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MAY 1915
NWC ARCHIVES
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DECLASSIFIED
J915-T5
declassified
Not to ba take#^^- ^^t-
from Library
if
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SUBJECT
|Sr«- Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]
Jtifeed not be reiuvtiea, § /
EFFECT OF MINE EXPLOSIONS.
v Z ,, ^15 n , May 1, 1915. 1Cl1
From —Jvo Date ' : , 191
Replying to 0. N. T. No - Date^ i^z/_ A^^M
'7^9 ^^
I have had opportunity to see the reports
and talk with two of the captains of the American steamers
blown up by wines. Reports on the blowing up of the »CA?JB"
and •EVELYN" have already been submitted and a copy of the
report of the "QREENBRIAR "explosion accompanies this report.
The feature which I desire to bring out is
that while in one case the explosion was where it might be
expected, under the bow, yet the other two cases the explosions
were amidships ( • CARIB* ) and aft ( « OKBEMBRIAR").
From the circumstances governing the various
cases it does not appear probable that the ships-? were attacked
by submarine "oats.
It would therefore appear that either the
mines are usually connected together, or that there is a
delayed action in the mechanism.
The captain of the "CARIB8, while on board
steamer which rescued him, heard something to the effect, that
the mines were connected torether, but in what manner and to
what extent he was unable to say.
SHIPBUILDING, MUNITIONS, AND TRANSPORT AREAS.
Need not be returned.
MAY 1915
^CEIvefD
uai
RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons,
dated 29 April 1915;— /or,
COPY " of Report and Statistics of Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions,
and Transport Area.s."
Treasury Chambers,"!
29 April 1915. J
D. LLOYD GEOEGE.
(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)
Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
1 May 1915.
LONDON:
PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
By HARRISON and SONS, 45-47, St. Martin's Lane, W.C.,
Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty.
To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from
WYMAN and SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Buildings, Fetter Lane, E.C., and
28, Abingdon Street, S.W., and 54, St. Mary Street, Cardiff; or
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, Forth Street, Edinburgh; or
E. PONSONBY, Ltd., 116, Grafton Street, Dublin;
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,
the United States of America and other Foreign Countries of
T. FISHER UNWIN, London, W.C.
220
1915.
Price 3d.
INDEX.
Admiralty Beporta •• „,.'"
Report of Deputation to t-ho Government ■ Ivom the Ship-
building Employe!*' Federation on 29th Maroh,
L9H ...
Bummarj of Statistical Material submitted to tho
.vernment by the Shipbuilding Employers'
ration
PAGK.
2
10
13
Extract from letter dated 26th March, 1915, from
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe to the First Lord of the
Admiralty •■•
Reports from Armament Works ...
Ecport of Enquiries made by the Home Office in
regard to loss of time in the Shipbuilding Trades...
Reports on Transport Difficulties
PAGE.
15
16
17
27
(A.)
ADMIRALTY REPORTS.
I.
Percentage of Hours worked by Government Employes in Ports-
mouth Dockyard during week ending April 24, 1915.
Men working
85
hours
a week and
upwards
>j
80
ii
ii
>)
75
ii
ii
n
70
ii
>)
)i
65
ii
ii
5)
60
S)
)>
>I
55
5)
)>
11
50
))
ii
11
No
rmal
(48 hours)
Less than normal
. .
6
pei
■ cent.
4
ii
8
!!
19
11
35
>!
6
))
4
5)
2
))
11
5>
o
))
It will be seen from the foregoing that no less than 78 per cent, of the workmen
at Portsmouth were working for 60 hours or over in the week ending last Saturday —
24th instant — i.e., 12 hours or more in excess of the normal working hours of the
week.
The above statistics may be taken as typical of all the Admiralty dockyards.
II.
Reports to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the Effect of
Excessive Drinking on Output of Work on Shipbuilding,
Repairs, and Munitions of War.
First Lord,
THE enclosed statement has been drawn up, showing the effect of excessive
drinking on the output of work as regards shipbuilding, repairs, and munitions of
war being carried out by contract for the Admiralty.
A report by the Director of Transports as to the effect on transport work is also
enclosed.
F. C. T. TUDOR,
Third Sea Lord.
April 2, 1915.
REPORTS which have been received from the Clyde, Tyne, and Barrow districts
recently are in agreement that at the present time the amount of work put in by the
workmen is much less than what might reasonably be expected.
Put briefly, the position is that now, while the country is at war, the men are
doing less work than would be regarded as an ordinary week's work under normal
peace conditions. As instances of this, tables are attached showing the numbers of
hours worked in a submarine engine shop and in shipyards on the N. E. Coast.
It will be seen that in the case of the 135 fitters employed on submarine engine
work, the number of hours lost during the first week of March amounted to the
equivalent of a full week's work of twenty-eight men, i.e., on the average each man
did little more than three-quarters of a day's work.
r
NAVAL WAR C»Lfc.CGE
USftARV
• HCLF (-
MARK )
3
I f*:t>%1b JUL 14
The reports from the N.E. Coast show that over periods of five to ST! \ uu wcolio tho
time lost at one of the shipyards by riveters equals about 35 per cent, of the normal
week's work ; platers, 25 per cent. ; and the caulkers and drillers about 22 per cent. ;
the later returns for the same yard show that by far the greater majority of the work-
men are absent at starting time — 6 a.m.
The figures reported from two other shipyards on the North East Coast are similar
and the reports from the Clyde, though details have not been received, are to the same
effect, showing that the large amount of lost time is general throughout the country.
Thus the problem is not how to get the workmen to increase their normal peace
output, but how to get them to do an ordinary week's work of 51 or 53 hours, as the
case may be.
The reasons for the loss of time are no doubt various, but it is abundantly clear
that the most potent is in the facilities which exist for men to obtain beer and spirits,
combined with the high rates of wages and abundance of employment. Opinion on
this point is practically unanimous.
The matter has been referred to from time to time in letters which the firms have
written in regard to progress of work in hand for the Admiralty, as shown by the
following extracts ; —
Clyde.
" We regret to say a number of men are losing a considerable amount of time,
mostly, we are afraid, due to their drinking habits, no doubt aggravated by the
extra money they are earning by working overtime, and we respectfully submit
that if some step could be taken to restrict their opportunities to indulge in
intoxicating liquor enormous benefits would result in the progress of this and
other naval work we have in hand."
North-East Coast.
" Regret to say considerable number of our workmen absent from duty
to-day — drinking. ' '
Clyde.
" Regret to complain construction of H.M.S. delayed through
workmen absenting themselves from work through excessive drinking."
The Captains-Superintendent of the Clyde and Tyne districts, who supervise the
warships being built and repaired by contract, are very well placed to form an opinion
on this matter.
The Captain-Superintendent on the Tyne (which district includes the north-east
coast of England and Barrow) reported on 26th February that the early morning
drink was responsible for a great deal of the short time, and that it would be a great
help if the public-houses were closed until 10 a.m. In a later report he stated that
;< everyone agrees that if the pubs could be closed until 10 a.m. things would
improve, and they should close at 9 p.m., being open say from 5 or 6 p.m. In this
district no one in uniform can be served between 1 and 6 p.m., so I would advocate
closing altogether for those times — and not only in the neighbourhood of the shipyards.
I have spoken to some of the foreman class, and they tell me 90 per cent, of the men
would approve."
The Captain-Superintendent of the Clyde district considers that the one thing
needed to get the full output of work is to prohibit the sale of all spirits.
In a further report, he states that the drinking is on the increase and is
causing delay and bad work ; and. as a remedy he proposes the prohibition of
spirits and of the sale of liquor by the bottle by public-house, grocers, &c, and the
restriction of the hours during which public-houses are open.
The Captain-Superintendent of the torpedo-boat destroyers building in various
parts of the country reports that " the main difficulty that contractors have to contend
against is the inability on the part of the men to work full time, and the only way to
meet the difficulty appears to be to have some form of enlisted labour, or further
restrictions imposed on the licensed houses in the vicinity of shipyards."
An officer, who is overseeing the construction of vessels building by a
firm on the North-East Coast, reports, " The time-keeping of the men is not
at all satisfactory ; whole gangs are thrown out owing to the absence of three
[580] B 2
or four hands. The firm are of opinion that, short of Martial Law, the only
thing to stop it is to stop the sale of spirits."
The Director of Naval Equipment's report, after his visit to the Tyne, is
appended (p. 10) ; a further report has now been received from him after a visit to the
Clyde.
In this be states that " the conditions of labour on the Clyde are such that, except
tor one or two firms, the abstentions are so great as to cause a serious loss of time, and
consequent difficulty in meeting contracts.
" When war broke out the opening of public-houses was limited to the hours of
10 a.m. to 10 p.m., and this has had a beneficial result, but does not entirely meet the
case, ami if is generally considered that much greater restrictions should be imposed
in the hours that liquor may be sold, and that such restriction should apply to all
rlassrs equally."
The foregoing remarks have reference chiefly to the large shipbuilding yards and
engineering works, but amongst these are included some of the largest armament firms,
who are manufacturing munitions of war of all sorts. The output of the last is
also adversely affected by the drink question. The manager of works on the
North-East Coast, where large quantities of shell are manufactured, stated that if the
two public-houses just outside the works could be closed his output would be very
largely increased.
The question of the extent to which it is desirable or necessary to curtail the sale
of intoxicants involves serious national considerations, and is not a matter for one or
two Government departments only, but from the point of view of Admiralty work it
does not appear that partial measures are likely to be successful, judging from the
results of the partial restriction of opening of public-houses which has been in
operation on the Clyde during the war.
Total prohibition, with all its attendant objections and disadvantages, would at
least have the general effect that all classes would at last realise the existence and
seriousness of the war, and that they were personally involved in its consequences.
A great principle, such as " prohibition for the war," will probably depend for
its success largely on details, such as the convenience of obtaining hot and cold
non-alcoholic drinks, both outside and inside the yards and works.
Further, an attractive scheme for saving the large amount of money earned by
the men, of which so much is now spent in drink (which might possibly be worked
through the Government Insurance organization), seems well worthy of consideration,
but should in no way delay decision and action on the vital question of restricting the
sale of intoxicants.
Enclosures.
(A.) — Submarine engine-shop. Time lost by fitters.
(B.) — Time lost by ironworkers at shipyard on North-East Coast.
(C.)— Time lost by workmen on repairs of a battleship.
(D.) — Time lost by workmen at shipyards on North-East Coast.
(E.) — Copy of report from Captain Barttelot (Captain-Superintendent, Clyde
district), dated the 25th March, 1915.
(A.)
Submarine Engine Shop.
Lost Time by Fitters working on Submarine Engine Work from 6 a.m. on Monday,
March 1, to 12 o'clock noon on Saturday, March 6, 1915.
Monday, March 1, 1915.
Total number of fitters employed . . . . . . . . 135
Only 60 of these worked a full day (9^ hours).
The following- statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — •
Hours.
20 were absent all day, time lost . . . . . . . . 190
2 worked 3-| hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 12
1 worked 5 hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 4^
52 worked 7 hours, time lost . „ . . . . . . 130
Total .. .. .. .. .. 3361
135 fitters working full time .. .. .. .. 1,282-^-
Actual time worked by 135 fitters . . . . . . . . 946
Time lost . . . . . . . . 336-|
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 35 men working full time.
/
Tuesday, March 2, 1915.
Total number of fitters employed . , . . . . . . 135
Only 90 of these worked a full day (91 hours).
The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — >
Hours.
18 were absent all day, time lost . . . . . . . . 171
27 worked 7 hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 67-^-
xotai •» .. .. .. •• Zoo-^y
135 fitters working full time,. .. .. ... .. 1>2821
Actual time worked by 135 fitters . . . . . . . . 1,044
Time lost . . . . . . . . . . 238^-
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 25 men working full time.
Wednesday, March 3, 1915.
Total number of fitters employed .. .. .. .. 135
Only 86 of these worked a full day (9^ hours).
The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : — •
Hours.
21 were absent all day, time lost .. .. .. .. 199^
28 worked 7 hours, time lost . . . . . . . . 70
Total .. .. .. .. .. 2691
135 fitters working full time . . . . . . . . 1,282^
Actual time worked by 135 fitters .. .. .. .. 1,013
Time lost . . . . . . . . . . 269^
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 28 men working full time*
[580] B 3
6
Thursday, March 1, 1915.
Total number of litters employed
Only 77 of these worked a full day (9.J hours).
The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder :-
22 were absent all day, time lost
1 worked -', hours, time lost
1 worked 2 hours, time lost
8j) worked 7 hours, time lost
1 wo'rkcd 6 hours, time lost
J. oral . • •• . • . • • ••
135 titters working1 full time
Actual time Avorked by 135 litters
135
Hours.
209
7
n
821
3091
1,2821
973
3091
Time lost
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 32 men working fall time.
Friday, March 5, 1915.
Total number of fitters employed . . . . > *
Only 91 of these worked a full day (9i hours).
The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder
16 were absent all day, time lost .. . . ..
1 worked 3^- hours, time lost
27 worked 7 hours, time lost
Total
135 fitters working full time
Actual time worked by 135 fitters . .
135
Hours.
152
6
671
2251
1,2821
1,057
2251
Time lost . . . . ...
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 24 men working full time.
Saturday, March 6, 1915.
Total number of fitters employed
Only 103 of these worked a full day (5i hours).
135
The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder : —
Hours.
17 were absent all day, time lost
15 worked 3 hours, time lost
Total . .
135 fitters working full time. .
Actual time worked by 135 fitters
Time lost
931
371
131
7421
61H
131
This represents a total loss on the day's working of 24 men working full time.
Summary.
Monday,
March!.
Tuesday,
March 2.
Wednesday,
March 3.
Thursday,
March 4.
Friday,
March 5.
Saturday,
March 6.
135 fitters working full time. . (hours)
Actual time worked by 135 fitters( „ )
Number of men wrho worked full time
Number of men who worked 7 hours . .
Number of men who were absent all day
1,2821
946"
60
52
20
1,2821
1,044
90
27
18
1,2821
1,013
86
28
21
1,2821
973
77
33
22
'>i
l,28z
1,057'
91
27
16
7421
61H
103"
15*
17
135 fitters working full time for one week (53 hours) == 7,155 hours.
Actual hours worked by 135 fitters in one week = 5, 644^ „
Time lost by 135 fitters in one week = 1,510| „
This represents a total loss on the week's working of 28 men working 53 hours each.
* 3 hours each.
(B.)
Statement of Lost Time of Ironworkers in a Shipyard on the North-East Coast.
Trades.
Pay ending
1915.
Number
of Men.
Possible
Hours.
Hours Lost.
Percentage
Lost Time,
Riveters . .
Jan. 2G . .
219
11,169
3,576
32
Feb. 2 . .
203
10,353
3,333
32
9 ..
211
10,716
3,770
35
„ 16 ..
203
10,353
3,869
37
i, 2o . .
210
11,340
4,002
35
March 2 . .
215
11,610
4,270
37
,, J . .
216
11,664
4,034
35
Platers
Feb. 2 . .
213
10,863
2,797
25-75
,, y . .
216
11,016
2,525
22-92
>, 16 ••
220
- 11,220
2,380
21-24
„ 23 ..
222
11,988
3,251
27
March 2 . .
226
12,204
3,615
30
„ 9 ..
230
12,420
3,350
27
Caulkers
Feb. 9 .
60
3,060
575
18-79
„ 16 ..
62
3,162
627
20-00
„ 23 . .
64
3,456
859
25
March 2 . .
67
3,618
834
23
q
80
4,320
978
23
Drillers
Feb. 9 . .
128
6,528
1,205
18-45
„ 16 ..
130
6,630
1,223
18-44
,, 23
130
7,020
1,457
21
March 2 ,
129
6,966
1,634
23
141
7,614
2,162
28
Percenta.ge of Absentees in the Ironworkers' Department of same Shipyard,
Monday, 22nd March, 1915.
Trades.
Total Number
of Men.
Absent at
6 A.M.
Percentage
Absent from
6 A.M. to 9 A.M.
Absent
at 9 a.m.
and All Day.
Percentage
Absent
All Day.
Riveters
241
217
90
68
28
Holders-on
110
104
95
39
36
Platers
232
164
71
39
17
Platers' helpers
404
350
87
107
26
Percentage of Time Lost by Ironworkers in the same Shipyard,
Monday, 22nd March, 1915.
[580]
Trades.
Total
No. of Men.
Absent
All Day.
Percentage
Absent
All Day.
Possible
Hours.
Hours Lost,
including
Parts of
Day.
Percentage
of Hours
Lost.
1
Riveters
llolders-ou
Platers
Helpers
241
110
232
404
68
39
39
107
28
36
17
26
2,349
1,073
2,262
3,939
1,035
542
692
1,650
44
51
31
42
B 4
8
Analysis of Riveters' Time for week ending February 9, 1915.
Total riveters employed, 211, of which. —
1 6 were absent whole week
11 „ 40 hours aud under 51 hours
14
41
50
65
14
)>
40
30
30
20
10 „ „ 20 „
from 2 to 10 hours . .
no t ime . .
Per cent.
7-58
5-21
6-64
19-43
23-70
30-80
6-64
100
211 men at 51 hours = 10,761 hours ; lost time, 3,770 hours = 35 per cent., an
increase of 3 per cent, over the preceding two weeks.
(C.)
Time Lost by Workmen on Repairs of a Battleship.
Average per
Day before Ac
vance
Average per Day since Advance
Granted.
Granted.
No.
on
Absentees.
No.
on
Absentees.
Books.
Per
Per
Books.
Per
Per
6 A.M.
Cent.
9 A.M.
Cent.
6 A.M.
Cent.
9 A.M.
Cent.
Ironworkers
162
38
23
22
14
198
64
32
32
16
Platers
20
6
30
3
15
24
8
33
5
21
Riveters and holders-on
142
32
23
19
13
174
56
32
27
16
Drillers
46
18
39
12
26
36
19
53
11
30
Carpenters
58
14
24
8
14
55
13
24
7
13
(D.)
Time Lost by Workmen at Shipyards on North-East Coast.
Average per Week from
to March 9.
February 9
Week ending March 16.
Absentees.
Absentees.
No. on
Books.
No. on
Books.
Per
Per
Per
Per
6 A.M.
Cent.
9 A.M.
Cent.
6 A.M.
Cent.
9 A.M.
Cent.
Shipyard A.
Ironworkers
200
134
67
53
27
223
147
66
64
29
Platers
66
37
56
11
17
69
37
54
12
17
Riveters and Holders-OD. .
134
97
72
42
31
154
110
71
52
34
Drillers
25
14
56
<fc5
20
16
12
46
5
19
Carpenters
57
23
40
L9
16
65
26
40
13
20
Shipyard B.
titii i .-
Ironworkers
298
145
49
55
18
288
108
38
34
12
Platers
150
58
39
20
13
136
41
30
12
9
Riveters and Holders-on. .
148
87
59
35
23
152
67
44
22
14
Drillers
73
29
40
xl3
18
91
22
24
11
12
Carpenters
89
19
21
7
8
100
12
12
5
5
9
(No. 425/456.)
Sir, 3, Clyde View, Partick, Glasgow, March 25, 1915.
IN accordance with the directions contained in your telegram of the 20th March,
calling for proposals that will facilitate the completion of H. M. ships, I have the
honour to report on the effect of drink on the output of work.
2. From close observation — and my opinion is shared by all the managers of
shipyards — the amount drunk by a section of the men is much greater than it was
before the war, and it is on the increase. Those principally concerned are the iron-
workers and shipwrights, and on their efficiency the output entirely depends.
3. The sole reason for this heavy drinking is that the men earn more money than
they know what to do with.
4. In a shipyard last week where a warship is under repair, work on the
inner bottom of the ship was so badly carried out as to suggest at once on inspection
that it could not have been done by men who were sober. It was dangerous, and had
to be condemned. In the same yard (and it is common in most others) drunken men,
nominally at work, have had to be removed. Men are bringing or smuggling liquor
into the yards in bottles, and facilities for buying spirits in bulk at public-houses and
at licensed grocers must be stopped.
5. All this (and the serious point is that it is getting worse) has a much greater
effect on delay than the shortage of labour.
6. I cannot state too forcibly my own opinion that the total prohibition of the sale
of spirits would be the most effective act that could at the present time be taken to
win this war. Any measure less drastic will not be a cure ; it will keep alive the
craving which has been growing after six months' indulgence, and some men will
endeavour to satisfy it by keeping away from work.
7. The hours I recommend for the public-houses to be open for the sale of drink
(not spirits) are from —
Noon till 2 p.m.
and
7 p.m. till 9 p.m.
and drink must be consumed on the premises, a prohibition being placed on the sale of
liquor by the bottle by public-houses and by licensed grocers.
8. As to the districts in which restrictions should be enforced, they cannot be too
wide. Public-houses here are opened at 10 a.m., and I am informed by the manager
of one yard that some of his men have been known to go several miles before coming
in to work in the morning in order to obtain drink under the travellers' clause. I
would like to see — and in this view I am supported by all shipbuilders on the Clyde —
the whole city of Glasgow, and from there down to Gourock and Dumbarton on either
side of the river, included in the restricted areas.
9. If that is not considered possible, then the following districts closely connected
with shipyards must be the minimum : —
On the North Bank — On the South Bank-
All Finnieston.
All Partick.
All Whiteinch.
All Scotstoun.
All Clydebank.
All Dalmuir.
All Dumbarton.
From Kinning Park.
All Govan.
All Renfrew.
All Port Glasgow.
All Greenock.
All Gourock.
I would also submit that a most beneficial effect would be produced if the men
could be told by some leading statesman exactly and very plainly where they are
failing their country. They have been flattered and told what splendid fellows* they
were just at the time when slackness was beginning to set in, and this has not had a
good result. It is not that the men (I am referring always to the men who drink) are
bad at heart or unpatriotic, but they have failed through weakness and opportunity,
and they know they have failed and would at heart welcome being corrected and
put right.
I have, &c.
(Signed) BRIAN H. F. BARTTELOT.
to
III.
Report by Captain Greatorex, R.N., Director of Naval Equipment,
dated 4th March, 1915, to Third Sea Lord.
THE condition of labour is deplorable, and the men are in a most uncertain and
and spendable stale. This is so serious, that at any time the whole of the ship-
building work on the Tyne may come to a standstill.
Sunday working is of little value, as the money paid for Sunday work leads to
abstention from all work for often two days, and a Sunday worker will frequently not
return till Wednesday.
The money earned is sufficient to satisfy the men's standard of living, and
anything extra beyond ordinary wages encourages abstention to enable loafing in
public-houses, instead of doing their honest day's work.
The opening of public-houses at early morning conduces to abstention from work
till after breakfast, and then the work is unsatisfactory, due to the amount that has
been imbibed.
I was informed by one of the firms that the average non-attendance of workmen
amounts to 1'45 days in six days' work, practically 25 per cent, of time is lost.
Unless something drastic in the way of measures is taken, I fear that the state of
deliveries of ships and vessels of all kinds will be most seriously affected ; but in the
present frame of mind of the men, drastic measures might have the effect of producing
a critical situation. On the other hand, further extra grants and bonuses only
accentuate the present deplorable indifference of the workmen to their duty and to
attendance to their daily work.
The only approach to a solution that was suggested as being likely to do good
was to partially or totally close all public-houses, and that all offers of extra wages
were most harmful, and only accentuated the difficulty.
I make the foregoing remarks with a full sense of the fact that it is not my
personal duty to enquire into these matters, but these facts were apparent in the
course of my visit of inspection to the ships building in the Tyne district, and as the
deliveries of ships are being so influenced by these facts, I consider it my duty to bring
them to your notice.
C. GREATOREX,
Director of Naval Equipment.
m
REPORT OF DEPUTATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM
THE SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYERS5 FEDERATION ON
29th MARCH, 1915.
(Extract from " The Times " of the 30th March, 1915.)
AN important deputation from the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation was
received yesterday at the Treasury by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary
for Scotland. With Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. McKinnon Wood were : —
Mr. E. S. Montagu, M.P., Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, M.P., Rear-Admiral Tudor, Rear-
Admiral Morgan Singer, Captain Greatorex, R.N., Major-General S. B. von Donop, Sir
Francis Hopwood, and Sir George Gibb.
The following representatives of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation wrere
present : —
Mr. G. J. Carter (Messrs. Cammell, Laird, and Co., Limited, Birkenhead),
Mr. James Marr (Messrs. J. L. Thompson and Co., Limited, Sunderland),
Mr. H. B. Rowell (Messrs. R. and W. Hawthorn Leslie and Co., Hebburn-on-Tyne),
Mr. H. M. Napier (Messrs. Napier and Miller, Limited, Old Kilpatrick), Colonel
R. Saxton White, Mr. F. E. W. Coller, Sir Charles Ottley (Sir W. G. Armstrong,
11
Whitwortli, and Co., limited, Walker-on-Tyne and Newcastle-on-Tyne), Mr. F. N.
Henderson (Messrs. D. and W. Henderson and Co., Limited, Partick, Glasgow), Colonel
J. M. Denny (Messrs. William Denny and Brothers, Dumbarton), Mr. A. B. Gowan
(Messrs. Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company, Limited, Jarrow and Hebbum-on-
Tyne), Mr. N. E. Peck (Messrs. Barclay,. Curie, and Co., Limited, Whiteinch, Glasgow,
and Messrs. Swan, Hunter, and Wigham Richardson, Limited, Neptune and Wallsend-
on-Tyne), Mr. George Jones (Sir William Gray and Co., Limited, Hartlepool), Mr. W.
Beardmore Stewart (Messrs. Beardmore and Co., Limited, Dalmuir, Glasgow), Mr. J. B.
Hutchison (Messrs. Scott's Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Limited, Greenock),
Mr. J. Barr (Messrs. Vickers, Limited, Barrow), Mr. J. Hamilton (The Fairfield Ship-
building and Engineering Company, Limited, Govan), and Mr. Thomas Biggart and
Mr. James Cameron, joint secretaries.
The deputation, which was representative of the leading shipbuilding firms in
the country, was unanimous in urging that, in order to meet the national requirements
at the present time, and the urgent necessities of the position, there should be a total
prohibition during the period of the war of the sale of excisable liquors. It was
represented by them that mere restriction of hours, or even total prohibition, within
certain war work areas, was not sufficient, as certain classes would be entirely
unaffected, and it was felt by the deputation that total prohibition should apply as
an emergency war measure not only to public-houses, but to private clubs and other
licensed premises, so as to operate equally for all classes of the community. In
putting forward these views, those who spoke on behalf of the deputation expressed
themselves as satisfied that there was a general consensus of opinion on the part of
the workers favourable to total prohibition along the lines indicated.
Less Worh than Before the War.
It was stated that in many cases the number of hours being worked was actually
less than before the war, and, in spite of Sunday labour and all other time, the total
time worked on the average in almost all yards was below the normal number of hours
per week. In spite of working night and day seven days a week, less productiveness
was being secured from the men. The deputation was of opinion that this wa*s
principally due to the question of drink. There were many men doing splendid and
strenuous work, probably as good as the men in the trenches. But so many were not
working anything like full hours that the average was thus disastrously reduced.
The members of the deputation stated that, speaking with the experience of from
twenty-five to forty years, they believed that 80 per cent, of the present avoidable
loss of time could be ascribed to no other cause than drink. The figures of weekly
takings in public-houses near the yards were convincing evidence of the increased sale
of liquor. Allowing for the enhanced price of intoxicants and for the greater number
of men now employed in shipbuilding, the takings had in one case under observation
risen 20 per cent., in another -±0 per cent.
Curtailment, in the opinion of the deputation, resulted in excessive drinking
during the shortened hours. The takings of certain public-houses which had had
their hours reduced from 10 to 9 had actually increased, and there had been a
considerable growth in the pernicious habit of buying spirits by the bottle and taking
it away to drink elsewhere. It was this " drinking habit " rather than drunkenness
that the deputation had to face. The cost of the drink habit was sufficiently illustrated
by the case of a battleship coming in for immediate repairs and having these repairs
delayed a whole day through the absence of the riveters for the purpose of drink and
conviviality. This case was one of hundreds.
This was not the only reason in favour oE prohibition as against curtailment. As
long as public-houses were open there would be found men to break the rules of the
yard and come late to work in order to secure drink beforehand. And the indisposition
to work after the consumption of excessive alcohol was too obvious to need elaboration.
Different members of the deputation gave different hours for their week's total
of labour, but it was emphasised that the important factor was not the average time
worked, but the time worked by certain of the most important branches. In one
yard, for example, the riveters had only been working on the average forty hours per
week, in another only thirty -six hours.
The deputation drew attention to the example set by Russia and France, and
urged upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the need of strong and immediate
action.
12
(C.)
SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE
GOVERNMENT BY THE SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYERS'
FEDERATION.
HOURS ACTUALLY WORKED BY IRONWORKERS.
THE Shipbuilding Employers' Federation have laid before the Government
detailed figures for the month of March 1915, taken out by 48 representative firms. Of
these 48 firms, 15 are in the Clyde district, 27 in the North-East Coast district, and
6 at Birkenhead, Barrow, or Hull.
The figures analysed are not selected or merely illustrative figures. They are the
record of the actual number of hours worked by every " ironworker " separately
tabulated, and the resulting percentages are therefore based on precise and exhaustive
facts.
By iron workers are meant : platers, riveters, holders-on, heaters, angle-iron
smiths, caulkers, and drillers. The work of these men determines the output of each
shipbuilding yard.
The ordinary working week for ironworkers is 53 or 54 hours a week according
to district (excluding overtime). Analysis of the hours now actually being worked
shows that in spite of the effort to increase the output by overtime, the hours actually
being worked are less than the hours of a normal week in a time of peace. Only a
quarter of the ironworkers are working more than this.
Table I.
Hours actually Worked by Ironworkers in March 1915.
(Standard Week in Time of Peace 53 or 54 hours (excluding Overtime).)
Over 80 hours
per wee
k .
»
. .
)>
75 hours
per week and
up
to 80
>»
70
11
ii
))
ii
75
))
65
11
ii
)j
ii
70
)>
60
11
ii
■ ii
ii
65
n
53-
54 „
ii
ii
yi
60
j)
50
ii
ii
ii
ii
53-54
»
45
>i
ii
ii
»)
50
n
40
ii
ii
ii
j)
45
11
35
n
j)
ii
ii
40
;)
30
ii
ii
ii
ii
35
11
25
ii
ii
ii
))
30
)t
20
ii
ii
)>
ii
25
>!
20 hours
a week
or under
• *
Per thousand.
Men.
1
18
4
74
15
16
36
37
62
02
120
42
113
8
147
1
139
°1
136
"H
493
91'
men
55
out of
30
3.1
1,000.
40
6J
The above analysis shows conclusively —
(a.) Only 24 per cent, of the men are working more than a normal week of
53-54 hours.
(b.) Of the remaining 76 per cent., 40 per cent, are working between 40 hours a
week and the normal week of 53-54 hours ; 36 per cent, are working under
40 hours per week,
(c.) 493 men out of every 1,000 are in time of war working less than 45 hours a
week.
13
Comparison of Districts
This state of things is not peculiar to any one district. The following table shows
the comparison between the Clyde and the North- East Coast ironworkers : — ■
Table II.
Comparisons between Clyde and North-East Coast Ironworkers.
Clyde
North-East Coast
Clyde
North-East Coast
Clyde
North-East Coast
2 7 '6 per cent, worked over 53-54 hours per week.
19-7
39-4
40-5
33
39-8
>> >> j)
„ 40 hours and under 53-54.
>> >> J3
., under 40 hours per week.
)) >5 >>
An examination of the detailed statistics increases the significance of the
summarised figures. For example, detailed sheets from a very important firm show
in the case of every one of their " drillers " for four weeks in March how far each
man —
(a.) Failed to come to work until after breakfast ; or
(b.) Was absent from work all day.
From these sheets it appeared : —
1. The vast majority of the men fail either in (a) or (6).
2. A minority of workmen are absolutely regular in their attendance. They keep
uniformly good time. There are also a few cases where the only absence
throughout the period is an occasional absence before breakfast.
3. Many workmen made it an almost regular habit not to come until after
breakfast.
4. When a workman keeps bad time, it is nearly always continued for several
days running. Many of them are absent from work altogether for three,
four, or five days.
The effect of the detailed sheets about the " drillers " is shown in the following
table. Similar results can be worked out for any other of the ironworkers : —
Table III.
Record of 159 Drillers during 22 Datjs (8th March-lst April).
Average per Day.
Cases of " out all day "
Cases of " out first quarter," i.e., until
after breakfast hour (including those
" out all day ")
25 out of 159 men, or 15'7
per cent.
85 out of 159 men, or 53 per
cent.
It must be remembered that these figures represent absences during ordinary
working hours.
Another set of figures supplied by the same firm compares the absences from
work of men in the Shipyard Department with those of men in (1) the Engine and
Boiler Shops and (2) the Repair Department. The special importance of these figures
is that they show that while engineers are not as bad as shipyard workers, they are also
keeping very bad time, while the bad time kept in the Repair Department is (having
regard to the urgency of repairs) a specially serious matter.
14
The figures provided show the number of men of each class (platers, joiners,
pattern-makers, litters, &c.) who were out all day for each day between the 1st March
and the 8th April.
The Bgures have been extracted for a fortnight and put m summary tormina
table as follows : —
Table IV.
Men out all Day.
Shipyard
Department
(4,900 Men).
Engine and
Boiler Shop
Department
(4,500 Men).
Repair
Department
(average of
about 1,000)
(No Sunday work.)
Monday March 8
669
317
416
Tuesday, „ 9
627
291
447
Wednesday, ,, 10
564
273
318
Thursday ,, 11
670
284
297
Friday, „ 12
567
287
263
Saturday, „ 13
686
311
260
(No Sunday work.)
Monday, March 15
624
290
381
Tuesday, „ 16
602
299
327
Wednesday, „ 17
633
296
284
Thursday, „ 18
690
304
301
Friday, ,,19
609
297
313
Saturday, „ 20
629
321
260
(No Sunday work.)
The following points should be specially noted : —
1. Monday and Saturday are usually the worst clays. (There must have been
some special cause influencing the 17th and 18th March.)
2. No Sunday work was being clone, so the men had a week-end rest.
3. These figures are limited to all-day absence. No account is taken of failure to
work before breakfast.
4. Absences in the Repair Department are particularly serious, and though
engineers are not so bad, their figures indicate great delay in construction.
The 2nd to 5th April were holidays. On Tuesday the Gth April, 1.798 men of the
Shipyard Department failed to turn up ; 1,431 of the Engine and Boiler Shops, and
666 in the Repair Department ; and the absences continued abnormal for some days.
On the 7th April, 2,916 men were out from work the first quarter of the-day, of whom
1,670 remained out all day. Even on the 8th, 2,500 were out the first quarter, and
1,500 remained out all day. The importance of these last figures lies in the fact that
three days' holidays had been given to the men in these yards.
15
Is Drink the Cause of this abnormal Loss of Time f
The evidence is really overwhelming that the main canse of this alarming-
loss of time is the "lure of drink." The employers say so most emphatically;
the Admiralty have received elaborate reports emphasising the same conclusion
in the case of shipbuilding, repairs, munitions of war, and transport. The Home
Office reports are to the same effect, and the detailed figures summarised above are, in
themselves, strong evidence that drink is the cause. A section of each class of
workmen keep perfectly good time throughout the week, and therefore the cause
is not one which is common to all workmen, or due to any general industrial
condition. The worst time is generally kept after wages are paid, and at the beginning
of the following week. When absence from work occurs the workman is usually absent
for several days together. Staleness and fatigue no doubt must arise from working
during long hours over an extended period, but inasmuch as half the men are not in
fact working for more than 45 hours a week, the cause must be found elsewhere. The
testimony of observers in each district is that drink is by far the most important factor.
The facilities for excessive drinking in the immediate vicinity of these works are
abundant ; the men in many cases work at a long distance from their homes. The
restriction of hours in these districts has rather tended to concentrate drinking into a
period without diminishing the temptation, or limiting the quantity consumed.
The contention that the cause of irregular hours is the excessive time worked is
completely disposed of by observing that on average the time worked is unfortunately
not so great as the standard in time of peace. The figures show, not that workmen
who have been working long hours for days together occasionally take a day off, but
that while some workmen are working steadily day by day for long hours, those who
fail to work even ordinary hours are continually repeating this failure.
In conclusion it may be pointed out the detailed returns which have been furnished
by the Shipbuilders' Federation show that during the four weeks of March, 670,000 hours
of work have been avoidably lost. This is no less than 25 per cent, of the normal
working hours.
(B.)
EXTRACT PROM LETTER DATED 26th MARCH, 1915, PROM
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE TO THE FIRST LORD
OF THE ADMIRALTY:—
I AM very uneasy about the labour situation on the Clyde and Tyne. I have sent
a telegram or two lately about it. Your may think I am exceeding my sphere of action
in doing so, but the efficiency of this Fleet is so affected by it that I felt it my duty
to wire.
To-day an officer in a responsible position arrived. His account of things on the
Clyde was most disquieting. He said that the men refused altogether to work on
Saturday afternoon, that they took Wednesday afternoon off every week (if not the
whole of Wednesday), and worked on Sunday because they got double pay for it. He
said also that they only worked in a half-hearted manner. My destroyer dockings
and refits are delayed in every case by these labour difficulties, and they take twice as
long as they need do. I feel that you ought to know the facts, and so put them
before you now.
* # # # #
16
(E.)
REPORTS FROM ARMAMENT WORKS.
THESE are not as serious as those received from the shipyards. They indicate,
however, that much time is avoidably lost in some of the most important works.
For example, this is a report received on the 19th March, 1915, from important
works engaged in the manufacture of munitions : —
" Some drastic restrictions are absolutely necessary if largest possible output
of certain war munitions is to be obtained Among some shell workers
there is a considerable amount of lost time due to their drinking habits. With
the better class mechanics the time lost due to drinking is comparatively small, but
in the case of labourers and the semi-skilled trade it is a very serious item."
Another most important firm reports : —
" Speaking generally, margin of lost time allowed by us before the war has
now to be trebled. Condition much worse in shipyards. Much of this loss of time
is attributable to drink."
In another report from these works it is said : —
" Loss of time from drink most noticeable in shell department, about 10 per
cent, of total time worked."
In another important munitions works : —
" Avoidable loss of time considerable among a minority."
Even in districts least heard of in this connection, and from which fewest complaints
are received, all say that work would be considerably improved were there a restriction
of facilities for the sale of intoxicating liquor.
The following are particulars of a week's work in April in one of the most
important shell shops in England : —
Pabticulabs of Times Worked in Week Ending April 13, 1915^
Per thousand.
Working over 80 hours per week
11
I a
UJJ IA
i ou nui
no p
J-
11
70
11
75
11
))
65
))
70
))
11
60
11
65
1)
11
53
))
60
11
11
50
11
53
11
!)
45
11
50
11
11
40
11
45
11
11
35
11
40
1)
))
30
5)
35
11
11
25
11
30
11
11
20
11
25
))
))
20
and under
?!
Percentage who have worked 53 hours per week and over
Percentage who have worked 40 hours per week and under 53 . .
Percentage who have worked under 40 hours per week
Note. — The percentage of time lost for the corresponding- week of last year
Here is a report, dated the 16th March, 1915, which came from works engaged in
the manufacture of high explosives : — ■
Men.
94
37
86
77
177
42
130
00
156
27
100
96
38
83
39
33
23
7
31
2
10
18
12
72
16
•07
82
•22
74
■57
10
•19
15
■24
amounted to 7 "8
1 We would also take this opportunity of expressing in the strongest possible
manner our opinion that something should be done in this district to curtail the
sale of drink. We fear that unless drastic steps are taken to lessen the sale of
alcohol, before long we shall find it impossible to deliver anything like the quantities
17
of trinitrotoluene we have undertaken to supply to your department. Even at
the present time we are not turning out as much as we could otherwise, owing to
various troubles, and this is due to the fact that the men have been making good
money and unfortunately wasting most of it in drink. Consequently, they are in
such a condition that it is impossible for them to attend to their duties in a proper
manner even when they come to the works, which is at odd timesjand to suit their
own convenience."
There are several works engaged in the production of munitions of which this is not
in the least true. Here again the great majority of the workmen are above reproach,
and their action is praiseworthy-.
(F.)
REPORT OF ENQUIRIES MADE BY THE HOME OFFICE
IN REGARD TO LOSS OF TIME IN THE SHIPBUILDING
TRADES.
THE enquiries were made by 33 investigators, 17 of whom were sent to
various places on the Clyde, 6 to Newcastle and the Tyne, 4 to Barrow, and 2 each
to Sunderland, Stockton, and West Hartlepool respectively. The enquiries occupied
three days, from the 1st to the 3rd April inclusive.
Separate districts were marked out for each investigator. Detailed instructions were
given them in which they were asked to ascertain the principal causes which had led to
the loss of time among the workers, and the questions put to them were so framed as
not to prejudice their judgment.
Each investigator made a separate report of the results of his enquiry without
collaboration with his colleagues. A general summary of these reports is attached,
followed by a more detailed summary of the reports, arranged according to districts.
The enquiries made by these investigators have been supplemented by reports from
three factory inspectors, which are printed in full.
April 12, 1915.
(1.)— REPORTS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS.
(a.) General Summary.
Shipbuilding is the main industry of the districts visited, but there are also many
engineering works and other factories engaged on Government contracts.
Owing to the demands made by the war on the trades engaged in shipbuilding and
the manufacture of munitions, the pressure of work in these districts is unprecedented.
The demand for labour is greater than the supply, especially as large numbers of the
regular workmen have enlisted in the naval or military forces. Wages are uniformly
high, which means a large increase in the spending power of the working classes.
Wages of 51. or 61. a week are common, and it is possible for a skilled and energetic
mechanic to earn as much as 10Z. or 15L a week.
The hours of work are about fifty-four a week, excluding overtime. The day is
divided into two shifts of eleven or twelve hours with intervals for meals, but many of
the men work overtime. There is also a certain amount of Sunday labour with the
attraction of double pay, but this has not proved altogether a success. Steady workmen
feel the strain of working seven days a week, while others are disposed to work
on Sunday and lose time on other days. An important feature of shipbuilding is the
system of working in gangs consisting of two riveters, one holder-up, and one or two
boys. While many of the men are working regularly and steadily beyond the normal
hours, there is a considerable number, especially among the " black squad," in the
shipbuilding yards who are not working up to the maximum of their capacity.
[580J C
18
The riveters are mentioned particularly, and some distinction is drawn between them
and the mechanics employed in engineering factories.
The reasons given for irregularities of attendance are mainly staleness and fatigue
due to long hours over an extended period: unusually high wages leading to idleness:
and habits of drinking. It is not altogether possible to isolate these causes, as they are
more or less closely connected one with another, but the reports are unanimous in the
conclusion that drink is by far the most important factor.
Many of the workmen engaged in these industries are, in normal times, heavy
drinkers, partly, no doubt, owing to the nature of the work. Much of it is hard manual
labour in severe heat, which creates a desire for stimulant. It is not suggested that all
the workmen drink heavily. Many of them are abstemious, and in Scotland especially
there is a considerable proportion of teetotallers. To those who are heavy drinkers,
the facilities for drinking are unfortunately very great. An instance is given in one
street where there were no less than thirty public-houses within a distance of
half-a-mile. The yards and works are surrounded by public-houses and drinking-bars,
where every possible facility is offered for obtaining drink for consumption both on and
off the premises.
The drinking habits of the workmen on the Clyde differ somewhat from those of j
the English workmen. The popular drink there is half-a-gill of whisky, quickly
followed by a schooner of beer (about f pint), and the beer is of a heavier quality than
English beer. This particular combination of liquor, though it does not apparently
produce much effect on the hardened drinker at the moment, is not calculated to
improve the capacity of the men for sustained work. Heavy drinking on Saturday in
the public-houses, and on Sundays in clubs, is described as a feature of the life
of the workmen on the Clyde, which frequently results in unfitness or loss of time
at the beginning of the week. There is also a prevalent practice in Scotland of taking
whisky in bottles home in the evening, especially on Saturday night for consumption on
Sunday when the public-houses are closed. On the Tyne and in Barrow, spirit
drinking is not so common, as the popular drink is beer, and the English workman's
drinking appears to be more evenly distributed over the week, though the effect is very
much the same in all the districts referred to.
Apart from the public-house great facilities for drinking are offered by clubs,
which are open to members and to which visitors can be readily introduced. Thesa
places are freely resorted to on Sundays when the public-houses are closed.
Attention is drawn in the reports to the fact that many of the workmen take
insufficient food, which not only increases the temptation to drink, but makes the effect
of the liquor taken more injurious, so that the result is to incapacitate the workmen for
the strain of heavy work. The men whose homes are near the works are able to obtain
meals without difficulty, but owing to the lack of housing accommodation many
workmen are obliged to travel long distances to get to their work. This is especially
the case at Barrow-in-Furness. The usual practice is for the workmen to take cold food
with them, which is generally consumed in the public-houses with their liquor.
Reference is made in some of the reports to cases where food could not be obtained at
the public-houses, and it is evident that the sale of drink is out of all proportion to that
of food. The reports emphasise the need for mess-rooms and canteens in the yards
where the men could get good meals in comfort without having to resort to the public-
houses. Such accommodation is very rarely provided.
The practice of paying the whole wages of a "black squad" to the leader is also
said to be productive of drinking, as the men go to the public-house to divide the money,
and the custom is for each member of the squad to stand drinks all round.
It is stated that some of the worst offenders in the matter of drinking are
men who in normal times are not employed in the yards but who now owing to
the scarcity of labour have been given work. Where a large proportion of the
steadiest men have enlisted, and great numbers of inferior men are brought in to
meet the pressure, a general increase in drinking is inevitable.
The investigators say that trade union restrictions which might tend to diminish
the output have been very generally abrogated to meet the exceptional conditions,
though some of the men still display reluctance to undertake different work from that
to which they are accustomed.
Much absenteeism is caused by the " black squad " system. If one of the members
of the squad is absent from idleness, or drinking, the rest of the squad is held up, and
where several sguads are affected the cumulative result is very marked. To some
19
extent this evil is being met by pooling men, so that if one of a squad is away, his place
can be taken by another.
The evils of excessive drinking were readily admitted by some of the better
workmen, who considered that the action of a minority was bringing unmerited discredit
on the workmen as a whole. Others considered that the part played by drinking had
been exaggerated, that the workmen had been subjected to too great a pressure and
were suffering from the strain, and that the deficiency of output was largely due,
I especially on the Clyde, to the withdrawal of skilled men who should be recalled from
[the colours.
(b.) Detailed Summaries.
The Clyde.
Scotstouu and Clydebank. — The investigators who visited Scotstoun and Clydebank
came to the conclusion that the falling-off in output is mainly due to excessive drinking,
[especially at the week-ends. Fatigue and insufficient food are contributory causes.
The day-shift men have an interval for dinner from 1*30 to 2'15, when a considerable
portion of the workmen indulge in drinking. The day-shift ends at 5*30, when a
smaller number of men take a drink before their tea. At 9 '45 p.m. the night-shift
men have an interval of ten minutes, when some of them get drink.
There are large numbers of drinking bars in the neighbourhood of the works with
circular bars designed for quick service. There is, as a rule, no seating accommodation,
but they are said to be well conducted.
Although there is a considerable amount of drinking during meal times, most of
the drinking takes place on Saturdays at the drinking bars. One of the features of
these bars is the preparation for drinking after wages have been paid. Three or four
hundred glasses of whisky are made ready to meet the rush of customers, and in
some cases some of the workmen are taken on to help in the service. These are called
" 5s. helpers." If drinking were limited to Saturdays, and the men took a rest on
Sundays, they might recover in time for the work on Monday, but unfortunately men
take bottles of whisky home with them, which is frequently consumed the same night.
Although the public-houses are closed on Sunday, it is also easy for them to obtain
liquor at the various clubs. These places are restricted to members, but they are able to
introduce one or more visitors. The clubs are used, not only on Sundays, but also on
week-days late at night when the public-houses are closed. The normal drink taken by
the men is half-a-gill of whisky followed by three-quarters of a pint of beer, and the
gravity of the beer is said to be higher in Scotland than in England.
The workers admit that the output could be increased, but in their opinion many of
them are overtired from working long hours of overtime, and they also allege that their
meals are insufficient owing to the want of proper accommodation for getting meals in
the yards. Others allege that the want of skilled labour is the chief cause of the
falling off of output, and those who are employed are working as hard as possible.
It is stated that the trade union restrictions have been set aside in the present
emergency, but they still exist to a certain extent, as many workmen will not accept
work outside their own particular line.
Renfrew and Govan. — In one of the reports a distinction is drawn between the
engineers and iron-turners engaged mainly on the production of shell cases, and the
men who comprise the " black squads" employed in shipbuilding. The former are said
to be working strenuously and are very abstemious, many of them being teetotallers.
Instances are given of engineers working thirty-six hours at a stretch, with intervals
for meals. The " black squads," on the other hand, are frequently held up by ir-
regularities on the part of members of the gang. Attention is drawn to the practice
of paying the ;< squads" a lump sum, which is afterwards divided in the public-house.
This leads to treating all round and much heavy drinking, and it is suggested that
if each man could be paid his own wages there would be an improvement.
Although the amount of drinking during the day did not appear to be excessive
having regard to the character of the work, a large number of men drink to excess at the
end of the week. One of the investigators states that in one public-house in Govan
between 12.30 and 1.35 p.m. on Saturday he saw lOOi. taken. The national drink is a
half gill of whisky, price 4d., followed by a schooner of beer, price 2^d. The beer in
Scotland is heavier than in England. Bottles of whisky are also sold in large quantities
[580] C 2
20
on Saturday night, as the public-houses are closed on Sunday. Drinking goes on very
largely on Sunday in olubs, and this is responsible for a lot of time lost on Monday.
Another reason suggested for the deficiency of output is that many skilled men
have joined the colours, and their places have been filled by unskilled men. If some
o{' the men who have enlisted could be sent back the output would be materially
increased.
The public-houses are large open bars without seating accommodation. They
have conspicuous notices affixed, " Liberty and sobriety : avoid excess."
Large numbers of bottles, varying in price from 6d. to 2s., are put ready in the
public-houses, to be carried away just before closing time for use the next morning,
owing to public-houses not opening until 10 A.M. In some cases men wait about in the
morning till they do open, preferring the loss of time to going without their morning
drink.
In none of the yards on the Clyde, except one at Govan, is there any accom-
modation for taking meals. Men have to go long distances to and from their
homes, and form the habit of taking refreshment by the way. The provision of
accommodation for meals inside the works would be greatly appreciated, and would
lessen temptation to drink.
Partick, Pointhouse, Old Kilpatrick, Dalmuir, and Whiteinch. — There was not
much evidence of excessive drinking during the day in this district, though men
frequent public-houses at meal-times. In the evening, about 6 o'clock, the men
resort to the public-houses and drink freely. Week-end drinking is the principal
feature. After being paid on Saturday men adjourn in parties to the public-
houses and indulge in drinks all round. The popular drink is half a gill of
whisky swallowed at a gulp, followed by a schooner (three-quarters of a pint) of beer.
Afterwards many of them adjourn to a football match or other amusement, and then
return to the public-houses for the rest of the day. In the evening bottles of whisky are
taken home for Sunday drinking, but they are often consumed the same evening. On
Sundays drink is freely obtained in clubs, where members can introduce visitors.
Liquor is also obtained from the licensed grocers, who deliver whisky or bottled beer
to their customers.
The method of working known as the " black squad " is said to encourage excessive
drinking. A " black squad " is composed of one blacksmith, two riveters, one holder-up,
and two boys. The wages are paid to the principal of the squad, and the money is
divided in a public-house, when the custom of standing drinks all round is observed.
One of the investigators states that during the conversations which he had with some of
the workers in the " black squads," they gave him the impression that they could not
perform the work of holding and striking hot metal without the aid of stimulants.
The men complain that there are no places in the yards where they can take their
meals. The majority of the men are of opinion that the workmen employed are turning
out as much as possible, but there is a want of skilled labour, as many of the younger
skilled men have enlisted, and their places are filled by inferior workmen. A good
deal of time is lost where one member of a " black squad" fails to turn up and the
rest are obliged to stand down for the day. This defect has been remedied to some
extent by the system of pooling men, by which men can be found to take the place
of absentees.
Dumbarton. — Two reports were made on the conditions found at Dumbarton, in
which deficiency of output is attributed partly to fatigue on the part of the steadier
workmen, principally those who have been working overtime on hard manual work,
and partly to excessive drinking by a minority of the workmen. A number of the best
workmen have joined the army, and their places have been filled by men who, prior
to the w7ar, did little or no work, or existed on what the regular workers would give
them. It was suggested that if some of the men who have joined the army were
allowed to return to their work it would have a good effect on the output.
As regards drinking habits, there were not many signs of drunkenness, but the
public-houses were well patronised during meal times. In addition to drink consumed
on the premises the men were in the habit of purchasing whisky in bottles, which
usually contain a " mutchkin," or just over half a pint. The usual drink in Dumbarton,
as in other parts of Scotland, is whisky followed by beer. Many of the men have
two or three such drinks on each visit to the public-house. One of the investigators
mentions the case of a workman who had been away from work five days
drinking, and had spent 11. a-day in drink for himself and other persons. He was
21
decidedly shaky, though not drunk. He was expecting to work on the sixth day, but
it was obvious that he was not in a condition to stand hard work for any length of time.
The difficulty of working in squads where one of the squad is absent from drink
may be obviated to some extent by a new arrangement, which seems likely to be made
in the shipbuilding yards at Dumbarton, for pooling the squads. Where there are
several broken squads, complete squads would be formed by allowing a riveter to act as
a holder-up, &o. This is against the ordinary trade-union rules, but has been
agreed to.
Some of the better-class workmen suggest that the drinking problem would be
overcome by closing the public-houses outside, and opening canteens inside, the yards.
Many of them who are apparently anxious to do their best to expedite the output,
expressed the opinion that some stimulant is necessary for men engaged in some branches
of shipbuilding.
The public-houses in Scotland being closed on Sunday, a practice has grown up of
purchasing whisky on Saturday night. One of the investigators noticed a barman who had
filled about 100 bottles of whisky which he expected to sell between half-past nine and
closing time. The result is that the men are able to drink on Sunday and are frequently
unfit for work on Monday morning. The question of prohibition has been much
discussed in Dumbarton ; many of the working men are in favour either of total
prohibition or of suspending the sale of liquor for consumption off the premises.
Total prohibition would meet with considerable opposition from others.
The suggestion made by one investigator is that the public-houses should be
closed during meal hours and also from 12 to 3 on Saturdays, in order to induce the
workman to go to his home with his wages and get proper meals. The practice of
taking drink without food has a bad effect on their physical condition.
Greenock. — The men are working more than normally, and loss of time may be
due in some cases partly to fatigue and partly to wet weather ; but, generally speaking,
it is due to the temptation to idleness owing to good wages and heavy drinking among
a minority.
Drinking is indulged in especially on Saturdays, Mondays, and Tuesdays, when
drunken persons can be seen both in the streets and public-houses. The favourite drink
is whisky, followed by beer, and if spirit drinking were stopped there would be less
drunkenness. Many of the workmen admitted that drink was the chief cause of the
decrease of output and advocated universal prohibition.
The public-houses are open from 10 a.m. until 9 p.m., so that early and late drinking
is prevented ; but there is a great deal, of liquor taken during the meal-times by men on
the day-shift, and in the afternoon by men working on the night-shift.
The system of working in squads also leads to drinking where one of the squad is
absent from any cause, and the usual result is that the whole squad goes off work and
drinks.
While the above statement in regard to excessive drinking is true of a considerable
number of the workmen, there are many who are working very hard, and who feel the
strain of the prolonged hours. The more respectable workmen are in favour of drastic
restriction, and even prohibition, either of spirits or of all liquor, and the belief is that
some such steps will be taken. Prohibition on the Clyde or in Scotland alone would lead
to trouble ; the men say that if prohibition is to come it must apply to the whole country.
There are plenty of facilities for drinking in Greenock. The public-houses have
small rooms like cubicles, where several men can sit comfortably round a small table and
drink as long as they wish, as they are free from observation. The suggestion was
made in the town that the firm should establish canteens in the yards.
Port Glasgow. — This small town on the Clyde has a population of about 17,000,
almost entirely supported by shipbuilding.
Men work from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m., 9*45 a.m. to 1 p.m., and 2 to 5*30 p.m. On
Saturdays work ends at noon. The week's work is fifty-four hours, but there is much
lost time as well as insufficiency of labour. The loss of time is attributed mainly to drink,
especially in the evenings. The public-houses are open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. (instead of
8 a.m. to 10 P.M. before the war). In many cases men prefer to wait until 1 0 A.M. in order
to get a drink before going to work, thereby losing half a day. The popular drink is
four pennyworth of whisky followed by a pint of beer. The investigator could find no
evidence of men being overtired or idling because of good wages. Most of the men are
in ordinary times heavy drinkers, and while further restrictions are needed, prohibition
would be resented, The establishment of canteens in the works would be a great
safeguard.
[580] C 3
22
The Tynb.
Six investigators visited various places on the Tyne, including Newcastle, Walker,
Elswick, Hebburn, Wallsend, and North and South Shields. The war has brought
great prosperity to all workers on the Tyne generally, with the result that high wages
are readily obtained by all who are willing to work. Many of the men attracted by
high wages are working steadily and during long hours, and some of the regular
workmen become stale and need an occasional holiday. The general impression,
however, is that the loss of time, which is considerable, is due to idleness, and
especially to drink. It is not alleged that there is a large amount of open drunken-
ness though one of the investigators states that at 7*30 A.M. in South Shields he saw
fifteen men who had come off the night-shift all under the influence of drink, and
several of them hopelessly drunk; but there is plenty of evidence of heavy drinking.
The public-houses on the Tyne are generally open from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m., with the
exception of South Shields, where the public-houses open at 6 a.m. There is some
drinking during the breakfast and dinner hours, but the principal time of drinking is at
night, when all the public-houses are crowded. The majority drink beer, not spirits,
and the extra halfpenny on beer has not led to a change from beer to spirits, as money
is plentiful ; but more spirit is drunk than is usual with English workmen, and there is
some drinking of spirit and beer mixed. The habit of drinking in batches is a common \
feature on the Tyne. Four or five men on the same shift will enter a public-house and
each stands drink successively. One investigator saw five men consume five half-pints
each in less than ten minutes.
It is said that the payment of double wages for Sunday labour has led to idling
on Monday, and no doubt the drinking on Saturday and Sunday has produced the
same result. For this reason it is suggested that special restrictions should be made
in regard to Monday hours. The earlier opening of public-houses at South Shields
not only invites early drinking among workmen from that place, but also attracts men
from Jarrow and Hebburn.
Two of the investigators comment on the insufficient food which the men take, partly
owing to the difficulty of getting food in the public-houses. It is thought that in this
way they are more easily affected by the amount of liquor which they consume, and are
consequently unfitted for hard work.
Generally, the effect of the reports from the Tyne is that drinking is a serious
evil, largely leading to loss of time, and that further restriction should be placed on
the hours during which public-houses are open. Local opinion expects some such
restrictions, but would not tolerate total prohibition.
It may be added that shortage of labour has led to the employment of men
who would not in ordinary times be given employment, and no doubt they are more
likely to take to drink than the regular workman.
One of the investigators, who has had experience of workers in Government
establishments, states that he has never seen so much drinking at all times of the
day as he witnessed in Newcastle and the surrounding district.
Sunderland.
The chief industry is shipbuilding, which employs most of the working population.
As in other places, the men work in two shifts covering the twenty-four hours, 6 a.m.
to 6 p.m., and 6 p.m. to 5 a.m., with two stoppages of half-an-hour for meals. There is
no work between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m. The two investigators who visited Sunderland say
that drinking is very prevalent, and that this rather than fatigue is the cause of loss of
time. Many men idle because of their good wages, and it is suggested that the
temptation to idle from this cause might be met if the employers would bank a portion
of the wages until the war is over. It is said that many of the men would willingly
agree to this suggestion.
The public- houses, of which there are a large number (in one street thirty in the
space of half-a-mile), open at 6 a.m. and close at 9 p.m. The Sunday hours are
12.30_to 2.30 p.m. and 6 to 9 p.m. One of the features of the public-houses in Sunder-
land is the sitting-room where tables and lounges are placed and liquor is brought to
the customer. These sitting-rooms are crowded nightly, mostly by the better-class
workmen, and they are used by men and women alike. Beer is the popular drink, and
it is sold at 2c?. per glass of rather under half-a-pint to meet the increase of duty.
23
The early hour at which the public-houses open seems to be a great incentive to
drinking, as the men coming off the night-shift loiter about until the public-houses
open, and those starting on the day-shift remain drinking and are late at the yards.
One of the investigators visited several public-houses between 6 and 7 a.m. and asked for
a cup of tea or coffee, but he was told that it could not be supplied, and apparently
nothing can be purchased except liquor and cigarettes. There is a great deal of time
lost on Monday owing to Sunday drinking.
The drink question is apparently a common topic of conversation among the workmen
in Sunderland, and many of them would like to see the public-houses closed altogether
during the war, but there are others who say they cannot work without beer, especially
where the work is in intense heat, and the opinion is that the case could be met if the
public-houses were closed for consumption of liquor on the premises, but opened for
about two hours in the middle of the day for the sale of bottled beer to be consumed
off the premises. The suggestion also was put forward that canteens should be provided
at the works where food and beer could be obtained.
West Hartlepool.
About 12,000 to 15,000 are employed in shipbuilding, engineering, and steel and
iron works. The normal hours are, for the day-shift, from 6 a.m. to 5 P.M., and for the
night-shift from 6 p.m. to 6 A.M., with intervals for meals. Overtime is worked by a
good many, but there is very little Sunday work. The two investigators who visited
Haitlepool did not think that the men suffered from fatigue and they heard no
complaints of the kind : the workmen looked healthy and cheerful. Good wages were
causing idleness in some cases, but generally speaking the men were working well.
Drink does cause loss of time, but the effect on output would not be very considerable.
The public-houses open at 8 a.m. and close at 9 p.m., and on Sundays from 12*30
to 2 p.m. and 6 to 9 p.m. The men are unable to obtain liquor on their way to their
work, but they drink freely during the intervals for breakfast and dinner. They
carry food in their pockets which they take to the public-houses to eat. The favourite
drink is a glass of whisky or rum followed by a pint of beer, which is sometimes repeated.
Public-houses are very busy in the evening, and though there is too much heavy
drinking there is comparatively little drunkenness. The consumption of spirits has
somewhat increased since the extra tax on beer. There is a good case for restricting
further the hours during which the public-houses are open, especially during the
breakfast hour, but prohibition would cause a great deal of trouble in the labour world.
Both these investigators thought that the output was affected by trade union
restrictions. For instance, a squad is frequently held up by the absence of one of
their number, although the work could proceed with other assistance if it were not for
trade union rules, which do not allow one class of job to be done by a man of a different
trade.
Stockton-on-Tees.
The two investigators who made the enquiries in Stockton-on-Tees came to the
conclusion that loss of time was due solely to drinking; although many of the
workmen complained that over-work made them stiff and that they were thus
unable to keep time. This especially applies to the men working in squads, as
frequently one of them fails to turn up and thus prevents the whole squad from
working. The public-houses are open from 8 a.m. until 9 P.M. (the hours before the
war were 6 a.m. and 1 1 p.m.), and on Sundays 12-12*30 and 6-9. The favourite drink
is beer, taken in great quantities, and very little spirit is drunk. When the public-
houses were opened at 6 a.m. a good trade was done with men on their way to then-
work. This has now stopped, but there is reason to believe that men take beer home
with them in the evening for early morning consumption. Stockton is well supplied
with public-houses, many of them close to each other, and these are all crowded in the
evenings and on Saturday afternoons with workmen drinking beer. The publicans
appear to be taking as much money within the restricted hours as when the hours
of opening were longer.
Barrow-in-Furness.
Barrow has a population of about 70,000, and of these about 20,000 are employed
at Messrs. Vickers, Son, and Maxim, and about 3,000 at the Hematite Steel Works.
[580] C 4
24
The men work in two shifts : — Day-shift from 6 a.m. until 5 P.ivr., with intervals of
half-an-hour for breakfast and an hour for dinner. Night-shift, 5 P.M. until 6 A.M.,
with intervals of two hours for meals. Borne of the men, chiefly shell-makers, work two
or three hours overtime.
The four reports agree that there was little evidence of drunkenness in the streets,
and few cases of drunkenness had been brought into the Courts, but there was evidence
to show that during the particular week when the enquiry was made there had been
considerably less drinking than recently, owing probably to the fact that the employers
had offered double wages on Good Friday and one and a-half wages on Saturday
morning to men who had worked regularly all the week, which was a distinct incentive
to the workmen to remain sober. It is not clear that the conditions were normal when
the enquiries were made.
There was evidence to show that there had been less drinking since the hours of
the public-houses had been restricted. They now open from 10"30 a.m. and close at
10 p.m. ; on Sundays they are open from 12*30-2 and 6'30-9. The publicans do not,
however, seem to have been hit by the restricted hours, as the men drink more heavily
during the shorter period and some take drink away with them.
The men are not spirit drinkers, although the influx of men from Scotland has
led to the greater sale of spirits. They are generally drinking at present a rather
expensive beer known as " 6d. and lOdL," which is a combination of two beers priced at
lOd. and 6d. a quart respectively, and sold at 5d. a pint. Prior to the present boom
the men could only afford to drink beer at 3d. a pint. A good deal of beer is consumed
in the evening and on Saturday afternoon and evening, but on the whole there was not
at the time of the reports very much ground for complaint, though much time had
been lost in the past through heavy drinking.
Though the drinking habit may have had serious effects on output, it appears that
excessive drinking is not very general. The majority of the men seem to have been
keeping good time and working long hours, and there was evidence of fatigue and
staleness. The reports indicate that better work could be got out of the men if they
were on three shifts of eight hours, but this would be impossible without a large
number of extra men, and a great increase in the accommodation.
Accommodation is very difficult to get, and many of the workmen have to live
outside Barrow, at places several miles away. In some cases this increases the
temptation to drink, as men have to pass public-houses on their way to and from work.
It also appears that the means of travelling are inadequate. It is suggested in one of
the reports that increased accommodation could be provided by vessels in the docks.
(2.)— REPORTS OF FACTORY INSPECTORS.
The Clyde.
I have had many interviews from time to time with shipbuilders and engineers on
the subject of bad time-keeping among workmen, and to-day I have supplemented my
information by interviewing the Chief Constable of Govan and a number of publicans
in an area surrounding the largest shipbuilding yards.
There does not appear to be any noticeable increase of drinking since the war
began. The quantity consumed is about normal, the same men frequent the same
premises, and those inclined to drink too much continue as before the war commenced.
There is, however, some evidence that small bottles of whisky are purchased and
consumed off the premises, especially by men on night-shift work, This, however, is
confined to a very few men. For instance, in a yard employing 10,000, three men in
one night were found partially intoxicated in the works and expelled.
In fairness to the men it should be noted that irregular time is confined largely
to certain specific trades : riveters, caulkers, platers, riggers, and to a very much less
extent engineers, are the chief offenders ; such tradesmen as pattern-makers, moulders,
turners, and time-workers generally keep relatively good time. Broadly speaking,
the men engaged in outdoor work, that is, on the construction of the ship itself,
usually piece-workers, are responsible for most of the irregular time, and their behaviour
has cast a stigma on the general class of workers employed in shipbuilding and
marine engineering which is certainly not justified by the facts, and it is undeserved.
Coming to the causes of irregular time-keeping among the outdoor workers, while
drinking is an important source of bad time-keeping, it is only one cause, and here
25
again the action of a relatively small proportion will disorganise the work of many-
others who may be capable and willing to work full time. Riveters and platers
work in squads, but if one man fails to turn up at 6 A.M. the squad cannot proceed,
and because of the absence of one man four or five will lose a morning's or
possibly a whole day's work. Riveting is hard and exhausting work, and it
is frequently and necessarily carried on in trying conditions — j exposure
in winter to bitter cold and damp. The temptation to take a morning or
a day off during very cold or very hot weather is great, as the riveter knows
he is indispensable at present, and will not lose his job if he does lie off. More-
over, his pay is sufficent, even with a partial week's work, to keep him and his family in
comfort. The machine men working under cover are in a comfortable shop and have
not the same temptation to lie off. Again the pay is relatively much less, and being
time workers they cannot make up the lost time by a special spurt. Another important
point frequently overlooked is that at present, owing to the extraordinary scarcity of
skilled labour, men who in ordinary times would never be employed on account of their
irregular habits, are at work in many yards, and materially affect the numbers of those
losing time. Briefly, I am convinced that the " black squad " piece-workers have not risen
much above the social position of the man earning 30s. a-week, yet their remuneration
is equal to that of a professional man. They have not yet been educated to
spend their wages wisely, and the money is largely wasted, for they have few
interests and little to spend their wage on apart from alcohol.
For some reason, difficult to define, men do not readily take up riveting and
plating, and consequently there is a constant shortage of this class. This shortage has
tended to force up wages to such an extent that the present pay is in excess of their
needs. The fear of loss of employment is absent, consequently there is no spur to
stimulate a man to work regularly such as exists in most callings.
The question of fatigue due to prolonged overtime does not arise to any great
extent. The same men do not work overtime week after week, and Sunday work is
only done by the same man every second or third Sunday. The general feeling among
employers is that Sunday work with double pay is not a success, it is considered that
stopping it would improve time-keeping in the rest of the week.
One large works has just taken a vote of their men on the question of further
restrictions, and I attach particulars of the questions put to them, and the percentage of
men in favour of each alternative.
Per cent.
1. Are you in favour of total prohibition ? .. .. .. .. .. 31
2. Are you in favour of leaving matters as at present ? . . . . . . 44
3. Are you in favour of reducing hours to from 12 noon to 2 p.m. and 7 to 9 p.m.,
and on Saturday 6 to 10 p.m. ? .. .. .. .. .. 11
4. Are you in favour of reducing hours to from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. on week-days,
and Saturday from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. ? . . . . . . . . 4
o. Leaving hours as at present, but for sale of beer only . . . . . . 10
Out of the 2,500 men employed about two-thirds voted.
Most of the drink on the Clyde is consumed on licensed premises ; it is not the
habit to drink much in the homes. A prohibition of the purchase of alcohol for
consumption off the premises would possibly improve one class only, namely, those who
have to work at night, and now take liquor to their place of employment. One must also
recognise that teetotalers lose time as well as those who do not abstain. Away from
shipbuilding pure and simple there does not appear to be any serious irregular time-
keeping ; it does not exist to any material extent in engineering generally, nor in the
iron and steel producing towns in Lanarkshire.
The whole question has arisen because of the action of a few men in the more
important shipbuilding yards, and there is a feeling that the mass of workers
throughout the country should not be penalised because of the dissipated and
unpatriotic behaviour of a small minority of overpaid men in one or two specific callings.
More comfortable working conditions improve timekeeping ; for instance, during
the last three weeks of fine bright weather distinctly better time has been kept.
Again, much time lost by the " black squad " is due to wet and windy weather ; work
outside is difficult and almost impossible under such conditions unless the building
berth is a roofed one. To meet this difficulty, sheds are being built over the berths
devoted to submarines and small shallow draft craft.
Figures showing the percentage of hours lost by outside workers are valueless unless
allowance is made for the periods in which work was impossible owing to weather
conditions. It is not uncommon for men to work on piece work until their clothing is
26
wet through, and the experience of employers is that in this condition, if they hang
about afterwards, c<f
week or fortnight's <
be given full justice.
about afterwards, colds and chills supervene, with perhaps the consequent loss of a
week or fortnight's employment. These facts I mention so that the men's position can
HARRY J. WILSON.
April 3, 1915.
The Tyne.
I beg to report that I have taken a deep interest in the subject of lost time since
the commencement of the war, and on every possible occasion I have made it a point
to discuss the* subject with employers, managers, foremen, and with the workers
themselves. The following statements show the conclusions I have arrived at : —
1. So far as shipyard workers are concerned, there is no doubt whatever, in my
mind, that the " drinking habit " is more responsible than any other cause for the great
loss of time amongst the workmen. It is common knowledge to those who know the
habits of shipyard workers in this district, that in normal times they usually indulge
pretty heavily every week-end, and that Monday is a very bad day as regards the time
worked. In the present time of continuous employment, this week-end habit is to some
extent broken up, but results in spasmodic indulgence at irregular intervals during the
week. The fact that double time is paid for Sunday work, and that consequently the
men's earnings are so much more than usual, no doubt tends to foster the habit of
frequent indulgence in drink.
As regards engineers and armament workers, and others engaged in emergency
work, the drinking habit undoubtedly plays an important part, although to a lesser
extent, in the reasons given for lost time. Only yesterday, I was informed by an
engineering employer that a number of his men occasionally stopped work at 8 p.m.
instead of 9 p.m., the usual overtime period. He explained that, when asked the reason
for their action, the workmen informed him that "the 'pubs' closed at 9 P.M. and
they wanted a few drinks before closing time." He stated, further, that he had noticed
that the men who indulged in this practice formed the majority of the late arrivals
next morning.
The "drinking habit" is not confined to men alone in this district. I have had
similar complaints as regards women workers in rope and waggon cover works.
2. The fact that double pay is given for Sunday work, no doubt, is also a factor in
the situation. The men openly state that they can afford to have a "good time ': (as
they call it) occasionally, without reducing their wages below normal. In one large
engineering works recently I was shown a statement which one of the directors had
prepared. This showed that a large number of men systematically lost time during
the week equivalent to nearly a full normal day, so that the Sunday work on double
time was of no real value at all to the firm. He also pointed out that a fair percentage
of the men — good, steady workmen — kept excellent time week after week.
I have formed an opinion that Sunday labour can only be made of real value if the
sale of alcoholic liquor is entirely prohibited except under doctors' prescription.
3. I do not place a great deal of reliance on fatigue having much to do with lost
time. I think the financial aspect combined with the indulgence in drink is solely
responsible.
In several works recently I have been informed, that the employers intend, as an
experiment, to introduce a new system, whereby if a man loses more than a quarter of
a day from Monday to Saturday inclusive, he will not be allowed to work on Sunday at
all. This is, I think, an excellent plan as, if the lost time is due to fatigue, it gives the
workman a day's rest on Sunday, and if due to a drinking bout, it will reduce the man's
wages and make him, perhaps, more careful the following week. Further, if in a riveting
or plating squad one of the men keeps bad time and is not allowed to work on Sunday,
it will probably prevent the squad working on Sunday altogether, and consequently the
man's mates will put pressure upon him to keep better time.
W. B. LAUDER.
April 2, 1915.
27
Barrow-in-Furness.
Since the outbreak of the war I have paid five visits to the above firm in connection
with Emergency Orders, and on each occasion have made enquiries as to loss of time by the
workers and the question of drinking. At my second visit, owing to an allegation made
that the reasons why Vickers could not obtain sufficient men, and why they were
continually losing their men, were that they did not pay them so highly and they had " a
bad name " amongst the workers, I took the opportunity of going round some of the public-
houses in the evening and mixing freely with the men. I then ascertained that the general
opinion was that Vickers was an extremely good shop. There was plenty of drinking,
though I saw no actual cases of drunkenness up to 9 p.m. The men gave me the
impression that they could stand a fair amount of liquor without showing signs of
drunkenness.
At subsequent visits I have always noted that the public-houses in Barrow were
well patronised during the daytime, and one always saw a number of men in their
working clothes in the vicinity of these, with signs that they had had quite as much
liquor as they could carry, though I have never seen a workman actually drunk in the
town.
1. I think the drinking habit is prevalent in Barrow amongst riveters and platers,
and the less skilled workers and labourers. At my visit last month several of the foremen
whom I interviewed said that drinking had always been rather bad in Barrow and was now
worse than ever. The statement was made that restriction of the hours of public-houses
should be uniform throughout the district. Serious complaint was made by several of
the managers that though the Barrow public-houses were open only between 9 A.M. and
9 p.m. there were no restrictions at Dalton 6 miles away, and many of the night-shift
men took train to Dalton and started drinking there soon after 6 a.m., as the Barrow
public-houses were not open. I was unable, for lack of time, to verify this statement
personally.
2. I doubt if there is anything like the amount of fatigue among the workers
which is considered in some quarters to be prevalent. Much of the manual work in the
factories at the present day is not fatiguing : the workmen have simply to stand and
watch their machines. The workers at the large shell forging presses and the heating
furnaces are an exception, and also the riveters and platers in the shipyards.
3. I attribute the loss of time in Barrow which, from figures I have seen, is serious
in some of the departments at Vickers' works, to the fact that many of the workers are
earning such good wages that they can maintain their ordinary standard of comfort and
living with four or five days' work. Without doubt much is also due to drinking
habits. Loss of time through sickness has not been at all pronounced in Barrow during
the last winter. In fact, I was assured that the amount of sickness had been below the
normal.
W. SYDNEY SMITH.
(G.)
REPORTS ON TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES.
Report by Director of Transports to the First Lord of the
Admiralty.
First Lord,
I WISH to call attention to the fact that the transport work is now being
conducted under serious difficulties.
The workmen — seamen, dock labourers, &c— are rapidly becoming absolutely
out of hand. The present labour situation on the Clyde and at Liverpool is merely
the beginning. Unless effectual measures are taken we shall have strikes at every
port in the United Kingdom, and supplies to the Army and the Fleet will be stopped.
In the main, we have now to deal, not with the ordinary British workmen, but with
what remains after our best men have been recruited for the Army and Navy.
28
Yesterday the crew of a transport deserted. The same thing happened the day
before. The firemen go on board the transports drunk, making it impossible to get up
a full head of steam, so greatly reducing the speed and endangering the lives of
thousands of troops by making the vessels a target for submarines.
The root cause of the serious congestion at some of the docks is not a shortage
of labour but the fact that the men can earn in two or three days what will keep
them in drink for the rest of the week.
What is wanted, in addition to a proper control of the drink traffic, is a well-devised
scheme promptly applied for bringing the seamen under naval, and other workmen in
Government employ under military, discipline. In many cases it is now taking three
times as long to get ships fitted and ready to sail as it did when war broke out.
Expedition is a thing of the past, and it is obvious that this may at any moment have a
disastrous effect on the naval and military operations.
The following practical instance of the effect of military discipline, even on those
totally unused to it, may be of interest : —
We sent 250 dock labourers to Havre under capable civilian supervision. They
all got drunk and out of hand in the first fortnight. We brought them back and
enlisted a similar lot of men under military discipline. On the first pay day one got
drunk and was given twelve months' hard labour. There has been no trouble since,
and the men are working splendidly.
GRAEME THOMSON,
Director of Transports.
March 6, 1915.
II.
As an example of a case in which it was deemed urgently necessary to take police
court proceedings in this country, the following may be cited : —
Seven firemen employed on a certain transport were charged at Southampton on a
warrant with unlawfully combining together to neglect duty, and to impede the
navigation of the ship, and the progress of the voyage.
All seven pleaded not guilty, but, in answer to a further question from the
Magistrate's Clerk, admitted " signing-on " in the usual way.
Mr. C. Lamport, prosecuting, said that he appeared really on behalf of Captain
John Roberts, the commander of the transport, and the prosecution, which was
supported by the authorities, was of a similar character to that before the Bench a few
weeks ago. It was considered by the authorities, as well as the officers, to be a matter
of national importance. All these men had signed articles, as they had admitted, and
part of their duties were in connection with the transport service. It was necessary
for the transport to sail at a certain time, and no man was entitled to be absent
without obtaining leave. No leave was asked for and no leave granted, and orders
were given that all firemen must be present at a certain time. There were over 1,000
troops on board this ship ready to go away, and he must not say more than that the
vessel was held up through the absence of these men, and actually had to return to the
port, or near it, and the troops had to be transferred to another vessel, for the Bench
to see what a terribly serious thing this was. One could scarcely conceive that the
legislature had given sufficient power to deal with such offences. As an Englishman
and an advocate, he said that it might well be that men who undertook to serve on a
transport ought to be under the same liability to severe punishment as those under
military or Admiralty law.
Captain Roberts, the commander of the transport, told the Court that there
were over 1,000 troops on board, and that the men should have joined the ship not
later than 3*30 on the afternoon in question. The sailing hour was 6 o'clock. Two
men were brought on board at 7, one of them intoxicated, but the rest did not put in
an appearance at all. In consequence of the absence of these men witness was unable
to proceed with the ship, which, as a matter of fact, had to return to Southampton.
The troops had to be transferred, there was twenty-four hours' delay, and everything
was dislocated.
Harold Graham, the chief engineer of the transport, and George Tounson, the
second engineer, bore out the evidence of their captain, both stating that they gave no
leave whatever.
29
Asked what they had to say in defence, Carpenter and Payne told the Court that
they had no intention of leaving the ship, and, as a matter of fact, did rejoin ; Hock
and Podesta stated that their reason for absence was that they were not feeling well ;
Thompson and Hatton explained that they were detained at the Bargate by the police
on charges of drunkenness, and therefore could not join the ship ; and Mountain
refrained from saying anything.
In passing sentence, the presiding magistrate said : —
" By the way you have acted by not joining your ship at the proper time you
impeded the progress of the ship and affected its destination, and the vessel had to
put back and reship its troops. The Bench under these _ circumstances ^ cannot
consider any question but the utmost penalty, and you will all go to prison for
twelve weeks with hard labour."
The magistrates having passed sentence as recorded above,
Commander Prefect, who said that he represented the Principal Naval Transport
Officer, desired to emphasise the seriousness of these cases. Some of the troops, said the
Commander, had been travelling for fifty or sixty hours from the north of Scotland and
the west of Ireland, and they were detained on board, not by military exigencies, but
by the action of these men.
III.
Extract from Report made by Director of Transports to
Admiralty, dated March 27, 1915.
Some of the transport workers at most of the large ports are content to earn in three
days money which keeps them in drink for the rest of the week. It is necessary to secure
throughout the country a state of affairs which will make it possible for transport
operations to be carried out with speed and efficiency. At present this is impossible,
and neither the Fleet nor the Army can get on without transport.
In my opinion measures are necessary to withdraw all licences to sell intoxicating
liquors throughout the country.
IV.
Extract from letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty from
Mr. T. Roy den (member of Director of Transport's Advisory
Committee), dated March 29, 1915.
the labour situation at our seaports is so unsatisfactory that immediate
action is imperative. In any remedial steps that may be taken it should be borne in
mind that our best men have joined the colours in various capacities, and that in
consequence their influence, which under normal conditions exercises a steadying
effect on their fellow-workers, is for the time being lost. At the best of times casual
labour, and under that category I place dockers and ship-repairers, is unsatisfactory
and unreliable, and this characteristic has become still more pronounced with the
increased opportunities for employment 'brought about by the war. The men know
they can get work whenever they want it, however indifferent their behaviour may be,
and as a result there is "an absolute lack of discipline. I am confident that the root of
all the trouble is drink, and the high scale of wages now ruling, instead of acting as
an inducement to increased effort, tends to produce the opposite effect, inasmuch as it
enables the men to earn in a shorter time the amount of money they regard as sufficient
for their immediate needs, and they are able to work fewer hours and spend more of
their time drinking. I trust that in the national interest, and in the interest of
the men themselves, it may be found possible to deal with this great and growing
evil by a drastic reduction in the hours during which intoxicants may be sold,
or, preferably, by absolute prohibition. If sailors can, and do, abstain from alcoholic
refreshment while at sea, it does not seem unreasonable in a time of national urgency
30
that those whose work keeps them at home should do likewise. Pressure should he
brought to bear, through the Licensing Justices, ou the owners and tenants of licensed
premises with a view to largely increasing the facilities for obtaining reasonable
refreshment of a non-alcoholic character, as it would be unreasonable to prohibit the
sale of intoxicants without providing reasonable substitutes. I have discussed the
situation with a large number of employers of labour both on the docks and in
the repair shops, and so far have failed to discover any who do not endorse my views.
I gather from notices that have appeared in the public press that the officials of the
Transport Workers' Union are also in sympathy with them.
Yours truly,
T. ROYDEN.
V.
Report from Director of Transports to the Third Sea Lord,
dated 1st April, 1915.
Third Sea Lord,
I enclose extracts from reports from Naval Transport Officers at various ports in the
United Kingdom indicating the extent to which drink is obstructing the progress of
transport work.
I can only reiterate that the time now taken to prepare ships for service is a grave
danger to the success of the naval and military operations, which depend so largely on
efficient sea transport.
To-day I find a transport, required for urgent military service, to prepare for
which would normally occupy seven days, will take twenty-two days to complete, in
spite of every effort made to accelerate the work.
GRAEME THOMSON, Director of Transports.
I. — Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South Coast).
December 12 .. .. Seamen under influence of drink ; captain and pilot clear ropes
away, and take ship out themselves.
January 8 . . . . Men on shore all returned drunk ; ship unable to put out to sea.
January 20 . . . . Men again drunk ; much delay in putting out.
November 11 . . . . Firemen and seamen on shore return drunk; ship loses the tide.
Comments by Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South Coast).
1. Considerable drunkenness : prosecutions not pressed owing to circumlocution
of the law and difficulty of obtaining conviction.
2. Recommends as an "excellent remedy" Naval Discipline Act for Transport
Service instead of Merchant Shipping Act. Masters ask for this themselves.
3. Cases quoted taken from the twelve transports in port ; if details were obtained
from the twenty-three transports away, total number of offences would be pro-
portionally greater.
This report is from an officer who will never make a complaint if he can possibly
help it. — Graeme Thomson.
II— Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (North West Coast).
The following points have been arrived at after consultation with the various
firms engaged in Transport Service on the North West Coast : —
Restrictions are necessary ; delay from drink notorious.
A large Coaling Company say : —
1. Some of the men begin to drink on receipt of wages on Saturday, hence
Saturday afternoon "hands" contain a good proportion of men under influence of
drink, so choice of men restricted.
31
2. Men engaged at 4 p.m. on Saturday for work early on Sunday, anticipating
well-paid work on Sunday, drink freely in interval, turn up unfit, so ship is under-
manned.
3. Every Saturday a certain number of men are dismissed for returning after
meals drunk.
4. In event of any inevitable delay men go to public-house, and return long alter
proper time for resumption.
5. Many regular employees cannot be given important orders Friday or Saturday
owing to drink ; many stay off on Monday, and do not turn up till Tuesday morning.
III. — Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (Bristol Channel).
1. Increasingly difficult to get crews for transports owing to laziness, lack of
discipline, and drunken habits.
2. Steamship ( ) 21st March, 4 seamen
20 firemen > absent ;
9 trimmers J
she had to stop at ■ to obtain subsidiary labour.
Steamship ( ) sailed 6 men short.
J) v ) 5) " )>
( ) „ 6 „
,, ( ) had to take 16 men substitutes.
3. Crews, rather than dock labourers, are usually seen drunk, hence
impossible to rely on ships leaving at stated times.
IV. — Report from Principal Naval Transport Officer (Bristol Channel).
1. Drink question in relation to transport service not so bad here as at other ports.
2. Drunkenness among dock labourers, chiefly amongst night shifts coming out
at 6 a.m.
3. British seamen and firemen of mercantile marine chief offenders, e.g., crew of
steamship ( ) unfit for work, officers have to do crews' work.
15th October to 3rd February —
Twenty-six ships delayed through desertions, &c, resulting in total delay of
thirty-four days six hours —almost entirely due to drink. Since February
behaviour much improved.
V. — Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South-East).
Many cases wherein crews have failed to join their ships owing to drunkenness,
though the men do not drink to excess in the docks themselves.
VI. — Report of Principal Naval Transport Officer (Soute Coast).
Transport work hampered by : —
1. Drunken members of crews miss ships, hence ships sail short-handed, or on
occasion are prevented from sailing altogether.
2. Firemen return in drunken condition, hence they are unable to keep steam,
causing speed to be seriously reduced with obvious dangers resulting — constantly
occurring.
3. Dock labourers and coal porters, especially latter, knock off work early to get
drunk before closing time.
*^Z)u/7$W&
)
. , • Constantinople ,&c.
.Ateed wo* 60 returned.
•o -o -o -o -0 -c -o -o -o -c -c -c -c -o -o - ■
Country, ........ Sharkey Port«
Date of P^Port.^3.
Report from U.S.aTsOCR
-o -o -c -c -o -o -o -o -o ~o -c -c -o -c -c -o — 0 -o -0 -o ■
1. iter dane lies*
(a) On April 2 5-2 6, the British landed at four places! — -
l*/r«\Burnu (Ara Cape)*
2*Sighin De're'CSighin Valley). ,
3*Tefcie,Te'ke,or Hikie' 5urau (Safes Cape), i#^
on European sideband <-Jrr/*
4#Xum Kale, on Asiatic Side*
{Y enclose a copy of a sort of relief view of the Dardanelles,
from i local Turkish paper, on which these positions are mariasd.This View
is copied frcm a view which originally appeared in the Xiepzig u Illustrate
Zeitung", after the naval action of March 19» Manes of above points have been
added however, and trarislations are written alongside, X$ftla Tepe (Kritia
Hill), and Zsja Tepe (Xatfs Hill) , refer red to belcw,are also indicated (pos-
itions 5 and 6 respectively) J # ^Jf$fc
(b) At Arc Burne (Ara Cape), position Kb #1, the
British landed from 1C,CCC to 15,000 troops,
under pro beet ion of a heavy protecting shel-
ing of beach from shij^s.and proceeded inland
to occupy iSapa Tepe' (ifey?. Mil ),x>osition lfo.6,
tv«D one half miles to & 3 (d, about ICC feet
high,vsfoich dominates llaidos and adjoining
forts* When they hv& arrived at surf it they
were suddenly outflanked by Turks previously
entrenched under brow of hill, and charged
with bayonet* They wore forced to re tire, and
lest from 1,CCC to 8f©fc© kill ed9 with proport-
ionate loss in wounded and prisoners* The re-
mainder re-embarked for the time being,but no
other landing have since been effected* light-
ing continues daily* The Turks admit British
are still entrenched at foot of Kaja Tepe, but
say all their efforts to capture the hills
have been repulsed.
(o) At Sighin Cere (Sighin Valley), position No. 2,
and Tekie,Teke,or Wikie Eurnu (Teke Cape) pos-
ition Se#3,£ro» 25,000 to 40,000 troops were
landed, and a combined assault made on kritia,
Etritift,ep Kir ithia, Tepe (Kritia mil) near
Seo ul Bahr, which is about 750 feet high and
dominate the Chanak forts* Fighting still con-
tinues* Final outcome net known* Losses not known,
Turks also admit allies' troops are still on
shore here, but say they have not taken. Kritia
Hill yet*
(d) At Ktan Kale from 35,000 to 6C,0C0 troops were
landed m& crossed river, "but are said tc have
since been forced to rstlire.and re-®ibark*Iacts
are not known, known losses British 1,000 to
3, OOC, corresponding losses in wounded and r.rison-
jrr,0I$ i? believed now that the landing he re, the
first day, was simply a feint, as nothing further
has been heard of rfrm -'fele*
(4) Turkish losses* In above engagoi*enti%nct known,but
about 2,500 Turkish lightlv funded were "brought
to Constantinople, on two transports, on April 30.,
and two, or three, transports have been arriving
with wounded, daily, over since#3etv^n 7,0^0 and
8,000 to undo d have been hr ouch t* in during the week,
(f) The wrecked British submarine, ".ML 5", is about 400
yards to southward of -Raphes ?3urnu (3ss*Aaaoi),*m6
is partly visible above mter*
(g) The Turkish troops, at Dardanelles, are i.trio*ly in
good spirits, under command of Turkish Off icers,
(not Germans), well drilled and enthusiastic, accord-
ing to Captain P.. II. William s,C./.C. ,U*3,/rmy,who
J46
5-
I
Page 2.
Country Turkey. Place* . .. • Constantinople,^.
Report from U. S.S.SCeKPICH*
Pate of Report* . . . »U^y 3^1^*
—O -O — C -0 -0 -0 -0 -C ~0 -0 -0 -0 -0 ~6 -0 -0 -C"-0 — o -o -o ~o -o -c -o -c -c -c -o -c — o -o -o -o -c -
has just "been at Dardancs two days, and saw
the fiercest pert of the landing operations*
Captain 911114*8 efts a great deal cf import-
ance,but cannot divulgs anything in accord-
ance si fa arrangements toads? which he went,
until after tve w is over^g?!^ under cer-
tain condi tions*
ffe) Throe British submarines are said to hays
been sunk, or captured, in the Sea of Marmora,
near Mere f 11, (about 40 miles above Gallipoli),
during the past week* The prisoners from one of
them were brought into Constantinople April 30*
1 have heard they oasts thru the Dardanelles
Straits during the resent moonlight nights.
{1} The "Haraddin 3arbarrc3sa'r and "forgot Jiois"
alternate on duty at the Dardanelles, one of
them being there while the other overhauls and
provides at the Golden Hbrn»2hey have been re-
lieving each other about every ws^k or so*
*o
2* Black Sea*
(%1) The Russian Fleet has continued bombarding var-
ious parts of the Turkish Black Sea Ooa&ti tiqzt
the 3osphorus,and the past three days hwps bom-
barded the entrance itsslf*42ach dajpyV ie p&at week, -Jtffc
the civilian inhabitrnts have been sent out of "
Buyukedere,on European side above Therapia,the
same rs they were from Bel cos, en the other aide,
some time ago* Shots have fallen at far south as
Therapia,and are of large caliber* !?o material />
jfetfotfy has "bQ:-.!! done so far as feiown* (p/ytJ^f, <&{ /
3» qonstcmtinople*, / ^X ^ ^
(k) tatrols are still maintained between Seraglio
ioint and 3cutari,as previously roper ted; and re-
cently,on tvso occasions, three email tuge ./ere ob-
served maintaining definite positions, at; different
plaesa in this vicinity, apparently also on look out
duty. This was before the fchree Erttish aT&martnos*. —
known to be in the See of T.'ar mora, were sunk or
cap tured*
(1) Several of the larger Chirkets (cBssphoros pas-
senger steamers J have been taken o^er for use as
trasnports the past week.
few On April ."8 about 30 British and "French prisoners
v^re brought info StBjabottl*.and ths ftsjas mirber ma
also brought in April 20* About ©C ara said to have >^
been brought in, in all,
(n) Between 7,000 and 8,0C0 lightly funded Turks have
been brought in during past we?lcfand taken to the
different hospitals in city and viclr.icy*i*bout
2fC00 wounded ha^e been arriving, daily, during; past
week. The transports first stop at Hi* Ida Jacha, (near
Scutari „ on Asiatic side) , and, 1 c; ie taldydiseharj
their more seriously H©tt»dsd at the hospital fchsrst
then they bring the others hare* The vsry grave
cases are said to be left at the Jjarianelles of
course
(o) The "Sultan Selim", (ex -German "Goeben") , stood do-tfi
from 3tsnla at 7.3C p.m. /,;,ay 2, and stood in again
and up Bo sp horns at 4* .30 p.m., this morning, (MayJfcJ • ^UfJ-
She was escorted by a torpedo boat and destroyer* "
(p) J hostile aeroplane appeared ovsr the outskirts of
Constantinople, Kay 2, and dropj ed bombs and papers.
I
9fk v
Page 3.
Country* * • • TurlSBy, Fort* , Constantinople , &c.
Beport from U.S. 3. SGOBPICiT*
Date of Report. » » »Hay ..&191B.
-O-O-0-O-0-O-C-C-C-C™'-0-0-^^
ITo material damage done. National Itrr not known*
bnt undersides painted gross*
(q) 13 01s" the So Italian sailors, who were loft here
from the "Archiroede'.and who attempted to laasre
last week on the S* S* "Jast ia" Tfiich wa3 held *P at
the Sospherus.as reported, left April 27 for It sly,
"by rail* via Dedeagatch^&c* ,2 sailers remained* The
steamship '-'i-mal iaM also finally sailed for Roumania
on Apr il 2 Qg^ft^y s+<s/%£j- y&<t?u k^^^aM^>y^^/^^^r, _y^^£
(r) i few mere /i.rmenfans have heen sent to Ifeftia during
past weul£»2t is said tney were suspected of plot-
ting anl xrp rising to aid the entry ef British and
This, ians* It is said that 680 have new been arrested
here.
(a) Ess lories and Germans here now seem to he still
grimly confident! the Armenians all seem worried, and
are undoubted! ly ap-;rehensira;the Greefce are clronl-
a ling all sorts of rumors and are evidently ezpeot-
ant;Arahs and others dc not seem especially interest-
ed, except most of them place nc faith in the offic-
ial oonmunlqusstfill admit conditions are especially
critical just now, and that anything may happen* So
far everything is outwardly as calm as ever however,
{t; Captain Morton is e: pec ted to rjrr ivc the coming -
Wednesday or Thursday, and ftirther reports will there-
fore be from him«„
-4%%
r * * —
M
j*
.iout
^WV
OFFICE CF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
COPY.
FML
No. 9
NAVAL ATTACHE.
AURICAN LEGATION.
PEKING.
1915
May 6j» Ij
From: Naval Attache", Peking.
Tc: Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department (O.N. I.);
Subject: Naval Base at Hsiang Shan, Nimrod Sound,
Chekiang Province.
1L The value of a naval base at Hsiang Shan has been
realized for quite a while by the Chinese Government.
2. The Xhineee Navy has made an estimate of the con-
struction of such a base, and appended hereto is a transla-
tion of the same.
C. T. EUTCHINS, Jr.-
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.
♦
.
•
«QTT
■ . t ■ [. t J .. . . ■
( • I • . 0 ) t .. i o i : 5
<
• ...
» •
-
3 •-;■
.
* *. *
# • .1 • V 4 *
Need not be returnee
The following detailed estimate ox the cost of labor and mater-
ial for the construction of the proposed naval "base at Esiang Shan
is respectfully submitted for Your Excellency's perusal.
Item 1. A sea-wall is to "be built in an east and west
direction, length 5700 feet (6697.5 feet);
20 feet (£3.5 feet); width at the bottom 12
feet (14.1 feet); width at the top 6 feet
(7.05 feet); average width 9 feet (10.575 feet).
The foundation ©f the wall to be faced with
large concrete blocks of the following demens
sions:- 8 feet long, 4feet thick, and 4 feet
..ide. A total of 715 blocks. Labor in
connection with same at six taels per block, —
4278 taels. On top of the above mentioned
concrete blocks, the wall to be faced with cut
and dressed stone blocks 1 foot square and 2
feet long, a total of 51,180 blocks at taels
2.50 per block, or 1255,950 taels.
To cover the wall there will be needed 2,850
large blocks of stone 1 foot thick, 4 feet long,
and £ feet wide, at 8taels per block, or a total
•f 22,800 taels. The inside of the wall to be
built of stone, that is, roughly quarried rock
without regard the size. 10,260 fang (a fan
is 1 foot thick and ten feet square, or 10 cubic
feet). Taels 3.50 per* . , tctal of 35,910
'
548 fang (10 cubic feet) of broken stone at 4 t
taels per fang, or 2,192 taels.
365 fang (10 cubic feet) of sea sand at 3 taels
•r fang, or 1,095 taels.
6,100 barrels of oenont, at taels 3.80 per bar-
rel, or 23,18< t. ols.
The above mentioned three articles, the broken
stone, sea sand, and cement, are the neces*
sary aaterials for making the 713 cencfcete
blocks.
The entire wall, being 57C0 feet long, with an
average width of 9 feet and a height of 20 feet
contains 1026 cubic fang (10,260 cubic feet).
Labor cost for building one cubic fang, — 100
taels ^ Total labor f©r wall, 102,600 taels .
Cesent for laying stones for the entire wall:
22 barrels for every cubic fang, a total ©f
22,572 barrels, at taels 5.80 per barrel, or
85,773.60 taels.
2320 fang of sea sand { a fang is 10 cubic feet)
t 3 taels per fang, or 6,960 taels.
20 wooden forms for moulding concrete blocks;
labor and material, total cost 670 taels.
Building a wooden bridge for use in connection
with the construction ©f thesea wall andfor
transporting materials for same; also removing
this bridge when the whole work is completed.
Cost ©f labor, 1/200 taels.
Material for the bridge, which is 5700 fe t
long, and consists of 800 spans of 7 feet each.
2,500 pine poles for piles, 18 feet 7 inches
lonL:, at taels 2.40 each, 6,000taels.
170/000 square feet of pine planks (foreign) at
taels .035 per square foot, 4,950 taels.
(should be 5,950 taels).
Screws and nails, beth included, 16,000 pound3
at taels .08 per pound, 14,000 taels. (should
be l,a80 taels) .
Total for the above mentioned item,
Construction of sea wall, -labor and materials
both included, 440,838.60 taels. (should be
427,838.60 taels) .
Item 2. Filling in and laveling behind the sea wall as
area 5700 feet long east and west and an avert,
width ©f 1830 feet north and south, a total
©f 104,310 fan.'-.
The top of the sea wall is to be 20 feet above
the level of the foreshore (above low water
level ?) .
Filling in behind the sea wall, 1,251,720 fang
(10 feet square by 1 foot thick) at an estimat-
ed cost for labor of taels .55 per fang, -total
for labor 688,446 taels.
The total land reclaimed is 1,738.5 mu at a cost
©f taels 396.10 per mu for filling in. Total
cost of the above mentioned item 2, -filling in
behind the sea wall,- 688,446 taels.
Itea 3. An ir©n pier 500 feet long east and west and
500 feet wide north and south? The face ©f
the wharf to exten<f26 feet above the surface
•f the water at lew tide when there is a depth
©f 20 feet alongside the pier.
For the sche I construction and the materials
to be used, Bee the drawings.
The piles t© be 3 feet square ' ef an average
length ©f aeeut 45 feet over all, is t© be built
up ©f 3/10 inch steal plates and fil ed with
cement reinforced with 3 inch triangular steel
bars.
Total number of piles, 180.
Steel ,TI" beam, 446.
Lattice girders for the side of the wharf,
534.
Labor and material as follows :-
Steel plates 3/10 inch thick, 5 feet wide 12
feet long, 1,330,000 pounds at taels .038 per
pound. 50,540 taels.
3-inch triangular steel "bars, 880,000 pounds
at taels 3.80 per 100 peunds. 33,440 taels.
3 l/2-inch triangular steel tars, 187,00-
100
pounds at taels 3.80 per pounds. 7,106 tael
2 by 4 inch ,TT" bars,— - 154, COG peunds at taels
3.38 per 16© peunds. 5,205.20 taels.
Rivets, 458,800 pounds at taels 4.6$) $et 100
pounds. 21,517.72 taels.
Steel "I" beams, 300,000 pounds at taels 3.38
per 100 pounds. 10,140 taels.
Flat iron bars, 2 2/10 inches wide by 2/10 inch
thick, 65,00' pounds at taels 3.65 per 100
peunds. 2,372.50 taels.
Iron plates, 11 1/2 inches wide by 2/10 inch
thick, — 39,000 pounds at taels 3.00 per LOO
peunds. 1,170 tael .
iron plates for the wharf face, —
553,000 pounds at taels 3.38 per 100 pounds.
18,691.40 taels.
Cement, 55 (5,500?) barrels at taels 3.80
per bar el. 20,900 taels.
Broken stone, &53 fjng (1 1 thi<: \ 10 feat
square) at aels 4.00 per fang. 1,412 taels.
Sea sand, 262 fang (Ifoot thick by 10 feet
aquare) at taels 3.00 per fang. 786 taels.
Pitting fenders to three sides ©f the wharf.
Total length of 1,360 fent fer say 50 fenders.
Labor and material 3,000 taels.
Meering bollards, 10. b, 2,000 pounds.
70 taels.. (700 taels?) .
Iron rail stanchions, 720. Each 3 feet long and
1.2 inches in dial eter and weighing 21 pounds.
Total 15,120 pounds at taels .10 per pound. 1,512
taels.
Rail stanchion sockets, 720. Total of 5,760 pound
691.20 taels-
Galvanised iron chain for the railing, 4,000 feet
weighing 3,600 pounds. $52 taels. (4,320 taels?)
Ladders, 4 Total of 1,200 taels.
Boat davits, 4 sots. 8 iron davits and 16 "blocks
and falls complete. 1000 taels.
Lamps for the v/harf witn: posts, 10. 200 taels*
Fainting the entire wharf three times. 1500 taels.
Fqt the above noiiticned Item 3.
Fqt materials 182,886.02 taels
For labor 133,800.00 taels
Teatal for labor & material 316,686.02 taels.
In all eases when building an iron pier on the fore-
shore, it is necessary t© build a rough wooden wharf
frrst for the use of the workmen, and. when the work
of construction is finished and the iron wharf com-
pleted, the wooden wh ,rf is entirely relieved.
This Item is abcolutely necessary.
Total cost for labor and material, 4,0C0 taels.
Item 4. On the edge of the wharf a pair of rs s to
be erected, together with necessary machinery for
suae, for handling machinery end. guns requiring re-
pairs and for like usage.
The shears to be 100 feet high and capable ef lift-
ing 60 tons, and to consist of 3 legs instead of hav-
ing rowe ketays.
The engine, boiler, and wkixk winch to be located in
rear of the shears.
6.
The "bleaks and falls to have a eapaeity of 60 tons;
the latter to be wire rope and «f a length suitable
f©r the shears; all complete. (Investigation shows
that this item must "be purchased abroad)
Total cost 45,000 taels.
Item5* A machine shop for making all kinds cf minor repairs.
A building 200 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet
high at the eaves; inside measurements. In all, 80
fang, at a cost ©f 140 taels per fang for labor and
aterial.
Total ccst 11,300 taels. (11,200 taels?)
Equipment fop machine shop as follows :-
About 60 machine tools of various kinds and sizes.
Trfcal cost 120,000 taels.
Nippers, pliers, tongs, etc., asserted sizes. #0 in
all. Total cost 320 taels.
Shafting, pulleys, and belting.
Total cost 25,000 taels.
A shop engine of about 80 nominal horse^power, with
the boiler for same. Total cost 17,000 taels.
Total cost of item 5, labor and material. 173,520Tael
Item 6. Boiler shop.
A building 150 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet
high at the eaves; inside Measurements.
In all, 60 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang
for labtr and material.
Total cont 8,400 taels.
Equipment for boiler shop as follov/s:-
1 combined punch and shears. 3,500 taels.
1 reamer 1,200 taels
1 plate r«lls 5,500 tael,
1 cast iron bending slab, 10 feet wide by 20 foot
l»ng, built up ef 4 section 260 Taa&s.
1 blower i,500 taels.
6 forges 90 taels
6 anvils 78 taels.
60 hammers of assorted sizes 90 taels.
Total cost of Item 6, labor and aaterial.
20,858 taels. (20,618 taels?)
Item 7. Blacksmith shop.
A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18feet
high at the eaves; insido measurements.
In all, 40 fang, at a cost ef 140 taels per fang
for labor and material.
Total cost 5,600 taels.
Equipment for blacksmith shop as fellows :-
1 2-ton steam hammer. ••• 4,000 taels*
1 1-ton steara hammer 2,000 taels"
10 anvils 150 taels.
4 cast iron slabs 160 taels.
12 forges 180 taels.
1 blewer 800 taels.
50 hammers efaassorted sizes 100 taels"
Tetal cost ef item 7, laber and material^
12,990 taels.
Item 8. Brass and iron foundry.
A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet
high at the eaves; inside measurement.
In all, 40 fang, at a cost ef 140 taels per fang
for labor and material.
Total cfst 5,600 taels.
Equipment fer 9UK±t±H$ feundry as follows :-
1 crane 5,000 taels
1 cupola for molting iron 2,000 taels.
1 blower fer same 1,900 taels.
Tetal cost of- it cm b» labor and material.
8.
14,500 taels.
Itea 9. Coppersmith shop.
A building 60 feet long, 40 feot wide, and 18
feet high at the eaves; inside measurements.
In all, 24 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per
fang for labor and material.
Total cost 5,360 taels.
Equipment for coppersmith shop as follows :-
Hippers, pliers, tongs, etc., in all, 10. 8©
taels.
1 forge 15 taels
30 hammers, asserted sizes 45 taels.
Total ci st of item 9, labor and material/
3,500 taels.
Item 10. Woodworking shop.
A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18
feet high at the eaves; inside measurements.
In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per
fang for labor and material.
Total cost 5,600 taels".
Item 11. Main boiler house.
A building 100 feet long 40 feet wide, and 18
feet high at the carves}, inside measurements.
In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per
fang for labor and material,
tal cost 5,600 taels.
Item 12. Chiianey
A chi: ney 120 feot high.
Total cost for labor and material. 3,400 taels
Item 13. tore houses.
To oonsist of three buildings. The main
building to bo 90 feet long east and we3t, 30
feet wide n©rth and south, and 2 stories high.
Each side building to be 90 feet long, 30 feet
wide, and 1 story high.
In all, 108 fang for the three buildings, at a
cost of 115 taels per fang for labor and mater*
ial. Total cost for labor and material.
12,420 taels-
tea 14. Coal storage.
4 coal store houses, each 250 feet long, 40 feet
wide, and 16 feet high at the eaves. In all,
400 for the 4 buildings, at a cost of 85
taels per fang for labor and material.
Tatal cost 34,000 taels j
Storage capacity for the 4 buildings about
1,000 tens (10,000 tons?)
4 stone-walled enclosures, with a storage capa-
city ©f 2,500 tens of co 1 oach,- a total ©f
10,000 tons. Each enclosure to have 100 fang
of storage ground.
Total cost 27,200 taels.
Tatal cost of Item 14, labor and material.
61,200 taels.
tern 15. Office buildings.
Director's office and residence t© c©nsist ©f
about 40 cftien, at an estimated cost for labor
and material ©f 300 tae s per chien.
Total cost 12,000 taels.
Item 16. Quartes for the staff.
Abeut 100 ©rhion, at an estimated cost for lab©r
and material ©f 200 tael3 per chien.
T©tal cost 26,000 taels.
Jem 17. Workmen's drellii
Abo rfc 200 chion, at an estimated ccst for lab©r
10
and material of 150 taels per chein*
Ictal cost 30,000 taels.
Item 18. ITaval Headquarters.
Not yet definitely decided upon.
Estimate for labor and material, including furnish-
ing sane. 100,000 taels.
Item 19. Water works .
Laying fresh water mains and "building reservoir and
ter tower. Estimated cost of about 120,000
taels.
Item 2C. light railway.
To "be used for transporting earth and coal. Total
length 7,500 feet, at a cost for labor and material
of 26.80 taels for 10 feet.
Total cost 20,100 taels.
16 iron cars for same at a cost of 90 taels perear
1,440 taels.
Total eost of item 20, labor and material
21,540 taels.
Itea 21. Working equipment.
A mat shed and certain machinery and tools, as listed
below, must be obtained before the work of building
the sea wall and wharf is begun. A rough mat s£ed
400 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 14 feet high tc
the eaves.
In all, 160 fang, at an estimated cost of 9C taels
per fang. 1,440 taels.
1 boiler 5 feet in diameter and 20 foot long, iron
smoke stack, and all complete including a small
feed pump 2,600 taels
1 horizontal en. ine i -out 80 hor: ;- jwer (20
nominal horee-power) 8t5< tael .
75 feet of 2.7 inch shafting in 7 sections, /vlso 7
11
7 hangers assorted "belting, and 10 pulleys
1,500 taels
1 pump with 1 1/2 inch discharge 1,800 taels*
1 steam driven combined punch and shears, (not "belt
driven) 3,600 taels.
5 hand-pwoer punches 1,500 taels.
1 reaner 600 taels*
1 drill pres
1 large lathe & 1 small lathe
4 forges
6 anvils
60 wooden bellows, various sizes
2 sast iron slabs 8feet by 4 fe t
100 haifiEaers, assorted sizes
20 dozen files, assorted sizes
1,000 taels.
2,000 taels.
48 Taels
72 taels
240 taels
320 taels.
200 taels
200 taels
1 grindstone, 4-feet in diameter, with tank
helt, and pulley all complete 180 taels
1 eevaent mixing Machine 750 taels*
1 diving suit (outfit?); outside rubber suit,
2 snail garments, aid rubber cloth for repairs
1,500 taels.
2 machines for pouring cenent 500 taels
2 road scrappers (?) 600 taels
12 wooden double bloclcs, 1 arge and small 48 tae [
4 pile drivers (?),-2 steam and 2 hand 3,200taols
2 small vertcal boilers, with 2 snail feed
pumps 3,600 taels
2 4-ton differential purchases at 35 taels each
70 taels
4 3-ton
8 2-ton
4 1-ton
2 l/2-ten
do
do
di
do
do
do
it
! 30 taels each
120 taels
at 22 taels each
176 taels
at 14 taels each
56 tael3
at 10 taels each
20 taels
12
1,00' feet 3-ineh wire rope, weighing about 15
pounds per 10 feet (?) at taels .23 per pound
345 taels
1 ceil 2-ineh coir r©pe,- 89 pounds to the ceil at
tae&s .25 per pound 22.25 taels
2 coils 3-inch coir rope, -198 pounds to the coil
&t taels .25 per pound 99.50 taels
coir
1 coil 4-inch txxxfci: rope, -4-5)8 pounds to the coil at
taels .25 per pound 102.00taels
1 coil 4-inch tarred rope,- 418 pounds t© the ceil
at teals .24 per pound 100.32 taels
100 steel shovels
70 at taels .67 a piece
30 at taels 1.10 a mece 79.80 taels
(79.90 taels?)
200 pickaxez 150 taels
Assorted kinds and sizes of round and flat iron and
round and square ateel for making tools
3,000 taels
A snail stone pier to "be first "built for use in
handing materials 3,500 taels
The various items of material specially needed for
the construction of the sea wall and of the wharf
are required when the work is "begun.
Total cost of I ten 21, labor and material
51,918.87 taels
Grand- total of the above enumerated 21 items required
to begin the work 2,199,967.49 taels.
tern 22. Mooring buoys.
Laying down 10 mooring buoys in the harbor at • cost
of 3,500 t per buoysq 31,000 taels.
tern 23. . Dry docks.
Dry deck Ne.l. 500 feot long inside, 9C i'eot wide
at the entrance, and 15 feet ever the blocks at low
water. Pumping machinery, boilers, and smol ok
IS.
350,000 taels.
Dry d@ek Ho. 3. 300 feet long inside, £0 feet
wide at the entrance, andIO feet ever the blocks
at low water. Pumping machinery, "boilers, and smoke-
stack 250,000 taels.
Dry deck No. 3. 840 feet long inside, 40 feet
wide at the entrance, and 5 feet over the bkocks
at l@w water. Pumping machinery, boilers and
smakestack 150, 00 > taels.
This dock is especially for docking torpedo-boats
and snail crafts
After the docks are completed, the several shops will
be added t@ and addit 1 tools installed^the esti-
mated ap. roximate cost for th&s being about 80 taels
(800,000?)
Total cost ©f item 23 , labor and material.
1,550,000 taels.
Careful estimates ©f the cost to build the sea-wall
•n the foreshore and the cost to build it ©n the rice
fields are as f©ll©ws:-
On the foreshtere.
Building the sea-wall and filling in,- 2 items.
Total cost 1,129,284 taels.
1738.5 m© ©f land to be levelled off at a cost of
647.30 taels per no.
On the rice fields at Hsi iihan
C©st ©f filling in. 479,357.70 taels.
672 ia© ©f land to be levelled ©ff at a cost •£
713.33 taels per no.
As a result ©f this c rision it is t t if
the rice fields arc used there will be a saving of
650,00' taols.
14
Also it will avoid many difficulties in connection
.ith the work.
A me ©f cultivated land costs about 50 taels. Lab«r
fer filling in ccsts about 180 taels per me. The
rice fields have to "be filled in t# a height »$ 5 ffct
and eack Mi of ground takes 300 fang ©f earth.
10
Item
Item
1.
2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6 6
Item 7
Item 8
Item 9
Item 10
Itea 11
Item 12
Item IS
Item 14
Item 15
Item 16
Item 17
Item 18
Item 19
Item 20
Item 21
Summary of the foregoing It. ems.
Building jrhe seaewall
billing in behind the sea-wall
Building iron wharf
Shear legs
Machine shop
Boiler shop
Blacksmith shep
Brass and iron foundry
Coppersmith shop
Woodworking shop
in boiler house
Chimney
Store houses
Coal storage (including enclasureg
Office buildings
Quarters for the staff
a1 s dwellin
Taels. .440,858.60
O'
ITaval Headquarters
Water wcr
Light railway
working equipment
Total for the aboye enumerated 21 items
required to begin the work
Item 22 Mooring buoys
Taels
Item 33
Dry docks
;427>
688
338.60?
,446.00
356
,636.02
45,
,000.00
173
,520.00
20,
,585.00
12,
,990*0.0
14,
,500.0
2,
,500*0,
5,
,600.00
5,
,600. C
5.
,400.00
12,
,420.00
61,
,200.00
12,
,000.00
20^000.00
50,
,000.00
100,
,000.00
120,
,000.00
21,
0.00
51,
,918.- 7
2,199,
,967.49
55,
,000.00
1,550,
000.00
SUBJECT
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. l9°tfee(l TlOt be rStWt'tieCi. /-»
MAY a*? i9ilT +
f.fcm
Present Constitution of Italian Fleet. """■ "
From.
No. 104* Date
.Xagg,,7>,,,^15«..
Replying to O. N. I. No.
Date
1. As well as can bo determined with war imminent
the following is the present constitution of the Italian
■ fleet. This allocs for the aroadnought luilio which, from
all reports- can join at any moment.
o
i •
She assignment of destroyers to divisions is im-
possible, as no information has been given out since last July.
1st. Squadron
Coanandcr-in-Chiof, S« . .. . il Irnca dogli Abrus::it
Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Cito,
Flagship - Conte di Cavour.
Is t.Bi virion.
3d.Division.
5th.£i vision.
MMMMMMM
-Rear-Admiral Coral.- -Roar- Admiral Trifari R.Atol.Cervin-
Dante Alighieri
Leonardo da Vinci
Giulio Cesar©
Ivuillo.
Garibaldi
L'erruccio
Varese
V* Pisani.
3rin
E.Pilibcrto
Saint Bon
Carlo Alberto.
8d. Souadron
Commandcr-in-Chiof. Vice Admiral Presbitoro,
Chief of Staff. *
Flagship - Regina >larghorita.
2d. division,
-Roar-Admiral Cutinolli-
>gina ;lona
Uapoli
Vittorio ".manuolo
Roma.
, 4th. ; ivision.
-Re I 1 t- idmifcal C agnl-
San arco
Pi3a
1 Giorgio
Ifi.
Division of 3 o outs
Ilino Bixio
uarto
roala.
2.
Destroyers
— tW) ~
Alplno
Aqnilone
Art ignore
Ardlto
Araento
Aadaco
Aaliaoso
Aecaro
AjPoerio
Bersagliero
'JTBB
Carabinioro
Corasclore
CTQl
rdo
JO
rue ill ore
limine
. 'illo
"ibalfllno
Granatioro
Gruglielmo "?epe
indoroito
Ijnpari&o
Inferepido
Impetnoso
Irrequieto
Insitliooo
Iiarnpo
Lane lore
:mbo
Ostro
ontiore
Strala .
Turbine
ffiro.
Bo change In I: juts.
Subraarines
(r;l)
Belfino
?olo!3
Jaioa
Glauco
Jantir
Squalo
AT£0
Barvalo
Fisal."
G.Pulllno
Otarla
Salpa
G#Ferraris
Eric hoc o
Hccutlltis
Atropo
Foca
Hercide
Argonauta.
fi^UH
^^_-/^':7^
^_//
Asterisk (*) designates Austrian vessels; all others are German
/?j-m ■' 7 w)
-L. __ \; W.r CV
>
Department of commerce
BUr£$AU OF' NAVI6A1 .
WASHINGTON
GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN 7ES ■■■_ IN roiri';- 01 THE UNITED STATES.
May 8, 1915.
ff
srsrsss
CSSS~5
:;-;-;."
:=^r;=;^^-_-^
.i;Cw=?=?===??=>=:
■z^.—. —~— ~ — — —=———————— —
Gross
Net Pas sen
Name
bona
bone
gej .
Crew
Speed A I
Owner
erland
54282
2354J
.V. !
923
24 '
New York , N. Y.
HambUj g. Amer i can.
Washington
^55 1 1
15379
2755
' ;o
n 9 -
do
North Gorman Lloyd.
ka
226
13637
2567
541 ^17-L
Boston, Mass.
Hamburg --Amer i can.
I Jronprinaoaain
Cuci ! .
19503
0584
15 76
650
-23i-
do.
North Gorman Lloyd.
WilhoJm 11
19361
6353
1593
655
-23A-
New York, N.Y.
do.
^ ■ Line
tent Grant
18168
11171
c/ OJ
305
-14A-
do.
Hamburg -American.
18072
1 1 1 12
o::03
' : / , ■ 1
-: 0,
do.
do.
j
10339
9733
2449
370
-15 J .
-Boston, Mass.
do.
i a
13333
85 a v
267]
-13A-
Now York, N.Y.
do.
Kurfarst
13102
'881
1965
26.0
45,}-
do.
North Gorman Lloyd.
1.1440
7218
Baltimore, Md.
Hamburg American .
0984
is;
215
-14-
New York, N.Y.
Not Mi German Lloyd.
ferinzess In i
6443
L930
.
- 3 52
.
do.
ricl
*| Gros
107 VI
6585
1827
£15
-14J-
do.
do.
Jaobi>
10531
6420
1387,
-16-
do.
Hamburg -Ame r i can
.100 08
03
180
155
13-
Ba L t i mo r e , Md .
North German Lloyd.
loni£ Wj lhulm II
|
192
170
-14 -
do,
do-
9410
5764
-J-0-
.New Vui k, N.Y.
Hamburg Amoi lean .
.
84
52 • •
i :
do.
do.
Washington 8312
5379
1101
250
-17 -
do.
Unions Aue bi iaca.
7 109
.
105
Boston, Mass.
North Gorman Lloyd.
• i
70
4£
.
New York, N.Y.
Unione Austriaca.
6600
4141
81
12$
Philadelphia.
Hamburg-Ame] i can
:ny
I
4X71
L3
Bos1 on, Maes.
n tone Austi i aca .
.
-
7 7
1045
J 04
13.
Philadelp3
tfamfcurg-Amj an.
■ittekind
5640
5607
1265
■ ! n , Mass •
North C©] man Lloyd
Ockcui
5621
3452
do.
Han sa.
54i
331
lJ7«
44
New xoi \:, N.Y.
Hamburg Anion can.
tread
5454
34
44
Norfolk, Va.
I
.000
490'/
31 "
3148
; .48
66
42
12
Now r : < Ik, M . V .
do
Hanua
Hamburg -American.
No raw.
948
4795
3106
do
Galveston, Tex
D.Tripovich S.S.Co.
Atlantica Sea Nmv .Go
47i
3012
1071
93
12
Bos Ion, Mass.
Noi Hi German Lloyd.
him
. 'GO
2981
96
- New York, N i
I i m.
|
:
3068
43
Sari Francisco.
K08mO8 li|io.
rinz August
LWi ram
47
y/'o
10
- Now 5fork, N.Y.
Hamburg American.
-2-
Gross
Net
Passen-
a Name
tons
4730
tons
309
gers Crew
Speed A I
Owner
'Ida
12
New York, N.Y.
Unione Austriaca.
nz Eitel
Fried rich
650
2921
62
12
do.
Hambui g -American .
-
4637
3019
Philadelphia.
D, ch S.S.Co.
kllemannia
4630
2915
82
13-
• New York, N.Y.
i urg American.
tarbur^
4472
20
do
:.' 1 , : i :'. . MO.
: I
2
48
Sea b tie, Wash.
Samburi k\ ■■ Lean.
39...
2541
Nev Or leans , La
Union
1 # a
>02
■ /5
44
New fork, N.Y,
Hami m , :'""'■. ; m
3769
i 561
New 0] Leans ,La.
.' ; ' aca.
i ape st
.
N ii roil! , Va.
At lant i Na r. Co.
i
: si
22'.
:,,, i "_■; ! . ._> n T1, :
D T] Lpi vie] ! S Co
■.'<■
297-i
18c
;;,..•, ni ib Ga,
;'• . he] MF] G
2778
I 7 1-4
28
New York, N.Y
D tmpi h ■ 1 ! ' ' d
Horn Atk.
1
2555
1635
20
Holm • : "■ U ■ ■ ' en.
Clara Mennig
1685
1005
do .
i>i-.i .. ;; i !i
Unr
.feptun
1571
989
New Oi ) ( ans
Lone Ans i aca.
197
L31
San Francisco.
J ij Let.
lotomern
,
40 ■
Honolul u.
No] an Lli rd .
C. J. D. Ahlers
Prinz Waldemar
7490
4737
Hi Lo
Hansa.
3227
173
i
Honolulu.
forth ■ ■ -:i in L] Dyd .
Bet
4730
30:.
do.
ECosmos.
Bolsatia
5649
3533
do.
Hai Amei icin.
lock;:'
1657
10:-
No] man Lloyd.
tog Moon
» TOatssekretar
1971
1245
do.
Ham Lean.
Krautkc
2009
1208
12
do.
do,
Governeur Jaeschke
1738
1045
do.
do.
'Luc •■
6744
;
13-
- Pensacola .
Unione Austriaca.
. Blumberg
17<
1077
do.
Leonard t & Blumberg.
n
3716
557
H. Vogemann.
eda Leonhardt
2822
1818
Jacksonville.
L'. h rdt & 131 umberg.
Bor
3621
2337
Tampa, Fla.
Soc. Anon.Ungherese di
Ain-. : to Maritt. Ori enl
Menwa
•
in Juan, P.R.
lean Line.
69 vessels 530,835 308,503 42,135 7,685
f
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October
3, &eed not be rMwttenL
r
.*,-» t
SUBJECT
MAY Jgs 101b
Fortifications of feranto ~ Italy,*,,,,,',,1 '..:..:. 1/
From...JL. - No $$$*
Date
8t %ffi&+
mmmm»mm
Replying to O. N i. No.
T.... Date ^^^—^^^^fc^^u^
3^ <
/?*
3
1. The fort if lections of T-arcnto arc "conrplelro"_with
the exception of 3 new batteries, iich I hot-r from good
authority arc -under construction ** 4, 10 and 80 meters » re-
spectively b. or £W5 from Cape San Vito. .hose, I understand,
are off shore - "But no details arc available •
. Besides the forts there have beer, cons rue . ed
submerged breakwaters as ohov.n on the attached slDotch. These
br akwatcrs enclose the harbor e::ecpt between the island of
St» Paolo and the shoal of San Vito.
3. All mines. etc, arc storcc? in the old castle.
4. Fortifications as follows:
Hondinella ?$. 4 to Q :":■: om« howitzers on cireulrr
mounting;
St.Pietro Is. 6 to 8 on. howitzers.
om. " under shields;
119 ton 31. Krupp in Oruson .
turret;
6n &&m on naval : countings;
} em. guns.
0 « howit:.crc.
1 mm.
. mm. behind shields in earth-
works .
St*Paolo Is.
C.San Vito
Castcllo
( 8 —
Shore battery
i
Enol. 1.
C
ton t , Ft c3? / /
=f / / o /v S
Bellow.
3 ^"JU^.'iOi
.5?
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)
CO
SUBTECT Fortifications of Venice ~T
J Qua tfeed not be returned.
Precautions against attack.
From T No W6. /fc* A0mK^^lHmUGmi^
Replying to O. N. i. Nor~mm~— — Date | ^-'- "X^o^n^^
1* I forward here, itli the very latest Information
I have been able to compile on the fortifications of Venice
and various military precautions taken against attack. The
Italians consider Venice a very vulnerable spot, although an
ideal base for torpc do craft for naval operations in the
Adriatic. Tho forte have been lately overhauled, and many
new battcrios have boon installed. It is believed that the
below list of guns is substantially correct.
. As rogords precautions against attack, I loom
that wire network has been placed over the entire Inner
basin and over all sho s end submarines under construction.
Shis is within tho Arsenals where no foreign Attaches have
boen permitted since August last. .11 works of art have bocn
ronoved.
3. There have been mounted on tracks along CavaX-ino
shoal many aeroplane guns of French manufacture, and I believe
tho same hrs boen done alongt&he Lido.
.. Fortifications:
All forts and battorles will bo found marked in red ink on tho
attached tracing and numbered:
(1) Cavallino Shoal: Two - " . • cm. .30 Cal. / tottery
lour- lo a .:. modern , a complet-
( ) Fort. San Andrea: Six - 15 cm. .F.
I
cd in
191 .
(3) Eegla llarina: Two - 30.5 on. 3.... .runs ( UNI of
fire be-
tween s, *
and B.S.E.
(x) (4) Fort. Tre orte: Six- 24 S*. ft« -. bmitthf r.*hls batt-
ers; J ry may
Four- 15 cm. /have been
/moved,
{ 5 ) F o rt . 8 an ' :rasmo : S Ie - 6 inch U ? , r~ ro j rib ly
in chlolds. V nountod on
I Southern
) ond of
l island.
(G) Fort. San IlicoloMThroo - 20,0 om. . . ho\;-
it%ors
Four - 7., m.
our - 15 an, . . . .
or - 1 c .. .. .
Foiu* m f& mm.
fm - 1*3 c:.'i. oio{;o L;uno on
who el-car: m
(x) Wot shown on chart -
)
CD) o:
{!:} Tort Ml MM
(11) art.
45
C
\
- */ >
: I
«.
5
3SS - ' -
Etiie,
-
- i
;
•
• 9
) Tort., Sen
{!•'.) Part, j: 1 oe. • . RWBi
(1 ) ,rfc, pot <■» 4 *
(16) or
lies
Bucl« x*
■*■■*.;
jYvrc, \s
/jp
Office of Kaval Intelligence,
ay 10, 1915.
**^
v&xe
©'
11/5
(.7
■mm i m hi i.*»ii iu> -win i.iw»
Proia; &t*(J«g«] J. E. Klein,
So J Chief of operations,
via Director of Ilaval Intelligence.
&UBJ> Battle practice - Discussion.
1. In reading Over and studying the HQ tionort
of the various warring nations (the filing of «felen is assigned
to my desk) I have been more than surprised to note the ex-
reme ranges at which aite are now feeing made Ly both the
iglish and the German men-o-war. In this paper I have tried
to condense the data and the lessons deducted from these Op-
erations abroad and to ..reseat Ihem lor your consideration
with special reference to the form of Battle .iraotiso as con-
ducted in our navy. I e&ar&losa of the manner in which these
cations may be received, i shall feel hiore than thankful
if any email amount of discussion be begun which will wo:
toward the increasing of our Gunnery hffi .ey in order to
fit us to eep* v'ith vessels that seen to be able to a }. its
at hitherto unheard of ranges.
This diocussion can best be divided into the following
in topics.
I. Lessons drawn from the present 7,'ar.
II. notes on lien ^.im, «erxcKa Battle
I I I. Com pari son with United 3tatos havy.
17. Battle j ractloe U.SJIavy.
(a) ange
(b ) Speed
(c) ather Conditions.
V. Conclusion.
As ciuch of the information concerning affairs abroad is
"Confidential", it is most itly requested that none of
ese notes be -.ivon out.
1. Lessons drawn from resent War.
■ [■■Mi^MWMiaiW. urn iKrMnnwiii—n.w* ^. »iimnW.i< H <nM*>***'ia*i »m"»Wm*>v*+—*m>4 • <iwl iim> .■» mi imMmUm* »
all the engagements which have taken place to
date, only the following three major operations are cited, as
these are the only ones in which two fleets of nearly the
same strengths have engaged each other.
Action of January 24, 1915,
or
"Sinking of hltlcher" .
English -/'loot
German i-'lcot
1. i,10li( Flag Hh.G. )28.5 kto-0-13':5 1 .herf linger ( . ; >(B.d.)
,10
r*
2. 8 !jj.C)
icts.-a-i3«i5
j kts.- B-ajB".
2.U0LTKE (h.C.)27,2 kts-lG-11" .
J.PRIHC YAL(B.C) 23.5 hie.- 3. (B.Q.)29 ktfi .-10-11" .
0-3 3.5 •
*-n ( .0,)26.4 kta-8-12". 4.BLUC :.;.0.)25.8 lets. -
*3C ..
5. :(B.C. )27.3 kts.a-iL .
Jpeed - 26.4 to 10 -its. -Full
Guns - H - 13f:5
1C - 1 .
l£-8?2.
ood-25.0 to 3 ■ ,-;ull
Guns - 0-1:
20-lln
12-8.
Vw»
>V*vSN
<*tr ; : • y v
6T
- 2 -
Sea Smooth
British fired single 13".5
ranging shots (8,53-9.09 A.ll. )
at 20,000 yds. -one of which hit.
INDOMITABLE lagging behind.
K£W SAALAED exceeding contract
speed .Fleet speed 29 to 30 knots.
Began salvoes at (9:20 A.ll. }18000
yds .PBUfCBSS SOXil opens on 3LU-
CHEB 17500 yds.BAUCHER hit at about
this range .Many German shells hit
but did not explode*
Tactics.
and.
keep
glish maneuvred
then hold position
just out of range
to
so
of
up
Germans open fire 18000 yds.
and minimum range 16,400 yds.
Average range reported 17000
yds.BLUCIIJAH hit. Shell pene-
trated decks and exploded in
fire -room, put ting 4 boilers
out of commissi on. Direct
cause of lagging behind and
becoming prey to smaller
ships .Finally sunk \>y torpedo
at very short range after re-
sistance ceased.
Tactics.
Using full speed to es-
cape - trying to return to
Helgoland or get behind mine-
12" guns of Germans
catch
as to
11" and
fields.
Both fleets steaming in
column, courses practic-
ally parallel, (about .L.3.B.)
English Fleet withdrew-said to
have done so to avoid mine-fields f
However, the 2nd in command, E. Ad.
Aoore was later relieved of com-
mand for not pursuing Germans farther.
Note : -British Battle Instructions provide that when 5 ships en-
c 4 ships, Uo.l and 2 British, concentrate on ilo.l enemy;
::o.3, fires on enemy I!o.2; So. 4 on enen-y Ho .3; and Ho. 5 on
enemy No . 4 .
During this fight, IlIDaALTABLE(IJo.5 } fell behind-could not
make the Fleet speed. LI Oil (Ko.l) fired on LEIJALIHGEK ( II o . 1 ) .
TIGEH(Uo.2) fired on D2jRFLINGER(ll'o.l )as per instructions.
RIJSCESS ROYAL (Ho. 3) fired on SEYDLI2Z (Ho .3), assuming
INDOMITABLE out of position.
W :D(No.4) fired on BLUCHER(Ifo .4 ), assuming II! .Doll I TABLE
out of position.
IHDOMITABLE (No. 5) fired on BLtfCHIB (Ho .4 ) .
(when she caught up)
As a result, MOLTKE(IO.S) escaped almost untouched and prob-
ably inflicted most of the damage on LI01 and TIGER.
Results
Damage to LI OK - one shell struck
engine room below armor; (caused her with-
drawal from fight ) , one shell exploded in
forward torpedo room; one exploded on armor
belt and loosened plate .Hit about £4 times.
Damage to TIG2R - more general than BLUOHER-eventually sunk,
to LIOH, but not as serious .Details lack- Armor not pierced until
ing.Hit 14 times, nearly all in upper works .near end .Neither engine
HKW ZEALAHD.PBIJTCESa RoYAL and 1IU
DOMITABLE damage not known, if any, very
Ilight.
room damaged when she
sank.
OTLIM hit attaft 11"
turret by long range 13'.T5
shot and explosion ignited
400Q kil03 powder, Avi-
dently penetrated vicinity
£6gi - 3 -
ndling room as entire personnel
of turret and handling room killed
by burns (34 men), llo reports on
further damage .
\o report on nature of damage
to
bly escaped with.
v&ry a ;e,if any at all.
gunnery Lessons : English made single ISIS hits at 20,000
yards and landed saivoes at 1§V000 yds, while stealing at fall
speed. hopelessly outranged. Long range hit on
BLCCHEB made her easy prey to faster English cruisers.
is inflicted some damage at long ranges (averaging
17,000 yds.} with 11" and 12" guns, while steaming full speed.
German report states minimum range - 16,406 yds.(l )
tres ).
Action of December 8, 1914.
.Inland Islands."
«iw— «r ■**■««'- — — ■^■^»— i
lis action consisted of a series of duels, but for I \ e
- oses of this vv.per, only the main action "between the iliVm.-
CIB and IlfJUSXIl a 8C and 3 ■./ need be
considered.
l,:i£lish Germans
11(S.C. )28 lets. 8-12". S( -TfA.C. )£2.7 fcts.8-8".2
IMFIiEXIB£E( . . )27.2 kts.8-12" .ajfEISSHAVUtC . )23.5 kts. 8-822.
Guns-16-12" Guns-16~8r:2
Speed-Practically full speed 3peed-i'ull speed attempting
throughout . to escape .
Tact ice -Manouvred so as to Tactics-(1 )Attempted to escape
(l)get within 12" range (2)C. ed course fre-
(2)keej> outside 8'i2 range. quently to throw off Pish
spotting.
Sea - Smooth
.m1 her -Clear and Pair.
Kange - £8*800 yds. to 16,500 yds.
Battle commenced 12:55 p.m. BCE&BBHQ sank 4:17 p.h.
developed about 29 mm 'J sank 6:00 p.m.
knots. " ran out o£ aramun-
[ ;LK said ition about *|2 .
to have fired BOO rourids 12"
apiece • (Hot eon f i rmed )
first hit at about
16, ■.-. yde.IHVD I IS hit between
20 and 30 times during battle.
So serious material damage .Ho por-
sonnel losses .Damage Iil?Ii:
not known*
Gunn r:ry Wesson : ~r^he British made sufficient 12" hits to
sink fi armored cruisers at from 13,500 yds. to 16, yds. while
both fleet* ware steaming full speed. The reported unusually
heavy expenditure of ammunition may be due in a groat measure
to the tactics of the ans Lb changing ree frequent]
and to the fact that the entire battle was fo it long ranges
ana nade from 80 to tits '■;;.. t> - una at ranges
of from 13500 yds. to 16 yds., while a foil Speed*
c slight uatorial damage i i Lish is & iot to faulty
German gunnery, but to the &rcat r q at which these shell
re fire .
Note: -The and U were both uunnory trophy
Ships.
- 4 -
Action of llov.l, 1914.
"Coronel Chili."
This action was virtually a duel between S0HAB3JH0RS5) and
Ol'EISElIAU versus GOOD HOPE and aOi&LGU^H. GLASGOW and C TO
escaped. Small German cruisers inflicted little damage.
German English
Si .:iI0^3fr(A.C. )22.7 Its^G-a^E GOOD E0PE(G }23 kts.2-.9,J2-16-6"
GUEI3EBAU(A.C.)83.5 kts.8-8Ti2 MOHMO UEH ( C )22.5 kts.-14-G'J
Guns - 16 - 8':2 Guns - 2-9r.'2; 30 - 6"
Speed - Pull Speed Speed - 17 knots
£actics-Haneuvred to obtain
advantage of light after sun had
set and to 'kcB].) beyond 6" range.
Sea - Very Heavy.
Weather - Heavy winds - unf avorable .
Some of 6" guns could not be used due
to heavy seas end spray which also
interfered with the 2-9"2 guns.
Ilange-12000 yds .to 4500 yds.
Third salvoes (about 12000 yds ) . '
Set both GOOD HOPE and LIOIMOUTH afire.
Small material damage. GOOD HOPE and K0ITLi0US.lI sank*
English did not get within
6" range until Soo dar^ to see.
Gunnery Lesson: Germans 872 guns completely outranged English
6" guns. G06D HOPE'S 2-97 guns hampered by heavy sea and spray.
Germans made 8"2 hits at 12000 yds. in a very heavy sea after
'sunset, while steaming at, or nearly at, Full Speed.
A study of these Gunnery Lessons will reveal the following
points:
(a) Hereafter Kaval battles will be fought at ranges about
twice as great as the average of those of the Eus so -Japanese
War - namely at 15000/ yards.
(b ) Hereafter Ilaval Battles will be fought at, High Speeds,
(which in two of these three actions was almost 29 knots )
(c) Hereafter, the victor must be able to make hits at very
Ion,:: ranges while steaming at Full Speed, and in some cases, be
able to accomplish this in a heavy sea way.
fd) ma victor in each case suffered small material and per-
sonnel losses. fhM vanquished lost every thing.
(e) A small initial advantage, either in gunnery or material,
doubles itself before one third of the en^a^ement is fought and in-
creases to an insuperable advantage by the middle of the engagement.
In short, the victor is invariably the one who possesses this initia
superiority, measured in terms of speed, g*uns or gunnery efficiency.
Is our ITleet sufficiently skilled in gunnery to "draw first
blood" from any possible enemy, or rather do our battle practice
results compare favorably with the results of these actions?
Note: -A statement of the percentage of hits made in these three
bat ties, if compiled from the meager data available to date, would
probably be so inaccurate as to be misleading. An attempt is being-
made to obtain reliable information on this siibject.
II. Hotes on Lnglish and German Battle Practices.
1. There is very little data on file in this office re-
ferring to this subject, but the following isolated notes, ar©
inserted for what they may be worth.
(a) Both Germany and England have, for some years, antici-
pated a fleet engagement in the L'orth Sea. It is said that
— 5 —
they therefore engaged in practices -under north oea conditions -
at is - choppy sea, hasy weather and ran&e of visibility
mt 6 yds*, .ever, they probably did not confine t\ -
selves entirely to this short battle rant;e as the following
notes prove; nor would the excellent gtuanexy duri he war
ve boon possible had they not practiced at longer r»33£
an 6000 yds.
(b) i« Soott director syateia as used in the Ilah
Havy has increased the British efficiency In long - o gun-
nery. Die Permans have investigated the director system and
may have installed it in some of their vessels - but on Jan-
uary 8, 1915, no evidence of the director system v;as found on
an inspection of the battle cruiser HOLXKS and of the small
ori'isor 55 I3USQ.
(c) In 1913, England fired experimental strings at the
old !' ess of India" with 13'io guns at a range of eight
les.
fd) In 1912, EogXmft conducted battle practice at from
to 1 , yards,
(e) As early as 1908 or 1909, the Germans conducted
act. ices at I0t000 yards or more, and quite recently zhej
red at a minimum range of 13124 yards (l£,C0u metres).
S. It is yerj regrettable that no data is at hand re-
gard I exaot ranges &M conditions of the sea durin
thasfl practices, The Lnglish issue tables containing the
reeu of hits made but this is of no particular value bo-
use the other conditions are omitted. Incidentally, these
tables which usually refer to ^un&ayers testa, state that
weather conditions were "Ekc client" "Favorable" etc, but in
a very few isolated cases ?i,ere the conditions reported to be
Diavorohle.
3. Comparison with United states havy.
In comparing our Gunnery efficiency with that of .England
and of Germany, the comparison naturally follows two separate
and distinct lines - i.e. -(a )MMaterial" and (b )nFire Control".
(a) Material". The following verbatim quotation from
the daily press is said to have been authorized hy the Uavy
apartment :-
"There is an a:;iom with regard to calibres which amounts
to this - that a ship should mount the smallest big gun that
will pierce the enemy's armor over vitals at the maximum pro-
bable ..htine * e. She 14" guns of the i h- will
■, through the maximum armor afloat, so far as our knowledge
ejocs, at a range of 12000 yards.
It is not ay ■ urpose to discuss at length the subject of
•..crial. The following notes, bearing on the above statement,
are inserted without comment.
1. The ocharnhorst axid Cnoisenau were destroyed by 12"
guns at rang«« between 13500 yards and 14*500 yards.
£. The blueher was disabled by 12" and 13V 5 guns at
about 17000 yards range.
3. The Good Hope and Uonmouth were defeated by S«2 guns
at a range of 12000 yards in a rough sea after sunset.
4. it substance of 1, Z and 5, indicates that battle
ranges of 1 yards now out of date.
5. ish, evidently due to recent I riences,
are building two or four vessels of the following character-
istics:
Length - 8QQ feet.
Displacement - 17000 tons.
ii. .-. - 12' j,
3peed - 31: knots.
at - /tin - 4-15" raifti
eoondary- robetoly 6 "-numb or of nai not
known. LI to be mounted on
cc r line.
- G -
ihiel - Probably Oil.
Armor - Hone of any kind neither vertical nor horizontal
HI III || i ■ ■ - ■ ■-■■«■- ■ - ■ ■ ■■ - -- - ...-..■. T .Hi - - - ti ,i
'1'hese vessels arc designed to sacrifice amor for speed.
our fleet
and must fight at the very greatest ranges possible in order to
protect themselves, "his again emphasises the fact that the next
fleet en . agement will be fought at enormous ranges and that vic-
tory must certainly be won by accurate long range firing .One well
plaoed*on one of these vessels will be sufficient to spoil her
doom, yet the English are taking that chance in order to be able
to dictate battle ranges and at the same time to win the battle hj
long range heavy plunging hits, such as disabled the Blueher.
It is not my intention to convey the idea that England in-
tends to build all her future capital vessels along these lines -
but it is my aim to invite attention to the possible changes in
gunnery ideas which are bound to come if these vessels prove
effective.
(b) Fire-control.
As stated heretofore, there is no satisfactory way
of comparing results of our Battle Practices with the results
of B&glish or German fractices. Hior can the results of these
engagements be accurately compared, because the advantages of a
larger target are more than offset by the interference of the
enemy, the greater speed used in action, etc.
We assume that our fleet in time of war would also
arise to the occasion and perform marvelous feats of gunnery.
I say we "assume" that, we "hope" that, and we "believe" that -
but do the results of our battle practices warrant such an assump-
tion? Can we actually make a reasonable percentage of 12" or
14" hits at from 13,500 to 20,^00 yards?
The Department slates that the battle practice of
1914 showed little improvement over that of 1913 . Further I
have heard that the practice of 1915 could not be classified
as "good". 'The Department al30 states that the Spotting of
1914 was not as good as that of 1913. ose three sentences
indicate that we are not advancing . fhe first section of this
paper certainly proves that Lngland and Oermany are not merely
roving their ^^uiiaery, but that they are advancing by leaps
•1 bounds. hat is being done to improve our gunnery?
IV. Battle i-ractice - U.S. Havy.
Conditions under which battle practice is held divide
selves naturally into three headings - (a) Range, (b )
jc&, (c) weather conditions. Briefly stated, the Range should
be as great as possible up to limits of accuracy of gun fire;
^^e speed should be the most the vessel is capable of up to the
point where vibration interferes too seriously with gun point-
ing; the weather conditions (other than visibility) should be the
average weather expected at sea, i.e., not "Excellent" nor always
"Favorable". To reconcile these three factors, to give each its
proper weight, and then to frame a set of rales for Battle Prac-
tice is an undertaking that merits much consideration and dis-
cussion.
£he Italos for 1914 iractice prescribe
hanges - 7000 to 9000/ yards.
Speed - 15 knots.
Aher Conditions - little is said except that conditions mu3t
bo fair to all ships.
*
(a) I^an^e - Summaries of previous practices.
1912 - 12* ranges, 10640 to 11760 yards. .Fall charges,
1913 - 12" ranges, 8770 to 8410 fcds . deduced charges.
1914 - 12" ranges, 9050 to 10790 yds. Pall charges.
Alto note that in 1914, among the battleships, the LOUIS IA
fired at from 10380 to 12510 yds. (the maximum average range )# the
IE fired at from 6850 to 8900 yds. (the minimum average
range) and that the 7IRSIHIA, actually fired at a range of only
6330 yds. at some point in her run.
In hie report on 1914 practice, a Division Commander remarked
on battle ranges of 10,000 to 13,000 yds.
m
Shen the above practice ranges are compared with the actual
battle ranges of the three battles noted abroad, it seems that our
ideas of battle ranges are short by about 6000 yards.
!Phe following table shows approximately the limits of accuracy
of our guns:
8""- 45 cal. - 15,000 yairds.
12" - 40 cal. - 15,000 yards.
12"- 45 cal. - 18,000 yards,
14"- 45 cal. - 20,000 yards.
12"- 50 oal. - 22,000 yards.
I believe our practices should be fired at ranges as great as
possible, up to the limit where "chance" enters into ballistics.
Additional attempts should be made to build and handle larger targets
in order that the range may be increased to 15,000 yards and still
remain within "aceuracy'1 limits. Jurther, the 8" gam should bo
discounted in this connection and the rules framed with reference
to the 12" and 14" guns only.
(b) Speed.
The old conception of two fleets of nearly equal strength
and speed, steaming in parallel columns, more or less willing to
decide the issue, needs revision. In modern times, no two fleets
have fought under those conditions, ?robably never again will two
fleets be both willing to engage - one will invariably be forc4% the
engagement on the other, I.e. there will be a pursuer and a pursued.
This applies directly to cruiser etc. actions and It may also be
more or less applicable to Battleship Fleets.
Discussing these three engagements the following becomes
apparent :
(a) Craddook's ideas will never be known* But he was severely
criticized for his foolishness in not attempting to escape from the
Germans at Ooronel - at least for not running away until the Oanopus
Joined him. The Germans, were using all speed possible to sink
the Good Hope and Monmouth before this junction obuld be affected
and to gain the advantage of the light just after sunset. Ithout
superiority of speed theiSermans would have failed to force the
engagement under their own terms. ;ain, let mo repeat, while
foing at full speed, they dropped salvoes on the English ships at
2000 yds., with 8 ".'2 guns, under severe weather conditions.
(d) At the Falklands, the Germans unknowingly Bteppad into a
trap and then used all speed possible in trying to escape. 'ilio
;lish battle cruisers needed their high speed to overtake the
Germans, and when overtaken, to maintain the range within limits to
their own advantage. Yet, while both fleets were steaming- at full
speed the English made sufficient 12" hits, to sink their adversaries,
trtiile the Germans made 20 to 30 - B12 hits on the Invincible at
ranges of 13,600 to 16,500 yards.
(c) On January 24, 1914, the Gorraans wore evidently on their
fay to raid the English coast when surprised by the Knglish
-8-
battle cruisers. Knowing they were outranged and outnumbered by the
English, the Germans made all speed possible to escape. Again,
while steaming at fall speed, each side did some remarkable long
range shooting, i.e. at least 24 - 8J 11", and 12" hits at 17000
yards average range were made h^ the Germans . 99 record of damage
inflicted by English other than the notes under the results of the
battle quoted at beginning of this paper.
The question of building faster ships is not under discussion
{see 32 knot, new Snglish ship) but the subject of "making long
range btits while our ships are steaming full speed" should and must
soon, be duly considered. I do not believe we have ever held a long
range battle practice with the firing vessel makin; full speed. Does
16 knots speed give us the necessary earner ience, practice or data?
The question of speed, as discussed herein, is not confined to the
innge of range* factor. I refer especially to the interference
gunnery caused by 1- excessive vibration, 2- smoke and powder
oloud interference en own ship and on other ships, 3- additional
oonfusion below decks when operating at high speeds, etc., etc.
I suggest that eaoh ship have a point on her speed curve deter-
mined where the interference by vibration be considered as detrimental
to ganneT'j and that each vessel fire her individual battle practice
at slightly less than that speed. The higher the speed the more
realistic will battle conditions be reproduced. Carbine ships should
bo able to fire when steaming at fall speed.
If it be considered necessnry or desirable to adopt a fleet
speed for all these practices, why not adopt the speed of the ship
whose vibration point is lowest on the curve? This point certainly
should exceed 15 knots. Before leaving the question of speed,
attention is invited to the subject of ^Speed versus submarines* .
In the battle of last August (Helgoland) Admiral Beatty reports
that while his battle cruisers were waiting to support the light
cruisers and flotillas they steamed about at fall speed. Suddenly
they were attacked by three German submarines, but, due to the high
speed of the battle cruisers, the submarines were easily avoided/
The battle cruiser 3 later on ongn^Bd and assisted in sinking the
*rladne, 2oln, I&omz and V-187.
In short, although a battle fleet is subject to submarine attack
at any time, it is especially so during and just Immediately before
and after an engagement . In the present stage of submarine
development, 25 - 30 knot battle cruisers easily avoided 10 - 12 knot
submerged speed submarines. Cound a 15 knot fleet avoid 10 - 12
knot submarines as easily? Shea submarine speed is increased to 25
knots on surface and 16 knots submerged, our creeping 15 knot battle
fleet will not be able to outmaneuvre them as easily a3 Admiral
Beatty did. Speed is the best ^possibly the only, defense against
submarines .
(c) feather Conditions .
Of the three factors concerned In Battle practice Rules,
this one Is the least important, but is cot a neglible factor by any
■sans. It must be subordinated to range and speed in order to avoid
unnecessary inaccuracies. However, neglecting it entirely is very
apt to result disastrously especially in affairs such as the Coronel
Battle.
Our last individual practice .rules rnde no special mcrtton of
unfavorable state of sea, eto.
By state of weather is meant the wind and sea only, visibility
should always be of the best because it is worse than useless, it is
absolutely misleading, to fire when the visibility Is poor or deceptive.
As stated before, Jagland and Germany practiced under North Se
conditions, which I assume to mean that they fired battle practice
when the aea was choppy, etc.
Lieutenant Commander Jackson (in 1913-1914) of the '.'yoraing,
advoontod firing In the open oea under deep sea cojiditions.
- 9 -
I can not refrain from mentioning another topic which
bears on this subject, i.e., the spirit of competition in
each ship, in each division and in each fleet is so slron, ,
that saoat of us will sacrifice many other considerations in
order that our turret, ship, division or fleet may get "the
edge" on the other turret, ship, division, or fleet. And a
favorite way of getting this small advantage is to use every
possible means of being able to fire our strings during the
:'t favorable weather conditions. I doubt not that the En -
lish feel the same way about it. But the German system of
administration is such that this is not likely, farther, if
it were possible, 1 believe that each unit in the German llavy
is willing to sacrifice its small individual edvantapo if it
nefit the German Havy as a whole. A study of the Goronel
battle will certainly convince anyone that the Germans mast
have had some practice at battle ranges under unfavorable
:tlier conditions. Tha string of protests usually following
any event which tends to reduce scores is evidence gx tnio
spirit* Competition must be fosteied as it is necessary to
induce extra effort, but some method should be devised or
me rale framed in order that the Fleet be made to fire
under weather conditions other than those of the "mill-pond"
variety,
V. Conclusion.
1. rhe conclusions to be drawn from this discussion
are properly left to the chief of Operations, however, in
order to emphasis© the main points, 1 Invite attention to the
following summary statements, which, in my opinion, must be
carried out in order to bring our Gunnery Efficiency up be
at of Bnglanfl and of Germany.
(a) Battle Practice ranges must be increased to 15000
yards or more.
(b) The firing vessel must steam at high speed - as
nearly Full Speed as practicable.
(c) rhe firing should be conchicteci in the c con sea
under average \. or conditions.
• V
X
I
Need not be rex
jhfaai*- Qf^ffUv^^L wtvuJL^. m. ^nj.jb-iyS'
Country* ,.#..... .Turkey. Port. ...... • • Constantinople, &c#
Report from % S* 3. SCORPIO E.
Date of B»Wt*r^rigj|f »,IIIftt
■^-q-O -o ~o-o-o-o-o-o-c-o -o-o-o -c -o~o-o~o -o-o -o-o-o -o-o-o -o-o-o -c -o-o -o-o-o-
s
1*
Constantinople*
(a) On Sunday Hay 2, a Turki* aeroplane with pink
underbody, which had left the Turkish hangars
at San Stefano and was flying to northwards-
possible in pursuit of the hostile aeroplane
with green underbody, which was mentioned in
last report Inas fired upon and shot down out-
side of Chichi i, (a suburb of Constantinople)*
The funeral of the two officers killed, one
Turkish and the other German or Turkish, was ,
held the ftp owing day, a part of the aeroplane S^'1*^
being carried on the coffins* /
(b) On May 2, and 3, nearly all the British and Erench
subjects remaining here, (about 3,0C0 in all, it
is said,mostly Maltese and other provincials),
were notified to hold themselves in readiness to
go to the Dardanelles on Thursday .Hay 6* They
were later told to report at Sophsaie Quay,-***—
-aosaang of4»ay^50 of them, 2 5 British and 25
French, were then chosen by the Chief of Police,
and embarked on small s tearner, which took thorn to
Call ipolUI^r. Hoffman Philip, 1st* Secretary of the
American !M>assy,by order of the Ambassador, ac-
companied them* It is understood he has since been
recalled* the State Department having disapproved
of his having been sent there ;but he has not arriv-
ed back yet*!&T& American T&wgQggwr reporters, s
representative of Collierfs Weekly and a reporter
of the Brooklyn 3agLe,tfio arrived here recently
from Berlin, also went on same steaner.lt is said
they are to be stationed in undefended towns which
have been bombarded on the Gall ipoli Peninsula*
(c) The Turkish battleship MTorgut-Reis'* stood Jn from
Sea of I.*armcra,en route fvn the Dardanell es ,and
into Golden I!om,on Thursday, May 6* Since then both
the "Torgut-Reis" and "rfe.ridilin-3arbarossa" have
be; n here, in Golden 2icrn,undergoing repairs, the
former, among other things .reseating a 28~cm (11- / < /
inch) gun dt is said,and the "Saridlin-Barbarossa'Vt^^^
one of its masts* / v
(d) The Turkish cruisers "Bamadieh" and "Midilli" (e: -
German "Breslau") stood out of Golden Horn and up
Bo sp horns early on morning- of Thursday .I1 ay 6 8 and
at 5#0C a#ra. ,the "Sultan Selim" m: c-Geraan "Goeben"),
"Breslau", "Hamad ieh", and trm torpedo boats, stood out
of Beicos and into the Black Sea, along the Anatolia,
C . sia I.:lnor) side*Cn Iriday night they returned
again, with two ooal vessels they are said to have
been convoying,and the "Hamadieh" and "Breslau",
went into Golden Iforn again on following morning*,
and "Goebsn" remains off Stenia.
(e) As mentioned in preceding paragraph,a collier and
another coal vessel, came in on evening ,May 7, from
either Chamli or ZongaT dak, having been convoyed,
part of way,by part of the Turkish, fleet. The col-
lier is said to have brought in 3,000 tons of coal,
and the otber coal vessel, about 500 tons. This is
for the Government* At the sane tine, an other small
private vessel got in with 41 tons,v#iich has been
bought by the SCCRPIOH,and has been taken on board.
Pag© 2.
Country. • • Turkey. Port. •.....». Constantinople ,&c.
Bepcrt from fcS.S.3CCFJPIC2U
Date of Kepcrt.. .. ...May 10,1915.
— o ~o -o -o ~o — c -o -c -o—o ~o -c <— o -o -*o -o -o -o -o -o -o -o-o -o -© -o —0—0 -0 — o -o -c -0-0-0-
(f) PVom 3f0C0 to 4,000 more wounded have arrived from
the Dardanelles the past weekjand from 5,000 to 6,000
more troops have "been sent there from here* There are
now said to "be about 160,000 Turkish troops at the
Dardanelles jand it is said there are 300,000 more at
Adrianoplajrahich could he "brought the»ev?t short
notice*
(g) A. law has "been promulgated here, the past week, by
which all civilians are required to report, and turn
in all fire -arms, ammunition, and weapons ^ when consid-
ered necessary by Military Governor* The Greslcs and
Armenians are said to have a large number of arms
stowed awsy.and it iw supposed that the law is
directed principally against these.
2* Dardanelles*
Thl The city of Gallipoli is reported by M*» Hoffman
ihilip, 1st .Secretary of the American &iba8sy,who
went there Kay 6,totf!'unoccuried and without food
or beds.^ &-
3. Black Sea.
(i) There have been no more Russian bombardments of
the Bosphorus the past waek,but the Russian Fleet
bombarded other small pi aces, on Anatolian coast,
during first part*<yW^,
(j) 2 art of the Turkish Fleet went outside into Black
Sea again for first time In some time, as reported
above ;and "Goeben" accompanied the force.
s
American Embassy,
London.
May 11th. 1915
^"Tffibd not be returned.
•x « £
From: bt. Col. Ifco&as C. Trea&well , "J. 3.^. 0.
To: Haral Attache.
Subject: nolland and the war.
The undersigned visited Ifolland officially May 4-8, and
the follov.inp report is baseu on inf 'orr^tion obtained at that
time. Eo attempt is made to go into details oi tne situation
from point of view of the I eth^rl? r<dn, er ©onitt«n$jag the Army
or defences of that country, as Can tain dander Ian a, U.S. A., now
military attache at the Hague, las no doubt made reports on
these subjects.
▲bout April Vo , the regular passenger service to and from
Holland was stoppeu by the Admiralty. Mail boats, however,
continued bo run under direction of the Admiralty from Harwich
to the Hook oi Holland. 1 had received authority from the
Admiralty to go over on the .'.Jail boat from Harwich to leave on
ning of the 3rd Lay. In Kay 1st" 1 receiver word that no
boat Rrould leave Harwich for iiolland on the 3rd, and about
7 p.m. on the 2nd that a boat would leave Illhury for Flushing
on the following morning. Z feook this borJ. with Ir. Minot.au
attache to the American Embassy in Berlin, and though it was
regular steamer of the healand Line there was only one other
passenger* After May 3rd. the regular passenger service was
for
resumes to and from Flusfcinff, *>ut only,* Hiit«d number of
psc ers - 100 on eocl trip. Passengers am put to areat
inconvenience in Lng this trip, and are subject to strict
e.emination at soth ends of tie lino, nnd it is strictly
ti
prohibited for any passenger to carry letters or written
messages to or from Holland, during the ten days that passenger
service was stopped about £,Cno people had collected in The
Hague wjio were waiting to make the trip to England.
$o reason was given for this interruption oi* the passenger
service, and. taken in connection with the rather critical
condition in Holland at the time, and the fact that Great
Britain was still full of troops of the ilew Armies that had
not yet been sent over, there were of course various rumours
in England as to the cause, such as that Holland would he drawn
into the war, that Great Britain would land troops there, that
it was on account of naval activity in the Hearth Sea, that
Germany intended to violate the neutrality of Holland by using
the port of Antwerp for naval or military operations, etc.
-he most plausible reason, however, seems to be that the
passenger service was stopped on account of spies. Holland is
full of Herman spies who could obtain information of sailings
to and from England, as well as of naval and military movements,
if passengers were to pass to and fro freely. The interruption
of passenger traffic also corresponded with the meeting of the
Women's" Peace Conference at the Hague, and this meeting would
have given opportunity for a large number of passengers to go
back ami forth, and consequently an increased opportunity for
s -ies.
ie position of "-olland nas been critical, and the tension
in the country high since She beginning of the war. after the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg many
feared that Holland was threatened with a similar fate and
would be unable to keep out of the war. lien there was the
apprehension that Great Britain might practically blockade the
coast in order to prevent war munitions and food from getting
to Germany via Holland. After the fall of Antwerp there was
the threat that Germany might seek to u3e that port as v
.
naval "base and thus violate Dutch neutrality. During April
much tension was caused by the torpedoing of a number of
Dutch vessels and the seizing of others, which were taken in
to lino eke and Zubrugge. A considerable number of Belgian,
British, and German troops were forced over the border and
interned; there are no?? in the country otfer £00,000 Belgian
refugees; and the country id full of German spies.
She interned Belgians; numbered over 50,000, and are
in camps at Siest and iiarcunierfk. There are about 1,600
interned British at the Island of Usk and Gronin-;en; and a small-
er number of Sermana at Bergen ani Alknear.
Since the war began dolland has mado every effort to
preserve neutrality, and i$;,.$.s probably almost tie unanimous
wish of the Inhabitant! to remain at peace, for they have
little to gain vnl much to loce by goifig into the war. At the
same time, the aiiiiculi*^ oi u.t.ii.t.Laininfe strict neutrality,
owing to the geographical position of the country, has been
groat and may in the future be oven greater'. At the present
writing, however, it seems to be the general opinion there
that nothing short of actual invasion of her territory rill
drive Holland into the war. The gonerrl feeling of over 90$
of tie population is in favor of the AXlies, but many of the
officers of t), 9 i aj e pro-German.
..ri ■■■ Arty of the netherlands has been mobilised since
the beginning of the war, and no?, consists of about £55,000
officers ano. men* Oi this number 90,000 ?:>re on the frontier,
90,000 in depots, and 70,000 in garrisons of defensive works.
The organization and training of the Army is based on the
German system. 7} ere are new witfc the Colours the levios of
17 years, 1899-1916. The mobile army is organised in 4
divisions, and e fifth is now being organized.
- 3
The ri vision is organised as follows:-
3 Brigades of infantry of 2 regiments each - each
regiment consisting of 3 battalions and
machine gun company.
1 regiment of cavalry of 4 squadrons.
1 regiment of artillery of 12 batteries.
1 company pioneers.
1 company bicyclists.
Pontoon detachment.
Telegraph detachment
Infantry and artillery ammunition columns.
Field and supply column.
Field hospital and field ambulances.
The total strength of the division is 538 officers, and 22,351
men.
The army is understood to be short of munitions of
war and equipment.
The troops seen drilling and: Torching at the Hague
did not appear to be very Well drilled or efficient, and were
in the gret service uniform, in blue uniform, a canvas working
suit, ana many in various combijiation;3 oi t^ese.
The scheme of defence of Holland against a strong
force provides for the openeing of the dykes and flooding a
portion of the country. The area to be defended woula. t; en
include only a small part of the country, but one including
the largest cities - .Amsterdam, xtotteraam, and the Hague. This
which
line passes outside of Amsterdam, Utreoht, and Rotterdam, is
defer.; lei by numerous iortk an., entrer ehr sen bs between, ana.
outside the line would extend a broad lic/iu of flooded country.
ister&ara i:s also enclosed by a lino containing over
4 '•' orts, ana country without i.i3 line may be flooded, thus
isolating that city. How mueh of an obstacl3 this scheme of
defence would prove to on invading army could not be estimated
without actual trial, but it seems probable that it might be
rather a serious one even though the forts are ouly earth works
without elevation and containing fow large calibre modern guns.
There would be little difficulty to an invading army landing
on the cr;a3t, for the -ufceh i-avy is weak, >nd such coo.st
fortifications as there are are low earthworks with inferior
-4-
guns.
At the present period of the war, the strategic
position of Holland is of great importance to boxh Great Britain
ana Germany.
If Holland should go into the war on the side of the
Allies and Great Britain should land a strong military force
on the coast, she should be able to make the German position
In Belgium untenable and force the Germans tq evacuate the
country, without fcfce heavy east in $im# ana. casualties that
might be required to force brick the strong German line as at
present he] d and the probably stronger Antwerp~I4ege line.
. ii , such a strong "British force would be in a position for
e campaign to throttle the German coast and drive out the
German fiavy# ere then arises the question if, in view of
the present British campaigns* involving considerable forces
in France, Egypt, the Dardanelles, and iiesopauamia , ana. smaller
forces in the 3 German colonies in Africa., Great Britain would
feel strong enough or justified in undertaking another campaign
In a new tie at re.
If Holland should join Germany, thi I country could
use tii;1 )utch ports and Uiake use oi Antwerp as a naval or
submarine base. in ease of fcfce hostility rf Holland, it does
t seen provable now that Germany wo*cl14 have any military
necessity, or that she could spare the troops, to attack that
area fehat could be protected by flooding country. ^ere
i'i, however, danger that the neutrality of Holland might be
violated on account of the importance of using Antwerp as *
base. Antwerp was taken by the Germans early in October and
since that time has been useless to them as a naval base
because the Scheldt flows for some 30 miles through Su*£ek
"Dutch territory. Antwerp would appear however to be of great
importance to Germany if it could be used as 6 naval or
5.
3xin£
■
submarine base, or as a base for a military invasion or raid
on England. It is only about 130 miles from nearest point of
.English coast, whereas one ^ermctii ports in. ueligol&lid Bight
are about 300 miles, a fact which would increase the chances
of a successful rail immensely. Although it is reported that
much shipping was destroyed or damaged before the Belgians
evacuated Antwerp, yet it is one of the principal commercial
ports of who world, ana it Is probable thau there is now
sufficient shipping available there in good condition to
furnish transport for h ^argo number of troops. It is believed
that such an attempted raid is not considered by any means
in-possible b;. the authorities in Great Britain, and recent
©enaar activities might be considered as intended tn prepare
for such an attempt. .here have been numerous German units
that have been rep. or tad as sent to Belgiuffi and that have not
appeared on the Western front. $&f torpedoing of numerous
trawlers in the IsortJi tfea would seem to be intended to clear
that area from observation oy these craft* 11. e sinking of the
iia to drs off ill val iorce to protect merchant steamers;
and the recent air raids on English east cotst principalis
for t )se c reeeimaiseaic.ee.
^U^J^^^^
'
Need not be returned. \^_
Country*. »•••*« • •••.Tur'- . jrt«.»*.»*Qo«*tsatinople,te.
crt frow U. S» . '' 2 !■ 1915
&*tc cf oxcrt, .Kay 17, 19:! * ^ ^-^-/i^.^j'
CO
|* Sonstantlnonle*
(a) 5r75Tffraem Philip, First Secretary of the Aaarioas 7,
the t^o re£crtsrsf and the -fifty British., Mftfi 'rench, vsib^cts,
referred tc in $hs report of Kay &cf as bavin sent to
Galllpoli, t*3rs returned on 12 1 tc Constantinople, and sat
froe# !Tho reasons for returning t3 re net ftrplslBed,
lias no bofltoardraant pf Gallipcli taring their stay there*
(bi Cn Taj 11, a Turkish gtmbcat, stellar to the 933 JHEHXR, fPltH
h©r bow badly - »4f as if trtm col* is) en, $&m in fro,y IS I
- Bosporus m& anchored* i largga transport, with hay how torn
open, as if 'by alias, or tcrpcle, c&™e in frca the Jtfrdanel3.es,
* and wsnt u a Golden Horn, There are persistant reports .
t' Tit, at least, one of the /Hies* submarines is in the 3oa of
r.arr.cra, and that it sank one HN&l Jraoepcrt, tad daw;a<re& ■
lar.rre one, and hoe taken ftftppliea of food fro I ill veer- els
that it has hold ug> toned lately fb Hoeing ttn BtrivaJ of I
itrps transport, w ^ precautions mare ado ' in the e I -
log of ships tc thy 2flrd*&i21eft* T?h^ now, invariably,
convoyed by leatroyers i boats* It is est! thai from
SfOCC to SfOfcC troopa are prooa ding ally fro- have* Artillery
i are being tranaporto<-J in ■ ■■ .rs.
(c) It is eetiraats :, at ' bent I8*00€ sc torfeieh soMisrs
ti I - lenstantinople lbs i* ?hoy are nearly all lightly
Wffl&dftd*
(d) the fovea? Sfcatlcnttalre fi \..r, ehioh am* Interned at I
beginning or | ■■ •% h b been toeed into tfes harbor* end moor
>ar t> , it files nc hf#» sad is, ft] srently, in
Cv 1 Of CiviliTJ18»
(o) " - tm fe:~ ), is in a swell bey at 9%eniatand is,
v atOyf in good ahaee* B ■■:■ l UttX I (ox- . iiau), has mads ■
tripe up the Boephoms, but is after at I » ■ Tard* 2fcere
la -t octivifcy i tg tho tc " ' -ts and deetreyers - they
tteaSt trips to the Jsrdnnslles, and in the dir n cf
tho !--';!*c"<: tea,
(f / Ba&tea ^^3 he«fd*la the dlreetloa of the Sf>atiate in the
afternoon of * a** !$♦
fe) I collier, vlhidh W»t into- the BlaQK ?or oo£«l , IWtUI'asd to I
aaefcoragc ^th lb tn» shot holes in h^r f»idof erldeatly na4 l"
or SH 3hellsj all wore well sfeovs the viator lins# eolllere,
that i-ift hare on the isth» to set eee&9 m^rs •' in the Bleak
i*rcr, rell^ls attoraaa the bouibsrd&aant, by v Iliad He t, is
being r.nch reduced, tho da!-af~e cansoo by shells being very slight.
The CU^.2? SL12 baa bo ;n nein/r a eaptl^t halcrn to ohserre the
tell of shot* :Jhe fi4el4 ov-jir V mineala at a range of sbevt 11'
ral'ies, At tinea an aar ae has obeerved tho fell of vv " t*
ilea, and the fire has been controlled t > I-Or this reason
the Turkish vessels hftVft often (jaioXly shift *: ;lr an-. "e#
The destroyer 9Vat- • 'fll, carried a Gcrran of^ iccr. I
.'jssnoe of a ataxia Qernaiw officer lee at tevemae ofiect or- the
Turkish troops, irently privinf: then increased ooafldeeoe« In
all !"•; or tan t and Tln^s, ro quiring daeh i-!<.7 II f at l^st one
German is sent a!cw>
!• I failed to -ention* i hnat I lt that ^ile I \teio in Gib-»
raltar (0 . . I saw ths s 00-? 1 med-
iately @o Int dry lftflfc| she was badl; 1 her
■ Sjolaa> "ha informed, u-- 1 arrival, that she was itl ,
1 at I r.lta had nil thoy could attend to.
Oo"jntry# •«*«•«•««••«• Turkey. rt# ,*..»., Constantinople, &c*
port frost U. % % 80GBP20H,
flats of Bqport»««*&tap 17, 1915.
4*
/bout SO nil est fro» 2tedsag£$o!9 the rrtniwuifT t upon whioh i ma
I848g0rf £&f*«4 wltMn 20^ psp&i o£ ft tornoao sttUI ns&»
Bj> arontly, drifted ovar fror. ft* rec-icn of tfce TttriliTHTI es»
I r*po**%*4 It tr> t'-r; m;^-crltlas ftt iipitnlli| as It me,
$gp*«B iftflMMI tc Sfcrlg&tlOH* ' lrl%I«5! fefttroysr ms
at fiedsftgaftgh* Vat I 914 not c- i loa&e "S/i%"h It, altho Ihft
Irl feign Cor nil mt$ ftaong fchoe* ttftoa I inforrttd of the torpodo'i
wfiiiofti
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October? gffcadftO^ D& W&*
?
SUBJECT ,.....3M^^4itt«|...f|rj«iM..1?l»f4..* I.1S»Mi£.flie.*j
Jl
,
From &.... No. li 1*
Date
Replying to 0. N. i. No. ~~~~~~~~-~Date
1. I hear on good authority i sent fcirne
ell wtbmorinee of the Italian fleet have r.iobilisod at Venice.
All destroyers of the Indonito Class and of a later date are
with the fleet at £ara&to. All destroy/ nd torpedo boats
previous to the Indonito close are divided between Venice and
Brindisi.
The fourth division of the fleet consisting: of
the San ::areot -isa, ijcm Gioreia, and /.e:olfl are at i3rindisi,
but I understand this is only for tceYporory duty, upon the
completion of which they uill rejoin" the fleet at Toronto.
<
I
|Sec Paragraph A, instructions of October SI, 1900.]
CONFIDENTIAL. J
Japan and ..Italy.
Jrom ^ (H) ^> j)^^--May_lB-.---193JcE^c^rr^rri-. i#i
eplying to 0. JV. I. No Da^.-----C3^tN.-^.^19lS!. {, 191
In the first place, the German people are a unit in every
new proposition - knowing that the Government is under the con-
trol of the military and naval authorities I Lave beett attempt-
ing to find out how the people feel, especially the social demo-
crats which are in great number in Germany, and also the f inane*
people. The opinion and sentiment of those two classes ass
and the finance peojb&e, mean more to me than the military be-
oause they are really the country; furthermore, I know full well
i how the military and naval authorities feel.
In the first place, every German feels and believes that
; America has oeen unneutral and that America is aiding in ft ^reat
measure the Allies. They feel that by sinking the LUSITAHIA, they
I have "got back" at us in a small way for what we are doing. In
case of war, with our country, they would heartily support it
because they believe that it would stop the supply of ammunition
and that we could not do more harm to Germany then we are doing
at present.
The next sentiment or feeling that the German people
have is the feeling of revenge - they will "get back" at us for
.at we have been doing. They consider Japan our great enemy j
| they confidently expect war sooner or later between Japan and
i
America.
About three months ago I noticed a sudden falling off in
the harsh and bitter talk against Japan. During the past three
months there has 'nardly been a v.ord said against Japan. Several
months ago a prominent man here, financially, at whose house I
have frequently been a visitor, came to see me about tter of
importance, as he termed it. He said that the son of a vory dear
— & —
friend of his had "been lost and requested, that, if possible, an
Lquiry "be made concerning him of the French Embassy in Paris.
After settling this and when about to leave, he saidjMBy the way,
what do you think of the Japanese situation?" I replied that I
d no late nor definite informat ion concerning it. He then
asked: "Do you net think that Japan and America could come to-
gether on some amicable agreement thereby any chances of
would be averted?" T replied that as far as I could see cgree-
r. ents nowadays seemed easily made and more easily broken. Re.
then asked what made the present ill feeling, commercial or
racial reasons. I replied that it was racial. He then asked /
veral random Questions which I sidestepped. The result of this
conversation was to .lead me to the supposition that he intended
to invest there and as he is in 7/ith numerous other big inter-
clI-s, it appeared that some Germans were intending to invest money
in Japan. I have recently learned that other big men, financially,
are putting what money they can in. Japanese investments and that
re is a bi$ plan whereby Japan is to be really subsidised by
German money. They say what they have done in Turkey they can
also do in Japan. Underlying all this is the opposition to Amer-
ica, Japan is to be the tool of Germany against America; Ger-
ry and Japan will line up against America ,g^( if not openly, at
least secretly. }
There is also a plan whereby in case of war between
Japan and America, ammunition and arms will be shipped to Japan
via Russia,
There is goo<: -son for believing that two months ago
>rmatty and Japan came to an agreement. The exact terms are, of
course, a secret but it is believed that the agreement is for
certain cooperation between the two countries in the t of a
war with America*
In this connection it can be stated that the German
financial men are right with the Government - it is no exaggera-
tion to state that their patriotism extends to the la3t pfennig.
- z -
In one way it is wonderful - an example of patriotism which our
"big men" will probably find difficult to equal. In another way
it is absolutely selfish, because they know that if the Kaiser
and the Germans win, they will win later financially, and if the
German lose, "they" lose 8lso - so why make private fortunes if
such should be lost after the war; better, they argue, to give
everything to the Government to win because in the long run they
rise or fall with the Government.
Several days ago, the political leaders of the Reichstag,
i
representing all the various parties of Germany, met and dis-
cussed the coming budget and the general situation. !Dhe leaders
were unanimous in their confidence and belief in the victory of
the Germans and were determined to rmsh the war to the very lim-
it . 2hey e&aimed that their financial and military status was
sound enough to withstand the entrance into the war of Italy -
and any other country, u-hey stood ready to give Italy wha t was
offered (claimed to be 1,000,000,000 marks) and stood equally
ready to fight her if she did not accept the offer. The Germans
claim that every preparation has been made to meet Italy in case
she comes into the war. According to news from a prominent Rus-
sian, if Italy does not come into the war, Russia may make peace
by fall j it will not be because Russia lacks men; it will be be-
cause Russia lacks money and artillery. According to information
from Roumania, Russia will be able to get money and be able to
carry on the war as long as the Grand Dukes and Generals wish it.
,'i'he fact, however , that the financial men in Moscow favdr an
early peace is worthy of note.
The entrance of Italy into the war makes all calculations
worthless. One of the queer sides of this war is the dislike of
America in Russia, notwithstanding the supplies which she is get-
ing from us .
One fact looms up constantly and that is that America is
becoming more disliked every day by all sides. If we keep clear
- 4 -
of thia war, we will emerge without a friend and with many enc-
ies. And J believe that the people who come over to Europe and
go to both aides, go back to America not so much pro-Ally or
pro -German, as pro ~Amer i can because they see the position of our
country as regards the world and realise that it is not a time
to worry about the warring factions over here, but a time co
worry about cur ability "go win in a war with any nation or ov^
combination of nations.
Several days after the sinking of the LUSITAliIA, there
appeared an article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (Of-
ficial Government organ here) concerning the loss of American
lives and property in Mexico, this* article being near other ar-
ticles concerning American opinion of the loss of American lives
on the LUSITAliIA. The evident purpose of this was to show that
we should not be so aroused about the loss of Americans on the
LUSITAITIA when we had lost so many lives in Mexico; in other
words, they said, if we stand for Mexico, why not stand for the
LUSIxAlTIA? A certain man in the Foreign Office here stated to a
certain American that all we would do concerning the loss of
American lives on the LUSITANIA would be to send a note or pro-
test.
I hope that this will be of interest to you and that it
will give you an idea of the situation here. We are plugging
-long and neither worried nor excited, and hoping that everything
will be settled satisfactorily to all concerned. However, know-
ledge and consequent preparation are always of importance.
|See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, IQOO.]
Feed not be returned.
SUBJECT
SITUATION TO MAY 18th 1915,
5
.19
From
No.
331
Replying to O. N. I. No.
Date
Date
May 18, IjBLjf.
, 191
, 191
The diplomatic note from America to Germany
over the various happenings affecting the loss of American life
and of Aaerican shipping wma handed to the Foreign Office Saturday
morning. No reply has up to this writinp. been received. Prom
what Rear Admiral B e h n k e told me after the "LUSITANIA1'
affair, ±imk they felt fully Justified in what had been done and
no change of policy would ensue. Also the newspapers foreshadowed
the same reply. As the terms of the American note are mandatory,
I therefore judpa the situation to be extremely critical. The
note has been published in American papers and the Ambassador
in Berlin immediately upon receipt cabled the State Department
that in his judgement the answer to it would be unfavorable.
The German government has held a strong censor-
ship on the American news and the comments of the American press
on the "LUSITANIA" affair have not appeared. The American note
was not allowed to be published until last nipht.
In the meantime, the press has been filled
with accounts of the Italian situation, almost to the exclusion
of other news.
THE NA^T.
Outside the submarine warfare and the fiphtinp
in Turkish waters there is not much to record. The Zeppelins
have been showinr* increased activities in their visits to England.
Stories are circulated here of the enormous bombs that are beinp
made which will destroy whole sections of London when the time
for an attack comes.
THE EASTERN ARMIES.
There does not seem to be any doubt but that
the fiphtinp of the past month has resulted in a triumph for the
Austrian-German armies in Galicia. Whether the actual number of
prisoners is 150,000, a3 stated and whether the Russian
demoralisation is so preat as claimed are open to doubt, but the
whole campaign is one which has riven the greatest encouragement
in Germany and Austria and has considerably modified the
attitude of Roumania.
THE WESTERN ARMIES.
East
Western Durinp the progress of the armies in the Want, the
SastaxK armies have been continuing the position warfare with
activity and have prevented any marked advance of the allies.
GENERAL REMARKS.
There can be no doubt that in Government and
military circles there is stronr optimism and a belief that
they will brinp. the war to a successful conclusion at an early
date.
- 3 -
Among the generality of the people there is a certain
amount of depression due to the length that the war
has lasted beyond their expectations and this depression
will be greater if Italy comes in against Germany.
There is however no surface manifestation of this
feeling and all political parties strongly support
the government and are prepared to vote it all the
money and men asked for. There is a talk of raising
the serviceable age from 45 to 55 years.
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)
@d ' lot be .
SUBJECT Jl9f|A.£il^
Italian ..li.avy.
From X No !*•<! Date ... l:®$ ^tj^^g*
Replying to 0. N i. No.
"~~"~ Z>tf&
/
1» (The Budget for the Italian Havy, as originally
compiled for Fiscal Year 1^14-15 has nor. been increased by
Hoyal decree Ho. 619 of Say 14f 1915* is increase amounting
to Tv/entyfive million lire is required otving to the Europeefe
situation vfoich has necessitated a large active fleet to" be
always ready,
. The [Decree in auootion provides at the sane tine
for an increase of One Hundred million Lire for the /.rmy, like-
wise required for military purposes o\. in feg the present ;ur-
oan situation.
4
(Sera Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 3iffitWff>fl()t l)C fCtUTfl^^
s
.11
SUBJECT DK. E OF &AVAX STATION
AOADiST AIR-GRAFTS.
Date
From Y
No. 91
Replying to 0. N. I. No. 1 341 1 Date iwap»*4*T'H£1^ .
1. from my observations and experience in the present
tar, I have to submit the following plan for defense of naval
a fuel station;; against air- craft
2. D e fen & i v e 'L£e as u re a . - All buildings In which it is
probable work will be done at night should have shaded
fitted ov^r all windows, glass roofs, etc., shieh effectually
tve&t any light from shewing. A simple end effective method
b at I have ee on for dolnj its it the way it is done at the
v.'cr.. of the ou.'.e Company here in P^ris. In common
with moat of ths manufactories in Paris, their buildings are
fitted with > loos roofs, sod their factory is llluainated during
daylight by this method, there being no windows.
3. ThicK. matting shades have oeen fitted to this glass
roof, ana by a simple system of coras and pulleys, these can
oe quickly drawn, shutting out all light from f A thin.
•i. In Paris and London also the Ltreoi lights rod arc
\. .eu painted bi:ict on too, so that ail light is
thrown diroctiy dov. - sod none up,
5. Cc t xr u I have been able to ascertain - and I ha
dllligeat inquiries - no at temps base yet o^n mads in
ce to mSJco fuel oil t anks impervicuL to a^r attacks. I saw
pe soaally i tanks at the naval station at Brest, Sfld no
defensive precaution! igalaot air attacks had been taken.
irth armors, the European representative of one of the largest
oil ct Li* la the SO rid has personally looked into the matter
my request, and he states no . LUticni r< ■ en
taken. too Ls Bourgot aerodrome, ■ tJtnttaatly
ewer one taadr* id fifty aereplames, fehi $aoo lent tenhs i
left 0U1 in the Q .0 linprot i-
•
o
6. , it la ...... 2 a to Bay, no aatter ¥hat t3 s French
practice is, any pi r . for de bo of a a^v^I station
cuid cct opiate placing cf all fuel oil ta I round,
I rly it shouid I an ding order, ti anlO;
lately ,iec, ry , all dry-doclca should N toept .full.
?- Of fens ive-; naive Measures. - In iuy opinion, t I
roal defense of at tlona a .ir-craft will, in tha future,
ad In gunj i ..... rohlig&to. Xh. ... . ml plan for this
mid con i plats t i .. s of i ayotosj similar to that u*
toj defena s aboard and -
8. Jhore , ieuld bt s central fire control s ion, Pirn liar
to thai jard ship, and connected up with suo-eo.jtroi stations
win .6 laid un ad. The guns should be limited
in n r; - it la aiucb h ardor tc apot for aerial firing fch i
.r Kinds, searchlights should tve below ground and
conceal e -■ possible, x oir location should be kept
as conf: tial as possible. If in advance an s&aa ., knows the
location of searchlights, the^ ssreo to hisu the gas i purpose
ghtheui I land. One of the re sens ^hj the I ..cent
Id! i ria have boo i ao untuCceLfui, I i&g convinced la
a thy pllotf b luring 9 day and night attacks coulvi
not loca' lvei successfully.
It b e the aatper4e&es &u . , , .«ar that ahrapnel
ells ar« not sueaeseful In ampleyaient at air-craft.
losivi Lla bj m lei .en. sf festive; Xb ch are
igh BXplc 12 now for thia worn, fitted with a
Blal fuze. ■ - ii d drawing a and a sample of this 1
iv a air I 1 i foreej by us to 1 t.
10. To show the ineffectiveness ci snrapuei I rifle fire
ilnst 1 nee, t la new on exhibit 1< 1 t t Hal dos
Inv ,ii ,. . . aim an bij . Lc 1 more
four hundred di lg ahr 1 and bulla .lee.
3
done is practically all so far I ."jits cone .r.-i-id;
t .0 engine h v.. simply w&r froa use.
11. Tae aerodrome attached t; . tat ion for its fief arise
should be separ tsiderabla diet -/ice from it,
fcr the reason that at g lights h&Ye to ; displayed
i necessarily i< * ill tend to serve pilot lights fcr
the 4 al&c .
3L2, eh station should h n s . uxiliary power sad
Ing station, concealed in the sar$h, SO that bs/ no . abi-
lity colu. r-crsft. ? . tity for
"e-guarui - - {[ires e used bj in©ea .\ bombs is
oovioul. r his r< *uxiIio;f>? pumping station for tj
pressure mains is >x noes ty«
13, On the ai: bt of the first ! alia raid en JParii .
i fii d searchlight control *; . pitiful. Sicca that I -
it ... ^ . \ ,-ttly, but I i&vs never yet seen a drill.
. is drill it -... as lary for the efficient work of the defense
^s torpedo-boat attack drill en board ship. 1 arc. convinced that
weli-arilled crew, at a #ell equipped station, could drive
off almost qxvj sort of air att&efcs that be delivered against
it. One of the reasons why mere air craft have not been brought
down in this war is because, in my opinion, officers are
not as familiar as l officers in fire searchlight coa-
troi. I i 4uQ la* o control exit Usilarly in London as
in pa < . 11 the errors and Its, th >-■ tQ of ttavj have
been t against in handlj . r< -nts, are still
Lag committed he$i In Paris, and in December last in London,
Pari,. ..arin/: t ::-. 1 ,st fee seeks, aeroplanes at night carry
disti^; d recognition li/ i white, reu or £*reeu, eithr
color is used indlsor sly, to serve as it counter-
sign foi .t in question.
OFFICE OP NAVAL INT3LLIG ^(rs, TRANSIATION-FV.
June 29, 1915.
Number 659 (May 22, 1915) of the Official Collection of the
Laws and. Decrees of the Kingdom contains the following decree:
VICTOR EMMANUEL III.
11915
KIHG OF ITALY". ^"^
Having consulted the Code of the Merchant Marine of the King-
dom of Italy (Title IV);
Since the "belligerent powers in the present international con-
flict exercise the right to capture and have retained in their ports
the enemy merchant vessels which were there at the outbreak of host-
ilities;
Having consulted the Cabinet of Ministers;
Upon proposal of Our Minister of the Navy, and with the con-
sent of the Attorney General;
We have decreed and do decree:
Single Article.
In case of participation by Italy in the present international
conflict, Articles 211 and 243 of the Code for the Merchant Marine
shall not be applied.
The present decree, which will go into effect on the day of
its publication, shall be submitted to Parliament to be made a law.
»
We order that the present decree, sealed with the Seal of the
State, shall be inserted in the Official Collection of Laws and
Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, requiring all concerned to observe
it and see that it is observed.
Done at Rome, this 16th day of May, 1915.
VITTORIO EMANUELE
SALANDRA - VIALE - ORLANDO.
Witnessed, ORLANDO.
Keeper of the Seals.
NOTE (by Naval Attache, Rome).- This Deoree permits the
conf ideation of all belligerent merchant ships found in Italian
ports at the outbreak of war*
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October
31 tWked not be returned.
SUBJECT
k
t>
From JU N°- 3UaO. Date % ..4
Replying to 0. N. i. No .mmm Date
.4 ,-■
u
*i»
•
:-$ e
jun 2 8 \m
;1 where r-^
fcfc IDo r
.
entire
fsa ana th g;
Feed not be returned.
on f orts o.; , ;rto Corsin -7/«f
Barlet , and Yenie *;ay '4,191 > e
(Official e ion)
XV
It w»e foreseen that the declaration of war would \ ly
tide - off en si' t
& ouy tic et , lore for tl 1 effect then to
gain any military objective* but it proved m en encounter to
be of short duration*
'sell detachments of the ene. ships, pt-rti' .?ly destroy-
ers, fired with their raain batteries on our ki ;ic coast* This
tween the hours of four end six in %'■■ .orning o:'
Aereoplenes also rtfo-rapted to el rsenal of Venice.
Ihe enernyfs ships wer > retreat by our division of
tor )c boats* The eneray1© arecplanee were shot at h^ our antl- .
arcoplan , id by rifle lie our areoplanes attacked them an
did a ill, was flying over the Adriatic ♦
The localities L ere:rorto Gorsini whose fire <lrwe the
or- at once; Ant here the attack was chiefly against t"
railroad Where slight di :ised hv. ieh was easily re-
naredjBarletta, where the att; ado by a scout and by des-
troyers, these were put to fli .*y our torpedo vessels and another
vessel.
At Jesi the en en a
hangar but out success. .
&ay other notice Of rations on this night are without found-
comtstiicat©
8 1915
"Era previsto che, appena dichiarata la guerra, vi sarebbero
state azioni offensive contro la nostra costa adriatica intese a pro-
durre un effetto morale anziche a raggiungere un obbiettivo mili-
tare; ma si era provveduto per fronteggiarle rendendole di brevis-
sima durata.
Dif atti piccole unita navali nemiche, specialmente cacciatorpe-
diniere, dalle 4 alle 6 del 24 corr. hanno tirato colpi di cannone sullc
nostre coste adriatiche. Anche aereoplani hanno tentato di attac-
care Parsenale di Venezia.
Le navi avversarie dopo un brevissimo cannoneggiamento sono
state costrette da un nostro naviglio silurante ad allontanarsi. Gli
aereoplani nemici sono stati' cannoneggiati dalla artiglieria anti-
aerea, fatti segno a fuoco di fucileria ed attaccati da un nostro ae-
reoplano e da un dirigibile che volava sulPAdriatico.
Localita attaccate sono: Porto Corsini, che rispose immedia-
iamente e costrhise il nemico ad allontanarsi subito; Ancona, ove
I'attacco, diretto specialmente ad interrompere la linea ferroviaria
ha cagionato lievi danni facilmente riparabili; Barletta, ove I'at-
tacco fu compiuto da un esploratore e da cacciatorpediniere, che
una nostra nave, scortata da siluranti, mise in fuga.
A Jesi aereoplani nemici gittarono bombe sulF "hangar ", ma
senza raggiungere l'obbiettivo. Ogni altra notizia sulle operazioni
di questa notte non ha fondamento. "
—
i/
Need not be returned.
y^
Co
ero, bj 5, 1
Agenzia - ron Ion: \^J^— /4^-f *$&
^
j*\,p, $/
One of out destroyers, at 3 a.m. entered the port of
3uso, near the italo-austrii rontier and destroyed the
pier thereof, o the station and the "barracks, sinkir
all the auto-boi ts pothered in that port.
The Italians suffered no i e either ;While the fcnemy
is reported to have had 2 dead and 47 made prsioners, ong
them, 1 officer and 15 non-co rris;;ioned officers.
J
American Embassy, IP
21 £ not &e returned
$1
u)
i/o WDO N.
May -" ,19^5,
From: Lt. Col/ Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.
To; . aval attache.
Subject: The Forcing of the Dardanelles,
The forcing of the Dardanelles, presents the greatest example of
combined operations against strong defences, supported by large mobile
forces, of modern times. The scope of these operations embraces the
co-operation of fleets and armies of ^reat Britain, France, and Russia, the
use of ships against forts and mines, and of land forces in conjunction with
the fleets. kuch tame must elapse before we can arrive at correct con-
ceptions of the political, strategical, and tactical problems involved, and
view the whole undertaking in its proper perspective, as the sources from
which information can be had are necessarily, at the present time, in-
accurate, contradictory, and limited. On account of the great importance
and magnitude of the Dardanelles operations however, this study of them
has been undertaken during their development, with the hope that it may
be useful as a basis for a fuller and more accurate report at a later date.
A
I }iS *04t &ft%1K
».L
^ ■
, XL,
'.moil
' - Tn .86 ■ ■■'atsd &dt lo anxtno1*! e . : to'-* tchiS
10 0XqflIi5X8 ^89J"/30ri li :iaiq , > J JBQ 9'l.j ' : 0 gi i ed?
.cfora sqibX vd be^Toqq.ya t8eofltalab gaoiia tsfij snexteiaqo benxdiaoo
Id" aaaBic cdBiaqo ©earld" to aqoou #fff »B6fflivt ma boat to t8©01(
tox^B*iaqo~oo
ri^xw h'oxd'oatftttoo nx aoytoi bnsX . baa ajioi JattXBgB aqxrte to aau
-aoo toaiioo c-ij avxna ixbo ew arte >aq&Ia rfouM hsaXl arf-
3 tbavlovax afagfXdoK i»^j* boa <X. ■■ hdita tXaoiJiXaq ©rid" to enox^qeo
£3oi iatoabflu aXoifw erf* waxv
, - >aa*xq erf<t ta tyXitsaaeaata a . ,d rcao aoxtamota xiiw
aiseteoqiax tBal t.:ujoooB nO • ba^ixuxX bus t^iotoiibeTtfi'toa taJBiyoos
>ds to ybute cidt 4 aXXaasbi .timjBzn brta
i ix jBtiJ- aqe [Btoabau nsad esri
2 te J aforcuaoB sioia bfts 'ioXXiil b tot p,x«i5b b eB Xjjtaau 3d'
Events Leading up to the Participation of Turkey in the War.
Great Britain declared war on Turkey, Nov. 5, 1914. Thus
the opinion of Bernhardi, and other eminent German authorities, that
in case of a European /ar, Turkey would cast her lot with Germany and
Austria, while Italy would endeavour to keep out of the conflict, or
would join the Triple Entente, was justified by the x'act.
The general situation in the Balkans, acute for many years
and constantly threatening the peace of Europe, had during the last
few years become more threatening and complicated, and had gradually
tended to make Turkey to all intents and purposes, a member of the
Triple Alliance, and if not a very effective partner, in her sympathies
at least, a much more real ally of Germany and Austria, than Italy »
The whole situation presented without doubt, a very complicated diplo-
matic tangle. Austria has suddenly declared the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1908, and Turkey had been at war ?/ith Italy in 1911-
12 over the question of Tripoli, which she obtained as a result of the
war, and is still occupying Rhodes and other islands of the Aegean,
Thus, while Turkey had reasons for hostility to these two countries,
with Germany her relations had been growing more and more intimate»
It was German policy to be Turkey's patron, and to secure political
and commercial control of that country. "Peaceful penetration" was
the method adapted, and on account of the financial difficulties of the
Turk, she found many opportunities for strengthening her hold in his
country. To build and own railroads, to furnish loans, to train Turkish
array, and sell munitions of war, and to dominate Turkish diplomacy were
the objects pursued. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia, and the Italian
war and annexation of Tripoli, threatened German influence, but she
managed nevertheless, to retain it, during these periods.
In 1912, came Turkey's disastrous war with the Balkan Allies,
in which German sympathies were with Turkey, but in which German support
was confined to good wishes; but as the Balkan Allies fell out and fought
among themselves, Turkey was able torecover Adrianople, and by the backing
of Germany to retain it at the treaty of Bukharest.
-2-
&nd? lotifruB natroai) Jaanxae led^+o bus txb i 20 noxaxqo ad&
froX it >n«a i$ lo aaao ni
■ ,.-v.j.i od" iwoviiso ; .. ■ . bXuow viij^i. eXxrfw ,BX*id*auA
BSW ^Jft9te; JiXq .
a-rasv Ynjau ^°^ »*jj!ob taixsilxv : ax fiox&etftxa i-
d-asX artf aoiiwb baa* t€jqorui!I \q ooaoq ©lit 3«xaaJae*ai;l" yXtaaJaaoo bna
arid" 10 tacftaaia a » eta ao-aaJax XXs o go o$ bBbrtBt
ee-.critfisq&^a "Jsrf nx «" ■' "tav a ton is boa ^eoaaxXXA eXqiiT
■ ■■• f tsxtd"ewA bfiB '... ■■■.■;■ »£) lo vIX^ Xjb»i siow t-toixii 3 tlfraaal ci\s
■sav /5 «#< ihuea'd'iw ba&faaaiq aai£s{*#xe aXorfw eriT
axiaaoS Ilq no-: turn arii" baiaXaab vXaebbua aaa* Bx*ii"3uA *aX|}nai oxtera
-XX6X a>xw ibw to a'sod bj&rl ^eahuiT bas t6QfcX fix aaxvo&esiaH baa
".i ■: frX aai & bj3 asi ca^d 'to n< .' **sv»
.aaa^aA arfJ1 *tc abaaXax lartto baa aeboriH gaxYqaapo XXx^a ax ba# ti.sw
^aexi^xiuoo 01 i -iol araoaaert b/< aXxnw «BurfT
. ^drti .' .:: gaxwo'xg aaad htai eae ynsenaw iitxw
uaaa :i rtaq e\re^is ' aaw tl
eaw rt«ox. «v-£vtftw^ji >^. :; i* to Xo'xtafOO Xaiai^uciosi baa
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aid ax bXod ' iol a ■■ . ■ [a t>l*xuT
das. :.iisyt« ot »ai itfl od tabaoiXxa' i baa bXiuci .yitawoo
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njsxXst 'x bn.s »Bx«e©a lo nox^Bxamija nexite«i». arf* •bdiratuq ajje'ido $dt
eri: 'inx ru hflenrfJ ciXoqxiT lo noxtaxanrus dh« ibw
0ti itiBfet o.t taa >ven b9p,joMBra
»89xXXA asMXBa aiiJ- rltxw isw a.uor£d-aji«xb a'YasC'wT 9ul»jo tSX6X a'i
d"2oqqwe n<3ijiaU riox a'^xw ertaw aexfttaqaiYB nairtafl rioJ
^■ff^wo't bnB J-«o XX^'t . tucf ;earfaxw b( baxillnoo aaw
3«X2ii>BCf ariJ" yd bfiB «aXqo;tBX*xbii iftyouai M ^e^ltfl ,
. 3d r'^iisu lo vj-mtJr eiii && tl nxsvtei of y^w to
When the European crisis developed in July, 1914, it obscured
an acute crisis between Turkey and Greece, which threatened v/ar between
those two countries, on account of persecutions of Greeks in Asia Minor,
and the question of ownership of islands off that coast. There was
rivalry between the two for Naval supremacy. Turkey had two dread-
noughts building in England, to be delivered in the Autumn, but Greece
had forestalled her rival by the purchase of two battleships from the
United States to reach Greece in July. Thus if war was declared in the
eummer, the arrival of the American battleships would give the Naval
superiority in the Aegean Sea to Greece, while if Turkey delayed the
crisis until the arrival of the dreadnoughts from England, a superiority
would rest with Turkey. One of the results of the great war in Europe
was, that the danger of a minor war between these two countries dis-
appeared for a time*
Though Turkey did not immediately join the German powers in
the European War, it soon became evident that Turkish neutrality was
not likely to long continue^ and many complications soon sprang up.
The mobilization of Turkish Army was begun at outbreak of war, though
Turkey declared intention of preserving neutrality, and British Govern-
ment declared its intention of taking over the dreadnoughts "Berinje
Qsman" and "Reshadieh" under construction in England for Turks, and
nearing completion. On Aug. 10, the German warships "Goeben " and
"Breslau*' reached the Dardanelles, and the next day it was learned that
the Ottoman Government had bought them from Germany for the purpose, as
stated, of being on a Naval equality for negotiations with Greece, and
not with any intention of making war on Russia. Meanwhile, the Army
mobilization was continued, new defences were prepared, and mines laid
in the Dardanelles, German crews retained, and warlike preparations were
daily more in evidence. Every effort was made by the Triple Entente to
preserve the neutrality of Turkey during the war, and it was promised
that if this neutrality was maintained, they woulu uphold her indepen-
dence and integrity against any enemies that should make use of the
-3-
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awtad ibw bonatoj" crfis ,aoaaii ^ex'u axaxio atuoa
,ti tnuooaa no ,aaX"id"m;03 our.t eaorft
«tef3aa &Bti$ 11 :iLzu io q lanwo io noitaeup add" bn.8
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biodqu bJ i uan sxnv urft
arid ; iara bXworia tadt r*e vu.b I'Bnxa^B ^txiaeJTii bjia son&b
-£-
European conflict to attack her, and would recognise sale of "Goei^nM
and "Breslau" , provided it were a genuine one, and German crews went
away. Turkey, however, on Aug, 20, made the proposal that capit-
ulations should be immediately abolished, that two Turkish dreadnoughts
taken over by Great Britain at beginning of war should be returned
immediately, that there should be no interference in internalaf fairs
of Turkey, that Western Thrace should be restored to Turkey, and that
Greek Islands should be restored. To these demands the Triple Entente
replied as follows: — "If the Turkish Government will repatriate
"immediately the German officers and crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau"
"will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished
"for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, amd
"that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey
"during the present war, the three Allied Powers will in return agree
"with regard to the Capitulations to withdraw their extra-territorial
"jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration which
"will satisfy modern conditions is set up* They will further give a
"joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence
"and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the
"terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence
"and integrity."
The Triple Entente had every reason to try to preserve the
neutrality of Turkey during the war, both from political and military
considerations, but all their efforts were in vain. The Porte announced
the abolition of the capitulations from October 1; special trains full
of German officers, soldiers, and sailors were run through Bulgaria;
and many military reservists were posted to garrison the Dardanelles
forts . British merchant vessels carrying cargoes from Russia to the
ivediterranean had throughout August been subjected to delays and
searches, at the Dardanelles. The case of the "Goeben" and "Breslau"
had compelled the British Navy to keep a close watch at the entrance to
the Straits. On Sept. 26, a Turkish destroyer was stopped outside
the Dardanelles and turned back, and thereupon the Dardanelles were
closed, ejnd in spite of assurance given by the Grand Vizier, were not
Ihow bits ,'.
bam »»«© a . i i ■ ■■• I bcus
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n03X*l'Iiig u LXffl ytti
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" Yu WaVXJjjj 90OB , ~ L3
reopened. The "Goeben" and "Breslau" made cruises in the Black Sea.
By the middle of September it was estimated that there were over
4|000 German sailors and soldiers in Constantinople alone. The officers
of the German military mission, under General^-iman von Sanders, dis-
played much activity in the military affairs of Turkey, and were the
principal organisers of peeparations in Syria which directly menaced
Egypt, and caused many British and Colonial troops to be sent there
for its defence. In October, i»4,000,000 (^20,000,000) was delivered
to the German .Ambassador at Constantinople, and it was said that a
definite arrangement was arrived at, that as soon as the financial
provision reached a certain figure, Turkey should be called upon to
enter the war. On October 2y, it was reported from Cairo, that an
armed body of 2,000 Bedouins had made a raid into the Sinai peninsula,
and that their object was an attack on the Suez Canal; and on the
same day, 3 Turkish torpedo boats raided Odessa Harbor, sinking the
Russian guard-ship, and damaging four steamers.
The protests of the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors
were disregarded, and the alternative of rupture of diplomatic relations
on the dismissal of German iiaval and Military missions having mot
with an unfavorable response, the Ambassadors handed in their papers
and left Constantinople, and Turkey had definitely cast her lot in
the war on the side of Germany and Austria.
-5-
♦ *'. lo era© I
fix ^GJJIJ" 6i)-;' CU9 tab CLX frlBftXEIOb 810JS J3
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-ft.
on the eastern line. If the Suez Canal could be seized, and the
Dardanelles held,two of the prineipal water-ways of the world would be
under the control of the Germanic Powers, and those which it was of
the utmost importance for the Allies to keep open. The control of
Germany over furkish affairs would be retained, and the chance of carry-
ing out her policy in the near East. Perhaps the most important
result would be the closing of the Dardanelles to shipping of the Allies,
thus keeping from Russia vast supplies of munitions of war, of which she
was in urgent need in order to put her whole enormous strength in the
field, or in fact, to maintain her armies already there; while at the
same time England and France would be cut off from valuable supplies of
grain and oil from Russia. Even if the Turkish campaigns in the
Caucasus against Russia, and in Egypt against England were not successful,
they would serve to divert large military forces of the Allies for their
protection, which would otherwise be available for the battlefields in
the east and west of Europe, and whose absence from these fields might
be sufficient to turn the scale there in favor of the Germanic Armies.
Finally, the Turkish Navy, strengthened by the Goeben and Breslau,
might be aole to gain a temporary control of Black Sea, or at least to
make raids there to harass Russia, or it might be reinforced by. ships
and torpedo craft from the German or Austrian Fleets.
The principal military aims of Turkey - Roumania, and Bulgaria
being neutral, and Turkey being therefore separated from her .allies -
thus became to seixe Egypt, and the Suez Canal, or at least, to threaten
them with raids, to seize Trans Caucasus and Northern Persia, and to
harass Russia by naval activity in the Black Sea.
The military aims of the Allies were to force and keep open
the Dardanelles, and take Constantinople; and to seize the head of the
Persian Gulf, the lower valley of Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Basra the
terminus of Bagdad railway, and to secure and hold the rich oil fields
in this district.
-7-
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Any study of the resources of Turkey, and of the country
involved will soon show the tremendous difficulties of campaigns either
in the Caucasus or against Egypt, and this principally on account of lack
of good communications and difficulties of terrain. The country in the
Caucasus is a maze of mountains from i$>,000 to 17, 000- ft. high, with
passes at 8, 000- ft., and during the winter deep in snow. There are no
railroads in that section of Asia Minor, and reinforcements for Turkish
Army in that vicinity would have to come via Tribizond, or other Black
Sea port, which, if Russia held control of the Black Sea, would be
impracticable. Any attack on the Suez Canal is even more difficult.
Here, the Turkish Army would have to be concentrated at Jerusalem, and
other parts of southern Syria, and would be separated from its objective
by miles of waterless desert. No advance could be made over this by a
very large force with heavy guns, until a light railroad was laid, which
would take considerable time, and moreover, the line of the Suez Canal
is a particularly strong one to force*
For the Allies, the operations in the Persian Qulf presented
no such difficulties. A force could be sent there from India, and this
was done, and the district occupied soon after the declaration of war on
furkey.
The operations in the Dardanelles on the other hand was a
tremendous undertaking, presenting the greatest difficulties to the Allies
In fact, it was held by many that to force the Straits would be imposs-
ible, without a very strong fleet acting in conjunction with large
military forces; and this operation was not undertaken until the latter
part of February.
-8-
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••O "■
Turkish Army and Navy,
The strength of the Turkish Army is more difficult to estimate
with any degree of accuracy than that of any other country in Europeo
While the Turkish Empire includes 20 million inhabitants, there are
so many nationalities and religions embraced in this figure, and so
many of the people are remote and cannot be mobilized, that the Turkish
Army could only draw soldiers from about half this population*
The Balkan War of 1912-13, reduced considerably the military
prestige of the Turkish Empire, and deprived it of certain sources of
its power. The faults in organization and administration of this Army
are such that in itself it could not be considered as an efficient force
in modern war, but on the other hand owing to its considerable numbers,
and the good fighting qualities of the Turkish soldier, it might under
German leadership and control, be made a very useful factor in the war.
The army in the field would rarely if ever correspond with the paper
estimates, and there would always have to be large deductions made on
account of Turkish methods, lack of money, intrigues, and other
embarrassments.
According to the latest estimates, the peace strength of the
Army was 17,000 officers, 250000 men, 45,000 horses, 1,500 guns, and
400 machine guns. There were 130 regiments of infantry, 70 rifle
battalions, and 13 frontier battalions. About 473 battalions in all.
The second line was intended to provide 500 battalions more. The infantry
are armed with Mauser Magazine rifle.
There were 200 squadrons of Cavalry, each regiment having 5
squadrons of 70 men each, armed with sabre and Mauser carbine.
The Field Artillery consisted of 35 regiments of two or three
battalions - 3 batteries to a battalion;., 23 mountain Artillery battal-
ions; 10 horse batteries; and 13 heavy howitzer batteries. Most of the
batteries had 4 guns.
-9-
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Each Army Corps has 3 divisions of 27 battalions, with 9
machine gun companies, 6 rifle battalions, 3 cavalry regiments; 12
batteries of field, 3 of horse, 6 mountain, and 3 of heavy artillery.
There are nominally, four armies* The first consisted of the
1,2,3, and 4 Array Corp3 with Headquarters at Constantinople, Rodosto,
Kirke Kilisse, and Adrianople.
The second consisted of 5, 6, and 8 Army Corps, the first two
in Europe, and the 8th with Headquarters at Damascus. The third army
included, 9, 10, and 11 Array Corps at Erzerura, Erzinghian, and Van.
The fourth army included the 12, and 13 Army Corps at Mossul and Bagdad*
The 14 Army Corps which was independent, was at Sanaa, Xlodeida and Ebka.
Mobilization had been in progress since the war began, and it
is estimated that there are now 500,000 more or less trained men with
the army, and 250,000 or more untrained men at the depots*
. At and near Constantinople, there were, when Turkey entered
the war, the 1, 3, and 5 Array Corps, and part of the 6th. There were
also the Bosphorus defence troops, several cavalry brigades, etc. In
Thrace were the 2 and most of the 6 Corps, 3 Cavalry brigades, and
Dardanelles defence troops. At Smyrna, was part of the 4th Corps 0 In
Palestine, was the 8th Corps, and numerous irregular Arab troops, etc*
The main mass of the Turkish Army (over 250,000 men) was
thus in Europe, the next largest body was on the Russian frontier in Asia
Minor (about 150,000 men) and the third mass was near the borders of
Egypt (about 65,000 men).
The Turkish Navy consisted of 3 old battleships of about 10,000
tons each; a small harbor defence ship of 2,400 tons; 2 small cruisers,
3 torpedo gun-boats, 10 small destroyers, and 10 torpedo boats. The
chief strength of the Turkish Navy was in the battle cruiser Goeben
and the cruiser Breslau, both formerly of the German Navy, A list of
ships of the Turkish Navy is appended*
-10-
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-OX-
Operations Leading up to Attack on Dardanelles •
After the entrance of Turkey into the war, in the early part
of November, operations were undertaken by her in the Caucasus, Egypt,
and in the Black Sea, for all of which she had been mobilizing, her forces
and preparing previous to that time*
Un Nov. 18, The Russian Black Sea Fleet engaged the Goeben
and Breslau both of which disappeared in the fog, the former damaged to
some extent by the Russian fire* The Goeben also ran on a mine at a
later date, and was so badly damaged, that she could not be repaired
at the Turkish yards for some months, and when she did again take the
sea, the first part of April her speed was much reduced*
On Dec. 12, submarine B 11 entered the Dardanelles, dived
under five rows of mines, and torpedoed the Turkish battleship Missudiyeh
which was guarding the mine-fields. Although pursued by gunfire and
torpedo boats, the B 11 returned safely after being submerged on one
occasion for 9 hours*
These disasters to the Turkish Navy destroyed all hope of
Turkey obtaining naval control of the Black Sea, which thus definitely
passed to Russia* Turkish troops could not be moved thereon without
great danger, and the Russian fleet succeeded in sinking a number of
transports and supply ships, and bombarded TREBIZOND and other ports on
the Asia Minor coast*
On Dec* 17, the Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was ended, and
Egypt annexed to the British Empire, strong military forces having been
collected therefor its defence, consisting of British Territorials and
Indian troops, and also contingents from Australia and New Zealand*
About the middle of November a force consisting of a division
of Indian troops was landed at the head of the Persian Gulf, defeated and
drove back the small Turkish force in that region, and occupied Basra
and Kurna* This operation put the British in possession of the lower
-11-
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Tigris and Euphrates, the terminus of the Bagdad railway (not yet
completed), and the important oil fields of that district. This country
is still held, though the Turks have made various attacks here, the
most important of which was one near Basra in April, by a force of about
15,000 which resulted in the driving back of Turks with heavy losses.
As Turkey did not enter the war until the beginning of November,
military operations in the Gaucusus could be undertaken only with great
difficulty, which with a long and ardous desert march before her towards
Egypt, with Bulgaria and Greece neutral, and the Navy incapable of more
than raids, made it appear as if Turkey's participation in the v/ar would
for months to come, be of little more than a nominal kind. The Turks,
however, under their German leaders did not let the v/inter pass without
undertaking both of these campaigns. No doubt the Germans hoped that by
an immediate vigorous campaign in the Caucasus, Russia would be forced to
detach considerable forces from the eastern theatre of war, and thus
relieve the pressure upon herself and Austria. The Russians were, how-
ever, prepared for Turkey, whose hand had been plainly shown from the
beginning of the European War. The Russian Army in the Caucasus stood
at its post, and when Turkey entered the war, no men were transferred
from the eastern front.
The Russian troops crossed the Turkish iv frontier and drove the
Turkish advance bodies back towards Erzerum. This was only a demon-
stration and not an advance in force, the general policy of Russia being
to act for the time on the defensive in this theatre. At the end of
November, theTurks began to develop their advance having concentrated the
9th, 10th and 11th Corps at Erzerum. The Russian concentration took
place at Kars, distant about 100 miles. The whole intervening country
between these two fortresses is a tangle of mountain ridges, and snow
swept valleys. The plan of the Turks, as prepared oy the Germans, was
to attempt the envelopment of the Russians. Though the Turks had super-
iority in numbers, about 150,000 to 100,000, such a plan in this
difficult country, covered with snow, without railroads or good roads,
and depending on the Black Sea via Trebizond for reinforcements had little
chance.
-42-
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.ao«ari3
-SI-
The Turkish plan, however, in spite of difficulties of com-
munications, and of timing various movements, came near to success, but
the stubborn Russian resistance at all points upset the Turkish plan
of delivering a sudden stunning blow on inferior forces. The fighting
went against the Turks, two of whose Amy Corps were^almost annihilated,
and in the first part of January the Turkish forces were driven back
into Asia L&nor, Trebizond, was bombarded and communications by Black
Sea cut, and the remnants of the Turkish Army na well as the civil
population of Erzerum and surrounding country have since been decimated
by disease and hunger.
The Turkish forces for operations against the Suez $anal were
mobilized in southern Palestine with Jerusalen as a base, and various
reconnaissances of small forces were made in the Sinai peninsula* In
January these forces were said to number 65,000. No extensive operations
could however, be undertaken until a railroad was built across the
desert, and this would take considerable time, but was necessary in order
to supply troops with water, transport heavy guns, etc. Nevertheless,
a reconnaissance in force, or raid, by about 12,000 men, was attempted
and succeeded in transporting light guns, and briging equipage»
On Feb. 2 and 3, the Turks tried to cross the canal but
were repulsed with considerable loss by British forces, and lost most of
their bridging outfit. It is difficult to see what such a small force
could have accomplished, but it seems that they hoped to get possession
of a portion of canal temporarily, and accomplish some destruction. The
British forces do not appear to have advanced across the canal in any
great strength, until the morning of Feb, 4th. They collected about
600 prisoners, but the bulk of the Turkish force got away with the guns.
By Feb. 3th. there were no Turk3 within 20 miles of the canal. There
was no organized pursuit, but enemy suffered losses of about 1,000 in
dead and wounded.
It is understood that German engineers are busy with light
railway in Syria, and other attempts against the canal will perhaps be
undertaken. The raid in February at least showed that the Turks can
cross the desert in some strength, and can bring guns with them.
-13-
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The first few months of her war had therefore been disastrous.
The territory at the head of the Persian Gulf had been occupied by the
British, the operations in the Caucasus and in Egypt had resulted in
complete failures; the Turkish Navy had been roughly handled, and
transports sunk in Black Sea and towns bombarded* By keeping the
Dardanelles closed and defended, and thus shutting off munitions of
war from Russia, so necessary to her in developing the full strength
of her army, as well as supplies of grain and oil for Great Britain
and France, Turkey could still, however, exercise a considerable influ-
ence on the results of the war*
The forcing of the Dardanelles became, after the entrance of
Turkey into the war, one of the important features of the Allies*
strategy* When such an attack could be made depended much on the
results of operations in other theatres of the war. Operations in
the Dardanelles being far removed from the main theatres, and to a
certain extent a secondary operation, any attempt there likely to
weaken the Allies in the principal theatres in the east and west of
Europe would be open to criticism* The disastrous results of the
Turkish campaigns, however, in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesapotamia,
and their naval losses in the Black Sea; together with deadlock on
the western front, defeat of German armored cruiser squadron in the
North Sea; clearing of the sea of German cruisers; and apparent secure
position, preponderance in force, and limited field of activities for
British and French fleets; and the importance of the results to be
achieved by a successful attack on the Dardanelles seemed to warrant
the move*
The political and strategical results of the forcing of the
Dardanelles would be of the utmost importance to the Allies cause*
If the straits could be forced, Constantinople would be at t e mercy of
the Allies' fleets, European would be separated from Asiatic Turkey
without means of sending reinforcements from one to the other, and the
Ottoman Empire might be compelled to sue for peuce* German interests
-14-
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~^X-
in Turkey would be lost. Russia might be freely supplied with the
munitions of war so vital to her successful military operations, and
the mobilizing of her full strength, and Great Britain and Rrance could
draw on Russia for grain and oil. Any threat of further operations
against the Caucasus or Egypt would be lessened or completely disappear;
and the effect on the Balkan States of Roumania, Greece, and Bulgaria
now hesitating on the brink of war, and whose policy had been such a
source of trouble and uncertainty to the Allies, might be to cause them
to join them or come out openly in their support* The decision of
Italy might also be hastened*
To force the Dardanelles in view of the strong and numerous
fortifications defending the straits, and the other difficulties attending
the work was a task for the combined operations not only of a powerful
fleet, but also of a strong landing force. To insure success and that
i
the Straits should be forced in the shortest time, and with a minimum
of loss would probably require the joint action of a strong British
and French naval force in the Dardanelles, in conjunction with the Russian
Black Sea Fleet at the other end in the Bosphorous; and the operation
was not one that could be left to the Navy alone, but would also require
strong military forces from these countries to act in conjunction with
the fleets. The situation was such that a naval force would accomplish
little unsupported by a landing force. If, however, the operation would
have to be undertaken by both military and naval forces of Great Britain,
France, and Russia, acting together, we may form some estimate of the
great difficulty in co-ordinating plans to provide for the best use of
the 3 armies, and 3 fleets involved. Successful co-operation under
the circumstances could only result from a well Matured plan, a good
system of command, and thorough accord and team work among the various
forces.
In spite of these obvious considerations, this attack was car-
ried on for some time, with only a Naval force of Great Britain and France.
-15-
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•2X-
It became an affair of ships against forts and mines, and the result
was naturally disastrous to the ships. The attack was started earlier
than anticipated, owing to conditions stated above, and the military
expeditionary forces were not ready to participate. To undertake
such an affair was to count too much upon the inefficiency of the
Turks, on the second-class character of the fortifications, and the
effect of their guns being outranged by the ships, on the east of
guarding against mine fields and drifting mines, and on the chance
of creating panic in Constantinople by the threat of forcing the
Straits .
Military Geography and Defenoes of the Dardanelles*
The Dardanelles is over 31 miles in length from the Sea
of karmora to the Aegean. At the mouth at the Straits are over 4,000
yards across, from which they open out until near the Morrows. The
Narrows are 13-jj> miles from the mouth, about 3 miles in length* and at
Chanak less than 2,000 yards from the European to Asiatic shore* while
at Nagara the distance apart of the two shores is slightly more. The
two most critical points for a fleet in the Straits are the passage at
Chanak, and opposite Nagara Point. More than 20 miles beyond Naraga
Point the Straits broaden out into the Sea of Marmora.
North of the Straits on the European side is the Gallipoli
Peninsula closed by the isthmus of Bulair. This isthmus is only about
3 miles wide at its narrowest point, and across this narrow neck have
been constructed permanent works to defend the peninsula from an attack
by land* On the peninsula are a confused mass of heights, the higher
summits of which are in a range along a part of the northern coast, the
peaks here rising to an elevation of over 1,000- ft., the highest being
over 1,200- ft. On the rest of the peninsula is a confused mass of hills
whose summits are from 400 to 1,000-ft.
-16-
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-dX-
The position of the forts at the Narrows with respect to
the northern coast line of the Gallipoli peninsula renders indirect
fire over the peninsula practicable. The shortest range from the
open sea to the main forts of Kilidbahr is about 11,000-yards, and to
the Asiatic shore beyond 14,000 yards. It is therefore possible
for the latest and most powerful battleships to attack both shores by
indirect fire. The reduction of forts upon the Narrows from the
open sea depending on heavy guns operating with accuracy at over 11,000
yards, observation from the air above target to correct fire, and
communications from aeroplanes to ships to regulate fire. These
conditions did not exist when the Dardanelles forts were designed, and
consequently there is only one small permanent work on north shore of
peninsula.
Between the Narrows and open sea to the north west - that
is in line with the shortest range - there is a flat topped hill,
the Pasha Dagh, about 650 feet high, and sloping down rather steeply
to the Narrows, and gently towards the open sea, in such a way that
ships lying in the open sea can hit some of the works on northern shore
at Narrows, end with greater accuracy those on Asiatic side*
^he permanent works at the Narrows are the strongest in the
Dardanelles. The most powerful group is upon the slope of the Pasha
Dagh, and here within the limits of a little over a mile are 12 permanent
works.
Upon the Asiatic shore opposite, are 4 principal works near
the town of Chanak.
There are also in the Narrows besides the above 7 works on
the Asiatic and 5 works on the European side. These latter, however,
would seem to be less difficult to force than those defending the
Narrows at Chanak.
The shores are steep everywhere in the Dardanelles, and there
is a great depth of water, except in bight below Chanak, where the 5
fathom line comes well out from the shore. The current runs from Black
to Aegean Sea, and at places has a speed of from 4 to 5 knots.
-17-
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-VX-
The attack upon the Dardanelles is chiefly a Naval operation,
with a naval object, but which depends on the joint operations of strong
land forces for its success. If the Isthmus of Bulair is captured
and held by a power commanding the sea, the reduction of the forts, with
modern siege train, and high ecplosives, would be only a question of time.
This isthmus is occupied by one big hill with three summits
between 400 and 500- ft. high, the 200 foot contour reaching close to
the sea, upon each side* The highest euuanit near the centre of the
isthmus has a permanent work, and there are entrenched lines following
the ridge and reaching across the narrowest part. This line can be
turned by a power in command of the sea. A range of 6,000 yards will
carry clear over the isthmus, and there is deep water clear up to
the north-western shore.
The whole of the Gallipoli peninsula may be regarded as a
large fortress, and in March was said to have a garrison of 60,000 Turks.
Besides the permanent works shown on the map, the terrain offers
opportunities to place heavy howitzers in concealed positions, and
lighter guns and howitzers which could be moved from point to point*
The terrain on the Asiatic side is flatter near the entrance
to the Dardanelles, where are the plains of Troy, and the river Meander,
flowing in northerly direction and emptying near Kum Kale. Further up
the shore is lined with a mass of high hills, the highest near Chanak,
where a peak rises to over 1,500- ft.
From Bulair at end of Dardanelles to Constantinople across
the length of the Sea of Marmora is a little over 100 miles; and
Constantinople is practically undefended from this riea. It is, however,
defended from a land attack by the famous Tchataldja lines extending
from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora, about 25 miles in length and
the same distance from the city; and there is an inner line of defences
from sea to sea a few miles from the city.
The Bosphorus extends for about 15 miles from the Black Sea
to the Sea of wlarmora. It has many windings, is very narrow, and
-18-
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reaches between high hills on each side. It is defended by numerous
forts and batteries on each side of the Straits. These forts are not
supposed to be so strong as those at the Dardanelles , but to force the
passage might be even more difficult*
As Russia has command of the Black Sea, she is in a position
to land a large invading force near Constantinople! either on European
or Asiatic side. The work of Russian fleet should, therefore, be con-
fined to covering the landing, and maintaining oversea communications*
Only a long range bombardment of forts would probably be attempted, Frftm
Cape Rumili to Constantinople, is only about 15 miles, but the Straits
are very narrow - at points not over half a mile wide. The whole passage
is difficult, and there are heights on each side from which a plunging
fire can be delivered, which would given an immense advantage to guns on
shore, and little opportunity for outranging an account of turns, and
over a part of course ships would have to steam in column.
Malta and Bizerta the bases for British and French fleets are
distant about 800 miles from the Dardanelles. Tenedos and Imbros
islands that belong to Turkey and suitable for advance bases are about
12 and 30 miles respectively. Lemnos, a Greek island is about 30 miles
distant, and Liytilene and other Greek islands at short distances, Alex-
andria, a base for military forces operating against the Straits is 700
miles distant. Smyrna, the second city of the Turkish Empireis a
good naval base, defended by forts, and connected with Constantinople,
about 250 miles distant, by railroad.
The theatre of the Dardanelles and Constantinople had during
the few years before the present war, figured in military operations*
In the war with Italy in 1912, when the war had dragged on for a long
time, and Italy had been unable to bring a decision by operations in
Africa, she sought to bring the war nearer home to Turkey, and seized
some of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor, At that time, it
was rumored that Italy intended to attack the Dardanelles. The attack,
however, went no further than a bombardment of forts at Kum Kale by
the Italian Fleet, whereupon Turkey closed the Straits for a month to
-19-
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On Feb. 25, the forts at entrance to the Dardanelles were
again bombarded and reduced by the combined Anglo -French squadrons.
The forts at the entrance were shattered by fire of Allied Fleet,
including the new British draadnought "Queen Elizabeth" which had
joined attacking fleet. Demolition parties were landed under protec-
tion of Marine Brigade Royal Naval Division, and completed the des-
truction of the forts.
On the 26th, the Dardanelles bombardment continued. The
Straits were swept for 4 miles from entrance. British warships
proceeded to limit of swept area, and bombarded Dardanus and other forts.
On March 1, the battleships went in the straits bombarding
forts at G. Kephez, and opposite on European shore.
On March 4, sweeping and bombarding operations were continued,
demolition parties landed to continue clearance of ground at entrance of
Straits. The Sapphire silenced a battery of field guns in Gulf of
Adramyti, and defences at Bisika were shelled by Prince George.
March 5, Dardanelles operations opened by indirect fire from
Queen Elizabeth which fired 29 rounds upon defences at Narrows. This
attack was supported by Inflexible and Prince George. Magazine in Fort
L was blown up, and two other forts damaged.
March 6, "the Queen Elizabeth supported by Agamemnon and Ocean
began to attack forts U and V by indirect fire across Gallipoli
peninsula at 21,000 yards. These forts were armed as follows: —
"\T 2 - 14- in. guns.
7 - 9.4-in. "
"V" 2 - 14-in. guns.
1 - 9.4-in. "
1 - 8.2-in. "
4 - 5.9-in/ "
"Queen Elizabeth was replied to by howitzers and field guns,
and 3 shells from field guns struck her without doing any damage.
"Meanwhile, inside the Straits. Vengeance, Albion, Majestic,
Prince George, and the French battleship Suffren, fired on forts
F. and E. and were fired on by a number of concealed guns. Fort
J. which had been attacked on previous day opened fire, and was
engaged and hit by 12" shells. The uiajority of the ships inside
were struck by shells, but there was no serious damage and no
casualties.
"On March 7, the weather continuing calm and fine, the four
French battleships entered the Straits to cover the direct bom-
bardment of the defences of the Narrows by the Agamemnon and Lord
Nelson. The French ships engaged Dardanus battery and various
-21-
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-XS-
concealed guns, silencing the former. Agauemnon and Lord Nelson
than advanced and engaged the forts at the Narrows at 14,000 to
12,000 yards by direct fire* Forts J. and ¥7. replied. Both were
silenced after heavy bombardment* Explosions occurred in both
forts. Uaulois, Agamemnon, and Lord Nelson were struck three
times each, but not seriously damaged. While these operations
were in progress, the Dublin continued to watch the Bulair Isthmus.
She was fired at by 4" guns, and struck 3 or 4 times*
"Owing to the importance of locating the concealed
guns, seaplanes had to fly very low on occasions, and suffered
some damage and casualties. The Ark Royal is equipped with
every appliance neoessary for the repair and maintenance of the
numerous air craft she carries. H
On March 8th, the Queen Elizabeth supported by four
battleships entered the Straits and bombarded forts at the Harrows.
On March 19th, the Admiralty issued the following
statement; —
"Mine sweeping having been in progress the last 10 days
inside the Straits, a general attack was delivered by the British
and French Fleets yesterday morning upon the forts at the Narrow^
of the Dardanelles.
"At 10.45 a. me yueen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamemnon,
and Lord Nelson bombarded forts, J. L. T. U. and V; while Triumph
and Prince George fired at batteries E. F. and H* A heavy fire
was opened on the ships from howitzers and field guns. At 12*22
the French squadron consisting of the Charlemagne, Suffren, Gaubois,
and Bouvet advanced tip the Dardanelles to engage the forts at
closer range. Forts V, U, F. and E* replied strongly. Their
fire was silenced by the 10 battleships inside the Straits, all
the ships being hit several timea during this part of the action*
"By 1.25 poiue ell forts had ceased firing, Vengeance,
Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure, and Majestic then advanced
to relieve the 6 old battleships inside the Straits. As the French
squadron which had engaged the forts in the most brilliant manner
was passing out, Bouvet was blown up by a drifting mine, and sank
in 36 fathoms north of Erinkior village, in less than 3 minutes.
"At 2*36 p.m. the relief battleships resumed the attack
on the forts who again opened fire. The attack on the forts was
maintained while the operations of the mine sweepers continued.
At 4.9 the Irresistible quitted the line, listing heavily, and at
5*50 she sank having probably struck a drifting mine. At 6.5
Ocean, also having struck a mine, sank in deep water; practically
the whole of the crews of both vessels having been removed under
a hot fire*
"The Gautufcis was damaged by gunfire. Inflexible had her
forward control position hit by a heavy shell, and requires repair.
"The bombardment of the forts, and the mine sweeping
operations terminated when darkness fell. The damage to the forts
effected by a prolonged direct fire of the very powerful forces
cannot yet be estimated, and a further report will follow.
-22-
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saw ad'TOl add" no jiaad'tte e-xil' .©tx* banaqo hxb^b odw e;v'iOi ©rid" no
,baxjf«xd"aoa a . iwa axixu add io exxoxd'aiaqo exld" ©Xxd% baxixadrixaxa
da btta ,YXxvB©d gnxd'aiX 4©xix£ arid" bad'dxwp ©Xdid-axaaiil add" i?.^ d*A
did 3"A «anxi>: a«td-ixib J3 ilamd'a ^Xosdoiq gxtxvad Afisa ©da 06 »2
YXXaox.toBnq ;iadaw qaab nx rtnaa , ■ ■ a jiouida ^axvari oaXa «na©oO
ibc« bavoxaai n©ad gxixyari eXoaaav diod xo a\?aio aild 'to aXodw odd*
•exii d'od a
nad bad ©XdxxoXini ►eTtiii«i£ \d b ax^dxiav adT"
.ixaqai eaixx.'- wa ,XX©da Yv^»-i & Yd J-xd noid"xaoq Xoid-noo EnawiQl
Etxqeawe ©nxw add" bxxa tad"xo2 add \u \ ibrtadxaod ©dT"
ed-iu'i <i&i- od- ©^aaiab wdV .XX©1 aaarx j(*xab nadw bad'an.r.njT.ad' sxioxia'saqo
aaoio't Xxj'iiawoq y^^v 6i^* I0 a*xx*i d■^©^x.b bo^XioXoiq a yd bivtoaix©
.woXXol XXxw d-uoqai iadd"H/i a bna tbad-aaixd-a© ©d to\- crortaoo
SS'
"The losses of ships were caused by mines drifting
with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto
swept clear, and this danger will require special treatment.
"The British casualties in personnel are not heavy
considering the scale of the operations , but practically the
whole of the crew of the Bouvet were lost with the ship, an
internal explosion having apparently supervened on the
explosion of the mine.
"The Queen and Implacable, which were dispatched from
England to replace ships casualties in anticipation of this
operation are due to arrive immediately, thus bringing the
British Fleet up to its original strength.
"The operations are continuing, ample naval and
military forces being available on the spot,
"On the 16th inst. Vice Admiral Garden, who has been
incapacitated by illness, was succeeded in the Chief Command by
Reatf Admiral de Rebeck with acting rank of Vice Admiral."
The general procedure in this naval attack on the Dardanelles
was about as follows:— To use Malta and Bizerta as bases and Tenedos
as an advance base for the fleets. To carry on long range bombardment
of group of forts until the guns were apparently silenced; then to send
in ships to closer range to complete the work of destruction with their
lighter armaments. The distance to which these ships were sent in was
limited to area up to which mine sweeping operations have been carried
out. To use the Queen Elizabeth with her large 15" guns, and sometimes
other ships for indirect fire. To use aeroplanes to correct results of
indirect and long range fire, note damage done, and positions of newly
mounted guns. To sweep Bulair Isthmus with fire from ships, destroy
defences there, and make it difficult or impracticable to reinforce
Gallipoli peninsula. To use destroyers, trawlers, etc. for sweeping
mine areas. To land demolition parties, covered by force of Marines, and
fire from ships, where practicable, to complete demolition of forts that
had been silenced.
Up to Liar, J.7, three weeks after attack on Dardanelles began,
there were gales and a good deal of thick v/eather, so that long range
bombardment had been practicable on only about 7 days, as at such ranges
it would be essential for effective fire both for gun pointer to see his
mark, and for those observing fire to detect where shells fall to correct
range
the range. Without such observation, long ,tf ire is of course a waste of
-23-
niaw aqXrfa 10 . ul ailT"
oJ-'Twittxii eisatJi nx baio^nwooiio s' fa6t*XUt) &ti& dlrv
ni J- i. irMjixpei Xlx bn£ i*ixmIo dxjawa
\jvj te XannoB-iaq nx eoxtXj a'*'
tfd- vliijuxdryjanq Jxrd «ufloxd\Btoqo ©rid' 1c >a edor jjaJknabXanoa
tt3 ,qxtfa arid ridxw JaoX ©raw .tevwoa odd' 10 waio oiid" lo aXt
arfd- no ©enavtaqua Y^dnainqq^ anxvarf noxaoXqxa Xjmi'x© d*nx
*&ium ©fl*d" lo noxaoXqxa
ii barioJaqaxb ©new riax/iw , oXduoxi Xr peX ban a ©riTw
axxCdf '10 noxd'.aqxoxd'ns nx aox^Xxuus&o aqxrie ©oaXqa't ©d« baaXaaS
arid- gnxgnxid Bud& t\rXaJaxbacuai: avjhfi© ot axifc: erca n©i*B*xa<
•dd-gaeid'a tfcnigjHo edx od- qu ^©aX'i rfsxdxnS
baa Xavsn unxJao© ana anoxcrxna, ■?'*
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naad aarf oriw <n9©iaO Xa^xrafeA ©©XV *d"aax lif'dl an** no"
yd bnaasooO itexriO ©lid* nx babaaosxra saw tea©nXXx \ci bad^tx&aqxionx
".XB'UiiibA aoxV io rfaai gnx«ft»j3 ri'dMCW iaadoH ®b La*ikmbA H&&H
aaXXamsbtk no :itint&M Xsvbj. -t nx aiobayoiq la-tansa eriT
aobenal bna aoasd ax; &&' bns »A£M& ©au oT — ;awoXXoi a# d**oda saw
Jnesibattdaiod 930^*1 §ttoX no \t9rti50 oT .e^asXl ©lid* iai ©sad eonavbs as e-ss
bfl©s od" nan\t ;©®»n9Xxa \rXd"ne*iBqqa ©«*©;*. a««S ©4d* Xxdmr ad"io'i so qyotg 10
liaHi ri-frxw noxd'yjjid-aab "to at**©* add" rjj-aXqcioo 0* o>;n£i 'iaaoXo od" aqins nx
saw nx daea a; ©earfid; d&JEdw ad" ©onaiaxJa . ©d*i9ffiafiita i3tdgxX
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aaax^eiaoa fans «8««3 M2X ©giaX tad A&lw . neaxiy -j£^ .two
lo ad"Xw£ai toafioa od- aansXqoiaB aa>: .©ixi ooeiibnx ic -ia laiito
yXws« 10 enoxi*iRoq bmj ,anob e§BfiUib a^Oia teixl e§nea gnoX bna Joaixfcnx
YO-£d"aeb , aqxrfa sioii a*iil rf$i ,xtal iXbXuQ qiaawa ofJ *amQ b9d"nwoc
aatoinxat od* aXOBox^oxriqEU to JiuoiViih 3"i aieiat bus ,9'i9ftt' aaonalab
gnxqaewa tol «y^a tanoXweTi- tmoyoitaab aaxr oT ..eX^enxneq xXoqxXXsx)
biia ,aanx*iBi/i 10 ou* d batavoo ,aaxd"iisq xioxtxXomab bxtaX ol »aaa*^ anxm
d-fifii- ai-toi iQ nox^XXpnab a^aXqiaoo 0? ,aXd/3DXJx>^'iq a?*ffa «aqxnj: ciot't a^*i
.baonaXxe naad bad
»ajB3©d aaXXarLsb*xBa no -Aout&si i&ftB ajlaew ©e'ld* ,VX •wad ot qO
a§i [«oX SmU oa ,'isiUiiaw :{oxiij- rto XxjaL boo^ i> bnjs eaiss aiaw eiaiiJ
aagiuii rfau ,u^xvb V d*wod^ y-^110 ;Ii) " no* neau nail tnecabTBdtaod
ex/{ 888 od- tarf-nxoq n«g To't rfjou atii evid-oalls -toi Xx^icirnaaaa ad bXuow ^x
d'aaiioa ot XXsl eXXaxie aiarfw d'oad-ab o# Qtlt ynivieado eeorfj 10I bne t£iB&
lo ai-esw /i aaiuou lo ax aiX^gnoX tnoiTi3v*i9£jdo rfoua d'Worfd'X^ .©^n^T arid"
ammunition, In any case the number of shells used to destroy so many
forts would have to be prodigious. The operations in any case could
only have been continued by sending the ships close in, which even if
the Straits were swept clear of mines, would greatly endanger them from
fire of the forts. The operations being interrupted for such long periods
the Turks had ample time not only to repair the forts and get guns
ready to meet new bombardments, but also to plant other guns and howit-
zers in concealed positions,
The great advantage of the forts over the ships was that
though they might be temporarily silenced by ship fire, their permanent
destruction was practically impossible, unless demolition parties were
landed; and that in the face of a strong covering mobile force would
be a very difficult operation for the fleet which necessarily had only
a limited number of men available. If the fleets had been accompanied
by a military force capable of extensive operations both against the
mobile field army and of attacking forts from land side, matter swould
have been simplified.
Ifi the forcing of the Dardanelles had been a naval problem
only, and if waste of ammunition and of time were a matter of indifference
the operations might have continued as they had begun. But a rapid
solution was of the utmost importance, and the ammunition question was
serious. The forcing of the Dardanelles was not, however, a purely
Naval problem as must have been apparent from the first. Military forces
were absolutely essential, and when the military forces were fully em-
ployed, the function of the fleet should have been principally to cover
the advance of the Army and protect communications. The ships guns
supporting the artillery on shore, and maintaining fire on the enemy's
defences up to time the assault was delivered; but obviously such an
effective fire could not be maintained from a very long range.
Reports of military expeditions were current soon after the
attack was begun by the fleet. A French Army under Generu.1 d'Amonde was
concentrated near Bizerta. The island of iiiumnoo waw used for a time
as a base for military expeditions, and here on Larch 18, there were
encamped a part of the French forces and an Australian contingent
-24-
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,«ti • ■ iliLov tiQ&d eVBd \;Xfto
jb tol fae^qi/tio^ni rxoivftrieqo ©rfT .8i"*iol sr(j lo etil
UoJt frii coo ni eies
te/iJ" .. *favo edre ■- , . •'. ■• rfii?vbij ^ei;, erlT
io*tot b'Ijg *l«x«vovo jijitoii to eritfst a . tnrt& bHa jbabnisX
Lutilllib ytsiv a
ad .eXcfeXJ ' ouiX b
9 id" 0 ■ ■ ' uVj.Bl' 9 £ . is . '.
< . .: . . [\ jvja'rf
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and there were about 40 transports in the harbour* The French Army was
about the the first of April moved to Egypt, and camped near Alexandria.
A British force under General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O. who was
to command combined British and French forces was assembled in Egypt. And
a Russian Army was rumoured to be assembling at Odessa.
Why the military expeditions were so long in getting ready,
and a landing for operations against Dardanelles was so long delayed is
not apparent. The difficulties of preparing such large expeditionary
forces composed of such a variety of national units, so far from the
home countries and without suitable bases near the objective, were no
doubt very great, and there were also political conditions which may
have caused delay and change in original plans.
The four outer forts were reduced by the fleet without a great
deal of trouble, but even here the limitations of ships in an action
against shore defences was so apparent that it is remarkable the opera-
tions should have been so long persisted in, without the aid of land
forces. These forts had only 10 - 10.2" and 4 - 9.2" guns, and it is
not probable that any of them were of latest type. Yet they survived
the first heavy bombardment, and were finally reduced after over 7 hours
firing from 9 battleships, one the Queen Elizabeth, all the ships making
excellent practice against a poor reply. moreover, some of the guns
were found still mounted when demolition party was landed, and the Turks
concealed behind the ruins of the forts and villages caused considerable
loss to the brigade of Royal Marines covering demolition parties, until
finally driven off by fire from the ships.
From these preliminary operations, it was possible to estimate
the magnitude of the task on which the Allied Fleet was engaged, und to
arrive at the conclusion that, if the Turks made best use of defensive
possibilities and unless their resistance suddenly collapsed, progress
was likely to be extremely slow, difficult, and costly. The work at
the entrance v/as only preliminary and not to oe compared with that when
the Narrows came within zone of operations. Yet many people in Englattd,
and 30me Iiaval authorities among them seemed to look on the forcing of
-25-
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the Dardanelles as not much more than a Naval parade to be accomplished
in a few weeks at most.
The Admiralty seems to have grown impatient at the delay, and
limited results caused oy long range fire, ana to have ordered ships
in to make an attack on forts at closer range, apparently believing
it practicable to reduce the forts guarding the Dardanelles, and get
ships through, or at least to give mine sweepers such support as would
enable them to successfully clear the Straits* If this was the idea
it was reckless in the extreme, and doomed to meet with disaster, Three
battleships were sunk in the attempt, and three others considerably
damaged, one of wnich the Gaulois was only saved by being beached
at Tenedos, and this without accomplishing any results commensurate
witn the heavy loss.
Garden
It has been said that Admiral/was opposed to tailing this
riSK, and resigned his command rather than to take fleet in for a close
bombardment of iarrows defences. However, this may be he was relieved
shortly before the attempt was made, and Admiral de Roebeck put in command
After this disastrous action on Mar, 18, there was little news
of Naval or Military operations there for over a month. During this
time the fleets were repaired, and their strength increased by the
joining of n&tt units, and the military expeditions were concentrated in
Egypt preparatory to a renewal of attack by combined operations. The
ship3 were protected against mines and torpedoes by fitting them with
double nets and other means. Some mine sweeping and recosinai3sance were
carried out, out little bombardment of the forts. During one of these
reconnaissances a British submarine was lost, and about the middle of
April the transport MANITQU, with British troops was attached in the
Aegean by a Turkish torpedo boat from Smyrna, three torpedoes being fired
without a hit, but 51 men on transport were lost owing to capsizing of
coats on which they were attempting to abandon the ship. The Turkish
torpedo boat was then chased oy Br it is u destroyers that had come up, and
ran ashore and was destroyed on coast of Chios,
The Russian Black Boa Fleet bombarded forts at the entrance to
the Boaphorous late in March at long range* Early in April, the Turkish
-26-
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Fleet made a raid into Black Sea, when the Hadiidish struck a mine
and was damaged, and the Goeben, which was reported as much reduced
in speed, engaged in an action with Russians at long range and was
driven back to the Bosphorous.
Smyrna was also attacked early in Larch by Itest Indian
squadron for purpose of demolishing fortifications, in order that it
could not be used as a naval base by the enemy. In this attack the
Swiftsure and Triumph joined. The forts were first bombarded at long
range producing no response; then mine sweepers were sent in, forts
opened on them and ships came in to closer range and engaged. One of
the forts fired well making 8 hit 3 on the ship3, out causing no great
damage. The bombardment did not apparently do very much damage to
forts which were not reduced. In April flights were made over Smyrna
by aeroplanes, bombs dropped and considerable damage reported. From
observations of aviators at that time it was estimated that there were
35,000 Turkish troops at Smyrna occupying trenches recently dug between
Vosula and Smyrna, and heights which dominate the city; the two forts
of Two Brothers anu Restrati, which had been rebuilt; and a new fort
constructed above the farm of St. George which was said to be armed with
30 guns brought from Constantinople.
The Naval activities at the Dardanelles brought Lalta to
much prominence as a Naval base. English and ivrench fleets and transports
collected there in large numbers. Supplies, munitions, and ammunition
were drawn from its arsenals, and to it damaged ships retired to be
docked and repaired. The wounded found accomodation in its hospitals,
and it served as a port of call for transports on their way to Egypt
and the Dardanelles.
^Tiile Admiral Jellicoe and the main British fleet blockades
the German coast, and the main, French fleet ±a bottling up the Austrian
fleet in the Adriatic, practically the whole of the powerful pre-Dread-
nought fleet are free to attack Dardanelles, ana to assist British and
French armies to land to open the Straits and attack Constantinople.
-27-
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A purely Naval attack had, however, been unable to drive the
Turks from the Gallipoli Peninsula. There is plenty of cover among
the hills and besides fire from forts, and danger from nines, hov?itzers,
and guns could be mounted to shell ships from concealed positions. Even
had the ships succeeded in reducing the forts, so long as Turkish troops
with artillery held the peninsula, traffic through the Straits would not
be safe. And even if mine fields were all swept there would still
be danger from floating mines.
For ships alone to force the Straits and appear before Con-
stantinople was clearly impracticable, if Turks made best use of defensive
possibilities, and this in spite of large naval force available, weight
of primary armament, excellence of gunnery, and means of observation
from large number of aeroplanes. Having made such preparations to force
the Straits the Allies were obliged to carry the attempt through at any
on
cost, and could not afford to fail, not only/account of military importanoe
but also from political considerations, and because the eyes of the world
were on them.
Why then did the fleet attempt to force the Dardanelles in
Larch - an attempt, which made without the support of military forces, not
only led to a considerable disaster, but gave the Turks and Germans many
weeks to organize their defence. There are only two answers which can at
present be offered to this question. The first is that the British
Admiralty was guilty of a gigantic and easily avoidable blunder. The
other is that their plan was spoilt at the last moment by the downfall
of Venizilos the Greek Premier. An interesting article in support of this
second reason appeared in the "Hew Statesman" of April 17, and is quoted
below: —
"In the last week of February a powerful squadron of Dritish
and French ships began a ooubardment of the Dardanelles, and success-
fully reduced the 4 small forts at the mouth. Mo secret was made
of the importance of the operation coratemplated; the official
communiques '/ere more than usually communicative, and the French no
less than the English press foreshadowed an early triumph. Well
informed people who opined that at least a month would be necessary
-28-
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for the forcing of the Straits were suspected of official caution.
"One can hardly imagine that the Admiralty shared this easy
optimism. They have before them not only the general considerations
showing the disadvantages at which ships are placed in a contest
with land artillery, but the special experience obtained last
autumn in our bombardment of the Belgian coast, A belated des-
patch from Rear Admiral Hood published only last week confirms
what one had surmised about that amphibious operation. It was
very successful so long as the Germans had no very heavy guns mounted
among the sand dunes. But the ships could not prevent the guns
from being mounted there, and eventually the guns drove the ships
away. In sfdte of all our naval preponderance the enemy have been
able to hold this strip of coast at our very doors, with sufficient
security to maintain their submarine bases there, although the
later phases of such submarine activity gave us the strongest motives
for interfering with them. There is evidently only one way in which
our navy could master the German positions at Knocks and Zeebrugge,
and that is by the co-operation of an adequate land force. And if
that is true of the Belgian coast it will be true of the Turkish.
The natural obstacles are much greater in the latter case, while
the artificial ones - German generalship and German gunnery are
the same.
"Yet bo adequate land force did in fact co-operate at the
Dardanelles, and for that reason the ships failed as they were bound
to do. For 3 weeks they kept up an intermittent and costly bombard-
ment, weather permitting. Mines were swept clear, coast villages
were destroyed, and here and there a few kutm hits were recorded on
an almost impossible target, which a widely dispersed and well con-
cealed land artillery presented. But nothing was done by land
operations at bulair or elsewhere to prevent the Turks from in-
definitely re-inforcing the Gallipoli peninsula, and more than making
good any losses sustained there in men, guns, or ammunition.
Finally on Liar. 13, the Allied commanders resolved to attempt
a "coup de main". Their fleet entered the Strait3 and failed dis-
astrously. Not only were 3 oattleships sunk, Out the full accounts
-29-
oivt-ut;;, ItilosViv 'to be^otjqa/Ja oi»'«v 9&&M*itQ arid to ^txxoioi odd" lol
vase eider beiBde yd"Xa-iJaflbA add" tedd acUgani \XoTum obo .j^o"
■tteitoi add* \;Xxxg ^on cnadd" G'io'ieu evBii wm£T ««ja(iflji4,qjD
j6 tooa jl: nx baosXq otb eqxrfe rioxdw to iv&aexD add- yixwode
d-aaX beniBd-de eaaaiiaqxe Xaxoeqe add- Ji;. ^naXXitTLB b/u ...
-eob bedBlad A «£aaoo ftaxgXad add* 'to tfriawbiBCJaiou two at twu&ue
Wtilnoz ta&l yinc bariaxldjuq faooH laiinbA leafi ffloil to
8bw dx" •coxd'Biaqo rarfd; d-wooi» n&ahu¥iu& bad ©no itexljr
batauoffl enus vVJ*6^ r**v on anaanefi add" exs §«©! oa XirtBaaooi/e yiBV
•itU£ aiid ctaave-xq ^Ofl bluoo aqxda ©xij fruS. *&qhud base ado- gnoxaa
ide od& svoib enx% edt ^IXauJaava bixs ,©TeriJ bed*nwoc.: . x»o*ri
oaed evad ^aaxxa e*t# aoixsiabaoqaiq Xsvsa iwo XXb lo ^fx^a nl .^bwb
jxoxilua .'•.;xv. te*xcob yxev -wo te fanou 2o qxitfe exri* bXod ot eXds
eriw d%UQ&t±A ,a*xedj aeasei enXiBBidwe *xx©dw six&ftijttm ot yi~iiUQ$$
aevxd*o« creeijiiotd'a aad" aw ©vBg YdxvxJoa eai'SBSKfwa dpua xq aaasdq Tted\BX
doidw ivJ yaw ©no \xxxo \rXdmbi,re ex a/tadT .sjadd" dtfiw gaxieiiaftu *xoi
ggjndsaS bixs £Oiyon;i dvj Baexi'XBOf escrceiD esi;r Te^esai bxuos yvan iuo
'ix b&A •aoio'l basX edmspabB ns io noxd^aqo-co ad* \;d ax ds.dd" boa
.daxjiiwT odd 'io a^ntf eu Xxxw dx jaaoa oex^Xed art* So oin:d" ex 3»d*
aXxdv, teajsa •xad'ifrsX adc xxx *iad"a©Tg tioum &t& eeXoBd-edo Xsitxtefi afCT
aijB ^t««u«2 assnai) brtB qxdeXB*so|!«s asanas - eeno Xbx^xIxj'-ib add-
.eai£8 add"
axid" d"B aj-B*£©qo-ot> £oxs2 fix bxb ooiol biseX efosLpsba od 5"sY"
Bjmod aiaw ^adi" aa5 baxxBi eqxda axid" noefian j-^dd- *io1 bxta taeXXorii3bieG
«-b*jx;c£;od \;id-ao^ bus fn&£$£a*ie&ni ti& qu jqeti \Qiii aiaew I •xo'5 »ob o;
as^BXixv wSboo »'iJ3©Xo d"q©W8 aiev; aa:xxu; .5jci^#lffiia9 ladCBaw t^eflu
no bainooai ©new adxri k&uk wo'i b amada baa atsd dxib ,bavoia'8ei3 aiew
-ijoo XXaw bns baaiaqaxb vXabxw a doxdw (d'egiaJ' aXdxaaaqioi cfaciiiis tjb
briBX y^ axiob aB\s? ^nxdtfon ti/d ,b©d"naaaiq ytaXXx^B baeX baXBeo
-ni «oiS aairurT add" dnevaiq c.r eieriwaaXe ic tCBXird era enoxd"Biaqo
;-»ia xiBdd ©toai baa taXjJaaxxtaq xXoqxxiBi; add" jjaioiolfii-ai yXacrxrix'teb
•aoxd'XfUiffimB *ic iQiur^ ,n©iM ni on >axx£ad"Bife seeeoX \t;b boos
sqi^>z::j; Ow- bavX^aoi anebfiBaaaoo BaxXXj1 arid- ,&X *'XBt.i no ^U
-ax& baXx.' i - 8d"-ta*id"S aiici" baiad-isa d"oaxi ixaxi'I . jb quoo" a
ad-x-ijjouoB XXu'i add" d*wa «jim/a aqiriaeXd-d-aa .;; a* ino d-c .YxajjcidaB
published in the Italian press, which appear to be on the whole
trustworthy, suggest that very great damage was inflicted on many
other vessels by gun fire. The strongest corroboration of this
is the sequai. The Allied Admirals held a council of war and
decided to keep their fleet in the neighbourhood. A formal
abandonment of the attack would have had too serious a moral effect
throughout the impressionable East, But in fact, save for mine
sweeping and a little reconnoitering, nothing more appears to have
been attempted from that day to thia.
"How and why was this quasi- inevitable failure courted and
incurred? The explanation seems to lurk in the sudden reversal
df Greek policy following the down-fall of h, Venizelos. Venizelos
had made arrangements for Greece to co-operate with the Allies.
They were to have the aid of a division of Greek troops, and (still
more important) could use ail the Greek islands and harbours as
bases. Relying on this, they started their operation, and then
at the critical moment the Greek Premier was unable to carry out
his part of the bargain. King Constantino, and his German Queen,
and Germanophile officers dealt the Allies one of the shrewdest
blows possible. Having begun their attack they had to go on,ibtKattgk
though they had little chance of success. Moreover their diffi-
culties increased. They had occupied mnanoa as a base for troops
with Venizelos tacit or express consent. They have now had to
abandon it. Some say they did so because the water supply was
unsatisfactory, but there is reason to suppose that M. Gournaris
the new Greek Premier took up a strong attitude against their
staying on. Indeed since fejemnos was a Greek island it is difficult
to see how they could stay if Greece is to remain neutral.
"The despatch of the French Expeditionary Force to Alexandria,
which was casually announced last week, shows how much this has
embarrassed the Allies. Vhey need now a very large army to over-
come the German-Turkish position, which since February has been
incalculably strengthened. The total force which was originally
arranged for seems to have been about 100,000 men (20,000 Greeks
-30-
ox ' ' , . , -.it ax in jq
IU1J
; . . ■ . . , . ■ . '. Mug y;d aXaes ;■
i Cioowoa iXeri aXaiiiob* baiXXA ©d » Loupe a ©a"j ex
. »Oj ■:. ■'* i £X©/ «i iseXI iJ
.■ ■ . , ©jsTdra
i .'. .<■-■. . . • .J. &di /''iii j*
svj nxrfjon ,g aaeoei ©IjJxX , boa gnii
•axi -b ta&f a arxa a
rXx-sl ©Xtij inx-xaaup axiu saw ^riw baa »o^
£sB<x©va'*x nai cid ii i'wl oj era©© e R titfoal
.aoXasixieV . . Jo ... .,... oXXol ^oiXoq »e©i3 Xo
»aaiXXi i /... tet#qo-oo ol soee1., m baa"
XXXuS |8C[i»v'i.- 20 fl'OXSX^
a* tr. ifi laXax jf@i - iau bXxfO ( jrax a^om
,i i •■ >qo lis dU (^i.iij' no ,_i5X\i-.,:-. . ■
owo ^it axiw ta te8*t£) a , . Xspid'X'io ©JdTJ" xa
(Hdai/^ X- ljX'i t isq ai£j ic j*usq sxri
yg •. i (J *xo ©no aaiXXA add ££s©b aieaillo ©Xxtiqe . wxa
^S»»jRjai:,KO u^ &i h^d \e-i . &jb liarfif Cili - E -ssoq aw;
-x ;ixb ■ ii©vo©'gCfti .aaaoowe io s :i Y^r^' rtatforfir
in ,g baxqtJooo .iseasaiooi eax.tXjJo
of h vad yt .i-fiaanob aaatqxa to -frxoisi Golaxxno'/ rijxw
jua 10 i ausae'cf ©a sa . ■ ■ ,tl "neb a
8xtaani/o2 . »aoqqi »*n fj Xtfd 4v: d;
IX t&a ^iV-lXS £ qJJ jiOOT 1 .
ix ix bimXa. •; ii:j & aaie b©©bxil .no anxTjaTa
. ££78 bXifoa •. -;"i I; woif '©•© ou
, xifertsxaXA o^ . ^•tJjnoxJ\cb©qif .
and aid. delta t . te&i b©»rwo .:.. 'ri.Cx>ijwxi%> Baw lioiJ
-lavo oj i. i .aaxXXA sricr i
Y ,x'£v s aiolt lai .. ^AuaXuaiXadJr^:
a.i.'.-; DtOS) J.'iOOX ^*;ooii naa >©a iox b ti.a
and the rest French, British, Australian, and Indian). It could
have used SLemnos, Mitylene, and Salonika as bases so that its
accommodation, supply, and handling presented no difficulties.
Now men on the spot talk of 250,000 troops being necessary. Even
if this large force can be collected, where can the men be put?
not
Imbros and Tenedos, the only islands which are/Turkish and can be
used by the Allies are small, timberless, almost waterless, and
with little accomodation. The bases to which the Allies must
apparently be reduced are Alexandria and Cyprus, which are aoout
equidistant from the Dardanelles, and each over two days steaming
for transports. The handicaps imposed by these facts are obvious.
"If one asks how the Greek "^rite-face" has been possible in
view of the obviously serious effect which it must have on Greece's
prospects if the Allies win the war, the truest answer probably is,
that opinion in the Balkans on the whole, expects Germany to win it.
The consequences of this expectation may be observed not in Greece
alone* Since the war began an enormous number of German officers,
engineers, and artillerists have found their way to Constantinople,
together with guns, shells, mines, and even it is said parts of
submarines* All these have come through Bulgaria or Rumania, and
they have been coming quite openly through the latter country ever
since the bombardment of the Dardanelles." •
The second phase of the attack on the Dardanelles - Combined
Operations - began with the landing of military forces there during the
latter part of April, and will be made the subject of a continuation of
this paper.
-31-
fcJl ■ ' i '■ •■ ■ IBM
eti, ... te x | -don bvau svjsrl
ne\ . ..'..' . DO, ■ ..' froqa Brfd ao i
tb®&Q®££e ebo a mo '2 6$m£ bM$ *i
«jo ■ i'w rfpxrfo ebittsXei ^X«o arU , ©often©? am: aondjul
, Le ,uv Tecteii (XX&asB a^s &q£H,„ . yci dhqjj
fca . d ri&<trfi o* ■ e....' .ttox^^okKaooos falcr;rxX $j*iw
torouja ©lis rioixfa |8tftqnr^ ^fiS fiX©I& ©tu beojjjsen ad \tiuffy,ix;qqx'.
o . ,r lavo das© bit , eeXXeiTBi)' r moil touBifelbiiupe
,ejj©x ate b&m&I ntd* \fd beao^jffii: eqfea .u. .Ev-ioqei^iij' *j:oi
iii: eluxccjoq need aari Haox-'.- -■ '■.;.»,, 2lo©iO .. • . sroti Bisfi eco IT'
e'o fto ©virri i'auu t£ . ^©ll© euoil©© ^Xfiijoxvdo ©tii lb vreXv
t8X 'r,'-v.< cioiQ '-,;'.' ,'... If t .rosqeoic!
. _ Kin o* ^oBfinai aftKMgxe , . ij &c eissatli rfit
aJt ,\m bsvaaedo ad ^sds oox&tKte>e<|x© bxjeW to e^u: ..,.-...• feriT
,e*feoillo «ato*x© vdcswis BifOEHona raa • ib* a$ >fii3 . itfOvJjs
isiqori, . :,- w./ \..^,' ixorfd ii9£&i&
Id e^Tjatj ...ij'c; ex frx naw.bisa {©©n&Q teXivifB <i.: ,,
te , " .eortjHJsffltfi/B
is" la ^ .' i ■ i ' i ■ ■ ><j©
• .#.«*.».«.•••##• M.8©Xl8imD*i* o tfi©trfbnj5cfi e» >3fiie
biUoiboC - bbXX BXi* ho a^ ■ - »rfJ io e&exiq bnooee ed
aiiw gfxxiwb aiedi1 aeoiol ^is^xXxn 'lc god - <iiiOXwf£*xaqO
',o box; 3 £»©£ IXxw fr » -'■:• - - ihtaq isJ-^X
. • ■ . .
SJURKISE ;Y.
Goeben
22635 -bona
Breslau 4478
Kner-M-Mnjarbarossa 9900
lor/rot He is
o
in-I»Zaffa
Hamidieh
9900
'A00
38£0
Sejidieb 2&$2
3 To: o Gunboats 763 to806 tons
10 Destroyers 184 to £37 tons
10 Torpedo Boats.
Svjaioi Ivstafii 12840
Io re Slatoust 12840
Pas simon
Bosti: •'_'
13582
8300
10-121.1, I2-.
I3-4.I
6-IIi.n, 0-4, llii
6-IIin, 8-4. Iin
8-f.Sia, 12-Siri
2-6in, 9-4,75.13
2-Sin, 8-4. 7in
Tr± 3Tyatitel 13 >I(
Georgii Pobyedonos«ts II032
Sinop II230
2 evia 75
agul 6675
2o Destroy z L5 to IIIO tons
II Submarlni 110 to 700 tows
Imperatriats . fefc&L&ing, laid flotm 1918', E2S50 tons, 21 kts.,
Imperator Aleksandr III I2-I2int 20-4»7in
Ekaterina II
4-I2in,4-8in,I2-6in
4«I2in,4-8in,I2-6in
4-ISin,I6-6in
4-I0int B-6iJi
4-I2int 8-6ia
6-I2in, 7-6in
o-ISin, 7~6in
I2~6in
I2-Gin
Admiral Sasare7
Adiiiii'o.j
building, laid down 1913, 8085 tons,
;.-,i(
Itish and French fleets during First Jhase of
Attack on elles.
"ueen Elizabeth
27500 tons
Inflexible
17250
Lord Nelson
16500
Agamemnon
Irresi stable
16500
15000
Cornwall! o
14000
Vengeance
12950
Ocean
12950
- Ibion
12950
Swift sure
II800
triumph
1 1800
Jestic
14900
Prince George
U
French Fleet.
Suffren
1252?
Charl ne
II082
Gaulois
II082
nyet
12007
8-I0in
■-I2in
4-I2in
4-I2in
4-I2in
4-I2in
4-I21n
••■4 10 in
4- 10 in
4-I2in
4-l"2in
I6-Cdn Runs
...
I6-4in
10-9.2 in
-9*2in
I2-6in
I2-6in
I2-6in
I2-6in
12- 6 in
14-7.. '
14-7. 5 in
I2-6in
I 2 -Gin
-*-I2int 10-6. 4in
4-I2in, 10-5. Sin
in, I0-5.5in
2-I2iri, 2-10.8.1
8-5. 5in
In addition to the above big gun ships there were
numerous cruisers, destroyers, submarines, trawlers &c;
and a large number of hydroplanes.
.. -
[~§
SUBJECT
SITUATION TO MA
V
s
35, 1915.
From
No.
341 Date
Replying to O. N. I. No. Date
With the entry of Italy into the war at midnight
of May 34th 1915, a new phase of the European complication in
probable.
The extraodinary concessions to remain neutral
offered to Italy by Austria at the solicitation of Germany, are
well known and show how important the matter is considered here.
Not only has Austria and Germany been compelled
to detach large forces from the Eastern front which could have
driven home the late victories over Russia in Galicia, but the
Mid-European powers must face threatened complications on the
Turkish flank.
The best information asserts that Greece must
Join the allies in a very short time* Italy now belonging to the
allies, is to send troops to the Gallipoli peninsula and for this
t*A aid is to have her aspirations in Asia Minor, in the rep-ion
of Alexandre tte recognized. Greece also has aspirations in Asia
Minor in the region of 3uyma, and cannot see Italy receive
colonies in Asia Minor without Joining the race for colonial
expansion. The participation of Italy and Greece means the
certain -"all of Constantinople. The entry of Greece into the
war means that the remaining Balkan states will more than
probable take up arms to satisfy their ambitions at the expense
of the falling Turkish power and of Austra. Bulgaria wants back
Adrianople and the strategic line proposed for her at the Treaty
of London. Roumania wants Transylvania from Austria.
The situation between the United States and
Germany over the treatment of American ships and citizens
during the submarine warfare remains in the critical state. The
demands of the United States have not yet been answered, but
from all indications the substance of the reply will be a refusal
of the principal demands made by our government.
Since the sinking of the "LUSITAITIA" , very little
appears to have been accomplished in the submarine blockade of
England, In the Baltic the German fleet assists the army in the
occupation of Liebau and generally controls the Baltic Sea.
There does not appear to be any indication which
can be interpreted into a probable ending of the war for a long
time to come*
The questions involved are so far reaching in
their consequences to the countries involved that only the
absolute exhaustion of the resources of the countries will hrinr-
about peace. Germany shows no sims of exhaustion. To make any
predictions on the duration must be regarded as almost a guess,
but I see no reason to believe those people who hope to see peace
this summer. To my mind another year of war is probable and
perhaps mors*
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October -:
&W& not be return S
SUBJECT CAPTURE Of HOSPITAL SHIP
From No.
Replying to O. N. I. No.
?36
Date
Date
2 191!
References:-
Z-337 of 1914.
Z-357 of 1914
Z-398 of 1914
Z-190 Of 1915.
The English Prize Courts have declared
this ship as good prize. A careful study of the whole a/ffair
and of the reasons for declaring the ship a prize should be made
in connection with the outfitting, conduct and anounoing of U.S.
hospital ships in war time.
i
The German pent of view has been covered
in past reports referred to above.
The following is a translation from the
"Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung":-
?HE HOSPITAL SHIP "OPHELIA" DECLARED A PRIZE.
London, May 31. Reuter reports:- The
Prize Court arrived at a Judgement this morning rer*ardin^
the German hospitalship "Ophelia". The Court declared
the ship as prize, as she had neither been built for a
a hospitalship nor fitted up as such and used as such,
but had served for military purposes only.
We have been informed from competent
authority:- The "OPHELIA" waa sent on the 17th of
October 1914, after the news of a torpedo fight arrived
which had taken place on the Dutch coast, from Helgoland
to the scene of action to look for survivors. The
hospitalship was stopped by English naval forces and
brought to Yarmouth. Later it developed that the
anouncement of the "OPHELIA" as auxiliary hospitalship
had not been made by the neutral power requested to do so,
The German government has protested against the seizure
of the ship and requested that the ship be ^-iven free.
The English government, instead of givong the ship free,
had her brought before a Prize Court which has now
declared her a prize, basing the deciision on the fact
that she had served as a miliaty ship.
•OPHELIA" was fitted up as a hospitalship.
It ia of course understood that the ship had not been
used for any but hospital purposes, as provided by the
Harue Convention.
3~
N 2 611915 ^
.S.8.H0KTH CAROLIITA^J
Alexandria, Egypt.
May 25,19:
From: Lieut .( j .g. }E.G.Blakeslee , U.b.IIavy.
To: Office of Naval Intelligence.
Subject: Landing of Ally forces on the Gallipoli
Peninsula April 25, 1915, and General
Operations in the vicinity of the Dardan-
elles,
1. The following information of the landing of the Austral-
ian and New Zealand forces on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, April
25, 1915, has "been gained by me from Captain G-, an Australian
officer, wounded on the first day of the landing and convalescing
?in Alexandria. Captain G- was second in command of a Company of
the Third Brigade of the Australian force, this brigade being the
covering detachment and the advance body during the landing. The
Captain went over the landing with me on the ship's charts of the
Dardanelles and Peninsula which I had provided previously; and he
pointed out the principal points of the enemy's strength and dis-
position together with what information he had been able to obtain
of the Turks preparations on the Peninsula. The facts, which fol-
low, I believe, may be considered most reliable as I have checked
up same with snatches of conversation with numerous officers and
men among the wounded now in Alexandria. I consider this infor-
mation as doubly reliable as Captain G- spent eight years in the
British navy and was quite familiar with the Navy's part in the
occupation and able to discuss same intelligently, having entered
the navy as a Midshipman and schooled for the Naval service.
2. The Australian and Hew Zealand forces, about 50,000 in
number, arrived in Egypt on December 6th, 1914, after a voyage
of fifty days on thirty eight transports, were disembarked and en-
camped at the foot of the pyramids. The Australian force consisted
of four brigades of infantry together with a regiment of cavalry
and a regiment of artillery, the whole being a complete advance
force and army corps unit. Since the arrival of tliis force in
Egypt, the whole has been put on the new British war footing, the
Infantry arm, which is modeled as follows:
Australian force comprised four brigades of infantry.
A brigade comprises four (4) battalions.
A Battalion comprises four (4) companies.
A company comprises four (4) platoons.
A platoon comprises four sections. (4)
A section comprises fourteen (14) men.
Each section is in charge of a non-commissioned officer, there
being sixteen (16) to the company. There
are
(6) officers
to each company, a Major in command, a Captain, who is second in
command, and four lieutenants, each in command of one platoon; eaeb
platoon having four non-commissioned officers, each in charge of a
section. The foregoing is the model of tho latest British war
footing for all troops.
' 3.
Brigade
The Australian Advance Force consisting of the Third
left Alexandria aboard transports for the first time on
March 2, 1915, and went to Lemnos Island,
been made the
Dardanelles .
forces left
and 10th of
transports,
embarked at
destroyers
British Advance Base
The remainder of the
for Tenedoa Island
April and remained
The Advance force
Lemnos Island and
for the final occupation of Gallipoli.
Which was to be and has
for her land attack on the
Australian and Hew Zealand
from Alexandria, between the 5th
there seventeen days aboard their
which left Alexandria March 2, dis-
there remained until embarked aboard
the 24th
On
instant, all transports under cover of
darkness
moved on to the
v v -"
lb'
'
... .
i
'
.
- 2 -
Island of Imbros where they were anchored before midnight of the
24th. The Third Brigade had "been placed on destroyers at Lemnos
Island for transport to the place of landing. Concentrated off
Imbros Island then were about 35,000 men aboard transports and
ready for the landing on the Peninsula. This force consisted of
sixteen battalions of Australians, four battalions of Hew Zea-
landers and twelve battalions of British Uaval Division.
4. xhe Third Brigade of Australians acting as the covering
detachment and embarked aboard destroyers proceeded to Imbros
ahead of the transports. Each destroyer carried one company of
infantry, about 450 men and towed a line of six boats from each
quarter. There were seven destroyers used. The boats towed were
boats from the men-of-war present, transport's boats and as it was
termed, any boats they could get. The destroyers at a speed of
four knots, towing twelve boats each with 432 of the Advance Party
aboard each destroyer, left Imbros after midnight and went within
500 yards of the projected landing place.
5. The landing was supposed to be in the nature of a sur-
prise and was made during darkness just preceding daylight. De-
stroyers had all lights out, with orders not to fire. As scon as
the destroyers were within a thousand yards of the beach, the Turks
commenced firing and the destroyer, on board of which was Captain
G-, had twelve men wounded before embarking in the boats. The
destroyers, however, did not use their guns during the landing.
Arriving about 500 yards from the beach, the destroyer v/as stepped,
port side to the beach, and the troops embarked in the boats over
the starboard side. Each boat was manned by four bluejackets from
a destroyer, there being thirty six men of the advance force to
each boat. This was done under a heavy fire from the beach, the
port side of the destroyer being hit numerous times. There was no
confusion in the boats, each man taking his place as previously
ordered. Two steam launches towed a string of six boats each to
within fifty to one hundred yards of the beach and into shallow '
water. Here the boat" were in some cases beached, but most of the
troops jumped overboard and waded ashore. The four bluejackets
in each boat were unarmed, acting simply as boat keepers. After
disembarkation, steamers picked up all boats and returned them to
the destroyers which took them in tow and rushed back to the ad-
vanced base for more troops. The landing took place about 4.00 a.m.,
and about one mile and a half to the Ilorth of Gaba Tepe . The fir-
ing from shore broke out very badly as soon as the boats Y/ere seen
to approach and there were a number of casualties left in the boo,ts.
This advance force having landed, the main body came up in trans-
ports and two hours later began landing in the ship's boats, the
transports anchoring within about a mile from the beach.
6. The Advance force dressed in khaki, v/as fully equipped
with three days rations, water bottle and 200 rounds of ammunition.
The Australian fully equipped pack weighxs about 56 pounds, which
includes the overcoat. The officers were equipped same as the men,
except they carried a revolver, v/hieh was said to be of little
use, this officer in question picking up a rifle and using sane in-
stead of revolver. Only one officer was seen flourishing a sword
antf he was killed almost as soon as he landed. The force landed
with fixed bayonets, pieces loaded, deployed and charged immediately
driving those Turks who were near the beach back up the hill. The
men threw off their packs as soon as the landing was made, the beach
being littered with knapsacks, overcoats and canteens.
7. The actual landing took place to the northward of the in-
tended one. The proposed landing was to be made just above Gaba
Tepe, but due to darkness and reasons unknown, the landing was mde
about a mile and a half to the Northward of Gaba i'epe. As after-
wards proved, this was a fortunate mistake as Gaba Tope consisted
of a seven gun emplacement of lour inch guns, as wall as being ..oil
■
- 3 -
entrenched and mined with wire entanglements throughout. Barbed
wire entanglements had been placed "below the surface of the water
from fifty to a hundred yards from the shore line. It was here that
the Turks had prepared for the landing, they notbbeing as well
prepared to the Northward where the "beach is steeper and covered
over with heavy underbrush. The beach where the landing took place
rises in steppes about a hundred yards
from
The
steep but not enough to prevent climbing.
with Turks and the guns from Gaba Tope and
placement in the hills enfiladed the whole
thousand men were either killed or wounded out of a force
five thousand landed. Infantry only was landed at first.
the water ana is very
hills were crowded
another three gun em-
beach. About seventeen
of thirty
A regi-
ment of cavalry was later landed without their mounts/and sent to
protect a certain position. An Indian mountain battery of six six
:he day. This battery is commanded
inch guns was landed later in
by British officers with a few native officers. These heavy guns
were landed in flat bottom lighters in which the stern drops out
' and the lighters beached. These were said to oe the lighters used
for landing horses and known as the horse lighter. The Infantry
and Mountain Battery guns consisting of ten pounders and eighteen
pounders were landed in life boats, being taken to pieces and later
assembled on the beach.
The Ilavy took very little part in the landing, the ship3
did not protect the landing of the troops nor was the beach
In a 1)0 sit ion
8.
present
shelled before or during
the
landing
rp
rhe
Ships were
;o protect the
inks
md In one case II. M.S. Majestic, turned her
search lights on a movement of Turks around the left flank of the
landing force and fired a few shells, driving the Turks back.
Later the ships oj>ened up on Gaba Tepo but did not succeed in silen-
cing same as the guns here are concealed from seaward behind a
Braall hill. The ships present took a very small part in the land-
ing delivering only a small covering fire and as this officer
stated not anything like the Army expected. It is said that only
one out of five of the advance party escaped being killed or wounded.
Turks as snipers in concealed positions did terrible damage. They
were found later in concealed positions, pits covered over with
underbrush, the pits containing several thousand rounds of ammuni-
tion and one month's rations. Some of the ships present wore the
Queen Elizabeth, Swiftsure, I.lajesiic, Amethyst, London and seven
destroyers, besides, the transports, hospital ships and ammuni-
tion and supply ships.
9. After landing, the companies, plattoons, etc., became ell
mixed up and the men belonging to different companies were .not
sorted out that night. The senior officer in a small rodius tak-
ing command oj^those near him. Twenty two out of ttomty nine offi-
cers in one battalion were killed or wounded the first day. In
another battalion only two hundred and fifty men were left at the
close of the first day.
10. From a British War Department map issued to each officer,
an idea of the country was gained. This was simply a contour map
showing topography, elevations, all principal land marks, roads,
etc. The Peninsula was divided into squares, each square being'
numbered and subdivided into nine equal squares, lettered from a to
i inclusive. Lach numbered square was 675 yards • in length. The
whole Peninsula was so divided into squares, which were i$ ed for
purpose of directing gun fire, it being possible to switch your
fire wherever you pleased. r"he following is an example:
126
I
d
g
e
9
Q
cT
£
1
j
.
I
1
- 4 -
11. One reason given for the lack of h&lp "by the ships was said
to he due to the difficulty in signalling ranges and positions to
the ships from shore, The ranges had to be relayed by several.
lignal parties on shore and by the time same reached the ships the
position of the Turks would have changed*
12. The Turk's batteries were well masked, and concealed and it was
ii id that the ships had extreme difficulty, in fact it was almost
impossible to pick out these batteries. Everything favored the
Turks end they made good use of all their resources, such as eov-
Ir i n g , o b s t a c 1 o s , e n t angle me n t s , e t c .
13. Captain G- re narked that it had been realized that a mistake
s made in not using the ships to protect the landing as well as
shelling the beach previous to the landing. The opinion was ex-
pressed when asked concerning the Havy's part in forcing the Dar-
danelles; that they were sanguine, too sanguine, it was thought .
■he two forts at the narrows of the Straits were said to be among
'the strongest in the world and that same could not be taken by the
fleet acting alone. Very little damage had been done as yet to
either of these forts. The present strategy seemed to be the occu-
pation by troops of the several hills on the Peninsula mounting
heavy artillery thereon and taking the forts both from land and sea.
Once having gained command of the several hills, such as 900 metre
hill, etc., it was thought that the forts would in time, be reduced,
but the time would be considerable as the forces ashore were paying
dearly for every foot of ground gained. At this date there was a
great need of Infantry, though fresh troops were coming regularly.
Infantry is all that can, at present, be used on the Peninsula, at
least until those hills commanding the forts and surrounding country
can be taken. The Cavalry has been sent back to Egypt. It might
be said here that hundreds of horses died on board the transports.
They were stabled in small stalls without room to lie down, in con-
sequence o^ which their limbs beca^me swelled to large proportions
and their feet became core and diseased. It became necesaary to use
traps to trice them up, taking the weight off their legs.
r
14. Before the actual landing, feints were ra de on the Peninsula
at various points. In one place a thousand mules were put ashore
near dark and with a piece of khaki on their backs to resemble sad-
dles, -..ere driven up in the hills. This ruse was said to have had
the desired effect and the mules were sacrificed.
15. The Turks are said to have placed Torpedo tubes along the
,res of the S1 ts of the Dardanelles and! at the entrance to the
sea of Marmora. Preparations for the defense of the Peninsula were
laid to have been started by the Turks as early as November. Rail-
ways run up to all forts and as soon as a gun or carriage is put
put of action another can be readily put in place. The whole Pen-
insula is said to be a mass of modern intrenchments, obstacles and
Lglement3 with all of the principal elevations defended by well
concealed batteries.
16. At the same time the landing v.as being made to the ilorth of
a Tope similar landings were taking place by the French on the
Asiatic side and by English regulars and territorials at Cape
Hollos. Tho remainder of the British regular army comprising such
regiments as the Dublin Fusileers, Lancashires, llunsters and hoyal
Fusileers, were here entirely annihilated. An attempt was made off
e Ilelles to beach a transport loaded with about 3000 Territori-
als, the idea being to run her on the shore and land the troops in
shallow water without the aid of boats. The transport, unfortunately,
grounded astern before close enough to the beach. The troops, how-
ever, piled down the gangways , OTer the side and through the cargo
•ts into the water and under an enfilading fire from Turkish bat-
teries ashore. Those who were not killed by gun fire were for the
most part drowned and a very few of the three thousand aboard were
Saved from destruction.
(signed) E. G. Blakeslee.
Need not be returned,
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) fT' }
SUBJECT ffea B#GXa»e*i0n &t ---81*0lDtii*--£t---tfe*-
0)1
- Coasts of -Aus-tr-:;. ;y and Albania. - •
/^^ * No. |3g# £>#& -I^gr-^^-JL^-ft^^K--- *
Replying to 0. N. i. No mm»»M Date ...M^^^^j^^^x^.x^m^f^p..^\^
1. ..^inning fro:e the 86tli of Acy, 19^5« HI effective
blockade will l)c considered to exist toy tn feaiian Lirval . oroes
folio s:
1) The . n trior.-, i eri en coast ©attend north to t
Italian 1 run tier and eotith to t: :onte ; ion frontier in-
eluding ell the inlands, ports, inlets, roads and beys;
) The coast of '1 '.ending froe. the Aont; riesn
frontier south- to the hicphali ( inclusive ) .
>grephieal 11 of I y od territory ore:
r^tria-Huncary - llorth - let. 45* - 4£f - 0
long 1A° - 51 f - 1C" E.
South - let. &lc - 6T - :.5n II
Long 10 r' - 5f - ;0n E
Albania - llorth - let 41° - 58 * - 00n H
lonf; 1j° - 50« - 30" B
ips of -rricndl: i i neutral powers will
bo riven a time lindt which will be eotablisl bfy the
Let of '.*. Italian n orces. ,o commence
fror: the day of the declaration af the bloelcc.de in order to bo
free to leave ;locI: port.
▼iolat .d
a ii trante or Chit-
all will 'be treated in »onf * mt %
laws at ing t ies.
K 5
(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of 6cto^er 31^588$ n°^ ^° returned.'
SUB7ECT Battl AwtloM 1m th> AArtatla Sea on May 24, 1915 •
-fiw» f No 18 Date May 26 , 1915 .
Replying to 0. N. I. No Date
On the 24th instant the following official announcement was
made in Vienna:
"In the night following the declaration of war (May 23-24)
our fleet undertook ^~ siefioa against the east coast of Italy
between Venice and Barletta, and effectively bombarded important
military objects in numerous places. Simultaneously our naval
aeroplanes dropped bombs on the baloon shed in Chiarvalle, the
military works of Anoona and the arsenal in Venice, whereby
visible damage and conflagrations were caused.
Commander of Fleet."
On the 25th inst. the following report was given out:
"The official telephonic report of the fleet action on the
morning of the 24th inst. is as follows:
"Before sunrise to-day, that is within 12 hours of the declar-
ation of war by Italy, the 1, & R. Navy executed a set of success*
ful simultaneous attacks on the coast of Italy from Venice to
Barletta.
"A naval aviator dropped 14 bombs in Venice, setting firs to
the arsenal, seriously injurung a destroyer, and bombarding the
railway station, oil tanks, and hangar in the lido.
"The destroyer "Scharfechiitse" pushed into the very narrow
channel of Porto Corsini until it found itself in the immediate
proximity of a fully manned infantry trench. A large portion
of the completely surprised garrison was shot down, whereupon
three entirely concealed shore batteries opened a heavy fire
from guns of about 12 cm. caliber against the cruiser "Ho vara"
and torpedoboat "80", which were lying at the entrance to the
channel. The latter received a hit in the officers messroom
which seriously wounded one man and caused the boat to leak.
The "Hovara" continued the fire, in order to help the destroyer
out of its predicament, and enfiladed the trenches and demolished
a barracks, but received many hits herself.
"lieutenant Persich &n& 4 men killed, 4 men seriously and
several slightly wounded, but the losses of the enemy are per-
haps 10 to 20 times greater.
"The "Scharfschiitze7' escaped entirely uninjured; torpedoboat
"80" to Pola with a collision mat.
"The railway station and bridges in Rimini were bombarded by
the armored cruiser" 3t. Georg"
"In ainigaglia railway bridges, water tower, harbor works,
station buildings and a train were demolished by 3.M.3."3rinyi" ;
the stattion, train and adjacent buildings were burned.
"In Ancona the old forts, the cavalry and infantry camp,
wharves, electric power house, railway station, gas tank3, petro-
leum depot, semaphore and radio station were bombarded by the
main body of the fleet, and great damage was wrought by stray
shots and fire. Two steamers in the harbor were sunk and one
on the ways ready for launching was demolished. Resistance was
made only by two light batteries and a few machine guns against
two destroyers. In the only modern fort, Alfredo Savoe, the
I
(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900.)
SUBJECT
From No. Date
Replying to O. N. I. No. Date
men stood at their guns at the beginning of the bombardment , but
two of our aviators who appeared at the right moment drove them
away so effectively that they did not return to their stations.
These aviators and a third also dropped bombs on the baloon shed
inshore of Chiaravalle and on several other military objects.
"The airship "Citta di Ferrarau threw several bombs at 3 .M.S.
"Zrinyi" without results and attempted to attack the retiring
fleet, but hurriedly retreated at the approach of two aeroplanes,
which, however, had used all of their bombs.
"fhe same or another airship had already been sighted half an
hour after midnight by the fleet on opposite course halfway be-
tween 2ola and Ancona, doubtlessly bound for Pola. However,
when the two vessels that were accompanying it retreated before
gunfire the airship put about and disapeared to the northwestward,
apparently without having seen the fleet.
"S. M.S. "Admiral Spaun" with 4 destroyers fired on the railway
bridge over the Sinarea river, the railway statfcion, locomotives,
pumping station, etc. in Oampo Mariano, demolished the semaphore
of Tremitl and damaged that of Mileto.
"S •M.S. "Helgoland" with 5 destroyers bombarded Viesto and
llanfredonia and near Barletta fell in with 2 Italian destroyers
which it at once took under fire and pursued. One of the destroy-
ers made its escape, but the second, the "Turbine", was pressed
toward Pelagosa by our destroyers Csepel and Tatra, and was set
on fire and redixced to a sinking condition hy hits in the boilers
and engines. She surrendered. The "Csepel", "Tatra', and :,I*eka"
rescued 35 of the crew, including the captain, executive officer,
and chief engineer, and made prisoners of them. The rescue work
was disturbed by the appearance of tvo battle ships of the "Yit-
torio Smanuele" class and an auxiliary cruiser which approached
to within 9000 meters.
"In the ensuing gunfire action only the "Csepel ' received an
unimportant hit, whereby one man was seriously wounded and 2 men
slightly wounded. The fire was returned with good effect by
the "Helgoland" and the destroyers. Minimum range 3000 meters.
Within a short time our vessels were out of range.
"The railway bridge over the Potenza rivor was fired upon and
damaged by the "Ptadetr.ky".
"The I. & R. fleet nuff red no losses than those noted above."
U.S.S.Horth Carolina,
Al exandr ia , Egypt .
May 27. 1<
From: Lieut, (j.g.) E.G.Blakeslee, U.S. Navy/
To: Office of Naval Intelligence,
Subject: Hospital and Transport Service ttr-*— ^iw,,
and from the Dardanelles.
1. The following features of the British Army Transport and
Hospital Service were noted in Alexandria, Egypt, between May
14th and May 26th, 1915. The harbor was crowded with British and
French transports and Hospital Ships, coming and going daily and
it is believed that in saying there were 200 ships in the harbor,
is not an over estimation. These ships are converted passenger
Steamers, merchant steamers, etc., and having been requisitioned
by the British authorities are being us ed as transports, supply
and hospital ships.
2. Each transport and supply ship has had its name painted
out and all marks of identification done away with. In their
place, eadh ship is given a letter and number, such as Ae4, B-5,
N-16, etc. These letters and numbers are about four feet high and
painted black on a white field, carried forward of the btidge and
on the bow or side. Each letter indicates some distinct service
such as A= Army Transport Service or Australian Forces, 2=Indian
Troops, F-French Troops and N=British Naval Division, etc.
3. The Hospital ships are painted white with a green band
around the side and with the red cross displayed on both sides.
At night the Hospital ship carries green lights around her side,
spaced two feet apart, with the red cross in red lights. These
ships are for the most part converted South African liners, P.&O.
liners, etc., and it is said that it takes but six weeks to convert
a passenger steamer into an efficient hospital ship.
4. The wounded from the Dardanelles and Gallipoli Peninsula
are being cared for at base hospitals, situated at Alexandria,
Port Said, I.ialt^and Marseilles. The Australians and Territorials
are being brought to Alexandria; the British Marine and Naval Div-
isions to Port Said; the Naval wounded to Malta and the French
wounded to .Marseilles. There are seven hospital ships plying be-
tween Alexandria and the Dardanelles alone, there being some 20,000
wounded men in Alexandria. The seriously wounded who are conva-
lescent with little chance of being returned to the scene of hos-
tilities, are being sent to England. A hospital ship on May 16th
arrived with 600 wounded from the Dardanelles and one sailed the
Bame day with the same number of convalescent wounded for England.
5. Several transports were seen to fly the commission pennant
and are in command of naval officers with the rank of Lieutenant
Commander or Commander. La Provence, the French liner, came in on
the 17th inst . , flying a commission pennant and commanded by a
Commander of the French navy. She was fitted with guns as a
commerce destroyer .
6. The French cruiser Jeanne D'Arc, flying the flag of Vice
Admiral Dartige du Fournet commanding the 3rd squadron, came
in on the 19th inst., and remained several days, riving liberty.
7. Regarding the transport and supply system, it is said
the navy has full charge of the ships to the anchorage, where the
Army Transport Service takes charge.
(signed) El G. Biakeslee .
I
■
Need not he returned*
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)
SUBJECT Italian. iJail.Ste.a^
S
V)
3
From
T
.No 134 Zto& M«ir 2ftt 19X0-
Replying to 0. N. I. No. .—:.*™)™*-...Date
1. The four Government owned steamers, "CXTTA* ai
PA3SBMCnfffCITTAf dl CATMIIA", "CITTA* di iflSSSHJtf* nCI3?TAf
ai SIRAGUSA% of 5500 tons displacement have boon taken over
by the 2;avy end listed as auxiliary men-of-war. Tho *0Xf$A*
dl CATAUIA" and "CITTA1 dl 2&.ERM0" have Parson tiirbines and
tho "CI??Afdl SIRACUSA" and "CI2TA* di UAn, quadruple
expansion engines, Tho bo vessels, all* develop IE 000 I3B»
and ore ratod bb 23 Itnot steamers. They are armed with
6 - 4.7 guns.
2# In addition to the
former,
there have been telron
over by tho Ilavy, tho following sto; .mors: "CITTA* di CAGLIA?.In,
"CITTA* dl SASSARI*, and "CAERERA,,f of £300 tons dlsplcce xnt.
These voscols develop 4500 HP., and ar fcatod as 15 knot steam-
ers.
,
Heed not he returned.
r
Tribuna, May \ EL 1^15.
* - - ^
The heroic ena of the EBRBHIE. \7^_
The heavy loss suffered by the enemy should not
make us regret the loss of the old 330 ton destroyer STOBBU
built in 1901. The TUKBIJJE while on scouting duty the morning
of the 24th, saw an enemy's destroyer at which she immediately
gave chase, thereby getting a long way from her main body.
After chasing for half an hour, she was surprised by four units
of the enemy; three destroyers and the light bruiser HELIGrOLAHD
The afSRBBTB trying to get back was hit by t . o shells, gn& slow-
ly lost her speed* She continued fighting for nearly an hour
notwithstanding a fire on board. Having exhausted all her ammun-
ition the Captain ordered her sea valve opened rather than she
should be captured by the enemy. The Turbine then oc iced
to sink, and although her entire crew were drawn up on the
poop, the enemy continued to fire on her from a short distance.
The Captain who had been wounded from the 5&KS& beginning of t
fight, seeing that the ship was sinking, gave the order to the
crew to jump overboard. The Austrian destroyers lowered their
boats to pick up the survivors. At this moment the ships to
which the Turbine belonged came over the horizon, and the enemy
picking up their boats steamed away towards their own coasts.
Our ships leaving their boats to pick up the men, steamed after
the enemy, and repeatedly hit them. A destroyer of the type
Tatra end the Heligoland were severely damaged.
Ulne men of the Turbine were saved. Austrian commun-
ication states 35 were picked up, the Captain being among the
survivors*
*■©
Office of Naval Intelligence* V^ Copy f
Jm^^k^r"^W\ * N.E.L. -w%
Report from Naval Attache, Berlin, I^^p^^lglS^ / IJ
Plans for the Defense of Naval Stations and Fuel
Stations against Air Craft .
The subject is best considered under two headi
installations for repulsing the attack and second the method
screening or concealing the sts,tion in question.
1. At the outbreak of the war there had been a certain amount
of preparation in regard to anti-balloon guns. Batteries of anti-
balloon guns were on the very latest ships and were in course of
preparation for all the ships of the "Dreadnaught" type. For the
Army and Coast Defense Krupp and Ehrhardt had designs which may
be found in the "TASCHENBUCH der LUFTFLOTTM 1914M . With the de-
velopment made by the war, however, there was at once an enormous
demand for guns of this class made necessary to defend important
positions.
Of the class of guns observed as most in use are 1st the
Navy 8.8 c/m cal. 45 semi-automatic Krupp gun, roughly described
in report 37 of 1915. The German army, pressed for guns, took a
number of captured French field pieces, cal. *75, had them changed
at Krupp's to calibre .77 to take the German ammunition and used
them with a siDecial mounting as anti-balloon gun3.
She following rough description of the protection given
an important headquarters illustrates the present practice:
1. The, guns are not in the town but on the tops of cer-
tain hills surrounding the town where a clear obser-
vation may be had all around.
2. The guns are grouped in batteries of four to six guns.
3. The control and range finder station is removed from
the guns some little distance and control is by tele-
phone .
4. The control station has a range finder and also a tel-
escope counted, so as to be turned in azimuth and al-
titude. Degrees are marked so that they can be read
off by the telephone operator to put the gun pointers
on the target. I give a rough sketch of this arrangement.
5. The guns have a broken backed telescopic sight.
6. The wheels move in an iron track and the trail of the
piece is on a brick or cement floor, if possible, so
that turning the gun in azimuth is easy.
Tlachine guns are also part of the defense scheme but ow-
ing to their shbrx range, they must be mounted in the immediate
vicinity of the position to be guarded.
For instance, to protect the Hew York Navy Yard under
this system, the anti-balloon guns might go on Fort Uruen far ,
Governor's Island, and Blackwell Island, while the machine guns
v/ould b< st be on top the most prominent building in the Yard and
on the towers of the Brooklyn Bridge, Williamsburg Bridge, etc.
* K
^\7
'
!
! 1,
- 2 -
A sketch of the improvised mounting for machine guns for hg;gh angle
firing is given also, see illustration page 80 of the book "Hit
dem Hauptquartier nach com Y.ejsjen" "by Heinrich Binder, forwarded
with this mail. d^*i*^ fo-Jtsf, *$r&V0&.
Where positions are of great importance such as a group of
dirigible halls, or a big dock yard, all these precautions are taken
and also there are aeroplane groups always on watch ready to go up
and take the offensive against an enemy.
The protection of the Kiel Canal requires very heavy anti-
balloon guns installations. In addition it is necessary to protect
the bridges which go over it. The following is a general descrip-
tion of the method of protecting one of the great iron railroad b
bridges which span the Canal.
"On a recent trip to Flensburg in Schlesv/ig-Holstein, i
my route carried me over the Kiel Canal. The railroad crosses
it on a steel bridge, one span over the Canal, at a height
probably 130-150 feet above the water.
Approaching the Canal from the south the railroad at a
distance of nearly a mile begins its elevation on an earth
embaxnkment, The immediate approach to the bridge on both
banks is on a steel viaduct . The tracks parallel the Canal
on the. southern bank and turning across the water at right
angles to the Canal. On the north shore the railroad makes
a large loop so that it runs into the station at Eensburg
beneath the steel approach on the north side.
At Bokelholm, a small station on the south bank, the
train is boarded by a detachment of soldiers (Landsturm) four
men to each car. All windows are closed, shades pulled down,
packages and hand luggages taken from the seats and floors
and placed on racks above the seats. The guards are so sta-
tioned that each one nas a watch over two compartments. Pas-
sengers are not permitted to leave their compartments during
the crossing.
On the north shore, Eensburg, there is a small basin, a
floating dry dock, large enough to accommodate small steamers-
1000 tons. A marine railway on which was drawn up a tug of
perhaps 500 to 600 tons displacement • Two tramp steamers -
flying no flag - were steaming westward through the Canal,
while a third was moored alongside the wharf.
The approaches were patrolled by soldiers Landsturm.
"achine and anti-balloon guns were placed along the bank for
some distance from the bridge."
The highest towers in a town to be protected is almost
always armed with anti-aricraft guns. Under certain circum-
stances the Germans have found it to advantage to use captive
balloons, both as observation stations and as a position for
a machine gun to keep off bomb dropping from aeroplane.
These balloons are of a special type frequently seen in
the war illustrations. In appearance they resemble a larr;c
sausage with a smaller one looped about one end. They are
up about 306 metres and ride steadily so that there is a
fairly good gun -platform.
At places where are good roads and a considerable
stretch is to be covered I have seen automobiles with anti-
balloon guns used. In regard to calibre of guns, the naval
officers tell me the best gun is the one of largest calibre
which is practicable with rapid fire. I should judge 4-inch
would about fill this condition.
S^*"1* .V^5^ •%r^vfb
- 3 -
At the beginning of the war the very oldest armored ships,
long since past their usefulness in the fleet ("AEGIR" class),
were commissioned for port guard duties. (These ships are
said to have "been given anti-aircraft armaments and to be
prcoared to assist in repelling attack from the air*
£• SCREENING and COHCEALIIIG .
In several previous reports (lTo.399 of 1914, etc.) the
screening of lights has been referred to. This is carefully
looked out for in regard to ships of the Havy, merchant ships
in port where the navy may be attacked, and all Navy Yards,
shipbuilding works and ammunition factories. Windows and sky-
lights have dark curtains which pull completely across them.
In addition to this all buildings in the vicinity of
statiozis, or factories are required to be screened as well as
street lamps, or anything which might give a leading makr to
an aeroplane or airship.
In such an important naval place as Kiel, the whole city
is prepared to be thrown into darkness by turning off the
electric lights in case of attack.
Whore practicable important reservoirs are under ground
and in future, I believe, all reservoirs of fuel oil and gas-
oline, hydrogen plants, etc. are to be also placed under ground.
An excellent descri.pt ion of the method of disguising an
naval hydro-aeroplane station, written by Lieutenant Herb-
ster occurs in report Uo. 9 of 1915 to which attention is in-
vited.
The Zeppelin shed at ^otsdam has also been painted, both
sides and roof, so as to merge with the landscape, no matter
from which direction the aviator approaches and this is
apparently the general practice.
The importance of having magazines and explosive fac-
tories protected or concealed may be judged from the recent
attack on Ludwlgshafen. The important ammunition factory at
this place was attacked l>j a squadron of eighteen French aer-
oxjlanes, although Ludwigshafen is nearly a hundred miles
behind the German front .
ADDITIONAL IIQTEu Oil SEi'EL'SE AGAINST
AERIAL ATT.-VJX3 by Lieut. Ilcrbeter.
Methods used:-
1. CAPTIVE BALLOOIiS.
One of the methods used by the Germans to
repel attacks of enemy flyers is the use of a large captive
balloon of the Parseval-Siegsfeld type. This type of balloon
was used recently at ffrie&riohshafen to repel an attack by
French flyers and its is claimed that it was successful in
repelling the attack. This balloon, floating at a height
from 800 to 1500 metres, has a better field of observation
and a better point from which to resist an aerial attack than
any other location, such as on the ground. The ordinary bal-
loon 'of spherical form should not be used as it is not only
unsatisfactory in regard to handling, but also affords a poor
platform for the observer and gunner. This balloon should,
if possible, be anchored directly above the group of build-
ings to be protected • It should be armed with both machine
gun and rifle.
- 4 -
The "Taschenbuch" for 1915 contains a description and
several illustrations of the Parseval-Sicgsfeld captive "bal-
loon. This balloon has been in active service for about
seven years and has proven to be a very stable type of bal-
loon in strong and variable winds.
2 . TRANSPORTABLE ANTI-BALLOON GUNS AND IPACHINE QUITS MOUNTED
ON AUTOMOBILE TRUCKS WHICH HAY 3E ARMORED OR
UN ARMORED.
A number of these should be distributed along the approaches
to the place to be protected. The gun mounted should be at
least 6.5 c/m in calibre and if possible, 10.5 c/m in calibre;
the higher the calibre the better. On pp.398 and 399 of the
"Taschenbuch der Luftflotten, 1914" are seen several illustra-
tions of the mounting of an anti-balloon rapid fire guns.
On p. 399 is an illustration of the mounting of an anti-balloon
gun on an automobile truck. On p. 395 are shown illustrations
of a 7.1 c/m anti-balloon gun mounted on an automobile truck
and a 7.5 c/m gun mounted in a field. On page 396 is shown
a 10.5 c/m anti-balloon gun.
3 • SEARCHLIGHTS for REPELLING- MIGHT ATTACK.
The use of searchlights is both an advantage and a dis-
advantage. However, it seems to be the only satisfactory
method of discovering the location of an enemy's aircraft
at night - especially when the night is very dark. If search-
lights are used, they should be of the very highest possible
power and should be mounted at the approaches to the city or
port to be protected, so that they will sweep all these app-
roaches.
4. ONE OE HORE AEROPLANE SQUADRONS TOR INSTANT SERVICE.
These should be located at a short distance from the
yard or place to be protected and close l>j the approaches to
this harbor or location, in order that the flyers whose duty
it is to repel this attack may have time to ascend and engage
the enemy flyers, or if possible, to cut off their retreat #
5. THE PATROL OP PLYER3 PATROLLING ALL THE APPROACHES OE
THE PLACE TO BE PROTECTED.
This is especially difficult at night, but can very
often be used.
-culan sifee/ tract for jt nee fe of our, mount.
mac/e in two Aatf c/rctes, an J So /Sec/ toae/Aer.
Ste yo//on o/wAee / in /nacf
JPfoi/f?//na 0/ flrmy /yW/ - a /r era/ A aun.
fn^/rume^n/ /or c//rec//na /Ae //re, 0/ a arot/jb 0/
/?/)//- /j/rcra// 01/ /?s
if
Chrca m/ererce; of c//sA mar/ceeS
in c/egree$ on Aont/retAo.
Tfa'r yy//A mo//w
in at /ma /A '"Srf /{/fade
s@%5
ffia/? &> e/eya//or? 0/ rnoan/
^Aown on pope SO. of
* f/o/ a^erv Aoa/otpaar-Az/r />acA
o/e/n )r extern ."
J/jo</ A/ocA ry//A Aa/e,
/Deo s> /e t/ on rrooc/ /#?£>
/nocn/ne oar?
/ leyat/o/i^
W/4&
1
flood upper mount {Ae /eys of /Ae
f/e/</ me cA /ne oun mount- ere
apreoe/ over Ate /r/ano/e.
*fjunhnf for mac4/ne fun for
atr/e/ cftfe/tte-
*r
See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.1 . ^ i^^u/n////
Need not be return
f
SUBJECT 0 E R M A I- NATAL POLICY. J * W
r)
From Z No 346 Date liay 39, 1915^ ^ m
Replying to 0. N. I. No. Date r^^nT^f^0^ *
6^f^( is-" SEP 1 \1915
This morning I reciei32^4r^'t«l^phonic message
from Admiral B e h n k e t Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff ,
saying he would like to talk with^ the Ambassador in regard to the
recent torpedoing of the American ship "GULFLIGHT* and the
hydroplane attack on the American ship ,aCUSH ING*.
The meeting took place in the Embassy at 13
a clock at which I was present. Afterwards I had a short talk
with Admiral B e h n k e alone.
s
The converation touched on many points besides
the ones mentioned. Admiral B e h n k e spoke with great
earnestness and with apparent conviction that the German attitude
was a correct one9 The tone of the conversation was in no sense
provocative or unpleasant.
THE »GULFLIGHT«.
The German submarine which torpedoed the
"GULFLIGHT* sighted the ship approaching accompanied by two vessels
of the trawler type. One of these vessels had a very wireless
installation. The trawlers occupied positions a little ahead of
and on the bows of the steamer which positions are the best for
attacking a submarine attempting to torpedo the ship. The flag of
the ship was not visible, nor any distinguishing mark up to the
time that the torpedo was fired. At that moment the flag on the
staff on the poop came in sight but too late to stop the firing of
the torpedo. The nearest trawler turned toward the submarine
and attempted to ram her. Under the circumstances Admiral
B e h n k e considers the captain of the submarine not liable to
disciplinary measures, as he made a mistake which considering the
circumstances were unavoidable. Of course full recompense would
be made for damage. He hoped that our government would conside*
it as an unintentional mistake which he considered that it was.
«CUSHING«.
In this case the officer of the hydroaerox>lane
recognized no marks showing the ship to be a neutral and it was
very much regretted that the attack had been made but it was hoped
that it would be regarded as an unfortunate, unintentional
accident. No damage had been made.
'LUSITANIA*.
On the subject of the "LUSITANIA" the Staff
considered that they had acted within their rights and that
while they deplored the loss of life which could not be foreseen,
they considered that they had complied with international lav/
when they had published warnings in regard to the steamer.
However, the subject was so bound up with other subjects that the
reply to be given in the answer to the American note must be
consulted before Judrinr the whole matter.
•ft t «-
This reply is to be submitted May 39th to our
Ifcabassy and will appear in the ftarman n&f&p&pWB of lion lay
May 31st.
Admiral B e h n k e called attention to the
propositions made earlier in the war to insure safety of
neutral passengers that of convoy and of securing a* tree port*
in Enrland to which no reply had been pivan. Admiral
Behnke spoke of the nisuse of the neutral flap* especially
the Scandinavian flapst and of the paintings which he claimed
was still done, I asked him if he had any evidence to show
that such hatf occurred with the American flap* as no information
had been piven us of such nisuse. He said he had no direct
evidence but there h^A been some reports which he would send
to the IWbassy. He thoupht they had cone from a Spanish port
where Unplish s tempers had arrived.
I asked Admiral 8 e h « tr e if any of the
neutral ships torffdoed had been found to be Bnplish ships
under false colors as I had n^.vBT seen any reports to show that
such was the case. lie replied that he thoupht there had not
been such a case.
Admiral Behnke and the Ambassador each
stated their positions in regard to the American delivery of
ammunition which has been one of the preat factors in the
Intense dislike of the Oerraan people for America. Afterwards
Admiral B e h n k e -r^oke about the prowinp power o<f submarine
warfare about an follows: With the inereasinp efficiency
of the German submarine fleet due to the numbers now under
construction and to the preatly increased efficiency of the
units » it i^ certain that we can blockade Knpland absolutely
so that not a sinple ship can pet in or out. If we surrender
our rights to conduct the warfare of the sea with the submarine,
we bar ourselves forever for securinp our rights under inter-
national law for the free navigation of the ocean for our
merchant marine. We can t her fore make no concessions which w41X
lead to the abandonment of the submarine blockade. The captains
of our submarines h&v^ orders to be most careful in their
re~ard for neutral ships and the$r report havinp had opportunity
to torpedo in one case as many as nineteen ships before a ship
flylnp the British flap came alonp. Admiral 8 e h n k e
said that to finish the submarine fleet to the proportions
proposed would take four to five years.
V">v
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct .31,19#®);-
<
Need not be returned, ^
SUBJECT Relation Between China and Japan.
Fro* K No 12 Date May gist. 1915. *fj
niTnin jiim — -p^S^OSjj^r T~J
Replying to O.N. I. He Date ^
It is an absolute fact that Japan's policy towards
China is t© ultimately make China a dependency of Japan.
There is n© doubt that Japan is in no way attempti:
to help China to better herself financially or otherwise.
Japanese actions towards China have been so high
handed and crooked as t© cause the big: est contempt t© be
felt by all foreigners in China towards Japan.
The following is a direct translation ©f the Japanese
Premier's speech, C©unt Okuma.
The Government, with a view t© placing the peace ©f
the ^ar'Sast on a permanent basis and f©r the furtherance of
Sino-Japanese friendship, approached the Chinese Government
in January last with seme diplomatic demands. fortunately
these ne satiations have been brought t© a peaceful settlement,
and 1 feel n@w quite confiient that the basi3 ©f Oriental
peace has been consolidated and Sino-Japanese friendship all
the more enhanced. The ©nly natter for regret is that hostile
conditions in Europe still remain unimproved. I hope and
trust with you all that the w©rthy efforts ©f the Allies will
be duly crovmed with success, and that peace in the European
Continent will be restored before Ion/ .
The Government had cempiledtthe Budget for the 4th
fiscal year of Taisho, embodying therein plans for financial
and administrative readjustments, national defense, and various
other important State projects laid down aiter careful delioera:
ations. These Estimates were submitted to the Diet in December*
lust, but unfortunately a difierence ©f opinion in the Rouse
necessitated a dissolution and a general election. As a ccvnse-
quonce, the Government had to follow precedent and enforce trie
Budget fcr the preceding fiscal year, with the exception of
ojects oci such urgency as to require pr t execution, and
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT -oiation ietween China and Japan.
Fr#m * *• » Date ^y -lut. 191o.
Replying to O.W.I. No Date
(2)
to no t these expene.es the i-overament has decided to introduce
& Supplementary Budget and other necessary Bills. It is ay
earnest desire that you will in these circumstances exercise
every sincere effort for the attainment of the important object
for which We have c illed here.
BAHC . -TC'S CE.
?he i'cl cv/in ; is a direct translation 3aro c jg's
oeoh, the rorei ieter.
Gentlemen,- I have the henor of addressing you en the
subject of the negotiations that have practically neen concluded
between Japan and ohina, except which there is little to be
:orted in our foreign relations since th ion of
the Diet. As, however, the text ©f the traeties and
panyin te , -.7hieh are now being x>repared by the representa-
tives of the tv/o countries, are not yet ready for publication,
my state ont or to-day 'Till ne aril; moral in scope
and mere or less abstract in character.
I reported te you in the last I lea, with the
occupation on Hovomber 7th by tne imperial Army fc&i llavy, of
Maochau Bay, the base ef German activities in the Far >:ast,
the main object with rchieh we entered into war with Germany
was attained. In order to meet the consequent exigencies ef
tnation, and at the m rae time actuated by the aesire
to promote friendly relations between betw en Japan and China
and also to ensure a It ace in the ar ;iast by stren ~
ening t'.e Impire1 .sitien in that region, the trial
Government presented to the Chi nese Government the followi.
proposals, irhich Include t.:ose r the .>revi2ico of
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction ©f Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT elation Between China and .Japan.
Frem k *• 18 Dat« J. llJlr.
Replying t© O.N. I. He Date
Shantung, together ./ith those relating t© the recognition ®f
Japan's special position in l&nehuria and t© the solution ®f
various other questions.
■The Exactions.
1. Proposals relating t® the previnee oi :ihantun :
1. ent ©n the part vt China t© consent t© all saatters
that say fee agreed upon between the Inperisl ont and the
Gernan Gevemment with regard t® the disposition c I rivets,
intere ts, and concessions, which, in virtue ©f treaties ©r
otherwise, GrQrm&ny p@ssess©s In relati©n te the previnee ©1*
hantung;
2. ^n^agenent for non-alienation ©i* ^shantung province;
3. Grant t© Japan of the ri&ht or construction ©f a railway
cennecting Chefoe ©r Lun,-$:ou with the Tsinan-Kia©chau Railway:
4. The Chinese Government t© &j>en the principle cities I
the province ©f Jhantung for the residence and trade ©f for-
eigners.
6. 11. Proposals relating to ;>euth llanchuria and "Astern
Inner Mong©li
1. -iXtension c o terras ©f the lease ®f j.'©rt Authur and
Dairen, and those ©f the South Manchuria and . iintung-I-.iukden
Railway t© a period ©f ni net -nine years respectively;
2. Japanese subjects to be pemitted to lease ©r ©wn lai
nece ary eitnor fer erecting buildin :s ©f various kinds for
commercial and industrial uses or for cultural pur ©a;
3. Japanese subjects to be permitted t© re :ide, travel, and
car y on business of varion , coranerci J.t industri.
or otherwise;
4. Japanese oubjoctc to be tt ft t> - .its of
cert in specified mines;
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT elation Between China ami Japan.
From K »© 12 Date U*J 51tr*. 191bm
Replying te O.N. I. No Date
(4)
6. The consent ©f the Imperii art t© fee obtained in
advance when China, proposes t© grant a railway ccnco: ; i©n t©
subjects ©f a third m ©r t© procure a supply ©f capital
?on a third or for the construction of ax, railway ©r t©
raise a lean Xrem such security ©X duties ©r taxes;
6, The Iaperlal iriitiiiiii'iinmiiiti t© be consulted before engaging
Advisers or Instructors regard* political, financial or
Mlitary matters;
V. The m " control of the Kirtn-Changchun Railway
to be transfer ed to Japan far a fcerm ©f ninety-nine .'s.
III. rroposals relating to tho Han-* . .- La y:
1. Kav." r& to the close relatione between Japanese
capitalists and this flompn ny. the Chinese (?©vernraent to agree
t© bring the ttempajQf at an opportune moment under joint
Japanese and Chinese management and not to dir ©r permit
the Comppji;- tc so, without Japan's consent, of any right
©t property belonging tc tho Company;
z. Owing to the necessity i'or the protection ox the interests
od Japanese at li^ts, the Chinese Government t© on not
t© omit rithout the consent ©i" the ueiapany any ©ne ctner
t'-an tho C to work mines situated in the neighborno^d
©r those belonging t© th<- ypGRy, and also to obtain its
previous consent in caso it is proposed to take measures
which many bo normal! to ai'i'ect the Company directly or I: ctly,
IV. proposal at Chinese Government engage noa to
ionate ©r to lease to another . ower any ports or i ©n ©r
any islands ©ff the coast oX China.
V# rroposals re latin.-.- ro s©lution ©X pending questions
and ©triors:
1. The Central Oovernnent t© on influential Japanese as
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT R»le*i©a itween China p.nd Japan.
From II o IS Date May ^Ist. l*^lo.
Replying to O.N. I. No Date
(5)
political, * „ ilitary advise?
2. The Chinese -Government t® reco rignt ©f .or
ship for the ose of build! Japanese hospit. , temples.
and schools thereon in the interior of Chin
8, The police in localities, whore such B ©nts are
necesc-ar", to do . laoed unaer joint J- I and Chinese 1-
nistrati©n ©r Japanese t© be ei od in police ofric#s la zh
localities;
4. China to obtain fr 3 o srt&ln quant i'
©r arms or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese
and Chinese arrangements and to ne sup; lied with experts and
wt ©rials f
&♦ J i to be m the rights or i \ction of the rail-
way to : *t ' t aehang 5-ine and ©f
anchan' a and F?an©3 - aocheu railm
6. la view c between t'': .'evince ©£ an
and Formosa and the a ment respect: - 11 :.:ati©n of
iJrien, Japan to be consulted uhoneror foreign c needed
in connection with the r tysf rbor works in that
provin e;
V. The Chinese Government to reoc: a the rignt oz preaehin.
by Japanoso in China.
UJIOUI
In those proposals, which wer ith the object
as aoove stated, there is not anet be re£ ct as
oit i natural demand or a reasonable wish on the part of
Japan. inclua© no it- d.ch is incompatible with tn©
rinciple ©i territorial integrity, equal opportunity and th©
©pen d , which the imperial rovernmont hav© in the interest
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oot. 31,1900)
subject Halation Bttwdsn China and tf&pas.
From & HO 12 Date May ^lst.1915.
Replying to O.N. I.N© Date
(6)
•f China declared t© the Beware from time to tim©» Thnx regard-
in 9 province ntung, in view ©f China's obvious inability
prevent the revival of Gc i influence there, it is natural
that Japan, who at i •* "ce has Just succeeded in expel-
ling trie disturbing factor, should se 3z means ±*©r perpetuating
the result of her victory se s to prevent the r earanee e£
Germany in that pro vine ich will be as such od jice to
Japan as to Chin* . • regards 3©ut3 churia, ' : predo-
minant posit.' en, about which there is no-thin i i. consider-
ing the close and special relet ioi ie has with that : :n, is
univera&lly reecpnised. 3© is almost si r with tern
Inner lia which 1 t close"'. tan inseparably connected
.anuria geographically as well as ee ;cal<y. In
octs, hewever, Japan's position in these re^rions has
hithertobe n net specifier L recepnised fcf the Chinese Govern-
Mnet. The result -ettable outgrowth ox' various
quosti >en the two countries, thus leaving much to be
desired in their relatione. It is therefore nost necessary in
the interest ti ' I »as of. th 1 o countries that fall
re: tion by the Chinr ©vemnent ef Japan's natural position
these re be obtained, r« rcr t3 Kan-Yeh-
Company, with which Japaneee capitalists are so closely
Identified tie object ef th sal As to ird the o nySs
best interest, while as to r r non-alienation of
China ©easts it is only intended to inciple of
China's territorial integrity *ni« arton dec the
Imperii X over nont.
■ ides in order to to the friendly relations of the
two countries it 1 le that several oenctin questions
and others, ich aro ©what diT-orent in character from Those
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT
From K No 12 Date May ,31st, 1915^
Replying to O.N. I.N© Date
(7)
air , i en this ©ce\ i. e
>erial it t3 e presented as t isaes e. . in
pr ... m t© -ass Be** at and
adviseci them to & e ther. Interest of the friendship
•f the two count! Iqx the s ex their mutual benefit.
,laf t -hine eat refused abselut -
ly to discus:- those reli olio. th©se
included : y.f while consent as to the ©there was withheld
under varx tea. tar! such t© the 3 ret ti er-
ial uovernnont trio terms ©f their pr©p©sals were permitted t© leak
fut in es: trated s anS the proceedings ©f the conferences
ore a . oar in the t thus the
pro \ re 3 s ©f the 3.. itiem .
:ithstunding this attitude ©r the Chinese Government, the
Imperial G-o vernnent „ throughout the twenty-five conferences extend-
ing over ncro than three months, fully shewed their sincerity by
repeatedly e I ining the metives of the proposals and endeaver-
ing t© hear the unreserved views ©f the Chin *•▼ n»fill« eir
i co rt to roach a satisfactory conclusion ©f the neg©-
tiat in a spirit off c©nclliatlon appeared t© have had s©me
ef!oct ©n the Chinese <*©vernmont; f©r the Japanese prop©sal res-
pesting the previnco oi img was as a whole assented to with
II a slight t of I tea 3, while regarding the Jcuth Manchuria
quentio: nt was reached in resjoct oi Items l,4,t>,and G
with 3c Iterations, and ©f Item 1 relativ© to the Xirin-Chan -
chu.ii .ailway With understanding that a radical a: ont of the
existing loan ccntaect 11 bo made in a manner nest ecus
to Ja . But with r the rt .nt questien ©f ri hts
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT Relations Between China and Japan.
Frem & Ut y> Date ^ 21st. l^lo.
Replying t© O.N. I.N© Date
(8)
respect in g residence and land tenure, the Chinese 'Jovermaent pre-
posed to put various restrictions, and as to the question ©f
Eastern Inner HSamgaUA and the quesxions ©numerated under Grwp
V., they recused to consider them ©n the ground that these quest-
ions were derosaterv t© the sovereign rights g£ China ©r that
the:;- conflicted with the treaties with other cowers. In spite
•£ the Japanese Minister's repeated explanations that such was
not the a . Apparently the sincere spirit of conciliation ©n
Japan's sid was n©t fully appreciated fey the Chinese authorities.
The Imperial Government 8© ;ever that • . ;©r$ con-
clusion of the negotiations was absolutely essential to the main-
tenance ox peace in the Orient, presented on the ;:6th April a
revised draxt in which the Chinese contentions were takaa into
consideration and s©me concessions were riade.
In this revised draft, which was formulated in deference
t© the views of the Chinese rnraent which had been expressed
at tr.o conferences, proposals regard stern Inner Ilongelia
were sor>arated fro* the proposals respecting oouth Manchuria and
item Inner Mongolia under the secend group above referred t©
and China was left free in Item z to alter the warding "leas© ©r
•wn land" to "lease or purchase land," to change it into "lease
land for a rt ofc an lone* term;" or simply into 'lease land"
with the understandiiLi; that a lone lease with the privilege ©f
L renewal shall be per ■■.' , I rth©r as restrie-
tior: ;n tne proposals mentioned in Itoma a and a, passports
were t© be presented to the local auxhoriiiesana* re gi stored, the
Lio© laws and rotralatiOi d oy tne Japanese Consuls war©
observe , .no taxes, ni d, tc a, wjiile
a civil cits tno court of t; . ants tt iity
was to va the Jurisdiction as in apon ma. , with tne on::
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31st ,1900)
SUBJECT I&ti .. | r< a.
From K Ne Jg Date lst, 3 915.
Replying to O.N. I. No Date
I (9)
proviso that the ci'iicials ojl I untries shall be permitted
te attend I at each ether1 & GGu.ru to ;oh tne proceedings,
and civil suits c ing lana between Ja - 3© and Chinese were
to be jointly ;icied accer te the la .a local
customs ©f tfhl .
KB or
The proposals relating to Eastern Inner . 14 §ra con-
fined te (1) joint' enter arises of and Ujiiiese inagrieul-
turaland auxiliary ittdnst , I ) preferential right* with res-
pect railway loans and loans to bo ?od by the taxes, ana
(3) increase res. ards t? ...n-Yeh- Company
the Chinese Government were they had frequently declared at
the conferences, to approve 1 mt that nay be cor eluded
in future betawaa the C nd Japanese iTer its joint undertak-
ing and net t© confi ^ it, or to a 'inlise it, -without tne
isent of the interested Ja we capit ta, or to permit it
%i loan ojrher than Japanese. iras
the - i;i©n ef tre J ose coasts, t ish of the Chinese
Gc it that it lo t ef a voluntary declaration
ei tnat Government on the subject waa respected. ?inally as
re s the pri de under Grou '., ;stions were made
accc to t its made at the conferences by tne Chinese
r reseat ives U) that tne Chinese Government should, in ease of
aecessit; re, o ploy Japanese advisers; (2) that tne lease
er purch of lan< c the purpose or building sen 1 el ho;
pitals in the interior i tied by th< nese Govorn-
ent; ) that the Chinese tfovornmont Bheul omo In fu-
t jy of icors to Japan to o arrar. its either
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT
From K Wo u Date ? I9a^
Replying to 0. IT. I. No Date
(10)
r purchase xm& rros Japan or ior establishing an arsenal in
China under the 3©int C d Chi it; and the
<e £evo :;..■ at ©n their art. t the Chinese content ions
into consideration, ( ^©ed t© withdraw the 1 respeetigs
land Tor build:' >i tetaples whil 3ti@n i ree-
dem oi' preaching for future ciiseussien, and proposed (5: that the
d©3lred rai ' lid bo pasted t©
Japan if ther - s no objection to it on t. . art ei a»y other
Power et once- ieno in guest: should n©t
he granted ' wer until Japan had reached an agreement
by direct -©tiatien WltiJ tne interested part, * we pi
■ ; merely to nta on record,
vS ro '. b joint •••olice nitration, tJ
irawn, a c~: lie- ;o
It en 6 r ont I ichuria.
(7 Lth regard to ico the Chinese * e
, otes, t3 at t oiild not
tt 1. -or the right to build a shipyard, eoali:
' at ion, or any other military t i blishment ©n cr along
st ©f tfc id previnoe, or to alio* ;isment
Lt I ' foreign capit 1 n the aot.
tii&on of the revised drai't
1 Oct ( at
agre U th rait, Japan would,
in case :;hc ©sing of tne leased
rrit ry oi Klaeehau , as the renult ©i* tne ;e
. ci' tno | rt ry
to C. t it 'nod as a con ©rcial port,
ion be e lished tnere ana an international
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction ©f Oct. 31, 1900)
SUBJECT Japan,
From K No 12 Dat* g let, X91S,
Replying t© O.N. I. No Date
(11)
ee . Is© led i f and
•rraa Birding tin s-
pcsal . uclic estanl- ants leetiex . Ger-
many 'S Oi ■ "id he :• of
nor. iate orci i rt of
highest J ;ien in the
rtv it rly 3 la
of the leased territory; and Japan havir it
ree of , sue la to c;. : it ills,
and is ccrr -an to return it to Chine; bt.t
of lered her ©wn will te return Maochau, ©©cause respected the
pr:= ' ra&l i: , S to
net r fr to :ain r-
al t.
-
She Chin- eat* hov/evor, railed to reeip ta
'a sentimnt of nod&tion ana conciliation, id ©n 1st
jntod a counter draft '*?hieh the-/ declared to be their
r. in tail tor drait taegr reinsert, Brit rd
t© Seat , to grant a l©n lease ©x laad t© Japanese
'.eoaaaod that Japanese uiri submit unconditionally t©
Chinese polio 11 actions arisir;
out of i dispul or bet eso and Chinese or
between - lvos should co; .ctor tne jurisdiction
or Chinese courts. ;;orn Inner Mtag lian, baey put
limitations on the e: eo to permit
the main point ©IT the Japanese tdt ich was the joint enter
prise ©f Japanese and ^'haaose i roltare and in-
■'., er th eso tfev ont e same
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 51,1900)
SUBJECT elations Between China an.
From He - Date . , - ,
a x^ Hay «->l3t. IV It).
Replying t© 0. IT. I. No Date
(1
tino the unconditional surrender ef the leased territcr iae-
ch recagnitiea ©f their right to participate in the ecraing
■ci at ions feetwe -n Japan and Ger , a* the in-
dc i cation "b:; Japan for the Inevitable losses cered 1
Chi i cons ice I ~ ji and the immediate rem©*.
rfcablishiaents c ^anese army ana
pr. ' ^d torriter: . ised
Lth the eieeptien or that relating t: ien
contained in "r 7. o<: the 3 ese revised c t these
more t record:: ants Etad© by tne
b representative at the conferences . Indeed , in their
, the Chine ^veriment, in i e re
9tat i "by their ropr natives, revived in
some c rticl rhieb "n^en wit ssm, and ide
ions in matters all . or, itwas clearly
3 ibl ; to ouch d i the
surre an, the iaaeani: ir
tence c - .■■•□an war, and t
ition of the Chinese ent in tj c neg©tiatl©z
. I overnment declared
;ainir >e demands gave their final
, so lor . ecu o to
, n® h if a satis:; ry settle-
irecticnL . I
, ;he terms e. draft art absoli;.
ill
In view of t c-' t ' , t l©
;olor; mxinue
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction ef Oct. 51,191®)
SUBJECT u
Frem Ne 12 Date . -' *
Replying to O.tt.I.Uc Date
as; o t@ aveid
ceniplieatu .
» » ■ . • ve
QttA.11 Due it@S8i I. te i . ?r
discussion the i t vien e£ that
relating t rhieh hat to :: eg .. the
Chinese rnnont; and ©n , . lose
Minister at Peking to « ieci;r. - to the Chinese
Gevernraent and at the ■ time te netiry them I ; should
after taatore eensi , ant %4
drait not later than 6 P/ra/ o & dth* the
serial §• . Its receive act i e by that
j.r, ko sue. .... ary.
The I 9 U*'. it, equally solic:< rial
Gebernriont nee e£ Orient, decided
lese minister
to a ne pi- ooeptli r pr
re hr t te a satisfactory conclusion .
oati- netes tve -
a cencrc :*rsi t© these negetiatiei , -ister at Lng is
JLreai ... e Imperii 1 ,<ovor- , in ccn-
CLltatll Lth the Chinese autnoritie nd it is believed tnat
the cc in oinm inertly be presented te
raiii ien and it is eur iticn te ., bei'ere
yt e el" ici; en the i it
moment arrii . e lnperii 1
i xnei:e agreements cerne o ierc. , the s<
ti«n ' it of t had been
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31,190' )
SUBJECT 3 :1#
From K Ho 12 Date 5
Replying t© O.W.I. No Date
(14)
pending between id China to t. tneir cardie. 1
jns and t alt the ri ends!
countries *. v id the peace ©£ the Far east will
"oo placed on a ion than erer.
ekir, .aotve of
7 31st. 1915, e i on Baron Kate's ;. shewln g t
id. if t3 3d Chinese regards tr r«
It c i& that the c !
Is eountr .
The striking ii fsiea left en the normal MM fr#M
perusal c Baron ers of
the nese Diet, wale! eed in . uo, is tne sense
inteliictual insincerii ro® tr.e r to en .
"here is no inevitable . ah no 2 ie
ut subject i . ite - that iatx»4 by the
dc to pr- y relations hot China"
panose tfove rat presented to the pre a
lich bat a r, unfettered by the restraints
ictiens of civili , ild exact of a .eaker state
not a victim c qaest. is not a little astounding
at one © i iir o's first iisters of State should a
har rdiheed to rehoaroe in j arliaaent and to the
world the t i i tion: ed in tne Japanese ircfce
and at tno sane t -rt 1 • is n<
cannot be ^ r a "natural dom or a "reas
on the part of Japan and t t none +f ^ero :-.*s i:ioc.
(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct. 31, 1900)
,
SUBJECT ' ti.
From K No 12 Date &ay 3lst. 1915.
Replying to O.N. I. Mo Date
(15)
rineiples o±* the territorial independence and 5 rity
ef Chi. iti ef the open door in taJ at v . It 5. t easy
: ieat* the mo. a ^ce of the "natural" demands and
"reasonable" eata tea* la the Protocol of January lb in
apter an those use daily Hews and Leader when
the cocunont was first published la Saglaad by the . heater
Guardian:
rould concert the province •: eataag into
iero of influence: 1 would make nehuria
for practical purposes, C. eee; they w \ve Japan
rfc ainer |. ef the 8 valle, ,
incident* .1 V; .:h:Le; aid he the power te seTer Herthea £re»
Southern China; they weald ;j1vq Japan the control ef China1 s wax
oaitieas; they wo 3 e?er the Lielag ef important area
ef China to ,n; they would, set Japanese experts i*i control
ef C ' political, mil , irs; they would
sot. tctrln or .tiv ainet all .Lowers except
Japan; in* to t- iterpriao of Japanese
pe I : . scheme otf this Mud would pat all
China aa 7sor; . ti ief it woul la*
)ril extensive British eoamerelal 1 .1 interests in
Ch; , nd it would knock the botto: o a lo- Japanese
eaty, which guaranteed tno integrity of China and equality of
opportunity to all reworr.
Ho r©n Kate's: re- t teraent of tae Japanese cor.-
tentien concerni >uth Kancnuria, it in time to point out I
the war with od not for tno oenq Sout
cnuria - this wae cut fe of the
.r dowa to the Treaty of Portsnout ;er - bat or t.'
declared purpose of icrcin. the iti -ra/d
(See Paragraph 4, Instruct itn tf Oct. 31, 1900
SUBJECT Relation Between China and Japan,
Fr?m £ ' »• 12 Date . Iyi5.
Replying t# O.N. I.N© Date
(161
that their presence in South 2-Ianehuria menaced certain vital
interests ox' Japan; and the Japanese succession te .m.
rights in the previnee was demanded and justified les in the
sense that tnese rights were fruits ex" eemquest than that such
a successien was necessary for the, protection ©f Jftp inst
Asian ressi©n. Cn this view it will be seen how very
fallacious is the :estion that, because Japan succeeded in
partially defeating the Russians en the i'lanchurlan plains, she
is entitled new te demand ©f China righto whlea r-oulci. never I
been cencoded t© nor in 1\ . saiO it i ross misreading of t
facta ex history to contend that the Japanese warred with t
ians in the series of indecisive battles ending with the
struggle oi' Mukden In order to save . ihuria far China, They
did nothing ef the kind, believed, wre. , that
the extension ef Russian influence and power t© the Liaotux:
-linsula was inconsistent with the ex ace ef a Great Japan;
id it was this alone that inspired them t© snails: ssia
by deliverj chereus blew at t nips
in Part Arthur and thus eommenae i P in which defeat was certain
If 1< • n sueceu withheld. Nothing ox a has
enured t© Chj y the retreat of the ns rrem South I.lan-
churi . I retreat has resulted in the reaoval of a Pewar
t© who. -eneny wrs never but an irresolute e a,
a vision, e ' e lav's sense ox dreaming our - o thin; of
Imperial lure and luxury - and the substitution of anot wer
to whom tno subjection ©x China and tr a or her unnv.
millions and continental resources are 0 noc ty if Jopaa i
to pursue succc- r arch oi* mastery acre I e werl .
v Heed not be returned. ^
0 "
CI/)
Date o f Report. . *May 51^1915. Z^-- /?-^\)\j\
-o-o-o-o^-c-o-o-o^^™^'^
1. Constantinople.
""Since making last report the Battleship "Torgnt-Reis"
has made several runs into the Sea of Karmora, usually going out at dark,
without lights, and returning about sunrise* On one occasion it remained
absent for several days; during that time it was anchored in the Dardanelles.
Two aeroplane bombs were dropped very close to it, whereupon the ship got un-
derway and returned to the Golden Bora. These bombs exploding $n the ground
kill or maim cattle,horses and soldiers, within a range of 50 yards. When an
aeroplane appears the troops lie down or repair to the trenches, if any are
near. At present the ex-GOSBSIT is in Stenia Bay surrounded by sand lighters,
and barges. She has not moved during last two weeks, The "Torgut Reis",
"Barbarossa","Midilli" (e-;-Breslau),and remaining large vessels of the Turk-
ish navy, are in the Golden Hbm# Special precautions, in the way of chains
and beams protect the Stamboul bridge*
2. On Kay 25th. , about 12.45 p.m#,a submarine (English
or lirench) entered the bay and was sighted 300 yards to the S.3. of this
vessel, about a foot of the periscope shov&ng. Soon after the shore batteries
and infantry opened fire; whereupon it submerged and fired one torpedo in a
westerly direction and struck the (Transport "Stamboul", lying at anchor off
Tophane landing, and tore a hole about 15 feet long abreast the engine room.
The hole shows about two feet above the water line. Another torpedo was '
fired in the direction of two transports, anchored in the middle of the Bos~
phorus distant about 1000 yards;this was a miss. She "Stamboul" was not load-
ed,and tugs succeeded in getting her into the Golden I-fcrn. This vessel went
to a point off Uclma Ba^tehe and asked permission to proceed to Bebekf Toflday
permission was received to go to 3ebek,and will proceed thither tomorrow.
Field guns are placed at intervals along the water front, and every suspicious
object is fired at. Mfle firing at porpoises and floating bits of wood goes
on every fl€j» All troops on transports were at once disembarked (about 10,000)
and were marched off *• proceeding by land to Gallipoli* 2To large transports
have left the harbor since. Smaller ones have gone out, two are known to have
besn sunk by submarines. An American reporter was on one of these, and acted
as interpreter and hailed the Oom-ander of the Ml, who ordered all hands to
the beats. The submarine conr'ander went on board and found the vessel loaded
with i 15-o.m. gun and g large quantity of ammunition* Seeing a strange ves-
sel a$ .roaching he returned to the submarine and withdrawing to I point about
300 yards away, fifed a torpedo which sank the transport. In all cases where
authentic reports have cor^e in, the Snglish allow the crews to escape before
sinking the vessel. Rifle-fire is employed to bring the ships to a stop. The
German submarine,at the Dardanelles, is reported to be the U-2l;came by way of
Gibraltar;and is to be joined by three others being pat together at lol ♦
There are said to be several sub^iarines belonging to the Allies in the Sea of
ISarmorajbut their base cannot be located altho guards are placed along the
shoras and on the islands; and a great deal of digging into the ground being
done • ■ rantly in search of concealed stores. The spy system on both sides
Ifl excellent. Cur shift of anchorage was made known, in a mystfcious manner,
to our iaymaster by t civilian at Dedeagatch the day after the shift was made,
althc no report was sent by us or anyone connected with the Embassy.
3* Severrl heavy detonations have been heard in the Sep
Of i'.armora during the past week|but as nothing is polished in the local papers
that can be construed ?s favorable to the Allies, the causes are unknown. An
American, returning from t trip in the Marmora, reports a vast amount of wreck-
age on the water at various points., The papers did not allude to the subma.r-
inefs visit to the harbor rltho it tooJtjziSfle in daylight within 250 yards of
the crowded water front.
4. The people are confident and calm, the /rmy splendid
in appearance and magnificently equip ed throughout. The ships of the nr>vy
ara well handled and tfl ear very smart as far ps can be observed.
Sage 2*
Country. Turkey. Port Constantinople.
Report from U.S.3.SCCRPIC1J.
Date of Report. , *Bgy 3fo ljjjlg.
-0-0 -O -0-0~0-0-<>-0-0-0-0^-0*",'d'",0 -0-0-0 -0-0 -0-0 -o-o-o-o -o-o-o-o -o-o-o -o-
5. The qk-BR33L£U returned from a trip to the
Blaolc Sea and escorted two loaded colliers from the Turkish mine about j
100 miles to the Mst of the Bosphorus* fcierous colliers have been
sunk by the Russian fleet; a sailor, returned from one of the sunken col-
liers.reported nine sunk in one day* He also reported that large raid-
ing parties of Russian soldiers were 0n the coast. All private accum-
ulations of coal nave been taken over by the Government, or the owners
notified that it would be taken as needed*
6. Dardanelles*
The "Torgut Reis" and "Barbarossa'^by reason 1
of the great angle to which their large guns can be elevated, have been
employed to fire over the peninsula* The firing has been witnessed by
some of our observers, but the effect can only be judged by the word of
the authorities* It is claimed that they have done great damage to the
Allies1 fleet. Since the advent of the German submarine the Allies*
fleet has been withdrawn, only destroyers now remaining in the vicinity'
of the peninsula* This considerably weakens the position of the invad-
ing forces on shore* At /ri-Burnu the Allies are in rather a precarious
positionfhaving advanced only a short distance from the beach* Their
trenches are, in some places, not over t?airty yards from the Turks, while
thelrmposition is dominated by batteries situated on the high hills in
front of them* Erom Sedd-ul-Bahr the advance is checked, and the Turks
are taking the offensive* The withdrawal of the fleet makes this exped-
ition appear hopeless. The effect of the fleet's fire on the shore bat-
teries is practically nil;only one gun, so far, having been damaged - ac-
cording to a reliable authority*
SIGiraD:- J. P. M0RT01.
J 1 'V
led not be
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)
SUBJECT cb*aa£ I fc&IH&--l&&%-4
- .iia. —
Date
r
,31
r i
From... ...No. 135
Replying to 0. N I. No.
Ammm> <m*j+
Date
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7? f\$>&mrjd
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B0W lino
m
■r-.-. ■'- I
<*- *"*: H '
o
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»■.»•
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Need not be returned.
(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 19001
SUBJECT Conait'oiD m £*£&?* ,^L
From
.. No.
flte£. It
137 . Date ... May
Replying to 0. N i. No. mmm0mmm... Date
X, I
0' 10
...
I »
1 mi e •■ "iitif
- v -v* ' ' „. JfcV/t*JUI
9 Mr
know a.:.
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Mbcro $■
210 to lc
c
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4 Mi ■■" '■■-■
if
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, ,>o*
■
v?on ,
'ora? ten
lta$ Xict 0 re
0. »
v *
,
0 31 W A>L
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i 1
c
• May f 1(
city denouncing Giolitti and
XT.
largest of the demonstrations, bitt all during the
f
el'. crisis
tmt oo ttse 1 * -ntiX i
teste r.
*,tli hrvi.
jl woe res
9
1*0X1 *o!\zzt t 9 '■'■-''
r o teigo • . as
- May 2 End. -
I ^ Mil .*■■■— II —■ ■■ — ■■
'-
0 b
■*•■£/ * '*** M • ■ •
a formal notice '■:■ WB£
■
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[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
(s^j£,cr;.......su&MA-R_I.jfE.__P0S6j.Bj.L.I.T.I.E&i-
From
No a49-
Date
Replying to 0. N, I. No. Date
^.osu
The recent success of German submarines in sinking
British battleships at the Dardanelles shows the increasing range
of the submarine and
duo ted by the German
the vigor of this arm of the service as ocn-
Navy.
If these boats made the run from the most advanced German
port Zeeortlgge, they had over 3000 miles to go. If they weftt from
an Austrian port, the problem was much more simple. During the
winter there were numerous rumors that submarine parte were on
their way by rail to Austria and it is quite practicable that they
were assembled there.
Nevertheless, if the submarine easily capable of crossing
the Atlantic is not actually ready, such boats undoubtedly eocn
will be. To fuel on the American side of the Atlantic, consider-
ing the efficiency of the present day intelligent services, would
not be an insurmountable difficulty. There are many deserted
harbors on the coasts of Canada and in the West Indies and along
the Spanish Main and plenty of agents to attempt to run a cargo
where directed. A great success might be had against an unpro-
tected fleet at anchor and greatly popularize a war. It would
have also a very demoralizing effect on commerce. The great
method of prevention lies in being fully cognizant of the destina-
tion of fuel suitable for submarine use as is being done in the
Mediterranean. On the declaration of war by Italy, a Dutoh
steamer loaded with oil sailed without her clearance papers, but
was overhauled and brought back by men-of-war. It was supposed
that her fuel was to be used by enemies submarines.
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