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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

THE NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Its Official History

ORIGINS AND EARLY YEARS

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THE

NAVAL SERVICE
of CANADA

Its Official History

VOLUME I
ORIGINS AND EARLY YEARS

Gilbert Norman Tucker, Ph.D. (Cantab.)

Director oj the Naval Historical Section; sometime
Fellow of Rranford College in Yale University

Published under the authority of
The Minister of National Defence

KINC S PRINTER
OTTAWA

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The wholesome sea is at her gates,
Her gates both east and west.

CONTENTS

Chapters

Pace

1. Canada and the Sea 1

2. Naval Defence, 1763-1870 18

3. The Imperial Defence Question, 1870-1902 ». . . . 60

4. The German Naval Threat 85

5. Decentralization of Responsibility 104

6. The Naval Service Act 121

7. Implementing the Naval Service Act 140

8. A New Government and a New Policy 170

9. The New Policy Miscarries 188

10. War Declared: Shore Activities 212

11. Operational Activities on the East Coast 237

12. H.M.C.S. Rainbow 261

13. Canada's First Submarines 283

14. Postwar Policy to 1922 304

15. Hope for Collective Security, 1922-1933 329

16. The Road to War, 1933-1939 343

Appendices

i. Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1817 372

ii. Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865 374

in. Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act,

1909 - . . 376

iv. British Naval Estimates, 1901-15 377

v. Naval Service Act, 1910 377

vi. Naval Defence Act, 1910 (Commonwealth of

Australia) 385

vii. Order in Council transferring Halifax

Dockyard, 1910 392

vii

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

viii. Admiralty's Secret Memorandum, Aug. 20, 1912. . 394

ix. Naval Aid Bill, 1912-13 407

x. Estimates and Expenditures (Naval Service),

1910-40 408

xi. Estimates and Expenditures (three Services),

1935-40 409

xn. Ministers and their Periods of Tenure, 1910-49 . . 410

xin. The Navy League of Canada 411

List of Books 413

List of Abbreviations 416

Index 417

vni

ILLUSTRATIONS

Plates

Facing
Pagh

i Canada and Adjoining Areas, 1938 4

ii Principal Naval Bases of the British Empire, 1887 . 46

in Organization of the Department, 1912 154

iv The Halifax Naval Base in 1904 160

v The Esquimalt Naval Base in 1903 162

vi Canadian Naval Stations as Formulated in 1911 . . 167

vn Operational Area of H.M.C.S. Niobe, 1914-15 . . .242

viii Patrol Area — East Coast and Newfoundland,

1916-18 252

ix Operational Area West Coast, 1914-17 266

x Organization of the Department, 1922 327

Other Illustrations

Commissioner's House in the Naval Yard, Halifax . 49

Warships at Esquimalt in 1870 59

Warships in Halifax Harbour in 1901 79

Sir W7ilfrid Laurier 124

Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill 150

George J. Desbarats, Esq 152

Sir Robert Borden 188

Halifax Dockyard after the Explosion in 1917 . . 232

H.M.C.S. Niobe 244

H.M.C.S. Rainbow 264

View of Esquimalt Dockyard in 1913 271

H.M.S. Newcastle 272

Capt. Walter Hose 281

One of the Submarines in Victoria Harbour .... 287

H.M.S. Shearwater 295

CC I in a Good Seaway 296

H.M.C.S. Aurora . . ' 319

H.M.C.S. Skeena 335

Cdr. Percy W. Nelles 354

H.M.C.S. Venture 363

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

^^TAVAL history in its Canadian setting has hitherto received
^^ little attention from historians. Even that part of the
subject which consists of high policy has been told only as a
part of more general political accounts, and with most of the
purely naval implications omitted. The story of the Naval
Service of Canada covers a large part of this field.

When the Second World War began, the Canadian army
already possessed a historical unit which was expanded in order
to deal with the history of the current war. In February 1940
the Royal Canadian Air Force also established a historical
organization, and in May 1941 the writer was appointed as a
professional historian to collect material for and to write the
official history of the Naval Service.

Late in 1942 a branch unit was set up in London, and two
research assistants were obtained to help with the work in
Ottawa. At its peak the Naval Historical Section had a staff
of twelve engaged in historical work. The Section was respon-
sible for producing a detailed history of the Naval Service from
its beginnings to the end of the Second World War.

The policy of appointing professional artists as such to the
Canadian armed Services took effect early in 1943. The official
naval war artists, of whom at different times there were eight,
were attached to the Naval Historical Section. They were
asked to interpret the Second World War on canvas, with
particular reference to Canadian naval activities, and the
paintings which they produced are in the permanent custody of
the National Gallery in Ottawa.

The official history of the Naval Service was planned to
consist of three volumes, of which the first was to cover the
period down to 1939. The remaining two were to be concerned
with the Canadian naval effort during the Second World War.
Vol. II would deal with activities on shore, principally the
work of getting the warships to sea properly manned, armed,
equipped, and supplied, and of maintaining them there.
Vol. Ill would be devoted to Operations, including operational
policy. In place of the third projected volume, however, it has
been decided to publish a popular account of the Operations.
This account is being written by Mr. Joseph Schull, and will be
printed in the near future. It is also intended that the part

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

played by the Royal Canadian Navy in the whole Canadian
war effort should be dealt with as part of a general story of
Canada at war to be issued later.

The sources that have been chiefly used do not lend them-
selves to compilation into a useful bibliography; this apparatus
has consequently been limited to a list of the books referred to
in footnotes in this volume. The departmental records upon
which much of the story is based are almost all undigested
material, and are exceedingly voluminous. Their use for
historical purposes has consequently involved much labour. It
is well for those engaged in research of this kind to remind
themselves constantly that they carry an unusually heavy
responsibility, for their work will probably be definitive. In
the case of most other practitioners of research, should the
well of truth be muddied because they have done inferior work,
the water will probably be cleared again by those who follow
after.

Five of the chapters in this volume have been published,
more or less in their final form, as articles or papers: chs. 8 and
9 in the Canadian Historical Review, March 1947; part of ch.
11 in the Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Associa-
tion, 1941; and chs. 12 and 13 in the British Columbia His-
torical Quarterly, VII, nos. 1 and 3.

As far as this volume is concerned, the following acknow-
ledgements are due. Warm thanks are herewith expressed to
Henry Borden, Esq., K.C., for generous permission to examine
the Borden Papers, and to publish material obtained from
them and extracts from the Borden Memoirs; to the Rt. Hon.
Winston Churchill, M.P., for his cordial consent to the use
made in chs. 8 and 9 of material taken from his unofficial
correspondence with Sir Robert Borden; and to the Admiralty
for permission to publish in full its secret memorandum of
August 20, 1912 (see Appendix VIII). The staffs of the Public
Archives of Canada, the Parliamentary Library, and the
Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia and British Columbia, have
been very courteously helpful. Most grateful thanks are given
to Professors George Brown and George Glazebrook for expert
editorial advice. Mr. Arthur Pidgeon collected part of the
material for chs. 9, 15, and 16, while chs. 6 and 14 are princi-
pally his work. Responsibility for the whole volume, neverthe-
less, rests with the writer.

Gilbert Norman Tucker
Ottawa, /

August 1948.

xii

Chapter 1

CANADA AND THE SEA

FOR peoples who possess the necessary maritime techni-
ques, the sea is not a barrier but a highway. The hollowed-
out log of the savage was one of the cardinal inventions,
and its essential principle, applied more ambitiously, produced
such results as the Viking long-ship, the sailing vessel, and the
30-knot liner. As ships developed in effectiveness civilized man
depended increasingly upon them, for the moving of materials
and men from one place to another absorbs more time and
energy than does any other human activity, and the modern
world has come to require a range of commodities so wide that
the greater part of the earth must be drawn upon to supply
them. Of all means of transportation ships are much the
cheapest, until about a century ago they were also the fastest,
and with the limited exception of the airplane they are the
only vehicles which can cross deep water. It follows that the
importance ol the sea and the ships that sail upon it can hardly
be exaggerated.

The expansion of Europe overseas, which began in the
fifteenth century, has probably been the most permanently
significant activity of modern times. It was made possible by
the relatively advanced maritime techniques of western
Europe, for it consisted of exploration and discovery, followed
by settlement and trade, and all these depended upon ability
to navigate the great oceans. The territory that now forms
Canada has been particularly dependent upon and conditioned
by the sea.

The great discoverers and explorers who first determined
the Canadian coast-lines and the more accessible features of
the interior, which the cartographers were then able to enter
upon their maps, were seamen. Some bore names that will be
famous for all time. One of them, Capt. James Cook, was
probably the most adept of all explorers by sea. Besides his
great achievements in the southern Pacific, he surveyed the
coasts of Newfoundland, the channel of the St. Lawrence

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

River, and the coast of British Columbia, and so "traversed the
ocean gates of Canada both east and west." Jacques Cartier,
looking for a way through the continent, discovered the easiest
route into the interior of Canada, and reported to his sovereign
that the land was good. Cartier and Cook and the others
pioneered for pioneers.

In 1608, more than seventy years after Cartier had first
seen Cape Diamond, a group of settlers sailed up the St.
Lawrence and founded Quebec. These were among the first of
the multitude of migrants who from that time onward have
embarked at European ports in order to seek a home in Canada.
As long as the age of sail lasted, the migrant's voyage was
something to be dreaded; for ships were crowded and insani-
tary, and the westward crossing of the North Atlantic usually
took several weeks and might take months.

The settlers in New France before the conquest were
bound to old France by the closest ties. France absorbed most
of their exports, chiefly furs and particularly the beaver skins
from which gentlemen's hats were made, and sent manufac-
tured goods in exchange. Governmental authority remained
in France, whence local officials were sent out and instructed.
Religious authority and cultural leadership were similarly
centralized. The colonists relied largely upon France for
defence, especially naval defence. Communications with
France by sea were accordingly essential to their prosperity,
security, and continued existence as a civilized people.

Though French colonists took almost no direct part in their
own naval defence, they produced a naval sailor, Pierre le
Moyne d'Iberville, whose achievements will never be forgotten.
Born in New France in 1661, d'Iberville was educated in
Montreal and entered the French navy. He returned to Can-
ada at the age of 22, and during the period from 1689 to 1697
he commanded with extraordinary success four expeditions
against the English in Hudson Bay. In 1696 d'Iberville
captured St. John's, Newfoundland, the centre of English
strength in that island. He also became the founder and first
Governor General of Louisiana.

After the Conquest in 1763 the colonies created by the
addition of English-speaking settlers to the French population
came to be less dependent upon Great Britain than the French
had been upon their mother country, yet they relied heavily
upon the North Atlantic sea routes for trade, immigration,
protection, and cultural increments. After the middle of the

CANADA AND THE SKA

nineteenth century a considerable part of their external trade
was with the United States, and their economy became more
self-sufficient as their industry developed, yet Canada's inter-
est in the sea did not noticeably decrease.

Much of this dependence on Europe, and therefore on the
sea, was owing to the lack of economic and cultural self-
sufficiency which is characteristic of newly-settled countries.
Pioneer communities are great producers of food and raw
materials, but they have little or no industry. They must
therefore import most of their manufactured articles, export-
ing in exchange their large surpluses of raw products, and their
external trade is proportionately very large. Nor are they
culturally or technically self-sufficing. In the Canada of a
century ago, for example, few books or periodicals were pro-
duced, while a good professional, technical, or artistic educa-
tion could not be obtained. An additional and special reason
for Canadian dependence was the fact that eastern Canada was
closer to Europe than almost any other area of European
settlement overseas.

The large external trade which has characterized the Cana-
dian economy has made the country heavily dependent upon
shipping. In the French period the trade was with France and
the West Indies. After the conquest the shipping in which
Canada was chiefly interested was engaged for the most part
in trade with Great Britain, with the West Indies, and with
the Orient in the later period, and also in the extensive
coastal trade and fisheries that developed on both coasts. In
sailing days many ships owned in Quebec and the Maritime
Provinces were engaged in ocean trade.

After Capt. James Cook's exploration between 1776 and
1779, a fur-trade with China developed on the west coast, and
later the Hudson's Bay Company established itself there. In
1849 Vancouver Island was granted to the company, and the
discovery of gold on the mainland nine years later led to the
establishment of the colony of British Columbia. Until the
completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885 the posts
and settlements in British Columbia communicated with the
outside world only by sea. Since that time the west coast has
become a terminus for ships running to the Orient and Aus-
tralia, and after the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914
Vancouver became the outlet for exports of a large hinterland
reaching well out into the prairies. The whole of the trade
along the 700-mile stretch of coast has also been carried by sea.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Of the ten Provinces of Canada eight touch salt water,
and there is no settled part of the country which the sea has
not strongly affected. The white man established his perma-
nent influence on the Canadian prairies by way of Hudson
Bay. In 1668 the Nonsuch set sail from England for the bay,
and after founding a fort on its shores returned home with a
valuable cargo of furs. In 1670 the Hudson's Bay Company
was founded, to trade in furs, and having at its disposal by far
the shortest route to the centre of northern North America, it
throve exceedingly. Agents of the company thereafter exten-
ded its influence, a British influence, from the bay to the Pacific
Ocean, and it is largely owing to this fact that the prairies and
British Columbia in due time became a part of Canada.

In the development of steam-driven ships an active part
was played in Canada. The Royal William^ the first ship to
cross the Atlantic driven all the way by steam, was built at
Quebec in 1831, and in the summer of 1833 her trail-blazing
voyage, which took about three weeks, was made from Pictou,
N.S., to London. Perhaps the outstanding figure in the de-
velopment of transatlantic steam shipping was Samuel Cunard,
who was a native of Halifax and began his career as a ship-
owner in that city. Canadian companies, moreover, have
operated steam liners on the North Atlantic run from the be-
ginning. On the west coast the first steam-driven vessel was
the Hudson's Bay Company's Beaver. Launched in England
in 1835 she arrived in the following year at the scene of her
activities, which consisted in collecting furs and carrying sup-
plies up and down the coast. The Beaver foreshadowed the
extensive coasting trade that has since developed in those
waters. Transpacific liner services from Vancouver and Vic-
toria to Japan and China were inaugurated by the Canadian
Pacific Railway in 1891.

In the days of wooden ships the eastern Provinces were the
scene of a large shipbuilding industry. During the French
regime the government encouraged shipbuilding in New
France, with the result that many merchantmen, some of
considerable size, and a few warships, were built by an industry
which was centred at Quebec. After the American Revolution
an extensive shipbuilding industry grew up in the Maritime
Provinces. It was during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth
century that shipbuilding in Canada was reaching its greatest
development; in 1852 the city of Quebec possessed no less than
twenty-five shipyards. The ships were usually built of tama-

CANADA AND THE SEA

rack, the North American larch. They were able to compete
against the longer-lived vessels built of English oak, because
they were lighter in weight and much cheaper to construct.
The great advantage which Canadian shipbuilders enjoyed in
the period was their abundant supply of easily-accessible wood.
With the coming of the steel ship, however, this industry de-
clined and has never since recovered.

The waters off both coasts contain some of the richest
fisheries in the world. On the east coast the Gulf of St. Law-
rence, the inshore waters of the Atlantic, and the Banks south
of Newfoundland, teem with fish of which the most important
is the cod. Some of the early explorers mentioned this abun-
dance of fish, and it is just possible that even before the
voyage of Columbus vessels from the north of France fished on
the Banks. The Maritime Provinces have almost from the
beginning possessed a large fishing industry which has been
one of their principal sources of wealth, and the story of this
fishery is a distinctive chapter in Canadian history, in which
economics and international diplomacy are combined. On the
west coast the salmon, that return in immense runs from blue
water to breed and die in the rivers where they were spawned,
have supplied the foundation for a large fishery, and canned
salmon from British Columbia are sold all over the world.
The fishermen of British Columbia supplied a special naval
reserve during the Second World W7ar.

The area which forms the present Province of Ontario
possesses four freshwater seas of its own, with ports along their
seaboards, merchant shipping, and fisheries. The earliest
sailing vessel to navigate the upper Great Lakes was built in
1679 by Cavelier de la Salle, who pioneered in so many ways.
She was of about fifty tons burden, and was constructed on the
Niagara River and named the Griffon. La Salle intended to
use the ship for bringing furs down from the western posts.
On her maiden voyage the Griffon, after loading a cargo of furs
at Green Bay on Lake Michigan, set sail for Niagara and was
never seen again. Shipping and shipbuilding on the lakes be-
came important after the American Revolution, and during
the season of navigation in 1793 twenty-six vessels cleared
from Kingston at the foot of Lake Ontario. In 1809, two years
after Fulton had demonstrated on the Hudson what a steam-
boat could do, the steam-driven vessel Accommodation was
launched at Montreal to ply between that city and Quebec.
By 1826 there were nine steamboats operating on Lake Ontario

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

and the upper St. Lawrence. With the development of the
west in the later nineteenth centry, there was a great increase
of tonnage on the lakes, which came to be among the most
important shipping areas in the world. These saltless and tide-
less waters have called tor and reared seamen as skilful as anv
that the oceans have known. The shipbuilding industry on the
lakes retained its vitality in the age of steel construction, be-
cause large ships could not be sailed up to the Great Lakes
from the ocean.

The St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes form a magnificent
waterway running inland for a distance of more than two
thousand miles. Over a century ago Canadians were hoping
that this waterway might become the principal outlet for the
whole centre of the continent, and to that end canals, which were
later enlarged, were built round the rapids in the St. Lawrence.
This dream in all its fullness was never realized. Yet the St.
Lawrence and Great Lakes system, up to the dimensions of the
canals, has been an extension of the Atlantic Ocean and a
vitally important highway for all the lands which lie along it.

Before 1763 Canada was under the protection of the
French navy, which was usually weaker than that of Britain,
as France was primarily a land Power and its navy a secondary
consideration. The way in which the superior British sea
power could be used in war-time to obstruct the flow of sup-
plies and reinforcements from France across the North
Atlantic was strikingly illustrated in the spring of 1747 during
the War of the Austrian Succession. The fortress and naval
base of Louisbourg on Cape Breton having been seized by the
British, twenty-five transports filled with troops and supplies
sailed from France to retake it. The convoy was escorted by
thirteen warships under the command of La Jonquiere. A
superior British fleet under Anson set upon them, and in a
running fight forty leagues north of Cape Ortegal overcame
the French escort and captured six of the transports, where-
upon the survivors fled back to port. Under such conditions of
naval inferiority it was not possible for France to bring to bear
in the colonial wars her overwhelming land superiority. Until
the Seven Years' War, nevertheless, New France was pre-
cariously kept in existence.

After the conquest British North America came under the
protection of the Royal Navy, which throughout the next
century-and-a-half was almost invariably the strongest naval
force afloat. Against potential enemies in Europe the Royal

CANADA AND THE SKA

Navy on its stations in European waters was always in a
position to protect Canadian trade and other interests. To
deal with any threat from the United States, a squadron in the
western Atlantic, which had the Halifax base at its disposal and
which could be quickly reinforced from Britain, was in a strong
strategic position. As important interests began to develop on
the west coast of Canada in the later nineteenth century, the
Admiralty's Pacific Squadron moved its base to Ksquimalt,
next door to Victoria.

From the point of view of naval strategy the primary fea-
ture of Canada's position has been that she is closer to Europe,
and except for Alaska closer to Asia, than is any other part of
the North American continent. Moreover her coasts reach out
towards and flank the direct routes between this continent and
northern Europe and Asia. Actual or potential naval bases on
the Canadian coasts are therefore well situated to support
either offensive or defensive action against an enemy on the
opposite side of the North Atlantic or the North Pacific. For
the same reason, in the War of the American Revolution and
the War of 1812, Halifax was an effective base for naval
Operations against the United States. The relative proximity
of Canada to Europe and Asia has been given a greatly in-
creased significance by the airplane.

In the course of its long history as a naval base, Halifax
has played two distinctive roles. In the wars down to 1815
it faced westward, so to speak, and acted as an advanced base
of the Royal Navy for Operations against enemies in North
America. In the two world wars of the twentieth century, on
the other hand, Halifax faced outward, and directed its power
to sustain Operations, and the movements of merchant ship-
ping, against enemies in Europe.

The presence of the Royal Navy at its two bases in Canada
imparted a distinctly naval flavour to the nearby communities.
The naval personnel as such had esoteric duties to perform,
but their social life was partly that of Halifax and Victoria.
To these communities the local squadrons were a source alike
of profit and of pride, and the relations between dockyard and
town were mutually friendly. When the Royal Navy withdrew
from these bases early in the twentieth century many hearts
were sad, while the two cities lost a distinction that they had
greatly valued and which they did not forget.

In Canada at large the prestige of the most famous of sea
Services had been very great, and continued to be so. The rich

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

traditions of that Service were accepted as an inspiring inheri-
tance from the past. Of the history of the Royal Navy, more-
over, one whole chapter had been enacted on the Great Lakes
themselves, and there must have been few Canadians who had
not heard the story.

The withdrawal of the Royal Navy from its bases in Canada
by no means meant that its protection had been wholly with-
drawn. The great fleets in British waters continued to cover
Canada, and the weight of the Royal Navy in the scales of
diplomacy was as great as before. Warships could steam to
any threatened area; in August 1914, for example, the naval
defences on the British Columbia coast being very weak,
H.M.S. Newcastle was despatched from the China Station and
reached Esquimalt twelve days later. Moreover the need for
warships to be stationed near the Canadian coasts had been
much diminished by improved Anglo-American relations. It
is nevertheless true that the chance of limited and sporadic
raids in Canadian waters was increased by the removal of the
British squadrons.

It is probable that no single factor in Canada's development
has been more important than the protection which the Royal
Navy afforded during the youth and adolescence of the Domin-
ion. Through all those years, by day and by night, the most
powerful fleets in the world sailed, or steamed, or lay at anchor,
a floating breastwork guarding Canada from serious assault or
intimidation from across the sea. Moreover it is a most note-
worthy fact that from start to finish this powerful protection
was furnished free of charge.

The third of the great navies which have acted as a shield
for Canada is that of the United States. The development of a |
good understanding between Britain and the United States !
was accompanied by the growth of the United States Navy
into a fleet of the first rank. This fleet was a probable line of
defence for Canada against any major attack; but its interven-
tion could not be claimed as of right. In the course of the
Second World War direct contacts with the United States
Navy were established which seem likely to increase.

In the many ways which have been described Canadians
through all their history have been influenced by the great
waters to an unusual extent. Yet with so many interests
dependent upon the sea, it was not until 1910, a century and a
half after the Conquest and nearly fifty years after Confedera-

CANADA AND THE SEA

tion, that they began to take an active part in their own naval
defence.

This striking fact had several causes. Most of the people
in Canada lived in the heart of the continent, and were largely
oblivious of the sea which thev seldom or never saw. Moreover
a navy in any case remains largely hidden from landsmen.
Accordingly, as the warships of the Royal Navy lay in readiness
at their stations, to Canadians in general they were like the
air — mysterious, invisible, gratuitous, and taken for granted.
The people of Canada accepted security without much thought
about how it had been contrived, and the incentives to act on
-their own behalf were very weak. The particular military
traditions of Canada were chiefly associated with war on land,
and in the later period its people derived an added sense of
security from the strength and increasing friendliness of the
United States. It should also be borne in mind that almost any
positive Canadian naval policy was certain to raise most
serious questions in the field of external relations.

These obstacles eventually gave way before the pressure
of events, and in 1910 Parliament established a Canadian
navy. From that time on Canadian governments bore the
additional responsibility of keeping some positive and author-
ized naval policy in existence at all times. A policy of national
defence is determined by the geography, external relations,
economic and social conditions, history, and political compon-
ents, of the country concerned. Canadian naval policy in the
period from 1910 to 1939, therefore, is not fully intelligible
apart from its general environment.

Geography has given Canada strong natural defences, in
the past, against effective invasion by any enemy except the
United States. An invading force coming from the east must
first have crossed the Atlantic, and having reached the shores
of Canada would still have been far from the principal centres
of the country's wealth and strength. These centres, including
the greatest of the eastern seaports, lay hundreds of miles
inland. Quebec and Montreal could only have been reached
overland from any part of the coast by crossing a great stretch
of undeveloped and difficult country. Only by way of the St.
Lawrence River could easy access have been obtained, but the
defenders would have had several effective means of closing
that waterway to an invader. Moreover the great river is
sealed by ice throughout the winter. The Maritime Provinces,
however, might have been invaded fairly easily by an enemy

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

who commanded the sea. The only naval base in Canada on
the Atlantic was at Halifax which, considered as a base for
Operations off the east coast, was as well situated as any single
place could be; but it was inconveniently tar away for small
warships which might be employed to give direct protection to
shipping in the Gulf. The strategic significance which New-
foundland had for the direct defence of Canada is evident from
its position in relation to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the
Maritime Provinces. In all these waters fogs are frequent, and
in winter the off-shore climate is severe.

The seven hundred miles of coast on the Pacific Ocean
form an exceedingly strong defensive position. The immense
stretch of the Pacific ends here at a mainland shore screened
by islands, many of which offer positions of great strategic
value for the defence of the waters and coasts within. Van-
couver Island covers the southern half of the British Columbia
coast like a shield. The island was for a long time largely
unsettled on its seaward side. The approaches to the waters
between it and the mainland are narrow and naturally easy to
defend. They would also be difficult for hostile vessels to
operate in without the help of pilots possessing intimate local
knowledge. All the important ports and other settlements on
the coast, except Prince Rupert, grew up in this protected area.
The shore is almost everywhere very high and steep, and
presents few landing places. Parallel to the coast, and between
it and the Prairies, runs a broad belt of high mountain ranges,
through which three main lines of communication lead to the
interior. The mountainous terrain of British Columbia im-
posed settlement in isolated communities with few roads or
railways connecting them. The natural difficulties with which
the coast of that Province, and its hinterland, would have
confronted an invader wishing to do more than occupy a few
isolated areas near the shore, were therefore most formidable.
The longer half of Canada's western boundary, lying north of
Portland Canal, had an equally difficult terrain, and was covered
by American territory to the westward. The naval base at
Esquimalt was fairly well placed to support Operations off the
southern and much the more important part of the coast; but
it had the disadvantage of being situated at one end of British
Columbia's long seaboard.

Three distinctive conditions most important to naval de-
fence were present on both the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts.
Since the days of sail it had not been possible for a fleet to

CANADA AND THE SKA

operate with the width of the Atlantic, or a fortiori of the
Pacific, between it and its bases, except at a great disadvantage,
and no potential overseas enemy possessed a naval base any-
where near the Canadian coasts. That Newfoundland and
Bermuda were parts of the British Empire, and that Greenland
was the possession of a small and peaceful State, were among
the many blessings which Canada enjoyed. In the Pacific
there were no islands that were not Canadian or United States
territory, on which an enemy fleet could have been based
within easy striking distance of the Dominion. Nor, inciden-
tally, are there any islands well out to sea, on which the
Canadian authorities could have established advanced naval
or air defences for the west coast similar to those based by the
United States on Oahu. Each of the two seaboards, consider-
ing its length and configuration, has surprisingly few harbours
suitable for a good-sized naval base.

The Dominion was almost impregnable to serious attack
by way of the immensely long line of coast which stretched
around Labrador and Hudson Bay, and thence along the
Arctic Ocean to Alaska. The natural defences in this great
northern area were: a bare and often ice-rimmed shore,
washed throughout most of its length by dangerous Arctic
waters; the vast barren wilderness lying between the coasts
and the vital parts of the country; and the stern climate. An
enemy force could no doubt have entered Hudson Bay during
the three months or so in the year when Hudson Strait is open.
Throughout most of the period, however, this danger was
negligible. In all parts of Canada except the comparatively
small area west of the Coast Mountains in British Columbia,
but to an increased extent in the more northern regions, the
long and severe winter which seals up the rivers and hampers
movement by land would have been a most useful ally against
an invader.

With the fourth side of the quadrilateral the naval author-
ities were only indirectly concerned. On this side Canada had
been provided by geography with relatively weak defences.
Her southern boundary marched with the northern frontier of
the United States for a distance of 3,987 miles. The settled
areas of the Dominion lay chiefly in a narrow belt along the
border, so that a large proportion of the towns and cities were
within a hundred miles of United States territory. The main
lines of transportation which tied the country together ran
east and west, and in case of an attack from overseas this

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

orientation would have been a great asset. It would have been
a most serious handicap, on the other hand, had the attack
come from the south; for the principal railway lines and
waterways lay both parallel to the international boundary and
within easy striking distance from it. Parts of the area near
that boundary provide topographical features helpful to de-
fence; but generally speaking no very serious natural obstacles
stand in the way of invasion from the south, and the people of
the United States were always overwhelmingly superior to
their northern neighbours in numbers and other physical
resources. Before Confederation the two Canadas were
considered very difficult to defend by land, and after railways
had been developed throughout North America it is reasonably
certain that the Dominion, even with the powerful support of
Great Britain, could not have been successfully defended
against a resolute invasion from the United States.

From the standpoint of direct naval defence Canada has
suffered a pronounced disadvantage in facing the navigable
ocean on two widely-separated seaboards. The United States
has experienced the same difficulty in a less acute form, and
that country built the Panama Canal chiefly in order to reduce
as far as possible this strategic handicap. France also has two
widely-separated coasts, and a canal joining the Bay of Biscay
to the Mediterranean has sometimes been suggested. Russia
has possessed no less than four such coasts. She has therefore
felt obliged at various times to maintain two or three separate
fleets which could not support each other, and the dispersion
of her naval forces was a principal cause of her defeat in the
Russo-Japanese War. As far as the two Canadian coasts are
concerned, the passage north about was impracticable, and
the sea distance between Halifax and Esquimalt was 15,000
miles by Cape Horn before 1914, and after that date was 7,000
miles via the Panama Canal — a fortnight of fast steaming for
a destroyer. Two seaboards remote from each other raise the
dilemma that one of them must be deprived of naval protection
or the fleet must be divided. The second alternative offers
protection for both coasts, employment for all the dockyards,
a wider popular interest in the navy, and an escape from an
obvious political difficulty. On the other hand, such a dis-
persion, unless both fleets are large, makes training more
difficult; and above all it may ensure weakness at the critical
point, the immediate cause of almost every military failure or
disaster.

CANADA AND THE SKA

There are also a number of geographical features that have
been strategically significant because Canada was part of the
British Empire. The largest of the Dominions, she was the
closest to Europe, and was so situated that the forces of the
Royal Navy based on Great Britain were at all times in a
position to protect her against the fleet of any European Power.
The enormous industrial and other resources of North America
were indispensable to an allied victory during the First World
War, in which conflict the Dominion played a new and momen-
tous part by furnishing a terminus for the most important
ocean trade route. In this connection the ancient functions of
Halifax as an imperial naval base were radically changed. The
shipping routes between the United States and northern
Europe passed not far from Halifax. They also lay near to
Cape Race, Newfoundland, and that island was a key position
in the strategy of the north-western Atlantic.

The completion of the transcontinental line of the Canadian
Pacific Railway in 1885 opened a new and rapid line of com-
munication between Great Britain and the Far East via
Halifax and Vancouver, a route which would be relatively safe
in case of war with a European Power. This line of communica-
tion, however, lost some of its strategic importance after the
opening of the Panama Canal in 1914. Throughout the period
Esquimalt was the only eastern Pacific naval base in the British
Empire. After the partial Europeanizing of Japan the Pacific
acquired a new strategic significance, and like Australia and
New Zealand, although to a less degree, Canada was directly
affected by the distribution of power in that great ocean.
Apart from whatever naval forces Canada might possess, it
was a great advantage to the Royal Navy that its ships en-
joyed the use of Halifax and Esquimalt after those bases had
been handed over to the Canadian Government.

Canada lay within the magnetic fields of two of the most
powerful nations in the world, and in matters of external affairs
and defence the greater of these influences was that exercised
by Great Britain. As a member of the British Empire or
Commonwealth, Canada was vitally affected by British
foreign policy, was near the main stream of international
affairs, and probably had more influence in the world than she
would have wielded as an independent republic. During the
period from 1910 to 1939 the world was disordered and inse-
cure, and the imperial connection, which possibly made
Canada more likely to be involved in war, at the same time

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA.

ensured most powerful protection and support if war came.
Many attempts had been made to organize participation by
the Dominions in providing and controlling a single imperial
navy; but the formidable difficulties which lay in the way had
not been overcome. Nevertheless the question of Canadian
participation, in some form, in imperial naval defence, was
always present. The Royal Canadian Navy which was created
in 1910 conformed closely to the Royal Navy in types of ship
and equipment, training, doctrine, and other matters.

The chief instrument of imperial defence was the Royal
Navy, until about 1930 the most powerful force afloat, and
after that date equalled in strength only by the navy of the
United States. In the twentieth century the Royal Navy was
no longer dominant in the Pacific; but at all times it remained
unlikely that the waters and shores of Canada would experience
any hostile acts more formidable than small-scale raids or
violations of neutrality.

The other great external influence was that of the United
States. After 1910 the official relations between that country
and Great Britain remained cordial; it was a cardinal principle
of British foreign policy that no dispute with the United States
should be allowed to get anywhere near the confines of war;
and the temper of Canada's big neighbour was unaggressive.
The Monroe Doctrine was the foundation of American foreign
policy, and any violation of its principle which had affected
Canada would no doubt have been considered, for strategic
reasons, to be exceptionally serious. It was therefore almost
certain that the United States, although it had given no special
undertaking to do so, would have intervened to prohibit or
repel an all-out assault upon Canada, or even a much more
limited use of force affecting Canadian waters or territory.
These inferences must have been perceived everywhere; but
what no one knew was the point on the scale of armed incursion
at which the United States would decide to act.

It was also very important from the point of view of
Canadian defence that in an emergency the immense industrial
and other economic resources of its neighbour could probably
be utilized by the Dominion. Moreover commodities obtained
from the United States could all be transported overland in
time of war. Such support from the adjacent economy, how-
ever, might be seriously restricted by the obligations of
neutrality.

CANADA AND THK SKA

In short, Canada was well protected by geography from
every possible enemy except one, and with that one relations
were good. At all times the Dominion was protected by the
Royal Navy, and less fully and certainly by the United States
Navy as well. It is probable, therefore, that during the in-
creasingly dangerous twentieth century Canada was safer from
conquest or coercion than any other land. Geography had
allotted to the Dominion, moreover, the ability to play an
import role on the stage of world strategy, and in imperial
defence.

Canada was in general so richly endowed with economic
resources that during the twentieth century its people enjoyed
a standard of living among the highest in the world. Though
raw materials and foodstuffs were more abundant than varied,
the country could feed itself, with a large surplus, except for
some products that required a warmer climate and none of
which were absolute necessaries of life. The primarily extrac-
tive economy was steadily becoming more industrialized,
notably after 1910, but it remained for the most part confined
to the less complicated types of manufacture. Many Canadian
industrial units were connected with or similar to correspond-
ing concerns in the United States.

There was virtually no armament industry in Canada, and
many of the related industries were immature or lacking.
There was shipbuilding on both coasts and on the Great Lakes,
producing for the most part the smaller types of vessel. It
would have been advantageous to build warships in Canada,
as a help towards developing the industry and for other
reasons. But the highly specialized designers and the necessary
technical knowledge were both lacking, and it was decidedly
cheaper and quicker to get warships from Great Britain. In
addition, a considerable part of the industry was situated on
the Great Lakes, where only ships small enough to pass through
the St. Lawrence canals could be practicably built for use on
salt water, and whence during freeze-up vessels could not
proceed to the sea.

There were extensive fisheries in the Atlantic and the Gulf
and off the coast of British Columbia, and the existence of a
large body of fishermen on each coast was occasionally referred
to as a potential naval asset. However, after the end of the
nineteenth century the number of Japanese living in Canada
steadily increased, until by 1931 there were more than 23,000,
most of them living on the British Columbia coast, and many

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

of them fishermen. In the event of a war with Japan during
which Japanese forces were to operate against the west coast,
resident Japanese, especially fishermen, would have had var-
ious means of helping the enemy, and some of them might
have wished to do so. **•

Among Canadian exports, raw or partly-processed products
were dominant. The external trade of the Dominion was
relatively very large, and by far the greater part of it was with
the United States and Great Britain. Much the most impor-
tant part of the export trade was with Britain. On the east
coast it used the St. Lawrence ports when the river was free
from ice, and of all the ports in Canada, Montreal was the
largest and best equipped. In winter the Canadian termini
were Saint John and Halifax with their ice-free harbours. The
normal route was south of Newfoundland, but during a brief
portion of each year the Strait of Belle Isle was used. The
overseas trade of the west coast was principally with Great
Britain and the Far East, and that with Britain greatly in-
creased after the Panama Canal became available. Vancouver
was the terminus of nearly all this shipping, and access to that
port was through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, at the inner end
of which the Esquimalt naval base was situated.

On both the eastern and western seaboards there was a
large coasting trade, for roads and railways connecting points
along the coasts were few or non-existent, especially round the
Gulf of St. Lawrence and in British Columbia. Due to ice, the
coasting trade in the Gulf was seasonal only. On the west coast
'the coasting trade followed the inside passage which runs
behind Vancouver Island and other islands farther north, a
route which was also used by ships running between Seattle
and Alaska. These waters are deep, offer few anchorages, and
discourage the laying of mines. Along the far northern coasts
there was no trade, except for a single ship which visited the
northern posts and missions once a year. Given peaceable
relations with the United States, the very extensive shipping
on the Great Lakes could' cause no anxiety, for no hostile
naval force could reach those lakes from the ocean.

The Canadian people lived throughout most of their early
history in a secure land. The problem of developing their half
of a new continent tended to absorb their interest and wealth.
. Although more closely connected to Europe than were the
inhabitants of any other country in either of the Americas,
they nevertheless lived in an isolated continent. The Dominion

CANADA AND THE SEA

had no external interests or ambitions that were at all likely
to produce serious international friction. The inhabitants had
no martial tastes, and some of them possessed a good share of
that democratic self-confidence which believes that a military-
emergency can be dealt with when it arises. In earlier days
the country had experienced armed onsets; but since the Con-
quest these had always been by land, and to most of the
people, who lived tar from any coast, the sea and all naval
matters probably seemed largely irrelevant.

The human resources of the country, however, included
plenty of potentially good naval material. Canadians were for
the most part accustomed to machines, and there was to be
found among them a considerable wealth of technical skills.
They were also adaptable, and their level of education on the
whole was high. Throughout their later history their sense of
nationality, and of self-reliance as a community, had steadily
increased.

Naval policy was often a contentious subject in Canada,
for it was intimately connected with external policy concerning
which the people were seriously divided. Opinions about naval
policy tended to fall into three groups. J3ne body of opinion
thought it unnecessary or inexpedient for Canada to take any
measures for naval defence. A second group considered that
such measures should be taken; that these should be very
closely integrated with the Royal Navy; and that the naval
defence of Canada should be sought chiefly by co-operating'
closely in the defence of the Empire as a whole. Those who
held the third point of view, although they did not reject such
co-operation, felt that to shape the naval policy of the Domin-
ion principally as an arc in the circle of imperial naval policy,
would be an undesirable subordination of Canadian interests.
They therefore aimed primarily at the direct defence of the
country, by a purely Canadian navy under the absolute control
of the Dominion Government.

Chapter 2

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

WHEN the French territories that were to form the
nucleus of Canada passed under the British flag in
1763, they became part of an old-established imperial
system. The old British Empire was an abnormal political
structure in many ways, and particularly so in its method of
providing for defence.

The primary function of the State, and at times almost its
only one, is to protect the lives and property of its citizens and
their interests as a community. The security provided is for
the most part against injury by lawless fellow-citizens, or by
the agents of some other community. In the modern State,
defences against other nations or attacks upon them have
increasingly called for elaborate and expensive preparations,
in both peace and war, and the State has called upon its citizens
to provide the necessary means by paying taxes and by render-
ing personal service.

In the normal State these obligations have presented no
special problems to statesmen and administrators, even when
they involved the defence of an overseas empire. Such an
empire, under the absolute and accepted rule of the home
government, like the former empire of Spain, was subject to
overall taxation by the central government to pay for the
general defence. The colonies were separated from Spain by
an ocean, they were very different from the home land in many
ways, and their interests were not always the same as hers.
For centuries, nevertheless, the right of the Crown, with or
without the advice of its ministers in Spain, to tax the colonists
and spend the proceeds, was not seriously questioned. Span-
iards in the colonies, like those in Spain, expected no parlia-
mentary control over national finances. Similar conditions
prevailed in the great overseas empires which were ruled by
the absolute monarchies of France and Portugal.

A different condition was to be found in the numerous
colonies of settlement founded by Britons after the beginning

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

of the seventeenth century. On the continent, weak feudal
governments had almost everywhere evolved into highly
centralized absolute monarchies, which were buttressed by the
civil law. In England, on the other hand, the strong feudal
monarchy established at the Norman Conquest had been
subordinated little by little to Parliament, and the common
law reflected this unusual allocation of power. The principal
means whereby Parliament had established its authority over
the Crown, and placed the King under the law like any of his
subjects, was the control of the purse. In its mature form this
meant that no taxes could be legally imposed without the
consent of Parliament, which also had the sole right to ordain
how such taxes were to be used, and to ensure that they were
actually spent according to its instructions. Almost from the
first the elected branch of Parliament was held to possess
special interests, which later developed into rights, with regard
to public finance, and the principle that there could be no legal
taxation without representation came to be deeply imbedded
in the constitutional fabric. It was held to express a right, not's
only of Parliament, but also of the citizen who paid the taxes.
The supremacy of Parliament over the Crown was put to the
decisive test of civil war during the fourth decade of the seven-
teenth century, an ordeal from which it emerged intact and
strengthened.

Accordingly, at the time when English colonies of settle-
ment began to be founded in unpeopled regions which were
climatically suited to become permanent homes for men of
European race, the inhabitants of England had long been
accustomed to government controlled by a representative
assembly which alone had the right to tax them. Those of them
who became colonists, at that time and later, took their
political ideas and traditions with them. This important fact
was officially recognized; for the colonies, almost from the
beginning, were equipped with local legislatures composed in
part of representative assemblies. These legislatures were
expected to deal only with local affairs, in which field, however,
most taxes were held to lie. They were for long regarded as
wielding a delegated rather than an inherent authority, and
the laws which they passed were subject to disallowance;
nevertheless, with the passage of time, many of the colonists
came to regard them as little Parliaments, and to invoke on
their behalf the long-established claims of the Parliament at
Westminster.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The imperial structure which gradually evolved was more
logical in terms of political theory than well adapted to the
hard facts of geography; nevertheless it worked tolerably well
for a century and a half. The mother country, accepted respon-
sibility in a general way for the defence of the whole Empire.
For defence by land, garrisons maintained by England were
stationed at or within easy reach of the points most likely to
be threatened. In time of war these were reinforced if neces-
sary. Against a local enemy, native or white, the colonies
were expected to supplement these garrisons or expeditionary
forces by means of armed forces of their own. The extent of
the co-operation actually afforded by a given colony depended
on local conditions. A colony which was obviously exposed to
danger was likely to devote a much larger proportion of its
resources to defence than was one which enjoyed a more
sheltered position. Navies of any importance were maintained
only by the Powers possessing colonies, and the Royal Navy
was at most times the strongest. To the English colonies this
great Service, directly or indirectly, gave most powerful though
not absolute protection, which was less visible than that affor-
ded by the soldiers. The burden of naval defence rested wholly
upon the shoulders of the English taxpayer, except occasionally
in time of war.

Thus taxation for defence fell unevenlv; but the old
colonial system provided a quid pro quo which was generally
assumed to be fair. The economic organization of the old
Empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was
based upon the mercantilist theory, which proclaimed among
other things that a nation and its colonies should be comple-
mentary to each other, the one producing the manufactured
goods while the others provided raw materials, particularly
those which for climatic reasons could not be produced in the
motherland. It was considered to be very desirable that the
whole imperial economy should be as self-contained as possible,
and particularly that only an irreducible minimum of goods
should be imported from foreign countries and their colonies.
To these ends manufactures in the colonies were discouraged
or prohibited. A tariff barrier which encircled each empire was
also maintained, which gave mother country and colonies a
preference in each others' markets; and trade with the foreigner
was either forbidden or controlled. In the interest of defence
as well as of supposed economic advantage, navigation laws
excluded foreign ships from the trade between the mother

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

country and its colonies, and also between one colony and
another. The system as a whole, although it included the
colonists among those for whom the benefits of monopoly were
provided, gave the mother country disproportionate economic
advantages. It was held that these were a compensation for
bearing almost the whole burden of defence.

After the Seven Years' War of 1756-63 the British Govern-
ment attempted to levy direct taxes on the thirteen colonies
of North America, in order that they should help to pay for
their own defence. The theory that the colonial assemblies
were little Parliaments in their own right, with exclusive rights
to tax their respective areas, was thereupon asserted by colon-
ists in arms, and the American Revolution which began in 1776
broke asunder an Empire which the Seven Years' War had so
greatly enlarged. That war had seen the conquest by Great
Britain of most of the French possessions on the North
American continent. After the American Revolution, areas
that had formerly been French were the only part of the
continent that remained under the British flag. In the course
of time the settled portions of these areas were transformed
into colonies of the usual British type, equipped with assem-
blies having the power to tax. They were accordingly able to
participate, and in fact they took the leading part, in the
application of liberal principles to colonial government, which
resulted in ever-increasing autonomy and finally in Dominion
status.

The year 1776, which witnessed the beginning of the
American Revolution, saw also the publication of one of the
most important books that has ever been written in the field of
economics. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations was a devastating
attack over a wide front against the mercantilist philosophy on
which the old colonial system rested. The Industrial Revolu-
tion— the substitution of production by power-driven machin-
ery for production by hand — was already under way in Britain,
and Adam Smith expressed ideas which were far more in keep-
ing with the needs of the developing machine industry than
were the restrictive doctrines of the mercantilists. In order that
the wealth of nations might be increased, he advocated the
abolition of practically all government restrictions on trade and
industry, in the interest of private initiative and of efficiency
through competition. He therefore condemned the old colonial
system, lock, stock, and barrel. Of its great complex of restric-
tive measures he wished to retain the navigation laws alone,

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

on the ground that "defence ... is of much more importance
than opulence." Smith thought that for Britain the colonies
were a source not of strength but of weakness, and that if they
became separate States they would continue to trade with
Britain at least as freely as before. While he did not advocate
independence for the colonies, he looked upon the possibility
of it without alarm. Imperial defence was treated bluntly:

Great Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only state which,
as it has extended its empire, has only increased its expense without once
augmenting its resources. Other states have generally disburdened them-
selves upon their subject and subordinate provinces of the most consider-
able part of the expense of defending the empire. Great Britain has hitherto
suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburden themselves
upon her of almost this whole expense.1

The Wealth of Nations was concerned with the whole area
of economic life. The laissez-faire doctrines which it contained,
as is the case with most brand-new ideas, made their way but
slowly; yet gradually they acquired a momentum which
carried almost everything before them in Great Britain, influ-
enced opinion and policy among statesmen and business men
alike, and became an armoury from which arguments have
been drawn ever since.

The outstanding representative of the extreme free traders
of nineteenth-century Britain was Richard Cobden, who
organized the Anti-Corn-Law League, and had as much as any
man to do with the triumph of free trade in his own country.
Cobden went even further than his master, advocating the
repeal of every form of economically restrictive legislation
including the navigation acts. He also thought that the colon-
ies should be cast adrift in the interest of retrenchment. In
this matter sentiment had no weight at all with him, and he
considered that Britain would be more prosperous if the colon-
ies became independent, for she would thus avoid the cost of
defending them. It is difficult in the present day to realize how
general this feeling became, and how widespread in high places.
In 1848 the Governor General of Canada, in a private letter to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote that:

. . . there is I am confident a growing indisposition among our masters
the middle classes, to bear those charges which are indispensable to the
maintenance of our Colonial Empire.

1 Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. iv, ch. 7, pt. iii.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

The Secretary of State for the Colonies referred to the same
subject in a letter written the following year:

. . . unfortunately there begins to prevail in the H. of Commons & I am
sorry to say in the highest quarters, an opinion (wh. I believe to be utterly
erroneous) that we have no interest in preserving our Colonies & ought
therefore to Make no sacrifice for that purpose, Peel, Graham & Gladstone
if they do not avow this opinion as openly as Cobden & his friends, yet
betray very clearly that they entertain it, nor do I find some Members of
the Cabinet free from it, so that I am powerless to do anything wh. involves
expense — It is the existence of this feeling here wh. is to me by far the most
serious cause of apprehension for the future.2

Some free traders, while professing a preference for retain-
ing the colonies, thought that separation was inevitable; and
there were still others who advocated it in the interest of the
colonies themselves.

Free trade eventually appealed with irresistible force to the
British business man of that day. Britain had been the pioneer
of the industrial revolution, and was still so far ahead of all
other countries in the new techniques of production as to fear
no purely economic rivalry. An industry that had so far out-
stripped all others in the cheapness and volume of its produc-
tion, proved not immune to persuasion that what it needed
was not a sheltered position in a limited market, but the
maximum of freedom to compete in all the markets. To its
converts, moreover, laissez /aire was much more than a cold
economic principle applicable to Britain alone. It was a gospel
of universal prosperity and happiness, and of peace on earth*.
Any land which abolished economic restrictions would obtain
rich rewards from its enlightened action; the resulting pros-
perity would confer far-reaching social benefits; and universal
free trade would remove the causes of war. The eventual
triumph of laissezfaire everywhere was also regarded as inevit-
able. Meanwhile, the free traders of Britain were determined
to set their own house in order, and they succeeded. In 1846
the duties on imported grain and flour were thrown overboard;
in 1849 the navigation acts followed them; and in the course of
a few years the whole mercantilist structure had disappeared.
To the old colonial system, as it lay discredited on its death-
bed, came the most flattering tribute which it had ever
received. Almost unanimously the colonies protested against
the removal of restrictions which had afforded to them an
effective preference in the British market.

2 Elgin to Grey, May 23, 1S48, and Grev to Elgin, May 18, 1849, Doughtv, Elgin-Grey
Papers, i, pp. 179, 351-2.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Had the purely negative ideas of the extreme free traders
dominated British colonial policy after about 1830, as they
might easily have done, the ties which attached the white
colonies to Britain would no doubt have rotted awav or been
broken. The policy actually followed, however, was greatly
influenced by a group of careful students of the colonial prob-
lem who were not disciples of Cobden. The so-called Colonial
Reformers, whose leader was Edward Gibbon Wakefield, were
minor public figures whose zeal and knowledge of their subject
enabled them to exercise a very powerful influence on an im-
perial policy which they never controlled. They believed in
free trade, and agreed that expenditure on colonial defence
ought to be reduced. On the other hand they thought that
there was no need to lose the colonies and that it was exceed-
ingly undesirable to do so. The Reformers considered that the
political part of colonial policy should be based on a large
extension of self-government in the colonies. In the economic
field they advocated assisted emigration to the colonies, which
would be subsidized from the proceeds derived from the sale of
colonial crown lands to settlers. The cost of defending the
colonies might be greatly lessened by reducing or withdrawing
the colonial garrisons. Although some of their ideas proved to
be impracticable, the Reformers are entitled to a high rank
among creative statesmen. They invented a colonial status
which was justifiable in terms of nineteenth-century liberalism,
and enriched British colonial policy with an infusion of dis-
interested ideas which it has retained ever since. Wakefield
and his collaborators are the fathers of Dominion status.

The policy of extending an enlarged measure of self-govern-
ment to the colonies, devised and advocated by the Reformers,
was put into effect by others. The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper
and Lower Canada was followed bv the mission of Lord
Durham, who was sent to the Canadas for the purpose of
conducting a thorough inquiry. Durham was a disciple of the
Reformers, and he took Wakefield to the Canadas with him.
His report, the most important document in the whole story
of British colonial policy, recommended among other things
that the two colonies should be united and that the principle
of responsible government should be extended to the colony
thus formed. This meant that the government of the colony
should be responsible to the elected branch of the legislature,
instead of holding office during the governor's pleasure as
colonial governments had always done. The Canadas were

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

united, and in 1847 the Earl of Elgin was appointed governor
with instructions to introduce responsible government. The re-
form was put into effect in Nova Scotia in 1 848, and in Canada
the following year. When Elgin's tenure of office ended, the old
colonial system had been abolished, responsible government
was a recognized ingredient in British colonial constitutions,
and it could already be discerned that the colonies would not
follow Great Britain along the path to free trade as the Reform-
ers had assumed would be the case. Colonial defence, moreover,
had become an outstanding problem. For with the disappearan-
ce of the British monopoly in the colonial markets, the expenses
incurred for the purpose of defending the colonies had begun to
arouse widespread criticism in Britain, on the ground that the
British taxpayer no longer received any return for his outlay.
With the granting of responsible government the discontent
increased. The critics said that those who had the privilege
of governing themselves should accept responsibility for their
own defence.

Earlier in the century, while the old system was still in
force, a Select Committee had inquired into expenditure for
colonial defence, and reported in 1834 and 1 8 3 5 . 3 The com-
mittee did not challenge the principle of expenditures by the
British treasury for purely colonial defence, merely drawing,
attention to the desirability of effecting economies here and
there. The following opinion, given in evidence before the
committee by Sir James Kempt, a professional soldier and
former Governor General of Canada, is quoted because it sets
forth the special position of the Canadas from the point of view
of defence:

Canada is very peculiarly circumstanced; it has a most extensive fron-
tier to the United States of America, open in every point, and for six months
in the year without any direct communication with England. I am of
opinion, that even if a considerable portion of the militia were rendered
efficient, the small regular force now in Canada would nevertheless be
necessary to support and give confidence to the militia of the Colony. There
are large depots of military stores to protect in Canada, and there ought to
be at all times in the country a regular military force sufficient for the pro-
tection of the town and citadel of Quebec, the stronghold of Canada at
present.

In 1849 William Molesworth, a rather unorthodox colonial
reformer, moved in the House of Commons that a Royal
Commission be appointed to inquire into the administration of
the colonies. According to Molesworth:

3 Pari. Paps., 1834, vi, and 1835, vi.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

In the course of the last fifteen years the colonies have directly cost
Great Britain at least £60,000,000 in the shape of military, naval, civil, and
extraordinary expenditure, exclusive of the £20,000,000 which were paid
for the abolition of slavery. Therefore, the total direct cost of the colonies
has been at least £80,000,000 in the last fifteen years.4

A second and much more important report on expenditure
for colonial defence was made by another Select Committee
in 1861. 5 This committee divided the oversea possessions of,
Great Britain, exclusive of India, into two classes from the
point of view of defence. One group consisted of dependencies
such as Malta, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Bermuda, and the
Falkland Islands. Because of their outstanding importance as
military garrisons, or naval stations, or for some other reason,
these were maintained chiefly for purposes of imperial policy,
and none of them contained more than a small population of
British birth or descent. The committee considered that the
responsibility and main cost of the defence of this class of
dependency properly devolved upon the British Government.
The other class was made up of self-governing colonies of settle-
ment. The committee felt that with due regard to the local
resources and vulnerability to external attack of each of these,
and also to the general needs of the Empire, the responsibility
and cost of the military defence of such colonies ought to de-
pend mainly upon the colonies themselves.

The committee also submitted the opinion:

. . . that the tendency of modern warfare is to strike blows at the heart of a
hostile power; and that it is therefore desirable to concentrate the troops
required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and
to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression
the distant dependencies of Empire.

Giving evidence before the committee, W. E. Gladstone made
the following statement:

Question: A great change has taken place in this respect since the
application of steam to navigation. No sudden attack could be made upon
any of these Colonies, by a foreign force making its appearance without
notice, in any of these seas? Answer [by Gladstone]: I think the change is
enormous, and that, in point of fact, our present system is one founded upon
a state of things and a condition of this empire relatively to other powers
which has entirely passed away. In former times, our communications with
our colonies were rare, slow, and uncertain, and it would have been very
dangerous indeed to trust to the principle of supporting them from the
centre; but now, on the contrary, the communications with the world in

4 Egerton, Selected Speeches of Sir William Motesworth, p. 222.
s Pari. Paps., 1861, xm.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

general are constant, rapid and certain: and England is the very centre of
those communications. We have enormous advantages for supporting them
upon the principle of keeping our great mass of force at home, and supply-
ing them as they may require.

These opinions in favour of concentrating the armed forces in
Great Britain, applied to the disposition of naval instead of
land forces, were to constitute the greater part of the arguments
advanced in order to justify the naval concentration that was
carried out more than forty years later.

Before the same committee the Duke of Newcastle,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, talked about the possibility
of some of the colonies co-operating in the field of naval
defence:

Question: ... I think you say that Australia mainly depends upon the
naval force? Answer [by the Duke]: Yes. Question: Do you think it possible
for any arrangement to be made by which these colonies should contribute
towards the cost of a naval force? Answer: I think that the only mode in
which it is possible to accept from them a contribution towards their naval
defences would be in the shape of a money vote to the Admiralty. I think
it undesirable that they should have colonial ships, which would neces-
sarily be much more under the local control of the government of the
Colony, than under the Admiral on the station .... it would be impossible,
either at their expense or ours, to defend the Colony by ships retained, if we
may say so, for the service of each colony; it must be done on a larger scale.
I have frequently had to state to the colonists that in truth our Channel
fleet constitutes a defence to Australia, because any large fleets which could
attack that Colony must come from Europe, and therefore it is much better
to deal with a fleet by a concentrated force than to keep ships scattered over
the world, with a view of defending any port which it may not be the inten-
tion perhaps, of the enemy to attack, and which, in these days of the electric
telegraph, they would take care not to attack if ships were stationed there.

Robert Lowe, who had spent eight years in professional and
public life in New South Wales, thought that the self-governing
colonies ought in the main to undertake their own land defence
but:

I do not think that England could ask the Colonies for any naval
assistance; the contribution would be very small, and I think that they
would very much repine at it. If England did not supply the naval force, I
do not think the Colonies would fit out ships for themselves.

The report of 1861 laid down the general policy concerning
the land defence of the self-governing colonies which the
British Government was to follow thereafter. Ten years after
the recommendations had been made, the imperial garrisons
had been withdrawn from all such colonies, except in a few
cases where very unusual conditions existed. The report had

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

comparatively little to say about naval defence; nevertheless
it established the principles in the light of which the overseas
naval bases were afterwards regarded. The position which the
Admiralty was to take later in relation to co-operation by the
Dominions and colonies in naval defence, moreover, was clearly
foreshown in some of the evidence given before this committee.

In 1865 the British Parliament passed the Colonial Naval
Defence Act,6 which authorized any colony to obtain and man
warships, and maintain them in service, to raise bodies of Royal
Naval Volunteers, and to procure the services of officers and
men of the Royal Navy. The act authorized the British Gov-
ernment to accept naval volunteers offered by a colony for
service in the Royal Navy, and also enacted that:

It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as
Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the
Admiralty to accept any Offer for the Time being made or to be made by
the Government of a Colony, to place at Her Majesty's Disposal any Vessel
of War provided by that Government and the Men and Officers from Time
to Time serving therein; and while any Vessel accepted by the Admiralty
under such Authority is at the Disposal of Her Majesty, such Vessel shall be
deemed to all Intents a Vessel of War of the Royal Navy, and the Men and
Officers from Time to Time serving in such Vessel shall be deemed to all
Intents Men and Officers of the Royal Navy, and shall accordingly be sub-
ject to all Enactments and Regulations for the Time being in force for the
Discipline of the Royal Navy.

The problem of defending the British North American
Provinces was one to which the British Government and its
expert advisers naturally gave much attention, from the time
of the American Revolution down to Confederation, and after-
wards. Serious consideration of this question in time of peace,
moreover, was practically confined to the authorities in the
United Kingdom; for, except in actual war, the interest of the
governments and people of the Provinces and of the later
Dominion in any form of defence whether imperial or local,
was exceedingly limited. The policy of the British Government
and its advisers remained substantially unchanged until
towards the end of the nineteenth century.

The Royal Navy was rightly held to afford a perfect pro-
tection against any possible oversea enemies, and until the
eighteen-sixties no idea was expressed or even entertained in
official quarters of a contribution by any of the dependencies,
except India, towards the naval defence either of the Empire or

• 28 Vic, c. 14, Apr. 7, 1865. See App. H.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

of their own coasts. On the other hand, it was a principle of
imperial defence at all times, before as well as after the Ameri-
can Revolution, that the colonies were partly responsible for
their own defence by land, and that any colony occupying an
exposed position should actually in time of peace take reason-
able measures to provide such a defence. The practice nearly
always lagged far behind the theory in this respect; but the
theory was there.

Because of British supremacy at sea, the local defence of
British North America meant defence against the United
States. With every passing year the republic grew more popu-
lous and stronger, relatively as well as absolutely; while
improving means of communication gave it a slowly increasing
ability to concentrate its strength at any point on the perimeter
of its vast territory. As far as the British Empire was con-
cerned, Great Britain was the principal repository of power in
every form, and was certain to intervene with all her strength
in the event of an attack upon any of her dependencies. The
marked superiority in speed of sea communications over land
ones, before the coming of the railway, meant that practically
all the colonies were either immune to serious attack, or less
accessible from the centres of power of any likely enemy than
they were from Britain herself. In British North America,
Newfoundland was in the first-mentioned class, while the
Maritime Provinces and the Pacific Coast were in the second.
The two Canadas were the serious problem.

Up to Quebec the St. Lawrence was so wide that warships
and transports could ascend it, at night if necessary, in spite of
an enemy on its bank. As long as Britain retained control of
the North Atlantic, consequently, she could count on an open
line of communication to Quebec, except when the river was
sealed by ice. Quebec was therefore necessarily the base from
which the local defence of the Canadas must be conducted;
and it was also a kind of Torres Vedras to which the regular
troops to the westward might withdraw for the time being, if
overwhelmingly outnumbered.

Montreal was also of great strategic importance because the
principal military and commercial lines of communication
converged at that place. There was some prospect that the
river between Quebec and Montreal could be kept open during
a war. If Upper Canada lying west of Montreal were also to be
defended, however, British control of Lake Ontario and of a
dependable line of supply up to that lake from Montreal, was

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

always regarded as being indispensable. For only by this
means could troops operating west of Kingston be supplied and
also covered on their otherwise wholly exposed flank. It was
with these necessities in mind that Kingston, at the east end
of Lake Ontario, had been developed as a naval base, and that
the Rideau Canal had been built later as a poor alternative to
the almost indefensible stretch of the St. Lawrence between
Montreal and Lake Ontario.7

The two Provinces ran a considerable danger of being
attacked, and by greatly superior forces. They lay intimately
close along more than a thousand miles of boundary to a people
immeasurably more powerful than themselves, and who were
so energetic and expansive that even the richer half of a great
continent proved to be scarcely enough for them. During
most of the nineteenth century, moreover, Anglo-American
relations were usually uneasy when they were not actually bad.
If hostilities came, the Americans were almost certain to
attack Britain by invading the Canadas — by far the most
vulnerable objective accessible to them — as in fact they did
in 1812, and as the Fenians did fifty years later.

The dependable contact of the Canadas with the sea at
Quebec lay at one end of their long and narrow area of settle-
ment. Their only internal line of communication coincided,
except where the Rideau Canal made possible a detour between
Montreal and Kingston, with the front that had to be defended.
It followed that a comparatively shallow penetration by the
enemy almost anywhere along the front would soon paralyze
the whole defence westward of that point. The railways when
they came afforded additional lines of communication; but
they conferred even greater advantages upon the Americans.
Another strategic peculiarity of the Canadas was that, al-
though situated many hundreds of miles from the sea, because
of their position in relation to the St. Lawrence and the Great
Lakes they might at any time have a naval threat at their own
front door-step.

During the War of 1812 the urgent need to control the
Great Lakes, and the extreme difficulty of doing so, had been
very apparent to the British Government. Soon after the
peace conference which ended the war had opened at Ghent in
August 1814, the British commissioners proposed that the

1 The Rideau Canal, besides making a wide detour, was a barge-canal useful for carrying
supplies, but unable to accommodate any but the smallest war-vessels.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

United States should undertake to maintain no armed forces
on the Great Lakes. This suggestion was advanced on the
ground that the United States had shown an aggressive spirit
by its attempts to conquer Canada, and in other ways, and that
the relatively weak Canadian Provinces would be in constant
danger if the United States were allowed to control the Great
Lakes. When the American representatives would not agree
to this proposal, the British commissioners suggested that both
British and American armaments on the lakes should be
limited; but the Americans pointed out that they had received
no instructions on this point. A few years later the subject was
broached again, this time by the Government of the United
States, and an agreement was embodied in an exchange of notes
between the American Secretary of State, Richard Rush, and
Sir Charles Bagot the British Minister in Washington. By the
Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 both nations undertook not to
construct or maintain on the Great Lakes any armed vessels
other than a few small and lightly-armed craft for police
purposes. 8

The Rush-Bagot agreement, one of the oldest of inter-
national covenants, has not at all times been strictly observed;
but generally speaking it has kept the Great Lakes clear of
warships, and has made it unnecessary to maintain naval bases
on their shores. It has been highly beneficial to the United
States, even more so to Great Britain, and to Canada most of
all. The understanding has spared each of the parties to it a
large expenditure on armaments, and almost certainly facili-
tated the belated development of friendly relations between
the British Empire and the United States. The Rush-Bagot
agreement and the unfortified land frontier between Canada
and the United States are famous all over the world, and few
articles or speeches on the advantages of peace and disarma-
ment are considered complete without some reference to them.

The British Government's policy was to keep a considerable
number of regular troops in the Canadas and to encourage the
maintenance of a local militia for the purpose of supplementing
the regulars. It was considered desirable that the weakness of
these two forces, relative to what the Americans would prob-
ably be able to put into the field, should be offset by fortifica-
tions at the key points. The function of most of these fortifica-
tions was to enable the defence to be prolonged until adequate

8 See App. i. In a recently-revised form the agreement is still in force.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

reinforcements could arrive from Britain. Prior to 1817, in the
event of war the essential naval superiority on the St. Lawrence
and the Great Lakes, particularly Ontario, would be sought, in
spite of the superior local resources of the LTnited States.
Throughout the period the British Government assumed entire
responsibility for the control of the North /Atlantic, and for
maintaining the regular troops, as well as an obligation of
helping to provide the necessary fortifications and naval forces
on the river and lakes. These responsibilities it performed; at
the same time exhorting the Provinces to carry out the rest of
the programme, a doctrine which more often than not was
preached in vain.

The confederation of the British North American colonies,
toward which the decisive step was taken in 1867, was preceded
and followed by careful consideration of the means and respon-
sibility for their defence. The American Civil War would by
itself have sufficed to emphasize the problem of means; while
a political change as radical as was Confederation obviously
created a need to clarify the question of responsibility.

While Confederation was being worked out it was agreed
that the details of defence policy should lie over for considera-
tion by the government of the confederated Provinces. Re-
garding land defence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in
a circular despatch in 1865, addressed to the British North
American colonies concerned, referred to "the determination
which this country has ever exhibited to regard the defence of
the Colonies as a matter of Imperial concern", and went on to
say that:

The Colonies must recognize a right and even an obligation encumbent
on the Home Government to urge with earnestness and just authority the
measures which they consider to be most expedient on the part of the
Colonies with a view to their own defence — nor can it be doubtful that the
provinces of British North America are incapable when separate and divided
from each other, of making those just and sufficient preparations for
national defence which would be easily undertaken by a province uniting in
itself all the population and all the resources of the whole.9

At this time the Canadian Ministers brought up the question
of a naval armament on Lake Ontario, and the British Govern-
ment took the position that:

. . . apart from any question of expediency, the Convention subsisting be-
tween this country and the LTnited States rendered it impossible for either

» Cardwell to Monck, June 24, 1865 (Pub. Arch.: G Series, vol. 174).

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-187)

nation to place more than the specified number of armed vessels on the
Lakes in time of peace. In case of War it would, as a matter of course, be the
duty of any Government in this Country to apply its means of Naval
Defence, according to the judgment it might form upon the exigencies of
each particular time, and the Canadian Ministers might be assured that
His Majesty's Government would not permit itself to be found in such a
position as to be unable to discharge its duty in this respect. This was the
only assurance the Canadian Ministers could expect or we could give.10

In the pre-coniederation period it seems to have been taken for
granted that Britain would continue to be responsible tor the
defence of Canada by sea.

In 1868 it became the fixed policy of the British Govern-
ment to withdraw the regular troops at the earliest possible
moment from all the self-governing colonies, except those in
South Africa where the presence of very numerous and warlike
native tribes made the retrenchment impracticable. The
British Government had favoured and promoted the con-
federation of British North America, partly because it would
strengthen those Provinces for local defence; and it therefore
expected a confederated Canada to assume an increased
responsibility in this respect. The Dominion did so. A year
after Confederation the newly-constituted federal Parliament
passed the Militia Act, the foundation upon which the land
defences of the country have rested ever since; and in 1870 the
regular troops were withdrawn. In 1865 the Parliament at
Westminster had passed the Colonial Naval Defence Act which
empowered colonial legislatures to establish and maintain
naval forces; and after 1867 the British Government undoubt-
edly felt that the principal responsibility rested with Canada
to provide any purely local naval defences that might be
needed. On the other hand, the inclusive imperial responsibili-
ties of the Royal Navy were not regarded as having been
circumscribed by Confederation. Nor was the new Dominion
officially considered to be under any obligation to share in the
support of that Service. After its detachments in Canada had
been withdrawn, the available forces of the British Army would
certainly have been sent across the Atlantic, to the required
extent, in order to reinforce the Canadian militia in the event
of a serious invasion of the Dominion. Because of the nature of
naval war, on the other hand, the Royal Navy on its customary
stations was always throughout the nineteenth century in a
position to cover the Canadian coasts and trade routes.

10 Cardwell to Monck, June 17, I860, ibid.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The later seventeenth century, and the eighteenth, saw a
long series of wars between France and England. Both nations
being great naval Powers with large oversea possessions and
trade, and because of the military preponderance of France,
these wars were largely fought on the sea. One of the fruits of
naval superiority was the capture from the enemy of colonial
possessions which might either be retained at the close of the
war, or used for bargaining when the terms of peace were being
arranged. France was primarily a continental and land Power
for whom her navy was a secondary consideration only.
England, on the other hand, had no important commitments or
ambitions on the continent of Europe. The island kingdom
was therefore in a position to reap the full advantage of its
insularity, trusting for defence almost entirely to its navy upon
which the greater part of the national effort aimed at defence
was expended. For this reason mainly, Britain was usually
stronger than France at sea, often decisively so, a fact which
events in North America clearly reflected. During the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries Quebec, the citadel of French
power in North America, was four times attacked and twice
taken, while New York was never directly threatened by
French forces. In the War of the League of Augsburg the
French lost Acadia, though it was restored at the peace in 1697.
As a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-13,
England obtained Nova Scotia together with the predominant
position in the Hudson Bay region and in Newfoundland.
Finally, the Seven Years' War brought about the removal of
the French power from the North American continent. These
were principally triumphs of British sea power, for although
the English colonies in North America greatly outweighed the
French ones in population and wealth, this advantage was
largely offset by the superior organization and the martial
character of the French settlers. It was a continuing advantage
to the English, however, that in all these wars their naval
strength in the North Atlantic was greater than that of their
opponents. They could therefore in time of war send supplies
and men comparatively freely across the ocean; while France
had only a restricted power, or none at all, to replenish and
strengthen her colonies after the outbreak of a war.

The Seven Years' War, 1756-63, was a world-wide conflict
which had two distinct aspects. It was both a European war in
which Great Britain supported Frederick the Great against his
numerous enemies, and a naval and colonial war between

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

France and Great Britain. In North America the continental
British colonies had never been open to attack from any source
except the French settlements to the north, which, however,
had been a serious danger to them for longer than anyone
could remember. The capture of Quebec, the strongest fortress
in North America, was made possible only by the ability of the
Royal Navy to escort Wolfe's army right up the St. Lawrence
to the city, and to maintain an unchallenged control of the
river and gulf, and of the open sea beyond. The campaign
against Quebec, a masterpiece of amphibious warfare, was the
decisive step towards the destruction of French power on this
continent. In the earlier part of the war, when fortune was
smiling upon him, the Marquis de Montcalm had warned his
king that nothing could save the colony in the end if it failed to
receive supplies from France, and as he had feared so it befell.
In the War of the American Revolution which lasted from
1775 to 1783, Great Britain found herself, without allies and
with a navy suffering from neglect, pitted against a coalition of
the leading naval Powers of Europe. The control of the North
Atlantic slipped from her hands for a time, and she became
subject to many of the disadvantages from which France had
suffered in the previous war. Not only did it become exceed-
ingly difficult to supply and reinforce the British armies in
North America: the rebelling colonies also obtained a tremen-
dous advantage from their comparative freedom to use the
waters along their coast. Writing to the Marquis de Lafayette
in 1781 George Washington stated the matter clearly:

As you expressed a desire to know my Sentiments respecting the oper-
ations of the next Campaign, before your departure for France, I will with-
out a tedious display of reasoning declare in one word, that the advantages
of it to America, and the honor and glory of it to the allied arms in these
States must depend absolutely upon the naval force, which is employed in
these Seas, and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act
decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can more
than negative advantages be expected without it. For proof of this, we have
only to recur to the instances of the ease and facility with which the British
shifted their ground, as advantages were to be obtained at either extremity
of the continent, and to their late heavy loss the moment they failed in their
naval superiority .... It follows then as certain as that night succeeds the
day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and
with it every thing honorable and glorious. A constant naval superiority
would terminate the war speedily; without it I do not know that it will
ever be terminated honorably.11

The American Revolutionary War throws into relief a very

striking fact. Only once in modern history has Great Britain,

11 Ford, Writings of George Washington, ix, pp. 406-7.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

almost always a very weak land Power, been decisively de-
feated in war. The effectiveness of superior sea power in the
past when wielded by an island people could scarcely receive
a more conclusive proof.

Thereafter British North America lay, a narrow fringe
along the northern border of the far more populous and power-
ful United States, in the east at first and later all across the
continent. For more than a century after the American
Revolution the relations of Great Britain with the United
States were uneasy or hostile, and the ability of Britain to
defend British North America against the growing republic
depended on the fact that the United States was never in this
period, except briefly during its Civil War, a great military
Power. During the most serious test between 1812 and 1815,
the Royal Navy was able to maintain communications across
the Atlantic and up the St. Lawrence; and the regular troops in
the North American colonies, supplemented by local levies,
were able to prevent an American conquest.

In all three of these wars — the Seven Years' War, the War
of the American Revolution, and the War of 1812 — naval
Operations of considerable importance were conducted on the
interior lakes. At the time of the undeclared hostilities in
North America which preceded the Seven Years' War, the
French, unlike the British, had for many years possessed war-
ships on Lake Ontario and the river below it. In 1754 the
British authorities began to consider the desirability of creating
a naval force on those waters, so as to cut the communications
between the French forces on the Mississippi and those on the
St. Lawrence.12 Using Oswego as a shipbuilding site and later
as a naval base also, a number of small warships were built.
There were reported to be six of these ships in the harbour at
Oswego in August 1756, of which two had been built the
previous year.13 After having failed in its Operations against
the French naval force on the lake, this flotilla was destroyed
with the fall of Oswego in 1756. In 1758 the French naval
power in those waters was in turn eliminated by the capture of
the naval base at Fort Frontenac.

After the conquest of New France and the end of the Seven
Years' War, a naval organization known as the Provincial
Marine was set up. It comprised the ships and shore establish-

12 Sketch for the Operations in North America, Nov. 16, 1754, in Pargellis, Military Affairs
in North America 1748-1765, pp. 45-8.

13 An Account of Oswego ... in August, 1756, ibid., pp. 218-21.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

merits on the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence River, and Lake
Champlain. The organization was placed under the Governor
of Canada; the Admiralty supplied officers and men, and the
enrolment of local residents was authorized.14

In the French-English conflicts in North America before
1763, the passage between the St. Lawrence Valley and the
colonies to the southward, by way of the Hudson, Lake
Champlain, and the Richelieu, had been a frequently-used
invasion route in both directions; for it afforded easy transport
by water through otherwise impassable country. At the begin-
ning of the American Revolution, a small force of Americans
advanced rapidly to Lake Champlain and seized or destroyed
all the vessels which they found there. This timely act gave
them control of the lake; and as long as they were able to
maintain it, any advance southward of that point by British
forces was impossible. That fall the Americans, having ad-
vanced northward by the same route, captured Montreal and
unsuccessfully assaulted Quebec. The following spring the
arrival of reinforcements from Britain compelled them to fall
back on Lake Champlain, whither a British force followed
them. The British then decided to launch a superior naval
force on the lake, and drawing supplies from warships and
transports in the St. Lawrence, they were able during the
summer of 1776 to outbuild their American opponents. On
October 11 and the two following days, in a series of engage-
ments off Valcour Island and farther down the lake, a superior
British flotilla wiped out the American naval force after an
extraordinarily determined resistance. Nevertheless the
American flotilla had succeeded in seriously delaying the
British campaign. On the other hand, the British advance
southward the following year under General Burgoyne, though
it was to end in disaster, had been made possible by the naval
victory on Lake Champlain.

The War of 1812, on its naval side, was fought partly on
salt water and partly on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.
American attempts to invade the Canadas could beimplemented
very effectively by control of these waters, for the lack of
usable roads left the British possessions almost wholly de-
pendent upon the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes; and as in
the previous war, control of Lake Champlain would open a very
promising invasion route. The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence

14 Cuthbertson, Freshwater, chs. 4, 5, 7, and 10.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

waterway was highly vulnerable strategically, for it ran close
and parallel to the front which the British forces had to defend.
If the Americans could cut this line at any point they would
thereby isolate the British territory and forces to the westward
of that point. The importance of controlling the lakes was
enunciated during this war by no less an authority than the
Duke of Wellington. "I believe", he wrote, "that the defence
of Canada, and the co-operation of the Indians, depends upon
the navigation of the lakes. . . . Any offensive operation foun-
ded upon Canada must be preceded by the establishment of a
naval superiority on the lakes."15

In 1812 the British enjoyed a slight naval superiority on
both Ontario and the upper lakes, and the Americans on Lake
Champlain; and throughout the war, in each of the areas con-
cerned, both sides strove to achieve or maintain naval suprem-
acy by means of new construction. In these building races the
Americans had some advantage because the contiguous
territories which supported them were the more highly de-
veloped. After the spring of 1813 the preparations and Oper-
ations of the British on the lakes were directed by a distin-
guished young officer, Capt. Sir James Lucas Yeo, who also
commanded the fleet on Lake Ontario.

By the summer of 1813 the American naval force on Lake
Erie had achieved a marked superiority, and at the Battle of
Lake Erie on September 10 at Put-in Bay they completely
defeated the British squadron, and retained control of that
lake for the rest of the war. On Lake Ontario throughout the
three years of hostilities, superiority of force alternated be-
tween the two fleets, and several indecisive actions were
fought. Late in 1814 Yeo's fleet, which was based at Kingston,
was decisively strengthened by the addition of the St. Lawrence,
a very large ship mounting no less than 102 guns, and thereafter
the American fleet remained in its base at Sackett's Harbor.
Naval superiority on Lake Champlain was wielded by an
American flotilla, until a minor engagement in June 1813
reversed the balance for a time. The conclusive battle on this
lake was fought between roughly equal forces in Plattsburg
Bay on September 1 1, 1814. It ended in an American victory,
and this enforced the retreat of a strong British force which had
advanced as far as the lake with the intention of invading
American territory. It is probable that the British Government

16 Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Feb. 22, 1814.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

was influenced to some extent by this defeat on Lake Cham-
plain when in the following year it decided to make peace.16

During the great struggle against Napoleon, of which the
War of 1812 was one facet, British North America helped to
maintain Britain's naval effort in an indirect but most impor-
tant way. Before the Napoleonic Wars and during the earlier
part of that conflict, the Royal Navy had depended upon
native oak for the hulls of its ships and upon Baltic pine for
their masts. After 1804 Napoleon was able to shut off almost
entirely the export of timber to Britain from continental
Europe. This was at a time when the supply from the United
States was uncertain, because of the uneasy relations between
the two countries and of President Jefferson's policy of peaceful
coercion. English oak was becoming scarce, moreover, a
difficulty which was aggravated by the activities of a timber
monopoly :

The Navy was supported during the critical years by Britain's overseas
possessions. Of these, Canada stood so far above the others that it can
almost be said that Canadian pines and oaks sustained the Navy during its
long struggle with the Napoleonic Empire .... The Navy had turned to this
new region for its masts ... as a tardy measure during the American Revo-
lution, when there had been such desperate need for the great pine sticks.

The supply of masts from this source reached its maximum in
1811, a year in which, as against 3,319 masts received from
Russia and Prussia, the North American colonies furnished
23,053. Of these 19,025 came from Quebec, 3,131 from New
Brunswick, 842 from Nova Scotia, and 54 from Cape Breton
and Prince Edward Island. During these years also, though on
a smaller scale, supplies of sorely-needed oak timber reached
Britain from Quebec.17 Thus it seems reasonable to say that
small as the British North American colonies were at this time,
their resources may have had a decisive influence upon the
fortunes of the world.

After 1815 the United States and Great Britain did not
again go to war, but for several decades the relations between
the two countries remained uneasy, and on two occasions dur-
ing this period naval events of some interest took place along
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence frontier. Following upon
the failure of the Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada, a number
of the rebels escaped to the United States where many of the

16 Detailed accounts of the lake Operations during the War of the American Revolution and
the War of 1812 will be found respectively in Clowes, The Royal Navy, III, pp. 353-70, and
Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, i, chs. 5,7; II, chs. 10, 11, 12, 15, 17.

17 Albion, Forests and Sea Power, pp. 33, 346, 356.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

people strongly sympathized with them. Sporadic threats and
attacks ensued along the frontier from Windsor to Prescott, by
bands led or instigated by escaped rebels and largely composed
of the more lawless elements among the population south of the
border. The most serious of these unofficial acts of hostility
was the seizure of Navy Island on the Canadian side of the
Niagara River by an armed band led by William Lyon Mac-
kenzie. The unofficial invaders proclaimed a provisional
government and began to fortify the island. A force of Cana-
dian militia under Col. Allan MacNab was concentrated at
Chippewa, opposite Navy Island, and preparations were begun
to fit out armed vessels with a view to retaking the island.
Capt. Andrew Drew, a retired officer of the Royal Navy, had
settled at Woodstock, Upper Canada, in 1834, and at the time
of the Rebellion he was the senior naval officer in the Canadas.
In the emergency he was placed in charge of a company of
naval militia which contained a number of experienced sailors
including some former naval ratings. On December 28, 1837,
the illegal occupants of Navy Island began to use the American
steamer Caroline for the purpose of running supplies out to the
island from Fort Schlosser, New York, and the following after-
noon MacNab asked Capt. Drew to cut her out.

The Operation was planned for that night, December 29-30.
Volunteers for a very risky task were called for and obtained,
and at 11.30 p.m. they pushed off. Seven four-oared boats,
some twelve feet in length, carried about sixty officers and men.
They pulled a short distance up-stream, where they were
assembled and told what was expected of them. They were
then ordered to pull across the river independently, to a
rendezvous close to the American shore a short distance above
Fort Schlosser where the Caroline was known to be lying. A
very unusual feature of this Operation was that to the normal
danger from enemy action was added the risk of being carried
by the rapid current over the falls a few hundred yards below.
During the passage of the river two of the boats went astray
and were not seen again until after the expedition had returned
to the Canadian side. About halfway across, a light appeared
on the American shore, which afterwards proved to have been
burning in the Caroline. Five boats turned up at the rendez-
vous, where, because of too bright moonlight, they waited for
about half an hour 30 or 40 yards from the shore and not more
than 200 yards from the steamer.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

When it seemed to have become dark enough, they dropped
silently down on their prey without moving an oar until they
were close aboard. The Caroline was lying alongside a wharf
to which she was secured by chains. Before actually touching
her they were challenged from her deck, and immediately
afterwards they boarded. After overcoming a brisk but brief
resistance the boarders took possession of the steamer, aroused
a considerable number of men who had been sleeping below,
and sent them ashore. The Caroline was set on fire in several
places and was soon well alight. It was difficult to cast off
because one of the mooring-chains had to be chopped away
from under thick ice. The chain was freed, however, and the
vessel set adrift. All hands were now ordered to the boats, for
musket-fire had been opened from shore and the drifting
steamer was blazing fore and aft. One of Drew's officers was
seriously or fatally injured during the action, and several of
the men were slightly wounded. At least one of the Caroline's
defenders was killed, and a few were wounded.

As the boats rowed back across the river, keeping well clear
of the falls, they saw a great blazing fire on the Canadian
shore, which had been lighted by previous arrangement in
order to guide them home. They landed between 2.00 and
3.00 a.m., and received an enthusiastic welcome:

By this time the burning vessel was fast approaching the Canadian
shore, and not far distant .... When free from the wharf at Fort Schlosser,
her natural course would have been to follow the stream, which would have
taken her along the American shore and over the American falls; but she
. . . navigated herself right across the river, clearing the rapids above Goat
Island, and went as fairly over the centre of the British falls ... as if she
had been placed there on purpose.18

Preparations to clear Navy Island were continued, but
before an assault could be delivered the island was evacuated.

The skilful and spirited little Operation which removed the
Caroline from the scene so completely and permanently became
a serious issue between the United States and Great Britain.
The American Government had not seriously tried to prevent
its territory from being used as a base for an invasion of the
Province: British forces, on the other hand, had seized within
the jurisdiction of the United States an American ship which
they had afterwards destroyed, and in doing so they had

18 This description of the Operation is based principally on Drew, The Burning oj the Caroline
and other Reminiscences of 1887-88, originally published by the Hamilton Spectator, republished
bv R. S. Woods with an eyewitness account of his own, Pub. Arch. Pamph. Cat., II, No. 2098,
p.0.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

killed an xAmerican citizen. The irritation on both sides was
intense, and war might have resulted. Accordingly in February
1838 the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the
Provincial authorities that it might be expedient, early in the
spring, to place a small flotilla of armed steamboats on the St.
Lawrence and the Great Lakes, and that Capt. Sandom of the
Royal Navy would be sent to the Canadas to take charge of the
project. A month later the Commander in Chief, West Indies,
Halifax and Newfoundland Station, was warned to keep his
fleet in readiness. The apparent need lor naval defence on the
lakes and river at this time led the British Government to
consider the desirability of terminating or modifying the
Rush-Bagot agreement so as to regularize any defensive mea-
sures that might prove necessary. 19 The American authorities,
however, eventually assisted in preventing further incursions.
The prolonged and at times acute friction which the seizure of
the Caroline had generated did not lead to war because both
governments were just sufficiently conciliatory to prevent a
catastrophe, and in the summer of 1842 the Caroline incident
as an international bone of contention was officially buried.

Nearly thirty years later a renewed threat from across the
border called for naval defensive measures in addition to those
by land: as in 1837 the danger was that of invasion by unofficial
armed bands. The Fenian Brotherhood was a by-product of
Ireland's tragic history. This organization, founded in New
York in 1858, existed for the purpose of setting up an indepen-
dent republic in Ireland, and many Irishmen in the United
States became members. In 1865, immediately after the
American Civil War, Fenian conventions were held in several
American cities. From the United States the most obvious way
of trying to free Ireland seemed to be to attack the British-
Provinces next door, and in the spring of 1866 well-armed and
formidable bands of Fenians, intending invasion, gathered on
the borders of New Brunswick and Canada. The United States
authorities prevented the invasion of New Brunswick, but
Canada was entered near Niagara and threatened elsewhere.

In these circumstances the Governor General asked for
naval assistance, and the Commander in Chief, North Ameri-
can and West Indies Station, took appropriate action. The
frigate Aurora and a smaller vessel, the Py lades, were sent up

19 Glenelg to Colborne, No. 25, Feb. 14, 1838, with enclosure, Fox to Paget, Mar. 15, 1838,
Pub. Arch.: G Series, No. 38, pt. 1, p. 155; Glenelg to Durham, July 20, 1839, ibid., No. 39,
p. 142.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

the St. Lawrence and stationed at Quebec and Montreal
respectively, and later the Rosario was also stationed at
Montreal. Three gunboats were provided by the British and
four by the Provincial governments for service in the upper
St. Lawrence and on the Great Lakes. All were manned and
armed by the North American and West Indies Squadron,
the complements being supplied by the Aurora and Pylades.
The officers were instructed to intercept, if possible, any
Fenians attempting to cross into Canada by water, and
especially to cut off any who might have succeeded in getting
across. All the vessels were under the orders of Capt. A. M. de
Horsey of the Aurora, and their disposition for the season of
1866 was as follows:

Vessel Guns Men Headquarters Station

Ships

Aurora 35 51520 Quebec St. Lawrence River and

Great Lakes

Pylades 21 27520 Montreal St. Lawrence River

Rosario 11 130 Montreal St. Lawrence River —

Quebec to Montreal

Gunboats

St. Lawrence River — west

Royal 4 40 Cornwall end of Beauharnois Canal

to Cornwall

St. Andrew.. 4 40 Prescott St. Lawrence River —

Prescott to Kingston

Heron 2 46 Toronto Lake Ontario — Kingston

to Niagara River

Rescue 2 50 Port Colborne Lake Erie — Fort Erie to

Port Maitland

Britomart. . . 2 46 Port Stanley Lake Erie — Port Maitland

to Amherstburg

Lake St. Clair and St.
Michigan... 2 50 Windsor Clair and Detroit Rivers—

Amherstburg to Sarnia

Cherub 2 46 Goderich Lake Huron — Sarnia to

Collingwood

In the same year, 1866, bodies of naval volunteers were formed
at Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, Dunnville, and Port Stanley,

20 The numbers of men given for Aurora and Pylades are apparently their complements be-
fore detaching crews for the gunboats. The total for all the vessels is given as 1,040. Some of
the gunboats may have had local volunteers on board. The number and identity of the vessels
did not remain constant throughout; but the general scheme was not changed.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

in Canada, and by May 1867 Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
had asked the Commander in Chief to supply instructors for
their naval brigades.

In the spring of 1868 the warship was withdrawn from
Montreal, and H.M.S. Constance^ stationed at Quebec, pro-
vided crews lor two Dominion and three British gunboats on
the lakes. When autumn came the danger seemed to be slight,
and this improvised naval force was withdrawn. Its provision,
mainly by the Admiralty, had been a practical application of
the principle which British governments had often proclaimed,
that Britain would afford naval protection to any threatened
part of the Empire. During the emergency the four Provinces
were confederated, and the Squadron continued to give to the
new Dominion the direct protection which the separate Prov-
inces had been receiving. The Commanders in Chief of the
Station, nevertheless, felt uneasy about prolonging this com-
mitment in the heart of the continent, because the ships that
supplied the officers and men for the gunboats were thereby
rendered largely useless. In a memorandum written for the
information of his successor, shortly after the force had been
withdrawn, Admiral Rodney Mundy wrote:

I am in hopes that if Naval protection is again required, arrangements
will be made by which the Colonial Government will take upon themselves
the charge of these inner waters. The attention of the Admiralty has
frequently been called to the necessity of some permanent arrangement
being made to provide for this service by the Dominion Government . . . 21

In matters such as these the mainland Provinces of British
North America, and the Dominion which later included them,
depended upon the assistance of Great Britain. On the other
hand they made it possible to augment the resources available
for general imperial defence in a way that was exceedingly
valuable. The usable sea-coasts of that area, particularly the
eastern one, were most favourably situated from the point of
view of deep-sea strategy. The Royal Navy therefore develop-
ed a naval base on each of these coasts, at Halifax in Nova
Scotia and much later at Esquimalt in British Columbia.
Halifax at once became one of the most significant naval bases
in the world, while Esquimalt met a serious deficiency in the
structure of imperial sea power. In time, moreover, both were

21 Memo, dated Aug. 31, 1869, A.R.O., General Reports on N.A. and W.I. Station by the
respective C-in-C's., Mar. 1860 to Oct. 1886, i. Above account of naval defence measures
against the Fenians is based on reports and other material, ibid., and in A.R.O., British North
American Frontier — Protection from Fenians, 105. See also Sess. Paps., 1867-68, i, No. 63.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

to play an additional role by serving the local defence of coastal
waters.

Warships at sea are wholly dependent upon consumable
material obtained on shore. Fuel, food, and other commodities,
are continually being used up at a great rate, and frequent
refits are also necessary. Tn action a warship may expend all
her ammunition in a few hours, and may be more or less seri-
ously damaged. She must therefore be at all times within
reach of a suitable port that is stocked with whatever supplies
she may need and equipped to provide her with routine and
emergency repairs. Such ports are naval bases, and they may
range all the way from minute harbours where small vessels
can fuel, to ports where immense and complex naval establish-
ments are able to build, repair, and maintain, ships of every
size and type. Naval bases are prerequisite to any exercise of
naval power, because warships cannot operate without them.
The steam-driven ship, moreover, has been even more depen-
dent on the shore than her sailing predecessor was, chiefly
because of her inexorable need of fuel;22 and bases have had
an increasing burden placed upon them by the mechanized
warship, stuffed ever fuller from year to year with apparatus of
progressively greater variety and complexity. No matter how
imposing it may be, however, a naval base by itself can exercise
no power at sea beyond the range of its fixed batteries. The
harbour beside which a base lies is usually, though not neces-
sarily, used by merchant ships as well as by warships.

A naval base should be conveniently situated with respect
to the areas in which the warships using it may need to operate,
and it is very advantageous if the fleet in its operative area is
able to cover the base. The latter should be situated on a
sheltered and sufficiently commodious harbour, which contains
good anchorage and which can be entered at all times without
difficulty. The local terrain and the approaches by sea should
be suited to the defence of the base, which ought to be rendered
possible, for a time, even in the absence of warships. A well-
disposed and fairly numerous population in the neighbourhood,
and access by land to supplies of food and fuel and to a suitable
industrial area, are valuable assets.

During the Middle Ages English naval activity had been
confined to waters close to the British coasts. Even towards

22 The methods of refitting and providing supplies at sea, so highly developed during the
Second World War, particularly by the United States Navy in the Pacific, have considerably
lengthened the leash that ties the steam-driven warship to her base. But if the warship is thus
enabled to stay away from the base for longer periods, the supply ship must visit it in her stead.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

the end of the sixteenth century, Sir Francis Drake had been
considered daring or reckless when he wanted to forestall the
expected sailing of the Armada by means of an offensive naval
Operation against Cadiz. The gradual growth of colonial and
trading interests overseas, from the beginning of the seven-
teenth century onwards, came to involve, as far as the Royal
Navy was concerned, both enormously increased responsibilities
and greatly augmented means of discharging them. British
territories and other interests, scattered more thickly and
widely around the world as time went on, had all to be pro-
tected by the navy; and with a few exceptions, of which
Canada was one, they were so situated as to have little need of
other defence. The oversea territories, however, added greatly
to the resources of the Royal Navy in a number of ways, and
above all by providing it with conveniently-placed harbours
and bases in almost all the areas where it might be called upon
to operate. A number of the possessions overseas, in fact, were
acquired expressly in order to provide bases for the fleet. The
unique structure of British sea power rested in part upon an
unrivalled appanage of seaports, a number of which occupied
some of the choicest strategic positions in the world. The
imperial annals are sprinkled with the names of Aden, Cape
Town, Gibraltar, Halifax, Hong Kong, Malta, Minorca, and
others only less renowned than these.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century this whole
network of bases was controlled and maintained by the Ad-
miralty. After that time, however, the status of some of them
was affected by the evolution of the Dominions toward complete
autonomy, and by the swift expansion after 1898 of the German
Navy. Early in the twentieth century the naval bases at
Halifax and Esquimalt passed from the Admiralty's ownership,
and entered upon their career as Canadian establishments.

The naval base at Halifax has had an unusual history. The
area which now constitutes the Maritime Provinces of Canada
was originally settled, as far as white men are concerned, by
the French in the seventeenth century, by whom it was known
as Acadie. The first settlement in 1604, in Passamaquoddy
Bay, was a failure and was transferred in 1605 to the Annapolis
Basin; and this settlement, known at first as Port Royal and
later as Annapolis Royal, was a centre of Acadian life during
the whole of the French regime. Immigration was always on a
very small scale, and by the end of the century the French
population of Acadia did not much exceed a thousand. During

-J

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1 763-1870

the War of the Spanish Succession which began in 1702,
Acadia was occupied by New England forces supported by the
Royal Navy. At the close of that war in 1713, by the Treaty of
Utrecht between France and Great Britain, France retained in
full sovereignty the islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, includ-
ing Cape Breton; but Newfoundland, subject to French fishing
rights on parts of her coast, and Acadia with its limits unde-
fined, became British territory, the latter under the name of
Nova Scotia.

During the reign of Louis XIV French engineers had come
to lead the world in the science of fortification, and during the
period of the wars in North America the French authorities
put much trust in key positions strongly fortified. After the
Treaty of Utrecht a settlement was established on Cape Breton
at Louisbourg, which had a good harbour and an excellent
strategic position in relation to the Gulf. This settlement seems
to have been intended to become a centre for the fisheries and
for trade, a strongly-garrisoned post, and a base for any naval
forces of France in those waters. The French Government then
constructed at Louisbourg, over a period of years, those great
fortifications of stone masonry the remains of which can still be
seen. During the summer of 1744, the opening year of the War
of the Austrian Succession, twenty-five Boston vessels were
captured by French privateers working out of Louisbourg.
William Shirley, the Governor of Massachusetts, thereupon
took the lead in preparing to remove what New England had
come to regard as a major threat; and in June 1745 about
four thousand New Englanders, supported by warships of the
Royal Navy, succeeded in capturing the fortress. At the close
of the war in 1748, however, as part of an overall settlement,
the island of Cape Breton, and Louisbourg with it, was re-
turned to France.

Yet the continuing rivalry of Britain and France in North
America indicated that peace on that continent was unlikely
to endure for long. If war should come again, its fortunes were
certain to depend greatly upon sea power. The British author-
ities set a high value upon retaining, if war came, their hold
on Nova Scotia, "the key of all the Eastern Colonies upon the
Northern Continent on this side of Newfoundland", as Gover-
nor Shirley called it.23 Accordingly in July 1749, the year after
the peace treaty and the return of Louisbourg to France,
Col. the Honourable Edward Cornwallis, the recently-appoin-

'" Lincoln, Correspondence of William Shirley, II, p. 149.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ted Governor of Nova Scotia, arrived in Chebucto Bay with
instructions to create a settlement and stronghold at that place.
The new establishment was to do for British interests what
Louisbourg had been designed to do for those of France.

For the purposes to be served the site was almost ideal. It
was central in relation to Nova Scotia itself, and had a
superbly commanding position with respect to all the neigh-
bouring waters and trade routes. The western shore of the
inlet offered a strong position for defence against attacks by
land, and a suitable area for settlement. Chebucto Bay was
already known to French and British mariners as an excellent
harbour. The outer bay is very large, well protected, and easily
entered; while the headlands, and the islands within the
entrance, offer good positions for outlying fixed defences
against attack by sea.24 Above the outer bay, and connected
to it by a narrow but easily-navigated channel, lies the expanse
of Bedford Basin, able by itself to accommodate a large fleet.
The inlet is almost wholly free from ice the year round, and
the anchorage is excellent both in the outer bay and all over the
basin. These attributes have combined to make the place one
of the finest natural harbours and naval bases in existence.

Unusually strong motives were needed to induce a British
government in the eighteenth century to make itself fully
responsible for establishing a plantation. On this occasion,
Parliament had voted £40,000 to cover initial expenses. The
government had undertaken to provide the emigrants free of
charge with transportation to the settlement, subsistence for a
year after arrival, arms, and implements, while land was to be
granted to them on easy terms. As a result of this firm support,
Cornwallis was accompanied to Chebucto Bay by an escorted
fleet of thirteen transports bearing 2,576 settlers. The new
arrivals landed, the plantation and military post were rapidly
laid out, and a small garrison arrived soon afterwards. The
clearing of land and the construction of buildings and of rough
fortifications were pushed forward. The new establishment
was named Halifax.25

In 1750 Cornwallis's settlement was made the capital of
Nova Scotia, in place of Annapolis Royal, and Dartmouth on
the east side of the harbour was founded. As has so often

24 The entrance, however, was rather wide for shore defence with eighteenth-century
artillery.

25 In honour of the 2nd Earl of Halifax, President of the Board of Trade, 1748-61, who had
been the most influential sponsor of the new establishment.

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NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763 1870

happened in the history of colonization, most of the original
settlers at Halifax proved unfitted for the exacting life which
they were called upon to lead. The venture was well managed,
however, and numerous other settlers arrived from England,
New England, and elsewhere. When the many difficulties
which always beset the colonizers of a wilderness are consid-
ered, the plantation must be pronounced a success; and when
the preliminary hostilities of the Seven Years' War began in
1755, a firm settlement had been established. An Irish army
officer has left the following description of Halifax in 1757:

The town of Halifax is large: the streets (which are not paved) are
tolerably regular, and of a good breadth; but their houses, upon a nearer
view, are mean, and do not display any great knowledge of architecture,
much less of taste, in those who erected them; which in general, together
with a capacious church, are of wood, and covered with the same materials.
Great allowances must nevertheless be made for a settlement still in its
infancy, and the inhabitants, together with the troops, have had incredible
difficulties to struggle with .... Their batteries, citadel, and other fortifica-
tions are of timber, these being thought sufficient to protect them against
an Indian enemy; but the channel of the river is well defended by a respec-
table battery on the eastern shore, and by several others upon George's
island .... They have here great variety of excellent fish, the staple com-
modity of this country and its dependent islands: as for the other necessaries
and conveniences of life, they must be indebted for them to New-England,
the other provinces to the southward, and to the mother-country; but I
must not omit that Chebucto or Halifax harbour is one of the finest in the
whole world, for depth of water, good anchorage and safety: they have a
royal dock here, with all the conveniences for the largest first-rate ship to
heave down and careen; moreover, it very rarely happens, that this harbour
is frozen up in the winter; for which several reasons, it is the rendezvous ot
all his Majesty's ships in America, and is frequently resorted to by others
from the West-Indies, whenever they have occasion to undergo any
repairs.26

The Halifax base was destined to play, during the first two
centuries of its existence, a leading role in five wars: the Seven
Years' W7ar, the War of the American Revolution, the War of
1812, and the two world conflicts in the first half of the
twentieth century. Of these wars, all except the third were
among the most fateful that have ever been fought. The first
three occurred in the days of sail, and in these three wars
Halifax served as the main British advanced base for Operations
against enemies on the North American continent. Eor this
purpose its strategic position was almost ideal. Most map
projections conceal a fact which a globe reveals, that a great
circle from Boston to Brest passes within a few miles of Halifax.
'I he base therefore lay close to or within convenient striking

Knox, Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America, i, pp. 50-52.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

•distance of the important trade routes which connected north-
ern North America with Europe and with the West Indies. 27
After 1776 the ports south of Nova Scotia, and particularly
those of New England, could be efficiently blockaded by ships
based on Halifax, so as to close the American termini of the
trade routes already mentioned, and disrupt coastwise ship-
ping. The comparative nearness of Halifax to Britain was also
advantageous.

The formal beginning of the Seven Years' War was preceded
by a virtual certainty that it must come, and by actual
hostilities between French and British forces. In the spring of
1755 a small British fleet was sent to cruise offLouisbourg so as
to prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching the
French possessions in North America; this blockade in peace-
time, however, did not succeed. In May 1756, a sham peace
changed to formal war, which was both a European war be-
tween two opposing alliances, and an imperial war between
Great Britain and France, fought on and beyond the seas.
French success in the early stages of hostilities brought
William Pitt to power in Britain late in 1756. The policy of
this great war Minister laid a primary emphasis upon the
imperial conflict, and especially upon offensive measures
against French North America, the decisive feature of which
was to be an assault against the centre of New France delivered
by way of the Gulf and the St. Lawrence. After one abortive
campaign, the first step in these crucial Operations was com-
pleted when an amphibious Operation 28 resulted in the sur-
render of Louisbourg in July 1758, and in the consequent un-
covering of the entrance to the Gulf. The following year a
British army supported by a fleet pushed up the St. Lawrence
to Quebec. After overcoming a heroic and skilful resistance,
one of the most famous amphibious Operations in history
brought about, in September 1759, the fall of Quebec which
had been the heart of the French power in North America. For
the British armies and fleets that carried out these momentous
Operations, Halifax had been the assembly point and base. In
1758, in the course of this war, the dockyard at Halifax had
been established.29

27 Throughout the period considered here the West Indies possessed an outstanding eco-
nomic importance which they afterwards lost.

28 This would now be called a "combined Operation".

29 In the year 1759 James Cook the future explorer was stationed in Halifax. The original
wall enclosing the dockyard at Halifax, and which forms part of the present wall, was begun
in 1769.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

The War of the American Revolution, 1775-83, from the
naval point of view falls into two parts. During the first
two years the Royal Navy dominated the Atlantic. British
land forces near the coast could therefore be freely supplied,
reinforced, or moved, by sea, and the seaborne trade of the
revolted colonies was progressively throttled. The forces
controlling the waters of northern New England were based on
Halifax, and the British army which evacuated Boston in
March 1776, fell back upon the Nova Scotia base, from which
also sailed the army and fleet that captured New York in the
summer of the same year. The second phase of the conflict
began in 1778 with the entry of France into the war as an ally
of the colonies, and in July of that year a strong French fleet
arrived off the American coast, broke the British blockade, and
released the bottled-up colonial trade. Thereafter the British
naval forces engaged in the decisive Operations in western
Atlantic waters were based for the most part on New York and
Newport and in the West Indies; in this phase of the conflict,
however, a number of privateers were fitted out in Halifax to
prey upon the trade of New England. As the struggle pro-
gressed Great Britain found herself outmatched by a coalition
which contained all the other important naval Powers, lost
control of the North Atlantic during a considerable period, and
lost the war. In the course of this conflict Halifax played a
much smaller role than it had in the previous war.30

Throughout the long period which extended from 1793 to
1815, Great Britain was engaged, except for one very brief
interval, in war with a revolutionary France which transformed
itself in the course of the conflict into the vast empire of
Napoleon. In June 1812 the United States declared war on
Great Britain, and this Anglo-American offshoot of the struggle
against Napoleon lasted until shortly after the Treaty of
Ghent of December 1814 had proclaimed peace between the
two nations on the basis of the status quo. During this war the
Royal Navy directed its principal effort against the enemy in
Europe; yet it was also able at all times to maintain forces in
the Western Atlantic which were overwhelmingly superior in
strength to the efficient but very small navy of the United
States. In 1812 the effective warships of the United States
Navy consisted of seven frigates and nine smaller warships,
while the Royal Navy had eighty-five warships on the Ameri-

30 In a long paragraph on operational bases on the North American continent during the
second phase of the War of the American Revolution, Capt. Mahan does not mention Halifax.
See Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 515-16.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

can station when hostilities began. Early in the war the
unusually powerful 44-gun frigates and some other warships of
the United States Navy were victorious in a series of single-
ship actions, which were humiliating to the older Service but
had no significant effect upon the course of the conflict. The
Royal Navy, on the other hand, maintained an adequate block-
ade along the whole coast of the United States:

The pressure brought to bear on America by the British blockade was
exceedingly effective .... Its [the blockade's] mere existence inflicted a
direct material loss to the American people a hundredfold greater than the
entire American navy was able to inflict on Great Britain .... It told heavily
against the coasting trade, though less heavily than against foreign com-
merce .... Exports practically ceased by the close of 1813.31

During the War of 1812 the mainland bases south of Nova
Scotia which had maintained the Royal Navy during the War
of the American Revolution were no longer available. Halifax
therefore served once again as the principal British base in the
western hemisphere, and was never threatened by land. In
spite of the blockade not a few xAmerican merchant ships
ventured to leave port, and many of these were captured by
ships of the Royal Navy, and by privateers for a considerable
number of which Halifax was the home port. On March 17,
1813, an auctioneer in the town advertised the sale of twenty-
three vessels by order of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, and a
judge of that court is reported to have received £10,000 in fees
during the war. Of all the prizes brought into the Nova Scotia
base at this period the most famous was the American 38-gun
frigate Chesapeake. In May 1813, this ship had been in Boston
harbour while H.M.S. Shannon, a frigate of about the same
force, was cruising outside. On June 1 the Chesapeake sailed
out to engage the British ship, and after a hot and extraordin-
arily brief encounter, one of the most celebrated single-ship
actions in history, the Chesapeake was captured by boarding.
She was taken to Halifax, where her commanding officer who
had been killed during the action was buried with naval
honours, six British post captains acting as pall-bearers. %-

The War of 1812 was the last of those waged by Great
Britain against an enemy in North America. The rest of the
century was comparatively peaceful, and such wars as Britain
fought in that period were restricted ones in which the Halifax

31 Roosevelt, "The War with the United States, 1K12-1815'', in Clowes, The Royal Navy, vi.

32 A memorial of this victory in the grounds of Admiralty House, Halifax, was unveiled
in 1927.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

base had no part. Nevertheless the swords were not beaten into
ploughshares, and the principle was maintained that the
British Government was fully responsible for developing and
maintaining naval bases and other positions considered essen-
tial to general imperial defence; and that the principal instru-
ment of imperial defence was sea power. Of the bases believed
to be necessary for imperial purposes Halifax was one, and
accordingly it continued to be maintained and garrisoned by
the British Government until early in the following century.
Testifying before the Select Committee on Colonial Military
Expenditure of 1861, a senior naval officer said that "Halifax
is a very important part of the naval strength of this country."
Another witness before this committee, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, who had recently visited Canada, expressed
the following opinion:

I look upon Halifax as an Imperial post, quite as much as I do upon
Gibraltar or Malta .... It is an important military post; it is still more
important as a naval station, inasmuch as by its natural capabilities it is
certainly one of the finest, and in all probability the finest harbour in the
world .... In Halifax all the navies in the world can be sheltered. In that
magnificent harbour called the 'Bedford Basin' you might fight a naval
engagement, and in the other two harbours any number of vessels might
ride in safety.33

The Admiralty's North America and West Indies Station34
had bases or coaling stations at Halifax and Bermuda, and in
the West Indies, and its headquarters were often, though not
always, situated at Halifax. The station was subdivided in
different ways at various times. In 1867, for example, it had
four more or less permanent divisions: Barbados, which
included the Windward Islands; the Jamaica division, which
comprised the remaining West Indies area and the Bahamas,
the coasts of Central America, British Honduras, and Mexico;
the Bermuda division; and the Halifax division, which included
the remainder of the station to the northward of Bermuda.
In addition, at this time, in view of threatened Fenian raids
from the United States, a fifth division had been temporarily
set up to take care of all the navigable waters above Cap Chat
in the St. Lawrence estuary. In 1863 when the American Civil
War was at its height, there were twenty-four warships on the
station: in 1870 there were twenty. In addition to performing
the usual duties of warships in peace-time, protection was

33 Pari Paps., 1861, xm. The naval officer quoted was Rear Admiral Sir C. Elliot, and the
Secretary of State was the Duke of Newcastle.

34 The official name of this station varied at different times.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

provided for the Canadian and Newfoundland fisheries. For
climatic reasons the warships were as far as possible assigned
to the northern part of the station in the summer, and were
moved southward for the winter. Many of the provisions needed
by the squadron were purchased in the Maritime Provinces,
and after the introduction of steam some of the coal required
lor fuel was obtained from the Nova Scotia mines. The close
proximity of the United States was a problem in that it tempted
ratings to desert, but not to the same extent as at Esquimalt.36

If during the long period of the Pax Britannica Halifax was
never a war base, it was a valuable diplomatic asset. The
United States, which had begun the century as a minor Power
and was to end it a giant, had many controversies after 1815
with governments in Europe; and most of all with Britain,
whose interests in the Americas far exceeded those of any
wholly extra-American state. Most of these British interests
were territorial or other claims, principally and often momen-
tously important to British North America and the later
Dominion of Canada. In the numerous negotiations which
accordingly took place, Great Britain was the most formidable
principal with whom the United States had to deal, for if it
came to war, she alone could have used superior sea power to
throttle American seaborne trade, and to deploy, if necessary,
her available land forces upon the North American continent.
Such arguments as these, even if unspoken, have been the
strongest ones when diplomats have sought agreement con-
cerning any question that might lead to hostilities. In many of
the Anglo-American negotiations from the Convention of
1818 to the Venezuela Boundary Award of 1899, the naval
base at Halifax was an important weight upon the British side
of the scales.

The eastern Pacific and the west coast of North America
were very late arrivals on the stage of world strategy; conse-
quently the creation of Esquimalt as a naval base post-dated
that of Halifax by more than a century. Sustained British
interest in what is now the coast of British Columbia began
with Capt. Cook's third voyage, 1776-79, which was followed
in 1792 by the visit of Capt. Vancouver to those waters. The
Hudson's Bay Company later extended its activities to the
Pacific Coast, and in 1843 founded Fort Camosun, which was
soon to be re-named Victoria. In 1849 the Company received

85 From material preserved in the Admiralty Record Office. Most of the records of this
.station, however, have not been found.

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

the grant of Vancouver Island to which it undertook to bring
settlers, and in the same year Victoria became its western
headquarters. This small fortified trading-post on the
southern tip of the island proved to be the beginning of a
prosperous settlement with a promising future.

The founding of Victoria and the subsequent development
on the island of a colony which soon afterwards extended to the
mainland, imposed a new responsibility upon the Royal Navy.
From the settlement of the Nootka dispute between Spain and
Great Britain in 1795 down to the establishing of Victoria,
there had been no need for British frigates to cruise as far north
as Vancouver Island. The Pacific Station as a separate entity
had been created in 1837, with its headquarters at Valparaiso.
In 1846, three years after the planting of Victoria, the survey
vessel H.M.S. Pandora came north and began to chart the
harbour of Victoria and that of Esquimalt nearby; and in
July 1848, H.M. frigate Constance used Esquimalt harbour as
an anchorage, this being the first occasion on which a ship of
the Royal Navy ever did so.36

The harbour at Victoria is very restricted, and the site of
the fort there had been chosen by the Hudson's Bay Company
officials chiefly on account of the good agricultural land in the
vicinity. Esquimalt, which is three miles from Victoria, is a
first-rate harbour of medium size, and the ships of the Pacific
Squadron used it after 1848 whenever they were in that
neighbourhood. The Spanish had named the harbour, in 1790,
Puerto de Cordova: the Br;rish adopted the Indian name,
which may mean "a place gradually shoaling,"37 In the very
early days this name was often spelled "Is-whoy-malth" or
"Squirnal".

A naval officer presents the following picture of Esquimalt
as it appeared in the year 1849:

In that year, when we spent some weeks in Esquimalt Harbour on
board H.M.S. Inconstant, there was not a house to be seen on its shores; we
used to fire shot and shell as we liked about the harbour, and might send
parties ashore and cut as much wood as we needed without the least chance
of interruption.38

36 For the historical background of the Esquimalt base, see F. V. Longstaff, " The Begin-
nings of the Pacific Station and Esquimalt Royal Naval Establishment" in Third Annual
Report and Proceedings of the British Columbia Historical Association, 1925; idem and W. Kaye
Lamb, "The Royal Navy on the Northwest Coast, 1813-1850", pt. i in British Columbia
Historical Quarterly, ix, No. 1, and pt. n ibid., No. 2.

37 Walbran, British Columbia Coast Names, p. 171.

38 Mayne, Four Years in British Columbia, p. 25.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Another officer describes how they made the road from
Esquimalt to Victoria in 1852:

It did not take us long to realise that in bad weather communication
with the fort [Victoria] was risky by water, for an officer and two men lost
their lives in a rough sea and the floating kelp which entangles swimmers
along the shore. It was, therefore, resolved to break a road through the
forest, and the novel task was tackled with enthusiasm. Axes sent their
echoes ringing down the glades; mighty trees fell. We macadamised the
track after a fashion, and from henceforth by this road (now traversed by
electric cars) we had easy access to Victoria.39

In 1851 Rear Admiral Fairfax Moresby, the Commander in
Chief of the Station, stated in a report to the Admiralty:

Victoria has been too hastily preferred to Esquimalt, it happily leaves
this beautiful Harbour and its shores in their primitive state — I earnestly
recommend the Government to reserve for 'Her Majesty, Her Heirs and
Successors' this Harbour of Esquimalt and its shores; the only place where
a Naval Establishment can be formed, and admirably adapted for all its
operations.40

The beginning of a naval establishment at Esquimalt
resulted from the Crimean War which began in the spring of
1854. In September an Anglo-French squadron suffered heavy
casualties during an unsuccessful attack upon Petropavlovsk —
an action marked by a probably unique incident when the
Admiral in command, having committed his ships to the
attack, retired to his cabin and committed suicide.41 Serious
suffering was occasioned to the wounded because there was no
base in the North Pacific where they could be given adequate
attention. In February 1855 Rear Admiral Bruce, the Com-
mander in Chief, in a letter from Valparaiso, informed the
Governor of Vancouver Island, Sir James Douglas, that a
number of warships would be visiting the island the following
July, and asked him to obtain a supply of coal and of fresh
meat and vegetables for their use. The letter concluded with
the suggestion: "Your Excellency will probably be able to
provide a building upon the arrival of the Squadron, that may
serve as a temporary Hospital for the sick and wounded: the
want of which was seriously felt last year."42

39 Moresby, Two Admirals, p. 103.

40 Moresby to Sec. Admiralty, July 3, 1851, "Correspondence Relating to the Establish-
ment of a Naval Base at Esquimalt, 1851-57", in British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vi,
No. 4.

41 Clowes, The Royal Navy, vi, p. 430.

42 Bruce to Douglas, Feb. 14, 1855, "Correspondence Relating to the Establishment of a
Naval Base at Esauimalt."

NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

Douglas replied that everything possible would be done to
meet these requests. Concerning the last of them he said that,
as no suitable building was available, "I resolved with the
advice of a majority of the Members of my Council, to take
immediate steps tor the erection of decent and comfortable
buildings, to serve as a naval hospital; and the work is now in
progress, and will probably be sufficiently advanced, on the
arrival of the Fleet, to receive the sick." In August Douglas
reported that the buildings were ready. He mentioned the fact
that they had cost about £1,000, and raised the question of
who would pay for them. Soon afterwards a part of the
Squadron arrived at Esquimalt and received the provisions
that had been collected there for them: the hospital accom-
modation, however, was not needed. These hospital buildings
were three in number, each fifty feet long by thirty feet wide,
and the Admiralty willingly paid for them. They were the
pioneer naval buildings at Esquimalt, and one of them lasted
until the summer of 1939. In a letter to the Commander in
Chief the Governor had suggested: "I think you would find it
convenient to make this place a sick Depot, or what is better
a general naval Depot for the Pacific Fleet." In November
1856, Bruce reported to the Admiralty:

I am of opinion that it would be an advantage to the Service, if a
Provision Depot were established at Vancouver [Island] for the Ships
employed in the North Pacific. At present a Ship stationed at that Island,
for the protection of the Colony, has to sail over a space of seven thousand
miles to get to her Depot: so that in point of fact, when a vessel arrives at
that distant part of the Station, it is time to think of returning again for
supplies.43

At the beginning of the Crimean War the Russian and
British Governments had reached an agreement which in
practice made the eastern Pacific a neutral area. The colony of
Vancouver Island, however, remained in ignorance of this fact
tor several months, and the colonists were consequently alarm-
ed by their apparently exposed and defenceless position. A
proposal to draft the able-bodied settlers and to arm some of
the Indians was brought before the Council, only to be rejected.
Instead the colony chartered the Hudson's Bay Company's
steamer Otter, and employed her as a patrol vessel for a short
time, at a cost of £400 which the British Government even-
tually paid. During this war the colony was never, in fact, in
any appreciable danger of Russian attack.44

43 Introduction and correspondence, ibid.

** Davidson, "The War Scare of 1854" in British Columbia Historical Quarterly, v, No. 4.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The harbour continued to be used by ships of the squadron
after the Crimean War, and store ships brought supplies there
from England. In various places along the shore houses built
by colonists began to appear. By 1856 the colony was con-
sidered sufficiently mature to receive a representative Assem-
bly. Two years later the discovery of gold up the Fraser River
caused a gold rush and the creation of a government for the
mainland.

In March 1859, the Admiralty asked the Commander in
Chief of the Pacific Station, Rear Admiral Baynes, for his
opinion concerning the best position for the headquarters of the
Station. Baynes replied that should the Admiralty decide to
move the headquarters from Valparaiso, Esquimalt would be
found to have many advantages. He considered that the
duties of a Commander in Chief could be carried out as effici-
ently at Esquimalt as at Valparaiso. As far as was known no
harbour in those waters was better suited than Esquimalt for a
naval yard and hospital; moreover the seventeen acres which,
in addition to the hospital site, the Admiralty owned there,
would afford ample space for all purposes. The climate was
very healthy. Stores and provisions kept well, and were,
except for fresh beef, at least as cheap at Victoria as at
Valparaiso. The Admiral suggested that the money put into
circulation by such a naval establishment would greatly help
the infant colony.

On the other hand, Baynes thought that the granting of
leave to ships' companies at Esquimalt would present a diffi-
culty, because of the strong temptation to desert to the United
States nearby. He also pointed out how easy the place would
be to attack from the United States, and that the tongue of
land on which the naval property stood was seriously exposed
to shell-fire from ships at a considerable range. He felt that a
decision on the permanent establishment of a naval yard and
hospital at Esquimalt should be postponed. H.M.S. Plumper
was surveying on that coast, and Baynes thought that the
Admiralty ought not to commit itself to Esquimalt until she
should have carried out a further year's work, on the chance
that she might find a more suitable harbour.45

45 Baynes to Sec. Admiralty, May 12 and Nov. 14, 1859, "Vancouver's and Queen Char-
lotte's Islands," n, Pacific Station Records, Provincial Archives of British Columbia. The
records of the Pacific Station were left in Esquimalt when that base was transferred to Canada.
The Admiralty later consented to their remaining permanently in Canada, and they were
divided between the British Columbia and Dominion Archives.

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NAVAL DEFENCE, 1763-1870

By the following summer Admiral Baynes, whose cautious-
ness makes it difficult to feel sure what his opinions really were,
seems to have favoured a commitment:

The necessity of having a depot at Vancouver Island for Provisions and
Stores is becoming every day more apparent, and as these Colonies become
developed, if their Lordships should decide on making it the Head Quarters
of the Station, will be indispensable. It then becomes a question which I
wish to submit for their Lordships consideration whether it might not be
more advisable, and in the end less expensive to erect buildings suited to our
present requirements instead of sending ships from England as Floating
Depots.46

Admiral Baynes had recommended in 1858 that a light should
be placed at the entrance to the harbour, and another on Race
Rocks outside. The suggestion was carried out, and both the
lights went into operation in 1860. In 1865 Esquimalt was
created a permanent naval base by imperial Order in Council.

The following is a description of Esquimalt in 1870 as it
appeared to one of the officers of H. M.S. Zealous:

It would be difficult to find a snugger harbour than Esquimalt; com-
pletely land-locked, surrounded on all sides by dense forests. There are few
houses outside of a diminutive dockyard, but through the trees appears a
larger building than usual, which serves as a naval hospital. At the head ot
a shaky pier is another building, designated the Naval Club. Though on a
small scale, it supplies a want which was long felt. Altogether, there is a
charming abandon about this spot; a short plunge into the dense forest, and
all signs of civilization cease — birds and insects are your sole companions.47

46 Same to same, Aug. 2, 1860, ibid.

47 Eardley-Wilmot, Our Journal in the Pacific, pp. 34-5.

Chapter 3

THE
IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

WITH the year 1870 the curtain rose upon a new scene
in the international drama. During the last third of
the nineteenth century Germany, Japan, the United
States, and Italy, made their appearance as great Powers.
These new large masses of organized strength, particularly
the first, overset the existing balance of power all over the
world. In the same period, moreover, nationalism increased
in strength, while international diplomacy became tenser
and less scrupulous. Among the great Powers the advance
of the industrial revolution combined with a desire for national
aggrandizement to produce a dynamic imperialism and highly
competitive policies of colonial expansion. Accordingly the
nations lived in a world that had lost much of its former
stability and security.

The new era in international affairs began with the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870, and the unification of Germany in the
following year. The German Empire which was then created
proved to be the most dynamic State in Europe, and in-
herited the military traditions of Prussia. In 1879 it entered
into a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary, and soon
afterwards Italy established defensive alliances with both of
these Powers. The Triple Alliance occasioned great uneasiness
in France and Russia, who in 1894 sought to counter it byi|
entering into a defensive alliance of their own. These alliances
were created and maintained by fear, and they increasingly
competed against each other in amassing armaments.

At the other side of the world the ancient empire of Japant
having learned the bitter lesson that its industrial and milil
tary techniques were obsolete, rapidly assimilated those of
the west. By the end of the century Japan had become a
western-type State, a fact which altered the whole structure
of international relations in the Pacific. As for the United

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

States, following upon its Civil War it assumed the unques-
tioned status of" a first-rate Power.

The growth of nationalism and imperialism in this period
placed a premium upon the ownership of fleets. In 1890 and •
1892 Capt. Mahan published his two most famous works, in
which, among other things, he almost equated superiority at
sea with prosperity in peace and victory in war, and exalted
sea power in general. Mahan's books were read almost every-
where, and their influence was very great. Accordingly four
new great-Power navies appeared on the scene, and the fleets
of the smaller nations were expanded and multiplied.

After Trafalgar the Royal Navy had remained the strong-
est upon the seas except for one brief moment,1 and until
towards the end of the century the only other navy of conse-
quence was that of France, over which the British Admiralty
was content to maintain a superiority of about a third. Later,
however, the navies of Russia and the United States reached
a significant strength. In 1889 the "two-Power standard'^
was officially set up as a measure of British naval requirements*!
the Royal Navy must be at least as strong as the second andl
third navies combined. In practice a good margin of super-
iority was maintained over the French and Russian navies,
counted as one, because the device of a close blockade had
not yet been abandoned.2 The United States Navy, though
it supplied food for thought at times, was never included in
the calculations.

Although after 1815 the nineteenth century saw little of
naval war, it witnessed the greatest technical revolution in
naval history. The mechanics of the industrial age, applied
to warships, altered these almost beyond recognition. The
wooden ship, propelled by sails, and firing solid or hollow
shot from muzzle-loading cannon, gave place to the steel
ship, protected where necessary by steel armour, driven by
propellers which were turned by steam-engines, and firing
explosive shells from breech-loading guns. The submarine,
the mine, and the torpedo, were also developed in a practical
form within the century, although the revolutionary effects
which they were to work upon naval warfare were not known
until later. A far larger vessel could be built of steel than of

1 In 1858 and for a short time thereafter the French Navy achieved an approximate
equality by launching a number of ironclads before the Royal Navy was ready to do the same.

2 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 105; Woodward, Britain and the German Navy, p. 12.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

wood, and the mechanized ship steadily increased in size and
cost.3 Her life was shorter than that of her wooden prede-
cessor, for so quickly were improvements in design evolved
in the machine age that whereas a wooden ship might be
good for fifty years or more,4 many warships built during
the latter part of the nineteenth century were obsolescent
before they struck the water. The ever-present danger of
being suddenly outclassed by some decisive improvement in
design created a feeling of nervousness and insecurity among
admiralties and peoples; and this feeling may have been one
cause of the increasing naval construction after about 1880.

The upsetting of the existing balance of power after 1870,
the extension of the industrial revolution to other countries,
and the growth of navies everywhere, weakened the position
of Great Britain and the Empire, and in this period the
question of Canadian participation in naval defence outside
the Great Lakes was officially raised for the first time. The
changes which were taking place in the international sphere
were destined to exercise the most profound effects upon
Canada; but of this fact the people of the Dominion remained
almost wholly unaware.

Between 1877 and 1882 certain events took place which,
though of minor importance in themselves, foreshadowed the
future in a very interesting way. The Russo-Turkish War
1877-78 brought Russia and Great Britain to the verge
hostilities, at a time when the depredations of the Confederal
cruiser Alabama were still fresh in everyone's mind. In these
circumstances the Canadian Government, after having con-
sidered a memorandum from the Minister of Militia and
Defence, asked Lord Dufferin, the Governor General:

To communicate by cable, with the Imperial Government drawing
attention to the defenceless condition of our Atlantic Sea-Board and the
danger to the shipping interest of the Empire, should War be declared,
without ample provision being made for defence — and submitting that a
fleet of fast Cruisers would be absolutely necessary for protection.

The idea was that swift and lightly-armed auxiliary cruisers
should be stationed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay

3 Displacement tonnage of certain British battleships:

Battleship Date of Completion Displacement (tons)

Bellerophon 1866 7,550

Renown 1895 12,350

Dreadnought 1906 17,900

Queen Elizabeth 1915 27,500

4 "The outstanding example of real longevity was the Royal William 90, built in 1719>
which participated in a campaign in 1780 and lasted altogether nearly a century without
extensive repairs." Albion, Forests and Sea Power, pp. 84-5.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

of Kund>' in order to deal with any similar ships which the
Russians might be able to obtain in the ports of the United
States. Lord Dufferin transmitted the Canadian Govern-
ment's message the same day to the Colonial Secretary, Sir
Michael Hicks Beach. The request was, of course, referred
to the Admiralty by the Colonial Office. Replying the Ad-
miralty stated that they had made such arrangements as
means permitted to check depredations by enemy cruisers at
the outbreak of a war; that the events of the American Civil
War indicated how difficult, if not impossible, it would prob-
ably be to prevent much mischief being done by a single fast
raider; and that a large additional expenditure would be
needed if this danger were to be met at all adequately. The
Admiralty then raised the question of action by the Dominion
Government:

Looking at the very large mercantile marine possessed by the Do-I
minion, it is only reasonable to assume that the Canadian Government
will avail themselves of their own resources for the protection of Canadian
ports and shipping, and My Lords trust that Her Majesty's Government
will readily aid any such efforts by the loan of guns (which the Dominion
does not appear to possess), to arm their vessels, which would certainly
exceed in number and speed any force an European power at War with
England could readily acquire on the Atlantic Seaboard.

Writing to the Governor General the Colonial Secretary
enclosed a copy of the Admiralty's reply, and referred to the
possibility that the Canadian Government might help to
meet the danger, should it occur, by taking up and arming
some fast merchant ships. He asked Dufferin to invite the
careful attention of his Ministers to the subject:

. . . which appears to me to be of great importance, not only in view of the
present unsettled condition ot European affairs, but with reference to any
contingencies which may arise in the future. In connection with it I woulc^
suggest that they should consider the expediency of passing an Act through'
the Dominion Legislature, if this has not been already done, in pursuance
of the third Section of the 'Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865,' of which I
annex a copy.5

Great emphasis had been placed upon the armed mer-
chant cruiser with the development of the fast steam passenger
ship. The earliest of these were faster than the contemporary
cruisers and consequently embodied a formidable threat, as
they might be armed and sent raiding in time of war. In these

5 Report of a Committee of the Privy Council, Mav 4, 1878; Dufferin to Hicks Beach,
May 4, 1878; Colonial Office to Admiralty, Mav 31, 1878; Admiraltv to Colonial Office, June
10, 1878; Hicks Beach to Dufferin, July 8, 1878: copies in Macdonald Papers — Militia
Defence, vol. 2 (Pub. Arch.).

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

circumstances the best reply to an auxiliary cruiser was an-
other auxiliary cruiser. Regular cruisers later came to surpass
passenger ships in speed; and the armed merchant cruiser
then became merely a useful addition to the cruiser fleet, and
an economical instrument of naval war like the privateer
before her. This earliest suggestion that Canada should
prepare in time of peace to use auxiliary cruisers in war was
to be repeated later at various times.

The international crises of 1878 did not lead to war, but
the idea that the Canadian Government should make some
preparation for naval defence was not immediately dropped.
The following year the officer . commanding the Canadian
Militia suggested that on account of the long seaboard and
great inland lakes and rivers of the Dominion, it would be
most prudent that a naval reserve should be created which
would be available as a powerful support to the land forces in
time of war. He added that there were probably about ninety
thousand fishermen and other seafaring men in the country,
and suggested that an attempt be made to enrol a consider-
able number of them in such a reserve, which would be ad-
ministered by the Department of Marine and Fisheries. He
also suggested that it would be of mutual benefit for the
British Government to give or lend to the Dominion an iron-
clad or a wooden frigate which could be used for coast defence
in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and also for training naval vol-
unteers and boys.

On October 8, 1880, therefore, the Governor General
stated in a despatch to the Colonial Secretary that his govern-
ment "would not be averse to instituting a ship for training
purposes if the Imperial Government would provide the
ship." The Admiralty said that H.M.S. Charybdis, an old-
type steam corvette6 which was not worth the heavy expense
of refitting for another commission, would serve the purpose.
She was expected home at any moment from the China
Station, after more than seven years' absence; and the Ad-
miralty offered her, as a loan at first and shortly afterwards
as a gift. The Canadian Government cabled its acceptance,
and Capt. Scott, a retired officer of the Royal Navy, was sent
to England to bring the Charybdis over. Soon after his arrival
Scott reported to the Canadian High Commissioner that he

6 The corvette was "a flush-decked war-vessel, ship-, bark-, or brig-rigged, having one tier
of guns" {Shorter Oxford Dictionary). The name was to be revived during the Second World
War and applied to a considerably different type of vessel.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

thought her suitable for a training ship. The disappointment
began when the chief engineer reported that the ship's boilers
were practically worn out and would not stand a winter
voyage across the Atlantic. The corvette was therefore re-
paired at the expense of the Canadian Government, and early
in 1881 Scott sailed her safely to Saint John, N.B.

While there she broke loose in a gale and damaged ship-
ping in the harbour; and on another occasion two citizens of
Saint John, who were trying to go on board, broke a rotten
gang-plank and were drowned. The Canadian Government
was severely criticized by the House of Commons in Ottawa,
and the Admiralty was asked to take back their gift. The
Minister of Marine and Fisheries stated that during the
voyage across the Atlantic the ship had proved heavy to
handle, and that she would require a larger crew and conse-
quently a greater annual expenditure than had been con-
templated "in view of the sparse and employed population of
this young country." A heavy outlay would also be necessary
in order to prepare her for training purposes. The Admiralty
having agreed to take the Charybdis back, she was towed to
Halifax in August 1882 and delivered to the naval authorities
at that base.7

From the point of view of Canadian naval development
the Charybdis incident was unfortunate, inasmuch as it was
often afterwards referred to in Canada as a warning to those
desirous that some Canadian naval effort should be under-
taken. The episode is interesting because of the expressions
of opinion and policy which it called forth. The Charybdis
was the first warship that was ever owned by the Dominion
Government.

During the last two decades of the century the problem
of general imperial defence became very insistent, especially
in the field of naval defence. For almost the whole of the
British Empire sea power was more vital than defence by land,
because a military disaster on land in any of the dependencies
except India and Canada would probably not be irreparable, y
A decisive naval defeat, on the other hand, would have en-
abled the enemy to attack with overwhelming land forces
almost any part of the overseas Empire, to which no sup-
porting forces could then be sent from Britain; or to invade

7 Material on the gift and return of the Charybdis is to be found in Sess. Paps., 1879, No.
5; 1880, No. 8; 1881, No. 66; House of Commons Debates, 1882, xn, p. 124; A.R.O., S6199/82.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

and conquer, or blockade and starve, the British Isles them-
selves, the principal source of the Empire's military power.

The hazards of the new age, and the unequalled splendour
of the British imperial heritage, produced a rising tide of
imperial sentiment both in Britain itself and among those of
British descent in the dependencies overseas. The British
imperialist embraced a nationalism which had been expanded
so as to include the whole vast extent of the lands over which
the Queen-Empress ruled. He rejected the Cobdenite belief
that the colonies were irrevocably destined to fall away into
independence. Yet he feared that the ever-expanding auton-
omy of the self-governing dependencies, if it were not offset
by powerful centripetal forces, would probably end in the v
dissolution of the Empire. The imperialist therefore sought
to strengthen the existing bonds of union and to fashion new
ones. Imperialist sentiment reached its greatest strength on
the eve of the Boer War: thereafter it declined. At its worst
it was an intolerant chauvinism, based on racial pride or
investments in Rhodesia. At its best it was the most inclusive
patriotism that the world had seen, and may even have
been the prototype of some unanimity of the future which
will transcend all the frontiers of nationality and race.

For some years after their point of view had begun to be
important, the imperialists confined themselves to advocating
a stronger imperial sentiment and closer ties between the
various parts of the Empire, without envisaging any new
constitutional machinery:

The 'eighties witnessed a boom in Imperialism. The race between the
Great Powers for the acquisition of colonies, the growing militarism on
the Continent, and the defeat of Free Trade in almost all foreign countries
had placed the value of colonies beyond all doubt. Prominent statesmen
of all parties were vying with each other in declaring their attachment to
the colonial Empire. Public attention was directed to the problem of the
relations between England and her colonies by a stream of publications,
by far the most important of which were Seeley's Expansion of England
and Froude's Oceana^ and by spectacular events like the Colonial and
Indian Exhibition in 1886 and the Jubilee in 1887. 8

At any time since the demise of the old colonial system, a
consideration of imperial problems had usually led the in-
quirer to decide that the principal one was defence, and to
this conclusion the imperialists quickly came. For the pur-
pose of preparing for or making war, although it possessed

8 Bodelsen, Studies in Imperialism, p. 205.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1 870-1902

immense potential resources the Empire as a whole was ill
organized. Moreover the existing distribution of responsi-
bility for imperial defence, with its financial implications,
was still the aspect of the imperial connection that it was
easiest to criticize. Since defence was probably the most
fundamental and important of all the interests which the
various parts of the Empire held in common, it might appear
that if the imperialists failed to solve the problem of common
defence they would fail all along the line.

This and similar considerations eventually led many of
them to advocate what was called "imperial federation." In
the words of one of the early converts to this belief:

Common defence involves common expense; common expense and
danger confer the right of common control of foreign affairs, from which
danger may arise, and of the forces required for defence; common control
must be by common representation; common representation is Imperial/
Federation.9

In 1884 the Imperial Federation League was founded in order
to work for some form of union or federation, and in 1886 the
League began to publish its own journal. The gospel was
vigorously preached, and the movement succeeded in ob-
taining the support of a large number of prominent men.

The imperial federationists never agreed upon and sup-
ported any one detailed scheme of federation; but various
proposed imperial constitutions were put forward by in-
dividuals. The general aim upon which most of the federa-
tionists were agreed, however, is expressed in the following
statement by one of them:

The ideal of Federation which naturally presents itself to the mind
is one which provides a supreme Parliament or Council, national not merely
in name but in reality, because containing in just proportion representa-
tives of all the self-governing communities of the Empire. Such a body,
relegating the management of local affairs to local Governments, and
devoting its attention to a clearly defined range of purely Imperial con-
cerns, would seem to satisfy a great national necessity.10

The Imperial Federation League dissolved in 1893; but the (,
creed was widely and actively professed thereafter. The
League's greatest achievement, during its short life, was the
major part that it played in bringing about the meeting of
the first colonial conference in 1887.

'■' Quoted in Burt, Imperial Architects, p. 162.
lu Parkin, Imperial Federation, p. 303.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

In seeking a closer political and military integration of the
Empire, imperialism was to find its most serious obstacle in
the local national sentiment which was slowly developing in
the self-governing dependencies. In general the descendant
of settlers did not think of himself as an exile from the land
of his fathers, but was contentedly indigenous to the country
of his birth. At a later stage, in the Dominions and larger
colonies at least, he began to feel a new pride in and enthus-
iasm for his political unit. Among the inhabitants of the
overseas dependencies who were of British descent, this senti-
ment might conceivably have identified itself primarily with
the larger imperial structure; but for the most part it did not
do so. The growing nationalism of the self-governing colonies
was friendly to the British connection. That which it cher-
ished more dearly than anything else, however, was political
autonomy, which was in harmony with the prevailing political
ideal of the age and a symbol of the national individuality and
status.

The idea that the governments of the United Kingdom and
of the self-governing colonies should confer from time to time
regarding their mutual problems, was one that in the circum-
stances was certain to have been suggested and acted upon
sooner or later. It was put forward in unconventional form
in the year 1869, by a group of colonists in London who strongly
resented the recent policy of the British Government with
respect to New Zealand. In the late eighteen-sixties the
British Army garrisons were being withdrawn from most of
the self-governing parts of the Empire, including New Zea-
land where the long and indecisive Maori Wars were still in
progress. This policy of leaving them to face the Maoris
without the support of regular troops had aroused widespread
dissatisfaction among the colonists, a feeling which produced
in the year 1869 — in New Zealand of all places — an agitation
on behalf of annexation to the United States.

A meeting of colonists was held in London, apparently for
the purpose of considering the government's policy. The
meeting set up a committee in whose name a circular letter
was sent to the colonial secretaries of the self-governing
colonies, expressing the view that the policy of withdrawing
the troops from New Zealand:

. . . seems to point, as an ulterior result, to a severance of the connection . . .
disastrous alike to the Mother Country and the Colonies .... Our object
is, if possible, to make arrangements by which the Colonies themselves,

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

through properly authorized Representatives, may meet and confer . . .
with the view of urging on the Imperial Government, with the weight
due to the combined opinion, such changes in the present administration
of Colonial affairs as may appear desirable.11

The obscure origins of this letter, its outspoken criticism of
the existing government and system, and the unorthodox
use that was made of it, commended it neither to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies nor to the colonial governments.
Accordingly the suggestion which it contained came to
nothing.

On August 11, 1886, the Imperial Federation League
asked the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, to summon an
official conference of colonies with a view to the creation of
an imperial council, a suggestion which Salisbury received
sympathetically. At a Mansion House dinner the same
evening Sir Adolphe Caron, the Canadian Minister of Militia,
spoke approvingly of united action for defence.12 In Novem-
ber, the Secretary of State for the Colonies addressed a des-
patch to the self-governing colonies, inviting them to send
representatives to a conference for the discussion of certain
mutual problems, especially that of defence.13 The First
Colonial Conference was a product of imperialist sentiment,
of anxiety, and of a feeling on the part of the imperial author-
ities that an unreasonable proportion of the weight of the
Empire's defence — particularly naval defence — rested upon
the shoulders of the taxpayers in the United Kingdom.

The conference sat in London from April 4 until May 9,
1887 — the year of the Queen's first jubilee. In his opening
address Lord Salisbury disavowed any wish to raise at that
conference the question of imperial federation.14 The British
Government reiterated its earlier-established position that
land defences, generally speaking, were the responsibility of
the colony concerned. Nearly half the meetings of the con-
ference were devoted to the subject of naval defence, espe-
cially that of the Australian colonies. The British Government
postulated a strong navy, free to operate anywhere. In order
that the Royal Navy might in practice be ubiquitous, it was
essential that certain bases and coaling stations should be

11 C. 24, " Correspondence respecting a Proposed Conference of Colonial Representatives
in London", enclosure in No. 1, Pari. Paps., 1870, xlix.

12 Jebb, Imperial Conference, i, p. 7.

13 C.5091, "Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1887," i, p. vii, Pari. Paps., 1887, lvi.

14 Ibid., p. 5.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

provided with shore defences. "In addition to the Imperial
fortresses Malta, Gibraltar, Bermuda, and Halifax, it would
seem necessary to defend on an adequate scale, Cape Town
and Simon's Bay, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, Port Louis
(Mauritius), Aden, Colombo (Ceylon), Singapore, Hong
Kong, Port Royal (Jamaica), Port Castries (St. Lucia), and
Esquimalt, in addition to minor coaling stations . . ." The
imperial fortresses would remain a responsibility of the Lmited
Kingdom; but in the case of certain colonies in which local as
well as imperial interests seemed to require that naval bases
be maintained, the government of the United Kingdom
thought that the cost should be shared, and to this arrange-
ment the governments of Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore,
and Ceylon, had already agreed.15 The British Government
also announced that arrangements had been made to facilitate
the employment of British officers by the various colonial gov-
ernments.

The negotiations with the Australian colonies led to an
agreement whereby Britain would build and provide five
third-class cruisers and two torpedo gunboats. The colonial
governments would pay £350,000 over a period of ten years
toward the cost of these ships, and £91,000 a year for their
upkeep. The amount of this contribution was not based upon
any principle, although attempts to find a fair and acceptable
one had been made. Probably the best one that could have
been found was that suggested by Jan Hofmeyr, representing
Cape Colony, whose proposal was: 'To discuss the feasibility
of promoting a closer union between the various parts of the
British Empire by means of an Imperial Tariff of 'Customs,
to be levied independently of the duties payable under existing
tariffs, on goods entering the Empire from abroad, the revenue
derived from such tariff" to be devoted to the general defence
of the Empire."16 Hofmeyr suggested that the amount of the
imperial tariff might be two per cent; or more, or less. This
scheme, avowedly aimed at both unification and defence,
called for the imposition of a reasonably fair and painless levy,
and included all the colonies rather than the Australian ones
only. The contribution of each colony would have been pro-
portioned to the value of its imports from foreign sources;
This amount would in turn have afforded a rough indication
of a colony's individual stake in the protection of the sea-

15 Sec. of State for the Colonies (Sir Henry Holland), who was president and chairman ot
the conference, {ibid., p. 11).

16 Ibid., p. 4(i3.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

routes in time of war, in most cases though not in all. Under
this plan, for example, Canada would have owed a relatively
heavy contribution, because of its very large imports over-
land from the United States. Hofmeyr's suggestion obtained
a warm welcome from the colonial delegates who, besides
sincerely wishing to do something for imperial defence, wel-
comed even so embryonic a preference in the British market.
From the Secretary of State for the Colonies, however, the
proposed imperial tariff received a reception so cold as to
freeze it in its tracks; for by the canon of free trade it was a
damnable heresy. "The question," said Alfred Deakin of
Victoria, "... appears to me ... to be one really for the Eng-
lish people, and not for the Colonies; and so far as 1 can judge,
until a very great change indeed comes over the manner of
regarding fiscal questions in this country (a change which may
come sooner than we anticipate), it is almost idle for us to
raise the issue."17

Three expressions of the local rather than the Imperial
point of view were voiced during the conference. "1 feel per-
fectly satisfied," said Robert Wisdom, "that New South
Wales would not be willing for them [warships] to go out of
Australian waters; and if I estimate public opinion rightly, I
think if we proposed any scheme which put it in the power
of the Admiral on the station to remove the vessels paid for
by the Colony, such a proposition would not be accepted."18
On this point the local is also the layman's view, that adequate
naval protection of a given area can only be afforded by war-
ships which are actually in that area. This recurring argu-
ment, which had great political validity, was, of course,
contrary to the Admiralty's doctrine that "the seas are one."

The second of the arguments which reflected the local
point of view was that the defence of shipping was by no
means the primary consideration for any of the colonies that
it was for the United Kingdom. James Lorimer of Victoria
stated that the interest in ships and cargoes of the colony
which he represented was very small, and that it would be
much cheaper for Victoria to pay the war-time insurance
rates on her part of the cargoes than to pay her share of the
proposed contribution to the Royal Navy.19 "The ships that

17 Ibid., p. 473. Deakin, who was later to be three times Prime Minister of the Common-
wealth and who strongly supported imperial preference, was probably the ablest of all the
delegates.

18 Ibid., pp. 41 and 44.

19 Ibid., p. 4.r,.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

trade between England and the Colonies are undoubtedly
more English than Colonial bottoms," said the Premier of
South Australia.20 "We are desirous, of course," said Alfred
Deakin, "of falling in, as far as may be possible, with the
proposals of the Imperial Government for federal reasons.
But we have always held that in the protection of shipping
we had only a proportional interest."21 Deakin also put the
third of the local arguments before the conference: "Again,
as we have often been promised some additions to the fleet
in Australian waters, probably, the very squadron which is
now proposed, or some portion of it, might have been ob-
tained if this Conference had not been held, and if the Colonies
had remained quiescent, and would then have been obtained
at the sole cost of the Imperial Government."22

Canada was represented at the conference by Sir Alex-
ander Campbell the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario, and by
Sandford Fleming. A largely negative policy, so far as direct
naval defence was concerned, was presented by Campbell in
a speech longer than its content demanded. He said that
responsibility for the naval defence of the Empire had for-
merly been undertaken by the British Government. "It was
not at that time a very burdensome undertaking upon them;
I do not think it is so now. They maintain for Imperial pur-
poses, as for other purposes, the North American Squadron,
and so long as that Squadron is at our doors, Canada does
not need any other naval defence." He went on to say that
Canada had acquired a coast on the Pacific which was also
defended for the present by a squadron of the Royal Navy.
He thought that it might be possible for Canada to afford
some help. She had a large body of fishermen, estimated to
number 80,000, and a school might be established in order
to give them some naval training.23

Sandford Fleming had explained earlier in the conference,/
with great conviction and effectiveness, the strategic benefits
conferred upon the British Empire by the Canadian Pacific
Railway which had been opened for public use the year before.
His intimate connection with that railway, particularly during
its earliest years, lent additional interest to his remarks.
Canada, he said, was generally thought of as being at one

20 Ibid., p. 34.

21 Ibid., pp. 36-7.

22 Ibid., p. 37.

23 Ibid., pp. 275-6.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

extreme of the Empire, with Australia at the other; whereas,
in fact, by way of the Pacific Ocean the two countries were
relatively close to each other. Canada also lay between
Great Britain and her rich colonies and dependencies in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Canadian Pacific was there-
fore a great imperial line of communication. It had been
achieved by the Canadian people, at large expense to their
government and without having cost the government of
Great Britain anything at all. Fleming emphasized its use-
fulness as a postal, passenger, and telegraph route, between
the United Kingdom on the one side and Australasia and
Asia on the other. He pointed out that any fast mail steamers
which the Canadian Pacific might in future operate across the
Pacific would be available for use as armed merchant cruisers
in time of war:24

There is now a continuous line of railway from Halifax to the Pacific
entirely on British soil. The Pacific Railway was opened for public use
last year. Eight months before it was opened for public traffic the last
rail was laid; but the last rail had not been laid many days when a con-
signment of naval stores passed through to the station of the North Pacific
Fleet from Halifax. The time occupied on the then unfinished railway
was seven days and a few hours from tide water of the Atlantic to Esqui-
malt. Without the railway it would have taken some three months to
have sent the same stores in a British bottom to their destination. This
one fact must be recognized as of striking significance, as it clearly shows
the immense political value of the Canadian Railway. This new line
practically brings what was once the most remote naval station, in the
most distant Colony of the Empire, within about two weeks of Ports-
mouth.25

The Canadian representatives at the conference circulatec
a memorandum which contained an offer by the Canadian
Pacific Railway to undertake a fortnightly mail and passenger
service to Australia, which would touch at Suva and ter-
minate at Sydney. These liners would supplement the Cana-
dian Pacific's projected fast transatlantic service, and it was
thought that the through time from Great Britain to Aus-
tralia would be about thirty-four days. The Pacific service
would require five new vessels, which would be designed to
meet the Admiralty's requirements for potential auxiliary
cruisers.26

24 At the beginning of the First World War three Canadian Pacific liners, the Empress of
Asia, Empress of Japan, and Empress of Russia, were armed as auxiliary cruisers and added
to the Eastern Fleet.

26 Proceedings note 13, pp. 189-92.

M Ibid., ii, pp. 87-8.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

From the contemporary imperialist's point of view, this
conference of 1887 was a major achievement. It established
a precedent for similar meetings which were destined to be-
come a permanent and notable imperial institution. The
whole question of general imperial defence as a joint responsi-
bility was squarely laced for the first time since the eighteenth
century. The conference also originated, though not gener-
ally, the practice of small colonial contributions toward the
cost of the Royal Navy. On the other hand, the discussions
revealed very clearly the difficulties which were to beset
every attempt to introduce the most effective measures of
co-operation in time of peace. The colonies were eager to
build an ambitious framework for economic collaboration;
but Britain's predilection for free trade proved to be an in-
superable obstacle. Britain herself was equally desirous that
the colonies should co-operate fully, or at least generally, in
centrally-controlled measures of defence: the reluctance of
the colonies to give up any part of their autonomy, however,
stood solidly in the way. The positive achievements of the
conference were consequently limited; and in this respect all
the later ones were destined to resemble it. In 1887 Canada
showed that the problem of naval defence, local or imperial,
had no place at all in the minds of her people, and her repre-
sentatives revealed their unwillingness to commit her to a
naval policy of any kind. Their successors were to take a
similar stand at subsequent conferences during the next
twenty years.

The Second Colonial Conference was held in Ottawa from
June 28 to July 9, 1894, on the initiative of the Canadian
Government. Its avowed purpose was to find means to in-
crease trade between the colonies and to establish telegraphic
and steam communication between certain of them, and the
question of defence was not raised. Jan Hofmeyr referred to
his proposal at the previous conference of a tariff over and
above the local tariffs, the proceeds to be used for defence;
but he did not renew the suggestion.27

The Third Colonial Conference assembled in 1897, the
year of the Diamond Jubilee. The old Queen had come to be
regarded as the majesty of Empire incarnate, and imperialist
sentiment had reached its zenith. Joseph Chamberlain was
at the Colonial Office; the Jameson Raid was a recent mem-
ory; and the Laurier Government, just come to power in

""Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1894,'' Sess, Paps., 1S94, No. 5b.

[MPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

Canada, had proposed a gratuitous preference on British
goods. Capt. Mahan's Influence of Sea Power had been pub-
lished in 1890. In February 1895 the big-navy movement in
Germany had been initiated by the Kaiser, and the Kiel
Canal had been opened a few months later; while in Great
Britain in the same year the naval estimates had exceeded
those of the army for the first time in the century. During
the jubilee celebrations an awe-inspiring spectacle was seen
at Spithead, where thirty miles of warships, the flower of the
Royal Navy and the greatest concentration of force which
the world had ever seen, passed in stately procession before
the Queen and her colonial and foreign guests.

It was in this atmosphere that the third conference was
opened on June 24 by Chamberlain, who stated clearly his
conception of what effective collaboration involved:

It may be that the time has come, and if not I believe it will come,
when the Colonies will desire to substitute for the slight relationship
which at present exists a true partnership, and in that case they will want
their share in the management of the Empire which we like to think is as
much theirs as it is ours. But, of course, with the privilege of management
and of control will also come the obligation and the responsibility. There
will come some form of contribution towards the expense for objects
which we shall have in common .... I think the charge upon the Ex-
chequer [for land and naval defence] . . . constitutes more than one-third
of the total income of the country. Now, these fleets, and this military
armament, are not maintained exclusively, or even mainly, for the benefit
of the United Kingdom, or for the defence of home interests. They are
still more maintained as a necessity of empire . . . and if you will for a
moment consider the history of this country . . . during the present reign,
you will find that every war, great or small, in which we have been en-
gaged, has had at the bottom a colonial interest .... If we had no Empire,
there is no doubt whatever that our military and our naval resources
would not require to be maintained at anything like their present level ....
if Canada had not behind her to-day, and does not continue to have behind
her this great military and naval power of Great Britain, she would have
to make concessions to her neighbours, and to accept views which might
be extremely distasteful to her in order to remain permanently on good
terms with them.

He expressed pleasure and pride that several of the colonies
had offered voluntary contributions. 'The amount, of course,
is at the present time absolutely trifling, but that is not the
point. We are looking to the Colonies as still children, but
rapidly approaching manhood."28

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Goschen, stated
that the Admiralty was quite content with the existing ar-

28 C.8596, "Proceedings of the Colonial Conference of 1897," pp. 6-8, Pari. Paps., 1S97,
i.ix.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

rangement with the Australian colonies, and he added that:
"We should be very glad to open up negotiations with Canada,
if not precisely on the same lines, because its situation is
somewhat different, yet on other lines." Referring to the
doctrine of unrestricted Admiralty control, he said that:

. . . the object for which we want a free hand is to be able to conduct the
defence of Australia on the same principles as those which we should
follow in the defence of our English, Scotch and Irish ports, principles
which exclude our undertaking to detach ships to particular ports .... We
must rely upon the localities themselves for the defence of those ports,
while, on our part, we undertake that no organized expedition should be
directed against any part of Australia .... But I cannot conceive of any
case, unless we lost actually our sea power, when we should think it our
duty not to defend so valuable a portion of our Empire as Australia, New
Zealand, and Tasmania, for the safety of which we hold ourselves respon-
sible in the same way as we hold ourselves responsible for the safety of
the British Islands .... In all our strategical combinations we have never
conceived the possibility that we should expose such possessions as the
Australian Colonies.29

The discussions which followed have never been pub- /
lished; but their results are known. The Australian naval t
subsidy was to be continued. The Prime Minister of Cape
Colony announced to the conference that in accordance with
a resolution of the Cape legislature favouring a contribution
to the Royal Navy, he was prepared to offer on behalf of the
colony an unconditional contribution of the cost of a first-
class battleship.30 Canada was represented by Sir Wilfrid
Laurier. The leading exponent of British preference, he had,
since his arrival in Britain, publicly expressed sentiments
which seemed to stamp him as a whole-hearted imperial
federationist:

It was, therefore, not without apparent reason that the imperialists
thought that they had captured for their own this new romantic and ap-
pealing figure from the premier British dominion. But when the imperial
conference met, Mr. Chamberlain, as colonial secretary, encountered not
the orator intent on captivating his audience, but the cool, cautious
statesman thinking of the folks at home.31

Laurier firmly declined to commit Canada to any form of
naval collaboration. The conference of 1897 agreed that it
would be desirable in the future to hold periodical conferences
of representatives of the colonies and Great Britain in order
to discuss matters of common interest, and such conferences

29 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

30 Ibid., p. 18.

31 Dafoe, Laurier, p. 63.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

continued to be the principal forum tor the discussion of
imperial naval defence down to the outbreak of the First
World War.

At these conferences the British Government, expressing
the point of view of the professional sailors, strongly favoured
a single and therefore uniform navy under one unfettered
control. If this principle were accepted, unless some form of
federation should place a new apex upon the imperial struc-
ture, the only way in which the colonies and Dominions
could co-operate, other than by maintaining shore facilities,
would be by contributing ships and men, or money, to the
Royal Navy under Admiralty control. The case for a cen-
tralized authority was much stronger when applied to naval
than to land forces, owing to the far greater mobility of war-
ships than of soldiers, taken in conjunction with the ability
of ships and fleets, if properly supplied, to reach almost any
part of any ocean. Hostile warships, in a fleet or operating as
raiders, might proceed to any part of the British Empire or
its trade-routes in the event of war or the threat of war. A.
menace of this sort would have to be met wherever the enemy
might be. The naval experts were therefore united in asking
for authority to move every ship, without restriction, as
freely as a chess-player moves any of his pieces over the whole
board. Accordingly, the Admiralty advocated time and
again, at the colonial and imperial conferences and elsewhere,
the principle of undivided authority. The same is true of the
strategic doctrine that the naval defence of scattered areas
far removed from the source of the enemy's strength is not
necessarily, or even usually, best afforded by warships per-
manently stationed in waters adjacent to the areas which
need to be defended. This concept — which is one way of
regarding the principle of the concentration of force — as
applied to the naval defence of the British Empire, so often
affirmed by the Admiralty, has perhaps received its clearest
exposition from the pen of Capt. A. T. Mahan:

The question of the Eastern seas introduces naturally the considera-
tion of what the great self-governing colonies can do, not only for their
own immediate security, and that of their trade, but for the general fabric
ol Imperial naval action, in the coherence of which they will find far
greater assurance than in merely local effort. The prime naval considera-
tions for them are that the British Channel Fleet should adequately pro-
tect the commerce and shores of the British Islands, and that the Medi-
terranean Fleet should insure uninterrupted transit for trade and for
reinforcements. These effected and maintained, there will be no danger to
their territory; and little to their trade except from single cruisers, which

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

will have a precarious subsistence as compared with their own, based upon
large self-supporting political communities. Australasia, however, can
undoubtedly supply a very important factor, that will go far to fortify the
whole British position in the Far East. A continent in itself, with a thriving
population, and willing, apparently, to contribute to the general naval
welfare, let it frame its schemes and base its estimates on sound lines, both
naval and imperial; naval, by allowing due weight to battle force; imperial,
by contemplating the whole, and recognizing that local safety is not always
best found in local precaution. There is a military sense, in which it is true
that he who loses his life shall save it ... .

Non-professional — and even military — minds need the habit of re-
garding local and general interests in their true relations and proportions.
Unless such correct appreciation exist, it is hard to silence the clamor for a
simple local security, which is apparent but not real, because founded on a
subdivision and dissemination of force essentially contrary to sound mili-
tary principle. What Australasia needs is not her petty fraction of the
Imperial Navy, a squadron assigned to her in perpetual presence, but an
organization of naval force which constitutes a firm grasp of the universal
naval situation. Thus danger is kept remote; but, if it should approach,
there is insured within reaching distance an adequate force to repel it be-
times. There may, however, be fairly demanded the guarantee for the
fleet's action, in a development of local dock-yard facilities and other re-
sources which shall insure its maintenance in full efficiency if it have to
come.

In this essential principle other colonies should acquiesce. The essence
of the matter is that local security does not necessarily, nor usually, depend
upon the constant local presence of a protector, ship or squadron, but upon
general dispositions. As was said to and of Rodney, 'Unless men take the
great line, as you do, and consider the King's whole dominions as under
their care, the enemy must find us unprepared somewhere. It is impossible
to have a superior fleet in every part.'32

A policy for the naval defence of the Empire, however,
could not be decided upon solely, or even mainly, by the
rules of naval organization and strategy. In actual tact such
a policy had to be framed, to a very large extent, in accordance
with political considerations. The determining political factor
obviously was the attitude of the self-governing dependencies;
for Great Britain already had a naval policy and was not re-
quired to make any new decisions. It was in the power of
these dependencies to contribute to a single navy, to create
naval forces of their own, or to do nothing. It was realistic
that in this matter political considerations should be allowed
to override purely naval ones; for it seems almost certain that
in the long run the issue actually lay, not between contribu-
tions and Dominion navies, but between the latter and no
Dominion naval effort at all. A single control in the hands
of the Admiralty was never popular in the dependencies, tor

33 Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, pp. 199-204.

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IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

a number of reasons. Except in New Zealand, such a cen-
tralized authority was regarded by a majority of the people
as an unacceptable curtailment of their sovereignty, as com-
mitting them in advance to active participation in every
future British war, and as involving them in European mili-
tarism from which geography had striven so hard to free them.
Naval defence was also thought of in some quarters as being
a local rather than an imperial concern, which had best be
achieved by means of strictly local force. The feeling per-
sisted, moreover, and was particularly marked in Australia,
that effective defence required ships that would be perman-
ently stationed off the coasts to be defended, and that an
unfettered Admiralty might withdraw such ships for larger
or merely different purposes at the moment when the need
for their presence was greatest.33

Although Canada did not make any direct contribution
towards the Royal Navy, she was indirectly helping to in-
crease its effectiveness by means of the two naval bases
within her territory. In 1886 the newly-formed Halifax
Graving Dock Co., Ltd., undertook to build at Halifax a dry
dock of specified dimensions; in return for which the city of
Halifax, the Canadian Government, and the Admiralty, each
undertook to pay the company a subsidy of $10,000 a year
for twenty years. In return for its subsidy the Admiralty ob-
tained an undertaking that its warships were to be docked
at the prevailing rates and with a priority over other ships.
The dock was built by S. Pearson and Son of London, in asso-
ciation with S. M. Brookfield of Halifax. This very important
addition to the base was opened in 1889, and the first ship
to enter it was H.M.S. Canada^ a composite steel, iron, and
wooden warship of 2,770 tons.34 The importance of Halifax
for the land defence of Canada in winter was multiplied when
the Intercolonial Railway was completed in 1876. This line,
the whole length of which lay on Canadian soil, started from
Halifax and connected with the railways of central Canada
at a point near Levis in Quebec.

In the long period during which it occupied the base, the
Royal Navy was an important ingredient in the economic

33 " Experience has taught that free nations, popular governments, will seldom dare
wholly to remove the force that lies between an invader and its shores or capital." Mahan,
Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 394.

34 Correspondence in N.S. 51-4-3 (1); information obtained from Halifax Shipyards Ltd.
The dimensions of this dock were: average length, 570'; top width, 102'; bottom width, 70';
width of entrance, 85'; depth over sill at high water, 30'. In 1918 the dock was taken over by
Halifax Shipyards Ltd.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

and social life of the town or city of Halifax. As was natural
in the circumstances, many young Nova Scotians entered the
Royal Navy, of whom no less than seven advanced to flag
rank. The best known of these admirals from Nova Scotia
were Sir Provo William Parry Wallis, and George Augustus
Westphal. Wallis was born in Halifax in 1791, and distin-
guished himself in the action between the Chesapeake and the
Shannon, after which he brought both ships into Halifax. In
1877 he was advanced to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet,
and died in 1892 at the phenomenal age of a hundred and one.
Westphal was born at Preston, N.S., in 1785, and entered the
Royal Navy at the age of thirteen. He was present in the
Victory at Trafalgar, where he was wounded. He reached the
rank of Admiral and died in 1875. 35

Soon after British Columbia had entered Confederation!
the government of that Province began to construct a dry
dock adjoining the naval yard at Esquimalt. The Admiralty
agreed to contribute £30,000 towards the cost, an amount
which was later raised to £50,000, and the Dominion also
contributed. The actual costs were soon leaving the estimates
far behind, and the project became a serious political issue in
the Province. The Dominion took over the ownership of the
enterprise, and the dry dock, a large part of which had been
cut out of solid rock, was opened on July 20, 1887.36 By agree-
ment with the Canadian Government, for a period of fifteen
years from January 1888, ships of the Royal Navy were to
have priority in the use of this dock, and its services at cost.
Before its completion, warships at Esquimalt requiring a dry
dock had been sent to San Francisco.37

The existence of coal on Vancouver Island had been known
at an early date, and in 1851 a coal mine was opened at
Nanaimo within easy reach of Esquimalt. The Nanaimo
coal was of good quality, though considered inferior for
steaming purposes to the best Welsh product, and the presence
of the mines so near at hand became an important asset as
warships came to rely primarily or entirely on engines instead
of sails. A coal depot was established on Thetis Island in I860.
In the same year Cole Island at the head of the harbour was
placed at the disposal of the naval authorities and a magazine

35 Biographical sketches of these and other distinguished sailors from Nova Scotia who
served in the Royal Navy are to be found in D.C. Harvey, "Nova Scotia and the Canadian
Naval Tradition,'' in The Canadian Historical Review, Sept. 1942.

36 Overall length, 450'; width of entrance, fi.5'; minimum depth over sill, 26, •_>'•

37 Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.), passim.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

was established there. The first rifle range was situated on
Coburg Peninsula, a spit outside the harbour: many years
later, because of the increased range of service rifles, a new
range was developed on Goose Spit near Comox. In 1889,
after a dispute occasioned by the harbour-master's having
assigned a merchantman to an anchorage which the naval
authorities had reserved for a warship, Constance Cove was
set aside by Dominion Order in Council as a man-of-war
anchorage.

The problem of desertion, common to many naval sta-
tions, always faced the Royal Navy to an unusual degree
at Esquimalt, chiefly because American territory lay so near
at hand. The proverbially high wages and pleasant conditions
of life in the United States were a constant temptation to
discontented sailors. In 1874 H. M.S. Myrmidon at Esquimalt
had an abnormally unfortunate experience. On March 8, six
of her crew, having tampered with the gear of the other boats
so as to ensure delay in lowering them, pulled off in a whaler.
The deserters were pursued, but with a good start, and dark-
ness coming on, they succeeded in escaping. Three days later
one of Myrmidon s cutters, in charge of the gunner and a
petty officer, was sent in search of the missing whaler. While
the gunner was making enquiries on shore, the eight men who
formed the crew threw the petty officer out of the boat,
shoved off, and deserted.38 During the Fraser River gold
rush many years earlier, H.M.S. Satellite was being employed
in the river keeping order and enforcing the customs regula-
tions. More than twenty of her men having deserted, the
Colonial Government agreed to provide the crew with a
special allowance additional and equal to their naval pay.39

In the year 1885, after long delay during which all the
resources of the engineers and financiers alike were called into
play, the transcontinental line of the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way was completed, connecting at one end with the railway
lines of eastern Canada, and having its western terminus at
Vancouver. One of the many results of this great achievement
was that Esquimalt was in effect brought much nearer to
Great Britain. Thenceforth it also offered close protection to
a key point on a new, rapid, and relatively safe route between

38 Cdr. Richard Hare to Sec. Admiralty, Mar. 12, 1874, British Columbia — Records of the
Senior Naval Officer Stationed at Esquimalt, i (B.C. Archives).

39 CO. Satellite to Gov. James Douglas, June 28, 1858, replv Jujy 5, 18.58: Nav> — H.M.S.
Satellite (B.C. Archives).

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Great Britain and the Far East. The line of the Canadian
Pacific was likened by a distinguished naval writer, in 1886,
to an artificial north-west passage which would take the place
of the one that nature had failed to provide.40 Naval opinion
was by this time becoming doubtful that Great Britain
would be able to use the Mediterranean in time of war, in
which case shipping would be obliged to resort either to the
Cape route or to the new one which the Canadian Pacific
had provided.41

The publicity which the British Columbia base received
at this time was reflected in the United States Senate on one
occasion, when a certain Senator who was eloquently de-
manding stronger coast defences pointed to Esquimalt and
the warships stationed there as being a potential threat:

... at Victoria on Vancouver Island she [Great Britain] keeps constantly
from one to three war ships convenient to the commercial cities along the
Sound and upon the Columbia River, and within forty-eight hours to [sic]
the wealthy and populous city of San Francisco. She has recently ordered
. . . twenty Armstrong 80-ton guns for her fortifications at Vancouver
Island, to frown on our defenceless coast just across the straits of Juan de
Fuca, and she has notified the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company to be
ready to transport them with other war material across the continent in
April next.42

By 1893 and probably earlier, naval personnel and the
less bulky stores were being transported to and from Esqui-
malt across the North Atlantic and the line of the Canadian
Pacific, a very much quicker though more expensive route
than the old one around Cape Horn.43 In 1895 the Admiralty
approved that invalids from the China Station should be
returned to Britain across Canada.44

The results of the Bering Sea controversy were of con-
siderable importance for the Esquimalt base. The fur seals
of the Pacific range widely over the ocean, but return each
year to their home islands to bear their young and to breed.
Their habits made them an easy prey for numerous sealers
who were induced to pursue them by the great value of the
skins. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the prin-
cipal remaining herd was the one frequenting the Pribilof
Islands, and these had become an American possession with

40 Colomb, Imperial Federation: Naval and Military (pamphlet, London 1886), pp. 22-3.

41 See Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, pp. 225-6.

42 Senate debate, Feb. 16, 1887, Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., xvm, p. 1810.

43 Correspondence in Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.), I.

44 Admiralty to Vice Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle, Apr. 8, 1895, ibid., vm.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE QUESTION, 1870-1902

the purchase of Alaska in 1867. In 1869 and 1870 the Con-
gress of the United States passed laws to protect the fur
seals upon the islands and in adjacent waters. Sealers of other
nationalities therefore resorted to hunting on the high seas, a
method which necessarily resulted in the destruction of large
numbers of females and pups, and even threatened to ex-
tinguish the species. In 1886 and subsequent years certain
British Columbia vessels were seized and condemned by the
United States authorities for taking seals, contrary to laws
of the United States, in waters over which tha t country claimed
jurisdiction. The British Government protested against these
seizures, and after prolonged negotiations it was agreed in
1892 that the question should be arbitrated.

A tribunal was accordingly set up, on which each of the
parties to the dispute was represented by two nominees, the
other members being appointed by disinterested European
governments. The decision was against the American claim.45
The tribunal then prescribed certain regulations designed to
protect the seals outside the three-mile limit, and these rules
were put into effect by the two governments. They proved
to be inadequate, however, owing to the fact that sealing on
the high seas was continued by hunters who were neither
British subjects nor American citizens. In July 1911, there-
fore, a convention was signed by the United States, Great
Britain, Russia, and Japan, which prohibited such sealing
in the North Pacific, and awarded to each of the interested
nations a fixed percentage of all the skins that should be
taken thenceforth.46

In 1894, no doubt as a result of the need for enforcing the
regulations laid down by the arbitrators, the Pacific Station
was extended so as to include the Hawaiian Islands and the
more important of the American islands in the Bering Sea.47
For many years the sealing patrols carried out for the purpose
of helping to implement the fur-seal agreements were an im-
portant function of warships based on Esquimalt. In addi-
tion to their obvious general usefulness, these patrols pro-
vided excellent naval training for the ships concerned.

45 As a result of separate arbitration proceedings the United States paid $473,151.26 as
reparation for the seizing and condemning of the Canadian sealers.

46 Latane, History of American Foreign Policy, pp. 461-72; Bemis, Diplomatic History of
the United States, pp. 413-15; Ward and Gooch, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,
m, p. 226.

47 See Admiralty to C. in C. Pac. Station, Jan. 1, 1894, Pacific Station Records (Pub.
Arch.), in.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

By the end of the century, owing to the creation or expan-
sion of other navies, the relative strength of the Royal Navy on
its stations abroad had changed very much for the worse,
and the former superiority of the squadron on the Pacific
Station had passed away.48 In 1893 the Commander in Chief
was told that the Mediterranean Fleet was to be strengthened
by a ship which would be taken from his command, and a few
years later his successor asked that the squadron should be
strengthened. Rear Admiral Bickford called the Admiralty's
attention in 1901 to "the (in my opinion) dangerously weak
state of the Squadron on the Pacific Coast." In support of
this opinion he contrasted the ten warships49 of all sorts
which were at his disposal against the nineteen which the
United States maintained on that coast. When he brought up
the subject again the following year, Bickford chose his words
clumsily and was told that:

Their Lordships do not consider it becoming in you to apply the re-
mark 'ridiculously small' to the dimensions of the Squadron which they
have thought it right to place under your orders.60

These incidents and opinions foreshadowed the radical change
in policy which the Admiralty was to announce in 1904.

Throughout the period covered by this chapter the official
attitude of Canada in regard to naval defence remained
wholly negative, and at the colonial conferences the weight
of the senior British dependency was heavy in the scales on
which policy was weighed. To most Canadians the world of _x
international power politics seemed too remote to call forth
action, and only when an unusually obvious and apparently
imminent threat appeared, early in the twentieth century,
was positive action taken.

48 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 351.

** Warspite (flag-ship), Phaeton, Amphion, Icarus, Condor, Egeria (surveying ship), Virago,
Sparrowhawk, and Torpedo Boats Nos. 39 and 40.

i0 Sec. Admiralty to C. in C, Oct. 9, 1893; C. in C. to Sec. Admiralty, Feb. 10, 1897; C.
in C. to Sec. Admiralty, Sept. 17, 1901; Sec. Admiralty to C. in C, May 17, 1902: Pacific
Station Records (Pub. Arch.), i, xn, xm, xvn, xix.

Chapter 4

THE GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

THE last three decades of the nineteenth century wit-
nessed a revolution in international affairs. Technologi-
cal progress and mutual distrust encouraged a competi-
tion which was to lead Mr. Winston Churchill to declare on
March 18, 1912: "The spectacle which the naval armaments
of Christendom afford at the present time will no doubt
excite the curiosity and the wonder of future generations."
As the century drew to its close Great Britain's naval position
had deteriorated to a point where she no longer felt safe in
continuing the policy of "splendid isolation," a policy of no
commitments, which she had pursued since the Napoleonic
Wars. The appearance on the stage of three new Powers of
the first rank — Germany, Japan, and the United States, all
with strong navies, and two of them outside Europe, was,
from the British point of view, of the greatest significance.
Against the navies of Japan and the United States the tra-
ditional blockading cordon, drawn around part of western
Europe and based on ports in the British Isles, could not be
used. Moreover the important navies became so numerous
that British naval forces could no longer hope to match any
possible combination of them.

British foreign policy gradually adjusted itself to these
great changes in its environment. Relations with the United
States were progressively improved until, in the twentieth
century, the possibility of war with that country was prac-
tically eliminated. To offset her growing naval inferiority in
the Pacific, Britain formed with Japan in 1902 a defensive
alliance which applied to that ocean. With the young and
aggressive German Empire Great Britain sought more than
once in the closing years of the nineteenth century to estab-
lish some kind of alliance or understanding, but none of these
attempts succeeded. Britain therefore looked elsewhere, and
in 1904, after careful diplomatic preparation, entered into an
entente with France. In 1907 she established a similar agree-
ment with France's ally Russia.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Germany proved to be by far the most disturbing of the
new factors in the international balance of power. After
1890 her policy appeared to be aggressive and expansionist,
and her army was so strong that it seemed doubtful whether
any land forces in Europe could contain it. More imme-
diately disquieting, from the British point of view, was the
fact that, beginning in 1898, the German Reichstag passed a
series of navy laws, under the authority of which a very
powerful navy was developed. The moulder of the new
German Navy, and the principal driving force behind its
development, was a naval officer, Alfred von Tirpitz.

The rapid growth, and apparent purpose, of Tirpitz's navy
which lay at Britain's own back door, aroused the minds of
the British Government and people to an anxiety which at
times was tightened to the pitch of alarm, and to a firm
determination to provide adequate shelter against the possible
or probable storm. So far-reaching were the results of the
German naval threat, and so decisively did it affect Canadian
policy, that some attention must be given to its background
and significance.

From 1858 until early in the eighteen-nineties, British
naval expenditures had not shown any very striking increase.
Thereafter, however, the expansion of naval shipbuilding
throughout the world began to be clearly reflected in the
British naval Estimates. In 1895 these had exceeded the army
Estimates for the first time in the century.1 It is a mistake
to suppose that the general public in Britain, all through the
nineteenth century, had been keenly aware of the navy and
its importance; nevertheless the island people, in contrast to
the Germans, almost instinctively thought of the navy first
when they thought of defence at all. Before the end of the
century the navy was in the forefront of public consciousness,
and no organized propaganda was necessary in order to obtain
increased appropriations.2 Between the passage of the two
first German navy laws and the establishment of the entente
with France, the German Navy bulked ever larger in the
mind of the Admiralty whenever plans for building ships
were being considered.

As compared with other continental navies, Tirpitz's
young fleet was increasing at an unequalled rate and in

1 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 235.

2 In 1901 the German Navy League claimed 600,000 and the British Navy League
15,000 members.

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

quality was rightly judged to be in a class by itself. The
German ships, built for strength rather than speed, later
proved to be almost indestructible, and their armament and
equipment were excellent. The organization was very good,
as was the quality of the officers and men. The cardinal
feature of Tirpitz's navy was the line of battle, and for this
reason the Anglo-German naval rivalry which continued
down to the outbreak of the First World War was to a con-
siderable extent a competition in the building of capital ships.
It was this feature which received almost all the attention of
the general public, especially after the launching of the
Dreadnought.

The technical improvements which characterized the
nineteenth century had included a very large increase in the
range of guns, which in turn, together with the greater speed
of ships, had presented the naval gunner with a whole series
of pretty problems. These difficulties were largely overcome
by a radical change in the theory and practice of gunnery, a
change which is closely associated with the name of Sir Percy
Scott.3 One thing leads to another, and it was not long before
a new ship had been produced to meet the needs of the new
gunnery. Throughout the nineteenth century the Admiralty
had always refrained from introducing novelties which seemed
likely to make obsolescent existing ships or armament, on
the ground that any such innovation would penalize the
stronger navy. In December 1905, however, the keel of
H.M.S. Dreadnought was laid in Portsmouth Dockyard, and
she was completed the following year. For her time she was
a very large ship, and her extra size was used to provide a
high rate of speed; but these were conventional improvements.
The peculiar feature of the Dreadnought was her armament,
which consisted almost wholly of very large guns of the same
calibre.4 Because of this, her striking power was far greater
than that of any previous ship at the medium and long ranges
which her superior speed would enable her to maintain. Her
uniform armament was ideal for the practitioners of the new
gunnery. A limited number of medium-calibre guns were
later introduced into ships of the Dreadnought type; but
emphasis on large guns of uniform calibre has been the general
rule ever since.

3 See Clowes, The Royal Navy, vn, p. 52; Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, passim.

* Length of the Dreadnought, 526'; displacement, 17,900 tons; speed, 21 k.; complement,
800; cost, £1,797,497.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The Dreadnought completely outclassed every other ship
afloat; nevertheless the Admiralty's wisdom in building her
was questioned at once in many quarters. According to the
Kaiser:

At the first conference regarding the introduction of the 'dreadnought'
type of big fighting ship by England .... Admiral von Tirpitz remarked . . .
that England had robbed her enormous pre-dreadnought force, upon which
her great superiority rested, of its fighting value.5

Lloyd George states that: 'The laying down of the Dread-
nought seemed to many of us a piece of wanton and profligate
ostentation."6 On the other hand, the Dreadnought forced
Germany, at great expense, to enlarge the Kiel Canal which
was too small for ships of her type. The essential features of
the Dreadnought design had already been thought of, more-
over, both in Italy and the United States. A ship of that
type, therefore, would almost certainly have been built before
long; and the Admiralty would have been running a small but
unnecessary risk, by not taking the lead. It is suggested, not
very confidently, that the Admiralty was probably right.7

In October 1904, Tirpitz's British equivalent, Sir John
Fisher, became First Sea Lord of the Admiralty. This fearless,
tactless, immensely energetic genius, "the most distinguished
British Naval officer since Nelson",8 proceeded without delay
to bring about a number of sweeping changes in the Royal
Navy. These were to result in placing the existing ships in a
more effective condition in face of the apparent German
threat. They also achieved a considerable saving of expense,
which was particularly important at this time. The radical
wing of the Liberal Party had for many years been of th^
opinion that the navy Estimates exceeded what was required
for defence pure and simple, and that the needlessly large
navy was dangerous to peace and a consumer of money which
was urgentlv needed for social reform. 1 he naval Estimates
had expanded from £27,522,000 in the vear 1900, to £36,-
889,000 in 1904, and in 1903 and 1904 they were widely criti-
' cized as being excessive.9

In December 1904 the Admiralty issued a memorandum
which expressed the opinion that the principles governing the

6 Wilhelm II, The Kaiser's Memoirs, pp. 240-41.

6 Lloyd George Memoirs, i, p. 9.

7 For fuller accounts of the Dreadnought and her importance, see Marder, Anatomy of Sea
Power, ch. 27; Woodward, Britain and the German Navy, ch. 5.

8 Churchill, World Crisis 1911-1914, P- 437.

9 Marder, Anatomy of Sea Povcer, pp. 484-7.

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

existing distribution of the Royal Navy had been invalidated
by the development of foreign navies, and pointed out that:

The new German navy has come into existence; it is a navy of the
most efficient type and is so fortunately circumstanced that it is able to
concentrate almost the whole of its fleet in its home waters.

The memorandum stated in addition that:

The principles on which peace distribution of His Majesty's ships
and the arrangement of their stations are based, date from a period when
the electric telegraph did not exist and when wind was the motive power ....
In the opinion of the Board of Admiralty . . . the new conditions described
above have necessitated a review and readjustment of this distribution of
ships and arrangement of stations.

A new disposition of the fleets and squadrons was therefore
proposed in the interest of fighting efficiency and of economy. l °

The redistribution was carried out. The squadrons on
several of the outlying stations were abolished, while others
were diminished, and a number of bases were closed. Among
those which were withdrawn was the Pacific Squadron, based
on Esquimalt; and the sloop H.M.S. Shearwater was stationed
there for any services that might be required on the Pacific
coast, particularly for duties connected with the Bering Sea
fisheries. The essence of the redistribution was that a larger
proportion of the whole Royal Navy would be stationed in
home waters, facing the German Navy. The fleets and squad-
rons everywhere were as far as possible to be kept concen-
trated, and thus ready for instant action at all times. War-
ships of the reserve were to be kept in commission, with
nucleus crews, ready to proceed to sea at a few hours' notice.11
Nearly a hundred and fifty of the oldest ships of all descrip-
tions were put on the scrap heap, and their former crews were
used to form the nucleus crews of the reserve ships.12 The
strain which the battleships would have to bear in time of
war had been reduced to some extent when the policy of a
close blockade had been finally abandoned a short time
before.13

After 1905 a series of incidents underlined the growing
seriousness of the situation. In 1906 a third German navy
law was passed, which authorized an increased building
programme. Early in 1908 the fourth of these laws was en-

10 Pari. Paps., 1905, xlviti, Cd. 223o. Commonly known as the Selborne Memorandum.

"Ibid. Cd. 2430.

12 Pari. Paps., 1906, lxx, Cd. 2791.

1S Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 308.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

acted, a measure that reduced the age of warships in com-
mission and increased the rate at which the old ships would
be replaced by new ones. During the Anglo-German race in
naval armaments, which was to continue as long as peace
lasted, the pace was necessarily set by the weaker naval
Power. The British Government made many attempts, at
the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 and through direct
diplomatic approaches, to arrange that the competitive
building for both navies should be stopped, or delayed, or
limited. But the German Government consistently either
refused to consider any of these suggestions, or would con-
sider them only if they were sweetened by a political quid pro
quo which Britain could not concede. The tenacity of the
Germans in this matter made the Anglo-German naval
problem insoluble.

An incident which for a few weeks seemed to threaten the
peace of Europe, occurred in September 1908, when French
officials at Casablanca caught the local German consul in the
act of helping six men of the Foreign Legion to desert by
escaping to a German steamer which was lying off the port.
The following month Austria-Hungary suddenly announced
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which caused both
anxiety and ill-feeling in Russia, the Balkans, and Italy.
During 1908 also, the advisability of resorting to conscription
in England was raised in very responsible quarters, and in
November, in the House of Lords, Lord Roberts laid the
question squarely before the whole country:

Across the narrow seas, opposite our shores, within a few hours'
steaming of our coasts, there is a people numbering over 60,000,000; our
most active rivals in commerce and the greatest military Power in the
world, no longer depending upon her supremacy in one arm, but adding
to an overwhelming military strength a naval force which she is resolutely
and rapidly increasing; while we, on our side, are not attempting to take
any military precautions in response .... and it is my absolute belief that,
without a military organization more adequate to the certain perils of
the future, our Empire will fall from us and our power will pass away.14

Lord Fisher states that at some time in 1908 he suggested to
King Edward that it would be "a sagacious act on England's
part to seize the German Fleet when it was so very easy of
accomplishment", and thus "to repeat Nelson's Copen-
hagen."15 This unregenerate idea, however, was never ser-
iously considered by anyone in authority, and possibly not

14 Hansard, 4th Series, cxcvi, pp. 1693-5.

15 Lord Fisher, Memories, pp. 18-19.

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

even by Fisher himself. The events of this overclouded year
had given rise to a vigorous campaign in the press of each
country, and these verbal hostilities had stimulated ill-feeling
on both sides. It is easy to see why, during the year 1908,
Great Britain cast anxious glances to seaward, fearful of
what the future might hold in store.

In the middle of the summer Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign
Secretary, stated in a memorandum to King Edward:

If the Germans continue to execute their Naval programme at a
rapid speed, we shall certainly have to ask Parliament to vote a con-
siderable increase to our expenditure: no Government of either party
could avoid doing so. The justification and necessity for this increase,
which would have to be openly avowed, would be the German expenditure
.... If the German fleet ever becomes superior to ours, the German Army
can conquer this country. There is no corresponding risk of this kind to
Germany: for however superior our Fleet was, no naval victory would
bring us any nearer to Berlin. It is certain that if we have to propose a
greater Naval expenditure next year the effect on the Press here and on
public feeling in both England and Germany will be adverse to good
relations. If, on the other hand, the Germans are willing to arrest the
increase of their Naval expenditure, we should do the same.16

These words express a point of view which, with minor
variations, the British Government was to maintain to the
very end. In the last days of 1908, Metternich, the German
Ambassador in London, reported to Biilow, the Imperial
Chancellor, that:

Last summer was the psychological moment. At that time a little
yielding might have achieved much. At present this is scarcely the case.
Then the English Government was irresolute and uncertain. Now
they are determined to compete with us in Dreadnoughts on the basis of
the Two-Power Standard.17

Early in January 1909 the Chancellor restated the German
Government's view, with a qualification attached, in a private
letter:

It is all the same to us how many ships England wants to build. We
are building our fleet solely for defence according to our general economic
and political needs, and not in competition with England .... we can de-
part from our statutory, fixed, naval programme, only if England is ready
to satisfy us in other parts of the world . . .18

Meanwhile the German naval threat, as seen in Britain,
appeared to have taken on a new and menacing feature. In

16 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi, App. in.

17 Metternich to Biilow, Dec. 29, 1908, Grosse Politik, xxvm, pp. 40-45.

18 Biilow to Metternich, Jan. 11, 1909, ibid., pp. 58-9.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

December 1908 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald
McKenna, told Metternich that he believed that the German
facilities lor building warships had become more highly
developed than those in Britain.19 Early in January, Grey
had a conversation with the German Ambassador:

I told Count Metternich to-day that we had been considering our
Naval Estimates for the forthcoming year: they would have to be very
serious .... I then told . . . Metternich that, according to our information,
if the German shipbuilding proceeded at its normal rate, Germany would
have 13 'Dreadnoughts' completed by February 1912; if materials were
collected in advance for the four next 'Dreadnoughts', as had been done
in the case of four vessels already, Germany would have 17 'Dreadnoughts'
completed by February 1912; and if the full German shipbuilding capacity
was used without financial restriction, Germany might have 21 'Dread-
noughts' ready by April 1912 .... Therefore, if we did not take due pre-
cautions, there might come a time when, in spite of all the efforts we
might subsequently make, there would be a period of some six months
during which Germany's force of 'Dreadnoughts' would be superior to ours.

Metternich replied that Germany's naval programme
was fixed by law, and that she would not exceed it.20 Two
months later he told Grey that he had heard considerable
. comment in London, both in political circles and in society,
on the supposed quickening of the German programme ot
construction. He explained that materials had been col-
lected in advance for four of the earlier ships of the pro-
gramme, because, although the building of the vessels had
been decided upon, the designs had not been finally settled.
As the contracts had been awarded, however, the contractors
were in a position to collect and prepare materials for building
these ships. Grey then suggested that the British naval
attache in Berlin should be allowed to see, without examining
in detail, all the ships which the German Government was
actually constructing, and that in that case reciprocal ad-
vantages would be given to the German attache in London.
To this suggestion Metternich gave a non-committal answer.21
His not entirely satisfactory denials put the British Govern-
ment in an awkward position. To act as though the German
assurances were valueless would be rude; yet for various
reasons they did not feel safe in assuming that there had been,
and would be, no acceleration of building in Germany. They
therefore chose to be safe rather than polite.

19 Metternich to Bulow, Dec. 11, 1908, ibid., pp. 25-6.

20 Grey to Goschen, Jan. 4, 1909, Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi, pp. 237-8.
Sir Edward Goschen was British Ambassador in Berlin. The Admiralty's evidence which
indicated that German construction was being accelerated has never been published.

21 Grey to Goschen, Mar. 5, 1909, ibid. pp. 240-41.

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

The exceptionally strong Liberal government which was
in power from 1905 onwards was always at a double disad-
vantage in dealing with the threat which the German naval
programmes implied. The Liberal Party had the reputation
of laying less emphasis upon national defence than did the
Opposition. This fact increased their vulnerability to attacks
delivered by those who claimed that the Royal Navy' was not
being increased fast enough. On this question, moreover, the
Liberal Party was itself divided. The social-reform wing, led
by Lloyd George and which Mr. Churchill usually supported,!
while it favoured adequate naval defence, was apt to feel that
the actual naval expenditures were extravagant. The "im-
perialist" wing was led by Asquith, Grey, and Haldane, the
Secretary of State for War. The naval policy which was
actually pursued was generally in accord with the views of
this group, to which, whenever the naval situation seemed
unusually grave, the decisive influence of Lloyd George was
always given.

When building requirements were being considered in the
spring of 1909, the possibility that the Germans were going
ahead of their schedule caused the Admiralty to ask for no
less than eight Dreadnoughts:

For some days there was a Cabinet crisis. Eventually it was observed
that all eight ships could not be laid down at once, and it was agreed that
the construction should proceed in a manner that would not delay the
completion of the eight ships if reflection and further knowledge proved
them to be necessary, but on the understanding that reduction of the
number could be made, if it became apparent that the need for them had
been overestimated. To the public and the Press at this time 'eight ships'
became a formula, but in the Cabinet the difference was about substance
and not formula. No one of us wanted eight ships, unless they were really
required; every one of us was prepared to agree to them, if they were
proved necessary to secure national safety.22

The naval Estimates for the ensuing year were introduced
in the House of Commons on March 16, 1909. 23 The First
Lord of the Admiralty asked for four Dreadnoughts; but he
said that there were certain circumstances which might make
it necessary for the government, later in the year, to order
the laying down of four additional ones, a contingent action
which he desired the House to authorize. The government's

22 Grey, Tiventy-five Years, i, p. 193.

23 Debate of Mar. 16, 1909, in Hansard, New Series, n, pp. 930-95. This debate was the
immediate cause of the adoption by Canada, for the first time, of a positive naval policy.
The Foster resolution was introduced in the House of Commons in Ottawa, on Mar. 29, 1909,
and the Roval Canadian Navy was established the following year.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

strong desire to economize was overborne by the necessity
of safeguarding the Empire at any cost. Several Powers were
rapidly developing their naval strength, but none as fast as
Germany. McKenna said that the Admiralty no longer
knew the rate at which the Germans were building, and had
been informed of materials collected in advance for four
Dreadnoughts, or even eight. It was possible, therefore, that
instead of having nine ships completed in 1911, Germany
might have thirteen in that year, and seventeen by April 1912.
Reference was made to the extraordinary growth of facilities
in Germany for building warships of the largest size. Mc-
Kenna also justified the maintaining of a large superiority in
cruisers.

Arthur Balfour, Leader of the Opposition, took an even
more serious view of the situation than the First Lord had
done. He said that this particular matter, unlike almost all
of those with which Parliament usually had to deal, if de-
cided wrongly, could never in the future be set right. The
German shipyards had come to equal those of Britain in
speed of building: the xAdmiralty, therefore, could no longer
wait to see what rivals might project, and then lay down an
answer which would be finished first. According to Balfour's
calculations, by the end of 1910 the Germans would possess
thirteen Dreadnoughts as against ten British ones. By April
1912 they might have twenty-one, or even twenty-five: while
Britain would only possess twenty. A situation had arisen so
new and dangerous that its full meaning was hard to realize.
The proposed programme of construction, in Balfour's opin-
ion, was utterly insufficient. He implored the government to
make use, without delay, of every means to preserve, not the
two-Power standard which had already broken down en-
tirely, but a mere one-Power standard which seemed to be
slipping from Britain's grasp.

The Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, pointed out that the
Germans had hitherto firmly refused even to consider any
suggestion to reduce naval armaments on both sides, and
that Great Britain must therefore build against them. He
estimated that by April 1912 Britain would have twenty
Dreadnoughts, if the four contingent ones were included;
while the Germans might dispose of seventeen. Asquith
acknowledged that the German Government had distinctly
disavowed any intention to accelerate their programme of
construction; but he added that they had not pledged them-

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

selves. This statement was a tactful attempt to escape from
the dilemma mentioned above. The Prime Minister admitted
that Britain had lost her monopoly of rapid construction,
adding that: "This is a fatal and most serious fact."

The three speakers were obviously trying hard to meet
in advance the arguments of those who were likely to oppose
the government on grounds of economy. Later in the debate
the advocates of reduced expenditures on armaments had
much to say; but it was generally agreed that the country
must be sufficiently protected. What constituted adequate
protection was the only point of controversy. Metternich
reported to his chief the following day:

The earnestness with which yesterday's debate in the House of
Commons on the state of the navy was conducted, shows the enormous
importance attributed to this question by the members of both Parties ....
In the speeches of Mr. McKenna and Mr. Asquith, as well as in that of
the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Balfour, there was an evident attempt
to raise the question of naval armaments above the level of party con-
troversy.24

After several days of discussion the Estimates were passed.
The first four Dreadnoughts were laid down, as also were the
four contingent ones at a later date., The alarm which this
debate had sounded brought an immediate response from the
Dominions and self-governing colonies, and on April 30, 1909,
the British Government suggested the holding of a special
Imperial Conference to consider what was to be done, and
the conference was duly held that summer.

The day after the Estimates had been introduced, Metter-
nich called on Grey in order to express his "surprise and
regret" that his previous denial of any German intention to
accelerate building had been disregarded. The Ambassador
had, in fact, been telling the truth, and the British Govern-
ment's policy of construction, following on the heels of his
assurances, had naturally annoyed not only Metternich him-
self, but the Kaiser and Tirpitz as well.26 The German Gov-
ernment at this time was considering some concession in
warship-building, in exchange for territorial compensation
or a guarantee of British neutrality in the event of war.
Even the rigid Tirpitz was now willing to think of this, and

24 Metternich to Biilow, Mar. 17, 1909, Grosse Po/itik, xxvm, pp. 110-12.

25 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi,pp. 242-3,255,275. The British Government
did not know until later that the information which had caused them to suspect the Germans
of accelerating their building was incorrect, and the form of the German denials had aroused
suspicion.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

the Kaiser followed him as usual. Bethmann Hollweg re-
placed Bulow as Chancellor in July, and for a time it looked
as though some agreement might be reached; but all the
negotiations ended in failure.26

In 1911 there occurred another of the violent interna-
tional crises which characterized those years, and the last of
which ended in war. In Morocco, where France had a special
position, discontent had led to a revolt, and French troops
were sent to occupy the capital. Germany regarded this as a
violation of the existing agreement regarding Morocco, and
she also seems to have wanted to use the situation as a means
of obtaining concessions from France. On July 1 a German
warship steamed into Agadir, ostensibly to protect German
nationals. Three days later Grey warned Germany that Great
Britain would expect to be consulted as to any new arrange-
ment concerning Morocco. The definite, but negative, British
interest in that country was to prevent any potentially un-
friendly naval power from obtaining a base so close to three
important British trade routes. More than two weeks passed
without a reply from the German Government.

On July 21, at the bankers' annual banquet in his honour
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George plainly warned
Germany that if Britain were to be forced into a position
where she had to choose between peace and the maintenance
of her vital interests, she would choose the latter.27 Germany
backed down, and peace was preserved for a while longer;
but the distrust and ill-feeling on both sides had been stirred
up once more. The vicious circle in which the nations of
Europe were constrained to move during these years is ad-
mirably illustrated by an entry in Tirpitz's memoirs, which
mentioned a by-product of the Agadir incident:

With these ideas in my mind I went to Berlin in the autumn [1911],
and represented to the Chancellor that we had suffered a diplomatic
check, and must salve it by a Supplementary Naval Bill.28

Early in 1912, with Tirpitz's supplementary law in the
offing and no agreement in sight, the British Government
decided to try a new method. The idea of direct conversations
between German and British statesmen seems to have been
suggested by Albert Ballin of the Hamburg-Amerika Line,

26 See ibid., especially pp. 283-324.

27 Lloyd George Memoirs, i, p. 44n.

28 Tirpitz, Memoirs, i, p. 211.

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

through his friend Sir Ernest Cassel, a German who had be-
come a British subject. The ground was prepared as care-
fully as possible, and the British Government then sent
Haldane to Berlin, not as a plenipotentiary, but with instruc-
tions to discuss fully with the Germans the difficulties between
the two countries, to try to find a basis lor an agreement to
limit the construction of new warships, and to report to the
Cabinet. The Secretary of State lor War was chosen for this
mission partly because he knew Germany and spoke the
language. On February 8, 1912, Haldane arrived in Berlin.
He had a long conversation with the Chancellor, Bethmann
Hollweg, who was anxious lor an understanding, but told
Haldane that "my admirals are very difficult." The next
dav he had a meeting with the Kaiser and Tirpitz. The latter
was no compromiser, but he seemed willing to consider some
of Haldane's proposals. The immediate result of these con-
versations was a proposed agreement which both governments
were to consider further. Very briefly, neither country would
attack the other, and in any war in which one was not an
aggressor, the other would remain neutral, subject to the
obligations of existing treaties. The possibility of certain
colonial concessions to Germany was also to be explored.
The Germans would consider slowing up the building of the
Dreadnoughts provided for in their intended new navy law,
which Tirpitz would not give up. This last suggestion fell
far short of what Britain wanted, for it was even less than a
subtraction from an addition. The French and Russian gov-
ernments had been very uneasy while these negotiations were
under way, even though they had been kept fully informed
throughout, because they feared that Britain might commit
herself to unconditional neutrality.

The Haldane Mission was a flat failure, and nothing came
of it except more ill-feeling.29 According to the German
Chancellor:

I, personally, had made up my mind to work for the limit of con-
cession in the question of the Naval Bill, provided that I could find a
compensating counterweight in a political agreement. But this England
would not give us.30

In G

rev s version

The upshot was that the Germans were not really willing to give up
the naval competition, and that they wanted a political formula that won Li

29 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, vi, pp. 666-760; Grosse Po/itik, wxi.

30 Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections, l, p. "vi.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

in effect compromise our freedom of action. We could not fetter ourselves
by a promise to be neutral in a European war.31

What the Germans feared was a war in which France and
Russia would be combined against them, and they wanted
a promise, in advance, of British neutrality in such a war.
Britain was willing to give this undertaking, provided that
it should not apply to a war in which Germany was the ag-
gressor. For an unconditional promise of neutrality would
have made the ententes worthless to France and Russia, and
would have prevented Great Britain from pursuing her
traditional and basic policy of trying to prevent any single
State from dominating the continent. It would also have
been in conflict with the terms of certain treaties, including
one with Belgium which later became famous. To the Ger-
mans, on the other hand, a conditional promise was of little
use. They knew that in any case they would probably appear
to be the aggressors, because their army would be mobilized
at unequalled speed and their strategic plans called for a
swiftly-moving offensive against France.

On March 18, 1912, before the Haldane negotiations had
quite reached their futile end, the British naval Estimates
for 1912-13 were introduced by Mr. Winston Churchill, who
had relieved McKenna at the Admiralty the previous year.
The new First Lord spoke at some length on the financial
aspects of the competition in warships. ■ He concluded that
the only safe rule was for the Admiralty to maintain the
smallest navy consistent with full security. Though it might
become necessary later, he was not then prepared to recom-
mend the laying of two keels to one against Germany. A
two-Power standard had served as long as France and Russia
were at the same time the two next strongest naval Powers,
and also "what one might call the most probable adverse
diplomatic combination." The actual standard for new con-
struction which the Admiralty had used during recent years
had been a 60% superiority over Germany alone, in Dread-
noughts, with other and higher standards for the smaller
vessels. This moderate yardstick would not serve for ever,
because it took into account the great British superiority in
pre-Dreadnoughts, which would gradually disappear; but it
would do for a time. Mr. Churchill asked that four Dread-
noughts be laid down in the coming year:

Grey, Twenty-five Years, I, pp. 243^1.

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

The Admiralty are prepared to guarantee absolutely the main security
of the country and of the Empire, day by day for the next few years, and
if the House will grant us what we ask for the future, that prospect may
be indefinitely extended.

The First Lord went on to assert that it the Germans
should add to their existing programme, Britain would lay
two keels to one in respect to any such additional ships.
"Let me make clear, however, that any retardation or re-
duction in German construction will, within certain limits,
be promptly followed here, as soon as it is apparent, by large
and fully proportional reductions." In 1913, for example,
Germany was apparently planning to lay down three capital
ships, and Britain would accordingly have to lay down five.
If both countries were to take a holiday from building Dread-
noughts in that year, Germanv would save herself between
£6,000,000 and £7,000,000:

We should not in ordinary circumstances begin our ships until she
has started hers. The three ships that she did not build would therefore
automatically wipe out no fewer than five British potential super-'Dread-
noughts', and that is more than I expect them to hope to do in a brilliant
naval action.

The indirect results for the whole world, of such an act'
would be "immeasurable in their hope and brightness."

Mr. Churchill expressed the opinion that Britain's facili-
ties for building warships were entirely adequate. 'The
House may take it for certain, therefore, that there is abso-
lutely no danger of our being overtaken unless we decide as
a matter of policy to be so." Speaking of the Estimates in
general he asked for large margins of safety. An attack on
Germany was out of the question: the Royal Navy was there-
fore obliged to stand on the defensive, and must have such a
preponderance as would enable it to meet at its average
moment, the naval forces of an attacking Power at their
selected time. Britain was fed from the sea, he continued,
and was the only Power in Europe which did not possess a
large army. He said that reference was often made to the
proportion which the navies of different countries should
bear to the commercial interests of those countries: "but
when we consider our naval strength we are not thinking of
our commerce, but of our freedom." In the course of the
debate which followed, Sir Gilbert Parker said that his in-
terest in imperial affairs led him to deplore the fact that the
First Lord had not once alluded to the very great importance

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ot the Dominions in naval defence. He thought that contribu-
tions to the Royal Navy would never satisfy the Parliaments
or people of the Dominions, and therefore preferred individual
navies co-ordinated with the general policy of the Admiralty;
and he also asked what the Canadian Government intended to
do.3*

Tirpitz's request of the previous fall for a supplementary
navy bill wherewith to salve the wound of Agadir, had been
granted, and shortly after the debate outlined above his bill
was passed by the Reichstag. On July 22, 1912, Mr. Churchill
asked the House of Commons for more money. J^The direct
cause of the Supplementary Estimates which I am now going
to submit to the House is to be found in the new German
Navy Law." He said that the main feature of this law was
not the rise in new construction of capital ships, but the in-
crease in the striking force of ships of all classes which would
be immediately available at all seasons of the year. A third
squadron of eight battleships would be created, and main-
tained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet,
which would thus be enlarged in the near future from 17 to
25 battleships; while there would be similar increases in other
types. Seventy-two submarines would be built within the
currency of the law. Nearly four-fifths of the entire German
Navy was to be maintained in full, permanent commission,
an unprecedentedly large proportion. The new law would
add 15,000 officers and men to the strength of that navy.
Three additional battleships were to be built, one in 1913,
one in 1916, and one at a date which had not yet been fixed.
These additions were a cumulative increase.

Mr. Churchill went on to state that the number of Dread-
noughts which Britain would need to build in the next five
years, in order to maintain the 60% standard of superiority,
would have to be raised from the 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, in successive
years, of the existing plan, to 5, 4, 4, 4, 4. He said that this
proposed increase in building did not affect the Estimates
then before the House, but that it would be reflected in those
of the following year, and he asked for the modest sum of
£999,000 to cover immediate needs. The First Lord annnoun-
ced that a further concentration of naval strength in the
waters of the United Kingdom was already under way. The

32 The debate of Mar. 18 is in Hansard, 5th Series, xxxv, pp. 1549-1654. This debate, and
the one of July 22, are presented at sorre length because they depict the situation which gave
rise to Borden's navy bill of 1912, insofar as the picture could be shown to the public at that
time.

KM)

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

six battleships of the Atlantic Fleet at Gibraltar, and two
from the Mediterranean, had been brought home, and the
four remaining Mediterranean battleships had been sta-
tioned at Gibraltar to take the place of the old Atlantic
Fleet. The force of fully-commissioned battleships available
in home waters had thus been raised from sixteen to twenty-
four, and further steps along the same line would be taken as
needed. He said that neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy
had any Dreadnoughts in commission, but that they were
supposed to be building nine or ten between them and that
four British battle cruisers would be stationed at Malta. New
Zealand's battle cruiser, which was to have gone to the China
Station, was being retained in the waters ot the United
Kingdom with the consent of the New Zealand Government.
The First Lord acknowledged the comfort and encourage-
ment which had been afforded during the last few weeks by
the presence in London of the Prime Minister of Canada
and some of his colleagues.33

It will have been noted that at the time of the debate in
March, the future seemed to the British Government to hold
out the prospect of an expensive, but stabilized and manage-
able, competition with Germany in naval armaments. This
debate, generally speaking, had accordingly been calm and
confident in tone. The subsequent action of Germany in
screwing the naval competition up to a higher pitch, how-
ever, had altered the situation considerably; a fact which
was strongly reflected in the debate of July. In the course of
his speech on this latter occasion, Mr. Churchill appealed for
the support of the Dominions in meeting the renewed German
challenge, and accepted the principle that if the burden of
naval defence were to be shared, the responsibility for direct-
ing policy should be shared also. Whereas in the earlier debate
the possible co-operation of the Dominions was barely men-
tioned, in the later one several of the speakers not only
thanked the Dominions for what they were doing, or seemed
about to do, but also expressed the opinion that a sharing of
the common burden was no more than just. Sir Robert
Borden's bill calling for the contribution of three Dread-
noughts was laid before the Canadian Parliament in De-
cember 1912; and during the long controversy that followed,
the two debates of March and July at Westminster were
frequently cited.

33 Debate of July 22 in Hansard, ">th Series, xli, pp. 835-94*'). Sir Robert Borden heard
Mr. Churchill's speech from the gallery.

10.

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

In his speech on the naval Estimates in the spring of
1913, the First Lord predicted a steadily increasing burden.
"I think," he said, ". . . that there is no prospect in the future
of avoiding increases of the Navy Estimates unless the period
of acute naval rivalries and rapid scientific expansion through
which we are passing comes to an end." He renewed his sug-
gestion for a one-year holiday from laying down warships.
The battleship which the Federated Malay States had pro-
vided for the Royal Navy, and any which Canada might give,
would, he stated, be additional to the 60% margin of super-
iority, as they had been presented and accepted on that
condition. "They are additional to the requirements of the
60 per cent, standard; they are not additional to the world-
wide requirements of the British Empire."34

As the prolonged proceeding of matching keels drew to
its close, there were signs of a deeper dissatisfaction than ever
before among important sections of the British public:

It was not without difficulty that Parliament was persuaded to assent
to the large naval increases which were submitted to it both by Mr. Mc-
Kenna and Mr. Churchill. Economists, lovers of peace, promoters of
social reform, advocates of reduced taxation, not unnaturally chafed at
the alarming and continuous growth in the expenditure on naval arma-
ments. It is no secret now that there were from time to time serious
controversies on the subject in the Cabinet, particularly in the autumn
and winter of 1913-14, when it was only after protracted discussion that
sanction was given to the Estimates for the year 1914-15. They amounted
to £52,500,000 — an increase of some £20,000,000 on the annual expendi-
ture on the navy only a few years before.35

The war of Estimates and shipyards was soon to be merged
in a much broader contest as the evil year of 1914 came
around at last. Yet just before the storm clouds broke, the
sky seemed for a moment to be clearing. In May the German
Ambassador in London assured his government that:

Our relations with England are as good, on the whole, as they could
possibly be. To desire more would be foolish and fruitless. They are
willing to meet us on every point.36

The naval rivalry between Germany and Great Britain
before 1914 was only a limited part of the whole chaotic pic-
ture of international relations atrfhat time. Germany's navy
was an expression of her abounding vitality and ambition, and

perhaps it was also the ostentation of a nouveau riche. Tir-

34 Hansard, 5th Series, l, pp. 1750-91.

35 Asquith, Genesis of the War, p. 86.

36 Lichnowsky to Jagow, May 10, 1914, Grosse Politik, xxxix, pp. 101-103. See also Grey,
Tiventy-five Years, i, p. 269.

102

GERMAN NAVAL THREAT

pitz's implacable policy of rapid and unlimited expansion
was ill-conceived. The great fleet which Germany built was
paid for, as the French and Russian governments were quick
to realize, with money which she might otherwise have spent
on her army. Britain was the only European State of the
first magnitude which was at all likely to remain neutral in a
general European war, and a navy which helped to drive
her into the arms of France and Russia was an apparatus
that Germany could ill afford. Both Bismarck and his far
more venturesome successor Hitler were wiser in this respect'

The Germany of that day, though fully conscious of her
gigantic strength, was afraid. After Bismarck's fall the
Triple xAlliance gradually grew weaker, while the other
Powers became more closely integrated with each other.
Neither Britain nor Germany at any time seriously con-
sidered attacking the other; yet each of them at times feared
that the other might start a preventive war. To Britain,
Germany was the potential enemy; while Germany was al-
ways thinking in terms of a continental war in which Britain
might support France and Russia. The naval rivalry was
disliked in Britain chiefly because it involved an immense
expenditure, which only German unreasonableness seemed to
make necessary, and which statesmen and citizens alike
tended to think of as nearing the economic or financial break-
ing-point. Actually, however, the burden was lightened by
the fact that the whole period of the acute naval rivalry was
one of rising prices and world-wide prosperity. Moreover the
ability of the twentieth-century industrial State to tax and
spend was enormously greater than anyone at that time sup-
posed. In terms of what was economically possible, it is al-
most certain that Great Britain could have borne indefinitely
much greater financial burdens than she actually did. The
political problem, however, was a very real one for the Asquith
government, and would probably have been more difficult still
had the Opposition been in power. The Anglo-German naval
rivalry stimulated the feeling in Great Britain that the Do-
minions ought to take a larger part in naval defence, especially
in the difficult circumstances which existed. It likewise
strengthened the body of opinion in the Dominions which
favoured increased co-operation in this respect. The threat
which was latent in Tirpitz's ships was strong enough to over^-
come, for a time, the ingrained reluctance of Canadians to put
forth any serious naval effort in time of peace, and was the im-
mediate reason for the creation of the Canadian Naval Service. '

103

Chapter 5

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

THE danger with which the expanding German Navy
seemed to threaten British sea power transformed imperial
naval defence into an immediate and pressing problem.
Accordingly, as far as the Dominions were concerned, the
evolution of naval policy was greatly accelerated, and in the
years from 1902 to 1909 the structure of imperial naval defence
was fundamentally altered. The Admiralty's policy of concen-
trating its forces more fully in one part of the Empire produced
a decentralizing of responsibility. In this situation the part to
be played by the Dominions was agreed upon in principle. In
assigning this part Dominion autonomy was given priority
over purely naval considerations, and the policy of separate
Dominion naval forces was established. As far as Canada was
concerned these changes were to result in the transfer to Cana-
dian ownership of the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt,
and in the creation of a separate naval organization. The de-
cision of the Admiralty to face the growing German Navy by
concentrating a larger proportion of the Royal Navy in home
waters involved the reduction or abolition of the squadrons on
some of the outlying stations. In accord with this policy almost
the whole of the Pacific Squadron was withdrawn from that
station. On February 28, 1905, Commodore J. E. C. Goodrich
lowered his flag in H.M.S. Bonaventure, and on March 4 the
former flag-ship sailed from Esquimalt for duty with the China
Squadron, leaving on the station only H.M.S. Shearwater and
the surveying ship Egeria.1

The bases at Halifax and Esquimalt had ceased to be more
than potentially useful to the Royal Navy, and the Admiralty
was willing to transfer them to the Canadian Government,
subject to certain conditions. These were intended to safeguard
the Admiralty's future interests by ensuring as far as possible
that the naval facilities at the two ports would neither be
allowed to deteriorate beyond usefulness nor be employed for

1 Longstaff, Esquimalt Xaval Base, p. 14(i.

104

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

other purposes; and that ships of the Royal Navy would always
be able to use them, particularly in time of war. In a broad
form which left the details to be discussed later, the Admir-
alty's conditions were transmitted to the Canadian Govern-
ment early in 1906, 2 and accepted.3 It was subsequently
arranged that the dockyard at Halifax should be physically
handed over to the Dominion authorities on January 1, 1907,
and this was carried out.4 On later consideration, however,
the Dominion Government disliked some of the Admiralty's
conditions: these were therefore reconsidered, and less exacting
ones were substituted for them.5 The revised conditions were
essentially the same as those on which the formal transfer later
took place.

In March 1908, the Canadian Government announced that
the revised terms were "quite satisfactory in every respect",
and accepted them. Authority was provided at the same time
for taking over immediately the naval properties at Esquimalt,
subject to the revised conditions.6 In Britain, however, the Law
Officers of the Crown advised that the formal transfer of the
bases would need to be covered by a detailed memorandum
setting forth the conditions and agreed to by both govern-
ments, and also by special legislation. Such a memorandum
was accordingly submitted to the Canadian Government,
which assented to its terms.7 The Parliament at Westminster
took the step required of it by passing the "Naval Establish-
ments in British Possessions Act", which became law in
October 19098. The Act authorized His Majesty, on the advice
of the Admiralty and the Treasury, to vest any property
situated in a British possession and held in trust for naval
purposes, in the Governor of the possession concerned. Trans-
fer of custody would be effected by Order in Council, and
would be subject to any conditions that such an Order might
lay down. It was under the authority of this Act that the bases
at Halifax and Esquimalt were transferred to the Dominion
the following year.

The policy of Dominion navies was evolved at a series of
colonial and imperial conferences. The first of these conferen-

- Elgin to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, N.S. 51-4-2 (1).

1 P.C. 876M., Apr. 2, 1906.

1 Memo., Nov. 2, 1908, N.S. 51-1-1 (1).

5 Elgin to Grey, Oct. 5, 1907, ibid.

B P.G. 1697M., Mar. 11, 1908.

7 P.C. 188N., Apr. 16, 1909.

8 9 Edw. VII, c. 18. See App. in.

105

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ces was held in 1902, at the time of King Edward's coronation.
To British naval strategists the world at that moment presen-
ted a disquieting scene. The South African War which had
just been won, if it had demonstrated the force of imperial
sentiment in the Dominions, had also shown that the British
Empire stood alone in a panoplied world, and that its security
depended on the strength of the Royal Navy. The German
Reichstag had passed its first two navy laws, while all the great
Powers and many small ones were providing themselves with
navies. Two of the new great-Power navies had their roots in
North America and Asia, and in order to act decisively against
them the Royal Navy would be obliged to operate far from its
home bases, and while doing so to leave the source of its
strength exposed. The conditions that had governed the
strategy and size of the Royal Navy for three hundred years
were undergoing a revolutionary change. It was with this
disturbing picture in their minds that the British delegates
came to the colonial conference of 1902.

At that conference Joseph Chamberlain urged, as he had in
1897, that the colonies should bear a larger proportion of the
weight of naval preparedness, and that even though it might be
impossible to eliminate immediately the existing disproportion
in naval expenditure for the common defence, it ought to be
reduced.9 The representatives of the colonies were invited to
discuss the matter with the Admiralty; and this they did, most
of them undertaking to contribute or to increase the existing
contributions/ The First Lord10 then laid a memorandum
before the conference. It showed that the naval Estimates for
the year 1902-3 amounted to over £31,000,000, of which the
self-governing colonies would only be paying £328,000, a figure
which was the total of the increased contributions which had
just been agreed upon. The cost of the Royal Navy to the
United Kingdom and the self-governing colonies respectively,
per head of white population, was given as: United Kingdom,
15s. 2d.; Australia, Is. |d.; New Zealand, Is. ^d.; Canada, nil;
Newfoundland, 3^d.; Cape Colony, Is. 10jd.; Natal, 10s.
9^d. X1 The memorandum stated that a larger sum of money
provided by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom for the

9 Cd. 1299, "Papers relating to a Conference . . . 1902", p. 5, Pari. Paps., 1902, lxvi.

10 Lord Selborne.

11 Cd. 1299, p. 18. These figures take no account of income or wealth per head, nor of
relative interests in shipping and seaborne trade.

106

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Royal Navy was spent in the Dominions12 than these last
contributed towards the cost of the navy; that about a quarter
of the seaborne trade of the Empire was trade between a
colony at one end and another colony or a foreign country at
the other, in which the taxpayer in the LJnited Kingdom had
no interest either as buyer or seller; and that in a state of
independence the self-governing colonies would have had to
spend far more on naval defence than they were in fact doing,
in support ot which statement the naval expenditures of
Holland and Argentina were cited.

The First Lord's memorandum continued:

. . . the danger to the Empire which I fear is that Canada, South Africa,
and Australia, being in fact continents, should become too much continental
and too little maritime in their aspirations and ideas. The British Empire
owes its existence to the sea, and it can only continue to exist if all parts of
it regard the sea as their material source of existence and strength. It is
therefore desirable that our fellow subjects in the Dominions beyond the
seas should appreciate the importance of Naval questions. If they will
undertake a larger share of the Naval burden, well and good. But I regard
it as of even more importance that they should cultivate the maritime
spirit; that their populations should become maritime as ours are, and that
they should become convinced of the truth of the proposition that there is
no possibility of the localisation of Naval force, and that the problem of the
British Empire is in no sense one of local defence.

The sea is all one, and the British Navy therefore must be all one; and
its solitary task in war must be to seek out the ships of the enemy, wherever
they are to be found, and destroy them. At whatever spot, in whatever sea,
these ships are found and destroyed, there the whole Empire will be simul-
taneously defended in its territory, its trade, and its interests. If, on the
contrary, the idea should unfortunately prevail that the problem is one of
local defence, and that each part of the Empire can be content to have its
allotment of ships for the purpose of the separate protection of an individual
spot, the only possible result would be that an enemy who had discarded
this heresy, and combined his fleets, will attack in detail and destroy those
separated British squadrons which, united, could have defied defeat.13

This memorandum, which of course embodied the ideas of
the Admiralty, might have come from the pen of Capt. Mahan.
The Admiralty point of view, which was also that of the British
government of the day, was more plainly and persuasively
presented to this conference than to any other before or after-
wards. The imperialists, many of whom were federationists,
were very numerous and influential, and this British govern-

12 Overseas bases of the Royal Navy put considerable money into the pockets of the local
inhabitants through such means as pay spent on shore, the construction of buildings with local
labour and materials, and the purchase of fresh meat and vegetables.

13 Cd. 1299, p. 20.

107

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ment on the whole subscribed to their ideas. There is no doubt
that imperialists felt the time to be ripe for a long step in the
direction of co-operation for defence, which they regarded not
only as good in itself, but also as a logical preliminary to com-
bined direction of foreign policy and some form of federation.
What was said in discussion is not known, as the proceedings,
in accord with a request from the Canadian delegates, were
not published.

An agreement was reached between the Admiralty and the
governments of a now federated Australia, and of New Zealand.
The naval force on the Australian Station was to consist of an
armoured cruiser, two second-class and four third-class
cruisers, four sloops, and a naval reserve consisting of 25
officers and 700 seamen and stokers. This force was to be
based on Australian and New Zealand ports, and its sphere of
Operations was to be the waters of the Australian, China, and
East Indies stations. The agreement would run for ten years,
and it was arranged that: "In consideration of the service afore-
mentioned the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand
shall pay the Imperial Government five-twelfths and one-
twelfth respectively of the total annual cost of maintaining the
Naval force on the Australian Station, provided that the total
amount so paid shall in no case exceed £200,000 and £40,000
respectively in any one year . . . "14 Cape Colony and Natal
also undertook to increase their unconditional annual contri-
butions, the former from £30,000 to £50,000, and Natal from
£12,000 to £35,000. Newfoundland agreed to provide £3,000
a year toward the expenses of the branch of the Royal Naval
Reserve which had been established in that colony two years
earlier. The total amount of the colonial naval contributions
had been almost doubled.

Canada was represented by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir
Frederick Borden,15 W. S. Fielding, Minister of Finance, Sir
William Mulock, and W. B. Paterson.

The conception of Canada's status which Sir Wilfrid developed in his
later years of office was that of a nation within the Empire. He became
convinced that it was possible to reconcile what was sanest and most
practicable in the ideals of independence and imperialism. Canada might
attain virtual independence, secure control of her own destinies at home and
abroad, and yet retain allegiance to a common sovereign. As for the Empire,
its strength and its only hope of permanence lay in the freedom of the com-

14 Ibid., pp. 24-6. Australia and New Zealand together had been contributing at the rate of
£126,000 a year.

16 Laurier' s Minister of Militia and Defence, and a cousin of Sir Robert Borden.

108

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

ponent parts; centralization would prove unwieldy and provoke revolt ....
He did not believe that this nicely balanced compromise would prove an
eternal solution. That Canada's eventual goal would be independence,
remained his conviction. But that was not for his time, and sufficient for
the day was the principle thereof.16

Laurier and his colleagues at the conference were very willing
to co-operate in the economic field; but with respect to naval
defence their policy was almost wholly negative. They
answered the requests which the representatives of the British
Government had made, in a memorandum17 in which they
regretted that they had been unable to assent to the sugges-
tions made by the First Lord and to similar ones from the War
Office. They stated that their objections arose, not so much
because of the expenditure involved, "as from a belief that the
acceptance of the proposals would entail an important de-
parture from the principle of Colonial self-government." As
Canada increased in wealth and population it should undoub-
tedly spend more for self-defence:

At present Canadian expenditures for defence services are confined to
the military side. The Canadian Government are prepared to consider the
naval side of defence as well. On the sea-coasts of Canada there is a large
number of men admirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve, and it is hoped
that at an early day a system may be devised which will lead to the training
of these men, and to the making of their services available for defence in
time of need.

It may be that during this conference Laurier went a long
step beyond the formula which has just been quoted, for the
First Lord stated in a memorandum that although the Cana-
dian Government felt unable to make any offer of assistance
along the lines which had been suggested, Sir Wilfrid had told
him that he and his colleagues were contemplating the creation
of "a local Naval force" in the waters of the Dominion.1* Yet
the fact that the memorandum is dated four days earlier than
that of the Canadian delegation makes it likely, or at least
possible, either that by "Naval force" the First Lord merely
meant a naval reserve, or that he had misinterpreted what
Laurier said to him. For the first time at any conference a
Canadian Government had been willing to consider taking
some direct measures for naval defence; but the evidence
invalidates any statement that in 1902 the idea of forming a
Canadian navy entered the field of practical politics.

16 Skelton, Life of Laurier, n, pp. 291-2.

17 Cd. 1299, App. vi.

18 Ibid. p. 18.

109

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The members resolved that it would be to the advantage of
the Empire to hold similar conferences, if practicable, at inter-
vals not exceeding four years, and that, consistent with the
confidential negotiation of treaties with foreign Powers, the
views of the colonies affected should be obtained so as^to put
them in a better position to adhere to such treaties. Though
the colonies which were already making contributions increased
these, no general basis for contributions nor common accep-
tance of them as a policy had been reached. The Admiralty
agreed that a certain number of suitable candidates from the
Dominions would be accepted annually as naval cadets. All
in all the imperialists, who had expected great things from this
conference, had small reason to rejoice over its results.

Before the next conference met, the Committee of Imperial
Defence, which was to be so closely associated with the defence
aspects of later conferences, had been formed. The Boer War
had revealed the ineffectiveness of the existing machinery for
the purpose of co-ordinating a war effort, and the whole ques-
tion of armv reform had been a live one for many vears. Soon
after he became Prime Minister in 1902, Arthur Balfour
arranged for the creation of this committee, which held its first
meeting on December 18, 1902. It was an unorthodox body,
composed at each meeting of those persons whom the Prime
Minister had invited to attend, and possessing very general
terms of reference. /•'As a consequence", wrote Balfour, "it
becomes far easier to make the Committee a truly Imperial
body, in which the Colonies as well as the Mother Country may
find an appropriate machinery for considering together the
greatest of their common interests — the interests of Imperial
Defence."19 The first representative of a Dominion to attend
a meeting of the committee was Sir Frederick Borden, who did
so in December 1903 while visiting London. The Colonial
Conference of 1907 was later to pass resolutions to the effect
that the colonies should be authorized to refer any local
military questions to the Committee of Imperial Defence, for
its advice, and that a representative of any colony which might
have asked for the committee's opinion should attend as a
member during the discussion of the questions which had been
raised.20 The committee was there to advise on every aspect
of imperial preparations for war, and the defence plans of the

19 Quoted from a Cabinet memo, of 1904 in Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, i, p. 366.

20 C.3523, "Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907", p. v, Pari. Paps.,
1907, lv.

110

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Dominions were to owe much to the advice received from this
source.

Chamberlain's campaign for protection, waged because he
had come to feel not only that industry in the United Kingdom
required it, but also that only by this means could the closely
integrated Empire of his dreams be realized, had placed an
almost intolerable strain upon the Conservative Party, of
which, after the death of Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour had
proved to be an ineffective chief. It was no surprise, therefore,
that in the election of 1906 the Liberals under the leadership
of Campbell-Bannerman were returned by an overwhelming
majority. The country stood on the threshold of one of those
comparatively rare periods during which a great mass of
reform legislation is crammed into the statute books in the
course of a few years, and the triumphant Liberals were much
more anxious to spend money on social reforms than on war-
ships. The new Prime Minister had suggested a method for
resolving this dilemma, in an article which he had contributed
to The Nation in March 1907, advocating a limitation of
armaments by international agreement.21 But the public was
very sensitive on the subject of the German Navy, which
continued to expand at an alarming rate; accordingly the Royal
Navy likewise received great accretions of strength, including
the Dreadnought, launched in 1906, the most famous warship of
her time.

At the conference of 1907 Great Britain was represented by
Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Elgin the Colonial Secretary, and
Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty. Australia was
represented by Alfred Deakin, the Transvaal by Louis Botha,
Cape Colony by Dr. L. S. Jameson22 and Dr. Thomas Smartt,
and Canada by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Frederick Borden, and
L. P. Brodeur. In his opening address Campbell-Bannerman
stated that: "We do not meet you to-day as claimants for
money, although we cordially recognize the spirit in which
contributions have been made in the past, and will, no doubt,
be made in the future."23 He added that the cost of naval
defence and the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs
went hand in hand. Lord Tweedmouth expressed the Admir-

21 Jebb, Imperial Conference, i, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

22 The most dramatic feature of this conference was the presence together at the same
council table of the most eminent of the Boer commanders in the South African War and the
leader of the Jameson Raid.

23 "Minutes of Proceedings," p. 5.

Ill

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

alty's opinion : "There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there
is one Navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help,
and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage
this great service without restraint." This was old doctrine;
but he broke new ground as far as the Admiralty was concerned
by saying that it would be a great help if the colonies were to
^provide local squadrons of small ships to operate against raiders
and to co-operate with larger units of the Royal Navy. Tor-
pedo boats and submarines were considered to be the most
suitable types, submarines being thought the most effective
weapon against raiders. It would be advantageous if the
colonies, particularly Australia and New Zealand, could
arrange to provide these small craft locally, because such
vessels were too small for long ocean cruises. The former objec-
tion against local navies was withdrawn, provided that such
forces were under the Admiralty's control. Lord Tweedmouth
also pointed out that it would help greatly if the colonies would
furnish docks and coaling facilities.24

Speaking for Canada, Brodeur objected to the statement
frequently made that the Dominion spent nothing whatever on
naval defence. He pointed out that a considerable sum was
spent annually for fishery protection on the seas and the Great
Lakes — a duty which had been taken over from the Admiralty
— as well as on wireless stations and the hydrographic survey.
Responsibility for the upkeep of the dockyards at Halifax and
Esquimalt, moreover, was in course of being transferred by the
British Government.25 The proposal for a fast mail and pas-
senger service from the United Kingdom to Australia and New
Zealand across Canada, a utility which would involve heavy
subsidies, came up again at this conference. To this proposal
Laurier was very friendly, and a resolution favouring it was
passed unanimously.

Speaking to a resolution introduced by Smartt of Cape
Colony, that the colonies ought to help in naval defence by
means of contributions, or of local naval defence, or in some
other way, the Canadian Prime Minister stated his case as
follows:

Laurier: I am sorry to say, so far as Canada is concerned, we cannot
agree to the resolution. We took the ground many years ago that we had
enough to do in that respect in our country before committing ourselves to
a general claim. The Government of Canada has done a great deal in that

> u Ibid., pp. 129-30.
*Itid.,p\>. 139-41.

112

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

respect. Our action was not understood, but I was glad to see that the First
Lord of the Admiralty admitted we had done much more than he was aware
of. It is impossible, in my humble opinion, to have a uniform policy on this
matter: the disproportion is too great between the Mother Country and the
Colonies. We have too much to do otherwise; in the Mother Country, you
must remember, they have no expenses to incur with regard to public
works; whereas, in most of the Colonies, certainly in Canada, we have to
tax ourselves to the utmost of our resources in the development of our
country, and we could not contribute, or undertake to do more than we are
doing in that way. For my part, if the motion were pressed to a conclusion,
I should have to vote against it.

Dr. Smartt: But the public works to which you refer are of a reproduc-
tive character which are vital to the interests of your Dominion.

Laurier: Some of our railways have never paid a cent of interest or
expenses.

Dr. Smartt: Still, it is developing and opening up the country to an
enormous extent. All the colonies are building developing railways of a
character which may not be revenue-producing for years. I thought the
wording of this resolution would have specially met your views because you
will find to make such a contribution towards the upkeep of the Navy it
may take the form either of a grant of money, or the establishment of a local
defence force or other services. I understand Canada suggested strongly
the other day that some of their other services were in the nature of local
defence.

Laurier: I have said all I have to say on the subject.26

Three years later, in Montreal, Laurier explained his stand
regarding Smartt's resolution and questions:

Or, messieqrs, pour ma part, je m'opposai de.toutes mes forces a cette
proposition. Et pourquoi? Parce qu'on faisait une obligation et un devoir
de ce qui a mes yeux devait etre facultatif. Sur mon opposition, la propo-
sition n'alla pas plus loin. Et pourquoi cela? Parce que je yoyais la le salut
de notre pays, de notre autonomic . . . 27

A variant of Hofmeyr's earlier suggestion of a two per cent
duty was strongly advocated at the conference by Alfred
Deakin. His eloquence was in vain, however, and at a later
stage, during discussions which they had with the Admiralty,
the Australian delegates expressed the opinion that it would be
desirable for their Dominion to start something in the way of
a local naval defence force, and the New Zealand representa-
tives asked for figures stating the probable cost of a similar
force, to be composed of submarines. Still later Deakin voiced
an opinion which he had arrived at some years previously: "In
Australia . . . the existing contribution has not proved generally

26 Ibid., p. 542.

27 Discours de Sir Wiljrid Laurier . . . an Monument National, Montreal, le 10 octobre 1910„
Pub. Arch. Pamph. Cat., n, No. 3712, p. 16.

113

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

popular."28 Newfoundland expressed a willingness to increase
its annual grant towards the local naval reserve. By a unani-
mous vote the conference resolved that a similar meeting, to be
known as the Imperial Conference, should be held every four
years; and the word "Dominion" was officially adopted in
place of "Colony", as far as the self-governing units were
concerned.

On March 16, 1909, the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom and the First Lord of the Admiralty announced in
the House of Commons that the tremendous expansion of the
German Navy had placed Great Britain in an exceedingly
critical situation. Six days later a cablegram arrived in London
from the government of New Zealand, offering a battleship of
the latest type, and two of them if necessary, to the Royal
Navy. On March 29 a resolution approving the establishment
of a Canadian naval Service was passed by the House of
Commons in Ottawa. A message from New South Wales and
Victoria arrived on April 4, offering to share, on the basis of
population, in the cost of a Dreadnought, unless the govern-
ment of the Commonwealth were to provide one. In view of
all these circumstances the British Government suggested that
a special imperial conference be held in order to discuss general
questions connected with the military and naval defence of the
Empire. Before the conference met, a change of government in
Australia brought Deakin to power for the third time, and his
government promptly offered to provide for the Royal Navy a
Dreadnought "or such addition to its naval strength as may be
determined" at the conference.29

Among the members present at this conference were the
British Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith; the Earl of Crewe,
Colonial Secretary; Reginald McKenna, the First Lord; Sir
J. G. Ward, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister of New
Zealand; J. C. Smuts for the Transvaal; and J. B. M. Hertzog,
Attorney General of the Orange River Colony. Canada was
represented by Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and
Defence, and L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries.
Major General Lake and Rear Admiral Kingsmill accompanied
the Canadian delegation as advisers.

A memorandum prepared by the Admiralty formed the
basis of the preliminary discussions. The Admiralty's opinion

28 Minutes of Proceedings, p. 473. He gave his reasons at some length. The Australian
contributions came to an end with the founding of the Royal Australian Navy two years later.

19 Cd. 4948, "Imperial Conference on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire,
1909", p. 13, Pari. Paps., 1909, lix.

114

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

was that if imperial defence were considered simply as a prob-
lem of naval strategy "it would be found that the greatest out-
put of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the
maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of
training and unity of command." Nevertheless, "it has long
been recognized . . . that other considerations than those of
strategy alone must be taken into account." The various
circumstances of Dominions which were dissimilar in maturity,
geographical environment, and historical background, might
understandably lead one Dominion to prefer a contribution of
"money or materiel" to the Royal Navy, while another might
wish to maintain a local naval force, which would be at the
disposal of the Crown in war, but would also be a basis for a
future Dominion navy. A third might prefer to perform other
local services in place of naval expenditure of direct imperial
value. The conference would therefore try to determine the
form of naval defence best suited to the naval circumstances of
each Dominion, not seeking a final scheme of defence, but
hoping "to formulate the broad principles upon which the
growth of Colonial naval forces should be fostered."

"In the opinion of the Admiralty, a Dominion Government
desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct
Fleet unit, and the smallest unit is one which, while manage-
able in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component
parts in time of war." Since torpedo boats and_submarines
would not be able to co-operate with larger shlpson the high c-f //%
seas, a scheme limited to these types would not result in a self-
contained fleet capable of offensive action. Such a flotilla,
moreover, would afford a restricted future to its personnel, and
inadequate training for the senior officers. The smallest fleet
unit which was recommended would consist of an armoured
cruiser of the Indomitable class, three unarmoured cruisers of
the Bristol class, six river-class destroyers, three C-class sub-
marines, and certain auxiliaries.30

Such a unit would be able to defend trade routes as well as
coasts, and to deal with a hostile squadron in its waters, and
could moreover be easily combined with a squadron of the
Royal Navy. It would require 2,300 officers and men, its
initial cost would be £3,700,000, and the annual cost of its

30 The Indomitables were early battle cruisers and were classed as Dreadnoughts. H.M.A.S.
Australia, mentioned elsewhere, was an Indefatigable — an improved Indomitable. Four
Bristol-class cruisers were the backbone of the projected Canadian shipbuilding programme
which followed on the heels of the Naval Service Act of 1910.

115

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

maintenance would be £600,000. As far as possible it should
be manned from the shore in the Dominion concerned, and if
necessary the Royal Navy would lend officers and men: the
pay would be a question for the Dominion. The essential
component of the unit would be the Indomitable, which ought
to be laid down in advance of the other ships. In the cases of
Australia and New Zealand the cost of the Indomitables would
be cancelled off by that of the Dreadnoughts already offered to
the Royal Navy. Establishments for shipbuilding, supply, and
training, would have to be developed in the Dominions. For
the sake of effective co-operation between the navies of the
Dominions and the Royal Navy, there should be a common
standard for building, armaments, discipline, and base facili-
ties; especially as "it is a sine qua non that successful action in
time of war depends upon unity of command and direction ....
it has been recognized by the Colonial Governments that in
time of war the local naval forces should come under the
general directions of the Admiralty."31

In a statement to the conference, which was necessarily
based on the Admiralty memorandum, the First Lord said that:

Nobody recognizes more fully than we do at the Admiralty that you
have to take other things into account besides strategy, and that the
representatives of some of the Dominions may naturally . . . wish to have
some regard to a future . . . when they would have a navy of their own, not
a navy separate from the British Navy . . . but [one] which, in time of peace,
would be developed by themselves, manned by themselves, and controlled
by themselves.

McKenna emphasized the fact that the Admiralty's proposals
were tentative only, as the wishes of the Dominions were not
known, and their permanent naval forces could only be built
up on lines acceptable to themselves, and he offered them the
willing co-operation of the Admiralty. He suggested that
Canada should establish a fleet unit on her Pacific coast, which
would raise to four the number of units stationed in that ocean.
There was not the same urgency in regard to the east coast of
Canada, because those waters were within the operating area
of the great fleets based on the United Kingdom.32

In his principal speech at the conference, Sir Frederick
Borden read the revised Foster Resolution of March 29, 190933,

31 Memo, in "Imperial Conference . . . 1909", pp. 20-23.

32 Conference on . . . Defence of the Empire — Minutes of Proceedings (Dominions No. 15,
Secret, Colonial Office, 1909), 3rd Day, pp. 2-6, "Conference— Defence of the Empire, 1909",
Library of Parliament, Ottawa.

116

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

which he considered to be a mandate. The three principles
contained in the resolution were, according to Borden, that
Canada wished to do whatever was needed herself, in direct
connection with the British authorities and under their guid-
ance; that she wanted to act along the lines laid down by
Lord Tweedmouth at the conference of 1907; and that in an
emergency the Dominion might go beyond the "expenditure
of her own money herself" to help the United Kingdom to
meet the crisis. Borden said that he would view the Admiralty
memorandum in this light. Canada's national ambitions would
not be satisfied by having a naval unit on one ocean only,
relying on the Royal Navy for protection in the other, and the
more so since seven-eighths of the population lived in the
Atlantic region. Canada should therefore establish a unit on
each coast. Borden asked for a full discussion of the subject
under three headings which the Admiralty had suggested: the
means of reconciling local control by the Canadian Govern-
ment over its naval forces with the principle of unity of com-
mand in time of war; the best means of interchanging ships and
personnel between the British and the Dominions' navies; and
plans for the transitional period while the creation of complete
Dominion fleet units was taking place.34

Brodeur expressed appreciation of the fact that the United
Kingdom authorities had recognized the principle of Dominion
autonomy in naval defence. He said that the resolution of
March 29 went beyond mere coastal defence to co-operation in
imperial defence. He pointed to Canada's river, canal,- and
port facilities as a contribution to that end. Brodeur also
suggested that merchant ships which could be converted in
time of war into auxiliary cruisers might be a useful naval
asset, and asked for the Admiralty's opinion on the subject.35

The smaller units, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and the
South African colonies, supported the policy of contributions
against that of Dominion navies which was advocated by
Australia and Canada. McKenna supported the two big
Dominions. Borden expressed the opinion that small countries
such as Newfoundland or New Zealand could not be expected
to maintain navies of their own; but that Australia and Canada
were in a different position:

:,:i See pp. 127- Z l^Iow.

M Conference on . . . Defence oft1-' Empire, 4th Day, pp. 2-4.

s5 Ibid., 4th Day, pp. 4-6. The rkimiralty subsequently rejected this idea.

117

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

We are a young nation, and we take pleasure — and it pleases our
people in their national pride and aspirations — in calling ourselves a young
nation. Well, it seems to me one of the first duties of a young nation is to
defend itself. My country, at any rate, do not feel that we are going to pay
anybody or hire anybody to do that which we ought to do ourselves, so long
as we are able to do it ... . We are told here that strategy is against the idea
of local navies. I have no doubt it is, and I would add that convenience is
against it. But it is the business of statesmen and, the business of admirals
and generals, to overcome difficulties of this kind, and strategy must take a
second place to Constitutional Government .... I do not believe there is
any insuperable difficulty. You might say the same thing with reference to
our land forces; why should not we employ the British Government, the
War Office, to do all our work of defence? Why have any local militia or
local forces? We have local militia and local forces, and we have developed
them until today the War Office has evolved a scheme by which we are on
the threshold, at any rate, of the establishment of an Imperial Army — a
method by which the forces of the armies of the different Dominions can
absolutely co-operate and form a whole.36

Later, defending the principle of local navies, Borden stated
that: "One objection put forward was that if a serious war
came, forsooth, some particular navy, Australian or Canadian,
might refuse to act. Surely it is only necessary to present that
view in order to see how absolutely necessary it is that there
should be individual navies."37

Merriman of Cape Colony said that "twopenny-halfpenny
navies" had no military usefulness, and that separate Domin-
ion naval forces would possess only a sentimental value. To
this Brodeur replied that the advocates of Dominion navies
were taking not a sentimental but a long-term view. "We are
growing fast." The British Empire would be strengthened in
the eyes of the world by having, not one navy only, but "four
or five nations with their own navies." A policy of contribu-
tions, on the other hand, might cause friction at a later time
when the conditions of to-day are forgotten; and the refusal of
a contribution would diminish the prestige of the British
Empire in the eyes of the world. Fears had been expressed lest
the granting of local autonomy in naval affairs might weaken
the imperial tie; yet the self-same fears had been aroused by
the granting of responsible government.38

/The Colonial Secretary in closing the conference repeated
that strategy must take second place to the wishes of the
Dominions. He said that with respect to naval policy the

36 Ibid., 5th Day, pp. 2-7.

37 Ibid., p. 8.

38 Ibid., pp. 12-15.

118

DECENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

relations between Great Britain and the Dominions were
similar to those between allies who "have to bear the disabili-
ties which belong to their respective forces not being under
identical control." The Colonial Secretary emphasized that it
is a grave responsibility to start a navy, an organization in
which inefficiency could not be tolerated. If criticism of local
navies was to be proved false, therefore, the Dominions must
create good ones and be willing to spend £600,000 or £700,000
a year upon them.39

The Canadian delegates took the position that while a fleet
unit on the Pacific might form an acceptable part of future
policy, it was out of the question for the present. They sug-
gested that two plans should be presented to them, which
would cost £400,000 and £600,000 a year respectively, and
both of which should omit the cost of the fishery and hydro-
graphic surveys, but include the maintenance of the two dock-
yards and of the wireless telegraph service. The Admiralty's
opinion was that for £400,000 the most desirable unit would
consist of three improved Bristols and four destroyers, manned
by 1,408 officers and men. Two of the Bristols should be
stationed in the Pacific, and the third, together with the four
destroyers, in the Atlantic. The components of the £600,000
unit which the Admiralty recommended were four Bristols and
one cruiser of the Boadicea class, with six improved river-class
destroyers, the whole manned by 2,194 officers and men:

Plan I: Summary of expenditure at British rates for £600,000 plan:

Ships 4 Bristols 1 Boadicea 6 Destroyers Totals

Building £1,508,000 £350,000 £480,000 £2,338,000

Maintenance... £ 79,600 £16,500 £64,200 £ 160,300
Depreciation

& Interest £ 101,200 £23,500 £40,200 £ 164,900

Personnel £ 107,200 £19,900 £33,000 £ 160,100

Annual Cost £ 288,000 £59,900 £137,400 £ 485,300

Plan II: Summary of expenditure at British rates for £400,000 plan:

Ships 3 Bristols 4 Destroyers Totals

Building £1,131,000 £320,000 £1,451,000

Maintenance. ... £ 59,700 £ 42,800 £ 102,500
Depreciation

& Interest £ 75,900 £ 26,800 £ 102,700

Personnel £ 80,400 £22,000 £ 102,400

Annual Cost £ 216,000 £91,600 £ 307,600

™ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

119

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

It was recommended that any submarine construction
should be deterred for the present, owing to the exceptionally
high standard of training required for the complements of these
boats., Pending the completion of the ships which it was recom-
mending, the Admiralty would lend the Canadian Government
two old cruisers of the Apollo class, so that the training of naval
personnel might be begun without delay. The Canadian
Government was to meet the cost of fitting out and maintain-
ing these cruisers, and of paying the volunteers from the Royal
Navy who would man them until trained Canadians could be
made available. The Admiralty offered to lend officers as
instructors, and to receive Canadian cadets at Dartmouth and
Osborne. It was also suggested that the Parliament of Canada
should, by statute, assimilate the discipline of the new Service
to that of the Royal Navy, and provide for the creation of a
naval reserve and a naval volunteer force. A further recom-
mendation was that the Canadian Government should provide
strategically situated docks, adequate for the largest warships
or liners, to serve the Pacific, Atlantic, and St. Lawrence
areas. The question of a flag was allowed to rest for the time
being for further consideration by the Admiralty.40

With a few modifications and changes the suggestions out-
lined above were soon afterwards adopted by the Canadian
Government and Parliament, although some of them were
never carried out. The fact that the majority of these recom-
mendations were afterwards accepted, and that a number of
them were implemented, means that they will appear very
frequently later on in the story as components of policy or as
accomplished facts. Parts of the programme outlined above
formed the mould in which the Royal Canadian Navy was cast
and of which it bears imprints to this day. An undertaking
along similar lines was also reached between the Admiralty and
the Australian delegation, and so it came about that in a sense
the navies of both the principal Dominions were born at the
conference of 1909.
-

*•" Imperial Conference . . . 19C9", pp. 23-4.

120

Chapter 6

THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

THE grave warnings of danger which were voiced in the
British House of Commons on March 16, 1909, had wide
repercussions. Large sections of the public in the Domin-
ions and colonies accepted these warnings at their face value,
and /the traditional reluctance of Canadians to spend money
updn naval defence gave way before this strong wind from the
outer world./ The Canadian press reflected various points of
view concerning the lesson to be drawn from the speeches in
London; but the majority of the newspapers which have been
consulted felt that some positive action should be taken. For
example, some of them did not allude to what the British
Ministers had said, while L 'Action Sociale, and Le Nationalist le
of Montreal, were strongly against the adoption of any naval
policy. Le Temps of Ottawa considered it unnecessary for
Canada to contribute Dreadnoughts in order to prove its
loyalty to Great Britain, or to convince Germany of that
loyalty, and favoured the creation of a Canadian navy. The
Halifax Chronicle felt that while Canada was willing to assist
the Mother Country to the full extent of her resources, consis-
tent with her autonomous status, "the sober people of the
Dominion are not going to be swept off their feet by the clamor
and hysteria of the Toronto crowd of warriors." Both the
Victoria Colonist and the Vancouver Daily News Advertiser,
while making no specific suggestions felt that the Dominion
should do something to help. The Toronto Globe stated on
March 23 that the time had arrived when every member of the
British family should aid in dissipating any doubts concerning
Britain's position as mistress of the seas, and claimed that the
danger was real. The next day it expressed the opinion that
Canada should provide herself with Dreadnoughts, and that
these should remain under Canadian control. The Manitoba

1 It is probable, however, thar had Canada been an independent republic she would have
furnished herself with a naval force of some kind during the opening years of this century.
Naval reference books published in that period have much to say of the policies and program-
mes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Norway, and other small States. In 191 1
even Cuba was planning to have some cruisers and a gunboat built.

121

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Free Press reported the First Lord's speech in a detached
manner; but on March 27, in a front-page editorial, it urged
that as an exceptional act to meet an exceptional situation,
and not as a permanent policy, some Dreadnoughts should be
given to Great Britain.

The views expressed in Parliament were similar on the
whole to those of the press. Earlier in the session at Ottawa,
before the debate on the naval Estimates had taken place in
London, the Hon. George Foster, Member for North Toronto
and one of the most prominent Conservatives in public life,
had given notice of a resolution calling for measures by Canada
to defend her coasts. He had been obliged to delay its intro-
duction for two months, because of opposition from F. D.
Monk and others within his own Party.2 On March 29, 1909,
however, a fortnight after the speeches had been delivered at
Westminister, Foster introduced his resolution:

That in the opinion of this House, in view of her great and varied re-
sources, of her geographical position and national environments, and of
that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and
growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper
share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable
protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports.3

In support of the resolution Foster said that it was not
conceived in any party spirit, and hoped that "those questions
that concern national defence and Imperial obligations may be
kept as far outside of party politics and party contention as
they are in Great Britain." He assured the House that for a
good many years he had been impressed with the need of facing
the question involved in his resolution, that difficulties are not
mitigated by avoiding them, and that the time had now come
when the Parliament and people of Canada should consider [
whether or not they had any duties, and if so what those
duties were, in regard to the defence of their common heritage. ,
He sympathized with those who declared war and its burdens
to be almost intolerable; nevertheless physical force lay at the
foundation of all our progress and civilization. Canada had
come to occupy an important position in the world: she could
neither escape the common burden, nor ignore the common
responsibility, and he did not think that she wished to do
either. She had immense resources and interests to defend in
an insecure world. Her great seaports had no defence, even

2 Skelton, Life of Laurier, n, p. 321.

3 It will be noted that the Foster resolution did not go beyond the idea of coast defence.

122

NAVAL SERVICE ACT

against a third-class cruiser, and when compared with other
overseas possessions in naval matters, the Dominion stood /~
silent and ashamed. Reliance upon the Monroe Doctrine
would be degrading and unworthy. Canadians must prepare
to defend themselves, either by themselves or in co-operation
with Great Britain.

In Foster's opinion, two possible policies presented them-
selves— a contribution of money or ships to the Admiralty, or
assumption by Canadians of the defence of their own ports and
coasts in constant and free co-operation with the forces of the
United Kingdom. The first of these policies would in any case
amount to a contribution of money, because even if one or two
Dreadnoughts were given, they could not be built in Canada.
He felt that this policy was open to the objections that the
fixing and occasional revision of the amount of a contribution
might lead to disagreement and unpleasantness; that it looked
too much like hiring someone else to do what Canadians them-
selves ought to do; and that a defence of that sort would pro-
vide no inspiration, and strike no roots in the soil of Canada.
The Dominion would have its own naval force sooner or later,
and it might well be the greater wisdom to sow the seed at once
and cultivate its growth. Foster therefore preferred the second
policy, the creation of a naval force owned by the Dominion,
and gradually Canadianized to the point where there might
some day be "a Canadian admiral on the Canadian coast "
The final result would be an imperial adjunct to the Royal
Navy for the defence of the Dominion and of the Empire, in
which Canada would have "some of her body, her bones, her
blood, and her mental power, her national pride." The destiny
of the Dominion might well be as great on the sea as on the
land, and its resources for the support of sea power were large
and varied. Foster also pointed out that Australia, after having
tried the contributory method, had adopted the policy which
he was advocating. "I do not know which of these forms our
aid will take after due care and consideration but whichever
form is chosen, one thing is certain, that something ought to
be done — and done now." He added that some extraordinary
and pressing danger might arise, or might even have already
arisen, which would require to be met by special means that
would lie outside the normal and settled policy:

Let me say to my right honourable friend that if, after careful consider-
ation, he proposes to this parliament a means for meeting that emergency
adequately, by the gift of Dreadnoughts or the gift of money, this side of

123

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

the House will stand beside him in thus vindicating Canada's honour and
strengthening the empire's defence.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Prime Minister, replying, began by
saying that: "to the eloquent and able observations with which
the House has just been favoured . . . very little exception, if
any, can be taken by anyone and certainly not by myself."
He objected that Foster's policy had not been stated explicitly
enough, and denied the truth of any implication in the resolu-
tion that Canada had been remiss in the duty of providing for
her own defence or for that of the Empire. The country would
not be stampeded by any hasty or feverish action, however
spectacular, but would calmly and deliberately consider its
position. He agreed with Foster that the problem should be
approached not only from the Canadian point of view, but also
from that of the Empire at large. "Today the British Empire
is composed of a galaxy of young nations proud of their alle-
giance to the British Crown and proud also of their own local
independence." The question of contribution was as old as
Confederation, and had presented itself in a concrete form at
the Imperial Conference of 1902. The Canadian policy, how-
ever, had always been not to undertake to contribute. Laurier
went on to say that: "at present there is a passing wave in
which we can trace anger, enthusiasm and fear, and which
directed and pushed us to depart from our policy and contri-
bute at once to the British Navy." He wished them to under-
stand that this was not the way in which, in the past, they had
understood their duty:

The real question is one of control. The problem before us is the asso-
ciation of our small naval strength with the great organization of fleets of
the mother country, so as to secure the highest efficiency and unity without
sacrificing our right to the constitutional control of our own funds, and of
any flotilla built and maintained at our own cost.

Laurier quoted Lord Milner and Sir Charles Tupper in
opposition to contributions for naval purposes, and claimed
that a great deal had already been done for defence.

In the development of naval defences, however, he ad-
mitted that the country had fallen behind. "Engaged as we
have been in the works of peace, we have delayed and put off
the development of our navy." This task, he said, would be
undertaken without delay:

We should consult with the naval authorities of the British Govern-
ment, as my honourable colleague the Minister of Militia has done with
the council of defence in London; and after having organized a plan, we
should carry it out in Canada with our own resources and out of our own
money. This is the policy which commends itself to the government.

124

Sir Wilfrid Laurier

NAVAL SERVICE ACT

As to an emergency contribution of a Dreadnought, Laurier
said that he did not consider the danger to be imminent, and
that the British nation, at all events, was not greatly alarmed.
He added:

. . . that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the
high seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughters of the
nation to close around the old mother land and make a rampart around her
to ward off any attack. I hope that day will never come, but should it come,
I would deem it my duty to devote what might be left of my life and energy
to stump the country and endeavour to impress upon my fellow-country-
men, especially my compatriots in the province of Quebec, the conviction
that the salvation of England is the salvation of our own country that
therein lies the guarantee of our civil and religious freedom and everything
we value in this life. Those are the sentiments which animate the govern-
ment on this occasion.

In place of the Foster resolution Laurier offered one of his j
own, which began by stating that: "This House fully recog-
nizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in
numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the respon-
sibilities of national defence." It stated further that under the
present constitutional relations between Great Britain and the
Dominions, any contribution to the British treasury for navai)r
and military purposes would not, as far as Canada was con-
cerned, satisfactorily solve the problem of defence. The core
of the resolution was contained in the following paragraph:

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure de-
signed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in
co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines
suggested by the admiralty at the last Imperial Conference, and in full
sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to
the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the
world.

The resolution ended by expressing a firm conviction that
should the need arise the Canadian people would be found
ready and willing to make any sacrifice required in order to
give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty
co-operation in maintaining the integrity and honour of the
Empire.

R. L. Borden, the Leader of the Opposition, claimed to be
as strong a champion of Canadian autonomy as anyone in the
House, adding that national status implied national responsi-
bility. He considered that too large a proportion of Canada's
national expenditure for defence in the past had been for land
defence; and that not less than half the total should be devoted
to naval purposes, inasmuch as the great external markets of

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the Dominion lay oyerseas and access to them could be assured
only by naval forces. Also at least fifty Canadian cities,
according to Borden, would be open to attack in time of war by
a hostile light cruiser. He went on to say that:

In so far as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister to-day out-
lined the lines of naval defence of this country I am entirely at one with
him. I am entirely of opinion, in the first place, that the proper line upon
which we should proceed in that regard is the line of having a Canadian
naval force of our own. I entirely believe in that.

Borden said that Australia had given up contributing to an
Australian squadron of the Royal Navy because Great Britain
had wanted the field of operations of that squadron extended
to the China and Indian seas. The new Australian policy of
acquiring a flotilla of small vessels would provide a force which
it would be difficult or impossible to send across the seas. In
thus protecting themselves, however, the Australians were
providing the best possible force for the protection of the
Empire as well. Borden said that he accordingly agreed with?
the Prime Minister in opposing a policy of contributions, and)
that Parliament should control, in the main at least, the ex-
penditure of any money which it might vote for naval
purposes.

The people of Canada, Borden went on, unanimously wish
to be in and of the Empire, a status which bore with it an
obligation to assume a fair share in defending by sea the
Empire and particularly their own coasts. He expressed a
strong desire that the policy of Canada on that great question
should be unanimously approved by Parliament and the
country. Laurier's resolution was criticized on the ground that
it told Great Britain and the world what Canada was not
prepared to do, instead of confining itself to stating what she
would willingly do. Borden also objected to the statement in
the resolution that any naval contribution was out of the ques-
tion, expressing the opinion, as Foster had done, that the day
might come, perhaps very soon, "when the only thing we could
do in the absence of preparation in this country would be to
make some kind of contribution." The inclusion of some word
which would indicate an intention to act promptly was also
urged.4

4 According to Borden, in the original phrase "the organization of a Canadian naval ser-
vice", he wanted to insert the word "immediate" before the word "organization". After a
private discussion with Laurier the word "speedy" was agreed upon. (Borden to L. J. Maxse,
May 10, 1909, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes No. 3).

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During the rest of the debate, those who opposed any naval \
policy and those who were hesitant suggested that Canada had!
already done much for Great Britain, by providing homes for 1
her surplus people, by supporting her in the South African War,
and in other ways. It was stated also that the Royal Navy
was far ahead of its rivals, and likely to remain so. A fear of
becoming involved in militarism was also expressed. One
speaker said that the Dominion was far too busily engaged in
doing other things to spend millions on naval defence, and
wanted money spent instead on a canal to the Georgian Bay.
The army was described as Canada's best protection. One
speaker called Foster a high priest of pessimism, wondered why
Germany and Great Britain, the two most advanced nations
on earth, should fight each other, and thought that any possible
danger to Canada could best be met by training young men
in discipline, physical exercise, and the use of the rifle.

As the attitude of the leaders had foreshadowed, a large \
majority of those who spoke in this debate favoured the
adoption of a naval policy and wanted a Canadian navy;
though some of them, following Foster and Borden, were
willing to consider a contribution should a serious emergency /
arise/'The existing position of the country with regard to
naval defence was described as humiliating. It was also sug-
gested that any naval policy which might be adopted should
be carried out in such a way as to develop the iron, steel, and
shipbuilding industries of the Dominion, and one Member
said that dry docks were badly needed. Another Member
thought that Great Britain should dispose of some dry docks
to Canada. No one suggested an immediate contribution
either of money or of Dreadnoughts.

Laurier concluded the debate by reintroducing his resolu-
tion, amended so as to meet all of Borden's objections, and
thus revised it was passed unanimously. The revised resolution
was as follows:

That this House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as
they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in larger measure the re-
sponsibilities of national defence.

The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations
between the mother country and the self-governing dominions, the payment
of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and
military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most
satisfactory solution of the question of defence.

The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure de-
signed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in

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co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines
suggested by the admiralty at the last imperial conference, and in full
sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to
the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the
world.

The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises
the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice
that is required to give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty
co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and
honour of the empire.5

Throughout the most important debate in the whole story
of Canadian naval policy, a remarkable degree of harmony had
prevailed, because public opinion was on the whole ready to
accept a naval policy, and also because, the issue being in a
sense brand new, Party commitments binding the faithful
were few and weak. The Foster resolution, moreover, merely
stated a general principle, and Laurier's, in both its forms,
contained much that appealed to imperialists and autonomists
alike. Moreover there seems to have been a genuine and wide-
spread desire to keep the country's naval policy clear of
controversy as far as possible. When the Members left the
House that night, Canada had abandoned the practice which
she had followed ever since Confederation of having no naval
policy at all. Both Parties had accepted in the most general
form a naval policy which proved to be permanent. That it
had received from the House of Commons a unanimous
endorsement, moreover, promised well for its future.

In Parliament Laurier had achieved a really extraordinary
success, with Borden's help, in obtaining acceptance for his
policy of compromise on this question so heavily charged with
political explosives. In the country at large also, the amended
resolution had the support of the greater part of the press, and
probably of a majority among the people; but many were
opposed, and their attitude was revealed without delay. As is
usual with compromises, this one received its support from a
large and composite middle group, while it was attacked from
both the extremes. It was too imperialist tor some, while for
others it was not imperialist enough'. There were also those
who objected to it on the ground that it would mean un-
necessary expense, and still others who did so on pacifist
grounds. , Coming events immediately began to cast their
shadows. The Mail and Empire of Toronto asked whether a
moment when there was great and immediate need to uphold

6 Debate in House of Commons Debates, 1909, n, pp. 3484-564.

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Britain's hands was the time to choose for "prating about
Canada's autonomy"?6 The Globe reported that the govern-
ments of Manitoba and Ontario had practically agreed to
contribute a Dreadnought to the Royal Navy, and that the
governments of New Brunswick and British Columbia were
interested as well.7

At the opposite side of the sky two clouds appeared at this
time. Quebec Conservatives, following the lead of Monk,
refused to march with the Party on this question. At the same
time Mr. Bourassa began a violent campaign in the same
Province against the resolution, and against Laurier tor having
sponsored it. Monk and Mr. Bourassa, largely on the same
grounds, attacked the agreement of 1909, and were later to
attack the Naval Service Bill and the emergency contribution
policy.

Frederick Debartzch Monk, born in Montreal in 1856, had
formerly led the Conservative Party in Quebec. He was by
nature exceedingly reserved, and his acquaintances seem to
have found him difficult to understand. A scrupulous integrity,
which found even the necessary and justifiable compromises of
public life difficult to accept, was combined in Monk with
considerable ability. His political ideals included a strong
sense of nationalism.

Mr. Henri Bourassa was born in Montreal in 1868. A
descendant of Louis-Joseph Papineau, he spent some years at
his ancestor's seigniory of Montebello, and became mayor of
Montebello at the age of twenty-two. Six years later he entered
the federal Parliament as a Liberal. He resigned his seat in
protest against the participation of Canada in the South
African War, which, he contended, involved a fundamental
change in the relation of the Dominion with Great Britain,
upon which the people of Canada should be thoroughly en-
lightened and directly consulted. He was re-elected by
acclamation. Mr. Bourassa broke with Laurier again in 1905
and became the leader of the Nationaliste group in Quebec.
When the naval question came to the fore in 1909 and 1910, he
resolutely opposed the adopting of any positive naval policy,
unless the people should have first been consulted. An original
thinker, and a brilliant orator and writer, fiery, full of courage,
and uncompromising, he always travelled the road of his own
individual choice.

« Mail and Empire, Mar. 31, 1909.
7 Globe, Mar. 31, 1909.

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Among the Laurier Papers in the Dominion Archives there
are a large number of letters and resolutions on the subject of
naval policy which were addressed to Laurier during the spring
and summer of 1909. Those written in March and April almost
unanimously advocated some form of contribution — one or
more battleships, or less specifically some sort of immediate
and effective support for the Royal Navy. Later the sense of
these communications changed, and the Prime Minister began
to receive a stream of letters which opposed any contribution,
and most of which also ran counter to any naval expenditure
at all. Two or three of them even said that rebellion would
result if money were squandered on a navy. A number of these
later letters suggested that before anything more was done a
plebiscite should be held. In July Laurier received a collect
cable suggesting that the Dominion should pay the interest on
a loan raised for the purpose of building ships for the Royal
Navy. To many of the later letters Laurier sent the same reply,
of which the following is an extract:

I can assure you that I am no more in sympathy than you are with
militarism in any form, but the question of defence is one which cannot be
altogether overlooked. It is the penalty of becoming a nation and which
all nations have to bear and which, in course of time, I hope they may
dispense with.

Unfortunately our standard of civilization is not yet high enough for
that ideal. I have no more intention today than I ever had of being drawn
into what I once denned as 'the vortex of European militarism'. The nations
'of Europe are spending at least fifty per cent of their revenue on military
armaments, both on land and sea; it would be a crime for us to attempt
anything of the kind, but if our revenue this year is ninety millions, and it
will be above that figure, an expenditure of two or three millions, which
would mean two or three per cent, seems to me a very light burden.8

The aroused interest in naval defence in the Dominions and
self-governing colonies led the British Government to suggest,
at the end of April 1909, that a subsidiary imperial conference
should be held. In June the Australian Government offered to
contribute a Dreadnought or its equivalent to the Royal Navy.
New Zealand had already offered one and if necessary two
Dreadnoughts, and the governments of New South Wales and
Victoria had undertaken to share the cost of contributing one
should the Commonwealth Government not do so. At the

8 The correspondence referred to in this paragraph is in the Laurier Papers, Contribution
by Canada to British Navy" Dreadnought", Pub. Arch., EE2, No. 4663. The cable suggesting
payment of interest on a loan is dated July 29, 1909, and marked: "Collect 210 words. Cost
$26.25 if accepted." It has not been possible to obtain access to the relevant Laurier Papers,
except for the rather unrewarding collection in the Public Archives.

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conference, which was held from July 29 to August 19, the
Admiralty accepted the principle of Dominion naval forces.

In the fall, as the new session of Parliament approached,
naval policy attracted more attention, and it became evident
that the Conservative Party was seriously divided on the
question. Among the outstanding leaders, Roblin, McBride,
Rogers, Hazen, Haultain and others, were opposing a "tin-t
pot navy", and wanted some form of contribution, permanent
or otherwise, and a large section of the press supported them.9
On the other hand, Monk and the Conservative newspapers in
Quebec were openly attacking both any sort of contribution
and any form of Canadian navy, and were demanding that
before so grave a decision was taken the people should be
consulted. From Sir Charles Tupper in England came an
elder statesman's blessing on the policy of the March resolu-
tion :

Regarding as I do British Institutions as giving greater security to life,
property and liberty than any other form of government I have devoted
more than half a century to unceasing efforts to preserve the connection of
Canada and the Crown. When Great Britain was involved in the struggle
in the Transvaal I led the van in forcing the Canadian Government to send
aid. But I did not believe then and I do not believe now in taxation without
representation. The demand which will soon be made by some that Canada
should contribute to the Imperial Navy in proportion to population I regard
as preposterous, and dangerous.

I read with pleasure the resolution passed unanimously by the House
of Commons which pledged Parliament to proceed vigorously with the
construction of the Canadian Navy and to support England in every
emergency, and all that in my opinion is required is to hold the Government
of the day bound to carry that out honestly ....

Under existing circumstances it was of immense importance to have
Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his party committed to the policy which secured the
unanimous consent of the House of Commons on a question of such vital
importance and a great responsibility will rest upon those who disturb that
compact.10

In each of two Ontario villages at this time a letter was
written to the Prime Minister. One, addressed to "Premier
Lauriea", ended with the words: "I know that there will be
great presure brought to bear, but sir, in the name of God, I
pray You to protect our homes from the taxes, needed for such
useless ornimants." The second was:

9 Skelton, Life 0/ Laurier, 11, p. 324; Borden Memoirs, 1, p. 249.

10 Sir Charles Tupper to Borden, Nov. 20, 1909, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes
No. 3.

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Dear Sir:

I thought I would write you a few lines in regard to the proposed Navy.

I have been a supporter of your party all my life time; and if you
allow this thing to go through without taking a vote of the people you will
certianly [sic] lose your head.

Yours truly

Earlier in the year Laurier had received a note warning him
not to let the naval bill pass, and signed "La Main Noire."11

The session of 1909-10 opened on November 11, and the
Address proposed, among other things, to establish a Canadian
naval Service. Many Conservatives still favoured a contribu-
tion, while Monk and Mr. Bourassa continued to campaign in
Quebec against contribution and Canadian navy alike. Both
Parties had split themselves on this adamant issue; the Con-
servatives, however, much more seriously than their opponents.
The Naval Service Bill was introduced by Laurier, the Minister
of Marine and Fisheries12 being ill, on January 12, 1910.\ The
Prime Minister mentioned the two programmes that the
Admiralty had furnished, by request, at the imperial conference
of the previous summer. The cheaper one, to cost $2,000,000 a
year, would consist of seven warships; the other, involving an
expenditure of $3,000,000 annually, called for eleven ships —
four Bristols, a Boadicea, and six destroyers. "We have
determined", Laurier said, "to accept the second proposition,
that is to say, the larger one of 11 ships." He stated that the
Admiralty had suggested destroyers of the river class on
account of their sea-keeping qualities, and that the ships
would be built in Canada, if possible, in spite of the fact that
the cost of local construction would be at least a third greater.

Borden agreed that it was desirable to establish a naval
force, which he preferred to speak of as a Canadian unit of the
British or imperial navy. It had been urged, with some force,
that Canada could not properly take a permanent part in the
naval defence of the Empire without having some voice as to
the wars which Great Britain might undertake; but he did not J
believe that Britain would engage in any great war without
having first consulted the Dominions/ This would provide the
necessary share in directing policy. A Dominion navy he
considered as no more likely than was the militia to erode the

11 Letters dated Nov. 17 and 18, 1909, and Mar. 14, 1910, Laurier Papers, Pub. Arch.,
EE2, No. 4663.

12 Louis Philippe Brodeur (1862-1924), Member for Rouville, P.Q., Minister of Marine and
Fisheries who had been at the head of that Department since 1906.

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imperial connection. Concerning annual contributions Borden

said:

. . . from the strategical point of view, I would be inclined to agree with the
view of the admiralty that this would be the best way for the great self-
governing dominions of the empire to make the contributions. But, Sir,
from a constitutional and political standpoint, I am opposed to it, for many
reasons. In the first place, I do not believe that it would endure. In the
second place, it would be a source of friction .... Permanent co-operation
in defence, in my opinion, can only be accomplished by the use of our own
material, the employment of our own people, the development and utiliza-
tion of our own skill and resourcefulness, and above all by impressing upon
the people a sense of responsibility for their share in international affairs.

Borden went on to say, however, that a contribution for
the purpose of meeting an emergency would be fully justified
and desirable. The government's proposals were entirely
inadequate, being either too much or too little. They were too
much for carrying on experiments in the organization of a*
Canadian naval Service, and too little for immediate and
effective aid. The speediest organization would not make a
Canadian Service effective in less than ten years. Indeed
fifteen or twenty years would probably be required; "and the
crisis, if a crisis is to be apprehended, will come and probably
within three years." Borden had visited Great Britain the
previous summer, where he had seen the fleet gathered for
review by the King. He described the scene, adding that:

... it was not a proud thought for a Canadian surveying that mighty fleet
to remember that all the protecting power which it embodied was paid for
without the contribution of a single dollar by the Canadian people, although
Canada and every Canadian throughout the world had the right to invoke
and the just expectation to receive the protection afforded by that great
armament.

The rapid growth of the German Navy, in Borden's opin- /
ion, was a most serious threat to the naval supremacy of Greaty
Britain, which in turn was "absolutely essential to the integ-
rity of the empire ..." The moment of imminent danger had
not actually arrived, but was fast approaching. "No one
pretends that the British navy is not supreme to-day, but the
continuance of that supremacy will cease within the next two
or three years at least, unless extraordinary efforts are made
by the mother country and all the great dominions." Borden
ended by advocating the provision ol a fleet unit, or else of
one Dreadnought; or, what would be the best course of all,
"the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the Admiralty to be
used for naval defence under such conditions as we may
prescribe." He moved an amendment in this sense.

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The bill came up tor its second reading on February 3,
1910, and the debate was continued on a number of later days
between that date and April 20. In the Minister's continued
absence the Prime Minister led off again. He criticized :

. . . those who within the [Conservative] party boast of their imperialism,
who carry abroad upon their foreheads the imperial phylacteries, who
boldly walk into the temple and there loudly thank the Lord that they are
not like other British subjects, that they give tithes of everything they
possess, and that in them alone is to be found the true incense of loyalty.

He twitted the Conservatives with their disunity in regard to
naval policy, and claimed that he himself was "a Canadian,
first, last and all the time." Laurier went on to sav that "this
idea of contribution seems to me repugnant to the genius of
our British institutions; it smacks too much of tribute to be
acceptable by British communities." He quoted Lord Milner
to the effect that local navies would be the best solution from
the imperial point of view. 13 It was in the course of this speech
that Laurier used the following words, which were very often
quoted or referred to afterwards:

If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. 1 do not say
that we shall always be attacked, neither do I say that we would take part
in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be determined by
circumstances, upon which the Canadian parliament will have to pronounce
and will have to decide in its own best judgment.14

The next speaker was Borden, who objected to the author-
ity which the bill would confer by implication on the govern-
ment to withold Canadian warships from imperial service in
time of war. He wanted unity of organization and of action
specified, and protested that neither immediate and effective
aid for the Empire, nor satisfactory results for Canada, were
promised by the bill. No permanent policy should be adopted
without consulting the people. Meanwhile he asked for a
contribution of money "to purchase or construct two battle-
ships or armoured cruisers of the latest Dreadnought type",
and that these ships should be placed at the disposal of the

13 Milner, the chief of the contemporary apostles of imperialism, in a speech given before
the Canadian Club in Toronto on Oct. 27, 1908, had favoured Dominion navies rather than
contributions to the Royal Navy, provided that whatever the Dominions did was done for the
Empire as a whole and not for themselves only.

14 Laurier later explained his position on this point more fully in the course of a speech in
Montreal on Oct 10, 1910: When Britain was at war, Canada was at war because of her relation
to the British Crown. Canada would defend her territory if it were attacked. If Britain were
at war Canada, if not attacked, would not take part unless she should judge it advisable to do
so. If there should be a war endangering the naval supremacy of the Empire, he believed that
it would be Canada's duty to aid Great Britain with all her strength. {Pub. Arch. Pamph.
Cat., ti, No. 3712, pp. 35 and 44).

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British Government. Monk followed Borden with a very able
speech in which he said that a contribution and a local nav\
would amount to the same thing. Pure and simple defence of
Canada would be all right; but the government's policy would
tie the Dominion tightly to the foreign policy of the British
Government, and create a commitment to fight in all Britain's
wars. "Most important of all, we have no voice of any kind
in the conduct of imperial affairs, while being bound by im-
perial obligations towards foreign countries." The policy
embodied in the bill would tend to destroy Canadian self-
government. Monk moved an amendment to the effect that
the House, declaring its unalterable devotion to the Crown,
considered that the bill would alter the relations of Canada
with the rest of the Empire, and ought therefore to be sub-
mitted to the Canadian people by means of a plebiscite.

Later speakers on behalf of the Naval Service Bill argued i
that Canada should cease to depend on the Royal Navy and
the Monroe Doctrine, and that the proposed navy would
increase Canada's prestige among the nations, and would tend
to stimulate business at home and create new openings for trade
abroad. It was also urged that the projected outlay was much
smaller than it would have had to be if Canada had been an
independent State. The Leader of the Opposition was accused
of having agreed with the resolution of March 1909, and then
turned around and advocated a different policy. From the
Opposition back benches it was claimed that the fate of Canada
would not be decided off the east coast but in the North Sea.
Cruisers and destroyers were too small and weak, and a dis-
maying picture was drawn of little Canadian cruisers sailing
out against the German Dreadnoughts while the whole world
laughed. It was also asserted that a contribution to the Royal
Navy would provide the most fighting power for the least
money, and that most of the arguments against an emergency
contribution were only applicable to a policy of permanent
contributions. A third group of speakers were more or less
opposed to any positive naval policy. From among these came
the arguments that the best preparation for war was to hus-
band one's resources in time of peace, and that the people of
Great Britain were accustomed to having a scare every few
years. The "frontier" point of view that a sturdy and resource-
ful citizenry would look after an enemy when the time came,
was also expressed, as was the pacifist opinion that any naval
expenditure would result in a tendency towards militarism.

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

One speaker thought that the possibilities of "air-ships"
should be investigated, and that Canadians ought to be en-
couraged in air activities which might mean more to the
country in the near future than a whole fleet of small cruisers
or even of Dreadnoughts.15

The point of view concerning the bill which Mr. Bourassa
had been putting before the people of Quebec, was expounded
in a speech that he had made on January 20, 1910, in Montreal:

Comme toutes les lois organiques ce projet affecte a la fois le budget et
la constitution. D'une part, il sera la source de depenses considerables; de
l'autre, il modifie profondement notre situation politique dans nos rapports
avec la mere-patrie, et plus tard nos relations avec les pays etrangers ....

S'imagine-t-on le gouvernement beige soumettant au parlement de
Bruxelles un texte de loi qui l'autorise, en cas de guerre, d'invasion ou
d'insurrection dans toutes les possessions francaises, a mettre l'armee beige
au service de la republique francaise et qui donne au ministre de la guerre,
a Paris, a compter du moment de la mobilization, le commandement des
forces beiges.

He said that between 1812 and 1907 Great Britain had been
engaged in twenty-four wars, but that Canada was not likely
to be attacked by any foreign country.

Referring to the proposed naval force, Mr. Bourassa
complained that:

Au lieu d'une marine canadienne, sous l'autorite du gouvernement
canadien, pour la defense du Canada, il [Laurier] nous gratifiait de deux
escadres, organisees et payees par le peuple du Canada; mises en cas de
guerre sous l'autorite exclusive de l'amiraute anglaise, pour prendre part a.
toutes les guerres de l'Angleterre.

Co-operation with the Royal Navy, he charged, had been
implied by Laurier when he had stated in Parliament that the
river-type destroyers had been chosen on account of their sea-
keeping qualities, and that the Bristols had been selected
partly for the same reason. The purpose of this proposed naval
force, therefore, was not to defend the ports, commerce, and
coasts of Canada, but to replace the squadrons which the
Admiralty had withdrawn a few years before. He did not want
control by the Admiralty in time of war:

Sans doute, en temps de paix le Canada garde la direction de sa flotte;
mais, je vous le demande, une marine de guerre est-elle faite pour la paix
ou pour la guerre?

16 The debates on the Naval Service Bill are to be found scattered through the following
pages of House of Commons Debates 1909-10: i, pp. 1732-76; n, pp. 2952-4698; in, pp.4848-
5195; iv, pp. 6509-7294; v, pp. 7393-592.

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[n spite of what Borden had said, Mr. Bourassa went on,
Britain would not in any predictable future consult the larger
colonies concerning foreign policy. He considered the so-called
German peril to be largely a bugbear. Imperial unification was
undesirable from every point of view, and Canada was not
responsible for the international mess in which Great Britain
had got herself involved. To the argument that Britain was
heavily taxed in order to provide naval defence for the Empire,
including Canada, his reply was that 'TAngleterre doit con-
server les mers ouvertes pour recevoir son pain quotidien."
British protection was an illusion; the only possible enemy
being the United States, against whom Great Britain could not
protect Canada. Britain would not fight the United States in
order to protect Canada, nor did he blame her. The Monroe
Doctrine was Canada's defence against external enemies. In
time of war Canadian trade, contraband excepted, could be
carried in neutral ships.

The imperialists, Mr. Bourassa continued, were accustomed
to say that if nothing was done, the Empire would fall to
pieces. It was possible; yet if Canada and the rest of the
Empire were left free to develop in their own national and
ethnic traditions, the separation would be a long way off, and
harmonious. "\Ph~e consequence of the imperialist policy would
be an early rupture in conflict and hatred:

Je dis aux imperialistes sinceres: Revenez sur la terre, voyez les hommes
comme ils sont: Vous ne pouvez pas du Canadien faire un Anglais, vous ne
pouvez pas de l'Australien faire un Neo-Zelandais.

These arguments, he said, applied equally to all Canadians.
"II n'y a pas ici de querelle de races." Mr. Bourassa concluded
by saying that no one there had loved Laurier more than he
had; but that his country came first. He offered a resolution
that Parliament had no right to commit the Dominion to an
entirely new naval policy without the previous consent of the
people, and ought not to enact the bill until after a plebiscite
should have been held.16

When the House of Commons divided, Monk's amendment
to the amendment was defeated, 175 to 18; and Borden's
amendment by 129 to 74. W. B. Northrup (East Hastings)
then moved that the second reading of the bill should be post-
poned for six months; but this amendment was defeated by 1 19

16 Henri Bourassa, Le Projet de Lot Navale, Pub. Arch. Pamph. Cat., II, No. 3706.

137

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

to 7<S. On its third reading the Naval Service Bill was passed
11 to 70, with eighteen Members pairing.

This important debate had contrasted markedly with the
one of the previous year, in that before it began definite Party
lines had been drawn concerning the question at issued/Both
Parties were seriously divided, and each of the principal policies
was a compromise. The unity of the Conservatives, however,
p. was much the more seriously affected; and it should be noted
that Borden at this time lacked his rival's tremendous prestige,
and that his control over his Party was much weaker than that
which Laurier exercised over his own followers. ^The naval
policy of a Dominion involved the whole question of imperial
relations: it is not surprising, therefore, that debate ranged
much more widely than the title of the bill would implyr-
Quotations from eminent statesmen or seamen had been care-
fully collected, like pearls of great price, by many Members on
both sides. The results of these researches were usually to the
effect that there was, or was not, an emergency; or that contri-
butions by the Dominions were, or were not, the best solution.
From time to time throughout the debate, salvoes of these
excerpts were fired off in the House. The Monroe Doctrine was
seldom mentioned, and then usually in order to minimize its
importance or relevance; the reason being, no doubt, that it
seemed in those days to weigh against the need for any naval
commitment/^ The annexation argument also appeared but
seldom, and was used to support both the bill and the emer-
gency contribution.

The division in public opinion on the naval question at this
time was illustrated by certain events which took place in the
city of Ottawa. When the debate which has just been described
began on the summit of Parliament Hill, another verbal con-
flict was raging in the city below; and the issue in both cases
was the same. The intensity of the municipal contest was at
least equal to that displayed at the top of the hill, and the
casualties suffered in it were much heavier. It was due to the
Prime Minister, in the first instance, that these minor hostili-
ties occurred. Laurier had been representing both Quebec
East and an Ottawa constituency: on December 17, 1909, he
resigned his seat in Ottawa, and a by-election to fill the vacancy
was called for January. A former Mayor of Ottawa, a Con-
servative in politics, immediately came forward as an indepen-
dent candidate. He was opposed to the creation of a Canadian
navy, feeling strongly that a Dreadnought should be contribu-

138

^ *

NAVAL SERVICK ACT

ted without delay; accordingly he wished to bring the govern-
ment's naval policy to a test. The Ottawa Citizen supported
his candidacy, while the Journal and Free Press opposed him.
Of the two Ottawa constituencies it was customary for one to
be represented by a French-speaking Member, and the un-
contested seat already had an English-speaking occupant. The
local Liberals therefore put up a French-speaking candidate
for the vacant constituency, and the Conservatives followed
suit. The Liberal candidate, however, was repudiated by the
leaders and press of his Party. For a while it was a three-
cornered contest, as the former Mayor refused to withdraw.
Nevertheless the Citizen ceased to support him, and he gave up
the fight soon afterwards. Meanwhile the irregular Liberal
candidate had also withdrawn, and had been replaced by
another contender who enjoyed the support of the government
and of the Liberal press. This curiously confused by-election
was fought almost exclusively on the naval issue, and as on the
hilltop so in the plain below the government won a victory.
On January 29, 1910, the Liberal candidate obtained 5,779
votes to 5,121 for his opponent.17

17 On this by-election see the following Ottawa newspapers: Citizen, Evening Journal, Free
Press, and he Temps, for the period Dec. 17, 1909 to Jan. 31, 1910 inclusive.

139

Chapter 7

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

THE Naval Service Act1 created a Department of the
Naval Service under the Minister of Marine and Fish-
eries who would also be the Minister of the Naval Ser-
vice, and authorized the appointment of a Deputy Minister.
The Command in Chief of the naval forces was declared "to
continue and be vested in the King." A Director of the Naval
Service was provided for, to be the professional head of the
Service, preferably with a rank not lower than that of Rear
Admiral. The Governor in Council was authorized to or-
ganize and maintain a permanent naval force, to appoint a
Naval Board to advise the Minister, and from time to time
to authorize complements of officers and men. Conditions of
service were also briefly laid down. Section 23 of the Act read:

In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the
disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval
Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and
the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or
seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

A Naval Reserve Force and a Naval Volunteer Force were
authorized, and both forces were to be liable for active service
in an emergency. A naval college was provided for in order
to train prospective officers in all branches of naval science,
tactics, and strategy. The Naval Discipline Act of 1866,
and the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions,
where applicable and except to the extent that they might
be inconsistent with the Naval Service Act or with regulations
made under it, were to apply to the Service. The Governor
in Council was authorized to make regulations for carrying
out the Act, and for the organization, training, and discipline
of the Naval Service.

The Naval Service Act was assented to on May 4, 1910:
it remained to carry out its provisions by establishing a naval
Service. The latter was placed, as laid down in the Act, with

1 9-10 Edw. VII, c. 43. For the text of this Act, as originally passed, see App. v.

140

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

the Department of Marine and Fisheries. The Hon. Louis
Philippe Brodeur, who had headed that Department since
1906, became also Minister of the Naval Service. Unlike the
First Lord of the Admiralty, who shares his responsibility
to some extent with the Sea Lords, the Canadian Minister
was vested with complete authority and responsibility, his
professional colleagues being advisers only.2 George J.
Desbarats, who had been Deputy Minister of Marine and
Fisheries since 1907 became the first Deputy Minister of the
Naval Service, and Rear Admiral Kingsmill its first Director,
an appointment which he was to hold until 1921. Seven other
officers of the Royal Navy who were already on loan to the
Canadian Government were also transferred to the new
Department.

This Department was divided into five branches: Naval,
Fishery Protection, Tidal and Current Survey, Hydro-
graphic Survey, and Wireless Telegraph. All except the first
of these had been detached from the Department of Marine
and Fisheries, and transferred in accord with Section 2 of
the Act. The Wireless Telegraph Service at that time com-
prised 21 government-owned stations. Of these, 13 were on
the east coast, most of them situated on the St. Lawrence
River or the Gulf; 2 were in Newfoundland; and 6 were in
British Columbia. Regulations for the entry of officers and
men into the Naval Service, and rates of pay and allowances,
were authorized. The old cruisers Niobe and Rainbow were
bought from the Admiralty and brought to Canada to be
used as training ships, and a naval college was established in
Halifax.

The smaller of the two cruisers, the Rainbow, was in-
tended for the west coast; the other, H.M.S. Niobe, was to be
based on Halifax, and for her the Admiralty received £215,-
000. 3 The Niobe was a protected cruiser of the Diadem class,4
launched in 1899 at a cost of £600,000. Contrary to a general
impression, she was a very big cruiser. Her displacement was
more than three-fifths that of the famous Dreadnought, which
at her launch, seven years after than of Niobe, was a battle-

2 Naval Service Act, Sees. 7-10 inclusive.

»P.C. 118, Jan. 24, 1910.

4A "protected" cruiser had no side or deck armour, but over her vital installations amid-
ships lay a shield of armour, convex on top and lying below the upper deck. Niobe was one
of the last protected cruisers to be built for the Royal Navy.

141

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ship of the largest size. The Niobe also mounted a tremendous
armament.6

In July 1910 the Director of the Naval Service went to
England to attend the trials of the two cruisers and to take
them over from the Admiralty. Before they were transferred
a number of alterations were carried out, to make them more
suitable as training ships.6 The Niobe was commissioned in
the Canadian Service at Devonport on September 6, 1910,
with Cdr. W. B. Macdonald, R.N., a native of British Colum-
bia, as her captain, and on this occasion a silk ensign was
presented to the ship on behalf of the Queen. On a full-power
trial two days later the Niobe made seventeen knots. On
September 27 some Canadian journalists visited the ship,
and on October 10 she left Devonport bound for Halifax.7
On her way over she received the following signal from
N.S.H.Q., via Cape Race: ''Keep look out for Wellman's air-
ship America . . . sailed from Atlantic City ... for England,
last heard of 12.45 p.m. Sunday abreast of Nantucket, report
if seen."8 Niobe, however, saw nothing of Walter Wellman's
dirigible, which had lost buoyancy and landed in the sea far
to the southward of the cruiser's course, the crew being res-
cued by a passing steamer.

The Niobe reached Halifax on October 21, 1910 — the
hundred-and-fifth anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar. At
the harbour entrance she was met by the fishery protection
cruiser Canada. After sending a message of welcome the
Canada turned and steamed up the harbour, followed by the
Niobe which came to anchor at 12.45 p.m. off the dockyard.9
The Royal Canadian Navy was a fact. Perhaps because the
years between have been so replete with tumults and the
upsetting of once certain things, that day seems long ago.
Whether Home Rule could be given to Ireland despite the
House of Lords was then an urgent question. South Africa
was a LInion at last, but its first Parliament had yet to meet.
King Manoel of Portugal had been driven from his throne,
and the dancer Gaby Deslys was offering to help him back
on to it again, though how this was to be done she did not

5 Statistics of Niobe: displacement, 11,000 tons; length, 435'; beam, 69'; draught, 26';
shaft h.p., 16,500; designed speed, 20.5 k. ; bunker capacity, 1,000 tons; armament, 16 6",
12 12-pdr., 5 3-pdr. guns; 2 18" torpedo tubes; complement, about 700.

6 Annual Report, 1911, p. 16.

7 Niobe1 s Log.

8 Naval to Niobe, Oct. 18, 1910, N.S. 18-1-1.

9 Halifax Morning Chronicle, Oct. 22, 1910.

142

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

say, nor why. Dr. Hawley Harvey Crippen was being tried
for his life in London.

After Niobe had fired a salute ot twenty-one guns and
dressed ship, she was visited by the Minister of Marine and
Fisheries, the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, and other
notables. The Minister, Hon. Louis Philippe Brodeur, wel-
comed the ship and her complement on behalf of the govern-
ment. In the course of his speech he said that:

This event tells the story of a dawning epoch of self-reliance. It
proclaims to the whole British Empire that Canada is willing and prouc
to provide as rapidly as circumstances will permit for her local naval
defence and to safeguard her share in the commerce and trade of the
Empire ... in whose world-girding belt Canada is the bright and precious
buckle.

As did^nany speakers and editors at this time, he emphasized
the idea that an enlargement of self-government involves
increased responsibilities.

1 0

A country is unfortunate when the basic principles of its
defence policy are included in the field of party strife. From
this misfortune Canada had suffered in respect to her naval
policy, and when the Niobe arrived the Naval Service Act
was still highly controversial. On the very evening before she
reached Halifax, Mr. Henri Bourassa had presided at a huge
Nationalist meeting in Montreal at which he, Monk, and
44 Armand Lavergne, had ridden full tilt against Laurier's whole
I naval policy. Nor could the Conservative newspapers en-
tirely and at once forget that Niobe was part of Laurier's
policy made flesh. The welcome which the press accorded to
the cruiser, consequently, though widespread was not unani-
mous, and comment ranged all the way down the scale from
enthusiasm to hostility and mockery. According to La Patrie-.

L'arrivee du 'Niobe' a Halifax, hier, marque en quelque sorte la nais-
sance de la marine canadienne. C'est le premier navire de guerre canadien,
et chacun sait qu'on en veut faire un navire-ecole. Le ministre de la marine
a souhaite la bienvenue aux marins du 'Niobe', et il a eu des mots bien
trouves pour souligner l'importance historique de cette arrivee du croiseur
dans les eaux canadiennes.11

"This splendid ship", stated the Charlottetown Patriot, an-
other Liberal newspaper, "is the first real warship of the
Canadian Navy and is but the beginning of that naval defence

10 Halifax Herald, Oct. 22, 1910.

" La Patrie, Montreal, Oct. 22, 1910.

143

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

which ranks Canada in the sisterhood of nations."12 The
Halifax Chronicle held nothing in reserve: "Here where we
have been bred to the ocean, and have for a century and more
been associated with the fleet which keeps and guards the
sea, we welcome the Niobe in no perfunctory way."13

The Halifax Herald, to whom Laurier and all his works

were anathema, had this to say:

H.M.C.S. Niobe is in port, and once more Halifax becomes a naval
headquarters. The four letters look strange, but we may get accustomed
to the change from the old fashioned 'H.M.S.', which Halifax once knew.
The newcomer among the initials stands for 'Canadian', so that now it all
means 'His Majesty's Canadian Ship Niobe .Xi

Some other Conservative organs were moderately friendly,

among them being the Montreal Gazette:

The Niobe, the first ship of the new Canadian navy to reach Halifax,
has been welcomed with addresses and gifts and loyal acclaim. This is
good and wholesome. Perhaps it indicates that in a little while there will
be found a complement of Canadians, enlisted men, qualified to work
the ship. So long as volunteers from England are needed to keep the crews
of Canadian war craft up to the standard, the new organization may be a
drain on rather than a help to the British fighting fleet.15

Le Canada, in the same city, rebutted a charge frequently
made by the Nationalists that the Niobe would soon be too
old for fighting, stating that she was only intended for train-
ing, and that the Admiralty had given Canada a very good
bargain.16

The Toronto Mail and Empire was openly scornful:

The coming of the Niobe means that we now have our first warship.
The Niobe is a cruiser which the Royal Navy has discarded. She was on
her way to the scrap heap when the Ottawa Government determined that
we should have a navy of our own. That decision necessitated the buying
■of ships, and the Niobe is our first purchase. Her cost is $1,075,000, and
she is to be employed in protecting the Atlantic coast from the enemy.
The first defence work assigned to the Niobe will partake of the nature of
a holiday trip to the West Indies, with the Governor-General on board.
After that she will be at the disposal of the Ministers for other defence
work of a similar character.17

"While the Conservative press had been opposing a separate
Canadian navy, the Nationalists in Quebec could not abide

n The Daily Patriot, Charlottetown, Oct. 24, 1910.

13 Halifax Morning Chronicle, Oct. 21, 1910.

» Halifax Herald, Oct. 22, 1910.

16 Montreal Gazette, Oct. 24, 1910.

16 Le Canada, Montreal, Oct. 22, 1910.

« Toronto Mail and Empire, Oct. 22, 1910.

144

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

the idea of a Canadian naval policy of any sort. Expressing
their point of view, Mr. Bourassa's newspaper Le Devoiry
perhaps the wittiest periodical in the country, announced the
Niobe' s arrival in this way, in a news column: "Le croiseur
'Niobe', le noyau de la flotte canadienne (canadienne en temps,
de paix, imperiale en temps de guerre), est arrive hier a
Halifax."18

The Niobe had been manned in England by a skeleton
crew consisting of officers and active and reserve ratings of
the Royal Navy, and after her arrival in Canada recruits were
obtained from shore to be trained on board. Since Halifax
had then neither naval college nor barracks, the Niobe s
great size had recommended her strongly at the time when she
was chosen. The plan was to use her for training until the
projected warships should have been completed, and after
that she was to be employed both for training and as a depot
ship for destroyers. During the first winter no cruising was
done, since the complement had not been filled by recruits
and also because Niobe s officers were needed to help in or-
ganizing the Halifax dockyard.

In the summer of 1911 the Niobe was nearly lost by mis-
adventure. While on her way from Yarmouth to Shelburne,
shortly after midnight of July 30-31, in thick weather and
with a strong tide running, the cruiser struck a rock on the
Southwest Ledge off Cape Sable. She pounded heavily as the
crew went to their stations, and the boats were swung out
and provisioned, wireless calls were sent out, and other neces-
sary measures taken. About two hours after striking the ship*
floated clear. An anchor was promptly lowered, but it dragged,,
while with the starboard engine-room flooded and the rudder
and port propeller damaged the Niobe was in danger of
going aground again. Soon after dawn some fishermen and
pilots arrived who were able to tell the captain where he was.
In the course of the next few hours tugs and a large number
of fishing boats arrived on the scene. By that time the cruiser
was settling by the stern, and accordingly all of the crew who
could be spared were transferred to fishing boats. The car-
penters worked at shoring up bulkheads and water-tight
doors until water swept them off their feet. As steering proved
difficult a tug took the ship in tow, and she arrived safely at
Clark's Harbour, where she remained until on August 5

18 Le Devoir, Montreal, Oct. 22, 1910.

145

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

H.M.S. Cornwall came to her assistance. In a dense fog,
however, the Cornwall damaged herself on an uncharted rock
while feeling her way in towards Niobe \ nevertheless she was
able to tow the latter to Halifax where both ships were re-
paired. Niobe' s navigating officer was severely reprimanded
and dismissed his ship by a Court Martial, and the officer of
the watch was reprimanded.19

The repair work on Niobe was not completed until De-
cember 1912. Meanwhile the personnel from the Royal Navy
who formed the framework of her crew had been returned to
England and not replaced. The Naval Service at this time,
indeed, was like a clock that is being allowed to run down.
No new ships were being built, the Service had only the most
meagre prospects to offer to either officers or ratings, and
''desertions were frequent. Until the First World War Niobe
stayed in port, training the remaining men in an atmosphere
of discouragement and futility.

The Rainbow was a light cruiser of the Apollo class, and
the Canadian Government paid £50,000 for her and assigned
her to the west coast. A ship of the Royal Navy often has
many predecessors of the same name, and on the Rainbow's
hand steering-wheels were inscribed the names and dates of
actions in which earlier Rainbows had taken part: "Spanish
Armada 1588— Cadiz 1596— Brest 1599— Lowestoft 1665—
North Foreland 1666 — Lagos Bav 1759 — Frigate Hancock
1777— Frigate Hebe 1777."20

The Rainbow was commissioned as an H.M.C. ship at
Portsmouth on August 4, 1910, and was manned by a nucleus
crew supplied by the Royal Navy and the Royal Fleet Re-
serve. The personnel were entered on loan for a period of
two years, while the fleet reservists were enrolled in the Royal
Canadian Navy under special service engagements of from
two to five years. On August 8 the Rainbow, commanded by
Cdr. J. D. D. Stewart, received her sailing orders, the first
instructions ever given to a warship by the Canadian naval
authorities.21 She left Portsmouth on August 20 for Esqui-
malt, sailing around South America by way of the Strait of

19 Annual Report, 1912, pp. 18-19; Fleet Paymaster J. S. Annesley (paymaster on board
Niobe) to Capt. W. G. Annesley, n.d. (Letter kindly lent by Mrs. J. S. Annesley).

*° See F. V. LongstafT, "The Eight 'Rainbows' ", British Columbia Historical Quarterly,
vin, No. 2.

21 N.S. 2-5-2. The account of Rainbow' s cruise to Esquimalt is based, except where other-
wise indicated, on material contained in this folder and in the cruiser's log.

146

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

Magellan, a distance of about 15,000 nautical miles. At the
equator "Father Neptune" came aboard wearing a crown of
gilded papier-mache, attended by his courtiers and his bears,
and performed his judicial duties in the time-honoured way.

Near Callao the German cruiser Bremen was seen carrying
out heavy-gun firing practice at a moored target, and at the
end of the cruise Cdr. Stewart reported on what had been
observed of this practice firing. The Admiralty knew very
little at this time about the German Navy's gunnery.22
Naval Headquarters in Ottawa immediately asked Cdr.
Stewart for further particulars; but these he was unable to
supply. On the morning of November 7, 1910, the Rainbow
arrived at Esquimalt which was to be her home thenceforth.
Among the ships in port when she arrived were two, H.M.S.
Shearwater and the Grand Trunk Pacific steamer Prince
George, with whom she was to be closely associated four years
later. Having saluted the country with twenty-one guns the
Rainbow dressed ship and prepared to receive distinguished
visitors.23

The following day the Victoria Colonist announced that:

History was made at Esquimalt yesterday. H.M.C.S. Rainbow came;
and a new navy was born. Canada's blue ensign flies for the first time on
the Dominion's own fighting ship in the Pacific — the ocean of the future
where some of the world's greatest problems will have to be worked out.
Esquimalt began its recrudescence, the revival of its former glories.24

The Victoria Times reported that "nothing but the most
favorable comment was heard on the trim little cruiser."
The same newspaper stated in an editorial that:

We are pleased to welcome His Majesty's Canadian ship Rainbow to
our port to-day. We are told in ancient literature that the first rainbow
was set in the sky as a promise of things to come. So may it be with His
Majesty's ship. She is a training craft only, but she is the first fruits on
this coast of the Canadian naval policy, the necessary forerunner of the
larger vessels which will add dignity to our name and prestige to our
actions.25

According to the Colonist:

The event was one calculated to awaken thought in the minds of all
who endeavored to grasp its true significance. The Rainbow is not a fight-
ing ship, but she is manned by fighting men, and her mission is to train

22 See confidential report by the British naval attache in Berlin, Gooch and Temperley.
British Documents, vi, pp. 506-10.

23 Daily Times, Victoria, B.C., Nov. 7, 1910.

24 Daily Colonist, Victoria, B.C., Nov. 8, 1910.

25 Times, Victoria, Nov. 7, 1910.

147

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

men so as to make them fit to defend our country from invasion, protect
our commerce on the seas and maintain the dignity of the Empire every-
where. Her coming is a proof that Canada has accepted a new responsi-
bility in the discharge of which new burdens will have to be assumed. On
this Western Frontier of Empire it is all important that there shall be a
naval establishment that will count for something in an hour of stress.26

Early in the following month the Rainbow visited Van-
couver, where the mayor and citizens extended a warm
welcome. Soon after her arrival on the coast the cruiser was
placed on training duty and recruits were sought and ob-
tained, twenty-three joining up during the ship's first visit
to Vancouver.27 On March 13, 1911, the Lieutenant Governor
and the Premier of British Columbia presented the ship with
a set of plate, the gift of the Province. During the next year-
and-a-half Rainbow made cruises up the coast, calling at
various ports where she was in great request for ceremonies
of all sorts. On some of these cruises training was combined
with fishery patrol work, which chiefly consisted in seeing that
American fishermen did not fish inside the three-mile limit.

Meanwhile the policy of developing a Canadian navy
had been allowed to lapse. Accordingly, during the two
years immediately preceding the First World War, the
Rainbow lay at Esquimalt with a shrunken complement, en-
gaged in harbour training, except when an occasional short
cruise was undertaken for the sake of her engines.

British warships had long been helping to enforce certain
sealing agreements covering the North Pacific, and for several
years prior to the First World War this work had been done
by the sloops Algerine and Shearwater. During the summer
of 1914 these vessels were performing duties on the Mexican
coast: the Canadian Government had therefore decided to
send the Rainbow on sealing patrol, and on July 9 she was
ordered to prepare for a three-months' cruise. Her extremely
slender crew was strengthened by a detachment from Eng-
land, another from the Niobe, and by volunteers from Van-
couver and Victoria. She was dry-docked for cleaning and
replenished with stores and fuel.

In May 1914, the steamer Komagata Maru had reached
Canada, carrying nearly 400 passengers, natives of India who
were would-be immigrants. When they found their entry
barred by certain Dominion regulations the Indians refused

26 Colonist, Victoria, Nov. 8, 1910.

» Report of Proceedings, Dec. 2, 1910, N.S. 2-5-1.

148

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

to leave Vancouver harbour, staying on and on, though their
food supplies ran low. On July 18, 175 local police and other
officials tried to board the Komagata Mara, so as to take the
Indians off by force and put them aboard the Empress of India
for passage to Hong Kong. A storm of missiles which in-
cluded lumps of coal greeted the police, who thereupon
steamed away without having used their firearms.28

By this time the Rainbow was in a condition to intervene.
The Naval Service Act contained no provision for naval aid
to the civil power; nevertheless, on July 19 the Rainbow's
commander was instructed to ask the authorities in Van-
couver whether or not they wanted his assistance, and the
next day he reported that: "Rainbow can be ready to leave
for Vancouver ten o'clock tonight .... immigration agent
Vancouver and crown law officers very anxious for Rainbow
. . ."29 The cruiser was ordered to proceed to Vancouver and
to render all possible assistance, while the militia authorities
were instructed to co-operate with her in every way. She left
Esquimalt that night taking a detachment of artillery with
her, and reached Vancouver next morning.

As H.M.C.S. RAINBOW steamed in through the Narrows on the bright
summer's morning and the Harbour and City opened up it was a wonderful
sight. Every street end, every window, every possible vantage ground was
thronged with expectant crowds, the waters of the harbour were like a
regatta day, and all deadly still.

As RAINBOW steamed round the 'Komagata Maru', the latter's decks
crowded with the recalcitrant Indians, one grizzled veteran, late of the
Indian Army, put the relieving touch of humour on the otherwise serious
outlook by standing on the upper bridge of the ' Komagata' and semaphoring
to the RAINBOW — 'Our only ammunition is coal'.30

The Indians had laid hands on the Japanese captain of the
Komagata Maru in an attempt to seize his vessel. The war-
ship's presence had the desired effect, however, without the
use of violence; the Indians agreed to leave, and were given
a large consignment of food, a pilot was supplied from the
Rainbow, and on July 23 the Komagata Maru sailed for Hong
Kong. The cruiser saw her safely off the premises, accom-
panying her out through the Strait of Juan de Fuca as far as
the open sea, and then returned to Esquimalt.

28 For a full account see Robie L. Reid,"The Inside Story of the Komagata Maru," British
Columbia Historical Quarterly, v (1941), pp. 1-23.

29 Hose to N.S.H.Q., July 20, 1914, N.S. 1048-3-9 (2).

30 Account by Capt. Walter Hose enclosed in idem to S. Brent, Esq., Feb. 19, 1919, N.S.
1000-5-5 (1).

149

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The personnel for the newly-created Service were ob-
tained partly in Canada and partly by borrowing from the
Admiralty. The first Director of the Naval Service was Rear
Admiral Charles Edmund Kingsmill, who was born in 1855
at Guelph, Ontario, and in 1870 became a midshipman in the
Royal Navy. He was promoted sub-lieutenant in 1875,
lieutenant in 1877, commander in 1891, and captain in 1898.
In 1908 he retired with the rank of Rear Admiral, and came
to Canada to command the Marine Service of the Depart-
ment of Marine and Fisheries. Kingsmill had served on
stations all over the world, and had commanded the Goldfinch,
Blenheim, Archer, Gibraltar, Mildura, Resolution, Majestic,
and Dominion. He had seen service in Somaliland in 1884 and
received the bronze medal and Khedive's Star for service in
Egypt in 1892, and was to be knighted in 1918. On April 19,
1909, three weeks after the Foster resolution had been moved
in the House of Commons, Kingsmill addressed to the Min-
ister of Marine and Fisheries a memorandum, with enclosures,
containing his professional advice as to setting up a Canadian
naval organization.31 The memorandum recommended that
Halifax and Esquimalt should have their defences and equip-
ment put into good order and modernized. The suggested
building programme was as follows:

We should at once commence building destroyers and cruisers. What
we should build, that is lay down, now as soon as possible, would be: Two
ocean going destroyers, vessels of 700 to 900 tons displacement, for the
Atlantic; two coastal destroyers, vessels of 270 tons displacement, for the
Pacific coast; four torpedo boats; the torpedo boats could be built, after a
model has been obtained, in Canada, to save sending them round Cape
Horn to British Columbia.

The greater part of this memorandum was devoted to the
salient and difficult question of training officers and ratings
for a naval organization which would have to start from
scratch.

Several other active or retired naval officers were also
employed by the Department of Marine and Fisheries, and
three of them who were on loan from the Royal Navy were
transferred to the Naval Service at its inception, along with
Kingsmill. Of these, Cdr. J. D. D. Stewart was assigned to
command H.M.C.S. Rainbow, Lieut. R. M. Stephens was
appointed Director of Gunnery, and Fleet Paymaster P. J.
Ling became Secretary to the Naval Staff. Shortly afterwards

31 Report on Naval Defence (Government Printing Bureau, Ottawa 1909). Original drafts
in N.S. 1017-1-1 (1).

150

■i ■

Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

the Admiralty lent Cdr. W. B. Macdonald to command the
Niobe, and Cdr. C. D. Roper who became Chief of Staff.
The following civilian directors were also transferred at this
time from Marine and Fisheries to the Naval Service: Messrs.
L. J. Beausoleil, Chief Accountant; J. A. Wilson, Director
of Stores; C. P. Edwards, Director of the Radiotelegraph
Branch; W. J. Stewart, Chief Hydrographer; and Dr. W. B.
Dawson, Director of the Tidal and Current Survey. These
officers and civilians were the first stones in the foundation
of the new organization. In November, 1911, a civilian com-
plement of 66 was authorized for the Naval Service, consisting
of a Deputy Minister, 61 clerks of various grades, and 4
messengers.32

The first Deputy Minister was George J. Desbarats.
Born in Quebec, P.Q., in 1861, he became a civil engineer,
obtained a wide experience in engineering work connected
with canals and railways, and was later responsible for a
hydrographic survey of the St. Lawrence River. In 1901
Desbarats became director of the government shipyard at
Sorel, and in 1908 he was appointed Deputy Minister of
Marine and Fisheries. He was Deputy Minister and Comp-
troller of the Naval Service from May 5, 1910, until the con-
solidation of 1922, and in 1924 he became Deputy Minister
of National Defence. He retired in 1932 and died in 1944.
Throughout the first twelve years of his long tenure of office,
the Naval Service having no Minister whose main concern
it was, Desbarats' authority and influence considerably ex-
ceeded those of most Deputy Ministers; and during the first
two decades of its existence he probably had more to do with
moulding the Service than any other man.

In the spring of 1909 Cdr. Walter Hose, R.N., executive
officer of the armoured cruiser H.M.S. Cochrane, was corre-
sponding with Admiral Kingsmill concerning employment as a
naval officer in Canada. Born at sea in 1875, he had entered the
Royal Navy in 1890. He served in many parts of the world,
including Newfoundland waters, and his wife whom he mar-
ried in 1905 was a native of St. John's. He took the War
Staff" course at Greenwich, and a course in amphibious Opera-
tions at the Military Staff College, Camberley. Promoted to
commander in 1908, his commands in the Royal Navy were
H.M. ships Tweed, Ringdove, Kale, Redbreast, and Jason. In
1911 the Admiralty lent Cdr. Hose to the Naval Service,

32 P.C. 45/2613, Nov. 18, 1911.

151

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

and in June of that year he was appointed to succeed Cdr.
Stewart in command of the Rainbow. The following year he
voluntarily retired from the Royal Navy to throw in his lot
permanently with the Naval Service. He was in command of
the Rainbow until early in 1917, when he was transferred to
Ottawa to organize the east coast patrols, and in the summer
of that year was appointed Captain of Patrols, a post which
he held for the remainder of the war. After a year as Senior
Naval Officer at Halifax, he was appointed to duty at N.S.H.Q.
in December, 1918; in 1920 he became Assistant Director of
the Naval Service; and in January, 1921, he succeeded Kings-
mill as Director.

It was intended from the beginning to man the Service
with Canadian officers and ratings, but at the start and for
many years afterwards there were practically none with the
necessary training. The newly-founded naval college was
expected as time went on to provide enough officers; but at
first the Admiralty had to be relied upon to supply all those
required, and for many years the senior officers continued to
be lent by the Royal Navy. In order not to block the pro-
motion of young Canadian officers who were advancing in
seniority, officers of the Royal Navy on loan to the Naval
Service were almost always given temporary appointments,
usually for four years. They were paid by the Dominion
Government at Canadian rates, and while the Admiralty
gave them no pay while employed by the Canadian Govern-
ment, the time so spent counted as service in the Royal Navy.
During the early years, also, the Royal Navy supplied a con-
siderable proportion of the ratings required by the Naval
Service. Assistance of this sort was an old story to the Ad-
miralty, which was helping the young Australian Service in
a similar way and had in the past acted as mentor and exem-
plar to half the navies in the world.

For several months after the arrival in Canada of the
Niobe and Rainbow, such recruits as offered themselves on
board either of the cruisers were accepted if they met the
physical and educational requirements. In February 1911,
posters calling for recruits for the Naval Service were ex-
hibited in all the principal cities and towns of the Dominion,
a recruiting pamphlet was widely distributed, and local post-
masters were authorized to act as recruiting agents. Local
doctors examined the prospective recruits, subject to final
acceptance by a naval medical officer. Seamen were entered

152

George J. Desbarats, Esq.

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

between the ages of 15 and 23, stokers from 18 to 23, and
boys from 14 to 16 years. All had to engage to serve for 7
years from the age of 18, with the option of re-engaging, if
recommended, for one or two further periods of 7 years each.33
The number of recruits obtained in Canada during the first
two years, and the Provinces from which they came, were:34

1911

1912

1911-1912
Grand

Niobe

Rainbow

Total

Niobe

Rainbow

Total

Nova Scotia.. . .

134

New Brunswick

. .

Prince Edw. I. .

. .

Quebec

Ontario

. .

Manitoba

. .

Saskatchewan. .

Alberta

British

Columbia.. . .

Totals

185

223

111

127

350

Pensioners and Fleet Reserve men of the Royal Navy were
allowed by the Admiralty to enlist in the Canadian Service;
and many did so, being entered for a period of five years under
special service engagements which carried gratuities not
payable to general service personnel.

Conditions in the Royal Canadian Navy required to be
unusually good if enough recruits were to be obtained. It was
not customary for young Canadians to take up a naval career;
the wages and standard of living in Canada were high; and
most of the recruits would come from that half of the popu-
lation which was of British origin. To conform to these special
circumstances the rates of pay, especially for ratings, were
set at a much higher level than those which prevailed in the
Royal Navy, and most of the ships which the Royal Canadian
Navy acquired from time to time were made more comfortable
by the addition of fittings not usually provided in warships.
Another problem, which resulted from the immense size of
the country and the distribution of its inhabitants, was that
of affording adequate home leave to men from far inland. On

3S Annual Report, 1911, p. 18.
** Annual Reports, 1911, 1912.

153

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

the other hand, there was reason to think that the men of the
hinterlands, if they joined the navy at all, would develop
into sailors as good as any others. The German Navy was
finding this to be true, and Admiral Tirpitz has stated that
when the supply of recruits from the coast regions proved
insufficient:

... we went inland for recruits; service in modern ships did not make the
same demands on seamanship as in the old days of sailing vessels. The
South Germans, and among them the Alsatians, distinguished themselves
in the navy.35

In the event, the German experience was duplicated in Canada.

The Royal Canadian Navy was patterned on the Royal
Navy and remained so throughout the period. Only when
Canadian conditions dictated it, notably in the case of pay
and allowances, were innovations made. Titles of ranks were
the same, and of ratings almost the same, as in the Royal
Navy. The regulations governing examinations, advancement
and promotions, and the uniforms of all ranks and ratings,
were identical in the two Services. Almost all of the Naval
Discipline Act and of the King's Regulations and Admiralty
Instructions applied to the Canadian Service.36 The profes-
sional idiom and to a less extent the colloquialisms were the
same, while the customs and etiquette of the Royal Navy
as well as its incomparably rich traditions, were accepted by
the younger Service. Although living as it were under the
shadow of the larger organization may have tended to dis-
courage originality and initiative, it can scarcely be doubted
that the Canadian navy profited immensely from its close
and continuous association with the greatest Service that the
seas have known. Moreover a close conformity between the
two navies offered a further advantage; for they were likely
to act closely together in war, and such co-operation is much
easier when the partners are almost identical in organization,
training, and doctrine.

In June 1911 a party consisting of a lieutenant, 2 midship-
men, and 35 ratings, represented the Royal Canadian Navy
at the coronation of King George V. The midshipmen were
Percy W. Nelles, a future Chief of the Naval Staff, and Victor
Brodeur, who later became a Rear Admiral, while one of the
ratings is now Rear Admiral (S) J. O. Cossette, R.C.N.

35 Tirpitz, Memoirs, i, p. 148.

36 Naval Service Act, 1910, sec. 45.

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(Ret'd). By the end of that year the fact that no contract for
new ships had been awarded, together with the several-times
expressed intention of the Borden government to ask for the
repeal of the Naval Service Act, made it impossible for the
Service to offer much inducement for young men to seek a
career in it. In his annual report for the year ending March
31, 1912, the Deputy Minister stated that no special efforts
had been made to obtain recruits. During that year 126
recruits had been entered and there had been 149 desertions.
In February 1913, the Deputy Minister reported that the
training cruisers had only about half their full complements
on board and were confined to harbour and almost reduced to
the condition of hulks, and he added that the Department did
not know what to do. In the year preceding March 31, 1914,
no recruiting was done, and most of the ranks and ratings on
loan from the Admiralty, having completed their service,
were returned to Great Britain without being replaced.

Equally acute was the problem of the young officers
and cadets. In the fall of 1913 five officers, Sub-Lieuts.
German, Nelles, Beard, Bate, and Brodeur, who had started
their careers before the Naval Service Act was passed and
begun their training in C.G.S. Canada, were finishing their
preparation for the rank of lieutenant. Nineteen cadets were
completing their training in H.M.S. Berwick, and by the end
of the year would need to begin two years' training in a sea-
going cruiser. It was necessary either to train them for the
Canadian Service if this was to be continued, or for them to
be absorbed by the Royal Navy.37 A year later, however,
the coming of the First World War solved these particular
personnel problems for the time being.

The Naval Service Act provided for the creation of a
naval college38 "for the purpose of imparting a complete
education in all branches of naval science, tactics and strat-
egy." Even before the Act had been passed steps were taken
to implement this provision. Halifax was selected as the
best site for the college, and the old naval hospital in the dock-
yard was set aside for that purpose. The college, which was
opened on January 11, 1910, had accommodation for forty-
five cadets. The cadets lived and studied in the college proper,
while separate buildings which formed part of the establish-
ment included a small electrical laboratory, engineering work-

37 Memos, in Borden Papers, O'C. No. 659.

38 Sees. 32-36.

155

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

shops and drawing office, a gymnasium, sick quarters, and a
boathouse. A playing field was provided in the Admiralty
House grounds. The original constitution of the college pro-
vided that candidates for entry should be British subjects
between 14 and 16 years of age, and that entry should be by
a competitive examination set and graded by the Civil Ser-
vice Commission. In November 1910, the Commission held
an examination for entry: there were 30 vacancies, and 34
boys took the examination, of whom 21 passed. During the
early years Cdr. A. E. Nixon, R.N., commanded the college,
and was assisted by a Director of Studies. The naval in-
structional staff was lent by the Admiralty; and three civilian
schoolmasters, who had been appointed on the recommenda-
tion of the Civil Service Commission, taught mathematics,
science, and languages.39 A two-year course was provided,
and within the limits set by mediocre facilities and a much
shorter course, the curriculum was approximated to that of
the naval colleges in Britain. The cadet's two years at the
college were to be followed by a year's training in one of H.M.
cruisers. In October 1910 the King's permission was obtained
to add the prefix "Royal" to the title of the college,40 a privi-
lege which the Royal Naval College of Canada received before
the Royal Canadian Navy itself did.41

The change in naval policy announced by the Borden
government seemed to have expunged the original purpose
of the college to train officers for the R.C.N. ; but the govern-
ment did not wish to close the institution. The curriculum
was therefore broadened so as to include preparation for other
careers, while the course was lengthened to three years; the
obligation which cadets had assumed to follow a naval career
was removed; and arrangements to receive cadets were made
with the Admiralty and with certain universities.42 In 1915
the subjects taught were mathematics, navigation, mechanics,
physics, chemistry, engineering, seamanship, pilotage, geo-

39 In 1919 the staff consisted of: a commander, an instructor commander, an engineer
commander, 2 instructor lieutenant-commanders, a paymaster lieutenant-commander, a
lieutenant, an engineer lieutenant, 3 civilian masters, a chief boatswain, a boatswain, and a
warrant writer.

40 Material in N.S. 15-1-4.

41 In answer to a request made in Jan. 1911, the Naval Service was notified on Aug. 29
that: "His Majesty having been graciously pleased to authorize that the Canadian Naval
Forces shall be designated the 'Royal Canadian Navy', this title is to be officially adopted,
the abbreviation thereof being 'R.C.NY ' D. Min. to Under-Sec. of State (Ext. Aff.), Jan.
30, 1911; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Aug. 16, 1911: N.S. 15-1^.

42 P.C. 3281, Jan. 8, 1914; House of Commons Debates, 1914, iv, p. 3254.

156

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

graphy, history, including navaJ history, English, French,

and German.43

The purely naval purpose of maintaining a reserve force
is in order to provide economically a reinforcement of pre-
dictable size, consisting of partly-trained personnel, to meet
the greatly increased needs which would be occasioned by a
future war. In sailing days the Admiralty had been accus-
tomed to take what extra men were required, as they were
needed, from the merchant marine; but the technical revolu-
tion of the nineteenth century introduced a marked and in-
creasing difference between the respective functions of the
naval and the merchant sailor. Soon after the middle of that
century it came to be realized that effective service in the
navy demanded a considerable amount of special training
even for merchant seamen. In 1853, accordingly, continuous
service was introduced in the Royal Navy. A few years later
the Royal Naval Volunteers were authorized: this body was
composed of merchant sailors, and ultimately developed into
the Royal Naval Reserve. The Royal Naval Volunteer Re-
serve was a later extension of the reserve system so as to
include men who were not professional seamen. At the turn of
the century it was decided to create the Royal Fleet Reserve,
to consist of former naval seamen and marines, and steps
were taken towards establishing naval reserves in the oversea
possessions.44

In Canada the creating of a naval reserve waited upon
the forming of a navy. The Naval Service Act authorized the
setting up of a Naval Reserve Force, which would have been
a modified Fleet Reserve, and of a Naval Volunteer Force to
be "raised by voluntary engagement from among seafaring
men and others who may be deemed suitable for the service
in which such volunteers are to be employed."15 For some
' time no steps were taken to implement these sections of the
Act; but in February 1912 it was suggested to the Prime
Minister that the best way in which Canada could support
the Royal Navy~irrthe face of the German danger would be
neither by contributing money nor by maintaining local fleet
units, but by training an auxiliary naval force composed of
fishermen. "They will be entirely under the Dominion Gov-

43 House of Commons Debates, 1915, n, p. 1615.

44 On this subject see Clowes, The Roxul Navy, vn, pp. 18-19; Hurd, The Merchant Navy,
i, pp. 97-116.

45 Sees. 19-21 and 26-31.

157

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ernment, simply passing by mutual agreement in the time of
peace under the Admiralty for Man of War training in all
details, and in time of war the Government will as may be
desirable by Order in Council place them for active service
in the Navy."46 The following September the Dominion
Government received a proposal from the west coast that a
naval reserve should be formed from officers and seamen
employed in those waters.47 The idea was in the air, for other
suggestions along similar lines were received by the govern-
ment at this time.

In July 1913 a body of young men in Victoria, B.C.,
among whom Messrs. Stanley Geary, Lifton, and Ponder, Dr.
Harper, and Lieut. Jarvis R.N.R., were moving spirits, de-
cided that they would try to establish a naval volunteer force
similar to the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in Great
Britain. Having obtained the support of a number of the
leading professional and business men in the city, they then
approached the Hon. J. D. Hazen, Minister of the Naval
Service, who had come to Victoria in connection with the
expected visit of H.M.S. New Zealand. The Minister encour-
aged them, and they received permission to use the facilities
at Esquimalt for drill. On the arrival of the New Zealand
some twenty of these pioneers were invited on board where
the commanding officer, Capt. Lionel Halsey, went out of his
way to emphasize the importance of what they were trying to
do. They drilled periodically at the dockyard, and it was a
great advantage to them that several officers and petty officers
of the Rainbow had volunteered to act as instructors.48 This
small body of enthusiasts, who had no official status, no
meeting-place of their own, and no pay-days, blazed the trail
for all the official Canadian reserve organizations that were
to follow.

In May 1914 the government established a Naval Volun-
teer Force by Order in Council under the provisions of the
Naval Service Act.49 The new organization received consid-
erable criticism in Parliament from the Opposition, prin-

46 Draft proposal by Lieut. Gen. T. Wimburn Laurie, enclosed in Mrs. Laurie to Borden
Feb. 16, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C, No. 656.

47 Sec, Merchant Service Guild of British Columbia, to Min., Marine and Fisheries,
Sept. 20, 1912, N.S. 62-1-12.

48 Enclosure in Capt. Hose to S. Brent, Feb. 19, 1919, N.S. 1000-5-5 (1); House oj Commons
Debates, 1914, II, p. 1914. For a more detailed and largely first-hand account of the Victoria
volunteers during their unofficial period, see Longstaff, Esquimalt Naval Base, pp. 69-71.

49 P.C. 1313, May 18, 1914.

158

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

cipally on the ground that instead of strengthening the
Canadian Naval Service, it would merely serve as an intake-
pipe for the Royal Navy. The force was to consist of officers
and ratings, enrolled as volunteers but engaging to serve in
time of war. Enrolment was to be open to seafaring men and
others who might be deemed suitable. The term of engage-
ment was to be three years, with re-engagement for successive
periods of three years up to the age of forty-five years. The
authorized strength was twelve hundred men to be organized
in three subdivisions. The Atlantic Subdivision included the
area from the Atlantic coast inland to a line just west of the
city of Quebec; from there the Lake Subdivision extended to
beyond Brandon, Manitoba; while the whole area farther to
the west formed the Pacific Subdivision. The force was to be
organized in companies of a hundred men each. It was pro-
posed to organize such companies in some of the large cities
at first, and later in a number of the smaller centres as well.
The already-existing unofficial unit in Victoria was, of course,
to be taken into the new organization. Training was to in-
clude, as far as might be practicable, seamanship, company
and field drill, torpedo and electrical instruction, engineering
and stokehold work, signalling, wireless telegraphy, and first
aid. Those volunteers who were seamen or fishermen in civil
life were to receive all their training on shipboard. Of the
others, those whose place of residence was such that they
could easily receive part of their training on shipboard would
do so, and the rest would be given only those types of training
which could be given to them at their respective headquarters.
The Admiralty was to be asked to provide instructional offi-
cers. Members of the force might be required in time of war
to serve in ships of the Royal Canadian Navy or of the Royal
Navy; as personnel for the examination, minesweeping, and
other services at the defended ports; as signallers or wireless
telegraphers in shore establishments; or as Intelligence officers.
There were to be twenty-one days of training a year, or the
equivalent in drills. The rates of pay for the officers would be
the same as in the Royal Canadian Navy; those of the men
were to be slightly higher so as to raise them approximately
to the level of the rates offered by the militia. The initial
annual expenditure required was estimated to be $200,000.60
Almost from the first the new organization was called the
Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve.

40 Ibid.\ and explanation by Min. in House of Commons Debates, 1914, v, pp. 5148-9.

159

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The initiative in the forming of companies of the R.N.C.V.R.
was left to those individuals who might wish to belong to that
organization, no steps being taken by the Department to
recruit, or to create company organizations in advance of an
effective demand.51 In the summer of 1914 fifty members of
the unofficial body of reservists in Victoria were embarked in
the Rainbow for training, just in time to sail for Vancouver to
support the civil power at the time of the Komagata Maru
incident.5'2

'he transfer to Canadian ownership of the naval bases at
ifax and Esquimalt took place soon after the Naval Service
had been passed. In March 1910, the Colonial Office for-
warded a letter from the Admiralty, submitting draft Orders
in Council to authorize the transfer of the two bases. It was
suggested that the Order relating to Halifax should be sub-
mitted to Council as soon as possible. A wish had been ex-
pressed from Canada, however, to postpone the transfer of
Esquimalt until after the anticipated passing of the Naval
Service Bill: the Admiralty therefore proposed to submit the
Order concerning the Pacific base as soon as the bill should
have become law.53 The Canadian authorities later proposed
that the transfer of the Esquimalt base should await the
arrival of the newly-acquired H.M.C.S. Rainbow at that port,
and take place immediately thereafter;54 and the Com-
mander in Charge at Esquimalt was instructed accordingly
by the Admiralty. The physical transfer of the properties at
Esquimalt was made on November 9, 1910, two days after
the arrival of the Rainbow. The sloops H.M.S. Algerine and
H.M.S. Shearwater continued to be based at Esquimalt in
order to discharge certain Admiralty commitments in the
eastern Pacific.

The final authority for the transfer of Halifax and Esqui-
malt to the Canadian Government was embodied in two
British Orders in Council.55 The specified properties at the
two ports were to be:

""Occasional Paper No. 12", Oct. 9, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1).

52 Enclosure in Hose to Brent, cited above.

53 Admiral Kingsmill to Sec. of the Admiralty, Jan. 24, 1910, A.R.O. Council Office
13/10/10; Admiralty to CO., Feb. 23, 1910, enclosed "in Crewe to Grey, Mar. 9, 1910, N.S.
51-1-1 (1).

" D. Min. to Undersec. of State for Ext. Aff., July 5, 1910, N.S. 51-2-1 (1);P.C. 1613, Aug.
6, 1910.

55 "The Canadian Naval Establishments (Halifax Dockyard) Order, 1910" and "The
Canadian Naval Establishments (Esquimalt Dockyard) Order, 1911." These almost identical
instruments were dated respectively Oct. 13, 1910, and May 4, 1911. The text of the first is
given in App. vn.

160

w
111

00
OS

ft,

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

. . . vested in the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada tor all
such estate and interest as is at the date of this Order vested in or held in
trust for His Majesty or the Admiralty and for the public purposes of
the Dominion . . .

The conditions, summarized, were that the Canadian Govern-
ment should maintain the existing naval facilities in usable
condition, or provide others; be responsible for storing fuel
and some other stores lor the use of ships of the Royal Navy;
permit the Royal Navy to use the workshops and appliances,
subject to payment for labour and materials only; inform
the Admiralty before devoting any of the properties to other
than naval or army uses; be responsible for all existing lia-
bilities, and enjoy any rent due from tenants and other inci-
dental benefits; and be free, subject to the above conditions, to
make such use of the properties as might seem desirable. Among
the special commitments that went with the bases was the
agreement with the Halifax Graving Dock Co., Ltd., dealt
with earlier; and when the Canadian Government acquired
the bases, four of the annual payments remained to be made.56

The properties which were finally transferred by these
Orders in Council were, as far as Halifax was concerned, the
Royal Naval Dockyard and Hospital, the Commander in
Chief's house and grounds, the recreation ground, and the
cemetery. The corresponding properties at Esquimalt con-
sisted of the Royal Naval Dockyard and Hospital, the naval
coal stores and magazine, the recreation and drill ground,
and the cemetery. Certain naval reserve lands on both coasts
were transferred to Dominion authority by Order in Council
on December 16, 1911. The assumption of Canadian custody
over the bases and reserve lands was officially announced in
the Canada Gazette of January 30, 1912.

The extraordinary delay which took place before the bases
were actually transferred is curious in view of the willingness
of both the parties, which sometimes amounted to eagerness,
to effect the transfer of custody. It is probable that the long
delays were largely due to the fact that, though the principals
were thus agreed, the completion of the affair was never really
urgent. As it was, the Admiralty merely paid maintenance
charges throughout the period of delay, while the Dominion
Government had a base on each coast by the time that the
first two warships obtained to implement the Naval Service
Act had reached their Canadian stations. The establishments

56 Correspondence in N.S. 51^-3 (1).

161

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

which had been taken over were small repair and fuelling
bases, somewhat run down and with part of their equipment
obsolescent; yet they were most valuable properties obtained
by Canada free of charge.

It was a matter of consequence that Canada, at the time
when she was embarking upon a naval policy of her own,
came into possession of a naval base on each of the oceans
toward which she faced. The acquisition of the Halifax and
Esquimalt bases placed the Dominion in a position where her
government, asking for money with which to create or main-
tain a naval force, was able to propose that nearly all the
expenditure should be devoted to the most obviously relevant
purpose — ships and men. The existence of the bases at Halifax
and Esquimalt also relieved the government of the embarrass-
ment of having to favour one among several rival interests in
choosing a site. The two establishments had been acquired
from the British Government on condition that they should
be maintained as naval bases, and that ships of the Royal
Navy might use them at all times. In accepting them on these
terms Canada committed itself to a considerable extent in
two important ways. The ownership of bases suggests the
advisability of owning warships as well; consequently the
possession of these establishments by the Dominion made it
more likely than it would otherwise have been that a Canadian
naval force, no matter how small, would continue to be main-
tained. The special status of the two bases after their acquisi-
tion, moreover, apart from all other considerations, would
make it very difficult, as long as the agreement stood, for
Canada to remain neutral in a subsequent imperial war
against an important naval power.

The dockyard at Halifax which the Canadian authorities
had taken over was a reasonably complete and well-constructed
plant, whose equipment, however, was largely obsolescent. A
committee was set up to consider what steps should be taken
by the Naval Service for the defence of Halifax in time of
war or strained relations. On November 25, 1911, this defence
committee recommended the blocking of the eastern channel
by sinking about six local schooners across it; the installing
of certain net and boom defences; a guard for the dockyard;
a harbour patrol by naval steamboats on each side of George
Island; and the establishing of an examination service.57 In
May 1912 the Overseas Defence Committee concurred in

57 Report in N.S. 1001-1-2 (1).

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these recommendations. Details connected with the defence
of the port were still being reviewed in 1914, and when war
came, although much thought had been bestowed upon the
defence of Halifax, no complete arrangements to that end
had been made.

The cruiser-destroyer shipbuilding programme was an
essential part of the general policy. An unsigned, undated
memorandum among Laurier's papers, obviously written by
well-informed persons, pointed out the great difficulties which
were inherent in any attempt to do the building in Canada,
inasmuch as the Dominion possessed no suitable shipbuilding
or marine-engineering establishments. To meet the views of
the government it was suggested that the construction of a
shipyard in Canada should be begun. At the same time two
cruisers and two destroyers should be laid down in Great
Britain, while skilled Canadian workers would be sent to
help in building them. As a further means towards increasing
the supply of skilled shipyard workers available in Canada,
a number of such workers should be encouraged to come from
Britain. As soon as the Canadian yard should be ready the
succeeding four ships would be laid down there, certain of
their important parts being imported ready-made. It was
hoped that the last three units of the programme could be
wholly constructed and equipped in Canada.58

The government decided, nevertheless, to build all the
ships in Canada, accepting the disadvantages which would
result. This policy was defended principally on the ground
that it would encourage the development of a shipbuilding
industry. The disadvantages were that the ships would be
built much more slowly, and cost considerably more, than if
they had been constructed in British yards. These drawbacks
resulted from the lack of shipbuilding plants and subsidiary
industries as well as of specialized engineers and workers, and
from the relatively high level of wages in the Dominion.

The Admiralty's specifications would have to be used.
Accordingly the first step to be taken was to ascertain whether
or not the Admiralty would object to firms not on its approved
list having access to these specifications. To this question
which was put on March 4, 1910, the Admiralty replied that
they were anxious to help in every possible way; but that as
the specifications of the latest types of warship were highly

Laurier Papers, " Navy Hill —Power to Legislate", Pub. Arch., EF.2.

163

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

confidential, they would wish to know the names of any firms
in Canada to which it was proposed to give this information.
The Admiralty also wanted to have one of their own over-
seers present in any yard where the specifications were being
used, and to be assured that the Dominion authorities
would rigidly enforce the law against any breach of secrecy.
To these conditions the Canadian Government agreed.59

The terms required the construction of four Bristol-class
cruisers of the improved Weymouth type, and of six river-
class destroyers of the improved Acorn type. It had been
decided to substitute the Niobe for the Boadicea of the original
programme.60 The first cruiser was to be finished within three
years of the signing of the contract, and another one each
following year. The first two destroyers were to be delivered
within three years, and additional ones at nine-month inter-
vals thereafter. The programme was to be completed within
six years, and all the ships were to be built in the Dominion.
Certain rules were to be complied with, which covered the
conditions of labour. The ships might be built on either
coast; but it was pointed out that the Rush-Bagot agreement
prohibited the construction of warships on the Great Lakes.
For obvious reasons it was intended that one firm should
build all the ships. After considerable delay the deadline for
tenders was set at May 1, 1911.

A shipbuilding firm considering the advisability of tender-
ing for this contract had to reckon with the difficulty and
initial expense of establishing a new yard under imperfectly-
known conditions. On the other hand the contract was a
fairly large one, and the prospect of subsequent orders, which
would serve to keep the new yard busy after this one had been
filled, while it was uncertain, may well have seemed good.
It was doubtless a consideration also that the Canadian
Parliament, with the needs of the Naval Service in mind, had
recently passed a law to encourage the construction of dry
docks. This Act empowered the government to grant a
generous subsidy to any suitable firm willing to build a dry
dock in Canada which would serve the public interest. The
maximum subsidy provided for was 33^% annually of the

59 Correspondence in A.R.O., S.6(i75/1912, "Canadian Shipbuilding Programme."

6J The Boadiceas were small, very fast cruisers, intended to act as parent ships tor des-
troyers. They drew criticism as representing too great a sacrifice of armament to speed. See
Brasse/s Naval Annual: 1908, p. 4; 1911, p. 6; 1912, p. 27.

164

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

cost of the work for a period of thirty-five years.61 By the
beginning of 1911 nineteen firms had corresponded with the
Department with a view to tendering tor the ships. Three
of these firms, the Collingwood Shipbuilding Company, the
Poison Iron Works, and the British Columbia Marine Railwav
Company, were Canadian firms. The others were concerns in
Great Britain, some of which bore names which were among
the most famous in shipbuilding. Seven tenders were actually
received. Six of these undertook to build the ships in Canada,
which meant, of course, that they were prepared to establish
plants in the Dominion. One firm, the Thames Iron Works,
tendered by mistake on the assumption that the ships would
be built at its yard in England. One Canadian firm offered a
tender; it planned to establish and equip the necessary works,
in which the ships would be built under the direction and
control of two distinguished British firms.

The highest tender was for $13,055,804; the lowest for
ships to be built in Canada was $11,280,000. Of all the
tenders the median came from the association of Canadian
and British companies. The Thames Iron Works' tender was
for $8,532,504: the average of the other six was $1 2,421, 41 2. 62
These two last figures, no doubt, measure approximately the
extra cost at that time of doing the work in the Dominion,
and confirm the prediction on this point which Laurier had
made in the House of Commons. In the difficulties inherent
in planning for a construction programme which involved
the establishing of an industry as well as the building of ships,
the Canadian Government had the benefit of the Admiralty's
unrivalled experience in these matters, which was freely
placed at their disposal. The numerous negotiations which
had to be completed before a contract could be signed, how-
ever, consumed much time. In the general election of Sep-
tember 1911 the government was defeated, and in October an
Order in Council decreed "that in view of the magnitude of
the transaction the question of awarding the contract be left
to the incoming administration."63

In the spring of 1911, while the Laurier government was
* still in power, was held the last imperial conference to meet

61 9-10 Edw. VII, c. 17. Like the Naval Service Act this was assented to on May 4, 1910.
Canadian warships and those of the Royal Navy were to enjoy priority, when necessary, in
the use of such subsidized dry docks.

62 The tenders did not include armour plate, armament, and certain httings usually sup-
plied by the Admiralty, but included the fitting of these on board the vessels.

63 P.C. 2414, Oct. 6, 1911.

165

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

before the First World War. Two naval subjects were dis-
cussed, a project for a centrally-controlled imperial navy,
and policy for co-ordinating the methods and status of the
navies in the Empire. At this conference Asquith and Har-
court, the latter being Colonial Secretary, represented Great
Britain, while Laurier, Sir Frederick Borden, and Brodeur,
were the Canadian members.

^ The Prime Minister of New Zealand advocated an im-
perial parliament of defence, on which Britain and the Do-
minions would be represented according to population. This
body would determine the naval needs of the Empire, and
levy annual contributions lor that purpose upon the member
States. This scheme received practically no support from the
conference, however, and was withdrawn.64

While the agenda for the conference was being worked out,
the Australian Government had asked for a discussion on the
related subjects of the status of the Dominion navies and co-
operation between the naval and land forces of the Empire.
During the conference a meeting composed of Admiralty offi-
cials and Australian and Canadian representatives was ac-
cordingly held. The agreement which was reached, and which
affected the navies of both Dominions, was as follows. The j
naval Services and forces of both Dominions were to be con-
trolled exclusively by their respective governments. Their
training and discipline were to be generally the same as, and
personnel interchangeable with, those of the Royal Navy. I
The Dominions, having already adopted the King's Regula-
tions and Admiralty Instructions and the Naval Discipline
Act, would communicate with the British Government should
they desire any changes in the regulations or in the Act. The
Admiralty agreed to lend to the younger Services, during their
infancy, whatever flag officers and other officers and men
might be needed, such personnel to be, as far as possible, from
or connected with the Dominion concerned, and in any case
to be volunteers. The service of any officer of the Royal Navy
in a Dominion ship, or the converse, was to count for the
purposes of retirement, pay, and promotion, as if it had been
performed in that officer's own force. Canadian and Aus-
tralian naval stations were created and defined: the Canadian
Atlantic Station covered the waters north of 30° N. and west
of 40° W., except for certain waters off Newfoundland, and

64 Cd. 5745, "Minutes of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911," pp. 46-75, Pari.
Paps., 1911, liv.

166

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

the Canadian Pacific Station included the part of that ocean
north of 30° N. and east of the 180th meridian. The Admiralty
would be notified whenever it was intended to send Dominion
warships outside their own stations, and a Dominion govern- 1
ment, before sending one of its ships to a foreign port, would
obtain the concurrence of the British Government. The
commanding officer of a Dominion warship in a foreign port
would carry out the instructions of the British Government
in the event of any international question arising, in which
case the government of the Dominion concerned would be V
informed. A Dominion warship entering a foreign port
without a previous arrangement, because of an emergency,
would report her reasons for having put in, to the Com-
mander in Chief of that station or to the Admiralty. It was
agreed that in the case of a ship of the Royal Navy meeting a
Dominion warship, the senior officer should command in any
ceremony or intercourse or where united action should have
been decided upon; but not so as to interfere with the execu-
tion of any orders which the junior might have received from
his own government. In order to remove any uncertainty
about seniority, Dominion officers would be shown in the
Navy List. In the event of there being too few officers of the
necessary rank belonging to a Dominion Service to complete
a court martial ordered by that Service, the Admiralty under-
took to make the necessary arrangements if requested to do
so. In the interest of efficiency Dominion warships were to .
take part from time to time in fleet exercises with ships of the '
Royal Navy, under the command of the senior officer, who
was not, however, to interfere further than necessary with the
internal economy of the Dominion ships concerned. Aus-
tralian and Canadian warships would fly the white ensign at the
stern and the flag of the Dominion at the jack-staff. "In time of
war, when the naval service of a Dominion, or any part there-
of, has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government
by the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral
part of the British fleet, and will remain under the control |
of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war."65
These arrangements were put into effect, and governed
thenceforth, within the period covered by this volume, the
status of the Australian and Canadian navies and the rela-
tionship of these Services to the Royal Navy.

66 Cd. 5740-2, No. 1, "Memorandum of Conferences between the British Admiralty and
Representatives of . . . Canada and . . . Australia", ibid.

167

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The attempts at the colonial and imperial conferences to
achieve a jointly-financed programme for Imperial defence,
drawn in terms of central military control and a general
imperial convergence, were made in vain. The obstacles which
this policy failed to surmount were: the growing sense of local
nationalism in the larger Dominions; a feeling of care-free
dependence in the smaller ones; and the fact that the possible
external threats, to meet which armed forces are usually pro-
vided, were or seemed to be far less menacing in some parts
of the Empire than in others. The naval arguments for un-
divided control, and the view that the financial burden should
be distributed approximately according to the strength of
the various shoulders concerned, did not prevail against argu-
ments which took more account of the special environment,
outlook, and immediate needs, of each part of the Empire.
It is an exceedingly significant fact that Australia, highly
sensitive to the need of preparations for defence, almost all of
whose people were of British origin, and whose financial
contributions to the Royal Navy had never constituted a
heavy burden, should have abandoned contributions after
more than twenty years' experience with them, and turned
to the development of a local navy.

The point of view which Canada had expressed so un-
waveringly at all the conferences was the Australian way of
thinking modified by three special circumstances. One of
these was the proximity of the United States with its decisive
military superiority in North America and its Monroe
Doctrine. Another was the fact that any concentration of the
Royal Navy, adequate in size and disposition to protect the
British Isles from invasion or blockade, was ipso facto capable
' of covering the routes by which alone any European enemy
could reach the shores of Canada. The third was the diversity
of opinion among Canadians regarding almost all aspects of
external policy. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's course throughout was
the greatest common factor of Canadian opinions.

The solution which was eventually found for the problem
was a compromise. Like most compromises it fell short of
perfection from any theoretical point of view. It had, however,
the sterling merit of meeting very largely the demands of those
who wanted specifically Dominion navies, of the advocates
of imperial fleets which would act as one, and of those who
had protested that the Dominions were doing almost nothing
for their own or imperial naval defence. Perhaps the most

168

IMPLEMENTING THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT

striking features of the conferences, as far as naval defence
is concerned, were the seriousness of the difficulties which
the problem presented, and the combination of good will and
persistence with which an answer was sought. The solution
itself was a masterpiece of resourceful statecraft.

169

Chapter 8

A NEW GOVERNMENT AND A NEW POLICY

THE Liberal Government was, in 1910, spending its four-
teenth year in office. Laurier's prestige was undimmed by
the passing years, and his government seemed on the
surface to be as strong as ever. The naval bill, although
potentially dangerous, had not created any serious difficulties
tor Laurier in his relations either with his party or with the
people as a whole. It had, however, occasioned a threat to his}
long ascendancy in his native Province, in whose soil his power
had always been chiefly rooted.

On October 13, 1910, the Hon. Louis Lavergne, federal
Member for Drummond-Arthabaska, was appointed to the
Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Sir George
Drummond. This appointment necessitated a by-election in
Sir Wilfrid's old constituency, and the Nationalists determined
to pit their strength against him there where his influence was
presumably at its very peak. They therefore supported a local
farmer/ Arthur Gilbert, who claimed to be a Liberal opposed to
the government's naval policy. With the greatest courage and
enthusiasm the Nationalists entered the battle, concentrating
their attack chiefly upon the Naval Service Act and the British
connection. Denouncing the naval policy as a result of im-
perialist machinations, they said that the navy was a herald of
conscription, pictured the future fate of Canada's sons fighting
Britain's wars in distant lands and on far-off seas, and reiter-
ated their demands for a plebiscite on the naval question.
Monk and Mr. Bourassa joined forces; while the Liberals
brought into the field many of their most stalwart chieftains
including Sir Wilfrid himself. Yet their candidate, J. E.
Perrault, lost the election by 207 votes.1 Their defeat in
Drummond-Arthabaska was a heavy blow to the government;
the Conservatives, however, could not endorse the victory
unconditionally, in view of the special circumstances of the
election and the hostility to the British connection which the
victors had expressed.

1 Skelton, Life of Laurier, n, pp. 337-40.

170

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

The government's last general campaign was to be prin-
cipally fought, however, not on the issue of naval policy, but
over the question of a reciprocal trade agreement with the
United States. When President Taft, early in 1910, showed an
interest in establishing tariff preferences between the two
countries, the Canadian Government responded cordially. On
July 29, 1911, Parliament was dissolved, and Laurier appealed,
to the country to endorse reciprocity.2 Yet elections are
seldom or never simple decisions on single issues, and this one
was complicated by the situation in Quebec, The Conserva-
tives in that Province, led by Monk, opposed reciprocity; the
Quebec Nationalists, following Mr. Bourassa, detested the
Naval Service Act while they were relatively unconcerned
about reciprocity. Both Monk and Mr. Bourassa were opposed
to Laurier, and had insisted upon the need for a plebiscite on
the naval question... It is evident that upon this common
ground a rapprochement took place: it is not clear, however,
what its exact terms were or to what extent Borden was directly
involved. Whatever the understanding was,, the Nationalists
undertook to support those candidates, irrespective of their
political affiliations, who should embody the demand for a
plebiscite in their respective platforms.3 The Nationalists did
not support Borden except in this incidental way. They
accused him along with Laurier of subordinating the naval
question to reciprocity, and expressed the opinion that he
would have liked, had it been politically possible, to inaugurate
a policy of contributions to the Royal Navy. They anticipated
that he would cease his appeals to imperialist sentiment, and
would recommend that the people should be consulted.4

Except in Quebec, the Conservative Party and press were
almost silent on the naval question during the election.
Borden's statement at the time of the dissolution, and his final
general appeal to the electorate on September 19, contained no
reference to it. Nor did he mention it when addressing a
Montreal audience on August 29. 6 La Presse noted the omis-
sion, and explained it by saying that Borden had no wish to
disturb those who were helping to pull his chestnuts out of the
fire for him in Quebec.6 On the other hand, Borden's election

2 The reciprocity issue and the election of 1911 are fully dealt with in Ellis, Reciprocity 1911.

3 Ibid., p. 171.

* Le Devoir, Aug. 16, 1911.

5 Gazette, Montreal, Aug. 30, 1911.

6 La Presse, Montreal, Aug. 31, 1911.

171

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

manifesto, issued on August 14, referred briefly to the naval
question:

Since the last general election the Government has entered upon a new
line of policy in regard to naval affairs, which is of far-reaching importance.
The policy adopted was not debated before the people during that election
and it bears all the earmarks of a hasty and ill-considered scheme. In my
judgment our duty to the Empire cannot be properly or effectively ful-
filled by such a measure. I hold that the plan of the Government contem-
plates the creation of a naval force that will be absolutely useless in time of
war, and, therefore, of no practical benefit to Canada or to the Empire.
It will cost immense sums of money to build, equip and maintain. It will
probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many valuable lives
and it will not add one iota to the fighting strength of the Empire. The
more it is considered, the more does it become evident that the whole naval
plan of the Government is an unfortunate blunder.7

Borden's opening speech in the campaign, given on August
15 in London, Ontario, ended with a further statement on this
subject. He explained that at the time when the naval Bill was
passed the Conservatives had believed that an emergency
existed. Then he spoke of the future:

The question of Canada's permanent co-operation in Imperial Naval
Defence involves far-reaching consideration. The Government proposals
were clearly a political makeshift and not a serious attempt to deal with a
difficult question. Responsibility for Empire defence clearly involves some
•-rvoice in Empire policy. Canada's permanent and effective co-operation in
naval defence can only be accomplished by proposals which take account
of this consideration and any such proposals should be submitted to the
people for their approval.

He also said that the projected navy would be useless, and that
the government's policy meant dismemberment of the Empire
if it meant anything. 8 Le Devoir commented on this statement
next day: "On sentait l'homme politique qui divine l'impopu-
larite de la loi, qui veut en beneficier sans trop se compromet-
tre."9

As the election drew near the fears of the government and
the hopes of the Opposition progressively increased. /The
patriotic appeal made by the Opposition strongly affected the
electors, many of whom, especially in Ontario, saw in recipro-
city the spectre of American domination. The elections, which
were held on September 21, 1911, more than confirmed the
fears of the government and the hopes of its opponents. The
respective positions of the two Parties were reversed. The

7 Gazette, Aug. 15, 1911.

* Ibid., Aug. 16, 1911.

• Le Devoir, Aug. 16,-1911.

172

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

Liberal representation was reduced, as compared wtih the
results of the previous election, from 133 to 86; the Conserva-
tives increased theirs from 85 to 133; the number of indepen-
dent Members, was reduced from 3 to 2. Seven Cabinet Minis-
ters were defeated, while in Ontario the Conservatives won
their greatest victory in the history of that Province by winning
72 seats to 13 for the Liberals. In Quebec the Liberals kept a
majority, but it had fallen from 42 to 10; 27 Conservatives and
Nationalists were returned as against 37 Liberals* British
Columbia went solidly Conservative, while the Maritimes
returned 16 Conservatives to 19 Liberals. The Prairie Provin-
ces, with the exception of Manitoba, went strongly Liberal.10
The Laurier government resigned on October 6, and Borden
formed an administration, in which the Minister of Marine
and Fisheries and of the Naval Service was John Douglas
Hazen who had previously been Premier of New Brunswick.

The Conservatives had taken such a firm stand against the
Naval Service Act while they were in opposition, that it was
difficult for them to carry out its provisions after they came to
power. An added deterrent was the election stand of many
Conservative Members from Quebec, who had stressed their
opposition to Laurier's naval policy almost to the exclusion of
all else. As far as naval policy was concerned, English- and
French-speaking Conservatives were united in their condemna- ^
tion of the Naval Service Act, and in nothing else. A new and \
inexperienced Prime Minister, whose hold over his Party was
as yet tenuous,11 had to deal cautiously with this combustible
question.

Shortly after the new Parliament met, Laurier caustically
noted that the Speech from the Throne failed to mention the
naval question. He went on to accuse the government of
having formed a Cabinet whose members held diametrically
opposite views on a question of the highest importance to the
Dominion and Empire, and maintained that such a situation
was contrary to the accepted principles of responsible govern-
ment. Borden replied with a guarded statement which criti-
cized the Laurier policy as being ineffective, expensive, and
ill-considered. He also said that the Naval Service Act
established the principle of disunited navies, and that the
proposed navy would be obsolete before it was completed:

10 Parliamentary Guide, 1940.

11 See Borden Memoirs, \, pp. 309-311.

173

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

I say there is only one thing to be done, and that is to stop such a
system of wasteful expenditure — and we propose to do it. Further . . . the
whole policy must be reconsidered, and we shall reconsider it. In so grave
and important a determination affecting for all time to come the relations
of this Dominion to the rest of the empire, it is infinitely better to be right
than to be in a hurry. The question of permanent co-operation between this
Dominion, and the rest of the empire ought to be threshed out and debated
before the people, and they should be given an opportunity of pronouncing
upon it. I say further that we shall take pains to ascertain in the meantime
what are the conditions that confront the empire, and honourable gentlemen
on this side of the House without exception, will be prepared to do their
duty as representatives of the people of this Dominion, and as citizens of
this great empire.12

Despite various attempts by the Opposition to obtain a
more specific statement from the government, none was forth-
coming. On November 29, 1911, the Minister stated in reply
to a question, that the government did not intend to accept
any of the tenders for the projected warships, and that all the
deposits which had been made in connection with them had
been returned.13 A few months later he said that the Naval
Service Act would be repealed, but not until the government
had presented its alternative policy to Parliament and the
people. In the meantime the Act would remain on the statute
book "for purposes in connection with the Fishery Protection
Service and otherwise."14 At this time the Naval Service was
being fashioned, as described in the preceding chapter, and the
Prime Minister stated that, as the government could not very
well sink the ships and burn the buildings, the existing estab-
lishment would be continued until a new policy had been
formulated. 15

Both the Minister and Borden reiterated the government's
decision to retain the existing Service until a new policy should
have been formulated after consultation with the Admiralty.
When pressed by the Opposition to give his reasons for con-
sulting the Admiralty, the Prime Minister replied that a
delegation would go to London, prepared to discuss the details
of a policy which would subsequently be submitted to Parlia-
ment and to the people as well. The Admiralty would be told
that in the opinion of the Canadian Government and people,
the Naval Service as then constituted was of no advantage

12 House of Commons Debates, 1911-12, i, pp. 41 and 58-61, Nov. 30, 1911.

13 Ibid., i, p. 526.

u Ibid., in, p. 4242, Mar. 4, 1912.
18 Ibid., in, p. 5356.

174

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

either to Canada or to the Empire.18 The question was not
further discussed during that Session.

Meanwhile the Naval Service was living precariously. No>
arrangements had been made or projected to provide effective
warships. Not many young Canadians wished to enter a
Service whose roots seemed fixed in such stony ground, and in
the summer of 1912 most of the borrowed R.N. ratings returned
to Britain and were not replaced. The following table, giving
the number of youths entering as cadets, the number of
R.C.N, officers and ratings on the strength, and the naval
expenditures, in each of four years, tells the story:

Year

No. of Cadets
entering

No. of R.C.N.
Officers & Ratings

Naval .
Expenditure

1910-11

1911-12

1912-13

191*3-14

704
695
592
330

$1,790,017

1,233,456

1,085,660

597,566

It will be remembered that during the debate of 1909 on
the Foster resolution,17 Borden had favoured the establishing
of a Canadian navy. He had opposed a policy of contributions,
adding, however, that if a serious emergency arose some sort
of contribution would be necessary. In the course of the debate
on the Naval Service Bill he had confirmed his previous
position; with the important qualification that he had come to
feel that a threatening emergency was near at hand, on account
of which he advocated a contribution in kind or in cash. Over
a year was to elapse after he had taken office, however, before
the new government's naval policy was presented to the public.^

Among Borden's papers there is a memorandum summariz-
ing his naval policy in the fall of 1910. It was drawn up by
someone else, but Borden's secretary minuted that "I sub-
mitted it to him and he said it was correct." According to this
summary Borden considered that British naval supremacy
was threatened and might in the near future be overthrown.
Accordingly an immediate cash contribution- from Canada,
sufficient to add two Dreadnoughts to the Royal Navy, was
needed. After the immediate emergency had been provided
for in this way, Canada's future course of action should be

16 Ibid., hi, pp. 5350-55.

17 See pp. 122-8 above.

175

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

carefully considered. A Canadian navy could not be made
effective in less than ten or fifteen years. Before embarking
upon a permanent policy the people of Canada should be
consulted, and only if the verdict were favourable should the
development of a Canadian navy be proceeded with. The force
proposed by the government was inadequate for effective
defence. Purely for naval reasons a Canadian navy should
immediately and automatically become part of the Royal
iNavy on the outbreak of war.18

Speaking in the House on November 17, 1910, Borden
expressed the opinion which was the keystone of his policy:

When Canada, with the other great Dominions within the empire,

embarks upon a policy of permanent co-operation in the naval defence of

the empire, it ought, from every constitutional standpoint, from every

reasonable standpoint as well, to have some voice as to the issues of peace

land war within the empire.19

The idea that co-operation in imperial naval defence ought to
carry with it the right to an effective voice in determining the
foreign policy of the Empire, was to occupy a prominent place
^in Borden's mind for a long time thereafter.

It was in the mid-winter of 1911-12 that the first steps were
taken which led to Borden's direct relations with Mr. Winston
Churchill, who was then the First Lord of the Admiralty in the
Asquith government. It happened that Richard McBride,
Premier of British Columbia, had for many years been a friend
of Mr. Churchill's. On January 31, 1912, McBride wrote to
Hazen enclosing an extract of a letter which he had received
from Mr. Churchill. The First Lord offered his own help and
that of the Admiralty in connection with the naval policy of
the Canadian Government:

They can consult the Admiralty in perfect confidence that we will do
all in our power to make their naval policy a brilliant success; and will not
be hidebound or shrink from new departures provided that whatever
moneys they think fit to employ shall be well spent according to the true
principles by which sea power is maintained.

McBride suggested that Hazen should drop Mr. Churchill a
line; the Minister wrote to Borden instead, enclosing McBride's
letter, with the extract, and stating that:

I think we will soon have to make up our minds as to what course we
intend to pursue with regard to consulting the Admiralty, and I will not

!8 Memo, enclosed in Sir Herbert Ames to A. E. Blount, Sept. 27, 1910, Borden Papers,
Annex to Memoir Notes No. 3.

19 House of Commons Debates, 1910-11, I, p. 34.

176

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

act upon Mr. McBride's suggestion to drop a line to Mr. Churchill until I
have a talk with you with regard to the subject.20

Some time afterwards, on his way home from a visit to
England McBride saw Borden, after which the following letter
was written by Borden to Mr. Churchill:

Mr. McBride spent some hours in Ottawa on his way to British Colum-
bia, and I had the pleasure of conversing with him on some matters which
he had discussed with you while in England. He conveyed to me your
message which I greatly appreciate and for which I thank you.

It is practically arranged that Mr. Hazen and I with one or two other
members of the Government will sail for England about the 26th or 28th
of June, arriving in London early in July. There are several questions
which we shall find it necessary to discuss with the members of the Imperial
Government; and not the least important is the naval question which I
hope to take up with you immediately after our arrival.21

It seems clear that pending the projected visit to Great
Britain the government made no decision, even of a tentative
nature, regarding naval policy. Borden says in his Memoirs
that: "So far as I remember there was no advance discussion on
policy, as that was postponed until after my colleagues had
been made acquainted with the results of our visit."22 Nor is
there in the documents which bear on the discussions in Eng-
land any indication that such a decision had been previously
made. The lines of policy more or less definitely laid down prior
to the journey to London seem to have included only the
scrapping of the Naval Service, at least in the form in which it
then existed, and the need for some form of Canadian partici-
pation in imperial foreign policy as a prerequisite to co-oper-
ation in the defence of the Empire.

A few weeks before sailing Borden asked for advice from
Sir James Whitney, the Conservative Premier of Ontario:

I would like to have from you as soon as convenient any suggestions
which you might be good enough to give me as to our course upon the
Naval question. We expect to leave for England about the end of this
month. Two questions will arise, first as to the necessity or expediency of
an effective contribution for the temporary purpose of meeting conditions
which undoubtedly confront the Mother Country at the present time,
secondly the larger and even more important question of co-operation on a
permanent basis.23

20 Hazen to Borden, Feb. 6, 1912, with enclosures, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.
» Borden to Churchill, May 30, 1912, ibid.

22 Borden Memoirs, I, p. 355.

23 Borden to Whitney, June 1, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.

177

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Whitney replied that:

I am in favour of placing at the disposal of the Imperial Authorities a
sum of money sufficient to build two battleships or armoured cruisers of the
Dreadnought type to be known as Canadian battleships, but to be abso-
lutely under the control and management of the Admiralty subject to any
conditions that may be deemed reasonable.

A permanent policy, in Whitney's view, was a large problem
which would involve the whole question of intra-imperial
relations and responsibilities; and the views of the other
Dominions would have to be ascertained and considered before
a decision could properly be made.24 At this time also, from
other sources, Borden received similar suggestions and he may
have been given advice in different or contrary terms as well.

The Prime Minister sailed for England on June 26, 1912.

Three of his colleagues went with him — Hazen, C. J. Doherty

the Minister of Justice, and the Postmaster General, L. P.

Pelletier. Admiral Kingsmill and Sir Joseph Pope accompanied

Borden and his Ministers as expert advisers. The party landed

on July 4, and went on to London. They found, as members of

missions have often done, that physical stamina was almost as

important as statesmanship:

The strain of official duties, as well as the more tremendous strain of
social functions, was greater than I had hitherto experienced. Our respon-
sibilities with regard to co-operation in Empire defence weighed heavily
upon us.25

On his first day in London Borden opened discussions with
Mr. Churchill, and immediately afterwards went to Spithead
to see the fleet, where he met the First Lord again, and Asquith,
the Prime Minister.

On July 11 Borden and his Ministers attended a meeting ot
the Committee of Imperial Defence at which Asquith presided.
Sir Edward Grey talked briefly on foreign policy. Mr. Churchill
spoke at much greater length, stopping occasionally to answer
a question. He said that the principal feature of the naval
situation was the growth of the German Navy; a problem
which was complicated, however, by the expansion of other
navies. The German Navy was always kept concentrated, and
with an unprecedentedly high proportion of ships in full
commission, the structural details of which suggested that they
had been constructed expressly for offensive action in or near
the North Sea. As both x^ustria-Hungary and Italy were

24 Memo, enclosed in Whitney to Borden, June 14, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 654.
26 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 356.

178

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

building Dreadnoughts, the Royal Navy would need, by the
year 1915, to have eight ships of that type in the Mediter-
ranean. This would leave a deficiency of three or four Dread-
noughts in home waters. "It comes to this, that really we
ought to lay down now three more ships over and above the
four we are building." The considerable financial incon-
venience of laying down these extra ships could be got over;
the real difficulty was that the existing year-by-year programme
was proportioned to that of the Germans. The sudden laying
down by Great Britain of three extra Dreadnoughts might
stimulate naval competition, and would cause the Germans to
ask what new fact existed to justify the building ot these
additional ships:

If we could say that the new fact was that Canada had decided to take
part in the defence of the British Empire, that would be an answer which
would involve no invidious comparisons, and which would absolve us from
going into detailed calculations as to the number of Austrian and German
vessels available at any particular moment.

Such a decision on Canada's part, Mr. Churchill continued,
could not offend any Power, and nothing could possibly
contribute more effectively to the prestige and security of the
British Empire. "The need, I say, is a serious one, and it is an
immediate need." He hoped that during the visit ot the
Canadian Ministers there would be long consultations on the
details of a permanent naval policy. What he had been talking
about was not a permanent policy, which would require careful
and unhurried consideration. "But the other need is urgent,
and if it is the intention of Canada to render assistance to the
naval forces of the British Empire, now is the time when that
aid would be most welcome and most timely." When Mr.
Churchill had finished, Borden said that he and his colleagues
would welcome an opportunity to talk the matter over with
him and his officials, and the First Lord replied that he would
make all the necessary arrangements. Asquith suggested that
after these consultations should have taken place a second
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence should be held,
and Borden said that he would be very glad to attend such a
meeting.26

On July 13, the Canadian Ministers conferred with Mr.
Churchill and other Admiralty officials. Three days later
Borden had a private interview with the First Lord:

26 Cttee. of Imperial Defence, Minutes of 118th Meeting, Julv 11, 1912, Borden Papers,
O'C. No. 643.

179

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

. . our conversation was very frank and intimate. Mr. Churchill was
fair and reasonable and was entirely disposed to give us assurance in writing
as to the peril which seemed everywhere to be apprehended in Great
Britain and as to the necessity for strong co-operation in naval defence bv
the Dominions. He spoke of coming to Canada with the Prime Minister.27

On July 19, the First Lord consulted Borden regarding the
speech with which he was to introduce in the House of Com-
mons, three days later, supplementary naval Estimates to
meet the provisions of the latest German navy law. The First
Lord's speech on that occasion was the first public statement
on the conferences between the Canadian Ministers and British
officials. He assured the House that Borden and his colleagues
had been placed in possession of all the facts, "... and we
have discussed, with the utmost freedom and confidence, the
action which should be taken and the way of surmounting the
difficulties which obstruct such action." Mr. Churchill said
that a clear distinction had been made between the needs of
the immediate future and the elaboration of a permanent long-
term naval policy, the latter requiring further consideration.
He added that the Canadian representatives had authorized
him to say that they shared this view and that any special
action which the immediate future might require would not
be delayed pending the settlement of a permanent naval
arrangement:

They wish that the aid of Canada shall be an addition to the existing
British programme, and that any step which Canada may take may directly
strengthen the naval forces of the Empire and the margin available tor its
security. And they tell me that the action of the Dominion will not be
unworthy of the dignity and power of Canada.

Finally he said that the Canadian Government's decision
would be announced after the Canadian Ministers had returned
home and laid before their colleagues the results of their
conferences in London. Later in the debate Asquith acknow-
ledged the co-operativeness of Borden and his colleagues, and
stated that it was the duty of the British Government to
respond as far as possible to their obviously reasonable request *
for a voice in determining policy. Arrangements of that sort
could not be made in a day, and he could not say what machin-
ery might be used; but a conscious partnership was desired.
Borden was present in the gallery during these speeches.28

The following week Borden had discussions with Asquith,
Grey, Harcourt, and Walter Long, on various topics including

27 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 359.

28 Hansard, 5th Series, xli, pp. 857-8, 872. Churchill's speech of July 22 is summarized
on pp. 100-101 above.

180

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

the*means of according to the Dominions a voice in determining
imperial foreign policy. He left for Paris on July 27, and while
there he wrote to the Governor General a letter which is
probably an inclusive summary of the discussions up to that
time:

The conferences with the Home Government have on the whole pro-
ceeded satisfactorily. A great deal of discussion has been upon the very
difficult question of representation. It may be that one of our Ministers
without portfolio will become a member of the Imperial Defence Committee
and will live in London part of the year in close touch with the Foreign
office and with the Colonial Secretary. This of course would only be a
temporary expedient until a more carefully prepared system of Empire
organization could be discussed after consultation with all the Dominions.
In the matter of cooperation in defence by active aid we have sharply
distinguished between present grave conditions demanding temporary
assistance and permanent policy. We have been promised a statement
which will present 'an unanswerable case' as to immediate temporary
assistance. . . .

We expect to sail on the 23rd or 30th August. It depends to some
extent on the question of a visit by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill which
has been discussed to some extent. If they should come the negotiations
and discussions will be completed in Canada.29

Borden returned from Paris in time to attend the second
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to which he
was accompanied by Hazen and Doherty. The principal
subject of discussion was Dominion representation. It was
pointed out that the Dominion delegates who had attended the
1 13th meeting of the committee during the imperial conference
of 1911, had unanimously accepted the principles that repre-
sentatives of the Dominions should be invited to attend
meetings of that committee whenever questions affecting them
were being considered, and that a defence committee should
be set up in each Dominion. Asquith's suggestion now was
either that the High Commissioners should attend meetings
whenever questions concerning the Dominions were discussed,
or that Dominion representatives of ministerial rank should
come to London from time to time in order to be present at
such meetings.

Borden replied that either suggestion was good enough in
itself, but that neither went far enough. He pointed out that
Canada was growing in population and in its conception of
what a national spirit demanded. In the very near future,*
therefore, it would be necessary that the Dominion should have J

a direct and immediate voice in foreign policy. Later in the

29 Borden to Duke of Connaught, July 30, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.

181

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

meeting Doherty strongly supported this point of view. As
to naval policy, Borden stated that two questions were being
considered which in Canada had been kept sharply separate.
The first was whether conditions currently affecting the Empire
were of such a character as to justify the Canadian Government
in taking some immediate and effective action. The other was
the problem of a permanent policy. He was anxious that the
Royal Navy should show the flag on both the Canadian coasts
more often than it had been doing recently, and the First Lord
replied that this could be done. Borden did not commit him-
self at this meeting concerning future Canadian naval policy.30

The discussions with the British Ministers were continued
a week later. On August 7:

... I had a long interview with Churchill with respect to the method and
extent of our co-operation in naval defence; and I told him that everything
depended upon the cogency of the statement which he would put forward
as to the emergency. He promised to give the subject his closest personal
attention. The discussion was renewed on the following day . . . with Mr.
Asquith to whom I communicated the substance of my conversation with
Mr. Churchill. Asquith observed that Mr. Churchill was extremely capable
and would be forceful in the preparation of such a statement as we desired.31

On August 13 Borden left London for the north, and on
the following day he and his Ministers inspected Yickers*
shipbuilding yard at Barrow where they saw the battle cruiser
Princess Royal which had just been completed there. He also
visited the Elswick works at Newcastle and John Brown's at
Clydebank. The desirability of encouraging naval and other
kinds of shipbuilding in Canada as part of any permanent
naval policy was prominent in Borden's mind, and the visits
to these great shipyards were undoubtedly undertaken with
this in view.

The First Lord had assured Borden on July 16, that the
Admiralty would make an unanswerable case for an immediate
emergency contribution by Canada. This case would be made
in two separate memoranda, one of which could be published
while the other would be secret.32 During Borden's visit to
Scotland he received from the Admiralty a draft of the piib-
lishable memorandum which seemed to him so inadequate that
he sent it back to the First Lord. "In returning it, I wrote to
him that if this contribution was the best we could expect it

30 Minutes of lWth Meeting, July 31, 1912, Borden Papers, ibid.

:" Borden Memoirs, 1, p. 3(14.

35 Corrected draft of Borden to Churchill, Aug. 28, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.

182

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

would be idle tor him to anticipate any results whatever from
the Government or the people of Canada."33

On August 26 Mr. Churchill sent the secret memorandum,
which had been prepared from data supplied by the War Staff.
Borden was asked to return it with suggestions tor any changes
which he might think desirable:

I wish to check it in its final form, to show it to the Prime Minister and
Sir Edward Grey, and to hold a formal meeting of the Board of Admiralty
upon it, so that it can be in the highest degree authoritative. I will then
have it printed together with some useful appendices and will send you a
dozen copies for use in your Cabinet and among confidential persons ....
If I could be of any use by coming over you have only to send for me and,
if it rests with me, I will come at once. If there is any matter in which the
Admiralty can assist you we are at your service.34

In acknowledging, on August 28, receipt of the secret
memorandum, Borden wrote that:

No doubt you will deal in subsequent memoranda with the other
questions raised sych as the importance and value of docks and harbour
fortifications from the Admiralty standpoint, the best methods of harbour
and coast defence, the arming of merchant steamships, the practicability of
aiding the establishment of shipbuilding in Canada by the method sugges-
ted. These matters more particularly concern the question of permanent
policy which we hope to take up without much delay but which is not so
pressing as the other.35

Immediately before leaving for Canada Borden returned the
draft of the secret memorandum with his suggestions noted on
it, and with the comment that: "The Memorandum seems to
be very thorough and covers the points which were brought up
at our interviews, so far as I can recall them at the moment,
except as suggested in my letter of yesterday."36

On August 29 Borden and his party started on their return
journey, and on September 8 they arrived in Ottawa. There-
after matters went forward without delay. Borden reported on
his visit to Britain in a speech given in Montreal on September
21. The impression of the general naval situation which that
visit had left on his mind is probably revealed in a letter which
he wrote to Sir Charles Tupper on September 25:

We are calling Parliament about the middle of November and doubt-
less there will be keen debate on this great question. Undoubtedly the
conditions confronting the Empire are very grave. Twelve years ago our

33 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 365.

M Churchill to Borden, Aug. 26, 1912, Borden Papers, OX". No. 656.

36 Corrected draft of Borden to Churchill, Aug. 28, 1912, ibid.

36 Borden to Churchill, Aug. 29, 1912, ibid.

183

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

flag was dominant on every sea and in every ocean; today in the North Sea
only. The further development of existing conditions might lead to such
an issue that the British Empire would in effect be manoeuvred out of
existence without the firing of a gun. The action of Canada will be watched
with great interest throughout Europe. Lord Northcliffe told me that our
visit attracted almost as much attention from the Continental as from the
British press.37

About September 28, the Department of the Naval Service
cabled the following enquiry to the Admiralty: "Request you
will report confidentially by telegraph entire cost of latest type
of Battleship and Battle Cruiser built by contract complete
except sea stores." The reply was: "... approximate cost ot
both battleship and cruiser each £2,350,000 including arma-
ment and first outfit of ordnance stores and ammunition."33
A similar request for information was sent through the Gover-
nor General about two weeks later, the reply to which included
the statement that prices were rising, a fact which might
cause the quoted figure to be slightly exceeded.39 On October
5 Borden requested Mr. Churchill to supply him, if possible
before November 7, with specific details regarding the current
and recent naval expenditures, establishments, and program-
mes, of certain countries. It had not been possible to obtain
the desired information from sources available in Canada.40

Copies of the two memoranda which Mr. Churchill had
prepared were forwarded, along with a letter from him dated
September 17. The First Lord said that he had had his Prime
Minister's help in revising the publishable one, and that
Borden might make any use he liked of this memorandum.
Ten printed copies of the secret one were also being sent, and
it was hoped that there would be no need to reprint in Canada.
'The document is one which, as you will realize, might do
harm to international relations if it were to leak out or to get
mislaid."41 Borden replied on October 1 that all the copies
had arrived, and added: "The secret document which I have
read very carefully seems an admirable presentation of the
case."42 Borden lent a copy of the secret memorandum to

37 Borden to Tupper, Sept. 25, 1912, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921".

38 D. Min. to Sec. Admiralty, n.d. (probably Sept. 28); Sec. Admiralty to D. Min., Oct. 5,
1912 (cables): N.S. 1017-1-1 (1).

39 Cables of Oct. 14 and 16, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 657.

40 Borden to Churchill, Oct. 5, 1912, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921".
The countries in question were Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Chile, Holland, Italy,
Japan. Norway, Sweden, and Spain.

41 Churchill to Borden, Sept. 17, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 656.
« Borden to Churchill. Oct. 1, 1912, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 657.

184

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

Laurier, with permission to communicate its contents to those
of his supporters who were Privy Councillors; and this copy
the Leader of the Opposition subsequently returned. It was
agreed between the authorities in Ottawa and those in London
that some of the matter contained in this memorandum might
be publicly used, and a series of letters and cables defined the
extent of such disclosures and settled the form in which they
might be made.

The secret memorandum43 presented a clear and detailed
picture of the apparent threat constituted by the rapidly
growing German Navy and the subsidiary naval forces of the
Triple Alliance, and the resulting concentration of the Royal
Navy in European waters. It had also embodied the
Admiralty's answer to the question of how, in the circum-
stances, Canada could best help:

Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present serious junc-
ture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the
Oversea Dominions of the Crown. She has before now successfully made
head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and the
greatest military Powers: and she has not lost her capacity, even if left
wholly unsupported, of being able by a wise policy and strenuous exertions
to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire. The Admiralty
will not hesitate if necessary to ask next year for a further substantial
increase beyond anything that has at present been announced, with conse-
quent extra additions to the burden of the British taxpayer. But the aid
which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in
ships or money. It will have a moral value out of all proportion to the
material assistance afforded. The failure of Canada at this moment, after
all that has been said, to take any effective step would produce the worst
impression abroad and expose us all to much derision. But any action on
the part of Canada to increase the power of the Imperial Navy, and thus
widen the margins of our common safety, would, on the other hand, be
recognized everywhere as the proof and sign that those who may at any
time be minded to menace any part of the Empire will have to contend with
the united strength of the whole.

On these grounds, not less than from purely naval reasons, it is desir-
able that any aid given by Canada at this time should include the provision
of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science
can build or money supply.

From the point of view of the British Government and of
the Admiralty there were several good reasons for preferring a
contribution to any other form of naval assistance at that time.
The contributed ships would have constituted the most quickly

43 For the text of this hitherto unpublished secret memorandum and the titles of the
appendices which were attached to it, see App. vm. Most, if not all, of the copies which were
sent to Canada are among the Borden Papers, three of them being in O'C. No. 656. The
"publishable" memorandum is Cd. 6513, Pari. Paps., 1912-13, liii.

185

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

and certainly available form of help towards meeting a genuine
threat. They would have strengthened the British Govern-
ment's position in relation to the left-wing members of its own
Party, who were restless in the face of ever-increasing naval
Estimates. The Admiralty had always favoured contributions
as opposed to local navies, and would no doubt have been
pleased to see the principle acted upon even as a temporary
measure. The point which the First Lord had made at the first
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence which the
Canadian Ministers had attended, that a contribution of
battleships from Canada would enable the battle fleet to
receive a needed addition to its strength without muddying
the diplomatic waters, must also have been an important
consideration with the British Government. The principal
argument advanced in the secret memorandum, however, was
probably the one that weighed more heavily than any other.
Although the British and German admiralties were building
against each other in warships of almost every kind, the most
decisive type, and the one which the public everywhere heard
about almost to the exclusion of any other, was the Dread-
nought. The willingly-proffered addition to the Royal Navy
of three of these compelling monsters would probably have
achieved a moral effect which the Admiralty did not exaggerate.

Shortly after the Canadian delegation had returned to
Canada, Borden began discussions with his colleagues on naval
policy. The two Admiralty memoranda were read in Cabinet
immediately after their arrival:

The secret memorandum was most impressive but the publishable
document had not been so well prepared, and it omitted the important
statement that capital ships were required. Following perusal of the docu-
ments, discussion arose as to the advisability of consulting the people by
plebiscite. Monk admitted that the situation was grave and emergent but
was very strong in his opinion that this course should be followed and
Nantel was his echo. The Ontario Ministers, as well as Hazen, Rogers,
Burrell and Roche, were strongly opposed to an appeal to the people.

Although Borden was very anxious to retain him in the
Cabinet, Monk, who was Minister of Public Works, had
formerly taken such a definite stand on the very subject of a
plebiscite that he could not give way. Borden reports that:

On October 14th, I presented to Council a draft of the Naval Aid Bill
which I had previously submitted to White and to Perley. There was about
an hour's discussion which resulted in unanimous approval. Monk, how-
ever, did not utter a word.

186

NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW POLICY

Four days later Borden received Monk's resignation: the
former Minister said, however, that he would not oppose the
government except on the naval issue.44

On November 2 the British Government was asked for an
assurance that, if Parliament should vote the money for a
contribution, and if the time should come when Canada was
prepared to maintain the contributed ships, these would be
transferred to the Canadian Government. Before the assurance
was given the Admiralty asked for and received a promise that
if such a request to transfer the ships were made, sufficient
notice would be given to permit of their place being taken by
new construction.45 At the beginning of November also,
Borden told Mr. Churchill that the Canadian Government
would wish any contributed ships to receive names related to
Canada, and suggested that should three battleships be pro-
vided they might be called respectively Acadia, Quebec, and
Ontario. He also asked that the Admiralty should consider
granting special opportunities for serving in such ships to
Canadian cadets and seamen. The answers were that no
difficulty regarding the names was anticipated; that eight
cadetships annually would be placed at Canada's disposal,
and opportunities afforded as far as possible to serve in the
contributed ships; and that something might also be done
about the more difficult question of seamen.46

The idea of a generous emergency contribution of ships to
the Royal Navy had won the approval of the delegates who
had gone to London, of the Cabinet, and of the Party leaders
in general. Embodied in the Naval Aid Bill, it was now to be
submitted to the wider and final judgment of Parliament.

44 Borden Memoirs, i, pp. 399^00.

« Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec, Nov. 2, and Nov. 7, 1912; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Nov. 6, 1912
(cables): Borden Papers, O'C. No. 657.

*» Borden to Churchill, Nov. 2, 1912; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Nov. 15, 1912;
Churchill to Borden (cable), Nov. 16, 1912; Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Nov. 20, 1912: ibid.

187

Chapter 9

THE NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

HE second Session of the twelfth Parliament opened on
November 21, 1912. The most important single item
in the Speech from the Throne was the following:

During the past summer four members of my government conferred in
London with His Majesty's government on the question of Naval Defence.
Important discussions took place and conditions have been disclosed which
in the opinion of my advisers render it imperative that the effective naval
forces of the Empire should be strengthened without delay. My advisers
are convinced that it is the duty of Canada at this juncture to afford
reasonable and necessary aid for that purpose. A Bill will be introduced
accordingly.1

Replying to the Speech, Laurier expressed the opinion that
Britain was far from being as defenceless as the government
was making out, and alluded to dissension in the Cabinet over
the naval question. 2 Borden has written that:

Shortly after the opening of Parliament ... I learned that some of the
Quebec members were restless with regard to the naval question and would
probably bolt. Thus, on Wednesday, November 27th, I had a meeting of
the French members and explained to them that we proposed to repeal the
Laurier Navy Bill; and I gave them an outline of our permanent policy.
Several of them . . . agreed that the proposals were wise but declared that
they were bound by promises to vote against them. [Six] promised to sup-
port us.3

On December 5, the Prime Minister introduced the Naval
Aid Bill4 in the House of Commons, and set in motion one of
the longest, most implacable, and most famous debates since
Confederation. Promising to avoid a controversial tone,
Borden referred to the increasing power and influence of
[Canada in the Empire, and to the marked evolution o\ intra-
imperial constitutional relations during the preceding half-

1 House oj Commons Debates, 1912-13, i, pp. 2-3.

2 Ibid., p. 28.

3 Borden Memoirs, I, p. 403.

4 No. 21. "A Bill to Authorize Measures for Increasing the Effective Naval Forces of
the Empire." Text in App. ix.

188

Sir Robert Borden

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

century. The. ..problem was to combine co-operation with »
autonomy- Responsibility for imperial defence on the high
seas, hitherto assumed by Great Britain, had necessarily car-
ried with it responsibility for and control of foreign policy.
The enormous increase in the naval strength of the Powers had
imposed a crushing burden upon the British people. 'That
burden is so great that the day has come when either the
existence of this Empire will be imperilled or the young and
mighty dominions must join with the Motherland to make
secure the common safety and the common heritage of all."
When Xireat Britain no longer assumed the sole responsibility
for naval defence, Borden continued, she could no longer
exercise the entire control of foreign policy; and the leaders of
both government and Opposition in Britain had explicitly
accepted this principle./Two years before, he said, he had
announced that if the situation should become grave, and if
he were in power, he would appeal to Parliament and if
necessary to the people to afford aid in the emergency.

Borden explained that he had gone to England after the
last Session to consult the British Government and the Ad-
miralty: some of the information thus obtained was very con-
fidential, but an important part of it would be communicated
to the House. At this point Borden tabled the Admiralty's
publishable memorandum. Continuing, he said that the
British Empire, which was not a great military Power, rested
its defence almost entirely on its navy, the defeat of which
would lay Britain and the Dominions open to invasion by any
great military State. The Royal Navy, which twelve years
before had been predominant in every ocean, was now superior
only in the North Sea; while 160 ships on foreign and colonial
stations had been reduced to 76 since the year 1902. "It
should never be forgotten that without war, without the
firing of a shot or the striking of a blow, our naval supremacy
may disappear; and with it the sole guarantee of the Empire's
continued existence." It was the general naval strength of the
Empire that primarily safeguarded the Dominions.

The government, said the Prime Minister, was not pro-
posing to undertake or begin a system of regular or periodic
contributions. The situation was sufficiently grave, never-
theless, to demand immediate action, and the Admiralty's
advice was that the most_effective emergency aid would take
the form of Dreadnoughts of the latest type. The cost of
these would be approximately £2,350,000 each, and he pro-

189

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

posed to ask Parliament for $35,000,000 with which to provide
three of them. They would be maintained by the British
Government as part of the Royal Navy; they would be at the
disposal of the Admiralty for the common defence of the
Empire; and they could later be recalled to form part of a
Canadian unit of the Royal Navy, in which case they would
of course be maintained by Canada. Special arrangements
would be made to give Canadians the opportunity of serving
as officers in these ships.

Borden went on to ask:

Is there really any need that we should undertake the hazardous and
costly experiment of building up a naval organization especially restricted
to this Dominion when upon just and self-respecting terms we can take
such part as we desire in naval defence through the existing naval organiza-
tion of the Empire, and in that way fully and effectively avail ourselves of
the men and the resources at the command of Canada.

The ships would be constructed in Britain, because no
adequate facilities for building Dreadnoughts existed in
Canada — the additional cost of building them in Canada
would be $\ 2,000,000.

According to my conception, the effective development ot shipbuilding
industries in Canada must commence with small beginnings and in a
businesslike way. I have discussed this subject with the Admiralty, and
they thoroughly realize that it is not to the Empire's advantage that all
shipbuilding facilities should be concentrated in the United Kingdom. I
am assured therefore that the Admiralty are prepared in the early future
to give orders for the construction in Canada of small cruisers, oil-tank
vessels, and auxiliary craft of various kinds .... For the purpose of
stimulating so important and necessary an industry, we have expressed our
willingness to bear a portion of the increased cost for a time at least.

Toward the close of his speech the Prime Minister referred
once more to the need for finding an acceptable basis for co-
operation in the moulding of foreign policy:

I am assured by His Majesty's Government that, pending a final
solution of the question of voice and influence, they would welcome the
presence in London of a Canadian minister during the whole or a portion
of each year. Such minister would be regularly summoned to all meetings
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and would be regarded as one of its
permanent members. No important step in foreign policy would be under- j
taken without consultation with such a representative of Canada. This
seems a very marked advance, both from our standpoint and from that ot
the United Kingdom.

Borden emphasized the complexity of this problem, and
the difficulty of finding a final solution for it. He thought that
it could be solved, and that it was not wise to evade it. "And

190

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

so we invite the statesmen of Great Britain to study with us
this, the rea] problem of Imperial existence." Meanwhile,
however, the skies were filled with clouds and distant thunder,
"and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending
storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster."

At a Liberal caucus held the following day it was decided
without dissent to right the proposed contribution and to
stand out for a Canadian navy and for a larger one than had
been planned in 1910, 5 and when the debate was resumed on
December 12, Laurier led off for the Opposition. He began
by saying that it was the Conservatives who had dragged the
Dominion's naval policy into the zone of contentious politics,
and alluded in passing to the divergent views held by members
of the government. If the Opposition disagreed with Borden's
policy, it was because they believed that their own would
better serve the end which the Prime Minister claimed to
have in view. The Admiralty memorandum had dispelled any
fear that England was in imminent danger, and had officially
revealed that she had been compelled to withdraw her ships
from distant seas in order to concentrate them at home:

In our humble judgment the remedy is this, that wherever, in the
distant seas, or in the distant countries — in Australia, Canada or else-
where— a British ship has been removed to allow of concentration in
F.uropean waters, that ship should be replaced by a ship built, maintained, .
equipped and manned by the young nation immediately concerned ....
This is the Australian policy; this ought to be the Canadian policy.

He deprecated any reliance on the protection of the Monroe
Doctrine, claiming that Cuba had paid a heavy price for
American help. If Britain were really in danger the Prime
Minister might ask for thrice the amount mentioned in the bill,
and they would give it to him; but the xAdmiralty memoran-
dum had revealed nothing new.

Laurier said that the Conservatives had turned against
the Foster policy because of the unholy alliance which they
had formed. The proposed contribution would be large in
money but in nothing else:

You say that these ships will bear Canadian names. That will be the
only thing Canadian about them. You hire somebody to do your work;
in other words, you are ready to do anything except the righting.

The policy in question, Laurier claimed, was a cross
between jingoism and nationalism, designed to meet the diver-

6 Skelton, Life of Laurier, II, p. 398.

191

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

gent views of those who had supported the government. He
said that Borden had given up the policy of a Canadian navy
before he went to England, and had then asked the Admiralty
what form of immediate contribution they would recommend.
The Prime Minister could not properly argue, therefore, that
his policy was what the Admiralty, without restriction, had
recommended. The government had decided against a
Canadian navy, and nobodv could suppose that only one con-
tribution would be made. -Laurier affirmed that the existing
Canadian naval organization was not separatist in tendency;
that Borden's proposal would settle nothing; and that, there
being no emergency, the problem facing them was one which#
'demanded a permanent policy. He understood the Prime
Minister to feel that the adoption of a permanent policy ought
to be postponed until Canada should have a voice in all ques-
tions of peace and war. Joint direction of imperial foreign
policy, however, was a large and difficult question, and action
alcng permanent lines ought not to await its settlement.
Laurier concluded by moving an amendment, the gist of
which was that any measure of Canadian aid in imperial naval
defence which did not carry out a permanent policy of parti-
cipation by ships owned, manned, and maintained by Canada,
and built in the Dominion, would not properly express the
aspirations of the Canadian people; that adequate measures
should be taken as soon as possible to realize the permanent
policy embodied in the Naval Service Act; and that accordingly,
in place of a contribution, two fleet units should be provided,
[_one for each coast.

The Minister of the Naval Service, the Hon. J. D. Hazen,
claimed that Borden was being perfectly consistent in wishing
to carry out the policy which he had enunciated before coming
to power. He said that inasmuch as the proposed contribu-
tion was not a permanent policy, the crux of the matter was
whether or not an emergency existed; and he argued at length
that it did. Spending some time in the field of naval strategy,
he said that the Royal Navy required a large margin of
superiority because an aggressor would strike at the moment
most favourable to himself, and that the German fleet was
obviously being built for the purpose of challenging the naval
supremacy of Britain. The latter country could not survive
defeat at sea; but a- defeat of the German Navy would not be
decisive, inasmuch as in that event Germany would still have
the most powerful army in Europe. Claiming that the pro-

192

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

posed contribution would have the character of a quid pro quo,
the Minister stated that between 1851 and 1901 the Admiralty
had spent $110,000,000 on maintaining warships at Esquimalt
and Halifax. As a Maritimer he expressed particular pleasure
at the government's intention to provide for the revival of a
shipbuilding industry in Canada upon what he considered to
be a sound basis. Throughout his speech Hazen drew heavily
*upon material contained in the two Admiralty memoranda.

In the course of this debate, which from beginning to end
was to cover a period of twenty-three weeks, many other ar-
guments were used. On the government side the core of the
contention was that a real and pressing emergency existed
which ought to be met in the most effective way. Autonomy
had been the watchword of the nineteenth century; partner-
ship should be that of the twentieth. One Member asked,
moreover, whether the Australasian colonies had lost any part
of their autonomy as a result of having contributed to the
Royal Navy. It was said that a separate Canadian navy
meant independence. The Leader of the Opposition was ac-
cused of "sitting on both sides of the fence," and it was sug-
gested that the proposed fleet units were merely a device for
'postponing indefinitely any effective help towards imperial
defence. The British taxpayer was heavily overburdened and
needed help. A single navy could defend the Empire more
effectively and economically than several. The contribution
money would be spent outside the country, but the Liberals
were free traders and should be glad to buy in the cheapest
market. As Canadians were habitually reluctant to go to sea,
it would be impossible to man Canadian warships without
greatly increasing the rate of pay or introducing conscription.
It was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite, as was frequently
being suggested from the Opposition benches, since the public
had rendered its verdict on the issue at the last election. Some
of the arguments from both sides of the House were only
relevant to a programme of recurring contributions, and
several Conservative speakers insisted that their temporary
and permanent policies should be kept separate.

Opposition speakers tended to deny that an emergency
existed, or to minimize its seriousness. It was urged against
the bill that a contribution would subvert the principle of
Dominion autonomy, and be equivalent to paying tribute.
Representation on the Committee of Imperial Defence con-
ferred no real voice in determining imperial foreign policy.

193

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Britain was much wealthier than Canada, and the $35,000,000
in question should be used to develop the Dominion, and ought
not in any case to be spent outside the country. The sug-
gested contribution would afford no relief to the British tax-
payer, lor the three ships would supplement the Admiralty's
long-term programme rather than form part of it. The un-
defended coasts of Canada constituted the emergency which
Borden ought to have found, and a fleet of cruisers and de-
stroyers would be exceedingly useful, even though such ships
could not stand in the line of battle. The Conservatives were
accused of flag-waving and of claiming a monopoly of pa-
triotism, and Borden was charged with inconsistency because
he had favoured a Canadian navy in 1909. The pacifist
argument was used that by making a contribution the Do-
minion would be joining in the march towards the ruin of
civilization through armaments. It was frequently urged
from the Opposition benches that a plebiscite should be held.
One Member opposed the contribution, and added that he was
in no hurry to start a Canadian naval Service either. Hugh
Guthrie, Liberal Member for South Wellington, made the
interesting suggestion that a compromise policy should be
adopted, on which both Parties might unite. He proposed
that two Dreadnoughts, instead of three, should be built in
Great Britain, and that the balance of two fleet units should
be constructed in Canada.

On December 18, 1912, Parliament adjourned until January
14, 1913, when the debate on the Naval Aid Bill was resumed.
On February 11a sub-amendment was introduced to the effect
that Parliamentary consent be postponed until the question
should have been submitted to the electors and approved by
them. Two days later this sub-amendment was defeated by
122 votes to 75. The House then divided on Laurier's pro-
posed amendment, which was defeated, also by 122 to 75.
Shortly afterwards Borden's motion was carried by 115 to 83.
Several of the Quebec Conservatives who had divided against
Laurier's amendment voted against Borden's motion also. On
February 27, an amendment which called for a redistribution
of seats and a general election prior to proceeding further with
the bill, and another to the effect that a verdict should be
sought through a plebiscite, were defeated by 36 and 176
votes respectively. The bill then passed its second reading
by 114 to 84, and on February 28 the House went into com-
mittee.

194

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

Up to this time the discussion on the Naval Aid Bill,
although uncommonly prolonged and taken part in by an
unusually large number of Members, had been a normal Par-
liamentary debate in the sense that the speeches had been
principally motivated by a desire to support or to discredit the
measure in hand by means of relevant and convincing ar-
gument. Soon after the bill went into committee, however,
the Opposition resorted to the tactics of obstruction which are
even older than Parliaments,6 and by March 3 the whole
effort of the Opposition was being devoted to taking up time.

We then entered upon a discussion which involved practically contin-
uous sitting for two weeks. The debate went on, night and day, until
Saturday, March 8th, at two o'clock in the morning. Members on each
side were divided into three relays or shifts and were on duty for eight
hours at a time. We had to adopt unusual precautions because we did
not know at what hour the Opposition might spring division and have a
majority concealed and available .... On Monday, March 10th .... the
debate was resumed and it continued at great length throughout the week
.... On Friday, March 14th, and again on the following day the debate
became so violent as to occasion apprehension of personal conflict .... As
midnight [Friday] approached the Speaker twice had to take the Chair
amid scenes of great disorder.7

The policy of the Opposition during this last and obstruc-
tionist stage of the debate was to discuss every point which
arose or could be introduced, and to discuss each for as long as
possible. Accordingly, the area of strict relevance at this stage
being comparatively narrow, the Chairman's most frequentlv
recurring task was that of calling speakers to order for break-
ing away from the subject. All the familiar methods of par-
liamentary obstruction were used, and the strain grew more
and more prolonged. The Conservatives said as little as
possible, and hoped as they waited that the physical exhaus-
tion of their opponents would open a way for the bill before
too long.

Soon after the bill had reached the committee stage the
Prime Minister had consulted several of his colleagues about
"the probable necessity of introducing closure."8 On March
15 he asked in the House that a reasonable time should be
fixed for the passage of the bill through committee. Borden

6 An instance of one-man obstruction in a debate is cited in Plutarch's life of Caesard
Another is described in one of Cicero's letters: "When it came to Clodius's turn, he wishe
to talk out the day, and he went on endlessly; however, after he had spoken for nearly thre<-*
hours, he was forced by the loud expression of the senate's disgust to finish his speech at last.'*
(Ad Atticum, iv. 2, tr. Shuckburgh).

7 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 413.

8 Ibid.

195

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

states that on April 3 he conferred with Laurier, who admitted
that obstruction was being practised, but was unwilling to
set a time-limit.9 On April 7 Borden again asked for a time-
limit and on April 9 moved that rules of closure be adopted.

In deciding to introduce closure the government had fore-
seen that the Opposition might seek to impose further delay by
offering and debating amendments to the proposed rules. It
was therefore decided in advance to drive these rules through
to an early vote by using the procedure known as the "pre-
vious question." This form of motion precludes, until it has
been decided, all amendment of the main question; and if the
previous question is passed, the original question must be put
to the vote immediately. If the previous question were to be
moved without delay, however, the field would have to be kept
clear of Opposition amendments to the motion for closure. In
order to achieve this second object the Conservatives planned
to invoke Rule 17, which read:

When two or more Members rise to speak, Mr. Speaker calls upon the
Member who first rose in his place; but a motion may be made that any
Member who has risen 'be now heard', or 'do now speak', which motion
shall be forthwith put without debate.

As soon as Borden had introduced his closure motion,
Laurier and Hazen both stood up, and the Speaker recognized
Laurier. Thereupon a Conservative Member moved under
Rule 17 that the Minister of Marine and Fisheries "be now
heard", and the Speaker put the motion which was agreed to
by 105 to 67. Hazen then moved the previous question.
Although the end of this extraordinary debate was more than
a month away, it was now in sight. On April 23 both Hazen's
and Borden's motions were passed, each by 108 to 73. The
debate was resumed on May 6; on May 9 closure was intro-
duced; the bill went through committee next day; and on May
15, by a majority of 101 to 68, the Naval Aid Bill passed its
third reading.10

Senators in Canada are appointed for life by the Governor
General in Council, and in practice new appointments are
always made from among the supporters of the Party in power
at the moment. It was therefore inevitable, in view of the
long Liberal tenure of office from 1896 to 1911, that in the
spring of 1913 the Senate should contain a large Opposition

9 Ibid., p. 415.

10 This prolonged debate is contained in House of Commons Debates, 1912-13, i-v incl.

196

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

majority. The Naval Aid Bill was introduced in the Upper
House on May 20 by Senator J. A. Lougheed, the government
leader. In the course of a long speech Lougheed reviewed the
whole story of Canadian naval policy since 1909, and presented
his arguments in support of the bill. Sir George Ross, the
Liberal leader, followed Lougheed. Ross claimed that both
Parties had the same object and differed only as to the best
means of reaching it. He said that the Naval Service Act of
1910, if properly used, would achieve all that the bill before
them would do for the defence of the Empire, and much more.
He suggested that the government should withdraw the Naval
Aid Bill, and that a supplementary Estimate should be sub-
mitted calling for ten or fifteen millions to be devoted to the
speedy construction of battleships wherever they could be
built. These ships could be completed by yearly grants under
the Naval Service Act, in the customary way. A separate bill
was not required. Ross listed his objections to the bill, in-
cluding the opinion that the three proposed Dreadnoughts
would be dead armour plate, "as inanimate as the dry bones
that Ezekiel saw in which no breath of life existed." As might
be expected, the arguments used during the Senate debate had
already, in nearly all cases, seen service in the House of Com-
mons. On May 29, by a vote of 51 to 27, the Naval Aid Bill
was defeated in the Senate.11

Had the proposed Canadian Dreadnoughts been author-
ized late in 1912, or in the spring of 1913, they would have
been fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class. The five
ships of this extraordinarily successful class which were
actually built were the Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Malaya^
Bar ham, and Valiant. The Malaya was a gift from the
Federated Malay States. They served throughout the First
World War, and four of them were present at Jutland where
they stood head and shoulders above the multitude like Saul
the son of Kish. All of them likewise served in the Second
World W7ar, the Warspite with unusual distinction.

While the Canadian debate was going on, the use which
the Admiralty intended to make of the proposed Canadian
battleships was made public by the First Lord. Borden had
been consulted in advance, and had strongly approved of the
"inspiring proposal." Mr. Churchill accordingly included the
following passage in a speech in the House of Commons on

11 Debates of the Senate, 1912-13.

197

NAVAL SERVICE OE CANADA

March 26, 1913. He said that Canada would always retain
the right to recall the ships after giving reasonable notice, and
continued:

We propose to form them with the 'Malaya', and if agreeable to the
Dominions concerned with the 'New Zealand', into a new squadron of
five ships of high uniform speed, to be called the Imperial squadron, which
would be based on Gibraltar, and from that station could easily reach any
portion of the British Empire in a shorter time than any European force of
equal power could move. From that station it would be possible for such a
squadron to reach ETalifax in five days, Quebec in six, Jamaica in nine, the
South American coast in twelve, Cape Town in thirteen, Alexandria in
three, Sydney in twenty-eight, New Zealand in thirty-two, Hong Kong in
twenty-two, and Vancouver in twenty-three days, and the Channel in a
very much shorter time. Our intention is that this squadron should, as
opportunity offers, cruise freely about the British Empire, visiting the
various Dominions, and showing itself ready to operate at any threatened
point at home or abroad. The Dominions will be consulted by the Ad-
miralty on all movements of this squadron not dominated by military con-
siderations, and special facilities will be given to Canadians, Australians,
South Africans, and New Zealanders to serve as men and officers in the
squadron. In this way, a true idea will be given of a mobile Imperial
squadron of the greatest strength and speed patrolling the Empire, showing
the flag, and bringing really effective aid wherever it may be needed. The
squadron could, of course, be strengthened from time to time by further
capital ships, or by fast cruisers, if any of the Dominions thought fit.

Side by side with this the Dominions will be encouraged by the
Admiralty to develop the necessary naval bases, dockyards, cruisers, local
flotillas, or other ancillary craft, which would enable the Imperial squadron
to operate for a prolonged period in any particular threatened theatre to
which it might be sent.12

That the proposed contribution by Canada had attracted
considerable attention in German official circles is attested by
numerous references to it in the published records of the
German Foreign Office. In August, 1912, the German Am-
bassador in London wrote as follows to the Chancellor in
Berlin:

In addition to domestic politics, the attitude of the 'Dominions' is a
factor in the naval question. Using the rallying-cry 'the Motherland is
in peril', they wish to consolidate those huge territories which at present
are united so loosely with England, and to persuade them to contribute
towards building ships. Mr. Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, has
been here for weeks with various members of his Cabinet. He is accorded
the honours of a great personage. He has already promised to provide
ships; but he makes stipulations. Membership in the Committee of
Imperial Defence, a body which has existed for some years and on which
the representatives of the Dominions sit in an advisory capacity, no
longer satisfies him. He wants the Dominion to have a decisive voice in.

12 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Mar. 19, 1913; Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (draft cable),
Mar. 22, 1913: Borden Papers," Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921"; Hansard, 5th Series, l, p. 1762.

198

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

the deliberations which decide peace and war. It is not certain whether?
an imperial Parliament or some other arrangement is contemplated. TV/
such terms the English Government will hardly agree.13

Some months later, when Borden had announced his policy
in the House of Commons, the German naval attache in
London reported:

It must be assumed that Mr. Borden's bill to place three warships of
the newest and largest type at the disposal of the Motherland, will be
passed in the Canadian Parliament .... It will now have to be reckoned
that the three Canadian ships, and the Malay ship, are a net addition to
the programme of construction which was announced in March As-
suming that the Canadian funds are made available at once, it is possible
that the Estimates for 1913-14 will provide for more than five new ships,
so as to strengthen the fleet as quickly as possible.14

A tew days later Zimmermann, the Undersecretary of
State at the Wilhelmstrasse, suggested in a memorandum that:
'The impending grant of three Dreadnoughts by Canada — a
consequence of our latest navy law — seems to be excellent
material for agitation."15 After the defeat of Borden's project
in the Senate, the attache said in his next report that ". . . the
British Admiralty have been deprived indefinitely of the
windfall of three battleships which they had hoped for."16

In October 1913, the German charge d'affaires in London
reported :

In Canada the Party warfare still rages over the question of whether
a Canadian fleet should be built and stationed in the coast waters on the
Atlantic and Pacific, or whether the fleet of the Motherland should be
strengthened by means of single ships .... It has been noted here that
Sir Wilfrid Laurier was able to argue against his opponent Borden at an
election meeting, that the serious emergency which Borden had advanced
as the principal reason why Canada ought to bear part of the cost of the
English fleet, simply did not exist. In fact, considering the relatively
small amount of new German naval construction, and the steady improve-
ment in the relations between the two countries, it is difficult even tor a
Winston Churchill to persuade the colonies to believe in his fiction of a
seriously threatened English World Empire.17

A month later the naval attache wrote:

It is doubtful whether there will be any more gifts like the Malaya.
The naval policy of the self-governing colonies tends . . . more and more
in the direction of establishing small fleets for themselves. This develop-

13 Von Marschall to Bethmann Hollweg, Aug. 5, 1912, Crosse Politik, xxxi, p. 241.

14 Report by Capt. von Muller, Dec. 8, 1912, ibid., xxxix, p. 3.

15 Memo, by Zimmermann, Dec. 14, 1912, ibid., p. 6.

16 Report by von Muller, June 20, 1913, ibid., p. 39.

17 Kiihlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, Oct. 21, 1913, ibid., p. 58.

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ment is a very slow one which takes place outside European waters, and in
comparing England's naval strength in Europe with that of Germany it
may be ignored.18

Borden had kept on resolutely in his attempt to obtain
the enactment of the Naval Aid Bill, until the defeat of that
measure in the Senate. To a suggestion privately made late
in March 1913, that he withdraw the bill and announce forth-
with a permanent policy calling for a Canadian navy, together
with the development of bases and shipyards, Borden replied
that the government could not withdraw the bill in face of
"the unworthy obstruction which is being practised by the
Opposition."19 The eventual defeat of the bill did not cause
the Prime Minister to give up hope for the success of his pro-
ject. On June 1 he asked Mr. Churchill to consider the prac-
ticability of having the three ships laid down immediately by
the British Government, on the Canadian Government's
assurance that before their completion it would introduce
into the Dominion Parliament a bill to provide the means of
paying for them. The British Government, however, felt
that such an arrangement "would be open to criticism in both
countries as seeming to go behind the formal decision of the
Canadian Parliament and that we have no right at present to
assume that Senate's vote could be reversed." Both parties
must feel perfectly free to deal with the future. The First
Lord added that the Canadian ships would have been ready
for battle in the third quarter of 1915, and that in order to
maintain the battle fleet at the required strength, orders
would be given to lay down the last three ships of the 1914-15
programme at once instead of in the following March as had
been prescribed. This acceleration would effectively safe-
guard the imperial naval position for another six months,
during which time some further discussions could, if desired,
take place.20

During his speech introducing the naval Estimates on
March 26, 1913, the First Lord had set up a theoretically
separate strategic function for contributed battleships. Ac-
cording to this definition they would meet the world-wide
requirements of the British Empire, while the battle fleet

18 Report by von Muller, Nov. 30, 1913, ibid., p. 65. Other references to Borden's
policy will be found in Grosse Politik, xxxix, pp. 6n., 13, 33, 34, 66, 81, 82, 91.

19 V. E. Mitchell to Borden (telegram), Mar. 24, 1913; reply (letter), same date: Borden
Papers, O'C. No. 658.

20 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (draft cable), June 1, 1913; reply, June 4, 1913: Borden Papers,
"Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921".

200

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

provided by the United Kingdom would be more particularly
concerned with the defence of that country.21 This strate-
gically unconvincing formula was advanced to meet the
objection that if the Admiralty's sixty per cent margin was
adequate the Dominion ships would be redundant. It was
also an argument that could be used to meet the German
claim that they would be obliged to build to offset any Do-
minion contributions, and Canadian expressions of a pre-
ference that any contributions should actually strengthen
imperial defence rather than merely relieve the British tax-
payer. Because of this doctrinal commitment, the last-cited
and subsequent communications referred to a possible Cana-
dian contribution as being earmarked for special imperial
requirements.

On June 25, Borden gave Mr. Churchill some reasons why
the obstructive tactics of the Opposition had not been coun-
tered by dissolving Parliament, and said that the failure to
reach any compromise with the Liberals in the Senate had been
due to Laurier's insistence, backed by a threat to resign, on
complete rejection of the bill. Borden added that if three
ships were laid down in place of the unordered Canadian ones
it would be desirable that they should be of the same character,
class, and fighting value, as those which his government had
proposed to build. He himself could not visit Britain; but
W. T. White, the Minister of Finance, was planning to go
there shortly, and would be authorized to discuss the whole
situation informally and confidentially, in order to facilitate
future developments along the lines that had been suggested. 22
In the middle of the summer he cabled Mr. Churchill:

We firmly adhere to our intention of providing three capital ships. I
cannot at present definitely state method we shall pursue. My own
opinion strongly inclines to insertion of substantial sum in estimates but
there are political difficulties which I hope to overcome but which render
consultation with colleagues imperative before final conclusion is reached.23

Two months later the Canadian Government's intentions
had assumed the following form:

After discussion with my colleagues we are unanimous in opinion that
proposals of last session should be pressed to conclusion by methods most
likely to ensure successful result. Unless more satisfactory and effective
method can be devised before our session opens on eighth January we

21 Hansard, 5th Series, l, p. 1761.

22 Borden to Churchill, June 25, 1913, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921."

23 Confirmed in Borden to Churchill, Aug. 4, 1913, ibid.

201

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

propose to include in general estimates, or to present in a separate estimate,
an item of ten or fifteen million dollars for increasing effective forces of
empire. We shall explain to Parliament that this item will be appro-
priated to construction of three battleships or battle cruisers which will be
commenced immediately but which cannot be completed until after
general election. We shall further point out that if present government is
again returned to power at that election the three ships will be placed at
the disposal of His Majesty for common defence of Empire until recalled
upon notice and that if we go out of office after election the new government
can utilize them for the purpose of its policy announced by Laurier last
session. I am hopeful but not absolutely confident that Senate will pass
such an estimate. If necessary to secure passage we would agree to reduce
number of ships to two and appropriate one third of proposed total expen-
diture to harbour and coast defence. Meantime I shall be very glad to
have your observations and suggestions.24

By the end of the year, however, and with the beginning
of the Session close at hand, the government had decided not
to proceed with the contribution project in the immediate
future. Two communications to the First Lord, dated
December 30 and 31 respectively, suggest that for some
reason Borden and his colleagues were less confident than
formerly that the Senate could be induced to pass any measure
which would satisfy them. Negotiations with Senator Ross
were being conducted at this time, but according to Borden
the government doubted the Senator's ability to make his
wishes effective. The two messages also indicate that the
Canadian Government was disturbed by the reduced em-
phasis which the Admiralty was apparently placing on battle-
ships. These considerations, and there may have been others
as well, had undermined the government's earlier purpose to
introduce a contribution measure in the coming Session of
Parliament.25

Soon afterwards Borden gave expression to an idea which
was to remain in his mind thereafter as containing perhaps the
only practicable solution for his difficulty until the moment
when the First World War lowered the curtain upon the
whole episode. On January 10, 1914, he ended a cablegram
to Mr. Churchill with the sentence: "It is just possible that
before end of Session we may secure majority in Senate."26
This statement derived its meaning from three facts. Most
Canadian Senators are elderly men, and the death-rate of the
Senate is therefore high. The Borden government would

24 Administrator to Col. Sec. (cable), Oct. 16, 1913, ibid.

25 Borden to Churchill (cable), Dec. 30; letter, Dec. 31, 1913: ibid.

26 Borden to Churchill (cable), Jan. 10, 1914, ibid.

202

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

follow the unbroken precedent by having members of its own
Party appointed to fill all vacancies that might occur in the
Upper House. Section 26 of the British North America Act
provided that on the recommendation of the Governor
General three or six additional senatorships might be created
and filled.27 x^t this time a redistribution bill was being con-
sidered, and in connection with it a few months later the
House approved an Address to His Majesty praying for an
amendment to the British North America Act which would
create twenty-four additional seats in the Senate.28 The
redistribution, however, was not carried out during this period,
and at no time does Borden appear to have thought of it as a
means of removing the obstacle in the way of his immediate
naval policy.

When the naval Estimates for 1914-15 were being compiled
in London, the First Lord cabled to Borden that the Ad-
miralty was proposing to antedate the construction of two
more battleships "to strengthen margin for defence Empire
apart from United Kingdom thus securing year more for
Canada to act." He explained that in the Cabinet, however,
there was considerable opposition to taking this course, and
added:

I should welcome telegram restating intention of your Government
and prospect of effective action being taken within twelve months to provide
either three ships or alternatively two ships and other smaller vessels.
Deeply anxious no step here should hamper your policy and chance of
success. Conditions stated Admiralty Memorandum unchanged and
British declared programme will be regularly executed.29

Borden replied as follows:

From our point of view further acceleration as suggested seems much
the best course. As repeatedly declared we are determined to provide the
three ships and we confidently believe that at the latest we can do so next
session. Any new departure which might neutralize declarations in Ad-
miralty Memorandum would of course strongly influence public opinion
here and might seriously hamper our action. Liberal majority of forty

27 "On August 31st [1913], I [conferred] with Lord Haldane .... [with whom] I discussed
the naval question, and the possibility of making appointments to the Senate under Section
26 of the British North America Act. This had previously been the subject of a conference
with Mr. Asquith while we were in London." {Borden Memoirs, i, 379).

28 Ibid., pp. 433-6.

29 Churchill to Borden (cable), Jan. 30, 1914, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-
1921". Mr. Churchill has recorded his difficulties at this time, which were occasioned by strong
opposition to increased naval expenditure: "There followed [after the end of November 1913]
nearly five months of extreme dispute and tension, during which Naval Estimates formed the
main and often the sole topic of conversation at no less than fourteen full and prolonged
meetings of the Cabinet .... By the middle of December it seemed to me certain that I
should have to resign." (Churchill, World Crisis, pp. 181-187.) See also p. 102 above.

203

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

nine in senate when we assumed office has already been reduced to twenty
one by subsequent vacancies and new appointments. Some Liberal
senators openly deplore Senate's action in defeating so many of our im-
portant measures and all of them are becoming alarmed at evidence of
popular agitation for elective senate.30

An appreciation of the naval situation at that moment
was sent to Borden by Mr. Churchill in March:

The Navy Estimates have been, as I telegraphed to you, satisfactorily
settled. They reach the enormous total of S\x/2 millions.31 Approximately
half a million of this charge is due to the acceleration of two battleships
to cover the position in the Mediterranean and generally, pending the
settlement of a Canadian naval policy. .This will secure a year's more
breathing space in which Canada could renew her proposals. Meanwhile,
however, time is passing and naval science developing. It is possible
that it may be more convenient to you, should you be able to act next
year, to build two capital ships and convert the third into cruisers or
other craft. If so, the Admiralty would certainly approve such a decision.
The dangers to which the capital ship is exposed increase continually. Our
strength in the line of battle as against Germany, thanks to our exertions,
is very great. We could certainly furnish you with good reasons for
making such a change in respect of one of the capital ships, if such ideas
commended themselves to you.32

Borden continued to await the time when control of the
Senate would pass to his Party, and in the meanwhile he took
a tentative step towards hastening that day. On July 13,
1914, he wrote the following letter to the High Commissioner
for Canada in London:

In reply to your letter of the 24th June respecting the question of a
naval conference, I entirely agree with you that it would be best to postpone
further consideration of the subject until the next Imperial Conference.
If a naval conference should be held before we obtain control of the Senate
our position would be unsafe and unsatisfactory. It may be that we shall
have control of the Upper Chamber by the end of next session, but that,
of course, is quite uncertain.

At present our representation in the Senate consists of 37 Conserva-
tives, including vacancies, as compared with 50 Liberals. When the
number stands 42 to 45 we may find it desirable to forward a recom-
mendation under section 26 of the British North America Act. You
might informally sound Mr. Harcourt as to what their probable action
would be upon such a recommendation.

During Mackenzie's administration the Imperial Government declined
to act for the reason that the appointment of six Senators would not give
*

30 Borden to Churchill (cable), Feb. 2, 1914, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years
1912-1921."

31 See App. iv.

32 Churchill to Borden, Mar. 6, 1914, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921."

204

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

control, but that reason would disappear under the conditions which I
have mentioned.33

This initiative was extinguished a very short time after-
wards, together with the whole emergency contribution
project; for three weeks later the warships of the Royal Navy
were steaming to their war stations.

It has already been pointed out that Borden had had two
naval policies. One of these had been designed to meet a
specific emergency and was therefore both urgent and tem-
porary in character. The second policy was intended to
provide a permanent instrument of Canadian and imperial
defence. It would necessarily take considerably longer to
mature than the other, and was regarded by Borden as beings
less pressing. To find the origin of this policy for the long*^
future, and a possible source of the contribution project also,
it is necessary to go back to the earliest weeks of the Borden
administration.

In the fall of 1911 Sir William White, who had been
Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty from 1885
to 1902 and the most widelv-known naval architect of his dav,
visited Canada for the purpose of inspecting the Grand Trunk
Railway of which he was a director.34 While in Ottawa on
November 7 he called on Borden, and the two men discussed
the question of Canadian naval policy, the Prime Minister
asking the naval expert lor his advice. Several weeks later
White sent Borden a memorandum which recapitulated and
possibly amplified the elements of their previous conversation.
White advised that help afforded by Canada in the naval
defence of the Empire should be given in four ways. He sug-
gested that the Canadian Government arrange for the sub-
vention and arming as auxiliary cruisers of the great steam-
ships that carried mail and passengers to and from the ports
of the Dominion on both coasts. Only ships with a speed of
eighteen knots or more should be subsidized, and the plans of
all new ships should be approved by the naval advisers of the
government. These armed merchant cruisers would be used
to protect commerce on the trade routes leading to and from
the principal Canadian seaports. They would operate for
the most part in the approaches to the terminal ports on both
the Canadian coasts, and if it were thought desirable they

33 Borden to Perley, July 13, 1914, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 660.

34 For an account of White's career see Manning, Life of Sir William White.

205

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

might also be employed further afield. White considered that
a Canadian naval force should have some protected cruisers,
and that the construction of these might well be associated
with a general scheme for developing a modern shipbuilding
industry in the Dominion. He added, however, that it would
take a considerable time before Canada could build warships
both rapidly and cheaply. In making plans White thought
that war with the United States need not be considered. He
did not agree that Dominion naval forces ought to include
battleships:

In my judgment the construction ot battle-ships may well remain in
the hands of the mother country for a long time to come. /Any assistance
in that direction which may be rendered by Dominions beyond the Seas
will best take the form of financial contributions to necessary expenditure
on building and maintaining such a fleet.

.This excerpt may conceivably contain the origin of Borden's
contribution project.

On August 26, 1912, during his visit to England for the
purpose of consulting the Admiralty, Borden saw White again
and asked him for a second memorandum which would reflect
the situation as it then existed. This memorandum, which
was dated September 4, was intended to be read in conjunction
with the first. At Borden's suggestion, no doubt, it drew a
distinction between permanent and temporary or emergency
programmes. For a permanent policy, the products of which
the Canadian Government would own and control, retaining
at the same time complete freedom of action, White again
made four recommendations. The feature of his scheme
which he represented as being the most important and urgent,
was the provision of armed merchant cruisers as suggested in
the earlier paper. Naval bases well equipped to supply vessels
of the Royal Navy should be maintained on the Atlantic and
Pacific. Means for defending these bases should also be pro-
vided. The fourth suggestion was that arrangements be made
for training officers and men. If it were desired in addition
to make some special and temporary provision in order to
help in meeting the German naval threat, White suggested
that it could best take the form of a gift to Great Britain of
four to six million pounds, representing the cost of two or
three battleships. The moral effect of such evidence of
imperial solidarity would be very great.

35 White to Borden with enclosure, Dec. 28, 1911, and Sept. 4, 1912, Borden Papers,
O'C. No. 634.

206

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

The need to have a permanent programme ready when the
time came was present in Borden's mind from the moment
when the government had decided to commit itself to a non-
recurring contribution. The Prime Minister had no knowledge
of naval affairs, and he probably trusted White and was glad
to have had the advice, independently of the Admiralty, of a
very outstanding naval expert. He also documented himself
by obtaining memoranda on various aspects of the problem
from the Admiralty and the Naval Service. /'His permanent ^
policy had not been developed in detail when the First World
War began. Nor, in view of Borden's concept of imperial
relations, could it have achieved finality until the question of
according to the Dominion a satisfactory share in the control
of imperial policy should have been settled in one way or^
another. , -The direction in which he intended to set out, how-
ever, is clear enoughs In March 1913 he formulated his ideas
on the subjecFTor Mr. Churchill's information:

As Canada may eventually desire to establish and maintain one or
more fleet units in eo-operation with and in close relation to an Imperial
navy and as the three ships [Canada's proposed contribution] might be
required to form part of such unit or units I would suggest that you should
allude to their possible recall upon reasonable notice. We shall probably
announce later in this session that, pending consideration of the great and
difficult problems attending the thorough co-operation of the Dominion
in matters affecting Imperial defence and foreign policy, Canada proposes
to undertake certain measures of defence which while primarily designed
for the protection of her own shores and of her interests in contiguous
waters will nevertheless be of importance from an Imperial standpoint.
It is anticipated that this will be undertaken upon following lines. First,
provision of dry docks useful for commercial purposes as well as for those
of Admiralty. Second, establishment of naval bases and fortification of
ports and harbours where they are situate, also defence of such ports and
harbours by submarines, torpedo craft, etc. Third, establishment and
gradual extension of shipbuilding and repair plants. Fourth, training of
officers in naval college and of seamen in training ships. Fifth, subsidizing
of swift and modern merchant steamships useful for scouting and other
purposes, equipment of such ships with necessary guns and fittings and
manning thereof by trained seamen. Sixth, gradual extension of Fishery
Protection Service by addition of light cruisers manned by trained men
and under naval discipline which while specially useful for primary purpose
of protecting Fisheries will also be effective and available in time of war.36

An important ingredient in Borden's whole concept of
naval policy was the idea that that policy should be so directed
as to encourage the growth of a .shipbuilding industry in**
Canada. He Tiad discussed the question with Mr. Churchill

36 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (draft cable), Mar. 22, 1913, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes,
Years 1912-1921".

207

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

in 1912 in London. Shortly after his return to Canada he
reminded the First Lord of the earlier conversations, and
pointed to the dilemma that while a great weakness in the
contribution plan was that all the money would be spent out-
side Canada, on the other hand battleships could not within a
reasonable time be built in the Dominion. He reminded the
First Lord of the possibility, which they had discussed in
London, that the Admiralty might build some small warships
in Canada, the additional cost being divided between the two
governments. The First Lord replying recognized the im-
portance of Borden's idea, and said that any practical scheme
for the co-operation of the Admiralty in carrying it out would
command his support. The main difficulty lay in the high
degree of expert knowledge and experience required for the
efficient building of modern warships. He assured Borden
that if the prices were reasonable, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances including the willingness of the Canadian Govern-
ment to share the extra cost, and if the time required for con-
struction was not excessive, the Admiralty would be willing
to place some orders in Canada. The most suitable types of
vessel with which to inaugurate the scheme would be light
cruisers, tankers, and small auxiliary craft. The Admiralty,
would remain wholly responsible for design and lor super-
vising construction. The details could be worked out later
and should not present any difficulty.37 'This understanding
lapsed with the demise of the Naval Aid Bill of which it had
been a corollary.

One more plan which was destined to end abortively was
set on foot before the final curtain descended. On March 6,
1914, Mr. Churchill wrote suggesting that a naval officer of
high rank should be sent to Canada to discuss with the gov-
ernment matters relating to emergency and permanent naval
policies. He thought that such a conference would strengthen
the government's hand for future action. The First Lord said
that if Borden favoured the idea he would select for the mis-
sion Sir John Jellicoe, whom he described as "the first of
British sailors at the present time." Jellicoe was Second Sea
Lord, and had been chosen to take command of the Home
Fleets at the end of the year. After several months' delay
Borden replied that Jellicoe's proposed visit would be very
welcome; and twelve days before war began he cabled a formal

" Borden to Churchill, Oct. 3, 1912, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921";
Borden to Churchill, Oct. 5, 1912, O'C. No. 657; Churchill to Borden, Nov. 4, 1912, O'C.
No. 653.

208

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

request that a naval officer "of adequate experience and capa-
city" should be sent. Jellicoe's experience was destined to
become considerably more adequate before he actually came
on his well-known mission to Canada more than five years
afterwards.38

With the declaration of war on Germany the Admiralty's
objections to publishing the secret memorandum disappeared.
A week after that declaration Mr. Churchill cabled to Borden
asking for his consent to the publication of the document with
a few omissions. For obvious reasons Borden strongly
favoured the idea; but Asquith and the Colonial Secretary
were opposed, and the memorandum was not published.39

The discussions and debates which took place from 1909
were of basic importance in the history of Canadian naval
policy. In the deliberations on the Foster resolution, and
Laurier's amendment to it, in the spring of 1909, it had
quickly become apparent that the leaders on both sides were
anxious to avoid party conflict in the field of naval policy. This
they found it comparatively easy to do, for few Members had
any preconceived motives for reluctance to fpllow their
leaders. There are many matters of which the printed page
or the spoken word can only reproduce a lifeless simulacrum.
The foreign offices and war staffs of Europe were not of much
interest to Canadians, and competition in armament, though
it was described in the newspapers, remained largely unreal
to a people most of whom had never seen a battery or a war-
ship. Accordingly, when the British Ministers spoke their
warning words in the spring of 1909, many Canadians felt the
emotions which are normally induced by an apparent threat
to the common safety; but very few possessed any detailed
knowledge bearing on that problem, any preconceived opinions
as to how it should be solved, or much sustained interest in
the subject. To use an often-quoted phrase, Canadians were^
"more interested in box-cars than in battleships." A cor-
respondent of Borden's who had been sounding public opinion
throughout the west, reported in the fall of 1910 that:

I did not find any interest in the Navy question except in parts of
British Columbia where the population is quite English and direct contribu-
tion was strongly favored. The general attitude in the West seemed to
be towards the Navy about what it is towards the I.C.R.; if the East
wanted it then the West ought to have the Hudson Bay railway or some-
thing else as an offset.40

38 Correspondence in Borden Papers, O'C. No. 660.

39 Correspondence, ibid.

40 I. W. King to Borden, Oct. 28, 1910, Borden Papers, Annex to Memoir Notes No. 3.

209

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Neither of the political Parties had as yet committed them-
selves to attitudes or dogmas relating to naval defence, with
the important exception of the stand which Laurier had con-
sistently taken at the imperial conferences that any future ef-
fort should take the form of a separate Canadian naval force.
The makers of policy at this time, therefore, had an almost
clean slate to write upon. A people seldom achieves a greater
unanimity concerning any public question than Canadians
then showed in regard to naval policy; but this high degree of
concurrence was partly due, as later events were to show, to
the fact that they had not as yet reflected much upon the*
subject.

The debate on the Naval Service Bill saw the two Parties
begin to diverge from each other, and thenceforth, down to
August 1914, the naval policy of, the Dominion remained a
bone of Party contention. The imperialists in the Conserva-
tive Party wanted a more ambitious policy, one which would
emphasize imperial defence more strongly, and one by which
Canada's share in the common defence would find expression
through or in the closest possible integration with the Royal
Navy. Opposition critics no doubt attacked the bill because
it was a government measure; but most of them probably did
so on less partisan grounds as well.

^TThe precise origin of the Naval Aid Bill is uncertain! The
idea of a contribution had become commonplace in Canada
long before Borden went to England in 1912; indeed he had
himself, during the naval debate of 1909, foreshadowed a
possible need to adopt such a policy. In 1910 the secondary
and conditional idea which he had enunciated the year before*
was converted into a primary and absolute one. In 1912 he
may have suggested to the Admiralty the idea of contributing
battleships; in which case the father of the idea may have been
one of the government's supporters, or Sir William White, or
Borden himself. More probably Borden asked the Admiralty
what would be the best means of giving quick and effective
aid; but the idea of a contribution of battleships was already
exceedingly familiar to him. If he merely sought the Ad-
miralty's advice, Mr. Churchill's words during the first
meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence were probably
the formal statement of the Admiralty's opinion which Borden
had already been given unofficially. ./The origin of Borden's
contribution idea owes its obscurity largely to the fact that
in Britain and the Dominions the air had long been filled with

210

NEW POLICY MISCARRIES

the three related notions of a German naval threat, Dominion
contributions, and battleships.

The close relations that existed between the Liberal First
Lord and the Conservative Prime Minister throughout the
whole period when the contribution policy was under con-
sideration rested upon mutual confidence and a common aim.
Mr. Churchill's undisguised desire to see Borden's policy car-
ried out was largely based, no doubt, on motives that he shared
with the other members of the British Government. In addi-
tion, however, it is probable that he would have welcomed a
contribution from Canada, both as an imperialist and also
because it would have redounded greatly to his credit as First
Lord. He realized that the contribution was a temporary one
only, and his full acceptance of this fact seems to be suggested
in a letter that he wrote to Borden at the end of 1913. In it he
said that a current attempt to arrange a "holiday" in naval
building could probably be facilitated by Borden: "What I
ask is this. In introducing yr. proposal, could you say that
these are emergency proposals, distinct from the permanent
naval policy of Canada."41 The unofficial correspondence
between these two men, which was published only in part, was
unusual and drew considerable criticism at the time.

During its pre-war tenure of office the Borden government
had not implemented the Naval Service Act. It had not set
on foot its own intermediate policy, still less a permanent one.
Nor had it been able to start its immediate project, born of
the German naval threat and a fear of war. When this fear
became a reality, therefore, there were no Canadian Bristols
and destroyers, nor fleet units, nor contributed Queen Eliza-
beths, either built or building.

*l Churchill to Borden, Dec. 19, 1913, Borden Papers,"Naval Notes, Years 1912-1921."

211

Chapter 10

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

EVER since the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 it had been
evident that success in war would thenceforth depend
upon systematic preparation which would take care of
every predictable detail. The Committee of Imperial Defence
in Great Britain had arranged in 1911 for the compiling of a
"War Book," a comprehensive programme of measures to be
taken by each Department of the government in the event of a
serious international crisis or of war. Each of these programmes
was co-ordinated with the others. A first set of steps was
preliminary in character, while a second set was to be taken
after the actual outbreak of war. Of the first set of steps a
"Precautionary Stage" would reflect strained relations with a
certain Power or Powers, and the next stage was to be ushered
in by the sending of the "Warning Telegram" to all concerned.
The second set of steps would be initiated on the decision to
declare war.1

A suggestion that a War Book should be compiled in
Canada was made in the summer of 1912 by Lieut. R. M.
Stephens, R.N., who was attached to N.S.H.Q.; and the Prime
Minister, during his visit to England the same year, had asked
the Committee of Imperial Defence for information regarding
the British War Book. The Overseas Defence Committee
accordingly prepared a memorandum on the subject which
reached Canada early in 1913; but nearly a year passed before
anything more was done. On January 12, 1914, an Inter-
departmental Conference, at which the Naval Service was
represented by its Deputy Minister, met for the purpose of-
starting the preparation of a Canadian War Book, which was
to include drafts of all telegrams, Orders in Council, and other
paper instruments that would be needed to effect the various
precautionary measures. Arrangements were included for
establishing an examination service at certain ports, detaining
enemy shipping, inspection of outward-bound ships to prevent

1 Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, i, pp. 18-22; see also Asquith, Genesis of the
Mar, p. 118.

212

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

the exporting of contraband, and a strict control of wireless
stations with censorship of messages sent out from them.

Rapid progress was made, and before the end of July, with
dramatic timeliness, the War Book was ready. On July 29 the
completed War Book arrived at N.S.H.Q. The Deputy
Minister was sitting at his desk preparing to sign it, when the
telephone rang. It was a call from Government House to say
that a coded signal from the Admiralty had just arrived. The
message was sent for and decoded, and turned out to be the
Warning Telegram.2

When the Warning Telegram arrived in Ottawa, Parliament
was not in session and the Prime Minister was having a holiday
in Muskoka. He hastened back to Ottawa where he arrived on
August l.3 A Cabinet meeting was held the same day, and the
Governor General sent the following message to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies:

My Advisers while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful
solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved and their
strong desire to co-operate in every possible way for that purpose wish me
to convey to His Majesty's Government the firm assurance that if un-
happily war should ensue the Canadian people will be united in a common
resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary to
ensure the integrity and maintain the honour of our Empire.

This cable was implemented the same day by another, in
which the Canadian Government stated that they would
"welcome any suggestions and advice which the Imperial
Naval and Military authorities may deem it expedient to
offer", concerning the most effective means of affording help.4
On August 1, also, all midshipmen were recalled from leave,
the naval authorities at Esquimalt were empowered to enrol
volunteers, and the Niobe and Rainbow were ordered to prepare
for active service.

On August 2 the cordial thanks of the British Government
were received for the promise of unstinted support which the
Canadian Government had tendered. The British Government
also undertook to inform the Canadian Government should
the situation call for further measures.5 This day the Naval
Service assumed control of all wireless stations, and the
collectors of customs at the seaports were instructed to give

2 Interview with G. J. Desbarats, Jan. 1942.

3 Borden Memoirs, i, p. 451.

4 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. (2 cables), Aug. 1, 1914, Sess. Pap. No. 40A, 1914, p. 41.
b Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Aug. 2 and 3, ibid., pp. 41-2.

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

notice of the fact that the Admiralty had called out the Royal
Naval Reserve. The volunteer reserve company at Victoria
was ordered to report at the Esquimalt dockyard.

Esquimalt presented an animated appearance . . . Its busy streets
reminded one of the days, not far back, when the British fleet made
Esquimalt its home port. Throughout the afternoon and well on into the
evening, many Victorians and a number of the people visiting this city
took the street cars to the naval town to look over what may be the scene
of an engagement.6

The examination service went into force that evening.

On August 3 a number of wireless stations were shut down,
and censors were provided for the others. Certain ports were
warned to be on guard against surprise attack, and Esquimalt,
which was not a mercantile port, was closed to all except naval
vessels. At 1 a.m. the same day H.M.C.S. Rainbow put to sea
on the first of her operational cruises. During the period
immediately preceding the outbreak of war many last-minute
naval preparations were being made, including the distributing
of ammunition and equipment and rounding up personnel.

On August 4 news reached London that German troops had
entered Belgium. The neutrality of that country was a primary
consideration with Great Britain, for reasons that rested upon
both good faith and self-interest. At 2 p.m. on that day,
accordingly, the British Government sent an ultimatum to
Berlin, demanding that Germany undertake to respect Belgian
neutrality, and asking for a reply by midnight. When the
ultimatum had expired without a favourable reply, the British
Empire declared war on Germany.

Mr. Winston Churchill has vividlv described the scene at
the Admiralty that night as the dreadful moment arrived:

It was 11 o'clock at night — 12 by German time — when the ultimatum
expired. The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm
night air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders were
gathered a small group of Admirals and Captains and a cluster of clerks,
pencil in hand, waiting. Along the Mall from the direction of the Palace
the sound of an immense concourse singing 'God save the King' floated in.
On this deep wave there broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the first
stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room.
The war telegram, which meant 'Commence hostilities against Germany',
was flashed to the ships and establishments under the White Ensign all
over the world.7

6 Times, Victoria, Aug. 3, 1914.

7 Churchill, World Crisis, pp. 245-6.

214

WAR DECLARED: SHORK ACTIVITIES

On the morning of August 4 the Governor General and Sir
Wilfrid Laurier arrived in Ottawa. As soon as he had reached
the capital the Leader of the Opposition, who had been spend-
ing the summer at his home in Arthabaska, issued a statement.
In it he expressed a hope that war might even yet be averted.
If it came, however, he considered that it would be the duty
of the Dominion to take an active part in waging it, and he
declared a truce to Party strife.8 The Prime Minister has
epitomized in a few lines the most portentous time that
Ottawa had ever known:

We were in Council on August 4th at eleven and again at four. During
the evening, while again in Council, at 8.55 p.m. the momentous telegram
arrived announcing that war had been declared. Immediately an Order-
in-Council was passed summoning Parliament to meet on August 18th.9

The same evening the Niobe and Rainbow, as authorized
by Section 23 of the Naval Service Act, were "placed at the
disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy";
C.G.S. Canada and C.G.S. Margaret were transferred from the
Department of Customs to the Naval Service, and orciered to
hoist the white ensign; and the naval and naval volunteer
forces were placed on active service.10 Instructions were sent
out through the Department of Customs embodying the advice
that should be given to British shipping regarding precautions
against capture, and arrangements were made by N.S.H.Q. to
secure daily information concerning German cruisers near the
Pacific coast.

The task which the war imposed upon the naval forces of
the allies was, of course, to obtain and keep control of the seas,
so that allied merchant ships and transports could use them in
comparative safety, and enemy shipping be prevented from
doing so. Command of the seas would also shield the allies from
serious attacks against or by way of their coasts. The Austro-
Hungarian fleet was small, and was largely immobilized by the
uncertain attitude and later the hostility of Italy. The French
Navy ranked about fourth among the fleets, while that of
Russia was small and poorly equipped. Except in the Pacific
Japan would not seriously exert her formidable naval strength.
The most powerful naval weapon on either side was that
wielded by Great Britain, and during the night of July 28-29,

8 Skelton, Life of Laurier, n, pp. 427-8.

!l Borden Memoirs, i, p. 456.

10 P.C. 2049, P.C. 2047, and P.C. 205(1: Any. 4, 1914.

215

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

1914, the Royal Navy's Home Fleet, with lights out and at
high speed, steamed to its war station at Scapa Flow.

The German fleet was inferior in size only to the Royal
Navy, while in quality it was second to none. The naval war
was therefore to be largely a duel between the Royal Navy and
that of Germany. The German High Seas Fleet was to be
contained throughout the war by the British Grand Fleet,
with some help from the United States Navy in the later stages.
Of the British Dominions Australia alone had a naval force to
be reckoned with. In wealth of bases at home and overseas and
of shipyards, and in the size of her merchant fleet, Great
Britain was in a class by herself. On the other hand, she was
far more dependent than any other Power upon sea-borne
supplies, and like the rest of the Empire except South Africa,
could bring land forces to bear against the enemy only by
sending them across salt water. The great superiority of the
allied navies, therefore, was partly discounted by their much
greater responsibilities. The German Navy had relatively few
commitments and its home bases were invulnerable.

Both navies maintained considerable cruiser forces in non-
European waters. Of the German ones Admiral Scheer states
that " . . . importance was attached to sending the best we had
in the way of light cruisers to foreign seas."11 The position of
the Royal Navy in this respect has been set out by Mr.
Churchill:

The keynote of all the Admiralty dispositions at the outbreak of war
was to be as strong as possible in home waters in order to fight a decisive
battle with the whole German Navy. To this end the foreign stations were
cut down to the absolute minimum necessary to face the individual ships
abroad in each theatre. The fleet was weak in fast light cruisers and the
whole of my administration had been occupied in building as many of them
as possible .... The inconvenience in other parts of the globe had to be
faced. It was serious.12

Apart from the German cruisers on distant stations, a com-
merce raider might occasionally escape from the North Sea.
There was also the certainty that attempts would be made to
arm German liners in neutral ports and send them out to raid.

Their lack of bases and friendly coasts throughout the
oceans was in fact destined to hamper, though not to prevent,
commerce raiding by German warships. A skilfully-handled
raiding cruiser is exceedingly difficult to run down — at one

11 Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet, p. 15.

12 Churchill, World Crisis, pp. 308-9.

216

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

time during the war S.M.S. Emden was to occupy the undivided
attention of about twenty allied cruisers. In the event, the
achievements of the German surface raiders conformed to
Mahan's thesis that such raiding might cause embarrassment
but had never proved to be decisive.

In the course of hostilities, however, a new type of com-
merce raider appeared, the advent of which had been foreseen
by so few that no provision had been made to meet it. This
was the submarine, which in skilful and ruthless German hands
almost proved a decisive weapon. Several anti-submarine
measures, however, among which the most important was the
old device of escorted convoys, provided a defence against the
U-boat raider which was sufficiently effective to make an allied
victory possible.

The outbreak of war faced the Naval Service with many
immediate and detailed problems. In 1914 the waging of war
was a more gentlemanly procedure than it afterwards became,
and on August 5, 1914, the Canadian Government provision-
ally granted ten days of grace during which German merchant
ships might leave Canadian ports, a privilege which was later
extended to Austro-Hungarian shipping as well. 13 At this time
Canadian millers and food exporters were expressing great
anxiety about shipping their products to Great Britain under
existing conditions. The British Government was consulted,
and replied with the following cable announcing a policy that
solved the problem by re-establishing confidence:14

With reference to your cypher telegram of yesterday, food shipments.
As stated in House of Commons yesterday His Majesty's Government are
inaugurating a scheme of state insurance for ships and cargoes based on
report of committee, copy of which goes to you by mail. Every effort is
being made to protect shipping.

The shortage of trained naval officers was greatly eased
at this time by an understanding with the Admiralty that the
Naval Service might have the first call on the services of retired
officers of the Royal Navy living in Canada. On August 5
Aemilius Jarvis of the Navy League of Canada informed
N.S.H.Q. that he had rounded up fifty former ratings, who
were likely-looking young men and willing to serve in Niobe.
In addition to facing its own problems of personnel at this
time, the Naval Service was helping to smooth the path of
numerous British naval reservists who wished to go to Great

13 P.C. 2055, Aug. 5, 1914; P.C. 2129, Aug. 14, 1914.

14 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec, Aug. 4, reply, Aug. 5, 1914, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 189.

217

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Britain or wherever they were needed. The following telegram
from the Collector of Customs at Fort William was typical of
many that were arriving at N.S.H.Q. from various parts of the
country:

Fourteen Royal Naval Reserve men and one Board of Trade A.B.
reported here for duty. Please advise if these men are wanted and if any
arrangements have been made for transportation from here.

On August 6 the exporting of certain commodities useful in
war, to ports in Europe through which they might easily reach
the enemy, was prohibited; and other measures to regulate
exports, to the enemy's detriment and in the interest of the
allies, were enacted the following day. On August 7, also,
Collectors of Customs were informed that the days of grace
permitting the departure of German ships had been terminated,
and two submarines which had been obtained in Seattle by the
government of British Columbia became the property of the
Canadian Government and were placed at the disposal of the
Admiralty the same day.

Advice was received from the British Government on
August 8 that enemy merchant ships should be detained per-
manently, and instructions to this effect were immediately
issued. 15 On the 9th customs officers were told to report the
names of merchant vessels thought to have embarked German
reservists. Since the beginning of the month various steps had
been taken by the army authorities to protect the principal
seaports and other vital installations, and on the 1 1 th the naval
authorities mounted guns to protect the city of Vancouver.
Next day the news of war with Austria-Hungary was received,
and on the 14th and 15th further regulations were issued
covering certain types of export. By the middle of August the
important immediate measures covering the naval side of the
war had been completed or set on foot.

Long-term policy for making war soon began to occupy the
centre of the stage, and early in October the Admiralty was
confidentially asked, through the High Commissioner in
London, for advice concerning the naval side of this policy:

Probability elections makes it desirable to ascertain Admiralty view
as to cooperation Canada in naval defence during war. Please obtain
following information: First. What course would Admiralty advise if we

15 The only German ship in a Canadian port was the barque Bellas, which was seized at
Rimouski and later condemned in prize court. The Austro-Hungarian S.S. Ida was also seized
after the outbreak of war with that country, but was afterwards released.

218

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

decided offer naval aid. Second. In case we make official inquiry is Ad-
miralty prepared to give advice?

The reply was as follows:

Secret regarding cooperation advocated naval defence during war
Admiralty inform me don't think anything effectual can now be done as
ships take too long to build and advise Canadian assistance be concentrated
on army would probably give that advice if official inquiry made.16

This was convincing advice, and in developing its war policy
the government did not try, except in one limited respect,17 to
expand the sea power of the Dominion. Accordingly, only a
very small part of the country's resources was used for that
purpose, and the naval side of Canada's effort in the First
World War can be told in a comparatively small space.

In spite of Canada's concentration on the army, the Naval
Service enrolled during the war over nine thousand officers and
ratings. When hostilities began the only naval reserve force in
the country was the volunteer unit at Victoria. Its members
took an important part in manning H.M.C.S. Rainbow, the
submarines CC I and CC 2 and their parent ship the Shear-
water, and other vessels at Esquimalt. They also supplied
some men to H.M.S. Newcastle after the arrival of that cruiser
in the waters of British Columbia. Towards establishing the
reserve on a country-wide basis, however, only the preliminary
steps had been taken by August 1914. Early in the war
9 officers and 120 men of the R.N.C.V.R. offered to go to
Britain in order to join the Royal Naval Brigade which had
been formed there. The brigade, however, had been raised for
service ashore: applicants for entry were therefore advised to
join the Canadian Expeditionary Force.18

No serious attempt was made during the first year and a
half of the war to enlist any considerable number of men for
naval purposes. In February 1916, however, the Minister ol
the Naval Service asked the Admiralty if they would care to
have recruits obtained in Canada for service in the Royal
Navy. It was pointed out that the Royal Navy would have to
train any such recruits, as the Canadian Service had no instruc-
tors to spare for that purpose. The Admiralty welcomed the
proposal and suggested that the men should be enlisted at the

16 Prime Minister to Can. High Comm., London, Oct. 7, 1914; reply, Oct. 10, 1914 (cables) :
Borden Papers, O'C. No. 660.

17 For the development of the east coast patrols, see ch. 11.

18 "Canada's Effort," Borden Papers, O'C. No. 237A.

219

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

rates of pay prevailing in the Royal Navy. 19 Capt. the Hon.
Rupert Guinness was sent to Canada with a small party to
recruit for the Yacht Patrol Services. But the rate of pay that
was offered — about a third of that which could be obtained by
enlisting in the Expeditionary Force — was too low to attract
recruits.

The Dominion Government therefore offered to enrol
volunteers in the reserve so as to bring their pay up to the
Canadian rate, and to place them at the Admiralty's disposal.
This offer the Admiralty accepted.20 The Canadian Govern-
ment authorized the enrolment of five thousand men;21 the
Naval Service created an Overseas Division of the Royal Naval
Canadian Volunteer Reserve, for service with the Royal Navy;
and a recruiting organization was set up. The Dominion was
divided into nine recruiting districts with head offices in each
of the provincial capitals, except in British Columbia where
the office was in Vancouver. Influential committees were
formed to forward the recruiting campaign, and Capt. Guinness
and his staff addressed eighty-three meetings throughout the
country. By these means about seventeen hundred men were
enrolled for service with the Royal Navy; and the number
would probably have been larger had not the east coast patrols,
later in the war, become the primary naval need as far as
manning was concerned. The divisional organization, however,
continued to be used for obtaining naval recruits generally
until the end of the war, when the district offices were closed.22
In all about eight thousand officers and ratings were enrolled
in the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, including the
Overseas Division, during the period of the war, at the close of
which the reservists were demobilized and the organization
was allowed to lapse.

In recruiting as in almost all the other forms of naval
activity, the main emphasis was upon supplementing as far as
possible the undertakings of the Admiralty, rather than upon
developing a large and distinctively Canadian effort. Enrol-
ment by the Naval Service during the war was for the duration
only. In July 1915 a system of pensions was provided to cover
disabilities incurred on active service by officers and men of the

19 D. Min. to Can. High Comm., Feb. 10, 1916; Sec. Admiralty to High Comm., Mar. 8,
1916; same to same, Mar. 27, 1916: N.S. 62-16-1.

20 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Aug. 1, 1916, ibid.

21 P.C. 2130, Sept. 9, 1916.
*>" Occasional Paper No. 12."

220

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

R.C.N, and R.N.C.V.R., and to meet the needs of widows and
other dependents of casualties.

The following figures are round numbers only, and even in
that form most of them are offered diffidently. At the end of
July 1914 the total strength of the R.C.N, did not exceed 350
officers and ratings; while the R.N.C.V.R., which had been
established by Order in Council earlier in the year, comprised
about 250 officers and ratings, all of them in the company at
Victoria. The total enrolment of officers and ratings during the
war may be listed as follows:

R.C.N 1,000

R.N. and R.N.R 600

R.N.C.V.R.

Atlantic Subdivision 4,300

Pacific Subdivision 2,000

Overseas Division 1,700

Total: 9,600

The deaths from all causes amounted to more than 150. A
large but unknown number of Canadians also enlisted and
served in the Royal Navy.

A considerable number of officers of the R.C.N, served dur-
ing the war in H.M. ships. Eng. Lieut. Stanley Nelson de
Quetteville was killed in action at Jutland while serving in
H.M.S. Indefatigable. Lieut. William McKinstrey Maitland-
Dougall was killed in action on March 15, 1918, while serving
in H.M. submarine D j. Mids. Malcolm Cann, William A.
Palmer, Arthur W. Silver, and John V. W. Hathaway, were
lost in H.M.S. Good Hope at Coronel on November 1, 1914, and
were the first Canadian-Service casualties of the war.

Important Intelligence activities were carried on by the
Naval Service during the war years. The naval Intelligence
organization in Canada, when first established in 1911 had
been local in character, but two years later it had been included
in the Admiralty's world-wide naval Intelligence organization.
Immediately after the outbreak of war, the Commander in
Chief, North America and West Indies, selected Halifax as the
naval Intelligence centre for his station, making use of the
already-existing Canadian organization. Responsibility for
part of the area concerned was later transferred to a centre at
St. John's, Newfoundland, but in 1917 the unit at St. John's
was abolished, and its duties were returned to the Elalifax
centre which remained under Canadian control. At the begin-

221

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ning of the war the naval Intelligence centre at Esquimalt
became responsible for the North Pacific, an area which was
later reduced in size when a centre was established at Callao.
The centre at N.S.H.Q. looked after the interior of the Domin-
ion and co-ordinated the work done by the three centres.23

When hostilities began, no coast wireless stations were
available which could provide reliable communication with
ships of the North America and West Indies Squadron when in
the neighbourhood of New York. The Canadian Government
accordingly built a 10-kilowatt station for that purpose at
Barrington Passage in south-eastern Nova Scotia. This station
began operating in May 1915, and became a link in a chain of
wireless stations extending from St. John's, Newfoundland, to
British Guiana. 24 The station at Barrington Passage was subse-
quently enlarged.

The Naval Service, early in the war, arranged transporta-
tion tor reserve officers and men wishing to return to Great
Britain. It also assisted the Admiralty in selecting and en-
rolling residents of Canada for the Royal Naval Air Service,
the Yacht Patrol Service, and the Royal Naval Auxiliary
Patrol (Motor Boat Service), and itself enrolled some 1,700
men in the Overseas Division, Royal Naval Canadian Volun-
teer Reserve, for service with the Royal Navy.

It was also possible for the Naval Service to help the
Admiralty considerably in the matter of fuel and stores. When
war was declared both the British and Canadian stocks of
Welsh steam coal at Halifax and Esquimalt were low. The
Department therefore bought five cargoes of suitable coal, and
stored it at both bases for the use of H.M. as well as H.M.C.
ships. Early in the war also, the Department offered to supply
H.M. ships at Canadian bases with all provisions, clothing, and
such other naval stores as were readily obtainable in the
Dominion. This offer was accepted fully as far as provisions
were concerned, and partly with respect to the rest. Stocks of
provisions were therefore maintained for this purpose, and
arrangements to supply fresh provisions were made, at both
the dockyards. Supplies were also issued from time to time to
Australian and allied warships.25 In addition to H.M.C. ships,

""Occasional Paper No. 7," Sept. 13, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1); "Occasional Paper No.
20," Oct. 24, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-3 (1).

24 "Details Regarding Roval Canadian Navy," May 16, 1918;"Radiotelegraphy" (memo.,
n.d.):N.S. 1000-5-5(1).

25 Memo., Sept. 8, 1915, N.S. 1000-5-5 (1); "Canada's Effort," Borden Papers, O'C. No-
237 A.

222

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

moreover, H.M. and allied warships occasionally used the
repair facilities at the two dockyards.

Examination services were maintained at the principal
ports in order to prevent hostile merchant ships, including dis-
guised warships, from entering. Minesweeping was carried out
as a routine in the approaches to those harbours where the
traffic was heaviest. The Naval Service moreover, was respon-
sible for "naval control" at these ports. Even in peace-time a
considerable degree of regulation is exercised by civil officials
over shipping in and near harbours. In time of war against a
naval Power, however, a much more extensive and rigid
regimentation is needed, and most of it is placed in naval
rather than civilian hands. At the beginning of hostilities,
therefore, the functions of the civil port authorities at the
principal Canadian ports were transferred to the Naval
Service, which controlled the movements of shipping inward
and outward for the duration of the war. Among the most
important functions of naval control was that of giving route-
ing and other instructions to merchant ships about to sail, and
in the latter part of the' war, organizing and directing the
sailing of convoys.

The war brought about an immediate and progressive
increase in control of shipping by the British and other govern-
ments. The great majority of British-registered ships, and
many others besides, which in peace-time had sailed from port
to port and handled cargoes at the sole discretion of their
owners or private charterers, came under the control of the
British Government by being chartered, often by requisition.
Their movements and the types of cargo which they carried
were thenceforth determined by agents of that government, in
terms of war requirements as a whole, and of the volume and
character of the shipping which was available to meet those
requirements.26 The movements of ships, however, were inter-
dependent with the transportation of commodities to make up
cargoes, and government controls had therefore to be extended
inland so as to cover rail shipments to ports.

On August 4, 1914, the President of the Canadian Pacific
Railway wrote to the Prime Minister, offering the assistance of
the company's organization in obtaining and forwarding food-
stuffs to Great Britain, in the event of hostilities.27 The

26 See Salter, Allied Shipping Control, passim.

27 Shaughnessy to Borden, Aug. 4, 1914, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 212.

223

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

following month A. H. Harris of the C.P.R. was appointed
Acting Director of Overseas Transport,28 although he remained
on the payroll of the company. It was obviously desirable that
the handling of shipments for overseas should be centralized
as far as possible, and as time went on an ever larger part of
these movements came under Harris's capable supervision.
As far as movements of freight destined for transports were
concerned, the D.O.T. received his instructions from the
Admiralty acting through N.S.H.Q.

On the east coast, for the seven months or so during which
the St. Lawrence was open, Montreal was the principal ship-
ping port because of its greatly superior equipment. It was
served by 2 double-track and 2 single-track railways in addition
to the St. Lawrence waterway, and its terminal facilities were
adequate to war-time needs. Halifax was the chief outlet for
overseas shipments in winter. Its magnificent harbour left
nothing to be desired, but its port and rail facilities were
inadequate. Like the other Maritime Province ports it was
considerably closer to Britain than were Montreal and any of
the United States ports. Saint John was supplementary to
Halifax, and when pressure on the Canadian outlets became
too great, shipments were sometimes diverted to New England
ports. Sydney, N.S., with the coal mines nearby, was a valu-
able asset. All merchantmen and most warships were coal-
burners, and many merchant ships went to Sydney for fuel. In
May 1916, because of congestion in the ports in Great Britain,
the Admiralty instructed all transports that could do so to take
aboard enough coal at a Canadian port for the return voyage to
Canada. Early in the war the Admiralty had a contract with
the Dominion Coal Company to supply coal at $3.50 a ton.

After the organization for handling transports had taken
shape, the procedure was more or less as follows. When a ship
was due to sail from Britain, and when she actually sailed, the
Admiralty informed N.S.H.Q., which in turn notified the
D.O.T. and the Naval Transport Officer at the Canadian port
or ports concerned. As the transport approached Cape Race
she reported to the wireless station there, which notified
N.S.H.Q., and the ship was then instructed by wireless to
which port she should proceed. Her arrival was signalled to
N.S.H.Q. which notified the D.O.T. and the Admiralty. The
port then reported the arrangements for loading, the size and

28 Later Director of Overseas Transport.

224

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

nature of the cargo, and the estimated time of sailing, to
N.S.H.Q., which relayed this information to the Admiralty and
the ship's route orders to the port. N.S.H.Q. also received
from the port for transmission to the Admiralty the actual time
of sailing and a detailed description of the cargo, and later the
bill of lading. The Admiralty signalled to N.S.H.Q. the name
of the port in Britain at which the ship had arrived, and the
date of her arrival.

The Naval Service helped in every way possible to expedite
sailings and to iron out such difficulties as arose. For example,
in February 1916, the Admiralty transport Harmattan arrived
at Saint John. A Chinese member of her crew had appendicitis
and was therefore sent to a hospital on shore, whereupon the
immigration authorities insisted that the $500 head tax on
Chinese entering Canada should be paid by the Harmattan s
master, who possessed only $400 which he needed for the
purpose of paying his crew. When the transport was ready to
sail, N.S.H.Q. signalled to the Naval Transport Officer at
Saint John: ''HARMATTAN is not to be delayed. You are to
make any necessary arrangements. The Department will
assume liability for the tax."29

Special precautions were for obvious reasons taken in the
case of troop transports. Whenever possible these sailed in
convoy with a powerful escort, and the first million troops
transported overseas under the auspices of the Admiralty, from
different parts of the British Empire, reached their destinations
without the loss of a single life from enemy action or the risks
of the sea. The first Canadian contingent embarked at Quebec,
and the transports afterwards assembled in Gaspe Bay whence
they sailed, a convoy of thirty-one ships, on October 3, 1914. 30
The later contingents embarked at Halifax, tor both the
Admiralty and the Naval Service considered that port to be
safer than Montreal or Quebec, because of the difficulty of
avoiding any U-boats that might be present in the lower
reaches of the St. Lawrence. In 1917 and 1918 large numbers of
coolies were sent from Hong Kong via Vancouver and east-
coast ports to France, to serve in labour units, and many of
these coolies were returned home by the same route after the
war was over.31

29 N.S.H.Q. to N.T.O., Saint John, Feb. 6, 1916, N.S. 1048-12-49 (1).

30 Hurd, The Merchant Navy, n, p. 93.

31 Material in N.S. 1048-45-2 and 104&45-11.

225

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Prior to the First World War the Admiralty had not
planned to arm merchant ships.32 This had seemed to be un-
necessary, and the arming of a merchantman would have
deprived her of non-combatant status. The use of submarines
against merchant shipping, however, was unexpectedly intro-
duced, and the U-boat raiders made little distinction between
combatant ships and others. Soon alter the submarine cam-
paign started, therefore, the Admiralty began to arm British
merchant ships as a defence against the U-boat. The guns
were mounted astern, for a ship attacked by a submarine was
best advised to present her stern to the enemy, and the position
was testimony to the defensive purpose of the armament. It
was necessary to strengthen the deck beneath each gun, to fit
up a magazine, and to provide trained gunners.

Canadian-registered ships were treated in this respect like
those of British registry, and it about to undertake a voyage
into a danger-zone they were defensively armed. The cost of
preparing these ships for their armament was borne by the
owners or by the Canadian Government, while the guns, am-
munition, and gunners, were supplied by the Admiralty.
Forty-three Canadian-registered ships were armed with 6-inch,
4.7-inch, or smaller weapons, and paravane gear was also
fitted in some cases. All the ships under construction for the
Canadian Government's mercantile marine during the war
period were "stiffened," and provided with magazine-space,
while they were being built. None of these government ships
were actually armed, however, as the coming of the armistice
made this unnecessary.33

It is well known that in the course of the hostilities the
U-boat raiders came within an ace of barring the seas against
allied shipping, and thereby winning the war. In February
1917, the German Government initiated unrestricted sub-
marine warfare, after which the losses of allied shipping became
almost insupportable. In April no less than 169 British mer-
chant ships totalling 545,282 gross tons were sunk by enemy
action.34 The practice of convoy — sailing merchantmen in
company, and if possible escorted by warships — was an old and
formerly successful device for protecting shipping in time of
war. During the First World War, however, until no other
recourse seemed to be left, the Admiralty made no general use

32 Apart from a few liners for use as auxiliary cruisers.

33 "Occasional Paper No. 18," Oct. 21, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-3 (1).
3A Hurd, The Merchant Navy, III, table in App. C.

226

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WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

of convoy, for the ship-owners and masters and many naval
officers thought that under modern conditions it was impractic-
able.35 But the sinkings that occurred in the spring of 1917
were terrifying, and as a last resort the Admiralty decided to
introduce convoy on the most dangerous routes through the
Atlantic and the Mediterraneanj

The ports of assembly for convoys proceeding to Great
Britain were to be Gibraltar, Dakar, New York,36 Hampton
Roads, and Sydney or Halifax. The first convoy from Canada
left Sydney on July 10, 1917, escorted by H.M.S. Highflyer.
The following month, in order to make a more efficient use of
the available tonnage, ships were segregated according to their
speed. Fast convoys comprising vessels with a speed of 123^
knots or more sailed from Halifax; medium-speed convoys
from New York; and slow convoys from Hampton Roads.37
These convoys, with a cruiser or auxiliary cruiser as ocean
escort, were accompanied outward through the approaches by
small escort craft, and were met by destroyers at the edge of
the U-boat danger-zone on the European side. In the spring of
1918 very large numbers of American troops were being
transported to Europe, and in order that they might embark
at New York, and sail in fast convoys, the western terminus of
these convoys was transferred from Halifax to New York
where it remained until the end of the war. During the period
when convoys were used, ships from Canada bound for the
Mediterranean either sailed independently or started in convoy
and broke off part-way over. Ships on the Pacific routes were
not placed in convoy.

At the time when the convoy system was introduced,
convoy officers were appointed at the ports where the ships
assembled prior to departure. On the day before a convoy was
due to sail, a conference was held which was attended by
masters, chief officers, and engineers. Instructions38 were
issued to masters regarding such matters as keeping station
and a careful watch, wireless silence, and rendering assistance
to other ships. In the event of their becoming separated from
the rest of the convoy, they were expected to open sealed
instructions with which they were provided and to proceed
accordingly. The organizing of shipping into convoys, although

35 Ibid., I, pp. 241-2; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, v, pp. 11-12.

36 The United States declared war on Germany on Apr. 6, 1917.

37 Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, v, pp. 48, 52, 104-5.

38 A collection of these general instructions is to be found in N.S. 1048-48-4 (1).

227

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

it did not give complete protection, reduced shipping losses
sufficiently to make possible an allied victory.

At the outbreak of war, in accord with the usual British
practice, the army took over the fixed-artillery defences at the
Halifax base, which were in good condition. The approaches to
the harbour were well covered by powerful lights. An examina-
tion service went into force at midnight of August 1-2, 1914,
and a port war signal station was established at Camperdown
where there was also a wireless station. The blocking of the
eastern passage by means of schooners was a failure, and a
barrier was therefore made by means of a line of piles driven
across the channel. During a large part of the war a mine-
sweeping service was maintained. An anti-submarine net
defence was laid across the harbour entrance in 1917, and mine
nets were added the following year. The weak point in the
defences lay in the lack of destroyers, and throughout most of
the war of submarines also.39 In addition to the duties im-
plied above, the naval authorities at Halifax were responsible
for operating the patrol vessels which were based there, regu-
lating the traffic inside the harbour, assembling and organizing
convoys and routeing merchant ships proceeding overseas
independently, the handling of troop transports, certain
services connected with defensively armed merchant ships as
such, collecting and distributing naval Intelligence, and for
contraband control.40

Halifax was one of many ports at the disposal of the Admir-
alty, into which neutral ships were sent to be searched for
contraband. At one time during the war more than eighty
neutral vessels were anchored in Halifax harbour awaiting
examination of their cargoes.41 In addition to H.M.C.S. Niobe
many Commonwealth cruisers and other warships used the
base at various times. Among these was the distinguished
Australian cruiser Sydney , and H.M.A.S. Melbourne which
brought a German-owned prize into Halifax.42 In the course
of the war, repair facilities at the base were not always equal to
the demands made upon them.

In earlier wars Halifax had been an advanced base for
Operations against enemies in North America; during the First
World War the place served as a base for warships operating

»• See Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec, Sept. 1914, A.R.O., H.S. 1026, North America Various, 1914.
« N.S. 1001-1-3.

41 D. Min. to T. C. Keenleyside, July 11, 1921, N.S. 1000-5-5 (1).

42 See Jose, Royal Australian Navy, pp. 254, 255, 259.

228

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

against the forces of a European Power, and a port from which
ships sailed bearing the material and human resources of North
America. The sending forth of these ships and their protection
at sea being one of the decisively important war activities on
the Allied side, Halifax was able to contribute at least as much
toward victorv as it had ever done in earlier wars.43 Until
comparatively late in the struggle most ships sailed indepen-
dently. After the introduction of convoy, however, the two
important ports of departure for convoys were Halifax and
Sydney. The first of a series of convoys left Sydney on July 10,
1917, and the first of another series, consisting of five Canadian
troop-ships and seven merchantmen, sailed from Halifax on
September 5. The following year, after considerable reorgani-
zation, convoys were leaving Halifax at eight-day intervals.44

In the early winter of 1917 Halifax was smitten by a
disaster so sudden and severe that the inhabitants have never
since forgotten it. The French-registered S.S. Mont Blanc,
after loading a cargo of high explosives in New York, had sailed
on the night of December 1-2 from that port for Halifax, to
join a slow convoy. The Mont Blanc arrived at the Halifax
examination anchorage late in the afternoon of December 5,
and at or soon after 7.30 the following morning weighed anchor
for Bedford Basin. Her cargo comprised 8,830 barrels of wet
picric acid, 11,500 kegs of dry picric acid, and 3,000 kegs of dry
T.N.T.; while on deck she carried containers of highly-inflam-
mable benzol.45

Meanwhile the S.S. Imo, Norwegian-registered and char-
tered to the Belgian Relief Commission, had arrived at Halifax
in ballast on December 3, and anchored in Bedford Basin.
She had been due to sail for New York on the afternoon of the
5th; but her departure had been postponed because a supply of
coal for her bunkers had arrived late. The Imo got under way
about 8.00 a.m. on December 6, passed out of the basin, and
steamed down the harbour towards the incoming munitions
ship. Each of the two vessels was carrying a pilot, and the
weather was fine and clear; yet by extraordinary mismanage-

43 These statements would also apply to the role of Halifax in the Second World War.

44 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, in, esp. ch. 9.

46 Two reports, N.S. 37-25-9; extract of letter from British Ministry of Shipping, Feb. 14,
1918, N.S. 37-25-1 (1);" Evidence taken in Wreck Commissioner's Court," printed in In the
Supreme Court oj Canada on Appeal from the Exchequer Court of Canada .... (Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique vs. the ship "Imo.") The Commission, consisting of the Hon.
Arthur Drysdale, Justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, assisted by Capt. J. A. Demers
and Capt. Walter Hose, R.C.N., acting as nautical assessors, took evidence in Halifax con-
cerning the collision and explosion during the period Dec. 13, 1917, to Jan. 30, 1918.

229

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ment they collided, the bow of the Imo striking the Mont Blanc
on the starboard side forward. Their combined speeds produced
only a moderate impact, and apart from the delaying of the
two ships for repairs no serious effects would have resulted, had
it not been for the terrible cargo which one of them carried.

As a result of the collision Mont Blanc caught fire. Her
captain then gave orders to abandon ship, knowing that she
might blow up at any moment, and her crew rowed to shore on
the Dartmouth side of the harbour where they ( successfully
sought refuge. The abandoned munitions ship drifted, or
steamed slowly, burning, straight across the harbour toward
Halifax. She grounded almost touching Pier 6 next to the dry
dock, and a few minutes after 9 a.m. her disastrous burden
exploded. In the meantime the Imo had got clear, and having
attempted unsuccessfully to turn up the harbour in order to
return to Bedford Basin, steamed over to the Dartmouth side
where she went aground. The captain, the pilot, and some
others on board the Imo were killed when the Mont Blanc
exploded, but the rest got safely ashore.46

As the Mont Blanc disappeared, a ravaging blast like the
breath of a destroying angel swept over harbour and city.
After visiting that stricken place the Prime Minister, Sir
Robert Borden, who knew Halifax intimately, said in an
interview:

One cannot realize the force of the explosion or the extent of the des-
truction without visiting the scene. At least one square mile of the city
is absolutely wiped out. Many of the houses which remain standing are
so shattered as to be utterly useless without extensive repairs. Hardly a
pane of glass remains intact. Two miles away from the scene of the
explosion heavy doors were blown from their hinges and window casings
were crushed and swept away. The heavy gun on the Mont Blanc was
hurled two miles into the woods beyond Dartmouth. Huge pieces of the
ship were thrown more than a mile through the air and crashed through
roofs of houses. Large telephone poles a mile away were snapt off like
pipestems. The railway track was washed away by the tidal wave created
by the explosion. The shock was felt as far away as Charlottetown and
glass was broken in windows at Truro, 60 miles distant .... Apparently
there was a minor preliminary explosion and many persons rushed to the
windows just before the final tremendous explosion occurred. Instantly
the glass was shattered into countless myriads of minute fragments and
driven so forcibly as to render countenances almost unrecognizable with
minute scars. Thus in many cases there has been loss of eyesight ....
Nearly every person who described the explosion told me that they thought
it had occurred quite near to the place where they happened to be at the
moment . . . . A great many people believed that a German raider had got

46 "Evidence in Wreck Commissioner's Court," passim.

230

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

through and that the first shell had fallen in their immediate locality.
Hence there was at first a rush to the cellars for safety from the shells which
were expected to follow.47

Help was quickly and generously extended from many
quarters. On the evening ot December 7 medical parties began
to arrive from outside points, the first units on the scene being
from New Glasgow, Saint John, Moncton, and Truro, in the
Maritime Provinces. Early help and encouragement were also
given by an American naval hospital ship, sent to Halifax for
the purpose, which put a large party ashore to assist in caring
for the wounded. To administer relief funds the federal
authorities on January 22, 1918, appointed a commission whose
status was later confirmed by special statute. The British
Government subscribed £1,000,000, and the Dominion Gov-
ernment from time to time appropriated sums which by the
end of the war had reached a total of $15,000,000. Many
private subscriptions for relief came from the rest of the
Dominion and from other countries.48

The explosion caused fewer casualties among naval person-
nel than might have been expected. H.M.S. Highflyer sustained
over twenty.49 The official list of Canadian naval casualties,
officers and men, showed 20 killed; 1 died in hospital; 1 missing,
believed killed; and 8 injured.50 Noteworthy among the naval
casualties was a group of six ratings under the charge oiNiobe s
boatswain, Warrant Officer Albert C. Mattison, who all lost
their lives as the result of a very brave act. After the collision
and before the explosion, H.M.C.S. Niobes steam pinnace put
off with a volunteer crew of seven for the purpose of trying to
scuttle the burning munitions ship. When they had come
alongside, the Mont Blanc blew up and the seven sailors were
all killed. The Highflyer also sent off a boat, whose crew were
saved by the fact that they had not yet reached the Mont Blanc
when the explosion occurred.51

The commanding officer of the Royal Naval College was
seriously injured by the explosion, and many of the staff and

47 Extract from a paper dated Dec. 12, 1917, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 185. A full and
dramatic account of the Halifax explosion and its aftermath, in fictional form, is to be found
in MacLennan, Barometer Rising; numerous photographs of the effects of the blast are repro-
duced in Bell, Romance of the Disaster.

48 Halifax Herald, Dec. 8, 1917; 8-9 Geo. V, c. 24; and several Orders in Council.

49 Halifax to Naval (signal), Dec. 9, 1917, N.S. 37-25-1 (1).
60 Halifax Morning Chronicle, Dec. 11, 1917.

51 D. Min. to Miss Elizabeth Poison, Oct. 2, 1919, N.S. 1000-5-5 (1); Pres. Navy League
to Min., Oct. 16, 1918, N.S. 37-25-2 (1). The list of awards etc. received by Canadian naval
personnel in connection with the Halifax disaster is in House of Commons Debates, 1919, 1st
Sess., p. 879.

231

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

cadets were also injured, seriously or otherwise. The college
building remained standing with its walls and roof intact, yet
its condition was such that the staff and cadets had to be
moved, and they were sent to Kingston, Ont., for the ensuing
term, the needed accommodation being provided by the Royal
Military College. In September 1918 the naval college was
transferred to Esquimalt, and for a few months after their
arrival there the cadets slung their hammocks in the Rainbow,
until the buildings in the dockyard which had been assigned to
the college were ready to be occupied.

Much of the physical damage wrought by the explosion,
needless to say, was of such a nature as to obstruct naval and
shipping activities. Besides the Mont Blanc herself three
smaller vessels were destroyed, among which, unluckily, was
the wrecking steamer Stella Maris. Including the Imo, ten
non-naval vessels were badly damaged.52 Naval ships and
craft suffered less severely, damage in their case being limited
to demolition of superstructures, perforation of decks, breakage
of glass, and other minor injuries. Although the dockyard lay
just outside the heaviest zone of destruction, its buildings were
all more or less wrecked and two of them were completely
destroyed. There was much wreckage in the harbour; piers,
wharves, and warehouses, other than those belonging to the
dockyard, were damaged; and the dry dock was rendered
inoperative. Telegraph communication was interrupted.

Apart from the losses and hardships that had been inflicted
upon the city, the most important Canadian outlet for sending
armed forces and war materials overseas had been crippled. It
was thrice unfortunate, moreover, that the disaster occurred
when it did, for the long northern winter had just begun. The
St. Lawrence would be frozen for months to come: the port of
Halifax was therefore carrying a heavy burden, and rebuilding
is relatively difficult in the winter season. Immediate problems
were intensified by a very heavy snowstorm which followed
upon the heels of the explosion and greatly hampered railway
traffic. The task of getting the port and naval installations into
working order had to be undertaken at once. A meeting was
accordingly called on December 9, under the auspices of the
Halifax Board of Trade, at which four naval representatives
were present. The meeting was addressed by the Prime
Minister.53 The most pressing need was to renew the ship-

62 Navy Yard to Naval (signal), Dec. 19, 1917, N.S. 37-25-1 (1).

63 Dir. of Stores to D. Min., Dec. 24, 1917, N.S. 37-25-3 (1).

232

HHH|p*,wafL

4Wv

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

repairing facilities, and both these and the port as a whole
were gradually restored to their normal state.

The owners of the Mont Blanc brought action in the
Admiralty Court of Nova Scotia, claiming damages from the
owners of the Imo for loss caused by the collision, and the
verdict placed the entire responsibility upon the Mont Blanc.
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Canada modified
this decision. Two judges held the Mont Blanc, and two others
the Imo, alone to blame. The fifth justice considered that both
ships had been negligent, and in the end this was the judgment
of the court.54

At Esquimalt, as soon as war had been declared, an exam-
ination service and port war signal station were set up, the
fixed artillery defences were placed on a war looting, and other
measures suited to a state of hostilities were taken. In view of
the limited naval forces available, it was possible that an
enemy light cruiser might enter the Strait of Georgia by the
northern route, and so obtain access to the Nanaimo coal
mines or to Vancouver. To prevent such a raid, sixteen old
mine shells were fitted and loaded by H.M.S. Newcastle, then
at Esquimalt, and were placed on board C.G.S. Newington
which had meanwhile been equipped with dropping gear. All
arrangements were made so that should the need arise these
mines could be laid immediately in a position just west of
Malcolm Island, so as to block the main channel leading to
Johnstone Strait. The eastern entrance to that strait was
protected by a patrol of three motor launches carrying 14-inch
torpedoes. Farther to the south-east, as an added precaution,
two 4-inch guns from H.M.S. Shearwater were mounted on the
mainland side of Seymour Narrows a short distance north of
Ripple Rock, and were manned by naval reservists. After the
destruction of von Spee's squadron at the Falkland Islands on
December 8, this defence organization was withdrawn and the
equipment was returned to Esquimalt.

Early in November 1914, the commanding officers of
H.M.S. Newcastle and the Japanese armoured cruiser Idzumo,
both of which were operating out of Esquimalt, decided to base
their ships in Barkley Sound for a time, so as to avoid advertis-
ing their movements by passing up and down the Strait of
Juan de Fuca. A patrol consisting of three Dominion Fishing
Patrol launches manned bv naval reservists was accordingly

64 C.G.T. vs. Imo., Reports oj the Supreme Court of Canada, vol. 59, pp. 644-5.

233

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

maintained throughout the last six weeks of that year, in order
to prevent unauthorized vessels from entering the eastern
channel of Barkley Sound.55

After the end of 1914 allied naval power in the Pacific was
virtually unchallenged, and Esquimalt thenceforth lay far
from the scene of any actual or probable Operations. An
occasional allied warship visited the port; the most notable
being H.M. cruiser Kent, which, after having been in action at
the Falkland Islands and later at the destruction of the German
cruiser Dresden, put in to Esquimalt in May 1915 for a general
refit. The Rainbow remained there throughout the war, and
H.M.C. submarines CC I and CC 2 were based at Esquimalt
from August 1914 until they were transferred to the east coast
in June 1917.

Although the shipbuilding industry in Canada was not
highly developed in 1914, a considerable number of warships
were built or assembled in the Dominion during the First
World War. For anti-submarine work, 36 trawlers and 100
drifters were constructed to the order of the Admiralty, and
12 trawlers were built for the Naval Service. In the spring of
1915 the Royal Navy needed a large number of fast, seaworthy,
and well-armed motor launches for anti-submarine work,
patrolling, and other purposes. No less than 550 of these craft
were ordered in the United States and assembled at Quebec
and Montreal.56

In March 1916, N.S.H.Q. consulted the Admiralty about
the advisability of building two or three destroyers in Canada.
The Admiralty expressed great pleasure at the suggestion and
undertook to help by supplying detailed drawings of the latest
British designs. They doubted, however, whether such des-
troyers, which would probably have had to be built in Mont-
real, could be delivered before the close of navigation in 1917.
In these circumstances the Admiralty, without directly advis-
ing against the attempt, suggested that the Canadian
authorities should carefully consider whether it might not be
better to use the resources of Canadian yards for building
merchant ships. The idea does not seem to have been further

65 This and immediately preceding paragraph chiefly based on "The Great War 1914-1918 —
Reports, Organization, etc." This volume consists of typed papers dealing with the activities
of the R.C.N, during the First World War, principally on the west coast.

66 Hurd, The Merchant Navy, n, pp. 266-7.

234

WAR DECLARED: SHORE ACTIVITIES

entertained.57 The difficulty in the way of carrying it out,
which in similar circumstances had appeared before and was
to do so later, was that Canadian shipbuilders had not the
experience needed for constructing the more complicated types
of warship.

An interesting series of incidents, however, led to the build-
ing of submarines in Montreal at this time. Soon after hos-
tilities began, Charles M. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel
Corp. went to England with an offer to undertake the produc-
tion of war materials for the British Government. He promised
very rapid delivery of submarines, and the Admiralty ordered
20 to be produced jointly by Bethlehem and the Electric Boat
Co. of Groton, Connecticut. The United States Government,
however, objected to the arrangement as likely to violate the
neutrality of that country. Accordingly, although the construc-
tion of 10 of the boats was continued in the United States,
Schwab arranged with Canadian Vickers Ltd., Montreal, to
build the other 10 in the yards of the Canadian company.
Schwab took over Vickers' yard on behalf of the Electric Boat
Co., and the American experts remained in charge of it for a
considerable period while the submarines were being construc-
ted. The 10 submarines built at Vickers for the British
Government were completed in the course of a few months.
Some finishing was done at Quebec, and the trials were carried
out off Murray Bay. These submarines were allocated to the
H class in the Admiralty's system of classification. Six of
them58 left Halifax for Britain on July 22, 1915, and were the
first submarines to cross the Atlantic under their own power.
The other 4 sailed shortly afterwards for the Dardanelles.

After these submarines had been completed, 8 more of the
same type were built at Canadian Vickers for the Italian
Government, and 6 H-class hulls for the Russian Government
which were shipped in "knockdown" condition. In all, there-
fore, 24 H-class submarines, of which 6 were hulls only, were
built at Vickers in Montreal during the war. The hulls of these
vessels were constructed at the Vickers yard, while the
machinery, piping, fittings, and equipment, were supplied from
the United States and installed in Montreal.59 Of the other

67 D. Min. to Undersec. of State (Ext. Aff.), Mar. 23, 1916; Bonar Law to Gov. Gen.,
May 26, 1916; and other correspondence: "Notes relative to Defence and Naval Intelligence."

" H 5 to H 10 inch

69 This account of the Schwab contract with the Admiralty and the building of submarines
in Montreal is chiefly based on information kindly supplied by the Electric Boat Co., Groton,
Conn. Disparate statements exist concerning the number of submarines built at Canadian
Vickers for Italy and Russia respectively; but Electric Boat's figures have been used as the
most likely to be correct.

235

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

10 submarines ordered by the British Government, which were
built in the United States, 2 were commissioned in the R.C.N.
after the war.60

In September 1914 the Colonial Office forwarded a message
from the Russian Government, asking the Canadian Govern-
ment to sell them an ice-breaker for use during the coming
autumn at Archangel. It was very important from the military
point of view to keep open the channels of supply into Russia.
The Canadian Government's ice-breaker Earl Grey was
accordingly sold to Russia, sailed to Archangel by a naval
crew, and turned over to the Russian authorities there.61

Almost all the various functions of the Naval Service during
the First World War were supplementary to and intimately
co-ordinated with the corresponding activities of the Royal
Navy, which were supported in every practicable way. One of
these activities which the Naval Service was able to reinforce
to some extent remains to be described, and it was the most
directly important of all. The two old cruisers which the Naval
Service had obtained in 1910 were in its possession when
hostilities began four years later. H.M.C. ships, whose number
greatly increased in the course of the war, played a useful if
unspectacular part in Operations in both oceans; the Niobe and
a patrol flotilla in the Atlantic, and the Rainbow and the
submarines CC I and CC 2 on the Pacific coast.

60 See pp. 316-7 below. For an account of merchant-ship building in Canada for the Bri-
tish Government, see Carnegie, Munitions Supply in Canada, 191^-18, ch. 23 and pp. 309-10.
""Canada's Effort," Borden Papers, O'C. No. 237A.

236

Chapter 11

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES ON
THE EAST COAST

IN the summer of 1914 the Niobe was lying in Halifax,
exceedingly deficient in trained personnel, her engines
suffering from disuse, the ship in general very far from
being in condition to go to sea. On August 1 the Captain in
Charge at Halifax received the following signal from N.S.H.Q. :
"NIOBE may commission. Telegraph earliest date probably
available. Commence work immediately. Use Fishery Pro-
tection Engine Room staff as necessary under Engineer
Officer 'NIOBE'." l In the absence of his seniors a very young
engineer lieutenant had to say how long the renovation of those
aged and bedridden engines would take, and grasping his
courage in both hands he asked for a month. The ship was dry-
docked for cleaning, and her engines were gradually got into
running order and everything done that was necessary to fit
her for sea and for war. Her crew was greatly enlarged, though
not completed, by the addition of the well-trained crews of the
Algerine and Shearwater who were brought across from
Esquimalt, of ex-Service men living in Canada, and of volun-
teers,2 the whole under the command of Capt. R. G. Corbett,
R.N. In the meantime the diplomats had yielded their place
to the soldiers and sailors, and on August 4 the Canadian
Government placed the Niobe at the disposal of the Admiralty

The western part of the North Atlantic, and more especially
the Caribbean area, has probably seen more naval warfare
than have any other non-European waters. During the
contests between France and England from the late seven-
teenth century to the close of the Napoleonic Wars, North
American waters formed a theatre of naval Operations second
in importance only to those of western Europe, because it was
there that the most important and easily accessible colonial
possessions of both powers were situated. A French or a

1 Naval to Capt. in Charge, Halifax, Aug. 1, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-2.

2 Annual Report, 1915, p. 61.

237

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

British admiral was especially likely to take his ships to the
West Indies, the most highly valued of all colonies in a mer-
cantilist age. Small islands, moreover, have always been
extremely easy to seize by means of a fleet and a landing force,
in the absence of a stronger enemy fleet. The West Indies,
however, gradually sank from their position of high esteem,
while their mighty neighbour North America was rising from
relative obscurity towards a plenitude of wealth and strength.
That continent was the second largest and richest area in the
world in which white men can make their homes, and during
the nineteenth century it had come to contain, except for
Europe itself, the most dynamically productive society and
the most abundant springs of power on earth. This reduplica-
tion of Europe across the Atlantic is probably the most
portentous development of modern times. Its already visible
effects are manifold, and one of them has been this, that
Europe, the mother of wars, has lost that absolute control of
her offspring which she formerly possessed. In the great wars
of the twentieth century a new world, mightier by far than the
one which Canning knew, has been called in to redress the
balance of the old.

By 1914 North America possessed the greatest of industrial
nations, and exportable surpluses of food and raw materials
which exceeded those of any other continent. The sea routes
which led from it to Europe were short. The British Empire
held in its hand decisively superior naval power, a chain of
bases and other ports on or near the North American coast,
more than half the world's merchant shipping, and unrivalled
resources of cash and credit. A large part of North America
was also part of the British Empire, and most of the rest of it
was increasingly sympathetic to the allied cause. The North
Atlantic routes were pipe-lines leading to the most abundant
and accessible non-European sources of the ingredients of
fighting strength. To the British Empire, and to its allies also
since they shared the benefits, the importance of keeping those
pipe-lines open was obviously enormous.

The western part of the North Atlantic routes was guarded
by the cruisers of the North American Squadron, which had to
watch both the West Indies with the routes intersecting them
and also the more northerly waters off the United States and
Canada. Lord Fisher's policy of concentration in the North
Sea had greatly reduced this squadron; but in the year 1913 it
had been strengthened again. It was realized, of course, that

238

FAST COAST OPERATIONS

in time of war these waters would be of very great significance,
even though the important role that was to be played by
Canada and the United States as the war progressed was not
foreseen. The headquarters of the station was at Bermuda,
and the two principal bases were there and at Halifax. The
warships constituted the Fourth Cruiser Squadron under Rear
Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, who was to leave the
station soon after the war began and meet a hero's death at
Coronel. The squadron consisted of four 23-knot armoured
cruisers, the Suffolk (flagship), Lancaster, Essex, and Berwick,
and the 25-knot light cruiser Bristol. Other ships were to be
added later, including the old battleship Glory. The French
had two cruisers in that area, and the Germans also had two,
the very fast Dresden and the even faster Karlsruhe. Germany
had no naval base on that side of the Atlantic. Of the whole
trade between North America and Europe, so large a propor-
tion passed near Newfoundland that the waters immediately
south of that island, and between it and New York, would
ofrer to a German raider in the event of war a field of unsur-
surpassed richness in which to reap.

When Cradock received the preliminary warning on July
27 at Vera Cruz, he sent the Essex northward to join the
Lancaster which was docked at Bermuda, the two of them
being detailed to guard the northern routes. At the moment
when war was declared the exact position of the two Germans
in the West Indies was unknown to the British admiral; but it
was virtually certain that they would begin to raid commerce
without delay. The German cruiser warfare which was to
begin with the declaration of war had been carefully planned by
the Naval Staff in Berlin. The Dresden and Karlsruhe might
choose the northern routes for their debut, and it was not long
before reports began to come in that they were in the waters
near Newfoundland and Canada. One unofficial story which
was published in Sydney, had it that two German cruisers had
been sighted off St. Pierre. The fastest ship in the squadron,
the Bristol, was then sent northward. A few hours before the
declaration of war, Cradock was warned by the Admiralty
that the point of greatest danger on his station appeared to be
off New York, and he thereupon started northward himself in
the Suffolk. On his way he saw the Karlsruhe, and more than
once came within a hair's breadth of catching her. Although
she was saved by her great speed which exceeded that of any
of Cradock's cruisers, the British admiral succeeded in pre-

239

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

venting her from raiding the northern routes, if that was her
intention. Rumours in Canada, however, continued to locate
one or more Germans in northern waters; but in fact none of
them had gone there, and before the month was half over those
routes had been well secured. On September 28 Admiral von
Tirpitz wrote: "The cruisers out at sea must one after the other
perish for lack of coal, provisions, and refitting stations."3 He
was right, and by the end of the year the German raiders all
over the seas were under control. They failed to produce more
than a local and temporary effect on the flow of trade.4 Admiral
Cradock took the Suffolk to Halifax where she arrived on
August 13, and where a large number of the inhabitants, in-
cluding three hundred officers and men of the 63rd Regiment,
came down to the dockyard and helped to coal her.5

The Operations which have been described were almost
exclusively directed against German cruisers. There was
another danger, however, which was present from the begin-
ning and which lasted until the entry of the United States into
the war. The North American routes had been distinguished
from all others by the large number, the size, and the speed of
the liners which plied upon them. Many were German, and of
these, when the war-cloud burst, a large number were lying in
the ports of the United States or were racing to reach them. A
considerable proportion of these enemy liners were admirably
adapted to commerce raiding. The decision in the famous
Alabama case had affirmed the principle that a neutral govern-
ment is bound to use due diligence to prevent, within its
jurisdiction, the arming and equipping of a belligerent ship for
commerce raiding, and also to prevent the departure of such
ships from its territorial waters. This principle had been fur-
ther validated by the Hague Convention of 1907. Nevertheless
there was nothing to prevent the conversion of a liner into a
warship on the high seas. This had already been done in the
case of the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which had left New York a
short time before war was declared and had received guns and
men from the Karlsruhe not far from the Bahamas. In the
ports from Cartagena to Boston ninety-one enemy ships had
found refuge. Along the northern part of that coast there were
fifty-three, of which thirty-two were at New York. The liners
at New York and Boston were particularly dangerous, because

3 Tirpitz, Memoirs, n, p. 352.

4 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, I, p. 1.

6 Account of these cruiser Operations is based on Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations,
i, pp. 44-51.

240

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

those two ports were so close to the most vulnerable part oi the
North Atlantic routes. In addition to the danger of merchant
ships being sent out to raid commerce, there was also the
chance of their trying to cross the Atlantic with cargoes des-
tined for Germany, or slipping out to coal some German
cruiser. Moreover there were German officials and organiza-
tions in the United States with both the will and the means to
assist them. On November 7, for example, the following report
reached Ottawa from Halifax:

Glory, Niobe in port. No cruisers in Canadian Waters. Other ships
out of wireless touch since noon. Dutch ships leave today New York with
balloon for Germany, also German reserves. Crown Princess Cecilie arrived
Boston from Bar Harbour. North German Lloyd Breslau coaling at New
Orleans to proceed Panama Canal to coal German cruisers.6

From time to time, until the United States entered the war,
naval Intelligence continued to receive reports of German
liners preparing to leave.7

The danger of enemy cruisers on the northern part of the
station was removed in a little more than a week, except for the
chance, which was present throughout the war, that raiders
might slip or break out from Germany to raid on the routes
between Europe and North America. In addition to preventing
enemy merchant ships from leaving American ports, the Fourth
Cruiser Squadron had occasionally to provide escorts for Cana-
dian troops crossing to Great Britain. Later in the war, auxiliary
patrols were developed on a considerable scale to deal with any
enemy submarines which might operate near Canada or New
foundland.8 These patrols, although commanded by an officer
of the Canadian Naval Service, were under the general direc-
tion of the Admiral at Bermuda.

While the Niobe was being refitted at Halifax, the manager
of the powerful wireless station at Glace Bay, which was an
important strategic link, had come to fear that German and
Austrian miners living in the neighbourhood, or an enemy
ship, might try to disable his station, and he asked for an
armed guard. A party from Niobe with two 12-pounders and
two Maxims left Halifax for Glace Bay on the night of August
4-5 by special train. They reached the wireless station the
following day, mounted their guns, and made other defensive
preparations. The Niobe 's party remained on guard until, two

6 Halifax to Naval (signal), Nov. 7, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-2.

7 These German liners are fully dealt with in Fayle, Seaborne Trade, t, ch. 6.

8 See below pp. 245-55.

241

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

days later, an army guard being present to protect the wireless
station, they returned to their ship.9

The Niobe had been acquired for training purposes and not
for war. She was not comparable in usefulness for warlike
Operations to a more modern cruiser, and was far too slow to
catch or escape from the enemy cruisers which she might have
met. Her guns might possibly have been outranged by theirs,
and she was very liable to mechanical defects. In war, however,
almost any warship is useful. Had Niobe been able to engage at
her own range, a privilege ordinarily but not always denied to
the slower ship, and with reasonably good gunnery, she would
have been more than a match for any of the German light
cruisers which operated in the outer oceans during the war,
because of her extraordinarily heavy battery. She was also
thoroughly adequate to deal with an armed merchant cruiser,
and was a valuable addition to the Fourth Cruiser Squadron.

By September 1 the Niobe was ready for duty, and reported
to Ottawa: "Trial most satisfactory worked up to 104 revolu-
tions, ammunition completed to full stowage. Coaling tonight;
have reported myself to Fourth Cruiser Squadron; leave here
tomorrow for St. John's in accordance with orders received
from SUFFOLK." 10 The Halifax Chronicle reported her going:
"At seven yesterday morning the cruiser's anchors were hoisted
and she steamed rapidly down the harbor, passing Chebucto
Head before eight o'clock. The Niobe will assist in the protec-
tion of the transatlantic trade routes." She was actually on her
way to Newfoundland in order to complete her complement.
A branch of the Royal Naval Reserve which had been formed
in that colony in the year 1900 was now able to supply the
trained ratings the Niobe so sorely needed, and these were
taken on board at the Canadian rates of pay. The island was
living up to its reputation as a "nursery for seamen." On
October 30 the numbers borne on the Niobe 's books were:11

(R.N 16

Officers {R.C.N 18

[Volunteers 10

R.N 194

R.C.N . 28

Volunteers, including 107

Newfoundland Reservists. . 441

Total 707

Men

9 Duguid, Canadian Forces in the Great War, I, pp. 17-18; Capt. C. E. Aglionby's account
noted below.

10 Niobe to Naval (signal), Sept. 1, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-2.

11 Niobe to Naval (signal), Oct. 30, 1914, N.S. 1-1-19.

242

PLATE VII

OPERATIONAL AREA
of H.M.C.S. XfOBE

1914 - 1915

tor easluiird tontinuation
of map see inset.

BERMUDA

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

The Niobe" s first operational assignment on October 22,
1914, took her to the northward, where she cruised about
among icebergs orT the Strait of Belle Isle, trying to intercept a
German cruiser which had been reported to be in the Gulf, but
which turned out to have been a myth. Her second mission
was as an escort. The first armed force to leave Canada during
the war was the Royal Canadian Regiment — the only infantry
regiment in the Permanent Force — which was detailed to
relieve the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment on
garrison duty in Bermuda. They sailed in the transport
Canada^ with Niobe escorting, to arrive at Bermuda on
September 13. The Canada reached Halifax on her return
journey with the Lincolnshires on board on September 18, the
Niobe again acting as escort.12 On her arrival the cruiser was
suffering from a defective condenser which necessitated several
days of dockyard treatment. Niobe had been earmarked as one
of the escorts for the first Canadian contingent, which was
expected to sail for England in the near future: but this plan
was not carried out.

The 'Niobe' then joined the blockading squadron of the Royal Navy
[Fourth Cruiser Squadron] off New York harbour, inside which there were
thirty eight German ships including some fast liners, which could act as
commerce destroyers if they could escape. We boarded and searched all
vessels leaving the harbour, and in the early days took off many German
reservists who were trying to get back to Germany in neutral ships .... we
had to pass many things in neutral ships which we knew were destined for
Germany, to be used against our men. One particular example I remember
was a large sailing ship carrying a cargo of cotton bound for Hamburg, but
this was not contraband at that time and we had to allow it to go on. It
was very monotonous work, especially after the first few weeks when, owing
to reports of possible submarine attacks, we had to keep steaming up and
down, zig-zagging the whole time. After the first few weeks, owing to
complaints in the American press by German sympathizers to the effect that
we were sitting on Uncle Sam's doorstep preventing people coming in and
out, we had to keep our patrol almost out of sight of land. The American
Navy were very friendly to us, and when their ships passed us they used to
cheer ship and play British tunes. One day when we had news that the
'Vaterland' had raised steam and would probably bolt out at night, we over-
heard a signal made by wireless 'En clair' from one American ship to
another "it is the Dutch 'Vaderland' not the German 'Vaterland' which is
going out tonight." We used to spend sixteen days at sea, return to Halifax
for coal and provision, and then resume our beat. This was done in all
weathers, and sometimes the temperature off Nova Scotia would fall to 20°
below zero, and then the spray would freeze into a solid coating all over the
ship, making it almost impossible to work the guns. Our most exciting
moment perhaps was when the 'Niobe' was ordered down to Newport News

12 Duguid, Canadian Forces in the Great fi'ar, i, pp. 70-71, and App. 30.

243

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

in Virginia, for which port a German armed raider was making. We were
unlucky enough to meet a 100 mile an hour gale, and the ship had to turn
head to sea and go slow till the weather moderated. During this time we
had many S.O.S. messages, but were unable to render any assistance.
When the weather moderated and we arrived off the harbour, the German
raider had passed in. She was given 24 hours to put to sea again, and
declared her intention of doing so, so we waited just outside the three mile
limit for her. When the 24 hours expired, however, she decided not to risk
it.13

Niobe spent about nine months taking her turn at patrolling
off New York, and so successful were she and the other cruisers
assigned to that duty that no enemy ship sailed from that
port.14 The composition of the Fourth Cruiser Squadron
varied from time to time. On February 22, 1915, for example,
it consisted of the Glory (flagship), Berwick, Caronia, Essex,
Melbourne, Niobe, Suffolk, and Sydney.1* The Niobe s base
throughout was Halifax, which other members of the squadron
also visited occasionally. As their names imply, the cruisers
Melbourne and Sydney were Australian warships serving ten
thousand miles from home. The Sydney was already famous
for having destroyed the Emden, and when she put into Halifax
during August and September 1915 she was given a welcome
befitting a conqueror.

On July 17, 1915, Niobe returned to Halifax badly in need
of reconditioning. Her hull was intact; but the funnels were
collapsing, the boilers worn out, and the bulkheads in bad
shape, besides which she had no fire-control mechanism. To
recondition her would have been an extensive and expensive
task, and one which was not worth undertaking because of the
ship's obsolescence.16 The Admiralty proposed that H.M.S.
Sutlej, a large cruiser three years younger than Niobe, should be
exchanged for the latter free of cost. But the Canadian naval
authorities were in no position to man the Sutlej, because of
their commitments in connection with the east coast patrols,
and the Admiralty's offer was therefore not accepted.17 The

13 Niobe' s records of* movements for the period Aug. 1914-July 1915 have not been found
in Canada, England, or Bermuda. The above quotation is from an account kindly written and
supplied in 1944 by Capt. Aglionby, who in 1914-15 was Cdr. C. E. Aglionby, R.C.N., and was
the cruiser's executive officer. Capt. Aglionby's account is based on memory supplemented by
some documents in his possession. In the early days of the patrol off New York, until the
practice was stopped out of deference to United States neutrality, outgoing British liners used
to stop and send over to Niobe turkeys and other choice fare.

14 Hurd, The Merchant Navy, i, p. 170.

16 Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, n, p. 422.

16 Niobe to Naval (signal), July 18, 1915, N.S. 1047-19-2; interview Julv 1943 with Eng.
Cdr. J. F. Bell, O.B.E., R.C.N., engineer officer Niobe, 1914-15.

17 Correspondence in A.R.O., L 745-1915; and in Borden Papers, O'C. No. 660.

244

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

Niobe was paid off on September 6, reverting to the disposal of
the Canadian authorities who recommissioned her as a depot
ship. The great explosion at Halifax on December 6, 1917,
wrecked Niobe s superstructure and caused a number of fires.
Many of the records on board were destroyed, and the depot
was disorganized tor some time. The damages were repaired,
however, and the ship continued to act as a depot until 1920
when she was sold for $40,175 to be broken up.

In an earlier age the warship was by no means the highly
specialized vessel which she has since become. For the most
part she was a merchant ship used in time of war for fighting,
and Henry VII of England was accustomed, during the periods
of peace which he so dearly loved, to hire out to merchants his
men-of-war. Before the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, a warship had become as different from any vessel built
for peaceful ends as a suit of armour is from a suit of clothes.
Accordingly, when the First World War broke out, no one had
foreseen that such inoffensive little craft as fishing boats,
yachts, excursion boats, and tugs, would have any significant
naval part to play at all. Yet in the course of that war Great
Britain was obliged to mobilize for warlike purposes an aux-
iliary navy of nearly four thousand small commercial or
pleasure craft, manned by almost fifty thousand officers and
men.18 She was, in fact, compelled, in order to command the
sea, to employ two distinct navies instead of just one, each of a
formidable size. On a much smaller scale the same was true of
the other allied powers with maritime interests. This was a
manifestation of the tendency of modern war to replace the
national army and navy by the nation in arms.

Prior to 1914 the submarine mine and the submarine had
been adjuncts of practically every navy; nevertheless, although
commerce raiding was an old story, it had been generally
assumed for various reasons that these two modern devices
would be used against warships and transports only. Conse-
quently, when in the course of the First World War the German
Navy loosed them both against the merchant ships, defensive
measures were almost wholly wanting and had to be improvised
in all haste. The mine and the submarine are two of the most
furtive and elusive products of the industrial revolution. They
walk in darkness and destroy in the noonday; and so menacing
did their achievements along the sea routes become, that it
seemed not onlv that the allies would suffer defeat, but also

u Hurd, The Merchant Navy, I, p. 257.

245

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

that sea power itself in any positive sense had passed away.
As time went on, however, many means were found to counter
this dire threat. Each was a palliative rather than a cure, yet
in their aggregate they enabled the war to be won. The mines
were sought by patrol craft and removed by minesweepers.
Various were the means employed against submarines, the
most important being escorted convoys, and the patrolling of
known or likely hunting-grounds by vessels armed with guns
and depth charges. It was chiefly for the latter duty that the
small ships which formed the auxiliary flotillas were taken
over, armed and equipped, and sent forth.

The Naval Service set up a small coastal patrol on the east
coast of Canada in the early months of the war, and during the
summer of 1915 a patrol was maintained on the Newfoundland
coast by the governments of that colony and of Great Britain.
By the end of the season it had become evident to ail concerned
— the governments of Canada and Newfoundland and the
Commander in Chief of the North America and West Indies
Station — that it was desirable to co-ordinate this work with
that of the Canadian flotilla. An arrangement was accordingly
made whereby the Canadian patrols became responsible for the
whole Canadian coast, and for the shores of Newfoundland,
except that part extending from St. Pierre eastward and north-
ward to Belle Isle which the Newfoundland ships were to
patrol. In other words, the Canadian patrols were to watch the
coasts which bordered the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the open-
sea coast of the Maritime Provinces. The senior officer of the
Canadian flotilla was to command the whole, and the ships
were to be interchanged if necessary. 19 During the season of
1916 the Canadian patrol and minesweeping vessels were
twelve in number, of which five were on duty at Halifax, while
seven patrolled in the Gulf, and of the Newfoundland ships
there were three.20 These vessels were armed with 3- or 6-
pounder guns, and as their fewness implies their function was
a limited one. They provided coastal and port patrols — a war-
time naval coastguard service.

Meanwhile Germany's naval designers had been working
very hard, and her yards were turning out submarines greatly
superior to their predecessors in size, armament, and cruising
radius. The possibility consequently arose that submarines

19 Material in N.S. 1065-4 series.

20 Memo, by Dir. Naval Service, Jan. 26, 1917, N.S. 1065-7-2 (1).

246

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

might cross the Atlantic, and in April 1916 the Admiralty,
whose responsibilities were almost unlimited, sounded a warn-
ing. This was to the effect that any submarines which might
operate near the Newfoundland or Canadian coasts would
probably be U-boats of the latest type, and that nothing
smaller than a 12-pounder gun was in the least likely to put
them out of action. 2 l This despatch was full of submarine lore,
learned in the school of bitter experience. In May the Com-
mander in Chief also warned the Canadian authorities: "It
should be clearly understood that, should enemy submarines
appear off the Canadian Coasts, my cruisers are no protection
to Transports against submarine attacks."22 No raiders
appeared that summer; nevertheless in November the Admir-
alty sent word that in view of the activity of German sub-
marines in the North Atlantic the twelve existing patrol vessels
ought to be increased in number to about thirty-six, and offered
to lend an officer experienced in patrol work to advise the
Canadian Government, and, if desirable, to command the
patrols.23

The Canadian Government's reply went across a few days
later in these words: "As danger to Admiralty store transports
and Canadian trade in near future from enemy submarines
appears to be growing serious, Canadian Government considers
adequate protection should be accorded by Admiralty."24 To
support this claim the government pointed out that in the early
months of the war it had asked the Admiralty whether or not
Canada should undertake to supplement the naval defence of
the Empire, and had received the reply that Canada's efforts
should be concentrated on providing land forces.25 The gov-
ernment's case also rested upon the fact that every available
man with naval training, and every spare gun, had been
scraped together and sent to England. The problem was
further made difficult because the fishing boats on the Cana-
dian coasts, unlike the trawlers and drifters which operated out
of the ports in Britain, were not considered suitable for patrol
work. Nor were more than a handful of other ships that could

21 Admiralty to Col. Office, Apr. 8, 1916, N.S. 1065^-1 (1).

22 C. in C. to Dir. Naval Service, May 22, 1916, ibid.

23 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen. (cable), Nov. 11, 1916, N.S. 1065-7-2 (1). A similar message was
sent to the Newfoundland Government. Additional weight was lent to this warning by the
fact that during the summer the German .submarine Deutschland had crossed the Atlantic to
Norfolk, Va., with a commercial cargo, and returned safely to Germany.

24 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec, Nov. 17, 1916, ibid.
26 See pp. 218-9 above.

247

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

be used available either in Canada or in the United States.
The other side of the picture was that although unrestricted
submarine warfare had not yet formally begun, the Admiralty
already had tremendous responsibilities and commitments in
waters where submarines were not merely feared but were
actually swarming. For a while longer, therefore, the Admir-
alty declined to provide for the east coast patrols.26

Accordingly the Canadian Government, receding from its
first position, reported that it was making every effort to buy
or build the necessary ships, and asked the Admiralty to
provide guns and trained men for them. It also suggested that
the cruiser Rainbow, stationed on the west coast, should be
paid off, and that some of her men and guns should be used for
the new patrol vessels,27 and this was done. The government
bought a number of suitable ships, and arranged for twelve
trawlers to be built at the Vickers yard in Montreal, and at
Poison's in Toronto. Attempts were also made to obtain guns
in the United States, and later in Japan, but without success.
At this point Sir Robert Borden stepped into the picture by
sending a personal cablegram to the First Lord of the Admir-
alty, Sir Edward Carson, asking for guns and trained gunnery
ratings. Ships to the required number were available or in
prospect, but these would be useless without guns and men to
fire them.28

Borden's appeal for help had only just been received when
the German submarine campaign suddenly entered a new and
much more menacing phase. On January 31, 1917, the German
Government announced to the world its decision to wage un-
restricted submarine warfare, declaring that shipping found in
the Mediterranean and the north-eastern Atlantic would
thenceforth be sunk at sight. The newcomer to the seas was
making his own rules as the game proceeded. This declaration
did not apply to Canadian and Newfoundland waters; yet
besides greatly complicating the problem on the European side
of the Atlantic, it intensified the potential danger elsewhere.
The combined result of Borden's appeal and of the increased
danger was that the Admiralty began to contribute largely to
the resources of the east coast patrols, and this support was
continued to the end. Carson replied to the Prime Minister,
offering to release to the Canadian Government enough 12-

26 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Jan. 10, 1917, N.S. 1065-7-2 (1).

27 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec, Jan. 16, 1917, ibid.

28 Jan. 27, 1917, ibid.

248

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

pounder guns, ordered by the Admiralty from a firm in the
United States, to arm the flotilla, and promising that every-
thing possible would be done about the gunners.29 The Ad-
miralty went much further than this, moreover, for it asked the
Canadian Government to arrange for and supervise the build-
ing of 36 trawlers and 100 drifters. These were to be built in
Canada at the expense of the British Government. The
Admiralty undertook to furnish the designs, and implied that
some of the vessels would be added to the Canadian patrols.30
The Dominion Government arranged to have the vessels con-
structed, distributing the work among the principal ship-
builders in eastern Canada.

Neither these vessels, nor the dozen trawlers which the
Canadian Government had ordered for itself, were available
during the summer of 1917. In the spring the Admiralty's
expert arrived and was placed in command of the patrols. His
tenure of office was brief, however, for wherever he went he
trod on other people's toes; so the Admiralty recalled him and
the patrols saw him no more. Capt. Walter Hose, R.C.N., who
had formerly commanded the Rainbow, was appointed Captain
of Patrols and held that position until the end of the war.

The commander of a German submarine entering the area
in question had a choice of objectives. He might try to attack
the coastwise traffic or the fishing fleets, or he might turn his
attention to the stream of shipping which flowed between the
Canadian ports and Europe, chiefly Great Britain. Ships
might be attacked either in port or at sea; a harbour and its
immediate approaches, however, are relatively easy to protect
against naval forces, largely because the vulnerable area is very
restricted. The greatest threat, therefore, was to ships at sea,
and of these by far the most important and the most difficult
to safeguard were the ones which plied between Canada and
Europe. The route was one of the main channels through
which supplies flowed to Great Britain from the outside world.
It was comparatively short and therefore economical of ships.
It tapped the resources of the greater part of the North Ameri-
can continent, which included by far the greatest industrial
area outside Europe. The route was frequented by troop
transports, and it is difficult to think of anything which govern-
ments in war-time fear more than the loss of these. Along it

29 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., Feb. 8, 1917, ibid.

30 Signal, Feb. 5, 1917, ibid.

249

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

too, in a westerly direction, came ships bringing gold from
Great Britain to Canada.

A raider, whether surface or submarine, was unlikely to
find good hunting in the open spaces of the ocean, for there the
ships which he was seeking to capture or destroy had a choice
of many routes. For this reason raiders generally operated at
those points where traffic is compelled to concentrate — near
straits, off prominent headlands, or near a terminus. The
waters off Canada and Newfoundland were well adapted to a
raider's work, at least in the summer; for they contained a
number of places where the traffic, both inward bound and out-
ward, was forced to concentrate. The most important of these
areas lay off Cape Race, in Cabot and Belle Isle Straits, in the
upper reaches of the Gull near Anticosti, and off Halifax and
Sydney. Along those coasts too, the land surrenders reluc-
tantly to the sea, the continental shelf projecting itself outward
for many miles to form a broad belt of water shallow enough in
many places to permit of mines being laid,31 or of submarines
resting on the bottom. The coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador,
and Canada, were in great part unsettled, and dotted along
them were many inlets where a submarine might go for rest
and minor repairs, or in order to meet a supply ship. In the
raider's favour also was the immense area of the region to be
patrolled, and the consequent length of the coast-lines sur-
rounding and within it. The special disadvantage of those
waters from the point of view of German submarines was the
great distance from home or from any friendly territory.

The last summer of the war saw a great increase in the size
and effectiveness of the flotilla, as the newly-built trawlers and
drifters became available after the St. Lawrence opened in the
spring. Modern war is insatiable, however, and the plans now
called for an auxiliary fleet of 112 vessels, in place of the 36
which the Admiralty had recommended a year and a half
before. On March 2 the Commander in Chief had written that:

In view of the vital interests at stake, and the natural geographical
features which offer so strong an inducement to the enemy to undertake a
submarine and mine offensive in the area mentioned against Allied troop
and cargo vessels and convoys as soon as weather and ice conditions admit,
I cannot but regard the position as involving very grave risks, and feel it my
duty to urge that every effort be made to have the whole flotilla completely
equipped and organized and at work in their assigned positions at as early
a date as possible.32

31 They could be laid effectively in depths up to a hundred fathoms.

32 C. in C. to Admiral Supt., Halifax, Mar. 2, 1918, N.S. 1065-7-6 (1).

250

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

Like so many human endeavours, the construction of the
trawlers and drifters was slower than had been anticipated;
nevertheless, soon after the river opened, nearly 50 patrol
ships were available, and by early October the auxiliary fleet
consisted of 116 vessels. Of these, 87 belonged to the Admiralty
and the remaining 29 to the Canadian Naval Service; but all
except those attached to Halifax were under the Captain of
Patrols. The 12 trawlers belonging to the Naval Service were
modelled on the North Sea fishing vessels of that name. They
were sea-worthy craft of 136 tons and a speed of 10 knots, and
they had cost $191,000 each to build. The commercial or
pleasure boats which had been taken over for the patrols were
of various types. Several had been obtained from other govern-
ment Departments, a number were bought in the United
States, and 3 had been Canadian-owned private yachts.33 One
of these last, the Grilse, was a most formidable little craft for a
patrol vessel, since she carried two 12-pounders and a torpedo
tube, and could travel at 32 knots. The Admiralty drifters
were fitted with a 6-pounder gun apiece, while most of the
others mounted a 12-pounder. All carried depth charges — from
2 to 6 per vessel — and a large number were fitted with wire-
less.34 They had the status of warships and flew the white
ensign.

They were obviously not Dreadnoughts, nor did their work
require that they should be. Between them and the German
battleships stood the Grand Fleet, and in order to reach them
hostile cruisers would have had to pass both the British cruisers
in Europe and those of the North America and West Indies
Squadron. It was to deal with submarines, against which
battleships and cruisers could give little protection, that the
auxiliary patrols had been called into existence. What was
required for this purpose was not powerful ships, which can
never be very numerous, but a large number of vessels capable
of dealing with a submarine, preferably single-handed. These
being many could scatter widely, to sweep up mines, to recon-
noitre, or to stand on guard:

Each degree of Latitude

Strung about Creation

Seeth one (or more) of us . . .

They could attack a hostile submarine with gun-fire if it was
on the surface, and with depth charges if it was submerged.

33 Digest by Asst. N. Sec, N.S. 1001-5-1.

34 Memo, for the Admiralty, July 18, 1918, N.S. 1065-7-6 (1).

251

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

By these means, with luck and good management, they could
destroy the submarine, or damage it, or drive it away.

The area which the east coast patrols had to cover extended
from Belle Isle to the Bay of Fundy, and from Rimouski to
the Virgin Rocks. Their sole purpose was to protect shipping
in those waters, and as they increased in number this protec-
tion assumed various forms and they ceased to be merely
coastal patrols. The principal ports were Halifax, Sydney,
Montreal, and Quebec. Halifax was at all times important,
but particularly so in winter when it became the prin-
cipal shipping centre. Being also the chief Canadian naval
base, British and other warships frequented it and it had
always to be carefully watched. Sydney, with the coal mines
close by, was the most important fuelling station on the coast.
The two St. Lawrence ports served the larger part of the ship-
ping during the open season. The difficult river navigation was
their protection; but the stretch below them where the river
slowly merges into the Gulf had to be watched. During the
season of 1918 the flotilla was divided into three roughly equal
groups, one of which looked after Halifax. The channels lead-
ing to the port had to be swept every day and the harbour itself
patrolled. Merchant ships and transports about to sail in
convoy necessarily left the harbour one by one, and were
placed in convoy formation outside. Patrol vessels were there-
fore assigned to protect them while they were forming up, and
in general to watch the approaches to the port. For the same
purposes a second group of vessels was stationed at Sydney.
In addition, the coasts of the whole area were patrolled, in
order to watch for suspicious craft and for mines, and to
investigate any reports received from shore of unusual and
possibly sinister doings. The positions of special strategic
importance which have already been mentioned had to be
watched. Escorts were provided for convoys moving along the
coast, and to accompany for some distance to sea the slower
convoys sailing to Great Britain. The third group of patrol
vessels attended to these various duties.

Even little patrol ships must have bases, and with these the
region was well supplied. There are many harbours along those
coasts, and even the smaller ones could accommodate these
vessels. With one exception, all the patrol craft were coal-
burners for which a supply of good fuel was obtained from the
mines on Cape Breton. The three principal bases were at
Sydney, Halifax, and St. John's, Newfoundland. The head-

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EAST COAST OPERATIONS

quarters of the east coast patrols and the main base for most
of the vessels were at Sydney, the easiest port at which to coal,
and admirably situated with relation to the whole Gulf area
from a strategic point of view. The vessels protecting Halifax
and its approaches were based on that port, and nearly all
extensive repairs were done there, minor ones often being
carried out elsewhere. The main base for the Newfoundland
ships was at St. John's. A number of other ports, among them
Gaspe, were used as cruising bases for the more distant patrols.
Those vessels whose duties took them away from their bases
ordinarily spent slightly more than a third of their time in port
for supplies, repairs, rest, and training.

The manning of the flotilla had been a matter of extreme
difficulty, since practically all the trained naval personnel in
Canada had been pre-empted long before, and no adequate
steps had been taken well in advance to train crews for the
greatly-enlarged auxiliary fleet. The Admiralty and the Naval
Service between them, however, had contrived to rake up
officers and men, some of those sent over from England being
Canadian volunteer reservists who had been serving in trawlers
off the British coast. There were barely enough to go around,
and a large proportion were inexperienced. 'The officers and
men of the vessels are untrained", reported their commander,
"not only in the technical knowledge required to handle the
weapons and offensive appliances on board the ships, but also
in service discipline being drafted to ships as hardly more than
raw recruits."35 By the end of the war there were nearly two
thousand officers and ratings serving in the east coast patrol
vessels. This improvised organization was never called upon
to deal with any sustained or serious attack. Not until the
summer of 1918 did the German submarines appear in those
waters; and when at last they came their behaviour was
passive and discreet. This unwonted abstention from vigorous
measures was attributed by the Captain of Patrols to their
being on their way home and to their mission in those waters
being largely to spy out the nakedness of the land.36

A few staccato generalizations are perhaps in order. The
east coast patrols were a successful venture in imperial co-
operation— mainly between the Services, for in purely naval
matters the governments did not intervene. The Admiralty

Capt. of Patrols to Sec. N.S., Sept. 24, 1918, N.S. 1065-7-12 (1).

Ibid., Oct. 21, 1918. The relevant volume of the German official history is not yet

available

253

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

prescribed the general policy, which was carried out by officers
responsible to the Department of the Naval Service. The
Admiralty on the whole acted with restraint and tact, and the
Canadian Service cheerfully accepted its subordinate role.
"Knowing full well we have not a proper organization," wrote
its Director, "we have most warmly appreciated and acted on
the advice of the Admiralty on every occasion."37 The tech-
nical advantages of this close association to the smaller Service
are evident at every turn. The relatively large share in the cost
of the shipbuilding programme borne by the Admiralty is
noticeable, and the close common interest of Canada and
Newfoundland in any scheme of naval defence on the east coast
is clearly revealed. In their joint patrol arrangements, the
relations of Newfoundland with Canada were very similar to
those which existed between Canada and Great Britain in
matters naval.

The difficulties and dangers which lie in unpreparedness for
war, given the type of world in which we have had to live, are
apparent enough throughout. It is not always recognized,
however, that of all forms of defence, naval defence is the most
difficult to improvise rapidly. The patrols were probably as
efficient as circumstances permitted; nevertheless the bricks
which the Israelites were forced to make without straw were
not necessarily the best in Egypt. The flotilla suffered from
two irremediable weaknesses, one being the scarcity of trained
officers and men. The other was a lack of supporting destroyers
or their equivalent, for there was only one well-armed vessel
available capable of quickly reinforcing a threatened area. In
view of an opinion which is sometimes expressed, it is worth
noting that the Canadian Government reacted to the threat of
hostile submarines off the coast precisely as governments with
large maritime interests have always done on similar occasions.

The east coast patrols were a necessary precaution, and may
have been a deterrent as well. They also, with the auxiliary
fleets elsewhere, built up a large part of that foundation of
experience on which the much more recent campaign against
the submarines was based. The flotilla was prolific of prece-
dents: it was the first fleet to be commanded by an officer of the
Royal Canadian Navy; it contained the first ships built
expressly for the Naval Service; and it faced the first direct
naval attack in the history of the Dominion. The east coast
patrols and their organization now seem like the first run of a

" Memo, by Dir. Naval Service, Jan. 16, 1917, N.S. 1065-7-2 (1).

254

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

play which was to be revived many years later in the same
theatre during the Second World War.

In the summer of 1918 the efforts of the flotilla began to be
supplemented by means of air patrols.38 During the spring of
that year the appearance of U-boats on the western side of the
Atlantic had been considered to be more likely than ever, and
in March the Admiralty, in drawing the attention of the
Canadian Government to the probable danger, had advised
that air defences should be set up on the east coast of the
Dominion. The question was considered on April 20, at a
meeting of representatives of the British, United States, and
Canadian navies, which was held in Washington. It was
decided that air stations should be immediately established as
follows: at Cape Race, two dirigibles and two kite balloons; at
Sydney, six flying boats, three dirigibles, and four kite bal-
loons; at Halifax, six flying boats, three dirigibles, and four
kite balloons; and at Cape Sable, three flying boats or two
dirigibles. Canada possessed none of the necessary equipment
or trained personnel, and owing to the pressure of the sub-
marine campaign on the eastern side of the Atlantic the British
Government was not in a position to make up the deficiencies.
The United States authorities were accordingly asked to do so,
pending the time when a Canadian organization should be in a
position to assume the responsibility. The Dominion Govern-
ment was to provide the necessary bases.39

The construction of two air bases at Halifax and North
Sydney respectively, at an estimated cost of $2,189,600 for the
first year, was therefore authorized.40 The American Govern-
ment having undertaken to supply the necessary personnel and
planes, the United States Naval Reserve Flying Corps trans-
ferred elements of its coast patrol organization, equipped with
flying boats, to Halifax and North Sydney, with instructions to
operate from those bases. A number of officers were loaned by
the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for the purpose of
organizing an aviation branch of the Department of the Naval
Service, and early in September the Royal Canadian Naval Air
Service was established. The reason for creating the new
service was stated to be " . . . that pending further consider-

38 In this chapter the designation "east coast patrols" has been applied exclusively to the
auxiliary-vessel flotilla, as was customary at that time.

39 Paragraph based on "Occasional Paper No. 6," Sept. 10, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1); and
on P.C. 3009, Dec. 5, 1918.

40 P.C. 1379, June 5, 1918.

255

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ation ot the organization of a Canadian Air Service for military
and for naval purposes and in order to provide for immediate
needs it is desirable that a Canadian personnel be enrolled and
trained for service in connection with the two Air Stations
above referred to ... The government authorized the entry
as cadets of about 80 suitable young men between the ages of
17}^ and 26 years, and of 1,000 ratings. The Minister was
given authority to arrange for the training of cadets, and of
ratings as far as might be necessary, in Great Britain, or the
United States, or elsewhere.41 Lieut. -Col. J. T. Cull, R.A.F.,
served as Director during the first few months, and was suc-
ceeded by Major C. MacLaurin, R.A.F., with the title of
Acting Director. Both these officers had been lent to the
Canadian authorities by the Royal Air Force.

The machines sent from the United States were single-
motored Curtis flying boats, with Liberty engines. These
planes required a suitable area of water on which to take off
and land. The base near Halifax was situated at Baker Point42
on the Eastern Passage about three miles south of Dartmouth.
It was served by the Dartmouth Road, a railway siding, and
a water route across the harbour to Halifax. The buildings
comprised a mess and recreation building to accommodate
three hundred men; a barracks for a hundred men; a large
stores building; and a temporary steel hangar. The base at
North Sydney was located at Kelley's Beach on the western
boundary of the town, and was served by a main road, a rail-
way siding, and an electric railway. The buildings corres-
ponded to those at the Halifax station: the mess and recreation
building, however, had accommodation for four hundred men,
and the hangar was slightly larger than the one at Halifax.43
The site had required considerable filling to prevent flooding at
high tide.44

The cruising speed of the flying boats was approximately
60 knots, and their endurance about four hours. At first there
were 4 of them at each station, a number which was later
increased to 6. The plan was to provide air escort through the
approaches to the two ports for all convoys, both inward and
outward; to reserve one plane for emergency anti-submarine

41 P.C. 2154, Sept. 5, 1918.

42 An R.C.A.F. station was situated at Baker Point during the Seccr.d World War.

43 Dirrensions: hangar at Halifax 110' x 120', with 28/ clearance; hangar at North Sydney
110' x 140', with 28' clearance.

44 Paragraph based on "Occasional Faper No. 6."

256

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

missions; and to do as much patrolling as possible, given the
number of planes and the commitments which have just been
mentioned.46 Practices in spotting for harbour-defence guns
were also carried out. From each station anywhere from 11 to
51 hours of flying were performed weekly, these operational
flights being almost wholly uneventful. During the week pre-
ceding October 13, a convoy leaving Sydney was given air
protection for a distance of about 60 miles by 4 seaplanes
working in relays. In the course of the following week a sub-
marine was reported to be 63^ miles from the entrance to
Halifax harbour. Within ten minutes 2 planes were in the air
followed a little later by 2 others, and the whole of the suspec-
ted area was searched without result. Late in October a
successful flight was made from Halifax to Sydney with a load
of bombs.46

It had originally been intended to set up more than two air
stations, to employ dirigibles and kite balloons as well as
flying boats, and to replace the Americans as soon as possible
by trained Canadian personnel. After the bases had been set
up, also, there was a desire to obtain planes of a later and
therefore better design than those which had been supplied.
The scheme would no doubt have evolved along all or most of
these lines, had not its development been arrested at a very
early stage by the armistice of November 11. It had been
suggested in the course of the summer that air sub-stations
should be established at Cape Sable, Canso, Cape North, and
the Magdalen Islands. The idea of setting up such a station at
St. John's, Newfoundland, and another in northern Newfound-
land or Labrador to cover the Strait of Belle Isle, had also been
put forward.47 Only four of the kite balloons and none of the
dirigibles of the original plan materialized, nor were the im-
proved planes forthcoming.

In order to implement the policy of providing a Canadian
personnel, immediately after the creation of the new service on
September 5, candidates for entry as cadets were examined at
various centres across Canada, and at the end of that month .
the first draft of cadets reached Boston, Mass., to begin their
training, and the third and final draft left a month later for the
same destination. While in Boston all these cadets were

45 Minutes of meeting to discuss air operations, held on Aug. 26, 1918, N.S. 63-1-1 (1).

46 Weekly reports by the Dir., R.C.N.A.S., N.S. 63-1-4 (1).

47 Correspondence in N.S. 63-1-1 (1).

257

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

housed and trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology. A much smaller number of cadets were sent to Great
Britain for their training. The recruiting and training of these
cadets went forward very rapidly, in spite of some delay caused
by the influenza epidemic which was sweeping across North
America at this time.48 The recruiting and training of ratings
had gone forward more slowly, and no trained Canadian
personnel were available while the war lasted. The Americans
therefore continued to maintain and operate the planes until
the stations were closed down shortly after the armistice.

The air patrol formations were supplied by the United
States Navy. They were instructed to comply promptly with
all requests made by the Canadian naval authorities, but were
not under Canadian command. Partly, perhaps, because a
unified command was lacking, but chiefly because co-ordina-
tion of air and sea forces was in its infancy, the joint Operations
were by later standards very loosely integrated. In passing it
is worth mentioning that the commanding officer of the
American unit at Halifax was Lieut. Richard E. Byrd, U.S.N. ,
who was later to become widely known as an airman and
antarctic explorer.49

In December the Deputy Minister went to Washington,
where he came to an understanding with the American naval
authorities regarding the division of expenses. It was agreed
that Canada should pay for all the ground material which the
United States had furnished and left at the stations; and that
the flying material which the United States Navy had supplied,
consisting of 12 flying boats, 4 kite balloons, 26 spare Liberty
motors, and other equipment, should become the property of
the Canadian Government.50 Early in the same month re-
cruiting for the service was stopped and the existing personnel
were ordered to be discharged, on the ground that:

... a large number of Canadians have enlisted in the Royal Naval Air
Service, and many of these have distinguished themselves by their work at
the front. These men will return to Canada shortly and many of them
would doubtless wish to remain in the service permanently, and would form
a proper nucleus for a Canadian Naval Air Service.51

« Weekly reports in N.S. 63-1^ (1).

49 For Lieut. Byrd's personal account of his tour of duty at Halifax, see Byrd, Skyward,
pp. 64-76.

60 D. Min. to Min., Dec. 13, 1918, N.S. 63-1-1 (1).
51 P.C. 3009, Dec. 5, 1918.

258

EAST COAST OPERATIONS

The question of perpetuating the organization was raised from
time to time during the ensuing months, most notably in the
Jellicoe Report a year later. On his mission to Canada at the
end of the year 1919, Lord Jellicoe was asked, among many
other questions, whether permanent naval air forces were
necessary for the defence of the Canadian coasts, and if so what
their scale should be and where the necessary air stations
should be placed.

In his report Jellicoe recommended that a squadron of
flying boats and a torpedo squadron should be stationed on the
west coast. The purpose of the flying boats would be recon-
naissance and anti-submarine Operations, and the torpedo
squadron would be ready to operate from some point near the
Strait of Juan de Fuca or elsewhere on the coast, or from an
aircraft carrier. Jellicoe felt unable to specify suitable sites
for air stations on the west coast, or to recommend what
permanent disposition should be made of the existing stations
at Halifax and North Sydney. His suggestion that naval air
forces be maintained on one coast only doubtless resulted from
his opinion that, in the existing circumstances, Japan was a
likelier enemy than any other Power. Of the four fleet pro-
grammes which he put forward for the Dominion Government
to choose from, the two more ambitious ones included one and
two aircraft carriers respectively.52

During the year 1919 various suggestions were also made
and seriously considered, for combining Service aviation in
some way with the carrying of mail by air, forest protection by
means of planes, or commercial flying. At that time these
activities were potential, not actual; yet to a few minds they
seemed capable of being developed. In the Dominion of that
post-war period, however, a feeling of hostility to any measures
reminiscent of war together with a strong desire for retrench-
ment soon came to prevail; and the naval air service was not
revived in any form.

This abortive naval air organization calls to mind several
relevant features or incidents of the Second World War, among
which three may be mentioned. The Royal Canadian Naval
Air Service was a precursor of the Naval Air Division, R.C.N. ,
which was to be started a quarter of a century later. As an
instance of welcome assistance given by the United States

62 Report of Admiral oj the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., on Naval
Mission to the Dominion cf Canada {November-December, 1919), I, pp. 5, 13, 15; II, pp. 20-23.
For an account of Jellicoe's mission and report, see ch. 14.

259

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Government to the Naval Service, the incidents which have
been recounted foreshadowed many similar forms of help or
co-operation that were to appear in the course of the later
conflict. It is interesting to note, moreover, that as early as
1918 the outstanding role which air support was later to play
in anti-submarine warfare was faintly presaged, among other
places, on the east coast of Canada.53

63 Wing Cdr. F. H. Hitchens, "Evolution of the Royal Canadian Air Force," in Report of
the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, 1946, contains an account of the
R.C.N.A.S.

260

Chapter 12

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

THE Admiralty's problem off the west coast of North
America was threefold. First of all there was the coast
of British Columbia to protect. The greater part of it
was unrewarding to a raider, but it offered several inviting
objectives, of which, though Vancouver and Nanaimo were
difficult to get at, Victoria, Esquimalt, and Prince Rupert,
were more or less exposed. In the second place, shipping had
to be guarded. The coastwise trade received some protection
from the configuration of that extraordinary seaboard, and
the fishing boats were unlikely to invite a serious attack. The
Strait of Juan de Fuca with its approaches, however, formed
a focal area where the ships on two important ocean routes
converged. The routes were those from Vancouver to the
Orient and from Vancouver to Great Britain. The ships on
the former run were mainly fast liners, and were protected
by the immense size of the ocean on which they sailed, except
in the terminal waters. The ships sailing tor Great Britain,
carrying for the most part grain, lumber, and canned salmon,
took their cargoes southward down the coast and around by
the Strait of Magellan, or passed them by rail across the Isth-
mus of Panama. This traffic lane was a tempting one for
commerce raiders, because, running along the coast as it did,
merchantmen using it would be easy to find, while the raider
operating along it could remain close to possible sources of
fuel and of information. Moreover, in addition to receiving
the trade to and from Vancouver, this route was fed by the
principal Pacific ports of the United States. On the other
hand it was easy for a merchant ship on this run to hug the
coast. By doing this, should a hostile cruiser appear anywhere
north of Mexico, the merchantman might have a good chance
to take refuge inside the territorial waters of an exceedingly
powerful neutral.

On August 4, 1914, the naval force at the disposal of the
Admiralty in those waters consisted of three units. This
number was soon and unexpectedly increased to five when, a

261

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

few hours after the war began, the Canadian Government
acquired two submarines. Although not immediately ready
to act effectively at sea, the submarines could afford consider-
able protection to both coast and trade from Cape Flattery
inward, by the deterrent effect of their presence. Two little
H.M. sloops, the Algerine and Shearwater ; had also for some
years been stationed on the coast with their base at Esqui-
malt. The Algerine was a seasoned veteran, having taken in
the year 1900 a prominent and dangerous part in the action
off the Taku Forts in China,1 and the Shearwater was a relic
of the once proud Pacific Squadron. Their functions were to
visit various ports in North and South America, being avail-
able to assist British subjects in times of unrest or revolution
and to discharge Great Britain's responsibility in connection
with the sealing patrol. These sloops were useful for police
work, but they would have been quite helpless against a
cruiser. On the eve of the war they were on the west coast of
Mexico, safeguarding British subjects and other foreigners
during the civil war between Huerta and Carranza. When
Britain declared war on Germany the Algerine and Shearwater
sailed for Esquimalt, and during the voyage they were them-
selves in need of protection, a fact which constituted the
Admiralty's third responsibility. The remaining naval unit
in the area, and the only one theoretically capable of taking
the offensive, was H.M.C.S. Rainbow.

The German squadron in the Pacific consisted of two
powerful armoured cruisers, and three modern-type light
cruisers, the Emden, Nurnberg^ and Leipzig^ besides several
smaller vessels.2 The squadron, which was commanded by
Admiral Graf von Spee, was based on Tsingtau, and had no
bases or depots whatever in the eastern Pacific. When the
war began the squadron was at Ponape in the Carolines, and
von Spee had a wide choice of objectives. His purposes were,
of course, to damage allied trade, warships, and other interests,
on the largest possible scale, and eventually to take as many
of his ships as he could safely back to Germany. His two
most evident anxieties were the probable entry of Japan into
the war and the very powerful Australian battle cruiser
Australia. On the morning of August 13 von Spee made the
following entry in his diary:

1 Keyes, Adventures Ashore and Afloat, pp. 210-27; Longstaff, Esquimalt Naval Base, pp.
164-6.

2 This paragraph is based almost entirely on the German official naval history, Der Krieg
zur See, 1914-1918: Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausldndischen Gewdssern, i.

262

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

If we were to proceed toward the coast of America, we should have
both [coaling ports and agents] at our disposal, and the Japanese fleet
could not follow us thither without causing great concern in the United
States and so influencing that country in our favour.3

There were no enemy bases there, and the continent was com-
posed of neutral states; consequently von Spee thought that
on that coast it would be comparatively easy for him to get
coal and to communicate with Germany. He evidently meant
the coast of South America, and in the event it was there
that he took his squadron, having first detached the Emden
to the Indian Ocean where she began the most distinguished
career of any German raider of the First World War.

The civil war in Mexico had some time before resulted in
the forming of an international naval force, under i\merican
command, to protect foreigners near the coast. S.M.S.
Niirnberg represented the German Navy, until she was re-
lieved on July 7 at Mazatlan by S.M.S. Leipzig, commanded
by Capt. Haun. On her arrival at Mazatlan, the Leipzig
found, among other warships, the Japanese armoured cruiser
Idzumo and H.M.S. Algerine, and while they were in port
together friendly relations were established between the
German cruiser and the British sloop. The Shearwater at that
time was stationed at Ensenada. At the end of July the
American, German, and British warships had co-operated in
evacuating the Chinese from Mazatlan and embarking Euro-
peans and Americans, because the Carranzists were about to
storm the town. On July 31 the Canadian collier Cetriana
arrived at Mazatlan to coal the Leipzig.'' During the night of
August 1 the Leipzig s guns were cleared for action while she
and the Cetriana made ready for sea. In order to keep the
collier as ignorant as possible about current events in the
field of international relations the Germans took charge of
her wireless set.5

On August 1 the Admiralty asked the Canadian Govern-
ment that the Rainbow might be kept available for the pro-
tection of trade on the west coast of North America, where
the Leipzig was known to be.6 Had it not been for the govern-

3 Ibid., p. 80.

4 The Cetriana was owned in Vancouver, her master was a Royal Naval Reservist, and she
had been chartered in the spring by the N umber g s commander to carry coal and other sup-
plies to him from San Francisco. After the Germans had chartered her, according to the
British consul in San Francisco, the Cetriana had engaged a fresh crew consisting mainly of
Germans and Mexicans. Consul Gen., San Francisco, to N.S.H.Q., Sept. 12, 1914, N.S.
1018-10-2.

5 This paragraph is based on the account in Kreuzerkrieg, i, ch. 5.

6 Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen.'s Sec, n.d., N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

263

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

merit's earlier decision to send her out on sealing patrol the
Rainbow could not have intervened in connection with the
Komagata Maru, nor would she have been fit for sea when
war came. As it was, however, she was ready for sea though
not for war, and in accordance with the Admiralty's request
N.S.H.Q. telegraphed this order the same day to her captain,
Cdr. Walter Hose, R.C.N. :

Secret. Prepare for active service trade protection grain ships going
South. German cruiser NURNBERG or LEIPSIG [sic] is on West Coast
America. Obtain all information available as to Merchant ships sailing
from Canadian or United States Ports. Telegraph demands for Ordnance
Stores required to complete to fullest capacity. Urgent.7

Rainbow was also ordered to meet at Vancouver an ammuni-
tion train from Halifax, which it was hoped would arrive by
August 6. 8 The same day the press got wind of a German
cruiser's supposed presence near the coast. "The Rainbow,"
said the Victoria Times, "a faster boat and mounting two six-
inch guns, is more than a match for the German boat. If
Britain engages in war it will be the business of the Rainbow
to get this German boat."9

After receiving her orders the Rainbow was alongside at
the dockyard or anchored in Royal Roads, preparing for war,
and on August 2 she reported herself ready. 10 The railway
and express companies were not organized for war, and their
refusal to handle explosives was a tangle that had to be un-
ravelled before the promised ammunition train could start.
In any case it could not arrive for several days, while the
European crisis was becoming more acute every hour. The
cruiser therefore had to meet her needs as best she could from
old Royal Navy stores in the dockyard.11 When all possible
preparations had been made, Rainbow remained weak at
many points. Her wireless set had a maximum night range
of only two hundred miles, though this defect her wireless
operators were able to overcome at a later date. An almost
incredible fact is that she had no high-explosive ammunition:
all that she had been able to obtain was old-fashioned shell
filled with gunpowder.12 She had no collier, and no depend-

7 N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 1, 1914, ibid.

8 N.S.H.Q. to Commander in Charge, Esquimalt Dockyard, Aug. 1, 1914, ibid.

9 Times, Victoria, Aug. 1, 1914.

10 Dockyard to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 2, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

11 N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty, Aug. 3, 1914, N.S. 1046-1-48 (1).

12 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings kindly lent by Rear Admiral \V;lter Hose,
C.B.E., R.C.N. (Ret'd), and other documentation. The statement that Rainbow at first had
no H.E. shells is made after full consideration of the available evidence, and in spite of the
fact that it has been contradicted by a well-informed witness whose testimony, if it stood
alone, would seem to be conclusive. Rainbow's Reports of Proceedings for this period have
not been found, but the extracts are probably adequate.

264

(

■

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

able coaling station south of Esquimalt. Less than half the
full complement was on board, and more than a third of these
were Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reservists, many of
whom knew nothing of the sea or of warships. There was
little likelihood, however, that the enemy would learn of the
Rainbow's deficiencies in shells and men, and the German
official history — which refers to her as "the Canadian training
ship 'Rainbow' " — gives no indication that they did so.

In the afternoon of August 2 Cdr. Hose received the fol-
lowing message direct from the Admiralty:

LEIPZIG reported left Mazatlan, Mexico, 10 a.m. 30th July. RAIN-
BOW should proceed south at once in order to get in touch with her and
generally guard trade routes north of the equator.13

As Cdr. Hose did not know whether or not the Canadian war-
ships had come under the Admiralty's orders, he repeated the
above message to Ottawa with a request for instructions, and
ordered the fires lit under four boilers. Shortly afterwards he
wired to N.S.H.Q.:

With reference to Admiralty telegram submitted RAINBOW7 may
remain in the vicinity Cape Flattery until more accurate information is
received LEIPZIG, observing that in event of LEIPZIG appearing Cape
Flattery with RAINBOW twelve hundred miles distant and receiving no
communications, Pacific cable, Pachena W.T. Station, and ships entering
straits at mercy of LEIPZIG with opportunity to coal from prizes. Vessels
working up the West Coast of America could easily be warned to adhere
closely to territorial waters as far as possible. Enquiry being made LEIP-
ZIG through our Consul.14

N.S.H.Q. did not approve his suggestion, and at midnight,
August 2-3, this signal arrived from Ottawa:

You are to proceed to sea forthwith to guard trade routes North of
Equator, keeping in touch with Pachena until war has been declared
obtain information from North Bound Steamers. Have arranged for 500
tons coal at San Diego. United States does not prohibit belligerents from
coaling in her ports. Will arrange for credits at San Diego and San Fran-
cisco. No further news of Leipzig.15

The Admiralty knew that the Leipzig was, or had very
recently been, in Mexican waters, and thought it possible that
the Nurnberg might also be cruising somewhere near that
coast. Lloyd's thought that both the German cruisers were
operating on the west coast of North America, and warned

13 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.

" Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 2, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

15 N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 3, 1914, ibid.

265

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

shipping accordingly.16 It goes without saying that rumours
grew thick and fast along the coast, flourishing in the fertile
soil of uncertainty. For the most part these rumours reported
the presence and doings of the Leipzig and the N umber g.
Though the Leipzig was actually near the North American
coast, the N umber g was not; yet the story of her presence
with Leipzig^ and the rumour which was current in those days
that one or both of these cruisers • operated in the coastal
waters of British Columbia, have often since been repeated as
facts.17

At 1 a.m. on August 3, the Rainbow put to sea from
Esquimalt, and according to a well-informed witness, "but
few of those who saw her depart on that eventful occasion
expected to see her return."18 Yet if any protection at all
were to be given to the two helpless sloops and to shipping off
the coast, the Rainbow had to be sent out since nothing else
was available. She rounded Cape Flattery and steamed south-
ward, proceeding slowly so as to keep in touch with the
Pachena wireless station. With the same end in view, at 4
a.m. on August 4 she altered course to the northward, having
reached a point a little to the southward of Destruction
Island, forty-five nautical miles down the coast from Cape
Flattery.19

The same day the Rainbow was informed that war had
been declared against the German Empire,20 and at this time
she became the first ship of the Royal Canadian Navy ever to
be at sea as a belligerent. On this day too the cruiser was
placed at the disposal of the Admiralty for operational pur-
poses.21 Since the early hours of August 3 all hands had been
engaged in preparing the ship for action, exercising action
stations, and carrying out firing practice in order to calibrate

16 Times, Victoria, Aug. 5, 1914.

17 Launched in 1891, Rainbow was obsolescent and much inferior to either the Leipzig or
the Nurnberg in speed and type of armament. Statistics of Rainbow: displacement, 3,600
tons; length, 300'; beam, 431 2'; draught, 17J#; h.p. (designed), 9,000; designed speed, 19.75
k.; armament, 2 6" and 4 12-pdr. guns, and 2 14" torpedo tubes; complement, c. 300. The
displacement, main armament, designed speed, and laying-down date of each of the other
warships mentioned prominently in this chapter were: Leipzig, 3,250 tons, 10 4.1" guns, 23 k.,
1904; Nurnberg, 3,450 tons, 10 4.1" guns, 23.5 k., 1905; Newcastle, 4,800 tons, 2 6" and 10 4"
guns, 25 k., 1909; Idzumo, 9,800 tons, 4 8" and 14 6" guns, 20.75 k., 1898; Algerine, 1,050 tons,
4 4" guns, 13 k., 1894; Shearwater, 980 tons, 4 4" guns, 13h k., 1899. Of these warships only
the ldzumo was armoured.

18 George Phillips," Canada's Naval Part in the War." The author was superintendent of
the Esquimalt Dockyard. MS kindly lent by Mrs. Phillips.

19 Rainbow ' s movements throughout are based on her Logs.

20 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 4, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).
5' P.C. 2049, Aug. 4, 1914.

266

PLATE IX

12(1

OPERATIONAL. AREA
WEST COAST

19/4 - I9'7

40 H

.t^1 •-

See inset

CAPE BLANCO

CAPE MENDOCINO

EARAEEONES

SO"

\*i

130°

120e

110

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

the guns. At 5.30 p.m. on August 4 a southerly course was
set, the objective being San Diego; but three hours later a
signal was received to the effect that the inestimable high-
explosive shell had reached Vancouver, and the course was
altered accordingly.22 OfFRace Rocks at 6 a.m. on August
5 the following message from N.S.H.Q. reached the Rainbow:

Received from Admiralty. Begins— 'NUREMBERG' and 'LEIP-
ZIG' reported August 4th off Magdalen a Bay steering North. Ends. Do
your utmost to protect Algerine and Shearwater, steering north from San
Diego. Remember Nelson and the British Navy. All Canada is watching.23

The cruiser therefore turned about once more and proceeded
down the coast at fifteen knots, with no high-explosive shell.
As the two submarines which had been bought in Seattle
arrived at Esquimalt that morning, the waters which the
Rainbow was leaving would thenceforth enjoy the protection
which their presence afforded. At 6 a.m. on August 6 the
cruiser was abreast of Cape Blanco, and she arrived off San
Francisco twenty-four hours later.

Cdr. Hose decided to put in for the purpose of filling up
with coal, and in order to obtain the latest information from
the British consul. At 9.30 a.m. on August 7 the Rainbow
anchored in San Francisco harbour, and only an hour and
twenty minutes later the German freighter Alexandria of the
Hamburg- Amerika Line, said to be carrying a valuable cargo,
was sighted off the Heads inward bound. She had been re-
quisitioned by the Leipzig a few days before and ordered to
discharge her cargo at San Francisco. After taking in coal
and some lubricating oil, she was to rendezvous with the
Leipzig."1* A richly-laden enemy ship which was about to
become an auxiliary to a hostile cruiser would have been no
ordinary prize.

The Rainbow did not experience much better luck in San
Francisco than she had met with outside:

On arrival in Port was boarded by Consul-General who informed us
that 500 tons coal were in readiness. Made arrangements to go alongside
when informed by Naval & Customs authorities that in accordance with
the President's Neutrality proclamation we could only take in sufficient
coal to enable us to reach the nearest British Port. As we already had
sufficient it meant we could not coal at all, but on the plea that we had not
a safe margin we were permitted to take 50 tons. The Consul-General

22 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.

23 N.S.H.Q. to Hose, Aug. 5, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

24 Kreuzei'krieg) i, ch. 5.

267

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

could give no news of 'Algerine' and 'Shearwater' and stated that last news
of 'Leipzig' was that she coaled at La Paz two days previously. All through
that day various conflicting reports were received regarding the two
German cruisers.25

The consul's information before the Rainbow left was that both
the German cruisers had been seen near San Diego steering
north.26 Four former naval ratings joined the ship here, and
at 1.15 a.m. on August 8 she weighed and with all lights ex-
tinguished sailed out of the bay.

Instructions had been sent to Cdr. Hose from Ottawa

early on the same day:

Your actions unfettered considered expedient however you should
proceed at your utmost speed north immediately, order will be given
ALGERINE, SHEARWATER wait Flattery.

The cruiser had sailed, however, before this signal arrived.
She steered northward so as to keep between the enemy who
was thought to be very near San Francisco, and the little
sloops, and also because a store ship was expected from Esqui-
malt, which was to meet Rainbow near the Farallones Islands.
The morning watch was spent in tearing out inflammable
woodwork and throwing it overboard. Flotsam from a war-
ship, doubtless the Rainbow's woodwork, which was reported
to have been found shortly afterwards near the Golden Gate,
caused some anxiety.27 During the 8th and 9th Rainbow
cruised at low speed in the neighbourhood of the Farallones,
whose wireless station kept reporting her position en clair.
By the morning of August 10 the Rainbow's supply of coal
was running low. No German cruiser, nor British sloop, nor
store ship had been sighted. It seemed probable that the
sloops must have got well to the northward by this time, and
at 10 a.m. the cruiser altered course for Esquimalt.28

The Rainbow was operating alone on a very dangerous
mission. In order to reduce to some extent the risks which
were being run by her complement, the S.S. Prince George
was hurriedly fitted up as a hospital ship and sent out from
Esquimalt on August 11 to meet Rainbow and accompany
her. The Prince George, a fast coastal passenger liner owned
by the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, had three funnels,29 a
cruiser stern, and a general appearance not unlike that of a
warship. On the 12th, about 8 o'clock in the morning, a vessel

26 Extracts from Reports of Proceedings.

28 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 7, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

27 N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty, Aug. 11, 1914, ibid.; Times, Victoria, Aug. 12, 1914,

28 Extracts from Repor ts of Proceedings.

29 The Leipzig and Nurnberg each had three funnels.

268

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

which appeared to be a warship was sighted on the port bow
by Rainbow's lookouts. The cruiser immediately altered
course about fourteen points to starboard, and put on full
speed while all hands went to action stations. A few minutes
later the stranger was identified as a merchant ship which
turned out to be the Prince George. The latter carried an
order that Cdr. Hose should return to Esquimalt, and both
vessels accordingly proceeded towards Cape Flattery. Early
next morning about twenty miles from Esquimalt they found
the Shearwater at last: she had no wireless set, and her first
question was whether or not war had been declared. Shortly
after 6 a.m. Esquimalt was reached.

The Shearwater s commander was unable to supply any
news of the Algerine, and expressed great anxiety regarding
her. N.S.H.Q. reported that she had been off Cape Mendocino
on August 11, and Cdr. Hose now obtained permission to
proceed down the coast as far as Cape Blanco in order to find
and protect her.™ Rainbow was coaled as quickly as possible
and a consignment of high-explosive shell was taken aboard;
but the delight of the gunners was short-lived since there were
no fuses. Twenty of the volunteers on board who had ex-
perienced as much of the seafaring life as they could endure
were replaced from shore. At 5.30 that evening the cruiser
set out once more, at full speed, to look for the Algerine,
which was sighted at 3 o'clock the next afternoon. The little
vessel had been struggling northward against headwinds.
Having run short of fuel she had stopped a passing collier,
and was engaged in getting coal across in her cutters. As the
Rainbow approached the Algerine signalled: "I am damned
glad to see you." When the sloop was ready to proceed
Rainbow took station astern, and late in the afternoon of
August 15 they reached Esquimalt.*1 The most pressing naval
responsibility in those waters had now been discharged, and
before the cruiser went to sea again she had received fuses for
her high-explosive shells.

On August 11, 12, and 13, the Leipzig and Nur?iberg were
reported to be off San Francisco.3- It was soon rumoured that
they were capturing ships in the approaches to the Golden
Gate, and the stories which travelled up and down the coast
paralysed the movements of British shipping from Vancouver

30 Signals in N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

31 Alg;rine' s and Shearwater s Rerorts of Proceedings covering this period are in A.R.O.,
H.S. 7P2, Pacific Coast of America, letters of Proceedings, July 1914-May 1916.

■I8 The Leipzig was in fact close to San Francisco on the 1 1th and 12th. See below p. 274.

269

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

to Panama.33 On August 14 the two cruisers were reported to
be headed for the north at full speed. "Should they continue
directly up the coast," wrote the editor of the Victoria
Times, "they will get all the fighting they want. The Rainbow
and the two smaller vessels will be ready for them."34 Shortly
after midnight, on the morning of the 17th, the Leipzig herself
sailed boldly into San Francisco harbour in order to coal, and
her commanding officer, Capt. Haun, received a group of
journalists on board. His fighting spirit flamed as brightly as
did that of the Times' editor. "We shall engage the enemy,"
he told the San Francisco reporters, "whenever and wherever
we meet him. The number or size of our antagonists will make
no difference to us. The traditions of the German navy shall
be upheld." The Leipzig's captain landed, called on the
mayor, presented the local zoo with a couple of Japanese
bear cubs, and put to sea again at midnight.35 Meanwhile the
Rainbow at Esquimalt had been preparing to go to sea once
more. Although Japan had not yet declared war on Germany,
the powerful Japanese cruiser Idzumo which had represented
her country in the international naval force in Mexican
waters, was still on the west coast, and it was reported that
her commander intended to shadow the Leipzig. The Victoria
Times offered words of sympathy: "Unhappy cruiser Leipzig!
For the next six days she is going to be stalked wherever she
may go by a warship big enough to swallow her with one bite."36

From August 4, to August 23 when Japan entered the war,
the warships at the Admiralty's disposal on the Pacific coast
of North America were incapable of destroying, bottling up,
or driving away, both or even either of the German cruisers,
a fact which was emphasized by the widely-advertised entry
of the Leipzig into San Francisco. The waters in question
clearly required more protection. The Admiralty accordingly
ordered the Admiral commanding on the China Station to
send one of his light cruisers, and on August 18 H.M.S.
Newcastle left Yokohama for Esquimalt.37 The Newcastle
was a light cruiser of the Bristol class — 38 she was a newer ship

33 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, I, p. 163.
** Times, Victoria, Aug. 14, 1914.

35 Colonist, Victoria, Aug. 18, 1914.

36 Times, Victoria, Aug. 18, 1914.

37 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, i, pp. 154, 164.

38 She came to protect waters which a former Canadian government had undertaken to
defend, and there was irony in the fact that she was a Bristol. Of the four Bristol-class cruisers
in the Canadian naval programme of 1910, two were to have been stationed on the Pacific
coast.

270

■■'■:■'■::■:;:

*^|]

IOl m

». -

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

than either of the Germans and was taster and more power-
fully armed. The same day Cdr. Hose asked for permission
to take the Rainbow to San Francisco in order to rind and
engage the Leipzig. The Admiralty approved the suggestion
and the following signal was sent to Rainbow at sea:

Proceed and engage or drive off LEIPZIG from trade route; do not
follow after her .... You should cruise principally off San Francisco.3'1

This order, of course, was based on the idea that the Leipzig
might be molesting shipping in the approaches to San Fran-
cisco. The same day the order was countermanded, however,
because both the German cruisers were reported to be off San
Francisco, and the Rainbow returned to Esquimalt to await
the arrival of the Newcastle.

The most exposed town on the British Columbia coast
was Prince Rupert, which had no local protection whatever.
The war had consequently brought a feeling of uneasiness to
many of the citizens, and the mayor had arrived in Victoria a
few days after hostilities began, hoping to obtain some de-
fences for the town.40 Rumours that one or both of the
Germans were on their way northward had been current for
some time, and on August 19 a cruiser with three funnels —
the Leipzig and the N urnberg each had three funnels — was
reported to be in the vicinity of Prince Rupert.41 Before
dawn next day Rainbow set out for the northern port which
she reached on August 21, and where inquiries elicited further
evidence that a strange cruiser had been seen. Two days
after his arrival Cdr. Hose reported to N.S.H.Q. : "Strong
suspicions Nurnberg or Leipzig has coaled from U.S. Steam-
ship Delhi in vicinity of Prince of Wales Island on Aug. 19th
or Aug. 20th."42 The carrying of coal to Prince Rupert by
water in British ships was immediately stopped. The sus-
picions were never confirmed, and whatever the cause of
anxietv mav have been it was not a German cruiser.43

39 N.S.H.Q. to Host-, Aug. 18, 1914 (two signals), N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

10 Colonist, Victoria, Aug. 11, 1914.

" S.N.O., Esquimalt, to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 19, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (1).

12 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 23, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (2).

vi A similar rumour had germinated during the Spanish-American War. In July 189P>
the Admiralty sent the following message to the Commander in Chief at Esquimalt: "The
American Consul, Vancouver, has reported that a Spanish privateer of five guns is in the
waters near Queen Charlotte Sound, apparently] on look, out for vessels going to and from
Klondyke and is suspected of endeavouring to obtain a British pilot." Warships of the
Pacific Squadron at Esquimalt went north to look for the Spaniard, but found nothing. In
this case the anxietv was lest a belligerent warship might compromise British neutrality.
Admiralty to C. in C, July 17, 1S98, Pacific Station Records (Pub. Arch.).

271

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The Rainbow remained in the north until August 30 when
she sailed south. When Japan had declared war on August
23, the Japanese armoured cruiser Idzumo had been at San
Francisco; and two days later, firing a salute as she came in,
the Idzumo dropped anchor in Esquimalt. The Newcastle
reached the same base on the 30th, and the Canadian warships
together with the Idzumo came under the orders of her com-
mander, Capt. F. A. Powlett. On September 2 the Rainbow
arrived at Esquimalt, having steamed during the month of
August more than 4,300 miles.

On September 3 the Newcastle left Esquimalt to look for
the Leipzig. 44 Capt. Powlett's first idea had been to take the
Rainbow with him; but after that ship's return from the
north she had needed a few days in dockyard, and was there-
fore left behind to protect the approaches to the Strait of
Juan de Fuca. At the same time the Idzumo was detailed to
watch the approaches to San Francisco. The Niirnberg had
been at Honolulu on September 1, a fact which rendered it
unlikely that she would appear ofT North America. There
were numerous stories which pointed untrustworthy fingers
at the whereabouts of the Leipzig, and some of these, as so
often happens in time of war, seemed to rest on first-hand
evidence. Since August 18, however, no certain news of her
whereabouts had been received, and the disturbance to trade
which she had caused was rapidly subsiding. The Newcastle
carried out a thorough search along the coast down to and
including the Gulf of California, and on her way she estab-
lished a series of improvised lookout and Intelligence stations
on shore which assured her receiving immediate information
should the Leipzig return to her former hunting grounds.
Capt. Powlett then concluded that the Leipzig had gone too
far south to be followed, and he returned to Esquimalt.

There was a bare possibility that if the other parts of the
Pacific got too hot for them, the German Pacific Squadron
might come to the North American coast, where in addition
to causing havoc among shipping they might even attack
Vancouver or the coal mines at Nanaimo. With this in mind
Capt. Powlett suggested measures of shore defence at these
points and made arrangements for mines to be laid in suitable
areas should the need arise. On September 30 the Newcastle
set out on a second reconnaissance of the coast as far south as

44 The proceedings of the Newcastle described in this paragraph are based on Favle, Sea-
borne Trade, i, pp. 229-30.

272

wp^t

Jm(8

r '

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

the Gulf of California, leaving the Idzumo and the Rainbow
behind on guard as on the previous occasion. While the
Newcastle was on her two cruises, Rainbow had watched her
part of the trade routes, keeping a lookout for supply ships
from United States ports and engaging from time to time
in gun and torpedo-firing practice.

The actual Operations of the German cruisers remain to
be described.45 The Nurnberg left Mazatlan on July 7, called
at Honolulu, and joined von Spee on August 6 at Ponape.
She later revisited Honolulu and rejoined her squadron on
September 6. The same day she was detached to destroy the
Canada-Australia cable and cable station at Fanning Island.
On September 7 she landed a party there which cut the cable
and destroyed the essential installations on shore. She then
returned to von Spee once more. It is almost certain that
after the outbreak of war the Nurnberg was never less than
about 2,500 miles from the coast of British Columbia. She
strongly influenced the movements of the Rainbow and other
allied warships, but she did so in absentia.

The Leipzig was at Magdalena Bay when on August 5 she
received the news that Great Britain had declared war. Her
mobilization orders instructed her to join von Spee in the
western Pacific, but before he did this Capt. Haun wanted to
make sure of his coal supply. The problem of fuel almost
stultified all the German surface raiders, and it seems to have
been unusually difficult on the west coast of North America:

German warships very seldom visited the north-west coast of America,
and it had always been thought that these waters would not be of much
importance to Germany in time of war. Accordingly the Naval Staff had
made little preparation for furnishing coal and provisions to warships in
th'

is area.

Of such organization as there was, San Francisco was the
principal centre. Haun therefore telegraphed to that port
asking that arrangements be made to send coal and lubricating
oil to him at sea. Early on August 5 the Leipzig left Magdalena
Bay for San Francisco, following a circuitous route. On the
night of August 6 she heard the press radio service at San
Diego reporting that the British naval force on the west
coast consisted of the Rainbow, Algerine, and Shearwater, and
two submarines bought from Chile. Haun hoped that after
coaling he would be able to do some local commerce raiding

a Kreuzerkrieg, I, has dispelled all but a few remnants of the fog which formerly hid most
of the movements of the Leipzig and Nurnberg during Aug. and Sept. 1914.
** Kreuzerkrieg, i, p. 349.

273

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

before joining von Spee, and for that purpose the most likely
hunting grounds in those waters were considered to be the
areas off Vancouver, Seattle and Tacoma, San Francisco, and
Panama.

Captain Haun naturally weighed the advisability of winning an im-
mediate military success by attacking the Algerine and Shearwater on their
way to Esquimalt, by capturing one of the Canadian Pacific liners which
could be fitted as an auxiliary cruiser, or by attacking the Canadian train-
ing ship Rainbow.

Considering the importance of commerce raiding, however, these
enterprises would scarcely have been justified; for even a successful action
with the Rainbow, which was an older ship but which had mounted a
heavier armament, might have resulted in such serious damage to the
Leipzig as would have brought her career to a premature end.47

On August 11, apparently in the forenoon, and in misty
weather, the Leipzig reached the approaches to the Golden
Gate, and next day near the Farallones Islands the Ger-
man consul came on board. He told Haun that Japan would
probably enter the war and that the presence of the Rainbow
north of San Francisco had been reported. The consul said
that American officials were unfriendly in the matter of
facilities for coaling, and also that he had not been able so
far to obtain either money or credit with which to pay for coal.

When the German Consul met the Leipzig, he was not even sure that
the United States authorities would permit her to coal once, in spite of the
fact that no objection had been made to supplying the Rainbow. Such a
refusal would have made it necessary to lay the Leipzig up before she had
struck a single blow. As Captain Haun and his crew could not bear to
think of such a thing, he determined to remain at sea for as long as he
could, to try to hold up colliers and other merchant ships off the Golden
Gate, and then to steam northward and engage the Rainbow. He there-
fore told the consul that he would return to San Francisco on the night
of August 16-17 and enter the harbour, unless he should have been advised
not to do so.

The Leipzig cruised in territorial waters on August 12, proceeding as
far northward as Cape Mendocino. She then made for the Farallones
Islands, keeping from twenty to thirty miles from the coast. The Rainbow
was not sighted, and all the merchant ships that came along were American.
These the Leipzig did not interfere with in any way, so as not to wound
American susceptibilities.48

« Ibid., p. 347.

48 Ibid., p. 354. Cape Mendocino was the most northerly point reached by the Leipzig.
In 1917 the Admiralty published a chart which showed the Leipzig's track running north as
far as Cape Flattery. A British official chart published immediately after the war, however,
shows her as "Cruising offS. Francisco Aug. llth-17th". Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Opera-
tions, i (Maps), No. 14. There seems to be no reason for doubting the accuracy of the German
official history on this point. It is true that none of von Spee's ships got home; nevertheless
the Leipzig had opportunities of reporting her movements to the German consul at several
places, including San Francisco, and no doubt she did so. Four of her officers, moreover,
.survived the battle of the Falkland Islands.

274

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

At the appointed time the Leipzig returned to San Fran-
cisco. She entered the harbour just after midnight, paying
a visit which has already been described, and twenty-four
hours later she left after taking aboard five hundred tons of
coal.

When she had cleared the harbour the Leipzig steamed at high speed
towards the Farallones Islands, without lights and ready for action; but
no enemy ships were seen. After August 18 she proceeded outside the
trade routes at seven knots, steaming on only four boilers while the others
were cleaned. On August 22 she passed Guadelupe. Because future sup-
plies of coal were so uncertain, it was impossible for her to raid commerce,
especially as British ships were still being kept in port while the searching
of neutral vessels would merely have advertised the Leipzig's where-
abouts.49

The cruiser continued her way down the coast. She left the
Gulf of California on September 9, well supplied with coal,
and proceeded on her southward journey making her first
captures as she went.50 During the opening weeks of the
war xAdmiral von Spee's squadron had been crossing the
Pacific in a leisurely fashion, far to the southward.51 In the
words of Admiral Tirpitz:

The entry of Japan into the war wrecked the plan of a war by our
cruiser squadron against enemy trade and against the British war vessels
in those seas, leaving our ships with nothing to do but to attempt to break
through and reach home.52

Von Spee was able to remain undetected because of the vast
size of the Pacific and because the strength of his squadron
forced his enemies to concentrate. The Leipzig joined him on
October 14 at Easter Island. His squadron arrived at last off
the coast of South America, where on November 1 it engaged
and almost completely destroyed a British squadron off Cape
Coronel — a battle in which the Leipzig took part and in which
the N umber g sank the already seriously damaged H.M.S.
Monmouth. The arrival of von Spee off the South American
coast had not for long remained a secret, and the Admiralty
tried to bar his path wherever he might go. It was possible that
he might elect to sail northward, in order to go through the
recently-opened Panama Canal or to the west coast of North
America. To deal with such a move on his part a British-

49 Ibid., p. 357.

50 The Leipzig's movements, Sept. 11-21, are described in a personal account by the
master of a captured British merchant ship. (Hurd, The Merchant Navy, i, pp. 180-84).

81 This brief account of the Operations of von Spee and his opponents is based on: Krenzer-
krieg, i; Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, i; and Jose, The Royal Australian Navy.

62 Tirpitz, Memoirs, II, p. 351.

275

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Japanese squadron was formed off the Mexican coast, whence
it proceeded to the Galapagos Islands. This concentration
proved to have been unnecessary, however, for after Coronel
von Spee moved southward. After rounding South America
he ran headlong into a decisively stronger British force on
December 8 at the Falkland Islands, where all his ships save
one were sunk. The Niirnberg met her end at the hands of
H.M.S. Kent, alter an epic chase during which the Kent's
stokers, in order to squeeze out a little more speed, burned
up practically all the woodwork in the ship. The Leipzig was
sunk by the Cornwall and the Glasgow, only eighteen of her
officers and men being saved. The very fast Dresden alone
escaped, to remain at large in South American waters until,
on March 14, 1915, she too was found and destroyed by
H.M.S. Kent and Glasgow , in Cumberland Bay on the island
of Mas a Tierra off the coast of Chile.

It seems evident that at the outbreak of the war, Capt.
Haun's intention had been to obtain coal in order to join
von Spee, seizing or sinking any British merchant ship which
he might meet en route. He probably wanted to take a collier
with him when he should start to cross the Pacific, and apart
from this consideration the need to fill his own bunkers pro-
longed his stay on the coast. The only ports available were
neutral ones in which he could not stay for more than twenty-
four hours, and to enter which would tend to defeat his pur-
pose as a raider. When he did in tact enter San Francisco, the
news spread far and wide, and British merchant ships in the
neighbourhood went into hiding or postponed their sailings.
Moreover his presence in port might have brought up the
Rainbow, to force an action under circumstances which could
have been very unfavourable for him. To remain at sea, on
the other hand, meant burning precious coal. Operations by
the Leipzig anywhere on that coast were severely hampered by
her orders to join von Spee, and by the fact that the nearest
German base was thousands of miles awav.

Did Haun desire to engage the Rainbow? On the informa-
tion available it seems highly probable that he considered
his principal obligations to be, in the order of priority, to
join von Spee, to damage commerce, and to engage enemy
warships. Of these duties the two last as well as the first, in
order of precedence, may have been assigned to him by von
Spee. If not, they were prescribed for his case by orthodox
naval doctrine. Haun did not know about the Rainbow's

276

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

obsolete shells; but he did know that serious injury to the
Leipzig, situated as she was, would probably have deprived
his country of a fine cruiser for the duration of the war. It is
suggested that Haun would have been very pleased to see the
Rai?ibow, and that had he done so he would have attacked
at once; but that only during August 13 and 14 did he feel
free to search for her.

During her Operations between August 4 and September
10, the Leipzig failed to lay hands upon a single merchant
vessel or warship, or to alarm by her visible presence any
Canadian community. Turning to the other side of the ledger,
some anxiety was caused among the coast population of Bri-
tish Columbia — banks in Vancouver and Victoria, for example,
transferred some of their cash and securities to inland or neu-
tral cities.53 A serious effect on British shipping was also
produced :

In view of the frequent reports rece ved as to the supposed move-
ments of these ships [Leipzig and N urnberg)y owners were generally un-
willing to risk their vessels until the situation should be cleared up. Char-
tering was suspended at all ports on the coast, and most tramp steamers
remained in port, while the liner services were curtailed and irregular ....
[but] within two or three weeks of the Leipzig's departure from San Fran-
cisco trade had become brisk all along the coast.54

Most important of all, the attention of three allied cruisers,
of which two were considerably more powerful than the
Leipzig herself, was wholly occupied until the German cruiser
was known to have removed herself from the area. It is safe
to say that during the first six weeks of the war, from the
point of view of the German Government, the Leipzig was a
paying concern. The dividend would probably have been
smaller, however, had it been known on shore that she was
operating alone.

After Coronel the Rainbow co-operated for a time with the
British-Japanese squadron which had been formed in order
to meet von Spee should he turn northward. She could not
keep up with the other ships, and was frequently used as a
wireless link between them and Esquimalt. At a time when
it was thought likely that von Spee would turn northward,
Cdr. Hose sent the following signal to the Director of the
Naval Service:

53 Report of the Commissioner [Davidson Commission] concerning Purchase of Submarines
(Ottawa 1917), p. 11.

H Kayle, Seaborne Trade, I, pp. 162, 179.

277

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Submit that Admiralty may be asked to arrange with Senior Officer
of Allied Squadron . . . that Canadian ship Rainbow shall if possible be
in company with squadron when engaged with enemy.55

He received in reply a refusal, with reasons for the same, one
of them being that "if the Rainbow were lost, immediately
there would be much criticism on account of her age in being
sent to engage modern vessels."56 Among the squadron whose
lot her commander wished to share was the battle cruiser
Australia.

After the German squadron had entered the Atlantic the
threat on the Pacific coast of North America was greatly
diminished, and with the destruction of the Dresden it ceased
altogether as far as German cruisers were concerned. The
only danger thereafter, which was present until the entry
of the United States into the war in April 1917, lay in the
possibility that German agents might send out merchantmen
lying in neutral harbours, armed as commerce raiders. This
threat, though it never actually materialized on that coast,
was a real one none the less. German sympathizers were at
work at various neutral ports, and attempts were probably
made to send out raiders. The Rainbow was well adapted to
the work of intercepting armed merchant ships. She was less
vulnerable than a liner, faster than any except the swiftest of
them, and adequately armed. The nature of this problem
and some of the means used to deal with it are clearlv illus-
trated by the case of the S.S. Saxonia.

On August 1, 1914, the Hamburg-Amerika liner Saxonia
was at Tacoma taking aboard 1,000 tons of hay for Manila. On
orders from her company she unloaded the hay and went to
Seattle where she tied up. Late in October the naval authori-
ties at Esquimalt learned that the Saxonia would probably
be transferred to American registry, and that she had been
measured for the Panama Canal which had been opened for
traffic during the summer. The British Vice-Consul at
Tacoma made inquiries and arranged to have the ship kept
under observation. She did not leave, and in March 1915
Esquimalt was warned by the postmaster at Victoria that she
would probably try to do so on the night of March 16, and
that guns were awaiting her at Haiti and gun-mountings in
New York. N.S.H.Q. was notified, and spread a wide net by
passing the warning on to the Admiralty, St. John's, New-

56 Hose to Dir. Naval Service, Nov. 9, 1914, N.S. 1047-19-3 (2).
66 Dir. Naval Service to Hose, Nov. 10, 1914, ibid.

278

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

foundland, the Embassy in Washington, and the Vice-Consul
at Tacoma. Naval measures were also taken to block the
exit of the Saxonia through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The
Vice-Consul went to Seattle on March 16, and after dark he
patrolled the entrance to the port in a motor launch until 1
a.m. He then entered the harbour and circumspectly inves-
tigated the Saxonia at close quarters. She had no steam up,
and the Vice-Consul decided that she would not sail that
night and that she would never be able to raise steam without
its being observed by his agents in a nearby shipyard. On
several subsequent occasions it was reported that she was
about to sail. In the end the United States authorities seized
the Saxonia; but not before her crew had put her engines out
of commission by damaging the cylinder-heads and by throw-
ing overboard various indispensable parts.57

Another of the Rainbow's duties during the rest of her
commission was to assist in preventing German shipping,
open or disguised, from using the coastal waters. By the end
of October 1914 she had 251 officers and men on board. Of
this total, 8 officers and 45 ratings belonged to the R.N., 5
officers and 139 ratings to the R.C.N., and 2 officers and 52
men to the R.N.C.V.R.58 On December 18 Rainbow left
Esquimalt to superintend the dismounting of certain guns
which had been temporarily placed at Seymour Narrows to
prevent an enemy from entering the Strait of Georgia by the
northern route. The following spring she did useful recon-
naissance work off Mexico. In February 1916 she set out once
more for a similar patrol of Mexican and Central American
waters, her freedom of movement being greatly enlarged by
the presence of a collier. During this cruise the Oregon, a
vessel on the American register, was intercepted on April 23
near La Paz. A boarding party went over to her, and after
a search it was decided to send her to Esquimalt with a prize
crew on board. On May 2 the Mexican-registered Leonor,
owned by a German firm, was also seized. This schooner had
taken part in coaling the Leipzig in the Gulf of California.
These prizes were both taken on the ground that they were
actually German ships whose neutral registry was a disguise
for activities which were in the interest of the enemy. They
had to be towed a good part of the way home, and as a result
of the delay provisions ran short. The Rainbow therefore

« Signals and letters in N.S. 1048-10-25.

58 Hose to N.S.H.Q., Oct. 31, 1914, N.S. 1-1-19.

279

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

pushed on ahead of her collier and prizes, and on May 21
she reached Esquimalt. From August 8 to December 14, 1916,
Rainbow was on a third cruise of the same kind, during which
she went as tar south as Panama.59

On several occasions in the middle period of the war the
Rainbow performed an unusual service. During 1916 and 1917
the financial operations of the Russian Government included
the transfer to Canada of large amounts of gold, which came
across the Pacific in Japanese warships. In February and
August 1916, and again in February 1917, very large con-
signments of Russian bullion were transshipped to Rainbow
at Esquimalt or Barkley Sound and taken by her to Van-
couver. The value of all the gold transported by the cruiser
in this way amounted to about $1 40,000,000. 60

Early in 1917 great difficulties were encountered in man-
ning the east coast patrols. N.S.H.Q. accordingly suggested
that as Rainbow would soon need to be extensively refitted,
she should be paid off so that her crew might be transferred
to the patrols, and the Admiralty concurred.61 T he Japanese
navy had long since assumed responsibility for the whole of
the North Pacific except for Canadian coastal waters, and the
small remaining possibilities of danger were cleared away on
April 6, 1917, when the United States entered the war. The
Rainbow performed her last war service in training gunners
for the patrol vessels, and was paid off on May 8. She re-
verted to the disposal of the Naval Service on June 30, 1917,
and was recommissioned as a depot ship at Esquimalt. In
1920 she was placed out of commission, and sold for $67,777
to a firm in Seattle to be broken up.

What would have happened, during those opening weeks
of the war, had the Rainbow met the Leipzig? The latter would
almost certainly have attacked. Rainbow was older and
slower than the German cruiser, and less effectively manned.
The type of main armament which she mounted, consisting
of guns of two calibres, was less efficient than that of the
Leipzig because a mixed armament makes spotting difficult.
The Rainbow's 6-inch guns were probably inferior in range to
the Leipzig's much smaller weapons, and German gunnery at

69 Reports of Proceedings of Rainbow, Apr. 25 and May 21, 1916, A.R.O., H.S. 762, Pacific
Coast of America, Letters of Procs., July 1914-May 1916.

60 Signals in N.S. 1047-19-3 (4); note among papers kindlv lent bv Rear Admiral Walter
Hose, C.B.E., R.C.N. (Ret'd).

41 See p. 248 above.

280

Captain Walter Hose

H.M.C.S. RAINBOW

that time was the best in the world. Notwithstanding these
great disadvantages, the Rainbow would probably have had
a very uneven chance of disabling or even destroying her
opponent, had all else been equal which it was not. The fact
that during the critical period she had only gunpowder-filled
shells on board made the old cruiser nearly helpless. Off the
coast where she was operating, however, fog-banks are fre-
quent, and the Rainbow encountered many of them. Her
commanding officer hoped that if he met a German cruiser he
might be able to use the tog-banks very much as smoke-
screens were to be employed later. By that means he hoped
for a chance to engage at a range at which the enemy could be
so damaged as to make her return home difficult or im-
possible.62

The Rainbow performed useful services during the war.
She afforded a considerable measure of protection to the coast
of British Columbia and the moral effect of her presence
there was very valuable, especially during the first three
weeks. After the arrival of the Idzumo and Newcastle, she
played a useful if secondary part. The Rainbow was unable to
afford much protection to trade. The Leipzig searched for mer-
chant ships as freely as her coal-supply and her orders per-
mitted, and temporarily succeeded in clearing the nearby
waters of British ships.

At the same time, the presence of the Rainbow was even more effective
in putting a stop to German trade. The few enemy steamers on the coast
cut short their voyage at the nearest port, sending on their cargoes under
the American flag, and numerous sailing vessels of large size were held up
in Californian and Mexican harbours.63

Rainbow s services throughout were more restricted and
much less valuable than would have been the case had she
been newer and consequently faster and more powerful. If
she had succeeded in disabling the Leipzig, it is obvious that
von Spee's squadron would have been seriously weakened.
The young Canadian Service would have benefited immeas-
urably and in a host of ways had the Rainbow been able to
clothe herself in a mantle of glory as Australia's Sydney did;
but this she could not reasonably hope to achieve. She had
been acquired purely as a training ship and not in order to
fight. Obsolescent vessels are very useful in time of war, but
only for duties which take account of their limitations. Be-

62 Interviews with Admiral Hose, June 1944 and April 1947.

63 Fayle, Seaborne Trade, i, pp. 162-3.

281

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

cause of the Rainbow's outmoded design and defective ammuni-
tion, moreover, her officers and men had to be sent out expect-
ing to face almost hopeless odds. They had to be placed in a
very unfair moral position as well, for uninformed opinion on
shore concerning the Rainbow as a ship alternated illogically
between ridicule and a tendency to regard her undiscrimin-
atingly as a cruiser and therefore a match for any other cruiser.
Her complement did all that could have been done with the
instrument at their disposal, cheerfully facing unequal danger
with little prospect of earning the fame which crowns un-
qualified success, and they served their country well.

282

Chapter 13

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

ONE of the most interesting stories of the Canadian Naval
Service in the First World War has to do with submarine
activity on the west coast. It is to this that Compton
Mackenzie refers on page 110 of his Gallipoli Memories, where
he says:

About ten o'clock on the morning of the Fourth of June, the destroyer
Wolverine commanded by Lieut. -Commander Adrian Keyes, the younger
brother of the Commodore, took us from Kephalo to Helles .... Keyes was
full of stories about his experiences in Canada at the very beginning of the
war, when he manned a submarine with a crew of local business-men. I
wish I could remember the details of the good stories he told us; but they
have passed from my recollection irretrievably, and I can only remember
the gold watch that was presented to him by his amateur crew. One of
those Canadian business-men ought to give us the tale of that submarine's
adventures: Blackwood's Magazine would be the proper medium. Keyes
himself is no longer alive, and the little epic ought not to be lost eternally.

Although vessels able to navigate under water had been
thought of and built in the eighteenth century, it was not until
near the end of the nineteenth century that a fully practicable
one had been designed. The prototype of the modern sub-
marine was invented by John P. Holland of Paterson, N.J.,
an Irish patriot who saw in such a vessel, used against the
Royal Navy, a means of achieving independence for Ireland.
His boats were the first to use a combination of internal-com-
bustion engines for cruising on the surface and electric motors
driven by storage batteries for propulsion when submerged.
In the year 1900 the Admiralty ordered the first submarines
for the Royal Navy, and these were of the Holland type. By
1907 all the great naval Powers, most of whom had bought
plans and permission to use them from the Holland Company
in the United States, were building their own submarines.
Smaller countries usually ordered any they wanted from the
shipbuilders of their larger neighbours. 1

1 Article on Holland in Dictionary of American Biography, ix; Clowes, The Royal Navy,
vii, p. 61 ; Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, pp. 288, 296 n.

283

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

On July 29, 1914, with war apparently imminent and the
waters off the British Columbia coast very poorly protected, a
group of about half a dozen men met at the Union Club in
Victoria. Among them were Capt. W. H. Logan, Surveyor to
the London Salvage Association, and Mr. J. V. Paterson,
President of the Seattle Construction and Drydock Company,
who was in the city on business.

War possibilities were under discussion. The acquisition of a Chilean
warship was suggested and put aside as impossible. Paterson stated that
his company had, at Seattle, two submarines which might be obtained. Of
their existence Logan was aware. This was the first intimation, however,
that there was chance of their acquirement.2

These submarines had been ordered by the Chilean Govern-
ment in 1911 from the Electric Boat Co. of New Jersey, holders
of the Holland patents, who had arranged for Paterson's
company to build them. The Chilean Government had agreed
to pay $818,000 for the pair, and had actually paid $714}000;
but the payments were slightly in arrears. Chilean naval
experts had recommended that the boats should not be accep-
ted, on the ground that they were overweight and that their
sea endurance was consequently not up to specification. The
builders were willing and anxious to sell the submarines to
some one else, because their relations with the Chileans were
strained, and also because in this way they would probably
obtain a much higher price.

During the first two days of August the international
situation was rapidly deteriorating. The Premier of British
Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, took the matter of the sub-
marines in charge, and conferences of leading men were held
at McBride's office, at the dockyard, and elsewhere. The Hon.
Martin Burrell, Dominion Minister of Agriculture and Mem-
ber for Yale-Cariboo, happened to be taking a holiday on the
Pacific Coast at the time, and McBride obtained his advice
and personal support; but Burrell would not commit the
Federal Government.

So exigent did the situation become, that a summons was issued to meet
at the Naval Yards on Monday morning the 3rd of August at 3 o'clock.
Later in the day other meetings took place. Logan got into telephonic
communication with Paterson, and asked for a definite price. The answer
was $575,000 each. Logan expressed surprise at the figure, and handed the
receiver to Mr. Burrell, who found it confirmed. To an attempt at bar-

2 Account of this meeting and the rest of the paragraph are based on Report of the Commis-
sioner [Davidson Commission] concerning Purchase of Submarines (Ottawa 1917), pp. 7-25.
It is not clear whether Paterson had come to Victoria in order to sell his submarines or whether
he was there on other business.

284

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

gaining Paterson answered brusquely: "This is no time to indulge in talk ot
that kind and that I would not listen to it, and that if they did not care to
get the boats they did not need to take them." On the next day Logan, at
Seattle, again brought up the question of price. Paterson replied that the
price was not open to discussion at all. The price included the cost of
delivering the vessels at the border of Canadian territorial waters. Naval
opinion supported the belief that the purchase ought to be made, and Sir
Richard McBride assumed the responsibility of completing arrangements.3

On August 3 the Commander in Charge at Esquimalt
signalled to N.S.H.Q.:

Two submarines actually completed for Chilean Government Seattle,
estimated cost £115,000 each. Could probably purchase. Ready for action
torpedoes on board. Chilean Government cannot take possession. I con-
sider it most important to acquire immediately. Burrell concurs. Provin-
cial Government will advance money pending remittance.4

The next day, having been warned that the submarines should
leave American waters by midnight, he sent another signal to
N.S.H.Q.:

Can get submarines over immediately. Urgently suggest to do this
before declaration of war, after which builders fear international complica-
tions. Shall not act without authority.5

After receiving the first signal from the Commander in Charge,
N.S.H.Q. had twice cabled to the Admiralty:

Am informed two submarines ready for delivery Seattle, ordered by
Chile. Chile unable to take possession. Government desires information as
to Admiralty opinion ot capabilities of Chilean submarines at Seattle.
Understand skilled British ratings in crews. Do you advise purchase?6

As time was very pressing, however, McBride, fearful that
further postponement might make it impossible to obtain the
submarines, went ahead on his own responsibility and arranged
to buy them with Provincial money. The negotiations were
completed by Capt. Logan, who had gone to Seattle for that
purpose accompanied by Sub-Lieut. T. A. Brown, R.N.C.V.R. 7
The Chilean Government strongly objected to losing the

3 Ibid., p. 11. This report, the whole ot which should have been rewritten before publica-
tion, is responsible tor the strange mixture of recta and obliqua in Paterson's quoted reply.

4 N.S. 1062-1-2- (1). The statement that the submarines had torpedoes on board was
incorrect.

5 Ibid.

6 N.S.H.Q. to Admiralty, Aug. 4, 1914 (two signals), ibid.

7 McBride later told the Davidson Commission that "had it not been for Captain Logan,
we would never have had these vessels." Royal [Davidson] Commission concerning Purchase of
War Supplies, Evidence (Sess. Pap. No. 60, 1917), p. 1598. Brown was disguised in clothes
which he had borrowed trom a cook. His job seems to have been to try to make sure that no
German agents were included in the crews when the submarines left Seattle.

285

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

submarines, but it had not completed the payments. 8 Through-
out the day of August 4 Logan kept in touch with Victoria by
telegraph and telephone. Paterson finally accepted McBride's
assurance that whatever amount was agreed to would be paid,
and the deal was closed at the price which he had earlier set and
refused to discuss. The amount was $1,150,000 lor the two
submarines, which was $332,000 more than the Chileans had
undertaken to pay.

The Seattle Construction and Drydock Co. had agreed to
take the two submarines out so as to reach, by daylight on the
morning of August 5, a position five miles south ol Trial Island
where, just outside Canadian territorial waters, the S.S. Salvor
was to meet them. Precautions were taken to prevent news of
the transfer from reaching the ears ol American officials, ol the
local Germans, and also of certain Chileans who were in Seattle
in connection with the hoped-lor release of the submarines to
their own government. It was to be an escape rather than a
clearance, for clearance papers had not been obtained. Pater-
son and Logan went on board one of the submarines, and at
about 10 o'clock in the evening ol August 4 the boats cast ofT,
manned by company crews. Covered by darkness and log,
and running on their comparatively silent electric motors, they
came safely to the harbour entrance. Here, in spite ol the loud
noise which the exhausts would make, the diesel engines were
started and the submarines worked up to lull speed. During
this cruise, or earlier, one of them must have scraped her plates
on some obstruction; but this lact was not known to their new
owners until later.9

Meanwhile the Canadian authorities had been arranging to
receive the two vessels. An officer who had had several years'
experience with submarines was lortunately available in the
person of Lieut.-Cdr. Bertram Jones, R.N. On the retired list
and living on the west coast, he had reported at the dockyard
in Esquimalt when war seemed imminent, and his services had
been accepted. Jones was ordered to go out with the Salvor
to meet the submarines at the rendezvous. He carried written

s The rather formidable Chilean navy which had been in the making was deprived ot more
than the two submarines at this time. The British Government requisitioned the battleship
Almirante Latorre — 28,000 tons, 10 14-inch guns — which had been launched a short time before
in a British yard. Renamed the Canada, she was present at Jutland, and was released to Chile
after the war. Three powerful Chilean flotilla leaders were similarly requisitioned for the
duration of the war. (See Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1920-21, p. 61).

9 The story of how the submarines were acquired, except where otherwise indicated, is
based on the evidence given before the Davidson Commission, and the ensuing report.

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instructions to inspect them as carefully as conditions permit-
ted, spending at least an hour in each boat. If they appeared to
be fully satisfactory the submarines were to be paid for, and
he was then to bring them to Esquimalt. Jones carried with
him a cheque for J 1,1 50,000 drawn by the Province of British
Columbia on the Canadian Bank of Commerce and endorsed
by McBride. Accompanied by Lieut. R. H. Wood, Chief
Engineer at Esquimalt, Jones met the submarines at the ap-
pointed place, where they drew alongside the Salvor. About
four hours were spent in inspecting the boats, the huge cheque
was then given to the impatient Paterson, British colours were
hoisted, and no time was lost in making for Esquimalt which
they reached safely on the morning of August 5.10

On the heels of the various declarations of war President
Wilson signed a series of identical neutrality proclamations.
These forbade, within the jurisdiction of the United States, a
number of acts likely to benefit one of the belligerents at the
expense of the other. The acts which were specified included:

Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring
to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing,
fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or
vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents.

This, the most nearlv relevant section, would hardly have
applied to an intention to take the two submarines out of
American and into Canadian waters. As the two boats had not
been cleared out of Seattle, however, their seizure could no
doubt have been based on that fact, and it is easy to see why
the United States authorities should have wished to bar any
possibility of a couple of miniature Alabamas running loose in
the Pacific. Whatever the legal position may have been, the
President's proclamation covering the hostilities between
Germany and Great Britain was signed on August 5, and the
following day, at 8 a.m., the United States cruiser Milwaukee
sailed from Bremerton Navy Yard in order to intercept the
two submarines if they were still in American territorial waters,
and "prevent violation of Neutrality." The Milwaukee
searched Port Townsend harbour, and having steamed for
some distance towards New Dungeness without finding the
submarines she returned to Bremerton.11

10 Report . . . concerning Purchase of Submarines; Richard Ryan to McBride, Aug. 6, 1914,
B.C. Archives. The Ryan letter is a report by an eyewitness.

11 Material from the Milwaukee 's Cruising Report and Log kindly furnished by the Officer
in Charge of Naval Records and Library, Navy Department, Washington, D.C!

287

NAVAL SERVICE OE CANADA

The unheralded arrival of the submarines caused much

excitement. Many of the people in Esquimalt concluded that

the enemy was upon them. The examination vessel on duty

outside ran hastily into the harbour, with the lanyard of her

siren tied to the rail and the siren sounding an uninterrupted

alarm. The shore batteries, which were manned bv the armv

and which apparently had not been warned, telephoned to the

dockyard before opening fire, in order to find out whether

or not any submarines were expected. In the end, the causes of

the excitement entered the harbour unmolested and tied up at

the dockyard. The Esquimalt base was ill-prepared to receive

the newcomers, and wired at once to Ottawa:

Require all gear in connection with 18" submerged tubes firing tor-
pedoes; including gyroscopes spare tools and torp. manuals, torp. artificers,
torp. ratings. We have nothing.1'2

They also asked for any submarine officers and men who might
be available.

The request from N.S.H.Q., mentioned above, for advice
as to the desirability of buying the submarines, brought a reply
from the Admiralty favouring the purchase, provided that
Canada could man the boats.13 This opinion was given
principally on the advice of Sir Philip Watts, who had been for
many years Director of Naval Construction at the Admiralty.
He was naval adviser to the Chilean Government, and he
knew all that could be known about the two submarines by
anyone who had not actually seen them. He thought that they
were well worth buying, and his opinion was supported by the
commodore of the British submarine service. The Canadian
Government had thus been advised to buy the boats by the
best-informed authority accessible to it.

As soon as he had made up his mind to buy the submarines

with Provincial funds, Sir Richard McBride had sent the

following telegram to Sir Robert Borden:

After consultation with Burrell and Naval Officers have advanced
to-night one million and fifty thousand dollars ... tor purchase two modern
submarines lying Seattle harbour and built tor Chile. All arrangements
complete for their arrival Esquimalt tomorrow morning unless untoward
incident occurs. Congratulate Canada if this operation successful on acqui-
sition of such useful adjunct defence of country.

Borden replied:

Yesterday morning we communicated with Admiralty as to advisa-
bility of securing two submarines mentioned, and as to feasibility of man-

" Dockyard to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 5, 1914, N.S. 4(5-1-48 (1).
13 Admiralty to N.S.H.Q., Aug. 5, 1914, N.S. 1062-1-2 (1).

288

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

ning them, as without crew they would be useless. They advise purchase
provided crews could be secured. As this has been accomplished we ap-
preciate most warmly your action which will greatly tend to increase
security on the Pacific coast, and send hearty thanks. Please advise us of
their arrival.14

The naval signals which bracketed the actual buying of the
submarines were very terse. On August 5, N.S.H.Q. sent a
signal to Esquimalt: "Prepare to purchase submarines.
Telegraph price." The reply was: "Have purchased sub-
marines."15 British Columbia thus became the only Province
that has ever, since Confederation, owned any warships. On
August 7 the Dominion Government assumed responsibility
for the purchase, and the boats were placed at the disposal ot
the Admiralty by Order in Council on the same day.16

Their prospective Chilean owners had named the vessels
Iquique and Antojagasta. The Senior Naval Officer at Esqui-
malt, subject to the approval of N.S.H.Q., called the new
arrivals Paterson and McBride after their builder and buyer.
His action was not approved, however, an Australian precedent
being followed instead. Some time previously the Royal
Australian Navy had acquired two submarines ot the Royal
Navy's E class, and had named them AE i and AE 2. The
Canadian submarines approximated to the Admiralty's C
class boats, so the Iquique became CC I and the Antojagasta
CC 2. Yet President Paterson did not go entirely unrewarded,
for the Electric Boat Company let him keep $40,000 by way
ot commission. 17

These were small submarines ot a type well adapted to
operating in coast waters. The approaches to Victoria and
Vancouver through the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the islands
within were admirably suited to detence by means ot sub-
marines, because a ship entering those narrow waters would
have to tollow more or less predictable courses. Also the
knowledge that submarines were present might weigh heavily
with the commander ot a raider so tar trom any triendly base
that a serious injury would make her return home impossible.
It was with this in mind that the Secretarv ot State tor the

14 McBride to Borden, Aug. 4, 1914; Borden to McBride, Aug. 5, L914: Sess. Pap No. 158,
1915, pp. 4-5.

15N.S. 1062-1-2 (1).

16 P.C. 2072, Aug. 7, 1914.

17 The Electric Boat Company's representative had quoted to Paterson the price c.f
$555,000 for each of the submarines. Paterson hoisted the amount to $575,0(10, and kept the
difference.

289

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Colonies, when he accepted the submarines for operational
purposes on behalf of the Admiralty, transmitted the following
suggestion :

The fact of their being on the coast cannot be too widely advertised but
their actual position should be concealed. Plausible reports should be issued
from time to time of their presence at different ports.18

Nor was the knowledge that two submarines were stationed on
the coast valuable only with respect to its probable effect on
the enemy. During tbose earliest days of the war there was
much uneasiness among the seaboard population. The banks
in Victoria and Vancouver, for example, were transferring their
cash and securities to inland or neutral cities. Blasting in
connection with work on sewers in Victoria was stopped, be-
cause of nervousness among the people. Several million
dollars' worth of insurance against bombardment seems to
have been bought, and one family went so far as to prepare a
vault in the cemetery for occupancy in case of attack. There
was no panic, yet it was very desirable that the coast should
not only be but also seem to be adequately protected. The
local press almost from the start struck a note of confidence,
and the submarines gave it something tangible to work with.
Thus the Victoria Daily Times was only enlarging a salutary
fact when on August 5, after announcing their arrival, it
added:

The Iquique and Antofagasta are modern submarines of high speed and
wide radius of activity. They could cope with a hostile fleet of considerable
proportions.19

The following day the Colonist^ of the same city, alluded to the
arrival of the submarines in an editorial:

These vessels are a highly important addition to the defences of the
Coast, and fortunately one of the best experts in submarine navigation is on
hand to take charge of them ....

The southwestern part of the British Columbia Coast is now very well
provided for in the matter of defence. In deference to the wishes of Ottawa
we shall not enter into any details as to the nature of these preparations, but
we can assure the citizens that nothing has been left undone that ought to
be done or that can be done with the available facilities, and that these are
quite sufficient for defence against any probable enemy.20

During the first few days of the war the naval arrangements
at Esquimalt call to mind those on board H.M.S. Pinafore.

18 Col. Sec. (Harcourt) to Gov. Gen., Aug. 9, 1914, N.S. 1062-1-2 (1).

19 Daily Times, Victoria, B.C., Aug. 5, 1914.

20 Daily Colonist, Victoria, B.C., Aug. 6, 1914.

290

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

The Senior Naval Officer, who had been overloaded with work,
had a nervous breakdown, and his actions showed that he
roundly suspected the enemy of roaming at large in the streets
of the town. Accordingly there was a hiatus which was filled
for the time being, adequately if unofficially, by the Provincial
Premier. The position of Senior Naval Officer was then
assumed by Lieut. Bertram Jones, pending the arrival from
Ottawa of Admiral W. O. Storey, who took over the duties on
October 20. Preparations were begun to man the submarines
and get them to sea, and much of the credit for this achievement
belongs to the late Lieut. Adrian Keyes, R.N. (Ret'd).21
When the war began Keyes was working in Toronto for the
Canadian Northern Railway, and Admiral Kingsmill, at his
wits' end to find a submarine officer, heard of him and asked
him to report in Ottawa. It was a real windfall for the Naval
Service to obtain at this time a first-rate submarine commander
of great ability and unusually wide training, and after an inter-
view Keyes was sent forthwith to Esquimalt to take charge of
the submarines. His resources consisted of two strange boats,
a badly-equipped dockyard, and about a hundred volunteers
most of whom were amateurs. Keyes lined up these volunteers,
asking that any men who might not wish to serve in a sub-
marine should step out of the ranks, whereupon not a man
moved. From this group the crews were chosen, and the work
of learning to handle the boats began.

During the first few days, largely as a means of training,
CC i and CC 2 were taken apart on the dry dock by the crews,
and after about five hundred tally plates had been changed
from Spanish to English the submarines were put together
again. In this period no leave was granted, and the busy days
spent on valves, tanks, and tallies, were rounded out with
lectures by Keyes from 8 to 10 p.m., in which he imparted to
them as much of his knowledge as they could absorb. By the
time that the submarines were afloat once more the crews
could dive them without turning the wrong taps or other un-
toward incidents.22

No torpedoes for the submarines had been supplied at
Seattle, and none of the required 18-inch calibre were available
at Esquimalt as the Rainbow 's were 14-inch ones. The Niobe,
which was at Halifax, used 18-inch torpedoes however, and a

21 Keyes was a brother of Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Keyes.

22 Most of the information contained in this and the preceding paragraph was supplied bv
Capt. B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.C.N.R.

291

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

supply of these was sent to Vancouver as quickly as possible.
One of them went bumping across the continent with its
compressed-air chamber rilled; but all arrived safely.

Less than two weeks after the boats had reached Esquimalt
long strides had been taken towards making them fit tor active
Operations. Keves himself commanded CC i , and with him
were Lieut. Wilfrid T. Walker, R.N. (Ret'd), and Mid.
Maitland-Dougall, a graduate of the Royal Naval College of
Canada, who was later to see much submarine service and to
lose his life on the other side of the Atlantic. The crew con-
sisted of three former naval ratings and thirteen volunteers
who had been enrolled locally. CC I had on board five of
Niobes torpedoes and was fitted with wireless. She was
reported ready tor active service. CC 2 had a full complement
in training under the command of Lieut. Bertram Jones. His
first officer was Lieut. B. L. Johnson, R.N.R.23 The crew was
composed of six active or former naval ratings and ten local
volunteers. The CC 2 had three torpedoes and was expected to
be ready for service before the end of the month.24 The two
submarines were almost identical. Their surface displacement
was 313 tons, and their submerged displacement 421 tons.
Thev measured 15 feet across the beam and were 144 and 152
feet long respectively. CC i had 5 torpedo tubes and could
stow 5 torpedoes; CC 2 had 3 tubes and could carry 6 torpedoes.
One of the tubes in each submarine was mounted in the stern.
The designed speed of these boats was 13 knots on the surface
and slightly over 10 knots submerged; on November 2, 1914,
however, in a surface trial over a measured mile, CC I achieved
a'speed of 15.1 knots. Neither of the submarines possessed any
gun armament.

On September 8, H.M.S. Shearwater, one of the two R.N.
sloops stationed on the coast, was commissioned as tender to
the submarines, having been lent by the Admiralty for that
purpose. Workshops and other conveniences were installed in
the Shearwater so that the endurance of the submarines would
be greatly increased by cruising in company with her. The
Shearwater s former crew had been sent east to join the Niobe,

23 This officer was later to command H.M. submarine H S, which he took from Montreal
across to Great Britain and afterwards commanded in the North Sea. On one occasion, while
running submerged, the H S struck a mine which blew off a portion ot the bow. Lieut. Johnson
brought her safely back to Harwich, and was promoted to lieutenant-commander, and awarded
the D.S.O. a year and a half later for continued good service in H.M. submarines. For a
description of this extraordinary incident see Carr, By Guess and By God, pp. 280-82.

u Signal, Aug. 17, 1914, N.S. 40-1-48 (1).

292

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

and the officers and men of CC / and CC 2 lived in the sloop
when in port. She accompanied her charges wherever they
went, and acted as a target for their practice torpedoes. A
submarine is at once the least comfortable and the most
dangerous of all naval craft which spend any prolonged periods
of time at sea. The discomfort arises principally from the lack
of space on board. On the surface, submarines have only a
small margin of buoyancy, and when submerged they are
exposed to a whole series of hazards which surface vessels never
know. Experienced "submariners" testify that the life is made
much more eligible that it would otherwise be by a characteris-
tic informality and an unusually strong feeling of comrade-
ship. 25 The crews of these two Canadian submarines had given
themselves to an exigent apprenticeship which was more
irksome if less perilous because, except during the first few
weeks of the war, there was no likelihood of their seeing the
enemy. These crews were largely composed of landsmen, most
of whom probably had never seen a submarine before, and the
way in which they carried out a task which was the more
dangerous because of their inexperience was, as Sir Richard
McBride put it, "most creditable to the naval volunteers of
British Columbia."

An exceedingly unpleasant experience early befell the
complement of CC i. During her first cruise, with an expert
from the Seattle yard still on board, somebody accidentally
pushed against the handle controlling the horizontal rudders.
The tremendous down helm which the boat received resulted
in a steep and sudden dive. The Seattle man instantly called
for full speed ahead while Lieut. Keyes ordered full speed
astern. Fortunately it was Keyes' command which was
obeyed, and the submarine righted herself.26

The following descriptions are taken from a personal
account supplied by a former R.N.C.V. reservist who was
selected at the beginning for one of the crews:

A few days after the commencement of the fateful 4th of August,
1914 ... I was 'peeling spuds' as 'cook of the Mess' for the day, when I
happened to glance casually seaward from outside the old barrack room of
the present Dockyard and observed two low lying craft proceeding towards
the entrance of Esquimalt Harbour .... Little did I realize . . . that these
boats in about a week's time were to be my home for over three years ....

26 E.g.: "In a U-Boat there was scarcely any visible difference of rank: no clicking of heels.
The life itself bound us to a common fate: a common life or death." Hashagen, U-Boats
Westward!, p. 131.

26 Information supplied by Capt. B. L. Johnson.

293

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

It was an extreme transformation from an office to a submarine complete
with electric motors, pumps, pipe lines, high pressure lines and air bottles,
but with the tolerance of those splendid men of the Royal Navy, who
willingly assisted me in my new duties, I spent three of the happiest years
of my life on these two boats .... in a few months the work of each branch
of the boat i.e. engineers, stokers, seamen, electricians and torpedo men,
was splendidly coordinated and resulted in most efficient operations. . . .

After Coronel was avenged . . . there was no menace to the B.C. coast
and for two years the peacetime routine of the Royal Navy for submarines
was observed, which was approximately two weeks sea time per month and
two weeks harbour routine which included the care and maintenance of the
engines, torpedoes, motors and so on.

During these years with diving and torpedo running, the boats reached
a high state of efficiency and had the opportunity of showing the White
Ensign in many parts of British Columbia where it had not been previously
seen and possibly in many places where it has been impracticable to show
it since .... Many interesting practice torpedo attacks were made, one being
an attack on H.M.S. 'Orbita',27 an auxiliary cruiser which CC 1 attacked
scoring a direct hit with a collision head. This attack was the result of a
wager made in the wardrooms the previous night between the Captain of
the 'Orbita' and our Commanding Officer. The submarines, in accordance
with plan, proceeded to sea early in the morning to attack 'Orbita', although
it must be admitted 'Orbita' had little chance to see our periscope as the sea
was very choppy that particular morning. . . .

Leave was practically unobtainable in the months which succeeded the
opening of the war and one afternoon both boats happened to be in Harbour,
having returned from patrol that morning. The crew desired leave and after
a 'council of war' it was decided that we would have a wedding, to which
the Officers could hardly refuse to grant leave for the afternoon and evening.
This was consequently applied for in the service manner to attend the
wedding of a petty officer whose name I will not record. This was readily
granted and one of our officers even kindly thought that a wedding present
would not be inappropriate and proceeded accordingly. As many men from
both boats as could be spared went ashore and the first problem was to
procure a bride and bridesmaids. This was not a difficult matter in Victoria
and a most glorious party resulted. This took the form of a dinner party in
the famous Westholm Grill, attended of course, by the bride and her maids.
It was felt that the suspicions of the officers might be aroused and this
actually proved to be the case, as several of the officers attended the
Westholm Grill and witnessed the wedding supper and they were then
apparently satisfied, or at least they could not deny the existence of the
wedding. Leave expired at 1 a.m. and our Commanding Officer, being still
somewhat suspicious, to use his own words, decided 'to give the beggars a
wedding breakfast' and took both boats to sea at 4 a.m. in very heavy
weather. 2S

For nearlv three years the submarines remained on the west
coast, based on Esquimalt and engaged in cruising and train-
ing. The Admiralty then sent them around to Halifax on their

27 A new liner of 15,486 tons gross, owned by the Pacific Steam Navigation Co. In 1939
she was still in service, running between Great Britain and South America.

,8 Account by F. W. Crickard, Esq.

294

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

way to Europe, and they left Esquimalt for the last time on
June 21, 1917, accompanied by the Shearwater. During this
cruise engine-trouble was almost chronic, and twelve days
were spent at Balboa for overhaul and repairs, after which,
on August 12, the sloop and the two submarines obtained the
distinction of being the first warships flying the white ensign
ever to pass through the Panama Canal. The United States
naval authorities signalized this event by giving the little
flotilla a welcome at Balboa and Colon, and the British
Minister to Panama and the Vice-Consul at Colon accom-
panied them through the canal. The personal account which
follows testifies to the fact that this was no ordinary cruise:

Leaving Esquimalt harbour quietly on the morning of June 21st, the
three vessels started on their long voyage. Two days later bad weather set
in and the submarines were battened down with the decks just awash.
The temperature in the engine rooms of these subs in the Tropics reached as
high as 140 degrees and considerably added to the discomfort of the crews
as we were unfortunate in having much bad weather which necessitated the
boats steaming battened down.

In order to keep the engines from racing it was necessary for the CC 2
to keep charging the storage batteries. Then the submarine would use her
motors until the batteries were run down. The only ventilation obtainable
was through the operation of the engines. They would be run for ten
minutes drawing fresh air into the craft, and in twenty minutes time they
would be again started and would draw in a fresh supply.

It was not often possible to keep both engines running at once. While
one engine was propelling the submarine, the engine crew would be working
feverishly on the other. When the running engine showed signs of weaken-
ing and then quit entirely the idle engine would be started while the dis-
abled one was fixed.

Then came another horror. During a heavy gale off Cape Blanco on the
Oregon coast, and again off Salina Cruz, Mexico, the storage batteries,
through weak construction, were short-circuited time and again and caught
fire, giving out chlorine gas that laid low the greater portion of CC 2's
personnel. For one night the craft was navigated by the coxswain, while
only one or two others were fit for duty, the others lying around in an un-
conscious state. Sardine sandwiches were the only sustaining power given
the men for their all-night vigil. Sometimes they wondered if the game
wasn't up for them. That was one of the worst experiences of the whole trip.
On October 14th, 1917, the Shearwater and the submarines made
Halifax, and the latter were promptly ordered to refuel and proceed across
the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. This was impossible, and the order was
later cancelled.

The CC 1 and CC 2 were badly strained and their engines were down
and out. A pile of cracked piston heads, and other parts discarded, bore
testimony to the difficulties of the long trip. The CC 2 made 7,00029 miles

29 "CC 2 has been the more reliable of the two boats and her engines have run 5,000 miles
out of the whole distance of 7,300." Letter of Proceedings bv the Shearwater's CO., Oct. 17
1917, N.S. 45-2-12(1).

295

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

with her own engines, a wonderful tribute to the men who coaxed and en-
ticed the machinery to endure the strain which it was never designed to
bear. The engine room staff was repeatedly complimented by the Shear-
water's commander on the fine performance and on arrival at Halifax the
little flotilla received a highly congratulatory message from Sir W. Brown-
ing, then Commander-in-Chief of the North America and West Indies
station.30

As it was evident after their arrival in Halifax that the sub-
marines were unfit to cross the Atlantic without new engines,
the Admiralty cabled: "Consider submarines should be re-
paired and should remain at Halifax where they may be useful
if enemy submarines cross Atlantic."31 The two boats re-
mained at Halifax until the close of the war. They were laid
up for repairs during the summer and early fall of 1918, and it
was during this time that German submarines appeared in
those waters. In 1920 CC I and CC 2 were sold out of the
Service.

The purchase of these two submarines in 1914 had been
made in very unusual and difficult circumstances, and Sir
Richard McBride seems to have realized from the first that he
was taking his political life in his hands. If the boats were to
be obtained at all, swift, secret, and irregular steps had to be
taken. McBride's action bears a striking resemblance to that
of Disraeli in 1875 when he bought the shares in the Suez
Canal for the British Government. Unlike Disraeli, however,
McBride caused public money to be spent without the author-
ity of his legislature. This serious irregularity had been
inevitable; but the transaction was made to appear even more
questionable by two incidents which happened to occur in
connection with it. In the telegram quoted above which
McBride sent to Borden on August 4, owing to a clerical error
made in Ottawa the amount paid for the submarines was
stated to have been $1,050,000 which was $100,000 less than
the amount that had actually been asked for and paid. Fur-
thermore, as soon as the submarines had been delivered in
Esquimalt, Paterson had taken his cheque for $1,150,000 to the
Canadian Bank of Commerce in Victoria, the bank that had
issued the cheque, and had there converted it into three drafts,
two on New York and one on Seattle. The manager of the
bank seems to have considered this to be an odd proceeding.

30 Account by a crew member, printed in Harbour and Shipping (Vancouver), Apr. 1921, p.
745. J. H. Hamilton, Esq., editor of Harbour and Shipping, has kindly permitted this account
to be reprinted here.

31 Admiralty to N.S.H.Q., Oct. 28, 1917, N.S. 4.5-2-12 (1).

296

OS
0)
VI

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o
o

o
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CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

He evidently expected a simple transfer of credit to a single
account somewhere, and he probably wondered why Paterson
was in such haste to get his money out of the country.32
Altogether it is not to be wondered at that the transaction gave
rise to criticism. By the end of the year scandals were begin-
ning to be suspected in connection with many acquisitions of
war materials, and the purchasing of the submarines, when
viewed from the outside, had a sinister appearance.

On February 11, 1915, the Hon. William Pugsley, who had
been Laurier's Minister of Public Works, moved in the Cana-
dian House of Commons that a copy of all the official corres-
pondence and reports relating to the submarines and their
purchase should be laid before the House. Pugsley asserted
that the submarines were out of date and not built according
to specifications, that Chile had not wanted them, that the
price paid had been too high, and that the government had
been too secretive. He also asked whether anyone had got a
commission out of the deal. In the course of his speech he
referred to McBride as "the sixteenth member of this Govern-
ment, though he is not yet sworn in." Pugsley also said:

... it looks to me as if this Government was hesitating about purchasing
the submarines and Sir Richard McBride took it upon himself to force the
hand of the Government by purchasing them himself on behalf of the
British Columbian Government .... I myself am very much in favour of
adding submarines to the Canadian navy .... My only regret is that there
should be any question as to the suitability of these submarines for the
purpose for which they were bought.

Later in the debate Pugsley expressed the opinion that
McBride would probably have known what to do with a
quarter of a million dollars. The suggestion was, not that
McBride had put money into his own pocket, but that he
might have used it for Party purposes.

The Minister33 replied for the government. He argued that
there was no reason to consider the submarines defective; that
the naval experts, including those at the Admiralty, had
recommended that the boats should be bought; that it had
been exceedingly desirable to have two submarines stationed
at Esquimalt; and that there had been no time to lose. He
promised to produce all the relevant documents at an early
date, excepting any that might give useful information to the

32 The evidence given before the Davidson Commission is extremely detailed regarding the
whole transaction.

33 Hon. J. D. Hazen.

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

enemy. Sir Robert Borden supported his Minister, emphasiz-
ing the danger that had seemed to threaten the west coast and
the duty of the government to furnish all possible protection.
He added that:

If Sir Richard McBride had not taken the action which he did the
submarines could not have been purchased by Canada and the security
they have afforded to the Pacific coast would not have been available.34

McBride also defended what he had done, in a long speech
delivered on February 24 in the Provincial Legislature.35 The
same day he telegraphed to Borden asking for a strict investi-
gation. The Prime Minister replied that he did not think
Pugsley worth that much attention, and McBride agreed to
let the matter rest for the time being. On June 2, 1915, the
Dominion Government authorized Sir Charles Davidson,
under Royal Commission, to inquire into war purchases, and
during the same month McBride went to Ottawa and asked
once more for an investigation. The buying of the submarines
was included in the terms of reference of the Davidson Com-
mission, which took evidence on that subject in Victoria,
Vancouver, Ottawa, Montreal, and New York. The Com-
mission reported that the submarines could not, in the circum-
stances, have been obtained for less, and that alternative
purchasers were available to whom Paterson or the Electric
Boat Co. would have sold them had McBride not met the
quoted price. The report also completely exonerated McBride
and all others whose names had been unfavourably mentioned
in connection with the purchase, stating that "this . . . enter-
prise was, throughout, of blameless character."36 Both of
these verdicts seem to be worthy of acceptance. The sequence
of political events which has been described — the unorthodox
transaction in emergency; the criticism and demand for infor-
mation, by the Opposition; the publishing of the relevant docu-
ments; and the Commission's investigation, followed by a
published report and minutes of evidence — -furnishes a good
instance of parliamentary institutions functioning at the top
of their form in time of war.

The assertion that the boats were of an unsuitable type was
invalid. Their design was not perfect; but it should be remem-
bered that practical submarines were a comparatively recent

34 The debate on the submarines is in House of Commons Debates, 1915, 1, pp. 94-116. Sess.
Pap. No. 158, 1915, carried out the Minister's promise.

35 Reported in Colonist, Victoria, Feb. 25, 1915.

36 Report, p. 25.

298

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

invention, and that contemporary boats of virtually the same
design gave an excellent account of themselves in European
waters. The question of workmanship is more difficult; yet on
this point, too, it is possible to reach a fairly certain conclusion.
The Kingston valve leading from the main ballast-tank of each
submarine seemed from the first to be obstructed, and on
examination a piece of 2-inch plank was discovered in one of
the tanks and a pair of overalls in the other. Both submarines
were docked for overhaul in the spring of 1915, and the Chief
Engineer at Esquimalt reported on their condition. Of CC I
he said among other things that: "The general state of the
valves conveyed the impression of gross carelessness in the
original workmanship;" and of CC 2: "The defects mentioned
indicate a lack of detailed inspection during the Construction
of the boats." Of both submarines he stated that: "The
workmanship put into the vessels does not approach the
Admiralty standard of construction." CC i was docked again
in December 1915, and on this occasion about seventeen
hundred of her hull rivets had to be renewed.37

The Davidson Commission, on the other hand, basing its
judgment mainly on evidence given by a number of naval
officers who were in a good position to know the facts, praised
the construction of the boats.38 The overalls and plank in the
tanks did not necessarily indicate inferior workmanship, and
the deterioration of the rivets referred to above has been
credibly attributed to electrolytic action resulting from contact
between the steel hulls of the submarines and the copper
sheathing of the Shearwater. Among those who served in the
boats, whose special knowledge carries weight and whose
opinions have been available, the prevailing judgment is that
the submarines were well constructed, and this verdict it is
probably safe to accept.

The main propelling machinery consisted of two direct,
reversible, six-cylinder, two-cycle diesel engines, of 300 b.h.p.
each at 500 r.p.m. The engines operated under blast injection,
with a two-stage air-cornpressor driven directly from the main
crank-shaft at the forward end of the engines. Blast air was
supplied at 1,000 lb. pressure per square inch at the compressor,
and restricted to 900 lb. at the fuel-nozzles. Circulating water,
lubricating oil, and primary fuel pumps were connected to a
single cross-head and driven by a small auxiliary crank-shaft,

37 Reports by the Chief Engineer, Esquimalt, N.S. 45-2-8 (1).

38 Report, pp. 15-20.

299

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

also geared to the main crank-shaft at the forward end. A
single cam-shaft operated the fuel-injection valves, scavenger
valves, and air-starting valves, and was mounted on top of the
cylinders and fitted with a reversible clutch. Lubrication was
on the closed pressure system, and the oil, after passing the
main bearings and the bottom and top ends of the connecting-
rods, passed into the piston-heads in order to cool them, and
then returned to the crank-case. These engines had been
designed at a time when the diesel was in its infancy, and
trouble with them was almost chronic. Cracked piston-heads,
broken auxiliary crank-shafts, and trouble with the compressor
and the inter-coolers, were extremely frequent experiences, and
only the untiring efforts of the engine-room staff kept the
engines running.39

The German cruiser Leipzig had been in Magdalena Bay,
Mexico, when she received the news that Great Britain had
declared war on Germany, and from /August 5 to September 9
she operated off the west coast of North America between
Mazatlan and Cape Mendocino.40 During a press broadcast
from San Diego on the night of August 6-7, while she was on
her way to San Francisco, she learned for the first time that
the naval force at the Admiralty's disposal on the west coast
included "two submarines bought from Chile."41 The German
■official history42 does not represent the Leipzig's captain as
having known that CC I and CC 2 would for some time be
unprepared for serious Operations. Nor does it credit the
Canadian submarines with having influenced the Leipzig's
movements in any way. Submarines were an untried weapon
at that time, and many naval officers, of whom the Leipzig s
captain may possibly have been one, had a low opinion of their
•capabilities. A more likely explanation, however, is that the
Germans probably weighed the two submarines very lightly in
their calculations because they had no intention of entering
the Strait of Juan de Fuca or its approaches.

The great masters of naval strategy from Drake to Mahan
have practised or preached concentration of force, and offen-

39 "At the beginning of the World War [the United States Navy possessed] . . . about
fifty serviceable submarines, of small size and indifferent engine efficiency." Knox, History of
the United States Navy, p. 385.

40 See ch. 12.

41 Several weeks later S.M.S. Xiirnberg informed Admiral von Spee from Honolulu that
the enemy ships on the Canadian coast consisted of three cruisers [correct] and two auxiliary
cruisers [Hilfskreuzer]. It seems much more likely that the last three words were an inaccurate
description of the Algerine and Shearwater than that they referred to the submarines.

48 Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918: Der Kreuzerkrieg in den ausldndischev Gewdssern, I, ch. 5.

300

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

sive action whenever practicable. Landsmen, on the other
hand, often think of naval war as being chiefly a matter of
passively defending coasts and ports. During the Napoleonic
wars Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty and one of
the greatest of all British naval strategists, was loudly criticized
for keeping the fleet concentrated and out of sight of land when
invasion seemed to threaten:

As the panic grew, frenzied demands came from all parts of the kingdom
for ships to be stationed on the nearest parts of the coast, and an insistence
on the manning of flat boats, brigs, and other small craft to repel a landing.43

In the United States, at the beginning of the Spanish-American
War:

. . . the seaboard people were swept off their feet by fear of invasion or
bombardment .... Senators rushed to the Secretary of the Navy pleading
that a naval vessel, any kind of ship, be sent to the leading ports of their
states to reassure the population.44

The phenomenon is not peculiar to English-speaking countries,
nor does it occur only in time of war. "Throughout my whole
career," wrote Grand-Admiral Tirpitz at the end of it, "I have
always had to oppose two ideas, especially beloved of the lay
mind — the idea of a special coastal defence . . . "45 The
fundamental objection of the experts to a shallow-water policy
is that it violates the principle of concentration of force and
destroys any prospect of offensive action. To place a warship
or a small squadron like a goal-keeper outside each port, will
weaken the main fleet to the point of ineffectiveness and may
expose the isolated ships to being destroyed in detail by
superior forces of the enemy. This policy is therefore one of
passive defence. The most eminent of the prophets of con-
centration and the offensive as sound principles of naval
strategy has declared that:

When war has been accepted as necessary, success means nothing short
of victory; and victory must be sought by offensive measures, and by them
only can be insured.46

He also writes:

A raid? Well, a raid, above all a maritime raid, is only a raid; a
black eye, if you will, but not a bullet in the heart, nor yet a broken leg.47

43 Sherrard, Life of Lord St. Vincent, p. 207.

44 Davis, A Navy Second to None, p. 81.

45 Tirpitz, Memoirs, i, p. 92.

46 Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, p. 152. Mahan's insistence on offensive measures as the
only certain means to victory is too extreme to win unreserved acceptance among the expert;
but there is general agreement that naval forces should act offensively whenever practicable.

47 Ibid., p. 175.

301

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Lord Fisher has put the naval point of view on this subject
into two pithy sentences, written in his tempestuous style:

General principle: The Admiralty should never engage itself to lock up
a single vessel even — not even a torpedo-boat, or submarine — anywhere
on any consideration whatever. The whole principle of Sea fighting is to be
free to go anywhere with every d — d thing the Navy possesses. 48

This plebiscite of the giants has been held only in order to show
that a blessing pronounced upon the action of the Provincial
and Dominion governments in acquiring the two submarines
should not be construed too widely.

Purchasing the submarines and stationing them at Esqui-
malt were acts thoroughly justified in the circumstances of
place and time. The 700-mile front which British Columbia
presented to the ocean was exceedingly easy to protect against
a naval attack. By fortifying its northern entrance, the Strait
of Georgia could be quickly and easily converted into an inlet
from the strategic point of view. Inside the Strait of Juan de
Fuca, which would then form its single, narrow entrance, lay
all but one of the important ports. The exception, Prince
Rupert, was not a vital spot except in the virtually impossible
event of an attempted invasion, and lent itself admirably to
local defence by means of shore batteries. The remainder of
the exposed coast, including the seaward side of Vancouver
Island, was practically uninhabited except for a few very small
towns and an occasional village. Through the Strait of Juan
de Fuca came and went almost all the merchant ships which
plied overseas, and into it or its approaches any enemy ship
hoping to cause serious physical damage would have to come.
The coastwise trade route up to a point nearly two hundred
miles north of Vancouver was covered by the rampart of
Vancouver Island. The presence of the submarines in or near
the Strait of Juan de Fuca, therefore, achieved far more than
merely local protection for Esquimalt and Victoria. Placing
them there was, in fact, applying the principle of concentration
for defence to the abnormal coast of British Columbia.

Had it been possible to obtain and man, in place of the
submarines, one or more cruisers as good as the Leipzig or
better, they would have been even more effective than the
submarines were, for pure defence. They would also have been
able to go wherever the enemy might be, and so to make a
positive rather than a purely passive contribution toward

48 Fisher, Memories, p. 197.

302

CANADA'S FIRST SUBMARINES

winning the war. Such ships could have caught the Leipzig off
the coast of Mexico, or driven her at once from North American
waters. They could then have formed an important addition
to the allied naval forces in the Pacific or elsewhere. The
supreme merit of the two submarines was, however, that they
were available.49

49 For expert and unstinted help in connection with this chapter sincere thanks are due to
Capt. B. L. Johnson, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.C.N.R. (Ret'd.), and to R. Pearson, Esq., O.B.E.
Dr. W. Kaye Lamb very kindly placed at the author's disposal his private collection of ma-
terial concerning these submarines.

303

Chapter 14

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

AT THE Imperial Conference of 1917 it was agreed "that
XjLthe Admiralty be requested to work out, immediately
after the conclusion of the war, what they consider
the most effective scheme of Naval Defence for the Empire for
the consideration of the several Governments summoned to
this Conference, with such recommendations as the Admiralty
consider necessary in that respect for the Empire's future
security."1 Acting on this request the Admiralty submitted to
the Imperial War Conference, in May 1918, a memorandum
containing their recommendations.2 In the x^dmiralty's
opinion, war experience had shown that the maintenance of
adequate sea power was essential to the independence of the
separate communities which formed the British Empire. The
memorandum pointed to the superior value of a single navy,
as a means to facilitate the preparing of effective war plans,
and to command the seas and protect seaborne traffic. The
Admiralty therefore proposed a scheme whereby the whole
naval force of the Empire would form one organization, all
effective units being under the control of an imperial naval
authority both in peace and war. Ships were to be available
for service in any waters, and officers and men for service in
any ship. The partner nations would establish local naval
boards, and these, while working in co-operation with the
imperial naval authority, would be under their respective
Ministers for the navy and responsible to their respective
Parliaments. Under this scheme the imperial naval authority
would deal with questions of strategy and the utilization of the
navy as a righting force, organization, equipment, efficiency,
promotions and appointments, principles of training, and the
formulation of the requirements which the annual Estimates
would reflect. The naval boards, on the other hand, would
control all local naval establishments such as dockyards and
institutions for training. They would also be responsible for

'"Occasional Paper No. 3," July 3, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1).

2 Copy with "Occasional Paper No. 21," Oct. 1919, N.S. 1017-31-3 (1).

304

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

construction and repairs, the entry and training of personnel,
providing material and supplies, and other functions which
help to keep a fleet in a state of efficiency. Discipline, the type
of uniform, and qualifications tor promotion, were to be the
same for all, and the rates of pay would be as nearly equal as
possible. The Admiralty did not make any specific proposals
about the permanent composition and constitutional status of
the imperial naval authority; but arrangements to cover the
transitional period were tentatively suggested. In the opinion
of the Admiralty the final arrangement would be determined
by the form in which a desire for closer imperial unity might
ultimately be expressed. On the naval and professional side,
the staff of the single navy would form the basis of an organiza-
tion which would gradually become fully representative as
officers drawn from the overseas nations acquired sufficient
naval experience to fit them tor the higher posts. It was
suggested that if the Dominions accepted the proposed scheme,
arrangements might be made to include India.

It was decided, however, that this memorandum should be
considered by the Dominion Prime Ministers individually,
before it was presented to the Imperial War Conference.3 The
memorandum was first of all given to Sir Robert Borden, who
decided that it could not be accepted, as it did not sufficiently
recognize the status of the Dominions and would therefore
offend the newly-awakened sense of nationhood in Canada and
the other members of the Commonwealth. Agreeing that the
Admiralty's proposal was probably the best that could be
devised from the standpoint of efficiency, he thought that it
was politically impracticable, and the same conclusion was
reached at a meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers. Borden
states in his Memoirs that after this meeting he called on the
First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, and explained
that the Prime Ministers felt unable to accept the proposals
contained in the memorandum. He adds that "Geddes asked
me to put proposal forward for visit of Jellicoe and I agreed."
The day before he left for Canada, Borden wrote to the First
Lord enclosing a memorandum which had been approved by
all the Prime Ministers except the Prime Minister of New-
foundland.4 This memorandum expressed the opinion that the
scheme for a single navy under a central authority was not

3 "Occasional Paper No. 3."

4 In his letter Borden stated:"The Prime Minister of Newfoundland has been requested to
communicate with you direct."

305

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

practicable; and that even from the standpoint of naval
strategy the Admiralty's arguments on behalf of such a navy,
although they were weighty, were not unanswerable. It
argued that experience during the war had shown that Domin-
ion navies could operate with the highest efficiency as parts of a
united navy, and cited the Royal Australian Navy as an ex-
ample. The memorandum admitted, however, that construc-
tion, armament, equipment, training, organization, and admin-
istration, should be kept uniform as far as possible in all the
navies of the Empire, and pointed out that this policy had, in
fact, been followed hitherto by those Dominions that had
established naval forces. For this purpose "the Dominions
would welcome visits from a highly qualified representative of
the Admiralty who, by reason of his ability and experience
would be thoroughly competent to advise the naval authorities
of the Dominions in such matters." It was also suggested that
as the naval forces of the Dominions developed it might become
necessary to consider establishing, for purposes of war, a
supreme naval authority in which each Dominion would be
adequately represented.5

On November 18, 1918, Lord Jellicoe accepted an invita-
tion to visit the Dominions.6 His tour was to include Australia,
New Zealand, and Canada: in the end South Africa was
dropped from his itinerary, while India was added to it. The
Admiralty told Jellicoe that although they continued to prefer
a single navy, the main purposes of his mission were to promote
uniformity in naval organization and training and to advise
concerning local defence. On February 21, 1919, the mission
sailed in H.M.S. New Zealand for India. Jellicoe then visited
Australia and New Zealand, and on November 8 he arrived at
Esquimalt.7

Early in 1919 the Canadian Naval Service had begun to
consider plans for its own future. A deliberative body known
as the Naval Committee was set up in February, and at an
early meeting the committee decided to advise the Minister
that the Service should be reduced as far as possible, so as to be
ready for a fresh start after Lord Jellicoe's report should have
been presented. The committee instructed the Assistant
Director of the Naval Service to prepare basic plans "so that

8 Borden Memoirs^ n, pp. 841-3.

6 A similar visit by Jellicoe to Canada had been projected in 1914, but had been prevented
by the outbreak of war. See pp. 208-9 above.

7 Bacon, Life of Jellicoe, pp. 393-4. Ch. 24 contains the story of Jellicoe's visit to India,
Australia, and New Zealand: a detailed account of the mission to Canada is given in ch. 25.

306

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

when a programme was finally adopted by the Government,
the foundation would be ready and progress would be im-
mediately made." The advisability of preparing a report for
presentation to Lord Jellicoe was also agreed upon. At a
meeting on June 11 the Deputy Minister informed the com-
mittee that the Minister wished to have a definite basis for the
discussion of future naval policy, and the Assistant Director
was asked to prepare alternative suggestions for a naval
programme.8 The result was a memorandum dated July 3,
1919, prepared by the Naval War Staff.9 In it the Staff stated
that they had attempted to formulate the principles which
ought to govern a decision on any recommendations which the
Admiralty might put forward. They urged that a definite
policy extending over a period of years should be adopted, and
that its central feature should be a programme of naval
construction to be spread over the space of fifteen or twenty
years and sanctioned by a special Act of Parliament.

Assuming that only a policy which provided for a Canadian
navy would be acceptable, the memorandum stated that the
size and composition of such a navy would depend on Canadian
requirements. These might be met more or less adequately in
any one of four different ways: providing docking and repair
facilities for the Royal Navy; creating a local naval force as
well; maintaining a fleet unit in addition to the foregoing; and
finally by means of a fair-sized fleet, to include capital ships
and all the other components of a complete and versatile force.
The Staff considered the experience of the war to have shown
that provision for local defence was essential. They also felt
that because of the importance of Canada's overseas trade and
the growth of Canadian interests abroad, some additional form
of naval defence should be provided. It was suggested that the
best policy would be to maintain, in accordance with the third
of their four suggested schemes, a small fleet to consist of
cruisers which would be available for service anywhere in time
of war, and local defence forces, together with bases at which
facilities for docking and repairs would be available to ships of
the Royal Navy. For local defence the Staff recommended the
use of several destroyers and submarines, eighteen PC-boats10

8 Meetings of Mar. 13, Mar. 20, and June 11, 1919, N.S. 1078-1-1 (1).

9 "Occasional Paper No. 2," July 3, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1).

10 P-boats had been built during the war in order to take the place of destroyers in patrol
and escort work, and submarine hunting. Their special characteristics were smallness, good
sea-keeping qualities, simplicity of construction, a speed considerably in excess of that of a
submarine on the surface, shallow draft, high manoeuvrability, low upperworks to reduce
visibility, and economy of fuel. They had a speed of twenty-three knots when new, and were
a successful anti-submarine type. Those converted into decoy ships were called PC-boats.
See Jane's Fighting Ships, 1922.

307

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

with a parent ship, and certain auxiliary vessels to be ear-
marked for commissioning at the outbreak of war. The PC-
boats were recommended on the ground that they were in
general adequate, and in some ways superior to destroyers for
the purpose of Canadian local defence: also because they were
about half as expensive to build and maintain as the same
number of destroyers would be. Some destroyers were needed,
however, to escort fast merchant ships or cruisers, to support
the weaker vessels, and for hunting submarines and other
special purposes. The Naval War Staff did not advise the
building of battle cruisers for the present. To help in the
defence of trade routes they recommended cruisers of the
Frobisher class;11 and they suggested that submarines would
be the best means of dealing with enemy battle cruisers, being
of the opinion that the presence of submarines would have a
great moral effect upon any battle cruiser operating so far
from her bases.12 Suggestions were also made concerning
dockyards and naval bases. Owing to the prevailing uncer-
tainty about future air policy in Canada, no recommendations
were made regarding it, beyond the statement that either a
naval air service or air forces attached to the navy would be
essential in modern war.

Two successive programmes were proposed, each covering
seven years. The first would provide, by 1926, 18 PC-boats,
3 destroyers, and 3 cruisers. The second programme would
expand this force by 1934 to 18 PC-boats, 3 parent ships, 6
submarines, 12 destroyers, and 7 cruisers. When that time
came, Parliament could decide whether or not to extend the
navy by including battleships in a new scheme. The cost of
these two programmes was estimated at $60,522,000 for
construction, and $15,939,500 for annual upkeep. Finally the
Staff pointed out that a small navy provides little opportunity
for the advancement of officers, and suggested that some
arrangement be made similar to that contained in the Ad-
miralty memorandum of May 1918, whereby Canadian
officers might get into the flow of imperial promotion and
command. This memorandum was considered in detail by the
Naval Committee on July 9, and the proposals which it
contained were generally concurred in as providing a good

11 Later rejected as being too expensive. The Frobishers were the only British light cruisers
superior to the corresponding Japanese ships, and were considered to be well suited to Canadian
conditions. When the actual cost of a Frobisher — £1,600,0G0 — becarre known, it was decided
to recommend D-class cruisers instead. Note attached to "Occasional Paper No. 2."

12 The type considered most suitable was a coastal boat similar to the H class, but slightly
larger.

308

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

basis for future development.13 In order to provide a factual
foundation for a naval policy, the Naval War Staff prepared
thirty-six "Occasional Papers" covering every aspect of the
naval problem. Twenty-three of these, including the one which
has just been summarized, were prepared before Jellicoe's
arrival and were available tor his use.14

Lord Jellicoe reached Ottawa on November 27, 1919,
having visited Esquimalt, Victoria, Port McNeill, and Van-
couver. Soon after his arrival he had several conferences with
Sir Robert Borden in which they discussed the extent of
Canada's participation in naval defence, and Borden told him
that the financial position of the Dominion was very difficult. 15
Jellicoe cabled to the Admiralty on November 30, stating that
the Canadian Cabinet was discussing naval Estimates for the
next few years, and that there had been some expression of a
desire to bear a proportionate share of the Empire's naval
defence. In order to provide the government with a standard
for comparison he asked to be given the approximate total of
probable British naval Estimates for the next two or three
years. Jellicoe added that the matter was urgent, as a decision
would shortly be reached. Having received no reply, he wrote
privately to the First Lord on December 3, saying that Borden,
pressed hard by Ballantyne, the naval Minister, was in favour
of an immediate start being made on a new programme; but
that some of the Ministers wished to postpone any action
either tor political or financial reasons. Jellicoe suggested that
some modern ships should, if possible, be offered by the
Admiralty to Canada as a gift, light cruisers and submarines
being principally required:

Mr. Ballantyne who is very much in earnest, is concerned that unless
the matter is settled now, before I leave Canada nothing will be done for
several years. He tells me distinctly that unless a serious start is made
now, he intends to wipe out completely the present Canadian Naval Service
as being a pure waste of money. He is right.

On December 5 Jellicoe received a memorandum from the
x^dmiralty in which it was stated that in view of their decision
on the previous Admiralty memorandum, the Dominions could
now best contribute by building up their own navies. The

13 Proceedings, 18th meeting, N.S. 1078-1-1 (1).

» The "Occasional Papers" are in N.S. 1017-31-2 (1), 1017-31-3 (1), and 1017-31^ (1).
It seems almost certain that the earlier papers were shown to Lord Jellicoe. While the Mission
was in Canada Admiral Kingsmill was a member of Jellicoe's staff. In any case, many of the
ideas contained in "Occasional Paper No. 2" are to be found in the Jellicoe Report.

15 Borden Memoirs, II, pp. 1014-15.

309

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Admiralty expressed the view that the primary role of the
Dominion navies should be to assist in the control of imperial
communications in distant seas and in protecting the trade
along their own coasts. Sound strategy, however, required
that each ship should be available for war service in any part
of the world, and a general campaign directed by one central
authority. Each Dominion would have to decide its own
programme on its own responsibility. Initial difficulties might
be overcome by taking over ships, and temporarily absorbing
personnel, from the Royal Navy; but the problem could only
be adequately solved by organizing as soon as possible the entry
and training of officers and men. The special needs of the
Dominions in number of ships and types required should be
under the continued consideration of the Naval Staff at the
Admiralty, in consultation with representatives of the Domin-
ions. The Admiralty thought that in all cases a start should be
made with light cruisers and submarines. Concerning the
system of command and direction in war, the Admiralty
suggested that an Imperial Council should be created to
consider questions of policy. It was also recommended that the
Dominions should be represented on the Naval Staff of the
Admiralty, that officers from the Dominions should be appoin-
ted to the Naval Staff College, and that common operational
and technical text-books should be used. Dominion officers
should be in entire command of their own ships and squadrons
for purposes of discipline and administration; but they should
obey the Commander in Chief or Senior Naval Officer in all
operational matters.16 Jellicoe received permission to inform
the Canadian Government of the contents of this memorandum.

On December 22 Jellicoe attended a meeting of the Cabinet
where he presented his proposals concerning naval policy.
These were discussed in Cabinet on December 30, and it was
agreed that they should be submitted to caucus for considera-
tion before any decision was made.17 The Jellicoe Report1*
was presented to the Governor General on December 31, 1919.
It was printed in three volumes, of which the first subsequently
appeared as a Sessional Paper. Jellicoe had been instructed by
the Admiralty:

To advise the Dominion Authorities whether, in the light of the
experience of the war, the scheme of naval organization, which has been

16 Bacon, Life of Jellicoe, pp. 418-26.

17 Borden Memoirs, II, p. 1018.

18 Report of Admiral . . . Jellicoe . . . on Naval Mission to . . . Canada. Vols, n and m
were secret, but vol. I was published as Sess. Pap. No. 61, 1920.

310

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

adopted, or may be in contemplation, requires reconsideration; either from
the point of view of the efficiency of that organization for meeting local
needs, or from that of ensuring the greatest possible homogeneity and co-
operation between all the naval forces of the Empire; and, should the
Dominion Authorities desire to consider how far it is possible for the
Dominions to take a more effective share in the naval defence of the Em-
pire, to give assistance from the naval point of view in drawing up a scheme
for consideration.

The Canadian Government had given Jellicoe a memoran-
dum outlining the points on which they wished to be advised.
In general terms they asked for his opinion on the steps to be
taken, and the best methods to be adopted, should the govern-
ment decide to adopt a policy of a local navy. They requested
that his advice should cover as many incidental points as
possible, and attached a list of questions which they did not by
any means regard as being exhaustive. The government told
Jellicoe that they would gladly consider any other recom-
mendations he might wish to make, and that they would value
his opinion on any point concerning naval defence on which
he cared to express himself. The questions submitted by the
Canadian Government, listed under fourteen general headings,
in themselves gave Jellicoe wide scope, covering as they did
most aspects of the naval problem from the policy of imperial
co-operation to the details of organization and training.
Jellicoe answered this request very fully. His report not only
concerned itself with general policy, but also included detailed
recommendations regarding administration, personnel, train-
ing, Intelligence and wireless telegraphy, naval air require-
ments, bases, docks, fuel, and the defence of Canadian har-
bours.

The Report began by stating that the question of the naval
forces suited to Canada's needs could be viewed in two ways:
first the requirements of the Dominion for the defence of her
own coasts; and second her requirements if, in addition to
providing for local defence, she were to take part in the defence
of the seas as a whole. The naval force suggested as being fully
adequate for the defence of Canada's trade and ports would
consist of 3 light cruisers, a flotilla leader, 12 torpedo craft,
8 submarines with a parent ship, and certain auxiliary small
craft for training purposes. Jellicoe advised that if Canada
decided to participate with the United Kingdom and the other
Dominions in the naval defence of the whole Empire, she
should obtain and man, in addition to the purely defensive
navy already mentioned, either one or two fleet units each of

311

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

which would by itself be a complete and versatile naval force.
The fleet unit which Jellicoe suggested as being suited to Cana-
dian conditions would consist of a battle cruiser, 2 light cruisers,
6 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2 fleet minesweepers, an aircraft
carrier, and certain additional vessels including a depot ship
and a flotilla leader for the destroyers, and a parent ship for
the submarines.

With these two forces in mind, Jellicoe approached the
question from the point of view of cost, drawing up four plans
based on yearly Estimates which would ultimately approxi-
mate respectively: 1, 2, 3J/£, and 5 million pounds:

(1)
£1,000,000

(2)
£2,000,000

3 light cruisers
1 flotilla leader

(4)
£5,000,000

2 battle cruisers
7 light cruisers
1 flotilla leader
12 destroyers

8 submarines

4 local defence
destroyers

8 P-boats

4 trawler mine-
sweepers

(3)
£3,500,000

1 battle cruiser

5 light cruisers
1 flotilla leader

6 destroyers
1 destroyer parent 1 destroyer

ship parent ship

8 submarines 16 submarines

1 sub. parent ship 1 sub. parent ship 1 sub. parent ship

1 aircraft carrier 2 aircraft carriers

2 fleet mine-
sweepers

4 local defence
destroyers

8 P-boats

4 trawler mine-
sweepers

8 submarines

4 local defence
destroyers

8 P-boats

4 trawler mine-
sweepers

4 fleet mine-
sweepers

4 local defence
destroyers

8 P-boats

4 trawler mine-
sweepers

Also provided for: Administration

Training Establishments
Dockyards
Local Defences
Fuel Reserves;

and, except in the case of Plan No. 1 :

Wireless
Naval Air Squadron — 12 machines.

Plans No. 1 and No. 2 were based exclusively on the needs for
local defence. Plans No. 3 and No. 4 provided for participation
in imperial naval defence as well, by adding one and two fleet
units respectively, with one minor modification, to the larger
local defence force.19 The Admiralty had previously offered
surplus ships of certain types to the Dominion, and the vessels

19 The modification occurs in column No. 3, where the addition of one complete fleet unit
would have given 12 submarines instead of 8.

312

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

in the two lower estimates, excepting the light cruisers and the
submarine parent ship, were assumed to be gifts. The esti-
mated cost of each of these programmes included the annual
cost of maintenance as well as the cost of construction of those
ships not given by the Admiralty. Plans No. 1 and No. 2
would be completed in seven years, and No. 3 and No. 4 in
nine years.20

Jellicoe recommended the formation of a Canadian Navy
Board similar to the Board of Admiralty. Subject to the con-
trol of Parliament, this body would be charged with the
administration of all matters relating to the Royal Canadian
Navy. It would be composed of the Minister of the Naval
Service, the First Naval Member and Chief of the Naval Staff,
the Second Naval Member, and the Civil and Finance Mem-
ber. There would also be a secretary who would not, however,
be a member of the Navy Board. The Minister, responsible to
Parliament, would be charged with the general direction of all
business including questions of policy and finance. The First
Naval Member would be responsible for preparations for war,
the fighting efficiency of the fleet, the movements of ships, and
all matters coming under the heading of Operations. The
Second Naval Member would control personnel, training,
discipline, engineering and construction, dockyard manage-
ment, and stores. The Civil and Finance Member would be in
charge of finance and works. It was considered advisable that
he should be a Member of Parliament, in order to ensure that
close touch was maintained between Parliament and the Navy
Board in regard to financial and other questions of mutual
concern. The board would act as a whole, its orders being
issued over the signature of the secretary. It was also suggested
that the Minister should have a naval assistant, preferably a
naval officer of the executive branch. Beneath this apex
Jellicoe drafted in detail the naval organization that would be
required, and the various spheres of responsibility. He pointed
out that if Canada were to confine herself to a very small navy
some of this organization might be superfluous, but that the
principles were the same no matter what the size of the navy
might be.

20 ' ' There has never been any real measure of agreement in Canada regarding naval defence,
and it was very difficult to formulate proposals during my visit which would be likely to meet
with any general approval. Consequently, four alternative schemes were placed before the
Government ..." Earl Jellicoe, "Naval Policy of the Empire — The Need for Co-operation,"
Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1926.

313

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Other recommendations regarding administration included
one that the Naval Service should have a separate Minister of
its own. Jellicoe felt that the general interests of the Royal
Canadian Navy would be better served by a Minister who
should be free to devote his undivided attention to naval
affairs: therefore he urged strongly that the existing arrange-
ment whereby the Naval Service and Marine and Fisheries
were under the same Minister, should be discontinued. A close
understanding should exist, however, between the naval
authorities, the ship-owning community, and the fishing
industry. An elementary knowledge of naval warfare, as far as
it affected the conduct of merchant ships in time of war, was
suggested as part of the qualification for masters' and mates'
certificates. All new fishing vessels should be made as suitable
for naval purposes as might be possible without interfering
with their normal occupation. Jellicoe proposed that a shipping
committee comprising representatives of ship-owners, fishery
firms, the Department of Marine and Fisheries, and the Naval
Staff should meet periodically to consider the general develop-
ment of marine resources. Their function would be purely
advisory during peace; but in war they would take control of
shipping, their chairman acting as Shipping Controller. The
report stressed the value of direct communication with the
Admiralty so as to ensure rapidity and secrecy. It therefore
recommended that both in peace and war the method which
had been used until that time should be continued, namely,
direct communication between the Naval Service and the
Admiralty on all questions except important ones of policy,
which should pass through the usual official channels.

Close co-operation between the Naval Service and the
Admiralty was considered to be extremely important, and
Jellicoe set a very high value on similarity of ships, organiza-
tion, training, and discipline. In time of war, co-operation
between the two Services would necessarily be very close, and
this co-operation could be most effectively achieved by follow-
ing uniform principles of command and staff work, and by
having a common understanding of tactical and strategic
requirements. If these were to be achieved, similarity of train-
ing was essential. Jellicoe recommended that the Royal Naval
College of Canada should be continued, its regulations for
entry and for training up to the rank of lieutenant following
closely the lines laid down by the Admiralty. It was considered
desirable that Canadian staff officers should receive their

314

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

training at the Naval Staff College at Greenwich, along with
officers of the Royal Navy and the other Dominion navies, and
that Canada should be represented on the Staff of the Ad-
miralty. The point was also made that in a small navy it is
impossible for officers to obtain a wide and varied experience,
and that for this reason the policy adopted in the past of giving
officers fleet training with the Royal Navy should be continued.
The best way ot ensuring that officers should obtain this
experience would be by placing all officers of the military
branch in all the navies of the Empire on one general list. If
this were not feasible, a general list of all officers above the
rank of lieutenant-commander or commander was suggested;
or a separate list for each Dominion might be retained, com-
bined with a frequent interchange of their officers with those
of the Royal Navy.

Lord Jellicoe's Report also discussed the recruiting of ratings
and their conditions of service. Specific recommendations were
made for the organization and training of the naval reserve.
A whole chapter was devoted to the importance of discipline.
The question of training was carefully considered, including
the development of establishments for that purpose, and
training, both general, and also in gunnery, torpedo and
mining, wireless telegraphy, anti-submarine technique, and
air force work. Jellicoe recommended that naval Intelligence
work in the Dominion should be centralized in Ottawa. The
establishment of a high-power wireless station on the Pacific
Coast was considered to be necessary, and suggestions were
made concerning direction-finding and low-power stations in
Canada. The Report dealt fully with naval bases, docks and
docking facilities, and the defence of Canadian harbours. The
importance of air co-operation was stressed, and Jellicoe
expressed the opinion that as time went on this importance
would increase. He outlined naval needs in this respect,
pointing out that flying personnel needed specialized training
in order to co-operate effectively with naval forces; but he
refrained from making any specific recommendations as to the
nature of the force. He urged, however, that the navy should
be strongly represented on the recently-formed x^\ir Board, so
as to ensure that naval matters should be duly considered by
that body.

Reviewing the general naval situation Jellicoe pointed out
that the financial burden which had been imposed on the
people of Great Britain by four years of war had brought about

315

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

a great reduction in the strength of the Royal Navy. Although
the German menace had disappeared, the people of the Empire
would have to make considerable efforts in the future in order
to maintain their sea power on the same proportionate scale as
in the past. The United States and Japan were adding to their
already large fleets, and while it was "almost inconceivable"
that war would ever again occur between the British Empire
and the United States, future relations with Japan were less
predictable. The widespread nature of the British Empire
emphasized the value of sea communications to the prosperity
of its various members, and even to their existence as such.
The Dominions were well placed to defend the sea communica-
tions of the Empire, and to provide war anchorages and refit-
ting bases for sea-going trade and naval ships. Canada faced
two oceans, and it was pointed out that while her own naval
problem was complicated by this fact, her value in the general
realm of imperial defence was thereby increased. If the
Dominions and India should decide to protect their own ports
and coast trade, and to provide war anchorages and refitting
bases for ships which might operate near their shores, they
would be affording some support to the general defence in any
future war. They could assist still further by providing war-
ships which would strengthen the forces protecting the sea
communications of any particular area or which might be used
as a portion of the main fleet.

Early in the First World War the Admiralty had ordered a
number of H-class submarines in the United States. Some of
these were to be made in the United States and assembled in
Canada.21 In the spring of 1915 the Naval Service had asked
that two of those which were being completed in the Dominion
might be stationed at Halifax, for they were anxious about the
floating defences of that port. The Admiralty felt unable to
grant this request, however, being of the opinion that such
additional defences were not an urgent need, and that the
submarines in question were more vitally needed elsewhere.22

Of the H-class submarines completed in the United States
for the Admiralty, two were on their way to England23 when
the hostilities ended, and were thereupon ordered to Bermuda,
where they remained. In January 1919, Sir Robert Borden,

21 See p. 235 above.

22 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec, May 3, and reply, May 14, 1915,'Notes Relative to Defence and
Naval Intelligence."

23 One of them was commanded by Cdr. B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.N.R.

316

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

who was in Paris at the time, was asked whether the Canadian
Government would wish to accept a gift of the two submarines
at Bermuda. The gift was intended as some recognition of the
contribution which had been made by the Naval Service to the
defence of the Empire during the war. After consulting his
colleagues by cable Borden replied that the Canadian Govern-
ment would accept the submarines "with deep appreciation."24
The two submarines, H 14 and H 15, arrived at Halifax in
June and were commissioned in the Roval Canadian Navy as
CH 14 and CH15.™

In April Borden had asked the British Government con-
fidentially whether, in view of the fact that Great Britain
possessed many more warships than she would presumably
need in time of peace, it might not be possible to arrange for
the Naval Service to take over a fleet unit consisting of ships
that would otherwise be superfluous. The reply was that the
British Government would be willing to transfer to Canada a
number of warships of various types, and wished to know how
many the Canadian Government would like to have, and of
what types. If the Dominion would undertake their care and
maintenance and to pay their personnel, the ships would be
given free of charge.26 A decision on this subject was delayed,
however, possibly because Lord Jellicoe's mission was already
under way.

In the fall of 1919 the Admiralty began to reduce the fleet
to a peacetime basis, which involved both a reduction in
personnel and disposing of surplus ships. The vessels to be
relinquished included capital ships, light cruisers, sub-
marines, destroyers, sloops, patrol gun-boats, minesweepers,
coastal motor-boats, motor-launches, trawlers, and drifters.
Before disposing of these vessels, the Admiralty wished to have
some idea of what the Dominion navies might require. The
Admiralty recognized that a final decision regarding Canadian
requirements must await Jellicoe's recommendations, but
asked the Canadian Government if a very general estimate of
its probable needs, especially in smaller vessels, could be
supplied at an early date. These small units were deteriorating
rapidly while awaiting disposal, and the commercial market for
them was depreciating; the Admiralty therefore wished to sell

24 Correspondence, Jan. 24-Feb. 15, 1919, Borden Papers, O'C. No. 589.

25 Displacement, 364 tons surface, 434 tons submerged; dimensions, 150^' x 153i' x 12J/J}';
speed, 13 k. surface, 11 k. submerged; torpedo tubes, 4 — 18" (bow); complement, 20-22.

26 Correspondence, Apr. 14-Aug. 25, 1919, Borden Papers, "Naval Notes-Years 1912-
1921."

317

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

the surplus ones as soon as possible. The Naval Service asked
for further information about the classes which were available
except trawlers and drifters which were not required. The
Canadian Government was informed in December that the
British Government had authorized the Admiralty to offer,
as gifts to the Dominion governments, any surplus warships
which might help the Dominions to develop their naval forces.
The Admiralty pointed out, however, that owing to congestion
and costs of maintenance they could not undertake to reserve
any vessels for which a good offer might be received. The
Canadian Government soon afterwards informed the Ad-
miralty that Lord Jellicoe, who was then in Canada, had told
them that applications for any of the surplus warships would
have to be made before the end of January 1920, and asked
that the deadline should be postponed until March 15, as the
acquisition of any of the vessels in question would need to have
the approval of Parliament which was not due to meet until
February 20. This the Admiralty agreed to do. The Canadian
Government then intimated that the surplus vessels which
they had in mind were a light cruiser of the Bristol class, a
flotilla leader, four destroyers of the M class, eight P- or PC-
boats, and six submarines of the G class.

Lord Jellicoe's report, presented on December 31, 1919, was
before the Canadian Government for some months. No de-
cision had been made by the time that the extended deadline
was reached on March 15, and the government consequently
requested a week's further postponement. On March 24 the
Naval Service advised the acceptance of one light cruiser of the
Bristol class and two destroyers. The Minister announced that
these ships were being accepted in order to replace the obsolete
and useless training ships Niobe and Rainbow. On May 26 the
news came that H.M.S. Glasgow'1'1 and the destroyers Patriot
and Patrician28 had been selected for Canada. The Canadian
Government gratefully accepted the destroyers. They added,
however, that the Glasgow had been launched as far back as
1910, and that it was not considered advisable for Canada to
acquire an obsolescent ship of this class; and they asked the
Admiralty if a more modern cruiser could be spared — an oil-

27 H.M.S. Glasgow had a striking war record. She had been the only British ship actually
engaged at Coronel to escape from that battle. At the Battle of the Falkland Islands she
helped to sink S.M.S. Leipzig, and not long afterwards, assisted by H.M.S. Kent, she sank the
Dresden (Corbett and Newbolt, Naval Operations, i and n). The most famous of all twentieth-
century warships, H.M.S. Dreadnought, was being disposed of by the Admiralty at this time.

28 Displacement, 1,004 tons; dimensions, 271' x 27H' * 11'; h.p., 27,500; speed, 35 k.;
guns, 3 4", (i smaller; torpedo tubes, 4 21"; complement, 80.

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POST WAR POLICY TO 1922

burner being particularly desired. The Admiralty agreed to
allot the best oil-burning cruiser available, the selection to
depend largely upon the amount of reconditioning which
would be necessary, and H.M.S. Aurora was finally chosen.29

The three warships were given the necessary repairs, and
a meat-room, refrigerating room, and magazine-cooling plant,
were installed in Aurora. Great difficulty was experienced in
finding crews. Most of the ratings were recruited in Canada,
some in Great Britain, and some were loaned by the Admiralty.
Most of the officers were supplied by the Canadian Service,
though several came from the Royal Navy, including Capt.
H. G. H. Adams, C.B.E., R.N., who was lent by the Admiralty
to command the Aurora. Lieut. George C. Jones, R.C.N., and
Lieut. Charles T. Beard, R.C.N., commanded Patrician and
Patriot respectively. All three ships were commissioned on
November 1, 1920, at Devonport, and sailed a month later for
Halifax where they arrived on December 21, 1920.30

The three ships that Canada acquired at this time had all
seen service in the First World War. Patriot and Patrician had
been commissioned on June 17 and July 27, 1916, respectively,
for service in the destroyer flotillas of the Grand Fleet. They
had been employed on patrol and anti-submarine duties in the
North Sea until the end of the war, and had never been in
action. The Aurora, a light cruiser of the Arethusa class, had
served with the Grand Fleet from 1914 to 1916. She had taken
part in the Operations occasioned by the raids on Gorleston
and Scarborough in 1914; was the first British ship in action at
the battle of the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915; and had
participated in other important Operations.31

These and all later Canadian warships were oil-burners, a
fact which largely altered the nature of the fuel problem. Even
before the first war the Royal Navy had begun to commit
itself to oil in place of coal as fuel, in spite of the tremendous
disadvantage that whereas unlimited quantities of the best
steam coal in the world were produced in Great Britain, that
island possessed no petroleum. As a fuel for warships, how-
ever, oil has almost every advantage over coal. It is more

29 Displacement, 3,500 tons; dimensions, 436' x 39' x \Z\i\ h.p., 40,000; speed, 29k.;
guns, 2 6", 6 4", 11 smaller; torpedo tubes, 8 21"; complement, 370.

30 Account of the acquisition of Aurora, Patriot, Patrician, and the submarines, is based on
material in N.S. 1062-22-1 (1), 1017-10-8 (1), and 1017-10-8 (2).

31 Capt. Adams to N.S.H.Q. (signal), Apr. 18, 1921, N.S. 31-1-1; Corbett and Newbolt,
Naval Operations, passim.

319

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

efficient, far more convenient to handle, and produces less
smoke. Canada also suffered a disadvantage, although a much
smaller one than did Great Britain, in turning to oil in place of
coal for naval fuel. The mines of Cape Breton and Vancouver
Island, and in the Rocky Mountains, produced a fairly satis-
factory naval coal from sources which were either at the very
edge of tidewater or easily accessible from it. The home-
produced oil supplies of the Dominion were very limited; but
there was easy physical access, overland if necessary, to the
immense supplies of the United States. At the close of the First
World War the only stocks of fuel oil on either coast were
maintained by the Imperial Oil Company at Halifax, Quebec,
Montreal, Vancouver, Victoria, and Prince Rupert.32 These
commercial stocks of oil were maintained by tankers. Much of
the fuel was not ideal for naval purposes; but most of it was
capable of being used in emergency. For financial reasons,
however, at no time between the two wars did it prove possible
to build up sufficient stocks of naval oil on the coasts.

The Minister was very anxious that an adequate naval
policy, preferably along one of the lines suggested in the
Jellicoe Report, should be adopted and carried out. The
country was in a frame of mind, however, in which any sug-
gestion that money should be spent for naval defence was
distasteful.

The newspaper press, on the whole, showed little enthu-
siasm for Jellicoe's recommendations, and did not divide in any
clear-cut way on Party lines in commenting upon them. The
Toronto Globe thought: "What the majority of the people will
want to be assured of is that the Dominion is really in earnest
about the establishment of a moderate but efficient system of
naval defence."™ The Victoria Colonist considered that it was
Canada's duty to maintain a naval force sufficiently strong to
defend its own shores:

If the Union Government be true to the principles it always has
expressed it will adopt one of the plans outlined by the distinguished
British authority and proceed with the work of its execution .... There
is nothing that the manhood and womanhood of this Dominion regret so
much as the fact that we were represented only in an infinitesimal way on
the seas during the Great War in which victory, first last and all the time,
was decided by sea power.

32 Material in N.S. 31-9-3 (1).

33 Globe, Mar. 26, 1920.

u Colonist, Mar. 11 and 24, 1920.

320

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

L! Action Catliolique, on the other hand, remarked:

La guerre a certes montre l'utilite d'une marine; mais elle a fait
disparaitre du meme coup, avec l'aneantissement de la flotte allemande, le
principal pretexte mis de 1'avant par ceux qui voulaient nous inciter aux
depenses d'une flotte de guerre.35

Shortly after the arrival of the Jellicoe Mission in Canada the
Manitoba Free Press expressed a belief that the adoption of a
naval policy was important but not urgent, emphasized the
fact that Jellicoe's function was purely advisory, stated that
any scheme of imperial defence must recognize the existence of
Dominion navies locally controlled, and hoped that "profiting
by the experience of the past, there will be agreement by all
parties upon a national naval policy and the question will not
again become a party issue in Canada."36 Le Devoir feared that
the Jellicoe Mission and Report were influences making for
imperialism. The most frequent comment called forth by the
Report was that the country could not afford to spend money
on naval preparations. This point of view was expressed, for
example, by La Presse and the Gazette of Montreal.

Neither the Party nor the Cabinet would support the
Minister's point of view. The Jellicoe Report had been tabled
in the House of Commons on March 10, without comment, and
on March 25 the Minister announced the government's de-
cision concerning it:

The Government has had under consideration for some time the
question of the naval defence of Canada and the suggestion of Admiral
Viscount Jellicoe in reference thereto. In view of Canada's heavy financial
commitments and the fact that Great Britain has not yet decided on her
permanent naval policy and of the approaching Imperial Conference at
which the question of naval defence of the Empire will come up for dis-
cussion between the Home Government and the Overseas Dominions, it
has been decided to defer in the meantime action in regard to the adoption
of a permanent naval policy for Canada. The Government has decided to
carry on the Canadian Naval Service along pre-war lines and has accepted
the offer of Great Britain of one light cruiser and two torpedo-boat destroy-
ers to take the place of the present obsolete and useless training ships, the
Niobe and Rainbow. The Minister of the Naval Service, in order to be free
to thoroughly reorganize and place the present service on an economical
and efficient basis, has issued orders for the demobilization of all officers and
naval ratings and for the discontinuance of civilian help at Headquarters
and at the Naval Dockyards in Esquimalt and Halifax.

The Canadian Officers who are in the Imperial fleet and who are now
being paid by the Canadian Government will be recalled and placed on

:t5 L' Action Catholique, Mar. 12, 1920.
16 Manitoba Free Press. Nov. 24, 1919.

321

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

duty with the Canadian Naval Service. The Naval College will also be
continued. After reorganization has been completed, only those officers and
other ratings and civilians will be taken on who are absolutely necessary
and possess the qualifications desired.

The Minister also announced the forthcoming retirement of
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill, and stated that an officer
of lower rank would shortly be appointed as Director of the
Naval Service.

The Minister made a further statement in the House to-
wards the close of the session in which he described how the
reorganization had been carried out:

So that I might have a free hand to reorganize the entire Naval Service
of Canada, with the consent of the Government, I issued general demobili-
zation orders to all naval ratings and to all civilians at headquarters,
Esquimalt and Halifax, that their services would not be required on and
after the 15th May. I did that so that I, as responsible head of the Naval
Service, and my technical officers associated with me, might re-engage only
those naval officers, ratings and civilians who possessed the necessary
efficiency. Furthermore, my instructions were that only those who were
absolutely needed and who possessed the requisite efficiency would be taken
on.

These orders would not affect Canadian officers serving in the
Royal Navy, nor officers and men at the naval college. The
Minister stated that the number of naval and civil personnel
had been reduced from 1,303 to 521, adding: "The naval
officers and civilians who are now in the employ of the Govern-
ment are all men who possess the necessary knowledge and
efficiency, and we certainly have not two men where only one
is necessary." He also said that the very small navy which
Canada had retained, consisting of one cruiser, two destroyers,
and two submarines, would be absolutely efficient. They
would be stationed part of the time on each coast, and would
spend as much time as possible at sea in order that the crews
might get the best training that could be given to them. The
Minister announced that arrangements for the future had been
made with the Admiralty to interchange ships and officers so
that at all times the Canadian navy, though small, would be
kept up to the Royal Navy's standard of efficiency. He hoped
that a decision as to participation by the Dominions in the
defence of the Empire would be made at the forthcoming
imperial conference:

It is to be sincerely hoped also that Canada, as a result of that con-
ference, will adopt a permanent naval policy in keeping with her position
as a self-governing nation within the Empire, and in many respects the

322

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

most important. Aside from every consideration, either sentimental or other,
she ought to take measures to insure that her long coast lines and important
seaports, as well as her merchant marine should be amply protected at all
times and against any eventuality.

This exceedingly modest programme did not escape criti-
cism. There was some objection to the manner in which the
Estimates had been introduced.37 It was argued that this
policy was itself a permanent one, and should have been laid
before Parliament for discussion. It was also pointed out that
times were hard; that the German menace had disappeared;
and that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which it was supposed
would be renewed shortly, would remove all danger from the
Pacific. The hope was expressed that the League of Nations
would settle any future international differences and that there
would therefore be no further appeals to force. Among other
arguments used was the one that air power might replace sea
power. It was clear that Parliament did not wish to impose
any added financial burdens for the sake of national defence.38

The demobilization of officers and men who had enrolled
for service during the war had been practically completed by
the middle of 1919, and after that date only those officers and
men needed for existing ships and establishments were re-
tained. In May 1919 a complement of 500 was authorized, and
by the end of the year it had been filled.39 The future naval
policy of the country was as obscure as it had been before the
war; consequently no boys or inexperienced men were accepted,
and ratings were entered for one year only. On March 17,
1920, the emergency was officially declared to have ceased,
and the naval forces were placed on a peace footing.40 The
Minister had directed that the personnel of the Service, both
civil and naval, should be drastically curtailed prior to re-
organization on a post-war basis. Graduates of the naval
college, however, were not discharged at this time, and by the
middle of May, 143 officers of all ranks remained in the
Service, of whom 39 were undergoing training in H.M. ships.41

37 Only $300,000 had been asked for the Naval Service in the main Estimates, as against
$2,200,000 in the supplementary Estimates. The Minister explained that: "The reason that
only $300,000 appears in the main Estimates is that the Government were anxious to table the
Estimates and our arrangements not being at the time completed with the Admiralty, we did
not know just what we would be able to get from them in the wav of ships." The supplementan
Estimate was later reduced to $1,700,000.

38 House of Commons Debates, 1920, i, p. 707; iv, pp. 3499-506 and 4380-413.

39 P.C. 1008, May 15, 1919.
<° P.C. 559, Mar. 17, 1920.
41 Annual Report, 1921, p. 6.

323

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The transfer of the naval college to Esquimalt in 1918 had
always been regarded as a temporary one; but before the
question of a permanent location had been settled post-war
retrenchment had changed the whole picture. In May 1922
the Minister paid a tribute to the college, but he said that for
the time being at least the prospects of naval employment for
the cadets were too limited to justify the continuance of that
institution.42 The college was accordingly closed. In each of
the eleven years of its existence the number of cadets that had
entered was as follows: 1911—21; 1912—10; 1913—12;
1914—8; 1915—6; 1916—14; 1917—20; 1918—16; 1919—17;
1920—15; 1921—11. During the whole period about 150
cadets had passed through the college, and the appropriations
had amounted to $1,453,000.

Throughout the brief life of the Royal Naval College of
Canada the prospect of a naval career had appealed only to a
comparatively small number of Canadian youths, the build-
ings and equipment of the college had been makeshift, and
specialized instruction in so small an institution had been
relatively expensive. Until the First World War, also, the
Naval Service had remained a political issue, and in 1911
Stephen Leacock had derided the college as "a Canadian naval
college for instruction in Canadian naval tactics."43 At the
time when the college was closed, however, another distin-
guished educator, who must have been well familiar with its
methods and products, expressed his regret in these words:

I am very sorry indeed that it has been found necessary to abolish the
Royal Naval College, and consider it a distinct loss to Canada in very many
respects. It is an educational loss. The training the boys received made
them valuable citizens and an excellent influence in their communities. It
furnished naval reserve officers which were useful in the War and may again
be badly needed. It furnished technical men for the hydrographic survey,
and trained officers for the merchant marine. In deciding to restrict
Canada's participation in the Navy to training personnel, one would have
expected that they would have retained the school, for trained men require
trained officers . . . "44

As a substitute was needed for the training which the college
had been providing, the Admiralty was asked and agreed to

42 House of Commons Debates, 1922, in, p. 2048. For financial reasons it would hardly have
been possible to retain the college and in addition to develop a volunteer reserve, and the
college was probably the less important consideration.

43 Stephen I.eacock, " What shall we do about the Navv,'' in The University Magazine,
Dec. 1911.

44 Dean R. W. Brock, University of British Columbia, to D. Min., June 9, 1922, N.S.
23-1-11. Except as otherwise noted this account of the naval college is chieflv based upon two
sources: Annual Report, 1911 ; "Occasional Paper No. 4," Aug. 1, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-2 (1).

324

POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

accept Canadian cadets for training on a basis similar to that
of the "special entry" system, and until the Second World War
all cadets were trained in England.

When the delegates met at the Imperial Conference of 1921,
they were too greatly interested in disarmament and the fate
of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to spend much time on naval
affairs. The delegates wished the British Empire to maintain
a naval force equal to that of any other Power; but they
seemed prepared to rely on alliances and ententes for imperial
security rather than on their own combined efforts. The
conference had opened on June 20, 1921, and was still in session
when Warren G. Harding, the recently-elected President of the
United States, issued his invitation to the principal naval
Powers to attend a disarmament conference in Washington.
With this further meeting in view the imperial conference
passed the following resolution:

That, while recognizing the necessity of co-operation among the
various portions of the Empire to provide such naval defence as may prove
necessary for security, and while holding that equality with the naval
strength of any other power is a minimum standard for that purpose, this
Conference is of opinion that the method and expense of such co-operation
are matters for the final determination of the several Parliaments concerned,
and that any recommendations thereon should be deferred until after the
coming Conference on disarmament.45

A desire that the Powers should agree to limit their naval
armaments had been officially expressed in Great Britain early
in 1921. The idea also found considerable support in Japan
where the pace which had been set by American naval expan-
sion was found to be exhausting. The Harding administration
seemed resolved to continue the huge American programme of
naval building; yet there was an increasing public demand in
the United States for a conference on naval disarmament.
From the American point of view, a major stumbling-block on
the road to any naval agreement was the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, which was due to be renewed in July 1921. 46 Whether
the treaty ought to be given a new lease of life, or terminated,
was thoroughly discussed at the imperial conference. Canada,
in the person of the Rt. Hon. Arthur Meighen, stood solidly,
and at first alone, against renewing the treaty; claiming that
the reasons for its existence had passed away, that it was in-
compatible with the principles of the League, and that extend-
ing its life would arouse mistrust in the United States and

45 Cd. 1474, Proceedings, Pari. Paps., 1921, xiv.

46 Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, ch. 8.

325

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

China.47 The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, in fact, made it
possible, however unlikely, that Great Britain might some day
reel obliged to take up arms at the side oi Japan in a war
against the United States. This conceivable result of the treaty
would have placed the Dominion in an immeasurably difficult
plight. Because ot Canada's resolute opposition, and for other
reasons, British statesmen were reconsidering the advisability
ot prolonging the alliance when Harding invited the Powers to
conter on the limiting ot naval armaments and on tar eastern
policy generally.

The Washington Conference met on November 12, 1921,
and continued its deliberations into the following February.
The Treaty tor the Limitation ot Armament which was signed
on February 6, 1922, set a ratio ot capital ships for Great
Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, at
5-5-3-1.75-1.75 respectively. The particular capital ships to be
retained by these countries were specified, and it was agreed
that no new ones should be acquired except as replacement
tonnage. The total displacement of capital ships was eventu-
ally not to exceed 525,000 tons in the case of Great Britain
and the United States, and 315,000 tons in that of Japan;
while France and Italy were to be allowed 175,000 tons each.
The Washington Treaties also covered the relations of the
signatories in the Pacific area, and prohibited the construction
ot fortifications and naval bases throughout a considerable part
of that ocean.

The British Government did not renew the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. A serious threat to Anglo-American relations and any
danger that the treaty might be invoked against the United
States were thus removed; but the position of the Royal Navy
in the Pacific was very weak. Its greatest disadvantage was
that no British base capable ot servicing large, modern ships,
existed anywhere in or near that ocean. Accordingly the British
Government decided to make possible fleet Operations by the
Royal Navy in the western Pacific by building there a large
modern base. A position was required which would enable a
fleet based on it to cover Malaya, Burma, India, Australia,
New Zealand, and the sea routes leading to them; and after
careful consideration the island ot Singapore was chosen. It
had been left outside the area within which the signatories at
Washington had agreed not to build fortifications and bases,

47 J. Bartlet Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Con-
ference,"' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 50, p. -53.

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POSTWAR POLICY TO 1922

and on a site acquired and presented by the Straits Settlements
the British Government began the construction of a tremen-
dous naval base. In 1924 construction was suspended, to be
resumed later, and the work was completed shortly before the
Second World War. The cost was mainly borne by Great
Britain; but contributions toward it besides the one already
mentioned were made by the Federated Malay States, New
Zealand, and Hong Kong.48

While the Washington Conference was sitting there had
been a change of government in Canada. The Conservative
government, having been decisively defeated at a general
election on December 6, 1921, resigned on the 29th and was
succeeded by a Liberal administration under the leadership of
the Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King. The naval policy of the new
government was announced in the House of Commons, in
May 1922, by the Hon. George Graham, Minister of the Naval
Service.49 Speaking of the naval situation in general the
Minister said that every country in the world was trying to
reduce its armaments. He referred to the recent Washington
Conference where the great nations had agreed not only to
take a holiday from naval construction but also to scrap many
of their fighting ships. All peoples were anxious to reduce
expenditures on armaments, as far as they could do so without
sacrificing national dignity. Canada had certain obligations,
however, which resulted from her status as a nation and her
relations with the mother country, and one of these was to
have a naval Service of some kind.

The Minister recommended that a naval reserve force of
fifteen hundred officers and men should be developed; that
Canada's five warships should be placed out of commission;
and that the permanent force should be reduced as far as
possible. He felt that this arrangement "would be more in
keeping with the protection of our coasts than it would be in
harmony with high-sea fighting, because the fleet as now
constituted is for action on the sea, and not for the protection
of our harbours and coasts as we understand that protection."
Under this scheme four officers of the Royal Navy would be
retained in Canada, the rest of those on loan from the Ad-
miralty being returned to the United Kingdom. The Minister
later modified his recommendation that all the five ships

48 Lord Jellicoe's report on the naval requirements of Australia had strongly recommended
that a great naval base should be built at Singapore.

49 The Minister made three statements, on May 12, 16, and 22, respectively.

327

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

should be decommissioned, stating that it had been based on a
misunderstanding of what his naval adviser had suggested.
His final recommendation to Parliament, on May 16, 1922,
was that the two destroyers only should be retained in service,
one on each coast, where they would be used for training
reservists. He also intimated that it would be desirable to close
the naval college.50 The House was asked to vote $1,500,000
for the Naval Service, a sum which had been reached only by
reducing demands to a bare minimum, and Parliament passed
the Estimates. This policy of retrenchment was praised or
criticized by the newspapers in the main according to the Party
affiliation of each.

It has been seen that in the years which immediately
followed the First World War there was no lack of precise and
authoritative drafts for a Canadian naval policy. Two such
plans were carefully worked out, one by those experts who
possessed the greatest knowledge of Canadian conditions, and
the other by the most widely-experienced naval officer of his
time. Except in a few minor details, however, neither of these
policies was adopted; the naval force which was actually
maintained being scarcely more than a nominal one. The
attitude which her largely negative policy reflected, however,
was not peculiar to Canada at this time, war-weariness being
general in the countries that had taken an exacting part in the
recent conflict. It was widely hoped that peace could be en-
sured; social and economic reconstruction was taking prece-
dence over armies and navies; and there was an almost
universal wish for some form of "holiday" from preparations
lor war.

50 House of Commons Debates, 1922, n, pp. 1736^1, 1843^; HI, p. 2048.

328

Chapter 15

HOPE FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1922-1933

THE decade which began in 1922 was a comparatively
peaceful interlude between the aftermath of the first war
and the ominous tensions that preceded the second. It
had become evident that conflict between modern nations in
arms furnished with unprecedentedly destructive weapons
threatened to undermine the foundations of life itself, and that
man, if he continued to wage wars under the conditions which
had come into existence, would be sawing off the branch on
which he sat. Moreover many burdens resulting from the recent
war were still being borne. The urgent need to prevent war
had accordingly impressed itself on the human consciousness.

The League of Nations had been set up for this very purpose,
and to many it seemed to have a promising future. Numerous
disarmament conferences appeared to be a step in the right
direction. Moreover the fund of international good will was
impressively large, and Foreign Ministers circulated widely
among their kind making fraternal statements and gestures,
like heralds of the millennium. Certain sombre facts lay in the
background: the basic causes of war were not being removed,
the machinery for enforcing peace was weak, attempts to
achieve disarmament usually failed, and the nations were not
yet prepared to pay the price of collective security. Neverthe-
less a peaceful and hopeful spirit was abroad in the world.

Canadians fully shared this spirit. Their national feeling
had been strengthened by the war, but it remained unaggres-
sive and not at all disposed to be gratified by the panoply ol
war. They welcomed the prospect of peace in their time,
accorded at least verbal support to the League, and addressed
themselves wholeheartedly to their civil tasks. Their govern-
ment pursued a policy of aloofness in the field of external
affairs, and laid before Parliament, year by year, singularly
modest defence Estimates. Indeed the average of the annual
naval Estimates in this period was only $2,278,000.

At the Imperial Conference of 1921, it had been decided
that recommendations concerning the method and cost of

329

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Commonwealth co-operation in naval defence should be post-
poned. In this conference also the arguments that led to the
terminating of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been presen-
ted. The Washington Conference of the same year had little
effect upon Canadian naval policy. The Imperial Conference
of 1923 asserted the principles that a further general limitation
of armaments was exceedingly desirable; that the minimum
ratio of naval strength consistent with imperial security was
equality with the strongest foreign power; and that each part
of the Empire represented at the conference was primarily
responsible for its own defence. It was also agreed that the air
forces of the various Dominions and of Great Britain should be
developed on uniform lines. 1 In general the imperial confer-
ences after the First World War played a much smaller part in
imperial naval policy than those which preceded it had done,
partly because the lines which that policy was to follow had
already been laid down.

After the uncertainties of the period which immediately
followed the war had disappeared, Canadian naval policy
crystallized, and it retained its form largely unaltered down to
the Second World War. The general policy may be stated as
follows. Canada had, in theory, a double naval responsibility:
first of all to provide means for the defence of mainly Canadian
interests, and then to prepare for co-operation with the other
naval forces of the Commonwealth in more general measures of
defence. In practice, however, the Dominion was obliged to
build her naval forces on a foundation of exceedingly limited
appropriations.2 It was not practicable, therefore, to aim at
discharging for the time being more than the primary obliga-
tion. Nor was this close objective reached until just before the
Second World War, and then only in respect to the defences of
a single threatened coast. The expanding defence measures
which reflected the growing threat of the nineteen-thirties
involved no change in principle. They merely implemented a
programme which had been worked out years before.

The general considerations on which Canadian naval policy
was based may be briefly stated. W7ar with the United States
was judged to be so "unthinkable" that it was not considered
when plans were being made. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
was no longer in existence, and until the later nineteen-thirties

1 Cd. 1987 and 1988, Pari. Paps., 1923, xn, pt. I.

2 See App. x. In almost every year from 1910 to 1939, moreover, the appropriations
exceeded the actual expenditures.

330

COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

Japan was regarded as being the most probable enemy. In the
event of a war with Asiatic or European Powers it was not
anticipated that major enemy naval forces would appear in
Canadian waters, and it seemed to be even less probable that
an invasion of the Dominion would be attempted. On the other
hand, it was thought that raids on commerce or sporadic
attacks on harbours might be attempted by light naval forces.
Until the late 'thirties, any forecast of probable Operations by
the enemy in waters close to Canada always depicted one or
two cruisers or armed merchant cruisers, or a few submarines,
motor torpedo boats, or airplanes from a carrier, raiding com-
merce, shelling or bombing the shipping and shore installations
in one or more Canadian ports, or perhaps laying mines. In
the event of war the naval forces would seek, in conjunction
with the Royal Canadian Air Force, to protect coastwise
shipping and also all trade in the crowded areas lying off the
principal harbours. These focal areas on the west coast were
the approaches to the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the strait
itself. On the east coast the focal area lay off Cape Breton
Island in the summer and eastward from Halifax in winter.
The defence of naval bases and other harbours was a joint
responsibility of the three Services. The army was responsible
for the fixed defences of defended ports, and was expected to
deal with any raiding parties that might get ashore. The air
force was partly responsible for reconnaissance and for oppos-
ing any hostile aircraft that might appear in the neighbourhood
of a defended port. Patrolling along the coasts by aircraft and
naval vessels would be necessary, so as to prevent the least-
frequented parts of the shore from being used by hostile ships,
particularly submarines.

It was also considered possible that Canada might remain
neutral in an important war. The most likely contingency of
this sort seemed to be a war in which the United States would
be engaged, probably against Japan; and it was recognized
that Canada's freedom of action, and even her existence as an
independent nation, might depend upon an ability to carry out
her obligations as a neutral in such a conflict. From the naval
point of view the problem would be that of preventing the
enemy of the United States, by force if necessary, from estab-
lishing bases in Canadian territory for the use of his warships,
and from attacking American ships in the territorial waters of
the Dominion. Such ships, in the event of an American-
Japanese war, would probably be exceedingly numerous along

331

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

the coast route between the United States and Alaska, and
would constitute a vital artery of American defence and a
correspondingly strong temptation to Japanese raiders. To
keep those and other territorial waters inviolate constant
patrolling would be necessary, as also would available force
sufficient to expel an enemy found carrying on naval or air
activities in neutral Canadian territory. These were the
primary obligations which it was considered should be ade-
quately met before any attempt was made to protect trade
routes at a distance from the shores of the Dominion. It was
always assumed that if Canada were a belligerent the Oper-
ations of Canadian naval forces engaged in performing any
of these tasks would be covered by the heavy ships of the
Royal Navy.

The Royal Canadian Navy, after it had disposed of the
Aurota and the two H-class submarines in 1922, remained a
small-ship navy. The fighting ships, moreover, were all of one
type, which greatly simplified the problems of training,
manning, and refitting. The type of warship of which the
whole striking force was to consist until early in the Second
World War was the destroyer. The case for destroyers rather
than cruisers as a means of meeting Canadian needs was stated
in 1930 by the Chief of the Naval Staff:

It is more important to have numbers than individual unit size and
offensive power. One cruiser is more than powerful enough to deal with
an armed merchant raider, but her range of visibility is limited. On the
other hand, two or three destroyers would render the position decidedly
dangerous for a light cruiser; each would be a match for most armed
raiders; and for search purposes they would cover a large radius of effective
action, and concentration on any point could be achieved with rapidity.3

The destroyer was developed at the end of the nineteenth
century to meet a particular need. In the eighteen-sixties
Robert Whitehead had invented a practicable torpedo, which
underwent steady improvement thereafter. For the first time
in the history of naval warfare, a weapon powerful enough to
damage or destroy the most heavily-armed and well-protected
warship afloat could be used by a very small vessel, a fact
which was to have revolutionary effects on tactics and design.
Small, fast craft, known as torpedo boats, intended to deliver
attacks on capital ships by means of torpedoes, made their
appearance in the French navy. In 1892 the Admiralty set up
a committee to find a reply to this threat. The committee

3 C. N. S. before Defence Council, Aug. 29, 1930, Chiefs of Staff Cttee. Proceedings (here-
after referred to as C.S.C.P.).

332

COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

recommended that the torpedo boat should be answered by a
larger and faster vessel, armed with guns. This idea the Ad-
miralty accepted. The first torpedo boat destroyers were
ordered the same year, and the Royal Navy soon had a
considerable flotilla of them.4 Torpedo tubes were mounted in
destroyers, which assumed the function of the type that they
had been created to offset, and other vocations besides. As
fleet destroyers they became a necessary screen for the battle
fleet, and a frequent threat to the enemy's larger ships. In the
First World War destroyers acquired a wholly new sphere of
usefulness, indeed of indispensability, as the most formidable
enemy of the submarine, whether acting as patrol vessels or as
escorts for warships or convoys. The special feature of the
destroyer is her tremendous speed, which is both an essential
component of her offensive strength and her principal protec-
tion. Destroyers are also very manoeuvrable, and they are the
most versatile of all types of warship. They lose most of their
speed, and consequently of their effectiveness, in a very heavy
sea; are peculiarly subject to weather damage; and need to be
overhauled more frequently than do warships of any other
type. A destroyer, in theory, has a life of only twelve or fifteen
years. She is not intended to fight against other surface
vessels alone, but as one of a group. In the Royal Navy and in
those of the Dominions destroyers were organized to operate in
flotillas of nine, divisions of four, and sub-divisions of two each.

One of the earliest destroyers to have its base in Canada
was H.M.S. Sparrowhawky which was stationed at Esquimalt
at the end of last century. In 1901 the Admiral commanding
on the station wrote that:

Destroyers in these waters are most useful, as the nature of the Coast
lends itself to the general operations for the defence of Esquimalt and
Vancouver, and of the coaling Ports of Nanaimo and Comox by offensive
operations on the part of these destroyers. The mere fact of their presence
being a defence in itself, instead of withdrawing destroyers from this
station I am of opinion that their number should be largely increased.5

The Patriot and Patrician were the first destroyers in the
Royal Canadian Navy. By 1927 they were worn out, and the
government decided to build two destroyers to replace them.
For the time being, however, the Admiralty was asked and
agreed to supply two substitutes. H.M.S. Torbay and H.M.S.

4 Clowes, The Royal Navy, vn, pp. 39^10; Marder, Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 168.
6 Rear Admiral Bickford to Sec. Admiralty, Sept. 17, 1901 ," Records of the North Pacific
Naval Station," vol. 17 (Pub. Arch.).

333

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Toreador were lent to the Canadian Government, and were
re-named respectively H.M.C.S. Champlain and H.M.C.S.
Vancouver.6 There was already a Vancouver in the Royal
Navy; but the Admiralty agreed to change her name and she
became H.M.S. Vimy. These were the first ships of the Royal
Canadian Navy, other than auxiliary-type ones, to receive
names associated with the Dominion, although the idea had
been suggested earlier at the time when Patriot and Patrician
were acquired. Champlain had been launched on March 6,
1919, and Vancouver on December 7, 1918. The Patriot and
Patrician were paid off, and their crews went to Great Britain
to man the replacements. Champlain and Vancouver were
commissioned for service in the Royal Canadian Navy on
March 1, 1928, at Portsmouth. They sailed on March 17 for
Canada. The Champlain arrived in Halifax on May 12, and
the Vancouver at Victoria on May 24, and they were stationed
on the east and west coasts respectively.

The two destroyers which the Canadian Government
intended to build were proceeded with after considerable delay.
In 1928 it was decided:

That tenders should be invited by the High Commissioner for Canada,
from the fifteen firms who quoted for the construction of the Royal Naval
Destroyers known as the new Admiralty "A" Class, and by the Depart-
ment of National Defence from such firms in Canada as are equipped
for the construction of ships of this Class, which may desire to tender;
these tenders to be for one and two vessels respectively, of the same design
and specification as the Admiralty "A" Class vessels, subject to certain
changes and additions considered necessary for service in Canadian waters,
particulars of which changes and additions will be furnished to the firms
invited to tender.7

As in 1910, when it had also been a question of building
warships expressly for the R.C.N., the possibility of building
p them in Canada was carefully canvassed. In this case, how-
ever, a cost from 50% to 60% greater than that of construction
in Great Britain would have had to be accepted. On account
of the great complexity of warships, moreover, the conclusion
was reached that "the building of a modern destroyer must of
necessity be performed by contractors who have long ex-
perience and who are specialists in the work if a reliable ship in
every way is to be obtained." Tenders were received from
fourteen British firms, and of the designs considered most

6 Displacement, 1075 tons; dimensions, 266^' x 271f x 11'; h.p., 29,000; speed, 3« k.-
guns, 3 4", 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 4 21"; complement, 90.

7 P.C. 764, May 7, 1928.

334

c/i

COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

suited to Canadian conditions, that of Messrs. John I. Thorny-
croft was thought to be the best. The contract for the two
destroyers was awarded to Messrs. Thornycroft in January
1929, and the ships were built at that firm's Woolston Works
in Southampton.8 The arrangements with the firm were
identical with those for building a ship for the Admiralty,
except that Canadian officers acted as overseers.

The destroyers were named Saguenay and Skeena.9 The
Saguenay was launched on July 11, 1930, Mrs. G. J. Desbarats,
the wife of the Deputy Minister, performing the naming cere-
mony. This was followed by a luncheon given by the directors
of Thornycroft's, presided over by Sir John Thornycroft and
at which the Acting High Commissioner for Canada and other
prominent Canadians were present. On her full-power trials
which were held on January 22, 1931, the Saguenay did slightly
over 35 knots. After her acceptance trials on May 21 a dinner
was given on board for the officials of Thornycroft's. She was
commissioned at Portsmouth on May 22 with Cdr. P. W.
Nelles, R.C.N. , in command. The Skeena was launched on
October 10, 1930. At her full-power trials on March 23, 1931,
she did 36 knots. She was commissioned on June 10 at Ports-
mouth, under the command of Cdr. V. G. Brodeur, R.C.N.,
and the two destroyers left the same day for nearby Portland.
From there they sailed on June 23 for Halifax where they
arrived on July 3. Next day the Halifax Herald carried the
following editorial, which is quoted in full:

A FERVENT HOPE

Halifax welcomes the two trim new Canadian destroyers, Saguenay
and Skeena — and trusts that this country never will have need to send
them into action.10

The Saguenay remained on the east coast where Champlain
was already stationed. The Skeena sailed on July 8 to join the
Vancouver on the west coast, and she arrived on August 7 at
Esquimalt. J1

The Saguenay and Skeena were the first warships, other
than auxiliary-type vessels, that had ever been built expressly

8 Champlain and Vancouver had been built by the same firm.

9 During the remainder of the period covered by this volume all destroyers were named
after Canadian rivers.

10 Halifax Herald, July 4, 1931.

11 Saguenay and Skeena: displacement, 1,320 tons; dimensions, 322' x 32^' x 12'; h.p.,
34,000; speed, 35 k.; guns, 4 4.7", 2 2-pdr. pom-poms, 5 machine-guns; torpedo tubes. 8 21":
complement, 138.

335

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

-^ for the Royal Canadian Navy. They were also the first war-
ships, in the same sense of the word, that had been bought for
that navy for almost seventeen years. They were destroyers
of the Acasta class with certain special features built into them
to make them better suited for Canadian conditions. In order
to adapt them for cruising in the northern waters of the western
Atlantic, they were given additional strengthening against
floating ice, as well as an unusually large margin of stability
to counterbalance possible accumulations of ice on the upper
decks, bridges, and rigging, and a heating system was installed.
Against the sub-tropical climate of the West Indies they were
equipped with ice-cupboards, shower-baths, and a special
ventilating system. Even with these additional structural
features, however, they were perfectly capable of operating
with destroyers of their general type which belonged to the
Royal Navy.12

While Saguenay and Skeena were still in the hands of the

builders, the Chief of the Naval Staff had recommended that a

clearly-defined mark should be set up and aimed at in the

matter of acquiring warships:

The Naval force considered essential to be maintained in peace time
as a defensive measure to protect the focal points of Canada's Overseas
trade and the requirements necessary to carry out her obligations as a
neutral, should comprise: 1 destroyer leader, 5 destroyers, and 4 twin
screw mine-sweepers . . .

He advised that Champlain and Vancouver be kept in com-
mission in the Royal Canadian Navy until the end of 1936, to
make, after Saguenay and Skeena should have been acquired,
a total of four destroyers in commission for the time being;
and he wanted two new minesweepers to be provided as soon
as possible. 13 The strong wind of the most formidable economic
depression on record was already blowing, however; while the
Paris Pact, which was said to "outlaw" war, had been drawn
up only two years before and was still being signed by various
nations. The London Naval Treaty, moreover, had been
signed in April 1930, setting an upper limit to the total tonnage
of warships of each type that the British Empire, the United
States, and Japan, might respectively possess. 14 The world's

12 Engineering, Aug. 7, 1931, pp. 161-3.

13 C.N.S. before Defence Council, Aug. 29, 1930, C.S.C.P.

14 Including destroyers. The destroyer allotments were set at 150,000 tons each for the
British Empire and the United States, and 105,000 tons for Japan. At this conference Great
Britain and the United States, supported by Canada and the other Dominions with one
exception, unsuccessfully urged the abolition of submarines. Throughout the conference
the Canadian delegates showed a special interest in proposals for limiting the construction
of submarines and also of aircraft carriers.

336

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

first general disarmament conference was soon to be called
together. In this atmosphere of financial stringency and of
optimism concerning disarmament, the Canadian Government
took no steps to procure new warships; nor were any such steps
to be taken for some time to come.

In the period covered by this chapter Halifax and Esqui-
malt continued to function as small-scale naval bases. At the
climax of retrenchment in 1922 the Halifax dockyard had
almost ceased to operate as far as repairs were concerned; but
from that time on it performed the usual duties of a base for
the minute Canadian naval force, and also from time to time
provided facilities for ships of the Royal Navy. Certain services
were also performed for vessels of the Royal Canadian Moun-
ted Police (Marine Section) and for the Departments of
Transport and Fisheries. In 1927 the construction of the Joint
Services Magazine on the eastern shore of Bedford Basin was
begun; and this magazine, the naval part of which consisted of
twenty-four buildings, was completed in 1931. At Esquimalt
the naval barracks were commissioned in 1922 as H.M.C.S.
"Naden", and in the same year the destroyer Patrician arrived
at the Pacific base where she was stationed until paid off in
1928. In 1926 a new dry dock able to accommodate the largest
ship afloat was completed at Esquimalt by the Dominion
Government. 15

The most important step taken by the Naval Service be-
tween the two wars was the establishing of the naval and naval
volunteer reserves as continuing institutions. In 1920 and 1921
suggestions had been made that a naval reserve force should
again be formed, 16 and in 1923 action was taken. The Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve was created, with an authorized
complement of a thousand officers and ratings, 17 and the prefix
"Royal" was soon afterwards added to its title. The initiative
in forming it had come chiefly from the Director of the Naval
Service, who had taken a warm and effective interest in the
setting up and training of the reserve company at Victoria in
1913-14. He argued that on a very limited budget more
preparation for naval war could be obtained by building up one
or more reserve forces than in any other way. Moreover with
a unit in each of the principal cities across the Dominion, a

15 Dimensions: length, 1,173'; bottom width, 126'; depth on sill at high water, 40'. Canada
Year Book 1943, p. 618.

16 A/Dir. Naval Service to Dir. Naval Service, Jan. 23, 1920, N.S. 1017-10-8 (1); Naval
Cttee. to Min.,Oct. 19, 1921, N.S. 1078-2-4 (1).

17 P. C. 139 and P. C. 140, Jan. 31, 1923.

337

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

volunteer reserve would be visible to the people who lived in
the hinterlands, which the navy proper could never be.

The Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve,18 whose
authorized complement comprised 70 officers and 930 ratings,
was originally organized into companies or half-companies, one
of which had its headquarters in each of the following cities:
Calgary, Charlottetown, Edmonton, Halifax, Hamilton, Mont-
real, Ottawa, Quebec, Regina, Saint John, Saskatoon, Toronto,
Vancouver, and Winnipeg. Montreal had two companies, one
French-speaking and the other English-speaking. By Septem-
ber 1939, units, each of which was known as a Division, were in
existence in the above cities, and also in Kingston, London,
Port Arthur, and Prince Rupert.

The volunteer reserve was for civilians who did not follow
a seafaring career. Those entering were required to be phys-
ically fit British subjects between the ages of 18 and 32, or in
certain cases 40, years of age. They had to sign an engagement
for three years, be willing to serve wherever required in case of
need, and perform at least thirty drills a year at Divisional
Headquarters. A further requirement was two weeks of train-
ing each year at Halifax or Esquimalt or at sea.19 A member
of the R.C.N.V.R. received a 25-cent bonus for each drill
attended, and during his periods of training in a warship or
naval training establishment he was paid on the R.C.N, scale.
The volunteer reservists were intended to provide a pool of
partly-trained personnel for use in emergency.

At about the same time as the R.C.N.V.R., a seaman's
reserve was also authorized.20 It consisted of men who had
followed a seafaring career in foreign-going, coasting, fishing, or
other vessels. A complement of 70 officers and 430 ratings was
laid down. Enrolment was to be for one or more periods of five
years each up to a maximum of twenty-five years. The
minimum age for entry was set at 18 years, and the maximum

18 The earlier organization had been entitled "The Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer
Reserve." In 1919 Lord Jellicoe had recommended that: "In order to bring the Naval
Reserve Forces in Canada into line with the Naval Reserves of other Dominions ... its title
should be changed to that of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve." {Jellicoe Report, I, p. 33.)
In 1923 the more logical order of words was adopted.

19 At the start of its career the R.C.N.V.R. received a splendid introduction to sea training.
In 1924 the Special Service Squadron (battle cruisers Hood and Repulse, and 5 light cruisers),
during its world cruise reached Victoria on June 22. The battle cruisers later sailed around
to the east coast reaching Halifax on Aug. 5, and 40 officers and men of the R.C.N.V.R.
accompanied them for training on this 33-days' cruise. (Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual,
1925, pp. 23-4; 1926, p. 28).

20 P.C. 80, Jan. 15, 1923.

338

COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

at 35 years for first entry and 50 years for re-entry. Candidates
were to be physically fit British subjects of good character,
living in Canada, and willing to serve at sea or wherever
required.

The Royal Canadian Naval Reserve was originally organ-
ized in nine Port Divisions which were soon afterwards
reduced in number to five, one at each of the following ports:
Charlottetown, Halifax, Montreal, Quebec, and Vancouver.
Small annual retaining fees to an amount determined by rank
were paid to the members of this reserve, while periods of train-
ing were prescribed which varied in length according to rank
and branch. On account of the limited funds available actual
enrolment remained far below the complement, as is shown by
the following figures which represent the average numbers
borne in each of three years:

Year

Officers

Ratings

Total

1925-26

128

165

1930-31

129

164

1935-36

147

187

Unlike the larger R.C.N. V.R. which was composed of
amateurs, the R.C.N.R. consisted of men who possessed a
professional knowledge of ships and the sea.

In the year 1922 the defence Services were combined to
form one Department of National Defence.21 The National
Defence Act vested in a single Minister the powers deriving
from the Naval Service Act, the Militia Act, and the Air
Board Act, and the responsibility for all matters relating to
defence. The Act had been advocated on the grounds of
efficiency and economy, and for the principle involved there
were Australian and South African precedents. The Naval
Service Act was amended accordingly, and the necessary
changes were made within the Service. While this centraliza-
tion of Departments was being carried out, five technical
services which had been under the naval Department were
transferred to the Department of Marine and Fisheries— the
Radiotelegraph Service, Hydrographic Survey, Tidal and
Current Survey, Fisheries Protection Service, and Patrol of
Northern Waters.22 The Purchasing, Accounts, Records, and

21 By the National Defence Act, 12-13 Geo. V, ch. 34, June 28, 1922.

22 P.C. 1246, June 14, 1922. The Fisheries Branch had been transferred from Marine
and Fisheries to the Naval Service in 1914 and back again in 1920. (P.C. 1574, June 16,
1914; and P.C. 1227, May 29, 1920).

339

r-V_

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Printing and Stationery organizations of the respective
Services were amalgamated.

In order to facilitate the co-ordinating of defence policy a
number of joint-Service bodies were created during the
nineteen-twenties. Shortly after the control of the Services had
been centralized in 1922 the Defence Council was formed by
adding a naval and later an air force member to the former
Militia Council. Its duties were to advise the Minister on any
matter related to national defence.23 On June 9, 1927, a Joint
Staff Committee was set up in order to co-ordinate the work
of the three Services, and to advise on all questions which the
Services might refer to it. This committee, which had no
executive functions, consisted of the Chief of the General Staff,
the Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Director of the Air Force.
The Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was
an associate member, and the committee was provided with a
secretary.24 The first meeting was held on October 31, 1927.
In 1928 Local Defence Committees, on each of which the three
Services were represented, were set up at Halifax and Esqui-
malt to bring about co-operation between the Services in
defensive measures on the coasts.25

After the National Defence xAct of 1922 had gone into force
there was a marked tendency for the Naval Service to become
partly absorbed in the much larger militia organization. The
most important phase of this process of partial absorption
concerned the relations of the senior officers of the two Services.
By two Orders in Council passed in 1922 the senior officer at
Militia Headquarters became Chief of Staff, Department of
National Defence, and also Inspector General of the Militia,
Navy, and Air Force. The Director of the Naval Service
consistently protested against and resisted all attempts on the
part of the Chief of Staff to exercise authority inside the Naval
Service or to advise the Minister regarding it.26 This difficulty
was partly removed by a double change of title and status. In
June 1927 the office of Chief of Staff, Department of National
Defence, was abolished. The following year the Director of the
Naval Service was made Chief of the Naval Staff of Canada,
as had been suggested by the Admiralty in 1924, and the officer

23 Memo, in H.Q.S. 5199K.

-"> C.G.S. to Min. (memo.), Jan. 22, 1929, C.S.C.P.

25 Materia] in N.S. 1006-1-3 (1).

-'' These protests were based en both legal and technical grounds.

340

COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROSPECTS, 1922-1933

concerned continued to be "charged with the direction of the
Naval Service."27

At the time when the Services were combined in one
Department, the organization of the Naval Service at the top
consisted of the Minister and Deputy Minister, with a Naval
Staff comprising the Director of the Naval Service, an Assis-
tant Director, a Consulting Naval Engineer, and a secretary.
In theory the Director was responsible for the purely naval part
of the Service, the Assistant Director was in charge of the War
Staff, and the Consulting Naval Engineer of material. The
War Staff was divided into Operations, Intelligence, and
Transport. This whole division of responsibility was often an
aim rather than a fact, owing to the small number of the officers
at headquarters. A civilian staff was responsible lor the Stores
and Accounts branches, under the Director of Stores and the
Chief Accountant. The five branches which were transferred
to the Department of Marine and Fisheries in 1922 were
included in the departmental structure. The organization was
different from that of the Admiralty in some respects, and
particularly because there was no Naval Board prior to the
Second World War. The structure was modified as a result of
the centralized control of the Services, and by 1933 the Naval
Staff had been grouped in the following divisions: Naval
Intelligence and Plans, Operations and Training, Reserves,
Stores, Engineering, and the Naval Secretariat.

Canadian naval Intelligence continued to function after the
First World War as a part of the Admiralty's world-wide
Intelligence organization. The work was done from centres at
Ottawa, Halifax, and Esquimalt, each with an area of observa-
tion allotted to it. The part of the ocean for which Halifax was
responsible was bounded by a line drawn from the point where
the east coast of the United States reaches 33° N. due east to
40° W. and thence due north to the coast of Greenland. The
Ottawa centre was responsible for the Great Lakes, and the
St. Lawrence River west of a line from Cap des Rosiers to
South West Point, Anticosti, and thence due north from Wrest
Point, Anticosti. Esquimalt looked after the space bounded by
a line drawn from the frontier between the United States and
Mexico at Lat. 32° N., to Lat. 5° N., Long. 135° W., and thence
due west to Long. 180°, and then north to the coast of Siberia.28

27 I\C. 372, Mar. 7. 1928; Naval Service Act, Sec. 9 (2).

-k "Occasional Paper No. 20", Oct. 24, 1919, N.S. 1017-31-3 ( 1 ).

341

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The principal duty was to report the movements of ships in
these areas. The Naval Service also assumed responsibility for
all naval Intelligence on the North American continent.

The latter part of the buoyant nineteen-twenties witnessed
an economic boom of the first magnitude, which lasted out the
decade. The boom was succeeded by the severest of the
depressions that have characterized the age of the industrial
revolution. Beginning in 1930 the world's economy suffered
for several years from an increasing paralysis in all its parts.
Everywhere the depression weighed down upon the whole
fabric of society, which in Germany was already so ill-adjusted
that it slowly collapsed under the strain.

The sensitive economy of Canada suffered severely, with
numerous results that need not be mentioned here. From the
point of view of national defence the more immediate effects of
the depression, which were also related effects, were that
Canadians understandably became more than ever preoccupied
with their economic problems, and that defence Estimates
were greatly reduced. The naval Estimates for 1930-31 were
$3,600,000; those for 1934-35 were only $2,222,000— a reduc-
tion from the earlier figure of more than 38%.

By 1933 the depression had already become exceedingly
severe, and when in June of that year the Department of
National Defence was being pressed very hard to reduce its
expenditures, the Chief of the General Staff advised that
should sufficient funds not be available to maintain a really
effective army, navy, and air force, it would be best to throw
one Service out of the sleigh in order to save the other two.
He considered the navy to be the least necessary of the three,
and therefore the one to be sacrificed; the army and air force
being relied upon to deal with offensive action by an enemy on
the coasts. The Treasury Board suggested that the appro-
priation for the Naval Service for 1933-34, which amounted to
$2,422,000, should be cut to $422,000. The Chief of the Naval
Staff was summoned to appear before the Treasury Board
where he presented the naval point of view, and after further
consideration this extraordinary suggestion was dropped. At
the time when it was made the Japanese invaders had been in
Manchuria long enough to feel at home, and a dark man named
Hitler had for a number of months been Chancellor of the Ger-
man Reich.

342

Chapter 16

THE ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

POST-WAR hopes for organized peace had been vain or
premature. The great depression watered seeds of fear
and hatred, which sprouted, grew luxuriantly, and later
produced a prodigious harvest of war. The first sign of this
dangerous germination was the Japanese invasion of Man-
churia in 1931, an unprovoked assault which the League of
Nations ominously failed to prevent or even to hinder. This
outbreak was the first of an unprecedented series of threats
and aggressions that laid the structure of collective security
in ruins.

The most menacing of these events occurred early in 1933
when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. There-
after the National Socialist Party, whose leader he was,
assumed complete control over the strongest and most highly
disciplined community in Europe. The Nazis preached a
fanatical racialism, gloried in many other forms of intolerance,
and repudiated the very concept of impartial law. Into the
field of international relations, such as it was, they brought a
diplomacy in which muscularity and deceit were bewilder-
ingly blended, and exercised it on behalf of a policy that dis-
mayed the world. There were many careful observers of the
new Germany who asserted that the only destination at
which it could possibly arrive was war.

The passing of Germany into the hands of the Philistines
was followed in the year 1935 by the Italian invasion and
conquest of Abyssinia; in 1936 Germany and Italy became
allies, and the demilitarized Rhineland was occupied by
Hitler's troops; in 1937 Japan attacked China proper; and in
1938 Germany annexed Austria and the border zones of
Czechoslovakia. In 1939 the occupation of Czechoslovakia
was completed, and Hitler opened upon Poland one of the
verbal barrages with which he was accustomed to prepare the
way for a physical onslaught.

The democratic nations had not been wholly blind to the
meaning of these portents; but an aversion to war, which had

343

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

become ingrained, and wishful thinking, came near to para-
lysing them. Accordingly they did not intervene effectively,
or form a counter-alliance, or begin to rearm, until it was
almost too late. Moreover attempts to reach a satisfactory
understanding with Germany, at Munich and elsewhere,
ended in failure. The fate of Czechoslovakia, however, in-
duced Britain and France to serve notice, in March 1939,
that an armed attack on Poland would bring them into the
lists. Ignoring this warning Hitler invaded Poland on Sep-
tember 1; two days later Britain and France declared war on
Germany, and Canada followed their lead on September 10.

In Canada the appearance of Nazi Germany upon the
stage, and the chain of events that followed, had given rise to
great uneasiness; yet as in the case of the other democracies
the people detested the idea of war and of making warlike
preparations. Such preparations began in 1935, but the
government's ability to provide protection against the coming
storm was restricted by the divided state of public opinion.
An examination of the newspaper press during the critical
period from 1935 to 1939 clearly reveals the failure of the
community as a whole to reach any substantial agreement
concerning the, nature of the danger and what was best to
be done.

Editorials seldom discussed international events in Europe
or Asia in the light of the effects which those events were
likely to have on the Dominion, except in the case of certain
French-Canadian newspapers in which the traditional fear
lest Canada became involved in a war which did not concern
her was frequently and eloquently expressed. An editorial in
Le Droit, Ottawa, in October 1935, entitled "Les elections et
la menace de guerre" ended with the exhortation: "Et
tactions d'elire au parlement d'Ottawa des hommes qui
comprendront leur devoir, poseront les actes et prononceront
les paroles qui nous delivreront de I'imperialisme militaire."1
This point of view was very forcibly stated by Le Devoir
early in 1937:

Nous savons les fruits de cette nefaste politique de 1'imperialisme
militaire; nous devinons quelles terribles consequences comporterait une
nouvelle et sanglante aventure. Et nous entendons bien faire tout ce qui
dependra de nous epargner a nos fils a tous ceux que nous aimons a la

1 Le Droit, Oct. 7, 1935. Twelve carefully-selected newspaper files were used. It is not
suggested that the newspaper press is an accurate means of measuring public opinion. The
results of this survey are presented only in order to indicate the political difficulties that lay
in wait for any full and timely measures to meet the oncoming danger.

344

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

patrie canadienne, ce tragique destin . . . . Le temps nc tardera peut-etre
pas beaucoup ou le Canada se demandera si, vraiment, il est de son interet,
avec de pareils risques de demeurer dans le Commonwealth .... Ou fixez-
vous la premiere ligne de defense du Canada? En Amerique, en Afrique,
en Europe ou en Asie? .... II faudra tout de meme finir par le savoir. Car
c'est la reponse a cette question qui domine forcement tout ce qu'on
appelle notre politique de defense.2

When the League of Nations imposed limited economic
sanctions on Italy in the fall of 1935, considerable discussion
was aroused. Some newspapers, with the Manitoba Free Press
in the vanguard, strongly supported collective action. The
Toronto Globe opposed sanctions on the ground that ineffec-
tive ones would only produce further humiliation at Geneva,
while adequate ones would inevitably lead to war.3 Some
French-Canadian editors viewed the League as primarily an
instrument of British policy, and feared that support of the
League would entangle Canada in affairs in which she had
no interest, including the next European war. Le Devoir
thought that: "L'attitude que le Canada devrait tenir dans
le cas ou TAngleterre irait jusqu'aux sanctions militaires; —
et pour nous, on le sait, c'est: Pas un homme, pas un sou."4

After the attempt by the League to stop Italy had tailed,
the Winnipeg Free Press bitterly criticized the English-
speaking nations for their League policy, but expressed a
long-term optimism:

Thus the matter stands at the moment; but this is not the end.
Dead men rise up never but lost causes sometimes show a vitality sur-
prising to undertakers who give them imposing funerals. In any case, the
issue is now joined in the lists of history. What will be, will be. It is well,
however, that the day of duplicity and deceit is over; and that the events
of tomorrow will be played out in the open.5

According to the Edmonton Bulletin:

It is the smaller nations — such as Canada — to whom collective se-
curity is most vital, and to whom the disappearance of the League would
be most perilous. Europe is back now to pre-war days — without a recog-
nized code of international law. For the time the pre-war system of al-
liances offers the only existing guarantee of peace.6

At this time the press for the most part began to take up one
of two positions. That more support should be given to
Great Britain and the Commonwealth was one oi these: the

- Le Devoir, Feb. 12, 15, 23, 1937.
•! Globe, Oct. 3, 1935.

4 Le Devoir, Oct. 11, 1935.

5 Winnipeg Free Press, June 20, 1930.
fi Bulletin, June 20, 1996.

345

NAVAL SERVICE OE CANADA

other and more frequently expressed opinion favoured an
attitude of aloofness toward developments in Europe, and
supported the government's policy of avoiding any commit-
ments made in advance. At various times it was suggested
in Parliament and elsewhere that Canada should formally
declare her intention of remaining neutral in any future war
unless directly attacked. The advocates of this negative
commitment, however, obtained little support from the press.

The considerably increased defence Estimates of 1937
found general support in the English-language newspapers,
but were strongly opposed in those representing French
Canada. 'The King government," wrote the Vancouver
Province, "in its programme of defense, which is the strongest
programme of defense Canada has had since the war, is en-
titled to the sympathy and support of the Conservative
party." Other Conservative newspapers expressed the
same opinion. The editorial in the Province which has just
been quoted went on to say: "But the Conservative party
would not be overstepping the bounds of propriety if it
pointed out to the government that Canada can be defended
more effectively by coordinating her efforts with those of the
Empire than by going it alone."7 The Edmonton Bulletin
pointed out:

Canadians hate war whole-heartedly, as they have the best reasons
for doing. But we live in a world where several powerful states are de-
claring by word and action that they intend to make war the instrument
of their aggrandizement, with reference particularly to the capture of
sparsely populated territories.8

A French-Canadian newspaper, on the other hand, warned:
"Les deputes qui s'imaginent que, en votant pour l'augmenta-
tion des credits, ils ne votent pas pour des armements qui
serviront dans une guerre future de 1'Angleterre se trompent."9

The Munich crisis fixed the attention of Canadians as
never before on the European situation. The policy of Great
Britain found general support in the Canadian press, although
some newspapers did not like appeasement. The Halifax
Chronicle belonged to the latter class, and at this time it
referred to the defences of Halifax as being deplorably weak.
"Canada should and must have a small but highly efficient
air force, fully capable of defending such seaports as Halifax." l0

7 Province, Feb. 19, 1937.

8 Bulletin, Feb. 8, 1937.

9 Le Droit, Feb. 17, 1937.

10 Chronicle, Sept. 30, 1938.

346

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

The Winnipeg Free Press opposed appeasement, including the

Munich pact:

It may be that racial animosities in the Czechoslovak state, steadily-
fanned by the provocative and savage incitement of the Nazi Press, will
make such a peaceful solution impossible for years to come. In that case
it remains the first duty of British statesmen to maintain and extend, by
definite commitment, the front against aggression.11

V Action Catholique hailed the Munich settlement and felt
that as long as Great Britain and France worked together
there was some hope: "Aujourd'hui, ces vieilles nations tra-
ditionnalistes tiennent une dictature deraisonnable en echec;
souhaitons qu'elles s'unissent demain, pour endiguer la maree
montante du bolchevisme . . ." l2 The Toronto Globe and Mail
predicted that: "If a major war comes Canada will be found
fighting with Great Britain for self preservation." la

The defence Estimates which were introduced in the
spring of 1939 found considerable support in the press. In
the opinion of the Winnipeg Free Press: "If anyone can be
found who questions the desirability of Canada this year
spending more than 60 millions on defence the quick and
effective answer is that the Canadian taxpayer can consider
himself lucky it is not more."14 Some newspapers thought
that the government's defence policy was insufficient. The
Globe and Mail considered the danger to be so great that:
". . . surely this is no time to divide public expenditures:
$557,000,000 for the routine duties of government and $63,-
000,000 for national defence . . . "15 In the opinion of the
Vancouver Province:

What our money should be spent for is to make the most weighty
contribution possible to the combined military strength of the British
Empire. W^e cannot do that by frittering it away on piffling little adven-
tures in coastal defence.16

Typical of criticism from the opposite direction was the
statement of Le Droit that:

La situation internationale est pleine de menace. Nous n'avons pas
a nous meler de ce qui ne nous regarde point. Nous avons suffisament de
problemes interieurs a resoudre ici pour exiger le concours de toutes les
forces du pays.17

11 Winnipeg Free Press, Sept. 13, 1938.
'- U Action Catholique, Sept. 21, 1938.
,;! Globe and Mail, Sept. 16, 1938.

14 Winnipeg Free Press, Apr. 28, 1939.

15 Globe and Mail, Apr. 28, 1939.
18 Province, May 3, 1939.

17 Le Droit, Apr. 2fi, 1939.

34-

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Throughout this period the newspaper press seldom
referred to Canadian defence policy, and when it did so was
primarily interested in air defence. The only editorial that
has been found, written during the four years which led up
to the Second World War and wholly concerned with Cana-
dian naval policy, appeared in the Montreal Gazette of May 4,
1939. This editorial stated, inter alia-.

The fact is that in this matter of Naval defence the Dominion has
fallen far short of what was contemplated under the Laurier naval policy,
to say nothing of the program sponsored by the Borden Ministry. There
is indeed a question as to whether or not the majority of Canada's des-
troyers, judged in terms of effective war service, are worth their upkeep ....
Mr. Mackenzie is scarcely to be blamed for . . . [his] gallant endeavour to
fit the Dominion's naval responsibilities into the small compass of its
naval strength. Nevertheless the proposition is that Canada must go on
sponging upon the Mother Country and, what is even worse, upon the
goodwill of a foreign nation, the United States, for the protection which
Canada itself should provide, having regard to the position it occupies as
a trading country. The Dominion should be in a position either to protect
its own trade routes or to cooperate adequately with Great Britain in
providing the protection that is necessary. It is absurd to suggest that
anything like this is possible with six destroyers, four of which are antiques,
and a few minesweepers.18

In and after the year 1935, increased appropriations
enabled the Naval Service to make special preparations for
meeting the threatened storm. Throughout this period the
amounts of the annual naval Estimates remained small, yet
the ratio of increase was very considerable. The Estimates
for 1931-32 had been the first to reflect the depression, and
during the next three years the amount of the Estimates
was progressively reduced. For the year 1935-36 they showed
an increase, and were further enlarged every year up to the
outbreak of war. From 1934-35 to 1939-40 they increased
from $2,222,000 to $8,800,000. 19

During the period of special preparation the naval facilities
at Halifax and Esquimalt were improved. Until a short time
before the war began, however, the defences on the west
coast were accorded a priority, no doubt because the Royal
Navy afforded such strong cover in the Atlantic. The Halifax
base entered the Second World W7ar barely equipped to meet
the needs of the peace-time navy and ill prepared to carry the
unforeseen and heavy burden which the war was to lay upon
it. The war-time duties of Esquimalt were to be much less

18 Gazette, May 4, 1939.

19 See App. x.

348

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

onerous than those of Halifax, and therefore more easily
discharged.

Throughout its long history the suitability of Halifax as
the sole or principal naval base on the east coast was never
challenged. On the other hand, the qualifications of Esqui-
malt for the same role on the west coast were sometimes seri-
ously questioned, mainly on the following grounds: the small-
ness of its harbour, in which, moreover, ships and installations
are relatively exposed; the narrowness of the approaches; the
vulnerability of Esquimalt to attack from the south; and the
tact that being on an island the base could be cut off from the
mainland by a superior naval force. It was variously suggested,
therefore, between 1910 and 1939, that to replace or supple-
ment Esquimalt a base should be established at Prince Rupert,
Barkley Sound, Vancouver, or elsewhere.20 No attempt to
act on any of these suggestions was made at any time prior
to the Second World War.

During the later nineteen-thirties as additional warships
were acquired the complement of the R.C.N, was increased,
as was that of the R.C.N.V.R. which attracted a wider in-
terest with the growing threat of war. In this period also the
personnel of both reserves were specifically earmarked for
various duties which they would be required to assume at the
outbreak of a war, and instructions were issued accordingly.

From the closing of the naval college in 1922 until the
Second World War the training of cadets was carried out in
ships and establishments of the Royal Navy. Officers and
ratings were also sent to the Royal Navy for advanced and
specialized courses. In 1935, for example, 32 officers were
training with the Royal Navy, of whom 22 were following
courses preparatory to qualifying for lieutenant, while the
remainder were taking specialist courses or acquiring fleet
experience. In 1938, 53 officers and 90 ratings were similarly
in training overseas.21 By the nineteen-thirties the older
Canadian officers were largely replacing the officers of the
R.N. on loan, but down to the Second World War there was
always at least one R.N. officer in a senior post at N.S.H.Q.

The importance of naval training can hardly be exag-
gerated. The proper handling of a modern warship in action

29 E.g. Paper entitled "Esquimalt", July 15, 1913, N.S. 1017-1-1 (1); Proposals for Cana-
dian Naval Expansion, 1919, N.S. 1017-10-8 (1); Cdr. in Charge, Esquimalt, to N. Sec, Nov.
8, 1937, N.S. 1006-M (1).

21 Annual Reports, 1936, p. 19, and 1939, p. 23.

349

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

is extraordinarily difficult. Both officers and ratings have
exacting and specialized tasks to perform, and all the separate
functions must co-ordinate precisely under the direction of a
single mind. The problem is much increased by smoke, noise,
and imminent danger, and also by the awkward fact that any
individual or group on board, no matter how important, or
the ship's communication system, may at any moment be
put out of action. Most people perform their occupational
functions in the fullest sense almost every day; but the naval
man ordinarily does so only a few times in his whole career,
and for the rest he must practice and rehearse under conditions
which at the best are thoroughly fictitious. Nor can he be
certain in peace-time that the doctrine which he follows will
prove to have been valid. These are formidable conditions in
which to prepare, and they emphasize the importance of con-
scientious training as well as of constant appraisal of existing
doctrine.

A warship at sea is the best place of all in which to perfect
naval training. Accordingly a warship spends as much time
as possible at sea, and when cruising, unless she has to reach
a destination quickly, she carries out various exercises more
or less continuously. These may consist of tactical exercises
with other ships; gunnery or torpedo practice; action stations,
fire, and abandon-ship drills; or other forms of rehearsal.
The following sketch of the activities of H.M.C. destroyers
between the two wars affords a glimpse of a segment of Cana-
dian life which, though almost unknown to the public, was
the culmination of all the naval preparations that were being
made in Canada.

It was customary for H.M.C. ships to remain during the
greater part of the year in Canadian waters, where they
cruised, trained, and visited as many ports as the rest of their
programme permitted. Typical of such visits was one made
by Saguenay in September 1931, shortly after her first arrival
in Canada. The destroyer called at Gaspe and Tadoussac,
and then steamed up her name-river to Chicoutimi where
she was hospitably welcomed. Calls at various ports were also
utilized for the purpose of taking reservists on board for their
annual period of training, which it was exceedingly desirable
that they should spend at sea.22 Some of these visits were
synchronized with general or local occasions involving a con-

22 The most difficult problem in the training of naval reservists is that of giving them
experience at sea.

350

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

siderable amount of ceremonial. For example, Saguenay and
Champlain took a prominent part in the Jacques Cartier
quatercentenary celebration at Gaspe on August 25, 1934, a
ceremony in which H.M.S. Dragon and a French destroyer
and sloop also took part. An exceptional duty took the
Saguenay and Skeena across the Atlantic in May 1937, when
they represented the R.C.N, at functions in England con-
nected with the coronation of King George VI.

During the first three or four months of each year the
Canadian destroyers were accustomed to cruise in southern
waters, chiefly in order to take part in fleet exercises with the
America and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy.23
Warships stationed on the east coast cruised to Bermuda and
the West Indies, and occasionally continued round to the
west coast by way of the Panama Canal. The winter cruises
of those stationed in British Columbia took them down the
west coast of North America, and they usually joined the east-
coast ships in the West Indies.

On January 5, 1932, Skeena and Vancouver left Esquimalt
for their winter cruise. Nearing Balboa they altered course
for Acajutla, Salvador, to protect British residents, and
arrived there on January 23. Ten British subjects of whom
five were women were accommodated on board for some time.
On the 31st Skeena left Acajutla. Vancouver arrived back at
Esquimalt on February 29, and Skeena on March 19.

On January 3, 1934, the Saguenay sailed from Halifax in
company with the Champlain, and called at Bermuda, Jam-
aica, and British Honduras, and then at Colon where Skeena
and Vancouver joined, having come round from Esquimalt.
The four destroyers then proceeded to Curacao, and from
there to La Guaira, Vene7Aiela. During the last-mentioned
visit a newspaper in near-by Caracas printed the following
front-page headlines:

LA VISITA DE LOS DESTROYERS CANADIENSES
Excursion al Campo de Carabobo. — Lunch en el Hotel Jardin.-
Homenaje al Libertador en el Panteon Nacional. Otros actos. '

23 Better climatic conditions in the south for training, and meeting the special problems
connected with cruising in a hot climate, were further advantages, and Canadian trade com-
missioners in the countries on their route seem to have thought that the visits of the destroyers
were beneficial to their work. During the period no cruises were carried out in far northern
latitudes in either ocean.

24 Eng. tr.: Visit of the Canadian Destroyers: Excursion to Carabobo Field — Lunch at the
Hotel J ardin —Homage to the Liberator at the National Pantheon -Other functions.

351

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The warships then called at the following places in succession:
Trinidad, St. Kitts, Grenada, St. Vincent, Barbados, St.
Lucia, Martinique, Antigua, and Jamaica where the west-
coast destroyers parted company. Saguenay and Champlain
returned to Halifax by way of Port au Prince, Nassau, and
Bermuda, reaching their home base on May 10.

The same two ships sailed from Halifax for Bermuda on
January 13, 1936. From Bermuda they proceeded to Jamaica,
and on the way colours were half-masted for the death of
King George V. Shortly afterwards the accession was pro-
claimed, and on the high seas all the commissioned officers
swore allegiance to King Edward VIII. At Jamaica they
were in company with a number of H.M. ships, and with
Skeena and Vancouver who had come from the west coast.
During this cruise the Champlain called at a port in Texas
where a very warm welcome was extended to the ship. A
strenuous round of motor drives, lunches, and other enter-
tainments, had been arranged, and the commanding officer
was versatile enough to manage addresses to the students of
the State Teachers' College and to those of a Senior High
School. The destroyer was open to the public every after-
noon, and about fifteen hundred visitors were estimated to
have come on board daily. On the day after her arrival a
local newspaper gave Champlain about half its front page,
said that as she appeared over the horizon on the way in she
had "literally plowed up the rolling sea," and added: "In
naval parlance, such a vessel is a veritable 'hornet.' Cham-
plain arrived back in Halifax on May 3, and Saguenay two
weeks later.

A normal feature of the winter cruises to the West Indies
was exercises and manoeuvres in company with ships of the
Royal Navy, the benefits of which were obvious. These
joint exercises enabled the Canadian destroyers to take part
in relatively complex and large-scale practices which would
otherwise have been beyond their means, and gave them a
useful standard of comparison. Moreover the probability of
close co-operation between the two Services in the event of
war lent considerable realism to such rehearsals. During the
winter cruise of 1934 which has been briefly described above,
the four Canadian destroyers exercised for several days with
ships of the Home Fleet, including the battleships Nelson,
Rodney , Valiant, and Malaya, and an aircraft carrier, cruisers,
and destroyers. In this period of combined training the

352

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

Canadian division formed a complete flotilla with H.M.S.
Kempenfelt, Crescent, Cygnet, Crusader, and Comet, all five
of which were later to become H.M.C. ships.25 Through the
nineteen-twenties and thirties, also, one of H.M. cruisers
usually appeared at Esquimalt in the course of the summer,
and exercised in company with the one or more H.M.C.
destroyers on that station.26

Immediate action on the outbreak of war calls for many
detailed arrangements made in advance. Some planning of
this sort had always been done by the Naval Service, but
after the year 1932 progressively greater attention was given
to it. Existing arrangements were extended, and additional
ones were made as the threat of war grew more serious. A
War Book was prepared and frequently revised along lines
suggested by the Oversea Defence Committee. Co-operation
between certain Departments was provided for, and various
means for assisting the Admiralty were devised. The naval
Intelligence organization was to be immediately expanded,
wireless censorship instituted, and the naval part of the
defence schemes put into effect at naval ports. Suitable
government and privately-owned vessels were earmarked as
auxiliaries, to be used in most cases for anti-submarine work
or minesweeping. Arrangements were made to institute
naval and contraband control, and to issue routeing and other
instructions to merchant ships, some of which would also
have to be defensively armed. Preparations were made to
set up examination services where needed. Enemy merchant
ships which might happen to be in Canadian ports at the
outbreak of a war were to be seized, subject to any agreement
for according "days of grace" to them. Plans for mobilizing
the reserves were drawn up, while suitable retired as well as
reserve officers were marked out for particular duties. The
supply of highly-trained officers who would be available in
war was largely increased by the fact that the Admiralty
had given the Naval Service the first call on retired officers
of the Royal Navy living in Canada. At most of the prin-
c pal ocean ports office accommodation was selected in ad-
vance. Such signals, Orders in Council, and other paper
instruments as were likely to be required on or immediately
before the outbreak of war were drafted in advance.

25 With names respectively changed to Assinibuine, Fraser, St. Laurent, Ottawa, and
Restigouche.

26 Account of winter cruises is based on the Logs of the destroyers concerned.

353

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

On July 1, 1934, Capt. Percy Walker Nelles succeeded
Cdre. Hose as Chief of the Naval Staff.'-7 The new C.N.S.
had been born in Brantford, Ont., in 1892. He may have
acquired his vocation for a Service career unusually early, for
his father commanded a regiment in the South African War.
He was a member of the original group of Canadian naval
cadets who entered the profession in 1908 before the Naval
Service had been founded, and received their first training in
C.G.S. Canada. During the First World War Lieut. Nelles
served with the Royal Navy, returning to his own Service in
1917. He later attended the Royal Naval Staff College and
the Imperial Defence College. Along with a few other officers
he chose to remain in the Naval Service during its very difficult
and unpromising early years, and his career was to be closely
interwoven with the storv of that Service to near the end of
the Second World War. He was the first Canadian to reach
the highest post in the R.C.N., and his appointment closely
preceded the period of preparation for an early conflict.

Seen through Canadian eyes, the possibility of war seemed
to have increased greatly after Hitler's regime had become
firmly established, and a war might have to be waged against
both Germany and Japan. The chance of attack on or near
the coasts of the Dominion, therefore, appeared to have in-
creased, and the prospect of immediate support from the Royal
Navy in the waters near Canada to have diminished. The
naval authorities accordingly advised in November 1934
that the recommended minimum force of 6 destroyers and
4 minesweepers should be increased in the least expensive
way possible by the addition of 12 auxiliary vessels, to be
taken up in the event of war or the threat of war, chiefly or
wholly from other Departments. It was recommended that
this force, which would suffice only to afford a minimum of
security on one coast, should be provided as a first objective.
The desirability of acquiring some submarines had been con-
sidered, and rejected on the ground that submarines would
prove to be less efficient and economical than destroyers.28

The general election in the fall of 1935 resulted in a change
of government at Ottawa. One of the first acts of the new
Minister of National Defence, Hon. Ian Mackenzie, was to
ask the three Services to report on their organization and

27 At this time Cdre. Hose retired with the rank of Rear Admiral, and Capt. Nelles was
promoted to Cdre. 1st Class.

28 Memo, by Acting C.N.S., Nov. 21, 1934, N.S. 1017-10-18 (1).

354

■I

Commander Percy W. Nelles

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

ability to face any tasks which might confront them.29 The
reports which resulted all showed a serious deficiency in
equipment. The Minister was anxious, therefore, to present
Estimates in 1936 substantially higher than had been asked
for; but his colleagues urged him not to press the matter at
that moment. A postponement would provide time in which
the European situation might become clearer, and would
permit the requirements of national defence to be further
examined.30

Under the terms of the London Treaty, the Champlain and
Vancouver were due to be discarded at the end of 1936. Early
in 1935, after some correspondence between N.S.H.Q. and the
Admiralty, the latter had agreed to transfer two C-class
destroyers to the Royal Canadian Navy. It seemed better to
accept this offer than to have two new destroyers laid down;
for although new ships would be longer lived and slightly
more efficient than second-hand ones, they would cost con-
siderably more and would take a couple of years to build.
The Admiralty recommended H.M. ships Crescent and Cygnet.
They were very similar to Saguenay and Skeena; consequently
their acquisition would mean that the Royal Canadian Navy
would possess a largely homogeneous half-flotilla.31 These
particular destroyers also, together with H.M. ships Comet
and Crusader, formed a distinctive half-flotilla in the Royal
Navy. Canadian plans envisaged the acquisition of four addi-
tional destroyers, and it would be possible for the Admiralty
to hand over the four C's without breaking up a homogeneous
flotilla. After considerable delay, and in accord with the
recommendations of the Naval Service and the Joint Staff
Committee, the Cygnet and Crescent were purchased from the
Admiralty for $978,527 each. They had been built by Vickers-
Armstrong, and launched on September 29, 1931. 32 They
were commissioned in the Royal Canadian Navy at Chatham
on February 17, 1937. The Crescent was re-named Fraser,
while the Cygnet's name was changed to St. Laurent. On
March 12 the two destroyers sailed from Portland for Bar-
bados by way of the Azores. At Barbados they joined the

29 Statement by Min., Apr. 26, 1939, House of Commons Debates, 1939, in, p. 3237.

30 Statement by the Prime Minister, Feb. 19, 1937, House of Commons Debates, 1937,
ii, p. 1050.

31 Cable from Can. High Comm., London, to Sec. of State (Ext. Aff.), June 22, 1935;
C.N.S. to Min. (memo.), June 26, 1935; Admiralty to N.S.H.Q. (signal), Sept. 4, 1936: N.S.
1017-10-18 (1).

32 Statistics of the four C's: displacement, 1,375 tons; dimensions, 326' x 33' x %V<i\ h.p.,
36,000; speed, 35.5 k.; guns, 4 4.7", 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 8 21".

355

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Saguenay and Skeena, and in company with these the St.
Laurent reached Halifax on April 8, 1937. The Fraser sailed
around to the west coast from Barbados, arriving on May 3
at Esquimalt.33

In the summer of 1936 it was evident that greatly-en-
larged defence Estimates were in prospect. The government
therefore took the important step of setting up the Canadian
Defence Committee, a sub-committee of the Cabinet, for the
purpose of exercising a general supervision over defence
measures and expenditure. Its members were the Prime
Minister and the Ministers of Justice, Finance, and National
Defence.34

During the same summer the Joint Staff Committee under-
took a complete survey of the question of Canadian defence,
and embodied their conclusions in a long memorandum.35 They
stated that the responsibility for national defence could no
longer be considered to rest solely with the Department of
National Defence. They pointed out that in view of develop-
ments in industry and the reliance of the contemporary
civilization upon machinery, modern war made the heaviest
demands on every sphere of civil activity, and that the effec-
tiveness of a nation's armed forces was now governed less by
the size of its population than by the extent of its industry.
In dealing with Canada's responsibility for defence the com-
mittee briefly reviewed the principles of Canadian and im-
perial defence as these had evolved during the preceding
thirty years. They reiterated the well-established principles
that the direct defence of Canada was the primary responsi-
bility of the Canadian forces; that the possibility of war
with the United States was not considered when Canada's
defensive needs were being estimated; and that an attempt
by an overseas Power to invade the Dominion was unlikely.
It was pointed out, however, that the development of air
power had lessened Canada's immunity to attack, and that
adequate air support would now have to be afforded to de-
fended ports and to the defence of the focal areas of trade.

In the committee's opinion the likelihood of a major war
was increasing; and if such a conflict were to occur, the same
relentless forces that had drawn the Dominion and afterwards
the United States into the First World War would again

33 Logs.

M P.C. 2097, Aug. 20, 1930; House oj Commons Debates, 1937, u, p.1051.

38 Joint Staff Cttee. memo., Sept. 5, 1930, H.Q.S. 5199B.

356

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

make their influence felt, perhaps with even greater intensity.
The Joint Staff Committee thought that the war which they
feared was more likely to break out in Europe than in Asia;
nevertheless they felt that from the point of view of Canada's
direct defence the needs of the west coast ought to be at-
tended to first. This conclusion was probably reached in the
light of the facts that the Royal Navy commanded the eastern
approaches to Canada, that the German Navy was much
smaller than that of Japan,36 and that Canadian neutrality
was far more likely to be endangered on the west than on the
east coast.

There were two possible developments, in the opinion of
the committee, which the Dominion should urgently prepare
to meet. The first was a situation in which Canada might be
neutral in a war between the United States and Japan. The
other possibility was that in such a war Great Britain, the
Australasian Dominions, and Canada, might find themselves
allied with the United States. In the first case Canada would
need to dispose of a force strong enough to carry out her
obligations as a neutral. These duties might not be easy to
perform on the Pacific coast, indented and sparsely settled,
and lying squarely between Alaska and the United States
and also between the latter and Japan. In the second event-
uality Canada might definitely expect attacks on her west
coast and ought to have an adequate force with which to
meet them; and in this connection the Joint Staff Committee
altered the scales of attack for the west coast so as to include
the possibility of Japanese landing parties operating in some
strength.

The indirect defence of Canada through the participation
by its forces in a war overseas was considered to be a secondary
responsibility, but also one that might ultimately require a
much greater effort. Any decision to participate in that way,
however, would have to depend on future circumstances. The
Joint Staff Committee nevertheless expressed the opinion
that neither the Dominions nor the United States could re-
main unaffected by any threat to the continued existence of
Great Britain as a world Power. Should Canada decide to
take part in a European war, the committee considered that
this participation would involve land and air forces rather

36 In June 1935, the British Government had concluded an agreement with the German
Government whereby the strength of the German fleet was to be limited to 35% of the aggre-
gate naval strength of the British Commonwealth. This percentage was to apply to each
type of ship, except submarines of which Germany was entitled to a larger proportion.

357

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

than naval ones. They would be highly mechanized, and their
effectiveness would depend upon the ability of Canadian in-
dustry to maintain them in the field.

For the direct naval defence of Canada the Joint Staff
Committee repeated the earlier recommendation that a force
should be built up as soon as possible which would consist of
^r 6 modern destroyers and 4 minesweepers, and that the neces-
sary auxiliary vessels should be earmarked, and equipment
for the defence of bases provided. They proposed a sys-
tematic programme for naval expansion, the details of which
were included in an appendix to the memorandum. It was
pointed out that of the four destroyers in commission, Van-
couver and Champlain would have to be scrapped at the end of
the year; the committee therefore endorsed the immediate
acquisition of H.M. ships Cygnet and Crescent, which were
available. Under the five-year plan an additional destroyer,
H.M.S. Crusader, would be acquired in the first year, and
another, H.M.S. Comet, in the third year, to make a total of
six destroyers. The agenda for the first year called for the
laying down of four minesweepers, and the balance of the
programme included the providing of base-defence equip-
ment, ammunition, and an increase in naval personnel in-
cluding reserves. The committee pointed out that if their
programme were followed, most of the new material would be
acquired in the course of the first three years, but that it
would be five years before the personnel were fully trained
to man the ships. During the five years following the com-
pletion of this programme it was proposed to increase the
number of destroyers to 8, and also to acquire a flotilla leader
and 4 more minesweepers. The total naval force would then
consist of a complete flotilla of destroyers and 8 mine-
sweepers.37

The Joint Staff Committee also urged that the fixed
defences at Esquimalt should be extensively modernized, that
the militia should be reorganized and provided with modern
equipment, and that the air force should be increased to 11
permanent and 12 non-permanent squadrons. The duties of
the air force in connection with the direct defence of Canada
were defined as being: to reconnoitre at sea and along the
coast-lines; to attack hostile surface craft or submarines, and
any forces entering Canadian territory; to assist in defending

37 Statement attached to the memo, of Sept. 5.

358

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

ports against enemy aircraft from carriers or cruisers; and
generally to co-operate with the naval and land forces. The
great mobility of aircraft largely reduced the problem of
their disposition, as they could be concentated very quickly
in any threatened area on either coast.

Early in the Session of 1937 the government introduced
substantially higher Estimates for national defence. These
Estimates went part of the way towards implementing the
recommendations of the Joint Staff Committee. The occu-
pation of the Rhineland by the German army in March
1936, the capitulation of Addis Ababa in May of the same
year, and the beginning of the Spanish civil war in July, had
further increased the general concern over international
affairs; nevertheless these Estimates were not passed without
considerable opposition. Some members claimed that the
Dominion was in no danger, and that consequently the de-
fence Estimates were not for local defence but to prepare for
Canadian participation in a war overseas. Others said that
preparing for war would make its advent certain, and that
Canada should rely solely upon goodwill in international
relations. The Prime Minister assured the House that the
Estimates were intended to provide for home defence only,
and replied to other critics by arguing that if competitive
arming meant war, then war on a colossal scale was inevitable,
and it was surely time that Canadians should begin to place
their country in a position to defend itself. He also pointed
out:

. . . that any nation that does not wish to become a belligerent in a war
must at least be able to see that the waters adjacent to its own coasts are
so patrolled by its own vessels that no belligerent can come and operate
from that base against some other country with which it may be at war. 3S

Although the appropriations for national defence as a whole
were higher in 1937 than they had been in the preceding year,
those for the Naval Service were not as high, the increase
being confined to the other two Services. This was owing to
the fact that the naval appropriations had been doubled in
1936 as compared with the preceding year in order to provide
for the purchase of the Crescent and Cygnet from the Ad-
miralty.

Canadian defence policy as recommended by the Joint
Staff Committee in 1936, and enunciated by the government

38 House of Commons Debates, 1937, n, pp. 1039-74.

359

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

in 1937, was almost wholly concerned with the direct defence
of Canada; yet the likelihood of the Dominion's becoming
involved in a major war, which might originate either in
Europe or Asia, raised the question of co-operating with the
United Kingdom and the other members of the Common-
wealth in such an event. In January 1937 the Joint Staff
Committee drew up a memorandum bearing upon the agenda
of the forthcoming imperial conference.39 The committee
re-stated briefly the opinions that they had set forth in their
defence memorandum of the previous September, emphasizing
the conclusion that should a world war break out it was im-
probable that Canada would be able to remain aloof. The
committee thought that although commitments in advance
were out of the question, an exchange of information concern-
ing the measures that were being taken by the governments
of Great Britain and the Dominions would be helpful in
solving Canada's own defence problems. In a later expression
of opinion on this subject the Joint Staff Committee stated
that to protect trade on the west coast was clearly beyond
the resources of the Royal Canadian Navy as existing or as
planned, and that in the event of a Pacific war the trade in
question would cease entirely unless help were to come from
some external source. The obvious fact was also pointed out
that co-operation with the Royal Navy was essential to the
protection of Canada's vitally important Atlantic trade.40

In view of the dependence of the country in this respect,
there were those who felt that the government had not gone
far enough with its naval programme. In March 1937 the Rt.
Hon. R. B. Bennett broke the silence of the Conservative
Opposition on the subject of defence, reviewing the history
of Canadian naval policy and generally endorsing Laurier's
point of view. He asked for unity of purpose and expressed a
hope that when the delegation to the imperial conference
conferred with the Admiralty: "they might be able to arrive
at a common understanding which would look not merely to
the defence of our own shores, but, in the words of the late
Sir Wilfrid Laurier more to the defence of civilization and
the maintenance of world peace by the defence of the British
Empire itself."41 During a debate in the Upper House, Senator
C. C. Ballantyne said that he did not think that naval defence

39 Joint Staff Cttee. memo., Jan. 22, 1937, C.S.C.P.

40 Joint Staff Cttee. memo, on imperial conference agenda, Apr. 9, 1937, C.S.C.P.

41 House of Commons Debates, 1937, in, pp. 2218-24.

360

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

had received the attention which it deserved, and expressed
concern over the possibility that the Royal Navy might not
be able to come to Canada's aid if war broke out.42

At the Imperial Conference of 1937 the vital importance
of defending the sea communications of the Empire was
stressed, but no change was made in the existing arrange-
ments for imperial defence. Each Dominion reported on its own
preparations, and it was generally acknowledged that these
did not exceed what was needed for local defence. The con-
ference also agreed that the security of the member nations
could be increased by a free exchange of information con-
cerning the state of the three Services in each country, by
continuing the existing arrangements to concert the scale of
defence for ports, and by co-operating to protect communi-
cations. "At the same time the Conference recognized that
it is the sole responsibility of the several Parliaments of the
British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope of
their own defence policy." The conference likewise con-
sidered the question of the munitions and supplies which
would be required by the United Kingdom and the Dominions
in time of war, and means of providing them.43 A general
survey of Canadian industry from the point of view of war-
time needs was begun in Canada the same year.

During the year 1938 international relations deteriorated
alarmingly. The forcible annexation of Austria by Germany
was unopposed except by gesture. The Spanish conflict con-
tinued unabated, with three of the Powers intervening to an
extent that converted the war into a dress rehearsal. The
Munich crisis in September brought Europe to the brink of
war.44 In March 1938 the Canadian Government introduced
its defence Estimates for 1938-39. The amounts asked for
the army and air force were less than those of the preceding
year: the naval Estimates, however, were increased by about
two million dollars, mainly in order to pay for two additional
destroyers. As in 1937, the government's defence policy was
stated in terms of home defence and of safeguarding neu-
trality.45 The Minister also referred, however, to the possi-

« Senate Debates, 1937, p. 113, Mar. 3, 1937.

43 Cmd. 5482, Pari. Paps., 1936-37, xn. This Summary of Proceedings deals only in
generalities.

44 Precautionary steps were taken in Canada at this time. The destroyers Ottawa and
Restigouche which had arrived at Gaspe on Sept. 13, on their way from England to the west
coast, were kept on the Atlantic coast until the crisis was over.

46 House of Commons Debates, 1938, n, pp. 1645-51.

361

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

bility that Canada might take her part, along with Great
Britain, France, and the United States, in the defence of
democracy itself. He reviewed in detail the principles and
requirements of the country's direct defence, and emphasized
Canada's reliance on the Royal Navy in the Atlantic and on
"friendly fleets" in the Pacific to prevent major attacks. The
Minister outlined the scales of probable attack as laid down
by the Joint Staff Committee, namely, minor attacks by
combined sea, land, and air forces, or sporadic hit-and-run
raids by light cruisers or submarines, and he added:

If that be the situation; if that is a correct description of potential
dangers, then what are the defensive requirements needed in Canada to
meet them? In the first place, for the defence of our focal sea areas we
require sea and air forces capable of finding and destroying hostile service
[surface?] craft, submarine or aircraft raiders, and this requires aircraft
and naval strength. That is why the small naval force of Canada is being
increased by two destroyers at the present time. A slight increase in our
naval forces is vital and essential, in cooperation with air and militia
services, for the preservation of our neutrality, and the defence of our
focal areas, our trade routes, our terminals and our ports.46

The Minister also pointed out the need of anti-aircraft de-
fences, of ground troops, and of aircraft to co-operate with
the army and to patrol the coast areas. He announced that
the Naval Service was planning to establish a Fishermen's Re-
serve on the Pacific coast, and once this was done it was in-
tended to establish a similar one on the Atlantic. This policy
was criticized in the House as being inadequate for the coastal
defence of Canada.

On June 15, 1938, H.M. ships Comet*1 and Crusader were
commissioned in the Royal Canadian Navy at Chatham, and
as had been the case with the Fraser and St. Laurent they were
manned from the beginning by Canadian crews. They were
identical with the Fraser and St. Laurent, and had been built
at Portsmouth Dockyard and launched on September 30,
1931. The Admiralty was paid $1,635,000 for the two des-
troyers; and before these were transferred to the Royal
Canadian Navy alterations were made so as to provide for
general messing and central stores, a heating system was
installed, and general repairs were carried out. H.M.S. Comet
was re-named H.M.C.S. Restigouche, and the Crusader became
the Ottawa. They sailed from Portland on September 6, 1938,
arriving at Gaspe on the 13th; and the six-destroyer pro-

46 Ibid., p. 1650.

17 An earlier Comet had been the first steam-driven warship ever ordered by the Admiralty.

362

„,^ «■■'■■.«. mi' ii«'W'M"«»»

mmmt **

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

gramme had at length been completed. A month after their
arrival at Gaspe the Ottawa and Restigouche left for their
station on the west coast, and on November 7 they reached
Esquimalt. In January and February of 1938 four Basset-
class minesweepers were laid down, two on the west coast,
one on the Great Lakes, and one at Quebec.48 These vessels
were specially strengthened against ice. They were com-
missioned late in the year with the names of Fundy, Gaspe,
Comoxy and Nootka. The minimum, single-coast, defensive
flotilla which had been aimed at for so long, was now com-
plete. In October 1937, the auxiliary wooden training-
schooner Venture, built for the Department in Nova Scotia'
was commissioned and stationed on the east coast.49

In July 1938, the Canadian Fleet Reserve was created,50
with an authorized complement of 500, and this reserve be-
came effective on April 1, 1939. It was to consist of ratings
who had been honourably discharged after having served for
not less than seven years in the Royal Canadian Navy. The
C.F.R. was in course of being organized when war broke out.51
Like the R.C.N. R. and the R.C.N.V.R. it was modelled after
a similar reserve of the Royal Navy.

In 1938 the Fishermen's Reserve was also formed. This
reserve was designed to meet a special Canadian problem, and
was in many ways peculiar to the Dominion. For several
years before the outbreak of the Second World War the con-
centration of Japanese on the west coast of Canada had
caused anxious speculation in British Columbia and in Ot-
tawa concerning special measures that might be needed in
case of hostilities with Japan. The Japanese in British Colum-
bia, many of whom operated fishing boats and had an intimate
knowledge of the coast waters, were one side of the problem.
Defence against actual attack was the other. With the coming
of war the destroyers based on the west coast would probably
have to be employed elsewhere, and an alternative force
seemed to be needed, particularly for patrol work.

In the summer of 1937 Mr. Roland Bourke, at that time
a civilian employee of the Naval Service, during an informal

48 Displacement, 696 tons; length, 150'; speed, 12.5 k.; guns, 1 4"; average cost, $310,500.

49 Displacement, 250 tons; guns, 2 3-pdr. ; complement, 40 including 24 boys under train-
ing.

50 P.C. 1753, July 20, 1938.

51 In many of the years between the two wars, members o\ the Royal Fleet Reserve living
in Canada received their annual training in H.M.C. ships.

O—

363

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

conversation with certain naval officers had suggested that
the fishermen should be organized, and trained in their own
boats.62 A fishermen's reserve was not a new idea, but the
project of a largely self-sufficient training organization was
original. The suggestion met with favour in a small Service
in which economy was unusually important. In January 1938,
Mr. Bourke was instructed to visit the west-coast ports and
consult those engaged in the fishing industry. His idea was
welcomed by enough of the owners and fishermen to make
practicable the desired force of two hundred men.83 A re-
cruiting campaign was carried on during the summer, and the
Fishermen's Reserve was formally established.

Those proposing to enter the reserve maintained an un-
usually independent attitude, for several reasons. A fisher-
man's occupation encourages a sturdy individuality.84 Some
of the men concerned had been liquor smugglers during the
prohibition period in the United States; others had brought
from Europe a dislike of compulsory military service; and
still others were political and social radicals. There was
therefore a tendency to look upon the State and its represen-
tatives with a suspicious eye. From these roots sprang two
demands for special treatment which the Naval Service felt
that it was desirable to recognize. The members of the
Fishermen's Reserve thus received two unusual if not unique
exemptions: they would not be used in industrial disputes,
nor would they be liable for general service in the navy.88

The Fishermen's Reserve was formed as a separate sec-
tion of the R.C.N.R. Their officers were accordingly desig-
nated skippers and chief skippers as were officers in the senior
organization who held coasting or home-trade certificates.
The classes of rating were fewer than those in the R.C.N.R.,
being limited to able-bodied seaman and seaman cook, for
the chief duty of the fisherman patrols would be reconnais-
sance. The reservists were to receive a month's training each
year during the off season in the fishing industry between
October 15 and April 1, chiefly in seamanship, signalling, and
patrol duties. Enrolment was limited to men who made their
living by fishing. As a rule a complete crew entered the reserve
with their boat, in which they would train in peace-time and

52 D.N.R. to D.N.O. and T., Nov. 15, 1937. N.S. 126-1-2 (1).

53 Roland Bourke to N. Sec, Mar. 5, 1938 (N.O.I.C. Esquimalt: Records).

54 See Walmsley, Fishermen at War, passim.

M N.S.H.Q. to"Naden" (signal), n.d. (N.O.I.C. Esquimalt: Records).

364

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

patrol in the event of war. During the training period the
typical F.R. vessel was a fishing boat whose crew had stopped
fishing for the time being and had sailed her to Esquimalt
where they were receiving naval instruction.

In August 1938 an Honorary Advisory Committee for each
Service was created, composed of senior non-permanent
officers whose help was likely to be useful. The members
appointed to the Honorary Naval Advisory Committee were:
Cdrs. B. L. Johnson, D.S.O., R.N.R. (Ret'd); J. J. Des
Lauriers, R.C.N.R. (Ret'd); W. B. Armit, R.C.N.R. (Ret'd);
E. A. Brock, R.C.N.V.R. (Ret'd); and K. C. Sherwood,
R.C.N.V.R.56

In June of the same year the Joint Staff Committee drew
up a combined Services plan, the principal object of which
was to facilitate common action and to ensure that the re-
sponsible commanding officers of each Service were informed
of the plans of the other two.57 At this time too the com-
mittee reviewed the appreciation of Canadian defence prob-
lems and the recommendations which they had made in
September 1936, and set forth their revised conclusions in a
memorandum dated July 22, 1938. 58 The committee thought
that the international situation had developed in such a
way as to shift the primary threat from the Pacific to the
Atlantic coast; not because the danger to the Pacific coast
had diminished, but because the risks on the Atlantic had
increased. They revised the forms and scales of attack to
allow for possible incursions by one or more of the most
powerful of the German warships — the Scharnhorst and
Gneisenauy and the three "pocket battleships" of the
Deutschland class. These five ships were especially well
suited for raiding at a distance from their home bases, and
by reason of their eleven-inch guns, speed, and endurance,
were held to constitute a serious menace to the safety of the
Atlantic seaboard.59 Owing to the marked advances in range,
speed, and useful load, of modern aircraft, and the great

56 P.C. 1903, Aug. 10, 193S.

57 Joint Staff Cttee. Plan for the Defence of Canada, June 27, 1938. In January 1939 the
Joint Staff Cttee. was renamed the Chiefs of Staff Cttee., and up to the time when its title
was changed it had held forty-eight meetings.

38 Memo, entitled "A Review of Canada's Position with Respect to Defence" Julv 22
1938, H.Q.S. 5199B.

59 Scharnhorst and Gneisenaic announced displacement, 20,000 tons; supposed speed c.
29 k.; guns, 9 11", 12 5.9", and smaller. Deutschland (later Lutzow), Admiral Scheer, Admiral
Graf Spee: displacement, 10,000 tons; speed, 26 k.; radius, 18,000 miles at 13 k.; guns, 6 11",
8 5.9", and smaller.

365

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

number of them that Germany had come to possess, the
committee also revised the scales of air attack to include
Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto, as centres subject to attack
by airship or to occasional raids by ship-borne aircraft.60

Concern was expressed over the lack of defences on the
east coast and it was urged that immediate attention should
be paid to these deficiencies. To meet the increased danger of
attack the committee recommended, for the navy, that a
flotilla leader should be acquired as soon as possible, and an
immediate increase of personnel. They also suggested that
orders for 2 motor torpedo boats and 2 anti-submarine vessels
should be placed with Canadian firms, so that experience in
building these vessels might be gained, with a view to the
ultimate provision of at least a flotilla of motor torpedo boats
for each coast and of 8 anti-submarine vessels for the east
coast. They urged that Halifax, Sydney, and Saint John,
should be furnished with anti-submarine and anti-torpedo
nets and booms. An early increase in the accommodation at
Halifax and Esquimalt was recommended, as well as a gradual
expansion of the general facilities and of the joint Service
magazine at each of these bases, to meet the needs of the
growing naval force. The authorities were asked to consider
the desirability of purchasing one or more cruisers as soon
as the navy should be in a position to provide crews for them.
For the army the committee advised that the necessary coast
and anti-aircraft armament and equipment should be pro-
vided immediately. They pointed out that delay in pro-
curing all that was needed in this respect had been unavoid-
able, and urged the immediate emplacing of all available
coast-defence armament. They also advocated determined
action to finish the equipping of two divisions. For the Royal
Canadian Air Force the committee advised the early com-
pletion of seaplane bases, aerodromes, and other facilities on
both coasts, the provision of aircraft and equipment for
fighting units, and the training of additional personnel.

The Speech from the Throne which opened the parlia-
mentary Session of 1939 expressed concern at the deteriorating
international situation and the aggressive policies which were
being actively pursued in other continents:

60 In July 1938 the Joint Staff Committee decided that because of the disturbed inter-
national situation and of constant developments in methods of air and naval attack, the forms
and scales of attack should be reviewed bv the committee at least every six months. (Minutes,
July 6, 1938, C.S.C.P.).

366

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

The government shared in the general sense of relief that the appalling
disaster of war, which threatened Europe during the month of September
last, was averted, and in the recognition which that crisis manifested of the
widespread will of the peoples for peace. They are hopeful that the efforts
now being made to find a solution for the specific differences which are
causing friction will meet with success. They recognize, nevertheless,
that time is required for these forces to work, and that the possibility of
further tension in the meantime must be faced. In this situation, the
government have considered that the uncertainties of the future and the
conditions of modern warfare, make it imperative that Canada's defences
be materially strengthened. Two years ago the appropriations for defence
were substantially increased, and a beginning made on a program of
modernization to safeguard the country from the dangers of attack. The
government intend to pursue this policy vigorously, and to propose to
Parliament that the program of defence should be further augmented and
that particular emphasis should be laid upon air defence.61

The defence Estimates for 1939-40 reflected both the tone
and the emphasis of the Speech from the Throne. The amount
asked for exceeded by more than $24,000,000 the defence
Estimates of the preceding year, and of this increase almost
$18,000,000 went to the air' force.

When introducing his Estimates in the House of Commons
the Minister made the fullest statement on Canadian defence
policy that the government had yet given.62 He reviewed in
detail the policy which had been followed since the govern-
ment had taken office in 1935, and reiterated the well-estab-
lished principles on which it had been based. The Minister
announced that as far as the Naval Service was concerned it
was proposed during the coming year to buy a flotilla leader
from the Admiralty, to create a Fleet Reserve, and to form
a Fishermen's Reserve on the east coast similar to the one
that had recently been set up on the Pacific. He also an-
nounced an increase in the personnel of the Royal Canadian
Navy, the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, and the Royal
Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, and referred to plans
for constructing new facilities at Halifax and Esquimalt.
In a later statement, speaking of a long-range programme for
defence, the Minister set up a new goal in developing the
naval forces of the countrv:

The ultimate objective which the navy has set out for Canada is to
build up a naval force of eighteen destroyers, nine on each coast; eight
anti-submarine vessels, four on each coast; sixteen minesweepers, eight on
each coast; eight motor torpedo vessels, to be used on the east coast only;

61 House of Commons Debates, 1930, i, p. 3, Jan, 12. 1939.
»'- Ibid., hi, pp. 3233-65, Apr. 26, 1939.

367

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

two parent vessels, one for the destroyers on the west coast and one for the
motor torpedo boats on the east coast.63

Several members from the west coast criticized the gov-
ernment's immediate naval programme on the ground that
the naval force envisaged would be inadequate for the tasks
which would have to be assigned to it. One member urged
that more destroyers and also a cruiser should be acquired.
Another objected that destroyers were designed to work
with a battle fleet, and that they were useless against cruisers,
unnecessarily fast for escorting convoys, and expensive: he
wanted a larger number of motor torpedo boats to be acquired
and perhaps some submarines as well. The government was
also criticized for not embarking upon a definite programme
of naval construction as both Australia and Great Britain
had done.64

The ultimate objective of eighteen destroyers, which the
Minister had announced, had been envisaged within the
Naval Service as the number of destroyers required, as early
as November 1936. The formula had been that the minimum
number of immediately-available destroyers required for
coastal defence was six on each coast, and that to make sure
of six destroyers being available at any moment a flotilla of
nine destroyers would be needed. This idea was incorporated
in a secret memorandum on policy early in 1939. Capital
ships were still considered as being beyond Canada's ca-
pacity to man, maintain, or finance. It was suggested that
the need for cruisers should never be lost sight of, but that
owing to their cost and the numbers needed to man them
cruisers could not be considered at the moment. It was
repeated that a flotilla of destroyers on each coast should
provide reasonably adequate naval defence, and vessels of
the Admiralty's tribal class were recommended as being
suitable:

The modern destroyer (Tribal class with powerful gun armament
and moderate torpedo armament) is able to fulfil many of a cruiser's func-
tions and with the number proposed should provide a real defence to cruiser
attack. They are also an efficient counter to attack by Armed Merchant
Vessels, Submarines or Minelayers.

The memorandum also advocated the acquisition of eight
"specially fitted" anti-submarine vessels, on the ground that
the increasing powers of the modern submarine had rendered

63 Ibid., iv, p. 4129, May 16, 1939.

64 Ibid., pp. 3994-5, 4020-21, 4282.

368

ROAD TO WAR, 1933-1939

such craft essential to the defence of approaches to naval and
commercial harbours and the focal areas of trade. It was
stated that while the considerably greater number of these
vessels which would be needed in an emergency could be ob-
tained by requisitioning suitable craft, at least four were
required on each coast for training personnel and so as to be
immediately available at the outbreak of hostilities. Eight
minesweepers for each coast were also recommended, and it
was proposed that a few motor torpedo boats should be
acquired for use on the east coast:

The increasing development of this type of vessel by all Naval Powers
shows the value attached to them for both offensive and defensive action.
In the St. Lawrence area motor torpedo vessels should be of real value and
a flotilla of 8, with a parent vessel, must be included in our ultimate Naval
objective.

In order to man and maintain the proposed force, and
expand the reserves proportionally, it was recommended that
the existing complement of 1,965 officers and ratings should
be increased to 6,000. In addition to the two existing naval
bases, a subsidiary base at Sydney and another at Prince
Rupert would ultimately need to be developed. The capital
cost of all these additions, to be spread over six or more years,
was estimated at $68,860,000, and the annual cost of main-
taining the expanded Naval Service, at $ 1 3,500,000. 68

In August 1939 arrangements were completed to buy from
the Admiralty the flotilla leader H.M.S. Kempenfelt. A
flotilla leader is a destroyer with extra accommodation on
board for the commanding officer of a flotilla and his starT.
Kempenfelt had been launched on October 29, 1931; she was
recommissioned as H.M.C.S. Assiniboine and arrived in
Canada shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War.98

During the spring of 1939, in the black shadow of im-
pending war, King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visited
their Dominion of Canada from coast to coast. Their Majes-
ties crossed the Atlantic in the Empress of Australia, and
were met on May 15, about fifteen miles west of Cape Ray,
by the Eastern Sub-Division consisting of H.M.C.S. Saguenay
and H.M.C.S. Skeena. The Empress of Australia was accom-
panied by H.M.S. Southampton and H.M.S. Glasgow. The
two destroyers approached from ahead, cheered ship as they

66 "Objective of the Canadian Naval Service," Jan. 17, 1939 (memo.), N.S. 1017-10-34 (1).
66 Displacement, 1,390 tons; dimensions, 326' x 33' x 8%'; h.p., 36,000; speed, 35.5k .;
guns, 4 4.7", 6 smaller; torpedo tubes, 8 21"; complement, 175.

369

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

passed down the Empress' side, and took station on either
bow of the liner. The King and Queen were escorted up the
St. Lawrence to Quebec where they landed on May 17.67
During their journey through the Dominion they received
unstinted expressions of the affection and allegiance of their
Canadian subjects. At each of the cities which they visited,
where a Naval Volunteer Reserve Divisional Headquarters
was situated, the Division concerned provided a naval guard
of honour. At Vancouver their Majesties were met by the
Western Destroyer Division — Ottawa, Restigouche, Fraser,
and St. Laurent — which escorted the royal party on board
the Princess Marguerite to Victoria. As they left Vancouver
harbour:

The complete stretch from Prospect Point to Spanish Bank, was
kept clear by vessels of the Fishermen's Reserve, who steamed slowly
seaward in two straight columns, forming a channel three-quarters of a
mile wide, through which the Escort was able to steam at high speed, in
cruising order No. 20, without interruption.

On May 31 the royal visitors, turning their faces eastward,
embarked in the S.S. Prince Robert at Victoria, and the
Western Division escorted them back to Vancouver.68

Toward the end of their return journey across the con-
tinent the King and Queen visited Prince Edward Island.
They crossed the Northumberland Strait from Tormentine
to Charlottetown, and back again the same day to Pictou,
in Skeena with Saguenay in company; and on this occasion
Skeena wore the roval standard and the Admiraltv flag;.
Their Majesties left Canada on June 15 on board the Empress
of Britain, and were escorted by Skeena and Saguenay tor
some distance to sea. The King sent a signal to his two
Canadian destroyers as they turned to leave: 'Thank you
for your escort, good-bye and good luck!"69 In days and
years that were approaching fast there would be plenty of
escorting for them to do, in circumstances far more rigorous,
and they would need all the good luck which their Sovereign
had wished them.

67 Logs of Saguenay and Skeena; Skeena, Report of Proceedings, May 31, 1939, N.S.
138-7-5 (2).

68 Logs of destroyers; Report of Proceedings by Capt. (D), June .">, 1939, N.S. 141-7-.J.
fi9 Logs; Report of Proceedings, June 22, 1939, N.S. 138-7-5 (2).

370

APPENDICES

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA
Appendix I

TEXT OF THE RUSH-BAGOT AGREEMENT, 1817

Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Minister at Washington and

the United States Secretary of State concerning the Naval Force to be

maintained on the Great Lakes, Washington, 28-29 April, 1817.

From His Majesty's Minister at Washington to the United States Secretary

of State

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1817.

The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary, has the honour to acquaint Mr. Rush that
having laid before His Majesty's Government the correspondence which
passed last year between the Secretary of the Department of State and the
Undersigned upon the subject of a proposal to reduce the Naval Force of
the respective countries upon the American lakes he has received the com-
mands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to acquaint the Govern-
ment of the United States, that His Royal Highness is willing to accede to
the proposition made to the Undersigned by the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of State in his note of the 2nd of August last.

His Royal Highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of His
Majesty, agrees, that the Naval Force to be maintained upon the American
lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall
henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side — that is:

On Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burthen
and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon.

On the Upper Lakes to two vessels not exceeding like burthen each and
armed with like force.

On the waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel not exceeding like
burthen and armed with like force.

And His Royal Highness agrees, that all other armed vessels, on these
lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and that no other vessels of war shall
be there built or armed.

His Royal Highness further agrees, that if either party should hereafter
be desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that
effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of
six months from the date of such notice.

The Undersigned has it in command from His Royal Highness the
Prince Regent to acquaint the American Government, that His Royal
Highness has issued orders to His Majesty's Officers on the lakes directing,
that the Naval Force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as
will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of
the other party.

The Undersigned has the honour to renew to Mr. Rush the assurances
of his highest consideration.

CHARLES BAGOT

372

APPENDIX

From the United States Secretary of State to His Majesty's Minister at

Washington

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

April 29, 1817.

The Undersigned, acting Secretary of State, has the honour to acknow-
ledge the receipt of Mr. Bagot's note of the 28th of this month, informing
him that, having laid before the Government of His Britannic Majesty, the
correspondence which passed last year between the Secretary of State and
himself upon the subject of a proposal to reduce the naval force of the two
countries upon the American lakes, he had received the commands of His
Royal Highness the Prince Regent to inform this Government that His
Royal Highness was willing to accede to the proposition made by the
Secretary of State in his note of the second of August last.

The Undersigned has the honour to express to Mr. Bagot the satis-
faction which the President feels at His Royal Highness the Prince Regent's
having acceded to the proposition of this Government as contained in the
note alluded to. And in further answer to Mr. Bagot's note, the Under-
signed, by direction of the President, has the honour to state, that this
Government, cherishing the same sentiments expressed in the note of the
second of August, agrees, that the naval force to be maintained upon the
lakes by the United States and Great Britain shall, henceforth, be confined
to the following vessels on each side, that is:

On Lake Ontario to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden,
and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon. On the Upper Lakes to two
vessels not exceeding the like burden each, and armed with like force, and
on the waters of Lake Champlain to one vessel not exceeding like burden
and armed with like force.

And it agrees, that all other armed vessels on these lakes shall be
forthwith dismantled, and that no other vessels of war shall be there built
or armed. And it further agrees, that if either party should hereafter be
desirous of annulling this stipulation and should give notice to that effect
to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six
months from the date of such notice.

The Undersigned is also directed by the President to state, that proper
orders will be forthwith issued by this Government to restrict the naval
force thus limited to such services as will in no respect interfere with the
proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.

The Undersigned eagerly avails himself of this opportunity to tender
to Mr. Bagot the assurances of his distinguished consideration and respect.

[From Treaties and Agreements ajfecting Canada in Force between His Majesty
and the United States of America, 1814-1925 (Ottawa 1927), pp. 12-13.]

RICHARD RUSH

373

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA
Appendix II

TEXT OF THE COLONIAL NAVAL DEFENCE ACT, 1865

28 Victoria
Ch. 14

An Act to make better Provision for the Naval
Defence of the Colonies.

(7th April 1865.)

Whereas it is expedient to enable the several Colonial Possessions of Her
Majesty the Queen to make better Provision for Naval Defence, and to that
end to provide and man Vessels of War, and also to raise a Volunteer Force
to form Part of the Royal Naval Reserve established under the Act of
Parliament of 1859 "for the Establishment of a Reserve Volunteer Force
of Seamen, and for the Government of the same," (hereafter in this Act
called the Act of 1859,) and accordingly to be available for general Service
in the Royal Navy in Emergency:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of
the same, as follows:

1. This Act may be cited as The Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865.

2. In this Act —

The Term "Colony" includes any Plantation, Island, or other Pos-
session within Her Majesty's Dominions, exclusive of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Islands being immediate Depen-
dencies thereof, and exclusive of India as defined by the Act of Parliament
of 1858 "for the better Government of India:"

The Term "the Admiralty" means the Lord High Admiral of the
United Kingdom, or the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord
High Admiral.

3. In any Colony it shall be lawful for the proper Legislative Authority,
with the Approval of Her Majesty in Council, from Time to Time to make
Provision for effecting at the Expense of the Colony all or any of the
Purposes following:

(1). For providing, maintaining, and using a Vessel or Vessels of War,
subject to such Conditions and for such Purposes as Her Majesty in Council
from Time to Time approves:

(2). For raising and maintaining Seamen and others entered on the
Terms of being bound to serve as ordered in any such Vessel:

(3). For raising and maintaining a Body of Volunteers entered on the
Terms of being bound to general Service in the Royal Navy in Emergency,
and, if in any Case the proper Legislative Authority so directs, on the
further Terms of being bound to serve as ordered in any such Vessel as
aforesaid:

374

APPENDIX

(4). For appointing Commissioned, Warrant, and other Officers to
train and command or serve as Officers with any such Men ashore or afloat,
on such Terms and subject to such Regulations as Her Majesty in Council
from Time to Time approves:

(5). For obtaining from the Admiralty the Services of Commissioned,
Warrant, and other Officers and of Men of the Royal Navy for the last-
mentioned Purposes:

(6). For enforcing good Order and Discipline among the Men and
Officers aforesaid while ashore or afloat within the Limits of the Colony:

(7). For making the Men and Officers aforesaid, while ashore or afloat
within the Limits of the Colony or elsewhere, subject to all Enactments and
Regulations for the Time being in force for the Discipline of the Royal

Navy.

4. Volunteers raised as aforesaid in any Colony shall form Part of the
Royal Naval Reserve, in addition to the Volunteers who may be raised
under the Act of 1859, but, except as in this Act expressly provided, shall
be subject exclusively to the Provisions made as aforesaid by the proper
Legislative Authority of the Colony.

5. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time
as Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the
Admiralty to issue to any Officer of the Royal Navy volunteering for the
Purpose a Special Commission for Service in accordance with the Provisions
of this Act.

6. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as
Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the
Admiralty to accept any Offer for the Time being made or to be made by
the Government of a Colony, to place at Her Majesty's Disposal any Vessel
of War provided by that Government and the Men and Officers from Time
to Time serving therein; and while any Vessel accepted by the Admiralty
under such Authority is at the Disposal of Her Majesty, such Vessel shall
be deemed to all Intents a Vessel of War of the Royal Navy, and the Men
and Officers from Time to Time serving in such Vessel shall be deemed to all
Intents Men and Officers of the Royal Navy, and shall accordingly be
subject to all Enactments and Regulations for the Time being in force for
the Discipline of the Royal Navy.

7. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council from Time to Time as
Occasion requires, and on such Conditions as seem fit, to authorize the
Admiralty to accept any Offer for the Time being made or to be made by
the Government of a Colony, to place at Her Majesty's Disposal for general
Service in the Royal Navy the whole or any Part of the Body of Volunteers
with all or any of the Officers raised and appointed by that Government in
accordance with the Provisions of this Act; and when any such Offer is
accepted such of the Provisions of the Act of 1859 as relate to Men of the
Royal Naval Reserve raised in the United Kingdom when in actual Service
shall extend and apply to the Volunteers whose Services are so accepted.

8. The Admiralty may, if they think fit, from Time to Time by War-
rant authorize any Officer of Her Majesty's Navy of the Rank of Captain
or of a higher Rank to exercise, in the Name and on behalf of the Admiralty,

375

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

in relation to any Colony, for such Time and subject to such Limitations, if
any, as the Admiralty think fit, any Power exerciseable by the Admiralty
under this Act.

9. Nothing done under this Act by Order in Council, or by the Ad-
miralty, or otherwise, shall impose any Charge on the Revenues of the
United Kingdom without express Provision made by Parliament for meet-
ing the same.

10. Nothing in this Act shall take away or abridge any Power vested
in or exerciseable by the Legislature or Government of any Colony.

Appendix III

TEXT OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN BRITISH

POSSESSIONS ACT, 1909

9 Edward VII
Ch. 18

An Act to make better provision respecting Naval Establishments in

British Possessions.

(20th October 1909.)

Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this
present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: —

1. — (1) It shall be lawful for His Majesty, on the representation of the
Admiralty and of the Treasury that it is expedient to do so, by Order in
Council to vest any store, yard, magazine, building, or other property in
any British Possession held in trust for naval purposes (whether vested in
His Majesty or in the Admiralty or in any officer), and the care and disposal
of such property, in the Governor of the possession for such estate and
interest, and upon such terms and conditions, and subject to such reserva-
tions, exceptions, and restrictions, as may be specified in the Order, and the
Governor of the possession shall, by virtue of this Act and the Order, take
and hold, subject to the provisions of the Order, the premises transferred
to and vested in him accordingly.

(2) Every representation to His Majesty proposed to be made under
this Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and shall lie for not
less than forty days on the table of both Houses before it is submitted to
His Majesty.

(3) Nothing in an Order made in pursuance of this Act shall affect any
estate, interest, right, or claim in or to any property comprised in the Order
other than such as at the date of the Order was vested in or held in trust fo
His Majesty or the Admiralty.

2. — This Act may be cited as the Naval Establishments in British
Possessions Act, 1909.

376

APPENDIX

Appendix IV
BRITISH NAVAL ESTIMATES, 1901-1915

Year

1901-2

1902-3

1903-4

1904-5

1905-6

1906-7

1907-8

1908-9

1909-10

1910-11

1911-12

1912-13

1913-14*

1914-15*

Total Expenditure from

Navy Votes (Net)

30,981,315
31,003,977
35,709,477
36,859,681
33,151,841
31,472,087
31,251,156
32,181,309
35,734,015
40,419,336
42,414,257
44,933,169
48,809,300
51,550,000

Expenditure on New
Construction

8,865,080

8,534,917

11,115,733

11,263,019

9,688,044

8,861,897

7,832,589

7,406,930

9,597,551

13,077,689

12,526,171

13,401,358

14,513,500

15,282,950

* Estimated
Taken from Cd. 7802 y 1914.

Appendix V

TEXT OF THE NAVAL SERVICE ACT AS PASSED IN 1910

9-10 Edward VII
Ch. 43

An Act respecting the Naval Service of Canada.

{Assented to 4th May, 1910.)

His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House
of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: —

Short Title

1. This Act may be cited as The Naval Service Act.

Interpretation

2. In this Act, and in any regulations made hereunder, unless the
context otherwise requires, —

(a) "Active Service," as applied to a person in the Naval Forces, means
service or duty during an emergency;

(b) "Department" means the Department of the Naval Service;

377

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

{d) "emergency" means war, invasion or insurrection, real or appre-
hended;

(e) "general orders" means orders and instructions issued to the Naval
Forces by the authority of the Minister;

(/) "Minister" means the Minister of the Naval Service;

(g) "naval establishment" includes officers' quarters, barracks, dock-
yards, victualling yards, naval yards, factories, rifle and gun ranges, naval
colleges, and all other buildings, works and premises under the control of
the Minister, constructed or set apart for the Naval Service;

(h) "Naval Forces" means those naval forces organized for the defence
and protection of the Canadian coasts and trade, or engaged as the Gover-
nor in Council may from time to time direct;

(/) "Naval Service" includes His Majesty's service in respect of all
naval affairs of which by this Act the Minister is given the control and
management, and also the Fisheries Protection Service, Hydrographic
Survey, tidal observations on the coasts of Canada, and wireless telegraph
service;

(j) "officer" includes commissioned, warrant and subordinate officers
serving in the Naval Service of Canada, but not petty officers so serving;

(k) "prescribed" means prescribed by this Act or by regulations made
thereunder;

(/) "regulations" means regulations made by the Governor in Council
under the authority of this Act;

(m) "seaman" includes petty officers, seamen and all other persons
engaged in the Naval Service of Canada, other than officers;

(») "on service" means when called upon for the performance of any
duties other than those specified as active service.

3. The Interpretation Act and section 2 of this Act shall apply to all
regulations, orders and articles of engagement made or entered into under
this Act.

Command in Chief

4. The Command in Chief of the Naval Forces is declared to continue
and be vested in the King, and shall be exercised and administered by His
Majesty, or by the Governor General as His representative.

Department of The Naval Service

5. There shall be a Department of the Government of Canada, which
shall be called the Department of the Naval Service, over which the
Minister of Marine and Fisheries for the time being shall preside, and he
shall be the Minister of the Naval Service.

6. The Governor in Council may also appoint an officer, who shall be
called the Deputy Minister of the Naval Service, who shall be the deputy
head of the Department, and may also appoint such other officers and
clerks as are requisite for the due administration of the business of the
Department, each of whom shall hold office during pleasure.

2. The Governor in Council may transfer to the Department of the
Naval Service any officer, clerk or employee of the Department of Marine

378

APPENDIX

and Fisheries whether or not such officer, clerk, or employee is at present
connected with any one of the branches of the Department of Marine and
Fisheries which is by this Act transferred or assigned to the Department of
the Naval Service, and the money voted by Parliament for the financial
year ending the thirty-first day of March, one thousand nine hundred and
eleven, applicable to the payment of the salary or the increase of salary
of any such officer, clerk or employee shall be available for the payment of
his salary or increase of salary in the Department of the Naval Service in
the same manner and to the same extent as if such officer, clerk or employee
had not been so transferred.

Administration

7. The Minister shall have the control and management of all naval
affairs, including the purchase, maintenance and repair of the ordnance,
ammunition, arms, armouries, stores, munitions, and habiliments of war
intended for the use of the Naval Service.

8. The Minister shall have the control and management, including the
construction, purchase, maintenance and repair, of naval establishments
and of ships and other vessels for the Naval Service.

9. There shall be appointed an officer, not lower in rank than Rear
Admiral, to be called the Director of the Naval Service of Canada. If a
suitable officer of such rank is not available then an officer of the rank of
captain may be appointed, who shall have the rank of Commodore of the
first class.

2. The Director of the Naval Service of Canada shall, subject to the
regulations and under the instructions of the Minister, be charged with the
direction of the Naval Service.

10. The Governor in Council may appoint a Naval Board to advise
the Minister on all matters relating to naval affairs which are referred to
the Board by the Minister.

2. The composition, procedure and powers of the Board shall be as
prescribed.

11. The Governor in Council may organize and maintain a permanent
naval force.

12. The Governor in Council may authorize the engagement of officers
and seamen in the Naval Service upon such terms and conditions as may
be prescribed, and may from time to time fix the maximum number that
may be so engaged.

2. Every officer and seaman shall take and subscribe the following oath
upon engaging to serve in the Naval Service: —

"I, A.B., do sincerely promise and swear (or, solemnly declare) that I
will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty."

3. Such oath may be administered by any commissioned officer in the
Naval Service.

13. The rank and authority of officers in the Naval Service shall be
as prescribed.

14. The commissions of officers in the Naval Service shall be granted
by His Majesty during pleasure, and all warrant, subordinate and petty
officers shall be appointed in such manner and shall hold such rank and
perform such duties as may be prescribed.

379

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

15. The Governor in Council may at any time relieve from duty any
officer or seaman in the Naval Service.

16. Any person who has voluntarily engaged in the Naval Service
shall be entitled to be discharged at the expiration of the time of service
for which he engaged, unless such expiration occurs in time of emergency,
in which case he shall be liable to serve for a further period of not more than
twelve months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any
increase of pay unless, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, the
circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned merits it.

17. The uniform, arms, clothing and equipment of the Naval Service
shall be of such patterns and designs as are prescribed, and where supplied
at the public cost shall be issued as may be prescribed.

18. Officers of the Naval Service shall provide their own uniforms and
equipment, with the exception of officers of torpedo vessels and of the
submarine service, to whom special clothing may be issued as prescribed.

Naval Reserve

19. The Naval Reserve Force shall consist of such persons as join
the said reserve after naval service or after undergoing such training as may
be prescribed. All members of the said reserve shall be liable to active
service upon an emergency.

20. The Governor in Council may make regulations for the government
of the Naval Reserve Force.

21. In time of war no officer or seaman in the Naval Reserve Force
shall be required to serve continuously for a longer period than one year;
but any officer or seaman who volunteers to serve for the war, or for any
longer period than one year, may be compelled to fulfil his engagement:
Provided, however, that the Governor in Council may, in case of unavoid-
able necessity (of which necessity the Governor in Council shall be the sole
judge), call upon any officer or seaman to continue to serve beyond his one
year's service for any period not exceeding six months, and for such further
service he shall not be entitled to any increased rate of pay, unless, in the
opinion of the Governor in Council, the circumstances of the case and the
conduct of the person concerned merits it.

Active Service

22. The Governor in Council may place the Naval Forces or any part
thereof, on active service at any time when it appears advisable so to do by
reason of an emergency.

23. In case of an emergency the Governor in Council may place at the
disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval
Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and
the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or
seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

24. Whenever the Governor in Council places the Naval Service or any
part thereof on active service, as provided in the two preceding sections, it
Parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will
not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall issue for a meeting of

380

APPENDIX

Parliament within fifteen days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and
sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue to sit
in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.

25. When the Governor in Council declares that an emergency has
arisen in which it is expedient for the public service that His Majesty
should have control of any dock, shipyard, pier, wharf, machine shop,
repairing or salvage plant, factory, warehouse, store or other building the
Minister may, by warrant under his hand, empower any person named in
such warrant to take possession thereof in the name and on behalf of His
Majesty, and to use it for the service of His Majesty in such manner as
the Minister directs, and all persons, officers, servants and employees
employed thereon shall obey the directions of the Minister in connection
with the management or operation thereof.

2. Such warrant shall remain in force so long as, in the opinion of the
Minister, the emergency exists.

3. There shall be paid to any person whose property is taken possession
of in pursuance of this section, out of moneys to be provided by Parliament,
such full compensation for any loss or injury he so sustains as is agreed
upon between the Minister and the said person, or, in case of difference, as
is fixed upon reference to the Exchequer Court of Canada.

4. Where any property is taken possession of under the provisions of
this section all contracts and agreements between the persons whose
property is so taken possession of and the directors, officers and servants of
such person or between such person and any other person in relation to the
working or maintenance of such property which would, if such possession
had not been taken, have been enforceable by the said person shall, during
the continuance of such possession, be enforceable by His Majesty.

Naval Volunteer Force

26. The Governor in Council may organize and maintain a force to be
called the Naval Volunteer Force.

27. The Naval Volunteer Force shall consist of officers and seamen
raised by voluntary engagement from among seafaring men and others
who may be deemed suitable for the service in which such volunteers are to
be employed.

28. The Governor in Council may make regulations for the government
of the Naval Volunteer Force.

29. Every naval volunteer shall be engaged for the term of three years
and, provided his conduct and qualifications are satisfactory, shall be
eligible for re-engagement for further periods of three years up to the age
of forty-five years; at the expiration of each term he shall be entitled to his
discharge, save as hereinafter mentioned.

30. Naval volunteers shall receive such training and capitation or
other remuneration as may be prescribed.

31. In an emergency the Governor in Council may order and direct
that the Naval Volunteer Force, or such part thereof as may be deemed
necessary, shall be called into active service, and the naval volunteers so
called out shall be liable to serve under such regulations as may be pres-
cribed.

381

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

2. If a naval volunteer's period of service expires while he is employed
on active service, he shall be liable to serve for a further period of not more
than six months, and for such further service he shall not be entitled to any
increased remuneration, unless, in the opinion of the Governor in Council,
the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the person concerned
merits it.

Naval College

32. There shall be an institution for the purpose of imparting a com-
plete education in all branches of naval science, tactics and strategy.

2. Such institution shall be known as the Naval College of Canada, and
shall be located at such place as the Governor in Council may determine.

33. The Naval College shall be governed and its affairs administered
under such regulations as may be made by the Governor in Council.

2. Such regulations shall be published in The Canada Gazette, and upon
such publication shall have the same force of law as if they formed part of
this Act.

34. The Naval College shall be conducted under the superintendence
of a naval officer who has special qualifications with regard to discipline and
to the instruction to be given, and such professors, instructors and assistants
as are found necessary and as are authorized by Parliament.

2. The staff of the Naval College shall be appointed by the Governor in
Council and shall hold office during pleasure.

35. Every candidate for admission to the Naval College shall be re-
quired to pass a medical examination and produce satisfactory proof of date
of birth and satisfactory certificates of good character.

2. No candidate shall be admitted until he has passed a medical examin-
ation, and thereafter such qualifying examination as may be prescribed.

3. The age of candidates on admission for the Military and the Engineer-
ing branches of the Naval Service shall be as prescribed.

36. Every person admitted as a student to the Naval College shall
engage to serve in the Canadian Naval Forces for such length of time and
under such conditions as may be prescribed, and shall take the oath of
allegiance to His Majesty.

Target Practice

37. The Minister may lay down targets, buoys and other appliances
for target practice by the vessels in the Naval Service, and also may provide
rifle ranges suitably equipped for the use of the Naval Service at or near
any port or any naval establishment.

2. The Governor in Council may make regulations for ensuring the safety
of the public during such practice and may provide penalties for infringe-
ment of such regulations and for wilful damage to any such targets, buoys,
ranges or other appliances.

General Provisions

38. For the purpose of legal proceedings, all moneys subscribed by or
for or otherwise appropriated to the use of the Naval Service, and all

382

APPENDIX

vessels, arms, ammunition, clothing, equipment, musical instruments, or
other things belonging to or used by the Naval Service, shall be deemed to
be the property of His Majesty; and no gift, sale or other alienation of any
such thing by any person shall be effectual to pass the property therein
without the consent of the Governor in Council.

39. All general orders issued to the Naval Forces shall be held to be
sufficiently notified to all persons whom they concern by their publication
and exhibition in the vessel or naval establishment to which those concerned
belong, and proof of such exhibition shall be evidence of the issue of such
orders.

40. The production of a commission or appointment, warrant or order
in writing, purporting to be made under the provisions of this Act, or of
regulations made hereunder, shall be prima facie evidence of such com-
mission or appointment, warrant or order, without proving the signature or
seal thereto, or the authority of the person granting or making it.

41. When any officer or seaman is killed on active service, or dies from
wounds or disease contracted on active service, drill or training, or on duty,
provision shall be made for his widow and family out of the public funds
at the prescribed rates.

42. Every case of permanent disability, arising from injuries received
or illness contracted on active service, drill or training or on duty, shall be
reported on by a medical board and compensation awarded, under such
regulations as are made from time to time by the Governor in Council.

43. The Governor in Council may from time to time transfer to or from
the Naval Service any vessel belonging to His Majesty.

44. The Governor in Council may from time to time direct that The
Government Vessels Discipline Act shall or shall not apply to any ship or
vessel in the Naval Service, or to the officers, seamen or persons engaged for
service thereon. Until otherwise provided the said Act shall continue to
apply to all ships and vessels in the Fisheries Protection Service and the
officers and persons engaged for service thereon, and to all ships and vessels
employed on the Hydrographic Survey and Tidal Survey and the officers
and persons engaged for service thereon.

Regulations

45. The Governor in Council may make regulations for carrying out
this Act, and for the organization, training, discipline, efficiency, adminis-
tration and good government generally of the Naval Service.

46. Such regulations shall be published in The Canada Gazette^ and
upon being so published they shall have the same force in law as if they
formed part of this Act.

47. Such regulations shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament
within ten days after the publication thereof if Parliament is then sitting,
and if Parliament is not then sitting then within ten days after the next
meeting thereof.

48. "The Naval Discipline Act, 1866," and the Acts in amendment
thereof passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom for the time being
in force, and the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, in so far
as the said Acts, regulations and instructions are applicable, and except in

383

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

so far as they may be inconsistent with this Act or with any regulations
made under this Act, shall apply to the Naval Service and shall have the
same force in law as if they formed part of this Act.

2. Where in the said Acts or in the King's Regulations and Admiralty
Instructions any power or duty is vested in or imposed upon the Admiralty
or any other body or officer, and there is no such body or officer in Canada
or in the Naval Service, the Governor in Council may direct who shall
exercise or perform such power or duty in Canada, or in the Naval Service.

3. This section shall not apply to any ship or vessel to which The Govern-
ment Vessels Discipline Act applies, or to officers or persons who, being
engaged for service upon such ships or vessels, are subject to the said Act.

Penalties

49. Any person who, —

(a) procures or persuades any member of the Naval Forces to desert; or,

(b) aids or assists any member of the Naval Forces in deserting; or,

shall be liable upon summary conviction to imprisonment, with or without
hard labour, for any period not exceeding twelve months.

Execution of Warrants and Sentences

50. The keeper, jailer or warden of every jail, prison or penitentiary
in Canada shall receive and detain according to the exigency of any warrant
under the hand of the senior commissioned officer in the Naval Service
present in any district, or other person authorized under the regulations to
issue a warrant, any person mentioned in such warrant and delivered into
his custody, and shall confine such prisoner until discharged or delivered
over in due course of law; and every such keeper, jailer or warden shall take
cognizance of any warrant purporting to be signed by any such officer or
other authorized person.

51. Any prisoner sentenced for any term of imprisonment by any naval
court martial, or by any naval authority under this Act, may be sentenced
to imprisonment in a penitentiary.

2. If such prisoner is sentenced to a term less than two years, he may be
sentenced to imprisonment in the common jail of the district, county or
place in which the sentence is pronounced, or if there is no common jail
there, then in that common jail which is nearest to such locality, or in some
other lawful prison or place of confinement other than a penitentiary in
which imprisonment may be lawfully executed.

52. Any officer or seaman in the Naval Service, sentenced to be
imprisoned may, if the Governor in Council by regulation or otherwise
directs, be imprisoned in any place specially appointed therefor, instead of
in a jail, prison or penitentiary.

384

APPENDIX

Repeal

53. Chapter 41 of the Revised Statutes, 1886, intituled an Act respect-
ing the Militia and Defence of Canada, is repealed in so far as it concerns the
Active and Reserve Militia Marine Force.

54. The schedule to The Department of Marine and Fisheries Act,
chapter 44 of the Revised Statutes, 1906, is amended as follows: —

Clause 5, by adding thereto the following: "except steamships and vessels
belonging to the Naval Service;"

Clauses 15 and 20 are repealed;

Clause 23, by adding thereto the following: "except the Fisheries Pro-
tection Service which is under the control and management of the Depart-
ment of the Naval Service;"

Clause 24, by adding thereto the following: "except such matters as are
under the control and management of the Department of the Naval
Service."

Appendix VI

TEXT OF THE NAVAL DEFENCE ACT, 1910
(Commonwealth of Australia)

No. 30 of 1910

An Act relating to Naval Defence

{Assented to 25th November, 1910).

Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the
House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Australia, as follows: —

Part I. — Introductory

1. This Act may be cited as the Naval Defence Act 1910.

2. This Act is divided into Parts as follows: —
Part I. — Introductory.

Part II. — Administration.

Part III. — The Naval Forces.

Part IV. — The Service of the Naval Forces.

Part V. — Obligations in respect of Naval Training.

Part VI. — Special Powers in relation to the Naval Forces.

Part VII. — Miscellaneous.

385

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

3. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears —

"Active service" means service in or with a force which is engaged in
operations against the enemy, and includes any naval or military service in
time of war;

"The Defence Act" means the Defence Act 1903-1910 as amended from
time to time and includes any Act for the time being in force in substitution
for that Act;

"Governor-General" means the Governor-General of the Common-
wealth, or the person for the time being administering the Government of
the Commonwealth, acting with the advice of the Executive Council;

"The Naval Discipline Act" means the Imperial Act called The
Naval Discipline Act as amended from time to time and includes any Act
for the time being in force in substitution for that Act;

"Naval establishment" includes any Naval College, instructional
establishment, ship, vessel, or boat used for services auxiliary to Naval
Defence, and any dock, shipyard, foundry, machine shop, work, or estab-
lishment in connexion with Naval Defence;

"Officer" means a commissioned officer, subordinate officer, or warrant
officer, but does not include a petty officer;

"Prescribed" means prescribed by this Act or the Regulations;

"Regulations" means the regulations relating to the Naval Forces
whether made in pursuance of this Act, the Defence Act, or any other
power;

"Seaman" means a member of the Naval Forces not being an officer,
and includes any person serving in any capacity on board a vessel of the
Naval Forces when engaged in any naval service;

"This Act" includes all regulations under this Act;

"Time of War" means any time during which a state of war actually
exists, and includes the time between the issue of a proclamation of the
existence of war or of danger thereof, and the issue of a proclamation
declaring that the war or danger thereof, declared in the prior proclamation,
no longer exists;

"War" means any invasion or apprehended invasion of or attack or
apprehended attack on the Commonwealth or any territory under the
control of the Commonwealth by an enemy or armed force, and includes
actual war in which the Naval Forces take part.

4. The Defence Act is amended as set out in the First Schedule, and
that Act as so amended may continue to be cited as the Defence Act 1903-
1910.

5. Part I., sections thirty, forty-three, forty-six, forty-seven, fifty-one,
fifty-three and fifty-eight of Part III. and parts IV. to XIV. both inclusive
of the Defence Act shall, subject to this Act, continue to apply in relation
to the Naval Forces.

6. Nothing in this Act shall be taken as an appropriation of any public
moneys.

386

APPENDIX

Part II. — Administration

7. — (1). The Governor-General may appoint a Board of Administra-
tion for the Naval Forces, to be called the Naval Board.

(2). The Naval Board shall have such powers and functions as are
prescribed.

8. The Governor-General may —

(a) appoint and promote officers of the Naval Forces, and issue com-
missions to them; and

(b) appoint an officer to command the whole or any portion of the
Naval Forces.

9. Officers of the Naval Forces holding office at the commencement of
this Act shall continue to hold office as if appointed under this Act.

10. The appointment or promotion of an officer under this Act shall
not create a civil contract between the King or the Commonwealth and
the officer.

11.— (1). Subject to sub-section (2), a person shall not be appointed
to be an officer in the Naval Forces or promoted to any higher rank therein
unless he has passed the prescribed examination for the rank to which he is
appointed or promoted.

(2). A person who has not passed the prescribed examination for any
particular rank may be appointed provisionally to be an officer of that rank.

(3). A person provisionally appointed to be an officer of any particular
rank shall cease to hold office as an officer of that rank if he fails to pass the
prescribed examination for the rank to which he has been provisionally
appointed within the prescribed time, not exceeding eighteen months, after
his appointment.

(4). The requirements of this section may be dispensed with by the
Governor-General in the case of persons who are officers of the King's
Regular Naval Forces.

12. Every officer shall hold his appointment during the pleasure of the
Governor-General, but the commission of an officer shall not be cancelled
except for cause and after he has had notice, in manner prescribed, of the
cause, and has been called upon to answer in his defence.

13. — (1). Except in time of war, an officer may by writing under his
hand resign his commission at the expiration of any time not being less than
three months from the date of the receipt of the resignation.

(2). The resignation shall not have effect until it has been accepted by
the Governor-General.

(3). For special reasons the Governor-General may accept any resigna-
tion at any time after the receipt thereof.

14. Warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and petty officers
shall be appointed and shall hold their offices as prescribed.

15. The seniority of officers in their respective ranks shall be as
prescribed.

16. The Governor-General may appoint any person to be an officer, or
promote any officer to a higher rank for distinguished service or for marked

387

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

ability and gallantry on active service, without that person having passed
the prescribed examination for the rank to which he is appointed or pro-
moted.

17. The ages for the compulsory retirement of officers and members of
the Naval Forces shall be as prescribed, but in special cases the Governor-
General may extend the prescribed age of retirement for a period not ex-
ceeding two years.

18. — (1). The Governor-General may establish Naval Colleges and
Instructional Establishments for the purpose of imparting education in the
various branches of naval science and in the subjects connected with the
naval profession, and for the purpose of qualifying persons for the naval
service.

(2). Persons receiving instruction or training at any Naval College
on Instructional Establishment shall be subject to this Act and the regu-
lations.

Part III. — The Naval Forces

19. The Naval Forces shall be divided into two branches called the
Permanent Naval Forces and the Citizen Naval Forces.

20. The Permanent Naval Forces shall consist of officers who are
appointed officers of those Forces, and seamen who have enlisted or engaged
as members of those Forces and who are bound to continuous naval service
for the term of their enlistment or engagement.

21.- — (1). The Citizen Naval Forces shall be divided into the Naval
Reserve Forces and the Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces.

(2). The Naval Reserve Forces shall consist of officers and seamen
who are not bound in time of peace to continuous naval service and who
are paid for their services as prescribed.

(3). The Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces shall consist of officers and
seamen who are not bound in time of peace to continuous naval service and
who are not ordinarily paid for their services in time of peace.

22. The Governor-General may raise, maintain, and organize such
Permanent and Citizen Naval Forces as he deems necessary for the defence
and protection of the Commonwealth and of the several States.

23. — (1). The Naval Forces existing at the commencement of this
Act shall be subject to this Act as if raised thereunder.

(2). Members of the Naval Militia Forces under the Defence Act are
by this section transferred to the Naval Reserve Forces.

(3). Members of the Naval Volunteer Forces and members of the
Naval Reserve Forces under the Defence Act are by this section transferred
to the Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces.

24. Except as provided in the Defence i\ct, the Naval Forces shall be
raised and kept by voluntary enlistment only.

25. Enlistment in the Naval Forces shall be for such period as is
prescribed, but no prescribed period shall be less than two years.

26.— (1). Every person enlisting in the Naval Forces shall take and
subscribe an oath or affirmation of enlistment in accordance with the form
in the Second Schedule.

388

APPENDIX

(2). The oath or affirmation of enlistment shall be taken before an
officer, a Justice of the Peace, or a prescribed person.

(3). The oath or affirmation of enlistment shall bind the person sub-
scribing it to serve in the Naval Forces in accordance with the tenor of the
oath until he is discharged, dismissed, or removed therefrom, or until his
resignation is accepted.

27. Persons in any part of the King's Dominions may, subject to the
law in force in that part, voluntarily enlist as members of the Naval Forces
of the Commonwealth, and this Act shall apply to persons who enlist as
members of the Naval Forces in parts beyond the limits of the Common-
wealth to the same extent as if they had enlisted within the limits of the
Commonwealth.

28. A member of the Naval Forces shall be entitled to be discharged
therefrom at the expiration of the period of service for which he enlisted,
unless such expiration occurs in time of war, in which case he shall not be
entitled to his discharge until the war has terminated.

29. — (1). A seaman of the Citizen Naval Forces may, except in time
of war, claim his discharge before the expiration of the period of service for
which he enlisted subject to the following conditions: —

(a) He shall give three months' notice in writing to his commanding
officer of his intention to claim his discharge; and

(b) He shall, if a member of the Naval Reserve Forces, pay such sum
not exceeding two pounds as is prescribed; or

(2). Any payment under this section may for special reasons be waived
by any authorized officer.

(3). This section shall not apply to persons undergoing training or
liable to be trained in pursuance of the Defence Act.

30. The Governor-General may at any time by order published in the
Gazette —

{a) disband any corps or portion of a corps; or

(b) dispense with the services of any officer or seaman.

Part IV. — The Service of The Naval Forces

31. The Permanent Naval Forces are liable to continuous naval
service, and shall at all times be liable to be employed on any naval service,
including active service, and the defence and protection of the Common-
wealth and of the several States.

32. — (1). The Citizen Naval Forces are not liable in time of peace to
continuous naval service, but are liable to such naval service as the regula-
tions prescribe.

(2). The Citizen Forces shall only be liable to be employed on active
service when called out for active service by proclamation.

(3). Nothing in this section shall prevent the employment on active
service or any naval service of any members of the Citizen Forces who
volunteer for such service.

389

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

33. Members of the Naval Forces may be required to serve for training
or any naval service either within or beyond the limits of the Common-
wealth.

34. The Naval Forces shall be subject to such drill training and
inspection as are prescribed by the regulations.

35. — (1). The Governor-General may, for the purpose of naval service
or training, place any part of the Naval Forces on board any ship of the
King's Navy or in any naval training establishment or school in connexion
with the King's Navy.

(2). The members of the Naval Forces while so placed shall —

(a) be under the command of the officer commanding the ship, training
establishment, or school; and

(b) be subject to the laws and regulations to which the members of the
King's Naval Forces on the ship or attending the training establishment or
school are subject.

36. The Naval Discipline Act and the King's Regulations and Ad-
miralty Instructions for the time being in force in relation to the King's
Naval Forces shall, subject to this Act and to any modifications and
adaptations prescribed by the regulations, apply to the Naval Forces.

37. Whenever the Commonwealth Naval Forces are acting with the
King's Naval Forces for the purpose of training or for any naval service —

(a) the command of the forces shall, subject to any Imperial Act or
Regulation, devolve upon the senior naval officer present and acting in a
position of command; and

(b) any part of the Commonwealth Naval Forces may be placed under
the command of any officer of the King's Naval Forces.

Part V. — Obligations in Respect of Naval Training

38. Persons who are liable under the Defence Act to be trained in the
Junior or Senior Cadets and who are allotted to the Naval Forces shall be
subject to this Act and the regulations.

39. Commissioned rank in the Junior and Senior Naval Cadets shall
be deemed honorary rank in the Naval Forces, but shall not confer any right
to command in those Forces.

40. Persons who are liable under the Defence Act to be trained in the
Citizen Forces and who are allotted to the Naval Forces shall be subject to
training as prescribed, and shall be subject to this Act and the regulations,
and shall while undergoing training be deemed to be members of the
Citizen Naval Forces.

Part VI. — Special Powers in Relation to The Naval Forces

41. — (1). In addition to any powers contained in section sixty-three
of the Defence Act, the Governor-General may —

(a) acquire or build and maintain ships, vessels, or boats, for Naval
Defence, or for services auxiliary to Naval Defence;

(b) acquire or construct and maintain docks, shipyards, foundries,
machine shops, and other works or establishments in connexion with
Naval Defence; and

390

APPENDIX

(c) authorize the employment of any persons in a civil capacity in
connexion with any services auxiliary to Naval Defence or any works or
establishments under this section.

(2). The provisions of section sixty-three of the Defence Act shall
apply in relation to the above-mentioned powers as if they were included in
that section.

42. — (1). The Governor-General may —

(a) accept the transfer to the Commonwealth Naval Forces of any
vessel of the King's Naval Forces or of the Naval Forces of any part of the
King's Dominions;

(b) accept the transfer to the Commonwealth Naval Forces of any
officers and seamen of the King's Naval Forces or of the Naval Forces of
any part of the King's Dominions;

(c) transfer to the King's Naval Forces or to the Naval Forces of any
part of the King's Dominions any vessel of the Commonwealth Naval
Forces; and

(d) transfer to the King's Naval Forces or to the Naval Forces of any
part of the King's Dominions any officers or seamen of the Commonwealth
Naval Forces.

(2). Any transfer in pursuance of this section may be for such period
and subject to such conditions as the Governor-General thinks desirable.

(3). Subject to the conditions of transfer, all officers and seamen of the
King's Naval Forces or of the Naval Forces of any part of the King's
Dominions transferred in pursuance of this section to the Commonwealth
Naval Forces shall, while so transferred, be deemed to be members of the
Commonwealth Naval Forces, and shall be subject to this Act and the
regulations so far as they are applicable.

(4). Subject to the conditions of transfer, all officers and seamen of the
Commonwealth Naval Forces transferred in pursuance of this section to
the King's Naval Forces or to the Naval Forces of any part of the King's
Dominions shall, while so transferred, be subject to the laws and Regu-
lations governing the King's Naval Forces or the Naval Forces of the part
of the King's Dominions to which they are transferred so far as those laws
and regulations are applicable.

Part VII. — Miscellaneous

43. When any member of the Naval Forces —

(a) is killed on active service or on duty, or

(b) dies, or becomes incapacitated from earning his living from wounds
or disease contracted on active service,

provision shall be made for his widow and family or for himself, as the case
requires, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund at the prescribed rates.

44. Funds may be established in such manner and subject to such
provisions as are prescribed for providing for the payment of annuities or
gratuities to members of the Naval Forces permanently injured in the
performance of their duties, and for the payment of annuities or gratuities
to members of the Permanent Naval Forces who are retired on account of
age or infirmity.

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

45.— (1). The Governor-General may make regulations, not incon-
sistent with this Act, prescribing all matters which by this Act are required
or permitted to be prescribed, or which are necessary or convenient to be
prescribed, for securing the discipline and good government of the Naval
Forces, or for carrying out or giving effect to this Act, and in particular
prescribing matters for or in relation to —

(a) the good government of Naval establishments;

(b) the discipline of persons receiving instruction or training in or
employed in or in connexion with Naval establishments; and

(2). The regulations may provide penalties for breaches thereof, not
exceeding imprisonment with hard labour for three months, in the case of
imprisonment, or Twenty pounds, in the case of pecuniary penalties.

(3). The power to make regulations contained in this section is in
addition to any power to make regulations contained in the Defence Act.

[Two Schedules which follow are omitted.]

Appendix VII

TEXT OF ORDER IN COUNCIL TRANSFERRING HALIFAX
DOCKYARD ETC. TO CANADIAN CUSTODY

At the Court at St. James's,
The 13th day of October, 1910.

Present,
The King's Most Excellent Majesty
Lord President Lord Pentland

Lord Chamberlain Sir W. S. Robson

Whereas by Section 1 of the Naval Establishments in British Possessions
Act, 1909, it is enacted that it shall be lawful for His Majesty on the
representation of the Admiralty and of the Treasury that it is expedient to
do so, by Order in Council to vest any store, yard, magazine, building, or
other property in any British Possession held in trust for naval purposes,
and the care and disposal of such property, in the Governor of the Pos-
session for such estate and interest, and upon such terms and conditions,
and subject to such reservations, exceptions, and restrictions, as may be
specified in the Order, and that every representation to His Majesty pro-
posed to be made under the said Act shall be laid before both Houses of
Parliament, and shall lie for not less than forty days on the table of both
Houses before it is submitted to His Majesty:

And whereas it hath been represented to His Majesty by the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty and by the Lords Commissioners of the
Treasury that it is expedient by Order in Council, pursuant to the aforesaid
Act, to vest in the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada the yards,

392

APPENDIX

buildings and other property, specified in the Schedule hereto, situate at
Halifax, in the Province of Nova Scotia:

And whereas the said representation was laid before both Houses of
Parliament, and lay for not less than forty days on the table of both Houses
before it was submitted to His Majesty:

Now, Therefore, His Majesty doth order, by and with the advice of
His Privy Council, and in pursuance of the powers vested in Him by the
Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act, 1909, as follows: —

1. The buildings and other property specified in the Schedule hereto
and the care and disposal thereof shall be and the same are hereby vested in
the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada for all such estate and
interest as is at the date of this Order vested in or held in trust for His
Majesty or the Admiralty and for the public purposes of the Dominion
upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following
reservations, exceptions and restrictions, namely: —

(/') If the Dominion Government fail to maintain the said properties
in a state of efficiency or make any alteration in the buildings, wharves,
jetties, &c, or in the present use of the sites, or if they fail to maintain the
existing depth of water alongside the frontages of the properties con-
veniences at least equal in character to those which exist at present shall
be provided by the Dominion Government at the same port:

(/'/") The Dominion Government will arrange for the storing of coal or
other fuel at Halifax in a suitable manner for the use of His Majesty's
Ships and will allow their local representatives to take charge of it the
necessary arrangements being settled as occasion requires by the Admiralty
and the Dominion Government:

(Hi) The Dominion Government will grant all facilities required by
His Majesty's Navy including user of workshops and appliances by men of
the Fleet whenever wanted at any Government Establishments of which the
Dominion may now or in the future be possessed, such facilities with the
exception of labour and materials to be given free of cost:

(iv) The Dominion Government will inform the Admiralty before
carrying out any proposal which they may have in view to use the said
properties for other than naval or military purposes:

(v) The Dominion Government will undertake the responsibility for
all existing liabilities to which the said properties are subject:

(vi) The transfer is made subject to all tenancy and other Agreements
affecting the properties and includes all rents payable to the Admiralty
under such Agreements:

(vii) Subject to the observance of the above conditions the Dominion
Government will be free to make such use of the properties as they may
think best.

2. This Order may be cited as "The Canadian Naval Establishments
(Halifax Dockyard) Order, 1910."

A I. M ERIC FlTZROY

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NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Schedule

Halifax

The Royal Naval Dockyard and Hospital.

The Commander-in-Chief's House and Grounds.

The Recreation Ground and Cemetery.

The above properties are more particularly described in plans thereof
which were for the purpose of identification signed by Sir Charles Inigo
Thomas, K.C.B., the Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty, on the ninth
day of April, 1910.

Appendix VIII

TEXT OF THE ADMIRALTY'S SECRET MEMORANDUM

AUGUST 20, 1912
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Secret

Memorandum on the General Naval Situation

(Prepared for the Information of the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, K.C., M.P.)

I. — General Position

1. THE power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on
the sea which is essential to its security must obviously be measured from
time to time by reference to the other Naval Forces of the world, and such a
comparison does not imply anything unfriendly in intention, or in spirit,
to any other Power, or Group of Powers. From this point of view the
development of the German Fleet during the last fifteen years is the domin-
ant feature of the Naval situation to-day. That development has been
authorised by five successive legislative enactments, viz., the Fleet Laws
of 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912. These laws cover the period up to
1920.

Whereas in 1898 the German Fleet consisted of —

9 battleships (excluding coast-defence vessels),
3 large cruisers,
28 small cruisers,
113 torpedo-boats, and
25,000 men,

maintained at an annual cost of £6,000,000, the full Fleet of 1920 will
consist of —

41 battleships,
20 large cruisers,
40 small cruisers,
144 torpedo-boats,
72 submarines, and
101,500 men,

estimated to be maintained at an annual cost of £23,000,000.

394

APPENDIX

These figures, however, give no real idea of the advance, for the size
and cost of ships has risen continually during the period, and, apart from
increasing their total numbers, Germany has systematically replaced old
and small ships, which counted as units in her earlier Fleet, by the most
powerful and costly modern vessels. Neither does the money provided for
the completed law represent the increase in cost properly attributable to
the German Navy, for many charges borne on British naval funds are
otherwise defrayed in Germany; and the German Navy comprises such a
large proportion of new ships that the cost of maintenance and repair is
considerably less than in Navies which have been longer established.

Even if no further increases are made by Germany in the interval, the
Fleet possessed by that Power in 1920 will be far stronger than the British
Navy of to-day. Already, by 15 years of scientific effort, Germany from
having practically no Fleet at all has raised herself to what is indisputably
a second place among the Fleets of the world. The whole of this extra-
ordinary evolution— comprising as it does not only the building of ships
of all kinds and of the most powerful types, but the formation and training
of great numbers of officers and men of every specialist grade and rating;
the development of a naval science and of naval tactics of their own; the
provision of colleges and training schools, of vast arsenals for the supply of
guns, ammunition, torpedoes, armour plate, and every kind of naval
equipment; of naval harbours, docks, dockyards, and of marine fortifica-
tions on an unexampled scale,— has been achieved under the guidance and
during the tenure of a single Minister, Admiral von Tirpitz.

2. The cause which has led Germany to create and develop this Navy
is still a matter of dispute. The debates in the British Houses of Parliament
for the past 10 years reproduce with monotonous fidelity two antagonistic
views: While the one points to the inherent anti-British nature of German
increases and the necessity for Great Britain to reply from time to time
with larger programmes, if she be determined to maintain her naval
superiority and consequently her national existence, the other insists that
German Naval expansion is due to the naval or the foreign policy of Great
Britain.

With foreign policy this memorandum is not concerned: it is sufficient
to observe that the great German Law, that of 1900, was passed with
national assent before the friendship between England and France rendered
the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 a possibility, and while we were still
on bad terms with Russia. It is therefore impossible to regard the good
relations which have prevailed since 1904 between Great Britain and
France, or since 1907 between Great Britain and Russia, as the cause or
reason for German naval expansion, much of which had been publicly
determined on in periods anterior to these dates.

3. Again, the naval policy of Great Britain has certainly not been
provocative. On the accession of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's
administration to power at the end of 1905 a deep and earnest desire pre-
vailed throughout the dominant political forces in Great Britain to check
and mitigate the rivalry in naval armaments. The expression of this desire
and the hope that the Hague Conference of 1906 might be productive of
some reasonable scheme for the limitation of armaments were not well
received by the German Government. They declined to discuss the matter

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at The Hague, or between the Sovereigns, and proceeded to the passage of
their new law of 1906, which had already been projected during the tenure
of Mr. Balfour's administration in the preceding year. Great Britain,
however, did not relinquish her efforts to check the rivalry of armaments,
and in order to support words by deeds and precept by example, the
British construction in capital ships and the cost of the Naval Estimates
were substantially reduced. The following figures are instructive: —

In 1905 Great Britain was building 4 capital ships and Germany 2.

In 1906 Great Britain reduced to 3 capital ships and Germany in-
creased to 3.

In 1907 Great Britain built 3 capital ships and Germany built 3.

In 1908 Great Britain reduced to 2 capital ships and Germany in-
creased to 4.

The year 1906 was signalised by the passage of the 3rd German Naval
Law, which provided among other things for the addition of 6 large cruisers,
the greatest ships in the world, to that Fleet. It is noteworthy also that
whereas prior to the year 1906 the Germans were building only 6 torpedo-
boat destroyers a-year, they have since built double that number annually.

A man must be very anxious to prove Great Britain in the wrong if he
seeks to found any charge of naval provocation against her upon the above
figures. It cannot be contended with justice that Germany has been, com-
pelled by British naval rivalry and British naval increases to expand her
naval establishments.

It has, indeed, been made a matter of reproach in many quarters that
the reduction in British naval construction in the 3 years 1906, 1907, and
1909, encouraged the German Navy to a sudden and more rapid exertion
in the hopes of overtaking the naval power of Great Britain. This is not the
Admiralty view, as will be shown later; but it is necessary to state that it
was not until the efforts of Great Britain, to procure the abatement or
retardation of naval rivalry, had failed for 3 successive years that in 1909
upon a general review of the naval situation we were forced to take excep-
tional measures to secure against all possible hazards the safety of the
Empire. In that year 8 capital ships were laid down in Great Britain and
2 others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Domin-
ion of New Zealand respectively — a total of 10. The German new con-
struction continued at 4.

4. In the spring of the present year the fifth German Navy Law was
assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the
increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important,
but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will
be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full
commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the
unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle
or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers, it will in the near future
consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small
cruisers; and whereas at present, owing to the system of recruitment which
prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile during the

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winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of
this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily
available. Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers, instead of 66, will be
maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; 72 new submarines will
be built within the currency of the new law, and of these it is apparently
proposed to maintain 54 with full permanent crews. Taking a general view,
the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German
Navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say,
instantly and constantly ready for war. Such a proportion is without
example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers.

So great a change and development in the German Fleet involves, of
course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers and men
of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has reached
66,000. Under the previous Navy Laws, and various amendments which
have preceded this one, Germany has been working up to a total in 1920,
according to Admiralty calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they
have been approaching that total by increments of approximately 3,500 a
year. The new law adds 15,000 officers and men, and makes a total in 1920
of 101,500. The new average annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of
all ranks, but for the next three years, from 1912 to 1914, by special pro-
vision, 500 men extra are to be added, and in the last three years of the
currency of the law 500 less will be taken, making the total rate of increase
of the German Navy personnel about 5,700 men a-year for the first three
years.

The new construction under the law prescribes for the building of 3
additional battleships — 1 to be begun next year, 1 in 1916 — and 2 small
cruisers, of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third
battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six
years which are in view. The cost of these increases in men and in material
during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 spread over that
period above the previous estimates.

The facts set forth above were laid before the House of Commons on
the 22nd July, 1912, by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

5. The effect of the new German Navy Law is to produce a remarkable
expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and
efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of battleships
and large armoured cruisers which will be kept constantly ready and in
full commission will be raised by the law from 21, the present figure, to
33 — an addition of 12, or an increase of about 57 per cent.

The new fleet will, in the beginning, include about 20 battleships and
large cruisers of the older type, but gradually as new vessels are built the
fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely
of modern vessels.

This full development will only be realised step by step; but already in
1914 2 squadrons will, according to Admiralty information, be entirely
composed of what are called Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up
of good ships like the "Deutschlands" and the "Braunschweigs", together
with 5 Dreadnought battle cruisers.

The organisation of the German Fleet will be 5 battle squadrons and a
fleet flagship, comprising 41 battleships in all, each attended by a battle

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or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries
of all kinds and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and sub-
marines.

This great fleet is not dispersed all over the world for duties of com-
merce protection or in discharge of Colonial responsibilities; nor are its
composition and character adapted to those purposes. It is concentrated
and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German and British coasts,
and has been organised and designed at every stage and in every particular
with a view to a fleet action on a large scale in the North Sea or North
Atlantic with the navy of some other great naval Power.

Attention must be drawn to the explicit declaration of the tactical
objects for which the German Fleet exists as set forth in the preamble to
the Naval Law of 1900 as follows: —

"In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing
"conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess
"a battle fleet of such a strength that even for the most powerful naval
"adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's
"own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely
"necessary that the German Fleet should be as strong as chat of the
"greatest naval Power, for, as a rule, a great Naval Power will not be
"in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

6. When in 1900 Germany commenced the building of her Fleet, the
well-known preamble to her Naval Law fully defined the objects and
determination of that law. The development of the law by the various
amendments is perfectly consistent with the preamble, and the Admiralty
do not believe that the naval programmes or general policy of Great Britain
have had any effect whatever upon the German Naval Law or its amend-
ments. Although the German Naval Law has been developed in stages,
and each stage has afforded opportunity for political recrimination in this
country, it is more likely that the full scope of the Naval Law was clearly
foreseen by the rulers of Germany in 1900, and that its announcement in
instalments was merely accommodated to the capacity for digestion of the
German finances and of their naval organisation at the moment of an-
nouncement. Harbours had to be designed and constructed for the new
Fleet; docks to be provided; personnel to be entered and trained; the Kiel
Canal to be deepened, and fortifications everywhere to be designed and
established. Neighbouring nations that could not take umbrage at the
more modest proposals of the earliest period might well have been shocked
had the whole scheme been announced at once. A close study of the Naval
Law of 1900 and its amendments and a careful consideration of the strength
of our Fleet at that time compared with its strength to-day, leads the
Admiralty to the conclusion that the law as we know it to-day was in the
mind of the author of the law of 1900, and that it was reasons of policy and
method only that caused the successive announcements of its development
to be spread over a decade. What more there is to come cannot be known,
but there are already signs, similar to those which have appeared on former
occasions of increases, that even the mighty fleet which Germany will
possess in 1920 is no final limit to her naval aspirations.

7. The purpose of German naval expansion is also a subject of doubt
and controversy. We have often been assured that the German Navy is

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intended simply for the defence of Germany's oversea possessions and her
growing seaborne commerce and mercantile marine. If this were the true
object, we might have expected to see a Navy of numerous and powerful
cruisers distributed widely all over the world, showing the German flag in
distant seas and aiding German commerce and colonial developments by
their presence and influence. Instead of this, we are confronted with a very
strong fleet of battleships concentrated and kept concentrated in close
proximity to the German shores and our own.

Next we have been informed that the German Fleet exists for the
defence of Germany against an attack by a naval Power, presumably Great
Britain. If this be a sincere apprehension, it is singularly ill-founded, and
becomes increasingly ill-founded as the march of naval science progresses.
Germany has a very small coast-line and few great harbours in the North
Sea. It would be difficult to find a more unpromising coast for a naval
attack than this line of small islands, with their dangerous navigation,
uncertain and shifting channels and sand banks, currents, mists, and fogs.
All the difficulties of nature have been developed by military art, and an
immense front of fortifications crowned by enormous batteries already
covers and commands all the approaches to Germany from the North Sea.
With every improvement in the mine, the torpedo, and the submarine-boat
the German coasts become more effectually protected from a naval attack.
The total military force which Great Britain could provide for an invasion
of Germany would not exceed at the most 150,000 men. The German Army
attains on mobilisation a strength of over 4,000,000.

Although, no doubt, the scare of a British invasion has been used in
Germany to delude the vulgar, it is impossible that it can have any basis in
the minds of the powerful naval and military classes in Germany, or of the
men who direct the policy of that Empire.

8. The whole character of the German Fleet shows that it is designed
for aggressive and offensive action on the largest possible scale in the North
Sea or the North Atlantic. The structure of the German battleships shows
clearly that they are intended for attack in a fleet action. The disposition
of their guns, torpedo tubes, armour, the systems of naval tactics which the
Germans practise and the naval principles which they inculcate upon their
officers, leave no room to doubt that the idea of sudden and aggressive
action against a fleet of great power is the primary cause for which they
have been prepared.

Their "torpedo-boats," as they call them in contrast to our term
"torpedo-boat destroyers," by their high speed and general characteristics,
show themselves to be designed with the prime purpose of making an attack
upon the great ships of the Navy they may be opposed to. The British
torpedo-boat destroyers, on the other hand, are designed primarily for the
purpose of destroying the torpedo-boats of the enemy and thus defending
the British Battle Fleet from attack. Gun power for defence is the main
characteristic of British torpedo craft: speed for closing to effective torpedo
range that of the German.

No class of vessel yet designed belongs more naturally to the defensive
than the submarine; but the German development of the submarine, from
all the information we can obtain, tends to turn even this weapon of defence
into one of offence by building not the smaller class, which would be useful

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for the defence of their limited coast-line, but large submarines capable of
a sudden and offensive operation at a distance from their base across the sea.

The Admiralty feel it impossible to resist the conclusion that the Ger-
man Fleet, whatever may be said about it, exists and has been created for
the purpose of fighting, if need be, a great battle in the North Sea or the
North Atlantic both with battleships and all ancillary vessels against some
other great naval Power. The weapon which has been so patiently and
laboriously prepared is fitted for that purpose, and that alone.

9. We have further been assured from German sources that, even if
this were so, the Germans have no expectation of obtaining a victory over
the strongest naval Power, and that all they seek to achieve is a standard
of strength that will leave the greatest naval Power so seriously weakened
after the battle is over that she would hesitate before embarking on a
quarrel. This explanation is scarcely respectful to the sagacity of the
German Government, and to the high degree to which they carry their
studies of the military art both by land and sea. Whatever purpose has
animated the creators of the German Navy, and induced them to make so
many exertions and sacrifices, it is not the foolish purpose of certainly
coming off second best on the day of trial.

10. Reference must here be made to a very secret matter. During
the last few years we have become aware of the development in the United
Kingdom of an extensive system of German intelligence agents. The
materials at the disposal of the Admiralty on this subject were submitted
by the present First Lord in November last to the Director of Public
Prosecutions (Sir Charles Mathews), and to Mr. A. H. Bodkin, K.C., in
order to obtain a perfectly cool and dispassionate opinion from persons
unconnected with the Admiralty and accustomed to weigh evidence. The
following is an extract from their report: —

"We have carefully examined and considered the material with
"which we have been furnished, and have come to the following
"conclusions: —

"(a) That as far as England and Wales are concerned there is
"already established therein an extensive and systematic machinery of
"secret service, kept in motion and controlled by one or more persons
"in the secret service of Germany.

u(b) That agents in this country are employed and controlled
"from Germany in collecting information relating to land and naval
"defence of this country, and in communicating such information to one
"or more members of the German secret service.

"(c) That such agents are distributed over various parts of
"England and Wales, chiefly at places near to the sea coast, where
"information upon such matters would more probably be obtained.

"(d) That such agents in this country are principally, it would
"appear, of German nationality, but in some cases English in one or
"other of the services."

11. The purpose which governs the creation of a weapon may be un-
connected with any intention to employ it. It would not be fair to draw
from the character of the German Fleet the conclusion that the German
Government, or still less, the German people, have formed any conscious

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intention of attacking the British Empire; and so long as we maintain a
good and sufficient superiority in naval power it is unlikely that they will
ever do so. It is permissible to believe that Germany wishes to be powerful
at sea, simply for the sake of being powerful and of obtaining the influence
which comes from power without any specific danger to guard against or
settled purpose to employ the power. Still, the German Empire has been
built up by a series of sudden and successful wars. Within the lifetime of
many she has carved a maritime province out of Denmark, and the Rhine
provinces out of France. She has absorbed half the ancient Kingdom of
Poland; she dominates Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Her policy has been
such as to place her in a position to absorb Holland with scarcely an effort.
Her military strength renders her alone, among the nations of Europe, free
from the fear of invasion. But there is not a State on her borders, nor a
small State in Europe, but has either suffered at her hands or lies under the
impression of her power. From these anxieties Great Britain, and the
British Empire, sheltered by the Navy of Great Britain, have hitherto been
tree.

12. In this connection the disparity of the naval risks of the British
and German Empires must not be overlooked.

Great Britain can never violate German territory even after a defeat
of that Power at sea, her Army not being organised or strong enough for
such an undertaking. Germany with her large Army could, however, if she
chose, invade and conquer Great Britain after a successful naval campaign
in the North Sea. Germany has no overseas territory desired by Great
Britain. Great Britain has overseas territories, the cession of which might
be demanded by Germany after a successful war. A decisive battle lost at
sea by Germany would still leave her the greatest Power in Europe. A
decisive battle lost at sea by Great Britain would for ever ruin the United
Kingdom, would shatter the British Empire to its foundations, and change
profoundly the destiny of its component parts. The advantages which
Great Britain could gain from defeating Germany are nil. There are
practically no limits to the ambitions which might be indulged by Germany,
or to the brilliant prospects open to her in every quarter of the globe, if
the British Navy were out of the way. The combination of the strongest
Navy with that of the strongest Army would afford wider possibilities of
influence and action than have yet been possessed by any Empire in modern
times.

II. — Situation in 1915

13. In Home Waters: —

In the spring of the year 1915 —

Great Britain will have 25 Dreadnought battleships and 2 Lord Nelsons.
Germany will have 17 Dreadnought battleships.
Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.
Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

The Admiralty have decided upon a certain margin of superiority in
Home waters which they consider to be absolutely necessary to secure the
safety of our shores. This margin has been broadly fixed for that year at a
ratio of 3 to 2 in Dreadnought battleships apart from other vessels.

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Consequently, when Germany has —

2 battle squadrons of Dreadnoughts and 1 fleet flagship; total, 17;

Great Britain will have—

3 battle squadrons of Dreadnoughts and 1 fleet flagship; total, 25

It will be noted that, owing to the dispatch of 4 battle cruisers to the
Mediterranean, Great Britain and Germany will each have an equal number
of these vessels in Home waters, viz., 6.

14. These standards in new ships are sober and moderate. No one can
say that they err on the side of excess. The reason we are able to content
ourselves with them for the present is that we possess a good superiority
in battleships and especially armoured cruisers of the pre-Dreadnought era.

In this are included 8 King Edwards (3rd Battle Squadron), which are
more powerful than any other pre-Dreadnought ships; 8 Formidables (5th
Battle Squadron) and 5 Duncans (6th Battle Squadron), which are as good
as the ships of the 3rd German Squadron; and 8 Majesties (7th Battle
Squadron); 6 Canopus, and 2 Swiftsures (8th Battle Squadron), which are
superior to the 4th and 5th German Squadrons as they will be in 1915.
There are, besides, 22 armoured cruisers, some of which are very good
ships, against which the Germans have 7 of similar strength. There is also
a preponderance in torpedo-boat destroyers and a good margin in sub-
marines.

This reserve of strength will steadily diminish every year, actually
because the ships of which it is composed grow old, and relatively because
the new ships are more powerful. It will diminish more rapidly if new
construction in Germany is increased or accelerated. As this process con-
tinues, greater exertions will be required by the British Empire.

15. The margin above prescribed in new ships has been decided upon
after a consideration of many factors, including the individual power of the
ships on both sides, and the British preponderance in older vessels to which
reference has been made.

16. Attention is directed to the necessity of our being prepared at our
average moment for an attack by Germany at her selected moment.

With regard to this: —

In the North Sea Germany has about 140 miles of coast line. Approxi-
mately one-half of this is north of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal which, 40
miles in length, communicates directly with Kiel, the largest German naval
station. This northern coast is protected by the Frisian islands, which
are being fortified, but it comprises no harbours or naval stations. The
southern and western half includes the entrance to the Kiel Canal with a
coast line of approximately 75 miles, contains the naval stations of Wil-
helmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Emden, and is protected by a long line of
islands strongly fortified, Heligoland being an outlying fortified post. It
follows that, without any variation of routine conditions, the whole German
Navy can be concentrated within a narrow compass at any moment without
exciting any attention.

17. It here becomes necessary to allude to the German pre-Dread-
nought forces.

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In addition to the 17 Dreadnought battleships and 6 Dreadnought
cruisers above mentioned, Germany will have in permanent commission
by 1915 a 3rd squadron of 8 ships, bringing the total numbers in full
commission up to 25, or 3 squadrons of 8 and 1 Fleet flagship.

She will also have from 12 to 14 battleships in reserve, of which under
the new law 4 will be in permanent commission. The numbers thus avail-
able at any selected moment in battleships alone are: —

29, of which 17 are Dreadnoughts and 12 pre-Dreadnoughts, with 6
battle cruisers;

and, without attracting any attention whatever, these ships can, by reason
of the conditions of the coast-line and harbours above alluded to, be con-
centrated for war at any moment 300 miles from the entrance to the River
Thames.

18. Great Britain, average moment.

In 1915, according to the present arrangements (which may have to
be reconsidered in the light of German progress), we shall have in permanent
full commission —

4 battle squadrons and 1 Fleet flagship,

of which 3 squadrons or 25 ships will be Dreadnoughts. One of these four
squadrons (King Edwards) may at an average moment be at Gibraltar,
leaving 25 ships, or 3 squadrons in British waters.

In addition, there will be a squadron of 8 ships (Formidables) and 5
Duncans manned permanently as to 50 per cent, of their crews, the re-
maining 50 per cent, being at the various schools of torpedo, gunnery, &c,
available at the shortest notice provided the ships are at their ports. An aver-
age moment may find them away from their ports exercising, and at all
moments it will be necessary to embark the balance crews before they can
be put in the line of battle.

Further, as regards the three fully commissioned squadrons numbering
25 ships in full commission, the possibility of concentration which has been
alluded to in the case of Germany does not exist for us at our average
moment. There is in effect no harbour where such an assemblage of ships
could lie at an average moment without causing a great disturbance of
organisation; the exigencies of their practices in tactics, gunnery, torpedo,
&c, actually compel their dispersion among the various ports and harbours
of the British Isles.

There are not very many harbours convenient for these purposes. The
necessity of non-interference with commerce, fisheries, &c, practically
limits the normal exercising positions to the east and west coasts of Scot-
land, Berehaven on the south-west of Ireland, and Portland on the south
coast of England. It will, wherefore, be noticed that at an average moment
our whole active Fleet may be dispersed, as to one squadron as far as
Gibraltar, as to 3 squadrons over the whole coast-line of about 2,000 miles
of the British Isles, as to the 5th and 6th (not yet formed) at a distance
measured in time for mobilisation of anything up to 48 hours, and as to the
7th and 8th up to, say, 5 days.

Although after the Reserves have been mobilised the British forces will
be superior, unremitting vigilance is required; and anything which increases

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our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our
security and our chances of being left unmolested.

19. Mediterranean Station. — Four battle-cruisers and four armoured
cruisers will be required to support during the years 1913 and 1914 the
interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and the important food
supplies and Oriental trade which pass through that sea. By keeping this
squadron in the Mediterranean we reduce our superiority in battle-cruisers
in Home waters, leaving us a bare equality in this important class. During
these years the Navies of Austria and Italy will gradually increase in
strength, until in 1915 they will each possess a formidable Fleet of 4 and
6 Dreadnought battleships respectively, together with strong battleships of
the pre-Dreadnought types and other units, such as cruisers, torpedo craft,
&c. It is evident, therefore, that in the year 1915 our squadron of 4 battle-
cruisers and 4 armoured cruisers (maintained, be it remembered, at the cost
of our superiority in the former vessels in Home waters) will not suffice to
fulfil our requirements, and its whole composition must be re-considered.
To maintain a force that will secure consideration for our interests from
Mediterranean Powers we should have at least 6 Dreadnought battleships
with 2 battle-cruisers. The maintenance of such a force may well be the
factor that will determine Mediterranean Powers to hostility or amity with
Great Britain.

It is not that with inferior forces our officers and men would fear to
meet an enemy: no doubt they would do so, and with good heart; but it is
the duty of the citizens of the Empire, upon whom the actual fighting cannot
devolve, to furnish those upon whom it might devolve with such forces as
will give them fair prospects of victory.

The policy of keeping upon foreign stations ships of which the strength
is less than that of the ships of foreign Powers whom they may expect to
meet in battle proved disastrous to this country in the American War of
1812, when, owing to the policy of expecting our 32-gun frigates to fight with
success the American 44-gun frigates, many mortifying reverses attended
our arms.

20. Overseas.— Within a decade the paramount duty of ensuring our
preponderance in Home waters (at present the decisive theatre of a possible
war), has compelled Great Britain to abandon her policy of maintaining at
great expense in men and money squadrons in every distant sea, and to
concentrate the Fleet mainly in Home waters.

Thus in 1902 there were 55 pennants in the Mediterranean; to-day
there are 19. There were 14 pennants on the North America and West
Indies Station; to-day there are 3.

There were 3 cruisers on the south-east coast of America; to-day there
is 1.

There were 16 pennants on the Cape of Good Hope Station; to-day
there are 3.

There were 8 pennants on the Pacific Station; to-day there are 2.

There were 42 pennants on the China Station; to-day there are 31.

There were 12 pennants on the Australian Station; to-day there are 8.
These will eventually be increased by the formation of the Australian Fleet
unit to 10.

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There were 10 pennants on the East Indies station; to-day there are 9.

Or a total of 160 pennants on foreign stations against 76 to-day.

On the other hand, there has been a substantial accession of strength
at home. Whereas in 1902 the Channel Fleet had 13 ships in full commis-
sion, while 25 were under the orders of the Admiral Superintendent of
Naval Reserves and 24 destroyers were attached to the Home ports for
instructional purposes, to-day the 1st Fleet numbers 56 ships, while 11
ships and 66 destroyers in full commission are attached to it. The 2nd
Fleet, with 50 per cent crews embarked, comprises 21 ships; and 13 ships
with 66 destroyers and 24 torpedo-boats, also 48 submarines with 4 attached
ships, are within its organisation.

The 3rd Fleet, which represents all remaining effective vessels required
upon outbreak of war, comprises 16 battleships and 38 cruisers, all of which
have a small number of men embarked in order that they may be effective
on mobilisation. (These last would greatly need a short period in which to
develop their efficiency.)

Neither the 2nd nor 3rd Fleet existed in 1902, vessels not in full com-
mission being kept in dockyards with no men on board of them.

Heavy and increasing as the strain has been, the Admiralty cannot
admit that up to the present it has not been met, or that there is not time
to provide for the future.

21. From this comparison it will be seen that the growth of the German
Navy has compelled us to concentrate our Fleet at home. Money has not
been stinted by Parliament. Estimates of £31,000,000, which were sufficient
in 1902, have risen to £45,000,000 in the present year, and will rise again
substantially next year. The enlistment of men, the training of officers, the
steady and methodical development by every possible means of British
naval strength and efficiency have been and will be untiringly pursued.
But in spite of this largely increased expenditure and these exertions the
fact remains that the Admiralty have been compelled by the pressure of
circumstances to withdraw or diminish various forces which in time of peace
were a symbol of Empire and the visible link which united all the subjects
of the Crown and citizens of our race.

Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things,
impart a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons, and
enable the flag to be again flown confidently in the distant seas.

22. Naval supremacy is of two kinds: general and local. General naval
supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive from the seas
the strongest hostile Navy or combination of hostile Navies wherever they
may be found. Local superiority consists in the power to send in good time
to, or maintain permanently in, some distant theatre forces adequate to
defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been
obtained in the decisive theatre. It is the general naval supremacy of Great
Britain which is the primary defence for the safety and interests ot the great
dominions of the Crown, and which for all these years has been an effective
deterrent upon possible designs prejudicial to or inconsiderate of the policy
and the security of Canada.

23. The rapid expansion of Canadian sea-borne trade and the immense
value of Canadian cargoes always afloat in British and Canadian bottoms

405

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

here require consideration. On the basis of the figures supplied by the
Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the
overseas trade (imports and exports) of the Dominion of Canada in 1909-10
was not less than £72,000,000, and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was
718,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still
increasing. For the whole of this trade wherever it may be about the distant
waters of the world, as well as for the maintenance of her communications
both with Europe and Asia, Canada is dependent, and has always depended,
upon the Imperial Navy without contribution or cost to her of any kind.

24. Further, at the present time and in the immediate future we still
have the power by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion
of our reserves to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective Fleet
of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the
British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British
Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand. And these communities are also
protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of
Great Britain so long as her naval strength is unbroken.

25. This power both specific and general will be diminished with the
growth not only of the German Navy, but by the simultaneous building by
many Powers of great modern ships of war. Whereas, in the present year
Great Britain possesses 18 battleships and battle cruisers of the Dread-
nought class against 19 of that class possessed by the other Powers of
Europe, and will possess in 1913 24 to 21, the figures in 1914 will be 31 to
33, and in 1915 only 35 to 51. The existence of a number of Navies all
comprising ships of high quality creates possibilities of adverse combina-
tions being suddenly formed against which no reasonable standard of
British naval strength can fully guard. And the development of British
naval strength has to be accompanied by a foreign policy which does not
leave us without friends in Europe and Asia, and relieves us from the
impossible task of building against the whole world.

26. Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present serious
juncture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the
Oversea Dominions of the Crown. She has before now successfully made
head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and the
greatest military Powers; and she has not lost her capacity, even if left
wholly unsupported, of being able by a wise policy and strenuous exertions
to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire. The Ad-
miralty will not hesitate if necessary to ask next year for a further sub-
stantial increase beyond anything that has at present been announced,
with consequent extra additions to the burden of the British taxpayer. But
the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured
only in ships or money. It will have a moral value out of all proportion to
the material assistance afforded. The failure of Canada at this moment,
after all that has been said, to take any effective step would produce the
worst impression abroad and expose us all to much derision. But any action
on the part of Canada to increase the power of the Imperial Navy, and thus
widen the margins of our common safety, would, on the other hand, be
recognised everywhere as the proof and sign that those who may at any
time be minded to menace any part of the Empire will have to contend
with the united strength of the whole.

406

APPENDIX

27. On these grounds, not less than from purely naval reasons, it is
desirable that any aid given by Canada at this time should include the
provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war
which science can build or money supply.

It is true that the forms of naval architecture change and are changing
as the years pass; that great ships are not the only units in which decisive
naval power can be measured; and that new weapons and new conditions
may modify their influence.

It is after a full consideration of these aspects that the Admiralty
record their opinion as above. They are satisfied that no step which Canada
could take at the present time would be so helpful to the British Navy, or so
likely to put a stop to dangerous naval rivalry, as the provision of capital
ships for general Imperial service.

Admiralty ', September 20, 1912.

Appendix A — Tables illustrating the Development of the German Navv
under the Fleet Laws of 1898 and 1900, and Amendments of 1906, 1908,
and 1912.

Appendix B — Extract from Memorandum accompanving the German Fleet
Bill of 1900.

Appendix C — Translation of German Naval Law Amendment Bill, 1912.

Appendix 1 — Comparison of the Amendment with the Fleet Laws.

Appendix 2 — Programme of Construction.

Appendix 3 — Increased requirements of Personnel.

Appendix 4 — Calculation of Cost.

Appendix D — Statement showing Construction of Ships for the British and
German Navies under the Programmes 1902-3 to 1912-13, inclusive.

[This memorandum is published here with the kind permission of the
Admiralty. The appendices listed above are omitted.]

Appendix IX

TEXT OF THE NAVAL AID BILL, 1912-13

2nd Session, 12th Parliament, 3 George V., 1912-13

The House of Commons of Canada

Bill 21

An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of

the Empire.

HIS MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and
House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:—

1 . This Act may be cited as The Naval Aid Act.

2. From and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there
may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars lor
the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the
Empire.

407

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

3. The said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the
Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or
armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.

4. The said ships when constructed and equipped shall be placed by
the Governor in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common
defence of the Empire.

5. The said sum shall be paid, used and applied and the said ships shall
be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such
terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the
Governor in Council and His Majesty's Government.

Appendix X
ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES, 1910-40

Naval Service

Under- Over-

Year

Estimates

Expenditures

expended expended

$ $

1910-11

3,000,000

1,790,017

1,209,983

1911-12

3,000,000

1,233,456

1,766,534

1912-13

1,660,000

1,085,660

574,340

1913-14

1,000,000

579,566

420,434

1914-15

1,000,000

(War)

512,806
3,096,125

487,194

1915-16

1,000,000

(War)

401,722
3,274,020

598,278

1916-17

1 ,000,000

(War)

578,581
3,806,329

421,419

1917-18

1,000,000

(War)

398,920
9,666,229

601,080

1918-19

600,000

(War)

228,728
13,385,346

371,272

1919-20

600,000

(Demob.)

209,457
6,780,905

390,543

1920-21

2,000,000

(Demob.)

1,999,362
239,329

638

1921-22

2,500,000

(Demob.)

2,041,379
119,371

458,621

1922-23

1,500,000

1,378,927

121,073

(War Claim:

1923-24

1 ,500,000

1,354,527

145,473

(War Claim:

1924-25

1,400,000

1,399,056

944

(War Claim:

1925-26

1,479,500

1,419,664

59,836

(War Claim:

1926-27

1 ,670,469

1,667,848

2,621

(War Claims)

408

APPENDIX

1927-28

1 ,748,000

1,725,195
(War Claims) 2,111

22,805

1928-29

2,725,000

1,836,488
(War Claims) 1,061

888,512

1929-30

3,600,000

3,013,396
(War Claims) 356

586,604

1930-31

3,600 030

3,597,591
(War Claims) 6

2,409

1931-32

3,375,000

3,043,201
(War Claims) 309

331,799

1932-33

2,462,000

2,167,328
(War Claims) 6

294,672

1933-34

2,422,000

2,171,210
(War Claims) 213

250,790

1934-35

2,222,000

2,226,439

1935-36

2,395,000

2,380,017.80

14,982.20

1936-37

4,853,000

4,763,294.05

89,705.95

1937-38

4,485,097.25

4,371,980.48

113,116.77

1938-39

6,639,232

6,589,714.46
(To Aug. 31, 1939)

49,517.54

1939-40

8,800,000

1,869,162.36

1 Covered by Salary Deduction Act, 1934-35.

4,439'

Appendix XI

ESTIMATES AND EXPENDITURES

FOR THE

THREE SERVICES

1935—1940

NAVY

ARMY

Estimate

Expenditure

Estimate

Expenditure

Year

1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40

2,395,000.00
4,853,000.00
4,485,097.25
6,639,232.00
8,800,000.00

2,380,017.80
4,763,294.05
4,371,980.48
6,589,714.46
1,869,162.361

10,651,000.00
12,018,926.00
18,703,636.00
16,727,020.00
21,146,750.00

10,141,230.22
11,345,751.36
17,222,804.01
15,768,165.82
5,795,356.62 «

AIR

FORCE

TOTALS

Year

Estimate

Expenditure

Estimate

Expenditure

1935-36
1936-37
1937-38
1938-39
1939-40

4,302,900.00

6,809,215.00

11,752,650.00

11,686,517.00

29,450,515.00

3,777,319.58

5,821,823.77

10,018,104.28

11,216,055.11

4,835,276.52!

17,348,900.00
23,681,141.00
34,941,383.25
35,052,769.00
59,397,265.00

16,298,567.60
21,930,869.18
31,612,888.77
33,573,935.39
12,499,795.50 J

1 To August

31, 1939.

409

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA
Appendix XII

MINISTERS 1910—1949

Minister of Marine and Fisheries and of the Naval Service

Brodeur, Hon. Louis Philippe June 3, 1910 to Aug. 10, 1911

Lemieux, Hon. Rodolphe Aug. 11, 1911 to Oct. 9, 1911

Hazen, Hon. John Douglas Oct. 10, 1911 to Oct. 12, 1917

Ballantyne, Hon. Charles Colquhoun. . . .Oct. 13, 1917 to Dec. 29, 1921

Minister of National Defence

Graham, Hon. George Perry Dec. 29, 1921 to Apr. 28, 19231

Macdonald, Hon. Edward Mortimer Apr. 28, 1923 to June 28, 19262

Guthrie, Hon. Hugh June 29, 1926 to Sept. 25, 19263

Ralston, Hon. James Layton Oct. 7, 1926 to Aug. 6, 1930

Sutherland, Hon. Donald Matheson Aug. 7, 1930 to Nov. 17, 1934

Stirling, Hon. Grote Nov. 17, 1934 to Oct. 23, 1935

Mackenzie, Hon. Ian Alistair Oct. 23, 1935 to Sept. 19, 1939

Rogers, Hon. Norman McLeod Sept. 19, 1939 to June 10, 1940

Ralston, Hon. James Layton July 5, 1940 to July 12, 1940

Minister of National Defence for Naval Services

Macdonald, Hon. Angus Lewis July 12, 1940 to Apr. 18, 1945

Abbott, Hon. Douglas Charles Apr. 18, 1945 to Dec. 12, 19464

Minister of National Defence^
Claxton, Hon. Brooke Dec. 12, 1946

1 Minister of Militia and Defence and of the Naval Service until the Services were formed
into one Department by the Department of National Defence Act of June 28, 1922.

2 Acting from April 28, 1923, and sworn as Minister Aug. 17, 1923.

3 Acting from June 29, 1926, and sworn as Minister July 13, 1926.

4 Minister of National Defence for Naval Services Apr. 18, 1945, and Minister of National
Defence (Army) Aug. 21, 1945.

6 Three Defence Services.

410

APPENDIX

Appendix XIII

THE NAVY LEAGUE OF CANADA

The Navy League of the British Empire was founded in 1894. Its de-
clared purpose was "to do its utmost to secure naval efficiency and a fleet
entirely adequate to the needs of the Empire." In the closing years of the
century similar organizations were established elsewhere, including the
German Navy League, which enjoyed the active support of the Kaiser and
soon after its creation claimed to have over 600,000 members. These navy
leagues were predominantly civilian organizations whose primary purpose
was to forward the interests of their respective national navies.

The Navy League of Canada was founded in 1896, affiliated with the
Navy League of the British Empire. Its founders were responsible Cana-
dians who considered sea power to be one of the strongest imperial links.
The League was to be non-sectarian and free from Party affiliations, and its
purposes were declared to be:

(a) To assist in securing as a primary object of the Imperial Policy the
Command of the Seas;

{b) To spread information showing the vital importance to the British
Empire of the maintenance of Naval Supremacy, upon which depend its
Trade, Empire and National Existence;

(d) To collect, receive, invest and hold funds and property from
voluntary contributions, subscriptions, gifts and legacies for the objects of
the League, or such of them as the donors may direct.

One of the most active early members of the League, and for some time
its president, was Aemilius Jarvis of Toronto. Among its prominent
supporters were Sir William Eearst, sometime Premier of Ontario, Sir John
Eaton, and Edward W. (later Sir Edward) Beatty. A staunch supporter
of the League during the difficult years after the First World War, when the
public was tired of everything having to do with defence, Beatty became
honorary president of the organization in 1920, a position which he retained
until his death in 1943.

In 1918 the Navy League of Canada was organized under federal charter.
At this time also the Dominion Council of the League was formed. An
advisory body, the council, which consisted of Dominion presidents and
ex-presidents, and Provincial or territorial presidents, met once a year or
oftener. The national presidents of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of
the Empireand of theFederated Women'sInstitutesofCanadawere^.v-o$W<9
members of the council. The president at that time was William Gillies Ross,
chairman of the Montreal Harbour Commission. The League was subse-
quently organized in fifteen divisions: Nova Scotia Mainland, Cape Breton
Island, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Quebec City, Three Rivers,
Montreal, Ontario, Manitoba, North Saskatchewan, South Saskatchewan
North Alberta, South Alberta, British Columbia Mainland, and Vancouver
Island.

411

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

The League sought at all times to convince the Canadian people of the
importance of sea power, stressing the dependence of the Dominion and
Empire on ships and the men who sail in them. In December, 1919, when
the Jellicoe Mission was in Canada, a delegation from the League was
received by the Cabinet in Ottawa. Aemilius Jarvis urged that future naval
policy, which was being considered by the government at that time, should
include a navy large enough to be effective, the principle that the Dominion
should retain control of its warships, and the modernizing of the Canadian
merchant fleet. During the nineteen-twenties the organization preached
continually, in print and through Members of Parliament, the desirability
of developing the Canadian navy and merchant marine, and of educating
the youth of the country in the meaning of good citizenship. To further
these aims, naval brigades which were later to be known as sea cadet corps
were established in the coast and lake cities, and also in certain western
centres which were remote from any large bodies of water. Naval traditions
were taught under the direction of volunteer officers, and boys in their
formative years were shown the value of self-discipline and co-operation.

In addition to its primary function of seeking to arouse interest in the
sea and sea power, the Navy League of Canada worked to promote the
welfare of both naval and merchant sailors, and sought to co-operate with
other organizations possessing the same interest, usually by granting funds
to help them in their efforts. The following are examples of its activities on
behalf of seamen. During the First World War the League endowed sailors'
homes in Saint John, Quebec, and Montreal, and also contributed to the
Limpsfield Sailors' Home in England. In 1918 a gift of $500,000 was made
to the King George Fund, a benevolent fund for seamen. From 1914 to
1918 about $1,700,000 was raised in the Dominion for relief work in Great
Britain. At the close of the war returned Service men were assisted in
various ways, some of them for example being helped with the procedure of
placing claims before the government. Early in the nineteen-twenties
hostels and recreation centres for naval and merchant seamen were opened
in Halifax and Sydney. In 1928-29, 150 English families, relatives and
dependents of former sailors, were brought to Canada and provided with
money wherewith to establish themselves in their new homes.

When war approached once more in 1939, the Navy League, under the
presidency of David H. Gibson Esq., was available to help in alleviating
some of the hardships which seamen were likely to suffer in the. course of
that conflict.

[This account, except for the first paragraph, is based on information
supplied by officials of the Navy league of Canada and on certain
publications of that organization. The records of the League have
not been used.]

412

LIST OF BOOKS

(Referred to in Footnotes [n this Volume)

Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power, Cambridge, Mass., 1926. Deals with
the timber problems of the Royal Navy in the days of sailing ships.

Asquith, H. H., The Genesis oj the War, London, 1923.

Bacon, Sir Reginald, Life of John Rushworth Earl Jellicoe, London, 1936.
One distinguished naval officer is here the biographer of another.

Bell, F. McKelvey, A Romance of the Halifax Disaster, Halifax, 1918.

Bemis, S. F., A Diplomatic History of the United States, New York, 1936.

Bodelsen, C. A., Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, Copenhagen, 1924.
By a Danish scholar.

Borden, Henry (ed.), Robert Laird Borden: his Memoirs, 2 vols., Toronto,
1938.

Brodie, Bernard, Sea Power in the Machine Age, Princeton, 1941.

Burt, A. L., Imperial Architects, Oxford, 1913.

Byrd, Richard Evelyn, Skyward, New York, 1928. Autobiography.

Carnegie, David, The History of Munitions Supply in Canada, 1914-18,
London, 1925.

Carr, William Guy, By Guess and By God, New York, 1930.

Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis 1911-1914, New York, 1924.

Clowes, W. L. (ed.), The Royal Navy, 7 vols., London, 1897-1903. The
standard history, written by various contributors.

Corbett, Sir Julian S., and Newbolt, Henry, Naval Operations, 5 vols.,
London, 1920-31. Semi-official history of the Operations of the Royal
Navy during the First World War. Corbett was the outstanding
British naval historian of his day. The last two volumes, which he did
not live to write, were completed by Newbolt.

Cuthbertson, George A., Freshwater, Toronto, 1931. An indefinitive
account of early French and British naval activities on the Great Lakes.

Dafoe, J. W., Laurier, Toronto, 1922.

Davis, George T., A Navy Second to None, New York, 1940.

Doughty, Sir Arthur (ed.), The Elgin-Grey Papers 1846-1852, 4 vols.,
Ottawa, 1937.

Dugdale, Blanche E. C, Arthur James Balfour, 2 vols., London, 1936.

Duguid, Col. A. Fortescue, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the
Great War 1914-1919, I (including appendices and maps), Ottawa, 1938.

F.ardley-Wilmot, Lieut. J. C. (ed.), Our Journal in the Pacific, London, 1873.

413

NAVAL SERVICE OF CANADA

Egerton, H. E. (ed.), Selected Speeches of Si?- William Molesworth, London,
1903.

Ellis, L. Ethan, Reciprocity 1911, New Haven, 1939.

Fayle, C. Ernest, Seaborne Trade, 3 vols., London, 1920-24. The standard
account of British seaborne trade during the First World War.

Fisher, Lord, Memories, London, New York, and Toronto, 1919. By one
of the most brilliant naval minds of his day. In these reminiscences
Fisher is original, pontifical, witty, indiscreet, and often inaccurate.

Ford, W. C. (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, New York, 1893.

Gooch, G. P., and Temperlev, Harold (eds.), British Documents on the Origins
of the War, 1898-1914, l'l vols., London, 1926-38.

Grey, Lord, Twenty-five Years, London, 1925.

F'ashagen, Ernst, U-boats Westward!, London and New York, 1931, tr.

Hurd, Archibald, The Merchant Navy, 3 vols., London, 1921-29. The
standard account of the British merchant marine during; the First World
War.

Jebb, Richard, The Imperial Conference, 2 vols., London, 1911.

Jose, Arthur W., The Royal Australian Navy 1914-18, 7th ed., Sydney,
1939. Vol. ix of the official historv of the Australian forces in the First
World War.

Keyes, Sir Roger, Adventures Ashore and Afloat, London, 1939.

Knox, Dudley W., A History of the United States Navy, New York, 1936.

Knox, Capt. John, An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America,
3 vols., Toronto, 1914-16.

Latane, J. H., A History of American Foreign Policy, New York, 1927.

Lepsius, J., Bartholdy, A. M., and Thimme, (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der
Europaischen Kabinette, Berlin, 1922-27. German Foreign Office docu-
ments.

Lincoln, C. H. (ed.), Correspondence of William Shirley, 2 vols., New York,
1912.

Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs, 6 vols., London, 1933.

Longstaff, F. V., Esouimalt Naval Base, Victoria, 1941. The author is the
leading authority on the history of the Esquimalt base.

MacLennan, Hugh, Barometer Rising, Toronto, c. 1941.

Malum, A. T., The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, 25th ed.,
Boston, 1916. This book, which was first published in 1890, established
Mahan's reputation, and was by far the most influential work ever
published in the field of naval history.

Mahan, A. T., Retrospect and Prospect, Boston, 1902.

414

LIST OF BOOKS

Mahan, A. T., Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1 SI 2, 2 vols., Boston,
1905. The best documented of the author's many works.

Manning, Frederic, The Life of Sir William White, London, 1923.

Marder, Arthur J., The Anatomy of British Sea Power, New York, 1940.

Mayne, Cdr. R. C, Four Years in British Columbia and Vancouver Island,
London, 1862.

Moresby, Admiral John, Two Admirals, new ed., London, 1913.

Pargellis, Stanley (ed.), Military Affairs in North America 1748-1765, New
York, 1936. Selected documents.

Parkin, G. R., Imperial Federation, London, 1892.

Raeder, Vice Admiral Erich, Der Kreuzerkrieg in den auslandischen Gewas-
sern, i, Berlin, 1922. One of three volumes on surface-raider warfare
in Der Krie% zur See, 1914-1918, the German official naval history of the
First World War.

Robinson, C. N. (present ed.), Brasseys Naval and Shipping Annual,
London. This useful publication first appeared in 1886.

Salter, J. A., Allied Shipping Control, Oxford, 1921.

Scheer, Admiral, Germany's Hi^h Sea Fleet in the World War, London,
1920, tr.

Scott, Sir Percy, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, London, 1919. The author
initiated the early twentieth-century revolution in gunnery methods.

Sherrard, O. A., A Life of Lord St. Vincent, London, 1933.

Skelton, O. D., Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 1 vols., New York,
1922.

Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations. First published in London in 1776.

Sprout, H. and M., Toward a New Order of Sea Power, Princeton, 1940.

Tirpitz, Gd. Admiral von, My Memoirs, 2 vols., London and New York,
1919, tr.

Walbran, John T., British Columbia Coast Names, Ottawa, 1909.

Walmsley, Leo, Fishermen at War, London, 1941.

Ward, Sir A. W., and Gooch, G. P. (eds.), The Cambridge History of British
Foreign Policy 1783-1919, 3 vols., Cambridge, 1922-23.

Wilhelm II, German Emperor, The Kaiser s Memoirs, New York, 1922, tr.

Woodward, E. L., Great Britain and the German Navy, Oxford, 1935.

415

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.R.O Admiralty Record Office

c approximately

Can. High Comm High Commissioner for Canada

Cdre Commodore

C.F.R Canadian Fleet Reserve

C.G.S Canadian Government Ship

C.G.T Compagnie Generale Transatlantique

C. in C Commander in Chief

C.N.S Chief of the Naval Staff

CO Commanding Officer

Col. Sec Secretary of State for the Colonies

C.S.C.P Chiefs of Staff Committee Proceedings

Cttee. Committee

Dir Director

D. Min Deputy Minister

D.N.O. and T Director of Naval Operations and Trade

D.N.R Director of Naval Reserves

D.O.T Director of Overseas Transport

Ext. Aff External Affairs

F.R Fishermen's Reserve

H.M.A.S His Majesty's Australian Ship

H.M.C.S .His Majesty's Canadian Ship

H.M.S His Majesty's Ship .

h.p horse power

I.C.R Intercolonial Railway

k knots

Min Minister

N.A. and W.I North America and West Indies

N.S Naval Service

N. Sec Naval Secretary

N.S.H.Q Naval Service Headquarters

N.T.O Naval Transport Officer

P-boats see ch. 14 footnote 10

Pac Pacific

Pari. Paps British Parliamentary Papers

PC-boats see ch. 14 footnote 10

pdr pounder

Pub. Arch Public Archives of Canada

R.C.N.A.S Royal Canadian Naval Air Service

R.C.N.R Royal Canadian Naval Reserve

R.C.N.V.R Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve

R.N.C.V.R Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve

Sess. Paps Sessional Papers of the Canadian Parliament

S.M.S Seine MajestLts Schiff

S.N.O Senior Naval Officer

W.T Wireless Telegraph

416

INDEX

Abbreviations, used in this volume, list

of, 416
Acadie (Acadia): 6; lost by French, 34,
47: population in 17th century, 46
Acajutla, Salvador, protection of Brit-
ish subjects in, by Skeena and Vancouver,
351
Accommodation, steamer launched at

Montreal, 5
Adams, Capt. H. (1. H., R.N., commands

Aurora, 319
Admiralty, sec Royal Navy
Air Board Act, 339
Air patrols, sec Fast coast air patrols
Air-ships, 136
Air support, local defence, recommended

by Joint Staff Committee, 356
Alabama case, 240
Alexandria, S.S., German freighter in San

Francisco, 267
Algerine, H.M. sloop: functions on west
coast, 148, 262; based on Esquimalt,
160; crew sent to Niobe, 237; leaves
Mexico for Esquimalt at war's out-
break, 262; with international naval
force in Mexico, 263; statistics, 266n;
search for, by Rainbow, 268-69; possi-
bility of attack by Leipzig, 273, 274
Allied warships, and Canadian bases,

222-23
America and West Indies Station, see
North America and West Indies Sta-
tion, R.N
American Civil War, 32
Anglo-American relations: and naval
defence of Canada, 8; 19th century un-
easiness, 30; strained by Navy Island
incident, 42; Halifax diplomatic asset,
54
Anglo-Japanese Alliance: implications of
renewal, 325-26; not renewed by Britain,
326; 330
Annapolis Basin, 46
Annapolis Royal, 46, 48
Anson, Vice-Admiral, British naval com-
mander 1747, 6
Anti-submarine vessels, recommended in

memorandum 1939, 368-69
Archangel, 236

Armament, innovation in Dreadnought, 87
Armaments, limitation of naval, sought.

by Britain and Japan, 325
Armed merchant cruisers: C. P. R.'s Pacific
liners designed as, 73; 117; suggested to
Borden, 205
Armit, Cdr. W. B., R.C.N. R. (Ret'd.),
appointed to Honorary Naval Advisory
Committee, 365
Asquith, Herbert H., prime minister of
Britain: on naval Estimates, 1909, 94-
95; at Committee of Imperial Defence,
178; and Borden's case for joint foreign
policy, 180; and Admiralty secret
memorandum, 209

Assuiiboinr, ll.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S. Kempenfelt): flotilla leader,
arrives in Canada, 369: statistics, 369,
369n; see Kempenfelt

Assistant Director of the Naval Service:
Hose appointed 1920, 152; plans for
future of N.S. 1919, 306-07

Atlantic Subdivision, of4R.N.C V R
1914, 159

Aurora, H.M. frigate, at Quebec, 1866.
42-43

Aurora, H.M.C. cruiser (formerly
H.M.S.): Arethusa-class, 319; given by
Admiralty, 319; statistics, 319n: dis-
posed of 1922, 332

Australia: colonies contribute part cost
and upkeep R.N. Australian Station
1887, 70; and Britain linked via Canada
by C.P.R., 73; naval subsidy to R.N.
continued 1897, 76; opinion on Admir-
alty control, 79; increases naval sub-
sidy 1902, 108; and suggestion of local
aid for R.N., 112; delegates suggest
local naval defence force, 1907, 113-14;
offers battleship to R.N. 1909, 114, 130;
development of Royal Australian Navy
114n, 117, 120, 166-67, 168, 216; supports
Dominion navies at conference 1909,
117; navy cited in Canadian Commons,
123, 126, 191; warships and Canadian
bases, 222-23, 228; and precedent for na-
ming H.M.C. submarines, 289; Jellicoe
visits, 306; R.A.N, and efficient war-
time co-operation, 306; Naval Defence
Act, 1910, text of, 385-92

Australia, H.M. A. battle cruiser: Inde-
fatigable-class, 115r*; 262; with allied
squadron, 278

Austria-Hungary, Triple Alliance, 60.

Auxiliary cruisers, see Armed merchant
cruisers

Bagot, Sir Charles, British minister at
Washington, see Rush-Bagot Agreement
Bahamas, 240

Baker Point, Halifax flying base at, 256
Balance of power, upset after 1870, 62
Balboa, and submarines CC1, CC2, 295
Balfour, Arthur, on British naval Esti-
mates 1909, 94-95; 110, 111
Ballantyne, C. C: and naval programme,
309; views on naval policy unsupported
by Party, 320, 321; and post-war
retrenchment, 321-23, 323«; on naval
defence 1937, 360-61 ; Minister of Marine
and Fisheries and of the Naval Service.
410
Barkley Sound: as temporary naval base,.
233-34; transshipment of Russian gold„
280; suggested as naval base, 349
Barrington Passage, Nova Scotia, wire-
less station, 222

417

INDEX

Battle cruiser, Indomitable-class, in pro-
jected Canadian naval squadron, 1 15-16,
115m

Battle of Lake Erie, in War of 1812, 38

Battleships: outclass other types, 186;
cost of proposed Canadian contribution,
189-90; 197; Sir William White on, as
contribution, 206

Bavnes, Rear Admiral, R.N., C. in C.
Pacific Station, on Esquimalt as head-
quarters, 58-59

Beard, Lieut. Charles Taschereau,
R.C.N. : 155; commands Patriot, 319

Beausoleil, L. J., Chief Accountant,
transferred from Marine and Fisheries,
151

Beaver, H.B.C. vessel, first steamer on
west coast, 4

Bedford Basin, 48

Bellas, German barque, 218m

Bennett, R. B., endorses Laurier's naval
policy, 360

Bering Sea controversy and arbitration,
pelagic sealing, 82-83

Bermuda: headquarters of N.A. & W.I.
Station, 239; 243; and two H-class sub-
marines, 316; 351; destroyers at, 352

Berwick, H.M. cruiser: R.C.N, cadets
train in, 155; in Fourth Cruiser Squad-
ron, 239, 244

Bethlehem Steel Corp., and Admiralty
submarine order, 235

Bickford, Rear Admiral, R.N., C. in C.
Pacific Station: 84; on destroyers for
west coast, 333

Bonaventure, H.M.S., Pacific Squadron
flagship 1905, 104

Borden, Sir Frederick, Minister of Militia
and Defence: Colonial Conference 1902,
108; meeting of Committee of Imperial
Defence 1903, 110; at Imperial Confer-
ence 1909, 116-17; defends principle of
local navies, 118; at Imperial Confer-
ence 1911, 166

Borden, Sir Robert: and German naval
threat, lOOn; and debate on Foster
resolution, 125-26; and debate on Naval
Service Bill, 132-33, 134, 137, 138; early
period in office after election 1911, 156,
173-74; and Conservative-Nationalist
rapprochement, 171 ; two-sided naval
policy, 175-76, 189, 205-08, 209, 210, 211;
and preliminaries to his Naval Aid Bill,
176-84, 186-87, 205-06; and Naval Aid
Bill in the House, 188-91, 194, 196, 197;
and defeat of Naval Aid Bill, 197, 200-
04, 208-09; and close relations with
Churchill, 211; and War Book, 212;
during First World War, 215, 230-31,
248, 288-89, 298; and Admiralty memor-
andum on imperial naval defence, 305-
06; and post-war naval programme, 309,
316-17

Boston, Mass.: vessels and French
privateers, 47; enemy ships in, 240; and
training of R.C.N. A.S. cadets, 257-58

Bourassa, Henri: background, 129; oppo-
sition to Laurier's naval policy, 129,
132, 136-37, 143; and arrival of Niobe,
145; and Drummond-Arthabaska by-
election, 170; and general election 1911,
171

Bourke, Roland, and Fishermen's Re-
serve, 363-64

Bremerton, Wash., navy yard, 287

Bristol, H.M. cruiser, and search for
German cruisers, 239

British Columbia: mainland colony estab-
lished 3, 54; and Satellite, 81 ; and contri-
bution to R.N., 129; purchase of sub-
marines by, 218, 285, 287, 289; see West
coast

British Columbia Marine Railway Co.,
165

British foreign policy: attitude toward
U.S., 14; affected by change in relative
naval strengths, 85

British North America: problems of de-
fence of the Canadas, 24-25, 29-33;
American attacks, 37: and suggestions
for defence after Navy Island incident,
42; 54

Britomart, gunboat at Port Stanley 1866,
43

Brock, Cdr. E. A., R.C.N.V.R. (Ret'd),
appointed to Honorary Naval Advisory
Committee, 365

Brock, Dean R. W., letter on naval
college, 324

Brodeur, Louis Philippe: Minister of
Marine and Fisheries, at Colonial Con-
ference 1907, 112; Imperial Conference
1909, 117, 118; 132n; appointed Minister
of the Naval Service, 141; Niobe wel-
comed by, 143; Imperial Conference
1911, 166; Minister of Marine and Fish-
eries and of the Naval Service, 410

Brodeur, Cdr. Victor G., R.C.N. : 154,
155; commands Skeena, 335

Brookfield, S. M., of Halifax, and Halifax
dry dock, 79

Brown, Sub-Lieut. T. A., R.N.C.V.R.,
and submarines CCl, CCS, 285

Brown's, John, of Clydebank, visited by
Borden, 182

Bruce, Rear Admiral, R.N., C. in C.
Pacific Station, 1855: and Esquimalt,
56, 57

Burgoyne, General, and Lake Champlain
route, 37

Burrell, Martin: Minister of Agriculture,
opposes plebiscite on naval policy, 186;
and submarine purchase, 284, 285, 288

Byrd, Lieut. Richard E., U.S.N. , and
Halifax air patrol, 258

C's, four R.N. destroyers, later R.C.N.,

355
Cabinet, sets up Defence Committee, 356.
Cabot Strait, focal area, 250
Cadets, naval, training after naval college

closed, 349

418

INDEX

Calgary, Alta., R.C.N. V.R. Division,
338

California, Gulf of, and Leipzig, 275

Callao, Peru, naval Intelligence centre at,
222

Campbell, Sir Alexander, at Colonial
Conference 1887, 72

Campbell-Bannerman Sir Henry, British
prime minister, at Colonial Conference
1907, 111

Camperdown, Nova Scotia, wireless and
port war signal stations, 228

Canada, C.G.S.: fishery protection cruiser,
142; first training ship, 155, 354; trans-
ferred from Customs at war's outbreak,
215; 243

Canada, H.M.S., and Halifax dry dock, 79

Canadian Fleet Reserve (C.F.R.), crea-
ted 1938, 363

Canadian Pacific Railway Co.: as defence
link, 3, 4, 13, 72, 81-82; ships as auxiliary
cruisers, 73, 73/t; and food supplies for
Britain, 223-24; 274

Canadian Vickers Ltd., Montreal: and
Admiralty submarine contract, 235; and
trawlers for east coast patrols, 248

Canals, on St. Lawrence, 6

Cann, Mid. Malcolm, R.C.N. , died at
Coronel, 221

Cape Breton, and timber for R.N., 39; 47

Cape Colony: offers R.N. battleship, 76;
agreement with Admiralty, 108

Cape Flattery, 265, 266

Cape Mendocino, 274

Cape Race, Newfoundland: 13; focal area,
250; air station, 255

Cape Sable: and Niobe, 145; air station,
255

Captain of Patrols: Hose appointed, 152,
249; Halifax patrols not under, 251

Caroline, and Navy Island incident, 40-42

Caron, Sir Adolphe, Minister of Militia,
69

Caronia, H.M.S., Fourth Cruiser Squad-
ron, 244

Carson, Sir Edward, First Lord of the
Admiralty, and east coast patrols,
248-49

Cartier, Jacques: discovers St. Lawrence,
2; quatercentenary celebration, 351

Cetriana, S.S., Canadian collier, and
Leipzig, 263; 263n

Chamberlain, Joseph, Colonial Secretary,
at Colonial Conference 1897, 75

Champlain, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S. Torbay): lent by Admiralty,
333-34; statistics, 334w; stationed on
east coast, 334, 335« ; 336; at Gaspe, 351 ;
winter cruises, 351-52; discarded 1936,
355

Champlain, Lake: and Provincial Marine,
36-37; in War of American Revolution
and War of 1812, 37-38

Charlottetown, P.E.I.: R.C.N.V.R. Di-
vision, 338; R.C.N. R. Port Division,
339; 370

Charybdis, H.M.S., as Canadian training

ship, 64-65
Chebucto Bay, 48

Cherub, gunboat at Goderich 1806, 43
Chesapeake, American frigate, captured.

52,80
Chicoutimi, Saguenay at, 350
Chief of the General Staff, advice on

defence economies, 342
Chief of the Naval Staff: states case for
destroyers, 332; and size of effective
naval force, 336; title changed from
Director of N.S. 1928, 340-41; and
Treasury Board hearing 1933, 342;
Nelles becomes, 354; see Director of the
Naval Service
Chief of Staff, Department of National
Defence and Inspector General of the
Militia, Navy, and Air Force; office
created and abolished, 340
Chiefs of Staff Committee: 332/t; Joint

Staff Committee re-named, 365n
Chile: and submarines built in Seattle,

273, 284, 285-86, 288, 289; 276
China, and Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 326
Chinese labour battalions, during First

World War, 225
Chippewa, Upper Canada, 40
Churchill, Winston, First Lord of the
Admiralty: on naval armament race
and German threat, 85, 98-101, 102, 178-
79, 210; and Borden's Naval Aid Bill,
176-81, 197-98; and secret memorandum,
182-85; and Borden after defeat of Naval
Aid Bill, 200-04; 207-09; relations with
Borden, 211; on outbreak of war, 214,
216
Civil Service Commission, 156
Clark's Harbour, Nova Scotia, 145
Climate, and Canadian defence, 11
Coal, as fuel for warships, 319-20
Cobden, Richard, on colonies, 22
Collingwood Shipbuilding Co., 165
Colon: submarines at, 295; destroyers at,

351
Colonial Conferences: proposals for, 68-69;
conference 1887, 69-74; conference 1894,
74; conference 1897, 75-77; periodic
meetings held desirable, 76-77, 110;
conference 1902, 10(5-10; conference 1907,
110-14; next to be called Imperial Con-
ference, 114; see Imperial Conferences
Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865,
authorizes colonies to maintain naval
forces, 28, 33, 63; text of, 374-76
Colonial reformers, and imperial policy,

24
Comet, H.M. destroyer (later H.M.C.S.
Restigouche) , and flotilla training with
Canadian destroyers, 353
Command in chief of naval forces, 140
Commerce-raiders: Kronprinz Wilhelm
fitted out, 240; threat on west coast,
278-79

419

INDEX

Committee of Imperial Defence: terms of
reference, 110-11; and Borden, 118th
meeting, 178-79, 186, 210; and Borden,
119th meeting, 181-82; representation
on, 193; and War Book, 212

Comox, rifle range at, 81

Comox, H.M.C. minesweeper: 363; statis-
tics, 363m

Concentration of force, principle of: 26-28;
as expressed by Marian, 77-78; example
of, 302

Conservative party, and naval policy:
divided, 129, 132, 134, 138; and Naval
Service Act, 173; imperialists in, 210

Conservative party in Quebec: Monk
former head, 129; and Nationalists in
general election 1911, 171; opposition to
Borden's naval policy, 186-87, 188

Constance, H.M. frigate: and gunboats on
lakes, 44; first R.N. ship in Esquimalt,
55

Contributions to R.N. as defence measure:
Foster and, 123-24; Laurier and, 124-25,

130, 134; Borden and, 126, 133-34, 189,
202, 211; Canadian opinions on, 127, 129,

131, 135, 210; R.N. prefers, 185-86
Convoys, escorted: defensive measure,

217, 246; introduced, 226-27; organiza-
tion, 227-28; air escort, 257
Cook, Capt. James, R.N.: Canadian

surveys, 1-3; stationed in Halifax, 50n;

charts B.C. coast, 54
Corbett, Capt. R. G., R.N., commands

Niobe, 237
Cornwall, and gunboat Royal 1866, 43.
Cornwall, H.M. cruiser: and Niobe, 146;

sinks Leipzig, 276
Cornwallis, Lieut .-Col. the Hon. Edward,

governor of Nova Scotia, founds Hali-
fax, 47-48
Coronel, Battle of: Cradock killed at, 239;

British squadron destroyed, 275
Corvette (old-tvpe), Charybdis, 64, 64m
Cossette, Rear Admiral (S) J. O., R.C.N.,

(Ret'd), 154
Cradock, Rear Admiral Sir Christopher,

R.N ., America and West Indies Station,

at war's outbreak, 239, 240
Crescent, H.M. destroyer (later H.M.C.S.

Fraser), and flotilla training with

Canadian destroyers, 353
Crewe, Earl of, Colonial Secretary, at

Imperial Conference 1909, 118-19
Crimean War, effects at Esquimalt, 56
Cruisers: Bristol-class (Newcastle), 115,

115n, 119, 132, 136, 164, 270, 270m, 318;

Boadicea-class, 119, 132, 164, 164m;

Apollo-class (Rainbow), 120, 146, 206;

Diadem-class (Niobe), 141, 141n;

Frobisher-class, 308, 308m; D-class,
308n; Arethusa-class (Aurora), 319; and

R.C.N. , 332, 368
Crusader, H.M. destroyer (later H.M.C.S.
Ottawa), and flotilla training with
Canadian destroyers, 353

Cull, Lieut.-Col. J. T., R.A.F., first

director, R.C.N.A.S., 256
Cumberland Bay, Mas a Tierra, sinking

of Dresden, 276
Cunard, Samuel, shipowner in Halifax, 4
Cygnet, H.M. destroyer (later H.M.C.S.

St. Laurent), and flotilla training with

Canadian destroyers, 353

Dakar, 227
Dardanelles, 235

Dartmouth, Nova Scotia: 48; Imo runs
aground near, 230

Davidson Commission, see, Report of the
Commissioner concerning Purchase of
Submarines

Davidson, Sir Charles, 298

Dawson, Dr. W. B., Director of Tidal and
Current Survey, 151

Deakin, Alfred, Victoria, Australia:
Colonial Conference 1887, 71; Colonial
Conference 1907, 113-14; 114

Defence Committee, Canadian, 356

Defence Council, 340

Delhi, S.S., rumour about, 271

Demers, Capt. J. A., and Halifax exolo-
sion, 229m

Department of Customs: 213, 218; ships
transferred to N.S., 215

Department of Fisheries, and Halifax
base, 337

Department of Marine and Fisheries, and
Charybdis, 64; N.S. placed with, 141;
transfer of personnel to N.S. , 151; return
of technical branches from N.S., 339;
return of Fisheries Branch, 339m

Department of National Defence: amal-
gamation of three defence Services
1922; 339; N.S. difficulties in, 340

Department of the Naval Service: direct
result of German threat, 103; creation
proposed, 119-20, 132; created 1910, 140;
technical services, 141; early personnel,
141, 151; 184; technical services re-
turned to Marine & Fisheries, 339,
339m; see Department of National
Defence

Department of Transport, and Halifax
base, 337

Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries,
appointed deputy minister of N.S., 141

Deputy Minister of the Naval Service:
G. J. Desbarats, 141, 151, 307; annual
report 1912, 155; and War Book, 212
213
Desbarats, George J.: 141; biographical

sketch, 151
Desbarats, Mrs. G. J., christens Saguenay,

335
Desertions: from R.N., 54, 81; 1911-1912,

155
Des Lauriers, Cdr. J. J., R.C.N. R.
(Ret'd), appointed to Honorary Naval
Advisory Committee, 365

420

INDEX

Destroyers: river-class, 115, (table) 119,
132, 136, 164; M-class, 318; and R.C.N. ,
after 1922, 332; qualities of, 333; A-
class, 334; naming of Canadian, 335n;
Acasta-class, 336; C-class, 355; tribal-
class, 368

Destruction Island, 266

Director of the Naval Service: office
created, 140; Kingsmill becomes, 141,
150; 142; Hose becomes, 152; 322; and
creation of R.C.N.R., R.C.N. V.R.,
337-38; protests curtailment of func-
tions, 340; title changed to C.N.S., 340-
41; see Chief of the Naval Staff

Doherty, C. J., Minister of Justice, to
Britain with Borden, 178

Dominion Coal Co., Sydney, Nova
Scotia, contract with Admiralty, 224

Dominion Fishing Patrol, see Fishery
Protection Service

Dominion Prime Ministers, and Admiralty
memorandum on naval defence, 305-06

Dominions and self-governing colonies,
and German naval threat, 95, 101, 103,
104

Douglas, Sir James, 56-57

Dragon, H.M.S., at Gasp6, 351

Dreadnought, H.M. battleship: descrip-
tion, 87-88; statistics, 87/i

Dresden, S.M.S.: 234; in West Atlantic at
war's outbreak, 239; destruction of,
276, 278

Drew, Capt. Andrew, R.N. (Ret'd), and
Navy Island incident, 40-41

Drifters: built in Canada for Admiralty,
234; in east coast patrols, 251

Drummond, Sir George, 170

Drummond-Arthabaska by-election 1910,
170

Dry docks, construction encouraged by
Parliament, 164-65

Drysdale, Arthur, Justice of the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia, and Halifax
explosion, 229n

Dufferin, Lord, Governor-General of
Canada, 62

Dunnville, Ont., naval volunteers 1866,
43

Durham, Lord, mission to Canada and
Report, 24

Earl Grey, C.G.S., ice-breaker sold to

Russia, 236
East coast: early shipping and shipbuild-
ing, 4; fisheries, 5; sparsely settled, 250;

naval defence of focal areas, 331; lack of

defences of, 366
East coast air patrols: supplement to

naval patrols, 255; activities, 256-57;

maintained by U.S. until Armistice,

258
East coast patrols: organized by Hose,

152; manning of, 220, 253; primary N.S.

activity, 235; under direction of Admiral

at Bermuda, 241; description of, 246-53;

generalizations on operation of, 253-55;

supplemented by air patrols, 255; gun-
ners trained by Rainbow, 280

Eastern Sub-Division, Saguenay and
Skeena, escort Empress of Australia,
369-70

Edmonton, Alta., R.C.N.V.R. Division,
338

Edwards, C. P., Director of the Radio-
telegraph Branch, 151

Egeria, H.M.S., surveying ship left at
Esquimalt 1905, 104

Electric Boat Co., Groton, Conn.: con-
tractors for Admiralty submarine
order, 235; holders of submarine
patents, 284; in Davidson Report, 298

Elgin, Earl of, 25

Elswick works, Newcastle, visited by
Borden, 182

Emden, S.M.S., German cruiser: and
allied cruisers, 216-17; destroyed by
Sydney, 244; in German Pacific Squad-
ron, 262; sent to Indian Ocean, 263

Empress of Asia, Empress of Japan,
Empress of Russia, C.P.R. liners, in
First World War, 73n

Empress of Australia, S.S., 369

Empress of Britain, S.S., 370

Enemy merchant ships: days of grace
allowed, 217-18; tied up in Atlantic
ports, 240-41; Saxonia, 278-79

England, and France during 18th century,
34

Ensenada, Mexico, 263

Esquimalt naval base: developed, 7, 13,
44, 54-59, 80-81; location, 10, 12, 16;
Indian name, 55; harbour charted by
Pandora, 55; appearance 1849, 55;
appearance 1870, 59; and C.P.R. , 73;
dry dock cost a political issue, 80; dry
dock dimensions, 80n; considered threat
to U.S., 82; sealing patrols based on, 83;
Pacific Squadron flagship leaves, 104;
transfer from Admiralty, 104-05, 160,
161; and Rainbow, 147, 160, 234, 264,
268-72, 277, 279, 280; in Kingsmill's
memorandum, 150; First World War,
activities ashore, 213, 214, 219, 222,
233-34; naval Intelligence centre for
North Pacific, 222; 341; naval college
moved to, 232; and destruction of
German Pacific Squadron, 234; and
submarines CCl, CC2, 234, 267, 285,
288-89, 291-95, 302; base for Algerine,
Shearwater, 262; and hospital ship
Prince George, 268; and Newcastle, 270,
271, 272; and Idzumo, 272; and rumours
about Saxonia, 278; Oregon sent in to,
279; and change of S.N.O., 290-91;
Jellicoe arrives in, 308, 309; destroyer
Sparrowhawk based on, 333; Vancouver
and Skeena based on, 334, 335; Patrician
based on, 337; new dry dock completed,
337; dry dock dimensions, 337«; Local
Defence Committee formed, 340; prep-
arations for Second World War, 348-49;
suitability questioned, 349; 351; annual

421

INDEX

Esquimalt naval base — Continued

visits to, by R.N. cruiser, 353; Fraser
arrives at, 356; Joint Staff Committee
on fixed defences of, 358; Ottawa and
Restigouche reach, 363; recommenda-
tions for expansion, 366; plans for new-
construction announced, 367

Essex, H.M. cruiser: guards northern
routes, 239; in Fourth Cruiser Squadron,
244

Estimates, British naval: in 1895, after
rise of Great Power navies, 86; 88; for
1912, and Naval Aid Bill, 100; British
Navy Estimates, 1901-1915, (table) 377

Estimates, defence: for 1937 and 1939,
press opinion, 346-47; for 1936, larger
Estimate postponed, 355, 356; for 1937,
359; for 1938-39, 361; for 1939-40, and
Minister's statement on defence policy,
367-68; Estimates and Expenditures for
the Three Services, 1935-40, (table)
409

Estimates, naval: 1920 figures, 323n; for
1922, 328; average, during period of
hope for collective security, 329; during
depression, 342; 1931 to 1940, generaliza-
tions on, 348; for 1936 and 1937, 359;
Estimates and Expenditures, Naval
Service, 1910-1940, (table) 408-09

Examination service, 214, 223, 228

Export regulations, 218

Falkland Islands, destruction of German

Pacific Squadron, 233, 276
Fanning Island, 273
Farallones Islands: Rainbow, 268; Leipzig,

274, 275
Federated Malay States: provide R.N.

battleship, 102; Malaya, 197, 199
Fenians, attack Canada, 30; raids planned

into N.B. and Canada, 42-44
Fielding, W. S., Minister of Finance, at

Colonial Conference 1902, 108
Fiji, 73

Fisher, Admiral Lord: appointed First
Sea Lord, 88; 238; on naval strategy, 302
Fisheries, 5, 15
Fisheries protection, Halifax division of

N.A. and W.I. Station, 54
Fishermen, as potential naval asset, 15,

72
Fishermen's Reserve: formed on west
coast, 362-63; separate section of
R.C.N.R., 364-65; and royal party, 370
Fishery patrol, in North Pacific, Rainbow,

148
Fishery Protection Branch: transferred to
N.S., 141; returned to Marine and
Fisheries, 339
Fishery Protection Service: 174; launches
patrol Barkley Sound, 1914, 233-34;
engine room staff repairs Niobe, 237;
returned to Marine and Fisheries, 339

Fleet units: for Dominion navies, size
suggested by Admiralty, 115; program-
mes in Jellicoe Report, 312-13
Fleming, Sandford, at Colonial Confer-
ence 1887, 72-73
Flying boats, Curtis, used by R.C.N.A.S.,

256
Fort Camosun, founded, 54; see Victoria
Fort Frontenac, 36
Fort Schlosser, N.Y., and Navy Island,

40-41
Foster, George, M.P. for North Toronto,

resolution on naval defence, 122-24
Foster resolution, 1909: as revised,
mandate at conference 1909, 116-17;
quoted, 122; stated general principle,
128; Laurier on, 191 ; non-partisan policy
expressed in, 209; see Laurier resolution
Fourth Cruiser Squadron, R.N., see
North America and West Indies Sta-
tion
France: and England in 18th century, 34;
lines of communication between Missis-
sippi and St. Lawrence, 36; and Lake
Champlain invasion route, 37; alliance
with Russia, 60; Triple Entente 1904,
85; 344
Franco-Prussian War, 60
Fraser, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S. Crescent) purchased, 355; statis-
tics, 355, 355n; to Esquimalt by way of
Barbados, 355-56; royal escort, 370; see
Crescent
Fraser River, gold-rush causes creation of

mainland government, 58
French navy: and New France, 6; force on
Lake Ontario, 36; helps Americans 1778,
51 ; only rival of R.N ., 61 ; and limitation
treaties, 326; cruisers in Atlantic, be-
ginning of First World War, 239 ; torpedo
boats developed by, 332; represented at
Jacques Cartier celebration, 351
French North America, offensive against,

50
French regime in Maritimes, 46
Fundy, H.M.C. minesweeper: 363; statis-
tics, 363n
Fur trade on west coast, 3

Galapagos Islands, 276

Gallipoli Memories, by Compton Mac-
kenzie, quoted from, 283

Gaspt, H.M.C. minesweeper: 363; statis-
tics, 363n

Gaspe, P.Q. : assembly point for first troop
convoy, 225; cruising base for east coast
patrols, 253; Saguenay at, 350; Saguenay,
Champlain at, for Jacques Cartier
celebration, 351 ; Ottawa and Restigouche
at, 361n, 362-63

Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord ol the
Admiralty, and Borden, 305

General election: 1911, 171; 1935, 354

Geography, influence on Canadian de-
fence, 9-13

422

INDEX

German navy: threat before First World
War, 86-87, 92, 94, 100, 104, 111, 114,
133, 147, 185, 216; surface raiders, 215,
216-17, 233, 239-41, 262, 273-77; U-boat
raiding begun, 226, 248; see U-boats

German Pacific Squadron, see Spee,
Admiral Graf von

Germany: Triple Alliance, 60; becomes a
first-class naval Power, 85; naval threat
of, decisively affected Canadian policy,
86; reaction to Canadian naval policy
in, 198-200; nationals of, in U.S. and
German merchant ships, 241, 286; trade
of, on west coast, and Rainbow, 281

Gibraltar, 227

Gilbert, Arthur, in Drummond-Artha-
baska by-election, 170

Glace Bay, wireless station and armed
guard from Niobe, 241

Glasgow, H.M. cruiser: and Leipzig,
Dresden, 276; offered by Admiralty,
318; note on career, 318«

Glory, H.M. battleship: added to X.A. &
W.I. squadron, 239; flagship, 244

Goderich, Upper Canada, and gunboat
Cherub, 43

Golden Gate, 274

Good Hope, H.M.S., four R.C.N, mid-
shipmen in, 221

Goodrich, Cdre. J. E. C, R.N., C. in C.
Pacific Squadron 1905, 104

Goschen, Lord, First Lord of the Admir-
alty, at Colonial Conference 1897, 75-76.

Governor in Council, authority of, in
Naval Service Act, 140

Graham, George P.: announces naval
policy, 327-28; Minister of Militia and
Defence and of the Naval Service, later
Minister of National Defence, 410

Great Britain: influence on Canadian
external affairs, 13; R.C.N.A.S. cadets
sent for training to, 258; and desire to
limit naval armaments, 325; and limita-
tion treaties, 326; 344

Great circle route, and Halifax, 49

Great Lakes: shipping and shipbuilding,
5-6; importance of controlling, in War of
1812, 30; limitation of armed forces on,
31 ; naval Operations, in three wars, 36,
37, 38; Provincial Marine, 36-37

Great Powers, rise of Germany, Japan,
U.S., Italy, 60

Greenland, 11

Griffon, first sailing vessel on upper lakes,
5

Grilse, H.M.C.S., converted yacht in east
coast patrols, 251

Guadelupe, 275

Guinness, Capt. the Hon. Rupert, and
recruiting in Canada, 220

Gunnery, naval, technical changes, 87

Guthrie, Hugh, Liberal member for South
Wellington: suggests compromise naval
policy, 194

Hague Convention, obligations of neu-
trals, 240

Haiti, guns for Saxonia at, 278

Halifax, Nova Scotia: 4; as naval base
before 1910, 7, 10. 44, 46-54; as nival
base after 1910, 7, 13, 228-29, 239, 349:
sea-distance from Esquimalt, 12; ice-
free harbour, 16; founded as British
strong-point, 48-49; dockyard estab-
lished, 50; and privateers, 51, 52; and
Chesapeake, 52; diplomatic asset, 54;
Charybdis returned to, 65; stoics shipped
to Esquimalt, 73; dry dock subsidy and
opening, 79, 79/;; 80; base transferred
from Admiralty, 104-05, 160, 161; and
naval college, 141, 155; and Niobe, be-
fore First World War, 142-43, 144, 145,
146; plan for, in Kingsmill's memoran-
dum, 150; Hose S.N.O., 152; recommen-
dations for defence of, 162; naval
Intelligence centre, 221 , 341 ; coal stocks
low, 222; chief east-coast winter port,
224; embarkation point for troops, 225:
as convoy assembly port, 227, 229; fixed
defences taken over by army, 228; war
measures, 228; base repair facilities,
228; Melbourne in, 228; explosion, Dec.
6, 1917, 229-33; and Niobe, First World
War, 231, 237, 243, 244, 291 ; new H-class
submarines leave, 235; Suffolk coaled by
inhabitants, 240; 243; welcome to
Sydney, 244; focal area off, 250; and east
coast patrols, 251-53; and air patrols,
255, 257, 258; and submarines CCl, CC2,
294, 296; and submarines CH14, CH15,
316, 317; Aurora, Patriot, and Patrician
arrive, 319; oil stocks in, 320; Champlain
based on, 334; Saguenay and Skeena
arrive, 335; Joint Services Magazine
built, 337; R.C.N.V.R. Division, 338:
Port Division, R.C.N.R., 339; Local
Defence Committee formed, 340; base
ill-equipped for First World War, 348;
351, 352; St. Laurent arrives, 356;
Venture stationed at, 363; Joint Staff
Committee recommendations for, 366;
plans for new construction announced,
367; see East coast

Halifax Graving Dock Co., build drv
dock, 79, 161

Halsey, Capt. Lionel, R.N., and Victoria
volunteers, 158

Hamilton, Ont.: naval volunteers 1866.
43; R.C.N.V.R. Division, 338

Hampton Roads, Va., convoy assemblv
port, 227

Harbours: few on coasts, 11; 16; defence
of, joint Services' responsibility, 331

Harding, Warren G., President of the
U.S., calls disarmament conference,
325

Harris, A. H., appointed Acting Director
of Overseas Transport, 224

Hathawav, Mid. John V. W., R.C.N.,
died at Ooronel, 221

423

INDEX

Haun, Capt., commander of Leipzig: 263;
in San Francisco, 270; plans to raid
commerce, 273-74, 276-77

Hazen, J. D.: favours contributions to
R.N., 131; encourages Victoria volun-
teers, 158; made Minister 1911, 173; and
Churchill's offer to help, 176; to Eng-
land with Borden, 178; opposes plebis-
cite on naval policy, 186; speech in
support of Naval Aid Bill, 192-93; in
submarines debate, 297-98; Minister of
Marine and Fisheries and of the Naval
Service, 410

Heron, H.M.S., gunboat at Toronto 1866,
43

Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, Colonial
Secretary, 63

Highflyer, H.M.S.: escorted 1st Canadian
convoy, 227; and Halifax explosion, 231

Hofmeyr, Jan, of Cape Colony, at Colo-
nial Conference 1887, 70-71; at Colonial
Conference 1894, 74

Holland Company, U.S.A., and sub-
marine plans, 283

Holland, John P., inventor of submarine,
283

Holland, Sir Henry, Colonial Secretary,
and Colonial Conference 1887, 71

Honolulu, Niirnberg at, 273

Honorary Advisory Committees, for each
Service, 365

Honorary Naval Advisory Committee,
created 1938, 365

Horsey, Capt. A. M. de, R.N., and Fenian
raids, 43

Hose, Rear Admiral Walter, R.C.N.
(formerly R.N.): commands Rainbow,
149, 264, 265, 271, 277-78; biographical
summary, 151-52; nautical assessor
after Halifax explosion, 229«; appointed
Captain of Patrols, 249; 280n; 337-38;
340-41; succeeded as C.N.S. by Nelles,
354; retired, 354n

House of Commons, debates on naval
matters: Foster resolution, 122-28;
Naval Service Bill, 132-38; Naval Aid
Bill, 188-96, see also Senate; Submarines
purchase, 297-98; Jellicoe Report, 321-
23; defence Estimates 1937, 359; criti-
cism of naval programme, 368

Hudson Bay: d'Iberville's expeditions
against English, 2; as trade route to
prairies, 4; as invasion route, 11; pre-
dominance won by England in region of,
34

Hudson River, invasion route, 37

Hudson's Bay Co. : 3; influence on prairies,
4; extends activity to west coast, 54-55

Hudson Strait, 11

Hydrographic Survey: transferred to
N.S., 141; returned to Marine and
Fisheries, 339

Iberville, Pierre le Moyne, Sieur d', naval
career, 2

Idzumo, Japanese cruiser: based inBarklej
Sound, 233; with international naval
force in Mexico, 263; statistics, 266n;
and Leipzig, 270; arrives in Esquimalt,
272; patrols approaches to San Fran-
cisco, 272, 273; 281

lino, S.S.: and Halifax explosion, 229-32;
action by owners of Mont Blanc against,
233

Imperial Conferences: suggested by Brit-
ish Govt., 95; conference 1909, specific
local navy plans asked for, 114-20; sub-
sidiary conference 1909, principle of
local navies accepted by Admiralty,
130-31; conference 1911, relation of
Dominion navies to R.N., 165-68; con-
ference 1917, imperial naval scheme
asked for, 304; conference 1921, Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 325-30; conference
1923, principles of imperial defence
policy asserted, 330; conference 1937,
memorandum prepared for, summa-
rized, 360-61

Imperial Defence: —

— Formulation of Policy: Adam Smith on,
22; colonial reformers and, 24; opinions
before Select Committees 1834-35, 1861,
25-28; principles of defence by land and
sea, 28-29, 53, 69-70, 77-80; fundamental
problems, 65-67; British government's
position at 1st Colonial Conference, 69-
70; political considerations paramount,
75-79, 101, 117-18, 168-69, 176, 189-91,
200-01, 306, 361; influence of imperialist
Liberals in Britain, 93; attempt at non-
partisanship in Britain, 95; structure of
naval defence altered, 104; views of
Admiralty at conference 1902, 107;
Committee of Imperial Defence formed,
110; Admiralty position at conference
1909, 115-116; 130; Admiralty memoran-
dum on naval defence 1918, 304-05;
and collective security, 325; principles
asserted 1923, 330; and post-war im-
perial conferences, 330

— and Canada: 13; question of participa-
tion, 62, 73, 109, 116; resolution on
establishing Canadian naval Service,
114, 122-28; Borden feels responsibili-
ty, 178; Borden's views on emergency
1912, 189; war-time assistance, 220, 247

Imperial Federation League, and proposal
for Colonial Conference, 67, 68-69

Imperial Oil Co., stocks in Canadian
ports, 320

Imperial War Conference, Admiralty
memorandum submitted to, 304-05

Imperialism, British: and imperial de-
fence, 66-68; Lord Milner chief propon-
ent, 134/i

Imperialist sentiment, in Canada: on
Laurier resolution, 128-29; in Conserva-
tive party, 210

Inconstant, H.M.S., in Esquimalt, 55

India, visited by Jellicoe, 306

424

INDEX

Industry: importance pointed out by
Joint Staff Committee, 356; survey of,
361

Intelligence, naval: organization and
later expansion, 221-22; reports on
German merchant ships on east coast,
241; stations established, to aid search
for Leipzig, 272; warning on Saxonia,
278; organization after First World
War, 341-42

International naval force during Mexican
civil war, disposition of ships, 263

International relations 1014, chaotic,
102-03

Italy: Triple Alliance, 60; and treaties,
326

Japan: balance of power changed in
Pacific, 60; strong navy, 85; war de-
clared against Germany, 272, 274, 275;
possibility of war against U.S. 326;
and limitation treaties, 326

Japanese fishermen, on west coast, 15-16

Jarvis, Aemilius, of Navy League, and
recruits for Niobe, 217; 411, 412

Jellicoe, Admiral Lord, R.N.: as naval
adviser to Dominions, 208, 305-06; N.S.
reports prepared for, 307; travels from
Esquimalt to Ottawa, 309; Admiralty
memorandum to, 309-10; given wide
scope by Canadian government, 311;
press opinion on mission, 321

Jellicoe Report: recommendations on
naval air forces, 259; terms of reference,
310-11; summary, 311-16; considered by
Govt., 318; Minister anxious to act on,
320; press opinion, 320-21 ; report tabled,
321

Johnson, Cdr. B. L., R.N.R.: first officer
of CC2, 292; commands H-class sub-
marine diverted to Bermuda, 316rc;
appointed to Honorary Naval Advisory
Committee, 365

Johnstone Strait, defence measures in,
233

Joint Staff Committee: formed 1927, 340;
recommends purchase of destroyers,
355; memorandum on defence 1936, 356-
59; memoranda for forthcoming im-
perial conference, and on naval defence,
360; 362; defence plan 1938, 365-66; re-
named Chiefs of Staff Committee 1939,
365tt

Jones, Lieut.-Cdr. Bertram, R.N. (Ret'd) :
experienced in submarines, 286; inspects
submarines before purchase, 286-87;
appointed S.N.O., Esquimalt, 291;
commands CC2, 292

Jones, Lieut. George C, R.C.N., com-
mands Patrician, 319

Karlsruhe, S.M.S., German cruiser: at
war's outbreak, 239; fits out Kronprinz
Wilhelm as raider, 240

Kelley's Beach, North Sydney air base,
256

Kempenfell, II. M. destroyer (later
II.M.C.S. Assinibouu): exercises with
Canadian destroyers, 353; 369

Kempt, Sir James, 25

Kent, H.M. cruiser: in Esquimalt for re-
fit, 234; destroys Xiirnberg, Dresden
276

Keyes, Lieut.-Cdr. Adrian, R.N. (Ret'd)
referred to by Compton Mackenzie, 283
experienced submarine officer, 2i)l
commands CCl, 292; and CCl'a first
cruise, 293

King Edward VIII, accession of, and
Saguenay, Champlain, 352

King George V: R.C.N, represented at
coronation, 154; death of, 352

King George VI: R.C.N, represented at
coronation of, 351; visit of, and Queen
Elizabeth to Canada, 369

King, I. W., letter to Borden, 209

King, W. L. Mackenzie, prime minister,
heads new government, 327

Kingsmill, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles E.,
R.C.N, (formerly R.N.): first Director
of N.S., 141; 142; career, and memoran-
dum on naval organization 1909, 150;
with Borden on trip to England, 178;
and Keyes, 291; on Jellicoe's staff dur-
ing Canadian visit, 309ai; retires, 322

King's Regulations and Admiralty In-
structions, 140, 154

Kingston, Ont.: devel >ped as naval base,
30; naval volunteers 1866, 43; temporary
quarters for naval college, 232; R.C.N.-
V.R. Division, 338

Komagata Maru incident: and Riinbow,
148-49; reservists in Rainbow during,
160

Kronprinz Wilhelm, S.S., 240

La Jonquiere, Marquis de, French naval
commander in 1747, 6

La Paz, Mexico, Oregon intercepted near,
279

La Salle, Robert Cavelier, Sieur de, built
Griffon for fur trade, 5

Labrador, coast unsettled, 250

Lafayette, Marquis de, letter from
Washington, 35

Laisser-faire, 22, 23

Lake Subdivision, of R.N.C.V.R., 159

Lancaster, H.M. cruiser, guards North
Atlantic routes, 239

Larch, North American (tamarack), used
in shipbuilding, 4-5

Laurie, Lieut. Gen. J. Wimburn, proposes
auxiliary naval force, 157-58

Laurier resolution on naval defence, text
as revised, 127-28

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid: Colonial Conference
1897, 76; Colonial Conference 1902, 108-
09; Colonial Conference 1907, 112-13; on
imperial naval defence, 113; and Foster
resolution, 124-26; his own resolution,
127-28; local-navy policy, 128, 168, 173,
210, 360; and Bourassa, 129; Quebec

425

INDEX

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid — Continued

opposition to naval policy of, and
Drummond-Arthabaska by-election,
129, 143, 170, 171, 173; communications
on naval policy, 130-32; and Naval
Service Bill, 132, 134; and control of
party, 138; and high cost of Canadian
shipbuilding, 165; Imperial Conference
1911, 166; general election of 1911, 171-
73; and Admiralty secret memorandum,
184-85; replies to Speech from Throne,
188; and Naval Aid Bill, 191-92, 201;
wants non-partisan naval policy 1909,
209; consistent stand on naval defence
at imperial conferences, 210; statement
at war's outbreak, 215; Bennett en-
dorses naval policy of, 360

Lavergne, Armand, and Laurier's naval
policy, 143

Lavergne, Senator Louis, 170

Leacock, Stephen, 324

League of Nations: and hope for peace,
323, 329; Anglo-Japanese Alliance in-
compatible with, 325; failure to prevent
Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 343

Leipzig, S.M.S.: cruiser in German Pacific
Squadron, 262; with international naval
force, 263; rumours of whereabouts,
264-65, 269, 272; statistics, 266w;
Alexandria requisitioned by, 267; in San
Francisco, 270; 271; Operations in
Pacific, 273-77; Admiralty track-chart
erroneous, 274n; as threat, 277; coaled
by Leonor, 279; comparison with Rain-
bow, 280-81; 300, 302, 303

Leonor, S.S., seized by Rainbow, 279

Liberals: causes of party defeat in 1911,
171-73; opposition strategy of, in Naval
Aid Bill debate, 191

Ling, Fleet Paymaster P. J., R.N.,
appointed secretary to Naval Staff, 150

Lloyd's, warnings to shipping about
German cruisers, 265-66

Local Defence Committees, formed 1928,
340

Logan, Capt. W. IL, surveyor to London
Salvage Association, and submarines
purchase, 284-86

London Naval Treaty: limits tonnage,
336; limits destroyer tonnage, 3367i;
Champluin, Vancouver to be discarded
under terms of, 355

London, Ont., R.C.N. V.R. Division, 338

Lorimer, James, of Victoria, Australia, at
Colonial Conference 1887, 71

Louisbourg, Cape Breton: 6; French trad-
ing centre and naval base, 47; capture
of, 50

Louisiana, founded by d' Iberville, 2.

Lowe, Robert, 27

McBride, Sir Richard, premier of British
Columbia: prefers contributions to
"tin-pot navy", 131; and Winston
Churchill, 176-77; and submarines CCl,

CC2, 284-88, 293, 296, 297, 298; takes
charge at Esquimalt, 291

Macdonald, Cdr. W. B., R.N.: commands
Niobe, 142; lent by R.N., 151

McKenna, Reginald, First Lord of the
Admiralty: naval Estimates 1909, 93-
95; at Imperial Conference 1909, 114.
116

Mackenzie, Compton, 283

Mackenzie, Ian A.: appointed Minister of
National Defence, 354, 410; and Esti-
mates 1936, 354-55; and Estimates 1938,
361-62; statement on expansion of N.S.,
367-68

Mackenzie, William Lyon, and Navy
Island incident, 40

MacLaurin, Major C, R.A.F., Acting
Director, R.C.N.A.S., 256

MacNab, Col. Allan, and Navy Island
incident, 40

Magdalena Bay, 273

Mahan, Capt. Alfred T.: doctrine of sea
power made public, 61 ; quoted on con-
centration of force, 77-78; thesis on
commerce-raiding borne out, 217; 301

Maitland-Dougall, Lieut. William Mc-
Kinstrey, R.C.N. : killed in action, 221;
in CCl, 292

Malaya, H.M.S., contributed to R.N. by
Federated Malay States, 197, 352

Manitoba, and contribution to R.N., 129

Margaret, C.G.S., transferred from Cus-
toms, 215

Maritime Provinces: fishing industry, 5;
and possible invasion, 9-10; before fast
land communication, 29; first settle-
ment by French, 46

Mattison, W.O. Albert C, Niobe' s boat-
swain, in Halifax explosion, 231

Mazatlan, Mexico, and international
naval force, 263

Meighen, Arthur, and Anglo-Japanese
Alliance at Imperial Conference 1921,
325-26

Melbourne, H.M.A. cruiser: brings Ger-
man prize into Halifax, 228; in Fourth
Cruiser Squadron, 244

Memorandum on the General Naval Situ-
ation (Admiralty's secret memoran-
dum), text of, 394-407

Mercantilism, 20-22

Merchant ships, defensive arming, 226

Merriman, John X., of Cape Colony, on
local navies, at Imperial Conference
1909, 118

Mexico: civil war, and international naval
force, 263; British-Japanese squadron
formed off, 275-76; Rainboio off, 279

Michigan, gunboat at Windsor, Ont. 1866,
43

Militia Act, 1868, basis of Canadian land
defence, 33; 339

Militia in the Canadas, encouraged by
imperial government, 31-32

Milner, Lord, quoted by Laurier, 124, 134.

426

INDEX

Milwaukee, U.S.S., and submarines CC1,
CC2, 287

Minesweepers: four considered essential,
336; laid down in Canada, and statistics,
363, 363n; recommended, 369

Minesweeping, in First World War: in
approaches to harbours, 223; at Halifax,
228

Minister in charge of the Naval Service
(changes in title and names of Ministers
will be found in App. XII, Ministers,
1910-1949, 410): office of Minister of the
Naval Service created, 140; authority
of, 141; Brodeur becomes, 141; 143;
memorandum from Kingsmill to, 150;
cancels shipbuilding programme, pro-
phesies repeal of Naval Service Act,
174; offers Canadian recruits for R.N.,
219; in debate on submarines, 297-98;
and advice by Naval Committee, 306;
and future naval policy, 307; wants
adequate naval policy, 309, 320, 321 ; and
post-war retrenchment, 321-23, 323n;
statement on naval college, 324; an-
nounces naval policy, 327-28; powers of
Minister of National Defence, and
effect on N.S., 339-40; Mackenzie
appointed, 354; deficiencies shown in
reports to, 354-55; speech supporting
Estimates 1938-1939, 361-62; statement
on defence policy 1939, 367-68

Minister of Marine and Fisheries: state-
ment on Charybdis, 65; ill during intro-
duction of Naval Service Bill, 132, 134;
also Minister of the Naval Service
under Naval Service Act, 140, 141; for
activities as Minister of the Naval
Service see Minister in charge of the
Naval Service

Minister of Marine and Fisheries and of
the Naval Service, see Minister in
charge of the Naval Service

Minister of Militia and Defence and of the
Naval Service, see Minister in charge of
the Naval Service

Minister of National Defence, see Minister
in charge of the Naval Service

Minister of National Defence for Naval
Services, see Minister in charge of the
Naval Service

Mississippi River, 36

Molesworth, Sir William, colonial re-
former, 25-26

Monk, Frederick Debartzch: opposition
of, delays introduction of Foster resolu-
tion, 122; background, and character,
129; opposes any naval policy without
plebiscite, 131, 132, 135, 137, 143, 170,
171, 186; resigns over Naval Aid Bill,
186-87

Monmouth, H.M.S., sunk by Nurnberg at
Coronel, 275

Monroe Doctrine, 14, 123, 135, 137, 138, 191

Mont Blanc, S.S.: and Halifax explosion,
229-32; action brought against Imo by
owners of, 233

Montcalm, Marquis de, on importance of
sea-route, 35

Montreal: as seaport, 16, 224; strategic
importance in local defence, 29; cap-
tured by Americans, 37; Pylades and
Rosario at, 43; Bourassa's mass meeting
in, 143; motor launches assembled in,
for Admiralty, 234; submarines built in,
235; and east coast patrols, 252; oil
stocks in, 320; R.C.N.V.R. Division,
two companies, 338, R.C.N.R. Port
Division, 339

Moresby, Rear Admiral Fairfax, R.N.,
suggests Esquimalt as Admiralty Re-
serve, 56

Motor launches for Admiralty, assembled
in Montreal, 234

Motor torpedo boats, recommended for
east coast, 369

Mulock, Sir William, at Colonial Confer-
ence 1902, 108

Mundy, Admiral Rodney, R.N., of N.A.
& W.I. Station, 44

Murray Bay, submarine trials off, 235

Myrmidon, H.M.S., and desertions at
Esquimalt, 81

"Naden", H.M.C.S., naval barracks at
Esquimalt, 337

Nanaimo, coal fields, 80, 233

Natal, at Colonial Conference 1902, 108

National Defence Act, 1922: combines
three defence Services in one depart-
ment, 339

Nationalists in Quebec: headed by
Bourassa, 129; opposition to Laurier's
naval po icy, 129, 144-45; in Drummond-
Arthabaska by-election, 170; tactics in
general election 1911, 171

Naval Aid Bill: origins of, lOOw, 101, 210-
11; and Cabinet, 186; debate in Com-
mons, 188-96; compromise policy, 194,
197; defeated in Senate, 197; text, 407-
08

Naval bases: transfer from Admiralty,
104-05, 160-62; effect on naval policy,
162; defence of, 331

Naval Board: authorized, 140; recom-
mended in Jellicoe Report, 313

Naval Branch of N.S., 141

Naval college, see Royal Naval College of
Canada

Naval Committee of N.S., deliberations
of, 306-07

Naval defence, other countries, 121m.

Naval Defence Act, 1910 (Commonwealth
of Australia), text, 385-92

Naval Discipline Act, 1866, and K.R. &
A. I., applicable to N.S., 140, 154

Naval Establishments in British Posses-
sions Act, 1909: and transfer of bases,
105; text, 376

Naval militia, in Navy Island incident,
40-41

Naval reserve lands, transferred from
Admiralty, 161

42;

INDEX

Naval Service: created, 140-41; and
change of government policy, 146, 155,
174-75; and preparation of War Book,
212; during First World War, 213-15,
217-20, 222-29, 232-34, 236; drastic cur-
tailment after war, 321-23, 327-28; effect
of National Defence Act on, 340;
organization at top, before and after
creation of Dept. of Nat. Defence, 341;
needs of, in report to Minister, 354-55

Naval Ssrvice Act: terms of, 140-41, 155,
157; highly controversial, 143; no pro-
vision for aid to civil power, 149; and
Borden government, 155, 173-74, 188,
211; common target of Laurier's oppon-
ents, 170-73; Laurier advocates two
fleet units, 192; amended 1922, 339;
text, 377-85

Naval Service Bill: introduced in Com-
mons, 132; passed, 138; and transfer of
Esquimalt base, 160; debate reflects
party divergence, 210

Naval stations (Canadian and Australian),
created, 166-67

Naval War Staff, memorandum 1919 on
future naval policy, 307-09

Navigation Acts, 23

Navy Island incident, after Rebellion of
1837, 40-41

Navy League, British, SQn

Navy League of Canada: and ratings for
Niobe, 217; account of, 411-12

Navy League, German, 86n

Navy List, R.N., to include Dominions
officers, 167

Navy, small-ship auxiliary, in First
World War, 245-46

Nelles, Cdre. Percy Walker, R.C.N. : 154,
155; commands Sagueniy, 335; made
C.N.S., and biographical summary,
354; promoted, 354n

Nelson, H.M.S., 352

New Brunswick: pine supply for R.N., 39;
Fenian threat 1866, 42; and contribu-
tion to R.N., 129; Hazen former premier
of, 173

New Dungjness, Wash., 287

New England: and action against Louis-
bourg, 47; ports in First World War,
224

New France: close ties with France, 2;
precarious existence, 6; conquest, 36

New South Wales, Australia, and contri-
butions to R.N., 130

New York, N.Y.:34, 51; convoy assembly
port, 227; and German merchant ships,
240, 278; Fourth Cruiser Squadron
blockade off, 243-44

New Zealand: and part annual cost of
Australian Station R.N., 108; and
suggestion of local aid for R.N., 112,
113; offers battleship 1909, 114, 130;
supports policy of contributions vs.
Dominion navies, 117; suggests im-
perial parliament of defence, 166;
Jellicoe visits, 306

New Zealand, H.M. battle cruiser: 101 ;
visits Esquimalt, 158; carries Lord
Jellicoe on mission, 306

Newcastle, Duke of, Colonial Secretary, 27

Newcastle, H.M. cruiser: protection of
west coast in 1914, 8, 233; and Victoria
volunteers, 219; statistics, 266n; better
than Leipzig, 270-71 ; search for Leipzig,
272-73, 281

Newfoundland: coast surveyed by Cook,
1; fishery on the Banks, 5; strategic
significance, 10; and War of Spanish
Succession, 34, 47; naval brigade, 1867,
44; branch of Royal Naval Reserve
formed 1900, 108, 114; supports policy of
contributions to R.N., 117; focal area
south of, 239; R.N.R. and Niobe, 242;
and east coast patrols, 246-47, 250, 252-
53, 254; and air patrols, 255, 257; and
Admiralty memorandum 1918, 305

Newington, C.G.S., and defence of John-
stone Strait, 233

Newport, R.I., in War of American
Revolution, 51

Newport News, Va., 243-44

Newspapers cited in this volume:
L' Action Catholique, Quebec, P.Q., 321,
347 '; L' Action Sociale, Quebec, P.Q., 121;
Bulletin, Edmonton, 345, 346; Le Canada,
Montreal, 144; Chronicle, Halifax, 121,
144, 242, 346; Citizen, Ottawa, 139;
Colonist, Victoria, 121, 147-48, 290, 320;
Le Devoir, Montreal, 145, 172, 321, 344-
45; Le Droit, Ottawa, 344, 346, 347; Free
Press, Ottawa, 139; Free Press, Winni-
peg, 121-22, 321, 345, 347; Gazette,
Montreal, 144, 321, 348; Globe, Toronto,
121, 129, 320, 345; Globe and Mail,
Toronto, 347; Herald, Halifax, 144, 335;
Journal, Ottawa, 139; Mail and Empire,
Toronto, 128-29, 144; Le Nationaliste,
Montreal, 121; News Advertiser, Van-
couver, 121; La Patrie, Montreal, 143;
Patriot, Charlottetown, 143-44; La
Presse, Montreal, 321; Province, Van-
couver, 346, 347; Le Temps, Ottawa,
121, 139n; Times, Victoria, 147,264,270,
290

Niagara River: Griffon built on, 5; Navy
Island incident, 40-41

Niobe, H.M.C. cruiser: bought from
Admiralty as training ship, 141-42;
statistics, I42n; official greeting in
Halifax, 143; complement unfilled, 145;
career to First World War, 145-46;
recruits in early days, 152, (table) 153;
prepares for active service, 213, 237;
placed under Admiralty, 215, 237; and
filling complement, 217, 237, 242, 292;
and Halifax explosion, 231, 245; 236;
limitations as warship, 242; operational
career with Fourth Cruiser Squadron,
242-44; based on Halifax, 244; recom-
missioned as depot ship, 245; and tor-
pedoes for submarines, 291-92; replaced
in 1920. 318

428

INDEX

Nixon, Cdr. A. E., R.N., naval college,
156

Nonsuch, early voyage into Hudson Bay, 4

Nootka dispute, between Britain and
Spain, 55

Nootka, H.M.C. minesweeper: 363; statis-
tics, 363/i

North America and West Indies Station,
R.N.: and Halifax as advanced base for
Operations, 49; headquarters usually
Halifax, 53; area of, 238-39; and Fourth
Cruiser Squadron under Cradock, 239;
Operations of squadron, 239-44; duties
of squadron, 241; C. in C. warns of
U-boats, 247, 250

North Sydney, Nova Scotia, air base
construction authorized, 255, 256

Northumberland Strait, 370

Nova Scotia: 25, 34; supply of pine for
R.N., 39; naval volunteer brigade 1867,
44; "key of all the Eastern colonies",
47; supplied R.N. personnel, 80; Venture
built in, 363

Nurnberg S.M.S.: German light cruiser,
262; with international naval force in
Mexico, 263; uncertainty as to where-
abouts, 265, 269, 271; statistics, 266n;
career after leaving Mazatlan, 272, 273,
275, 276

Oak, timbers for R.N. from Quebec, 39.

"Occasional Papers", prepared by Naval
War Staff, 309

Oil, as fuel for Canadian warships, 319-20.

Old Colonial System, 18

Ontario government, and contribution to
R.N., 129

Ontario, Lake: control necessary for
defence, 29; Rush-Bagot agreement not
violated 1865, 32-33; warships main-
tained by French on, 36; during War of
1812, 38

Orbita, H.M.S., auxiliary cruiser, and
submarines CCl, CC2, 294

Order in Council transferring Halifax
Dockyard etc. to Canadian Custody,
text, 392-94

Oregon, S.S., searched by Rainbow, 279.

Oswego, on Lake Ontario, 36

Ottawa, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S. Crusader): statistics, 355n; pur-
chased from Admiralty, 362; trip to
Esquimalt by way of Gaspe, 361/i,
362-63; in royal escort on west coast,
370; see Crusader

Ottawa, Ont.: R.C.N.V.R. Division, 338;
naval Intelligence centre, 341

Otter, Hudson's Bay Company steamer,
chartered for coast defence during
Crimean War, 57

Overseas Defence Committee: and Hali-
fax Defence Committee's recommenda-
tions, 162-63; memorandum for Canada
on War Book, 212; and War Book
revisions, 353

Overseas Transport, Director of, A. H.
Harris, 224

Pachena wireless station, 265, 266

Pacific Ocean: distribution of power in,
affects Canada, 13; shipping not in
convoy, 227

Pacific Station, R.N.: and Esquimalt, 7,
55, 81; founded, 55; extended to Bering
Sea, 83; decline, 84, 104; Shearwater
relic of, 104, 262

Pacific Subdivision, of R.N.C.V.R., 159.

Palmer, Mid. William A., R.C.N., died
at Coronel, 221

Panama: transshipment of west coast
cargoes, 261; 274; 280

Panama Canal: effect on Vancouver, 3;
and Canadian and American naval
defence, 12; significance in British
strategy, 13; and German Pacific
Squadron, 275; opened for traffic, 278;
Saxonia measured for, 278; first white-
ensign ships through, 295

Pandora, H.M.S. , survey ship 1846, 55

Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 129

Paris Pact, 1928, 336

Parker, Sir Gilbert, 99-100

Passamaquoddy Bay, first Acadia settle-
ment in, 46

Paterson, J. V., president, Seattle Con-
struction and Drydock Co.: and sale of
submarines CCl, CC2, 284-87; his
commission, 289, 289n; 298

Paterson, W. B., at Colonial Conference
1902, 108

Patrician, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S.): given by Admiralty, 318;
statistics, 318«; commissioned, Lieut.
G. C. Jones commands, 319; and
Patriot first R.C.N, destroyers, 333;
paid off, 334; based on Esquimalt from
1922, 337

Patriot, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S.): given by Admiralty, 318;
statistics, 318n; commissioned, Lieut.
C. T. Beard commands, 319; and
Patrician first R.C.N, destroyers, 333;
worn out, 333; paid off, 334

Patrol of Northern Waters, transferred to
Marine and Fisheries, 339

Patrols, auxiliary, to counteract U-boats,
246; see East coast patrols

PC-boats: general description, 307n; 308;
or P-boats, 318

Pearson, S., and Son, of London, England,
and Halifax dry dock, 79

Pelletier, L. P., Postmaster General, to
England with Borden, 178

Pensions, set up in 1915, 220-21

Perley, Sir George, High Commissioner in
London, letter from Borden on naval
conference, 204

Perrault, J. E., in Drummond-Arthabaska
by-election, 170

429

INDEX

Personnel: civilian complement 1911, 151;
employment problem 1912-1913, 155;
strengths, cadets, officers, ratings
1910-1914, (table) 175; R.N. agreement
relieves shortage, 217; enrolment, First
World War, 219, (table) 221; R.C.N. ,
R.N.C.V.R. strengths 1914, 221; casu-
alties in Halifax explosion, 231-32;
Niche strength on Oct. 30, 1914, (table)
242; total in east coast patrols, 253;
trained submarine personnel needed,
288; sources of, for Aurora, Patriot,
Patrician, 319; general demobilization,
number after reorganization, 322; com-
plement authorized May 1919, 323;
total number, officers, May 1920, 323;
complement increased, 349

Pictou, Nova Scotia: Royal William sails
from, 4; 370

Pine, for R.N. masts from Maritimes and
Quebec, 39

Pitt, William, prime minister of Britain,
and Seven Years' War, 50

Plattsburg Bay, battle in, on Lake
Champlain, 38

Plumper, H.M.S., surveys west coast
1859, 58

Policy, naval, framework of: Foster reso-
lution, 122; Laurier's revised resolution,
127-28; Naval Service Bill introduced in
Commons, 132; Naval Service Bill
passed, 137-38; Borden announces Naval
Service Act will not be implemented,
173-74; Council approves draft Naval
Aid Bill, 186; Naval Aid Bill introduced
in Commons, 188, passed, 196, defeated
in Senate, 197; Borden's permanent
policy, 205-08; Canada enters war un-
prepared, 211; decision at war's out-
break against naval expansion, 218-19;
policy during war principally to support
Admiralty, 236; close integration with
Admiralty rejected after the war, 304-
06; post-war policy as suggested by
Naval War Staff, 307-09; post-war
policy as suggested by Jellicoe, 311-16;
Jellicoe's suggestions not implemented,
and curtailment policy adopted instead
1920, 321-22; further curtailment 1922,
327-28; summary of principles which
were accepted between the two wars,
330-32; small-sized small-ship navy
1922-39, 332; creation of reserves 1923,
337; Hitler becomes Chancellor of
Germany 1933, 343; priority for west
coast, 348; increased naval appropria-
tions in and after 1935, 348; Service
reports reveal deficiencies to Minister,
354-55; Joint Staff Committee urges
increased naval force, 358; Estimates
greatly increased 1938-1939, 361; six-
destroyer programme completed 1938,
362-63; greatly increased force envi-
saged 1939, 367-68; see Imperial Con-
ferences; Programmes, for acquiring
warships for R.C.N.

Poison IronWorks, Toronto: 165; trawlers
built for east coast patrols, 248

Ponape, Caroline Islands: German Pacific
Squadron at, 262; 273

Pope, Sir Joseph, military adviser with
Borden in England, 178

Port Arthur, Ont., R.C.N.V.R. Division,
338

Port Colborne, Ont., gunboat Rescue, 43

Port Royal, see Annapolis Royal

Port Stanley, Ont., gunboat Britomart
and naval volunteers, 43

Port Townsend, Wash., 287

Portland Canal, B.C., 10

Portsmouth dockyard, England. Ottawa
and Restigouche built in, 362

Powlett, Capt. F. A., R.N., of Newcastle:
senior officer of warships, 272; disposi-
tion of warships, 272

Prescott, Ont., gunboat St. Andrew, 43

Press opinion: on Canadian defence and
German naval threat, 121-22; on revised
Laurier resolution, 128-29; Quebec
Conservative papers on naval policy
1909, 131; on Niobe's arrival, 143-45; on
Rainbow's arrival, 147-48; on Jellicoe
Report, 320-21; on naval policy 1922,
328; note on validity of, 344n; on threat
of Nazi Germany 1935-1939, 344-47; on
naval policy, 348; see Newspapers cited

Pribilof Islands, and Bering Sea con-
troversy, 82

Prince Edward Island: R.N. timber
supply, 39; 370

Prince George, S.S.: in Esquimalt on
Rainbow's arrival, 147; fitted out as
hospital ship, 268; meets Rainbow, 269

Prince Robert, S.S., and King and Queen,
370

Prince Rupert, B.C.: exposed position, 10;
and German cruiser rumours, 271;
capable of local defence, 302; oil stocks
in, 320; R.C.N.V.R. Division, 338;
suggested as naval base, 349, 369

Princess Marguerite, S.S., and King and
Queen, 370

Privateers, based on Halifax, War of
American Revolution, 51, 52

Programmes, for acquiring warships for
R.C.N. : two plans suggested by Ad-
miralty, 119-20; eleven-ship fleet pro-
posed by Laurier, 132; Niobe and
Rainbow, 141; Kingsmill's pioneer pro-
ject, 150; eleven-ship plan not imple-
mented, 165; no-expansion decision at
war's outbreak, 218-19; east coast
patrol vessels, 248; submarines CCl,
CC2, 286; Naval War Staff suggestions
1919, 307-08; Jellicoe's suggestions 1919,
311-13; submarines CH14, CH15, 316-17;
Aurora, Patriot, Patrician, 317-19; Chain-
plain, Vancouver, 333-34; decision to
build two destroyers, 333; Saguenay,
Skeena, 334-35; six destroyers, four
minesweepers suggested 1930, 336;
Fraser, St. Laurent, first of "four C's",

430

INDEX

Programmes, for acquiring warships for
R.C.N . — Continued

355; expansion urged by Joint Staff
Committee, 358; destroyer-minesweeper
project completed 1938, 362-63; flotilla
leader, anti-submarine vessels, and
motor torpedo boats recommended,
366; 367; enlarged force to include
eighteen destroyers envisaged 1936,
1939, 367-68; recommendations in secret
memorandum 1939, 368-69; Assiniboine,
369; see Policy, naval, framework of

Provincial Marine, naval force on lakes
after Seven Years' War, 36-37

Public opinion, in west, on naval policy
1910, 209

Pugsley, William, criticizes submarine
purchase, 297

Put-in Bay, Battle of Lake Erie at, 38

Pylades, H.M.S., stationed at Montreal
1866, 42-43

Quebec: and timber supply for R.N., 39;
Conservatives and Nationalists, and
Laurier's naval policy, 129, 170, 171;
Conservatives, and Borden's naval
policy, 188

Quebec, P.Q.: first settlement 1608, 2;
shipbuilding centre in New France, 4;
base for local defence, 29; 30; four times
attacked by British, 34; captured
through sea power, 35; assault by
Americans unsuccessful, 37; Aurora at,
43; Constance based on, 44; 1st Canadian
contingent left from, 225; motor
launches assembled for Admiralty in,
234; submarine building finished in, 235;
east coast patrol port, 252; oil stocks
in, 320; R.C.N.V.R. Division, 338;
R.C.N. R. Port Division, 339; King and
Queen land at, 370

Quetteville, Eng. Lieut. Stanley Nelson
de, R.C.N., killed at Jutland, *221

Race Rocks, light placed on, 1860, 59
Radiotelegraph Branch, see Wireless

Telegraph Service
Rainbow, H.M.C.S.: bought from Ad-
miralty as training ship, 141; descrip-
tion, and cruise to Esquimalt, 146-47,
160; and Komagata Maru, 148-49;
recruits in early days, 148, 152, (table)
153; Hose succeeds Stewart in com-
mand, 152, 249; and Victoria reservists,
160, 219; prepared for active service,
213, 214, 263-66; placed under Ad-
miralty, 215; 232; at Esquimalt during
war, 234; 248; capabilities, 262, 278,
281-82; duties, 263-65, 279; strengths
1914, 265, 279; statistics, 266/t; protec-
tion of R.N. sloops and search for
Leipzig, 267-74; and Leipzig, 274, 280-81 ;
and allied squadron, 277-78; guard duty
and patrols, 279-80; crew transferred to

east coast patrols, 280; as depot ship,
280; and torpedoes for submarines, 291;
replaced 1920, 318

Rebellion of 1837, 24, 30-41

Recruiting: for Xiobe, 145; for Rainbow,
148; early days, 150, 152-55; organized
war recruiting started 1916, 219; Over-
seas Division, R.N.C.V.R., 220; east
coast patrols, 220, 253

Regina. Sask., R.C.N.V.R. Division, 338

Report of the Commissioner concerning the
Purchase of Submarines, conclusions,
298-99

Rescue, gunboat at Port Colborne 1806,
43

Reserve force: suggestion in Canada for
formation 1879, 64; authorized in Naval
Service Act, 140, 157; suggestions for
use of Canadian reserve, 157-58; see
Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, etc.

Restigouche, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S. Comet): statistics, 355n; during
Munich crisis, 361/i; bought from Ad-
miralty, 362; to Esquimalt, 362-63; in
royal escort on west coast, 370; see
Comet

Richelieu River, invasion route, 37

Rideau Canal, built as war-time supply
route, 30

Rimouski, 218«, 252

Rodney, H.M.S. , 352

Roper, Cdr. C. D., R.N., Chief of Staff,
151

Rosario, H.M.S., at Montreal 1866, 43

Ross, Sir Oeorge, Senate Opposition
leader, and Naval Aid Bill, 197

Royal, gunboat at Cornwall 1866, 43

Royal Air Force, officers loaned, to form
aviation branch of N.S., 255, 256

Royal Canadian Air Force, naval policy
and, 331

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Marine
Section), and Halifax base, 337

Royal Canadian Naval Air Service,
created Sept. 1918, 255-56; development
stopped by Armistice, 257-58; sugges-
tions in Jellicoe Report, 259; generaliza-
tions, 259-60

Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (R.C.-
N.R.): authorized, complement and
enrolment, 338-39; personnel earmarked
for future duties, 349; Fishermen's
Reserve a separate section, 364; in-
crease in personnel announced, 367; see
Reserve force

Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
(R.C.N.V.R.): created 1923, 337-38;
new title recommended by Jellicoe,
338n; personnel earmarked for future
duties and complement increased, 349,
367; training cruise, 350: and royal
visit, 370; sec Royal Naval Canadian
Volunteer Reserve

Royal Canadian Regiment , and Xiobe, 243

Royal Fleet Reserve: and Rainbow, 146;
members in Canada, 363?*

431

INDEX

Royal Naval Air Service, 222

Royal Naval Auxiliary Patrol (Motor
Boat Service), 222

Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve
(R.N.C.V.R.): authorized, 140, 157;
created May 1914, 158; criticized, 158-
59; left to local initiative, 160; and
recruiting for R.N., 219-22, 2"3; person-
nel in Rainbow, 1914, 265, 279; personal
account by reservist in submarines,
293-94; change of title recommended by
Jellicoe, 338rc; see Royal Canadian
Naval Volunteer Reserve

Royal Naval College of Canada: provided
for, 140; established at Halifax, 141;
152; opened 155; curriculum affected by
change of government policy, 156;
staff in 1919, 156«; and Halifax explo-
sion, 231-32; moved to Kingston,
Esquimalt, 232; and post-war reorgani-
zation, 322; closed 1922, 324

Royal Navy: —

— as Chief Instrument of Imperial De-
fence: and British North America, 6-8,
20, 28, 35-37, 42-44, 47, 51-52; Canadian
opinion and, 7-8, 9, 123, 210; 14; respon-
sibility not circumscribed by Confed-
eration, 33; supremacy threatened, 61,
85, 89, 99, 104, 106, 111, 114; Canadian
responsibility for protection suggested
1878, 63; views on imperial naval de-
fence, 69-70, 71, 76, 77, 106-07, 112, 114-
16, 304-06; and contributions of ships or
money, 70, 77, 102, 108, 114, 130, 184,
198; and preference for contributions,
133, 185-86; and sealing agreement,
82-83, 148, 160; development of reserve
force, 157; and Admiralty's secret mem-
orandum for Borden, 182-85, 189, 191,
209, (text) 394-407; and Borden's Naval
Aid Bill, 187, 200, 208, (see Winston
Churchill); in First World War, 213,
215-16, 239, 245-46, 261-62, 270, 274n,
275-76, 278; and Canadian enquiry on
naval aid, 219; and Intelligence, 221;
and limitation treaties, 326; combined
exercises, 352; see Estimates, British
naval

— and Dominion Naval Forces: pattern
for R.C.N. , 14, 154, 363; development of
local navy idea, 112, 115, 119-20, 131,
132, 166; provision in Naval Service Act
for combining in emergency, 140;
R.C.N, assistance in First World War,
222, 225, 227-29, 236; development of
east coast patrols, 247-48; Admiralty-
owned drifters in patrols, 251 ; good
relations in east coast patrols, 253-54;
air patrols on east coast, 255; and
Jellicoe mission, 306, 309-10; R.C.N,
post-war co-operation, 322, 332, 352,
353, 360

— Naval Bases: advantages of Canadian
bases, 13, 44-46, 79; cost of maintaining
warships at Canadian bases, 1851-1901,
193; at Singapore, result of non-renewal

of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 326-27: for
Halifax, Esquimalt, as R.N. bases see
Halifax; Esquimalt

— Personnel in Canada: volunteers prom-
ised for new navy 1909, 120; on loan to
Canadian government, 141, 146, 150-51,
152, 155, 156, 319, 349; Rainbow nucleus
crew, 146, 279; Niobe, 146, 242; pen-
sioners and Fleet Reserve, 153; reserv-
ists in Canada, 214, 217-18, 353, 363n;
men and guns sought for east coast
patrols, 248, 253; aviation branch for
N.S. organized, 255

— Training of R.C.N. Personnel, and
Canadian Recruits: Colonial Naval
Defence Act 1865, 28; recruits from
Nova Scotia, 79-80; promise to accept
Canadian cadets, 110, 120: cruiser
training for cadets, 155, 156; Navy List
to include officers of Dominions, 167;
recruits in First World War, 219-22;
Overseas Division of R.N.C.V.R., 220;
and Canadian post-war reorganization,
321-22, 323; cadets after closing of
naval college, 324-325, 349; specialized
courses, 349; Nelles in First World
War, 354

— Warships and Warship-building relating
to Canada: ship timbers from British
North America, 39; Charybdis given as
training ship, 64-65; Rainbow and Niobe
sold as training ships, 141 ; warship-
building in Canada, 163-65, 165, 234-35,
249; R.C.N, ships placed under Ad-
miralty orders in First World War,
218, 237, 266, 289; advice on purchase of
submarines CC1, CCS, 285, 288; Shear-
water lent as submarine tender, 292;
N .S. request for two H-class submarines
refused 1915, 316; submarines given,
316-17; surplus ships offered, 317;
Patriot and Patrician given, 318; Aurora
given, 318-19; Torbay and Toreador lent,
333-34; re-naming of Vancouver, 334;
Crescent and Cygnet sold, 355; Crusader
and Comet sold, 362; Kempenfelt sold,
369; for Admiralty classes, see Destroy-
ers; Cruisers; Submarines

Royal William, 4

Rush, Richard, American Secretary of
State, see Rush-Bagot Agreement

Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1817: 31; and
Navy Island incident, 42; prevents war-
ship building on Great Lakes, 164; text
of, 372-73

Russia: in alliance with France, 60; navy
increased, 61; Triple Entente 1907, 85;
and ice-breaker for Archangel, 236;
bullion shipments to Canada, 280

Russo-Turkish War 1877-78, and Canadian
naval defence, 62

Sackett's Harbor, N.Y., on Lake Ontario,

38
Saguenay, H.M.C.S.: launched 1930, Cdr.

P. W. Nelles commands, 335; statistics

432

INDEX

Saguenay, H.M.C.S. — Continued

335n; and Skeena first combatant .ships
built, for R.C.N., 335-336; Acasta-class,
336; peace-time activities, 350-52; like
C-class, 355; 355-56; and royal visit,
369-70

St. Andrew, gunboat at Prescott 1866, 43

Saint John, N.B.: ice-free harbour, 16;
and Charybdis, 65; 224; R.C.N. V.R.
Division, 338; recommendations for
defence, 366

St. John's Newfoundland: captured by
d' Iberville, 2; and naval Intelligence,
221, 278-79; and Niobe, 242; and easl
coast patrol, 252; 253

St. Laurent, H.M.C.S. (formerly H.M.S.
Cygnet): purchased from R.N., 355;
statistics, 355, 355n; to Canada, 355-56;
in royal escort on west coast, 370; see
Cygnet

St. Lawrence, large warship on Lake
Ontario, 38

St. Lawrence, Gulf of: fishery, 5; 47; focal
area, 250

St. Lawrence River: channel surveyed by
Cook, 1; canals built, 6; invasion and
supply route, 9, 30; and Provincial
Marine, 36-37; protection during Fenian
raids, 53; and U-boats, 225; motor
vessels recommended for, 369

St. Vincent, Lord, 301

Salisbury, Lord, British prime minister,
and suggested colonial conference, 69

Salvor, S.S., and delivery of submarines
CC1, CC2, 286

San Diego, Calif., and German cruisers,
268, 273

Sandom, Capt., R.N., 42

San Francisco, Calif.: Rainbow at, 267;
Leipzig at, 270, 275; Idzumo at, 272;
German coal supply in, 273, 274

Saskatoon, Sask., R.C.N. V.R. Division,
338

Satellite, H.M.S. , and desertions, 81

Saxonia, S.S., potential commerce raider,
278-79

Schwab, Charles M., and submarine
order for Admiralty, 235-36

Scott, Capt., R.N. (Ret'd), and Charybdis,
64

Scott, Sir Percy, and gunnery, 87

Sea power: influence on Canadian history,
6, 34, 35; principal instrument of im-
perial defence, 53, 65-66

Sealing patrol, 83, 148

Seamen, on Great Lakes, skill of, 6

Seattle Construction and Drydock Co.:
and submarines for Chile, 284; and
delivery of submarines to Canada, 286

Seattle, Wash.: 274; Saxonia at, 278;
Germans, Chileans in, 286

Selborne, Lord, First Lord of the Ad-
miralty, at Colonial Conference 1902,
106

Senate, debate on Naval Aid Bill, 196-97;
see House of Commons debates, Naval
Aid Bill
Seven Years' War: 6, 21, 34-35; naval

Operations on lakes, 36
Seymour Narrows, defence measures at,

233
Shannon, H.M.S.: capture of Chesapeake,
52; Admiral Wallis commands, 80

Shearwater, H.M.S.: survivor at Esqui-
mau of Pacific Squadron, 104, 147, 160;
and sealing patrol, 148; and volunteer
reservists, 219; and guns for Seymour
Narrows, 233; and crew for Niobe, 237,
292; international naval force in Mexico,
262, 263; return at war's outbreak, 262,
268, 269, 273, 274; statistics, 266n; as
tender to submarines, 292, 295, 299

Sherwood, Cdr. K. C, R.C.N.y.R.,
appointed to Honorary Naval Advisory
Committee, 365

Shipbuilding: wooden, in early days, 4-5;
steel construction, and problems of
warship-building, 6, 15; Laurier's naval
programme, 115/i, 163-65, 174; naval
programme suggested by Kingsmill,
150; Borden's naval programme, 190,
193, 208; naval contracts and projects
1914-1918, 234-36, 249, 251; destroyer
contracts 1927-1928, 333-35; four mine-
sweepers, Venture 1937-1938, 363

Shirley, William, governor of Massa-
chusetts, and Operation against Louis-
bourg, 47

Silver, Mid. Arthur W., R.C.N., died at
Coronel, 221

Singapore naval base, 326-27

Skeena, H.M.C.S.: launched 1930, Cdr.
V. G. Brodeur commands, 335; statis-
tics, 335n; and Saguenay first warships
built for R.C.N., 335-36; Acasta-class,
336; peace-time activities, 351-52; like
C-class, 355; 355-56; and royal visit,
369-70

Smartt, Dr. Thomas, of Cape Colony, at
Colonial Conference 1907, 112-13

South African colonies, at Imperial
Conference 1909, 117

South African War, Bourassa opposes
participation, 129

Southampton, England, Saguenay and
Skeena built at, 335

Southampton, H.M.S., 369

Sparrowhawk, H.M.S., based on Esqui-
mau, 333

Special Service Squadron, and R.C.N.-
V.R., 338/?

Spee, Admiral Graf von: commands
German Pacific Squadron, 262; pro-
jected movements, 262-63; and Nurnberg,
273; and Leipzig, 273, 274, 281; at Cor-
onel and after, 275-76

Statistics: Halifax dry dock opened 1889,
79n; Esquimalt dry docks, (opened
1887) 80n, (opened 1926) 337«; Dread-
nought, 87n; Niobe, 142«; warships in

433

INDEX

Statistics — Contitmed

Pacific, 1914, 266n; submarines CCl,
CC2, 292; submarines CH14, CH15,
317n; Patriot, Patrician, 318ft ; Aurora,
319n; Champlain, Vancouver, 334«;
Saguenay, Skeena, 335n; "Four C's"
(Fraser, St. Laurent, Ottawa, Resti-
gouche), 355/;; Fundy, Gaspe, Comox,
Nootka, 363«; Venture, 363n; Scharn-
horst, Gneisenau, Deutschland (Lutzow),
Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee,
365n; Assiniboine, 369n

Stella Maris, and Halifax explosion, 232

Stephens, Lieut. R. M., R.N.: Director of
Gunnery, 150; and War Book, 212

Stewart, Cdr. J. D. D., R.N., commands
Rainbow, 146, 147, 150, 152

Stewart, W. J., Chief Hydrographer, 151

Storey, Admiral W. O., R.N. (Ret'd),
S.N.O. Esquimalt, 291

Strait of Belle Isle: 16, 243; focal area,
250

Strait of Georgia: 233; defensible, 302

Strait of Juan de Fuca: 16, 233, 272; focal
area, 261; defensible, 279, 289; 302

Strait of Magellan, 261

Submarines: in German building pro-
gramme 1912, 100; discussed at confer-
ences, 112, 115, 120; C-class, 115, 289;
H-class, 235-36, 308n, 316; inventor of,
283; E-class, 289; G-class, 318; see
Submarines CCl, CC2; Submarines
CH14, CH15

Submarines CCl, CC2: 218, 236, 262, 267,
273; and volunteer reservists, 219, 283,
291-94; based on Esquimalt until 1917,
234, 294-95; purchase and delivery, 284-
87; suitability, 288-89; psychological
effect of, 290; training and preparing
for sea, 291-93; statistics, 292; strengths
Aug. 1917, 292; routine duties, 293-94;
to Halifax 295-96; sold, 296; and enquiry
into purchase of, 296-99; engines, 299-
300; generalizations, 300-03

Submarines CH14, CH15 (formerly H14,
Hlo): built in U.S., 236; gift to R.C.N. ,
316-17; statistics, 317n; disposed of,
327-28; 332

Suffolk, H.M. cruiser: in Fourth Cruiser
Squadron, 239, 244; and search for
Karlsruhe, 239, 240; 242

Sutlej, H.iM.S., 244

Sydney, H.M.A.S.: in Halifax, 228; Fourth
Cruiser Squadron, 244; distinguished
career, 281

Sydney, Nova Scotia: coal valuable asset,
224; convoy assembly port, 227, 229;
focal area off, 250; and east coast
patrols, 252-53; and air patrols, 255, 257;
recommendations for defence, 366;
recommended as subsidiary base, 369

Tacoma, Wash.: 274, 278; and Saxonia,

278, 279
Tadoussac, P.Q., 350

Tankers, oil stocks in Canada supplied

by, 320
Thames Iron Works, 165
Thetis Island, in Esquimalt harbour, coal

depot, 80
Thornycroft, John I., shipbuilders in

England, and tender for destroyers,

335
Tidal and Current Survey: transferred to

N.S., 141; returned to Marine and

Fisheries, 339
Tiipitz, Grand Admiral Alfred von:

moulder of German navy, 86; and

British naval Estimates 1909, 95: 96-97;

301
Torment ine, 370
Toronto, Ont.: naval volunteers, and

gunboat Heron 1866, 43; 291; R.C.N.-

V.R. Division, 338
Torpedo boats, in local flotillas, 112, 115
Training cruises: value of winter cruises

with A. & W.I. squadron, 351, 351n,

352-53; summer exercises on west coast,

353
Training, naval, problems of, 349-50.
Transports: ships carrying naval supplies,

etc., 224-25; troop, method of handling,

225
Trawlers, built in Canada: for N.S., and

for Admiralty, 234; description, 251
Treasury Board, and naval Estimates,

1933-1934, 342
Treaty of Ghent, and limitation of armed

forces on Great Lakes, 30-31
Treaty for the Limitation of Armament,

terms, 326
Treaty of Utrecht, 47
Trial Island, 286
Triple Alliance, 60
Tsingtau, base for German Pacific

Squadron, 262
Tupper, Sir Charles, and naval policy,

124, 131, 183-84
Tweedmouth, Lord, First Lord of the

Admiralty, suggestions at Colonial

Conference 1907, 111-12, 117

U-boats: new type of commerce-raider,
217; danger zone in East Atlantic, 227;
ocean-going, predicted by Admiralty,
246-47; threat in focal areas of Western
Atlantic, 250; passivity of, in Western
Atlantic, 253

United States, boundary with, 11; strong
influence on Canada, 14; commissioners
at Ghent 1814, 31; declares war on
Britain, 51; and deserters from Halifax,
Esquimalt, 54, 81; after Civil War a
first-class Power, c4, 60-61; neutrality
measures in First World War, 235, 267,
274, 286-87; and submarines built for
Admiralty, 235, 316; authorities seize
Saxonia, 279; and naval race, 325

United States Naval Reserve Flying
Corps., 255

434

INDEX

United States Navy: shield for Canada, 8;
growth of, 14, 61, 85; in War of 1812,
51-52; in First World War, 216; east
coast air patrol formations supplied by,
258; and CCl, CC2, Shearwater at
Panama Canal, 295; and limitation
treaties, 326

Valcour Island, Lake Champlain, naval
engagement in War of American
Revolution, 37

Valiant, H.M.S., 352

Vancouver, B.C.: effect of Panama Canal
on shipping, 3; and overseas trade, 16;
guns mounted at, 218; measures to
protect, 233; waters off, 274; approaches
defensible by submarines, 289; uneasi-
ness at war's outbreak, 290; 309; oil
stocks in, 320; R.C.N.V.R. Division,
338; Port Division, R.C.N.R., 339;
suggested as naval base, 349; King and
Queen escorted by Western Destroyer
Division from, 370

Vancouver, Capt. George, R.N., surveys
west coast, 54

Vancouver, H.M.C. destroyer (formerly
H.M.S. Toreador): commissioned in
R.C.N. , 334; statistics, 334rc; based on
Esquimalt, 334; built by Thornycroft's,
335m; C.N.S. advises keeping in com-
mission, 336; winter cruises, 351, 352;
discarded 1936 under terms of London
Treaty, 355

Vancouver Island: granted to Hudson's
Bay Co., 3, 54-55; coal valuable to
R.N., 80; covers coastal route, 302

Venture, H.M.C.S., wooden training-
schooner; stationed on east coast, 363.

Vera Cruz, Mexico, 239

Vickers-Armstrong, builders of Fraser,
St. Laurent, 355

Vickers' shipbuilding yard, Barrow,
visited by Borden, 182

Victoria, B.C.: and relations with R.N.,
7; founded, 54-55; harbour charted by
Pandora, 55; postmaster at, and Saxonia,
278; and submarine purchase, 284;
approaches defensible by submarines,
289; uneasiness at war's outbreak, 290;
309; oil stocks in, 320

Victoria, Australia, offers Dreadnought
to R.N., 130

Volunteer force, unofficial naval, in
Victoria: formed 1913, 158; in Rainbow
during Komagata Maru incident, 160;
ordered to report to Esquimalt, 214;
supplies personnel for warships, 219;
encouraged in early days by Hose, 337

Volunteers: under Colonial Naval Defence
Act, 28; early units in Canada, Nova
Scotia, Newfoundland, 43-44; increase
Niobe's crew, 237; number serving in
Niobe, (table) 242

Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, colonial
reformer, 24

Walker, Lieut. Wilfrid T., R.N. (Ret'd),
first officer of CCl, 292

Wallis, Admiral Sir Provo William Parry,
R.N., sketch of career, 80

War Book, Canadian: suggested 1912, 212;
naval matters included, 212-13; timely
completion, 213; revived, 353

War insurance provided by Britain for
merchant shipping, 217

"Warning Telegram", stage of prepara-
tions in War Book, 212; from Ad-
miralty, 213

War of 1812: and Halifax naval base, 7:
Canadas invaded by U.S., 30; control of
lakes in, 30, 36, 37-38

War of the American Revolution: and
Halifax naval base, 7; 21; leading naval
powers against Britain, 35-36; and
Operations on lakes, 36, 37; and ship-
timber supply from B.N. A., 39; and
control of Atlantic, 51; see George
Washington

War of the Austrian Succession: French
attempt to retake Nova Scotia and
Louisbourg, 6; Louisbourg privateers,
47

War of the League of Augsburg, and
Acadia, 34

War of the Spanish Succession, and
Acadia (Nova Scotia), 34, 47

Warship design, radical changes in 19th
century, 61-62

Warships, Canadian: all oil-burners from
1920, 319; destroyers after 1922, 332

Washington Conference: 325; treaties,
326' 330

Washington, D.C., 255, 325

Washington, George, on importance of
naval superiority, 35

Washington treaties, terms, 326

Watts, Sir Philip, Director of Naval
Construction, Admiralty, and sub-
marines CCl, CC2, 288

Wealth of Nations, mercantilist colonial
policy attacked, 21-22

Wellington, Duke of, on control of Great
Lakes, 38

West coast: surveyed by Cook, 2, 3;
early development, 3, 4, 54; C.P.R.
inaugurates transpacific liner service,
4; salmon fishery, 5; fishermen and
special naval reserve, 5, 362-63; and
protection by R.N., 8, 29; natural
defences, 10, 16; First World War de-
fence measures for Strait of Georgia,
233; protection of shipping, 261; ru-
mours about Leipzig and Nurnberg,
266; naval protection at war's out-
break, 270, 281, 284; Capt. Powlett's
dispositions for naval defence of, 272-73;
and German cruiser threat, 275, 277,
278; defence against raiders planned,
278, 279; problem of defence of focal
areas, 331, 333; priority for defences of,
348, 357

Western Destroyer Division, 370.

435

INDEX

West Indies: and R.N. in War of American

Revolution, 51 ; 351
Westphal, Admiral George Augustus,

R.N., sketch of career, 80
White, Sir William, former Director of

Naval Construction at Admiralty,

and Borden's naval policy, 205-06;

207; 210
White, W. Thomas, Borden's Minister of

Finance, 201
Whitney, Sir James, premier of Ontario,

and Borden's naval policy, 177, 178
Wi lson, J. A., Director of Stores, trans-
ferred from Marine and Fisheries, 151
Wilson, Woodrow, President of U.S.,

and neutrality proclamations, 287
Windsor, Ont., gunboat Michigan at, 43
Winnipeg, Man., R.C.N.V.R. Division,

338
Wireless stations in First World War: put

under R.C.N. , 213; 214; 222; 228; Glace

Bay request for armed guard, 241

Wireless Telegraph Service: transferred
from Marine and Fisheries, 141; re-
turned to Marine and Fisheries 1922,
339

Wisdom, Robert, of New South Wales, at
Colonial Conference 1887, 71

Wolfe, General, capture of Quebec made
possible by sea power, 35

Wood, Lieut. R. H., chief engineer at
Esquimalt, and submarines CC1, CC2,
287

Wreck Commission, Halifax explosion,
229n

Yacht Patrol Service, R.N., 222
Yeo, Capt. Sir James Lucas, R.N., com-
mands on Lake Ontario, and C. in C.
on Great Lakes, 38

Zealous, H.M.S., in Esquimalt 1870, 59

436

» *■

I I I I v*

M
v.l
cop. 6

Canada. Dept. of National
Defence. Naval Historical
Section

The naval service of
Canada

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