War
Production Board, the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United
States Maritime Commission, the United States Employment Service, the United
States Civil Service Commission and such other agencies or departments as may
be affected, with a view to securing the concurrence of all affected parties in a
cooperative plan for the effective recruitment and utilization of workers in such
area and for the effective elimination of practices which result in the withdrawal
of workers from employers engaged in essential activities in such area. Upon the
approval of such a cooperative plan by all affected parties, or upon the failure of
such affected parties to concur in such a cooperative plan with reasonable prompt-
ness, the appropriate regional representative of the War Manpower Commission
shall submit a full report thereof to the Chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13285
II. Upon approving a cooperative plan which effectuates the purpose set
forth in this poUcy and which has been concurred in with respect to any designated
area, or upon approving a report that such a plan is needed and has been sought,
but has not been concurred in by all affected parties with reasonable promptness,
the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission will give notice that such area
constitutes a critical labor area, and that with respect to such area, specified
occupations and activities constitute, respectively, critical occupations and
essential war production activities.
III. After the publication of such a notice with respect to a given area it is
essentia] that no employer:
(a) Solicit (for the purpose of hiring) or hire, within or without such critical
labor area, for work to be performed wholly or principally within such area, or
(b) Solicit (for the purpose of hiring) or hire, within such critical labor area,
for work to be performed wholly or principally without such area, any worker
who on or after the effective date of this policy was employed at any place in an
occupation, designated as a critical occupation and an activity designated as an
essential war production activity, except (1) through a public employment office
of the United States Employment Service, or (2) in accordance with standards,
methods or conditions approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission or his authorized representative, or (3) in accordance with the cooperative
plan for such area which may include clause (1) or clause (2) hereof or both such
clauses. As used in this policy, the phrase "solicit (for the purpose of hiring)"
means any activity, including any written or oral communication or publication,
designated or intended to induce any individual to accept employment in a given
plant, factory, or other establishment.
IV. Any worker or employer, or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied
with any act or failure to act pursuant to this policj' shall be given a fair oppor-
tunity to present his or their case to an Industrial Area Management-Labor
Committee. Such Committee shall make recommendations concerning such
cases as well as other matters pertinent to the carrying out of this policy in its
area, to the War Manpower Area director for appropriate action. The Chairman
of the War Manpower Commission shall prescribe rules, regulations and pro-
cedures for the carrying out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this
policy, including procedures for the review of the recommendations of the Area
Committees, by Regional Management-Labor Committees and by the National
Management-Labor Policy Conmiittee.
V. AH lawful and appropriate steps will be taken to utilize the services, facili-
ties and authorities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government
to the fullest extent to achieve or promote compliance with the provisions of this
policy.
Approved :
Paul V. McNutt, Chairman.
Effective date: July 16, 1942.
Original filed in oflfice of Executive Director,
August 1, 1942,
Procedure for Development, Approval, and Operation of Cooperative
Plans Under War Manpower Policy to Prevent Pirating op War
Workers
I. initiation of action and submission of report
No action shall be taken under the War Manpower Policy to Prevent Pirating
of War Workers (hereinafter referred to as the "Policy") except upon the au-
thorization and direction of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Com-
mission. The Regional Director shall designate a particular area and shall au-
thorize and direct the appropriate regional representative of the War Manpower
Commission to initiate and attempt to secure agreement upon a cooperative plan
in the designated area as provided in Paragraph I of the Policy. As early as
practicable thereafter, the Regional Director shall submit a full report tb the
Director of Operations for submission to the Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission.
13286 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
II. CONTENT OF REPORT
The report of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission shall
include the following:
1. The participants in the negotiations:
(a) Government representatives: These must include in all cases,
representatives of the War Manpower Commission and of the
United States Employment Service. Representatives of the
War Production Board, United States Army, United States Navy,
United States Maritime Commission, and the United States Civil
Service Commission, if affected by the plan or policy must also
be included, as well as representatives of any other Federal agencv
or department so affected.
(b) Management representatives: The report must clearly indicate, by
description of the method of selection and otherwise, that the
management representatives were truly representative of manage-
ment affected by the plan or policy in the designated area.
(c) Labor representatives: The report must clearly indicate, by de-
scription of the method of selection and otherwise, that the labor
representatives were truly representative of labor affected by the
plan or policy in the designated area.
2. The nature of the problem which the cooperative plan is designed to meet:
(a) Necessity for plan : The report must indicate the reason why maxi-
mum utilization of manpower in the designated area has been or
is likely to be impeded, whether because of the concentration of
essential war production in any such area, the shortage of workers
for the designated occupations therein, an excessive rate of turn-
over among such workers, or the migration of such workers to
other areas, or any combination of these.
(b) Critical labor area: The report must describe with precision the
area proposed to be designated as the "critical labor area" for the
purposes of the plan and the policy.
(c) Essential war production activities: The report must indicate the
war production activities, including the names of principal plants
and their products, proposed to be designated as "essential war
production activities" for the purposes of the plan and the policy,
and should indicate the names of principal plants in the area not
proposed to be so designated.
(d) Critical occupations : The report must indicate the occupations pro-
posed to be designated as "critical occupations" for the purposes
of the plan and the policy, and insofar as possible the unions with
which workers in such occupations are affiliated.
(e) Hiring methods: The report must indicate the standalrds, methods
or conditions of hiring and solicitation for the purpose of hiring,
which are to be applicable under the plan.
3. Agreement or disagreement: The report must indicate whether all affected
parties concur in the plan and, if not, the individuals, organizations or agencies
which were in disagreement, or which did not with reasonable promptness indi-
cate concurrence in the plan, including reasons for any disagreement or failure
to concur.
4. A true copy of the cooperative plan, if any concurred in by representatives
of all affected parties, shall accompany the report.
III. PROVISIONS REQUIRED IN ANY APPROVABLE COOPERATIVE PLAN
1. The plan must clearly specify the area in which it will be applicable.
2. The plan must provide that after the effective date of the plan no employer
shall solicit (for the purpose of hiring) or hire, within or without the area for work
to be performed wholly or principally within the area, or solicit (for the purpose
of hiring) or hire, within the area for work to be performed outside the area, any
worker who after the effective date of the plan was employed in a critical occupa-
tion in an essential war production activity, except through a public employment
office or in accordance with methods approved by the Chairman of the War Man-
power Commission or his authorized representative.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13287
3. The plan must provide for the participation of the industrial area manage-
ment-labor committee in accordance with such rules, regulations, and procedures
as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall prescribe.
4. The plan must embody the principles governing movement of workers be-
tween plants as outlined in section V below.
5. The plan must provide that it shall become effective on and after the date of
publication of the notice given bj^ the Chairman of the War Manpower Commis-
sion pursuant to paragraph II of the Polic}'.
6. Employers, labor organizations, and Government agencies concurring in
the plan shall agree to adhere to its provisions.
IV. PROVISIONS PROHIBITED IN ANY APPROVABLE COOPERATIVE PLAN
1. No plan shall establish a procedure whereby certain individuals, predesig-
nated by name or other identification, will be denied employment.
2. The plan shall not contain any provision which would violate any Federal
law, or any rule, regulation, order or requirement thereunder affecting labor
relations, wages, hours, or conditions of employment. Nor shall the plan contain
any provision which might conflict with a determination of the National War
Labor Board or a stabilization agreement approved by the War Production
Board.
3. No plan shall contain a provision which violates a bona fide collective
agreement.
4. No plan shall be construed to prohibit the employment by any employer of a
worker who after the effective date of the plan has been employed at wages or
under working conditions substantially less favorable than those prevailing in
the community for the kind of work on which he was employed, even though he
may have been engaged at a critical occupation and in an essential war production
activity.
v. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPROVED MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
1. A worker who is employed in an activity other than an essential war pro-
duction activity may, without restriction, (except as provided in paragraph 3
below) be hired by an employer for work in an essential war production activity.
If such worker applies to the United States Employment Service, he shall be
referred in accordance with the procedures for preferential referrals. (War
Manpower Commission Directive No. Ill) ;
2. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 5. below, a worker who is em-
ployed in an essential war production activity shall hot be hired by an employer
for work in an activity other than an essential war production activity. If such
a worker applies to the United States Employment Service, the employment office
will attempt to persuade him to return to his previous employer or to accept
another position in accordance with the procedures for preferential referrals,
whichever appears more likely to serve the war effort;
3. All employments by departments and agencies of the Federal Government
which are subject to the rules and regulations of the United States Civil Service
Commission, shall be made only with the approval of the United States Civil
Service Commission, which will conduct its recruiting activities and make re-
ferrals in accordance with the Principles Governing Approved Movement of
Workers ;
4. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 5 below, a worker who after the
effective date of the plan was employed in an essential war production activity
shall be employed by another employer engaged in an essential war production
activity only upon presentation of a written statement by the former employer to
the effect that the worker is available for employment elsewhere in an essential
war production activity. The statement shall preferably be given to the United
States Employment Service (or the United States Civil Service Commission in
cases involving employment in the Federal Civil Service) which shall attempt to
place the worker according to the procedure governing preferential referrals; but
if the plan so provides, the statement may be given directly to the worker who
may present it to the prospective employer provided it is ascertained that the
latter is engaged in an essential war production activity;
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 4 above, a worker who,
after the effective date of the plan, has been engaged m an essential war production
activity, m9,y upon p.pplic.tion to, and referral by the United States Employment
Service, be employed by another employer whether or not for work in an essential
60396— 42— pt. 34 16
13288 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
war production activity and with or without a statement of availability, if the
circumstances are such as to indicate that the change of employment is in the best
interests of the war effort as well as the individual concerned. The following
circumstances are illustrative of what may be considered good ground for changes
of employment:
(a) When the worker is competent to perform higher skilled work than his
current employer is able or willing to provide;
(b) When the worker is employed for a substantial period at less than full
time;
(c) When the distance between the worker's residence and the place of
employment is unreasonably great (consideiing the restrictions on the
use of gasoline and tires and the load on transportation facilities) and
the place of prospective employment is substantially closer or more
accessible;
(d) When the worker has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change,
VI. NOTICE OF CHAIRMAN OF WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION MAKING PLAN AND POLICY
OPERATIVE
Upon submittal of the report and copy of the cooperative plan, if any concurred
in by all affects d parties, to the Chairman of the Wai Manpower Commission by
the Director of Operations, the Chairman, if he approves the same, shall give and
publish appropriate notice specifying the area which constitutes the critical labor
area, the occupations which constitute critical occupations, and the activities
which constitute essential war production activities. Upon publication of such
notice, Paragraphs III, IV, and V of the policy, and the piovisions of any approved
cooperative plan shall become immediately operative.
VII. PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF CONTROVERSY AS TO OPERATION UNDER PLAN
1. Cases of non-adherence or of aisputed interpretation may be raised by the
employer threatened with the loss of a worker, by the employer proposing to hire
a worker, by the worker, by any affected labor union or other labor organization
or by an affected Government department or agency;
2. Cases of nonadherence or disputed interpretation shall be referred to the
area War Manpower Commission representative (or if there be none, to the mana-
ger of the local employment office designated for that puipose), except in cases
involving only Federal Government employment which shall be referred to the
district manager of the United States Civil Service Commission designated for
the purpose. The area War Manpower Commission representative or the district
manager of the United States Civil Service Commission, as the case may be, shall
make a decision thereon and shall attempt to secure agreement in the decision
by all parties concerned;
3. If any party concerned is dissatisfied with the decision of the area represen-
tative, he may request review of the same by the Industrial Area Management-
Labor Committee which shall, in accordance with rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures prescribed by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, make
appropriate recommendations to the area War Manpower Commission repre-
sentative and intitiate such review of its recommendations as may be proper
under applicable procedures.
Frank J. McSherry,
(Brigadier General, U. S. A.),
Director of Operations,
War Manpower Commission.
(I) Minority Groups Service
War Department,
Civilian Personnel Division,
Manpower Branch,
Washington, D. C, July 25, 1942.
Subject: Minority Groups Service in War Manpower Commission Areas.
To: All Liaison Officers.
I. Attached is a list of Minority Groups Repr-esentatives of the War Manpower
Commission, with designations of the regions and areas served.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION
13289
2. Representatives of the Minority Groups Services will work out of Regional
War Manpower Commission offices through the various agencies represented
on the War Manpower Commission. Dr. Robert C. Weaver, Chief, Minority
Groups Services, War Manpower Commission, has instructed these representa-
tives to contact the Liaison Officers on problems involving the use of Negroes in
war work.
3. Liaison Officers are directed to contact these representatives at their earliest
convenience and to consult with them on labor supply matters within the field
of Minority Groups Service.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch
WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, MINORITY GROUPS SERVICE
Eepeesentatives
Area Covered: Maine, New Hamp-
shire, Vermont, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Massachusetts.
REGION 2
Area Covered: New York
REGION 3
Area Covered: Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, New Jersey.
Area Covered: Maryland, Virginia,
West Virginia, North Carolina,
District of Columbia.
Area Covered: Michigan, Ohio,
Kentucky.
Area Covered:
Wisconsin.
Area Covered: South Carolina,
Georgia, Tennessee, Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi.
Area Covered: Minnesota, Iowa,
North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska.
Area Covered: Missouri, Arkansas,
Kansas, Oklahoma.
Area Covered: Louisiana, Texas,
New Mexico.
Irea Covered: Arizona, Utah,
Colorado, Wyoming.
Area Covered: Washington, Ore-
gon, Nevada, California,
Mr. Neilson Abeel, Room 723, Chanin Building,
122 East 42nd Street, New York City, New
York Tel. Murray Hill 3-6805 Ex. 32.
Mr. Neilson Abeel.
Mr. E. Howard Molisani, U. S. Employment
Service, Juniper -fe Chestnut Streets, Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania.
Mr. Thomas Howard Wright, Room 1428 Civic
Opera Building, 20 North Wacker Drive,
Chicago, Illinois.
Miss Sara Southall (Consultant), 180 North
Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.
Lt. Col. Kendall Weisigei, Southern Bell Tele-
phone Co., Atlanta, Georgia.
Mr. Thomas Howard Wright .
Mr. Thomas Howard Wright.
Mr. Glenn 0. McGuire, Box 768, Albuquerque,
New Mexico. Tel., Albuquerque 6695.
Mr. Barron B. Beshoar, 626 Patterson Building.
Denver, Colorado.
Mr. Guy T. Nunn, Room 460, Roosevelt Build-
ing, 727 West 7th Street, Los Angeles,
California.
Philadelphia.
Washington,
D. C.
Birmingham.
Minneapolis.
Kansas City.
San Antonio.
San Fbancihco.
13290 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(J) Army-Navy Labor Policy
.War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, July 25, 1942.
Subject: Statement of Army-Navy Department Labor Policy, Government-
Owned, Privately Operated Plants.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Attached is a copy of the statement of labor polic}' governing Government-
owned, privately operated plants, which was recently adopted by the War and
Navy Departments and approved by the Congress of Industrial Organizations
and the American Federation of Labor. Attached is alistot Government-owned,
privately operated plants, showing the location, the name of the operator and the
name of the commanding officer. i
2. This policy statement was forwarded on July 17, by the Director of the Civi-
lian Personnel Division to the Commanding General, INIateriel Command, Army
Air Forces ; the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, and the Chief of Ordnance, with
instructions to transmit copies to the commanding officers at all Government-
owned, privately operated establishments with copies for the contractor-operators
at each plant. Each contractor-operator has been advised that no action may be
taken or agreement entered into which is inconsistent with anj^ of the provisions in
the statement of policy. The Congress of Industrial Organizations and the
American Federation of Labor have been requested to furnish copies of this state-
ment to their affiliated unions with similar instructions.
3. The Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in this policy except in
its interpretation and fulfillment by the Supply Services. The policy will be
further implemented by specific directives if necessary.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
June 22, 1942.
Statement of Labor Policy Governing Government-Owned, Privately
Operated Plants
Congress has charged the War and Navy Department with the responsibility
for the operation of nearly 100 giant Government-owned munitions plants, the
backbone of the Nation's armament program. Under the terms of the Congres-
sional Mandate, the War and Navy Departments had the option of themselves
operating the plants or operating them through the agency of selected qualified
commercial contractors. In order fully to utilize the labor and management
resources of the Nation and to minimize encroachment upon the country's indus-
trial structure, the two Departments chose the latter course. The industrial
units thus created are unique.
All are owned outright by the United States, and all but a very few are located
upon military reservations. All are engaged solely in war production — the
manufacture and loading of explosives and ammunition, the assembly of bombers
and the fabrication of guns and other munitions. In all of the plants the work
performed is of a secret or confidential nature, and in many of them it is highly
iiazardous. All are operated by private contractors under "Management
Service" contracts, any of which may at any time be terminated by the Govern-
ment if it should decide either to operate the plant itself or to entrust its operation
to another contractor. The normal factors which go to make up commercial
profit are lacking. The Government has title to the product at all times. It
pays the contractor a fixed fee for its services, which fee is unaffected by wages or
other costs, production delays or stoppages. The Government reimburses the
contractor for all costs, including wages, and in most instances must approve such
costs, including wage scales, in advance. The Army or Navy officer in charge may
direct the discharge of any employee if he deems it to be in the public interest.
These plants embody a new and unique tripartite relationship among Government,
labor, and management. They are sufficiently different from traditional Govern-
ment establishments so that existing Government policies regulating labor rela-
tions are not entirely suitable.
' This list no longer ava'lable.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13291
Recognizing these facts, and desiring to preserve the greatest freedom of
organization and collective bargaining by the employees which is compatible with
the necessarj^ discharge by the War and Navy Departments of their responsibility
for maximum production and the safe and efficient operation of these plants, the
War Department and the Navy Department have established the following labor
policies to which the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations have agreed after assisting in their preparation. It is recognized
that these policies do not cover all aspects of labor relations in these plants, and
experience may indicate the desirability of modifying, adding to, or otherwise
amending this statement of policy.
1. No employee or person seeking employment shall be discriminated against
by reason of race, color, creed, or sex.
2. The recognition of an exclusive bargaining agent for the employees in any
appropriate bargaining unit within any plant will be deferred until a majority of
the estimated total of that unit has been hired, unless special circumstances shall
justify an earlier designation of such exclusive bargaining agent. The War and
Navy Departments will undertake to estimate with reasonable promptness the
total employee complement of the appropriate unit.
3. While no recognition shall be accorded any organization as the exclusive
representative of any group of employees until the proper collective bargaining
agency shall have been determined under the conditions described above, pro-
vision will be made for the handling of grievances and other disputes, and the
elimination of friction between empioj^ees and management during the period
pending such determination. These procedures should be approved by the
representative of the Army or Navy in charge of operations at the plant.
4. Seniority shall be a determining factor in matters affecting lay-off and re-
employment, transfers, demotions and promotions only if other factors of ability
and aptitude are equal.
5. (a) Discharges directed by the War or the Navy Department for suspicion
of subversive activities will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the
"Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects
of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement," dated January 10, 1942.
(b) Discharges directed by the Army or Navy Officer in charge in the interest
of plant security will be handled in the following manner: (1) the Officer, or his
representative will direct the contractor to suspend the employee in question
immediateh^; (2) the employee will be advised in detail of the specific reasons for
his suspension and of his right to a hearing; (3) if requested, a hearing will be held
by the Offi.cer, or his representative, within a reasonable period and at such' hearing
the suspended employee will have an opportunity to produce witnesses and
present evidence and to be assisted by counsel; (4) based on such hearing, the
Officer, or his representative, will direct the reinstatement (with authority to
grant back pay) or the discharge of such employee; (5) an employee so discharged
will have the right, upon request, to have his case reviewed by the War or Navy
Department.
(c) Discharges effected by the contractor or his representatives for violation of
plant rules, inefficiency, or other reasons will be subject to review through the
established grievance procedure.
6. No agreement between the management and its employees, or their repre-
sentatives, except those which affect the safety and health of employees, may be
entered into, or action taken, which, in the opinion of either the Secretary of War
or the Secretary of the Navy, will have the effect of restricting or hampering
maximum output.
7. (a) Anti-sabotage, anti-espionage and plant protective measures, including
access into the plant, approved or prescribed by the War and Navy Department,
or their representatives, shall be binding upon management, employees, and their
representatives.
(b) Measures designed to guard against sabotage, espionage, subversive ac-
tivities and other plant protective measures which are ordered or approved by the
Army or Navy representatives shall insofar as practicable be prominently posted
throughout the plant and otherwise made available to employees. Violations of
any of these rules or regulations shall be grounds for disciplinary action, including
immediate dismissal.
8. (a) The War and Navy Departments in most instances, have contractual
responsibility for the approval of all costs including pay roll costs. These Depart-
ments therefore will from time to time jointly agree upon the policies to govern
the exercise of these contractual responsibilities to approve or disapprove proposed
wage scales at these plants.
13292 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(b) Before operations commence at any plant, the contractor will prepare a
wage scale to apply upon the commencement of operations and submit the same for
approval to the War or Navy Department through the local Army or Navy
representative at the plant, who will forward these with their own comments
regarding the appropriateness of the proposed scale. Any subsequent adjust-
ments in the initial wage scale at any plant shall be worked out by the contractor
and the employees through established procedures, provided only that the ap-
proval of the War or Navy Department must be obtained before such adjustments
may become effective.
9. This statement of policy shall be applicable to all such plants except that
where any provision of the statement conflicts with a provision in an existing
contract, such contract will be not altered except by mutual consent.
(K) Procedxjre for Handling Reports of Discrimination
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 17, 1942.
Subject: Suggested Procedure for Handling Reports of Discrimination Contrary
to Executive Order No. 8802.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Attached is a copy of a letter from the Under Secretary of War to the Chair-
man of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, now a part of
the War Manpower Commission. This letter should be considered in connection
with the policy statement and the list of Government-owned, privately operated
plants covered by bulletin LS-7.
2. The procedure has been accepted by the commit'tee and its field personnel
has been advised.
3. Liaison Officers will assume appropriate responsibility in the fulfillment of
this policy.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
Honorable Malcolm S. MacLean,
Chairman, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice,
Social Security Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Dr. MacLean: I am attaching hereto for your information and assist-
ance a list of Government-owned, privately operated plants under the supervision
of the War Department. As I shall indicate more fully below, these plants are
unique and deserve special treatment and consideration.
The plants, taken in the aggregate, constitute the backbone of the Nation's
armament program. Under the terms of the Congressional Mandate by which
their construction and operation was authorized, the War Department was given
the option of operating the plants itself or of operating them through the agency
of selected, qualified commercial contractors. The War Department chose the
latter course and in doing so created industrial units of a novel and peculiar
character. Among their most significant features are the following:
(1) Each plant, and the property on which it is situated, is wholly owned
by the Government, and, with very few exceptions, has been designated as
a military reservation.
(2) Each plant is, or when completed will be, wholly devoted to war pro-
duction— the manufacture and loading of explosives and ammunition, the
assembly of bombers, and the fabrication of guns and other munitions.
Most, if not all, will cease to operate when the war is concluded.
(3) In all of the plants the work performed is of a secret or confidential
nature, and in most of them it is highly hazardous.
(4) Most of the workers recruited for work in many of these plants will of
necessity be completely without experience in performing work of the hazard-
ous character required.
(5) All are operated by private contractors under "management service"
contracts, which can legally be terminated at any time if the Government
should decide either to operate the plant itself or to entrust its operation to
another contractor.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13293
(6) The entire cost of operating each plant is borne by the Governinent.
Under the contract with practically every operator, the latter is entitled
to reimbursement for all expenses of operation, but only where prior approval
of such expenses has been obtained from the War Department. In addition,
the operator receives a fixed fee for his services which fee is unaffected by
wages or other costs. .
(7) The Government has complete power to require the dismissal of any
person emploved in any of these plants if the continued employment of
such individual is, for any reason, deemed to be not in the public interest.
This power is specifically reserved by contract and can be exercised to
remove persons who are subversive or unqualified.
(8) Each plant is operated subject to the supervision of a Commanding
Officer.
The foregoing factors combine to form a unique relationship between the
operating contractor and the War Department, and, as you will immediately
appreciate, the handling of many problems, including that of discrimination,
must necessarily be slightly different than in the case of wholly private plants.
The primary responsibility for dealing with problems relating to the employment
of labor is with the contractor, since he is hired for the express purpose of utilizing
his skill and experience in running the plant and taking care of all questions of
personnel. Because of the relationship which obtains, however, the War Depart-
ment has a responsibility to see that each plant is operated in accordance with
all laws and Kxecutive Orders, and in such a manner as to provide for the safety
and protection of the plant and its personnel, and to insure maximum production
at a reasonable cost.
In the light of these facts, I suggest that, whenever your committee or one
of its field representatives has reasonable grounds for believing that the manage-
ment of any one of these plants is guilty of some form of discrimination by reason
of the race, color, creed or national origin of any employee, the following pro-
cedure be followed:
(1) The case will first be taken up at the local level by the representative
of your committee with the contractor-operator, notice of the nature of the
complaint being given simultaneously to the Commanding Officer at the
plant.
(2) Where your committee believes that a complaint of discrimination
is sound and that no satisfactory measures have been taken to meet the
complaint, and that any reasonable hope of settling the matter at the local
level has been exhausted, then your committee will immediately advise
Judge William Hastie, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War.
(3) Under no circumstances will your committee take formal or public
action in any case' until the War Department has had the opportunity to
use its good "offices to bring about compliance with the President's Executive
Order on this subject.
In my opinion, such a procedure, more than any other, possesses the means of
bringing about a greater measure of practical compliance with the spirit of the
foregoing Executive Order. I should hasten to add, of course, that this Depart-
ment intends, even apart from any charges or complaints which your committee
may discover, to see that these quasi-Government establishments are operated
in such a way as to preclude discrimination.
The list of facilities which is attached may be revised from time to time as
new plants are constructed or as new Commanding Officers are appointed to
any of the presently operating plants. In the event that the foregoing procedure
is acceptable to your committee, I suggest that a copy of this list of plants, as
well as a copy of this letter, be furnished to all of your field personnel. In turn,
I would suggest that you furnish me with a list of your personnel, together with
the region in which each is stationed.
Would you kindly advise me at the earliest possible moment whether the
procedure outlined is acceptable to the committee?
Sincerely yours,
Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War. ■
13294 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(L) Acceptance op Honorable Discharge Certificates in Lieu of Birth
Certificates
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, July 25, 1943.
Subject: Statute requiring "Defense Contractors to Accept Honorable Dis-
charge Certificates in Lieu of Birth Certificates."
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Attached is a copy of Public Law 620, 77th Congress, approved June 22,
1942. Copies of the Statute will be published in a War Department bulletin
issued to all Chiefs of Supply Services.
2. Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in connection with this
Statute except to assist in its interpretation and use by the Supply Services and
' 'Defense Contractors" as defined in the Statute.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(Public Law 620— 77th Congress)
(Chapter 432— 2nd Session)
(H. R. 6634)
AN ACT Tolfacilitate the employment by defense contractors of certain former members of the land and
naval forces, including the Coast Guard, of the United States
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That no defense contractor shall deny employ-
ment, on account of failure to produce a birth certificate, to any person who
submits, in lieu of a birth certificate, an honorable discharge certificate or cer-
tificate issued in lieu thereof from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast
Guard of the United States, unless such honorable discharge certificate shows on
its face that such person may have been an alien at the time of its issuance.
Sec. 2. As used in this Act the term "defense contractor" means an employer
engaged in —
(1) the production, maintenance, or storage of arms, armament, ammuni-
tion, implements of war, munitions, machinery, tools, clothing, food, fuel,
or any articles or supplies, or parts or ingredients of any articles or supplies;
or
(2) the construction, reconstruction, repair, or installation of a building,
plant, structure, or facility;
under a contract with the United States or under any contract which the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the United States
Maritime Commission certifies to such employer to be necessary to the national
defense.
Approved, June 22, 1942.
(M) Policy Against Discrimination in Employment of Aliens
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, July 27, 1942.
Subject: Policy Against Discrimination in the Employment of Aliens.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Attached hereto is a copy of a statement by the President, dated July 12,
1942, concerning the national policy with respect to the employment of aliens
or former nationals of another country. This statement was issued by Colonel
Joe N. Dalton, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, to the Chiefs of the Supply
Services, with the letter of July 18, 1942, copy of which is attached. The state-
ment directs procurement offices to bring to the attention of the Regional Liaison
Officers of the Manpower Branch evidence of noncompliance when it cannot be
adjusted by the procurement offices.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13295
2. Liaison Officers are now charged with increased responsibility for preventing
obstruction to the proper employment of aliens. Upon receipt of notice of non-
compliance with the policy's statement, the following action should be taken:
a. Determine whether there is an actual case of noncompliance.
b. If noncompliance is not found, notify the source from which the com-
plaint was received.
c. If noncompliance is found, take practical steps to secure compliance by:
(1) Conference with the appropriate officers of the Supply Services
involved.
(2) Negotiation with the employer or contractor.
(3) Action through the local division, War Manpower Commission
and its minority groups service representative.
d. If satisfactory action cannot be obtained in the field, the matter should be
referred to the Headquarters, Manpower Branch.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonakd J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supplt,
Washington, D. C, July 18, 1942.
Memorandum for: The Commanding General, Material Command, Army
Air Forces,
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service,
The Chief of Engineers,
The Chief of Ordnance,
The Chief Signal Officer,
The Quartermaster General,
The Surgeon General,
The Chief of the Transportation Service,
The Commanding Generals, All Corps Areas,
The Chief of Administrative Services.
Subject: Employment of Aliens.
1. Attached hereto is a copy of a statement by the President dated July 12,
1942, concerning the national policy with respect to the employment of aliens or
former nationals of another country.
2. Copies of the foregoing statement should be immediately distributed to all
procurement offices by the Supply Services with instructions that such offices
advise all contractors within their respective jurisdictions of the national policy.
The foregoing policy is applicable to all contractors, whether operating with
privately owned or Government-owned facilities.
3. Any evidence of noncompliance with this policy which cannot be resolved
by the procurement officers should be brought to the attention of the Regional
Liaison Officer of the Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, Services
of Supply.
For the Commanding General:
Joe N. Dalton,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Administrative Branch.
Inclosure: Statement of the President on July 12, 1942, concerning employment
of aliens.
The President's Statement
The text of President Roosevelt's statement on July 12, 1942, concerning the
employment of aliens or former nationals of another country was as follows:
In order to clarify the policy of the Government in regard to the employ-
ment of aliens and other persons of foreign birth, the President today issued
the following statement:
1. Persons should not hereafter be relused employment, or persons at
present employed discharged, solely on the basis of the fact that they are
aliens or that they were formerly nationals of any particular foreign country.
A general condemnation of any group or class of persons is unfair and dan-
gerous to the war effort. The Federal Government is taking the necessary
steps to guard against, and punish, any subversive acts by disloyal persons,
citizens as well as aliens.
13296 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
2. There are tio legal restrictions on the employment of any person (A) in
nonwar industries, and (B) even in war industries, if the particular labor is
not on "classified" contracts, which include secret, confidential, restricted
and aeronautical contracts.
CONTRACT LAWS ARE STRESSED
The laws of the United States do provide that in certain special instances
involving Government contracts an employer must secure from the head of
the Government Department concerned permission to employ aliens. Section
11 (A) of the act of June 28, 1940, (Public No. 671, 76th Congress, 3d Session)
contains a provision that:
"No aliens employed by a contractor in the penormance of secret, con-
fidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access
to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to par-
ticipate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the
Government Dejiartment concerned has first been obtained."
The Air Corps Act. of 1926 has a similar provision:
"No aliens employed by a contractor for furnishing or constructing aircraft
parts or aeronautical accessories for the United States shall be permitted
to have access to the plans or specifications or the work under construction
or to participate in the contract trials without the written consent before-
hand of the Secretary of the Department concerned."
There are no other Federal laws wliich restrict the employment of aliens
by private emploj^ers in national war industries. There are no Federal laws
restricting the employment of loreign-born citizens of any particular national
origin.
3. Where, under the law, permission to employ aliens is required from the
War and Navy Departments, the alien shall go to the nearest office of the
United States Employment Service, which will furnish him with application
form, and assist him in filling it out. The completed form will then be sub-
mitted by the alien to the employer who will fill out the reverse side of the
form, and then immediately forward same to the Department concerned.
Upon receipt of the application, the Department will act promptly thereon,
in the normal case within forty-eight hours, and give its approval or dis-
approval, either of which shall be subject to change at any later time.
SPECIAL GROUPS PROVIDED FOR
4. In passing upon applications for permits, the Department will give
special and expedited consideration to nationals of United Nations and
friendly American Republics, and any other aliens, including enemy aliens,
who come within the following categories:
A. Aliens who have served in the armed forces of the United States and
have been honorably discharged.
B. Aliens who have, or who have had, members of their immediate family
in the United States military service.
C. Aliens who have resided in the United States continuously since 1916
without having returned to the country of origin within the last ten years.
D. Aliens who have married persons who, at the time of marriage, were
citizens of the ITnited States and who have resided in the United States
continuously since 1924 without having returned to the countrj' of origin
within the last ten years.
E. Aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens of the
United States and who had filed petitions for naturalization before Dec. 7,
1941.
5. Any inquiries or complaints hy aliens, pertaining to specific instances
of discrimination, or intentional failure to carry out the above procedure,
should be referred directly to the Committee on Fair Employment Practice,
Washington, D. C This committee wil' consider the complaints and take
such action as may be warranted in the particular case.
8. Any information concerning disloyal activities in war industries or
elsewhere, or indications of disloyalty on the part of persons employed in
war industries, should be reported immediately to the nearest office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Employees have the same duty in tliis
matter as have employers.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13297
(N) Procedure for Clearing Employment of Aliens on Government
Contracts
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, July 21, 1942.
Subject: Procedure for Clearing Employment of Aliens on Restricted and
Aeronautical Contracts.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. This memorandum supersedes the memorandum of April 20, 1942 (SLS 7).
The attached form "Alien Questionnaire" approved July 4, 1942, is a revision
of the form of October 7, 1940, and either form may be used. Copies of the
Statutes incorporated in the previous memorandum are also attached to this
memorandum.
2. As stated in the President's statement of July 12, 1942, there are no legal
restrictions on the employment of any person (a) in nonvi^ar industries and (b)
even in war industries if the particular labor is not on "classified" contracts
which include secret, confidential, restricted, and aeronautical contracts. How-
ever, the laws of the United States (see Statutes attached) provide that in certain
special instances involving Government contracts, an employer must secure
from the head of the Government Department concerned permission to employ
3. The Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in the employment
of aliens, except in cases of alleged discrimination, (see LS -) but the following
procedure is stated for their information and use in the interpretation of Supply
Services employment policies and in assisting the Supply Services and war
contractors.
4. The following procedure will be observed in clearing employment of aliens
on restricted and aeronautical contracts:
a. Permission for the employment of aliens on restricted and aircraft con-
tracts requires the submission of an application in quintuplicate on an
approved form. Copies of the approved form may be obtained from
a commissioned factory representative of the plant in which employ-
ment is desired, from the commanding officer of the procurement district,
or from the nearest office of the U. S. Employment Service. Applicationsf
should be submitted on the revised confidential questionnaire form o
July 4, 1942, a copy of which is attached or may be submitted on the old
confidential questionnaire form of October 7, 1940. Application also may
be submitted on mimeographed or typed forms as long as the contents
and arrangements of the standard forms are followed.
h. AppUcation forms should be filled out by (a) the alien for items referring
to his personal record and (b) the contractor for items referring to em-
ployment of the alien. Offices of the U. S. Employment Service will assist
aliens in filling out items referring to his personal record. Such items are
grouped on the face of the July 4, 1942 form.
c. Each case is decided upon its individual merits in the light of all of the
information available. It is, therefore, important that the maximum
amount of data be provided for a proper evaluation of the case. In an-
swering question 38 (item 22 on the October 7, 1940 form) full considera-
tion should be given to the interference of production which would result
from delay in obtaining a citizen to replace an alien, even though such a
replacement could be made \\ ithin a relatively short period of time. Lack
of sufficient information on the part of the employer to allow him to vouch
for his loyalty, as asked in question 50 (item 33 on the October 7, 1940,
form) does not in itself bar the alien.
d. When the Secretary of the Navy grants consent for the employment of an
alien, it is the practice of the VVar Department to grant similar consent
without further action on the part of either the alien or the employer.
When the approval of the Secretary of the Navy is accepted by the Sec-
retary of War, the alieii's employer is automatically so notified in writing,
Por the Director, Civilian Personnel Division :
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
13298 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Alien Questionnaire
confidential
Accomplished form to be submitted in quintuplicate by contractor seeking
written consent of the Secretarj' of War for employment of an alien in relation
to aeronautical or classified (secret, confidential or restricted) War Department
contracts. Date _
I.
Name of employer City State
2 3 4 5
Alien's full name (any alias?) Age Birthplace Citizen of what country?
6 7 8
Mairied or single Male or female Citizenship status of husband or wife
9 10 ^
Number of children Citizenship status of chOdren
11 12
First papers applied for (date) First papers received (date)
13 14
Second papers applied for (date) Why was naturalization delayed?
15. Date of last entry into United States:
16 17 18
Place of entry Name of ship Dates of prior entries (attach explanation)
19. Length of service with contractor:
20. Complete present address:
2 1. All previous addresses :
22. Former employers in and outside the United States (give dates of employ-
ment) :
23
Military or naval service (give dates and name of country)
24 25
Membership in organizations, societies, clubs, or committees Religion
26
Dates and places of any arrest with statement of offenses and disposition
27. Names, relationship, and addresses of members of immediate family living in
any foreign country : -_
In the United States:
28. Social Security Number: 29. United States Department of Justice
I have seen Social Security Alien Registration Number:
Card : I have seen Alien Registration Receipt
Card:
30. Is alien willing to bear arms for the United States against all enemies?
Confidential Signed
Alien's signature
TO BE executed BY THE CONTRACTOR
31 32
Name of employer Name of alien
33. Is contract a prime contract or a subcontract?
34. Indicate whether contract is an aeronautical, or classified (secret, confidential
and restricted) contract:
35. Government procurement agency for which work is being done:
36
Government's numerical designation of contract, such as (W-535-ac-13333)
37
Job title and description of alien's proposed duties under contract
38. Can alien be shifted to other work and replaced by a citizen without interfering
with production? 39. If not, state special qualifications:
40. Will alien have access to plans, specifications or work under aeronautical or
classified (secret, confidential and restricted) War Department contracts, or
will he be likely to participate in such contract trials?
f
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13299
41. Is material upon which alien is working subject to
42. Could sabotage be readily detected?
43. Would sabotage mean failure of performance of the finished product?
44. Will alien have access to information pertaining to new ideas, lolans or specifi-
cations, not generally known to the industry?
45
Has alien served as seaman since 193S? (Explain)
46. What is the reputation of alien for loyalty to the United States? __
47 -
Describe any rumors or incidents concerning alien's loyalty
48
Do you recommend consent for this alien's work in relation to the above contract?
49. Are you sufficiently well acquainted with ahen to vouch for his loyalty to the
United States? 50. If so, do you vouch for his loyalty?
Signed
Title
Recommendations of Army Factory Representative and/or District Procurement
Representative.
Signed Signed .
Confidential.
Approved July 4, 1942.
Statutes Which Govern the Employment op Aliens on Government
Contracts
"Section 10 (j) of the Act of July 2, 1926, the so-called Air Corps Act (Public
"No. 446, 69th Cong.) provides in part, 'no aliens employed by a contractor for
furnishing or constructing aircraft, or aircraft parts, or aeronautical accessories,
for the United States shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifica-
tions or the work under construction or to participate in the contract trials with-
out the written consent beforehand of the Secretary of the Department concerned'".
"Section 11 of the Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671, 76th Cong.), pro-
vides in part 'no aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret,
confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access
to the plans, or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate
in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government
Department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who willfully vio-
lates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsec-
tion shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both' ".
(O) Compliance With Executive Order Relating to Nondiscrimination
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 17, 1942.
Subject: Compliance with Executive Order No. 8802, Fair Employment Prac-
tices.
"To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Attached is the joint letter from the War Department, Navy Department,
.and the Maritime Commission to the Chairman of the Fair Employment Practice
Committee which is now part of the War Manpower Commission. This letter
was sent to the Army Air Forces and the Supply Services on August 3, with a cov-
• ering letter, copy of which is also attached.
2. This statement should be considered in conjunction with LS-7 and other
policy statements which will follow.
3. The Liaison Officers have the responsibility of assisting in the interpretation
-and fulfillment of these policies and of the settlement of any questions which arise
13300 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
under them.- They also have the responsibility of reporting to Headquarters any
problems which cannot be solved locally.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
August 3, 1942.
Memorandum For: The Commanding General, Mat^iriel Command, Army
Air Forces,
The Chief of Administrative Services,
The Chief of Engineers,
The Chief of Ordnance,
The Quartermaster General,
The Chief Signal Officer,
The Surgeon General,
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service,
The Chief of Transportation Service.
Subject: Compliance with Executive Order No. 8802 Relating to Non-
discrimination.
1. Attached hereto is a joint letter from the War Department, the Navy De-
partment, and the Maritime Commission to Mr. Malcolm S. MacLean, Chairman
of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, in response to
identical letters received by the foregoing from him relative to compliance with the
provisions of Executive Order No. 8802 which forbids discrimination by war
contractors against any person by reason of race, color, creed or national origin.
2. In accordance with the policy prescribed in the foregoing letter, you will, as
rapidly as possible, transmit to all contractors holding a contract of, or contracts
aggregating, more than $25,000, a letter in the following form:
Dear Mr. :
In view of the increasing need of securing the full and united use of the
Nation's resources in manpower in our war effort, it is desired to call your
attention again to the national policv expressed by the President in Executive
Order No. 8802. dated June 25, 1941.
Pursuant to the terms of this Executive Order, there is embodied in your
contract the provision:
The Contractor, in performing the work required by this contract,
shall not discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color,
or national origin.
The War Department looks to you to carry out this provision as well as
the other provisions of the contract, not only as a matter of contract obliga-
tion but also as a part of your contribution to the war effort.
Compliance with the contract calls for compliance with the Executive
Order. The President has stated in that Order that it is "the policy of the
United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of
workers in defense industries or Government because of race, creed, color,
or national origin", and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers
and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this Order, to
provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense
industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national
origin.
We deem your contract to thus require —
(a) that your practice in recruitment, in-service training and up-grading
of employees shall conform to this policy;
(b) that any reference to race or religion, if such exists, should be
deleted from your application for employment forms;
(c) that your recruitments should not be confined to any source that
results in discrimination against workers solely because of race,
creed, color, or national origin; provided, of course, that the National
Labor Relations Act and the laws regarding aliens must be com-
plied with;
(d) that 3'ou should not in any other way discriminate against loj'al,
qualified applicants or employees solely because of race, creed, color,
or national origin.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13301
This letter is not written because of any specific question having been
raised as to your compliance with this provision of your contract, but to
again call your attention to the matter and to the importance that is attached
to it in securing the full application of our resources to the war effort.
Sincerely yours,
(signature).
For the Commanding General:
James P. Mitchell,
Director, Civilian Personnel Division.
1 Incl., Joint Letter.
Hon. Malcolm S. McLean,
Chairman, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices,
Social Security Building, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. McLean: 1. This joint letter of the War Department, Navy
Department and Maritime Commission, which has been submitted to the War
Manpower Commission, is in reply to your identical letter to us of 26 May, 1942,
regarding compliance with Executive Order No. 8802, Fair Employment Practices.
2. The responsibilities of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission for en-
forcing the nondiscrimination principles of Executive Order No. , 8802 may
properly be considered under three general categories:
a. Government establishments, i. e.. Navy Yards, Army Arsenals, etc.
b. Government-owned, privately operated plants.
c. Privately owned, privately operated plants having Government contracts.
3. In considering this subject it is desirable to discuss the matter in order that
there may be a clear understanding and acceptance of our procedures by all
interested parties.
4. Government Establishments. — In regard to those Government establishments
which are under our jurisdiction, we have directed compliance with Executive
Order No. 8802.
5. Government-Owned, Privately Operated Plants. — In regard to the Government-
owned, privately operated plants, operating for our account, we will, through our
Inspectors-In-Charge, or Commanding Officers, instruct the contractor-operators
that their policies and procedure must conform to the principles of Executive
Order No. 8802. In this category, although the Government agency concerned
has a vital interest in the matter, it should not itself take over any of the details of
personnel matters, but should hold the contractor-operator to his contractual
obligations including maintenance of satisfactory labor-management relationships.
The Government agencies will concern themselves with insuring that the policies
followed in such plants shall be consistent with maximum production, good
management, safety and security of the plant, and with the principles of fair
employment practices set forth in Executive Order No. 8802.
6. Privately Owned, Privately Operated Plants.- — The situation regarding plants
in this category is somewhat different. The Government agencies do not have
direction over the personnel or other management procedures of such contractors,
even though they may be working on Government contracts. However, such
Government contracts now contain a nondiscrimination clause caUing for
compliance with Executive Order No. 8802. We are, therefore, prepared to
inform our contractors through the c^ustomary channels that the Government
agency concerned regards it as necessary that the contractor carry out his con-
tractual obligations regarding nondiscrimination and that the points enumerated
in paragraph 8 hereof are deemed essentia] elements of the contractual ql)ligation.
You will appreciate the point we are making in the foregoing, namely, that such
instructions shall not be interpreted as an intrusion upon the contractor's responsi-
bilities in handling personnel, but rather as a definition of an obligation that
already exists by virtue of the noudiscrimination clause in the contract. For the
same reasons we cannot intrude upon labor unions, employment agencies and
vocational training schools outside of our jurisdiction.
7. Recognizing that the methods of providing equal employment opportunities
for all qualified persons regardless of race, creed, color or national origin will vary
in different parts of the country and in different types of plants, the following
principles will be used as a general guide in handling minority group questions:
a. Efforts will be continued particularly in cooperation with the War Man-
power Commission to provide equal opportunities for employment.
13302 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
in-service training and advancement to all qualified citizens, regardless of
race, creed, color or national origin, to expedite maximum production.
b. Such equal opportunities for minority groups may be provided either
parallel to or integrated with the opportunities afforded majority groups,
and thus may be arranged and provided for to conform to existing State
laws and community customs.
c. In the practical application of this policy every effort will be made to open
available employment opportunities to minority groups in such numbers
and in such classes of positions as will expedite maximum production and
as governed by the available supply of qualified workers.
d. In the event of any misunderstanding we will be glad to clarify our positions
as set forth in this document with any specific agency or business con-
cerned.
8. The letters which we are prepared to issue in conformity with the foregoing
will include the following:
a. That Executive Order No. 8802 should be complied with, and specifically,
b. That recruitment, in-service training and up-grading of employees should
conform thereto.
-c. That any reference to race or religion should be deleted from employment
forms if such exist.
d. That recruitment should not be confined to any source that results in
discrimination against workers solely because of race, creed, color or
national origin, provided, of course, that the National Labor Relations
Act and the laws regarding aliens must be complied with.
e. That the contractor should not in any other way discriminate against
loyal qualified applicants or employees solely because of race, creed,
color or national origin.
9. Success in carrying out these policies must depend largely upon the coopera-
tion of all parties concerned, including the War Manpower Commission, the
Federal contracting agencies, your own Committee and minority groups, unions,
State and local officials and the citizenry of particular locahties. The molding
of public opinion in any given working force and community is of great importance
and should be the concern of all.
10. Notwithstanding the difficulty of this problem, we recognize the importance
of securing compliance, not only with the work, but with the spirit of Executive
Order No. 8802, and we will continue to cooperate with your Committee in all
practicable ways in reaching a satisfactory solution.
Very sincerely yours,
[s] Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War,
[s] Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy,
[s] E. S. Land,
Chairman, U. S. Maritime Commission.
(P) Housing Policies — To Conserve Critical Materials
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 25, 1942.
Subject: Housing — Conservation of Critical Materials.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Solution of labor supply problems in many critical areas is expected and in
some cases is undertaken by the in-migration of workers and the provision of
adequate housing for such workers. Employers and labor supply officers are
often too ready to subscribe to this apparently simple but, in fact, expensive and
wasteful method. Already, an acute shortage of raw and critical materials is
causing a curtailment of war production (guns, shells and other equipment), the
closing of plants, and the laying off of workers. The obvious answer to this
situation is the conservation of vital war materials for production of the imple-
ments of war.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13303
2. A source of vast waste of critical material is the thousands of tons of steel,
copper and other strategic metals being used to provide housing and auxiliary-
community services for war workers. In fact, the more houses constructed will
lessen the material available for combat against the enemy and, to illustrate, the
housing of one worker requires one ton of steel, 8,000 board feet of lumber and
548 working days. This use of material and man hours cannot continue in the
face of otlier less expensive and more adaptable methods of solution of labor
shortage problems.
3. The material problem requires that all manpower questions be investigated
and solved on an over-all basis, rather than by the easier method of mere in-
migration plus housing facilities. Needs for additional housing should be
appraised only after the local available labor market has been fully utilized. In
short, no support shuld be given to any new housing construction unless it is
determined that no other means of meeting the labor supply problem can be used.
4. The current material shortage will curtail future housing and, in many cases,
divert material from housing projects now under construction. It is imperative,
therefore, that all efforts be made to obtain cooperation of all groups, including
employers and labor, in a program to meet labor demands by full utilization of all
available labor already housed within reasonable commuting distance of war
production centers.
5. Liaison Officers will assume appropriate responsibility in all critical labor
shortage areas where housing projects are now under way or in contemplation,
to make sure that the appropriate governmental or private agencies involved
have thoroughly considered the following matters:
a. The Employment of Women — No housing project should be approved
unless the employers in the community or area have made an accurate
estimate of the number of jobs which cannot under any circumstances be
performed by women.
b. The Employment of Available Negro and Minority Groups — Under no cir-
cumstances should additional housing be approved unless the various
war employers and labor groups in the communit}^ or area have agreed
to make use of all available Negroes and minority groups such as aliens,
Jewish workers and workers with minor physical handicaps; provided,
however, that such groups of workers are already housed locally and
living in the immediate vicinity.
c. Curtailment of Civilian Industries — In many communities there is an
available reserve of labor both men and women, now engaged in non-
essential activities. Consideration should be given to the possibility
of the transfer of large numbers of such workers engaged in nonessential
occupations to more essential war work before any program for addi-
tional housing is approved. In many cases it may be possible to curtail
or shut down completely nonessential industries using strategic mate-
rials. Efforts in this regard will be further aided by curtailment and
concentration programs now being initiated here in Washington. This
will be accomplished in large measures by limitation orders and con-
centration orders which will be issued from time to time by the War
Production Board. In other words, before planning additional housing,
the possibility of curtailment of all nonessential activities to the bare
minimum is to be explored and considered.
d. More Intensive Utilization of Existing Housing — The President' of the
United States has warned the American people that they must be
ready to make sacrifices for the war program. In labor shortage areas
this means that workers and residents of various communities will have
to "double up" more on housing accommodations. The possibility of
the utilization of extra rooms in private dwellings should be explored
thoroughly before any new housing program is planned. In addition,
a program for the remodeling of existing dwellings to provide additional
space for housing more workers should be explored.
e. Other Methods — Local conditions may suggest methods other than those
listed above. If appropriate, these auxiliary avenues must be fully
explored,
6. The immediate application of the policies herein set forth is requested.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
60396— 42— pt. 34 17
13304 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
(Q) Transportation of Labor — Conservation of Equipment and
Rubber
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 25, 1942.
Subject: Transportation — Conservation of Equipment and Rubber.
To: All Field Liaison Officers.
1. Transportation is a paramount question in the solution of labor supply
problems which, too often, is attempted by the formulation of programs based
■upon the recruitment of labor residing in adjacent areas of varjdng distance from
a labor shortage area and the transportation of such workers to and from their
homes. Such a method, in many cases, is short-sighted and, except in the cases
of remote and isolated plants, is wasteful and detrimental to the war effort.
2. Conservation of such scarce critical materials as steel, cojiper, rubber and
oil is necessary to prevent a curtailment of war production and the closing of war
plants. The needless and unplanned use of transportation equipment, tires and
gasoline for the transportation of war workers is a condition which cannot con-
tinue in face of the material shortage. Transportation questions encountered in
the solution of labor supply must to the greatest extent possible be solved by the
application of methods other than programs based on the expectation that the
transportation equipment and tires will be available.
3. The available supply of public transportation facilities is inadequate to
meet the estimated needs for war production. Within a few months all available
equipment will be utilized to its fullest capacity. In addition, the supply of
rubber for private automobiles for war workers will likewise be drastically cur-
tailed so that recaps and tires will be sparsely rationed.
4. The maintenance of war production schedules requires the continuation of
the present transportation facilities, both public and private. The majority of
workers employed at war production plants ride to and from work in their own
automobiles. Failure to continue this mode of transportation would swamp
public transportation facilities. Consequently war workers' automobiles and tires
must be conserved to the fullest extent.
5. This problem requires drastic action and in the solution of labor supply prob-
lems no support or approval should be given to plans contemplating the allocation
or acciuisition of additional public transportation equipment, or to plans whereby
workers would be recruited and required to travel in their automobiles from
distant places. Only in those cases where the isolation of the plant is obvious or
peculiar local conditions exist, will equipment and tires be made available. It
is imperative, therefore, that appropriate action be taken on your responsibility
to obtain the cooperation of all groups in programs to meet the labor demand by
full utilization of all available labor within walking or reasonable transporting
distance of war production plants. The failure to invoke cooperative programs
designed to offset the need for transportation equipment and tires will only
accentuate the problem locally and nationally.
6. In all critical labor shortage areas where the allocation of additional public
transportation equipment is in contemplation or where considerable use of private
automobiles is made by war workers, the Field Liaison Officers shouid take aU
appropriate action to see that governmental and private agencies, as well as the
contractors and workers, have thoroughly considered the following matters:
a. Determination of Peak Employment: The number of war workers to be
employed in a given area must be determined. Also, monthly schedules
of manpower requirements till peak employment is reached should be
obtained. This data will provide a sound basis for traffic and trans-
portation surveys and estimates of needs for additional equipment.
6, The Employment of Women: The utilization of women will, in most cases,
partially eliminate the necessity of providing additional transportation
facilities and will prevent the recruitment of male workers who live at
considerable distances from the plant.
c. Employment of Available Negro and Minority Groups: No recruitment of
workers living in remote areas should be undertaken unless employers
and labor groups in the community or area have agreed to make use of
all available Negroes and minority groups who reside within walking
or reasonable commuting distance of a war production plant.
d. Intensive Utilization of Housing Facilities Adjacent to Production Plant: In
labor shortage areas, persons who have housing accommodations in the
immediate vicinity of a war production plant should be strongly urged to
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13305
make extra rooms in private dwellings or other housing facilities avail-
able for war workers. In addition, no housing project should be
planned or approved unless it is located in the immediate vicinity of the
plant. The recognition of these factors in housing war workers will be
helpful in alleviating actual or potential transportation problems.
e. Intensive Utilization of Private Automobiles: No program involving addi-
tional transportation equipment should be planned or approved unless
the war workers, through the cooperation of employers and labor
unions, institute and carry out a complete program for utilization of the
full capacity of private automobiles used by war workers, and for the
conservation of tires and gasoline. Such methods as "Share Your Car"
and car pools are recommended. In addition, the cooperation of tire
and gasoline rationing officials should be obtained so that these agencies
may cooperate in obtaining full compliance with the conservation pro-
gram .
/. Other Methods: Local conditions may suggest methods other than those
listed above. If appropriate and applicable, these auxiliary avenues
must be fully explored.
7. It is realized that the application of the above methods may vary as to
localities and as to war plants, but it is important that all possible methods to
conserve transportation equipment, tires and gasoline, be invoked so that some
alleviation of an already critical problem may be obtained. The fact is that
rubber, automobiles, busses and gasoline are critical and scarce, and that no steps
to meet labor supply problems should be taken which would in any manner
accentuate the gravity of this problem without considering and initiating any
other remedial methods.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(R) Employment of Women
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 26, 1942.
Subject: Employment of Women as a Part of the Community Labor Supply
Program.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Because of the impending drain on the Nation's manpower reserves for war
production and military service, it is obvious that larger and larger numbers of
women must be drawn into industrial employment. You have already received
information concerning the types of occupations suitable for women and also a
copy of a pamphlet ("Women in War Industries" by Helen Baker, Industrial
Relations Section, Princeton University) which outlines the techniques of utihzing
women in war production. This memorandum deals with the employment of
women as an element in the planning of community, or industrial area, labor
supply programs. In this connection, reference should be made to previous
memoranda on housing, transportation, and minority groups which also emphasize
the importance of utilization of local labor supply.
EMPLOYER attitudes ON EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
Most employers today will admit that they can replace men with women on a
substantial proportion of jobs, if they find it necessary to do so. In other words,
theoretically or statistically, employers are willing to absorb large numbers of
women in their working forces. In the meantime, however, employers may
follow a contrary course. As long as it is possible to attract male workers from
other areas, employers will prefer to use in-migrant labor rather than go to the
trouble of providing facilities and training for women workers. The attitude of
employers in utilizing minority groups in the community is very similar. They
naturally prefer to import farm boys or even steal trained workers from other war
employers before offering employment to the Negroes, Jews, aliens or other
minoritj' groups. There is pressing need for education of employers on this score.
The policy of the Government is that no additional housing or transportation
facilities for a community will be approved unless it is determined beyond a doubt
13306 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
that employers have already utilized available pools of labor in the area and have
formulated definite plans for utilizing women to replace men in all occupations
suitable for employment of women. If certain industrial areas become too con-
gested because of excessive in-migration of workers not already housed in the area,
the only alternative will be physical removal of certain types of war industry from
the coiiununity. Such a plan for the relocation of war work out of the Detroit
area has already been approved by Mr. Donald Nelson and the Plant Site Board
of the W. P. B. Similar drastic measures will be taken in other cities if employers
fail to utilize all available local supplies of labor.
Liaison Officers must inform every large war production employer in prospec-
tive labor shortage areas of these facts. These facts must also be presented to
employers' associations, Chambers of Commerce, and labor union groups through-
out your region.
WHEN SHOULD WOMEN BE
DRAWN INTO WAR PRODUCTION?
War production employers should not be encouraged to utilize women on a
large scale until all available male labor in the area has first been employed. In
this connection it is important that the male Negroes, Jewish workers, aliens and
other minority groups be fully employed before women who are not normally
part of the labor market be recruited in large numbers. For example, a drive to
recruit large numbers of women for war production when Negroes are still unem-
ployed in the area will stir up bitter controversy on the race problem and lay the
groundwork for future discontent and dissension in the community.
After local male labor is absorbed, a drive for the employment of women in
war industries should be launched at the same time as a drive for the transfer of
male labor from civilian industries to war production plants. In this way, women
can be utilized in war plants, and, at the same time, those not suited for war
production occupations can take the jobs left vacant by men in essential civilian
industries.
All available women should be employed before male labor is imported from
other areas to fill jobs that might be performed by women.
Liaison Officers are instructed to make sure that this point is impressed upon
local agencies charged with administration of the manpower program.
VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION OF WOMEN FOR WAR EMPLOYMENT
Most of the women who must eventually be brought into industry are not now
part of the labor market; they are not actively seeking employment, and perhaps
have little training or experience. In order to estimate and classify the avail-
able reserve of womanpower in a particular area, therefore, it may be necessary
to request all women over 16 to 18 years to register. It is important to note that
registration is made for the purpose of securing an inventory of available women;
registration is not, in itself, a means of recruiting women for war work.
In the recent registration of women which was conducted in the Detroit area,
registration cards, or questionnaires, were distributed by the Post Office to every
home and dwelling in the area. The cards were then mailed by the women
registering to the United States F]mployxnent Service. The USES then
classified the cards and undertook a recruitment of those women who seemed
best fitted for employment.
There are three factors vital to the success of any program for registration of
women. First, the registration must be given active publicity. Second, the
registration should be undertaken only when the demand for women in war
work IS extensive and immediate. Third, the regi.<^tration should be made through
an official Federal agency such as the Post Office which has sufficiently wide cover-
age. Attempts to register women through schools, air raid wardens, or Boy
Scouts have had varied degrees of success. Likewise, where city officials have
devised systems of registration the results have been bad. The registration
must be initiated and sponsored by the proper Federal agencies such as the War
Manpower Commission.
Liaison Officers must inform Headquarters of registration of women before
lending their backing and support to the program. Likewise, Liaison Officers
should oppose any plan of registration which is unsound for any of the reasons
set forth above.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13307
COMMUNITY PROGRAMS NECESSITATED BY THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
The employment of women in factories naturally necessitates the installation
of necessary rest room facilities in the plant. Materials for such installations
will be given priority over materials for new housing for war workers.
Another necessary program is training. The pre-employment vocational
schools should make provisions for the training of women in accordance with
specific requirements of employers who expect to hire them. In addition, the
companies must be required to set up the necessary in-plant training programs
for women after they are on the job. The particular personnel problems con-
nected with the employment of women are well presented in the booklet, "Occu-
pations Suitable for Women," published by United States Employment Service,
February 1942. If large numbers of married women with children are drawn
into industrial employment, provision must be made for the care of the children
while the mother is at work. A separate memorandum on day-care of children
of working mothers will be issued later. In the meantime, however, Liaison
Officers should impress upon the appropriate community groups the necessity for
planning on this score.
ATTITUDES OF ORGANIZED LABOR
In general, labor is not opposed to the employment of women in war indus-
tries provided that local unemployed male workers are first absorbed. In every
case, however, organized labor groups should be consulted regarding any pros-
pective program for the recruitment and employment of women in industry.
Their support and active participation in the program must be secured in advance.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(S) Labor Relations Activities
War Department,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Washington, D. C, August 31, 1942.
Subject: Labor Relations Activities.
To: All Liaison Officers.
1. Because of the pressing importance of certain manpower problems in many
areas, it is important that all Field Liaison Officers devote the major portion of
their time to the solution of these prolilems rather than to labor relations matters.
2. In view of the foregoing, Field Liaison Officers shou'd limit their labor rela-
tions activities to the following:
(a) Reporting to Headquarters, S. O. S., any situations which, in their
opinion, will very seriously interfere with war production, together with
any special recommendations concerning action which may be needed.
(b) Carrying out specific assignments which may from time to time be given
by Headquarters, S. O. S.
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division:
Leonard J. Maloney,
Chief, Manpower Branch.
(T) Award of Contracts to Seattle Firms
August 22, 1942.
Memorandum for the Quartermaster General.
Subjp.ct: Contracts Awarded by Quartermaster Corps in Seattle, Washington.
1. Attached is a list of contracts awarded by Quartermaster Depots to Seattle
manufacturers since May 1, 1942. In this period it appears that contracts
amounting to over $4,000,000 for clothing, equipage and general supplies have
been placed in this area.
2. At the present time Seattle is faced with a very serious shortage of labor
which will be extremely critical within a very few weeks. It is doubtful whether
sufficient labor will be forthcoming to meet the mounting demands for workers
13308 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
by the shipyards, the Boeing aircraft factories, and the Pacific Car and Foundry
Tank plant in the Seattle area A copper refinery at Tacoma has already cur-
tailed operations because of a labor shortage. A strategic plant manufacturing
items for the Chemical Warfare Division is unable to operate because of inability
to secure labor. In addition, the production of aluminum in this area is threat-
ened for the same reason.
3. In the face of this drastic situation, the textile industry in Seattle has been
called upon to expand its employment as a consequence of the new Army orders
placed in the area recently. The textile firms are unable to meet the wage scales
of other war production plants in the area, and are experiencing rising turn-over
of labor. One company, for example, hired seventy-three new workers in the
last sixty days, but had sixty quits in the same period.
4. On the other hand, labor supply in other cities is still in excess of demand.
For example, there are currently about 400,000 unemployed workers in New
York City. The Army has been under criticism for failure to locate more war
contracts in the New York area.
5. In the light of the facts set forth above, it is requested that you explore the
possibilitj' of transferring as many of your present contracts as possible out of
the Seattle area to other areas where the labor supply situation is less critical.
The labor now employed by your contractors in Seattle must sooner or later be
absorbed by other war industries whose location cannot be changed. The trans-
fer of this labor to other industries, of course, will only result in failure of your
contractors to meet delivery schedules, if action is not taken at once to transfer
your contracts to other areas.
6. \^ e will be glad to assist members of your organization in recommending
areas where your contracts might be placed with tJie assurance that there will
be labor available Tor successful completion.
For the Commanding General:
James P. Mitchill,
Director, Civilian Personnel Division.
(U) Action To Relieve Critical Labor Shortage in Buffalo, N. Y., Area
August 22, 1942.
Memorandum for the Chiefs of All Supply Services.
Subject: Critical Labor Shortage, Buffalo, N. Y., Area.
1. The production requirements placed upon war industries in the Buffalo,
N. Y., area (Erie and Niagara Counties) have created a critical labor supply
problem, which will become acute by October 1, 1942. To meet this situation
the Manpower Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division, Headquarters, Services
of Supply, is initiating a program, with the cooperation of the War Manpower
Commission, whereby the available labor market in the Buffalo area will be fully
utilized. The program contemplates the recruitment of women, the transfer of
workers from nonessential industries to war work, and the use of other methods
to meet the labor shortage. If necessary, a curtailment of present production
activities in this area will be recommended to prevent a break-down of the present
war production schedules.
2. It is apparent that an increase in the number of war contract placements
in this area will only serve to aggravate a problem already serious. Such action
would tend to require revised estimates of labor needs and would disrupt the
application of methods of solution of the labor shortage. In addition, it is
extremely doubtful that the labor supply in the area is sufficient to produce or
manufacture any additional war material.
3. It is requested that no additional contracts for war material be placed in
the Buffalo area, as described above, unless this Division receives prior notice
thereof. It is further requested that field procurement officers be advised of the
contents of this memorandum.
By command of Lieutenant General Somervell:
James P. Mitchell,
Director, Civilian Personnel Division.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13309
(V) Pre-Induction Training Procedures
Services op Supply
civilian personnel division
Manpower Branch
Pre-Induction Training Section
M. M. Peake— Chief
July 27, 1942.
Agreement has been reached between the Oflfice of Education and the Pre-
Induction Training Section, Manpower Branch, Civihan Personnel Division, on
the following basic policies and procedures for the Pre-Induction Training Section.
1. The United States Office of Education will act as a channeling agency for
the pre-induction education and training, using present machinery and
funds now available or hereafter to be appropriated for such train-
ing programs as the Army may require.
a. Appropriations exist which may be utilized with concurrence of
War Manpower Board for training in:
2,G00 vocational schools.
3,700 rural community schools.
200 colleges.
(These present accommodations are estimated as sufficient to
train 200,000 additional trainees per month.)
h. Basic training and beginning technical specialization may be offered
in 28,000 secondary schools and 1,740 colleges.
c. Full-time training to ineet critical needs for occupational specialists
may be provided for civilian employees of the War Department,
who have been selected by the Civil Service Commission in
collaboration with the United States Employment Service and
local Selective Service Boards from men classified for military
service.
d. Part-time courses for voluntary enrollment by men of draft age.
e. Full-time elective courses offered voluntarily by schools and
colleges to their day-school students.
2. The pre-induction training programs offered under this plan will be
administered by the United States Office of Education and will be given
supervision by the Pre-Induction Training Section, Manpower Branch,
Civilian Personnel Division, Headquarters, Services of Supply, to insure
achievement of the training objective desired by the Army.
3. There will be established continuous and effective liaison with the Office
of Education and the Pre-Induction Training Section, Manpower
Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, for the pur-
pose of making pre-induction training programs most effective through
the joint determination and promulgation of policies and procedures
within the limits of the legal authority of the two agencies.
4. The cooperation of any other agencies, public or private, which is neces-
sary to implement and effectuate the pre-induction training program,
will be sought.
(W) Recommendations of a Conference of Members of Management
AND Labor in Xonferrous Metals and Lumbering Industries in the
Western States, Held in Washington, D. C, September 3-4, 1942
Recognizing the existence of certain basic conditions responsible for the undue
migration and transfer of workers from the nonferrous-metal and lumbering
industries in the western States with the ensuing curtailment of production
which seriously impairs the war effort, it is the sense of this conference called by
the Government to increase the production of copper, aluminum, lead, zinc,
other nonferrous metals and lumber to meet the needs of the war effort; and
13310 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
1. That the various agencies of Government concerned should expedite their
efforts to remedy the various basic conditions responsible for unnecessary migra-
tion including those agencies dealing with wages, housing facilities, t'ires and
transportation, and recruitment for the Armed Services;
2. That as, if, and when it is determined by the Chairman of the War Man-
power Commission that specific action is necessarv for the promotion of the
national war effort, it is the sense of this conference that the attached plan,
formulated pursuant to and in accordance with the War Manpower Commission's
anti-pirating policy and procedures approved by the Managem.ent-Labor Policy
Committee, July 16, 1942, appears at present the most desirable instrumentality
to attain the end sought;
3. That when such plan is made operative the participants in this conference
hereby pledge themselves to cooperate in every practical way with the Govern-
ment in carrying out such program.
COOPERATIVE PLAN TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY MIGRATION
1. That the following States shall be declared by the Chairman of the War
Manpower Commission to be a critical labor area for the purposes of this plan:
Arizona Utah Oregon
Colorado Wyoming Washington
Idaho California New ]Mexico
Montana Nevada Texas
_ 2. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall designate as activi-
ties essential to war ])roduction all nonferrous metal, mining, milling, smelting
and refining and all logging and lumber industries in the critical area named above.
3. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall designate as critical
occupations all production and maintenance occupations in the activities essential
to war production as named above.
4. After the effective date of this plan, no worker engaged in an essential war
production activity shall seek employment in any other activity, whether essential
or nonessential to war production, without first obtaining "from a designated
representative of the United States Employment Service a certificate of separation.
5. No employer in the critical labor area, whether conducting activities essential
or nonessential to war production, shall employ any worker who, after the
effective date of this plan, had been engaged in a critical occupation in an essential
war production activity within the designated critical area except upon presenta-
tion of a certificate of separation issued by the United States Employment Service.
6. Each employer conducting an activity listed in paragraph 2 above essential
to war production in the designated critical area shall, when work is available,
refrain from separating any worker, except in cases of gross misconduct, without
the approval of a designated representative of the United States Employment
Service. Such approval shall be granted only when continued employment of
the worker in his present job will no longer contribute to the war production
program.
7. Any worker applying for employment with an employer in any of the in-
dustries essential to war production in the designated critical area who feels that
he is being denied employment for some reason other than his lack of qualifica-
tion and physical fitness for performing the job for which he is an applicant,
may request a designated representative of the United States Employment Serv-
ice to intercede in his behalf. The representative of the United States Employ-
ment Service will investigate the facts, and if he concludes that the worker is
being refused employment on grounds other than lack of qualification or physical
fitness for performing the job, he shall endeavor to persuade the employer to
reconsider his decision and employ the worker. If an adjustment satisfactory to
the worker is not achieved, the case shall be referred to the War Manpower Com-
mittee for appropriate action.
8. Any worker engaged in a critical occupation in an essential war production
activity within a critical area as designated will upon request, be given a certifi-
cate of separation by the United States Employment Service if the circumstances
are such that his separation is in the best interests of the war effort, as well as the
individual concerned, or if a refusal to grant such separation certificate would
result in hardship and injustice to the individual.
The following circumstances are illustrative of what may be considered good
ground for separation'
(a) When the worker is competent to perform higher skilled work than his
current employer is able or willing to provide.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13311
(b) When the worker is employed for a substantial period at less than full
time.
(c) When the distance between the workers' residence and the place of em-
ployment is unreasonably great, considering restrictions on the use of
gasoline and tires and the load on transportation facilities.
(d) When the worker has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change.
(e) When the worker is employed at wages or under working conditions sub-
stantially less favorable than those prevailing in the community for the
kind of work on which he is employed.
9. Any worker or emplover, or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied with
any act or failure to act pursuant to this policy shall be given a fair opportunity
to present his or their case to the Area War Manpower Committee. Such Com-
mittee shall make recommendations concerning such cases as well as other mat-
ters pertinent to the carrying out of this policy in its area to the War Manpower
Area Director for appropriate action. The Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission shall prescribe rules, regulations and procedures for the carrying
out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this policy, including pro-
cedures for the review of the recommendations of the Area Committees, by Re-
gional Manpower Committees and by the National Management-Labor Policy
Committee. Upon request of the employers, the employee, or the Union, the
representative of the United States Employment Service shall present to such
Committee his reasons for having granted a certificate of separation.
10. Nothing contained in this plan shall be construed to restrict any employee
from seeking advice, aid or representation from the Union of which the employee
is a member at any step of the operation of the plan or the Union to intervene in
behalf of the employee.
11. Nothing contained in this plan shall change, modify or restrict any collec-
tive agreement existing between the bargaining agency of the employees and
their emplovers.
12. At the call of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, but within
three months after the effective date of this plan, a conference of representatives
of management and labor shall be called for the purpose of considering the plan
in the light of the experience thus gained. Such modifications or alterations as
may be required to meet the problem of war production in the essential activities
designated and to avoid injustices and hardships to employers and employees
shall be recommended at that time.
(Y) Employment Stabilization in Nonferrous Metal and Lumbering
Activities, War Manpower Commission
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com-
mission, and having found, after consultation with members of Management and
Labor in the affected industries, and after consultation with affected Federal
Departments and agencies, that immediate effectuation of the War Manpower
Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating of War Workers, issued July 16, 1942,
is necessary to alleviate serious labor shortages which imperil the Nation's war
production program, I do hereby give notice that:
I. The plan set forth in paragraph IV hereof, designed to prevent unnecessary
migration of workers, and formulated pursua^nt to and in accordance with the
War Manpower Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating of War Workers and
approved procedures in implementation thereof, is hereby approved, and shall
constitute an approved plan for all purposes of the said Policy.
II. The following areas, activities, and occupations constitute, respectively,
critical labor areas, essentia! war production activities, and critical occupations,
for all purposes of the War Manpower Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating
of War Workers and of the approved plan set forth in paragraph IV hereof. •
(a) The area comprising the States of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Utah, Wyoming, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, New
Mexico, and Texas, constitutes a "critical labor area."
(b) All nonferrous metal mining, milling, smelting and refining, and all
logging and lumVjering industries and activities carried on within stich
critical labor area constitute "essential war production activities."
(c) All production and maintenance occupations in the industries and activi-
ties designated as "essential war production activities" in paragraph
(b) above, constitute "critical occupations."
13312 WASHINGTON HEARINGS
III. The aforementioned Policy and approved plan shall become operative
on and after September 7, 1942, and shall remain operative until publication by
the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission of appropriate notice to the
contrarv.
IV. Plan to prevent unnecessary migration of certain war workers:
(a) After the effective date of this plan, no worker engaged in an essential
war production activity shall seek employment, whether essential or
nonessential to war production, without first obtaining from a desig-
nated representative of the United States Employment Service a
certificate of separation.
(b) No employer in the critical labor area, whether conducting activities
essential or nonessential to war production, shall employ any worker
who, after the effective date of this plan, had been engaged in a critical
occupation in an essential war production activity within the desig-
nated critical labor area except upon presentation of a certificate of
separation issued by the United States Employment Service.
(c) Each employer conducting an essential war production activity in the
designated critical labor area shall, when work is available, refrain
from separating any worker, except in cases of gross misconduct,
without the approval of a designated representative of the United
States Employment Service. Such approval shall be granted only
when continued employment of the worker in his present job will no
longer contribute to the war production program.
(d) Any worker applying for employment with an employer engaged in an
essential war production activity in the designated critical labor area
who feels that he is being denied employment for some reason other
than his lack of qualification and physical fitness for performing the
job for which he is an applicant, may request a designated represen-
tative of the United States Employment Service to intercede in his
behalf. The representative of the United States Employment Service
will investigate the facts, and if he concludes that the worker is being
refused employment on grounds other than lack of qualification or
phvsical fitness for performing the job, he shall endeavor to persuade
the emplover to reconsider his decision and employ the worker. If an
adjustment satisfactory to the worker is not achieved, the case shall
be referred to the Area War Manpower Committee for appropriate
action.
(e) Anv worker engaged in a critical occupation in an essential war produc-
tion activitv within a critical labor area will upon request, be given a
certificate of separation by the United States Employment Service if
the circumstances are such that his separation is in the best interests of
the war effort, as well as the individual concerned, or if a refusal to
grant such separation certificate would result in hardship and injustice
to the individual.
The following circumstances are illustrative of what may be considered good
ground for separation:
(1) When the worker is competent to perform higher skilled work than his
current employer is able or willing to provide.
(2) When the worker is employed for a substantial period at less than full
time.
(3) When the distance between the worker's residence and the place of em-
ployment is unreasonably great, considering restrictions on the use of
gasoline and tires and the load on transportation facilities.
(4) When the worker has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change.
(5) When the worker is employed at wages or under working conditions
substantially less favorable than those prevailing in the community for
the kind of work on which he is employed.
' (f) Any worker or employer, or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied
with any act or failure to act pursuant to this plan shall be given a
fair opportunity to present his or their case to the Area War Man-
power Committee. Such Committee shall make recommendations
concerning such cases as well as other matters pertinent to the carry-
ing out of this plan in its area to the War Manpower Area Director
for appropriate action. The Chairman of the War Manpower Com-
mission shall prescribe rules, regulations and procedures for the
carrying out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this
policy, including procedures for the review of the recommendations
NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13313
of the Area Committees by Regional Manpower Committees and by
the National Management-Labor Policy Committee. Upon request of
the employers, the employee, or the Union, the representative of the
United States Employment Service shall present to such Committee
his reasons for having granted a certificate of separation,
(g) Nothing contained in this plan shall be construed to restrict any em-
ployee from seeking advice, aid or representation from the Union of
which the emplovee is a member at any step of the operation of the
plan or the Union to intervene in behalf of the employee,
(h) Nothing contained in this plan shall change, modify or restrict any col-
lective agreement existing between the bargaining agency of the em-
ployees and their employers. _ _
(i) At the call of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, but
within three months after the effective date of this plan, a conference
of representatives of Management and Labor shall be called for the
purpose of considering the plan in the light of the experience thus
gained. Such modifications or alterations as may be re(|uired to
meet the problem of war production in the essential activities desig-
nated and to avoid injustices and hardships to employers and em-
ployees shall be recommended at that time.
V All persons are herebv enjoined and directed to observe strictly all pro-
visions of the War Manpower Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating of War
Workers, all provisions of the approved plan set forth in paragraph IV hereof,
and all provisions of regulations and procedures issued by the War Manpower
Commission in implementation of such Policy and plan.
All Departments and agencies of the Federal Government are hereby directed
tp take all steps which may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate these pro-
visions and to insure their observance.
Paul V. M Nutt,
Chairman, War Manpower Commission.
September 7, 1942.
Exhibit 7. — Placement of Contracts in Relation to Labor
Supply
Statement by John J. Corson, Chief, Industrial and Agricultural Em-
ployment Division, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C.
The Industrial and Agricultural Employment Division of the War Manpower
Commission has directed the attention of contracting officials of the Army, Navy,
and Treasury Procurement to the importance which must be attached to the
availability of workers before contracts are assigned. It is our position, which we
have been able successfully to impress upon the contracting agencies, that if we
and they are to meet the production goals set for the war program it is essential
that, insofar as a choice of facilities is available to contracting agencies, contracts
be systematically placed in those labor markets whose workers have the relatively
least chance of contributing to the war production program without such contracts
being in their home communities. It is recognized, of course, that strategic con-
siderations, uniqueness of facilities, or the need for speed of delivery will require
many contracts to be placed in labor-market areas into which it is already apparent
that workers are migrating or will ha^e to migrate to meet presently made
commitments.
This Division makes available monthly to contracting agencies a list of com-
munities in which labor shortages are already apparent, in which they are soon to
become felt, and a third list consisting of those areas where labor surpluses exist.
The Army, the Navy, and the Treasury Procurement officials are making these
lists available to every contracting officer with instructions that wherever possible
contracts are to be placed outside of a tight labor market. One example of the
acceptance by Federal officials of this principle can be found in a memorandum
from the Quartermaster General to field purchasing officers dated August 26,
which prescribes 11 cities for the placement of contracts. The cities the Quarter-
master General selected were Buffalo, Baltimore, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles,
San Diego, Norfolk, Sacramento, Portland, Seattle, Indianapolis, and Hartford.
The Quartermaster General with all other arms and services of the Army and
Navy are expected soon to expand this list of 11 to include every city which we
have reported as having or expecting a labor shortage.
13314
WASHINGTON HEARINGS
Exhibit 8. — Statistical Data on Unmarried Selective Service
Registrants Submitted by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey,
Director, Selective Service System, Washington, D. C.
Number of unmarried selective-service registrants reported as receiving occupational
deferment (class II) — first, second, and third registration (ages 20-44 years)
continental United States
JULY 31, 1912
State
United States .
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado_
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia ._
Idaho
Illinois -
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota -._
INtississippi
Missouri ___
State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina -
North Dakota..
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania.. _
Rhode Island...
South Carolina..
South Dakota...
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia...
Wisconsin
Wyoming.
Number :
5,176
9,470
869
2,510
38, 081
1,032
96, 137
11,548
9,382
45, 307
5,885
7,175
4] 827
4,166
8,383
7,595
19, 460
2,123
3,234
12, 065
19, 351
6,440
37, 147
2,453
' As of July 31, 1942, occupational information on registrants in class II are available for only 10 States.
In these States the proportion of class II men in agricultural employment is 39.5 percent. Although in-
formation is not available on the marital status of class II registrants, it is known that as of July 31, 1942, a
large majority of these registrants are single men.
Estimated number of unmarried selective-service registrants who are not in the armed
forces — first, second, and third registrations (ages 20-44 years), continental
United States
JULY 31, 1942
state
Number i
state
Number '
2 3, 991, 000
Nebraska
62.000
16, 000
26, 000
323, 000
23, 000
66, 000
10, 000
31,000
50, 000
57, 000
19, 000
189, 000
74, 000
72, 000
40, 000
53, 000
56, 000
26, 000
79, 000
160, 000
187,000
102, 000
50, 000
105, ono
21, 000
32, 000
Arizona
Nevada . . -
8.000
New Hampshire
New Jersey
16,000
California
127, 000
Colorado
New Mexico
New York
12, 000
Connecticut
561,003
85, 000
27, 000
Florida
Ohio
190, 000
38. 000
37, 000
Illinois
Pennsylvania
308, 000
23, 000
38, 000
Kansas
South Dakota .
21,000
Tennessee
62, 000
144, 000
Utah X
17, 000
Vermont
11,000
Virginia
88, 000
Michigan
Washington
West Virginia .
73, 000
42, 000
Wisconsin
124, 000
10, 000
1 This excludes 1,1.50,000 registrants deferred because of physical, mental, and moral unfitness for military
service (class IV-F).
2 As of July 31, 1942, these unmarried registrants are distributed by selective-service classification in
approximately the following proportions: Awaiting induction (class I-A), 17 percent; awaiting local board
physical oxarnination (class I), 15 percent; (lualified for limited service (class I-B), 13 percent; deferred for
occupational reasons (class II). 15 percent: deferred for dependency (class III). 25 percent; deferred for other
reasons (class IV exclusive of class IV-F) and not yet classified, 15 percent.
INDEX
Aircraft industry: ^^^^
Extent of expansion 13172
Loss of workers to armed services 13097-13108
Allocations: Priorities replaced by 13185
Armed forces:
Estimate of requirements 13068, 13072-13073, 13171
Recruitment of doctors--, 13091-13093, 13133
Cargo planes 131 82
Civilian Personnel Division. {See Services of Supply.)
Committee on Fair Employment Practice. (See Discriminations.)
Concentration of civilian industries 13124, 13194
Concentration orders. (See under Production.)
Allocation of, in relation to labor supply 13255-13257, 13313
Awards in Seattle, Wash., by Quartermaster Corps 13307-13308
Nondiscrimination provisions 13294-13301
Placement in labor shortage areas 13148, 13153
Purchase Policy Committee for 13174
Copper mining. {See Employment, Nonferrous-metal mining States.)
Day care of children of working mothers: Directive issued by War Man-
power Commission 13236-13237
Defense migration: In-migration requirements in 35 labor-market
areas -- 13248-13250
Directives I-XII issued by War Manpower Commission 13231-13242
Discrimination against minority groups 13155, 13292-13295
Employment:
Average monthly turn-over rates, factory workers 13244, 13250
Labor policy adopted by Army and Navy 13290-13292
Monthly quit rates, factory workers, selected industries 13251
Nondiscrimination in employment of aliens 13294-13302
Non-ferrous-metal mining States, stabilization of employment
in - 13309-13313,13148-13149,13213
Nonwhite employment, selected plants, May 1942 13243, 13248
Prevention of pirating of war workers 13283-13288
Reasons for high quit rates 1 3245
Requirements for proof of American birth in - _ 13281-13283, 13294
Sources of labor supply 13115
Employment Service:
Confusion of authoritv and objectives under recent legislation 13117,
13131, 13152
Control of hiring by 13067
Directives issued to, by War Manpower Commission :
Agricultural workers, to expedite recruitment and placement
of 13234-13235
Encouragement of transfers to essential occupations 1 3233
Listing of essential activities and occupations 13231
Placement priorities 13232r-13233
Recruiting and clearance of labor 13117
Program and policies of 13258-13260
Role of, in labor displacement problems 13152
Executive Order No. 9139, creating War Manpower Commission 13115,
13229-13231
Farm labor: Deferment policies of draft boards 13106
Federal employees:
Classification standards for field service 1 3242
Occupational deferment 13239-13241
Transfer and release of 13237-13239
13315
13316 INDEX
Page
Health: Functioning of in-plant committees on health and safety 13218
Housing:
Conservation of critical materials for, by utilizing local labor. _ 13302-13303
Directive of War Manpower Commission covering transient agricul-
tural workers 13235-13236
Inventories. {See Production.)
Labor-management production committees:
Establishment of, under War Production Board 13161
Functions, status, and objectives of 13065,
13127, 13132, 13150-13152, 13190, 13216-13222
Labor utilization:
Inspector system for, discussed 13065, 13094, 13119, 13129, 13155, 13191
Plant inspections by Army and Navy 13132
Role of Employment Service in 13152
Utilization of minority groups 13155
Qualifications and duties of proposed inspector teams 13125-13126
Manpower. {See also War Manpower Commission.)
Action to relieve critical labor shortage in Buffalo, N. Y., area 13308
Allocation of 1 3089-1 3 1 23
Complexities of problem of supply 13146, 13193-13194
Concentration of contract distribution, analyzed on basis of labor
supply 13255-13257
Concentration of war employment 13244
Cooperation of agencies to effect fuller utilization of 13213-13214
Coordination of control of 13090
Coordination of production and manpower planning 13118-13119,
13136-13137, 13147-13148, 13153, 13154, 13165, 13258-13260
Estimates of emj^lovment and requirements, June 1940 to December
1943 1 13247
Estimates of labor supplv and in-migration requirements, bv city and
industry "_ _ - 13248-13250
Increased demands, 1943 13113
Inventory of, by Selective Service 13095-13096
Loss of trained civilian workers to armed forces 13097-13098, 13147
Lowering of standards as supply decreases 13107
Maximized use of, through prohibition of volunteering.. 13082, 13123
Procurement of labor in Great Britain 13088
Requirements and resources 13113-13115
Shortages of, in non-ferrous-metal States, action on 13118,
13213, 13309-13313
Total available labor force 13115
Utilization of total available supply 13155, 13167, 13243, 13303
Waste in use of 13134-13136
Materials. {See under Production.)
National Service Act, discussion of need for 13061,
13087-13090, 13120, 13123, 13130, 13139-13140, 13176
Negroes, employment of 13243, 13252-13255
Procurement {See Contracts).
Production Requirements Plan . 13186-13188, 13222-13225
Production :
All-out program required for 13203
Combined Production and Resources Board 13184
Concentration orders 13163-13165
Control and recapture of inventories 13195-13196, 13208-13211, 13222-13225
Control of, by material supply 13172-13173, 13177-13178
Control of civilian production 1321 1-13212
Elimination of materials waste 13199
Material allocations 13183, 13200-13201
Material distribution 13178-13180, 13189, 13204-13205
Material utilization, inspectors for 13188-13189
Problems involved in controlling the flow of materials 13226-13228
Production Requirements Plan, accomplishments of 13186-13188,
13195-13196, 13206
Scheduling of operations 13155, 13173-13175, 13180-13183, 13195
Purchase Policy Committee. {See under Contracts.)
Recommendations: Unemployment benefits for displaced workers. - 13157-13161
INDEX 13317
Selective Service System: Page
Classification of registrants 13067, 13072
Deferment of registrants:
Dependency 13080, 13084, 13092, 13102
Farm workers 13102-13104, 13314
Occupational deferment. 13068-13071, 13079, 13081, 13234, 13241, 13314
Policies 13099, 13100
Directives to, issued by War Manpower Commission.' 13066-13067
Diversity in application of act 13076-13077
Occupational inventory of national manpower by 13095-13096
Quota system 1 3075
Reclassification of registrants 13067, 13085-13086
Reduction of age limit 13083, 13092
Unmarried registrants not in armed forces, July 31, 1942 13314
Transfers of classification 13100
Services of Supply:
Civilian Personnel Division : Functions of 13056,
13064-13065, 13128, 13262-13263, 13270-13271
Coordination of labor supply needs of War Department procurement
agencies 13055, 13058, 13060, 13064
Initiation of action on labor shortage in copper industry 13057
Manpower Branch:
Functions of . 13263-13277, 13307
Organization charts 13269
Policies and procedures 13277-13288, 13292-13309
Preinduction training procedures 13309
Organization of 13261-13262
Statistical data on manpower, prepared by War Manpower Commis-
sion 13242-13252
Transportation of workers:
Aid supplied by labor-management committees 13219, 13221
Directive issued by War Manpower Commission on 13236
Labor policy as conserving equipment and rubber 13304-13306
Unemployment compensation for displaced workers, recommendations
for 13157-13161
United States Employment Service. (See Employment Service.)
United States Office of Education. (See also Vocational training.)
Training courses for war-production workers 13246, 13251, 13309
Vocational training: (See also United States Office of Education.)
Enrollments in courses of —
National Youth Administration 13251
United States Office of Education 13251
Work Projects Administration 13252
Full-time trainees employed by War and Navy Departments 13252
Responsibility for determination of policies for war training 13065
Training of men subject to draft 13167-13168
Types of defense-training courses offered 1 3246
Wages and hours : Determination of wage rates 1 3063
War Department. (See Services of Supply.)
War Manpower Commission:
Activities summarized 13116-13118
Authority over occupation deferihents 13123
Cooperation with War Production Board 13118,
13122, 13124, 13177, 13192-13193
Directives issued by 13231-13242
Executive order establishing 13229-13231
Functions of 13058, 13116
Management-Labor Policy Committee.. 13152
Minority groups service 13289
Pohcy on labor piracy 13284-13285, 13311-13313
Regional and area offices 13116
Relations with other agencies 13116, 13276
Organization chart 13138
Stabilization of employment in non-ferrous-metal mining States by.. 13117-
13118, 13121, 13122
Staff members 13138
Surveys of labor conditions by 13057-13058
13318 INDEX
United States Employment Service. {See Employment Service.)
War Production Board. {See also Production.) " Page
Concentration committee ^ 13124, 13163, 13212-13213
C'ooperation with War Manpower Commission 13118
13122. 13124, 13177', 13192-13193
Directive from War Manpower Commission covering critical war
products 1 3232
Divisions of, concerned with manpower problems 13189-13190, 13215
Labor-Management Policy Committee ' 13191
Labor-management committees. {See also Labor-management pro-
duction committees.)
Functions of 13065
Labor Production Division:
Actions on manpower problems 13149-13150
Functions and responsibilities 13146, 13162, 13166, 13167, 13169
War Production Drive {see also Labor-management production com-
mittees) 1 13161
Women workers:
Employment and unemployment, July 1940 to June 1942 13247
Trends in employment of, durable and nondurable goods industries, _ 13247
Utilization of womanpower in war production 13063
13114, 13243. 13"305- 13307
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OCTj 1943
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