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Full text of "National defense migration. Hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, Seventy-seventh Congress, first[-second] session, pursuant to H. Res. 113, a resolution to inquire further into the interstate migration of citizens, emphasizing the present and potential consequences of the migraion caused by the national defense program. pt. 11-[34]"


ll 













"E. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING 

NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION 
HOUSE OF REPEESENTATIVES 

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

PURSUANT TO 



H. Res. 113 



A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTERSTATE 

MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING THE PRESENT 

AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

MIGRATION CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL 

DEFENSE PROGRAM 



PART 34 
WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

SEPTEMBER 15, 16, AND 17, 1942 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration 




NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE mVESTIGATING 

NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 

HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES 

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGBESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



H. Res. 113 



A RESOLUTION TO INQUIRE FURTHER INTO THE INTERSTATE 

MIGRATION OF CITIZENS, EMPHASIZING THE PRESENT 

AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 

MIGRATION CAUSED BY THE NATIONAL 

DEFENSE PROGRAM 



PART 34 
WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

SEPTEMBER 15, 16, AND 17, 1942 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee Investigating 
National Defense Migration 




UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1942 



SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING NATIONAL DEFENSE 
MIGRATION 

J OHN H. TOLAN. California, Chairman 
JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama '' CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska 

LAURENCK F. ARNOLD, Illinois GEORGE H. BENDER, Ohio 

Robert K. Lamb, Staff Director 



CONTENTS 



Page 

List of witnesses V 

List of authors vn 

Tuesday, September 15, 1942, morning session 13055 

Testimony of James P. Mitchell 13055 

Statement by James P. Mitchell 13064 

Testimony of Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey 13066, 13070 

Statement by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey 13066 

Wednesday, September 16, 1942, morning session 13111 

Testimony of Paul V. McNutt 13111, 13121, 1312g 

Statement by Paul V. McNutt 13113 

Testimony of Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry 13125 

Testimony of Wendell Lund 13145, 13161 

Statement by Wendell Lund 13146, 13153, 13165 

Testimony of Paul H. Norgren 13163 

Testimony of Donald M. Nelson 13170 

Statement by Donald M. Nelson 13202, 13222 

Introduction of exhibits 13228 

Exhibit 1. Executive order establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission 13229 

Exhibit 2. Directives I-XII issued by the Chairman of the War 

Manpower Commission 13231 

Exhibit 3. Statistical data on manpower submitted by War Man- 
power Commission, Washington, D. C 13242 

Exhibit 4. Area allocation of war supply -contracts according to 
adequacy of labor supply; report released by War Manpower 
Commission, Lidustrial and Agricultural Employment Divi- 
sion, Washington, D. C 13255 

Exhibit 5. Relation of manpower mobilization to procurement, 
by John J. Corson, Director, United States Employment Serv- 
ice, Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Washing- 
ton, D. C 13258 

Exhibit 6. Manpower functions of Civilian Personnel Division, 
Services of Supply, War Department, documents submitted by 
Leonard J. Maloney, Chief, Manpower Branch, Civilian Per- 
sonnel Division, Services of Supply, War Department, Wash- 
ington, D. C 13261 

Exhibit 7. Placement of contracts in relation to labor supply, by 
John J. Corson, Chief, Industrial and Agricultural Employment 

Division, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C 13313 

Exhibit 8. Statistical data on unmarried Selective Service regis- 
trants submitted by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director, 

Selective Service System, Washington, D. C 13314 

Index 13315 

in 



LIST OF WITNESSES 

Washington Hearings, September 15, 16, 17, 1942 

Page 

Hershey, Maj. Gen. Lewis B., Director, Selective Service System, Wash- 
ington, D. C 13066, 13070 

Lund, Wendell, Director, Labor Production Division, War Production 

Board, Washington, D. C 13145, 13161, 13165 

McNutt, Paul v., Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington, 

D. C 13111, 13121, 13128 

McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J., Director of Operations, War Manpower 

Commission, Washington, D. C 13125 

Mitchell, James P., Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of 

Supply, War Department, Washington, D. C 13055 

Nelson, Donald M., Chairman, War Production Board, Washington, D. C_ 13170 

Norgren, Paul H., Acting Chief, Industry Consultant Branch, Labor Pro- . 
duction Division, War Production Board, Washington, D. C 13163 



LIST OF AUTHORS 

Of Prepared Statements and Exhibits 

Page 

Corson, John J., Chief, Industrial and Agricultural Employment Division, 

War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C 13313 

Corson, John J., Director, United States Employment Service, Federal 

Securitv Agency, Social Securitv Board, Washington, D. C 13258 

Hershev,"Mai. Gen. Lewis B., Director, Selective Service System, Wash- 
ington, D. C 13066, 13314 

Industrial and Agricultural Employment Division, War Manpower Com- 
mission, Washington, D. C 13255 

Lund, Wendell, Director, Labor Production Division, War Production 

Board, Washington, D. C 13146, 13153 

McNutt, Paul v., Chairman, War Manpower Commission, Washington, 

_ D. c._ - - 13113, 13231 

Malonev, Leonard J., Chief, Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Di- 
vision, Services of Supply, War Department, Washington, D. C 13261 

Mitchell, James P., Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of 

Supply, War Department, Washington, D. C 13064 

Nelson, Donald M., Chairman, War Production Board, Washington, 

D. c ' 13202, 13222 

War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C 13242 

vn 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGKATION 



TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1942 

morning session 

House of Representatives, 

Select Committee Investigating 

National Defense Migration, 

Washington, D. C. 
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 a. m,, September 15, 
1942, in room 1102, New House Office Building, Washington, D. C, 
Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman), presiding. 

Present: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of Cahfornia; 
Jolm J. Sparkman, of Alabama; George H. Bender, of Ohio; Carl T. 
Curtis, of Nebraska; and Laurence F. Arnold, of Illinois. 
Also present: Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director. 
Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Mitchell, will you come forward, please? 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. MITCHELL, DIRECTOR, CIVILIAN PER- 
SONNEL DIVISION, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, WAR DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Mitchell, I understand that you have an 
appointment at 10, or a few minutes after, so we will move as speedily 
as we can in order to release you in time for that appointment. 

The committee this morning is starting a series of hearings for the 
purpose of inquiring further into the manpower needs set-up in the 
program that we are now engaged in. 

We have prepared some questions to ask you. The matter in 
which we are interested is one that has a lot of involvenients, a lot of 
implications, and for me a good many confusing technicalities, so I 
hope you will pardon the use of these formal prepared questions that 
I shall submit to you. 

It is our understanding from your press release of July 16 and from 
discussions with members of your staff that at the present time, in a 
number of tight labor markets, the Civilian Personnel Division has 
sent representatives to study the utilization of manpower within the 
war plants themselves. After such a survey, these liaison officers 
contact the war contractor, the supply and material inspectors, a,nd 
the local employment and training offices in order to obtain a solution 
to the particular labor utilization problem which they have observed. 
Do you consider that this is a key function of the Civilian Personnel 
Division? 

coordinating responsibility of services of supply 

Mr. Mitchell. May I put it in another way, Mr. Congressman? 
The Services of Supply is responsible for the coordination and super- 
vision of eight major supply organizations of the War Department, 

13055 



13056 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

which include the Quartermaster, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance, 
Chemical Warfare, and Signal Corps. All of these agencies operate 
at a local level, and it is there that the liaison officers are most effective 
in coordinating the labor supply needs of those procurement agencies, 
and bringing to bear in the problems of those procurement agencies 
the various facilities of the other governmental agencies which are set 
up to assist the war contractors in solving their labor supply problems. 

For example, the liaison officer, in his contact with the procurement 
officer of Ordnance, may discover X plant is m need of additional em- 
ployees or is having difficulty with its training program. In that 
event, the liaison officer makes contact with the proper agency of the 
War Manpower Commission or the War Productioji Board, such as 
the Training- With in-Industry Agency, the United States Employ-- 
ment Service, and brings to these agencies our needs, that is, the War 
Department needs. 

Mr. Sparkman. From our own investigation we know that Govern- 
ment plants are as greatly overstaffed as private plants. We know, 
for example, that machinists are frequently ordered when machine 
operators are needed, and that all-around machinists are frequently 
employed at jobs which are really machine operators' jobs. Wliat 
specifically does the Civilian Personnel Division intend to do about 
overstaffing in the plants of war contractors? 

Mr. Mitchell. It is making an assumption that they are over- 
staffed, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes. I stated in the beginning that we had reached 
a conclusion that many of them are overstaffed. 

MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE LABOR 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. Well, that is both a labor supply and a pro- 
duction problem. The War Department is concerned with the maxi- 
mum utilization of labor. It becomes a problem not only of our 
division, which is concerned with labor supply, but also of the pro- 
duction divisions which are concerned with the availability of mate- 
rials. I do not think you can separate the availability of materials 
and the availability of manpower. As you may have noted, in some 
war production plants, the jobs may be overmanned. Oftentimes, 
management, in anticipation of materials, has hired men, and the 
materials not being forthcoming they have held the men. We feel 
that our responsibility as a procurement agency is to see that our 
contractors make the maximum utilization of available labor and of 
available materials. Our procurement officers are instructed to see 
that plants are not overmanned, and are constantly bringing to the 
attention of those contractors who are overmanning plants their re- 
sponsibility for seeing that adequate but not too m.any people are 
used on a particular operation. 

Mr. Sparkman. Do they also try to see that the proper persons are 
used in the proper jobs? "What I mean by that, take the example 
that I just used, for instance, that machinists are not used simply for 
machine operators' jobs. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Although we do not have the organiza- 
tion to make a detailed inspection of the occupational skills and the 
use of those skills of every employee in a war plant, we have insisted 
with our contractors that our production requirements are met. We 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13057 

do use whatever sanctions our contract permits us to see that contrac- 
tors do not waste skills, and the use of a machinist as a machine hand 
is a waste of skill. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now, you say you use whatever sanctions are 
provided by the contract. Just how far do those sanctions go? 

Mr. Mitchell. Not very far, sir, except that the procurement 
officer in the field is in very close association with his contractors. 
He may have contractor A and contractor B both producing for him. 

If contractor A is usmg skills wastefully, he has many ways of 
calling that to his attention: Priorities in materials, priorities in 
machinery, and so forth. There is nothing in the contract that 
permits him to use sanctions, but the relationship is such that I 
believe the contracting officer does and can help that situation very 
much. 

Air. Sparkman. Does that apply likewise to the matter of over- 
staft'ing? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

MANPOWER problems IN COPPER INDUSTRY 

Mr. Sparkman. In the development of the recent copper order, we 
understand that the initiative for this order came from your office, 
and that your office proposed that the Army should issue the order 
subsequently issued by Mr. McNutt. Why was the order not issued 
by the War Department to its contractors? 

Mr. Mitchell. Of course, the War Department has been aware, 
probably is in the position of being the first to be aware, of the shortage 
of basic materials, and the copper shortage is one that has given great 
concern for some months. Last June, at our suggestion, a meeting 
was called of all of the agencies concerned with labor supply or man- 
power, which included the War Manpower Commission, the War 
Production Board, ourselves, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, 
and the Navy, to examine the manpower problem so far as copper was 
concerned. As the result of a series of meetings of those agencies a 
program was drawn up in which each agency participated; that is, 
the War Labor Board was concerned with the stabilization of wages 
in the copper industry; the housing people were concerned with pro- 
viding adequate housing; the Manpower- Commission, with the re- 
cruitment of labor. 

There were many factors which caused the lack of labor supply 
in the copper mines. Subsequently the problem of the hiring away 
of workers from the copper mines by war contractors presented itself. 
That problem was discussed jointly by the Ai-my and Navy, the War 
Production Board, the War Manpower Commission. It would not 
have been of any benefit for any one agency to have issued an instruc- 
tion by itself. It required the united action of all agencies and all 
contractors in that area. That is the reason why it was necessary 
for the War Manpower Commission, in order to get the united action 
of all contractors, to issue that directive. 

SURVEYS OF LABOR CONDITIONS BY WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION 

Mr. Sparkman. It is our understanding that the Civilian Personnel 
Division has already advised the contract services of the armed forces 
on the availability of labor. In fact, as we understand it, several 



13058 WASHINGTON iftEARINGS 

contracts have already been taken out of tight labor market areas 
upon the advice of the Civilian Personnel Division. Would you 
describe several cases of this for us? 

Mr. Mitchell. We have an arrangement with the War Manpower 
Commission, with the Director of Operations, to keep us advised of 
tight labor markets — critical shortages in various areas. That is a 
periodic flow of information which comes to us from the War Man- 
power Commission. Acting on that information, we advise our 
procurement agencies of shortages and overages in labor in any par- 
ticular areas. As the result of that advice some of the procurement 
agencies have desisted from placing further contracts in an already 
tight and short labor market. The Quartermaster, for example, has 
recently refrained from placing additional contracts for certain types 
of clothing in Seattle, which is very definitely a tight labor market. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now, as I understand it, the Manpower Com- 
mission makes the survey and furnishes the information to you. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. You do not establish the fact as to the condition 
of the market, you depend upon the Manpower Commission for that, 
and you simply transmit that information to your procurement 
officers? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir, and to our liaison officers in the 
field who coordinate or correlate the activities of all the procurement 
agencies in the War Department. 

Mr. Sparkman. Is that a general coverage of the whole country? 
Does it cover the country fairly well? 

Mr. Mitchell. Fairly well, where there are obvious shortages and 
overages of labor. 

Mr. Sparkman. It is our understanding that the War Manpower 
Commission, tlu-ough the Labor Production Division and through the 
Employment Service, performs" a similar advisory function to the 
industry branches of the War Production Board. What do you think 
is the need or the desirability of such duplication of work as this? 
Is it necessary? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not clear as to your question, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. I stated that we understand that the Manpower 
Commission performs a similar service, advising the industry branches 
of the War Production Board along the same line. 

Mr. Mitchell. I see. I should think that that would be highly 
desirable. I am not acquainted in detail with the function of the 
industry branches, but it would seem to me that any information on 
labor supply would be helpful in planning curtailment programs or 
concentration programs, or any other programs that the industry 
branches may have as their function. 

Mr. Sparkman. Of course, as I understand it from your state- 
ment, the Manpower Commission gathers and places in factual form 
the information. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. And that information, which is transmitted to 
you, is used by you for advising the procurement officers of the Army? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Of course, the Manpower Commission probably 
would gather information as to all of the armed forces and even 
civilian forces as well. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13059 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Would that be your idea? I do not mean the 
Manpower Commission, I mean the War Production Board. In 
other words, yours would be a much smaller field than theirs. 

Mr. Mitchell. I should think so. The information the Manpower 
Commission gives us is used by us as one of the criteria in the allotting 
of contracts for militarj^ items. 

Mr. Sparkman. Of course, this thought occurs to me: Suppose 
there is a certain area that has an overage of available labor and you 
advised your procurement officers, and suppose the Navy advises 
its procurement officers to the same effect, the Maritime Commission 
so advises its officers, and the industry branches of the War Produc- 
tion Board advise the people engaged in civilian production, then it 
seems to me, unless you have got some kind of coordination 

Mr. Mitchell (interposing). In the letting of contracts? 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes. In that case, you are liable immediately 
to create a tight labor market, are you? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don't know enough about it to comment 
on it. The procurement agencies of the Government, of the War 
Department, lets contracts. It seems to me that they should know 
when they are letting contracts, so long as they are going to let con- 
tracts, all the factors that might have a bearing on the production of 
that contract. Labor supply is one of them. 

Mr. Sparkman. I am thinking of these various procurement agencies 
of the various services. 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Acting simultaneously. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Is there any clearing house from which they might 
operate? 

Mr. Mitchell. That I do not know, sir. 

The Chairman. Don't you think there should be? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you get into the realm there, Mr. Congress- 
man, of the whole' system of contract letting in Government. Very 
frankly, I know so little about it that I would hesitate to offer any 
opinion. 

Mr. Sparkman. I might ask this question, which would be whoUy 
practicable: Have you incurred any difficulty along that line? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. In connection with your own contracts? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. 

SERVICES complementary RATHER THAN DUPLICATIVE 

Mr. Sparkman. From the organizational chart and statement of 
functions of the Army Civilian Personnel Division, it would appear 
that your office duplicates in part the functions of the War Man- 
power Commission. Do you think we are correct in believing that 
your operations are duplicative at many points? What is your 
opinion on the need for or desirability of such duplication? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not aware, sir, of any duplication. 

Mr. Sparkman. It is your attitude that they are complementary 
to each other? 



13060 WASIJINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. As I stated before, we beheve 
that the Services of Supply have an internal problem of coordination 
of its various procurement agencies in this labor-supply problem. 
The function of our liaison officers is that of interpreting to our pro- 
curement agencies, so that we have a uniform policy, the policies and 
procedures and practices and operations of the Manpower Commis- 
sion, and in turn bringing to the Manpower Commission our needs, 
so that the Manpower Commission has a central point at which it 
can obtain the Army's needs for labor. I do not see any duplication 
in that function. 

Mr. Spaekman. Is the Civilian Personnel Division subject to di- 
rectives issued by the War Manpower Commission? 

Mr. Mitchell. Only insofar as those directives may be issued to 
the governmental agencies as a whole. In other words, the War 
Manpower Commission in its directives may direct — I do not know 
of any occasion that it has, but I understand it may have the au- 
thority to direct — action on the part of each and every governmental 
agency concerned with this problem of labor supply. Insofar as that 
is concerned, we are subject to the direction of the Manpower Com- 
mission, as is the Navy and Maritime Commission, or any other 
governmental agencies. 

Mr. Sparkman. I wonder if you might give us a statement as to 
what you consider to be the functions of the War Manpower Com- 
mission which are separate from those that are now performed or can 
be performed by the Civilian Personnel Division. 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the Civilian Personnel Division, that is, the 
Manpower Branch of that Division, can only be concerned with the 
procurement and production problems of the War Department. We 
have no mechanism for national recruitment of labor. We have no 
mechanism for the national training of war contractors' employees. 
We have no mechanism for determining the total labor requirements 
of the country. In fact, it seems to me that there is need, very 
definite need, for an over-all agency which concerns itself with the 
total labor-supply problem. Ours is an internal problem of what are 
the needs of the War Department, which is only a part of the total 
labor-supply need. 

Mr. Sparkman. And that agency would be the Manpower Com- 
mission? 

Mr. Mitchell. I understand that agency is the Manpower Com- 
mission. 

AUTHORITY OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIVISION 

Mr. Sparkman. Does the Civilian Personnel Division, through 
the War Department, have the power to require war contractors 
to do all of their hiring either through the Employment Service 
or through some other central placement agency? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; we do not so require. At present the 
terms of our contracts do not require that a contractor hire from 
any one particular source, the labor. 

Mr. Sparkman. Could you do so if you saw fit to do it? 

Mr. Mitchell. I suppose we could, sir. 

Jvlr. Sparkman. Through the same means that you described a few 
minutes ago? 

Mr. Mitchell. I suppose we could; yes, sir. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13061 

Mr. Sparkman. Does the Army, Civilian Personnel Division, have 
the authority to require war contractors to set up training programs 
of an adequate size and quality within the plant? 

Mr. Mitchell. If you are speaking of legal authority; no, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Could you do that by the same means that you 
described a few minutes ago? 

Mr. Mitchell. I suppose you can write anything into a contract 
that you wish, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. Well, you can always control it by the allocation 
of materials and men; is that right? 

Mr. Mitchell. And men; yes, sir. At the moment, I would say 
that most war contractors accept with readiness the training-within- 
industry idea, and are anxious and willing to accept the services of 
any governmental agency that will help the contractor to produce his 
contract or to meet his contract requirements. I doubt whether any 
compulsory acceptance of either recruitment or trainmg withm indus- 
try would have any greater benefit than the present system. 

ON NEED FOR NATIONAL SERVICE ACT 

Mr. Sparkman. There seems to be some difference of opinion over 
the need for a national service act at this time. Some persons have 
suggested that it is preferable to control labor demand of war con- 
tractors rather than exert compulsion upon the individual worker at 
this time. What are your views on the necessity for a national 
service act? 

Mr. Mitchell. My personal views? 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would say that if a national service act were 
adopted there might be very Httle occasion to use it. In other words, 
the very existence of an act of that kind would make it unnecessary to 
use its powers. I think that has been the experience in England and 
other countries that have had that or similar parallel compulsory acts. 

Mr. Sparkman. There has been very httle use made of it? 

Mr. Mitchell. There has been very little use made of it. Al- 
though it may be necessary that the act be adopted. 

Mr. Sparkman. Have it ready, in case? 

Mr. Mitchell. Have it ready, in case; that is right, sir. 

Mr. Sparkman. There seems to be some difference of opinion be- 
tween the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission 
over the interpretation of directive 2 of the War Manpower Com- 
mission which instructs the War Production Board to give the War 
Manpower Commission a preference list of plants. I wiU describe to 
you the impression we have of this difference. Some officials of the 
War Production Board believe that this directive authorizes them to 
instruct the War Manpower Commission on all phases of manpower 
demand, both as to location, quantity, and quality. In fact, a War 
Manpower Priorities Branch has been set up within the War Production 
Board, regional offices are planned, and it has been suggested that 
labor utilization inspectors should be employed by the War Produc- 
tion Board to check on the need for labor and the use for labor within 
war plants. The War Manpower Commission for its part also plans 
to have labor utilization mspectors. If the War Production Board's 
interpretation of directive 2 is taken, would this not reduce the 



13062 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

War Manpower Commission to the status of a placement and recruit- 
ing agency only? 

Mr. Mitchell. I know nothing of the War Production Board's 
interpretation of the War Manpower Commission's directive, in the 
first place. I have no opinion on it, so therefore the question is lost 
on me. 

Mr. Sparkman. That gets back to the over-all picture, rather than 
your restrictive part; is that right? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right; yes, sir. 

INTEGRATION OF MANPOWER AND PRODUCTION PLANNING 

Mr. Sparkman. Well, it seems that an integration of manpower 
and production planning has to be developed. What is your con- 
sidered judgment as to how this can best be done? 

Mr. Mitchell. Well, 1 have no judgment or opinion on that. I do 
not know enough about the larger issues which may be brought to 
bear on such a problem. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now, let me ask you this: In your own particular 
field, do you think that has been very well done? 

Mr. Mitchell. The integration of labor supply and production? 

Mr. Sparkman. And production plamiing. 

Mr. Mitchell. It necessarily has to be, because, after all, we are 
interested in only one thing, the production that our contractors can 
give us, and the only reason we perform this function of liaison with 
our war contractors in the labor supply field is in order to insure pro- 
duction. It seems to me that the adequate utilization of labor supply 
is an integral part of production. 

Mr. Sparkman. Do you think that that has been accomplished in 
your particular field? It is a continuing problem, I suppose. Is it 
being done? 

Mr. Mitchell. We are integrating our activities very closely with 
our own production people. Naturally, we are part of a production 
organization. 

Mr. Sparkman. Assuming that that is being done in each of the 
services concerned with production, then is it your idea that the War 
Manpower Commission coordinates the entire program? 

Mr. Mitchell. Of labor supply? 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. I think that is its function, or one of its 
functions. 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, that is all I care to ask. 

The Chairman. Any questions, Congressman Curtis? 

Mr. Curtis. With reference to your discussion of the waste of skill, 
I take it by that you mean in a certain factory there are some men 
who are highly skilled to do a certain job and they are assigned to 
some task that requires much less skill. Is that your idea? 

Mr. Mitchell. I gathered that that was the Congressman's 
thought. I might add^ since the question has been raised again, that 
in my opinion that type of wastage does not exist to any great degree. 

Mr. Curtis. There has to be some of it in the natural course of 
events? 

Mr. Mitchell. In any organization that mushrooms in the short 
time that these war plants have there is bound to be some of it, but 
I do not think it exists to any great degree. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13063 

Mr. CuRiis. To the degree that woukl justify pulhng them out of 
one plant and moving tliem into another pLant? 

Mr. Mitchell. To the contrary, m.ost plants do not have enough 
skilled men in the particular jobs that they want, so I cannot imagine 
any wastage of skills in that way. What I was referring to before 
was probably the use of too many unskilled people in a given plant, 
rather than a wastage of particular skilled men. 

FIXING OF WAGE RATES 

Mr. Curtis. Is it the intent of the Government that war jobs pay 
higher wages than other work? 

Mr. AliTCHELL. No, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. In other words, is it set out as a policy that in order 
to attract the needed labor that higher wages be used as an incentive? 

Mr. Mitchell. I should say definitely not. 

Mr. Curtis. You are speaking of the contractors of materiel, are 
you not, primarily? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. How about the construction program of the War 
Department? 

Air. Mitchell. The wages in the construction program of the 
War Department are determined by the Department of Labor and 
they are based, I understand, on the Bacon-Davis Act, which estab- 
lishes that determination on the basis of pi-evailing wages in the com- 
muxiit}'. Tliose wages are part of the contract. 

Mr. Curtis. That is all. 

EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN 

Mr. Bender. I should like to ask one question: From your under- 
standing of the persounel problems, how many women do you think 
will be needed in war production work during the next year? Have 
you any idea? 

Mr. JVIitchell. I have no idea as to the figures, sir; but I would 
say that more and more women must necessarily be employed in 
war production, and the War Department, in its own establishments, 
is definitely promoting and encouraging the employment of women 
and developing ways and means in which they can be employed. 
As an example, at the moment we have at Aberdeen Proving Grounds 
women running tanks, assembling guns, firing guns. This is a testii^g 
ground. We have used it more or less as an experimental laboratcry 
as to those occupations in which women can be employed. We 
believe most war contractors, too, must be encouraged to develop 
and promote the employment of women. 

Mr. Bender. That is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, I understand you want to go early. 

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to, sir. I am at your disposal, how- 
ever. 

The Chairman. I just want to ask you one question. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether the Government, or any 
agency of the Government, is undertakmg at the present time an 
inventory of the manpower of the United States, of the skilled and 
unskilled workers in the United States? 

60396— 42— pt. 34 2 



13064 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS 

Mr. Mitchell. I do not know, sir. 

The Chairman. Don't you think it should be done? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Otherwise, there is going to be an overlapping in 
the different plants in the different States. 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mow, when you speak to me about England, it is 
not always comparable. There you have a nation that is compact, 
that is smaller in area than is the State of Oregon, with one govern- 
ment. Here, practically, we have 48 nations; haven't we? We 
have really a different and more complex problem, haven't we, in a 
lot of ways, than England? 

Mr. Mitchell. I shopld think so. Geography makes it so. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Mitchell, for coming, 
and for supplying us with a statement answering questions heretofore 
submitted to you by the committee. Your statement, together with 
these questions, will be inserted in the record at this point. 

(The matter referred to is as follows:) 

STATEMENT OF JAMES P. MITCHELL, DIRECTOR, CIVILIAN PER- 
SONNEL DIVISION, SERVICES OF SUPPLY, WAR DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

(Answer to question 1: "Will you briefly outline the functions of the Civilian 
Personnel Division of the Services of Supply?") 

In the General Orders issued by the Secretary of War on March 9, 1942, to 
effect the reorganization of the Army, the Commanding General, Services of 
Supply, was charged with the following mission in reference to personnel: 

"The administration of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which 
pertain to personnel as individuals, both military and civilian, to include pre- 
military training, mobilization of industrial manpower, and labor relations." 

The Civilian Personnel Division was created on his staff to carry out all the 
phases of this mission with the exception of military personnel activities. This 
division is divided into three branches: 

(a) The Civilian Personnel Branch is responsible for the formulation of policy 
and development of programs, together with supervision of the administration of 
all civilian personnel matters concerned with direct employees of the various 
agencies in the Services of Supply. This includes the supervision of the civilian 
personnel branches in the individual supply services and service commands in 
their development and supervision of programs for — 

1. Appointment and placement of employees. 

2. Job classification and wage administration. 

3. In-service training of executive, supervisory, manual, and clerical per- 

sonnel. 

4. Employee relations. 

5. Maintenance of personnel records. 

(b) The Labor Relations Branch is responsible for the formulation of policy 
and development of programs on labor-relations matters which affect production 
of military items. It provides liaison with the National War Labor Board, 
National Labor Relations Board, Department of Labor, and other labor relations 
agencies which perform services for War Department contractors. It also makes 
certain that the contracts for which the Services of Supply is responsible are con- 
ducted in accordance with existing labor laws and the policies of the War Depart- 
ment. It provides advice and guidance to War Department procurement agen- 
cies on their responsibility for seeing that their contractors maintain proper 
wage and hour structures. 

(c) The Manpower Branch is responsible for the coordination of the labor 
supply needs of the procurement agencies of the Services of Supply and for the 
interpretation of those needs to the War Manpower Commission and the War 
Production Board. It is also responsible for interpretation, to the procurement 
agencies of the Services of Supply and its contractors, of the policies_of the War 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13065 

Manpower Commission as it affects their operations and to Vjring to bear on the 
problems of the procurement agencies and their contractors the pertinent service 
which the War Manpower Commission renders, such as the recruitment facihties 
of the United States Employment Service and the Civil Service Commission, the 
training facilities of the Training- Within-Industry Section, the Apprenticeship 
Training Section, and its other training agencies, etc. It is further the objective 
of this division to supervise the administration of these policies within the estab- 
lishments operated by and through the Services of Supply so as to insure an 
optimum utilization of the manpower resources made available to the War 
Department by the War Manpower Commission. 

(Answer to question 2: "How man}' liaison officers are functioning in conjunction 
with the War Manpower Commission to advise War Department agencies as to 
the availabihty of labor, hoarding, and pirating of labor?") 

There are 12 regional liaison officers operating in the field who have an addi- 
tional 31 officers on their staffs. These officers are charged with the respon- 
sibility for discharging the functions of the Manpower Branch as outlined above. 

(Answer to question 3: "It is our understanding from a War Department press 
release of July 16 that the liaison officers do not duplicate existing services.") 

The service performed by these officers is a necessarj- part of the Services of 
Supply responsibility and, so far as we are able to determine, cannot duplicate, 
by'the very nature of its mission, any existing Federal service. 

(Answer to question 4: "This committee has proposed in its fifth interim 
report the creation of civilian labor utilization inspectors. These inspectors 
would have authority to survey use of labor in war plants. Do the liaison officers 
of the Civilian Personnel Division perform at the present time any such function 
as that described in the committee's recommendation II 1. A. p. 37 of the fifth 
interim report?") 

I consider that responsibility for the proper utilization of civilian labor 
rests with the management on any construction or production enterprise. The 
Civilian Personnel Division has made every effort to see that the personnel of the 
Services of Supply, responsible for efficient production, are thoroughly aware of 
the labor supply problem and are constantly making use of their position with 
relation to War Department contractors to see that the War Department con- 
tractors and producers are doing everything possible to utilize labor to its miaxi- 
mum. The function of labor utilization inspectors, if used, should be to review 
existing conditions in plants visited and if these are not satisfactory to ask the 
contracting agency responsible to take necessary action to improve these conditions. 

(Answer to question 5: "Do you consider that the management-labor production 
committees should have the responsibility for executing policies on upgrading, 
training, and transfer of workers within war plants?") 

It is our understanding that the management-labor production committees, as 
set up in accordance with the recommendation of the War Production Board, 
are established to do the following: 

(a) Arrange in individual plants for production scoreboards. 

(6) Increase plant efficiency by studying all physical working conditions. 

(c) Arrange for handling suggestions. 

(d) Arrange for production advertising. 

I believe the determination of policies on training, upgrading and transfer of 
workers must finally be made by management. Many managements, particularly 
those which deal with their employees through collective-bargaining agencies, 
make it a practice to consult with their employees on such policies and in some 
cases policies and procedures in connection with training, upgrading and transfer 
of workers are a part of collective-bargaining agreements. As far as the War 
Department is concerned, in haaidling its own direct employees, policies in con- 
nection with upgrading, transfer and training of workers are often governed by 
statute or civil-service regulations. 

(Answer to question 6: "Has the Civilian Personnel Division instituted measures 
to utilize in war plants the workers in civilian industries, soon to be curtailed?") 

I believe that the War Department has responsibility to encourage its con- 
tractors to make maximum utilization of available labor in the areas in which these 
contractors are operating. All decisions on the curtailment of civilian industries 
and the availability of employees freed by such curtailment seems to be jointly 
that of the War Production Board and the War ^Manpower Commission. As the 
War Department is notified by these agencies of plans for curtailment and con- 
centration, it will make such information available to its contractors and work 



13066 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

with its contractors to bring about the maximum utilization of such labor freed 
for war work. 

(Answer to question 7: "What controls do you consider necessary to eliminate 
labor pirating, to increase within-industry training, and to execute an orderly 
transfer of workers from civilian to war work?") 

In considering the controls necessary for the elimination of labor piracy, 
for the augmentation of within-industry training, and for the execution of an 
orderly transfer of workers from civilian to war work, it would seem that every 
effort should first be made to plan in advance the amount, type, and location of 
production to permit effective planned production. This planning should include 
the obtaining of comprehensive and accurate information, in usable form, which 
would indicate: The amount of skills currently needed and required in the future; 
the amount of skills available, adjusted as the market is depleted by induction 
into the armed forces; and the amount of skills that can be made available by 
training and by induced entry into the labor market. 

Before the institution of any control, by law or by regulation, an energetic 
educational program should be carried on to educate all employers so that they 
will themselves, through their own leadership, carry on desired programs. There 
should also be, at the same time, a program of education for the Government 
contracting agencies so that they may use the compulsion power inherent in their 
contracts to bring reluctant employers into line. 

It is, however, believed that, when civilian activities are curtailed, clearance 
machinery should be set up through which freed employees must register, in order 
that this force of workers, with their skills, will not be dissipated, and will be used 
to best advantage in war industry. It would appear that the United States 
Employment Service should be named to handle this clearance and that every 
effort should be made to strengthen it administratively and financially so that it 
will be able to discharge these responsibilities. 

Mr. Mitchell. All riglit, sir. 

The Chairman. We will take a recess for 5 minutes. 
(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing 
was resumed.) 

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order. 
General Hershey, will you be kind enough to take that chair there? 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY, DIRECTOR, SELEC- 
TIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. I want to say on behalf of the committee, General, 
we appreciate your coming here. We know you have a tremendous 
responsibility, and we are just trying, through this committee, to 
acquaint Congress as to how we are getting along. Congressman 
Bender will ask a few questions here. 

General Hersey. I am very glad to be here, Mr. Tolan. I remem- 
ber with a great deal of pleasure the last time we met together. It 
has been some months novv'. 

The Chairman. Before you begin your testimony, General, I will 
introduce into the record the very excellent statement that you have 
furnished us. 

(The statement follows:) 

STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY, DIRECTOR, 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

In response to your letter of September 3, 1942, I am herewith submitting 
answers to the questions raised in your letter. 

Your first question inquires as to the. action taken by Selective Service in 
response to directives addressed to it by the War Manpower Commission. 

We have received two directives. One of them is referred to on page 21 of 
your committee's fifth interim report of August 10, 1942, as directing the Selec- 
tive Service System to instruct all its local boards located in a community served 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13067 

by the United States Employment Service to secure the advice of the local public 
-employment office before classifying or reclassifying an individual skilled in a 
critical war occupation. Pursuant to that directive we issued State Director 
Advice No. 59 on August 29, 1942, copy of which is enclosed herewith.' 

Prior to issuing State Director Advice No. 59, the Selective Service System 
had been maintaining contacts, not only with the United States Employment 
Service, but also with the many other governmental, public, and private groups 
and persons. You are already familiar with the coordination that has been main- 
tained by Selective Service with the Department of Agriculture, the War Depart- 
ment, the Navy Department, the Department of Labor, the Department of 
Justice, the Maritime Commission, the Office of Defense Transportation, the 
War Production Board, the Civil Service Commission, the Office of Civilian 
Defense, and many other Government agencies and departments. You also are 
familiar with our coordination with labor and management groups, and other 
public and private organizations. I informed you generally about these contacts 
on page 4 of the statement I submitted to you on February 3, 1942.2 I shall, of 
course, be pleased to explain any of the aspects of such liaison more in detail 
should you so desire. 

The second of the two directives was issued by the chairman of the Manpower 
Commission on September 7, 1942. Preceding the general directive provision 
of the document was an order that certain types of miners in 12 western States 
must rem.ain in their jobs unless released by the local United States Employment 
Service office. The United States Employrrent Service office was also to be the 
agency for appeals. The directive which followed the order stated as follows: 

"All departments and agencies of the Federal Government are hereby directed 
to take all steps which may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate these pro- 
visions and to insure their observance." 

On September 7, 1942, Selective Service issued a statement to the local boards 
stating in effect that local boards should consider the classification of any of the 
types of men in cjuestion should they leave their present jobs, and also stated 
that such men should be reclassified out of classifications requiring certain occu- 
pational status if the local boards determined it was more in the interest of the 
war effort for the men to remain in their former jobs rather than in the ones to 
which they had transferred or were planning to transfer. 

Section 626.1 of the Selective Service Regulations, which in general substance 
has been in existence from the outset of our operations, reads as follows: 

"626.1 Classification not permanent. — (cr) No classification is permanent. 

"(6) Each classified registrant shall, within 10 days after it occurs, and any 
other person should, within 10 days after knowledge thereof, report to the local 
"board in writing any fact that might result in such' regis! rant being placed in a 
different classification. 

"(c) The local board shall keep informed of the status of classified registrants. 
Registrants may be questioned or physically or mentally reexamined, employers 
may be required to furnish information, police officials or other agencies may be 
requested to make investigations, and other steps may be taken by the local board 
to keep currently informed concerning the status of classified registrants." 

Under that regulation a registrant is required under severe penalty to report 
any change in status that might cause the local Selective Service board to find 
that he no longer was performing the requirements for deferment. For instance, if 
a man were deferred because his grandmother needed him for support, and if the 
grandmother died, then the registrant would be obligated to immediately report the 
change in status and the board would determine in that case that the registrant 
should no longer be deferred. So also, if a man were temporarily deferred because 
of w'ork he was doing in the copper mines, and if he changed his job and went to a 
shipyard, then he must report that fact to his local board, and the local board 
would, after reviewing all the facts, decide whether it were more in the national 
interest for that particular man to be in the mine rather than in the shipyard, and 
would decide whether he still continued to be entitled to deferment. 

As a result of this policy, many registrants realize that it is in the interest of the 
war effort as well as to their own interest to clear with the local Selective Service 
board prior to leaving their jobs, rather than doing so after leaving them and then 
having to return to their former jobs and thereby disrupting the war effort and 
themselves in the process. Most registrants, I believe, desire to do their patriotic 
duty and desire to do anything and everything that they are reasonably convinced 

' This material had not been received at time of publication. 
2 Washington hearings, pt. 27, p. 10235. 



13068 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS 

they should do to win the war. In spite of lack of uniformity and other short- 
comings of the Selective Service System's operations, the uncompensated local 
boards have performed an honest operation in deciding whether registrants should 
be selected for war or should be selected by deferment for civilian war work or 
other endeavors. 

In answer to your question, "Do you know of instances where employees have 
been granted occupational deferment on condition that they remain in their present 
location?", the effect of these Selective Service policies has been to cause men in 
some areas to remain in their present location, provided, of course, it is found by 
Selective Service to be more in the interest of the war effort for them to do so. 
Greater application of this principle with the attending publicity will, of course, 
extend and broaden the effect in that respect. 

One of your questions concerns certain complaints from employers to the effect 
that workers with essential skill are being drafted. I, again, refer to the state- 
ment of February 3, 1942, which I heretofore submitted to this committee in 
which I stated "the Selective Service System has been charged with the responsi- 
bility of registering and classifying the entire manpower of this Nation between 
the ages of 18 and 65, and with the further responsibility of determining which of 
the men between 20 and 45 should be allocated to the armed forces and which of 
them should be allocated to wartime production or other essential civilian activities 
or responsibilities. As a specified amount of money must be so budgeted as to 
obtain the best use, so also must the supply of manpower be budgeted and allo- 
cated so as to obtain the most effective results." 

The position of national headquarters of the Selective Service System is the same 
as it was then and always has been, namely, that the Selective Service System, 
as a result of comprehensive study and research and also as a result of 2 years 
of actual operations during which it has had an opportunity to observe its plans 
in operation, recognizes that this war cannot be won by placing every man in the 
armed forces, but that a proper balance must be maintained as between the fight- 
ing men on the one hand and materiel, including food and equipment for them and 
the civilian population on the other hand. 

During the peacetime operations of the Selective Service System when only 
approximately 600,000 men were being inducted annually out of the 27,000,000- 
men between the ages of 20 and 45, the Selective Service System could very easily 
procure that type of men for the armed forces which would in no way interfere with 
war production and which would not interfere to any great extent with civilian 
activities. However, now that we are in a wartime operation which may require 
10,000,000 in the armed forces, leaving 17,000,000 deferred out of the 27,000,000, 
in lieu of a much different peacetime ratio, classification policies necessarily 
have been revised and it was and is essential that, insofar as can be done without 
disrupting the war effort, employers must train those who are of such status that 
they should be included among the 17,000,000 deferred rather than among the 
10,000,000 fighting men, or should train women and elder men, to replace those 
employees who are of the status which the national interest and the war efi'ort 
require should be in the armed forces. 

As above indicated, national headquarters of Selective Service System very 
definitely realizes that an orderly withdrawal from industry of men with temporary 
occupational deferments can be accomplished by close cooperation by and between 
the Selective Service and the governmental production agencies on the one hand 
and the employers on the other hand. . For some time Selective Service has been 
endeavoring to work out proper solutions for these problems so that replacements 
will be trained and made which will free a number of the class II men for military 
service but yet will not remove them at a rate which will leave irreplaceable 
vacancies to the detriment of the war effort. 

One of your questions reads as follows: "The committee has stated in its 
Fifth Interim Report (p. 27), that 'Deferment practices applied on a plant-by- 
plant basis are not only inequitable but strike directly at the objective of effective 
manpower mobilization.' Do you agree with this statement?" 

In checking with your staff to make sure I understood the question correctly, 
I was informed that'the committee did not intend to give the impression that de- 
ferment should not be based upon analsyis of individual plants, but on the other 
hand intended to indicate that in its opinion occupational deferment should not 
be conditioned solely upon a request for deferment made either by the individual 
employee or by his employer. In this connection, although it is not necessary for 
an employer or an employee to request deferment, it is most advisable and as a 
matter of fact is a patriotic duty, for the employer to file a Form 42A or other 
affidavit setting forth exactly what the employee does as well as other pertinent 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13069 

and detailed information concerning the employee. For the information of the 
committee a copy of Form 42A is attached hereto and made a part hereof.^ Some 
employers, particularly the self-employer or those that are in a father-and-son 
relationship, which is the case in many local farming and rural areas, acquired the 
erroneous idea that they would not be considered as patriotic if they filed 42A or 
suggested deferment. Selective Service has continually been endeavoring to 
educate employers of all types in connection with this matter so that they will 
realize that any such viewpoint is really a matter of false patriotism as it is most 
certainly in the interest of the war effort for local boards to be furnished with full 
and complete information, together with a recommendation from those best 
qualified to furnish it. 

In connection with this aspect of the farm labor situation, we have recently 
met with governmental agencies interested in agriculture and also with members of 
the national farm organizations in an endeavor to work out the best ways of dealing 
with and solving the problem. We have also recently issued a release covering the 
subject generally. 

As to whether or not detailed deferment practices should be on a basis of 
plant-by-plant analysis, I believe that such should be the case. The vast majority 
of plants and businesses differ one from the other even in many instances where 
they produce the same product. The method of operation and functions of em- 
ployees differ as between plants, and there are other individual differences. Almost 
everyone recognizes the need for local, decentralized investigations and determina- 
tions as a basis for ascertaining the personnel structure of the various plants and 
businesses in order to have a basis for classification. This, the local boards, aided 
by all available local assistance, endeavor to do. Local boards are assisted by 
our occupational advisers who operate out of State headquarters. Representatives 
of the offices of the Under Secretaries of War and Navy who are interested in 
materiel procurement along with Mr. Nelson's organization are of assistance to 
our State headquarters and local representatives. 

One of your questions inquires whether or not I know of instances where Selective 
Service boards are receiving advice from labor-management production committees 
in granting deferments. 

This is a field which has very far-reaching possibilities. I have been very 
well impressed with the splendid work being accomplished by the Labor-Manage- 
rnent Policy Advisory Committee to the War Manpower Commission, and believe 
that if local committees would be of the same quality, they would be a great 
assistance to our local Selective-Service representatives and agencies on different 
questions. They would, of course, have to operate long enough and efficiently 
enough to secure inplant confidence comparable to that enjoyed by the National 
Labor- Management Committee already referred to. I understand that some of 
such committees are already in existence and are being formed in connection with 
the functions of Mr. Nelson's War Production Board which is interested in the 
production of essential mat6riel. Our contacts on all levels with labor, manage- 
ment and all other elements of the communities, of the States, and of the Nation 
have been of the best, and certainly the advice of any and all additional groups or 
committees that may be established would be welcomed by us at all levels if they 
would have any information or advice that would be of any possible assistance. 
The Selective Service System is most anxious to cooperate with labor-manage- 
ment groups to insure placement of all registrants where they may render the 
greatest service in winning the war. If anything further is needed to supplement 
our relationship with labor, with management or with any of the other elements, 
Selective Service is most certainly interested in filling that need. 

One of your questions is: "Do you know of instances where the drafting of 
workers has resulted in replacement through migration from communities which 
have been granted deferments to workers with similar skills?" 

I know of no specific instances where that has occurred but such a situation 
should most certainly be prevented insofar as is possible. Any instances which 
are brought to our attention will receive prompt action. Field representatives of 
national headquarters coordinate our State headquarters and coordinators of State 
headquarters extend the coordination among the local boards. The appeal agents 
attached to each local board and other local representatives of the Selective Service 
System do through periodic regional meetings keep in close touch with the co- 
ordinators and occupational advisers. 

• This material had not been received at time of publication. 



13070 WASHINGTON HEARINfGS 

We in national headquarters of Selective Service have maintained very close 
contact with Members of Congress and particularly with members of both Com- 
mittees on Military Affairs. As a result, we have continuously received suggestions, 
criticisms and recommendations based upon communications the various Members 
of Congress have received from their millions of constituents or based upon obser- 
vations the congressmen have acquired of their own knowledge and experience. 
This has been another way in which we have attempted to undergo self-analysis 
and improve our operations. It has been and will be our sincere intention to give 
the most careful consideration to such suggestions, criticisms and recommenda- 
tions and to maintain fluid and elastic policies which will be modified accordingly 
should investigation disclose that our operations will be improved and the war 
effort will be furthered thereby. 

In conclusion I desire to say that I believe Selective Service must continue to 
increase its exercise of powers heretofore unused to the fullest extent. The maxi- 
mum use of manpower will require more and more management in particular 
areas or industries. I believe that the basic Selective Service policy and organi- 
zation is sound and capable of accepting its obligations as the control over indi- 
viduals by the Government increases. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. LEWIS B. HERSHEY— Resumed 

Mr. Bender. General Hershey, is it your view that Selective 
Service is the key agency in supplying the armed services with man- 
power and through control of deferment policy likewise the key to 
providing industrial users with manpower? If so, does this require 
that Selective Service scrutinize the needs of both industry and the 
armed services? 

SELECTIVE SERVICE AS A KEY AGENCY 

General Hershey. Well, sir, that is three or four questions. I 
think that I could say, to the first part of it, that I believe the Selective 
Service is the key agency in furnishing our men to the armed forces. 
I realize that is subject to challenge, because at tlie present time we 
are not directly furnishing men to one of the armed forces. I think 
we are a very vital factor in furnishmg men even to the armed forces 
that we do not directly furnish. 

Now, as to the question of whether or not we are the key agency 
in the occupational field, that is probably controversial. vSo far as 
one individual goes, you cannot both induct a man and defer him, 
except on a time relationship. Therefore the problem of who is left 
behind will always depend very directly on whom you take. 

The Selective Service System, as I understand it, is responsible 
for furjiishing the luimber of men that we are called upon to furnish, 
with the least disturbance to tne occupational set-up, consistent with 
the accomplishments of the men. 

]Now, if that be true, necessarily there has got to be an over-all 
determination upon the basis of the type of war that we are going to 
fight, on what the relationship has got to be between the supporting 
populatian and the participating population. I am using "partici- 
pating" to mean those participating actually in the armed forces. 

ISiow, I think it is a question, first of all, of what we mean by 
"key." As to whether or not we are the key in this question of 
deferment, I would hesitate to say. Obviously, you cannot uiduct 
a man and defer him, except you can defer him for 3 months or 6 
moiiths or 9 months and then take him, but you never can decide 
how many men you are going to have m the Army or Navy without 
deciding liow many men that is going to leave j^ou. 



XATIOXAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13071 

I do not want to leave the impression, however, at least in the 
individual cases, that you cannot take a man for the Army unless 
everyone agrees that there is a replacement for him. That is not the 
way, in our primitive day, that we replace the men in the firing line. 
The enenw decides who is a casualty. That being true, the only way 
you replace is from the rear to the front. If you are going to do it in 
the other direction you are in retrogression. 

I do not know that I have answered the question. If I have not, 
I want you to pm me down and show me wherein I did not. I may 
not be able to answer the last part of it, as to what extent the Selective 
Service is the key in setting up the needs for occupational deferment. 

'Sir. Bender. In your opinion, the Selective Service System does 
not satisfy both needs? 

General Hershey. Now, let us see. T\Tiom are we satisfying? 
I mean: ^Miat are you talking about? What do you mean by 
"satisfy"? 

Mr. Bender. Well, you are not in a position to scrutinize the needs 
of industiy as well as the needs of the armed forces? 

OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENT 

General Hershey. I think to date we have spent a great deal more 
time on scrutinizing the needs of industry than of the armed forces. 
That is to say, there are now more than ample people for the armed 
forces and therefore, in case of doubt, we leave them m the factory. 
Now, as the armed forces' needs grow, and until such time as there 
are no longer any supplies to go to the factories, I think we have got to 
begin to make our determinations more favorable to the armed forces. 
Due to the fact that the total force is perhaps 60 or 62 or 65 million, 
it makes some difference as to whether you take your 15- or 16-year- 
olds as the productive lower limit and whether you go to 65 or whether 
you go to 70. No matter where you go you will find yourself with a 
definite number of people, and out of that you will have 20 or 25 million 
women that obviously caimot be used except to a small degree in the 
armed forces. Then, when you take out your old men, your cripples, 
your less physically fit, you find that unfortunately you only have a 
limited field from which you can take soldiers, but you .do not have 
such a limited field from which you can take workers. I thmk that is 
a fact that we have always got to bear in mmd. 

Mr. Bender. Is it your view. General Hershey, that the occupa- 
tional deferment powers of the draft S3^stem are limited in application 
because you camiot control a man who is deferred for reasons of 
dependency, who has been physicially rejected, or who is too young or 
too old to be liable for service? 

General Hershey. Let me dispose of the last part of your question 
first. We obviously cannot control the men over 45 or the men under 
20. Although he is registered, he is only registered for statistical and 
occupational purposes and, therefore, let me wipe those out im- 
mediately. 

Mr. Bender. By the way, how many are deferred for occupational 
reasons? 

General Hershey. Approximately a million. 



13072 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS 

Now, let US go next to the man wlio is physically disqualified. The 
only way that I can control what he does is by getting a waiver from 
the War Department to take him regardless of his physical condition. 

Now, let us go back to the man who is deferred for dependency. 
There are ample powers now to make him do one of two things, pro- 
vided he is acceptable either to the Army originally or on a waiver, 
and that is he must comply with the National Selective Service Act. 
If he does not, I think you can induct him, because the powers given 
to the President to take men from 20 to 45 are only hedged in the 
case of mmisters and certain Government and State officials. The 
power of deferment otherwise is only discretionary with the President, 
presumably in the national interest. 

Mr. Bender. About how many men are subject now to the draft 
who have not been classified or who have been deferred for other 



reasons 



NUMBER CLASSIFIED AND DEFERRED 



General Hershey. Well, now, let me get your question. 

Did you ask how many had not been classified or how many had 
been deferred? 

Mr. Bender. Both. 

General Hershey. Well, the classification is now going to the 
vanishing point. Between perhaps 5,000,000 at the last of June to, 
I think, zero point on the 15th of October. Now, just where we are 
in there, I would guess perhaps a million or a million and a half are 
still unclassified, perhaps two million, not more than that. I believe 
my instructions to finish classifications even to the 20-year-olds who 
registered in June will be accomplished on the 15th of October. 

Now, as to the men who have been deferred, you have got out of 
this total group that we have classified approximately 18,000,000 that 
will be either initially or eventually classified in the dependency classes. 
You have, as I say, somewhere around a million that went into 
your II-A and II-B, perhaps a little more than a million. You will 
have at least 2,000,000 and perhaps 3,000,000 that will go into IV-F 
by the 1st of this commg year; that is January 1, 1943. Now, that 
does not mean the maximum number will go in IV-F. More will go 
into IV-F as you continue to make physical examinations. 

Mr. Bender. General Hershey, what is the basis for the estimated 
need of an army of 13,000,000? 

General Hershey. I do not beHeve that I am equipped properly to 
say that we will have an Army of 13,000,000. I will tell you very 
frankly I do not know what the size of the Army is, but I have seen 
the actual demand during the last 5 or 6 months upped. Unfortu- 
nately, I cannot reveal my responsibilities to the public until the day 
that I go to take them. I realize there are many reasons why you 
should not unduly agitate people, but you should not, on the other 
hand, keep from them adjustments they may have to make. I do not 
know, but if I would plot a curve of the last 6 months on what little 
I do know it would be somewhat startling, perhaps, but, on the other 
hand, I realize that somewhere we do get out to a celling. I do not 
know what it is, because I am not in the councils to decide how many 
people we should have. I am running a service station. 

Mr. Bender. The general opinion up to the present time has been 
that our goal is 9,000,000. Of course, there has been something said 
recently about as high as 13,000,000. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13073 

REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVY INCREASED 

General Hershey. I heard mentioned the words "thirteen milhon." 
I think we ought to remember this, that when we talk about an Army 
of 9,000,000, even if we do not furnish them, the Navy has to come 
from somewhere and it is out of this same man pool. The men that 
man the ships, whether they are in the Navy, in the Maritime Com- 
mission, or somewhere else, they have got to be obtained, the ships 
have got to be manned. So, you always have several hundreds of 
thousands, and as we grow, even millions, of men who will man the 
ships. I think the President announced the other day that the Navy 
already had reached 700,000, which is greater than it has ever been 
before, and I do not believe anybody thinks we are at the end of 
naval expansion. 

Mr. Bender. In other words. General, there is no precedent for this 
war, is there? 

General Hershey. We have sailed beyond the place where our 
charts showed. Now, we can look back at them to try to get some 
plot of the future, but we have saUed beyond the last war. I will not 
say the Army is larger than it was on the last day of the last war, but 
we are taking in each day far, far more men, I think, than the public 
normally realizes. The Selective Service System, being the agency 
that operates between the public and the Army, has a tendency to be 
blamed, as any go-between is, by the Army for some of the things 
that the public does, and by the public for a great many tilings that 
the Army does. That is natural; that is our business. 

Mr. Bender. In other words. General, Russia, the way things look, 
cannot lick Germany alone, and we will probably have to do it. 

General Hershey. I am not a military man; I am not a war stu- 
dent, and I know notliing about it. 

NO PRECEDENT FOR PRESENT WAR 

Mr. Bender. I am going to draw the conclusion from that that we 
are working under different conditions, that there is no precedent for 
this war. 

General Hershey. Yes. 

Mr. Bender. In other words, sitting here today we know that the 
ultimate manpower will have to come from the United States to win 
this war, don't we? 

General Hershey. Yes. I think the thing we ought to always 
keep in mind when we think of the last war is that in the last war we 
fought in Europe, which we thought was quite a ways away, and now 
we are fighting on every continent in the world. Not only that, in 
the World War I happened to be a Field Artillery man, and there was 
not a shot fired out of a 75-millimeter gun built by the United States. 
Now, we have a war that is 5, 10, 15, or 20 times as mechanized as the 
World War was, and we are not only furnishing the armies that we 
raise but I have no idea what we will eventually have to do in furnish- 
ing other armies with manpower. 

Mr. Bender. For instance, in the last World War, General, we 
did not fire a shot in the Pacific. We did not have the Pacific problem 
at all, did we? 



13074 WASHINGTON HEARINKiS 

General Hershey. That is true. We had a few troops there, very 
few. I do not happen to know. As I remember, there were 7,000, 
but I am certainly not a historian; I think General Gray said there 
were 7,000 troops'in Siberia. We had a few in north Russia, we had 
a few scattered here and there, but our main force was in France. 

SCHEDULING OF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS 

Mr. Bender. General, do you consider that an adequate occupa- 
tional deferment policy must be based upon advance information 
and a proper scheduling of manpower requirements for industry and 
the Army? 

General Hershey. Well, I would have to answer "Yes" to that, 
because my whole experience in governmental things has been: How 
well you plan is probably about 75 percent of how well you operate. 

Mr. Bender. About how many men is the Army taking at the 
present time, will you say? 

General Hershey. If I should answer that, I think I should answer 
it in executive session. Personally, I might feel very free to answer 
it, in fact I would rather it would be told, because I think it helps my 
task, but the Army exercises the right of censorship over numbers. 
I am only allowed to publish to each community how many they want. 
I will be more than happy to tell you in executive session. It is not 
my censorship that restrains me now. I haven't control of that. 

Mr. Bender. General, who decides at the present time what man- 
power should go to the Army and what manpower should go to 
industry? 

General Hershey. Selective Service. 

Mr. Bender. Selective Service decides that entirely? 

General Hershey. That is true. The Congress gave the President 
the power to defer people, but that did restrict his power to defer by 
telling him how he would exercise that power. That is, he would 
exercise it through the local boards. The local boards, I think, in a 
very complicated field, are trying their very best to translate into 
John Jones the manpower picture. That is, they are trying to put 
him in a spot in this whole picture. They are doing it by what they 
think is probably too much mformation, and I do not doubt it, but 
the complications of modern warfare and the demands of all types of 
industry probably drive us uito putting out more uiformation than 
they can really assimilate, more than most of us can, I guess. 

INTERRELATION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE AND MANPOWER COMMISSION 

Mr. Bender. To whom is the Selective Service System answerable? 
To the Army or to the War Manpower Commission? 

General Hershey. I thuds: we are on something that has not been 
entirely figured out. I believe it is fair to say, first of all, that the 
Selective Service System mider Directive 5 of the Manpower Com- 
mission and under the executive order of the President is bound to 
carry out the mstructions of the Manpower Commission as it has to 
do with occupational deferment. I think that is a fair statement 
that everybody will agree on. I thmk cooperation is the answer. We 
have not yet had a clash. If it ever should come, if there ever came a 
time when you could not carry out those directives and at the same 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13075 

time provide the armed forces with the men that they call for, I do 
not know what the answer is. 

Mr. Bender. You think if the clash would come maybe it would 
clear the atmosphere? 

General Hershey. I am not, of course, a born optimist. I thmk 
we are here trying to run a very complicated war. We have got a 
great many agencies, and I think one clash is a natural thing. I would 
not be so hopeful as to believe that everything from there on would 
go without a clash. I meet around the table with quite a few of these 
people at least once a week or oftener. I do not think it is good for 
democracy for everybody to believe exactly the same, I really do not. 

Mr. Bender. I agree with you, General. 

General Hershey. We both come from the Middle West. 

Mr. Bender. General, here is a question I wrote down because it 
is a long one, and I am going to read it very carefully, because it deals 
with something that has come to my attention many, many times. 
Under the circumstances, I would like to give it to you very carefully 
so we might have some answer to it. 

Let us take the case of a local draft board. Let us say that they 
have a quota upon the Selective Service System m order to 
fill the needs of the Army. On the one hand they have a list of occupa- 
tions which should be deferred, which you have received and trans- 
mitted to them from the War Manpower Commission. If they fill 
the quota, they are miable to make occupational deferments in line 
with their instruction from the War Manpower Commission and the 
Selective Service. On the other hand, if they defer workers for occupa- 
tional reasons, they are miable to fill the quota. Who is to decide 
the distribution of manpower between the Army and industry in 
this case? 

HOW QUOTAS ARE BUILT UP 

General Hershey. Well, I think in this case at the present time 
it can be done. Let me go into a little expression of what we are 
attempting to do. I do not want to wear you out with some of our 
troubles, but going back to the World War, we started with attempt- 
ing to build our quotas on the basis of population, because that was 
the only thing we had. Very soon there were a lot of reasons why 
that would not work out — the presence of aliens, the presence of 
the lack of men in the population or too many men in the population, 
as you had in the West. Then, they went to registrations, which 
was a little nearer actually what they had, but they soon found some 
area had a lot of people in mdustfy, had a lot of farmers, had a lot 
of something else, so they went to 1-A, that is, the men who were 
classified and found not in either the dependency class or on a farm 
or in industry. Now, the war quit about that time. That seemed a 
happy solution, because they did not run long enough on this system 
to find out that it had some shortcomings. We started back 2 years 
ago somewhere near where the war left off in 1918. So we started 
to try to fill our quota on the basis of 1-A. Obviously, when we 
registered 16,000,000 in October 2 years ago and we had to fill a call 
in November, we could not fill it on the basis of completed classifica- 
tions, because they had not been completed. So, we had to make 
an estimate, and we took the first 20 percent that would be 1-A. Very 
soon, though, we began to get indications as to how many people 



13076 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS 

would be classified 1-A in each State in turn, so we began to project 
our figures as to the number that would be 1-A. Now, however, 
into that picture came two or three more age groups. Now, it does 
not necessarily follow that the 21- to 36-year-olds were 50 to 75 percent, 
or were a certain percentage that went in 1-A, or that will fill in tha<- 
1-A group of those between 20 and 21, or those between 36 and 45. 
Not only that, but we have several other classes. We have got 
children writing checks on their father's bankroll and not any of 
them are keeping stubs except one. Our problem was attempting 
to set a quota. Now, in working ©n the Deceniber quotas, I am trying 
to set them up on the basis of information which was available to me 
about the 15th of July and which on the 1st of August seemed 
complete, but are incomplete in that certain of the armed forr^'^ 
that have enlisted men have not yet given us the grades for them. 

DIFFICULTIES IN FORECASTING 

Now, I can think of one State where in the month of July there 
were 400 more men enlisted than were inducted and many of those 
grades are like some of the checks that the man forgets to cash for 
6 or 8 weeks. When I am trying to forecast right now the number 
of 1-A men there will be in Cleveland in December, on the basis of 
incomplete information from the middle of July, not knowing exactly 
how many people will enlist in all the different activities or how much 
of a shift there will be in occupational needs between now and Decem- 
ber, it just cannot be done, or it is an extremely difficult thing to do. 

Now, those are some of the difficulties that we find ourselves in.. 
What we are trying to do is forecast how many people will be in 1-A, 
in the State of Ohio, or any other State, on the 1st of Deceniber, not 
knowing exactly how many will enlist m the several services, not 
knowing what the changes in industries will be, whether they are 
gomg to put men m 2-A or 2-B or take them out— not knowing even 
now all of the numbers of people who enlisted in August. 

Now, those are the things under which we allot the quotas. 

Mr. Bender. In States? 

General Hershey. The States in turn allot them in the local 
boards. When the local board sends in and says: "I have no more 
1-A men," necessarily what they have got to do is take them out of 
other boards. For instance, we have told the local boards, in attempt- 
ing to carry out what we believe, from the report, to be the intent of 
Congress, not to take married men that have children. We have 
mstructed the local boards to not take them and to notify us when 
they run out of the 1-A men. 

DIVERSITY IN APPLICATION OF ACT 

Mr. Bender. In that connection, there is a wide diversity in the 
application of the act? 

General Hershey. Yes. 

Mr. Bender. For example, in Illinois, generally throughout the 
State they have deferred all married men, whUe in Ohio they were 
taking them. 

General Hershey. Let me call your attention to one of the reasons 
for it. Now, I am not attemptuig to defend the fact that we lack_ 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13077 

uniformity. In this room are men who are all the way from 4 feet 
8 up to 6 feet 2, probably. There is a difference in the divorce laws, 
in the school laws. There is not anything in the United States that 
is uniform. That is no excuse ; it is just one of the reasons why human 
beings are different and why human beings in Ohio may be a little 
tougher, as we call it, than in Illinois. 

Let me give you one other reason why that is so: Section 15 (c) 
of the old act prescribed that no person should make a claim for 
dependency except on an economic basis. That meant that the m.an 
who had a rich wife, the man who had lots of money of his own, not 
earned — well, he might have earned it at some time buu I mean he 
was not earning it at that time — or a working wife, all three of those 
groups, if the board lived up to the law strictly, or with any degree 
of strictness, the board would take them. Now, human beings being 
what they are — and remember these 25,000 people work for nothing 
and board themselves, and I do not mmd saying if everybody else in 
the United States, any other citizen, had done as much to win this 
war as not only the average but the below average local board men, 
the war would be over. I have made the statement several times, and 
I repeat it. Those fellows really take the gaff. But that is beside 
the question. 

Some of the fellows said, "We don't c^re to break up the family, 
we don't care what the Congress said." The only thing I could do 
was appeal it. When I go to appeal it to the initial agency, the mem- 
ber of the board, probably a lawyer in the town, says: "What is the 
use of taking the man away from his family when there are other young 
men here?" 

Now, however, out in Ohio, in some areas, some of the local boards 
said: "That is the law and we are going to live up to the letter of the 
law. Why should not they go?" "His family won't suffer." Some 
even said: "His family is better off with him gone," 

I will tell you very "frankly one of the difficult things we get into is 
that there are a lot of men, especially since the allotment law has been 
passed, that the boards look at and say, "If that man's wife can get 
$80 or $100, why keep him here?" I have got some States that have 
had a great deal of difficulty with that very thing. No matter what 
you order them to do, they say: "Why take a man off the farm, even 
if he is not entu-elv necessary, when you can take a fellow who is 
over here doing nothing and his wife can get $80 or $100?" 

Now, the repeal of that law in July marked a turning point, be- 
cause then instead of putting the emphasis on the economic factors, 
your emphasis was on the family relationship, and we had to reeducate 
25,000 local boards to the fact that the law does not compel you to 
do this any more. We were caught on the 1st day of July with a call 
that was 50 percent greater than in June, with 40 days being the 
required distance that registrants had to travel. In the time he 
received his notice, or sending out the questionnaire, his notice of the 
right to appeal, his notice of selection, even if he did not take any 
appeal — there is a 40-day lag between the time we start him through 
this chute and the time we get him out at the other end. When we 
got the call in July, with all our available system, having the married 
mixed into it, we had to do one of two things: If we sent out the order 
as Illinois did, and said, "Don't take any married men," they would 
find themselves unable to meet the call. If you send out the order. 



13078 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

''Take no married men," then you will find yourself short, and I do 
not think that Congress has yet indicated that we were to short the 
request of the Army, 

Mr. Bender. In connection with this matter of occupational 
deferment, the draft board had one set of instructions, the Selective 
Service had another set of instructions that was different from the 
War Manpower Commission. Now, who is to decide? 

UNFORTUNATE PUBLICITY 

General Hershey. I do not want to say that it is not so, but I 
cannot admit the fact that the War Manpower Commission has 
sent any instructions to the local board. If there were any 1 would 
be glad to have it called to my attention. 1 do not think they have. 

1 will grant that at the outset of the Manpower Commission in April, 
there was very much misunderstood publicity on what the Man- 
power Commission was going to do. I think the Manpower Com- 
mission approached the whole problem correctly, but 1 do not think 
the publicity which they received — which more or less said they were 
going to blanket out whole groups of people — was very fortunate. I 
think it was unfortunate, and I do not think it was justified by 
anything that was said by the Manpower Commission. 

The next thing that happened, I think there was quite a little said 
that the Manpower Commission was coming into the field to take 
care of the employers. 1 think that was an inference that was not 
justified. 1 think the Manpower Commission had to find itself; it 
had to go through many of the things that we have gone through for 

2 years. 1 think the Manpower Commission is operating very true 
to form. I think they are getting a full realization of many of the 
factors involved. 

1 also would like to call your attention to the fact that the situation 
now and in April is vastly different. In April 1 was working under 
the assumption that we would produce 3,600,000 by Christmas. 
General Marshall, at West Point, when the graduation took place 
about the 1st of June, said 4,500,000. I do not think there has been 
any announcement since, but that is no longer the figure. 

Now, you can see the situation that the Manpower Commission, 
and all of us, faced in April. It was quite different than it is now. 
I think we all realize, and I plead guilty for doing my full share for a 
year and a half of putting emphasis on the fact that we must leave 
behind everybody we possibly can. In the first place, you remember 
industry was getting set. A lot of the industry is now up to their 
plateau, and they have been up there for quite a while. 

I would be the last person that would be critical of industry. 
They have had their troubles, but in April I knew of several factories 
that turned aside from their replacement policy because they thought 
they were getting a breather. That is one of the things that the 
publicity in regard to the Manpower Commission was unfortunate in. 

Mr. Bender. Has any effort been made to correct the im.pression 
that the draft boards have done that, and that the country generally 
has, in that connection? 



national defense migration 13079 

industry's part in occupational deferment 

General Hershey. I think for the last 2 or 3 weeks, if the things 
that have been said to me as to what some of the newspapers have 
said are correct, about some of the things I said, they either misinter- 
preted what I was saying, or they are trying to create that impression. 
I think industry is coming along. I have here a company, and while 
I am not at liberty to disclose the details, this company has, during 
the last 4 or 5 months, made a very careful study of their manpower, 
and they have reduced it into patterns in order to decide whom they 
will go out for, and they succeeded in 80 or 90 percent of the appeals 
to the local appeal board since they actually were able to go and tell 
what each man was doing. 1 have looked at several thousand appeals 
•of one kind or another, quite a few of them occupational, and I have 
been impressed with the fact that I got a two-page letter from an em- 
ployer on how important the particular industry was, and sometimes 
less than a paragi^aph saying what John Smith had to do with it. After 
all, we have got to know whether John Smith is the fellow that is run- 
ning the factory or whether he is a 22-year old boy that drifted in 
there 18 months ago and is doing a machine operation that a week's 
training will replace. 

It is going to take time. I think industry is coming along, but I 
think they have to be shocked, and I think you have got to take 
somebody away from them, or they will never believe you are going to. 

OCCUPATION AS A BASIC CONDITION OF DEFERMENT 

Mr. Bender. General Hershey, Selective Service is now drawing 
very heavily upon our manpower reserves and it may be expected that 
if we are to have an army of ten to thirteen million men, that even 
more drastic withdrawals will be made. It will .become necessary at 
the same time to greatly increase our industrial manpower to service 
this large Army. Yet we have only a limited amount of manpower, 
particularly skilled manpower. Will it not become essential to make 
occupation the basic condition of deferment rather than physical or 
dependency conditions and dependency status? 

General Hershey. That is a rather long question. Let me say 
"Yes" very heartily to one part of it, that is I think we are very rapidly 
going to the place where what a man can do for his country occupa- 
tionally — and that means either go into the armed forces or into indus- 
try — must transcend other things. No other country has had the 
hardihood to attempt to handle the dependency question. We did. 
Many people like to point to what England has accomplished, but 
they never taclded dependencies. They gave them separation allow- 
ances, and once in awhile they might leave a man behind, or increase 
his amount, by and large, they only made a determination as to 
whether he went into the armed forces or did not. Wliether he did not 
depended on whether they needed him occupationally. 

I do not want to say our system does not have some disadvantages, 
even aside from breaking the family. I yield to no one in a desire to 
give the maximum protection to the American home, but I do not 
yield, on the other hand, to any one in a little long-range thinking. 
The American home may have to be defended at some distance from 
its location. 

6039G— 42— pt. 34 3 



13080 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS 

The Chairman. General, may I interrupt you there? 

England, as I understand, for the first 2 years, as you say, took 
them ii-respective of dependencies; then, they had to recall hundreds 
of thousands and put them back into industry. Did dependency 
have anything to do with the question of whom they recalled? 

RECALL OF CLASSES IN ENGLAND CONTRASTED WITH OUR SYSTEM 

General Hershey. You see, England did not have to recall them 
very far after Dunkirk. I think the last time I came before this 
committee I said that our problem, if we ever have to recall people is 
vastly different than England's. England had them within a reason- 
able distance. If we get our people and our forces into the distribu- 
tion that we are getting them now, recalling them will not be practical, 
make no mistake about that. Therefore, it is most important that we 
do use our very best judgment. 

Mr. Bender. In connection with Dunkirk, some statements have 
been made that as many as a half million men, skilled machinists in 
industry, were recalled after Dunkirk in England, and other state- 
ments were that the number was somewhere in the neighborhood of 
50,000. 

General Hershey. I do not happen to know. I should not be sur- 
prised at the rather large numbers, because, after all, Germany and 
England are m the situation where they can recall them for certain 
seasons of the year, where they could locate the people on the farm or 
in industry, where they are father near. You must remember at 
Dunkirk they did lose great volumes of material and the coasts of 
Britain were unprotected. 

Mr. Bender. If we have 50,000, say, skilled workers in Australia, 
or 25,000 in Egypt, it is no simple thing to recall them back home and 
put them in industry. 

General Hershey. You would simply be using the transportation. 
Not only that, but of course if you fight in that far-flung field you have 
got to have maintenance bases out there, where you have to have a 
hioh percentage of skilled workers. 

I would like to sav this, that our dependency arrangement has given 
a great deal of incidental protection to industry. When you look at 
the percentages we have deferred for occupational reasons at the 
present time ard look at what England has, you are just lookirg at 
two different things. Our World Wry experience shows us that for 
every man that was deferred occupationaliy at least 10 men were 
deferred for dependency, who could have been deferred for occupa- 
tional reasons had they had to ask for it. So we have had a little bit 
of an easier time by having a blanket on deferment. As we go into 
the deferred classcsfor dependency we are going to have to work harder 
to reclassify these men in 2-A or 2-B, if they have to go in them, 
before we put them into 1-A. That is one of our very serious profclenis. 

Another thir<r I would like to caU your attention to, the fact is, 
I believe, we have done much better than England in breakirg down 
our skills. I think we have been able to break them down, and I do 
not mean to say that there are not kev men. Gentlemen, I believe we 
have come to a place row where both in the Army and in the Navy 
and in industry, your biggest demand is for somebody that you can 
make into what you want him to be. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13081 

Now, in tliis study here, we cannot take them out too fast, but if 
the withdrawals from industry, even of the semiskilled, are reasonable, 
well and good. As long as the supply of women, overaged men and 
less physically fit remain available, they can be trained and must be 
trained. 

Mr. Bender. There is need, however, in your opinion, for a 
uniform policy regarding this matter, isn't there? 

General Hershey. I would not want to quibble over what you 
mean by "uniform," but in the first place England has decentralized 
about as much as we have. England hns quite an inspection system, 
but, as I understand it, one of the most difficult things in the world is 
to find inspectors that can really decide on the question of what a 
factory can spare and what it cannot. 

When you get down to it, I think we are going to have close coop- 
eration. I think W. P. B., for instance, is going to have to say, 
"Here is a drop-forging factory that has got to go," but just as soon 
as there are 100,000 factories that have to go, then you cannot give 
them must protection, because you cannot protect everything. 

DISADVANTAGES IN SETTING UP TECHNICAL COMMITTEES 

Air. Bender. General, at the present time we are told that local 
boards having layman's knowledge of the needs of industry cannot 
give proper weight to occupational status in deferment policy. What 
do you think of the suggestion that technical boards be established to 
decide or to review cases of occupational deferments? 

General Hershey. Well, I would like to challenge that statement. 
I will grant that the local board is a lay board, but I would like to 
point out that operating even these factories from the management's 
standpoint and trying to decide whether you can take out 2 or 10 
percent is somewhat of a strategical question and it hasn't that 
technique. I think these local boards have not only found that per- 
haps they did not know every single process in the factory, but our 
experience has been that management has not known very much about 
who does what in their own factories. T do not think it is a technical 
situation. I think you have got first of all to depend upon manage- 
ment, and I am very much interested in the management labor 
committee and how it develops. Until it has had a little more time 
to develop, it is a question whether it can pass. If it can take the 
responsibility for production in the factories, I think it can take som.e 
responsibility in deciding what persons they can spare, and what 
percentage of people they can spare. We are flexible enough, if that 
advice can be given, to act on it. I have no fear of that. The thing 
I have had fear about is the factory which wants to keep every man 
when 60 percent of them are immediately replaceable — and an addi- 
tional 15 or 20 percent if you give them 6, 9, or 12 months. 

The technical committee, I have no particular quarrel with; I 
think we have got to be very careful, though, that we do not get such 
a succession of committees that we do not get anything done. 

Mr. Bender. Your impression is that too many cooks spoil the 
broth. 

General Hershey. Unfortunately, I have seen some projects that 
have been going along, during which time I have had to mobilize 
over a million men. I just wonder what would happen if I had waited 



13082 WASHINGTON HEARINlGS 

until everybody had gone over the matter and was thoroughly satisfied. 
I have been nothing but a battery commander most of my life, but 
I generally left to the corporal as to how to run his squad. Even 
though he makes a mistake once in awhile and shoots the wrong man, 
he is better off than if he waits until he tells me and I tell him to fire, 
because by that time he is captured and so am 1. 

POSITION ON VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT 

Mr. Bender. We know that you have gone on record several 
times against the voluntary system of recruitment for the armed 
services. Recent newspaper accounts have stated that the Army 
and Navy will not accept voluntary recruits unless they have been 
granted a release from their local boards or from employers. Do you 
consider that the problems of voluntary enlistment will be solved by 
these arrangements? 

General Hershey. I would like to make one correction and then 
say "No." The correction I want to make is that the Navy has only 
obligated itself not to take 2-A, 2-B and 3-B, and then I still answer 
"No." My answer is, until you close the avenues and put one valve 
on the intake the valve will be buried and there will be leakages 
there, but they will not be near as much as when you have a half a 
dozen spigots running and you just cannot get around to watch them 
all. 

Mr. Bender. President Roosevelt observed in a recent press con- 
ference that 18- and 19-year-old youths will probably not be drafted 
for service this year. Do you care to express an opinion regarding 
the necessity and desirability of recruiting youth of these ages? 

General Hershey. Now, wait a minute. I would have to say 
that recruiting anyone is not in accordance with the philosophy 
that I was taught in becoming whatever I am on the question of 
manpower. I am over 100 miles from home so I guess I am an expert, 
but I do not believe that you should have recruiting anywhere. I 
simply beheve that, because, first of all, in times like these, I do not 
think the individual should be obligated to decide when he does 
what he must do for his country. I think he is entitled to have that 
decided for him. 

Another thing is you cannot run a recruitmg system for any group 
without affecting other people. Smiday night, for some reason or 
other, I had a chance to turn on the radio and tuned in a program 
that I listen to at times, and I found myself being told who needed 
men for the armed forces. If I had not had some other ideas, perhaps 
I would have been led to believe that there were certam things that 
people needed that had opportunities to get them m other places. 
I think any recruiting is unfortunate, but that is a personal opinion. 
I have expressed it so many times and it has not accomplished any- 
thing, so I have no particular hopes in it. Now, you asked me the 
question, and that is my personal opmion. 

Mr. Bender. You are trying to be nonpartisan between the Army 
and the Navy, is not that it? 

General Hershey. I have associated with the Navy for a long 
time. Because I merely happen to belong to the Anny does not 
mean I lean that way. I would probably criticize them as quickly 
as the other branch of the service. I do think it is unfortunate that 
we have not had a common method of increasing both of them. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13083 

ESTIMATES OF AVAILABLE 18- AND 19-YEAR-OLDS 

Mr. Bender. How many 18- and- 19-year-olds are there? 

General Hershey. You mean left? 

Mr. Bender. Yes. 

General Hershey. Well, at the time we registered them, we had 
about 2y4 million, but remember that this supply is bemg drawn upon 
in quite a number of ways. That is, there are several kmds of 
Reserves. There are enlistments in the different forces. I would 
not attempt to estimate just how much that has been depleted in the 
last 3 months, but I think it is quite a little. I think you should 
remember this, that those who are m it will represent the residue 
from which able-bodied people have been selected. 

Air. Bender. How many would you estimate have already volun- 
teered for service? 

General Hershey, You mean, smce June? 

Mr. Bender. Yes. 

General Hershey. Probably not more than a quarter of a million. 
That guess is very vague. I do not know. In the fij^st place, I do 
not have access to recruitment, nor do I have figures for the several 
Reserves that are in existence. I think my opinion would be quite 
worthless on that. 

Mr. Bender. On the basis of your experienpe, what would you say 
as to how many of the remainder will pass the physical examination? 

General Hershey. Of course, this group ought to rmi very high. 
We hope that 'at least 80 percent of them would, but I do want to 
point out to you that of the ones that are left, many of them have 
already been rejected. In other words, the ones that have gone 
probably represent the 80 percent, and we stiU have the 20 percent 
rejected out of another perhaps half a million that have already gone. 
So that is going to make quite a rejection rate in the residue, greater 
than it ought to be. 

Mr. Bender. How many do you think the draft would get? 

General Hershey. While I am guessing somewhere around a million, 
someone else would guess 500,000. Your guess I think is as good 
as mine. 

Mr. Bender. Do you think the estimate that has been made in 
some quarters that there are 2,000,000 that could be drawn from this 
group is way out of line? 

General Hershey. I think that is 'way out of line. I thmk if I 
could get somewhere around a million and a half it would be doing 
very well . The more we need manpower the lower become the physi- 
cal standards. That is another thmg that makes it very hard for the 
manpower estimator, because he is figuring, first of all, on something 
that is fluid. Even the yardstick sometimes has 36 inches one day, 
the next day 28 inches, the next day 24 mches, and it keeps one on his 
toes in making the measurements. 

Mr. Bender. The claim has been made that the average age for 
Marme enlistments is 19^ years; is that correct? 

General Hershey. I do not know. I happen to have several 
Marines on my staff. They have been with me so long that I do not 
thmk that I can get any more information out of the Marme Corps 
than I have already received. I was always curious when I asked 
them whether they meant during the last year or the last 20 years. 



13084 WASHINGTON HEARIXiGS 

You see, statistics are a very peculiar thing, and you expand your 
base on what you want to prove, that is, if it is favorable, and if it 
is not, you elimmate it and try another base. So I don't. know. 

Mr. Bender. Voluntary enlistments, in your opinion, tap mainly 
youths below the age of 20? 

General Hershey. No ; I would guess it is at least half. I do know 
something about the number of men I lose between the day they get 
their notice of niduction and the day they are supposed to be inducted, 
and that somewhere around half of the recruiting in the months came 
out of that group. I would have to presume quite a few were above 
20, because I do not select for induction anybody under 20. 

Mr. Bender. I have had more letters, and I assume that is the 
experience of most of the Members of the House and Senate, regarding 
this drafting of fathers in 1943. How are you going to do that? 

POLICY ON drafting MEN WITH DEPENDENTS 

General Hershey. Well, unless Congress has other intentions, I 
think that we will, first of all, take those with secondary dependents, 
those that are not fathers, those that are the fellows that have mothers, 
fathers, grandmothers, grandfathers, grandchildren, brothers, and 
sisters. You cannot take all the people, because there will be some 
hardship cases that will just have to stay back, and the local board 
will not take genuine cases where, even with the allotment money, it 
will not take care of the case. 

The next group are those who have wives only, and again you can- 
not take the whole group, because the local boards simply will not 
take somebody's husband because they believe even with the amount 
of money involved that the case is unusual enough to warrant an 
exception. I realize those exceptions will not be uniform, but they 
would not be uniform if we made them from punchcards in Wash- 
ington, and they would not be as prompt there, but that is another 
story. 

The next group, we pass into people who are presumably with one 
child, and on up. Of course, the people that are rejected physically, 
if they are married, remain behind the same as any other 4-F. 

The men that we have got to have in industry, necessarily we have 
got to reclassify each of these fellows, to be sure, to 2-A and 2-B. If 
they are necessary men in Critical industries, we are going to have to 
review them and we will have to revise them. Even though someone 
says, "What is that 22-year-old boy doing up there?", he has been 
able to convince somebody that they have been unable to get along 
without him for 3, 6, or 9 months. Some of these studies we have made 
of the men in the two classes, on the question of age or critical skills, 
have exploded the theory a bit because of the fact that two of our 
largest industries have mushroomed from 1939. They happen to be 
the airplane and shipbuilding industries, and they had started out at 
a time when there was a great supply of youngsters available for em- 
ployment. Many of the youngsters came in. Perhaps they were 
not too important, but they tried to make a case for them. Some of 
them have actually, with the growth of the plant, come into positions 
of some skin and some responsibihty, and it is going to take quite 
some time to replace many of those. They are always a bad public- 
relations problem, because the wife who is losing her husband is 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13085 

saying, "Why is that young fellow over there not inducted?" If that 
young fellow is the only man that can make a drop forging, or some- 
thing of that kind, in the national need, as I think you brought out 
a while ago, the occupational need may be there to keep him. 

Mr. Bender. General Hershey, serious labor shortages in some 
industries are the result of the out-migration of workers who seek 
better-paying jobs in other industries. Notable examples, of course, 
where labor shortages have arisen, are nonferrous metals, lumber and 
agriculture. To what extent is deferment of workers in these occupa- 
tions based upon their remaining in these occupations? 

OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENT IN CRITICAL AREAS 

General Hershey. In theory, we have always said an occupational 
deferment is a coat that you wear while working at that job. When 
you leave that job you should leave your coat. In other words, you 
ought to be reclassified. You can see that during the time when we 
have plenty of men it is very possible for a man to be working on a 
farm in Iowa, get a 2-A deferment, and when next the board hears 
from him he is out on the west coast, and they send a 2-A for approval 
and they state that he is the most important man in the airplane 
factory. He has been there only 3 months, but that is the way the 
board feels. All right, he is keeping up the war effort, and they do 
not change his deferment. This order which the Manpower Commis- 
sion got out a few days ago on copper is some indication of the fact 
that we have got to begin to manage our manpower on the basis of 
critical areas. I think we have got to face the prospect of the War 
Production Board saying: ''Here are factories that have just got to 
run." I can visualize the Secretary of Agriculture setting up certain 
areas where certain things are being produced and saying: ''That has 
got to go on." When that happens, the Selective Service's job is to 
give its full support to see that just exactly that happens. Then if a 
man has a 2-A deferment, he has to remain in that area and work. I 
do not thinlv it is any more than he can expect. He will lose his 2-A 
when he leaves the occupation for v/hich he has been given the 2-A. 
To that extent I think the occupational deferment tends to restrain 
him. 

I do not think we have done as much of that in the past as we will 
have to do in the future, due to the fact that we felt we had quite 
an abundance of labor. We have a philosophy of abundance and a 
philosophy of plenty. That is what is hurting us now, because we 
are going from that philosophy to one of scarcity, and it hurts us, 
because the employers do not like to change. Men do not like to 
leave their families. You cannot blame them, but you cannot 
mobilize the whole Nation without dislocating both. 

Mr. Bender. Do you think that a review of wages and working 
conditions by a Government agency is necessary before such a con- 
dition upon deferment is imposed? 

General Hershey. That is a pretty big question and gets me into 
something I do not know anything about. I came from a farm and 
merely because we lived economically does not make me an economist. 



13086 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

SOLDIER SUFFERS FROM THREE DIFFERENTIALS 

I do know we have got in the Arm.y three differentials that are set 
up against the soldiers. First of all, this differential of pay. It is 
much better than it used to be, but just the same he does not think 
he is getting as much money as he can get if he works at som.ething 
else. 

The next differential is comfort. He does not think he has as 
good a bed to sleep in, he does not have a chance to eat as well. 

The third thing, of course, is danger. Those three dift'erentials are 
always against the soldier and tend to make the fellow who has 
been in the Army any time feel that anything that tends to pay higher 
wages and to afford much more comfort broadens the breach between 
the soldier and the fellow who stays behind, and tends to make the 
soldier a little less contented. 

Coming back to the farmer again: When I see the people leaving 
my neighborhood to go to Toledo, Indianapolis, and even Cleveland^ 
Detroit, and Chicago, I think something ought to be done so they 
will not go off and leave the farm. Just how that is to be done, I 
do not know. Wlien you get into the question of control of wages 
and living conditions, you are getting into something on which it is 
quite presumptuous for me to offer an opinion. I am just telling you 
what I feel as a person who has been some time in the Army and a 
quarter of a century on the farm. 

DEFERMENT OF WORKERS IN LUMBER AND NONFERROUS-METALS 

INDUSTRIES 

Mr. Bender. You referred to the order of the War Manpower 
Commission as issued recently in connection with the lumber and 
nonferrous metals industries, where essential workers in these indus- 
tries are granted deferments. Will you briefly describe what action 
the Selective Service has taken to implement this order? 

General Hershey. We sent a telegram to 12 States. What we 
had to do was to call their attention to the fact that the men 

The Chairman (interposing). Wliat 12 States do you mean? 

General Hershey. Well, in general, about everything west of the 
Mississippi River. I do not know that I could name them, but they 
are the three coast States, most of the Rocky Mountain States, and 
I think it includes New Mexico and Texas. 

The Chairman. They are the nonferrous-metal States? 

General Hershey. Yes, sir, the nonferrous-metal States. 

We called the attention of the State directors to the fact that when 
a man left the job for which he was deferred — perhaps the best way 
is to read the telegram. It states: 

On September 7, 1942, the War Manpower Commission took action to increase 
the urgently needed war production of copper, critical nonferrous metals and lum- 
ber in the twelve States of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, 
California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, New Mexico, and Texas. It called 
for uninterrupted production and maintenance operations in all nonferrous metal 
mining, milling, smelting, and refining and all logging and lumbering activities 
carried on within those States. 

So that the Selective Service System will give its full cooperation to the achieve- 
ment of this objective, local boards are directed to reclassify out of class 2-A or 



NATIONAL DEFENSE "migration 13087 

class 2-B into a class immediately available for service or out of class 3-B into 
class 3-A — 

which moves them from the occupational into the straight de- 
pendency — 

subject to the usual rights of appeal, any registrant who leaves a production or 
maintenance occupation in any of these activities without presenting satisfactory 
evidence to his local board that his separation did not adversely affect the war 
effort. 

State directors in the 12 States listed above should give the widest possible 
publicity to the provisions of section 626.1 of the regulations — 

that is the regulation which all along has said that whenever you 
leave the occupation you notify your local board. Those regulations 
have been in effect for 2 years. (Contmuing): 

section 626.1 of the regulations requiring that local boards be notified whenever 
a registrant changes his occupational status. 

Mr. Bender. When was that issued? 

General Hershey. September 10, 1942, 3 days after the War 
Manpower Commission issued the order. It was either on the 9th 
or 10th. 

Mr. Bender. Would you describe the order governing the non- 
ferrous metals and lumber industries as a volmitary national service 
act for the copper and lumber industries? 

General Hershey. I am afraid whatever I would say on that would 
not be worth very much. It is not entirely voluntary. It certainly 
is very lightly compulsory. Whether it is national service under any 
circumstances, I would not know. I thmk it is an effort to control 
manpow^er, that is, it is a law to control the manpower — no question 
about that. 

views on question of national service act 

Mr. Bender. Here is an miportant question, General. It is com- 
mon knowledge that active consideration is bemg given by many 
Federal agencies for formulation of a national service act. As we 
understand it, there is a difference of opinion whether these controls 
should operate through the Employment Service or tlu^ough the 
Selective Service Admmistration. What is your view on this matter? 

General Hershey. Well, I think if I answered very honestly I 
would have to say that they haven't crystalized. I liave heard a 
great deal about this discussion. I have been on a great many of the 
discussions. I have never yet, either as Director of Selective Service 
System or as an individual, come to the conclusion that national 
service was indicated. Now, I mean as of right now. If you say: 
Should we have it in January? I do not know — or any other time. 
But I have never been convinced that a national service was mdicated. 

Now, when it comes to how it is going to be operated, you have 
gotten into the very reason that T have had difficulty in seeing it as a 
national service, because I have not been able to visualize how you are 
going to operate it. If you have it merely as sort of a threat that 
you are only going to use when you have to, then I can say you need 
very little machinery for it. On the other hand, if you get down and 
actually manage 62,000,000 people, or some fraction of them, that is 
going to mean a lot of machinery, and I have had a great deal of diffi- 
culty in seeing it. Selective Service has felt that trying to mobilize the 



13088 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

people that they have mobihzed and not mobilize the people they 
could not mobilize has kept us fairly well engaged. We, of course, are 
a govermnental agency, and whatever we are asked to do we will do, 
but I do not believe that I have clearly enough in mind what a national 
service law will be to express very much of an opinion on how you are 
going to operate it. It depends a great deal on what kind of national 
service law you are going to talk about, whether it is something that 
tries to tell each human being what he does, or whether it is going to 
be one that will straighten out those who refuse to do even what 
public opinion feels they should do. 

Mr. Bender. Of course, you have heard a great deal of discussion, 
or have read in the newspapers or elsewhere, that there has been 
considerable talk regarding such a move. 

General Hershey. Yes. 

Mr. Bender. Of course, we are vitally concerned about this whole 
question, and because of your experience in the administration of this 
matter, the committee is anxious to know just what your views are, 
and of course you have expressed them. 

General, is the mobihzation of manpower in England primarily 
the function of the Selective Service or of their Employment Service 
Administration? 

General Hershey. They have one agency over there under the 
^Ministry of Labor and Service that handles the mobilization of both 
men for the services and -women for the services. They still have 
some volunteers, but as fast as they are puttmg in the services, it is 
handled by a single agency. 

Mr. Bender. To whom in this country do you consider the func- 
tions of the head of the Ministry of Labor to be comparable? 

General Hershey. In this country? 

Mr. Bender. Yes. 

General Hershey. I do not believe we have quite gotten to the 
place where there is any one person that is comparable, because at 
the present time you still have several agencies that have the right 
to draw without restriction on the labor supply. I am not talkmg 
about the labor supply meaning the man that works, I mean the human 
being that can do somethmg in this war, vhether he goes in the Army 
or whether he goes to work. 

Mr. Bender. This question is one that will hit us between the 
eyes one of these days. Of course, these questions are not being 
asked of you facetiously. 

Let us assume for a moment that the Employment Service is em- 
powered to carry out rigorous control measures over both employers 
and employees. In the event that such controls were exercised hj 
the Employment Service, how would the functions of the Selective 
Service tie in with those of the Employm.ent Service? 

General Hershey. Well, I visualize that if the Employment Service 
is vested with the authority to move men any place they want to, 
you would have to have some penalty, probably, for their not going. 
Now, you can do that in two ways: You can make them amenable to 
some court, or perhaps someone might want to use the induction as 
another method. If they use the latter, then the Selective Service 
would be ill a position where it would have to cooperate with the 
national plan to carry it out. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13089 

Mr. Bender. I have another question m that connection. As 
you will recall from your previous appearance before this committee/ 
we are concerned with the mobilization of manpower to meet all the 
demands of war. You told us that the Selective Service System had 
the responsibility of registering and classifying the effective man- 
power of the Nation and of allocating men eligible for military service 
among the various users of manpower. How have these responsi- 
bilities been affected by the establishment of the War Manpower 
Commission? 

ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER 

General Hershey. I think at the time I was here before, we had 
to try to determine the industrial needs and act on them. At the 
present tune, I feel that when the Manpower Commission says 
we have got to have men in a certain occupation, and prepares policies 
which we put out, I feel it is the obligation of the Selective Service 
System to carry out those mstructions. However, the question that 
you can raise is what is going to happen if it gets to the place where 
you cannot do both. My feeling, although I do not know, is that 
self-preservation will take precedence and probably in a rather active 
way, and I suppose we have gotten to the place where if there is only 
one man left, I should say he would go to the Army. I do not want 
to be misunderstood that we are going to check building the Army. 
There are many people who can work in the factory, but there are 
only a limited number that can work m the Army. I think back 
in Boonesboro, or any other primitive place, as long as there are any 
able men left they are kept on the walls firmg. Some put out the 
fires that are burnmg, some do other things, but they do not call the 
men away from the walls. When a man drops at the wall one of the 
boys goes up, a 14- or 15-year-old boy; he picks up the gun and takes 
the place of the man who has fallen. That holds true for the Army, 
the mdustry, or anythmg else. You have got to come back to see 
what you are doing. On the other hand, Boonesboro could not send 
men to the west coast in those days. Thej^ had to put the men right 
there where they coulc fight. You cannot be pulling the men back 
from the line. England did, I realize that, but England did not pull 
them very far, because they had them near at home. 

Mr. Bender. In your previous testimony, General Hershey, you 
expressed the opinion that if a national agency were set up to prop- 
erly integrate and develop the allocation of manpower, both the users 
and procurers of manpower should be represented in this agency. 
You expressed the further, opinion that such an agency should be 
civilian in composition . Do you consider that we have such an agency 
in either the War Production Board or the War Manpower Commis- 
sion? 

General Hershey. Well, I think that we have an agency that rep- 
resents the users and procurers of manpower. If you are going to 
ask me if I visualize that they have accomplished all those things I 
can quicldy say no. I do not know that it is humanly possible to do 
so, but the fact is we have not integrated — ^we have not decided our 
over-all picture the way, which at that time last spring, I perhaps 

1 See pt. 27, p. 10235. 



13090 WASHINGTON HEARIN1GS 

hoped we would. There are many changes that have taken place, 
but you have got to start with something before you can change it. 

Mr. Bender. Your answer is "No" to the question: Do we have 
such an agency at the present time? 

General Hershey. I guess I can say no or yes, but it has not done 
all the things I visualized. I don't care which way you accept the 
answer. What I am trying to get at is I am not challenging the 
statement that we have not got such an agency, but I do not think 
we have gone far enough yet to accomplish all the things I visualized 
last February. I think I have enough Irish in me to be a little 
optimistic, and I see things a little rosy at a distance. 

Mr. Bender. General, the committee has been given to under- 
stand that the War Production Board is planning to set up a divi- 
sion with regional offices to concern itself with manpower priorities, 
specifying the types and quantities of labor needed and calling upon 
the War Manpower Commission to fulfill these needs. If such a 
division is actually set up, what do you consider would be the respon- 
sibility of the Selective Service in regard thereto? 

COORDINATION OF MANPOWER SELECTION 

General Hershey. Well, of course, that comes into the question 
of the relationship between manpower and the War Production 
Board, and I perhaps have a little different idea than some. I think 
that it is the War Production Board's responsibility to see that air- 
planes — to take that as an example, which may not necessarily be 
true — come before tanks, or tanks come before something else, so on, 
and so forth. I tliink it is a good production business probably to 
say that in the production of airplanes they need so many hundred 
thousand men, and so many hundred thousand on each of the others. 
Don't misunderstand me. That does not mean that they get them, 
because when you add this all up the number is going to be greater 
than they have got. Then, you have the adjustment proposition by 
the person that controls the budget. I think the War Manpower 
Commission has the budgetary control. That does not mean if the 
War Production Board says they want 100 men that they will not 
get them. It does not mean the advice on which the Manpower 
Commission acts is not the advice of the War Production Board. 
What we have got to do is when they set up a plant here — I do not 
care what kind of plant it is — this plant must go on. We have, 
between the War Production Board and the Manpower Commission, 
our own occupational people who decide, what percentage and how 
you are going to withdraw from that plant, and having decided that, 
perhaps with the assistance of the labor-management group, or any- 
body else that is connected with tile production there — the manage- 
ment, after all, has got to be primarily responsible — then we have 
got to take the coverage, and there is enough flexibility in our system, 
I believe, to do it. Of course, you are going to make mistakes. In 
one plant, you may be withdrawing 60 percent and in another 90 
percent — it all depends on what kind of activity it is, and the War 
Production Board has got to have the primary responsibility of de- 
ciding whether the airplane factory is more important than the tank 
factory, or between two airplane factories whether the fighter is more 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13091 

important than the bomber, or vice versa. It is going to take, of 
course, cooperation of each group in it. 

The Selective Service's business is, once it has been decided, to 
see where the manpower will go. We would go to the Manpower 
Commission and say: "Do you want your men in the plant or do 
you want them in the Army?" Even after a man gets in the Army 
there still is a chance to call him back. If we make a mistake that 
is too critical the Army can still furlough him out to go in the plant if 
they want him there worse than in the Army. 

Mr. Bender. General, if War Production Board controls the 
material budget and War Manpower Commission controls the man- 
power budget, and both are essential to production, who is going to 
control the production planning? 

General Hershey. Well, I suppose when you get down to the last 
analysis, when cooperation between War Production Board and War 
Manpower Commission is stopped, you are gomg to have to have a 
decision, and the President is the one place where you can get that 
decision. That is on a very broad basis. When that decision is 
made, then there is not any conflict any more. I have been a staff 
officer a great deal of my life. As adjutant I had to get along with 
the quartermaster, and there w^as the question of who decides what, 
and finally we wound up with the colonel deciding it. After that we 
knew what had to be done. 

RECRUITMENT OF DOCTORS 

Mr. Bender. General, the committee observes that the War 
Manpower Commission has undertaken an intensive campaign to 
recruit doctors for the armed services. Do you know what principles 
of selection are being used by the War Manpower Commission in this 
regard? Wliat comment do you have as to the present manner of 
recruiting doctors? 

General Hershey. Well, the idea, of course, was to try to provide 
the number of men that the Army and Navy had to have in doctoring. 
The War Manpower Commission, through one of their agencies, 
attempted to assist the Army in this particular. The Army attempted 
to send out boards, generally two men, into these localities, and these 
men, aided by the Local doctor committees, attempted to recruit, and 
I think they have done a reasonably fair job. Selective Service has 
had very little to do with it — at times a little more than Selective 
Service cared to have, because it is quite easy to say, ''What we want 
you to do we will tell the local board." We have a few agencies that 
at times do that. The only observation I have to make is that that 
has been done a little more frequently than I should like. I did 
speak, however, to the American Medical Association last summer, 
and I think Selective Service, so far as anyone understood our position, 
realized if they did not accept these commissions when the time came 
that we were called upon to furnish the doctors we would furnish 
them according to the .way that Congress and the regulations laid 
down; that we would choose anybody else, that is, on the basis of 
general men who would not otherwise "be deferred, and on the basis of 
the place that they were drawn in the national lottery. 



13092 WASHINGTON HEARIMGS 

DRAFTING OF 18- AND 19-YEAR-OLDS 

Mr. Bender, Coming back to this matter of 18- and 19-year-old 
youths, do you think the 18- and 19-year-old youths must be drafted 
next year, or sooner, if Congress acts? 

General Hershey. I think that in a mobilization of this size, regard- 
less of which one we go to, or which of several we go to, I think we 
either are going to take the 18- and 19-year-olds or we are going to 
take a million or a million and a half, somewhere in there, out of 
family people. That is the issue. Now, whether you take them in — 
well, November would be as early as we could take them granting 
we had legislation now, or whether you take them in January, or 
whether you take them in February is probably not greatly material, 
except the War Department probably has certain reasons why they 
do want younger men. There are probably certain reasons why 
industries are going to be disturbed less by taking the 18- and 19-year- 
olds than by going into this older group, I do not think, on the basis 
of any war we have ever had of any size, that we have had reason to 
believe you could come anywhere near an all-out mobilization and 
defer those groups. 

Mr. Bender. Do you definitely think you have to take men with 
dependents in 1943? 

DRAFTING OF MEN WITH DEPENDENTS 

General Hershey. I think we will have to take men with secondary 
dependents m 1942. 

Mr, Bender. 1942? 

General Hershey. Yes; I have sort of hoped that the secondary 
dependents and perhaps a moderate number of men with wives only 
would be sufficient, but I cannot leave any impression that the calls 
between now and January 1 are not very, very large. There'i^were 
numbers that 2 years ago this summer you would have thought in 
terms of a pretty big Army. 

Mr. Bender. How soon do you think you will reach men with 
children? 

General Hershey. Well, in between being an administrator and a 
prophet, I get in trouble at times, but I have thought, or perhaps 
hoped, that the last quarter of next year would be the very earliest, 
but I would like to hedge to the extent that I am not familiar always 
with the demands, and I might have someone go up 40 or 50 percent in 
demands for manpower and still have my prophecies good. I made 
some prophecies when I was here the other time, and changing my 
sights 60 or more percent disturbs my prophecies a good deal. If I 
had to give advice to someone that had to have it, and I had to speak, 
I should say the last quarter of next year, but it is subject, as they say, 
to change without notice. 

recruitment of doctors THROUGH RECRUITMENT AND ASSIGNMENT 

SERVICE 

Mr. Bender, Coming back to this matter of doctors, I had a call 
about 11 o'clock last night from an Ohio doctor who said that he was 
told in a rather firm letter to report down at Columbus for examina- 
tion, and that some group of doctors had recommended him for a 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13093 

certain branch of the service. He was the head surgeon in a hospital 
and his job was essential to that hospital, and they said that if he 
did not come through, why, they would put him on the noncooperative 
list, whatever that is. Have the doctors been compelled, by social 
pressure, to enlist rather than by any principle of selection? 

General Hershey. The Selective Service lias had nothing to do 
with procurement and assignment. They liave an association of 
doctors and it has S3me connection with the Army and Navy and has 
been effective in this recruiting. The thing you speak of is the thmg 
which happens on occasion, in which Selective Service has been some- 
what embarrassed at times. The assumption is if the local board is 
notified they are going to draft him. That assumption is incorrect. 
I will not say you might not have a local situation in which it will 
happen. If 1 hear of it I shall appeal it. 

I want to say wlien it comes to tlie time when we take doctors, we 
will take tli^m, but when we take them it will be upon the basis of the 
evidence submitted by the Procurement and Assignment Service, the 
evidence submitted by the doctor himself, the evidence submitted by 
anybody else, his hospital in that case, and others who are interested, 
and when those things are valid and he is on the list, it will determine 
whether he goes or not. 

Selective Service cannot wholly give up its functions to any agency; 
we are still responsible. 

Mr. Bexder. Have the health needs of any communities received 
any consideration b3fore the enlistment of doctors was accepted? 

General Hershey. I am a little embarrassed trying to testify to 
this, because I have felt I had such a casual connection with it. I 
would say, "Yes, they have been considered." I think there is recruit- 
ing from at least half of the States, because of the fact the quotas were 
set up initially with consideration given to the number of doctors oer 
thousand, not only in cities but within a region where the population 
was badly scattered. The only thing, in any volunteer business is 
the danger of "soft spots" recruiting. Remember you run into a doctor 
who is out somewhere where distances are great, collections are diffi- 
cult, and he will be attracted a great deal more by a captain's com- 
mission than one in a residential district where the people in it are 
well-to-do, and that sort of thing. It has been given consideration 
in the setting up of the quotas initially, and sometimes, because doctors 
were willmg and did find it easier to make more money, it was easier 
to recruit than in some metropolitan centers where the income was 
greater. 

suggested method of recruiting doctors 

Mr. Bender. General, if Selective Service had complete control 
over the recruitment of doctors, how would you arrange their 
recruitment? 

General Hershey. As far as I know, there is nothing wrong with 
the allotments set up on the basis of the number of doctors per thou- 
sand in the rural areas, or the number of doctors per thousand in the 
city areas by the Procurement and Assignment Service, which is a 
combination of the American Medical Association, the Surgeon Gen- 
eral's office, and so forth. I think I would apply against that the 
number of men that have already been recruited, and give them credit 
for it, and I would apply the quotas to the places that have not yet 



13094 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

furnished their share of doctors. We would start with the first 
doctor who comes to the local board, who is on the local board list. 
If he would indicate that he was a necessary man in his community, 
we would give him 2-A or 2-B, If he did not, we would put him in 
the Army, and follow the order numbers on down. 

INSPECTION OF LABOR UTILIZATION 

Mr. Bender. That is a very direct answer. 

The next question. General, we have received advices that there is 
considerable hoarding and overstsaffing of labor in Government plants 
as well as those of private war contractors. Do you think that effec- 
tive deferment pohcy must be accompanied by some system of mspec- 
tion of labor utilization in those plants? If so, what agency should 
perform this inspection? 

General Hershey. Well, I believe we are going to have to come 
to it. I would disagree probably with some of the teclmicians on how 
far down you would run for inspection. Not being a technician, 
probably as a defense mechanism, I would tend to try to take a 
general over-all picture of a plant. First of all, what are they pro- 
ducing? How many people do they necessarily need? Then go to 
management and say: "Look here, you are in for 20 percent. You 
make up your mind which ones you are going to spare." This is my 
personal opinion, but I think the training part of the Manpower 
Commission — training and inspection both for hiring and for upgrading 
and maximum utilization, and all that sort of thing, can go together 
better than any other. That inspection service, however, has got 
to be fairly well or closely coordinated, of course, with the War 
Production Board and with the Army and Navy people who have 
their inspections which are on the production basis. There is no 
reason in the world why it cannot be done that way. In fact, that 
is one reason why the inspection service does not have to be as large 
as you think, because the Army people are already in there, perhaps 
for another reason, but we use them now many times in determining 
where we can apply deferment, because they are interested in produc- 
tion. So, I think you will have to have some sort of over-all control, 
and that is the very thing that Selective Service is very much inter- 
ested in, because when it is decided the plants are absolutely critical 
and under no circumstances must their production be interfered with, 
then we are able to do something for them. But you cannot have 
300,000 plants and all of them critical. 

I am a field artilleryman, and I think in terms of the limited 
amount of materiel, limited amount of men, and limited amount of 
shells, and therefore you have got to pick out the vital point to shoot 
at. If you put one shot every mile you will not do any good; you 
have got to make up your mind on what is critical and expend your 
energy on that. You just cannot be everywhere simultaneously. 

RELATION OF LABOR UTILIZATION TO DEFERMENT POLICY 

Mr. Bender. General, the committee is much concerned with the 
problem of labor utilization within the plants and the relation of such 
labor utilization to an effective occupational deferment policy. How 
could labor utilization inspectors be of effective help in developing an 
adequate occupational deferment policy? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13095 

General Hershey. Well, we have been giving quite a lot of stiidy 
for several months to different phases of what we call mannmg 
tables. I do not know that the name is particularly descriptive. It 
is an organizational table. "\Miat it gets down to, it says, ''Here are 
2 percent of people; if we lose them, we are gone. Death will take 
enough of them, perhaps. Here are 7 percent that are one-year or 
two-year people. Here is so forth and so on." This happens to be a 
Seattle corporation, and when you can accomplish somethmg like we 
have got here, then no matter whether you are taking out 10 or 40 
percent, you have got the order to take out and the plant knows just 
exactly what will happen to them when they lose them. It is difficult 
to get cooperation in every place to that extent, but that is what the 
labor inspector has got to meet. The fellow inspecting the use of 
labor has got to look at it as a whole, and he has got to be pretty 
careful in not getting himself too much involved. 

The technician, if jou do not watch him, is getting all interested in 
something else. You can go mto the plants and when you see a good 
deal of standing around, a group standing around not domg anything, 
you can assume either that it is a bad day or else they are over- 
staft'ed, and we have felt very definitely that they are overstaffed. 

Mr. Bender. Do you think Selective Service considers that 
management-labor production committees could be of any assistance 
in developing an adequate occupational deferment policy? 

General Hershey. Definitely, I do. If we could have a com- 
mittee in each factory that would approach the things realistically, I 
should be perfectly willing to say: "All right; tell us, what have you 
got to have here and we will give it to you"; but the difficulty is to 
develop such committees into a place where they will accept a very 
heavy responsibility. 

DISPOSITION OF OCCUPATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRES 

!Mr. Bender. General, whatever was done with the occupational 
questionnaires which were circulated by the draft system? 

General Hershey. There were three chmiks of those. One smaU 
tabulating number is coming in from the Census. I do not know 
whether I have it here or not, but we are getting out reports by 
States which show the tabulation of the skills that are listed. One 
copy was turned over to the Employment Service, and one copy we 
still have in the local boards. 

Mr. Bender. Has an over-all occupational picture been made on 
the basis of the questionnaire? 

General Hershey. No; there have never been enough funds 
allotted to the Employment Service for them to make their tabula- 
tions. The initial plan was that they were to maks the survey. We 
only acted as the gathering agency. We did later insist on keeping 
a copy, because we were afraid some day the time might come when, 
for some reason or other, they would not be available elsewhere, and 
when we would be called upon to do somethitig in an emergency. We 
have them, and we have them filed with the jackets. Up to date, 
we have not used them, except in determining whether or not men 
should be deferred, and not the Selective Service System itself, 
except in the tabulations which we made through the Census; the 
Selective Service System has not attamptcd to do this sort of thing, 

60396—42 — pt. 34 4 



13096 WASHINGTON HEARINiGS 

and the Employment Service has not had enough funds, as I under- 
stand it. In fact, I went before one of the subcommittees of the 
Senate with someone else, the chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission, to try to get some funds for them to use, but we did not 
succeed very well. 

Mr. Bender. General, in order to straighten out the record, you 
say you were misquoted on the 13,000,000 Army. Do you care to 

" the comnnttee what you did say? 

NUMBER INVOLVED IN MOBILIZATION 



say 
tell 



General Hershey. What I said was, as I remember it, that in any 
mobilization that mvolves ten to thirteen million people — now, mind 
you, either figure would include not only the Army but the Navy, 
and bear in mind always, regardless of the men called, the men that 
sail our merchant marine, have got to come out of this great group, 
because they cannot be too old, they cannot be cripples, they must 
be active, like the men you normally have for the Army and JNavy. 

Mr. Bender. I hold in my hand a newspaper that commented on 
your statement and just quoted something that was only part of 
what you said, and they proceeded to editorialize and treat you as if 
you were a Congressman in the editorial. 

General Hershey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bender. I will ask you this, in closing. General — and I 
appreciate your frankness in answering questions: Now, I know that 
you are not a politician, you are not running for President or justice 
of the peace. Is it not your opinion that those people vested with 
these various powars, in line with the questions I have asked you, 
should not at the same time be running for some political office while 
they are administering this job? 

General Hershey. Well, I happen to come from Indiana. As you 
say, we are Jiot politicians out there, so I would hav3 no capacity 
whatever to answer your question. 

Mr. Bender. That is all. 

The Chairman. General, I think you have been mighty patient, 
and, speaking for myself, tremendously interesting. I have just got 
one or two questions or observations to make, and then the other 
members of the committee are entitled to have some questions. 

To me, the tremendously interesting thing that you pointed out 
was that while England made a mistake in sending their skilled work- 
ers into the Army and she had to recall them, the distance she had to 
recall them is not comparable with the distance we have to 
recall our soldiers. In other words, if we send them to Australia or 
Egypt it' is going to take months to get them back, if we ever get 
them back. That is a problem that the Congress should give deep 
study to, and that is why these hearings are very useful, to anticipate 
any possible solution. 

Along that line, let me give you some figures. You probably know 
more about that than I do, although I just received this report 
(reading) : 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13097 

LOSS OF AIRCRAFT WORKERS TO MILITARY SERVICES 

The aircraft industry in California — 
this is from Lockheed — 

has lost more than 15,000 emploj^ees to military services since last January 1. 
Of that total, 3,593 left the factories of 5 companies during the first 28 days of 
August, according to data compiled by the Aircraft War Production Council. 

During the first 6 months of 1942, an average of 1,390 men left factories of the 
5 companies each month to join the Army, Navy, or Marines. 

An increase of 158 percent over the 6-month average was recorded by the 5 com- 
panies in the first 28 days of August when they lost 3,593 men to the armed 
services. 

Figures of the five companies represent a rate of turn-over for military service 
of 1.91 persons for every 100 employees in August. This figure was doubled 
between August 24 and 26 by at least two companies, bringing the rate to 3.82 
persons for each 100 employees. 

If that rate of 3.82 persons leaving for military service out of every 100 em- 
ployees continues for the five southern Cahfornia companies for the next 30 days, 
without any further increase in the percentage, a total of more than 7,000 aircraft 
industry workers will be lost to military services. It should be pointed out that 
many of these are in jobs essential to war production and are irreplaceable at this 
time. The figure for eight companies will be considerably higher. 

However, that rate is still increasing and unless the trend is checked effectively 
and immediately, the aircraft companies of southern California will be denuded 
of experienced workmen in the draft-age group by the end of 1942. Many of the 
men now leaving are men who must be depended upon to teach new workers on 
the job. Without sufficient experienced personnel to instruct new personnel, the 
entire airplane production program of California plants, which represent a large 
proportion of the Nation's aircraft production, will suffer a danger setback which 
may disrupt schedules — 

They give the figures, and I will be glad to see that you get this, 
General (continuing) : 

We have noticed a substantial increase both in number of men being drafted 
from our company and the number of men leaving to enlist in the armed forces 
which we attribute entirely to the newspaper publicity releases relative to the 
induction into mihtary service of essential and necessary employees in industry. 

I am just giving you those quotations to see what problem we have 
in California. 

General Hershey. I will be glad to comment on it. 

The Chairman. I was just wondering what it is doing to the 
aircraft industry now. 

General Hershey. I do not want to take the Committee's time, but 
I would be glad to comment on it. I am quite familiar with the 
situation out there, and I know some of the factors in it. I would 
like to call the committee's attention to one or two or three companies. 

The Chairman. Maybe some of the other Congressmen would 
want to ask some questions. 

Mr. Arnold. I would like to ask the witness to comment on it. 

General Hershey. We have got a very dehcate situation out there, 
because remember that at the present time out in southern California 
24 percent is the highest that any company has in women. In other 
words, when Britain is running with 60 to 65 percent of women in 
the airplane factories, we are lagging. We have got one company 
out there that has only 5 percent women. There are a lot of reasons 
for that. They started at a time when there were lots of young men 
available. Not only that, but we all wanted them to be hired. 
Don't think I am blammg the aircraft people, not the shghtest, but 
they find themselves in a rather difficult situation because they have 



13098 WASHINGTON HEARINIGS 

got a lot of men that are under 22 or 23. In fact, we have got 125,000 
in the State of Cahfornia in 2-B out of our million. 

Now, what has happened? Well, this thing that they are charging, 
I suppose no one else in the country is as much to blame for it as I 
am, but let me call .your attention to this: Up to a little while ago 
we had thought of this war in the sense that of course we are going to 
have to lose rubber, we are going to lose cars, we are going to have 
gasoline rationing, but the average man who had a wife felt that he 
was not going to participate in it actively, and I think the man who 
was deferred in 2-B, especially the one who had two or three defer- 
ments, thought he was in there for the duration of the war. Now, 
it was a rather severe jolt in August when it came to their attention 
that they were only there until the Army took them out, and many 
of those boys, I think, said: "Well, if I am going to leave, why don't 
I leave now?" 

QUIT KATE IN CALIFORNIA 

I would like to mention one or two other things, and one is the 
quit rate in California. I think it got around to 4 percent in the last 
pai't of August, for 4 or 5 days. I think some did go back to work, 
but the quit rate in the airplane factories has been over 5 or 6 percent 
ever since the 1st of January, and of that number, until August, 
only about 1.1 percent was due to military reasons. 

Another thing, out of those who quit for military reasons, most of 
the time over two-thirds of them enlisted, and even in the last 5 days 
of August, the band of those being inducted rose, but only about 25 
percent when it ought to have gone up 60 percent, because the call 
over August in the United States was about that proportion to June, 
for instance, and yet during that same time, when w^e increased the 
call 50 to 60 percent in the United States, the numbers that were 
actually inducted out of several of those firms out there fell off, but 
the enlisted rate went up two or three or four or five times, of course 
due to the fact that they had to let them enlist in the first place, and 
I had said that the time would come when we were going to have to 
make a determination on the really necessary men. 

Now, certainly we do not want these people flowing out of these 
airplane factories at a heavy rate, and I believe we are going to figure 
out a way with them so we can replace them. As soon as you leave 
places where your men go freely, you cannot tell where they are going. 

The Chairman. You are not overenthusiastic about this idea? 

General Hershey. Sir? 

The Chairman. You are not overenthusiastic about this idea? 

General Hershey. These airplane people out there are some of 
the best supporters I have ever had on this recruiting. Some of the 
figures I have had on recruiting have been furnished me by one of 
the largest factories. Some of the best material I have had has been 
furnished by the California airplane people on their relationships. 
They have kept very close track of that for a good many months. 
I am not being critical. They have a terrific problem, but they 
will have to let go a great many of the boys. The thing is not to 
have them go so rapidly that it will interfere with production. 

Mr. Curtis. General, is it not true that the longer the factory 
waits to hire women and men past 45 the greater the problem gets 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13099 

and the more serious it is for them and the more serious for the 
Nation? 

General Hershey. Yes; they realize that now. I guess they did 
not realize that last spring. 

THE URGE TO ENLIST 

Mr. Curtis. Referring to the boys that are enlisting, I have had 
occasion to talk to a number of the boys, many of them farm boys, 
and they are not enlisting because they fear they are going to be 
drafted. I have talked to a young chap who had several deferments, 
who was with the Martin plant, and he enlisted because he had the 
urge to enlist. All his buddies, old friends, chaps he went to school 
with, were joining the Army, willing to make whatever sacrifices were 
necessary, and he did not want that job and he did not want that pay. 

General Hershey. Yes. 

Mr. Curtis. Is it not true that as long as industry can get a man 
deferred they will not replace him? 

General Hershey. That has been the tendency. I think something 
has happened here in the last month or so. It is a little bad out there 
for a few days; but I think we are going to get on top of that, and I 
think it has done some permanent good. 

Mr. Curtis. The agricultural regions, agricultural interests, have 
not gone to the extreme in demanding deferments, have they? 

General Hershey. No. I think we are faced with the time when 
some of the critical areas are going to have to be in agriculture, and 
they are going to be very critical. 

Mr. Curtis. I think it has reached a point in a number of rural 
areas where they look upon occupational deferment as draft dodging. 
I am not commenting on whether it is good or bad, but it exists; is not 
that true, General? 

General Hershey. It is. That is one of the things we must meet 
all the time in occupational deferment. Remember, gentlemen, we 
are fighting a twentieth century war with human beings who have 
still a sixteenth century complex: "When there is a war I am going to 
do what 1 can in the Army, or d© a lot of tnings," and you are still 
going to have trouble. When the pressure gets too heavy a man is 
not going to stay; he is going on. 

Mr. Curtis. The longer the war lasts the greater the need gets. 
As you pointed out a bit ago, the kids, the women, the physically im- 
perfect, the men past 45, might be able to take over the factories and 
farms, but they cannot take over the piloting of planes or running of 
tanks; is not that true? 

General Hershey. That is right. 

deferment policies 

Mr. Curtis. The greater the occupational deferment program we 
launch upon, the greater the danger point we are going to reach if the 
war lasts a long time; is not that right? 

General Hershey. That is true. The whole problem is how to draw 
them out slowly enough to not disturb production. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you know of any industry or any line of work that 
does not consider that line of work the most important one in the war? 



13100 WASHINGTON HEARIN-GS 

General Hershey. Well, my experience in the last 2 years would 
bear out your statement, I think. 

Mr. Curtis. It does not even warrant a comment. As I under- 
stand it, you do distinguish on the matter of deferment between mere 
dependency and the family relationships. 

General Hershey. Well, at the present time, the family relation- 
ship is paramount. Now, when you get down to a place where you 
have aU the men who have a wife only, I presume most local boards 
would take the man with the wife who w^as fully able to support her- 
self before the man whose wife had to live on his allotment, but the 
manpower thing is moving so rapidly that even if they did take him 
earlier he might still be on the same call. 

Mr. Curtis. Take two men with an equal number of dependents, 
one of them is a father of children of rather tender age, would you 
disthiguish between that individual and someone who is supportmg 
a wife and grow^n children? 

General Hershey. I am hopmg we have not got to come down to 
decisions between men with children, because we have told the local 
boards not to take anyone with wives and children without further 
instructions. That is going to be a little hard to carry out in areas 
where, as I said a while ago, there is $70 or $80 or $100 waiting for the 
wife and children, where he has not given them any more than $25 
any time during his life, and we do get that in some parts of the 
country. 

Mr. Curtis. That is what you are hopmg you will not have to 
come to a decision on in the last quarter of 1943? 

General Hershey. That is right. In my own experience, having 
brought up part of the way four children, I have a feelmg that up to 
the time they are 12 years of age is the time that they probably 
could use the father, and especially in the lower income brackets, and 
that is where I had my experience, rather than after they get up above 
it. My experience has been that a father has to do a great many 
thmgs that are just called work, maybe washmg dishes, washing 
clothes, or domg something else. When the family gets to growmg I 
think the family can spare the father easier. When my youngsters 
began to get over 12, 1 was not active enough to keep track of the fam- 
ily probably as much as I was wdien they were small. That is why 
we rather oppose taking the young, the 25- to 35-year-old father with 
a lot of children, rather than the fellow between 35 and 45. 

transfers of classification 

Mr. Curtis. Local draft boards tell me that they get orders from 
some place, I do not know where they get them. They have juris- 
diction over a young man because he has registered in that commu- 
nity, and when he is workuig some 2,000 miles away they do not pass 
on the deferment, somebody else does. Who does it? 

General Hershey. That is the case of transfer of classification from 
the local board. Where the boy left the farm and went out to work, 
well, we will say, in the shipyard or airplane factory, they transferred 
the classification to the other board and the transfer is registered m 
the uiitial board. They do not let go of the record. He still would 
be classified at home. What it was set up for was to try to make it 
so the man would not have to travel long distances m order to make 
a personal appearance before the board. You see, both his physical 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13101 

examination and his induction can be carried out when he is away 
from home. It is a convenience, but it is % thing that the local board 
does not have to grant if they do not want to. They do, because 
they feel they do not want to brmg him so far, a thousand miles, what- 
ever his destination may be.. 

Mr. Curtis. General, I have some five questions callmg for statis- 
tics. If you do not have the information but it is available, you can 
furnish the data for the record. I would like to read the questions to 
the reporter, and you can supply the hiformation. 

General Hershey. Depending on what they are. 

Mr. Curtis. I am not very anxious to get mformation that anybody 
should not have. 

I would like to have the number of men who were unmarried when 
they became subject to the draft law, who are now between the ages 
of 20 and 45 and are not now in the service. 

I would like to have that broken down into States. 

General Hershey. You want the number of single men that were 
single when they registered; is that the point? 

Mr. Curtis. I said, subject to the draft law, because there was a 
certain age group that were in and then they were out and then in 
again. 

General Hershey. We will do our best. That is a pretty good- 
sized job. 

Mr. Curtis. May I say this: If any of these figures call for a 
break-down that you do not have, I do not want it. 

General Hershey. We will do what we can. 

Mr. Curtis. Then, I would like to have the number of unmarried 
men and married men without children that are deferred from the 
draft by occupational deferment. 

General Hershey. Well, the men that could make a dependency 
case would not come up for occupational deferment. The only 
fellows that you will have will be the ones who either had wealthy 
wives or working wives prior to the repeal of 15 (c), and the ones 
who have been reclassified during the last few weeks, the 3-B. You 
see, the 3-B is an occupational classification, it is a combination of 
occupational and dependency. 

Mr. Curtis. You do not have that separated? 

General Hershey. Yes; we have the 3-B separately, but the fellow 
that is in 2-B that is married, that is a little unusual. 

Mr. Curtis. I want the unmarried. 

General Hershey. You can practically take the whole million in 
the unmarried. With the very occasional fellow in 2-A or the 2-B 
that are unmarried. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you have that broken down by States? 

General Hershey. Yes. 

Mr. Curtis. In that break -down can you tell me how many of them 
were farmers? 

General Hershey. I think we can give you some, at least in several 
of these States around in the breadbasket, we have probably got more 
in there than we have in some of the other areas. ^ 

Mr. Curtis. Do I understand that there have been no fathers with 
minor children drafted? 



See Exhibit 8, p. 13314. 



13102 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



DRAFTING OF MEN WITH FAMILIES 



General Hershey. No; of course that is not true in the first year 
and a half. Several local boards carried out too strictly the con- 
gressional injunction, they began to take the married men who had an 
independent income, unearned income, or whose wife had an inde- 
pendent income, or an earned income. It included not only the 
wealthy wives but the working wives. There was one other thing, 
and that is the date of marriage, because we have ruled administra- 
tively certam marriages after certain dates are not marriages under 
our rules. Of course, you have got men who will live apart from their 
wifes, that even now, even if a man had a wife and six children, if he is 
living apart from them, he cannot make a claim of maintaining a 
bona fide relationship. I think I was telling you about the wife that 
called me the other night and said her husband was in the Navy, 
wanted me to do something about it, that she told the local board 
she was not living with hmi but now she had changed her mind, but 
he was gone. 

OCCUPATIONAL DEFERMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 

Mr. Curtis. I would like to have the figures on how many Govern- 
ment employees have received occupational deferment. Is that 
available? 

General Hershey. We can get something on that, because Senator 
Tydings' committee took that up. We studied a thousand cases. 
I think quite a share of them have gone into the service — before we 
got through with the survey — but at least you will have some. As to 
the number of people in Government employ, it is not necessary that 
they be deferred, but regardless of whether they are men or women 
they do come ou t of the pool, and they constitute some problems that 
we have got to solve?. 

Mr. Curtis. I would like to have the number of men between the 
ages of 20 and 45 without dependents who are now employed by the 
United States Government and are not in the armed services.^ 

DEFERMENT OF FARM LABOR 

And further. General Hershey, I would like to read a letter which I 
received from a member of the advisory board of the draft board in 
one of the counties in my district and ask you to analyze the case given 
therein and give me the answer. In this connection, I might say that 
it is the opinion of a great many of us that the rural areas in America 
are furnishing more than their share of the soldiers and that this is 
because rural people ar slow to ask for deferment and labor and 
industry are pressing their cases vigorously. 

I will now read the letter: 

Phil B. Campbell 
attorney at law 

Osceola, Nebr. 

September 14, 1942. 
Hon. Carl T. Curtis, 

House of Representatives Office Building, 

Washington, D. C. 
Friend Carl: I have had a long talk this morning with the local chairman of 
the draft board and learned that he wrote Senator Norris yesterday about the 
matter which is on my mind and of decided importance to Polk County. 

1 This material, not having been received at time of going to press, may be published in a later volume. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13103 

The tentative call for October is substantially more than twice the one for this 
month, and the board has been notified to prepare for a call of 50 percent more 
than that for November. I am chairman of the advisory committee, and in close 
touch both with the board and with men who are asking deferment of their sons 
in order to enable them to get this year's corn crop out of the field. We have, 
in the north half of the county, a good corn crop for the first time in years, and 
they, of course, want to save it if possible. It is impossible to hire help when 
they can go to Grand Island or Hastings, or any one of a number of other places 
in Nebraska, and get 60 cents an hour for common labor with a lot of overtime 
every week so that it brings their check up to around $50 a week. If the present 
program of the Selective Service is carried out, it is going to mean that thousands 
of bushels of corn in Polk Count}* will probably rot in the field, and it is going to 
mean another thing on the meat and produce angle. I have just prepared an 
affidavit asking for deferment of his son by a farmer in his 50's, who has 98 acres 
of corn, and he tells me that if he is going to have to shuck it alone, the only way 
he can possibly get it done will be to sell off all his milk cows except enough for 
the family. 

On the other hand, the draft board members tell us that when they try to get 
a man out of an airplane factory, they get a flock of affidavits about how important 
he is; that he is working 40 hours a week, and sometimes more, and things along 
that line. Forty hours is just the start of a Polk Country farmer's week. I 
recentl}^ talked to a young man who came back from California where he had 
been working in an airplane plant since before the first registration, and he tells 
me that most of the workers would be glad to put in longer weeks, but are limited 
to 40 hours. From wiiat information he gave me, I am convinced that these 
plants are attempting to keep at least three men to do two men's work, if the 
two men v>ere permitted to work full time, while here on the farm one man is 
expected to do three men's work and get it done somehow. 

It is self-evident that a man in the factory or a man in the service must eat 
before he can do his job; if our farms are to be absolutely denuded of our labor 
except the aged, infirm, children, and women, then how long are the other fellows 
going to be able to eat? Don't you think it would be wise for all of the Nebraska 
delegation to present this matter to General Hershey along the line the Kansas 
delegation did last week, and certainly sufficient pressure can be brought to bear 
to, at least, let us get out the crop we now have practically matured. 

Phil B. Campbell, 

As I stated, I would like to have you analyze the contents of the 
letter and give me the answer. 

General Hershey. Mr, Curtis, our records disclose that approxi- 
mately 23 percent of our registrants were working on farms, whereas 
only 13 percent of registrants who have been inducted had been work- 
ing on farms. Such statistics may not be entirely accurate, however, 
and there are factors involved which should not be disregarded. In 
this latter connection, it is common knowledge that there has been a 
tremendous migration from the less attractive war-eifort jobs to the 
more attractive war-effort jobs because of the differentials in pay, 
comfort, danger, and other working conditions. In addition thereto, 
the Navy and Army recruiting services by conducting campaigns m 
rural areas have played a considerable part in disrupting the man- 
power situation. 

There is no question but that Selective Service should not sit back 
and say that because it was not one oi the main causes for the migra- 
tion that it should not do all in its power to remedy the situation. 
Selective Service must not aggravate the farm manpower shortage by 
denying deferment to farm workers who cannot be replaced and who 
are working on essential farms. 

In this latter connection it must be recognized that not all agricul- 
tural activities are essential but that there are some nonproductive 
units as well as some that may not be producing essential products or 
products ot which there are or will be shortages. 



13104 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Selective Service has been endeavoring to get the best information 
avaihible from the Department ol Agriculture and from all other avail- 
able sources, but the time has come when it is necessary for more 
specific plans to be formulated on the basis of how much material, 
equipment, and manpower is to be available for the agricultural phase 
of the war effort after total war plans of all war-effort users are con- 
formed with, and cut down to existing supplies of manpower, materials, 
and equipment. 

Present mdications are that something must be done in the near 
future to clarify this situation. In the meanwhile the Selective Service 
System will use its full powers and all available information to the 
best of its ability. 

Mr. Curtis. That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Congressman Arnold. 

Mr. Arnold. General, I just wonder if you know whether or not 
the farm boys have been deferred in as large numbers as they could 
have been? 

General Hershey. Well, that is a very difficult question. I have 
thought that we had a farm problem. I think for a lot of reasons the 
agricultural areas have been stripped. They always have, to my 
experience, whenever you have a shortage of labor. That was true 
back in 1910 or 1911 in my part of the country when Ford started the 
expansion of his plant. We not only lose the men to the services but 
of course we lose them in every other place, because for some reason or 
other, wages or manner of living, they want to go somewhere else, and 
of course there are some voluntaiy enlistments. We have in the 
agricultural States a very fair proportion of 2-A, but wdiether we have 
enough or not T do not know. I don't know whether we will know 
untilpcrhaps this year. We have got good crops in the first place, and 
I think they will, somehow or other, get them harvested, but next 
year is another problem, and I think it is one that has got to be given 
quite a little study. 

Mr. Arnold. Then, in deferring the boys on farms you might take 
into consideration the fact that the country is depleted by men going 
to defense work? 

General Hershey. We have got to take that into consideration, 
because the men who will go into the defense work will be in 2-B and 
wili not be in the group on which we lay our calls anyway. 

Mr. Arnold. For instance, in the little county where I live in 
Illinois, last year 34 children w^ere in the grade school, and this year, 
because the men have boarded up their homes and gone to defense 
work, there will be only 14 children enrolled in that school. Those 
men naturally will go without work and will be available for agricul- 
tural occupations, seasonal occupations, but once they go to the de- 
fense plants they are not available any more. 

selection of doctors 

Now, another question along a different line. Don't you think the 
manner of selecting doctors by the Medical Association is likely to 
be abused and doctors will be railroaded wdio are in competition with 
those who have the authority, and a great injustice will be done in 
that manner of selection? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13105 

General Hershey. I think I would better content myself with 
saying that that is always a possibility. I do not know that I can say 
that I know of specific cases. I have had some come to my attention 
that might be questioned. There are many reasons why it would be 
better to have doctors chosen by some sort of voluntary method, 
but all voluntary methods that require large numbers get into social 
pressures and many other things that are very unfortunate. The 
same thing happens in any other volunteer system; the same things 
that are bad with the volunteer methods, no matter what you get 
them for, do apply in the getting of doctors, and perhaps some of the 
other things that you suggest, especially if you leave it to other doctors. 
Doctors remain iiuman beings. That is the point I am trying to 
make; they remain human beings even though they are doctors. 

Mr. Arnold. That is all. 

Mr. Sparkman. General Hershey, I want to ask you a few ques- 
tions. The hour is getting rather late. I will probably get you when 
you come before the Military Affairs Committee anhyow. 

INDUCTION OF FARM LABOR 

I have just returned from my district, and one of the principal 
topics of conversation throughout that area, which is primarily an 
agricultural section, was the working of the various draft boards. 
The farmers tell me they are already confronted with a very serious 
situation with reference to harvesting this year's crop. For instance, 
in order to comply with the request of the agricultural program they 
have planted thousands and hundreds of thousands of acres of peanuts, 
something they had never grown before, and now they are threatened 
with the possibility of letting the peanuts go unharvested because 
of lack of farm labor. From nearly all of them comes the report to 
me that there are no deferments for farm labor. In fact, I do not 
know a single farmer in my home district that has been deferred by 
reason of occupation. 

I have a letter, since coming back up here, from some farmer that 
told me that early in the year they took off two, I believe it was, who 
were working for him and that now he had only one left, one man, 
who had made a crop for himself and had helped him make his crop. 
Now, he has been notified to report for induction, leaving the crops 
unharvested and nobody to harvest them except this one man who is 
75 years of age and his brother who is 83 years of age. 

I talked to one member of a draft board who was a farmer himself, 
and he told me that they were strictly ordered not to defer farm 
labor, except in the most extreme cases. I just wondered what 
comment you might have on that situation. 

General Hershey. I think it is a little difficult to comment on 
what might be true in a locality. I think that probably in your 
State deferment is even less used, for one reason or another, except 
one that is quite apparent, than in perhaps some other States. 

Another thing is that you, in your State, have a great many defense 
plants that have stripped quite a bit of your labor. 

I do not know enough about the peanut crop business to make a 
guess, but I do know in our farm program we did very much as we 
have done in many other things, that is, we set up a pretty great 



13106 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

program and there probably will be a shortage of labor, just like 
there have been shortages in material. 

I would be rather mterested to know just how these boards were 
instructed on not deferring farmers. I would like to say this, that 
we tried to get cooperation between the war boards and the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture to sort of help the men who had boys and did 
not feel like going m to make any effort to get them deferred, because 
they felt there was a social problem in not asking for his own boys to 
be deferred, even though his own boys worked for him. 

I do think in areas where the local boards are confronted with 
registrants that are all farmers, some feel, "Well, if I defer one I have 
to defer them all." That is one of the shortcomings of human nature. 

Up in my part of the country, I know of some 40 's that have 
two or three men on them and it would not make any difference if we 
took them all. Not in the last 25 years have they grown much more 
than they have eaten, and a great many times they have grown less. 

On the other hand, I know a great many farms where a great 
many tons of hogs have been produced. In order to get anywhere 
with our selectivity, even though we are criticized, we will have to take 
the poor fellow off the 40 that is domg nothing and leave the fellow 
that has $200 in the bank perhaps, even though he owes a good deal 
more than that, who has a larger place, or a better farm, something 
which is producing definitely m.ore than he is consuming; we would 
leave him behind. 

Another thing, of course, is the crop. I do not know where the 
peanuts stand, but we are going to have to decide what crops we are 
going to need the most and produce those, and we should not have to 
ignore certain crops that are too hard to do without. 
" I do not think that gets anywhere toward answering your specific 
question. It is too indefinite for me to do more than attempt to 
evade, or talk about the thing in general. 

Mr. Sparkman. I have simply mentioned peanuts incidentally. 

General Hershey. There have been a great many peanuts grown 
there. It is soybeans in my part of the country. We are into that 
like we have never been "before. It was hard planting this spring 
but it* is going to be very difficult to harvest them. We never har- 
vested them before. 

AUTHORITY OF LOCAL BOARDS 

Mr. Sparkman. Is the matter of deferment of farm labor, for 
instance, very largely up to the local boards, or do they receive specific 
orders? 

General Hershey. Of course, the local boards need not pay any 
attention to 99 percent of the things which we send out. It is a 
good thing they do not have to. We have tried to guide them, and 
we have set up agricultural people as some of the people that can be 
deferred. On the other hand, in the areas M^here they have nothing 
else, when they leave one boy then everybody else feels, "Wliy did 
you leave him?" They cannot lay it on Washington very well, and 
reply that Washington said, "You should take the fellow on the 40 
but don't take the fellow on the 60 or 70." I know one State where 
they have set up the formula in which they put down certain factors, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13107 

and the answer they get decides pretty much whether the fellow is 
prodiicino; quite a bit more than he consumes. 

Mr. Sparkman. Has any study been made of this farm problem? 

General Heeshey. I think I have now another occupational bul- 
letin which the War Manpower Commission has evolved on farming. 
It is about ready to be published. I am not so optimistic as to believe 
that the publication of one or two or three more bulletins would help, 
because the human-being element enters into it, and unless you get 
a man to believe that this fellow should stay at homic and should not 
go to war it will not help. I think the board member has got to be 
able to defend himself when you say: "Why did you take the fellow^?" 
He says, "Washington said so." As long as they are doing as good 
a job as they are doing now, I do not care what they call me, or the 
State headquarters even, or perhaps Congress. 

Mr. Sparkman. General, of course you are simply the procuring 
agency for the armed services; you do not set up the standards; 

General Hershey. No. 

RELAXATION OF ARMY STANDARDS 

Mr. Sparkman. Is it true that recently the Army has relaxed to 
some extent its rules w^ith reference to the taking of illiterates? 

General Hershey. Yes; they have said they will take up to 10 
percent of the illiterate in each induction in each State. Of course, 
they do not have that many in every place, but unfortunately in 
some places they are overstocked. 

Mr. Sparkman. Do you think that will serve to absorb all of these 
that have been left out by reason of illiteracy? 

General Hershey. It will not absorb all of them, but the Army — 
perhaps I am optimistic — is going to take more today; I do not know 
when, but they are. 

Mr. Sparkman. I noticed, too, that the Army has relaxed on some 
possibly minor physical defects. 

General Hershey. Quite materially. We did pretty well. Be- 
tween August 1 and August 31, without changing standards we 
lowered the rejection rate in the United States 8 percent — the Army 
did. The Selective Service had some small part in bringing things 
to their attention. 

Mr. Sparkman. Well, it has not yet, though, gotten around to 
taking persons that are suffering with venereal diseases, has it? 

General Hershey. They have promised on the 1st day of October 
they will start to taking them. The percentage they are taking is 
not satisfactory, but I still have hopes that we are going to raise that. 
As the manpower gets short, those things just must happen. They 
make for bad public relations for Selective Service, the longer they 
are delayed. I have some appreciation of what the Army is up against, 
but the pressure that we have exerted in the last 5 or 6 months on the 
Army has been bringing results. I think they are trying very honestly 
to absorb them without destroying their efficiency. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now, when you speak of the percentage that 
they will take, is it going to be something in line with the illiterates? 

General Hershey. No; unfortunately it is not. Here is where, 
you see, in our negotiations, the Army was at a little disadvantage. 
They took the national rate in dealing with me, and unfortunately 



13108 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

that national rate does not help. Wlien they come on a national rate, 
supplying it in one-third of the places, then we are only selling one- 
third as rapidly as we must if we are going to overcome our bacldog. 
I am optimistic. I believe in another month or two we are going to 
force them to take in a very considerable number. 

Mr. Sparkman. This probably belongs to the Army rather than to 
you, but is there any reason why these persons should not be taken 
and placed in detention camps and treated? 

General Hershey. You are getting right into the heart of the argu- 
ment. A person who has been away from the Army for 2 years has 
different opinions about what facilities they must have to take care of 
them than those who are responsibile for ruiming the Army at the 
present time. It is a great deal easier, I suppose, to pitch the game 
up in the bleachers than out in the field, and they are up there pitching. 
I still think they could take more than they are taking. That is 
what the discussion is about. 

Mr. Sparkman. The Government is already paying for the treat- 
ment through the various health services. 

General Hershey. Yes; sometimes we pay for two or tliree treat- 
ments, because we cannot get them back into the induction stations 
before November. 

Mr. Sparkman. Some of the health officers told me they were 
rather alarmed at the increase in venereal cases and in the refusal of 
those people to take the treatments voluntarily because it does give 
them protection from the draft. 

General Hershey. That is the reason why, when we get them so 
that we are taking them in reasonably large numbers, the rate is going 
to fall. 

Mr. Sparkman. Just one other question. You mentioned about 
this quitting rate in the airplane factories in California being about 
5 percent, I believe j^ou said. 

General Hershey. Between five and six. 

Mr. Sparkman. It raised a little over 1 percent, I believe. 

General Hershey. Of course, that was not in August. In August 
it was getting up to 3.8, I think, as the chairman has stated, as I 
remember it. The curve in August showed straight up. But the 
the point I was trying to make was the selective-service band did not 
widen much more than 30 percent, even with that upshot, whereas we 
had a right to expect it to double over June. 

Mr. Sparkman. I was just curious to know what accounts for the 
variance. 

General Hershey. The difference between 1 and 5? 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes. 

General Hershey. That, I could not say. As a farmer, I feel that 
certainly they did not go back to the farm. There are only one or 
two or three other industries that would be more favorable places to 
work than where they are, therefore, whether they are stealing from 
each other or some are going on vacations or wherever they go, there 
is quite a little movement around with labor. That is one of the things 
that disturbed me and made me thmk; we have got to, as rapidly as 
possible, tighten down and see that every factory has got what they 
need and has no oversupply, and try to get these fellows to stay where 
they are. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13109 

The Chairman. There is a certain psychology: "Well, I have got 
to go anyway, and I might as well go now." I have received a few 
letters along that line. 

General Hershey. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. I have just got one question. General, if you assume 
an Army of 10 to 13 milhon, you automatically assume a pretty large- 
size production job. In fact, that also is raising our sights consider- 
ably above where we have been before in production. "When you 
match that with the rate at which you are now drawing them out, 
you run up against a situation in which you see it from the point of 
view of the individual drawn, and naturally your attitude is bound to 
be that these people are needed and demanded by the armed services. 
The armed services, themselves, however, are in the business of pro- 
curing war goods. They are going to run up against the fact that they 
are asking for men out of industry at the same time that they are 
asking for production out of industry. 

General Hershey. That is right. 

Dr. Lamb. Does not that suggest that the real need m this situation 
is a survey, particularly as you are saying that it is impossible to draw 
them out much slower than they are now being drawn out, and maybe 
we will step it up even more. Is it not that the real need is for a 
survey such as you have described as coming from that steel com- 
pany so that a much more orderly system of priorities as to the release 
of men can be worked out and keyed into the production program in 
the future? Then the burden does not fall particularly heavily on 
the individual farmer or the plant to supply such information as that. 
Then the development of a much more adequate training and up- 
grading program in many plants would key into this plan. As 3^ou 
take these people out on what is, for many plants at present, a hap- 
hazard basis, you lack the training and leadership within the plant to 
leave men enough to run the plant, or at least men enough to train a 
new crop. 

General Hershey. There is no question about that. I think you 
cannot expect the Army and Navy to freeze what they need, but even 
if you do not freeze it, you can take that as a basisfor your present 
planning. I do not think there is any question about that, and I 
might even say we are probably overdue. I would not be adverse 
to admitting we are probably overdue on having set up what is our 
maximum of accomplishment, as we look at it now. Then I think we 
are going to have to give a great deal of thought to whether or not 
any experience of any country can be applied to us in determining 
how many workers you have got to have without, in order to main- 
tain a man within. 

The things I have said at any time are not based on the fact that I 
thought or did not think that men should or should not go to war. 
The only thing about it is if we commit ourselves to using certain 
numbers, then it is going to be catastrophic if we do not go tlirough 
with it. \Thether we commit ourselves is a problem that I do not 
even attempt so solve. I only tried to execute what seemed to be a 
survey, and I tried to get a final understanding on what they must 
expect, otherwise they are going to find a very serious problem 6 or 8 
months from now when I surprise somebody who did not expect to 
participate in this war. I would rather have him think about it for 



13110 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

6 or 8 months, to become accustomed to that thought, rather than 
the contrary. If he does have to go then, I am not worried about 
what he thmks of me, but if he has to go without warning, then I do 
worry. 

I agree with you wholly. You must set up these things, and you 
must get these relationships. You cannot mobilize every man in this 
country. I do not think the physical condition is the bottleneck. I 
do not think you can mobilize every physically fit man. 

Dr. Lamb. I can see in your statements certain salutary effects not 
only upon the men but also upon the agencies which have got to rise to 
this particular occasion. It seems to me that really is the problem. 
The more you speed up, or the Army speeds up the goal, the more 
rapidly you are going to be hit between the eyes with this particular 
problem. The training and upgrading process is absolutely the only 
way you can lick it, and that requires a much better organization than 
I see on the horizon at the present time, planned or actual. 

General Hershey. I agree with you wholly on the training. The 
Army now is probably 15 times what it was a little over 2 years ago, 
and tlie other fourteen-fifteenths had to be trained. Industry has 
had the same problem. I think they have been a little slow in getting 
to it. I think this thing here represents what for the last 2 or 3 months 
we have tried to get industry to do. 

Dr. Lamb. That is one of the reasons why the committee suggested 
the last time the setting up of this equitable system. That means 
connecting up all along the line the people who ought to know their 
own business better and who ought to acquaint themselves more with 
it. An outsider entering their plant is going to see a great many 
thmgs; he is going to be able to bring experiences from elsewhere to 
push this thing along. 

The Chairman. General, I want to state to you, on behalf of the 
committee, we are very grateful to you. You have given us a very 
fair and valuable contribution for the record of the committee. You 
have been very fine about it. We deeply appreciate the courtesy. 
Thank you very much. 

The committee will stand adjourned to 9:15 tomorrow morning, in 
this room. 

(Wliereupon, at the hour of 12:30 o'clock p. m., an adjournment 
was taken until 9:15 a. m., of the following day, Wednesday, September 
16, 1942.) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION 



WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1942 

MORNING SESSION 

House of Representatives, 

Select Committee Investigating 

National Defense Migration, 

Washington, D. C. 
The committee met at 10:15 a. m., in room 1102, New House Office 
Building, Washington, D. C, Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman), pre- 
siding. 

Present: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of California; 
John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; George H. Bender, of Ohio; Carl T. 
Curtis, of Nebraska; and Laurence F, Arnold, of Illinois. 
Also present: Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director. 
The Chairman. The committee will please come to order, and 
Governor McNutt will be the first witness. 

I would like to say, on behalf of the committee. Governor, we Imow 
what a busy man you are and that we appreciate you coming here this 
morning. 

The gentleman from Illmois, Mr. Arnold, will interrogate you. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL V. McNUTT, CHAIRMAN, WAR MAN- 
POWER COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. Governor, will you please give the reporter the 
names of your assistants, for the record? 

Mr. McNutt. General Frank J. McSherry, Mr. William Haber, 
and Mr. Alvin J. Roseman. 

Mr. Arnold. Any questions which I ask you that you feel that 
should be referred to your assistants, we will be glad to have them 
answer. 

It is our understanding that, under the First War Powers Act, you, 
as Chairman of the War Manpower^ Commission, can direct either War 
Production Board or the Services of Supply to require war contractors 
to hire exclusively through the Employment Service. Is this correct? 

Mr. McNuTT. I have not that authority. I can ask them to do it. 

Mr. Arnold. But you cannot require it? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Arnold. Similarly, you can by directive through the Services 
of Supply of the War Department require employers to set up ade- 
quate training programs. Is this within your power? 

Mr. McNuTT. We can issue the directive, but I have some serious 
doubts as to any legislative authority to enforce it. We have had to 
operate by persuasion and by agreement up to the present time. 

Mr. Arnold. Have you been pretty successful? 

60396— 42— pt. 34 5 13111 



13112 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. McNuTT. We have had success in some measure and in some 
spots. 

The Chairman. How is it handled in England? 

Mr. McNuTT. It is handled in England by a national service act 
which gives the authority to do these things. 

Mr. Arnold. If it were possible to control the labor market demand, 
to control hiring and training through directives to the War Produc- 
tion Board and the Services of Supply, woidd it be necessary to obtain 
compulsory powers over the individual worker? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes; I do thinlv so. I will answer that categorically, 
"Yes." 

NATIONAL SERVICE ACT 

Mr. Arnold. It has come to our attention that there are at present 
under consideration at least two different drafts of a National Service 
Act, one of which makes the Employment Service the key agency 
through wbich control will be exercised. The other makes the Selec- 
tive Service the key operating agency through which labor-market 
controls will be operated. Which of these two approaches to this 
problem do you favor? 

Mr. McNuTT. Your premise is wrong. Who gave you that in- 
formation, if I may ask that? 

Mr. Arnold. I do not know myself; I will have to be frank. 

The Chairman. If the premise is wrong, we want it in the record, 
because the question does not amount to anything if the question is 
not right. 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. You make an assumption which is 
not based on facts. There has been no discussion of any details of a 
National Service Act. Little study has been given to it. I am 
interested from the standpoint of our efforts to do this job, as to who 
made such a statement. 

Mr. Bender. It has been made repeatedly on the floor of the House. 
Members have discussed the National Service Act and some of the 
departments have been talking about it, and because of the conflict 
on the part of various agencies, of the Government, there has been 
suggestion at times, and, in fact, quite recently, for such an act in 
order that there might be better coordination between the various 
heads of the departments so we will not go in so many different direc- 
tions in handling this problem. 

Mr. McNuTT. Mr. Chairman, in response to your letter, I have 
prepared a statement in which I have endeavored to answer the ques- 
tions that you put to me there. Don't you think it would be better 
in the conduct of this hearing if you permit me to make the statement 
and then you ask your questions? 

Mr. Arnold. How long is the statement? 

Mr. McNuTT. It is a rather long statement. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you want to read it? 

Mr. McNuTT. I think it would be wise. I think I will cover most 
of the questions which the members of the committee have. 

Mr. Arnold. Very well. W^ill you proceed and read that, and if 
there are any further questions we will ask them. 

The Chairman. It is preferable to you that way? 

Mr. McNuTT. I think it would be better and more orderly, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Chairman. All right. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13113 

STATEMENT BY PAUL V. McNUTT, CHAIRMAN, WAR MANPOWER 
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. McNuTT (reading): 

I want to begin by impressing on you my sense of the magnitude and urgency 
of the manpower problem which confronts us. Between now and the end of next 
year we must add about 5,000,000 workers in our war industries and probably an 
equal number to the armed forces. In order to replace workers withdrawn by 
the armed forces and to make the necessary shifts from nonessential to essential 
work, we shall have to place about 18,000,000 workers in new jobs. About 
11,000,000 workers must be trained, mainly for semiskilled production jobs, be- 
tween now and the end of 1943. At this moment there are serious general labor 
shortages in 35 centers of war production, including Los Angeles, Seattle, Port- 
land, Oreg., Baltimore, and Buffalo. Each of these shortages must be met. 
Labor shortages in copper mining and smelting have already cost several thousand 
tons in this valuable war material and shortages exist also in other nonferrous 
metal-mining industries and in logging. 

Meanwhile, needless migration goes on and labor pirating remains unchecked. 
In some areas acute shortages of housing and transportation facilities are pre- 
venting an adequate flow of labor into critical war plants. In other areas arti- 
ficial labor shortages exist because of discrimination against women workers 
and members of minority groups. Workers already employed in war plants are 
frequently utilized at much less than their full capacity. All of these problems 
must be met wherever they arise. 

BACKGROUND OF THE MANPOWER PROBLEM 

During the first 2 years of the war production program we were engaged mainly 
in taking up the slack in the labor force and shifting several million people already 
employed to new occupations. In June 1940 there were 48.1 million people 
in civilian employment and the armed forces. By June 1942 this figure had grown 
to 57,000,000. 'Where did these 9,000,000 people come from? They came 
^lainly from a reduction of almost 6,000,000 in the number of people unemployed. 
In addition, the labor force increased by 3,000,000, about half of which was normal 
growth and the other half an unusually large increase in the labor force during the 
spring and early summer of 1942. 

During this period manpower was not an important limiting factor on produc- 
tion. Production and procurement plans could be made on the assumption that 
labor shortages would be made up by migration, and that the flow of manpower 
would follow the flow of contracts and materials. Acute shortages of a few scarce 
skiUs have been met fairly satisfactorily by breaking down jobs and upgrading 
workers. Potential shortages of semiskilled workers in some areas have been 
averted by large-scale migration. Most of this migration has been from areas 
close to the centers of war industry. More than half of the migrants into the 
Philadelphia area, for example, came from other parts of Pennsylvania. The 
average distance travelled was only 80 miles. Two-thirds of the migrants into 
Seattle came from Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and western Montana. 

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this period of easy expansion in 
employment is about ended. The sources of migration are beginning to dry up. 
The manpower situation during the next year and a half will be much tighter 
and will require advance planning and a positive administrative program to meet 
manpower needs. 

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCES 

The latest estimate of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Employ- 
ment Security indicates that 62.5 million people will be required for industry and 
the armed forces by December 1943. It should be pointed out that this figure 
rests on a large number of practical judgments about military and production 
requirements and about our probable success in organizing the labor market and 
reducing the amount of unemployment. Specifically, this figure assumes that: 

1. The armed forces will reach the level projected by the planning divisions of 
the Army and Navy for December 1943. If present goals are raised, total labor 
requirements must be raised accordingly. 

2. Expenditures for war materials and war construction will be at an annual 
rate of eighty to eighty-five billion dollars by December 1943. 



13114 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

3. Plants in war industries will be used to the limit of practical capacity. 
This assumes that raw material bottlenecks will be broken and production 
schedules maintained. 

4. Virtually all of the metal-working industry will have been converted to 
war production. Many consumer goods industries will be cut back to the limit 
set by raw material supplies. 

5. Unemployment will be reduced to 1,000,000, which could result only from a 
very high degree of success in organizing the labor market. The millions of 
placements required in war industry during the next year and a half would have 
to be made with very little lost motion and the amount of seasonal and casual 
unemployment would have to be greatly reduced. 

6. The volume of employment in agriculture will decline by less than 5 percent. 
It is assumed that there will be a considerable outflow of male workers to industry 
and the armed forces, but that most of this will be made up by natural increase 
and by increased utilization of women and young workers in farm production. 

7. Output per worker in the war industries will be 18 percent higher in December 
1943 than in December 1941. This is expected to result partly from increased 
efficiency and partly from lengthening of working hours. 

Some of these assumptions — and they are assumptions — probably make for an 
overestimate of labor requirements, while others make for an underestimate. 
On balance, the figure of 62.5 million is probably as good a judgment of the future 
as can be obtained at this time. It depends, however, entirely on the view taken 
of the military situation and of production necessities. This may change very 
rapidly. If it proves necessary to expand the armed forces beyond present goals, 
to increase the production of raw materials beyond present goals, and to construct 
additional fabricating capacity, labor requirements may be sharply increased. 
It is not safe to count heavily on labor requirements geared to our present indus- 
trial capacity when it may become necessary through force of circumstance to 
stretch our capacity farther than now seems possible. In manpower planning, 
even more than in production planning, it is the part of caution to set the sights 
high. We should face the possibiUty that we may need a labor force of 65,000,000 
or more by the end of 1943. 

The labor force available in December 1943 would, on the basis of natural 
increase alone, amount to about 57.5 million. If requirements of 62.5 million are 
to be met, about 5,000,000 people will have to enter or remain in the labor force 
who would not normally do so. If requirements turn out to be larger than this, 
the number of workers to be added is still larger. These additional workers 
will come from women not now employed, from young people still in school, from 
older workers who can delay their retirement or come back to work from retire- 
ment, and possibly from certain groups in the agricultural population. 

There are about 4.5 million nonfarm housewives under 45 with no children 
under 16. There are 9.1 nonfarm housewives under 45 with children under 16. 
Availability of these women for employment will depend on provision of ade- 
quate day care for their children. There are, finally, 9.5 million nonfarm house- 
wives 45 and over. The actual reserve of woman power is smaller than it looks, 
because many of these women live in nonindustrial areas where there are few 
employment opportunities and cannot be expected to leave their homes to take 
employment. Even where jobs are available near their homes, the willingness of 
women to take them will depend on the extent to which they are convinced that 
they are really needed, the attractiveness of the jobs, and the efficiency of the 
recruitment and placement efforts. 

There are almost 7,000,000 students aged 14 to 17 inclusive. Accelerating 
the entrance of these students into the labor force by 6 months, that is, reducing 
the average school-leaving age by 6 months, would add a million to the working 
force between now and December 1943. Another half million workers could be 
added by increasing the average retirement age by 6 months. 

An additional industrial labor reserve of unknown size exists in agriculture. 
It has been estimated that as many as 2,000,000 farm operators could be with- 
drawn from marginal and subsistence farms, with a drop of only 3 percent in the 
production of commercial farm crops. Even if one considers this figure too high, 
there is certainly considerable slack here which could be taken up if we were 
seriously pressed for labor supplies. 

It is misleading to make a simple addition of the numbers in these various 
groups and to label the result "the labor reserve." Such a total merely states 
that there are so many million people in the population with characteristics which 
do not bar them from gainful employment. But the important question is how 
many of these people can actually be brought into employment. The answer 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13115 

to this question depends on the kinds of inducements offered and the efficiency 
of the recruitment and placement efforts. 

Many additional workers would probably enter the labor market by the end 
of 1943 even if we did nothing at all. To obtain a net addition of 5,000,000 
people, however, will require a carefully planned recruitment, training, and 
placement program. If sufficiently intensive efforts were made, the labor force 
could probably be increased to at least 65,000,000. This would give us the 
same percentage of the population, 14 years and over, as is now gainfully em- 
ployed or in the armed services in Great Britain. 

It is dangerously misleading, however, to look at national totals alone. We 
do not have a national labor market, but a network of local labor markets. It 
is quite possible to have acute shortages in some markets while adequate supplies 
are available in others. This is in fact the situation in which we now find our- 
selves. Shortages of labor in some occupations and localities are so severe that 
they are testing our ingenuity to the utmost. They can be met only by the 
promptest and most vigorous efforts. We are not faced with planning now for a 
national labor shortage which may possibly come into existence a year from now. 
We are required to plan and act immediately to meet specific labor bottlenecks 
which already exist. 

The heart of the problem is that our labor reserves are widely dispersed, while 
the demand for labor in war industry is highly concentrated. The difficulty can 
be met only partially by greater spreading of war contracts, because the produc- 
tion facilities themselves are highly concentrated. 

In July 1942, 35 of the local labor markets surveyed regularly by the Bureau of 
Employment Security already faced general labor shortages, 81 expected shortages 
to develop, and only 44 expected a continued surplus of labor. Almost all of these 
areas expect to reach peak employment before July 1943, and action which is not 
taken in the next few months might as well not be taken at all. The number of 
people needed to reach peak employment is very large for the major war produc- 
tion centers. It is estimated that the Philadelphia metropolitan area needs about 
120,000 workers, the Detroit area, 200,000; the Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton area, 
48,000; the Portland-Vancouver area, 90,000; the Baltimore area, 55,000; and the 
Buffalo area, over 90,000. 

While conditions differ in detail from one area to the next, certain common 
elements are found in almost all the shortage areas. There has been little effort 
to see that workers already employed are efficiently utilized. Some plants are 
seriously overmanned and hoarding skilled workers, while nearby plants are in 
urgent need of labor. In spite of persistent efforts by the War Manpower Com- 
mission, there is still widespread discrimination against Negroes and minority 
groups. Failure to use local labor reserves has necessitated heavy in-migration, 
which in turn has caused acute housing and transportation difficulties. The 
prospect of many thousand more in-migrants during the next year creates an 
urgent need for additional housing construction. Labor turn-over is high and 
rising in most areas, due partly to unsatisfactory living conditions. 

Employers in most areas seem to be taking it for granted that in-migration will 
continue in sufficient volume to meet hiring requirements. This rests on the 
illusion that what has been true during the past 2 years will continue to be true in 
the future. The large centers of war industry in the Pacific coast, Atlantic coast, 
and North Central States have already exploited nearby sources of labor rather 
thoroughly. Each city must now reach farther and farther afield until all are 
trying to tap the same reserves. These reserves are located mainly in the South- 
ern and Mississippi Valley States, amd must be moved over relatively great 
distances. 

It is fairly safe to predict that cities in the Pacific coast and Northeastern 
States will find the flow of migrants beginning to fall off before the end of 1942. 
There is a danger that labor pirating, which has thus far been confined largely to 
skilled workers, will then be extended to semiskilled and unskilled labor. Labor 
of all types will shift more and more rapidly from plant to plant. Labor turn- 
over will be further accelerated by housing and transportation shortages. 
Employers will eventually be forced to make greater use of local labor, but this 
may not be done until several months after it should have been done. In the 
meantime there may be serious retardation of production in many plants. 

ORGANIZATION OF WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION 

Faced with this possibility of a manpower crisis, the President on April 18, 
1942, created the War Manpower Commission. The Executive Order No. 9139 
creating the Commission directs the chairman, among other things, to "formulate 



13116 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the most 
effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in 
the prosecution of the war; and issue such policy and operating directives as may 
be necessary thereto * * * direct the several departments and agencies of 
the Government as to the proper allocation of available manpower * * * 
establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all Federal programs relating 
to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of workers * * * 
formulate legislative programs, designed to facilitate the most effective mobiliza- 
tion and utilization of the manpower of the country." 

As chairman, I consult with the other members of the Commission representing 
the principal agencies concerned with manpower problems, on the plans and 
procedures necessary to achieve these ends. A management -labor policy com- 
mittee which includes seven representatives of management and seven of labor, 
considers and advises the chairman on matters of major policy. 

The Commission performs a number of functions formerly performed by 
agencies which were transferred to the Commission at the time of its creation. 
Among these are the labor supply and training function^ of the Labor Division 
of the War Production Board, the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized 
Personnel, the Procurement and Assignment Service of the Oihce of Defense 
Health and Welfare Service, the Apprenticeship Section of the Division of Labor 
Standards of the Department of Labor, and the President's Committee on Fair 
Employment Practices. 

Certain other agencies of the Government — the Selective Service System, the 
Federal Security Agency, the Work Projects Administration, the Civil Service 
Commission, the Railroad Retirement Board, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, the Civilian Con- 
servation Corps^ — that is, what is left of it, the Department of Agriculture, and 
the Office of Defense Transportation — were directed by Executive Order No. 
9139 to "conform to such policies, directives, regulations, and standards as the 
chairman may prescribe in the execution of the power vested in him." Operating 
relations with these agencies are maintained through divisions of the Commission 
functioning under the Director of Operations. I am filing for the record a copy 
of the organization chart indicating the present structure of the Commission.^ 

I might add that directives have already been issued to most of the agencies 
mentioned above covering a considerable range of subjects falling within the 
Commission's authority.^ 

Twelve regional offices, each headed by a regional manpower director, are 
being established in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland, 
Chicago, Atlanta, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Mo., Dallas, Denver, and San 
Francisco. The structure of each regional office will resemble on a smaller 
scale the organizational pattern of the headquarters office of the Director of 
Operations. A joint management-labor advisory committee will be appointed 
in each region. 

It is intended also to establish several area offices in each region. Many of 
these are already in operation. The number, and geographical coverage of the 
area offices, will be flexible and will depend largely on the manpower problems 
to be solved. The area manpower director will be responsible for coordinating the 
activities of the various Government agencies concerned with manpower problems 
in much the same way that these activities are coordinated by the War Manpower 
Commission itself on a national scale. Within the limits of established Com- 
mission policy, he will be responsible for developing a coordinated manpower 
program for the area. 

ACTIVITIES OF WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION 

I am sure, however, that you are not so much interested in the structure of the 
Commission as in what we "have been doing. It i«, of course, impossible to say 
very much about this in a few minutes, but I shall try to cover a few of the more 
important points. The central agency for recruiting and placing labor is the 
United States Employment Service. A variety of special recruitment methods, 
including a Nation-wide clearance system, has been in effect for almost 2 years 
for the skilled occupations in which shortages are most acute. In localities such 
as Seattle and Detroit, where labor shortages are serious and housing facilities are 
inadequate to permit heavy in-migration, special efforts are now under way to 
recruit women not normally in the working force. Efforts are also being made to 

1 See chart facing p. 13138. 

» These directives are set out in full in Exhibit 2, p. 13231. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13117 

facilitate the entrance of women into the labor market by developing an intensive 
program for the day care of young children. I have directed the Office of Defense 
Health and Welfare Services to coordinate the activities of the various agencies 
participating in the program. 

The placement activities of the United States Employment Service are being 
concentrated more and more directly on jobs related to the war program. Certain 
types of work not directly related to war production, such as the placement of 
domestic servants, have been discontinued in many areas. The occupational 
questionnaires submitted to all Selective Service registrants are being analyzed 
by the Employment Service as rapidly as its staff permits. Workers with scarce 
skills not already engaged in war production are being called to the local emi^loy- 
ment office for "interviews. This effort to persuade skilled workers to transfer 
voluntarily to more important positions has thus far been successful in only about 
10 percent of the cases. The main reason for unwillingness to transfer has been 
loss of seniority and other accumulated rights in the worker's present job. It is 
apparent that this objection must be met if transference of labor is to be carried 
out on a large scale. 

I shovdd like to point out that the work of the United States Employment- 
Service is being carried on under very severe handicaps. The lack of clearly 
defined authority of the national officers over State Employment Service directors 
is a major problem. It arises mainly from the provision in the Department of 
Labor-Federal Security Agency Appropriations Act for 1943, which requires 
that the Employment Service shall be returned to State direction and control 
at the conclusion of the war, and this results in a considerable confusion of authority 
and objectives. State Employment Service directors in collaborating with national 
policy often do not free themselves from emphasis on distinctly local and State 
interests. This is war. We can have only one strategy and one authority in 
dealing with these problems. The same appropriations act requires the mainte- 
nance of salaries at State compensation scales, which are in most cases below the 
salaries for corresponding positions in the Federal service. Relatively low 
salary scales and lack of adequate funds to hire additional staff in the face of a 
steadily rising volume of work, has resulted in serious demoralization of the 
Employment Service staff and heavy resignations of key personnel. Until the 
Employment Service is freed of these restrictions and provided with adequate 
funds, we shall be seriously hampered in the recruitment, transference, and 
placement work which is the core of our labor-market activity. 

Increasing emphasis is being placed on the extension and development of train- 
ing programs. Since June 1940 more than 3,800,000 workers have attended 
training courses for war production workers and the pace is still increasing. 
Training is being made increasingly available to women, Negroes, and national 
minority groups. The training activities of the National Youth Administration 
are now directed entirely to preparation for employment in war industries. 

I regret that there is not sufficient time to describe the excellent work being 
done by other divisions of the Commission. For example, the work of the 
Housing and Transportation Service in accelerating provision of adequate housing 
and commimity facilities in war industry areas, the work of the Negro and minority 
groups services in breaking down discriminatory hiring practices, and the work of 
the Professional and Technical Personnel Division in mobilizing the facilities of 
our colleges and universities for effective participation in the war effort. 

The first area manpower organization, in Baltimore, has been in operation for 
more than 2 months. Steps have already been taken to recruit, train, and place, 
large numbers of women workers, to utilize more effectively the labor force now 
employed in essential industries by reducing turn-over and absenteeism, to transfer 
skilled workers from nonessential to essential industries, through the voluntary 
cooperation of management and labor groups, to secure the orderly in-migrstion 
of such workers as can be accommodated in available housing facilities. These 
steps are being given widespread publicity in the local press and are being carried 
out in close cooperation with labor and management organizations and with all 
related Government agencies. 

In recent months employees have been leaving the nonferrous metal and logging 
industries more rapidly than replacements could be recruited. Several Federal 
agencies are cooperating to make employment in these industries more attractive 
through wage adjustments, new housing facilities, and the provision of transpor- 
tation facilities. Since these efforts cannot all be imm.ediately completed, I have 
deemed it necessary to take steps to prevent the transfer of production and main- 
tenance workers from these industries to other employment. This step has been 



13118 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

taken in accordance with the pattern approved by the National Management- 
Labor Policy Committee of the War Manpower Commission and after consulta- 
tion with managers and labor leaders in these industries regarding the details of 
the order. In accordance with this order, the Army, Navy, Maritime Commis- 
sion, and the Procurement Division of the Treasury, have instructed their own 
establishments and their contractors to refuse employment to any persons who 
leave the nonferrous metals or logging industries since the issuance of the order, 
unless the worker has obtained from the United States Employment Service a 
certificate of separation. Such a certificate will be issued if the separation is in 
the best interest of the war effort or if the refusal to grant it would result in 
hardship and injustice to the individual. 

I hope that I have conveyed to you a sense of the great variety and difficulty 
of the problems which we face from day to day — and the problems are only 
beginning. As the need for labor increases, labor already employed must be 
used more and more efficiently. The men who are drafted or who enlist in the 
armed forces must be replaced, the replacements must be trained, necessary in- 
migrants to war production areas must be housed, local manpower programs must 
•be coordinated with the activities of the Selective Service System, the War Pro- 
duction Board and other war agencies. 

I know that some of our problems are of special interest to members of this 
committee and I would like to speak in some detail about three of them: The 
problem of coordinating manpower planning and production planning, the prob- 
lem of securing efficient utilization of labor, and the possible need for some type 
of national service legislation. 

MANPOWER PLANNING AND PRODUCTION PLANNING 

The War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission are working 
together toward the common objective of maximum war production. The suc- 
cess of each agency depends on the efficiency of the other. Failure by the War 
Manpower Commission to recruit, train, and place labor at the points of greatest 
need will slow up the production program. Faulty scheduling of production 
and an irregular flow of raw materials will waste labor time, require more men to 
produce a given output, and thus make the job of the War Manpower Commis- 
sion harder. 

Increasingly close relations are being established between the agencies charged 
with manpower and production planning. The chairman of the War Production 
Board and the head of the Board's Labor Production Division are members 
of the War Manpower Commission and participate in all policy discussions. 
The Director of Operations of the War Manpower Commission maintains close 
working relations with the War Production Board Industry Branches through a 
staff of industrial requirements consultants. The program now under dis- 
cussion for concentrating production of a considerable number of nonmilitary 
products in fewer establishments is being worked out jointly by the two agencies 
and manpower considerations are being weighed along with considerations of 
raw materials and plant capacity. The Housing and Transportation Service of 
the War Manpower Commission works closely with the branches of the War 
Production Board concerned with priorities for construction materials. The 
War Manpower Commission is represented on the Plant Site Board, the Purchase 
Policy Committee, and the Manpower Priorities Committee of the War Production 
Board. 

In addition to these operating relations, a joint committee has been established, 
composed of two representatives of the War Manpower Commission Planning 
Service and two representatives of the War Production Board Planning Com- 
mittee, to give continuous consideration to the need for integrating manpower 
and production policies and to make recommendations for dealing with specific 
problems involving both agencies. 

This cooperative relationship must of course be extended downward to regional 
and local levels if it is to be fully effective. It must exist within each community 
and within each plant. 

While manpower requirements stem from the requirements of the production 
program, the relation is not so simple and direct as in the case of raw materials. 
A given production schedule does not indicate the exact number of workers 
required because labor productivity varies greatly from plant to plant and may 
change rapidly over the course of time. Even more important, a given pro- 
duction schedule does not determine the kinds of labor needed— the proportions 
of skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, of male and female workers. All 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13119 

sorts of different combinations may be used to achieve the same result. This is 
true to some extent of raw materials, but in much less degree. 

Another difference is that the raw material problem is mainly a prol^lem of 
allocation. The labor supply problem is essentially a problem of utilization. 
There is no evidence that our labor reserves are inadequate to meet the needs of 
essential industries and the armed forces. The problem is not that too few- 
people are available, but that too few people with the right training are available. 
In skilled metal-working occupations there are scarcely any workers available 
and, therefore, nothing to be allocated. The main problem is to break down 
skilled jobs into semiskilled jobs, to train large numbers of inexperienced workers 
rapidly to fill these semiskilled jobs, and to meet the minimum requirements for 
skilled labor by training and promotion within the plant. If these things are done 
effectively the need for allocation of labor wiU be greatly reduced. 

SECURING EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF LABOR 

It is one of the major responsibilities of the War Manpower Commission to 
insure that employers make the best possible use of the labor available to them. 
This is a problem which must be met and solved plant by plant. Some way must 
be found to determine what each plant actually needs and to see that it gets no 
more and no less labor than it can use to the best advantage. There is a natural 
tendency for each employer to try to skim off the cream of the labor force. This 
may have been all right 2 years ago when there was plenty of cream available. 
It is not all right now when the market is tight, when millions of untrained people 
must be brought into use and when skilled men must be conserved for the jobs 
which only they can do. Employers must be required to pare down their labor 
demands, to prepare for increasingly heavy Selective Service withdrawals by 
substituting women and men beyond the military age, and to abandon any dis- 
crimination which may have existed against Negroes and other minority groups. 

Determination of actual l9,bor requirements is essential not only for efficient 
distribution of manpower but also for effective operation of the Selective Service 
System. As the pool of available manpower shrinks, and as the demand of the 
armed services for men of military age increases, the Selective Service System 
needs clearer guidance as to which men are really indispensable in industry and 
which are not. Employers even in the most essential industries can no longer 
count on retaining men of military age for production work. They will be able 
to secure deferment for men only in skilled jobs requiring lengthy training, only 
if the men are actually working at these jobs and only if there is no other way of 
getting the jobs done. It is obvious that decisions are required which cannot be 
left entirely to the einployer's discretion and which require the judgment of 
experts skilled in occupational analysis and labor utilization. 

Some progress has already been made by the United States Employment 
Services through the development of "manning tables" indicating the average 
occupational distribution of workers in shipyards, ordnance plants, and airplane 
plants. These tables enable one to see whether a particular plant is far out of 
line in its demands for skilled labor. This sort of work, however, needs to be 
expanded and carried along on a continuous basis rather than by means of sporadic 
surveys. There is a clear need for a system of labor utilization inspectors to 
maintain continuous contact with plants in essential industries, to analyze the 
need for labor and the utilization of labor in each plant, to advise the Employment 
Service on actual labor requirements, to advise the employer on methods of break- 
ing down production processes and substituting semiskilled for skilled workers, to 
stimulate training programs and increased use of women workers on the jobs 
which they are capable of performing. 

A system of labor supply inspectors has been in effect in Great Britain since 
the summer of 1940. In June 1942 there were 687 inspectors reporting to 44 dis- 
trict manpower boards, which correspond roughly to our area manpower directors. 
The British inspectors have been recruited mainly from production engineers and 
from experienced trade union officials. Their main duties are to see that employers 
make effective use of the services of skilled workers, to secure increased use of 
semiskilled and unskilled workers, including women and trainees, and to advise 
on the release of men for the services or for employment on other work of greater 
importance. The inspectors work in ver}^ close cooperation with the local employ- 
ment exchanges. Decisions by the local employment exchange on providing addi- 
tional labor for a plant depend largely on the inspector's report as to how efficiently 
the employer is using the labor he already has and whether a genuine need for 
additional workers exists. There is also frequent consultation with production 
officials. Where investigation reveals evidence of labor hoarding or a poorly 



13120 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

organized labor force, production officers have cooperated with labor supply 
inspectors by providing information on the production program and on the con- 
tracts which a particular firm might expect. 

It is not intended to suggest that the British pattern should necessarily be 
followed here or, indeed, to discuss at all the administrative organization necessary 
to secure efficient labor utilization in this country. Since men with the necessary 
qualifications are hard to find, and take considerable time to train, action on the 
subject needs to be and will be expedited. There are administrative problems 
of how to tie in such an inspection staff with the regional and area manpower 
structure and with the Employment Service. A clear division of function must 
also be worked out between the labor utilization inspectors, the inspectors who are 
being appointed by the War Production Board, and the field liaison officers of the 
Army and Navy, in order to avoid duplication of effort and to secure maximum 
cooperation from employers. These problems are under consideration at the 
present time. 

NATIONAL SERVICE LEGISLATION 

I have frequently been asked, as you asked this morning, whether I consider 
that additional legislative authority is necessary for an effective manpower pro- 
gram. As you know, we have been trying thus far to do the job by voluntary 
measures such as the local antipirating agreements, the provisions for voluntary 
transfer of workers to essential industries through the Employment Service, and 
special voluntary agreements such as the one just concluded for logging and non- 
ferrous metal mining. There is good reason to doubt, however, whether such 
measures will long be adequate. 

We know that within the next 6 months the problem of supplying men to the 
armed forces and workers to industry will grow much more difficult. Induction 
schedules have been raised, the unemployed group is dwindling rapidly, shortages 
of labor in particular localities and industries are becoming more acute, and turn- 
over and absenteeism are rising. In the face of these problems, the continued 
success of voluntary efforts cannot be assured, and we are moving rapidly into 
a situation where the Government must intervene increasingly in the labor market. 

We have before us the experience of other countries. Great Britain was forced 
to adopt sweeping labor-market controls as early as 1940. Broad control meas- 
ures were announced in Canada last month and have been adopted also in Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand. The manpower problems which we face are not essen- 
tially different from those of our Allies, and it is unlikely that we shall be able to 
avoid the controls which they have found necessary. 

The War Manpower Commission would be derelict in its duty if it did not 
study carefully the need for national service legislation, and if it did not have 
plans prepared well in advance of actual need. The Commission has not yet 
considered a specific bill, nor has it sent any bill or recommendation to the Presi- 
dent. The problem has, however, been under study for some time by a subcom- 
mittee of the Commission and also by a subcommittee of the Management-Labor 
Policy Committee. Before any recommendations are made the matter will have 
been discussed from every angle, and representatives of labor and management 
will have been fully consulted. 

The term "national service" often raises in peoples' minds the specter of a 
dictatorial government, moving people about with no regard to their convenience, 
and forcing them into jobs which may be contrary to their training and interests. 
I should like to point out that this notion is entirely false and contrary to all 
experience in Great Britain and other democratic countries. The object of a 
universal service system is to answer the question which every patriotic person is 
now asking himself: Where do I best fit into the total national effort? The in- 
dividual receives conflicting advice from different sources, he does not know the 
total manpower picture, he is confused as to the best use of his talents. He needs 
counsel rather than compulsion, and this in general is what he would receive 
under a system of national service. 

In British experience, the great value of having compulsory powers has been 
shown to arise from their mere existence. The fact that the powers are in the 
background materially assists the work of voluntary transfer and resort has to be 
had to the exercise of powers in only a limited number of cases. Up to date only 
a handful of people have been prosecuted for failing to obey directions to go to 
new employment or stay in their present employment. It is also important to 
remember that under the British system any worker or employer injurionsly 
affected by an administrative decision may present his case to an appeal board 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13121 

on which management and labor are represented. It is obvious that similar 
safeguards should be contained in any legislation which we may decide to adopt. 

Compulsory ])owers, in short, must be held in reserve rather than kept in con- 
stant use. If they have to be used constantly the whole system becomes unwork- 
able. In a democratic country people must be mobilized by invoking their 
free will in a cooperative enterprise. This fact is not changed in the least by 
passage of a National Service Act. 

To sum up: It is not yet certain how soon the Commission will recommend 
legislation to the President, or what form the recommendation will take. It is 
my considered judgment, however, based on the best available knowledge of the 
manpower situation, that some type of national service legislation is inevitable. 
You ma.v take it for granted that any legislation which may be recommended 
will have been considered very carefully and will contain appropriate safeguards 
for the interests of all parties concerned. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL V. McNUTT— Resumed 

Mr. Arnold. Thank you very much, Governor. That is a very 
very thorough statement. 

Mr. McNuTT. It has been too long. 

The Chairman. You have covered a lot of ground, Governor, 
the Manpower Commission. 

Mr. Arnold. It will be made a part of the record. I know, from 
my experience, in a month out in my area of Illinois, that thousands 
of people are wondering where they will best fit in, in this picture. 

:Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Arnold. And they come to us for advice as to where they can 
best fit in. 

The questions that were prepared here were not predicated on such 
a smooth-working organization as you seem to detail in your paper. 
I think perhaps you would want to answer some of these questions, 
to clarify the atmosphere as to rumored conflicts of authority and 
perhaps jealousies over authority. 

Mr. McNuTT. The Nation is at war, gentlemen of the committee, 
and it is no time for conflicts over authority or any disputes about 
jurisdiction. 

Mr. Arnold. Some people seem to think that the authorities of 
Washington are fighting among themselves instead of fighting Hitler. 
I do not know whether that is true or not, but some of these questions 
might bring that out. 

Mr. McNuTT. All right. 

The Chairman. The answer is, though, in a great measure, that 
after all we are a great big democracy and it takes democracy some 
little time to get under way. There is bound to be certain complica- 
tions. 

Mr. ]\IcNuTT. That is inevitable in a democracy. 

agreement in copper and lumber industries 

Mr. Arnold. You spoke of the order in nonferrous metals and 
lumber. Did the War Alanpower Commission have distinct authority 
in that? 

Mr. McNuTT. Actually, that was the result of an agreement which 
was reached after much travail but the agreement was there. That 
was the basic fact. We had the agreement of the employers and of 
the employees in both of those industries. HappUy, that could be 
brought about because there were recognized representatives of both. 



13122 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

But there are many industries not so organized. Then, we used 
every power that we had to implement that agreement. 

Mr. Arnold. Wouldn't you say that could fairly be described as a 
voluntary national service act? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Arnold. Then, it would be fair to say that your experience in 
arriving at an agreement on what was to be done about copper and 
lumber has established a kind of model for other industries? 

Mr. McNuTT, I hope that it will, but, as I pointed out, other 
industries may not be so well organized on both sides of the line. 
If they are, then of course, you can bring about an agreemeiit. You 
can gather men about a table and bring about a meeting of minds, but 
in many occupations that is not possiole. It would not be possible in 
agriculture, for example. 

Mr. Arnold. I do not laiow whether arything is possible in agri- 
culture. 

Mr. McNuTT. I decline to comment further upon that one. 

NO real conflict between war production board and war 

MANPOWER COMMISSION 

Mr. Arnold. It has come to our attention that there has been some 
difference of opinion over directive No. 2 issued by the War Man- 
power Commission which requires the War Production Board to pre- 
sent the Manpower Commission with a preference list of war plants. 
As we understand it, the War Production Board has already set up a 
manpower priorities branch and this branch plans to establish regional 
offices and to employ labor utilization inspectors. Do you consider 
that the War Production Board, under directive No. 2, should instruct 
the War Manpower Commission as to the need for labor supply by 
location, amount of labor needed, and quality of labor needed? 

Mr. McNuTT. Any conflict of opinion there is more apparent than 
real. Mr. Nelson and I, by exchange of letters, have, I thinJv, satis- 
factorily, adjusted anything that might even appear to be a conflict. 
I am to meet him as soon as I leave this committee here, to go over 
the details. 

There is not any real conflict between us. Mr. Nelson is a member 
of the Commission, and I might sav to you that I thiniv, in the entire 
existence of the Commission, there has only been a divided vote twice. 
All other actions have been unanimous. 

The Chairman. Governor McNutt, you straighten out everything 
with him today, because he will be here tomorrow and then we can 
report progress. 

Mr. McNuTT. I think he will say precisely what I have said to 
you, that there is not any real conflict. 

Mr. Arnold. He has authority over materials? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. We have authority over manpower, 
whatever authority exists. We must work together. 

Mr. Arnold. You must work together or there will be divided 
authority over production planning? 

Mr. McNuTT. And that goes for the whole war effort. 

That is, I feel that it is not any time to be fighting about who 
is to have control. The Commander- in Chief determines that. Let 
every man do his job and work together the solution of the problems. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13123 

Mr. Arnold. How is it possible to properly schedule manpower 
unless we have advance information on the manpower requirements 
of industry and the Army? 

Mr. McNuTT. It is not possible. 

ALLOCATION OF MANPOWER 

Mr. Arnold. Who decides at the present time what manpower 
should go to the Army and what manpower should go to industry? 
We tried to get that yesterday from General Hershey, and he did 
not answer. 

Mr. McNuTT. I wish I could, and I know he could not. That is, 
he gets his requirements from the military authorities. He has to 
get his men. At the same time, he gets from us the requirements 
on the other side, that is, for the production lines. We have authority 
over the occupational deferments. That is, we can give the directives 
to hun as to that. 

The Chairman. Governor McNutt, General Hershey was very 
much concerned about the different conditions prevailing in England 
and this country. For instance, they had to recall, as you know ■ 

Mr. McNuTT. Forty thousand miners from the armed services 
after they had been trained and equipped. 

The Chairman. Yes. He was making the point anyway, about 
recalling them to England from France, which was an entirely different 
proposition from calling them from Egypt and Australia. 

Mr. McNuTT. Precisely so. Let's not make the mistake so that 
it has to be corrected. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. McNuTT. And a proper allocation would avoid anything of 
that kind. Of course, ere long, we will be in the position of "Solomon 
dividing the child." 

The Chairman. How are you going to do it? Are you going to 
do it under deferment? 

Mr. McNuTT. I will get back to the point. I think a National 
Service Act is inevitable with the authority some place to make this 
allocation of manpower. 

The Chairman. In other words, in the month of August, in 5 
airplane factories in southern California, they lost 3,395 men. 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

The Chairman. Now, a certain number of those men were necessary 
to instruct new men. 

industrial production hampered by enlistments 

Mr. McNuTT. There is no question about that. They lost sottip. 
very good men. You are talking about the group they lost by enlist- 
ment, not by induction. Only yesterday, I sat with the officials of 
the Sperry Corporation, and I thmk you know how essential their 
work is to this war effort. They showed me item by item, classifica- 
tion by classification, what they were losing by enlistment, mind 
you, and there is nothing in the world that can be done about it. 
We have gone as far as we can. We have persuaded the Army and 
Navy in their recruiting programs, before taking any man in 2-A, 2-B, 
or 3-B, to get the clearance from the local selective-service board: 



13124 ' WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

but I also think that you realize the pressures that are now on those 
local boards. 

There was a State director in the office yesterday afternoon talking 
about the manager of a plant which is entirely given over to war 
production. Pressures in that small commimity are to take that man. 
They say: "If my son went, he goes"; but it is a case where, if that 
man is taken, I would not say that the plant will shut down but 
certainly its efficiency will be impaired in the war effort, and the war 
effort to that extent will be impaired. 

The Chairman. Of course, Governor, there is no question of what 
is sweeping over this country. The psychology is "Well, I have got to 
go in sometime, so why not go in now?" 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right, and don't forget we have 150 years 
of thinking in this country that in time of war the only place to serve 
is in the armed forces, but this is the first total war and it is not a 
matter of sentiment; it is not a matter of desire, but this time every 
person has to serve where he will contribute most to victory. 

Mr. Arnold. In the committee's fifth interim report, there was 
stressed the need for integrating manpower and production planning. 
In the concentration of civilian industries, the need for such integra- 
tion seems peculiarly evident, since, if possible, the remaining civilian 
production should be concentrated in loose labor-market areas. 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

COMMITTEE ON CONCENTRATION OF CIVILIAN INDUSTRIES 

Mr. Arnold. What part has the War Manpower Commission 
played in the concentration of civilian industries? 

Mr. McNuTT. We are represented on the War Production Board 
committee for that purpose, on their Concentration Committee. 

Mr. Arnold. And that has been planned? 

Mr. McNuTT. They are at work now. 

Mr. Arnold. It has come to our attention that Mr. Nelson, in 
establishing a permanent committee on the concentration of civilian 
industries, failed to place a representative of the War Manpower 
Commission on this committee although the committee includes 
representatives from the Office of Price Administration, the Services 
of Supply of the War Department, and several other agencies outside 
of the War Production Board. How do you explain this omission? 

Mr. McNuTT. May I say in defense of Mr. Nelson, that whenever 
a suggestion has been made that he utilize some of our staff in the 
solution of any problems, he has always taken that suggestion most 
cheerfully. There are no differences between the chairman of the 
War Production Board and the chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and I say that publicly. 

Mr. Arnold. The committee would like to ask your full views on 
how labor utilization within the plants can be improved. In the 
Fifth Interim Report the committee recommended the creation of 
labor utilization inspectors to survey individual plants, with authority 
to make changes in the utilization of workers within war industry. 

Mr. McNuTT. I went into that at some length in my statement. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13125 

LABOR UTILIZATION INSPECTOR TEAMS 

Mr. Arnold. Do you think you have covered that? 

Mr. McNuTT. I think I have covered that; yes. It must be done. 
In other words, we cannot afford at this time to allow any plant to 
hoard skilled labor. We cannot afford anything but utilization to 
the highest degree of what they have. 

The Chairman. You cannot rely entirely on the plants. One 
might go 100 percent with you but another might not. 

Mr. McNuTT. Precisely; they differ as persons differ. 

Mr. Curtis. May I ask a question? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes. 

Mr. Curtis. Wliat would be the qualifications of these inspectors? 
Where would you get them? Would you draw skilled labor from 
the plants and make them inspectors? 

Mr. McNuTT. I would like to ask General McSherry to answer 
the question, because that w^ill be his job in the event it is done. 

The Chairman. That is a tough job. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. FRANK J. McSHERRY, DIRECTOR OF 
OPERATIONS, WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, 
D. C. 

General McSherry. The inspector should have the qualifications 
of an industrial engineer. 

Mr. Curtis. Have you got plenty of those? 

General McSherry. We have a considerable number in the 
country, and they are utilized to a large extent by mdustry, and we 
must go to industry to secure them. There are not many unem- 
ployed. These men should have a production background as well as 
be industrial engineers. They would be your key men. In addition 
to that, we would send one representative of Training- Within-Indus- 
try to go along with that industrial engineer, and we would send an 
occupational analyst from our Employment Service, and if it is a 
closed shop or if it is a union shop, we would have a representative of 
labor go along. 

These teams would go into those plants that are reported to be 
hoarding labor or having ineffective utilization of labor or lack of 
training programs, and would make recommendations to the manage- 
ment on how to improve the over-all eft'ective use of manpower. 

Mr. Curtis. How small a plant would you expect to include? 

General McSherry. At first inspection it would be restricted to 
the larger plants, but, later on we would continue until we covered all 
plants. I presume when we got to the smaller plants we would not 
need so complete a team, perhaps an occupational analyst could do 
the job, or perhaps a training man would go in. 

Mr. Curtis. How many such teams would you need? 

General McSherry. I have asked that we have one for each region 
at the present time, or rather I have asked for one industrial engineer 
for each region and six for the national office. The training people 
we have on hand at the present time. Of the occupational analysts, 
we have a great number on hand, and, of course, we get the labor 
representative from the local union. 



13126 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

In England, they have some 660, as I recall, industrial engineers. 
They vary from high-grade industrial engineers to men who come from 
some small plant. They have a man at each of their local placement 
services for that purpose. It may be, when we get along further, we 
will have to have a much larger staff, but at the present time I think 
that we could start with a relatively small staff. 

Dr. Lamb. In that connection. General McSherry, what about the 
team? We have heard some talk about a team composed of an 
industrial engineer and a person who was experienced in occupational 
analysis and some representative of a labor organization, if there was 
one in the plant, and possibly that three-man team would be sufficient 
for the purposes. Do you contemplate the development of such 
teams? 

IMPORTANCE OF IN-PLANT TRAINING 

General McSherry. Yes. I would add a Training-Within-In- 
dustry man because practically all personnel problems require some 
sort of a training program to make effective the recommendations of 
the industrial engineer or the occupational analyst. 

Dr. Lamb. As a matter of fact, that would perhaps be the key to the 
whole situation, particularly where you have the rapid induction that 
you have going on now. 

General McSherry. That is correct. As a matter of fact, one of 
the biggest potential labor supplies that we have is the increase in 
the productivity of the mdividual worker, and we have had certain 
examples where that productivity has been increased as much as 50 
percent. When we come to the tighter labor market that we now see 
ahead, it is going to be essential we increase the individual's produc- 
tivity through better arrangement of production lines, the flow of 
materials, training, and integration of jobs. 

Dr. Lamb. By using the word "individual," perhaps the emphasis 
is off the pomt that I have in mind, and actually it is more a matter of 
integration and of a reexamination of the uses made throughout the 
plant, is it not? 

General McSherry. That is correct, but the net effect is the indi- 
vidual's increase in productivity; but that is accomplished through the 
integration, training, and flow of materials. 

Dr. Lamb. The committee has the impression that over a period of, 
we will say a very short period, of a few months or even weeks in some 
plants, a competent production engineer, acting as labor utilization 
inspector, could transform the output of that plant. 

General McSherry. I think that is a correct statement. I feel 
confident that it is a correct statement, and, of course, it will become 
more and more important as we get into labor situations, such as in 
Portland, Greg., where there is a limited amount of housing, and there 
is a big program for additional workers necessary to carry on the con- 
struction of ships in the three yards of Kaiser's. If he should place 
this new contract for airplanes there, it would increase the problem 
tremendously. At that particular place, it would be well if we had 
full utilization of the labor that they have on hand and every method 
that we know of should be applied to secure the full utilization of 
the individual's efforts. 

Dr. Lamb. I think we would be prepared to predict, where your 
skills are being effectively used and hoarders found on this type of 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13127 

operation, that you can get your projected expansion in those plants 
without tlie addition of workers from outside the plants. 

General McSherry. That is true. Certain plants that I know of 
have increased output, some 50, some 75 percent, with no increase of 
personnel. That was definitely due to the application of what we 
contemplate through the use of an inspector. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you have any mformation on this subject? 

It has come to the committee's attention that the Army Civilian 
Personnel Division already has liaison inspectors in the plants of war 
contractors and that these liaison mspectors already are working with 
material and supply inspectors of the different services of supply. 
As we understand it, these liaison ofj&cers survey labor utilization in 
the plants and, working through the material supply inspectors and 
through the local offices of the Employment Service and the training 
programs, they are attempting to correct inadequate labor utilization 
in the plant. We are told that as a result of their work, piracy of 
workers by war contractors from each other has been greatly reduced. 
Do you have any information on this subject? 

Mr. McNuTT. There is no question about their being very useful 
and they work with our own people. 

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES SERVE AS APPEAL BOARDS 

General McSherry. May I amplify that remark somewhat? There 
are, in many localities, agreements amongst employers to require a 
clearance from_ other war employers before they will hire a man. We 
have that in Philadelphia. We have it in Boston. We have it in 
Charleston. We have it all over the country. That is an employers' 
agreement. Now, the difficulty comes in having an appeal agency 
for the individual worker, because many times he does not get his 
clearance from his employer when he has perfectly valid reasons 
to have clearance. As we set up our management-labor committees 
in the local area, they act as an appeal board to eliminate friction 
that has developed in certain localities. These agreements have been 
worked out by manufacturers in many places, and are in effect at 
the present time. The difficulty with them is that they do not 
include all employers, and, of course, if you do not get all employers, 
you have difficulty with the ones not included in the agreement. 

The Chairman. General McSherry, I am informed that 70 percent 
of the ammunition in England is turned out by factories employing 
40 or less men. Why is that? because the factories are scattered 
all over the country, or what? 

General McSherry. I could not answer that question. I do know 
that, ui some of the plants manufacturing artilleiy ammunition, they 
utilize women entirely, and it may be that there are less than 40 men 
in the plants, but some of these plants certainly employ more than 
40 people. They have large numbers of women. In one plant manu- 
facturing 6-inch shells, there is not a man in the plant. The forgings 
come in, and the completed round of ammunition goes out packed. 
There is not a single man in the plant, but I do not believe they have 
plants with just 40 men and no one else. 

I think the implication was that there was a large number of women 
m those plants manufacturing the ammunition. 

-42— pt. 34 6 



13128 WASHINGTON HEARIN^GS 

APPARENT DUPLICATION 

Mr. Arnold, From the organizational chart and statement of func- 
tions of the CiviUan Personnel Division of the Army, it would appear 
that there is a complete duplication of the work of the War Manpower 
Commission. What is your opinion of the usefulness of such 
duplication? 

Mr. McNuTT. I have never felt that duplication was necessary any 
place. However, I do not know. That is merely rumor. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you consider that the function of advising con- 
tracting services on the availability of labor is primarily a function of 
Civilitxn Personnel Division or the operating agency 

Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Of the War Manpower Commission. 

General McSherry. We have been advising the procui-ing a.gencies 
of the War Department, Navy Department, and Maritune Commission, 
of the labor situation for some time, as well as the War Production 
Board. The greatest advantage of the Manpower Division of the 
War Department is the fact that they can secure from the local in- 
spectors or procurement agents of the War Department acceptance by 
contractors of our policy. In other words, they have closer contact 
with the procurement officers m the field than we would have, and 
when we have difficulty getting a war contractor to carry out some of 
our policies, the War Department's manpower representative assists 
us. In fact, there is one representative of the Civilian Personnel 
Division of the Army on each of our regional staffs for that purpose, 
to assist us in carrying out our policies with the war contractors. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL V. McNUTT— Resumed 

Mr. Arnold. Does the War Manpower Commission have authority 
to issue directives to the Civilian Personnel Division of the Services 
of Supply of the War Department? 

Mr. McNuTT. The question has never arisen. That is not one of 
the agencies listed, as I remember, on the Executive orders. Of course, 
the War Department is represented on the Commission and ordinarily 
in problems of that kind we would ask it to handle them. 

Mr. Arnold. Some newspapers and civic organizations have as- 
serted that the Fair Employment Practices Committee would be 
hamstrung by its transfer to the War Manpower Commission. What 
are your views on that? 

Mr. McNuTT. Well, let me answer the criticism first of all. I 
think the work of the committee will be strengthened because of the 
help we can give them and the integration is commg along very 
satisfactorily. 

Mr. Arnold. How do you propose to enforce Executive Order No. 
8802? 

Mr. McNuTT. We will utilize everything we have to bring about 
the purposes of that Executive order. 

Mr. Arnold. How will the freezing order for Federal employees 
operate? 

Mr. McNuTT. First of all, I think the term "freezing" is unfor- 
tunate. It is not that. If the committee desires, I will put into the 
record the directive which was signed on Monday.^ 

• See p. 1S237. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13129 

The Chairman. I think we would hke to have it, Governor, if you 
would be kind enough to send it. 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes; I will be very glad to. It is an effort to put 
the Government's house in order, so that we will be best utilizing 
what we have. 

Mr. Arnold. I do not want to detain you too long, but I have a 
few more questions. 

Mr. McNuTT. All right. 

POWER OVER CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 

Mr. Arnold. It has come to the committee's attention that the 
Civil Service Commission makes no review of the job specifications 
of orders for workers placed with it by Government plants — and I 
understand that Government-operated plants are as greatly over- 
staffed as private industry. Is it in the power of the War Manpower 
Cominission to issue a directive to the Civil Service Commission in- 
structing it to analyze the job requirements for all orders placed with 
it by Government plants? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes; I would suppose so, but I want to say this 
also, that the Civil Service Commission has cooperated in every way. 
It is anxious to do a good job, and it likewise is represented on the 
War Manpower Commission. 

Mr. Arnold. Is it within the power of the War Manpower Com- 
mission to instruct the Civil Service Commission to rmdertake labor 
utilization surveys of Government-operated plants? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes. 

Mr. Arnold. The committee has investigated examples of faulty 
job specifications. For example, in one Government plant an order 
was placed for 200 machinists. Upon review by occupational analysts 
it appears that approximately 10 machinists were needed; the remain- 
ing workers needed were machine operators. In general, it is our 
impression that many private and public plants are tremendously 
overstaffed and that labor is definitely not being used at its highest 
skill or in the proper manner. This is why the committee advocated 
labor utilization inspectors in the fifth interim report and why we 
believe that manpower planning at the plant level is of prime impor- 
tance at this tmie. Is it williin the authority of the War Manpower 
Commission to require an occupational analysis of all employer orders 
for workers through dnectives to the War Department and the War 
Production Board? 

_ Mr. McNuTT. Yes; without doubt. Of course, there are some 
limitations. You must remember that whatever staff you use for that 
purpose must be adequate. It would be futile to give an order if 
there were no staft' available to carry it out. 

The Chairman. But you are doing your very best? 

Mr. McNuTT. We are utilizing everything we have. 

The Chairman. But you are doing the best you can in the art of 
persuasion? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Arnold. Did you say, Governor, that an appointment of 
regional manpower directors was being made? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes. They have all been made but one, and that 
very likely will be made this week. 



13130 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

MUST ALSO BE OPERATING AGENCY 

Mr. Arnold. What is your opinion of the proposal to transfer the 
Employment Service by Executive order to the War Manpower 
Commission itself? 

Mr. McNuTT. I have asked for it. 

Mr. Arnold. In your first press conference, you suggested that the 
War Manpower Commission would have a minimum of operating 
function and that it would be confined primarily to policy decisions. 

Mr. McNuTT. I thought that was the case then. Experience has 
demonstrated that we have to become an operating agency. 

Mr. Arnold. And you think it has to be an operating agency? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Arnold. That is all I have. 

The Chairman. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Bender. 

Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, in the beginning you seemed to 
take exception or were rather concerned or distressed about a question 
that was asked, and in your statem.ent you indicated the very thing 
that question was about, that a national — — 

Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Service act was necessary; that is 
right. 

Mr, Bender. So, there is no argument between us about that. 

Mr. McNuTT. No; but I was objecting to gossip as to what differ- 
ences of opinion might exist. I do not think that such gossip is 
helpful at times like these. 

Mr. Bender. We are not interested in gossip. 

Mr. McNuTT. That is all it is. 

Mr. Bender. We have had so much discussion about it, and we 
turn on the radio and hear of it, and on the floor of Congress we have 
had discussions about it, and in committee we have had discussion, 
and among ourselves. Certainly, it emanates from some place. 
Regarding persuasion and agreement, do you think that policy is no 
longer effective? 

Mr. McNuTT. Wlien it is all you have, you use it to the greatest 
extent possible, but necessarily It makes for a piecemeal solution of 
many problems and time is short. 

Mr. Bender. You believe that the other method is more desirable? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 
• Air. Bender. Governor McNutt, who is Mr. Rubicam and what 
are his duties? . 

Mr. McNuTT. Mr. Rubicam is the special assistant to the Chau-- 
man of the War Manpower Commission, and he has actually the 
direction of all of our informational activities. He serves without 
pay. 

Mr. Bender. He is a dollar-a-year man? 

Mr. McNuTT. He serves without pay. 

Mr. Bender. You made a point in your paper about farm women 
and how many of the women on the farms might be used in industries. 

Mr. McNuTT. I was simply stating those totals. As to how many 
could be used, that is a different problem. 

Mr. Bender. You are not advocating taking women off the farms 
and using them in industry, are you? 

Mr. McNuTT. No. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13131 

General McSherry. That statement was nonrural. All those 
women listed were nom-ural. The only mention of rural people was 
where the submarginal and subsistence farmers might be a potential 
labor supply. 

Mr. McNuTT. Both those were npnfarm housewives. The farm 
housewives are needed on the farms right now. 

Mr. Bender. That is my impression. 

Mr. McNuTT. As are some of the farmers themselves who have 
left their farms to go into industry. 

POSITION OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICE IN PROGRAM 

Mr. Bender. You made a point of the need for continuation of the 
transfer of the State Employment Services to the Federal Govern- 
ment, not for war manufacturing alone but as a permanent policy. 

Mr. McNuTT. No; there was nothing said about that. 

Mr. Bender. You indicated there was possibly a lack of coopera- 
tion as the result of that undertaking, that that service was transferred 
only for the war. I listened quite attentively to your paper, and 
that was my impression. If I am wrong, I want to be corrected, 

Mr. McNuTT. Very frankly, we want to get a job done in this war, 
and I have been very much disturbed by attempts to point this 
transfer out as an attempt at federalization of a good many of these 
activities. Please believe me, I am honest in wanting to utilize the 
Employment Service to the greatest possible extent. It is one of our 
great operating arms, but we are suffering now by losses of our own 
key personnel simply because we cannot hold these people due to the 
limitation in the appropriations act. That is one thing. They are 
leaving us to go and become personnel managers in plants at two 
and three times the salary they have been receiving, and, frankly, I 
cannot blame these people as individuals. You can appeal to them 
to stay, that this is a patriotic duty to stay, but, after all, their own 
economic status has something to do with it. 

Mr. Bender. My State is Ohio, and, from my understanding of 
the employment situation in Ohio, that is, the State Employment 
Service, I understand that it is now wholly under Federal supervision. 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Bender. And there is no conflict there at all. 

Mr. McNuTT. There is no conflict, except a very natural reaction 
on the part of those who are members of that service. They under- 
stand that the transfer is made for the period of the war. They are, 
therefore, subject to such pressures as may be applied at the State 
level. I am just talking about the natural reaction of a person. 
Here is an important operating agency. It will become more and 
more important as their activities go on in this war. It should be 
brought to the highest point of efficiency. 

Mr. Bender. Governor, is there a duplication of effort at the present 
time in connection with the work that is outlined for the War Man- 
power Commission and the Selective Service Commission and the 
Army and Navy? Is there a cooperative spirit existing there alto- 
gether, or is there considerable duplication at the present time? 

Mr. McNuTT. No; I do not see any duphcation as far as Selective 
Service is concerned, for one. How much is going on in the War 



13132 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS 

Department, I do not know; but, as I say, the War Department and 
the Navy Department are both represented on the War Manpower 
Commission, one by a special assistant to the Secretary of War, and 
the other by the Under Secretary of the Navy; and we have been 
reasonably successful in getting the desires of the War Manpower 
Commission carried out. 

PLANT INSPECTIONS BY ARMY AND NAVY 

Mr. Bender. Governor, both you and the general made the point 
of need for these inspectors in plants. Aly information from the 
Cleveland plants, for example, is that the inspection is now being 
carried, and very adequately, both by the Army and the Navy. 
Is that your opinion? 

General McSherry. The inspection of the Army and the Navy 
which is carried on regularly is an inspection of materials. They are 
interested in seeing that the specifications of an item are complied 
with and that a certain quality of steel, for instance, goes into a given 
item. That is the normal inspection that is carried on by the Army 
and Navy. 

As far as an inspector for the utilization of labor, that has not been 
established by the Army or Navy in any degree. Of course, indi- 
vidual instances always come to the top where maybe some man who 
has had an industrial background is a commissioned officer and he 
might make suggestions, but, as a planned proposition, the Army and 
Navy are not making inspections for the determination of effective 
utilization of workers in these war plants. 

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 

Mr. Bender. Governor, if manpower planning is to be done on a 
local level where the job, after all, is actually going to be done, will the 
labor inspectors need the cooperation of management and labor within 
the war industry and within the war planning, and what relationship 
do you envisage between the management-labor production committee 
and the utilization inspectors? 

Mr. McNuTT. There is no question, we must have the help of both 
management and labor, and our plan, of course, includes the setting 
up of a labor-management committee in every area in which we oper- 
ate. They will work in close connection, and in some instances, the 
W. P. B. labor-management committee will have the same personnel 
as our own. 

Mr. Bender. Do you think that the management-labor production 
committees, insofar as they do production planning within the plants 
are also doing manpower planning within the plant? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes; of course they are. That is like a seamless 
web, utilization of manpower and production. They are parts of 
the same thing, but we work with them, they work with us. We have 
gone to this extent: Mr. Nelson and I, by agreement, have made our 
regions coextensive, and we, for example, have moved two regional 
offices in order that they may be in the same place to avoid loss of 
time, and wherever possible they will be in the same building. We 
look upon this as partnership act,ivity. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13133 

Mr. Bender. You feel, then, that the entire management-labor 
production committee set-up should be a part of the War Manpower 
Commission? 

Mr. McNuTT. No. We are not asking for that. They represent 
the War Production Board. As I say, our people work together in 
the field. They are so instructed, and I have no reports of any failure 
to cooperate at any level. . 

Mr. Bender. Has any thought been given to the question of pro- 
duction as it relates to manpower? For example, if a man is hired 
and paid for 8 hours' work, that there be some standard set as to how 
much work he should perform in that 8 hours? 

Mr. McNuTT. Necessarily, you must consider a question of that 
kind. 

Mr. Bender. Is the standard of production on the basis of the 
survey that you have made reached pretty generally by the employees 
in the industry? 

peak of INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVITY NOT YET REACHED 

Mr. McNuTT. 1 should say not. In other words, we can do more, 
and it is going to be necessary to do more. There have been some 
other factors brought to bear upon that, supply of materials, for 
example; the plant being unwilling to release its men because its 
activities were hampered by lack of materials at that time. Of course, 
you can appreciate the reason for that. Why destroy your organiza- 
tion when you know that perhaps next week you have the material to 
go ahead? The thing has not geared as well as anyone would like 
it, but once again it has been due to a number of factors perhaps not 
within the control of anyone. 

General McSherry. When you consider the shipbuilding industry 
had only 60,000 workers in 1940 and now has 700,000, obviously 
the men working in shipyards have not reached their peak production 
and their individual productivity is one of our largest sources of 
potential manpower. That has not been reached in the aircraft 
industry or the shipbuilding or the munition industry, because they 
have all expanded from a very small productive force up toward a 
million or more this year. Obviously they have brought in men who 
have not had the chance to be trained and they have not reached that 
point of productivity that you mentioned. There is a big field to 
develop at the present time. 

Mr. Bender. I would like to ask you. Governor McNutt, regarding 
the recruitment of doctors. Is it your opinion that voluntary recruit- 
ment of doctors is haphazard and the worst type of compulsion? 

Mr. McNuTT. Well, it was the "great experiment." The medical 
profession came in and said they could do it on a voluntary basis, 
and I said: "All right. If you want to try it I will give you all the 
help I can." 

I do want to say that that service has been improved, remarkably 
improved. Of course, I think you realize some of the difficulties 
when you are dealing with professional men. 

Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, what is your opinion regarding 
this whole manpower question? Is it your opinion that your agency 
is equipped to handle this whole problem in the event that there is 
that single authority granted by a national manpower act? 



13134 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. McNuTT. Well, it is indicated that that is where it belongs. 
We need more help. For example, in asking for help from the 
Employment Service, I went in with a letter from the President, 
approved by the Budget committee, asking for $19,000,000, and I 
got $2,400,000. 

The Chairman. None of the members of this committee are on 
that committee. 

Mr. McNuTT. No ; I realize that. 

Mr. Bender. I would like to ask this question. Governor, and I 
am asking it in good faith. We are here because we are part of a 
political system, and, of necessity, we are elected as a part of a political 
system, either by one group or the other, and by the citizens generally. 
I do not mind talking out loud about the fact that the country is 
generally concerned about this manpower issue being on a nonpartisan 
basis, that is, so that there cannot be any question raised as to some- 
body, somewhere, using this as a vehicle, not only for the war efl'ort 
but for some political purpose, and I am sure that is not in your mmd. 
It is not m mine, but I feel very strongly about the need for em- 
phasizing that point, and I think you should not resent my making 
this statement so that the opportunity is presented for emphasis on 
that basis, and so we are not confronted with the constant specter of 
the issue of politics being raised at any time. Do you care to make 
any comment on that issue? 

Mr. McNuTT. First of all, to my knowledge, there has been no 
criticism that the operations of the Manpower Commission have been 
dictated by any partisan political considerations and, if such criticism 
were made, it would have absolutely no basis. 

Mr. Bender. I think that is all. 

Mr. Curtis. I have a question or two. 

BASIC CAUSES OF WASTE 

What are the basic causes of waste of skill, the waste of labor and 
the hoarding of the same? . 

Mr. McNuTT. I tried to set out at length m a publication, last 
Sunday in the New York Times Magazine entitled "Waste," some 
of the things, and if the committee likes, I will put that in the record. 

Mr. Curtis. There is a certain amount of waste that you can hardly 
escape in going through an experunental period of expansion like the 
General cited in reference to shipbuilding, employing 60,000 men and 
going to 700,000 men. 

Mr. McNuTT. And those instances are multiplied. I mentioned a 
moment ago the Sperry operation. They have 10 times the employees 
there, and that is a highly skilled operation. 

Mr. Curtis. That is something time will cure, won't it? 

Mr. McNuTT. Yes; time and attention. 

Mr. Curtis. What are the other causes? Is it intentional on any- 
body's part? Why would somebody waste skills 

Mr. McNuTT. (interposing). It is perfectly human to want to keep 
what you have now, anticipating future demands. Of course, there 
have been some horrible examples. One firm had, I thmk, 240 
engineers to do a job, which, even projected in the future, would not 
have required it to exceed one-tenth of that number. That is 
hoarding. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13135 

Mr. Curtis. Was that a cost-plus job, or did the carrying of all of 
those engineers cost the concern out of its own pocket? 

Mr. McNuTT. It is not cost-plus. That is, as I understand it, it 
is cost plus a fixed fee these days, so that the actual expenditure is not 
reflected in the fee itself. That would not be the reason. 

Mr. Curtis. It did not cost the concern anything to waste that 
much skill? 

Mr. McNuTT. I suppose not. 

Mr. Curtis. Is there any other basic cause for the waste of skill? 

General McSherry. There is one cause; that is in common practice 
in certain machine-tool companies. Every man was a qualified tool 
maker. Now, as a matter of fact, as necessity develops, you can 
break jobs down so that machine operators can do many of the 
operations normally performed by a tool maker. Some companies 
have not done so. In other words, they are now having qualified 
tool makers sit and watch a lathe, drill press, or milling machine 
operation for a number of hours during the day. That is probably 
one of the most common causes, and the reason for it was that there 
were tool makers available to do those jobs. It has been a habit of 
the companies, and, in agreements with the unions, it was stated 
that there v/oukl be tool makers for those particular jobs. We have 
such a case now. We are going out to Detroit next week to try to 
break it. 

SKILLED LABOR INSURANCE 

Now, manpower insurance or skilled labor msurance, as we call it, 
is another cause. A company that is expanding, particularly an 
au'craft company, shipbuilding or munitions company, is asked at 
regular intervals, I won't say regular but at varying intervals, to 
increase their production, to start a new plant somewhere, or to take 
over some converted civilian production plant. That means they 
have to take key personnel from the home plant or parent plant and 
place it in this new plant. Obviously, if they can get a backlog of 
skilled workers and technical and professional people, it is much 
simpler to start this new plant. 

Mr. Bender. Is that a loss? 

Mr. McNuTT. Of course, that is a loss. 

General McSherry. Of course, if they do not get a contract. 

Mr. Bender. Yes; it would be a loss if they did not get a contract, 
but how much time 

Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Failure to utilize skills presently is a 
loss. It is bound to be a loss but 

Mr. Bender (interposing). But how much of a loss in time are you 
gomg to forego before you pull that man out of the factory and put 
him in somebody's else's factory, and how many miles are you gomg 
to move hun? 

Mr. McNuTT. We have not the authority to do it. 

Air. Bender. I mean, if you get what you are asking for. If here, 
is a concern that has a certain skill and because they want to keep 
him, they use him all the time and have him do something else — what 
is going to be your measuring stick as to what to do about that? 

General McSherry. Take the man out of there if there was no need 
for that mm in the next 2 or 3 weeks. If you had tool makers in 
Detroit during this conversion period not emploved as tool makers 



13136 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

but on some other job in the plant, when Ford, Chrysler, Bri2-o:s, and 
Murray needed tool makers, you would not allow the tool makers to 
sit around doing some other job than tool making during a long 
period. 

Mr. Curtis. Of course, you have in Detroit a concentration of 
industry tliere that you would not have in some of the other work that 
is scattered over a wider area; isn't that true? 

General McSherry. We have many places with concentrated in- 
dustries. Philadelphia probably has much more than Detroit and 
more need for tool makers. Of course, Detroit's problem came all of 
a sudden. In February they cut out automobile production and 
those plants had to be converted to war production. They all needed 
tool makers to retool the plants, and we had to put out instructions 
to various manufacturers in other cities j^ot to recruit tool makers 
in Detroit. The.y thought there was an ample supply of tool makers, 
and a good chance to recruit. They complied with our request and 
got out of Detroit. 

Mr. Curtis. To what extent is waitmg for needed materials a 
factor in the waste of production? 

WASTE THROUGH UNEVEN FLOW OF MATERIALS 

General McSherry. For instance, the California Shipbuilding Co: 
was short of materials and they had about 5,000 additional workers 
over and above what they could utiUze. Now, they did not know 
how soon they would get those materials. They had priorities for 
them, and obviously the thing the company would do would be to 
hold those men until such time as they did get more materials. Of 
course, the Maritune Commission is reopening those contracts and 
readjusting them, so that each company will know what materials 
they will have in the future. That is, of course, a temporary proposi- 
tion. 

Another company, the Portland Shipbuilding Co. at Portland, had 
28,000 employees and, under the readjustment, they will need 24,000. 
What they will do is to transfer those men over to their Vancouver 
yard. 

We have no figures on all the plants that have been affected by 
shortage of materials, and, of course, again, how many men there are 
idle because of shortage of material and that are still held by the com- 
pany is a very difficult figure to get. 

IVir. Curtis. Well, does the answer lie in manpower planning or 
in material planning? 

General McSherry. Material planning must be such that there 
will be a uniform movement of material to the plant. If you do not 
have that, you are going to waste manpower. If you send into a 
plant material enough to employ 4,000 men for 3 months and then 
that supplv of material is cut off and you employ 1,000 men for 
2 months and then you put in material for 4,000, vou are wasting 
manpower because in that interval you cannot utilize those 3,000 
men in another plant. You can hardly eet them placed and pro- 
ducing in another plant before they are called back to the first plant. 

To my mind, a uniform flow of material should be given to every 
plant in order to conserve manpower. From a manpower viewpoint, 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13137 

an even flow of material or increasing flow, but a predicted flow that 
will be lived up to, should be given to every plant. 

The Chairman: General McSherry, in England, as I understand 
it, the way they handle it there regarding priorities and supplies, you 
give a formal contract accompanying the priority for material; is 
that correct? 

Genernl McSherry. That is correct. From our viewpoint a 
uniform flow of material to the plant would mean uniform employ- 
ment, and uniform employment is the best way to conserve your 
labor supply. If you have an irregular flow of material so there 
would be irregular emplovment, you wDste manpower. 

Mr. Curtis. That is perhaps one of the biggest factors in the waste 
of manpower, wouldn't you say? 

Mr. McNuTT. It would be considerable. 

General McSherry. I think it would be considerable in manpower. 
I think you are correct. 

Mr. Curtis. I understand the number of regional offices is 12. 
How many area offices do you think will be established? 

WAR MANPOWER STAFF 

Mr. McNuTT. It looks to us as if in the end we will need probably 
200. We have appropriations for 25. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. McNutt, the four gentlemen with you, do they 
constitute your entire staff in Washington? 

Mr. McNuTT. No. 

Mr. Curtis. About how many do you have as principal experts on 
your staff? 

Mr. McNuTT. One hundred and thirty plus the national roster 
plus the procurement and assignment, a total of around 500. 

Mr. Curtis. Is that your total number of employees? 

Mr. McNutt. Here in Washington; yes. I made the division — 
150 as far as the War Manpower Commission staff itself is concerned, 
but the numbers are on the roster staff. 

Mr, Curtis. Which roster is that? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is the professional and scientific roster which 
we maintain, and which is the pool to which all agencies go for 
scientific personnel. 

Mr. Curtis. Maybe I should not have used the word "staff." I 
think perhaps we are using it interchangeably with "total employees." 
If you have a staff meeting, how many people come? In other words, 
I see you have four advisers around you this morning. I want to 
know if that is all of them; or how many you have got? 

Mr. McNuTT. The staff meeting would be about a dozen — the Chief 
of Operations, and the heads of our various divisions. 

Mr. Curtis. You do not need to do it now, but if you would have 
someone submit a list of those dozen individuals, together with what 
industry or department they are now with, we would like to have 
that for the record. 

Mr. McNuTT. We would be very glad to give you an organization 
chart and make it a part of the record. 



13138 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS 

(The material subsequently submitted by Mr. McNutt is as 
follows:) 

Principal Staff Members of War Manpower Commission 

Paul V. McNutt Chairman. 

Fowler V. Harper Deputy Chairman. 

Arthur J. Altmeyer Executive Director. 

Alvin Roseman Assistant Executive Director. 

Harold Dotterer Chief, Administrative Service. 

Bernard C. Gavit General Counsel. 

Raymond Rubicam Special Assistant to the Chair- 
man on Informational Activ- 
ities. 

Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry, United States Director of Operations. 
Army. 

Joseph P. Tufts Chief, Housing and Transporta- 
tion Service. 

John J. Corson Chief, Industrial and Agricul- 
tural Employment Division. 

Brig. Gen. William C. Rose, United States Chief, Military Division. 
Army. 

W. W. Alexander Chief, Minority Groups Service. 

Robert C. Weaver Chief, Negro Manpower Service. 

Lawrence W. Cramer Executive Secretary, President's 

Committee on Fair Employ- 
ment Practices. 

Edward C. Elliott Chief, Professional and Technical 

Personnel Division. 

Leonard Carmichael Director, National Roster of Sci- 
entific and Specialized Per- 
sonnel. 

Frank H. Lahey Chairman, Procurement and As- 
signment Service. 

Philip Van Wyck Acting Chief, Training Division. 

William Haber Director, Planning Service. 

Frederick Stephan Director, Statistical Service. 

Mr. Curtis. The job to be done caused you to change your sight 
as to the type of organization you would have to have smce the War 
Manpower Commission was formed? 

Mr. McNutt. That is right. 

Mr. Curtis. I gather from the stories that have appeared along in 
the press, that it was the original intention that the Manpower Com- 
mission would determine the policy. Has that been changed to 
where your staff determines the policy and the Commission ratifies 
or is an advisory group? 

Mr. McNutt. Well, of course, these matters are submitted to the 
Commission. You receive the advice of the Commission. The 
authority is in the chairman. Matters are put on the agenda at the 
suggestion of Commission members or they may be submitted by the 
staff. It does not make any difference what the source is. 

AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER 

Mr. Curtis. As a former Governor of a great State, which State, 
of course, has some submarginal land the same as the State I come 
from, you mentioned it would become necessary to move these 
farmers off submarginal land and to other occupations and perhaps 
to better land. The submarginal farmers are paying taxes and 
interest, or trying to pay interest, not the mortgageholder who owns 
the land with the farmer as tenant: What provision should be made 



OFFICE OF P»ESI»E»T 






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i HOUSING AKO TR*NSP0RT»TION I IHOySTRlAl OPERiSTIOHS 1 

cnHSi'LTfli.T stavtce [ | comsulTi>wt service | 















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Organization Chart of War Manpower Commission. 



C0396 — 42 (Facep. 1313S) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13139 

if that has to be done to protect the landowner of this submarginal 
land with respect to taxes? 

Mr. McNuTT. Considerations of fairness would indicate that some 
provisions should be made to protect him against loss and it does 
seem obvious now that it will be necessary to utilize farm labor on 
land which is productive. In other words, the submarginal, the 
subsistence farm would, in the event change must be made, be the 
first to go necessarily. 

Mr. Arnold. The Federal Government is going to have to provide 
taxes and interest? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Mr. Arnold. And investment? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right; otherwise it would amount to confisca- 
tion, 

Mr. Curtis. Does this Commission go into the field of agriculture 
from the point of determining the needs for food for ourselves and 
our allies and the number of men required for it? 

Mr. McNuTT. No. Of course, that obligation rests elsewhere. 
We get that information to determine what we need by way of man- 
power for agriculture. It is production that is determined in the 
War Production Board and the contracting agencies, and they let 
us know what manpower they need, and we try to adjust that. We 
get an over-all picture necessarily because we are dealmg with the 
entire manpower supply. 

Mr. Bender. I have another question, Mr. Chairman — before I 
asked it, someone handed me this note. I think you have already 
answered this question in your paper, but in any event this is the 
question: 

Governor McNutt, if we operated under a national-service act, 
would that enable the Manpower Commission to compel employ- 
ment of Negroes and stop the present and continued discrimination 
which neither it nor the Employment Service Committee seem 
to correct on a large scale? The Negroes have to keep waiting despite 
400,000 sons in United States military service, and their parents beg 
for jobs. 

I think you covered that? 

Mr. McNuTT. I think I covered that, and certainly we have given 
our earnest attention in an effort to stop discrimination agamst 
Negroes or other minority groups. 

The Chairman. So has the President himself. 

Mr. McNuTT. And I want to gay that great progress has been 
made. You do not break down prejudice overnight. It has taken 
persuasion and everything else we can bring to bear, but it is per- 
fectly obvious, of course, that they will be utilized. 

NATIONAL SERVICE ACT DISCUSSED 

Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, if a national-service act is passed, 
does that mean that the Army no longer determines its needs? 

Mr. McNuTT. Of course, the determination of needs should be 
based upon a consideration of all of the factors, for it is not enough to 
say we wUl have an Army of a certain size. You not only consider the 
military needs, meet them insofar as you can, but armed forces must 
have supporting economy. You cannot destroy it and maintain 



13140 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

armed forces. That balance must be kept, and the problena is being 
studied, now, by those who are responsible, taking into consideration 
our total manpower pool. I signed a letter this morning in response 
to two questions. 

Mr. Bender. Wliat about an occupational deferment policy versus 
quotas, that is, how would you handle that? Quotas for the Army 
as compared to quotas for occupational deferment? 

Mr. McNuTT. It seems to me that such problems would have to be 
determined by, well, let us say a committee consisting of representa- 
tives of the armed forces, the War Production Board and War Man- 
power. That is, in determining the size of the armed forces, certainly 
those who make the call should take into consideration our productive 
capacity and likewise our supply, our total supply, of manpower. 

Mr. Bender. Governor McNutt, is it your opinion that the Presi- 
dent now has sufficient authority to establish what is discussed here 
as a national-service act? Is it necessary for additional legislation to 
be passed by Congress in order to establish such authority, or does the 
President now have that authority? 

Mr. McNuTT. Well, if I may revert to my former occupational 
calling, you are asking me as a lawyer 

Mr. Bender (interposing). I am not a lawyer, myself. 

Mr. McNuTT. I am not so sure that I am any more, but I feel that 
legislation is necessary, that is, to remove any doubt whatever. It is 
so vital and it is something that the Congress of the United States 
should give public expression to as representing the idea of the people. 
I think the people are ready for it. 

Mr. Bender. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Lamb. Governor McNutt, you reassured the committee as 
to the cooperation between the agencies involved with your work. 
Isn't the question, however, one of effectiveness of procedures? I 
would like to paint a picture as we got it yesterday from General 
Hershey so you can see what seemed to be the proportions that are 
now developing. 

General Hershey did not say that a 13,000,000-man Army was 
now in progress, but whether he did or not, there is a popular concept 
that a 13,000,000-man Army is not inconceivable. General Hershey 
made the statement that a 10,000,000-man Army is now m sight. 
If we take that number of people, and we are taking them, as General 
Hershey said yesterday, at a very rapid rate, out of civihan life and 
particularly out of war production, the question of the effectiveness 
of procedures is going to become overnight a much more serious 
question even than it has been recently. I think we can all agree 
it has been getting increasingly serious. Consequently, the problem 
that confronts lis is that unless you have simultaneously an orderly 
plan for withdrawals which is keyed into an orderly plan for utilization 
of labor, not merely for the moment, but projected into the future, 
how are we going to lick the manpower question? 

I would like to say one more thing in terms of projection. A 
13,000,000-man Army or 10,000,000-man Army is going to take a 
great deal more production. 1 do not say a great deal more productive 
workers, although it will, but a great deal more production than we are 
getting today. The President himself said we are at 50 percent of 
capacity, or something of that kind. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13141 

Now, the problem, as it seems to confront the countiy at the 
moment, is what comes first in the way of reorganization to meet 
the occasion? The committee in its fifth interim report said that the 
problem of compulsion was undeniably ahead of us, that the question 
of timing was the fundamental question, so that between the timing 
of compulsion and the institution of these particular reorganizations 
and realinements, your judgment is, as stated in the paper which 
you presented, and in your testimony this morning, that the National 
Service Act comes first, at least I presume that that would be your 
judgment? 

Mr. McNuTT. Not necessarily first. I think if these things could 
be as nearly simultaneous as possible, it would be well. 

Dr. Lamb. I agree with you that it would be well if they could be 
as nearly simultaneous as possible, although I am no politician or 
judge of such matters, as the members of the committee are • 

Mr. Bender (interposing). We resent that. 

Dr. Lamb. But it would seem to me to be reassuring to the country 
to feel that initial steps have been taken first, and the problem, as 
stated in the fifth interim report on the question of the lack of meshing 
between the flow of materials and the flow of manpower, is considered so 
the emphasis is placed on the fact that until the flow of materials is 
more properly scheduled and better arranged, your job— — 

Mr. McNuTT (interposing). Becomes more difficult. 

Dr. Lamb (continuing). Is almost insurmountable in terms of pro- 
portion of the job now developing. In other words, that this other 
thing has got to be licked first, or at least we have got to see our way 
forward along that line first. 

Mr. McNuTT. As I look at tliis effort, it must be a joint effort on 
the part of those who have been given responsibility; in other words, 
those who are charged with the armed forces, those who are charged 
with production, and those who ai^e charged with manpower should 
sit down and frankly review the facts. It will be our business to tell 
them what the manpower situation is, and the military needs, of course, 
feel the impact of the productive capacity and the supply of manpower 
and all those factors must be considered in any of these determina- 
tions^ — what our commitments would be under lend-lease, and every- 
thing else of the kind. 

BALANCING MANPOWER NEEDS AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS 

Dr. Lamb. But, at the present time, is it not fair to say we are not 
organized and equipped to match manpower needs of a military type 
with military requirements for materiel which are, in turn, manpower 
needs on the war-industry front? In other words, from here out we 
are in a war economy, 

Mr. McNuTT. That is right. 

Dr. Lamb. And as you said at the beginning of your remarks, the 
war economy requires that manpower for war industry and essential 
civilian industries be recognized as a part of that war economy and 
not something that can be done without organized plan? 

Mr. McNuTT. You have these needs to meet; you have your armed 
forces. _ You must supply them. You must feed them, and at the 
same time you must have an economy that will support them. That 



13142 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

is, it has to be a balance. You keep adjusting as you go along to ni 
the needs as they arise. 

Dr. Lam;b. In some of his remarks a few minutes ago, General 
McSherry says it is a loss if they do not get a contract. This seems 
to me to sum up, in the shortest possible space, what is wrong. The 
present attitude of those in charge of war production is and has been 
that whether these groups get a contract is dependent upon whether 
or not they make a successful bid. Now, the fact of the matter is 
that there are latent capacities, there is productive capacity, there are 
workers, and whether or not they get a contract is a matter of the 
location at which they find themselves on a list of bids. If we intend 
to fully utilize these workers and these machines, we must have a 
system for taking the workers out of plants where they are not to be 
used for using them in the plants where they now find themselves and 
not questioning whether or not that particular plant has come up to 
the mark in some abstract particular. If we really want the goods, 
we will ask for it. 

I will give you an example from the committee's own experience 
which I think illustrates this thing as well as I can. We had a pro- 
ducer from Decatur, 111., who was a bidder in shell production. This 
plant had been the mother plant for the retooling of a plant in Chat- 
tanooga. This plant was affiliated with another corporation which 
was practically identical in ownership and control in Canada. The 
Canadian plant had been producing shells since 1937. The Decatur 
plant had bid and been unsuccessful in its bid. As the committee's 
investigation indicated, its bid was turned down not because shells 
were not needed throughout the country but because the ordnance 
district within which it found itself had met its particular quota. 
Now, this situation has, since the entrance of the country in the war — 
that was last November — -undoubtedly been improved, if not com- 
pletely corrected, not necessarily in respect to this plant, but through- 
out ordnance districts; but the approach prevails, the Chattanooga 
plant gets the contract; its ordnance district has a quota and that 
plant is able to meet the requirements and quota. The plant which 
tooled it up, the plant that has the "know how," as people in Washing- 
ton like to say, does not get it. The workers in that plant have a 
choice of going to Chicago for a job, let us say, or sitting where they 
are and waiting for that plant to be a successful bidder. 

Now, that seems to be the nature of the problem. Would you 
agree? 

Mr. McNuTT. That is simply one of the problems. 

Dr. Lamb, Isn't it pretty close to the center of the problems? 

Mr. McNuTT. I would not put a finger on it and say that is the 
whole problem. It is not. 

Dr. Lamb. Well, let's state it this way: You have the contracts in 
the services. You have materials controlled in War Production 
Board and the manpower in the Manpower Commission. Each of 
these is essentia] to the plan. How can we from here out plan produc- 
tion as a whole around those three separate agencies and their three 
operating functions? 

Mr. McNuTT. By the three sitting down together. That should be 
simple. 

Dr. Lamb. It should be, but it has not been to date. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13143 

ir. McNuTT. I am not here to argue with you on that. I do my 
part of it, but the suggestion which you imply, I Ukewise put in writ- 
ing, as I say, this morning. 

The Chairman. Governor McNutt, you have certainly been very 
patient and also the gentlemen with you. 

Mr. McNuTT. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and members of the com- 
mittee. If we can be of any further service, Mr. Chairman, you only 
have to call I think as you well know. 

The Chairman. We will adjourn until 9:15 o'clock tomorrow 
morning in this room. 

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 9:15 a. m,, 
Thursday, September 17, 1942.) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGEATION 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1942 
MORNING SESSION 



House of Representatives, 

Select Committee Investigating 

National Defense Migration, 

Washington, D. C. 
The special committee met at 9:15 a. m., iii room 1102 New House 
Office Building, Washington, D. C, Hon. John H. Tolan (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present: Representatives John H. Tolan (chairman), of California; 
John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; George H. Bender, of Ohio; Carl T. 
Curtis, of Nebraska; and Laurence F. Arnold, of Illinois. 
Also present: Dr. Robert K. Lamb, staff director. 
Mr. Curtis. I think we might as well start. 
Mr. Lund, we are ready whenever you are. 

TESTIMONY OF WENDELL LUND, DIRECTOR, LABOR PRODUCTION 
DIVISION, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Lund, please give to the reporter your full name 
and the title of your present position. 

Mr. Lund. I am Wendell Lund, Director of the Labor Production 
Division of the War Production Board, and I am also a member of the 
War Manpower Commission. 

Mr. Curtis. How long have you been with the War Production 
Board? 

Mr. Lund. Since the 1st of May, Congressman. 

Mr. Curtis. With whom were you connected before that? 

Mr. Lund. I was director of the Michigan Unemployment Com- 
pensation Commission. 

Mr. Curtis. For how long? 

Mr. Lund. For a period of some 9 months. 

Mr. Curtis. How long have you been engaged in personnel and 
labor problems? 

Air. Lund. For 9 years. Before that I was a member for some 
years ot a large international union. 

Mr. Curtis. What particular training have you had in that? 

Mr. Lund. Training in labor problems and labor economics, and 
then this experience starting in 1934. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Lund, you may submit to the reporter whatever 
brief statement you wish inserted in the record. 

13145 



13146 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

(The- statement submitted by Mr. Lund is as follows:) 

STATEMENT BY WENDELL LUND, DIRECTOR, LABOR PRODUC_ 
TION DIVISION, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

When I appeared before your committee in June,i I pointed out the change of 
function that took place in the Labor Production IDivision when it ceased to be 
the Labor Division. Until the estabhshment of the War Manpower Commission 
in April 1942, the Labor Division of the War Production Board was responsible 
for the national Labor Supply and Training Program. Under the Executive 
order, these functions were transferred to the War Manpower Commission. 
This transfer gave the Labor Production Division the opportunity to devote 
itself wholeheartedly to the functions which I described to this committee in 
June. At that time, as the committee will recall, I said, "The LaVjor Production 
Division of the War Production Board * * * jg founded on two premises: 
(1) That the implements of war cannot be turned out without full and intelligent 
utilization of our democratic labor force; (2) that labor participation in the design 
and management of the war production program is essential to maximum pro- 
duction. The Labor Production Division is going to do everything possible to 
insure labor's participation in the war production program, and to interpret the 
problems of the war production program to labor groups." 

This conception of our job in the Labor Prodtiction Division as one of service 
to labor both broadens and narrows the interest of the Division in questions of 
manpower. It is broadened in the sense that every one of the multifarious ways 
labor is affected by the war production and war manpower programs of the 
Government is our concern. It is narrowed by the fact that no longer is it our 
responsibility to operate the programs, but only to promote the participation of 
labor therein. An understanding of this change is important as the background 
of this testimony, because I want to express what I believe to be labor's major 
concern on questions of manpower. 

It need hardly be said that the problems of manpower, of their relation to 
production in wartime are extraordinarily difficult and complex. In the first 
place, we are seeking to replace the peacetime mechanics of manning American 
industry, which in ordinarv times have been left to the free play of economic and 
personal motive, with an organized, directed flow of manpower into war activity. 
In the second place, we are not only manning the most tremendous army in the 
Nation's history, but at the same time, embarking on the most stupendous pro- 
gram of industrial output ever undertaken in the history of the world. In the 
third place, we are dealing not with tangible materials, but with men and women 
And the relationships with which we deal are those that he at the very heart of 
our society — those between man and family, between employer and worker, 
between the individual and Government. Thus, the decisions we make in the 
field of manpower, and the way we make them, may in large part determine whether 
or not our kind of democracy will survive. 

I beheve that three major aspects of manpower are of particular concern to 

(1)" The creation of agencies which would guarantee the most eflTicient division 
of available manpower between the fighting forces and the nonmilitary war and 
civilian industries. j r ai, j 

(2) the establishment of a working relationship between the needs of the armed 
orces for war materiel, the production of that materiel, and the Nation's supply 
of workers. ... ,, 

(3) the most efficient division and utiUzation of the manpower outside the 
arn ed forces for the maximum war effort. 

With regard to the first, labor has long held the view that the basic manpower 
problem is to divide the Nation's men and women between the armed forces and 
everything else. The purpose of this division is easy enough to state. It is 
simply that we want to create the largest and most efficient allied force we can, 
on the one hand, and to equip it with the tools for victory. This means that 
some authority has to make the decision that present strategic considerations call 
for armed services of, say, 10 or 12 million, and that the remaining manpower 
■can equip it satisfactorily. 

1 See Washington hearings, pt. 33, p. 12503. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13147 

Until the War Manpower Commission was created, at least a dozen different 
Government agencies were splashing around in the pool of manpower with little 
coordination. The Manpower Commission was provided as an instrument by 
which the fundamental decisions of policy on manpower might be applied. As yet, 
however, neither the Manpower Commission nor the other agencies involved are 
equipped with the basic facts about the size of the armed services we now want 
to create, nor the size of the production program necessary to equip our fighting 
men. 

The longer such a decision is delayed, the more serious danger we run of going 
to excess either in one direction or another. On the one hand, workers may be 
taken out of jobs into the Army in such a way as to cripple the production that 
the armed services need for their maximum efficiency. On the other hand, there 
is danger that the armed forces may be denied the men they need to operate the 
war machine. I cannot see how either the War Manpower Commission or the 
Selective Service can be expected to do their jobs the way they ought to be done 
until they know much more exactly just what is required. 

The present methods of recruiting manpower for the Army and Navy add to 
the difficulties. Until very recently, we were faced with the fact that the Navy 
was recruiting, without restriction, building up its entire force from voluntary 
enlistments. The Army has been using both the Selective Service and a restricted 
recruitment. In addition, both services have been recruiting commissioned men 
and setting up a number of special commissioned reserves. Within the last few 
days, the Army and Navy have announced their intention of restricting their 
recruiting efforts somewhat, but these decisions were made independently, and 
not inside the framework of a basic manpower machinery. 

The net effect of this situation has been to make more difficult the orderly 
withdrawal of manpower from civilian life, a withdrawal carried on in cooperation 
with those responsible for maintaining production. In some cases there has been 
vigorous competition between the services for manpower. 

The result of this in many cases has been serious injury to industry, by the 
loss of skilled men who are gravely needed for its operation. We recognize that 
the armed forces need skilled men, but such men must be withdrawn in an orderly 
fashion so that our industries will not be crippled. Furthermore, it is most 
unfair to men in industry to demand, on the one hand, that they stay at their 
work benches, and, on the other, to subject them to patriotic appeals to enlist 
voluntarily in the armed' forces. American woi-kers are the most patriotic workers 
in the world; and to face them with such a confusion of advices is wholly incon- 
sistent with sound manpower policy. 

Labor has clearly indicated its view in this matter. It has called for the end 
of voluntary enlistments, and the supplying of manpower for the armed forces 
through an efficient and enlarged use of selective service. 

RELATIONSHIP OF MANPOWER TO PRODUCTION 

Of special interest, too, is the relationship of manpower to production. It 
should not be necessary to remind anyone that manpower is so integrally related 
to production, that the man is closely related to the work of the machine, and that 
the two can hardly be thought of separately. Yet, because the problems are 
separated on an administrative chart, the subjects are sometimes considered to 
be separate. 

Early this summer, labor again raised this issue forcibly. Unions in the metal 
fabricating industries were finding scattered instances of plant slowdown and 
even shutdowns for the lack of raw materials. They have found that skilled men 
were being made idle and machines stopped, men and machines which were in 
the greatest demand for the war effort. They found themselves and their 
membership gravely puzzled by being exhorted one day to work to the maximum, 
and the next being thrown out of work by lack of materials or parts to work on. 

The result of this concern was a request to the Labor Production Division for 
a meeting with the operating heads of the War Production Board so that these 
questions might be discussed. For 2 days, the major officials of the War Pro- 
duction Board sat down with the labor men and discussed the problem. The 
labor men were unrestrained in their demands that the necessary steps be taken 
to insure that plants should no longer be necessarily shut down because of short- 
ages of parts and materials. They emphatically called upon the War Production 
Board to assume responsibility for the scheduling of production and of raw ma- 
terials that might be necessary to accomplish this end. And they asked that 
labor be given an opportunity to participate in accomplishing these ends. I 
believe their propositions were wholly sound. 



13148 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Before there can be established a reasonable relationship between manpower 
and production, before the necessary decisions and steps can be taken to man 
the Nation's industry, several things need to be done: 

(1) A determination must be made of total production program, as accurately 
as possible. 

(2) This program must be translated into raw materials and component parts 
and scheduled so that materials and parts are ready when and where they are 
needed. 

When these two things are done it will be possible to place American workers 
where they are most needed in the war effort, and to use them to their maximum 
capacities. 

Just how far we are from attaining the goal of relating the allocation of work 
to the availability of manpower was shown by a study of the War Manpower 
Commission. That study showed that of a total of more than 6>^ billion in war 
supply contracts, let between May 1 and July 31, 1942, only 12 percent went to 
labor surplus areas; 53.8 percent went to prospective labor shortage areas; and 
28.1 percent went to current labor shortage areas. This shows clearly that 
little regard is being given by the contract-letting agencies to the problems of labor 
supply. 

A particular example of what can be done to relate manpower requirements to 
the production job is provided by the steps that were taken in copper and other 
nonferrous metals. It so happens that the Labor Production Division has 
equipped itself with an especially competent staff in this field, and has been able to 
work very closely with both the unions and the affected branch of the War Pro- 
duction Board Materials Division. Following is a brief summary of the work 
that is being done in this field. It must be realized, of course, that such problems 
are extraordinarily complex, and that such a short document can barely scratch 
the surface. 

The Labor Production Division participated with the Office of Price Adminis- 
tration and the Copper Branch in a report to the War Production Board on 
February 19, 1942, and called for a labor-management production drive in the 
copper, lead, and zinc mines to improve morale as a means of raising labor produc- 
tivity. Underground mining is not a mechanized industry in the same sense as 
a fabricating plant which runs on prearranged schedules. There is relatively 
little supervision in an underground mine, and the rate of production depends 
largely on the human element. Hence, we emphasized the necessity of the labor- 
management production drive, pointing to the fact that a 1-percent increase in 
labor productivity would result in an annual increase of 10,000 tons of copper. 

In March 1942, following a resolution passed by the War Production Board 
steps were taken to set up labor-management committees in the metal mining 
areas. On June 13, Donald Nelson formally launched the war production drive 
in the nonferrous metals industries by a radio address to a miners' day rally in 
Butte, Mont. In the meantime, the Labor Morale Section of the Services of 
Supply of the War Department in cooperation with the Labor Production Division, 
arranged for continuous publicity programs to bring home to mine workers the 
importance of their jobs in the war effort. 

A study by this division indicated that expansion projects in copper mining 
alone would require approximately 4,000 new workers in 1942-43. A heavy 
demand for labor in aircraft and shipbuilding projects on the Pacific coast and in 
huge construction projects in the Rocky Mountain States developed at this time. 
Since the largest industries in these States, besides agriculture, are the mining, 
logging, and railroad industries, it became evident that these huge war construc- 
tion projects might draw heavily upon the existing labor force for labor. 

In view of this possibility, the Labor Production Division took steps to procure 
reports on labor supply and labor requirements at individual mines and made 
arrangements to secure data through the reporting facilities of the United States 
Employment Service and the Bureau of Employment Security. 

The first fairly complete reports on the labor supply problem at copper, lead, 
and zinc mines were procured by the Bureau of Employment Security in May 
and reached us early in July. These reports indicated that a critical labor 
shortage had developed, due to an extensive outmigration of mine workers seeking 
more attractive jobs in war industries on the Pacific coast and in adjoining areas 
in the Rocky Mountain States. Reports obtained in July from individual mine 
operators indicate that there is a shortage of some 6,000 workers for the copper, 
lead, and zinc mines and mills in the Western States. Between March and 
August 1942 a substantial dechne in total employment took place. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13149 

The production of copper for the first 6 months of 1942 was remarkably close 
to estimates that had been prepared in advance. However, in July 1942 — a long 
month — production dropped 5,000 tons below that of the previous month, and 
from now on it will continue to fall unless the exodus of labor ceases and the supply 
of workers is augmented. At the same time, mines which are short of labor are 
transferring men from development work and from stripping overburden to actual 
ore development in order' to keep mine output from declining. This cessation of 
development work will make itself evident when present ore bodies will have 
become depleted. Mine operators have sought to overcome the labor shortages 
by hiring green and partially trained workers with the result that there has been 
a drop in production. 

The factors causing this outmigration are complex, the main one being wages. 
Over a number of years a significant wage differential had existed between aircraft 
and shipbuilding industries on the one hand, and mining industries on the other, 
and this gap widened with the beginning of the war efi'ort. Other factors which 
are causing the outmigration are poor housing conditions in mining areas, inade- 
quate transportation, working conditions which are deemed unsatisfactory, and 
the general fear of a post-war dechne in the production of copper, lead, and zinc. 

Since the factors responsible for the exodus reach beyond the responsibilities 
of the War Production Board itself and involve Government agencies dealing 
with wages, with housing, with transportation, with the Selective Service, with 
the hiring of workers for war construction projects, and with recruitment pro- 
cedures, it became evident that some coordination would have to be achieved 
before a concerted attack on the problem could be made. 

With the data on out-migration from mining areas at hand, preliminary steps 
were taken early in July to bring these agencies together. A meeting for this 
purpose was called by representatives of various branches of the War Department, 
the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Labor 
Board. At this meeting a report on the responsibilities of the various govern- 
mental agencies was prepared and submitted on July 8. 

Meanwhile the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, which 
had shown its interest in augmenting the production of critical metals in a pro- 
gram presented to the Labor Production Division in December, had become 
extremely concerned over this out-migration of workers and its effect on produc- 
tion. On July 22, it presented a memorandum on the manpower problem to 
Wendell Lund", Director of the Labor Production Division. 

In order to establish a working committee which could coordinate the activities 
and responsibilities of the organizations which deal with the various aspects of the 
manpower problem, on August 4 Mr. Lund called a meeting of representatives 
of the agencies which had attended the earlier meeting and also of the Office of 
Price Administration and of Selective Service. A week later this committee 
was established as a permanent working group under the chairmanship of Mr. 
Harry O. King, chief of the copper branch. Since then, this committee has met 
regularly once a week and has added to its membership representatives from the 
Bureau of Mines and from the Army and Navy Munitions Board. 

This committee acts as a clearinghouse for information on the manpower 
problem and serves as a medium by which each of the agenceis represented can 
keep abreast of the activities of the other agencies. 

ACTIONS ON MANPOWER PROBLEM 

Since its inception, as a result of its deliberations, the following actions on the 
manpower problem have been taken: 

(1) A series of letters from the heads of the War Production Board, the War 
Manpower Commission, the War Labor Board, and the Selective Service have 
been prepared for distribution to operators and unions in the mining areas. 

(2) Statements from General Hershey, Selective Service, and from General 
McSherry, War Manpower Commission, describing, respectively, procedure on 
deferments of miners and on recruiting facilities of the Employment Service, have 
been prepared and are ready for distribution to mine operators. 

(3) Data on manpower aspects of the wage problem in the cases now before the 
War Labor Board, as well as other reports to this agency have been prepared in 
order to expedite their handling of this problem. 

(4) General McSherry of the War Manpower Commission is taking steps to 
introduce training programs into the mining properties. A member of his staff 
is now working with the production drive crew in the western mining areas. 



13150 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(5) The Interdepartmental Committee is now taking steps to see that the pres- 
ent working force is more fully utilized through training and upgrading of labor, 
by improving working and living conditions (including transportation to and from 
the job) by lowering age and other restrictions on hiring, and by procuring high 
priority ratings on mine equipment to increase labor productivity. 

The War Labor Board has had some 40 wage-dispute cases before it. These 
cases involve properties in Nevada, Utah, and Idaho; and also smelters and 
refineries in other States. In view of the urgency of the problem, the War Labor 
Board expedited its hearings, and a decision can be expected very shortly. 

Meanwhile, the War Manpower Commission had become extremely alarmed 
over the wide-scale out-migration which had taken place. It seemed that unless 
immediate action weretaken to halt this movement of workers the labor shortage 
would grow much worse. Accordingly, it called a meeting of representaties of 
the mining companies and of labor, at which discussions were held on means of 
curtailing the out-migration of mine workers. The urgency of the problem was 
recognized by all the members present. An order, designed to curtail withdrawals 
from the industry, was drawn up with the approval of the representatives both 
from management and labor. This order was modeled on a plan approved by the 
National Labor- Management Policy Committee of the War Manpower Com- 
mission. 

It is, however, recognized by all the Government agencies represented on the 
Interdepartmental Committee, as well as by the representatives of labor and of 
management who attended the meeting of the War Manpower Commission, that a 
mere curtailment of out-migration is not a complete solution of the problem. It 
is recognized that this measure in itself does not in any way meet the causes which 
have been responsible for this withdrawal of workers. The wage problem, the 
housing and transportation problem, and the unattractive working conditions 
still exist. Mining is an unattractive and hazardous occupation. It is not the 
intention of the War Manpower Commission to penalize the workers for happening 
to be in that occupation. From the point of view of obtaining increased produc- 
tion alone, i^. would be inadvisable to believe that this War Manpower Com- 
mission order has solved the problem. This directive may harm morale and result 
in a loss of production. Measures must be taken to overcome this possibility. 
Since the mines are now short some 6,000 workers, it is extremely important that 
efforts be taken to see that the working force is not only retained but augmented. 

The Interdepartmental Committee on Nonferrous Metals now looks forward to 
a curtailment of gold-mine operations as a means of freeing manpower which 
could be transferred to the production of critical metals. An order to curtail 
gold-mining operations is now being drafted by the War Production Board. 

The drive to establish labor-management production committees in mining 
properties has been going on all summer, and there is at this very time a field 
crew from the copper branch and from the Labor Production Division setting up 
these committees in Arizona. Representatives from the Apprenticeship Training 
Division and the Training- Within-Industry Division of the War Manpower Com- 
mission are on this crew and are trying to interest both labor and management 
in training and upgrading programs. 

An approach very much similar to this is being made in the lumber industry. 
If this method of meeting critical manpower situations continues to prove success- 
ful in these instances, I believe that we may find it used in a number of other situa- 
tions, particularly those involving critical raw materials. 

Another basic manpower problem is the concentration of production. The 
concentration involves not only the release of facilities and of materials, but also 
of manpower. Therefore, all three must be a consideration in the decisions. A 
new Committee on Concentration, of which I am a member has just been formed 
in the War Production Board; and it is devoting itself to consideration of these 
various aspects. 

LABOR-MANAGEMENT PRODUCTION COMMITTEES 

The chairman of your committee has asked me to comment on the present status 
of the management-labor production committees. I feel that these committees 
have a real function on the plant level in helping adjust the available manpower 
to the production job of the plant. 

So far over 1,300 labor-management committees have reported to Washington 
employing over 2,700,000 workers. Of these, some 246 are in plants producing 
guns and ordnance equipment, 182 in iron and steel cables, 92 in aircraft and air- 
craft parts, 90 in various types of synthetics, 77 in machinery, 69 in shipbuilding, 38 
in engines, 20 in tanks, and 427 in various other war-materials industries, including 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13151 

anthracite coal mines, copper mines, and lumber mills. These committees have 
equal representation from management and labor, the actual number of members 
depending upon the size and specific needs of the plant, mine, or mill involved. 
Under these top joint committees most plants have found it advisable to have 
specialized subcommittees, concentrating their attention on specific subjects 
such as suggestions, conservation of material, publicity, production efficiency, 
care of tools and equipment, health and welfare, etc. Over 72 percent of the 
workers covered in those plants reporting to drive headquarters are in establish- 
ments in which recognized unions are participating on the committees. Both 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
have given active support in promoting the drive objectives. 

Problems handled by the joint committees fall, roughly, within two areas. 
First, creating and retaining good worker morale through making the individual 
worker feel his part in the whole war effort and giving him a better understanding 
of problems facing management; and secondly, working to solve production 
problems through direct suggestions. Each joint labor-management committee 
adjusts its immediate functions to the specific problems facing its plant or indus- 
try. For example, in this period of acute material shortage the committees have 
served a valuable function in gathering suggestions on ways of conserving materials 
reducing scrap and giving sufficient explanation to workers so that morale is not 
completely broken through lay-offs or cuts in working hours. 

To carry out their functions, committees must receive adequate information 
from both Government and employer on those production problems. Mr. 
Nelson has already indicated that the War Production Board would attempt to 
supply such information. Unless these committees have accurate information, 
they cannot hope to induce a cooperative understanding and constructive atti- 
tude toward these difficulties on the part of the workers. 

Committees have also served significantly in stimulating and channeling pro- 
duction-efficiency suggestions, discovering new tools, improvements in equip- 
ment and lay-out. and better use of machines and material. In many situations, 
as a result of these activities, plants have broken all-time production records, 
ships have been launched weeks before contract dates, men have found ways 
of cutting in half the time necessary for their operation, together with important 
savings in the vitally needed scarce materials. In some cases absenteeism has 
been the greatest production bottleneck. Committees have been successful in 
eliminating this through special campaigns, checks, and appropriate publicity. 
Other committees have helped to solve the transportation problem through car 
pooling. Problems of manpower conservation are handled through safety cam- 
paigns, health and w^elfare activity and improved training programs. One of the 
most significant results of the drive is the close cooperation it engenders between 
labor and management through a better understanding of each others' problems, 
thus eliminating unnecessary disputes and friction. 

Experience has already shown that these joint committees have an enormous 
potential contribution to make to our war effort through expanding production, 
improving morale, and providing for w^orkers a feeling of participation in war pro- 
duction. In initiating this program, Mr. Nelson has provided an opportunity 
which, if fully developed, can make an enormous contribution to the winning 
of the war. 

The effectiveness of these committees is measured in direct proportion to the 
effectiveness of labor-management relationships. At the same time that they con- 
tribute to an improvement in working relationships, their w'ork is also dependent 
on the ways in which management and labor have solved the problems that 
mutually affect them. • 

In those committees that already have been established, it has been found that 
real acceptance of organized labor and wiUingness to give labor full opportunity to 
participate are prerequisites for gaining the maximum success from the joint 
production committees. Some employers have demonstrated their sincerity 
toward eliminating all detriments to production by guaranteeing piece-work rates 
for the duration, and giving out a statement that extra effort now until the end of 
the war will not be used as "standard performance" thereafter. Others have 
found that efficient handling of grievances helps to produce a willingness on the 
part of workers to put forth the greatest possible personal efforts. 

Though these 1,300 committees have already been established, the plan must be 
extended to a far greater nuinber of war production plants before its tremendous 
potential contribution to the war effort can be realized. Many employers have 
been unw'illing to grasp the- significance of these committees as an aid toward 
increasing their production. No amount of effort on the part of Government or 



13152 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

the union has been successful in making these executives realize the need for tap- 
ping the production reservoir of employee ideas and cooperation on production 
problems. This, together with the lack of full labor participation on committees 
in other plants, has done the most to slow down the expansion of this vitally needed 
program. 

EFFICIENT USE OF LABOR 

The third aspect of particular interest to labor is the way in which labor can be 
divided and utilized for the tasks that are to be done outside the armed forces. 
I am a profound believer, with organized labor, that we should do as much of this 
job of handling manpower in industries without coercion as is humanly possible. 
That means that every device for adjusting the labor supply through democratic 
and cooperative methods should be exhausted before further steps are taken. I 
believe deeply in labor's patriotic desire to cooperate. I feel sure that every 
American worker will do the job he is asked to do. In order to accomplish this, 
we must be sure what we want, so that we can tell our needs clearly and directly 
to every American worker in terms of what we expect him as an individual to do. 
One of the big obstacles to the efficient use of our manpower has been the con- 
tinued existence of habits of mind in management which grew up in the days 
when there was extensive unemployment in the country. This meant that labor 
could be used wastefuUy, that discrimination could be exercised against minorities, 
against older workers, and against women. It meant that training and upgrading 
programs were largely unnecessr„ry. These undesirable indulgences by manage- 
ment are no longer possible. They must be eliminated forthwith. This I regard, 
in concert with labor, to be one of the first obligations of the War ManpoAver 
Commission. 

The basic necessity for any manpower program is the machinery of a highly 
efficient national system of employment offices. Our own system of employment 
offices is most greatly handicapped by lack of appropriations and by restrictions 
placed upon its operations by Congress. I would most strongly urge this com- 
mittee to consider recommending to the Appropriations Committee of the House 
immediate increases in the funds available for the operation of the Employment 
Service, the appropriation of money for transporting workers to the places where 
they are needed, and the wiping out of restrictions on the administration of the 
Employment Service staff. I feel certain that you will find strong support from 
both organized labor and management for such steps. As long as the Employ- 
ment Service remains so crippled, it is impossible for the War Manpower Com- 
mission to carrv out the functions necessary to our Nation's productive effort. 

I would call the committee's attention to the excellent work of the War Man- 
power Commission's Management-Labor Policy Committee. My own opinion is 
that it has made an outstanding contribution not only to manpower policies, but 
to the technique of providing Government with the constructive viewpoint of 
both labor and management. Both of these groups have the greatest stake in 
the operation of a manpower program and only their willing cooperation can make 
it a success. I think the committee would do well to follow with closest atten- 
tion the experience of the Manpower Commission in utihzing joint labor-manage- 
ment committees on both the regional and local level where they will soon be in 
operation. The experience of the national committee has indicated that both 
labor and management, when given a place in the determination of policy with 
Government, exercise close devotion to the national interest without partisanship 
or self-seeking. These men have informed themselves most carefully on the issues, 
and have devoted extensive time from their very urgent business to this work 
for the public welfare. One of the management members faithfully commutes 
each week from the Pacific coast to Washington to meet with this committee. 

These men are not unusual men in their devotion to the war effort. Their 
spirit lends strength to my conviction that the great and pressing problems of 
production and manpower can be solved in the American way with labor and 
industry standing together to do the job we have determined to do. It is Govern- 
ment's urgent responsibility to create the mechanisms through which this common 
aim can be accomplished. 

Mr. Curtis. You have a portion of your testimony that you wish 
to read at this time? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, Congressman. 
Mr. Curtis. You may proceed. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13153 

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT BY WENDELL LUND, DIRECTOR, 
LABOR PRODUCTION DIVISION, WAR PRODUCTION BOARD. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. Lund (reading): 

In addition to my prepared statement, I should like to discuss briefly with your 
committee in an informal way some of the problems raised in my mind by Governor 
McNutt's forthright and comprehensive statement given yesterday morning. 
I wish to say in regard to Mr. McNutt's testimony that I want to corroborate 
it and endorse some of the things he said and, on the other hand, make one 
or two points that he did not make. 

I am sure that we have all realized the tremendous task which faces the War 
Manpower Commission, and if we were not already completely aware of it, Governor 
McNutt's remarks must have made us all especially conscious of the terrific 
strain to which our manpower resources will be subjected in the coming months. 
It is the job of Government to allocate our limited manpower resources so as best 
to keep our military and production programs in balance. It is equally important 
for all agencies of Government to cooperate with the War Manpower Commission 
to the utmost by holding labor requirements down. We must take every vigorous 
step which may be necessary to reduce this strain upon our reserves of labor. 

This job of holding down our requirements cannot be done by Governor McNutt 
alone, though I believe he can play an important part. His customers, to speak 
colloquially, must cooperate with him. And I should like to submit for the con- 
sideration of your committee a few of the steps which, in the opinion of organized 
labor and of those of us who have been working closely with labor, could be taken 
to relieve some of the pressure on manpower. 

EFFECTIVE PROCUREMENT POLICY REQUIRED 

First, It is vitally important for us to have a clear and effective procurement 
policy which recognizes the absolute necessity of distributing war-supply contracts 
so as to utilize all of our untapped or partially tapped manpower supply. We see, 
for instance, the great city of New York, with a half million idle and capable 
workers, rapidly becoming the number-one ghost city of this war while other 
communities are so choked with war work that boarding houses are operating on 
a three-shift basis. On the one hand housing, transportation, and community 
facilities are idle or only partially used in some of these communities, while in 
others we are expending precious critical materials to build new dwellings, new 
sewers, new schoolhouses, and new busses to care for .migrant workers. 

This problem is serious not merely because of the social and economic disloca- 
tions which occur as a result of inadequate procurement policies. Even if we dis- 
regarded all the human factors involved, the fact would still remain that we are 
wasting scarce natural resources because of our failure adequately to plan the dis- 
tribution of our gigantic war-supply program. 

This in particular should interest your committee, which has done such valuable 
work in investigating the migration of workers. No single factor contributes so 
largely to the unnecessary and wasteful migration of war workers as the lack of a 
planned procurement policy. 

UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF WAR CONTRACTS 

Some of the details of this situation are set forth in my prepared statement 
to which this is a supplement, but I should like to emphasize these facts again. 
The War Manpower Commission has recently surveyed the distribution of war 
contracts in relation to our total supply of manpower, and some of the conclu- 
sions which it has drawn are startling and disturbing. The Commission sur- 
veyed the distribution of more than $6,500,000 in war contracts let between 
May 1 and July 31, 1942. Of those contracts 28.1 percent of the dollar volume 
was put in areas where labor shortages now exist, and 58.8 percent to areas where 
shortages are anticipated. Only 12 percent — that is to say less than one-eighth of 
the total volume — was placed in areas containing a surplus of manpower. 

Mr. Curtis. Alay I ask you a question at that point? 
Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. How much of the 58.8 percenji and 28.1 percent was 
placed there because the tools and equipment were located there? 



13154 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Lund. A fairly good proportion, Congressman. 

Mr. Curtis. You have to send the contracts to the factories that 
have the tools and equipment, is that not true? 

Mr. Lund. That is true, although we have expanded some faciJities 
in tight labor-market areas instead of putting production where 
facilities already exist. 

Mr. Curtis. I will not argue that. I have been fighting for the 
decentralization of the defense program. Every reason under the sun 
points to the fact that it should not be in one spot. 
f' Mr. Lund. We have these tremendous unutilized facilities in New 
York City, for example, and a good many other areas. We have just 
begun to concentrate civilian production. That might have been 
started earlier and facilities might have been released in various parts 
of the country where we have housing and transportation and com- 
munity facilities, so we would not have to create this tremendous 
movement of people. 

Mr. Curtis. You may proceed. 

Mr. Lund (continuing): 

We find large orders for textiles, for instance, flowing into such critical areas as 
Seattle, Detroit, and Baltimore. 

Organized labor, speaking both through the Labor Policy Committee of the 
War Production Board and the Labor-Management Policy Committee of the 
War Manpower Commission, has repeatedly urged the imperative necessity of 
an adequate procurement policy. I should, like to see a vigorous, powerful pro- 
curement policy board and I think an experienced representative of labor could 
render real service on such a board. 

If the other agencies of Government are to give to Governor McNutt and the 
Manpower Commission the kind of assistance and cooperation to which they are 
entitled, something must be done and done quickly to bring procurement under 
control. We can no longer afford to see the skilled needle-trades workers of New 
York City walking the streets while Mexicans are imported for agricultural labor 
in the Southwest to take the places of workers drained off the farms to make pants 
for the Army. 

ACCELERATING LABOr's PRODUCTIVITY 

Second. We must take account of and do everything possible to accelerate the 
increasing productivity of our existing labor supply. We have always known that 
American labor was the most efficient in the world and it is upon the basis of this 
knowledge that we have summarized our whole experience and policy in the slogan 
for this Labor Dav which has just passed — "Free Labor Will Win." 

Most of you are familiar, I am sure, with the fact that when we commenced 
our merchant shipbuilding program it was estimated that 700,000 man-hours of 
labor were required to complete the single merchant ship. Today that require- 
ment has been reduced to a little more than 400,000 man-hours per hull and it is 
falling every month. Similarly, one of our bombers was originally estimated to 
require 75,000 man-hours of work. Now we have it down to 18,000 and expect 
it to go still lower. 

The patriotism and skill and energy of American labor have already worked 
miracles on the production line; and these miracles will not stop, but rather 
multiply. This astounding record of efficiency and productivity that American 
labor has established must be taken into account more fully in our future estimates 
of manpower requirements. 

I think that is one thing we have often failed to do. We see these colossal 
figures of manpower requirements, and they are based upon a rate of productivity 
that antedates the figures by 6 months or a year and does not take into considera- 
tion the possibilitv of a progressively increasing production. 

My own experience in Michigan has indicated that such estimates, often 
based upon the individual guesses of particular employers, are apt to furnish a 
somewhat distorted and exaggerated picture. We all know of one large and 
experienced employer in Michigan who first estimated that one of his great new 
plants would require 110,000 workers. Then he reduced his estimate to 90,000, 
then to 70,000, and now we are told he will require only some 50,000 workers. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13155 

In my opinion, we shall find it necessary in the future to revise downward our 
estimates of these requirements. 

Furthermore, we must frankly face the fact that a substantial number of our 
war plants are overmanned. It is natural in a period of expanding employment 
and impending labor scarcity for employers to hoard labor just as they want to 
hoard materials. Reports which I have received, from officials of the War Man- 
power Commission, from our own people in the field, and from my own personal 
observations would indicate that a substantial saving in our manpower require- 
ments can be affected if we institute the same sort of inventory controls in the 
labor market that we have instituted and are instituting with respect to critical 
raw materials. 

LABOR UTILIZATION INSPECTORS 

This, in my opinion, means that it will be necessary for the War Manpower 
Commission to place in all important war plants labor-utilization inspectors, by 
whatever name they may be called. These inspectors should be given authority 
to see that labor is efficiently utilized, at maximum skills. Governor McNutt 
suggested this yesterday, and I recall that the fifth interim report of your com- 
mittee has also pointed out the desirability of this step. I concur most heartily, 
and I am urging the War Manpower Commission to take immediate steps in 
this direction. 

An adequate and vigorous system of labor-utilization inspectors should be 
geared closely with the labor-management production committees in the plants. 
Experience has shown that nobody is so efficient at increasing the efficiency of 
labor as labor itself. The labor-management committee is the tested mechanism 
for affording labor a channel and an opportunity to make its distinctive contri- 
bution to the increase of efficiency and effective utilization of our manpower 
resources. 

The labor-utilization inspector and the labor-management production com- 
mittee should take an active part in the promotion of programs and plans for 
training and upgrading unskilled and semiskilled workers into skilled occupations, 
and for breaking down complicated jobs into simpler and more easily manned 
occupations. Up to the present time, we have relied upon the voluntary accept- 
ance of training and upgrading programs by employers. We can no longer, in my 
opinion, rely only upon persuasion. Our resources are growing too scarce and 
our needs too great. 

Those methods of labor-utilization which have proved so successful in great 
sections of the shipbuilding industry, for instance, should be extended to the 
entire industry, and all Government "contractors should immediately be required, 
as part of their obligation, to conduct efficient operations, to utilize the accepted 
and proved training practices developed so successfully by the Training- Within- 
Industry Division of the War Manpower Commission. 

UTILIZATION OF MINORITY GROUPS 

Third. We must not permit prejudice and caprice to deprive our war effort of 
the services of a single qualified worker. We have in this country thousands of 
Negroes, foreign-born Americans, and loyal alien residents. All of them are for 
the most part" capable of carrying their "load on the production fine. They are 
ready and anxious to serve. They and their families cannot understand why they 
should not be permitted to render this service. Likewise, those of us who know 
of the critical manpower shortage which prevails in many areas cannot understand 
or condone the waste of this irreplaceable resource. Up to now, we have not 
licked this problem. In my opinion, we must fight it through without appease- 
ment or compromise. 

We are all agreed with the President's excellent policy which forbids discrimina- 
tion against any worker or prospective worker on account of his race, creed, or 
national origin. Our real job is to enforce and effectuate this pohcy. The 
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice has done a magnificent job 
of education, and in pointing the light toward those black spots where the Presi- 
dent's policy is openly or secretly defied. We must, however, supplement the 
work of the President's Committee in the day-to-day placement of idle workers 
throughout our great war industries. In other words, we must expect the United 
States Employment Service to carry a heavy responsibility in the enforcement of 
the President's antidiscrimination pohcy. The Employment Service is not, in 
mv opinion, able to meet this responsibility today. From my own experience, I 
can say that in many cases the local officials who are called upon to deal with these 



13156 WASHINGTON HEARIN^GS 

problems are too often subject to the powerful pressure of local prejudice and local 
political influence. The power of this pressure is increased by the legislative 
restrictions which the Congress has laid upon the operation of our newly federalized 
Employment Service. I agree thoroughly with Governor McNutt and Mr. 
Corson as to the immediate necessity of striking these shackles from the Employ- 
ment Service and providing it with adequate funds so that capable, vigorous, and 
able personnel may be obtained. If this is done, it is my opinion that under the 
able direction of Mr. Corson and Governor McNutt the Service will be in a position 
to obtain the acceptance of these basic manpower policies, and thus to secure the 
utilization of labor resources which are now wasted. 

PROPER SCHEDULING OF MATERIAL FLOW REQUIRED 

Fourth, the War Production Board, through its control over the armed services, 
should make certain that we do not lose valuable manpower through the inade- 
quate scheduling of production and through lack of control over the flow of raw 
materials. Nothing is so demoralizing to the morale of our labor force as shut- 
downs and slow-downs caused by the failure of Government agencies to see that 
our raw materials are put in the proper places at the proper times and for proper 
purposes. 

Recently representatives of leading international unions in both the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor met to discuss 
this problem at the invitation of our Labor Production Division. This conference 
was called at the suggestion of our Labor Policy Committee and, as a result, a num- 
ber of suggestions were submitted to the War Production Board. These labor 
organizations expressed most vigorously their opinion that the War Production 
Board should immediately institute a program for scheduling not only the flow 
of raw materials, Vjut the production of component items and finished end prod- 
ucts so as to achieve not only a maximum utilization of our limited supply of critical 
materials but a maximum and uninterrupted use of our manpower resources. 

Mr. Curtis (interposing). Now, I want to ask you a question right 
there, if I may. Everybody knows when they haven't got material 
they cannot run a factory. 

We often read in the paper about them stopping, and they ask why 
don't they have that material. Of course, we all agree that we have 
got to get somebody to see that they get the material. Why don't 
they get the material? 

Mr. Lund. I would say that they do not get the materiil for the 
following reasons: First, we probably have not sufficiently stressed the 
raw-materials aspect of our program. Secondly, there has been an 
inadequate scheduling of the raw materials gomg into the plants and 
of the semifabricated and fabricated materials into articles that 
become component paits. We have permitted some of the items to 
get far ahead of other items and therefore they use up materials that 
should not be used perhaps for 3 to 6 months later. Our program, 
as Mr. Nelson puts it, has gotten out of balance. 

Mr. Curtis. Have you got any specific cases? I do not Iviiow 
whether it is true or not, but you hear accounts where airplanes are 
all completed except they are waiting for a propeller, or something like 
that. 

Mr. Lund. That is right. 

Mr. Curtis. Who is to blame? What is wrong? 

Mr. Lund. Well, I should hesitate, Mr. Congressman, to fix blame. 
I will tell you what I think may be wrong: There is certainly inade- 
quate or improper scheduling, or things like that would not happen. 

Mr. Curtis. Evidently. 

Mr. Lund. The two things are tied in together. Somewhere along 
the line the folks that are working with this thing have not done a 
satisfactory job of scheduling this production, because if we did, 
taking into account the time, these items should have been ready to 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13157 

take their place with other items in a finished product. Under a 
complete plan, let us say, we would not have that situation. It may- 
be that, under the circumstances, a better job just could not have 
been done. Another factor in the situation is the ever-changing 
requirements because of changes in milita^ry strategy. 

Mr. Curtis. It probably will be helpful to have somebody get to- 
gether and talk about it, but I think somebody is going to have to be 
specific to find out where and how and when and why somebody 
failed. 

Mr. Lund. That is right. 

Mr. Curtis. But those things happen. 

Mr. Lund. That is right. That ought to be done, certainly, 
through a field force. The services have got men in many of the 
plants and they certainly report to the services, and we have our men 
out. Properly organized, they could be one part of the machinery 
for furnishing information needed for adequate schedulmg of produc- 
tion. I understand the reason, Mr. Congressman, that it was not 
done, is that there was such eagerness to get maximum production of 
all articles in all lines that the balance between them was UQt taken 
suffi.cientlv into account. 

Mr. Curtis. If we take the War Manpower Commission and give it 
a service act, or anything it wants, it still will not have jurisdiction of 
that problem? 

Mr. Lund. No. That is essentially, I would say, the War Produc- 
tion Board's job. 

Mr. Curtis. That would go to the materialmen, to work it out? 

Mr. Lund. Yes. ... 

Mr. Curtis. It is one of our major causes of loss of utilization of 

Mr. Lund. That is right, but it is a materials problem and belongs 
in the War Production Board and services. 

Mr. Curtis. You may proceed. 

Mr. Lund (continuing) — 

I concur most heartily in these suggestions, and the War Production Board is 
now at work to set up such a scheduUng system. 

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR DISPLACED WORKERS 

It is clear, however, that we are not yet able to schedule our production pro- 
gram tightly enough to prevent some operations from lagging and creating un- 
eraplovment. 

No decent manpower program can overlook measures for taking care ot the 
workers thus unemployed. In the first .place, purely from the point of view of 
morale, some adequate provision for benefits must be made for such workers and 
their families. Secondly, we cannot hope to keep these workers where we need 
them unless they have the means to keep body and soul together until work is 
available. I would, therefore, strongly urge upon the committee the immediate 
necessitv of instituting a special unemployment benefit program for workers 
thrown out of jobs because of material shortages or plant change-overs, buch 
benefits should not be less than two-thirds of the regular pay, exclusive of over- 
time. I think we look on it as a loss, although that is important from the human- 
itarian point of view or from the practical point of view of having labor supply 
there when we need it 

Mr. Curtis (interposing). Would you do that regardless of the 
inability to get jobs for civilian enterprises? 

Mr. Lund. No, sir. If some of them could, for a period of, let us 
say, 3 months, while our conversion was going on, get a job in civilian 



13158 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

industry in that immediate locality so as to make themselves avail- 
able for war work when the plant is converted, I think they ought to 
get that job, by all means. It seems to me, if properly administered, 
this fund would not be a deterrent to .their finding jobs for the con- 
version period. I found, when I was director of the unemployment 
compensation commission of Michigan, that all of these incidents that 
one was supposed to know about — cases where men would rather take 
unemployment compensation than to work — were invariably un- 
substantiated. A man would sooner make three-thirds than two- 
thirds of his pay. 

Mr. Curtis. When would you start that? Just as soon as they 
were out of work? 

Mr. Lund. Immediately. 

Mr. Curtis. Would you proceed on the theory that the individual 
should not look out for himself at all? 

Mr. Lund. No; I would not. I would encourage him to get em- 
ployment in civilian mdustry, but I would want him there when the 
plant is converted. 

Mr. Curtis. I thought that was the thing you wanted to avoid. 
Instead of having him there resting on his oars, you wanted him in a 
factory working for the war effort. 

Mr. Lund. Congressman, that is all right if he can work in the 
immediate locality, let us say, or if he can be transported somewhere, 
moved somewhere where he is going to be needed immediately fcr any 
productive work. Wliat we would find is that a lot of these people 
would leave for a few weeks or a few months and then they would 
be needed back there again, needed back where they came from. 

Mr. Curtis. You are criticizing the employer for hoardmg the 
workers? 

Mr. Lund. Yes. 

Mr. Curtis. Then, you just want to take them outside of the 
factory and hoard them outside. 

Mr. Lund. No; not at all, Congressman. We call that a planned 
reservoir of workers for a particular purpose in a particular com- 
munitv. What we are tryitig to avoid is the needless migration of 
these families when they ought to stay where they are because in the 
rather immediate future they could be in war production there. 

Mr. Curtis. If I understood all the witnesses who have appeared 
so far, that is the thing you do not want, people waiting around, not 
turnmg theii- labor into war production while plants were being con- 
verted and while you were waiting for materials. 

Mr. Lund. My position is somewhat different. Congressman, than 
theirs. If they are needed elsewhere, let us say on a war production 
job for a continuous period, and can, profitably to the program, make 
that shift to this other job, I would probably be thorouglily in favor 
of their going. That is not always the case, however. It is fre- 
quently advantageous to keep men where they are for a couple of 
weeks so they will be available when the plant is ready for them. 

Mr. Curtis. That is what they are criticizing the employers about. 
We had witness after witness throw up his hands and say, "Wliy, they 
are hoarding labor; they are holding a man until they can use him 
next Tuesday." 

Mr. Lund. I do not see any necessary inconsistency there. You 
see, Congressman, many of these employers hoard employees for a 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13159 

veiy improbable future use. If an employer were to keep an em- 
ployee that he did not need for a month or two in a locality where 
that employee has his home, frankly I do not see anything wrong with 
that, unless there is a labor sliortage there. If the fellow could be 
used in the next plant just as profitably, the employer ouglit not to 
hoard Imn. In my view, if that fellow could get a job in the next 
plant, we certainly would not want him paid anything for remaining 
idle. It is when he would have to go, let us say, to a community 500 
miles distant, or even 100 miles distant, or 200 miles distant, though 
it might be a good deal more, and then he would be needed a month 
later in the same locality in which he was living, where he was dis- 
placed, where he lost his job, it would seem to me it is only using good 
judgment to keep him there. 

Mr. Curtis. The only difference I can see in your proposal and 
the employer hoarding him is that you would pay him two-thirds of 
his salary out of the unemployment fund. 

Mr. Lund. On the other hand, the employer pays him his full 
salary. 

Mr. Curtis. Then, he would be doing something. 

Mr. Lund. I tliink there is more real justification than that. 

Dr. Lamb. May I ask a question? 

Mr. Curtis. Yes, go ahead. 

Dr. Lamb. I do not want to prolong this discussion because of the 
number of prepared questions that you will be asked, and the neces- 
sity of getting on. 

Mr. Lund. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. D.oes not your proposal run along the lines of the one 
made a year ago which resulted in the fiasco ol the $300,000,000 
appropriation? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, somewhat, though the administration of it would 
be difi'erent. 

Dr. Lamb. Is it not possible that they ran into trouble because it 
was not connected with a plan for full utilization of labor but was a 
form of hoarding, or whatever you please to call it, on the part of the 
Government? 

Mr. Lund. Of course, I think that plan ran into trouble not for 
any rational reasons at all, but because certain State unemployment 
compensation administrators and Governors were afraid of nationali- 
zation of unemployment compensation. 

Dr. Lamb. I agree with that, Mr. Lund; but I still think those 
are just as important factors and have to be taken into consideration 
as completely as these other considerations, and what is more, there 
was a certain illogicality about the proposal. 

Mr. Lund. I think it requires very careful planning, and there 
would have to be safeguards against abuse. 

Dr. Lamb. Does it not require more than planning? 

Is not one of the fundamental lacks of the thing the absence, for 
instance, of any connection with a training program, and is not the 
training program the real key to this arrangement? If— instead of 
attempting to increase unemployment compensation in order to give 
these workers a somewhat larger sum of money under unemployment 
compensation, still subsidizing them while not working — you were 
directing their energies toward getting into a job, and you knew what 

60396— 42— pt. 34 8 



13160 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

the job was going to be, and you had the plans made for the forth- 
coming production, would not joii be much further ahead of the 
game and more likeh^ to get congressional support for your proposal? 

Mr. Lund. Doubtless. Remember this proposal of mine addresses 
itself to two aspects of the problem: One is the aspect wherein an 
employee is out of work because his plant is being converted; in the 
second he is out of work because of a slow-down or shut-down of the 
plant due to a temporary shortage of raw materials. Really, I think 
that that is the more important of the two. 

Mr. Curtis. Do I understand you that you are recommending that 
the moment some worker is out of a job because they are waiting for 
materials you would pay him two-thirds of his salary? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir; he is a casualty of the war through no fault of 
his own, and it seems to me it is important and contributes to the 
man's morale and also important to hold him there, available, let us 
say 2 weeks later or a month later, when the plant takes up again. 

Dr. Lamb. In other words, you would consider it is a penalty upon 
the Federal Goverimient for the failure to plan? 

Mr. Lund. Exactly. 

Dr. Lamb. It is unfortunate, in carrying that out, that there is 
not some manner of assessing the others responsible for that failure 
so that they would make some contribution. 

Mr. Curtis. The people are going to be amply assessed; but, to 
be concrete, they have a war worker, let us say, drawing $100 a 
week 

Mr. Lund. Yes. 

Mr. Curtis. If he has a temporary shut-down, you would start 
paying him from the first day $66.66? 

Mr. Lund. Per week? 

Mr. Curtis. Per week. 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir; if that is two-thirds of his income exclusive of 
overtime. 

Mr. Curtis. Now, when the war is over, would you continue 
that? 

Mr. Lund. That is, of course, another problem. I think, however, 
we might well be preparing ourselves for that eventuality when the 
war is over by improving ovir* unemployment compensation set-ups 
in the various States. I am not prepared to make a statement as to 
how far I would go at the conclusion of the war. It is very probable 
that that employee and many of the rest of us may take quite a licldng 
when the war is over. I think, however, we want to avoid any immedi- 
ate deflationary trend, and it may very well be better to pay him con- 
siderably more than what he would be getting in most States at the 
end of the war. In the average State he would wait a couple of weeks, 
then would get $15 or $16 a week in unemployment compensation 
instead of the much larger amount he was earning. 

I do not necessarily say a worker who is laid off should get $66.66 
a week; but I think he should be kept right there for a month or 6 
weeks at at least two-thirds of his earnings exclusive of overtime. 
Among other things I think probably that would be quite a spur on 
the company to plan its work better and even on, say, the Federal 
officials and others to schedule the operation more efficiently, 

Mr. Curtis. I think we better go on with your statement. It is 
-quite convincing. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13161 

Mr. Lund [continuing]— 

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize my belief that we should not wait for 
sweeping legislation to set about this tremendous manpower job which faces us 
today. Labor has no cantankerous or theoretical views as to the necessity of 
legislation in this field, nor do I. I am for whatever is necessary, and it may well 
be true that if we are to finish the task, it will be necessary to embody in legislation 
those principles of manpower mobilization which have been tested and proved by 
practical experience. But, if our legislation is to be soundly conceived, and our 
operation of the legislation is to be effective, we must be getting that experience 
now. 

There already exists a powerful weapon in the hands of our Government with 
which to institute a large measure of the necessary labor-market controls. Through 
their power to direct the hiring practices of Government contractors, the various 
agencies could, without legislation, compel the institution of labor-market controls 
by the United States Employment Service. Whether the Manpower Com- 
mission, under its Executive order, possesses the power to institute these controls 
is a legal issue which I shall not undertake to resolve. But the fact is that the 
power does now exist somewhere and I am sure that if there is any doubt as to 
whether Governor McNutt possesses it, the President would be quite willing to 
give it to him. 

I should like to emphasize also the necessity, whether under legislation or under 
an administrative program, for securing adequate participation by labor and 
management both in the formulation of manpower policies and the administration 
of our manpower program. Many of our most constructive and effective sugges- 
tions for the solution of manpower problems have come from the ranks of organized 
labor. I should particularly like to refer to the extraordinary assistance given to 
the Government by the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers 
in the solution of the vexing labor shortage in nonferrous-metal mines — a con- 
tribution referred to at some length in my prepared statement. 

Incidentally, I attended their convention on Tuesday in Denver and found 
them working most wholeheartedly and constructively on manpower problems, 
and patriotically, I will say, too, on manpower problems in that industry. 

All along the line we must rely, here under legislation, upon the cooperation of 
labor and management. We may at some future time substitute compulsion for 
our present voluntary program, but these sanctions will not work unless they are 
accepted by labor and by management and they cannot succeed unless every 
provision is made for the fullest participation at every level. 

With this participation, with increased cooperation on the part of those Govern- 
ment agencies which have it within their power to reduce our manpower demands, 
thereby easing the tremendous task of the Manpower Commission, and with the 
immediate commencement of a vigorous manpower program, without waiting for 
legislation I believe that we can solve this problem, and with its solution hasten 
measurably the day of ultimate victory. 

TESTIMONY OF WENDELL LUND— Resumed 

Mr. Curtis. All right, Mr. Lund. I will try not to omit anything 
vital in our prepared questions. There is one thing I want to ask 
you before I go to the questions. . 

Within the War Production Board, you have your agency, the 
Labor Production Division, do you not? 

Mr. Lund. Correct. 

Mr. Curtis. What is the war production drive? What is that? 

WAR PRODUCTION DRIVE 

Mr. Lund. The war production drive is a project instituted last 
spruig by Mr. Nelson which provides for the setting up of so-called 
labor-management production committees in the various war-produc- 
tion plants thi-oughout the country. Those committees, as the name 
indicates, are made up of representatives of labor>nd of management, 
and they address themselves to problems of war'production. • 



13162 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Curtis. All right. Who heads that? 

Mr. Lund. Presently, there is some confusion as to the authority 
for the operation of the war production drive between the so-called 
war production drive headquarters and the Division of which I am 
director. It is in the process now of being resolved. 

Mr. Curtis. Another question. The Ai-my has a Civilian Person- 
nel Division in the Services of Supply headed by Mr, Mitchell, does 
it not? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. Does the Navy have anything of that sort? 

Mr. Lund. No; I do not believe the Navy has a manpower section. 
None has come to my attention. 

Mr. Curtis. Now, of this war production drive and your agency, 
the Labor Production Division, and the War Manpower Commission, 
which one is the newer agency? 

Mr. Lund. The War Manpower Commission and the Labor Pro- 
duction Division were established by the same executive order. 

Mr. Curtis. I imderstood Governor McNutt yesterday to say 
that originally he thought the War Manpower Commission was a 
policy-making board, they would have practically no personnel, but 
he has changed his mind and it is going to be an operating agency, 
setting up 12 regional offices, a couple of hundred area offices, and 
they have their staffs, and they are going to run these labor mspec- 
tors, and so on. Where does that leave your agency and this war- 
production drive? Is there any need for them? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, I would certainly say so. The War ^Manpower 
Commission will not do anything with the war production drive per 
se. It will certainly want to tie in with these labor-management 
committees. I should say the war production drive committees are 
on the plant level, and manpower problems are a problem mcidental 
to production, but there are many others, too, for example, improve- 
ment of production techniques, to which they devote themselves at 
their meetings. These workers contribute numerous ideas as to better 
processes for doing things and so forth. They help solve absentee- 
ism, transportation, and other problems. 

Mr. Curtis. You recommend the continuation of all three agencies 
then? 

Mr. Lund. Let us see. The three being what? 

Mr. Curtis. Your own, the Labor Production Division 

Mr. Lund. The Civilian Section of the Army. 

Mr. Curtis. The war production drive, and at the same time the 
War Manpower Commission has a huge operating organization. 

Mr. Lund. I probably should clarify this point. The conduct of 
the war production drive is one of the main fimctions of the Labor 
Production Division. The war production drive headquarters is 
only in charge of the publicity side of it. 

Mr. Curtis. You recommend the retaining of all three? 

Mr. Lund. By all means, sir. because I think each has a different 
and distinctive and important function. 

Mr. Curtis. You recommend the continuation of Mr. Mitchell's 
division? 

Mr. Lund. I do not have any comment to make on that, because 
I do not fully understand their operation there and bow it fits in 
with thfe war manpower question. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13163 



CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION 



Mr. Curtis. What do you mean by "concentration''? 

Mr. Lund. Concentration is a method of putting civihan produc- 
tion in certain plants so as to keep them busy on what is more nearly 
a full-time basis, rather than to have that civilian production scat- 
tered in a large number of plants that are working on a part-time 
basis. 

Mr. Curtis. To illustrate, to mean if you have got 10 factories 
that make typewriters, instead of letting them all make 10 percent 
that you would have one make them all? 

Mr. Lund. Or two, that is right. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you have any trouble with the companies? 

Mr. Lund. Yes; we have some trouble with the companies. Ob- 
viously, they all would like to continue to make typewriters. 

Mr. Curtis. How do you go about deciding which factory receives 
the concentration of work in that line, and which will you convert? 

Mr. Lund. We will apply certain criteria, Mr. Congressman. 

Mr. Curtis. Tell us about that. 

Mr. Lund. One of them is, which of these plants now making type- 
writers, let us say, can be the most readily, completely and effectively 
converted into war production. Secondly, which of them is located 
in a tight labor area and which of them is located in a loose labor 
area. The application of that criteria would be that you would per- 
mit those plants, or that plant, to continue making typewriters that 
is located in a loose labor area. A third factor is transportation; 
and the fourth factor might well be power, and conceivably the fifth 
factor might be housing. 

Mr. Curtis. Wlio should make the decision? 

Mr. Lund. We have a committee on concentration made up by 
Mr. Nelson for the purpose. I am a member of that committee. 

Mr. Curtis. You can enforce it by withholding material, can you 
not? 

Mr. Lund. Yes; it is very easily enforced. 

Mr. Curtis. In reference to the typewriters, if you have not 
covered it all, tell us, step by step, what you did in that regard. 

Mr. Lund. I have with me Mr. Norgren from my staff; I should 
have introduced him. I wonder if he could come up here and tell 
you about that? He can do a much better job than I can. 

Mr. Curtis. You might show, Mr. Reporter, that the chairman 
has arrived at this meeting. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL H. NORGREN, ACTING CHIEF, INDUSTRY 
CONSULTANT BRANCH, LABOR PRODUCTION DIVISION, WAR 
PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. Curtis. Mr. Norgren, do you want to briefl}^ state the con- 
centration of the typewriter set-up? If we crowd you too much for 
time, you can submit it in the printed record, but, briefly, I would 
like to have you cover it. 

Mr. Norgren. The procedure in typewriters was that our Division, 
our branch of the Labor Production Division, conceived that the 
concentration of typewriters was a desirable thing. It was deter- 
mined first and agreed on by the various sectors of the War Production 



13164 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Board that only a very small production of new typewriters was 
necessary for the duration of the war. The branch that has line 
jurisdiction over typewriters, the Services branch, did not appear to 
be too anxious to push the matter of getting the typewriter production 
concentrated, so our people who were acting as consultants to that 
branch decided to take the initiative. They studied the productive 
capacity of the various companies in the industry and came to the 
conclusion that it would only be necessary to keep one small plant 
operating out of the six or eight — ^I have forgotten the number of 
total plants. The process from then on was simply a matter of 
obtaining the concurrence of the various sectors and persons within 
the War Production Board to procure the issuance of a limitation 
order, or rather a concentration order, which is a type of limitation 
order to order that type of concentration. 

I do not believe there is any point in going into the details of how 
that was done, but the end result was that a limitation order was 
issued. 

Mr. Curtis. What company got the concentrated typewriter 
business? 

Mr. NoRGREN. The Woodstock Company. 

Mr. Curtis. That will be the only company that will make type- 
writers? 

Mr. Norgren. That will be the only company that will make new 
typewriters. 

OTHER CONCENTRATION ORDERS 

Mr. Curtis. Have you tried this with the farm equipment busi- 
ness? 

Mr. Norgren. That is in the process of being worked out now. 

Mr. Curtis. Did you have any success? 

Mr. Norgren. It has not been decided yet. The concentration 
committee of which Mr. Lund spoke has only begun to function 
officiallv for the past few weeks. 

Mr. Curtis. There you find a different problem. There are so 
many different farm machines. After all, the typewriters are more 
or less alike. 

Mr. Norgren. That is right. That is one of the serious compli- 
cating factors. The future requirements of new farm equipment 
are another complicated factor. 

Mr. Curtis. What would you say is retarding the concentration 
of these industries? • • i 

Mr. Norgren. Right at the present time, I would say it is the 
general problem of securing the concurrence of a relatively large 
number of branches and committees within the War Production 
Board on a feasible, worRable and acceptable plan. 

Mr. Curtis. Have any of the industries so far concentrated or been 
concentrated in the tight labor market? 

Mr. Norgren. There is a stove concentration order that covers 
what is called the cooking-appliance industry that I think can be 
called a concentration order, emphasizing the concentration of stove 
production, cooking-appliance production, in loose labor-market areas. 

Mr. Lund. I think you were asked about tight labor-market areas. 

Mr. Norgren. That goes also there. I mean it is a concentration 
of production, to a very considerable extent, out of tight labor areas. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13165 

Mr. Curtis. How about the bicycle industry? 

Mr. NoRGREN. The bicycle case is definitely not that type of case. 
It is more rfearly the opposite, although I would not say entirely. 

Mr. Curtis. Opposite of the stove industry? 

Mr. NoRGREN. It happens to have come out so that the two com- 
panies selected have continued production of, in this case, combat 
bicycles for the Army and both are in areas of impending labor shortage. 

TESTIMONY OF WENDELL LUND— Resumed 

Mr. Curtis. Has the War Manpower Commission taken an}^ part 
in the discussions leading to the orders to concentrate these industries? 

Mr. Lund. There is a plan being worked out now for very close 
cooperation between this committee and the War Manpower Com- 
mission. The War Manpower Commission will assign a consultant 
to the Concentration Committee to represent the mterests of the War 
Manpower Commission. I have discussed that with Governor Mc- 
Nutt, and he has named a man to work with the Concentration 
Committee. 

Mr. Curtis. It is our understanding that Directive 2 has opened 
up the question of integration of production and manpower planning. 
We understand that a Manpower Priorities Branch has been set up 
in W. P. B. with plans for regional, offices and labor-utilization 
inspectors. Why was this branch set up outside of the Labor Pro- 
duction Division? 

INIr. Lund. I think in order to tie it in very closely with the plan- 
ning for the use of raw materials, which is done under the vice chair- 
man, Mr. Knowlson, and this Manpower Priorities Section was placed 
under Mr. Knowlson also. 

Mr. Bender. Where did this directive come from? 

Mr. Lund. The directive came from the War Manpower Com- 
mission, sir, which has issued a number of directives. 

Mr. Curtis. Could your Division perform the functions of this 
Manpower Priorities Branch? 

Mr. Lund. I would say, given the personnel to do it, it probably 
could, although I think there is a lot of propriety in the present 
arrangement because of the close relationship between materials 
and manpower priorities. 

Mr. Curtis. I believe you stated your connection with the War 
Production drive is that you carry out what they decide. 

Mr. Lund. No; as far as the actual operation of the committees is 
concerned, we run the drive. 

Mr. Curtis. Why has the responsibility for guiding the labor- 
management production committees not been placed in the Labor 
Division? 

Mr. Lund. I am puzzled about that myself, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you think there is a little hoardmg of talent going 
on in the W. P. B? 

Mr. Lund. I do not loiow whether it is that. Congressman, or just 
a difference of opinion as to where the drive should be. 

Mr. Curtis. Dr. Lamb has a question or two. 



13166 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

FUNCTIONS OF LABOR PRIORITIES COMMITTEE 

Dr. Lamb. I would like to go back to the previous ^[uestioii and 
ask whether it is not true that the people now employed in your agency 
were not called in the Labor Division and subsequently responsible for 
much of the work now being done by the Labor Priorities Committee? 

Mr. Lund. Yes. 

Dr. Lamb. So that, in effect, the Labor Priorities Committee has 
superseded, let us say, the Labor Division in these matters? 

Mr. Lund. Well, in those particular matters I would say possibly 
to an extent. Dr. Lamb. Probably those matters were never as fully 
developed as they should have been. 

Dr. Lamb. But insofar as they were, you people were carrying them 
on? 

Mr. Lund. Yes. I think you will remember, as a matter of history, 
the work on manpower was performed by the old Labor Division and 
then certain responsibilities of the Labor Division were transferred to 
the War Manpower Commission. 

Dr. Lamb. But not to the War Production Board in some other 
branch. 

Mr. Lund. That is true. 

Dr. Lamb. These functions are now being carried on by the War 
Production Board outside of. your organization? 

Mr. Lund. That is correct. 

Mr. Curtis. In regard to labor utilization inspectors, what relation- 
ship should they have to the management-labor production com- 
mittees? 

Mr. Lund. I should say, Mr. Congressman, they ought to work 
most closely with them, because these labor-management com- 
mittees will know very well what is going on in the plant in the way 
of utilization of labor. 

Mr. Curtis. According to your statement, the Labor Production 
Division is designed to insure labor participation in the War Produc- 
tion Board? 

Mr. Lund. That is right. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you consider this participation is adequate? 

Mr. Lund. No, sir; I do not, and have repeatedly stated so. Or- 
ganized labor does not consider its participation adequate. We do 
not, in our division. We think labor ought to have a greater voice in 
policy determination and also in operations. 

Mr. Curtis. Wliat functions of the Labor Division have been 
transferred already to the War Manpower Commission? 

Mr. Lund. The function of labor supply and training, two of them. 

Mr. Curtis. The labor supply and training? 

Mr. Lund. That is correct. 

Mr. Curtis. What have you got left? 

Mr. Lund. We have left our industry consultant branch, which 
devotes itself to representing, let us say, the labor point of view in the 
various branches of W. P. B. We have the War Production Drive 
which we have touched on here, and the major part of it is administered 
by our division. We have a shipbuilding wage stabilization agree- 
ment, the administration of that agreement. 

Mr. Curtis. What functions does the Labor Division perform upon 
the directive of the War Manpower Commission? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13167 

Mr. Lund. Directive No. 2. None. I think probably this should 
be pointed out. It is an operating job to make up these priorities 
lists. It is done by the War Production Board, and then these 
priorities are acted upon by the War Manpower Commission. The 
Labor Production Division is not primarily an operating agency, it 
is an agency that has as its purpose, its main purpose, getting labor's 
participation at various levels in the War Production Board. 

Mr. Curtis. Do you think that the function of production planning 
and manpower planning should be done by separate agencies? 

Mr. Lund. As an original proposition, no. I think there are many 
good reasons, however, for having them done by separate agencies. 
They are big jobs, each of them, and each requires a large agency to 
perform them. I think sometimes there is perhaps a danger if you 
get too much under one roof. Certainly, though, Congressman, they 
ought to be very closely coordinated and many of the problems are 
inseparable. 

TRAINING OF MEN SUBJECT TO DRAFT 

Mr. Curtis. I want to ask you one question about training, and 
then I am through. Has it been done since the declaration of war 
and is it being done now in this Traming-Withm-Industry? Are 
they training men who would be subject to the draft? By that, I 
mean of the proper age limit, physical fitness and unmarried, or 
married without children. 

Mr. Lund. Undoubtedly. Undoubtedly a good many men have 
been trained and are being trained who are subject to the draft, that 
is, who will be taken by the Services. 

Air. Curtis. They are training them knowing they are going to 
be taken? 

Mr. Lund. Let me add to that this, that certainly attention should 
be called to the fact that perhaps the largest number are those who 
are likely to be deferred time and again. I think the reason that 
many of them who were trained are perhaps now in the Services, and 
will be in the Services three to six months hence, is because we have 
not known, and do not know now, what the ultimate needs of the 
Services will be. 

Mr. Curtis. Don't you think the people you are training, at least 
from here on out, should be women, men past 45, physically imperfect, 
and the men with several primary dependents? 

Mr. Lund. By all means. Congressman. I think the concentra- 
tion m training should be exactly where you have stated that it ought 
to be — women, and older men, men of over 45, let us say, and the 
handicapped, and men with one or more dependents. 

Mr, Curtis. Who is responsible for giving that training to men 
subject to the draft mstead of first exhausting this other group? 

Mr. Lund. What has been done of that nature — and certainly Mr. 
McNutt and other officials of the War Manpower Commission would 
be in far better position to discuss that than I — probably was done 
mistakenly, but it was done before we had full realization of what 
the demands for the services would be. I am not prepared to say, 
Mr. Congresman, to what extent it has been done, because certainly 
all along concentration has been on men who were more likely to be 
deferred. 



13168 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Curtis. But you have not exhausted the non military prospect 
in your training program before you started to train those fellows? 

Mr. Lund. That is correct as far as I know, sir. 

Mr. Curtis. In all this manpower discussion and planning, who 
is it that is looking after the agricultural interests to insure that we 
have suflEicient men to run these farms and to harvest these crops? 

Mr. Lund. That is the dual responsibility of the Employment 
Service and the Department of Agriculture. However, as far as the 
strictly employment phase of the job is concerned, the training phase 
of the job would be done by the Employment Service, which is one 
division of the War Manpower Commission. 

Mr. Curtis. As far as you are concerned, you have nothinsr to do 
with that angle? 

Mr. Lund. That is right. 

Mr. Curtis. That is all. 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Lund. 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bender. Would you develop your views on the National Serv- 
ice Act, which would operate through the existing employment 
services? 

Mr. Lund. I am not prepared, Mr. Congressman, to express my- 
self on the National Service Act. I think probably other officials of 
the War Manpower Commission ought to do that. I would want to 
make this comment, however, that I believe we should exhaust all 
voluntarv means of getting workers for jobs before we think of drafting 
thom. In my statement here this morning, I stated that there was 
still a good deal of discrimination against the Negro and against 
loyal aliens. 

Furthermore, we have not begun, of course, to utilize women to 
the fullest extent, or to any considerable extent, in industry. It just 
seems to me that all those things ought to be carried further, just as 
far as we can, before we start talking about a National Service Act. 
I thmk sometimes there is a tendency on the part of many of us to 
have too great a respect for the miraculous results of legislation. I 
personally am a firm believer in the sort of participation you can get 
on a voluntary basis, if it is properly explained to people and properly 
administered. 

Mr. Bender. Would you favor a National Service Act to operate 
through the Selective Service, providing the Selective Service strength- 
ened its relationship in local States and national levels with manage- 
ment and labor? 

Mr. Lund. No, sir. If we are going to have a National Service 
Act there would have to be the very closest cooperation between the 
National Selective Service and the War Manpower Commission. 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Lund, a large part of your functions were trans- 
ferred to W. M. C? 

Mr. Lund. Yes. 

functions not transferred 

Mr. Bender. Another large part has gone to W. P. B., the Priori- 
ties Branch, and the whole problem of concentration is now in a 
concentration committee. What basic functions are left to the Labor 
Production Division? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13169 

Mr. Lund. I reviewed that very briefly a few minutes ago. I 
would say, No. 1, sir, the war production drive, which of course has 
not been transferred out of this Division. I indicated there was some 
confusion as to where the full responsibility for it belonged. How- 
ever, the major part of the war production drive is still conducted by 
the Labor Production Division. Then, a second branch is what we 
call our Industry Consultant Service. In that we have consultants 
who work with all of the industry branches of W. P. B., getting labor's 
point of vi(>w into their deliberations and decisions. 

Incidentally, labor has insistently and consistently taken a position 
in the branches for all-out conversion to war production, and ^hat 
is one of its major contributio7is in these branches. 

Then, a third branch that we have is the Shipbuilding Wage Stabili- 
zation Branch, which administers an agreement, a wage stabilization 
agreement, affecting upwards of 500,000 shipbuilding workers. 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Lund, one other question. Some testimony has 
been offered here in these hearings about the productivity of workers 
in these plants. 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bender. As union men. 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

NO FORMULA FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION 

Mr. Bender. Do you thinlv a standard or a formula or a barometer 
as to how much should be produced by an individual worker, say in an 
8-hour shift, should be set? 

Mr. Lund. You are asking me: Do we have that? 

Mr. Bender. Yes. 

Mr. Lund. No, sir, we do not. I do not know that anyone has. 
I thinlv I should say, however, that the increase in productivity of 
American labor has been little short of phenomenal. That is true for 
a variety of reasons, one of them being that there pro'oably is in many 
plants more labor participation, in giving ideas as to improving 
production processes, than ever before. 

Mr. Bender. Do you believe in the shop-steward idea? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Bender. You believe that is a good plan? 

Mr. Lund. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Bender. The reason I asked that question, I know what your 
background is. I heard your name. Before you came into this 
work you were an official of some kind of some organized labor group ; 
were you not? 

Mr. Lund. No, sir; I was not. I was director of the Michigan 
Unemployment Compensation Commission. 

Mr. Bender. I heard of you in some connection. I might say I 
am not a labor baiter; I always enjoyed labor support in my own 
State. However, this matter has come to my attention quite recently: 
A man who carries a card in the Electrical Workers Union in my own 
city — ^ui fact he has carried the card for 27 years — ^took a job in a war 
plant during his vacation because he had one son overseas and another 
one about to go and he felt he ought to make this contribution. He 
was taken into a plant as an employee and he described this experience 
that he had: He said the man in the front office had absolutely nothing 



13170 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

to say; the foreman has nothing to say; the union has a shop steward 
in that plant who runs the works, and he said that he was there to 
receive an 8-hour pay for 8 hours work, and he was wilhng to give 
more than that, in fact, he was animated by a desire to produce 
because of patriotic reasons; when he was workmg too fast it was 
called to his attention that he was doing too much. 

As a matter of fact, the plant he worked in had a Navy "E" flying 
from the flag mast. He said whenever some employee would work 
too hard or too fast they would take some toilet paper and put an 
"E" on and pin the "E" on this fellow, just as a matter of a joke. 

Now, I am concerned about labor, I am concerned about labor not 
losing its advantages in this country, and I am wondering if any effort 
is being made on the part of your group to correct a condition of that 
kind? 

Now, this man was thoroughly incensed; in fact, he was not only 
telling me about it but telling everybody he met. He was thoroughly 
aroused. In fact, he made an issue of it on the floor of his union. I 
wonder if you have anything to say about that? 

Mr. Lund. Congressman, I would say that instances of the nature 
you have mentioned are, in my opinion, very few and far between. 
On the contrary; I know because instances come to our attention 
every day that labor has made an amazing record in increasing its 
productivity during this war and in going all-out in all respects. 
Therefore, this instance would, in my opinion, be an extremely rare 
exception. I can assure you that it is not geueral. I can be very 
positive on that point. Where we find instances like that, of course 
we do our best to correct them. I am not sure that we have found 
any. I will amend that to say if we would find any we would cer- 
tainly do our best to correct them, although there again the best 
vehicle would be the labor-management committee in the plant, it 
seems to me, for dealing with such a situation as you have described. 

You asked me a question a moment ago, and I am not sure that I 
gave a satisfactory answer to it. I said: If we were to have a national 
service act it would be necessary for Selective Service and the War 
Manpower Commission to work very closely together. Now, I do 
not mean to imply that I would favor, or organized labor would 
favor, placing the civilian phase of the administration of any national 
service act in Selective Service. 

Mr. Bendee. That is all. 

The Chaieman. Thank you very much, Mr. Lund. 

Mr. Nelson, have you assistants that you desire to bring with you? 
Have them seated there with you. 

The Congressman says you come from the State of Illinois and he 
says you do not need any assistance. 

Mr. Nelson. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY BY DONALD' M. NEISON, CHAIEMAN, WAR 
PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chaieman. Mr. Nelson, on any questions propounded to you 
by members of the committee, we do not want to say for a minute 
that there is anything critical in them, because that is not intended 
at all. 

Mr. Nelson. I am sure that is true. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE AilGRATION 13171 

The Chairman. We are just simply Members of Congress, and we 
have to report back to the Congress certain facts, that is all. So, 
there are no catch questions or any attempt to criticize you in any way. 

We appreciate very much your coming here. The committee has 
a few questions to ask you. 

The first question I would like to ask you, Mr. Nelson, is this: 

When you last appeared before this committee in October 1941/ 
you emphasized that planning war production required a full knowl- 
edge of military requirements. At that time you told this committee 
that the first action you had taken as Executive Director of S. P. A. B. 
was to request this information of the Army and Navy and that you 
expected to get it within 30 or 40 days. Have you, as yet, obtained 
data on military requirements and developed a detailed war production 
program? Have you been able to? 

REQUIREMENTS OF GLOBAL WAR 

Mr. Nelson. Oh, yes, Mr. Congressman. I think we have got to 
view this question of military requirements as one where none of us 
recognized at any time the complete necessities of tomorrow. 

Now, let us stop and think what the condition was in 1941, when 
I told you that. We did get requirements after a fashion. As far 
as I am concerned I believe the military tried to do their best to give 
their requirements, what they thought their requirements would be, 
but as you get into a global war of the immense size of this one, 
the question of requirements has now become a question of whether 
or not they can be fulfilled, because the requirements are everything 
that can possibly be had. We have got to look at our job and be 
reconciled to that fact. 

The Chairman. In other words, there is no such thing as a blue- 
print? 

Mr. Nelson. There is no such thing as a blueprmt. 

Conditions change, the whole thing changes overnight. We have 
got to be prepared and be flexible for those changes. That is war. 
That is what war is ajl about. War is pitting our strength and our 
brains against the enemy's strength and brains. They have strength, 
and they have brains. 

The Chairman. All over the world? 

Mr. Nelson. All over the world, yes; any place they may attack 
us. Now, I think, sir, that todny, as in the past j^ear, the Army and 
Navy and the Maritime Commission gave us the best they had, but 
this thing has changed to such an extent that the thing that we thought 
was all-out effort in 1941 , and then m the early part of 1942, that which 
we thought was all-out effort, is not. Now, it is necessary to do much 
more than that. There is just no comparison between our job today 
and our job 6 months ago. 

The Chairman. In the World War, for instance, why, we did not 
have to fire a gun m the Pacific, did we? 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

The Chairman. There was no trouble in the Pacific at all. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. We had production in France, produc- 
tion in England, production in Italy, production in other places that 

' See Washington Hearings, pt. 20, p. 8015. 



13172 WASHINGTON HEARIN<iS 

we could depend upon. Today, they depend upon us. We must 
supply Russia with the needed things that she has to have as her 
territories are occupied and certain strategic minerals or strategic 
materials of one kind or another are taken by the enemy. We want 
to keep Russia fighting, because they are killing Germans, and even if 
it disrupts our program and they need certain things to make air- 
planes or tanks, I think it is our job to give it to them. I know of no 
way to plan that. 

EXPANSIONS IN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 

We have tried, sir, and are continuing to try to do the best job of 
planning that can possibly be done. I would just like to cite you one 
figure. I want to give you one part of this picture. Let us take the 
aircraft industry, for example. You say, why cannot we plan that all- 
out and have the thing done in fine detail so that everything moves 
smoothly? If you will just look at this picture: In 1939 the aircraft 
industry had 49,000 workers -and they expanded to 640,000 m 1942, 
and they will go up to 1,200,000 in 1943, a multiplication of 24 times. 
The value of the production will go up from $280,000,000 to 
$21,000,000,000 in 1943. 

I will just try to put down a homely illustration to show you what 
this means, to expand the industry to that extent. Let us say you had 
a city of 500,000 people and that city grew from that 500,000 in 1939 
to 6,500,000 in 3 years, and to 12,000,000 in 4 years, and you had 
to prepare the housing, the sanitation, transportation, and all of the 
essential supplies for 12,000,000 instead of 500,000; you people who 
have had a knowledge of what it means to administer city govern- 
ment will get an impression of what it means to expand the aircraft 
industry to that extent. Thousands and thousands of items have to 
be expanded all over this country to do that. If we are going to have 
mass production in the aircraft industry we have to assemble some 
40,000 different parts. They all must meet at one time. The bomber 
is no good unless these parts all meet at one time and they are put in 
and the bomber moves out of the factory. 

That is not an alibi. I am merely trying to give you the situation, 
what it means to make a blueprint of this thing. 

The Chairman. Another problem brought out by General Hershey. 
You say you have to run to 1,200,000 aircraft workers before you finish. 
Well, 3,895 quit their jobs there in August this year. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

The Chairman. That is another problem. 

Mr. Nelson. That is a real problem. 

The Chairman. As General Hershey pointed out, of course they 
can recall them from France to England, that is a short way; but we 
cannot recall them from Australia and Egypt very easily. 

Mr. Nelson. It is very difficult to do that. 

The Chairman. Do you think that war production can be organ- 
ized eft'ectively unless there is a detailed production program consisting 
of a monthly schedule of products to be manufactured? 

materials and production control 

Mr. Nelson. No, sir; I do not. Of course, that has been our 
constant aim. We have reached the point where the demands upon 
us are such that we have to produce the maximum. Now, the maxi- 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13173 

mum is dictated by the maximum you can get out of certain materials. 
We have got so much steel; we have got so much copper; we have so 
much molybdenum, tungsten, vanadium, and so forth, and those 
things determine the size of the program. 

The Chairman. Do you know exactly how much you have? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir, as nearly as we can figure those things. 
Of course, they are dependent upon a lot of things, too. Our quan- 
tities are determined upon shipping and a lot of other things, all of 
which may change the picture overnight. 

The Chairman. A constant reference is always made to what 
England is doing. England is not comparable with us. She is not 
comparable geographically, and not from the standpomt of population 
either. She has got a central government there. You met Williams 
when he was here? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In England, what they do, of course, is to give a 
man a war contract and attach to it his contract for materials at the 
same time. 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. Don't forget this, Mr. Chairman, if they 
cannot supply all of the materials they have us to call on to give the 
materials to them. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Mr. Nelson. For instance, if they haven't got enough of a certain 
material and we can ship it, the demand comes on us. We are 
anxious to supply it; we are glad to. It may be ball bearings today, 
it may be transmissions, it may be alloy steel, it may be ingot steel, 
it may be anything. We figure we have got to keep the production 
going. They have got a great, big reservoir that they can draw from 
and get a regularity of flow. We want it that way. 

The Chairman. I saw an article in Collier's last week wherein it 
was stated that 37 airplanes out of 100 in England are built from 
salvaged material from German and English planes. I could hardly 
believe that. 

Mr. Nelson. I think it depends on what you mean by "built," sir. 
If a plane crashes, you can often rebuild it. Now, it may be merely 
the repair of a plane. If a plane has a carburetor or somethmg goes 
bad, all right, they can put another carburetor on, or anything of that 
kind; they can repair, and should repair, and do repair it. 

The Chairman. Of course, the words "rebuilt completely" were left 
out. That is what you are getting at? 

Mr. Nelson. That is what I am getting at. 

The Chairman. Of course. It seems to me that if you want to add 
a new type of war production to your current schedule, such as air 
cargo planes, you could only do it efi'ectively if you deliberately modi- 
fied your existing program in order to make room for the new schedule. 
Since we are in a very rapidly changing situation and need a great 
deal of flexibility in production, is it not doubly important that we 
have a detailed program which we can modify according to changed 
conditions? 

IMPORTANCE OF PROPER SCHEDULING 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir; very definitely so. And I think that this 
whole question of scheduling is probably the most important single 
problem ahead of us. We have been working on it for some months, 



13174 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

finding the right way to do it, have had the best brains from industry- 
come in and advise us. It is not just a question of scheduUng a few 
items, it is a question of scheduling thousands and thousands of com- 
ponents all over this United States. The job of scheduling in this 
picture is just the most gigantic job of scheduling that anybody under- 
took, and the difficulty, sir, is in getting all your figures compiled. 

The Chairman. Not only the war came upon us quickly, but we 
are a democracy, too; we do not get under way so fast. 

Mr. Nelson. Yes; it is rather difficult. 

The Chairman. When we do roll, we roll pretty fast. 

Mr. Nelson. Yes; we roll pretty fast. I think we are nearer to it 
today than we have ever been. 

In addition to the items we need to make for Army and Navy and 
the Maritime Commission, we need to make articles for England, 
Russia, Australia, for China, for South America; and for our own 
civilian economy; that means scheduling practically everything that 
is produced in the United States. 

The Chairman. In your March realinement of the War Production 
Board, you eliminated the contract review function which the W^ar 
Production Board had formerly exercised, thus giving the military 
services exclusive responsibility for contract letting and production 
scheduling. Are you satisfied that contracts to date have been so let 
as to maximize production? 

Mr. Nelson. No; of course, no one could be satisfied completely. 
The reason that was done is that our own people from our organiza- 
tion were put right over there with the Army and Navy, who are 
doing it and who are doing it according to the plans and policies that 
had been laid out. It seems to me that the thing to do is to avoid as 
much duplication and waste as possible. When Mr. Frank Folsom 
goes over to the Navy and works at the right hand of Admiral Robin- 
son and Mr. Forrestal I think right there Mr. Folsom can do a better 
job passing on the contracts right in the Navy, and does it. Now, I 
did not feel that it was necessary to have another group review those 
same contracts. The whole question of policy, Mr. Chairman, is 
tied in through the Purchase Policy Committee which Was set up at 
that time, composed of a man from the War Production Board, one 
from the Army, one from the Navy, one from the Maritime Commis- 
sion, and the Air Corps, and the whole question of policy is set, and 
then it becomes a question of reviewing the contract in terms of that 
policy. I did not feel, I have never felt, that that was relinquishing 
any authority, by the delegation of Mr. Folsom to review those con- 
tracts right over there. I felt certain Mr. Folsom would do the job 
for the Navy as he would do it if he were working in my own shop. 
He would get speedier action there and avoid duplication, because 
duplication is a waste, as you know. That was the purpose of it, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you. You have pointed out that effective 
war production depends on the snnultaneous scheduling of materials, 
facilities, and men in proper proportion. I gather from curreni news- 
paper reports that there is a conflict going on as to whether scheduling 
should be done by individual prime contractors, by the military serv- 
ices, or by a production scheduling group within the War Production 
Board. Which method do we now have and are you contemplating 
any changes? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13175 

Mr. Nelson. Well, I am amazed to read in the newspapers today 
about all these conflicts going on. Some of them I never heard about. 
Wlien you get a job of any size, you get men from all over the country, 
you get differences of opinion as to how the job is going to be done, 
differences of opinion during the formative period, and those things 
are often regarded as conflicts. I do not regard those as conflicts. 
To me the way to get a job well done is to take men of different walks 
of life, different experiences, and have them get together to find out 
what the best method is. 

RECORDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT 

On that point, certainly it has to be done in two ways, it seems to 
me. A job of scheduling, of course, has to be done by the manufac- 
turer. No manufacturer can operate well without a schedule. On 
the other hand, he has to be given a schedule within which to operate. 
Then you get this thing into a regularized form. 

Let me explain what I mean. In March, just to take the period 
that you were talking about, no one could predict how much American 
industry could do in any particular. Had we set a schedule at that 
time, we could never have gotten maximum production, because of the 
savings that have been made in man-hours and material through con- 
stant repetition, through engineering genius, and tlirough this co- 
operative work that has gone on all over this country, to try to pro- 
duce more with less, and I think some of the records of accomplish- 
ment and reduction in man-hours to manufacture a gun or airplane, or 
this thing or that thing, has been perfectly amazing, and would be 
amazing to you. I shall be very glad for somebody to check back. I 
have prepared just the experience of one group of companies, and I 
wiU show you what I mean, how by changing forgings to stampings 
and stampings to something else, changing one material to another, 
and as we get these things into production these changes are made. 

The Chairman. Who supervises the changes? Is that carried on 
through some sort of training? 

^Ir. Nelson. In the main, of course, it is the Army and Navy who 
supervise the changes. We have a conservation and simplification 
division made up of some of the best experts we can get, who make 
recommendations to the Army for changes of specifications, and things 
of that sort. By getting the best engineering brains out of the steel 
industry, for instance, and the American Society for Testing Mate- 
rials, we have been making new specifications for steel which eliminate 
some critical materials like nickel. 

The Chairman. Governor McNutt testified yest erday that the 
productivity of individual workers has really gone up, too. 

Mr. Nelson. It has, sir. It has kept going up. 

The Chairman. The sunplest example is in shipbuilding; 10,000-ton 
cargo ships that formerly took 103 days are now being tm-ned out in a 
relatively few days. What is the number of days now? 

Mr. Nelson. Twenty-nine days now. 

The Chairman. That is really remarkable. 

Mr. Nelson. It is remarkable. It is the application ofmew meth- 
ods of mass production, and managerial genius combined with pro- 
ductivity of the workers doing a job. 

The Chairman. In the old days, they used to start from the keel 
and build the ship up from the keel. 

60396— 42— pt. 34 9 



13176 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Nelson. Yes; they built it by putting on plate by plate, and 
today it is built in sections. Groups can be making sections all over 
the big yard. Formerly a shipyard was a small plot of ground in 
which you just had the inventory and keel, you put it on plate by 
plate. Now, you have a big yard, with fabrication of parts going on 
all over; the fabricated parts are put together and welded, and when 
they are completed the whole superstructure has been built in the 
meantime and can be picked up by a crane and put on the hull, and 
the job is completed. 

Mr. Bender. Congressman, would you mind if I asked a question? 

The Chairman. Not at all. 

Mr. Bender. Now, that you are on Mr. McNutt, I wonder if you 
would care to express yourself regarding the National Service Act? 
Do you favor the National Service Act? 

Mr. Nelson. I really must say to you that I have not studied 
that enough to be able to tell you anything about it. What I want to 
say, of course, what I think we have to say, is we must have workers at 
places where they are needed at times that they are needed. If that 
can be done voluntarily, I think it is fine ; if it cannot be done volun- 
tarily, then in some way it ought to be done. We have got to have 
men in the copper mines who are producing copper, producing the 
maxunum amount of copper, because every pouncl of copper we lose 
today out of production is a pound of ammunition lost. We are short 
of copper, we need copper, and every single pound we lose through 
any reason whatsoever takes a pound of ammimition away from our 
soldiers. 

Mr. Bender. If such a national service act would be in order, do 
you think it ought to be operated through the existing employment 
services? 

Mr. Nelson. That I do not know — I do not know enough about 
either, sir, to express an intelligent opinion to you, because I have my 
own problems. 

The Chairman. I heard you have got quite a few. 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. 

WAR AGENCIES ALL PART OF ONE ORGANIZATION 

The Chairman. Will it ever be possible to schedule production 
factors properly if contract letting and production scheduling is 
under the control and responsibility of the Army and Navy, the dis- 
tribution of raw materials is centered within the War Production 
Board, and the planning and manpower is centered in still other 
agencies? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, may I give you the picture as I see it? There 
has been a great deal of talk about this question of one thing being 
in one place and another thing being in another place. To me the 
War Production Board, the Army and Navy, the Maritune Com- 
mission, and all other agencies engaged in war production are part of 
one organization, and each has its functions to perform. It can be 
done in that way, sir; I am positive of that. I am positive that is 
the only way it can be done. 

The Chairman. Wlio has the final say? 

Mr. Nelson. Sn? 

The Chairman. Who has the final say, the board or you? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13177 

Mr. Nelson. I have the final say. I have been given the authority- 
over war production by the President, and I have the final say m any 
particular, in anything relating to war production. 

Now, you talk about the question of manpower. There, again, owp 
job is to say how many workers we need in a certain place to do a cer- 
tain job, and then it is the function of the Manpower Commission to 
get those workers for us to do that particular job. 

There was a question at one time whether the Manpower Commis- 
sion ought to be under War Production Board or not. Well, you can 
make a structure so big that no one person can do a job in adminis- 
tering it. This job is so big that it takes more than one. There are 
no superhuman people m this country; there are few geniuses, we are 
all just average people; we can do just so much, and if you put all 
the activities in one place you still have to delegate them to people 
to administer. The question is where you delegate and how well the 
people work together to do a job. 

As far as Mr. McNutt and I are concerned, I was 100 percent for 
Mr. McNutt's appointment. He and I can work together 100 per- 
cent. There is no difficulty there. 

The Chairman. He so stated yesterday. 

Mr. Nelson. That is the fact, sir. We have a function to perform, 
and the War Manpower Commission has a function to perform. 
Its function is to take the total manpower of the country just as we 
take the total material and decide how to get the best distribution of 
that, in order to get the maximum impact on the enemy from that 
number of people. That maximum impact may come through the 
military services, through putting them on doing a job making war 
material of one kind or another, or doing various other things that are 
necessary to be done. This is a war economy today. It must be. 
The only function of this country today is to win this war. It must 
be that. Everybody has to work together to do that job of wmning 
this war. 

The Chairman. Mr. Nelson, according to information furnished us, 
the Army and Navy have proposed through the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board that the military services take over detailed alloca- 
tion of materials for military products after allocation by the War 
Production Board as between military and civilian uses. Do you 
think the military should be burdened with such additional serious 
responsibilities? 

]\lr. Nelson. No; ^nd I do not think they are. I do not know 
anythmg about the particular thing that you are talking about. 
Under my executive order, the Army and Navy Munitions Board 
report to the President through me. Now, it is a question of how the 
thing can be done best. That is the only way I look at it, how the 
thing can be done best. You say: ''Can this be done best that way?" 
If it cannot be, sir, it will not be done that way. If you look at my 
executive order, the Army and Navy Munitions Board reports directly 
to the President through me, and therefore I do not understand this 
newspaper talk that I am at war with the Army or that there is a 
conflict of opiniori as to this thing, that thing, or the other thing. 
Certainly, it is a question of trying to find the right way to do this job. 
It is going to be improved every day. We will change it every day, 
if necessary, until we find the right way to get the maximum war. 
production in this country out of the material that we have or can get. 



13178 WASHINGTON HEARIN'OS 

By that "can get," I mean we constantly have to mcrease our pro- 
duction of material. But on the other hand it takes material to make 
material. It takes steel to make more steel, and there comes the 
fine question of balances, as to how much you shall use to get your 
maximum impact on the encmj^ now, how much you shall use in the 
spring of 1943, how much in the fall of 1943, how much in the spring of 
1944, because it often takes a year to 18 months to expand these 
facilities. The material you use now in expanding steel will not come 
in until the fall of 1943. If you start making a new expansion it takes 
just that much longer. A lot of expansion is going on; we are expand- 
ing in every direction. 

We set July 1943 as the cut-off date. It was set as a cut-off date 
for material that could be brought in by July 1943 and we went ahead 
with that expansion. If it could not be brought in by July 1943, we 
deferred the expansion, the only exception to that being a few things 
like copper and a few critical materials that we knew we were going 
to have to have. 

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION — -STEEL AS AN EXAMPLE 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Nelson, our report of last March said 
that the chief failure of procurement was due to the company-by- 
company and item-by-itcm purchase of armaments by the separate 
supply services. We also said: "Each of the major corporations have 
been permitted to determine the extent to which it could subcontract 
and to choose its contractors. With the best of will, the 50 to 100 
corporations charged with production of virtually our entire program 
could not individually have planned so as to secure the full use of our 
industrial resources." 

Now, Mr. Nelson, if the job of materials distribution were given to 
the Services, would they not transfer the responsibility to the prime 
contractors, just as in the past they have transferred the responsibility 
for determining subcontracting and facility expansion? What have 
you done in that regard? 

Mr. Nelson. May I explam to you how this material is now being 
distributed? 

The Chairman. If you will, please; yes, sir. 

Mr. Nelson. It is not anywhere near perfect yet, but we see ways 
of improving it all the time, and have. This question of distribution 
of material I have seen for a year was gomg to be a major problem. 
I said so before a number of committees. 

Now, let us look at the question of steel, for example. "Steel" is a 
generic term for hundreds of different items that go to make up steel, 
such as steel plate for the building of ships, steel plate of all varieties, 
sizes, and thiclmesses, structural shapes of all kinds and descriptions' 
each one of which is fitted for a particular kind of job to meet certain 
stresses or strains ; alloy steels of all kinds or formulae for every sort of 
thing. The airplane engine is really a metallurgical developrnent 
rather than a mechanical development. It was done on the basis of 
development of metallurgy of steel and various formulae are used for 
different parts of that paTticular engine. We can go on to bars, rods, 
rivets, nails, bolts, nuts, screws, and all of those things that are made 
of steel. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13179 

Now, tlio job is to assemble in one place all of the various require- 
ments of all the claimants, seat them around the table with one man 
given the authority to make that distribution. That man is the head 
of our requirements committee; he has the complete authority from 
the Chairman of the War Production Board to make the distributions. 
The head of the steel division is chairman of the steel subcommittee. 
The thing is perfected more every day. We know each day more 
and more about what out requirements really are, because these people 
represent literally thousands of individual consumers, so we know 
each month what our demand is for all of the thousands and thousands 
of items that are made of steel. 

That demand comes in, the Army brings in its estimated demand as 
well as it can — and it is perfecting its estimated demand each day — 
not one of these are perfect yet, and probabl}'^ will not be until the day 
we win the war. The Navy brings m its requnement or request, the 
Maritime Commission makes its request, the Procurement Division 
of the Treasury for lend-lease and others; our Division of Civilian 
Supply for the absolutely essential things that are needed for the 
health and safety of the people, the things that are needed for the fire 
services, sanitation, running our cities, and so forth. That is brought 
down to the bare essentials today, only the things that are absolutely 
necessary for the health and safety of the people. 

South America: It is necessary that we supply steel to South 
America, because we are getting copper, molybdenum, and tin, and 
all kinds of things from South America, which we have to have from 
South America, and in order to do that they have to have their rail- 
roads so they can bring that stuff to port. 

For England, for lease-lend, for Russia, for Canada. Canada has 
big production going. All of these people, we try to get in one place, 
try to seat them around the table each month to find what their re- 
quirements are. Then, we know the total supply; then it becomes 
a question of where to whittle down and how to whittle it down, and 
to do it as best we can in terms of strategy and necessity, and a lot 
of other things to make your cloth fit your pattern. 

The Chairman. What check have > ou, Air. Nelson? In other 
words, the Army might fudec, or the Navy, or the Maritime Com- 
mission. Do you check back? 

Mr. Nelson. Oh, yes, of course, it is checked back. Don't forget 
sitting around the table are the claimants, and they check each other. 

The Chairman. They watch each other pretty closely? 

Mr. Nelson. They v/atch each other pretty closely. 

That is the s.ystem, sir. It gets better, better, and better, as our 
requirements get better, as we know what we need. It is not perfect 
yet, a long w\ay from it, but that, sir, is the method. 

Now, when that is done the Army is allotted so much, the Navy is 
allotted so much, and the Maritime Commission is allotted so much. 
Just taking the question of steel plate for merchant ships, a program 
has been set for merchant ships, so man}^ million tons the next 2 years. 
All right, thai takes half the amount of steel plate. We have checked 
with the Maritmie Commission, we know how much steel plate goes 
to make up a vessel, and it is easy to check and it is checked, and 
then the plate is allotted to all these dift'erent companies. The Mari- 
time Connnission takes that plate and allots it to the various ship- 
yards. They need so much plate each month, they can buy so much 



13180 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

steel plate each month. Plate is allotted for pipe lines, plate is 
allotted for shells, plate is allotted for gun carriages, plate is allotted 
for locomotives — we can just go down the line and give you hundreds 
of uses for steel plate. People say, "Why can't we have more plate?" 
We can do any one thing, and can do probably any two things, just 
carve them out and do them, but to do the myriad and multiple 
things with that steel plate is a very difficult thing to do. 

Then, again, we have so many ingot tons of steel. We have to 
fabricate the ingot mto the various things. Steel plate is one of them. 

Alloy steel: Ingot steel might be put to making alloy steel, bars, 
shapes, nuts, bolts, rivets, nails, structural shapes of all kinds, de- 
scription, and sizes. The amount of steel plate you can make is 
determined by the total amount of other things you have to make out 
of the total amount of ingot steel. The job is to try to increase the 
total amount of ingot. If we can get more scrap we can increase the- 
total ingot. All right, we have to conduct a scrap campaign. We go 
all over the country to get in all the scrap we can in order to increase 
the ingot, and when we increase the ingot we can get more shapes, 
we can get more bars, we can get more nails, we can get more of all 
the other things that I mentioned. 

Am I making the picture plain? 

The Chairman. Yes; I think so. 

Mr. Nelson. Now, the job of scheduling is an exceedingly impor- 
tant one, one that we have not perfected, and it has not been perfected 
for one of the reasons as I stated to you previously, no one knew the 
maximum of what any one factory could do. On the other hand, we 
did not know just what you were going to need to accord with strategy. 
Our strategy changes. It is necessary to move one thing ahead of 
another. Maybe one thing today assumes great importance because 
of its immediate necessity. 

We have arrived at the point which one of your first questions in- 
dicated, a very clear perspective. As you add anything to your pro- 
gram, 3^ou have to subtract something from it. 

The Chairman. Yes; I tMnk you are clear about that, absolutely 
clear, about the fact that we did not know just what the individual 
factories could produce. We had striking evidence of that. This 
committee spent several days m Detroit over a year ago on the 
conversion of the automobile industry. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

The Chairman. We had Ford's representative, we had General 
Motors — we had them all, and they all agreed it could not be done. 
So, we brought them back to Washington, which was Mr. Knudsen's 
own idea, and it is being done. 

Mr. Nelson. It has been done. 

The Chairman. We did not know it could be done. They said it 
could not be done. 

Mr. Nelson. Yes. 

review and scheduling of operations 

The Chairman. I just have one or two more questions. Our 
studies of some time ago show that 10 companies were awarded approx- 
imately two-fifths of all military supply contracts and that 100 com- 
panies were awarded more than 80 percent of the war contracts. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13181 

If the War Production Board were to review the contracts and 
schedule the production of, first, the 10 largest prime contractors, 
and then the next 100, would not the bulk of the material and produc- 
tion schedulmg be mider control? Is there any way to handle that? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes. I think that is a very mtehigent question, sir. 
It could be handled if we had some 700 different companies scheduled 
and had a schedule made up for them from the services. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Nelson. You would have about 50 percent of the steel covered 
by a schedule. 
' The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. Nelson. That is the big job ahead of us that we are hard at 
work on. We have got some of the best brams of uidustry down 
here helping us to do that particular job. 

The Chairman. I want to say to you that you are modest to this 
extent, to admit the job is not done by you or by anybody so far. 
You have got plenty of work to do yet. 

Mr. Nelson. We certainly have. We have just started. 

The Chairman. If the War Production Board were to review and 
schedule the operations of the largest prime contractors, would not 
you need a special division composed of uidustrial engineers and men 
"directly from the production line and would not this enable you to 
reduce the size of the remainder of your staff? Or have you got 
them now? 

Mr. Nelson. We have got them now, sir, and we have got them 
in the Army and Navy. Don't forget, I consider if a man is working 
in the Army or the Navy, and workmg on this particular problem, I 
don't care whether he is working there or for us, we are all working 
to the same end. The job is to get them together to work to that end. 
There will be at the start differences of opmion as to the best way to 
do it — there are bound to be, just as there are differences of opinion in 
the legislature, and that is the best way to pass a particular kind of 
law. You have these variations of opinion, because men have 
different ideas, different experiences. After they have found what 
they consider is the right thing, then it is a job that everybody pitches 
in to do, and it is done according to that right way. 

We have industrial engineers, the best in the country. Take Mr. 
Ernest Kanzler who is with us. He is the man who did the whole 
scheduling for Henry Ford. I think he is the principal exponent of 
scheduling in the United States. He was with the Ford organization 
when it was done — it was his responsibility to do it for the Ford 
organization. 

We have men from General Motors. We have got men from many 
companies, all of whom are working in this direction, and have been 
for months. This is not a kind of thing that has been stationary, 
but perhaps it has not been going fast enough. Each day I know we 
have not done as much as we should have done, and I know tomorrow 
we will not do as much as we should do, but not because we haven't 
tried. 

The Chairman. Do you contemplate setting up any special division 
of consulting engineers to work just the way you are doing now? 

Mr. Nelson. The Division of Consulting Engineers — doing what? 



13182 WASHINGTON HEARINlGS 

The Chairman. Do you contemplate setting up such a special 
division composed of industrial engineers, as you indicated, all by 
itself? You will have them work with you, that is your idea? 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. It works out much better than these 
advisory committees. 

The Chairman. There was one question handed up here by a 
reporter, I guess, that we might as well find out about if we can. 

CONTROL OF PRODUCTION FLOW 

There have been statements published to the effect that your new 
director general of operations, A4r. Ernest Kanzler, favors turning 
large quantities of materials over to war industries, and let them, to a 
large extent, control the flow of production. Do you favor this plan? 
Would this not make it impossible for Kaiser to secure materials for 
cargo planes? I understaDd you have already answered that. 

Mr. Nelson. That question does not mean anything. We are not 
turning materials over to anybody except on the basis of indicated 
need. There must be some place where all these programs come from. 
If we decide cargo planes are essential — I say "we," I mean the Gov- 
ernment — the people who decide the question of whether cargo planes 
are or are not essential are our chiefs of staff. Our chiefs of staft' are 
fighting this war — it has been entrusted to them, and they must 
determine the kind and character of airplanes they want; they must 
determine the urgency of dift'erent items, or of the program; they 
must determine bow much shipping is needed to take the men over- 
seas. Now, we come back to them and point out certain things, and 
it is a question of a constant flow back and forth to determine what 
the total program will be. 

Now, take this question of cargo planes. There are a lot of cargo 
planes being made in the program, and big ones are in the program. 
This is a particular kind of cargo plane that is bigger than anything 
we have. I want to go ahead and build some of them to see whether 
they fly, to see whether they are the thing we need. I am certain if 
we are shown that they are, and that they are better than something 
else in the program, the program can be arranged to put these into the 
program. 

The Chairman. Are you working on that now? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir; we are working on that right now. 

Mr. Bender. I would like to ask Mr. Nelson a question here. 

We, a few days ago, had a message dehvered to us from the President 
of the United States regarding production. If we are encountering 
shortages of materials today, how are you going to produce twice the 
present war goods? 

discussion of lead factor 

Mr. Nelson. Well, sir, because we are today cutting up material 
at the rate at which we are going to be making up material into 
finished products next January. There is a big lead factor in this 
thing. We are on this big upswing of production. It goes up like 
that [indicating]. That is the way it is scheduled and planned. We 
are cutting up material today into component parts of one kind or 
another that are going to be up at this point [indicating], way up here 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13183 

some place [indicatingj. It has not come out yet in a finished product. 
It takes a long while for these pipe lines to fill up and turn out a finished 
product. Take the airplanes, for example. The material is going 
into the airplane factories now, or has been for the past few months, 
that eventually will come out in January or February. 

Mr. Bender. Dr. I.amb would like to ask you a question that he 
has in mind. 

Dr. Lamb. Sir, if your lead factor is, say, 6 months, what would be 
your picture, and if so will the line continue to go up, and if so will the 
materials increase proportionately — or don't they have to increase 
proportionately? 

Mr. Nelson. Of course, your whole question of lead factors de- 
pends upon the time it takes to fabricate that particular thing. Some 
things have a lead factor of 6 months, some 2 month, some 1 month. 

Dr. Lamb. I am trying to strike an average. 

Mr. Nelson. Say the average lead factor would be somewhere 3 or 
4 months. At this particular time you are having to get into pro- 
duction many of the things that are going into the schedule that comes 
way up here [indicating]. Eventually, that has to be worked out. Ifc 
cannot go on indefinitely, of course. The question where it stops de- 
pends entirely on the total that we can do in this country. Nobody 
knows wliat that total is. We thought, when the President made his 
speech last January, it was 40,000,000,000 in 1942 and 60,000,000,000 
in 1943. We are going to beat that considerably. We are planning 
much bigger than 60,000,000,000 for 1943, because v*^e know we can 
do it. Just how much more, we do not know as yet. 

The Chairman. One question, and then I am through with my 
questions. See if I have this clear: You say to this congressional 
committee that no matter how much the Army's estimates are, or the 
Navy's, or any other war program agency's estimates, they are still 
checked, and you have the final say, after consultation with them; 
is that the idea? 

ALLOCATION OF MATERIALS 

Mr. Nelson. That is right, sir. Somebody has to have that, 
because you have all of these claimants for this material. You have 
got two things that function now in this present program; One, the 
materials that go into making up the materiel of war, which is under 
the War Production Board, and then you have the Munitions Assign- 
ment Board that determines where they shall go after they are made. 
Now, we have nothing to do with that. The question of where they 
go is none of my business. The question of who gets the material 
has to be decided by some umpire. Some umpire has to determine 
how much shall go to Russia, how much shall go to England, how much 
shall go to South America, how much shall go to Australia, how much 
shall go to China. In terms of making these things which they need 
badly, strategic material, aluminum, magnesium, or whatnot, how 
much goes to the Army, how much goes to the Navy, how much goes 
to the Maritime Commission, how much goes to the railroads, how 
much to communications systems, how much to health services, how 
much to new construction, and all of these various things, all of which 
are claims on the materials. War Production Board must be the final 
umpire. If there is a greater demand than we can supply we say, 



13184 WASHINGTON HEARIN'GS 

"You cannot divide what you haven't got; you can only divide the 
material that you have." It has got to be divided according to our 
best judgment. 

In many cases we go back to the chiefs of staff in matters like steel 
plate, where we cannot fill all the requirements, and they determine 
the urgencies in all these things. You hear of priorities. Priorities 
are really urgency ratings. They determine whether one thing is 
more important than another. That importance varies at different 
times. If, in order to get a plant into production, it is going to take 
steel, but that plant is going to produce more steel, if you can give 
them 100 tons now and 3 months, later get out a thousand tons a 
month, then certainly you are justified in giving them 100 tons now, 
even above a lot of other things. Individual items move up and down 
in the scale of urgency as the program goes on. 

The Chairman. In other words, as you explained a while ago, con- 
ditions here are not comparable at all with England. Wlien she 
enters into a contract the materials go with it. They can come to 
us, but we cannot go to them. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right, sir. If their steel production goes 
down, they can come to us and ask us to increase the kind of steel 
that goes to them, and we have done that. We have sent a mission 
to England, made up of some of the very best men, with England's 
full cooperation and consent. This steel mission did a magnificent 
job and had full cooperation and support. There was complete 
cooperation. 

Now, we have today a mechanism through which the two produc- 
tions, the production of England and the production of this country, 
can be regulated and adjusted, so that the thing can be made in the 
place where it is more desirable to make it. 

Always remember our one objective is to bring the maximum 
impact on the enemy. In England, if it can be made there out of 
materials from here, we supply the materials to them. We have an 
organization that we call the Combined Production and Resources 
Board, appointed by the President and Mr. Churchill. It is made up 
of Captain Littleton, who is in charge of production in England, and 
myself. We make up this committee. We are designated by the 
President and the Prime Minister to determine where these things can 
be made best, according to shipping needs, shipping necessities, 
necessities of the war and a lot of other things, and we work constantly 
with the allied chiefs of staff in maldng these determinations. 

The Chairman. Where does the responsibihty lie? For instance, 
England needs 25 bombers, the Solomon Islands need 25 — where is 
the responsibility? 

Mr. Nelson. "That responsibihty is in the Munitions Assignment 
Board appointed by the President and made up of the chiefs of staff 
and Mr. Hopkins. 

The Chairman. You have nothing to do with that? 

Air. Nelson. No sir; I have nothing to do with that. That is not 
my job, to determine where these things go after they are made up. 

The Chairman. I will say to you, Mr. Nelson, speaking for myself, 
that 3^ou have a man-sized job. You look well, though, under all the 
circumstances. 

Mr. Nelson. Well, we are still working at it. 

The Chairman. Congressman Sparkman. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE IVnCRATION 13185 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Nelson, I want to ask you a few questions. 
I want to say "Amen" to what the chairman has just said, and I 
further say I think you have done a fine job, and I think the country 
is behind you and has confidence in the program. 

Mr. Nelson. Well, I appreciate that, sir. 

The Chairman. You left out one thing, Congressman, and that is 
his ability to take it. 

Mr. Sparkman. Yes, I think he has abiUty to take it. 

Mr. Nelson. That, you have to have. 

replacement of priorities by allocations 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Nelson, in October 1941, you were before us,^ 
and at that time you told us that 3^ou were dissatisfied with priorities 
and were planning to allocate materials. Priority ratings did not 
limit, either in time or the amount, the raw material that was obtained 
by the individual manufacturer. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

Mr. Sparkman. I beheve you said that this resulted in dispro- 
portionate production. For example, airplanes could not be finished 
because propellers were missing, or machine tools were unfinished for 
lack of spindles. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

Mr. Sparkman. Now, since that time, during the past 11 months, 
when and how were priorities replaced by allocations? 

Mr. Nelson. We have been constantly replacing them with allo- 
cations as fast as we could get all the requirements together to do that 
job. There is a confusion whether w^e are using priorities now or allo- 
cations. We still have priorities, as I said, to indicate urgencies, but 
all steel plate has been allocated now for months, allocated to. the 
various uses directly. All nickel has been allocated; copper has been 
allocated; molybdenum, vanadium, alloy steels are now being allo- 
cated. As fast as we can we are moving one thing after the other 
to make allocations. When we find, for instance, we need steel for 
airplane propellers, the only way to get it is to direct a certain flow of 
steel to do that. We do that. 

Everything is not on a basis of allocation yet, because it has not 
been possible. It just physically has been impossible for us to get all 
of these requirements together at any one time. The work has gone 
on steadily since that time, trying to get a mechanism set up that would 
give us the requirements at any particular time, but they are changing 
so rapidly, have been changing up to the present so rapidly, that by 
the time we got them they were obsolete, they did not mean anything. 
We might need a certain number of things today, and tomorrow need 
thi^ee or four times as many, because of the urgency of the situation. 
I think we are at a point now, where, by the 1st of January, all steel 
will be allocated. When you say "steel" that means hundreds of 
difi^erent varieties of steel, not just steel. Ingot has been allocated for 
some time, to make the various things that are necessary to be made. 
So much ingot is for plate, so much for alloy steel, so much for nuts, 
bolts, rivets, and so forth, all the way tlu'ough this picture. 

I think by the 1st of January we will be able to come to your com- 
mittee and tell you we have got about 75 percent of the program under 

• See Washington Hearings, pt. 20, p. 8015. 



13186 WASHINGTON HEARIX/GS 

allocation. I do not think we can get it all, because there are just too 
many different things that you never can get together in one place, 
because of the wide variety of things that are needed in maintaining 
an economy and running even the machinery, because you have to 
have tools of all kinds, new machine tools to replace the obsolescent 
tools, new machine tools to do the job better, ball bearings of all kinds, 
clips, just thousands and thousands of items. 

If you stop to think of this whole question of allocation of material, 
it has to move into nearly everything in the United States. That is 
the nature of this problem. That is not alibiing, it is tryuig to do 
the best you can, so you know what you are going to do, you know 
what you are going to do it with, so you know when you are going 
to do it. 

Mr. Sparkman. It is a constantly moving program and you have 
to move with it? 

Mr. Nelson. You have to move with it. It will never be the set-up 
of a particular time because always there will be something more 
important to do than yesterday. It may be that bombers have to 
be fitted out for a certain mission. They have to have different radios 
for different parts of the country, they have to have difl'erent cowlings 
for different parts of the country or different parts of the world, 
perhaps different gas tanks for different missions. All of that has to 
be accomplished. 

Mr. Sparkman. Mr. Nelson, this next question I believe you have 
pretty well answered in some of the responses to Mr. Tolan's questions. 

PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS PLAN 

As I understand it, under the Production Requirements Plan, or 
P. R. P. as you call it, the individual manufacturer makes a request 
for the supply of raw materials which he thinks he needs for the 
following 3-month period. These requests are then trimmed down 
by the War Production Board to match the expected supply ; however, 
the final allocation is still based primarily on the manufacturer's own 
requests which to date are not a part of any scheduled production 
program. How can P. R. P. prevent the unbalanced production we 
now have? 

Mr. Nelson. I do not believe it can, sir. I believe you have got 
to match it with scheduling. Production requirements plan can do 
a good job of inventory control. . It is an information thing. It has 
already accomplished a good deal in getting a redistribution of these 
inventories, because when you have to match an inventory, this lead 
factor we are talking about would cut down the allocation. It has 
done a very good job in the past 2 months of informing us where 
inventories were excessive so when allocations were made they could 
be made more in line with the realistic fact of what amount of work 
that company is going to do and not what amount they thought tliey 
were going to need. 

Production requirements plan must be accompanied by schedid- 
ing. Two months ago we arrived at the decision that we have got 
to start scheduling. You may ask why we did not do it before. I 
don't know that we could have done it before. Suppose you had 
scheduled Henry Kaiser's shipbuilding yaid and said to Henry Kaiser, 
"You can make only so many ships''. Your schedule would not 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13187 

contain itself. Wo liave been making ships in 29 days that could not 
have been made if they were schedul(^d. Schedules would have been 
changed every week. If we Avent to manufacturers and said, "Make 
everything you can," you would not know what the limit of this was. 
You can see the application from Kaiser's shipyard. We have been 
scheduling on 105 days. Now, when you get to the point where you 
know pretty well what the limits are, it is comparatively easy to 
schedule, such as tank production and machine guns, and all of the 
various components, because we know pretty well today, within limits, 
what the maximum reallj^ is that we can do. We did not know 6 
months ago; we had no experience. Many of these plants are produc- 
ing three, four, or five times as much as they originally planned for. 
We know today, for example, that the air-frame plant, which was 
originally scheduled, can make more, many more airplanes, assemble 
many more, than it was originally built for. As fast as we can build 
up the supply of engines, all the 40,000 diflferent items that go to 
make up the airplanes, uistruments, landing gears, all sorts of varieties 
of things, we will get a better airplane production out of the present 
air-frame plants. We know pretty well what the Imiits are in various 
things, because we have had bellwethers that taught us how much 
could be done. 

I decided 2 months ago on gomg ahead and developing a scheduling 
program. Production requirements plan cannot work on a majority 
of things without a scheduling program. It works well on all of 
the thousands of miscellaneous items that can never be scheduled. 
You can never schedule, for instance, ball bearings, because there are 
too many wide varieties of sizes and formulae, and so forth, for ball 
bearings, so the thing to do in the case of a ball-bearing factory is to 
schedule them on an inventory basis, so many pounds of products 
coming out each month, so many pounds of material needed to go in 
to bring out so many pounds. Rather than to attempt to count all 
of the endless variety of ball bearings, you do it on the basis of inven- 
tory. P. R. P. works perfectly on a thing of that kind, many thou- 
sands of items — nuts, bolts, rivets, nails — all sorts of things, but as to 
tanks and airplanes, we have a scheduling unit in Wright Field for 
airplanes for months, and it is being scheduled. 

As those tlimgs are perfected and as we know better how to do 
them the schedules will mean more, and are meaning more, every 
day. This airplane thing has been scheduled for months. The new 
thing each day is to learn how to do it, so that all of these wide vari- 
eties of things, and all of the constant changes that have to be made 
in strategic plans can be taken care of for the different Services. 

To summarize, I might say this: I think P. R. P. has a very definite 
place for informational value, in determining how much inventory 
you have to do a certain kind of job and in certain places. It is not 
of any value except for that purpose, unless a master schedule is made 
and bills of material are set up. On this wide variety of miscel- 
laneous things, I tliink P. R. P. is the only method. An inventory 
control method, in other words, is the only method of controlling the 
wide variety of small things. 

Mr. vSparkman. The P. R. P. gives specific materials' quotas to in- 
dividual manufacturers, })ut makes no arrangement for them to obtain 
their materials. Will not tliere be a tendency for one raw material 
producer to get a lot of orders and a large backlog and for another to 
have very few orders? 



13188 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Mr. Nelson. No. You see, if you had a situation of that kind you 
would not need P. R. P. at all. You have got to divide up the thing 
when the demand is greater than the supply. Now, if the supply is 
greater than the demand, you do not need any regulations, aud, believe 
me, I wish we had some things in that category, so we would not need 
to worry about the condition you point out. That is, it is a question 
of every supplier making the maximum he can possibly make and then 
trying to protect, in the various places, that particular manufacturer 
from every one of the others. We had the situation where a few sup- 
pliers, we will say of copper, had a surplus, and there you would not 
have the situation where you had to make such strict allocations. 

Have I covered your question correctly? 

Mr. Sparkman. In other words, all suppliers of raw materials are 
taxed to their utmost already? 

Mr. Nelson. All suppliers of raw materials are taxed to their ut- 
most in nearly everything I know. There are very few things I Ivuow 
of that are not taxed to the limit. Even lumber is taxed clear to the 
limit. 

Mr. Sparkman. Military inspectors and expeditors assigned to in- 
dividual plants, to get out particular contracts, have contributed to 
excessive inventories and disproportionate production. Do you feel 
that these individuals should have the responsibility of checldng on 
material requirement and use? 

Mr. Nelson. If you refer to their issue of the PD-3 ratings, that 
has been taken away from them and is now under the control of 
W. P. B. It was wrong if an expeditor could send out material to 
his particular plant. Today, he has to come to the W. P. B. and get 
the approval. 

Mr. Sparkman. That has been remedied? 

Mr. Nelson. That has been remedied. 

PROPOSAL FOR MATERIALS UTILIZATION INSPECTORS 

Mr. Sparkman. A proposal has been made that each individual 
plant designate an employee as a materials utilization inspector, and 
that he be put on the Government pay roll to check materials require- 
ments and use of this plant for the War Production Board. Would 
you favor such a proposal as against a plan where the War Production 
Board would assign its own independent group of industrial engineers 
to act as materials utilization inspectors? 

Mr. Nelson. I tliink if we could get good men, it would be better 
than to get our own men. When you talk about industrial engineers, 
there is a shortage of good ones in this comitry. We have hired aU 
we could get, because there is certamly a place for all of them. The 
question of whether you put a man in the plant or not, is more a 
question of getting the men properly tramed rather than your having 
to go to the work of trammg them and having the thing delayed. 
For example, I believe in 90 percent of the cases if you have a man 
picked by the company and appomted by us, sworn m as a Govern- 
ment man, taking the oath of office, in time of war it would be trea- 
sonable if he did not do his job well. We pick a man that has a 
very good reputation. All of them have been drawn out of industry 
because they have had experience in the schedulmg of this material. 
The whole problem is to get experts in their profession, men who have 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13189 

brains and experience. You can get a lot of brains, but it has to be 
combined with experience or else you have to teach them. That is 
your big- problem. 

Mr. Sparkman. The bulk of critical raw materials is accounted by 
less than a thousand plants. If you want to control material dis- 
tribution and use, why not place War Production Board mspectors 
in these key plants to check on material requirements, mventories, 
use and production scheduling? 

Mr. Nelson. That is, m answer to your other question, one of the 
plans that has been suggested which I thmk has a great deal of merit. 
It has a great deal of merit when combined with the scheduling, so 
he knows what it should be. 

jMr. Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, that is all I care to ask. 

PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS CAN BE INCREASED 

Mr. Curtis. I just want to ask one question, Mr. Nelson. 

Can our production of raw materials, particularly metals, be 
increased, or has the maximum been reached? 

Mr. Nelson. No; of course it can be increased. For instance, 
steel; we could increase steel, put up more blast furnaces, more open- 
hearth furnaces, but when you do that there is a wide chain of things 
which you have to do. You have to increase the facilities for unload- 
ing and loading the ore. You have to have many more ore boats. 
There is a wide variety of things which have to be done when you start 
that increase. Now, there is a question, as I said to the chairman, 
Congressman Tolan. You have to make a decision as to whether 
you shall spend more steel to make more steel or whether you should 
take the steel that you have got now and produce it into things which 
you are going to throw at the enemy as soon as you can. 

Mr. Curtis. That is rather typical of most of the metals? 

Mr. Nelson. That is rather typical of most of them; sir. Many 
of them can be expanded by various methods and without the ex- 
penditure of critical material. In copper, for example, it is a question 
of trying to get more miners mto the mines and do more work, be- 
cause there is smelting capacity to handle more copper. It is a ques- 
tion of getting ores from various fields and processing them where it 
can be clone without great expenditures of critical materials. We are 
trying constantly to expand every one of these things. We wUl get 
more steel ingots if we get more steel scrap. If we can see our way 
clear to send more scrap each month throughout the winter months to 
the mills, we can get more steel uigots. 

Answering your question directly, it is possible to expand many 
things, and where it is possible we are certainly trying to do it at the 
maximum. 

manpower problems in three divisions 

Mr. Arnold. I have a few questions, and I am sure, from listening 
to you, that you can answer every one of them. At the present time, 
there are within the War Production Board three branches concerned 
with manpower problems in relation to production. I refer to the 
Labor Requirements Committee, the war production drive with its 
1,500 management-labor production committees, and the Labor 
Production Division. Why are these three divisions separate? 



13190 WASHINGTON HEARINiGb 

Mr. Nelson. Because the function of each one of them is different. 
The Labor Requirements Committee does exactly the same job in the 
distribution of labor that our Material Requirements Committee does. 
If you allocated so much material to make airplanes, for example, or 
airplane engmes, you have to do the same for the manpower. If you 
are going to produce something quickly in this program, changes may 
occur in" it from time to time. If you are going to allocate steel for 
landing gears, you must also have the people to make the landing 
gears. This group of people are trained in requirements, working 
with the chiefs of staff, and know constantly what the urgencies are. 
They sit around the table and take part m figuring out the labor re- 
quirements. There are exactly the same claimants for the labor as 
there are for the material. You have here agriculture as one of the 
claimants, and so forth. I think it is good organization to put the 
Labor Requirements Committee right in with the Material Require- 
ments Committee, so only one group works with the chiefs of staff 
and two do not have to do it. That is the reason for the Labor Re- 
quirements Committee being set up. 

The war production drive is joint management and labor. Now, 
it is exceedmgly important to us that that be kept absolutely on the 
right track and go right down the middle and be neither totally manage- 
ment nor totally labor, that it be done to increase production. As I 
said constantly, it is neither to put management mto labor nor labor 
into management. 

It is to bring them together so the maximum productivity of the 
two can be joined together to get the maximum war production. 
I felt that it would be better for that committee to be reporting 
directly to the chairman rather than to the Labor Production Division. 
Maybe I am wrong. Whenever I come to that conclusion, I will 
put" it in the Labor Production Division, I will put it anywhere. 
It does not conflict, and it uses a great deal of the staff" of the Labor 
Production Division. 

Mr. Arnold. What plans do you have to increase labor participa- 
tion in production planning? 

LABOR PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCTION PLANNING 

Mr. Nelson. Of course I feel you get the maximum production 
when labor an(l management know what the problems are, that you 
get more out of people in a democracy. As this program goes on, 
there are going to be certain plants that will become more important 
and certain plants that will become less important, because the 
strategy may change, or the necessity for particular weapons may 
change or assume much larger importance. Now, I feel definitely 
that when labor and management both know why those changes 
are made, insofar as it is possible to tell them in terms of strategy 
without divulging secrets of prime importance to the military, it 
would be better all around. Those employees in that plant ought to 
know why that particular thing is heing done. If they can rely 
upon our being frank and candid with them there will not be that 
human tendency to make the job last as long as possible, always 
feeling that some day it may shut down. That is a human tendency 
and you cannot change it, even in time of war, because it is in all of 
us. Now, the more they know, the more nearly they know, why 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13191 

these things are necessary to be done, the more I beheve we will be 
able to solve many of our problems. That is why it seems very 
necessary to me that labor and management know why these things 
are being done. 

We arc sending this committee, the Labor-lManagement Policy 
Committee made up of two representatives of management and two 
representatives of labor w^ith an impartial chairman who will be able 
to correspond with these labor-management committees, all over the 
coimtry on production, to interchange ideas on how to do this job 
better, to do a lot of things which can be done. We have every 
evidence today, through the working of some of the committees, 
that they can completely change the whole production picture. 

Mr. Arnold. Perhaps you have answered this. What do you 
consider the proper functions of labor-management committees? 

Mr. Nelson. I have answered that. I consider the proper function 
is to do everything they can cooperatively to improve production 
without impinging upon either one, that is, not puttmg management 
into labor nor labor into management. 

Mr. Arnold. It is our understanding that there has been some 
difference of opinion over directive No. 2 of the War Manpower 
Commission. Do you consider that the Labor Requirements Division 
of War Production Board should inform the War Manpower Commis- 
sion where labor is needed, in what quantity and by what skills? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, I do, sir. There is — I would call it a difference 
of opinion. I think two agencies working together, each should know 
what its particular function is. That is, it is not a question of one 
having any more power or anything else. Mr. McNutt and I have 
determined we are not going to quarrel about any hypothetical thing 
that may happen between that committee and the Manpower Com- 
mittee. W^e are not going to worry about hypothetical differences 
that may occur at some future date. That is the whole story. 

Mr. Arnold. The committee would like your com.ment on its 
recommendations for the establishment of labor utilization inspectors 
in the War Manpower Commission. 

POSITION on need for LABOR UTILIZATION INSPECTORS 

Mr. Nelson. I thuik, sir, that is a very important thing to do. I 
think as you get to a point where you get shortages of manpower you 
want to be sure that there is a full utilization of your manpower in 
any particular factory, just as we want to be sure there is a full 
utilization of material. The two oi them go hand in hand. 

Mr. Arnold. Do you think that labor utilization inspectors should 
be employed by W^ar Production Board as well as by the War Man- 
power Commission? Would this not result m wasteful duplication 
of effort? 

Mr. Nelson. No, sir; I would rather see it done by a single man- 
power commission. 

Mr. Arnold. It would probablv result in a wasteful duplication of 
effort. 

Mr. Nelson. It would, some. 

Mr. Arnold. Until you are able to furnish the War Manpower 
Commission with a production time schedule by items and plants, 
how can the W^ar Manpower Commission schedule manpower re- 
quirements for industrial needs? 

«0396— 42— pt. 34 10 



13192 WASHINGTON HEAEINGS 

Mr. Nelson. Well, of course, they cannot do it perfectly. I do 
not think it will ever be done perfectly. We can tell them within 
certain areas what are the most important things to be done now and 
I think get 75 percent of the job done. I think the scheduling, as I 
have said in answer to several other questions — I think we have arrived 
at a time when better scheduling needs to be done, and the Army and 
Navy are in complete accord with that. There is no difference of 
opinion. They are both hard at work today to try to get the schedul- 
ing on a time basis. We have had a scheduling on quantity but not 
on a time basis, because the problem was to get the maximum. Now, 
it is being done on a time basis and there is complete harmony 
among all of us on that problem. 

CONSIDERATION OF MANPOWER IN PRODUCTION PLANNING 

Mr. Arnold. Do you consider that manpower limitations are as 
prime a consideration as materials in production plannmg? What is 
your machinery for giving weight to manpower in production planning? 

Mr. Nelson. Of course, they are important, but I say again today 
no one can tell what the limit of manpower is in this country, because 
you have still got untapped sources of manpower. I think this will 
come about locally first rather than nationally. I think nationally 
you probably will have figures that will balance pretty well on totals, 
but there will be certain spots where they do not balance and where 
it will be necessary that certain things be done. 

The problem is one that we have to tackle jointly. Take for 
example, Detroit. It may be necessary, and soon, to take out of 
Detroit certain types of work which are now being done there and 
move them into other spots where there is less stress on manpower. 
Preparations have been made for that whenever it becomes necessary 
to move the simpler things that can be taken out and put into other 
plants. 

Mr. Arnold. You are talking of war production? 

Mr. Nelson. I am talking of war production; I am talking of 
the essential civilian production. It is a problem of concentration 
of our essential civilian production into a few sources, and that will 
take into account the question of manpower in certain communities. 
When we make stoves we will not make stoves in the places where 
we need manpower for other things. 

Mr. Arnold. If contracts are let by the armed services, if raw 
materials are allocated by War Production Board, if the War Man- 
power Commission controls the manpower budget, and yet all three, 
contracts, materials, manpower, are equally essential to production 
planning, how can the War Production Board or the armed services 
or industry undertake over-all production planning at the present 
time? 

Mr. Nelson. I do not see any conflict in that at all. All you are 
doing there is saying that this problem is very, very complex, and 
that certainly is true 100 percent. 

Mr. Arnold. I believe you answered that question wholly at the 
outset. There is at present no final authority to decide what man- 
power should go to the armed services and what manpower should 
go to industry. For this reason, no one knows what manpower will 
be available for industry 6 or 8 months from now. How can you 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13193 

intelligently schedule contracts and production without knowledge of 
this vital productive element? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, of course, there is a final authority in the 
President, but it can be done, I think, by better coordination, and 
I think there is every desire to do it, as between the Manpower Com- 
mission, War Production Board, and the chiefs of staff. Now, in 
between those three agencies there is an interchange of ideas, 
as to material that is available, from the standpoint of material, 
the manpower from the Manpower Commission, the chiefs of staff 
who have knowledge of strategy. I think the three of us, three 
different agencies, can come to certain agreements, as nearly as it 
can be forecast at present. If there is a difference of opinion between 
any two of the three, certainly it is a very important thing for the 
President to act on it. So I think there is authority there, it is merely 
the question of Ivnowing the limits of all of these things, knowing how 
to do them. We are learning every day how to do the thing better; 
we are learning how this thing should be done. 

Now, there has not been the coordination that there should have 
been in many of these spots, largely because we did not know how to 
go about gettmg it. As each day goes by, we are learnmg how to do 
it better. 

We have today close working arrangements with the chiefs of 
staff. Wliere we could not be domg it in terms of strategy, we ask 
the chiefs of staff. We say: "Here is the material we have; here is 
what it is used for; what are the quantities?" Well, the plates go 
into bombs, planes, all sorts of things in the country. The chiefs 
work with our committee, and we work out a schedule, we schedule 
out a million tons of steel a month so it gets the maximum impact 
on the enemy. 

Mr. Arnold. We were told yesterday by General McSherry that 
there is a considerable wastage of manpower in waiting for materials, 
as well as a loss due to inadequate utilization of men on the job. 
What steps do you consider necessary to secure the maximum efficiency 
of labor output? 

Mr. Nelson. Better scheduling, sir, will bring that about. That 
is all part of the job, better scheduling, so you know and the plant 
loiows pretty well where it fits into the schedule and what its urgency 
is in the whole question of strategy. 

organizing the flow of manpower 

Mr. Arnold. General Hershey'was talking about a total of ten 
to thirteen million men in the armed services. The effect of such 
a draft upon our productive manpower is not remote in view of the 
current huge monthly draws of Selective Service. Meantime, the 
plans for organizing our production program are undergoing further 
reorganization, and we continue to be far short of the production 
needed to equip such an army. What are your proposals for organiz- 
ing the flow of manpower to war jobs, and the training and upgrading 
of our reserves for replacing draftees as well as the further jobs now 
projected? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, that of course is a big question. I can answer 
it briefly this way, that when the number of men is determined, that 
has to be done, as I said, by a combination of three different factors, 



13194 WASHINGTOX HEARIN'GS 

tlie number you get fi-om the standpoint of the mihtaiy people to 
do the offense and defense that is necessary; from the Manpower 
Commission, the knowledoe of the total manpower and how much of 
it is needed for agriculture, how mucli is needed to keep your com- 
munities going, how much available there is to be replaced, and so 
forth; the question of material for equippmg them, and productive 
facilities, and all of those thmgs, from a (ime standpoint. Now, the 
combination of the three working it out will eventually determine 
what the size of the armed forces really should be. When that is 
determined and we know definitely what the limits are with respect 
to the times, then you can begin plannmg replacements, as you have 
asked in your question. 

Mr. Arnold. What is holding up the concentration of the farm 
equipment mdustry which was proposed as long ago as last March 
by the Labor Production Division? 

Mr. Nelson. Merely the question of the size of the job, of deter- 
mmmg how much we need and where it should be put. This con- 
centration is new to us. We do not know yet'. I do not think there 
is anything holding it up except the immense size of the job. The 
whole question is getting the pattern, and eventually this thing fits 
right into a groove. 

Mr. Arnold. The same answer would apply, I suppose, to this 
next question. What is holding up the concentration of the machinery 
industry? 

Mr. Nelson. That is the same thing. 

Mr. Arnold. And the same answer would apply to what is holding 
the concentration of the remaining essential civilian industries? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes. 

Mr. Arnold. That is all. 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, this is not a question that may be as 
orthodox as some of the others that we have been asking you. There 
was a time in this country when we only felt a combination of letters 
like AB, PC, TR had some significance; but in recent years we have 
had a reshuffling of the alphabet and now we have WAVES, WAACS, 
SPAB — all these things. I wonder what significance, if any, there is 
to the combination of the letters BE and AE, as far as you are con- 
cerned? 

Mr. Nelson. BE and AE? 

Mr. Bender. BE— "before election," and AE— "after election." 
Does that have any bearing on any of the programs? 

Mr. Nelson. Not a thing; sir. I pay no more attention to th(> 
election than if it were never going to occur — we have got a job to 
do — I pay no attention to it whatsoever. I can truthfully say it has 
not interfered with a single thing we have been doing. 

Mr. Bender. The reason I asked the question, reading national 
periodicals and daily papers, they seem to place such a great signifi- 
cance on that particular thing that I wondered if there was any act 
on the part of the War Production Board that would give ground for it. 

Mr. Nelson. It has had no significance, sir, no significance what- 
soever with me or any of the actions of the War Procluction Board. 

Mr. Arnold. Has "the President ever suggested that it misht have? 

Mr. Nelson. Not once; sir. The President has never said a word 
of that kind to me in any particular. I have never yet heard him say 
anything about election in any way, shape, or form. I can truthfully 
say that to you, sir. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13195 

SIZE OF INVENTORIES 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, I would like to go back to the discussion 
of scheduling of operations as a means of tightening up production 
and manpower utilization. Obviously, if a plant is using a certain 
kind of critical material at a given rate, it must protect itself by having 
a sufficier.t supply on hand so that it can schedule its operations on a 
continuous basis. It must have at least a few days' supply. On the 
other hand, there is such a thing as an excessive inventory where a 
company has piled up enough steel or copper to cover 6 months' 
operations or longer. What is your opinion as to what is a satisfac- 
tory w^orking inventory? 

Air. Nelson. Well, that varies, sir, with so many different things. 
There are so many components that enter into it. I think I should 
make one thing plain. When we talk about shortage of material, 
we arc not always talking just about a shortage of raAv materials, 
we are talking about shortage of components, because these com- 
ponents come from all sorts of places today, and they must to do this 
job. As you get more and more subcontracting these things fan out 
in all directions. 

You say "shortage of material." Wliat is material to one man is 
an end product to the other. Now, the whole problem of how much 
you have depends upon .how long it takes you to replace it, and what 
a proper insurance factor for replacement really is, in connection with 
time. We have got certain plants that are w^orking today on 15 
da.\s' supply of certain components, where the two are linked pretty 
well together, and we know we have got the production schedules 
linked, and tliey get a certain number of transmissions coming through 
every day. For instance, in the automobile industry they were, even 
on m^nv things, able to work on a 2- or 3-d.ay inventory because they 
had the thing pretty well scheduled, so they knew what the flow of 
components into the thing was. As we get better scheduling the 
length of time in your lead factor will come down. I think 3 months 
ought to be a pretty good average inventory at the present time. 
Some take 4, some take 5, and some take only 1. I thinJc by the 
first of the year we can reduce that to 2 months. 

As w^e reduce the lead factor, we increase the amount of flow that 
we can get out, because that difference of 1 month's inventory can go 
into the making of end products and be liquidated, just as in business 
your inventory is liquidated in terms of cash. Today we think of 
the||iiend products that can be made of that inventory. 

CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE INVENTORIES 

Mr. Bender. What is the War Production Board's organization 
and procedure for controlling and recapturing excessive inventories? 

Mr. Nelson. It has two different methods of doing it: One, the 
P. R. P., by not scheduling in as much if there is apparently enough of 
a supply there. 

We have an organization that is constantly looking for inventory, 
the requisitioning section. We have made arrangements with R. F. C. 
This was not very easy to set up. There are a lot of involvements in it 
for buying up frozen inventory where a curtailment order came 
through, and we could not use it to make up any more particular end 



13196 WASHINGTON HEARINfGS 

products. We buy that up and bring it back into the picture through 
the arrvingement with R. F. C. 

We are trying to control this inventory in every direction. Of 
course, it is aViolation of our priority order. A man is actually violat- 
ing a law when he has an excessive inventory. We have not enforced 
that yet, but I think we should. I have been thinking seriously of 
starting a better enforcement on that particular part of our priority 
regulation which requires that a company does not have excessive 
inventories. 

Mr. Bender. Have all idle inventories left over from curtailed 
civilian production been recaptured, includhig inventories of semi- 
fabricated parts? 

Mr. Nelson. No. As I said, we have set up a corporation in 
R. F. C. to buy those, and I have given you in the memorandum 
the amounts of those that have already been recaptured. 

Mr. Bender. What, according to your understanding, are the 
largest outstanding inventories in terms of length of time it will take 
to consume them, which are to be found either in the plants of private 
contractors. Government arsenals, and navy yards for such critical 
materials as copper, steel, magnesium, aluminum, nickel, and so forth? 
Mr. Nelson. I am sorry, I do not understand the question. Will 
you repeat the first part? 

Mr. Bender. What, according to your understanding, are the 
largest outstanding inventories in terms of length of time it will take 
to consume them, which are to be found either in the plants of private 
contractors. Government arsenals, and navy yards for such critical 
materials as copper, steel, magnesium, aluminum, and so forth? 

Mr. Nelson. I do not know what that question means. You ask 
what are the outstanding things, and then you indicate them. I do 
not know what you are driving at there. 

Mr. Bender. The thing we are drivmg at is this: Have you any 
record of the inventories on these various items? 

Mr. Nelson. That is what P. R. P. gives us, you see. 
Mr. Bender. That is on the basis of the time that it will take to 
consume them? 

' Mr. Nelson. P. R. P. gives us first a statement of what they 
have. It gives us what they consumed in the past quarter, the 
quarter preceding, and what they estimate they will consume in the 
quarter following. Now, in the proper analysis of that you can get 
a line on where there are outstanding inventories that look excessive. 
Mr. Bender. That is m private plants, Government arsenals, or 
navy yards? 

Mr. Nelson. Anywhere. 

Mr. Bender. Has any use been made of the inventories shown on 
the P. R. P. forms for recapturing excessive inventories? 

Mr. Nelson. I do not know the details on that, sir. I can get 
that for you. I just do not know whether they have or not. 

Mr. Bender. Last Thursday, I read in the newspapers about a 
report of E. A. Tupper, chief of your Inventory and Requisitionmg 
Branch, which says that out of estimated excessive inventories of 
copper of 400,000,000 pounds only about 100,000,000 have thus far 
been reported to the War Production Board, and that furthermore 
only about 30,000,000 pounds of this have been disposed of by the 
War Production Board. Copper shortage was already acute a year 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13197 

ago, and, in fact, use of copper for civilian purposes was almost 
entirely eliminated in 1941. Why has it taken so long to get under 
way the recapture of excessive inventories of such critical materials 
as copper and steel? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, I cannot answer that. It has taken too long; 
there is no doubt about it. It mvolved the setting up of a corporation, 
involved trying to evaluate these different products. W^e have done 
as good a job as we could have done on the recapturing of the inven- 
tories. I cannot say anything except that it has taken too long. 

Mr. Bender. Are the excessive inventories which have been re- 
vealed on the P. R. P. forms being considered as part of the raw 
materials supply in planning your material allocations? Could you 
tell us what has been determined as being an excessive inventory in 
processing the reports which are the basis of your Production Require- 
ments Plan? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, that, sir, is a detail I cannot answer for you. I 
will be glad to get the answer for you by the men who do that; I can 
keep ill touch with a lot of the details but not all of tliem.^ 

cooperation of ARMED SERVICES IN MATERIAL CONSERVATION 

Mr. Bender. Are you satisfied with the extent to which the armed 
services have been cooperating with the W. P. B. Bureau of Conser- 
vation in the carrying out of recommendations to conserve critical 
raw materials? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, today, when you say ''Are you satisfied?" I do 
not believe we can be satisfied with anything. I am satisfied with 
this: that there has been an intent to cooperate. There have been 
differences of opinion as to whether certain things could be done or 
could not be done. Now, I have always taken the position that when 
it comes to the determination of whether there shall be a change in 
the specifications of a gun, or ammunition, or anything that is a 
highly technical item, that the armed services should be the ones that 
determine that. Certainly, from my standpoint, I think our job is 
to produce the highest quality weapons we can, because quality means 
as much as quantity in the matter of these weapons. We must have 
weapons that are superior to those of our enemy. Now, there have 
been differences of opinion as to whether the armed services were fast 
enough in changing this or that or the other thing. We feel certainly 
they should go slow in changing their specifications, and to be -sure 
that the thing we are recomm.ending is a highly satisfactory thing. 

Take the question of the substitution of steel for copper. It appar- 
ently has gone along very slowly and still I know that the armed serv- 
ices, both the Army and Navy, have energetically, because of us, 
followed through in that particular matter and made these tests 
rapidly. 

We do not want to have a steel shell casing that will stick in the 
gun at a critical time when somebody goes to use that gun to protect 
his life, and we have to be darned sure, very, very sure, that steel will 
do as good a job as copper and not jam. Therefore, there are differ- 
ences of opinion. Some of them break out into the press because 
people get heated and discussions occur. 

• See supplemental statement of Donald M. Nelson, p. 13222. 



13198 WASHINGTON HEARINIQS 

The Chairman. And that was the only determunng- factor? 

Mr. Nelson. That was the only detcrminmg factor. I am not 
nrging them to go so fast that we have a poor quality of ammunition. 
I want the best, I want to see it the best. Sometimes you are better 
off with fewer of them and have them better than to have more of 
them and not so good. That is why we have gone slowly in many 
cases. 

You can analyze different things and say they should have done 
this or they should have done that. I am positively convinced that 
there has been a spirit of cooperation at the top, as between Admiral 
Robinson of the Navy and Frank Folsom who is our own man, who 
are trying to do these things, and General Somervell in the Army, and 
his particular man, Al Browning, and others working on that. There 
is, and there has been, a spirit of wanting to do it and feeling the 
necessity for doing it. 

You asked the question as to whether I am satisfied that they are 
going fast enough. I say, ''No," I am not satisfied, and I do not 
know that I will be satisfied on anything. I am only satisfied that 
there has been a spirit of wanting to do it the best they could. 

Mr. Bender. Are you satisfied with the job that Mr. Rosenwald's 
Bureau of Conservation is doing? Do you think it employs an ade- 
quate number of technical personnel in order to cover the field? 

Mr. Nelson. I do not know the answer to that, whether they have 
an adequate number to cover the field. They have quite a few, and 
of coarse they call on a lot of people. I do not think we can be satis- 
fied with the job we are doing in any division of our show. I am 
truthful. I cannot answer you yes on the question, "Are you satisfied 
with any division of the show, that it is doing the maximum?"^ I 
would say no. We have got to do more because of the size of the job 
we are called upon to do, and there is going to be a constant improve- 
ment in the character of the things we do, because of the urgency, the 
necessity and need for it, the changes in organization that have to take 
place all over our place in order that we do a better, better, and better 
job. 

Mr. Bender. Possibly I should not ask you this, and yet I do 
respect you; I think the whole country does. They feel you are 
trying to do a good job. I read in Collier's magazine an editorial 
this week — no doubt you have read it 

Mr. Nelson. No, sir; I have not seen it. I do not get time to read. 

Mr. Bender. They pay you high compliments, but they say you 
are too nice, you are not hard-boiled enough. Have you anything to 
say to that? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes; I would like to talk on that, because I can be 
just as hard-boiled as anybody needs to be to do the job. I have 
always preferred to be a gentleman in doing a job. I can be the other, 
if I have to be. I have found that sometimes the fellow that breaks 
up tables cloes not get it done any faster than the fellow who quietly 
goes about the job of getting a thing done. All I can say: I can point 
to my record, and I am not ashamed of my record in getting things 
done' around the Government. When you get all of the different 
agencies of government working together to do a particular job, 
whether you can get them to work better with the fellow who cracks 
the whip 'and cusses all the time or one that quietly goes about the job 
of getting the thing done, you will have to determine. I will be tough 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13199 

enough to do the job, because the war demands that I do, and this 
emergency demands that 1 do. No man has a right to be so nice as to 
stand in the way or let personahties stand in the way of doing any- 
thing to get a job done. It is just a question of whether I can appear 
before you, or you before m^ and answer questions in a gentlemanly 
way or whether we have to be fighting all the time. 

I think it gets the job done better by trying to get it done coopera- 
tively. I will say this, I will be just as tough as anybody to get all the 
job done that has to be done in my jurisdiction, except I do not rush 
into print with it, and I do not intend to. 

The Chairman. I think you still believe in the art of persuasion, 
don't you? 

Mr. Nelson. Well, sir, I feel there are all kinds of persuasions. 

Mr. Bender. I think your answer is most satisfactory, and I 
appreciate it. I should have not asked it. I am glad you answered it 
as frankly as you did. 

Mr. Nelson. I am glad to answer any questions. 

ELIMINATION OF MATERIALS WASTE 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, it would seem to me that there could be 
very wide differences in the practices of individual plants as far as 
scrap and spoilage is concerned. Has any machinery been set up to 
see that a minimum amount of materials are used by war contractors? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes. Of course that is the job of the Army inspector, 
to try to see that that be done. I do not think we have done as good a 
job in that as we could have done or should have done. Attempts 
have been made to do it. We have brought in the engineering societies. 
They have gone around and visited plants m cities all over the country 
with the idea of getting everybody interested in doing that particular 
job. One of the mteresting tlimgs these labor management com- 
mittees are doing is eliminating waste, doing the job, making sugges- 
tions as to how the job may be done better. 

One that may stand out is relativelj^ small, but it has saved a lot of 
aluminum. A man worked punching certain parts out of aluminum 
and he figured out a way of changing the work and getting five out of a 
particular sheet instead of four, and we will save just that much scrap, 
save 20 percent. Those things are going on constantly. 

As I was saying, we are trying to get these committees to do this 
work. Take the tank people, they will meet any committee, or the 
machine-tool people, or others, and exchange ideas as to how it can 
be done with less waste, as the forging is dropped, and so on, so you 
do not have as much waste in cutting it out. That is passed on to 
others in the industry, and the art is just passed back and forth between 
the engineers. I feel it is a very fertile field. We have not done 
nearly enough in that. 

Mr. Bender. Do you think any substantial progress can be made 
in controlling the use of raw materials particularly with respect to 
conservation, spoilage, and so forth, unless you have a War Production 
Board representative assigned for this purpose in each of the major . 
plants? 

Mr. Nelson, Well, that of course would be one of the jobs of those 
men we were talking about, putting them into the plant in charge of 
inventories. Theirs would be the job of domg that. I think it can- 
not be done unless there is a War Production Board man in the plant. 



13200 WASHINGTON HEARINiGS 

1 feel very definitely that that is a very important thing that that man 
must do. 

Mr. Bender. Mr. Nelson, I do not want to tax your patience. 
Every Member of Congress daily receives letters or receives com- 
plaints from individual plants, or from* insurance companies. This 
one does not happen to come from this plant, but it has come to my 
attention, and I think it deserves a moment or two (reading): 

The Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co. has a subsidiary company under the name 
of the Cleveland Pneumatic Aerol Co. which is building a plant at Euclid, Ohio, 
for the construction of airplane parts. 

Incidentally, this plant and the Bendix plant, I think, manufacture 
most of the struts. 

Mr, Nelson. Most of the struts are made by the two companies. 
Mr. Bender. It is a vital plant (contmuing): 

This plant is being financed by the Defense Plant Corporation, and the factory 
building will cover an area 800 by 800 feet which will house the machine shop. 
Part of this building will be separated by fire walls, and the separated section will 
house the heat-treating and welding sections. There will be another building 
which will house the office, covering 70,000 square feet, and then there will be 
three separate utility buildings. 

The building and machinery will be owned by the Defense Plant Corporation, 
and the value of these will be about $22,000,000. The value of the stock and 
work in process will be approximately $20,000,000. 

The problem is this: That there is no insurance company or group of insurance 
companies large enough to write the total amount of insurance which will be 
required as it is too much of a hazard concentrated in one area. The only com- 
panies which could even approach this amount are the Associated Factory Mutuals 
which held the entire insurance on the parent plant. 

The situation, therefore, is this: The insurance companies will not write this 
risk unless a sprinkler system is installed, and the War Production Board abso- 
lutely refuses to permit the installation of sprinklers, while with the Navy Depart- 
ment it is immaterial whether the sprinklers are installed or not. The reason the 
War Production Board turned down sprinklers is because of the shortage of steel. 

Although the plant will be operated 24 hours a day and this will hold the chance 
of a fire down to the minimum, the possibility of a fire still exists and if it gets out 
of control it will burn down a plant which is of enormous size and, therefore, the 
interruption of production in a plant of this size will be a great catastrophe from 
the point of view of the war effort. 

Incidentally, the National Bronze & Aluminum Co., a war plant' 
burned down about a year ago, burned right down; the whole thing 
was a total loss and many forms were lost. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

Mr. Bender. In this connection, they had a fire at this plant about 

2 months ago and because of the sprinkler system the loss was very 
slight (resummg): 

It stands to reason that many small plants can eliminate the sprinkler system, 
and if one burns completely no great loss is incurred because other plants can 
make up the production. But with an enormous plant such as this, if there is an 
interruption of production to anv great extent this cannot be made up by a large 
number of small plants. Therefore, the elimination of the possibility of a great 
hazard occurring will more than off -set the shortage which the Government might 
feel in the steel which would be used in the construction of the sprinkler system. 

Do you have any comment to make on that? 

Mr. Nelson. Yes, I have, sir, because that just illustrates thede- 
cisions you have to make through this whole thing. You have just 
got so much steel pipe, and that pipe is used, as you know, for various 
purposes among which is to bring water into houses, so you may build 
a house that a family can live in. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13201 

You also have the point that you would again take chances on. 
Your judgment is sometimes bad, sometimes it is good. I think a 
thing like that ought to be weighed and reweighed in the light of each 
individual's particular case. 

Mr. Bender. Incidentally, the War Production Board changed its 
decision on another plant some time ago and approved installing a 
sprinkler system after previously rejecting it. 

Mr. Nelson. That happens. We would be glad to review that 
case. 

Mr. Bender. This is a plant, as I say, that is so vital because every 
airplane produced needs these struts, and in the event of fire it would 
have a bad influence on production. As you pointed out m the be- 
ginning, there are more employees today m the airplane irdustry as 
compared with the numbers that were employed in 1939. 

Mr. Nelson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Congressman, may I ask you, is that in your 
Congressional District? 

Mr. Bender. Very much, yes. 

Mr. Nelson. We would be very glad to review it, sir. I thought, 
as you read the letter, knowing this particular plant and knowmg its 
importance, that perhaps somebody had not given it the proper 
consideration. I will be glad if you send that letter to me, and it will 
be reviewed in the light of the situation. 

Mr. Bender. That is all. 

The Chairman. You leave it to an Ohio Republican not to overlook 
his district. 

Mr. Nelson. We will be very glad to do that, because I think it 
should be done. I think a thing like that ought to be reviewed most 
carefully. 

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Nelson, you have been exceedingly 
patient, kind, interesting and mtelligent in your whole remarks here, 
and this committee deeply appreciates, especially your frankness, and 
the observations you made in your statement this morning. When 
do you sleep? Do you get any sleep at all? 

Mr, Nelson. A little bit. 

The Chairman. Not much, though. 

Mr. Nelson. From about 1 to 7. 

The Chairman. Well, we thank you, Mr. Nelson. 

We appreciate very much your coming. 

Mr. Nelson, It is always a pleasure to appear before your com- 
mittee. 

The Chairman. I have here a copy of the excellent memorandum 
which you had prepared in answer to questions which I have sub- 
mitted to you for the committee, and will place this memorandum, 
together with the questions submitted, in the record at this point. 

(The material referred to follows:) 

Letter From the Chairman of the Committee to Donald M. Nelson, 
Chairman, War Production Board 

September 5, 1942. 
Mr. Donald M. Nelson, 

Chairman, War Produclion Board, New Social Security Building, 

Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Nelson: This committee, as you have been informed, plans to hold 
hearings September 15, 16, and 17. As we understand it, you will be available on 



13202 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Thursday, September 17, at 10 A. M. We will inform you at a later date the 
location of the hearing room. ' 

Attached to this letter is a brief list of questions on various manpower mobiliza- 
tion problems in which the committee members have expressed interest. These 
questions are not exliaustive, and others undoubtedly will suggest themselves to 
you and to the committee. It would be helpful if you would submit a summary 
statement of your testimony, 3 or 4 pages in length, on or before September 12. 

We have had many expressions of interest from management and labor in the 
committee's recent fifth interim report published on August 10, 1942. For this 
reason we are extending invitations to both these groups to send observers to 
these hearings. 

The comiBittee wishes to thank you for your cooperation. 

With all good wishes, I am 
Sincerely, 

John H. Tolan, Chairman. 

QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED 

1. What types of problems have been encountered in the distribution of raw 
materials? 

2. Would you describe the distribution methods, reporting procedures and 
other controls which have been recently introduced in order to improve the use 
of raw materials? 

3. What improvements have already resulted from the new methods or can be 
expected to result in the near future? 

4. What are the problems of maximizing and balancing over-all war production 
and how do the new methods of raw material distribution contribute to the 
solution of these over-all problems? 

5. Would you illustrate the information furnished in answer to questions 1-4 
with specific data for steel, copper, or other exemplary critical raw materials? 

6. Would you describe the administrative organization and procedures by 
which the War Production Board determines the type, amount, and location of 
essential civilian production? 

7. What factors dictate the use of concentration programs for essential civilian 
production and for what types of industries and products are such programs being 
developed? 

8. What general criteria are used for deciding the plants and areas in which 
essential civilian production shall be concentrated? 

9. To what extent do the War Manpower Commission and other Federal 
agencies participate in the formulation of the over-all policy with respect to con- 
centration and the details of the individual concentration program? 

10. The committee has heard a great deal about the difficulties of securing ade- 
quate labor for copper and other nonferrous mines. Have there been any studies 
of the potential productive capacity of mines and mills producing nonferrous ores 
and metals? Have labor shortages resulted in less than capacity production of 
any of these ores and metals? 

il. What responsibility does the War Production Board have in cases where 
labor shortages limit ]:>roduction? By what organization and procedures does it 
exercise such responsibility? What has specifically been done in the case of 
copper, zinc, aluminum, and other nonferrous metals? 

12. What are the functions and objectives of the labor-management production 
committees? Is there any organization within the War Production Board for 
assuring proper contribution from these committees and for utilizing their sug- 
gestions and other activities? How many labor-management production com- 
mittees have already been set up and what has been their conlribution to date? 

STATEMENT BY DONALD M. NELSON, CHAIRMAN, WAP PRO- 
DUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

I. Introduction 

(Answer to the committee's fourth question [in part]: "What are the problems 
of maximizing and balancing over-all war production?") 

The committee has submitted questions which are very broad in their implica- 
tions. The answers call for a substantial amount of impression and opinion. It 
seems appropriate to lay a foundation for the more specific questions. One of 
those submitted, to wit: "What are the problems of maximizing and balancing 
over-all war production?" seems an appropriate point of dej)arture. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13203 

The "problems of maximizing and balancing over-all war production" are those 
which are inherent in the kind of situation in which we find ourselves. We are 
dealing with an all-inclusive emergency, where all factors confronting us are 
abnormal. The factors are abnormal even from the military point of view in that 
plans carefully laid before the outbreak of war have had to be drastically revised, 
in the very process of carrying them out, to meet the actual military necessities. 

The situation is also one of an unprecedented dynamic nature, where the entire 
normal production of the country is tending to go from 100 percent toward zero 
at the very time that this new and abnormal production is going from zero toward 
100 percent. The products to be made and the materials and plant used are in 
many respects either completely new or completely different from anything 
previously made. 

Ihe scale of the operation is so enormous that no single human eye can view all 
of the facets at any one time and place. The output of implements of war and 
other products necessary to the war is greater by far than that we have ever 
produced or than has ever been produced at any time in the past by any country 
or group of countries. 

Ihe shifts in the program that must be made are so kaleidoscppic that they 
tend to defy organization and classification into simple terms which can he dealt 
with in an orderly way. While the aggregate is rapidly expanding, the place in 
the aggregate between item and item in the program is constantly changing as 
strategy changes. 

If the factors were all known, they could in due course be neatly harnessed. 
However, our actual capacity to perform has constantly outrun our most careful 
predictions. Unfortunately this has not occurred uniformly. The result is that 
we find ourselves ahead of plans at some points, and behind expectations in others. 
Therefore, balance has to be created after these developments show the places 
needing attention. 

Our objective is a complete harnessing of all of the productive forces and 
resources of this Nation to the purposes of war, while at the same time developing 
what those purposes are and the facilities with which to perform them. 

There is no suggestion that we should not have to cope with a dynamic, gigantic 
and flexible situation, but the "problems of maximizing and balancing over-all war 
production" must be recognized as being incompatible with perfection. 

The basic problem of scheduling production may appropriately be discussed to 
some extent at this point. Scheduling production as an abstract exercise is very 
simple. Total desired product is multiplied by the bills of material entering, into 
that production, and the rate of material supply is permitted to establish the 
rapidity with which the program is performed. As a practical matter, however, 
complete bills of material for the hundreds of thousands of items and sub- 
assemblies which need to be scheduled, many of them new and rapidly changing in 
specifications, have not been available. This lack is being rapidly supplied by 
gigantic efforts of the armed services and civilians cooi^erating with them. 

Material supply has also been a fairly rapidly changing aspect of the problem 
as we have rapidly expanded in some materials, which, as in the case of aluminum 
and magnesium, are capable of enormous, rapid expansion, while other materials, 
such as nickel, have not been susceptible to equally rapid expansion. When this 
is compared with the fact above mentioned, that actual capacity to process and 
fabricate material has not fitted predictions with any degree of smoothness, it is 
■ apparent that a satisfactory schedule could only be evolved, and not created 
instantly at the outset. 

As we have now a current picture of all production requirements for every 
calendar quarter coming in from all manufacturers or plants of any size, and since 
the capacity to process and fabricate is settling down into fairly well established 
rates of production, we are emerging steadily into a situation which can be and is 
being scheduled. This scheduling, however, will never be static, and flexibility is 
one of our primary concerns. We will seek greater rather than less flexibility. 
But this will be under control so that we know what to flex and are in shape to flex 
accordingly by having our fingers on the reins all the way out to the lead mules 
in our 40-mule teams. 

We have set up an office for program determination to lay out all production 
into programs, and we have commenced introducing our field offices into the pro- 
duction requirements problems of the plants in each region, looking toward 
detailed sclieduling of production in all large plants. 

It is a fair prediction that with the present rate of improvement in the aggregate 
of scheduled portions of the program, we may expect to be reasonably well 
scheduled by the first quarter of 1943. 



13204 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

The problems of material and labor supply are more specifically brought out 
by other questions and will be developed in subsequent sections of this 
memorandum. 

II. Problems in Distribution of Raw Materials 

(Answer to committee's first question: "What types of problems have been 
encountered in the distribution of raw materials?") 

The ideal in the distribution of raw materials is the smooth flow of all essen- 
tial materials to a decided production program. The problems in the distribu- 
tion of raw materials are all incidental to providing this smooth combination of 
raw materials in a total-production program. 

In order to accomi^lish a smooth distribution of raw materials, the total demand 
for each important material for some period of time, or the rate of demand that 
would fit with the production program, would have to be reasonably accurately 
known. This would enable the matching of supply and demand and adjusting 
the program so as to be consistent with supply, or increasing supply within such 
limits as might be possible to meet the demand. 

Discussions of controls of distribution of materials imply a fixed supply to be 
cut up and passed around. The problem of maximizing the supply to be con- 
trolled is, however, a constant field of intense activity. One of the problems in 
this connection results from the fact that important amounts of scarce materials 
often must be diverted from immediate use in combat or other essential finished 
items in order to expand the basic material supply. Other problems of maximiz- 
ing material supply include the assurance of full labor supply, in proving efficiency 
of operations, keeping all facilities in continuous use, etc. 

One of the most difficult problems in the distribution of raw materials appears 
at this point, due to the fact that strategic decisions as to size and type and 
duration of operations must change constantly, as above indicated. Good deci- 
sions in terms of efficient production and distribution of required materials would 
have to be valid decisions for a considerable period of time. The creation of 
manufacturing facilities for particular products and the creation of additional 
material supply take periods usually in excess of 1 year. In the meantime, 
strategic decisions as to the amount of the particular products planned a year 
before and their nature and their rate of production will be drastically changed 
by the urgency and nature of operations in the military theaters. 

Our military program in general has been one that changed on the side of in- 
crease, as was foreseen, but the proportions of the program and the required 
materials going into landing equipment, aircraft, tanks, equipment for new manu- 
facturing facilities, etc., have changed many times. _ ■ , . 

The most drastic and sudden of changes take place in connection with the 
export program, and it should be remembered at all times that we are endeavor- 
ing to be the arsenal of democracy and the last resort for all essential supplies 
that cannot be obtained by the United Nations at home from their own plants. 
Accordingly, there are emergency exports of basic materials to Russia, to Great 
Britain and the other theaters of war and of equipment to the same theaters which 
cannot be predicted and which fall in very substantial amounts in the midst of 
the plan of action previously decided upon and the commitments already made 
for production and for the supply of materials to accomplish that production.^ 

The distribution of materials to the ■ manufacturers of essential civilian prod- 
ucts should theoretically be one of the simplest problems in that the essential 
civilian demands, such as necessary transportation, communications, sewage and 
water systems, not to mention food, clothing, and shelter, are continuing demands. 
In fact,' however, the variety of civilian requirements represents the entire spec- 
trum of products normally made by industry. This demand represents a cross 
section of our whole normal economy. It is true that a great many products 
can be completely eliminated in time of war, but it is also true that there is a 
continuing demand, small in amount, for a very large number of civilian items 
that can never completelv be eliminated. Likewise, the process of reduction ot 
demand for civilian products to the minimum and bare essential quantity pro- 
duces a rapid change in the rate of production as the normal economy is pro- 
gressively pared down. The planning of the distribution of materials and the 
production program that is assumed, to which the materials are to be distributed 
under the circumstances of enormous variety and a rapidly decreasing curve of 
civilian production is almost as difficult as the converse situation in the military 
program, with its equallv great variety on a rapidly rising curve of production. 

The problem of distribution of materials to meet production requirements 
is to a very large extent reflected in the problem of translation of requirements 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13205 

for use into demands upon production, or the translation of the desired total 
product in all its variety into the amounts of material that must arrive at factories 
in the various kinds, on schedules appropriate to the desired rate of delivery of 
final products. 

The development of bills of materials for assembled products is a laborious 
process of building up the material content of each part going into the assembled 
product. The specifications of every part going into every assembled product 
tend constantly to change, due to the fact that amounts of scarce materials con- 
sidered necessary at one time are soon discovered to be subject to reduction or 
substitution by less scarce materials when intensive work is done on spreading 
available scarce materials as thinly as possible. Productive equipment being 
adjusted to particular materials, changes are deferred as long as possible to avoid 
the necessary changes in machinery and processes going with changed specifica- 
tions. Therefore, there are constantly developing new changes at late dates 
which were not planned for in the material-supply program. 

Another problem in the distribution of materials arises from the constantly 
changing relationships between capital construction, assembled product output, 
and material supply. To provide a clear and dependable picture of the appro- 
priate balance, month by month and year by year, between these factors would 
necessitate the ability to stop the rapid fluctuation of each part of the program 
long enough to balance the other parts of the program. This has so far been 
impossible in view of the rapid development of the war. 

A decision is made to expand an aircraft program beyond facilities at the 
moment of the decision, whereupon buildings and machine tools are contracted 
for in order to make good the decision on planes. The expansion of the supply 
of aluminum and magnesium, in turn, calls for increased construction of supply 
of productive equipment. Other decisions of Uke nature made on strategic 
grounds indirectly produce an enormous number of expansion projects, where- 
upon it is discovered that the aggregate diversion of materials into the projects 
for expansion is in itself reducing the supply of basic materials that was assumed 
in making the calculations in the first place. This sequence is never ended. 

The problems of distribution of raw materials can, many of them, be referred 
to the category of elimination of waste. Some wastes occur as above indicated 
in using greater proportions of scarce materials in specifications than is subse- 
quently found necessary as shortages become more acute. Essentiality of use of 
a particular scarce material, such as nickel in armor plate, is found in subsequent 
study to yield to alternate combinations of chrome and other alloys when the use 
of nickel' for parts in aircraft exceeds previous calculations. Essentiality is 
always a relative term. 

Another waste in the use of materials develops from lags or too great accelera- 
tions in the rate of delivery. If materials required are delivered too slowly, other 
material already arrived at the point of production is immobilized, either in 
raw-material form or in the form of incomplete assembled products or in the form 
of parts which cannot be matched by their counterparts. 

If, on the other hand, delivery of materials is too swift relative to the production 
program, those materials first arriving will remain immobihzed until a balance of 
required materials arrive at the point of production. 

These principles have caused us from the start to prohibit by provisions, in 
our forms and in our regulations, any deliveries ahead of requirements for usage 
in production or construction. We realize, however, and plan, that individual 
scheduling supervision must be provided in each major plant to make this rule 
effective. 

These problems, and many others, have led us to the new methods of distribu- 
tion which are described in the following section of this memorandum. 

III. New Methods of Distribution of Materials 

(Answer to the committee's second question: "Would you describe the distri- 
bution methods, reporting procedures, and other controls which have been recently 
introduced in order to improve the use of raw materials?") 

The report of the undersigned introduced in response to Senate Resolution 195, 
developed methods and plans, actual and contemplated, as they existed in Decem- 
ber of 1941 in the Office of Production Management. New methods referred to 
currently are new in the sense of full application during recent or current periods, 
but in another sense they are not new in that they have been evolutionary de- 
velopments based upon plans in contemplation or in beginning stages as long as 
a year ago. 



13206 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS PLAN 

The most generally extensive new method of distribution of materials, referred 
to as the Production Requirements Plan, falls within the category just described 
of plans which are new currently in the sense of first general application to the 
production program but which have been in contemplation and in evolution 
throughout the previous year. 

This plan, as put into general application, requires every plant in the United 
States consuming in excess of $5,000 worth of basic metal in its production during 
a calendar quarter, to apply each quarter for permission to purchase its require- 
ments of basic material, as called for by its own production schedules. Its 
application shows primarily the products produced in the previous calendar 
quarter and proposed to be produced in the next calendar quarter. Likewise, it 
shows the materials used in production in the previous calendar quarter and those 
required for the proposed production during the next calendar quarter. Inven- 
tories of each material at the closing of the last previous calendar quarter are 
shown so that allowances of new materials may take into account and require 
the use of any excess inventories. The policy in connection with inventories per- 
mitted has been steadily tightened down as our controls improve, so that a normal 
allowance of 90 days inventory is tending to become 45 days. When deliveries 
are undependable, inventories must be longer to prevent shut-downs due to 
failures of delivery in one or another item. As we succeed in preventing excess 
purchasing, and in scheduling deliveries more closely, the uncertainty of delivery 
to those who are given permission to receive material will be reduced. Inventory 
in greater amount than that which can be corrected by mere subtraction from 
requests for new materials are being taken over by our Inventory and Requisi- 
tioning Branch, as will be developed in a subsequent section of this memorandum. 

The necessity for over-all control of materials required for production having 
become apparent some time ago, an effort was made to expand the operation 
of the only instrumentality previously 'developed in this war which covered in 
its very nature the requirements for all classes of scarce materials required by 
a particular producing plant, in direct relationship to the product to be pro- 
duced by that plant and the materials on hand in the possession of that plant. 
All other forms of control had been based upon an individual treatment of a 
particular class of material and did not seem capable of extension in such fashion 
as to provide a means of revealing periodically the entire material requirements 
of all important producers for all scarce materials with relationship to production 
and inventory as above. 

Use of special controls, based on a careful distribution or supervision of ship- 
ments of particular materials, has continued on a monthly basis in the case of 
the most important scarce materials, and will doubtless continue for some time 
to come, but the total allowances and permissible purchases for those scarce 
materials are balanced and given general guidance once every calendar quarter 
by the Production Requirements Plan. 

Beginning with the third calendar quarter of 1942 under the Production 
Requirements Plan, all manufacturers purchasing metal in basic forms for their 
operations in excess of $5,000 per quarter were required to file their production 
requirements under this plan. These larger producers, numbering, in terms of 
individual plants having separate inventories, approximately 18,000, in fact 
filed their requirements for the months of July, August, and September. _ All 
such requirements were carefully reviewed and screened and authorizations given 
to each such plant accordingly. This first effort on an over-all basis to screen 
and reduce requirements to supposed minimums in terms of permissible produc- 
tion constituted a sweeping experiment, was undertaken in view of the absolute 
necessity of maximum effort to provide administrative control of the flow of 
materials, but with considerable uncertainty as to the consequences. While the 
experiment was not a perfect success, the tolal authorized purchases by all impor- 
tant metal-consuming plants was, in fact, reduced for the first time within a 
relatively small degree of excess over available supply. This had the effect of 
reducing the amount of conflicting demands, as stated by the applicants, approxi- 
mately 25 percent. If this entire excess of demand had been permitted to impinge 
upon the short supply of scarce metals, it is fair to assume that the failures of 
balanced completed assemblies of products which occasionally continue to develop 
would have been much greater. 

There are various necessary conditions for the satisfactory and adequate 
performance of any general control of the distribution of materials which have 
not as vet existed "but which are gradually being increased for the effective use 
of the Production Requirements Plan or its successor forms of control. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13207 

One necessary condition of success of such control device is the inclusion in 
the control of all large portions of requirements on some adequate basis of knowl- 
edge and control. 

The greatest failure in this respect currently is the inability up to the present 
moment of completely analyzing, summarizing, and controlling the requirements 
for expansion of productive facilities. Most material requirements for inclusion 
in construction projects in the nature of increasing facilities go into those facilities 
indirectly in the form of productive machinery. However, directly and indirectly 
there is a great need for increasing the adequacy of knowledge as to the total 
material requirements in our present expansion program and the controlling of 
those requirements. Steps are in process looking to this conclusion, but general 
results are not available at the present moment. 

Another necessary condition for satisfactory functioning of a general material 
requirements control is accurate identification of the connection between pro- 
duction requirements stated and the program of finished products to be produced. 
The production requirements of the final assembler of finished products, for 
direct consumption by the final assembler, consist to a substantial degree, in 
fabricated subassemblies and parts and not raw materials. To the extent that 
the final producer of the finished product, who enters into a direct contract with 
the Government, requires himself to be supplied with raw materials, the appro- 
priateness of his requirements as stated, in terms of his inventory on hand and 
his output of product, can be readily checked by Government officers. To the 
extent that the final assembler buys subassemblies, the accurate identification 
of the material requirements that are comparable, to the programed finished 
products directly purchased by the Government is, in many cases, difficult, if 
not impossible, to establish. The producer of motors, bearings, forgings, etc., 
may be many industrial processing layers removed from the final assembler and 
the Government. 

Up until the present time we have been forced to rely, for identification of 
requirements, on preference ratings received by producers of subassemblies and 
parts. It has been true to date that preference ratings on final assembled products, 
placed there by thousands of procurement officers of the armed services and 
thousands of officials of the War Production Board and its predecessor organiza- 
tions, has not been capable of aggregate quantitative control. 

. The result of this has been that preference ratings, indicating supposed relative 
urgency of purchase orders and contracts, have in the aggregate exceeded the 
supply of products, fabricated and unfabricated, for which purchase orders and 
contracts were placed. 

Another new method, again merely evolutionary, but new to an important 
degree, is the institution of a new series of so-called urgency-rating categories. 
As the receiver of a bankrupt institution has been known to issue receivers' 
certificates to come ahead of outstanding mortgages and debentures, in order to 
be entitled to prime credit and low rates of interest, so AA urgency ratings have 
been put ahead of the well-known previous preference ratings, but on a controlled 



No AA urgency rating can be assigned to production or creation of facilities 
except in accordance with the latest version of the program of production and 
expansion. The Army and Navy Munitions Board has prepared a directive 
covering the last 6 months of the year 1942, reflecting the strategic decisions of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the approval of the Chairman of the War Production 
Board. It is this program which guides the entire placement of AA urgency 
ratings on military products. The military urgency ratings for the first quarter 
of 1943 will be ready to apply by next month. 

The latest available program" for indirect military product and essential non- 
military product has been inadequate up until the present time but AA ratings 
are limited in this field, insofar as possible, to those minimum amounts and kinds 
of indirect military and nonmilitary requirements. For example, no new AA 
urgency ratings are permitted, in general, on expansion of productive capacity 
except where basic material supply is thereby increased. 

Likewise, high urgency standing is accorded to the minimum of repair and 
maintenance of essential nonmilitary facilities, including manufacturing estab- 
lishments and essential services, such as transportation, communication, power, 
etc. The amounts of production of repair and maintenance items accorded this 
status (described currently as AA-2X) is limited to a small proportion of non- 
military production. 

There are exceptions to the generalizations above but as the production pro- 
gram becomes more adequately developed exceptions will be fewer. It is in- 
tended that ultimately. there will be no exceptions except as the reservation of 
60396 — 42— pt. 34 11 



13208 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

a "kitty" of scarce materials, parts, equipment, etc., permits the meeting of the 
exceptional requirement. 

Another new method inaugurated with the recent "realinement" of the War 
Production Board is represented by the determination of a "program" for every 
requirement that is susceptible of being programed. We have created the Office 
of the Vice Chairman on Program Determination, with a staff working exclusively 
on program determination. Insofar as it is possible, no place in the most urgent 
production program, and no distribution of scarce materials, is permitted except 
as it accords with a program which has been balanced in terms of supply and 
conflicting demands. 

The mechanism for balancing conflicting demands against American productive 
facilities is focused around the Requirements Committee, on which sit repre- 
sentatives of the Army, the Navy, Maritime Commission, the Office of Lend-Lease 
Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, State Department, and the Office of 
Civilian Supply. When total requirements submitted by each such agency exceed 
available supply, as is normally the case, the uses to which materials are to be 
put, and the justifications ofl'ered by all claimants, are balanced and decisions 
made at this point by the Vice Chairman on Program Determination. 

Several of the individual material controls have recently achieved degrees of 
development that distinguish them from previous control of these materials suffi- 
ciently to be worthy of special mention. Among these is the control of steel plate. 
At the present time a program of steel-plate production is set for every month, 
determining the total of plate that can be produced without too greatly reducing 
the supply of supplementary shipments of steel that have to be produced in order 
to make complete ships, tanks, etc. When this plate-production program is set, 
definite allocations are provided for the Army and Navy, Maritime Commission, 
Board of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease, and civilian usage. 

It is fair to say that if similarly tight control of the distribution of materials 
were practicable for all scarce materials the material-control problem could be 
considered in very good shape. In fact, such control cannot be applied to every 
form of every scarce material and is possible for plate partly due to the large 
concentrations of demand where identification of the use is satisfactory. The 
usage of plate for naval and maritime construction, for tanks and artillery and 
a few other classes of use, accounts for a large proportion of the total steel-plate 
production. 

Likewise, the control of copper has recently been extended, with the aid of the 
production code hereinafter referred to, to represent a distribution in terms of the 
ultimate use to which the copper is put to a greater degree than has ever been 
possible in the past, and it is believed that the efficiency in the distribution of 
copper has been greatly improved. 

Controls of other specially important materials, such as aluminum, magnesium, 
nickel, alloy steel, and vanadium, have been relatively satisfactory and highly 
developed, partly due to the fact that their uses have been less widespread than 
the all-pervasive steel and copper and their controls, accordingly, more within the 
limits of administrative feasibility. 

There are other new methods recently installed which have not had time to 
affect the problems of material distribution which have been outlined. Among 
these are the so-called Production Code, by which it is sought to transmit the' 
information known to the ultimate user of a product as to the purpose for which 
the product is produced, through the interinediate processing layers of industry, 
turning out the subassemblies going into those products, to the supplier of the 
raw materials and the controller of those materials. 

Another of those devices is the so-called Contract Production Control, intro- 
duced only on an experimental basis to ascertain whether a highly refined and 
detailed control of the scheduling of subassemblies, parts, and materials can be 
administered so as to supplement the broad control provided by the production 
requirements plan. It is too early to tell whether this experiment will be 
successful. 

MATERIALS REDISTRIBUTED BY WAR PRODUCTION BOARD 

It is quite evident that despite the grave shortages of vital war material, sub- 
stantial quantities of such materials have been too long permitted to stay out of 
war production and to remain in idle and excess inventory. To meet this problem 
we have adopted a number of devices through which these dead stocks are now 
being redirected into war production. The test of the effectiveness of these devices 
will be the extent to which inventories will decline in relation to the volume of 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13209 

production instead of mounting, as they have in the past. That test lies, however, 
at least some 6 months in the future, and will be a test not only of our inventory 
control and material redistribution devices but also of our ability to control the 
whole flow of the materials needed for war-production purposes. 

I have already told you about the methods we have instituted and are about 
to institute for controlling the flow of materials. Let me now mention several 
of the devices which we are using to redistribute materials that are in the hands 
of people who should not have them, or should not have them in the quantities 
in which thev now have them. 

(1) We have instituted a regulation (Priorities Regulation No. 13), which makes 
it possible for persons who have materials that they themselves cannot use because 
of some War Production Board conservation or limitation order, to sell those 
materials to others who can use them without having to come to Washington for 
special permission. This regulation permits and urges the sale of idle inventories 
through channels which are controlled by the War Production Board. Since such 
sales of idle material are taking place without reporting each instance to the War 
Production Board we cannot at this time present you with a measure of the effec- 
tiveness of these regulations. We know, however, that the pressure on us to per- 
mit special sales has been almost entirely removed since the promulgation of this 
regulation, and we can therefore assume that the regulation is in fact effective, 

(2) We have in addition set up what might be called a clearing house within 
the War Production Board to which holders of idle and excess inventories can 
come and be brought together with persons who are experiencing shortages of 
materials. This "clearing house," acting as broker without fee, makes arrange- 
ments for sales of these materials for approved purposes. The following is a 
partial tabulation of quantities of materials that have thus moved out of idle 
inventories into active war production: 

Table I. — Voluntary sales consummated through Sept. 12, 1942 

Commodity: 

Babassu oil pounds.. 286, 000 

Bolts and nuts do 4, 252, 992 

Coconut ofl do 413, 734 

Copper and brass— do 11, 866, 764 

Corkboard do 160,965 

Graphite electrodes do 261, 696 

Iron ^ tons.. 1,273 

Lead'- pounds.. 1, 464, 077 

Locomotives _._. number.. 14 

Lubricating oil gallons.. 909, 066 

Machinery lots.. 78 

Molybdenum concentrates pounds.. 119, 100 

Molybdenum wire feet.. 3, 670, 000 

Nafls kegs.. 11,788 

Palm oU pounds.. 1, 246, 612 

Rubber do 7, 224, 719 

Steel tons.. 30,398 

Tin do 1, 394 

We could present a very much longer list of commodities and quantities but 
even that list would be only a partial measi^re of the effectiveness of our Materials 
Distribution Unit, since many of the parties brought together through this "clear- 
ing house" do not and are not required to report to us, although sales have actually 
been consummated. 

(3) A much more formal mechanism has also been set up through officially 
organized purchase programs. Through these programs, the Government, rein- 
forced by its requisitioning power, redistributes idle and excess inventories of 
specific materials by forcing the holder of these inventories either to sell them to 
private users or to one of the Government's agencies, organized in conjunction 
with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The tabulation below presents 
again only a partial picture of the effectiveness of these programs since the 
amounts allocated do not include the quantities redistributed voluntarily by the 
holders in accordance with Priorities Regulation No. 13, which quantities have 
not therefore had to be aUocated by the War Production Board. 



13210 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Table 2. — Summary of programs through Sept. 12, 1942 





Number of reports- 


Total allo- 
cated 
(pounds) 




Mailed 


Received 


Aluminum 


2.594 
2,604 
698 
1,300 
79 
94, 975 


1,964 
2,297 
656 
1,231 
78 
39, 698 


23, 912, 974 




1, 697, 090 




94,834 




1, 687, 397 


Britannia metal - - . 


204, 427 




31, 200, 402 







Moreover, this tabulation does not present any data on programs which 
although organized, have not yet fully begun to function. Among these organ- 
ized programs are the following: 

A manila cordage program designed to pick up over 10,000,000 pounds of 
manila rope in the hands of some 40,000 wholesalers and retailers who may not 
sell the rope by virtue of a War Production Board order. 

An iridium program designed to pick up iridium and other precious metals 
vitally needed for war production. 

A copper insect screening program designed to pick up 13,000,000 square feet 
of copper screening in the hands of over 60,000 fabricators, wholesalers, and re- 
tailers, who may not sell that screening because of a War Production Board order. 

A tin anode program designed to pick up tin anodes and other tin shapes in 
the hands of tin platers. 

A tin oxide program designed to pick up tin oxide in the hands of manufac- 
turers of ceramic enamels who may no longer use the oxide by virtue of a War 
Production Board order. 

A cadmium program designed to pick up cadmium in the hands of manufac- 
turers who may no longer use that cadmium because of a War Production Board 
order. 

In addition, the War Production Board has organized a Steel Recovery Corpora- 
tion in conjunction with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This Steel Re- 
covery Corporation will, within a very short period of time, be ready to purchase 
idle and excess stocks of all kinds of iron and steel materials. 

To date we have had to exercise our requisitioning authority in 273 instances, 
and through the use of that authority we are able to add substantial quantities 
to the materials available for war-production purposes, including among others 
7% million pounds of copper, 11 million pounds of wood pulp, 10% million pounds 
of zinc concentrates, 1,700 tons of rubber, 17,000 bales of silk, 31,000 boxes of tin- 
plate, and 274,000 gallons of toluol. 

(4) As the above programs are set up, the War Production Board is put into 
a position whereby it can, where necessary, purchase the idle and excess inven- 
tories that are uncovered as part of the examination of data submitted to us with 
requests for allocations of materials. We are at this time concentrating on the 
most critically needed materials, and even then only on the significant quantities 
of such materials. As our system of allocation becomes more fully coordinated 
and as our redistribution mechanisim grows in size and experience, we expect to 
be able to do a bigger and better and more effective job. 

IV. Effects of New Methods on Production Program and Material 
Distribution 

(Answer to the committee's third question: "What improvements have al- 
ready resulted from the new methods or can be expected to result in the near 
future?" and to the committee's fourth question [in part] "and how do the new 
methods of raw material distribution contribute to the solution of these over-all 
problems?") 

The major effect of the new methods above outlined on the production program 
and the distribution of materials has been to reduce the proportion of demand 
that cannot be satisfied, which impinges on the market in conflict with the balance 
of demand. There is a positive gain in the production picture when material 
to be received is relatively well known in advance, even though requirements 
for full production cannot" be served. Programs can be adjusted and schedules 
made to make best use of available material whqn prospective deficiencies are 
known. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13211 

The reduction of inventory accumulations has been greatly improved by the 
new methods described. The reduction in stated production requirements over 
authorized purchases for the months of July, August, and September was largely 
accomplished at the cost of excess inventories reported under the production 
requirements plan and subtracted from materials authorized. 

Not the least among the effects of the recent methods above described is the 
preparation for still further improvements made possible by the first stages of 
these new developments. Since production requirements have been organized 
by all important producers of metal products and reduced to a quarterly basis, 
it becomes possible to move forward in the near future into an improvement of 
the production program itself. One of the next steps in improving the methods 
described involves the reporting of proposed production in classes of product 
more adequately organized than available information in the past, so that permis- 
sible production can be laid out for each calendar quarter for every class of product. 
We expect that this next step will be advanced in the preview of the production 
requirements for the first quarter of 1943 by having each important producer 
state his requirements and proposed production for every one of a list of 500 
products groups, so devised as to include all important products made of metal. 
On this basis it will be possible, in effect, to produce 500 production programs 
adding up into one master production program. This will never be perfect and 
will constantly be subject to intensive development within each of the 500 classes, 
but planning will be advanced to the extent that we can program our production 

Several of the more important individual scarce-material controls are described 
in appendixes at the end of this memorandum. This includes steel, copper, 
nickel, magnesium, and vanadium. 

(Answer to the committee's fifth question: "Would you illustrate the informa- 
tion furnished in answer to questions 1-4 with specific data for steel, copper, or 
other exemplary critical raw materials?") 

Descriptions of the methods of distribution of steel, copper, nickel, magnesium' 
and vanadium appear in supplemental statement. i 

V. Essential Civilian Production 

(Answer to the committee's sixth question: "Would you describe the adminis- 
trative organization and procedures by which the War Production Board deter- 
mines the type, amount, and location of essential civilian production?") 

Essential civilian production has often been defined, the definition changing with 
conditions. It is vitallv important that we all be clear in our minds as to what that 
definition is today — and will continue to be until we are within sight of our goal, 
which is victorv. Todav, essential civilian production can mean but one thing — 
that which cannot be identified as directly consumed or used by the military, but 
which is necessary to sustain civilian life and to the promotion of military opera- 
tions. Most obviously in this category are food supply, rail, water, and highway 
transportation of war materiel and its component parts and materials ; fuels and 
electric power for industry, etc. Falling within the essential civilian category is 
that segment of supplv devoted to preservation of the health and safety of the 
civilian population, that definition is still valid but it means exactly what it 
says, no more. Our civilian population will in time be engaged almost entirelyin 
occupations contributing in one way or another to military operations. Main- 
tenance of their health and safety is of course vital to the war activity — as vital as 
maintenance of the fighting effectiveness of our armed forces. 

The standard of reference is important, however. That standard is necessity 
to the promotion of military operations. The effects of wartime supply condi- 
tions upon the individual are important only insofar as they bear on the effective- 
ness of our military effort. In practice, this means that the legitimate- demands 
of the civilian population and civilian supplying industry upon our resources are 
becoming more and more restricted. This restriction will progress very rapidly 
until we are completelv "stripped for action." 

General responsibilitv for representing the civilian interest and economy in the 
formulation of War Production Board policv is vested in the Office of Civilian 
Supply. In execui:in,<i this responsibility, the Office seeks to determine essential 
civilian and indirect military requirements and to develop balanced and consistent 
programs for allocatins scarce materials, facilities, and services among competing 
demands, including allocations among broad categories of use, among different 
industries and among specific end products. Such programs may cover anything 

1 See p. 13222. 



13212 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

from indirect military and civilian requirements for copper or chlorine to require- 
ments for housing or farm machinery. These programs are prepared after con- 
sultation with technical advisers from the various industry and materials branches; 
participation in industry advisory meetings called by these branches; discussion 
with other interested governmental agencies such as the Office of Defense Trans- 
portation, Office of Petroleum Coordinator, Bureau of Mines, etc.; and analysis of 
published data concerning the field in question. The information is evaluated and 
consolidated within the Office of Civilian Supply, where standards for determining 
the minimum requirements of both the civilian consumers and the industries sup- 
porting the war program are developed. The completed programs are presented 
by the Office of Civilian Supply to the Requirements Committee, the Standard 
Products Committee and other interdepartmental committees on which the 
various claimants for raw materials and finished products are represented. 

At these committees the total stated requirements of all the claimants are com- 
pared with total supplies and reductions made, if required. Where necessary, 
the programs are then revised to conform to the reduced quotas. 

When a decision is reached as to the amount of materials to be allocated for a 
given purpose, or the quantity of a particular item to be produced, and when a 
program distributing the quota has been approved, it is the function of the Director 
General for Operations to implement this determination. Such implementation 
may take various forms. Conservation and limitation orders, for example, may 
be issued to restrict the use of scarce materials to specified purposes, force the use 
of substitutes, limit or prohibit the production of particular items, or simplify 
and standardize products. Within the framework of the conservation and 
limitation orders and other regulations, preference ratings for specific amounts of 
material for particular permitted purposes are assigned to different manufacturers 
by various mechanisms, the most important of which is, at the present time, the 
production requirements plan. 

Until a short time ago, the major efforts of the War Production Board were 
directed toward determining the type and amount of production to be permitted 
rather than the locations at which such production was to be carried on. Recently, 
however, much attention has been given to the possibilities of concentration of 
production in particular plants and particular areas, as mentioned in replying to 
other questions of the committee. 

(Answer to the committee's seventh question: "What factors dictate the use 
of concentration programs for essential civilian production and for what tj'pes of 
industries and products are such programs being developed?") 

A general answer is that concentration is considered when some or all firms in 
the industry are required for and convertible to war production; when permitted 
civilian production is so restricted as to prevent the economic operation of all 
firms; when a significant part of the production is continuing in regions or localities 
in which there are bottlenecks in labor, transport, power, or warehouse accom- 
modation. 

In most cases the existence of excess capacity in an industry which is con- 
tinuing to produce an essential civilian product must be established before con- 
centration of production is considered. At the present time special emphasis is 
being placed upon the concentration of production in the metal-using industries. 
Because the war requires the greatest possible conservation of metals, these 
industries generally have excess capacity for the production of essential civilian 
type products, and it is for this reason that attention is being devoted to these 
industries first of all. 

The Committee on Concentration of Production has decided not to consider 
concentrating operations in the wholesale and retail trades for the time being. 

(Answer to the committee's eighth question: "What general criteria are used 
for deciding the plants and areas in which essential civilian production shall be 
concentrated?") 

No universal rules can be laid down for the selection of plants to continue 
operation ("nucleus plants") at or near capacity. In drafting programs the oper- 
ating authorities should be guided by the following criteria, but their relative 
importance depends upon the circumstances of the industry and the conditions 
which have made concentration necessary. The best judgment available both 
within the War Production Board and the industries affected must be used in 
deciding on the relative importance of the criteria in each case and in applying 
them to the plants in the industry. In most cases the first and second criteria 
wUl be by far the most important. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13213 

(1) Suitability for conversion to war production: This will mean, as a rule, 
although not necessarily, that small plants will be given nucleus status and large 
plants, which are usually better equipped to handle war contracts, will be required 
to suspend civilian production. 

(2) The local labor markets: Civilian production should be suspended in areas 
in which labor is urgently required in war plants, especially in cases where the 
labor released by suspending civilian production would be directly transferable 
to war production. Nucleus status should be given wherever possible to plants 
in areas in which there is still a surplus of labor (e. g., New York and many rural 
communities) . 

(3) Economy of transport: The nucleus firms should be so selected that cross- 
hauling is eliminated wherever possible and the requirements on the transport 
system are reduced to a minimum, especially in areas in which regional transport 
bottlenecks have developed. 

(4) Power supply: Production should be suspended or restricted in regions in 
which the power supply is, or is likely to become, inadequate. 

(5) Requirements for warehouse accommodation: This is becoming a serious 
problem, especially in areas surrounding important ports. By closing and con- 
verting factories in these areas we can save the time, labor, and building materials 
necessarv to construct new warehouses. 

(6) Efficiency: To save resources and to protect price ceilings, production 
should be concentrated in the most efficient nonconvertible plants. As a rule, 
however, relative efficiencies will be extremely difficult to evaluate, and differ- 
ences in efficiency are likely to be so small that other and more important criteria 
should control. If the product is standardized when production is concentrated, 
the suitability of plants to produce the standard lines must be taken into 
consideration, 

VI. Manpower 

(Answer to the committee's ninth question: "To what extent do the W^^r 
Manpower Commission and other Federal agencies participate in the formulation 
of the over-all policy with respect to concentration and the details of the individual 
concentration program?") 

The Committee on Concentration of Production has asked the War Manpower 
Commission to appoint a consultant to speak for it on questions of general policy. 
The War Manpower Commission has been the source of all detailed information 
on labor-market conditions necessary to formulate concentration programs. The 
Office of Price Administration has been consulted on all programs considered up 
to this time, and will be consulted on future programs. 

Where other agencies such as the Office of Defense Transportation have definite 
interests in a specific concentration program, they will be consulted by the Com- 
mittee on Concentration of Production. In cases where power supply is impor- 
tant, the Power Branch of the War Production Board will be asked to provide the 
necessary information. 

(Answer to the committee's tenth question: "The committee has heard a great 
deal about the difficulties of securing adequate labor for copper and nonferrous 
mines. Have there been any studies of the potential productive capacity of 
mines and mills producing nonferrous ores and metals? Have labor shortages 
resulted in less-than-capacity production of any of these ores and metals?") 

PRODUCTIVE CAPACITT OP NONFERROUS MINES AND MILLS 

The basis of all activity in the production sections of the commodity divisions 
is the productive capacity of mines, mills, smelters, and refiners under the juris- 
diction of the respective divisions. We have detailed production data of all 
mines, mills, and smelters, by establishment. The Mining Branch has listed 
over 8,000 mines, each of which is given a serial number which it is necessary 
to have in order to obtain priority for materials and repair parts. Through 
this control we obtain the production data. 

DECLINE OF PRODUCTION DUE TO LABOR SHORTAGES 

Nearly all the nonferrous-metal mines have been reporting a net loss of labor in 
recent months and this has been reflected in a lower volume of production. The 
mine production of duty-free copper fell off nearly 5,000 tons in July. Curtail- 
ment of production during the month of August indicates that, with adequate 



13214 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

labor, copper production could be increased 12 percent, molybdenum 15 percent, 
zinc 20 percent, and tungsten 25 percent. At the time when supplies of these 
critical materials are barely sufficient for the most important military uses we 
have been losing production due to labor shortages. 

Labor turn-over has been high in nonferrous mining owing principally to the 
high wages paid in nearby construction and shipbuilding establishments. There 
has been some loss through the operation of Selective Service but this has been 
small in comparison to the losses to other industries. Also the mining companies 
have been complaining that the replacements generally are not quite as efficient 
as the experienced manpower lost and that this is resulting in a significant drop in 
output per man per day. 

In a recent survey of the Labor Production Division it was estimated that 
6,150 additional workers would be needed in domestic mines and mills for the 
balance of 1942 to augment the present employment of about 54,000. These 
requirements are for additional labor for the balance of the year and do not 
include replacement needs resulting from withdrawals due to out-migration, quits, 
or any other cause. Another total of 2,220 net addition to the labor force would 
be necessary for the copper, lead, and zinc smelters and refineries. Although the 
labor requirements might appear to be comparatively small, they are approxi- 
mately 10 percent of the present employment and a large number of fabricating 
plants in many different industries employing many hundreds of thousands of 
workers depend upon the output of the mines. 

ACTIONS TAKEN TO RELIEVE LABOR SHORTAGES 

From preliminary investigations of the manpower problem in nonferrous metals 
in May 1942 it became apparent that the activities of several governmental 
agencies outside of the War Production Board had to be coordinated if this complex 
problem was to be handled successfully. Steps were taken to bring these agencies 
together in a joint attack on the problem. A meeting for this purpose was called 
by representatives of the various branches of the War Department, the War 
Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Labor Board. 
At this meeting a report on the responsibilities of the various Government agencies 
was prepared and submitted on July 8. Shortly thereafter the International 
Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers presented a memorandum on the man- 
power problem to Wendell Lund, Director of the Labor Production Division. On 
August 4, Mr. Lund called a meeting of the representatives of the various agencies 
listed above and of the Office of Price Administration and the Selective Service. 
A week later this committee was established as a permanent working group under 
the chairmanship of Mr. H. O. King, chief of the Copper Branch. Since its 
inception, representatives of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and of the Bureau 
of Mines have been added to it. The committee has met regularly every week 
and has served as a clearing house for information on the various aspects of the 
manpower problem. 

As a result of the deliberations of the committee, a series of letters from the heads 
of the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, the War Labor 
Board, and Selective Service urging miners to stay on the job have been distributed 
to operators and miners in the mining areas; statements from General Hershey and 
from General McSherry, describing, respectively, the procedure on deferments of 
miners and on recruiting facilities of the .Selective Service have been distributed to 
mine operators; the War Manpower Commission is taking steps to introduce 
training programs into mining properties; steps are being taken to see that the 
present working force is more fully utilized through training and upgrading of 
labor, improving working and living conditions (including transportation to and 
from the job), lowering age and other restrictions on hiring and procuring high 
priority ratings on mine equipment; data on the manpower aspects of the wage 
problem were presented to the War Labor Board, enabling it to expedite its con- 
sideration of the cases now before it; an order curtailing gold mining as a means of 
freeing skilled mine labor for more essential operations is being drafted and dis- 
cussed before the committee. 

I approve of the action taken by the chairman of the War Manpower Commis- 
sion which attempts to stabilize employment in the metal mining, milling, smelting, 
and refining industries in the critical labor area of the far West by making it 
necessary for a production worker to obtain a certificate of separation from the 
United States Employment Service before he can leave his job. 

(Answer to the committee's eleventh question: "What responsibility does the 
War Production Board have in cases where labor shortages limit production? By 
what organization and procedures does it exercise such responsibility? What has 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13215 

specifically been done in the case of copper, zinc, aluminum and other nonferrous 
metals?") 

Although primary responsibility for maximum war production is assigned to 
the War Production Board, the President has given to the War Manpower Com- 
mission responsibility for seeing to it that manpower in the necessary quantities 
and with the necessary skills is made available for war production. Therefore, 
the first and most important responsibility of the War Production Board is to see 
that the War Manpower Commission is informed both with respect to production 
which is immediately threatened because of labor shortages and with respect to 
future production programs for which the War Manpower Commission must 
provide labor. 

The industry branches of the War Production Board and the regional offices 
are aware of the responsibility of the War Manpower Commission and keep them 
currently informed of labor shortages which are interfering with war production. 
The War Manpower Commission is kept informed of future labor requirements 
through its membership on the Plant Site Board of the War Production Board which 
reviews all major facility projects. It is jjrimarily through expansions and new- 
plants that the labor requirements of the war production program are increased. 
The Procurement Policy Division has worked out with the services numerous 
modifications in bidding rules and in conditions of contract awards designed to 
distribute more supply contracts to areas of labor surplus and fewer to areas of 
labor shortages. 

In addition the War Production Board has established a Labor Requirements 
Committee under the chairmanship of the vice chairman of the War Production 
Board on Program Determination, which has as one of its functions keeping the 
W^ar Manpower Commission informed with respect to program determinations 
which will influence the labor requirements they must provide for. The work of 
this committee is described in more detail below. 

Although primary responsibility for meeting labor shortages is in the hands of 
the War Manpower Commission," there are a number of ways in which the War 
Production Board helps the War Manpower Commission to handle this problem. 
For example, through the labor-management committees organized by the War 
Production Board much effective work has been done in areas of labor shortages 
to inaugurate and expand training and upgrading programs and to liberalize 
hiring specifications. 

Many of the regional directors of the War Production Board work m coopera- 
tion with the War Manpower Commission in labor shortage areas to develop 
programs for more extensive training and upgrading and for fuller utilization of 
women, Negroes, and minority groups. They have, helped in many cases to or- 
ganize communitv agencies and employer and employee groups behind such pro- 
grams. In addition, they have frequently been able to work out with war 
contractors wavs of subcontracting or of spreading out production through branch 
plants which have assisted in reducing labor requirements in congested areas. 
The program of the War Production Board for concentration and curtailment of 
production described in some detail above is also worked out in cooperation with 
the War Manpower Commission and with a principal objective of reducing the 
seriousness of local labor shortages. 

Recentlv, in order to carrv out its responsibilities under directive No. II of the 
War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board has organized a War 
Production Board Labor Requirements Committee, which, working under the 
chairmanship of Mr. J. S. Knowlson, tl\e vice chairman of the War Production 
Board on Program Determination, is charged with the function of providing to 
the War Manpower Commission information which can be used by it in labor 
shortage areas to see that the most essential needs of the war production program 
are met first. This committee, on which are represented the War Department, 
the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, the War Manpower Commis- 
sion, the Civilian Supplv Division of War Production Board and the Director 
General of Operations of the War Production Board, secures information from 
all of these sources on the relative importance of various types of war production, 
on products which have fallen behind schedule and products which are ahead of 
schedule, on plants or industries whose rate of production has been cut or is 
threatened with curtailment l^ecause of labor shortages, etc. 

These data provide the basis for establishing a system of labor priorities which 
should enable the War Manpower Commission to plan to meet labor shortages 
in an orderlv fashion in conformance with the needs of the war supply program. 
It is expected that, in order to provide the W^ar Manpower Commission with 
prompt answers to their questions as well as answers which are based upon a 



13216 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

familiarity with local labor market and war production conditions, the bulk of the 
work of this committee will be delegated to similarly constituted committees at 
regional and subregional levels. 

It is clear that as the program expands and labor shortages become an increas- 
ingly acute problem, additional measures will have to be taken for close cooper- 
ation between the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board 
in insuring that the supply of labor and the flow of materials are so closely inte- 
grated with each other and with the available facilities as to insure the maximum 
production of the articles needed for a balanced war supply program. 

(Answer to the committee's twelfth question: "What are the functions and 
objectives of the labor-management production committees? Is there any 
organization within the War Production Board for assuring proper contribution 
from these committees and for utilizing their suggestions and other activities? 
How many labor-management production committees have already been set up 
and what has been their contribution to date?") 

FUNCTIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 

The function and principal objective of the joint labor-management committees 
is to increase war production by stimulating and channeling production ideas 
from workers to the areas within management where they will be most effec- 
tively utilized for achieving the utmost war production. This is accomplished 
both by inspiring the workers to give greater individual efi"ort, and through 
improving operating efficiency. The specific job of these committees varies 
according to the immediate production problems facing the plant. Their duties 
range from handling rallies and giving out publicity material for making the 
individual worker realize his importance in the war effort, to organizing effec- 
tive suggestions from workers, to improving production techniques, and further, 
under present circumstances, to supporting worker morale through full explana- 
tion of material shortages and other serious problems facing industry. 

I have made it clear from the beginning that the war production drive is a 
voluntary effort and that it is intended to increase the production of weapons 
and services now and not to further the special interests of any group. It is not 
a plan to tear down or add to the power or position of any union, nor is it a plan 
to interfere with bargaining machinery where it exists or to undertake the func- 
tions of such machinery. It is not a plan that contemplates a measure of control 
of management l)y labor. It is purely and simply a plan to secure greater plant 
efficiency through cooperation of both labor and management. 

The war production drive has been organized through the production drive 
headquarters and the Labor Production Division in the War Production Board 
and has had the active cooperation of the armed services. Headquarters of the 
production drive plans for and promotes the establishment of joint labor-manage- 
ment committees in all plants, mines, and facilities engaged in war production and 
coordinates and advises these committees in their efforts to achieve increased 
production and eflficiency. In order to further strengthen the drive, we are in 
the process of establishing an over-all top committee with labor and management 
participation. 

ORGANIZATION FOR ASSURING PROPER CONTRIBUTION FROM COMMITTEES AND 
UTILIZATION OF THEIR SUGGESTIONS 

The matter of increasing production and plant efficiency has been approached 
in many different ways by the 1,500 joint committees now functioning. No 
hard-and-fast rules were laid down in Washington as to the organization and 
functioning of these committees. It was felt that the plants engaged in war 
production were so varied as to the kind of production engaged in, the size of their 
operations, their location, degree of unionization, and other factors that details 
of organization and activities should properly be a matter for local decision by 
each committee. We have insisted, however, that they be truly representative 
of both management and labor in order to secure the full cooperation necessary. 

Boosting production is not just a matter of enthusiasm. In addition to the 
need for sound industrial relations, a big part of the job is using tools, machines, 
and manpower as efficiently as possible. It was suggested that each committee 
should give attention to such problems as breaking production bottlenecks, using 
every machine to the fullest practical extent, adapting old machines to new ones, 
preventing break-downs, maintenance and repair, good lighting, cutting down 
accidents, taking care of tools, conservation of materials and elimination of 
waste, and dealing with transportation problems of workers in the plant. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13217 

The scope of these activities are in themselves considerable and involve almost 
every aspect of production in a plant. Every plant can do more to increase 
machine and tool utilization. Management wants to increase war production. 
Workers in and out of trade unions also want to help to this end. Their sons, 
brothers, and friends are out there in the firing line. They are anxious to provide 
them with as many and as perfect weapons as it is possible to make. It was 
important that every person in every plant be given an opportunity to participate 
in all-out production and to submit and receive serious consideration for his or 
her ideas for increasing plant efficiency. 

IMPROVING PRODUCTION BY WORKERS' SUGGESTIONS 

As a vehicle for such participation, we have urged that each committee inaugu- 
rate a suggestion system in its plant. Over 500 committees are known to have 
done so. There are probably many more which have not been reported. Sug- 
gestion boxes have been installed at convenient places throughout the plant. Pads 
and pencils have been put beside these boxes and workers have been urged to 
submit ideas which will boost production, improve quality, cut down rejections, 
or do anything else to increase that plant's efficiency. The knowledge and skill of 
millions of workers have thus been harnessed in the interest of greater production 
and efficiency. Their suggestions, growing out of close contact with work at 
the point of the tool, of having to contend with the innumerable bottlenecks, 
little and big, which tend to develop in any plant, are being submitted by the 
thousands weekly. They are either adopted, rejected as impracticable for one 
reason or another, or held for further investigation and research. While suggestion 
systems are not new in} America, we know that the war production drive has 
resulted in their establishment for the first time in numerous plants. Even in 
plants where such systems have been in effect, the patriotic impulses stimulated 
by the drive among war workers have multiplied by several times the number 
of suggestions which are being turned in. 

CASH AND MERIT AWARDS 

To stimulate and encourage the submission of suggestions, by those whose 
duties do not normally require them to do so, many committees are awarding 
cash prizes in the form of war bonds which often amount to as much as 10 percent 
of the estimated net annual savings accruing from the adoption of the suggestion. 
Further stimulation has been achieved by the development of a series of Govern- 
ment awards to suggestors whose ideas have been adopted and found useful. 
These are the awards of individual production merit which are distributed by 
labor-management committees themselves; the certificate of individual production 
merit, awarded by production drive headquarters, and the citation for individual 
production merit which is awarded by me for outstanding suggestions contribut- 
ing to the Nation's war production. We have felt that something equivalent 
to the military honors accorded to members of our armed forces should be avail- 
able to the production soldiers who have made outstanding contributions to the 
war effort. 

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND MORALE BUILDING 

In getting the drive under way in their respective plants, the committees have 
undertaken" important public relations jobs with the workers in their plant. 
Those of us who are close to the war effort here in Washington do not always 
realize how remote from the war effort many workers in war plants feel. Many 
are working away at the same old job of making nuts or bolts or rivets or washers 
and do not realize that their products are now going into the assembly of ships, 
planes, tanks, and guns. There are hundreds of thousands of workers who are 
making parts of larger assemblies which they have never seen. Many have given up 
jobs in plants or mines performing essential services to go to work in munitions plants 
because, among other reasons, they believe that they are thereby contributing 
more to the war effort than they were in the equally essential job they previously 
held. Many are so little aware of the importance of their jobs as to remain away 
from work without reasonable excuse. Some few even take it easy on the job. 
For these and other reasons, it has been found necessary by the committees to 
bring home to the work(^>rs in numerous ways their relationship to the war effort, 
the urgency of the job they are doing, and the need for more production. There- 
fore, subcommittees on publicity have been established by many joint labor- 
management committees. 



13218 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

These subcommittees see to it that appropriate posters and streamers are dis- 
played in the plants, that information stands are set up throughout the plants and 
kept filled with interesting and informative literature on the war effort generally 
and on activities in the plant. They set up scoreboards showing the over-all 
production goal and the daily progress toward that goal. They see to it that 
transcriptions and recordings are played over the plant public-address system, 
bringing the urgency of war production home to the workers, that motion pictures 
taken a1^ the front and in other war plants are shown to the workers. 

They also arrange rallies at which prominent speakers, war heroes, torpedoed 
merchant marine men, and enlisted personnel are invited to speak to the workers 
in the plant, to tell them how their equipment works in the field, how desperate 
is the need for more weapons, etc. Representatives of labor and management 
also speak at these rallies urging the cooperation of workers, foremen, and all those 
responsible for the organization of work in the plant. Other meetings and rallies 
are held for the purpose of making awards to individual workers, to promote the 
sale of war bonds, to emphasize the importance of safe practices and to train 
workers in first aid. 

Publicity committees secure communiques from the armed forces at the front 
to the workers in the plants, set up correspondence between former workers now 
in the armed forces and their friends and coworkers in the factory, run plant 
newspapers which contain war information, and set up displays showing the use 
of the plant product in final assembly. These are placed where all the workers 
in the plant can see them. 

The sum total of these efforts is to help to produce an attitude in workers 
favorable to making suggestions, to staying on the job and making extra efforts 
to increase the quantity of production. The publicity program serves as a tool 
of the joint labor-management committee in bringing the war home to the work- 
ers, in explaining its objectives, and in informing the workers how they can play 
their full part in the war effort. War production drive headquarters has sent 
millions of leaflets, posters, streamers, and stickers to the committees to aid in 
the work. We have also made available to the committees war films, transcrip- 
tions. Army and Navy communiques, still photographs of war equipment, and 
technical and procedural bulletins and booklets for the use and guidance of 
committee members. 

SAFETY AND HEALTH FUNCTIONS 

With the rapid increase in war employment and the millions of green workers 
being brought into mass-production industries for the first time, the problem of 
providing for industrial safety has multiplied many times. While many plants 
and mines have had safety and health committees for years, nevertheless even 
in such cases present-day conditions have required the full cooperation of the 
joint labor-management committees. 

They have made safety surveys of their plants having in mind the safeguarding 
of machines, the protection of individual workers by means of special clothing and 
appliances, and the elimination of industrial diseases caused by poor ventilation, 
dangerous fumes, contact with poisons and industrial chemicals. They have 
organized special meetings to train workers to safeguard themselves and to teach 
first aid. They have organized publicity campaigns through posters and plant 
newspapers to foster safety consciousness among the plant workers. They have 
encouraged workers to make safety suggestions through the suggestion system 
and have arranged through the cooperation of management for the provision of 
first-aid rooms, doctors, and nurses. The subcommittees have also secured 
and distributed pamphlets on safety and health to workers via information stands. 

War production drive headquarters has provided them with safety and health 
posters, leaflets, and technical bulletins for both committee members and plant 
workers. This has been accomplished in cooperation with the Division of Labor 
Standards of the United States Department of Labor, and the LTnited States 
Public Health Service. We have also arranged through the Division of Labor 
Standards to make available to the joint labor-management committees the 
consulting services and advice of almost 500 safety experts who will, on request, 
actually call on and assist them in planning their work. We have suggested, 
tried, and proved methods of accident record-keeping and methods for gaging 
the effectiveness of their safety programs. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13219 

TRANSPORTATION FUNCTIONS 

Gasoline rationing in our Middle Atlantic and New England States and the 
rationing of tires throughout the country have suddenly raised a new set of 
transportation problems for workers in war plants. A high percentage of all 
American workers have been accustomed to riding to and from work in their 
own automobiles. During the last 30 years, the availability of automotive 
transportation has worked a great change in our cities and in the average worker's 
mode of living. Workers have moved out of cities into suburbs and the nearby 
country. Industrv has also located plants at points sometimes a considerable 
distance from centers of population. All this has been made possible to a large 
degree because of the privately owned automobile. Also, for strategic reasons, 
many of our new war plants have been placed at points remote from centers of 
population. In spite of temporary war housing, increased bus service, and other 
provisions, thousands of war workers still find it necessary to travel distances up 
to 60 miles a day to and from their places of work. 

Inability to transport war workers may result in serious curtailment of pro- 
duction. With local restrictions surrounding the hours of operation of many 
gasoline stations, war workers have found it increasingly difficult to obtain 
sufficient gas outside of working hours. Those reporting to work before 7 a. m. 
and working long hours, as well as those on night shifts have often been unable 
to obtain g-asoline without taking time off from work or breaking into their 
daytime sleep to go to gas stations which are open only between 7 a. m. and 
7 p. m. These and other problems have been tackled by joint labor-management 
committees in an effort to eliminate absences and time lost because of inadequate 
transportation and to conserve all available rubber on tires as long as possible. 
Manv committees have undertaken to make arrangements with gasoline stations 
to adjust their hours of business to the working hours of the workers on various 
shifts on their plants to eliminate the necessity for workers to take time off from 
work to obtain needed gas. 

Car pooling has been a major activity of many committees. Strenuous efforts 
are being made to reduce the number of cars arriving daily at war plants. The 
committees have undertaken surveys to determine the number of workers who 
must travel by car and their place of residence. They have surveyed the condi- 
tion of these cars and their tires. They have designed and issued questionnaires 
to obtain the information necessary t6 aS"ect car-pooling among the workers in 
the plant and with workers in neighboring plants. 

Amendment No. 16 to the tire rationing regulations of the Office of Price 
Administration has recognized the efficacy of these efforts and the desirability 
of having joint labor-management committees serve as certifying agencies to 
local rationing boards where war workers are in need of tires. A certain number 
of grade 2 tires have been' made available to eligible war workers in plants haying 
an organized transportation plan. Such a plan, as defined by these regulations, 
must do more than provide for ride swapping. It must provide that a particular 
worker volunteer to drive his car daily and to agree to carry with him, to and 
from work, four other workers who either have no other mode of transportation 
or who agree to forego the use of their cars in going to and from work. This 
program has met with more resistance than ordinary ride swapping from workers 
and has necessitated a considerable educational program to fully effectuate 
it. It has become a responsibility and function of many labor-management 
committees. 

CONSERVATION'" FUNCTIONS 

Shortages of materials and the increasing difficulty in many industries of 
obtaining replacement of machines and tools have accented the importance of 
conserving both materials and equipment in war plants. Numerous ways have 
been found by committees to assist in this direction and many have established 
subcommittees to work on this problem alone. Through the suggestion systems 
many specific ways have been discovered and adopted in which actual raw ma- 
terials can be conserved in particular plants. Campaigns to raise the quality of 
production and to reduce rejects have been initiated by committees. Educational 
programs on the use of machinery to prevent wear and tear are being conducted. 
Reclamation of materials which were formerly thrown out has been carried on. 
Salvage programs involving the installation of properly marked receptacles 
throughout plants in which to segregate rubber, copper, tin, and other scarce 
metals have been initiated. 



13220 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

War production drive headquarters has bolstered this work of the committees 
by circulating suggestions and photographs to the committees as to what they 
might do on conservation and by distributing posters, leaflets, stickers, and other 
materials to be used by them for educational purposes. 

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS FUNCTIONS 

In addition to the above functions, many committees have participated actively 
in war bond purchase drives in their plants, in specific programs aimed to reduce 
absenteeism, in educational programs to sustain plant morale when material 
shortages and other unavoidable conditions necessitated temporary lay-offs or 
shut-downs, in facilitating training programs, and in dealing with housing diflS- 
culties of plant workers. 

War production drive headquarters has cooperated with committees in these 
functions by providing general morale-building materials, by serving as a clearing 
house for workable ideas in the various activities, and by securing for all com- 
mittees the best information available on material shortages to be used in educa- 
tional work. 

NUMBER OP LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 

Since the war production drive is a voluntary program, we cannot compel 
reports from committees. However, before committees may obtain the complete 
services rendered by headquarters and submit suggestions for higher awards, 
they are required to register the name of the chairman of the committee and the 
names of the labor and management representatives, as well as to give certain 
other facts as to the number of employees in the plant and the type of war pro- 
duction on which they are employed. From these registrations it is possible to 
know fairly accurately the number of the joint labor-management committees. 
In addition to the 1,420 committees which have registered with headquarters as 
of September 10, 1942, it is estimated that there are between 350 and 400 com- 
mittees formed and operating in plants which have not formally registered. 
This is estimated on the known lag in registration as shown by experience to date 
which ranges from 3 weeks to 2 months. Almost 3,000,000 workers are employed 
in those plants which have registered. 

These have included in greatest number plants producing guns and ordnance 
equipment, next iron and steel mills, a'ircraft and parts, synthetic materials, 
machinery and machine tools, shipbuilding, tanks, engines, anthracite coal, 
lumber, and many other miscellaneous industries. 

With increasing emphasis being placed in recent weeks on directing the drive 
into the raw-materials producing industries, the number of new committees in 
these industries is increasing rapidly. During August, 183 anthracite coUiery 
committees registered their entry into the drive. A considerable number of 
committees have also been established recently in the copper, lead, and zinc 
mining and refining, lumber logging and miUing, and bituminous coal industries. 

A. recent analysis showed that over 73 percent of the workers in the plants which 
had established joint labor-management committees are known to be members 
of trade-unions. The union affiliations of employees are not always reported 
by committees and it is probable that the actual percentage of employees in 
trade-unions is considerably higher. 

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE COMMITTEES 

Your committee* has asked me to comment on the contributions which these 
- committees have made. I think we have started something in American industry 
of immeasurable value. I don't know just how you can adequately measure the 
contribution of a program of this sort. Certain it is that a mere description of 
the activities of these committees gives one the impression that they are busy 
with a multitude of useful activities directly aimed at increasing production in 
war plants. 

We do not have a required reporting schedule, but we have received thousands 
of reports from them on their activities. They write us letters. They send us 
minutes of the business meetings. We have held a number of regional meetings 
of committee members at which they have described their accomplishments 
and outlined their problems to us. We have sent field men into some of the 
plants to see what is happening. From all of these sources, we do have a fairly 
good idea of what the copnmittees are doing. 

But this is a different thing from actually measuring accomplishments in an 
objective way. We have received many telegrams and letters from committees 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13221 

reporting that they have broken production records, cut down cars arriving at 
the plant to a certain percentage, reduced absenteeism by specific amounts, and 
giving similar facts on other activities. However, we are conscious of the fact 
that there are many factors, other than the war-production drive, operating in 
the plants where our committees are functioning and we do not know just how 
the effect of these other factors can be separated from the contributions of the 
committees. 

The following are some samples from among scores of statements made to us 
by management and bv our committees: 

Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation, Dunkirk, N. Y. — "For the month of June 
the Dunkirk plant has made shipments of 7 percent over the largest month that 
we have ever had in the history of the plant." 

Arma Corporation, Brooklyn, N. Y. — "Production throughout the plant is 
reaching a new high and is continuing to do better." 

Bemis Bros. Bag Co., Buffalo, N. Y. — "Our first week of production chart 
sandbag production went over the top 16.5 percent." 

National Battery Co., Depew, N. Y. — "Within 3 weeks after installing the war- 
production drive for victory the increased volume of production had become so 
noteworthy that commendation was received from the Assistant Secretary of 
War." 

Johns-Manville, Manville, N. J. — "Proposal from Miss Irma Tobias, head 
asbestos yarn inspector for the inspection and control department, covers a. 
special rack for checking measured lengths of yarn for test thus saving approxi- 
mately 10 man-hours per week." 

Watson-Stillman Co. Roselle, N. J. — "Production exceeded the quotas in both 
plants for the month of June." 

Westinghotise Electric Elevator Co., Jersey City, N. J. — "April 1, 1942, report 
was that this company was approximately 25 percent above their production 
quota at that time. Since that date their production has increased considerably 
more and they are now approximately 36 percent above their production quota. 
Noticeable increase in production since the winning slogan was posted." 

National Tube Co., Elhvood City, Pa. — "Best production record ever achieved. 
The hot-finish department, cold-draw department, cold-finish department, specialty 
department, and tube-reducer department, broke all previous production records 
and as a total represented the largest amount of finished material shipped (for 
the present type of product) in the history of this plant." 

Parish Pressed Steel Co., Reading, Pa. — "We can safely say that on an average 
our plant has had a step-up on production output amounting to 8 to 10 percent 
since our production-drive program has been in effect and we feel that the increase 
in production will continue to rise as we get further along with the production- 
drive program." 

Vollrath Co., Sheboygan, Wis. — "Output increased from 3,000 pieces per day to 
6,000 since establishing War Production Board labor-management committees." 

RCA Mamifacturing Co., Inc., Indianapolis, /nd.— "Production output of 
sound equipment for the United States Government during the month of June 
was 26.8 percent greater than for the highest production output month since 
Pearl Harbor." 

SUGGESTION SYSTEMS 

Of the 1,298 active committees reported through August 31, 486 had _ started 
suggestion systems and installed suggestion boxes. Reports coming in have 
shown that hundreds of thousands of suggestions have been turned in by workers 
but no total is as yet available. Letters have been received from many plant 
officials stating that the war production drive has acted as a great stimulus to their 
suggestion systems and has resulted in manifold increases in numbers of sugges- 
tions turned'in. To date, we have received over 12,000 requests for the Individual 
Production Merit Awards forms. These are awarded by the labor-management 
committees for suggestions of high merit which have actually been adopted. 
The award forms have been available for only the recent weeks. It is not likely 
that such awards will be made for more than one out of every 25 suggestions. On 
this basis, approximately 300,000 suggestions have probably been received by 
committees to date. 

.TRANSPORTATION PLANS 

Two hundred and twelve committees have reported the organization of trans- 
portation plans. Actual accomplishments in terms of the reduced number of 
cars transporting workers to plants are not available. Indications in reports 



13222 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

received are that considerable success in this direction has been achieved by many 
committees. There has been a substantial reduction in the number of cars 
carrying no passengers or only one passenger and a similar increase in the number 
of cars carrying two, three, or more passengers. 

TRAINING PROGRAMS 

Although, heretofore, training has been regarded in most plants as strictly 
a problem for the personnel department, now in many plants, labor-management 
committees have been cooperating in the formulation of plans and policies, and 
have actually assisted in the training of new workers. One hundred fifty-eight 
committees have actually reported such activity at the end of August. 

MORALE BUILDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS 

A considerable number of morale building activities have been carried on by 
the joint labor-management committees. While all the facts have not been 
reported the following will give some idea of the extent of this activity: 

Over 890 committees have had bulletin boards installed in their plants and 
have distributed and put up 441,000 posters. These were colored posters of the 
themes of "More Production," "Better Quality," "Men Working Together," 
"Save Tires and Rubber," "Eliminate Accidents," "Work Harder," etc. In 
addition 90,000 placards and 90,000 health posters have been distributed and 
posted. 

Five hundred and twenty-four committees have set up information stands 
and distributed 6,167,000 leaflets to workers in war plants. These leaflets have 
been written in simple language and directed at bringing home to workers an 
understanding of the total nature of this war, and are pictures of the immensity 
of the production job we have to face. They have also directed their attention 
to the stake they have in the war. Other leaflets have been descriptive of the 
purpose of the war-production drive, of necessary precautions to prevent accidents, 
of simple health rules, of the part a particular industry is playing in the total 
war effort, etc. 

The committees have distributed over 2,500,000 stickers to be put on workers' 
machines and on their cars. These stickers are directed toward obtaining greater 
energy, efficiency, and interest in production. 

Three hundred and sixty-three committees have designed and erected produc- 
tion scoreboards to help workers visualize the production goal and their daily 
progress toward that goal. 

Four hundred and nineteen committees have conducted slogan contests in 
their plants. Some contests have been held only once in a particular plant; 
others maintaining a running contest with monthly prizes of war bonds and cash. 
These contests have helped to concentrate the thinking of employees on the 
objectives of the drive. Committees display the winning slogans throughout 
their plants and in their plant newspapers. 

One hundred and ninety-three committees have published or utilized house 
organs and plant newspapers to further the drive and its objectives. 

Six hundred and twenty-two joint labor-management committees have appointed 
subcommittees to handle various aspects of their programs. 

SUPPL-EMENTAL STATEMENT BY DONALD M. NELSON, CHAIRMAN, 
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

I. Control of Inventories 

The committee has asked that I cover more fully than in my memorandum 
submitted at the time of my appearance before it on September 17, the War 
Production Board's activities in controlling and utilizing existing idle or excess 
inventories. Specifically, I have been asked to answer these questions: (1) In 
analyzing Production Requirements Plan applications for materials, how do we 
determine what constitutes an excess inventory? (2) To what extent have 
materials been recaptured when excess inventories were located on PRP forms? 
In this memorandum I shall attempt to answer the committee's specific questions 
first and then discuss the present shortcomings of the inventory utilization pro- 
gram which we recognize and are attempting to overcome. 

The manufacturer reports on PRP, for each material item, his inventory on 
hand, and the quantity he will withdraw from inventory (requirements). Re- 
ported requirements are reduced if Prograin Determination arrives at the con- 
clusion that there is not enough material available to allow for production of 100 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13223 

percent of the contemplated program in which the material is to be used, or the 
requested requirements may also be reduced whenever they seem inflated. Re- 
duced requirements are then compared with his reported inventory. If it appears 
that his inventory is greater than the minimum level, his receipts are limited to 
a quantity which, when added to his inventory, provides for 3 months' consump- 
tion plus a minimum stock. In other words, excess inventory is re'duced to the 
minimum level by the end of the quarter. The minimum level is defined as 
approximately 45 days for manufacturing plants, or one-half of the quantity 
which will be withdrawn from inventory during the quarter. Only enough 
materials are authorized to leave 45 days' inventory on hand at the end of the 
quarter after meeting the quarter's production requirements. However, excep- 
tions are made to this definition for special industries. For example, in the ship- 
building industry, the minimum level for yards constructing ships is 60 days and 
for yards repairing ships 120 days. It can be seen that inventory control exer- 
cised under PRP consists of not allowing a manufacturer to receive quantities 
from outside sources if his inventory is sufficient to take care of his production 
requirements. It is believed that an inventory can best be used in the manu- 
facture of the products for which it was purchased, and that over a period an 
excessive inventory in an individual plant can be eliminated without wasteage 
of material. 

Whenever excessive inventories appear on PRP applications a report is made 
to the Inventory and Requisitioning Branch covering inventories and quantities 
to be used. An effort is made by the Inventory and Requisitioning Branch to 
release these inventories to plants needing critical materials for the manufacture 
of war products. The Inventory and Requisitioning Branch investigates cases 
of apparent excessive inventories and obtains a detailed list of sizes, types, and 
gages available for distribution. From this information obtained through the 
PRP reports, detailed lists are made up showing available supplies of inactive 
materials. Manufacturers requiring these materials write in requesting certain 
items in the list. An investigation is made and the nearest supply located. Then 
the prospective purchaser is placed in contact with the manufacturer who has idle 
inventories. 

For example, over 14,000 firms have reported a total of 111,000,000 pounds of 
idle and excess inventories of copper and copper-base alloys. Much of the copper 
reported has been offered for voluntary sale at the Government's prices. That 
which the owner refuses to sell but which is nevertheless needed for war production 
will be requisitioned. 

Copper and copper-base alloys are now being allocated from idle inventories 
into strategic war production at the rate of over 4,000,000 pounds a week. 

Through the first week in September, 29,700,000 pounds of copper and copper- 
base alloys had been allocated from immobilized stocks to war production channels 
through the WPB's copper recovery program, instituted early in July. Of this 
total, 2,400,000 pounds were allocated for stockpiling to meet future anticipated 
demands for standard shapes and sizes of mill products; 6,300,000 pounds were 
reported and allocated as scrap; 9,300,000 pounds were allocated, or known to 
have been moved for use in existing form under Priorities Regulation No. 13, and 
11,700,000 pounds were allocated to brass mills and ingot makers for remelting. 

A special unit from the Copper Branch of WPB has been set up in the offices 
of Copper Recovery Corporation, 200 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y., to 
locate copper in the forms needed, and to redistribute it to war plants urgently 
requiring it because of unforeseen material shortages, plant break-downs, receipt 
of new war orders or other emergencies.- In most of these emergencies, the war 
plant cannot wait for receipt of the needed shapes from its regular source of 
supply. 

At the present time, emergency requests for copper in various forms are being 
received from war plants and the armed services at the rate of 500,000 pounds a 
day. More than half of all these emergency requests are being successfully filled 
from idle and excess inventories where the materials are located in exactly the 
form needed, sales arranged and immediate shipments made. 

For example, the Howard D. Foley Co., electrical contractors for a Philadel- 
phia armor plate plant, were ordered to complete their work 4 months ahead 
of schedule. They needed immediately 52,000 pounds of copper cable and copper 
bar which was not scheduled from the regular suppliers for 90 days. They placed 
their problem before the Copper Recovery Corporation, and within 24 hours, all 
but 2,000 pounds of the material was located in the inventories of companies in 
five different states. Sales were arranged and the needed copper delivered. 

A tank production line was kept in operation when copper tubing, urgently 
needed by the American Car & Foundry Co., was located at the Frigidaire divi- 
60396— 42— pt. 34 12 



13224 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

sion of General Motors in Dayton, Ohio, the Noland Co. in Newport News, Va. 
and the Westinghouse Manufacturing Co., Mansfield, Ohio. All three firms 
quickly cooperated by voluntarily selling the tubing from their idle inventories 
and production was maintained. 

A production line of aircraft instruments of P. R. Mallory & Co., Indianapolis, 
Ind., needed brass in a number of forms, and could not wait for special shipments 
from regular suppliers. The brass was located in the inventories of nine different 
companies in seven nearby States, sales were arranged and the production line 
was kept moving. 

The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at Burbank, Calif., was in immediate need 
of special copper cable to avoid a break-down on one of its welding machines, 
which was working day and night. They appealed to the WPB Inventory and 
Requisitioning Branch field office in Los Angeles. The material was located in 
the inventory of General Motors of Southern California, a private sale arranged, 
and the welding machine was kept going. 

The Lee C. Moore Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., working on an important Navy con- 
tract, had a crane break-down and needed a special type of trolley wire at once. 
It would take 6 weeks to get it from the manufacturer. The Inventory and 
Requisitioning Branch office in Pittsburgh located the wire in a plant 50 miles 
away. 

In Jacksonville, Fla., Army engineers sent in a hurry call to the Copper Re- 
covery Corporation for 50,000 pounds of copper cable for completion of special 
communications lines. The cable was located in the inventory of a firm in 
Wilson, S. C, which voluntarily sold it direct to the Army. 

The copper recovery program is one of a number of similar recovery programs 
instituted by the Inventory and Requisitioning Branch of WPB in cooperation 
with the Metals Reserve Co. and other WPB branches. In the copper pro- 
gram, inventories of idle materials are being secured from approximately 100,000 
firms and individuals. A master inventory is kept in New York, and inventory 
sheets are regularly distributed to WPB field offices, so that whenever possible 
material may be supplied from inventories of companies adjacent to the war 
plants needing it. 

The Steel Recovery Corporation, which will function in much the same way 
as the Copper Recovery Corporation, is now setting up its offices in Pittsburgh 
and will shortly institute a Nation-wide program to redistribute idle and e.xcess 
inventories of steel and steel products. 

Idle inventories frozen by limitation and conservation orders were released by 
Priorities Regulation No. 13, issued July 7, 1942. Under this regulation rules are 
set up which facilitate the transfer of excess inventories. Every manufacturer 
who reports high inventories on PRP forms receives a copy of Regulation No. 13 
together with a letter explaining its provisions and urging him to distribute his 
excess inventories through these channels. Later a field representative of the 
Inventory and Requisitioning Branch calls upon the manufacturer to collect 
facts and arrange for the transfer. In addition, transfer of excess inventories 
has been accomplished on a less formal basis by representatives of WPB making 
compliance investigations in each plant. When an excess inventory is discovered 
in a plant, it is reported to the WPB field office by the investigator. The investi- 
gator then urges manufacturers in the district to contact the nearest field office 
if they cannot obtain critical materials. In this way needs for materials are 
satisfied from sources of supply in nearby plants. 

There are still serious gaps in our system of inventory utilization. Most of 
them are symptoms of the early stage of our experience with this very complex 
problem. We are cognizant of the most serious gaps, and are aiming at closing 
them. 

The most serious gap at this time results from our inability to schedule closely 
the delivery of all critical materials to all plants requiring them. Since the 
function of an inventory is to cushion the consumer's production schedule against 
variations in the rate of flow of materials to him, the size of the inventory he must 
be allowed varies directly with the risk of an interrupted flow. Until we succeed 
in refining our controls over materials distribution, two kinds of excess inventories 
must be permitted manufacturers: (1) an over-all stock large enough to protect 
their production schedules against uneven flow of material receipts, and (2) stocks 
of some materials not immediately usable because of temporary inability to secure 
individual "bottleneck" materials or parts. 

Probably our largest recapture of inventories will result from the reduction of 
working stocks which our improving material distribution controls will permit. 
Included among inventories which can be reduced as greater assurance of an even 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13225 

flow of materials can be provided, are those in the hands of Army and Navy 
Establishments. The operating and field officers in charge of Army and Navy 
installations are increasingly showing themselves to be aware of the need for keep- 
ing inventories of raw and semifinished materials at as low a level as is consistent 
with realistic military necessities. The Services are not only steadily improving 
their procedures for keeping inventories of raw and semifinished materials down, 
but they are also organizing to find ways to transfer materials from one use to 
another wherever excessive inventories are found. A problem of considerable 
magnitude still exists, but we are aware of it and are moving to work it out with 
the aid of the operating Departments. As to finished m-ilitary items, it will be 
necessary to continue to pile up inventories for some time to come in anticipation 
of future strategic moves. 

Our coverage of the locat^ion and ownership of inventories which may be use- 
ful in war supply is not yet complete. The problem of wholesale and retail in- 
ventories is one on which we have been working for some time. It is a difficult 
problem, not only in the collection of factual data but, more important, in evaluat- 
ing the adequacy of stocks on hand in individual cases. We are about to initiate 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers in the technique of keeping records of 
inventories in relation to sales. The larger units in these businesses (those with 
annual sales of $100,000 or more and inventories of $25,000 or more) will be re- 
quired to keep records quarterly of their inventories and of the ratio of their 
stocks to sales. They will compute their average ratio of stocks to sales in cor- 
responding quarters of 1939-40, which will be used as standards against which t'o 
measure current inventory turn-over. The keeping of these records by business- 
men is intended both to educate them in evaluating their own inventories in 
terms of sales volume, and to provide us with a basis for determining whether or 
not tjie inequitable distribution of inventories m the marketing system shown by 
our research to exist this spring and summer is being evened out. If, by a sample 
check of these records, it is discovered that sufficient progress is not being made 
toward a more equitable distribution of inventories and that inventories in the 
hands of certain types of distributors and in certain areas of the country are stiU 
disproportionately large and prejudicial to the interests of smaller operators and 
consumers in other areas, we will take steps to remedy the situation. On the 
basis of the information now at hand, it seems that various forces are working 
toward a more equitable distribution of inventories. We do not, therefore, want 
to set up elaborate administrative machinery to correct a situation which may 
correct itself. By initiating a record-keeping system such as that outlined. above, 
we expect both to learn the true facts and to lay the groundwork for adminis- 
trative control if it proves necessary. 

Our knowledge of inventories has evolved largely as a byproduct of our efforts 
to control the flow of materials. In the rnain, we become aware of their existence, 
therefore, in connection with a seller's request for permission to deliver, or a 
buyer's request for permission to receive the material in question. There may 
still be substantial quantities of critical materials owned by speculators or by 
consumers who have not requested permission to buy or use additional amounts, 
and whom we therefore do not control. The procedures under Priorities Regu- 
lation No. 13, and the individual purchase programs described in chapter III-A 
of my memorandum to the Committee, are designed to get at most of these im- 
mobilized stores. We will have to do more. 

There may be inaccuracies in the reports of inventories which we have received 
from holders — specific data received in connection with PRP and the individual 
material allocation systems, and the general statements that inventories are at 
minimum working levels, required of all applicants for priority assistance. This 
is a matter of compliance. We intend to become stricter in securing compliance, 
and are strengthening our policing activities to that end. 

We have been slow in invoking the requisitioning power to compel slow or re- 
calcitrant owners to part with their holdings. This is partly because we believe 
strongly that voluntary means should be proved incapable before compulsion is 
resorted to. Also, however, the mechanics of requisitioning have been slow and 
cumbersome, partly by nature, and partly because they are new tools in our hands. 
In the future we will be quicker to use our requisitioning powers. 

Because we have only just begun to tackle the job of redistributing inventories 
we have hit the high spots first. The large and obvious accumulations have 
occupied a substantial part of our time in the initial stages of the work, as is 
desirable in the interests of efficiency. We will get down to the smaller and less 
obvious stockpiles before we are through. 



13226 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Our eflforts to date have been concentrated on redistributing stocks of raw 
materials and those in early stages of fabrication. Our conservation and limita- 
tion orders, as well as rationing regulations, have stopped a great deal of manu- 
facturing in its tracks. Inventories of semifabricated materials, parts, and prod- 
ucts therefore stand idle. Finished products, plumbing and heating equipment, 
for example, have been manufactured but cannot be installed. This is a field 
into which we have hardly ventured. We are proceeding cautiously in order that 
existing inventories of partly and completely manufactured items can be used 
most economically. In other words, we do not want to melt down as scrap any- 
thing which can be used in war or essential civilian production "as is" or with 
further processing. Neither do we want to destroy any frozen finished products 
which we may need before the war is over. We do not intend, however, to freeze 
in disuse any manufactured products containing materials useful in war production 
merely because of the financial loss which would be involved in reducing them to 
useful form. 

Finally, the utilization of existing idle inventories poses problems not present 
in utilizing "new" materials. In no single place is there a complete assortment 
of grades, forms, sizes, etc., upon which to draw. Much of the material available 
has been specially fabricated for a particular use, and is not readily adaptable 
to other uses. We are meeting this problem partially by such devices as the 
weekly catalog of available copper stocks distributed to field offices. Much of the 
work, however, involves finding the right use for a particular lot of material and 
will continue to be a slower job than that of putting to use an equal quantity of 
new material. 

II. CONTEOLLING THE FlOW OF MATERIALS InTO WaR AND ESSENTIAL 

Civilian Production 

The problem of controlling the flow of materials into war and essential civilian 
production is a many-sided and extremely complicated one. I should like to be 
able to report to you that this problem has been completely solved. Realism, 
however, compels me to report that much more information must be secured, 
that much more experience in using information must be gained, and that much 
more skill must be developed in government, before we can say that all major 
aspects of the problem of controlling the flow of materials are being satisfactorily 
handled. 

For this conclusion I feel no need to offer alibis. In my judgment the fact is 
that since last December 7 the flow of materials into war and essential civilian 
production has been steadily moving toward the national objective of maximum 
utilization of all available resources. 

It is not my intention at this time to attempt a detailed description of the 
paper work now used or under consideration for aiding in our task of securing 
maximum utilization of materials. On the other hand, I should like to point out 
that there is one basic principle which should govern all paper-work systems used 
in this connection. 

That principle may be expressed thus: Flow of materials is a physical fact, and 
is a part of the composite sets of physical facts which, taken together, go to make 
up production of finished products. Labor, machinery, materials, and manage- 
ment are what do the actual work. All these productive forces must be syn- 
chronized and kept in good working balance. Shortages or overages in any one 
productive element, at a given place and tihie, interfere with maximum utilization 
of production facilities. The prime movers in getting production out of materials, 
labor, and machinery are the innumerable plant managers throughout the Nation. 
The principle which should govern paper-work aids used by Government is that 
such paper work must so far as possible function to serve the production needs of 
managements. 

What Government must do, through whatever paper-work systems we may use, 
is to inform industry, in effect, of Government's decisions on the following 
questions: 

(1) What kinds of finished products do we need to receive? 

(2) What quantities of these finished products will be needed at stated 
time periods? 

(3) At what rates will scarce materials be available for the producers and 
subproducers who are asked to combine their efforts in making the desired 
finished products? 

(4) By what mechanisms will producers and subproducers be permitted to 
obtain the needed scarce materials at the appropriate times? 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13227 

The answers to the first two of these questions tell industry what the demand 
is for finished products in kinds, quantities, and times. The answer to the third 
question describes the scarcity aspect of the materials-supply problem, and the 
answer to the fourth question establishes the rules by which supplies of scarce 
materials will be made available to producers and subproducers. 

It seems appropriate to emphasize at this point that the need for Government 
aid in controlling the flow of scarce materials does not imply a need for eliminating 
production managers' decisions as to what is needed and when it is needed. On 
the contrary, Government aid in controlling the flow of scarce materials is needed 
only because there is a scarcity of materials, not because there is a scarcity of 
managerial skills and talents. This point may be demonstrated readily by making 
one assumption, i. e., the assumption that there is no scarcity of any material. 
Such in fact was the case during the earliest stage of the rearmament program. 
In that stage the flow of materials was allowed to operate normally. Industrial 
planners in plants holding military contracts, whether private plants or Govern- 
ment-owned plants, were expected to place ordinary commercial orders for delivery 
of needed materials at such times as experience dictated to be correct. 

As scarcities developed, because military demands began to overtake and then 
to outrun the capacity to produce materials — raw, semifabricated, and fabricated, 
to the point of subassemblies — then and then only were Government controls 
called for. 

There are two basic reasons for instituting governmental controls over the flow 
of materials. The first reason is that Government alone can make the over-all 
strategic decisions as to relative urgencies of the needs for finished products. 
The choice, for instance, between directing the flow of steel into finished tanks, or 
raflroad locomotives, or passenger automobiles, cannot be left to private judgment 
or to competitive bidding in the marketplace. The second reason is that the 
normal calculations of industry for determining amounts and delivery dates of 
required materials are based on plant-profit factors, including prestige for reli- 
ability in making finished-product deliveries rather than on maximum quantitative 
utilization of all the Nation's productive resources. 

The two primary objectives, then, of Government aids in the control of material 
flow are: First, to assure direction of materials and programming of finished- 
goods production into most urgent uses as dictated by military and economic 
strategy; and second, to guard against excess purchases which would overinsure 
against failures of delivery. The degree of strategic balance between end-product 
programs, in the first connection, and of operating balance, or timing, in the use 
of materials and production of components in the second, is a common test of the 
quality of achievement of both objectives. 

The first objective, of directing materials and programming finished-goods 
production into most urgent needs, has been approached, at successive stages of 
scarcity, by various devices, including voluntary priorities, limitation and curtail- 
ment orders, compulsory preference ratings, allocations, allotments, and quotas. 
These devices to date have served their strategic purpose fairly well. If there are 
valid complaints to be made, I believe they should be directed against the slowness 
with which certain strategic decisions as to kinds, quantities, and timing of pro- 
duction have been made. There is still too large an area in which materials find 
their way into goods which are on or even beyond the border line of essentiality. 
On the whole, however, I am impressed with the success of the materials controls 
in aiding the great bulk of our production efforts, and with the success of industry 
in meeting the demands put upon it. 

There is much more doubt, however, concerning our effectiveness in meeting the 
second objective of Government control over the flow of materials, namely, getting 
the maximum utilization of available scarce materials once they have been directed 
into strategically urgent channels of production. There are large gaps in our 
factual knowledge, concerning the myriads of needs which must be satisfied, 
between the producing of raw materials and the final assembly of components into 
finished products ready for use. There are large gaps in our experience in dealing 
with shifting delivery schedules, with changing technological processes, with 
peaks and valleys in the output or importation of primary materials. 

The problems presented by our lack of information, of experience, and of final 
determinations of essentiality are matters of grave concern, not only to the 
War Production Board but also to the several procurement agencies responsible for 
military victory. To these problems we long have been and still are giving full- 
est consideration. 

Our current efforts in this connection are to devise mechanisms which will 
function more precisely and thus give greater aid to industry in its task of achiev- 
ing maximum utilization of all productive resources in the shortest possible period 



13228 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

of time. These more precise mechanisms should assure that enough, but only- 
enough, materials will flow to the needed points at the proper times. Several 
new mechanisms aimed at this purpose have been recently proposed and are under 
intensive study. One is being tried out on a small scale. 

All these proposals rely in the first instance on the skills of management — private 
and in Government-operated plants — in calculating tonnages and delivery 
schedules needed for maximum output on military schedules and on permitted 
essential civilian goods. 

In this brief review of the problem of controlling the flow of materials, I should 
like to offer two general observations. The first is to reiterate and to emphasize 
the vast scope of the task our Nation is doing. We are establishing the greatest 
military production system in history, and I believe it no exaggeration to say that 
the ultimate victory of the United Nations, military and economic, will be based 
upon our capacity to outproduce the entire enemy production network. This is 
so vast an undertaking that it requires a complete change-over from ordinary 
competitive practices and management techniques, to a new kind of management- 
thinking. Millions of new decisions must be made throughout the Nation as well 
as in Washington. For these new decisions we obviously have very little basis in 
past experience. We know but one thing surely: We must achieve maximum 
production. 

The other general observation concerns the speed with which this maximum 
output must be reached. In ordinary times, new industrial decisions and tech- 
niques evolve slowly, each typically requiring a period of several years or more. 
In the present grave emergency there is no time for such careful, deliberate, and 
time-consuming procedures. We must act just as rapidly as we can — learning at 
the same time that we are doing. 

INTRODUCTION OF EXHIBITS 

Mr. Lamb. Mr. Chairman, I should like at this time to offer for the 
record a group of exhibits which will serve to supplement the hearings 
here. 

Because of the necessity of making accessible to the Members of 
Congress and other readers the Executive Order setting up the War 
Manpower Commission and the subsequent directives issued by the 
chairman of the War Manpower Commission we wish to prmt them, 
together with other relevant material, as exhibits to this hearing. 

The Chairman. The exhibits will be made a part of the record. 
If tliere is nothing further the committee will stand adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at the hour of 12:25 p. m., the committee adjourned.) 

(The exhibits referred to appear on following pages.) 



EXHIBITS 



Exhibit 1. — Executive Order Establishing the War Manpower 
Commission 

Executive Order Establishing the War Manpower Commission in the 
Executive Office of the President and Transferring and Coordinating 
Certain Functions to Facilitate the Mobilization and Utilization op 
Manpower 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes, 
including the First War Powers Act, 1941, as President of the United States and 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and for the purpose of assuring the 
most effective mobilization and utihzation of the national manpower, it is hereby 
ordered: 

1. There is established within the Office for Emergency Management of the 
Executive Office of the President a War Manpower Corr mission, hereinafter 
referred to as the Commission. The Commission shall consist of the Federal 
Security Administrator as Chairman, and a representative of each of the follow- 
ing Departments and agencies: The Department of War, the Department of the 
Navy, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Labor, the War Pro- 
duction Board, the Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, the 
Selective Service System, and the United States Civil Service Commission. 

2. The Chairman, after consultation with the members of the Commission, shall: 

a. Formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to 

assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the 
Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war; and issue such pohcy 
and operating directives as may be necessary thereto. 

b. Estimate the requirements of manpower for industry; review all other 

estimates of needs for military, agricultural, and civilian manpower; 
and direct the several departments and agencies of the Government as 
to the proper allocation of available manpower. 

c. Determine basic policies for, and take such other steps as are necessary 

to coordinate, the collection and compilation of labor market data by 
Federal departments and agencies. 

d. Establish policies and prescribe regulations governing all Federal pro- 

grams relating to the recruitment, vocational training, and placement of 
workers to meet the needs of industry and agriculture. 

e. Prescribe basic policies governing the filling of the Federal Government's 

requirements for manpower, excluding tliose of the military and naval 
forces, and issue such operating directives as may be necessary thereto. 

f. Formulate legislative programs designed to facilitate the most effective 

mobilization and utilization of the manpower of the country; and, with 
the approval of the President, recommend such legislation as may be 
necessary for this purpose. 

3. The following agencies shall conform to such policies, directives, regulations, 
and standards as the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers 
vested in him by this Order, and shall be subject to such other coordination by 
the Chairman as may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the 
resiDonsibilities placed upon him: 

a. The Selective Service System with respect to the use and classification 

of manpower needed for critical industrial, agricultural and govern- 
mental employment. 

b. The Federal Security Agency with respect to employment service and 

defense training functions. 

13229 



13230 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

c. The Work Projects Administration with respect to placement and training 

functions. 

d. The United States Civil Service Commission with respect to functions 

relating to the filling of positions in the Government service. 

e. The Railroad Retirement Board with respect to employment service 

activities. 

f. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor. 

g. The Labor Production Division of the War Production Board, 
h. The Civilian Conservation Corps. 

i. The Department of Agriculture with respect to farm labor statistics, farm 
labor camp programs, and other labor market activities. 

j. The Office of Defense Transportation with respect to labor supply and 
requirement activities. 

Similarly, all other Federal Departments and agencies which perform functions 
relating to the recruitment or utilization of manpower shall, in discharging 
such functions, conform to such policies, directives, regulations and standards as 
the Chairman may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by 
this Order; and shall be subject to such other coordination by the Chairman as 
may be necessary to enable the Chairman to discharge the responsibilities placed 
upon him. 

4. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the War Manpower 
•Commission: 

a. The labor supply functions of the Labor Division of the War Production 

Board. 

b. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel of the United 

States Civil Service Commission and its functions. 

c. The Office of Procurement and Assignment in the Office of Defense 

Health and Welfare Services in the Office for Emergency Management 
and its functions. 

5. The following agencies and functions are transferred to the Office of the 
Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, and shall be administered under 
the direction and supervision of such officer or employee as the Federal Security 
Administrator shall designate: 

a. The Apprenticeship Section of the Division of Labor Standards of the 

Department of Labor and its functions. 

b. The training functions of the Labor Division of the War Production 

Board. 

6. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel transferred to 
the War Manpower Commission and the Apprenticeship Section transferred to 
the Federal Security Agency shall be preserved as organizational entities within 
the War Manpower Commission and the Federal Security Agency respectively. 

7. The functions of the head of any department or agency relating to the 
administration of the agency or function transferred from his department or 
agency by this Order are transferred to, and shall be exercised by, the head of 
the department or agency to which such transferred agency or function is trans- 
ferred by this Order. 

8. All records and property (including office equipment) of the several agencies 
and all records and property used primarily in the administration of any functions 
transferred or consolidated by this Order, and all personnel used in the adminis- 
tration of such agencies and functions (including officers whose chief duties 
relate to such administration) are transferred to the respective agencies concerned, 
for use in the administration of the agencies and functions transferred or con- 
solidated by this Order; provided, that any personnel transferred to any agency 
by this Order, found by the head of such agency to be in excess of the personnel 
necessary for the administration of the functions transferred to his agency, 
shall be retransferred under existing procedure to other positions in the Govern- 
ment service or separated from the service. So much of the unexpected balances 
of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available for the use of any agency 
in the exercise of any function transferred or consolidated by this Order or for 
the use of the head of any agency in the exercise of any function so transferred 
or consolidated, as the Director of the 'Bureau of the Budget with the approval 
of the President shall determine, shall be transferred to the agency concerned, 
for use in connection with the exercise of functions so transferred or consolidated. 
In determining the amount to be transferred, the Director of the Bureau of the 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13231 

Budget may include an amount to provide for the liquidation of obligations 
incurred against such appropriations, allocations, or other funds prior to the 
transfer or consolidation. , , , , j_, . 

9. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available for that purpose, 
the Chairman may appoint such personnel and make provision for such supphes, 
facilities, and services as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
Order. The Chairman may appoint an executive officer of the Commission and 
may exercise and perform 'the powers, authorities, and duties set forth in this 
Order through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may deternnne. 

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 

The White House, 

April 18, 1942. 



Exhibit 2. — Dieectives I-XII Issued By The Chairman of The 
War Manpower Commission 

Directive No. I 

To United States Employment Service, to maintain lists of essential activities 
and essential occupations. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower 
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission that the measures hereinafter set forth will promote the 
effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prose- 
cution of the war, it is hereby directed : 

I. The United States Employment Service, after consultation or collaboration 
with the War Production Board, the War Department, the Navy Department, 
the Department of Agriculture and such other departments and agencies as it 
may deem appropriate, shall prepare and keep current, for its own use and for the 
use of appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, (a) 
lists of essential activities; (b) lists of essential occupations; and (c) lists of critical 
war occupations. 

II. Each list of essential occupations and of critical war occupations prepared 
by the United States Employment Service pursuant to this directive shall either 
contain a simple description of each occupation therein listed, and the minimum 
training time or experience required by an untrained individual in order to attain 
reasonable proficiency therein, or shall make reference to a readily available text, 
document or compilation of data wherein such description or required training 
time or experience is recorded. 

III. As used in this or any other directive prescribed under Executive Order 
No. 9139, unless the context requires otherwise: 

(a) Essential activities include (1) essential war activities, (2) any activity 
required for the maintenance of essential war activities, and (3) any activity 
essential to the mauitenance of the national safety, health or interest; 

(b) Essential war activities include the production, repair, transportation or 
maintenance of equipment, supplies, facilities or materials required in the prose- 
cution of the war by the United States and by the other United N,ations: 

(c) An essential occupation means any occupation, craft, trade, skill or pro- 
fession, required in an essential activity, in which an untrained individual is 
unable to attain reasonable proficiency within less than six months of training or 
experience; 

(d) A critical war occupation means an essential occupation, found by the 
United States Employment Service to be one with respect to which the number of 
individuals, available and qualified to perform services therein, is insufficient for 
existing or anticipated requirements for essential activities; 

(e) The United States Employment Service means the United States Employ- 
ment Service in the Social Security Board in the Federal Security Agency. 

IV. This directive may be cited as the "Essential Activities and Essential 
Occupations Directive." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
June 24, 1942. Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 



13232 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



DiEECTIVE No. II 



To War Production Board, to furnish information as to relative importance of 
critical war products. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpovrer 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War Man- 
power Commission, that an insufficient number of available workers, qualified to 
perform work in certain essential occupations, renders it necessary that the War 
Manpower Commission be currently advised as to the relative importance, in the 
effectuation of the national war supply program, of filling job openings in estab- 
lishments whose products or services are required for that program, and that the 
measures hereinafter set forth will promote the effective mobilization and utiliza- 
tion of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The War Production Board, with the aid of the War Department, the Navy 
Department, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Maritime Commission, 
the Department of Agriculture, and such other departments and agencies as it 
may deem appropriate, shall furnish to the War Manpower Commission, current 
information with respect to the relative importance, in connection with the 
maintenance and effectuation of the national war supply program, of filling job 
openings in plants, factories or other facilities whose products or services are re- 
quired for that program. 

II. To that end, the War Production Board, with the aid of such departments 
and agencies, shall take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to transmit 
to the War Manpower Commission at its headquarters as well as in the field, 
information pursuant to paragraph I hereof, in a manner which will assure close 
contact and collaboration in all areas of operation. 

III. The War Production Board, after consultation with the War Department, 
the Navy Department, and the Maritime Commission, shall designate whether, 
or the extent to which, any information furnished pursuant to this directive 
constitutes confidential information and may indicate the manner in which the 
confidential character of any such information shall be safeguarded. 

IV. The War Manpower Commission shall observe and enforce, in every detail, 
the instructions of the War Production Board with respect to safeguarding the 
confidential character of any information made available to it pursuant to this 
directive. 

V. The War Production Board shall to the maximum extent practicable notify 
the War Manpower Commission of any information made available pursuant to 
this directive within such period prior to the date or dates when workers will be 
required in connection therewith, as may be necessary to enable the recruiting 
facilities of the United States Employment Service and other appropriate agencies 
to be fully utilized. 

VI. This directive may be cited as the "Critical War Products Directive." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
June 24, 1942. Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 



Directive No. Ill 

To United States Employment Service,- to accord certain placement priorities. 

By virtue of "the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War Man- 
power Commission that the war production program requires that priorities be 
accorded in the recruitment of workers for and the placement of workers in essen- 
tial activities and that the measures hereinafter set forth will promote the proper 
allocation and the effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower 
in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The United States Employment Service shall take such action as may be 
necessary or appropriate to assure that: 

(a) Each local public employment office exerts its maximum efforts, including 
the utilization of all personnel, funds and facilities at its disposal, to expedite the 
recruitment and placement of all workers required for essential activities in pref- 
erence to undertaking or continuing to recruit or place workers for any other 
activity; and 

(b) Referrals are made to job openings for workers required for essential occu- 
pations, irrespective of the location of the work, in accordance with the relative 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13233 

need for filling such job openings under the national war supply program, as shown 
by information made available by the War Production Board pursuant to the 
Critical War Products Directive. 

II. If the United States Employment Service, on the basis of its own mfornia- 
tion or of authoritative information from other sources, has reason to believe, with 
respect to any plant, factory, or other facihty, hereinafter referred to as an em- 
ploying establishment, that: 

(a) The wages and conditions of work are not at least as advantageous to a 
worker referred to a Job opening therein, as those prevailing for similar work in 
similar establishments in the industrial area; or 

(b) Proper measures have not been or will not be instituted to reduce or 
eliminate its use of or need for workers in critical war occupations by effective 
utilization, through training, upgrading, appropriate personnel transfers and job 
isimplification, of the workers employed in such establishment; or 

(c) Its need for additional workers in critical war occupations can be reduced 
or eliminated by the transfer of workers, employed in nonessential activities in 
such establishment or in another employing establishment, under the same owner- 
ship or control in the industrial area; the Director of the United States Employ- 
ment Service may provide for excepting such establishment from the provisions 
of paragraph I hereof, subject to such policies, conditions, and standards as the 
Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may approve. 

III. This directive may be cited as the "Placement Priorities Directive. ' 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
June 24, 1942. 



Directive No. IV 

To United States Employment Service, to encourage transfers to essential activities. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War Man- 
power Commission, that the national war supply program requires that increased 
efforts be made to encourage each individual who is unemployed or is not engaged 
in an essential activity but is capable of performing services in an essential occupa- 
tion and is needed for such activity, to accept, through the United States Employ- 
. ment Service, suitable work in an essential activity and that the measure herein- 
after set forth will promote the effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's 
manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The United States Employment Service shall, as expeditiously as possible, 
complete an occupational classification of each registrant under the Selective Train- 
ing and Service Act of 1940, on the basis of his Selective Service Occupational 
■Questionnaire. 

II. The United States Employment Service shall request each such registrant 
whose occupational questionnaire indicates that (a) he is qualified to perform 
services in an essential occupation and (b) he was not, as of the date of his filing 
of such questionnaire, utilizing his highest skill in an essential activity, to report 
to his nearest pubhc employment office. If, through its interview of any such 
registrant or from other sources, the United States Employment Service finds that 
he" is capable of performing services in an essential occupation and is not utilizing 
his highest skill in an essential activity, the United States Employment Service 
shall exert all reasonable efforts to persuade such registrant to transfer to suitable 
work for which he is needed in an essential activity. 

III. The United States Employment Service shall maintain a complete record 
of and submit a full report to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission 
with respect to (a) each case in which a registrant, after being offered suitable 
work in an essential activity pursuant to paragraph II hereof, has, without good 
cause, refused to accept such work, and (b) each case in which an employer or his 
representative, has directly or indirectly, in any manner, dissuaded or deterred or 
attempted to dissuade or deter, from so transferring, a registrant in his employ 
who is requested by a public employment office to transfer to work in an essential 
activitv pursuant to this directive. 

IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Encourage Transfers to 
Essential Activities." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
June 24, 1942. 



13234 > WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Directive No. V 

To Director of Selective Service, concerning occupational deferments for indi- 
viduals needed for essential occupations in essential activities. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission, that existing and anticipated labor needs for essential 
activities require that consideration be given such needs, in connection with the 
classification, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, of available 
individuals qualified in essential occupations, and that the measures hereinafter 
set forth will promote the proper allocation and the effective mobilization and utili- 
zation of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The Director of Selective Service shall take such action as may be necessary 
or appropriate to assure that : 

(a) Copies of lists, including amendments and supplements thereto, of essential 
activities and of essential occupations, transmitted to him from time to time by 
the United States Employment Service pursuant to the Essential Activities and 
Essential Occupations Directive, are promptly made available to all local boards 
and boards of appeal in the Selective Service System; 

(b) To the extent required for the maintenance of essential activities, indi- 
viduals who are engaged in essential occupations in essential activities are tem- 
porarily deferred from training and service under the Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940 while so engaged; 

(c) To the extent required for the maintenance of essential activities, indi- 
viduals who are not engaged in essential occupations in essential activities but 
who are qualified in essential occupations, are afforded reasonable opportunity, 
prior to induction under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, to become 
so engaged. 

II. The Selective Service System and the United States Employment Service 
shall establish and maintain close collaboration at their respective headquarters 
as well as regional, State, and local levels to insure full utilization by the Selective 
Service System and eflScient transmission by the United States Employment 
Service of the labor market and occupational information currently available 
through the offices of the United States Employment Service, and so as otherwise 
to effect the purposes of this directive. 

III. This directive may be cited as the "Essential Occupational Deferment 
Directive." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
June 24, 1942. Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 



Directive No. VI 

To United States Employment Service, to expedite the recruitment and placement 
of essential agricultural workers. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, estabhshing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission that the agricultural production program contemplated 
by the "Food for Victory" goals prescribed by the Secretary of • Agriculture pur- 
suant to the directions of the President, renders essential the conservation and 
maximum utilization of available agricultural workers and the recruitment of 
additional agricultural workers from every appropriate source and tliat the 
measures hereinafter set forth will promote the proper allocation and effective 
mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the 
war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The United States Employment Service, after consultation with such 
bureaus, oflFiees and divisions in "the Department of Agriculture and with such 
other departments and agencies as it may deem appropriate, shall prepare, keep 
current and make available to the Department of Agriculture and other interested 
departnxents and agencies, data reporting its best estimates with respect to the 
available number of agricultural workers and the anticipated requirements for 
such workers, by periods, areas and agricultural commodities. 

II. If, with respect to any area, the United States Employment Service deter- 
mines after consultation with such bureaus, offices and divisions in the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture and other departments and agencies as it may deem appro- 
priate, that the available number of agricultural workers is insufficient for the 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13235 

production, cultivation or harvesting of any agricultural commodity, essential to 
the effective prosecution of the war, the United States Employment Service shaU 
take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to assure that its maximum 
efforts are expended in the recruitment and placement of the number of agricul- 
tural workers required for such production, cultivation or harvesting, including: 

(a) The estabhshment and maintenance of such agricultural labor recruitment 
and placement services and facilities as may be necessary; 

(b) The solicitation of all available workers, qualified to perform agricultural 
work, in projects or programs maintained by the Work Projects Administration, 
the National Youth Administration, the Department of Agriculture, and other 
appropriate private or pubhc agencies or departments; 

(c) The solicitation of qualified agricultural workers in rural and urban centers, 
youth groups and educational institutions; 

(d) The retention for such purposes of qualified agricultural workers who 
might otherwise be recruited for placement in less essential industrial activities; 

(e) The promotion, among growers, of the cooperative use of agricultural 
workers ; 

(f) The promotion of the maximum utilization of transient workers for such 
purposes by directing and guiding their movement to those areas in which non- 
local agricultural workers are required; and 

(g) The submission, currently, to the Department of Agriculture, of all avail- 
able information with respect to those areas in which and the periods and crops 
for which the establishment and maintenance of adequate housing facilities will 
promote the recruitment and placement of required agricultural workers. 

III. The United States Employment Service shall not, pursuant to this directive, 
recruit agricidtural workers for, or refer such workers to, any agricultural employ- 
ment in which the wages or conditions of work are less advantageous to the 
worker than those prevailing for similar work in the locality. 

IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Expedite the Recruit- 
ment and Placement of Essential Agricultural Workers." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
June 24, 1942. 



Directive No. VII 

To Secretary of Agriculture, concerning adequate housing for transient essentia 
agricultural workers. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Cornmission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower 
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission, that existing and anticipated requirements for agricul- 
tural workers for the production, cultivation or harvesting of agricultural com- 
modities essential to the effective prosecution of the war render necessary certain 
movements of such workers between areas and crops, that such movements will 
be facilitated if reasonable shelter is available for such workers, and that the 
measures hereinafter set forth will promote the effective mobilization and utiliza- 
tion or the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The Secretary of Agriculture shall, on the basis of data made available to 
him from time to time by the United States Employment Service and on the 
basis of such other data as he may deem appropriate, prepare and keep current,' 
information with respect to the availability of adequate housing or other types 
of shelter facilities in each area in which nonlocal agricultural workers will be 
required for the production, cultivation or harvesting of any agricultural com- 
modity essential to the effective prosecution of the war. 

II. If, with respect to any area, the Secretary of Agriculture determines, after 
consultation with the United States Employment Service and such other depart- 
ments or agencies as he may deem appropriate, that existing housing facilities, 
including permanent or mobile Department of Agriculture labor camp facilities, 
are insufficient to provide adequate shelter for nonlocal agricultural workers 
required in such areas for the production, cultivation or harvesting of any agri- 
cultural commodity essential to the effective prosecution of the war, the Secre- 
tary of Agriculture shall take such action as may ,be necessary or appropriate 
(including the utilization of all personnel funds and facilities at his disposal 
therefor) to assure that: 



13236 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(a) All Department of Agriculture labor camp facilities, existing or hereafter 
established in such area, are made available to and utilized by such workers be- 
fore such facilities are made available to or are utilized by any other individuals; 
and 

(b) Such additional Department of Agriculture labor camp facilities are estab- 
lished and maintained in such areas and for such periods as are necessary to 
provide adequate shelter for such workers. 

III. The Secretary of Agriculture, after consultation with the United States 
Employment Service, the Office of Defense Tranpsortation, the Office of Price 
Administration and such other agencies or departments as he may deem appro- 
priate, shall take such action (including the utilization of all personnel, funds and 
facilities at his disposal therefor) as may be necessary or appropriate to assure 
that: 

(a) Agricultural workers, required for the production, cultivation or harvest- 
ing of any agricultural commodity essential to the effective prosecution of the 
war, are provided needed transportation facilities, and 

(b) Nonlocal agricultural workers and their families, transported or housed 
pursuant to this directive are provided needed health and welfare services. 

IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Assure Adequate Housing 
for Transient Essential Agricultural Workers." 

Paul V, McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
June 24, 1942. 



Directive No. VIII 

To certain Government agencies, concerning adequate transportation for workers 
in essential activities. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower 
Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission, that careful plans must be made to assure the availa- 
bility of adequate transportation facilities for workers transferring to, moving 
between, or engaged in essential activities and that the measures hereinafter set 
forth will promote the effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's man- 
power in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The United States Employment Service, the Department of Agriculture 
and any other department or agency of the Federal Government having infor- 
mation concerning workers transferring to, moving between, or engaged in essen- 
tial activities, shall maintain, keep current and submit to the War Manpower 
Commission, for transmission from time to time to the Office of Defense Trans- 
portation, information with respect to each situation or area in which existing or 
anticipated transportation needs of such workers are not or will not be adequately 
provided for by existing and readily available transportation facilities. 

II. In carrying out the functions and responsibihties vested in it by Executive 
Order No. 8989, as amended, particularly as such functions and responsibilities 
relate to assuring that adequate transportation facilities are available, as needed, 
to workers transferring to or moving between essential activities and to workers 
requiring transportation between their homes and places of employment in es- 
sential activities, the Office of Defense Transportation shall give careful consid- 
eration to the information submitted to it from time to time pursuant to para- 
graph I hereof and shall consult with such other departments or agencies as it 
may deem appropriate. 

III. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Provide Adequate Trans- 
portation for Workers in Essential Activities." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
June 24, 1942. ] 



Directive No. IX 

To certain Government departments and agencies, to develop, integrate and 
coordinate Federal programs for the day-care of children of working mothers. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Man])ower 

Commission by Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13237 

Commission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission, that existing and anticipated requirements for workers 
in essential activities render necessary the employment of large numbers of 
women, that among such women may be found many mothers of young children, 
that no woman responsible for the care of young children should be encouraged 
or compelled to seek employment which deprives her children of her essential 
care until after al' other sources of labor supply have been exhausted, but that 
if such women are employed, adequate provision for the care of such children 
will facilitate their employment, and that the measures hereinafter set forth will 
promote the effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's 
manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. The Office of Defense Health and \\ elfare Services, in consultation with 
such departments and agencies of the Federal Government as it may deem 
appropriate, shall: 

(a) Promote and coordinate the development of necessary programs for the 

day-care of children of mothers employed in essential activities; 

(b) Determine, either directly or through such Federal departments and 

agencies as it may designate, areas in which such programs of day- 
care should be promoted, and the respective responsibilities of the 
Federal departments and agencies concerned in the development of 
such programs; and 

(c) Take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to assure the 

effectuation of all such programs. 

II. The United States Employment Service shall prepare, keep current, and 
make available to the Office or Defense Health and Welfare Services, data re- 
porting its best estimates with respect to the number ot working mothers with 
young children, and the anticipated requirements of essential activities for the 
employment of such mothers, by periods and areas. 

III. The Work Projects Admmistration in the Federal Works Agency, the 
Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor, the Office of Education in the 
Federal Security Agency, the Bureau of Public Assistance in the Social Security 
Board in the Federal Security Agency, the Farm Security Administration in the 
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Public Housing Authority in the Na- 
tional Housing Agency and every other Federal department or agency carrying 
on child day-care programs or programs related thereto shall make available to 
the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services reports with respect to such 
day-care programs or programs related thereto, carried on by such department 
or agency, and shall take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to in- 
sure the integration and coordination, through the Office of Defense Health and 
Welfare Services, of all Federal programs for the day-care of children of working 
mothers and otherwise to carry out the purposes of this directive. 

IV. This directive may be cited as the "Directive to Develop, Integrate and 
Coordinate Federal Programs for the Day-Care of Children of Working Mothers " 

Paul V. McNtjtt, 
Chairm.an, War Manpower Commission, 
August 12, 1942. 



Directive No. X 

To all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern- 
ment, concerning transfer and release of Federal employees. 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and by Executive Order No. 9243, and having found, after consultation 
with the members of the War Manpower Commission, that the measures herein- 
after set forth will facilitate the filling of the Federal Government's requirements 
for manpower in the civilian service, and promote the proper allocation and the 
effective mobilization and utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecu- 
tion of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall find that a civilian employee 
of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government 
can make a more effective contribution to the war effort in a position in some 
other such department or agency, the Commission, with or without the consent 



13238 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

of the employee or of the department or agency in which he is employed or to 
which he is transferred, shall direct the transfer of such employee to such position. 

II. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall find that a civilian employee 
of any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government 
is qualified to perform work in a critical war occupation (as defined in the Essen- 
tial Activities and Essential Occupations Directive) and can make a more efl"ec- 
tive contribution to the war effort in an essential activity carried on by a private 
enterprise, the Commission, with the consent of the employee, but with or with- 
out the consent of the department or agency in which he is employed, shall, upon 
request of such private enterprise, authorize the release of such employee to such 
private enterprise for work in such critical war occupation in such essential 
activity. An employee whose release has been authorized pursuant to this para- 
graph shall be carried on a leave-without-pay basis from his Federal position for 
the period of such employment with a private enterprise, except that such leave- 
without-pay status shall not continue beyond six months after the end of the war. 

III. The Civil Service Commission shall base its findings, pursuant to para- 
graphs I and II of this directive, upon: 

(a) the extent to which the skills, abihties, training, and experience of the 
employee are required and will be utilized by the departments, agencies, 
activities or private enterprise concerned; and 

(b) the relative importance to the war program of the Government activities 
in which the employee has been employed and to which he will be trans- 
ferred, as indicated by, among other considerations, priority classifica- 
tions established by tlie Director of the Bureau of the Budget pursuant 
to Executive Order No. 9243; and 

(c) the relative importance to the war program of the Government activity 
in which the employee has been employed and of the private enterprise 
to which he will be transferred, as indicated by priority classifications 
established by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to 
Executive Order No. 9243 and by such policies and directives as the 
Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may prescribe. 

IV. Any employee of a department or agency of the executive branch of the 
Federal Government (other than an employee holding a temporary position) who 
has been transferred pursuant to paragraph I of this directive shall be entitled to 
thirty davs' notice from the department or agency to which he has been transferred, 
prior to the termination of his services with such department or agency, unless 
such termination is for cause. Upon the termination, without prejudice, of the 
services of an employee (other than an employee transferred or released from a 
temporary position) in the position to which his transfer or release has been au- 
thorized or directed pursuant to paragraphs I or II of this directive (or in a 
position which, for the purposes of this directive, is substantially similar thereto) 
such employee shall be entitled to the reemployment benefits hereinbelow set 
forth, provided he makes application for reinstatement therein within forty days 
after the termination of his services with a department or agency of the Federal 
Government and, with respect to an employee released to a private enterprise, 
within forty days after the termination of his services with such an enterprise but 
in no event later than six months after the end of the war: 

(a) Reinstatement, within thirty days of his application, in the same depart- 

ment or agencv and to the maximum extent practicable, in the same 
locaHty, in his former position, or in a position of like seniority, status, 
and pav, in such manner, to the maximum consistent with law, that 
he does"^ not lose any of the rights or benefits to which he would have 
been entitled had he not been transferred or released; 

(b) If such a position, or if the agency or activity in which he was employed 

is no longer in existence, and such person therefore cannot be rein- 
stated, the placement of his name on the Reemployment List estab- 
lished pursuant to Executive Order No. 6924 of September 20, 1932, 
to be considered for certification to positions for which he is qualified 
elsewhere in the Government service. Certifications from such list 
shall be made by the Civil Service Commission prior to certifications 
from all other lists maintained by the Commission. 

V. Any department or agency in which is employed an employee whose transfer 
or release is to be directed or authorized pursuant to this directive without the 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13239 

consent of such department or agency, shall be afforded, prior to such transfer 
or release, a fair opportunity to present to the Civil Service Commission evidence 
as to the ej;tent to which such agency's or department's execution of its respon- 
sibilities will be jeopardized by the loss of such employee and as to the extent to 
which the employee's skills, abilities, training, and experience are being and will 
be utilized in such department or agency. 

VI. Any employee whose transfer is to be directed pursuant to this directive 
without the consent of such employee shall be afforded, prior to such transfer, a 
fair opportunity to present to the Civil Service Commission evidence that the 
proposed transfer is inequitable or will impose upon him an undue hardship. 
No employee shall, without his consent, be transferred to a position at a lower 
salary than he received at the time such transfer is directed, nor shall any em- 
ploj'ee, without his consent be transferred to a position beyond reasonable com- 
muting distance from his home unless the department or agency concerned shall 
reimburse the employee for the cost of transporting himself, his immediate 
family, and his household goods, in accordance with Government regulations. 

Vli. Whenever the filling of any positions by promotion from within for an 
indefinite period is being considered by any department or agency, employees who 
have been transferred or released pursuant to this directive and are entitled to 
reemployment in such department or agency under this directive shall be given 
the same consideration they would have received had they not been transferred 
or released, and such employees may be selected for such promotion. In the 
event of such selection, if such emploj'ee is not authorized to return to the position 
to which promotion was made, the position in question shall be filled only for the 
duration of such employee's reemployment rights under paragraph IV of this 
directive and such reemployment rights shall be applicable to the position to 
which promotion was made. 

VIII. No request for the transfer or release of any civilian employee in any 
department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government shall 
be made by another such department or agency except through the Civil Service 
Commission, and no civilian employee of any such department or agency shall be 
released for transfer to another such department or agency except upon request 
of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission shall not request or authorize 
the transfer of any such employee who can make a more effective contribution 
to the war effort in the position in which he is currently employed or whose 
transfer would be contrary to the most effective methods of filling the Federal 
Government's requirements for manpower in the civilian service or would conflict 
with policies or directives of the War Manpower Commission. 

IX. The Civil Service Commission is authorized and directed to adopt such 
measures and take such action as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of this directive and to insure that the reemployment provisions set 
forth in paragraph IV of this directive are given full force and effect. 

X. This directive shall become effective on and after September 27, 1942. 

XI. This directive may be cited as the "Directive With Respect to the Trans- 
fer and Release of Government Employees." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
September 14, 1942. 



Directive No. XI 

To all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern- 
ment, concerning requests for the occupational deferment of their officers or 
emploj'ees. 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission, that the measures hereinafter set forth will promote an 
equitable and uniform application to employees of the Federal Government of 
the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, 
facilitate the filling of the Federal Government's requirements for manpower 
in the civilian service, and promote the effective mobilization and maximum 
utilization of the Nation's manpower, it is hereby directed: 

60396— 42— pt. 34 13 



13240 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

I. Not later than ten days after the publication of this directive in the Federal 
Register, each department and agency of the executive branch of the Federal 
Government shall have prepared and submitted to the Civil Service Commission, 
and shall thereafter keep current, information, hereinafter referred to as the 
department's or agency's list of key positions, with respect to each position, 
directly concerned with the war effort or with essential supporting activities, 
in such department or agency, the adequate performance of the duties of which 
requires, (a) special skills or abilities and (b) a considerable period of training or 
experience. Such list of key positions shall include with respect to each such 
position, a description of the skills, abilities, training or experience required and 
a description of the relation of the position to the war effort or essential supporting 
activities. 

II. On the basis of the information so submitted, the Chairman of the War 
Manpower Commission will designate those positions which shall be eliminated 
from each department's or agency's list of key positions. In irxaking such desig- 
nations, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission will base his determina- 
tion with respect to each position (a) on the relation of such position to the war 
effort or to essential supporting activities, (b) on the skills, abilities, training or 
experience required for the adequate performance of the functions and duties of 
such position, and (c) on the ability of the department or agency concerned to 
secure from Government or non-Government sources, a replacement for such posi- 
tion, consistently with such policies and directives as the Chairman of the War 
Manpower Commission may have prescribed. The Chairman of the War Man- 
power Commission will promptly inform the appropriate department or agency 
of such designations, and will thereafter from time to time make, and notify the 
appropriate department or agency of, such new designations or revisions in former 
designations as changing circumstances may require. 

III. On and after the twentieth day after the publication of this directive in 
the Federal Register, no department or agency of the executive branch of the 
Federal Government shall directly or indirectly request the occupational defer- 
ment, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, of any 
officer or employee of such department or agency, unless such request conforms 
with the following principles and procedures: 

(o) Each such request shall be made only by the head of the appropriate 
department or agency, or by the person or persons designated by such 
head to take such action ; 

(b) Ea-ch such request shall be made on the form or forms prescribed by the 

Director of Selective Service; 

(c) No such initial request for a Class II classification on occupational 

grounds shall be made unless the head of the appropriate department 
or agency or the person or persons designated by him to take such 
action shall certify that: 

(i) The officer or employee possesses special skills or abilities, abso- 
lutely essential to the performance of his duties, which skills or 
abilities have been acquired as a result of a considerable 
period of training or experience; 
and 

(ii) The officer or employee is employed in a position which is in- 
cluded in the department's or agency's list of key positions 
as currently revised pursuant to paragraph II of this directive, 
or though he is not employed in such a position, the officer 
or employee is engaged in an activity which is directly con- 
cerned with the war effort or with essential supporting activi- 
ties and occupies such an extraordinary and unique relation- 
ship to the conduct of that activity that the head of his 
department or agency and the Chairman of the War Man- 
power Commission have determined that his separation from 
the activity would seriously impair, over a substantial period 
of time, the effective functioning of that activity. 

(d) No such request for an additional occupational deferment beyond the 

initial period of six months shall be made unless the head of the 
department or agency, or the person or persons designated by such 
head to take such action shall, in addition to certifjing to the matters 
prescribed under subparagraph (c) hereof, also certify that: 

(i) The department or agency concerned and the Civil Service 
Commission have determined that any effort to recruit a 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13241 

replacement would be in conflict with the policies and 
directives of the Chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission, or 

(ii) Vigorous efforts have been made, subject to the policies and 
directives of the Chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission, by the department or agency concerned and by the 
Civil Service Commission to secure a replacement and 
such efforts have been unavailing, or 

(iii) A replacement has been secured but a further period of train- 
ing is required before the trainee will be qualified to assume 
the responsibilities of the position, or 

(iv) The head of the department or agency and the Chairman of 
the War Manpower Commission have determined that the 
officer or employee is engaged in an activity which is 
directly concerned with the war effort or with essential 
supporting activities and occupies such an extraordinary 
and unique relationshi]) to the conduct ot that activity 
that his separation from the activity would seriously im- 
pair, over a substantial period of time, the effective func- 
tioning of that activity. 

IV. If, pursuant to the requirements of the War Department or the Navy 
Department with respect to the voluntary enlistment in the armed forces by, or 
the offer or award of commissions in the armed forces to, civilian officers or em- 
ployees of the executive branch of the Federal Government, any such officer or 
employee presents to the head of his department or agency a request for a release 
in order to so enlist or to secure such a commission, such release shall 
be denied if the head ot .such department or agency determines that he would 
have requested the occupational deferment of such officer or employee under the 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, pursuant to the pro- 
visions of paragraph III (c) of this directive, unless the Chairman of the War 
Manpower Commission determines that the services tor which such officer or 
employee is sought by the armed forces will constitute a more effective contribu- 
tion to the war effort than the services performed by the individual in his position 
in such department or agency. In the event of such denial, the head of the de- 
partment or agency shall at the same time certify to the officer's or employee's 
appropriate Selective Service local board that he had refused to issue to such 
officer or employee a release which would have enabled him to enlist in or accept 
a commission in the armed forces of the Nation, including therein a statement_of 
the reasons for such refusal. 

V. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission will exempt from the 
provisions ot this directive, any civilian activity of a department or agency of the 
executive branch of the Federal Government which he finds (a) is substantially 
identical to an industrial enterprise and (b) has established and is maintaining 
policies and procedures with respect to the occupational deferment, under the 
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, of officers or employees 
engaged therein, which are consistent with the policies and directives of the Chair- 
man of the War Manpower Commission. 

VI. Each department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Govern- 
ment seeking a determination by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commis- 
sion pursuant to paragraph III, IV or V hereof shall submit its request therefor, 
together with such information in connection therewith as it may deem pertinent, 
to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall submit its 
recommendations with respect to such requests and with respect to each depart- 
ment's or agency's list of key positions submitted pursuant to paragraph I hereof, 
to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. 

VII. The Director of Selective Service shall take such actions as may be neces- 
sary or ^appropriate to acquaint all local boards and boards of appeal in the 
Selective Service System with the provisions of this directive. 

VIII. This directive may be cited as the "Directive With Respect to Requests 
for the Occupational Deferment of Federal Employees." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 
REPTEMBEn 24, 1942. 



13242 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Directive No. XII 

To all departments and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Govern- 
ment, concerning the classifications of field positions in the Federal service. 
By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No'. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with the members of the War 
Manpower Commission, that the measures hereinafter set forth will facilitate the 
filling of the Federal Government's requirements for manpower in the civilian 
service, effectuate the administration of Executive Order No. 9243 and War 
Manpower Commission Directive No. X, and promote the effective utilization of 
the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, it is hereby directed: 

I. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall have reason to believe that the 
classification of any civilian positions in the field services of an executive depart- 
ment or agency which are subject to the schedule of grades and salaries prescribed 
by the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, are such as to result in (a) material 
interference with the effective administration of Executive Order No. 9243 and 
War Manpower Commission Directive No. X, or (b) undesirable competition for 
employees among such departments or agencies, or (c) an impediment to the 
effective utilization of the Nation's manpower in the war effort, it shall make a 
fact-finding survey of the positions concerned or such other study as it deems 
necessary, and shall, after consultation with the affected department or agency, 
prepare and promulgate standards for the proper classification of such positions 
in accordance with the schedule of grades and salaries prescribed by the Classifica- 
tion Act of 1923, as amended. Any such fact-finding survey or study may be 
made at the request of or in cooperation with an affected department or agency. 

II. Upon receipt of such standards, each department and agency, having field 
positions affected thereby, shall classify such positions in accordance with such 
standards and report its classifications to the Civil Service Commission, together 
with such additional information and in such manner and form as the Civil 
Service Commission may prescribe. 

III. The Civil Service Commission shall make such audits as may be necessary 
to determine the extent of adherence to standards prescribed pursuant to para- 
graph I hereof, and shall report its findings with respect to variations therefrom 
to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 

IV. Whenever the Civil Service Commission shall have reason to believe that 
the results described in clause (a), (.b), or (c) of paragraph I hereof are occurring 
or are likely to occur with respect to positions in the Federal service for which 
wage scales are fixed on a prevailing rate basis, it shall take such action as may 
be appropriate to promote such adjustments of such wage rates or other action by 
the departments or agencies concerned, as may appear proper or necessary to 
effectuate the purjDoses of this directive. 

V. The Civil Service Commission is authorized and directed to adopt such 
measures and take such action as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out 
the provisions of this directive. 

VI. The Civil Service Commission shall prescribe such rules or regulations as 
may be necessary to assure that the incumbent of any position whose rate of pay 
will be reduced by reason of any action pursuant to paragraph II hereof is pro- 
vided, prior to such reduction, a fair opportunity to present to the Civil Service 
Commission, his objections thereto. 

VII. This directive may be cited as the "Directive With Respect to Classifica- 
tion Standards for Positions in the Field Service of Executive Departments and 
Agencies of the Federal Government." 

Paul V. McNutt, 
Chairman, War Mawpower Commission. 
September 24, 1942. 



Exhibit 3. — Statistical Data on Manpower 

SUBMITTED BY WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The following statistical information has been assembled in answer to questions 
on employment, training, turn-over, labor shortages and discriminations, presented 
by the Committee. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13243 

I. Employment and Turn-over 

Overall summary. — ^Statistics on employment and unemployment from the be- 
ginning of the defense program to June 1942 and on anticipated requirements for 
manpower to the end of 1943 are presented in Table 1. The assumptions under- 
lying the estimate of requirements are set forth in Governor McNutt's testimony.' 
It should be noted that the requirements for June 1943 are set at a level some 
3,000,000 higher than by the end of 1943. This is due mainly to the seasonality 
of operations in agriculture, where employment at the summer peak is from 
three to four million higher than .during the slack winter months. 

Emj)loyment of women. — Considerable interest attaches to progress made in the 
employment of women because the projected expansion in the labor force is 
dependent mainly upon an increased use of women as replacement for men 
drawn into the armed forces. Summary statistics on employment and unem- 
ployment of women are presented in Table 2. Employment of women outside 
agriculture had risen in the two-year period ended in June 1942 by 2,000,000, or 
over 20 percent, while the number of nonagricultural employees and the self- 
emploj^ed increased by only 14 percent (see Table 1). In agriculture the use 
of women is naturally subject to pronounced seasonal fluctuations, considerably 
sharper than those for men. Nevertheless, the figures in the table clearly in- 
dicate an increase of 300,000 to 400,000 in the first two quarters of 1942 as 
compared with the corresponding periods in 1941. Unemployment among women 
available for and seeking work declined steadily from 2,700,000 at the beginning 
of the period to 1,000,000 at the end. 

Although the increase in the employment of women was substantial over the 
period, a relatively minor share of it was represented among wage earners in 
manufacturing industries, the most important sector of the war economy. The 
number of women factory wage earners as compared with the total is shown in 
Table 3 for the period October 1939- April 1942. Separate figures are presented 
for durable goods and nondurable goods industries, because employment in the 
latter (including the apparel trades and canning) is subject to wide seasonal 
swings. In durable goods the employment of women wage earners increased 
from October 1939 to April 1942 by about 140,000, or nearly 42 percent; this 
rise was smaller than in total employment which increased 52 percent. To avoid 
distortion by seasonal factors, the gains in nondurable goods must be measured 
either from October 1939 to October 1941, with an increase in the employment of 
women of some 125,000, or from April 1941 to April 1942, with an increase of a 
little more than 100,000. On either basis the relative rise in the employment 
of women in nondurable goods factories was approximately 6 percent, about' the 
same as the increase in total employment in these industries. In manufacturing 
as a whole then tliere were about )■{ million more women wage earners at the end 
of the period than at the beginning. 

Employment of Negroes. — Interest in the employment of Negroes is second only 
to that in the employment of women. If the large drain on manpower necessi- 
tated by the expansion of the war economy is to be met, fullest possible use 
must be made of all human resources and hiring specifications which have the 
effect of discriminating against Negroes or other minority groups must be set 
aside. The latest available data on the employment of Negroes are presented 
in Table 4 based mainly upon the survey carried out by the Bureau of Employ- 
ment Security in May 1942. This survey, one of the series of regular bimonthly 
surveys designed to measure anticipated labor requirements against current 
employment, is in the nature of the case limited mainly to the larger plants in 
industries contributing significantly to the war effort. As the table shows, it 
covered only 44 percent of the total employment in the industries listed in the 
table. In the plants surveyed nearly 460,000, or a little over 5 percent of the 
total number of employees, were classified as nonwhites. It is estimated that 
approximately 95 percent of this group are Negroes. 

Progress made since the beginning of the defense program cannot be measured 
by the figures in Table 4, because no data are available which show the employ- 
ment of Negroes by industry for May 1940 or a comparable date. However, in 
the more important war industries definite progress has been achieved. Whereas 
two years ago there were practically no Negroes employed in the aircraft industry, 
at present most of the leading aircraft firms, in their plants outside the South, 
hire colored workers in both unskilled and production capacities. There has 
been a steady increase in the number of Negroes hired in shiobuilding and there 



13244 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

is growing acceptance of colored workers in ordnance. In the latter industry 
many Negroes are being introduced into production work. 

More specific data on the efforts to eliminate discrimination are shown in the 
appended report indicating the latest figures on Negro employment in firms and 
membership in unions cited before the the President's Committee on Fair 
Employment Practice. ^ 

Concentration of war employment. — Information on concentration of employ- 
ment under the control of large corporations is difficult to obtain because employ- 
ment statistics are generally maintained on the basis of industry or the nature of 
product made rather than by type of ownership. However, a special compila- 
tion prepared from reports submitted by plants in metal-product manufacturing 
industries for June 1942 indicates that wage earners, in 631 plants of 94 largest 
war contractors accounted for 60 percent of the total number of wage earners 
reported for these industries. For 374 plants of 88 largest war contractors infor- 
mation was also furnished on the scheduled employment of wage earners at peak; 
the scheduled increase from June 1942 to peak was about 86 percent. It should 
be noted that these figures are not complete since the reports did not cover plants 
with 20 wage earners or fewer and plants engaged in the production of machine 
tools, Government-owned ordnance plants, and the primary smelting, refining, 
rolling and drawing industries in the iron and steel and nonferrous groups. Also, 
within these limits reporting was not complete; for example, information should 
have been furnished for 711 plants by the 94 contractors whereas only 631 plant 
reports were actually received. Despite the incompleteness of the basic data, 
it is believed that the percentages cited above are approximately correct. 

Local labor markets. — The manpower problem is not as yet a problem of over- 
all labor shortage, but mainly one of deficits in particular industries or crafts and 
in specific localities. The analysis by the Bureau of Employment Security as of 
July 1942 shows that shortages of male labor for use in industry existed in 35 
labor market areas and that shortages could be anticipated in an additional 81 
areas. The 35 areas of present shortage are listed in Table 5. Wherever possible 
the local labor supply in each area and the amount of in-migration that will be 
necessary to fill the estimated demand are listed. The extent to which full use 
of the local labor reserve would modify the number of in-migrants needed is indi- 
cated in some cases. 

It is not possible to estimate the total amount of in-migration to be expected 
in labor shortage areas on the basis of these data, since they represent only the 
difference between estimated supply and war industry demand in each area and 
take no account of the effect of competing demands from other areas. 

Turn-over. — The problem of locating, training and placing in the right jobs 
people needed for an expansion of production is complicated by turn-over, as a 
result of which it is always necessary to have more than 100 people to keep 100 
jobs continuously staffed. Monthly turn-over rates for representative establish- 
ments in 135 manufacturing industries for the period beginning January 1941 are 
presented in Table 6. The most important of the components of turn-over are 
undoubtedly the quits and miscellaneous separations. Accessions include replace- 
ments for the workers separated from the pay roll and additions needed to increase 
production. For present purposes the figure on accessions is important only to 
the extent that it is inflated by replacements for avoidable separations. Lay-offs 
represent mainly the separation of employees from the pay roll because of the sea- 
sonal or other contraction in the activity of the establishment, and discharges, 
confined to dismissal of unsuitable workers, are numerically insignificant. 

From the beginning of 1941, the quit rate has shown a pronounced tendency to 
rise, and in the first half of 1942 was about 80 percent above the level of the corre- 
sponding month of 1941. This phenomenon is the usual accompaniment of a 
rising labor market with its increased opportunities for better paying and other- 
wise better situated jobs. Thus in the first half of 1937 at the height of the most 
recent period of predefense prosperity, the quit rate was 88 percent greater than 
in the first half of the worst depression year 1932. Nevertheless, the quit rate 
at present is considerably above the levels attained at any tune since January 
1930, when systematic compilation of turn-over data was begun by the Department 
of labor. 

Miscellaneous separations, though only one-fourth as numerous as quits, have 
also increased steadily since the beginning of 1941, with the relative rise being 
larger than for quits. This, however, is traceable entirely to the expansion in 

1 See p. 13252. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13245 

the armed forces; separations immediately preceding military enlistment or induc- 
tion are included in the miscellaneous category together with separations due to 
death, permanent disability, retirement on pension, etc. 

Special interest attaches to quits in war industries. Data for selected indus- 
tries of this type for the period from 1939 to date are presented in Table 7. Some 
of these industries were affected by the foreign orders as early as 1939 and by 
defense preparations for this country in 1940. A very marked increase in the 
quit rate over the preceding vear is shown for several of them in 1940 and for all 
but aircraft in 1941. During that year, the rate of quits in some of the most 
important war industries such as shipbuilding, aircraft, and copper snaelting was 
greatly in excess of the average for manufacturing. The increase in quits in 1942, 
while substantial for all but one of these industries, was not as large as for man- 
facturing as a whole. However, the shipyards, where the rise in quits exceeded 
80 percent, present an important exception. 

Reasons for high quit rates. — In an inquiry mailed by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to plants with higher than average turn-over and quit rates during the 
spring months of 1942, the management was requested to comment on the reason 
for their situation. They were asked specifically to what extent inadequacies in 
local transportation or housing were responsible, or whether other factors were 
causing the excessive rates. Replies giving one or more specific reasons were 
received from 50 establishments distributed as follows among ten industries: 

Shipbuilding 12 

Electrical machinery 11 

Brass, bronze and copper products ' 

Machine tools 6 

Aircraft ^ 

Aluminum 2 

Foundries 2 

Boots and shoes 2 

Leather 1 

Miscellaneous rubber goods 1 

The most common reason for high quit rates is the workers' desire to secure 
higher wages elsewhere, the reports indicate. Twenty-six out of the 50 replies 
received gave better wages in other private or Government establishments as a. 
reason for quitting. Inadequate local housing impelled employees to quit their 
jobs in 13 plants, and in 10 plants, poor transportation facilities. Eight reports 
mentioned the fact that for one reason or another, work was irregular or seasonal 
and that the quit rate was high because employees left to obtain steadier work; 
4 of the 12 shipbuilding firms gave this reason. 

Only one firm mentioned pirating of its workers by other plants and this was 
not a specific complaint. 

The number of firms reporting specified reasons for high quit rates was as 
follows : 

Higher wages elsewhere 26 

Inadequate local housing 13 

Inadequate local transportation 10 

Irregular and insufficient work 8 

Enlistment in armed forces 6 

Dislike of work 6 

Better jobs for trainees elsewhere 6 

Restlessness of youth . 3 

Desire for draft-exempt job 2 

Return to farm 2 

Pirating 1 



13246 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

II. Training 

Vocational training. — Under the auspices of the United States Office of Educa- 
tion, training for war production workers at the vocational school level has been 
in progress since July 1940. During a period of two years, over 1,500,000 persons 
have been enrolled in courses preparatory to war employment and nearly 1,360,000 
in courses supplementary to employment, designed to make possible upgrading 
(Table 8). New enrollments in pre-employment courses increased 60 percent in 
the first six months of 1942 over the last six months of 1941. In supplementary 
courses, the increase was considerably smaller^under 20 percent. 

Relatively few women have enrolled in vocational school courses until recently. 
Over the two-year period, only 8 percent of the enrollees in pre-employment classes 
have been women, and only 2 percent of the supplementary trainees. However, 
after Pearl Harbor, the number increased markedly and in June, women con- 
stituted almost 20 percent of the pre-employment trainees; in supplementary 
courses they were still only 5 percent of the total active enrollment. 

Negroes have played an even smaller part than women in the vocational 
school training program, chiefly because in general the local schools were required 
to train for local needs, and in most areas Negroes have been unacceptable to local 
employers. Only 5 percent of the pre-employment trainees have been Negroes 
and 2 percent of the supplementary trainees. In the first six months of this 
year, the number of Negro pre-employment trainees increased substantially, but 
the number in supplementary courses dropped. . At the end of June, some 11,500 
Negroes were enrolled in pre-employment classes, and less than 2,700 in supple- 
mentary classes. 

In addition to the regular vocational school courses, the Office of Education has 
also provided training in simple mechanical and machine operations for out-of 
school youth, chiefly in rural areas. Over 530,000 have enrolled in such classes 
since December 1940. Less than 1 percent were females, and 17 percent were 
Negroes. 

Technical training at the college level is provided under the engineering-science- 
management program of the Office of Education. Almost half a million persons 
have enrolled in these courses of whom 36,000 were women and 3,800 Negroes. 

The National Youth Administration also furnishes war production training for 
out-of-school youth in its defense work program. During the first six months of 
the fiscal year 1941-42, 208,000 different youth were employed on this program, 
and in the second six months, 233,000 (Table 9). Approximately 20 percent of 
these were girls, and 13 percent Negroes. Some of these workers also received 
related training in the vocational school classes, and are included in the statistics 
for enrollees in the pre-employment courses. 

On-job training. — On-the-job training programs provided or sponsored by public 
agencies include the in-plant-pre-employment program of the Work Projects 
Administration and the training of civilians in the establishments of the War 
and Navy Departments. The Work Projects Administration has paid the 
wages of approximately 8,000 workers while they have received training in war 
production plants. According to the latest available figures, the War Department 
had on its pay roll 27,000 full-time trainees and the Navy Department 19,000, 
learning the skills required for war production. In addition, the Navy Depart- 
ment was giving less than full-time training to 39,000 persons. Compilation of 
similar figures on other trainees is not yet complete for the War Department 
establishments. 

Private industry is also conducting on-the-job training which varies from the 
usual instruction given by foremen to full apprenticeship programs. No data are 
available on the number of persons receiving such training except in the case of 
apprentices who were estimated to approximate 170,000 in June 1942. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE JVOGRATION 



13247 



Table 1 — Estimates of employment and man-power requirements June 1940- 
December 1943 

[In millions of persons] 



Total labor force... 

.\rmecl forces 

Nonasricultural employees 

Manufacturing 

Mining 

Construction (contracf) 

Transportation and public utilities.. 

Trade 

Finance, service and miscellaneous.. 

Government 

Self-employed (excepting agriculture) and 

tic service 

Agriculture 

Unemployed 



Estimated employment 



Anticipated require- 
ments 



57.9 
1.7 
34.5 
12.8 

2!o 
3.3 
6.9 



3.8 
36.7 
14.3 
1.0 
2.0 
3.5 
6.6 
4.3 
5.0 

5.1 
11.5 
2.8 



65.4 
7.3 
39.6 
17.8 
1.0 
1.7 
3.6 
5.9 
4.0 
5.6 

5.2 
11.5 



recem- 
l:erl943 



62.5 
9.0 
39.6 
18.6 
1.0 
1.0 
3.7 
5.5 
4.0 
5.8 

5.0 
7.9 
1.0 



Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Employment Security of the Social Security 
Board. 

Table 2.— Employment and unemployment of women, 14 years of age and over, 
average by quarter, July 1940~June 1942 

[In millions] 



July-September..-. 
October-December. 



January-March 

April-June. 

July-September 

October-December- 



January-March. 
April-June 



Outside 

agricu- 

ture 



9.9 
10.1 

10.0 
10.2 
10.8 
11.7 



In agri- 
culture 



Unemploy- 
ment 



Total in 
labor 
force 



13.7 
12.8 

12.3 
13.2 
14.0 
13.8 

13.7 
14.4 



Source: Averaged from monthly figures released by Current Surveys Section, Bureau of the Census. 

Table 3.— Total wage earners and women wage earners in durable- and nondurable-' 
goods rnanufaduring industries, October 19S9-April 1942 





[In thousands] 








Period 


Durable goods indus- 
tries I 


Nondurable goods in- 
dustries ' 


Total 


Women 


Total 


Women 




3, 800. 5 
4,343.9 

4,917.2 
5, 546. 
5, 771. 8 


329.0 
351.5 

403.7 
453.1 
471.0 


4, 877. 9 
4, 638. 4 

4, 760. 4 

5, 144. 
4, 972. 7 


1, 906. 5 


^(UC.■ Ortnher 


1, 798. 6 


1941: 

j^pril . . 


1,797.5 




2,03L4 




1,909.0 









1 Durable goods industries include the iron and steel, nonferrous metal, electrical and other machinery, 
automotive and other transportation equipment, lumber and wood products, and the stone, clay and gia^ 
groups The nondurable goods industries include the food products, tobacco products, textiles and apparel, 
rubber products, leather and leather products, paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, petro- 
leum and coal products, and the miscellaneous groups. 

Source: Census of Manufactures for October 1939, and U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for October 1949 
and subsequent months. 



13248 



WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



Table 4. — Total employment in selected industries and total employment and 
employment of nonwhites in selected plants, May 194^ 

[In thousands] 



Total-. --- 

Mining: 

Metal mining 

Bituminous and other soft coal mining 

Nonmetallic mining and quarrying 

Contract construction 

Manufacturing: 

Food and kindred products 

Tobacco manufactures 

Textiles and apparel 

Lumber and lumber basic products 

Fin-niture and finished lumber products 

Paper and products, and printing and publishing. . 

Chemicals and products of petroleum and coal 

Rubber products 

Leather and leather products.. 

Stone, clay and glass products 

Iron and steel and their products (including ord- 
nance and accessories)' 

Transportation equipment (excepting automobiles) ' 

Nonferrous metals and their products 

' Electrical machinery 

Machinery (excepting electrical) 

Automobiles and automobile equipment 

M iscellaneous 

Transportation, communication and utilities: 

Interstate railroads ...-- 

Trucking and warehousing 

Other transportation 

Communication: telephone, telegraph and related 

services — 

Utilities: electric and gas 



Total em- 
ployment ' 



20, 033. 



131.9 

458.2 

92.8 

1,909.3 

1, 313. 7 
103.6 

2, 386. 5 
553.9 
439.0 

845^5 
170.8 
421.2 
428.4 

1,781.6 
1, 440. 5 
430.7 
654.1 
1, 205. 
487.7 
477.6 

1, 403. 4 
454.6 
500.7 

472.0 
417.9 



Employment in plants surveyed 



52.4 

8.7 
540.2 

123.6 
12.8 
468. 9 
46.5 
91.4 
112.3 
431.6 
166.2 
94.8 
102.2 

2, 234. 1 
1, 506. 3 
314.2 
581.1 
900.9 
181.7 
221.8 

36.8 
109.9 
276.1 



0.4 
5.-6 
1.3 
99.6 

10.4 
6.8 

14.4 

14.4 
5.1 
2.3 

26.6 
3.5 
1.3 

135.6 
51.8 
25.1 
4.9 
21.1 
3.0 
2.0 

2.1 
4.1 
11.0 

1.2 

1.4 



Percent of 
Total 



0.6 

10.7 
14.8 
18.4 

8.4 
53.6 
3.1 



5.8 
3.7 
3.9 

4.8 

2.7 



1 The definition of industry for the total employment column is not strictly the same as for the employ- 
ment figures given for selected plants. Moreover, the selected plants include Government-operated estab- 
lishments, the employment figures for which are excluded from the column headed "Total employment". 
This accounts for the fact that for the iron and steel and transportation equipment manufacturing groups 
the employment in selected plants exceeds the total equipment for the industry. 

Source: Total employment estimated by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on employment 
in selected plants are from the bimonthly survey of employment and anticipated requirements by the 
Bureau of Employment Security for May 1942. 

Table 5. — Estimated supply of labor and estimated in-migration required in labor- 
market areas with shortage of general male labor — -Jidy 1942 i 



War industries 



Estimated local labor supply 



Estimated in-migration 
needed to fill demand 



Alabama: 

Childersburg. 



California: 

Los Angeles. 
Sacramento.. 
San Diego... 

Connecticut: 
Bridgeport... 



Ammunition. 



Shipbuilding, air- 



Aircraft... 
Air depot. 
Aii'craft--. 



Aircraft, machine 
tools, ordnance, 
communication 
equipment. 



Almost no workers available 
June 1942. 

Local supply qualified for 
demand exhausted June 
1942; women and Negroes 
potentially available. 

Information not available... 

....do 

Labor supply exhausted 
July 1942. 

About 11,900 available July 
1942-July 1943, including 
6,000 women in labor re- 
serve. 



2,300 by January 1943. Must, 
move in or commute beyond 
40 miles. 

7,000 in-migrants by August 
1943 unless local Negroes- 
hired. 



Information not available. 
Do. 



Minimum 
mated a 
July 1943, 



in-migration esti- 
; about 9,000 by 



1 Estimates of supply and necessary in-migration take account of use of reserves of women and transfers 
from nonwar industries on the one hand, and withdrawals for armed services, on the other. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



13249 



Table 5.— Estimated supply of labor and estimated in-migration required in labor- 
market areas with shortage of general male labor— July ^9^^— Continued 



Connecticut: 
Hartford. 



New London.. 
District of Colum- 



Illinois: Rockford- 
Bcloit. 



Indiana: 

Indianapolis. 



LaPorte-Michi- 
gan City. 
Iowa: 

Burlington 

Quad Cities, Il- 
linois and Iowa. 



Maine: 
Bath. 



Maryland: 
Baltimore. 



Elkton-Perry- 
ville. 
Mississippi: Pasca- 

goula. 
New Hampshire: 
Portsmouth 



Springfield- 
Claremont. 
New York: 

Buflalo 



North Carolina: 
Wilmington. 

Ohio: Ravenna- 
Warren. 
Oregon: Portland.. 



Pennsylvania: 

Berwick 

Harrisburg. 



South Carolina: 
Charleston. 



War industries 



Aircraft engines, 
firearms, machine 
tools. 

Boat building and 

machinery. 
Federal Government. 

Machine tools, tank 
parts. 



Air engines and 
parts, bomb 
sights, fire control. 

Gun carriages, am- 
munition. 



Ordnance. 
...-do 



Shipbuilding. 
....do 



Aircraft, shipbuild- 
ing. 



Explosives.. - 
Shipbuilding. 



Shipbuilding, ma- 
chine tools. 



Aircraft, iron and 
steel. 



Metal work. 



Shipbuilding. 



Ordnance, steel 

Shipbuilding, air- 
craft, iron and 

steel. 

Tanks. 

Airbase, ordnance.. 



Shipbuilding. 



Estimated local labor supply 



7,300 plus 9,000 women in 
labor reserve. July 1942-13. 



930 males available. May 

1942-43. 
43,000 available May 1942.... 

8,000 available July 1942-43- 



35,000 available July 1942 to 
end of 1943. 



700 available July 1942-43. 



Information not available... 
10,000 available July 1942-43. 



300 workers available July 
1942. 

About 1,500 available July 
1942 and 3,500 transferable 
from n on war industries 
within commuting dis- 
tance. 

22,000 available September 
1942-August 1943. 

200 available August 1942... 

6,000 available June 1942-.. . 



1,500 available June 1942. 



750 available July 1942. 



47,000 available July 1942-43 



4,500 available July 1942- 
August 1943. 



5,900 available July 1942- 
August 1943. 



Virtually no supply avail- 
able other than recent in- 
migrants. July 1942. 

6,000 available July 1942-43. 

Labor supply exhausted 
July 1942. 



Information not available . . . 
5,000 available July 1942; 

2,000 additional with 

school graduates. 
4,000 available July 1942 



Estimated in-migration 
needed to fill ' 



18,000-19,000 in-migrants 
needed by July 1943 even if 
all potential reserve of wom- 
en used. 

5,000 in-migrants needed by 
July 1943. 

55,000 in-migrants by Decem- 
ber 1942. 

In-migration probably not 
necessary if local supply and 
potential reserves are fully 
utilized. 

6,800 in-migrants by end of 
1943. 

Necessary in-migration may 
approximate 6,000. 

Information not available. 

In-migration probably not 
necessary if employers use 
women to fullest extent. 

Minimum of 1,000 in-migrants 

■by January 1943. 
6,500 in-migrants by October 

1942. 



Over 34,000 in-migrants by 
August 1943 assuming full 
use of potential supply. 

5,000 in-migrants by June 1943. 

2,500 in-migrants by June 1943. 

About 2,000 in-migrants by 
June 1943. In-migration 
may reach 4,000 if commut- 
ing becomes impossible. 

1,000 in-migrants by July 1943. 

Minimum in-migration of 6,000 
if potential reserve of 42,000 
women is used. 

About 2,100 in-migrants 
quired by August 1943, as- 
suming use of 5,100 women 
and 2,500 transfers from non- 
war industries. 

1,600 male workers by Augusi 
1943 unless women are used 
to greater extent by alum 
inum companies. 

9,000 in-migrants by May 1943 



3,500 in-migrants by July 1943, 



55,000-75,000 in-migrants by 
spring of 1943. 



Information not available. 
3,500 in-migrants by mid-1943. 



12,500 in-migrants by January 
1944 unless local ^" 
trained and used' 



13250 



WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



Table 5.~ Estimated supply of labor and estimated in-migration required in labor- 
market areas loith shortage of general male labor — Jidy 1942 — Continued 



Area 


M'ar industries 


Estimated local labor .<!upply 


Estimated in-miaration 
needed to fill demand 


Texas: Beaumont- 
Fort Arthur. 

Utah: 
Ogden 


ShipbuOding-_ 

Ordnance depot 

Ordnance, radio 
tubes. 


6,850 workers available of 
whom 4,850 are men, July 
1942. 

None available except 600 
housewives, June 1942. 

2,500 men, July 1942, 5,000 
potential women workers. 


9,000 in-m igrants will be needed 
by July 194.3 if employer 
specifications remain un- 
changed. Increased utiliza- 
tion of women would serve 
to reduce necessary iri-migra- 
tion to 7,000. 

18,000 in-miprants bv June 


Salt Lake City. 


1943, but housing is non- 
existent. 

3,000 to 5,000 depending on the 
number of women workers 
hired. 

40,000 in-migrants by unknown 
peak date, including 3,000- 
4,000 Negro men. 


Virginia: Hampton 
Roads. 


Shipbuilding, mili- 
tary establish- 
ments. 


4,600 available July 1942 


Washington : 
Seattle. 


Shipbuilding, air- 
craft. 


Local supply exhausted 
February 1942. 


At least 48,000 by January 1943. 



Source: Local labor market reports and statements prepared by the Bureau of Employment Security. 
Labor shortage areas are designated by the Bureau of Employmert Security by Ecpcrts and Analysis Di- 
vision on the basis of employers' statements of labor needs to the USES and recent contract and plant site 
actions. Only areas which contain a city of 100, COO or more and those in which there is a known demand 
for 5,000 or more war production workers ,are included. 

Tablil 6.- — Monthly labor turn-over rates of factory workers in representative 
establishments in 135 industries i 



Ckss of turn-over 
and year 



May 



Sept. 



SEPARATIONS 

Quits: 

1942 _. 

1941 

Discharges: 

1942 

1941 

Lay-ofTs: 2 

1942 

1941 

Miscellaneous sep- 
arations: 3 

1942 

1941 

Total: 

1942 

1941 



ACCESSIONS 



Rehires: 
1942.. _ 
1941... 

New hires: 
1942. _. 
1941... 

Total: 

1942... 
1941... 



5.10 
3.41 



1.41 

1.45 



3.02 
1.70 



5.36 
3.40 



1.18 
1.24 



5.81 
4.38 



1.11 
L04 



7.29 
5.95 



3.85 
2.06 



1.02 
.36 



6.46 
3.71 



7.13 

5.41 



8.25 
6.31 



1.05 
1.40 



4.96 

8.28 
6.00 



2.81 

Mi" 
i.'io' 



1.75 
'"."29" 
2.' is' 



.52 



1.11 
4."32" 
5."43" 



.87 
"4.'29 
'5."i6 



.79 
3.I2" 
3."9i" 



.94 
3."S2 
■4.'76' 



1.02 
4.36 
5.38 
total separations, and 



' The various turn-over rates represent the' number of quits, discharges, lay-i 
accessions per 100 employees. 

2 Including temporary, indeterminate, and permanent lay-oSs. 

3 Military separations included. 

Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



13251 



Table 7. — Monthly quit rates of factory wage earners in selected war industries^ 
1939- July 19 ^ 



Alu- 
minum 



Brass, 
bronze, 

and 
copper 
products 



Electrical 
machin- 
ery 



Engines 

and 
turbines 



Machine 
tools 



Ship 
build- 
ing 



Average 1939 

" 1940. 

1941. 

1942: 

January-. 
February 
March,,. 

April 

May 

June 

July, 



1.15 
2.24 

2.51 

2.82 
2.68 
3.70 
3.79 
4.06 
3.60 
3.76 



.75 
1.96 

1.32 
1.91 

3! 14 
3.48 
3.88 
3.51 



2.23 

2.30 
2.45 
3.02 
3.48 
3.41 
3.15 
3.81 



2.05 
1.78 
1.88 
2.34 
2.26 
2.27 
2.36 



1.21 
1.55 
1.72 
2.07 
1.71 
1.50 
1.67 



.82 
1.29 
2.01 

2.46 
2.23 
2.75 
.3.50 
3.17 
2.86 
3.02 



.76 
1.17 
2.42 

.3.25 
3.27 
4.27 
4.29 
5.20 
5.71 
4.67 



> Includes miscellaneous separations caused by 
' Not available. 

Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 



death, permanent disability, retirement on pensions, etc 



Table 8. — Training for war production workers under auspices of U. S. Office of 
Education — new enrollment of all trainees, of women, and of Negroes, since inau- 
guration of programs 



Program 



All trainees— new enrollment: 

Pre-employment and refresher coui-ses 

Supplementary courses 

Out-of-school youth courses' _., 

Engineering -.science-management courses '. 

Women— new enrollment: 

Pre-employment and refresher courses 

Supplementary courses 

Out-of-sohool youth courses ,,_ 

Engineering-science-management courses >, 

Negroes— new enrollment: 

Pre-employment and refresher courses 

Supplementary courses 

Out-of-school youth courses ' 

Engineering-science-management courses ', 



Total new 
enroll- 
ments 



1, 501. 155 

1, 359, 108 

531, 505 

497, 109 

2 119. 573 

2 23, 980 

3, 564 

35, 772 

2 69, 477 
2 19, 923 



July 1940- 
June 1941 



420, 530 
467, 614 
254.511 
119,293 

1,039 

770 

(?) 

34, 716 
816 



July 1941- 
Dec. 1941 



409. 369 

410, 105 
119,618 
127, 959 

15. 671 

2, 168 

23!) 



18, 625 

9, 323 

27,211 

661 



Jan. 1942- 
June 1942 



671, 256 
481, 389 
157, 376 
249, 857 

101,918 
20, 209 
2. 289 
31, 095 

30, 488 
5,007 

29, 553 
2,336 



Active net 
enroll- 
ment 
June 30, 
1942 



191, 898 
153, 845 
34,164 
95,566 

35, 543 
7,647 
1,015 

12, 992 

11,549 
2,665 
8,986 
1,092 



' Courses began December 1940. 

2 Estimate. 

' Not avaOable. 

Source: U. S. OiFice of Education. 



Table 9. — Other training programs for war production workers 

1. Total number of different youths employed in National Youth Administration defense projects, number 
of girls, and of Negroes— July 1941-June 1942 



Number of different youths 


July 1941- 
Dec. 1941 


Jan. 1942- 
June 1942 


Employ- 
ment, June 
1942 


Total 


208. 000 
40. 700 
26,800 


233, 000 
55, 400 
29,000 




Girls 


29,407 
' 13, 837 







• Estimate. 

Source: National Youth Administration. 



13252 



WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



Table 9. — Other training programs for war production workers — Continued 



2. Number of in-plant pre-i 



iployment trainees employed by Work Projects Administration, July 1940- 
June 1942 



In-plant 
pre-em- 
ployment 
trainees 


July 1941- 
Dec. 1941 


Jan. 1942- 
June 1942 


Employ- 
ment, June 
16, 1942 


Total 
7,952 


2,596 


5, 356 


1,531 



Source: Work Projects Administration. 

3. Number of full-time trainees employed by War and Navy Departments 



Type of trainee 


War Depart- 
ment 


Navy Depart- 
ment 


Total - 


27, 210 


19, 310 










1 2 25, 965 


3 1, 504 


Helper trainees - - 


3 6, 114 




3 1, 245 


5 11,692 







1 Includes other types of full-time trainees. 

2 July 1, 1942. 

3 March 1942. 

Source: U. S. Civil Service Commission. 

4. Estimated number of other civilian trainees in Navy Department— March 1942 

Trainees in trades and occupation -- 

Professional, technical, scientific, managerial and clerical workers - 



35,000 
4,000 



Source: U. S. Civil Service Commission. 
5. Estimated number of apprentices, excluding War and Navy Department apprentices, June 1942. 172, 000 
Source: Estimated by O. L. Harvey, Apprentice-Training Service, Federal Security Administration. 



Report on Negro Employment in Firms and Membership in Unions Cited 
Before the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice 

According to our most recent information, the following is a rdsum^ of Negro 
employment in certain firms cited before the President's Committee on Fair 
Employment Practice: 
BuiCK Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, Melrose Park, Illinois: 

Total Negro employment 350"! As of July 

Negro production workers -- 50-75/ 1942. 

Stewart Warner Corporation, Chicago, Illinois: 

Total Negro employment 441 As of July 

Semiskilled Negro workers 11/ 1942. 

Majestic Radio & Television Corporation, Chicago, Illinois: 
At the present time the plant is almost completely shut 
down due to a lack of vital materials. It expects to 
go back into partial production in October. There 
are only 33 workers employed, of whom none are 
Negroes. 

Studebaker Corporation, Chicago, Illinois: 

J-'^Mf'/Tfi^'" employment 188^^ of Aug. 

Skilled Negroes 10 ^^ jg^g.^ 

Semiskilled Negroes 78J 

AiiLis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, West Allis, Wisconsin: 

Total Negro employment 1291 .<, ^f Tnlv 

Skilled Negroes - ^f 1942 

Semiskilled Negroes _ — 14j 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13253 

Harnischfeger Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: C^^ ^^ j^2 

Total Negro employment 0| 1942. 

Heil Manufacturing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: 

Total Negro employment (apparently all in unskilled j-^^g ^^ j^^j 

work) 140| 1942. 

NoRDBERG Manufacturing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin: 

Total Negro employment ^JAsof July 

Semiskilled Negroes 5> 1942, 

Unskilled Negroes 3J 

A. O. Smith Corporation, Milawukee, Wisconsin: 

Total Negro employment 237"! ^g ^^ j^^jy. 

Skilled Negroes 6> 1942. 

Semiskilled Negroes 35j 

Sperry Gyroscope Company, New York City: 

Total Negro employment 300] 

Skilled Negroes lOOl As of Au- 

Semiskilled Negroes 150f gust 1942. 

Unskilled Negroes 50j 

New Sperry Gyroscope Plant, Lake Success, Long Island: 

Total Negro employment 60"1 ^^ ^^ ^^^ 

Skilled Negroes ln\ gnst 1942. 

Unskilled Negroes 40J ^ 

Fairchild Aviation Corporation, New York City: 

Total Negro employment 6| ^g^f ^^. 

Skilled Negroes_..-. l^^^st 1942. 

Semiskilled Negroes oj 

Ford Instrument Company, New York City: 

Total Negro employment 1101 

Skilled Negroes 6l As of Au- 

SemiskiUed Negroes 44r gust 1942. 

Unskilled Negroes 6OJ 

Carl Norden, New York City: 

This company presented evidence to the President's Com- 
mittee recently that caused the Committee to withdraw their 
citation for discrimination. 

Julius Kayser Company, New York City: 

Total Negro employment 1 "^^"^^1 gust 1942. 

Douglas Aircraft — 3 plants: Long Beach, Santa Monica, and El Segundo, 
California: 

This company has a fine record on the Pacific Coast. Approximately 
300 Negroes are used in the administrative, technical, and production de- 
partments. In addition, this company issued a forthright statement of 
policy with respect to nondiscrimination. 

Note. — Report on total employment not ready at this time, but will be 
submitted at a later date. 

Bethlehem Shipbuilding, Terminal Island, California: 

Employment in general has not been very stable at this yard; there has 
been a continuous fluctuation. Lay-offs, however, have not affected Negro 
workers to the same degree as they have other workers. This results from 
the fact that these lay-offs have hit the highly skilled hardest. Our relations 
with this company have been good in adjusting any problem that has arisen. 
On the whole, employment conditions for Negroes have been favorable. 

;Hercules Foundry, Inc., Los Angeles, California: 

This company was brought before the President's Committee on Fair 
Employment Practice as an example as to how good employment policies 
operate in the hiring of minority groups. The same good policies obtain 
and Negroes are being given greater opportunity for promotion to skilled 
jobs. The company did complain, however, that a large number of Negroes 
had quit and gone to other jobs. It is anxious to eliminate this situation 
if possible. Employment figures for Negroes show 36 skilled and 19 un- 
skilled. 



13254 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

North American Aviation, Inc., Inglewood, California: 

Only 8 Negroes were employed at the time this Company was cited before 
the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice. For the period 
ending August 22, 458 Negro workers were employed. Since the company 
has hired Negro female workers in production, employment has increased. 
Up until several months ago, Negro male workers were confined to custodial 
or maintenance jobs. Constant negotiations with the company finally re- 
sulted in a change of employment policy, which permitted the use of Negro 
women and the upgrading and initial hiring of Negro males for production. 
Our relations with the company are harmonious and the policy of non- 
discrimination is moving progressively. 

Lockheed- Vega Aircraft, Burbank, California: 

Combined employment for Lockheed-Vega Company total 602 workers. 
Of this total, approximately 50 are women. Company policy with respect to 
nondiscrimination has been satisfactory. 

Atlas Imperial Diesel Company, Oakland, California: 

Higher hourly wage rates and other opportunities at the shipyards have 
caused Negro workers to by-pass this company when seeking employment. 
Under the circumstances, we have not kept in regular contact with this 
company with regard to employment of Negro skilled or other workers. 
Poulsen and Nardon, Inc., Los Angeles, California: 

Prior to hearings in October, 1941, this company refused to employ Negroes 
in any capacity. Since then, it has lived up to its pledge to the President's 
Committee. For the past 60 days new hires have been very few at this com- 
pany. This has affected expansion of Negro employment. The company's 
nondiscrimination policy is operating effectively. 

Consolidated Aircraft, San Diego, California: 

At the time of the Los Angeles hearings, this company was employing 
about 210 Negro workers in custodial jobs. Conferences were held repeatedly 
with the management in an effort to have it arrange to fully integrate Negroes 
in all capacities. Progress in this direction was slow. It was not until W. 
Frank Persons came in as Director of Labor Relations that the situation 
began to improve. On or about July 10, procedures were effected for the 
up-grading of Negro male and female workers. As a complete deviation 
from its former policy of initially hiring these workers only as janitors or 
maids, on the basis of previous experience or pre-employment training, they 
are now hired for immediate production jobs. The company has apprised 
the USES accordingly. Our present figures show 78 Negroes in skilled and 
semiskilled capacities and 260 in unskilled. We are now awaiting a letter 
from Mr. Persons giving new figures. 

VuLTEE Aircraft, Downey, California: 

Current employment conditions for Negro workers are completely reversed 
from those existing at the time of the Los Angeles hearings. Up until May 8, 
the company had not employed a single Negro worker. Since then, 129 have 
been hired and on September 3, the company started employing Negro 
women. This company is to be commended in that it did not attempt to 
place Negroes in custodial jobs as a means of satisfying the requirement of 
nondiscrimination; nor has its changed policy toward Negro workers been 
representative of "token" hirings. It has employed Negro workers weekly 
and the company has also carried out its commitment with respect to using 
Negro women. 

International Association of Machinists, Local 68, San Francisco, California: 
As of September 2, one Negro machinist was working under this Local's 
jurisdiction. This worker had been cleared for employment in the Bethle- 
hem Shipbuilding Company on February 25. 

International Association of Machinists, Local 751, Seattle, Washington: 

There is one question that must be faced sooner or later in this union, and 
that has to do with the $3.50 monthly permit fee charged Negro workers. 
(This refers to the Boeing Aircraft Company.) As of September 3, 1942, 
53 Negro workers had been cleared through Local 751 and are working at 
Boeing. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13255 

SniPYARD Workers Union, Local 802, San Pedro, California: 

Wo have experienced considerable difficulty with this union. Negro 
workers are not excluded from membership, but there is a definite policy of 
limiting this membership. Repeated conferences have been held with officials 
of the Laborers' District Council and labor members of the various WPB 
committees in the interest of resolving this situation. According to a report 
of Mr. James Anderson, Negro representative of the California State Federa- 
tion of Labor, it appears that progress has been made. Lately, we have had 
no complaints from Negro workers, indicating their inability to clear through 
this local. Current information shows that some 500 Negro workers have 
been admitted to this union in the past several months or since our last con- 
ference with its officials. 



Source: Compiled in the oflBce of the Chief, Negro Manpower Service, War Manpower ComnilssioD. 



Exhibit 4. — Area Allocation of War Supply Contracts 
According to Adequacy of Labor Supply 

Report Released by War Manpower Commission, Industrial 
AND Agricultural Employment Division 

September 1, 1942. 

introduction 

This report analyzes war supply contracts awarded during May, June and July 
and reported to the War Production Board up to July 31, according to the adequacy 
of labor supply in the areas in which the contracts were let. This is the second 
report on the allocation of war supply contracts. These reports are based upon 
studies by the Bureau of Employment Security of areas of labor surplus, prospec- 
tive labor shortage and current labor shortage; and upon tabulations by the War 
Production Board of contracts issued by the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Com- 
mission and the Treasury Department. 

CLASSIFICATION OF COMMUNITIES 

Communities to which war supply contracts have been allocated have been 
classified into three groups. 

"Labor surplus" areas are those in which the general supply of unskilled and 
semiskilled labor is adequate to meet all known requirements. In these areas, 
contractors have the best assurance of a stable and efficient working force large 
enough to satisfy their labor requirements. 

"Prospective labor shortage" areas are those in which the general supply of 
unskilled and semiskilled male labor is sufficient to meet present demands, but 
a shortage can be foreseen on the basis of actual contract commitments for war 
production and approved projects tor plant construction. 

"Current labor shortage" areas are those in which a deficiency of unskilled and 
semiskilled labor is already apparent. Such areas face the danger of impeded 
production because of difficulty m staffing plants and high turn-over. 

The 222 most important labor market areas in the United States are divided 
in the following way: 

95, or 42.8 percent, are areas of labor surplus. 

91, or 41.0 percent, are areas ot prospective labor shortage. 

36, or 16.2 percent, are areas of current labor shortage. 

DISTRIBUTION OF WAR SUPPLY CONTRACTS 

The first report in this series, issued by the Industrial and Agricultural Employ- 
ment Division on July 22, analyzed the area distribution of $2,499,963,000 in 
recently awarded contracts. These contracts were distributed as follows: 

$437,450,000, or 17.5 percent, into areas of labor surplus. 
$1,407,394,000, or 56.3 per cent, into areas of prospective labor shortage. 
$480,789,000, or 19.2 percent, into areas of current labor shortage. 
$174,330,000, or 7.0 percent, into other areas of lesser importance. 
60396— 42— pt. 34 14 



13256 



WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



f Since the publication of the first report, additional contracts totalling $4,- 
055,629,000 have been analyzed with respect to the labor supply in communities 
where thej,work will be done. These contracts were awarded in June and July 
and reported to the War Production Board between June 23 and July 31. Con- 
tracts for which the location of the work is not definitel}^ known have been omitted 
from the tabulations. The total of $4,055,629,000 was distributed in the follow- 
ing manner: 

$396,470,000, or 9.8 percent, to labor surplus areas. 
$2,125,769,000, or 52.4 percent, to prospective labor shortage areas. 
$1,355,388,000, or 33.4 percent, to current labor shortage areas. 
$178,002,000, or 4.4 percent, to other communities of lesser importance. 

For the period covered by both reports (May 1 through July 31), a. total of 
$6,555,592,000 in war supply contracts has been analyzed. This total was 
distributed as follows: 

$833,920,000, or 12.7 percent, to labor surplus areas. 
$3,533,165,000, or 53.8 percent, to prospective labor shortage areas. 
$1,836,177,000, or 28.1 percent, to current labor shortage areas. 
$352,332,000, or 5.4 percent, to other communities of lesser importance. 

If a trend is to be found in these data, it is that allocation of contracts to over- 
burdened areas was greater in the later period than in the earlier period. While 
17.5 percent of contracts in the first period went to areas of adequate labor supply, 
less than 10 percent in the second period were so allocated. Correspondingly, 
while less than one-fifth of contracts in the first period went to areas of current 
acute labor shortage, over one-third in the second period were given to suppliers 
in such areas. 



CONTRACT AWARDS BY THE RESPECTIVE SERVICES JUNE AND JULY 1942 

War supply''contracts herein analyzed are awarded by four agencies: the Army, 
the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and the Treasury Department. The Army 
awarded approximately 63 percent of the contracts placed in June and July and 
reported from June 23 to July 31; the Navy awarded 32 percent and the Maritime 
Commission and Treasury Department awarded the remaining 6 percent. 

There are significant differences in the area distribution of contracts by these 
agencies with respect to the adequacy of labor supply. The dollar volume and 
the percentage distribution of contracts awarded by the Army, the Navy, and 
the Maritime Commission and Treasury (taken together) are shown below. 

Dollar volume of contracts awarded, June and July 19^2 





Contracting Agency 




Army 


Navy 


Maritime 
Commission 
and Treasury 


In Labor Surplus Areas 


$151,131,000 

1, 480, 737, 000 

808, 859, 000 

92, 098, 000 


$222, 463, 000 
539, 678, 000 
452, 742, 000 
69, 965, 000 


$22, 876, 000 
105, 354, 000 




93, 517, 000 


In Other Areas 


16, 239, 000 






Total 


2, 532, 825, 000 


1, 284, 848, 000 


237, 986, 000 







Percentage distribution of contracts awarded, June and July 1942 



In Labor Surplus Areas 


Percent 

5.9 
58.6 
31.9 

3.6 


Percent 

17.3 
42.1 
35.3 
5.3 


Percent 

9.6 




44.2 






In Other Areas 


6.9 






Total - - - - 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 







NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13257 

CONTRACTS PLACED IN CERTAIN CRITICAL LABOR SHORTAGE AREAS 

Labor supply is only one consideration entering into the decision to place a 
contract in one community instead of another community. Transportation, raw- 
materials, power, vulnerability, speed of delivery, and the availabihty of produc- 
tive facilities all must be taken into consideration. Among these factors, the 
most significant in limiting the choice of communities is the availability of 
facilities. 

For many items the range of option in contracting is small. However, there 
is a large and important group of contracts where the contracting agency has a 
wide choice in selecting the supplier. These contracts are primarily for the 
procurement of two types of commodities: 

(1) Commodities regularly consumed by the civilian population during peace- 
time, such as shoes, clothing, mattresses, towels, furniture, etc. 

(2) Articles which can be manufactured through relatively simple processes 
(such as stamping or casting) which require no great precision. 

By and large, there is no shortage of productive facilities for commodities of 
these types. Therefore, it is here that the contracting agencies have the best 
opportunity to take labor supply into consideration when awarding contracts. _ 

A considerable volume of contracts for such items has recently been placed in 
communities where shortages of labor, high turn-over, and pressure on housing 
and other facilities threaten to impede production and delay dehvery dates. A 
special tabulation has been made showing the volume of such contracts awarded 
to five critical labor shortage areas. 

(1) In May, June and July, contracts aggregating $4,087,389 were placed in 
Seattle for the procurement of items such as sleeping bags, comforters, jackets, 
auto covers, mattresses and mittens. 

By January 1943, at least 50,000 additional workers will be needed in the 
Seattle area, primarily for shipbuilding and aircraft manufacture. The housing 
shortage makes it questionable whether the tens of thousands of outside workers 
needed to fill out this total can be induced to come into the area. A recent re- 
port by the United States Employment Service stated: "The textile industry in 
Seattle has recently received contract awards in considerable volume and as a 
result is now seeking to expand its employment. This situation has complicated 
an already existing shortage of skilled textile workers. . . . These firms are un- 
able to meet the wage scales of war production plants and have, therefore, ex- 
perienced rising turn-over. One company, for example, hired 73 new workers in 
the last 60 days, but had 60 quits in the same period." 

(2) In Detroit, contracts aggregating $18,471,393 were placed in May, June 
and July for commodities such as comforters, tents, gloves, suits, helmets, haver- 
sacks and cartridge cups. Detroit must locate about 283,000 workers in order 
to meet the peak demands of war production and to replace workers inducted 
into the armed forces. Approximately 100,000 in-migrants will aggravate the 
already severe housing shortage. 

(3) In Los Angeles, contracts for pillow cases, furniture, sleeping bags, mat- 
tresses, wiping cloths and similar commodities totaled $16,707,749 in May, June 
and July. . 

By the spring of 1943, approximately 100,000 new workers will be needed m 
the Los Angeles area despite substantial in-migration of workers for the aircraft 
and shipbuilding industries during the past few months. The supply of male 
workers is virtually exhausted. 

(4) Contracts for cotton webbing, ammunition- boxes and other products re- 
cently awarded to Bridgeport, Conn., total $2,438,025. Virtually all of the 
15,000 new workers required in Bridgeport by July 1943 to produce aircraft, 
machine tools, ordnance and communication equipment must be drawn from 
the outside. Here also, housing is the chief obstacle to recruiting and retaining 
workers. 

(5) In Baltimore, contracts amounting to $10,210,282 for commodities such as 
cotton duck, tents, trousers, canvas, jackets, pajamas, overcoats and uniforms 
were awarded in May, June and July. 

Labor supply in Baltimore is inadequate even to replace Selective Service 
withdrawals. The deficit of workers will exceed 60,000 by May 1943. 

These five are typical of communities which are so crowded with the produc- 
tion of primary war materials that they should not be asked to produce com- 
modities which might better be manufactured elsewhere. 



13258 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Exhibit 5. — Relation of Manpower Mobilization to 
Procurement 

Letter From John J. Corson, Director, United States Employment Service 
Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Washington, D. C. 

September 15, 1942. 
The Honorable John H. Tolan, 

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Tolan: I have read the Fifth Interim Report of your Committee 
with the greatest interest and find myself in substantial agreement with its anal- 
ysis of the problems inherent in mobilizing manpower and in accord with many 
of its recommendations. Particularly would I wish to endorse the thesis of the 
report that "Any effective program for the mobilization of manpower must be 
formulated in the realization that its full utilization cannot be achieved without 
coordinating this program with the program of the procurement services." 

The U. S. Employment Service has been keenly aware of this problem for 
some time. Ever since the beginning of the defense program, we have been 
urging the spreading of contracts so as to bring the work to the available idle 
workers and plants rather than the reverse. You may not be aware of the fact 
that the Employment Service, with precisely this end in view, has been providing 
the contracting authorities, for many months, with detailed information on the 
availabilitv of labor in the different areas throughout the country. Of course, 
the United States Employment Service is in a position merely to provide this 
information and to point out, as emphatically as we can, the undesirable effects 
of continued concentration of production in areas of labor stringency. 

In this connection, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission in a 
recent press release (August 20) pointed out that only 17.5 percent of the total 
dollar volume of war production contracts awarded between May 1 and June 
20, had been placed in areas of labor surplus. Nineteen percent, on the other 
hand, went to areas where the labor supply was already inadequate to meet 
current demands and 56 percent to areas of prospective labor shortage. In 
view of the increasing number of areas reported by the Employment Service 
as experiencing or anticipating labor shortages, the Chairman concluded that 
"much more attention must be paid to the labor supply factor in deciding where 
contracts are to be awarded." He added that transfer of civilian production 
from labor shortage to labor surplus areas and further subcontracting of war work 
will also help to bring about a better balance of manpower and production 
requirements. 

Your report also emphasizes the importance of studies of plant organization, 
plant-wide training, upgrading of workers, dilution of jobs, transfer of workers 
from less to more essential work and the development of hiring schedules — all 
of which vou point out, quite correctly, are essential to the effective utilization 
of the labor supply for total warfare. The United States Employment Service 
has actually used each of these recommended measures in an effort to meet the 
requirements of war contractors effectively and with the least possible drain on 
the scarce suppHes of skilled labor. Far "from assuming that our function was 
merely to provide a referral service for the individual worker, the Employment 
Service, over a period of years, has developed a comprehensive body of industrial 
and of occupational data, and a wide range of job analysis and worker analysis 
techniques which are designed to meet the needs of major war production areas 
with full regard for Nation-wide labor supply and production factors. 

These technical services have been used by many of the largest employers in 
the country and by various branches of the armed services. For example, pro- 
grams for greater utilization of labor have been developed for the General Electric 
Companv, Westinghouse Electric, Radio Corporation of America and other 
firms both large and small. These programs have included job analysis, recom- 
mendations for the use of workers in related occupations to meet shortages in 
various occupations, and the development of aptitude tests and other technical 
devices for the more effective selection and use of labor. Similar programs have 
been developed for the U. S. Army and Navy, that for the Army Air Force being 
especially comprehensive. The United States Employment Service has also been 
very much concerned with plant organization and has developed "manning" 
tables for various industries, the different kinds of occupations involved, and the 
exact number of workers required in each occupation. These materials have 
been invaluable to war contractors undertaking the manufacture of a new product 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13259 

and are basic in any program of upgrading or transfer of workers from less to more 
essential jobs. r . . i. j. 

As you point out in vour report, these technical devices for msurmg the most 
effective use of our labor could and should be applied generally in war produc- 
tion. This can be accomplished through the kind of "plant inspection" program 
you recommend. I should like to point out that the United States Employment 
Service has presented a carefully developed plant inspection program for con- 
sideration, with respect to both the need for such activity and detailed plans for 
carrying it out. If funds were made available, we propose that plants in les3 
essential as well as war industries be inspected to determine whether such plants 
are using workers who could better serve the war effort in war production. We 
feel that any such program would necessarily require the information and the 
tools which the United States Employment Service has developed and is now 
using, to the extent that this has been possible on a purely voluntary and pro- 
motional basis. Our experience in this field over a period of many months 
indicates that such a program would constitute a natural extension of the present 
relationships of the United States Employment Service with employers. 

We believe that a program of plant inspection might be of assistance in meeting 
another of the problems you raise in your report — discrimination in employ- 
ment because of race, color, creed, or national origin. As you know, the poHcy 
of the United States Employment Service has been to serve all groups within 
the population equally and to make placements of workers on the basis of their 
qualifications for the job and that alone. The President's Executive Order No. 
8802 was a formal enunciation of a United States Employment Service pohcy 
which has obtained since the inception of the Service. In fact, one part of our 
continuing program has been to develop techniques for increasing the employ- 
ment opportunities of minority groups. It is true that progress has been slow 
and sometimes individual staff members of the United States Employment 
Service have themselves been guilty of the discrimination which we fight as an 
agency. You recognize, I am sure, that discrimination against minority groups 
is a long established tradition in many communities and sections of the country. 
Members of our staff come from these communities as well as from those holding 
quite different views on the question of discrimination! It is perhaps natural, 
if not commendable, that staff members should reflect the undesirable attitudes 
prevailing in their social group. We have undertaken a vigorous program of 
education with our staff but this as yet has not been successful in all cases. 

In dealing with a custom so ingrained, it may be necessary to use more than 
persuasion to effect a change amiong employers or wprkers or the population 
generally. Thus far, the only weapon which the United States Employment 
Service has been able to use is persuasion. In certain instances our efforts to 
persuade an employer to alter a discriminatory hiring specification have merely 
resulted in the employer withdrawing his order entirely and continuing to hire 
on the open market on a discriminatory basis. Certainly a program of plant 
inspection would help to uncover many cases of discrimination which now con- 
tinue unnoticed. It may be also, that the President's Committee on Fair 
Employment Practice should be granted powers in dealing with discrimination 
similar" to those held by the War Labor Board in dealing with stoppages of work. 
In connection with problems of full and effective use of our labor resources, 
we recognize that if our efforts in this direction are to be successful we must have 
detailed and complete information on the demand for labor, the actual need for 
labor, and the available supply in all parts of the country. As a matter of fact, 
the United States Emplovment Service has pioneered in the field of obtaining 
such data. Shortly after 'the inauguration of th^e defense program, we launched 
a program of periodic surveys of labor supply and demand. These surveys 
necessarily covered only the 'more critical occupations, but the list has been 
revised from time to time as the needs of war production and conditions in the 
labor market changed. The development of the most effective tools for analyzing 
labor supply and demand is necessarily a slow process but we feel that con- 
siderable progress has been made. The information which we have been gather- 
ing, granting its shortcomings, has nevertheless been the major source of infor- 
mation on the labor market that has been available and it has been extensively 
utiUzed by a number of Government agencies, including these concerned with 
war production and contracting, housing, health and welfare, transportation 
and other problems. We recognize the need for continuously refining these 
information gathering tools and are ready to take further steps to make them 
more effective instruments in coordmating production and manpower 
requirements. 



13260 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

There is one further statement in your report on which I should like to comment. 
It is stated that placements made by the United States Employment Service in the 
first four months of 1942 were only 10 percent over the total for the same period 
of 1941. The inference is that the United States Employment Service handles 
only a very negligible proportion of war production placements. Elsewhere the 
statement is made that the United States Employment Service has "traditionally 
served as a referral agency for persons who are unemployed for longer or shorter 
times" and has "characteristically worked closely with relief agencies." It is 
true that clients of relief agencies and workers on WPA have from time to time 
been required to register with the United States Employment Service. More 
recently, since 1935, plaimants for unemployment insurance have also been 
required to register. 

Of course, workers finding jobs through the United States Employment Service 
have come from all social and economic groups and it has been our traditional 
policy to serve all groups in the community. Since the beginning of the war, 
however, the United States Employment Service has gradually changed the 
emphasis of its work until now service to war production employers and to workers 
with skills needed by war industries takes precedence over all other activities. 
Both U. S. Employment Service Operations Bulletin No. B-29 and a War Man- 
power Commission Directive instruct employment offices to consider war produc- 
tion needs above all else and in the order of their relative importance and indi- 
cate in detail how the employment offices are to convert themselves to a full war 
footing. 

Entirely apart from these instructions, however, the effect of the defense pro- 
gram and later the war, has been clearly reflected in the number and character of 
our placements during the last two and a half years. An increasingly large pro- 
portion of our placements have been of industrial production workers, and of 
skilled and technical workers. Moreover, the statement that placements during 
the first four months of 1942 were only 10 percent above the same period of 1941, 
while true, does not adequately reflect the course of our activities. It overlooks 
the fact that the placements in the first four months of 1941 were 52 'percent over 
those made in the same period of 1940. The relatively smaller increase in 1942 
as compared with 1941 must be understood in terms of this previous very substan- 
tial increase and in view of the fact also that displacements as a result of production 
and conversion factors were widespread during the first four months of 1942. 

The trend of placements made by the United States Employment Service has 
been continuously upward, with minor setbacks, since early in 1940. In 1941, 
regular placements were j63 percent over the 1940 total; in the first five months 
of 1942, they were almost 15"percent above the same period of 1941. Moreover, 
in States with large war contracts, placements have increased much more than is 
indicated by these national totals. 

The above data is presented to the end that you may be apprised of progress 
which has been made by the United States Employment Service but not clearly 
reflected by statistical material to which you have had access. It was believed 
that you would be interested in knowing the steps which have been taken to insure 
the full assumption of responsibility by the United States Employment Service 
to meet, to the greatest possible extent within its wholly inadequate financial 
and staff limitations, the labor needs occasioned by the war program. 
Very sincerely yours, 

John J. Corson, Director. 



national defense migration 13261 

Exhibit 6. — Manpower Functions of Civilian Personnel 
Division, Services of Supply, War Department 

Documents Submitted by Leonard J. Maloney, Chief, Manpower Branch, 
Civilian Personnel Division, Service op Supply, War Department, 
Washington, D. C. 

(A) Organization of Manpower Branch in Its Relation to Civilian 
Personnel Division, Services of Supply 

July 17, 1942. 
Memorandum for all Liaison Officers. 
Subject: Administrative Outlines. 

1. For information and direction concerning the scope of responsibilities and 
duties of the Manpower Branch and its field representatives, the following admin- 
istrative outlines are made a part of the Administrative Manual. 

a. Organization of the Services of Supply, March 9, 1942. (Circular 59). 

b. Chart and organization plan of the Civilian Personnel Division. 

c. Organization chart and statements for Manpower Branch and Sections. 

(1) Organization chart. 

(2) Description of the functions of the Manpower Branch, 

(3) Executive offices — Manpower Branch. 

(4) Outline of functions. Labor Supply Section. 

(5) Outline of functions, Military Requirements Section. 

(6) Outline of functions, Pre-Induction Training Section, 

(7) Outline of functions, Reports and Analysis Section, 

(8) Outline of functions, Liaison Officers. 

For the Director, Civihan Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



(G. 0. 24) 

General Orders\ Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

No. 24 J Washington, D. C, July 20, 1942. 

Section 
Reorganization of the Staff Divisions and Administrative Services, Serv- 
ices of Supply I 

Announcement of appointments II 

I. Reorganization of the Staff Divisions and Administrative Services, Services of 
Supply. — Effective July 20, 1942, the following changes in the organization of 
the Staff Divisions and Administrative Services, Services of Supply, are directed 
(see attached chart), and all previous instructions in conflict herewith are 
rescinded: 

1. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Resources is 
abolished. 

2. The following offices are established in the Headquarters, Services of Supply: 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel. 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel. 

3. The Office of the Director of Procurement is established in the Office of the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel. 

4. The following transfers of functions, personnel, records, and equipment are- 
directed: 

a. To the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations: 

(1) Operations Division, redesignated the Plans Division, 

(2) Distribution Branch, Procurement and Distribution Division^ 
redesignated the Distribution Division. 



13262 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

b. To the Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel: 

(1) Requirements Division. 

(2) International Division. 

(3) Resources Division. 

(4) Production Branch, Procurement and Distribution Division, 
redesignated the Production Division. 

(5) Purchases Branch, Procurement and Distribution Division, 
redesignated the Purchases Division. 

c. To the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel: 

(1) The Military Personnel Division. 

(2) The Civilian Personnel Division. 

(3) The Special Service, redesignated the Special Service Division^ 
II. Announcement of appoiniments. — 1. Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay, 

09318, U. S. A., is appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Materiel. 

2. Brigadier General LeRoy Lutes, 05413, U. S. A., is appointed Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Operations. 

3. Colonel Joe N. Dalton, 04785, General Staff Corps, is appointed Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Personrrel. 

4. Brigadier General William H. Harrison, 0909263, U. S. A., is appointed 
Director of Procurement. 

By command of Lieutenant General Somervell: 

W. D. Styer, 
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps, 

Chief of Staff. 
Official: 

J. A. Ulio, 

Major General, 

The Adjutant General. 



The Civilian Personnel Division 
statement of organization 

In the War Department Reorganization (Circular 59, Page 6, 7e(7), March 2, 
1942) the Service of Supply is assigned the responsibility for "the administration 
of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which pertain to personnel as 
individuals, both military and civil, to include premilitary training, mobilization 
of individual manpower, and labor relations." 

Under this general assignment the Civilian Personnel Division has been 
specifically authorized to represent the Services of Supply, and the War Depart- 
ment in the formulation, supervision and execution of policies and practices in 
labor supply and labor relations. The Division also represents the Services of 
Supply in the formulation, supervision and execution of personnel standards, 
policies and practices including jiremilitary training. 

To carry out these responsibilities the Civilian Personnel Division operates as a 
staff service under the Commanding General of the Services of Supply. Within 
the scope of its responsibilities, the Civilian Personnel Director represents the 
office of the Commanding General in its relationships with the chiefs of all the 
Supply Services, the Corps Area Commanders and all offices, agencies, boards and 
committees of the War Department coming under the jurisdiction of the Services 
of Supply. 

The Civilian Personnel Division, in addition to its executive officers and staff 
services, maintains three operating branches: 1. Civilian Personnel Branch, 2. 
Labor Relations Branch, 3. Manpower Branch. 

Civilian Personnel Branch: 

1. To be responsible for the formulation of policy, the development of pro- 
grams and the supervision of administration of all civilian personnel matters 
within the Services of Supply. 

2. To review continuously existing practices with respect to estimating require- 
ments, selection of applicants, assignment of employees, classification of jobs, 
induction of employees, wages, hours of work, overtime compensation, promotion, 
upgrading, demotion, rating of employees and relations with employees, and to 
draft recommendations as needed for any changes. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY 



ADMINISTRATIVE 



UNDER 
SECRETARY 
OF WAR 



3=T 



COMMANDING 

GENERAL 

SERVICES OF SUPPLY 

CHIEF OF STAFF 






CORPS 



SUPPLY SERVICES 



I ■:°'"'"''^« I I "«'"'"" I I ':°» "»«" I I CCw'/aKEA I IcMirLaE,, | | CO.f?.RE. | I COKli°ABE. | | CORg°*REA | | CORp" .R£> [ 



'^^L^ 



80306— 42— pt. 34 (Pace p. 13262) 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13263 

3. To institute a uniform system of job analysis and labor grading for ungraded 
employees. To supervise the conduct of wage surveys and to make recommenda- 
tions on such changes as_ may be necessary to bring into closer accord compensa- 
tion of "ungraded" and "graded" employees of the Services of Supply. 

4. To develop and supervise programs for in-service training of executives, 
supervisory, manual and clerical workers and to provide assistance to the Services 
of Supply in carrying out these programs. To arrange with other branches of the 
Civilian "Personnel Division for such supplementary vocational training as may be 
needed by employees. To prepare handbooks, guides and manuals for the use 
of employees. 

5. To assist in development and supervision of facilities and services to 
employees. 

6. In cooperation with the Surgeon General's Office, to develop programs for 
industrial health and the safety of employees of the Services of Supply. 

7. To provide necessary liaison with the Civil Service Commission in the 
establishment and manning of jobs within the classified departmental service. 

8. Continuously study problems aflecting the efficiency of employees and 
develop ^\ays and means of overcoming them. 

9. To perform such related functions as may be necessary for the proper prose- 
cution of the Civilian Personnel Division program. 

Labor Relations Branch: 

1. To be responsible for the formulation of policies and the development of 
programs on labor-relations matters and to supervise all labor-relations activities 
within the Services of Supply, such activities to be carried on in close coopera- 
tion with the Manpower Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division. 

2. To provide a liaison with national and international labor organizations 
such as the American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
and independent labor organizations. 

3. To represent the War Department in all matters involving labor relations in 
which the War Department has a direct interest and to i)rovide liaison with the 
War Labor Board, the National Labor Relations Board, the Department of 
Labor and other Labor Relations Agencies. 

Manpower Branch: 

1. To be responsible for the formulation of policies and the development of 
programs for the effective utilization of civilian manpower, making plans for the 
speedy mobilization of labor for the prosecution of the War Production Effort, 
and to supervise all labor-supply activities within the Services of Supply. 

2. In cooperation with other agencies and divisions to estimate manpower 
needs for War Departm.ent operations and for war production and to assist in 
the planning for recruitment and distribution for maximum war production, to 
advise procurement and manufacturing agencies of the Services of Supply on 
areas of labor shortage and labor surplus as a guide for the effective distribution 
of war production contracts. 

3. To develop programs for special nonmilitary training of civilians prior to 
induction into the armed forces. 

4. To represent the War Department on all matters dealing with manpower 
and the utilization of labor, serving as liaison with the War Manpower Commis- 
sion and its constituent agencies, the War Production Board, the Department 
of Labor,' the United States Employment Service, the Selective Service Adminis- 
tration and other Government agencies, if necessary. 



Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Division 
statement of duties and functions 

The Manpower Branch, as a part of the Civilian Personnel Divison, has the 
following general responsibilities: 

1. To formulate policies and develop programs for the effective utilization of 
civilian manpower for War Department production and military services by: 

a. Active cooperation with labor supply and training agencies, and Selective 

Service. 
h. Direct action on behalf of the War Department in supplementing such 

agencies. 
c. Arrangements for appropriate training of individuals prior to entrance into 

military service or employment by the War Department. 



13264 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

2. To supervise all labor supply activities within the Services of Supply by: 

a. Serving as the representative of the Supply Services in all problems of 

labor information, labor supply, and the coordination of employment 
programs of the Supply Services with the facilities of labor supply and 
training agencies. 

b. Providing technical supervision and guidance to Supply Services in labor 

supply policies and practices, both on a national level and through Liai- 
son Officers on local levels. 

c. To serve as liaison on labor supply matters with the War Manpower Com- 

mission, the War Production Board, the United States Employment 
Service, Selective Service, Department of Labor, and other Government 
agencies as necessary, on the national level and through Liaison Officers 
on local levels. 

(1) On the Federal level, Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr, Special Assistant to 

the Secretary of War, serves on the War Manpower Commis- 
sion and represents the Manpower Branch as well as other 
divisions of the War Department. The Chief of the Man- 
power Branch and the chiefs of appropriate sections of the 
branch maintain liaison with corresponding sections of the War 
Manpower Commission and associated agencies. 

(2) At regional levels the Liaison Officers of the Manpower Branch 

will serve as Liaison Officers with the regional officers of the 
War Manpower Commission. The Liaison Officers as repre- 
sentatives of the War Department will not be under direct 
supervision by the War Manpower Commission but will par- 
ticipate in its work on labor supply problems within the area, 
and will directly represent War Department interests in labor 
supply. The same relationship will exist where War Man- 
power Commission offices are established on subregional. State, 
or local levels. 



Executive Offices, Manpower Branch 

statement of duties and functions 

^.The Executive Offices of the Manpower Branch include the Chief of the Branch, 
the Executive Officer, the Operations Section, and the Plans and Staff Training 
Section. 

1. The Chief of the Manpower Branch is responsible for the determination and 
execution of policy and programs, and the coordination and direction of staff and 
fine operations of the Manpower Branch. Under the Director of the Civilian 
Personnel Division, he is responsible for representing the Manpower Branch and 
coordinating its activities with the other branches of the Civilian Personnel 
Division and with other agencies. 

a. The Executive Officer is the Chief Administrative Officer of the branch and 
also serves as Associate Chief representing the Chief of the Branch in his 
absence or on assignment. 

2. The Operations Section is responsible for the control and direction of the field 
officers of the Manpower Branch. 

a. The Chief of the Operations Section, under the supervision and direction 
of the Chief of the Branch and the Executive Officer, will be responsible 
for the development of a unified field program for the Manpower Branch. 

h. The Chief of the Operations Section will exercise direct line authority over 
the Liaison Officers on regional, State or local level. 

c. He will be responsible for the receipt and handling of all reports and cor- 

respondence with the field Liaison Officers. 

d. He wiU be responsible for the proper execution, by the Liaison Officers, of 

the estabhshed policies and procedures of aU sections of the Manpower 
Branch. 

e. He will refer to the Section Chiefs reports and correspondence for han- 

dling and for preparation for signature. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13265 

3. The Plans and Staff Training Section is established within the Executive 
Office. 

a. To assist the Section Chiefs and Executive Officers in preparing organiza- 
tion charts and job descriptions, statements of pohcy, and operating 
procedures. 
5. To be responsible for collecting and maintaining current records of all 
established policies and procedures of the Manpower Branch and pre- 
paring suitable training materials based on these records. 

c. To be responsible for induction training for all new staff members of the 

Manpower Branch. 

d. To be responsible for continuing training programs for the Manpower 

Branch in all new or revised procedures and policies of the branch, and 
in such policies and procedures of related services of the Civilian Per- 
sonnel Division, the War Department and other agencies as directly 
pertain to the work of the Manpower Branch. 

e. To be responsible, in cooperation with the Executive Officers and Section 

Chiefs, for the distribution to the Field and Staff Officers of informational 
materials, publications, changes in personnel or organization. 
/, To maintain liaison with training, information, and public relations sec- 
tions and other branches of the S. O. S., and of related agencies. 



Labor Supply and Demand Section 
statement op duties and functions 

1. To ascertain the manpower needs of War Department contractors, to evalu- 
ate the factors such as recruiting methods, training methods, transportation and 
housing facilities which preclude the satisfaction of these needs. 

2. To formulate and recommend to the proper agencies for action, War De- 
partment policies and programs for the orderly recruitment, training, transporta- 
tion, and housing of industrial and agricultural workers. 

3. To diiect the Supply Services and to advise war industries in all matters of 
labor supply for war production. 

4. To provide liaison on national and regional levels in all labor supply matters 
with the War Manpower Commission and its constituent agencies, the War Pro- 
duction Board, the Navy, the Maritime Commission and other agencies inter- 
ested in labor supply and training; and to directly represent the Supply Services 
in their labor supply problems and the coordination of their employment pictures 
with other agencies. 

Military Requirements Section 
statement op duties and punctions 

1. To maintain schedules of information concerning the miUtary needs for 
manpower as far as they are now determined, and estimates of the probable 
needs for future periods. Such information to be in the form in which it will 
be of most use for labor supply and training activities. 

2. To formulate policies and plan programs for the transfer to civilians of non- 
combatant jobs with the armed forces ^hich can be satisfactorily performed by 
women or by men not eligible for military duty. In cooperation with the Labor 
Supply Branch to formulate policy on the fiUing of these jobs. To provide 
general supervision for these programs. 

3. To supervise all matters dealing with the deferment from miUtary service 
of such civilian personnel as may be deemed essential to the War Department or 
to contractors working for the' War Department, and to formulate plans and 
execute estabhshed policies and procedures for the release from the Army of key 
industrial personnel necessary for the War Production program. 

4. To represent the War Department in the Army and Navy Munitions Board 
and similar organizations on all matters dealing with manpoAver and mihtary 
personnel in relation to labor supply problems, and the utilization of labor. 

5. To represent the Civilian Personnel Division on problems involving internal 
security and the protection of information when these problems are related to 
questions of labor supply. 



13266 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

6. To provide liaison: 

1. On labor supply policies as they affect military personnel with: 

(a) Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply. 

(b) The Adjutant General's Department. 

(c) The General Staff and other War Department agencies. 

(d) Air force. 

(e) Ground force. 

(f) Navy. 

2. On all matters with the Selective Service Administration. 

Pre-Induction Training Section 

statement of duties and functions 

Policy and planning 

1. Establish policies, plan, initiate, coordinate and supervise the necessary and 
appropriate training of individuals prior to entrance into military service or 
employment by the War Department, except for personnel specially trained to 
perform functions peculiar to the air forces. 

2. Recommend policies regarding the eft'ective use of trained manpower. 

c. Propose effective relationships between pre-induction and post 
induction training. 

b. Propose improvements in practices of detecting and assigning skilled 

manpower to military duty. 

c. Propose methods of detecting and assigning men with substitute 

qualifications for critical skills. 

d. Propose improvements in methods of reassigning skilled men in 

service. 

e. Propose job classifications and standard qualifications. 

Needs 

In cooperation with the divisions and officers concerned and other agencies 
determine: 

1. Manpower needs and shortages in terms of numbers, skills and degrees of 

skill required. 

2. Training needs in terms of skills and when required. 

3. Training facilities needed to^ meet training requirements. 

Survey of facilities 

In cooperation with the field representatives and other agencies, determine and 
recommend : 

1. Facilities available for training skills required. 

2. The locations, character and suitability of such facilities. 

3. The preparation of a check list of basic requirements, for equipment, 

qualifications of instructors, courses of study and housing. 

4. Necessary changes to adapt existing faciUties to effectively serve pre- 

induction training. 

Program 

1. Determine courses of study appropriate to develop needed skills according 
to Army standards.' 

2. Survey and adapt courses of study, manuals and methods of instructions to 
meet Army requirements. 

3. Preparation of necessary instructional manuals as needed. 

4. Investigate and recommend improvements in "instructional methods, equip- 
ment and facilities. 

5. Coordinate pre-induction training programs with the post-induction training 
program. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13267 

Reports and Analysis Section 

statement op duties and functions 

Functions 

1. To collect, correlate, analyze, and interpret reports from ail establishments 
of the various services of Services of Supply which will reveal: 

o. Volume of current civilian employment, by occupation. 

b. Anticipated hires and lay-offs by occupation. 

c. Degree to which various labor needs of the Services may be considered 

critical. 

d. Whether or not special measures, such as special recruitment devices, 

increased use of women, training, etc., will be necessary in order to insure 
an adequate supply of labor. 

2. To arrange for obtaining regularly from the appropriate Government agencies 
and to have readily accessible information in the form of surveys, special reports, 
etc., on condition of labor supply in all significant labor markets in the United 
States which will show: 

a. Labor market areas in which serious general shortages of manpower already 

exist. 

b. Labor market areas in which labor is currently adequate but shortages are 

anticipated on the basis of contracts already awarded or new plant site 
awards. 

c. Labor market areas in which an ample labor supply is available currently 

and in the foreseeable future. 

3. To arrange for obtaining regularly from the appropriate Government agencies 
and to have in readily accessible form lists of essential war occupations in which 
critical shortages have developed or are expected to develop. These should be 
available in form to reveal: 

a. Occupations in which there are general national shortages. 

b. Occupations in which shortages have developed only in specified areas. 

4. To arrange for obtaining regularly from the appropriate Government agencies 
and to have accessible, data revealing for specific areas the size of the available 
labor force and known future demands for labor by monthly periods at least six 
months in advance. 

5. To promote, advance, and obtain periodically from the appropriate Govern- 
ment agencies special studies of manpower problems in particular industries, such 
as munitions, aircraft, tanks, etc., in which the S. O. S. may have a special interest. 

6. To work in cooperation with other appropriate agencies of Government to 
develop procedures and techniques for imi)roving and expanding the available 
sources of information in the field of labor supply. 

7. To initiate, promote, and help direct projects within S. O. S. and in other 
related agencies which will provide more accurate information about and permit 
more precise estimates of labor needs, by skill, location, and time period. 

8. To be responsible for keeping the branch completely and continuously 
informed regarding all information and data on labor supply available everywhere 
in Washington and regarding any new or proposed projects to be undertaken in 
this field so that: 

a. The interests of the S. O. S. may be represented wherever it is possible to 

influence the course of such new work. 

b. The Manpower Branch is fully aware of all operations in this field and of 

all potentially available information. 

9. To keep the policy and operation sections of the Manpower Branch con- 
tinuously informed regarding factual developments revealing problems requiring 
special attention, and to analyze and present reports to such sections in such 
form as to indicate lines of possible action or policy. 

10. To be responsible for regular routing of selected data on labor supply, 
critical occupations, etc., to the field liaison officers of the Manpower Branch. 

11. To develop and operate a reporting system on labor supply from the field 
liaison office to the Washington office to supplement local sources of data. 

12. To gather such special information and data as may be requested by the 
operating and policy sections from time to time. 



13268 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Liaison Officers, Manpower Branch, Services of Supply 
statement of duties and functions 

1. General responsibilities: Liaison Officers, whether assigned to regional or 
local areas, will be the representatives of the Services of Supply in all matters 
of labor supply. They will assume appropriate responsibility for all matters 
within the scop"^e of the Manpower Branch, and upon assignment may also repre- 
sent and act for the Labor Relations Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division. 

2. Specific responsibilities: All Liaison Officers have the responsibility, upon 
direction from the Manpower Branch and in accordance with the labor supply 
policies determined for the Services of Supply: 

a. To recommend and to assist in the formulation of labor supply policies for 

the Services of Supply. 
h. To ascertain the n\anpower needs of the Supply Services and related war 

industries. 

c. To furnish labor supply information and to give technical supervision and 

assistance to the Supply Services in meeting their labor supply needs. 

d. To represent the Manpower Branch in providing lor the War Department 

an official source of information as to the adequacy of labor supply to 
meet War Department requirements, including information concerning 
militarv requirements and the need for pre-induction training. 

e. To serve "with Divisions of the War Manpower Commission and to directly 

represent the Supply Services in clearing labor matters and in co- 
ordmating their needs and activities with the War Manpower Com- 
mission, its constituent agencies and related services. 

/. To cooperate and if necessary to initiate community action with individuals 
or groups in securing effective employment practices in accordance with 
the policy of the War Department. 

g. To secure action and final solution of local labor supply problems where- 
ever possible and to make proper reference to the Chief of the Manpower 
Branch of such labor supply problems as cannot be satisfactorily settled 
locally. 

3. Liaison Officers, according to the needs of the labor supply program for the 
War Department, will be assigned on regional, State and local levels: 

a. The Regional Liaison Officers will be located in the areas of the Regional 

Offices of the War Manpower Commission and will have general super- 
visory responsibility for the interests of the Services of Supply in labor 
supply problems within the region. He will also have supervisory 
responsibility over any other Liaison Officers, S. O. S., within the region 
and will direct and coordinate the work for the Manpower Branch. 

b. Within a region, subregional. State or local Liaison Officers may be 

assigned to represent the Manpower Branch and to assist the Regional 
Liaison Officer. Where so assigned, these Liaison Officers will have 
corresponding authorization within the area to that of the Regional 
Liaison Officer, except that reports and instructions, unless otherwise 
directed, will be with the Regional Liaison Officer rather than with the 
Chief of the Manpower Branch. Below the regional level. Liaison 
Officers will be assigned only in. critical labor market areas where im- 
mediate and continuing representation is dee)ned necessary for proper 
service to War De])artment interests in labor supply. Because of 
service to a smaller area, these Liaison Officers will be expected to know 
more intimately and to serve more directly and completely the labor 
supply interests, than may be possible for regional officers. They wiU 
be expected to be familiar with and active in labor market studies, 
problem analyses, employment policies, recruitment practices, training 
facilities and all phases of labor market activities including housing, 
transportation, and related problems. 



ORGANIZATION CHART 
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60396 — 12— pt. 34 ( Face p. 1320fl 1 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



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13270 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(B) Inclusion of Army Air Forces Within Scope of Responsibility op 
Manpower Branch 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 13, 1942. 
Subject: Inclusion of Army Air Forces Within Scope of Responsibility, Man- 
power Branch. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. The Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, has the specific author- 
ity and responsibility for providing technical supervision and guidance in the 
labor supply policies and practices of the Supply Services and for serving as liaison 
on labor supply matters with the War Manpower Commission, the War Produc- 
tion Board and other agencies. In addition to these responsibilities, which have 
been formally assigned the Civilian Personnel Division under War Department 
reorganization of March 9, 1942, the Civilian Personnel Division is also responsible 
for these same services for the Materiel Command, Army Air Forces. 

2. The inclusion of the Army Air Forces within the scope of responsibihty of 
the Manpower Branch is set forth in the following letters and directives. The 
Under Secretary of War delegated this function to the Civilian Personnel Division 
in a memorandum for Brigadier General Styer, Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, 
on May 19, 1942, which reads in part as follows: "The Civilian Personnel Division 
[shall] take charge of matters bearing on manpower in the aircraft industry and 
other industries in which the Army Air Forces are interested, in the same way 
that this section deals with industrial manpower for production of other equip- 
ment for the War Department." General Styer forwarded this memorandum of 
May 19, 1942, to Brigadier General B. S. Meyers, Materiel Division, Army Air 
Forces. General Meyers acknowledged and expressed his satisfaction with this 
agreement in a memorandum dated May 22, 1942, to Brigadier General Styer. 

3. Liaison Officers will clarify any misunderstanding which may exist and wiU 
perform the same functions for and with the Air Corps Procurement Districts 
as with the Supply Services. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



(C) Resum:6 op Conference op Liaison Officers of Manpower Branch 

MONDAY MORNING SESSION JUNE 22 

The conference was opened by Lt. Col. James T. O'Connell, Executive Officer 
of the Civilian Personnel Division. Colonel O'Connell welcomed the Liaison 
Officers and introduced Mr. James P. Mitchell, Director, Civilian Personnel Divi- 
sion. Mr. Mitchell outlined the functions and objectives of the Services of 
Supply with particular emphasis on the responsibilities of the Civilian Personnel 
Division and the Manpower Branch. He stated that — 

Labor supply responsibilities are closely linked with Selective Service, and 
the duties of Occupational Advisors are part of the whole labor supply func- 
tion. However, demands for full time work in labor supply for war produc- 
tion made necessary the reassignment of officers between Selective Service 
and the Manpower Branch. 

Labor supply is closely related to labor relations functions and Liaison 
Officers may be assigned special responsibilities as Field Representatives of 
the Labor Relations Section of the Civilian Personnel Division. 

There is an increased need for reliable estimates of: the manpower require- 
ments for the Army itself; the manpower requirements for Army contractors; 
the manpower requirements for the Army Procurement Districts. Primary 
responsibiUtity in labor supply is to adequately present labor needs to proper 
labor supply agencies. Initial responsibility is with the Washington staff, 
the remaining responsibility is with the Field Staff in liaison at national, 
regional, and local levels with the Manpower Commission, War Production 
Board, labor supply and training agencies. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13271 

INIr. Mitchell later gave an illustrated talk on the importance of the manpower 
function in production of materials necessary for the equipment and maintenance 
of the Army — 

The production of materials depends on the efficiency and morale of the 
present ten million war workers and our ability to increase this force to 
seventeen million war workers. Sound policies of labor supply and labor 
relations are essential in meeting the responsibility for materials which rests 
on the Services of Supply. 

The War Department is one of the Nation's greatest employers of civilian 
labor, employing more than 610,000 civilian workers. Four hundred thou- 
sand additional civilian employees on cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts gives the 
Army responsibility for sound wage and employment policies on the part of 
contractors. The Corps of Engineers alone has cost-plus contracts which by 
September will total five and a h.alf billion dol'ars. 

The indirect employment of one-fourth of the Nation's labor force on jobs 
for the Army makes Army production plans and Army policy on employment 
standards one of the major determinants of national labor supply policy. 

Only through an organization which can devote its full time to these prob- 
lems can Services of Supply handle manpower problems adequately. Such 
an organization is the Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, which 
has three branches: (1) Manpower, (2) Labor Relations, (3) Civilian Per- 
sonnel. The manpower functions include: 

1. Supervision of Army's labor supply program; 

2. Development of estimates on n anpowor needs; 

3. Liaison with Manpower Commission, War Production Board, and Se- 

lective Service System ; 

4. Guidance to procurement officers on contract placement; 

5. Utilization ol Nation's manpower; 

6. Policies for effective use of minority groups; 

7. Pre-induction programs for training in special skills for the Army. 

There followed a discussion: 

Q. Should Liaison Officers continue to contact Selective Service? 

A. Liaison should be conducted, particularly in matters of labor supp'y> 
but action should be in policy matters on the State level and not in indi- 
vidual deferment cases. 

Q. Is there a responsibility for handling Navy as well as Army needs? 

A. Yes; upon any specific request of the Navy. 

Q. Are needs of the air forces included in the responsibilities of the 
Liaison Officers? 

A. Yes; the same responsibilities as to the air forces as to the ordnance 
plans. 

Q. Will there be a field staff for the Labor Relations Branch? 

A. Not at present and Liaison Officers will assist on specific cases as 
directed. 
The next speaker was Mr. Leonard J. Maloney, new Chief of the Manpower 
Branch. Mr. Maloney congratulated the Liaison Officers on their past per- 
formance as he had observed it as an Employment Service Director — 

The jobs of Liaison Officers are interpretative, advisory, and based on 
"persuasive guidance." Action .should be through existing agencies or in 
supplementing rather than duplicating such agencies. Liaison Officers 
should understand: 

1. The labor supply problem on State, regional and national levels; 

2. The needs of particular . individuals and employers in essential war 

production; 

3. The relative importance of needs of contractors in terms of produc- 

tion schedules and critical war needs. 
Mr. Maloney indicated the present and anticipated increased shortages of 
skilled workers: the probable employment of 27 million persons in the war effort 
and the accompanying problems of housing, transportation, and use of minority 
groups. 

Q. Will thespe be a Directive setting forth priority or preferences of m- 
dustries in order of war importance? 

A. Such a list is in process, listing types of production in three groups: 

60396— 42— pt. 34 15 



13272 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

1. Those considered most important and which are behind in pro- 
duction immediately needed; 

2. Industries on essential war production whose production is on 
schedule but whose products are immediately needed; 

3. Firms which are either ahead of production or whose products 
are not of immediate demand. 

Preference or priority lists are intended for Regional Directors with 
adjustments or appeals made on the regional level. 

MONDAY AFTERNOON SESSION JUNE 22 

Mr. Maloney introduced Lieutenant Colonel Junius R. Smith, Executive Officer 
of the Manpower Branch. Colonel Smith distributed organization charts of the 
Civilian Personnel Division and of the Manpower Branch, and a booklet of 
related materials. He then outlined in detail the functions and responsibilities 
of the Labor Supply Section, the Military Requirements Section, the Operations 
Section and the Pre-Induction Training Section — 

Field force operations is centered in the Office of the Chief with the Adminis- 
trative Sections performing staff services on the national level. Liaison 
Officers are representatives of the Services of Supply with all its implied 
powers. They will also become members of the Regional Boards of the War 
Manpower Commission. They are to be concerned with labor supply 
information and with the recruitment, training, transportation, housing and 
other problems of labor supply. They are to aid the Procurement Services 
in solving their labor problems by fully utilizing all agencies concerned with 
manpower. They are to supply Manpower Branch Headquarters with 
information on local labor supply problems and on matters of interest in the 
formulation and execution of regional labor supply policies. 

Colonel Smith then introduced Major George L. Webber, Chief of the Military 
Requirements Section. Major Webber briefly reviewed the development and 
work of the Liaison Officers as representatives of the Office of the Under Secre- 
tary, the Resources Division, of Selective Service, and of the Manpower Branch. 
He outlined the major duties of the Military Requirements Section as follows: 

1. The job transfer study for the replacement by civilian personnel of officers 
in certain types of duty; 

2. The deferment of key personnel in industry and agriculture and liaison 
with Selective Service in pohcy matters; 

3. Representation of the War Department on the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board and liaison with Military Personnel Division, Air Forces, Ground 
Forces, and Navy on labor supply policies. 

The next speaker was Major S. P. Coblentz, Liaison Officer for Manpower Branch 
with National Selective Service Headquarters — 

The interest of Liaison Officers in Selective Service is in the effect of 
Selective Service operations on labor supply. Liaison Officers should main- 
tain frequent and cooperative relationship with the State Directors of 
Selective Service but should work on policy matters rather than on cases of 
particular individuals. -They are also to assist employers with information 
about deferment policies and labor Supply, and to advise Manpower Branch 
Headquarters about Selective Service policy and operations effecting labor 
supply. 

The next speaker was Mr. M. M. Peake, Chief of the Pre-Induction Training 
Section. Mr. Peake explained that his program was the newest of the Man- 
power Branch, having been established ouly for about forty days. The functions 
of the Pre-Induction Training Section are: 

a. To determine pre-induction training needs; 

b. To survey available training facilities and to determine appropriate 
courses and methods of instruction to meet War Department 
requirements; 

c. To establish policies and to plan, provide, supervise and coordinate 
necessary and appropriate training of individuals prior to entrance 
into military service; 

d. To maintain liaison with training agencies and to coordinate pre- 
induction training programs with post-induction training programs. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13273 

As an additional responsibility the Pre-Induction Training Section is 
interested in providing facilities for a large number of Selective Service 
registrants who cannot be inducted because they are unable to meet literacy- 
tests or fourth grade requirements. 

Liaison Officers have no present responsibility in the pre-induction 
program but may be requested to perform specific assignments in determin- 
ing training needs and training facilities. 

TUESDAY MORNING SESSION — JUNE 23 

The meeting was opened by Mr. Maloney, who introduced Dr. Douglas Brown 
of Princeton University, Consultant for the Manpower Branch. Dr. Browa 
spoke on current labor market responsibilities — 

By December, 1942, there should be 15 million men and women in war 
production. Additions will include approximately 2 million new workers, 
y/2 million from the present unemployed group and 7.9 millions by transfer 
from nonessential industry. Other workers will be drawn from agriculture 
and other self-employed groups. The estimated potential reserve of women 
44 years of age or less, who have no children under 10 years of age, approxi- 
mates 4.3 millions. 

From a qualitative standpoint the Armed Services will draw the younger 
able-bodied and most adaptable workers, and industry will need to shift 
toward older men and women. Careful consideration of the length of the 
work week is needed, since longer hours do not always mean more production. 
Some of the incentives to the movement of labor are assurance of continuing 
employment and favorable wage differentials. 

Retarding factors include inadequate or costly living accommodations^ 
transportation facilities, lack of opportunities for the second or third wage 
earner in the family, and loss of benefits of seniority rights in present 
employment. 

Among the steps necessary for effective mobilization are coordination of 
procurement functions and distribution of contracts to areas of adequate 
labor supply. 
Mr. Maloney then introduced Mr. Fred H. Harbison, Chief of Labor Sup^jly and 
Demand Section. N r. Harbison outlined the major functions of the Labor Supply- 
Section listing as a first function the recruitment and allocation of labor — 

Piracy and raiding must be eliminated. Orderly recruitment must be 
effected to avoid disruption of war production. Liaison Officers, representing 
the N'anpower Branch and the Services of Supply, should point out the 
necessity for orderly recruitment and then work toward that objective. 
Employers' cooperation must be sought in the induction of women and 
minority groups including prisoners and interned aliens. Full utilization of 
training facilities also present an important source of new workers and 
Liaison Officers should work toward the coordination of recruitment and 
training programs. The Labor Supply Section will maintain close liaison 
with the War Manpower Commission and the headquarters office of labor 
supply and training agencies. The Liaison Officers are expected to work for 
local solutions of labor supply problems and to forward information and 
requests for action to the headquarters office in appropriate cases. liaison 
Officers must be interested in the trasnportation and housing problems w-hen 
they become obstacles to adequate labor supply. 
In conclusion Mr. Harbison introduced three other members of his staff, Captain. 
Russell W. Nauman, Field Service; Captain Daniel L. Boland, in charge of Housing 
and Transportation, and Mr. Wilfred C. Leland, Minority Problems. 

Mr. Maloney asked Dr. Brov^ai to make a statement on how Liaison Officers 
can most eft'ectively assist in the job of labor procurement. Dr. Brown stated 
that the Army, as the largest user of manpower in the United States, will have a. 
tremendous share of the functions of the War Manpower Commission; therefore, 
the Army must have full information as to its own labor needs and the employ- 
ment policies and practices of its divisions as well as information about the general 
labor supply picture. Dr. Brown closed by saying, "The chief objective on the 
part of the.'Liaison Officers is to be fully advised about everything that concerns 
the use of manpower in their area so as to provide the Army and war contractors 
information about policies and changes of policies in labor procurement, so thati 
by pulling together it will all add up to a job well done." 



13274 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, 
paid a brief visit to the conference, complimenting the Liaison Officers on the 
work they had done in their relationship with Selective Service and labor supply 
and expressed his regret at losing from the Selective Service System those officers 
present who were being transferred to full-time duty with the "Manpower Branch. 
General Hershey stated that in the past relationship both Selective Service 
and the Manpower Branch had benefited by the cooperative work of the Liaison 
Officers and he recognized the necessity for separation and specialization of 
functions at this time. General Hershey was then introduced to each of the 
officers. 

Llr. Maloney then introduced Lieutenant R. Mayne Albright, Chief of the Plans 
and Staff Training Section. Lieutenant Albright summarized the labor supply 
agencies — 

Although war production schedules are being met there is still confusion 
in labor market information, labor supply agencies, and employment pohcies 
and practices. 

Short of controls there are two principal objectives: 

1. Full utilization of presently employed workers, and 

2. Orderly recruitment and training of new workers. 

To accomplish these objectives there is already established a complete 
organization of labor supply agencies : 

1. United States Employment Service and Civil Service Commission. 

2. National Youth Administration, Vocational Education, Engineer- 
ing, Science, Management Defense Training, Training within 
Industry, Apprenticeship Training. 

B. Unions, employer associations and private agencies. 

These services are coordinated by State Councils of Administrators and 
regional labor committees formerly of the Bureau of Employment Security 
and now under the War Manpower Commission. 

After sketching the history and development of the United States Employ- 
ment Service, Lieutenant Albright stated as the chief problems of labor supply: 

1. Inadequate needs data. 

2. Wasteful employment practices. 

3. Area shortages because of wages, housing, etc. 

4. Total skill shortages in critical occupations. 

5. Need for controls in hiring priorities. 

To meet these problems of labor supply and to fully utilize labor supply 
agencies. Liaison Officers have a primary responsibihty to effect good employ- 
]uent practices by administrative supervision and persuasive guidance with 
employment officials in local divisions of Services of Supply. 

Liaison Officers have a second responsibihty (a) in interpreting labor 
supply services, (b) in assisting in the regular services and in special prob- 
lems, (c) in coordination of labor supply services and Services of Supply 
3ieeds through War Manpower Commission, employer groups and individual 
•employers. 
The final speaker at this session was Captain Ira B. Cross of the Labor Relations 
Section, Manpower Branch. Captain Cross made a brief report on the Coosa 
•Ordnance Plant as an example of discriminatory practices and practical solutions. 
The War Manpower Commission has a Negro Manpower Division to 
supplement the work of the President's Committee. The purpose of both 
groups is to see that in a period of labor scarcity full utilization is made 
of all available manpower including Negroes and other minority groups. 
Where misunderstanding can be avoided by early action, solution is made 
easier in cases of discrimination. 

TUESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION JUNE 23 

Colonel Smith introduced Dean Barker, representative of the Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy, who spoke on labor procurement for the United States 
Navy — 

Navy labor procurement is divided into three main areas: 

a. Navy Yards. 

b. Government7pwned plants. 

c. Privately owned and operated plants. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13275 

From 1922-37 Navy yards were doing little but repair work. Until 
recentlj' labor supply has been abundant and recruitment has been easy. 
In the last six months women have been placed in many jobs and on ma- 
chines and in repair shops. A problem of particular difficulty is selecting^ 
the overseas staff. 

In privately operated plants the Inspector in Charge works closely with 
the contractor and tries to interfere as little as possible Avith his policies. 
As the labor pool gets tighter relations between naval procurement and 
Manpower Branch will become much closer. 

Navy recruitment will probably continue on a voluntary basis but Selec- 
tive Service will be used if and when necessary. 

Colonel Smith then introduced Air. John H. Ohly, Chief of Labor Relations 
Branch, Civilian Personnel Division. Mr. Ohly gave some background material 
on problems of labor supply and indicated the functions that the Labor Rela- 
tions Branch wishes to perform. The War Labor Board of the National Labor 
Relations Board and other agencies are designed to settle temporarj^ disputes and 
to act quickl}- in preventing or ending strikes, in which the Labor Relations Section 
is interested as a consumer, that is, as the representative of the largest user of 
labor. By its organization and position in the War Department, the branch is 
in a position to get information quickly and impartially and to attempt to secure- 
immediate action in avoiding or settling a dispute. The branch also works with, 
these agencies in helping to determine the strike. 

Power has been given the War Department to revise or renegotiate fixed- 
fee contracts. Though these price adjustments are a matter of lalior rela- 
tions, regulation of overtime and working conditions may also become a 
matter ot labor relations. 

The next speaker was Mr. Herbert Carey, Chief of the Civilian Personnel 
Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division. Mr. Carey briefly outlined his talk 
and gave full copies to each of the officers. He also explained the Civilian Per- 
sonnel Policy Committee of the Services of Supply, consisting of the Staff Divi- 
sions, Administrative Services, and representatives of each of the Supply 
Services. 

Colonel Smith then introduced Lieutenant Colonel Thomas LaJie of the Division 
of Internal Security who spoke on "Alien Certification and Internal Security" — ■ 

The War Department distributes questionnaires to be presented by the 
employer to the alien. The questionnaires are forwarded to the Division of 
Internal Security, which takes immediate action except where further iii- 
vestigation is necessary. There is no policy of the War Department pro- 
hibiting the alien from entering war production employment. The Internal 
Security Division acts for the Navy as well as the Army. 

Colonel Smith led a discussion on the problem of employment where the 
applicant is an American citizen but does not have a birth certificate. 

The next speaker was Mr. Otis E. Mulligan, Chief of the Labor Relations Sec- 
tion of the United States Department of Agriculture. Mr. Mulligan spoke on 
the Farm Labor and Department of Agriculture War Boards. Mr. Mulligan gave 
figures showing the value of agricultural production and the percentages used in 
the war effort — 

The United States has about 30 million farm residents with an additional 
7 million persons living in rural areas but not on farms. The actual number 
of persons working on farms in 1941 was 10,267,000. Although wage levels 
are still a problem in securing farm labor, there has been an increase from 
$43.64 per month without board in 1941 to $53.20 in 1942. The Depart- 
ment of Agriculture works with the United States Employment Service for 
finding recruits and replacing workers taken into the Armed Services and 
war industries. Representatives of the Department of Agriculture, and the 
voluntary Department of Agriculture War Boards supplement the efforts of 
the Employment Service, particularly in rural areas not otherwise served. 
There have been no serious losses in agricultural production to date but 
next year there will inevitably be such losses. 

WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION JI3NE 2-1 

The first speaker on the Wednesday morning program was Mr. Arthur Fleming^ 
member of the Civil Service Commission. Mr. Fleming outlined the change in 
operations of the Civil Service Commission in eliminating investigations and tha 



13276 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

■establishment of registers to facilitate the recruitment and placement of workers 
in the shortest possible time. 

Mr. Fleming was of the opinion that wage stabilization in the near future 
was not to be expected. Neither did he anticipate national service for the control 
of civilian workers. The Civil Service Commission is represented on the War 
Manpower Commission. 

Mr. Maloney then introduced Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry, Chief of 
Operations of the War Manpower Commission. General McSherry outlined the 
past experience of the labor policy committees including the National Advisory 
Committee, the Office of Production Management, Labor Division of the War 
Production Board, and War Manpower Commission — 

Practically every agency of the Federal Government that has anything to 
do with manpower, training, labor supply, or the military service, is partially 
or wholly under the direction and policy of the War Manpower Commission. 
This includes the United States Employment Service, the Civil Service Com- 
mission, the Selective Service Commission, Railroad Retirement, Works 
Progress Administration, the training agencies, as well as representatives from 
the War and Navy Departments, Department of Labor, and War Production 
Board. There has also been established a Labor Management Polic}^ Com- 
mittee to advise the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Under 
Mr. McNutt as Chairmaln of the Commission and Mr. Fowler Harper as 
Deputy Chairman, Mr. Arthur J. Altmcyer is Executive Director of the 
program with respect to the direction of the technical stalT, including adminis- 
trative services, planning, statistical analysis, and coordination services. 
The Director of Operations, General McSherry, has direct supervision of the 
operating agency following under the War Manpower Commission. 

General McSherry then outlined the organization of the Regional Committees 
of the War Manpower Commission and explained the relationship of the Liaison 
Officers to these committees. He requested that a representative be designated 
from the Manpower Branch to maintain liaison with the War Manpower Com- 
mission on the national level, and offered to provide space and facilities for the 
Liaison Officers in the Regional War Manpower Commission Boards. General 
McSherry stated that the War Manpower Commission had no authority to put 
the Liaison Officers under the regional staff but that he hoped and expected that 
they would work in close cooperation with the regional staffs. The Regional 
Directors of the War Manpower Commission will be Regional Directors of the 
Federal Security Agency, thus reporting directly to Mr. McNutt and having direct 
control over the field agencies of the Federal Security Agency. 

There will be no State organizations since activities will be coordinated at the 
regional level. There may be subregional offices, but generally the outline of the 
present labor supply committee arrangements will be followed. 

Mr. Maloney then introduced Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr, Assistant to the Under 
Secretary of War and member of the War Manpower Commission. Mr. Dorr 
impressed upon the Liaison Officers their responsibilities as representatives of the 
War Department and offered his services in clearing particular matters which 
could not be settled except by direct action between the War Manpower Com- 
mission or War Department. " He urged that oflScers attempt to settle local pro- 
lems through the regional offices of the War Manpower Commission and its 
constitutent agencies. Mr. Dorr stated that now that organizational details had 
been overcome, the War Manpower Commission would work rapidly on all fronts 
of the labor sup])ly problem. He discussed the question of priorities among war 
production plants and the allocation of manpower to such plants. It was indi- 
cated that the final decision within broad policies would be made on the regional 
or local level b.y Regional Officers of the War Manpower Commission or a subcom- 
mittee thereof. It is important that there be a flexible system to meet conditions 
which vary both by area and from time to time. 

The final speaker on the conference program was Mrs. Clara Beyer of the Labor 
Standards Section, Department of Labor. Mrs. Beyer spoke on the War and 
adjustment of labor standards — 

Originally there was a panicky approach to the labor supply problem and 
consequent relaxations of laws which were not always necessary. The 
Department of Labor agrees that there should be relaxation and adjustment 
but no break-down of labor standards. Some employers have been too prone 
to look for relaxation before exhausting other efforts to secure the necessary 
production. The United States Department of Labor is cooperating with 
State Department and a recent survey by the Department shows that the 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13277 

States have been ready and willing to relax labor laws where sufficient justi- 
fication was shown. On the other hand, long hours do not produce the 
desired rate of production unless definite maxima are maintained. Forty- 
eight hours appear to be the desirable limit. Seventy-eight percent of the 
New York manufacturers reported that they secured maximum production 
from women working 48 hours and from men working 54 hours. Both 
Canada and England have ceased 60-, 70-, and 80-hour weeks and have 
returned to 48 to 55-hour weeks. 

The concluding session of the conference was devoted to a summary and 
restatement by Mr. Maloney of the objectives of the branch and the responsi- 
bilities of the Liaison Officers. Mr. Mitchell presented illustrated material on 
the labor supply problem and responsibilities of the Civilian Personnel Division 
and adjourned the meeting. 



(D) Use of Labor Supply Directive 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Manpower Branch, 
Washington, D. C, July £4, 1942. 
Memorandum Jfor All Field Liaison Officers. 
Subject: Temporary Use of Labor Supply Directive, August 28, 1941. 

1. Pending developments in the reorganization of labor supply agencies, the 
OUSW Memorandum to All Liaison Officers, dated August 28, 1941, remains in 
effect. 

2. The organizational set-up of the War Manpower Commission on the regional 
level as presented by Brigadier General Frank McSherry to the Field Liaison 
Officers in Washington on June 24, has not been completed. At such time as 
the Regional or Area Manpower Directors are selected and appointed, a Directive 
will be issued outlining in detail the relationship of the Regional Liaison Officer 
to the War Manpower Commission organization. 

3. Pending the formal institution of the new War Manpower Commission 
organization, Field Liaison Officers will continue to attend meetings of the Regional 
and Area Labor Supply Committees where such committees are still in existence. 
A summary statement of the proceedings of the meetings, or a copy of the minutes, 
or both, should be submitted to Headquarters. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



(E) General Instructions on Staff Relationships 

War Department, 
Headquarters, ■ Services of Supply, 

Manpower Branch, 
Washington, D. C, July 24, 1942. 
Memorandum for All Field Liaison Officers. 
Subject: General Instructions on Staff Relationship of Liaison Officers. 

1. what types of cases you should handle 

a. In general, you are not responsible for solving the manpower problems of a 
particular employer or particular individual. It is neither necessary nor desirable 
to write a memorandum to Washington stating that some small employer needs 
six toolmakers and another employer is having great difficulty in securing seven 
machinists, or that James Jones of the X Company was inducted despite filing a 
Form 42a. You should refer such cases to the Regional Director of Manpower 
or to the constitutent and related agencies of the W^ar Manpower Commission 
for appropriate action. You can be of help to individual employers by telling 
them the proper agencies to contact. You will greatly fortify the operating 
agencies of the War Manpower Commission if you make them, rather than your- 
self, assume the responsibility for solving the routine, day-by-day problems. 



13278 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

b. In some cases, of course, the problem of a particular employer may warrant 
your personal attention and advice — if the problem is^ typical of problenis of other 
employers and, therefore, is a "pilot case", if the company is a large and dominant 
employer in a particular community or area, or if the company is of critical im- 
portance to the war production program. It is obvious that you should have 
personal acquaintance with the executives of leading firms in your area, and, of 
course, you should make reports to Washington on significant and important 
developments in such companies. 

c. The Manpower Branch is concerned with all policies, procedures and action 
involving the maintenance of a balance between military manpower and essential 
industrial manpower. You are expected to keep this office informed of anything 
which tends to upset the balance, either by depriving the armed forces of the 
services of men not essential for war production or by taking essential men away 
from war production. You should not be concerned with the administration of 
Selective Service beyond this extent and are not expected to follow individual 
cases unless they are of extreme importance to war production or are pilot cases 
involving a significant matter of policy. You are not part of the Selective Service 
System and must not interfere in its operations. You should have a thorough 
knowledge of all activities involving military manpower problems in relation to 
labor supply and should maintain close relations with all organizations concerned 
in this field. 

d. Always bear in mind that you will be held responsible for giving Head- 
quarters an over-all picture of important developments. If you are so busy 
with details that you haven't time to see over-all trends and problems, you can- 
not be efl'ective in your job as policy adviser. 

2. WHEN TO CALL ON HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON 

a. When you need assistance in developing a policy or program, feel free to 
call on headquarters at any time. Perhaps you may want to suggest a program 
for the mobilization and employment of women for war industries — a plan to 
induce nondefense workers to enter war employment — a drive to employ aged 
workers — a program to prevent the pirating of labor. These are the types of 
matters for which you can secure suggestions and instructions from Headquarters. 
You will find that the Headquarters staff will be glad to give prompt consideration 
to your requests for assistance. If advisable, Headquarters will arrange to send 
a specialist to your area to assist you in drawing up programs and to acquaint 
you with important aspects of national policies. Don't, however, ask us for help 
on a lot of detailed minor cases. We expect you to see that appropriate agencies 
handle these at the local level. 

3. WITH WHOM YOU SHOULD HAVE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS 

a. You should be in continual contact with the Regional Director of Man- 
power in your area at such time as he is appointed. A formal or written arrange- 
ment for clearance of problems is not sufficient. The Manpower Director will 
clear broad problems and programs with you only if he learns to depend on you 
and respect your counsel and advice on important matters. This requires con- 
tinued and constant contact. 

b. You should also have personal contacts with the State Directors of the 
USES, the Directors and key personnel of the State Selective Service Systems, 
the Board of Control for Vocational Education, the Regional offices of Training- 
Within-Industry, and such other constituent agencies of the War Manpower 
Commission which you think necessary. You should make it clear to the repre- 
sentatives of these agencies, however, that you deal directly with the Regional 
Director of Manpower, but that your relationship with the Regional Director 
does not preclude cooperative and friendly arrangements with his subordinate 
agencies. 

c. It goes without saying that you must be consxilted and informed on every 
important development in the field of manpower in your region or area. You 
must be part of an inner circle of advisers to those charged with the responsibility 
of administering the manpower program. You should not, however, attempt to 
assume the functions of the operating agencies of the Manpower Commission. 
You should always bear in mind that your responsibility is to stimulate thought, 
to lend backing to action, and to be available for consultation and advice at any 
time. As the representative of the War Department, you are responsible for 
seeing that action is taken, but you are not responsible for taking direct action 
unless other methods are inadequate or fail. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13279 

4. WHAT ARE YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE SUPPLY SERVICES, AIR FORCES AND 
ARMY CONTRACTORS 

a. Your sole mission is to represent the interests of the War Department in 
all action to assure an adequate supply of qualified labor for war production 
without interfering with the orderly fulfillment of military manpower require- 
ments. You are the channel for carrying the labor supply problems of the Army 
and Army contractors to the proper agencies for remedial action. You are the 
agent to represent Army interests with the other agencies and the interest of 
these agencies with the Army and Army contractors. 

h. It is fundamental that you have a well established basis of mutual under- 
standing with the key officials of the Supply Service Air Force, and Army con- 
tractors, subcontractors and supplies for whoin and with whom you should be 
working. It is not enough to shake hands and say hello. It is incumbent upon 
you to get to know these officers well, to know the conditions under which they 
work, the objectives they must attain and the difficulties they face. It is equally 
important to see that they know what you are there for, what you can do and 
how you can do it. 

c. A satisfactory working relationship must be built upon understanding and 
confidence. Understanding can be built by educating the key officers. Con- 
fidence can be developed by convincing them that you have a necessary function 
and the means for carrying out that function and then by delivering the goods. 
There is widespread lack of understanding regarding the system of labor supply 
and training agencies and the Selective Service System, and the relation of the 
Liaison Officers in the picture. Until this is cleared up you cannot expect the 
responsible officers to come to you with their problems and work with you as 
they should. You must make it plain that you are not there to supplant or com- 
pete with their facilities, but are there to help them and represent their interests; 
not to do their work but to see that they receive the service they may properly 
expect from the respective agencies. Yon are not working unsupported. You 
are backed by definite authority as specified in the directive of August 28, 1941, 
and the corollary directives of the various Services, but the adequacy of your 
job of salesmanship will determine whether you are used by your customers as 
you should be. No one else can do that job but you. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 

(F) Instructions for Bi-Weekly Reports 

Memorandum for All Liaison Officers, S. O. S. 

Subject: Bi-Weekly Reports of Liaison Officers to Manpower Branch. 

1. The following instructions wiU cover the submission of reports from the 
Liaison Officers. 

a. Repoits will be submitted on the 1st and 16th of each month beginning 

August 1, 1942. 
h. Three copies of the reports should be submitted to this office. 

c. Repoits will be made on a regional basis and submitted through the Re- 

gional Liaison Officers who will receive and combine reports from the 
Liaison Officers within their region. Where any Liaison Officer feels 
that immediate consideration is needed for any item of a particular 
report, a copy may be sent directly to the Manpower Branch with a 
covering letter. 

d. The content and the form of this report may change with the development 

of the program of the Manpower Branch. In its present form, the 
report will be a general appraisal and analysis of the over-all develop- 
ments in the areas; and specific analyses of significant instances of par- 
ticular plants, projects, or labor shortages. The first report should be 
as complete and detailed as practicable on all of the listed topics which 
are pertinent to the area. Later reports will be based on the material 
submitted in the first report plus new developments. 

2. For orderly handling in the Headquarters office, Liaison Officers are re- 
quested to follow the attached form, entering numbers and subdivisions whether 
or not reports are to be made on each of the designated topics. 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch, 
Civilian Personnel Division. 



13280 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

War Department 

headquarters, services of supply 

Washington, D. C. 

Period Covered to 

Bi- Weekly Report, , Liaison Officer, Region 

1. Reciuitment and Employment of Workers: 

a. Areas of labor shortage or surplus. (Outhne briefly the situation, 

mentioning principal industries and communities aiid the appartnt 
extent of th( shortage or surplus.) 

b. Labor shortage factors: 

(1) Piracy. (Discuss extent of piracy and measures already 

taken and those proposed for local or headquarters action.) 

(2) Minority Problems. (Discuss lack or compliance with na- 

tional policy on use of negroes, ahens, prison labor, aged 
workers, handicapped persons and all minority groups.) 

(3) Employment of Women. (Discuss employers plans and 

labor's attitude, any significant instances of use or lack 
of use of women in industry and recommendations con- 
cerning methods for increasing the use of women.) 

(4) Migration of Workers. (Discuss in-migration or out- 

migration of workers and effect on local labor market 
with action taken or recommended.) 

(5) Agency Cooperation. (For the shortage areas, discuss com- 

pletion of coordination of employment recruiting piogram 
with United States Employment Service and other agen- 
cies. Discuss extent and effectiveness of recruitment 
programs by the United States Employment Service.) 

2. Training Programs and Industrial Workers: 

a. Pre-employment and supplemental tiaining. (Discuss effectiveness 

of training programs; extent of utilization of training stations; 

extent of acceptance by employers of trainees; and recommended 

action.) 
h. Tiaining Within Industry. (Discuss effectiveness of TWI Program 

in fully utihzing present employed workers.) 

3. Housing. (For shortage areas discuss housing problems where directly re- 
lated to adequacy of labor supply, mentioning utilization of public transit systems, 
pools, and sponsorship of transportation programs.) 

Indicate definitely the I'elationship between lack of adequate transportation 
facilities and labor shortages. 

4. Transportation (Discuss transportation where it directly affects labor supply 
in shortage areas. Outline plans and programs on construction of houses and 
dormitories for war workers. Indicate facilities which may be available through 
supply services, such as new barracks.) 

5. Location of War Contracts (Outline briefly the situation in any communi- 
ties in which it appears desirable for war contracts to be placed because of available 
labor or from which war contracts should be shifted because of critical shortages 
of labor.) 

6. Civilian Production (Discuss labor shortage areas in which certain types of 
civilian industries and occupations might be curtailed in order to provide addi- 
tional manpower for the vital war industries.) 

7. Military Requirements in Relation to Labor Supply: 

a. Report policies, procedures and actions which tend to upset the 
maintenance of a practical balance between the fulfillment of 
manpower requirements for the armed forces and for war pro- 
duction. 

h. Report significant instances in which the present procedure for 
protecting necessary men in industry has not prevented the 
withdrawal from war production of necessary employees by 
induction through: 

(1) Enlistment 

(2) Commissioning 

(3) Selective Service 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13281 

c. Report all instances in which it is believed that tlie procedure of 
releasing soldiers classified as key employees in industry to the 
enlisted reserve is being improperly used by employees or is 
otherwise unsatisfactory. 



(G) Procedures Covering Use of Declaration of Citizenship Form 

July 25, 1942. 
Subject: Use of "Declaration of Citizenship" Form. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Enclosed for information and use by the Liaison Officers are procedures 
covering the "Declaration of Citizenship" form: 

a. Copy of letter of June 11, 1942, to Chiefs of Supply Services, from Mr, 

Mitchell, regarding distribution of forms from the Manpower Branch 
to the Chiefs of the Supply Services and through them to the field per- 
sonnel, contractors and subcontractors. 

b. Copy of letter of July 9, 1942, from Colonel Dalton to the Chiefs of the 

Supply Services regarding erroneous newspaper publicity and setting 
forth the correct method of distribution of the forms. 

c. The memorandum of June 4, 1942, addressed to all present and prospective 

Army and Navy contractors and subcontractors on "Requirements for 
Proof by Employees of their American Citizenship" with attached 
copies of Statutes Restricting Employment of Aliens; and the "Declara- 
tion of Citizenship" Form. 

2. The Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in connection with 
this procedure, except to interpret and assist in its fulfillment by the procurement 
offices and contractors. In interpreting the procedure the following facts should 
be noted: 

a. Forms are distributed only through district procurement offices direct to 

contractors and subcontractors on their lists and having war contracts. 
They will not be distributed or filled out by the United States Employ- 
ment Service, War Manpower Commission or other agencies. District 
procurement offices will not duplicate the form but will request it from 
the Chief of the appropriate Supply Services, who will secure forms 
through Headquarters, Manpower Branch. 

b. Forms may be used only at the place of employment and only at the time 

application for woi-k is made. 

c. Forms must be signed in the presence of an Army or Navy District 

Procurement, Factor}- or Plant Protection representative and cannot 
be signed in groups in advance of actual application for work. 

d. Forms are recommended only. Their acceptance is not required by the 

employer, and does not relieve the employer from the duty of making 
further investigation whenever there is reason to doubt the truth of 
the declaration. 
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, July 9, 1942, 
Memorandum for: The Chief of Ordnance, 

The Quartermaster General, 
The Chief Signal Officer, 
The Chief of Engineers, 
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, 
The Surgeon General. 
Subject: Distribution of "Declaration of Citizenship" Form. 

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated June 11, 1942, (SPGC-M 014.33), 
regarding distribution of a "Declaration of Citizenship" form which has been 
recommended for use by industry in facilitating employment of those of American 



13282 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

birth who are unable to produce birth certificates in situations where the submis- 
sion of a birth certificate is a condition of employment. 

2. Reference is made also to the unfortunate newspaper publicity which ap- 
peared on Monday, July 6, 1942, which gives the erroneous impression that this 
form had been evolved by the War Manpower Commission, and would be made 
available to the public through the offices of the United States Employment 
Service. 

3. For purposes of clarity, you are directed to inform your field force that only 
one method of distribution will be followed; namely, forms will be made available 
to you for distribution through your procurement offices only to Army contractors 
and subcontractors on their lists. The applicant can receive the form only when 
applying for work at the place he is to be employed, and such form is to be filled 
out at the place of employment. 

By Command of Lieutenant General Somervell: 

Joe N. Dalton, 
Colonel, General Staff Corps, 
Chief of Administrative Branch, 



War Department, 
Washington, June 4, 194^. 

Memorandum for all Present and Prospective Army and Navy Contrac- 
tors AND Subcontractors. 
Subject: Requirements for Proof of Employees of Their American Citizenship. 

In a inemorandiuii dated July 16, 1941 addressed to all Army and Navy con- 
tractors and subcontractors, subject: "Requirements for Proof by Employees of 
their American Birth", reference was made to the provisions of certain statutes 
restrictijig the emplovment of aliens in connection with the performance of speci- 
fied contracts (sec. 10, act of July 2, 1926, 44 Stat. 734; 10 U. S. C. 310; sec. 11, 
act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 676; 50 U. S. C, App. 1), and a procedure was recom- 
mended for facilitating such employment of persons who are unable to produce 
birth certificates. That memorandum was concerned primarily with establishing 
proof of birth in the United States in cases of prospective employees who are 
imable, for one reason or another, to produce birth certificates. It has been the 
experience of recent months that the securing of the delayed certificate of birth 
Mentioned in that memorandum has, in some instances, been attended by con- 
.siderable delay during which the services of the individual were not available in 
■connection with the contracts in question. For this reason, it is deemed advisable 
to rpcommend a revised procedure designed to fulfill the indicated requirements 
of the statutes in question. 

Accordingly, the previous memorandum is suspended and in l-ieu of the pro- 
cedure set forth therein it is recommended that contractors and subcontractors 
a-equire applicants for employment in the performance of any secret, confidential 
•or restricted contract, or any contract for furnishing aircraft, aircraft parts, 
or aeronautical accessories, to sign a statement in the presence of an Army or 
Navy District Procurement, Factory or Plant Protection representative, to the 
•effect that he is a citizen of the United States and that he has read and under- 
stands the pertinent provision of the act. of June 28, 1940 (Public Law 671, 76th 
'Cong.), as indicated by the inclosed form entitled "Declaration of Citizenship". 
The foregoing recommended procedure does not relieve the employer from the 
duty of making further investigation when there is any reason to doubt the truth 
of applicant's declaration that he is a citizen. 

Quotations from the pertinent statutes and a suggested form of declaration 
of citizenship are attached hereto. 
In els. 

Robert P. Patterson, 

Under Secretary of War. 

FORRESTAL, 

Under Secretary of the Navy. 

Statutes Restricting Employment of Aliens in Connection with 
Performance of Certain Contracts 

"Sec. 10 (j) * * * no aliens employed by a contractor for furnishing or 
■constructing aircraft, or aircraft parts, or aeronautical accessories for the United 
States shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications or the work 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13283 

under construction or to participate in the contract trials without the written 
consent beforeliand of the secretary of the department concerned." (Act of 
July 2, 1926, 44 Stat. 787; 10 U. S. C. 310 (j).) 

"Sec. 10 (p) * * * and any person, firm, or corporation that shall, uponr 
indictment and trial, be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this 
section shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding $20,000, or to be im- 
prisoned not exceeding five vears, or both, at the discretion of the court." (Act 
of July 2, 1926, 44 Stat. 788; 10 U. S. C. 310 (p).) 

"Sec. 11 (a) No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, 
confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access 
to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate 
in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government 
department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who willfully 
violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this 
subsection shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both." (Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 676; 50 U. S. C., App. 1.) 

"Sec. 11 (b) Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or. 
restricted Government contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status,, 
or who makes such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment,, 
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five j'^ears, or- 
both." (Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 676; 50 U. S. C , App. 1.) 

Declaration of Citizenship 

I, declare that 

I am a citizen of the United States, by reason of 

I am applying for employment on classified Government war contracts on work 
which may be secret, confidential, or restricted in character. I am declaring my 
citizenship for the purpose of securing such employment. I have read the law 
herein quoted and am aware of the penalties imposed for misrepresentation. 

(Public Law 671, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, Chapter 440, Section lib) 
"Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Gov- 
ernment contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes 
such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 

I was born in date 

Witness ^ 



Signed 
(Title and Address) 
(Name) 
(Title and Address) ~ ~ 



(H) Procedure Covering Manpower Commission on Labor Piracy 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 26, 194^~ 
Subject: Manpower Commission Policy on Labor Piracy. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Attached is the policy statement of the War Manpower Commission, issued 
July 16, 1942, on "Pirating of War Workers"; and the procedure for cooperative 
plans under this policy. These bulletins are to be considered in connection with 
the Labor Piracy Bulletin (LS-5) issued by the Manpower Branch on June 20. 
1942. 



■ If natural born, indicate whether by birth in the United States or by birth in a foreign country of Ameri- 
can parentage. 

If by naturalization, indicate whether by naturalization by court proceedings, by naturalization of parent 
or by marriage to a citizen of the United States, including dates and names of places, persons and title of court 
involved. 

' One of the two witnesses must be an Army or N^'avy District Procurement, Factory or Plant Protection 
representative. 



13284 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

2. It should be noted that the War Manpower Commission's procedure is not 
to be applied on a Nation-wide basis, but to specific areas according to need. No 
."Specific procedures are issued by the Commission, but it is provided: (a) that the 
appropriate regional representative of the War Manpower Commission shall con- 
fer with representatives of labor, employers and governmental agencies concerned 
for the purpose of securing a cooperative agreement to avoid piracy or other dis- 
ruptive employment practices; or (b) if a cooperative plan is not satisfactorily 
completed, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission may give notice that 
the area constitutes a critical labor area and make provision for restrictions on 
employers' hiring practices in that area. 

3. Liaison Officers continue to have the responsibilities outlined in the Man- 
power Branch bulletin on labor piracy, and the additional responsibility of co- 
operating with the War Manpower Commission representatives in accordance 
-with the above policy and procedure. Although it is the responsibility of the War 
Manpower Commission to initiate all actions under its policy, the Liaison Office 
should be alert to pirating practices, particularly where they affect War Depart- 
ment production; should take initial action to prevent piracy; and should take 
necessar}' steps to bring any employment situations involving piracy to the atten- 
tion of the Manpower Commission authorities. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



Manual of Operations, War Manpower Commission 

Date: July 16, 1942 Title: III 

Section: 2-1 
Designation: Policy. 
Subject: Pirating of War Workers. 

policy to prevent pirating of war workers 

In our rapidly expanding war industries, thousands of skilled workers are re- 
quired. In certain occupations- there are not enough skilled workers to meet the 
immediate and future requirements of war industires. This shortage of skilled 
workers has created needless labor turn-over and uncontrolled migration of 
skilled labor. Such turn-over and migration results in wasteful and ineffective 
utilization of skilled workers, which is likely to impede the war production pro- 
gram to an increasing extent in those areas in which war production is concentrated. 
Having so found, after consultation with the members of the War Manpower 
Commission, and having further found, after such consultation, that the measures 
herein provided are necessary to promote the effective mobilization and maximum 
utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war, by virtue of 
the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission by 
Executive Order No. 9139, establishing the War Manpower Commission, I 
hereby declare the following War Manpower Commission policy: 

I. if the maximum utilization of the manpower in a designated area has been 
or is likely to be impeded because of (a) the concentration of essential war pro- 
duction in any such area, (b) the shortage of workers for designated occupations 
therein, (c) an excessive rate of turn-over among such workers, or (d) the migra- 
tion of such workers to other areas, the appropriate regional representative of the 
War Manpower Commission shall confer with the representatives of management 
and labor in such area and with such regional or local representatives of the War 
Production Board, the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United 
States Maritime Commission, the United States Employment Service, the United 
States Civil Service Commission and such other agencies or departments as may 
be affected, with a view to securing the concurrence of all affected parties in a 
cooperative plan for the effective recruitment and utilization of workers in such 
area and for the effective elimination of practices which result in the withdrawal 
of workers from employers engaged in essential activities in such area. Upon the 
approval of such a cooperative plan by all affected parties, or upon the failure of 
such affected parties to concur in such a cooperative plan with reasonable prompt- 
ness, the appropriate regional representative of the War Manpower Commission 
shall submit a full report thereof to the Chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13285 

II. Upon approving a cooperative plan which effectuates the purpose set 
forth in this poUcy and which has been concurred in with respect to any designated 
area, or upon approving a report that such a plan is needed and has been sought, 
but has not been concurred in by all affected parties with reasonable promptness, 
the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission will give notice that such area 
constitutes a critical labor area, and that with respect to such area, specified 
occupations and activities constitute, respectively, critical occupations and 
essential war production activities. 

III. After the publication of such a notice with respect to a given area it is 
essentia] that no employer: 

(a) Solicit (for the purpose of hiring) or hire, within or without such critical 
labor area, for work to be performed wholly or principally within such area, or 

(b) Solicit (for the purpose of hiring) or hire, within such critical labor area, 
for work to be performed wholly or principally without such area, any worker 
who on or after the effective date of this policy was employed at any place in an 
occupation, designated as a critical occupation and an activity designated as an 
essential war production activity, except (1) through a public employment office 
of the United States Employment Service, or (2) in accordance with standards, 
methods or conditions approved by the Chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission or his authorized representative, or (3) in accordance with the cooperative 
plan for such area which may include clause (1) or clause (2) hereof or both such 
clauses. As used in this policy, the phrase "solicit (for the purpose of hiring)" 
means any activity, including any written or oral communication or publication, 
designated or intended to induce any individual to accept employment in a given 
plant, factory, or other establishment. 

IV. Any worker or employer, or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied 
with any act or failure to act pursuant to this policj' shall be given a fair oppor- 
tunity to present his or their case to an Industrial Area Management-Labor 
Committee. Such Committee shall make recommendations concerning such 
cases as well as other matters pertinent to the carrying out of this policy in its 
area, to the War Manpower Area director for appropriate action. The Chairman 
of the War Manpower Commission shall prescribe rules, regulations and pro- 
cedures for the carrying out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this 
policy, including procedures for the review of the recommendations of the Area 
Committees, by Regional Management-Labor Committees and by the National 
Management-Labor Policy Conmiittee. 

V. AH lawful and appropriate steps will be taken to utilize the services, facili- 
ties and authorities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
to the fullest extent to achieve or promote compliance with the provisions of this 
policy. 

Approved : 

Paul V. McNutt, Chairman. 
Effective date: July 16, 1942. 
Original filed in oflfice of Executive Director, 



August 1, 1942, 

Procedure for Development, Approval, and Operation of Cooperative 
Plans Under War Manpower Policy to Prevent Pirating op War 
Workers 

I. initiation of action and submission of report 

No action shall be taken under the War Manpower Policy to Prevent Pirating 
of War Workers (hereinafter referred to as the "Policy") except upon the au- 
thorization and direction of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Com- 
mission. The Regional Director shall designate a particular area and shall au- 
thorize and direct the appropriate regional representative of the War Manpower 
Commission to initiate and attempt to secure agreement upon a cooperative plan 
in the designated area as provided in Paragraph I of the Policy. As early as 
practicable thereafter, the Regional Director shall submit a full report tb the 
Director of Operations for submission to the Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission. 



13286 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

II. CONTENT OF REPORT 

The report of the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission shall 
include the following: 

1. The participants in the negotiations: 

(a) Government representatives: These must include in all cases, 

representatives of the War Manpower Commission and of the 
United States Employment Service. Representatives of the 
War Production Board, United States Army, United States Navy, 
United States Maritime Commission, and the United States Civil 
Service Commission, if affected by the plan or policy must also 
be included, as well as representatives of any other Federal agencv 
or department so affected. 

(b) Management representatives: The report must clearly indicate, by 

description of the method of selection and otherwise, that the 
management representatives were truly representative of manage- 
ment affected by the plan or policy in the designated area. 

(c) Labor representatives: The report must clearly indicate, by de- 

scription of the method of selection and otherwise, that the labor 
representatives were truly representative of labor affected by the 
plan or policy in the designated area. 

2. The nature of the problem which the cooperative plan is designed to meet: 

(a) Necessity for plan : The report must indicate the reason why maxi- 

mum utilization of manpower in the designated area has been or 
is likely to be impeded, whether because of the concentration of 
essential war production in any such area, the shortage of workers 
for the designated occupations therein, an excessive rate of turn- 
over among such workers, or the migration of such workers to 
other areas, or any combination of these. 

(b) Critical labor area: The report must describe with precision the 

area proposed to be designated as the "critical labor area" for the 
purposes of the plan and the policy. 

(c) Essential war production activities: The report must indicate the 

war production activities, including the names of principal plants 
and their products, proposed to be designated as "essential war 
production activities" for the purposes of the plan and the policy, 
and should indicate the names of principal plants in the area not 
proposed to be so designated. 

(d) Critical occupations : The report must indicate the occupations pro- 

posed to be designated as "critical occupations" for the purposes 
of the plan and the policy, and insofar as possible the unions with 
which workers in such occupations are affiliated. 

(e) Hiring methods: The report must indicate the standalrds, methods 

or conditions of hiring and solicitation for the purpose of hiring, 
which are to be applicable under the plan. 

3. Agreement or disagreement: The report must indicate whether all affected 
parties concur in the plan and, if not, the individuals, organizations or agencies 
which were in disagreement, or which did not with reasonable promptness indi- 
cate concurrence in the plan, including reasons for any disagreement or failure 
to concur. 

4. A true copy of the cooperative plan, if any concurred in by representatives 
of all affected parties, shall accompany the report. 

III. PROVISIONS REQUIRED IN ANY APPROVABLE COOPERATIVE PLAN 

1. The plan must clearly specify the area in which it will be applicable. 

2. The plan must provide that after the effective date of the plan no employer 
shall solicit (for the purpose of hiring) or hire, within or without the area for work 
to be performed wholly or principally within the area, or solicit (for the purpose 
of hiring) or hire, within the area for work to be performed outside the area, any 
worker who after the effective date of the plan was employed in a critical occupa- 
tion in an essential war production activity, except through a public employment 
office or in accordance with methods approved by the Chairman of the War Man- 
power Commission or his authorized representative. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13287 

3. The plan must provide for the participation of the industrial area manage- 
ment-labor committee in accordance with such rules, regulations, and procedures 
as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall prescribe. 

4. The plan must embody the principles governing movement of workers be- 
tween plants as outlined in section V below. 

5. The plan must provide that it shall become effective on and after the date of 
publication of the notice given bj^ the Chairman of the War Manpower Commis- 
sion pursuant to paragraph II of the Polic}'. 

6. Employers, labor organizations, and Government agencies concurring in 
the plan shall agree to adhere to its provisions. 

IV. PROVISIONS PROHIBITED IN ANY APPROVABLE COOPERATIVE PLAN 

1. No plan shall establish a procedure whereby certain individuals, predesig- 
nated by name or other identification, will be denied employment. 

2. The plan shall not contain any provision which would violate any Federal 
law, or any rule, regulation, order or requirement thereunder affecting labor 
relations, wages, hours, or conditions of employment. Nor shall the plan contain 
any provision which might conflict with a determination of the National War 
Labor Board or a stabilization agreement approved by the War Production 
Board. 

3. No plan shall contain a provision which violates a bona fide collective 
agreement. 

4. No plan shall be construed to prohibit the employment by any employer of a 
worker who after the effective date of the plan has been employed at wages or 
under working conditions substantially less favorable than those prevailing in 
the community for the kind of work on which he was employed, even though he 
may have been engaged at a critical occupation and in an essential war production 
activity. 

v. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING APPROVED MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 

1. A worker who is employed in an activity other than an essential war pro- 
duction activity may, without restriction, (except as provided in paragraph 3 
below) be hired by an employer for work in an essential war production activity. 
If such worker applies to the United States Employment Service, he shall be 
referred in accordance with the procedures for preferential referrals. (War 
Manpower Commission Directive No. Ill) ; 

2. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 5. below, a worker who is em- 
ployed in an essential war production activity shall hot be hired by an employer 
for work in an activity other than an essential war production activity. If such 
a worker applies to the United States Employment Service, the employment office 
will attempt to persuade him to return to his previous employer or to accept 
another position in accordance with the procedures for preferential referrals, 
whichever appears more likely to serve the war effort; 

3. All employments by departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
which are subject to the rules and regulations of the United States Civil Service 
Commission, shall be made only with the approval of the United States Civil 
Service Commission, which will conduct its recruiting activities and make re- 
ferrals in accordance with the Principles Governing Approved Movement of 
Workers ; 

4. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 5 below, a worker who after the 
effective date of the plan was employed in an essential war production activity 
shall be employed by another employer engaged in an essential war production 
activity only upon presentation of a written statement by the former employer to 
the effect that the worker is available for employment elsewhere in an essential 
war production activity. The statement shall preferably be given to the United 
States Employment Service (or the United States Civil Service Commission in 
cases involving employment in the Federal Civil Service) which shall attempt to 
place the worker according to the procedure governing preferential referrals; but 
if the plan so provides, the statement may be given directly to the worker who 
may present it to the prospective employer provided it is ascertained that the 
latter is engaged in an essential war production activity; 

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 4 above, a worker who, 
after the effective date of the plan, has been engaged m an essential war production 
activity, m9,y upon p.pplic.tion to, and referral by the United States Employment 
Service, be employed by another employer whether or not for work in an essential 

60396— 42— pt. 34 16 



13288 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

war production activity and with or without a statement of availability, if the 
circumstances are such as to indicate that the change of employment is in the best 
interests of the war effort as well as the individual concerned. The following 
circumstances are illustrative of what may be considered good ground for changes 
of employment: 

(a) When the worker is competent to perform higher skilled work than his 

current employer is able or willing to provide; 

(b) When the worker is employed for a substantial period at less than full 

time; 

(c) When the distance between the worker's residence and the place of 

employment is unreasonably great (consideiing the restrictions on the 
use of gasoline and tires and the load on transportation facilities) and 
the place of prospective employment is substantially closer or more 
accessible; 

(d) When the worker has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change, 

VI. NOTICE OF CHAIRMAN OF WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION MAKING PLAN AND POLICY 

OPERATIVE 

Upon submittal of the report and copy of the cooperative plan, if any concurred 
in by all affects d parties, to the Chairman of the Wai Manpower Commission by 
the Director of Operations, the Chairman, if he approves the same, shall give and 
publish appropriate notice specifying the area which constitutes the critical labor 
area, the occupations which constitute critical occupations, and the activities 
which constitute essential war production activities. Upon publication of such 
notice, Paragraphs III, IV, and V of the policy, and the piovisions of any approved 
cooperative plan shall become immediately operative. 

VII. PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF CONTROVERSY AS TO OPERATION UNDER PLAN 

1. Cases of non-adherence or of aisputed interpretation may be raised by the 
employer threatened with the loss of a worker, by the employer proposing to hire 
a worker, by the worker, by any affected labor union or other labor organization 
or by an affected Government department or agency; 

2. Cases of nonadherence or disputed interpretation shall be referred to the 
area War Manpower Commission representative (or if there be none, to the mana- 
ger of the local employment office designated for that puipose), except in cases 
involving only Federal Government employment which shall be referred to the 
district manager of the United States Civil Service Commission designated for 
the purpose. The area War Manpower Commission representative or the district 
manager of the United States Civil Service Commission, as the case may be, shall 
make a decision thereon and shall attempt to secure agreement in the decision 
by all parties concerned; 

3. If any party concerned is dissatisfied with the decision of the area represen- 
tative, he may request review of the same by the Industrial Area Management- 
Labor Committee which shall, in accordance with rules, regulations, and pro- 
cedures prescribed by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, make 
appropriate recommendations to the area War Manpower Commission repre- 
sentative and intitiate such review of its recommendations as may be proper 
under applicable procedures. 

Frank J. McSherry, 
(Brigadier General, U. S. A.), 

Director of Operations, 
War Manpower Commission. 



(I) Minority Groups Service 

War Department, 
Civilian Personnel Division, 

Manpower Branch, 
Washington, D. C, July 25, 1942. 
Subject: Minority Groups Service in War Manpower Commission Areas. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

I. Attached is a list of Minority Groups Repr-esentatives of the War Manpower 
Commission, with designations of the regions and areas served. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 



13289 



2. Representatives of the Minority Groups Services will work out of Regional 
War Manpower Commission offices through the various agencies represented 
on the War Manpower Commission. Dr. Robert C. Weaver, Chief, Minority 
Groups Services, War Manpower Commission, has instructed these representa- 
tives to contact the Liaison Officers on problems involving the use of Negroes in 
war work. 

3. Liaison Officers are directed to contact these representatives at their earliest 
convenience and to consult with them on labor supply matters within the field 
of Minority Groups Service. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch 



WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION, MINORITY GROUPS SERVICE 



Eepeesentatives 



Area Covered: Maine, New Hamp- 
shire, Vermont, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts. 

REGION 2 

Area Covered: New York 

REGION 3 

Area Covered: Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, New Jersey. 



Area Covered: Maryland, Virginia, 
West Virginia, North Carolina, 
District of Columbia. 



Area Covered: Michigan, Ohio, 
Kentucky. 



Area Covered: 
Wisconsin. 



Area Covered: South Carolina, 
Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi. 



Area Covered: Minnesota, Iowa, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Nebraska. 



Area Covered: Missouri, Arkansas, 
Kansas, Oklahoma. 



Area Covered: Louisiana, Texas, 
New Mexico. 



Irea Covered: Arizona, Utah, 
Colorado, Wyoming. 



Area Covered: Washington, Ore- 
gon, Nevada, California, 



Mr. Neilson Abeel, Room 723, Chanin Building, 
122 East 42nd Street, New York City, New 
York Tel. Murray Hill 3-6805 Ex. 32. 



Mr. Neilson Abeel. 



Mr. E. Howard Molisani, U. S. Employment 
Service, Juniper -fe Chestnut Streets, Phila- 
delphia, Pennsylvania. 



Mr. Thomas Howard Wright, Room 1428 Civic 
Opera Building, 20 North Wacker Drive, 
Chicago, Illinois. 



Miss Sara Southall (Consultant), 180 North 
Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. 



Lt. Col. Kendall Weisigei, Southern Bell Tele- 
phone Co., Atlanta, Georgia. 



Mr. Thomas Howard Wright . 



Mr. Thomas Howard Wright. 



Mr. Glenn 0. McGuire, Box 768, Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. Tel., Albuquerque 6695. 



Mr. Barron B. Beshoar, 626 Patterson Building. 
Denver, Colorado. 



Mr. Guy T. Nunn, Room 460, Roosevelt Build- 
ing, 727 West 7th Street, Los Angeles, 
California. 



Philadelphia. 



Washington, 
D. C. 



Birmingham. 



Minneapolis. 



Kansas City. 



San Antonio. 



San Fbancihco. 



13290 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(J) Army-Navy Labor Policy 

.War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, July 25, 1942. 
Subject: Statement of Army-Navy Department Labor Policy, Government- 
Owned, Privately Operated Plants. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Attached is a copy of the statement of labor polic}' governing Government- 
owned, privately operated plants, which was recently adopted by the War and 
Navy Departments and approved by the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
and the American Federation of Labor. Attached is alistot Government-owned, 
privately operated plants, showing the location, the name of the operator and the 
name of the commanding officer. i 

2. This policy statement was forwarded on July 17, by the Director of the Civi- 
lian Personnel Division to the Commanding General, INIateriel Command, Army 
Air Forces ; the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, and the Chief of Ordnance, with 
instructions to transmit copies to the commanding officers at all Government- 
owned, privately operated establishments with copies for the contractor-operators 
at each plant. Each contractor-operator has been advised that no action may be 
taken or agreement entered into which is inconsistent with anj^ of the provisions in 
the statement of policy. The Congress of Industrial Organizations and the 
American Federation of Labor have been requested to furnish copies of this state- 
ment to their affiliated unions with similar instructions. 

3. The Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in this policy except in 
its interpretation and fulfillment by the Supply Services. The policy will be 
further implemented by specific directives if necessary. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



June 22, 1942. 

Statement of Labor Policy Governing Government-Owned, Privately 
Operated Plants 

Congress has charged the War and Navy Department with the responsibility 
for the operation of nearly 100 giant Government-owned munitions plants, the 
backbone of the Nation's armament program. Under the terms of the Congres- 
sional Mandate, the War and Navy Departments had the option of themselves 
operating the plants or operating them through the agency of selected qualified 
commercial contractors. In order fully to utilize the labor and management 
resources of the Nation and to minimize encroachment upon the country's indus- 
trial structure, the two Departments chose the latter course. The industrial 
units thus created are unique. 

All are owned outright by the United States, and all but a very few are located 
upon military reservations. All are engaged solely in war production — the 
manufacture and loading of explosives and ammunition, the assembly of bombers 
and the fabrication of guns and other munitions. In all of the plants the work 
performed is of a secret or confidential nature, and in many of them it is highly 
iiazardous. All are operated by private contractors under "Management 
Service" contracts, any of which may at any time be terminated by the Govern- 
ment if it should decide either to operate the plant itself or to entrust its operation 
to another contractor. The normal factors which go to make up commercial 
profit are lacking. The Government has title to the product at all times. It 
pays the contractor a fixed fee for its services, which fee is unaffected by wages or 
other costs, production delays or stoppages. The Government reimburses the 
contractor for all costs, including wages, and in most instances must approve such 
costs, including wage scales, in advance. The Army or Navy officer in charge may 
direct the discharge of any employee if he deems it to be in the public interest. 
These plants embody a new and unique tripartite relationship among Government, 
labor, and management. They are sufficiently different from traditional Govern- 
ment establishments so that existing Government policies regulating labor rela- 
tions are not entirely suitable. 

' This list no longer ava'lable. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13291 

Recognizing these facts, and desiring to preserve the greatest freedom of 
organization and collective bargaining by the employees which is compatible with 
the necessarj^ discharge by the War and Navy Departments of their responsibility 
for maximum production and the safe and efficient operation of these plants, the 
War Department and the Navy Department have established the following labor 
policies to which the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations have agreed after assisting in their preparation. It is recognized 
that these policies do not cover all aspects of labor relations in these plants, and 
experience may indicate the desirability of modifying, adding to, or otherwise 
amending this statement of policy. 

1. No employee or person seeking employment shall be discriminated against 
by reason of race, color, creed, or sex. 

2. The recognition of an exclusive bargaining agent for the employees in any 
appropriate bargaining unit within any plant will be deferred until a majority of 
the estimated total of that unit has been hired, unless special circumstances shall 
justify an earlier designation of such exclusive bargaining agent. The War and 
Navy Departments will undertake to estimate with reasonable promptness the 
total employee complement of the appropriate unit. 

3. While no recognition shall be accorded any organization as the exclusive 
representative of any group of employees until the proper collective bargaining 
agency shall have been determined under the conditions described above, pro- 
vision will be made for the handling of grievances and other disputes, and the 
elimination of friction between empioj^ees and management during the period 
pending such determination. These procedures should be approved by the 
representative of the Army or Navy in charge of operations at the plant. 

4. Seniority shall be a determining factor in matters affecting lay-off and re- 
employment, transfers, demotions and promotions only if other factors of ability 
and aptitude are equal. 

5. (a) Discharges directed by the War or the Navy Department for suspicion 
of subversive activities will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the 
"Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects 
of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement," dated January 10, 1942. 

(b) Discharges directed by the Army or Navy Officer in charge in the interest 
of plant security will be handled in the following manner: (1) the Officer, or his 
representative will direct the contractor to suspend the employee in question 
immediateh^; (2) the employee will be advised in detail of the specific reasons for 
his suspension and of his right to a hearing; (3) if requested, a hearing will be held 
by the Offi.cer, or his representative, within a reasonable period and at such' hearing 
the suspended employee will have an opportunity to produce witnesses and 
present evidence and to be assisted by counsel; (4) based on such hearing, the 
Officer, or his representative, will direct the reinstatement (with authority to 
grant back pay) or the discharge of such employee; (5) an employee so discharged 
will have the right, upon request, to have his case reviewed by the War or Navy 
Department. 

(c) Discharges effected by the contractor or his representatives for violation of 
plant rules, inefficiency, or other reasons will be subject to review through the 
established grievance procedure. 

6. No agreement between the management and its employees, or their repre- 
sentatives, except those which affect the safety and health of employees, may be 
entered into, or action taken, which, in the opinion of either the Secretary of War 
or the Secretary of the Navy, will have the effect of restricting or hampering 
maximum output. 

7. (a) Anti-sabotage, anti-espionage and plant protective measures, including 
access into the plant, approved or prescribed by the War and Navy Department, 
or their representatives, shall be binding upon management, employees, and their 
representatives. 

(b) Measures designed to guard against sabotage, espionage, subversive ac- 
tivities and other plant protective measures which are ordered or approved by the 
Army or Navy representatives shall insofar as practicable be prominently posted 
throughout the plant and otherwise made available to employees. Violations of 
any of these rules or regulations shall be grounds for disciplinary action, including 
immediate dismissal. 

8. (a) The War and Navy Departments in most instances, have contractual 
responsibility for the approval of all costs including pay roll costs. These Depart- 
ments therefore will from time to time jointly agree upon the policies to govern 
the exercise of these contractual responsibilities to approve or disapprove proposed 
wage scales at these plants. 



13292 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(b) Before operations commence at any plant, the contractor will prepare a 
wage scale to apply upon the commencement of operations and submit the same for 
approval to the War or Navy Department through the local Army or Navy 
representative at the plant, who will forward these with their own comments 
regarding the appropriateness of the proposed scale. Any subsequent adjust- 
ments in the initial wage scale at any plant shall be worked out by the contractor 
and the employees through established procedures, provided only that the ap- 
proval of the War or Navy Department must be obtained before such adjustments 
may become effective. 

9. This statement of policy shall be applicable to all such plants except that 
where any provision of the statement conflicts with a provision in an existing 
contract, such contract will be not altered except by mutual consent. 



(K) Procedxjre for Handling Reports of Discrimination 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 17, 1942. 
Subject: Suggested Procedure for Handling Reports of Discrimination Contrary 

to Executive Order No. 8802. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from the Under Secretary of War to the Chair- 
man of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, now a part of 
the War Manpower Commission. This letter should be considered in connection 
with the policy statement and the list of Government-owned, privately operated 
plants covered by bulletin LS-7. 

2. The procedure has been accepted by the commit'tee and its field personnel 
has been advised. 

3. Liaison Officers will assume appropriate responsibility in the fulfillment of 
this policy. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 

Honorable Malcolm S. MacLean, 

Chairman, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 
Social Security Building, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Dr. MacLean: I am attaching hereto for your information and assist- 
ance a list of Government-owned, privately operated plants under the supervision 
of the War Department. As I shall indicate more fully below, these plants are 
unique and deserve special treatment and consideration. 

The plants, taken in the aggregate, constitute the backbone of the Nation's 
armament program. Under the terms of the Congressional Mandate by which 
their construction and operation was authorized, the War Department was given 
the option of operating the plants itself or of operating them through the agency 
of selected, qualified commercial contractors. The War Department chose the 
latter course and in doing so created industrial units of a novel and peculiar 
character. Among their most significant features are the following: 

(1) Each plant, and the property on which it is situated, is wholly owned 
by the Government, and, with very few exceptions, has been designated as 
a military reservation. 

(2) Each plant is, or when completed will be, wholly devoted to war pro- 
duction — the manufacture and loading of explosives and ammunition, the 
assembly of bombers, and the fabrication of guns and other munitions. 
Most, if not all, will cease to operate when the war is concluded. 

(3) In all of the plants the work performed is of a secret or confidential 
nature, and in most of them it is highly hazardous. 

(4) Most of the workers recruited for work in many of these plants will of 
necessity be completely without experience in performing work of the hazard- 
ous character required. 

(5) All are operated by private contractors under "management service" 
contracts, which can legally be terminated at any time if the Government 
should decide either to operate the plant itself or to entrust its operation to 
another contractor. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13293 

(6) The entire cost of operating each plant is borne by the Governinent. 
Under the contract with practically every operator, the latter is entitled 
to reimbursement for all expenses of operation, but only where prior approval 
of such expenses has been obtained from the War Department. In addition, 
the operator receives a fixed fee for his services which fee is unaffected by 
wages or other costs. . 

(7) The Government has complete power to require the dismissal of any 
person emploved in any of these plants if the continued employment of 
such individual is, for any reason, deemed to be not in the public interest. 
This power is specifically reserved by contract and can be exercised to 
remove persons who are subversive or unqualified. 

(8) Each plant is operated subject to the supervision of a Commanding 
Officer. 

The foregoing factors combine to form a unique relationship between the 
operating contractor and the War Department, and, as you will immediately 
appreciate, the handling of many problems, including that of discrimination, 
must necessarily be slightly different than in the case of wholly private plants. 
The primary responsibility for dealing with problems relating to the employment 
of labor is with the contractor, since he is hired for the express purpose of utilizing 
his skill and experience in running the plant and taking care of all questions of 
personnel. Because of the relationship which obtains, however, the War Depart- 
ment has a responsibility to see that each plant is operated in accordance with 
all laws and Kxecutive Orders, and in such a manner as to provide for the safety 
and protection of the plant and its personnel, and to insure maximum production 
at a reasonable cost. 

In the light of these facts, I suggest that, whenever your committee or one 
of its field representatives has reasonable grounds for believing that the manage- 
ment of any one of these plants is guilty of some form of discrimination by reason 
of the race, color, creed or national origin of any employee, the following pro- 
cedure be followed: 

(1) The case will first be taken up at the local level by the representative 
of your committee with the contractor-operator, notice of the nature of the 
complaint being given simultaneously to the Commanding Officer at the 
plant. 

(2) Where your committee believes that a complaint of discrimination 
is sound and that no satisfactory measures have been taken to meet the 
complaint, and that any reasonable hope of settling the matter at the local 
level has been exhausted, then your committee will immediately advise 
Judge William Hastie, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War. 

(3) Under no circumstances will your committee take formal or public 
action in any case' until the War Department has had the opportunity to 
use its good "offices to bring about compliance with the President's Executive 
Order on this subject. 

In my opinion, such a procedure, more than any other, possesses the means of 
bringing about a greater measure of practical compliance with the spirit of the 
foregoing Executive Order. I should hasten to add, of course, that this Depart- 
ment intends, even apart from any charges or complaints which your committee 
may discover, to see that these quasi-Government establishments are operated 
in such a way as to preclude discrimination. 

The list of facilities which is attached may be revised from time to time as 
new plants are constructed or as new Commanding Officers are appointed to 
any of the presently operating plants. In the event that the foregoing procedure 
is acceptable to your committee, I suggest that a copy of this list of plants, as 
well as a copy of this letter, be furnished to all of your field personnel. In turn, 
I would suggest that you furnish me with a list of your personnel, together with 
the region in which each is stationed. 

Would you kindly advise me at the earliest possible moment whether the 
procedure outlined is acceptable to the committee? 

Sincerely yours, 

Robert P. Patterson, 

Under Secretary of War. ■ 



13294 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(L) Acceptance op Honorable Discharge Certificates in Lieu of Birth 
Certificates 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, July 25, 1943. 
Subject: Statute requiring "Defense Contractors to Accept Honorable Dis- 
charge Certificates in Lieu of Birth Certificates." 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Attached is a copy of Public Law 620, 77th Congress, approved June 22, 
1942. Copies of the Statute will be published in a War Department bulletin 
issued to all Chiefs of Supply Services. 

2. Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in connection with this 
Statute except to assist in its interpretation and use by the Supply Services and 
' 'Defense Contractors" as defined in the Statute. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 

Chief, Manpower Branch. 

(Public Law 620— 77th Congress) 
(Chapter 432— 2nd Session) 

(H. R. 6634) 

AN ACT Tolfacilitate the employment by defense contractors of certain former members of the land and 
naval forces, including the Coast Guard, of the United States 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That no defense contractor shall deny employ- 
ment, on account of failure to produce a birth certificate, to any person who 
submits, in lieu of a birth certificate, an honorable discharge certificate or cer- 
tificate issued in lieu thereof from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast 
Guard of the United States, unless such honorable discharge certificate shows on 
its face that such person may have been an alien at the time of its issuance. 

Sec. 2. As used in this Act the term "defense contractor" means an employer 
engaged in — 

(1) the production, maintenance, or storage of arms, armament, ammuni- 
tion, implements of war, munitions, machinery, tools, clothing, food, fuel, 
or any articles or supplies, or parts or ingredients of any articles or supplies; 
or 

(2) the construction, reconstruction, repair, or installation of a building, 
plant, structure, or facility; 

under a contract with the United States or under any contract which the Presi- 
dent, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the United States 
Maritime Commission certifies to such employer to be necessary to the national 
defense. 

Approved, June 22, 1942. 

(M) Policy Against Discrimination in Employment of Aliens 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, July 27, 1942. 
Subject: Policy Against Discrimination in the Employment of Aliens. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a statement by the President, dated July 12, 
1942, concerning the national policy with respect to the employment of aliens 
or former nationals of another country. This statement was issued by Colonel 
Joe N. Dalton, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, to the Chiefs of the Supply 
Services, with the letter of July 18, 1942, copy of which is attached. The state- 
ment directs procurement offices to bring to the attention of the Regional Liaison 
Officers of the Manpower Branch evidence of noncompliance when it cannot be 
adjusted by the procurement offices. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13295 

2. Liaison Officers are now charged with increased responsibility for preventing 
obstruction to the proper employment of aliens. Upon receipt of notice of non- 
compliance with the policy's statement, the following action should be taken: 

a. Determine whether there is an actual case of noncompliance. 

b. If noncompliance is not found, notify the source from which the com- 

plaint was received. 

c. If noncompliance is found, take practical steps to secure compliance by: 

(1) Conference with the appropriate officers of the Supply Services 

involved. 

(2) Negotiation with the employer or contractor. 

(3) Action through the local division, War Manpower Commission 

and its minority groups service representative. 

d. If satisfactory action cannot be obtained in the field, the matter should be 

referred to the Headquarters, Manpower Branch. 
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonakd J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supplt, 

Washington, D. C, July 18, 1942. 
Memorandum for: The Commanding General, Material Command, Army 
Air Forces, 
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, 
The Chief of Engineers, 
The Chief of Ordnance, 
The Chief Signal Officer, 
The Quartermaster General, 
The Surgeon General, 

The Chief of the Transportation Service, 
The Commanding Generals, All Corps Areas, 
The Chief of Administrative Services. 

Subject: Employment of Aliens. 

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a statement by the President dated July 12, 
1942, concerning the national policy with respect to the employment of aliens or 
former nationals of another country. 

2. Copies of the foregoing statement should be immediately distributed to all 
procurement offices by the Supply Services with instructions that such offices 
advise all contractors within their respective jurisdictions of the national policy. 
The foregoing policy is applicable to all contractors, whether operating with 
privately owned or Government-owned facilities. 

3. Any evidence of noncompliance with this policy which cannot be resolved 
by the procurement officers should be brought to the attention of the Regional 
Liaison Officer of the Manpower Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, Services 
of Supply. 

For the Commanding General: 

Joe N. Dalton, 
Colonel, General Staff Corps, 
Chief of Administrative Branch. 

Inclosure: Statement of the President on July 12, 1942, concerning employment 
of aliens. 

The President's Statement 

The text of President Roosevelt's statement on July 12, 1942, concerning the 
employment of aliens or former nationals of another country was as follows: 

In order to clarify the policy of the Government in regard to the employ- 
ment of aliens and other persons of foreign birth, the President today issued 
the following statement: 

1. Persons should not hereafter be relused employment, or persons at 
present employed discharged, solely on the basis of the fact that they are 
aliens or that they were formerly nationals of any particular foreign country. 
A general condemnation of any group or class of persons is unfair and dan- 
gerous to the war effort. The Federal Government is taking the necessary 
steps to guard against, and punish, any subversive acts by disloyal persons, 
citizens as well as aliens. 



13296 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

2. There are tio legal restrictions on the employment of any person (A) in 
nonwar industries, and (B) even in war industries, if the particular labor is 
not on "classified" contracts, which include secret, confidential, restricted 
and aeronautical contracts. 

CONTRACT LAWS ARE STRESSED 

The laws of the United States do provide that in certain special instances 
involving Government contracts an employer must secure from the head of 
the Government Department concerned permission to employ aliens. Section 
11 (A) of the act of June 28, 1940, (Public No. 671, 76th Congress, 3d Session) 
contains a provision that: 

"No aliens employed by a contractor in the penormance of secret, con- 
fidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access 
to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to par- 
ticipate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the 
Government Dejiartment concerned has first been obtained." 

The Air Corps Act. of 1926 has a similar provision: 

"No aliens employed by a contractor for furnishing or constructing aircraft 
parts or aeronautical accessories for the United States shall be permitted 
to have access to the plans or specifications or the work under construction 
or to participate in the contract trials without the written consent before- 
hand of the Secretary of the Department concerned." 

There are no other Federal laws wliich restrict the employment of aliens 
by private emploj^ers in national war industries. There are no Federal laws 
restricting the employment of loreign-born citizens of any particular national 
origin. 

3. Where, under the law, permission to employ aliens is required from the 
War and Navy Departments, the alien shall go to the nearest office of the 
United States Employment Service, which will furnish him with application 
form, and assist him in filling it out. The completed form will then be sub- 
mitted by the alien to the employer who will fill out the reverse side of the 
form, and then immediately forward same to the Department concerned. 
Upon receipt of the application, the Department will act promptly thereon, 
in the normal case within forty-eight hours, and give its approval or dis- 
approval, either of which shall be subject to change at any later time. 

SPECIAL GROUPS PROVIDED FOR 

4. In passing upon applications for permits, the Department will give 
special and expedited consideration to nationals of United Nations and 
friendly American Republics, and any other aliens, including enemy aliens, 
who come within the following categories: 

A. Aliens who have served in the armed forces of the United States and 
have been honorably discharged. 

B. Aliens who have, or who have had, members of their immediate family 
in the United States military service. 

C. Aliens who have resided in the United States continuously since 1916 
without having returned to the country of origin within the last ten years. 

D. Aliens who have married persons who, at the time of marriage, were 
citizens of the ITnited States and who have resided in the United States 
continuously since 1924 without having returned to the countrj' of origin 
within the last ten years. 

E. Aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens of the 
United States and who had filed petitions for naturalization before Dec. 7, 
1941. 

5. Any inquiries or complaints hy aliens, pertaining to specific instances 
of discrimination, or intentional failure to carry out the above procedure, 
should be referred directly to the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, 
Washington, D. C This committee wil' consider the complaints and take 
such action as may be warranted in the particular case. 

8. Any information concerning disloyal activities in war industries or 
elsewhere, or indications of disloyalty on the part of persons employed in 
war industries, should be reported immediately to the nearest office of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Employees have the same duty in tliis 
matter as have employers. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13297 

(N) Procedure for Clearing Employment of Aliens on Government 

Contracts 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, July 21, 1942. 
Subject: Procedure for Clearing Employment of Aliens on Restricted and 

Aeronautical Contracts. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. This memorandum supersedes the memorandum of April 20, 1942 (SLS 7). 
The attached form "Alien Questionnaire" approved July 4, 1942, is a revision 
of the form of October 7, 1940, and either form may be used. Copies of the 
Statutes incorporated in the previous memorandum are also attached to this 
memorandum. 

2. As stated in the President's statement of July 12, 1942, there are no legal 
restrictions on the employment of any person (a) in nonvi^ar industries and (b) 
even in war industries if the particular labor is not on "classified" contracts 
which include secret, confidential, restricted, and aeronautical contracts. How- 
ever, the laws of the United States (see Statutes attached) provide that in certain 
special instances involving Government contracts, an employer must secure 
from the head of the Government Department concerned permission to employ 

3. The Liaison Officers have no immediate responsibility in the employment 
of aliens, except in cases of alleged discrimination, (see LS -) but the following 
procedure is stated for their information and use in the interpretation of Supply 
Services employment policies and in assisting the Supply Services and war 
contractors. 

4. The following procedure will be observed in clearing employment of aliens 
on restricted and aeronautical contracts: 

a. Permission for the employment of aliens on restricted and aircraft con- 
tracts requires the submission of an application in quintuplicate on an 
approved form. Copies of the approved form may be obtained from 
a commissioned factory representative of the plant in which employ- 
ment is desired, from the commanding officer of the procurement district, 
or from the nearest office of the U. S. Employment Service. Applicationsf 
should be submitted on the revised confidential questionnaire form o 
July 4, 1942, a copy of which is attached or may be submitted on the old 
confidential questionnaire form of October 7, 1940. Application also may 
be submitted on mimeographed or typed forms as long as the contents 
and arrangements of the standard forms are followed. 

h. AppUcation forms should be filled out by (a) the alien for items referring 
to his personal record and (b) the contractor for items referring to em- 
ployment of the alien. Offices of the U. S. Employment Service will assist 
aliens in filling out items referring to his personal record. Such items are 
grouped on the face of the July 4, 1942 form. 

c. Each case is decided upon its individual merits in the light of all of the 
information available. It is, therefore, important that the maximum 
amount of data be provided for a proper evaluation of the case. In an- 
swering question 38 (item 22 on the October 7, 1940 form) full considera- 
tion should be given to the interference of production which would result 
from delay in obtaining a citizen to replace an alien, even though such a 
replacement could be made \\ ithin a relatively short period of time. Lack 
of sufficient information on the part of the employer to allow him to vouch 
for his loyalty, as asked in question 50 (item 33 on the October 7, 1940, 
form) does not in itself bar the alien. 

d. When the Secretary of the Navy grants consent for the employment of an 
alien, it is the practice of the VVar Department to grant similar consent 
without further action on the part of either the alien or the employer. 
When the approval of the Secretary of the Navy is accepted by the Sec- 
retary of War, the alieii's employer is automatically so notified in writing, 

Por the Director, Civilian Personnel Division : 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



13298 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

Alien Questionnaire 

confidential 

Accomplished form to be submitted in quintuplicate by contractor seeking 
written consent of the Secretarj' of War for employment of an alien in relation 
to aeronautical or classified (secret, confidential or restricted) War Department 

contracts. Date _ 

I. 

Name of employer City State 

2 3 4 5 

Alien's full name (any alias?) Age Birthplace Citizen of what country? 

6 7 8 

Mairied or single Male or female Citizenship status of husband or wife 

9 10 ^ 

Number of children Citizenship status of chOdren 

11 12 

First papers applied for (date) First papers received (date) 

13 14 

Second papers applied for (date) Why was naturalization delayed? 

15. Date of last entry into United States: 

16 17 18 

Place of entry Name of ship Dates of prior entries (attach explanation) 

19. Length of service with contractor: 

20. Complete present address: 

2 1. All previous addresses : 

22. Former employers in and outside the United States (give dates of employ- 

ment) : 



23 

Military or naval service (give dates and name of country) 
24 25 

Membership in organizations, societies, clubs, or committees Religion 
26 

Dates and places of any arrest with statement of offenses and disposition 
27. Names, relationship, and addresses of members of immediate family living in 
any foreign country : -_ 



In the United States: 



28. Social Security Number: 29. United States Department of Justice 

I have seen Social Security Alien Registration Number: 

Card : I have seen Alien Registration Receipt 

Card: 

30. Is alien willing to bear arms for the United States against all enemies? 

Confidential Signed 

Alien's signature 

TO BE executed BY THE CONTRACTOR 

31 32 

Name of employer Name of alien 

33. Is contract a prime contract or a subcontract? 

34. Indicate whether contract is an aeronautical, or classified (secret, confidential 

and restricted) contract: 

35. Government procurement agency for which work is being done: 

36 

Government's numerical designation of contract, such as (W-535-ac-13333) 

37 

Job title and description of alien's proposed duties under contract 
38. Can alien be shifted to other work and replaced by a citizen without interfering 
with production? 39. If not, state special qualifications: 

40. Will alien have access to plans, specifications or work under aeronautical or 
classified (secret, confidential and restricted) War Department contracts, or 
will he be likely to participate in such contract trials? 



f 

NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13299 



41. Is material upon which alien is working subject to 

42. Could sabotage be readily detected? 

43. Would sabotage mean failure of performance of the finished product? 

44. Will alien have access to information pertaining to new ideas, lolans or specifi- 

cations, not generally known to the industry? 

45 

Has alien served as seaman since 193S? (Explain) 

46. What is the reputation of alien for loyalty to the United States? __ 

47 - 

Describe any rumors or incidents concerning alien's loyalty 

48 

Do you recommend consent for this alien's work in relation to the above contract? 

49. Are you sufficiently well acquainted with ahen to vouch for his loyalty to the 
United States? 50. If so, do you vouch for his loyalty? 

Signed 

Title 

Recommendations of Army Factory Representative and/or District Procurement 
Representative. 



Signed Signed . 

Confidential. 
Approved July 4, 1942. 



Statutes Which Govern the Employment op Aliens on Government 
Contracts 

"Section 10 (j) of the Act of July 2, 1926, the so-called Air Corps Act (Public 
"No. 446, 69th Cong.) provides in part, 'no aliens employed by a contractor for 
furnishing or constructing aircraft, or aircraft parts, or aeronautical accessories, 
for the United States shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifica- 
tions or the work under construction or to participate in the contract trials with- 
out the written consent beforehand of the Secretary of the Department concerned'". 

"Section 11 of the Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671, 76th Cong.), pro- 
vides in part 'no aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, 
confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access 
to the plans, or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate 
in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government 
Department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who willfully vio- 
lates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsec- 
tion shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both' ". 



(O) Compliance With Executive Order Relating to Nondiscrimination 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 17, 1942. 
Subject: Compliance with Executive Order No. 8802, Fair Employment Prac- 
tices. 
"To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Attached is the joint letter from the War Department, Navy Department, 
.and the Maritime Commission to the Chairman of the Fair Employment Practice 

Committee which is now part of the War Manpower Commission. This letter 
was sent to the Army Air Forces and the Supply Services on August 3, with a cov- 
• ering letter, copy of which is also attached. 

2. This statement should be considered in conjunction with LS-7 and other 
policy statements which will follow. 

3. The Liaison Officers have the responsibility of assisting in the interpretation 
-and fulfillment of these policies and of the settlement of any questions which arise 



13300 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

under them.- They also have the responsibility of reporting to Headquarters any 
problems which cannot be solved locally. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 

August 3, 1942. 

Memorandum For: The Commanding General, Mat^iriel Command, Army 
Air Forces, 
The Chief of Administrative Services, 
The Chief of Engineers, 
The Chief of Ordnance, 
The Quartermaster General, 
The Chief Signal Officer, 
The Surgeon General, 

The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, 
The Chief of Transportation Service. 

Subject: Compliance with Executive Order No. 8802 Relating to Non- 
discrimination. 

1. Attached hereto is a joint letter from the War Department, the Navy De- 
partment, and the Maritime Commission to Mr. Malcolm S. MacLean, Chairman 
of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, in response to 
identical letters received by the foregoing from him relative to compliance with the 
provisions of Executive Order No. 8802 which forbids discrimination by war 
contractors against any person by reason of race, color, creed or national origin. 

2. In accordance with the policy prescribed in the foregoing letter, you will, as 
rapidly as possible, transmit to all contractors holding a contract of, or contracts 
aggregating, more than $25,000, a letter in the following form: 



Dear Mr. : 

In view of the increasing need of securing the full and united use of the 
Nation's resources in manpower in our war effort, it is desired to call your 
attention again to the national policv expressed by the President in Executive 
Order No. 8802. dated June 25, 1941. 

Pursuant to the terms of this Executive Order, there is embodied in your 
contract the provision: 

The Contractor, in performing the work required by this contract, 
shall not discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, 
or national origin. 

The War Department looks to you to carry out this provision as well as 
the other provisions of the contract, not only as a matter of contract obliga- 
tion but also as a part of your contribution to the war effort. 

Compliance with the contract calls for compliance with the Executive 
Order. The President has stated in that Order that it is "the policy of the 
United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of 
workers in defense industries or Government because of race, creed, color, 
or national origin", and I do hereby declare that it is the duty of employers 
and of labor organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this Order, to 
provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense 
industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national 
origin. 

We deem your contract to thus require — 

(a) that your practice in recruitment, in-service training and up-grading 
of employees shall conform to this policy; 

(b) that any reference to race or religion, if such exists, should be 
deleted from your application for employment forms; 

(c) that your recruitments should not be confined to any source that 
results in discrimination against workers solely because of race, 
creed, color, or national origin; provided, of course, that the National 
Labor Relations Act and the laws regarding aliens must be com- 
plied with; 

(d) that 3'ou should not in any other way discriminate against loj'al, 
qualified applicants or employees solely because of race, creed, color, 
or national origin. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13301 

This letter is not written because of any specific question having been 
raised as to your compliance with this provision of your contract, but to 
again call your attention to the matter and to the importance that is attached 
to it in securing the full application of our resources to the war effort. 
Sincerely yours, 

(signature). 
For the Commanding General: 

James P. Mitchell, 
Director, Civilian Personnel Division. 
1 Incl., Joint Letter. 



Hon. Malcolm S. McLean, 

Chairman, President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, 

Social Security Building, Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Mr. McLean: 1. This joint letter of the War Department, Navy 

Department and Maritime Commission, which has been submitted to the War 

Manpower Commission, is in reply to your identical letter to us of 26 May, 1942, 

regarding compliance with Executive Order No. 8802, Fair Employment Practices. 

2. The responsibilities of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission for en- 
forcing the nondiscrimination principles of Executive Order No. , 8802 may 
properly be considered under three general categories: 

a. Government establishments, i. e.. Navy Yards, Army Arsenals, etc. 

b. Government-owned, privately operated plants. 

c. Privately owned, privately operated plants having Government contracts. 

3. In considering this subject it is desirable to discuss the matter in order that 
there may be a clear understanding and acceptance of our procedures by all 
interested parties. 

4. Government Establishments. — In regard to those Government establishments 
which are under our jurisdiction, we have directed compliance with Executive 
Order No. 8802. 

5. Government-Owned, Privately Operated Plants. — In regard to the Government- 
owned, privately operated plants, operating for our account, we will, through our 
Inspectors-In-Charge, or Commanding Officers, instruct the contractor-operators 
that their policies and procedure must conform to the principles of Executive 
Order No. 8802. In this category, although the Government agency concerned 
has a vital interest in the matter, it should not itself take over any of the details of 
personnel matters, but should hold the contractor-operator to his contractual 
obligations including maintenance of satisfactory labor-management relationships. 
The Government agencies will concern themselves with insuring that the policies 
followed in such plants shall be consistent with maximum production, good 
management, safety and security of the plant, and with the principles of fair 
employment practices set forth in Executive Order No. 8802. 

6. Privately Owned, Privately Operated Plants.- — The situation regarding plants 
in this category is somewhat different. The Government agencies do not have 
direction over the personnel or other management procedures of such contractors, 
even though they may be working on Government contracts. However, such 
Government contracts now contain a nondiscrimination clause caUing for 
compliance with Executive Order No. 8802. We are, therefore, prepared to 
inform our contractors through the c^ustomary channels that the Government 
agency concerned regards it as necessary that the contractor carry out his con- 
tractual obligations regarding nondiscrimination and that the points enumerated 
in paragraph 8 hereof are deemed essentia] elements of the contractual ql)ligation. 
You will appreciate the point we are making in the foregoing, namely, that such 
instructions shall not be interpreted as an intrusion upon the contractor's responsi- 
bilities in handling personnel, but rather as a definition of an obligation that 
already exists by virtue of the noudiscrimination clause in the contract. For the 
same reasons we cannot intrude upon labor unions, employment agencies and 
vocational training schools outside of our jurisdiction. 

7. Recognizing that the methods of providing equal employment opportunities 
for all qualified persons regardless of race, creed, color or national origin will vary 
in different parts of the country and in different types of plants, the following 
principles will be used as a general guide in handling minority group questions: 

a. Efforts will be continued particularly in cooperation with the War Man- 
power Commission to provide equal opportunities for employment. 



13302 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

in-service training and advancement to all qualified citizens, regardless of 
race, creed, color or national origin, to expedite maximum production. 

b. Such equal opportunities for minority groups may be provided either 
parallel to or integrated with the opportunities afforded majority groups, 
and thus may be arranged and provided for to conform to existing State 
laws and community customs. 

c. In the practical application of this policy every effort will be made to open 
available employment opportunities to minority groups in such numbers 
and in such classes of positions as will expedite maximum production and 
as governed by the available supply of qualified workers. 

d. In the event of any misunderstanding we will be glad to clarify our positions 
as set forth in this document with any specific agency or business con- 
cerned. 

8. The letters which we are prepared to issue in conformity with the foregoing 
will include the following: 

a. That Executive Order No. 8802 should be complied with, and specifically, 

b. That recruitment, in-service training and up-grading of employees should 

conform thereto. 
-c. That any reference to race or religion should be deleted from employment 
forms if such exist. 

d. That recruitment should not be confined to any source that results in 

discrimination against workers solely because of race, creed, color or 
national origin, provided, of course, that the National Labor Relations 
Act and the laws regarding aliens must be complied with. 

e. That the contractor should not in any other way discriminate against 

loyal qualified applicants or employees solely because of race, creed, 
color or national origin. 

9. Success in carrying out these policies must depend largely upon the coopera- 
tion of all parties concerned, including the War Manpower Commission, the 
Federal contracting agencies, your own Committee and minority groups, unions, 
State and local officials and the citizenry of particular locahties. The molding 
of public opinion in any given working force and community is of great importance 
and should be the concern of all. 

10. Notwithstanding the difficulty of this problem, we recognize the importance 
of securing compliance, not only with the work, but with the spirit of Executive 
Order No. 8802, and we will continue to cooperate with your Committee in all 
practicable ways in reaching a satisfactory solution. 

Very sincerely yours, 

[s] Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War, 
[s] Frank Knox, 

Secretary of the Navy, 
[s] E. S. Land, 
Chairman, U. S. Maritime Commission. 



(P) Housing Policies — To Conserve Critical Materials 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 25, 1942. 
Subject: Housing — Conservation of Critical Materials. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Solution of labor supply problems in many critical areas is expected and in 
some cases is undertaken by the in-migration of workers and the provision of 
adequate housing for such workers. Employers and labor supply officers are 
often too ready to subscribe to this apparently simple but, in fact, expensive and 
wasteful method. Already, an acute shortage of raw and critical materials is 
causing a curtailment of war production (guns, shells and other equipment), the 
closing of plants, and the laying off of workers. The obvious answer to this 
situation is the conservation of vital war materials for production of the imple- 
ments of war. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13303 

2. A source of vast waste of critical material is the thousands of tons of steel, 
copper and other strategic metals being used to provide housing and auxiliary- 
community services for war workers. In fact, the more houses constructed will 
lessen the material available for combat against the enemy and, to illustrate, the 
housing of one worker requires one ton of steel, 8,000 board feet of lumber and 
548 working days. This use of material and man hours cannot continue in the 
face of otlier less expensive and more adaptable methods of solution of labor 
shortage problems. 

3. The material problem requires that all manpower questions be investigated 
and solved on an over-all basis, rather than by the easier method of mere in- 
migration plus housing facilities. Needs for additional housing should be 
appraised only after the local available labor market has been fully utilized. In 
short, no support shuld be given to any new housing construction unless it is 
determined that no other means of meeting the labor supply problem can be used. 

4. The current material shortage will curtail future housing and, in many cases, 
divert material from housing projects now under construction. It is imperative, 
therefore, that all efforts be made to obtain cooperation of all groups, including 
employers and labor, in a program to meet labor demands by full utilization of all 
available labor already housed within reasonable commuting distance of war 
production centers. 

5. Liaison Officers will assume appropriate responsibility in all critical labor 
shortage areas where housing projects are now under way or in contemplation, 
to make sure that the appropriate governmental or private agencies involved 
have thoroughly considered the following matters: 

a. The Employment of Women — No housing project should be approved 

unless the employers in the community or area have made an accurate 
estimate of the number of jobs which cannot under any circumstances be 
performed by women. 

b. The Employment of Available Negro and Minority Groups — Under no cir- 

cumstances should additional housing be approved unless the various 
war employers and labor groups in the communit}^ or area have agreed 
to make use of all available Negroes and minority groups such as aliens, 
Jewish workers and workers with minor physical handicaps; provided, 
however, that such groups of workers are already housed locally and 
living in the immediate vicinity. 

c. Curtailment of Civilian Industries — In many communities there is an 

available reserve of labor both men and women, now engaged in non- 
essential activities. Consideration should be given to the possibility 
of the transfer of large numbers of such workers engaged in nonessential 
occupations to more essential war work before any program for addi- 
tional housing is approved. In many cases it may be possible to curtail 
or shut down completely nonessential industries using strategic mate- 
rials. Efforts in this regard will be further aided by curtailment and 
concentration programs now being initiated here in Washington. This 
will be accomplished in large measures by limitation orders and con- 
centration orders which will be issued from time to time by the War 
Production Board. In other words, before planning additional housing, 
the possibility of curtailment of all nonessential activities to the bare 
minimum is to be explored and considered. 

d. More Intensive Utilization of Existing Housing — The President' of the 

United States has warned the American people that they must be 
ready to make sacrifices for the war program. In labor shortage areas 
this means that workers and residents of various communities will have 
to "double up" more on housing accommodations. The possibility of 
the utilization of extra rooms in private dwellings should be explored 
thoroughly before any new housing program is planned. In addition, 
a program for the remodeling of existing dwellings to provide additional 
space for housing more workers should be explored. 

e. Other Methods — Local conditions may suggest methods other than those 

listed above. If appropriate, these auxiliary avenues must be fully 
explored, 

6. The immediate application of the policies herein set forth is requested. 
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 

Chief, Manpower Branch. 
60396— 42— pt. 34 17 



13304 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

(Q) Transportation of Labor — Conservation of Equipment and 
Rubber 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 25, 1942. 
Subject: Transportation — Conservation of Equipment and Rubber. 
To: All Field Liaison Officers. 

1. Transportation is a paramount question in the solution of labor supply 
problems which, too often, is attempted by the formulation of programs based 
■upon the recruitment of labor residing in adjacent areas of varjdng distance from 
a labor shortage area and the transportation of such workers to and from their 
homes. Such a method, in many cases, is short-sighted and, except in the cases 
of remote and isolated plants, is wasteful and detrimental to the war effort. 

2. Conservation of such scarce critical materials as steel, cojiper, rubber and 
oil is necessary to prevent a curtailment of war production and the closing of war 
plants. The needless and unplanned use of transportation equipment, tires and 
gasoline for the transportation of war workers is a condition which cannot con- 
tinue in face of the material shortage. Transportation questions encountered in 
the solution of labor supply must to the greatest extent possible be solved by the 
application of methods other than programs based on the expectation that the 
transportation equipment and tires will be available. 

3. The available supply of public transportation facilities is inadequate to 
meet the estimated needs for war production. Within a few months all available 
equipment will be utilized to its fullest capacity. In addition, the supply of 
rubber for private automobiles for war workers will likewise be drastically cur- 
tailed so that recaps and tires will be sparsely rationed. 

4. The maintenance of war production schedules requires the continuation of 
the present transportation facilities, both public and private. The majority of 
workers employed at war production plants ride to and from work in their own 
automobiles. Failure to continue this mode of transportation would swamp 
public transportation facilities. Consequently war workers' automobiles and tires 
must be conserved to the fullest extent. 

5. This problem requires drastic action and in the solution of labor supply prob- 
lems no support or approval should be given to plans contemplating the allocation 
or acciuisition of additional public transportation equipment, or to plans whereby 
workers would be recruited and required to travel in their automobiles from 
distant places. Only in those cases where the isolation of the plant is obvious or 
peculiar local conditions exist, will equipment and tires be made available. It 
is imperative, therefore, that appropriate action be taken on your responsibility 
to obtain the cooperation of all groups in programs to meet the labor demand by 
full utilization of all available labor within walking or reasonable transporting 
distance of war production plants. The failure to invoke cooperative programs 
designed to offset the need for transportation equipment and tires will only 
accentuate the problem locally and nationally. 

6. In all critical labor shortage areas where the allocation of additional public 
transportation equipment is in contemplation or where considerable use of private 
automobiles is made by war workers, the Field Liaison Officers shouid take aU 
appropriate action to see that governmental and private agencies, as well as the 
contractors and workers, have thoroughly considered the following matters: 

a. Determination of Peak Employment: The number of war workers to be 
employed in a given area must be determined. Also, monthly schedules 
of manpower requirements till peak employment is reached should be 
obtained. This data will provide a sound basis for traffic and trans- 
portation surveys and estimates of needs for additional equipment. 

6, The Employment of Women: The utilization of women will, in most cases, 
partially eliminate the necessity of providing additional transportation 
facilities and will prevent the recruitment of male workers who live at 
considerable distances from the plant. 

c. Employment of Available Negro and Minority Groups: No recruitment of 

workers living in remote areas should be undertaken unless employers 
and labor groups in the community or area have agreed to make use of 
all available Negroes and minority groups who reside within walking 
or reasonable commuting distance of a war production plant. 

d. Intensive Utilization of Housing Facilities Adjacent to Production Plant: In 

labor shortage areas, persons who have housing accommodations in the 
immediate vicinity of a war production plant should be strongly urged to 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13305 

make extra rooms in private dwellings or other housing facilities avail- 
able for war workers. In addition, no housing project should be 
planned or approved unless it is located in the immediate vicinity of the 
plant. The recognition of these factors in housing war workers will be 
helpful in alleviating actual or potential transportation problems. 

e. Intensive Utilization of Private Automobiles: No program involving addi- 
tional transportation equipment should be planned or approved unless 
the war workers, through the cooperation of employers and labor 
unions, institute and carry out a complete program for utilization of the 
full capacity of private automobiles used by war workers, and for the 
conservation of tires and gasoline. Such methods as "Share Your Car" 
and car pools are recommended. In addition, the cooperation of tire 
and gasoline rationing officials should be obtained so that these agencies 
may cooperate in obtaining full compliance with the conservation pro- 
gram . 

/. Other Methods: Local conditions may suggest methods other than those 
listed above. If appropriate and applicable, these auxiliary avenues 
must be fully explored. 

7. It is realized that the application of the above methods may vary as to 
localities and as to war plants, but it is important that all possible methods to 
conserve transportation equipment, tires and gasoline, be invoked so that some 
alleviation of an already critical problem may be obtained. The fact is that 
rubber, automobiles, busses and gasoline are critical and scarce, and that no steps 
to meet labor supply problems should be taken which would in any manner 
accentuate the gravity of this problem without considering and initiating any 
other remedial methods. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



(R) Employment of Women 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 26, 1942. 
Subject: Employment of Women as a Part of the Community Labor Supply 

Program. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Because of the impending drain on the Nation's manpower reserves for war 
production and military service, it is obvious that larger and larger numbers of 
women must be drawn into industrial employment. You have already received 
information concerning the types of occupations suitable for women and also a 
copy of a pamphlet ("Women in War Industries" by Helen Baker, Industrial 
Relations Section, Princeton University) which outlines the techniques of utihzing 
women in war production. This memorandum deals with the employment of 
women as an element in the planning of community, or industrial area, labor 
supply programs. In this connection, reference should be made to previous 
memoranda on housing, transportation, and minority groups which also emphasize 
the importance of utilization of local labor supply. 

EMPLOYER attitudes ON EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN 

Most employers today will admit that they can replace men with women on a 
substantial proportion of jobs, if they find it necessary to do so. In other words, 
theoretically or statistically, employers are willing to absorb large numbers of 
women in their working forces. In the meantime, however, employers may 
follow a contrary course. As long as it is possible to attract male workers from 
other areas, employers will prefer to use in-migrant labor rather than go to the 
trouble of providing facilities and training for women workers. The attitude of 
employers in utilizing minority groups in the community is very similar. They 
naturally prefer to import farm boys or even steal trained workers from other war 
employers before offering employment to the Negroes, Jews, aliens or other 
minoritj' groups. There is pressing need for education of employers on this score. 

The policy of the Government is that no additional housing or transportation 
facilities for a community will be approved unless it is determined beyond a doubt 



13306 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

that employers have already utilized available pools of labor in the area and have 
formulated definite plans for utilizing women to replace men in all occupations 
suitable for employment of women. If certain industrial areas become too con- 
gested because of excessive in-migration of workers not already housed in the area, 
the only alternative will be physical removal of certain types of war industry from 
the coiiununity. Such a plan for the relocation of war work out of the Detroit 
area has already been approved by Mr. Donald Nelson and the Plant Site Board 
of the W. P. B. Similar drastic measures will be taken in other cities if employers 
fail to utilize all available local supplies of labor. 

Liaison Officers must inform every large war production employer in prospec- 
tive labor shortage areas of these facts. These facts must also be presented to 
employers' associations, Chambers of Commerce, and labor union groups through- 
out your region. 



WHEN SHOULD WOMEN BE 



DRAWN INTO WAR PRODUCTION? 



War production employers should not be encouraged to utilize women on a 
large scale until all available male labor in the area has first been employed. In 
this connection it is important that the male Negroes, Jewish workers, aliens and 
other minority groups be fully employed before women who are not normally 
part of the labor market be recruited in large numbers. For example, a drive to 
recruit large numbers of women for war production when Negroes are still unem- 
ployed in the area will stir up bitter controversy on the race problem and lay the 
groundwork for future discontent and dissension in the community. 

After local male labor is absorbed, a drive for the employment of women in 
war industries should be launched at the same time as a drive for the transfer of 
male labor from civilian industries to war production plants. In this way, women 
can be utilized in war plants, and, at the same time, those not suited for war 
production occupations can take the jobs left vacant by men in essential civilian 
industries. 

All available women should be employed before male labor is imported from 
other areas to fill jobs that might be performed by women. 

Liaison Officers are instructed to make sure that this point is impressed upon 
local agencies charged with administration of the manpower program. 

VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION OF WOMEN FOR WAR EMPLOYMENT 

Most of the women who must eventually be brought into industry are not now 
part of the labor market; they are not actively seeking employment, and perhaps 
have little training or experience. In order to estimate and classify the avail- 
able reserve of womanpower in a particular area, therefore, it may be necessary 
to request all women over 16 to 18 years to register. It is important to note that 
registration is made for the purpose of securing an inventory of available women; 
registration is not, in itself, a means of recruiting women for war work. 

In the recent registration of women which was conducted in the Detroit area, 
registration cards, or questionnaires, were distributed by the Post Office to every 
home and dwelling in the area. The cards were then mailed by the women 
registering to the United States F]mployxnent Service. The USES then 
classified the cards and undertook a recruitment of those women who seemed 
best fitted for employment. 

There are three factors vital to the success of any program for registration of 
women. First, the registration must be given active publicity. Second, the 
registration should be undertaken only when the demand for women in war 
work IS extensive and immediate. Third, the regi.<^tration should be made through 
an official Federal agency such as the Post Office which has sufficiently wide cover- 
age. Attempts to register women through schools, air raid wardens, or Boy 
Scouts have had varied degrees of success. Likewise, where city officials have 
devised systems of registration the results have been bad. The registration 
must be initiated and sponsored by the proper Federal agencies such as the War 
Manpower Commission. 

Liaison Officers must inform Headquarters of registration of women before 
lending their backing and support to the program. Likewise, Liaison Officers 
should oppose any plan of registration which is unsound for any of the reasons 
set forth above. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13307 

COMMUNITY PROGRAMS NECESSITATED BY THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN 

The employment of women in factories naturally necessitates the installation 
of necessary rest room facilities in the plant. Materials for such installations 
will be given priority over materials for new housing for war workers. 

Another necessary program is training. The pre-employment vocational 
schools should make provisions for the training of women in accordance with 
specific requirements of employers who expect to hire them. In addition, the 
companies must be required to set up the necessary in-plant training programs 
for women after they are on the job. The particular personnel problems con- 
nected with the employment of women are well presented in the booklet, "Occu- 
pations Suitable for Women," published by United States Employment Service, 
February 1942. If large numbers of married women with children are drawn 
into industrial employment, provision must be made for the care of the children 
while the mother is at work. A separate memorandum on day-care of children 
of working mothers will be issued later. In the meantime, however, Liaison 
Officers should impress upon the appropriate community groups the necessity for 
planning on this score. 

ATTITUDES OF ORGANIZED LABOR 

In general, labor is not opposed to the employment of women in war indus- 
tries provided that local unemployed male workers are first absorbed. In every 
case, however, organized labor groups should be consulted regarding any pros- 
pective program for the recruitment and employment of women in industry. 
Their support and active participation in the program must be secured in advance. 
For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 



(S) Labor Relations Activities 

War Department, 
Headquarters, Services of Supply, 

Washington, D. C, August 31, 1942. 
Subject: Labor Relations Activities. 
To: All Liaison Officers. 

1. Because of the pressing importance of certain manpower problems in many 
areas, it is important that all Field Liaison Officers devote the major portion of 
their time to the solution of these prolilems rather than to labor relations matters. 

2. In view of the foregoing, Field Liaison Officers shou'd limit their labor rela- 
tions activities to the following: 

(a) Reporting to Headquarters, S. O. S., any situations which, in their 
opinion, will very seriously interfere with war production, together with 
any special recommendations concerning action which may be needed. 

(b) Carrying out specific assignments which may from time to time be given 
by Headquarters, S. O. S. 

For the Director, Civilian Personnel Division: 

Leonard J. Maloney, 
Chief, Manpower Branch. 

(T) Award of Contracts to Seattle Firms 

August 22, 1942. 

Memorandum for the Quartermaster General. 

Subjp.ct: Contracts Awarded by Quartermaster Corps in Seattle, Washington. 

1. Attached is a list of contracts awarded by Quartermaster Depots to Seattle 
manufacturers since May 1, 1942. In this period it appears that contracts 
amounting to over $4,000,000 for clothing, equipage and general supplies have 
been placed in this area. 

2. At the present time Seattle is faced with a very serious shortage of labor 
which will be extremely critical within a very few weeks. It is doubtful whether 
sufficient labor will be forthcoming to meet the mounting demands for workers 



13308 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

by the shipyards, the Boeing aircraft factories, and the Pacific Car and Foundry 
Tank plant in the Seattle area A copper refinery at Tacoma has already cur- 
tailed operations because of a labor shortage. A strategic plant manufacturing 
items for the Chemical Warfare Division is unable to operate because of inability 
to secure labor. In addition, the production of aluminum in this area is threat- 
ened for the same reason. 

3. In the face of this drastic situation, the textile industry in Seattle has been 
called upon to expand its employment as a consequence of the new Army orders 
placed in the area recently. The textile firms are unable to meet the wage scales 
of other war production plants in the area, and are experiencing rising turn-over 
of labor. One company, for example, hired seventy-three new workers in the 
last sixty days, but had sixty quits in the same period. 

4. On the other hand, labor supply in other cities is still in excess of demand. 
For example, there are currently about 400,000 unemployed workers in New 
York City. The Army has been under criticism for failure to locate more war 
contracts in the New York area. 

5. In the light of the facts set forth above, it is requested that you explore the 
possibilitj' of transferring as many of your present contracts as possible out of 
the Seattle area to other areas where the labor supply situation is less critical. 
The labor now employed by your contractors in Seattle must sooner or later be 
absorbed by other war industries whose location cannot be changed. The trans- 
fer of this labor to other industries, of course, will only result in failure of your 
contractors to meet delivery schedules, if action is not taken at once to transfer 
your contracts to other areas. 

6. \^ e will be glad to assist members of your organization in recommending 
areas where your contracts might be placed with tJie assurance that there will 
be labor available Tor successful completion. 

For the Commanding General: 

James P. Mitchill, 
Director, Civilian Personnel Division. 



(U) Action To Relieve Critical Labor Shortage in Buffalo, N. Y., Area 

August 22, 1942. 

Memorandum for the Chiefs of All Supply Services. 
Subject: Critical Labor Shortage, Buffalo, N. Y., Area. 

1. The production requirements placed upon war industries in the Buffalo, 
N. Y., area (Erie and Niagara Counties) have created a critical labor supply 
problem, which will become acute by October 1, 1942. To meet this situation 
the Manpower Branch of the Civilian Personnel Division, Headquarters, Services 
of Supply, is initiating a program, with the cooperation of the War Manpower 
Commission, whereby the available labor market in the Buffalo area will be fully 
utilized. The program contemplates the recruitment of women, the transfer of 
workers from nonessential industries to war work, and the use of other methods 
to meet the labor shortage. If necessary, a curtailment of present production 
activities in this area will be recommended to prevent a break-down of the present 
war production schedules. 

2. It is apparent that an increase in the number of war contract placements 
in this area will only serve to aggravate a problem already serious. Such action 
would tend to require revised estimates of labor needs and would disrupt the 
application of methods of solution of the labor shortage. In addition, it is 
extremely doubtful that the labor supply in the area is sufficient to produce or 
manufacture any additional war material. 

3. It is requested that no additional contracts for war material be placed in 
the Buffalo area, as described above, unless this Division receives prior notice 
thereof. It is further requested that field procurement officers be advised of the 
contents of this memorandum. 

By command of Lieutenant General Somervell: 

James P. Mitchell, 
Director, Civilian Personnel Division. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13309 

(V) Pre-Induction Training Procedures 

Services op Supply 

civilian personnel division 

Manpower Branch 

Pre-Induction Training Section 
M. M. Peake— Chief 

July 27, 1942. 

Agreement has been reached between the Oflfice of Education and the Pre- 
Induction Training Section, Manpower Branch, Civihan Personnel Division, on 
the following basic policies and procedures for the Pre-Induction Training Section. 

1. The United States Office of Education will act as a channeling agency for 

the pre-induction education and training, using present machinery and 
funds now available or hereafter to be appropriated for such train- 
ing programs as the Army may require. 

a. Appropriations exist which may be utilized with concurrence of 
War Manpower Board for training in: 
2,G00 vocational schools. 
3,700 rural community schools. 
200 colleges. 
(These present accommodations are estimated as sufficient to 
train 200,000 additional trainees per month.) 
h. Basic training and beginning technical specialization may be offered 
in 28,000 secondary schools and 1,740 colleges. 

c. Full-time training to ineet critical needs for occupational specialists 

may be provided for civilian employees of the War Department, 
who have been selected by the Civil Service Commission in 
collaboration with the United States Employment Service and 
local Selective Service Boards from men classified for military 
service. 

d. Part-time courses for voluntary enrollment by men of draft age. 

e. Full-time elective courses offered voluntarily by schools and 

colleges to their day-school students. 

2. The pre-induction training programs offered under this plan will be 

administered by the United States Office of Education and will be given 
supervision by the Pre-Induction Training Section, Manpower Branch, 
Civilian Personnel Division, Headquarters, Services of Supply, to insure 
achievement of the training objective desired by the Army. 

3. There will be established continuous and effective liaison with the Office 

of Education and the Pre-Induction Training Section, Manpower 
Branch, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, for the pur- 
pose of making pre-induction training programs most effective through 
the joint determination and promulgation of policies and procedures 
within the limits of the legal authority of the two agencies. 

4. The cooperation of any other agencies, public or private, which is neces- 

sary to implement and effectuate the pre-induction training program, 
will be sought. 

(W) Recommendations of a Conference of Members of Management 
AND Labor in Xonferrous Metals and Lumbering Industries in the 
Western States, Held in Washington, D. C, September 3-4, 1942 

Recognizing the existence of certain basic conditions responsible for the undue 
migration and transfer of workers from the nonferrous-metal and lumbering 
industries in the western States with the ensuing curtailment of production 
which seriously impairs the war effort, it is the sense of this conference called by 
the Government to increase the production of copper, aluminum, lead, zinc, 
other nonferrous metals and lumber to meet the needs of the war effort; and 



13310 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

1. That the various agencies of Government concerned should expedite their 
efforts to remedy the various basic conditions responsible for unnecessary migra- 
tion including those agencies dealing with wages, housing facilities, t'ires and 
transportation, and recruitment for the Armed Services; 

2. That as, if, and when it is determined by the Chairman of the War Man- 
power Commission that specific action is necessarv for the promotion of the 
national war effort, it is the sense of this conference that the attached plan, 
formulated pursuant to and in accordance with the War Manpower Commission's 
anti-pirating policy and procedures approved by the Managem.ent-Labor Policy 
Committee, July 16, 1942, appears at present the most desirable instrumentality 
to attain the end sought; 

3. That when such plan is made operative the participants in this conference 
hereby pledge themselves to cooperate in every practical way with the Govern- 
ment in carrying out such program. 

COOPERATIVE PLAN TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY MIGRATION 

1. That the following States shall be declared by the Chairman of the War 
Manpower Commission to be a critical labor area for the purposes of this plan: 
Arizona Utah Oregon 

Colorado Wyoming Washington 

Idaho California New ]Mexico 

Montana Nevada Texas 

_ 2. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall designate as activi- 
ties essential to war ])roduction all nonferrous metal, mining, milling, smelting 
and refining and all logging and lumber industries in the critical area named above. 

3. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission shall designate as critical 
occupations all production and maintenance occupations in the activities essential 
to war production as named above. 

4. After the effective date of this plan, no worker engaged in an essential war 
production activity shall seek employment in any other activity, whether essential 
or nonessential to war production, without first obtaining "from a designated 
representative of the United States Employment Service a certificate of separation. 

5. No employer in the critical labor area, whether conducting activities essential 
or nonessential to war production, shall employ any worker who, after the 
effective date of this plan, had been engaged in a critical occupation in an essential 
war production activity within the designated critical area except upon presenta- 
tion of a certificate of separation issued by the United States Employment Service. 

6. Each employer conducting an activity listed in paragraph 2 above essential 
to war production in the designated critical area shall, when work is available, 
refrain from separating any worker, except in cases of gross misconduct, without 
the approval of a designated representative of the United States Employment 
Service. Such approval shall be granted only when continued employment of 
the worker in his present job will no longer contribute to the war production 
program. 

7. Any worker applying for employment with an employer in any of the in- 
dustries essential to war production in the designated critical area who feels that 
he is being denied employment for some reason other than his lack of qualifica- 
tion and physical fitness for performing the job for which he is an applicant, 
may request a designated representative of the United States Employment Serv- 
ice to intercede in his behalf. The representative of the United States Employ- 
ment Service will investigate the facts, and if he concludes that the worker is 
being refused employment on grounds other than lack of qualification or physical 
fitness for performing the job, he shall endeavor to persuade the employer to 
reconsider his decision and employ the worker. If an adjustment satisfactory to 
the worker is not achieved, the case shall be referred to the War Manpower Com- 
mittee for appropriate action. 

8. Any worker engaged in a critical occupation in an essential war production 
activity within a critical area as designated will upon request, be given a certifi- 
cate of separation by the United States Employment Service if the circumstances 
are such that his separation is in the best interests of the war effort, as well as the 
individual concerned, or if a refusal to grant such separation certificate would 
result in hardship and injustice to the individual. 

The following circumstances are illustrative of what may be considered good 
ground for separation' 

(a) When the worker is competent to perform higher skilled work than his 
current employer is able or willing to provide. 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13311 

(b) When the worker is employed for a substantial period at less than full 
time. 

(c) When the distance between the workers' residence and the place of em- 
ployment is unreasonably great, considering restrictions on the use of 
gasoline and tires and the load on transportation facilities. 

(d) When the worker has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change. 

(e) When the worker is employed at wages or under working conditions sub- 
stantially less favorable than those prevailing in the community for the 
kind of work on which he is employed. 

9. Any worker or emplover, or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied with 
any act or failure to act pursuant to this policy shall be given a fair opportunity 
to present his or their case to the Area War Manpower Committee. Such Com- 
mittee shall make recommendations concerning such cases as well as other mat- 
ters pertinent to the carrying out of this policy in its area to the War Manpower 
Area Director for appropriate action. The Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission shall prescribe rules, regulations and procedures for the carrying 
out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this policy, including pro- 
cedures for the review of the recommendations of the Area Committees, by Re- 
gional Manpower Committees and by the National Management-Labor Policy 
Committee. Upon request of the employers, the employee, or the Union, the 
representative of the United States Employment Service shall present to such 
Committee his reasons for having granted a certificate of separation. 

10. Nothing contained in this plan shall be construed to restrict any employee 
from seeking advice, aid or representation from the Union of which the employee 
is a member at any step of the operation of the plan or the Union to intervene in 
behalf of the employee. 

11. Nothing contained in this plan shall change, modify or restrict any collec- 
tive agreement existing between the bargaining agency of the employees and 
their emplovers. 

12. At the call of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, but within 
three months after the effective date of this plan, a conference of representatives 
of management and labor shall be called for the purpose of considering the plan 
in the light of the experience thus gained. Such modifications or alterations as 
may be required to meet the problem of war production in the essential activities 
designated and to avoid injustices and hardships to employers and employees 
shall be recommended at that time. 



(Y) Employment Stabilization in Nonferrous Metal and Lumbering 
Activities, War Manpower Commission 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Chairman of the War Manpower 
Commission by Executive Order No. 9139 establishing the War Manpower Com- 
mission, and having found, after consultation with members of Management and 
Labor in the affected industries, and after consultation with affected Federal 
Departments and agencies, that immediate effectuation of the War Manpower 
Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating of War Workers, issued July 16, 1942, 
is necessary to alleviate serious labor shortages which imperil the Nation's war 
production program, I do hereby give notice that: 

I. The plan set forth in paragraph IV hereof, designed to prevent unnecessary 
migration of workers, and formulated pursua^nt to and in accordance with the 
War Manpower Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating of War Workers and 
approved procedures in implementation thereof, is hereby approved, and shall 
constitute an approved plan for all purposes of the said Policy. 

II. The following areas, activities, and occupations constitute, respectively, 
critical labor areas, essentia! war production activities, and critical occupations, 
for all purposes of the War Manpower Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating 
of War Workers and of the approved plan set forth in paragraph IV hereof. • 

(a) The area comprising the States of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 

Utah, Wyoming, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, New 
Mexico, and Texas, constitutes a "critical labor area." 

(b) All nonferrous metal mining, milling, smelting and refining, and all 

logging and lumVjering industries and activities carried on within stich 
critical labor area constitute "essential war production activities." 

(c) All production and maintenance occupations in the industries and activi- 

ties designated as "essential war production activities" in paragraph 
(b) above, constitute "critical occupations." 



13312 WASHINGTON HEARINGS 

III. The aforementioned Policy and approved plan shall become operative 
on and after September 7, 1942, and shall remain operative until publication by 
the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission of appropriate notice to the 
contrarv. 

IV. Plan to prevent unnecessary migration of certain war workers: 

(a) After the effective date of this plan, no worker engaged in an essential 

war production activity shall seek employment, whether essential or 
nonessential to war production, without first obtaining from a desig- 
nated representative of the United States Employment Service a 
certificate of separation. 

(b) No employer in the critical labor area, whether conducting activities 

essential or nonessential to war production, shall employ any worker 
who, after the effective date of this plan, had been engaged in a critical 
occupation in an essential war production activity within the desig- 
nated critical labor area except upon presentation of a certificate of 
separation issued by the United States Employment Service. 

(c) Each employer conducting an essential war production activity in the 

designated critical labor area shall, when work is available, refrain 
from separating any worker, except in cases of gross misconduct, 
without the approval of a designated representative of the United 
States Employment Service. Such approval shall be granted only 
when continued employment of the worker in his present job will no 
longer contribute to the war production program. 

(d) Any worker applying for employment with an employer engaged in an 

essential war production activity in the designated critical labor area 
who feels that he is being denied employment for some reason other 
than his lack of qualification and physical fitness for performing the 
job for which he is an applicant, may request a designated represen- 
tative of the United States Employment Service to intercede in his 
behalf. The representative of the United States Employment Service 
will investigate the facts, and if he concludes that the worker is being 
refused employment on grounds other than lack of qualification or 
phvsical fitness for performing the job, he shall endeavor to persuade 
the emplover to reconsider his decision and employ the worker. If an 
adjustment satisfactory to the worker is not achieved, the case shall 
be referred to the Area War Manpower Committee for appropriate 
action. 

(e) Anv worker engaged in a critical occupation in an essential war produc- 

tion activitv within a critical labor area will upon request, be given a 
certificate of separation by the United States Employment Service if 
the circumstances are such that his separation is in the best interests of 
the war effort, as well as the individual concerned, or if a refusal to 
grant such separation certificate would result in hardship and injustice 
to the individual. 
The following circumstances are illustrative of what may be considered good 
ground for separation: 

(1) When the worker is competent to perform higher skilled work than his 
current employer is able or willing to provide. 

(2) When the worker is employed for a substantial period at less than full 
time. 

(3) When the distance between the worker's residence and the place of em- 
ployment is unreasonably great, considering restrictions on the use of 
gasoline and tires and the load on transportation facilities. 

(4) When the worker has compelling personal reasons for wishing to change. 

(5) When the worker is employed at wages or under working conditions 
substantially less favorable than those prevailing in the community for 
the kind of work on which he is employed. 

' (f) Any worker or employer, or group of workers or employers, dissatisfied 
with any act or failure to act pursuant to this plan shall be given a 
fair opportunity to present his or their case to the Area War Man- 
power Committee. Such Committee shall make recommendations 
concerning such cases as well as other matters pertinent to the carry- 
ing out of this plan in its area to the War Manpower Area Director 
for appropriate action. The Chairman of the War Manpower Com- 
mission shall prescribe rules, regulations and procedures for the 
carrying out of the responsibilities of Area Committees under this 
policy, including procedures for the review of the recommendations 



NATIONAL DEFENSE MIGRATION 13313 

of the Area Committees by Regional Manpower Committees and by 
the National Management-Labor Policy Committee. Upon request of 
the employers, the employee, or the Union, the representative of the 
United States Employment Service shall present to such Committee 
his reasons for having granted a certificate of separation, 
(g) Nothing contained in this plan shall be construed to restrict any em- 
ployee from seeking advice, aid or representation from the Union of 
which the emplovee is a member at any step of the operation of the 
plan or the Union to intervene in behalf of the employee, 
(h) Nothing contained in this plan shall change, modify or restrict any col- 
lective agreement existing between the bargaining agency of the em- 
ployees and their employers. _ _ 
(i) At the call of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, but 
within three months after the effective date of this plan, a conference 
of representatives of Management and Labor shall be called for the 
purpose of considering the plan in the light of the experience thus 
gained. Such modifications or alterations as may be re(|uired to 
meet the problem of war production in the essential activities desig- 
nated and to avoid injustices and hardships to employers and em- 
ployees shall be recommended at that time. 
V All persons are herebv enjoined and directed to observe strictly all pro- 
visions of the War Manpower Commission's Policy to Prevent Pirating of War 
Workers, all provisions of the approved plan set forth in paragraph IV hereof, 
and all provisions of regulations and procedures issued by the War Manpower 
Commission in implementation of such Policy and plan. 

All Departments and agencies of the Federal Government are hereby directed 
tp take all steps which may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate these pro- 
visions and to insure their observance. 



Paul V. M Nutt, 
Chairman, War Manpower Commission. 



September 7, 1942. 



Exhibit 7. — Placement of Contracts in Relation to Labor 

Supply 

Statement by John J. Corson, Chief, Industrial and Agricultural Em- 
ployment Division, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C. 

The Industrial and Agricultural Employment Division of the War Manpower 
Commission has directed the attention of contracting officials of the Army, Navy, 
and Treasury Procurement to the importance which must be attached to the 
availability of workers before contracts are assigned. It is our position, which we 
have been able successfully to impress upon the contracting agencies, that if we 
and they are to meet the production goals set for the war program it is essential 
that, insofar as a choice of facilities is available to contracting agencies, contracts 
be systematically placed in those labor markets whose workers have the relatively 
least chance of contributing to the war production program without such contracts 
being in their home communities. It is recognized, of course, that strategic con- 
siderations, uniqueness of facilities, or the need for speed of delivery will require 
many contracts to be placed in labor-market areas into which it is already apparent 
that workers are migrating or will ha^e to migrate to meet presently made 
commitments. 

This Division makes available monthly to contracting agencies a list of com- 
munities in which labor shortages are already apparent, in which they are soon to 
become felt, and a third list consisting of those areas where labor surpluses exist. 
The Army, the Navy, and the Treasury Procurement officials are making these 
lists available to every contracting officer with instructions that wherever possible 
contracts are to be placed outside of a tight labor market. One example of the 
acceptance by Federal officials of this principle can be found in a memorandum 
from the Quartermaster General to field purchasing officers dated August 26, 
which prescribes 11 cities for the placement of contracts. The cities the Quarter- 
master General selected were Buffalo, Baltimore, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, 
San Diego, Norfolk, Sacramento, Portland, Seattle, Indianapolis, and Hartford. 
The Quartermaster General with all other arms and services of the Army and 
Navy are expected soon to expand this list of 11 to include every city which we 
have reported as having or expecting a labor shortage. 



13314 



WASHINGTON HEARINGS 



Exhibit 8. — Statistical Data on Unmarried Selective Service 
Registrants Submitted by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, 
Director, Selective Service System, Washington, D. C. 

Number of unmarried selective-service registrants reported as receiving occupational 
deferment (class II) — first, second, and third registration (ages 20-44 years) 
continental United States 

JULY 31, 1912 



State 



United States . 

Alabama 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

California 

Colorado_ 

Connecticut 

Delaware 

District of Columbia 

Florida 

Georgia ._ 

Idaho 

Illinois - 

Indiana 

Iowa 

Kansas 

Kentucky 

Louisiana 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota -._ 

INtississippi 

Missouri ___ 



State 



Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New Mexico 

New York 

North Carolina - 
North Dakota.. 

Ohio 

Oklahoma 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania.. _ 
Rhode Island... 
South Carolina.. 
South Dakota... 

Tennessee 

Texas 

Utah 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

West Virginia... 

Wisconsin 

Wyoming. 



Number : 



5,176 

9,470 
869 

2,510 
38, 081 

1,032 
96, 137 
11,548 

9,382 
45, 307 

5,885 

7,175 

4] 827 
4,166 
8,383 
7,595 

19, 460 
2,123 
3,234 

12, 065 

19, 351 
6,440 

37, 147 
2,453 



' As of July 31, 1942, occupational information on registrants in class II are available for only 10 States. 
In these States the proportion of class II men in agricultural employment is 39.5 percent. Although in- 
formation is not available on the marital status of class II registrants, it is known that as of July 31, 1942, a 
large majority of these registrants are single men. 

Estimated number of unmarried selective-service registrants who are not in the armed 
forces — first, second, and third registrations (ages 20-44 years), continental 
United States 

JULY 31, 1942 



state 


Number i 


state 


Number ' 




2 3, 991, 000 


Nebraska 










62.000 
16, 000 
26, 000 
323, 000 
23, 000 
66, 000 
10, 000 
31,000 
50, 000 
57, 000 
19, 000 
189, 000 
74, 000 
72, 000 
40, 000 
53, 000 
56, 000 
26, 000 
79, 000 
160, 000 
187,000 
102, 000 
50, 000 

105, ono 

21, 000 


32, 000 


Arizona 


Nevada . . - 


8.000 




New Hampshire 

New Jersey 


16,000 


California 


127, 000 


Colorado 


New Mexico 

New York 


12, 000 


Connecticut 


561,003 






85, 000 






27, 000 


Florida 


Ohio 


190, 000 






38. 000 






37, 000 


Illinois 


Pennsylvania 


308, 000 






23, 000 






38, 000 


Kansas 


South Dakota . 


21,000 




Tennessee 


62, 000 






144, 000 




Utah X 


17, 000 




Vermont 


11,000 




Virginia 


88, 000 


Michigan 


Washington 

West Virginia . 


73, 000 




42, 000 




Wisconsin 


124, 000 




10, 000 













1 This excludes 1,1.50,000 registrants deferred because of physical, mental, and moral unfitness for military 
service (class IV-F). 

2 As of July 31, 1942, these unmarried registrants are distributed by selective-service classification in 
approximately the following proportions: Awaiting induction (class I-A), 17 percent; awaiting local board 
physical oxarnination (class I), 15 percent; (lualified for limited service (class I-B), 13 percent; deferred for 
occupational reasons (class II). 15 percent: deferred for dependency (class III). 25 percent; deferred for other 
reasons (class IV exclusive of class IV-F) and not yet classified, 15 percent. 



INDEX 



Aircraft industry: ^^^^ 

Extent of expansion 13172 

Loss of workers to armed services 13097-13108 

Allocations: Priorities replaced by 13185 

Armed forces: 

Estimate of requirements 13068, 13072-13073, 13171 

Recruitment of doctors--, 13091-13093, 13133 

Cargo planes 131 82 

Civilian Personnel Division. {See Services of Supply.) 
Committee on Fair Employment Practice. (See Discriminations.) 
Concentration of civilian industries 13124, 13194 

Concentration orders. (See under Production.) 

Allocation of, in relation to labor supply 13255-13257, 13313 

Awards in Seattle, Wash., by Quartermaster Corps 13307-13308 

Nondiscrimination provisions 13294-13301 

Placement in labor shortage areas 13148, 13153 

Purchase Policy Committee for 13174 

Copper mining. {See Employment, Nonferrous-metal mining States.) 
Day care of children of working mothers: Directive issued by War Man- 
power Commission 13236-13237 

Defense migration: In-migration requirements in 35 labor-market 

areas -- 13248-13250 

Directives I-XII issued by War Manpower Commission 13231-13242 

Discrimination against minority groups 13155, 13292-13295 

Employment: 

Average monthly turn-over rates, factory workers 13244, 13250 

Labor policy adopted by Army and Navy 13290-13292 

Monthly quit rates, factory workers, selected industries 13251 

Nondiscrimination in employment of aliens 13294-13302 

Non-ferrous-metal mining States, stabilization of employment 

in - 13309-13313,13148-13149,13213 

Nonwhite employment, selected plants, May 1942 13243, 13248 

Prevention of pirating of war workers 13283-13288 

Reasons for high quit rates 1 3245 

Requirements for proof of American birth in - _ 13281-13283, 13294 

Sources of labor supply 13115 

Employment Service: 

Confusion of authoritv and objectives under recent legislation 13117, 

13131, 13152 

Control of hiring by 13067 

Directives issued to, by War Manpower Commission : 

Agricultural workers, to expedite recruitment and placement 

of 13234-13235 

Encouragement of transfers to essential occupations 1 3233 

Listing of essential activities and occupations 13231 

Placement priorities 13232r-13233 

Recruiting and clearance of labor 13117 

Program and policies of 13258-13260 

Role of, in labor displacement problems 13152 

Executive Order No. 9139, creating War Manpower Commission 13115, 

13229-13231 

Farm labor: Deferment policies of draft boards 13106 

Federal employees: 

Classification standards for field service 1 3242 

Occupational deferment 13239-13241 

Transfer and release of 13237-13239 

13315 



13316 INDEX 

Page 

Health: Functioning of in-plant committees on health and safety 13218 

Housing: 

Conservation of critical materials for, by utilizing local labor. _ 13302-13303 
Directive of War Manpower Commission covering transient agricul- 
tural workers 13235-13236 

Inventories. {See Production.) 

Labor-management production committees: 

Establishment of, under War Production Board 13161 

Functions, status, and objectives of 13065, 

13127, 13132, 13150-13152, 13190, 13216-13222 

Labor utilization: 

Inspector system for, discussed 13065, 13094, 13119, 13129, 13155, 13191 

Plant inspections by Army and Navy 13132 

Role of Employment Service in 13152 

Utilization of minority groups 13155 

Qualifications and duties of proposed inspector teams 13125-13126 

Manpower. {See also War Manpower Commission.) 

Action to relieve critical labor shortage in Buffalo, N. Y., area 13308 

Allocation of 1 3089-1 3 1 23 

Complexities of problem of supply 13146, 13193-13194 

Concentration of contract distribution, analyzed on basis of labor 

supply 13255-13257 

Concentration of war employment 13244 

Cooperation of agencies to effect fuller utilization of 13213-13214 

Coordination of control of 13090 

Coordination of production and manpower planning 13118-13119, 

13136-13137, 13147-13148, 13153, 13154, 13165, 13258-13260 
Estimates of emj^lovment and requirements, June 1940 to December 

1943 1 13247 

Estimates of labor supplv and in-migration requirements, bv city and 

industry "_ _ - 13248-13250 

Increased demands, 1943 13113 

Inventory of, by Selective Service 13095-13096 

Loss of trained civilian workers to armed forces 13097-13098, 13147 

Lowering of standards as supply decreases 13107 

Maximized use of, through prohibition of volunteering.. 13082, 13123 

Procurement of labor in Great Britain 13088 

Requirements and resources 13113-13115 

Shortages of, in non-ferrous-metal States, action on 13118, 

13213, 13309-13313 

Total available labor force 13115 

Utilization of total available supply 13155, 13167, 13243, 13303 

Waste in use of 13134-13136 

Materials. {See under Production.) 

National Service Act, discussion of need for 13061, 

13087-13090, 13120, 13123, 13130, 13139-13140, 13176 

Negroes, employment of 13243, 13252-13255 

Procurement {See Contracts). 

Production Requirements Plan . 13186-13188, 13222-13225 

Production : 

All-out program required for 13203 

Combined Production and Resources Board 13184 

Concentration orders 13163-13165 

Control and recapture of inventories 13195-13196, 13208-13211, 13222-13225 

Control of, by material supply 13172-13173, 13177-13178 

Control of civilian production 1321 1-13212 

Elimination of materials waste 13199 

Material allocations 13183, 13200-13201 

Material distribution 13178-13180, 13189, 13204-13205 

Material utilization, inspectors for 13188-13189 

Problems involved in controlling the flow of materials 13226-13228 

Production Requirements Plan, accomplishments of 13186-13188, 

13195-13196, 13206 
Scheduling of operations 13155, 13173-13175, 13180-13183, 13195 

Purchase Policy Committee. {See under Contracts.) 

Recommendations: Unemployment benefits for displaced workers. - 13157-13161 



INDEX 13317 

Selective Service System: Page 

Classification of registrants 13067, 13072 

Deferment of registrants: 

Dependency 13080, 13084, 13092, 13102 

Farm workers 13102-13104, 13314 

Occupational deferment. 13068-13071, 13079, 13081, 13234, 13241, 13314 

Policies 13099, 13100 

Directives to, issued by War Manpower Commission.' 13066-13067 

Diversity in application of act 13076-13077 

Occupational inventory of national manpower by 13095-13096 

Quota system 1 3075 

Reclassification of registrants 13067, 13085-13086 

Reduction of age limit 13083, 13092 

Unmarried registrants not in armed forces, July 31, 1942 13314 

Transfers of classification 13100 

Services of Supply: 

Civilian Personnel Division : Functions of 13056, 

13064-13065, 13128, 13262-13263, 13270-13271 
Coordination of labor supply needs of War Department procurement 

agencies 13055, 13058, 13060, 13064 

Initiation of action on labor shortage in copper industry 13057 

Manpower Branch: 

Functions of . 13263-13277, 13307 

Organization charts 13269 

Policies and procedures 13277-13288, 13292-13309 

Preinduction training procedures 13309 

Organization of 13261-13262 

Statistical data on manpower, prepared by War Manpower Commis- 
sion 13242-13252 

Transportation of workers: 

Aid supplied by labor-management committees 13219, 13221 

Directive issued by War Manpower Commission on 13236 

Labor policy as conserving equipment and rubber 13304-13306 

Unemployment compensation for displaced workers, recommendations 

for 13157-13161 

United States Employment Service. (See Employment Service.) 
United States Office of Education. (See also Vocational training.) 

Training courses for war-production workers 13246, 13251, 13309 

Vocational training: (See also United States Office of Education.) 
Enrollments in courses of — 

National Youth Administration 13251 

United States Office of Education 13251 

Work Projects Administration 13252 

Full-time trainees employed by War and Navy Departments 13252 

Responsibility for determination of policies for war training 13065 

Training of men subject to draft 13167-13168 

Types of defense-training courses offered 1 3246 

Wages and hours : Determination of wage rates 1 3063 

War Department. (See Services of Supply.) 
War Manpower Commission: 

Activities summarized 13116-13118 

Authority over occupation deferihents 13123 

Cooperation with War Production Board 13118, 

13122, 13124, 13177, 13192-13193 

Directives issued by 13231-13242 

Executive order establishing 13229-13231 

Functions of 13058, 13116 

Management-Labor Policy Committee.. 13152 

Minority groups service 13289 

Pohcy on labor piracy 13284-13285, 13311-13313 

Regional and area offices 13116 

Relations with other agencies 13116, 13276 

Organization chart 13138 

Stabilization of employment in non-ferrous-metal mining States by.. 13117- 

13118, 13121, 13122 

Staff members 13138 

Surveys of labor conditions by 13057-13058 



13318 INDEX 

United States Employment Service. {See Employment Service.) 

War Production Board. {See also Production.) " Page 

Concentration committee ^ 13124, 13163, 13212-13213 

C'ooperation with War Manpower Commission 13118 

13122. 13124, 13177', 13192-13193 
Directive from War Manpower Commission covering critical war 

products 1 3232 

Divisions of, concerned with manpower problems 13189-13190, 13215 

Labor-Management Policy Committee ' 13191 

Labor-management committees. {See also Labor-management pro- 
duction committees.) 

Functions of 13065 

Labor Production Division: 

Actions on manpower problems 13149-13150 

Functions and responsibilities 13146, 13162, 13166, 13167, 13169 

War Production Drive {see also Labor-management production com- 
mittees) 1 13161 

Women workers: 

Employment and unemployment, July 1940 to June 1942 13247 

Trends in employment of, durable and nondurable goods industries, _ 13247 

Utilization of womanpower in war production 13063 

13114, 13243. 13"305- 13307 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 

3'9999 05706 1432 



OCTj 1943