Nelson's History of the war

Jj|lf;

NELSON'S HISTORY
OF THE WAR. By

John Buchan.

Volume VII. From the Second Battle of Ypres to
the Beginning of the Italian Campaign.

THOMAS NELSON AND SONS

LONDON, EDINBURGH, DUBLIN, AND NKW YORK

CONTENTS.

L. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES ... 9

LI. THE POLITICAL SITUATION : BRITAIN AND

ITALY 55

LII. THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST . 75
LI II. THE CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST . .109
LIV. IVANOV'S RETREAT 134

LV. THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI . . .154
LVI. THE BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN . 172

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I. THE SECOND BATTLE OF
YPRES AND THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT:
SIR JOHN FRENCH'S SEVENTH DIS-
PATCH 195

APPENDIX II. THE GALLIPOLI LANDING:
SIR IAN HAMILTON'S FIRST DIS-
PATCH 224

LIST OF MAPS.

Second Battle of Ypres. Sketch showing position at the

Ypres Salient on the morning of April 22nd . . 12

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the morning of

Friday, April 23rd 21

Second Battle of Ypres. The position on the evening

of Saturday, April 24th 25

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the evening of

Monday, April 26th 31

Second Battle of Ypres. Sketch showing the shortening

of the line on May 3rd 36

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the evening of

Sunday, May gth 39

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the evening of

Wednesday, May i2th 41

Second Battle of Ypres. The fight on the front held

by the cavalry, May i3th 44

Map showing the French Attacks on the St. Mihiel Wedge,

with Inset Sketch of the Les Eparges Position . . 85

Sketch showing importance of Douai and Valenciennes
Junctions in the German Railway Communications
on the Western Front go

The French Offensive between Arras and I^ens ... 95

8 LIST OF MAPS.

The Advance against the Aubers Ridge, May gth . .100

Scene of the Battle of Festubert 104

The Forcing of the Donajetz-Biala Line 125

The Passage of the Wisloka and the Wistok. . . .128
The Russian Retreat from the Donajetz to the San . . 131
Situation on the Eve of the Recapture of Przemysl . . 140
The Operations for the Recapture of Lemberg . . .146
The Russian Front after the Fall of Lemberg . . 150, 151
Attack on the Krithia-Achi Baba Position, May 6-8 . 158

Position of Australian and New Zealand Corps at Gaba

Tepe 164

Attack on the Krithia-Achi Baba Position, June 4 . . 167

The Austro-Italian Theatre of War 176, 177

1. The Trentino Frontier 178, 179

2. The Central (Alpine) Section of the Frontier. . 181

3. The Isonzo Frontier and the Defences of the

Julian Alps 183

The Austrian Naval Raid in the Adriatic . . . .187

NELSON'S
HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER L.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

Position at the Beginning of April — Difficulties of the Ypres
Salient — British Dispositions; — The Capture of Hill 60 — Shell-
ing of Ypres begun — The First Gas Attack — Retreat of the
French — Behaviour of Canadian 3rd Brigade — The Filling
of the Gap — The Second Gas Attack — Stand of Canadian
and Brigade — Loss of St. Julien — Failure of Attempt to
retake it — The Canadians relieved — Nature of their Achieve-
ment— The Fight of the Northumbrian Division — The
Struggle for Grafenstafel Ridge — The Third Gas Attack —
British Line shortened — Work of R.A.M.C. — Loss of Fre-
zenberg Ridge — The Cavalry replaces the 28th Division —
Cavalry Battle of May i3th — Charge of the 8th Cavalry
Brigade — Stand of London Rifle Brigade — The Fourth Gas
Attack, May 24th — Death of Captain Francis Grenfell —
Deductions from the Second Battle of Ypres — Performance
of Territorial Troops — Spirit of the Army — Description of
Ypres after the Bombardment — The Fate of the City and
the Salient.

IN April the spirits of the Allies were high.
Russia was believed to be making way in the
Carpathians in the direction of the plains of
Hungary. France was preparing for a great effort
against the most vital portion of the German front,
and in Britain it was thought that presently we
should repeat on an extended scale the tactics of

io HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Neuve Chapelle, and do more than dint the oppos-
ing line. Such a season of optimism is often a
precursor of misfortunes and black depression, and
within a month's time a series of desperate actions
on both East and West had convinced us that
Germany did not intend yet awhile to forgo her
favourite part of the offensive. So far as the
British front was concerned, the assault came where
we were least ready. Our heavy guns had been
largely taken from the northern section to assist the
artillery preparation farther south. The French
regulars had gone from the Ypres Canal to join in
the great movement in the Artois, and the Salient,
that old cockpit of war, was held in very moderate
strength. Suddenly, and almost without warning,
it became the theatre of an attack which put our
fortitude to a fiery trial.

The First Battle of Ypres — still the greatest and
most critical struggle of the Western war — began on
2oth October, and ended with the repulse of the
Prussian Guard on nth November. The battle-
front stretched from Bixschoote in the north to
Armentieres in the south, over a broad salient whose
first apex was Becelaere, and second Gheluvelt. In
it we opposed numbers which were never more than
150,000 to an enemy whose strength was at least
half a million. During the worst part of the fight-
ing we had three infantry divisions and some cavalry
to meet five army corps, three of the first line. We
had to face not only a perpetual bombardment by
superior artillery, but a succession of attacks by
massed infantry delivered with desperate resolution.
The German aim was the road to Calais ; their assault
was a deliberate and sustained offensive comparable

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 11

to their first sweep from the Sambre and the Meuse,
or von Hindenburg's November thrust against
Warsaw. Its failure marked the end of the second
phase of the war in the West.

The Second Battle of Ypres belongs to a different
category. It was confined to the northern segment
of the Salient, between the Ypres Canal and the
Menin road. Probably the Germans had no elabo-
rate offensive purpose at the start. The battle began
with a local counter-attack in return for our efforts
at Hill 60, and when this attack prospered it was
pushed beyond its original aim. A proof is that
there was no great massing of troops, as in the
autumn battle. Local reserves were brought up,
but the German line was not thinned elsewhere.
But in two respects the battles are akin. The
second lasted almost exactly as long as the first—
from Thursday, 22nd April, to Thursday, i3th
May, when it slackened owing to the British thrust
from Festubert. Like the first, too, it was fought
against heavy odds. A crushing artillery prepon-
derance and the use of poison gas were more deadly
assets than any weight of numbers. For days our
fate hung in the balance, dispositions grew chaotic
in the fog of war, and it became a soldiers' battle,
like Malplaquet and Albuera, where rules and text-
books were forgotten, and we won by the sheer
fighting quality of our men.

A glance at the map will show the peculiar
difficulties of the Ypres Salient. Its nominal base
was the line St. Eloi-Ypres-Bixschoote, but its real
base was the town of Ypres itself. Ypres was like
the hub of a wheel from which all the communica-

12

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

tions eastwards radiated like spokes. One important
road crossed the canal at Steenstraate, and a few
pontoon bridges had been built nearer Ypres ; but all
the main routes ran through Ypres — to Pilkem, to
Langemarck, to Poelcapelle, to Zonnebeke, to Ghe-

Second Battle of Ypres. Sketch showing position at the
Ypres salient on. the morning of April 22ncf.

luvelt and Menin, besides the railway to Roulers.
Virtually all the supplies and reserves for the troops
holding the Salient must go through the neck of the
bottle at Ypres. Now, early in November the
Germans won gun positions at the southern re-

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 13

entrant which enabled them to shell the town,
and a bombardment was continued intermittently
throughout the winter. A serious cannonade would
gravely interfere with our communications, and we
held the Salient with this menace perpetually before
us. We could assume that a neavy shelling of
Ypres would be a preliminary to any German
attack.

From the middle of November to the end of
January the Salient was held by the French — Du-
bois's famous Qth Corps, and Territorials. On the
ist of February part or the French were withdrawn,
and General Bulfin's 28th Division was brought
north to replace them. By the zoth of A^r-i 2Q
April the Allied front was as follows : **
From the canal through Bixschoote to just east of
Langemarck, and covering the latter place, was a
French division — the 45th — of Colonial infantry.
On the right of the French, to a point north-east
of Zonnebeke, lay the Canadian Division, under
General Alderson, General Turner's 3rd Brigade
on the left, and General Currie's 2nd Brigade on
the right.* From north-east of Zonnebeke to the

* The Canadian Division was composed as follows : —

ist Brigade (Brigadier-General Mercer) — ist Battalion
(Ontario Regiment), 2nd Battalion (Eastern Ontario), 3rd
Battalion (Toronto Regiment), 4th Battalion (Central On-
tario).

2nd Brigade (Brigadier-General A. W. Currie) — 5th Bat-
talion, 6th Battalion (Fort Garry's), 7th Battalion (British
Columbia Regiment), 8th Battalion (goth Winnipeg Rifles).

yd Brigade (Brigadier-General Turner, V.C.) — I3th Bat-
talion (Royal Highlanders of Canada), I4th Battalion (Royal
Montreal Regiment), isth Battalion (48th Highlanders of
Canada), 1 6th Battalion (Canadian Scottish).

+th Brigade (Brigadier-General Cohoe) — o,th Battalion,

14 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

south-east corner of the Polygon Wood was the
28th Division, the 85th, 84th, and 83rd Brigades
in order from left to right. At the corner of the
Polygon Wood was Princess Patricia's Regiment of
the 27th Division ; and this division, under General
Snow, continued the front east of Veldhoek along
the ridge almost to Hill 60, where General Mor-
land's 5th Division took over the line. The trenches
we had received from the French were not good,
especially in the section held by the Canadians and
the 85th Brigade. They were very wet, and the
dead were buried in the bottoms and the sides, so
that to improve them was a gruesome and unwhole-
some task. Had it been possible, it would have
been better to construct a wholly new line. Farther
south the situation was better, and the 83rd Brigade
and the 27th Division were comfortably entrenched.
Against this section was arrayed the left wing of
the army of Wurtemberg, whose headquarters were
at Thielt. Opposite the British were the 26th and
27th Corps, reserve formations composed of mixed
Saxons and Wurtembergers, and the right of the
1 5th Corps from Alsace, the heroes of Zabern.
Other detachments appeared during the battle, in-
cluding a battalion of Marines.

To understand the significance of the events
which began on 22nd April it is necessary to go
back to what happened on the i7th. The opera-
tions at Hill 60 were not strictly a part of the Ypres
battle, but they were a link in the chain of causes.

loth Battalion (Western Canada Regiment), nth Battalion,
I2th Battalion.

There was also an unbrigaded iyth Battalion — the Nova
Scotia Highlanders.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 15

Hill 60 is only a hill to the eye of faith, being no
more than an earth heap from the cutting of the
Ypres-Lille railway. Its advantage is that it gives
a gun position from which the whole German Front
in the neighbourhood of Hollebeke Chateau can be
commanded. It is just east of the hamlet of Zwar-
telen, where the Household Brigade made their
decisive charge on the night of 6th November.
About seven in the evening of iyth April /. .,
we exploded seven mines on the hill, P ''
which played havoc with the defence, blowing up
a trench line and 150 men. The ist Royal West
Kent and the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers
won the top, entrenched themselves in the shell
craters, and brought up machine guns. Next day,
Sunday, at 6.30, the Germans made a * ., «
counter-attack in mass formation, which *
resulted in a desperate struggle at close quarters.
Our machine guns mowed down the enemy, but he
reached our trenches, and there was some fierce
hand-to-hand fighting. Repeatedly during the day
the attacks were renewed, but all were driven back,
and by the evening we had expelled the enemy from
the slopes of the hill with the bayonet. The 2nd
West Riding and the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry
now relieved the original battalions. In this struggle
we lost heavily, but the Germans lost more, and all
the glacis was littered with their dead.

For the next three days there was no respite.
The position was vital to the enemy if he would
keep his Hollebeke ground, and the iQth Saxons
were hurled against it, with the support of artillery
and asphyxiating bombs. The hill formed a salient,
and we were exposed to fire from three sides. On

16 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the 1 9th and 2oth the terrific cannonade con-
tinued. On the evening of the latter day, about

A-hril 6.30, there was another infantry attack
Apn 20. wjjjcjj iasted for an hour and a half,
while all the night parties with hand grenades
worked their way up to our trenches. Lieutenant
George Roupell of the ist East Surreys won the
Victoria Cross for the courage and tenacity with
which, though several times wounded, he held his
position with the remnants of his company till relief
came. Second Lieutenant Geoffrey Woolley of the
9th London Regiment (Territorial) earned the same
distinction that night, during which at one time he
was the only officer on the hill. On Wednesday

* Y morning, the 2ist, the enemy had estab-
P ' lished himself at one point on the slopes,
at the north-east edge, but in the afternoon we dis-
lodged him. All that evening howitzer shell rained
on us, and asphyxiating bombs choked and blinded
our men, while the German field guns were in close
range. Against an area 250 yards long by 200 deep
tons of metal were flung, and for four and a half days
the defenders lived through a veritable hell. But
on Thursday, the 22nd, the hill was still ours, and
there came a sudden lull in the attack — another such
dangerous lull as that which on 28th October had
preceded the launching of the thunderbolt.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, the 2Oth, the bom-
bardment of Ypres had begun. Suddenly into the
streets °f the little ci fi^e(i with their

20

normal denizens and our own reserves,

there fell the great 42 -cm. shells. Fifteen children
were killed at play, and a number of civilians per-
ished in the debris. It was the warning for which

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 17

we were prepared, and the high command grew
anxious. The destruction of Ypres served no mili-
tary object in itself. It could only be a means to
the blocking of the routes through which we sup-
plied our lines on the Salient. It could not be aimed
at Hill 60, where our communications had a free
road to the west. It must herald an attack on the
section between the canal and the Menin road.

The evening of Thursday, the 22nd, was calm
and pleasant, with a light, steady wind blowing
from the north-east. About 6.30 our * .,
artillery observers reported that a strange *
green vapour was moving over the French trenches.
Then, as the April night closed in, and the great
shells still rained upon Ypres, there were strange
scenes between the canal and the Pilkem road.
Back through the dusk came a stream of French
soldiers, blinded and coughing and wild with terror.
Some black devilry had come upon them, and they
had broken before this more than human fear.
Behind them they had left hundreds of their com-
rades stricken and dead, with froth on their lips
and horrible blue faces. The rout surged over the
canal, and the road to Vlamertinghe was choked
with broken infantry and galloping gun teams lack-
ing their guns. No discredit attaches to those who
broke. The pressure was more than flesh and blood
could bear. Some of the Zouaves and Turcos fled
due south towards the Langemarck road, and in the
early darkness came upon the Canadian reserve
battalions. With amazement the Canadians saw
the wild dark faces, the heaving chests, and the
lips speechless with agony. Then they too sniffed
something on the breeze, something which caught

Vll. 2

i8 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

at their throats and affected them with a deadly
nausea.

The instant result was a four-mile breach in the
Allied line. What was left of the French were back
on the canal from Boesinghe to Steenstraate, where
they were being pushed across by the German
attack, and between them and the left of the Can-
adian 3rd Brigade were four miles of undefended
country. Through this gap the Germans were
pouring, preceded by the fumes of the gas, and
supported by a heavy artillery fire.

The Canadians had suffered from the gas, but
to a less extent than the French. With his flank in
the air there was no course before General Turner
except to refuse his left. Attempts were made to
rally the fleeing Turcos, and Captain Guy Drum-
mond of the Royal Highlanders, a gallant and
popular officer, fell heroically in this task. Under
the pressure of an attack by four divisions the 3rd
Brigade bent inwards from a point just south of
Poelcapelle till its left rested on the wood east of
St. Julien, between the Langemarck and Poelcapelle
roads. Beyond it there was still a gap, and the
Germans were working round its flank. The whole
ist Canadian Brigade was in reserve, and it was
impossible to use it at a moment's notice. Two
battalions, the loth and i6th, were in the brigade
reserve of the 2nd and 3rd, and these were brought
forward by midnight and flung into the breach.

A battery of 4.7 guns, lent by the 2nd London
Division to support the French, was in the wood
east of St. Julien. The gun teams were miles away.
That wood has no name, but it deserves to be
christened by the name of the troops who died in

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 19

it. For through it the loth Battalion under Colonel
Boyle, and the i6th under Colonel Leckie, charged
at midnight, and won the northern fringe. They
re-captured the guns, but could not bring them
away ; but they destroyed parts of them before
they fell again into German hands, when the line
was forced back by artillery fire. Another counter-
attack was attempted to ease the strain. Two bat-
talions of General Mercer's ist Brigade — the ist
and 4th Ontario — charged the German position in
the gap. Colonel Birchall of the 4th was killed
while leading his men, and his death fired the
battalion to a splendid effort. They carried the
first German shelter trenches, and held them till
relief came two days later.

A wilder battle has rarely been witnessed than
the struggle of that April night. The British re-
serves at Ypres, shelled out of the town, marched
to the sound of the firing, with the strange, sickly
odour of the gas blowing down upon them. The roads
were congested with the nightly supply trains for
our troops in the Salient. All along our front the
cannonade was severe, while the Canadian left, bent
back almost at right angles, was struggling to en-
trench itself under cover of counter-attacks. In
some cases they found French reserve trenches to
occupy, but more often they had to dig themselves
in where they were allowed. The right of the
German assault was beyond the canal in several
places, and bearing hard on the French remnants
on the eastern bank. All was confusion, for no Staff
work was possible. To their eternal honour the 3rd
Canadian Brigade did not break. Overwhelmed with
superior numbers of men and guns, and sick to death

20 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

with the poisoned fumes, they did all that men
could do to stem the tide. The i5th Battalion
(48th Highlanders), who bore the brunt of the gas,
recovered themselves after the first retreat, and re-
gained their position. The i3th Battalion (Royal
Highlanders) did not give ground at all. Major
Norsworthy, though badly wounded, rallied his men
till he got his death wound. Captain M'Cuaig,
who had received a crippling wound, insisted that
he should be left behind, so as not to encumber
his men. And all the while there was the yawning
rent on our left which gave the enemy a clear way
to Ypres. Strangely enough, they did not push
their advantage. As in the First Battle of Ypres,
they broke our line, but could do nothing in the
breach.

Very early in the small hours of Friday morning
the first British reinforcements arrived in the gap.
A >, They came mostly from the 28th Divi-
P *• sion,* which, as we have seen, was hold-
ing the line from east of Zonnebeke to the south-
east corner of the Polygon Wood. The line was
held by three companies of each battalion, with one
in support, and the supporting companies were sent
to reinforce the Canadians. This accounts for the
strange mixture of units in the subsequent fighting.
In addition they had in reserve the 2nd Buffs, the
8th Middlesex (Territorials), the ist York and Lan-

* Its front was formed from left to right by the 3rd Royal
Fusiliers, the and East Surrey, and the 3rd Middlesex of the
85th Brigade ; the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, the ist
Suffolks, the 2nd Cheshires, and the ist Welsh of the 84th
Brigade ; and the 2nd King's Own Royal Lancashires, the
Monmouths (Territorial), and the ist Yorkshire Light In-
fantry of the 83rd Brigade.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 21

caster, the 5th King's Own (Territorials), and the
2nd East Yorks. These five battalions, under the
command of Colonel Geddes of the Buffs, took up
position in the gap, and acted along with the loth
and 1 6th Canadians, who had conducted the first

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the morning
.of Friday, April 23rd.

counter-attack. This force varied from day to day
—almost from hour to hour — in composition, and
for convenience we may refer to it as Geddes's
Detachment. It picked up, as the fighting went
on, some strange auxiliaries. Suddenly there were

22 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

added to it two officers and 120 men of the North-
umberland Fusiliers. They were the grenadier
company of that battalion, who had been lent to
Hill 60, and had already been eight days in the
trenches. Bearded, weary, and hungry, this com-
pany, marching back to rejoin their division, fell
in with Geddes's Detachment, and took their place
in its firing line. That night the old " Fighting
Fifth " lived up to its fame.

On the morning of Friday, 23rd, the situation
was as follows : The 27th Division was in its old
position, as was the 28th, save that the latter was
much depleted by the supports which it had dis-
patched westwards, and was strung out in its
trenches like a string of beads, one man to every
twelve yards. The Canadian 2nd Brigade was in-
tact, but the 3rd Brigade was bent back so as to
cover St. Julien, whence the supporting Canadian
battalions and Geddes's Detachment carried the
line to the canal at Boesinghe. North of this the
French held on to the east bank ; but the Germans
had crossed at various points, and had taken Lizerne
and Het Sas, and were threatening Steenstraate.
The British cavalry — General Allenby's three divi-
sions and General Rimington's two Indian divi-
sions— were being hurried up to support the French
west of the canal. That day there was a severe
artillery bombardment all along the front of the
28th Division, the Canadians, and Geddes's De-
tachment, especially from the heavy guns on the
Passchendaele ridge. But the fighting was heaviest
against the Canadian 3rd Brigade, which by now
was in desperate straits. Its losses had been huge,
and the survivors were still weak from the effects

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 23

of the gas. No food could reach it for twenty-four
hours, and then only bread and cheese. Holding
a salient, it suffered fire from three sides, and by
the evening was driven to a new line through St.
Julien. One company of the Buffs sent up by
Geddes to support it was altogether destroyed.
There were gaps in all this western front, and the
Germans succeeded in working round the left of
the 3rd Brigade, and even getting their machine
guns behind it. By this time the Canadian line
was held from right to left by the 5th, 8th, i5th,
i3th, three companies of the yth, and the i4th
Battalions, from which Geddes's Detachment ex-
tended to the French.

About three o'clock on the morning of Saturday,
the 24th, a violent artillery cannonade began. At
3.30 there came the second great gas A^.-J
attack, and of this we have full details. **
The gas was pumped from cylinders, and, rising in
a cloud, which at its maximum was seven feet high,
it travelled in two minutes the distance between
the lines. It was thickest close to the ground, and
filled every cranny of the trenches. Our men had
still no knowledge of it, and were provided with no
prophylactics, but instinct taught some of them
what to do. A wet handkerchief wrapped round
the mouth gave a little relief, and it was best for
a man to keep on his feet. It was fatal to run
backwards, for in that case he followed the gas
zone, and the exertion of rapid movement com-
pelled deep breathing, and so drew the poison into
the lungs. Its effect was to fill the lungs with fluid
and produce acute bronchitis. Those smitten by
it suffered horribly, gasping and struggling for

24 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

breath, with blue, swollen faces, and eyes bursting
from the head. It affected the sight, too, and pro-
duced temporary blindness. Even a thousand yards
from the place of emission men were afflicted with
violent sickness and giddiness. After that it dissi-
pated itself, and only the blanched herbage marked
its track.

That day, the 24th, saw the height of the Cana-
dians' battle. The much-tried 3rd Brigade, now
gassed for the second time, could no longer keep
its place. Its left fell back well to the south-west
of St. Julien, gaps opened up in its front, and Gen-
eral Currie's 2nd Brigade was left in much the same
position as that of the 3rd Brigade on Thursday
evening. His left was compelled to swing south to
conform ; but Colonel Lipsett's 8th Battalion,
which held the pivoting point on the Grafenstafel
ridge — the extreme north-eastern point of our salient
— did not move an inch. Although heavily gassed,
they stayed in their trenches for two days until they
were relieved. The 3rd Brigade, temporarily forced
back, presently recovered itself, and regained much
of the lost ground.

About midday a great German attack developed
against the village of St. Julien and the section of
our line immediately east of it. The 3rd Brigade
was withdrawn some 700 yards to a new line south
of the village and just north of the hamlet of For-
tuin. The remnants of the i3th and i4th Battalions
could not be withdrawn, and remained — a few hun-
dred men — in the St. Julien line, fighting till far on
in the night their hopeless battle with a gallantry
which has shed eternal lustre on their Motherland.
Scarcely less fine was the stand of Colonel Lipsett's

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 25

8th Battalion at Grafenstafel. Though their left
was in the air they never moved, and at the most
critical moment held the vital point of the British
front. Had the Grafenstafel position gone, the
enemy would in an hour have pushed behind the

Second Battle of Ypres. The position on the evening of
Saturday, April 24th.

28th Division and the whole eastern section. It is
told how one machine-gun officer of the yth -
Lieutenant Bellew — with a defiant loaf stuck on his
bayonet point above the parapet, fought his machine
gun till it was smashed to pieces, and then con-

26 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

tinned the struggle with relays of rifles. Far on
the west the French counter-attacked from the
canal and made some progress, but the Germans
were still strong on the west bank, and took Steen-
straate, though the Belgian artillery succeeded in
destroying the bridge behind them.

Meantime British battalions were being rushed
up as fast as they could be collected. The i3th
Brigade * from the 5th Division took up position
west of Geddes's Detachment, between the canal and
the Pilkem road, and they were supported by the
York and Durham Brigades of the Northumbrian
Territorial Division, which had arrived from Eng-
land only three days before. The loth Brigade j-
from the 4th Division were coming up to support
the 3rd Canadian Brigade south of St. Julien. To
support the critical point at Grafenstafel the 8th
Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry Brigade of
the Northumbrian Division, and the ist Hampshires
from the 4th Division, took their place between the
8th Canadians and the left of the 28th Division.
The Canadians were gradually being withdrawn ;
the 3rd Brigade had already gone, and the Lahore
Division and various battalions of the 4th were
about to take over the whole of this part of the line.

But meantime an attempt was made to retake
St. Julien. Early on the Sunday morning, about
4-3O> an attack was delivered by General
25- Hull's loth Brigade and two battalions

* 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd West Riding,
ist Royal West Kent, 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry. All
four battalions had been engaged in the fight for Hill 60.

f ist Warwicks, 2nd Seaforths, ist Irish Fusiliers, 2nd
Dublin Fusiliers, and 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
(Territorial).

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 27

of the York and Durham Brigade against the vil-
lage. It was pushed up through the left centre of
the Canadian remnant to the very edge of the houses,
where it was checked by the numerous German
machine guns. In the assault the loth Brigade had
desperate casualties, while the York and Durham
battalions, which missed direction in the advance,
lost 13 officers and 213 rank and file. On that
day, so mixed was the fighting, General Hull
had under him at one moment no less than fifteen
battalions, as well as the whole artillery of the
Canadian Division. Farther east the 8th Battalion
of the Durham Light Infantry Brigade at Grafen-
stafel was heavily attacked with asphyxiating shells
—less deadly than the gas, but for the moment
incapacitating — and at 2 p.m. a German attack was
launched against its two front companies. From
2 to 7 p.m. they hung on, and then the pressure
proved too great, and they fell back with heavy
losses. Farther on, at the extreme eastern point
of the front, the Germans made a resolute attempt
with artillery and asphyxiating bombs on the line
of the 28th Division at Broodseinde. The 85th
Brigade, however, managed to hold its ground, and
made many prisoners. The position on that Sun-
day night was that the British line from west to
east was held by the i3th Brigade, part of the York
and Durham Brigade, Geddes's Detachment, the
loth Brigade, more York and Durhams, the Lahore
Division, the Hampshires, the 8th Battalion of the
Durham Light Infantry Brigade, and the 28th
Division. Our front was intact on the east as far
north as the Grafenstafel ridge, whence it ran in
a generally western direction through Fortuin.

28 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Monday, the 26th, was a day of constant and
critical fighting, but we managed to get our reliefs

A-b 7 26 m anc^ ta^e out t^ie battalions which had
•^ been holding the pass since the terrible

night of Thursday. The 3rd Canadian Brigade had
retired on Saturday, the 2nd followed on Sunday
evening. But on the Monday the latter, now less
than 1,000 strong, was ordered back to the line,
which was still far too thin, and, to the credit of
their discipline, the men went cheerfully. They
had to take up position in daylight, and cross the
zone of shell fire — no light task for those who had
lived through the past shattering days. That night
they were relieved, and on Thursday the whole
division was withdrawn from the Ypres Salient,
after such a week of fighting as has rarely fallen
to the lot of British troops. Small wonder that a
thrill of pride went through the Empire at the tale,
and that Canada rejoiced in the midst of her sorrow.
Most of the officers were Canadian born, and never
was there finer regimental leading. Three battalion
commanders died — Colonel Birchall of the 4th,
Colonel M'Harg of the yth, and Colonel Boyle of
the roth. Many of the brigade staff officers fell.
From the 5th Battalion only ten officers survived,
five from the yth, seven from the 8th, eight from
the loth. Of the machine-gun men of the i3th
Battalion thirteen were left out of fifty- eight, in the
7th Battalion only one. Consider what these men
had to face. Attacked and outflanked by four
divisions, stupefied with a poison of which they
had never dreamed, and which they did not under-
stand, with no heavy artillery to support them, they
endured till reinforcements came, and they did more

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 29

than endure. After days and nights of tension they
had the vitality to counter-attack. When called
upon they cheerfully returned to the inferno they
had left. If the Salient of Ypres will be for all
time the classic battle-ground or Britain, that blood-
stained segment between the Poelcapelle and Zonne-
beke roads will remain the holy land of Canadian
arms.*

The Monday's fighting fell chiefly to the North-
umbrian and Lahore Divisions, which had taken the
Canadians' place. Let us glance at the several
engagements along our front. The i3th Brigade
on the left was not seriously troubled, nor was
Geddes's Detachment, which that evening was
broken up and the battalions returned to the 28th
Division. Its gallant commander fell mortally
wounded as he was leaving the trenches. At four
in the morning the Germans attacked the two
companies of the 8th Battalion of the Durham
Light Infantry Brigade at Fortuin and enveloped
them, so that they were compelled to fall back
behind the Hannabeeke stream, from which in the
evening they retired 400 yards to still another line.
The other battalions of the brigade were ordered to
advance to the Frezenberg ridge, so as to take the
enemy in flank. They suffered heavily from shell
fire, for the Germans were making a curtain behind
us to prevent our receiving reinforcements. The
Northumberland Brigade, under General Riddell,

* Three Canadians won the Victoria Cross in this battle :
Captain Francis Scrimger, the medical officer of the I4th
Battalion ; Colour-Sergeant Frederick Hall of the 8th, and
Lance-Corporal Frederick Fisher of the I3th — both of whom
fell.

30 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

were ordered at 10.15 a-m- to m°ve to Fortuin.
Along with the Lahore Division they made an
attack upon St. Julien. It was part of a general
counter-attack by the Allies, which farther west led
to the French retaking Lizerne and the trenches
around Het Sas, and which did much to check
the enemy's offensive and relieve the desperate
pressure on our line. But the attack on St. Julien
prospered ill. The Northumberland Brigade had
had no time to reconnoitre the ground, it was
held up by wire, and it received the worst of the
shell fire. Its 6th Battalion managed to get 250
yards in advance of our front trenches, but could
not hold the position. The Brigadier, General
Riddell, fell at 3.30, and the Brigade lost 42 officers
and some 1,900 men. Daylight attacks of this kind
were impossible in the face of an enemy so well
provided with guns, and the Lahore Division fared
no better. Most of its battalions never got up
through the fire curtain to our trenches. The 4oth
Pathans, the famous " Forty Thieves " of Indian
military history, were among the chief sufferers.
Their colonel fell, and nearly all their British officers
were killed or wounded. There died Captain Dal-
mahoy, a soldier of exceptional gallantry and skill, who
still led on his men after he had been six times hit.*
Farther east, at Grafenstafel, there was fierce
fighting. The 85th Brigade kept their line intact,
but on their left, in a wood between the ridge and
the Passchendaele road, there was a hot corner.

* Jemadar Mir Dast of the 57th (Wilde's) Rifles led his
platoon with great gallantry, and when all the British officers
of the regiment had fallen collected the remnants and con-
ducted the retirement. He received the Victoria Cross.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 31

By the evening they were compelled to give up
the north-west section of the ridge, and our line
was temporarily pierced at Broodseinde. That
night we took up a slightly different line, which the
map will explain. The 28th Division on the right

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the evening of
Monday, April 26th.

held its old front from the south-east corner of the
Polygon Wood to just north of Zonnebeke and the
eastern edge of the Grafenstafel ridge. Then our
front bent south-west along the left bank of the
Hannabecke stream to a point half a mile east of

32 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

St. Julien. There it turned south to the Vamheule
farm on the Poelcapelle road. That farm should
be noted ; our men christened it Shelltrap Farm,
and it played a great part in the later fighting.
Thence it ran to just west of the Langemarck road,
where it joined the French. The French line was
now held by divisions of the Qth regular corps.
The British line from left to right was held by the
1 3th Brigade, from the French to Shelltrap Farm ;
the loth Brigade on to Fortuin ; the Northumbrian
Division, and the 28th Division, which had now
for the most part received back its battalions from
the western and central sections. The Lahore
Division was being withdrawn, and the nth and
1 2th Brigades of the 4th Division were on their
way up. But there were odd fragments of other
divisions in the front. The 4th Rifle Brigade, for
example, from the 27th Division, was in support
of the French ; the Qth Royal Scots (Territorials)
and the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry
from the same division had been in support of the
Canadians since the night of the 22nd ; and two
companies of the Shropshire Light Infantry from
the 8oth Brigade were used to fill the gap between
the Hampshires and the Royal Fusiliers at the
Grafenstafel angle in the front of the 28th Division.
The patchwork nature of our line made Staff work
excessively difficult. Units and bits of units were
brought up and used to strengthen weak places.
We have seen the experience of the brigadier of
the loth Brigade on the 25th. General Prowse of
the nth Brigade a few days later found himself
suddenly in command of twelve British battalions
and three French.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 33

We may pass over the next few days till the
morning of Sunday, 2nd May. The British and
French counter-attacked several times during these
five days, and all our front was heavily shelled.
On ist May there was a desperate bombard-
ment against the line of the 85th Brigade be-
tween Grafenstafel and Zonnebeke. On the last
day of April the I2th Brigade,* under General
Anley, took over the line held by the i3th Brigade
on the extreme left of the British section. On its
right was the loth Brigade from Shelltrap Farm
to Fortuin. Then came the nth Brigade,f hold-
ing 5,000 yards on the right of the northern section.
On the 29th it was badly shelled, and the London
Rifle Brigade lost 170 men. Next day it had to
face a German thrust from St. Julien, which the
Territorials drove back with machine-gun fire. The
loth Brigade held the old French second trenches,
very badly made and awkwardly placed, but it is
their boast that they never lost a trench. Beyond it
was the 28th Division, holding 6,000 yards down to
the Polygon Wood.

It was obvious that the 4th Division was hold-
ing far too lone a line, and General Bulfin, who
was in charge or the operations, resolved to shorten
the front. The Ypres Salient had always been a
danger. Now that it had been broken on the north
there was no reason for maintaining a position which,

* It had from left to right on its front the 2nd Essex, the
ist King's Own, and the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, with the
2nd Royal Irish in support and its two Territorial battalions
in reserve.

t The London Rifle Brigade (Territorial), the ist Somer-
set Light Infantry, the ist Rifle Brigade, and the ist Hamp-
shires.

VII. 7

34 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

as the map shows, was open to assault upon three
sides. We held what was virtually an oblong, five
miles long by about three broad, with ugly corners
at Grafenstafel and the Polygon Wood. Accord-
ingly preparations were made for a bold retirement
which would make of the Salient an easy curve
with its farthest point under three miles from the
town.

But first, on Sunday, 2nd May, we had to meet
a new German attack. Gas and asphyxiating bombs
were discharged both against the French on the
Ypres Canal and the 4th Division east and west of
Fortuin. The French were ready for it. Their
75 mm. guns mowed down the invaders, and the
German position on that section was in no way
improved. Against the British they fared little
better. By this time our men had respirators — not
yet of the best pattern — and they managed to let
the gas blow past with little loss. The Lancashire
Fusiliers and the Essex in the i2th Brigade suffered
most, and gave way a little. The and Seaforths
of the loth Brigade never moved. Their medical
officer, Lieutenant James, a civilian doctor who had
been with the regiment in South Africa, behaved
with conspicuous courage, for, though badly affected
by the gas, he continued for two days at his post.
The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Terri-
torials of the loth Brigade, actually charged through
the gas under Colonel Garden and took a German
trench. The result was that the 4th Division,
assisted by the 4th Hussars, who had come up as
reinforcements from the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, suc-
ceeded in holding their ground. Many deeds of
courage were reported for that day and for the fol-

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 35

lowing morning, when the ist Rifle Brigade were
attacked. Captain Railston of that battalion was
buried alive by a shell ; then he was hit by a shell
fragment, and left with only three men. Yet he
managed to bluff the enemy and hold his trenches
till relief came in the evening. Private Lynn of
the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, a machine gunner
who had already received the Distinguished Con-
duct Medal, played on the advancing gas with his
guns, without putting on his respirator. He con-
tinued firing even when the cloud caught him. He
then got his gun to the top of the parapet and kept
off the German attack. For his heroic stand he
received the Victoria Cross, but it cost him his life.

On 3rd May the time came to shorten the line.
The 1 2th Brigade on our left did not move ; it
was the pivot of the operation. Bat- **
talions were withdrawn piecemeal, and
picked riflemen from each company were left to
cover the retirement. This withdrawal, in perfect
order, in a very short time, and with no losses,
was one of the most creditable pieces of Staff work
in the war. The work began as soon as the dark-
ness fell. Every day of the fighting we had got
in our wounded under cover of night, and in
the cellars of Zonnebeke village operations had
been performed by candlelight. That evening the
wounded were evacuated, all but a small number
of very bad cases whom it was impossible to move,
and who were left behind in charge of two orderlies.
The Royal Army Medical Corps have never done
more brilliant work in all their brilliant history.
Under the guidance of Colonel Ferguson, assisted

36 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

by Major Waggett (the well-known London special-
ist on throat diseases), the cases were brought from
the cellars and dug-outs, and silently and swiftly

Second Battle of Ypres. Sketch showing the shortenfng of
the line on May 3rd.

carried along the dark roads beyond the fire zone.
The difficulty of such a withdrawal may be realized
from the fact that at some places, such as Grafenstafel
and Broodseinde, the Germans were within ten yards

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 37

of our line. Not less than 780 wounded were re-
moved from our front, and the retirement of the
battalions was equally skilful. Not a single man
was lost. The 85th Brigade had a difficult task,
coming from the extreme north-eastern point of
the Salient. The nth, coming from Fortuin, had
to move for nearly four miles down lines of parallel
trenches. Most of the supplies and ammunition
was removed, and what could not be carried was
buried.

Touches of comedy were not wanting. The
83rd Brigade, on the right of the 28th Division,
had constructed new and admirable trenches which
they were loth to leave. One man solemnly
cleaned and swept his dug-out before going, like
a landlord preparing a house for a new tenant.
The order to retire did not reach the last man of
a score of picked shots who had been left to the
end. He belonged to the 2nd Cheshires, and re-
mained for more than an hour after our retirement,
a solitary figure facing the whole army of Wurtem-
berg. Then he suddenly realized that he was very
lonely, and fled westwards after his comrades. It
was not till the early morning of the 4th that the
Germans knew we had gone. For some time before
that they had been busy shelling our empty trenches.

Our new line ran from the French west of the
Langemarck road by Shelltrap Farm, along the
Frezenberg ridge, and then due south, including
the Bellewaarde Lake and Hooge, and curving round
to the Zillebeke ridge and Hill 60. The 27th
Division held it from near the latter point up to
the Menin road, the 28th along the Frezenberg
ridge to just east of Shelltrap, and the 4th Division

38 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

to the junction with the French. This line was
at least three miles shorter than the old one, so
it could be held with fewer troops, which gave a
chance of rest to some of the brigades which had
been most highly tried. The critical point was
now our centre on the eastern front of the Salient,
which ran from the Hannabeeke stream along the
eastern face of the Frezenberg ridge. This ridge
covered all the roads from Ypres by which our
supplies and reinforcements travelled, and if the
Germans should carry it our position would be
gravely prejudiced. It is a ridge just as Hill 60 is
a hill — by courtesy only ; for the present writer, who
visited the neighbourhood a week later, could barely
detect the gentle swell among the flat meadows.

For the next three days there was little more
than a heavy shelling. At the south-western ex-
tremity of the Salient, Hill 60 was recaptured by a
German gas attack on 5th May. Early on the

j.* g morning of the 8th, about 5.30, there

was an attack on the centre held by the

28th Division. The result of that day and of the

jy, next, Sunday, the 9th, was that our line

* 9' was pushed back west of the Frezenberg
ridge till it ran east of the well-named hamlet of
Verlorenhoek, on the Zonnebeke road. The ist
Suffolks, in the 84th Brigade, were wiped out by
shell fire, only seven men remaining. The 2nd
Cheshires held back the enemy most valiantly till
they had only one officer left. The ist Yorkshire
Light Infantry, in the 83rd Brigade, also suffered
terribly. The Monmouths, a Territorial battalion
who had done most gallantly, were in a precarious
position, and another Territorial battalion, the i2th

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 39

London, was brought up to relieve them. They
reached the trenches through a barrage of fire, and
there they suffered like the Suffolks. The whole

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the evening of
Sunday, May 9th.

centre was driven in, all but the ist Welsh, under
Colonel Marden, who did not retire till they
were ordered. They sent message after message
back that theirs was a hot corner, but that they

40 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

were very comfortable, and could remain as long
as they were wanted. Mention should be made
also of the 9th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
(Territorials), who had 900 8-inch shells in their
trenches, and still stayed in them. They counter-
attacked brilliantly on the nth, and lost their com-
mander, Lieutenant-Colonel James Clark, one of
the most gallant and well-beloved of leaders.

On the following Wednesday, the i2th, we made
certain changes on our front thus further drawn in.
,, The 28th Division went into reserve.

It had been fighting continuously since
22nd April, and its losses had been almost equal
to those which the yth Division had suffered in the
First Battle of Ypres. Only one lieutenant-colonel
was left, and most of its battalions were commanded
by captains. Its place was now taken by a cavalry
detachment, the ist and 3rd Cavalry Divisions,
under General De Lisle.* The line was now held
from left to right by the i2th Brigade, the nth
Brigade, and a battalion from the loth Brigade of
the 4th Division to a point north-east of Verloren-
hoek. Then came the ist Cavalry up to the Roulers
railway, and the 3rd Division from the railway to
the Bellewaarde Lake, whence the 2yth Division
continued the line to Hill 60. It was not a good

* Important changes had now been made in the high
commands. General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, who had
acquitted himself so brilliantly in a long series of actions
from Le Cateau to La Bassee, had relinquished the command
of the Second Army, and his place had been taken by General
Sir Herbert Plumer, the commander of the Fifth Corps. The
Fifth Corps was now under General Allenby, and he in turn
had handed over the Cavalry Corps to General Julian Byng,
who had formerly commanded the 3rd Cavalry Division.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 41

line, for we had no natural advantages, and our

trenches were to a large extent recently improvised.

The cavalry took up their ground on the even-

Second Battle of Ypres. Position on the evening of
Wednesday, May 12th.

ing of Wednesday, I2th May. The ist Division
line was held from left to right by the ist and 2nd
Brigades, with the newly-formed 9th Brigade in
reserve ; that of the 3rd Division by the 6th and

42 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

yth Brigades, with the 8th Brigade in reserve.
Early on the morning of Thursday, the i3th, a
y* day of biting north winds and drench-

y 3' ing rains, a terrific bombardment began
against the cavalry front. The 2nd Brigade of the
ist Division were affected, and the 9th Lancers
managed to hold their line, but the brunt fell on
the 3rd Division. In a short space more than 800
shells fell on a line of little more than a mile. The
3rd Dragoon Guards, in the 6th Brigade, were almost
buried alive, but the remaining regiment, the North
Somerset Yeomanry, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Geoffrey Glyn, did not yield their trenches, but
actually charged and drove back the advancing
Germans. General David Campbell brought up the
Royals from his brigade reserve, and the line of the
6th Brigade remained intact. Not so the yth Bri-
gade on the right. There the shelling was too des-
perate for man to endure, and it fell back some
hundreds of yards, making an ugly dent in our
front, and leaving a gap between it and the right
of the 6th Brigade. The loth Hussars and the
Blues were hurried up to fill the rent, and at 2.30
p.m. the whole 8th Brigade, under General Bulkeley-
Johnson — the loth, the Blues, and the Essex Yeo-
manry— made a counter-attack to recover the lost
ground. They were assisted by a detachment of
the Duke of Westminster's armoured motor cars,
which did excellent work.

That charge of dismounted cavalry was one of
the great episodes of the whole battle. The cavalry
advanced as if on parade, so magnificent was their
discipline. The loth Hussars were conspicuous in
the action, and Major Crichton by his gallantry added

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 43

lustre to a famous fighting name. The Essex Yeo-
manry, in company with the finest cavalry in the
world, were equal to the best. The charge suc-
ceeded, for we took the lost ground ; but it was
beyond our power to hold it. The German heavy
guns, exactly ranged, made the place a death-trap.
By that evening this section of our line had fallen
back in a sag between the Bellewaarde Lake and
Verlorenhoek. For that day we paid a heavy price.
In the ist Division the Qth Lancers and i8th Hus-
sars suffered much, and in the 3rd Division the
Royals, the Blues, the loth Hussars, and the three
Yeomanry regiments were mere shadows of their
former strength. As always in our battles, the toll
of gallant officers was lamentably high.

On the same day the infantry on our left were
fiercely attacked, but contrived to hold their ground.
Two exploits may be specially noted. The London
Rifle Brigade, a Territorial battalion, had lost most
of its men in the earlier fighting. It began that
day only 278 strong, and before evening 91 men
more had gone. One piece of breastwork was held
by Sergeant Douglas Belcher with four survivors
and two Hussars whom he had picked up, and
though the trench was blown in and the Germans
attacked with their infantry, he succeeded in bluffing
the enemy by rapid fire, and holding his ground till
relief came. That gallant stand, for which the Vic-
toria Cross was awarded, saved the right of the 4th
Division. Farther on our left the 2nd Essex, the
reserve battalion of the i2th Brigade, did no less
brilliantly. Shelltrap Farm, between the Poelca-
pelle and Langemarck roads, had fallen into German
hands. The Ksscx cleared it with the bayonet, and

44

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

all that day the place was taken and retaken, but
we held it in the evening. The Essex, like the
Welsh a few days before, were perfectly cheerful
in their greatest peril. They continued to send

Second Battle of Ypres. The fight on the front held
by the Cavalry, May 13th.

back messages — by a man who swam the moat — that
they were very comfortable, and getting on well :
comfort being a tangle of ruined masonry on which
shells and machine guns played without ceasing.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 45

Battles in this war did not usually end with a great
climax, but ebbed away in a series of lesser engage-
ments. By this time our activity in the Festubert
region and the vigorous thrust of the French to-
wards Lens had compelled the Germans to move
some of their heavy guns farther south. There
remained, however, the deadly weapon of the gas,
and before we close our tale we must record an
instance of its use, the most desperate of all. After
the 1 3th the 3rd Cavalry Division, which was now
severely reduced, was withdrawn into reserve, and
its place taken by the 2nd, under General Briggs.
The early morning of Monday, the 24th, ,*
promised a perfect summer day, with a
cloudless sky and a light north-easterly breeze.
Just after dawn our front was bombarded with
asphyxiating shells, and immediately after gas was
released from the cylinders against the whole three
miles of line from Shelltrap to the Bellewaarde
Lake. The wind carried it south-westwards, so that
it affected nearly five miles of front ; the cloud in
some places rose to forty feet, and for four and a
half hours the emission continued. The chief suf-
ferers were the infantry of the 4th Division, on our
left. Where our men were handy with their res-
pirators they managed to hold their ground, and the
cavalry on the whole suffered little. After the gas
came a violent bombardment from north, north-
east, and east. The chief attacks were in the vicinity
of Shelltrap, where the 9th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders and the 2nd Royal Irish suffered ;
against our front on the Roulers railway, and along
the Menin road near Bellewaarde Lake ; and in these
areas we were forced back for some little distance.

46 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The three salients which the enemy had now estab-
lished did not profit him much, and before the
evening our counter-attacks had re-established most
of our line except in two places near Shelltrap and
the Menin road. The day was a triumph for the
cavalry, and their splendid steadfastness saved the
infantry on their left and right.

The Qth Lancers, one of the most hardly- tried
regiments in the British army, stuck to their trenches
through the gas and the subsequent shelling, but they
paid a heavy toll. Among those who fell was Captain
Francis Grenfell, who had won the Victoria Cross
for saving a battery of guns at Doubon * on 24th
August, and who had not less distinguished himself
in the fight of the cavalry at Messines on ist No-
vember. In him the army lost one of its most
heroic figures, a soldier whose influence in his own
service cannot be overpraised. Francis Grenfell
was an example of what by the grace of God an
English gentleman might attain to. He was a
brilliant sportsman, who played always for his side
and never for himself, an able and indefatigable
student of his profession, a leader who inspired a
unique affection both among his men and his
brother officers. As Clarendon wrote of Falkland :
" Whosoever leads such a life need not care upon
how short warning it be taken from him." His
courage was no insensibility to danger, but the
triumph of duty and devotion over all personal
fears. His simplicity, his gentle courtesy, his ten-
derness to suffering, his passionate loyalty, his
unostentatious goodness, will be an abiding and
fruitful memory long after the last echoes of
* Vol. II., p. 43.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 47

the war have ceased. Patriae quaesivit gloriam,
videt Dei.

The Second Battle of Ypres, as has been already
said, was less critical than the first, for it was not
fought to defeat any great strategical intention.
It was an episode in the war of attrition, in
which the Germans, by the use of heavy artillery
and gas, caused us severe losses without gaining
any special advantage of position. We still held
the Ypres Salient — a diminished salient ; but we
lost so heavily that, so far as attrition went, the
balance of success may be said to have been with
the German side. On the other hand, the moral
gain was ours. The Germans had a wonderful
machine — a machine made up of great cannon firing
unlimited quantities of high explosive shells, an
immense number of machine guns, and the devilry
of the poisoned gas. We had no such mechanism
to oppose to theirs, and our men were prevented
from coming to grips. The German infantry rarely
made a serious attack, and when they did they were
annihilated. Whenever we could get near them as
man to man we destroyed them. On one occasion
a battalion, exasperated to madness, stood up on
their parapets and invited the enemy in abusive
language to come on. Some accepted the invita-
tion, upon which we cheered them — and accounted
for them. The Second Battle of Ypres was the
first event which really brought home to the British
people the inferiority of our machine which handi-
capped our man-power, and it led indirectly to that
reconstruction or the Government which we shall
deal with in the next chapter.

48 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The moral gain was ours, because no battle in
the war so convinced us of our superiority in man-
hood, and inspired our troops with a stronger opti-
mism or a more stubborn determination. We
learned that we had now a homogeneous army, in
which it was hard to say that one part was better
than another. The Territorials, infantry and cav-
alry, whether they had been out since November
or had left home a few days before, held their ground
in the most nerve-racking kind of conflict with
the valour and discipline of veterans. Some of
their achievements we have recounted ; they were
not exceptions but the rule. The miners of South
Wales and North England, the hinds and the me-
chanics of the Scottish Lowlands, the shepherds
and gillies of the Highlands, the clerks and shop-
boys of London and the provincial cities, were alike
in their fighting value. They were led, and often
brilliantly led, by men who a little time before had
been merchants, and solicitors, and architects. The
present writer had the privilege of meeting most of
the battalions that fought in the action as soon as
they were withdrawn from the line, and the impres-
sion was unforgettable. One lean veteran had a
year ago been a spruce clerk on the Stock Exchange,
travelling to the City every morning in the sombre
regimentals of his class. He looked now like a big-
game hunter from Equatorial Africa. Another stern
disciplinarian of a non-commissioned officer was a
year ago a business man who cultivated tulips in his
suburban garden. Now from him to Surbiton was
a far cry. A grimy private from whom one asked
the way answered in the familiar accents of Oxford.
Two men, fresh from battle, and full of keen pro-

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 49

fessional interest, were once London shopwalkers.
The change was very marked in the case of the
Scots. The kilt as worn to-day has a somewhat
formal and modern look, suggestive less of Rob Roy
than of the Prince Consort. But watch that com-
pany of Camerons returning from a route march.
The historic red tartans are ragged and faded, the
bonnet has a jaunty air, the men have a long, loping
stride. They might be their seventeenth-century
forbears, slipping on a moonlight night through the
Lochaber passes. Here is a battalion from the
Borders. The ordinary Borderer in peace time
looks like anybody else, but these men seem to
have suddenly remembered their ancestry. They
have the lean strength, the pale adventurous eye of
the old Debatable Land.

There is an optimism which is far more merci-
less than any pessimism, for it knows the worst and
is still unafraid. Our troops at Ypres had dwelt
long in the valley of the Shadow of Death, and
had trod the very pavements of hell. They came
out of it silent, weary, bereaved, but unshaken in
the faith. They knew themselves the better men
in all that makes for human worth, and they knew
that some day the German machine would be
broken, and that then the human factor, which in
the last resort gives victory, would prove its quality.
That day might be delayed, though waited for as
a sick man waits for morning, but its advent was
as certain as the rising of the sun. From Ypres,
too, they brought another bequest. They were
resolved beyond all suspicion of a doubt to con-
quer, for they now understood that they were fight-
ing the enemies of the human race. The news of

vn. 4

50 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the sinking of the Lusitania on yth May, added to
the horrors of the gas, worked a strange transfor-
mation in our good-humoured and tolerant soldiery.
It filled them with a seriousness beyond anything
in their history. It was not hatred, for it had
nothing personal in it ; it was a resolve that an
unclean thing should altogether disappear from the
world.

The present writer first saw Ypres from a little
hill during the later stages of the battle. It was
a brilliant spring day, and, when there was a lull
in the bombardment and the sun lit up its white
towers, Ypres looked a gracious and delicate little
city in its cincture of green. It was with a sharp
shock of surprise that one realized that it was an
illusion, that Ypres had become a shadow. A few
days later, in a pause of the bombardment, he
entered the town. The main street lay white and
empty in the sun, and over all reigned a deathly
stillness. There was not a human being to be seen
in all its length, and the houses on each side
were skeletons. There the whole front had gone,
and bedrooms with wrecked furniture were open to
the light. There a 42-cm. shell had made a breach
in the line, with raw edges of masonry on both
sides, and a yawning pit below. In one room the
carpet was spattered with plaster from the ceiling,
but the furniture was unbroken. There was a
Buhl cabinet with china, red plush chairs, a piano,
and a gramophone — the plenishing of the best
parlour of a middle-class home. In another room
was a sewing-machine, from which the owner had
fled in the middle of a piece of work. Here was

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 51

a novel with the reader's place marked. It was
like a city visited by an earthquake which had
caught the inhabitants unawares, and driven them
shivering to a place of refuge.

Through the gaps in the houses there were
glimpses of greenery. A broken door admitted to
a garden — a carefully-tended garden, for the grass
had once been trimly kept, and the owner must
have had a pretty taste in spring flowers. A little
fountain still plashed in a stone basin. But in one
corner an incendiary shell had fallen on the house,
and in the heap of charred debris there were human
remains. Most of the dead had been removed, but
there were still bodies in out-of-the-way corners.
Over all hung a sickening smell of decay, against
which the lilacs and hawthorns were powerless.
That garden was no place to tarry in.

The street led into the Place, where once stood
the great Church of St. Martin and the Cloth Hall.
Those who knew Ypres before the war will remem-
ber the pleasant facade of shops on the south side,
and the cluster of old Flemish buildings at the
north-eastern corner. Words are powerless to de-
scribe the devastation of these nouses. Of the
southern side nothing remained but a file of gaunt
gables. At the north-east corner, if you crawled
across the rubble, you could see the remnants of
some beautiful old mantelpieces. Standing in the
middle of the Place, one was oppressed by the
utter silence, a silence which seemed to hush and
blanket the eternal shelling in the Salient beyond.
Some jackdaws were cawing from the ruins, and a
painstaking starling was rebuilding its nest in a
broken pinnacle. An old cow, a miserable object,

52 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

was poking her head in the rubbish and sniffing
curiously at a dead horse. Sound was a profana-
tion in that tomb which had once been a city.

The Cloth Hall had lost all its arcades, most of
its front, and there were great rents everywhere.
Its spire looked like a badly-whittled stick, and the
big gilt clock, with its hands irrevocably fixed, hung
loose on a jet of stone. St. Martin's Church was
a ruin, and its stately square tower was so nicked
and dinted that it seemed as if a strong wind would
topple it over. Inside the church was a weird sight.
Most of the windows had gone, and the famous rose
window in the southern transept lacked a segment.
The side chapels were in ruins, the floor was deep
in fallen stones, but the pillars still stood. A mass
for the dead must have been in progress, for the
altar was draped in black, but the altar stone was
cracked across. The sacristy was full of vestments
and candlesticks tumbled together in haste, and all
were covered with yellow picric dust from the high
explosives. In the graveyard behind there was a
huge shell crater, fifty feet across and twenty feet
deep, with human bones exposed in the sides.
Before the main door stood a curious piece of
irony. An empty pedestal proclaimed from its
four sides the many virtues of a certain Belgian
statesman who had been also mayor of Ypres. The
worthy mayor was lying in the dust beside it, a
fat man in a frock coat, with side- whiskers and a
face like Bismarck.

Out in the sunlight there was the first sign of
human life. A detachment of French Colonial
tirailleurs entered from the north — brown, shadowy
men in fantastic weather-stained uniforms. A

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES. 53

vehicle stood at the cathedral door, and a lean and
sad-faced priest was loading it with some of the
church treasures — chalices, plate, embroidery. A
Carmelite friar was prowling among the side alleys
looking for the dead. It was like some macabre
imagining of Victor Hugo.

The ruins of old buildings are so familiar that
they do not at first dominate the mind. Far more
arresting are the remnants of the pitiful little homes,
where there is no dignity, but a pathos which cries
aloud. Ypres was like a city destroyed by an earth-
quake ; that is the simplest and truest description.
But the skeletons of her great buildings, famous
in Europe for five hundred years, left another im-
pression. One felt, as at Pompeii, that things had
always been so ; one felt that they were verily
indestructible, they were so great in their fall.
The cloak of St. Martin was not needed to cover
the nakedness of his church. There was a terrible
splendour about these gaunt and broken structures,
these noble, shattered fa9ades, which defied their
destroyers. Ypres might be empty and a ruin, but
to the end of time she would be no mean city.

One of the truest of our younger poets, Rupert
Brooke, who died while serving in the Dardanelles,
wrote in his last months a sonnet on the consola-
tion of death in war.

" If I should die, think only this of me :
That there's some corner of a foreign field
That is for ever England. There shall be
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed."

In the Salient of Ypres there are not less than a hun-

54 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

dred thousand graves of Allied soldiers, sometimes
marked byplain wooden crosses, sometimes obliterated
by the debris of ruined trenches, sometimes hidden in
corners of fields and beneath clumps of chestnuts.
That ground is for ever England ; and it is also for
ever France, for there the men of Dubois died
around Bixschoote and on the Klein Zillebeke ridge.
When the war is over this triangle of meadowland,
with a ruined city for its base, will be an enclave
of Belgian soil consecrated as the holy land of two
great peoples. It may be that it will be specially
set apart as a memorial place ; it may be that it will
be unmarked, and that the country folk will till
and reap as before over the vanishing trench lines.
But it will never be common ground. It will be
for us the most hallowed spot on earth, for it holds
our bravest dust, and it is the proof and record of
a new spirit. In the past when we have thought of
Ypres we have thought of the British flag preserved
there, which Clare's Regiment, fighting for France,
captured at the Battle of Ramillies. The name of
the little Flemish town has recalled the divisions in
our own race and the centuries-old conflict between
France and Britain. But from now and henceforth
it will have other memories. It will stand as a
symbol of unity and alliance — unity within our
Empire, unity within our Western civilization, that
true alliance and that lasting unity which are won
and sealed by a common sacrifice.

CHAPTER LI.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION : BRITAIN AND ITALY.

Public Opinion in Britain — Causes of Uneasiness — The Munitions
Question — Disabilities of Politicians — Mr. Asquith's New-
castle Speech — Resignation of Lord Fisher — Formation of
a National Ministry — Merits of Reconstruction — Temper
of British People — The Italian Situation — Salandra and
Giolitti — Sonnino — The Diplomatic Duel with Vienna — Work
of Prince Buelow — Austria's Compensation Proposals —
Salandra resigns — Italian Chamber approves War — War
declared against Austria — The True Motives of Italy.

DURING April there was discernible in Britain
a growing uneasiness about certain aspects of
the conduct of the war. There was no dis-
trust of our generals in the field or our admirals
on the sea ; still less was there any weakening in
warlike purpose. But it was gradually becoming
apparent that the mechanism of national effort was
faulty, and did insufficient justice to the resolution
of the nation. Ever since the beginning of the year
certain events had compelled thinking men to re-
examine their views, and certain other events had
produced in ordinary people that vague disquiet
which ends in a clamour for change.

The Second Battle of Ypres, with its heavy
casualties, did much to foster this feeling. No
totals were issued at the time, but the endless lists
of names published in the press did more to un-

56 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

nerve the public mind than any totals. In June the
Prime Minister announced the casualties in the war
by land up to 3ist May as 258,069, of which 50,342

Mav *i were.dead> I53^° wounded, and 53,747
y & missing. On 4th February the total
had been 104,000, with about 10,000 dead. In
four months, therefore, without any conspicuous
success or any battle comparable to the first Ypres,
we had multiplied our losses by 2j, and our dead
by five. Then there was the Dardanelles affair,
for which we were projecting a land expedition.
Much violent and ill-informed criticism in the press
and a perpetual tattle in private life had convinced
many people that a great disaster was imminent,
and the high hopes of the early spring changed to
forebodings.

Germany's submarine campaign was also a
source not of depression, but of irritation, and irri-
tation means presently a demand for some more
effective policy. Our losses were indeed trifling, as

]**• compared with German boasting. On

* "' 1 9th May it was three months since the
great " blockade " had been instituted, and during
that time we had lost fifty ships — one-sixth per cent.
of those which had arrived at or left our ports. In
the later weeks Germany had waged war against
trawlers to improve her average, and in one week
no less than seventeen trawlers and drifters were
sunk. It was relatively a small loss, but it was a
loss ; it involved many valuable lives ; and, above
all, we had not succeeded in accounting for any
considerable number of enemy submarines. Then
on 7th May came the news of the sinking of an un-
armed liner, the Lusitania, with nearly 1,500 souls.

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 57

The news threw Germany into transports of de-
light, and roused in our own people a deep and
abiding anger, of which anti-German riots in Lon-
don and elsewhere were the smallest symptoms.
It was generally felt that the war for the ordinary
man had taken on a new character. Henceforward
for the least well-informed it was a strife a outrance,
and the people began to look about them to make
sure that nothing was left undone.

During these weeks, too, the limited number
who turned their minds to economic problems were
beginning to be seriously disquieted. We had con-
ducted the war on a lavish scale, and clearly there
had been much avoidable waste. The foolish doc-
trine that expenditure was a good thing in itself,
since it increased the circulation of wealth, seemed
to have captured the minds of those responsible for
our outlay. It was certain that we must find out of
our savings or our capital at least another £600,000,000
a year, if we were to provide the Government with
money to meet our current war expenditure and
pay other nations for our colossal purchases. It
was probable that the debit balance against us in
our external indebtedness would be something like
£400,000,000 a year. This could only be reduced
By the practice by all classes of a rigid economy ;
failing that, we should be obliged to export gold
to balance the account, or see the exchange go
heavily against us, and perhaps lose our premier
position as the financial centre of the world. But
few in authority emphasized the danger. We spoke
and behaved as if our purse were bottomless.

More important, because more generally under-
stood, was the shortage in munitions— in rifles, in

58 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

machine guns, and especially in high explosive
shells. A diligent inquest began to be made about
this time with a view of fixing responsibility — a
barren and intricate task which might well have
been left alone. In the last instance the whole
nation was responsible, for we started the war
inadequately prepared. At the same time com-
parison with Germany was futile, for no nation
can be adequately prepared unless, like Germany,
it intends war ; and Britain, like France, paid the
penalty of her honest desire for peace. A more
serious charge was that, when the nature of the war
revealed itself, we did not recognize the necessity
for organizing the manufacture of munitions on a
scale corresponding to the organization of our new
armies. It is to the eternal credit of Lord Kitchener
that he saw from the start the need of preparing
armies on the grand scale, and with this herculean
task before him — one of the greatest tasks ever
undertaken by a British Minister — it was scarcely
to be wondered at if he could not spare the time
to organize munitions in a similar fashion. It is
the duty of a Government, and more especially of
its head, to think out questions for which the busy
departmental officers have not the leisure, to take long
views, to colligate departmental activities, and to sup-
plement departmental deficiencies. Clearly this work
was not adequately performed by Lord Kitchener's
civilian colleagues. It may be said, and rightly
said, that a war reveals unexpected needs, and that
the demand for high explosives which was so urgent
in April could scarcely have been foreseen. There
is reason to believe that, till the early spring, artil-
lery experts spoke with a divided voice ; and when

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 59

the expert is uncertain the civilian Minister is help-
less. But the charge, for which there seemed good
foundation, was not that a particular explosive was
not forthcoming, but that the machinery for pro-
viding munitions of any sort, on a scale commen-
surate with the personnel we were providing, was
not organized when the new armies were first raised.

Here, again, it was idle to blame individuals.
Our misfortune was the result of the kind of polit-
ical system which the British people had tolerated
for a generation, with its strife between party cau-
cuses and the consequent disinclination to tell the
nation unpalatable truths. Again, in a crisis like
a great war the one thing required is high adminis-
trative talent. But in normal times this was at a
discount. What led a politician to fame was skill
in debate and platform rhetoric. Even if he pos-
sessed administrative gifts and did well by his
department, he got less thanks for his work than
for a hectic platform campaign which did service
to his party. Now all these pleasing talents were
valueless. It was unfair to blame the politicians for
not possessing what they never had claimed to pos-
sess, for not cultivating a thankless administrative
efficiency in a world where the prizes fell to him
who could tinkle most loudly and most continu-
ously the party cymbal.

When France after the Battle of the Marne
realized the nature of the coming war and her lack
of shells and heavy guns, she set to work at once
to supply her deficiencies. Every factory which
could be turned to the purpose was utilized ; every
scrap of talent in the nation was called upon ; local
committees were formed everywhere to organize

60 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the effort ; and the result was that early in the
new year France had multiplied her material by
six, and was in the way to multiply it by nine.
She had one great advantage in her conscript sys-
tem, which enabled her to produce munitions under
military law and to bring back her skilled workers
from the trenches and send the less useful to take
their place. In Britain our need, not less great and
far more difficult to meet, was not fully recognized till
the February strikes brought the matter to a head.
In a previous chapter we have endeavoured to show
that these strikes sprang from a variety of causes, and
were by no means entirely the fault of the work-
men. Mr. Lloyd George addressed himself to the
problem with zeal and courage. He spoke the
naked truth, though his candour was somewhat
discounted by the official optimism of the press
and his colleagues. He fastened upon drink as the
chief cause of the evil, and announced a drastic
policy of prohibition. Various eminent people pro-
claimed their intention of foregoing the use of alcohol
during the war, but their example was not generally
followed. Mr. Lloyd George, under pressure of
political opinion, was forced to whittle down his
scheme into a device for a few new taxes, which
presently were dropped as manifestly unworkable.

The truth is that it was idle to seek for any single
cause of the unfortunate situation. The causes
were many, but they sprang all from one tap-root
— the fact that the nation had not been organized
for war, and that so long as it remained unorganized
we were fighting, whatever our spirit, with one
hand tied up. Our voluntary recruiting, splendid
in its enthusiasm, worked unfairly and wastefully.

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 61

Skilled workers in vital industries had been allowed
to go to the trenches, and others who would have
been good soldiers in the firing line had been sent
back to a work in which they had no particular
skill. The compulsion of recruiting posters and
public opinion was drastic, but it was unscientific.
Many men in these days who still believed in vol-
untaryism as the system best suited to the British
temper were driven to modify their views, and to
accept some form of State compulsion as at any
rate the proper measure for a crisis. A common
basis of agreement between the different schools
was found in the desire for some kind of national
registration, which would enable the State to use
any special powers it might assume to the best
advantage.

Various expedients were tried in the first in-
stance to meet the difficulty. After our British
fashion, we appointed a number of committees to
deal with the munitions question. There were the
original committee appointed by the Prime Min-
ister in the second month of war, Sir George
Askwith's Committee on Production, the Labour
Advisory Committee, Mr. George Booth's War
Office Committee, and the combined War Office
and Admiralty Committee over which Mr. Lloyd
George presided. These committees occupied the
time of many very able men, and succeeded in
getting in their own way and the way of willing
manufacturers.

On 2oth April the Prime Minister made a speech
at Newcastle in which occurred this » .,
passage : "I saw a statement the other Pr
day that the operations of war, not only of our army

62 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

but of our Allies, were being crippled, or at any rate
hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary
ammunition. There is not a word of truth in that
statement. I say there is not a word of truth in
that statement, which is the more mischievous be-
cause, if it was believed, it is calculated to dishearten
our troops, to discourage our Allies, and to stimu-
late the hopes and activities of our enemies." Un-
fortunately the speaker was misinformed, for the
statement was literally true. Every soldier at the
front had learned the lesson of Neuve Chapelle.
High explosive shells were necessary in attack, for
they alone could destroy the enemy's wire entangle-
ments and parapets, and enable infantry to advance
without desperate loss. They were necessary in
defence, for without them we could not subdue
the fire of the enemy's heavy guns.

Presently we had dramatic proof of this truth.
Two days after the Prime Minister's speech the
struggle began on the Ypres salient. We were
almost without heavy artillery, and what we had
was very short of shells. The Germans had at
least fifty heavy guns in action, and endless muni-
tions. We beat off the attack in the end, but with
a terrible sacrifice. The lives of our soldiers were
the price we paid for our deficiency in high ex-
plosives. Again, on Sunday, 9th May, we made
an attack from Fromelles against the Aubers ridge.
Our artillery preparation was necessarily inadequate,
our men were held up by unbroken wire and para-
pets, and the result was failure and heavy losses.
On the other hand, the French in their great move-
ment towards Lens about the same date had 1,100
guns firing all day with the rapidity of maxims.

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 63

In one restricted area they placed 300,000 shells.
As a consequence, the whole countryside was steril-
ized and flattened, nothing remained but a ploughed
field with fragments of wire and humanity, and
the infantry could advance almost as safely as on
parade. The lesson was writ too plain to be mis-
read. We must pay either in shells or in human
lives.

The temper of the people was becoming in-
tolerant of smooth speeches. A press campaign
began, which led to the virulent abuse of certain
newspapers, but which on the whole did good.
Unhappily, as is usual in such campaigns, there
was an attempt to find a scapegoat, and to fasten
the blame on individuals, and in this case blame
was apportioned with a singular lack of judgment.
But the finishing touch was given by a perfectly
irrelevant episode. Mr. Winston Churchill had
rendered services to the nation at the outbreak of
war for which his countrymen can never be suffi-
ciently grateful. His ardent spirit, his high cour-
age, and his quick if not always judicious intelli-
gence made him take great risks and afford endless
material for his critics. In easy-going ministerial
circles he moved like a panther among seals. No
doubt he made mistakes, but he was usually selected
to be blamed for decisions for which his colleagues
were not less responsible. For some time there had
been disagreements between him and the First Sea
Lord, and on or before May i8th Lord ,* o
Fisher resigned. This incident brought
matters to a head. There were no alternatives before
the Government except to go out of office, or to
reconstruct on a broader basis. On i9th May the

64 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Prime Minister announced the formation of a
,* National Ministry. It would have come

y 9' with a better grace eight months earlier ;
but Ministers are human, and so long as things
seem to be going well they are anxious to keep the
credit for themselves. It is only responsibility,
when it looks as if it may be heavy, that they are
ready to share. Now that the smooth self-confi-
dence of the early days had gone, they were anxious
to make all parties responsible for the conduct of
the war. This, rather than a resolve to mobilize the
best talent in the country, seems to have been the
motive of the change. Sir Edward Grey and Lord
Kitchener of course remained at their posts ; in
them the country had the completest confidence.
Mr. Churchill was given the Duchy of Lancaster,
so that his great abilities were not lost to the Cabinet
councils. Lord Lansdowne brought to the com-
mon stock his unique administrative experience,
Mr. Austen Chamberlain his financial knowledge,
Mr. Bonar Law his business talents, and Lord Curzon
his penetrating intelligence and boundless energy.
By the appointment of Lord Robert Cecil to the
Under- Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs the Min-
istry was strengthened by a man of first-rate ability
and courage. Mr. Balfour, the greatest intellect
which our time has seen in British politics, went
to the Admiralty. One of the ironies of the situa-
tion was the retirement of Lord Haldane, the man
of all the previous Government who had done most
for the British army. If he was misled by Ger-
many, he erred in company with almost the whole
nation, and at any rate he had given us an Expe-
ditionary Force, a General Staff, and an admirable

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 65

Territorial levy — gifts which those who remember
the start of the South African War will rate at
their proper value. The root of his offending in
the eyes of his critics was that he had owed much
to German literature and philosophy, and had had
the generosity to acknowledge his debt.

The reconstruction of the Government awak-
ened little interest in the people at large. The old
political game was out or fashion, and the bitter
cry of the wire-pullers passed unheeded. The one
vital fact was the creation of a new department, a
Ministry of Munitions, which should take over all
the responsibility for materiel which had fallen upon
the Secretary for War, and should also assume some
of the powers hitherto belonging to other depart-
ments. The selection of Mr. Lloyd George for the
post — it was understood that he would be assisted
by Lord Curzon — was universally approved. His
imagination, his zeal, and the deep seriousness with
which he faced the war, had profoundly impressed
his countrymen. He had not only the power of
kindling enthusiasm by his remarkable eloquence,
but he had the courage to speak plain truths to his
quondam supporters. He did not despair of the
republic, and he had the intellectual honesty to
jettison old prejudices and look squarely at
facts. The Coalition had also the useful result
that it demobilized the respective caucuses and
allowed criticism greater liberty. Henceforward
there was no obligation upon a Liberal to spare
the Ministry from party loyalty or a Unionist from
motives of good taste. The Government was now
the whole people's to applaud or censure.

A review of political accidents is apt to leave

VIL 5

66 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

a false impression of the temper of a nation. At
this juncture the British people were a little dashed
in spirits, but there was no serious pessimism, and
there was certainly no weakening. It is instructive
to remember the history of the great war with
Napoleon, and to reflect how many of the best
brains then in England were out of sympathy with
the national cause. In this struggle we had no
Fox or Sheridan to lavish praise upon the enemy
and lament in secret a British victory. The work-
ing classes and their official spokesmen were most
earnest and practical in their determination to carry
the war to the end, and many a man who had
imagined that he was a cosmopolitan discovered
that he was a patriot. Such slender opposition as
there was came from that class whom we call in-
telkctuels because of the limitations of their intel-
lect. There were a few honest opponents of all
war, who imagined that by saying that a thing was
horrible often enough and loud enough you could
get rid of the thing. A paradoxical litterateur
secured a brief moment in the limelight by foolish
utterances. There were protests from men who,
physically unwholesome, felt that pain was the worst
of all evils, and from those who, having no creed
or faith, and staking everything upon the present
world, regarded loss of life as the ultimate calamity.
One or two amiable sentimentalists professed that
we must not humiliate Germany, apparently under
the delusion that a barbarian may become a good
citizen if only you can avoid hurting his feelings.
A few political declasses attempted to redeem their
insignificance by venting their spite on their country.
But the opposition was, in Burke's famous meta-

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 67

phor,* like the twittering of grasshoppers in a
meadow where the kine graze undisturbed.

In an earlier chapter we have discussed the
political situation in Italy during the first months
of war. The country seemed almost equally divided
between Interventionists and Neutralists, though it
is probable that on a plebiscite the former would
have had a large majority. The latter class was
composed of the extreme clericals, who distrusted
France and Russia on religious grounds, a small
aristocratic section who saw in Germany a bulwark
against socialism, the extreme socialists who fol-
lowed a pacificist and anti-national tradition, and
a great body of ordinary middle-class people who
asked only for a quiet life. Much of the capital
employed in the development of North Italy was
German ; the banking system was largely in Ger-
man hands ; and at first it seemed as if the conv
mercial interests of the country would be strongly
ranged on the side of neutrality. Against this stood
the potent tradition of the Risorgimento, a national
antipathy to the Teutonic character, and a popular
revulsion against the barbarism and arrogance of
Germany's creed.

The situation was complicated by what seemed

* " Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make
the field ring with their importunate chink, whilst thousands
of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak,
chew the cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those
who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field ;
that, of course, they are many in number ; or that, after all,
they are other than the little, shrivelled, meagre, hopping,
though loud and troublesome, insects of the hour."— Kcflcc-
tions »n the Revolution in I'rance.

68 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

a parliamentary stalemate. In March 1914 Signer
Antonio Salandra had succeeded Signor Giolitti as
Premier. He was believed to have favoured war
from the start ; but his Foreign Secretary, the
Marquis di San Giuliano, had leanings towards
Germany, and this fact was instrumental in main-
taining neutrality. In December San Giuliano died,
and was succeeded in office by Baron Sidney Son-
nino, in whose ancestry there were Jewish and
British elements. Baron Sonnino had been twice
Premier, and had done much by his upright and
straightforward methods to purify public life and
to restore the economic prosperity of his country.
On the other side stood Signor Giolitti, four times
Premier, and the most powerful political influence
in Italy. Of the 508 members of the Chamber of
Deputies over 300 were believed to be his followers.
Though he supported Signor Salandra, it looked as
if he held the Ministry in the hollow of his hand.
Enthusiasm was foreign to his nature ; he was an
opportunist, and not without reason, like the ma-
jority of his countrymen. He desired certain gains
for his nation, but preferred bargaining to war.

Baron Sonnino 's appearance at the Foreign
Office meant the beginning of a long and intricate
diplomatic duel, in which the Italian Minister con-
ducted his case with remarkable skill and discretion.
Early in December he took his stand upon the
terms of the Triple Alliance, especially Article
VII.* That clause, he reminded Count Berch-

* " Austria- Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view
the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial status quo
in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to pre-
vent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 69

told, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, bound
Austria not to occupy any Balkan territory without
a previous agreement with Italy, and without ade-
quately compensating her. Italy had the deepest
interest in preserving the integrity and independ-
ence of Serbia : Austria had invaded Serbia, and
so disturbed the whole political gravity of the
Balkans ; compensation was due to Italy, and he
invited Austria to discuss its terms. Count Berch-
told replied that Italy could have no grievance,
because the Austrian occupation of Serbian terri-
tory was " neither temporary nor permanent, but
momentary." Upon this Baron Sonnino reminded
him that in April 1912 Austria had protested against
the Italian bombardment of the Dardanelles, and
had prohibited even the use of searchlights against
the Turkish coast. She had declared that such
acts were an infringement of Article VII., and
threatened that " if the Italian Government desired

to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present
Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information
calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own in-
tentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the
case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of
the status quo in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman
coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the .fligean Seas becomes
impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of
a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or
Italy should be obliged to change the status quo for their part
by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation
would only take place after previous agreement between the
two Powers, which would have to be based upon the prin-
ciple of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other
advantages that either of them might acquire over and above
the existing status quo, and would have to satisfy the interests
and rightful claims of both parties."

70 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

to regain its liberty of action the Austro-Hungarian
Government would do the same."

The diplomatic honours at this point lay with
Baron Sonnino. Prince Buelow, the German Chan-
cellor, was hurried to Rome, and a complex game
of intrigue began. The aim of the Austrian diplo-
matists was to play for time, but Baron Sonnino
pinned them to the question — " What compensa-
tions are you prepared to offer for a breach of the
Triple Alliance which you are obliged to admit ? "
Austria was quite willing to offer these from other
people's territory, but this Italy declined to con-
sider. Germany now took a hand. Prince Wedel,
who was at Vienna, pressed Austria to surrender
the Trentino, and Prince Buelow at Rome urged
Baron Sonnino not to ask for Trieste. Meanwhile
Italy was putting her army on a war basis, and
throughout the winter bought large quantities of
military stores. In February the Chamber met,
and the dullness of the sittings led to a general
opinion that Prince Buelow had succeeded. In
March rumours of intervention revived with the
activity of the Allied fleets in the Dardanelles.
Italians in America began to close their German
accounts, and many Germans in Italy made prepara-
tions for departure.

On 9th March Baron Burian, who had succeeded
Count Berchtold, under pressure from Germany
** i accepted the principle that compensa-
9' tion must be made from Austrian terri-
tory. Baron Sonnino replied that the negotiations
must take place at once, and must be between Italy
and Austria, without any German intervention.
Prince Buelow tried threats, and drew awful pic-

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 71

tures of the consequences to Italy of a war with
the Teutonic League ; but on zoth March he in-
formed Baron Sonnino that he had been authorized
to guarantee in the name of Germany the execution
of any agreement that might be concluded between
Vienna and Rome. This touched the heart of the
matter. Italy had insisted that the transference of
any territories agreed upon must be made at once.*
Austria demurred, and Germany offered to back
her bills. But Baron Sonnino very naturally asked
what good the guarantee would be if the Teutonic

* The concessions which Austria was willing to make were,
according to the German Imperial Chancellor, as follows :—

1. The part of Tirol inhabited by Italians to be ceded to
Italy.

2. Likewise the western bank of the Isonzo in so far as
the population is purely Italian, and the town of Gradisca.

3. Trieste to be made an Imperial free city, receiving an
administration insuring an Italian character to the city, and
to have an Italian university.

4. The recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona and
the sphere of interests belonging thereto.

5. Austria-Hungary declares her political disinterestedness
regarding Albania.

6. The national interests of Italian nationals in Austria-
Hungary to be particularly respected.

7. Austria-Hungary grants an amnesty for political or
military criminals who are natives of the ceded territories.

8. The further wishes of Italy regarding general questions
to be assured of every consideration.

9. Austria-Hungary, after the conclusion of the agree-
ment, to give a solemn declaration concerning the conces-
sions.

10. Mixed committees for the regulation of details of the
concessions to be appointed.

11. After the conclusion of the agreement, Austro-Hun-
garian soldiers, natives of the occupied territories, shall not
further participate in the war.

72 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

League was defeated. He might have added that,
after recent experience of Germany's public honour,
it would be no more than a scrap of paper in the
event of her victory.

April was devoted by Austria and Germany
to playing for time. The Chamber had been
adjourned till i2th May, and Germany tried to
intimidate Italy by spreading rumours of an im-
pending separate peace between herself and Russia.
Baron Sonnino replied by setting forth his demands
in the shape of a draft treaty, under which the
Trentino and several Dalmatian islands would have
become Italy's, and the Istrian coast and Trieste
would have been occupied by her, pending their
constitution after the war as an autonomous state.

At> 7 6 These proposals were declined by Vienna

•^ ' on 1 6th April. On 3rd May Baron

Sonnino denounced the Triple Alliance, and it

jy was decreed that no member of the

™ 3" Government must for the present leave
Rome.

Then came a political crisis. Some of Signor
Giolitti's followers began an agitation for accepting
the Austro- German terms, and the attitude of their
leader was doubtful. It was possible that he might
turn out the Government and become Premier with

** an anti-war policy. On i3th May Sig-

ay 3- nor Salandra placed his resignation in
the King's hands, on the ground that his Ministry
did not possess " that unanimous assent of the con-
stitutional parties regarding its international policy
which the gravity of the situation demands." The
King refused to accept his resignation, and he re-
turned to office. His action had cleared the air,

BRITAIN AND ITALY. 73

and it was now plain that Signer Giolitti did not intend
to make himself responsible for a policy of neutrality.
On 2Oth May the Chamber, by 407 votes to 74,
passed a bill conferring full powers on ^j
the Government in the event of war.
On the 22nd a general mobilization was ordered.
On the 23rd Italy declared war upon ^
Austria. Baron von Macchio in Rome
was handed his passports, the Duke of Avarna was
recalled from Vienna, and Prince Bue- ,,
low ended his fruitless diplomacy. That
day the first shots were fired by the frontier guards
in the north.

The Italian Foreign Minister's brilliant hand-
ling of the negotiations had put Italy technically
in the right. She went to war on grounds fully
justified by the public law of Europe. But the dis-
cussions were in reality academic, for the dominat-
ing reasons lay elsewhere. Where would Italy have
been had Germany triumphed ? Supposing she
had got the territory she had asked for, how long
would she have kept it in face of a victorious Ger-
many, which would regard these concessions as
having been forced from her under duress ? And
if she had relied on Germany's bond, why should
that have been deemed sacred by a Power whose
international ethics were anarchy ? These were
the true grounds for war which lay behind all
Italy's ingenious manoeuvring for position.

She had amply vindicated herself in the eyes of
the world. So far from coming to the succour of the
victor,* she had joined the Allies just when their
* See Vol. III., p. 131.

74 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

prospects were darkening. As she marched to the
Isonzo, von Mackensen was driving the Russians to
the San ; and at Ypres, in the West, the British had
suffered grievously. The Dardanelles expedition
had not succeeded, and to the eyes of most men
its prospects were cloudy. We cannot judge the
temper of a nation by its formal diplomacy or by
its parliamentary debates, and in Italy as war drew
near there grew up a popular enthusiasm which
had very little care for material rewards. The
Irredentist tradition was less one of territorial
enlargement than of racial liberation. The nation
desired to wipe out the memories of Custozza and
Lissa and of the darker days before, but they also
fought in the cause of European liberty. It was
such a crusade as Mazzini might have preached,
that wise idealist who wrote : ' War is a fact, and
will be a fact for some time to come, and, though
dreadful in itself, is very often the only way of
helping Right against brutal Force." In the spirit
of Garibaldi and his Thousand, Italy entered upon
her latest war of liberation, as in the ancient
days when the streets of her cities heard the war-
cry : Popolo : Popolo : muoiano i tiranni.

CHAPTER LII.

THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST.

The Situation at the Beginning of April — The German Prepara-
tions— The New German Plan— Germany's Reinforcements
— The New " Divisions of Assault " — The New Allied Com-
mands— The War in Alsace — Hartmannsweilerkopf — The
Struggle for Metzeral — The Campaign in the Woevre — The
St. Mihiel Wedge — The French capture the Les Eparges
Heights — The Struggle along the Salient — Metz shelled —
The Movement in the Artois — Its Aim and Cause — The
German Front in the Artois— The Great Bombardment —
Capture of the White Works at La Targette — Fall of Carency
and Ablain — Capture of the Notre-Dame de Lorette Ridge —
The German " Fortresses " — The New Character of the War —
The British Attack from Fromelles — The British Attack
from Festubert — The New Siege Warfare.

BY the beginning of April, as we have seen,
the world was turning its eyes towards the
Western front, awaiting the news of some
great effort on the part of the Allies. The "nib-
bling " of the winter had given us points of high
strategic importance. France had new armies wait-
ing, and her munitions were known to have been
vastly increased since the Battle of the Marne.
Britain by her performance at Neuve Chapelle had
shown that she had mastered the main secret of
the present war, and a second and greater Neuve
Chapelle was daily expected. We had had for eight

76 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

months in training at home more than a million men,
and the first of these new armies must soon be on
the sea. Already the balance of man-power in the
West was in the Allies' favour ; soon it looked as if
our numerical superiority would enable us to force
the German front eastward to its own country.
Meanwhile Russia was hanging on the fringe of
Hungary, and threatening the road to Cracow.

The issue proved that Germany had judged more
shrewdly than any of the Allied Staffs. No one of
her three enemies was really ready or could be ready
for months. France was the best prepared. She
had in the field all the men immediately available,
and had done wonders with her supplies. Britain
was still backward. Her Government was only
just beginning to realize that in its present phase
it was a gunners' war, and especially a war of high
explosives. She had left her industries unorgan-
ized, and was behindhand in the most vital matters
— machine guns and high-explosive shells. More-
over, her splendid new armies were unaccountably
slow in getting ready, probably because of some
shortage in equipment. Russia was the most un-
ready of all. At the best a nation of few industries,
she had not taken full advantage of what she had.
She had trusted too much to buying supplies abroad,
where she competed with her Allies, and had much
trouble in taking delivery of her purchases. She
had brilliant leaders and large, gallant, and well-
trained armies, but she had not the weapons for
them.

Germany alone was fully awake to the precise
character of the war. All through the winter, when
we in Britain were speculating how long her stores

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 77

of food and explosives would last, she had been
busy preparing her armoury. She found substi-
tutes ror ingredients which she had formerly im-
ported, and the whole of the talent of her brilliant
chemists was mobilized for the purpose. All the
human strength of the nation, which was not in
the field, was employed directly or indirectly to make
munitions. Women and girls and old men took
their places in the armament factories. The quan-
tity of shells which she produced is beyond reckon-
ing. When we remember that she supplied 900
miles of front (with some assistance from Austria)
in the East, more than 500 miles in the West, and
equipped Turkey for the Dardanelles campaign,
and that her use of shells was five or six times more
lavish than that of her opponents, we may get some
notion of the magnitude of the national effort. It
was more impressive in its way than the muster of
her great armies in August.

She had created a machine with which she
believed she could destroy one enemy and in the
meantime keep the other at a distance. Her losses
had been immense — a dead loss, perhaps, of little
less than three millions by the beginning of April.
She saw clearly what the wiser observers in the
West had for some time been suggesting — that if
she were conquered it would be because of a short-
age, not of food or munitions, but of soldiers. She
was tied to a military theory which demanded an
extravagant sacrifice of men ; but apart from that
she was saving of life. She believed that her
machine could keep the enemy at long range on
the West till such time as she could turn and deal
with him. She had no illusions about the Allied

78 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

offensive, or, if she had, it was in the direction of
under-estimating it. She knew, or thought she
knew, that no weight of men could break her front
till the Allies had got a machine as strong as her
own. She therefore disregarded the West, and
swung the bulk of her new strength and the chief
weight of her artillery against Russia— the unreadiest
of her foes — leaving in France and Flanders only
sufficient weight of men and guns to hold the line
in a long-range contest.

It was a bold decision, for she took many risks.
But its boldness must not be exaggerated. Her
force in the West was at least half her total, still
not less than two millions, and though it was
numerically smaller than the Allied armies it was
better equipped with artillery and far better pro-
vided with shells. She adopted a novel policy in
her handling of her fresh levies. The new forma-
tions which she had begun to create in October —
the Hulfscorps, composed of Landwehr, Landsturm,
and volunteers of all ages unstiffened by first-line
troops — had been little of a success. Their first
onslaught was terrible, as we found at Ypres, but
they did not last. The fresh units which she now
formed took the shape of divisions, each made up
of three infantry regiments, several artillery regi-
ments, and divisional troops. The infantry re-
quired were taken intact from the old first-line
corps and the reserve corps formed on mobilization.
These new divisions were, therefore, the pick of
the German forces, and of those which we can trace
at least six were used in the West. Three were
assigned to von Buelow just opposite Arras, and
another three were employed in the Woevre. They

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 79

were strictly " divisions of assault," a spearhead to
be used wherever the chief danger threatened.

The gaps thus created in the old first-line corps
were filled up with new levies of the same type as
the Hiilfscorps — raw volunteers and middle-aged
men. We must remember that, when we speak of
some famous corps like the yth or the i5th being
in action, it was no longer the corps which fought
in the August battles. A considerable part or it
was made up of very indifferent material. The
present writer, after the first British attack from
Festubert, saw several hundred prisoners belonging
to the 57th Regiment of the 7th (Westphalian)
Corps, the corps which had at one time been the
elite of von Kluck's army. They were weedy, ill-
grown youths and flabby, elderly men. Ir one
talked with captured German officers one heard
bitter complaints of the quality of the new
recruits.

But Germany was not yet at the end of her best
material. To fill up the gaps, she had still a certain
number of Ersatz reserves not yet incorporated, who
made respectable fighting men, and she had the new
levies coming forward from the 1915 and 1916
classes. The latter- — her last line in the strictest
sense — were destined for her great movement in
the East. They were part of the new striking force
with whom, along with her artillery, she still hoped
to effect that complete debacle of the Allies, which
would compel them to call the campaign a draw,
and accept a peace on her own terms.

There was one joint in Germany's armour too
little appreciated at the time. She had lost ter-
ribly in her officer class — considerably more than

8o HISTORY OF THE WAR.

half her effectives ; and since that class was also a
caste, it was difficult to fill the gaps without a vio-
lent breach in her whole service tradition. But the
gaps must be filled, and accordingly there appeared
a new type of officer, created, so to speak, for the
war only, an officer on probation, and with limited
privileges. Now the German officer had his draw-
backs, but for the purposes of the German theory
of war he was highly efficient. His vigour, his

O ** O '

ruthlessness, his mechanical perfection, his pro-
fessional zeal, were all invaluable. The new type
might be a better and abler man, but he did not
fit in so well with the machine, and where the
machine is everything no part of it can safely be
out of gear.

The Allied offensive came, and the depleted
German front was ready for it. Germany had
calculated rightly. Blows which six months before
would have driven in the line and compelled a
retirement were now fruitless because of the mass
of artillery behind the defence. Germany, knowing
the superiority of the Allied infantry, struggled to
keep them at arm's length, and for a time succeeded.
Her very weakness was part of her strength, for a
blow which will shatter a steel rod may sink harm-
lessly into india-rubber. As we shall see, strange
things happened on the German front. What was
virtually a broken line managed to check the Allied
advance by the very fact that it was no longer co-
hesive. In place of a serried front, there were a
number of separate fortresses which had to be
reduced one by one. Germany was playing for
time, and she played the game with extraordinary
skill. It was her business in the West to hold the

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 81

Allies at all costs till the hammer of von Mackensen
had shattered the Russian panoply.

The Allied armies, as we have seen, had been
divided into two groups — that under Dubail, rang-
ing from Belfort to Compiegne, and that under Foch
from Compiegne to the North Sea. This was
changed now to a tripartite division, North, Central,
and East, with de Castelnau in charge of the central
secteur. De Castelnau's place at the head of the
yth Army was taken by General Petain. Some im-
portant changes had also been made in the com-
mands. General Putz, who had commanded the
ist Army in the Vosges, took over what had been
d'Urbal's 8th Army from Ypres to Nieuport.
D'Urbal succeeded Maud'huy in command or the
loth Army, holding the vital section of the Artois.
Maud'huy, a former Chasseur, went south to the
Army of the Vosges, where he would be with his
old regiments. Let us look first at the movements
of Dubail.

The months of April and May saw little progress
in Alsace. The campaign in the plains had become
a matter of trench warfare, and the chief incident
of these months was the struggle for Hartmanns-
weilerkopf , that spur of the MoTkenrain massif which
dominates the junction of the 111 and the Thur.
The summit of this hill had been won by the Ger-
mans on 2 ist January, but the French held the
higher ground to the west and the western slopes.
On 2501 March a grand assault was /!//._
made by the French artillery, which was " rc , *~
continued during the following day.
On the 26th the Chasseurs, after six hours' des-

vn. 6

8a HISTORY OF THE WAR.

perate fighting, succeeded in carrying the top, and
took more than 400 German prisoners. They were
not allowed to remain in quiet possession. The
place was too vital for the control of the 111 valley,
and for the next few weeks we saw a constant suc-
cession of counter-attacks. April was ushered in
with snow-storms, and the struggle on the tangled
slopes was conducted under winter conditions. It
was the aim of the French to clear the enemy off
the eastern side, and of the enemy to retake the
summit. It would appear that during these days
the summit was lost on at least one occasion, for
we heard of the recapture of it by the French on
» 7 8 2^k April. In May we had many con-
Vr ' ' tradictory accounts, both French and
German communique's claiming successes. The ex-
planation seems to be that each side controlled part
of the hill, and claimed that they held the vital
part. The French had all the west and the actual
top, the Germans the east and north-east and part
of the summit ridge. Till the whole mountain was
clear of the enemy the French could not be said
to occupy it so as to use it as a vantage point against
the communications of the 111 valley.

The other section of the Vosges fighting was
concerned with the valley of the Fecht, which flows
east from the Schlucht and Bramont passes past
Metzeral and Munster. The railway from Colmar
runs up its right bank to the terminus at Metzeral.
The Chasseurs Alpins held the heights in the upper
reaches of the Fecht valley, and their aim was the
two towns. During April they made considerable
progress on both banks of the Fecht. They won
the spur overlooking Metzeral from the north-west,

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 83

and on iyth April they carried the ridge between
the two valleys which unite at Metzeral. » .,
This converging attack was pushed on ? ' '
by slow degrees during May. The capture of
the towns or the Upper Fecht would bring them
within sight of Colmar and the lateral railway which
served the German front in the Alsatian plains.

Going north, the next theatre of active opera-
tions was the wooded plateau between the Meuse
and the Moselle, where ran the long thin German
wedge, with its apex across the Meuse at St. Mihiel.
That apex was strongly held by the position at the
Camp des Remains, the guns of which commanded
the country for ten miles round. The communi-
cations of this salient were curious. On the north
was the railway running from Metz by Conflans to
Etain. Twenty miles south another line ran from
Metz to Thiaucourt along the narrow Rupt de
Mad. About the centre of the narrows of the
salient lay the village of Vigneulles, on the only
practicable road to St. Mihiel, the better road to
the south by Apremont being controlled by the
French. From Thiaucourt a strategic railway had
been constructed by Vigneulles to St. Mihiel down
the Gap of Spada, a natural opening through the
hills of the Meuse valley. North of Vigneulles lay
the plateau of Les Eparges, about a thousand feet
above the sea, forming the eastern rim of the Heights
of the Meuse. The southern side of the salient was
high ground, along which ran the main road from
Pont-k-Mousson to Commercy. The interior was
the rough, woody country of the Woevre, the inside
of a saucer of which Les Eparges and the Apremont-
Pont-a-Mousson heights were the rim.

84 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The aim of the French was not to attack the
wedge at its point, where the guns of the Camp
des Remains made a strong defence possible, but
to squeeze it thin by pressing in the sides, and
ultimately dominating the communications of the
St. Mihiel apex. At the beginning of April the
north-western side of the German salient ran from
Etain in the north by Fresnes, across the Les Eparges
heights, then by Lamorville and Spada to St. Mihiel.
The south-eastern side ran from St. Mihiel by the
Camp des Remains, the Bois d'Ailly, Apremont,
Boudonville, Regnieville, to the Moselle, three miles
north of Pont-a-Mousson. Obviously the important
point was the Les Eparges plateau, which com-
manded much of the northern interior of the salient,
and the possession of which was the preliminary to
an attack upon the vital position of Vigneulles.

The Germans had seized Les Eparges on 2ist
September, and had made of it an apparently im-
pregnable fortress. Its steep slopes were lined with
trenches, and the hill had been honeycombed with
shelters and dug-outs. The operations during Feb-
ruary and March had given the French the village
of Les Eparges and part of the north-western slopes,
but they were still a long way from the crest, and
their advance was terribly exposed, since every
movement was obvious to the enemy on the upper
ground. The great attack on the position began
* 7 r on 5*k April, about four o'clock in the

•^ 5* afternoon. It was raining heavily, and
the whole hillside was one mass of mud seamed by
the channels of swollen springs. A considerable
piece of ground was won, but when the Germans
counter-attacked early next morning the French

Map showing the French Attacks on the St. Mihiel Wedge,
with Inset Sketch of the Les Eparges Position.

86 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

were unable to maintain their positions. That
Atoril 6 evenmg> 6th April, a second attempt
* P began, and the French left and right

made good progress. All night in the driving rain
the struggle continued, the attackers winning the
ground foot by foot with the bayonet. By the
A -j morning of the yth they had captured
* '* 1,500 yards of trenches, and were near-
ing the summit.

That morning the Germans brought up strong
reinforcements, and made a desperate effort to re-
gain what they had lost. But the French artillery,
brilliantly handled, caught the supports as they were
massing, and kept them off. The German guns did
the same thing by the French reserves, and nothing
was done during the rest of the day. On the morn-
A. -7 g ing of the 8th two regiments of French
•^ infantry and a Chasseur battalion made

a bid for the summit, and won it after an hour's
struggle. The Germans fell back to the eastern
side. All that day the battle continued, and after
thirteen hours' fighting the whole position was in
French hands, except a small triangle at the
extreme east.

On the morning of the 9th the weary troops on

the crest were relieved by a fresh regiment, which

A >j had taken no less than fourteen hours

P 9- to come up, so difficult was the ground,

and so violent the weather. That afternoon at

three the final attack began, and the eastern triangle

was cleared. Then came a sudden fog which made

artillery useless, and under cover of it the Germans

counter-attacked. For a moment the French fell

back, but only for a moment. The fog lifted, the

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 87

guns came again into action, the fresh regiment
charged with the bayonet, and at 10 p.m. the great
spur which dominates the Woe'vre was in the Allies'
hands.

The winning of the height of Les Eparges in
these five days of tempest was a wonderful feat of
arms. The Germans were well aware of the value
of the position, and fought desperately in its de-
fence. Their troops were no longer the 33rd
Reserve Division which had held the ground in
March, but the first-line loth Division of the 5th
(Posen) Corps. The French had to advance over
open ground up slopes where men could scarcely
find a foothold in the slime, and against trenches
and bastions prepared at leisure through the winter.
Many a soldier was drowned in mud. An unceas-
ing hail of projectiles was rained on the advance,
and the endless machine guns of the enemy from
carefully-chosen points made the hillside a death-
trap. So determined were the Germans to hold
the heights that in many cases the machine-gun
men had been chained to their weapons. The
enemy still held the lesser spur of Combres, but
it was little use to them, for any advance from it
was caught between French fire from Les Eparges
and St. Remy.

The capture of Les Eparges was the main feat
of this section of the campaign. But the attack was
kept up on the wedge at other points. The French
advanced to Etain in the north, capturing the low
hills on the right bank of the Orne, and thereby
restricting the German use of the Etain-Conflans
railway. They pressed in upon Gussainville, the
northern re-entrant of the salient ; upon Lamor-

88 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ville, which controlled the Gap of Spada, and upon
the Bois de la Selouse to the north of it. Especially
on the southern side of the salient was the fighting
severe. The French held the upper crest, from
which the land slopes towards the Rupt de Mad.
It is a country of thick, scrubby woods, which towards
the Moselle valley in the east grow into considerable
forests. The German trenches were well placed,
and took advantage of the admirable cover formed
by the inequalities of the ground. The main por-
tion of the French advance was in the Bois d'Ailly,
under the Camp des Romains, in the Forest of
Apremont, in the Bois de Mont-Mare, at the village
of RegnieVille, and in the Bois le Pretre, on the
banks of the Moselle. The gains look small even
on the largest scale map, but cumulatively they
amounted to a considerable pressing in of the
southern side of the salient. The French were
little more than four miles from Thiaucourt, which
lay in the hollow below them, and to the north
the possession of Les Eparges, threatening Vig-
neulles, and the movement against the Gap of
Spada, jeopardized the whole position at St. Mihiel.
A little farther, and it looked as if the wedge must
be squeezed so thin that it must cease to be, and
the lines of von Strantz's armies fall back to those
uplands west of Metz which contained the battle-
fields of Mars la Tour and Gravelotte.

By this time the French were within gun range

of Metz. On ist May, as a reprisal for the shelling

n* of Dunkirk by the German naval gun

ay x* at Dixmude, the French heavy artillery

at Pont-a-Mousson threw shells inside the southern

front of the Metz entrenchments. The successes

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 89

in the Woevre were generally believed to be the
first step in a great movement of the armies of
Nancy and the Vosges, which, based on the frontier
fortresses, would move into Lorraine and Alsace,
and strike a deadly blow against the German left.
It is not improbable that this was the view at one
time of the French Staff. The soldiers of France
were eager to meet the enemy on that very ground
where, forty -five years before, Bazaine and Mac-
Mahon had led them to defeat. Moreover, to out-
side observers, it seemed as if the southern front
offered the best chance for that manoeuvre battle
which was impossible in the congested north.

If such a policy was ever entertained, it was aban-
doned by the beginning of May. The reason is
not far to seek. The seriousness of the movement
against Russia had by that time revealed itself.
Something must be done to relieve the fierce pres-
sure upon our Eastern Allies, and it must be at-
tempted in the theatre which promised the speediest
results. A movement upon Lorraine and Alsace,
however successful, would be slow. It would be
masked by great fortresses, and it would not strike
at any vital communications. At the best it would
threaten the hill country of Baden and Wurtemberg,
an area far removed from the heart of Germany.
It was incumbent upon General Joffre to develop
a strategy which would distract the enemy from the
Eastern front by putting some vital interest in
jeopardy. One section was marked out above all
others for such a venture. If the roth Army in
the Artois could advance over the plain of the
Scheldt towards Douai and Valenciennes, the
communications of the whole of the German front

9o

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

from Lille to Soissons would be in instant peril,
and a wholesale retreat would be imperative. Else-
where a blow might be struck at the local com-
munications of one army, but here a blow was
possible against the lines of supply of three
armies. The history of the Allied offensive in May

Sketch showing importance of Douai and Valenciennes Junctions
in the Gernian Railway Communications on the Western Front.

is, therefore, the history of the thrust of the French
towards Lens and of the British towards Lille. The
centre of interest passes from the armies of Dubail
to the armies of Foch.

To follow the complicated fighting in the Artois
we must note with some care the nature of the
country between Arras and La Bassee. The downs

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 91

which bound on the south the valley of the Scarpe
are continued on the north by a low tableland which
falls in long ridges to the valley of the Lys and the
flat country around Lens. This chalky plateau is
full of hollows, most of which have their little towns.
Its highest part is what we know as the ridge of
Notre-Dame de Lorette, which runs west and east,
and is scored by many ravines. In the glen south of
it lies the town of Ablain St. Nazaire, and across
the next ridge the town of Carency. Then comes
a broad hollow, with the Bois de Berthonval in the
centre, till the ground rises again at Mont St. Eloi.
North of the Lorette ridge is the plain of the Lys.
East of it the ground slopes in spurs of an easy
gradient to the trough where runs the main road
from Bethune to Arras, with the towns of Souchez
and La Targette on the wayside. Farther east it
rises again to the low heights of Vimy, beyond which
runs the Arras-Lens road. The country is in type
like an outlying part of the Santerre — hedgeless
fields cut by many white roads, with endless possi-
bilities of defence in the ravines and villages. The
Lorette ridge is a bare scarp, but its sides are patched
with coppices which cluster thickly in the gullies.

At the beginning of May the German lines in
this part formed a sharp salient. They extended
from east of Loos, across the Lens-Bethune road,
east of Aix-Noulette, and reached the Lorette pla-
teau well to the west of its highest spur, where stood
the Chapel of Our Lady. They covered Ablain,
which was the extreme point of the salient, and
Carency. They then curved sharply back east of
the Bois de Berthonval, covering La Targette and
the Bcthune-Arras road. This last section of their

92 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

front was known by the French as the White Works,
because of the colour of the parapets cut from the
chalk. The village of Ecurie was inside their line,
which thereafter fell back to the east of Arras.

The meaning of this salient was the protection
of Lens, which was the key of the upper plain of
the Scheldt, and all the flat country towards Douai
and Valenciennes. Once they were driven off the
high ground, their hold on Lens would be endan-
gered, and the railway which ran behind this front
would be useless. During the early months of the
year the French had been nibbling at the positions
on the Lorette plateau, and had won considerable
ground. During the first week of May d'Urbal's
loth Army in the Artois received additions which
increased it to seven corps. A huge weight of ar-
tillery was concentrated, not less than 1,100 guns of
different types, and General Foch, the commander
of the army group, took personal charge of the
operations. The Germans seem to have been aware
that some danger threatened, for they brought up
three of their new " divisions of assault." We can-
not state with exactness the nature of von Buelow's
command at the moment. From prisoners' tales it
would appear to have consisted chiefly of troops
from Saxony, Baden, and Bavaria. It was certainly
outnumbered by the French, and probably out-
gunned ; but it had the advantage of holding one
of the strongest positions on either the Western or
Eastern front. We may describe its line as con-
sisting of a number of almost impregnable fort-
resses, manned by machine guns, and linked to-
gether by an intricate system of trenches. Between
Ablain and Lens there must have been at least

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 93

five series of trench lines prepared, each with its
for tins, which would enfilade an enemy advance.

On Sunday, 9th May, in clear weather, the
French began their artillery preparation, in the
section between La Targette and Ca- **
rency. That bombardment was the
most wonderful yet seen in Western Europe, and
may be compared with the attack which von Mack-
ensen was at the same time conducting in Galicia.
It simply ate up the countryside for miles. Para-
pets and entanglements were blown to pieces, and
all that remained was a ploughed land and frag-
ments of wire and humanity. For hours the great
guns spoke with the rapidity of maxims, and more
than 300,000 shells were fired in the course of the
day. About ten in the morning the infantry were
let loose. On the right they took what remained of
La Targette, and with it the vital cross-roads. East
of it, in the hollow below the Vimy heights, lies the
village of Neuville St. Vaast, with its big church.
By noon the French had taken the west of it, and
by three o'clock they were attacking the church.
The whole place bristled with machine guns, and
the battle was waged from house to house and from
cellar to cellar. Farther north, the centre moved
from the trenches in the Bois de Berthonval, and
swept like a flood over what had once been the
White Works. They poured on beyond the Arras-
Bethune road, and in an hour and a half had won
more than two and a half miles — the most conspicu-
ous advance made in the West since the war of
trenches began. Like Jeb Stuart's troopers in Vir-
ginia, they plucked sprigs of lilac and hawthorn
and stuck them in their caps as they surged on-

94 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

wards. Had the whole line been able to conform
to the pace of the centre, Lens would have fallen
in a day.

Meanwhile the French left was battling hard for
Carency. Here progress was slower, owing to the
endless ravines and nooks of hill. The first move-
ment carried them into the outskirts of the village,
whence they pushed east, and cut the road from
Carency to Souchez. The siege of Carency had
begun, for the only communication of the German
garrison was now with Ablain and the north. When
darkness fell the French had, on a front of five miles,
carried three German trench lines, and had taken
3,000 prisoners, ten field guns, and fifty machine guns.

Next day, the loth, the battle began again

farther north. After a hard fight the French car-

j^ ried all the German entrenchments across

the Loos-Bethune road. Farther south

they attacked the fortified chapel of Notre-Dame de

Lorette, and captured' the trenches south of it,

which connected with Ablain and Souchez. On

the right they took the cemetery of Neuville St.

Vaast, and repulsed the German reserves which came

up in motor cars from Lens and Douai. All this

was preparatory to the great assault of the follow-

M v ii m£ ^ay* That day, the nth, saw the

beginning of the end of Carency. The

ruins of the town, into which 20,000 shells had

fallen, were surrounded on west, south, and east.

It was slow and desperate work, for the Germans

had turned every available place into a for tin, and

^ each had to be separately carried. On

2* Wednesday, the i2th, about 5.30 in the

afternoon, the German remnants in Carency sur-

• Coel mines
^••^v Entrenchment

The French Offensive between Arras and Lens.

96 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

rendered, raising the total of prisoners in French
hands to over 5,000. That same day the summit
of Notre-Dame de Lorette fell, with its fort and
chapel, and, late in the afternoon, Ablain, now in
flames, followed suit, though one or two strong-
holds still held out. The whole of the high ground
west of Souchez was now in French hands, with
the exception of a few German fortins on its eastern
ridges.

What the fighting meant, both in attack and
counter-attack, may be seen from the account of a
French officer who was engaged in the assault on
Notre-Dame de Lorette : —

" Enormous shells pounded us — dead and living — without
interruption. We who had survived could scarcely breathe
for the thick nauseating smoke ; the earth shook ; the air was
alive with the scream of the missiles. The reinforcements
which had been sent melted away like snow under a burning
sun, and I applied incessantly for more. Heroes all they were ;
1 gripped them by the hand when they came, and was hon-
oured indeed to have such men under my command.

" There was no opportunity of getting provisions to us,
and we passed twenty-four hours without food. For five days
we remained in our positions. My Colonel, so they tell me,
remarked to his orderly, ' How can a company hold that hell ?
It's impossible ! ' It wasn't, as you know ; but the experiences
of those who were in it are indescribable. Day and night,
every hour, nay, every minute, on hands and feet we crawled
over nameless heaps which a little before had been living men.
Solemn thoughts filled the most sceptical of minds. And still
we held on. There was one moment when a great shell fell
and burst only eight feet away from myself and five men.
We were engulfed and buried in the upheaval of earth ; but,
wonderful to say, not one was wounded. When we had
extricated ourselves from what might very well have been our
graves, we knelt with bared heads and gave thanks to Our
Lady of Loretto for our safety.

" It was not long after this that we were relieved. I came

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 97

down from that plateau with my handful of men — all that was
left of two companies — like the rest, dead with fatigue. Our
eyes saw little, our lips were drawn, our teeth chattered in-
voluntarily, our clothes were in rags, our bodies covered with
dirt and blood. We were frightful to look at, but Notre-Dame
de Lorette was ours."

On Thursday, i3th May, the weather changed
to a north wind and drenching rain. The French
attack was now mainly directed to Sou- **
chez, Angres, and Neuville St. Vaast.
The situation was peculiar. Technically the Ger-
man line had been broken. In the direction of the
Vimy heights all the trenches had been carried, and
the way seemed open for a passage. What had
happened was that instead of bending back when
attacked and maintaining its cohesion, the German
front had become a series of isolated forts, like
drops of mercury spilled on a table. The most
notable of these were the sugar refinery at Souchez,
the cemetery at Ablain, the White Road on one
of the Lorette spurs, the eastern part of Neuville
St. Vaast, and especially the place called the
Labyrinth, between Neuville and Ecurie, where
the Germans had constructed an extraordinary
network of trenches and redoubts in the angle be-
tween two roads. These for tins were manned by
numerous machine guns, in some cases worked only
by officers. They were so placed that it was diffi-
cult for long-range fire to destroy them, and until
they were cleared out any advance was enfiladed.
The battle, therefore, resolved itself into »*•
a series of isolated actions against forts. a^

O T

On zist May the White Road was taken,

on 29th May the Ablain position fell, on the 3151

VII.

98 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the Souchez refinery was captured, though it
changed hands several times before it finally fell to
the French. Eight days later Neuville St. Vaast
was wholly in their hands. But as one for tin fell
another revealed itself. The Labyrinth especially
was a difficult business where the fighting was
desperate and continuous, and a day's progress had
to be reckoned in feet. There the German burrows
were sometimes fifty feet deep, and the struggle went
on in underground galleries by the light of electric
torches and flares — a miners' warfare like Marl-
borough's siege of Tournai.

At the close of May the first stage of what we
may call the Battle of the Artois had been a brilliant
though not decisive success for French arms. What
the losses of the Germans were up to that date we
can only guess, but in the month's fighting they can
scarcely have been less than 60,000, and may well
have been more. The French suffered severely
in the later hand-to-hand fighting, but their great
advance was made at little cost. One division killed
2,600 of the enemy and took 3,000 prisoners,
while their own loss was only 250 killed and 1,250
wounded. The German salient had gone, the line
was straightened, and all but the last defences of
Lens had fallen. The achievement was a triumph
for the fighting quality of the French infantry, and
especially for the French artillery. Here at last was
an adequate artillery preparation, which did not
stop till it had flattened and sterilized the whole
landscape before it. In these days we began to
realize how formidable a weapon Germany had
created in her vast accumulation of shells. The
machine, till it was mastered by a like creation,

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 99

must nullify the valour and discipline of the finest
soldiers in the world.

The British advance in May in the Festubert
region was intended mainly as an auxiliary to the
French effort in the Artois. It was designed in
the first place to detain the German yth Corps in
position, and to prevent reinforcements in men and
guns being sent south to Lens. But it had also a
positive if subsidiary purpose. If successful, it
would win the Aubers ridge, for the sake of which
we had fought Neuve Chapelle, and so threaten
Lille and La Bassee, and if the French got to Lens
we should be in a position to conform effectively
to their advance.

The first movement took place on the morning
of Sunday, 9th May, and the section selected was
that between Festubert and Bois Gre- ,,
nier. On the right, part of the First
Corps and the Indian Corps advanced from the
Rue du Bois in the direction of that old battle-
ground, the southern end of the Bois du Biez. But
the main attack was delivered by the 8th Division,
from Rouges Banes, on the upper course of the
river des Layes, towards Fromelles and the north-
ern part of the Aubers ridge. The artillery pre-
paration which preceded it was inadequate, and
our men came up against unbroken wire and para-
pets. Some ground was won, but most of our gains
could not be held, and by the evening we had made
little progress. That day was the occasion for many
acts of signal heroism. On our right, at Rue du
Bois, Corporal John Ripley and Lance-Corporal
David Finlay of the Black Watch received the Vic-

100

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

toria Cross for their gallantry in attack. In the
Fromelles section the 24th and 25th Brigades
especially distinguished themselves. Two Victoria
Crosses were won — by Corporal Charles Sharpe of
the 2nd Lincolns for his brilliant work with bombs,

The Advance against the Aubers Ridge, May 9th.

and by Corporal James Upton of the 2nd Sherwood
Foresters for his heroic services in bringing in the
wounded. A Territorial Battalion, the i3th (Ken-
sington) of the London Regiment, on the extreme
left, performed, according to the general command-

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 101

ing the Fourth Corps, " a feat of arms surpassed
by no battalion in the great war." They carried
three lines of German trenches with the bayonet,
and held them till the German fire made them un-
tenable, when they fell back with four company
officers left. The desperate nature of the fighting
may be realized from the following quotation from
the letter of one of the few survivors : —

" The minute our bombardment ceased we were over our
parapet, and, charging right through, captured the first,
second, and third lines of German trenches on our front at
the point of the bayonet. We swept straight through while
two companies, turning right and left, bayoneted and bombed
the Huns back along their trenches for a couple of hundred
yards on either side.

" Then we settled down to hold on to what we had
taken against steadily increasing German counter-attacks.
. . . But our right was floating in the air. We stuck it grimly
for eight hours or more — until half-past two on that Sunday
afternoon. My God, it was a Sunday I should like to forget.
Their guns and ours kept a continuous deafening bombard-
ment the whole day. Shells were pitching everywhere and
anywhere. We had a nasty enfilade fire from machine guns
we could not locate, and from snipers. We got a message
in the front trench from the Brigadier, ' You have done
splendidly, the - - are coming up to reinforce you.' That
was about 11.15, and I remember thinking of you people in
England in church or strolling round the country lanes.

" Well, we held on with men getting hit in quite an un-
healthy way. We held on — we saw our reinforcements come
out, we saw them fade away. We found the Germans coming
up in force on our flanks. Then we got the order to retire.
There was nothing else to do, and it was bitter and damnable.

" Moreover, we had to fight our way through the German
lines again in order to regain our men. I can't go into details
of the hellish afternoon, for hours above our waists in the
mud and foul crawling water of the German communication
trenches, isolated and cut off by an enemy we could not see,
but who was steadily reducing our numbers by very excellent

io2 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

sniping. We were four subalterns in command of thirty to forty
men. Two of the officers were killed. The other man and
myself determined to wait until darkness and then try and get
through the German lines to our own. It was a risk, but
everything was a risk that day.

" To cut a long (and in reality too thrilling to be enjoy-
able) story short, we made the venture and we got through
back into our trenches about a quarter-past eight. Incidentally,
I found that I was reported killed. How and why I got through
without being hit I shall never know. In advancing under
cross fire men on either side of me — within hand's reach of
me — were killed. At one point I had halted my men for a
breather (it was in the first charge of the morning, after taking
the first and before reaching the second German trench). The
two men on each side of me (I could have touched any of the
four) went in succession. A bullet struck the ground between
my forehead and the ground (I was lying as flat as possible),
but it only covered my face and head with dust. When I
took up the first reinforcements to our front line we had to
cross a field of a hundred yards of flat, bare ground, with
scarcely a blade of grass and with a machine gun sweeping
the place and a sniper doing very pretty shooting — too pretty
for my liking though ; a corporal and myself were the only
ones of the party who got across without being hit.

" Our hottest time I think, though, was the final scramble
back over this ground to the British trench in the evening.
About 120-150 yards through German barbed wire and across
ground raked by a withering cross-fire. It was a hailstorm of
lead, bullets splitting up the ground and filling the air with the
buzz of angry bees and bursting shells. For one hellish moment
I was caught in the barbed wire, but managed somehow to
wrench myself free, my nose almost burrowing the ground.
Men were being hit all about me. Somehow, I shall never
know how or why, I got across the foot of our parapet. There
was a slight ridge there ; lying absolutely flat, it gave cover.
It was still light — about 7.45 — and I told the men about to
wait until it was darker before the last dash over the sandbags
into our lines.

" Believe or disbelieve the following, but it is a fact, and
it surprised no one more than myself. Lying there flat under
the slightest ridge of earth, with shells bursting and whistling
overhead, with bullets throwing up earth behind and before

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 103

and around one, and going ' phlat ' against the parapet which
was my desired haven twenty yards away — lying there I fell
fast asleep from sheer exhaustion. It must have been nearly
half an hour when I woke. I made the dash, scrambled up
the parapet, and flung myself over and down among our own
men. I never said ' Thank God ' as I said it then." *

The next advance was on the morning of Sun-
day, 1 6th May, and the ground chosen was that
immediately east of Festubert, where •*. ,
the German front showed a pronounced
salient. The Battle of Festubert, as it may well
be called, would in other wars, looking at the casu-
alties and the numbers engaged, have been a major
action, but in this campaign is ranked only as an
episode — one link in the long-drawn chain of the
Allied attack. Our artillery preparation began late
on the Saturday night, assisted by three groups of
French 75-mm. guns, and just after dawn the in-
fantry advanced. The movement was entrusted to
two brigades of the yth Division, and part of the
2nd Division and the Indian Corps. The latter
attacked on the left near Richebourg I'Avoue" ; the
aoth Brigade moved from the Rue du Bois south-
eastward ; while the 22nd Brigade on the right
advanced to the south-east of Festubert against the
Rue d'Ouvert.

The left of the movement was held up by a
tangle of fortified farms. The 2nd Division cap-
tured two lines of trenches, but the Indian Corps
found progress impossible. The centre, advancing
from the Rue du Bois, reached the Rue de Cailloux,
and progressed some distance beyond till it was
checked by a severe flanking fire. Reinforcements

* Quoted by permission of the Times.

104

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

enabled it to proceed, and it reached a point to the
north-west of La Quinque Rue. Brilliant work was

Scene of the Battle of Festubert.

done by the bombers of the ist Grenadiers, for in
these networks of trenches the old eighteenth-cen-

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 105

tury weapon was the most efficient we possessed for
close-quarters fighting. One company of the 2nd
Scots Guards got too far ahead and were cut off.
The remnants of two Canadian battalions, it will
be remembered, remained in St. Julien at the
Second Battle of Ypres, and of the same kind was
this stand of the Scots Guards. When, some days
later, we took the ground, we found the Guards
lying on the field of honour with swathes of the
enemy's dead around them.

The most successful movement was that of our
right, the 22nd Brigade, under General Lawford.
The 2nd Queens, the ist Royal Welsh Fusiliers,
and the ist South Staffords, with the 2nd Warwicks,
and the 8th Royal Scots (Territorial) in support,
advanced for more than a mile. The German
trenches at this point were curiously complicated,
and we reached what was their main communica-
tion trench near the Rue d'Ouvert. The country
was dead flat and seamed with watercourses, and
it was not easy to find the points indicated by our
air reconnaissance. The enemy attempted to make
a barrage of fire behind us, so that it was a perilous
business to get up reserves of men and ammunition.
The supports in the rear had to sit still during
hours of shelling — the most difficult of duties in
war. This kind of work puts a premium upon
individual gallantry, and that day showed a con-
spicuous example. Company Sergeant- Major Barter
of the ist Welsh Fusiliers, when his battalion reached
the first line of German trenches, called for volun-
teers. With the eight men who responded, he
cleared with bombs 500 yards of hostile trenches,
found and cut eleven mine leads, and captured three

io6 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

officers and 102 men — an exploit worthy to be
ranked with that of Sergeant Michael O'Leary on
ist February at Cuinchy. Sergeant-Major Barter
received the Victoria Cross.

Rain fell on the following day, and this and the
marshy character of the ground to some extent nulli-
fied the effect of the German cannonade, for shells
often sank into the earth without bursting. For
three days we fought for the German communica-
tion trench, and endeavoured to disentangle our
left from the network of German for tins. On the
Monday evening we made a second advance on the
•*. right, this time by means of the 2ist

y '' Brigade. In this fight the farthest point
was reached by the 4th Cameron Highlanders, a
Territorial battalion recruited largely from Skye
and the Outer Islands. Their advance began at
7.30 p.m., and presently they found themselves
faced by a deep ditch which could not be jumped.
It was Sedgemoor over again, when the appearance
of an unexpected stream threw out a whole move-
ment. Many of the men swam it, and one com-
pany reached the farthest German communication
trench. Here its flanks were in the air ; it had no
bombs ; reinforcements could not reach it ; while the
Germans were closing in on both sides and " water-
ing " the whole hinterland with their fire. In the
small hours a retirement was ordered — no light task,
for the parapet was high, and there were no com-
munication trenches (since the trench was itself a
communication trench). The battalion was re-
duced to half its strength when, worn out and mud
covered, it regained the British position.

This, the first stage of the Festubert fighting,

ALLIED OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST. 107

was worth the price, for the ground gained was con-
siderable, and we undoubtedly caused heavy losses
to the enemy. But the price was high. The 2Oth
Brigade, for example, lost 45 officers and 1,179 rnen.
Many battalion commanders fell, including such
gallant and unreplaceable officers as Lieutenant-
Colonel Brook of the 8th Royal Scots, Lieutenant-
Colonel Fraser of the 4th Camerons, Lieutenant-
Colonel Bottomley of the 2nd Queens, and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Gabbett of the ist Royal Welsh
Fusiliers.

During the rest of May we continued to make
progress and to consolidate our gains, though we
were still short of any vital strategical point. On
1 9th May the 2nd and 7th Divisions were relieved,
and their place taken by the Canadian Division and
the Highland Division (Territorial). On the night
of the 2ist the Canadians made a fine attack, in
which they advanced our line by several hundreds
of yards. On the 22nd the Highland Division joined
with the Indian Corps in a movement on the south
of La Quinque Rue, and during the three following
days ground was won by the Canadians and the
2nd London Division (Territorial). The 26th of
May has been taken by Sir John French as the
close of the battle, for on that day he gave orders
to Sir Douglas Haig to curtail the artillery attack
and consolidate the ground he had won.

The Commander-in-Chief thus summed up the
results : ' Since i6th May the First .-. s
Army has pierced the enemy's lines on
a total front of four miles. The entire first-line
system of trenches has been captured on a front of
3,200 yards, and on the remaining portion the first

io8 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

and second lines of trenches are in our possession.
The total number of prisoners taken is eight officers
and 777 of other ranks. Ten machine guns have
fallen into our hands, as well as a considerable
quantity of material and equipment."

Our difficulty was that which the French were
finding in the Artois — that the enemy's line under
attack did not bend, but broke into isolated forts.
It had lost its old cohesion, and it was noteworthy
that many of the prisoners taken were " rounded
up," and that there were attempts by large bodies
to surrender — attempts checked by the fire of their
own guns. But the very weakness of the front was
its strength. These fortins, bristling with machine
guns, made any general advance impossible till they
were taken ; and to capture them, short as 'we were
of artillery, was no easy matter. A new kind of
stalemate, therefore, appeared on the Western front
— the stalemate not of the trench line but of the
field fortress. It was siege warfare in its strictest
sense, .for, as if under a magician's wand, the coun-
tryside became studded with strongholds.

Meanwhile in Galicia the clouds had gathered
and broken. The fiercest German assault since the
autumn had imperilled the very existence of the
Russian armies. We must turn to the titanic war-
fare in the East.

CHAPTER LIII.

THE CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST.

The Anticipated Russian Offensive — The Consequences of the
Fall of Przemysl — The Russian Advance in the Carpathians —
German Activity in Courland — The German Concentration
behind the Donajetz — Its Secrecy and Object — The Russian
Dispositions — The German Dispositions — Von Mackensen's
Plan — Its Merits — Its Drawbacks — Beginning of the Move-
ment— Von Mackensen forces the Lines of the Donajetz
and the Biala — Dmitrieff retreats to the Wisloka — Brus-
silov's Difficulties — Retreat to the Wistok — Retreat to the
San — Russian Counter-strategy.

IN April Western Europe looked with confidence
to the Eastern front, where Russia seemed to
be winning her way to a position which would
give her a starting-place for her great summer
offensive. We knew that she had abundance of
trained men, and it was believed that there was
sufficient equipment to double the force which
had held the long winter lines. There was some
division of opinion, indeed, as to where the offensive
would fall. One school held that the old route by
Cracow to the Oder promised the best results ; an-
other considered that, having won fifty miles and
more of the Carpathian watershed, and in many
places dominating the southern debouchments of the
passes, she would sweep down upon the Hungarian
plains and strike a blow which would detach Hungary

no HISTORY OF THE WAR.

from her alliance and render her no more a German
granary. There was little evidence to decide be-
tween the rival views, for to clear the crest of the
Carpathians was a necessary preliminary both for
an advance to Cracow and a descent upon Hungary.
But on the main point there was no difference of
opinion. Russia would speedily assume a vigorous
and sustained offensive, the great offensive of the
Allied summer strategy.

What actually happened was, perhaps, the most
dramatic reversal of fortune which the campaigns
can show. So far from being the attacker, Russia
became the attacked. In a second, as it seemed,
the centre of gravity was changed, and the main
strength of Germany descended upon her in an
avalanche not less deadly than the great swing
from the Sambre and Meuse in the first months of
war. Under this assault the Russian offensive dis-
appeared like smoke. Cracow and the Hungarian
cornlands were forgotten, the gains of nine months
vanished, and the whole fortitude of the nation
was centred in a desperate effort to keep the South-
ern armies from destruction. It was a bitter blow
to the Allies, for it involved the postponement of
their main attack, and the lengthening of the war.
For Russia it meant a long season of peril and
heart-searching, much suffering, but never a mo-
ment of weakness or despair. She had been equable
in success, and she was no less calm and resolute
in misfortune. She was like that English worthy of
whom Fuller wrote : " Had one seen him return-
ing from a victory, he would by his silence have
suspected that he had lost the day ; and had he
beheld him in retreat, he would have collected

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST, in

him a conqueror by the cheerfulness ot his
spirit."

The release of Selivanov's army of Przemysl
enabled Ivanov to strengthen the front which op-
posed von Linsingen at Koziowa, and to weight the
blow of Brussilov's right wing against the Uzsok
and Lupkow passes. We know that the reinforce-
ments moved south in two columns, one towards
Stryj by the Sambor-Stryj railway, the other to-
wards Sanok for the Lupkow section. A small part
seems to have gone to Jaslo and Gorlice to reinforce
Radko Dmitrieffs left on the Biala. But it was not
possible for Russia to use her army of Przemysl as
Oyama had used Nogi's army of Port Arthur, which
decided the Battle of Mukden by its unexpected
offensive on the Japanese left. In a struggle for
mountain passes the theatre is necessarily circum-
scribed, and the number of men employed is strictly
determined by the slender communications and
narrow approaches. Ivanov wisely held most of
Selivanov's force in reserve, and the day was ap-
proaching when there was need of the ultimate
reserve in man and rifle.

Przemysl fell on 22nd March. On the 25th the
Russian position was well south of the Dukla near
Bartfeld, just short of the crest of the T/ ; c
range at the Lupkow and the Uzsok', and
then among the foothills till the Bukovina was
reached, where on that day they crossed the Pruth.
By the end of March the last Austrian position on
the Lupkow had fallen to them, and they were press-
ing hard against the village of Uzsok, to the east of
the pass of that name. Here they were aiming at

ii2 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the spurs of the hills running from the glens of the
Upper Dniester, which would command the Austrian
right defending the pass. All through the first week
of April the regions south of the Dukla and Lupkow
and north of the Uzsok were the centre of severe
fighting. The last of the winter storms was raging,
and from the Dukla to the Bukovina there was snow
to the thighs in all the higher glens. By the middle
of the month the crest of the range for seventy miles
was Russia's, but the Uzsok still maintained its
stubborn defence. Brussilov, while continuing his
frontal attack, pushed on with his right wing south
of the watershed, and tried to work his way to the
rear of the Uzsok position from the Laborcz and
Ung valleys. The important junction of Eperies
south of the range was rendered useless to the
enemy, and the Austrians took some steps to clear
the inhabitants from the Ung valley. Brussilov was
now within two or three days' march of the Hun-
garian plains. From the iyth to the 2Oth the
/, 7 ^_ Austrian offensive suddenly revived, and

^ ' there was a vigorous counter-attack

against Brussilov 's left flank in the

vicinity of Stryj. By the 22nd the attack had failed,

/, y and the Russians in turn were pressing

•" ' on the Bukovina border. In somewhat

less than five weeks of fighting in the Carpathian
area Ivanov had captured, according to a Russian
communique, more than 30 guns and 200 machine
guns, and had taken over 70,000 prisoners, including
900 officers.

The last fortnight of April saw one of those
sudden thaws which Poland and Galicia know well.
The high valleys became impassable, for the melt-

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 113

ing snow had brimmed every torrent. Fighting,
therefore, was perforce confined to the foothills,
and on 25th April another Austrian counter-attack
developed all along the line from Ko- * .,
ziowa to the Delatyn Pass, and lasted for *
the better part of a week. General von Linsingen's
army appeared to be aiming at the Stryj-Stanislau
railway, and observers in the West assumed that
this was the last desperate effort of Austria to save
the Carpathian line, and with it the Hungarian low-
lands. A further portion of the Przemysl army was
hurried to this section, which was precisely what
the Austrians desired.

During April, too, there had been a curious
activity on the extreme north of the Eastern front.
On iyth March a Russian detachment ,, ,
had occupied the East Prussian town of '*

Memel, and had held it till the 2ist, when they re-
tired before a German relieving force. On the 25th
the Germans retaliated by bombarding ,, ,
the villages of the Courland coast by
means of their Baltic squadron, and sending a body
of East Prussian Landsturm, under Prince Joachim,
across the frontier, which captured Tauroggen,
north of the Niemen. On the last day of March
Libau was heavily shelled by the Ger- ** ,
man fleet, and during April the East
Prussians made some progress towards the line of
the Dubissa.

Observers in the West read in this northern
activity and the counter - attack towards Stryj
the same lesson. Both were attempts to relieve
the pressure on the Carpathian line, which threat-
ened at any moment to collapse and uncover Hun-

vii. 8

ii4 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

gary. The observers were wrong ; they were feints
to mislead Russia. For in the very region which
was confidently expected to be the scene of that
great offensive that should give her Cracow, a
mighty blow was preparing which was to wring all
Galicia from her hands.

Rarely has a secret been better kept. No accu-
rate details were known till the blow had fallen,
but curiously enough the possibility had been widely
canvassed for weeks, and very generally dismissed.

Abr'l A ^e ^rst ^mt came ab°ut 4th April,

* '" when fighting was reported on Dmi-
trieff's right on the Biala. Small attacks were
undertaken there, in order that when the great move-
ment began it should not at first be recognized for
what it was, but assumed to be merely a continua-
tion of the sporadic assaults of the past. On 6th

Ai) 7 6 April came a story that a German corps

* had been sent from Flanders by way of
Munich to the Carpathians, and that Austria was
withdrawing troops from Tirol for the same pur-

». -i pose. On 1 3th April large bodies of
* 3* German troops were reported to be
passing through Czestochowa. Then, from the
iyth onward, came the attacks on Brussilov's left
in the Stryj neighbourhood, and all the rumours
seemed adequately explained. The enemy had been
making a last effort to keep the invaders north of
the mountains. On the 23rd the Russian newspapers
discussed frankly the appearance of new German
armies round Cracow. From the 24th for several days
there was an almost complete absence of news.. The
reason was that the German censorship had suddenly
been drawn tight, for the bolt was ready to launch.

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 115

From the fall of Przemysl onward Germany had
been busy behind her frontiers. Her Landsturm
might go raiding with Prince Joachim, and her
Bavarians battle with von Linsingen for the passes,
but these were only the fringes of a mighty effort.
Three-fourths at least of the winter's accumulation
of shell were brought to Cracow and carried out
by night to the Donajetz line. Guns of every
calibre came from everywhere on the Eastern and
Western fronts and from Essen and Pilsen and
Budapest, and in one section alone of about twenty
miles along the Biala over 1,000 pieces were placed
in position. Train after train kept bringing material
and pontoons, and all the supplies of the Engineers,
for the land before them was a land of rivers. New
hospital stations and new depots for food and muni-
tions were prepared close behind the front ; a new
telegraph network was established ; great bands of
cattle were driven up to their pens under cover of
darkness. And then came the troops — from the
East and the West fronts, and new levies from
Austria and Hungary and Germany — all silently
getting into place in a great hive of energy from the
Nida to the Carpathians. Meanwhile Dmitrieff, in
the Donajetz lines half a mile off, inspected his
trenches and conducted his minor attacks and
counter-attacks without an inkling of what was
brewing. German organization had put forth a
supreme effort. The world has never seen a greater
concentration of men and guns more swiftly or more
silently achieved.

How came Russia to be caught napping ? The
question is easier to ask than to answer. There
were rumours in the West during March and April

n6 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

that the next German thrust would be eastward
from Cracow. The activity in Germany, the troop
trains passing up the Oder valley, might be directed
to this end ; but, on the other hand, they might not.
They might pass through the Gap of Moravia, to
the south side of the Carpathians, to reinforce
Boehm-Ermolli, or von Linsingen, or von Pflanzer.
This possibility of a double interpretation for a
movement which was known, at any rate in part,
to the Russian Staff was exactly what Germany had
counted on. That was why the counter-attack upon
Stryj was undertaken. Up to the very eve of the
great blow Russia's eyes looked south and east for
the enemy rather than west.

At the same time, it was undoubtedly anticipated
that a blow would be struck against the Donajetz,
but the Grand Duke Nicholas had no notion of the
strength in which it would be delivered. Like every
other Allied commander, he was ignorant of the
gigantic artillery strength which it had been Ger-
many's winter work to accumulate. He expected no
more than the ordinary attack of von Woyrsch's army,
a little reinforced, perhaps, by German troops, which
Dmitrieff had for four months beaten off with ease.
The Donajetz position, with the river big with melt-
ing snows, was believed to be impregnable. So, in-
deed, it was to any ordinary attack. Dmitrieff had
dug himself in securely since that day in December
when he first took up the ground. Unfortunately,
confident in the strength of his defence, he had
neglected to create second and third lines to which
in an emergency he could retire. Behind him was
a series of rivers — the Wisloka, the Wistok, and the
San. The first would give a good straight river line

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 117

covering the main western passes which Brussilov
held. But if he was forced from the Wisloka, there
was no river in the rear to afford complete cover to
his front, and the situation of Brussilov in the
mountains would be dangerously compromised.
Dmitrieff, a brilliant and audacious leader in a
manoeuvre battle, showed himself too little prescient
and cautious in a war of positions.

In the last week of April there had been no
change in the Russian commands, except in the
northern army group, where General Ruzsky, whose
health had suffered gravely from the winter cam-
paign, gave place on Easter Day to General Alexeiev,
who had commanded the little army » •,
in the Bukovina. Alexeiev had begun "
his military career in the Turkish war of 1877, an(^
had been Chief of the General Staff in the Kiev
command. In the south, in Ivanov's group, Ewarts
commanded the army on the Nida, Dmitrieff that
on the Donajetz and the Biala, Brussilov the main
army of the Carpathians, and Lechitsky the forces
in the Bukovina. Ivanov's aim was to clear the
passes and the southern foothills of the mountains,
after which a movement south into Hungary or west
towards Cracow could be undertaken at his dis-
cretion. The spring had brought him large new
armies, not yet fully equipped, and especially lacking
in heavy artillery. He may have considered that
until he was better supplied with shells the valley
warfare of the Carpathians was more suitable to
his forces than an attack upon the entrenchments
of Cracow.

During April there was a very complete read-
justment of the commands and forces of the Teutonic

n8 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

League from the Nida to the Sereth. Until then
von Woyrsch, in succession to Dankl, had com-
manded on the Nida, the Archduke Joseph Ferdi-
nand on the Donajetz, Boehm-Ermolli and the
German von Linsingen in the Central Carpathians,
and von Pflanzer in the Bukovina. Now the whole
group was placed under direct German control,
von Hindenburg's former lieutenant, von Macken-
sen, taking up the work of group commander. Von
Woyrsch still commanded north of the Upper Vis-
tula. Then, tightly packed in the narrows between
the river and the hills, came the army of the Arch-
duke Joseph Ferdinand and the German army of
von Mackensen. Boehm-Ermolli, with whom were
Boroevitch von Bojna and von Marwitz,* faced
Brussilov's right in the Carpathians, von Linsingen
was opposite Koziowa and the road to Stryj, while
to the east von Bothmer and von Pflanzer com-
manded the front towards the Sereth. These,
with one exception, were the armies of the previous
month, with the commands slightly rearranged.
The exception was von Mackensen's force on the
left centre, which was the operative part of the
whole machine.

Von Mackensen's army was probably the strong-
est which Germany had ever mustered under one
general. We cannot yet with any exactness deter-
mine its size or its constitution. Its nucleus was the
force with which he had delivered his famous thrust
against the Bzura and Rawka lines, swollen with some
divisions from the East Prussia command. He re-

* He had commanded the German cavalry in the advance
on Paris the previous August, and had subsequently been a
corps commander in the German forces north of Przasnysz.

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 119

ceived in addition the rest of the Prussian Guard
Reserve Corps from the Western front, the loth Corps
(Hanover), which had once been with von Kluck,
and the 4ist Reserve Corps. We saw in the previ-
ous chapter that the Germans had created fourteen
new " divisions of assault " by skimming the cream
from their first-line corps. How many of these von
Mackensen received is still in doubt ; two for cer-
tain were with him, and it is possible that as the
fight continued he received not less than eight.
His units had been brought up to full strength by
the inclusion of recruits from the classes just called
to the colours, and these recruits, be it remembered,
were of the best quality. Altogether it is probable
that his thrusting weapon, his phalanx of assault,
was not less than ten corps strong, and its artillery
supports were far superior to those of the whole
Russian southern front. One report put his heavy
batteries as high as 2,000 pieces, and they cannot
have been less than 1,500. The Austrian strength
—the total army except the two corps facing Serbia
—was at the moment something over a million, and
scattered among the different commands to give
them stiffening were at least six German corps,
mostly new formations like the 3ist and 33rd, but
including one first-line Bavarian corps. The total
force from the Nida to the Sereth we may esti-
mate as not less than two millions. Against this
Russia could, if she chose, produce an equivalent
number of men, but she had not the equipment.
Her immense man-power was still hampered by an
inadequate machine. It was her fate to play the
part of von Winkelried at Sempach, and draw a
multitude of spears to her naked breast.

120 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Von Mackensen, soon to be made a field-marshal
for his services, was one of the ablest of the German
generals. A Saxon by birth, he had risen, like
von Kluck, by sheer merit to high command.
He had been responsible for the great offensive
of November which had given Germany Western
Poland, and had gravely threatened Warsaw. It
is an idle task to speculate upon the special re-
sponsibility for a strategic scheme. Von Hinden-
burg had accustomed the world to look for sledge-
hammer blows, and much of the new offensive was
after the true Hindenburg fashion. But there were
elements of ingenuity which were not in his manner,
and these, and the skilful tactical handling, should
probably go to von Mackensen's credit. Germany
had never played her traditional game to more
brilliant effect than in the movement which we
have now to relate. It was more dramatic than
her great sweep on Paris in August, for then she
was working in the heyday of her first enthusiasm ;
whereas now she was stemming a hostile tide after
long months of drawn battles. There was no de-
generacy in the fighting quality of a Power which
could thus belie the expectation of the world, and
out of set-backs and checks snatch the materials
for a sounding triumph.

The elements of von Mackensen's plan were
simple, like the elements of all great strategy. The
main fact was that, for all her success, Russia's
southern position was not a good one. She was
holding the southern side of a salient, and so was
virtually enveloped ; only the mountain barrier of
the Carpathians and the weakness of the Austrian
armies prevented her from suffering the usual effects

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 121

of envelopment. Now in such a position a strong
blow does not merely dint a line ; it may compel
a wholesale retreat of remote parts of the front.
Russia's communications were the main railway
through Przemysl and Lemberg, and the southern
line which follows the foothills by Jaslo, Sanok, and
Stryj. A thrust from the Bukovina which recap-
tured Lemberg would mean the retreat of the
whole Russian front in Western Galicia. A blow
from the central passes which reached Jaroslav
would cut off Dmitrieff on the Donajetz and the
bulk of Brussilov's army. Finally, a thrust from
the Donajetz which succeeded would uncover the
Galician outlets of the passes which Russia held,
and drive Brussilov back from the watershed. Ob-
viously the first and second of these plans, if they
could be compassed, would be the most fruitful.
But Germany's trump card was her mass of artil-
lery, and this could not be handled with precision
among the wooded glens of the Bukovina or the
strait valleys of the Central Carpathians. The place
for it was the rolling plateau of Galicia. Accord-
ingly the thrust was made from the Donajetz.

The ultimate aim was clear. If the German
guns were numerous enough and fully supplied
with ammunition, there would be no rest for the
Russian armies till they were outside the zone of
good Austrian railways, and back among the in-
different communications beyond their own frontier.
It was a mathematical calculation. A certain weight
of shell would make any position untenable. This
meant that Przemysl and Lemberg would be re-
taken and handed back to Austria as a proof of the
potency of her ally. It meant that the valuable

122 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

oil-fields of Galicia would once again be in German
hands. It meant that the Hungarian cornlands
would be safe, and Count Tisza would be appeased.
It meant that the coquetries of Rumania with the
Allies would be summarily ended. She would no
longer be disposed to attack Austria, and, if she had
the disposition, she would not have the power.

These were political ends, important, but still
secondary. The main purpose was military — not
the reoccupation of territory, but the crippling
of Russia's field armies. If von Mackensen could
push Ivanov out of Galicia, a time would come when
the Russian front would have to fall back everywhere
to conform. The ultimate position would be south-
west of the railway from Rovno by Cholm, Lublin,
and Ivangorod to Warsaw, which would provide it
with lateral communications. If that position was
broken, then Warsaw must fall, and the whole front
retire behind the Polish Triangle. This would mean
that the armies of the north, based on Petrograd
and Moscow, and the armies of the south, based
on Kiev, were in danger of being separated by that
triangle of lake and swamp called the Marshes of
Pinsk or Pripet, over which lay no communications for
large masses of modern troops . If that happened , then
Alexeiev and Ivanov would be out of touch. It was
not the capture of Warsaw which would damage
Russia's position, but this isolation of her army
groups. No offensive would be possible for months
if such a fate was hers. The German high com-
mand had at the moment no desire to risk the
fortune of Charles XII. and Napoleon, and embark
on a serious invasion of Russia. Enough for them
to put the Russian armies temporarily out of action.

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 123

The plan was bold and sagacious, but it had
one drawback. It demanded nothing short of com-
plete success. If the Russian forces could be driven
over their border, and so split up that concentrated
action was impossible for many months, then indeed
a great thing would have been gained, and a million
men might be spared to reinforce the Western front.
But it was not enough merely to drive them out of
Galicia. It would be a costly process, and even
though the Russians lost more heavily, they could
afford it better. Somewhere in the not very dis-
tant future lurked for Germany the spectre of
shortage of men, and, if she wasted her manhood
in her costly methods of war for the sake of any-
thing but the most decisive successes, her case
would be evil. A new trench line on the eastern
Galician frontier would be no real change in the
situation. It would be more difficult to hold, for
her lines of communication would be several hundred
miles longer, and as the result of her efforts she
would have fewer men to hold it with. Russia
would still be permitted a dangerous offensive.
Therefore it was incumbent upon von Mackensen
to carry out the whole of his plan. Nothing less
would suffice. A partial success, however splendid
it might appear, would be a failure, for it would
leave him weaker and in a worse position than
when he started.

On the morning of Wednesday, z8th April, the
Austrian-German front lay along the left bank of
the Donajetz to its junction with the j. •/ o
Biala ; then along the left bank of the "?'
Biala to the foothills of the Carpathians, where

124 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

it crossed to the right bank in the vicinity of Ropa.
Its communications were good, for it had for its
left the Vistula, for its centre the main railway from
Cracow, and for its right the line which runs through
Novo Sandek to the junction at Grybow, on the
Biala. The possession of Tarnow, then held by
Dmitrieff, would give it a valuable cross line up
the Biala valley.

During these last days Dmitrieff was growing
anxious. He began to realize that a great effort was
pending, and he applied to Ivanov for two further
corps. By some blunder of a staff officer, the request
never reached Ivanov. Dmitrieff was left to meet
the enemy with no more than his winter strength.

On the 28th the action began with an advance of
von Mackensen's right on the Upper Biala towards
Gorlice. The place was skilfully chosen, for it had
already been the object of some minor attacks, and
the additional pressure did not at first reveal the
importance of the movement. It is a vital advantage
for a general not only to keep his concentration
secret, but to get the actual fighting begun before the
enemy realizes what it means. Further, a success
here would outflank DmitrierFs position, and would
threaten the rear of Brussilov's right wing, now well
south of the Dukla Pass.

For two days the attack progressed, positions

were won, and Dmitrieff was compelled to weaken

», his front in order to support his left.

y If Then on Saturday, ist May, the great

batteries were loosed. The centre of the attack was

now the village of Ciezkowice, half-way between

Grybow and Tarnow. Under cover of a prodigious

artillery fire bridges were pushed across the Biala,

'" ,.

.

X

HI/**

//*

ft*

^Ciezkcwice

Crossing
forced. May 2

,

r

Ropa ^^ Openng
^ attack
Apr. 28

r P a t

, •

6 •?

10

16

3

, Miles

The Forcing of the Donajetz-Biala Line.

126 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

and Ciezkowice was taken. Its oil tanks were set
on fire, and soon it was a heap of smouldering ruins.
Hundreds of guns were unmasked northward along
the valley, and the Russian position was simply
blown out of existence. Over 700,000 shells were
said to have been hurled into the Russian trenches.
It was Neuve Chapelle over again, and a greater
than Neuve Chapelle. The Russians had no
artillery powerful enough to check the awful
storm. Taken by surprise, they made what fight
they could, but the bravest of men cannot continue
in trenches which have ceased to exist. Meanwhile
the force which had crossed at Ciezkowice acted in
conjunction \vith the advance from Ropa, took
Gorlice, and turned the whole of DmitriefFs front.
jyr On Sunday, 2nd May, the defence col-

lapsed. Masses of the enemy had forced
the Donajetz-Biala line at various points, and by
that afternoon the Russians were retreating twenty
miles to the line of the Wisloka.

Von Mackensen had won an indisputable vic-
tory. The retreat to the Wisloka was not far from
a rout, and Dmitrieff paid the penalty in guns and
men for not having prepared a series of alternative
positions. Especially in the south the Russians
fared ill. The troops in the Carpathian foothills
extricated themselves only with heavy losses, which
fell especially upon the 48th Division. The Wis-
loka was a river and no more ; no entrenchments
had been made ready ; and the guns which had
driven in the Donajetz line would have little diffi-
culty in annihilating one so conspicuously weaker.

But by this time the Russians had recovered
from their first surprise, and they made a wonderful

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 127

stand on the Wisloka. Reinforcements had been
hurried up, including General Irmanov's famous
Caucasian Corps from the Bzura front. The
Caucasians, taking counsel from the valour of
their hearts, defied the artillery storm and got to
grips with the enemy. They lost 10,000 men, for
they had no heavy guns ; but in close-quarter fight-
ing, though reduced to 6,000 men, they captured a
heavy battery, took 7,000 prisoners, and slew many
thousands more. But in spite of this more than
mortal courage, the case was hopeless. For five days
—from Sunday, 2nd May, to Friday, 7th May — the
Russians clung to their shallow trenches on its eastern
bank. Von Mackensen delivered his main attack
against the railway crossing at Jaslo, and forced it
early on the morning of the 7th. Had the Wisloka
been held the Dukla might still have ,*
been saved, but when it went the troops ''

in the hills were in deadly danger. They fell back
in something of a rout, and von Mackensen's right
gave them no rest. Their goal was the upper glen
of the Wistok, and the Germans followed along the
two railways which branch eastward from Jaslo.

By the Saturday evening the enemy had n/r 0
*u ixr «. u «.u -i M0y 8.

won the Wistok, crossing by the railway

bridge east of Rymanow, and lower down at the
sharp bend of the river near Frysztak. Only the
Russian right succeeded in making a stand. It ran
from Debica, on the Cracow-Jaroslav line, to the
Vistula, a few miles west of the point where it re-
ceives the Wisloka. Ewarts' army on the north
shore had meantime fallen back from the Nida to
the Czarna, to conform with the southern retirement.
The forcing of the Upper Wistok had in effect

The Passage of the Wisloka and the Wistok.

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 129

broken the Russian line. For a moment it looked
as if von Mackensen were about to roll up the two
halves and effect a second Sedan. But the Russians
were now alive to the German purpose, and had
devised a strategy to meet the danger. At all costs
they must prevent a disaster to their left, so they
pushed out strong forces from Sanok, on the Upper
San, to stem the enemy's tide, which was surging
now beyond the Upper Wist ok. This temporary
check enabled Brussilov's army, after much desperate
fighting during the Sunday and Monday, to extri-
cate itself from the Carpathian foothills. The
troops from south of the Dukla and Lupkow passes
had a long way to travel, and the Germans naturally
made many prisoners. At the same time Ivanov's
right centre was compelled to fall back from the
Wisloka to the Lower Wist ok.

Next day, Tuesday, nth May, the retirement
to the San began. The Russian left was already
across its upper waters, and by the •**
Wednesday evening the bulk of the line
lay just west of the Lower San as far as Przemysl
and then south across the broken country to the
Upper Dniester, whence it was continued to the old
Koziowa position, which was still intact. During
the two following days the San was crossed, except
in its extreme lower course, and the front ran from
Przemysl northward along the right bank of the
river. That was on the evening of Friday, i4th
May. The latter part of the retirement ,,
was managed with great skill and in
perfect order. The bridge-head at Jaroslav was
held till troops and guns were safely across, in spite
of all von Mackensen *s efforts to turn the retreat

VII. Q

130 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

into a rout. In a fortnight the army of Dmitrieff
had fallen back eighty-five miles, and had lost heavily
in prisoners and in material — losses exceeded by
Brussilov's troops, who had to cut their way out of
the hills. In some cases a corps lost three-fourths
of its strength. But both armies were still in being.
Ivanov's southern front had not been broken.

The Russian alignment along the San marked the
end of the first stage of the great German offensive
in the East. That stage had within itself two phases.
There was first the overwhelming thrust and the
huddled Russian retreat till the Wist ok was reached.
They stayed not upon the order of their going,
outnumbered as they were, and blasted and scorched
by the fiercest artillery bombardment which the
world had seen. We know what was the result of
Neuve Chapelle and Carency, and here the fire was
greater, more universal, and more sustained. In
these circumstances the stand for five days on the
Wisloka, which enabled the guns to get away and
saved Brussilov from destruction, must rank as a
surprising feat of arms. Like the brother of ^Eschy-
lus, who at Salamis grappled a Persian ship, and
when his hands were cut off clung by his teeth,
thereby earning immortal fame among his country-
men, the Russians in their uttermost peril showed
all the craggy fortitude of their race. Their rear-
guards held the pass till the army could make good
its escape. Not less fine was the dash of Brussilov's
troops through the Carpathian foothills. They
fought their way to safety as Bulgakov's remnant
had fought in February through the Augustovo
forests. Their losses were terrible, but it was still
an army that assembled on the Wist ok.

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 131

From the Wistok onward the case was changed.
The Grand Duke Nicholas had mastered the facts
of the situation. It was idle to hope to withstand
von Mackensen's onslaught. That terrific phalanx
of men in close formation, preceded by a thunder-

The Russian Retreat from the DonajeU to the San.

storm of shell, could only be countered by a machine
of the same quality, and that Russia did not possess.
The German Stan was right. The laws of mathe-
matics apply universally, and this was a mathe-
matical calculation. Russia must give way before
the blast. But the most elaborate accumulation of

1 32 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

war material will some day be expended, and a
phalanx is the weaker for every thrust. It was
Russia's business to exhaust the great machine by
drawing it out to full stretch, though hundreds of
miles of territory should be sacrificed in the pro-
cess. The danger was from von Mackensen. If
we may judge by the stand of the Russian right,
the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had not
proved over formidable ; and it is obvious that that
of Boehm-Ermolli had blundered, or Brussilov,
caught between two fires, would never have been
able to bring away most of his forces. Before von
Mackensen retreat must be the only course, but it
must be retreat in close contact with the enemy,
drawing his fire, exhausting his munitions, and de-
pleting his ranks. It could not be such a retreat
as lured on Charles XII. and Napoleon, but one in
which the Austro-German troops had to fight for
every mile and halt again and again on bloody battle-
fields. From the Wistok onwards the Grand Duke
Nicholas had the reins tight in his hands. His
object was to save the most for Russia at the greatest
cost to the enemy.

But he made no mistake about the German
strength. His policy involved a retreat not of miles
and days, but of leagues and weeks. Behind Ivanov's
line lay Przemysl, for whose capture ten weeks be-
fore all the bells in Russia had rung, and Lemberg,
which had been the first spoil of Russian arms.
Two hundred miles north was the great city of
Warsaw, for which Germany had thrice striven in
vain. Such a retreat as the Grand Duke contem-
plated might give all three to German hands, and
one at least was doomed when his armies fell back

CLOUDS GATHER IN THE EAST. 133

on the San. But it has always been a trait of that
great nation that it sits loose in its territorial affec-
tions. The words which Kutusov, in Tolstoy's
War and Peace, speaks to his council on the ques-
tion of the sacrifice of Moscow, have always been
the creed of Russia's generals.* No province or
ancient city was to be weighed for a moment against
the safety of the armies of Russia. The Grand
Duke was aware that von Mackensen must succeed
fully or not at all, and he knew that success did not
mean the occupation of territory. Though the
Russian armies were to be forced back to the Bug
and the Sereth, and Warsaw, Lemberg, and Przemysl
were to be prize of the conqueror, yet if these
armies were still intact the adventure had failed.

* " The ancient and holy capital of Russia ! Allow me
to remind your Excellency that the phrase conveys absolutely
no meaning to Russian hearts. ... It is simply a military
problem, to be stated as follows : Since the safety of the country
depends on the army, is it more advantageous to risk its
destruction and the loss of Moscow by fighting a pitched
battle, or to withdraw without resistance and leave the city
to its fate ? ... In virtue of the power placed in my hands by
the Czar and my country, I command that we shall retreat."

CHAPTER LIV.

IVANOV'S RETREAT.

Situation on i4th May — Meaning of von Mackensen's " Phalanx "
— Ewarts' Counter-attack at Opatow — Russian Success on
Bukovina Frontier — Unimportance of Flank Battles — The
Battle of the San — Situation of Przemysl — Russians evacu-
ate the Fortress — Von Mackensen enters Przemysl — Value
of his Success — Von Linsingen crosses the Dniester —
Brussilov forces him back — Von Mackensen swings North-
east— Capture of Mosciska — Russians retire on Grodek Posi-
tion— Russian Left forced back from the Pruth — Von
Mackensen turns Lemberg on the North — Fall of Lemberg —
Its Significance — Ivanov's Position on 2ist June — Von
Mackensen's Aim — German Movement in Courland and on
the Narev — German Dispositions — Beginning of Second
Phase in German Attack.

IT was now the morning of Friday, i4th May.
Ivanov's right, under Ewarts, was being pushed
towards the Vistula, but was still in the neigh-
bourhood of Opatow. His right centre was west of
jy, the Lower San, his centre east of the

river had looped forward so as to cover
Przemysl, his left centre was along the Upper
Dniester, while his left was conducting a counter-
offensive in the district between the Dniester and
the Pruth. The Russian wings, as we shall see,
were having some success, but the main movement
was in the centre, where von Mackensen's phalanx
was slowly coming once again into action. It
travelled leisurely, for with the best communications

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 135

in the world you cannot move 2,000 heavy pieces
and a great weight of shells with the speed of in-
fantry. It had for its passage the two good rail-
ways of Western Galicia, and along the highroads
light rails had been laid to facilitate its transport.
May on the Eastern front was a month of constant
rain, and rivers and floods clogged the mobility of
the great machine. Once again the Russians drew
some assistance from the weather.

What are we to understand by a " phalanx " as
used in this supreme German thrust ? To the
minds of most people the word brings the picture
of a compact oblong of men, packed like sardines,
and gaining their effect by the sheer weight of human
bodies. Ii they elaborate the idea they still think
of the phalanx of Pyrrhus or Alexander, or the dense
infantry masses of mediaeval battles. But the whole
conception is erroneous in modern war. The Ger-
mans believed in massed attacks,* but the density
of their order was relative to the British practice,
and had always in view the conditions laid down by
modern weapons. A mass is a good target, and its
striking power is at any one moment only the strik-
ing power of the men in its front rank. Von Mack-
ensen would seem to have launched his infantry in
successive lines, perhaps a score of yards apart. In
each line the men were in what we should regard
as close order, probably one man to the yard, which
would appear to be the limit of density compatible
with free individual movement. This formation
had the moral effect of weight : each man felt that
he was closely supported to left and right and
behind. We must therefore think of von Mack-
* See Vol. II., p. 30 and p. 206.

136 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ensen's tactics as a series of efforts by lines of men
in close order, and not the impulsive power of a
serried mass.

Such tactics, according to the British view,
would not prevail against well- disciplined and well-
entrenched infantry. The experiment was tried at
Mons and at Ypres, and failed. But von Macken-
sen calculated upon the disintegrating effect of his
artillery bombardments. It was not an attack of
massed infantry upon infantry in position, but of
fresh troops against a dazed and broken foe. The
phalanx was destined to perform the work usually
assigned to cavalry — to complete an action by dis-
integrating the last remnants of the defence. On
this theory von Mackensen's tactics were sound,
but the artillery preparation beforehand had to be
sufficient. Otherwise, if anything was left to the
defence, the attack lost terribly. In this advance
there were places where the bombardment was in-
complete, and the German infantry came upon trench
lines still held and machine-gun positions, and went
down like corn before the scythe. In spite of their
many guns, there is reason to believe that between
the Donajetz and the San the German ranks paid a
toll scarcely less heavy than the Russian.

It was Ivanov's aim to check the enemy till such
time as Przemysl could be cleared of supplies and
armament. His method was a holding battle on his
centre and a vigorous counter-thrust on his wings.
Let us look first at the battles on the flanks.

Ewarts' army, the right wing of Ivanov's com-
mand, had been compelled by the retirement of the
centre to fall back from the Nida towards the Vis-
tula. It was opposed by von Woyrsch's Austrian

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 137

army, which had not the fighting value of von Mack-
ensen's centre, and its retreat was determined by
the strategical necessity of conforming, rather than
by superior pressure. It retired behind Kielce,
which gave von Woyrsch the railway junction and
the branch line to Ostrowiecs. It will be remem-
bered that in the first assault on Warsaw this line
had played a great part, since from Ostrowiecs a
good road led to the easiest crossing of the Middle
Vistula at Josef ov. On Friday, i4th May, the Rus-
sian right was well in front of Ostrowiecs, and ran
through the town of Opatow to the Vistula, west of
its confluence with the San.

Ivanov resolved to attempt a counter-attack
which would both check the dangerous move on
Josefov and, if fortune favoured, do something to
relieve the pressure on his centre. Von Woyrsch's
advance guard, consisting from left to right of two
German divisions, the Austrian 25th Division under
the Archduke Peter Ferdinand, an Austrian Land-
wehr division, and a Hungarian Honv6d division,
was progressing comfortably under the impression
that the Russians would not make a stand till the
Vistula was reached, when, on the morning of
Saturday, I5th May, Ewarts suddenly ,•*
struck. His blow was aimed at both
flanks of the advance, while his Cossacks fetched a
wide circuit and fell upon the Austrian communi-
cations. The result was that, in a three days' battle,
von Woyrsch was well beaten with nearly 30,000
casualties, and fell back to west of Iwaniska, where
he received reinforcements which enabled him to
make a stand. This action was fought largely with
the bayonet, and since the enemy was caught in the

138 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

open, the traditional Russian pre-eminence in this
arm had full play. The troops just south of
Ewarts along the San, infected by the activity on
their right, delivered a fierce attack, which drove
back the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to the town
of Tarnobrzeg, on the Vistula. Here the action
was stayed, rather because of Ivanov's general orders
than because the Russian energy was exhausted.
With his right wing much depleted for supports to
his centre, he had not the troops to attempt a true
enveloping action on a flank.

On the extreme Russian left, on the frontiers of
the Bukovina, von Pflanzer's forces had been gradu-
ally pushing back the Qth Army of General Lechit-
sky. He had a position which on his left was about
half-way between Nadworna, on the Delatyn rail-
way, and the important junction of Stanislau. His
right centre was on the Lower Dniester, holding
the railway crossing of Zalestchiki. On Qth May
,* the Russians struck at this extended

ay °* front, which can scarcely have been less
than a hundred miles long, and in five days' fight-
ing cleared von Pflanzer from the Dniester line.
jyr By Saturday, the i5th, the Austrian left

ay **' was back on the Pruth, and Nadworna
was in Russian hands. The Russians, too, were on
the south side of the Pruth at Sniatyn, and they
had cut the railway between Austria and the Buko-
vina. They were threatening, but had not taken,
the towns of Kolomea and Czernowitz.

It was a considerable success. They had driven
back the enemy in some places as much as thirty
miles, and had for the moment checked a move-
ment which might have cut one of their communi-

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 139

cations with southern Russia. On a different kind
of front these two rapid and effective blows at the
wings would have compelled a halt in the centre.
But in the situation of the Galician armies they had
only a local effect. The Russian right, as we have
seen, was too weak to attempt an enveloping move-
ment or the cutting of von Mackensen's and the
Archduke Joseph's communications. The Russian
left, though it drove the enemy back to the hills,
could incommode von Pflanzer only, and not the
whole Austro-German command. To strike at the
main enemy communications it would have to ad-
vance over the passes into the Hungarian plains,
and for this it had not the men or munitions. The
Carpathian barrier had the effect of making the
central enemy advance singularly insensitive to what
happened on its right wing. We may, therefore,
regard Ivanov's two counter-attacks as merely efforts
to gain time. The centre of gravity was on the
San, where von Mackensen's success would render
nugatory the losses of von Woyrsch or von Pflanzer.
The Battle of the San began on Saturday, I5th
May, and must rank as one of the major conflicts
of the war. It is important to note the Austro-
German dispositions, and the direction of the con-
verging attacks. On the left the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand was operating against the Lower San,
from the Vistula up to the neighbourhood of Jaro-
slav. The Russians held the left bank close to the
stream from Jaroslav down to Sieniawa, and from
that point ran well to the west till the Vistula was
reached at Tarnobrzeg. From Jaroslav they fol-
lowed the San in front of Przemysl, bent round
in a shallow salient to the railway junction of

140

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Dobromil, and then ran east by Sambor, Droho-
bycz, and Stryj, covering the upper waters of the
Dniester. Against the section Jaroslav-Przemysl
von Mackensen's phalanx was advancing on a
narrow front, with the corps of Boroevitch von
Bojna supporting its right. Boehm-Ermolli's forces,
having crossed the Dukla and Lupkow passes, were

Situation on the Eve of the Recapture of Przemysl.

moving against the re-entrant of the salient, just
south of Przemysl ; and his right wing, under von
Marwitz, was aiming at the railway between Dobro-
mil and Sambor. Von Linsingen, having at last
forced the Koziowa position, was moving upon Stryj
and the line of the Dniester, with his right flung out
in the direction of Halicz, where contact was at-
tained with the extreme right, under von Pflanzer.

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 141

About midnight on Saturday Jaroslav fell. The
Russian rearguard was driven from the low heights
west of the town, but it had fought a delaying action
sufficient to ensure the passage of the San for the
rest of the Russian centre. All Sunday *, ,
the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand battled j
for the San crossings, and on Monday '"
160,000 men had forded the river at several places,
principally by the bridges of Jaroslav and by the
shallows of Lezachow. Next day, Tuesday, he had
taken Sieniawa, and the Russian right •** «
was two miles back from the eastern
bank, astride the tributary stream of the Lubaczowka.
Here it made a new stand. It would appear that
von Mackensen's phalanx had not yet come up into
line, for during these days there was no strong attack
upon Przemysl from the west.

It was otherwise with the re-entrant on the
south. On Saturday, the i5th, von Marwitz cap-
tured the railway junctions of Dobromil and Sambor,
and pushed northward against the Przemysl lines.
On the 1 8th he captured Hussakow and presently
lost it, and next day took Lutkow and held it. This
attack was clearly most dangerous, for an advance
of a few more miles would give the enemy control
of the main line between Przemysl and Lemberg,
and cut off the troops in the city. The hazard of such
a position, as we have already seen, is not the apex
of the salient, but the angles at which it joins the
main front. At Ypres in October the most deadly
German attacks were on Bixschoote in the north
and the Klein Zillebeke ridge in the south. At
Lodz in November the German salient was almost
destroyed by the Russian pressure on the two sides

142 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of its base. The chief danger, therefore, came at
the moment from Boehm-Ermolli. Farther east von
Linsingen was attacking Stryj and the Dniester line,
which was now held by Brussilov's army of the
Carpathians.

Przemysl, after its capture by Selivanov on 22nd
March, had not been put in a state of defence. It
is improbable that anything had been done to re-
store the forts, but the western works, which had
not been seriously assailed, remained as they were
when von Kusmanek held the city. Inside the
place, however, were a number of guns, captured
from the Austrians, which had not been removed,
a quantity of supplies, and a good deal of rolling
stock, which had accumulated in the great junction.
Such materials cannot be removed in a few hours,
and it was Russia's aim to hold Przemysl long enough
to permit her to get them clear away by the Lemberg
railway. Ivanov was well aware of the danger of
the salient, and had no sentimental desire to hold
the fortress. All he asked for was a week or so
to complete its evacuation.

From the 2Oth of May till Wednesday, the 2nd
of June, the work of clearance went on, while von
Mackensen hammered at the western forts and the
river line as far as Jaroslav, and Boehm-Ermolli
attempted to force the southern re-entrant, or at
any rate get the Lemberg railway under his fire.
Von Marwitz, on his right, made no progress, being
held up by the impassable marshes of the Dniester
between Drohobycz and Komarno. Von Mack-
ensen succeeded in crossing the San at Radymno,
just below its junction with the little river Wisnia,
a success which made the neck of the Przemysl

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 143

salient no more than twelve miles across. But
meantime the Russian right pushed the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand out of Sieniawa and Lezachow,
forced him in some places back across the San,
and threatened the flank of von Mackensen's posi-
tion at Radymno. The consequence was that what
might have been a most dangerous attack upon the
northern re-entrant was for the moment foiled. It
was clear that von Mackensen had weakened the
armies on both sides of him for the attack upon
the salient itself.

The days of Przemysl were now numbered.
The Austro- German lines were pressing in on three
sides, and during the last two days of May the
outer defences began to crumble. By the evening
of Monday, 3ist May, the Bavarian in- ,*
fantry had carried the northern forts,
and on the Tuesday afternoon the southern forts
were evacuated. At 3.30 on the morning of Wed-
nesday, 2nd June, von Mackensen en- ~
tered the city. The Russians had held *
it a little over two months.

It is idle to underrate the significance of von
Mackensen's success. He had won back a city
whose capture had been the occasion of rejoicing
in every Russian town and village. If Russia rated
Przemysl lightly, why, Germany might ask, did she
exult over its fall in March ? Germany was enabled
to hand back to her ally her chief fortress, and
thereby greatly strengthen Austria's loyalty to the
alliance. But it is equally idle to rate the exploit too
high. The recapture of Przemysl was without mili-
tary significance except as an incident in the Russian
retreat. No booty to speak of fell into Austro-

144 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

German hands. The rolling stock, the stores, and
most of the captured guns had gone eastward, and
only a few useless pieces remained to be magnified
in German communiques into an arsenal of artillery.

We can now see something of the method of the
great German advance. Von Mackensen's phalanx
travelled slowly. The wings pushed out beyond
the centre, and against them the Russians fought
delaying actions with some success. But so soon
as the heavy guns arrived retreat became necessary,
and only the fortifications of Przemysl enabled the
Russian centre to make so long a stand. It was this
slowness of the phalanx which enabled Przemysl to
be evacuated with little loss. Had von Mackensen
been in Boehm-Ermolli's place about the 2Oth of
May the consequences would have been very dif-
ferent.

One result of the method was a constant shifting
of the main centre of operations. Now it was
Jaroslav, now the southern re-entrant, now the
western front of the salient, and, after Przemysrs
fall, it travelled many miles to the south. While
the great machine was getting in order for a further
movement, it fell to another army to take the next
step in the offensive.

It was the turn of von Linsingen. Stryj fell to
him on Tuesday, ist June, after an attack in which
<v a division of the Prussian Guard played

June i. tjie mam part The place was import-
ant as a railway centre, and Brussilov seems to have
held on too long, for he lost some guns and several
thousand prisoners. The fall of Przemysl a day
later compelled an alteration in the Russian front.
It now ran west of the Lower San, crossing to the

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 145

east bank below Radymno, and following the valley
of the Wisnia, west of Mosciska, till it reached the
Dniester, west of the great marshes. After that its
line was the canon of the Dniester till it dipped
south by Stanislau and Nadworna to the Pruth.

On Monday, yth June, von Linsingen forced the
crossing of the Dniester at Zurawno, and occupied
the high ground north of the river. The ~
place should be noted, for it was the -^
key to the river line. The river Stryj, descending
from the Carpathians and passing the town of that
name, enters the Dniester at Zydaczow, a village
which marks the eastern end of the main Dniester
marshes. To cross there meant that an army had
to ford both the Stryj and the Dniester, which run
for a short way parallel before they join. East of
Zydaczow is a lesser belt of marsh, and then comes
Zurawno, with firm land on both sides, an easy ford,
and good roads from railhead. Von Linsingen
chose his front well, forced a passage, and got the
bulk of his army across. Von Bothmer commanded
the main advance, and succeeded in taking the
northern heights and advancing some way into the
forests towards the railway from Stryj to Tarnopol.
He was now little more than forty miles as the crow
flies from Lemberg.

On 8th June Brussilov turned and caught him.
It was the old story, so familiar in these campaigns,

a repetition of what happened at Augus- <y

T^ • June 8-

tovo in oeptember and at Kazimirjev J

in October. The German machine got
too far from its railways, its guns and ammunition
travelled too slowly by the bad country roads, and
the more mobile Russians caught it at a disadvantage.

VII. 10

bO S

E »

.0 M

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 147

Von Bothmer, in a three days' battle, was flung back
across the Dniester with heavy loss — 17 guns, 49
machine guns, and more than 15,000 prisoners, in-
cluding an entire company of the Prussian Guard.

But this success could have no influence upon
the general situation. About the same time von
Pflanzer began to move in the east, and he had
against him a force much depleted to supply rein-
forcements for the centre. Von Linsingen's right
forced a crossing of the Dniester at Zaleszky above
Halicz ; von Pflanzer pushed Lechitsky from the
Pruth to the Dniester, took Stanislau, and near
Czernowitz forced the entire Russian left back to
the Russian frontier. Meanwhile von Mackensen's
phalanx was again moving, this time in a north-
easterly direction. He cleared the Russians from
the San between Sieniawa and Jaroslav, and, pivoting
on Sieniawa, swung round his right towards Mos-
ciska. In this advance he made many prisoners, for
the sudden change of direction made the Russian
retirement difficult. At first the line of the Lubac-
zowka was held, and thence by Mosciska to the
Dniester. But there there could be no continuance.
On I4th June von Marwitz captured ~
Mosciska, and the whole Russian centre J
began to retire on the famous Grodek positions.
Ewarts was now back from Opatow and Ostrowiecs,
and approaching the left bank of the Vistula, the
right centre was on the San and the Tanev, the
centre among the Grodek ponds, and Brussilov and
Lechitsky along the Dniester as far as the frontier.

The GrodeK position is a line of shallow, swampy
lakes, in all some fifteen miles long. Few roads cross
the tangle, and the place is impregnable to most

148 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

armies. It was the district where the Russian com-
manders anticipated that von Auffenberg would
make a stand after the capture of Lemberg in Sep-
tember. But such a position, if it cannot be forced,
can be turned, and Ivanov was unable to hold it
now for the same reason as von Auffenberg in the
autumn. Then Ruzsky had turned it on the north,
and now von Mackensen followed the same strategy.
Lemberg was doomed as soon as the phalanx forced
the Sieniawa-Jaroslav line, and swung its right to-
wards Mosciska. Moving along the Jaroslav-Rava
Russka railway, it was certain, unless checked, to
outflank the Lemberg defence on the north. Boehm-
Ermolli advanced against Grodek, von Linsingen
and von Pflanzer battled for the Dniester crossings,
but the operative part of the movement was that
of the great phalanx, advancing steadily north-east
across the Lubaczowka, in a country where there
could be no real defence short of the valley of the
Bug.

By the i6th the army of the Archduke Joseph
had compelled a Russian retreat from the east bank
<Y r of the Lower San, and was already, in
J part, inside the borders of Russian Po-

land, with its right nearing Tarnogrod. Von Mack-
ensen was moving on a broad front towards Rava
Russka, while Boehm-Ermolli advanced directly
upon the Grodek position. The evacuation of
«v Lemberg had begun, and thousands of

'* passports were issued for Russia. On
the iyth von Mackensen's right was in the town
<Y of Javorov. On the iQth his advance

J 9' guard was very near Rava Russka, the
scene of Ruzsky 's great victory in September,

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 149

and von Linsingen had forced the crossing of the
Dniester at Nizniov. On Sunday, the 2Oth, there
was a fierce battle for Rava Russka, and <y
by the evening the Russians had been •*
driven north of the road and railway which connect
the town with Lemberg by way of Zolkiev. Late
that evening Rava Russka and Zolkiev were in von
Mackensen's hands.

The key of Lemberg had been won, and the
Grodek position was turned. That night the Rus-
sians fell back in good order from the Grodek lakes,
and at the same time Brussilov evacuated the ground
he had held south of the Dniester between the
marshes and the mouth of the Stryj. The Upper
Dniester position was obviously untenable, and
Halicz was now the western limit of the Russian
stand on that river. The centre fell back east of
Lemberg to a line between the upper waters of
the Bug and the Gnila Lipa, the very position which
Dmitrieff had stormed before the capture of the city
in September. The way to Lemberg was open,
and on the afternoon of Tuesday, 22nd June, the

army of Boehm-Ermolli entered with- „

T. j tune 22.

out opposition. It was a proud mo- J

ment for the Austrian general, to whom Germany
gave the privilege of first entry. After nine months
the capital of Galicia was once more in Austrian
hands.

Lemberg was worth a score of Przemysls both
in sentimental and practical value. It controlled a
network of lines, and was the last post of a civi-
lized railway system before the Russian frontier
was reached with its two barren routes of com-
munication. The Power which held Lemberg held

150 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

a strong fortress against any invasion from the east,
for it had six lines whereby to bring up supports to
one at the disposal of the invader. With the fall
of Lemberg the reconquest of Galicia was com-
plete. Let this achievement be set down unre-
servedly to von Mackensen's credit. But, as we
have pointed out, territorial reconquest was not his
aim. He had not yet shattered the Russian armies.
He had not yet split the northern and the southern
commands. He had not yet even uncovered Warsaw.
If we take the 2ist day of June as a viewpoint,
we find Ivanov's forces in the following position.
,v Ewarts was back near the west bank of

J the Middle Vistula, running from west

of Radom to the junction of the Vistula and the
San. He had against him von Woyrsch's army,
which made little progress except when assisted by
the victories of its right-hand neighbours. The
Russian line ran along the east bank of the San
and the north bank of the Tanev, and thence south
of Zamosc to the valley of the Bug. It left the
Bug at Kamionka, and continued due south by
Przemyslany and down the Gnila Lipa to Halicz,
on the Dniester, whence it followed that river to
the Russian frontier. In the seven weeks of fight-
ing it had suffered heavy losses. Dmitrieff's ori-
ginal army of the Donajetz had been much broken,
as had also been Brussilov's right wing ; but before
the San was reached both forces had been renewed
by some of the picked corps from Alexeiev's com-
mand. We may, therefore, regard the armies which
lay in position on 2ist June as still strong and
unbroken forces, ready for any work to which they
might be called. Ever since the San the retreat

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 151

had been premeditated. From before the fall of
Przemysl steps had been taken to prepare positions
far in the rear of those held on zist June. Ivanov
knew well that his problem was something very
different from the derence of a political frontier.

With the fall of Lemberg the second great stage
begins of the Austro-German offensive. The thrust
had succeeded brilliantly up to a point, but the cost
had been heavy. We shall, perhaps, not be far
wrong if we estimate the dead loss of the invaders
during the seven weeks' campaign at 400,000 men,
and a large part of the winter's accumulation of
shells had been shot away. The Austrian troops,
even when advancing triumphantly, had fought half-
heartedly, and only the German stiffening kept
them to their work. Von Mackensen's problem
was now not the clearing of territory, but the cul-
minating blow at the heart of the Russian position.
Let us be clear as to what this signified.

We have spoken in the past of the Polish salient,
the wedge of Russian territory thrust out between
Galicia and East Prussia. But there was an inner
salient, which was the vital one. Warsaw was at
its apex, and the northern side was the railway
running by Bialystok and Grodno to Petrograd ;
the southern was the line by Ivangorod, Lublin,
Cholm, Kovel, and Rovno to Kiev. If the northern
or southern line were cut Warsaw must fall ; if both
were pierced, then the whole Russian force must fall
back behind the Polish Triangle, and not improbably
behind the marshes of Pripet, in which case the
two halves would be hopelessly severed. The cap-
ture of Lemberg was only an incident in von Mack-
ensen's sudden swing to the north-east ; his main

152 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

object was an attack upon the Warsaw-Kiev line.
Accordingly Ivanov in his retreat saw to it that the
railway was covered. He was still not closer to it
at any point than fifty miles, and it provided him
with what von Mackensen now lacked, a good line
of lateral communication.

Meanwhile there had been activity at other parts
of the Eastern front. In the middle of May the
Germans were in strength on the Dubissa, twenty
miles from Kovno. Libau had fallen to them on
yi^ 9th May, they had reached the Windawa,

•? "" and throughout May and early June they
made steady progress in the Courland province.
They attacked north of Przasnysz towards the Narev
~ x- line, and on 6th June they made a vio-
^ lent but ineffective gas assault upon the

Rawka position. These attacks were part of a per-
sistent pressure along the whole front to prevent
Russia reinforcing her harassed southern command.
But the time was drawing nigh when the assault on
the southern side of the Polish salient was to be
balanced by a no less fierce assault on the north.
Not less than forty-one German corps were dis-
posed for this crowning stroke. In the far north,
in Courland, there were seven under General von
Buelow. On the Niemen there were five in von
Eichhorn's loth Army. Von Gallwitz and von
Scholtz on the Narev had seven. In Central Poland,
in the forces of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, von
Woyrsch and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand,
and in von Mackensen's command, there was the
equivalent of fourteen ; and under Boehm-Ermolli,
von Linsingen, and von Pflanzer there were eight.
With the twenty-six Austrian corps which can be

IVANOV'S RETREAT. 153

identified, the total force reached the enormous
figure of sixty-eight corps — more than two and
a half million men.

Russia could produce equal numbers, but she
had not the arms, and above all she had not the
heavy guns and the shells. Her retreat had taught
her that whenever her men could get to grips with
the enemy they broke him, but so long as he could
determine the battle at long range she was helpless.
The situation spurred the Russian people to a
mighty effort. Hitherto they had trusted for muni-
tions mainly to foreign imports ; now in their des-
perate need they set every unit of their sparse
industrial machinery to the task of improvisation.
Meanwhile far in the south France and Britain were
struggling to open a passage to their hard-pressed
Ally. We must turn to the difficult campaign in
the Dardanelles.

CHAPTER LV.

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI.

The Position at Gallipoli on 28th April — The Turkish Communi-
cations— Exploits of British Submarines in the Sea of Mar-
mora— The Turkish Attack on ist May — The Allied Counter-
attack on and May — The Second Battle of Krithia — Its Results
— The Australian Fight at Gaba Tepe — The Third Battle
of Krithia — The Nature of the Allied Problem — The Need
for Reinforcements — The Work of the Fleets — The Sinking
of the Goliath — Arrival of the German Submarines — Loss of
the Triumph and Majestic — The Larger Battleships are With-
drawn.

"\ TT 7 E left the Allied forces, after the first move-
\X/ ment against Krithia on 28th April, extended
VV on a line running from a point on the Gulf
of Saros, three miles north-east of Capa Tekke, to
a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it
bent back a little to the shore of the Dardanelles.
For the next months the story of the campaign
is concerned with a slow and desperate struggle for
Krithia and the Achi Baba heights, which were the
first step towards the conquest of the peninsula.
Before we enter upon the details of that struggle
it may be well to glance at the problem of the
Turkish communications, for it had a direct bearing
upon the Allied strategy of the campaign.

General Liman von Sanders had in the butt-end
of the peninsula not less than 200,000 men and a

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 155

lavish provision of artillery. To feed his troops
and supply his guns he needed ample communica-
tions, and these could not be found in the narrow
road from Rodosto across the Bulair isthmus, a road
bad at the best, and now commanded by the fire
of the Allied ships in the Gulf of Saros. His true
communications lay by water down the Sea of Mar-
mora to the ports of Gallipoli and Maidos. If this
water transport could be hampered, the only re-
maining plan was to bring his reserves and supplies
along the Asiatic coast to Chanak, and have them
ferried over in the darkness of the night. This was
a practicable route, but slow and circuitous. If
he wished for free and speedy transport he must
keep the Sea of Marmora inviolate.

It was the object of the Allies to make that Sea
impossible. The only means at their disposal was
the submarine. An attempt was made by the Aus-
tralian submarine AE 2, but on 3Oth April it was
unfortunately sunk in a bold effort to enter the
Marmora. On 2yth April, £14, under * .,
Lieutenant-Commander Edward Court- Pr ''
ney Boyle, dived under the mine fields, entered
the Marmora, and for some days operated brilli-
antly in those waters right up to the entrance to
the Bosphorus. It was hunted hourly by Turkish
patrols, and had many difficulties with currents, but
it contrived to sink two Turkish gunboats and one
large transport full of troops. A few days later,
E n, under Lieutenant-Commander Eric Naismith,
followed the same course, and sunk one large gun-
boat, two transports, one communication ship, and
three store ships, and drove a fourth store ship
ashore. It exploded a torpedo right under the

156 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

wharves of Constantinople. On its return it was
well down the straits when another Turkish trans-
port was discovered astern, and it returned and
torpedoed it. It became entangled with a floating
mine, and towed the thing behind it to the mouth
of the Straits, where it managed to cast it off. These
brilliant feats, for which Lieutenant-Commanders
Boyle and Naismith received the Victoria Cross,
were performed with signal humanity. They in-
volved a prolonged risk and tension which it would
be hard to parallel from the annals of war. Their
results, too, were singularly fruitful. The Sea of
Marmora was no longer regarded as safe, and the
Turkish supplies began to travel by the Asiatic
shore and the ferries of the Narrows. This involved
a certain dislocation and delay which were of inesti-
mable service to the Allied troops which faced the
formidable batteries of Achi Baba and Kilid Bahr.

On 3oth April two further battalions of the

Naval Division disembarked, and next day came

» -T the ZQth Brigade of Indian Infantry. By

' that evening the French corps on our right

had landed all their troops and all but two of their

batteries. These were just in time, for the night

had scarcely fallen when the Turks attacked in

force. They began with a bombardment, and then, as

•»* the moon rose, their infantry charged.

* ' Their German officers had issued an

invocation to a counter-crusade : —

" Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy
him. We shall not retire one step, for, if we do, our religion,
our country, and our nation will perish. Soldiers ! the
world is looking at you ! Your only hope of salvation is to
bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give
up your life in the attempt ! "

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 157

The plan of the attack was for the Turks to crawl
forward under cover of their artillery fire till the
time came for the final rush. They came on in a
three-deep formation, and the first line had no
ammunition, so that it might be forced to rely on
the bayonet.

The Allied front from left to right was held by
the 8yth, 86th, and 88th Brigades, and on the right
was a French division, with the Senegalese in the
first line. The bombardment had fallen most
heavily on the right of the 86th Brigade, and this
part suffered also the chief impact of the Turkish
charge. A gap opened up in our line, which was
promptly filled by the 5th Royal Scots, the Terri-
torial battalion of the 88th Brigade. They faced
to their left flank, and with the bayonet cleared the
enemy from the trenches he had occupied. The
ist Essex came to their assistance, and presently
our front was restored.

The attack now swung against the French left,
where were the Senegalese. Here ground was lost,
and some British gunners and the 4th Worcesters
came up in support. All night long we maintained
our position here with difficulty, and at two in the
morning a battalion of the Naval Division was sent
to strengthen the French right.

The counter-attack was ordered for dawn. At
5 a.m. the whole line advanced, and on the British
left and centre progressed fully 500 ^
yards. The Senegalese on the French
left were able to conform to this movement, in spite
of their heavy fighting during the night, but the
French right were held up by barbed wire and
cunningly-concealed machine guns. The result was

158

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

that the advance was enfiladed upon the right, and
about ii a.m. had to withdraw to its former line.
At one moment the Turkish retirement looked like
a rout, and Sir Ian Hamilton was of opinion that

C. Ttkke,

_ Attack on the Krithia-Achi Baba Position, May 6-8.

but for the barbed wire and the machine guns on
the right we should have carried Achi Baba.

That afternoon the enemy buried his dead under
a flag of truce. In the evening the French front

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 159

was again assailed, and the following night the
attack was repeated and repulsed. On ,*
the 4th, part of the French line was taken
over by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and on the 5th the
East Lancashire Territorial Division arrived, and
was added to the reserves. Since the 25th of April
the British losses had been just short ^
of 14,000, of whom no less than 3,593
were prisoners. In attack in such a country, where
the movement is not uniform, troops which lead
the advance are in great danger of being cut off.
From the 3rd to the 5th we were busy readjusting
our line in preparation for a fresh offensive.

What may be called the Second Battle of Krithia
began on the morning of Thursday, 6th May, and
lasted for three days. The Allied dis- », ,
positions at the beginning of the action
were as follows : — On the extreme left the 8yth
Brigade held the hollow, down which a small stream
flows to Beach Y, and was entrenched on the heights
above it. Then came the 88th Brigade and a Naval
Brigade, and then the French to the Straits. In
reserve were the 86th Brigade, the 29th Indian Bri-
gade, a brigade of Australians and New Zealanders
brought down from Gaba Tepe, and the East Lan-
cashire Territorial Division. Our plan of attack
was for the left and centre to attempt to occupy
the Krithia ridge, while the French should assault
the high ground on the right across the valley of
the Kereves Dere — the small stream which enters
the Dardanelles just beyond Eski Hissarlik. The
French were to begin the movement, since, until
they had made some progress, the British advance
on Krithia would be enfiladed by the Turkish left.

i6o HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The French 75 -mm. guns opened fire from the
neighbourhood of Sedd-el-Bahr about eleven in the
morning, aiming at the southern spur of Achi Baba
and the broken ground in front of it towards the
Krithia road. At the same time the battleships in
the Straits, among which were the Agamemnon,
plastered the upper slopes of Achi Baba and the
Turkish trenches in the Kereves valley. After half
an hour of artillery preparation the Senegalese at-
tacked in open order, while their field guns dropped
shells fifty yards in front of them. As they reached
the top of the slope overlooking the Kereves Dere
they came suddenly upon Turkish trenches skil-
fully concealed behind the crest. This compelled
part of the line to wheel to the left, where they
advanced by a bridle path which traverses the
upper end of the Kereves hollow. Part of the
Naval Brigade was sent forward to reinforce the
French left, but they too fell in with concealed
Turkish trenches. The ships' guns and the French
field artillery rained shrapnel and high-explosive
shells on the Turkish position, but could not check
its fire. Again and again through the afternoon
the Senegalese struggled to advance, but the place
was too strong, and with heavy casualties they had
to be withdrawn and their place taken by a brigade
of Colonial infantry. At 5.30 p.m. the fighting died
away. The result of the day was that the French
had pushed forward a mile, and had dug themselves
in on the slopes above the Kereves Dere, but had
failed to carry the Turkish trenches on the reverse
slope or the redoubt at the top of the valley. That
night the Turks counter-attacked between 10 p.m.
and 2 a.m., but the French held their ground.

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 161

Next day, jth May, about ten o'clock, the ships
began a bombardment of the Turkish right ,,
on Achi Baba. They directed special
attention to the ground at the head of the ravine
leading to Beach Y. A quarter of an hour later the
British left attacked, the 8yth and 88th Brigades
towards the slopes between Krithia and the sea,
and the Naval Brigades in the centre towards
Krithia village. They carried the front Turkish
trenches, but the second line held them up, and
their supports were heavily shelled by Turkish
guns from the heights. One battalion got well
ahead of the rest, but at 1.45 p.m. was caught by
machine-gun fire, and forced to retreat. By 2 p.m.
we seemed to have reached an impasse.

Meantime the French on the right had lain
quiet till noon. Then they began an elaborate
bombardment, and at 3 p.m., supported by part of
the Naval Brigade, attacked over the same ground
as the day before. During the afternoon they made
some progress, but about 5 p.m. their advanced in-
fantry was caught on the slopes by such a hail of
shrapnel that the line wavered and broke. The
Turks counter-attacked and took the French trenches
on the crest. D'Amade flung in his reserves, and
after an hour's severe fighting they recovered the lost
ground, and held it till nightfall under a heavy fire.

During the afternoon the British had done little.
At 3.15 p.m. we strengthened our left, and at five
a second time bombarded the Turkish position.
Our infantry advanced, and about six attempted to
carry the hill between Krithia and the sea. It
proved too strong, but as a result of the dday we
had got our front entrenched within 800 yards of

VII.

162 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Krithia. It was desperately costly fighting. Our
artillery fire seemed to have no effect upon the
enemy, who had trench lines cunningly hidden
over the whole position.

Next day, 8th May, the battle was renewed at
ten o'clock. Again the ships in the Gulf of Saros
,* « bombarded the Turkish right and the
ground behind it, and after half an
hour's " preparation " the British left and left
centre attacked. The Syth and 88th Brigades gained
further ground in the broken bush country between
Krithia and the sea. The 86th Brigade and the
Australian and New Zealand supports were then
pushed in to strengthen the line. Nothing hap-
pened on the right of our front, and during the
afternoon there was a lull. We were reorganizing
our forces, with a view to a last attempt upon
Krithia valley.

At 5.15 p.m. all the available ships and the shore
batteries united in a terrific bombardment. From
the report of an observer, the Turkish position was
smothered in flame and smoke. " According to
all preconceived theories of artillery fire, the enemy
should have been wiped out and so stunned by the
exploding lyddite that he would not be capable of
resisting the advance of our infantry. Not a Turk
was to be seen, and their artillery had not fired a
shot." Once again we were to learn the strength
of scientifically-prepared entrenchments. At 5.30
our advance began, and no sooner did we move
than the Turks opened fire along the whole front
with artillery, machine guns, and rifles. On the
left we, moved a little way towards Krithia, but
soon reached our limit. The French on the right

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 163

carried the first Turkish trenches, and there stuck
fast. Confused fighting continued till 7.30 p.m.,
when night put an end to the battle.

The result of the three days' struggle was that
our front had been advanced over a thousand yards,
but we had not touched the enemy's main position.
We had realized its unique strength, and all idea of
rushing it was abandoned.

We must turn to the doings of the Australasian
corps* at Gaba Tepe. During the battles of 6th-8th
May they were persistently attacked ; but, though
they had lent part of their forces to the Krithia
front, they held their ground at all points. On the
morning of oth May the i5th and i6th ,^
Battalions of the 4th Australian Brigade
stormed with the bayonet three lines of trenches
on Sari Bair. Next day, at dawn, the Turks coun-
ter-attacked and retook the trenches, **
but were repulsed with heavy losses when
they continued their attack against the main Aus-
tralian position. After that nothing of importance
occurred till the night of i8th May. The Australian
line lay in a semicircle, with the enemy's ** o
trenches close up to it — in some places
as near as twenty yards — except in that part ad-
joining the shore where the ships' guns kept him
off. A wide hollow, which our men called Shrapnel
Valley, divided the position into two sections. On
the northern section the Turkish trenches were on

* This corps comprised the Australian Division (General
Bridges) — ist, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Infantry Brigades ; the
New Zealand and Australian Division (General God ley) — 4th
Australian Brigade, New Zealand Brigade, and Composite
Mounted Brigade.

164

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

much higher ground than ours. The curious align-
ment may be seen from the attached sketch, which
gives a rough plan of the main situation. Our posi-
tion at Gaba Tepe was of great strategical value,
for it divided the enemy's efforts. He could not
attack or defend at Achi Baba in full force, since

Position of Australian and New Zealand Corps at Gapa Tepe.

he was compelled to leave a large part of his army
to hold the Australian corps.

On the night of i8th May General Liman von
Sanders brought fresh troops from Constantinople,
and drew off part of his Krithia garrison. About
midnight a heavy fire from rifle and machine guns
broke out against the Australian trenches, and at
various points attacks were made which crumbled

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 165
away before our defence. At 5 a.m. on the

the Turkish artillery began, and all ^
morning the enemy attempted to rush our
lines. The cool and steady shooting of the Aus-
tralians kept him at bay, and by eleven o'clock the
battle died down. In the evening there were re-
newed attacks, in one of which Lance-Corporal
Jacka of the i4th Battalion retook a trench occu-
pied by seven Turks, killing all seven single-handed
— a deed for which he received the Victoria Cross.
On that day, the i9th, the Turks were believed to
have lost over 7,000 men, while the casualties of
the Australians were only some 500. An observer
who saw the action thus described the field :— ' The
ground presents an extraordinary sight when viewed
through the trench periscopes. Two hundred yards
away, and even closer in places, are the Turkish
trenches, and between them and our lines the dead
lie in hundreds. There are groups of twenty or
thirty massed together as if for mutual protection,
some lying on their faces, some killed in the act of
firing, others hung up in the barbed wire. In one
place a small group actually reached our parapet,
and now lie dead on it, shot or bayoneted at point-
blank range. Hundreds of others lie just outside
their own trenches."

To return to the main front in the south. Little
happened between Qth and iath May. On the night

of the 1 2th Major - General Hunter- ,,

Weston, with some troops of the 2Qth

Division and a double company of Gurkhas, operat-

ing close to the sea, drove in the extreme .,

Turkish right, and won some ground.

On the iyth the 2Qth Division advanced their

1 66 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

trenches 200 yards, and next day the French on
the right, supported by a Naval Brigade, made some
progress. During the following fortnight there was
nothing to record, except small local advances. On
j.f ^ the night of 28th May the Turks had a
slight success, and advanced in some
force to press it further. But our guns caught their
supports, and demoralized them, and their bombers
threw their grenades into their own first-line trenches.
The Turkish casualties were estimated at about
2,000. That same night the French carried the
redoubt, which they had named " Le Haricot," at
the head of the Kereves Dere, that same redoubt
which had held up their advance with its machine
guns in the battle of 6th-8th May.

The third great attempt upon Krithia and Achi

Baba was made on 4th June. Our front was formed

<v by the 29th Indian Brigade on the left,

ju e 4. t^e 2^tk Djvjsion on {fog ieft centre, the

East Lancashire Territorial Division in the centre,
the Naval Division on the right centre, and the
French 2nd Division on the right. After a prepara-
tion by all our shore batteries and ships' guns, the
advance began at noon. The Indian Brigade at
first made good progress, and captured two lines
of trenches. Unfortunately, on their right a part
of the 29th Division had found itself faced with a
heavy wire entanglement which our artillery had not
cut. This checked their progress, and the Indians
were compelled by enfilading fire to retire to their
original line. The rest of the 29th Division cap-
tured a redoubt and two trench lines beyond it, and
advanced the front by 300 yards. The Territorials
in the centre captured three lines of trenches, and

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 167

advanced 600 yards, but they were too far beyond
the rest for comfort, and after holding an advanced
captured trench for a day and a night, had to fall
back to the second trench. The Naval Division

C TeJck*1

Miles

Attack on the Krithia-Achi Baba Position, June 4.

progressed for 300 yards, taking a redoubt and a
line of trenches, but was obliged to yield its gains
owing to the position on its right. There the French,
charging with desperate gallantry, retook for the

168 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

fourth time the redoubt of " Le Haricot," but were
driven out of it by shell fire. Their right was more
fortunate, and captured a strong trench line, which
they were able to hold.

There were many counter-attacks during the
night, which forced us out of one of the captured
trenches. At the same time General Birdwood
attacked from Gaba Tepe, in order to divert rein-
forcements which were coming from Maidos, and
carried a trench line, inflicting heavy losses upon the
enemy. The fruits of this third attempt on Achi
Baba were an advance of some 500 yards on a front
of three miles, and the occupation of two lines of
Turkish trenches.

It was after the battle of 4th June that the need
for large reinforcements became too urgent to be
denied. After five weeks' struggle, in which the
fighting had been as desperate as any in the war,
we had not yet touched the outer Turkish position.
The German engineers had turned the terrain to
brilliant defensive uses, and even when long lengths,
of trenches were carried by our infantry attacks, there
remained redoubts, like the for tins on the Western
tront, to make a general advance impossible. It
may be questioned whether a more abundant supply
of high explosives would have greatly altered the
case. Our bombardments had been lavish enough,
but they had scarcely touched the enemy. The
Gallipoli campaign had revealed itself as a slow and
deadly frontal attack, in which yard by yard we
should have to fight our way across the ridges.
jtf Such warfare was costly beyond all reck-

oning. Up to 3ist May the casualties
in the Dardanelles — exclusive of the French —

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 169

reached a total of 38,636, of whom 1,722 were
officers. The battle losses for the three years of
the South African War were only 38,156. This
figure, it will be noted, covers only the landing and
the first two attempts on Achi Baba. The Turkish
losses were estimated at some 60,000.

The Allied Fleets had shared in every land attack,
and the Goeben, on the Turkish side, from farther
up the Straits, took part in at least one engage-
ment. These large vessels, stationary or moving
very slowly along the coasts, were a superb target
for under- water assault, and presently news came
that some of the large ocean-going German sub-
marines, which had been commissioned early in
the year, were on their way to the Mediterranean.
About the middle of May one was reported near
Malta, and there were many spots on the long
indented Anatolian coast where they could find
a base.

This possibility gave much anxiety to the Allied
admirals. Meantime, on the night of i2th May, a
Turkish destroyer performed a singu- ,,
larly bold feat on its own account. It
found the old British battleship, the Goliath* pro-
tecting the French flank just inside the Straits, sunk
it by torpedo fire, with a loss of the captain, 19
officers, and 500 men, and managed to return safely.
Such an exploit was only possible under cover of
darkness, and the risk of it did not interfere with
the daylight operations of the fleet. But presently a
far more formidable foe arrived, a foe whose pres-

* Built in 1900. 12,950 tons, 19 knots, four 12-in. and
twelve fo-in. guns.

170 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ence made naval support — so far at least as con-
cerned the great battleships — a very doubtful and
costly undertaking.

About midday on 26th May the Triumph was
moving slowly up the northern shore of the penin-

** , sula in support of the Australasian troops.
Apparently her nets were out, and there
were destroyers close at hand. A torpedo from
a German submarine tore through the nets, struck
the vessel amidships, and sank her in nine minutes.
Nearly all the officers and men were saved, and the
submarine was chased unsuccessfully by the de-
stroyers. Here was an incident to give serious
thought. The enemy in broad daylight, in water
full of shipping, had broken through all our safe-
guards, and destroyed a battleship. The hunt for
the submarine — there seems at the moment to have
been only one — was vigorously conducted, but

jU nothing was heard of it till next day,

* ' * when the Majestic, steaming very close
to the shore, was sunk in the same fashion.

The Allied Fleets, compelled by the necessities
of gunnery to move slowly, were obviously at the
mercy of an enemy under water. From this date,
therefore, the larger vessels began to withdraw.
The Queen Elizabeth returned home, and there
remained only a few of the older battleships, a
number of cruisers, French and British, like the
Euryalus, Minerva, Talbot, Phaeton, Amethyst, and
Kleber ; and a flotilla of destroyers, including the
Scorpion, Wolverine, Pincher, Renard, and Chelmer.
In addition we had the Humber, one of the monitors
which had operated in October off the Flanders
coast — a type of vessel whose shallow draught made

THE STRUGGLE AT GALLIPOLI. 171

it most suitable for coast bombardment and least
vulnerable to submarine attack.

The strength of the Gallipoli position and the
menace of the German submarines had turned the
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean into some
of the most difficult of the war. Farther west the
situation was brighter. Two days before •»*
the Triumph went down, the shores of a^ 2^'
the Adriatic had seen the opening of Italy's cam-
paign.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN.

The Military Strength of Italy — The Italian Army — The Italian
Navy — General Cadorna — The Duke of the Abruzzi — The
Italian-Austrian Frontier — The Trentino — The Carnic Alps
— The Isonzo — The Railway Communications — Italian
Strategical Necessities — Napoleon in 1797 — The War of
1866 — The Austrian Raid on the Italian Coast — The Austrian
Plan — The Advance to the Isonzo — The Fight for the Dolo-
mite Passes — Fighting in the Trentino — The Campaign up to
the End of May.

A PARALLEL might be drawn between the
/\ antecedents of the Italian kingdom and those
JL .Lof the modern German Empire. Both in
their present form were less than half a century
old. Both had been built up round the nucleus
of a long-descended monarchy, and the House of
Savoy had curious points of kinship with the House
of Hohenzollern. Its rulers ascended from being
Counts of Savoy to being Kings of Sardinia and
then Kings of Italy, as the Hohenzollerns were first
Electors of Brandenburg, then Kings of Prussia,
and then German Emperors. William II. of Ger-
many and Victor Emmanuel III. of Italy were each
the third of their line to hold their high positions.

But the military strength of the two states had
not developed on the same lines Italy's problem

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 173

since 1870 had been one of peculiar difficulty. Her
creation as a kingdom had left her with an unsatis-
factory northern frontier. The additions of Lom-
bardy and Venetia to the dominions of Savoy had
been acquired less by overmastering victories in the
field than by the diplomatic difficulties in which
Austria found herself at the moment. The French
victories in 1859 were discounted by the Emperor
Napoleon's divided aims, and Venetia was ceded
because of the Prussian victory at Sadowa, though
Austria had been successful in her Italian campaign.
In their acquisition, therefore, Italy exhausted her
purchase ; the situation was too delicate to insist upon
that rectification of boundaries which would have
made them secure. All the Alpine passes and all the
crossings of the Isonzo were left in Austrian hands.
Accordingly for fifty years she had rarely been free
from anxiety about the north. Again, her population
was from the military point of view curiously hetero-
geneous. Districts differed in their military value
as widely as Sparta differed from Corinth. These
circumstances — the overwhelming strategic import-
ance of the north and the mixed character of the
recruits — made it impossible to follow the German
plan of an army on a territorial basis. A regiment
was recruited from all parts of the country, but on
mobilization reservists joined that regiment which
happened to be quartered in their district. In
time of war, therefore, about half of those serving
had no previous connection with the units in which
they served.

Service was universal and compulsory, and the
liability began at the age of twenty, and lasted for
nineteen years. Recruits were divided into three

174 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

classes. The first formed the first line ; the second
were also regulars, but with unlimited leave ; while
the third passed into the Territorial militia. The
second class — corresponding to the German Ersatz
Reserve — received a few months' annual training
for eight years, and then passed into the Mobile
Militia and the Territorial Militia. The third class
received only thirty days' annual training. The
first class — the first line of the regular army — served
for two years with the colours, six in the Reserve,
four in the Mobile Militia, and the remaining seven
in the Territorial Militia.

The unit of organization was the army corps,
which consisted normally of two divisions. Each
division comprised two brigades of infantry and
a regiment — five batteries — of field artillery. A
brigade contained two regiments, and a regiment
three battalions. The peace establishment showed
twelve army corps, half of which had their stations
near the northern frontier.* A cavalry division
consisted of two brigades of two regiments each,
and two batteries of horse artillery. There were
twenty-nine cavalry regiments on the peace estab-
lishment. The light infantry was the Bersaglieri,
corresponding to the French Chasseurs and the
German Jaegers. A regiment of four Bersaglieri
battalions — three of infantry and one of cyclists-
was part of each army corps. Two other formations
must be noted. The six battalions of the Cara-
bineri were a force of military police, selected from

* I. Corps, Turin; II., Alessandria; III., Milan; IV.,
Genoa ; V., Verona ; VI., Bologna ; VII., Ancona ; VIII.,
Florence ; IX., Rome (three divisions) ; X., Naples ; XL,
Bari ; XII., Palermo.

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 175

the regular army. The Alpini — twenty-six bat-
talions of the first line, organized in eight regiments,
with thirty-six batteries of mountain artillery—
were special frontier troops for the defence of the
northern borders. The line regiments suffered to
some extent from the best men being taken for the
picked corps of Carabineri, Bersaglieri, and Alpini.

The peace strength of the army of Italy in the
year before the war was approximately 15,000 offi-
cers and 290,000 other ranks. On mobilization a
division of Mobile Militia was added to each corps,
bringing up its strength to 37,000 men and 134
guns. The war strength was approximately 700,000
in the first line — that is, from the two classes of the
regular army — and 320,000 in the Mobile Militia,
with a reservoir of something over 2,000,000 in the
Territorial Militia. Italy's field force might, there-
fore, be reckoned at something over 1,000,000
trained men. Her field artillery was armed with a
75-mm. gun, and she had a large number of batteries
of Krupp howitzers, and a siege train of very
high calibre. So far as can be judged, she organ-
ized her war strength in fourteen first-line corps.

The Italian Commander-in-Chief was King Vic-
tor Emmanuel, a monarch whose gallantry and
straightforward simplicity had won him a high
degree of popular confidence. The Chief of the
General Staff and the Generalissimo in the field
was General Count Luigi Cadorna, a native of
Pallanza, and a man of sixty-five at the outbreak of
war. He was the son of that Rafaele Cadorna who,
in September 1870, led the Italian army into Papal
territory and blew in the Porta Pia. He had served
on his father's staff during that expedition, had

176 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

commanded the roth Bersaglieri, and had been a
corps commander at Genoa. He succeeded Gen-
eral Pollio in 1914 as Chief of the General Staff.
He had won fame throughout Europe as a writer
on military science, and he had a unique knowledge
of the terrain of the coming war. As von Hinden-
burg had studied the East Prussian bogs, so had
General Cadorna mastered the intricacies of Italy's
northern frontier.

A word must be added on the Italian navy,
which now took over from France the task of hold-
ing Austria in the Adriatic. It contained four
Dreadnoughts, and two more were on the verge of
completion. These ships were all armed with 12-
inch guns. It possessed also ten pre-Dreadnought
battleships and a number of older vessels. Its
armoured cruisers were none of them faster than
22 knots, but it contained three very fast light
cruisers, as well as twenty submarines, a large
number of torpedo boats, and forty destroyers. At
the lowest computation it showed a considerable
superiority over the fleet of Austria-Hungary. The
Admiral-in-Chief was the first cousin of the King,
the Duke of the Abruzzi, perhaps, after the Grand
Duke Nicholas, the most brilliant member of any
reigning house in the world. A man of forty- two,
he had won fame as an explorer, a mountaineer, and
a scientific geographer. He had shown extraor-
dinary skill in organizing expeditions in the most
difficult latitudes from Alaskan and Himalayan
snows to the mountain jungles of Ruwenzori, and
in the Tripoli War had commanded with distinc-
tion a division of the Italian fleet.

The strategic position of Italy was disadvanta-

The Austro-ltali.'

Ifheatre of War.

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 177

geous, as we shall presently see ; but she began the
war with two assets. In the first place, both her
army and navy had had recent fighting experience.
For nearly a generation her colonial adventures had
involved her in small campaigns on the Red Sea
littoral, and the disaster of Adowa was fruitful in
its teaching. Her Tripoli War had given her much
difficult fighting, but it had afforded invaluable ex-
perience to her officers. The transport work which
it entailed and her bombardments and blockades
in the /Egean had kept the fleet in good practice.
In the second place, she did not begin her campaign
till nine months and more after the first shots had
been fired in Flanders. All through the winter she
was busy equipping her army, and remodelling it in
the light of the lessons which the campaign revealed.
The German strength in artillery and machine guns,
with all its consequences, was patent to her ; she
could draw upon the experience of both sides in the
winter war of attrition ; and she could revise and
bring up to date at her leisure her military pre-
conceptions. Her position as a spectator was of
incalculable advantage, and it was reasonable to
assume that she would begin with a stock of know-
ledge which the other combatants had only acquired
at a desperate cost.

The strategy of General Cadorna was deter-
mined by hard geographical facts, and it is neces-
sary to examine in detail the configuration of the
Italian-Austrian frontier. It has a length of about
480 miles, and the map will show that it is divided
naturally into three parts — the re-entrant angle of
the Trentino ; the great wall of the Dolomites, the
Carnic and the Julian Alps ; and the space on the

VII. 12

178 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

east between the main Alpine chain and the Adri-
atic. The Trentino forms a salient the sides of
which are mountain buttresses. It is drained to-
wards the Po by the Adige and the Sarca, which
flows into Lake Gar da. An enemy attempting its
conquest must advance principally by the Adige
valley, and would presently find himself confronted
with the strongly fortified town of Trent, which in
the Middle Ages so long defied the attacks of Venice.
If Trent were safely passed, he would struggle for
long in a wilderness of lateral valleys, and would
still have to force the main ridge of the chain at
the Brenner. Now, a salient may be a cause of
weakness in war, as Russia found in Western Poland,
for it is open to assault on both flanks. But the
containing walls of the Trentino make flank attacks
all but impossible. On the western side, high up
in the hills, is the Stelvio Pass, leading from the
Upper Adige to the vale of the Adda. Over this
pass in March 1799 Dessolles led the army of Italy.
But it is the loftiest carriage pass in the Alps, more
than 9,000 feet high, and even if a modern army
could win its strait defiles it would find itself in a
lateral valley, with many difficulties before it ere it
reached Bozen and the main road to the north.
Going south, we find the Tonale Pass, south of the
Ortler massif, which carries the road from the Noce
to the Oglio ; but for a great army that is no better.
Close to Lake Garda is the road pass of Cornelle,
too narrow in its debouchments for any considerable
force. On the eastern side of the salient the con-
ditions are still worse for invasion. The railway
from Venice to Innsbruck crosses the Valsugana at
Tezze, but the Brenta valley which it traverses gives

..S,AV«? •»
-iAv'

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 179

a difficult road to Trent. Farther north the road pass
from Caprile to Campitello leads into the defiles of
the Dwarf King's Rose-garden — a possible passage,
for these passes of the Western Dolomites are
bare and open, but one useless for an invader, since
the road bends away to Bozen, and there is no route
north to the Pusterthal. The salient of the Tren-
tino is a fine offensive and defensive position for
those who hold it. It is a hollow headland of
mountain jutting into the plains, and it is hard for
the plain-dwellers to pierce its rim. The deep
hollow of the Lake of Garda is no real opening in
the barrier. The breach, so far from weakening
the defence, is in reality a source of strength, for
it compels an attack from the Italian plain to be
made on divergent lines from different bases, east
and west of the lake.

The second part is a shallow arc of sheer rampart
—the Dolomite and Carnic ranges. The main pass
is that of Ampezzo, where the great highroad known
as the Strada d'Alemagna runs from Belluno to
Toblach through the heart of the white limestone
crags at an altitude of little over 5,000 feet. But
between Cortina and Toblach it makes a sharp de-
tour westward to circumvent the mass of Cristallo,
and that part is no better than a defile commanded
by a hundred danger points. The adjacent passes
of Misurina and Monte Croce are no better, and as
we go east the Val d'Inferno and the Plocken are only
bridle paths. The main pass in the chain is that
which leads from the valley of the Fella by Pon-
tcbbo to the upper streams of the Drave. It carries
the railway from Venice to Vienna, and its highest
point is only 2,615 feet. It was the old highroad

i8o HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of invasion from the north ; but, though the easiest
of the great routes, it is still narrow and difficult,
a gate which a modern army should with ease be
able to close and hold. South-east of it among the
buttresses of the Julian Alps there is no pass of any
military value.

The third section of the frontier — the low
ground between Cividale and the sea — is not the
natural avenue of movement which small-scale maps
would suggest. It is a narrow front, less than
twenty miles wide, and behind it is the line of the
river Isonzo, with hills along its eastern bank. The
upper part of the stream above Salcana is a ravine ;
then come six miles of plain in front of Gorizia ;
then the hills begin again and sweep round to the
sea-coast by Monfalcone. The value of such a
position for the defence is obvious. A strong field
force with a full complement of artillery could make
of the Isonzo a front as impregnable as any river
line in Europe.

For a modern army the natural strength of a
position is not enough ; there must be adequate
lateral communications. In this respect Italy had
the advantage, for she had the elaborate railway
system of her northern plains behind her, while
Austria had only the restricted railways of moun-
tain valleys. The main Italian line runs from
Verona by Vicenza and Treviso to Udine. It sends
off numerous branches up to the base of the hills—
from Verona up the Adige, from Vicenza to Torre-
belvicino, from Cittadella to the Valsugana, from
Treviso up the Piave to Belluno, from S. Vito to
Pontebba, and from Udine to Cividale. It is backed
by a coast railway, and between the two there are

i8a HISTORY OF THE WAR.

many connecting branches. Austria possessed a
railway system running round the whole half-moon
of frontier, but it had few feeders, for the hill valleys
in which it ran made branches difficult. From west
to east it ran from the point of the Trentino salient
by Trent and Bozen to Franzenfeste, then east along
the Pusterthal by Lienz and Spittal to Villach. It
then bent back from the frontier, ran down the
Upper Save, rounded the massif of Monte Nero, and
descended to Gorizia, where it connected by two
routes with Trieste. This encircling line was well
fed from its main bases, like Innsbruck, Salzburg,
Vienna, and Trieste, but it sent off very few branches
to the edge of the frontier. One ran from Trent to
the Valsugana; after that there was nothing for 150
miles till Tarvis was reached, when the Pontebba
line began. Branches went west for Gorizia to
Udine, and from Monfalcone to San Giorgio, and
these four were the only feeders on the Austrian
side of the hills.

This paucity of branch lines meant that the
Austrian offensive must concentrate at certain defi-
nite places — Trent, Tarvis, and Gorizia. It meant
conversely that an Italian offensive must aim at the
same points and at one more. This was Franzen-
feste, the junction of the Pusterthal line with that
which runs from Innsbruck to Trent. If that point
could be taken the communications of the whole
of the Trentino salient would be cut. Unfortunately
for Italy, this nodal point of Franzenfeste was just
the one which it was hardest to reach, for south and
east of it was the whole complex system of the
Dolomites. The long space without branch lines
was as awkward for the one offensive as for the

3. The Isonzo Frontier and the Defences of the Julian Alps.

184 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

other. What seemed a lengthy and precarious line
of communication was in reality defended by an
almost insuperable mountain wall.

The problem before General Cadorna was,
therefore, by no means simple. Austria had her
hands full in the Carpathians, and it was unlikely
that she would be able to take that swift offensive
for which her frontier had been designed. It was
a sovereign chance for an Italian forward movement,
and the direction of that movement was not in
doubt. It must be mainly towards Trieste, the
Istrian peninsula, and the wooded hills of Styria
which sweep to Vienna. There Austria was most
vulnerable, and there lay a terrain where modern
armies could manoeuvre. But the configuration of
the frontier made it impossible for a commander to
direct all his forces upon one section. The whole
northern border must be watched and held, else
Austria from the Trentino salient might cut his
communications and take him in the rear. Ac-
cordingly he resolved to attack at all the salient
points — towards Trent, across the Dolomite passes
against the Pusterthal railway, at the Pontebba Pass,
across the Julian buttresses in order to threaten the
Tarvis-Gorizia line. Such a series of movements
would keep the enemy busy and prevent any flank-
ing strategy. And meantime with his chief army
he would strike at the Isonzo and the road to Trieste.

The military history of that frontier during the

past century is an exposition of the difficulties which

General Cadorna was now called upon to face. In

1797 Napoleon, having overrun North-

'97- ern Italy the year before, resolved to
force Austria to sue for peace by a threat against

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 185

Vienna. He marched what we would now call a
small army into Carinthia, where the country was
open and defenceless. Austria had no adequate
force with which to oppose him, and an armistice
was concluded when he reached Klagenfurt. It
was an easy victory, but the point to note is that
he did not dare to cross the eastern frontier till he
had pushed forward an army as strong as his own
from Verona to Trent to protect his rear and his
communications. The campaign of 1866 showed
the strength of the Trentino position. £/-,-
In that year the Austrian commander,
General Kuhn, left only small detachments to guard
the passes, and kept his main force at Trent, which
he made the pivot of his defence. He easily de-
feated the Garibaldian columns which attacked on
both sides of the Lake of Garda and by the Tonale
Pass. The main Italian advance was made from
Padua up the Brenta valley, and this was not seri-
ously opposed till it was near the watershed. There
Kuhn was waiting with his reserves ; but the action
was never fought, since the first shots had scarcely
been fired when news came that an armistice had
been signed at Vienna. But it was the general im-
pression at the time that if the forces had been
engaged, Kuhn would have held his own. From
the first he had been greatly outnumbered, but,
thanks to his central position, he was always able
to secure a local superiority against attacks made
from widely divergent points.

At that time, it must be remembered, the passes
were not fortified, for the simple reason that Venetia
had been Austrian territory for half a century, and
the Trentino border was not a state frontier. Trent,

1 86 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

too, was then an open town. Now the conditions
were more favourable for the defence. An Italian
army attacking the Trentino would have to fight its
way up narrow valleys, all of which converged upon
Trent, the central fortress. The defence would,
therefore, be able to mass its reserves for a counter-
attack against one line of advance after another, and
need not strike till the invaders had already suffered
heavily in breaking down the advanced fortifications
of the passes.

War began, as we have seen, on 23rd May, and
the first serious blow was struck by Austria. This

-^ was a well-organized raid on the Adriatic

* 3- coast, the object of which was to delay
the Italian concentration by damaging vital points
on the coast railway from Brindisi to the north.
The attack began a little after four on the morning
of Monday, 24th May, and was carried out by a

•*, , squadron from Pola made up of two
4* battleships, four cruisers, and some
eighteen destroyers, strongly supported by aircraft.
The line, which runs along the Adriatic shore, is at
many points much exposed to attack from the water.
Ancona station, for example, is on the high ground
outside the town, and most of the river bridges are
within sight of the sea.

The assault extended from Brindisi to Venice,
and at the latter place airmen threw bombs into
the Arsenal and attacked the oil-tanks and the
balloon sheds on the Lida. In the Western press
the movement was interpreted only as a barbarous
attempt to send St. Mark's the way of Rheims and
Lou vain ; but it was in reality a serious military

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i88 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

operation. In the north the cruiser Novara, with
a flotilla of destroyers, attacked Porto Corsini, north
of Ravenna, in the hope of wrecking the Italian
torpedo-boat base. The destroyers were driven off,
and one was seriously damaged. Farther south the
cruiser St. George bombarded the railway station
and bridges at Rimini. In the centre the battle-
ship Zrinyi attacked Sinigaglia, and claimed to have
wrecked the railway station and railway bridge and
part of the railway line, while south of Ancona the
battleship Radetzky wrecked the bridge over the
Potenza River. In the south the cruisers Helgoland
and Admiral Spaun, assisted by destroyers, attacked
in the neighbourhood of Manfredonia and Viesti.
They shelled a railway bridge, a railway station,
and several signal stations, and did some damage
to the coast towns. It was all over before 6 a.m.,
and the squadron sailed back to Pola in safety.
The Italian fleet seems to have been taken by sur-
prise, and the marauders were unmolested. It was
a well-conceived and well-executed enterprise, and
achieved much of its purpose.

On the same day, 24th May, the Austrians blew
up two bridges in the Adige valley, thereby revealing
their plan of campaign. They were resolved to
stand on the defensive at the outset in the strong
positions which fortune had given them. They
would hold the crests of the passes along the fron-
tier of the Trentino and the line of the Carnic Alps.
On the Isonzo front they would abandon all the
country west of the river line, and make their stand
on a fortified line well to the east, which only touched
the Isonzo at Gorizia (Gorz), where they held a
bridgehead on the western bank. Their best troops

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 189

were busy in Galicia, including the famous i4th
Tirol Corps, and they had only Landsturm and a
few reserve divisions wherewith to meet the army
of Italy. The Archduke Eugene, not the most suc-
cessful of generals, had taken over the command,
and his aim was to risk nothing till von Mackensen
had finished his Galician enterprise and first-line
troops could be spared for this frontier.

On the 24th General Cadorna began his advance.
His main army moved against the Isonzo, and was
directed to the isolation and capture of Gorizia, a
necessary prelude to an advance on Trieste. A
second army was concentrated on the Trentino
frontier, with the capture of Trent as its nominal
aim. Its purpose, however, was largely defensive.
It aimed to acquire positions that would check that
counter-attack from the Trentino which would frus-
trate, if successful, the whole eastern movement.
Between these armies, detachments began to work
through the Dolomite and Carnic passes — also with
a purpose mainly defensive, until Cadorna's success
in the east should make feasible an offensive move-
ment against the Franzenfeste-Villach line.

The Italian mobilization was slow, and till the
close of May the actions were only affairs of cover-
ing troops, and little ground was won except that
which the Austrians had voluntarily yielded. On
the evening of the 24th the eastern army was well
inside Austrian territory, its left pushed forward to
Caporetto on the Isonzo just under Monte Nero,
its centre looking down on Gorizia from the high
ground between the Indria and the Isonzo, and its
right between Cormons and Terzo. On the ex-
treme right, among the islands of the coast, the

190 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Italian destroyers were busy. In the following week
and onward till the end of the month the record is
one of slow and cautious advance. It was a wet
season, and the Isonzo, fed from the hills, floods
easily, thereby making operations difficult when the
enemy has destroyed the bridges. The Italian left
about Caporetto was reinforced, preparatory to an
attack on the height of Monte Nero, which over-
looks the northern line from Gorizia. Italian avia-
tors persistently bombarded Monfalcone and the
railway between Gorizia and Trieste, in order to
cut off supplies and reinforcements for the troops
on the river line, while destroyers shelled the Mon-
falcone shipyards, and the coast town of Grado was
taken. By the end of May the Isonzo had been
reached, but had not been crossed, by the Italian
army.

In the central section of the frontier there was
much scattered fighting, and the Italians succeeded
in occupying several of the passes. On the 24th
the Val d'lnferno pass at the head of the Degano
valley was carried by a bayonet attack. More im-
T^r portant was the capture, on the 3oth, of

Cortina, on the great Strada d'Ale-
magna. The place is not more than fifteen miles
as the crow flies from the Franzenfeste-Villach rail-
way, but in these fifteen miles are included the
highest peaks of the Dolomites, and the road — one
of the finest in Europe — runs through a narrow
defile which gives every advantage to the defence.

The Trentino fighting began also on the 24th.
Detachments on that day pushed forward to the
frontier on both sides of the Lake of Garda ; up
the Chiese valley to Caffaro, which is just on the

BEGINNING OF ITALY'S CAMPAIGN. 191

frontier under the guns of the Italian fort of Rocca
d'Anfo ; and up the Oglio valley to the Tonale
Pass. Troops moved along the Italian ridge of
Monte Baldo, east of Lake Garda, towards the
Austrian summit of Monte Altissimo. On the east
side of the salient in the Brenta valley an advance
began, and on the 2jth it had reached ^
a point five miles from Borgo. On the
same day the frontier town of Ala, on the Adige,
was captured, and by the end of the month the
Italians held the high ground on the south which
commanded the forts of Rovoreto. So far the suc-
cesses, though small, had been continuous. Trent
is girdled by a number of lesser fortresses com-
manding the converging routes. Such is Rovoreto
on the Adige ; such are Lardaro on the Chiesi,
Levico on the Brenta, and the important fort of
Riva at the head of Lake Garda. The closing in
upon these outworks by the Italian armies meant
that daily the offensive power of the enemy in the
salient was declining. He no longer held the rim
of the cup from which he could descend at will
upon the plains.

APPENDICES

VII.

»3

APPENDIX I.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES AND
THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S SEVENTH DISPATCH.

From the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, The British

Army in France.
To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters, isth June, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report that since the date of my
last dispatch (5th April, 1915) the Army in France under
my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks
of the line held by the British Forces.

I. In the North the town and district of Ypres have
once more in this campaign been successfully defended
against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces
of the enemy, and supported by a mass of heavy and field
artillery, which, not only in number, but also in weight and
calibre, is superior to any concentration of guns which has
previously assailed that part of the line.

In the South a vigorous offensive has again been taken
by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large
area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured
from the enemy, whilst valuable support has been afforded
to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such
marked success against the enemy's positions to the east
of Arras and Lens.

196 APPENDIX I.

II. I much regret that during the period under report
the fighting has been characterized on the enemy's side by
a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages
of civilized war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Con-
vention.

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently
been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and
poisonous a nature that any human being brought into con-
tact with it is first paralysed and then meets with a linger-
ing and agonizing death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared, and sup-
ported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of
these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any
extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there can be no
doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially
influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience
suggested effective counter measures, which have since been
so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been
at work before this unworthy method of making war reached
the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its
practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these
designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret
and some surprise that an Army which hitherto has claimed
to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have
stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant
foes.

HILL 60.

III. On the night of Saturday, April lyth, a commanding
hill which afforded the enemy excellent artillery observa-
tion towards the West and North-West was successfully
mined and captured.

This hill, known as Hill 60, lies opposite the northern
extremity of the line held by the 2nd Corps.

APPENDIX I. 197

The operation was planned and the mining commenced
by Major-General Bulfin before the ground was handed over
to the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fer-
gusson, under whose supervision the operation was carried
out.

The mines were successfully fired at 7 p.m. on the ijth,
and immediately afterwards the hill was attacked and gained,
without difficulty, by the ist Battalion, Royal West Kent
Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish
Borderers. The attack was well supported by the Divisional
Artillery, assisted by French and Belgian batteries.

During the night several of the enemy's counter-attacks
were repulsed with heavy loss, and fierce hand-to-hand
fighting took place ; but on the early morning of the i8th
the enemy succeeded in forcing back the troops holding the
right of the hill to the reverse slope, where, however, they
hung on throughout the day.

On the evening of the i8th these two battalions were
relieved by the 2nd Battalion, West Riding Regiment, and
the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry,
who again stormed the hill under cover of heavy artillery
fire, and the enemy was driven off at the point of the bayonet.

In this operation 53 prisoners were captured, including
four officers.

On the 20th and following days many unsuccessful attacks
by the enemy were made on Hill 60, which was continuously
shelled by heavy artillery.

On May ist another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was
supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas, which
caused nearly all the men along a front of about 400 yards
to be immediately struck down by its fumes.

The splendid courage with which the leaders rallied their
men and subdued the natural tendency to panic (which is
inevitable on such occasions), combined with the prompt
intervention of supports, once more drove the enemy back.

A second and more severe " gas " attack, under much

198 APPENDIX I.

more favourable weather conditions, enabled the enemy to
recapture this position on May 5th.

The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely
to the use of asphyxiating gas. It was only a few days later
that the means, which have since proved so effective, of
counteracting this method of making war were put into
practice. Had it been otherwise, the enemy's attack on
May 5th would most certainly have shared the fate of all the
many previous attempts he had made.

THE COMING OF THE GAS.

IV. It was at the commencement of the Second Battle of
Ypres on the evening of the 22nd April, referred to in para-
graph i of this report, that the enemy first made use of
asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's
request to take over the trenches occupied by the French,
and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines
east of Ypres were posted as follows : —

From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far
as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division.

Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the
Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly
direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere,
whence another Division continued the line south-east
to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.
Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional
Reserve about Ypres ; the Canadian Division had one bat-
talion in Divisional Reserve, and the ist Canadian Brigade
in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just
been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was
resting about Vlamertinghe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked
the French Division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating
gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about

APPENDIX I. 199

5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the
German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote.
The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had
been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these
asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of
these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the
whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned
above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at
first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually hap-
pened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight,
and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying
condition, and within an hour the whole position had to
be abandoned, together with about 50 guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching
the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate
incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of
dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations
in which they have been placed throughout the course of
this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this
aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm
conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to
hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and
altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would
have stood firm.

THE STAND OF THE CANADIANS.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left
dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there
appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of
a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British
troops occupying the salient to the East.

In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the
Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of
tenacity and courage ; and it is not too much to say that

200 APPENDIX I.

the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a
disaster which might have been attended with the most
serious consequences.

They were supported with great promptitude by the
reserves of the Divisions holding the salient and by a Brigade
which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed,
effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch
was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

The 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had been at-
tached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the
right of the French Division, and, being involved in their
retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by
the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could
not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven
back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the
Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve,
to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the
disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second
Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the 3rd
Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet
eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans
succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some
works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by
the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west
of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his
succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian
troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the
reinforcements sent north should be used to support and
assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing
any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd connexion
was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division

APPENDIX I. 201

and the French right, about eight hundred yards east of
the canal ; but as this entailed the maintenance by the
British troops of a much longer line than that which they
had held before the attack commenced on the previous night,
there were no reserves available for counter-attack until
reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second
Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General
Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what
had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch
informed me that it was his intention to make good the
original line and regain the trenches which the French Divi-
sion had lost. He expressed the desire that I should main-
tain my present line, assuring me that the original position
would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further
informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforce-
ments, which were now on their way, and that troops from
the North had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish
to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the
way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was
not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the
British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that
which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had
compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was
very active, and his attacks all along the front were sup-
ported by some heavy guns which had been brought down
from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented
this fire from being kept down and much aggravated the
situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by
the vigorous counter-attacks made by the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed two Brigades of the 3rd Corps,

202 APPENDIX I.

and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, to be moved
up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second
Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circum-
stances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres
Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the
French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap
and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing
up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command,
which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came
up from the South, had to be pushed into the firing line in
an area swept by artillery fire which, owing to the capture of
the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties ; and I wish to place
on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource
and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the
spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-
General Hull were reported to me as being particularly
marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th
when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at
St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieu-
tenant-Gen era! Alderson, organized a powerful counter-attack
with his own Brigade and some of the nearest available units.
He was called upon to control, with only his Brigade staff,
parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were
quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not suc-
ceed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy's
further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy
were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division
from the point where it had originally joined the French
line.

APPENDIX I. 203

THE LAHORE AND NORTHUMBRIAN DIVISIONS.

During the night, and the early morning of the 25th,
the enemy directed a heavy attack against the Division at
Broodseinde cross-roads which was supported by a powerful
shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all
the roads to the East and West were uninterruptedly sub-
jected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this the supply
of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout
with order and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners
were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand
fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore Division and a Cavalry
Division were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on
the right of the French, the latter in support of the 5th Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction
with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back
some little distance towards the North, but their further
advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by
the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland
Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien, and actually
succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern
portion of that village. They were, however, eventually
driven back, largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line
a short way to the South. This attack was most success-
fully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I
regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation.

Although no attack was made on the south-eastern side
of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were
subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction which
took some of the battalions, which were advancing North
to the attack, in reverse.

Some gallant attempts made by the Lahore Division on

204 APPENDIX I.

the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy
further North ; but they were partially frustrated by the
constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite
of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

The French had succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and had
made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas ; but up
to the evening of the a8th no further progress had been made
toward the recapture of the original line.

THE SHORTENING OF THE BRITISH LINE.

I sent instructions, therefore, to Sir Herbert Plumer, who
was now in charge of the operation , to take preliminary measures
for the retirement to the new line which had been fixed upon.

On the morning of the 2gth I had another interview with
General Foch, who informed me that strong reinforcements
were hourly arriving to support General Putz, and urged me
to postpone issuing orders for any retirement until the result
of his attack, which was timed to commence at daybreak
on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and in-
structed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.

No substantial advance having been made by the French,
I issued orders to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May
ist to commence his withdrawal to the new line.

The retirement was commenced the following night, and
the new line was occupied on the morning of May 4th.

I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out de-
liberately with scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy
in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert
Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders.

The successful conduct of this operation was the more
remarkable from the fact that on the evening of May 2nd,
when it was only half completed, the enemy made a heavy
attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien
and the line to the west of it.

An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at
the same time under similar conditions.

APPENDIX I. 205

In both cases our troops were at first driven from their
trenches by gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting
battalions and two brigades of a Cavalry Division, which were
sent up in support from about Potijze, all the lost trenches
were regained at night.

On the 3rd May, while the retirement was still going on,
another violent attack was directed on the northern face of
the salient. This was also driven back with heavy loss to
the enemy.

Further attempts of the enemy during the night of the
3rd to advance from the woods west of St. Julien were frus-
trated entirely by the fire of our artillery.

During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled
the trenches we had evacuated, quite unaware that they were
no longer occupied. So soon as the retirement was discovered
the Germans commenced to entrench opposite our new line
and to advance their guns to new positions. Our artillery,
assisted by aeroplanes, caused him considerable loss in carry-
ing out these operations.

Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks
at short intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to
the east of Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with
heavy loss.

Throughout the whole period since the first break of the
line on the night of April 22nd all the troops in this area
had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombard-
ment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply
of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly
superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or to properly
reorganize the line, after the confusion and demoralization
caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent
almost daily gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date
(May 8th) that effective preventives had been devised and
provided. In these circumstances a violent bombardment of
nearly the whole of the 5th Corps front broke out at 7 a.m.
on the morning of the 8th, which gradually concentrated on

206 APPENDIX I.

the front of the Division between north and south of Frezen-
berg. This fire completely obliterated the trenches and
caused enormous losses.

THE LOSS OF THE FREZENBERG RIDGE.

The artillery bombardment was shortly followed by a
heavy infantry attack, before which our line had to give way.

I relate what happened in Sir Herbert Plumer's own
words : —

" The right of one Brigade was broken about 10.15 a.m. ;
then its centre, and then part of the left of the Brigade
in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very
heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the
day. At this time two battalions were moved to General
Headquarters 2nd line astride the Menin road to support
and cover the left of their Division.

" At 12.25 p.m. the centre of a Brigade further to the left
also broke ; its right battalion, however, the ist Suffolks,
which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on and
were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile,
three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two
other battalions were moved up in support to General Head-
quarters line, and an Infantry Brigade came up to the grounds
of Vlamertinghe Chateau in Corps Reserve.

"At 11.30 a.m. a small party of Germans attempted to
advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed
by the 2nd Essex Regiment.

" A counter-attack was launched at 3.30 p.m. by the ist
York and Lancaster Regiment, 3rd Middlesex Regiment,
2nd East Surrey Regiment, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and
the ist Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack
reached Frezenberg, but was eventually driven back and held
up on a line running about north and south through Ver-
lorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance. The I2th
London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in

APPENDIX I. 207

reaching the original trench line, and did considerable exe-
cution with their machine gun.

" The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the
ist East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly
direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line
with the ground gained by the counter-attack, the line being
consolidated during the night.

" During the night orders were received that two Cavalry
Divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of
the 5th Corps, and a Territorial Division would be moved
up to be used if required.

" On the gth the Germans again repeated their bom-
bardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two
hours on the trenches of the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment
and 2nd Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry
attack which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again
bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the after-
noon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The
Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the
attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire
from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable
not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrench-
ment was therefore dug across it.

" At 3 p.m. the enemy started to shell the whole front
of the centre Division, and it was reported that the right
Brigade of this Division was being heavily punished, but
continued to maintain its line.

" The trenches of the Brigades on the left centre were
also heavily shelled during the day, and attacked by infantry.
Both attacks were repulsed.

THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT.

" On the loth instant the trenches on cither side of the
Menin-Ypres Road were shelled very severely all the morn-
ing. The 2nd Cameron Highlanders, cjth Royal Scots,* and
• Query, <jth Argyll and Sutherland Highlander.

208 APPENDIX I.

the 3rd and 4th King's Royal Rifles, however, repulsed an
attack made, under cover of gas, with heavy loss. Finally,
when the trenches had been practically destroyed and a
large number of the garrison buried, the 3rd King's Royal
Rifles and 4th Rifle Brigade fell back to the trenches imme-
diately west of Bellewaarde Wood. So heavy had been the
shell fire that the proposal to join up the line with a switch
through the wood had to be abandoned, the trees broken by
the shells forming an impassable entanglement.

" After a comparatively quiet night and morning (loth-
nth) the hostile artillery fire was concentrated on the trenches
of the 2nd Cameron Highlanders and ist Argyll and Suther-
land Highlanders at a slightly more northern point than on
the previous day. The Germans attacked in force and gained
a footing in part of the trenches, but were promptly ejected
by a supporting company of the gth Royal Scots.* After
a second short artillery bombardment the Germans again
attacked about 4.15 p.m., but were again repulsed by rifle
and machine-gun fire. A third bombardment followed, and
this time the Germans succeeded in gaining a trench — or
rather what was left of it — a local counter-attack failing.
However, during the night the enemy were again driven out.
The trench by this time being practically non-existent, the
garrison found it untenable under the very heavy shell fire
the enemy brought to bear upon it, and the trench was
evacuated. Twice more did the German snipers creep back
into it, and twice more they were ejected. Finally, a re-
trenchment was made, cutting off the salient which had been
contested throughout the day. It was won owing solely to the
superior weight and number of the enemy's guns, but both our
infantry and our artillery took a very heavy toll of the enemy,
and the ground lost has proved of little use to the enemy.

" On the remainder of the front the day passed com-
paratively quietly, though most parts of the line underwent
intermittent shelling by guns of various calibres.

* Query, gth Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

APPENDIX I. 209

" With the assistance of the Royal Flying Corps the
3 ist Heavy Battery scored a direct hit on a German gun,
and the North Midland Heavy Battery got on to some German
howitzers with great success.

" With the exception of another very heavy burst of
shell fire against the right Division early in the morning
the 1 2th passed uneventfully.

" On the night of the I2th-i3th the line was re-organized,
the centre Division retiring into Army Reserve to rest, and
their places being taken in the trenches by the two Cavalry
Divisions ; the Artillery and Engineers of the centre Division
forming with them what was known as the ' Cavalry Force '
under the command of General De Lisle.

THE FIGHT OF MAY I3TH.

" On the I3th the various reliefs having been completed
without incident, the heaviest bombardment yet experienced
broke out at 4.30 a.m., and continued with little intermission
throughout the day. At about 7.45 a.m. the Cavalry Brigade
astride the railway, having suffered very severely, and their
trenches having been obliterated, fell back about 800 yards.
The North Somerset Yeomanry on the right of the Brigade,
although also suffering severely, hung on to their trenches
throughout the day, and actually advanced and attacked
the enemy with the bayonet. The Brigade on its right also
maintained its position ; as did also the Cavalry Division,
except the left squadron which, when reduced to sixteen
men, fell back. The 2nd Essex Regiment, realizing the
situation, promptly charged and retook the trench, holding
it till relieved by the Cavalry. Meanwhile a counter-attack
by two Cavalry Brigades was launched at 2.30 p.m., and
succeeded, in spite of very heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, in
regaining the original line of trenches, turning out the Ger-
mans who had entered it, and in some cases pursuing them
for some distance. But a very heavy shell fire was again
opened on them, and they were again compelled to retire
vn. 14

210 APPENDIX I.

to an irregular line in rear, principally the craters of shell
holes. The enemy in their counter-attack suffered very
severe losses.

" The fighting in other parts of the line was little less
severe. The ist East Lancashire Regiment were shelled out
of their trenches, but their support company and the 2nd
Essex Regiment, again acting on their own initiative, won
them back. The enemy penetrated into the farm at the
north-east corner of the line, but the ist Rifle Brigade, after
a severe struggle, expelled them. The ist Hampshire Regi-
ment also repelled an attack, and killed every German who
got within fifty yards of their trenches. The 5th London
Regiment, despite very heavy casualties, maintained their
position unfalteringly. At the southern end of the line the
left Brigade was once again heavily shelled, as indeed was
the whole front. At the end of a very hard day's fighting our
line remained in its former position, with the exception of
the short distance lost by one Cavalry Division. Later, the
line was pushed forward, and a new line was dug in a less
exposed position, slightly in rear of that originally held.
The night passed quietly.

" Working parties of from 1,200 to 1,800 men have been
found every night by a Territorial Division and other units
for work on rear lines of defence, in addition to the work
performed by the garrisons in reconstructing the front line
trenches which were daily destroyed by shell fire.

" The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has
been invaluable. Apart from the hostile aeroplanes actually
destroyed, our airmen have prevented a great deal of aerial
reconnaissance by the enemy, and have registered a large
number of targets with our artillery.

INDIVIDUAL GALLANTRY.

" There have been many cases of individual gallantry.
As instances may be given the following : —

" During one of the heavy attacks made against our

APPENDIX I. 211

infantry gas was seen rolling forward from the enemy's
trenches. Private Lynn of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers at
once rushed to the machine gun without waiting to adjust
his respirator. Single-handed he kept his gun in action the
whole time the gas was rolling over, actually hoisting it on
the parapet to get a better field of fire. Although nearly-
suffocated by the gas, he poured a stream of lead into the
advancing enemy and checked their attack. He was carried
to his dug-out, but, hearing another attack was imminent,
he tried to get back to his gun. Twenty-four hours later he
died in great agony from the effects of the gas.

" A young subaltern in a cavalry regiment went forward
alone one afternoon to reconnoitre. He got into a wood,
1,200 yards in front of our lines, which he found occupied by
Germans, and came back with the information that the
enemy had evacuated a trench and were digging another —
information which proved most valuable to the artillery as
well as to his own unit.

" A patrol of two officers and a non-commissioned officer
of the ist Cambridgeshires went out one night to reconnoitre
a German trench 350 yards away. Creeping along the parapet
of the trench, they heard sounds indicating the presence of
six or seven of the enemy. Further on they heard deep
snores, apparently proceeding from a dug-out immediately
beneath them. Although they knew that the garrison of the
trench outnumbered them, they decided to procure an iden-
tification. Unfortunately in pulling out a clasp knife with
which to cut off the sleeper's identity disc, one of the officer's
revolvers went off. A conversation in agitated whispers
broke out in the German trench, but the patrol crept safely
away, the garrison being too startled to fire.

" Despite the very severe shelling to which the troops
had been subjected, which obliterated trenches and caused
very many casualties, the spirit of all ranks remains excellent.
The enemy's losses, particularly on the loth and I3th, have
unquestionably been serious. On the latter day they evacu-

212 APPENDIX I.

ated trenches (in face of the cavalry counter-attack) in which
were afterwards found quantities of equipment and some of
their own wounded. The enemy have been seen stripping
our dead, and on three occasions men in khaki have been
seen advancing."

THE FIGHT OF MAY 24TH.

The fight went on by the exchange of desultory shell
and rifle fire, but without any remarkable incident until the
morning of May 24th. During this period, however, the
French on our left had attained considerable success. On
the I5th instant they captured Steenstraate and the trenches
in Het Sas, and on the i6th they drove the enemy headlong
over the canal, finding two thousand German dead. On the
I7th they made a substantial advance on the east side of the
canal, and on the 2Oth they repelled a German counter-
attack, making a further advance in the same direction, and
taking one hundred prisoners.

On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of
gas against nearly the whole front was followed by heavy
shell fire, and the most determined attack was delivered
against our position east of Ypres.

The hour the attack commenced was 2.45 a.m. A large
proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was too
sudden to give them time to put on their respirators.

The 2nd Royal Irish and the gth Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, overcome by gas fumes, were driven out of a
farm held in front of the left Division, and this the enemy
proceeded to hold and fortify.

All attempts to retake this farm during the day failed,
and during the night of the 24th-25th the General Officer
Commanding the left Division decided to take up a new line
which, although slightly in rear of the old one, he considered
to be a much better position. This operation was success-
fully carried out.

Throughout the day the whole line was subjected to one
of the most violent artillery attacks which it had ever under-

APPENDIX I. 213

gone ; and the 5th Corps and the Cavalry Divisions en-
gaged had to fight hard to maintain their positions. On the
following day, however, the line was consolidated, joining
the right of the French at the same place as before, and
passing through Wieltje (which was strongly fortified) in a
southerly direction on to Hooge, where the Cavalry have
since strongly occupied the chateau, and pushed our line
further east.

THE ADVANCE AT FROMELLES.

V. In pursuance of a promise which I made to the French
Co;nmander-in-Chief to support an attack which his troops
were making on the gth May between the right of my line
and Arras, I directed Sir Douglas Haig to carry out on that
date an attack on the German trenches in the neighbourhood
of Rougebanc (north-west of Fromelles) by the 4th Corps,
and between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy by the ist and
Indian Corps.

The bombardment of the enemy's positions commenced
at 5 a.m.

Half-an-hour later the 8th Division of the 4th Corps
captured the first line of German trenches about Rougebanc,
and some detachments seized a few localities beyond this
line. It was soon found, however, that the position was
much stronger than had been anticipated, and that a more
extensive artillery preparation was necessary to crush the
resistance offered by his numerous fortified posts.

Throughout the gth and loth repeated efforts were made
to make further progress. Not only was this found to be
impossible, but the violence of the enemy's machine-gun fire
from his posts on the flanks rendered the captured trenches
so difficult to hold that all the units of the 4th Corps had to
retire to their original position by the morning of the loth.

The ist and Indian Divisions south of Ncuve Chapellc
met with no greater success, and on the evening of the loth
I sanctioned Sir Douglas Haig's proposal to concentrate all
our available resources on the southern point of attack.

214 APPENDIX 1.

The 7th Division was moved round from the 4th Corps
area to support this attack, and I directed the General Officer
Commanding the First Army to delay it long enough to
ensure a powerful and deliberate artillery preparation.

The operations of the gth and loth formed part of a
general plan of attack which the Allies were conjointly con-
ducting on a line extending from the north of Arras to the
south of Armentieres ; and, although immediate progress
was not made during this time by the British forces, their
attack assisted in securing the brilliant successes attained by
the French forces on their right, not only by holding the
enemy in their front, but by drawing off a part of the German
reinforcements which were coming up to support their forces
east of Arras.

It was decided that the attack should be resumed on the
night of the I2th instant, but the weather continued very
dull and misty, interfering much with artillery observation.
Orders were finally issued, therefore, for the action to com-
mence on the night of the I5th instant.

THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.

On the I5th May I moved the Canadian Division into
the ist Corps area and placed them at the disposal of Sir
Douglas Haig.

The infantry of the Indian Corps and the 2nd Division
of the ist Corps advanced to the attack of the enemy's
trenches which extended from Richebourg L'Avoue in a
south-westerly direction.

Before daybreak the 2nd Division had succeeded in cap-
turing two lines of the enemy's trenches, but the Indian
Corps were unable to make any progress owing to the strength
of the enemy's defences in the neighbourhood of Richebourg
L'Avoue.

At daybreak the yth Division, on the right of the 2nd,
advanced to the attack, and by 7 a.m. had entrenched them-
selves on a line running nearly North and South, half-way

APPENDIX I. 215

between their original trenches and La Quinque Rue, having
cleared and captured several lines of the enemy's trenches,
including a number of fortified posts.

As it was found impossible for the Indian Corps to make
any progress in face of the enemy's defences, Sir Douglas
Haig directed the attack to be suspended at this point and
ordered the Indian Corps to form a defensive flank.

The remainder of the day was spent in securing and con-
solidating positions which had been won, and endeavouring
to unite the inner flanks of the yth and 2nd Divisions, which
were separated by trenches and posts strongly held by the
enemy.

Various attempts which were made throughout the day
to secure this object had not succeeded at nightfall in driving
the enemy back.

The German communications leading to the rear of their
positions were systematically shelled throughout the night.

About two hundred prisoners were captured on the i6th
instant.

Fighting was resumed at daybreak ; and by n o'clock
the yth Division had made a considerable advance, capturing
several more of the enemy's trenches. The task allotted to
this Division was to push on in the direction of Rue D'Ouvert,
Chapelle St. Roch, and Canteleux.

The 2nd Division was directed to push on when the situa-
tion permitted towards the Rue du Marais and Violaines.

The Indian Division was ordered to extend its front far
enough to enable it to keep touch with the left of the 2nd
Division when they advanced.

On this clay I gave orders for the 5ist (Highland) Division
to move into the neighbourhood of Estaires to be ready to
support the operations of the First Army.

At about noon the enemy was driven out of the trenches
and posts which he occupied between the two Divisions, the
inner flanks of which were thus enabled to join hands.

By nightfall the 2nd and 7th Divisions had made good

2i6 APPENDIX I.

progress, the area of captured ground being considerably
extended to the right by the successful operations of the
latter.

The state of the weather on the morning of the i8th
much hindered an effective artillery bombardment, and
further attacks had, consequently, to be postponed.

Infantry attacks were made throughout the line in the
course of the afternoon and evening ; but, although not
very much progress was made, the line was advanced to the
La Quinque Rue-Bethune Road before nightfall.

On the igth May the yth and 2nd Divisions were drawn
out of the line to rest. The 7th Division was relieved by the
Canadian Division and the 2nd Division by the 5ist (High-
land) Division.

Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian and 5ist Divisions,
together with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, under
the command of Lieutenant-General Alderson, whom he
directed to conduct the operations which had hitherto been
carried on by the General Officer Commanding First Corps ;
and he directed the 7th Division to remain in Army Reserve.

During the night of the igth-2oth a small post of the
enemy in front of La Quinque Rue was captured.

During the night of the 2Oth-2ist the Canadian Division
brilliantly carried on the excellent progress made by the
yth Division by seizing several of the enemy's trenches and
pushing forward their whole line several hundred yards.
A number of prisoners and some machine guns were captured.

On the 22nd instant the 5ist (Highland) Division was
attached to the Indian Corps, and the General Officer Com-
manding the Indian Corps took charge of the operations at
La Quinque Rue, Lieutenant-General Alderson with the
Canadians conducting the operations to the south of that
place.

On this day the Canadian Division extended their line
slightly to the right and repulsed three very severe hostile
counter-attacks.

APPENDIX I. 217

On the 24th and 25th May the 47th Division (2nd London
Territorial) succeeded in taking some more of the enemy's
trenches and making good the ground gained to the east
and north.

I had now reason to consider that the battle, which was
commenced by the First Army on the Qth May and renewed
on the i6th, having attained for the moment the immediate
object I had in view, should not be further actively pro-
ceeded with ; and I gave orders to Sir Douglas Haig to cur-
tail his artillery attack and to strengthen and consolidate
the ground he had won.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE.

In the battle of Festubert above described the enemy
was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched
and fortified, and ground was won on a front of four miles
to an average depth of 600 yards.

The enemy is known to have suffered very heavy losses,
and in the course of the battle 785 prisoners and 10 machine
guns were captured. A number of machine guns were also
destroyed by our fire.

During the period under report the Army under n.y
command has taken over trenches occupied by some other
French Divisions.

I am much indebted to General D'Urbal, commanding
the loth French Army, for the valuable and efficient support
received throughout the battle of Festubert from three groups
of French 75 millimetre guns.

In spite of very unfavourable weather conditions, render-
ing observation most difficult, our own artillery did excel-
lent work throughout the battle.

WORK OF THE THIRD CORPS.

VI. During the important operations described above,
which were carried on by the First and Second Armies, the
3rd Corps was particularly active in making demonstrations

218 APPENDIX I.

with a view to holding the enemy in its front and preventing
reinforcements reaching the threatened area.

As an instance of the successful attempts to deceive the
enemy in this respect it may be mentioned that on the after-
noon of the 24th instant a bombardment of about an hour
was carried out by the 6th Division with the object of dis-
tracting attention from the Ypres salient.

Considerable damage was done to the enemy's parapets
and wire ; and that the desired impression was produced
on the enemy is evident from the German wireless news on
that day, which stated " West of Lille the English attempts
to attack were nipped in the bud."

In previous reports I have drawn attention to the enter-
prise displayed by the troops of the 3rd Corps in conducting
night reconnaissances, and to the courage and resource shown
by officers' and other patrols in the conduct of these minor
operations.

Throughout the period under report this display of
activity has been very marked all along the 3rd Corps front,
and much valuable information and intelligence have been
collected.

WORK OF THE MEDICAL CORPS.

VII. I have much pleasure in again expressing my warm
appreciation of the admirable manner in which all branches
of the Medical Services now in the field, under the direction
of Surgeon-General Sir Arthur Sloggett, have met and dealt
with the many difficult situations resulting from the opera-
tions during the last two months.

The medical units at the front were frequently exposed
to the enemy's fire, and many casualties occurred amongst
the officers of the regimental Medical Service. At all times
the officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and nurses
carried out their duties with fearless bravery and great de-
votion to the welfare of the sick and wounded.

The evacuation of casualties from the front to the Base
and to England was expeditiously accomplished by the

APPENDIX I. 219

Administrative Medical Staffs at the front and on the Lines
of Communication. All ranks employed in units of evacua-
tion and in Base Hospitals have shown the highest skill and
untiring zeal and energy in alleviating the condition of those
who passed through their hands.

The whole organization of the Medical Services reflects
the highest credit on all concerned.

WORK OF THE FLYING CORPS.

VIII. I have once more to call your Lordship's attention
to the part taken by the Royal Flying Corps in the general
progress of the campaign, and I wish particularly to mention
the invaluable assistance they rendered in the operations
described in this report, under the able direction of Major-
General Sir David Henderson.

The Royal Flying Corps is becoming more and more an
indispensable factor in combined operations. In co-operation
with the artillery, in particular, there has been continuous
improvement both in the methods and in the technical
material employed. The ingenuity and technical skill dis-
played by the officers of the Royal Flying Corps, in effecting
this improvement, have been most marked.

Since my last dispatch there has been a considerable
increase both in the number and in the activity of German
aeroplanes in our front. During this period there have been
more than sixty combats in the air, in which not one British
aeroplane has been lost. As these fights take place almost
invariably over or behind the German lines, only one hostile
aeroplane has been brought down in our territory. Five
more, however, have been definitely wrecked behind their
own lines, and many have been chased down and forced to
land in most unsuitable ground.

In spite of the opposition of hostile aircraft, and the
great number of anti-aircraft guns employed by the enemy,
air reconnaissance has been carried out with regularity and
accuracy.

220 APPENDIX I.

I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice the assistance
given by the French Military Authorities, and in particular
by General Hirschauer, Director of the French Aviation
Service, and his assistants, Colonel Bottieaux and Colonel
Stammler, in the supply of aeronautical material, without
which the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps would have
been seriously impaired.

SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT.

IX. In this dispatch I wish again to remark upon the
exceptionally good work done throughout this campaign by
the Army Service Corps and by the Army Ordnance Depart-
ment, not only in the field, but also on the Lines of Com-
munication and at the Base ports.

To foresee and meet the requirements in the matter of
Ammunition, Stores, Equipment, Supplies, and Transport
has entailed on the part of the officers, non-commissioned
officers, and men of these Services a sustained effort which
has never been relaxed since the beginning of the war, and
which has been rewarded by the most conspicuous success.

The close co-operation of the Railway Transport Depart-
ment, whose excellent work, in combination with the French
Railway Staff, has ensured the regularity of the maintenance
services, has greatly contributed to this success.

The degree of efficiency to which these Services have
been brought was well demonstrated in the course of the
Second Battle of Ypres.

The roads between Poperinghe and Ypres, over which
transport, supply, and ammunition columns had to pass,
were continually searched by hostile heavy artillery during
the day and night ; whilst the passage of the canal through
the town of Ypres, and along the roads east of that town,
could only be effected under most difficult and dangerous
conditions as regards hostile shell fire. Yet, throughout the
whole five or six weeks during which these conditions prevailed,
the work was carried on with perfect order and efficiency.

APPENDIX I. 221

THE ARRIVAL OF THE " NEW " ARMY.

X. Since the date of my last report some Divisions of
the " New " Army have arrived in this country.

I made a close inspection of one Division, formed up on
parade, and have at various times seen several units belong-
ing to others.

These Divisions have as yet had very little experience
in actual fighting ; but, judging from all I have seen, I am of
opinion that they ought to prove a valuable addition to any
fighting force.

As regards the Infantry, their physique is excellent,
whilst their bearing and appearance on parade reflects great
credit on the officers and staffs responsible for their training.
The units appear to be thoroughly well officered and con.-
manded. The equipment is in good order and efficient.

Several units of artillery have been tested in the firing
line behind the trenches, and I hear very good reports of
them. Their shooting has been extremely good, and they
are quite fit to take their places in the line.

The Pioneer Battalions have created a very favourable
impression, the officers being keen and ingenious, and the
men of good physique and good diggers. The equipment is
suitable. The training in field works has been good, but,
generally speaking, they require the assistance of Regular
Royal Engineers as regards laying out of important works.
Man for man in digging the battalions should do practically
the same amount of work as an equivalent number of sappers,
and in rivetting, entanglement, etc., a great deal more than
the ordinary infantry battalions.

THE TERRITORIALS.

XI. During the months of April and May several divisions
of the Territorial Force joined the Army under my com-
mand.

Experience has shown that these troops have now reached

222 APPENDIX I.

a standard of efficiency which enables them to be usefully
employed in complete divisional units.

Several divisions have been so employed ; some in the
trenches, others in the various offensive and defensive opera-
tions reported in this dispatch.

In whatever kind of work these units have been engaged,
they have all borne an active and distinguished part, and
have proved themselves thoroughly reliable and efficient.

The opinion I have expressed in former dispatches as to
the use and value of the Territorial Force has been fully
justified by recent events.

MR. ASQUITH'S VISIT.

XII. The Prime Minister was kind enough to accept an
invitation from me to visit the Army in France, and arrived
at my Headquarters on the 3oth May.

Mr. Asquith made an exhaustive tour of the front, the
hospitals, and all the administrative arrangements made by
Corps Commanders for the health and comfort of men behind
the trenches.

It was a great encouragement to all ranks to see the
Prime Minister amongst them ; and the eloquent words
which on several occasions he addressed to the troops had a
most powerful and beneficial effect.

As I was desirous that the French Commander-in-Chief
should see something of the British troops, I asked General
Joffre to be kind enough to inspect a division on parade.

The General accepted my invitation, and on the 2yth
May he inspected the yth Division, under the command of
Major-General H. de la P. Gough, C.B., which was resting
behind the trenches.

General Joffre subsequently expressed to me in a letter
the pleasure it gave him to see the British troops, and his
appreciation of their appearance on parade. He requested
me to make this known to all ranks.

The Moderator of the Church of Scotland, the Right

APPENDIX I. 223

Reverend Dr. Wallace Williamson, Dean of the Order of the
Thistle, visited the Army in France between the 7th and
17th May, and made a tour of the Scottish regiments with
excellent results.

SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS.

XIII. In spite of the constant strain put upon them by
the arduous nature of the fighting which they are called upon
to cany out daily and almost hourly, the spirit which ani-
mates all ranks of the Army in France remains high and
confident.

They meet every demand made upon them with the
utmost cheerfulness.

This splendid spirit is particularly manifested by the
men in hospital, even amongst those who are mortally
wounded.

The invariable question which comes from lips hardly
able to utter a sound is, " How are things going on at the
front ? "

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND SIR HERBERT PLUMER.

XIV. In conclusion, I desire to bring to Your Lordship's
special notice the valuable services rendered by General Sir
Douglas Haig in his successful handling of the troops of the
First Army throughout the Battle of Festubert, and Lieu-
tenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer for his fine defence of
Ypres throughout the arduous and difficult operations during
the latter part of April and the month of May.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
J. D. P. FRENCH,

Field-Marshal,

Commanding-in-Chief,

The British Army in France.

APPENDIX II.

THE GALLIPOLI LANDING.
SIR IAN HAMILTON'S FIRST DISPATCH.

From the General Commanding the Mediterranean Expe-
ditionary Force.
To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
zoth May, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations
in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including the 5th May.

In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left
London on I3th March with my General Staff by special
train to Marseilles, and thence in H.M.S. Phaeton to the
scene of the naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean,
reaching Tenedos on the I7th March shortly after noon.

Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral
de Robeck, Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet ,
General d'Amade, Commanding the French Corps Expe-
ditionnaire ; and Centre Amiral Guepratte, in command of
the French Squadron. At this conference past difficulties
were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh
attack on the morrow was announced. The amphibious
battle between warships and land fortresses took place next
day, the i8th of March. I witnessed these stupendous events,
and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction

APPENDIX II.

225

that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my
command would be required to enable the Fleet effectively
to force the Dardanelles.

THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA.

By that time I had already carried out a preliminary
reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli
Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair
fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at its extremest point. From
Bulair this singular feature runs in a south-westerly direction
for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a breadth of 12 miles.
The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory-
slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain
of hills, which extend as far as Cape Sulva. The precipitous
fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow
gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements.
The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-
worn boot. The ankle lies between Gaba Tepe and Kalkmaz
Dagh ; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid
Bahr ; whilst the toe is that promontory five miles in width,
stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.

The three dominating features in this southern section
seemed to me to be : —

(1) Saribair Mountain, running up in a succession of
almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The
whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and
covered with thick jungle.

(2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortifi-
cation artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to
cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the
JEge&n.

(3) Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, don. mating
at long field gun range what I have described as being
the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern
sector is that from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is
vn. 15

226 APPENDIX II.

hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to
direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to
be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nul-
lahs, and confused under-features.

THE LANDING-PLACES.

Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good
landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small
sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small
break in the cliffs (X). Two miles farther up the coast the
mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet
another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully looked as
if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to
heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham, by
Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about
300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply-rising ground,
as the flat bottom of a half -saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked
on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort.
By Eski Hissarlik, on the east of Morto Bay (S), was another
small beach, which was, however, dominated by the big
guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two
good landing-places on either side of Gaba Tepe. Farther
to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to
be dangerous and difficult. In most of these landing-places
the trenches and lines of wire entanglements were plainly
visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun em-
placements and infantry redoubts could also be made out
through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences
and of the forces available to man them there was no possi-
bility of judging except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnais-
sances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and
systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under
my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet
with success ; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or
piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The

APPENDIX II. 227

landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have
described — a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and
prepared for any such attempt — involved difficulties for which
no precedent was forthcoming in military history except
possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were
either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted
by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three
simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly
enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the
rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy
was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary,
therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points
as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well.
The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable
if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable
intervals of the force.

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my
landing. Had it been British weather there would have
been no alternative but instantly tu give up the adventure.
To land two or three thousand men, and then to have to
break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks
of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back
was not an eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever
happened the weather must always remain an incalculable
factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a
fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.

THE SAILING OF THE TRANSPORTS.

Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the
troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembar-
kation. The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce,
been embarked without its having been possible to pay due
attention to the operation upon which I now proposed that
they should be launched.

Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in
that harbour was out of the question. With your Lordship's

228 APPENDIX II.

approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except
those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details
encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On
the 24th March I myself, together with the General Staff,
proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until yth April,
working out the allocation of troops to transports in minutest
detail as a prelude to the forthcoming disembarkation.
General d'Amade did likewise.

On the ist April the remainder of the General Head-
quarters, which had not been mobilized when I left England,
arrived at Alexandria.

Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit
to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded me oppor-
tunities of conferring with the G.O.C. Egypt and of making
myself acquainted with the troops, drawn from all parts of
the French Republic and of the British Empire, which it was
to be my privilege to command.

By the 7th April my preparations were sufficiently ad-
vanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to
Lemnos, so as to put the finishing touches to my plan in
close co-ordination with the Vice- Admiral Commanding the
Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.

The covering force of the 2gth Division left Mudros Har-
bour on the evening of 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V,
W, X, and Y. Of these, V, W, and X were to be main land-
ings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect
the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to
interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings
at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned
that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach
the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's
bombardment from the Fleet.

The transports conveying the covering force arrived off
Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the after-
noon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-
sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About

APPENDIX II. 229

midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and
other small boats, silently slipped their cables and, escorted
by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards
their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was
reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was
absolutely still ; there was no sign of life on the shore ; a
thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory ; the
surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battle-
ships and four cruisers which formed the 3rd Squadron at
once took up the positions that had been allotted to them,
and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent
bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun. Mean-
while the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small
boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move
on the part of the enemy ; except for shells thrown from the
Asiatic side of the Straits the guns of the Fleet remained
unanswered.

THE LANDING AT BEACHES S, Y, AND X.

The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik
Point) consisted of the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one
company) under Lieut. -Colonel Casson. Their landing was
delayed by the current, but by 7.30 a.m. it had been success-
fully effected at the cost of some 50 casualties, and Lieut. -
Colonel Casson was able to establish his small force on the
high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained
himself until the general advance on the 2j\. h brought him
into touch with the main body.

The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own
Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion,
Royal Naval Division, specially attached to the zgth Division
for this task, the whole under the command of Lieut. -Colonel
Koe. The beach at this point consisted merely of a narrow
strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff
some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia.

A number of small gullies running down the face of the

230 APPENDIX II.

cliff facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable
had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps
had been taken to defend them. Very different would it have
been had we, as was at one time intended, taken Y 2 for this
landing. There a large force of infantry, entrenched up to
their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss guns,
were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made
good its footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the
first instance to establish themselves on the heights, reserves
of food, water, and ammunition were hauled up to the top
of the cliff, and, in accordance with the plan of operations,
an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with the
troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's
strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing
at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately
to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not per-
severed with.

Later in the day a large force of Turks were seen to be
advancing upon the cliffs above Y beach from the direction
of Krithia, and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From
this time onward his small force was subjected to strong
and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing
to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland
from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships
could render him little assistance. Throughout the after-
noon and all through the night the Turks made assault after
assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the
trenches, and, favoured by darkness, actually led a pony
with a machine gun on its back over the defences and were
proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position
when they were bayoneted.

The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet,
and always drove off the enemy for the moment, but the
Turks were in a vast superiority and fresh troops took the
place of those who temporarily fell back. Colonel Koe (since
died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the day,

APPENDIX II. 231

and the number of officers and men killed and wounded
during the incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 a.m.
on the 26th only about half of the King's Own Scottish Bor-
derers remained to man the entrenchment made for four
times their number. These brave fellows were absolutely
worn out with continuous fighting ; it was doubtful if rein-
forcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued
for them to be re-embarked. Thanks to H.M.S. Goliath,
Dublin, Amethyst, and Sapphire, thanks also to the devotion
of a small rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers,
which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-em-
barkation of the whole of the troops, together with the
wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely accomplished,
and both battalions were brought round the southern end of
the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been,
and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good
so much ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it
stood, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to
the success of the main attack, seeing that the plucky stand
made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy
from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during
what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.

WORK OF " IMPLACABLE'S " GUNS.

The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip
of sand some 200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of
a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the ist Royal
Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from H.M.S. Im-
placable in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together
with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion,
Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S. Implacable,
with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood quite
close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she
could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers
made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion
then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114,

232 APPENDIX II.

situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-
attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of
the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the
troops had established themselves in an entrenched position
extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as
far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the
Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-
General Marshall, commanding the 8yth Brigade, had been
wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command
of the brigade.

THE LANDING AT BEACH V.

The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the
following lines : —

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bom-
barded by the Fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers
were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by
the collier River Clyde (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying
between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster
Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the
West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The River Clyde had been specially prepared for the rapid
disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for
the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on
to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly
into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows
had reached land the River Clyde was to be run straight
ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a
gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means
it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the
utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing,
a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been
mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this
beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battle-
ships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-

APPENDIX II. 233

Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr
village and that which is crowned by No. I Fort the ground
forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred
yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly
concave, so that the whole area contained within the. limits
of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise
gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be
swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy
strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along
almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment
about 4 feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down
to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarp-
ment played no small part in the operations of the succeed-
ing thirty-two hours.

At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the
shore and the village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr,
a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls and mounds
of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the
north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack.
Both of these buildings, as well as No. i Fort, had been long
bombarded by the Fleet, and the guns of the forts had been
put out of action ; but their crumbled walls and the ruined
outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from
the terraced slopes already described the defenders were
able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked
from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the
beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier
metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran
right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of
the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the
ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the
amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending
in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entangle-
ment, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end
of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the
upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's

234 APPENDIX II.

trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were em placed ;
in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the
debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover
and concealment for a number of machine guns, which brought
a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire
from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous
reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed
information with regard either to the locality or to the
enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual course of events did
not quite correspond with the intentions of the Commander.
The River Clyde came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance
of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Com-
mander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and
the collier were approaching the landing-place the Turks
made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as
if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the
first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of
fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier.
The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered
exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who
succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed
to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on
the farther side. None of the boats, however, were able to
get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon
the beach.

Now came the moment for the River Clyde to pour forth
her living freight ; but grievous delay was caused here by
the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the
ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work
and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man
engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however,
to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the
lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the
disembarkation began.

APPENDIX II. 235

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way ; but,
short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the
farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which
poured down upon them from both flanks and the front.
As the second company followed, the extemporized pier of
lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the
shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped
being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment
in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted
workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought
into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers
rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel
as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When
it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water,
with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade-
Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on
board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on
the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain
Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and n a.m.,
about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of these nearly half
had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little
cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the
beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up.
Had the troops all been in open boats but few of them would
have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier
was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to
the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made
no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was prac-
tically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was
probably saved by the machine-guns on the River Clyde,
which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's
fire and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch
a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusi-
liers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sc-dd-

236 APPENDIX II.

el-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V
beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It
was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body
which had been intended to land on V beach ; but this would
have involved considerable delay owing to the distance,
and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the
Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regi-
ment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high
ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situa-
tion by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure
on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire
entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and
at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground.
Just before dark some small parties of our men ma'de their
way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and
when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from
the collier were landed. A good force was now available for
attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as
to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate
in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the fort
and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one
after the other. The wounded who were able to do so with-
out support returned to the collier under cover of darkness ;
but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was
the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the
troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there
were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Mun-
ster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regi-
ment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major had been killed ;
Lieutenant-Colonel Carringt on Smith, commanding the Hamp-
shire Regiment, had been killed and the adjutant had been
wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was
wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were
either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party

APPENDIX II. 237

still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy
escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were
two officers of my General Staff — Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-
Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. These two officers,
who had landed from the River Clyde, had been striving,
with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their com-
rades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless
imminent peril.

Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels
Doughty- Wylie and WTilliams set to work to organize an attack
on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured
to pull scattered units together after they have been domi-
nated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous
fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortu-
nately General Hunter-Weston had arranged with Rear-
Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy bom-
bardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort,
Sedd-el-Bahr Village, the Old Castle north of the village,
and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of
this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-
Wylie, and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major R.A., the troops
gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They encountered
a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from
the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine guns. Un-
deterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gun-
fire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they pene-
trated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were
in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During
this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel
Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the
way up from the beach through the west side of the village,
under a galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his
own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had
almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last
assault. But the attack was pushed forward without waver-
ing, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash,

238 APPENDIX II.

the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle
and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.

THE LANDING AT BEACH W.

W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some
350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated imme-
diately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running
down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either
flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but, in the
centre, a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access
to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity
had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing-place
into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire
entanglement extended the whole length of the shore and
a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the
surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines
had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was
strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded
a natural covered approach. A number of machine guns
also were cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as
to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were
converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest
of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded
by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and
especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138.
Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements
about 20 feet broad, and could be approached only by a
bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above
W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition,
another separate entanglement ran down from these two
redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making
intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible
until these redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that
the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and
it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever

APPENDIX II. 239

been achieved by the British soldier — or any other soldier
— than the storming of these trenches from open boats on
the morning of 25th April.

The landing at W had been entrusted to the ist Battalion
Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete
lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion
that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the
landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half
an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole battalion approached the
shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast,
each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as
shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the
boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies
headed for the beach and a company on the left of the line
made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff
at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the
88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped
the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also
in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the
wire entanglements.

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had
been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first
boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the
battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally
hurled themselves ashore, and, fired at from right, left, and
centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire.
A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe,
but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the
fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the
shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the
extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and
collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here
the companies were rapidly re-formed, and set forth to
storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find
them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved

24o APPENDIX II.

up towards Hill 114 whilst a small party worked down towards
the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during
the advance, but the determination of the troops was in
no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches
were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.

About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark,
and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with
the troops who had landed on X beach.

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on
Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of
Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction
succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements,
but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that
Major Frankland, Brigade-Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade,
who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance,
was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been
wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General
Staff 2gth Division, was now sent ashore to take command at
W beach and organize a further advance.

At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been sub-
jected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment
advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion
rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the
entanglement ; some were killed, others persevered, and by
4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops
on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the
dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out the
86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along
the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-
wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again
the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could
be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they
were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The
fire pouring out of No. i fort grew hotter and hotter, until

APPENDIX II. 241

the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night
and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest
on their laurels for a while.

When night fell, the British position in front of VV beach
extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through
Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown
into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available
reserves on this part of our front were the 2nd London Field
Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which
had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-
attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of
ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of
the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

THE LANDING AT GABA TEPE.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out
of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of 24th April, escorted by
the 2nd Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear- Admiral Thursby.
The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the
morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been
placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were
transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out
with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simul-
taneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force
were transferred from their transports to six destroyers.
At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the
destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast,
H.M.S. Queen (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing
on a point about a mile north of Gaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m.
orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows and at
4.10 a.m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and
were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No
breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every con-
dition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking

242 APPENDIX II.

behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb,
betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected
for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the
Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent.
Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their
exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather
more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and
was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this
accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy
off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been
a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the
force of occupation has been much better defiladed from
shell fire.

The beach on which the landing was actually effected is
a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length,
bounded on the north and the south by two small promon-
tories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with ex-
ceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-
easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a
small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to
the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of
the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which
forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of
the spur the ground falls almost sheer except near the southern
limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access to the
mouth of the ravine behind. Farther inland lie in a tangled
knot the under-features of Saribair, separated by deep ravines,
which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp
spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many
places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal
mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west,
south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the
darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy
stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running

APPENDIX II. 243

along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so
critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praise-
worthy. Not a word was spoken — every one remained per-
fectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which
sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment
the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like
lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went
straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the
onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it
and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian in-
fantry.

This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade,
under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O.
The ist and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all
disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two
batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed.
The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing
to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the
anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected
to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand farther
out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for
sending any formed detachments post haste as they landed
to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of
scattered groups of the men who had pressed far farther into
the peninsula than had been intended — all these led to con-
fusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd
of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others fall-
ing back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified
into a semi-circular position with its right about a mile north
of Gaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisher-
man's Hut. During this period parties of the Qth and loth
Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's
Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of
the Australian Division was being followed by that of the
New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

244 APPENDIX II.

From ii a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a
strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a
specially strong effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left
of the 2nd Brigade. This counter-attack was, however,
handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M. ships.
Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined counter-
attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their
ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During
the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the
8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge ; but in spite of all
the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest
on the night of the 24th-25th ; they had been fighting hard
all day over most difficult country, and they had been sub-
jected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties
had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and
in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them
still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.

It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still
more seriously. Several times our machine guns got on to
them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country
is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganization of units and formations was impossible
during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An
advance was impossible until a reorganization could be
effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained
and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition,
water, and supplies to the ridges — in itself a most difficult
undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division
were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on the 28th and
2gth April.

On the night of 2nd May a bold effort was made to seize
a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The
enemy's enfilading machine guns were too scientifically
posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond
the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On 4th
May an attempt to seize Gaba Tepe was also unsuccessful,

APPENDIX II. 245

the barbed-wire here being something beyond belief. But
a number of minor operations have been carried out, such
as the taking of a Turkish observing station ; the strengthen-
ing of entrenchments; the reorganization of units, and the
perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also
a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best
troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, are con-
stantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely,
as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter,
even at his own game.

The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has
been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been
in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted
to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved him-
self to be to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

THE FRENCH AT KUM KALE.

Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of
the French Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum
Kale under the guns of the French Fleet, and remained ashore
till the morning of the 26th, when they were re-embarked.
500 prisoners were captured by the French on this day.

This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from
Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed
largely to the success of the British landings.

On the evening of the 20th the main disembarkation of
the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to our
Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French
should hold the portion of the front between the telegraph
wire and the sea.

The following day I ordered a general advance to a line
stretching from Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlik Point to the
mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. ThU
advance, which was commenced at midday, was completed
without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated thrir
new line. The forward movement relieved the growing con-

246 APPENDIX II.

gestion on the beaches, and by giving us possession of several
new wells afforded a temporary solution to the water problem,
which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety.

By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established
themselves on a line some three miles long, which stretched
from the mouth of the nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of
Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point, the three brigades of
the 2Qth Division less two battalions on the left and in the
centre, with four French battalions on the right, and beyond
them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right.

THE GENERAL ADVANCE BEGUN.

Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held.
Still, it was so vital to make what headway we could before
the enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforce-
ments that it was decided to push on as quickly as possible.
Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to com-
mence at 8 a.m. next day.

The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their
left brigade leading, the French were directed to extend their
left in conformity with the British movements and to retain
their right on the coast-line south of the Kereves Dere.

The advance commenced at 8 a.m. on the 28th, and was
carried out with commendable vigour, despite the fact that
from the moment of landing the troops had been unable to
obtain any proper rest.

The Syth Brigade, with which had been incorporated
the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of
the King's Own Scottish Borderers and South Wales Bor-
derers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a.m. had advanced some
two miles. Here the further progress of the Border Regiment
was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted
to concentrate and make dispositions to attack it, and at
that moment had to withstand a determined counter-attack
by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun fire from H.M.S. Queen
Elizabeth, they succeeded in beating off the attack, but they

APPENDIX II. 247

made no further progress that day. and when night fell en-
trenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the
morning.

The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right
on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters
of a mile south-west of Krithia. This was, however, the
farthest limit attained, and later on in the day they fell back
into line with other corps.

The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed
steadily until about 11.30 a.m., when the stubbornness of the
opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought
their advance to a standstill. The 86th Brigade, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve,
were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th
Brigade in the direction of Krithia.

The movement commenced at about I p.m., but though
small reconnoitring parties got to within a few hundred
yards of Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get
beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile, the
French had also pushed on in the face of strong opposition
along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere,
and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown
back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here
they were unable to make further progress ; gradually the
strength of the resistance made itself felt, and our Allies
were forced during the afternoon to give ground.

AMMUNITION RUNNING SHORT.

By 2 p.m. the whole of the troops with the exception of
the Drake Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line.
The men were exhausted, and the few guns landed at the
time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support.
The small amount of transport available did not suffice to
maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were run-
ning short despite all efforts to push them up from the land-
ing-places.

248 APPENDIX II.

Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Babi had now per-
force to be abandoned — at least for this occasion. The best
that could be expected was that we should be able to main-
tain what we had won, and when at 3 p.m. the Turks made
a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the
centre and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly
doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The
French were also forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were
issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they
could in the positions they then held, with their right flank
thrown back so as to maintain connection with our Allies.
In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was
temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered
severely.

Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men,
artillery, and munitions during the day, Krithia should have
fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would
have been avoided.

Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had
to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that
same time, have received proportionately greater support. I
was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result
was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that
hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose.

For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably
on the whole. The line eventually held by our troops on the
night of the 28th ran from a point on the coast three miles
north-east of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski
Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French south-
east to the coast.

Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th
Brigades had occurred during the day's fighting, and there
was a dangerous re-entrant in the line at the junction of the
8yth and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French
had lost heavily, especially in officers, and required time to
reorganize.

APPENDIX II. 249

The 2gth April was consequently spent in straightening
the line, and in consolidating and strengthening the positions
gained. There was a certain amount of artillery and mus-
ketry fire, but nothing serious.

Similarly, on the 3oth, no advance was made, nor was
any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing of the
bulk of the artillery was completed, and a readjustment of
the line took place, the portion held by the French being
somewhat increased.

Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had
been disembarked, and these, together with three battalions
of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed
into a reserve.

THE TURKISH COUNTER-ATTACK.

This reserve was increased on the ist May by the addition
of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the
three battalions of the 88th Brigade to return to the trenches.
The Corps Exp£ditionnaire d'Orient had disembarked the
whole of their infantry and all but two of their batteries by
the same evening.

At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our
position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of the
moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their
formation was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank
being deprived of ammunition to make them rely only upon
the bayonet. The officers were served out with coloured
Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the
Turkish guns that they were to lengthen their range ; white
that our front trenches had been stormed ; grren that our
main position had been carried. The Turkish attack was to
crawl on hands and knees until the time came for the final
rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was signed by Von
Zowenstern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file, who
were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back
into the sea.

250 APPENDIX II.

" Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy
him !

" We shall not retire one step ; for, if we do, our religion,
our country, and our nation will perish !

" Soldiers ! The world is looking at you ! Your only
hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue
or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt ! "

The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell
upon the right of the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing
all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded.
So when the Turks came right on without firing and charged
into the trenches with the bayonet they made an ugly gap
in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal
Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed
a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the
Essex Regiment detached for the purpose by the Officer
Commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of the British line held
its own with comparative ease, and it was not found necessary
to employ any portion of the reserve. The storm next broke
in fullest violence against the French left, which was held
by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field
Artillery Brigades and a Howitzer Battery. After several
charges and counter-charges the Senegalese began to give
ground, and a company of the Worcester Regiment and
some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later, a
second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up,
and the position was then maintained for the remainder of
the night, although about 2 a.m. it was found necessary to
dispatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to strengthen
the extreme right of the French.

About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was ordered and the
whole line began to advance. By 7.30 a.m. the British left
had gained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed the
enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had
gained some ground in conjunction with the French left,
but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress.

APPENDIX II. 251

As the British centre and left were now subjected to heavy
cross fire from concealed machine guns, it was found im-
possible to maintain the ground gained, and therefore, about
ii a.m., the whole line withdrew to its former trenches.

The net result of the operations was the repulse of the
Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses.
At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it not been
for those inventions of the devil — machine guns and barbed
wire — which suit the Turkish character and tactics to per-
fection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of
Achi Babi. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers
of dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were
left in our hands.

On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet,
burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which
we did not interfere. Shortly after 9 p.m., however, they
made another attack against the whole Allied line, their
chief effort being made against the French front, where the
ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed
with loss.

During the night 3rd~4th the French front was again
subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able to repulse
without assistance from my general reserve.

The day of the 4th was spent in reorganization, and a
portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily
during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the
2nd Naval Brigade. The night passed quietly.

During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the
East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in
reserve behind the British left.

Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next
day, and these and the three days' battle which ensued will
be dealt with in my next dispatch.

OUR LOSSES.
The losses, exclusive of the French, during the jK-riod

252 APPENDIX II.

covered by this dispatch, were, I regret to say, very severe,
numbering : —

177 Officers and 1,990 other ranks killed.

412 Officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded.
13 Officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.

From a technical point of view it is interesting to note
that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the
time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly
elaborate work involved by these landings was put through
by my General Staff working in collaboration with Commo-
dore Roger Keyes, C.B., M.V.O., and the Naval Transport
Officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck.
Navy and Army carried out these combined duties with that
perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to
success.

WORK OF THE NAVY.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy
has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but
realizes how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck ; to
the warships, French and British ; to the destroyers, mine
sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who
took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give
their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur
le General d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide
experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most
loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale
planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention
of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of the
Corps Expeditionnaire de 1'Orient into a brilliant operation,
which secured some substantial results. During the fighting
which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-
el-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more
creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very
heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Mon-
sieur le General d'Amade.

APPENDIX II. 253

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B.,
C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Gaba
Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact
of his having been responsible for the execution of these
difficult and hazardous operations — operations which were
crowned with a very remarkable success — speaks, I think,
for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter- Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was
tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more
especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks
which ensued. Untiring, resourceful, and ever more cheerful
as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my
opinion, very special qualifications as a Commander of troops
in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief
of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter
in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more
than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period
under review, and these will form the subject of a separate
report at an early date.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
IAN HAMILTON,

General,

Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force.

I'RINTED IN GREAT URIIAIN.

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