(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Naval Attache's Reports, Office of Naval Intelligence"

% 






Declassified 







J V^*£* rf««5#3!!*l!*»- 






ft 



k 



MAY 1915 



NWC ARCHIVES 



m 



DECLASSIFIED 






J915-T5 



declassified 

Not to ba take#^^- ^^t- 
from Library 



if 



^Si&si 



v; 






SUBJECT 



|Sr«- Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] 

Jtifeed not be reiuvtiea, § / 

EFFECT OF MINE EXPLOSIONS. 



v Z ,, ^15 n , May 1, 1915. 1Cl1 

From —Jvo Date ' : , 191 

Replying to 0. N. T. No - Date^ i^z/_ A^^M 

' 7 ^9 ^^ 

I have had opportunity to see the reports 
and talk with two of the captains of the American steamers 
blown up by wines. Reports on the blowing up of the »CA?JB" 
and •EVELYN" have already been submitted and a copy of the 
report of the "QREENBRIAR "explosion accompanies this report. 

The feature which I desire to bring out is 
that while in one case the explosion was where it might be 
expected, under the bow, yet the other two cases the explosions 
were amidships ( • CARIB* ) and aft ( « OKBEMBRIAR"). 

From the circumstances governing the various 
cases it does not appear probable that the ships-? were attacked 
by submarine "oats. 

It would therefore appear that either the 
mines are usually connected together, or that there is a 
delayed action in the mechanism. 

The captain of the "CARIB 8 , while on board 
steamer which rescued him, heard something to the effect, that 
the mines were connected torether, but in what manner and to 
what extent he was unable to say. 



SHIPBUILDING, MUNITIONS, AND TRANSPORT AREAS. 



Need not be returned. 

MAY 1915 

^CEIvefD 



uai 



RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons, 

dated 29 April 1915;— /or, 







COPY " of Report and Statistics of Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions, 

and Transport Area.s." 



Treasury Chambers,"! 
29 April 1915. J 



D. LLOYD GEOEGE. 



(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.) 



Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed, 
1 May 1915. 



LONDON: 

PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 

By HARRISON and SONS, 45-47, St. Martin's Lane, W.C., 

Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 



To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from 

WYMAN and SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Buildings, Fetter Lane, E.C., and 

28, Abingdon Street, S.W., and 54, St. Mary Street, Cardiff; or 

H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, Forth Street, Edinburgh; or 

E. PONSONBY, Ltd., 116, Grafton Street, Dublin; 

or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, 

the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of 

T. FISHER UNWIN, London, W.C. 



220 



1915. 
Price 3d. 



INDEX. 



Admiralty Beporta •• „,.'" 

Report of Deputation to t-ho Government ■ Ivom the Ship- 
building Employe!*' Federation on 29th Maroh, 

L9H ... 

Bummarj of Statistical Material submitted to tho 
.vernment by the Shipbuilding Employers' 

ration 



PAGK. 

2 



10 



13 



Extract from letter dated 26th March, 1915, from 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty •■• 

Reports from Armament Works ... 

Ecport of Enquiries made by the Home Office in 
regard to loss of time in the Shipbuilding Trades... 

Reports on Transport Difficulties 



PAGE. 



15 
16 

17 

27 



(A.) 

ADMIRALTY REPORTS. 



I. 

Percentage of Hours worked by Government Employes in Ports- 
mouth Dockyard during week ending April 24, 1915. 



Men working 


85 


hours 


a week and 


upwards 


>j 


80 




ii 


ii 


>) 


75 




ii 


ii 


n 


70 




ii 


>) 


)i 


65 




ii 


ii 


5) 


60 




S) 


)> 


>I 


55 




5) 


)> 


11 


50 




)) 


ii 


11 


No 


rmal 


(48 hours) 






Less than normal 


. . 



6 


pei 


■ cent. 


4 




ii 


8 




!! 


19 




11 


35 




>! 


6 




)) 


4 




5) 


2 




)) 


11 




5> 


o 




)) 



It will be seen from the foregoing that no less than 78 per cent, of the workmen 
at Portsmouth were working for 60 hours or over in the week ending last Saturday — 
24th instant — i.e., 12 hours or more in excess of the normal working hours of the 
week. 

The above statistics may be taken as typical of all the Admiralty dockyards. 



II. 

Reports to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the Effect of 
Excessive Drinking on Output of Work on Shipbuilding, 
Repairs, and Munitions of War. 



First Lord, 

THE enclosed statement has been drawn up, showing the effect of excessive 
drinking on the output of work as regards shipbuilding, repairs, and munitions of 
war being carried out by contract for the Admiralty. 

A report by the Director of Transports as to the effect on transport work is also 
enclosed. 

F. C. T. TUDOR, 

Third Sea Lord. 
April 2, 1915. 

REPORTS which have been received from the Clyde, Tyne, and Barrow districts 
recently are in agreement that at the present time the amount of work put in by the 
workmen is much less than what might reasonably be expected. 

Put briefly, the position is that now, while the country is at war, the men are 
doing less work than would be regarded as an ordinary week's work under normal 
peace conditions. As instances of this, tables are attached showing the numbers of 
hours worked in a submarine engine shop and in shipyards on the N. E. Coast. 

It will be seen that in the case of the 135 fitters employed on submarine engine 
work, the number of hours lost during the first week of March amounted to the 
equivalent of a full week's work of twenty-eight men, i.e., on the average each man 
did little more than three-quarters of a day's work. 



r 



NAVAL WAR C»Lfc.CGE 
USftARV 

• HCLF (- 

MARK ) 



3 

I f*:t>%1b JUL 14 

The reports from the N.E. Coast show that over periods of five to S T! \ uu wcolio tho 
time lost at one of the shipyards by riveters equals about 35 per cent, of the normal 
week's work ; platers, 25 per cent. ; and the caulkers and drillers about 22 per cent. ; 
the later returns for the same yard show that by far the greater majority of the work- 
men are absent at starting time — 6 a.m. 

The figures reported from two other shipyards on the North East Coast are similar 
and the reports from the Clyde, though details have not been received, are to the same 
effect, showing that the large amount of lost time is general throughout the country. 

Thus the problem is not how to get the workmen to increase their normal peace 
output, but how to get them to do an ordinary week's work of 51 or 53 hours, as the 
case may be. 

The reasons for the loss of time are no doubt various, but it is abundantly clear 
that the most potent is in the facilities which exist for men to obtain beer and spirits, 
combined with the high rates of wages and abundance of employment. Opinion on 
this point is practically unanimous. 

The matter has been referred to from time to time in letters which the firms have 
written in regard to progress of work in hand for the Admiralty, as shown by the 
following extracts ; — 

Clyde. 

" We regret to say a number of men are losing a considerable amount of time, 
mostly, we are afraid, due to their drinking habits, no doubt aggravated by the 
extra money they are earning by working overtime, and we respectfully submit 
that if some step could be taken to restrict their opportunities to indulge in 
intoxicating liquor enormous benefits would result in the progress of this and 
other naval work we have in hand." 

North-East Coast. 

" Regret to say considerable number of our workmen absent from duty 
to-day — drinking. ' ' 

Clyde. 

" Regret to complain construction of H.M.S. delayed through 

workmen absenting themselves from work through excessive drinking." 

The Captains-Superintendent of the Clyde and Tyne districts, who supervise the 
warships being built and repaired by contract, are very well placed to form an opinion 
on this matter. 

The Captain-Superintendent on the Tyne (which district includes the north-east 
coast of England and Barrow) reported on 26th February that the early morning 
drink was responsible for a great deal of the short time, and that it would be a great 
help if the public-houses were closed until 10 a.m. In a later report he stated that 
;< everyone agrees that if the pubs could be closed until 10 a.m. things would 
improve, and they should close at 9 p.m., being open say from 5 or 6 p.m. In this 
district no one in uniform can be served between 1 and 6 p.m., so I would advocate 
closing altogether for those times — and not only in the neighbourhood of the shipyards. 
I have spoken to some of the foreman class, and they tell me 90 per cent, of the men 
would approve." 

The Captain-Superintendent of the Clyde district considers that the one thing 
needed to get the full output of work is to prohibit the sale of all spirits. 

In a further report, he states that the drinking is on the increase and is 
causing delay and bad work ; and. as a remedy he proposes the prohibition of 
spirits and of the sale of liquor by the bottle by public-house, grocers, &c, and the 
restriction of the hours during which public-houses are open. 

The Captain-Superintendent of the torpedo-boat destroyers building in various 
parts of the country reports that " the main difficulty that contractors have to contend 
against is the inability on the part of the men to work full time, and the only way to 
meet the difficulty appears to be to have some form of enlisted labour, or further 
restrictions imposed on the licensed houses in the vicinity of shipyards." 

An officer, who is overseeing the construction of vessels building by a 
firm on the North-East Coast, reports, " The time-keeping of the men is not 
at all satisfactory ; whole gangs are thrown out owing to the absence of three 
[580] B 2 



or four hands. The firm are of opinion that, short of Martial Law, the only 
thing to stop it is to stop the sale of spirits." 

The Director of Naval Equipment's report, after his visit to the Tyne, is 
appended (p. 10) ; a further report has now been received from him after a visit to the 

Clyde. 

In this be states that " the conditions of labour on the Clyde are such that, except 
tor one or two firms, the abstentions are so great as to cause a serious loss of time, and 
consequent difficulty in meeting contracts. 

" When war broke out the opening of public-houses was limited to the hours of 
10 a.m. to 10 p.m., and this has had a beneficial result, but does not entirely meet the 
case, ami if is generally considered that much greater restrictions should be imposed 
in the hours that liquor may be sold, and that such restriction should apply to all 
rlassrs equally." 

The foregoing remarks have reference chiefly to the large shipbuilding yards and 
engineering works, but amongst these are included some of the largest armament firms, 
who are manufacturing munitions of war of all sorts. The output of the last is 
also adversely affected by the drink question. The manager of works on the 
North-East Coast, where large quantities of shell are manufactured, stated that if the 
two public-houses just outside the works could be closed his output would be very 
largely increased. 

The question of the extent to which it is desirable or necessary to curtail the sale 
of intoxicants involves serious national considerations, and is not a matter for one or 
two Government departments only, but from the point of view of Admiralty work it 
does not appear that partial measures are likely to be successful, judging from the 
results of the partial restriction of opening of public-houses which has been in 
operation on the Clyde during the war. 

Total prohibition, with all its attendant objections and disadvantages, would at 
least have the general effect that all classes would at last realise the existence and 
seriousness of the war, and that they were personally involved in its consequences. 

A great principle, such as " prohibition for the war," will probably depend for 
its success largely on details, such as the convenience of obtaining hot and cold 
non-alcoholic drinks, both outside and inside the yards and works. 

Further, an attractive scheme for saving the large amount of money earned by 
the men, of which so much is now spent in drink (which might possibly be worked 
through the Government Insurance organization), seems well worthy of consideration, 
but should in no way delay decision and action on the vital question of restricting the 
sale of intoxicants. 



Enclosures. 

(A.) — Submarine engine-shop. Time lost by fitters. 

(B.) — Time lost by ironworkers at shipyard on North-East Coast. 

(C.)— Time lost by workmen on repairs of a battleship. 

(D.) — Time lost by workmen at shipyards on North-East Coast. 

(E.) — Copy of report from Captain Barttelot (Captain-Superintendent, Clyde 
district), dated the 25th March, 1915. 



(A.) 
Submarine Engine Shop. 



Lost Time by Fitters working on Submarine Engine Work from 6 a.m. on Monday, 
March 1, to 12 o'clock noon on Saturday, March 6, 1915. 

Monday, March 1, 1915. 

Total number of fitters employed . . . . . . . . 135 

Only 60 of these worked a full day (9^ hours). 

The following- statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — • 

Hours. 

20 were absent all day, time lost . . . . . . . . 190 

2 worked 3-| hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 12 

1 worked 5 hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 4^ 

52 worked 7 hours, time lost . „ . . . . . . 130 



Total .. .. .. .. .. 3361 



135 fitters working full time .. .. .. .. 1,282-^- 

Actual time worked by 135 fitters . . . . . . . . 946 

Time lost . . . . . . . . 336-| 

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 35 men working full time. 

/ 



Tuesday, March 2, 1915. 

Total number of fitters employed . , . . . . . . 135 

Only 90 of these worked a full day (91 hours). 

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — > 

Hours. 
18 were absent all day, time lost . . . . . . . . 171 

27 worked 7 hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 67-^- 



xotai •» .. .. .. •• Zoo-^y 



135 fitters working full time,. .. .. ... .. 1>2821 

Actual time worked by 135 fitters . . . . . . . . 1,044 

Time lost . . . . . . . . . . 238^- 

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 25 men working full time. 



Wednesday, March 3, 1915. 

Total number of fitters employed .. .. .. .. 135 

Only 86 of these worked a full day (9^ hours). 

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — • 

Hours. 
21 were absent all day, time lost .. .. .. .. 199^ 

28 worked 7 hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 70 



Total .. .. .. .. .. 2691 



135 fitters working full time . . . . . . . . 1,282^ 

Actual time worked by 135 fitters .. .. .. .. 1,013 

Time lost . . . . . . . . . . 269^ 

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 28 men working full time* 
[580] B 3 



6 



Thursday, March 1, 1915. 

Total number of litters employed 

Only 77 of these worked a full day (9.J hours). 

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder :- 

22 were absent all day, time lost 

1 worked -', hours, time lost 

1 worked 2 hours, time lost 
8j) worked 7 hours, time lost 

1 wo'rkcd 6 hours, time lost 

J. oral . • •• . • . • • •• 

135 titters working 1 full time 
Actual time Avorked by 135 litters 



135 



Hours. 
209 

7 

n 

821 

3091 

1,2821 
973 



3091 



Time lost 
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 32 men working fall time. 



Friday, March 5, 1915. 

Total number of fitters employed . . . . > * 

Only 91 of these worked a full day (9i hours). 

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder 

16 were absent all day, time lost .. . . .. 

1 worked 3^- hours, time lost 
27 worked 7 hours, time lost 

Total 

135 fitters working full time 

Actual time worked by 135 fitters . . 



135 



Hours. 
152 
6 
671 



2251 



1,2821 
1,057 



2251 



Time lost . . . . ... 

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 24 men working full time. 



Saturday, March 6, 1915. 

Total number of fitters employed 

Only 103 of these worked a full day (5i hours). 



135 



The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — 

Hours. 



17 were absent all day, time lost 
15 worked 3 hours, time lost 

Total . . 

135 fitters working full time. . 
Actual time worked by 135 fitters 

Time lost 






931 
371 



131 



7421 
61H 



131 



This represents a total loss on the day's working of 24 men working full time. 



Summary. 



Monday, 
March!. 



Tuesday, 
March 2. 



Wednesday, 
March 3. 



Thursday, 
March 4. 



Friday, 
March 5. 



Saturday, 
March 6. 



135 fitters working full time. . (hours) 
Actual time worked by 135 fitters( „ ) 
Number of men w r ho worked full time 
Number of men who worked 7 hours . . 
Number of men who were absent all day 



1,2821 

946" 

60 

52 

20 



1,2821 

1,044 

90 

27 

18 



1,2821 

1,013 

86 

28 

21 



1,2821 

973 

77 

33 

22 



'>i 



l,28z 

1,057' 
91 
27 
16 



7421 
61H 
103" 

15* 

17 



135 fitters working full time for one week (53 hours) == 7,155 hours. 

Actual hours worked by 135 fitters in one week = 5, 644^ „ 

Time lost by 135 fitters in one week = 1,510| „ 

This represents a total loss on the week's working of 28 men working 53 hours each. 



* 3 hours each. 



(B.) 



Statement of Lost Time of Ironworkers in a Shipyard on the North-East Coast. 



Trades. 


Pay ending 
1915. 


Number 
of Men. 


Possible 
Hours. 


Hours Lost. 


Percentage 
Lost Time, 




Riveters . . 


Jan. 2G . . 


219 


11,169 


3,576 


32 






Feb. 2 . . 


203 


10,353 


3,333 


32 






9 .. 


211 


10,716 


3,770 


35 






„ 16 .. 


203 


10,353 


3,869 


37 






i, 2o . . 


210 


11,340 


4,002 


35 






March 2 . . 


215 


11,610 


4,270 


37 






,, J . . 


216 


11,664 


4,034 


35 




Platers 


Feb. 2 . . 


213 


10,863 


2,797 


25-75 






,, y . . 


216 


11,016 


2,525 


22-92 






>, 16 •• 


220 


- 11,220 


2,380 


21-24 






„ 23 .. 


222 


11,988 


3,251 


27 






March 2 . . 


226 


12,204 


3,615 


30 






„ 9 .. 


230 


12,420 


3,350 


27 




Caulkers 


Feb. 9 . 


60 


3,060 


575 


18-79 






„ 16 .. 


62 


3,162 


627 


20-00 






„ 23 . . 


64 


3,456 


859 


25 






March 2 . . 


67 


3,618 


834 


23 






q 


80 


4,320 


978 


23 




Drillers 


Feb. 9 . . 


128 


6,528 


1,205 


18-45 






„ 16 .. 


130 


6,630 


1,223 


18-44 






,, 23 


130 


7,020 


1,457 


21 






March 2 , 


129 


6,966 


1,634 


23 








141 


7,614 


2,162 


28 





Percenta.ge of Absentees in the Ironworkers' Department of same Shipyard, 

Monday, 22nd March, 1915. 



Trades. 


Total Number 
of Men. 


Absent at 

6 A.M. 


Percentage 
Absent from 

6 A.M. to 9 A.M. 


Absent 

at 9 a.m. 

and All Day. 


Percentage 
Absent 
All Day. 


Riveters 


241 


217 


90 


68 


28 


Holders-on 


110 


104 


95 


39 


36 


Platers 


232 


164 


71 


39 


17 


Platers' helpers 


404 


350 


87 


107 


26 



Percentage of Time Lost by Ironworkers in the same Shipyard, 

Monday, 22nd March, 1915. 



[580] 



Trades. 


Total 
No. of Men. 


Absent 
All Day. 


Percentage 

Absent 

All Day. 


Possible 
Hours. 


Hours Lost, 

including 

Parts of 

Day. 


Percentage 

of Hours 

Lost. 

1 


Riveters 
llolders-ou 
Platers 
Helpers 


241 
110 
232 
404 


68 

39 

39 

107 


28 
36 
17 
26 


2,349 
1,073 
2,262 
3,939 


1,035 
542 
692 

1,650 


44 
51 
31 
42 



B 4 



8 



Analysis of Riveters' Time for week ending February 9, 1915. 
Total riveters employed, 211, of which. — 



1 6 were absent whole week 

11 „ 40 hours aud under 51 hours 



14 

41 
50 
65 
14 



)> 



40 



30 



30 

20 

10 „ „ 20 „ 

from 2 to 10 hours . . 

no t ime . . 



Per cent. 

7-58 

5-21 

6-64 

19-43 

23-70 

30-80 

6-64 

100 



211 men at 51 hours = 10,761 hours ; lost time, 3,770 hours = 35 per cent., an 
increase of 3 per cent, over the preceding two weeks. 



(C.) 

Time Lost by Workmen on Repairs of a Battleship. 





Average per 


Day before Ac 


vance 


Average per Day since Advance 




Granted. 






Granted. 







No. 
on 




Absentees. 




No. 
on 


Absentees. 
























Books. 




Per 




Per 


Books. 




Per 




Per 






6 A.M. 


Cent. 


9 A.M. 


Cent. 




6 A.M. 


Cent. 


9 A.M. 


Cent. 


Ironworkers 


162 


38 


23 


22 


14 


198 


64 


32 


32 


16 


Platers 


20 


6 


30 


3 


15 


24 


8 


33 


5 


21 


Riveters and holders-on 


142 


32 


23 


19 


13 


174 


56 


32 


27 


16 


Drillers 


46 


18 


39 


12 


26 


36 


19 


53 


11 


30 


Carpenters 


58 


14 


24 


8 


14 


55 


13 


24 


7 


13 



(D.) 

Time Lost by Workmen at Shipyards on North-East Coast. 





Average per Week from 
to March 9. 


February 9 


Week ending March 16. 






Absentees. 








Absentees. 






No. on 
Books. 








No. on 
Books. 












Per 




Per 




Per 




Per 






6 A.M. 


Cent. 


9 A.M. 


Cent. 




6 A.M. 


Cent. 


9 A.M. 


Cent. 


Shipyard A. 






















Ironworkers 


200 


134 


67 


53 


27 


223 


147 


66 


64 


29 


Platers 


66 


37 


56 


11 


17 


69 


37 


54 


12 


17 


Riveters and Holders-OD. . 


134 


97 


72 


42 


31 


154 


110 


71 


52 


34 


Drillers 


25 


14 


56 


<fc5 


20 


16 


12 


46 


5 


19 


Carpenters 


57 


23 


40 


L9 


16 


65 


26 


40 


13 


20 


Shipyard B. 








titii i .- 














Ironworkers 


298 


145 


49 


55 


18 


288 


108 


38 


34 


12 


Platers 


150 


58 


39 


20 


13 


136 


41 


30 


12 


9 


Riveters and Holders-on. . 


148 


87 


59 


35 


23 


152 


67 


44 


22 


14 


Drillers 


73 


29 


40 


xl3 


18 


91 


22 


24 


11 


12 


Carpenters 


89 


19 


21 


7 


8 


100 


12 


12 


5 


5 



9 

(No. 425/456.) 

Sir, 3, Clyde View, Partick, Glasgow, March 25, 1915. 

IN accordance with the directions contained in your telegram of the 20th March, 
calling for proposals that will facilitate the completion of H. M. ships, I have the 
honour to report on the effect of drink on the output of work. 

2. From close observation — and my opinion is shared by all the managers of 
shipyards — the amount drunk by a section of the men is much greater than it was 
before the war, and it is on the increase. Those principally concerned are the iron- 
workers and shipwrights, and on their efficiency the output entirely depends. 

3. The sole reason for this heavy drinking is that the men earn more money than 
they know what to do with. 

4. In a shipyard last week where a warship is under repair, work on the 
inner bottom of the ship was so badly carried out as to suggest at once on inspection 
that it could not have been done by men who were sober. It was dangerous, and had 
to be condemned. In the same yard (and it is common in most others) drunken men, 
nominally at work, have had to be removed. Men are bringing or smuggling liquor 
into the yards in bottles, and facilities for buying spirits in bulk at public-houses and 
at licensed grocers must be stopped. 

5. All this (and the serious point is that it is getting worse) has a much greater 
effect on delay than the shortage of labour. 

6. I cannot state too forcibly my own opinion that the total prohibition of the sale 
of spirits would be the most effective act that could at the present time be taken to 
win this war. Any measure less drastic will not be a cure ; it will keep alive the 
craving which has been growing after six months' indulgence, and some men will 
endeavour to satisfy it by keeping away from work. 

7. The hours I recommend for the public-houses to be open for the sale of drink 
(not spirits) are from — 

Noon till 2 p.m. 

and 
7 p.m. till 9 p.m. 

and drink must be consumed on the premises, a prohibition being placed on the sale of 
liquor by the bottle by public-houses and by licensed grocers. 

8. As to the districts in which restrictions should be enforced, they cannot be too 
wide. Public-houses here are opened at 10 a.m., and I am informed by the manager 
of one yard that some of his men have been known to go several miles before coming 
in to work in the morning in order to obtain drink under the travellers' clause. I 
would like to see — and in this view I am supported by all shipbuilders on the Clyde — 
the whole city of Glasgow, and from there down to Gourock and Dumbarton on either 
side of the river, included in the restricted areas. 

9. If that is not considered possible, then the following districts closely connected 
with shipyards must be the minimum : — 

On the North Bank — On the South Bank- 



All Finnieston. 
All Partick. 
All Whiteinch. 
All Scotstoun. 
All Clydebank. 
All Dalmuir. 
All Dumbarton. 



From Kinning Park. 

All Govan. 

All Renfrew. 

All Port Glasgow. 

All Greenock. 

All Gourock. 



I would also submit that a most beneficial effect would be produced if the men 
could be told by some leading statesman exactly and very plainly where they are 
failing their country. They have been flattered and told what splendid fellows* they 
were just at the time when slackness was beginning to set in, and this has not had a 
good result. It is not that the men (I am referring always to the men who drink) are 
bad at heart or unpatriotic, but they have failed through weakness and opportunity, 
and they know they have failed and would at heart welcome being corrected and 
put right. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) BRIAN H. F. BARTTELOT. 



to 



III. 



Report by Captain Greatorex, R.N., Director of Naval Equipment, 
dated 4th March, 1915, to Third Sea Lord. 

THE condition of labour is deplorable, and the men are in a most uncertain and 
and spendable stale. This is so serious, that at any time the whole of the ship- 
building work on the Tyne may come to a standstill. 

Sunday working is of little value, as the money paid for Sunday work leads to 
abstention from all work for often two days, and a Sunday worker will frequently not 
return till Wednesday. 

The money earned is sufficient to satisfy the men's standard of living, and 
anything extra beyond ordinary wages encourages abstention to enable loafing in 
public-houses, instead of doing their honest day's work. 

The opening of public-houses at early morning conduces to abstention from work 
till after breakfast, and then the work is unsatisfactory, due to the amount that has 
been imbibed. 

I was informed by one of the firms that the average non-attendance of workmen 
amounts to 1'45 days in six days' work, practically 25 per cent, of time is lost. 

Unless something drastic in the way of measures is taken, I fear that the state of 
deliveries of ships and vessels of all kinds will be most seriously affected ; but in the 
present frame of mind of the men, drastic measures might have the effect of producing 
a critical situation. On the other hand, further extra grants and bonuses only 
accentuate the present deplorable indifference of the workmen to their duty and to 
attendance to their daily work. 

The only approach to a solution that was suggested as being likely to do good 
was to partially or totally close all public-houses, and that all offers of extra wages 
were most harmful, and only accentuated the difficulty. 

I make the foregoing remarks with a full sense of the fact that it is not my 
personal duty to enquire into these matters, but these facts were apparent in the 
course of my visit of inspection to the ships building in the Tyne district, and as the 
deliveries of ships are being so influenced by these facts, I consider it my duty to bring 
them to your notice. 

C. GREATOREX, 
Director of Naval Equipment. 



m 

REPORT OF DEPUTATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM 
THE SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYERS 5 FEDERATION ON 
29th MARCH, 1915. 

(Extract from " The Times " of the 30th March, 1915.) 

AN important deputation from the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation was 
received yesterday at the Treasury by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary 
for Scotland. With Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. McKinnon Wood were : — 

Mr. E. S. Montagu, M.P., Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, M.P., Rear-Admiral Tudor, Rear- 
Admiral Morgan Singer, Captain Greatorex, R.N., Major-General S. B. von Donop, Sir 
Francis Hopwood, and Sir George Gibb. 

The following representatives of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation w r ere 
present : — 

Mr. G. J. Carter (Messrs. Cammell, Laird, and Co., Limited, Birkenhead), 
Mr. James Marr (Messrs. J. L. Thompson and Co., Limited, Sunderland), 
Mr. H. B. Rowell (Messrs. R. and W. Hawthorn Leslie and Co., Hebburn-on-Tyne), 
Mr. H. M. Napier (Messrs. Napier and Miller, Limited, Old Kilpatrick), Colonel 
R. Saxton White, Mr. F. E. W. Coller, Sir Charles Ottley (Sir W. G. Armstrong, 



11 

Whitwortli, and Co., limited, Walker-on-Tyne and Newcastle-on-Tyne), Mr. F. N. 
Henderson (Messrs. D. and W. Henderson and Co., Limited, Partick, Glasgow), Colonel 
J. M. Denny (Messrs. William Denny and Brothers, Dumbarton), Mr. A. B. Gowan 
(Messrs. Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company, Limited, Jarrow and Hebbum-on- 
Tyne), Mr. N. E. Peck (Messrs. Barclay,. Curie, and Co., Limited, Whiteinch, Glasgow, 
and Messrs. Swan, Hunter, and Wigham Richardson, Limited, Neptune and Wallsend- 
on-Tyne), Mr. George Jones (Sir William Gray and Co., Limited, Hartlepool), Mr. W. 
Beardmore Stewart (Messrs. Beardmore and Co., Limited, Dalmuir, Glasgow), Mr. J. B. 
Hutchison (Messrs. Scott's Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Limited, Greenock), 
Mr. J. Barr (Messrs. Vickers, Limited, Barrow), Mr. J. Hamilton (The Fairfield Ship- 
building and Engineering Company, Limited, Govan), and Mr. Thomas Biggart and 
Mr. James Cameron, joint secretaries. 

The deputation, which was representative of the leading shipbuilding firms in 
the country, was unanimous in urging that, in order to meet the national requirements 
at the present time, and the urgent necessities of the position, there should be a total 
prohibition during the period of the war of the sale of excisable liquors. It was 
represented by them that mere restriction of hours, or even total prohibition, within 
certain war work areas, was not sufficient, as certain classes would be entirely 
unaffected, and it was felt by the deputation that total prohibition should apply as 
an emergency war measure not only to public-houses, but to private clubs and other 
licensed premises, so as to operate equally for all classes of the community. In 
putting forward these views, those who spoke on behalf of the deputation expressed 
themselves as satisfied that there was a general consensus of opinion on the part of 
the workers favourable to total prohibition along the lines indicated. 

Less Worh than Before the War. 

It was stated that in many cases the number of hours being worked was actually 
less than before the war, and, in spite of Sunday labour and all other time, the total 
time worked on the average in almost all yards was below the normal number of hours 
per week. In spite of working night and day seven days a week, less productiveness 
was being secured from the men. The deputation was of opinion that this wa*s 
principally due to the question of drink. There were many men doing splendid and 
strenuous work, probably as good as the men in the trenches. But so many were not 
working anything like full hours that the average was thus disastrously reduced. 
The members of the deputation stated that, speaking with the experience of from 
twenty-five to forty years, they believed that 80 per cent, of the present avoidable 
loss of time could be ascribed to no other cause than drink. The figures of weekly 
takings in public-houses near the yards were convincing evidence of the increased sale 
of liquor. Allowing for the enhanced price of intoxicants and for the greater number 
of men now employed in shipbuilding, the takings had in one case under observation 
risen 20 per cent., in another -±0 per cent. 

Curtailment, in the opinion of the deputation, resulted in excessive drinking 
during the shortened hours. The takings of certain public-houses which had had 
their hours reduced from 10 to 9 had actually increased, and there had been a 
considerable growth in the pernicious habit of buying spirits by the bottle and taking 
it away to drink elsewhere. It was this " drinking habit " rather than drunkenness 
that the deputation had to face. The cost of the drink habit was sufficiently illustrated 
by the case of a battleship coming in for immediate repairs and having these repairs 
delayed a whole day through the absence of the riveters for the purpose of drink and 
conviviality. This case was one of hundreds. 

This was not the only reason in favour oE prohibition as against curtailment. As 
long as public-houses were open there would be found men to break the rules of the 
yard and come late to work in order to secure drink beforehand. And the indisposition 
to work after the consumption of excessive alcohol was too obvious to need elaboration. 

Different members of the deputation gave different hours for their week's total 
of labour, but it was emphasised that the important factor was not the average time 
worked, but the time worked by certain of the most important branches. In one 
yard, for example, the riveters had only been working on the average forty hours per 
week, in another only thirty -six hours. 

The deputation drew attention to the example set by Russia and France, and 
urged upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the need of strong and immediate 
action. 



12 



(C.) 

SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE 
GOVERNMENT BY THE SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYERS' 
FEDERATION. 



HOURS ACTUALLY WORKED BY IRONWORKERS. 

THE Shipbuilding Employers' Federation have laid before the Government 
detailed figures for the month of March 1915, taken out by 48 representative firms. Of 
these 48 firms, 15 are in the Clyde district, 27 in the North-East Coast district, and 
6 at Birkenhead, Barrow, or Hull. 

The figures analysed are not selected or merely illustrative figures. They are the 
record of the actual number of hours worked by every " ironworker " separately 
tabulated, and the resulting percentages are therefore based on precise and exhaustive 
facts. 

By iron workers are meant : platers, riveters, holders-on, heaters, angle-iron 
smiths, caulkers, and drillers. The work of these men determines the output of each 
shipbuilding yard. 

The ordinary working week for ironworkers is 53 or 54 hours a week according 
to district (excluding overtime). Analysis of the hours now actually being worked 
shows that in spite of the effort to increase the output by overtime, the hours actually 
being worked are less than the hours of a normal week in a time of peace. Only a 
quarter of the ironworkers are working more than this. 



Table I. 

Hours actually Worked by Ironworkers in March 1915. 
(Standard Week in Time of Peace 53 or 54 hours (excluding Overtime).) 



Over 80 hours 


per wee 


k . 


» 


. . 


)> 


75 hours 


per week and 


up 


to 80 


>» 


70 


11 


ii 


)) 


ii 


75 


)) 


65 


11 


ii 


)j 


ii 


70 


)> 


60 


11 


ii 


■ ii 


ii 


65 


n 


53- 


54 „ 


ii 


ii 


yi 


60 


j) 


50 


ii 


ii 


ii 


ii 


53-54 


» 


45 


>i 


ii 


ii 


») 


50 


n 


40 


ii 


ii 


ii 


j) 


45 


11 


35 


n 


j) 


ii 


ii 


40 


;) 


30 


ii 


ii 


ii 


ii 


35 


11 


25 


ii 


ii 


ii 


)) 


30 


)t 


20 


ii 


ii 


)> 


ii 


25 


>! 


20 hours 


a week 


or under 


• * 



Per thousand. 


Men. 




1 


18 




4 


74 




15 


16 




36 


37 




62 


02 




120 


42 




113 


8 




147 


1 




139 


°1 




136 


"H 


493 


91' 




men 


55 


out of 


30 


3.1 


1,000. 


40 


6J 





The above analysis shows conclusively — 

(a.) Only 24 per cent, of the men are working more than a normal week of 

53-54 hours. 
(b.) Of the remaining 76 per cent., 40 per cent, are working between 40 hours a 

week and the normal week of 53-54 hours ; 36 per cent, are working under 

40 hours per week, 
(c.) 493 men out of every 1,000 are in time of war working less than 45 hours a 

week. 



13 



Comparison of Districts 



This state of things is not peculiar to any one district. The following table shows 
the comparison between the Clyde and the North- East Coast ironworkers : — ■ 



Table II. 

Comparisons between Clyde and North-East Coast Ironworkers. 



Clyde 
North-East Coast 

Clyde 
North-East Coast 

Clyde 
North-East Coast 



2 7 '6 per cent, worked over 53-54 hours per week. 
19-7 



39-4 
40-5 

33 

39-8 



>> >> j) 

„ 40 hours and under 53-54. 

>> >> J3 

., under 40 hours per week. 

)) >5 >> 



An examination of the detailed statistics increases the significance of the 
summarised figures. For example, detailed sheets from a very important firm show 
in the case of every one of their " drillers " for four weeks in March how far each 
man — 

(a.) Failed to come to work until after breakfast ; or 
(b.) Was absent from work all day. 

From these sheets it appeared : — 

1. The vast majority of the men fail either in (a) or (6). 

2. A minority of workmen are absolutely regular in their attendance. They keep 

uniformly good time. There are also a few cases where the only absence 
throughout the period is an occasional absence before breakfast. 

3. Many workmen made it an almost regular habit not to come until after 

breakfast. 

4. When a workman keeps bad time, it is nearly always continued for several 

days running. Many of them are absent from work altogether for three, 
four, or five days. 

The effect of the detailed sheets about the " drillers " is shown in the following 
table. Similar results can be worked out for any other of the ironworkers : — 



Table III. 

Record of 159 Drillers during 22 Datjs (8th March-lst April). 




Average per Day. 



Cases of " out all day " 

Cases of " out first quarter," i.e., until 
after breakfast hour (including those 
" out all day ") 



25 out of 159 men, or 15'7 

per cent. 
85 out of 159 men, or 53 per 

cent. 



It must be remembered that these figures represent absences during ordinary 
working hours. 

Another set of figures supplied by the same firm compares the absences from 
work of men in the Shipyard Department with those of men in (1) the Engine and 
Boiler Shops and (2) the Repair Department. The special importance of these figures 
is that they show that while engineers are not as bad as shipyard workers, they are also 
keeping very bad time, while the bad time kept in the Repair Department is (having 
regard to the urgency of repairs) a specially serious matter. 



14 

The figures provided show the number of men of each class (platers, joiners, 
pattern-makers, litters, &c.) who were out all day for each day between the 1st March 

and the 8th April. 

The Bgures have been extracted for a fortnight and put m summary tormina 

table as follows : — 

Table IV. 

Men out all Day. 






Shipyard 
Department 
(4,900 Men). 


Engine and 
Boiler Shop 
Department 
(4,500 Men). 


Repair 

Department 

(average of 

about 1,000) 


(No Sunday work.) 








Monday March 8 


669 


317 


416 


Tuesday, „ 9 


627 


291 


447 


Wednesday, ,, 10 


564 


273 


318 


Thursday ,, 11 


670 


284 


297 


Friday, „ 12 


567 


287 


263 


Saturday, „ 13 


686 


311 


260 


(No Sunday work.) 








Monday, March 15 


624 


290 


381 


Tuesday, „ 16 


602 


299 


327 


Wednesday, „ 17 


633 


296 


284 


Thursday, „ 18 


690 


304 


301 


Friday, ,,19 


609 


297 


313 


Saturday, „ 20 


629 


321 


260 


(No Sunday work.) 









The following points should be specially noted : — 

1. Monday and Saturday are usually the worst clays. (There must have been 

some special cause influencing the 17th and 18th March.) 

2. No Sunday work was being clone, so the men had a week-end rest. 

3. These figures are limited to all-day absence. No account is taken of failure to 

work before breakfast. 

4. Absences in the Repair Department are particularly serious, and though 

engineers are not so bad, their figures indicate great delay in construction. 



The 2nd to 5th April were holidays. On Tuesday the Gth April, 1.798 men of the 
Shipyard Department failed to turn up ; 1,431 of the Engine and Boiler Shops, and 
666 in the Repair Department ; and the absences continued abnormal for some days. 
On the 7th April, 2,916 men were out from work the first quarter of the-day, of whom 
1,670 remained out all day. Even on the 8th, 2,500 were out the first quarter, and 
1,500 remained out all day. The importance of these last figures lies in the fact that 
three days' holidays had been given to the men in these yards. 



15 

Is Drink the Cause of this abnormal Loss of Time f 

The evidence is really overwhelming that the main canse of this alarming- 
loss of time is the "lure of drink." The employers say so most emphatically; 
the Admiralty have received elaborate reports emphasising the same conclusion 
in the case of shipbuilding, repairs, munitions of war, and transport. The Home 
Office reports are to the same effect, and the detailed figures summarised above are, in 
themselves, strong evidence that drink is the cause. A section of each class of 
workmen keep perfectly good time throughout the week, and therefore the cause 
is not one which is common to all workmen, or due to any general industrial 
condition. The worst time is generally kept after wages are paid, and at the beginning 
of the following week. When absence from work occurs the workman is usually absent 
for several days together. Staleness and fatigue no doubt must arise from working 
during long hours over an extended period, but inasmuch as half the men are not in 
fact working for more than 45 hours a week, the cause must be found elsewhere. The 
testimony of observers in each district is that drink is by far the most important factor. 
The facilities for excessive drinking in the immediate vicinity of these works are 
abundant ; the men in many cases work at a long distance from their homes. The 
restriction of hours in these districts has rather tended to concentrate drinking into a 
period without diminishing the temptation, or limiting the quantity consumed. 

The contention that the cause of irregular hours is the excessive time worked is 
completely disposed of by observing that on average the time worked is unfortunately 
not so great as the standard in time of peace. The figures show, not that workmen 
who have been working long hours for days together occasionally take a day off, but 
that while some workmen are working steadily day by day for long hours, those who 
fail to work even ordinary hours are continually repeating this failure. 

In conclusion it may be pointed out the detailed returns which have been furnished 
by the Shipbuilders' Federation show that during the four weeks of March, 670,000 hours 
of work have been avoidably lost. This is no less than 25 per cent, of the normal 
working hours. 



(B.) 

EXTRACT PROM LETTER DATED 26th MARCH, 1915, PROM 
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE TO THE FIRST LORD 
OF THE ADMIRALTY:— 

I AM very uneasy about the labour situation on the Clyde and Tyne. I have sent 
a telegram or two lately about it. Your may think I am exceeding my sphere of action 
in doing so, but the efficiency of this Fleet is so affected by it that I felt it my duty 
to wire. 

To-day an officer in a responsible position arrived. His account of things on the 
Clyde was most disquieting. He said that the men refused altogether to work on 
Saturday afternoon, that they took Wednesday afternoon off every week (if not the 
whole of Wednesday), and worked on Sunday because they got double pay for it. He 
said also that they only worked in a half-hearted manner. My destroyer dockings 
and refits are delayed in every case by these labour difficulties, and they take twice as 
long as they need do. I feel that you ought to know the facts, and so put them 
before you now. 

* # # # # 



16 



(E.) 

REPORTS FROM ARMAMENT WORKS. 

THESE are not as serious as those received from the shipyards. They indicate, 
however, that much time is avoidably lost in some of the most important works. 

For example, this is a report received on the 19th March, 1915, from important 
works engaged in the manufacture of munitions : — 

" Some drastic restrictions are absolutely necessary if largest possible output 

of certain war munitions is to be obtained Among some shell workers 

there is a considerable amount of lost time due to their drinking habits. With 
the better class mechanics the time lost due to drinking is comparatively small, but 
in the case of labourers and the semi-skilled trade it is a very serious item." 

Another most important firm reports : — 

" Speaking generally, margin of lost time allowed by us before the war has 
now to be trebled. Condition much worse in shipyards. Much of this loss of time 
is attributable to drink." 

In another report from these works it is said : — 

" Loss of time from drink most noticeable in shell department, about 10 per 
cent, of total time worked." 

In another important munitions works : — 

" Avoidable loss of time considerable among a minority." 

Even in districts least heard of in this connection, and from which fewest complaints 
are received, all say that work would be considerably improved were there a restriction 
of facilities for the sale of intoxicating liquor. 

The following are particulars of a week's work in April in one of the most 
important shell shops in England : — 



Pabticulabs of Times Worked in Week Ending April 13, 1915^ 

Per thousand. 



Working over 80 hours per week 



11 


I a 


UJJ IA 


i ou nui 


no p 


J- 
11 


70 


11 


75 


11 


)) 


65 


)) 


70 


)) 


11 


60 


11 


65 


1) 


11 


53 


)) 


60 


11 


11 


50 


11 


53 


11 


!) 


45 


11 


50 


11 


11 


40 


11 


45 


11 


11 


35 


11 


40 


1) 


)) 


30 


5) 


35 


11 


11 


25 


11 


30 


11 


11 


20 


11 


25 


)) 


)) 


20 


and under 


?! 






Percentage who have worked 53 hours per week and over 
Percentage who have worked 40 hours per week and under 53 . . 
Percentage who have worked under 40 hours per week 

Note. — The percentage of time lost for the corresponding- week of last year 

Here is a report, dated the 16th March, 1915, which came from works engaged in 
the manufacture of high explosives : — ■ 



Men. 


94 


37 


86 


77 


177 


42 


130 


00 


156 


27 


100 


96 


38 


83 


39 


33 


23 


7 


31 


2 


10 


18 


12 


72 


16 


•07 


82 


•22 


74 


■57 


10 


•19 


15 


■24 


amounted to 7 "8 



1 We would also take this opportunity of expressing in the strongest possible 
manner our opinion that something should be done in this district to curtail the 
sale of drink. We fear that unless drastic steps are taken to lessen the sale of 
alcohol, before long we shall find it impossible to deliver anything like the quantities 



17 

of trinitrotoluene we have undertaken to supply to your department. Even at 
the present time we are not turning out as much as we could otherwise, owing to 
various troubles, and this is due to the fact that the men have been making good 
money and unfortunately wasting most of it in drink. Consequently, they are in 
such a condition that it is impossible for them to attend to their duties in a proper 
manner even when they come to the works, which is at odd timesjand to suit their 
own convenience." 

There are several works engaged in the production of munitions of which this is not 
in the least true. Here again the great majority of the workmen are above reproach, 
and their action is praiseworthy-. 



(F.) 

REPORT OF ENQUIRIES MADE BY THE HOME OFFICE 
IN REGARD TO LOSS OF TIME IN THE SHIPBUILDING 
TRADES. 

THE enquiries were made by 33 investigators, 17 of whom were sent to 
various places on the Clyde, 6 to Newcastle and the Tyne, 4 to Barrow, and 2 each 
to Sunderland, Stockton, and West Hartlepool respectively. The enquiries occupied 
three days, from the 1st to the 3rd April inclusive. 

Separate districts were marked out for each investigator. Detailed instructions were 
given them in which they were asked to ascertain the principal causes which had led to 
the loss of time among the workers, and the questions put to them were so framed as 
not to prejudice their judgment. 

Each investigator made a separate report of the results of his enquiry without 
collaboration with his colleagues. A general summary of these reports is attached, 
followed by a more detailed summary of the reports, arranged according to districts. 

The enquiries made by these investigators have been supplemented by reports from 
three factory inspectors, which are printed in full. 

April 12, 1915. 



(1.)— REPORTS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS. 

(a.) General Summary. 

Shipbuilding is the main industry of the districts visited, but there are also many 
engineering works and other factories engaged on Government contracts. 

Owing to the demands made by the war on the trades engaged in shipbuilding and 
the manufacture of munitions, the pressure of work in these districts is unprecedented. 
The demand for labour is greater than the supply, especially as large numbers of the 
regular workmen have enlisted in the naval or military forces. Wages are uniformly 
high, which means a large increase in the spending power of the working classes. 
Wages of 51. or 61. a week are common, and it is possible for a skilled and energetic 
mechanic to earn as much as 10Z. or 15L a week. 

The hours of work are about fifty-four a week, excluding overtime. The day is 
divided into two shifts of eleven or twelve hours with intervals for meals, but many of 
the men work overtime. There is also a certain amount of Sunday labour with the 
attraction of double pay, but this has not proved altogether a success. Steady workmen 
feel the strain of working seven days a week, while others are disposed to work 
on Sunday and lose time on other days. An important feature of shipbuilding is the 
system of working in gangs consisting of two riveters, one holder-up, and one or two 
boys. While many of the men are working regularly and steadily beyond the normal 
hours, there is a considerable number, especially among the " black squad," in the 
shipbuilding yards who are not working up to the maximum of their capacity. 
[580J C 



18 

The riveters are mentioned particularly, and some distinction is drawn between them 
and the mechanics employed in engineering factories. 

The reasons given for irregularities of attendance are mainly staleness and fatigue 
due to long hours over an extended period: unusually high wages leading to idleness: 
and habits of drinking. It is not altogether possible to isolate these causes, as they are 
more or less closely connected one with another, but the reports are unanimous in the 
conclusion that drink is by far the most important factor. 

Many of the workmen engaged in these industries are, in normal times, heavy 
drinkers, partly, no doubt, owing to the nature of the work. Much of it is hard manual 
labour in severe heat, which creates a desire for stimulant. It is not suggested that all 
the workmen drink heavily. Many of them are abstemious, and in Scotland especially 
there is a considerable proportion of teetotallers. To those who are heavy drinkers, 
the facilities for drinking are unfortunately very great. An instance is given in one 
street where there were no less than thirty public-houses within a distance of 
half-a-mile. The yards and works are surrounded by public-houses and drinking-bars, 
where every possible facility is offered for obtaining drink for consumption both on and 
off the premises. 

The drinking habits of the workmen on the Clyde differ somewhat from those of j 
the English workmen. The popular drink there is half-a-gill of whisky, quickly 
followed by a schooner of beer (about f pint), and the beer is of a heavier quality than 
English beer. This particular combination of liquor, though it does not apparently 
produce much effect on the hardened drinker at the moment, is not calculated to 
improve the capacity of the men for sustained work. Heavy drinking on Saturday in 
the public-houses, and on Sundays in clubs, is described as a feature of the life 
of the workmen on the Clyde, which frequently results in unfitness or loss of time 
at the beginning of the week. There is also a prevalent practice in Scotland of taking 
whisky in bottles home in the evening, especially on Saturday night for consumption on 
Sunday when the public-houses are closed. On the Tyne and in Barrow, spirit 
drinking is not so common, as the popular drink is beer, and the English workman's 
drinking appears to be more evenly distributed over the week, though the effect is very 
much the same in all the districts referred to. 

Apart from the public-house great facilities for drinking are offered by clubs, 
which are open to members and to which visitors can be readily introduced. Thesa 
places are freely resorted to on Sundays when the public-houses are closed. 

Attention is drawn in the reports to the fact that many of the workmen take 
insufficient food, which not only increases the temptation to drink, but makes the effect 
of the liquor taken more injurious, so that the result is to incapacitate the workmen for 
the strain of heavy work. The men whose homes are near the works are able to obtain 
meals without difficulty, but owing to the lack of housing accommodation many 
workmen are obliged to travel long distances to get to their work. This is especially 
the case at Barrow-in-Furness. The usual practice is for the workmen to take cold food 
with them, which is generally consumed in the public-houses with their liquor. 
Reference is made in some of the reports to cases where food could not be obtained at 
the public-houses, and it is evident that the sale of drink is out of all proportion to that 
of food. The reports emphasise the need for mess-rooms and canteens in the yards 
where the men could get good meals in comfort without having to resort to the public- 
houses. Such accommodation is very rarely provided. 

The practice of paying the whole wages of a "black squad" to the leader is also 
said to be productive of drinking, as the men go to the public-house to divide the money, 
and the custom is for each member of the squad to stand drinks all round. 

It is stated that some of the worst offenders in the matter of drinking are 
men who in normal times are not employed in the yards but who now owing to 
the scarcity of labour have been given work. Where a large proportion of the 
steadiest men have enlisted, and great numbers of inferior men are brought in to 
meet the pressure, a general increase in drinking is inevitable. 

The investigators say that trade union restrictions which might tend to diminish 
the output have been very generally abrogated to meet the exceptional conditions, 
though some of the men still display reluctance to undertake different work from that 
to which they are accustomed. 

Much absenteeism is caused by the " black squad " system. If one of the members 
of the squad is absent from idleness, or drinking, the rest of the squad is held up, and 
where several sguads are affected the cumulative result is very marked. To some 



19 

extent this evil is being met by pooling men, so that if one of a squad is away, his place 
can be taken by another. 

The evils of excessive drinking were readily admitted by some of the better 
workmen, who considered that the action of a minority was bringing unmerited discredit 
on the workmen as a whole. Others considered that the part played by drinking had 
been exaggerated, that the workmen had been subjected to too great a pressure and 
were suffering from the strain, and that the deficiency of output was largely due, 
I especially on the Clyde, to the withdrawal of skilled men who should be recalled from 
[the colours. 

(b.) Detailed Summaries. 

The Clyde. 

Scotstouu and Clydebank. — The investigators who visited Scotstoun and Clydebank 
came to the conclusion that the falling-off in output is mainly due to excessive drinking, 
[especially at the week-ends. Fatigue and insufficient food are contributory causes. 
The day-shift men have an interval for dinner from 1*30 to 2'15, when a considerable 
portion of the workmen indulge in drinking. The day-shift ends at 5*30, when a 
smaller number of men take a drink before their tea. At 9 '45 p.m. the night-shift 
men have an interval of ten minutes, when some of them get drink. 

There are large numbers of drinking bars in the neighbourhood of the works with 
circular bars designed for quick service. There is, as a rule, no seating accommodation, 
but they are said to be well conducted. 

Although there is a considerable amount of drinking during meal times, most of 
the drinking takes place on Saturdays at the drinking bars. One of the features of 
these bars is the preparation for drinking after wages have been paid. Three or four 
hundred glasses of whisky are made ready to meet the rush of customers, and in 
some cases some of the workmen are taken on to help in the service. These are called 
" 5s. helpers." If drinking were limited to Saturdays, and the men took a rest on 
Sundays, they might recover in time for the work on Monday, but unfortunately men 
take bottles of whisky home with them, which is frequently consumed the same night. 
Although the public-houses are closed on Sunday, it is also easy for them to obtain 
liquor at the various clubs. These places are restricted to members, but they are able to 
introduce one or more visitors. The clubs are used, not only on Sundays, but also on 
week-days late at night when the public-houses are closed. The normal drink taken by 
the men is half-a-gill of whisky followed by three-quarters of a pint of beer, and the 
gravity of the beer is said to be higher in Scotland than in England. 

The workers admit that the output could be increased, but in their opinion many of 
them are overtired from working long hours of overtime, and they also allege that their 
meals are insufficient owing to the want of proper accommodation for getting meals in 
the yards. Others allege that the want of skilled labour is the chief cause of the 
falling off of output, and those who are employed are working as hard as possible. 

It is stated that the trade union restrictions have been set aside in the present 
emergency, but they still exist to a certain extent, as many workmen will not accept 
work outside their own particular line. 

Renfrew and Govan. — In one of the reports a distinction is drawn between the 
engineers and iron-turners engaged mainly on the production of shell cases, and the 
men who comprise the " black squads" employed in shipbuilding. The former are said 
to be working strenuously and are very abstemious, many of them being teetotallers. 
Instances are given of engineers working thirty-six hours at a stretch, with intervals 
for meals. The " black squads," on the other hand, are frequently held up by ir- 
regularities on the part of members of the gang. Attention is drawn to the practice 
of paying the ;< squads" a lump sum, which is afterwards divided in the public-house. 
This leads to treating all round and much heavy drinking, and it is suggested that 
if each man could be paid his own wages there would be an improvement. 

Although the amount of drinking during the day did not appear to be excessive 
having regard to the character of the work, a large number of men drink to excess at the 
end of the week. One of the investigators states that in one public-house in Govan 
between 12.30 and 1.35 p.m. on Saturday he saw lOOi. taken. The national drink is a 
half gill of whisky, price 4d., followed by a schooner of beer, price 2^d. The beer in 
Scotland is heavier than in England. Bottles of whisky are also sold in large quantities 
[580] C 2 



20 

on Saturday night, as the public-houses are closed on Sunday. Drinking goes on very 
largely on Sunday in olubs, and this is responsible for a lot of time lost on Monday. 

Another reason suggested for the deficiency of output is that many skilled men 
have joined the colours, and their places have been filled by unskilled men. If some 
o{' the men who have enlisted could be sent back the output would be materially 
increased. 

The public-houses are large open bars without seating accommodation. They 
have conspicuous notices affixed, " Liberty and sobriety : avoid excess." 

Large numbers of bottles, varying in price from 6d. to 2s., are put ready in the 
public-houses, to be carried away just before closing time for use the next morning, 
owing to public-houses not opening until 10 A.M. In some cases men wait about in the 
morning till they do open, preferring the loss of time to going without their morning 
drink. 

In none of the yards on the Clyde, except one at Govan, is there any accom- 
modation for taking meals. Men have to go long distances to and from their 
homes, and form the habit of taking refreshment by the way. The provision of 
accommodation for meals inside the works would be greatly appreciated, and would 
lessen temptation to drink. 

Partick, Pointhouse, Old Kilpatrick, Dalmuir, and Whiteinch. — There was not 
much evidence of excessive drinking during the day in this district, though men 
frequent public-houses at meal-times. In the evening, about 6 o'clock, the men 
resort to the public-houses and drink freely. Week-end drinking is the principal 
feature. After being paid on Saturday men adjourn in parties to the public- 
houses and indulge in drinks all round. The popular drink is half a gill of 
whisky swallowed at a gulp, followed by a schooner (three-quarters of a pint) of beer. 
Afterwards many of them adjourn to a football match or other amusement, and then 
return to the public-houses for the rest of the day. In the evening bottles of whisky are 
taken home for Sunday drinking, but they are often consumed the same evening. On 
Sundays drink is freely obtained in clubs, where members can introduce visitors. 
Liquor is also obtained from the licensed grocers, who deliver whisky or bottled beer 
to their customers. 

The method of working known as the " black squad " is said to encourage excessive 
drinking. A " black squad " is composed of one blacksmith, two riveters, one holder-up, 
and two boys. The wages are paid to the principal of the squad, and the money is 
divided in a public-house, when the custom of standing drinks all round is observed. 
One of the investigators states that during the conversations which he had with some of 
the workers in the " black squads," they gave him the impression that they could not 
perform the work of holding and striking hot metal without the aid of stimulants. 

The men complain that there are no places in the yards where they can take their 
meals. The majority of the men are of opinion that the workmen employed are turning 
out as much as possible, but there is a want of skilled labour, as many of the younger 
skilled men have enlisted, and their places are filled by inferior workmen. A good 
deal of time is lost where one member of a " black squad" fails to turn up and the 
rest are obliged to stand down for the day. This defect has been remedied to some 
extent by the system of pooling men, by which men can be found to take the place 
of absentees. 

Dumbarton. — Two reports were made on the conditions found at Dumbarton, in 
which deficiency of output is attributed partly to fatigue on the part of the steadier 
workmen, principally those who have been working overtime on hard manual work, 
and partly to excessive drinking by a minority of the workmen. A number of the best 
workmen have joined the army, and their places have been filled by men who, prior 
to the w 7 ar, did little or no work, or existed on what the regular workers would give 
them. It was suggested that if some of the men who have joined the army were 
allowed to return to their work it would have a good effect on the output. 

As regards drinking habits, there were not many signs of drunkenness, but the 
public-houses were well patronised during meal times. In addition to drink consumed 
on the premises the men were in the habit of purchasing whisky in bottles, which 
usually contain a " mutchkin," or just over half a pint. The usual drink in Dumbarton, 
as in other parts of Scotland, is whisky followed by beer. Many of the men have 
two or three such drinks on each visit to the public-house. One of the investigators 
mentions the case of a workman who had been away from work five days 
drinking, and had spent 11. a-day in drink for himself and other persons. He was 



21 

decidedly shaky, though not drunk. He was expecting to work on the sixth day, but 
it was obvious that he was not in a condition to stand hard work for any length of time. 

The difficulty of working in squads where one of the squad is absent from drink 
may be obviated to some extent by a new arrangement, which seems likely to be made 
in the shipbuilding yards at Dumbarton, for pooling the squads. Where there are 
several broken squads, complete squads would be formed by allowing a riveter to act as 
a holder-up, &o. This is against the ordinary trade-union rules, but has been 
agreed to. 

Some of the better-class workmen suggest that the drinking problem would be 
overcome by closing the public-houses outside, and opening canteens inside, the yards. 
Many of them who are apparently anxious to do their best to expedite the output, 
expressed the opinion that some stimulant is necessary for men engaged in some branches 
of shipbuilding. 

The public-houses in Scotland being closed on Sunday, a practice has grown up of 
purchasing whisky on Saturday night. One of the investigators noticed a barman who had 
filled about 100 bottles of whisky which he expected to sell between half-past nine and 
closing time. The result is that the men are able to drink on Sunday and are frequently 
unfit for work on Monday morning. The question of prohibition has been much 
discussed in Dumbarton ; many of the working men are in favour either of total 
prohibition or of suspending the sale of liquor for consumption off the premises. 
Total prohibition would meet with considerable opposition from others. 

The suggestion made by one investigator is that the public-houses should be 
closed during meal hours and also from 12 to 3 on Saturdays, in order to induce the 
workman to go to his home with his wages and get proper meals. The practice of 
taking drink without food has a bad effect on their physical condition. 

Greenock. — The men are working more than normally, and loss of time may be 
due in some cases partly to fatigue and partly to wet weather ; but, generally speaking, 
it is due to the temptation to idleness owing to good wages and heavy drinking among 
a minority. 

Drinking is indulged in especially on Saturdays, Mondays, and Tuesdays, when 
drunken persons can be seen both in the streets and public-houses. The favourite drink 
is whisky, followed by beer, and if spirit drinking were stopped there would be less 
drunkenness. Many of the workmen admitted that drink was the chief cause of the 
decrease of output and advocated universal prohibition. 

The public-houses are open from 10 a.m. until 9 p.m., so that early and late drinking 
is prevented ; but there is a great deal, of liquor taken during the meal-times by men on 
the day-shift, and in the afternoon by men working on the night-shift. 

The system of working in squads also leads to drinking where one of the squad is 
absent from any cause, and the usual result is that the whole squad goes off work and 
drinks. 

While the above statement in regard to excessive drinking is true of a considerable 
number of the workmen, there are many who are working very hard, and who feel the 
strain of the prolonged hours. The more respectable workmen are in favour of drastic 
restriction, and even prohibition, either of spirits or of all liquor, and the belief is that 
some such steps will be taken. Prohibition on the Clyde or in Scotland alone would lead 
to trouble ; the men say that if prohibition is to come it must apply to the whole country. 

There are plenty of facilities for drinking in Greenock. The public-houses have 
small rooms like cubicles, where several men can sit comfortably round a small table and 
drink as long as they wish, as they are free from observation. The suggestion was 
made in the town that the firm should establish canteens in the yards. 

Port Glasgow. — This small town on the Clyde has a population of about 17,000, 
almost entirely supported by shipbuilding. 

Men work from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m., 9*45 a.m. to 1 p.m., and 2 to 5*30 p.m. On 
Saturdays work ends at noon. The week's work is fifty-four hours, but there is much 
lost time as well as insufficiency of labour. The loss of time is attributed mainly to drink, 
especially in the evenings. The public-houses are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. (instead of 
8 a.m. to 10 P.M. before the war). In many cases men prefer to wait until 1 A.M. in order 
to get a drink before going to work, thereby losing half a day. The popular drink is 
four pennyworth of whisky followed by a pint of beer. The investigator could find no 
evidence of men being overtired or idling because of good wages. Most of the men are 
in ordinary times heavy drinkers, and while further restrictions are needed, prohibition 
would be resented, The establishment of canteens in the works would be a great 
safeguard. 

[580] C 3 



22 



The Tynb. 



Six investigators visited various places on the Tyne, including Newcastle, Walker, 
Elswick, Hebburn, Wallsend, and North and South Shields. The war has brought 
great prosperity to all workers on the Tyne generally, with the result that high wages 
are readily obtained by all who are willing to work. Many of the men attracted by 
high wages are working steadily and during long hours, and some of the regular 
workmen become stale and need an occasional holiday. The general impression, 
however, is that the loss of time, which is considerable, is due to idleness, and 
especially to drink. It is not alleged that there is a large amount of open drunken- 
ness though one of the investigators states that at 7*30 A.M. in South Shields he saw 
fifteen men who had come off the night-shift all under the influence of drink, and 
several of them hopelessly drunk; but there is plenty of evidence of heavy drinking. 
The public-houses on the Tyne are generally open from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m., with the 
exception of South Shields, where the public-houses open at 6 a.m. There is some 
drinking during the breakfast and dinner hours, but the principal time of drinking is at 
night, when all the public-houses are crowded. The majority drink beer, not spirits, 
and the extra halfpenny on beer has not led to a change from beer to spirits, as money 
is plentiful ; but more spirit is drunk than is usual with English workmen, and there is 
some drinking of spirit and beer mixed. The habit of drinking in batches is a common \ 
feature on the Tyne. Four or five men on the same shift will enter a public-house and 
each stands drink successively. One investigator saw five men consume five half-pints 
each in less than ten minutes. 

It is said that the payment of double wages for Sunday labour has led to idling 
on Monday, and no doubt the drinking on Saturday and Sunday has produced the 
same result. For this reason it is suggested that special restrictions should be made 
in regard to Monday hours. The earlier opening of public-houses at South Shields 
not only invites early drinking among workmen from that place, but also attracts men 
from Jarrow and Hebburn. 

Two of the investigators comment on the insufficient food which the men take, partly 
owing to the difficulty of getting food in the public-houses. It is thought that in this 
way they are more easily affected by the amount of liquor which they consume, and are 
consequently unfitted for hard work. 

Generally, the effect of the reports from the Tyne is that drinking is a serious 
evil, largely leading to loss of time, and that further restriction should be placed on 
the hours during which public-houses are open. Local opinion expects some such 
restrictions, but would not tolerate total prohibition. 

It may be added that shortage of labour has led to the employment of men 
who would not in ordinary times be given employment, and no doubt they are more 
likely to take to drink than the regular workman. 

One of the investigators, who has had experience of workers in Government 
establishments, states that he has never seen so much drinking at all times of the 
day as he witnessed in Newcastle and the surrounding district. 

Sunderland. 

The chief industry is shipbuilding, which employs most of the working population. 
As in other places, the men work in two shifts covering the twenty-four hours, 6 a.m. 
to 6 p.m., and 6 p.m. to 5 a.m., with two stoppages of half-an-hour for meals. There is 
no work between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m. The two investigators who visited Sunderland say 
that drinking is very prevalent, and that this rather than fatigue is the cause of loss of 
time. Many men idle because of their good wages, and it is suggested that the 
temptation to idle from this cause might be met if the employers would bank a portion 
of the wages until the war is over. It is said that many of the men would willingly 
agree to this suggestion. 

The public- houses, of which there are a large number (in one street thirty in the 
space of half-a-mile), open at 6 a.m. and close at 9 p.m. The Sunday hours are 
12.30_to 2.30 p.m. and 6 to 9 p.m. One of the features of the public-houses in Sunder- 
land is the sitting-room where tables and lounges are placed and liquor is brought to 
the customer. These sitting-rooms are crowded nightly, mostly by the better-class 
workmen, and they are used by men and women alike. Beer is the popular drink, and 
it is sold at 2c?. per glass of rather under half-a-pint to meet the increase of duty. 



23 

The early hour at which the public-houses open seems to be a great incentive to 
drinking, as the men coming off the night-shift loiter about until the public-houses 
open, and those starting on the day-shift remain drinking and are late at the yards. 
One of the investigators visited several public-houses between 6 and 7 a.m. and asked for 
a cup of tea or coffee, but he was told that it could not be supplied, and apparently 
nothing can be purchased except liquor and cigarettes. There is a great deal of time 
lost on Monday owing to Sunday drinking. 

The drink question is apparently a common topic of conversation among the workmen 
in Sunderland, and many of them would like to see the public-houses closed altogether 
during the war, but there are others who say they cannot work without beer, especially 
where the work is in intense heat, and the opinion is that the case could be met if the 
public-houses were closed for consumption of liquor on the premises, but opened for 
about two hours in the middle of the day for the sale of bottled beer to be consumed 
off the premises. The suggestion also was put forward that canteens should be provided 
at the works where food and beer could be obtained. 

West Hartlepool. 

About 12,000 to 15,000 are employed in shipbuilding, engineering, and steel and 
iron works. The normal hours are, for the day-shift, from 6 a.m. to 5 P.M., and for the 
night-shift from 6 p.m. to 6 A.M., with intervals for meals. Overtime is worked by a 
good many, but there is very little Sunday work. The two investigators who visited 
Haitlepool did not think that the men suffered from fatigue and they heard no 
complaints of the kind : the workmen looked healthy and cheerful. Good wages were 
causing idleness in some cases, but generally speaking the men were working well. 
Drink does cause loss of time, but the effect on output would not be very considerable. 

The public-houses open at 8 a.m. and close at 9 p.m., and on Sundays from 12*30 
to 2 p.m. and 6 to 9 p.m. The men are unable to obtain liquor on their way to their 
work, but they drink freely during the intervals for breakfast and dinner. They 
carry food in their pockets which they take to the public-houses to eat. The favourite 
drink is a glass of whisky or rum followed by a pint of beer, which is sometimes repeated. 
Public-houses are very busy in the evening, and though there is too much heavy 
drinking there is comparatively little drunkenness. The consumption of spirits has 
somewhat increased since the extra tax on beer. There is a good case for restricting 
further the hours during which the public-houses are open, especially during the 
breakfast hour, but prohibition would cause a great deal of trouble in the labour world. 

Both these investigators thought that the output was affected by trade union 
restrictions. For instance, a squad is frequently held up by the absence of one of 
their number, although the work could proceed with other assistance if it were not for 
trade union rules, which do not allow one class of job to be done by a man of a different 
trade. 

Stockton-on-Tees. 

The two investigators who made the enquiries in Stockton-on-Tees came to the 
conclusion that loss of time was due solely to drinking; although many of the 
workmen complained that over-work made them stiff and that they were thus 
unable to keep time. This especially applies to the men working in squads, as 
frequently one of them fails to turn up and thus prevents the whole squad from 
working. The public-houses are open from 8 a.m. until 9 P.M. (the hours before the 
war were 6 a.m. and 1 1 p.m.), and on Sundays 12-12*30 and 6-9. The favourite drink 
is beer, taken in great quantities, and very little spirit is drunk. When the public- 
houses were opened at 6 a.m. a good trade was done with men on their way to then- 
work. This has now stopped, but there is reason to believe that men take beer home 
with them in the evening for early morning consumption. Stockton is well supplied 
with public-houses, many of them close to each other, and these are all crowded in the 
evenings and on Saturday afternoons with workmen drinking beer. The publicans 
appear to be taking as much money within the restricted hours as when the hours 
of opening were longer. 

Barrow-in-Furness. 

Barrow has a population of about 70,000, and of these about 20,000 are employed 
at Messrs. Vickers, Son, and Maxim, and about 3,000 at the Hematite Steel Works. 
[580] C 4 



24 

The men work in two shifts : — Day-shift from 6 a.m. until 5 P.ivr., with intervals of 
half-an-hour for breakfast and an hour for dinner. Night-shift, 5 P.M. until 6 A.M., 
with intervals of two hours for meals. Borne of the men, chiefly shell-makers, work two 
or three hours overtime. 

The four reports agree that there was little evidence of drunkenness in the streets, 
and few cases of drunkenness had been brought into the Courts, but there was evidence 
to show that during the particular week when the enquiry was made there had been 
considerably less drinking than recently, owing probably to the fact that the employers 
had offered double wages on Good Friday and one and a-half wages on Saturday 
morning to men who had worked regularly all the week, which was a distinct incentive 
to the workmen to remain sober. It is not clear that the conditions were normal when 
the enquiries were made. 

There was evidence to show that there had been less drinking since the hours of 
the public-houses had been restricted. They now open from 10"30 a.m. and close at 
10 p.m. ; on Sundays they are open from 12*30-2 and 6'30-9. The publicans do not, 
however, seem to have been hit by the restricted hours, as the men drink more heavily 
during the shorter period and some take drink away with them. 

The men are not spirit drinkers, although the influx of men from Scotland has 
led to the greater sale of spirits. They are generally drinking at present a rather 
expensive beer known as " 6d. and lOdL," which is a combination of two beers priced at 
lOd. and 6d. a quart respectively, and sold at 5d. a pint. Prior to the present boom 
the men could only afford to drink beer at 3d. a pint. A good deal of beer is consumed 
in the evening and on Saturday afternoon and evening, but on the whole there was not 
at the time of the reports very much ground for complaint, though much time had 
been lost in the past through heavy drinking. 

Though the drinking habit may have had serious effects on output, it appears that 
excessive drinking is not very general. The majority of the men seem to have been 
keeping good time and working long hours, and there was evidence of fatigue and 
staleness. The reports indicate that better work could be got out of the men if they 
were on three shifts of eight hours, but this would be impossible without a large 
number of extra men, and a great increase in the accommodation. 

Accommodation is very difficult to get, and many of the workmen have to live 
outside Barrow, at places several miles away. In some cases this increases the 
temptation to drink, as men have to pass public-houses on their way to and from work. 
It also appears that the means of travelling are inadequate. It is suggested in one of 
the reports that increased accommodation could be provided by vessels in the docks. 



(2.)— REPORTS OF FACTORY INSPECTORS. 

The Clyde. 

I have had many interviews from time to time with shipbuilders and engineers on 
the subject of bad time-keeping among workmen, and to-day I have supplemented my 
information by interviewing the Chief Constable of Govan and a number of publicans 
in an area surrounding the largest shipbuilding yards. 

There does not appear to be any noticeable increase of drinking since the war 
began. The quantity consumed is about normal, the same men frequent the same 
premises, and those inclined to drink too much continue as before the war commenced. 
There is, however, some evidence that small bottles of whisky are purchased and 
consumed off the premises, especially by men on night-shift work, This, however, is 
confined to a very few men. For instance, in a yard employing 10,000, three men in 
one night were found partially intoxicated in the works and expelled. 

In fairness to the men it should be noted that irregular time is confined largely 
to certain specific trades : riveters, caulkers, platers, riggers, and to a very much less 
extent engineers, are the chief offenders ; such tradesmen as pattern-makers, moulders, 
turners, and time-workers generally keep relatively good time. Broadly speaking, 
the men engaged in outdoor work, that is, on the construction of the ship itself, 
usually piece-workers, are responsible for most of the irregular time, and their behaviour 
has cast a stigma on the general class of workers employed in shipbuilding and 
marine engineering which is certainly not justified by the facts, and it is undeserved. 

Coming to the causes of irregular time-keeping among the outdoor workers, while 
drinking is an important source of bad time-keeping, it is only one cause, and here 



25 

again the action of a relatively small proportion will disorganise the work of many- 
others who may be capable and willing to work full time. Riveters and platers 
work in squads, but if one man fails to turn up at 6 A.M. the squad cannot proceed, 
and because of the absence of one man four or five will lose a morning's or 
possibly a whole day's work. Riveting is hard and exhausting work, and it 
is frequently and necessarily carried on in trying conditions — j exposure 
in winter to bitter cold and damp. The temptation to take a morning or 
a day off during very cold or very hot weather is great, as the riveter knows 
he is indispensable at present, and will not lose his job if he does lie off. More- 
over, his pay is sufficent, even with a partial week's work, to keep him and his family in 
comfort. The machine men working under cover are in a comfortable shop and have 
not the same temptation to lie off. Again the pay is relatively much less, and being 
time workers they cannot make up the lost time by a special spurt. Another important 
point frequently overlooked is that at present, owing to the extraordinary scarcity of 
skilled labour, men who in ordinary times would never be employed on account of their 
irregular habits, are at work in many yards, and materially affect the numbers of those 
losing time. Briefly, I am convinced that the " black squad " piece-workers have not risen 
much above the social position of the man earning 30s. a-week, yet their remuneration 
is equal to that of a professional man. They have not yet been educated to 
spend their wages wisely, and the money is largely wasted, for they have few 
interests and little to spend their wage on apart from alcohol. 

For some reason, difficult to define, men do not readily take up riveting and 
plating, and consequently there is a constant shortage of this class. This shortage has 
tended to force up wages to such an extent that the present pay is in excess of their 
needs. The fear of loss of employment is absent, consequently there is no spur to 
stimulate a man to work regularly such as exists in most callings. 

The question of fatigue due to prolonged overtime does not arise to any great 
extent. The same men do not work overtime week after week, and Sunday work is 
only done by the same man every second or third Sunday. The general feeling among 
employers is that Sunday work with double pay is not a success, it is considered that 
stopping it would improve time-keeping in the rest of the week. 

One large works has just taken a vote of their men on the question of further 
restrictions, and I attach particulars of the questions put to them, and the percentage of 
men in favour of each alternative. 

Per cent. 

1. Are you in favour of total prohibition ? .. .. .. .. .. 31 

2. Are you in favour of leaving matters as at present ? . . . . . . 44 

3. Are you in favour of reducing hours to from 12 noon to 2 p.m. and 7 to 9 p.m., 

and on Saturday 6 to 10 p.m. ? .. .. .. .. .. 11 

4. Are you in favour of reducing hours to from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. on week-days, 

and Saturday from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. ? . . . . . . . . 4 

o. Leaving hours as at present, but for sale of beer only . . . . . . 10 

Out of the 2,500 men employed about two-thirds voted. 

Most of the drink on the Clyde is consumed on licensed premises ; it is not the 
habit to drink much in the homes. A prohibition of the purchase of alcohol for 
consumption off the premises would possibly improve one class only, namely, those who 
have to work at night, and now take liquor to their place of employment. One must also 
recognise that teetotalers lose time as well as those who do not abstain. Away from 
shipbuilding pure and simple there does not appear to be any serious irregular time- 
keeping ; it does not exist to any material extent in engineering generally, nor in the 
iron and steel producing towns in Lanarkshire. 

The whole question has arisen because of the action of a few men in the more 
important shipbuilding yards, and there is a feeling that the mass of workers 
throughout the country should not be penalised because of the dissipated and 
unpatriotic behaviour of a small minority of overpaid men in one or two specific callings. 

More comfortable working conditions improve timekeeping ; for instance, during 
the last three weeks of fine bright weather distinctly better time has been kept. 
Again, much time lost by the " black squad " is due to wet and windy weather ; work 
outside is difficult and almost impossible under such conditions unless the building 
berth is a roofed one. To meet this difficulty, sheds are being built over the berths 
devoted to submarines and small shallow draft craft. 

Figures showing the percentage of hours lost by outside workers are valueless unless 
allowance is made for the periods in which work was impossible owing to weather 
conditions. It is not uncommon for men to work on piece work until their clothing is 



26 



wet through, and the experience of employers is that in this condition, if they hang 
about afterwards, c<f 
week or fortnight's < 
be given full justice. 



about afterwards, colds and chills supervene, with perhaps the consequent loss of a 
week or fortnight's employment. These facts I mention so that the men's position can 



HARRY J. WILSON. 

April 3, 1915. 



The Tyne. 

I beg to report that I have taken a deep interest in the subject of lost time since 
the commencement of the war, and on every possible occasion I have made it a point 
to discuss the* subject with employers, managers, foremen, and with the workers 
themselves. The following statements show the conclusions I have arrived at : — 

1. So far as shipyard workers are concerned, there is no doubt whatever, in my 
mind, that the " drinking habit " is more responsible than any other cause for the great 
loss of time amongst the workmen. It is common knowledge to those who know the 
habits of shipyard workers in this district, that in normal times they usually indulge 
pretty heavily every week-end, and that Monday is a very bad day as regards the time 
worked. In the present time of continuous employment, this week-end habit is to some 
extent broken up, but results in spasmodic indulgence at irregular intervals during the 
week. The fact that double time is paid for Sunday work, and that consequently the 
men's earnings are so much more than usual, no doubt tends to foster the habit of 
frequent indulgence in drink. 

As regards engineers and armament workers, and others engaged in emergency 
work, the drinking habit undoubtedly plays an important part, although to a lesser 
extent, in the reasons given for lost time. Only yesterday, I was informed by an 
engineering employer that a number of his men occasionally stopped work at 8 p.m. 
instead of 9 p.m., the usual overtime period. He explained that, when asked the reason 
for their action, the workmen informed him that "the 'pubs' closed at 9 P.M. and 
they wanted a few drinks before closing time." He stated, further, that he had noticed 
that the men who indulged in this practice formed the majority of the late arrivals 
next morning. 

The "drinking habit" is not confined to men alone in this district. I have had 
similar complaints as regards women workers in rope and waggon cover works. 

2. The fact that double pay is given for Sunday work, no doubt, is also a factor in 
the situation. The men openly state that they can afford to have a "good time ' : (as 
they call it) occasionally, without reducing their wages below normal. In one large 
engineering works recently I was shown a statement which one of the directors had 
prepared. This showed that a large number of men systematically lost time during 
the week equivalent to nearly a full normal day, so that the Sunday work on double 
time was of no real value at all to the firm. He also pointed out that a fair percentage 
of the men — good, steady workmen — kept excellent time week after week. 

I have formed an opinion that Sunday labour can only be made of real value if the 
sale of alcoholic liquor is entirely prohibited except under doctors' prescription. 

3. I do not place a great deal of reliance on fatigue having much to do with lost 
time. I think the financial aspect combined with the indulgence in drink is solely 
responsible. 

In several works recently I have been informed, that the employers intend, as an 
experiment, to introduce a new system, whereby if a man loses more than a quarter of 
a day from Monday to Saturday inclusive, he will not be allowed to work on Sunday at 
all. This is, I think, an excellent plan as, if the lost time is due to fatigue, it gives the 
workman a day's rest on Sunday, and if due to a drinking bout, it will reduce the man's 
wages and make him, perhaps, more careful the following week. Further, if in a riveting 
or plating squad one of the men keeps bad time and is not allowed to work on Sunday, 
it will probably prevent the squad working on Sunday altogether, and consequently the 
man's mates will put pressure upon him to keep better time. 

W. B. LAUDER. 

April 2, 1915. 



27 

Barrow-in-Furness. 

Since the outbreak of the war I have paid five visits to the above firm in connection 
with Emergency Orders, and on each occasion have made enquiries as to loss of time by the 
workers and the question of drinking. At my second visit, owing to an allegation made 
that the reasons why Vickers could not obtain sufficient men, and why they were 
continually losing their men, were that they did not pay them so highly and they had " a 
bad name " amongst the workers, I took the opportunity of going round some of the public- 
houses in the evening and mixing freely with the men. I then ascertained that the general 
opinion was that Vickers was an extremely good shop. There was plenty of drinking, 
though I saw no actual cases of drunkenness up to 9 p.m. The men gave me the 
impression that they could stand a fair amount of liquor without showing signs of 
drunkenness. 

At subsequent visits I have always noted that the public-houses in Barrow were 
well patronised during the daytime, and one always saw a number of men in their 
working clothes in the vicinity of these, with signs that they had had quite as much 
liquor as they could carry, though I have never seen a workman actually drunk in the 
town. 

1. I think the drinking habit is prevalent in Barrow amongst riveters and platers, 
and the less skilled workers and labourers. At my visit last month several of the foremen 
whom I interviewed said that drinking had always been rather bad in Barrow and was now 
worse than ever. The statement was made that restriction of the hours of public-houses 
should be uniform throughout the district. Serious complaint was made by several of 
the managers that though the Barrow public-houses were open only between 9 A.M. and 
9 p.m. there were no restrictions at Dalton 6 miles away, and many of the night-shift 
men took train to Dalton and started drinking there soon after 6 a.m., as the Barrow 
public-houses were not open. I was unable, for lack of time, to verify this statement 
personally. 

2. I doubt if there is anything like the amount of fatigue among the workers 
which is considered in some quarters to be prevalent. Much of the manual work in the 
factories at the present day is not fatiguing : the workmen have simply to stand and 
watch their machines. The workers at the large shell forging presses and the heating 
furnaces are an exception, and also the riveters and platers in the shipyards. 

3. I attribute the loss of time in Barrow which, from figures I have seen, is serious 
in some of the departments at Vickers' works, to the fact that many of the workers are 
earning such good wages that they can maintain their ordinary standard of comfort and 
living with four or five days' work. Without doubt much is also due to drinking 
habits. Loss of time through sickness has not been at all pronounced in Barrow during 
the last winter. In fact, I was assured that the amount of sickness had been below the 
normal. 

W. SYDNEY SMITH. 



(G.) 



REPORTS ON TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES. 



Report by Director of Transports to the First Lord of the 

Admiralty. 

First Lord, 

I WISH to call attention to the fact that the transport work is now being 
conducted under serious difficulties. 

The workmen — seamen, dock labourers, &c— are rapidly becoming absolutely 
out of hand. The present labour situation on the Clyde and at Liverpool is merely 
the beginning. Unless effectual measures are taken we shall have strikes at every 
port in the United Kingdom, and supplies to the Army and the Fleet will be stopped. 
In the main, we have now to deal, not with the ordinary British workmen, but with 
what remains after our best men have been recruited for the Army and Navy. 



28 

Yesterday the crew of a transport deserted. The same thing happened the day 
before. The firemen go on board the transports drunk, making it impossible to get up 
a full head of steam, so greatly reducing the speed and endangering the lives of 
thousands of troops by making the vessels a target for submarines. 

The root cause of the serious congestion at some of the docks is not a shortage 
of labour but the fact that the men can earn in two or three days what will keep 
them in drink for the rest of the week. 

What is wanted, in addition to a proper control of the drink traffic, is a well-devised 
scheme promptly applied for bringing the seamen under naval, and other workmen in 
Government employ under military, discipline. In many cases it is now taking three 
times as long to get ships fitted and ready to sail as it did when war broke out. 
Expedition is a thing of the past, and it is obvious that this may at any moment have a 
disastrous effect on the naval and military operations. 

The following practical instance of the effect of military discipline, even on those 
totally unused to it, may be of interest : — 

We sent 250 dock labourers to Havre under capable civilian supervision. They 
all got drunk and out of hand in the first fortnight. We brought them back and 
enlisted a similar lot of men under military discipline. On the first pay day one got 
drunk and was given twelve months' hard labour. There has been no trouble since, 
and the men are working splendidly. 

GRAEME THOMSON, 

Director of Transports. 
March 6, 1915. 



II. 

As an example of a case in which it was deemed urgently necessary to take police 
court proceedings in this country, the following may be cited : — 

Seven firemen employed on a certain transport were charged at Southampton on a 
warrant with unlawfully combining together to neglect duty, and to impede the 
navigation of the ship, and the progress of the voyage. 

All seven pleaded not guilty, but, in answer to a further question from the 
Magistrate's Clerk, admitted " signing-on " in the usual way. 

Mr. C. Lamport, prosecuting, said that he appeared really on behalf of Captain 

John Roberts, the commander of the transport, and the prosecution, which was 

supported by the authorities, was of a similar character to that before the Bench a few 

weeks ago. It was considered by the authorities, as well as the officers, to be a matter 

of national importance. All these men had signed articles, as they had admitted, and 

part of their duties were in connection with the transport service. It was necessary 

for the transport to sail at a certain time, and no man was entitled to be absent 

without obtaining leave. No leave was asked for and no leave granted, and orders 

were given that all firemen must be present at a certain time. There were over 1,000 

troops on board this ship ready to go away, and he must not say more than that the 

vessel was held up through the absence of these men, and actually had to return to the 

port, or near it, and the troops had to be transferred to another vessel, for the Bench 

to see what a terribly serious thing this was. One could scarcely conceive that the 

legislature had given sufficient power to deal with such offences. As an Englishman 

and an advocate, he said that it might well be that men who undertook to serve on a 

transport ought to be under the same liability to severe punishment as those under 

military or Admiralty law. 

Captain Roberts, the commander of the transport, told the Court that there 
were over 1,000 troops on board, and that the men should have joined the ship not 
later than 3*30 on the afternoon in question. The sailing hour was 6 o'clock. Two 
men were brought on board at 7, one of them intoxicated, but the rest did not put in 
an appearance at all. In consequence of the absence of these men witness was unable 
to proceed with the ship, which, as a matter of fact, had to return to Southampton. 
The troops had to be transferred, there was twenty-four hours' delay, and everything 
was dislocated. 

Harold Graham, the chief engineer of the transport, and George Tounson, the 
second engineer, bore out the evidence of their captain, both stating that they gave no 
leave whatever. 



29 



Asked what they had to say in defence, Carpenter and Payne told the Court that 
they had no intention of leaving the ship, and, as a matter of fact, did rejoin ; Hock 
and Podesta stated that their reason for absence was that they were not feeling well ; 
Thompson and Hatton explained that they were detained at the Bargate by the police 
on charges of drunkenness, and therefore could not join the ship ; and Mountain 
refrained from saying anything. 

In passing sentence, the presiding magistrate said : — 

" By the way you have acted by not joining your ship at the proper time you 
impeded the progress of the ship and affected its destination, and the vessel had to 
put back and reship its troops. The Bench under these _ circumstances ^ cannot 
consider any question but the utmost penalty, and you will all go to prison for 
twelve weeks with hard labour." 

The magistrates having passed sentence as recorded above, 

Commander Prefect, who said that he represented the Principal Naval Transport 
Officer, desired to emphasise the seriousness of these cases. Some of the troops, said the 
Commander, had been travelling for fifty or sixty hours from the north of Scotland and 
the west of Ireland, and they were detained on board, not by military exigencies, but 
by the action of these men. 



III. 

Extract from Report made by Director of Transports to 

Admiralty, dated March 27, 1915. 

Some of the transport workers at most of the large ports are content to earn in three 
days money which keeps them in drink for the rest of the week. It is necessary to secure 
throughout the country a state of affairs which will make it possible for transport 
operations to be carried out with speed and efficiency. At present this is impossible, 
and neither the Fleet nor the Army can get on without transport. 

In my opinion measures are necessary to withdraw all licences to sell intoxicating 
liquors throughout the country. 



IV. 

Extract from letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty from 
Mr. T. Roy den (member of Director of Transport's Advisory 
Committee), dated March 29, 1915. 

the labour situation at our seaports is so unsatisfactory that immediate 

action is imperative. In any remedial steps that may be taken it should be borne in 
mind that our best men have joined the colours in various capacities, and that in 
consequence their influence, which under normal conditions exercises a steadying 
effect on their fellow-workers, is for the time being lost. At the best of times casual 
labour, and under that category I place dockers and ship-repairers, is unsatisfactory 
and unreliable, and this characteristic has become still more pronounced with the 
increased opportunities for employment 'brought about by the war. The men know 
they can get work whenever they want it, however indifferent their behaviour may be, 
and as a result there is "an absolute lack of discipline. I am confident that the root of 
all the trouble is drink, and the high scale of wages now ruling, instead of acting as 
an inducement to increased effort, tends to produce the opposite effect, inasmuch as it 
enables the men to earn in a shorter time the amount of money they regard as sufficient 
for their immediate needs, and they are able to work fewer hours and spend more of 
their time drinking. I trust that in the national interest, and in the interest of 
the men themselves, it may be found possible to deal with this great and growing 
evil by a drastic reduction in the hours during which intoxicants may be sold, 
or, preferably, by absolute prohibition. If sailors can, and do, abstain from alcoholic 
refreshment while at sea, it does not seem unreasonable in a time of national urgency 



30 

that those whose work keeps them at home should do likewise. Pressure should he 
brought to bear, through the Licensing Justices, ou the owners and tenants of licensed 
premises with a view to largely increasing the facilities for obtaining reasonable 
refreshment of a non-alcoholic character, as it would be unreasonable to prohibit the 
sale of intoxicants without providing reasonable substitutes. I have discussed the 
situation with a large number of employers of labour both on the docks and in 
the repair shops, and so far have failed to discover any who do not endorse my views. 
I gather from notices that have appeared in the public press that the officials of the 
Transport Workers' Union are also in sympathy with them. 

Yours truly, 

T. ROYDEN. 



V. 

Report from Director of Transports to the Third Sea Lord, 

dated 1st April, 1915. 

Third Sea Lord, 

I enclose extracts from reports from Naval Transport Officers at various ports in the 
United Kingdom indicating the extent to which drink is obstructing the progress of 
transport work. 

I can only reiterate that the time now taken to prepare ships for service is a grave 
danger to the success of the naval and military operations, which depend so largely on 
efficient sea transport. 

To-day I find a transport, required for urgent military service, to prepare for 
which would normally occupy seven days, will take twenty-two days to complete, in 
spite of every effort made to accelerate the work. 

GRAEME THOMSON, Director of Transports. 



I. — Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South Coast). 

December 12 .. .. Seamen under influence of drink ; captain and pilot clear ropes 

away, and take ship out themselves. 
January 8 . . . . Men on shore all returned drunk ; ship unable to put out to sea. 

January 20 . . . . Men again drunk ; much delay in putting out. 

November 11 . . . . Firemen and seamen on shore return drunk; ship loses the tide. 

Comments by Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South Coast). 

1. Considerable drunkenness : prosecutions not pressed owing to circumlocution 
of the law and difficulty of obtaining conviction. 

2. Recommends as an "excellent remedy" Naval Discipline Act for Transport 
Service instead of Merchant Shipping Act. Masters ask for this themselves. 

3. Cases quoted taken from the twelve transports in port ; if details were obtained 
from the twenty-three transports away, total number of offences would be pro- 
portionally greater. 

This report is from an officer who will never make a complaint if he can possibly 
help it. — Graeme Thomson. 



II— Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (North West Coast). 

The following points have been arrived at after consultation with the various 
firms engaged in Transport Service on the North West Coast : — 

Restrictions are necessary ; delay from drink notorious. 

A large Coaling Company say : — 

1. Some of the men begin to drink on receipt of wages on Saturday, hence 
Saturday afternoon "hands" contain a good proportion of men under influence of 
drink, so choice of men restricted. 



31 

2. Men engaged at 4 p.m. on Saturday for work early on Sunday, anticipating 
well-paid work on Sunday, drink freely in interval, turn up unfit, so ship is under- 
manned. 

3. Every Saturday a certain number of men are dismissed for returning after 
meals drunk. 

4. In event of any inevitable delay men go to public-house, and return long alter 
proper time for resumption. 

5. Many regular employees cannot be given important orders Friday or Saturday 
owing to drink ; many stay off on Monday, and do not turn up till Tuesday morning. 



III. — Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (Bristol Channel). 

1. Increasingly difficult to get crews for transports owing to laziness, lack of 
discipline, and drunken habits. 

2. Steamship ( ) 21st March, 4 seamen 

20 firemen > absent ; 
9 trimmers J 

she had to stop at ■ to obtain subsidiary labour. 

Steamship ( ) sailed 6 men short. 

J) v ) 5) " )> 

( ) „ 6 „ 

,, ( ) had to take 16 men substitutes. 



3. Crews, rather than dock labourers, are usually seen drunk, hence 
impossible to rely on ships leaving at stated times. 



IV. — Report from Principal Naval Transport Officer (Bristol Channel). 

1. Drink question in relation to transport service not so bad here as at other ports. 

2. Drunkenness among dock labourers, chiefly amongst night shifts coming out 
at 6 a.m. 

3. British seamen and firemen of mercantile marine chief offenders, e.g., crew of 
steamship ( ) unfit for work, officers have to do crews' work. 

15th October to 3rd February — 

Twenty-six ships delayed through desertions, &c, resulting in total delay of 
thirty-four days six hours —almost entirely due to drink. Since February 
behaviour much improved. 



V. — Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South-East). 

Many cases wherein crews have failed to join their ships owing to drunkenness, 
though the men do not drink to excess in the docks themselves. 



VI. — Report of Principal Naval Transport Officer (Soute Coast). 

Transport work hampered by : — 

1. Drunken members of crews miss ships, hence ships sail short-handed, or on 
occasion are prevented from sailing altogether. 

2. Firemen return in drunken condition, hence they are unable to keep steam, 
causing speed to be seriously reduced with obvious dangers resulting — constantly 
occurring. 

3. Dock labourers and coal porters, especially latter, knock off work early to get 
drunk before closing time. 



*^Z)u/7$W& 






) 




. , • Constantinople ,&c. 

.Ateed wo* 60 returned. 



•o -o -o -o -0 -c -o -o -o -c -c -c -c -o -o - ■ 



Country, ........ Sharkey Port« 

Date of P^Port.^3. 
Report from U.S.aTsOCR 

-o -o -c -c -o -o -o -o -o ~o -c -c -o -c -c -o — -o -0 -o ■ 
1. iter dane lies* 

(a) On April 2 5-2 6, the British landed at four places! — - 
l*/r«\Burnu (Ara Cape)* 
2*Sighin De're'CSighin Valley). , 

3*Tefcie,Te'ke,or Hikie' 5urau (Safes Cape), i#^ 

on European sideband <-Jrr/* 

4#Xum Kale, on Asiatic Side* 
{Y enclose a copy of a sort of relief view of the Dardanelles, 
from i local Turkish paper, on which these positions are mariasd.This View 
is copied frcm a view which originally appeared in the Xiepzig u Illustrate 
Zeitung", after the naval action of March 19» Manes of above points have been 
added however, and trarislations are written alongside, X$ftla Tepe (Kritia 
Hill), and Zsja Tepe (Xatfs Hill) , refer red to belcw,are also indicated (pos- 
itions 5 and 6 respectively) J # ^Jf$fc 

(b) At Arc Burne (Ara Cape), position Kb #1, the 
British landed from 1C,CCC to 15,000 troops, 
under pro beet ion of a heavy protecting shel- 
ing of beach from shij^s.and proceeded inland 




to occupy iSapa Tepe' (ifey?. Mil ),x>osition lfo.6, 
tv«D one half miles to & 3 (d, about ICC feet 
high,vsfoich dominates llaidos and adjoining 
forts* When they hv& arrived at surf it they 
were suddenly outflanked by Turks previously 
entrenched under brow of hill, and charged 
with bayonet* They wore forced to re tire, and 
lest from 1,CCC to 8 f ©fc© kill ed 9 with proport- 
ionate loss in wounded and prisoners* The re- 
mainder re-embarked for the time being,but no 
other landing have since been effected* light- 
ing continues daily* The Turks admit British 
are still entrenched at foot of Kaja Tepe, but 
say all their efforts to capture the hills 
have been repulsed. 

(o) At Sighin Cere (Sighin Valley), position No. 2, 
and Tekie,Teke,or Wikie Eurnu (Teke Cape) pos- 
ition Se#3,£ro» 25,000 to 40,000 troops were 
landed, and a combined assault made on kritia, 
Etritift,ep Kir ithia, Tepe (Kritia mil) near 
Seo ul Bahr, which is about 750 feet high and 
dominate the Chanak forts* Fighting still con- 
tinues* Final outcome net known* Losses not known, 
Turks also admit allies' troops are still on 
shore here, but say they have not taken. Kritia 
Hill yet* 

(d) At Ktan Kale from 35,000 to 6C,0C0 troops were 
landed m& crossed river, "but are said tc have 
since been forced to rstlire.and re-®ibark*Iacts 
are not known, known losses British 1,000 to 
3, OOC, corresponding losses in wounded and r.rison- 
jrr, I$ i? believed now that the landing he re, the 
first day, was simply a feint, as nothing further 
has been heard of r frm -'fele* 

(4) Turkish losses* In above engagoi*enti%nct known,but 
about 2,500 Turkish lightlv funded were "brought 
to Constantinople, on two transports, on April 30., 
and two, or three, transports have been arriving 
with wounded, daily, over since#3etv^n 7,0^0 and 
8,000 to undo d have been hr ouch t* in during the week, 

(f) The wrecked British submarine, ".ML 5", is about 400 
yards to southward of -Raphes ?3urnu (3ss*Aaaoi),*m6 
is partly visible above mter* 

(g) The Turkish troops, at Dardanelles, are i. trio*ly in 
good spirits, under command of Turkish Off icers, 

(not Germans), well drilled and enthusiastic, accord- 
ing to Captain P.. II. William s,C./.C. ,U*3,/rmy,who 



J46 




5- 



I 







Page 2. 

Country Turkey. Place* . .. • Constantinople,^. 

Report from U. S.S.SCeKPICH* 

Pate of Report* . . . » U^ y 3 ^1^ * 

—O -O — C -0 -0 -0 -0 -C ~0 -0 -0 -0 -0 ~6 -0 -0 -C"-0 — o -o -o ~o -o -c -o -c -c -c -o -c — o -o -o -o -c - 

has just "been at Dardancs two days, and saw 
the fiercest pert of the landing operations* 
Captain 911114*8 efts a great deal cf import- 
ance, but cannot divulgs anything in accord- 
ance si fa arrangements toads? which he went, 
until after t v e w is over^g?!^ under cer- 
tain condi tions* 
ffe) Throe British submarines are said to hays 
been sunk, or captured, in the Sea of Marmora, 
near Mere f 11, (about 40 miles above Gallipoli), 
during the past week* The prisoners from one of 
them were brought into Constantinople April 30* 
1 have heard they oasts thru the Dardanelles 
Straits during the resent moonlight nights. 
{1} The "Haraddin 3arbarrc3sa' r and "forgot Jiois" 
alternate on duty at the Dardanelles, one of 
them being there while the other overhauls and 
provides at the Golden Hbrn»2hey have been re- 
lieving each other about every ws^k or so* 



*o 




2* Black Sea* 

( % 1) The Russian Fleet has continued bombarding var- 
ious parts of the Turkish Black Sea Ooa&ti tiqzt 
the 3osphorus,and the past three days hwps bom- 
barded the entrance itsslf*42ach dajpyV ie p&at week, -Jtffc 
the civilian inhabitrnts have been sent out of " 

Buyukedere,on European side above Therapia,the 
same rs they were from Bel cos, en the other aide, 
some time ago* Shots have fallen at far south as 
Therapia,and are of large caliber* !?o material /> 

j fetfotfy has "bQ:-.!! done so far as feiown* (p/ytJ^f, <&{ / 

3 » qonstcmti nople *, / ^X ^ ^ 

(k) tatrols are still maintained between Seraglio 

ioint and 3cutari,as previously roper ted; and re- 
cently,on tvso occasions, three email tuge ./ere ob- 
served maintaining definite positions, at; different 
plaesa in this vicinity, apparently also on look out 
duty. This was before the fchree Erttish aT&martnos*. — 
known to be in the See of T.'ar mora, were sunk or 
cap tured* 

(1) Several of the larger Chirkets (cBssphoros pas- 
senger steamers J have been taken o^er for use as 
trasnports the past week. 

few On April ."8 about 30 British and "French prisoners 
v^re brought info StBjabottl*.and ths ftsjas mirber ma 
also brought in April 20* About ©C ara said to have >^ 

been brought in, in all, 

(n) Between 7,000 and 8,0C0 lightly funded Turks have 
been brought in during past we?lc f and taken to the 
different hospitals in city and viclr.icy*i*bout 
2 f C00 wounded ha^e been arriving, daily, during; past 
week. The transports first stop at Hi* Ida Jacha, (near 
Scutari „ on Asiatic side) , and, 1 c; ie taldydiseharj 
their more seriously H©tt»dsd at the hospital fchsrst 
then they bring the others hare* The vsry grave 
cases are said to be left at the Jjarianelles of 
course 

(o) The "Sultan Selim", (ex -German "Goeben") , stood do-tfi 
from 3tsnla at 7.3C p.m. /, ;, ay 2, and stood in again 
and up Bo sp horns at 4* .30 p.m., this morning, (MayJfcJ • ^UfJ- 
She was escorted by a torpedo boat and destroyer* " 

(p) J hostile aeroplane appeared ovsr the outskirts of 
Constantinople, Kay 2, and dropj ed bombs and papers. 



I 



9fk v 



Page 3. 

Country* * • • TurlSBy, Fort* , Constantinople , &c. 

Beport from U.S. 3. SGOBPICiT* 
Date of Report. » » » Hay ..&191B. 

-O-O-0-O-0-O-C-C-C-C™'-0-0-^^ 

ITo material damage done. National Itrr not known* 
bnt undersides painted gross* 

(q) 13 01 s " the So Italian sailors, who were loft here 
from the "Archiroede'.and who attempted to laasre 
last week on the S* S* "Jast ia" Tfiich wa3 held *P at 
the Sospherus.as reported, left April 27 for It sly, 
"by rail* via Dedeagatch^&c* ,2 sailers remained* The 
steamship '-'i-mal ia M also finally sailed for Roumania 
on Apr il 2 Qg^ft^y s+<s/%£j- y&<t?u k^^^aM^>y^^/^^^r, _y^^£ 

(r) i few mere /i.rmenfans have heen sent to Ifeftia during 
past weul£»2t is said tney were suspected of plot- 
ting anl xrp rising to aid the entry ef British and 
This, ians* It is said that 680 have new been arrested 
here. 

(a) Ess lories and Germans here now seem to he still 

grimly confident! the Armenians all seem worried, and 
are undoubted! ly ap-;rehensira;the Greefce are clronl- 
a ling all sorts of rumors and are evidently ezpeot- 
ant;Arahs and others dc not seem especially interest- 
ed, except most of them place nc faith in the offic- 
ial oonmunlqusstfill admit conditions are especially 
critical just now, and that anything may happen* So 
far everything is outwardly as calm as ever however, 
{t; Captain Morton is e: pec ted to rjrr ivc the coming - 

Wednesday or Thursday, and ftirther reports will there- 
fore be from him«„ 





-4%% 



r * * — 



M 



j* 



.iout 



^WV 



OFFICE CF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 



COPY. 

FML 



No. 9 



NAVAL ATTACHE. 



AURICAN LEGATION. 
PEKING. 




1915 



May 6j» Ij 



From: Naval Attache", Peking. 

Tc: Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department (O.N. I.); 

Subject: Naval Base at Hsiang Shan, Nimrod Sound, 
Chekiang Province. 

1L The value of a naval base at Hsiang Shan has been 
realized for quite a while by the Chinese Government. 

2. The Xhineee Navy has made an estimate of the con- 
struction of such a base, and appended hereto is a transla- 
tion of the same. 

C. T. EUTCHINS, Jr.- 

Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N. 






♦ 



. 



• 












«QTT 



■ . t ■ [. t J .. . . ■ 
( • I • . ) t .. i o i : 5 



< 



• ... 



» • 
- 






3 •-;■ 



. 






* *. * 



# • .1 • V 4 * 



Need not be returnee 



The following detailed estimate ox the cost of labor and mater- 
ial for the construction of the proposed naval "base at Esiang Shan 
is respectfully submitted for Your Excellency's perusal. 

Item 1. A sea-wall is to "be built in an east and west 

direction, length 5700 feet (6697.5 feet); 

20 feet (£3.5 feet); width at the bottom 12 
feet (14.1 feet); width at the top 6 feet 
(7.05 feet); average width 9 feet (10.575 feet). 
The foundation ©f the wall to be faced with 
large concrete blocks of the following demens 
sions:- 8 feet long, 4feet thick, and 4 feet 
..ide. A total of 715 blocks. Labor in 
connection with same at six taels per block, — 

4278 taels. On top of the above mentioned 

concrete blocks, the wall to be faced with cut 
and dressed stone blocks 1 foot square and 2 

feet long, a total of 51,180 blocks at taels 

2.50 per block, or 1255,950 taels. 

To cover the wall there will be needed 2,850 

large blocks of stone 1 foot thick, 4 feet long, 

and £ feet wide, at 8taels per block, or a total 

•f 22,800 taels. The inside of the wall to be 

built of stone, that is, roughly quarried rock 

without regard the size. 10,260 fang (a fan 

is 1 foot thick and ten feet square, or 10 cubic 

feet). Taels 3.50 per* . , tctal of 35,910 

' 

548 fang (10 cubic feet) of broken stone at 4 t 

taels per fang, or 2,192 taels. 

365 fang (10 cubic feet) of sea sand at 3 taels 

•r fang, or 1,095 taels. 
6,100 barrels of oenont, at taels 3.80 per bar- 
rel, or 23,18< t. ols. 



The above mentioned three articles, the broken 

stone, sea sand, and cement, are the neces* 

sary aaterials for making the 713 cencfcete 

blocks. 

The entire wall, being 57C0 feet long, with an 

average width of 9 feet and a height of 20 feet 

contains 1026 cubic fang (10,260 cubic feet). 
Labor cost for building one cubic fang, — 100 
taels ^ Total labor f©r wall, 102,600 taels . 
Cesent for laying stones for the entire wall: 

22 barrels for every cubic fang, a total ©f 

22,572 barrels, at taels 5.80 per barrel, or 

85,773.60 taels. 

2320 fang of sea sand { a fang is 10 cubic feet) 

t 3 taels per fang, or 6,960 taels. 
20 wooden forms for moulding concrete blocks; 

labor and material, total cost 670 taels. 

Building a wooden bridge for use in connection 
with the construction ©f thesea wall andfor 
transporting materials for same; also removing 
this bridge when the whole work is completed. 
Cost ©f labor, 1/200 taels. 

Material for the bridge, which is 5700 fe t 
long, and consists of 800 spans of 7 feet each. 
2,500 pine poles for piles, 18 feet 7 inches 

lon L :, at taels 2.40 each, 6,000taels. 

170/000 square feet of pine planks (foreign) at 

taels .035 per square foot, 4,950 taels. 

(should be 5,950 taels). 

Screws and nails, beth included, 16,000 pound3 

at taels .08 per pound, 14,000 taels. (should 

be l,a80 taels) . 

Total for the above mentioned item, 

Construction of sea wall, -labor and materials 



both included, 440,838.60 taels. (should be 

427,838.60 taels) . 

Item 2. Filling in and laveling behind the sea wall as 

area 5700 feet long east and west and an avert, 
width ©f 1830 feet north and south, a total 

©f 104,310 fan.'-. 

The top of the sea wall is to be 20 feet above 

the level of the foreshore (above low water 

level ?) . 

Filling in behind the sea wall, 1,251,720 fang 

(10 feet square by 1 foot thick) at an estimat- 
ed cost for labor of taels .55 per fang, -total 

for labor 688,446 taels. 

The total land reclaimed is 1,738.5 mu at a cost 
©f taels 396.10 per mu for filling in. Total 

cost of the above mentioned item 2, -filling in 

behind the sea wall,- 688,446 taels. 

I tea 3 . An ir©n pier 500 feet long east and west and 

500 feet wide north and south? The face ©f 

the wharf to exten<f26 feet above the surface 

•f the water at lew tide when there is a depth 

©f 20 feet alongside the pier. 

For the sche I construction and the materials 

to be used, Bee the drawings. 

The piles t© be 3 feet square ' ef an average 

length ©f aeeut 45 feet over all, is t© be built 

up ©f 3/10 inch steal plates and fil ed with 

cement reinforced with 3 inch triangular steel 

bars. 

Total number of piles, 180. 

Steel ,T I" beam, 446. 

Lattice girders for the side of the wharf, 

534. 



Labor and material as follows :- 

Steel plates 3/10 inch thick, 5 feet wide 12 

feet long, 1,330,000 pounds at taels .038 per 

pound. 50,540 taels. 

3-inch triangular steel "bars, 880,000 pounds 

at taels 3.80 per 100 peunds. 33,440 taels. 

3 l/2-inch triangular steel tars, 187,00- 

100 
pounds at taels 3.80 per pounds. 7,106 tael 

2 by 4 inch ,T T" bars,— - 154, COG peunds at taels 

3.38 per 16© peunds. 5,205.20 taels. 

Rivets, 458,800 pounds at taels 4.6$) $et 100 

pounds. 21,517.72 taels. 

Steel "I" beams, 300,000 pounds at taels 3.38 

per 100 pounds. 10,140 taels. 

Flat iron bars, 2 2/10 inches wide by 2/10 inch 

thick, 65,00' pounds at taels 3.65 per 100 

peunds. 2,372.50 taels. 

Iron plates, 11 1/2 inches wide by 2/10 inch 

thick, — 39,000 pounds at taels 3.00 per LOO 

peunds. 1,170 tael . 

iron plates for the wharf face, — 

553,000 pounds at taels 3.38 per 100 pounds. 

18,691.40 taels. 

Cement, 55 (5,500?) barrels at taels 3.80 

per bar el. 20,900 taels. 

Broken stone, &53 fjng (1 1 thi<: \ 10 feat 

square) at aels 4.00 per fang. 1,412 taels. 

Sea sand, 262 fang (Ifoot thick by 10 feet 

aquare) at taels 3.00 per fang. 786 taels. 

Pitting fenders to three sides ©f the wharf. 
Total length of 1,360 fent fer say 50 fenders. 
Labor and material 3,000 taels. 
Meering bollards, 10. b, 2,000 pounds. 



70 taels.. (700 taels?) . 

Iron rail stanchions, 720. Each 3 feet long and 

1.2 inches in dial eter and weighing 21 pounds. 
Total 15,120 pounds at taels .10 per pound. 1,512 
taels. 

Rail stanchion sockets, 720. Total of 5,760 pound 

691.20 taels- 

Galvanised iron chain for the railing, 4,000 feet 

weighing 3,600 pounds. $52 taels. (4,320 taels?) 

Ladders, 4 Total of 1,200 taels. 

Boat davits, 4 sots. 8 iron davits and 16 "blocks 

and falls complete. 1000 taels. 

Lamps for the v/harf witn : posts, 10. 200 taels* 

Fainting the entire wharf three times. 1500 taels. 
Fqt the above noiiticned Item 3. 
Fqt materials 182,886.02 taels 

For labor 133,800.00 taels 

Teatal for labor & material 316,686.02 taels. 
In all eases when building an iron pier on the fore- 
shore, it is necessary t© build a rough wooden wharf 
frrst for the use of the workmen, and. when the work 
of construction is finished and the iron wharf com- 
pleted, the wooden wh ,rf is entirely relieved. 
This Item is abcolutely necessary. 
Total cost for labor and material, 4,0C0 taels. 
Item 4 . On the edge of the wharf a pair of rs s to 

be erected, together with necessary machinery for 
suae, for handling machinery end. guns requiring re- 
pairs and for like usage. 

The shears to be 100 feet high and capable ef lift- 
ing 60 tons, and to consist of 3 legs instead of hav- 
ing rowe ketays. 

The engine, boiler, and wkixk winch to be located in 
rear of the shears. 



6. 

The "bleaks and falls to have a eapaeity of 60 tons; 
the latter to be wire rope and «f a length suitable 
f©r the shears; all complete. (Investigation shows 
that this item must "be purchased abroad) 
Total cost 45,000 taels. 

Item5* A machine shop for making all kinds cf minor repairs. 
A building 200 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet 
high at the eaves; inside measurements. In all, 80 
fang, at a cost ©f 140 taels per fang for labor and 

aterial. 
Total ccst 11,300 taels. (11,200 taels?) 
Equipment fop machine shop as follows :- 
About 60 machine tools of various kinds and sizes. 
Trfcal cost 120,000 taels. 

Nippers, pliers, tongs, etc., asserted sizes. #0 in 
all. Total cost 320 taels. 
Shafting, pulleys, and belting. 
Total cost 25,000 taels. 

A shop engine of about 80 nominal horse^power, with 
the boiler for same. Total cost 17,000 taels. 
Total cost of item 5, labor and material. 173,520Tael 

Item 6. Boiler shop. 

A building 150 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet 

high at the eaves; inside Measurements. 

In all, 60 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang 

for labtr and material. 

Total cont 8,400 taels. 

Equipment for boiler shop as follov/s:- 

1 combined punch and shears. 3,500 taels. 

1 reamer 1,200 taels 

1 plate r«lls 5,500 tael, 

1 cast iron bending slab, 10 feet wide by 20 foot 

l»ng, built up ef 4 section 260 Taa&s. 



1 blower i,500 taels. 

6 forges 90 taels 

6 anvils 78 taels. 

60 hammers of assorted sizes 90 taels. 
Total cost of Item 6, labor and aaterial. 
20,858 taels. (20,618 taels?) 

Item 7 . Blacksmith shop. 

A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18feet 

high at the eaves; insido measurements. 

In all, 40 fang, at a cost ef 140 taels per fang 

for labor and material. 

Total cost 5,600 taels. 

Equipment for blacksmith shop as fellows :- 

1 2-ton steam hammer. ••• 4,000 taels* 

1 1-ton steara hammer 2,000 taels" 

10 anvils 150 taels. 

4 cast iron slabs 160 taels. 

12 forges 180 taels. 

1 blewer 800 taels. 

50 hammers efaassorted sizes 100 taels" 

Tetal cost ef item 7, laber and material^ 

12,990 taels. 

Item 8. Brass and iron foundry. 

A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet 
high at the eaves; inside measurement. 
In all, 40 fang, at a cost ef 140 taels per fang 
for labor and material. 
Total cfst 5,600 taels. 
Equipment fer 9UK±t±H$ feundry as follows :- 
1 crane 5,000 taels 

1 cupola for molting iron 2,000 taels. 

1 blower fer same 1,900 taels. 

Tetal cost of- it cm b » labor and material. 



8. 
14,500 taels. 

Itea 9 . Coppersmith shop. 

A building 60 feet long, 40 feot wide, and 18 

feet high at the eaves; inside measurements. 

In all, 24 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per 

fang for labor and material. 

Total cost 5,360 taels. 

Equipment for coppersmith shop as follows :- 

Hippers, pliers, tongs, etc., in all, 10. 8© 

taels. 

1 forge 15 taels 

30 hammers, asserted sizes 45 taels. 

Total ci st of item 9, labor and material/ 

3,500 taels. 

Item 10. Woodworking shop. 

A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 
feet high at the eaves; inside measurements. 
In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per 
fang for labor and material. 
Total cost 5,600 taels". 

Item 11 . Main boiler house. 

A building 100 feet long 40 feet wide, and 18 
feet high at the carves}, inside measurements. 
In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per 
fang for labor and material, 
tal cost 5,600 taels. 

Item 12 . Chiianey 

A chi: ney 120 feot high. 

Total cost for labor and material. 3,400 taels 
Item 13. tore houses. 

To oonsist of three buildings. The main 

building to bo 90 feet long east and we3t, 30 



feet wide n©rth and south, and 2 stories high. 
Each side building to be 90 feet long, 30 feet 
wide, and 1 story high. 

In all, 108 fang for the three buildings, at a 
cost of 115 taels per fang for labor and mater* 
ial. Total cost for labor and material. 
12,420 taels- 

t ea 14. Coal storage. 

4 coal store houses, each 250 feet long, 40 feet 
wide, and 16 feet high at the eaves. In all, 
400 for the 4 buildings, at a cost of 85 
taels per fang for labor and material. 
Tatal cost 34,000 taels j 
Storage capacity for the 4 buildings about 
1,000 tens (10,000 tons?) 

4 stone-walled enclosures, with a storage capa- 
city ©f 2,500 tens of co 1 oach,- a total ©f 
10,000 tons. Each enclosure to have 100 fang 
of storage ground. 
Total cost 27,200 taels. 

Tatal cost of Item 14, labor and material. 
61,200 taels. 

t ern 15. Office buildings. 

Director's office and residence t© c©nsist ©f 
about 40 cftien, at an estimated cost for labor 
and material ©f 300 tae s per chien. 
Total cost 12,000 taels. 

Item 16 . Quartes for the staff. 

Abeut 100 ©rhion, at an estimated cost for lab©r 
and material ©f 200 tael3 per chien. 
T©tal cost 26,000 taels. 
Jem 17 . Workmen's drellii 

Abo rfc 200 chion, at an estimated ccst for lab©r 



10 
and material of 150 taels per chein* 
Ictal cost 30,000 taels. 

Item 18 . ITaval Headquarters. 

Not yet definitely decided upon. 

Estimate for labor and material, including furnish- 
ing sane. 100,000 taels. 

Item 19. Water works . 

Laying fresh water mains and "building reservoir and 
ter tower. Estimated cost of about 120,000 
taels. 
Item 2C. light railway. 

To "be used for transporting earth and coal. Total 

length 7,500 feet, at a cost for labor and material 

of 26.80 taels for 10 feet. 

Total cost 20,100 taels. 

16 iron cars for same at a cost of 90 taels perear 

1,440 taels. 

Total eost of item 20, labor and material 

21,540 taels. 

Itea 21 . Working equipment. 

A mat shed and certain machinery and tools, as listed 

below, must be obtained before the work of building 

the sea wall and wharf is begun. A rough mat s£ed 

400 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 14 feet high tc 

the eaves. 

In all, 160 fang, at an estimated cost of 9C taels 

per fang. 1,440 taels. 

1 boiler 5 feet in diameter and 20 foot long, iron 

smoke stack, and all complete including a small 

feed pump 2,600 taels 

1 horizontal en. ine i -out 80 hor: ;- jwer (20 

nominal horee-power) 8 t 5< tael . 

75 feet of 2.7 inch shafting in 7 sections, /vlso 7 



11 



7 hangers assorted "belting, and 10 pulleys 

1,500 taels 
1 pump with 1 1/2 inch discharge 1,800 taels* 
1 steam driven combined punch and shears, (not "belt 
driven) 3,600 taels. 

5 hand-pwoer punches 1,500 taels. 

1 reaner 600 taels* 



1 drill pres 

1 large lathe & 1 small lathe 
4 forges 

6 anvils 

60 wooden bellows, various sizes 

2 sast iron slabs 8feet by 4 fe t 
100 haifiEaers, assorted sizes 

20 dozen files, assorted sizes 



1,000 taels. 
2,000 taels. 
48 Taels 
72 taels 
240 taels 
320 taels. 
200 taels 
200 taels 



1 grindstone, 4-feet in diameter, with tank 

helt, and pulley all complete 180 taels 

1 eevaent mixing Machine 750 taels* 

1 diving suit (outfit?); outside rubber suit, 

2 snail garments, aid rubber cloth for repairs 

1,500 taels. 

2 machines for pouring cenent 500 taels 

2 road scrappers (?) 600 taels 

12 wooden double bloclcs, 1 arge and small 48 tae [ 

4 pile drivers (?),-2 steam and 2 hand 3,200taols 

2 small vertcal boilers, with 2 snail feed 

pumps 3,600 taels 

2 4-ton differential purchases at 35 taels each 

70 taels 



4 3-ton 



8 2-ton 



4 1-ton 



2 l/2-ten 



do 



do 



di 



do 



do 
do 
it 



! 30 taels each 

120 taels 

at 22 taels each 

176 taels 

at 14 taels each 

56 tael3 

at 10 taels each 

20 taels 



12 

1,00' feet 3-ineh wire rope, weighing about 15 

pounds per 10 feet (?) at taels .23 per pound 

345 taels 

1 ceil 2-ineh coir r©pe,- 89 pounds to the ceil at 
tae&s .25 per pound 22.25 taels 

2 coils 3-inch coir rope, -198 pounds to the coil 

&t taels .25 per pound 99.50 taels 

coir 
1 coil 4-inch txxxfci: rope, -4-5)8 pounds to the coil at 

taels .25 per pound 102.00taels 

1 coil 4-inch tarred rope,- 418 pounds t© the ceil 

at teals .24 per pound 100.32 taels 

100 steel shovels 

70 at taels .67 a piece 

30 at taels 1.10 a mece 79.80 taels 

(79.90 taels?) 

200 pickaxez 150 taels 

Assorted kinds and sizes of round and flat iron and 

round and square ateel for making tools 

3,000 taels 

A snail stone pier to "be first "built for use in 

handing materials 3,500 taels 

The various items of material specially needed for 

the construction of the sea wall and of the wharf 

are required when the work is "begun. 

Total cost of I ten 21, labor and material 

51,918.87 taels 

Grand- total of the above enumerated 21 items required 

to begin the work 2,199,967.49 taels. 

tern 22 . Mooring buoys. 

Laying down 10 mooring buoys in the harbor at • cost 
of 3,500 t per buoysq 31,000 taels. 

tern 23 . . Dry docks. 

Dry deck Ne.l. 500 feot long inside, 9C i'eot wide 
at the entrance, and 15 feet ever the blocks at low 
water. Pumping machinery, boilers, and smol ok 



IS. 



350,000 taels. 

Dry d@ek Ho. 3. 300 feet long inside, £0 feet 
wide at the entrance, andIO feet ever the blocks 
at low water. Pumping machinery, "boilers, and smoke- 
stack 250,000 taels. 
Dry deck No. 3. 840 feet long inside, 40 feet 
wide at the entrance, and 5 feet over the bkocks 
at l@w water. Pumping machinery, boilers and 
smakestack 150, 00 > taels. 
This dock is especially for docking torpedo-boats 
and snail crafts 

After the docks are completed, the several shops will 
be added t@ and addit 1 tools installed^the esti- 
mated ap. roximate cost for th&s being about 80 taels 
(800,000?) 

Total cost ©f item 23 , labor and material. 
1,550,000 taels. 

Careful estimates ©f the cost to build the sea-wall 
•n the foreshore and the cost to build it ©n the rice 
fields are as f©ll©ws:- 
On the foreshtere. 

Building the sea-wall and filling in,- 2 items. 
Total cost 1,129,284 taels. 
1738.5 m© ©f land to be levelled off at a cost of 
647.30 taels per no. 
On the rice fields at Hsi iihan 
C©st ©f filling in. 479,357.70 taels. 
672 ia© ©f land to be levelled ©ff at a cost •£ 

713.33 taels per no. 
As a result ©f this c rision it is t t if 
the rice fields arc used there will be a saving of 
650,00' taols. 



14 

Also it will avoid many difficulties in connection 

.ith the work. 

A me ©f cultivated land costs about 50 taels. Lab«r 
fer filling in ccsts about 180 taels per me. The 
rice fields have to "be filled in t# a height »$ 5 ffc t 
and eack Mi of ground takes 300 fang ©f earth. 



10 



Item 
Item 



1. 
2 



Item 3 

Item 4 

Item 5 

Item 6 6 

Item 7 

Item 8 

Item 9 

Item 10 

Itea 11 

Item 12 

Item IS 

Item 14 

Item 15 

Item 16 

Item 17 

Item 18 

Item 19 

Item 20 

Item 21 



Summary of the foregoing It. ems . 

Building jrhe seaewall 

billing in behind the sea-wall 

Building iron wharf 

Shear legs 

Machine shop 

Boiler shop 

Blacksmith shep 

Brass and iron foundry 

Coppersmith shop 
Woodworking shop 

in boiler house 
Chimney 
Store houses 

Coal storage (including enclasureg 
Office buildings 
Quarters for the staff 
a 1 s dwellin 



Taels. .440,858.60 



O' 



ITaval Headquarters 
Water wcr 
Light railway 
working equipment 



Total for the aboye enumerated 21 items 
required to begin the work 



Item 22 Mooring buoys 



Taels 



Item 33 



Dry docks 



;427> 
688 


338.60? 
,446.00 


356 


,636.02 


45, 


,000.00 


173 


,520.00 


20, 


,585.00 


12, 


,990*0.0 


14, 


,500.0 


2, 


,500*0, 


5, 


,600.00 


5, 


,600. C 


5. 


,400.00 


12, 


,420.00 


61, 


,200.00 


12, 


,000.00 


20^000.00 


50, 


,000.00 


100, 


,000.00 


120, 


,000.00 


21, 


0.00 


51, 


,918.- 7 


2,199, 


,967.49 


55, 


,000.00 


1,550, 


000.00 



SUBJECT 



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. l 9°tfee(l TlOt be rStWt'tieCi. /-» 

MAY a*? i9ilT + 
f.fcm 

Present Constitution of Italian Fleet. """■ " 




From. 



No. 104* Date 



.Xagg,,7 > ,,,^15«.. 



Replying to O. N. I. No. 



Date 




1. As well as can bo determined with war imminent 
the following is the present constitution of the Italian 
■ fleet. This allocs for the aroadnought luilio which, from 
all reports- can join at any moment. 



o 

i • 



She assignment of destroyers to divisions is im- 
possible, as no information has been given out since last July. 



1st. Squadron 

Coanandcr-in-Chiof, S« . .. . il Irnca dogli Abrus::i t 
Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Cito, 
Flagship - Conte di Cavour. 



Is t.Bi virion. 



3d.Division. 



5th.£i vision. 



MMMMMMM 



-Rear-Admiral Coral.- -Roar- Admiral Trifari R.Atol.Cervin- 



Dante Alighieri 
Leonardo da Vinci 
Giulio Cesar© 
Ivuillo. 



Garibaldi 
L'erruccio 
Varese 

V* Pisani. 



3rin 

E.Pilibcrto 
Saint Bon 
Carlo Alberto. 



8d. Souadron 

Commandcr-in-Chiof. Vice Admiral Presbitoro, 
Chief of Staff. * 

Flagship - Regina >larghorita. 



2d. division, 
-Roar-Admiral Cutinolli- 

>gina ;lona 

Uapoli 

Vittorio ".manuolo 

Roma. 



, 4th. ; iv ision. 

-Re I 1 t- idmifcal C agnl- 

San arco 
Pi3a 

1 Giorgio 

Ifi. 



Division of 3 o outs 



Ilino Bixio 
uarto 
roala. 



2. 



Destroyers 
— tW) ~ 



Alplno 

Aqnilone 

Art ignore 

Ardlto 

Araento 

Aadaco 

Aaliaoso 

Aecaro 

AjPoerio 



Bersagliero 

'JTBB 

Carabinioro 

Corasclore 

CTQl 

rdo 

JO 

rue ill ore 

limine 

. 'illo 
"ibalfllno 
Granatioro 
Gruglielmo "?epe 



indoroito 

Ijnpari&o 

Inferepido 

Impetnoso 

Irrequieto 

Insitliooo 

Iiarnpo 

Lane lore 

:mbo 
Ostro 

ontiore 
Strala . 
Turbine 

ffiro. 



Bo change In I: juts. 





Subraarines 






(r;l) 




Belfino 


?olo!3 


Jaioa 


Glauco 




Jantir 


Squalo 


AT£0 




Barvalo 


Fisal." 


G.Pulllno 


Otarla 


Salpa 


G # Ferraris 


Eric hoc o 


Hccutlltis 


Atropo 


Foca 


Hercide 


Argonauta. 




fi^UH 



^^_-/^':7^ 



^_/ / 



Asterisk (*) designates Austrian vessels; all others are German 



/?j-m ■' 7 w) 

-L. __ \ ; W.r CV 



> 



Department of commerce 

BUr£$AU OF' NAVI6A1 . 

WASHINGTON 

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN 7ES ■■■_ IN roiri' ; - 01 THE UNITED STATES. 



May 8, 1915. 



ff 


srsrsss 


CSSS~5 


:;-;-;." 


:=^r;=;^^-_-^ 


.i;Cw=?=?===??=>=: 


■z^.—. —~— ~ — — —=———————— — 


Gross 


Net Pas sen 










Name 


bona 


bone 


gej . 


Crew 


Speed A I 


Owner 


erland 


54282 


2354J 


.V. ! 


923 


24 ' 


New York , N. Y. 


HambUj g. Amer i can. 


Washington 


^55 1 1 


15379 


2755 


' ;o 


n 9 - 


do 


North Gorman Lloyd. 


ka 


226 


13637 


2567 


541 ^17-L 


Boston, Mass. 


Hamburg --Amer i can. 


I Jronprinaoaain 

Cuci ! . 


19503 


0584 


15 76 


650 


-23i- 


do. 


North Gorman Lloyd. 


WilhoJm 11 


19361 


6353 


1593 


655 


-23A- 


New York, N.Y. 


do. 


^ ■ Line 
tent Grant 


18168 


11171 


c/ OJ 


305 


-14A- 


do. 


Hamburg -American. 


18072 


1 1 1 12 


o: : 03 


' : / , ■ 1 


-: 0, 


do. 


do. 


j 


10339 


9733 


2449 


370 


-15 J . 


-Boston, Mass. 


do. 


i a 


13333 


85 a v 


267] 




-13A- 


Now York, N.Y. 


do. 


Kurfarst 


13102 


'881 


1965 


26.0 


45,}- 


do. 


North Gorman Lloyd. 




1.1440 


7218 








Baltimore, Md. 


Hamburg American . 




0984 




is; 


215 


-14- 


New York, N.Y. 


Not Mi German Lloyd. 


ferinzess In i 




6443 


L930 


. 


- 3 52 


. 


do. 


ricl 
















*| Gros 


107 VI 


6585 


1827 


£15 


-14J- 


do. 


do. 


Jaobi> 


10531 


6420 


1387, 




-16- 


do. 


Hamburg -Ame r i can 




.100 08 


03 


180 


155 


13- 


Ba L t i mo r e , Md . 


North German Lloyd. 


loni£ Wj lhulm II 




| 


192 


170 


-14 - 


do, 


do- 


9410 


5764 






-J-0- 


.New Vui k, N.Y. 


Hamburg Amoi lean . 


. 


84 


52 • • 






i : 


do. 


do. 


Washington 8312 


5379 


1101 


250 


-17 - 


do. 


Unions Aue bi iaca. 




7 109 


. 




105 




Boston, Mass. 


North Gorman Lloyd. 


• i 


70 


4£ 






. 


New York, N.Y. 


Unione Austriaca. 


6600 


4141 




81 


12$ 


Philadelphia. 


Hamburg-Ame] i can 


:ny 


I 


4X71 






L3 


Bos1 on, Maes. 


n tone Austi i aca . 


. 


- 


7 7 


1045 


J 04 


13. 


Philadelp3 


tfamfcurg-Amj an. 


■ittekind 


5640 


5607 


1265 






■ ! n , Mass • 


North C©] man Lloyd 


Ockcui 


5621 


3452 








do. 


Han sa. 




54i 


331 


l J7« 


44 




New xoi \:, N.Y. 


Hamburg Anion can. 


tread 


5454 


34 




44 




Norfolk, Va. 


I 




.000 
490'/ 


31 " 
3148 


; .48 


66 

42 


12 


Now r : < Ik, M . V . 

do 


Hanua 

Hamburg -American. 


No raw. 


948 

4795 


3106 








do 

Galveston, Tex 


D.Tripovich S.S.Co. 

Atlantica Sea Nmv .Go 




47i 


3012 


1071 


93 


12 


Bos Ion, Mass. 


Noi Hi German Lloyd. 


him 


. 'GO 


2981 




96 




- New York, N i 


I i m. 


| 


: 


3068 




43 




Sari Francisco. 


K08mO8 li|io. 


rinz August 
LWi ram 


47 


y/'o 




10 




- Now 5fork, N.Y. 


Hamburg American. 







-2- 





Gross 


Net 


Passen- 








a Name 


tons 
4730 


tons 
309 


gers Crew 


Speed A I 


Owner 


'Ida 




12 


New York, N.Y. 


Unione Austriaca. 


nz Eitel 














Fried rich 


650 


2921 


62 


12 


do. 


Hambui g -American . 


- 


4637 


3019 






Philadelphia. 


D, ch S.S.Co. 


kllemannia 


4630 


2915 


82 


13- 


• New York, N.Y. 


i urg American. 


tarbur^ 


4472 


20 






do 


: .' 1 , : i :'. . MO. 




: I 


2 


48 




Sea b tie, Wash. 


Samburi k\ ■■ Lean. 




39... 


2541 






Nev Or leans , La 


Union 


1 # a 


>02 


■ /5 


44 




New fork, N.Y, 


Hami m , :'""'■. ; m 


3769 


i 561 






New 0] Leans ,La. 


.' ; ' aca. 


i ape st 




. 






N ii roil! , Va. 


At lant i Na r. Co. 


i 


: si 


22'. 






:,,, i "_■; ! . ._> n T 1 , : 


D T] Lpi vie] ! S Co 


■.'<■ 


297-i 


18c 






;;,..•, ni ib Ga, 


;'• . he] MF] G 




2778 


I 7 1-4 


28 




New York, N.Y 


D tmpi h ■ 1 ! ' ' d 
Horn Atk. 


1 


2555 


1635 


20 






Holm • : "■ U ■ ■ ' en. 


Clara Mennig 


1685 


1005 






do . 


i>i-.i .. ; ; i !i 


Unr 

.feptun 


1571 


989 






New Oi ) ( ans 


Lone Ans i aca. 


197 


L31 






San Francisco. 


J ij Let. 


lotomern 


, 


40 ■ 






Honolul u. 


No] an Lli r d . 


C. J. D. Ahlers 
Prinz Waldemar 


7490 


4737 






Hi Lo 


Hansa. 


3227 


173 




i 


Honolulu. 


forth ■ ■ - :i in L] Dyd . 


Bet 


4730 


30:. 






do. 


ECosmos. 


Bolsatia 


5649 


3533 






do. 


Hai Amei icin. 


lock;:' 


1657 


10:- 








No] man Lloyd. 


tog Moon 
» TOatssekretar 


1971 


1245 






do. 


Ham Lean. 














Krautkc 


2009 


1208 




12 


do. 


do, 


Governeur Jaeschke 


1738 


1045 






do. 


do. 


'Luc •■ 


6744 


; 




13- 


- Pensacola . 


Unione Austriaca. 


. Blumberg 


17< 


1077 






do. 


Leonard t & Blumberg. 


n 


3716 


557 








H. Vogemann. 


eda Leonhardt 


2822 


1818 






Jacksonville. 


L'. h rdt & 131 umberg. 


Bor 


3621 


2337 






Tampa, Fla. 


Soc. Anon.Ungherese di 
Ain-. : to Maritt. Ori enl 


Menwa 


• 








in Juan, P.R. 


lean Line. 



69 vessels 530,835 308,503 42,135 7,685 



f 




(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 



3, &eed not be rMwttenL 



r 



.*,-» t 



SUBJECT 



MAY Jgs 101b 

Fortifications of feranto ~ Ita ly,*,,,,, ',, 1 '..:..:. 1 / 




From...JL. - No $$$* 



Date 



8 t %ffi&+ 

m m mm»mm 



Replying to O. N i. No. 



T.... Date ^^^—^^^^fc^^u^ 

3^ < 



/?* 



3 

1. The fort if lections of T-arcnto arc "conrplelro" _ with 
the exception of 3 new batteries, iich I hot-r from good 
authority arc -under construction ** 4, 10 and 80 meters » re- 
spectively b . or £W5 from Cape San Vito. .hose, I understand, 
are off shore - "But no details arc available • 

. Besides the forts there have beer, cons rue . ed 
submerged breakwaters as ohov.n on the attached slDotch. These 
br akwatcrs enclose the harbor e::ecpt between the island of 
St» Paolo and the shoal of San Vito. 

3. All mines. etc, arc storcc? in the old castle. 

4. Fortifications as follows: 

Hondinella ?$. 4 to Q :":■: om« howitzers on cireulrr 

mounting; 
St.Pietro Is. 6 to 8 on. howitzers. 

om. " under shields; 
119 ton 31. Krupp in Oruson . 

turret; 
6 n &&m on naval : countings; 
} em. guns. 
« howit:.crc. 

1 mm. 

. mm. behind shields in earth- 
works . 



St*Paolo Is. 






C.San Vito 
Castcllo 



( 8 — 

Shore battery 



i 



Enol. 1. 






C 



ton t , Ft c 3 ? / / 



=f / / o /v S 




Bellow. 









3 ^"JU^.'iOi 




.5? 



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) 

CO 

SUBTECT Fortifications of Venice ~T 

J Qua tfeed not be returned. 



Precautions against attack. 
From T No W6. /fc* A0mK^^lHmUGmi^ 

Replying to O. N. i. No r ~ mm ~— — Date | ^-'- "X^o^n^^ 

1* I forward here, itli the very latest Information 
I have been able to compile on the fortifications of Venice 
and various military precautions taken against attack. The 
Italians consider Venice a very vulnerable spot, although an 
ideal base for torpc do craft for naval operations in the 
Adriatic. Tho forte have been lately overhauled, and many 
new battcrios have boon installed. It is believed that the 
below list of guns is substantially correct. 

. As rogords precautions against attack, I loom 
that wire network has been placed over the entire Inner 
basin and over all sho s end submarines under construction. 
Shis is within tho Arsenals where no foreign Attaches have 
boen permitted since August last. .11 works of art have bocn 
ronoved. 

3. There have been mounted on tracks along CavaX-ino 
shoal many aeroplane guns of French manufacture, and I believe 
tho same hrs boen done alongt&he Lido. 

.. Fortifications: 

All forts and battorles will bo found marked in red ink on tho 
attached tracing and numbered: 

(1) Cavallino Shoal: Two - " . • cm. .30 Cal. / tottery 

lour- lo a .:. modern , a complet- 



( ) Fort. San Andrea: Six - 15 cm. .F. 



I 



cd in 
191 . 



(3) Eegla llarina: Two - 30.5 on. 3.... .runs ( UNI of 

fire be- 
tween s, * 
and B.S.E. 

(x) (4) Fort. Tre orte: Six- 24 S*. ft« -. bmitthf r .*hls batt- 
ers; J ry may 
Four- 15 cm. /have been 

/moved, 
{ 5 ) F o rt . 8 an ' :rasmo : S Ie - 6 inch U ? , r~ ro j rib ly 

in chlolds. V nountod on 

I Southern 

) ond of 

l island. 

(G) Fort. San IlicoloMThroo - 20,0 om. . . ho\;- 

it%ors 
Four - 7., m. 

our - 15 an, . . . . 

or - 1 c .. .. . 
Foiu* m f& mm. 

fm - 1*3 c:.'i. oio{;o L ;uno on 

who el-car: m 

(x) Wot shown on chart - 






) 



CD) o: 

{!:} Tort Ml MM 

(11) art. 



45 
C 



\ 



- */ > 



: I 



«. 


5 




3SS - ' - 


Etiie, 






- 
- i 

; 

• 

• 9 





) Tort., Sen 
{!•'.) Part, j: 1 oe. • . RWBi 

(1 ) ,rfc, pot <■» 4 * 



(16) or 



lies 



Bucl« x* 






■*■■*.; 



jYvrc, \ s 



/jp 



Office of Kaval Intelligence, 

ay 10, 1915. 






**^ 






v&xe 



©' 



11/5 



(.7 










■ mm i m h i i.*»ii iu> - w i n i.i w » 

Proia; &t*(J«g«] J. E. Klein, 

So J Chief of operations, 

via Director of Ilaval Intelligence. 

&UBJ&GT; Battle practice - Discussion. 

1. In reading Over and studying the H Q tiono rt 

of the various warring nations (the filing of «felen is assigned 
to my desk) I have been more than surprised to note the ex- 
reme ranges at which aite are now feeing made Ly both the 
iglish and the German men-o-war. In this paper I have tried 
to condense the data and the lessons deducted from these Op- 
erations abroad and to ..reseat Ihem lor your consideration 
with special reference to the form of Battle .iraotiso as con- 
ducted in our navy. I e&ar&losa of the manner in which these 
cations may be received, i shall feel hiore than thankful 
if any email amount of discussion be begun which will wo: 
toward the increasing of our Gunnery hffi .ey in order to 
fit us to eep* v'ith vessels that seen to be able to a }. its 
at hitherto unheard of ranges. 

This diocussion can best be divided into the following 
in topics. 

I. Lessons drawn from the present 7,'ar. 

II. notes on lien ^.im, «erxcKa Battle 

I I I. Com pari son with United 3tatos havy. 
17. Battle j ractloe U.SJIavy. 

(a) ange 

(b ) Speed 

(c) ather Conditions. 
V. Conclusion. 

As ciuch of the information concerning affairs abroad is 
"Confidential", it is most itly requested that none of 
ese notes be -.ivon out. 

1. Lessons drawn from resent War. 

■ [■■Mi^MW M iaiW. urn i K rM nn wiii— n .w* ^. » iimnW.i< H < n M * >***' ia *i »m" »W m* >v* +—*m>4 • <i wl ii m > .■ » mi imMmUm* » 

all the engagements which have taken place to 
date, only the following three major operations are cited, as 
these are the only ones in which two fleets of nearly the 
same strengths have engaged each other. 

Action of January 24, 1915, 

or 
"Sinking of hltlcher" . 



Engl ish - /'loot 



German i-'lcot 



1. i,10li( Flag Hh.G. )28.5 kto-0-13':5 1 .herf linger ( . ; >(B.d.) 



,10 



r* 



2. 8 !jj.C) 



icts.-a-i3«i5 



j kts.- B-ajB". 
2.U0LTKE (h.C.)27,2 kts-lG-11" . 



J.PRIHC YAL(B.C) 23.5 hie.- 3. (B.Q.)29 ktfi .-10-11" . 

0-3 3.5 • 
*-n ( .0,)26.4 kta-8-12". 4.BLUC :.;.0.)25.8 lets. - 



*3C .. 



5. :(B.C. )27.3 kts.a-iL . 

Jpeed - 26.4 to 10 -its. -Full 
Guns - H - 13 f :5 
1C - 1 . 



l£-8?2. 



ood-25.0 to 3 ■ ,- ;ull 
Guns - 0-1: 
20-ll n 
12-8. 



Vw» 



>V*vSN 









<*tr ; : • y v 



6 T 






- 2 - 

Sea Smooth 

British fired single 13".5 
ranging shots (8,53-9.09 A.ll. ) 
at 20,000 yds. -one of which hit. 
INDOMITABLE lagging behind. 
K£W SAALAED exceeding contract 
speed .Fleet speed 29 to 30 knots. 
Began salvoes at (9:20 A.ll. }18000 
yds .PBUfCBSS SOXil opens on 3LU- 
CHEB 17500 yds.BAUCHER hit at about 
this range .Many German shells hit 
but did not explode* 



Tactics. 



and. 
keep 



glish maneuvred 
then hold position 



just out of range 



to 
so 
of 



up 



Germans open fire 18000 yds. 
and minimum range 16,400 yds. 
Average range reported 17000 
yds.BLUCIIJAH hit. Shell pene- 
trated decks and exploded in 
fire -room, put ting 4 boilers 
out of commissi on. Direct 
cause of lagging behind and 
becoming prey to smaller 
ships .Finally sunk \>y torpedo 
at very short range after re- 
sistance ceased. 
Tactics . 

Using full speed to es- 
cape - trying to return to 
Helgoland or get behind mine- 



12" guns of Germans 



catch 
as to 
11" and 

fields. 
Both fleets steaming in 
column, courses practic- 
ally parallel, (about .L.3.B.) 
English Fleet withdrew-said to 
have done so to avoid mine-fields f 
However, the 2nd in command, E. Ad. 
Aoore was later relieved of com- 
mand for not pursuing Germans farther. 

Note : -British Battle Instructions provide that when 5 ships en- 

c 4 ships, Uo.l and 2 British, concentrate on ilo.l enemy; 
::o.3, fires on enemy I!o.2; So. 4 on enen-y Ho .3; and Ho. 5 on 
enemy No . 4 . 

During this fight, IlIDaALTABLE(IJo.5 } fell behind-could not 
make the Fleet speed. LI Oil (Ko.l) fired on LEIJALIHGEK ( II o . 1 ) . 

TIGEH(Uo.2) fired on D2jRFLINGER(ll'o.l )as per instructions. 
RIJSCESS ROYAL (Ho. 3) fired on SEYDLI2Z (Ho .3), assuming 
INDOMITABLE out of position. 

W :D(No.4) fired on BLUCHER(Ifo .4 ), assuming II! .Doll I TABLE 
out of position. 

IHDOMITABLE (No. 5) fired on BLtfCHIB (Ho .4 ) . 

(when she caught up) 

As a result, MOLTKE(IO.S) escaped almost untouched and prob- 
ably inflicted most of the damage on LI01 and TIGER. 



Results 



Damage to LI OK - one shell struck 
engine room below armor; (caused her with- 
drawal from fight ) , one shell exploded in 
forward torpedo room; one exploded on armor 
belt and loosened plate .Hit about £4 times. 

Damage to TIG2R - more general than BLUOHER-eventually sunk, 
to LIOH, but not as serious .Details lack- Armor not pierced until 
ing.Hit 14 times, nearly all in upper works .near end .Neither engine 



HKW ZEALAHD.PBIJTCESa RoYAL and 1IU 
DOMITABLE damage not known, if any, very 
Ilight. 



room damaged when she 

sank. 

OTLIM hit attaft 11" 
turret by long range 13'. T 5 
shot and explosion ignited 
400Q kil03 powder, Avi- 
dently penetrated vicinity 



£6gi - 3 - 

ndling room as entire personnel 
of turret and handling room killed 
by burns (34 men), llo reports on 
further damage . 

\o report on nature of damage 
to 

bly escaped with. 
v&ry a ;e,if any at all. 

gunnery Lessons : English made single ISIS hits at 20,000 
yards and landed saivoes at 1§ V 000 yds, while stealing at fall 
speed. hopelessly outranged. Long range hit on 
BLCCHEB made her easy prey to faster English cruisers. 

is inflicted some damage at long ranges (averaging 
17,000 yds.} with 11" and 12" guns, while steaming full speed. 
German report states minimum range - 16,406 yds.(l ) 
tres ). 

Action of December 8, 1914. 

.Inland Islands." 



«i w — « r ■** ■« «' - — — ■^■ ^ »— i 



lis action consisted of a series of duels, but for I \ e 
- oses of this vv.per, only the main action "between the iliVm.- 
CIB and IlfJUSXIl a 8C and 3 ■./ need be 
considered. 

l,:i£lish Germans 

11(S.C. )28 lets. 8-12". S( -TfA.C. )£2.7 fcts.8-8".2 
IMFIiEXIB£E( . . )27.2 kts.8-12" .ajfEISSHAVUtC . )23.5 kts. 8-822. 
Guns-16-12" Guns-16~8 r :2 

Speed-Practically full speed 3peed-i'ull speed attempting 
throughout . to escape . 

Tact ice -Manouvred so as to Tactics-(1 )Attempted to escape 
(l)get within 12" range (2)C. ed course fre- 

(2)keej> outside 8'i2 range. quently to throw off Pish 

spotting. 
Sea - Smooth 
.m1 her -Clear and Pair. 
Kange - £8*800 yds. to 16,500 yds. 
Battle commenced 12:55 p.m. BCE&BBHQ sank 4:17 p.h. 

developed about 29 mm 'J sank 6:00 p.m. 

knots. " ran out o£ aramun- 

[ ;LK said ition about *|2 . 
to have fired BOO rourids 12" 
apiece • (Hot eon f i rmed ) 

first hit at about 
16, ■.-. yde.IHVD I IS hit between 
20 and 30 times during battle. 
So serious material damage .Ho por- 
sonnel losses .Damage Iil?Ii: 
not known* 

Gunn r:ry Wesson : ~ r ^he British made sufficient 12" hits to 
sink fi armored cruisers at from 13,500 yds. to 16, yds. while 
both fleet* ware steaming full speed. The reported unusually 
heavy expenditure of ammunition may be due in a groat measure 
to the tactics of the ans Lb changing ree frequent] 
and to the fact that the entire battle was fo it long ranges 

ana nade from 80 to tits '■;;.. t> - una at ranges 
of from 13500 yds. to 16 yds., while a foil Speed* 

c slight uatorial damage i i Lish is & iot to faulty 
German gunnery, but to the &rcat r q at which these shell 

re fire . 
Note: -The and U were both uunnory trophy 

Ships. 



- 4 - 

Action of llov.l, 1914. 

"Coronel Chili." 

This action was virtually a duel between S0HAB3JH0RS5) and 
Ol'EISElIAU versus GOOD HOPE and aOi&LGU^H. GLASGOW and C TO 

escaped. Small German cruisers inflicted little damage. 

German English 

Si .:iI0^3 f r(A.C. )22.7 Its^G-a^E GOOD E0PE(G }23 kts.2-.9 , J2-16-6" 
GUEI3EBAU(A.C.)83.5 kts.8-8 T i2 MOHMO UEH ( C )22.5 kts.-14-G'J 

Guns - 16 - 8':2 Guns - 2-9 r .'2; 30 - 6" 

Speed - Pull Speed Speed - 17 knots 

£actics-Haneuvred to obtain 
advantage of light after sun had 
set and to 'kcB].) beyond 6" range. 

Sea - Very Heavy. 
Weather - Heavy winds - unf avorable . 

Some of 6" guns could not be used due 
to heavy seas end spray which also 
interfered with the 2-9"2 guns. 

Ilange-12000 yds .to 4500 yds. 
Third salvoes (about 12000 yds ) . ' 
Set both GOOD HOPE and LIOIMOUTH afire. 

Small material damage. GOOD HOPE and K0ITLi0US.lI sank* 

English did not get within 
6" range until Soo dar^ to see. 

Gunnery Lesson : Germans 872 guns completely outranged English 
6" guns. G06D HOPE'S 2-97 guns hampered by heavy sea and spray. 
Germans made 8"2 hits at 12000 yds. in a very heavy sea after 
'sunset, while steaming at, or nearly at, Full Speed. 

A study of these Gunnery Lessons will reveal the following 
points: 

(a) Hereafter Kaval battles will be fought at ranges about 
twice as great as the average of those of the Eus so -Japanese 
War - namely at 15000/ yards. 

(b ) Hereafter Ilaval Battles will be fought at, High Speeds, 
(which in two of these three actions was almost 29 knots ) 

(c) Hereafter, the victor must be able to make hits at very 
Ion,:: ranges while steaming at Full Speed, and in some cases, be 
able to accomplish this in a heavy sea way. 

fd) ma victor in each case suffered small material and per- 
sonnel losses. fhM vanquished lost every thing. 

(e) A small initial advantage, either in gunnery or material, 
doubles itself before one third of the en^a^ement is fought and in- 
creases to an insuperable advantage by the middle of the engagement. 
In short, the victor is invariably the one who possesses this initia 
superiority, measured in terms of speed, g*uns or gunnery efficiency. 

Is our ITleet sufficiently skilled in gunnery to "draw first 
blood" from any possible enemy, or rather do our battle practice 
results compare favorably with the results of these actions? 
Note: -A statement of the percentage of hits made in these three 
bat ties, if compiled from the meager data available to date, would 
probably be so inaccurate as to be misleading. An attempt is being- 
made to obtain reliable information on this siibject. 

II. Hotes on Lnglish and German Battle Practices . 

1. There is very little data on file in this office re- 
ferring to this subject, but the following isolated notes, ar© 
inserted for what they may be worth. 

(a) Both Germany and England have, for some years, antici- 
pated a fleet engagement in the L'orth Sea. It is said that 



— 5 — 

they therefore engaged in practices -under north oea conditions - 
at is - choppy sea, hasy weather and ran&e of visibility 
mt 6 yds*, .ever, they probably did not confine t\ - 
selves entirely to this short battle ran t ;e as the following 
notes prove; nor would the excellent gtuanexy duri he war 
ve boon possible had they not practiced at longer r»33£ 
an 6000 yds. 

(b) i« Soott director syateia as used in the Ilah 
Havy has increased the British efficiency In long - o gun- 
nery. Die Permans have investigated the director system and 
may have installed it in some of their vessels - but on Jan- 
uary 8, 1915, no evidence of the director system v;as found on 
an inspection of the battle cruiser HOLXKS and of the small 
ori'isor 55 I3USQ. 

(c) In 1913, England fired experimental strings at the 
old ! ' ess of India" with 13'io guns at a range of eight 

les. 

fd) In 1912, EogXmft conducted battle practice at from 

to 1 , yards, 

(e) As early as 1908 or 1909, the Germans conducted 
act. ices at I0 t 000 yards or more, and quite recently zhej 
red at a minimum range of 13124 yards (l£,C0u metres). 

S. It is yerj regrettable that no data is at hand re- 
gard I exaot ranges &M conditions of the sea durin 
thasfl practices, The Lnglish issue tables containing the 

reeu of hits made but this is of no particular value bo- 
use the other conditions are omitted. Incidentally, these 
tables which usually refer to ^un&ayers testa, state that 
weather conditions were "Ekc client" "Favorable" etc, but in 
a very few isolated cases ?i , ere the conditions reported to be 
Diavorohle. 

3. Comparison with United states havy. 

In comparing our Gunnery efficiency with that of .England 
and of Germany, the comparison naturally follows two separate 
and distinct lines - i.e. -(a ) M Material" and (b ) n Fire Control". 

(a) Material". The following verbatim quotation from 
the daily press is said to have been authorized hy the Uavy 
apartment :- 

"There is an a:;iom with regard to calibres which amounts 
to this - that a ship should mount the smallest big gun that 
will pierce the enemy's armor over vitals at the maximum pro- 
bable ..htine * e. She 14" guns of the i h- will 

■, through the maximum armor afloat, so far as our knowledge 
ejocs, at a range of 12000 yards. 

It is not ay ■ urpose to discuss at length the subject of 
•..crial. The following notes, bearing on the above statement, 
are inserted without comment. 

1. The ocharnhorst axid Cnoisenau were destroyed by 12" 
guns at rang«« between 13500 yards and 14*500 yards. 

£. The blueher was disabled by 12" and 13V 5 guns at 
about 17000 yards range. 

3. The Good Hope and Uonmouth were defeated by S«2 guns 
at a range of 12000 yards in a rough sea after sunset. 

4. it substance of 1, Z and 5, indicates that battle 
ranges of 1 yards now out of date. 

5. ish, evidently due to recent I riences, 
are building two or four vessels of the following character- 
istics: 

Length - 8QQ feet. 
Displacement - 17000 tons. 
ii. .-. - 12' j, 
3peed - 31: knots. 

at - /tin - 4-15" raifti 

eoondary- robetoly 6 "-numb or of nai not 
known. LI to be mounted on 
cc r line. 



- G - 

ihiel - Probably Oil. 

Armor - Hone of any kind neither vertical nor horizontal 

HI III || i ■ ■ - ■ ■-■■«■- ■ - ■ ■ ■■ - -- - ...-..■. T .Hi - - - ti ,i 

'1'hese vessels arc designed to sacrifice amor for speed. 

our fleet 




and must fight at the very greatest ranges possible in order to 
protect themselves, "his again emphasises the fact that the next 
fleet en . agement will be fought at enormous ranges and that vic- 
tory must certainly be won by accurate long range firing .One well 
plaoed*on one of these vessels will be sufficient to spoil her 
doom, yet the English are taking that chance in order to be able 
to dictate battle ranges and at the same time to win the battle hj 
long range heavy plunging hits, such as disabled the Blueher. 

It is not my intention to convey the idea that England in- 
tends to build all her future capital vessels along these lines - 
but it is my aim to invite attention to the possible changes in 
gunnery ideas which are bound to come if these vessels prove 
effective. 

(b) Fire-control . 

As stated heretofore, there is no satisfactory way 
of comparing results of our Battle Practices with the results 
of B&glish or German fractices. Hior can the results of these 
engagements be accurately compared, because the advantages of a 
larger target are more than offset by the interference of the 
enemy, the greater speed used in action, etc. 

We assume that our fleet in time of war would also 
arise to the occasion and perform marvelous feats of gunnery. 
I say we "assume" that, we "hope" that, and we "believe" that - 
but do the results of our battle practices warrant such an assump- 
tion? Can we actually make a reasonable percentage of 12" or 
14" hits at from 13,500 to 20,^00 yards? 

The Department slates that the battle practice of 
1914 showed little improvement over that of 1913 . Further I 
have heard that the practice of 1915 could not be classified 
as "good". 'The Department al30 states that the Spotting of 
1914 was not as good as that of 1913. ose three sentences 
indicate that we are not advancing . fhe first section of this 
paper certainly proves that Lngland and Oermany are not merely 
roving their ^^uiiaery, but that they are advancing by leaps 
•1 bounds. hat is being done to improve our gunnery? 

IV. Battle i-ractice - U.S. Havy . 

Conditions under which battle practice is held divide 
selves naturally into three headings - (a) Range, (b ) 
jc&, (c) weather conditions. Briefly stated, the Range should 
be as great as possible up to limits of accuracy of gun fire; 
^^ e speed should be the most the vessel is capable of up to the 
point where vibration interferes too seriously with gun point- 
ing; the weather conditions (other than visibility) should be the 
average weather expected at sea, i.e., not "Excellent" nor always 
"Favorable". To reconcile these three factors, to give each its 
proper weight, and then to frame a set of rales for Battle Prac- 
tice is an undertaking that merits much consideration and dis- 
cussion. 

£he Italos for 1914 iractice prescribe 
hanges - 7000 to 9000/ yards. 
Speed - 15 knots. 

Aher Conditions - little is said except that conditions mu3t 

bo fair to all ships. 



* 



(a) I^an^e - Summaries of previous practices . 

1912 - 12* ranges, 10640 to 11760 yards. .Fall charges, 

1913 - 12" ranges, 8770 to 8410 fcds . deduced charges. 

1914 - 12" ranges, 9050 to 10790 yds. Pall charges. 

Alto note that in 1914, among the battleships, the LOUIS IA 
fired at from 10380 to 12510 yds. (the maximum average range ) # the 

IE fired at from 6850 to 8900 yds. (the minimum average 
range) and that the 7IRSIHIA, actually fired at a range of only 
6330 yds. at some point in her run. 

In hie report on 1914 practice, a Division Commander remarked 
on battle ranges of 10,000 to 13,000 yds. 



m 



Shen the above practice ranges are compared with the actual 
battle ranges of the three battles noted abroad, it seems that our 
ideas of battle ranges are short by about 6000 yards. 

!Phe following table shows approximately the limits of accuracy 
of our guns: 

8""- 45 cal. - 15,000 yairds. 

12" - 40 cal. - 15,000 yards. 

12"- 45 cal. - 18,000 yards, 

14"- 45 cal. - 20,000 yards. 

12"- 50 oal. - 22,000 yards. 

I believe our practices should be fired at ranges as great as 
possible, up to the limit where "chance" enters into ballistics. 
Additional attempts should be made to build and handle larger targets 
in order that the range may be increased to 15,000 yards and still 
remain within "aceuracy' 1 limits. Jurther, the 8" gam should bo 
discounted in this connection and the rules framed with reference 
to the 12" and 14" guns only. 

(b) Speed . 

The old conception of two fleets of nearly equal strength 
and speed, steaming in parallel columns, more or less willing to 
decide the issue, needs revision. In modern times, no two fleets 
have fought under those conditions, ?robably never again will two 
fleets be both willing to engage - one will invariably be forc4% the 
engagement on the other, I.e. there will be a pursuer and a pursued. 
This applies directly to cruiser etc. actions and It may also be 
more or less applicable to Battleship Fleets. 

Discussing these three engagements the following becomes 
apparent : 

(a) Craddook's ideas will never be known* But he was severely 
criticized for his foolishness in not attempting to escape from the 
Germans at Ooronel - at least for not running away until the Oanopus 
Joined him. The Germans, were using all speed possible to sink 
the Good Hope and Monmouth before this junction obuld be affected 
and to gain the advantage of the light just after sunset. Ithout 
superiority of speed theiSermans would have failed to force the 
engagement under their own terms. ;ain, let mo repeat, while 

foing at full speed, they dropped salvoes on the English ships at 
2000 yds., with 8 ".'2 guns, under severe weather conditions. 

(d) At the Falklands, the Germans unknowingly Bteppad into a 
trap and then used all speed possible in trying to escape. 'ilio 

;lish battle cruisers needed their high speed to overtake the 
Germans, and when overtaken, to maintain the range within limits to 
their own advantage. Yet, while both fleets were steaming- at full 
speed the English made sufficient 12" hits, to sink their adversaries, 
trtiile the Germans made 20 to 30 - B12 hits on the Invincible at 
ranges of 13,600 to 16,500 yards. 

(c) On January 24, 1914, the Gorraans wore evidently on their 
fay to raid the English coast when surprised by the Knglish 



-8- 

battle cruisers. Knowing they were outranged and outnumbered by the 
English, the Germans made all speed possible to escape. Again, 
while steaming at fall speed, each side did some remarkable long 
range shooting, i.e. at least 24 - 8J 11", and 12" hits at 17000 
yards average range were made h^ the Germans . 99 record of damage 
inflicted by English other than the notes under the results of the 
battle quoted at beginning of this paper. 

The question of building faster ships is not under discussion 
{see 32 knot, new Snglish ship) but the subject of "making long 
range btits while our ships are steaming full speed" should and must 
soon, be duly considered. I do not believe we have ever held a long 
range battle practice with the firing vessel makin; full speed. Does 
16 knots speed give us the necessary earner ience, practice or data? 
The question of speed, as discussed herein, is not confined to the 
innge of range* factor. I refer especially to the interference 
gunnery caused by 1- excessive vibration, 2- smoke and powder 
oloud interference en own ship and on other ships, 3- additional 
oonfusion below decks when operating at high speeds, etc., etc. 

I suggest that eaoh ship have a point on her speed curve deter- 
mined where the interference by vibration be considered as detrimental 
to ganneT'j and that each vessel fire her individual battle practice 
at slightly less than that speed. The higher the speed the more 
realistic will battle conditions be reproduced. Carbine ships should 
bo able to fire when steaming at fall speed. 

If it be considered necessnry or desirable to adopt a fleet 
speed for all these practices, why not adopt the speed of the ship 
whose vibration point is lowest on the curve? This point certainly 
should exceed 15 knots. Before leaving the question of speed, 
attention is invited to the subject of ^Speed versus submarines* . 

In the battle of last August (Helgoland) Admiral Beatty reports 
that while his battle cruisers were waiting to support the light 
cruisers and flotillas they steamed about at fall speed. Suddenly 
they were attacked by three German submarines, but, due to the high 
speed of the battle cruisers, the submarines were easily avoided/ 
The battle cruiser 3 later on ongn^Bd and assisted in sinking the 
*rladne, 2oln, I&omz and V-187. 

In short, although a battle fleet is subject to submarine attack 
at any time, it is especially so during and just Immediately before 
and after an engagement . In the present stage of submarine 
development, 25 - 30 knot battle cruisers easily avoided 10 - 12 knot 
submerged speed submarines. Cound a 15 knot fleet avoid 10 - 12 
knot submarines as easily? Shea submarine speed is increased to 25 
knots on surface and 16 knots submerged, our creeping 15 knot battle 
fleet will not be able to outmaneuvre them as easily a3 Admiral 
Beatty did. Speed is the best ^possibly the only, defense against 
submarines . 

(c) feather Conditions . 

Of the three factors concerned In Battle practice Rules, 
this one Is the least important, but is cot a neglible factor by any 
■sans. It must be subordinated to range and speed in order to avoid 
unnecessary inaccuracies. However, neglecting it entirely is very 
apt to result disastrously especially in affairs such as the Coronel 
Battle. 

Our last individual practice .rules rnde no special mcrtton of 
unfavorable state of sea, eto. 

By state of weather is meant the wind and sea only, visibility 
should always be of the best because it is worse than useless, it is 
absolutely misleading, to fire when the visibility Is poor or deceptive. 

As stated before, Jagland and Germany practiced under North Se 
conditions, which I assume to mean that they fired battle practice 
when the aea was choppy, etc. 

Lieutenant Commander Jackson (in 1913-1914) of the '.'yoraing, 
advoontod firing In the open oea under deep sea cojiditions. 



- 9 - 

I can not refrain from mentioning another topic which 
bears on this subject, i.e., the spirit of competition in 
each ship, in each division and in each fleet is so slron, , 
that saoat of us will sacrifice many other considerations in 
order that our turret, ship, division or fleet may get "the 
edge" on the other turret, ship, division, or fleet. And a 
favorite way of getting this small advantage is to use every 
possible means of being able to fire our strings during the 

:'t favorable weather conditions. I doubt not that the En - 
lish feel the same way about it. But the German system of 
administration is such that this is not likely, farther, if 
it were possible, 1 believe that each unit in the German llavy 
is willing to sacrifice its small individual edvantapo if it 

nefit the German Havy as a whole. A study of the Goronel 
battle will certainly convince anyone that the Germans mast 
have had some practice at battle ranges under unfavorable 

: tlier conditions. Tha string of protests usually following 
any event which tends to reduce scores is evidence gx tnio 
spirit* Competition must be fosteied as it is necessary to 
induce extra effort, but some method should be devised or 

me rale framed in order that the Fleet be made to fire 
under weather conditions other than those of the "mill-pond" 
variety, 

V. Conclusion. 

1. rhe conclusions to be drawn from this discussion 
are properly left to the chief of Operations, however, in 
order to emphasis© the main points, 1 Invite attention to the 
following summary statements, which, in my opinion, must be 
carried out in order to bring our Gunnery Efficiency up be 
at of Bnglanfl and of Germany. 

(a) Battle Practice ranges must be increased to 15000 
yards or more. 

(b) The firing vessel must steam at high speed - as 
nearly Full Speed as practicable. 

(c) rhe firing should be conchicteci in the c con sea 
under average \. or conditions. 





• V 



X 



I 



Need not be rex 



jhfaai*- Qf^ffUv^^L wtvuJL^. m. ^nj.jb-iyS' 

Country* ,.#..... .Turkey. Port. ...... • • Constantinople, &c# 

Report from % S* 3. SCORPIO E. 
Date of B»Wt*r^rig j | f »,IIIftt 

■^-q-O -o ~o-o-o-o-o-o-c-o -o-o-o -c -o~o-o~o -o-o -o-o-o -o-o-o -o-o-o -c -o-o -o-o-o- 



s 



1* 




Constantinople* 

(a) On Sunday Hay 2, a Turki* aeroplane with pink 
underbody, which had left the Turkish hangars 
at San Stefano and was flying to northwards- 
possible in pursuit of the hostile aeroplane 
with green underbody, which was mentioned in 
last report Inas fired upon and shot down out- 
side of Chichi i, (a suburb of Constantinople)* 
The funeral of the two officers killed, one 
Turkish and the other German or Turkish, was , 
held the ftp owing day, a part of the aeroplane S^' 1 *^ 
being carried on the coffins* / 

(b) On May 2, and 3, nearly all the British and Erench 
subjects remaining here, (about 3,0C0 in all, it 
is said,mostly Maltese and other provincials), 
were notified to hold themselves in readiness to 
go to the Dardanelles on Thursday .Hay 6* They 
were later told to report at Sophsaie Quay,-***— 

-aosaa ng of4»ay^ 50 of them, 2 5 British and 25 
French, were then chosen by the Chief of Police, 
and embarked on small s tearner, which took thorn to 
Call ipolUI^r. Hoffman Philip, 1st* Secretary of the 
American !M>assy,by order of the Ambassador, ac- 
companied them* It is understood he has since been 
recalled* the State Department having disapproved 
of his having been sent there ;but he has not arriv- 
ed back yet*!&T& American T&wgQggwr reporters, s 
representative of Collier f s Weekly and a reporter 
of the Brooklyn 3agLe,tfio arrived here recently 
from Berlin, also went on same steaner.lt is said 
they are to be stationed in undefended towns which 
have been bombarded on the Gall ipoli Peninsula* 

(c) The Turkish battleship M Torgut-Reis'* stood Jn from 
Sea of I.*armcra,en route fvn the Dardanell es ,and 
into Golden I!om,on Thursday, May 6* Since then both 
the "Torgut-Reis" and "rfe.ridilin-3arbarossa" have 
be; n here, in Golden 2icrn,undergoing repairs, the 
former, among other things .reseating a 28~cm (11- / < / 
inch) gun dt is said,and the "Saridlin-Barbarossa'Vt^^^ 
one of its masts* / v 

(d) The Turkish cruisers "Bamadieh" and "Midilli" (e: - 
German "Breslau") stood out of Golden Horn and up 
Bo sp horns early on morning- of Thursday .I 1 ay 6 8 and 

at 5#0C a#ra. ,the "Sultan Selim" m: c-Geraan "Goeben"), 
"Breslau", "Hamad ieh", and t r m torpedo boats, stood out 
of Beicos and into the Black Sea, along the Anatolia, 
C . sia I.:lnor) side*Cn Iriday night they returned 
again, with two ooal vessels they are said to have 
been convoying,and the "Hamadieh" and "Breslau", 
went into Golden Iforn again on following morning*, 
and "Goebsn" remains off Stenia. 

(e) As mentioned in preceding paragraph,a collier and 
another coal vessel, came in on evening ,May 7, from 
either Chamli or ZongaT dak, having been convoyed, 
part of way,by part of the Turkish, fleet. The col- 
lier is said to have brought in 3,000 tons of coal, 
and the otber coal vessel, about 500 tons. This is 
for the Government* At the sane tine, an other small 
private vessel got in with 41 tons,v#iich has been 
bought by the SCCRPIOH,and has been taken on board. 



Pag© 2. 

Country. • • Turkey. Port. •.....». Constantinople ,&c. 

Bepcrt from fcS.S.3CCFJPIC2U 

Date of Kepcrt.. .. ...May 10,1915. 

— o ~o -o -o ~o — c -o -c -o—o ~o -c <— o -o -*o -o -o -o -o -o -o -o-o -o -© -o —0—0 -0 — o -o -c -0-0-0- 

(f) PVom 3 f 0C0 to 4,000 more wounded have arrived from 
the Dardanelles the past weekjand from 5,000 to 6,000 
more troops have "been sent there from here* There are 
now said to "be about 160,000 Turkish troops at the 
Dardanelles jand it is said there are 300,000 more at 
Adrianoplajrahich could he "brought the»ev?t short 
notice* 

(g) A. law has "been promulgated here, the past week, by 
which all civilians are required to report, and turn 
in all fire -arms, ammunition, and weapons ^ when consid- 
ered necessary by Military Governor* The Greslcs and 
Armenians are said to have a large number of arms 
stowed awsy.and it iw supposed that the law is 
directed principally against these. 

2* Dardanelles * 

Thl The city of Gallipoli is reported by M*» Hoffman 
ihilip, 1st .Secretary of the American &iba8sy,who 
went there Kay 6,totf!'unoccuried and without food 
or beds.^ &- 

3. Black Sea. 

(i) There have been no more Russian bombardments of 
the Bosphorus the past waek,but the Russian Fleet 
bombarded other small pi aces, on Anatolian coast, 
during first part*<yW^, 

(j) 2 art of the Turkish Fleet went outside into Black 
Sea again for first time In some time, as reported 
above ;and "Goeben" accompanied the force. 




s 



American Embassy, 



London. 



May 11th. 1915 

^"Tffibd not be returned. 



•x « £ 



From: bt. Col. Ifco&as C. Trea&well , "J. 3.^. 0. 
To: Haral Attache. 

Subject: nolland and the war. 




The undersigned visited Ifolland officially May 4-8, and 

the follov.inp report is baseu on inf 'orr^tion obtained at that 
time. Eo attempt is made to go into details oi tne situation 
from point of view of the I eth^rl? r<dn, er ©onitt«n$jag the Army 
or defences of that country, as Can tain dander Ian a, U.S. A., now 

military attache at the Hague, las no doubt made reports on 
these subjects. 

▲bout April Vo , the regular passenger service to and from 

Holland was stoppeu by the Admiralty. Mail boats, however, 

continued bo run under direction of the Admiralty from Harwich 

to the Hook oi Holland. 1 had received authority from the 

Admiralty to go over on the .'.Jail boat from Harwich to leave on 

ning of the 3rd Lay. In Kay 1st" 1 receiver word that no 

boat Rrould leave Harwich for iiolland on the 3rd, and about 

7 p.m. on the 2nd that a boat would leave Illhury for Flushing 

on the following morning. Z feook this bor J . with Ir. Minot.au 

attache to the American Embassy in Berlin, and though it was 

regular steamer of the healand Line there was only one other 

passenger* After May 3rd. the regular passenger service was 

for 
resumes to and from Flusfcinff, *>ut only,* Hiit«d number of 

psc ers - 100 on eocl trip. Passengers am put to areat 

inconvenience in Lng this trip, and are subject to strict 
e.emination at soth ends of tie lino, nnd it is strictly 






ti 



prohibited for any passenger to carry letters or written 

messages to or from Holland, during the ten days that passenger 

service was stopped about £,Cno people had collected in The 

Hague wjio were waiting to make the trip to England. 

$o reason was given for this interruption oi* the passenger 

service, and. taken in connection with the rather critical 

condition in Holland at the time, and the fact that Great 

Britain was still full of troops of the ilew Armies that had 

not yet been sent over, there were of course various rumours 

in England as to the cause, such as that Holland would he drawn 

into the war, that Great Britain would land troops there, that 

it was on account of naval activity in the Hearth Sea, that 

Germany intended to violate the neutrality of Holland by using 

the port of Antwerp for naval or military operations, etc. 

-he most plausible reason, however, seems to be that the 

passenger service was stopped on account of spies. Holland is 

full of Herman spies who could obtain information of sailings 

to and from England, as well as of naval and military movements, 

if passengers were to pass to and fro freely. The interruption 

of passenger traffic also corresponded with the meeting of the 

Women's" Peace Conference at the Hague, and this meeting would 

have given opportunity for a large number of passengers to go 

back ami forth, and consequently an increased opportunity for 

s -ies. 

ie position of "-olland nas been critical, and the tension 

in the country high since She beginning of the war. after the 

violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg many 

feared that Holland was threatened with a similar fate and 

would be unable to keep out of the war. lien there was the 

apprehension that Great Britain might practically blockade the 

coast in order to prevent war munitions and food from getting 

to Germany via Holland. After the fall of Antwerp there was 
the threat that Germany might seek to u3e that port as v 









. 






naval "base and thus violate Dutch neutrality. During April 
much tension was caused by the torpedoing of a number of 
Dutch vessels and the seizing of others, which were taken in 
to lino eke and Zubrugge. A considerable number of Belgian, 
British, and German troops were forced over the border and 
interned; there are no?? in the country otfer £00,000 Belgian 
refugees; and the country id full of German spies. 

She interned Belgians; numbered over 50,000, and are 
in camps at Siest and iiarcunierfk. There are about 1,600 
interned British at the Island of Usk and Gronin-;en; and a small- 
er number of Sermana at Bergen ani Alknear. 

Since the war began dolland has mado every effort to 
preserve neutrality, and i$;,.$.s probably almost tie unanimous 
wish of the Inhabitant! to remain at peace, for they have 
little to gain vnl much to loce by goifig into the war. At the 
same time, the aiiiiculi*^ oi u.t.ii.t.Lainin fe strict neutrality, 
owing to the geographical position of the country, has been 
groat and may in the future be oven greater'. At the present 
writing, however, it seems to be the general opinion there 
that nothing short of actual invasion of her territory rill 
drive Holland into the war. The gonerrl feeling of over 90$ 
of tie population is in favor of the AXlies, but many of the 
officers of t), 9 i aj e pro-German. 

.. r i ■■■ Arty of the netherlands has been mobilised since 
the beginning of the war, and no?, consists of about £55,000 
officers ano. men* Oi this number 90,000 ?:>re on the frontier, 
90,000 in depots, and 70,000 in garrisons of defensive works. 
The organization and training of the Army is based on the 
German system. 7} ere are new witfc the Colours the levios of 
17 years, 1899-1916. The mobile army is organised in 4 
divisions, and e fifth is now being organized. 



- 3 



The ri vision is organised as follows:- 

3 Brigades of infantry of 2 regiments each - each 
regiment consisting of 3 battalions and 
machine gun company. 

1 regiment of cavalry of 4 squadrons. 

1 regiment of artillery of 12 batteries. 

1 company pioneers. 

1 company bicyclists. 

Pontoon detachment. 

Telegraph detachment 

Infantry and artillery ammunition columns. 

Field and supply column. 

Field hospital and field ambulances. 

The total strength of the division is 538 officers, and 22,351 
men. 

The army is understood to be short of munitions of 
war and equipment. 

The troops seen drilling and: Torching at the Hague 
did not appear to be very Well drilled or efficient, and were 
in the gret service uniform, in blue uniform, a canvas working 
suit, ana many in various combijiation;3 oi t^ese. 

The scheme of defence of Holland against a strong 

force provides for the openeing of the dykes and flooding a 

portion of the country. The area to be defended woula. t; en 

include only a small part of the country, but one including 

the largest cities - .Amsterdam, xtotteraam, and the Hague. This 

which 
line passes outside of Amsterdam, Utreoht, and Rotterdam, is 

defer.; lei by numerous iortk an., entrer ehr sen bs between, ana. 

outside the line would extend a broad lic/iu of flooded country. 

ister&ara i : s also enclosed by a lino containing over 

4 '•' orts, ana country without i.i3 line may be flooded, thus 

isolating that city. How mueh of an obstacl3 this scheme of 

defence would prove to on invading army could not be estimated 

without actual trial, but it seems probable that it might be 

rather a serious one even though the forts are ouly earth works 

without elevation and containing fow large calibre modern guns. 

There would be little difficulty to an invading army landing 

on the cr;a3t, for the -ufceh i-avy is weak, >nd such coo.st 

fortifications as there are are low earthworks with inferior 

-4- 



guns. 

At the present period of the war, the strategic 
position of Holland is of great importance to boxh Great Britain 
ana Germany. 

If Holland should go into the war on the side of the 
Allies and Great Britain should land a strong military force 
on the coast, she should be able to make the German position 
In Belgium untenable and force the Germans tq evacuate the 
country, without fcfce heavy east in $im# ana. casualties that 
might be required to force brick the strong German line as at 
present he] d and the probably stronger Antwerp~I4ege line. 

. ii , such a strong "British force would be in a position for 
e campaign to throttle the German coast and drive out the 
German fiavy# ere then arises the question if, in view of 

the present British campaigns* involving considerable forces 
in France, Egypt, the Dardanelles, and iiesopauamia , ana. smaller 
forces in the 3 German colonies in Africa., Great Britain would 
feel strong enough or justified in undertaking another campaign 
In a new tie at re. 

If Holland should join Germany, thi I country could 
use tii; 1 )utch ports and Uiake use oi Antwerp as a naval or 
submarine base. in ease of fcfce hostility rf Holland, it does 

t seen provable now that Germany wo*cl14 have any military 
necessity, or that she could spare the troops, to attack that 
area fehat could be protected by flooding country. ^ere 

i'i, however, danger that the neutrality of Holland might be 
violated on account of the importance of using Antwerp as * 
base. Antwerp was taken by the Germans early in October and 
since that time has been useless to them as a naval base 
because the Scheldt flows for some 30 miles through Su*£ek 
"Dutch territory. Antwerp would appear however to be of great 
importance to Germany if it could be used as 6 naval or 



5. 






3xin£ 



■ 



submarine base, or as a base for a military invasion or raid 
on England. It is only about 130 miles from nearest point of 
.English coast, whereas one ^ermctii ports in. ueligol&lid Bight 
are about 300 miles, a fact which would increase the chances 
of a successful rail immensely. Although it is reported that 
much shipping was destroyed or damaged before the Belgians 
evacuated Antwerp, yet it is one of the principal commercial 
ports of who world, ana it Is probable thau there is now 
sufficient shipping available there in good condition to 
furnish transport for h ^argo number of troops. It is believed 
that such an attempted raid is not considered by any means 
in-possible b;. the authorities in Great Britain, and recent 
©enaar activities might be considered as intended tn prepare 
for such an attempt. .here have been numerous German units 
that have been rep. or tad as sent to Belgiuffi and that have not 
appeared on the Western front. $&f torpedoing of numerous 
trawlers in the IsortJi tfea would seem to be intended to clear 
that area from observation oy these craft* 11. e sinking of the 

iia to drs off ill val iorce to protect merchant steamers; 
and the recent air raids on English east cotst principalis 
for t )se c reeeimaiseaic.ee. 



^U^J^^^^ 






' 



Need not be returned. \^_ 



Country*. »•••*« • •••.Tur'- . jrt«.»*.»*Qo«*tsatinople,te. 

crt frow U. S» . '' 2 !■ 1915 

&*tc cf oxcrt, .Kay 17, 19:! * ^ ^-^-/i^.^j' 



CO 




|* Sonstantlnonle* 

(a) 5r75Tffraem Philip, First Secretary of the Aaarioas 7, 

the t^o re£crtsrs f and the -fifty British., Mftfi 'rench, vsib^cts, 
referred tc in $hs report of Kay &c f as bavin sent to 

Galllpoli, t *3rs returned on 12 1 tc Constantinople, and sat 

froe# !Tho reasons for returning t3 re net ftrplslBed, 
lias no bofltoardraant pf Gallipcli taring their stay there* 

(bi Cn Taj 11, a Turkish gtmbcat, stellar to the 933 JHEHXR, fPltH 
h©r bow badly - »4f as if trtm col* is) en, $&m in fro ,y IS I 
- Bosporus m& anchored* i largga transport, with hay how torn 

open, as if 'by alias, or tcrpcle, c&™e in frca the Jtfrdanel3.es, 
* and wsnt u a Golden Horn, There are persistant reports . 

t' Tit, at least, one of the /Hies* submarines is in the 3oa of 
r.arr.cra, and that it sank one HN&l Jraoepcrt, tad da w ; a<re& ■ 
lar.rre one, and hoe taken ftftppliea of food fro I ill veer- els 
that it has hold ug> toned lately fb Hoeing ttn BtrivaJ of I 
itrps transport, w ^ precautions mare ado ' in the e I - 
log of ships tc thy 2flrd*&i21eft* T?h^ now, invariably, 
convoyed by leatroyers i boats* It is est! thai from 

SfOCC to SfOfcC troopa are prooa ding ally fro- have* Artillery 
i are being tranaporto<-J in ■ ■■ .rs. 

(c) It is eetiraats : , at ' bent I8*00€ sc torfeieh soMisrs 
ti I - lenstantinople lbs i* ?hoy are nearly all lightly 

Wffl&dftd* 

(d) the fovea? Sfcatlcnttalre fi \..r, ehioh am* I nte r ned at I 
beginning o r | ■■ •% h b been t oee d into tfes harbor* end moor 

>ar t> , it files nc hf#» sad is, ft] srently, in 

C v 1 Of CiviliTJ18» 

(o) " - tm fe:~ ), is in a swell bey at 9%enia t and is, 

v atOy f in good ahaee* B ■■:■ l UttX I (ox- . iiau), has mads ■ 
tripe up the Boephoms, but is after at I » ■ Tard* 2fcere 
la -t octivifcy i tg tho tc " ' -ts and deetreyers - they 

tteaSt trips to the Jsrdnnslles, and in the dir n cf 

tho ! --';!*c"<: tea, 
(f / Ba&tea ^^3 he«fd*la the dlreetloa of the Sf>a t iate in the 

afternoon of * a** !$♦ 
fe) I collier, vlhidh W»t into- the BlaQK ?or oo£«l , IWtUI ' as d to I 

aaefcoragc ^th lb tn» shot holes in h^r f»ido f erldeatly na4 l" 

or S H 3hellsj all wore well sfeovs the viator lins# eolllere, 

that i-ift hare on the isth» to set eee& 9 m^rs •' in the Bleak 

i*rcr, rell^ls attoraaa the bouibsrd&aant, by v Iliad He t, is 

being r.nch reduced, tho da!-af~e cansoo by shells being very slight. 
The CU^.2? SL12 baa bo ;n nein/r a eaptl^t halcrn to ohserre the 

tell of shot* :Jhe fi4el 4 ov-jir V mineala at a range of sbevt 11' 

ral'ies, At tinea an aar ae has obeerved tho fell of vv " t* 

ilea, and the fire has been controlled t > I-Or this reason 

the Turkish vessels hftVft often (jaioXly shift *: ;lr an-. "e# 
The destroyer 9 Vat- • 'fll, carried a Gcrran of^ iccr. I 

.'jssnoe of a ataxia Qernaiw officer lee at tevemae ofiect o r - the 
Turkish troops, irently privinf: then increased ooafldeeoe« In 
all !"•; or tan t and Tln^s, ro quiring daeh i-!<. 7 II f at l^st one 
German is sent a!cw> 

!• I failed to -ention* i hnat I l t that ^ile I \teio in Gib-» 

raltar (0 . . I saw ths s 00-? 1 med- 

iately @o Int dry lftflfc| she was badl; 1 her 

■ Sjolaa> "ha informed, u-- 1 arrival, that she was itl , 

1 at I r.lta had nil thoy could attend to. 



Oo"jntry# •«*«•«•««••«• Turkey. rt# ,*..»., Constantinople, &c* 

port frost U. % % 80GBP20H, 
flats of Bqport»««*&tap 17, 1915. 



4* 



/bout SO nil est fro» 2tedsag£$o!9 the r rtniwui f T t upon whioh i ma 

I848g0r f £&f*«4 wltMn 20^ psp&i o£ ft tornoao sttUI ns&» 
Bj> arontly, drifted ovar fror. ft* rec-icn of tfce TttriliTHTI es» 
I r*po**%*4 It tr> t'-r; m;^-crltlas ftt iipitnlli| as It me, 

$gp*«B iftflMMI tc Sfcrlg&tlOH* ' lrl%I«5! fefttroysr ms 

at fiedsftgaftgh* Vat I 914 not c- i loa&e "S/i%"h It, altho Ihft 
Irl feign Cor nil mt$ ftaong fchoe* ttftoa I inforrttd of the torpodo'i 
wfiiiofti 




(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October? gffcadftO^ D& W&* 



? 



SUBJECT ,.....3M^^4itt«|...f|rj«iM..1?l»f4..* I.1S»Mi£.flie.*j 




Jl 



, 



From &.... No. li 1* 



Date 



Replying to 0. N. i. No. ~~~~~~~~-~Date 




1. I hear on good authority i sent fcirne 

ell wtbmorinee of the Italian fleet have r.iobilisod at Venice. 
All destroyers of the Indonito Class and of a later date are 
with the fleet at £ara&to. All destroy/ nd torpedo boats 
previous to the Indonito close are divided between Venice and 
Brindisi. 






The fourth division of the fleet consisting: of 
the San ::areo t -isa, ijcm Gioreia, and /.e:olfl are at i3rindisi, 
but I understand this is only for tceYporory duty, upon the 
completion of which they uill rejoin" the fleet at Toronto. 






< 



I 



|Sec Paragraph A, instructions of October SI, 1900.] 

CONFIDENTIAL. J 




Japan and ..Italy. 

Jrom ^ (H) ^> j)^^--M ay_lB-.---193JcE ^c^rr^rri-. i#i 

eplying to 0. JV. I. No Da^.-----C3^ tN .-^.^19lS!. {, 191 



In the first place, the German people are a unit in every 
new proposition - knowing that the Government is under the con- 
trol of the military and naval authorities I Lave beett attempt- 
ing to find out how the people feel, especially the social demo- 
crats which are in great number in Germany, and also the f inane* 
people. The opinion and sentiment of those two classes ass 
and the finance peojb&e, mean more to me than the military be- 
oause they are really the country; furthermore, I know full well 
i how the military and naval authorities feel. 

In the first place, every German feels and believes that 
; America has oeen unneutral and that America is aiding in ft ^reat 
measure the Allies. They feel that by sinking the LUSITAHIA, they 
I have "got back" at us in a small way for what we are doing. In 
case of war, with our country, they would heartily support it 
because they believe that it would stop the supply of ammunition 
and that we could not do more harm to Germany then we are doing 
at present. 

The next sentiment or feeling that the German people 
have is the feeling of revenge - they will "get back" at us for 

.at we have been doing. They consider Japan our great enemy j 
| they confidently expect war sooner or later between Japan and 

i 

America. 

About three months ago I noticed a sudden falling off in 
the harsh and bitter talk against Japan. During the past three 
months there has 'nardly been a v.ord said against Japan. Several 
months ago a prominent man here, financially, at whose house I 
have frequently been a visitor, came to see me about tter of 
importance, as he termed it. He said that the son of a vory dear 



— & — 

friend of his had "been lost and requested, that, if possible, an 

Lquiry "be made concerning him of the French Embassy in Paris. 
After settling this and when about to leave, he saidj M By the way, 
what do you think of the Japanese situation?" I replied that I 

d no late nor definite informat ion concerning it. He then 
asked: "Do you net think that Japan and America could come to- 
gether on some amicable agreement thereby any chances of 
would be averted?" T replied that as far as I could see cgree- 
r. ents nowadays seemed easily made and more easily broken. Re. 
then asked what made the present ill feeling, commercial or 
racial reasons. I replied that it was racial. He then asked / 

veral random Questions which I sidestepped. The result of this 
conversation was to .lead me to the supposition that he intended 
to invest there and as he is in 7/ith numerous other big inter- 
clI-s, it appeared that some Germans were intending to invest money 
in Japan. I have recently learned that other big men, financially, 
are putting what money they can in. Japanese investments and that 
re is a bi$ plan whereby Japan is to be really subsidised by 
German money. They say what they have done in Turkey they can 
also do in Japan. Underlying all this is the opposition to Amer- 
ica, Japan is to be the tool of Germany against America; Ger- 
ry and Japan will line up against America ,g^( if not openly, at 
least secretly. } 

There is also a plan whereby in case of war between 
Japan and America, ammunition and arms will be shipped to Japan 
via Russia, 

There is goo<: -son for believing that two months ago 
>rmatty and Japan came to an agreement. The exact terms are, of 
course, a secret but it is believed that the agreement is for 
certain cooperation between the two countries in the t of a 
war with America* 

In this connection it can be stated that the German 
financial men are right with the Government - it is no exaggera- 
tion to state that their patriotism extends to the la3t pfennig. 



- z - 



In one way it is wonderful - an example of patriotism which our 
"big men" will probably find difficult to equal. In another way 
it is absolutely selfish, because they know that if the Kaiser 
and the Germans win, they will win later financially, and if the 
German lose, "they" lose 8lso - so why make private fortunes if 
such should be lost after the war; better, they argue, to give 
everything to the Government to win because in the long run they 
rise or fall with the Government. 

Several days ago, the political leaders of the Reichstag, 
i 

representing all the various parties of Germany, met and dis- 
cussed the coming budget and the general situation. !Dhe leaders 
were unanimous in their confidence and belief in the victory of 
the Germans and were determined to rmsh the war to the very lim- 
it . 2hey e&aimed that their financial and military status was 
sound enough to withstand the entrance into the war of Italy - 
and any other country, u-hey stood ready to give Italy wha t was 
offered (claimed to be 1,000,000,000 marks) and stood equally 
ready to fight her if she did not accept the offer. The Germans 
claim that every preparation has been made to meet Italy in case 
she comes into the war. According to news from a prominent Rus- 
sian, if Italy does not come into the war, Russia may make peace 
by fall j it will not be because Russia lacks men; it will be be- 
cause Russia lacks money and artillery. According to information 
from Roumania, Russia will be able to get money and be able to 
carry on the war as long as the Grand Dukes and Generals wish it. 
,'i'he fact, however , that the financial men in Moscow favdr an 
early peace is worthy of note. 

The entrance of Italy into the war makes all calculations 
worthless. One of the queer sides of this war is the dislike of 
America in Russia, notwithstanding the supplies which she is get- 
ing from us . 

One fact looms up constantly and that is that America is 
becoming more disliked every day by all sides. If we keep clear 



- 4 - 

of thia war, we will emerge without a friend and with many enc- 

ies. And J believe that the people who come over to Europe and 
go to both aides, go back to America not so much pro-Ally or 
pro -German, as pro ~Amer i can because they see the position of our 
country as regards the world and realise that it is not a time 
to worry about the warring factions over here, but a time co 
worry about cur ability "go win in a war with any nation or ov^ 
combination of nations. 

Several days after the sinking of the LUSITAliIA, there 
appeared an article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (Of- 
ficial Government organ here) concerning the loss of American 
lives and property in Mexico, this* article being near other ar- 
ticles concerning American opinion of the loss of American lives 
on the LUSITAliIA. The evident purpose of this was to show that 
we should not be so aroused about the loss of Americans on the 
LUSITAITIA when we had lost so many lives in Mexico; in other 
words, they said, if we stand for Mexico, why not stand for the 
LUSIxAlTIA? A certain man in the Foreign Office here stated to a 
certain American that all we would do concerning the loss of 
American lives on the LUSITANIA would be to send a note or pro- 
test. 

I hope that this will be of interest to you and that it 
will give you an idea of the situation here. We are plugging 
-long and neither worried nor excited, and hoping that everything 
will be settled satisfactorily to all concerned. However, know- 
ledge and consequent preparation are always of importance. 






|See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, IQOO.] 



Feed not be returned. 



SUBJECT 



SITUATION TO MAY 18th 1915, 



5 
.19 



From 



No. 



331 



Replying to O. N. I. No. 



Date 
Date 



May 18, IjBLjf . 




, 191 
, 191 



The diplomatic note from America to Germany 
over the various happenings affecting the loss of American life 
and of Aaerican shipping wma handed to the Foreign Office Saturday 
morning. No reply has up to this writinp. been received. Prom 
what Rear Admiral B e h n k e told me after the "LUSITANIA 1 ' 
affair, ±imk they felt fully Justified in what had been done and 
no change of policy would ensue. Also the newspapers foreshadowed 
the same reply. As the terms of the American note are mandatory, 
I therefore judpa the situation to be extremely critical. The 
note has been published in American papers and the Ambassador 
in Berlin immediately upon receipt cabled the State Department 
that in his judgement the answer to it would be unfavorable. 

The German government has held a strong censor- 
ship on the American news and the comments of the American press 
on the "LUSITANIA" affair have not appeared. The American note 
was not allowed to be published until last nipht. 

In the meantime, the press has been filled 
with accounts of the Italian situation, almost to the exclusion 
of other news. 

THE NA^T. 

Outside the submarine warfare and the fiphtinp 
in Turkish waters there is not much to record. The Zeppelins 
have been showinr* increased activities in their visits to England. 
Stories are circulated here of the enormous bombs that are beinp 
made which will destroy whole sections of London when the time 
for an attack comes. 

THE EASTERN ARMIES. 

There does not seem to be any doubt but that 
the fiphtinp of the past month has resulted in a triumph for the 
Austrian-German armies in Galicia. Whether the actual number of 
prisoners is 150,000, a3 stated and whether the Russian 
demoralisation is so preat as claimed are open to doubt, but the 
whole campaign is one which has riven the greatest encouragement 
in Germany and Austria and has considerably modified the 
attitude of Roumania. 

THE WESTERN ARMIES. 



East 
Western Durinp the progress of the armies in the Want, the 
SastaxK armies have been continuing the position warfare with 
activity and have prevented any marked advance of the allies. 

GENERAL REMARKS. 



There can be no doubt that in Government and 
military circles there is stronr optimism and a belief that 
they will brinp. the war to a successful conclusion at an early 

date. 



- 3 - 



Among the generality of the people there is a certain 
amount of depression due to the length that the war 
has lasted beyond their expectations and this depression 
will be greater if Italy comes in against Germany. 
There is however no surface manifestation of this 
feeling and all political parties strongly support 
the government and are prepared to vote it all the 
money and men asked for. There is a talk of raising 
the serviceable age from 45 to 55 years. 



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) 

@d ' lot be . 



SUBJECT Jl9f|A.£il^ 

Italian ..li.avy. 

From X No !*•<! Date ... l: ®$ ^tj^^g* 



Replying to 0. N i. No. 



"~~"~ Z>tf& 




/ 



1» (The Budget for the Italian Havy, as originally 
compiled for Fiscal Year 1^14-15 has nor. been increased by 
Hoyal decree Ho. 619 of Say 14 f 1915* is increase amounting 
to Tv/entyfive million lire is required otving to the Europeefe 
situation vfoich has necessitated a large active fleet to" be 
always ready, 

. The [Decree in auootion provides at the sane tine 
for an increase of One Hundred million Lire for the /.rmy, like- 
wise required for military purposes o\. in feg the present ;ur- 
oan situation. 



4 






(Sera Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 3 iffitWff>fl()t l)C fCtUTfl^^ 



s 

.11 



SUBJECT DK. E OF &AVAX STATION 

AOADiST AIR-GRAFTS. 

Date 



From Y 



No. 91 




Replying to 0. N. I. No. 1 341 1 Date iwap»*4*T'H£ 1 ^ . 

1. from my observations and experience in the present 

tar, I have to submit the following plan for defense of naval 
a fuel station;; against air- craft 

2. D e fen & i v e 'L£e as u re a . - All buildings In which it is 
probable work will be done at night should have shaded 
fitted ov^r all windows, glass roofs, etc., shieh effectually 

tve&t any light from shewing. A simple end effective method 
b at I have ee on for dolnj its it the way it is done at the 
v.'cr.. of the ou.'.e Company here in P^ris. In common 

with moat of ths manufactories in Paris, their buildings are 
fitted with > loos roofs, sod their factory is llluainated during 
daylight by this method, there being no windows. 

3. ThicK. matting shades have oeen fitted to this glass 
roof, ana by a simple system of coras and pulleys, these can 
oe quickly drawn, shutting out all light from f A thin. 

•i. In Paris and London also the Ltreoi lights rod arc 
\. .eu painted bi : ict on too, so that ail light is 
thrown diroctiy dov. - sod none up, 

5. Cc t xr u I have been able to ascertain - and I ha 
dllligeat inquiries - no at temps base yet o^n mads in 
ce to mSJco fuel oil t anks impervicuL to a^r attacks. I saw 
pe soaally i tanks at the naval station at Brest, Sfld no 
defensive precaution! igalaot air attacks had been taken. 

irth armors, the European representative of one of the largest 
oil ct Li* la the SO rid has personally looked into the matter 

my request, and he states no . LUticni r< ■ en 

taken. too Ls Bourgot aerodrome, ■ tJtnttaatly 

ewer one taadr* id fifty aereplames, fehi $aoo lent tenhs i 
left 0U1 in the Q .0 linprot i- 



• 



o 






6. , it la ...... 2 a to Bay, no aatter ¥hat t3 s French 

practice is, any pi r . for de bo of a a^v^I station 

cuid cct opiate placing cf all fuel oil ta I round, 

I rly it shouid I an ding order, ti anlO; 

lately ,iec, ry , all dry-doclca should N toept .full. 

? - Of fens ive-; naive Measures . - In iuy opinion, t I 
roal defense of at tlona a .ir-craft will, in tha future, 

ad In gunj i ..... rohlig&to. Xh. ... . ml plan for this 
mid con i plats t i .. s of i ayotosj similar to that u* 
toj defena s aboard and - 

8. Jhore , ieuld bt s central fire control s ion, Pirn liar 
to thai jard ship, and connected up with suo-eo.jtroi stations 

win .6 laid un ad. The guns should be limited 

in n r; - it la aiucb h ardor tc apot for aerial firing fch i 

.r Kinds, searchlights should tve below ground and 

conceal e -■ possible, x oir location should be kept 

as conf: tial as possible. If in advance an s&aa ., knows the 
location of searchlights, the^ ssreo to hisu the gas i purpose 
ghtheui I land. One of the re sens ^hj the I ..cent 

Id! i ria have boo i ao untuCceLfui, I i&g convinced la 

a thy pllotf b luring 9 day and night attacks coulvi 

not loca' lvei successfully. 

It b e the aatper4e&es &u . , , .«ar that ahrapnel 

ells ar« not sueaeseful In ampleyaient at air-craft. 

losivi Lla bj m lei .en. sf festive; Xb ch are 

igh BXplc 12 now for thia worn, fitted with a 

Blal fuze. ■ - ii d drawing a and a sample of this 1 

iv a air I 1 i foreej by us to 1 t. 

10. To show the ineffectiveness ci snrapuei I rifle fire 
ilnst 1 nee, t la new on exhibit 1< 1 t t Hal dos 

Inv ,ii ,. . . aim an bij . Lc 1 more 

four hundred di lg ahr 1 and bulla .lee. 



3 



done is practically all so far I ."jits cone .r.-i-id; 

t .0 engine h v.. simply w&r froa use. 

11. Tae aerodrome attached t; . tat ion for its fief arise 

should be separ tsiderabla diet -/ice from it, 

fcr the reason that at g lights h&Ye to ; displayed 

i necessarily i< * ill tend to serve pilot lights fcr 
the 4 al&c . 

3L2, eh station should h n s . uxiliary power sad 
Ing station, concealed in the sar$h, SO that b s/ no . abi- 

lity colu. r-crsft. ? . tity for 

"e-guarui - - {[ires e used bj in©ea .\ bombs is 

oovioul. r his r< *uxiIio;f >? pumping station for tj 

pressure mains is >x noes ty« 

13, On the ai: bt of the first ! alia raid en JParii . 

i fii d searchlight control * ; . pitiful. Sicca that I - 

it ... ^ . \ ,-ttly, but I i&vs never yet seen a drill. 

. is drill it -... as lary for the efficient work of the defense 
^s torpedo-boat attack drill en board ship. 1 arc. convinced that 

weli-arilled crew, at a #ell equipped station, could drive 
off almost qxvj sort of air att&efcs that be delivered against 

it. One of the reasons why mere air craft have not been brought 
down in this war is because, in my opinion, officers are 

not as familiar as l officers in fire searchlight coa- 

troi. I i 4uQ la* o control exit Usilarly in London as 

in pa < . 11 the errors and Its, th >-■ tQ of ttavj have 

been t against in handlj . r< -nts, are still 

Lag committed he$i In Paris, and in December last in London, 
Pari,. ..arin/: t ::-. 1 ,st fee seeks, aeroplanes at night carry 
disti^; d recognition li/ i white, reu or £*reeu, eithr 

color is used indlsor sly, to serve as it counter- 

sign foi .t in question. 



OFFICE OP NAVAL INT3LLIG ^(rs, TRANSIATION-FV. 

June 29, 1915. 

Number 659 (May 22, 1915) of the Official Collection of the 
Laws and. Decrees of the Kingdom contains the following decree: 

VICTOR EMMANUEL III. 




11915 
KIHG OF ITALY". ^"^ 

Having consulted the Code of the Merchant Marine of the King- 
dom of Italy (Title IV); 

Since the "belligerent powers in the present international con- 
flict exercise the right to capture and have retained in their ports 
the enemy merchant vessels which were there at the outbreak of host- 
ilities; 

Having consulted the Cabinet of Ministers; 

Upon proposal of Our Minister of the Navy, and with the con- 
sent of the Attorney General; 

We have decreed and do decree: 
Single Article. 

In case of participation by Italy in the present international 
conflict, Articles 211 and 243 of the Code for the Merchant Marine 
shall not be applied. 

The present decree, which will go into effect on the day of 

its publication, shall be submitted to Parliament to be made a law. 

» 
We order that the present decree, sealed with the Seal of the 

State, shall be inserted in the Official Collection of Laws and 

Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, requiring all concerned to observe 

it and see that it is observed. 

Done at Rome, this 16th day of May, 1915. 

VITTORIO EMANUELE 

SALANDRA - VIALE - ORLANDO. 

Witnessed, ORLANDO. 

Keeper of the Seals. 



NOTE (by Naval Attache, Rome).- This Deoree permits the 
conf ideation of all belligerent merchant ships found in Italian 
ports at the outbreak of war* 



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 



31 t Wked not be returned. 



SUBJECT 






k 



t> 



From JU N°- 3UaO. Date % .. 4 



Replying to 0. N. i. No .mmm Date 




.4 ,-■ 


u 








*i» 


• 





:-$ e 



jun 2 8 \m 









; 1 where r-^ 



fcfc IDo r 



. 






entire 









fsa ana th g; 






Feed not be returned. 

on f orts o.; , ;rto Corsin -7/«f 

Barlet , and Yenie * ; ay '4,191 > e 



(Official e ion) 



XV 



It w»e foreseen that the declaration of war would \ ly 

tide - off en si' t 

& ouy tic et , lore for tl 1 effect then to 
gain any military objective* but it proved m en encounter to 
be of short duration* 

'sell detachments of the ene. ships, pt-rti' .?ly destroy- 
ers, fired with their raain batteries on our ki ;ic coast* This 

tween the hours of four end six in %'■■ .orning o:' 
Aereoplenes also rtfo-rapted to el rsenal of Venice. 

Ihe enerny f s ships wer > retreat by our division of 
tor )c boats* The eneray 1 © arecplanee were shot at h^ our antl- . 
arcoplan , id by rifle lie our areoplanes attacked them an 
did a ill, was flying over the Adriatic ♦ 

The localities L ere:rorto Gorsini whose fire <lrwe the 
or- at once; Ant here the attack was chiefly against t" 
railroad Where slight di :ised hv. ieh was easily re- 

naredjBarletta, where the att; ado by a scout and by des- 
troyers, these were put to fli .*y our torpedo vessels and another 
vessel. 

At Jesi the en en a 

hangar but out success. . 

&ay other notice Of rations on this night are without found- 



comtstiicat© 




8 1915 



"Era previsto che, appena dichiarata la guerra, vi sarebbero 
state azioni offensive contro la nostra costa adriatica intese a pro- 
durre un effetto morale anziche a raggiungere un obbiettivo mili- 
tare; ma si era provveduto per fronteggiarle rendendole di brevis- 
sima durata. 

Dif atti piccole unita navali nemiche, specialmente cacciatorpe- 
diniere, dalle 4 alle 6 del 24 corr. hanno tirato colpi di cannone sullc 
nostre coste adriatiche. Anche aereoplani hanno tentato di attac- 
care Parsenale di Venezia. 

Le navi avversarie dopo un brevissimo cannoneggiamento sono 
state costrette da un nostro naviglio silurante ad allontanarsi. Gli 
aereoplani nemici sono stati' cannoneggiati dalla artiglieria anti- 
aerea, fatti segno a fuoco di fucileria ed attaccati da un nostro ae- 
reoplano e da un dirigibile che volava sulPAdriatico. 

Localita attaccate sono: Porto Corsini, che rispose immedia- 
iamente e costrhise il nemico ad allontanarsi subito; Ancona, ove 
I'attacco, diretto specialmente ad interrompere la linea ferroviaria 
ha cagionato lievi danni facilmente riparabili; Barletta, ove I'at- 
tacco fu compiuto da un esploratore e da cacciatorpediniere, che 
una nostra nave, scortata da siluranti, mise in fuga. 

A Jesi aereoplani nemici gittarono bombe sulF "hangar ", ma 
senza raggiungere l'obbiettivo. Ogni altra notizia sulle operazioni 
di questa notte non ha fondamento. " 






— 



i/ 



Need not be returned. 



y^ 



Co 



ero, bj 5, 1 



Agenzia - ron Ion: \^J^— /4^-f *$& 







^ 



j*\, p , $/ 



One of out destroyers, at 3 a.m. entered the port of 
3uso, near the italo-austrii rontier and destroyed the 
pier thereof, o the station and the "barracks, sinkir 
all the auto-boi ts pothered in that port. 
The Italians suffered no i e either ;While the fcnemy 
is reported to have had 2 dead and 47 made prsioners, ong 
them, 1 officer and 15 non-co r r is;;ioned officers. 



J 

American Embassy, IP 

21 £ not &e returned 

$1 



u) 



i/o WDO N. 



May -" ,19^5, 



From: Lt. Col/ Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C. 

To; . aval attache. 

Subject: The Forcing of the Dardanelles, 




The forcing of the Dardanelles, presents the greatest example of 
combined operations against strong defences, supported by large mobile 
forces, of modern times. The scope of these operations embraces the 
co-operation of fleets and armies of ^reat Britain, France, and Russia, the 
use of ships against forts and mines, and of land forces in conjunction with 
the fleets. kuch tame must elapse before we can arrive at correct con- 
ceptions of the political, strategical, and tactical problems involved, and 
view the whole undertaking in its proper perspective, as the sources from 
which information can be had are necessarily, at the present time, in- 
accurate, contradictory, and limited. On account of the great importance 
and magnitude of the Dardanelles operations however, this study of them 
has been undertaken during their development, with the hope that it may 
be useful as a basis for a fuller and more accurate report at a later date. 



A 



I }iS *04t &ft%1K 



».L 



^ ■ 

, XL, 




'.moil 






' - Tn .86 ■ ■■'atsd &dt lo anxtno 1 *! e . : to'-* tchiS 



10 0XqflIi5X8 ^89J"/30 r i li :iaiq , > J JBQ 9'l.j ' : gi i ed? 

.cfora sqibX vd be^Toqq.ya t 8eofltalab gaoiia tsfij snexteiaqo benxdiaoo 

Id" aaaBic cdBiaqo ©earld" to aqoou #fff »B6fflivt ma boat to t 8©01( 

tox^B*iaqo~oo 

ri^xw h'oxd'oatftttoo nx aoytoi bnsX . baa ajioi JattXBgB aqxrte to aau 

-aoo toaiioo c-ij avxna ixbo ew arte >aq&Ia rfouM hsaXl arf- 

3 tbavlovax afagfXdoK i»^j* boa <X. ■■ hdita tXaoiJiXaq ©rid" to enox^qeo 

£3oi iatoabflu aXoifw erf* waxv 

, - >aa*xq erf<t ta tyXitsaaeaata a . ,d rcao aoxtamota xiiw 

aiseteoqiax tBal t.:ujoooB nO • ba^ixuxX bus t^iotoiibeTtfi'toa t aJBiyoos 

>ds to ybute cidt 4 aXXaasbi .timjBzn brta 

i ix jBtiJ- aqe [Btoabau nsad esri 

2 te J aforcuaoB sioia bfts 'ioXXiil b tot p,x«i5b b eB Xjjtaau 3d' 



Events Leading up to the Participation of Turkey in the War. 

Great Britain declared war on Turkey, Nov. 5, 1914. Thus 
the opinion of Bernhardi, and other eminent German authorities, that 
in case of a European /ar, Turkey would cast her lot with Germany and 
Austria, while Italy would endeavour to keep out of the conflict, or 
would join the Triple Entente, was justified by the x'act. 

The general situation in the Balkans, acute for many years 
and constantly threatening the peace of Europe, had during the last 
few years become more threatening and complicated, and had gradually 
tended to make Turkey to all intents and purposes, a member of the 
Triple Alliance, and if not a very effective partner, in her sympathies 
at least, a much more real ally of Germany and Austria, than Italy » 
The whole situation presented without doubt, a very complicated diplo- 
matic tangle. Austria has suddenly declared the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1908, and Turkey had been at war ?/ith Italy in 1911- 
12 over the question of Tripoli, which she obtained as a result of the 
war, and is still occupying Rhodes and other islands of the Aegean, 
Thus, while Turkey had reasons for hostility to these two countries, 
with Germany her relations had been growing more and more intimate» 
It was German policy to be Turkey's patron, and to secure political 
and commercial control of that country. "Peaceful penetration" was 
the method adapted, and on account of the financial difficulties of the 
Turk, she found many opportunities for strengthening her hold in his 
country. To build and own railroads, to furnish loans, to train Turkish 
array, and sell munitions of war, and to dominate Turkish diplomacy were 
the objects pursued. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia, and the Italian 
war and annexation of Tripoli, threatened German influence, but she 
managed nevertheless, to retain it, during these periods. 

In 1912, came Turkey's disastrous war with the Balkan Allies, 
in which German sympathies were with Turkey, but in which German support 
was confined to good wishes; but as the Balkan Allies fell out and fought 
among themselves, Turkey was able torecover Adrianople, and by the backing 
of Germany to retain it at the treaty of Bukharest. 

-2- 



&nd? lotifruB natroai) Jaanxae led^+o bus t xb i 20 noxaxqo ad& 

froX it >n«a i$ lo aaao ni 

■ ,.-v.j.i od" iwoviiso ; .. ■ . bXuow viij^i. eXxrfw ,BX*id*auA 

BSW ^Jft9te; JiXq . 

a-rasv Y njau ^°^ »*jj!ob t aixsilxv : ax fiox&etftxa i- 
d-asX artf aoiiwb baa* t €jqo r ui!I \q ooaoq ©lit 3«xaaJae*ai;l" yXtaaJaaoo bna 

arid" 10 tacftaaia a » eta ao-aaJax XXs o go o$ bBbrtBt 

ee-.critfisq&^a "Jsrf nx «" ■' "tav a ton is boa ^eoaaxXXA eXqiiT 

■ ■■• f t sxtd"ewA bfiB '... ■■■.■;■ »£) lo vIX^ Xjb»i siow t-toixii 3 tl fraaal ci\s 

■sav /5 «#< ihuea'd'iw ba&faaaiq aai£s{*#xe aXorfw eriT 

axiaaoS Ilq no-: turn arii" baiaXaab vXaebbua aaa* Bx*ii"3uA *aX|}nai oxtera 

-XX6X a>xw ibw to a'sod bj&rl ^eahuiT bas t 6QfcX fix aaxvo&esiaH baa 

".i ■: frX aai & bj3 asi ca^d 'to n< .' **sv» 

.aaa^aA arfJ 1 *tc abaaXax lartto baa aeboriH gaxYqaapo XXx^a ax ba# t i.sw 

^aexi^xiuoo 01 i -iol araoaaert b/< aXxnw «BurfT 

. ^drti .' .:: gaxwo'xg aaad htai eae ynsenaw iitxw 

uaaa : i rtaq e\ r e^is ' aaw tl 

eaw rt «ox. «v-£ v tftw^ji >^. :; i* to Xo'xtafOO Xaiai^uciosi baa 

sdlt lo aax3*Xw fcoaaaxi ©rfvJ" 10 fru/oyya no baa «betqsbs bortfaia ed& 

aid ax bXod ' iol a ■■ . ■ [a t >l*xuT 

das. :.iisyt« ot »ai itfl od tabaoiXxa' i baa bXiuci .yitawoo 

©• [ib riax3ii«T atooxciob o# baa <*taw 'io aaoxifxami XXaa boa ,va.iB 

njsxXst 'x bn.s »Bx«e©a lo nox^Bxamija nexite«i». arf* •bdiratuq ajje'ido $dt 

eri : 'inx ru hflenrfJ c iXoqxiT lo noxtaxanrus dh« ibw 

ti itiBfet o.t t aa >ven b9p,joMBra 

»89xXXA asMXBa aiiJ - rltxw isw a.uo r £d-aji«xb a'YasC'wT 9ul»jo t SX6X a'i 
d"2oqqwe n<3ijiaU riox a'^xw ertaw aexfttaqaiYB nairtafl rioJ 

^■ff^wo't bnB J-«o XX^'t . tucf ;earfaxw b( baxillnoo aaw 

3«X2ii>BCf ariJ" yd bfiB «aXqo;tBX*xbii iftyouai M ^e^ltfl , 

. 3d r'^iisu lo vj-mtJr eiii && tl nxsvtei of y^w to 



When the European crisis developed in July, 1914, it obscured 
an acute crisis between Turkey and Greece, which threatened v/ar between 
those two countries, on account of persecutions of Greeks in Asia Minor, 
and the question of ownership of islands off that coast. There was 
rivalry between the two for Naval supremacy. Turkey had two dread- 
noughts building in England, to be delivered in the Autumn, but Greece 
had forestalled her rival by the purchase of two battleships from the 
United States to reach Greece in July. Thus if war was declared in the 
eummer, the arrival of the American battleships would give the Naval 
superiority in the Aegean Sea to Greece, while if Turkey delayed the 
crisis until the arrival of the dreadnoughts from England, a superiority 
would rest with Turkey. One of the results of the great war in Europe 
was, that the danger of a minor war between these two countries dis- 
appeared for a time* 

Though Turkey did not immediately join the German powers in 
the European War, it soon became evident that Turkish neutrality was 
not likely to long continue^ and many complications soon sprang up. 
The mobilization of Turkish Army was begun at outbreak of war, though 
Turkey declared intention of preserving neutrality, and British Govern- 
ment declared its intention of taking over the dreadnoughts "Berinje 
Qsman" and "Reshadieh" under construction in England for Turks, and 
nearing completion. On Aug. 10, the German warships "Goeben " and 
"Breslau*' reached the Dardanelles, and the next day it was learned that 
the Ottoman Government had bought them from Germany for the purpose, as 
stated, of being on a Naval equality for negotiations with Greece, and 
not with any intention of making war on Russia. Meanwhile, the Army 
mobilization was continued, new defences were prepared, and mines laid 
in the Dardanelles, German crews retained, and warlike preparations were 
daily more in evidence. Every effort was made by the Triple Entente to 
preserve the neutrality of Turkey during the war, and it was promised 

that if this neutrality was maintained, they woulu uphold her indepen- 
dence and integrity against any enemies that should make use of the 



-3- 



-njoaao si «£Xfc!X 4 yXjjI ajc baqoXavab axaiiy ontuS arid raeriW 

awtad ibw bonatoj" crfis ,aoaaii ^ex'u axaxio atuoa 

,ti tnuooaa no ,aaX"id"m;03 ou r .t eaorft 

«tef3aa &Bti$ 11 :iLzu io q lanwo io noitaeup add" bn.8 

-baai ^atfiwT .yoamoiqwa Xjsvjs. tXavxi 

aoaeil) toci «.ra?HJ,frii* add" nx beiavxXab gd gnJtftXiwa ("ri^yoia 

edt iio*ji aqxdaaXtctod owdh io aaiJdoiwQ add 1 v;u"Ibvx , « i©ri baX£ad > ea*xol barf 

arid- nx baisXoab saw isv; Si amJT .vii/l nx aoav i|*ei ot sate-frS batxj 

XiiV-cil arid avxg bluow aqxdaaXtf'da.Q' arid la Xavx*rifl arft ,*satmiitfa 

adt ba\ ti aXx roeeiO od KJSa§aA add nx vixioxiaqas 

Y?£idxiaq>j8 ja tbnaXaalH Hi a .trtgironbaash '©4* 'io iavxTia add* lidm* axaxto 

aqotu-X nx tew jiJG%_i add* lo ati. ari£ to extd •^a^iti/T d&iw fraal bXiicrw 

--.jib aaxidmrpo owd : • :^b add* tadd* < 

♦ aiuxt a 101 bateac 
nx atawc h£o{ ifled nl don ai tgwddT 

saw .yJxXiJi j> ■;■■•■■■ tx t tBy/ rusaqoiuS a/id" 

...jv; lo 'tiio *a fli/gad saw ^miA rtexiiiuT 'to box 

-a 'isrui bats ^flX&*t&, J cxaloaD *£ajf*ri 

teVO jgnxjl' ,: baiaXy atn 

bna ,a?I*uj? nu'i bnaX&nSI nx aQxd*Oind*an©a labrtu "daxbadaatf" bos "naraaO 

bits KadaoO" aqxi s ■ ,0X .gfltA ttb ©Xqjaci?** gaiisefl 

tadd beniaaX asw dx vab dxan arid boa , iaafiia< bsdoaai "ufaXeaid" 

ea , ■■'■■■■. : juou bad dfla*ame*v©3 ixadod'd'O arid 

bna ,aoaai£ rid*xw Bnoxtaxd"0*gan ioi ^&£au£to Liivall & no artied io t bata^a 

^btta a/it taXxHwnaaM ♦aleaw^ no *t& \ io nox^ne^ni- yna li^xw ten 

hi mt>ti&% '" t bQurtitcoo ■ ttesxXxdom 

aiew e/roxj-Biaqoiq e^xXiaw btu tbartxadlai awa'io nsiirrat ^ iXaxifibiaQ art" J rci 

o^ jrul aXqxiT irid -u abata saw jhril ie yi'- • .^onabxva nx enom \{Xxab 

baSXBOiq satv tx bn& t iaw arid" ^nxiab vasliwT io ytxiuituan adt aviaaaiq 

biodqu bJ i uan sxnv urft 

arid ; iara bXworia tadt r*e vu.b I'Bnxa^B ^txiaeJTii bjia son&b 



-£- 



European conflict to attack her, and would recognise sale of "Goei^ n M 
and "Breslau" , provided it were a genuine one, and German crews went 
away. Turkey, however, on Aug, 20, made the proposal that capit- 
ulations should be immediately abolished, that two Turkish dreadnoughts 
taken over by Great Britain at beginning of war should be returned 
immediately, that there should be no interference in internalaf fairs 
of Turkey, that Western Thrace should be restored to Turkey, and that 
Greek Islands should be restored. To these demands the Triple Entente 
replied as follows: — "If the Turkish Government will repatriate 
"immediately the German officers and crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" 
"will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished 
"for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, amd 
"that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey 
"during the present war, the three Allied Powers will in return agree 
"with regard to the Capitulations to withdraw their extra-territorial 
"jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration which 
"will satisfy modern conditions is set up* They will further give a 
"joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence 
"and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the 
"terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence 
"and integrity." 

The Triple Entente had every reason to try to preserve the 
neutrality of Turkey during the war, both from political and military 
considerations, but all their efforts were in vain. The Porte announced 
the abolition of the capitulations from October 1; special trains full 
of German officers, soldiers, and sailors were run through Bulgaria; 
and many military reservists were posted to garrison the Dardanelles 
forts . British merchant vessels carrying cargoes from Russia to the 
ivediterranean had throughout August been subjected to delays and 
searches, at the Dardanelles. The case of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" 
had compelled the British Navy to keep a close watch at the entrance to 
the Straits. On Sept. 26, a Turkish destroyer was stopped outside 
the Dardanelles and turned back, and thereupon the Dardanelles were 
closed, ejnd in spite of assurance given by the Grand Vizier, were not 



Ihow bits ,'. 
bam »»«© a . i i ■ ■■• I bcus 

-txqa;; tedt i ■ i*t©vSwori , 

a" «tf terffr t bart8xXo I bXi/orfa e Cu 

•t od blijoda taw lo attxfttixsad iajh£*iS £»«•»») vd i«vo naataj 

x on > ;, .' : '.' I r j a [ j < 

JvsdJ bna ^aaHuT od' ; ad b chad* cYeinuT lo 

stars J »fca*i©d*8©l sixjorfa Cal j{<9©Tij 

iavc u id r 11" «• :si : ..... b<HJ..i 

"uaiaoid" bn.s "nadei tsiboBsai* 

bade; Xada aaxixXioal XXa Aaritf Kaitfx'x* i XXxw" 

bxuj t 8ie38ev tatadwT; b9d*qini0i"nxBJif bag aeq add - *soi" 

ad XXa ; > .f XXb .tsrtd"'* 

;,.(# arid" %*um tneaeti -iitfb" 

Xaxiod-xTrxadv ■■■ • t wsntbj >Q add" oc; ■ ... it ;{J-xw 8 ' 

rtoxri^ ■ {. lo amartoa a aa aooa sjS noitoxbaxiut" 

a ibnop ma boas '{isit^a XXxw H 

:sbax add" #»©qs«i £Xx« d*x*l nx :©t" 

oxdxbaQo bns t^aaHuT lo v^' t 3ad"ax bna 5 ' 

i rfd" 80, add* d°a riQt" 

"tXtitgatttl bns" 
i i ■ • srIT 

>"=na XV ioq aot'i dtfoc ttaw ©rid* •gftiitfb ^©jHhT lo yi"xX\s«xtjjan 

baon>joflfla aj*£c . .lie - XXa ti isbxe 

XXul aaxait Xaxoaqa ;X 7©dod-oU raatl anoxd^Xud-xqai; 'OxtxXods s 

;&f. Id) ran atew atoXxaa bay ,fri«xb£oa «a*taox11o naurcaO. lc 

n03X*l'Iiig u LXffl ytti 

add - od- jsxsbjxH taoil aeog*!B! c^viflo sX'eaeav d , ni>do r ieia daxdxifl .ad - **-.}! 
Xeb o* b aed d-augwA >d§woirit bad i iitatxb 

. CXaaabiaCl arid or.a <ae- .otaaa 
od" oona^jno add* &a rti add - boiX9qiao-j b 

iovc. LaHuT .a t dS »tqa2 nO .BtlaitQ add 

td noqwsxodJ bru ad bo;n«. 

" Y u WaVXJjjj 90OB , ~ L3 



reopened. The "Goeben" and "Breslau" made cruises in the Black Sea. 
By the middle of September it was estimated that there were over 
4|000 German sailors and soldiers in Constantinople alone. The officers 
of the German military mission, under General^-iman von Sanders, dis- 
played much activity in the military affairs of Turkey, and were the 
principal organisers of peeparations in Syria which directly menaced 
Egypt, and caused many British and Colonial troops to be sent there 
for its defence. In October, i»4,000,000 (^20,000,000) was delivered 
to the German .Ambassador at Constantinople, and it was said that a 
definite arrangement was arrived at, that as soon as the financial 
provision reached a certain figure, Turkey should be called upon to 
enter the war. On October 2y, it was reported from Cairo, that an 
armed body of 2,000 Bedouins had made a raid into the Sinai peninsula, 
and that their object was an attack on the Suez Canal; and on the 
same day, 3 Turkish torpedo boats raided Odessa Harbor, sinking the 
Russian guard-ship, and damaging four steamers. 

The protests of the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors 
were disregarded, and the alternative of rupture of diplomatic relations 
on the dismissal of German iiaval and Military missions having mot 
with an unfavorable response, the Ambassadors handed in their papers 
and left Constantinople, and Turkey had definitely cast her lot in 
the war on the side of Germany and Austria. 



-5- 



♦ *'. lo era© I 

fix ^GJJIJ" 6i)- ; ' CU9 tab CLX frlBftXEIOb 810JS J3 

teed evurl vi^ frnefiunevoO . . id- -io «YrifiBri8Q 

ortt ba» »\ . ii/eee a ^xlfiTtftferi eJi 

.t gnuo? arid . "ttjeierf^Q boa jairiea*! levna lo aoxJicfi 

aaa loqtax add ,qb.bo \'flju fi - 

eel fre s:v "to driio; Cxia a bus »Is©x4"xIoq a ciotl ctood ,'• 

,fcad\Hfl?i:Je©*ievo 
bant, ie*i©wo ( 380 owe edtt 10 tjejaa nl 

exit 9*t«»oa ej boe t a« i©q ruaa®* 5 °* i**uT ©rfi" o£ seoa* 

£j<ri'i vaiifjT o^ aimsism X&i/d .dte ... bus eqo*uCi ax noxJxaoq 

. aiflP .axid'ewil be* ojkjbIXIA oa vd beSn&VB ed dM§xi .3.jH 

•' ■' j. ii«r< ' o t> ! c.- : . <<ox 

arid lo suaae Bq^iiiaq bit© , ,.:~.fyen »o dti^x.^ BdJtllA naallsS arid 1 ridiv; 

(if iUiX8a.uiI e© Haw exs Birsq^G bias d"q\ •banxjB&ei viti»lTt6J' deoX 

i u sxbal .■;.„. t od" beii £ffi euo©ejj©0 

a od"ax baXbni .i aim ftfiid'sx'xifG lebfiu e< sXeow ie 

yv > . , Joij'i i:-.x .i©bis©X bb twttisil ©rid" ridx^ taw eiioxsxl©** lb eiaali 
, .■■■■■,. &<$< «i isoid'xeoq 'ieri ibw sricr ^oil ©§ieBJ Ma 



« V U— -» ' vJ i 



: x 1©1 



arid" ojhtti: ^©ahmT lo ©ocuTCdrte ©xitfai/A baa \'fiBnnex) oT 

xLtito-i^ oj Bfloxd"xbnoo auoidmue be-tolio bit© ,dT)©d*xoqnix \rIXBupe eaw 

it \0 .©8809118 10 880 J 1X8 rfd nofld^naide 

t $( h; acoxd©Xjjqoq fc©X80U 8iid gaoi 

>xriw 'lo e^Xuaen ©fW - bxxujT dhb t j3xi8^XA 
f«j9qo*ii/:>i iol eqooij 8idi*Xijsv© nxodd- boe ,a©xi4 , «iioo eaori^ 'io newo^. erfJ- 
te ;XbxibO seu euttedo a eav; ^^a^^i, .ebXsxl 

hUd& ,BWi iiX aou-f: £2i*luT ©a*l»X Vu fiXBBtffl .."B ftB lo 

fciHia «jaXid"8«A bnxs nBcntsfi b©s©sfla ^ied tab ed^ ot iaxj jflibiolla 



-ft. 



on the eastern line. If the Suez Canal could be seized, and the 
Dardanelles held,two of the prineipal water-ways of the world would be 
under the control of the Germanic Powers, and those which it was of 
the utmost importance for the Allies to keep open. The control of 
Germany over furkish affairs would be retained, and the chance of carry- 
ing out her policy in the near East. Perhaps the most important 
result would be the closing of the Dardanelles to shipping of the Allies, 
thus keeping from Russia vast supplies of munitions of war, of which she 
was in urgent need in order to put her whole enormous strength in the 
field, or in fact, to maintain her armies already there; while at the 
same time England and France would be cut off from valuable supplies of 
grain and oil from Russia. Even if the Turkish campaigns in the 
Caucasus against Russia, and in Egypt against England were not successful, 
they would serve to divert large military forces of the Allies for their 
protection, which would otherwise be available for the battlefields in 
the east and west of Europe, and whose absence from these fields might 
be sufficient to turn the scale there in favor of the Germanic Armies. 
Finally, the Turkish Navy, strengthened by the Goeben and Breslau, 
might be aole to gain a temporary control of Black Sea, or at least to 
make raids there to harass Russia, or it might be reinforced by. ships 
and torpedo craft from the German or Austrian Fleets. 

The principal military aims of Turkey - Roumania, and Bulgaria 
being neutral, and Turkey being therefore separated from her .allies - 
thus became to seixe Egypt, and the Suez Canal, or at least, to threaten 
them with raids, to seize Trans Caucasus and Northern Persia, and to 
harass Russia by naval activity in the Black Sea. 

The military aims of the Allies were to force and keep open 
the Dardanelles, and take Constantinople; and to seize the head of the 
Persian Gulf, the lower valley of Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Basra the 
terminus of Bagdad railway, and to secure and hold the rich oil fields 
in this district. 



-7- 



Oi . «b9£J:o;.. liJoy im .errxX rid* no 

lo Xoifortio ei 

■■■■.;£ v+BOCUtu { 

.J';;: i! 1J I . e ' .' KJ . , 

BOXo ;'-Xjj8qi 

.. : -.xqeai s. ; . 

, . . , : ...c to tfoXsx'i 

nl 'I'to $!■■ 

.&: Li o btm ni 

.-,--. bsgB 8W8J3S 

«x s. ; , ^^oiq 

efoXaxl e , 

I ex ox 11 

tjj&l ha ,vv. 

- as.' i 

taeirf^ o3 , to 10 , , , 

, xxea 

, i ■ . : ■ ,ymti 

I i tae uj baa ;eJ , 

.xi eift fcXori - , 

• tox* 



Any study of the resources of Turkey, and of the country 
involved will soon show the tremendous difficulties of campaigns either 
in the Caucasus or against Egypt, and this principally on account of lack 
of good communications and difficulties of terrain. The country in the 
Caucasus is a maze of mountains from i$>,000 to 17, 000- ft. high, with 
passes at 8, 000- ft., and during the winter deep in snow. There are no 
railroads in that section of Asia Minor, and reinforcements for Turkish 
Army in that vicinity would have to come via Tribizond, or other Black 
Sea port, which, if Russia held control of the Black Sea, would be 
impracticable. Any attack on the Suez Canal is even more difficult. 
Here, the Turkish Army would have to be concentrated at Jerusalem, and 
other parts of southern Syria, and would be separated from its objective 
by miles of waterless desert. No advance could be made over this by a 
very large force with heavy guns, until a light railroad was laid, which 
would take considerable time, and moreover, the line of the Suez Canal 
is a particularly strong one to force* 

For the Allies, the operations in the Persian Qulf presented 
no such difficulties. A force could be sent there from India, and this 
was done, and the district occupied soon after the declaration of war on 
furkey. 

The operations in the Dardanelles on the other hand was a 
tremendous undertaking, presenting the greatest difficulties to the Allies 
In fact, it was held by many that to force the Straits would be imposs- 
ible, without a very strong fleet acting in conjunction with large 
military forces; and this operation was not undertaken until the latter 
part of February. 



-8- 



ytd-naoo arid - lo bna ,\:e^iiJT 10 eaotaoaai add" So ybud-a ynA 

tadd"ia ansiaqauao 10 eexd-Xuyxilib ewobnaraatd- add" worfe nooa XXiw bavXovni 

rioaX lo dvuioooa no yXXiiqionxtq airfd - biie »d"q\gS d"ania&B 10 euatsouBO ad* ni 

add- ni \*itmjoo adT ♦xiiBttad - lo BeidXi/oillib bita enoidtfoxni-'wcsoo bocg lo 

Ativ ( ri£id «dl-»000«TX od" 000, dl ;;unl aniaftufvw lo a sou fl ex eueaouaO 

on eta atad? .wcne ni qeeb *io*niw arid' %£U*wb baa <»crl>0Q0«8 d*a eaeaaq 

rtairftuT toU ad-neioaotoiniet boa t ioiud jsxaA 1© noifl-oaa iadd" ni abaotiiat 

^ojsXH tedd-o *io .biiosidiiT xsiv aciou od 1 ©vad bXuow \i-j.£ix^£V d-add - ni yaitA 

wd bXuow ,ae£ ioaXE odd" la Icid-noa bisd sieaufi 11 «rioiriw ,d"toq a©8 

. ffluai llifi ©tow nava ai I saa£ aril no te&x&& ^aa .eXdaoiduatqwi 

bna twaXuewtal d"B bs&a r Ua&oaQo ed ©d* av/iri bXuow \m"iM rfaisitwT arid - t ataH 

avitoatdo adi: iuoti badaiaqaa ©d' bXuow b«a t jsitvS ntaddruoa lo ad"iaq tarid - © 

a yd eiri^ is vo abas* ad biisoo aonavba oil •toaaab eaaXtedaw 1© eeXxm yd 

rioidw % bs:&l saw bsotXiat d"d&il a X±d*n« «en*j^ yvaori dd*iw aotol agtaX y^sv 

XanaO seiiS arid* lo aniX add- «tevo©t©& ban t ©wxd" ©Xdaiobxenoo aisd- bXuow 

•esrtol o# ano gaoita yX'saXuoid-tsq a ai 
bed'ttaaeiq SXtffi nssieta^ add" ni enoidratoqo arid - t a@iXX^ add" t< 
aixid - bna »aibnl moil: atadd' dtaaa ad bXijeo aorto't A «eaid*Xfj©i^1tib doua on 
no isw lo noidaiaXoab add - totta nooa beiqwooo Soiit&lb arid - baa % 9ticb aaw 

•ye^t«| 

a saw bmd tadd"o add 1 no eaXXanabtaG add" ni. snoij~ataqo edV 

aaiXXA add- od* Bexd'li/axliJeb d-eadasi^ add - ^nid'nesatq ^tii^attQbau aaobneasetd- 

-aaoqsii ed biwow edia**d*u add 1 eoto^ od- d-add- ynaai \'^' bXad aaw d"i ,d-oal ni 

agtai d$£w noid'onwtnoo ni 3nxd"oa daaX^: gnotd-a vtav a d^aodd-iv »aXdi 

ted-J-aX add" iid-nxj nedM&i&htiu d*on aaw noid-atoqo aidd - bna jaaotol ytsfilbn 

• Vtawtda^ \o d^taq 



••O "■ 



Turkish Army and Navy, 

The strength of the Turkish Army is more difficult to estimate 
with any degree of accuracy than that of any other country in Europeo 
While the Turkish Empire includes 20 million inhabitants, there are 
so many nationalities and religions embraced in this figure, and so 
many of the people are remote and cannot be mobilized, that the Turkish 
Army could only draw soldiers from about half this population* 

The Balkan War of 1912-13, reduced considerably the military 
prestige of the Turkish Empire, and deprived it of certain sources of 
its power. The faults in organization and administration of this Army 
are such that in itself it could not be considered as an efficient force 
in modern war, but on the other hand owing to its considerable numbers, 
and the good fighting qualities of the Turkish soldier, it might under 
German leadership and control, be made a very useful factor in the war. 
The army in the field would rarely if ever correspond with the paper 
estimates, and there would always have to be large deductions made on 
account of Turkish methods, lack of money, intrigues, and other 
embarrassments. 

According to the latest estimates, the peace strength of the 
Army was 17,000 officers, 250000 men, 45,000 horses, 1,500 guns, and 
400 machine guns. There were 130 regiments of infantry, 70 rifle 
battalions, and 13 frontier battalions. About 473 battalions in all. 
The second line was intended to provide 500 battalions more. The infantry 
are armed with Mauser Magazine rifle. 

There were 200 squadrons of Cavalry, each regiment having 5 
squadrons of 70 men each, armed with sabre and Mauser carbine. 

The Field Artillery consisted of 35 regiments of two or three 
battalions - 3 batteries to a battalion;., 23 mountain Artillery battal- 
ions; 10 horse batteries; and 13 heavy howitzer batteries. Most of the 
batteries had 4 guns. 



-9- 



©drooil©© od- d-Xuuxllxb ©too* ©X y^* 1 *- daXritii? add lo rf^nei^a eriT 

•eqcuiii ox \r"s^ wo:> T©dd*c ^ftfi 1© dBrid" msdd* y'Obtuooxs 1© e©Tg©b \tm ddXw 

©T« ©Tadd • ediiAixdaritu rcoXXXXui OS eebuXooX ©ixqmiE risXafcu? add- sXXdW 

oa bcua a e*nj§Xl airfd' nX baoeicfoo eaox^XXaT boB aeXdXXBaoX&fift yn&w oa 

daXjiTw? arid* tad& «,basXXxdoiH ©d d'Ofusea bm ©d°atu©T ®i& ©iqoeq arid lo y* 1301 

•xsoXdBXuqoq eXdd* IXari duocte saoil aieifcloa wsib \'X«© binoo ^autA 

Xifid'xXla add" YXdaiabXaaoa boojub6*s »E£~>&Xl } £ lo i»l nxiaXBH erf? 

lo b©otho8 fcXfidrea lo dX bevx'xqab bns «a*ixqaia daXrfiu? mis lo egktoeiq 

^iaiii eXiid" lo «oxd"B*3d"8xrsx£i.bjj bos jtioxdBsxnB§*io nx sd'Xwjsl eriT •*i©woq ©dX 

qoto! -dnaXoxll© rte as be*i©bXenco ©a &aet bX*j©o dX IXeedX iix t&>d& doiie ei£ 

,8T©dmufx ©IdBTe&xafjos* sdX od* ^xtxwo boerf naddro arid" no toe ,tbw me bom ax 

t&bfiu tii&ia dX »*s©Xi»Xo© rfeX^tuT add" lo eeidxlawp gisXd*j%X* boog ©rid" brsa 

«tsw add" nX lodusl XViee*; ^$dv B @&£gj at* *Xo*f4 v &0© b«B qXiieiab/soX xtajsTet) 

*z@q&q add* ddXw bnoqaaTxoo "xeve IX \'Xsn«T bluow bXaXl add «X \sns edT 

no ©bJMi 8ttoX&ub8b @s*tsX ©<i oi 1 ©v.sd ©yawXb bX.uow sTarid" bus «e©dBffild'B8 

Tadd© b«s t 8QjjgX , xd'fiX ,^©«ojm io sIobX «sbodd3a; daiiiwT lo dmrooojs 

• S dYHMB© 8J3TTJ3dui8 

add" 1© djtgaeite aaoaq add" ( eed > ARiXd > 8e $&®&&I add" ©# grsXbrooaA 

bm ,8«ua OGS«I «aaeT©d 000,3^ t a»te 000062 .anaoXllo 000, TX uw^mA 

®X1Xt OV »yid'njslnx 'io adxiafiaXseT Q£X ©tow eieriT .sfrug aaXdosca 00£ 

• XXa nx sifoxiBd-d-isd EV£ dwodA •anttXXed'd'jad ToXtnoti £X .bus t &ffQxlBd , d'J3d' 

\*sdYUBlfsx ©dT »QTOffi ©noXXfi&hscf 006 ©fcivoiq od* bobaed'ox aew ©oxX bnooee ©riT 

.eXIXT (©jiXsjbsbM T^syjsM dd'Xw teffiTB ©tb 
6 ^«i.vBri d-na^X^aT dos© «\*tXx$vbO 'io BttO'ttmitpn OOS ©t©w ©TodT 

*eiiXo''Xf»a T980SM foitB ©Tdije dd*Xw betQTfi n titma n©£ss OV "lo BfiOTbxJupe 
©©Tdd" t© owd* lo ettieaat^en ^€ lo bed'axenoo \ r T©XXXtTii bXaX^l 9riT 
-Xjaddsd" \*T©XXxdnA ttJLBfauoa €S ; ;«©XXjBd , d-&d & od - aeXTsdded £ - enoXXed-d-Bd 
©dd lo d-eoM .aaXT©d-irBd TesdXvori'xvBQd 8X bxxB jasxTaddBd ©aTori OX ;aotoX 

• Qitug £ bud 8axTe*dBd 



-e- 



Each Army Corps has 3 divisions of 27 battalions, with 9 
machine gun companies, 6 rifle battalions, 3 cavalry regiments; 12 
batteries of field, 3 of horse, 6 mountain, and 3 of heavy artillery. 

There are nominally, four armies* The first consisted of the 
1,2,3, and 4 Array Corp3 with Headquarters at Constantinople, Rodosto, 
Kirke Kilisse, and Adrianople. 

The second consisted of 5, 6, and 8 Army Corps, the first two 
in Europe, and the 8th with Headquarters at Damascus. The third army 
included, 9, 10, and 11 Array Corps at Erzerura, Erzinghian, and Van. 
The fourth army included the 12, and 13 Army Corps at Mossul and Bagdad* 
The 14 Army Corps which was independent, was at Sanaa, Xlodeida and Ebka. 

Mobilization had been in progress since the war began, and it 
is estimated that there are now 500,000 more or less trained men with 
the army, and 250,000 or more untrained men at the depots* 

. At and near Constantinople, there were, when Turkey entered 
the war, the 1, 3, and 5 Array Corps, and part of the 6th. There were 
also the Bosphorus defence troops, several cavalry brigades, etc. In 
Thrace were the 2 and most of the 6 Corps, 3 Cavalry brigades, and 
Dardanelles defence troops. At Smyrna, was part of the 4th Corps In 
Palestine, was the 8th Corps, and numerous irregular Arab troops, etc* 

The main mass of the Turkish Army (over 250,000 men) was 
thus in Europe, the next largest body was on the Russian frontier in Asia 
Minor (about 150,000 men) and the third mass was near the borders of 
Egypt (about 65,000 men). 

The Turkish Navy consisted of 3 old battleships of about 10,000 
tons each; a small harbor defence ship of 2,400 tons; 2 small cruisers, 
3 torpedo gun-boats, 10 small destroyers, and 10 torpedo boats. The 
chief strength of the Turkish Navy was in the battle cruiser Goeben 
and the cruiser Breslau, both formerly of the German Navy, A list of 
ships of the Turkish Navy is appended* 



-10- 



4? rfixw , anoxlsihted VS i© anoxaivxb £ eBii aqioO ^anA doaSI 
SX ; e£fl©fi)x c >©i ^iJxvaa S «8noxXBjrtod ttttkn S «aaxni}qinoa au^ ©nxdoaxa 
.Xioliitia x V£ie d ie & k^*' tflXJ»to»auro«8e*M>fi So £ tfolexl: to aaxioj-tod 
ori* lo bsJexeno;) toil! exfT • eaJtaraa iwo'l c \-,L££xufiioa e-ua ©*x©dT 

t oto©bo;] ,aXqofli:ta£tonoO to ai8d"iai?pbfiaH dtow aq-toQ yprnA s" fcxis ,£ t 2»I 

• a£qoar>Jt*sbB. forts ,©B8xXx}i eitxa 
otstf to*xxl ©fit ( 8q'ioU xtiTLti 6 boa «S »c to be^Bxanoi* bwooea e ' 

is inirftf edT «bw»bb£ib0 to bis tafiupJaeaH d#xw d£6 arid" briB «aqo*xij& nx 

•osV b«B ,nBxrignxs"6I «aMtfies'3& 4*J3 eqioO y^^ ^ &&& «0X «.6 t b©bijXonx 

*bfib^H bits Xiibsoh to aq*xoU v«ra& EX bn^ ,SX ©d£ babijioai \m& xidrrwoi ©riT 

• J33ldS bnB Bbx^boil t iiBftK>c; to e«w ,toebi5©q©bm: e*w xloxxiw sqnoQ ^xt$*xA £X ©dT 

to bits tiiB^oci" tbw ©dj eonia 8B©i^o*sq nx naad bad noxtosxXxdoul 

tHrivi nesa boncBtd' eael no b*xoib 000 « 008 won e>*XB srtert^ tortd" betoasxto© ex 

♦ stoqeb add" to nana benJLBi&tut a*i©xs to 000»0c!S bus ,v&tb ©rid - 

b©*s«.tiie ^aafcti? narfw *e*t9w ©•x@rU' «©£qofixtoBtonoQ ta©n bos $A . 

©law a'lafiT •lid'd ed£ 1© tn&q him ,8qi©0 \ai*tA 2 mm «£ t X add* ,*tsw add" 

nl .o^© 4 8©bi:$giid x'iIlwbv) Xaiev©® »Bqcsv^<? ©onalab a*n©dqaoS. &d& obIb 

bos «eeb£g±*ia r y*tXi)V£iO £ e^qioO 8 exit lo «eoffi bnu S ©du ©new aoAixfT 

«I *©qioO xid"£ ©rit 'io JNsq &bw «Bn*s\TMti to ♦ sqooTtd' soxxetab eaXXaxiBbtBG 

*oto ,aqeoi$ du'tk *uuu^©*six Buoisxmm bus ,8q*io0 fftB ©rit aew ,©jnx*8©XB c l 

8BW (fiQffl 000«0cS tevo) \*£3*iA daxituT eitt 1© eeBui nxBxa ©riT 

joxeA nx *j©xir!0'2l riBxeawfi fiiirf - **o ©bw ^bod ^ea^'XfiX 4"x©« ©rf»t ,8qo*u^i< fix swri^ 

lo aiebnod ©fid" isan bbw aaism btidt mU bn& {mta 0O0,02X Suods) lortxii 

.{neia 000 1 36 J-wod©) tq\ 

000,0X tuo-da 1© ssqidssii'd-ijd bXo £ 1© b©<frexett©o vvbK dex^jjiT ©riT 

»an98iui© XIsisiB S ;8ixoi 00#«S; io qxda ©oxxe'leb nodnad XXBtae b ;rlo£© exxoi- 

©xix .stood obsqio^ OX briB .«ane\;o*sd'eeb Hams OX t etood»«flg obeqtoJ" £ 

nedaoO i©ciM«x© ©Xd-tod ©xf# nx ©bw \'VbK daiituT ari* lo xi^fiaito IbMo 

lo d'exX b »^vail neisrzeii) aii* lo y^** 923 ** ^ dfod t a©X8©ic2 i©8iy*io adi 1 bxis 

*b©bn©qqB ei yvisH rieiMtuT ©di *o eqxde 



-OX- 



Operations Leading up to Attack on Dardanelles • 

After the entrance of Turkey into the war, in the early part 
of November, operations were undertaken by her in the Caucasus, Egypt, 
and in the Black Sea, for all of which she had been mobilizing, her forces 
and preparing previous to that time* 

Un Nov. 18, The Russian Black Sea Fleet engaged the Goeben 
and Breslau both of which disappeared in the fog, the former damaged to 
some extent by the Russian fire* The Goeben also ran on a mine at a 
later date, and was so badly damaged, that she could not be repaired 
at the Turkish yards for some months, and when she did again take the 
sea, the first part of April her speed was much reduced* 

On Dec. 12, submarine B 11 entered the Dardanelles, dived 
under five rows of mines, and torpedoed the Turkish battleship Missudiyeh 
which was guarding the mine-fields. Although pursued by gunfire and 
torpedo boats, the B 11 returned safely after being submerged on one 
occasion for 9 hours* 

These disasters to the Turkish Navy destroyed all hope of 
Turkey obtaining naval control of the Black Sea, which thus definitely 

passed to Russia* Turkish troops could not be moved thereon without 
great danger, and the Russian fleet succeeded in sinking a number of 
transports and supply ships, and bombarded TREBIZOND and other ports on 
the Asia Minor coast* 

On Dec* 17, the Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was ended, and 
Egypt annexed to the British Empire, strong military forces having been 
collected therefor its defence, consisting of British Territorials and 
Indian troops, and also contingents from Australia and New Zealand* 

About the middle of November a force consisting of a division 
of Indian troops was landed at the head of the Persian Gulf, defeated and 
drove back the small Turkish force in that region, and occupied Basra 
and Kurna* This operation put the British in possession of the lower 



-11- 



'•zQilnsi&h'mtt no rtaa**A o* q# grubaaJ anox*anaqO 

J*u»q Y^*wie e»d* «•* • ^* w a*** °* w * Y® 3 ^ ™ 1° ootm*ifn& ad* *ia*tA 
<*<R3ft *bu&hqubO ad* ax tod i>d n&&$£*wbau ©law 8«ax**n©qa ,toduiavoH \o 
eeoto'i -tad ^iiisjtlxdooi neocf bad ade doxdw 1© XXa *xo^ ae3 riaaXH ad* nx boa 

♦emi* *ari* o* euaxvgnq gnxoeqeiq bna 

nedeo-3 ad* baya^na *ael r i sa£ jJojbIS naxsayfi edT «6X .voM n^ 

o* baysciab laenot ad* t -go\ ad* nx beriaoqqaaib dairiw So d*od ualaaiti brts 

a te .. B no nat oala «e .©*iii naxeaafi ad* \d *na*xa emoa 

baixaqei ad *on blwao eda *sd* tbagaatab ^Ibaa q® bbw baa ,a*si) *xa*al 

add* a^si- 11x3343 bib aria ne4v djkb t Bd*naiis aiaos *sot abta^ rfaialiuT ad* *a 

• b©wjba*x d»iiss saw baeq-a t»d Xi*xqA lo **iaq ^ailS add" «aae 

bavxb ,a©XXof»Ir:j£Ci ad* b9"s©*na II 3 eax*is«cftfa ,&! .dad nQ 

ffoYxbuaaliil qinaalcM'ad fCeiJftifT ad* b®ofceq i io* fens ^aanxaj to awo*x svxl lebnw 

boa aixlfijB§ Tfd b«iie*swq dgyod^XA ♦abXelt^aiixffl ad* gnlbiBiig 8aw doxrfw 

ana a© b&giacsdua gnxed ia*la vl&laa bamw*©** XX a ad* ,8*aod obaqio* 

♦ etuod $ *t©l noxaaoao 
io aqod" 11b hax®*t$mb ^vall dei.jf'uj'? eri* ©* aistaaaxb aeariT 
3*xnxlab ead* daxriw «jss3 afaa&i ad* la I©i*noo Xavan §nxaxa*do v®^* 10 '? 

*w©d*iw noaisri* b& id *©n bXuod 8qoo*x* aairfiuT *iji:88ttK ©* ba8&sq 

to la drawn a ; ax baj we *aalA naxaeuR ad* bits c^agnab *aei^ 

no a*i©q md*© i>ns CIHUS2S2IHT babiadaioci fooc «aqide \Xqqua bna B^ioqanHi* 

. tsaoo tootU sxaA ad* 

boa tbabna eaw *q\^al *j©v« vtiu^nssua daxtfiuT ad* »VX .aad i 

nead ^nxvBd bsoio) ^is*xLui ^aoite ,aixqfl£I dax*xi9 ad* a* baxanoa *qY§3 

b«a aXxsx*?odrx*j' , S8T dai*i*i3 lo &nx*axEflo;> »©ono1;ab stl "xozatad* be*aaXXoo 

*b««Xi3aS wqU boa a2Xai*au/i aafl atafogoxfrioo oaXu bna .aqoot* nalbnl 

uox8X%'xb a to 3«i*axa«oo oatol a *xadwavoW lo ©Xbb^ ad* *uodA 

biw bataalab ,'iiyi) naxa'xa'i ad* 1© baad ad* *a babiiaX aaw aqoot* naibal \o 

Btesd baxqjjisoo bns t ngx3ai d Lfc at>': XXaaa ad* i»ad ovotb 

newoX ad* lo noxaaaaaoq nx ricx*x*id ©d* *«q noi*a*xaqo axriT ♦amtCi boa 






Tigris and Euphrates, the terminus of the Bagdad railway (not yet 
completed), and the important oil fields of that district. This country 
is still held, though the Turks have made various attacks here, the 
most important of which was one near Basra in April, by a force of about 
15,000 which resulted in the driving back of Turks with heavy losses. 

As Turkey did not enter the war until the beginning of November, 
military operations in the Gaucusus could be undertaken only with great 
difficulty, which with a long and ardous desert march before her towards 
Egypt, with Bulgaria and Greece neutral, and the Navy incapable of more 
than raids, made it appear as if Turkey's participation in the v/ar would 
for months to come, be of little more than a nominal kind. The Turks, 
however, under their German leaders did not let the v/inter pass without 
undertaking both of these campaigns. No doubt the Germans hoped that by 
an immediate vigorous campaign in the Caucasus, Russia would be forced to 
detach considerable forces from the eastern theatre of war, and thus 
relieve the pressure upon herself and Austria. The Russians were, how- 
ever, prepared for Turkey, whose hand had been plainly shown from the 
beginning of the European War. The Russian Army in the Caucasus stood 
at its post, and when Turkey entered the war, no men were transferred 
from the eastern front. 

The Russian troops crossed the Turkish i v frontier and drove the 
Turkish advance bodies back towards Erzerum. This was only a demon- 
stration and not an advance in force, the general policy of Russia being 
to act for the time on the defensive in this theatre. At the end of 
November, theTurks began to develop their advance having concentrated the 
9th, 10th and 11th Corps at Erzerum. The Russian concentration took 
place at Kars, distant about 100 miles. The whole intervening country 
between these two fortresses is a tangle of mountain ridges, and snow 
swept valleys. The plan of the Turks, as prepared oy the Germans, was 
to attempt the envelopment of the Russians. Though the Turks had super- 
iority in numbers, about 150,000 to 100,000, such a plan in this 
difficult country, covered with snow, without railroads or good roads, 
and depending on the Black Sea via Trebizond for reinforcements had little 
chance. 

-42- 



&&X ton) Y«wlxiii bjabjjo'I ed& \o QUtilmi&t &dt »«aJii'sdqki bna vi'i 

UtttuiQO &IrfT , Ju i*i J-«xb Audi In abXaxt Xia dcnmNoqial ad»t .b/ta , (baihsXqmoa 

erfJ- ,<»"M ■ Bdoatta &bm &vmi aatiu? edit dgxtodi ,bXeri XXx*8 si 

u'toi a yd ,XiiqA ai s"x&af tB&a afro eaw riaxrfw lo tfnatooqoix daoai 

. aaaeoX yvjjad ifi'iw fciiu? lo iiaad j^ixvxnb ed* ai ba.frXiJaa-s rfoxdw 000, ^X 

,iadot8VoH '10 gitinnxaad udj liJraa tew ad«J iscta© joa. bxb yaji'i^I. eA 

^i;.; dJxw \;Xm> fla^a^iebnu od bXaoa auaayuBO arid" nx anox&naqo \"i»tiXia 

abtswoJ- -tad aiaxad datxsii faaMak BU&ilim bivs &noX & iltiw daidw jY^Xuaillib 

alow lo aXaBqaaiix \jvb~6! ©ritf baa ,Xtrc;fr/afi aoaei*) boa sxtaaXwd dtfxw j'tq^fl 

bXuow t»w add ni nox^aqxaxcKsq s*v©diiiT ix aa laeqqs 'ix. &bam , ebiirr £i£d$ 

t e7iiu'i ©fii .bniti iB&aaon b imrfd* a*soi,i aX-i^xi 'to od t 9moo o£ crifriOK *tai 

chuod^xw senq •jadrtxw &d*t 4"©i #©a bib eiabsaX hearth tisrij- isbitw ,*xav9worf 

yd &sdt beqod aaBfjna&j adt Muob ©I! « ««3XBq£3Bi> aaoii^ '20 d&QQ gjfifctetoabfUf 

ot h&wiQ'l ad bXiiow MismH .sua-BaaaO &dt ax agi&qtmu uaoio^iv a$8xbWMX as 

aifdifr him it&t: 10 a*ifoi©d£ am$&iH9 arU aioi't aaaiol aXdjartsbxaaoa daaJab 

-wad ,aiaw sroixaauH ad? .BintfaaA boa IXaetsrf aac.u a*x«i8aaiq arf.fr avaxXaT 

ari^ moi r i av/oria yXaxfiXq aoad" bad bfsjaxi aaorfw ,\'a^iiiT *xo'x baiaqsiq «iava 

boocfrs stfaaa&BQ ad* fox >wtA ajaxaas/fl axfl? ,*sjsV» aesqa'iA/fi srf^ 10 snxnnigad 

batial&'n,u c i ? .i a*jaw nam on ,i£W adcf batata ^©jti»T nadw bxsa «a-aoq eji ^b 

-t »vc*jb bmj iox>fia'il^iiaxji e ti;T adt baaaoio aquoij tisieeufl adT 

•noiaab b \'Xnu aj*«r ai i? •aaj*ias*il£ sbiaweJ" ilyBd aaxbed BvttavbB dsljl*iaT 

3«xai.J aj ia ^slXoq XXrxofieg edi' ,ao*jfii «i Q'jtixvbu tm ton baa tiQiteifa 

"to hm &d& crii. «at*B8dJ" bM& ti£ svxaaa'iab ad^ fio afljid" ode *xol tuB ot 

ari^ batBtfuooiw'j univmi aumsrhis tiadd" qoXsvab o$ fto^a<i aji^w'Tad^ ,*xadiaevoH 

slao^ nox&iifrtaaftoo iiBiaauH arfT itf'S&sil ctj.- aqnoU d^XX biixi dwOX t di"^ 

ynftujoii %n£HQVm&ni. aludw adT .aaXxra CK3X j-jjocJb .tnisjrsib »e*iB}i ;*"« ao^Xq 

wone baa i u&^bs.t nxjstnuom la aXsiiBd' & ax eaBeat^noA owj aeadJ" noawd-ad 

aaw , sxtaanaO &dt ^d baieqaiq aa ,aj{iuT adt la raiiXq sdV .a\'sXIav ftjewt 

~"taqu8 bad e?{i«T ad^ rigiJOii? .enaxeaufl adi - 10 ^naiaqaiavno &dt -d-qaeWju od" 

axdd" nx ojiXq b daua ,'J00«00X at 000, OcX d aian «x vti-ioi 

,8bB0t boo^ 10 abwa'ri'xjj't .hiodtxw ,wona d^xw baiovoa ,^i^nwoa ^XuaxllXb 

aXt^xX bad atttsmwiolaiai 10't bnosxdaiT jljxv aaci >ioaXti yd^ tto gxixanaqab bn« 

.ao«ari3 
-SI- 



The Turkish plan, however, in spite of difficulties of com- 
munications, and of timing various movements, came near to success, but 
the stubborn Russian resistance at all points upset the Turkish plan 
of delivering a sudden stunning blow on inferior forces. The fighting 
went against the Turks, two of whose Amy Corps were^almost annihilated, 
and in the first part of January the Turkish forces were driven back 
into Asia L&nor, Trebizond, was bombarded and communications by Black 
Sea cut, and the remnants of the Turkish Army na well as the civil 
population of Erzerum and surrounding country have since been decimated 
by disease and hunger. 

The Turkish forces for operations against the Suez $anal were 
mobilized in southern Palestine with Jerusalen as a base, and various 
reconnaissances of small forces were made in the Sinai peninsula* In 
January these forces were said to number 65,000. No extensive operations 
could however, be undertaken until a railroad was built across the 
desert, and this would take considerable time, but was necessary in order 
to supply troops with water, transport heavy guns, etc. Nevertheless, 
a reconnaissance in force, or raid, by about 12,000 men, was attempted 
and succeeded in transporting light guns, and briging equipage» 

On Feb. 2 and 3, the Turks tried to cross the canal but 
were repulsed with considerable loss by British forces, and lost most of 
their bridging outfit. It is difficult to see what such a small force 
could have accomplished, but it seems that they hoped to get possession 
of a portion of canal temporarily, and accomplish some destruction. The 
British forces do not appear to have advanced across the canal in any 
great strength, until the morning of Feb, 4th. They collected about 
600 prisoners, but the bulk of the Turkish force got away with the guns. 
By Feb. 3th. there were no Turk3 within 20 miles of the canal. There 
was no organized pursuit, but enemy suffered losses of about 1,000 in 
dead and wounded. 

It is understood that German engineers are busy with light 
railway in Syria, and other attempts against the canal will perhaps be 
undertaken. The raid in February at least showed that the Turks can 
cross the desert in some strength, and can bring guns with them. 

-13- 



... , 
.hid , 9i s u bug ■ -.■ ■ ....ixcr ':c bm B tift&i:& 

• >eqju etfiiOQ JLLb B&fid'&ju Dddjj, 

it TEOjfc'x® iiu «o j ,, aafc&jse a ^xjciovllab 16 

1.o ow , ■.■■ ;• tsaJbsgjB tomw 

rib qiv^ eea -. '.:/.- ' $fi>#ng£> le ttsig franjcl arid 1 ox boa 

... OliiUSWOQ ' , ;. 01&f#33 t lUfUj,I flXSA Qih 

XXvx:. Mid S£ IXew es vcrw, fCaiatajfl ■>■ le rfiHtturi arij b t ;frjo bog 

q ,- ■■ i sa^SE So asex^jRinq 

£&£&§ -.2 ta« 

BiJCilJBV bee ,.;U- Bd 3 ais KeX^Biml ji^i:v. ©£$£& [fi { ijoa fix beaxX, 

nl *Bl.«drixnaq &Biit i 'itonx a&jaffi ■•':!.' s*}»*xo1 £l£ime le 3©sfw3aa.C;.i.-.:v;;si 
p£&a&£xg ol . 000 t £d taoaiu^ ©4" felis.8 ©*zow s©o*tt-i &&&£& Y^-e^rssL 

. .'■, . &B9$£$firtt« XIO: \. sg eisvawc E&oo 

- ., ;aa^*i $£ro fed ^$ :...:;■ ■ &&8;3tBd Q3i blifffiw &£si$ bm ,j**xaas.b 

t '. : ■ " '•: 'X"..-'ir...' I *od*e tSXtyg igffjs&fii j"iu. ,' : -.! ".-.i t i&&BW . ct.oo~. - ©4" 

•■■■:•• t mm 000, £X i s \<i ihssii io t e; . ooo-x js 

jija Lbximq oils b»o«X8 ®fr fr$£.i& a: >rM*. t £ &i i ! , .:■ rO 

haei bm tmanvli MM&tl pi ^acX &x>.- 
69*9$ ilBCaa js Jti'- te$sn eaa ©# tiw : .^ &X *d&lii/o ; xid" ";X 

eoq j.x, pd" frai g&j&f & :. »a ;tx wJUCf c bs>ii8i:Xqi>. 000.fi SVBl! fait. 

>XtToi lussij ..... ios riaix^fiiooofi ; tvAxt&iCQxtsi . r.u30 to . irnofl .s to 

^x$a ux ... ■ : * jaois . .■.■■.■■• '..•' ; ob to 

twode b$i-oaxXvO x®^>- ' ; ^*' * u: --''i ^ c ,a^-''- «*> t^^w^'ita d 

.axii/^ ©lid" ri uo'io'i dsxjil«T ©rf; to : .-, At cnjo ,ai i; iiO£xtq 

© 4 aS:u .Xsifso eiid to 8©Iic ' ou w$i .: .f£t8 .- 

0OG t i d-jjocitf i© ©a*eX fee*!) ^1 ( - Ofi 

ta'sebftii ai tl 

i ,X'iO ttfi , .:■•:■ - 3 ^ 3 ' I 



The first few months of her war had therefore been disastrous. 
The territory at the head of the Persian Gulf had been occupied by the 
British, the operations in the Caucasus and in Egypt had resulted in 
complete failures; the Turkish Navy had been roughly handled, and 
transports sunk in Black Sea and towns bombarded* By keeping the 
Dardanelles closed and defended, and thus shutting off munitions of 
war from Russia, so necessary to her in developing the full strength 
of her army, as well as supplies of grain and oil for Great Britain 
and France, Turkey could still, however, exercise a considerable influ- 
ence on the results of the war* 

The forcing of the Dardanelles became, after the entrance of 
Turkey into the war, one of the important features of the Allies* 
strategy* When such an attack could be made depended much on the 
results of operations in other theatres of the war. Operations in 
the Dardanelles being far removed from the main theatres, and to a 
certain extent a secondary operation, any attempt there likely to 
weaken the Allies in the principal theatres in the east and west of 
Europe would be open to criticism* The disastrous results of the 
Turkish campaigns, however, in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesapotamia, 
and their naval losses in the Black Sea; together with deadlock on 
the western front, defeat of German armored cruiser squadron in the 
North Sea; clearing of the sea of German cruisers; and apparent secure 
position, preponderance in force, and limited field of activities for 
British and French fleets; and the importance of the results to be 
achieved by a successful attack on the Dardanelles seemed to warrant 
the move* 

The political and strategical results of the forcing of the 
Dardanelles would be of the utmost importance to the Allies cause* 
If the straits could be forced, Constantinople would be at t e mercy of 
the Allies' fleets, European would be separated from Asiatic Turkey 
without means of sending reinforcements from one to the other, and the 
Ottoman Empire might be compelled to sue for peuce* German interests 

-14- 



.BuoitBBBib aeod ©iGlo*tfldd" bad law ted lo ariiaouj wal -fretx! ©riT 

arid" v a baxqwooo noad bud IXuO oaxatoH arid" lo baori add - 1b Yiod^xtod' ad? 

«x bodMJjaan toxi ih aJfc bras bxjuboubU add fix anoxtonaqo add* ,riaxd"X"x3 

baa i »ri ^Xcbjiio? x;©ad bad yvaH dalai^T arid" ;a8*ss/Xxja'i sd-eXqxsoo 

arid" jifixqe©^ •b&biit'h wod" bass :ioa£& fix siaiis ad"*xoqexan:d" 

jo aaoxtxfiiJiii llo %aJLttud& &ud& boa coebnaxob bxia bo a old «©XX©xi©biB(2 

xttgiiaiffe IXxii odor galqolovob fix tad od* v/us&aaaafi ,,8X8 ay ^ xao*xl tbw 

iilij^inci teeix) tol Xxo fane nxst^ ^° aailqquB bjs XX«w q£ t yart6 tad lo 

-xxLlnx ©Xd/jisbxanoo .3 ©exo*3©*:© ( iavewor( »XXxd"a bXuoo yoshw? t ©©fi©'«'S bna 

♦ •usw ©rid- lo alXiiaoi add* no aaaa 

10 oofi-aidaa add" *tad"le .acaaoad aeXXoxwjbiBti add" lo soxoiol ©ri? 

*ssxXXA add- 10 aoixxtx*©! d"ixad"xoqjJiX ©rid" 10 aa© *ibw odd- odYix veaJiuT 

©rid* no riowxa bebneqab ©xusiu ad bluoo ioatfii as rioua nariW •YadtoiJa 

fix anox&iieqO .ww odd* la eaiiAaaiid' i©xi£o Hi anoid-inaq© lo ad-Xuaai 

£ od - baa , s©*3.te«dd* xixsxs &dt moil bavomai iat &xix©d aeXXafiXJb'xuG add" 

od" Y,X&ixX ©isiicr #qfiaad'd , a y:as «iioxd - B r x©qo ^tjibxiooae £ d-nodx© nxad-xeo 

lo d*a©w ba© d'asa srid* fix aoid^odd; iiaqxafixiq odd" «1 eaxXXA add - naalaew 

arid" lo ad'Xyai ;<Hd*®BaJ;b axi f maJba>i.&i t io ad" «©qo ©d bluow aqo^ixl 

tiJXias^oqsaeM bas «£qraS[ »2U8,bowbU odd" ui 4 iavawod ^afigxeqeiso rieiateuT 

no 3i©oXb»©b rid'xw ^©rfrtBgoi; {.eaS iyaXS. odd - ax a&eeoX Xevsc ixerid" bus 

add* fix MO'tbBiipa naaxwio boioxflas aBarxev lo daelsb ,jxiQ*tl mad'asw arid* 

a*maea daa*xeqq.f5 baa ;arteaxuico neariaj!) lo asa ©rid - lo ^fiirrxiaXa jfi©2 dd-roH 

*£ol 88X^X7x4-913 lo bleli bsd*xiai;i bxia ,ao?ol fix aofiBiabtfoqo'-fq ,fioxd\iaoq 

od od ailueei add - lo oacurfioqmx ©rid" bxxa jedieaXl ilane*zl hcus daxdxia 

jfiaiifiw of b©tosaa£ .-wtBhtaG. odd no £&&&&» Xiilaesdoua xj Y d bavoxdoa 

•evoia ©dt 
add" lo gfixoiol add- lo ad-Xweei l30X3©4»*x*a bxvB Xi*axd"xXoq edT 

«©subo aoxXXA add" c»^ rioqiai d"8oxad"jj ©dd" lo ad bXuow 8©XX©fi©biaCI 

lo \foneia atd && ad bXuow u ^baotol &4 oXuoa ad'ieid'a odd" II 

^o^wT oxd-Xiieii ojoiI bo^iitBq©© od blwo* aoeqotiJcL t ad©ell ' BoillA add" 

j baa ,*iadd , o odd" od" ©no mot'i adaooasnolnxo't jjnxbfiae lo enxjaa tuodttw 

eiae'xod'fii: rj^nai) »ao>ji©q ioI ©we od* boXXsqatoo ©d d/ffe&i arUqoH fierao^ 

~^X- 



in Turkey would be lost. Russia might be freely supplied with the 
munitions of war so vital to her successful military operations, and 
the mobilizing of her full strength, and Great Britain and Rrance could 
draw on Russia for grain and oil. Any threat of further operations 
against the Caucasus or Egypt would be lessened or completely disappear; 
and the effect on the Balkan States of Roumania, Greece, and Bulgaria 
now hesitating on the brink of war, and whose policy had been such a 
source of trouble and uncertainty to the Allies, might be to cause them 
to join them or come out openly in their support* The decision of 
Italy might also be hastened* 

To force the Dardanelles in view of the strong and numerous 
fortifications defending the straits, and the other difficulties attending 
the work was a task for the combined operations not only of a powerful 
fleet, but also of a strong landing force. To insure success and that 

i 

the Straits should be forced in the shortest time, and with a minimum 
of loss would probably require the joint action of a strong British 
and French naval force in the Dardanelles, in conjunction with the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet at the other end in the Bosphorous; and the operation 
was not one that could be left to the Navy alone, but would also require 
strong military forces from these countries to act in conjunction with 
the fleets. The situation was such that a naval force would accomplish 
little unsupported by a landing force. If, however, the operation would 
have to be undertaken by both military and naval forces of Great Britain, 
France, and Russia, acting together, we may form some estimate of the 
great difficulty in co-ordinating plans to provide for the best use of 
the 3 armies, and 3 fleets involved. Successful co-operation under 
the circumstances could only result from a well Matured plan, a good 
system of command, and thorough accord and team work among the various 
forces. 

In spite of these obvious considerations, this attack was car- 
ried on for some time, with only a Naval force of Great Britain and France. 



-15- 



orf;r ritxw bexXqq;j« yXdeil oci til&xoi Bxeay.fi .teoX »d blu ow yeiiijT ni 

urtb «anoxtB*[oqo \"iBtiXxui Xnlaaaoowa larJ ot XbSxv oa *jbv; lo enoxtxmao 

bXnoo oon. us nxBti'tti txwriv bnxs ,rl^nei^e XXul lari lo ^nxsiXxdoia ©fit 

anoxtBisqo *teift*oul la tB©*jiit v-aa ♦ ixo btm aiat^ *tol BiaenH no WBtb 

;*xja©qqB8xb ^Xet©Xqwoo "io b©n»aeaX act bXwow tq^gS *x© ©mobowbO ©rit ^enXB^B 

bxib^XwH boa «aa©aiv tBxnBfixuofl 1© e©i"Bir8 nBsJXB&^arit no to© 11© ©rid" briB 

b rfoue n©ed bjBri ^axXoq eeorfw brae ,Ttaw 'to skcxiu ©n't no ^nxtBtxaea* won 

merit ©8MB© ot ad tji&xia t eoiXXA edt ©t '{ftuBttaamr bna ©Xcuno'tt to ©aiuoe 

1© noxexoab orfT .tioqqwa "XX©rit n± \-Xnsq© two ©&oa to merit nxct ot 

*b©n&t8Bri ed csXb trigics y^b^I 

ei/cxoiswn bns gn©*st3 ©fit lo wsxv nx ©©XXamsb'sisG erft aaiol oT 

Sflxbnedtfa aextluaillib rserfto ©lit b«B t 'stxBita ©n't gnXbueleb anoxtBaxlitiol 

Xtflnewoq .a 1© Y^ n0 ton ©«■©£■& ■" . banxamoo ©rit "sol jIsb^ b ex;* jiiow erit 

fmit bass, sa©yoi»8 9i«eci oT «©©*?©! snibneX ^ncxte b to oeXfi frud «taoXl 

exMioiniiij b ritxw btm t emx$ teetiGrfe erit nx beoiol ©d bXnorie ed"XB*id"8 arid" 

nexti gaotte b lo noxJbB tnioi ©rid" ©nxjjpen ^Xdjsdoiq bXnow seoX lo 

lutxeeuft ©rit rftiw nextoiur tno«* ni 4 u©XXenfibic»CI ©rid" ni eoiol it&Mtt rioaei'3 baa 

noxtBtaqo erit btm jej "qeoS exit nx bn© ierij"o ©lit £b $mL% a©2 sio^Xd 

&ix«p©*x obXb foXuow t«d t an©XB yv*K ©fit ot tl©X ©d bXiioo t&rit ©no ton ©bw 

ritxw noxtsixu £ttoa nx ts>£ ©t eexi^iujo© ©asrtt raoil eeoiol Y^^^xXxai ^no*xta 

fiaiXqii30©©B 5Xl*ow ©atol, Xbvb« b t&d& riowe aew nox^BtxcMe aiii .8<fr©aXl ©rid' 

bXiiow xiox^Biaq© ©rid" .levowori ,11 .eotol ^nxbntiX b x " be^oqquaiui el&itll 

t JUBd"XiS tBeiO lo ee^-xol Xbvbis briB ^iKd*xXixj ri^od \«d fl»aLfii*t©bnu ©d oi- ©vari 

©rit lo ©ti&ix^a^ at nel vaai ©w t *x©i{t©sot gnxtoB ,Bxesi/H bnB teonBi'S 

lo ©an taad srit *xol ©bxvoiq ot snBXq ^nxtanxbto-oo nx vd"Xu©xl*ixb tssis 

t&bnii noigBi.eq©~oo Xw'iaaeooyS ,bevXovnx etesXl £ bn& «e©xffi*iB £ ©rit 

boog b »HBXq btttntBCi XXev.' b e3o*il tineei v^ ft0 bXno© a©onBtBCJL'©"ji:o erit 

8W0X1BV ©fit jjnoaiB tfiow £jB©t bnB brtaaoB ri^woiortt baa ,bfiBJH»uo lo m©t8ve 

♦aaotol 
-tp;s aBW iiOBdtn exrft ,enoxtBiebianoo anoxvdo ©e»rit lo atlqe ni 
.sonBtH baa olai-itQ. tBaiO lo »©tol XbvbH « yXtto ritxvr «ecixt enoa nol no boil 



•2X- 



It became an affair of ships against forts and mines, and the result 
was naturally disastrous to the ships. The attack was started earlier 
than anticipated, owing to conditions stated above, and the military 
expeditionary forces were not ready to participate. To undertake 
such an affair was to count too much upon the inefficiency of the 
Turks, on the second-class character of the fortifications, and the 
effect of their guns being outranged by the ships, on the east of 
guarding against mine fields and drifting mines, and on the chance 
of creating panic in Constantinople by the threat of forcing the 
Straits . 



Military Geography and Defenoes of the Dardanelles* 

The Dardanelles is over 31 miles in length from the Sea 
of karmora to the Aegean. At the mouth at the Straits are over 4,000 
yards across, from which they open out until near the Morrows. The 
Narrows are 13-jj> miles from the mouth, about 3 miles in length* and at 
Chanak less than 2,000 yards from the European to Asiatic shore* while 
at Nagara the distance apart of the two shores is slightly more. The 
two most critical points for a fleet in the Straits are the passage at 
Chanak, and opposite Nagara Point. More than 20 miles beyond Naraga 
Point the Straits broaden out into the Sea of Marmora. 

North of the Straits on the European side is the Gallipoli 
Peninsula closed by the isthmus of Bulair. This isthmus is only about 
3 miles wide at its narrowest point, and across this narrow neck have 
been constructed permanent works to defend the peninsula from an attack 
by land* On the peninsula are a confused mass of heights, the higher 
summits of which are in a range along a part of the northern coast, the 
peaks here rising to an elevation of over 1,000- ft., the highest being 
over 1,200- ft. On the rest of the peninsula is a confused mass of hills 
whose summits are from 400 to 1,000-ft. 

-16- 



dX.jeai add bits ,6anxia baa adiol danXB*j.B aqxda lo ixbIIb a& oniaosd dl 

igxXiea badlada sbw ioBddB od qxde add od awoidaaaib Y^^^wtert eaw 

^TBdxXxui arid boa ,avodB bads da anoxdibHoo od ^nxwo f badaqxoxdita rtBrid 

©rtBdisbm; oT .adBqxuxdiBq od \HbBai don otevr eeoiol ^iBMoxdibaqx© 

add" 10 y^"©^^'^®" 1 ®# floqw iiowifi ood dcuioa o* &pv ixallB ob rioua 

©rid baa 4 enoxdB;>xli;diol arid lo i«*dOBiBrio a8sio»bnoyos arid no ,a^»i«T 

lo d'BBa ariJ no «aqxris arid yd baynaid/wo anxad ani*$ ixarid lo d"oalla 

aoasdo ©rid no boa ,aaaxia ^nxdlxib bits abXaxl ©{sXtf deaxasB gnxbifltfa 

add - ^nxoiol 'to J-Bairid - ©rid yd ©XqonidnadanoJ nx oxa&q ^nxdaeio lo 

. adxai d3 



.aeXXanjabiBG add' lo asonalaG bnB ^dqx**%o©S YisdxXxiil 

a© a arid" moil rid^naX nx eoIJya IS iavo ax aaXXanBb'JBCl sriT 

000,^ i©vo his adiaidcs arid k® ridwoia &di $t>. .aaeaeii arid' od swodjub^ lo 

erfT .BWSKHJil add - Tusexs Xx^£tu duo ffsqo yad^ rfoxrfw raoil «a«oioa ebia\> 

da bras «d^£iaX ni Batten £ dwoda jridiiooj add" moil saXxm |-£X ©IB ©woiiaW 

aXxdw •aiada oxdaxeA od nBaqoiife. arid - woil abia^ 000 t S nsrid eeaX jtsnariQ 

adT »aiaa vXd'riaiXa ai aaioria owd ©rid lo dxsqs suiisdeib add" aiagaU da 

dB agaaafiq add aia adXaidci ©rid nx daaXl a ioi adnxoq Xaoxdxio dsoia owd 

agaiaPI bno¥©d aaXXa OS nadd 1 oioai ♦ dnxQ t l aiagBti ©dieoqqo baa ,3LBnariO 

•jsiooruswi lo aeu ©dd odnx dw© nabaoid edxaid8 arid d-nxoH 

xXoq.fcXXaij ©rid ax sbxa naaqoiulii ©rid no edxaitfo add lo ridioti 

d«ods ylao 2i awaidd-aX aid? .ixaXuU lo auuddex arid ^d bosoXo aXuanxnol 

©vsd ioan woman exdd aaoio«> bna ,dnioq daa^oiisn e^x de abxw 8aXxin £ 

■ 

ioBddfi na iaoil aXuenxittiq add bnelab od - a^iow dnanaaiiaq bao-oindenoo naad 

ledgXri add tBdri^xad lo aaafa baawlnoo js aia BXuanxnaq odd HO «bn©X yd 

add «dasoo niad^ion add lo diiuq & ^xsoxa q^obi b nx eie doxriw lo edxcoauja 

gnxad d"B8ri^iXd odd ,.dl-OOO t X iavo lo aox^BvaXa m; od £iuexi aiad a^saq 

sXXxd lo aaBui boaulnoo b ox BXiisxunaq ©rid lo daai &d^ nO »dl-OOS»X lavo 

.dl-OOO t X od 00^ moil aia adiraoiwa asodw 

-dX- 



The position of the forts at the Narrows with respect to 
the northern coast line of the Gallipoli peninsula renders indirect 
fire over the peninsula practicable. The shortest range from the 
open sea to the main forts of Kilidbahr is about 11,000-yards, and to 
the Asiatic shore beyond 14,000 yards. It is therefore possible 
for the latest and most powerful battleships to attack both shores by 
indirect fire. The reduction of forts upon the Narrows from the 
open sea depending on heavy guns operating with accuracy at over 11,000 
yards, observation from the air above target to correct fire, and 
communications from aeroplanes to ships to regulate fire. These 
conditions did not exist when the Dardanelles forts were designed, and 
consequently there is only one small permanent work on north shore of 
peninsula. 

Between the Narrows and open sea to the north west - that 
is in line with the shortest range - there is a flat topped hill, 
the Pasha Dagh, about 650 feet high, and sloping down rather steeply 
to the Narrows, and gently towards the open sea, in such a way that 
ships lying in the open sea can hit some of the works on northern shore 
at Narrows, end with greater accuracy those on Asiatic side* 

^he permanent works at the Narrows are the strongest in the 
Dardanelles. The most powerful group is upon the slope of the Pasha 
Dagh, and here within the limits of a little over a mile are 12 permanent 
works. 

Upon the Asiatic shore opposite, are 4 principal works near 
the town of Chanak. 

There are also in the Narrows besides the above 7 works on 
the Asiatic and 5 works on the European side. These latter, however, 
would seem to be less difficult to force than those defending the 
Narrows at Chanak. 

The shores are steep everywhere in the Dardanelles, and there 
is a great depth of water, except in bight below Chanak, where the 5 
fathom line comes well out from the shore. The current runs from Black 
to Aegean Sea, and at places has a speed of from 4 to 5 knots. 



-17- 



oJ" JDeqasi ritxw 8 wot \dt ft* at-iol a At "to xioxtxeoq ©a"? 

.•a©! BXuaaxnaq iIoqjr.IXaii . io anil $qbqo meii^ion ©dt 

ai '.>J"ioiia •■ .old^xjOB'iq x-iXwaaxaeq ©fit ievo e*u't 

od- baa ,«ta*xav i -OO0tXX ^uodji ©x iris £24 Vo i atit q$ .tin a naqo 

©Xaxaaaq eitxe'iadt ax tl •ainav, QOO*£X baa^ed ©torts aitaxeA a/it 

yd e©-io id ioatta ox aqxriaaXUad Xtrtiawoq taou boa si ©rit *xoJ 

Qd$ moil awcnBi ©rit aoqd «sd"£Oi lis itoxtoubsr-: aJT .atxl tosixbax 

OCX), XI isvo ta Yoatuaaa f^-t* &D Jfcdywaqo &ajjg yv^esii ao ^nxbaaqab aas aoqo 

boo ,«*ix1: taaTto© at $Q£"xa>? ev^da %fca ©a> motl acxtavisado t ainay 

eeeriT •aii^ ©«> - aqXda ot a^aaXqo-taa a*o**'l anoxJaaxfl i n 

:• tbaayxasb ©tew ad-iox asIXof: ©rit nerlw draxxe toa hih 6«Qid\£bnoo 

lo Q*ioria rfdroa no iiow taaaarimq Xiiaas ©o:o 'vino ex ©*x©dV T£l*a©upeaaoo 

•alaanxaaq 
terit - »ta©w ilj'ioa ©rtd" oj aes aeqo bow aweniaH aiit aaay/tad 

cXXxii beqqot &#S.\ a ax eiedtt' - ©sob"! s-aatoorie @ii^ dti'© ©nil ax ax 

^Iqasts isdifai awob gaxqola boa t^id &m*l 038 taodfj ,j%bG firfeal erft 

$»*&■ vaw b riawa ax t ea8 msqa ©rfi abiawot ^X4"n©^ bxts 4 ewoi*sflV{ srft.oi" 

©icrfe madtooa no 8i*iaw ©xfj soe txd a.so ase aaqo ariJh ax ^axyX eqxde 

arit ax tsD ate vhky \>iU da bjHcm taaaacaiaq &d* 

b&hz to &q<oL® ©at aoqw ax qtiOlg Xuliiawaci j-aoai ©if? .asIIaaabiaG 

Jaoaaiineq Si ©**» ©Xxfii a lev© el»r^x.t J3 to a^xsixX sad- axil^xw ©iari baa »HgJsa 

,eM*iow 
TBefi ai*sow Xjaqxaaitq ^ ©*ijj ,aJ-xaoqqo ©toiie oxftaxaA arid" OoqU 

• iaafidO lo aw* ©ai" 
ao eiiow V evoua &tU aabXaod awonwli ©Hi; ax oaXa ©lis ©i©iiT 
t*s©v©wod k *x9&rj3X ae©/ bxa fteeqonae ao a^iiew c! baa ox^aiaA ©rit 

aitf aaxbxieisb «. i ■:• aari* ©oiol ©4- ^Xuaxllxb ao©X oti j^ uieoa bXao* 

.^xtaariO ia awotxsli 
aiodi - baa , aaXXaxiabnail &di ax ©tarfw^iava qao'ta ©*ta aaioiia ©riT 

a ©aj" ©tsiiw tjUiox- o frigid i ax© ,19 taw 10 i^tqeb tao'r.^ a ax 

ioaXa moi'i aayi ta©t*iau ©dT .eioila ©fit iijoit tuo XX©« a©»ao» ©axX asoritat 

, J-oajl 2 oj- *» aoil lo be©qe « aad aaoaXq ta baa «a©2 aaa^©A ot 



-VX- 



The attack upon the Dardanelles is chiefly a Naval operation, 
with a naval object, but which depends on the joint operations of strong 
land forces for its success. If the Isthmus of Bulair is captured 
and held by a power commanding the sea, the reduction of the forts, with 
modern siege train, and high ecplosives, would be only a question of time. 

This isthmus is occupied by one big hill with three summits 
between 400 and 500- ft. high, the 200 foot contour reaching close to 
the sea, upon each side* The highest euuanit near the centre of the 
isthmus has a permanent work, and there are entrenched lines following 
the ridge and reaching across the narrowest part. This line can be 
turned by a power in command of the sea. A range of 6,000 yards will 
carry clear over the isthmus, and there is deep water clear up to 
the north-western shore. 

The whole of the Gallipoli peninsula may be regarded as a 
large fortress, and in March was said to have a garrison of 60,000 Turks. 
Besides the permanent works shown on the map, the terrain offers 
opportunities to place heavy howitzers in concealed positions, and 
lighter guns and howitzers which could be moved from point to point* 

The terrain on the Asiatic side is flatter near the entrance 
to the Dardanelles, where are the plains of Troy, and the river Meander, 
flowing in northerly direction and emptying near Kum Kale. Further up 
the shore is lined with a mass of high hills, the highest near Chanak, 
where a peak rises to over 1,500- ft. 

From Bulair at end of Dardanelles to Constantinople across 
the length of the Sea of Marmora is a little over 100 miles; and 
Constantinople is practically undefended from this riea. It is, however, 
defended from a land attack by the famous Tchataldja lines extending 
from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora, about 25 miles in length and 
the same distance from the city; and there is an inner line of defences 
from sea to sea a few miles from the city. 

The Bosphorus extends for about 15 miles from the Black Sea 
to the Sea of wlarmora. It has many windings, is very narrow, and 



-18- 



■•. ■ ;. odd- floqu alojs&te edT 

■jo d-nxot add- wo aboaqab rioxd* Jwd ,d"oe{,dQ Xjjvbh jb dd"iw 

be-. awiui , aeoooua ad\c a©o*ioi bruaX 

djxw ,e.' . j 1< sftiboaouoo tewoq b yd bXsd bna 

• wait to ftoitaaiip a \ano ad oXuow »eovxeoXqj© rfgxd bn/? « rajand - ©gaxa rriaborc 

ere ©eida ltd §Jtd ©a© ^usoo ai ejjairi^ui exdT 

od" 980j tdoaai 'mod-noo d*e idi 1 *.f» ? ;.;jiii . boa O0£ neew^ed 

©rid- lo e*id-n©o ©rid iaan d-xrouaja Jeerigxri od!T .obix aoqu t «©8 ©rij 

cwoXXol s©niX bedvuni&fm ©ita ©fiadd - btm t a*sow &i©£cais"xeq e/sri eiaarid"ex 

90 fiwo ©n£X airiV *r - arid* aaorjaa n&tdaain boa egbxi odd - 

XXxw ebi \ aai A .jsea add" 10 bnawiuco ex tewoq & \d bexnjjd - 

04" qy ibsXo "w<$&v« qaeb ex ©torid' bos t &m adit iovo ii;eXo yii^o 

♦elude iVied-aaw-rid-xon ©ad' 
a qb be J j xXoqxXXaU arid" "to eXoriw ©ri? 

•etfiuT 000,06 lo Koexvisg £ ©varf off bias eaw HoibM nx baa teas^d-no': ©;§*x.£X 
arsalx© «j :; ©ritf no rtworia B2t*xow dYsanscraaq ©rid" eaS 

•;..:«.; «■-.■. 1 tf&Iq 0. aexd'iajjtooqi 

*d > rioxri\ seined bos snug le^rigiX 

eojtand-fte ©rid" laaa :•. 3 -"all ax eftia ajt&sxai ed* no axjmei © 
, I tnabia . od 

qj* "*arid"xu r i .©Xjeii uii5.-i *£B8fl jglix^ifrpe ^' m ' nai&WXib Y^"** n * snxwcxl 

, idG tb©« Jar* rigid add* t aXXxri r io ts^jdi:! a ri&cw b©nxX ex eioria Brid" 

*d"1t~00<2 t X *i©vo od" aeaxi ii$aq # ©'•reriw 

brca ya OOX "jayo ©Xd'd-iX a ex aiooiaM 'io a© a ©rid la dd^neX arid 

«ax £X .B©a aidfr ajoTi bebftatebflu Difoaiq ex ©Xqcnxd-oad-axioO 

gi -x© earixi a^'iJscrBjbT 1 add" yc tftMUttfcs bwx>X a moil i. tab 

neX nx aeXXiu cJ& tisode <m*mbibSA 'to a©c.i 9dd- ©4" aeS 9{aaX8 arid" ciotl 

eeo/ieiob to bus,. ;jx na ax eiarid btm ; 5 id"xo a/lv* eio*tl eoned-axb ©fl'sfie i 

mXt±9 ©rid - w©*rt aeXlai w©^ a ij©e cd" see taotl 
tot obned'xa aytorii axfiP 

bfifj ,wotxb£i ^*tov ax »ag«xbjRxw yfteai a^ri d-I •aiaanaM lo aaS ©rid - od" 






reaches between high hills on each side. It is defended by numerous 
forts and batteries on each side of the Straits. These forts are not 
supposed to be so strong as those at the Dardanelles , but to force the 
passage might be even more difficult* 

As Russia has command of the Black Sea, she is in a position 
to land a large invading force near Constantinople! either on European 
or Asiatic side. The work of Russian fleet should, therefore, be con- 
fined to covering the landing, and maintaining oversea communications* 
Only a long range bombardment of forts would probably be attempted, Frftm 
Cape Rumili to Constantinople, is only about 15 miles, but the Straits 
are very narrow - at points not over half a mile wide. The whole passage 
is difficult, and there are heights on each side from which a plunging 
fire can be delivered, which would given an immense advantage to guns on 
shore, and little opportunity for outranging an account of turns, and 
over a part of course ships would have to steam in column. 

Malta and Bizerta the bases for British and French fleets are 
distant about 800 miles from the Dardanelles. Tenedos and Imbros 
islands that belong to Turkey and suitable for advance bases are about 
12 and 30 miles respectively. Lemnos, a Greek island is about 30 miles 
distant, and Liytilene and other Greek islands at short distances, Alex- 
andria, a base for military forces operating against the Straits is 700 
miles distant. Smyrna, the second city of the Turkish Empireis a 
good naval base, defended by forts, and connected with Constantinople, 
about 250 miles distant, by railroad. 

The theatre of the Dardanelles and Constantinople had during 
the few years before the present war, figured in military operations* 
In the war with Italy in 1912, when the war had dragged on for a long 
time, and Italy had been unable to bring a decision by operations in 
Africa, she sought to bring the war nearer home to Turkey, and seized 
some of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor, At that time, it 
was rumored that Italy intended to attack the Dardanelles. The attack, 
however, went no further than a bombardment of forts at Kum Kale by 
the Italian Fleet, whereupon Turkey closed the Straits for a month to 

-19- 



d©*ixj6bb Xidmi mailer xxeqo Jon bib bfl . qxile jo aonaxnavnoani itaa&2 exid* 

.fcewicie'i s?»d yon b£j}©v tf&JwMB 3Brfd" 
eeiwv. baa xiaistiuT ,EXtfi. ctx ts¥s oeaUBg ■ aXituU 

JuorUxv aex;xX -txBXxjti bos BiibXBxto? arid - no *srid"noaj 'io\ *tarfto doa© badrne-x^oo 
b t*x.uw exid- 1o bno a/id ebiawod bfta (estfifivbB ©d" ©Xwb %cubu 3bxe texidxe 
aauioi xiwxob^XjjH sUustf&s <tf fries &bw aq*ioO ^gar^A awi to atrial W.t!X5i*iJjT 
no BjhtuT baoiainXsi epno? ex rid* 1o J"io c I •BanxX *xj:bXw£ snxdnorrtrio© 
xid-xw befrielab bbw atari* anBiiBsXwa x»o j&Afrhs frarcf ,£XiJ8nxneq /XoqiXXBi) 
br 3 ni sd'nxoq bjjoI'xbv *b brmi cd" gnxJqwad/d'B d"*xaq tefid-o ana jbboX \vmbA 
• befrsXxfixurus d'eosXa bbw ( £eaX'i rfaxJiiuT arid- Y° f bad-xoqqwami Noa ,B-iocriBii lo 
sqBiiT CO, xtwobb arte a© one tab eifoioriqaoS baa aoXXariEbtjsG exfT 

• berfoBd-dB 



-3 /» T ? A T S H n 



'iWC-X'li'^ll.. Mt;. .«»4*£>«iW*w> «tMM 



twaXlal arfT .ritei *da^ ao nagad BeXXenabiBG ail* no aoBttdB ©ft? 

•**Tefrseiae''£i94 , e v&Xb jho*x1 nested - el anoxd'B'xeq© lo dwxoooB 



>. 



alt tad bm i BeXd'd'Bd" i© toaX'H fteJt&faa b t VX •da'? t *"-e 6 fri" 

rfonai' . yti bafeiB ana t aBXXx£oIl \jd* baxnac^iOooB t e*re2xuto 

eXixvjfeBS Xfliiiubix eoXV %o bnasittoo ©rid *s©bnij eioxiw arid" »no*xbBupe 

arid - ^to eoiu ■ . dB e^to'i arid" noqu sloBd'dB bb na&od «ft©biB0 »K 

»eeXX©nBb*ia(I 

xi#xw bebiBOfsod a'sav aXxCI amiX brta eeXXali eqaU Jb ejnol ariT" 
Boqu beouboiq aaw tfaezte aXdaiebxenoO »©il* egnat &noX frdB*sedXX»b 
ireqo ^nxad iwd t d*X*xi vl,tne.upe*sl e*xew EiaHd'O owT .aj^xol ©xid* lo owd* 
aJ"xol erPT •p%msb add" a^BWi^Be llxb bbw *i % ab*towrl^B© 

ill od* ^Xqe*s c.t aXdfi d'on ©lew ba^BBi^ixo §nxed 

o^- i -?o bbw a a i-o^ qxrfaeid'd'Bd erU 'xo noxtnoq b .xa.q fi^.S *A M 

♦ JxtaxaBKJTB ¥*xBbxtooa8 xid'xw a|ixxB,n laaoXo b && a^Hol aa^ baa aaoXa 

©lav bits «9*xx r i »©xiaqo atunB*x^'xi© ©xli lo sable d.to(S no bjHoi ©xiT 

tqutuiiT ,eXXXaajrioQ idonaa^naV y^ ee^fts'x e-dB-taboia ^b be^B^ne 

fi< bxiB ©XdixeXlfil vd ba^toqqBe t «havua8 texdousv «n©-[iii.'G 

^X^n8iBqqB o'i©w obis flaaqonn;: ao e^xoi exiT •©^bb'x ynoX ^b 

axid- xtaxiw Qisxtx't XXxdre bbw ebxa ox^bxbA axU no $io\ aoO .LsoneXxs 

1© qxrie oH .dri^xl ^nxbal ot ^«xwo i>ebnaq8ue cbw coxd'fi'xaqo aaii 

axveXXal ©di - bamuaat saw boJ-J-ob aifT .4"xri bbw iaeXi baxXX/. sxit 

"«begB6ifib 'i©j:{^i.!l ^rtxao &;Hgj arid .^xiXinor.* 






On Feb. 25, the forts at entrance to the Dardanelles were 
again bombarded and reduced by the combined Anglo -French squadrons. 
The forts at the entrance were shattered by fire of Allied Fleet, 
including the new British draadnought "Queen Elizabeth" which had 
joined attacking fleet. Demolition parties were landed under protec- 
tion of Marine Brigade Royal Naval Division, and completed the des- 
truction of the forts. 

On the 26th, the Dardanelles bombardment continued. The 
Straits were swept for 4 miles from entrance. British warships 
proceeded to limit of swept area, and bombarded Dardanus and other forts. 

On March 1, the battleships went in the straits bombarding 
forts at G. Kephez, and opposite on European shore. 

On March 4, sweeping and bombarding operations were continued, 
demolition parties landed to continue clearance of ground at entrance of 
Straits. The Sapphire silenced a battery of field guns in Gulf of 
Adramyti, and defences at Bisika were shelled by Prince George. 

March 5, Dardanelles operations opened by indirect fire from 

Queen Elizabeth which fired 29 rounds upon defences at Narrows. This 

attack was supported by Inflexible and Prince George. Magazine in Fort 

L was blown up, and two other forts damaged. 

March 6, "the Queen Elizabeth supported by Agamemnon and Ocean 
began to attack forts U and V by indirect fire across Gallipoli 
peninsula at 21,000 yards. These forts were armed as follows: — 



"\T 2 - 14- in. guns. 
7 - 9.4-in. " 



"V" 2 - 14-in. guns. 

1 - 9.4-in. " 

1 - 8.2-in. " 

4 - 5.9-in/ " 



"Queen Elizabeth was replied to by howitzers and field guns, 
and 3 shells from field guns struck her without doing any damage. 

"Meanwhile, inside the Straits. Vengeance, Albion, Majestic, 
Prince George, and the French battleship Suffren, fired on forts 
F. and E. and were fired on by a number of concealed guns. Fort 
J. which had been attacked on previous day opened fire, and was 
engaged and hit by 12" shells. The uiajority of the ships inside 
were struck by shells, but there was no serious damage and no 
casualties. 

"On March 7, the weather continuing calm and fine, the four 
French battleships entered the Straits to cover the direct bom- 
bardment of the defences of the Narrows by the Agamemnon and Lord 
Nelson. The French ships engaged Dardanus battery and various 



-21- 



anew aeXXermbnaG &dt ci* eafianto© to aitnoi arid - ,2S «do r i ttO 

.amnb rfa«an%-oXsflA bexiXtiaoo ©dd" \;d baouben b&A bebnadfijod axagJ 



. 



la lo anxS yd betedtoda anew ©;*fiB*:to© odd 1 to adnol eriT 



bari rtaxriw "dtodftsxXSL neeu^* 1 ddjjjjofibaanb dexdl'n£i van sxi^ ^nxbuXofli 

-oetonq nabnu b^bnei" stew aextaaq noxdiXoiaaCi .toaX^ gftisiyai'to befixofc 

-eeb add beieXqiaoo bos ,fioXaivx<3 lev*H Xflyofi a&a$xnS efiinaH lo twit 

»e£ncTi add *io ficXd-ywnd" 
ariT «.be»jfixtooo toecslrcBdiaod eaXIarusbnaCI exit «d.£6$? add isO 

eqxrl^naw rial dinS •©aixendne niont eoXlso £ nol d-qswa ©'sew edvLandfi 
e^nol narido bt%& ajjirebnad bsbnscsfsod biia «boib ^qswii 1© dXmXX ©d" bebeaoonq 
■gttfbitidauQ adxjsnto @dd° aX toew aqxdaeXd'tod add' ,X cfonsM fiO 

♦enoda w*eqontiS: no ad'x&oqqo boa ,s©riqa}{ .0 to ed-nol 

«beuni:dfioy ©new enoxtonaqo sfiibnadisod b«s gniq^ewa «£ doneM nO 

'to aofiiintoa to baaat^ to ©ortansaX© ewnxtooo o# babnaX eaxd"naq fioXdxXoiueb 

i© IXjjO fix snog bXext lo \'n©dtod a fcasoaXxs anxdqq&S ad? ..sd'XBnd-S 

•a^noeu oanin c i yd baXXarfe anew bhi&IS. to Baons^ab boa t £$\tn£tbA 

taoil enxt toanlbisi ^d befiaq© ©.noxtoneqo eeXXeitsbnaG «c. donaM 

aid!' • awonistf to aaonalsb fioqw abm/on SS feenil riaxdw rid-adjssxXa. naawy 

dno T i ai ofixajs. ♦ a^noei 1 ©onxnl b«e •IdXxftXlaX v° &©«H©qqii58 exiw jfojsdto 

.begBiasb fe«tolt naiid"© ©wd" bas ,qu e bbw *i 



naaoO baa aonsiaffi&six ^d bad'naqqua dtodasXXS neawp ©rid- w »d dona& 

iXoqiXXuO aaonuA ©nil i'yanxbni ^d V baa U e^nol atoed'to o^- naged 
-•:efro££ol as beuruB a-saw a dree) aa« ..eatsy 000, IS to aXvefiXaeq 



»»Y*» 



• anus .nx-M • S U" 



• atiu^i •nx»*X - o. 

M cfiX-4*^ » X 

H .ox-S.6 * i 

M \ax-9.8 - * 

»«ffi*4 bXax'l bna anas^iwetl f<< ©4r bexXqan a»w ri^eiiJ5$iil i ; neaup" 
+'3^mmh \tw ^nxob toori^lw nad iotrato a««a biaxl tnon^ eXXarfe € fcnje 

c oxtoe(;BM «£toXdXA t aotUBasn ♦acrxantfcl ©Hi* abiani ,eXxiiwn£©u" 
e^nol no baii'i , cdeaXd^tod ftoaenl eritf bnjj tea'ioe 1 ^ aonis^i 

^no^ .efiUg beX^aonoo *io nsdciwn b vd no banil ©new boe .a bxiB 

bbw bm? f anxl baneqo \;i8fi auolvanq no bsMojsi'to naad Kad rijiiriv *t 
©biafix aqxrie ad* to v.fxnot^.. ariT .aXIeiie "SX v^ W*l bwe ba^£c: 
on bfic egBasb auoxnaa on afiw an^d^ tod «sXXade \d jiown^e anew 

♦ e©xd*Xxiiie£o 

niiol add" tOfixl bne nXeo guiiifixtooa nedtoaw add* t V danaid «0 H 
•iiod toanib arid - novoa o;s* ed-xBnJ-ci adi* banato© eqxdaaXd'tod lianen^ 
bnoj bne fioiifciaau3§ii. arid 1 y° awonnjoH and - la aeafialab ad* lo toe^nsa 
euuXntiV brus xnod'tod BuimbttaQ fee n aqxifa dys en^ »j ,xi4>BXai' 



-XS- 



concealed guns, silencing the former. Agauemnon and Lord Nelson 
than advanced and engaged the forts at the Narrows at 14,000 to 
12,000 yards by direct fire* Forts J. and ¥7. replied. Both were 
silenced after heavy bombardment* Explosions occurred in both 
forts. Uaulois, Agamemnon, and Lord Nelson were struck three 
times each, but not seriously damaged. While these operations 
were in progress, the Dublin continued to watch the Bulair Isthmus. 
She was fired at by 4" guns, and struck 3 or 4 times* 

"Owing to the importance of locating the concealed 
guns, seaplanes had to fly very low on occasions, and suffered 
some damage and casualties. The Ark Royal is equipped with 
every appliance neoessary for the repair and maintenance of the 
numerous air craft she carries. H 

On March 8th, the Queen Elizabeth supported by four 
battleships entered the Straits and bombarded forts at the Harrows. 

On March 19th, the Admiralty issued the following 

statement; — 

"Mine sweeping having been in progress the last 10 days 
inside the Straits, a general attack was delivered by the British 
and French Fleets yesterday morning upon the forts at the Narrow^ 
of the Dardanelles. 

"At 10.45 a. me yueen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamemnon, 
and Lord Nelson bombarded forts, J. L. T. U. and V; while Triumph 
and Prince George fired at batteries E. F. and H* A heavy fire 
was opened on the ships from howitzers and field guns. At 12*22 
the French squadron consisting of the Charlemagne, Suffren, Gaubois, 
and Bouvet advanced tip the Dardanelles to engage the forts at 
closer range. Forts V, U, F. and E* replied strongly. Their 
fire was silenced by the 10 battleships inside the Straits, all 
the ships being hit several timea during this part of the action* 

"By 1.25 poiu e ell forts had ceased firing, Vengeance, 
Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure, and Majestic then advanced 
to relieve the 6 old battleships inside the Straits. As the French 
squadron which had engaged the forts in the most brilliant manner 
was passing out, Bouvet was blown up by a drifting mine, and sank 
in 36 fathoms north of Erinkior village, in less than 3 minutes. 

"At 2*36 p.m. the relief battleships resumed the attack 
on the forts who again opened fire. The attack on the forts was 
maintained while the operations of the mine sweepers continued. 
At 4.9 the Irresistible quitted the line, listing heavily, and at 
5*50 she sank having probably struck a drifting mine. At 6.5 
Ocean, also having struck a mine, sank in deep water; practically 
the whole of the crews of both vessels having been removed under 
a hot fire* 

"The Gautufcis was damaged by gunfire. Inflexible had her 
forward control position hit by a heavy shell, and requires repair. 

"The bombardment of the forts, and the mine sweeping 
operations terminated when darkness fell. The damage to the forts 
effected by a prolonged direct fire of the very powerful forces 
cannot yet be estimated, and a further report will follow. 



-22- 



tiotieli bntod bxia noxxx.isx.it xo't ©fU &r<xon©XxB , cuuxi baXaaonoo 

>X tB avoitait ad J J-^s sjnux arid" bega&aa i : >xta b(rs*j.nBvb£ xtaxid" 

ataw .boxlqai .W boa »t ad-to**! »e*£Xi tooixb yd eb*iB\- 000 t £X 

xidud fix ooo anoxaoXqxa • tfnsuibiBCliBOCl yvaad *iad1U beonaXxe 

eeidd- aoxj-idt. xxoeietf biod bxia ^xioraMuifi^ ,eioXu .sd^ol 

ancxj-a^qo aaadd «!.■. *be; ieuux-xae d-on d/jjd ,fioae. e&aiij* 

• 8i.uuiid'8l 'xxaXufi add rfadaw od" beunxdxioc nxXdaG axiJ' (fleai^o'tq fix anew 

, axuxd" »> io t atomic boa «axix% "# vo j-ji h&iil qbw exiS 

tlaeonoo i jmitoqfSLt &ti& od' g«iwO M 

ba-ia'liau bxia ,enoxoi;uoo no woj lav yXl ©d" hxsii aanaXqaea *«mj& 
ridxw boqqxup© ax XayoH itix b «c9xd\XajJBB0 brts <%axu«b ©xitoa 

ed& lo oonwt© dnxaxa baa txaqe'i o.ii 'io't y'laeaeweii eonaiXqqa \;*i©va 

**.fe«J:Tiao ©lie dlano tl& euorxaxaxjn 

•xiJOi yd b©d*xoqqwa ridadasxISi" H©&J$ ©xijr f rfdl8 do IBM nO 

woiobJI ©xli" d-a adrio" - beta aifrxaid'S add" ba^.d/na eqxdaaXifdBd 

■jXXoI add" ( dd$X; xbiak xxO 

— ; d'naxtiad'Bd'a 

ayab OX [ fix n9&d ^nxvxixi J" 

>tavxXeb a»w iloBd'd'a Xaiafxea a iadxxrxd'3 add - ©bxanx 
fctwoTt tld" da Bd-iol ©dd" noqw gxixfli' >\;' ad©«X'- : L don©/*i1 bxtfi 

. aaXXanabiaa ©dd - lo 

«©Xdxx®XzjxI «dd"ad'asxXI:i «eei*J , , ; ,a di^.OX dA" 
awxiif aXxdw •¥ bna *tl . Y ,J .L •.fitihtjri bab*$adxaod ao.eXaM btod. I 
aix'i yva ■ *"' : • 3 sexis-frited da ba*si3 ^yiixt 4 * bxxe 

;*SX jii Van , "j,i.i bxsa BTssdvewori moil aqida arfy no baxxsqo aaw 

ieXTEBiK) ©dd to aaxd^xaxiob no'xbaupa dun©*t r i ©xit 

od* aaXXoriJcs :d& qa bdoiiavbe d'avjioti bna 

•n'3 jjaXXqei »l bxta ,t »U ,V bHo^ . ioai isaoXo 

Xia , - . ... 5 laald'd'jsd OX ©dd - ^d bsonaXxo eaif ©ixi 

•noxdrojs add" to d i *UB (d- gxxiixj isvaa d"xd ^nxad eqide ertf 

, ,,.;.-.:. uaV »^ax'tx^ bs6£©o bad 3 4 t*xot XXe *xa*q 2S.X y^" 

byonavba naxid" oxd'aa^i '^ r - m ia*xwad"xxwS ,ix««oO ^«didl*k tSitixd^axaaTxI 

daudil ©d# aA ♦ad'XBid-:/ add" abxanx aqxdaaXd'd'Bd bXo d ©dt sybxXot od* 

i©nxxa/a dr^aiXXxi ni; ad"io'i edt b< t biid >li>s:tiw noibaupa 

ifiu ^©xixxo gxsxd'zjbril) b ^d qw xwoXd aaw teywofl ,. : .:.r.?. gnxaaaq aaw 

• aad'i/nxia £ oadd" aeaX nx ,asBi,IX,v totiak*^, io xid^ton Baoxidja'i 5 c nx 

^OBd"^*? add 1 be .i eqxdeeXd-d-Bd zaxXa*i axid" .xn.q S£ # S d"A M 

saw ad'TOl add" no jiaad'tte e-xil' .©tx* banaqo hxb^b odw e; v 'iOi ©rid" no 

,baxjf«xd"aoa a . iwa axixu add io exxoxd'aiaqo exld" ©Xxd% baxixadrixaxa 

da btta ,YXxvB©d gnxd'aiX 4 ©xix£ arid" bad'dxwp ©Xdid-axaaiil add" i?.^ d*A 

did 3"A «anxi>: a«td-ixib J3 ilamd'a ^Xosdoiq gxtxvad Afisa ©da 06 »2 

YXXaox.toBnq ;iadaw qaab nx rtnaa , ■ ■ a jiouida ^axvari oaXa «na©oO 

ibc« bavoxaai n©ad gxixyari eXoaaav diod xo a\?aio aild 'to aXodw odd* 

•exii d'od a 

nad bad ©XdxxoXini ►eTtiii«i£ \d b ax^dxiav adT" 

.ixaqai eaixx.'- wa ,XX©da Y v ^»-i & Yd J-xd noid"xaoq Xoid-noo EnawiQl 

Etxqeawe ©nxw add" bxxa t ad"xo2 add \u \ ibrtadxaod ©dT" 
ed-iu'i <i&i- od- ©^aaiab wdV .XX©1 aaarx j(*xab nadw bad'an.r.njT.ad' sxioxia'saqo 
aaoio't Xxj'iiawoq y^^v 6i ^* I0 a*xx*i d■^©^x.b bo^XioXoiq a yd bivtoaix© 
.woXXol XXxw d-uoqai iadd"H/i a bna tbad-aaixd-a© ©d to\- crortaoo 



SS' 



"The losses of ships were caused by mines drifting 
with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto 
swept clear, and this danger will require special treatment. 

"The British casualties in personnel are not heavy 
considering the scale of the operations , but practically the 
whole of the crew of the Bouvet were lost with the ship, an 
internal explosion having apparently supervened on the 
explosion of the mine. 

"The Queen and Implacable, which were dispatched from 
England to replace ships casualties in anticipation of this 
operation are due to arrive immediately, thus bringing the 
British Fleet up to its original strength. 

"The operations are continuing, ample naval and 
military forces being available on the spot, 

"On the 16th inst. Vice Admiral Garden, who has been 
incapacitated by illness, was succeeded in the Chief Command by 
Reatf Admiral de Rebeck with acting rank of Vice Admiral." 

The general procedure in this naval attack on the Dardanelles 
was about as follows:— To use Malta and Bizerta as bases and Tenedos 
as an advance base for the fleets. To carry on long range bombardment 
of group of forts until the guns were apparently silenced; then to send 
in ships to closer range to complete the work of destruction with their 
lighter armaments. The distance to which these ships were sent in was 
limited to area up to which mine sweeping operations have been carried 
out. To use the Queen Elizabeth with her large 15" guns, and sometimes 
other ships for indirect fire. To use aeroplanes to correct results of 
indirect and long range fire, note damage done, and positions of newly 
mounted guns. To sweep Bulair Isthmus with fire from ships, destroy 
defences there, and make it difficult or impracticable to reinforce 
Gallipoli peninsula. To use destroyers, trawlers, etc. for sweeping 
mine areas. To land demolition parties, covered by force of Marines, and 
fire from ships, where practicable, to complete demolition of forts that 
had been silenced. 

Up to Liar, J.7, three weeks after attack on Dardanelles began, 

there were gales and a good deal of thick v/eather, so that long range 

bombardment had been practicable on only about 7 days, as at such ranges 

it would be essential for effective fire both for gun pointer to see his 

mark, and for those observing fire to detect where shells fall to correct 

range 
the range. Without such observation, long ,tf ire is of course a waste of 



-23- 



niaw aqXrfa 10 . ul ailT" 
oJ-'Twittxii eisatJi nx baio^nwooiio s' fa6t*XUt) &ti& dlrv 

ni J- i. irMjixpei Xlx bn£ i*ixmIo dxjawa 

\jvj te XannoB-iaq nx eoxtXj a'*' 

tfd - vliijuxdryjanq Jxrd «ufloxd\Btoqo ©rid' 1c >a edor jjaJknabXanoa 

tt3 ,qxtfa arid ridxw JaoX ©raw .tevwoa odd' 10 waio oiid" lo aXt 
arfd - no ©enavtaqua Y^dnainqq^ anxvarf noxaoXqxa Xjmi'x© d*nx 

*&ium ©fl*d" lo noxaoXqxa 

ii barioJaqaxb ©new riax/iw , oXduoxi Xr peX ban a ©riT w 

axxCdf '10 noxd'.aqxoxd'ns nx aox^Xxuus&o aqxrie ©oaXqa't ©d« baaXaaS 
arid - gnxgnxid Bud& t \rXaJaxbacuai: avjhfi© ot axifc: erca n©i*B*xa< 

•dd-gaeid'a tfcnigjHo edx od- qu ^©aX'i rfsxdxnS 

baa Xavsn unxJao© ana anoxcrxna, ■?'* 

.d^oqa add; no ©XdaXxava &«xad sai>*xGi Y t iai , xXxitf 

naad aarf oriw <n9©iaO Xa^xrafeA ©©XV *d"aax lif'dl an** no" 
yd bnaasooO itexriO ©lid* nx babaaosxra saw t ea©nXXx \ci bad^tx&aqxionx 
".XB'UiiibA aoxV io rfaai gnx«ft»j3 ri'dMCW iaadoH ®b La*ikmbA H&&H 

aaXXamsbtk no :itint&M Xsvbj. -t nx aiobayoiq la-tansa eriT 

aobenal bna aoasd ax; &&' bns »A£M& ©au oT — ;awoXXoi a# d**oda saw 

Jnesibattdaiod 930^*1 §ttoX no \ t9 rti50 oT .e^asXl ©lid* iai ©sad eonavbs as e-ss 

bfl©s od" nan\t ;©®»n9Xxa \ r Xd"ne*iBqqa ©«*©;*. a««S ©4d* Xxdmr ad"io'i so qyotg 10 

liaHi ri-frxw noxd'yjjid-aab "to at**©* add" rjj-aXqcioo 0* o>;n£i 'iaaoXo od" aqins nx 

saw nx daea a; ©earfid; d&JEdw ad" ©onaiaxJa . ©d*i9ffiafiita i3tdgxX 

©©i*x"iao need ©y#a* an©4;da*x« ffa snxai ffoxaw ocr qu aoia oj badxaixx 

aaax^eiaoa fans «8««3 M 2X ©giaX tad A&lw . neaxiy - j£ ^ .two 

lo ad"Xw£ai toafioa od - aansXqoiaB aa>: .©ixi ooeiibnx ic -ia laiito 

yXws« 10 enoxi*iRoq bmj ,anob e§BfiUib a^Oia t eixl e§nea gnoX bna Joaixfcnx 

YO-£d"aeb , aqxrfa sioii a*iil rf$i ,xtal iXbXuQ qiaawa o f J *amQ b9d"nwoc 

aatoinxat od* aXOBox^oxriqEU to JiuoiViih 3"i aieiat bus ,9'i9ftt' aaonalab 

gnxqaewa tol «y^a t anoXweTi- tmoyoitaab aaxr oT ..eX^enxneq xXoqxXXsx) 

biia ,aanx*iBi/i 10 ou* d batavoo ,aaxd"iisq xioxtxXomab bxtaX ol »aaa*^ anxm 

d-fifii- ai-toi iQ nox^XXpnab a^aXqiaoo 0? ,aXd/3DXJx>^'iq a?*ffa «aqxnj: ciot't a^*i 

.baonaXxe naad bad 

»ajB3©d aaXXarLsb*xBa no -Aout&si i&ftB ajlaew ©e'ld* ,VX •wad ot qO 

a§i [«oX SmU oa ,'isiUiiaw :{oxiij- r to XxjaL boo^ i> bnjs eaiss aiaw eiaiiJ 

aagiuii rfau ,u^xvb V d*wod^ y-^ 110 ;Ii) " no * neau nail tnecabTBdtaod 

ex/{ 888 od - tarf-nxoq n«g To't rfjou atii evid-oalls -toi Xx^icirnaaaa ad bXuow ^x 

d'aaiioa ot XXsl eXXaxie aiarfw d'oad-ab o# Qtlt ynivieado eeorfj 10I bne t £iB& 

lo ai-esw /i aaiuou lo ax aiX^gnoX t noiTi3v*i9£jdo rfoua d'Worfd'X^ .©^n^T arid" 






ammunition, In any case the number of shells used to destroy so many 
forts would have to be prodigious. The operations in any case could 
only have been continued by sending the ships close in, which even if 
the Straits were swept clear of mines, would greatly endanger them from 
fire of the forts. The operations being interrupted for such long periods 
the Turks had ample time not only to repair the forts and get guns 
ready to meet new bombardments, but also to plant other guns and howit- 
zers in concealed positions, 

The great advantage of the forts over the ships was that 
though they might be temporarily silenced by ship fire, their permanent 
destruction was practically impossible, unless demolition parties were 
landed; and that in the face of a strong covering mobile force would 
be a very difficult operation for the fleet which necessarily had only 
a limited number of men available. If the fleets had been accompanied 
by a military force capable of extensive operations both against the 
mobile field army and of attacking forts from land side, matter swould 
have been simplified. 

Ifi the forcing of the Dardanelles had been a naval problem 
only, and if waste of ammunition and of time were a matter of indifference 
the operations might have continued as they had begun. But a rapid 
solution was of the utmost importance, and the ammunition question was 
serious. The forcing of the Dardanelles was not, however, a purely 
Naval problem as must have been apparent from the first. Military forces 
were absolutely essential, and when the military forces were fully em- 
ployed, the function of the fleet should have been principally to cover 
the advance of the Army and protect communications. The ships guns 
supporting the artillery on shore, and maintaining fire on the enemy's 
defences up to time the assault was delivered; but obviously such an 
effective fire could not be maintained from a very long range. 

Reports of military expeditions were current soon after the 
attack was begun by the fleet. A French Army under Generu.1 d'Amonde was 
concentrated near Bizerta. The island of iiiumnoo waw used for a time 
as a base for military expeditions, and here on Larch 18, there were 
encamped a part of the French forces and an Australian contingent 

-24- 



©a of QVEii biuov ed-io"i 
,«ti • ■ iliLov tiQ&d eVBd \;Xfto 

jb tol fae^qi/tio^ni rxoivftrieqo ©rfT .8i"*iol sr(j lo etil 

UoJt frii coo ni eies 

te/iJ" .. *favo edre ■- , . •'. ■• rfii?vbij ^ei;, erlT 

io*tot b'Ijg *l«x«vo v o jijitoii to eritfst a . tnrt& bHa jbabnisX 

Lutilllib ytsiv a 
ad .eXcfeXJ ' ouiX b 

9 id" ■ ■ ' uVj.Bl' 9 £ . is . '. 

< . .: . . [\ jvja'rf 

aeXX ' arii* SI 

■ (iinT; bai initio 

bxip . -,;. s fosiixij 

( J"JJ 9 fid" 33 

Xbv-bH 
arid" ri bi ■ ■ ,.- ■ 

■ 'i.l: "i. gxiia , fa no xiBliifa 

hx.uoo e 

. •.. . 

■■■<■■■■■ 

ifft lb 



and there were about 40 transports in the harbour* The French Army was 
about the the first of April moved to Egypt, and camped near Alexandria. 
A British force under General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O. who was 
to command combined British and French forces was assembled in Egypt. And 
a Russian Army was rumoured to be assembling at Odessa. 

Why the military expeditions were so long in getting ready, 
and a landing for operations against Dardanelles was so long delayed is 
not apparent. The difficulties of preparing such large expeditionary 
forces composed of such a variety of national units, so far from the 
home countries and without suitable bases near the objective, were no 
doubt very great, and there were also political conditions which may 
have caused delay and change in original plans. 

The four outer forts were reduced by the fleet without a great 
deal of trouble, but even here the limitations of ships in an action 
against shore defences was so apparent that it is remarkable the opera- 
tions should have been so long persisted in, without the aid of land 
forces. These forts had only 10 - 10.2" and 4 - 9.2" guns, and it is 
not probable that any of them were of latest type. Yet they survived 
the first heavy bombardment, and were finally reduced after over 7 hours 
firing from 9 battleships, one the Queen Elizabeth, all the ships making 
excellent practice against a poor reply. moreover, some of the guns 
were found still mounted when demolition party was landed, and the Turks 
concealed behind the ruins of the forts and villages caused considerable 
loss to the brigade of Royal Marines covering demolition parties, until 
finally driven off by fire from the ships. 

From these preliminary operations, it was possible to estimate 
the magnitude of the task on which the Allied Fleet was engaged, und to 
arrive at the conclusion that, if the Turks made best use of defensive 
possibilities and unless their resistance suddenly collapsed, progress 
was likely to be extremely slow, difficult, and costly. The work at 
the entrance v/as only preliminary and not to oe compared with that when 
the Narrows came within zone of operations. Yet many people in Englattd, 

and 30me Iiaval authorities among them seemed to look on the forcing of 

-25- 



' &u 

, ■ 'io foiJtTi Grid" srfd JTJO'dfl 

, . ■ . . ,..-.,.,■ i b«« do* t*t&. k 

Cex-'AHS ■ ot 

ai baiw 
tew . 

ucba&I « bits 

.q io aaxd\Ufox :Hi:b aril , jnuiBqqxj d"on 

08 t 8i"i;fiU ;i . ,jJ:-u.iV B SotfS io baa oioi 

t a VXd ,.,...'.■: ... cHori 

o±&±-' ..-,■; ,J\x I oq oaXs e-- iHB t ,'. vtav ucfuob 

kiBO ©Vfirl 

it fried £&.w ,ni ba oi oe bli/od - .ri 

i a " . . B " £ btt£ '' - • ..aoioi 

, . I • < *£X 1 

an i < . r ,- i . . . jrt&i - 

. ■ . [w bedrxuoiB £Xi 

Ix. -. ' < - O.t 8«0X 

. . ,u rwvi'xfc v-i-- 1 

qo yr- 

avxe&fj'io e> its 

qalioo \ ■ ■ ■ ■ , auq 

«■■■.<«' till) ,woIb 

srfd* 

■ 






the Dardanelles as not much more than a Naval parade to be accomplished 

in a few weeks at most. 

The Admiralty seems to have grown impatient at the delay, and 

limited results caused oy long range fire, ana to have ordered ships 

in to make an attack on forts at closer range, apparently believing 

it practicable to reduce the forts guarding the Dardanelles, and get 

ships through, or at least to give mine sweepers such support as would 

enable them to successfully clear the Straits* If this was the idea 

it was reckless in the extreme, and doomed to meet with disaster, Three 

battleships were sunk in the attempt, and three others considerably 

damaged, one of wnich the Gaulois was only saved by being beached 

at Tenedos, and this without accomplishing any results commensurate 

witn the heavy loss. 

Garden 
It has been said that Admiral/was opposed to tailing this 

riSK, and resigned his command rather than to take fleet in for a close 

bombardment of iarrows defences. However, this may be he was relieved 

shortly before the attempt was made, and Admiral de Roebeck put in command 

After this disastrous action on Mar, 18, there was little news 
of Naval or Military operations there for over a month. During this 
time the fleets were repaired, and their strength increased by the 
joining of n&tt units, and the military expeditions were concentrated in 
Egypt preparatory to a renewal of attack by combined operations. The 
ship3 were protected against mines and torpedoes by fitting them with 
double nets and other means. Some mine sweeping and recosinai3sance were 
carried out, out little bombardment of the forts. During one of these 
reconnaissances a British submarine was lost, and about the middle of 
April the transport MANITQU, with British troops was attached in the 
Aegean by a Turkish torpedo boat from Smyrna, three torpedoes being fired 
without a hit, but 51 men on transport were lost owing to capsizing of 
coats on which they were attempting to abandon the ship. The Turkish 
torpedo boat was then chased oy Br it is u destroyers that had come up, and 
ran ashore and was destroyed on coast of Chios, 

The Russian Black Boa Fleet bombarded forts at the entrance to 
the Boaphorous late in March at long range* Early in April, the Turkish 

-26- 



196 1 









■ 



83' 



0*. , 81 8BW ji 






1 . 






. : 









;te 












, 



bSV; 



11 iO JIv 



bn&iiHiioo ok >i> 



eioted \i?ic 



i .. ■ 



■ 






. 






i ... 












. 



. . 






■ 



- 



■ 



. 



• 



t • 



- 












BttBii" i 






■ o J 






i , 



Fleet made a raid into Black Sea, when the Hadiidish struck a mine 
and was damaged, and the Goeben, which was reported as much reduced 
in speed, engaged in an action with Russians at long range and was 
driven back to the Bosphorous. 

Smyrna was also attacked early in Larch by Itest Indian 
squadron for purpose of demolishing fortifications, in order that it 
could not be used as a naval base by the enemy. In this attack the 
Swiftsure and Triumph joined. The forts were first bombarded at long 
range producing no response; then mine sweepers were sent in, forts 
opened on them and ships came in to closer range and engaged. One of 
the forts fired well making 8 hit 3 on the ship3, out causing no great 
damage. The bombardment did not apparently do very much damage to 
forts which were not reduced. In April flights were made over Smyrna 
by aeroplanes, bombs dropped and considerable damage reported. From 
observations of aviators at that time it was estimated that there were 
35,000 Turkish troops at Smyrna occupying trenches recently dug between 
Vosula and Smyrna, and heights which dominate the city; the two forts 
of Two Brothers anu Restrati, which had been rebuilt; and a new fort 
constructed above the farm of St. George which was said to be armed with 
30 guns brought from Constantinople. 

The Naval activities at the Dardanelles brought Lalta to 
much prominence as a Naval base. English and ivrench fleets and transports 
collected there in large numbers. Supplies, munitions, and ammunition 
were drawn from its arsenals, and to it damaged ships retired to be 
docked and repaired. The wounded found accomodation in its hospitals, 
and it served as a port of call for transports on their way to Egypt 
and the Dardanelles. 

^Tiile Admiral Jellicoe and the main British fleet blockades 
the German coast, and the main, French fleet ±a bottling up the Austrian 
fleet in the Adriatic, practically the whole of the powerful pre-Dread- 
nought fleet are free to attack Dardanelles, ana to assist British and 
French armies to land to open the Straits and attack Constantinople. 



-27- 



is t b©a«flj8b ai 

~ $& ; ,/59 ,heoqa 

nx \ r Xtso i< 
dx ■ - ; ->:o eeo -ioi en pe 

< beau I ;;oo 

iJOO r tfaix'i anaw aj"iti-:' , • •• 

,. . : ^ oh gftiouboiq 9^> 

lO . ■■■■■• Q$ Hi . . 

I G ' U , ' ■'■.-' i . < - '..:■■ 

of dgsemb •/■ - ■■ ■ '■ tsmn&qq 

. . ■%.}■?{ rfoiriw a tool 

.•;.■• aiva io vsaeco 

rfexjiiJJT 000,26 
. BlweoV 



1 






x*j 






btm t 8flolcl . . nx 9*x8d; eXXoo 

a ati noil flWBiJb a 
. . ■ • . fane bejJoob 

to taoq « -. *~j one 

.eaJCJ 
aaiw^iiolri ta* : oooi 

f* qjj I ai teeJ 

-aT:q Xjui" 
bni fciseji od" bos r e »*ta ta 

i 






A purely Naval attack had, however, been unable to drive the 
Turks from the Gallipoli Peninsula. There is plenty of cover among 
the hills and besides fire from forts, and danger from nines, hov?itzers, 
and guns could be mounted to shell ships from concealed positions. Even 
had the ships succeeded in reducing the forts, so long as Turkish troops 
with artillery held the peninsula, traffic through the Straits would not 
be safe. And even if mine fields were all swept there would still 
be danger from floating mines. 

For ships alone to force the Straits and appear before Con- 
stantinople was clearly impracticable, if Turks made best use of defensive 
possibilities, and this in spite of large naval force available, weight 
of primary armament, excellence of gunnery, and means of observation 
from large number of aeroplanes. Having made such preparations to force 

the Straits the Allies were obliged to carry the attempt through at any 

on 
cost, and could not afford to fail, not only/account of military importanoe 

but also from political considerations, and because the eyes of the world 
were on them. 

Why then did the fleet attempt to force the Dardanelles in 
Larch - an attempt, which made without the support of military forces, not 
only led to a considerable disaster, but gave the Turks and Germans many 
weeks to organize their defence. There are only two answers which can at 
present be offered to this question. The first is that the British 
Admiralty was guilty of a gigantic and easily avoidable blunder. The 
other is that their plan was spoilt at the last moment by the downfall 
of Venizilos the Greek Premier. An interesting article in support of this 
second reason appeared in the "Hew Statesman" of April 17, and is quoted 
below: — 

"In the last week of February a powerful squadron of Dritish 
and French ships began a ooubardment of the Dardanelles, and success- 
fully reduced the 4 small forts at the mouth. Mo secret was made 
of the importance of the operation coratemplated; the official 
communiques '/ere more than usually communicative, and the French no 
less than the English press foreshadowed an early triumph. Well 
informed people who opined that at least a month would be necessary 

-28- 



erfx • ?Uw»«l trail \Ibt 

«©Xq ex air ,x loqlll»0 eilx tootU einu 

i ■ ■ b n r --' co ' ;d bne rf aHx 

beX-Bsc - iite o£ be too amis bras 

■ t&too i i b ■ ■ -:j: iwsri 

- 1 . 3 . I ■ .■■ ■■;■ blmi \t^iiJ 

bXiiowstiad ,Xj i 1j: oeva fon .©T&8 ad 

, e i tts.m &ut i neb ad 

>au , , ■ aoxxs>.B*3qiBi ^X*X£©Xo &B"® aXq<.tf!XXitf. ! XS 

aw <aXd Ljbvj3 so i#Xqa ra axdtf bos «eaJfcdlXi;di:e8©q 

B©x&3V*j©edo 1© anB©«s him % %*i ©©xieXXaox© <£n© ./rq l© 

:ol ox eftpxite'XJ , «anj?Xqo*i:e.B Its usX &o*n 

^fti ■• iti$ &ty .■■■■■-■ '■■:■■■■ igilcfo :rx.ei;r3 arid" 

no 
BifiXitiJ taiioosB\^Xiio Jo/.* »>. >i f^iell© d m 9 baa ,£aoo 

biiow ©ri£ 1© ec ■■•-■< od bum ,i siilQq ssvt\ o&Jjs ftucf 

> . ■ IIO 5*: 

ax a:..' arfx ©diol ox xqisia.iJ'X© #©@X1 arix r©fl"ifr \ 

&i>u t a©otol Ciila to dnaqqua e ■ • absiu rt&jirfw »» i - i oibM 

arii 1 avsg J [©bienod baX \-Xiso 

(te i •..•■■■'.. «aoffel©b txeu^ - ©sinssio od adeew 

da:.' : :■£ &B*tk't ©rfT *tfpJ:£eeup qj 11© sd d-fi©a©iq 

• labfluXd aXtijabiovi: w Y^XciucflifoA 

X£s ''.."■'. •'.,;'. , xXxoqa aei b Mil 1 fssti* ax Torino 

dl 'io d"x -x ©Xox«i i*i© &&ti ru* . •xaiia&'tH ifewtD ©rf* aolxsiasY lc 

aft© ,V'X XJ 'Ui ,% ttaia80& ■ ■-■■■'" &d$ ax. b©*iueqq£ noeaei bnossa 

— ;woX©d 

ttOlb-BUpB £jxl ■ i \% \0 •■:.': V' £©J £ E" 

-eaeo-ojjs t a fjsioci £ as^ed eqlrfa 

©bau ejsw xa"xo©fci >.-. . .' * Xjs extol XXi b©*i ^XXtfl 

1 o 

Off .niX fjftS ■■■;> '• Xl^ur.li ftdrfd I ■ - i/COiuOQ 

XI . [q : v >, ',;.',:.:• ftB &e i Gttiol aae'iq daxX^iivi sax ub&$ 

■n ad bXuow rflnoei ■£ Xjs xbiIJ" 



for the forcing of the Straits were suspected of official caution. 

"One can hardly imagine that the Admiralty shared this easy 
optimism. They have before them not only the general considerations 
showing the disadvantages at which ships are placed in a contest 
with land artillery, but the special experience obtained last 
autumn in our bombardment of the Belgian coast, A belated des- 
patch from Rear Admiral Hood published only last week confirms 
what one had surmised about that amphibious operation. It was 
very successful so long as the Germans had no very heavy guns mounted 
among the sand dunes. But the ships could not prevent the guns 
from being mounted there, and eventually the guns drove the ships 
away. In sfdte of all our naval preponderance the enemy have been 
able to hold this strip of coast at our very doors, with sufficient 
security to maintain their submarine bases there, although the 
later phases of such submarine activity gave us the strongest motives 
for interfering with them. There is evidently only one way in which 
our navy could master the German positions at Knocks and Zeebrugge, 
and that is by the co-operation of an adequate land force. And if 
that is true of the Belgian coast it will be true of the Turkish. 
The natural obstacles are much greater in the latter case, while 
the artificial ones - German generalship and German gunnery are 
the same. 

"Yet bo adequate land force did in fact co-operate at the 
Dardanelles, and for that reason the ships failed as they were bound 
to do. For 3 weeks they kept up an intermittent and costly bombard- 
ment, weather permitting. Mines were swept clear, coast villages 
were destroyed, and here and there a few kutm hits were recorded on 
an almost impossible target, which a widely dispersed and well con- 
cealed land artillery presented. But nothing was done by land 
operations at bulair or elsewhere to prevent the Turks from in- 
definitely re-inforcing the Gallipoli peninsula, and more than making 
good any losses sustained there in men, guns, or ammunition. 

Finally on Liar. 13, the Allied commanders resolved to attempt 
a "coup de main". Their fleet entered the Strait3 and failed dis- 
astrously. Not only were 3 oattleships sunk, Out the full accounts 

-29- 



oivt-ut;;, ItilosViv 'to be^otjqa/Ja oi»'«v 9&&M*itQ arid to ^txxoioi odd" lol 
vase eider beiBde yd"Xa-iJaflbA add" tedd acUgani \XoTum obo .j^o" 
■tteitoi add* \;Xxxg ^on cnadd" G'io'ieu evBii wm£T ««ja ( iflji4 , qjD 

j6 tooa jl: nx baosXq otb eqxrfe rioxdw to iv&aexD add - yixwode 

d-aaX beniBd-de eaaaiiaqxe Xaxoeqe add- Ji;. ^naXXitTLB b/u ... 
-eob bedBlad A «£aaoo ftaxgXad add* 'to tfriawbiBCJaiou two at twu&ue 
Wtilnoz ta&l yinc bariaxldjuq faooH laiinbA leafi ffloil to 

8bw dx" •coxd'Biaqo rarfd; d-wooi» n&ahu ¥ iu& bad ©no itexljr 

batauoffl enus v VJ *6^ r** v on anaanefi add" exs §«©! oa XirtBaaooi/e yiBV 

•itU£ aiid ctaave-xq ^Ofl bluoo aqxda ©xij fruS. *&qhud base ado- gnoxaa 
ide od& svoib enx% edt ^IXauJaava bixs ,©TeriJ bed*nwoc.: . x»o*ri 

oaed evad ^aaxxa e*t# aoixsiabaoqaiq Xsvsa iwo XXb lo ^fx^a nl .^bwb 
jxoxilua .'•.;xv. t e*xcob yxev -wo te fanou 2o qxitfe exri* bXod ot eXds 
eriw d%UQ&t±A ,a*xedj aeasei enXiBBidwe *xx©dw six&ftijttm ot yi~iiUQ$$ 
aevxd*o« creeijiiotd'a aad" aw ©vBg YdxvxJoa eai'SBSKfwa dpua xq aaasdq Tted\BX 
doidw i v J yaw ©no \xxxo \rXdmbi , re ex a/tadT .sjadd" dtfiw gaxieiiaftu *xoi 
ggjndsaS bixs £Oiyon;i dvj Baexi'XBOf escrceiD esi;r Te^esai bxuos yvan iuo 
'ix b&A •aoio'l basX edmspabB ns io noxd^aqo-co ad* \;d ax ds.dd" boa 
.daxjiiwT odd 'io a^ntf eu Xxxw dx jaaoa oex^Xed art* So oin:d" ex 3»d* 
aXxdv, t eajsa •xad'ifrsX adc xxx *iad"a©Tg tioum &t& eeXoBd-edo Xsitxtefi afCT 
aijB ^t««u«2 assnai) brtB qxdeXB*so|!«s asanas - eeno Xbx^xIxj'-ib add- 

.eai£8 add" 

axid" d"B aj-B*£©qo-ot> £oxs2 fix bxb ooiol biseX efosLpsba od 5"sY" 

Bjmod aiaw ^adi" aa5 baxxBi eqxda axid" noefian j-^dd - *io1 bxta t aeXXorii3bieG 

«-b*jx;c£;od \;id-ao^ bus fn&£$£a*ie&ni ti& qu jqeti \Qiii aiaew I •xo'5 »ob o; 

as^BXixv wSboo »'iJ3©Xo d"q©W8 aiev; aa:xxu ; .5jci^#lffiia9 ladCBaw t ^eflu 

no bainooai ©new adxri k&uk wo'i b amada baa atsd dxib ,bavoia'8ei3 aiew 

-ijoo XXaw bns baaiaqaxb vXabxw a doxdw (d'egiaJ' aXdxaaaqioi cfaciiiis tjb 

briBX y^ axiob aB\s? ^nxdtfon ti/d ,b©d"naaaiq ytaXXx^B baeX baXBeo 

-ni «oiS aairurT add" dnevaiq c.r eieriwaaXe ic tCBXird era enoxd"Biaqo 

;-»ia xiBdd ©toai baa t aXjJaaxxtaq xXoqxxiBi; add" jjaioiolfii-ai yXacrxrix'teb 

•aoxd'XfUiffimB *ic iQiur^ ,n©iM ni on >axx£ad"Bife seeeoX \t;b boos 

sqi^>z::j; Ow- bavX^aoi anebfiBaaaoo BaxXXj 1 arid - ,&X *'XBt. i no ^U 

-ax& baXx.' i - 8d"-ta*id"S aiici" baiad-isa d"oaxi ixaxi'I . jb quoo" a 

ad-x-ijjouoB XXu'i add" d*wa «jim/a aqiriaeXd-d-aa . ; ; a* ino d-c .YxajjcidaB 



published in the Italian press, which appear to be on the whole 
trustworthy, suggest that very great damage was inflicted on many 
other vessels by gun fire. The strongest corroboration of this 
is the sequai. The Allied Admirals held a council of war and 
decided to keep their fleet in the neighbourhood. A formal 
abandonment of the attack would have had too serious a moral effect 
throughout the impressionable East, But in fact, save for mine 
sweeping and a little reconnoitering, nothing more appears to have 
been attempted from that day to thia. 

"How and why was this quasi- inevitable failure courted and 
incurred? The explanation seems to lurk in the sudden reversal 
df Greek policy following the down-fall of h, Venizelos. Venizelos 
had made arrangements for Greece to co-operate with the Allies. 
They were to have the aid of a division of Greek troops, and (still 
more important) could use ail the Greek islands and harbours as 
bases. Relying on this, they started their operation, and then 
at the critical moment the Greek Premier was unable to carry out 
his part of the bargain. King Constantino, and his German Queen, 
and Germanophile officers dealt the Allies one of the shrewdest 
blows possible. Having begun their attack they had to go on,ibtKattgk 
though they had little chance of success. Moreover their diffi- 
culties increased. They had occupied mnanoa as a base for troops 
with Venizelos tacit or express consent. They have now had to 
abandon it. Some say they did so because the water supply was 
unsatisfactory, but there is reason to suppose that M. Gournaris 
the new Greek Premier took up a strong attitude against their 
staying on. Indeed since fejemnos was a Greek island it is difficult 
to see how they could stay if Greece is to remain neutral. 

"The despatch of the French Expeditionary Force to Alexandria, 
which was casually announced last week, shows how much this has 
embarrassed the Allies. Vhey need now a very large army to over- 
come the German-Turkish position, which since February has been 
incalculably strengthened. The total force which was originally 
arranged for seems to have been about 100,000 men (20,000 Greeks 

-30- 



ox ' ' , . , -.it ax in jq 

IU1J 

; . . ■ . . , . ■ . '. Mug y;d aXaes ;■ 

i Cioowoa iXeri aXaiiiob* baiXXA ©d » Loupe a ©a"j ex 

. »Oj ■:. ■'* i £X©/ «i iseXI iJ 

.■ ■ . , ©jsTdra 

i .'. .<■-■. . . • .J. &di /''iii j* 

svj nxrfjon ,g aaeoei ©IjJxX , boa gnii 

•axi -b ta&f a arxa a 

rXx-sl ©Xtij inx-xaaup axiu saw ^riw baa »o^ 
£sB<x©va'*x nai cid ii i'wl oj era©© e R titfoal 

.aoXasixieV . . Jo ... .,... oXXol ^oiXoq »e©i3 Xo 

»aaiXXi i /... tet#qo-oo ol soee 1 ., m baa" 

XXXuS |8C[i»v'i.- 20 fl'OXSX^ 

a* tr. ifi laXax jf@i - iau bXxfO ( jrax a^om 

,i i •■ >qo lis dU ( ^i.iij' no ,_i5X\i-.,:-. . ■ 

owo ^it axiw ta te8*t£) a , . Xspid'X'io ©JdTJ" xa 

(Hdai/^ X- ljX'i t isq ai£j ic j*usq sxri 

yg •. i (J *xo ©no aaiXXA add ££s©b aieaillo ©Xxtiqe . wxa 

^S»»jRjai:,KO u^ &i h^d \e-i . &jb liarfif Cili - E -ssoq aw; 

-x ;ixb ■ i i©vo©'gCfti .aaaoowe io s :i Y^ r ^' rtatforfir 

in ,g baxqtJooo .iseasaiooi eax.tXjJo 

of h vad yt .i-fiaanob aaatqxa to -frxoisi Golaxxno'/ rijxw 

jua 10 i ausae'cf ©a sa . ■ ■ ,tl "neb a 

8xtaani/o2 . »aoqqi »*n fj Xtfd 4 v: d; 

IX t&a ^iV-lXS £ qJJ jiOOT 1 . 

ix ix bimXa. •; ii:j & aaie b©©bxil .no anxTjaTa 

. ££78 bXifoa •. -;"i I; woif '©•© ou 

, xifertsxaXA o^ . ^•tJjnoxJ\cb©qif . 

and aid. delta t . te&i b©»rwo .:.. 'ri.Cx>ijwxi%> Baw lioiJ 

-lavo oj i. i .aaxXXA sricr i 

Y ,x'£v s aiolt lai .. ^AuaXuaiXadJr^: 

a.i.'.-; D t OS) J.'iOOX ^*;ooii naa >©a iox b ti.a 



and the rest French, British, Australian, and Indian). It could 

have used SLemnos, Mitylene, and Salonika as bases so that its 

accommodation, supply, and handling presented no difficulties. 

Now men on the spot talk of 250,000 troops being necessary. Even 

if this large force can be collected, where can the men be put? 

not 
Imbros and Tenedos, the only islands which are/Turkish and can be 

used by the Allies are small, timberless, almost waterless, and 

with little accomodation. The bases to which the Allies must 

apparently be reduced are Alexandria and Cyprus, which are aoout 

equidistant from the Dardanelles, and each over two days steaming 

for transports. The handicaps imposed by these facts are obvious. 

"If one asks how the Greek "^rite-face" has been possible in 

view of the obviously serious effect which it must have on Greece's 

prospects if the Allies win the war, the truest answer probably is, 

that opinion in the Balkans on the whole, expects Germany to win it. 

The consequences of this expectation may be observed not in Greece 

alone* Since the war began an enormous number of German officers, 

engineers, and artillerists have found their way to Constantinople, 

together with guns, shells, mines, and even it is said parts of 

submarines* All these have come through Bulgaria or Rumania, and 

they have been coming quite openly through the latter country ever 

since the bombardment of the Dardanelles." • 

The second phase of the attack on the Dardanelles - Combined 
Operations - began with the landing of military forces there during the 
latter part of April, and will be made the subject of a continuation of 
this paper. 



-31- 



fcJl ■ ' i '■ •■ ■ IBM 

eti, ... t e x | -don bvau svjsrl 

ne\ . ..'..' . DO, ■ ..' froqa Brfd ao i 

t b®&Q®££e ebo a mo '2 6$m£ bM$ *i 

«jo ■ i'w rfpxrfo ebittsXei ^X«o arU , ©often©? am: aondjul 

, Le , u v Tecteii ( XX&asB a^s &q£H,„ . yci dhqjj 

fca . d ri&<trfi o* ■ e....' .ttox^^okKaooos falcr;rxX $j*iw 

torouja ©lis rioixfa |8tftqnr^ ^ fiS fiX©I& ©tu beojjjsen ad \ t iuffy , ix;qqx'. 

o . ,r lavo das© bit , eeXXeiTBi)' r moil touBifelbiiupe 

,ejj©x ate b&m&I ntd* \fd beao^jffii: eqfea .u. .Ev-ioqei^iij' *j:oi 

iii: eluxccjoq need aari H aox-'.- -■ '■.;.» ,, 2lo©iO .. • . sroti Bisfi eco IT' 
e'o fto ©virri i'auu t£ . ^©ll© euoil©© ^Xfiijoxvdo ©tii lb vreXv 

t 8X 'r,'-v.< cioiQ '-,;'.' ,'... If t .rosqeoic! 

. _ Kin o* ^oBfinai aftKMgxe , . ij &c eissatli rfit 

aJt ,\m bsvaaedo ad ^sds oox&tKte>e<|x© bxjeW to e^u: ..,.-...• feriT 
,e*feoillo «ato*x© vdcswis BifOEHona raa • ib* a$ >fii3 . itfOvJjs 

isiqori, . :,- w./ \..^,' ixorfd ii9£&i& 

Id e^Tjatj ...ij'c; ex frx naw.bisa {©©n&Q t eXivifB <i.: ,, 
te , " .eortjHJsffltfi/B 

is" la ^ .' i ■ i ' i ■ ■ ><j© 

• .#.«*.».«.•••##• M .8©Xl8imD*i* o tfi©trfbnj5cfi e» >3fiie 

biUoiboC - bbXX BXi* ho a^ ■ - »rfJ io e&exiq bnooee ed 

aiiw gfxxiwb aiedi 1 aeoiol ^is^xXxn 'lc god - <iiiOXw f £*xaqO 

',o box; 3 £»©£ IXxw fr » -'■:• - - ihtaq isJ-^X 

. • ■ . . 






SJURKISE ;Y. 



Goeben 



22635 -bona 



Breslau 4478 

Kner-M-Mnjarbarossa 9900 



lor/rot He is 



o 



in-I»Zaffa 

Hamidieh 



9900 

'A00 
38£0 



Sejidieb 2&$2 

3 To: o Gunboats 763 to806 tons 
10 Destroyers 184 to £37 tons 
10 Torpedo Boats. 

Svjaioi Ivstafii 12840 

Io re Slatoust 12840 



Pas simon 

Bosti: •'_' 



13582 



8300 



10-121.1, I2-. 

I3-4.I 
6-IIi.n, 0-4, llii 
6-IIin, 8-4. Iin 
8-f.Sia, 12-Siri 
2-6in, 9-4,75.13 
2-Sin, 8-4. 7in 






Tr± 3Tyatitel 13 >I( 

Georgii Pobyedonos«ts II032 

Sinop II230 

2 evia 75 

agul 6675 

2o Destroy z L5 to IIIO tons 

II Submarlni 110 to 700 tows 

Imperatriats . fefc&L&ing, laid flotm 1918', E2S50 tons, 21 kts., 
Imperator Aleksandr III I2-I2in t 20-4»7in 

Ekaterina II 



4-I2in,4-8in,I2-6in 
4«I2in,4-8in,I2-6in 
4-ISin,I6-6in 
4-I0in t B-6iJi 
4-I2in t 8-6ia 
6-I2in, 7-6in 
o-ISin, 7~6in 

I2~6in 

I2-Gin 



Admiral Sasare7 

Adiiiii'o.j 



building, laid down 1913, 8085 tons, 



;.-,i ( 



Itish and French fleets during First Jhase of 
Attack on elles. 



"ueen Elizabeth 


27500 tons 


Inflexible 


17250 


Lord Nelson 


16500 


Agamemnon 
Irresi stable 


16500 
15000 


Cornwall! o 


14000 


Vengeance 


12950 


Ocean 


12950 


- Ibion 


12950 


Swift sure 


II800 


triumph 


1 1800 


Jestic 


14900 


Prince George 


U 


French Fleet. 




Suffren 


1252? 


Charl ne 


II082 


Gaulois 


II082 


nyet 


12007 



8-I0in 
■-I2in 

4-I2in 
4-I2in 

4-I2in 

4-I2in 

4-I21n 

••■4 10 in 
4- 10 in 
4-I2in 

4-l"2in 



I6-Cdn Runs 



... 



I6-4in 
10-9.2 in 

-9*2in 

I2-6in 

I2-6in 
I2-6in 

I2-6in 
12- 6 in 

14-7.. ' 
14-7. 5 in 
I2-6in 
I 2 -Gin 



-*-I2in t 10-6. 4in 

4-I2in, 10-5. Sin 

in, I0-5.5in 

2-I2iri, 2-10.8.1 
8-5. 5in 

In addition to the above big gun ships there were 

numerous cruisers, destroyers, submarines, trawlers &c; 

and a large number of hydroplanes. 



.. - 



[~§ 



SUBJECT 



SITUATION TO MA 



V 



s 



35, 1915. 



From 



No. 



341 Date 



Replying to O. N. I. No. Date 




With the entry of Italy into the war at midnight 
of May 34th 1915, a new phase of the European complication in 
probable. 

The extraodinary concessions to remain neutral 
offered to Italy by Austria at the solicitation of Germany, are 
well known and show how important the matter is considered here. 

Not only has Austria and Germany been compelled 
to detach large forces from the Eastern front which could have 
driven home the late victories over Russia in Galicia, but the 
Mid-European powers must face threatened complications on the 
Turkish flank. 



The best information asserts that Greece must 
Join the allies in a very short time* Italy now belonging to the 
allies, is to send troops to the Gallipoli peninsula and for this 
t*A aid is to have her aspirations in Asia Minor, in the rep-ion 
of Alexandre tte recognized. Greece also has aspirations in Asia 
Minor in the region of 3uyma, and cannot see Italy receive 
colonies in Asia Minor without Joining the race for colonial 
expansion. The participation of Italy and Greece means the 
certain -"all of Constantinople. The entry of Greece into the 
war means that the remaining Balkan states will more than 
probable take up arms to satisfy their ambitions at the expense 
of the falling Turkish power and of Austra. Bulgaria wants back 
Adrianople and the strategic line proposed for her at the Treaty 
of London. Roumania wants Transylvania from Austria. 

The situation between the United States and 
Germany over the treatment of American ships and citizens 
during the submarine warfare remains in the critical state. The 
demands of the United States have not yet been answered, but 
from all indications the substance of the reply will be a refusal 
of the principal demands made by our government. 

Since the sinking of the "LUSITAITIA" , very little 
appears to have been accomplished in the submarine blockade of 
England, In the Baltic the German fleet assists the army in the 
occupation of Liebau and generally controls the Baltic Sea. 

There does not appear to be any indication which 
can be interpreted into a probable ending of the war for a long 
time to come* 

The questions involved are so far reaching in 
their consequences to the countries involved that only the 
absolute exhaustion of the resources of the countries will hrinr- 
about peace. Germany shows no sims of exhaustion. To make any 
predictions on the duration must be regarded as almost a guess, 
but I see no reason to believe those people who hope to see peace 
this summer. To my mind another year of war is probable and 
perhaps mors* 



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October - : 



&W& not be return S 



SUBJECT CAPTURE Of HOSPITAL SHIP 



From No. 

Replying to O. N. I. No. 



?36 



Date 
Date 



2 191! 




References:- 



Z-337 of 1914. 
Z-357 of 1914 
Z-398 of 1914 
Z-190 Of 1915. 



The English Prize Courts have declared 
this ship as good prize. A careful study of the whole a/ffair 
and of the reasons for declaring the ship a prize should be made 
in connection with the outfitting, conduct and anounoing of U.S. 

hospital ships in war time. 

i 
The German pent of view has been covered 



in past reports referred to above. 



The following is a translation from the 
"Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung":- 



?HE HOSPITAL SHIP "OPHELIA" DECLARED A PRIZE. 



London, May 31. Reuter reports:- The 
Prize Court arrived at a Judgement this morning rer*ardin^ 
the German hospitalship "Ophelia". The Court declared 
the ship as prize, as she had neither been built for a 
a hospitalship nor fitted up as such and used as such, 
but had served for military purposes only. 

We have been informed from competent 
authority:- The "OPHELIA" waa sent on the 17th of 
October 1914, after the news of a torpedo fight arrived 
which had taken place on the Dutch coast, from Helgoland 
to the scene of action to look for survivors. The 
hospitalship was stopped by English naval forces and 
brought to Yarmouth. Later it developed that the 
anouncement of the "OPHELIA" as auxiliary hospitalship 
had not been made by the neutral power requested to do so, 
The German government has protested against the seizure 
of the ship and requested that the ship be ^-iven free. 
The English government, instead of givong the ship free, 
had her brought before a Prize Court which has now 
declared her a prize, basing the deciision on the fact 
that she had served as a miliaty ship. 

•OPHELIA" was fitted up as a hospitalship. 
It ia of course understood that the ship had not been 
used for any but hospital purposes, as provided by the 
Harue Convention. 




3~ 

N 2 611915 ^ 

.S.8.H0KTH CAROLIITA^J 
Alexandria, Egypt. 
May 25,19: 



From: Lieut .( j .g. }E.G.Blakeslee , U.b.IIavy. 
To: Office of Naval Intelligence. 

Subject: Landing of Ally forces on the Gallipoli 
Peninsula April 25, 1915, and General 
Operations in the vicinity of the Dardan- 
elles, 



1. The following information of the landing of the Austral- 
ian and New Zealand forces on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, April 
25, 1915, has "been gained by me from Captain G-, an Australian 
officer, wounded on the first day of the landing and convalescing 

? in Alexandria. Captain G- was second in command of a Company of 
the Third Brigade of the Australian force, this brigade being the 
covering detachment and the advance body during the landing. The 
Captain went over the landing with me on the ship's charts of the 
Dardanelles and Peninsula which I had provided previously; and he 
pointed out the principal points of the enemy's strength and dis- 
position together with what information he had been able to obtain 
of the Turks preparations on the Peninsula. The facts, which fol- 
low, I believe, may be considered most reliable as I have checked 
up same with snatches of conversation with numerous officers and 
men among the wounded now in Alexandria. I consider this infor- 
mation as doubly reliable as Captain G- spent eight years in the 
British navy and was quite familiar with the Navy's part in the 
occupation and able to discuss same intelligently, having entered 
the navy as a Midshipman and schooled for the Naval service. 

2. The Australian and Hew Zealand forces, about 50,000 in 
number, arrived in Egypt on December 6th, 1914, after a voyage 

of fifty days on thirty eight transports, were disembarked and en- 
camped at the foot of the pyramids. The Australian force consisted 
of four brigades of infantry together with a regiment of cavalry 
and a regiment of artillery, the whole being a complete advance 
force and army corps unit. Since the arrival of tliis force in 
Egypt, the whole has been put on the new British war footing, the 
Infantry arm, which is modeled as follows: 

Australian force comprised four brigades of infantry. 

A brigade comprises four (4) battalions. 

A Battalion comprises four (4) companies. 

A company comprises four (4) platoons. 

A platoon comprises four sections. (4) 

A section comprises fourteen (14) men. 
Each section is in charge of a non-commissioned officer, there 



being sixteen (16) to the company. There 



are 



(6) officers 



to each company, a Major in command, a Captain, who is second in 
command, and four lieutenants, each in command of one platoon; eaeb 
platoon having four non-commissioned officers, each in charge of a 
section. The foregoing is the model of tho latest British war 
footing for all troops. 



' 3. 

Brigade 



The Australian Advance Force consisting of the Third 
left Alexandria aboard transports for the first time on 



March 2, 1915, and went to Lemnos Island, 



been made the 
Dardanelles . 
forces left 
and 10th of 
transports, 
embarked at 
destroyers 



British Advance Base 
The remainder of the 
for Tenedoa Island 
April and remained 
The Advance force 
Lemnos Island and 



for the final occupation of Gallipoli. 



Which was to be and has 
for her land attack on the 
Australian and Hew Zealand 
from Alexandria, between the 5th 
there seventeen days aboard their 
which left Alexandria March 2, dis- 
there remained until embarked aboard 

the 24th 



On 



instant, all transports under cover of 



darkness 



moved on to the 



v v -" 












lb' 



' 



... . 

i 






' 















. 



- 2 - 

Island of Imbros where they were anchored before midnight of the 
24th. The Third Brigade had "been placed on destroyers at Lemnos 
Island for transport to the place of landing. Concentrated off 
Imbros Island then were about 35,000 men aboard transports and 
ready for the landing on the Peninsula. This force consisted of 
sixteen battalions of Australians, four battalions of Hew Zea- 
landers and twelve battalions of British Uaval Division. 

4. xhe Third Brigade of Australians acting as the covering 
detachment and embarked aboard destroyers proceeded to Imbros 
ahead of the transports. Each destroyer carried one company of 
infantry, about 450 men and towed a line of six boats from each 
quarter. There were seven destroyers used. The boats towed were 
boats from the men-of-war present, transport's boats and as it was 
termed, any boats they could get. The destroyers at a speed of 
four knots, towing twelve boats each with 432 of the Advance Party 
aboard each destroyer, left Imbros after midnight and went within 
500 yards of the projected landing place. 

5. The landing was supposed to be in the nature of a sur- 
prise and was made during darkness just preceding daylight. De- 
stroyers had all lights out, with orders not to fire. As scon as 
the destroyers were within a thousand yards of the beach, the Turks 
commenced firing and the destroyer, on board of which was Captain 
G-, had twelve men wounded before embarking in the boats. The 
destroyers, however, did not use their guns during the landing. 
Arriving about 500 yards from the beach, the destroyer v/as stepped, 
port side to the beach, and the troops embarked in the boats over 
the starboard side. Each boat was manned by four bluejackets from 
a destroyer, there being thirty six men of the advance force to 
each boat. This was done under a heavy fire from the beach, the 
port side of the destroyer being hit numerous times. There was no 
confusion in the boats, each man taking his place as previously 
ordered. Two steam launches towed a string of six boats each to 
within fifty to one hundred yards of the beach and into shallow ' 
water. Here the boat" were in some cases beached, but most of the 
troops jumped overboard and waded ashore. The four bluejackets 

in each boat were unarmed, acting simply as boat keepers. After 
disembarkation, steamers picked up all boats and returned them to 
the destroyers which took them in tow and rushed back to the ad- 
vanced base for more troops. The landing took place about 4.00 a.m., 
and about one mile and a half to the Ilorth of Gaba Tepe . The fir- 
ing from shore broke out very badly as soon as the boats Y/ere seen 
to approach and there were a number of casualties left in the boo,ts. 
This advance force having landed, the main body came up in trans- 
ports and two hours later began landing in the ship's boats, the 
transports anchoring within about a mile from the beach. 

6. The Advance force dressed in khaki, v/as fully equipped 
with three days rations, water bottle and 200 rounds of ammunition. 
The Australian fully equipped pack weighxs about 56 pounds, which 
includes the overcoat. The officers were equipped same as the men, 
except they carried a revolver, v/hieh was said to be of little 
use, this officer in question picking up a rifle and using sane in- 
stead of revolver. Only one officer was seen flourishing a sword 
antf he was killed almost as soon as he landed. The force landed 
with fixed bayonets, pieces loaded, deployed and charged immediately 
driving those Turks who were near the beach back up the hill. The 
men threw off their packs as soon as the landing was made, the beach 
being littered with knapsacks, overcoats and canteens. 

7. The actual landing took place to the northward of the in- 
tended one. The proposed landing was to be made just above Gaba 
Tepe, but due to darkness and reasons unknown, the landing was mde 
about a mile and a half to the Northward of Gaba i'epe. As after- 
wards proved, this was a fortunate mistake as Gaba Tope consisted 
of a seven gun emplacement of lour inch guns, as wall as being ..oil 



- 3 - 



entrenched and mined with wire entanglements throughout. Barbed 

wire entanglements had been placed "below the surface of the water 

from fifty to a hundred yards from the shore line. It was here that 

the Turks had prepared for the landing, they notbbeing as well 

prepared to the Northward where the "beach is steeper and covered 

over with heavy underbrush. The beach where the landing took place 
rises in steppes about a hundred yards 



from 



The 



steep but not enough to prevent climbing. 

with Turks and the guns from Gaba Tope and 

placement in the hills enfiladed the whole 

thousand men were either killed or wounded out of a force 

five thousand landed. Infantry only was landed at first. 



the water ana is very 
hills were crowded 
another three gun em- 
beach. About seventeen 



of thirty 



A regi- 
ment of cavalry was later landed without their mounts/and sent to 
protect a certain position. An Indian mountain battery of six six 



:he day. This battery is commanded 



inch guns was landed later in 
by British officers with a few native officers. These heavy guns 
were landed in flat bottom lighters in which the stern drops out 
' and the lighters beached. These were said to oe the lighters used 
for landing horses and known as the horse lighter. The Infantry 
and Mountain Battery guns consisting of ten pounders and eighteen 
pounders were landed in life boats, being taken to pieces and later 
assembled on the beach. 



The Ilavy took very little part in the landing, the ship3 
did not protect the landing of the troops nor was the beach 

In a 1)0 sit ion 



8. 
present 
shelled before or during 



the 



landing 



rp 



rhe 



Ships were 



;o protect the 



inks 



md In one case II. M.S. Majestic, turned her 



search lights on a movement of Turks around the left flank of the 
landing force and fired a few shells, driving the Turks back. 
Later the ships oj>ened up on Gaba Tepo but did not succeed in silen- 
cing same as the guns here are concealed from seaward behind a 
Braall hill. The ships present took a very small part in the land- 
ing delivering only a small covering fire and as this officer 
stated not anything like the Army expected. It is said that only 
one out of five of the advance party escaped being killed or wounded. 
Turks as snipers in concealed positions did terrible damage. They 
were found later in concealed positions, pits covered over with 
underbrush, the pits containing several thousand rounds of ammuni- 
tion and one month's rations. Some of the ships present wore the 
Queen Elizabeth, Swiftsure, I.lajesiic, Amethyst, London and seven 
destroyers, besides, the transports, hospital ships and ammuni- 
tion and supply ships. 



9. After landing, the companies, plattoons, etc., became ell 
mixed up and the men belonging to different companies were .not 
sorted out that night. The senior officer in a small rodius tak- 
ing command oj^those near him. Twenty two out of ttomty nine offi- 
cers in one battalion were killed or wounded the first day. In 
another battalion only two hundred and fifty men were left at the 
close of the first day. 



10. From a British War Department map issued to each officer, 
an idea of the country was gained. This was simply a contour map 
showing topography, elevations, all principal land marks, roads, 
etc. The Peninsula was divided into squares, each square being' 
numbered and subdivided into nine equal squares, lettered from a to 
i inclusive. Lach numbered square was 675 yards • in length. The 
whole Peninsula was so divided into squares, which were i$ ed for 
purpose of directing gun fire, it being possible to switch your 
fire wherever you pleased. r "he following is an example: 

126 



I 



d 



g 



e 


















9 




Q 




cT 


£ 










1 


j 






. 




I 


1 









- 4 - 

11. One reason given for the lack of h&lp "by the ships was said 
to he due to the difficulty in signalling ranges and positions to 
the ships from shore, The ranges had to be relayed by several. 
lignal parties on shore and by the time same reached the ships the 
position of the Turks would have changed* 

12. The Turk's batteries were well masked, and concealed and it was 
ii id that the ships had extreme difficulty, in fact it was almost 
impossible to pick out these batteries. Everything favored the 
Turks end they made good use of all their resources, such as eov- 
Ir i n g , o b s t a c 1 o s , e n t angle me n t s , e t c . 

13. Captain G- re narked that it had been realized that a mistake 
s made in not using the ships to protect the landing as well as 

shelling the beach previous to the landing. The opinion was ex- 
pressed when asked concerning the Havy's part in forcing the Dar- 
danelles; that they were sanguine, too sanguine, it was thought . 
■he two forts at the narrows of the Straits were said to be among 
'the strongest in the world and that same could not be taken by the 
fleet acting alone. Very little damage had been done as yet to 
either of these forts. The present strategy seemed to be the occu- 
pation by troops of the several hills on the Peninsula mounting 
heavy artillery thereon and taking the forts both from land and sea. 
Once having gained command of the several hills, such as 900 metre 
hill, etc., it was thought that the forts would in time, be reduced, 
but the time would be considerable as the forces ashore were paying 
dearly for every foot of ground gained. At this date there was a 
great need of Infantry, though fresh troops were coming regularly. 
Infantry is all that can, at present, be used on the Peninsula, at 
least until those hills commanding the forts and surrounding country 
can be taken. The Cavalry has been sent back to Egypt. It might 
be said here that hundreds of horses died on board the transports. 
They were stabled in small stalls without room to lie down, in con- 
sequence o^ which their limbs beca^me swelled to large proportions 
and their feet became core and diseased. It became necesaary to use 
traps to trice them up, taking the weight off their legs. 



r 



14. Before the actual landing, feints were ra de on the Peninsula 
at various points. In one place a thousand mules were put ashore 
near dark and with a piece of khaki on their backs to resemble sad- 
dles, -..ere driven up in the hills. This ruse was said to have had 
the desired effect and the mules were sacrificed. 

15. The Turks are said to have placed Torpedo tubes along the 

,res of the S1 ts of the Dardanelles and! at the entrance to the 
sea of Marmora. Preparations for the defense of the Peninsula were 
laid to have been started by the Turks as early as November. Rail- 
ways run up to all forts and as soon as a gun or carriage is put 
put of action another can be readily put in place. The whole Pen- 
insula is said to be a mass of modern intrenchments, obstacles and 

Lglement3 with all of the principal elevations defended by well 
concealed batteries. 

16. At the same time the landing v.as being made to the ilorth of 
a Tope similar landings were taking place by the French on the 

Asiatic side and by English regulars and territorials at Cape 
Hollos. Tho remainder of the British regular army comprising such 
regiments as the Dublin Fusileers, Lancashires, llunsters and hoyal 
Fusileers, were here entirely annihilated. An attempt was made off 

e Ilelles to beach a transport loaded with about 3000 Territori- 
als, the idea being to run her on the shore and land the troops in 
shallow water without the aid of boats. The transport, unfortunately, 
grounded astern before close enough to the beach. The troops, how- 
ever, piled down the gangways , OTer the side and through the cargo 

•ts into the water and under an enfilading fire from Turkish bat- 
teries ashore. Those who were not killed by gun fire were for the 
most part drowned and a very few of the three thousand aboard were 
Saved from destruction. 

(signed) E. G. Blakeslee. 



Need not be returned, 

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) fT' } 



SUBJECT ffea B#GXa»e*i0n &t ---81*0lDtii*--£t---tfe*- 



0)1 



- Coasts of -Aus-tr-:;. ;y and Albania. - • 

/^^ * No. |3g # £>#& -I^gr-^^-JL^-ft^^ K--- * 

Replying to 0. N. i. No mm»»M Date ... M^^^ ^j ^ ^^ x^ . x ^ m^f ^p..^\^ 

1. ..^inning fro:e the 86tli of Acy, 19^5« HI effective 
blockade will l)c considered to exist toy tn feaiian Lirval . oroes 
folio s: 

1) The . n trior.-, i eri en coast ©attend north to t 
Italian 1 run tier and eotith to t : :onte ; ion frontier in- 
eluding ell the inlands, ports, inlets, roads and beys; 

) The coast of '1 '.ending froe. the Aont; riesn 

frontier south- to the hicphali ( inclusive ) . 

>grephieal 11 of I y od territory ore: 

r^tria-Huncary - llorth - let. 45* - 4£ f - 

long 1A° - 51 f - 1C" E. 

South - let. &l c - 6 T - :.5 n II 

Long 10 r ' - 5 f - ;0 n E 

Albania - llorth - let 41° - 58 * - 00 n H 

lonf; 1j° - 50« - 30" B 

ips of -rricndl: i i neutral powers will 
bo riven a time lindt which will be eotablisl b f y the 

Let of '.*. Italian n orces. ,o commence 

fror: the day of the declaration af the bloelcc.de in order to bo 
free to leave ;locI: port. 

▼iolat .d 

a ii trante or Chit- 

all will 'be treated in »onf * mt % 

laws at ing t ies. 




K 5 

(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of 6cto^er 31^588$ n °^ ^° returned.' 

SUB7ECT Ba ttl AwtloM 1 m th> AArtat la Sea on May 24, 1915 • 



-fiw» f No 18 Date May 26 , 1915 . 

Replying to 0. N. I. No Date 



On the 24th instant the following official announcement was 
made in Vienna: 

"In the night following the declaration of war (May 23-24) 
our fleet undertook ^~ siefioa against the east coast of Italy 
between Venice and Barletta, and effectively bombarded important 
military objects in numerous places. Simultaneously our naval 
aeroplanes dropped bombs on the baloon shed in Chiarvalle, the 
military works of Anoona and the arsenal in Venice, whereby 
visible damage and conflagrations were caused. 

Commander of Fleet." 

On the 25th inst. the following report was given out: 

"The official telephonic report of the fleet action on the 
morning of the 24th inst. is as follows: 

"Before sunrise to-day, that is within 12 hours of the declar- 
ation of war by Italy, the 1, & R. Navy executed a set of success* 
ful simultaneous attacks on the coast of Italy from Venice to 
Barletta. 

"A naval aviator dropped 14 bombs in Venice, setting firs to 
the arsenal, seriously injurung a destroyer, and bombarding the 
railway station, oil tanks, and hangar in the lido. 

"The destroyer "Scharfechiitse" pushed into the very narrow 
channel of Porto Corsini until it found itself in the immediate 
proximity of a fully manned infantry trench. A large portion 
of the completely surprised garrison was shot down, whereupon 
three entirely concealed shore batteries opened a heavy fire 
from guns of about 12 cm. caliber against the cruiser "Ho vara" 
and torpedoboat "80", which were lying at the entrance to the 
channel. The latter received a hit in the officers messroom 
which seriously wounded one man and caused the boat to leak. 
The "Hovara" continued the fire, in order to help the destroyer 
out of its predicament, and enfiladed the trenches and demolished 
a barracks, but received many hits herself. 

"lieutenant Persich &n& 4 men killed, 4 men seriously and 
several slightly wounded, but the losses of the enemy are per- 
haps 10 to 20 times greater. 

"The "Scharfschiitze 7 ' escaped entirely uninjured; torpedoboat 
"80" to Pola with a collision mat. 

"The railway station and bridges in Rimini were bombarded by 
the armored cruiser" 3t. Georg" 

"In ainigaglia railway bridges, water tower, harbor works, 
station buildings and a train were demolished by 3.M.3."3rinyi" ; 
the stattion, train and adjacent buildings were burned. 

"In Ancona the old forts, the cavalry and infantry camp, 
wharves, electric power house, railway station, gas tank3, petro- 
leum depot, semaphore and radio station were bombarded by the 
main body of the fleet, and great damage was wrought by stray 
shots and fire. Two steamers in the harbor were sunk and one 
on the ways ready for launching was demolished. Resistance was 
made only by two light batteries and a few machine guns against 

two destroyers. In the only modern fort, Alfredo Savoe, the 



I 



(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900.) 



SUBJECT 



From No. Date 

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date 



men stood at their guns at the beginning of the bombardment , but 
two of our aviators who appeared at the right moment drove them 
away so effectively that they did not return to their stations. 
These aviators and a third also dropped bombs on the baloon shed 
inshore of Chiaravalle and on several other military objects. 

"The airship "Citta di Ferrara u threw several bombs at 3 .M.S. 
"Zrinyi" without results and attempted to attack the retiring 
fleet, but hurriedly retreated at the approach of two aeroplanes, 
which, however, had used all of their bombs. 

"fhe same or another airship had already been sighted half an 
hour after midnight by the fleet on opposite course halfway be- 
tween 2ola and Ancona, doubtlessly bound for Pola. However, 
when the two vessels that were accompanying it retreated before 
gunfire the airship put about and disapeared to the northwestward, 
apparently without having seen the fleet. 

"S. M.S. "Admiral Spaun" with 4 destroyers fired on the railway 
bridge over the Sinarea river, the railway statfcion, locomotives, 
pumping station, etc. in Oampo Mariano, demolished the semaphore 
of Tremitl and damaged that of Mileto. 

"S •M.S. "Helgoland" with 5 destroyers bombarded Viesto and 
llanfredonia and near Barletta fell in with 2 Italian destroyers 
which it at once took under fire and pursued. One of the destroy- 
ers made its escape, but the second, the "Turbine", was pressed 
toward Pelagosa by our destroyers Csepel and Tatra, and was set 
on fire and redixced to a sinking condition hy hits in the boilers 
and engines. She surrendered. The "Csepel", "Tatra', and :, I*eka" 
rescued 35 of the crew, including the captain, executive officer, 
and chief engineer, and made prisoners of them. The rescue work 
was disturbed by the appearance of tvo battle ships of the "Yit- 
torio Smanuele" class and an auxiliary cruiser which approached 
to within 9000 meters. 

"In the ensuing gunfire action only the "Csepel ' received an 
unimportant hit, whereby one man was seriously wounded and 2 men 
slightly wounded. The fire was returned with good effect by 
the "Helgoland" and the destroyers. Minimum range 3000 meters. 
Within a short time our vessels were out of range. 

"The railway bridge over the Potenza rivor was fired upon and 
damaged by the "Ptadetr.ky". 

"The I. & R. fleet nuff red no losses than those noted above." 





U.S.S.Horth Carolina, 
Al exandr ia , Egypt . 
May 27. 1< 



From: Lieut, (j.g.) E.G.Blakeslee, U.S. Navy/ 
To: Office of Naval Intelligence, 

Subject: Hospital and Transport Service ttr-*— ^iw,, 

and from the Dardanelles. 

1. The following features of the British Army Transport and 
Hospital Service were noted in Alexandria, Egypt, between May 
14th and May 26th, 1915. The harbor was crowded with British and 
French transports and Hospital Ships, coming and going daily and 
it is believed that in saying there were 200 ships in the harbor, 
is not an over estimation. These ships are converted passenger 
Steamers, merchant steamers, etc., and having been requisitioned 
by the British authorities are being us ed as transports, supply 
and hospital ships. 

2. Each transport and supply ship has had its name painted 
out and all marks of identification done away with. In their 
place, eadh ship is given a letter and number, such as Ae4, B-5, 
N-16, etc. These letters and numbers are about four feet high and 
painted black on a white field, carried forward of the btidge and 
on the bow or side. Each letter indicates some distinct service 
such as A= Army Transport Service or Australian Forces, 2=Indian 
Troops, F-French Troops and N=British Naval Division, etc. 

3. The Hospital ships are painted white with a green band 
around the side and with the red cross displayed on both sides. 
At night the Hospital ship carries green lights around her side, 
spaced two feet apart, with the red cross in red lights. These 
ships are for the most part converted South African liners, P.&O. 
liners, etc., and it is said that it takes but six weeks to convert 
a passenger steamer into an efficient hospital ship. 

4. The wounded from the Dardanelles and Gallipoli Peninsula 
are being cared for at base hospitals, situated at Alexandria, 
Port Said, I.ialt^and Marseilles. The Australians and Territorials 
are being brought to Alexandria; the British Marine and Naval Div- 
isions to Port Said; the Naval wounded to Malta and the French 
wounded to .Marseilles. There are seven hospital ships plying be- 
tween Alexandria and the Dardanelles alone, there being some 20,000 
wounded men in Alexandria. The seriously wounded who are conva- 
lescent with little chance of being returned to the scene of hos- 
tilities, are being sent to England. A hospital ship on May 16th 
arrived with 600 wounded from the Dardanelles and one sailed the 
Bame day with the same number of convalescent wounded for England. 

5. Several transports were seen to fly the commission pennant 
and are in command of naval officers with the rank of Lieutenant 
Commander or Commander. La Provence, the French liner, came in on 
the 17th inst . , flying a commission pennant and commanded by a 
Commander of the French navy. She was fitted with guns as a 
commerce destroyer . 

6. The French cruiser Jeanne D'Arc, flying the flag of Vice 
Admiral Dartige du Fournet commanding the 3rd squadron, came 

in on the 19th inst., and remained several days, riving liberty. 

7. Regarding the transport and supply system, it is said 
the navy has full charge of the ships to the anchorage, where the 
Army Transport Service takes charge. 

(signed) El G. Biakeslee . 






I 



■ 



Need not he returned* 

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) 



SUBJECT Italian. iJail.Ste.a^ 



S 



V) 



3 



From 



T 



.No 134 Zto& M«ir 2ft t 19X0- 



Replying to 0. N. I. No. .— :. * ™)™* -...Date 




1. The four Government owned steamers, "CXTTA* ai 
PA3SBMC n f ff CITTA f dl CATMIIA", "CITTA* di iflSSSHJtf* n CI3?TA f 
ai SIRAGUSA% of 5500 tons displacement have boon taken over 
by the 2;avy end listed as auxiliary men-of-war. Tho *0Xf$A* 
dl CATAUIA" and "CITTA 1 dl 2&.ERM0" have Parson tiirbines and 
tho "CI??A f dl SIRACUSA" and "CI2TA* di UA n , quadruple 

expansion engines, Tho bo vessels, all* develop IE 000 I3B» 
and ore ratod bb 23 Itnot steamers. They are armed with 
6 - 4.7 guns. 



2 # In addition to the 



former, 



there have been telron 
over by tho Ilavy, tho following sto; .mors: "CITTA* di CAGLIA?.I n , 
"CITTA* dl SASSARI*, and "CAERERA ,, f of £300 tons dlsplcce xnt. 
These voscols develop 4500 HP., and ar fcatod as 15 knot steam- 
ers. 



, 









Heed not he returned. 



r 



Tribuna, May \ EL 1^15. 






* - - ^ 



The heroic ena of the EBRBHIE. \7^_ 



The heavy loss suffered by the enemy should not 
make us regret the loss of the old 330 ton destroyer STOBBU 
built in 1901. The TUKBIJJE while on scouting duty the morning 
of the 24th, saw an enemy's destroyer at which she immediately 
gave chase, thereby getting a long way from her main body. 
After chasing for half an hour, she was surprised by four units 
of the enemy; three destroyers and the light bruiser HELIGrOLAHD 
The afSRBBTB trying to get back was hit by t . o shells, gn& slow- 
ly lost her speed* She continued fighting for nearly an hour 
notwithstanding a fire on board. Having exhausted all her ammun- 
ition the Captain ordered her sea valve opened rather than she 
should be captured by the enemy. The Turbine then oc iced 
to sink, and although her entire crew were drawn up on the 
poop, the enemy continued to fire on her from a short distance. 
The Captain who had been wounded from the 5&KS& beginning of t 
fight, seeing that the ship was sinking, gave the order to the 
crew to jump overboard. The Austrian destroyers lowered their 
boats to pick up the survivors. At this moment the ships to 
which the Turbine belonged came over the horizon, and the enemy 
picking up their boats steamed away towards their own coasts. 
Our ships leaving their boats to pick up the men, steamed after 
the enemy, and repeatedly hit them. A destroyer of the type 
Tatra end the Heligoland were severely damaged. 

Ulne men of the Turbine were saved. Austrian commun- 
ication states 35 were picked up, the Captain being among the 
survivors* 




*■© 



Office of Naval Intelligence* V^ Copy f 

Jm^^k^r"^W\ * N.E.L. -w% 

Report from Naval Attache, Berlin, I^^p^^lglS^ / IJ 



Plans for the Defense of Naval Stations and Fuel 
Station s against Air Craft . 

The subject is best considered under two headi 
installations for repulsing the attack and second the method 
screening or concealing the sts,tion in question. 

1. At the outbreak of the war there had been a certain amount 
of preparation in regard to anti-balloon guns. Batteries of anti- 
balloon guns were on the very latest ships and were in course of 
preparation for all the ships of the "Dreadnaught" type. For the 
Army and Coast Defense Krupp and Ehrhardt had designs which may 
be found in the "TASCHENBUCH der LUFTFLOTTM 1914 M . With the de- 
velopment made by the war, however, there was at once an enormous 
demand for guns of this class made necessary to defend important 
positions. 

Of the class of guns observed as most in use are 1st the 
Navy 8.8 c/m cal. 45 semi-automatic Krupp gun, roughly described 
in report 37 of 1915. The German army, pressed for guns, took a 
number of captured French field pieces, cal. *75, had them changed 
at Krupp's to calibre .77 to take the German ammunition and used 
them with a siDecial mounting as anti-balloon gun3. 

She following rough description of the protection given 
an important headquarters illustrates the present practice: 

1. The, guns are not in the town but on the tops of cer- 
tain hills surrounding the town where a clear obser- 
vation may be had all around. 

2. The guns are grouped in batteries of four to six guns. 

3. The control and range finder station is removed from 
the guns some little distance and control is by tele- 
phone . 



4. The control station has a range finder and also a tel- 
escope counted, so as to be turned in azimuth and al- 
titude. Degrees are marked so that they can be read 
off by the telephone operator to put the gun pointers 

on the target. I give a rough sketch of this arrangement. 

5. The guns have a broken backed telescopic sight. 

6. The wheels move in an iron track and the trail of the 
piece is on a brick or cement floor, if possible, so 
that turning the gun in azimuth is easy. 

Tlachine guns are also part of the defense scheme but ow- 
ing to their shbrx range, they must be mounted in the immediate 
vicinity of the position to be guarded. 

For instance, to protect the Hew York Navy Yard under 
this system, the anti-balloon guns might go on Fort Uruen far , 
Governor's Island, and Blackwell Island, while the machine guns 
v/ould b< st be on top the most prominent building in the Yard and 
on the towers of the Brooklyn Bridge, Williamsburg Bridge, etc. 






* K 






^\7 



' 









! 






! 1, 



- 2 - 

A sketch of the improvised mounting for machine guns for hg;gh angle 
firing is given also, see illustration page 80 of the book "Hit 
dem Hauptquartier nach com Y.ejsjen" "by Heinrich Binder, forwarded 
with this mail. d^*i*^ fo-Jtsf, *$ r &V &. 

Where positions are of great importance such as a group of 
dirigible halls, or a big dock yard, all these precautions are taken 
and also there are aeroplane groups always on watch ready to go up 
and take the offensive against an enemy. 

The protection of the Kiel Canal requires very heavy anti- 
balloon guns installations. In addition it is necessary to protect 
the bridges which go over it. The following is a general descrip- 
tion of the method of protecting one of the great iron railroad b 
bridges which span the Canal. 

"On a recent trip to Flensburg in Schlesv/ig-Holstein, i 
my route carried me over the Kiel Canal. The railroad crosses 
it on a steel bridge, one span over the Canal, at a height 
probably 130-150 feet above the water. 

Approaching the Canal from the south the railroad at a 
distance of nearly a mile begins its elevation on an earth 
embaxnkment, The immediate approach to the bridge on both 
banks is on a steel viaduct . The tracks parallel the Canal 
on the. southern bank and turning across the water at right 
angles to the Canal. On the north shore the railroad makes 
a large loop so that it runs into the station at Eensburg 
beneath the steel approach on the north side. 

At Bokelholm, a small station on the south bank, the 
train is boarded by a detachment of soldiers (Landsturm) four 
men to each car. All windows are closed, shades pulled down, 
packages and hand luggages taken from the seats and floors 
and placed on racks above the seats. The guards are so sta- 
tioned that each one nas a watch over two compartments. Pas- 
sengers are not permitted to leave their compartments during 
the crossing. 

On the north shore, Eensburg, there is a small basin, a 
floating dry dock, large enough to accommodate small steamers- 
1000 tons. A marine railway on which was drawn up a tug of 
perhaps 500 to 600 tons displacement • Two tramp steamers - 
flying no flag - were steaming westward through the Canal, 
while a third was moored alongside the wharf. 

The approaches were patrolled by soldiers Landsturm. 
"achine and anti-balloon guns were placed along the bank for 
some distance from the bridge." 

The highest towers in a town to be protected is almost 
always armed with anti-aricraft guns. Under certain circum- 
stances the Germans have found it to advantage to use captive 
balloons, both as observation stations and as a position for 
a machine gun to keep off bomb dropping from aeroplane. 

These balloons are of a special type frequently seen in 
the war illustrations. In appearance they resemble a larr;c 
sausage with a smaller one looped about one end. They are 
up about 306 metres and ride steadily so that there is a 
fairly good gun -platform. 

At places where are good roads and a considerable 
stretch is to be covered I have seen automobiles with anti- 
balloon guns used. In regard to calibre of guns, the naval 
officers tell me the best gun is the one of largest calibre 
which is practicable with rapid fire. I should judge 4-inch 
would about fill this condition. 



S^*" 1 * .V^ 5 ^ •%r^vfb 



- 3 - 



At the beginning of the war the very oldest armored ships, 
long since past their usefulness in the fleet ("AEGIR" class), 
were commissioned for port guard duties. (These ships are 
said to have "been given anti-aircraft armaments and to be 
prcoared to assist in repelling attack from the air* 



£• SCREENING and COHCEALIIIG . 

In several previous reports (lTo.399 of 1914, etc.) the 
screening of lights has been referred to. This is carefully 
looked out for in regard to ships of the Havy, merchant ships 
in port where the navy may be attacked, and all Navy Yards, 
shipbuilding works and ammunition factories. Windows and sky- 
lights have dark curtains which pull completely across them. 

In addition to this all buildings in the vicinity of 
statiozis, or factories are required to be screened as well as 
street lamps, or anything which might give a leading makr to 
an aeroplane or airship. 

In such an important naval place as Kiel, the whole city 
is prepared to be thrown into darkness by turning off the 
electric lights in case of attack. 

Whore practicable important reservoirs are under ground 
and in future, I believe, all reservoirs of fuel oil and gas- 
oline, hydrogen plants, etc. are to be also placed under ground. 

An excellent descri.pt ion of the method of disguising an 
naval hydro-aeroplane station, written by Lieutenant Herb- 
ster occurs in report Uo. 9 of 1915 to which attention is in- 
vited. 

The Zeppelin shed at ^otsdam has also been painted, both 
sides and roof, so as to merge with the landscape, no matter 
from which direction the aviator approaches and this is 
apparently the general practice. 

The importance of having magazines and explosive fac- 
tories protected or concealed may be judged from the recent 
attack on Ludwlgshafen. The important ammunition factory at 
this place was attacked l>j a squadron of eighteen French aer- 
oxjlanes, although Ludwigshafen is nearly a hundred miles 
behind the German front . 

ADDITIONAL IIQTEu Oil SEi'EL'SE AGAINST 

AERIAL ATT.-VJX3 by Lieut. Ilcrbeter . 



Methods used:- 

1. CAPTIVE BALLOOIiS . 

One of the methods used by the Germans to 
repel attacks of enemy flyers is the use of a large captive 
balloon of the Parseval-Siegsfeld type. This type of balloon 
was used recently at ffrie&riohshafen to repel an attack by 
French flyers and its is claimed that it was successful in 
repelling the attack. This balloon, floating at a height 
from 800 to 1500 metres, has a better field of observation 
and a better point from which to resist an aerial attack than 
any other location, such as on the ground. The ordinary bal- 
loon 'of spherical form should not be used as it is not only 
unsatisfactory in regard to handling, but also affords a poor 
platform for the observer and gunner. This balloon should, 
if possible, be anchored directly above the group of build- 
ings to be protected • It should be armed with both machine 
gun and rifle. 



- 4 - 

The "Taschenbuch" for 1915 contains a description and 
several illustrations of the Parseval-Sicgsfeld captive "bal- 
loon. This balloon has been in active service for about 
seven years and has proven to be a very stable type of bal- 
loon in strong and variable winds. 

2 . TRANSPORTABLE ANTI -BA LLOON GUNS AND IPACHINE QUITS MOUNTED 

ON AUTOMOBILE TRUCKS WHICH HAY 3E ARMORED OR 

UN ARMORED. 

A number of these should be distributed along the approaches 
to the place to be protected. The gun mounted should be at 
least 6.5 c/m in calibre and if possible, 10.5 c/m in calibre; 
the higher the calibre the better. On pp.398 and 399 of the 
"Taschenbuch der Luftflotten, 1914" are seen several illustra- 
tions of the mounting of an anti-balloon rapid fire guns. 
On p. 399 is an illustration of the mounting of an anti-balloon 
gun on an automobile truck. On p. 395 are shown illustrations 
of a 7.1 c/m anti-balloon gun mounted on an automobile truck 
and a 7.5 c/m gun mounted in a field. On page 396 is shown 
a 10.5 c/m anti-balloon gun. 

3 • SEARCHLIGHTS for REPELLING- MIGHT ATTACK . 

The use of searchlights is both an advantage and a dis- 
advantage. However, it seems to be the only satisfactory 
method of discovering the location of an enemy's aircraft 
at night - especially when the night is very dark. If search- 
lights are used, they should be of the very highest possible 
power and should be mounted at the approaches to the city or 
port to be protected, so that they will sweep all these app- 
roaches. 

4. ONE OE HORE AEROPLANE SQUADRONS TOR INSTANT SERVICE . 

These should be located at a short distance from the 
yard or place to be protected and close l>j the approaches to 
this harbor or location, in order that the flyers whose duty 
it is to repel this attack may have time to ascend and engage 
the enemy flyers, or if possible, to cut off their retreat # 

5. THE PATROL OP PLYER3 PATROLLING ALL THE APPROACHES OE 

THE PLACE TO BE PROTECTED. 

This is especially difficult at night, but can very 
often be used. 



-culan sifee/ tract for jt nee fe of our, mount. 

mac/e in two Aatf c/rctes, an J So /Sec/ toae/Aer. 






Ste yo//on o/wAee / in /nacf 



JPfoi/f?//na 0/ flrmy /yW/ - a /r era/ A aun. 



fn^/rume^n/ /or c//rec//na /Ae //re, 0/ a arot/jb 0/ 
/?/)//- /j/rcra// 01/ /?s 



if 



Chrca m/ererce; of c//sA mar/ceeS 
in c/egree$ on Aont/retAo. 



Tfa'r yy//A mo//w 
in at /ma /A '"Srf /{/fade 



s@ % 5 



ffia/? &> e/eya//or? 0/ rnoan/ 
^Aown on pope SO. of 

* f/o/ a^erv Aoa/otpaar-Az/r />acA 
o/e/n )r extern ." 




J/jo</ A/ocA ry//A Aa/e, 
/Deo s> /e t/ on rrooc/ /#?£> 



/nocn/ne oar? 



/ leyat/o/i^ 



W/4& 



1 

flood upper mount {Ae /eys of /Ae 

f/e/</ me cA /ne oun mount- ere 

apreoe/ over Ate /r/ano/e. 

*fjunhnf for mac4/ne fun for 
atr/e/ cftfe/tte- 



*r 




See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.1 . ^ i^^u/n//// 

Need not be return 

f 

SUBJECT E R M A I- NATAL POLICY. J * W 

r) 

From Z No 346 Date liay 39, 1915^ ^ m 

Replying to 0. N. I. No. Date r^^nT^f^ ^ * 

6 ^f^( is-" SEP 1 \1915 

This morning I reciei32^4r^'t«l^phonic message 
from Admiral B e h n k e t Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff , 
saying he would like to talk with^ the Ambassador in regard to the 
recent torpedoing of the American ship "GULFLIGHT* and the 
hydroplane attack on the American ship , a CUSH ING*. 

The meeting took place in the Embassy at 13 
a clock at which I was present. Afterwards I had a short talk 
with Admiral B e h n k e alone. 

s 

The converation touched on many points besides 
the ones mentioned. Admiral B e h n k e spoke with great 
earnestness and with apparent conviction that the German attitude 
was a correct one 9 The tone of the conversation was in no sense 
provocative or unpleasant. 

THE »GULFLIGHT«. 

The German submarine which torpedoed the 
"GULFLIGHT* sighted the ship approaching accompanied by two vessels 
of the trawler type. One of these vessels had a very wireless 
installation. The trawlers occupied positions a little ahead of 
and on the bows of the steamer which positions are the best for 
attacking a submarine attempting to torpedo the ship. The flag of 
the ship was not visible, nor any distinguishing mark up to the 
time that the torpedo was fired. At that moment the flag on the 
staff on the poop came in sight but too late to stop the firing of 
the torpedo. The nearest trawler turned toward the submarine 
and attempted to ram her. Under the circumstances Admiral 
B e h n k e considers the captain of the submarine not liable to 
disciplinary measures, as he made a mistake which considering the 
circumstances were unavoidable. Of course full recompense would 
be made for damage. He hoped that our government would conside* 
it as an unintentional mistake which he considered that it was. 

«CUSHING«. 
In this case the officer of the hydroaerox>lane 
recognized no marks showing the ship to be a neutral and it was 
very much regretted that the attack had been made but it was hoped 
that it would be regarded as an unfortunate, unintentional 
accident. No damage had been made. 

'LUSITANIA*. 

On the subject of the "LUSITANIA" the Staff 
considered that they had acted within their rights and that 
while they deplored the loss of life which could not be foreseen, 
they considered that they had complied with international lav/ 
when they had published warnings in regard to the steamer. 
However, the subject was so bound up with other subjects that the 
reply to be given in the answer to the American note must be 
consulted before Judrinr the whole matter. 



•ft t «- 

This reply is to be submitted May 39th to our 
Ifcabassy and will appear in the ftarman n&f&p&pWB of lion lay 
May 31st. 

Admiral B e h n k e called attention to the 
propositions made earlier in the war to insure safety of 
neutral passengers that of convoy and of securing a* tree port* 
in Enrland to which no reply had been pivan. Admiral 
Behnke spoke of the nisuse of the neutral flap* especially 
the Scandinavian flaps t and of the paintings which he claimed 
was still done, I asked him if he had any evidence to show 
that such hatf occurred with the American flap* as no information 
had been piven us of such nisuse. He said he had no direct 
evidence but there h^A been some reports which he would send 
to the IWbassy. He thoupht they had cone from a Spanish port 
where Unplish s tempers had arrived. 

I asked Admiral 8 e h « tr e if any of the 
neutral ships torffdoed had been found to be Bnplish ships 
under false colors as I had n^.vBT seen any reports to show that 
such was the case. lie replied that he thoupht there had not 
been such a case. 

Admiral Behnke and the Ambassador each 
stated their positions in regard to the American delivery of 
ammunition which has been one of the preat factors in the 
Intense dislike of the Oerraan people for America. Afterwards 
Admiral B e h n k e -r^oke about the prowinp power o<f submarine 
warfare about an follows: With the inereasinp efficiency 
of the German submarine fleet due to the numbers now under 
construction and to the preatly increased efficiency of the 
units » it i^ certain that we can blockade Knpland absolutely 
so that not a sinple ship can pet in or out. If we surrender 
our rights to conduct the warfare of the sea with the submarine, 
we bar ourselves forever for securinp our rights under inter- 
national law for the free navigation of the ocean for our 
merchant marine. We can t her fore make no concessions which w41X 
lead to the abandonment of the submarine blockade. The captains 
of our submarines h&v^ orders to be most careful in their 
re~ard for neutral ships and the$r report havinp had opportunity 
to torpedo in one case as many as nineteen ships before a ship 
flylnp the British flap came alonp. Admiral 8 e h n k e 
said that to finish the submarine fleet to the proportions 
proposed would take four to five years. 



V">v 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct .31,19#®) ; - 

< 
Need not be returned, ^ 

SUBJECT Relation Between China and Japan. 
Fro* K No 12 Date May gist. 191 5. *fj 

niTnin jiim — -p^S^OSjj^r T~J 

Replying to O.N. I. He Date ^ 




It is an absolute fact that Japan's policy towards 
China is t© ultimately make China a dependency of Japan. 

There is n© doubt that Japan is in no way attempti: 
to help China to better herself financially or otherwise. 

Japanese actions towards China have been so high 
handed and crooked as t© cause the big: est contempt t© be 
felt by all foreigners in China towards Japan. 

The following is a direct translation ©f the Japanese 
Premier's speech, C©unt Okuma. 

The Government, with a view t© placing the peace ©f 
the ^ar'Sast on a permanent basis and f©r the furtherance of 
Sino-Japanese friendship, approached the Chinese Government 
in January last with seme diplomatic demands. fortunately 
these ne satiations have been brought t© a peaceful settlement, 
and 1 feel n@w quite confiient that the basi3 ©f Oriental 
peace has been consolidated and Sino-Japanese friendship all 
the more enhanced. The ©nly natter for regret is that hostile 
conditions in Europe still remain unimproved. I hope and 
trust with you all that the w©rthy efforts ©f the Allies will 
be duly crovmed with success, and that peace in the European 
Continent will be restored before Ion/ . 

The Government had cempiledtthe Budget for the 4th 
fiscal year of Taisho, embodying therein plans for financial 
and administrative readjustments, national defense, and various 
other important State projects laid down aiter careful delioera: 
ations. These Estimates were submitted to the Diet in December* 
lust, but unfortunately a difierence ©f opinion in the Rouse 
necessitated a dissolution and a general election. As a ccvnse- 
quonce, the Government had to follow precedent and enforce trie 
Budget fcr the preceding fiscal year, with the exception of 
ojects oci such urgency as to require pr t execution, and 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 



SUBJECT -oiation ietween China and Japan. 

Fr#m * *• » Date ^y -lut. 191o. 
Replying to O.W.I. No Date 

(2) 

to no t these expene.es the i-overament has decided to introduce 
& Supplementary Budget and other necessary Bills. It is ay 
earnest desire that you will in these circumstances exercise 
every sincere effort for the attainment of the important object 
for which We have c illed here. 

BAHC . -TC'S CE. 
?he i'cl cv/in ; is a direct translation 3aro c jg's 
oeoh, the rorei ieter. 

Gentlemen,- I have the henor of addressing you en the 
subject of the negotiations that have practically neen concluded 

between Japan and ohina, except which there is little to be 

:orted in our foreign relations since th ion of 
the Diet. As, however, the text ©f the traeties and 
panyin te , -.7hieh are now being x>repared by the representa- 
tives of the tv/o countries, are not yet ready for publication, 
my state ont or to-day 'Till ne aril; moral in scope 
and mere or less abstract in character. 

I reported te you in the last I lea, with the 
occupation on Hovomber 7th by tne imperial Army fc&i llavy, of 
Maochau Bay, the base ef German activities in the Far >:ast, 
the main object with rchieh we entered into war with Germany 
was attained. In order to meet the consequent exigencies ef 

tnation, and at the m rae time actuated by the aesire 
to promote friendly relations between betw en Japan and China 
and also to ensure a It ace in the ar ;iast by stren ~ 
ening t'.e Impire 1 .sitien in that region, the trial 
Government presented to the Chi nese Government the followi. 
proposals, irhich Include t.:ose r the .>revi2ico of 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction ©f Oct. 31, 1900) 



SUBJECT elation Between China and .Japan. 
Frem k *• 18 Dat « J. l l Jlr. 

Replying t© O.N. I. He Date 

Shantung, together ./ith those relating t© the recognition ®f 
Japan's special position in l&nehuria and t© the solution ®f 
various other questions. 

■The Exactions. 
1. Proposals relating t® the previnee oi :ihantun : 

1. ent ©n the part vt China t© consent t© all saatters 
that say fee agreed upon between the Inperisl ont and the 
Gernan Gevemment with regard t® the disposition c I rivets, 

intere ts, and concessions, which, in virtue ©f treaties ©r 
otherwise, GrQrm&ny p@ssess©s In relati©n te the previnee ©1* 
hantung; 

2. ^n^agenent for non-alienation ©i* ^shantung province; 

3. Grant t© Japan of the ri&ht or construction ©f a railway 
cennecting Chefoe ©r Lun,-$:ou with the Tsinan-Kia©chau Railway: 

4. The Chinese Government t© &j>en the principle cities I 
the province ©f Jhantung for the residence and trade ©f for- 
eigners. 

6. 11. Proposals relating to ;>euth llanchuria and "Astern 
Inner Mong©li 

1. -iXtension c o terras ©f the lease ®f j.'©rt Authur and 
Dairen, and those ©f the South Manchuria and . iintung-I-.iukden 
Railway t© a period ©f ni net -nine years respectively; 

2. Japanese subjects to be pemitted to lease ©r ©wn lai 
nece ary eitnor fer erecting buildin :s ©f various kinds for 
commercial and industrial uses or for cultural pur ©a; 

3. Japanese subjects to be permitted t© re :ide, travel, and 
car y on business of varion , coranerci J. t industri. 

or otherwise; 

4. Japanese oubjoctc to be tt ft t> - .its of 
cert in specified mines; 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 



SUBJECT elation Between China ami Japan. 
From K »© 12 Date U*J 51tr*. 191b m 

Replying te O.N. I. No Date 

(4) 

6. The consent ©f the Imperii art t© fee obtained in 
advance when China, proposes t© grant a railway ccnco: ; i©n t© 
subjects ©f a third m ©r t© procure a supply ©f capital 

?on a third or for the construction of ax, railway ©r t© 
raise a lean Xrem such security ©X duties ©r taxes; 

6, The Iaperlal iriitiiiiii'iinmiiiti t© be consulted before engaging 
Advisers or Instructors regard* political, financial or 
Mlitary matters; 

V. The m " control of the Kirtn-Changchun Railway 

to be transfer ed to Japan far a fcerm ©f ninety-nine .'s. 

III. rroposals relating to tho Han-* . .- La y: 
1. Kav." r& to the close relatione between Japanese 

capitalists and this flompn ny. the Chinese (?©vernraent to agree 
t© bring the ttempajQf at an opportune moment under joint 
Japanese and Chinese management and not to dir ©r permit 
the Comppji;- tc so, without Japan's consent, of any right 
©t property belonging tc tho Company; 

z. Owing to the necessity i'or the protection ox the interests 
od Japanese at li^ts, the Chinese Government t© on not 
t© omit rithout the consent ©i" the ueiapany any ©ne ctner 
t'-an tho C to work mines situated in the neighborno^d 
©r those belonging t© th<- ypGRy, and also to obtain its 
previous consent in caso it is proposed to take measures 
which many bo normal! to ai'i'ect the Company directly or I: ctly, 

IV. proposal at Chinese Government engage noa to 
ionate ©r to lease to another . ower any ports or i ©n ©r 

any islands ©ff the coast oX China. 

V # rroposals re latin.-.- ro s©lution ©X pending questions 
and ©triors: 

1. The Central Oovernnent t© on influential Japanese as 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 



SUBJECT R»le*i©a itween China p.nd Japan. 
From II o IS Date May ^Ist. l*^lo. 

Replying to O.N. I. No Date 

(5) 

political, * „ ilitary advise? 

2. The Chinese -Government t® reco rignt ©f .or 
ship for the ose of build! Japanese hospit. , temples. 
and schools thereon in the interior of Chin 

8, The police in localities, whore such B ©nts are 
necesc-ar", to do . laoed unaer joint J- I and Chinese 1- 
nistrati©n ©r Japanese t© be ei od in police ofric#s la zh 
localities; 

4. China to obtain fr 3 o srt&ln quant i' 

©r arms or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese 
and Chinese arrangements and to ne sup ; lied with experts and 
wt ©rials f 

&♦ J i to be m the rights or i \ction of the rail- 
way to : *t ' t aehang 5-ine and ©f 
anchan' a and F?an©3 - aocheu railm 

6. la view c between t'': .'evince ©£ an 

and Formosa and the a ment respect: - 11 :.:ati©n of 

iJrien, Japan to be consulted uhoneror foreign c needed 
in connection with the r tys f rbor works in that 

provin e; 

V. The Chinese Government to reoc: a the rignt oz preaehin. 
by Japanoso in China. 

UJIOUI 
In those proposals, which wer ith the object 
as aoove stated, there is not anet be re£ ct as 

oit i natural demand or a reasonable wish on the part of 
Japan. inclua© no it- d.ch is incompatible with tn© 

rinciple ©i territorial integrity, equal opportunity and th© 
©pen d , which the imperial rovernmont hav© in the interest 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oot. 31,1900) 



subject Halation Bttwdsn China and tf&pas. 

From & HO 12 Date May ^lst.1915. 
Replying to O.N. I.N© Date 

(6) 

•f China declared t© the Beware from time to tim©» Thnx regard- 
in 9 province ntung, in view ©f China's obvious inability 

prevent the revival of Gc i influence there, it is natural 
that Japan, who at i •* "ce has Just succeeded in expel- 

ling trie disturbing factor, should se 3z means ±*©r perpetuating 
the result of her victory se s to prevent the r earanee e£ 
Germany in that pro vine ich will be as such od jice to 
Japan as to Chin* . • regards 3©ut3 churia, ' : predo- 
minant posit.' en, about which there is no-thin i i. consider- 
ing the close and special relet ioi ie has with that : :n, is 
univera&lly reecpnised. 3© is almost si r with tern 
Inner lia which 1 t close"'. tan inseparably connected 
.anuria geographically as well as ee ; cal<y. In 
octs, hewever, Japan's position in these re^rions has 
hithertobe n net specifier L recepnised fcf the Chinese Govern- 
Mnet. The result -ettable outgrowth ox' various 

quosti >en the two countries, thus leaving much to be 
desired in their relatione. It is therefore nost necessary in 
the interest ti ' I »as of. th 1 o countries that fall 
re: tion by the Chinr ©vemnent ef Japan's natural position 

these re be obtained, r« rcr t3 Kan-Yeh- 

Company, with which Japaneee capitalists are so closely 
Identified tie object ef th sal As to ird the o nySs 
best interest, while as to r r non-alienation of 

China ©easts it is only intended to inciple of 

China's territorial integrity *ni« arton dec the 
Imperii X over nont. 

■ ides in order to to the friendly relations of the 
two countries it 1 le that several oenctin questions 

and others, ich aro ©what diT-orent in character from Those 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 



SUBJECT 
From K No 12 Date May ,31st, 1915^ 

Replying to O.N. I.N© Date 

(7) 

air , i en this ©ce\ i. e 

>erial it t3 e presented as t isaes e. . in 
pr ... m t© -ass Be** at and 

adviseci them to & e ther. Interest of the friendship 
•f the two count! Iqx the s ex their mutual benefit. 

,la f t -hine eat refused abselut - 
ly to discus:- those reli olio. th©se 

included : y. f while consent as to the ©there was withheld 
under varx tea. tar! such t© the 3 ret ti er- 
ial uovernnont trio terms ©f their pr©p©sals were permitted t© leak 
fut in es: trated s anS the proceedings ©f the conferences 

ore a . oar in the t thus the 

pro \ re 3 s ©f the 3.. itiem . 

:ithstunding this attitude ©r the Chinese Government, the 
Imperial G-o vernnent „ throughout the twenty-five conferences extend- 
ing over ncro than three months, fully shewed their sincerity by 
repeatedly e I ining the metives of the proposals and endeaver- 
ing t© hear the unreserved views ©f the Chin *•▼ n»fill« eir 
i co rt to roach a satisfactory conclusion ©f the neg©- 

tiat in a spirit off c©nclliatlon appeared t© have had s©me 
ef!oct ©n the Chinese <*©vernmont; f©r the Japanese prop©sal res- 
pesting the previnco oi img was as a whole assented to with 

II a slight t of I tea 3, while regarding the Jcuth Manchuria 
quentio: nt was reached in resjoct oi Items l,4,t>,and G 
with 3c Iterations, and ©f Item 1 relativ© to the Xirin-Chan - 
chu.ii .ailway With understanding that a radical a: ont of the 
existing loan ccntaect 11 bo made in a manner nest ecus 
to Ja . But with r the rt .nt questien ©f ri hts 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 

SUBJECT Relations Between China and Japan. 
Frem & Ut y> Date ^ 21st. l^lo. 

Replying t© O.N. I.N© Date 

(8) 

respect in g residence and land tenure, the Chinese 'Jovermaent pre- 
posed to put various restrictions, and as to the question ©f 
Eastern Inner HSamgaUA and the quesxions ©numerated under Grwp 
V., they recused to consider them ©n the ground that these quest- 
ions were derosaterv t© the sovereign rights g£ China ©r that 
the:;- conflicted with the treaties with other cowers. In spite 
•£ the Japanese Minister's repeated explanations that such was 
not the a . Apparently the sincere spirit of conciliation ©n 
Japan's sid was n©t fully appreciated fey the Chinese authorities. 
The Imperial Government 8© ;ever that • . ;©r$ con- 
clusion of the negotiations was absolutely essential to the main- 
tenance ox peace in the Orient, presented on the ;:6th April a 
revised draxt in which the Chinese contentions were takaa into 
consideration and s©me concessions were riade. 

In this revised draft, which was formulated in deference 
t© the views of the Chinese rnraent which had been expressed 
at tr.o conferences, proposals regard stern Inner Ilongelia 
were sor>arated fro* the proposals respecting oouth Manchuria and 

item Inner Mongolia under the secend group above referred t© 
and China was left free in Item z to alter the warding "leas© ©r 
•wn land" to "lease or purchase land," to change it into "lease 
land for a rt ofc an lone* term;" or simply into 'lease land" 
with the understandiiLi; that a lone lease with the privilege ©f 

L renewal shall be per ■■.' , I rth©r as restrie- 
tior: ;n tne proposals mentioned in Itoma a and a, passports 
were t© be presented to the local auxhoriiiesana* re gi stored, the 

Lio© laws and ro t ralatiOi d oy tne Japanese Consuls war© 
observe , .no taxes, ni d, tc a, wjiile 

a civil cits tno court of t; . ants tt iity 

was to va the Jurisdiction as in apon ma. , with tne on:: 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31st ,1900) 



SUBJECT I&ti .. | r< a. 

From K Ne Jg Date lst, 3 915. 
Replying to O.N. I. No Date 

I (9) 

proviso that the ci'iicials ojl I untries shall be permitted 
te attend I at each ether 1 & GGu.ru to ;oh tne proceedings, 
and civil suits c ing lana between Ja - 3© and Chinese were 
to be jointly ;icied accer te the la .a local 

customs ©f tfhl . 

KB or 

The proposals relating to Eastern Inner . 14 §ra con- 
fined te (1) joint' enter arises of and Ujiiiese inagrieul- 
turaland auxiliary ittdnst , I ) preferential right* with res- 
pect railway loans and loans to bo ?od by the taxes, ana 
(3) increase res. ards t? ...n-Yeh- Company 
the Chinese Government were they had frequently declared at 
the conferences, to approve 1 mt that nay be cor eluded 
in future betawaa the C nd Japanese iTer its joint undertak- 
ing and net t© confi ^ it, or to a 'inlise it, -without tne 
isent of the interested Ja we capit ta, or to permit it 
%i loan ojrher than Japanese. iras 

the - i;i©n ef tre J ose coasts, t ish of the Chinese 
Gc it that it lo t ef a voluntary declaration 

ei tnat Government on the subject waa respected. ?inally as 
re s the pri de under Grou '., ;stions were made 
accc to t its made at the conferences by tne Chinese 
r reseat ives U) that tne Chinese Government should, in ease of 
aecessit; re, o ploy Japanese advisers; (2) that tne lease 
er purch of lan< c the purpose or building sen 1 el ho; 
pitals in the interior i tied by th< nese Govorn- 

ent; ) that the Chinese tfovornmont Bheul omo In fu- 
t jy of icors to Japan to o arrar. its either 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 

SUBJECT 

From K Wo u Date ? I9a ^ 

Replying to 0. IT. I. No Date 

(10) 

r purchase xm& rros Japan or ior establishing an arsenal in 
China under the 3©int C d Chi it; and the 

<e £evo :;..■ at ©n their art. t the Chinese content ions 
into consideration, ( ^©ed t© withdraw the 1 respeetigs 
land Tor build:' >i tetaples whil 3ti@n i ree- 

dem oi' preaching for future ciiseussien, and proposed (5: that the 
d©3lred rai ' lid bo pasted t© 

Japan if ther - s no objection to it on t. . art ei a»y other 
Power et once- ieno in guest: should n©t 

he granted ' wer until Japan had reached an agreement 

by direct -©tiatien WltiJ tne interested part, * we pi 

■ ; merely to nta on record, 

vS ro '. b joint •••olice nitration, tJ 
irawn, a c~: lie- ;o 

It en 6 r ont I ichuria. 

(7 Lth regard to ico the Chinese * e 

, otes, t3 at t oiild not 

tt 1. -or the right to build a shipyard, eoali: 

' at ion, or any other military t i blishment ©n cr along 
st ©f tfc id previnoe, or to alio* ; isment 

Lt I ' foreign capit 1 n the aot. 






tii&on of the revised drai't 

1 Oct ( at 

agre U th rait, Japan would, 

in case :;hc ©sing of tne leased 

rrit ry oi Klaeehau , as the renult ©i* tne ;e 

. ci' tno | r t ry 

to C. t it 'nod as a con ©rcial port, 

ion be e lished tnere ana an international 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction ©f Oct. 31, 1900) 



SUBJECT Japan, 

From K No 12 Dat * g let, X91S, 

Replying t© O.N. I. No Date 

(11) 

ee . Is© led i f and 

•rraa Birding tin s- 

pcsal . uclic estanl- ants leetiex . Ger- 
many 'S Oi ■ "id he :• of 
nor. iate orci i rt of 
highest J ;ien in the 
rt v it rly 3 la 
of the leased territory; and Japan havir it 
ree of , sue la to c;. : it ills, 
and is ccrr -an to return it to Chine; bt.t 
of lered her ©wn will te return Maochau, ©©cause respected the 
pr:= ' ra&l i: , S to 
net r fr to :ain r- 
al t. 

- 
She Chin- eat* hov/evor, railed to reeip ta 
'a sentimnt of nod&tion ana conciliation, id ©n 1st 
jntod a counter draft '*?hieh the-/ declared to be their 
r. in tail tor drait taegr reinsert, Brit rd 
t© Seat , to grant a l©n lease ©x laad t© Japanese 

'.eoaaaod that Japanese uiri submit unconditionally t© 
Chinese polio 11 actions arisir; 

out of i dispul or bet eso and Chinese or 
between - lvos should co; .ctor tne jurisdiction 

or Chinese courts. ; ;orn Inner Mtag lian, baey put 

limitations on the e: eo to permit 

the main point ©IT the Japanese td t ich was the joint enter 
prise ©f Japanese and ^'haaose i roltare and in- 

■'., er th eso tfev ont e same 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 51,1900) 



SUBJECT elations Between China an. 

From He - Date . , - , 

a x^ Hay «->l3t. IV It). 

Replying t© 0. IT. I. No Date 






(1 

tino the unconditional surrender ef the leased territcr iae- 
ch recagnitiea ©f their right to participate in the ecraing 

■ci at ions feetwe -n Japan and Ger , a* the in- 
dc i cation "b:; Japan for the Inevitable losses cered 1 
Chi i cons ice I ~ ji and the immediate rem©*. 

rfcablishiaents c ^anese army ana 
pr. ' ^d torriter: . ised 

Lth the eieeptien or that relating t: ien 
contained in "r 7. o<: the 3 ese revised c t these 

more t record:: ants Etad© by tne 

b representative at the conferences . Indeed , in their 
, the Chine ^veriment, in i e re 

9tat i "by their ropr natives, revived in 
some c rticl r hieb "n^en wit ssm, and ide 

ions in matters all . or, itwas clearly 

3 ibl ; to ouch d i the 

surre an, the iaaeani: ir 

tence c - .■■•□an war, and t 

ition of the Chinese ent in tj c neg©tiatl©z 

. I overnment declared 

;ainir >e demands gave their final 
, so lor . ecu o to 

, n® h if a satis:; ry settle- 

irecticnL . I 
, ;he terms e. draft art absoli;. 

ill 



In view of t c-' t ' , t l© 

;olor; mxinue 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction ef Oct. 51,191®) 

SUBJECT u 

Frem Ne 12 Date . -' * 

Replying to O.tt.I.Uc Date 

as; o t@ aveid 

ceniplieatu . 

» » ■ . • ve 

QttA.11 Due it@S8i I. te i . ?r 

discussion the i t vien e£ that 

relating t rhieh hat to :: eg .. the 

Chinese rnnont; and ©n , . lose 

Minister at Peking to « ieci; r . - to the Chinese 

Gevernraent and at the ■ time te netiry them I ; should 
after taatore eensi , ant %4 

drait not later than 6 P/ra/ o & dth* the 

serial §• . Its receive act i e by that 
j.r, ko sue. .... ary. 

The I 9 U*'. it, equally solic:< rial 

Gebernriont nee e£ Orient, decided 

lese minister 
to a ne pi- ooeptli r pr 

re hr t te a satisfactory conclusion . 

oati- netes tve - 

a cencrc :*rsi t© these negetiatiei , -ister at Lng is 

JLreai ... e Imperii 1 ,<ovor- , in ccn- 

CLltatll Lth the Chinese autnoritie nd it is believed tnat 

the cc in oinm inertly be presented te 

raiii ien and it is eur iticn te ., bei'ere 
yt e el" ici; en the i it 

moment arrii . e lnperii 1 

i xnei:e agreements cerne o ierc. , the s< 

ti«n ' it of t had been 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31,190' ) 

SUBJECT 3 :1# 

From K Ho 12 Date 5 

Replying t© O.W.I. No Date 

(14) 

pending between id China to t. tneir cardie. 1 

jns and t alt the ri ends! 

countries *. v id the peace ©£ the Far east will 

"oo placed on a ion than erer. 

ekir, .aotve of 
7 31st. 1915, e i on Baron Kate's ; . shewln g t 
id. if t3 3d Chinese regards tr r« 

It c i& that the c ! 

Is eountr . 

The striking ii fsiea left en the normal MM fr#M 
perusal c Baron ers of 

the nese Diet, wale! eed in . uo, is tne sense 

inteliictual insincerii ro® tr.e r to en . 

"here is no inevitable . ah no 2 ie 

ut subject i . ite - that iatx»4 by the 

dc to pr- y relations hot China" 

panose tfove rat presented to the pre a 

lich bat a r, unfettered by the restraints 
ictiens of civili , ild exact of a .eaker state 
not a victim c qaest. is not a little astounding 
at one © i iir o's first iisters of State should a 
har rdiheed to rehoaroe in j arliaaent and to the 

world the t i i tion: ed in tne Japanese ircfce 

and at tno sane t -rt 1 • is n< 
cannot be ^ r a "natural dom or a "reas 

on the part of Japan and t t none +f ^ero :-.*s i:ioc. 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900) 



, 



SUBJECT ' ti. 

From K No 12 Date &ay 3lst. 1915. 

Replying to O.N. I. Mo Date 

(15) 

rineiples o±* the territorial independence and 5 rity 
ef Chi. iti ef the open door in taJ at v . It 5. t easy 

: ieat* the mo. a ^ce of the "natural" demands and 
"reasonable" eata tea* la the Protocol of January lb in 
apter an those use daily Hews and Leader when 
the cocunont was first published la Saglaad by the . heater 
Guardian: 

rould concert the province •: eataag into 
iero of influence: 1 would make nehuria 
for practical purposes, C. eee; they w \ve Japan 

rfc ainer |. ef the 8 valle, , 
incident* .1 V; .:h:Le ; aid he the power te seTer Herthea £re» 
Southern China; they weald ; j1vq Japan the control ef China 1 s wax 

oaitieas; they wo 3 e?er the Lielag ef important area 
ef China to ,n; they would, set Japanese experts i*i control 
ef C ' political, mil , irs; they would 

sot. tctrln or .tiv ainet all .Lowers except 

Japan; in* to t- iterpriao of Japanese 

pe I : . scheme otf this Mud would pat all 

China aa 7sor; . ti ie f it woul la* 

)ril extensive British eoamerelal 1 .1 interests in 

Ch; , nd it would knock the botto: o a lo- Japanese 

eaty, which guaranteed tno integrity of China and equality of 
opportunity to all reworr. 

Ho r©n Kate's: re- t teraent of tae Japanese cor.- 
tentien concerni >uth Kancnuria, it in time to point out I 
the war with od not for tno oenq Sout 

cnuria - this wae cut fe of the 

.r dowa to the Treaty of Portsnout ;er - bat or t.' 
declared purpose of icrcin. the iti -ra/d 



(See Paragraph 4, Instruct itn tf Oct. 31, 1900 

SUBJECT Relation Between China and Japan, 

Fr ? m £ ' »• 12 Date . Iyi5. 

Replying t# O.N. I.N© Date 

(161 

that their presence in South 2-Ianehuria menaced certain vital 
interests ox' Japan; and the Japanese succession te .m. 
rights in the previnee was demanded and justified les in the 
sense that tnese rights were fruits ex" eemquest than that such 
a successien was necessary for the, protection ©f Jftp inst 

Asian ressi©n. Cn this view it will be seen how very 
fallacious is the :estion that, because Japan succeeded in 
partially defeating the Russians en the i'lanchurlan plains, she 
is entitled new te demand ©f China righto whlea r-oulci. never I 
been cencoded t© nor in 1\ . saiO it i ross misreading of t 
facta ex history to contend that the Japanese warred with t 

ians in the series of indecisive battles ending with the 
struggle oi' Mukden In order to save . ihuria far China, They 
did nothing ef the kind, believed, wre. , that 

the extension ef Russian influence and power t© the Liaotux: 

-linsula was inconsistent with the ex ace ef a Great Japan; 
id it was this alone that inspired them t© snails: ssia 
by deliverj chereus blew at t nips 

in Part Arthur and thus eommenae i P in which defeat was certain 
If 1< • n sueceu withheld. Nothing ox a has 
enured t© Chj y the retreat of the ns rrem South I.lan- 
churi . I retreat has resulted in the reaoval of a Pewar 
t© who. -eneny wrs never but an irresolute e a, 

a vision, e ' e lav's sense ox dreaming our - o thin; of 
Imperial lure and luxury - and the substitution of anot wer 
to whom tno subjection ©x China and tr a or her unnv. 
millions and continental resources are noc ty if Jopaa i 
to pursue succc- r arch oi* mastery acre I e werl . 



v Heed not be returned. ^ 




" 

CI/) 

Date o f Report. . *Ma y 51^1915. Z^-- /?-^\)\j\ 

-o-o-o-o^-c-o-o-o^^™^'^ 

1. Constantinople. 

""Since making last report the Battleship "Torgnt-Reis" 
has made several runs into the Sea of Karmora, usually going out at dark, 
without lights, and returning about sunrise* On one occasion it remained 
absent for several days; during that time it was anchored in the Dardanelles. 
Two aeroplane bombs were dropped very close to it, whereupon the ship got un- 
derway and returned to the Golden Bora. These bombs exploding $n the ground 
kill or maim cattle,horses and soldiers, within a range of 50 yards. When an 
aeroplane appears the troops lie down or repair to the trenches, if any are 
near. At present the ex-GOSBSIT is in Stenia Bay surrounded by sand lighters, 
and barges. She has not moved during last two weeks, The "Torgut Reis", 
"Barbarossa","Midilli" (e-;-Breslau),and remaining large vessels of the Turk- 
ish navy, are in the Golden Hbm# Special precautions, in the way of chains 
and beams protect the Stamboul bridge* 

2. On Kay 25th. , about 12.45 p.m#,a submarine (English 
or lirench) entered the bay and was sighted 300 yards to the S.3. of this 
vessel, about a foot of the periscope shov&ng. Soon after the shore batteries 
and infantry opened fire; whereupon it submerged and fired one torpedo in a 
westerly direction and struck the (Transport "Stamboul", lying at anchor off 
Tophane landing, and tore a hole about 15 feet long abreast the engine room. 
The hole shows about two feet above the water line. Another torpedo was ' 
fired in the direction of two transports, anchored in the middle of the Bos~ 
phorus distant about 1000 yards;this was a miss. She "Stamboul" was not load- 
ed, and tugs succeeded in getting her into the Golden I-fcrn. This vessel went 
to a point off Uclma Ba^tehe and asked permission to proceed to Bebek f Toflday 
permission was received to go to 3ebek,and will proceed thither tomorrow. 
Field guns are placed at intervals along the water front, and every suspicious 
object is fired at. Mfle firing at porpoises and floating bits of wood goes 
on every fl€j» All troops on transports were at once disembarked (about 10,000) 
and were marched off *• proceeding by land to Gallipoli* 2To large transports 
have left the harbor since. Smaller ones have gone out, two are known to have 
besn sunk by submarines. An American reporter was on one of these, and acted 
as interpreter and hailed the Oom-ander of the Ml, who ordered all hands to 
the beats. The submarine conr'ander went on board and found the vessel loaded 
with i 15-o.m. gun and g large quantity of ammunition* Seeing a strange ves- 
sel a$ .roaching he returned to the submarine and withdrawing to I point about 
300 yards away, fifed a torpedo which sank the transport. In all cases where 
authentic reports have cor^e in, the Snglish allow the crews to escape before 
sinking the vessel. Rifle-fire is employed to bring the ships to a stop. The 
German submarine,at the Dardanelles, is reported to be the U-2l;came by way of 
Gibraltar;and is to be joined by three others being pat together at lol ♦ 
There are said to be several sub^iarines belonging to the Allies in the Sea of 
ISarmorajbut their base cannot be located altho guards are placed along the 
shoras and on the islands; and a great deal of digging into the ground being 
done • ■ rantly in search of concealed stores. The spy system on both sides 
Ifl excellent. Cur shift of anchorage was made known, in a mystfcious manner, 
to our iaymaster by t civilian at Dedeagatch the day after the shift was made, 
althc no report was sent by us or anyone connected with the Embassy. 

3* Severrl heavy detonations have been heard in the Sep 

Of i'.armora during the past week|but as nothing is polished in the local papers 
that can be construed ?s favorable to the Allies, the causes are unknown. An 
American, returning from t trip in the Marmora, reports a vast amount of wreck- 
age on the water at various points., The papers did not allude to the subma.r- 



ine f s visit to the harbor rltho it tooJtjziSfle in daylight within 250 yards of 
the crowded water front. 

4. The people are confident and calm, the /rmy splendid 

in appearance and magnificently equip ed throughout. The ships of the nr>vy 
ara well handled and tfl ear very smart as far ps can be observed. 



Sage 2* 

Country. Turkey. Port Constantinople. 

Report from U.S.3.SCCRPIC1J. 

Date of Report. , *Bgy 3fo ljjjlg. 

-0-0 -O -0-0~0-0-<>-0-0-0-0^-0*" , 'd'" , -0-0-0 -0-0 -0-0 -o-o-o-o -o-o-o-o -o-o-o -o- 

5. The qk-BR33L£U returned from a trip to the 
Blaolc Sea and escorted two loaded colliers from the Turkish mine about j 
100 miles to the Mst of the Bosphorus* fcierous colliers have been 
sunk by the Russian fleet; a sailor, returned from one of the sunken col- 
liers.reported nine sunk in one day* He also reported that large raid- 
ing parties of Russian soldiers were n the coast. All private accum- 
ulations of coal nave been taken over by the Government, or the owners 
notified that it would be taken as needed* 

6. Dardanelles* 

The "Torgut Reis" and "Barbarossa'^by reason 1 
of the great angle to which their large guns can be elevated, have been 
employed to fire over the peninsula* The firing has been witnessed by 
some of our observers, but the effect can only be judged by the word of 
the authorities* It is claimed that they have done great damage to the 
Allies 1 fleet. Since the advent of the German submarine the Allies* 
fleet has been withdrawn, only destroyers now remaining in the vicinity' 
of the peninsula* This considerably weakens the position of the invad- 
ing forces on shore* At /ri-Burnu the Allies are in rather a precarious 
position f having advanced only a short distance from the beach* Their 
trenches are, in some places, not over t?airty yards from the Turks, while 
thelrmposition is dominated by batteries situated on the high hills in 
front of them* Erom Sedd-ul-Bahr the advance is checked, and the Turks 
are taking the offensive* The withdrawal of the fleet makes this exped- 
ition appear hopeless. The effect of the fleet's fire on the shore bat- 
teries is practically nil;only one gun, so far, having been damaged - ac- 
cording to a reliable authority* 

SIGiraD:- J. P. M0RT01. 



J 1 'V 



led not be 

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) 



SUBJECT cb*aa£ I fc&IH&--l&&%-4 

- .iia. — 

Date 



r 

,31 




r i 
From... ...No. 135 




Replying to 0. N I. No. 



A mmm > <m* j+ 



Date 



-■ 



/-•O-v/v 



7? f\$>&mrjd 




1« 






■ 



;ri-: - 






\t 



1*1 



• >3.oc|c&© - 









tints <kx 

1 




H i f 



. 



V©0 



- It , f ' - X* 

•at!: - : - J f - "" 

lorn 1*"' - •. * *■ *# • 



... 



B0W lino 



m 






■r-.-. ■'- I 






<*- *"* : H ' 






o 






>r 



»■.»• 



'**** 




Need not be returned. 



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 19001 



SUBJECT Conait'oiD m £*£&?* ,^L 



From 



.. No. 



flte£. It 

137 . Date ... May 



Replying to 0. N i. No. mmm0mmm ... Date 







X, I 






0' 10 



... 






I » 

1 mi e •■ "iitif 






- v -v* ' ' „. JfcV/t*JUI 



9 Mr 



know a.:. 



o 

Mbcro $■ 

210 to lc 



c 






t »1 



- 



' 









■.*. ». - Cv.-U' 

4 Mi ■■" '■■-■ 






if 



•lr© tten Quito uboks*. slit i f an < 

Nf , ana a re 5 t cr ivc 



, ,>o* 






■ 



v ? on , 

'ora? ten 

lta$ Xict re 

0. » 



v * 









, 






31 W A>L 







i 1 
























c 



• May f 1( 
city denouncing Giolitti and 



XT. 



largest of the demonstrations, bitt all during the 



f 



el'. crisis 

tmt oo ttse 1 * -ntiX i 

teste r. 

*,tli hrvi. 



jl woe res 

9 

1*0X1 *o!\zzt t 9 '■'■-'' 

r o teigo • . as 

- May 2 End. - 

I ^ Mil .*■■■— II —■ ■■ — ■■ 






'- 



b 

■*•■£/ * '*** M • ■ • 

a formal notice '■:■ WB£ 

■ 

i_ ** ** ** 

..;■-. , 









■ 



POM* 



*/ . ^ $ 



.--.,. 






v I^^^^^^H 






. .lOGt- 



. 



'■•V «, <?tvft T 



-ilia.- 






Qth» * It 

)-ib#iapA*) Pol 



M t mw mi\ w •*'*• • *'* ■" 



[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] 

CONFIDENTIAL. 



( s^j£ , cr;....... su&MA - R _ I .jf E .__ P0S6 j. B j. L . I . T . I . E&i - 




From 



No a49- 



Date 



Replying to 0. N, I. No. Date 



^.osu 




The recent success of German submarines in sinking 
British battleships at the Dardanelles shows the increasing range 
of the submarine and 
duo ted by the German 



the vigor of this arm of the service as ocn- 
Navy. 



If these boats made the run from the most advanced German 
port Zeeortlgge, they had over 3000 miles to go. If they weftt from 
an Austrian port, the problem was much more simple. During the 
winter there were numerous rumors that submarine parte were on 
their way by rail to Austria and it is quite practicable that they 
were assembled there. 

Nevertheless, if the submarine easily capable of crossing 
the Atlantic is not actually ready, such boats undoubtedly eocn 
will be. To fuel on the American side of the Atlantic, consider- 
ing the efficiency of the present day intelligent services, would 
not be an insurmountable difficulty. There are many deserted 
harbors on the coasts of Canada and in the West Indies and along 
the Spanish Main and plenty of agents to attempt to run a cargo 
where directed. A great success might be had against an unpro- 
tected fleet at anchor and greatly popularize a war. It would 
have also a very demoralizing effect on commerce. The great 
method of prevention lies in being fully cognizant of the destina- 
tion of fuel suitable for submarine use as is being done in the 
Mediterranean. On the declaration of war by Italy, a Dutoh 
steamer loaded with oil sailed without her clearance papers, but 
was overhauled and brought back by men-of-war. It was supposed 
that her fuel was to be used by enemies submarines. 



• -x 



1* '■ » 

I. > ■- * 



paiutuaj aq ox 



QNV1SI 3QOHU '±UOd/W3N 






3031100 HVM 1VAVN S Tl JO S3AW4e«* 



n avw 



ON 

VUVW 
JT3HS 



AHvyan 

303tTO0 BVA\ 1VAVN 



SDSEHf) nm * 



h?i tosoot 



■o lV 



■oft >/tf 



- *-s r- r-r f^ T « 



r> ^T /-i •— r 



s 



4 




i 



.*