Nelson's history of the war

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NELSON'S
HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOLUME IX.

NELSON'S HISTORY
OF THE WAR. By

John Buchan.

Volume IX. The Italian War, the Campaign at
Gallipoli, and the Russian Retreat from the
Warsaw Salient.

THOMAS NELSON AND SONS

LONDON, EDINBURGH, DUBLIN, AND NEW YORK

CONTENTS.

LXIV. THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE ... 9
LXV. THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI . . 33
LXVI. THE BALKAN LABYRINTH ... 67
LXVII. THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE .... 99
LXVIII. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF "GRANDEUR" in
LXIX. THE STRAINING OF AMERICAN PA-
TIENCE 123

LXX. THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT . . 149

APPENDICES.

I. THE CAMPAIGN IN GALLIPOLI . . 185
II. THE SPEECH OF THE GERMAN IM-
PERIAL CHANCELLOR . . . 217

LIST OF MAPS.

Railway Communications of Trieste 13

Gorizia (Gorz) 16

Line of the Isonzo. — Front held by the Italians in August 23
Sketch Map of the Passes by which the Italians attempted

to penetrate into the Pusterthal 26

Attacks on the Krithia-Achi Baba Position, June 21 and 28 43

Lines of Supply of the Turkish Army in Gallipoli . . 56

The Balkan Railways and Frontiers 72, 73

Map showing the Macedonian Districts beyond their
present Frontiers which the Bulgarians claim to be

mainly peopled by the Bulgar Race 80

Plan of the Hooge Area 104

Ivangorod 162

Sketch showing the situation on August 12 (eve of the

retirement of the Russian Centre from Siedlce) . .165

Situation of the Russian Centre, August 1 6, 1915 . . 167

Kovno 169

Sketch Map showing the possible Russian line of defence
that was made untenable by the fall of Kovno and

the German menace in the Balkan provinces . . 172

Novo Georgievsk 174

Brest Litovski 175

Gulf of Riga 177

NELSON'S
HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER LXIV.

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE.

Italy's Immediate Purpose — Difficulties of the Campaign — The
Isonzo Line — The Communications of Trieste — The Carso —
Gorizia — Disposition of Italian Advance — Position on ist
June — Fall of Monfalcone — Austrian Reinforcements arrive
— Attack on Podgora Spur — The Isonzo crossed at Plava —
Crossing won at Castelnuovo — The July Battles — Second
Battle of Plava — Ground won on the Carso — Results up to
mid- August — The War in the Mountains — The Carnic Fight-
ing— The Campaign in the Dolomites — The Trentino Cam-
paign— The Work of the Alpini — The War at Sea — Austrian
Raids and Italian Losses — Italy's Relations with Germany
— Italy's Relations with Turkey — War declared on Turkey.

"T XT THEN Italy entered upon war she had a double
\ \J purpose. If she struck heavily, she might
VV break through the frontier guards before
Austria could reinforce them ; and even if she failed,
the vigour of her attack might compel the Austro-
Germans to send large armies, which would weaken
the critical Galician front. Austria, in reply, re-
mained stubbornly on the defensive, utilizing the
strong protection of the border-line which she had
inherited. For the better part of a month the
forces under the Archduke Eugene and Conrad von

10 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Hoetzendorff were only Landwehr and Landsturm,
the latter including some levies from the Tirolese
mountaineers. No troops were withdrawn from
Galicia until the main Austro-German objective
in that country had been attained, and the clearing
of the Carpathian line had made Hungary secure.
The immediate purpose of Italy was therefore
frustrated. Her attack on the Isonzo in no way
relieved the fierce pressure on Ivanov's armies, and
after three months' campaign she had failed to win
to Trieste, or to cut the Austrian line beyond the
Dolomite Passes. The frontier was a barrier for-
midable even beyond the dreams of its makers.

Yet these three months had been crowned with
many successes, and the Italian effort must not at
this stage be judged topographically by the extent
of country won. To do justice to the valour of
Cadorna's armies, we must keep constantly in mind
the extraordinary obstacles which faced them. The
strength of the mountain barrier of the Trentino
and the Carnic Alps needs no explaining, but the
line of the Isonzo was only less difficult to force.

The Isonzo cuts its way southwards through the
butt of the Julian Alps in a deep gorge which ends
sharply north of the town of Gorizia. Gorizia lies
in a pocket of the hills, with the uplands protecting
it in a semi-circle on the north. West of the Isonzo,
dominating the bridgehead and the road and rail-
way to Gradisca and Udine, is the spur of Podgora,
which also commands Gorizia itself. South of the
town stretch some four miles of level plain, till on
the east bank of the river rises the extraordinary
plateau which Italians call the Carso and Austrians
the Karst, and which rolls east and west behind

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. n

Trieste, and south almost to the sea. Between it
and the coast is a strip of flat land which carries a
railway. The Carso is a low, wind-swept table-
land, strewn with limestone boulders, seamed with
deep fissures, and covered with rough scrub and
great masses of scree. North of Gorizia the Julian
Alps rise towards the stony uplands of the Krn
or Monte Nero. A tributary, the Baca, enters the
Isonzo on the eastern bank a little south of the
town of Tolmino, and up its difficult valley and
through the great Wochein tunnel runs the railway
to Villach and Vienna.

The difficulties of such a country for the offensive
are so obvious as scarcely to need explanation.
The only passage through the uplands was the
strip of land beside the sea, far too narrow for an
army to travel. The flat land south of Gorizia was
not really a gap, for the hills closed in a mile or two
east of the town. The ridges of Monte Nero, the
gorge of the Upper Isonzo, and the plateau of the
Carso offered secure positions for any defence.

Since the main object of General Cadorna was
Trieste, it was desirable to cut, if possible, the
communications of that city with its bases of supply.
The navy of Italy could ensure that nothing entered
it by sea. Trieste is served by two chief lines — one
running by Gorizia and the Wochein tunnel to Vil-
lach, the other by St. Peter's to Laibach. The first
had two branches which united at Gorizia — one by
the coast and Monfalcone, the other running direct
across the Carso plateau. The second received a
branch from Pola, and at St. Peter's the main line
from Fiume. To isolate Gorizia it was not enough
to cut the Villach line north of it, or the Monfalcone

12 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

line south of it. The Carso line in the east must
also be cut, and that involved a considerable advance
across the plateau. To isolate Trieste was still more
difficult. The cutting of the Gorizia line would
deprive it of its best and shortest connection with
Vienna ; but there would still remain the Laibach
line, which would only be effectively cut if the
junction at St. Peter's was captured.

What looked like open country to a casual
student of the map was therefore in its character
an intricate and difficult natural fortress. The
Carso, in particular, was a position which might be
compared with the Labyrinth in the Artois, save
that it owed its chief strength to nature rather than
to man. A swift advance was out of the question,
however feeble the Austrian defence might be at
the outset. General Cadorna's first task must be to
reduce the position by the capture of its chief details.

Gorizia was the key of the Austrian front. So
long as it was held it blocked any real advance
across the Carso, since it threatened an attack on
the flank, and, till the Carso railway was cut, could
be munitioned direct from Trieste. The Austrians
held not only the town but the bridgehead on the
west bank of the Isonzo, and the spur of Podgora
which commanded that bridgehead. The Italian
army advanced against this front in three forces.
One, consisting largely of Alpine troops, moved
against Tolmino and the heights of Monte Nero.
Its immediate task was to cut the Vienna line north
of Gorizia, and to protect the left of the main ad-
vance against reinforcements coming from the direc-
tion of Villach. The centre moved directly against
Gorizia itself, and especially against the Austrian

0 10 2C

20

rJVillach

• Tunnel

Railway Communications of Trieste.

14 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

position on the Podgora spur. The right wing
advanced on Monfalcone, to cut the coast railway
and begin the assault on the Carso plateau. All
three movements were fortunate in their communi-
cations. The Italian left had the railway to Civi-
dale, and the roads beyond over the Starasella Pass
and the other saddles of the Julian range. The
centre had the Udine-Gorizia railway. The right
wing had the San Giorgio-Monfalcone line.

By ist June the Italians had occupied the greater
part of the west bank of the Isonzo with little oppo-
<Y sition. The Austrians had chosen their

™ line, and were not concerned to defend

the indefensible. The weather in early June was
heavy rain, and those who know the quick flooding
of the torrents which descend from the Julian Alps
will realize how slow must be an advance in such
conditions. The Italian mobilization was not yet
complete, and the fighting fell chiefly to the screen
of troops on the flanks. The left wing was beyond
the Isonzo at Caporetto, and fighting its way among
the shale and boulders of Monte Nero, where the
Austrian artillery had strong positions. The navy
and the air service were active, and Monfalcone was
under constant bombardment.

On the yth an advance in force began all along

the front. The left wing continued its struggle

«Y for the Monte Nero slopes. Bridge-

^ ' ' " heads were established along the Middle

Isonzo south of Gorizia, and large bodies of cavalry

crossed at various points, and began the work of

<Y entrenching on the eastern bank. On

^' 9th June Monfalcone fell without trouble.

If was scarcely defended, for it lay outside the

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 15

zone which the Austrians had marked for their
defence. This meant that one of the loops of the
Gorizia-Trieste railway was cut, but the Carso
branch still remained. Next day the <y
centre made a great effort east of Gra- /
disca and Sagrado, but the river line proved far
stronger than had been believed. So did Tolmino,
which was now under the fire of Italian guns. The
only success was won that night at Plava, north of
Gorizia, where a surprise attack carried the place,
and so menaced the railway from Gorizia to Vienna.
The floods were the main obstacles on the lower
course of the river, and the Austrians added to
these by breaking the banks of the Monfalcone
canal. Had it been possible during these days to
push forward in full strength, Trieste would probably
have fallen, for the Austrian armies were still slender.
But the weather and the incompleteness of the
Italian mobilization made the advance partial and
ineffective. So good a chance was not destined to
appear again for many months.

From now on Austrian troops began to arrive
from the Galician front. Some portion of the Tiro-
lese Corps — there can now have been little left of it
— was brought to the lines in the mountains. Regi-
ments of Southern Slavs, who had no love for Italy,
were brought to the Isonzo, and so spared the diffi-
cult task of fighting against their Russian kinsmen.
Lastly, there came at least one division of Hun-
garians, who, apart from the Tirolese, represented
the finest fighting material in the Austrian ranks.
The chance of an easy victory was slipping from
Italy's hands. General Cadorna was discovering
the strength of the Austrian artillery, which seems

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 17

to have been admirably placed. All along the
western fringe of the Carso, and especially on the
Podgora spur which commands Gorizia, were rami-
fications of trench lines, protected by elaborate
entanglements and for tins, and with the glacis
heavily wired. The Austrian staff had not for-
gotten the lesson of Galicia.

On 1 5th June the first Italian attack was made
on the Podgora position. Next day the Alpini on
the left wing carried an important posi- ~
tion on Monte Nero, climbing the rocks J , •*
by night, attacking at dawn, and taking
many prisoners. But the conquest of these lower
slopes of the mountains did not greatly advance the
purpose of the campaign. No guns of great calibre
could follow them, and Tolmino, where Dante is
rumoured to have written part of his great poem,
could, with its fortress artillery, defy the posts on
the heights. On the iyth the Villach- Gorizia line
near Plava was definitely cut. That <v
fight for Plava was a spirited perform- * '*
ance. The village lies in the bottom of the ravine
beside the swift river, with precipitous wooded hills
on either side. The bridge had been destroyed ;
but the Italians with a great effort constructed
pontoons during the night, and at dawn on the
1 7th began their attack. The defence had 1 2-inch
guns, and entrenchments surrounded by deep net-
works of wire. By the evening the Italians had
carried the first line with the bayonet, and stood
firm all night against counter-attacks. ~ o
Next day they routed the enemy, taking *u
many prisoners, and occupied the heights on the
eastern bank of the stream.

IX.

i8 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

In the following week there were repeated
counter-attacks at Plava and on Monte Nero, where
the Italian Alpini seem to have been engaged with
cy their fellow-mountaineers of Tirol. By

?•' the 25th some ground north of Plava
was won, and, what was more important, a begin-
ning was made with the advance on the Carso, the
edge of the plateau being gained between Sagrado
and Monfalcone ; while from Cormons the Podgora
position and the Gorizia bridgehead were bom-
barded. The month of June closed in storms, with
thick fog in the mountains, which interfered with
artillery work, and deluges of rain in the flats. By
this time the inundations of the Lower Isonzo were
being mastered, for the Italian engineers, working
under the enemy's fire, succeeded in damming the
opening of the Monfalcone canal. On the 28th the
<Y o bridgehead of Castelnuovo, on the east
* ' " bank of the river, was carried by a
bayonet attack. This gave General Cadorna two
important bridgeheads — Plava was the other — in-
side the Austrian zone of defence. Monfalcone,
though on the east bank, was outside the zone, and
Caporetto and Gradisca were on the wrong side.
CY On the last day of June there was a

Ju ' 3°- great artillery bombardment, but a gen-
eral infantry attack on the centre failed to achieve
any results.

The position was now that Cadorna's left wing
was strongly posted, but in the nature of things
could not do much against Tolmino ; his centre was
facing the great entrenched camp of Gorizia ; while
his right was on the edge of the Carso, and had
advanced its flank as far as Duino, on the Monfal-

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 19

cone-Trieste railway. The Gorizia line had been
cut north and south of the town, and only the Carso
line remained to link the fortress with Trieste. The
first rush had failed, but preliminary positions had
been won from which to initiate the main struggle
for the plateau and the Gorizia defences.

That struggle began on 2nd July. It was an
attack on a broad front, not less than twenty-five
miles, and it was aimed directly at <* /
Gorizia. The left was to occupy the * «
heights east of Plava and then swing round through
the Ternovanerwald against the defences of Gorizia
in the north, and east round the village of San Gabriele
and San Daniele. The centre was directed against
the Podgora spur and the Gorizia bridgehead, while
the right, which had already won the western and
south-western edges of the Carso, was to swing round
against the northern part of that plateau which takes
its name from the village of Doberdo. The chief
operative movement was that of the right wing, for,
if the Doberdo upland were carried, the Trieste
railway would be cut and Gorizia must fall. The
forces on Monte Nero might be regarded as an
outlying defence of the left flank of the advance.

The long and confused fighting which began on
2nd July, and which ebbed away into an artillery
duel about the middle of August, is properly to be
considered as one action, which we may call the
First Battle of the Isonzo. The details <y /
may be briefly summarized. On 3rd ^u^ 3«
July the centre attacked fiercely the Podgora posi-
tion, and next day, after a lengthy <y *
bombardment, the right pushed some ^u^ 4-
way into the Carso. On the 5th the centre and right

20 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

— four corps strong — were again in action, and slowly
advanced their lines, taking over 1,000 prisoners.
cy / The Italians — now less than twenty miles

* y *' from Trieste — had got some of their
heavy guns up to the edge of the plateau, and for a
few days there was a continuous bombardment and
counter-bombardment. On Monday, the iQth, the
«Y / right made a successful attack, carrying

J y 9- several lines of trenches, and taking two
thousand prisoners and six machine guns. Next

% 7 20 ^ay t^ie centre> a^ter a desperate fight,
carried a considerable section of the
Podgora spur, though the Austrians still held the
eastern end overlooking Gorizia.

Meanwhile the left had been heavily engaged in
the Plava neighbourhood. Four brigades were
hurled against the wooded heights east of the river,
and for two days fought their way from ledge to
ledge. The Hungarians who opposed them, being
plainsmen unaccustomed to mountain warfare,
yielded at first before the attack of the Alpini, but
fought resolutely on the upper heights. The Italian
batteries from the other side of the river plastered
the hillside with shell, till the mountain flared to
heaven like a volcano. A Dalmatian regiment was
brought up from the Austrian reserves, and, con-
cealed in rifts and gullies, their fire flung back three
times the charge of the Piedmontese. Then came
a period of utter weariness, and for twenty-four
hours both sides rested. Next day three new Italian
brigades were brought up, and King Victor Em-
manuel himself was present to encourage his troops.
The final assault carried the heights, the last ground
being won by a close- quarters struggle with the

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 21

bayonet. This Plava battle was terribly costly to
both sides, and the Italian commander was seri-
ously wounded in the closing stage.

The action was renewed along the whole front
on 22nd July. That day the Italian right captured
the crest of San Michele, which domi-

nated most of the Doberdo plateau.
Before evening a violent cross fire drove them off
the actual ridge, but they maintained their position
just below it. General Cadorna was now engaged
with the enemy's second line of defence, and he
found it stronger than the first line. To add to
his difficulties, further reinforcements arrived in the
early days of August, chiefly from von Woyrsch's
army in the Ivangorod region, for the fall of Warsaw
had enabled the enemy to dispense with some of
his troops. By the middle of August the first great
Battle of the Isonzo had virtually ceased.

The result was stalemate. Much ground had
been won, but no vital position had been carried.
Gorizia was intact, and Trieste was no nearer its fall
than in the first weeks of the campaign. The line
of the Isonzo had been carried, except the loop west
of Gorizia. The western and southern portions of
the Carso were in Italian hands, including the im-
portant vantage points of Sei Busi, San Martino,
and San Michele. The Plava heights had been
won, but it was difficult to advance from there ; the
western part of the Podgora spur was in Italian
hands, but not the critical eastern section. Gorizia
was invested on three sides, but no one of its vital
outworks had been taken. General Cadorna was
discovering a truth which had been burned in upon
the minds of the armies in Western Europe — that a

22 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

first line may be carried, but that the real difficulties
only begin with the second line. Provided the
enemy has his communications intact, and has a
country behind him well adapted by nature to de-
fence, a withdrawal may only mean the accession of
fresh strength. The Austrian Staff deserves credit
for the handling of this section of the campaign.
They chose their ground with skill, defending only
what was defensible, and allowed the enemy to
break his teeth against positions which were short
of their vital lines. The Italian plan was sound,
the Italian fighting was beyond praise for its courage
and resolution ; but once again was proved the
enormous strength of the defence in modern war,
provided that its artillery equipment be adequate.
The result of the three months' campaign was a
check, and since the offensive was with Italy the
Austrian command was justified in claiming the
honours.

Italy's campaign in the high mountains was

Erimarily a war of defence. She must safeguard
er flanks and rear before she could push on with
confidence beyond the Isonzo. Such offensive pur-
pose as she had was subsidiary to the main effort
against Trieste, and did not absorb any large num-
bers of men. We have seen that the mountain
battle-ground fell into three clearly marked areas —
the salient of the Trentino, the passes of the Dolo-
mites, and the passes of the Carnic Alps. Very
early in June she had won the crest of the ridge in
the two latter theatres, and developed a slow offensive
against the Pusterthal railway. In the Trentino the
problem of defence was more intricate. It was not

Line of the Isonzo Front held by the Italians

in August.

24 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

enough to win the rim of the salient. She must
push her front well inland towards the nodal points
of the converging valleys. By August this task had
been largely accomplished, and she could look for-
ward with composure to the winter, since she held
the key of the mountain gates.

The details of the Carnic fighting would convey
little save to experts in its confused topography.
Early in June the Italians had crossed the frontier
at the railway pass of the Fella, and the Austrian
fort of Malborghetto was under their guns. At
the same time an attack was made on the right
by way of the Predil Pass against Plezzo, and the
mule paths over the range on the left were occupied
by parties of Alpini. No effective crossing of the
range was, however, achieved, and the important
railway junction of Tarvis was not in danger.

In the Western Carnic Alps the main struggle
centred round the pass of Monte Croce Carnico.
A fortnight after the outbreak of war the Alpini
had driven the Austrians from the dominating posi-
tion to the east of the pass. They then took the
Zellenkoffel to the west, and in successive weeks
captured the summits of Pal Grande, Freikoffel,
and Pal Piccolo. This gave the pass to Italian
hands ; but the Austrians, supported by their artil-
lery on the northern hills, clung to the farther
slopes. The Italians blasted paths and gun posi-
tions out of the solid rock, and secured their posi-
tion ; but, beyond repulsing Austrian counter-
attacks, they found themselves unable to do much
during the summer. As an example of the dash
of the Alpini, the capture of the Freikoffel may be
cited. The summit was taken by ten volunteers,

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 25

who climbed the sheer southern wall of the peak in
the darkness before the summer dawn.

Farther west, in the Dolomite region, the attack
was pressed hard, for the objective was very near.
Cortina had been captured on 3oth May, and the
Italians moved westwards towards the Falzarego Pass,
which leads to Bozen, and north towards the Puster-
thal railway. The former advance may be regarded
merely as a flank guard, but the latter was a serious
effort conducted with great skill and audacity.
From the Ampezzo valley there are two main routes
to the railway. One is the Strada d'Alemagna from
Cortina under the precipices of Tofana to Schlu-
derbach and Toblach, and another goes by the
Sexten valley to Innichen. Between the two lies
a third from Misurina by the Val Popena, which
joins the first route at Schluderbach. There are
other paths for cragsmen, but these are the only
roads for guns and transport.

By the middle of August the Italians had crossed
the watershed, and were only a few miles from the
Pusterthal railway. Casual students of the map
daily anticipated that that line must be cut. But
the difficulties of the Dolomite advance were not to
be measured in yards and miles. The debouch-
ment at Toblach was a narrow opening among pre-
cipitous crags. All the routes led through defiles,
where an advance could only be secured by the
capture of the neighbouring heights. This the
Alpini brilliantly performed. They scaled the shin-
ing white cliffs of Tofana and Cristallo, and brought
their mountain guns to vantage points which cleared
the passes for some distance before them. The
Austrians, with the assistance of their forts, fought

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

delaying actions in the narrows, and their detach-
ments skirmished on the heights. In this stage of
the business the Italians had a clear advantage, but
the real defence of the Pusterthal had not begun.
It is the first rule in mountain warfare that to control
a pass you must control its debouchments. In the
Pustertnal, with its excellent railway, the reserves

fano

Frontie

Sketch Map of the Passes by which the Italians attempted
to penetrate into the Pusterthal.

were waiting to greet the heads of any columns
that passed the defiles. With a broad valley and a
railway behind it the defence could concentrate
where it pleased. The Italians, on the other hand,
could not support each other, for each column
moved in its own groove, and their only lateral
communications were far behind in the easier

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 27

country of the foothills. The Alpini, who could
see from above Schluderbach the rock gate which
led to Toblach almost within range of their field
guns, were in reality as far from their objective as
if a province had intervened. Italy had made good
her defence on the northern heights, but the con-
ditions were still ominously against a true offensive.

The Trentino campaign aimed only at the
security of the Lombard plains. By the end of May
the Italians had the passes, and were moving by
three main routes — by the Adige valley against
Rovereto, and by the Val Sugana and the Val Giudi-
caria against Trent. Farther north, on the western
side of the salient, they were holding the watershed
in the vicinity of the Tonale and Stelvio passes.
The movement on Trent and Rovereto was slow
and difficult, owing to the necessity of mastering in
detail the surrounding heights and the immense
strength of the Austrian fortifications, hewn, as
they often were, out of the living rock. The main
interest of the summer months was the curious
campaign on the western ridges, where fighting
became a business of small detachments widely
separated by precipitous ravines and snow-clad
peaks. Those who have mountaineered in the
Adamello and Ortler groups know the strait, steep
valleys, with meadows in the bottoms and woods
of fir and pine on the lower slopes, and above them
the stony heights studded 'with green alps, and
over all the snows and glaciers of the summits. In
such country there was room for only small bodies
of troops, and the raising of guns to the lofty ridges
was a toil which only the hardiest mountain-bred

28 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

soldiers could accomplish. The Austrians, moun-
tain-bred also, were not an enemy to be despised,
and many desperate encounters took place among
screes and rock terraces — campaigning only to be
paralleled by the exploits of the Gurkhas in the
Lhasa expedition. It was a type of mountain
warfare far more arduous than the campaign among
the low saddles of the Carpathians.

By the middle of August the eagle's feathers of
the Alpini were seen on all the vantage grounds
from the Stelvio to Lake Garda. A chain of posts
lined the heights, passing through the snows of the
Ortler summit and the high mountain huts of the
Adamello. In these eyries, often at a height of
more than 10,000 feet, entrenchments and entangle-
ments were created, guns were put in position, and
the strange spectacle was seen of barbed wire among
the crevasses of the glaciers. Mountaineers know
the peculiar qualities of the best Italian guides—
their inexhaustible resource, their inspired audacity,
and their unwearying zest for difficulties. The same
qualities were present in the work of Italy's moun-
tain soldiers. Feats of physical endurance, which
involved long days of unbelievable toil, were varied
by expeditions whose keynote was boyish adventure.
One party of Alpini blew up a power-station in a
gorge which supplied the forts of Rovereto. Others
made night attacks which involved wonderful feats of
cragsmanship, dropping from the skies at midnight
upon an unsuspecting enemy. This clean warfare on
the old simple lines suited the genius of Northern
Italy, and it abundantly achieved its purpose. If the
Adige valleys were still in Austrian hands, the plains
of Lombardy were none the less safe from the invader.

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 29

The naval war during those months showed no
action of importance. The Austrian battle fleet lay
snug in Pola, and only its submarines and smaller
craft ventured into the northern Adriatic. The
Italian fleet in June cruised along the Dalmatian
coast, and destroyed the wireless stations on the
islands of Lissa and Cuzzola. On 6th June the
cables were cut between the Dalmatian *tune 5
islands and the mainland, and the Ragusa •?
railway was bombarded. On the i8th an Austrian
cruiser and four destroyers attacked «v ^
Fano, on the Adriatic coast, but did •*
little damage. On yth July Italy proclaimed a block-
ade of the Austrian and Albanian coasts, ~ ,
warning off vessels of all flags from the * ^ ' '
Adriatic. Early on the morning of the i8th a sub-
stantial loss was sustained, the old Italian cy / o
cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi being sunk *u ^
off Cattaro by an Austrian submarine, with the loss
of one hundred lives. On the 23rd cy /
some Austrian destroyers bombarded * ^ ^'
Ortona and the coast railway. Two days later the
Italians occupied the Dalmatian island cy /
of Pelagosa, and a French destroyer blew ^u^ ^'
up the submarine and aeroplane supply station on
the island of Laogosta. These incidents had little
importance, belonging only to the outer fringe of
naval activity. The Italian losses to the end of
July were two cruisers, a submarine, and a destroyer.
The situation in the Adriatic was in miniature the
same as that in the North Sea — the Allied Fleet
had the mastery, and moved at its pleasure, subject
to the menace of submarines and occasional abortive
raids of the enemy's lighter vessels. The much-

30 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

indented Illyrian coast had, since the days of Virgil,
been a hostile sheltering ground too good for the
ease of the Adriatic.

The relations between Italy and the Teutonic
League were in the beginning of August curiously
vague. She was definitely at war with Austria only
— a war supported by the full weight of racial aver-
sion and traditional grievances. But she had not
declared war against Germany, though diplomatic
relations between the two Powers were suspended.
It may be assumed that the Wilhelmstrasse laboured
to prevent a rupture, and hoped after the conclusion
of the war to placate Italy at Austria's expense.
Germany had for forty years been engaged in build-
ing up great commercial interests in Italy, and she
had no desire to lose her financial control of some
of the chief Italian industries. It may be added
that the fire of resentment against German ideals did
not burn so fiercely in Italian hearts as among the
other Allies. The popular repugnance to German-
enthum went rather to increase the hatred felt for
the traditional enemy of Vienna than to pillory the
dimly realized plotters of Berlin.

But with the third member of the Teutonic
League Italy had a long-standing quarrel. The
war with Turkey, which broke out in October 1911,
ended a year later with the Treaty of Lausanne.
But it should be noted that under that treaty
Turkey did not recognize formally the Italian occu-
pation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. She ignored it,
and set herself to put every possible difficulty in
Italy's way. Italian prisoners of war were not
released ; the Ottoman troops in Libya remained

THE ADVANCE ON TRIESTE. 31

under their old officers and flag. Enver continued
sporadic hostilities during the closing months of
1912, and Aziz Bey did not leave the country till
June 1913. After that, Turkish officers, specially
trained by Enver, continued to drift back to Tripoli
and Cyrenaica, and encourage the recalcitrant Arab
bands. When the great war broke out, the jehad
was preached as much against the Italians in Libya
as against the French in Morocco and the British in
Egypt. By the summer of 1915 Italy's North African
possessions were in a state of profound confusion
and unrest, and not unnaturally she blamed Turkey
for the situation. Her diplomatic protests had
been treated with the more than Oriental apathy of
Constantinople.

There was another and a very real grievance.
The liberty of Italian subjects within the Ottoman
Empire itself had recently been grossly interfered
with. Italian citizens had not been allowed to
depart from various ports in Asia Minor. Turkey
anticipated a declaration of war, and behaved as if
it had already come. On 3rd August *
the Italian Ambassador in Constan- u^' 3*
tinople addressed a Note to the Porte demanding
among other things that Italians should be allowed
to depart freely from Beirut, Smyrna, Mersina,
Alexandretta, Haifa, and Jaffa, and that local author-
ities in the interior should give up their opposition
to the movement of Italian subjects to the coast
and provide facilities for their voyage. This
Note was in form an ultimatum, and forty-eight
hours were granted for its consideration. The
Grand Vizier accepted all the demands within
the time specified, but he did nothing more. On

32 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the Qth news arrived that the Turkish authori-

* ties had revoked their consent to the

u&* 9- departure of Italians at Beirut and Mer-

sina. On Saturday, 2ist August, Italy's patience

/, was exhausted, and she declared war

Augm :>tl' against Turkey.

It was presently announced that Italy would
not be content with a passive hostility, but would
send an expedition to the Eastern Mediterranean.
From a military point of view this decision was
scarcely defensible, and there is reason to believe
that it was opposed by General Cadorna and the
military authorities. She was engaged in a very
difficult and laborious campaign in Europe, in which
her picked troops — the Alpini and the Bersaglieri —
had suffered heavily. The situation in Libya was
unsettled, and at any moment she might be obliged
to increase her forces there, or see rebellion triumph.
An expedition to the Dardanelles must be a strong
one if it was to effect anything, and it was hard to
see how first-line troops could be spared. This
policy may almost certainly be attributed to the
Italian Foreign Office, which believed that the dis-
ruption of Turkey was inevitable, and wished to
stake out claims in Asia Minor and among the
islands against the day of dissolution.

The news of Italy's declaration of war followed
hard upon a great effort of Britain to force the Galli-
poli defences. We must return to that ill-omened
peninsula, where for four months a struggle had
continued only less desperate than Russia's grapple
with her pursuers.

CHAPTER LXV.

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI.

The Situation at Gallipoli — Political and Strategical Justification
of Dardanelles Expedition — Faults of the Special Plan
adopted — Alternative Routes to Constantinople — Composi-
tion of Allied Army in June — General Gouraud — Position
after Battle of 4th June — New Tactics — Fighting during
First Fortnight of June — Awkward Position of Allied Wings
— The Straightening of the Line — French Advance on 2ist
June — Battle of the Longest Day — Advance of Allied Left
on 28th June — Capture of the Saghir Dere — Attack on Anzac
Corps — Turkish Counter-Attacks — French take the Quadri-
lateral— General Gouraud wounded — Enver's Wasteful Tac-
tics— Fighting during July — Allies draw near to Krithia —
Work of Submarines — Main Lines of Turkish Communica-
tions— Exploit of Lieutenant D'Oyly-Hughes — Work of
Allied Fleets— -Work of Allied Aircraft— Conditions of the
Gallipoli Campaign — Discomforts — The Anzac Troops —
Humour — The Casualties — Gallantry of both Sides — The
Allies meditate a New Plan— The Balkan Situation.

IN the old historical novels the hero, when he
was not to be observed wending his way on
horseback up a mountain path in the twilight,
was generally found holding a narrow staircase
against uncounted foes. To the Turks had fallen
the favourite romantic situation. We had chosen
to attack them in one of the strongest natural for-
tresses in the world. The convex arc of the Achi
Bab a heights might have been created for a modern
defence. Not a yard of it was. dead ground. Every

IX. 3

34 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

foot was exposed to bombardment from the well-
placed guns and the concentric trench lines. With
a base a few miles square, we attempted by frontal
fighting to win a step now and then of the staircase.
It is true that the Australasian Corps had secured a
position on the enemy's right rear ; but that, too,
was a step of a staircase, and our overseas troops
clung precariously to the edge of the cliffs. Every
inch of our position was under fire, and there was no
safe hinterland for wounded and reserves except
that gained by an embarkation and a voyage. The
wounded had to go to Alexandria and Malta, and
munitions, food, and water had to travel many
leagues of sea. The position is best described in
Sir Ian Hamilton's words : " The country is broken,
mountainous, arid, and void of supplies ; the water
found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite
inadequate for their needs ; the only practicable
beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable
lines of cliffs ; with the wind in certain quarters no
sort of landing is possible ; the wastage, by bom-
bardment and wreckage, of lighters and small craft
has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity ;
whilst over every single beach plays fitfully through-
out each day a devastating shell-fire at medium

ranges."

Such a position would have been grave against
a feeble opponent. But the Turk was no despicable
foe. He had long before at Plevna proved himself
a great master of defensive war. He was aided by
the best German military skill and the latest German
science. He was holding the gate of his sacred
capital against the infidel — a gate, like the bridge
of Horatius, where a thousand might be stopped

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 35

by three ; but his numbers were greater than ours.
He was like a posse of mailed men on the summit
of a narrow stairway, with every advantage of ground,
weapon, and forewarning.

In June the political and strategic importance of
the Dardanelles expedition had been amply proved.
What had not been dreamed of in April had come to
pass. The determined attack upon Russia could not
yet be balanced by a counter-offensive in the West,
and the Dardanelles was the only terrain where
the Allies could directly aid the hard-pressed armies
of the Tsar. They were striking a blow to free the
Russian left flank, to secure a passage for munitions
to the Black Sea ports, and to win for Christendom
and Russia the cradle of the Orthodox Church and
the capital of that Eastern Roman Empire to which
Russia was the legitimate heir. The value of the
enterprise on Russian public opinion cannot be
overstated. Strategically, too, it was more than
defensible. The Allies could not win the war with-
in reasonable time without the help of the Russian
armies, and anything which conduced to their aid
was a contribution to the whole Allied cause. Pro-
vided that some day the enemy's field forces were
destroyed, it mattered little in what part of Europe
that destruction took place. Besides, Germany had
given the East a special significance. It was clear
that, as a great land power, she was turning her eyes
more and more to those vast continental tracts of
Eastern Europe and Western Asia where sea-power
was meaningless. Whatever happened in the West,
her victory there might threaten India and Egypt,
points as vital for the British Empire as Verdun and
Belfort were vital for France. Only in the /Egean

36 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

and the Marmora could we use our fleets to strike
at this malign aggression.

But if by midsummer the political and strategical
value of the Dardanelles expedition was beyond
criticism, the passing of the weeks raised the gravest
doubts as to the wisdom of the actual plan adopted.
We had chosen to attack the Turks in their central
fortress, where they had all the advantages. It is
easy to imagine the kind of argument which led us
to the attempt. Our business was to secure as
quickly as possible a passage for our fleet, and for
this purpose to destroy the Narrows forts by taking
them in the rear. To land in Gallipoli seemed the
shortest way of accomplishing our desires. But it
could only seem the shortest way to those who were
ignorant of the nature of the ground and the quality
of the Turkish defence. Had we had the chance
of making a surprise attack it would have been
different, but for weeks and months we had adver-
tised our intentions to the world. There was no
lack of people to give us accurate information.
Englishmen had been employed in the Turkish
service ; Englishmen had helped to fortify the Bulair
line ; and there were scores of our countrymen who
could have explained the precise difficulties of Galli-
poli. There is reason, too, to believe that we had
the benefit of the advice of the Greek General Staff.
For Greece the Dardanelles was one of the chief
problems, and for years she had carefully studied
it. Her opinion was undoubtedly adverse to a
landing in Gallipoli, and the guess may be hazarded
that the absence of Greek co-operation in April was
not wholly due to her political difficulties. She
may well have declined the honour of being mas-

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 37

sacred in our company in an adventure which she
believed foredoomed to failure. The time is not yet
for a final judgment, but it looks as if those respon-
sible for the plan of the Gallipoli attack may have
to bear the heaviest burden of criticism from future
historians of the war.

Gallipoli was not the only avenue to Constanti-
nople. Troops might have been landed at the head
of the Gulf of Saros to move through Thrace, or
on the coast of the Trojan plain to advance along the
southern shores of the Marmora. There were diffi-
culties in both cases, but none comparable to those
encountered in Gallipoli. In those areas the Allied
forces would have been able to move on a broad
front, and to fight a campaign of manoeuvre battles.
Success in either would in time have led to the fall
of Gallipoli, since the supplies of that fortress would
have been cut. Why neither alternative was adopted
is not yet clear, but a possible explanation may be
found in the fact that the whole affair in its inception
was an Admiralty enterprise. The fleet was the
main thing, the landing force was a mere adjunct to
assist the passage of the ships, and success was
looked for from a combination of naval fire and
infantry attacks. In these circumstances an elabo-
rate land campaign which would take the troops far
inland seemed out of the question. That is the
difficulty of all amphibious warfare. The special
interests of each service may be sacrificed in attempt-
ing a compromise. There can be little doubt but
that, if the Allies had landed in April in Asia Minor
or Thrace, the situation by midsummer would have
been greatly in their favour. The world would have
lacked the tale of an heroic feat of arms, but Con-

38 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

stantinople would have been gravely menaced. As
it was, in June the menace had scarcely begun. We
were locked up in a neck of land where there was
no room for strategy, and where at the most, by
great expenditure of life, we could steal at intervals
a few hundred yards of trenches from the enemy.

The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, ac-
cording to its first conception, was now complete.
The British troops had been organized into the
Eighth Corps, under Lieutenant- General Hunter-
Weston. The constituents were the regular zgth
Division of glorious memory, in the command of
which General Hunter- Weston had been succeeded
by General De Lisle, formerly commanding the
ist Cavalry Division on the Western front ; the
42nd Territorial Division (East Lancashire), under
Major-General Douglas ; the Naval Division, under
Major-General Paris ; the 2Qth Indian Infantry
Brigade, under Major-General H. B. Cox ; and the
Scottish Lowland Territorial Division, under Major-
General Egerton. The Australian and New Zealand
Corps at Gaba Tepe, under Lieutenant- General Sir
W. R. Birdwood, embraced the Australian Division,
under Major-General H. B. Walker, who had suc-
ceeded to the command after the death of General
Bridges on I5th May, and the New Zealand and
Australian Division, under Major-General Sir A. J.
Godley. The French Corps Expeditionnaire had
been completed in the second week of May by the
arrival of its 2nd Division. Its troops — Zouaves,
Senegalese, Colonial Infantry, and the Foreign Le-

S'on — were under General Gouraud, who succeeded
eneral d'Amade on 1 4th May. General Gouraud,
the youngest and the most brilliant of French corps

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 39

commanders, had earned the name of the " Lion
of the Argonne " from his winter's work in that
forest campaign with a corps of Sarrail's 3rd Army.
In Sir Ian Hamilton's phrase, " a happy mixture of
daring in danger and of calm in crisis " made him an
ideal leader for the French Colonials. No one who
ever met General Gouraud was likely to forget him.
His grave and splendid presence, the fire in his dark
eyes, the lofty resolution in every line and gesture,
gave him the air of some great paladin of France
who had held the marches with Roland and Oliver.
Our narrative of the campaign broke off after
the battle of 4th June. On that day we had ad-
vanced in the centre from 200 to 400 <v
yards on a front of three miles. Our ^
left wing had moved only a little way forward, and
the French on the extreme right were still held up
by the ravine of the Kereves Dere. Our front was
now in the form of a semicircle, with the horns
flung well back, and our next business was to
straighten our line. The time for bold and sweep-
ing efforts had gone by. There had been a moment
on 28th April when Krithia and the Achi Baba
heights had been almost at our mercy ; but, as the
Turkish defence consolidated itself, all that remained
for us was a slow war of " nibbling " and attrition.
Surprise was out of the question. In Sir Ian Hamil-
ton's words : " The enemy was as much in posses-
sion of my numbers and dispositions as I was in
possession of their first line of defence ; the oppos-
ing fortified fronts stretched parallel from sea to
straits ; there was little space left now, either at
Achi Baba or at Gaba Tepe, for tactics which would
fling flesh and blood battalions against lines of un-

4o HISTORY OF THE WAR.

broken barbed wire. Advance must more and more
tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on
small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery
preparation. Siege warfare was soon bound to
supersede manoeuvre battles in the open. Consoli-
dation and fortification of our front, improvement
of approaches, selection of machine-gun emplace-
ments, and scientific grouping of our artillery under
a centralized control must erelong form the tactical
basis of our plans. " These words were written of
the situation after nth May, but they applied with
equal force to the position on 5th June.

During the first fortnight of June there were
frequent Turkish attacks, directed to regain the
trenches lost on the 4th. The French on the south
side of the Kereves Dere were slowly working from
point to point among the entrenched gullies and
redoubts, and many fine deeds of small volunteer
<Y parties were recorded. On 5th June

jum 5. second_Lieutenant Dallas Moor, of the
3rd Hampshires, won the Victoria Cross for his
gallant rallying of a detachment which broke for a
moment under a Turkish assault. On the night of
CY the nth, on our left centre, a local ad-

June .1. vance was made by the ist Border Regi-
ment and the 2nd South Wales Borderers from the
agth Division, and two trenches were won. On the
<Y A 1 6th the Turks attacked the section
Jun( held by the 88th Brigade, and that night

the trenches gained on the nth were so heavily
bombed that we were forced to fall back thirty yards
and dig ourselves in. The Turkish position, how-
ever, was a salient which we could enfilade, and at
dawn the ist Dublin Fusiliers won back the trenches

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 41

with the bayonet and filled them with the enemy's
dead.

Our centre, especially on its left, formed an
awkward salient, and till the wings could be brought
forward, this was a point of danger. On the i8th
the Turks made a resolute attempt to cy o
drive us back. They began with a heavy *u
bombardment after the approved pattern, and there-
after massed their infantry as if for an attack. Some-
thing restrained them ; but on the evening of the
following day they carried the point of the salient,
and we were hard put to recover it. The 5th Royal
Scots — Territorials from the Lothians — under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Wilson, assisted by a company of
the 4th Worcester s, managed by a brilliant charge
to drive out the Turks and clear the ground. The
Scots Territorials had already distinguished them-
selves in the action of ist May, and formed not
the least doughty battalion of the immortal 2Qth
Division.

On 2ist June a beginning was made with the
straightening of the Allied front. The most critical
position was that of the French corps cv
on the right, which was still held up ^
south of the Kereves Dere. At 1.30 in the morning
a great bombardment began. All the south-eastern
shoulder of Achi Baba was plastered with heavy
shells, and the 75-mm. field guns played incessantly
on the slopes of the ravine. Then came the infantry
rush. The 2nd French Division on the left, under
General Bailloud, made good progress. By midday
it had captured the first two lines of the Turkish
position, and taken the much-contested Haricot
Redoubt, with its tangle of wire and deep-cut

42 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

trenches and machine-gun for tins. They were across
the ravine, when they found that their right flank
was in the air. For General Simonin's ist Division,
between them and the Straits, though it had kept
line in its first onslaught, had been driven back by
counter-attacks. Twice the division advanced, and
twice it was compelled to retire. At a quarter to
three in the afternoon there was some risk that all
the gains of the 2nd Division would be lost. Gen-
eral Gouraud accordingly issued the order that in
the five hours of daylight that remained the right
of the advance must at all costs succeed. British
artillery was brought up, and every gun that could
be massed poured shells on the Turkish lines, while
the St. Louis in the Straits kept the Asiatic batteries
quiet. At six o'clock the last assault was delivered,
and the position carried. Turkish reinforcements
coming up were spotted by an aeroplane, caught by
the 75 's in the open, and destroyed. By nightfall
the French had won 600 yards of Turkish trenches,
and the whole Allied right wing was well beyond
the Kereves ravine. The French losses were 2,500 ;
those of the Turks at least 7,000, including fifty
prisoners. Sir Ian Hamilton reported that the strip-
lings of the latest French drafts had especially dis-
tinguished themselves by their dash and contempt
of danger. The enemy fought with superb courage
and resolution, and French officers who had cam-
paigned in the West declared that as a fighting man
the Turk was worth two Germans.

A distinguished writer,* who was present at the
action, has given us a vivid picture of that great
bombardment : " The dawn had been clear, but
* Mr. Compton Mackenzie.

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 43

soon a curtain of silver, through which gleamed the
ghost of the rising sun, hung over the Kereves Dere.
This was the smoke of bursting shells. Slowly as
the sun climbed up, the curtain became more sub-
stantial. Then it seemed to droop and sweep along
the hollows like a vanishing mist of dawn, and during

British Advance,
June 28

Allied Front before
the Advance o
June 21 and 28

French Advance,
June 21

4
_| Miles

Attacks on the Krithia-Achi Baba Position,
June 21 and 28.

a respite the thin blue smoke of the bivouac fires
came tranquilly up into the still air. The respite
was very brief, and the bombardment began again
with greater fierceness than before. The 75 's
drummed unceasingly. The reverberation of the
125*3 and of the howitzers shook the observation

44 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

post. Over the Kereves Dere, and beyond up the
sloping shoulders of Achi Baba, the curtain became
a pall. The sun climbed higher and higher. All
that first mirage of beauty had disappeared, and
there was nothing but the monstrous shapes of
bursting shells, giants of smoke that appeared one
after another along the Turkish lines. . . . The
smoke of the shells, which at dawn had been ethereal,
almost translucent, was now, in the sunset, turbid
and sinister ; yet the sunset was very splendid,
flaming in crimson streamers over Imbros, tinting
the East with rosy reflections, and turning the peaks
of Asia to sapphires. It had a peculiar significance
on this longest day of the year, crowning as it did
those five precious hours of daylight that, for the
French, had been fraught with such achievement.
Slowly the colour faded out, and now, minute by
minute, the flashes of the guns became more dis-
tinct, the smoke was merged in the gathering dusk,
and away over the more distant Turkish lines the
bursts of shrapnel came out like stars against the
brief twilight. One knew the anxiety there would
be in the darkness that now was falling upon this
2ist of June, but in the morning we heard gladly
that the enemy's counter-attacks had failed, and that
our Allies were indeed firmly established."

The right wing having advanced, it remained to
bring on the left. That left ran from the Krithia
road, crossed the ravine called the Saghir Dere,
about half-way between its head and its mouth,
and rested on the high ground above the Gulf of
Saros. The Saghir Dere was one of those desolate
and arid water-courses common in Gallipoli and
on the Anatolian coast. At the sea end its sides

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 45

were 200 feet high, clothed for the most part with
a light scrub, but with open patches of yellow clay.
A small stream, generally dry, trickled down it, and
there were a few springs. Towards its head it
grew shallower, and finally died away in the Krithia
plateau. The north end was held strongly by the
Turks, who had entrenched themselves on the top
of the banks on both sides, and had fortified a small
redoubt, which we called the Boomerang Fort, in
front of their position.

The Allied plan was to pivot upon a point in our
front about a mile from the sea, and to swing for-
ward our left wing until its outer rim had advanced
1,000 yards. This meant that the distance to be
covered decreased as the pivoting point was neared.
The extreme left had to carry five Turkish trenches,
the left centre no more than two. The forces to
whom the task was entrusted were, from right to
left, the I56th Brigade of the Scottish Lowland
Territorial Division, the 2Qth Division, and the
th Indian Brigade. The movement was in the
charge of General Hunter- West on.

On the morning of 28th June the wind blew
steadily from the west. At 9 a.m. the bombard-
ment began with high explosive shells, cy Q
and columns of dust hid Achi Baba. Ju
The French lent some of their big trench mortars,
and the cruiser Talbot and the destroyers Wolverine
and Scorpion from the sea enfiladed the trenches of
the Turkish right. Our field guns, firing shrapnel,
succeeded effectually in cutting the enemy's wire.
At 10.20 the bombardment increased, every Allied
piece firing in conjunction. At 10.45 our infantry
leaped from the trenches. The ist Border Regiment

46 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

from the Syth Brigade carried the Boomerang works
on the east side of the ravine with little opposition.
The place was full of dead, and the survivors were
dazed and blinded by our artillery. At n a.m. the
gunners lengthened the range, and the rest of the
8yth Brigade, under Major-General Marshall — the
ist K.O.S.B., ist Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and
2nd South Wales Borderers — captured three lines
of trenches between the ravine and the sea. East
of the gully the left of the 15 6th Brigade — the 4th
and yth Royal Scots — made good progress, and took
the two trench lines allotted to them. But their
right nearer the pivoting point met with heavy
opposition, and could make little ground.

At 11.30 the second attack was launched. The
86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, passed
through the 8yth Brigade, and carried two farther
lines of trenches, making up the required total of
five. * This advance was a magnificent sight,"
wrote a correspondent, " the men never wavering
or losing their formations under a heavy artillery
and rifle fire." On the extreme left the Gurkhas
from the 2gth Indian Brigade, moving just above
the shore, carried a green spur called the Knoll,
which joined up the line from the farthest captured
Turkish trench to the sea, while some companies of
the ist Lancashire Fusiliers completed the connec-
tion with the 86th Brigade. In an hour and a half
we had done all we aimed at, except for a small
section of trench near the pivoting point. That
section was attacked again at 5.30 in the afternoon,
but it proved impregnable. The British losses were
moderate, some 1,750 in all, and most were incurred j
in the difficult point on the right of the I56th Brigade.!

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLL 47

We captured large quantities of rifles and many
thousand rounds of ammunition — booty scarcely
less valuable than prisoners. The action was ad-
mirably planned and conducted. Our artillery work
had been perfect, and the path of the infantry was
made plain.

The whole Saghir Dere was now in our hands,
and our left wing, instead of facing north-east, now
faced due east, and was less than a mile west of
Krithia. The captured upper section of the ravine
was a horrible place, half graveyard, half rubbish-
heap, for the Turks had no gift of cleanliness.
" All the way up," wrote a correspondent, " there is
a litter of debris of the camp and the great fight —
scattered bodies half-protruding from the ground,
hastily-dug graves, hundreds of rifles and bayonets,
some broken but the majority intact, thousands
upon thousands of rounds of ammunition . .
entrenching tools, loaves of bread, soldiers' packs,
Turkish letters, a Mullah's prayer stool (a souvenir
eagerly sought after), greatcoats and kits, blankets
and old socks, cooking utensils and firewood, left
just where the enemy abandoned them, when our
gallant infantry broke through at the bayonet's
point. Great fires are burning at intervals. They
are avoided by all, and give forth a horrid, sickly
stench. On these the Turkish dead, who have been
hastily collected, are being burnt, for it is all impor-
tant to get the dead out of the way as quickly as
possible in this hot climate." Add to this a baking
sun, air shimmering with heat, some stagnant pools
of green water, an indescribable smell of decaying
refuse, and everywhere swarms of flies, and the
picture is complete.

48 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The Turkish counter-attacks of the afternoon
were repulsed, and the night of the 28th was fairly
<Y quiet. On the afternoon of the 29th

9* we observed a moving of troops on the
Turkish right, and during the evening there were
mines exploded against our right centre, a good
deal of firing, and an abortive bayonet attack on
our left. At the same time there was much activity
at Gaba Tepe. About midnight heavy rifle fire
broke out, to which the Australian Corps replied
<v with cheers. At 1.30 on the morning

J* ' 30< of the 30th a Turkish column advanced
with bayonets and bombs against General Godley's
division. It never came to the shock, for it was
completely broken by the musketry and machine-
gun fire of the yth and 8th Light Horse. By two
o'clock the enemy were routed, and many fell in
the withdrawal. On the Australian left they had
come up against a well-concealed sap ahead of our
main line, and the dead lay in swathes before it.
At 3 a.m. they tried again. A small party came
over the parapets in front of Quinn's Post, and died
to a man. The main threat against the left and
left centre was similarly broken up by our rifle and
gun fire.

There was fighting all round the peninsula on that
last day of June. About two in the morning the
searchlights of the Scorpion discovered the enemy
advancing near the sea north-west of Krithia, and
the ship drove them back by her fire. At the same
time the Knoll due west of Krithia was attacked,
the point which we had captured on the 28th.
The Turks got within forty yards of the parapet,
and then melted away under our guns. '(Several

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 49

times during the night the enemy won a few yards
of trenches by bomb attack, but these were regained
by us with the bayonet in the morning. At 5.30
a.m. on ist July, 2,000 Turks attempted to get
from Krithia into the Saghir Dere, but <y ,
were driven off by machine guns. At * ^
ten o'clock in the evening another bomb attack was
delivered against the most northerly of the trenches
which we had captured on the 28th. Of the results
let Sir Ian Hamilton tell : " An officer of the
Gurkhas being wounded — not dangerously, as it
turned out — the men became infuriated, flung all
their bombs at the enemy, and then, charging down
out of the trench, used their kukris for the first
time, and with excellent effect. About dawn the
Turks once more attempted an attack on the open,
but nearly the whole of their attacking forces, about
half a battalion, were shot down ; and a final bomb
attack, though commenced, failed utterly."

On the Allied right there was heavy fighting.
On the night of the 2Qth the Turks attempted a
surprise attack along the shore of the ~
straits, but the movement was dis- ^
covered by the searchlights of the Wolverine and
brought to a standstill. The van of the attack
was not stopped till it was some forty yards
from our trenches. At 6.30 on the morning of
the 30th the French moved forward, and in less
than an hour had carried the fortified <y
network known as the Quadrilateral, *u
east of the head of the Kereves Dere. The Infan-
terie Coloniale carried seven lines of trenches, and
their leading companies for a moment were in
danger of being cut off. They held, however, to

IX. 4

50 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the ground they had won, and by the afternoon had
beaten off all counter-attacks and consolidated their
position. This advance, taken in conjunction with
the advance of the Allied left on the 28th, straight-
ened out the dangerous bulge in our front.

One serious loss marred the success of the day.
General Gouraud was struck by shell splinters while
visiting an ambulance on his return from congratu-
lating his troops on their victory. The wound,
which later involved the amputation of a leg,
compelled him to return home and relinquish the
command of the French Corps to General Bailloud.

These violent Turkish counter-attacks resulted
in nothing but the needless loss of many brave
men. General Liman von Sanders had instructed
his troops to act strictly on the defensive, and not
to attempt to recover lost ground. But Enver,
arriving during the fight on the 28th, reversed the
policy, and ordered counter-attacks along the whole
front. He is believed to have used considerable
reinforcements for the purpose, which disappeared
under our fire. Sir Ian Hamilton estimated the
Turkish losses during the five days following upon
28th June at 5,150 killed and 15,000 wounded, and
these casualties produced no single gain. A cap-
tured order, issued by the Commander of the nth
Division, showed the disquiet felt by the Turkish
Staff at the Allied gains, and their fear of demorali-
zation among their men.

" There is nothing that causes us more sorrow, increases the
courage of the enemy, and encourages him to advance more
freely, causing us great losses, than the losing of these trenches.
Henceforth commanders who surrender trenches, from what-
ever side the attack may come, before the last man is killed,

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 51

will be punished in the same way as if they had run away.
Especially will the commanders of units told off to guard a
certain point be punished if, instead of thinking about their
work, supporting their units, and giving information to the
Higher Command, they only take action after a regrettable
incident has taken place. I hope that this will not occur
again. I give notice that if it does, I shall carry out the pun-
ishment. I do not desire to see a blot made on the courage of
our men by those who escape from the trenches to avoid the
rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy. Henceforth I shall
hold responsible all officers who do not shoot with their re-
volvers all the privates who try to escape from the trenches
on any pretext."

The July fighting was of the same nature as that
of June, save that it did not reveal any large Allied
movement, but was composed mainly of sporadic
Turkish counter-attacks. What ground we won
was on a level with the French gains in the Artois
during June, when, after a heavy bombardment, a
small advance would be made and consolidated
at a great expense of life. We were now close
up against the main strength of the Achi Baba
fortress.

On and July, after bombarding our advanced
position on the left with high explosives and shrap-
nel, the enemy attempted an advance, cy j
but was repulsed by our musketry and ^U^
the guns of the Scorpion. At seven in the evening
the Turkish artillery began again, and two battalions
emerged from the nullah beyond Krithia, and
charged in two lines across the open. Our field
batteries played havoc with them, and the arrival
of Gurkha supports dispersed the attack with heavy
losses. Next day it was obvious that ~ /
the enemy were receiving reinforce- *W 3-
ments, which some put as high as 10,000 men. On

52 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the morning of 4th July a general attack on our
CY 7 whole position was undertaken. About

- J y 3 a.m. all the Allied front and hinterland
was bombarded, a Turkish battleship moored be-
tween Maidos and Chanak assaulted the Australian
lines at Gaba Tepe, and aeroplanes made an attempt
to drop bombs at several points in our trenches.
The cannonade did little harm, and died away
about 6 a.m. The infantry attack came at 7.30,
and was directed chiefly against our right centre,
where the British Naval Division joined with the
French. At the start the Turks gained a footing in
our first trenches, but we drove them out by a
counter-attack. Their advance on the right of the
29th Division was checked by our rifles and machine-
gun fire, and that against our extreme left fared no
better. Before noon the action had died away.

From the French report it would appear that
the affair was no better than a costly fiasco. " Not-
withstanding an ostentatious display of all sorts of
reserves, of which the Turks had never yet given us
an exhibition, their infantry attacks were lifeless,
spasmodic, and ineffective. In front of the French
left, and at very many points in front of the British
line, the Ottoman infantry left their trenches and
advanced, but nowhere with the valour and the ar-
dour which they had manifested in previous engage-
ments. The Allies awaited their assailants calmly,
allowed them to approach, and then almost at point-
blank range opened a murderous fire from rifles and
machine guns. Very few survivors indeed were
fortunate enough to return to their lines ; the
majority remained on the ground in front of our
trenches. The hesitating attempts of the Turks

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 53

had never for a single moment threatened any of out
positions, and had resulted only in hecatombs in
their ranks. Our losses were slight. "

On 1 2th July the Allies made a resolute attempt
to advance their front and take the Krithia position.
The first attack was made by the Allied <y 7
right and right centre, the French Corps, * *
and the Scottish Lowland Division. Our bom-
bardment began at dawn, and thereafter our in-
fantry carried the first two lines of Turkish trenches.
The Scots Territorials reached a third line ; but they
could not hold it, for they lost touch with the French
on their right. The bombardment continued all
day, and at 4 p.m. a special cannonade was delivered
on the enemy positions in the upper ravines of the
Kereves Dere, where they run into the face of
Achi Baba. On the right, overlooking a ravine,
the Turks had a great rectangular redoubt, bristling
with machine guns. At five our guns lengthened
and attacked the ground where the Turkish reserves
might be looked for, while a warship bombarded
the observation station on the top of Achi Baba
with 12-inch shells. Then the Scots surged forward
against the redoubt. ' The ground," wrote an
observer, " resembled a gigantic steaming cauldron,
into whose thick vapours the gallant brigade poured
without once hesitating or looking back/' The re-
doubt, owing to the preliminary bombardment, was
carried easily with the bayonet. The second line
was taken, after some confused fighting, and by
nightfall 400 yards of ground had been gained.

The night was thick with counter-attacks. The
Turks came on repeatedly with bombs, and the
British right centre, which had advanced too far,

54 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

was forced to evacuate two lines of trenches. At
<Y 7 dawn the two wearied Scots brigades

J y 3- Were withdrawn, and their place taken
by the Naval Division. All day our artillery fire
played on the battered trenches, and at 4.30 in the
afternoon our right centre succeeded in retaking
the two trenches lost on the previous night. There
we stuck fast ; but our left, which now came into
action, had an easier road, and advanced our front
considerably. The French on the extreme right
had strengthened the line by extending their posi-
tions to the mouth of the Kereves Dere. During
the night of the I3th there were severe counter-
attacks, in the face of which the Allies succeeded in
maintaining the ground they had won. It was a
considerable advance, which brought us very near
to Krithia. But the heights of Achi Baba were as
far off as ever.

The rest of the month saw the inevitable Turkish

counter-attacks, and small local improvements of

,y 7 the Allied line. Both the British and

July 21. prencj1 sections were raided on the i8th.

On the 2ist a small Turkish redoubt was cap-

cy 7 tured. On the 23rd there was an attack

July 23. on Qur je£t wjjicjji was repulsed after a

twenty minutes' struggle. . On the 28th there was
CY j ~ & slight advance by the French right.
July 25. rpjie ^y Q£ concerted frontal attacks was

over, and the mind of the High Command was

busied with a new plan.

While we were battling against the outer walls
of the Turkish fortifications we did not neglect the
duty of striking at the routes of supply. The work

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 55

of our submarines in the Marmora continued, and
there is no question but that we hampered and
occasionally held up both munitions and reinforce-
ments. At the same time the complete closing of
the Marmora, even had we accomplished it, would
not have cut Turkish communications, as was too
readily assumed in some quarters at the time. A
brief examination of Turkey's transport problem is
necessary for a proper understanding of the situation.
Turkey had three possible passages to her Galli-
poli position. She could send troops and supplies
by sea all the way from Constantinople to the ports
of Maidos and Gallipoli. She could send them by
rail through Thrace to Uzun Keupru, whence a fair
military road would carry them to the peninsula by
way of Bulair. For troops the distance from rail-
head was perhaps forty-eight hours' march ; for
heavy transport, by means of oxen and buffalo carts,
it would mean a journey of some five days. At
Bulair, it is true, the road was open to our naval
guns ; but in dry weather the wagons could leave
the path and find a more sheltered cross-country
route. Finally, troops and supplies could travel by
the Anatolian and Ottoman railways via Smyrna
and Soma to the port of Panderma, in the south-
western half of the Marmora. Most of the reinforce-
ments came from Syria and Anatolia ; and they
naturally used the Panderma line, embarking at
that port for the short sea journey to Gallipoli in
the Bosphorus passenger steamers which were used
as transports. Heavy material, such as shells and
guns, either used the through sea route from Con-
stantinople or were railed down to Smyrna and
back to Panderma.

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THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 57

Our submarines made the Marmora road nearly
impossible. They also interfered gravely with the
short sea voyage from Panderma to the peninsula.
Turkey was accordingly flung back more and more
upon her land routes — by rail to Uzun Keupru and
thence to Bulair, and by rail to Panderma and
thence by road to the port of Lapsaki, on the Dar-
danelles, opposite Galata. This was a real incon-
venience, but it was by no means an insuperable
difficulty. Since most of the fresh troops came
from Asia, Panderma was the natural point of
arrival, and the farther road to Lapsaki was easy.
Nor was the route so bad for shells and heavy material
which came from Constantinople, for a good rail-
way system took them to Smyrna, and the railway
journey from Smyrna to Panderma occupied no
more than nine hours, while there was the Uzun
Keupru-Bulair road as an alternative. Our sub-
marine warfare, brilliant as it was, hampered and
delayed, but it did not cut, or perhaps seriously
cripple, the communications of the Turkish fortress.

How audacious and devoted the warfare was may
be gathered from the exploit of Lieutenant Guy
D'Oyly-Hughes, R.N., who on 2ist

August made a single-handed attempt ' '

to cut the first section of the Anatolian railway which
runs along the northern shore of the Gulf of Ismed,
at the eastern end of the Marmora. He swam
ashore from a submarine, pushing a raft carrying
his clothes and explosives. Finding the cliffs un-
climbable, he had to prospect along the coast till he
found a point which could be scaled. He then
moved towards the railway line, but discovered that
it was strongly guarded. At first his idea was to

58 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

destroy the viaduct ; but finding this impossible,
he resolved to blow up a low brickwork support
over a small hollow. The sound of the fuse pistol
brought up the guards, and Lieutenant D'Oyly-
Hughes had to retire, fighting a running fight for
about a mile. From this point we may quote the
official account :—

" He plunged into the water about three-quarters
of a mile to the eastward of the small bay in which
the boat was lying. The charge exploded as he
entered the water, fragments falling into the sea
near the boat, although the distance between the
boat and the charge was between a quarter and
half a mile. After swimming for four or five hun-
dred yards straight out to sea, he blew a long blast
on his whistle ; but the boat, being in a small bay
behind the cliffs, did not hear it.

" Day was breaking very rapidly, so after swim-
ming back to the shore, and resting for a short time
on the rocks, he commenced swimming towards
the bay in which the boat was lying. At this point
he discarded his pistol, bayonet, and electric torch,
their weight making his progress very slow. It was
not until he had rounded the last point that the
whistle was heard, and at the same time he heard
shots from the cliffs overhead, and rifle fire was
opened on the boat.

"As the boat came astern out of the bay the
early morning mist made her appear to him to be
three rowing boats — the bow, the gun, and the con-
ning tower being the three objects actually seen.
He swam ashore, and tried to hide under the cliffs ;
but on climbing a few feet out of the water he
realized his mistake, and shouted again before enter-

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 59

ing the water. We picked him up in an extremely
exhausted condition about forty yards from the
rocks, after he had swum the best part of a mile in
his clothes." *

The work of the Navy was not confined to below
the water. In Sir Ian Hamilton's phrase, the Fleet
was father and mother to the Army on land. The
appearance of German submarines in the middle of
May compelled us to keep our large transports at
Mudros. From Lemnos to the peninsula was forty
miles, and all troops and stores had to be brought in
fleet sweepers, trawlers, drifters, and other small
craft which were least vulnerable to submarine
attack. Apart from the good work done by the
naval guns in the land battle, the mere transport
services of the ships could not be overstated. Take
the work of the picket boats, the steam pinnaces
which towed the laden lighters to the beaches. Their
crews were often at work for sixteen hours out of
the twenty-four, and were constantly under fire.
Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett has drawn an interesting
picture of this strenuous and well-ordered activity.

' The line of demarcation between the authority
of the Army and of the Navy is strictly drawn. As
long as a soldier, a horse, a gun, or a biscuit is in
a ship or in a lighter on its way to the shore, all are
under the control of our beach parties. Standing
on one of the piers in the sweltering heat of the
last few days, with the beach behind him crammed
with men, stores, and animals, a young officer, with
a megaphone in his hand, shouts orders to a dozen
different lighters, each towed by a steam pinnace,

* Lieutenant D'Oyly-Hughes received the Distinguished
Service Order.

60 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

in the offing. One contains mules, another guns, a
third biscuits, a fourth tinned meat, a fifth ammuni-
tion, a sixth troops, a seventh generals and staff
officers. Every one is directed to its right destina-
tion as if by some enchanter's wand, and no one
dares to step ashore until he has received his orders.
At the end of the pier the naval authority ceases and
that of the army begins. Here are Army Service
Corps officers, who are waiting to seize what the
Navy has brought them. The thousand miscella-
neous articles, which look as if they never could be
sorted out, are speedily divided, checked, and sent
on their way down the lines of communication to
the troops in the front trenches. The whole is a
marvel of organization."

Splendid, too, was the work of the Allied airmen,
who fulfilled the duties of long-range artillery.
Turkish camps far back on the peninsula, or on the
southern shore of the Marmora, were bombarded
from the heavens. The Narrows and both sides
of the Straits were always under their surveillance.
They regulated the range of our guns, and they
detected the movements of the enemy's transports
and battleships. The Turk is a stolid and most
courageous fighter, but he did not like the menace
from the sky, which came suddenly upon him like
the destroying wings of Azrael. It is probable that
this risk had a more sinister effect upon his spirits
than the shells and cold steel of the Achi Baba
battles.

The discomforts of the life in the peninsula grew
as the summer advanced and the heat waxed greater.
The whole of our position was honeycombed with
trenches and dug-outs like a colony of sand-martins

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 61

in the bank of a river. There was no shade from
nature, for the copses were only scrub. The sun
beat down pitilessly on the acres of rock and gravel,
and was reflected from the blue waters around. Our
men were very close together, and the whole earth
soon became tainted in spite of all our care. .Sun-
stroke cases were few, for the sun of Gallipoli is not
the sun of India ; but fevers and dysentery began
to take their toll. The scarcity of water, the diffi-
cult journeys for the sick down communication
trenches and cliff roads, and the long voyage before
hospital was reached, intensified our discomfort.
And everywhere fell a plague of flies. Men who
had fought in South Africa remembered the curse
of the fly on the veld, but the South African scourge
was feeble compared to the clouds which hung over
the baked peninsula. Remember there was no
movement or chance of movement. The troops
had to sit still in their stifling trenches, and every
acre of that butt-end of Gallipoli was searched by
the enemy's fire.

Under such conditions — no movement, grave
losses, grave discomforts — it was a marvel that we
maintained so high a spirit and so steady a cheerful-
ness. Men returned to the habits of their first
parents. Khaki " shorts," a shirt, and a sun-helmet
formed the only wear of even exalted generals.
The Australians and New Zealanders especially,
perched in their eyrie at Gaba Tepe, showed a
noble disregard of apparel. These troops, embra-
cing in their ranks every class and condition, had
shown themselves superb fighting men. There was
a perpetual competition for the posts of danger, and
money was offered freely for the right to a place in

62 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

some hot corner. Their easy discipline knew none
of the usual military conventions ; but it was real
enough, and got through the work required. There
were endless tales of their keenness. " The other
day a group of four millionaires were working at a
mine-shaft. The task was not done when another
regiment came to relieve the one to which they
belonged. These four men refused to go with their
battalion till they had finished the job, as they wished
it to be known as their job and no one else's."
They probably represented the finest average of
physique in any of the belligerent armies — those
lean, great-limbed men, without an ounce of soft
flesh on their bodies. In the midsummer heats
they were burned to a dull brick-red, for they fought
almost naked. Coats, shirts, boots, and putties
disappeared in succession, their trousers shrank
into " shorts," as they toiled in the dust of the
trenches till the hour of relief came, and they could
wash in the shrapnel-dotted ^Egean. The oversea
nations of the Empire had won great honour — the
South Africans among the deserts of German terri-
tory, the Canadians in the sickly meadows of the
Ypres Salient. Not less glorious was the record of
the Australians in a land as sunburnt as their own.

Humour never fails the British soldier. He
showed it in the fantastic names he gave to the
various points within his survey, and in the notice-
boards in the trenches, like that which read, " Cas-
ualty Corner. Do not pass this Board, but if you
have to, for God's sake hustle." There were trench
newspapers, which contained as much authentic
news as the journals at home. And in those days
of heart-searching they found out the officers who

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 63

were leaders of men, and gave them their undivided
trust. General Birdwood, of the Anzac Corps, to
take one conspicuous case, was a commander after
the heart of his soldiers.

The three summer months had been among the
most costly in our military history. Out of some
six British divisions we had lost by the end of May
over 38,000. By the end of June the total was over
42,000 ; by the end of July it was nearly 50,000,
pf whom 8,000 were killed, 30,000 wounded, and
11,000 missing. The French losses were on a
similar scale, and the naval losses must be added
to the total casualties of the expedition. All our
divisions had suffered, and, to the people of the
Scottish Lowlands especially, the word Dardanelles
came to bear the fateful meaning which Flodden
bore for their ancestors. The results gained were
not proportionate to this huge wastage. But not
even at Ypres had our troops shown a more daunt-
less courage, a more complete devotion, or a more
stubborn resolution.* No kind of warfare involves
a sterner trial for the human spirit than the slow
sapping towards a fortress, when there is no obvious
advance, no chance of the swift excitement of a
manoeuvre battle. We may take the 2Qth Division
as a type of the others. Sir Ian Hamilton's words

* In addition to the instances mentioned in the text, the
Victoria Cross was conferred on Captain Gerald O'Sullivan, of
the ist Inniskilling Fusiliers, for his gallantry in retaking lost
trenches on the nights of i8th June and ist July ; on Second-
Lieutenant Herbert James, of the 4th Worcesters, for rallying
an attack on 28th June, and for holding a trench with bombs
single-handed on 3rd July ; and to Sergeant James Somers, of
the ist Inniskilling Fusiliers, for a similar performance on the
night of ist July.

64 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of praise, addressed to it after the battle of 28th
June, were applicable to the whole British army :—

" The General Officer Commanding feels sure that he voices
the sentiments of every soldier serving with this army when he
congratulates the incomparable 2Qth Division upon yesterday's
splendid attack, carried out, as it was, in a manner more than
upholding the best traditions of the distinguished regiments
of which it is composed.

" The 29th suffered cruel losses at the first landing. Since
then they have never been made up to strength, and they have
remained under fire every hour of the night and day for two
months on end. Opposed to them were fresh troops, holding
Hne upon line of entrenchments, flanked by redoubts and
machine guns.

" But when, yesterday, the 2Qth Division were called upon
to advance, they dashed forward as eagerly as if this were only
their baptism of fire. Through the entanglements they swept
northwards, clearing our left of the enemy for a full thousand
yards. Heavily counter-attacked at night, they killed or
captured every Turk who had penetrated their incomplete
defences, and to-day stand possessed of every yard they had
so hardly gained.

" Therefore it is that Sir Ian Hamilton is confident he carries
with him all ranks of his force when he congratulates Generals
Hunter- Western and De Lisle, the Staff, and each officer, N.C.O.,
and man in this Division, whose sustained efforts have added
fresh lustre to British arms all the world over."

Not less splendid was the performance of the
French Corps. Under d'Amade and Gouraud the
newest recruits had fought like heroes, and had
shown the Turks that furia francese which centuries
before had carried the walls of Jerusalem. " Shall
not thou and I," said King Harry in the play to the
Princess Katharine, " between St. Denis and St.
George, compound a boy half -French, half -English,
that shall go to Constantinople and take the Turk
by the beard ?" The first half of Shakespeare's

THE DEADLOCK AT GALLIPOLI. 65

prophecy had come true. Saint Denis and Saint
George fought in unison, but the beard of the
Soldan was still unplucked.

In this rivalry of gallant men the enemy was not
outdone. The Turks fought with all their old
patient steadfastness. They advanced to hopeless
assaults, and died in hundreds in the open ; they
clung to ruined trenches when the Allied steel was
upon them ; but the stolid Anatolian peasants did
not waver. The prisoners we took showed no
anger against Britain, save in the matter of our
tactless confiscation of their battleships, which had
been laboriously provided by the contributions of
the humblest. To them the war was Kismet, and
they obeyed orders uncomplainingly. They were
humane adversaries, too. The conflict was stained
by no atrocities, but brightened by many deeds of
chivalry. A wounded soldier, who had already
fought on the Western front, after expounding the
hardships of the Dardanelles campaign, added :
' There's one comfort there. You're fighting
against white men." It was a fine tribute to the
former allies of Britain.

By the end of July the complete stalemate had
compelled the High Command to revise its strategy.
A certain daring Englishman, who knew Turkey well,
contrived to be taken blindfold one night into the
enemy's trenches, and for several hours talked to
the Turkish officers. He was told on parting :
I Some day you may take Constantinople, but Achi
Baba — never." This was rapidly becoming the
view of those responsible for the expedition. Large
reinforcements had been asked for, and during July
were arriving at Egypt and Lemnos. To fling these

IX. C

66

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

into the congested butt of the peninsula was clearly
folly. A new strategical plan was being devised,
which should utilize them against a fresh objective.
As we shall see later, the peninsula still dominated
the minds of those responsible for our policy. That
is the worst of a false step. It is hard to retrace,
and, though the road may be shifted a point or two,
it still tends to bear in the same direction.

Meanwhile during these summer months strange
things were happening in the Balkan States. Under-
ground forces were at work, which were shortly to
give birth to events that staggered the otiose souls
who had let that old storm-centre of Europe slip
from their minds. To understand the situation now
developing, it is necessary to glance for a little at
the tangled labyrinth of Balkan politics.

CHAPTER LXVI.

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH.

The Strategic Importance of the Balkans — Topography of the
Peninsula — The Main Thoroughfares — The Alley-Way of
Macedonia — The Ambitions of the several States — Balkan
History — The Turkish Domination — The Struggle for Liberty
—The Treaty of San Stefano — The Treaty of Berlin— The
Recent History of Bulgaria — Prince Alexander — Stambolov
—The Balkan League — The First Balkan War — The Second
Balkan War— The Treaty of Bucharest— Bitter Feeling
between the States — Greece — Serbia — Bulgaria — Rumania —
Position in 1914 — Outbreak of European War — M. Venezelos
— Character of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria — Attitude of
Rumania — Attitude of Greece — M. Venezelos's Letter to the
King — Attitude of Bulgaria — The Secret Treaty of iyth July
— Failure of Allied Diplomacy.

IN the present chapter we can only attempt a
sketch of the main features of that Balkan
problem which for nearly a century had per-
plexed the statesmen of Europe. It was the land
of surprises, where nationalities had no recognized
boundaries. It lacked the contours of modern civi-
lization, that which elsewhere was moulded to use
being there left sharp and ragged. On the out-
break of the great war the peninsula was at first
dismissed as negligible, and its recent struggles
regarded as no more than the quarrels of kites and
crows. But as the tide of the campaign moved
eastwards, as the guns sounded in the /Egean and

68 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Russia fell back from Poland, men woke with a
start to the importance which those barren hills
might bear in the later stages of the contest. That
importance Germany had not forgotten while the
Allies slumbered. To understand it, we must con-
sider the determining factors in the labyrinthine
Balkan politics.

The immediate strategic significance of the
peninsula was obvious. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Ru-
mania stood between the Teutonic League and its
Turkish ally. While the two latter remained neu-
tral it could not easily munition or reinforce the
armies holding the gate of Constantinople. Should
either or both take up arms against it, there was a
possibility of a flank attack on the exposed Teutonic
right flank or an addition to the fighting strength
of the Allies in Gallipoli which might overbear
Turkish resistance. The Balkan races were for the
most part military peoples — those hard-bitten up-
land dwellers who, from the beginning of time,
have made good soldiers. Accustomed to hard-
ships, they could fight with a slender commissariat,
and they had the bravery of those not accustomed
to overvalue human life. If united, they could
put into the field an army equivalent to that of a
first-class Power, and, even without Serbia, their
fighting strength stood at a million bayonets.

Again, the Balkans were a fine field for diplomatic
activity, for they represented the incalculable. Each
state was still in a fluid condition. Each looked to
extend its borders, for each owned many '" na-
tionals " outside its territorial limits. The Serb
race was widely spread over Bosnia and Herze-
govina and Austria-Hungary ; there were Bulgarians

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 69

in Rumania, and the partition of Macedonia by the
Treaty of Bucharest did not correspond to nation-
alities. Each state had, therefore, its Alsace-Lor-
raine to which it turned jealous eyes. Moreover,
while each state had nominally a constitutional
government and believed itself a democracy, each,
owing to the comparatively recent date of its eman-
cipation from Turkish bondage, was liable to the
rule of a camarilla, an army, or a dynasty. Ex-
cepting Serbia and Montenegro, all had alien royal
houses. Rumania had a Catholic Hohenzollern on
the throne, Bulgaria a Coburg, Greece a prince of
the House of Schleswig-Holstein. History has
shown that such conditions offer a unique chance
for tortuous diplomacy.

To understand the Balkan situation a short
survey is necessary of the topography and the
history of the peninsula. It is a knot of moun-
tains, with no great valleys and no natural geo-
graphical centre round which settled and civilized
conditions of life could gather. Its peoples owe
their nationalities primarily to race and historical
accidents, rather than to geographical compulsion
such as destined Britain and Italy to be nations.
They were for long refugees in the uplands, and
as mountain dwellers they continued to look down
upon the plains of Thrace and Hungary. But
the country was not a barrier but a thoroughfare,
for through it lay the road from Central Europe
to the ^Egean and Constantinople. It was the
nature of these alleys of traffic which determined
the development of the Balkan States so soon as
their independence was secured.

The old Roman roads are the best guide to the

70 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

natural possibilities of movement. The greatest,
the Via Egnatia, ran from Durazzo on the Adriatic
by Monastir and Salonika to Constantinople. An-
other ran from Belgrade by Nish and Sofia to the
Bosphorus ; a third from Skutari to Nish, and on
to the Danube ; a fourth from Monastir to the
Danube by way of Sofia ; a fifth from Salonika by
Uskub and Novi Bazar to Serajevo. Looked at
geographically, there are two great gaps in this
mountain system. One lies between the main Balkan
and the Rhodope ranges, to-day the route of the
trunk railway from the West to Constantinople.
The second is the gap of Macedonia, a much-
encumbered gap, but nevertheless a true alley
between the Rhodope and the Western Mountains,
through which by way of the Vardar, Ibar, and
Western Morava valleys a way could be found to
the Save and the Upper Danube. Of the alley,
Kavala is now the eastern gate, as Philippi was in
ancient days. It is this alley -country, Macedonia,
which has been littered with fragments of all the
Balkan races, and which throughout history has been
the storm-centre of the Balkans. " In this narrow
belt, bounded westwards by the cruel karst hills,
eastwards by the wooded, pasture-bearing central
uplands, open widely at both ends, all but blocked
at the sides — within this belt is concentrated most
of the drama and most of the tragedy of the penin-
sula. Whether we think of the wistful Serb, with
memories of past glories ; the Bulgar, looking down
from his upland boundary to his compatriots in the
storm-swept plains below ; the Greek, with his
trader's instinct, pushing inland from the seaports
of the coast ; the Albanian, sweeping down from

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 71

his mountains in brigand's raid, or creeping onward
in peaceful agricultural penetration ; or, again, of
Teuton and Hungarian in the north ; of Italian,
watching the gaps of the Coastal Mountains ; of
the cynical Turk, still finding peasants to work for
him in the midst of the pervading tumult — with
whatever party our interests and our sympathies lie,
we have to remember that here, in this alley- way,
which we, quite inappropriately, still call Macedonia,
in this gap between western mountains and central
land mass, lies the key to the history of the whole
peninsula/' *

Such a geographical position had decisive effects
on the ambitions of the several states. Greece,
with a population of seafarers and coast-dwellers,
stood outside the main problem. Her natural ex-
tension was towards the islands of the /Egean and
the coast of Asia Minor. Bulgaria, stretching out
to the sea, looked naturally southwards. Her two
main rivers, the Maritza and the Struma, flowed to
the ^Egean, and national expansion tends to follow
the river valleys. Her small Black Sea coast-line
was insufficient ; the Marmora was blocked by
Turkey ; and at their best, Black Sea and Marmora
were not open to the world like the /Egean. Serbia,
too, looked southwards. She was land-locked, and
had no outlet for her commerce save through the
lands of strictly protectionist neighbours. Her
natural road was to Salonika, but if this failed she
had an alternative. A route to the Adriatic was
possible, which should debouch, like the Via Egnatia,
at Durazzo, on the flats of coastal Albania. Such

* Marion E. Newbigin: Geographical Aspects of Balkan
Problems, p. 9.

72 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

an outlet, while more difficult than that to the /Egean,
offered greater advantages, for it brought the markets
of Southern and Western Europe within easier reach.

Macedonia therefore, both its coast and its
hinterland, was certain sooner or later to become
an acute problem for Serbia and Bulgaria, and in a
lesser degree for Greece, and this purely on geo-
graphical grounds. It represented for the upland
principalities the simplest path to the sea. If Serbia
sought the ^Egean she must have south-east Mace-
donia ; if the Adriatic, she must control the northern
districts. For Bulgaria to reach the /Egean meant
the possession of eastern Macedonia, since the in-
hospitable Thracian coast offered no good harbours.
Moreover, to both Serb and Bulgar Macedonia was
irredenta in the full meaning of the Italian term.
There, under foreign rule, dwelt many thousands
of the compatriots and co-religionists of both. An
alley- way full of unemancipated kinsmen, which to
both states was the pivot upon which their racial
ambitions moved, meant, so soon as they attained
national stability, a contest first with Turkey and
then, in all likelihood, with each other. The con-
figuration of the earth's surface has been the ulti-
mate cause of most of the quarrels of mankind.

If Balkan geography determined the general
character of the problems, Balkan history had de-
cided the special form in which they were presented
to the modern world. " History," in M. Sorel's
famous phrase, " never stops short." The fruits
of forgotten deeds remain as a living legacy for the
future. Under the Roman Empire the peninsula
had become latinized and settled, and great trunk
roads led from the Illyrian coast to the trans-Danube

\

MONTENEGRO ^

s\>*S \

The Balkan

N r A I

bv-l— t-Hf H-*— *J

and Frontiers.

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 73

territories and the shores of the Bosphorus. But in
the fourth and fifth centuries after Christ the Slavs
swept down from the north, and absorbed the an-
cient Greek, Thracian, and Illyrian races, or drove
them into the hills or the islands of the /Egean. At
the close of the seventh century the Bulgars ap-
peared, a Turanian race akin to the Finns whose
home was the country between the Urals and the
Volga. Then followed fleeting Bulgarian empires,
when the horse-tail standards reached the gates of
Byzantium. In the fourteenth century the Serbs
rose to power, and for a short time dominated the
peninsula. Then came the Turks. The Bulgarians
fell before the conquerors in 1366, and in 1389 the
Serbians were vanquished at Kossovo — Q
that fatal "Field of Blackbirds," in X3*9-
memory of which a black patch is still worn in the
caps of the Montenegrins. Constanti-
nople was taken in 1453, and with the ^II*
defeat of the Albanians under Skander-
beg in 1466 the peninsula was in Ottoman hands.

For three hundred and fifty years their dominion
was unshaken. The armies of the Crescent used
the Balkans as the thoroughfare along which they
marched to their campaigns on the plains of Hun-
gary. The conquered peoples lived in their little
villages in the hills, and had no traffic with the
conqueror. The Turk did not try to assimilate his
subject races ; he was too proud and too indolent
to proselytize on a serious scale, and he left them
their language, religion, and customs with an easy
toleration. Accordingly, when his rule grew feeble,
there was a nucleus of nationality left to reassert
itself. Greece, with the aid of France, Russia, and

74 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Britain, became independent in 1829. Serbia, under
1820 t'ie ^rst Karageorge, raised the standard
of revolt in 1804, and by 1820 had won
o 4" a spectral autonomy as a tributary state.
The Danubian principalities of Moldavia
and Wallachia had long had an uneasy separate life,
and by 1 859 they had become united under
the name of Rumania. Bulgaria alone
remained in complete subjection till 1876,
when a rising broke out which was put down by
Turkey with the barbarities which Western Europe
came to know as the " Bulgarian atrocities. " That
event, and the previous declaration of war against
£ Turkey by Serbia, led to Russia's partici-

77* pation in the struggle, and the outbreak
of the Russo-Turkish War in April 1877.

In that war the Bulgarian contingent fought gal-
lantly with Gourko in the Balkans, and the Ru-
manians, under Prince Charles, contributed much
^ « to the success of Russian arms. On the
7 ' 3rd of March 1878, when Russia was
approaching Constantinople, the Treaty of San
Stefano was signed, under which Rumania was to
surrender to Russia her portion of Bessarabia, and
receive in return the Dobrudja territory, south of
the mouth of the Danube. Bulgaria was consti-
tuted an autonomous state, with boundaries which
fulfilled her wildest dreams, and which included
every detached fragment of the Bulgarian race and
something more. Her borders ran from the Black
Sea to the Albanian hills, and from the Danube to
the ^Egean, and included the port of Kavala on
the /Egean and most of Macedonia. This arrange-
ment was not allowed to stand, since the Powers of

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 75

Europe suspected that the new state would become
a Russian dependency. By the Treaty of Berlin,
signed on I3th July of that year, Bulgaria was given
only the land between the Balkan range and the
Danube, and the country south of the Balkans was
created into the autonomous province of Eastern
Rumelia. Serbia was given Nish, and Greece Thes-
saly ; Bessarabia went to Russia ; Rumania retained
the Dobrudja ; and Bosnia and Herzegovina were put
under Austrian administration. Turkey was left with
Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace on the continent
of Europe, though she remained the suzerain of Bul-
garia, Eastern Rumelia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.

The modern history of the Balkans dates from
the Treaty of Berlin. It is not an edifying record,
being concerned chiefly with the quarrels of the
separate states, and their indecision as to which of
the Great Powers might most profitably be culti-
vated. The chief international importance is to be
found in the record of Bulgaria. In 1879 the As-
sembly of the young state elected as g
sovereign Prince Alexander of Batten- «'"
berg, who identified himself completely with Bul-
garian national aspirations. In defiance of the
Powers, he brought about a union with Eastern
Rumelia in 1885. This led to a quarrel ™
with Russia, and the withdrawal of all
Russian officers from the Bulgarian army. Serbia
chose the moment to declare war, but was decisively
defeated by Prince Alexander at Slivnitza on iQth
November. Russia attempted to abduct the Prince ;
but a counter-revolution, organized by Stambolov,
the President of the Assembly, restored him. Un-
fortunately he now made a false move by offering

76 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

to resign his crown into Russian hands, and was

1886 compelled to abdicate and leave the
country on September 8, 1886.

In 1887 Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-

1887 Gotha was elected to the vacant throne ;
'" and the history of the following twenty

years was made up of the rivalries of the Russian
party and the anti-Russians, who adhered to the
policy of Stambolov and attempted to reach an
understanding with Turkey. War with the Porte
was brought very near at times by Turkish barbari-
ties among the Bulgarian population of Macedonia
« — barbarities which no doubt occurred,
but which were at least equalled by the
doings of the komitadjis. In 1908 the Austrian
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina inspired
Prince Ferdinand to declare Bulgaria an independent
kingdom. The matter was settled by the payment of
an indemnity, for which Russia advanced the funds.
This brings us to the eve of the Balkan Wars,
and we may summarize the situation thus. Bul-
garia owed gratitude to Russia for her action in
1877 and 1908, and as the consistent protector of
Slav nationalities ; but the Stambolovists had a
grudge against her for her treatment of Prince
Alexander, and were inclined to look rather to
Austria as a patron. Serbia had a general reliance on
Russia, and had many scores to settle with Austria,
partly on account of her treatment of the Southern
Slavs under her sway, partly because of the Bosnian
annexation, and partly because of old tariff wars as
to the passage of Serbian live-stock beyond the
borders. Rumania had a grudge against Russia
because of Bessarabia, and a grudge against Austria

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 77

because of the Rumanian districts of Transylvania.
Greece had little love for Russia because of the
Russian hankerings for Constantinople. All four
Powers, too, were deeply suspicious of the Austro-
German Drang nach Osten, the covetous eye cast on
the shores of the /Egean and the road thither, which
might put an end to their national existence. Bul-
garia was suspected by Greece because of the old
ecclesiastical quarrel between the Patriarchate and
the Exarchate, and the strife of the rival komitadjis
in Macedonia — a suspicion which she returned with
interest. Bulgaria, too, looked askance on Serbia
because of the unprovoked war of 1885, and on
Rumania because of the Dobrudja and its Bulgarian
population. The only bond which could unite
these jealous little nations was a common grievance
against Turkey ; for in Macedonia, under the rule
of the Porte, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, and Vlachs
suffered indiscriminately.

An alliance between such disparate peoples might
well have seemed impossible, even under the spur
of the Macedonian grievance. A Balkan League
had been tried in the past, and had failed. The
Serbian Ristitch, fifty years ago, had advocated the
scheme ; there were discussions on the subject after
the Russo-Turkish War, and King Charles of Ru-
mania and Prince Alexander of Bulgaria approved
it ; in 1891 the Greek statesman Tricoupis at-
tempted to form an alliance, but was met by the
opposition of Bulgaria under Stambolov. Six years
later Bulgaria herself revived the proposal. To the
most sanguine idealist the stubborn particularism
and the secular antagonisms of the states might well
have seemed an insuperable bar. The one common

78 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ground — hatred of Turkey — might unite them for
a little, but presently interests would diverge, and
alliance give place to conflict.

This, as it happened, was the course of events.
In the spring of 1912 a league was formed for the

purpose of driving Turkey out of Europe.

Its moving spirit was M. Venezelos, and
he was assisted by M. Gueshov, the Bulgarian
Premier, by the Serbian M. Pashitch, and not least
by the Times correspondent in the Balkans, Mr.
J. D. Bourchier. It was agreed that any territory
conquered should be held in trust until the allies
arranged for its partition. But a special treaty was
made in February between Serbia and Bulgaria,
under which it was arranged that north-west
Macedonia — that is, Novi Bazar and the Prizrend
and Prishtina districts — should go to Serbia unre-
servedly ; that in the same way Bulgaria should
have the south and south-eastern parts, notably
Monastir and Ochrida ; and that the zone between,
comprising the Uskub territory, should be sub-
mitted to the arbitration of Russia.

The story of the First Balkan War need not be
recounted here. The Bulgarian armies marched
into Thrace, defeated the Turks decisively at Lule
Burgas, invested Adrianople, and were only checked
by the Chatalja lines. Greece drove the enemy north-
wards beyond Salonika, and Serbia cleared northern
Macedonia and won the brilliant victory of Kuma-
novo. There was an armistice in December 1912,
and an abortive conference held thereafter in London.

Hostilities were resumed : Adrianople at

last fell on March 26, 1913, to the Bul-
garians, and on 5th March Jannina had surrendered

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 79

to the Greeks. Meantime, in the previous December,
Serbia had reached the Adriatic at Durazzo, and in
April the Montenegrins took Scutari.

It was now that the real trouble began. The
Triple Alliance refused categorically to allow Serbia
and Montenegro a share of the Adriatic coast. This
was the natural outlet on the sea for Serbia, the
direction to which her ambitions had always tended.
But since the road was closed to her here, she de-
clared that she must find compensation elsewhere ;
and that her arrangement with Bulgaria, which had
been founded on the assumption of an Adriatic
port, no longer held good. Bulgaria stuck to the
letter of the treaty, which had not mentioned the
Adriatic. Serbia was willing to meet Bulgaria and
to accept arbitration, provided that the whole allo-
cation of territory was arbitrated on, and not merely
the Uskub districts as formerly arranged. The
Treaty of London, signed on 3Oth May, deprived
Turkey of all her European possessions north and
west of the Enos-Midia line. But the allocation of
the conquered land among the victors was post-
poned by the outbreak of a new war. For a moment
there seemed a chance of peace when Russia invited
Serbia and Bulgaria to Petrograd. Serbia accepted,
but Bulgaria insisted on laying down conditions
about the limits of arbitration. Her intransigence
was generally attributed to the influence of King
Ferdinand. It was certainly not approved by her
civilian ministers or by the people at large.

The Second Balkan War broke out in the be-
ginning of July 1913. The Greeks and Serbians
had occupied land on the frontiers of the territory
which Bulgaria held, and the latter state took the

8o

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

initiative in hostilities. In a week Bulgaria found
herself attacked on four sides. The Turks, disre-
garding the Treaty of London, retook Adrianople

T T. Districts where there is a Turkish element.

Lands outside Bulgaria
(in Serbia and Greece)
where it is claimed the
population is Bulgar.

District of mixed Bui gar
and Albanian popula-
tion.

Map showing the Macedonian Districts beyond their
present Frontiers which the Bulgarians claim to be
mainly peopled by the Bulgar Race.

and advanced to the old Bulgarian frontier. Greece
and Serbia pressed in from south and west. Ru-
mania, hastening to fish in troubled waters, annexed
a further slice of the Dobrudja, which included

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 81

Silistria and a population of a quarter of a million
Bulgarians, and without striking a blow marched
her armies to within fifteen miles of Sofia.

Bulgaria had no alternative but unconditional
surrender. On roth August the Treaty of Bucharest
was signed by the Balkan States, and a separate
treaty was signed later at Constantinople between
Bulgaria and Turkey. As a result of two sanguinary
wars, and losses of at least 100,000, Bulgaria gained
only a strip of Thrace, a fraction of Macedonia, and
the open roadstead of Dedeagatch. The place was
useless to her, for Turkey, by regaining Adrianople,
controlled the only railway from Bulgaria to the
/Egean. Moreover, she lost to Rumania a slice of
her north-eastern territory. Serbia gained all cen-
tral and northern Macedonia, including Uskub,
Ochrida, and Monastir, and Greece received most
of the rest. The Greek gains included not only
Salonika, which was a legitimate object of Greek
ambition, but the port of Kavala, which was Bul-
garia's natural outlet. The Balkan League had
ended in producing a hostility the more deeply felt
because it could not be expressed in deeds : a hos-
tility compared to which the old quarrels had been
friendship itself. In Sir Edward Grey's words,
' The war began as a war of liberation. It became
rapidly a war of conquest. It ended in being a
war of extermination." The beaten intriguers at
Constantinople, Berlin, and Vienna had builded
better than they knew.

Such was the situation a year before the out-
break of the European contest. Let us take the
different states in turn. Greece alone was satisfied,
for she had won most with least effort, and in her

ix. 6

82 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

winnings had gained something more than her eco-
nomic needs warranted. Her true line of expansion
was, as a maritime people, towards the islands and
the Anatolian coast. Even if we grant that the
great port of Salonika was justly hers, the addition
of Kavala was beyond her due. But towards Bul-
garia she felt a jealousy and bitterness which made
her unwilling to surrender an acre. Ecclesiastical
quarrels in the past ; the brigandage in which the
scum of both countries had indulged for years in
Macedonia ; and above all, the fear lest Bulgaria, with
her industrious population, might beat the Greeks
in the race for numbers and wealth, shut her eyes
to the desirability for Balkan development of a peace
founded upon a just allocation of territory. Ru-
mania stood somewhat aloof. She had got what
she wanted, and did not intend to give it back ;
but she suspected Bulgaria, as a man suspects
another whom he has not treated quite fairly.

Serbia had gained some of her desires, but had
missed the vital one — an outlet to the sea — though
she had certain running powers on the Salonika
railway, and had been granted a shadowy permit
to construct a line through Albania. In the
scramble after the Balkan War she had on the whole
behaved with the most dignity. In her argument
with Bulgaria on the question of the secret treaty
she was probably in the right ; for her main object
had always been to secure free exports, and the|
prohibition by the Powers of access to Durazzo
meant, if she surrendered central Macedonia to
Bulgaria while Greece held the North /Egean coast,
that two protectionist states would intervene be-
tween her and the sea. It was clearly a case for

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 83

the revision of any agreement, since the conditions
had so materially altered. But the fact remained that
she had not won her salt-water outlet, and she had
acquired in her new Macedonian territory districts
largely peopled by Bulgars, whom not even the familiar
Balkan methods of proselytizing were likely to turn
into good Serbians. The little state was under the
guidance of a sane and politic statesman, M. Pashitch.
She was a true democracy, full of valour, confidence,
and no small military experience, having within a
century fought Turkey four times and Bulgaria
twice, and including among her citizens men who
had seen five campaigns. After many dynastic
troubles she had, in the grandson of Black George
the Swineherd, a popular monarch. Her people,
the Latins of the Balkans, fond of song and story,
and thrilling to heroic traditions, were beginning to
envisage with some sobriety the kind of future which
was their due. Her wisest brains were thinking less
of the East than of the West and South-west, of
that Adriatic port which must some day be theirs,
and of the championship of the Jugoslavs — Serbs,
Montenegrins, Bosnians, Herzegovinans, Dalmatians,
Croats, Slavonians, and Slovenes — most of them
now the uneasy subjects of the Dual Monarchy.
As it has been well put, Serbia in 1914 stood
to the Southern Slavs as Piedmont in the Italian
Risorgimento stood to Italy.*

Bulgaria was left sullen and dissatisfied, with her
pride deeply hurt and the glory won at Lule Burgas
sadly tarnished. She had staked all on a throw of
the dice, and had lost. She had taken the first step
in hostilities against her former allies, and in the
* Mr. Noel Buxton in The War and the Balkans.

84 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

summer campaign of 1913 had violated many of the
decencies of war. But she considered, with some
justice, that her punishment was disproportionate to
her offence. The war for which she had sacrificed
so much had left her in an impossible position. She
possessed no part of that district of Macedonia
which was inhabited chiefly by Bulgars. The great
route by the Struma valley which debouches at
Kavala was in the hands of Greece, who already had

Eorts enough and to spare. The route to the ./Egean
y the Maritza valley was cut by the Turkish re-
occupation of Adrianople. Finally, in the north-
east she had suffered the greatest grievance of all.
The Treaty of Berlin had left Bulgaria the south-west
corner of the Dobrudja plateau, including the town
of Silistria on the Danube. Rumania at the time
had protested against this, since the railway from
Bucharest to the chief Rumanian port of Constanza
crossed the river by the only bridge between Bel-
grade and the sea, at a point only twenty-two miles
from the Bulgarian border. She had been told in
reply that Bulgaria was not a military state, and
constituted no danger ; but after the Bulgarian ex-
ploits in the Balkan War she demanded some recti-
fication of this frontier, and carried her point. The
result was that Bulgaria not only lost a piece of
territory essentially Bulgarian in character, but,
instead of gaining new outlets on the coast, lost two
Black Sea ports, Kavarna and Baltchik, which she
had held for thirty years. The Bulgarian people
are the least emotional of Balkan races. They have
been called the Scots of the peninsula, and, like the
men of North Britain, are shrewd, cautious, and
industrious. The losses of 1913 were precisely of

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 85

the kind which they would feel most deeply. No
talk of Slav brotherhood could blind them to the
fact that they had lost very definite practical ad-
vantages which they had long looked forward to,
and which they believed they were entitled to claim.
This prosaic and tangible grievance, rankling in the
minds of such a race, was more explosive material
than any whimsies about wounded honour.

On the eve of the great war it was pretty clearly
recognized by the wisest heads in the Balkans and
by the statesmen of the Triple Entente that the
Treaty of Bucharest had been a blunder, and could
not last. No state — except Greece, who had gained
most — really accepted it as final. The aim of Ger-
many and Austria, as of Turkey before them, was
to keep the Balkans in a state of ferment and dis-
union. It was Austria that inspired the ill-omened
Second Balkan War. Cut-throat warfare among the
little nations was the best prelude to that movement
to the Bosphorus of which Berlin and Vienna
dreamed, and which would put a speedy ending to
the chaos of nationalities. The Triple Entente, on
the other hand, could secure its interests only by
the peace and unity of the several states, and to
win this end there must be a redivision of territory.

It was easy to suggest schemes for a fairer divi-
sion, but it was difficult to see where the motive
power was to come from to force their acceptance.
Observers in the West were accustomed to fix on
some particular state and idealize it — Greece be-
cause of the tradition of Hellas, Bulgaria because
of its sufferings, Serbia because of its warlike prow-
ess. But the world was apt to forget that these
were peasant states, nations of small cultivators but

86 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

lately emancipated ; that in such states there is apt
to be much of the cunning and parochialism of the
peasant ; and that to ask them for broad views on
world politics, more especially when such views
demanded some sacrifice of present advantage, was
like seeking grapes from thistles. Some strong per-
suasive influence from without was necessary before
union could grow out of such sturdy differences.

Into this confusion of struggling interests fell
the thunderbolt of the European War.

Serbia's part alone was beyond doubt. The
fates had placed her, like Uriah the Hittite, in the
forefront of the battle. Rumania was torn between
rival affections. King Charles, to whom she owed
so much, was a Hohenzollern ; German money had
built up most of her industries ; in Germany and
Austria she found her chief markets ; she had not
forgotten Russia's snatching of Bessarabia. On the
other hand, if she looked to the west, she saw three
million citizens of her blood in Transylvania under
the Magyar yoke. On the south lay Bulgaria,
watchful and unappeased Clearly, whatever her
sympathies, Rumania could not enter the war un-
less a prior understanding with Bulgaria were arrived
at. Greece had nothing to gain from the Teutonic
Alliance, and much to lose ; but she, too, was
obliged to keep an eye on Bulgaria's movements.
Bulgaria had a court and king whose Teutonic sym-
pathies were pronounced ; but her people and her
most conspicuous statesmen, such as M. Gueshov,
inclined to the Allies. Yet not unnaturally she was
suspicious and hesitating. She must be sure of her
" rights," whatever way she moved. The urgent
need from the Allies' point of view was a new Balkan

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 87

League which could promulgate a common policy
for all the states, since each was so busily engaged
watching her neighbour that she had no eyes for
the clouds gathering in the West. Such a League
would have been the more justified since, if the
Central Empires won, the danger would not menace
one state alone, but the very existence of Balkan
nationality.

At this point two personalities enter the tale.
Topography and history will not by themselves
wholly account for a problem ; the human element
plays its part ; and the quality of the actors deter-
mines the climax of the drama. The first is Eleu-
therios Venezelos, the Prime Minister of Greece.
No one who first saw that slim figure and grave
scholar's face could have guessed at the strange
career or the dauntless will-power of the man.
He had been the leader of the Cretan rebels, and
had held his own in the mountains in a life where
the hand keeps the head. Called suddenly to deal
with the military revolution in Athens in 1910, he
had quelled faction, won over the court, and re-
formed the constitution by sheer dominance of
character and mind. He feared nothing — neither
the bullets of his enemies nor the reproaches of
his followers. A democrat in policy, he could, if
necessary, defy the populace and control it. As he
told M. Take Jonescu, " I have always spoken to my
fellow-countrymen the truth and the whole truth,
and I have always been quite prepared to lay down
my power without regret/' His broad, sane ideal-
ism worked soberly in a world of facts. He had
founded the Balkan League ; he had striven to pre-
vent the second war, and to modify the vindictive

88 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Treaty of Bucharest. He saw what was implied in
a Teutonic victory, and, like a true Nationalist,
wrought for the enduring good of his nation and
not for a temporary gain. Before the war his policy
had been that of the Triple Entente, and from the
first day of hostilities he took his stand on the
Allies' side.

Far different was the second figure, Ferdinand
of Bulgaria. As a character in fiction, if truly
drawn, he would have amused the world, but would
have been condemned on the ground of his manifest
improbability. From the day when, twenty-eight
years before, he had been selected-- faute de mieux —
by Stambolov to fill the throne which Prince Alex-
ander had vacated, his career had been half melo-
drama and half romance. His mother, Princess
Clementine, the daughter of Louis Philippe, and,
according to Gladstone, the cleverest woman in
Europe, had kept him secure in his early days in
that uneasy seat. His treatment of Stambolov re-
vealed his coldness of heart, but his quick assump-
tion of Bulgarian nationalism proved his accuracy
of judgment. He was like a parody of a Bourbon
king in his tastes and manners. His hobbies were
many — farming, gardening, ornithology, clothes,
jewels ; and in his youth he had dabbled in the
sciences, and had written a book on his travels in
Brazil. His court was ridiculously ostentatious, so
that the frugal Bulgarians stared and pondered.
Physical courage had been denied him, and he
would babble to all and sundry about his fears and
disappointments. Surely the strangest monarch for
a taciturn and martial people !

But there was a method behind all this vanitv

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 89

and affectation. Ferdinand had a shrewd eye for
his own safety and well-being, and, since his fate
was bound up with Bulgaria's, he deserved well of
his land. He gave it prosperity and international
importance. He interpreted the saying " Apres
moi le deluge " in a different sense from its author,
and was resolved that if the deluge were to come
it would follow him, for he would be leading it.
Fears of assassination made him determined to be
the figurehead of the national advance, whitherso-
ever it tended. M. de Kallay, the Governor of
Bosnia, who knew him well, is reported to have put
his dominant characteristics in the form of a parable.
' We are here on the first floor. If I tell you that
assassins are waiting for you with loaded pistols at
the door of my room, and advise you to jump from
the window at the risk of breaking your neck, you
will hesitate ; but if you see a cart laden with straw
passing under your window you will jump. So will
Ferdinand, but not till he sees the cart coming."
The Balkan League gave him the chance of fighting
Turkey in comparative safety ; but Austria proved
an inadequate cart in the Second Balkan War, and
he had a heavy fall. In the great European War
he waited patiently for the straw till he believed he
had found it.

Vanity was his main trait, and for all his timidity
he had the occasional boldness of the vain man.
He knew also how to work on the vanity of others,
believing, like de Tocqueville, that " with the
vanity of man you do most good business." He was
an incomparable sentimentalist. To one visitor he
would deplore his fate as the leader of an ungrateful
nation, in constant danger because of his virtues.

90 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

To another he would pose as the lover of peace in
the midst of strife. " I am like a blind man," he
would say, " running about with a lighted torch
among haystacks. Whichever way I turn, I must
set something on fire." Ambassadors of rival groups
would be dismissed with dignified tears, and bidden
to take an old man's blessing with them. Some
ingenuous souls were deceived ; the more wary under-
rated him, and set him down as a farceur, which
was probably the exact impression which he desired
to produce. A fool's cap has before this covered
a very shrewd and persistent brain. About the
shrewdness of Ferdinand there was no question,
and it was to that quality that he owed his hold
upon his people. A monarch of such a state must
be either braver or more cunning than those he
rules over. Ferdinand had no courage to speak of,
but his cunning was immense, and very generally
respected by his subjects. They had had their
hero in Prince Alexander, and had not greatly
profited thereby ; now they were inclined to pin
their faith to the politique.

The course of Balkan diplomacy since the war
has already been referred to in earlier chapters, but
a short summary of the main events may be of value
to the reader. By the beginning of 1915 there was
little doubt but that Rumania's sympathies were pre-
ponderantly on the Allied side, and statesmen such
as M. Take Jonescu and M. Diamandy announced
her speedy entrance into the war. In January M.
Ghenadiev, the ex-Foreign Minister of Bulgaria,
was at Rome, and it was believed generally that an
agreement had been arrived at between Bulgaria

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 91

and Rumania. The Rumanian army, half a million
strong, and one of the best equipped in Europe, was
in a state of complete preparedness. During the
early spring negotiations went on with Russia to
determine Rumania's reward for intervention. At
that time, with Russia in the Carpathian passes, the
chance of an effective strategic blow by Rumania
was good. Suddenly there came a hitch in the
arrangements. Petrograd, it was generally believed,
put difficulties in the way on one point which
Bucharest regarded as vital, and nothing was done
during March and April. By the time that matters
were arranged the situation had changed. Russia
had suffered her debacle on the Donajetz, and the
easiest road for Rumanian participation was now
blocked. The little state was in a difficult posi-
tion, with the Teutonic League triumphant on her
northern border, and Bulgaria, on the south, once
more plunged in the mire of indecision. She could
do nothing but keep her army in readiness and wait.
The attitude of Greece was from the start benev-
olent to the Allied interests. In the second month
of the war M. Venezelos intimated to France and
Britain that, should the necessity arise, they might
count on the certain assistance of his country. In
January he realized that that necessity might be
near, and on the nth of the month addressed to
his king a letter which so admirably states the obli-
gations of Greece arising both from honour and
national interest that it deserves quotation in full : —

" Until to-day our policy simply consisted in the preserva-
tion of neutrality, in so far at least as our treaty obligation
with Serbia did not oblige us to depart therefrom. But we
are called upon to participate in the war, no longer in order to

92 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

fulfil simply moral obligations, but in view of compensations,
which if realized will create a great and powerful Greece, such
as not even the boldest optimist could have imagined only a
few years back.

" In order to obtain these great compensations great
dangers will certainly have to be faced, But after long and
careful study of the question I end with the opinion that we
ought to face these dangers.

" We ought to face them chiefly because, even though we
were to take no part in the war now, and endeavour to pre-
serve our neutrality until the end, we should still be exposed
to dangers.

"If we allow Serbia to be crushed to-day by another
Austro-German invasion, we have no security whatever that
the Austro-German armies will stop short in front of our
Macedonian frontiers, and that they will not be tempted as
a matter of course to come-down as far as Salonika. But
even if this danger is averted, and we admit that Austria,
being satisfied with a crushing military defeat of Serbia, will
not wish to establish herself in Macedonia, can we doubt that
Bulgaria, at the invitation of Austria, will advance and occupy
Serbian Macedonia ? And if that were to happen, what
would be our position ? We should then be obliged to hasten
to the aid of Serbia unless we wished to incur the dishonour
of disregarding our treaty obligations. Even if we were to
remain indifferent to our moral debasement and impassive,
we should by so doing have to submit to the disturbance of
the Balkan equilibrium in favour of Bulgaria, who, thus
strengthened, would either now or some time hence be in a
position to attack us, when we should be entirely without
either a friend or an ally. If, on the other hand, we had then
to help Serbia in order to fulfil the duty incumbent on us,
we should do so in far more unfavourable circumstances than
if we went to her assistance now, because Serbia would already
be crushed, and in consequence our aid would be of no, or
at best of little, avail. Moreover, by rejecting now the over-
tures of the Powers of the Triple Entente, we should, even in
the event of victory, secure no tangible compensation for the
support we should have lent.

" We must now examine on what conditions we ought to
take part in the contest. Above all5 we must seek the co-opera-
tion not only of Rumania, but if possible of Bulgaria as well.

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 93

" If this co-operation could be obtained, and all the Christian
States of the Balkans could form an alliance, not only would
every serious danger of local defeat be averted, but their parti-
cipation would bring a most important influence to bear on
the struggle of the Entente Powers. For it is no exaggeration
to say that their participation would exercise an important
influence in favour of the ascendency of the latter.

" For the success of this plan, I think we should make
adequate concessions to Bulgaria. So far we have refused
even to discuss any concessions of this kind. Not only that,
but we have declared that we should oppose any important
concessions by Serbia which might disturb the balance of
power established in the Balkans by the Treaty of Bucharest.

" So far this policy has obviously been the only one to follow.

" But now matters have evidently changed. The instant
that visions open out for the realization of our national aims
in Asia Minor, it becomes possible to consider some concessions
in the Balkans in order to secure the success of so great a
policy. To begin with, we should withdraw our objections to
concessions on the part of Serbia to Bulgaria, even if these
concessions extend to the right bank of the Vardar ; and if
these concessions do not suffice to induce Bulgaria to co-
operate with her former Allies, or at least to induce her to
maintain a benevolent neutrality, I would not hesitate, how-
ever painful the severance, to recommend the sacrifice of
Kavala, in order to save Hellenism in Turkey, and to ensure
the creation of a real Magna Grsecia which would include
nearly all the provinces where Hellenism flourished through
the long centuries of its history.

" This sacrifice, however, would not merely be the price
of Bulgaria's neutrality, but would be in exchange for the active
participation of Bulgaria in the war with the other Allies.
If my opinion were accepted, the Powers' of the Triple Entente
should guarantee that Bulgaria would undertake to redeem
the property of all those inhabitants of this ceded district
who wish to emigrate to Greece. At the same time it would
be agreed that the Greek population living within the boun-
daries of Bulgaria should be interchanged with Bulgarian
population living within the boundaries of Greece, each State
respectively buying their properties. It would be understood
that this interchange of population and the purchase of their
properties would be carried out by Commissions consisting of

94 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

five members, one member to be appointed severally by
England, France, Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria. The actual
cession of Kavala would only take effect after the fulfilment
of all these conditions. In this way a definite ethnological
settlement in the Balkans would be arrived at, and the idea
of a confederation could be realized, or, at any rate, an Alli-
ance with mutual guarantees between the States which would
allow them to devote themselves to their economic and other
developments, without being primarily absorbed almost exclu-
sively in the task of strengthening their military organization.

" At the same time, as a partial compensation for this
concession, we should ask that, if Bulgaria extended beyond
the Vardar, the Doiran Ghevgeli district should be ceded to
us by Serbia, so that at least we could acquire, as to Bulgaria,
a strong boundary on the north, since we should be deprived
of the present excellent frontier on the east.

" Unfortunately, on account of Bulgaria's greed, it is not
at all certain that, whatever concession we make, we shall be
able to satisfy Bulgaria and to secure her co-operation. If
we cannot obtain Bulgaria's co-operation, then it would be
important we should at least secure Rumania's co-operation,
for without it our joining in the war would be too hazardous.

" My opinion, that we should accept the invitation to join
in the war, is also supported by other considerations. In fact,
if we remain impassive spectators of the present struggle we
not only run the above-mentioned dangers, which the crush-
ing of Serbia will create against us. For, even if a fresh inva-
sion of Serbia were abandoned, and Austria, with Germany,
should seek to secure victory in the two principal theatres of
war, in Poland and in Flanders, again the danger for us would
be great, first because if they were victorious they would be
able to impose the same changes on the Balkans which I have
previously indicated as possible results of the crushing of
Serbia. Beyond that, their victory would mean the death-
blow to the independence of all small States, besides the
direct damage which we would suffer through the loss of
the islands. And again, if the war did not end by a decisive
superiority either of the one or the other, but by a return of
the status quo ante bellum, still there would come, swift and
sure, the complete destruction of Hellenism in Turkey. Turkey,
emerging unharmed from a war which she had braved against
the three big Powers and emboldened by the feeling of security

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 95

which her alliance with Germany would give her — an alliance
which clearly will last in the future, since it serves Germany's
aim — will complete at once and systematically the work of
destroying Hellenism in Turkey, driving out the population
pitilessly and in masses, and appropriating their possessions.
In this she will not only find no opposition from Germany,
but will be encouraged by her, inasmuch as Germany will be

?lad to get rid of a competitor for Asia Minor, which she covets,
he driving away in masses of hundreds of thousands of Greeks
living in Turkey will not only destroy these, but drag down
the whole of Greece into economic ruin. For all these reasons
I hold that pur participation in the struggle, under the above
conditions, is absolutely imperative.

" It is fraught, as I previously stated, with serious danger.
But, unfortunately, for us to keep any longer aloof offers also
grave danger, as I have said above. As against the dangers to
which we shall expose ourselves in taking part in the war,
there is the hope — a well-founded hope — that we may save
the greater part of Hellenism in Turkey, and that we may
create a great and powerful Greece. And even if we do not
succeed, we shall at least have our conscience at peace in the
conviction that we have struggled to save our fellow-Greeks
from slavery and worse dangers, and fought for the good of
humanity and for the liberty of small nations which German
and Turkish rule would irretrievably endanger. And, last,
even if we fail, we shall preserve the esteem and friendship of
powerful nations — those, indeed, who created Greece and so
often since have helped and supported her ; while our refusal
to fulfil our obligations to our ally Serbia would not only
destroy our moral standing as a State, and would riot only
expose us to the above dangers, but would leave us without
friends and destroy all trust in us in the future.

" Under these conditions our national life would be gravely
endangered."

We have already seen the consequences of the
Greek Premier's policy. Our Dardanelles scheme
failed to attract the support of the Greek General
Staff; and King Constantine, relying on this cir-
cumstance, and swayed by his German relation-
ship, insisted upon neutrality, and brought about

96 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

M. Venezelos's resignation. An appeal to the people
restored him to power, and by the middle of August
he was again in possession of the reins of govern-
ment. But no step was taken, for Bulgaria was
being wooed with concessions wrung with difficulty
from Greece and Serbia.

Bulgaria, so it seemed in the early part of the
year, might be won for the Allies if her price were
paid. Serbia was slow to relinquish any part of
Macedonia, more especially after the December
Battle of the Ridges had freed her for the moment
from Austrian invasion. The Greek people — but
not M. Venezelos — were also loth to surrender
Kavala. The compensating gains, it should be
remembered, like the Slav provinces of Austria and
a slice of Asia Minor, were only for the future,
whereas Bulgaria insisted upon a bird in the hand.
There is reason to believe that during the first
months of the year Bulgaria, in spite of the Ger-
man intrigues of her king, was honestly anxious for
an understanding with her neighbours, and her
most distinguished generals favoured a Russian
alliance. Some anxiety, it is true, was caused by
the payment in February by a German bank of a
second instalment of the loan concluded in Berlin
the year before, and people asked if it was likely
that the money had been transferred without some
substantial guarantee. In March there were Cabinet
difficulties, and the Premier, M. Radoslavov, found
it necessary to reassure the world that Bulgarian
policy was one of strict and loyal neutrality. The
» >j attack on the Salonika line on 2nd April
^Pr l 2' by Bulgarian bands looked ugly ; but it
was assumed that it was only a raid of the lawless

THE BALKAN LABYRINTH. 97

Bulgarian komitadjis, for whom, in Dr. Johnson's
phrase, patriotism was the last refuge of the scoundrel.
But in May came von Mackensen's Galician
advance, and from that date it is fair to assume that
the opinions of King Ferdinand and his camarilla
hardened in favour of the Central Empires. The
Russian retreat and the Allied stalemate in the Dar-
danelles seemed to have convinced them that vic-
tory would lie with the Teutonic League. On 29th
May the Allies made a definite proposal ,*
to Bulgaria, and throughout the summer
Serbia and Greece were brought into line, the
representations to M. Pashitch on 4th *
August by all the Allies being ~t-kar»c u£- 4-

98 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Serbian Macedonia and Salonika. To this Epirus
was added, a Greek territory which had never
before been mentioned in connection with Bul-
garian claims. This momentous act, which was
to have a far-reaching influence on the war, was
not the work of the whole Bulgarian people, prob-
ably not of the majority. It was concealed from
M. Gueshov and the Opposition, and, apparently,
from the greater chiefs of the army. The peasants,
who still held to Russia as their fathers had done
in 1877, were not consulted. If John Bright was
right, and the nation in every country dwells in
its cottages, the treaty had no national sanction.

The Allied diplomacy had failed, more espe-
cially that of Britain, which was entrusted with
most of the work. We had begun by refusing to
take the Balkans seriously, and ended by passing
from apathy to hustle. Two policies might have
been followed, each in itself reasonable. Balkan
unity might have been secured in the first half
year of war by putting sufficient pressure upon
both Serbia and Greece. Neither was in a posi-
tion to withstand the resolute representations of
the Allies. Or Bulgaria might have been isolated,
and Greece, Serbia, and Rumania brought into
active alliance. As it was, by urging concessions
ineffectually, we did not satisfy Bulgaria, and we
made difficulties for the leaders of the other states.
The ill-considered policy which produced the
Gallipoli landing was responsible no less for the
treaty of i7th July. The Balkan States, like many
of a more advanced civilization, could be won only
by straight and resolute dealing, backed by an
adequate force of arms.

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE.

The New British Divisions — The Elements composing Them —
Their Training — The Topography of Hooge — Importance of
the Position — The British Dispositions on the Salient in July
—The " Liquid Fire " Attack— The Counter- Attack by the
4ist Brigade — Its Failure and Losses — The British Bom-
bardment— The Counter-Attack of pth August — Its Re-
sults.

THE new divisions, of which the raising had
begun in the first weeks of the war, were by
the end of April ready for the field. Recruit-
ing had gone on busily during the winter, and five
new armies were in being. The first of these —
containing the gth to the I4th Division — represented
the levy of the early autumn, and by April its troops
were fully trained and equipped — if anything, over-
trained, for the last month or two had been a matter
of marking time. The men who enlisted in August
were for the most part of the same class as had
thronged to the Yeomanry regiments in South Africa.
Some of them loved fighting for its own sake, and
eagerly sought the adventure of war ; some of them
joined out of sheer devotion to duty ; some, young
men not yet harnessed to a profession, welcomed
the chance of an honourable occupation. As the
months passed, and the magnitude of the contest

ioo HISTORY OF THE WAR.

revealed itself, thousands enlisted out of a reasoned
patriotism, who had no natural attraction to the
soldier's life. But the First New Army contained a
large proportion of those who entered the profes-
sion of arms for the same reason as our Regulars —
because they liked the notion of it, and were endowed

" with a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence."

They made splendid recruits. Their standard
of physique was very high, and they contained the
best of British athletes. Their keenness made them
learn quickly, and submit willingly to a severe dis-
cipline. At the start the ranks contained many men
of birth and education, but gradually most of these
were given commissions in the different battalions.
The educated man in the ranks is always something
of a problem. At first he makes rapid strides, but
as the battalion settles down to the slow routine of
training his past may make the life intolerably irk-
some. Unlike the man from the factory, the mine,
or the farm, he has never been accustomed to long
hours daily of monotonous labour without the stimu-
lus of an intellectual interest. The discipline is
harder for him than for his fellows, and it may be
doubted whether on the average he makes as satis-
factory a soldier.

The question of officers for the new battalions
had always been recognized as our chief difficulty
in the event of a sudden improvisation of armies.
But the First New Army was fortunate in this respect.
It could draw on the various Officers' Training
Corps which Lord Haldane had established. A

THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE. 101

stiffening could be got from the Regulars and the
Special Reserve. A certain number of experienced
Indian soldiers were available, and retired officers
returned to the colours and did invaluable work in
training the new troops. The truth is, that we were
better off in this respect than most people recog-
nized. There was a type of man in Britain whom
the Germans overlooked in their calculations — the
man who spends a few years in the army, and then
leaves it to take the hounds somewhere, or travel
abroad. Nearly all that class was now available,
and in the fullest degree serviceable.

The work of the long winter months had been
trying. The training of the new battalions was
intensive, and the keenness of the men was strin-
gently tested. The weather was wet beyond the
usual, and the discomfort of some of the camps was
little less than that of the Flanders trenches. The
most difficult time, perhaps, was the early spring,
when training had been practically completed, and
officers were hard put to it to prevent their men
from growing " stale. " But the new troops had
acquired something of the traditional patience and
stamina of the British army, and the battalions
that marched along the roads of Northern France
in the beginning of May impressed every onlooker
with their alert and martial bearing, their discipline,
and their superb physique. " Britain," said one
French observer, " has sent out an army of athletes. "

The fighting at Hooge at the end of July and
the beginning of August had no strategic significance.
It was only an incident in the eternal struggle of
small losses and small gains to which the policy of

io2 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

holding the Ypres Salient condemned us. But it is
worthy of special notice, both because of the des-
perate nature of the conflict and because it was
the first appearance in battle of one of the new
divisions.

In an earlier chapter we have seen that the
grounds of the chateau of Hooge at the south-eastern
corner of the Salient had been the scene of much
confused fighting during the midsummer months.
The position needs careful note. The Menin road
ascends gradually from Ypres, and reaches its highest
point on the low ridge at Hooge. North of the
road lie the grounds of the chateau and the Belle-
waarde Lake, the chateau itself being near the
south-east corner of the lake, and its stables and
outbuildings a little farther to the west. South of
the Menin road is some open ground, and then two
moderate-sized pieces of woodland — which we named
the Zouave Wood and the Sanctuary Wood — sepa-
rated by some fields.

The Germans had held the chateau itself and
the Bellewaarde Lake since May. During the
summer we fought for the outbuildings, and occa-
sionally held the rubbish heap which had once
been the stables. Early in July the Germans won
them back, and by the middle of the month had
pushed their front considerably west and south-
west of the Bellewaarde Lake, making an ugly sag
in the Salient line. About that time the British 3rd
Division succeeded in exploding a mine below the
German trenches just north of the Menin road,
and thereby formed a big hollow which we called
the " Crater." Our first line at this part was a
little east of the Crater, between it and the out-

THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE. 103

buildings of the chateau. One other point must
be noted. South-east of the Bellewaarde Lake the
German front ran forward in a long wedge culmina-
ting in afortin just north of the Menin road. There
was a similar fortin south of the road in the north-
east corner of Sanctuary Wood.

The British dispositions in July, owing to the
coming of the first detachments of the New Army,
had undergone drastic changes. Here it is suffi-
cient to note that on the 2Qth day of July the Salient
was held by the new Sixth Corps, under ~ j
Major- General Keir, who had formerly •' ^
commanded the 6th Division. On the left was
the 49th (West Riding) Division of Territorials,
under Major-General Perceval. In the centre,
with its right near the Roulers railway, was the
6th Division, under Major-General Congreve, V.C.
South of it, in front of the Bellewaarde Lake
and Hooge, and extending down to Sanctuary
Wood, was the I4th Division * of the New Army,
under Major-General Couper. On their right lay
the 3rd Division, running south-west to the neigh-
bourhood of St. Eloi. The Germans at Hooge
were the ia6th Regiment of Wurtemberg. Our
trenches east of the Crater were occupied by two
companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade from the 4ist
Brigade, troops who had just come up and had
not been in these trenches before.

About 3 a.m. on the morning of Friday, 3Oth
July, the Germans delivered a violent «* /
attack upon the trenches east of the ^u^ ?
Crater. They were not good trenches, having been

* It comprised the 4ist, 42nd, and 43rd Brigades, and was
a light division composed of light infantry.

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

improvised only a short time before under fire, and
they had the misfortune to be completely open to
shelling from several points. Hooge, as we have
seen, represents the crest of the ridge. South and
west of it the ground slopes away and rises again

\

*&&?'

•£•££&

Plan of the Hooge Area.

(The black line shows German position on morning of July 30.)

in the Zillebeke ridge. It could, therefore, be
shelled not only by the German guns to the north
and east, but from Hill 60 in the south-west ; and
this applied not only to the Hooge position, but to
all the British front beyond the Zouave Wood.

THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE. 105

But the main attack that morning was not made
by artillery. The enemy had sapped up very close
to our line, and at three o'clock launched a torrent
of liquid fire. The liquid was pumped from
machines in the saps, and ignited itself in its pas-
sage. Now we knew the meaning of the accusa-
tion which had preceded the Crown Prince's move-
ment in the Argonne. This liquid fire had been
prepared since the beginning of the war, for we
captured directions for its use" in October ; but the
precise situation when it could be profitably used
had not revealed itself until now. Combined with
the fire was an assault by minenwerfers, those trench
mortars fired from close range which our troops
hated beyond every other weapon. The Germans,
too, had a great number of bombers, who stormed
our trenches with their grenades.

The combination of artillery bombardment,
liquid fire, trench mortars, and bombs was irresistible.
The two companies of the 8th Rifle Brigade were
nearly blotted out. The Germans carried our first
line, and won the Crater. Our troops fell back to
the second line, which ran north-west from the
corner of the Zouave Wood. Thereupon the enemy
began to plaster with shell the region behind our
front, and turned the Zouave Wood into a death-
trap. Second-Lieutenant Sidney Woodroffe, a boy
of nineteen, held his trenches to the last, and brought
off his men in good order. He fell heroically, under
the fire of machine guns, in a desperate attempt to
counter-attack. He was the first man of the New
Army to earn the Victoria Cross.

The general commanding the Sixth Corps or-
dered a counter-attack for the afternoon of that day.

106 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

It was entrusted to the yth Rifle Brigade, which was
brought up for the purpose from Vlamertinghe,
seven miles off, and to what remained of the 8th
Rifle Brigade. For three-quarters of an hour be-
fore it our artillery bombarded the German posi-
tion, but without much effect. Far more deadly
were the German shells, which swept Zouave and
Sanctuary Woods and the country between and
behind them.

The counter-attack began at 2.45 p.m., and was
doomed to failure from the start. The battalions
were mown down in Zouave Wood, and the few
that emerged into the open fell under the blast of
machine guns. They were under fire from the
German fortins and from the German position on
the Hooge ridge, and they had to face as well a
devastating artillery storm. The Rifle Brigade never
wavered, and no exploit in its long and splendid
regimental history surpassed in desperate valour the
advance of its new battalions towards certain de-
struction. Only a remnant remained in the trenches
outside Zouave Wood. The fields and coppices
were strewn with dead, platoons and companies
disappeared, and few were the officers who returned.
Among those who fell were two of the most brilliant
of younger Oxford men, Lieutenant Gilbert Talbot
of the yth Battalion, and Second-Lieutenant the
Hon. G. W. Grenfell of the 8th.*

What was left of the 4ist Brigade was now taken

* Mr. Grenfell was the fourth member of his family to fall
in the war, the third to fall in the Ypres Salient. His brother,
Captain the Hon. Julian Grenfell of the Royals, and his cousin,
Captain Francis Grenfell of the gth Lancers, fell in the May
righting.

THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE. 107

out, and its place filled by the 43rd Brigade, which
contained battalions of the Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry, the Durham Light Infantry, the Somerset
Light Infantry, and the Yorkshire Light Infantry.
No further attempt was made to repeat the suicidal
daylight advance. Instead, our gunners took up
the tale, and for the next ten days most successfully
bombarded the German lines with 9.2-inch and
8-inch heavy guns. That shelling achieved its
purpose, for it put a stop to the German artillery,
and gave us leisure to reorder our line and draw
out the broken remnants. It did more, for it put
new heart into our troops. They felt that condi-
tions were changing since the Second Battle of
Ypres, when we had been powerless to reply to the
German guns. Now at last we seemed to be on
an equality. The best tonic for overwrought nerves
and sinking spirits was the sound of our great shells
screaming overhead, and the sight of mushrooms of
dust above the enemy's line. This bombardment
was the more to our credit since our position in
the Salient was inferior to the German, inasmuch
as it gave us few opportunities for artillery obser-
vation. They held all the best view-points, and
every gunner knows that it is one thing to fire by
the map, and quite another to have hits chronicled
and ranges found by direct observation.

The great counter-attack was fixed for Monday,
9th August. Some changes had been made in the
British front. The 3rd Division had /,
taken up the ground held by the 6th
Division, and two brigades of the 6th Division —
the i6th and i8th — relieved the 4ist and 43rd Bri-
gades in the trenches opposite Hooge. It was to

io8 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the 1 6th and i8th Brigades * that the counter-
attack was entrusted.

The attack was made just before dawn, and
moved from the west against the Crater position,
and from the south from Sanctuary Wood against
the two sides of the new German salient. The
artillery work which preceded it was admirably
managed. The difficulty of the movement was
the great extent of ground to be covered. Between
our lines and the main German position on the
Hooge ridge was a space of at least 500 yards, and
it was all uphill. The enemy, after the bombard-
ment, was naturally on the alert, but what was lost
in surprise was gained in the perfect co-ordination
of infantry and guns. The York and Lancaster men
advanced from Zouave Wood against the Menin
road, with the Durham Light Infantry on their
right. It became a race between these two bat-
talions as to which should first reach the Crater,
and the Durhams won. On their right were the]
Sherwood Forest ers,f with the Queen's Westminsters
(Territorial) in reserve, but the fortin in Sanctuary
Wood enfiladed them and made progress impos-
sible. Over the horrible no-man's-land, strewn
with barbed wire entanglements and the bodies of
our unburied dead, our infantry swept right up to
the fringe of our own shell fire. Then the gunners

* i6th Brigade — ist Buffs, ist Leicesters, ist Shropshire
Light Infantry, 2nd York and Lancaster. i8th Brigade —
ist West Yorks, ist East Yorks, 2nd Sherwood Foresters, 2nd
Durham Light Infantry.

t The 7th and 8th Sherwood Foresters (Territorial), the
left wing of the 46th (North Midland) Division, had done
brilliantly on 3oth July, holding their ground with their flank
in the air after the 4ist Brigade had been driven in.

THE AFFAIR AT HOOGE. 109

lengthened their range, and our men were into the
I German trenches. With bayonet and bomb they
cleared out the enemy, especially the extraordinary
series of dug-outs which honeycombed the Crater.
The two hundred Germans and more who were
ensconced in that pit of death died to a man. The
attack swept beyond the Crater, and carried the
ruins of the stables. There we halted and en-
trenched ourselves. Sandbags and spades were
brought up, and the Royal Engineers, under heavy
fire, succeeded in putting up barbed wire defences
in front of our new lines.

The attack had succeeded. The dangerous
German for tin west of the lake was in our hands,
as were the Crater and the stables. Our losses
were extraordinarily few. The two battalions who
counter-attacked on the afternoon of 3Oth July
had had 2,000 casualties, including sixty officers.
The difference in losses was the difference between
a well-considered and adequately-prepared move-
ment and a hasty improvisation.

About half-past nine the Germans began to shell
our new front from the direction of Hill 60, as well
as from east and north. All day the bombardment
continued, and our losses began to increase till
they reached before nightfall a total of nearly 2,000
for the two brigades. We were forced back from
some of the trenches north of Sanctuary Wood, and
we retired a little way in front of the Crater. The
heavy shelling of the country behind our lines made
it very difficult to get up reliefs. The battalion
which had carried the Crater and entrenched itself
at the stables was ordered to withdraw, but four
officers and 200 men did not receive the order and

no HISTORY OF THE WAR.

held on all night, and were not relieved till late
the following morning. A small party, under Lance-
Corporal Smith of the Durham Light Infantry,

Eosted in the stables themselves, held out even
mger before giving place to fresh troops.

A day or two later the iyth Brigade was brought
up to consolidate the line. The 2nd Leinsters
occupied the Crater, and for a little there were a
good many casualties from the German bombard-
ment. Presently the fighting died away, and the
opposing lines returned to their normal condition
of intermittent artillery fire. We had restored the
Hooge part of our front, which had been left in a

frecarious state by the German success of 3Oth
uly, to as good a condition as was possible in that
ill-omened Salient. We had proved that when we
chose we could do as effective work with our heavy
guns as the enemy, and we had provided another
instance of the futility of weak daylight counter-
attacks. The New Army had won its spurs, but]
at a heavy cost.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF " GRANDEUR."

Indicting a Nation — Meaning of National Madness — The Two
Parties in Germany — The Politiques and the Fanatics —
German " Reasonableness " — The Speech of the Imperial
Chancellor — Sir E. Grey's Reply — Who were the Fanatics ?
— The Importance of the Commercial and Academic Classes
— Nature of German Fanaticism — Grandeur and Gloire —
Historical Antecedents of German Self- Worship — Professor
Werner Sombart's Handler und Helder — Germany the
" Chosen Race " — Megalomania and Peace.

THERE is no sentence in Burke more often
quoted than that in which he forbids us to
draw an indictment against a nation. The
warning is opportune in times of war, when belli-
gerents exhaust their ingenuity in unfavourable
generalizations about their opponents. No sweep-
ing condemnation will cover all aspects of a national
life, and therefore you cannot deduce from a gen-
erality an accurate judgment of an individual or of
a section of the society criticised. Again, national
faults are different in kind from the personal failings
with which we are familiar. A country publicly
disloyal to its bond may boast a majority of strictly
honourable private citizens. But Burke's dictum
must not be pressed too far. A nation can have
national vices ; it can sin as a community ; and
the historian is permitted now and then to fasten

ii2 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

guilt upon that corporate existence which we call
a people.

Very notably a people may go mad. This does
not mean that every individual loses his wits, but
that the governing and dominant elements in a
nation fall into a pathological state and see strange
visions. A malign spirit broods over the waters.
Something which cannot be put into exact words
flits at the back of men's minds. Perspective goes,
exaltation fires the fancy, the old decencies of
common sense are repudiated, men speak with
tongues which are not their own. We are justi-
fied in saying that France went mad in the days of
the Terror, though there were some millions of
sober citizens who repudiated her follies. That
viewless thing which we call national spirit had
become tainted with insanity. Such communal
mania is far more dangerous than the obsessions of
individuals, for it is harder to diagnose, to locate,
and to restrain.

The position in Germany, judging by her Press
and the speeches and writings of her public men,
had become curious and interesting very early in
the second year of war. While she was still amaz-
ingly united in her belligerent purpose, two dis-
tinct attitudes had revealed themselves among her
leaders. We may call the parties thus created the
politiques and the fanatics. The first claimed the
Imperial Chancellor, the Foreign Office, and prob-
ably most of the civilian ministers ; perhaps the
Kaiser ; certainly many of the army chiefs, and
some of the ablest military and naval critics, such
as Major Moraht and Captain Persius. They recog-
nized that a war of straightforward conquest was

PSYCHOLOGY OF " GRANDEUR." 113

no longer possible. They hoped for a draw, a
peace in which the conditions should favour Ger-
many. Accordingly they laboured to prepare the
public mind of the world for it, and relinquished
most of the inflated superman business which was
rampant among them at the outset. They were no
longer contemptuous in speech of their opponents.
They became complimentary, as towards brave men
fighting under a misconception. They talked much
of the purity and reasonableness of Germany's
aims, of her desire for an honourable peace, and
they endeavoured to curb the ardent spirits who
had already begun to divide up hostile territories.
Above all, they were assiduous in their efforts to
explain away the events which led to war, and to
get rid of the most damning counts against German
policy. These explanations were only aimed in a
small degree at their own people, for Germany had
been long ago convinced on the subject. They
were addressed to neutral countries, especially
America, and to what German statesmen fondly
hoped were wavering and uncertain elements among
the population of their enemies.

A striking example is to be found in the speech
which the Imperial Chancellor made in the Reichs-
tag on i Qth August. Herr von Beth- *
mann-Hollweg had never been among *' 9*
the fire-eaters, and had lost popularity in conse-
quence. In that speech he laboured to fasten the
guilt of war on British Ministers, who, he said,
had already violated Belgian neutrality by a secret
agreement, and had refused Germany's offer of a
pacific alliance, preferring an offensive pact with
France. He tried to prove that Germany, in the

ix. 8

ii4 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

crisis of July 1914, had striven for peace, and had
not scorned the proposal for a conference. He
talked much of the future of Poland when emanci-
pated from Russian tyranny. He declared that
Germany must win the freedom of the seas — " not as
England did, to rule over them, but that they should
serve equally all peoples." Germany, he said, would
be the shield of defence in the future for small
nations. And he concluded with a hope that the
day would come when the belligerent nations would
exact a terrible retribution from the leaders who
had so gravely misled them. " We do not hate the
peoples who have been driven into war by their
Governments. We shall hold on through the war
till these peoples demand peace from the really
guilty, till the road becomes free for the new liber-
ated Europe — free of French intrigues, Muscovite
desire of conquest, and English guardianship."

There is no need to discuss the arguments of a

speech which was convincingly disposed of by Sir

* s Edward Grey a week later.* The in-

u*' ' teresting point is the light it shed on
the role which Germany now desired to play in the
world's eyes. She stood for reason, public honour,
international decency, and peace, said the Imperial
Chancellor. She had been terribly sinned against ;
but, like a good Christian, she would forgive her
enemies. There was little trace of the high-handed
superman in his arguments. He laboured to justify
Germany's doings by the old-fashioned canons of
right and wrong. He was a politique, desirous of
preparing the way for an advantageous settlement.
That was intelligible enough, but the conclusion
* See Appendix II.

PSYCHOLOGY OF " GRANDEUR/' 115

was inconsequent. It asked for German supremacy,
neither more nor less. She was to be mistress, and
other nations were to have the measure of freedom
which she chose to give them. In Sir Edward
Grey's words : " Germany supreme, Germany
alone would be free — free to break international
treaties ; free to crush when it pleased her ; free
to refuse all mediation ; free to go to war when it
suited her ; free, when she did go to war, to break
again all rules of civilization and humanity on land
and at sea ; and, while she may act thus, all her
commerce at sea is to remain as free in time of war
as all commerce is in time of peace."

The Imperial Chancellor's conclusion was a
non sequitur. It did not follow upon his laborious
earlier arguments ; nay, it clashed sharply with them.
It was the same conclusion as that of the fire-eaters,
who were the more logical inasmuch as they would
have none of the Chancellor's premises. The cautious
politique had been infected with the same disease
as the fanatics.

Who were the fanatics ? Perhaps three-fourths
of the German people. It is more difficult to deter-
mine the chief fount of the virus. It was not to
be found in the National Liberal and Agrarian
stalwarts, who presented memorials demanding the
annexation of half Europe. They were merely
stupid people, swollen with the vainglory of suc-
cess.* It was probably not to be found in the
army itself. Its chiefs were professional zealots,

* An early expression of this vainglory may be found in
the words of Bronsart von Schellendorf, one of the men of
1870, and a former Prussian Minister of War : " Do not let
us forget the civilizing task which the decree of Provi-

n6 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

who did not as a rule trouble their heads about
grandiose political theories. Nor was it to be
traced to the coterie of Admiral von Tirpitz, for
whom Count zu Reventlow played in the Press the
part of dancing dervish. The German navy chiefs
had no victories to console themselves with, and
their wounded pride made them vindictive and
relentless enemies, soothing their chagrin with
violent words. But that was an intelligible human
motive.

It is more likely that history will put the chief
blame upon a class which Britain was apt to over-
look in the enumeration of her enemies — the Ger-
man high financial and industrial circles, with their
obedient satellites, the university professors. This
class was a comparatively new phenomenon in Ger-
many. For the most part humbly born, and often
Jewish in blood, it had found itself exalted from
social ostracism to the confidence of the Court
and a chief voice in the national councils. It had
been astonishingly successful. The industry of the

dence has assigned to us. Just as Prussia was destined to
be the nucleus of a new Germany, so the regenerated Germany
shall be the nucleus of a future Empire of the West. And in
order that no one may be left in doubt, we here proclaim
from henceforth that our continental nation has a right to
the sea — not only to the North Sea, but to the Mediterranean
and to the Atlantic. Hence we intend to absorb, one after
another, all the provinces that neighbour on Prussia. We
shall successively annex Denmark, Holland, Belgium, North-
ern Switzerland ; then Trieste and Venice ; finally, Northern
France from the Sambre to the Loire. This programme we
fearlessly announce. It is not the work of a madman. The
empire we intend to found will be no Utopia. We have ready
to our hands the means of founding it, and no coalition in
the world can stop us."

PSYCHOLOGY OF " GRANDEUR." 117

German people exploited by these entrepreneurs had
produced results which might well leave the pro-
moters dizzy. The standard of living had changed,
and extravagant expenditure on luxury had become
the fashion among industrial magnates ; a fashion
which was reproduced in the bourgeois life of the
cities. Being genuine nouveaux riches, they had no
tradition to conform to, no perspective to order
their outlook on the world. The kingdoms of the
earth had fallen to them, and, like Jeshurun, they
waxed fat and kicked.

Some of the wiser brains among the magnates
had a reason of policy behind this megalomania.
They saw that nothing short of a colossal and un-
disputed victory could safeguard their supremacy.
Unless Germany could pay her war bills with indem-
nities unimagined before in history, there would be
bankruptcy to face — bankruptcy which at the best
would mean a decade of lean years. The brightest
military glory would not restore their overseas
trade or redeem the wastes of paper currency. A
generation of hard living and preparation for a
further effort, which anything less than absolute
victory must involve, had no terrors for the hardier
souls of the army or the ancient squirearchy. But
it seemed the end of all things to the soft and vain-
glorious kings of German trade. They became
fanatics, partly from policy, and partly because they
had the disease in their blood.

They had strong allies in the academic class.
Not all, for there were many professors who sounded
a note of warning, and one or two who had the
courage to speak unpopular truths. But the in-
tense specialization of German scholarship and

n8 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

science did not tend to produce minds with a high
sense of proportion, and sedentary folk have at all
times been inclined to blow a louder trumpet than
men of action and affairs. What Senacour called
" le vulgaire des sages " — the absorption in dreams
and theories to which pedants are prone — was a
characteristic of the great bulk of the German
teaching profession.

What was this fanaticism which the politiques
reprobated, and to which nevertheless they fell
victims ? It is best described, perhaps, by the
French phrase, folie de grandeur. As such it must
be clearly distinguished from that other vice of
success, la gloire. The greatest leaders in history
— Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Cromwell, Gustavus
Adolphus, Washington — have striven for a profound
political and religious ideal which made mere fame
of no account in their eyes. Others, like Alexander,
have been possessed by a passion for glory, and
have blazed like comets across the world. The
most perfect example is Charles XII. of Sweden,
who, in his short career of nineteen years, followed
glory alone and drew no material benefit from his
conquests. In his old clothes he shook down
monarchies and won thrones for other people.
Glory may be a futile quest, but it has a splendour
and generosity which raise it beyond the level of
low and earthy things. Its creed is Napoleon's :
" J 'avals le gout de la fondation et non celui de la
propriete. Ma propriete a moi etait dans la gloire et
la celebrite" It is to the end of time an infirmity
of minds which are not ignoble.

But grandeur is a perversion, an offence against
our essential humanity. It may be the degeneration

PSYCHOLOGY OF " GRANDEUR." 119

of a genius like Napoleon, but more often it is the
illusion of excited mediocrities. It is of the earth
earthy, intoxicating itself with flamboyant material
dreams. Its heroics are mercantile, and the cloud-
palaces which it builds have the vulgarity of a fash-
ionable hotel. It seeks a city made with hands and
heavily upholstered. Its classic exponents were
those leaden vulgarians the later Roman emperors,
of the worst of whom Renan wrote : " He resembled
what a modern tradesman of the middle class would
be whose good sense was perverted by reading
modern poets, and who deemed it necessary to make
his conduct resemble that of Hans of Iceland or the
Burgraves." * Grandeur has always vulgarity in its
fibre, vulgarity and madness.

The German fanaticism was compounded of
commercial vainglory and a rhetorical persuasion
that the Teutonic race were God's chosen people.
This kind of belief is beyond the reach of argument.
But what in the Hebrews had been a sombre and
magnificent confidence became in this modern
German imitation something very like smugness.
There had always been a tendency towards such
racial arrogance in the German mind. It had noth-
ing to do with Nietzsche's doctrines, which did not
exalt any race stock, least of all the German. It
descended rather from the classic days of their
literature — from Hegel, for example, who, con-
templating the stately process of the Absolute Will,
found its final expression up to date in the Germany
before 1840. It blossomed out in humbler quarters
in the stupid insolence of German officialdom. As
a literary fashion it was innocent and preposterous
* L' Antichrist.

120 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

— an essay in provincialism which was pardonable
because of its absurdity. As a social failing it was
at least as comic as it was offensive. But exalt this
mannerism into a creed, base on it a thousand
material interests, and give it great armies to make
it real, and you are confronted with a dangerous
mania. Self-worshippers are harmless till they
seek to compel the rest of mankind to make the*
same obeisance.

A good instance of the spirit is to be found in
a little book published in February by Professor
Werner Sombart of Berlin, under the title of Huck-
sters and Heroes.* The author, who has been already
quoted in these pages, had earned some reputation
as an exponent of academic socialism. He had
published an account of the part played by the
Jews in modern civilization, and now he appeared
as the high priest of Germanenthum. He was not
a profound thinker or a pleasing writer, but his work
was typical of the spirit then dominant in his country.
It is the sciolist who has his ear most ready to catch
a hint of popular desires, and his work has always
documentary value.

Two quotations will make clear his meaning.
' Our kingdom " — he speaks for Germany — " is of
this world. If we desire to remain a strong state
we must conquer. A great victory will make it
possible not to trouble any more about those who
are around us. When the German stands leaning
on his mighty sword, clad in steel from his sole to
his head, whatsoever will may down below dance
around his feet, and the intellectuals and the learned
men of England, France, Russia, and Italy may rail
* Handler und Helder.

PSYCHOLOGY OF " GRANDEUR/' 121

at him and throw mud. But in his lofty repose he
will not allow himself to be disturbed, and he will
only reflect in the sense of his old ancestors in
Europe : Oderint dum metuant" *

The conception of the chosen people is de-
veloped in his peroration : " No. We must purge
from our soul the last fragments of the old ideal of
a progressive development of humanity. . . . The
ideal of humanity can only be understood in its
highest sense when it attains its highest and richest
development in particular noble nations. These
for the time being are the representative of God's
thought on earth. Such were the Jews. Such
were the Greeks.f And the chosen people of these
centuries is the German people. . . . Now we
understand why other people pursue us with their
hatred. They do not understand us, but they are
sensible of our enormous spiritual superiority. So
the Jews were hated in antiquity, because they were
the representatives of God on earth."

Such was the simple philosophy of history which
in varying degrees had captured the majority of the
German race. It is right and fitting that a people
should have a great tradition, and believe itself
dowered with a great destiny. Wordsworth in a
famous sonnet has written : —

* Much the same language was used by a scholar whom
all must respect, Herr von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, in his
inaugural address as Rector Magnificus of Berlin University.

t Even a scholar like Dbllinger took this view. The Ger-
man people, he said, are most like the Greeks of old. " They
have been called to an intellectual priesthood, and to this
high vocation they have done no dishonour." Vanity he
considered " the accepted characteristic of the French nation."
— Conversations of Dr. Dollinger.

i22 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

" In every thing we are sprung
Of Earth's first blood, have titles manifold/'

But to what purpose is this consciousness to be
used ? The poet has told us : —

" We must be free or die, who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spoke ; the faith and morals hold
Which Milton held."

Such noble confidence is directed to one end —
'national liberty. But when it degenerates into
megalomania, and seeks to set itself above the
human family ; when, crazy with a belief in a
divine mission, it regards itself as absolved from all
obligations of morality and law ; when it demands
that the fires before its altars shall be fed with the
rights and ideals of every other people ; when it
claims for itself the only freedom, and would make
all nations dependent upon its good pleasure ; then
it becomes a childish mania to be suppressed, a
malignant growth for which surgery is the only
cure. If Germany's claim were admitted, few honest
men would desire to continue their life on this
planet.

It was the existence of this disease which made
no terms of peace conceivable. The Imperial
Chancellor, seeing whither his country was tending,
might seek to diffuse an atmosphere of reasonable-
ness, and pave the way for a settlement. But mad-
ness is a prepotent thing, and the fanatics would
continue to call the tune till the day of cataclysm.
The spirits which had been summoned from the
unclean deeps could not be laid by a few puzzled
politicians.

CHAPTER LXIX.

THE STRAINING OF AMERICAN PATIENCE.

Difficulties of American Neutrality — American Popular Temper
Anti-German — Small Part played by German-Americans —
Growing Friendship between America and Britain — The
American Philosophy of Politics — Her Belief in Law — Her
Ethical Code — Humanitarianism — Pacificism — German Diplo-
matic Blunders — America's Reasons for Non-intervention —
Mr. Roosevelt — President Wilson — Germany's Attitude —
Consequences of the Lusitania Incident — The Arabic — Count
Bernstorff's Pledge — German Peace Talk — The Hesperian —
Germany's Underground Activity — The Dumba Case — The
German Embassy implicated — Captain von Papen's Letter —
Dumba given his Passports — Effect of Incident on American
Temper.

IT is worth while to turn from the narrative of
the campaigns in the Old World and consider
the difficulties which confronted the greatest of
neutral Powers, the Republic of the United States.
A man who is engaged in a life-and- death struggle is
inclined to resent the detachment of a friend, even
though that friend has no share in the cause of
quarrel. Analogies from private life are too readily
and too loosely applied to the affairs of nations,
and surprise and irritation are engendered which
seem baseless on a dispassionate survey of the facts.
During August the neutrality of America became
from various causes a razor-edge on which it seemed
impossible for any government to continue to walk.

124 HISTORY OF THE WAR,

The case for and against intervention was habitually
overstated by the Press of both continents, and in
Britain especially there was a tendency to under-
estimate the difficulty of President Wilson's prob-
lem. America, even as a neutral, was called on to
play so large a part in the war, and her attitude was
so vital to the ultimate issues, that it may be well
to examine with some care the intricacies of her
position after the first year of conflict.

The temper of her people at that time and the
reasoned convictions of her leaders were prepon-
derately hostile to the German cause. The large
Teutonic admixture in her population had not played
the part which German publicists had forecast. In
1910 the foreign-born elements numbered 13^
millions out of a total of 92 millions. There were
just over 2^ million Germans, nearly i£ million
Austrians, and half a million Hungarians. The
Irish, who numbered well over ij million, had
largely lost their hatred of Britain, save for a few
fanatical organizations, and the bulk of them, even
if they had little love for England, had less for
Germany. The German- Americans, a thrifty, in-
dustrious, and law-abiding element, tended far more
than most immigrants to be speedily absorbed, and
to take on the native American characteristics.
They had never played a large part in public life,
and had developed no distinctive race stock. The
younger generation was as a rule distinguishable
only by its enthusiastic Americanism. Hence, ex-
cept for recent immigrants, there were few bearers
of German names who felt any real kinship with
German ideals and interests. There was certainly
no racial tradition strong enough to stand out against

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 125

the very real anti- German feeling which soon pre-
dominated.

The origin of this feeling must be sought in a
number of converging lines of development. One
was the growing sense of community with Britain.
In the past there had been endless misunderstand-
ings, for a common tradition held with a difference
may be the most potent of disruptive forces. The
American Revolution, and still more the War of
1812, had left the seeds of bitterness. Britain's
part during the Civil War did not improve matters,
for the best-intentioned neutrality in such a struggle
must be provocative of criticism. American his-
tory-writing in those days was a design in snow
and ink — the simple virtues of the republican set
against the scowling infamies of the monarchist.
But as America advanced in power and wealth
her outlook broadened. She became more critical,
and discovered a truer perspective. Her scholars
and thinkers were less inclined to the worship of
mere words, and no longer found republicanism the
source of all the virtues. Her social reformers dis-
covered that a republic might be an oligarchy and
a monarchy a democracy. As she moved towards
a truer national culture of her own, she began to
realize her debt to the Old World, above all to
those islands from which she had inherited lan-
guage, literature, law, and a thousand habits of
thought. The touch of superciliousness which had
marred the British attitude towards her through
much of the nineteenth century disappeared on a
closer understanding, and the whole-hearted admira-
tion of modern Englishmen for her great personali-
ties like Lee and Lincoln awakened an equal interest

126 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

in contemporary British movements. American
flamboyance was a defence against British patronage,
and the two tended to decline together. As America
took her place in the larger life of the world, she
developed a new appreciation of that old land which
had been battling with world-problems for four
hundred years. She discovered, somewhat to her
surprise, that in the last resort she had the same way
of looking at the major matters of life as her cousin
across the seas.

The recognition of what an American writer has
called " like-mindedness " did not mean that the
two peoples would always see eye to eye in everyday
matters. There was a great deal of foolish talk
about kinship by British writers and statesmen
which was in defiance of the proved facts of history.
Blood relationship and common standards do not
prevent members of a family from moments of
acute exasperation with each other. But in those
ultimate crises which now and then confront nations
and families, " like-mindedness " awakens all the
subconscious instincts and dormant memories, and
makes apparent the strong common structure below
the surface differences. Even the most critical and
contumacious households are likely in emergencies
to show a solid front to the world.

A second reason was to be found in the American
philosophy of politics. The United States has pro-
duced many learned publicists, but we shall not find
her popular political philosophy in their admirable
works. That philosophy, like all popular creeds,
was crude and nai've, but it was universally held,
and impregnated the habits of thought of the ordinary
man to an extent which was probably not to be

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 127

paralleled from any other people. Its keynote was
liberty — an unanalyzed term which degenerated
often into a mere catchword, but which repre-
sented a very deep and abiding instinct. It was
the old English instinct expounded with a new
accent. Usually stated in the high-coloured Jeffer-
sonian style, it was interpreted in practice with
Alexander Hamilton's wary good sense. A man
should be allowed to live his life in the greatest
freedom compatible with the enjoyment of the same
right by his fellows. The State had no doubt rights
against the individual, but the individual had most
vital rights against the State. It was for this freedom,
construed in different senses, that both sides had
fought in the Civil War. It was this worship of
the individual which made America the stoniest
soil on the globe for Socialist propaganda. It was
this instinct which was responsible for much slack-
ness and corruption and anarchy in American ad-
ministration, since no half-truth can be safely wor-
shipped. Hence the bureaucratic state, such as
Prussia, was of all forms of government the most
repellent to American minds. And this right of the
individual to live freely was a right, too, of nations,
however humble. Caesarism, as well as bureaucracy,
was anathema.

Another item in the creed was a profound belief
in law, an inheritance from English progenitors.
The nation which had produced Story and Mar-
shall, which lived by a written constitution, which
had created the Supreme Court, which had fought
a great war on the construction of a clause in an old
document, which had to forgo direct taxation be-
cause of a phrase in its charter of government, and

128 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

which submitted time and again to serious adminis-
trative embarrassment rather than shake loose a 'single
legal fetter — such a nation was not likely to have
much sympathy with Germany's view that " reasons
of State " might override any law, and that inter-
national law in especial was only a pious make-
believe to keep the world quiet while the strong
man armed. Laws might be broken in a fit of
wrong-headedness or weakness, but that Law should
be deliberately contemned seemed to her an outrage
on civilization.

Lastly, into her philosophy of the State she read
the ordinary ethical code of Christianity. She be-
lieved in old-fashioned conservative right and wrong.
The ethical anarchism which set special individuals
or nations above Christian morals seemed to her
at once blasphemous and silly. She had no meta-
physics in her national soul. Good was good and
evil was evil, and no rhetoric or hair-splitting would
make them otherwise. The strong Puritan strain at
the back of her mixed ancestry was conspicuous in
her public professions. Her practice might limp
behind her creed, but at any rate she would never
blaspheme the light. Such an attitude was not
hypocrisy ; it was fidelity to a profound conviction.

A third reason for fighting shy of Germany was
to be found in that humanitarianism which is part
of the American character. There is no reason to
question the reality of this attribute. Monstrously
cruel in its results as was much of her civilization,
it was never so consciously or deliberately. She
could not be brutal, since brutality implies pre-
meditation. The nation was tender-hearted, with
a great pity for weakness and suffering. Her des-

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 129

perate Civil War was waged on both sides with a
singular chivalry. The German outrage on Belgium
and the long series of infamies proved against the
armies of the Kaiser revolted America in her inmost
soul. The detestation was increased when it pres-
ently became clear that these barbarities were cal-
culated and were part of a carefully thought-out
system. She might forgive the lapses of passion,
but never the outrages of copybook desperadoes.

A fourth cause was the pacificism to which as a
national ideal she had long been committed. Her
Civil War, one of the bloodiest in history, had in-
volved the death of a million men, and had destroyed
the best of her race stocks. The memory of that
holocaust had inspired her with an intense hatred
of war. Outside the ordinary diplomatic entangle-
ments of the world, she had not brought herself to
envisage an armed struggle between nations as an
eternal contingency. Moreover, as a commercial
people, she saw the economic loss and folly of war-
fare, and for long she had striven to give effect to
her views and to lead the nations into the pleasant
paths of conference and arbitration. The elements
of militarism in her daily life were few. Her army
was small, and as a profession made little appeal to
her youth. Her navy was unknown to most of the
inhabitants of her vast territories. Expenditure
even upon defence seemed to her waste, for she had
no urgent menace before her. Her love of abstrac-
tions and of high-sounding phrases made peace a
favourite counter in her popular oratory. In this
attitude there were, no doubt, unworthy elements.
There was something of the pedant who generalizes
from an exceptional case. There was much of the

IX. Q

130 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

prosperous rich man who repudiates whatever has no
immediate cash value. There was a touch, too, of
self-righteousness, which is not the quality that
exalteth a nation. Vapourings such as Mr. Bryan's
were the product of a mind drunk with its ample
rhetoric. But behind all these pacificist follies
America had a sober conviction which did credit
alike to her head and her heart. She had a vision
of a wiser and not less virile world where " the glories
of our blood and state " would be independent of the
sword. To such an idealism the creed of the new
children of Odin seemed the last and fatalest heresy.
Last, but not least, among these causes we must
rank the incredible blindness of German diplomacy.
Intensely conscious of her nationality, she found
certain elements in her population treated by German
agents as if they were still subjects of the Kaiser —
which, indeed, according to the German naturalization
laws, many of them were. Proud of her independ-
ence and her position in the world, she had to submit
to alternate threats and cajoleries, and to an insuffer-
able patronage. Count Bernstorff and his coadjutors
were masters in the art of blundering. There were
weak points in the case of the Allies from an Amer-
ican point of view, which an adroit man might have
used to advantage. There were features in the
British conduct of the naval war which might easily
have been turned into an irritant to inflame the
quick American sense of legality. But Germany
flung away lavishly the cards which the gods had

S'ven her. The Allies had no need of an advocate,
ermany herself was the chief pleader in their case.
The consequence was that from the outset of
the war the intelligence and the popular feeling of

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 131

America had been against the Teutonic cause. A
few political or legal theorists admired the German
system ; a few sociologists had an affection for the
German municipal regime ; a sprinkling of scien-
tists looked up to German scholarship ; some of
the Army officers professed esteem for the German
army ; one or two great financial houses could not
forget their German affinities ; and a considerable
proportion of German- Americans made no secret of
their sympathies. But these elements, though loudly
vocal and well supported by a subsidized Press,
were a mere fraction of the American people. Some
even of the leading German-Americans were fav-
ourable to the Allied cause. And the ablest state-
ments of that cause came from the pens of men
who, in the eyes of their countrymen, were the most
representative and authoritative Americans.

It may be asked — it was a stock question at the
time in France and Britain — why, since America's
convictions were thus clear, she did not range her-
self with the Allies. When inquiry was made as to
what it was proposed that America should do, the
reply was that on behalf of international honour
and public morals she should have declared war
upon Germany, or that at any rate she should have
called her to task. Both came to the same thing ;
for a protest, to which Germany would have given
a summary answer, would, if strongly supported,
have meant war. What reasonable ground was
there for holding that it was America's duty, apart
from direct provocation, to enter the struggle on
the Allies' side ? The matter is important, for on
it depends our estimate of American conduct. We
are dealing at present with the early stages of the

132 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

war, before Germany's submarine policy had created
a definite cause of offence.

It should never be forgotten that a nation, in
making the momentous decision for or against an
armed conflict, is guided not by sympathies but by
interests. A statesman is bound to consider the
enduring interests of his country, and not the pass-
ing moods of popular sentiment. He may for this
reason have to fight an unpopular war, or to insist
upon an unpopular peace. It may be the highest
unwisdom, because the feelings of his countrymen
are moved on a particular issue, such as the mis-
fortune of a dynasty, or the harsh treatment of a
little state, to go crusading on its behalf. It is not
his business to act as censor morum to the world at
large, or as the knight-errant of distressed peoples,
His duty is to consider the good of his own realm.
Occasionally he may be forced by popular clamour
to take up arms lest his country be rent internally.
But, save in this extreme case, his path is clear.
The steady light of policy, and not the marsh-fires
of sentiment, must be his guiding star.

In the case of America it might well be argued
that her deepest interests would be malignly affected
by Germany's success. But to set against this we
must remember that the conflict in the Old World
appeared to American observers to be at least evenly
matched, and that they did not seriously believe
that Germany would win in the long run. Had the
odds in her favour been greater, American policy
might have shaped itself differently from the be-
ginning. Again, it was clear that American sym-
pathy with the Allies, while sincere in itself, was
by no means so intense as to force the hand of a

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 133

politic statesman. Advocates for immediate inter-
vention, such as Mr. Roosevelt, based their argument
rather on sentiment than on policy, and that senti-
ment was still far short of a passion. America as a
whole was anxious that the Allies should be victori-
ous, but she did not consider it her duty to take up
cudgels in a quarrel which at first only remotely
concerned her. Her statesmen believed with much
reason that neutrality was for her the path of in-
terest, and by no means inconsistent with honour.
The popular temper was slightly different, but not
different enough to set up a dangerous antagonism
to these counsels of peace.

President Wilson, therefore, played a discreet
and aloof part, and he was supported in it by the
great majority of his countrymen. America real-
ized what many of her critics failed to understand,
that an active participation in the conflict was the
only alternative to complete neutrality, and she did
not see her way to so bold a step. As we have seen,
she had for long made a cult of peace, and was pos-
sessed of a genuine horror of war. She knew little
about the actual quarrel, for the average American
is profoundly ignorant of foreign affairs. She re-
membered Washington's warning against European
engagements,* and Jefferson's famous watchword,
" Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all
nations, entangling alliances with none."

Her cherished Monroe Doctrine was the charter
of her detachment. At the Hague Conferences of

* " Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have
none or very remote relations. Hence she must be engaged
in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially
foreign to our concerns."

134 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

1899 and 1907 she had formally restated her " tra-
ditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering
with, or entangling herself in the political questions
or policy or internal administration of any foreign
state," and she had become a party to the Algeciras
Treaty with the same reservation. A decade earlier
she had appeared to assume the duties of a World
Power, but her experience in the Philippines had
caused a reaction against this nascent imperialism,
and her recent relations with Mexico had sickened
her of foreign adventures.

These reasons decided public opinion, and,
since in America public opinion is the true sovereign,
President Wilson was loyal to his master. The
President of the United States has in theory more
absolute executive powers than any ruler in the world.
But he is bound to an unseen chariot wheel. He
dare not outrun the wishes of the majority of the
citizens. His pace is as fast as theirs, but no faster,
or he courts a fall. A true democracy is a docile
follower of a leader whom it has once trusted. But
an incomplete democracy such as America demands
not a leader but a fellow-wayfarer who can act as
spokesman. Hence it was idle to talk of President
Wilson's policy as if it were the conclusions and
deeds of an individual. It was his business to in-
terpret the opinion of America at large, and there is
no reason to believe that he erred in this duty.

A vital and magnetic personality like Mr. Roose-
velt could, indeed, create opinion on his own ac-
count, and initiate novel departures. But Mr.
Roosevelt was not the orthodox Presidential type.
Mr. Wilson was far more in the true line of suc-
cession from the founders of the republic. He was

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 135

a man of wide and liberal ideas, and a deeply-read
student of history and politics. Probably no modern
ruler has ever brought to his task a stronger equip-
ment of theoretical knowledge. Though a Demo-
crat, he did not follow the Jeffersonian tradition,
and his best-known political work revealed him as
an enthusiast for the new American Imperialism.
His political career before his election showed that
he possessed courage and initiative. In those days
he described himself as " a Conservative with a
move on," a phrase which may be taken as a sum-
mary of the central public opinion of both America
and Britain. His detractors called him academic,
but the term was an unwilling tribute to the judicial
quality of his mind. Having decided that the
temper and the interests of his country were on the
side of neutrality, he balanced the scales with a
meticulous precision. That in itself was no slight
achievement in the midst of a universal hurricane
of war.

His mistake, and that of his friends, was that
they were apt in their public utterances to base
their policy on the wrong grounds, and to spoil
their case with irrelevant rhetoric. America's con-
duct was founded on self-interest and on nothing
else. She looked to present and future advantages,
as she was justified in doing. No man is bound to
be a Crusader, and no nation is called upon to be
quixotic. But when the President declared that
America was " too proud to fight," and when
others, with half the world suffering for the eternal
principles of right and wrong, announced that
American neutrality was a triumph in the cause
of human progress, it had an ugly air of cant. Com-

136 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

mon sense is an excellent thing in its way, but it is
not heroic. The successful merchant becomes an
offence when he masquerades as a paladin.

The American attitude was a godsend to Ger-
many, but the latter had not the wit to appreciate
her blessings. The difficulty arose over the Allied
command of the sea. American markets were open
to all the belligerents to purchase munitions of war,
but only the Allies could take delivery. Germany
protested that this one-sided commerce was a
breach of neutrality, which it certainly was not,
and received on this point a very clear answer from
the President. Then she set herself with immense
industry to hamper the Allied purchases by foment-
ing internal trouble in the United States. Pres-
ently came the British blockade, and her reply to
it by submarine warfare. The indiscriminating
nature of the latter campaign was certain to bring
about trouble with neutrals, but Germany pre-
sumed upon American disinclination for war. She
believed that she had the measure of Washington,
and that if she spoke fair words she could escape
the consequences of her own offences, and, if for-
tune smiled, even provoke a breach with Britain.
She trusted Count Bernstorff and his merry men
to organize German sympathizers across the Atlantic,
and use the Western and the Southern states to
balance the Eastern. Meanwhile her submarines
would pursue their business unchecked. If America
suffered she would apologize, — and a little later do
it again.

The sinking of the Lusitania, when over a hun-
dred of her citizens lost their lives, first awoke
America to the nature of Germany's game. It led

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 137

to the retirement of that clumsy diplomatist, Herr
Dernburg, who at the request of the American Gov-
ernment returned to his fatherland on I3th June.
In an earlier chapter we have considered President
Wilson's Notes to Berlin, and the evasive answers
they received. The Note of 2ist July was in the
nature of an ultimatum. It declared that American
citizens were within their rights in travelling wher-
ever they wished on the high seas, and that the
American Government would take the necessary
steps to protect these rights.

Germany was not slow to put this resolution to
the proof. At half-past nine on the morning of
Thursday, iQth August, the White Star »
liner Arabic, which had left Liverpool
for New York the afternoon before, was torpedoed
and sunk off Cape Clear without warning by a Ger-
man submarine. The loss of life was small, as the
vessel remained afloat for ten minutes, and there
was time to lower the boats. But the indignation
in America at this outrage was great, for twenty-six
Americans were among the passengers. The first
German excuses were that the Arabic was a British
ship going out for a cargo of war materials, and
carrying on board gold to pay for them; that the
vessel had been mined, not torpedoed ; and that in
the alternative, if torpedoed, it was because she had
tried to ram the submarine after notice had been
given her to stop. This curiously inconsistent de-
fence was disproved in every detail by the officials
of the shipping company, and by the affidavits of
American survivors. The wrath of the American
people was so unmistakable that Count BernstorfT
thought it well to trim. He implored Washington

138 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

to wait for the official report, adding the usual

diplomatic assurance about his Government's regret

if American lives had been lost. Eight days later

Auz 27 ^e inf°rmec* Mr. Lansing that full satis-

r '* faction would be given to America for
the sinking of the Arabic, while Herr von Jagow
announced that before that event Germany had
adopted a policy designed to settle the whole sub-
marine problem.

What this policy was appeared on ist September,

when Count Bernstorff handed Mr. Lansing a

Sefit i wr*tten pledge. " My dear Secretary,"

P it ran, " in reference to our conversation

of this day, I beg to inform you that my instruc-
tions concerning our answer to your last Lusitania
Note contain the following passage : * Liners will
not be sunk by submarines without warning, and
without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-
combatants, provided that the liners do not try to
escape or offer resistance/ Although I know that
you do not wish to discuss the Lusitania question
until the Arabic incident has been definitely and
satisfactorily settled, I desire to inform you of the
above, because this policy was decided upon by my
Government before the Arabic incident occurred."

This undertaking obviously fell far short of
America's requirements. It ignored Mr. Lansing's
assertion of the rights of neutrals bound on lawful
errands in ships of belligerent nationality to be pre-
served in life and limb, for no submarine was able
to ensure their preservation. It could drive them
into the boats before torpedoing the vessel, but
small boats in mid-ocean may be a slender basis of
security. There were cases during the war of one

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 139

being without food and water for four days before
being picked up, and of consequent deaths from
exposure. Again, it applied only to passenger
liners and not to ordinary merchant ships. Further,
a submarine could sight a liner before a liner could
see a submarine, and the field was wide for bogus
charges of attempted escape. Yet in spite of its
ambiguity and insufficiency, the undertaking was
received in America with a paean of triumph over
Mr. Lansing's diplomacy, and eulogies of Count
BernstorfFs moderation. That a hard-headed race
should have shown such enthusiasm over a dubious
promise showed the intense disinclination of the
American people for war, and President Wilson's
success in interpreting the feelings of his country-
men.

The simple truth seems to have been that the
star of von Tirpitz was declining. Germany found
that her submarines were mysteriously disappearing,
and that the value of the whole campaign was
scarcely worth the price. Quick to seize a momen-
tary advantage, Count Bernstorff used the new
temper of America to angle for the support of the
peace sentimentalists. His agents in the Press and
elsewhere hinted not obscurely that the Kaiser
wished to settle the submarine controversy in order
to get the help of the United States in bringing the
war to a close. As we have seen elsewhere, this was
Germany's main desire at the moment. While her
arms were triumphant in Russia, she hoped for a
peace on her own terms. What these terms would
be may be gathered from the suggestions in the
American Press. They would include the creation
of an independent kingdom of Poland ; the cession

140 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of Courland ; the autonomy of Finland ; the parti-
tion of Serbia between Austria and Bulgaria ; the
evacuation of Belgium and North France in return
for Belgian Congo and the French possessions in
Africa ; the restoration of German Africa by Britain ;
an international agreement guaranteeing the freedom
of the seas and the immunity of private property
from attack ; and — as a curious afterthought —
world-wide recognition of the rights of the Jews.
These terms were, of course, not official ; but there
is reason to believe that they represented generally
the attitude of the German authorities. The mix-
ture of unabashed privateering with concessions to
American sentiment by the lip-worship of a bogus
autonomy and liberalism was characteristic of Ger-
man diplomatic methods.

But in the midst of this atmosphere of brother-
hood, when righteousness and peace in the shape of
the German Embassy and the American Foreign
Office kissed mutually, there fell a thunderbolt.
About half-past eight on the night of Saturday,
o 4th September, the Allan Liner Hesperian

eP • 4- was torpedoed without warning, 130
miles west of Queenstown. The vessel did not sink
immediately, and was towed towards port, but
^ ,- foundered at seven o'clock on the morn-
*epl ing of Monday, the 6th. There was a
small loss of life, but among the crew were two
American citizens. The incident played havoc with
the new harmony. It was clear to America that
whatever the Government of Berlin might say, and
whatever instructions might be given, submarine
commanders would go on their old path, and would
invent some excuse or other to cover their actions.

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 141

The irritation was increased by the official Note on
the subject of the Arabic, which was handed to the
Ambassador in Berlin on yth September. In it an
unbelievable tale was told of a deliberate attack by
the liner on the submarine, and it was announced
that, even if the commander had made a mistake,
Germany could not recognize any obligation for
compensation. In the event of no agreement being
reached, she offered to submit the matter to the
Hague Tribunal. This Note the American Govern-
ment refused to accept.

It was now becoming apparent that no German
undertaking had any real significance, since in each
case she would allege some special circumstance
which took it out of the general rule she had agreed
to observe. While the reaction from the premature
rejoicing of the first days of September was in full
swing, American patience received the hardest trial
of all. It was bad enough to have Germany play-
ing fast and loose with the lives of American citizens
on the high seas, but it was worse to find her tamper-
ing with domestic affairs within America itself. For
months there had been rumours of sinister under-
ground activities directed from the German Em-
bassy in Washington. Passports had been falsified —
a work in which the Naval and Military attaches,
Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen, were the
prime movers. The methods of the Black Hand
were adopted. There were dynamite outrages in
Canada and incendiary fires in various factories
throughout the Union. German money was lav-
ished in subsidizing a portion of the American
Press, and in distributing pro-German literature.
During August the New York World published

142 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

documentary evidence to prove the establishment
of a German Press bureau under the pretence of an
impartial agency for the supply of news. It showed
that Count Bernstorff had an income of some
£400,000 a week for propagandist purposes. It
proved also that German emissaries were engaged
in engineering strikes in American munition works,
and that German agents were urging the Imperial
Chancellor to prevent the dispatch of goods pur-
chased in Germany by United States manufacturers
in order that the blame might be put upon the
British blockade. This constituted a gross inter-
ference with internal American affairs, which not
even the most pacific people would be likely to
tolerate. But matters reached a head on 6th Sep-
tember, when the Dumba case was made public.

This business, for all its seriousness, belonged
so much to the world of pure comedy that it affords
a welcome relief to the grimmer chronicle of war.
* On 30th August the steamer Rotterdam

u°' 3 • touched at Falmouth. In it was an
American journalist, Archibald by name, whose aim
in life seems to have been the acquiring of minor
foreign decorations. The night before his departure
from New York this agreeable cosmopolitan had
dined with the German and Austrian Ambassadors,
and, as an aspirant for the Iron Cross, had been
entrusted with some highly confidential messages.
He was also given a number of letters of introduction,
including one to Baron Kuhlmann at the Hague, and
in a covering letter Count Bernstorff expressed his
pleasure that he was once more returning to Europe
" after having promoted our interests out here in
such a zealous and successful manner." In another

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 143

letter Captain von Papen wrote of him as " a strictly
impartial journalist." This pose was, of course,
necessary for the success of the former activities.

In the budget seized by the British authorities
there were documents bearing the signatures of
Count BernstorfF, Dr. Dumba, and Captain von
Papen. Count BernstorfFs principal contribution
was a copy of his memorandum to Mr. Lansing of
loth June, in which he dealt with the <y
charges of American newspapers that *
Germany was negotiating for the purchase of
factories and war material in the United States.
These charges he categorically denied. There was
also a memorandum from the same hand, dated
1 8th August, in which he faced the * «
difficult problem raised by the New ' %'
York World's disclosures. On the 3ist of July Dr.
Albert, the Financial Adviser to the German Em-
bassy, lost his portfolio in the New <v j
York Elevated Railway, stolen from him, -/"^ 31-
he declared, by the spies of the British Secret Service.
This portfolio came, as we have seen, into the hands
of the New York World, and for a week or so made
sensational reading for the students of American
journalism. Count Bernstorff accordingly felt him-
self obliged to offer to the American Government
a " short statement concerning the facts." He did
not disclaim any longer the German attempt to
obtain control of American munition factories, or
to purchase their output. He declared that nothing
of the sort had been done, but he asserted — with
some reason — Germany's right to do it if she had
the money for the purpose. That Germany had
ever tried to stir up strikes or " take part in a plot

144 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

against the economic peace " of America he reso-
lutely denied. He denied also that there was any-
thing improper in the very modest Press campaign
which Germany had conducted. So much for the
Ambassador. Unfortunately, his wholly correct
sentiments were not shared by his colleagues and
underlings. Dr. Dumba and Captain von Pap en
ingenuously toppled down the tall tower of ambas-
sadorial decorum.

Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador,
was one of those stormy petrels of diplomacy who
have often found shelter in the dovecotes of the
Ballplatz. A Macedonian by birth, the world first
heard of him as an agent-provocateur in the Balkans.
He was a walker in tortuous ways, with a front of
brass and an elastic conscience. The Archibald
portfolio held three of his dispatches to the Foreign
Minister at Vienna. The first was not published.
The second contained a very full description of
the efforts he had made to stir up unrest among
the munition workers. This was dated 2oth

» August, two days after Count Bern-

' storff had sent his official denial to Mr.
Lansing. " It is my impression," wrote Dr. Dumba,
" that we can disorganize and hold up for months,
if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of muni-
tions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which,
in the opinion of the German military attache, is of
great importance, and amply outweighs the com-
paratively small expenditure of money involved."
In the next sentence he revealed himself as a social
reformer. " Even if the strikes do not come off, it
is probable that we should extort more favourable
conditions of labour for our poor down-trodden

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 145

fellow-countrymen. In Bethlehem these white
slaves are now working for twelve hours a day and
seven days a week ! All weak persons succumb and
become consumptives." Dr. Dumba was a provi-
dent soul, and was resolved, if the secret came out,
to pose as a philanthropist. Then he proceeded to
implicate the German Embassy. ;< So far as Ger-
man workmen are found among the skilled hands,
a means of leaving will be provided immediately for
them. Besides this, a private German registry
office has been established, which provides employ-
ment for persons who have voluntarily given up
their places, and it is already working well." He
enlarged on the details. He explained what the
local Hungarian, Slovak, and German Press was
doing, and how its activities could be increased.
It may be noticed in passing that this was a libel
on the Slovaks in America, who had shown them-
selves throughout on the side of the Allies.

One passage revealed the main lines of the plot.
1 To Bethlehem must be sent as many reliable
Hungarian and German workmen as I can lay my
hands on, who will join the factories and begin their
work in secret among their fellow- workmen. For
this purpose I have my men turners in steel- work.
We must send an organizer who, in the interests of
the Union, will begin the business in his own way.
We must also send so-called ' soap-box ' orators,
who will know how to start a useful agitation. We
shall want money for popular meetings, and possibly
for organizing picnics. In general, the same applies
to the Middle West. I am thinking of Pittsburg
and Cleveland in the first instance."

The third Dumba dispatch was a long rigmarole

ix. 10

146 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

about the best ways of inflaming the anger of
American importers against Britain. There was also
a letter in which the New York World disclosures
were discussed. " Count Bernstorff," we were told,
" took up the position that these slanders required
no answer, and had the happy inspiration to refuse
any explanation. He is in no way compromised."
As we know, Count Bernstorff did explain the
whole matter to Mr. Lansing, and had the happy
inspiration to deny the charge of fomenting strikes.
Dr. Dumba, who knew the truth, went on to con-
sole himself and his employers with the reflection,
' there is no evidence to support the main charge."
That evidence, by the favour of Mr. Archibald, the
world possessed on 6th September.

Captain von Papen's contributions were the
most curious of all. One referred to the ordinary
small talk of the espionage business. One, ad-
dressed to the German Ministry of War, revealed
the fact that German agents had bought up large
amounts of war material, and had great difficulty
in knowing what to do with them. It was proposed,
among other things, to dump a quantity of toluol
on the Norwegian Government. But the most
interesting document was a private letter which is
worth quoting in full : —

" We have great need of being bucked up, as they say
here. Since Sunday a new storm has been raging against us —
and because of what ? I'm sending you a few cuttings from
the newspapers that will amuse you. Unfortunately they
stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert in the Elevated
(English Secret Service, of course !), of which the principal
contents have been published. You can imagine the sensation
among the Americans ! Unfortunately there were some very
important things from my report among them, such as the

STRAINING AMERICAN PATIENCE. 147

buying up of liquid chlorine and about the Bridgeport Pro-
jectile Company, as well as documents regarding the buying
up of phenol (from which explosives are made), and the acqui-
sition of the Wrights' aeroplane patent. But things like that
must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to see how
we protect ourselves. We composed the document together
yesterday. It seems quite likely that we shall meet again
soon. The sinking of the Adriatic [sic] may well be the last
straw. I hope in our interest that the danger will blow over.
How splendid on the Eastern front. I always say to these
idiotic Yankees they had better hold their tongues — it's better
to look at all this heroism full of admiration. My fcjends in
the army are quite different in this way."

No nation, not even the most pacific, likes to
be called idiotic. The Archibald disclosures, com-
ing on the top of the unsatisfactory reply about the
sinking of the Arabic, and the more recent Hesperian
incident, left an ugly impression on the public mind
of America. The Austrian Embassy was revealed
as a nest of insolent intriguers. The German
Ambassador was shown writing pompous dis-
claimers to Mr. Lansing with his tongue in his cheek,
while his satellites of the von Papen type were busy
at the very activities which he denied. The whole
German attitude towards the United States was now
blindingly clear. ' These good and naive Amer-
icans," said the German Government, " live on a
diet of windy words. Let us flatter their bent and
give them plenty of this inexpensive provender, and
we need not deviate one inch from the course we
have set ourselves. They are determined not to
fight, and will seize on any shadow of an excuse
to keep out of the quarrel."

This conclusion, though it had much surface
justification, was a complete misreading of the
American temper. We need not blame the Teu-

148 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

tonic ambassadors too much. The private cor-
respondence of most embassies, if published un-
expectedly, would make sensational reading for
the countries concerned. " The most malicious
democrat," wrote Bismarck on one occasion, " can
have no idea what nullity and charlatanry are con-
cealed in diplomacy." But we may be grateful that
a fortunate chance let in the light on a colossal
humbug. America was wounded in her amour
propre, and was compelled to take firm action.
Washington demanded that Dr. Dumba should be
recalled, on the ground that he had been guilty of
a violation of diplomatic propriety. Vienna hesi-
tated and quibbled, and Dumba was thereupon
handed his passports. By the middle of September
the reputation of Count Bernstorff and his staff
had fallen like speculative stocks in a financial
crisis.

One result of the incident may be noted. About
this time an Anglo-French Commission visited
America with a view to raising a loan. The matter
will be dealt with later when the autumn position
of the Allied finances is discussed. Here it is
sufficient to observe that the chance of a loan, which
had not been rosy during the summer, and in the
beginning of September had looked black indeed,
had by the middle of the month suddenly become
hopeful. The Government objection had been the
risk of stirring up bad feeling between the hetero-
geneous elements in the American people. But
Count Bernstorff and his friends had nullified that
argument. Their ill-advised intrigues had spilt the
fat into the fire, and made a decorous neutrality
impossible.

CHAPTER LXX.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT.

Result of the Fail of Warsaw — The Awakening of Russia —
Russia's Previous Mistakes — Shortage of Arms — Stamina of
the Russian Armies — German Inhumanity — Treatment of
Russian Prisoners — The German Plan after Warsaw —
Desire for a great Field Victory — The Russian Strategy —
Fall of Ivangorod — Prince Leopold crosses the Vistula —
Brilliant Retreat of the Russian Centre — The Narev Army
Falls Back — Von Mackensen seizes Vlodava — Importance of
Kovno — Siege of Kovno — Fall of Kpvno — Difficulty of
Russian Position — Fall of Novo Georgievsk — Germans ap-
proach Brest Litovski — New German Dispositions — Begin-
ning of Army Groups — The Situation in the Gulf of Riga —
Germans attempt to land at Pernau — Defeat of German
Squadron — The Moltke torpedoed — British Submarine
wrecked on Baltic Coast — The Meeting of the Imperial Duma
— The President's Address.

THE fall of Warsaw consummated a process
which began in the early days of May — the
awakening of Russia to the full gravity of the
war. From the start the nation had been united.
The campaign had been a popular one beyond any
in her history. It had been recognized by every
class as a struggle not only for national existence
but for the essential ideals of civilization and hu-
manity. But the magnitude of the contest had not
revealed itself. Her conquest of Galicia, her firm
defence of the Warsaw front, and her bold ventures
across the Carpathians had obliterated the memory

150 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of the first weeks when her unpreparedness had
weighed heavily on her High Command. The
extraordinary fighting quality of her soldiers had
made her forget how small a part individual valour
plays in the first stage of a modern war. Russia
had grown over-confident, and that confidence had
almost been her undoing.

Looking back in August at the course of events
since April it was easy to discover her mistakes.
In the first place, she had been holding an impossibly
long line for her numbers of men and guns, and her
Carpathian advance had made it daily longer and
more vulnerable. The Russian front was not the con-
tinuous series of entrenchments which existed in the
West. There were gaps in it, such as that between
the Niemen and the Narev, and the junctions of
the different armies seem to have offered points of
serious weakness. In many parts — vital parts — the
front was terribly thin. Take DmitriefFs 3rd Army
on the Donajetz. In April the gth Corps was hold-
ing a front of forty-five miles. The 3ist Division
held nearly eight miles ; the Elets Regiment, about
4,000 strong, held nearly five. It was believed that
in case of attack reinforcements could be readily
brought up ; but the communications were bad,
and little was done to improve them. Proposals
to bring out skilled workmen from England were
toyed with and shelved. No attempt was made to
double the single line from Lemberg to Jaroslav,
the chief feeder of the Donajetz front ; nor was the
railway bridge at Przemysl repaired after the cap-
ture of that city, so as to make available a direct
double route from Lemberg to Tarnow. The
result was that the Russian army suffered from lack

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 151

of mobility. Troops could not be brought up
quickly to the threatened point, and each regiment
was in effect left alone to repel any attack that
might be made on it. The enemy in an advance
could by means of his admirable railways weaken
remote parts of his front to strengthen the operative
part, but the same tactics were not open to the
defence. Hence Russia lost the advantage of hold-
ing the internal lines. Though the enemy had to
operate against a convex front, he had far greater
powers of local concentration.

Again, the individual ascendency which the
Russian soldier had established on the southern
front led to an undue depreciation of his opponents.
During the long halt on the Donajetz the Austrians
kept up an incessant bombardment ; but this did
little harm, for they never followed it up by an in-
fantry attack, and consequently a large proportion
of the Russian troops could be withdrawn from the
trenches attacked. This state of affairs led also to
a certain slackness of intelligence work, and the
sense of security which it induced prevented alter-
native positions being prepared. It may well be
questioned, however, whether the existence of such
positions would have made much difference in the
debacle of May. The best trenches in the world
would have been useless against the German artillery,
especially if, as frequently happened, they could
only be manned by unarmed soldiers at a distance
of twenty yards from each other.

This brings us to the essential Russian weakness
in equipment. Her total of heavy guns was far
lower than the enemy's, and her lack of railways
prevented her recalling readily those which had

152 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

been sent to other parts of the front. Her field
artillery, excellent in pattern and efficient in its
gunnery, was poorly supplied with shells ; and at
various times in the course of retreat its munitions
gave out altogether, and it made no attempt to
cope with the fire of the enemy. The Russians
were terribly short also in machine guns, having
at the most one to the enemy's four. As the retreat
continued, even their musketry fire was in danger
of starvation. Many of the new recruits took their
places in the firing line without rifles ; and captured
rifles, preserved as souvenirs, were collected from
the Red Cross detachments and wherever they could
be found. Men had to wait in the trenches under
heavy fire till they could get arms from wounded
comrades. In the 2nd Army a whole Siberian
division had to face a shrapnel attack without a
single rifle among the lot, and the field artillery of
that army was limited to two shells a day. When
Irmanov's 3rd Caucasians fought their great battle
at Jaslo, their general at one moment was compelled
to refrain from a counter-attack because he had
only twenty rounds of rifle ammunition per man.
In the words of a Russian private : ' ' We had only
one weapon, the living breast of the soldier. "

Even an army of veterans in circumstances like
these might have looked for annihilation. At any
rate its retreat, by all human calculation, should have
been a rout and a confusion. The amazing fact
was that- there was no rout ; that this force, which
had lost incredibly, which was short of every muni-
tion of war, held the enemy firm, and after the first
week fell back at its own pace, with stubborn rear-
guard actions and many successful counter-advances.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 153

There were no sweeping captures by the enemy,
and the few Russian guns taken testify not only to
the scarcity of arms but to the orderliness of the
retreat. Observers who took part in it bore witness
to the absence of panic, and, indeed, of any signs
of excitement. Corps like the 3rd Caucasians, who
had been reduced to a fragment, still planned and
executed bold measures of reprisal. The i2th
Siberian Division, on the Upper San, twice crossed
the river under heavy fire, and cut its way through
the enveloping Germans. There was no capture
of hospitals or Red Cross units. The trains moved
eastwards at their usual leisurely speed, and a colli-
sion on the main line was put right with perfect
composure. The great retirement, it may be fairly
said, caused less flurry to the troops engaged in it
than to the various Staffs at headquarters and to
spectators at a distance. " If we had only guns,"
said the soldiers, " we should be marching the other
way. As it is, we shall soon return."

The invincible fibre of the Russians could not
be weakened by a disaster which would have broken
the spirit of most armies. Still less was it affected
by the calculated barbarities of the enemy. The
Austrians behaved tolerably well, the Germans with
a steady cruelty which would have stained their
reputation had anything so dark been capable of
further blackening. If it is fear that makes men
brutes, then the panic would seem to have been on
the side of the invaders. The Russians in their
extremity never forgot the human decencies, as
countless instances proved. Officers reported that
it was difficult to get their men to shoot a spy, even
when caught in the act. Three Russians were

iS4 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

wounded by a German aviator whom they were
helping to hospital. They took prisoners who
continued to fire on them up to the moment of
surrender. No drunken man was ever seen in the
Russian lines, while the Germans were often so
drunk in action that the effects lasted long after
they had been taken captive. The evidence on
these and on other points is so strong that it cannot
be disregarded even by those who are rightly scep-
tical about tales of atrocities in war. The Germans
repeatedly shot or bayoneted their prisoners in cold
blood. In many cases, escaped Russian soldiers
returned horribly mutilated, because they had re-
fused to answer questions. In captivity the Rus-
sians were treated with excessive harshness, while
German prisoners in Russia were well provided for.
A description by a Red Cross representative of an
interchange of prisoners at a place on the Swedish
frontier reveals something of this difference in the
code of national ethics : —

'It is difficult to find words to describe the
dreadfulness of the scene at Tornea. Everything
possible had been done to invest the home-coming
of the poor Russians with an air of festivity. The
pier at which the barges discharged was lined with
Russian troops. A distinguished committee was
there to receive the prisoners. Flags fluttered. A
military band played the Russian National Anthem.
Crowds had assembled to cheer their compatriots
as they landed. . . . And then they came, and I
shall never forget the sight. I may claim, from my
hospital experience, to know something of the
symptoms of health and sickness. Those people
who crept off the barges hardly had the semblance

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 155

of human beings. Anything more pathetic it is
impossible to conceive. They came back dazed and
limping. Every man was in rags. There was
nothing approaching a complete uniform on any
one. Few had coats. Some had no shirts. Many
had no socks. There was not, I believe, one sound
pair of boots among them. Their hair was un-
trimmed. Some of the crippled supported them-
selves on crutches carved from the lids of packing
cases and the like. The less feeble helped the
others to walk. Every man was emaciated to the last
degree. Some had lost their wits and memory. . . .
They advanced slowly, weakly, with their eyes upon
the ground, without a smile, without a hand waved
or a voice raised in response to the cheers with
which they were greeted ; and, as the waiting people
saw what they were like, the cheers themselves died
away, and the awful procession went on in silence.
I say, unhesitatingly, knowing whereof I speak,
that nothing but continued and long-sustained
neglect and malnutrition would possibly have re-
duced these men to the condition in which I saw
them. Out of one party of 250 over sixty had
developed tuberculosis. . . . We mingled and
chatted with the Germans on their train. The
contrast with the condition of the Russians was
almost indescribable. There was not one German
prisoner who was not in full uniform, which had
been taken from him on his arrival in hospital and
carefully kept and returned to him clean on his
discharge. All had good boots. The lame were
without exception furnished with proper crutches.
But most striking of all was the physical well-being
and good spirits of the whole party. They were

156 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

well nourished. They laughed and joked with us
and among themselves. It was evident that they had
been treated with care, and, as convalescents, were
being sent home as physically fit as they could be
made. ... I know that, if the Germans had
hitherto throughout this conflict borne themselves,
so far as the world knew, with moderation and
decency, the sight which I saw at Tornea alone
would convince me that they are waging this war as
only a brutal and half-civilized people can wage it."

The occupation of Warsaw compelled von Fal-
kenhayn to decide the difficult problem of his future
objective. Two courses were open to him. One
was to entrench himself upon the ground he had
won, and make the Niemen, the Narev, and the
Vistula the front of the central and northern armies.
The line of the rivers in German hands could be
made of a strength which would defy any Russian
counter-advances for many a day. Warsaw, the
magazine and depot of the Grand Duke's forces,
was in his hands ; and, though it is easy to over-
rate the importance of any single city, yet the pos-
session of Warsaw conferred great and obvious
advantages. Such a position would paralyze Rus-
sian efforts for the immediate future. It would
enable him to weaken his armies without danger,
and send great contingents westwards. And it
would give his troops, weary with three months'
incessant fighting, the opportunity to rest and
recruit.

It is probable that this plan had been in the •
mind of the German Staff during the winter. But I
the successes of the summer had widened their i

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 157

outlook, and von Falkenhayn began to cherish
more spacious projects. The efforts required to
win Warsaw had made the Vistula almost impossible
as a halting-ground. The Archduke Joseph and
von Mackensen were already north of the Lublin
railway ; the right wing was pushed almost to the
Sereth ; while in the far north von Eichhorn was
well east of the Niemen, and von Below,* south of
Riga, had pressed forward in a deep salient towards
Dvinsk. To be content with a defensive line on the
rivers meant the sacrifice of these substantial gains,
and the holding of a long concave front. It was
desirable to straighten out the position by advancing
the centre.

But the chance of a crushing, perhaps a decisive,
offensive was what dominated the German mind.
The Russian armies were clearly in a perilous case
With Warsaw fallen, the southern railway cut, and
the Narev line crumbling, it seemed beyond human
power to extricate the centre from the narrow apex
of the salient. Meanwhile, in the north, von Below
and von Eichhorn were almost within striking
distance of the Petrograd railway ; and, once this
was cut in the neighbourhood of Dvinsk and Vilna,
the whole Russian front must split into isolated
and unrelated groups. It was a sovereign chance
to compel a field battle, in which more than one
of the armies of Russia should find destruction.

There was much debate during these days about
the German objective. Some said Petrograd, the
capital ; some said Kiev and the arsenals and iron-
fields of Southern Russia. But it is improbable

* This spelling, which has now official authority, will in
future be adopted in this narrative.

158 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

that either of these ends was directly envisaged in
the German plan. They sought a simpler and
far more valuable result. Between Riga and Petro-
grad lay three hundred miles of forest and meres,
served by one railroad. The same distance separated
Tarnopol and Kiev, though the country there was
better suited for the movements of great armies.
In a few weeks the autumn rains would begin, and
in two months the first snows of winter. The time
was too short to reach Petrograd or Kiev, even had
these been the gains that promised most. The
Grand Duke Nicholas might yield them both and
fall farther back into the heart of the country, and
Russia would still be unconquered. But let her
armies be beaten in detail in the next month, and
Russia would indeed be vanquished. She was
already in an almost hopeless position, with no
great base near, with slender communications,
with her ranks terribly depleted, and with her old
insufficiency of equipment unrelieved. The fruit
was almost within the German grasp. One great
effort, as forecast by the Kaiser in his telegram to
the Queen of Greece, must bring about that decisive
victory, so far unknown in the war, which would
put the defeated side out of action.

To realize what such a victory would mean to
Germany we must grasp her true policy, steadily
pursued behind the fog created by filibustering
journalists and the megalomania of her politicians.
She wanted peace, but a peace in which she should
condescend upon her opponents and dictate the
terms. For this an overwhelming military success
was necessary. She would not sue for peace, shej
would offer it, and for such a role she must come!

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 159

garlanded with the laurels of an indisputable tri-
umph. She still misunderstood the temper of
Russia. She still believed that her zealous agents,
working through the baser elements of the bureau-
cracy, could induce the empire of the Tsar to cry
off from a war in which it had suffered so grievously,
and had borne a burden unknown to the Allies in
the West. She believed that a refusal of peace
would mean a Russian revolution. It is probable
that Germany intended to offer terms which neu-
tral opinion might consider as reasonable, and
which she herself regarded as magnanimous. On
the surface it looked as if her purpose was likely
to succeed.

But, supposing that the impossible happened,
and the Russian armies escaped without a debacle,
the German position would be greatly improved
by an advance. It would give them Brest Litovski,
the last of the Polish fortresses. It would give
them the marshes of the Pripet as a great piece of
dead ground in their line. It would still further
disintegrate the Russian forces, till they fell from
an extended front into groups, from groups to
armies, and from armies to disjointed corps. Further,
there was a position which could be held for the
winter, and which offered greater security than
even the river line of the Vistula. There is a
lateral railway running south from Riga by way of
Dvinsk and Vilna to Rovno. If this was held, and
the Austrian right wing was firm on the Dniester,
a winter front would be gained shorter than the old
one by four hundred miles, and with communica-
jtions certainly no worse than those of Western
Poland. Again, such a line would give Germany

160 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

complete possession not only of Russian Poland, but
of all the territory which Polish nationalism had
ever claimed. Now, the unity of the Polish race
had always been the central ideal of Polish patriots.
Since the war began the wisest brains among them
had been loyal to Russia, believing that only Russia
could give them once more a racial and territorial
solidarity. But with Galicia and Russian Poland,
as well as Posen, in German hands, the allegiance
of the Poles would be sorely tried. Germany alone,
it might then appear, could implement her promises
and give reality to their aspirations. Besides, there
was the vast Jewish residuum of the Polish popu-
lation, without national tradition, which might be
trusted to worship the rising sun.

Fortune seemed to smile happily on the German
purpose on that day when Prince Leopold entered
Warsaw. Russia had one pressing duty before her
— to extricate her armies and refuse at all costs to
be driven into a field battle. Her first business was
to get her troops out of the Warsaw salient. That
meant that while her centre fought constant rear-
guard actions against Prince Leopold's advance,
her right centre must check von Gallwitz and von
Scholtz on the Narev, and her left centre the ad-
vance of von Woyrsch towards Lukow, till such time
as her 2nd Army had fallen back east of Siedlce.
She had left the great fortress of Novo Georgievsk
to hinder the use of the Vistula for German sup-
plies, in the hope that it would hold out for at
least a month. In that event the loss of its garrison
of 20,000 and its many guns would be justified.
Once the apex of the salient was clear, the retirement
would be on Brest Litovski ; and to enable her to

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 161

effect this in good order, the northern fortresses
of Ossowietz and Kovno must resist till, at any rate,
the end of August. Otherwise, in the difficult
country around the Bobr and the Upper Niemen,
there was a chance of more than one corps being
cut off. It was already clear that the Upper and
Middle Bug could not be held long against the
thrust of von Mackensen. Behind Brest Litovski
lay the marshes of the Pripet, and to withdraw
through that area meant a stiff holding battle around
Brest, for the withdrawal would be slow and in-
tricate.

Russia had two great perils immediately be-
fore her. One of her armies or army groups
might be enveloped, especially on the right flank,
where von Below and von Eichhorn had already
driven in deep salients. Or the onslaughts of the
German centre, aided by von Mackensen's drive
north-eastwards, might force her to fight west of
the Pripet marshes. If an army has narrow and
congested communications behind it, and the enemy
presses hard, it may be compelled against its will
to accept battle.

The extraordinary difficulties of Russia's posi-
tion must be understood if we are to do justice to
the splendour of her achievement. Let us look at
her immediate task — the retirement from Warsaw
to the Bug.

Ivangorod had fallen on 4th August to General von
Koevess. To defend it would have been folly, for it
was wholly surrounded, and it commanded no vital
route of communication. The guns and *
munitions were removed by the railway
to Lukow, and only the husk was left for the con-

IX. II

162

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

querpr. The rearguards of the Russian centre were

still in Praga, the Warsaw suburb east of the Vistula ;

Aug q kut ky Monday, gth August, they were

,*' y' driven out, and Prince Leopold could

Ivangorod.

begin the bridging of the river. In spite of the
ruin of the bridges both there and at Ivangorod,
the Germans were not slow to find a means of cross-
ing. Using the big thousand-ton barges, which are
the staple of the Vistula navigation, they constructed

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 163

pontoons, over which they ran their railways,
branches on an incline connecting with the per-
manent track. A line on barges seems an un-
satisfactory expedient, but till a few years ago this
was the way in which trains from Karlsruhe crossed
the Rhine into Alsace. Those who have made that
journey will remember that the train scarcely slack-
ened speed, and that there was no swaying of the
bridge ; only as the weight fell on it, it sank very
slightly, sending a wave up and down the river.
Probably with Prince Leopold's force there were
many men who each spring had helped in the con-
struction of the floating bridge at Maxau, and each
winter had taken it to pieces.

The main advance of Prince Leopold beyond
the Vistula began on Tuesday, loth August. It
was stubbornly opposed, and made slow *
progress. The Russian resistance in this
section was wholly conditioned by what was happen-
ing on the flanks. They dared not delay one hour
longer than the time permitted them to escape from
the pressure of von Gallwitz on the north and von
Woyrsch on the south. Had there been no such
coercion, Prince Leopold might have been held up
indefinitely, for it would appear that his army was
the weakest in the German dispositions. But the
thing had become almost a mathematical problem.
So soon as von Gallwitz and von Woyrsch reached
certain points, the Russian centre must break off
the action and retire to a position which would
allow them to evade outflanking.

We do not yet know who was the brilliant soldier
responsible for the tactical handling of the Russian
centre ; but whoever he was, he was beyond doubt

1 64 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

a master of his craft. It cannot have been Alexeiev,
who was in charge of the strategy of the whole
northern group of armies, and had his hands full
with the threats to Kovno and Riga. It was some
general who had borrowed Alexeiev's mantle, and
learned his supernatural coolness and calculation in
extremity. The Staff work, too, must have been
perfect.

The gravest peril came from the Narev front,
where the remnants of Plehve's army were working
as if to a time schedule. Von Gallwitz, it will be
remembered, had first crossed the river on the 26th
of July, after crushing the resistance of the fortified
bridgeheads at Pultusk and Rozhan. He was held
in the wooded country between the Bug and the
Narev, and was not able to force the crossing on a
* , broad front. On 6th August Novo

Georgievsk was completely isolated, and
von Gallwitz's right wing took Sierok and Zegrje,

at the junction of the Bug and the Narev.
o. stormed Lomza,

and next day von Gallwitz, moving east between
^ the Bug and the Narev, had won a very

'I* dangerous position, no less than the
junction where the central line to Ostrolenka joins
the main Warsaw-Pet rograd railway, a few miles
from where the latter crosses the Bug. This meant
that the whole Russian front on the Narev and Bug
west of this point must give way. They had de-
stroyed the Bug railway bridge, and fallen back,
apparently in good order, by the Bialystok railway,
and by the lateral Malkin-Siedlce railway, which
was still in Russian hands.

On the south von Woyrsch had joined hands

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 165

with von Mackensen on loth August. Moving
north-east, he took the railway junction ^ IQ
of Lukow two days later. By that time

Sketch showing the situation on August 12 (eve of the retirement
of the Russian Centre from Siedlce).

the Russian centre was in Siedlce, ready for a
further retreat as the enemy flanks closed in.

On the 1 2th von Gallwitz was at Zambrovo,
south-east of Lomza, an important junction of five

166 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

roads. His right wing was at Andrychov, just north

Au<> 12 °^ tne Petr°grad line- Siedlce and
6* ' the lateral railway were clearly no longer
tenable, especially as von Scholtz, on von Gallwitz's
left, had crossed the Narev at its junction with the
Bobr and was threatening Bialystok. On the i3th
Russ*an centre fell back from Siedlce

AUP i ^

*" 3- anc[ Sokolov into the profound forests

which stretch towards the Bug. The worst peril
was over, for the narrows of the salient had been
cleared. It remained to hold the ground in front
of Brest Litovski till the flanks could straighten
themselves into line with the centre.

That centre by the I4th was at Losice,some twenty

Aue IA. m^es east °f Siedlce, with its right on the

*' railway running north-east from Siedlce

and its left on the Lukow-Brest railway. There for

the moment it was safe, but to north and south the

position was precarious ; for next day von Mack-

AUP TC ensen> pushing north along the Cholm-

*' 5* Brest line, took Vlodava on the Bug,

and von Woyrsch was advancing along both sides

of the Lukow-Brest lines. In the north the left

wing of von Gallwitz's army had forced the cross-

ing of the river Nurzec, which enters the Bug about

fifteen miles west of the place where that river is

crossed by the main Petrograd railway. Next day

Prince Leopold's left crossed the Bug at Drohiczyn,

* , which brought it in touch with von

** Gallwitz's right, while its centre took

Biala on the Krzna River, and von Mackensen from

the south moved down the Bug from Vlodava.

Already the enemy were within twenty miles of the

fortress of Brest. It was time for the Russian

Situation of the Russian Centre, August 16, 1916.

168 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

centre to fall back on Brest, and for the High Com-
mand to decide whether that stronghold should
be surrendered or defended.

It is probable that the Grand Duke's first in-
tention was to hold Brest and the line of the Upper
Bug. The railway from Brest to Bialystok would
give good lateral communication behind the fronts.
Already, by the i5th, this line was endangered by
von Mackensen's advance from Vlodava, which
gave the Germans the mastery of the Bug above
the fortress, as well as the southern part of the
lateral line. But the essential condition of the
maintenance of the position was the Russian con-
trol of the Upper Niemen, and especially of the
fortress of Kovno. There Napoleon had crossed
the river, and there ran the main line from East
Prussia to Vilna. Ossowietz would be a point in
this front, which would run roughly from Brest
north by Bielsk and Ossowietz to the Niemen. But
if Kovno fell it was untenable, for that would give
von Eichhorn a chance of a flanking movement
which might threaten the right of the Russian centre,
and might even cut it off for good from the armies
in Courland.

The importance of Kovno was even greater in
relation to the situation on the Russian right.
Tukkum and Mitau had fallen to the army of
von Lauenstein, whose clouds of cavalry were now
scouring the valley of the Aa. Von Below was
well east of Shavli by the end of July, and by 12th
A August was at Poniebitz, moving towards

U8- l2- Dvinsk by the Libau-Dvinsk railway.
That day the Russian right made a strong counter-
attack upon von Below, and another attack checked

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 169

von Lauenstein on the Aa. If this movement could
be continued, or even if the positions won could be

Kovno.

maintained, then Dvinsk and Vilna and the vital sec-
tion of the Petrograd railway between them were safe,
and with them the whole of the Russian right flank.

170 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

But if Kovno fell, various awkward consequences
would ensue. The Niemen below the town was
already in German hands. Kovno, Olita, and Grod-
no were the three fortresses of the Upper Niemen,
and the first in the present situation was the most
vital. Its loss would imperil the other two ; it
would make the position of the Russian armies on
the Bobr an acute salient ; it would give the enemy
a direct route to Vilna and the Petrograd line.
Above all, it would place the Germans in rear of
the Russian position on the Sventa, which enters
the Niemen on the right bank a little below the
town.

Kovno, an old city with a flourishing trade in
grain and timber, was defended by eighteen forts,
five on the east safeguarding the Niemen, four on
the north protecting the Vilna bridge, and nine on
the south and west. The Russians had no time,
any more than at Ivangorod and Brest, to defend
it by those earthworks in a wide perimeter which
were the salvation of Verdun. The end of July saw
von Eichhorn's army close on Kovno from the east,
and on the day that Warsaw was abandoned the
bombardment began. For twelve days a concen-
tration of heavy artillery rained shells on the fortifi-
cations, while the infantry struggled for the outworks.
The factories were stripped of machinery, and the
Government records sent east, for soon it began to
appear that the 1 6-inch guns of the East Prussian
fortresses must speedily make an end of the defence.
It was urgent that the place should be held till the
latest moment for the security of the rest of the
Russian line, and for twelve desperate days the
garrison stuck to their post. A Russian eye-witness

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 171

of the siege has described the bombardment, which
took place to the accompaniment of wild weather.
" Guns of every calibre were employed here, and
the noise they made was beyond all description.
They fired at the Russian fortress without a stop,
and bombarded the position back and front of
the fortress incessantly. One would have thought
no living beings could stand it, and yet the Russians
were there and returned the fire. It seemed to us
that the Russians had concentrated all their artillery
around Kovno, for their reply was stupendous. . . .
All night the guns roared and the lightning played
in terrible fury, as if a deadly storm had concen-
trated itself on the town. Three gigantic Russian
searchlights added to the vivid grandeur of the

scene.'3

On Sunday, i5th August, the end was very near.
A German corps under von Litzmann carried a
small fort at the south-west corner, and pushed
through the gap thus created. The *
forts by this time were in ruins, and on
the night of Tuesday, the iyth, the heroic garrison
was overwhelmed. The eastern works /•
resisted to the last, and a portion of their u&' * ' *
garrison got away. The Germans claimed 20,000
prisoners and over 200 guns. When a forlorn hope
is destroyed there is little chance of saving men and
artillery.

The fall of Kovno — unexpectedly, for it was
counted upon for a long resistance — revived the
peril which for a moment seemed to have passed
by. It allowed von Eichhorn to transport his army
across the Niemen, and to outflank the Russians
on the Sventa, and it put the Bobr armies and the

Miles

Sketch Map showing the possible Russian line of defence that

was made untenable by the fall of Kovno and the

German menace in the Baltic provinces.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 173

force holding Ossowietz in a position of the gravest
danger. A retirement on the right centre was
necessary to avoid envelopment, and no less urgent
was a retirement in the centre. For on the i8th
von Gallwitz cut the Brest-Bialystok » g
railway at Bielsk, thereby isolating Brest
on the north. That same day Prince Leopold
crossed the Bug at Mielnik, east of his previous
crossing at Drohiczyn, and thus secured for a line
of advance and supply the railway which runs north-
east from Siedlce, and traverses the Bug between
these two crossing-points. Farther south von Mac-
kensen was east of the Bug, north of Vlodava, and
moving to cut the Brest-Moscow railway behind
the fortress. Prince Leopold's right was that even-
ing attacking the western forts of Brest itself.

Next day came a fresh and unexpected blow.
The siege of Novo Georgievsk had been entrusted
to von Beseler, the conqueror of Ant- *
werp, who for many months had dis- u*' *"
appeared from the war bulletins. The Russian
Staff assumed a lengthy defence, and a consequent
hold-up to German communications. But the great
cannon which had battered down Liege and Namur
carried Novo Georgievsk in something under three
weeks. Twenty thousand of the garrison were
taken, and over 700 guns, most of which had first
been rendered useless. The cyphers and maps
were carried into Russia by a brilliant feat of air-
work.

Brest alone remained now of the Polish Tri-
angle, and it was very clear that Brest was no con-
tinuing city. The first Russian line of retreat was
probably on a front from Riga through Kovno,

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Grodno, Bialystok, to the Upper Bug. But Kovno
had fallen, and von Mackensen had turned the river
line in the south. A farther retreat was needed,
and once more the duty revived of extricating the

i *• di <*a 5, Miles

i^fiV^C**

u %**«£«*

*<??<*

Novo Georgievsk.

weaker and most critical part by desperate holding
battles. But the task was now of a somewhat
different nature. The worst salient had been ;
cleared, and the problem concerned itself with the
manoeuvring of army groups so as to avoid envelop-

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 175

ment while moving through exceptionally arduous
country. For behind the Russian centre lay the
great marshes of the Pripet, which must divide the
front into sharply defined army groups.

The group system had already begun. We have

Brest Litovski.

seen that the Eastern front, unlike the West, was
never without its gaps. Ever since the abandon-
ment of Warsaw the Russian forces were arranged
in groups, not merely for administrative purposes,
but because a continuous line was impossible.

176 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Ewarts commanded the central group, Ivanov the
southern, and Alexeiev the northern. These groups
were still in touch, but they were separated by sub-
stantial territorial gaps. Against the three Russian
commands were arrayed three German army systems.
Von Hindenburg had the northern, and under him
were the armies of von Lauenstein, von Below,
von Eichhorn, von Scholtz, and von Gallwitz.
Prince Leopold led the centre, having with him
von Woyrsch ; while von Mackensen had the south-
ern command, including the armies of Boehm-
Ermolli, von Bothmer, and von Pflanzer. It would
appear that, ever since Warsaw fell, the bulk of the
forces of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and von
Linsingen had been kept as a general reserve.

While Russia grappled with the urgencies of
her land retirement there came a sudden threat
on the north from the sea. In March a German
squadron of battleships and torpedo-craft had
shelled the coast villages of Courland. In the early
days of June there had been fighting below Goth-
land and the Gulf of Riga, in which the Russians
lost the mine-layer Yenesei and the Germans the
transport Hindenburg and a destroyer. Russian
torpedo boats engaged German cruisers off Windau
on 30th June, and there was an action off Gothland
on 2nd July. These activities forewarned the Rus-
sian Baltic Fleet, under Admiral Kannin, that at
any moment an attempt might be made to assist
the armies by a landing of troops on the Riga shore.
Such a landing, if successful, would have turned
the Russian right and led at once to the fall of Riga.
But, for a landing to be possible, the mastery of the

Mango

(Finland)

Li

Win

Miles

Gulf of Riga.

IX.

12

178 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

sea must first be secured. It was Germany's busi-
ness first of all to sink or blockade the Russian fleet.
Till that was done any landing was the height of
rashness, more especially when we remember that
her object was not to gain a port but to establish
an advanced base for her extreme left, and such a
base involved a secure and continuous passage for
her transports from Koenigsberg and Danzig.

On Sunday, loth August, an attack was made

on a large scale. A German fleet, consisting of nine

^ of the older battleships, twelve cruisers,

and a destroyer flotilla, attempted to

force the southern channel which leads to the Gulf

of Riga. The attempt was defeated, probably by

the Russian submarines and smaller craft. But on

Aue 1 6 ^k ^ugust ** was renewed with deter-
*' ' mination. The opening of the Gulf is
defended by a group of islands, of which Oesel is
the largest, with the smaller islets of Dago, Mohn,
and Wormso stretching to the north-east. The
chief entrance, the only one practicable for ships
of heavy draught, lies between Oesel and the main-
land, but there is another east of Mohn through
the northern Archipelago. Riga, on the mouth of
the Dvina, lies at the southern end of the Gulf;
and on a bay on the eastern shore, about half-way as
the crow flies between Riga and Reval, is the little
port of Pernau.

On 1 6th August the German fleet engaged the
Russian at the mouth of both channels. The attack

Au? 17 was rePulsed > but next day a thick fog

** ' " settled on the water, and the enemy was

able to sweep the mines from the entrance. The

Russian light craft retired into the Gulf, while the

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 179

larger units remained outside, since in such weather
a general action was impossible. The Germans
moved in, apparently under the impression that
the Russians had withdrawn from the Gulf alto-
gether. On the iQth they began their prepara-
tion for a landing at Pernau, a port chosen because
it was unfortified, and was on the road ^
to Petrograd. Four very large flat-bot-
tomed barges laden with troops moved inshore,
and on the 2oth attempted to land. The *
conditions were favourable only on the ' *'
assumption that there was no enemy craft near, for
the shoal water forbade the ships in support to
approach the shore. It was the opportunity of the
Russian light craft, and quickly they seized it. The
whole landing force was captured or destroyed.

Meantime the Russian fleet had joined battle
throughout the length of the Gulf. The heaviest
fighting was in Mohn Sound, where the retreating
German vessels were caught by the Russian de-
stroyers. One old gunboat, the Sivoutch, engaged
a German cruiser which was escorting the torpedo
craft. The action began at a range of about 1,200
yards. " The Sivoutch" said the Russian Admiralty
report, " wrapped in flames, and on fire fore and
aft, continued to answer shot for shot until she
went down, having previously sunk an enemy tor-
pedo boat." It was the only serious Russian cas-
ualty. Eight German destroyers and two cruisers
were either sunk or put out of action, a submarine
was driven ashore, and it seems prob- ^
able that an auxiliary cruiser was also
destroyed. On the zist the Germans had evacuated
the Gulf.

i8o HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The action on the German side was an example
of a strategy which ignored the first conditions of
naval warfare. Any attempt to land till the Gulf
was clear and strongly held was an invitation to
disaster. It was a superb chance for the employ-
ment of smaller craft, and Russia, strong in this
class, used her strength to brilliant purpose. Com-
ing after the terrible crisis of the great retreat, the
success at Riga was of incalculable value in raising
the spirits of the nation. Its practical effects were
as great as its moral ; for had the Pernau landing
succeeded, and an advanced German base been
established there, the defence of the Dvina would
have been nullified and the retirement of the Russian
right must have been gravely confused.

About this time there were naval activities else-
where in the Baltic. The German battle cruiser
Moltke, a sister ship of the Goeben, which took part
in the raid on Scarborough, and was damaged in
the battle of 24th January, was torpedoed by a
British submarine under Commander Noel Laurence.
She was struck in the bows, and, though she suc-
ceeded in escaping, there was reason to believe that
she had been put out of action for some time. On
* i Qth August the submarine £13, under

ug- *9- Lieutenant - Commander Layton, ran
ashore on the Danish island of Saltholm. She was
given twenty-four hours to get off by the Danish
authorities, but while so engaged was shelled and
torpedoed by two German destroyers from a dis-
tance of 300 yards. The crew, who behaved with
great gallantry, took to the water, where they were
fired on with machine guns and shrapnel. This
dastardly outrage, which caused the loss of fifteen

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 181

lives, was in defiance not only of the laws of war
but of the ordinary decencies of mankind. It
roused profound anger among the Danes, who
rescued the survivors and sent them back to Eng-
land. One Danish torpedo boat steamed between
the submarine and the German destroyers, and
compelled the latter to cease fire. The campaign
revealed no uglier example of the strange code of
honour which obtained among the parvenus of the
sea.

The convening of the Imperial Duma on ist
August, while the fate of Warsaw was still unknown,
j was a wise step on the part of the Tsar

u&' *' and his advisers. Defeat had brought
no weakening to the Russian people, but it had
brought perplexity, and, for a moment, confusion.
The purge we have spoken of in an earlier chapter
was in process ; many high reputations had been
dimmed ; suspicion had fallen upon high quarters ;
and gossip was busy with a thousand tongues. It
was fitting that the determination of the great people
behind the bureaucrats should be made plain to
the world — that determination so slow to kindle, but
once inflamed, as constant as the brightness of a star.
For this purpose the Duma was the only mechan-
ism. It was the representative, along with the
army, of the whole nation. It met to register the fact
of a purified and reconstructed Government, and
to renew its oath of resolution.

The war was prolific in eloquence. M. Viviani
and Mr. Lloyd George made notable speeches;
but the nations were weary of words, and the
stimulants had lost their power. But there are

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

some speeches which have almost the quality of
deeds. Such have been the fiery orations of Chat-
ham and Gambetta, the homely good sense of Crom-
well, the noble simplicity of Washington, the grave
elevation of Lincoln. Such, too, was the address of
M. Rodzianko, the President of the Duma. His
words moved his hearers to a strange exaltation,
and rang throughout the land from the Dnieper to
the Pacific. He drew a picture of the Army — " the
living sword of our native land, menacing the foe,
but humble before God." He reviewed the events
of the year, and spoke words of comfort to the
patriots of Poland. The war, he said, was no longer
a duel of armies but of peoples, and victory could
only be won if civilians and soldiers alike wrought
for the common purpose. " Our duty — sparing
neither strength nor time nor means — is to set to
work without delay. Let each one give his labour
into the treasury of popular might. Let those who
are rich, let those who are able, contribute to the
common welfare. The Army and the Fleet have
set each of us an example of duty dauntlessly ful-
filled. They have done all that man may do ; our
turn has come." For victory, he pointed out, a
change of spirit was needful in the Government,
and the change must involve a new trust in the
people.

In his closing words, pointing to General Ruzsky,
who was among his hearers, and to the many wounded
officers around him, he appealed to the antique spirit
of the nation : —

' Such is the task which has now risen before us
in its giant stature. Remember that on the issue of
our labours for the assistance of the Army depends

THE GREAT RUSSIAN RETREAT. 183

the greatness of Russia, purged and liberated. If
they fail, there is nothing before her but humiliation
and sorrow. But they cannot fail. Our great
Mother will never be enslaved. Russia will fight
to the last, till she has broken the sordid might of her
foe. Some day he will fall, and peace will descend
upon us.

" Representatives of the people, at this critical
moment of our destiny we must take comfort from
the valour of our hearts. We must rise to the great
traditions of our race. The country awaits your
words. Cast out vain fears. We shall endure to
the end, to the last man who can hold a sword.
Our strength comes from our trust in the incom-
parable soldiers of our blood.

" In thee we trust, Holy Russia. We trust in
the inexhaustible riches of thy spirit. We speak for
the whole people, for every nook and cranny of our
ancestral soil, and in its name we greet our glorious
Army and our gallant Fleet. Know, heroic de-
fenders, that Russia, united, compact, burning with
a single wish and a single thought, will oppose to
her foes the steel breasts of her sons."

The resolution adopted by the Duma, in its
frankness and confidence, may be said to mark a new
epoch in the constitutional history of Russia : —

" Certifying that in the past year the military trials ex-
perienced fortified still more among the whole population
of the Empire the unshakable and unanimous resolution to
continue the struggle with our faithful Allies until the final
success is attained, and not to conclude peace before victory
is complete ;

" Recognizing that the nearest way to victory is the
willing assistance of the whole population for the creation
of fresh means of continuing the struggle, which demands

184 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the strengthening of internal peace and the forgetting of old
political quarrels, as well as the benevolent attention of the
authorities in regard to the interests of all loyal citizens of
Russia, without distinction of race, language, or religion ;

" Believing that rapid victory can only be attained by the
close union with the whole country of a Government enjoying
its entire confidence ;

" Expressing the unshakable faith that the shortcomings
which have hitherto existed in the provision of munitions
for the army will be immediately removed with the assistance
of the Legislative Chambers and the great force of public
opinion, and that those responsible for criminal omissions
should pay the penalty, no matter what their position ;

" The Imperial Duma passes to the Order of the Day."

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GALLIPOLI.

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S SECOND DISPATCH.

FROM the General Commanding, Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force,

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London,
S.W.

General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
26th August, 1915.

MY LORD,

At the close of the ten days and ten nights described
in my first dispatch our troops had forced their way forward
for some 5,000 yards from the landing places at the point of
the peninsula. Opposite them lay the Turks, who since their
last repulse had fallen back about half a mile upon previously
prepared redoubts and entrenchments. Both sides had drawn
heavily upon their stock of energy and munitions, but it
seemed clear that whichever could first summon up spirit to
make another push must secure at least several hundreds of
yards of the debatable ground between the two fronts. And
several hundred yards, whatever it might mean to the enemy,
was a matter of life or death to a force crowded together
under gun fire on so narrow a tongue of land. Such was the
situation on the 5th of May, the date last mentioned in my
dispatch of the 2oth of that month.

On that day I determined to continue my advance, feeling
certain that even if my tired troops could not carry the for-
midable opposing lines they would at least secure the use of

i88 APPENDIX I.

the intervening ground. Orders were forthwith issued for an
attack.

DISPOSITIONS ON 5TH MAY.

The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during
the previous critical fighting had forced me to disorganize
and mix together several of the formations in the southern
group, to the extent even of the French on our right having
a British battalion holding their own extremest right. For
the purposes of the impending fight it became therefore
necessary to create temporarily a Composite Division, con-
sisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry
Brigades (withdrawn for the purpose from the northern
section), together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Ply-
mouth and Drake Battalions. The 2Qth Division was recon-
stituted into four brigades — i.e., the 88th and 8yth Brigades,
the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (T.F.), and the 2Qth Indian
Infantry Brigade. The French Corps Expeditionnaire was
reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new Compo-
site Division formed my General Reserve.

The 2gth Division, whose left rested on the coast about
three miles north-east of Cape Tekke, was ordered to direct,
its right moving on the south-east edge of Krithia, while the
Corps Expeditionnaire with the 2nd Naval Brigade had
assigned to them for their first point of attack the command-
ing ridge running from north to south above the Kereves
Dere. A foothold upon this ridge was essential, as its capture
would ensure a safe pivot on which the 2Qth Division could
swing in making any further advance. Communication
between these two sections of the attack was to be main-
tained by the Plymouth and Drake battalions.

THE ATTACK BEGINS.

During the three days (6th-8th May) our troops were
destined to be very severely tried. They were about to attack
a series of positions scientifically selected in advance which
although not yet joined up into one line of entrenchment.

APPENDIX I. 189

were already strengthened by works on their more important
tactical features.

The 29th Division led off at n a.m., the French corps
followed suit at 11.30 a.m. Every yard was stubbornly
contested ; some Brigades were able to advance, others
could do no more than maintain themselves. Positions were
carried and held, other positions were carried and lost ; but,
broadly, our gunners kept lengthening the fuses of their
shrapnel, and by 1.30 p.m. the line had been pushed forward
two to three hundred yards. Here and there this advance
included a Turkish trench, but generally speaking the main
enemy position still lay some distance ahead of our leading
companies.

By 4.30 p.m. it became clear that we should make no
more progress that day. The French Corps were held up by
a strong field work. They had made good a point upon the
crest line of the lower slope of the Kereves Dere ridge, but
there they had come under a fire so galling that they were
unable, as it turned out, to entrench until nightfall. The
88th Brigade could not carry a clump of fir trees to their
front : company after company made the perilous essay, but
the wood, swept by hidden machine guns, proved a veritable
deathtrap. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade also were only
just barely holding on, and were suffering heavy losses from
those same concealed machine guns. The troops were ordered
to entrench themselves in line and link up their flanks on
either side.

At night, save for rifle fire, there was quiet along the whole
British line. On the right a determined bayonet charge was
made upon the French, who gave ground for the moment,
but recovered it again.

THE MOVEMENT ON THE LEFT.

Next morning (the 7th May) we opened with shrapnel
upon the enemy's trenches opposite our extreme left, and at
10 a.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade began the attack.

190 APPENDIX I.

But our artillery had not been able to locate the cleverly
sited German machine-gun batteries, whose fire rendered
it physically impossible to cross that smooth glacis. Next
to the right the 88th Brigade swept forward, and the i/5th
Royal Scots, well supported by artillery fire, carried the fir
trees with a rush. This time it was discovered that not only
the enfilading machine guns had made the wood so difficult
to hold. Amongst the branches of the trees Turkish snipers
were perched, sometimes upon small wooden platforms.
When these were brought down the surroundings became
much healthier. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of the
8/th Brigade, were pushed up to support the left of the
88th, and all seemed well, when, at 1.20 p.m., a strong Turkish
counter-attack drove us back out of the fir clump. As an
offset to this check the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers captured
three Turkish trenches, and a second battalion of the 87th
Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, was sent for-
ward on the left to make these good.

At 3 p.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade again reported
they were definitely held up by the accurate cross-fire of bat-
teries of machine guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge
between the ravine and the sea — batteries which also enfiladed
the left flank of the 88th Brigade as it endeavoured to advance
in the centre. Unless we were to acquiesce in a stalemate
the moment for our effort had arrived, and a general attack
was ordered for 4.45 p.m., the whole of the 87th Brigade to
reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to
support it.

THE GENERAL ATTACK.

Despite their exhaustion and their losses the men responded
with a will. The whole force, French and British, rose simul-
taneously and made a rush forward. All along the front we
made good a certain amount of ground, excepting only on our
extreme left. For the third time British bayonets carried the
fir clump in our centre, and when darkness fell the whole
line (excepting always the left) had gained from 200 to 300

APPENDIX I. 191

yards, and had occupied or passed over the first line of Turkish
trenches.

The troops were now worn out ; the new lines needed
consolidating, and it was certain that fresh reinforcements
were reaching the Turks. Balancing the actual state of my
own troops against the probable condition of the Turks, I
decided to call upon the men to make one more push before
the new enemy forces could get into touch with their sur-
roundings.

Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the
line gained, to maintain that line against counter-attack,
and to prepare to advance again next morning. The Lanca-
shire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn into reserve, and its
place on the left was taken by the Brigade of New Zeal-
anders.

General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment
on a hill in rear of the left of our line. Under my plan for the
fresh attack the New Zealand Brigade was to advance through
the line held during the night by the 88th Brigade and press on
towards Krithia. Simultaneously, the Syth Brigade was to
threaten the works on the west of the ravine, whilst endeav-
ouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers, to steal
patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German
machine guns.

THE BATTLE OF 8TH MAY.

At 10.15 a.m. heavy fire from ships and batteries was
opened on the whole front, and at 10.30 a.m. the New Zealand
Brigade began to move, meeting with strenuous opposition
from the enemy, who had received his reinforcements. Sup-
ported by the fire of the batteries and the machine guns of
the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right and ad-
vanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little
further progress. By 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards had been
gained beyond the previously most advanced trenches of the
88th Brigade.

At this hour the French Corps reported they could not

192 APPENDIX I.

advance up the crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till
further progress was made by the British.

At 4 p.m. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced
by the 2nd Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope
arms, and move on Krithia precisely at 5.30 p.m.

At 5.15 p.m. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bom-
barded the enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at
5.30 p.m. the field guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover
the infantry advance.

The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack
was perfect, the timing of the movement being carried out
with great precision. Some of the companies of the New
Zealand regiments did not get their orders in time, but acting
on their own initiative they pushed on as soon as the heavy
howitzers ceased firing, thus making the whole advance simul-
taneous.

STEADY BRITISH ADVANCE.

The steady advance of the British could be followed by
the sparkle of their bayonets until the long lines entered the
smoke clouds. The French at first made no move, then,
their drums beating and bugles sounding the charge, they
suddenly darted forward in a swarm of skirmishers, which
seemed in one moment to cover the whole southern face of
the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the Turkish
gunners now turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading
groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt the ink-black bursts
of high explosive shells blotted out both assailants and assailed.
The trial was too severe for the Senegalese tirailleurs. They
recoiled. They were rallied. Another rush forward, another
repulse, and then a small supporting column of French soldiers
was seen silhouetted against the sky as they charged upwards
along the crest of the ridge of the Kereves Dere, whilst else*
where it grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became
a blank.

Not until next morning did any reliable detail come to
hand of what had happened. The New Zealanders' firing line

APPENDIX I. 193

had marched over the cunningly concealed enemy's machine-
guns without seeing them, and these, reopening on our sup-
ports as they came up, caused them heavy losses. But the
first line pressed on and arrived within a few yards of the
Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advances
beyond the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.

The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Com-
posite Brigade, and, in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel,
machine-gun, and rifle fire, had progressed from 300 to 400
yards.

The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the
New Zealand Brigade, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston,
and the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-
General the Hon. J. W. McCay, is worthy of particular
praise. Their losses were correspondingly heavy, but in spite
of fierce counter-attacks by numerous fresh troops they stuck
to what they had won with admirable tenacity.

On the extreme left the 8yth Brigade, under Major-General
W. R. Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to
advance across the smooth, bullet-swept area between the
ravine and the sea ; but once more the enemy machine guns
thinned the ranks of the leading companies of the South Wales
Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but to give
ground. But when night closed in the men of the 8yth Brigade
of their own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved
progress to the extent of just about 200 yards. During the
darkness the British troops everywhere entrenched themselves
on the line gained.

On the right the French column, last seen as it grew dark,
had stormed and still held the redoubt round which the
fighting had centred until then. Both General d'Amade and
General Simonin had been present in person with this detach-
ment, and had rallied the Senegalese and encouraged the white
troops in their exploit. With their bayonets these brave
fellows of the 8th Colonials had inflicted exceedingly heavy
losses upon the enemy.

ix. 13

194 APPENDIX I.

The French troops whose actions have hitherto been
followed belonged, all of them, to the 2nd Division. But be-
yond the crest of the ridge the valley of the Kereves Dere lies
dead to any one occupying my post of command. And in this
area the newly-arrived Brigade of the French ist Division
had been also fighting hard. Here they had advanced simul-
taneously with the 2nd Division and achieved a fine success
in their first rush, which was jeopardized when a battalion of
Zouaves was forced to give way under a heavy bombardment.
But, as in the case of the 2nd Division, the other battalions
of the ist Regiment de Marche d'Afrique, under Lieutenant-
Colonel Nieger, restored the situation, and in the end the
Division carried and held two complete lines of Turkish re-
doubts and trenches.

THE RESULT OF THE THREE DAYS' BATTLE.

The net result of the three days' fighting has been a gain
of 600 yards on the right of the British line and 400 yards
on the left and centre. The French had captured all the
ground in front of the Farm Zjimmerman, as well as a redoubt,
for the possession of which there had been obstinate fighting
during the whole of the past three days.

This may not seem very much, but actually more had been
won than at first meets the eye. The German leaders of the
Turks were quick to realize the fact. From nightfall till dawn
on the gth-ioth efforts were made everywhere to push us back.
A specially heavy attack was made upon the French, sup-
ported by a hot cannonade and culminating in a violent
hand-to-hand conflict in front of the Brigade Simomn. Every-
where the assailants were repulsed, and now for the first
time I felt that we had planted a fairly firm foothold upon the
point of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Meanwhile in the Northern Zone also the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps had strengthened their grip on
Turkish soil. Whilst in the south we had been attacking and
advancing, they had been defending and digging themselves

APPENDIX I. 195

more and more firmly into those cliffs on which it had seemed
at first that their foothold was so precarious.

On the nth May, the first time for eighteen days and nights,
it was found possible to withdraw the 2gth Division from the
actual firing line and to replace it by the 2Qth Indian Infantry
Brigade and by the 42nd Division, which had completed its
disembarkation two days previously. The withdrawal gave
no respite from shells, but at least the men were, most nights,
enabled to sleep.

THE BEGINNING OF SIEGE WARFARE.

The moment lent itself to reflection, and during this
breathing space I was able to realize we had now nearly
reached the limit of what could be attained by mingling
initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much in posses-
sion of my numbers and dispositions as I was in possession
of their first line of defence ; the opposing fortified fronts
stretched parallel from sea to straits ; there was little scope
left now, either at Achi Baba or at Kaba Tepe, for tactics
which would fling flesh-and-blood battalions against lines of
unbroken barbed wire. Advances must more and more tend
to take the shape of concentrated attacks on small sections
of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation. Siege
warfare was soon bound to supersede manoeuvre battles
in the open. Consolidation and fortification of our front,
improvement of approaches, selection of machine-gun em-
placements and scientific grouping of our artillery under a
centralized control must ere long form the tactical basis of
our plans.

So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of
comparative rest I divided my front into four sections. On
the left was the 2Qth Division, to which the 2Qth Indian
Infantry Brigade was attached. In the left centre came the
42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right centre stood the
Royal Naval Division, and at my right was the Corps ExpMi-
tionnaire. Thus I secured organization in depth as well as

196 APPENDIX I.

front, enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs,
supports, and reserves, and giving strength for defence as well
as attack. Hitherto the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements
had forced a hand-to-mouth procedure upon headquarters ;
now the control became more decentralized.

A GURKHA PERFORMANCE.

Already, before the new system of local efforts had come
into working order, the 2Qth Indian Brigade had led the way
towards it by a brilliant little affair on the night of the loth-
nth May. The Turkish right rested upon the steep cliff
north-east of "Y" beach, where the King's Own Scottish
Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division,
had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy
had converted the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which
the fire of machine guns had held up the left of our attacks.
Two gallant attempts by the Royal Munster Fusiliers and the
Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing on this cliff on
the 8th and gth May had both of them failed.

During the night of the loth-nth May the 6th Gurkhas
started off to seize this bluff. Their scouts descended to the
sea, worked their way for some distance through the broken
ground along the shore, and crawled hands and knees up the
precipitous face of the cliff. On reaching the top they were
heavily fired on. As a surprise the enterprise had failed, but
as a reconnaissance it proved very useful. On the following
day Major-General H. B. Cox, commanding 2Qth Indian
Infantry Brigade, submitted proposals for a concerted attack
on this bluff (now called Gurkha Bluff), and arrangements
were made with the Navy for co-operation. These arrange-
ments were completed on I2th May ; they included a demon-
stration by the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, and
by our artillery and the support of the attack from the sea
by the guns of H.M.S. Dublin and H.M.S. Talbot. At
6.30 p.m. on the I2th May the Manchester Brigade and the
29th Divisional artillery opened fire on the Turkish trenches,

APPENDIX I. 197

and under cover of this fire a double company of the i/6th
Gurkhas once more crept along the shore and assembled below
the bluff. Then, the attention of the Turks being taken up
with the bombardment, they swiftly scaled the cliffs and car-
ried the work with a rush. The machine-gun section of the
Gurkhas was hurried forward, and at 4.30 a.m. a second
double company was pushed up to join the first.

An hour later these two double companies extended and
began to entrench to join up their new advanced left diago-
nally with the right of the trenches previously held by their
battalion.

At 6 a.m. a third double company advanced across the
open from their former front line of trenches under a heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire, and established themselves on this
diagonal line between the main ravine on their right and the
newly captured redoubt. The 4th double company moved up
as a support, and held the former firing line.

Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all
attempts on the 6th-8th, was now, by stratagem, advanced
nearly 500 yards. Purchased as it was with comparatively
slight losses (21 killed, 92 wounded), this success was due to
careful preparation and organization by Major-General
H. V. Cox, commanding 2gth Indian Infantry Brigade, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding i/6th Gurkhas,
and Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) F. A. Wynter,
R.G.A., commanding the Artillery Group supporting the
attack. The co-operation of the two cruisers was excellent,
and affords another instance of the admirable support by the
Navy to our troops.

ARRIVAL OF GENERAL GOURAUD.

On May I4th General Gouraud arrived and took over
from General d'Amade the command of the Corps Expedi-
tionnaire. As General d'Amade quitted the shores of the
peninsula he received a spontaneous ovation from the British
soldiers at work upon the beaches.

198 APPENDIX I.

The second division of the Corps Expeditionnaire, com-
manded by General Bailloud, had now completed disembar-
kation.

From the time of the small local push forward made by
the 6th Gurkhas on the night of the loth-nth May until
the 4th of June the troops under my command pressed against
the enemy continuously by sapping, reconnaissance, and local
advances; whilst, to do them justice, they (the enemy) did
what they could to repay us in like coin. I have given the
escalade of Gurkha Bluff as a sample; no forty-eight hours
passed without something of the sort being attempted or
achieved either by the French or ourselves.

THE ANZAC CORPS.

Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps were perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must
begin by explaining that their rdle at this stage of the opera-
tions was — first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of
the Turkish position ; secondly, to hold up as large a body as
possible of the enemy in front of them, so as to lessen the strain
at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle
to Cape Helles — a part out of harmony with the dare-devil
spirit animating those warriors from the South ; and so it has
come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive
of the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to
take on the character of an attack.

The line held during the period under review by the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed a rough
semicircle inland from the beach of Anzac Cove, with a
diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line is everywhere
close to the enemy's trenches, and in all sections of the posi-
tion sapping, counter-sapping, and bomb attacks have been
incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches
has been impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have
fallen on Anzac within the hour, and these of all calibres,
from ii inches to field shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both

APPENDIX I. 199

above and below ground, the contest has been particularly
severe. This section of the line is situated on the circum-
ference of the Anzac semicircle at the farthest point from its
diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the
brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below.
The enemy's trenches are only a few feet distant.

On gth May a night assault, supported by enfilade fire,
was delivered on the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's
Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the bayonet,
troops established in them, and reinforcements sent up.

At dawn on the loth May a strong counter-attack forced
our troops to evacuate the trenches and fall back on Quinn's
Post. In opposing this counter-attack our guns did great
execution, as we discovered later from a Turkish officer's
diary that two Turkish regiments on this date lost 600 killed
and 2,000 wounded.

On the night of I4th-i5th May a sortie was made from
Quinn's Post with the object of filling in Turkish trenches in
which bomb-throwers were active. The sortie, which cost us
some 70 casualties, was not successful.

On I4th May Lieutenant-General Sir W. B. Birdwood
was slightly wounded, but I am glad to say he was not
obliged to relinquish the command of his Corps.

DEATH OF GENERAL BRIDGES.

On I5th May, I deeply /egret to say, Major-General W. T.
Bridges, commanding the Australian Division, received a
severe wound, which proved fatal a few days later. Sincere
and single-minded in his devotion to Australia and to duty,
his loss still stands out even amidst the hundreds of other
brave officers who have gone.

On 1 8th May Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombard-
ment from large-calibre guns and howitzers. At midnight
of the iSth-igth the most violent rifle and machine-gun fire
yet experienced broke out along the front. Slackening from
3 a.m. to 4 a.m. it then broke out again, and a heavy Turkish

200 APPENDIX I.

column assaulted the left of No. 2 section. This assault was
beaten off with loss. Another attack was delivered before
daylight on the centre of this section ; it was repeated four
times and repulsed each time with very serious losses to the
enemy. Simultaneously a heavy attack was delivered on the
north-east salient of No. 4 section, which was repulsed and fol-
lowed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack was pre-
vented by shrapnel. Attacks were also delivered on Quinn's
Post, Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section.
At about 5 a.m. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious
cannonade was begun by a large number of enemy guns,
including 12-inch and 9.2-inch, and other artillery that had
not till then opened. By 9.30 a.m. the Turks were pressing
hard against the left of Courtney's and the right of Quinn's
Post. At 10 a.m. this attack, unable to face fire from the right,
swung round to the left, where it was severely handled by our
guns and the machine guns of our left section. By n a.m.
the enemy, who were crowded together in the trenches beyond
Quinn's Post, were giving way under their heavy losses.

According to prisoners' reports, 30,000 troops, including
five fresh regiments, were used against us. General Liman von
Sanders was himself in command.

The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from
the fact that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of
our trenches. A large proportion of these losses was due to
our artillery fire. Our casualties amounted to about 100
killed and 500 wounded, including nine officers wounded.

A SUSPENSION OF ARMS.

The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carry-
ing through of the negotiations for the suspension of arms,
which actually took place on 24th May. About 5 p.m. on 2oth
May white flags and Red Crescents began to appear all along
the line. In No. 2 section a Turkish staff officer, two medical
officers, and a company commander came out, and were met
by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding the Australian

APPENDIX I. 201

Division, half-way between the trenches. The staff officer
explained that he was instructed to arrange a suspension of
arms for the removal of dead and wounded. He had no
written credentials, and he was informed that neither he nor
the General Officer Commanding Australian Division had the
power to arrange such a suspension of arms, but that at 8 p.m.
an opportunity would be given of exchanging letters on the
subject, and that meanwhile hostilities would recommence
after 10 minutes' grace. At this time some stretcher parties
on both sides were collecting wounded, and the Turkish
trenches opposite ours were packed with men standing shoul-
der to shoulder two deep. Matters were less regular in front of
other sections, where men with white flags came out to collect
wounded. Meanwhile it was observed that columns were on
the march in the valley up which the Turks were accustomed
to bring up their reinforcements.

On hearing the report of these movements, General Sir
W. R. Birdwood, commanding Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps, ordered his trenches to be manned against a
possible attack. As the evening drew in the enemy's concen-
tration continued, and everything pointed to their intention
of making use of the last of the daylight to get their troops
into position without being shelled by our artillery. A message
was therefore sent across to say that no clearing of dead or
wounded could be allowed during the night, and that any
negotiations for such a purpose should be opened through the
proper channel and initiated before noon on the following day.

Stretcher and other parties fell back, and immediately fire
broke out. In front of our right section masses of men ad-
vanced behind lines of unarmed men holding up their hands.
Firing became general all along the line, accompanied by a
heavy bombardment of the whole position, so that evidently
this attack must have been prearranged. Musketry and
machine-gun fire continued without interruption till after
dark, and from then up to about 4 a.m. next day.

Except for a half-hearted attack in front of Courtney's

202 APPENDIX I.

Post, no assault was made till 1.20 a.m., when the enemy
left their trenches and advanced on Quinn's Post. Our guns
drove the Turks back to their trenches, and beat back all other
attempts to assault. By 4.30 a.m. on 2ist May musketry
fire had died down to normal dimensions.

As the Turks seemed anxious to bury their dead, and as
human sentiment and medical science were both of one accord
in favour of such a course, I sent Major-General W. P. Braith-
waite, my Chief of the General Staff, on 22nd May, to assist
Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding the
Army Corps, in coming to some suitable arrangements with
the representatives sent by Essad Pasha. The negotiations
resulted in a suspension of arms from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m.
on 24th May. The procedure laid down for this suspension
of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordship, correctly
observed on both sides.

The burial of the dead was finished about 3 p.m. Some
3,000 Turkish dead were removed or buried in the area be-
tween the opposing lines. The whole of these were killed on
or since the i8th of May. Many bodies of men killed earlier
were also buried.

On the 25th May, with the assistance of two destroyers
of the Royal Navy, a raid was carried out on Nibrunesi Point.
A fresh telephone line was destroyed and an observing station
demolished.

MAJOR QUINN KILLED.

On 28th May, at 9 p.m., a raid was made on a Turkish
post overlooking the beach 1,200 yards north of Kaba
Tepe, H.M.S. Rattlesnake co-operating. A party of 50 rifles
rushed the post, killing or capturing the occupants. A similar
raid was made against an enemy trench to the left of our
line which cost the Turks 200 casualties, as was afterwards
ascertained.

From 28th May till 5th June the fighting seemed to con-
centrate itself around Quinn's Post. Three enemy galleries
had been detected there, and work on them stopped by

APPENDIX I. 203

counter-mines, which killed 20 Turks and injured 30. One
gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at 3.30 a.m. on
29th May a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's
Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb
attack, before which our left centre subsection fell back,
letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one sub-
section on the left from the two other subsections on the
right.

At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by
6 a.m. the position had been retaken with the bayonet by
the I5th Australian Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn,
who was unfortunately killed. All the enemy in the trench
were killed or captured, and the work of restoration was
begun.

At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, supported by
artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs
from the trenches. The fine shooting of our guns and the
steadiness of the Infantry enabled us to inflict upon the enemy
a bloody repulse, demoralizing them to such an extent that the
bomb-throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the
middle of their own first line.

At 8.15 a.m. the attack slackened, and by 8.45 a.m. the
enemy's attacks had practically ceased.

Our casualties in this affair amounted to 2 officers, 31 other
ranks killed, 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The
enemy's losses must have been serious, and were probably
equal to those sustained on gth-ioth May. Except for the
first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine explosion, all
ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage.

On 30th May preparations were made in Quinn's Post to
attack and destroy two enemy saps, the heads of which had
reached within 5 yards of our fire trench. Two storming
parties of 35 men went forward at i p.m., cleared the sap heads
and penetrated into the trenches beyond; but they were
gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in spite of
our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused

204 APPENDIX I.

by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited
supply.

During 3ist May close fighting continued in front of Quinn's
Post.

On ist June, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New
Zealand Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge
of gun-cotton against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The
structure was completely demolished.

THE ANZAC MOVEMENTS.

After sunset on the 4th of June three separate enterprises
were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps. These were undertaken in compliance with an order
which I had issued that the enemy's attention should be
distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the
southern zone.

(1) A demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the
Navy co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.

(2) A sortie at n p.m. towards a trench 200 yards from
Quinn's Post. This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men
took place at 2.55 a.m. on 5th June and penetrated to
the Turkish trench, demolished a machine-gun emplace-
ment which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good
order.

(3) At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at n p.m.
A party of 60 men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party
on either flank, stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault
many Turks were bayoneted and 28 captured. A working
party followed up the attack and at once set to work. Mean-
while the Turkish trenches on the left of the post were heavily
assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which drew from
them a very heavy fire. After daybreak a strong bomb attack
developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier
type of bomb than hitherto.

At 6.30 a.m. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was
found necessary to retire to the original fire trench of the post

APPENDIX I. 205

and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Our casualties were 80 ;
those of the enemy considerably greater.

On 5th June a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by 2
officers and 100 men of the ist Australian Infantry, the ob-
jective being the destruction of a machine gun in a trench
known as German Officer's Trench. A special party of 10
men with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant
E. E. L. Lloyd, ist Battalion (New South Wales) Australian
Imperial Force) made a dash for the machine-gun ; one of
the 10 men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a
range of five feet and another three at the same range through
a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead
cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage
was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of
the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered
some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time
by machine guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant
assault being attained, the party withdrew in good order with
their wounded. Casualties in all were 36.

THE BATTLE OF 4TH JUNE.

I now return to the Southern Zone and to the battle of
the 4th of June.

From 25th May onwards the troops had been trying to
work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches.
On the 25th May the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions crept
100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on the night of 28th-29th
May the whole of the British line made a further small advance.
On that same night the French Corps ExpSditionnaire was
successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish
left west of the Kereves Dere.

All Turkish counter-attacks during 2gth May were re-
pulsed. On the night of 30th May two of their many assaults
effected temporary lodgment. But on both occasions they
were driven out again with the bayonet.

On every subsequent night up to that of the 3rd~4th June

206 APPENDIX I.

assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but
at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack
upon the enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the
west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

Taking our line of battle from right to left, the troops were
deployed in the following order : — The Corps Expeditionnaire,
the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lanes) Division,
and the 2gth Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were
concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry
available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the
General Officer Commanding 8th Army Corps to form a corps
reserve of 7,000 men.

My General Headquarters for the day were at the com-
mand post on the peninsula.

At 8 a.m. on 4th June our heavy artillery opened with
a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10.30 a.m.
At ii a.m. the bombardment recommenced, and continued till
11.20 a.m., when a feint attack was made which successfully
drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11.30
a.m. all our guns opened fire, and continued with increasing
intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range,
and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and
advanced.

The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme
right the French ist Division carried a line of trench, whilst
the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry,
captured a strong redoubt called the " Haricot," for which
they had already had three desperate contests. Only the
extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground —
a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the
final issue.

The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division
rushed forward with great dash ; the Anson Battalion

APPENDIX I. 207

captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt which
formed a salient in the enemy's line, the Howe and Hood
Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12.15 p.m.
the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in
their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at
12.25 P-m-

The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced
magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish
trenches was captured, and by 12.30 p.m. the Brigade had
carried with a rush the line forming their second objective,
having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working
parties got to work without incident, and the position here
could not possibly have been better.

On the left the 2Qth Division met with more difficulty.
All along the section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped
out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at
the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed
bayonets with our men and inflicted severe loss upon us.
But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester
Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder
of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as
well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had
fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.

THE CHECK ON THE LEFT.

.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here
I the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped
i damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed
I wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, though the
; I4th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite losses amount-
j ing to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the Brigade
I could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on
| the left, skilfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually
i forced its way into a Turkish work ; but the failure of the
I rest of the Brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skil-
i fully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements, were therefore

zo8 APPENDIX I.

sent to the left, so that, if possible, a fresh attack might be
organized.

Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morn-
ing were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack
had developed against the " Haricot.'* The Turks poured
in masses of men through prepared communication trenches,
and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were able to recapture
that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in
doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly
before i p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire
with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured,
thus exposing in their turn the Howe and Hood Battalions to
enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat
across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and
musketry fire.

By 1.30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this
section had been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its
original position — the Collingwood Battalion, which had gone
forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the
newly captured line from the right would continue until the
whole of our gains were wiped out. It looked very like it,
for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the
Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly
consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so
brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it became increasingly
difficult for this gallant Brigade to hold its ground. Heavy
casualties occurred ; the Brigadier and many other officers
were wounded or killed ; yet it continued to hold out with
the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to
sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown
back to make face against the enfilade fire, and reinforce-
ments were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it
and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became
clear that unless the right of our line could advance again
it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the

APPENDIX I. 209

very pronounced salient in which they now found them-
selves.

THE FINAL ATTACK.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval
Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh
attack, and reinforcements were dispatched to this end. The
attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request
of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be
unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success.
By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be ex-
tricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches,
and had to content themselves with consolidating on the
first line, which they had captured within five minutes of
commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by
this Brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the
men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing
would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of
the 88th Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made
by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left
flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them
back.

At 4 p.m., under support of our artillery, the Royal Fusiliers
were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches,
but the fact that the left flank was held back made the at-
tempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the dispatch
of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information
was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh
troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation
of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the
ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's
operations was considerable — namely, an advance of 200
to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly
3 miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated,
ix. 14

210 APPENDIX I.

not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his
attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon
the trench captured by the French ist Division on the extreme
right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400,
including n officers : amongst these were 5 Germans, the
remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the
Goeben. Their commanding officer was killed and the machine
gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made
by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.

THE BATTLE OF 2IST JUNE.

From the date of this battle to the end of the month of
June the incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have
so grievously swelled our lists of casualties have been caused
by the determination of the Turks to regain ground they
had lost — a determination clashing against our firm resolve
to continue to increase our holding. Several of these daily
encounters would have been the subject of a separate dis-
patch in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but,
with due regard to proportion, they cannot even be so much
as mentioned here. Only one example each from the French,
British, and Australian and New Zealand spheres of action
will be most briefly set down, so that Your Lordship may
understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies
and fortitude of the troops.

i. At 4.30 a.m. on June the 2ist the French Corps Ex-
p6ditionnaire attacked the formidable works that flank the
Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd Division had stormed all
the Turkish first and second line trenches to their front, and
had captured the Haricot redoubt. On their right the ist
Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-
attacked and driven out. Fresh troops were brought up and
launched upon another assault; but the Turks were just as
obstinate, and drove out the second party before they had
time to consolidate. At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud issued

APPENDIX I. 211

an order that full use must be made of the remaining five
hours of daylight, and that, before dark, these trenches must
be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division
would be sacrificed. At 6 p.m. the third assault succeeded ;
600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the
heavy counter-attacks made through the night by the enemy.
In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French
drafts specially distinguished themselves by their forward-
ness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken,
and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-
attacks) were estimated at 7,000. The losses of the Corps
Expeditionnaire were 2,500.

THE BATTLE OF 28TH JUNE.

2. The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with
special tenacity into the coast. In the scheme of attack
submitted by Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter West on,
commanding Vlllth Army Corps, our left, pivoting upon a
point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push
forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards.
If the operation was successful, then, at its close, we should
have driven the enemy back for a thousand yards along the
coast, and the trenches of this left section of our line would
be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east. Ob-
viously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew
back from the sea towards its fixed or pivoted right. Five
Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the
sea : only two Turkish trenches in the section farthest from
the sea. At 10.20 a.m. on the 28th June our bombardment
began. At 10.45 a.m. a small redoubt known as the Boom-
erang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At n a.m. the
87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured
three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and
7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted
to them, but further to the east ; near the pivotal point the
remainder of the I56th Brigade were unable to get on. Pre-

212 APPENDIX I.

cisely at 11.30 a.m. the second attack took place. The 86th
Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over the
trenches already captured by their comrades of the 8yth
Brigade, and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two
more lines of trenches, thus achieving the five successive
lines along the coast. This success was further improved
upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed to secure, and to
place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west
of the furthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our
casualties were small — 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered
heavily, especially in the repeated counter-attacks, which
for many days and nights afterwards they launched against
the trenches they had lost.

ENVER PASHA'S ORDER.

3. On the night of the 2gth~30th June the Turks, acting,
as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal order
of Enver Pasha, to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack
on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally
on that portion of the line which was under the command of
Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1.30 a.m.
a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was poured
upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the
assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry
and machine guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour
later another grand attack took place against our left and
left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery
and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the
fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and
500 were actually seen to fall.

On the evening of this day, the 3oth of June, the Medi-
terranean Expeditionary Force suffered grievous loss owing to
the wounding of General Gouraud by a shell. This calamity —
for I count it nothing less — brings us down to the beginning
of the month of July.

The command of the Corps Expeditionnaire francais

APPENDIX I. 213

d'Orient was then taken over by General Bailloud, at which
point I shall close my dispatch.

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORT.

During the whole period under review the efforts and
expedients whereby a great army has had its wants sup-
plied upon a wilderness have, I believe, been breaking world
records.

The country is broken, mountainous, arid, and void of
supplies ; the water found in the areas occupied by our forces
is quite inadequate for their needs ; the only practicable
beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable lines of
cliffs ; with the wind in certain quarters no sort of landing
is possible ; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage,
of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our
carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully
throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges.

Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy
submarines. On 22nd May all transports had to be dis-
patched to Mudros for safety. Thenceforth men, stores,
guns, horses, etc., etc., had to be brought from Mudros — a
distance of 40 miles — in fleet sweepers and other small and
shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every
danger and every difficulty was doubled.

But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be
thwarted in their landing operations either by nature or by
the enemy, whilst the Army Service Corps, under Brigadier-
General F. W. B. Koe, and the Army Ordnance Corps, under
Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, have made it a point
of honour to feed men, animals, guns, and rifles in the fighting
line as regularly as if they were only out for manoeuvres on
Salisbury Plain.

I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool
courage and unfailing efficiency with which the Royal Navy,
the beach personnel, the engineers, and the administrative
services have carried out these arduous duties.

214 APPENDIX I.

A CORPORAL'S APOLOGY.

In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under
the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Mani-
fold, Director of Army Signals, has provided the connecting
link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their com-
bined operations, and has rapidly readjusted itself to am-
phibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expan-
sion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General
Headquarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The
working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines,
often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties
have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the
Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their
work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape
Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high explosive
shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed
or wounded and the office entirely demolished. But No.
72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal Engineers, although
much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within
39 minutes reopened communication by apologizing for the
incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual
and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the
wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the
firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be
shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the
jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their
way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it
is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imag-
ine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I
can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method,
and even a certain quiet heroism have characterized the
evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.

APPENDIX I. 215

COMMANDS AND STAFF.

In my three Commanders of Corps I have indeed been
thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help
from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has
added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger
and of calm in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked
hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has
earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the
soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted
his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent
many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of
the front trenches ; and if he does not know every soldier in
his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is
known to his Chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston possesses a
genius for war. I know no more resolute Commander. Calls
for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon
imminent counter-attack are powerless to divert him from
his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible
for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom
which comes from close study in peace combined with long
experience in the field.

In my first dispatch I tried to express my indebtedness
to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again,
however inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal
assistance he has continued to render me ever since.

The thanks of every one serving in the Peninsula are due
to Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources
of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities
have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Finally, if my dispatch is in any way to reflect the feelings
of the force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole
of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and

216 APPENDIX I.

true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see
again ; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon
them for life ; but others, and, thank God, by far the greater
proportion, will be back in due course at the front.
I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
TAN HAMILTON,

General,
Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX II.

THE SPEECH OF THE GERMAN
IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR.

I.

HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG'S DEFENCE.

Aug. 19.

THE sitting of the Reichstag was opened to-day with a speech
by the President, who said : —

While in the West we maintain unflinchingly our gains,
and the Dardanelles and Italian frontier attacks are shattered
by the bravery of our heroic soldiers, in the East the second
year of war brings us and our Allies successes that border
on the fabulous.

After the President's speech the Chancellor spoke. He
said : —

Since our last meeting great things have again happened.
All attempts of the French, in spite of their contempt for
death and the utmost sacrifice of human life, to break our
West front have failed against the stubborn pertinacity of
our brave troops. Italy, who thought to conquer easily the
goods of others which she has coveted, has been thus far
brilliantly repulsed in spite of her numerical superiority and
unsparing sacrifice of human lives. At the Dardanelles the
Turkish Army makes an unflinching stand. Where we have
assumed the offensive we have beaten and thrown back the
enemy. With our Allies we have freed almost all Galicia,

218 APPENDIX II.

Poland, Lithuania, and Courland from the Russians. Iwan-
gorod, Warsaw, and Kovno have fallen.

Amidst the horrors of war we recall gratefully the practical
love of humanity displayed by neighbouring neutral States
towards us on the occasion of the return of civilians from
hostile countries, and the exchange of prisoners of war. The
Netherlands has already twice given ready and devoted
assistance to our severely wounded returning from England.
I express the heartfelt thanks of the German people to this
nation (applause), and add a word of special thanks to the
Pope, who has displayed untiring sympathy with the idea
of the exchange of prisoners and with so many works of
humanity during the war, and to whom belongs the main credit
for their realization.

Our enemies incur a terrible bloodguiltiness by seeking to
deceive their peoples about the real situation. When they do
not deny their defeats our victories serve them to accumulate
new calumnies against us. For instance, that we were victori-
ous in the first year of the war because we had treacherously
prepared for this war long beforehand, while they in their
innocent love of peace (laughter) were not ready for war.
You remember the bellicose articles which the Russian Minister
of War caused to be circulated in the spring of 1914 in which
the complete preparedness for war of the Russian Army was
praised ; you remember the frequently provocative language
which France has employed in recent years ; you know that
France, whenever she satisfied Russia's financial needs, made
it a condition that the greater portion of the loan should
always be applied to war equipment.

Sir Edward Grey said in Parliament on August 3 : —
" We, with our mighty Fleet, shall, if we participate in the
war, surfer little more than if we remained outside/' The
man who, on the eve of his own declaration of war, speaks
in such a very sober, businesslike tone and who, in accordance
therewith, also directs the policy of his friends, can only
act so when he knows that he and his Allies are ready. (Loud

APPENDIX II. 219

cheers.) The fable that England participated in the war
only for the sake of Belgium has been abandoned in the
meantime by England herself. It was not tenable.

ENGLAND AND THE SMALL NATIONS.

Do the smaller nations still believe that England and her
Allies are waging war for their protection and the protection
and freedom of civilization ? Neutral commerce on the sea
is strangled by England as far as possible, goods destined
for Germany must no longer be loaded on neutral ships.
Neutral ships are compelled on the high seas to take English
crews aboard and to obey their orders. England without
hesitation occupies Greek islands because it suits her military
operations, and with her Allies she wishes to constrain neutral
Greece to make cessions of territory in order to bring Bulgaria
to her side. In Poland Russia, who is fighting with the
Allies for the freedom of peoples, lays waste the entire land
before the retreat of her armies. Villages are burnt down,
cornfields trampled down, and the population, Jews and
Christians, are sent to uninhabited districts. They languish
in the mud of Russian roads in windowless, sealed goods
wagons. Such are the freedom and civilization for which our
enemies fight. In her claims to be the protector of smaller
States England counts on the world having a very bad memory.

In the spring of 1902 the Boer Republics were incorporated
in the British Empire. Then English eyes were turned to
Egypt. To the formal annexation of this there was opposed
the British Government's solemn promise to evacuate the
land. That same England that to our proposal to guarantee
to her Belgium's integrity if she remained neutral proudly
replied that England could not make her obligations relative
to Belgian neutrality a matter for bargaining, that same
England had no scruple in bartering away to France her
solemn obligation undertaken towards all Europe by the
conclusion of a treaty with France which was to give to
England Egypt and to France Morocco. In 1907 the southern

220 APPENDIX II.

portion of Persia, by agreement with Russia, was converted
into an exclusively English sphere of interest, and the northern
portion was delivered over to a freedom-loving regiment of
Russian Cossacks. (Herr Liebknecht here interjected " Pots-
dam interview.") I am coming to that later. Whosoever
pursues such a policy has no right to accuse of warlike aspira-
tions and territorial covetousness a country which for forty-
four years has protected European peace and, while almost all
other countries have waged wars and conquered lands, has
striven only for peaceful development. That is hypocrisy.
(Tempestuous applause.)

Conclusive testimony of the tendencies of English policy
and of the origin of the war is contained in the reports of the
Belgian Minister. For what reason are these documents as
far as possible hushed up in London and St. Petersburg ?
The public of the Entente may look at the publications which
I caused to be published, particularly about the negotiations
of the English Military Attach^ with the Belgian military
authorities. Here it is a question of England's policy of
isolation. His colleagues in London and Paris form an ex-
actly similar judgment to that of Baron Greindl, and this
harmonious judgment is of quite decisive weight.

Against these testimonies all attempts of the enemy to
ascribe to us warlike ambitions and to themselves a love of
peace fail. Was German policy not informed of these events
or did it intentionally close its eyes to them by still seeking
an adjustment ? Neither one nor the other. There are circles
who reproach me with political shortsightedness because I
again and again endeavoured to prepare an understanding
with England. I thank God that I did. It is clearly proved
that the fatality of this devastating world conflagration could
have been prevented if an honest understanding with England
directed towards peace had been accomplished. Who in
Europe would then have thought of making war ? With
such an aim in view should I have refused the work because
it was heavy, and because it again and again proved fruitless ?

APPENDIX II. 221

King Edward saw his main task in personally promoting
the English policy of isolation against Germany. After his
death I hoped the negotiations for an agreement already
inaugurated by us in 1909 would make better progress. The
negotiations dragged on till the spring of 1911 without achiev-
ing any result. Then England's interference in our discussion
with France in the Morocco question showed the entire world
how English policy in order to impose its will on the entire
world menaced the world's peace. Then also the English
people was not exactly informed concerning the danger of
the policy of its Government. When after the crisis it recog-
nized how, by a hairsbreadth, it had escaped the abyss of a
world-war, a sentiment grew up in wide circles of the English
nation in favour of establishing relations with us which would
prevent warlike complications.

LORD HALDANE'S MISSION.

Thus arose Lord Haldane's mission in the spring of 1912.
Lord Haldane assured me that the English Cabinet was
inspired with a sincere desire for an understanding. It was
depressed by our impending naval Budget. I asked him
whether an open agreement with us, which would not only
exclude an Anglo-German war, but any European war whatso-
ever, did not seem of more importance to him than a couple
of German Dreadnoughts more or less. Lord Haldane ap-
peared inclined to this view. He asked me, however, whether
if we were assured of security in regard to England, we would
not fall upon France and destroy her. I replied that the
policy of peace which Germany had pursued for more than
forty years ought really to save us from such a question. If we
had planned robber-like attacks we could have had the best
opportunity during the South African War and Russo-Japanese
War to show our love of war. Germany, which sincerely
wished to live in peace with France, would just as little think
of attacking another country. After Haldane had left negotia-
tions were continued in London. In order to arrive at lasting

222 APPENDIX II.

relations with England we proposed an unconditional mutual
neutrality undertaking. When this proposal was rejected by
England as going too far, we proposed to restrict neutrality
to wars in which it could not be said that the Power to whom
neutrality was assured was the aggressor.

This was also rejected by England, who proposed the
following formula : —

" England will not make an unprovoked attack on Ger-
many and will refrain from an aggressive policy towards
Germany. An attack on Germany is not included in any
agreement or combination to which England is at present
a party. England will not join any agreement which aims
at such an attack."

My opinion was that among civilized Powers it was not
customary to attack other Powers without provocation or
join combinations which were planning such things. There-
fore a promise to refrain from such attacks could not be made
the substance of a solemn agreement. The English Cabinet
then proposed to prefix the following to the above formula : —

" As both Powers mutually desire to secure between them-
selves peace and friendship, England declares that she will
not make any unprovoked attack," &c.

This addition could not in any way alter the nature of
the English proposal, and nobody could have blamed me if
already at that time I had broken off negotiations. In order
to do all in my power to secure the peace of Europe I declared
myself ready to accept the English proposal, also on condition
that it was completed as follows : —

" England therefore will, of course, observe benevolent
neutrality should war be forced upon Germany."

Sir Edward Grey flatly refused this addition, as he declared
to our Ambassador, from fear that it would endanger the
existing British friendship with other Powers. This meant
for us the conclusion of the negotiations. England thought
it a token of special friendship to be sealed by a solemn agree-
ment that she would not fall upon us without reason, but

APPENDIX II. 223

reserved for herself a free hand in case her friends should like

to do it.

MR. ASQUITH'S CARDIFF SPEECH.

Mr. Asquith, on October 2, 1914, referred to this at Cardiff.
He told his audience that the English formula that England
would not attack Germany without provocation was not
sufficient for the German statesmen, who demanded that
England should remain absolutely neutral in the event of
Germany's being involved in war.

This assertion of Mr. Asquith's is a misrepresentation of
the facts. Naturally we demanded unconditional neutrality
at first, but in the course of negotiations we restricted our
demand for neutrality to the contingency of war having been
forced upon Germany. This Mr. Asquith withheld from his
audience. I believe myself justified in declaring that he
thereby misled public opinion in England in an unjustifiable
manner. If Mr. Asquith had given the complete facts he
could'not have continued his speech as he did. He said : —

" And this demand, namely, for unconditional neutrality
in any war, was proposed by German statesmen at a moment
when Germany had greatly increased her aggressive and
defensive means of power, especially on the sea. They
demanded that we should give them, as far as we were con-
cerned, a free hand, when they chose the moment to conquer
and govern Europe."

I cannot understand how Mr. Asquith could objectively
represent so wrongly a fact of which he was very well informed
to draw from it conclusions which were contrary to the truth.
I mention this incident in order to protest before the entire
world against the falsehood and slander with which our
enemies fight against us. After we had made, in full cognizance
of the anti-German direction of English policy, with the
utmost patience, the greatest possible concessions, they wanted
to expose us before all the world by an exaggerated mis-
representation of the facts. Should our enemies succeed in
drowning also these statements in the noise of battle and in

224 APPENDIX II.

unworthy work of inciting peoples, the time will come when
history will pronounce judgment. At that time the moment
had come when England and Germany, by a sincere under-
standing, could have secured the peace of the world. We
were ready. England declined ; she will never free herself
from this blot.

Afterwards, Sir Edward Grey, and the French Ambassador
in London, M. Cambon, exchanged the well-known letters
which aimed at an Anglo-French defensive alliance, but by
separately concluded agreements between both the general
staffs and the Admiralty staffs they became in fact an offensive
alliance. This fact was also held from the public. Only
when there was no way out the English Government on
August 3, 1914, informed the public of this. Until then
the English Ministers had always declared in Parliament
that England in the case of a European conflict reserved a
completely free hand. The same policy was pursued by Eng-
land when naval negotiations in the spring of 1914 were
opened with Russia, and the Russian Admiralty desired to
invade our province of Pomerania with the assistance of
English vessels. Thus the encircling by the Entente with its
openly hostile tendencies became narrower. We were obliged
to reply to the situation with the great armament of the Budget
of 1913.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

As regards Russia, I have always acted from the conviction
that friendly relations to individual members of the Entente
might diminish tension. On isolated questions we had come
to a good understanding with Russia. I remind you of the
Potsdam Agreement. The relations between the Govern-
ments were not only correct, but were also inspired by personal
confidence. But the general situation was not solved, because
the " revanche " idea of France and the bellicose pan-Slav
attempts at expansion in Russia were continually encouraged
by the anti-German policy of the balance of power of the
London Cabinet. The tension thus grew to such an extent

APPENDIX II. 225

that it could not stand a serious test. Thus the summer
of 1914 arrived.

In England it is now asserted that war could have been
avoided if I had agreed to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey
to participate in a conference for the adjustment of the Russo-
Austrian conflict. The English proposal for a conference was
handed here on July 27 through the Ambassador. The
Foreign Secretary, in a conversation with Sir E. Goschen, in
which he characterized the proposed method as unsuitable,
declared that according to his information from Russia M.
Sazonoff was prepared for a direct exchange of opinion with
Count Berchtold, and that direct discussion between Petrograd
and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result. Therefore it
would be best, Heir von Jagow said, to await this discussion.

Sir E. Goschen reported this to London and received Sir
Edward Grey's answer, namely, that this would be a pro-
cedure which was by far to be preferred to all others. At
that time Sir Edward Grey agreed to the German standpoint
and expressly put aside his proposal for a conference. We
especially pursued our mediatory action at Vienna in a form
which approached to the last degree the line of what was
consonant with our alliance. On July 29 the German Am-
bassador in Petrograd reported that M. Sazonoff had announced
to him that the Vienna Cabinet categorically declined a direct
discussion. Therefore nothing else remained than to return
to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey for a conversation of four.
As the Vienna Government meanwhile declared itself pre-
pared to agree to a direct exchange of opinion with Petrograd,
it was obvious that a misunderstanding prevailed.

I telegraphed to Herr von Tschirschky, our Ambassador in
Vienna, that we could not expect that Austria-Hungary
should negotiate with Serbia, with whom she was in a state
of war. But the refusal of any exchange of opinion with
Petrograd would be a bad blunder. Though we were ready
to fulfil our duty as an ally, we must decline to be drawn
into a world conflagration by Austria-Hungary ignoring our
ix. 15

226 APPENDIX II.

advice. Herr von Tschirschky answered that Count Berch-
told had declared that in fact a misunderstanding prevailed
on the Russian side. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in
Petrograd at once received corresponding instructions.

When in England shortly before the war excitement in-
creased and serious doubts became loud concerning our
endeavours for the preservation of peace, I published this
incident in the English Press. And now the insinuation is
spread there that this incident never took place at all and
that the instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were inventions
in order to mislead public opinion. You will agree with me
that this accusation is not worthy of reply.

After clearing up the above-mentioned misunderstandings,
conversations began between Petrograd and Vienna until they
found a conclusion by general mobilization of the Russian
Army. I repeat that we carried on direct conversation
between Vienna and Petrograd with the utmost vigour and
success. The assertion that we, by a refusal of the English
proposal for a conference, are guilty of this war belongs to
the category of calumnies behind which our enemies wish to
hide their own guilt. War became unavoidable solely by a
Russian mobilization. We shall emerge as victoriously from
the fight against these calumnies as from the great fight on
the battlefield.

SOLICITUDE FOR POLAND.

Our and the Austro-Hungarian troops have reached the
frontiers in the East defined by the Congress of Poland. Both
now have the task of administering the country. For cen-
turies geographical and political fate has forced the Germans
and Poles to fight against each other. The recollection of
these old differences does not diminish respect for the passion
of patriotism and tenacity with which the Polish people
defends its old Western civilization and its love of independ-
ence in the severe sufferings from Russoism, a love which is
maintained also through the misfortune of this war.

I hope that to-day's occupation of the Polish frontiers

APPENDIX II. 227

against the East represents the beginning of a development
which will remove old contrasts between Germans and Poles,
and will lead the country, liberated from the Russian yoke,
to a happy future, so that it can foster and develop the in-
dividuality of its national life. The country occupied by us
will be justly administered by us with the assistance of its
own population. As far as possible we will try to adjust the
unavoidable difficulties of war and will heal the wounds which
Russia has inflicted on the country.

This war, the longer it lasts, will leave Europe bleeding
from a thousand wounds. The world which will then arise
shall and will not look as our enemies dream. They strive
for the restitution of the old Europe, with powerless Germany
as a tributary of a gigantic Russian Empire. No, this gigantic
world's war will not bring back the old bygone situation. A
new one must arise. If Europe shall come to peace it can
only be possible by the inviolable and strong position of Ger-
many. The English policy of the balance of power must
disappear, because it is, as the English poet Shaw recently
said, a hatching oven for wars.

When our Ambassador on August 4 took leave of Sir
Edward Grey, the latter said that this war which had broken
out between England and Germany would at the conclusion
of peace enable him to do us more valuable services than
the neutrality of England would allow him. (General laughter.)
Before his eyes the giant, victorious Russia, rose, and perhaps
behind it, defeated Germany. Then weakened Germany
would have been good enough to be a vassal of he/ helper
England. Germany must so consolidate, strengthen, and
secure her position that other Powers can never again think
of a policy of isolation.

GERMAN FREEDOM FOR ALL PEOPLES.

For our and other people's protection we must gain the
freedom of the seas, not as England did, to rule over them,
but that they should serve equally all peoples. We will be

228 APPENDIX II.

and will remain the shield of peace and freedom of big and
small nations. We do not menace the little peoples of Ger-
manic race. How busily are the diplomatists of the Quadruple
Entente engaged in influencing the Balkan peoples by telling
them that the victory of the Central Powers would throw
them into slavery, while the triumph of the Quadruple Entente
would bring them freedom, independence, gain in territory,
and economical thrift.

It is only a few years ago that the hunger for power of
Russia created under the motto " The Balkans for the Balkan
People," the union which soon decayed through her favouring
the Serbian breach of agreement towards Bulgaria. The
German and Austro-Hungarian victories in Poland have freed
the Balkans from Russian pressure. England was once the
protector of the Balkans. As the Ally of Russia she can
only be the oppressor of their independence.

Hardly another great people in the last century has endured
such sufferings as the Germans, and yet we can love this fate,
which gave us in such sufferings the spirit to accomplish
gigantic deeds. For the Empire, at last united, every year
of peace was a gain because we made best progress without
war. We do not want war. Germany never strove for
supremacy in Europe. Her ambition was to be predominant
in peaceful competition with great and small nations in works
for the general welfare of civilization.

This war has shown of what greatness we are capable,
when relying on our own moral strength. The power that
our inner strength gave us we cannot employ otherwise than
in the direction of freedom. We do not hate the peoples
who have been driven into war by their Governments. We
shall hold on through the war till those peoples demand peace
from the really guilty, till the road becomes free for the new
liberated Europe, free of French intrigues, Muscovite desire of
conquest, and English guardianship.

Long and stormy applause greeted the conclusion of the
Chancellor's speech, and the House adjourned till Friday.

APPENDIX II. 229

GERMAN PRESS COMMENT.

The Berlin correspondent of the Kolnische Volkszeitung
said : —

A characteristic of the Chancellor's speech in the Reichs-
tag was increased severity towards England. It was as
if the Chancellor was filled with physical loathing when
he spoke of Sir E. Grey's frivolity and bloodguilt in this
war. When he spoke of England the House listened
breathlessly to the descriptions of how England strangled
and violated the rights of neutrals. When, towards the
end, the Chancellor pleaded for the good intentions of
his former pro-English policy, the Reichstag showed that
it accepted his explanations, although there was little
or no applause. In that part of the speech there was
apparent much disappointment, personal bitterness, and
acerbity against England.

The correspondent noted that the Chancellor spoke hardly
at all of France or the fate of Belgium, but added that the
Chancellor's words about Poland caused joyful emotion and
surprise throughout the House.

Such words (he proceeds) have never before been pro-
nounced to the Polish people in the German Reichstag.
The Polish people will hear in them a promise that the
Austro-German victory will bring them freedom and the
realization of old hopes.

The writer considered that it was a " moment of political
importance " when the Chancellor expressed his gratitude to
the Pope, and said that a Chancellor of the German Empire
" has never in the presence of the assembled Reichstag used
warmer words in alluding to the supreme head of the Catholic
Church."

No passage in the speech was so loudly cheered as that
in which, while disclaiming hatred, Herr von Bethmann-
Hollweg said, " We have lost sentimentality," a sentence which

230 APPENDIX II.

the correspondent thinks ought to be inscribed over the doors
of German Embassies.

Most of the Deputies were present at the sitting, as were
also all the Ministers except Admiral von Tirpitz.

George Bernhard, in an article in the Vossische Zeitung,
considered that the Chancellor's instructions to the German
representative in Vienna prove the honesty of his endeavours.

The Tdgliche Rundschau noted the language used concern-
ing Poland, whereby Poland, doubtless on the basis of dis-
cussions with Baron Burian, is promised separation from
Russia and a happier future, and took this as implying the
creation of an almost independent Poland.

The Kreuz Zeitung drew from the speech the moral that
Great Britain's power must be so broken that the domination
of the seas will be permanently taken from her.

The Lokalanzeiger wrote : —

Germany never strove for the domination of Europe,
nor will she ever strive for it, but we will not suffer Great
Britain's sole domination of the sea.

The Berliner Tageblatt writes : —

In two cardinal points the Chancellor yesterday smote
his enemies. He was able to prove by documents that
the British premier, as Sir E. Grey had already attempted
to do before and after August 4, continued to mislead
the British Parliament and people on decisive questions.

Further, the Chancellor was able to adduce proof that,
in an endeavour to promote a direct agreement between
the Vienna and Petrograd Cabinets, we employed on
July 30 towards Austria-Hungary strong, and among
Allies unusual, pressure. The Russian mobilization caused
an abrupt end to all negotiations for agreement and all
labours for the localization of the conflict. That the
war party in Russia at the last moment, especially owing
to Great Britain's attitude, won the upper hand we know
inter alia from letters discovered.

APPENDIX II. 231

II.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S REPLY.

THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING
LETTER TO THE PRESS ON 26TH AUGUST.

SIR, — There are some points in the speech of the German
Chancellor, made last week, which may, I think, be suitably
dealt with in a letter to the Press, pending the fuller review
of the situation, which may be appropriate to some other
method and time. I will state the facts and the reflections
they suggest as briefly and clearly as I can, and ask you to
be good enough to make them public.

i. The Belgian record of conversation with the British
military attache was published by Germany last autumn to
prove that Belgium had trafficked her neutrality with us,
and was in effect in a plot with us against Germany.

The conversation of which most use has been made was
never reported to the Foreign Office, nor, as far as records
show, to the War Office at the time, and we saw a record of
it for the first time when Germany published the Belgian
record. But it bears on the face of it that it referred only
to the contingency of Belgium being attacked, that the entry
of the British into Belgium would take place only after the
violation of Belgian territory by Germany, and that it did
not commit the British Government. No convention or
agreement existed between the British and Belgian Govern-
ments. Why does the German Chancellor mention these
informal conversations of 1906 and ignore entirely that in
April, 1913, I told the Belgian Minister most emphatically
that what we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of
other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be
respected, and that as long as it was not violated by any
other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves
into their territory ?

Let it be remembered that the first use made by Ger-

232 APPENDIX II.

many of the Belgian document was to charge Belgium with
bad faith to Germany. What is the true story ? On the
2Qth July, 1914, the German Chancellor tried to bribe us by
a promise of future Belgian independence to become a party
to the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. On the
outbreak of war he described the Belgian Treaty as a scrap
of paper, and the German Foreign Secretary explained that
Germany must go through Belgium to attack France, be-
cause she could not afford the time to do otherwise. The
statement of Herr von Jagow is worth quoting again : —

The Imperial Government had to advance into France
by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get
well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike
some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter
of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by the
more southern route, they could not have hoped, in
view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the
fortresses, to have got through without formidable
opposition, entailing great loss of time. This loss of
time would have meant time gained by the Russians
for bringing up their troops to the German frontier.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while
that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops.

In the Reichstag, too, on the 4th August, 1914, the Ger-
man Chancellor stated, in referring to the violation of the
neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg : —

The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong we thereby
commit we will try to make good as soon as our military
aims have been attained.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was therefore de-
liberate, although Germany had actually guaranteed that
neutrality, and surely there has been nothing more despic-
ably mean than the attempt to justify it ex post facto, by
bringing against the innocent and inoffensive Belgian Govern-
ment and people the totally false charge of having plotted

APPENDIX II. 233

against Germany. The German Chancellor does not empha-
size in his latest speech that charge, which has been spread
broadcast against Belgium. Is it withdrawn ? And, if so,
will Germany make reparation for the cruel wrong done to
Belgium ?

2. The negotiations for an Anglo-German agreement in
1912, referred to by the German Chancellor, were brought
to a point at which it was clear that they could have no
success unless we in effect gave a promise of absolute neu-
trality while Germany remained free under her Alliances
to take part in European war. This can, and shall, be ex-
plained by publishing an account of the negotiations, taken
from the records in the Foreign Office.

3. The Chancellor quotes an isolated sentence from my
speech of the 3rd August, 1914, to prove that we were ready
for war. In the very next sentence, which he might have
quoted, but does not quote, I said : — " We are going to
suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in
it or whether we stand aside." I leave it to anyone out-
side Germany in any neutral country to settle for himself
whether those are the words of a man who had desired and
planned European war, or of one who had laboured to avert
it. The extent of the German Chancellor's misapplication
of the isolated sentence which he quotes will be obvious to
anyone who reads the full context of the speech.

As to the other statement attributed to me : not even
when we were perfectly free, when Japan, who was our Ally,
had not entered the war, and when we were not pledged to
other Allies as we are now by the Agreement of the 5th Sep-
tember, 1914, did I say anything so ridiculous or untrue as
that it was in the interest of Germany that we had gone
to war and with the object of restraining Russia.

4. The war would have been avoided if a Conference
had been agreed to. Germany on the flimsiest pretext shut
the door against it. I would wreck nothing on a point of
form, and expressed myself ready to acquiesce in any method

234 APPENDIX II.

of mediation that Germany could suggest if mine was not
acceptable. Mediation, I said, was ready to come into opera-
tion by any method that Germany thought possible, if only
Germany would press the button in the interests of peace.

The German Chancellor, according to his speech, en-
couraged nothing except direct discussion between Vienna
and Petrograd. But what chance had that of success when,
as we heard afterwards, the German Ambassador at Vienna
was expressing the opinion that Russia would stand aside,
and conveying to his colleagues the impression that he de-
sired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias
probably coloured his action there ?

Some day, perhaps, the world will know what really
passed between Germany and Austria respecting the ulti-
matum to Serbia and its consequences.

It has become only too apparent that in the proposal of
a conference which we made, which Russia, France, and Italy
agreed to, and which Germany vetoed, lay the only hope of
peace. And it was such a good hope ! Serbia had accepted
nearly all of the Austrian ultimatum, severe and violent as
it was. The points outstanding could have been settled
honourably and fairly in a conference in a week. Germany
ought to have known, and must have known, that we should
take the same straight and honourable part in it that she
herself recognized we had taken in the Balkan Conference,
working not for diplomatic victory of a group, but for fair
settlement, and ready to side against any attempt to exploit the
Conference unfairly to the disadvantage of Germany or Austria.

The refusal of a Conference by Germany, though it did
not decide British participation in the war. did in fact decide
the question of peace or war for Europe, and sign the death
warrant of the many hundreds of thousands who have been
killed in this war.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Emperor of Russia
proposed to the German Emperor that the Austro-Serb
dispute should be settled by The Hague Tribunal.

APPENDIX II. 235

Is there one candid soul in Germany and Austria-Hungary
who, looking back on the past year, does not regret that
neither the British nor Russian proposal was accepted ?

5. And what is the German programme as we gather it
from the speech of the Chancellor and public utterances in
Germany now ? Germany to control the destiny of all other
nations ; to be " the shield of peace and freedom of big and
small nations," those are the Chancellor's words ; an iron
peace and a freedom under a Prussian shield and under Ger-
man supremacy. Germany supreme, Germany alone would
be free : free to break international treaties ; free to crush
when it pleased her ; free to refuse all mediation ; free to
go to war when it suited her ; free, when she did go to war,
to break again all rules of civilization and humanity on land
and at sea ; and, while she may act thus, all her commerce
at sea is to remain as free in time of war as all commerce is
in time of peace. Freedom of the sea may be a very reason-
able subject for discussion, definition, and agreement between
nations after this war ; but not by itself alone, not while
there is no freedom and no security against war and German
methods of war on land. If there are to be guarantees against
future war, let them be equal, comprehensive, and effective
guarantees that bind Germany as well as other nations,
including ourselves.

Germany is to be supreme. The freedom of other nations
is to be that which Germany metes out to them. Such is
apparently the conclusion to be drawn from the German
Chancellor's speech ; and to this the German Minister of
Finance adds that the heavy burden of thousands of millions
must be borne through decades, not by Germany, but by
those whom she is pleased to call the instigators of the war.
In other words, for decades to come Germany claims that
whole nations who have resisted her should labour to pay
her tribute in the form of war indemnities.

Not on such terms can peace be concluded or the life of
other nations than Germany be free or even tolerable. The

236 APPENDIX II.

speeches of the German Chancellor and Finance Minister
make it appear that Germany is fighting for supremacy
and tribute. If that is so, and as long as it is so, our Allies
and we are fighting and must fight for the right to live, not
under German supremacy, but in real freedom and safety.

Your obedient servant,
Foreign Office, Aug. 25. E. GREY.

III.
THE FACTS OF THE HALDANE MISSION.

THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATE-
MENT ON 1st SEPTEMBER.

AN account of the 1912 Anglo-German negotiations was
published in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
last month. This account was misleading, and was no doubt
intended to mislead, and made it appear that the British
Government had at that time rejected what would be re-
garded in many quarters as a reasonable offer of friendship
from Germany.

In these circumstances it may be as well to publish a state-
ment of the facts compiled from official records here. Early
in 1912 the German Chancellor sketched to Lord Haldane
the following formula as one which would meet the views
of the Imperial Government : —

1. The high contracting parties assure each other
mutually of their desire of peace and friendship.

2. They will not either of them make or prepare to
make any (unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join
in any combination or design against the other for pur-
poses of aggression, or become party to any plan or
naval or military enterprise alone or in combination with
any other Power directed to such an end, and declare not
to be bound by any such engagement.

3. If either of the high contracting parties becomes

APPENDIX II. 237

entangled in a war with one or more Powers in which
it cannot be said to be the aggressor, the other party will
at least observe towards the Power so entangled a benevo-
lent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavour for
the localization of the conflict. If either of the high
contracting parties is forced to go to war by obvious
provocation from a third party, they bind themselves
to enter into an exchange of views concerning their
attitude in such a conflict.

4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the
preceding article has no application in so far as it may
not be reconcilable with existing agreements which the
high contracting parties have already made.

5. The making of new agreements which render it
impossible for either of the parties to observe neutrality
towards the other beyond what is provided by the pre-
ceding limitation is excluded in conformity with the
provisions in Article 2.

6. The high contracting parties declare that they will do
all in their power to prevent differences and misunderstand-
ings arising between either of them and other Powers.

These conditions, although in appearance fair as between
the parties, would have been grossly unfair and one-sided in
their operation. Owing to the general position of the Euro-
pean Powers, and the treaty engagements by which they
were bound, the result of Articles 4 and 5 would have been
that, while Germany in the case of a European conflict would
have remained free to support her friends, this country would
have been forbidden to raise a finger in defence of hers.

Germany could arrange without difficulty that the formal
inception of hostilities should rest with Austria. If Austria
and Russia were at war Germany would support Austria, as
is evident from what occurred at the end of July, 1914 ;
while as soon as Russia was attacked by two Powers France
was bound to come to her assistance. In other words, the

238 APPENDIX II.

pledge of neutrality offered by Germany would have been
absolutely valueless, because she could always plead the
necessity of fulfilling her existing obligations under the Triple
Alliance as an excuse for departing from neutrality. On the
other hand, no such departure, however serious the provoca-
tion, would have been possible for this country, which was
bound by no alliances with the exception of those with Japan
and Portugal, while the making of fresh alliances was pro-
hibited by Article 5. In a word, as appeared still more evident
later, there was to be a guarantee of absolute neutrality on
one side, but not on the other.

It was impossible for us to enter into a contract so obviously
inequitable, and the formula was accordingly rejected by Sir
E. Grey.

Count Metternich upon this pressed for counter-proposals,
which he stated would be without prejudice and not binding
unless we were satisfied that our wishes were met on the
naval question. On this understanding Sir Edward Grey, on
the I4th March, 1912, gave Count Metternich the following
draft formula, which had been approved by the Cabinet : —

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Ger-
many, and pursue no aggressive policy towards her.

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms
no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination
to which England is now a party, nor will she become a
party to anything that has such an object.

Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, and
suggested two alternative additional clauses : —

England will therefore observe at least a benevolent
neutrality should war be forced upon Germany ; or

England will therefore, as a matter of course, remain
neutral if a war is forced upon Germany.
This, he added, would not be binding unless our wishes were
met with regard to the naval programme.

Sir Edward Grey considered that the British proposals

APPENDIX II. 239

were sufficient. He explained that, if Germany desired to
crush France, England might not be able to sit still, though,
if France were aggressive or attacked Germany, no support
would be given by His Majesty's Government or approved
by England. It is obvious that the real object of the German
proposal was to obtain the neutrality of England in all eventu-
alities, since, should a war break out, Germany would cer-
tainly contend that it had been forced upon her, and would
claim that England should remain neutral. An admirable
example of this is the present war, in which, in spite of the
facts, Germany contends that war has been forced upon her.
Even the third member of the Triple Alliance, who had
sources of information not open to us, did not share this view,
but regarded it as an aggressive war.

Sir Edward Grey eventually proposed the following
formula : —

The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing
peace and friendship between them, England declares
that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked
attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is
not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, under-
standing, or combination to which England is now a
party, nor will she become a party to anything that has
such an object.

Sir Edward Grey, when he handed this formula to Count
Metternich, said that the use of the word " Neutrality " would
convey the impression that more was meant than was war-
ranted by the text ; he suggested that the substance of what
was required would be obtained and more accurately ex-
pressed by the words " will neither make, nor join in, any
unprovoked attack."

Count Metternich thereupon received instructions to
make it quite clear that the Chancellor could recommend the
Emperor to give up the essential parts of the Novelle (the
Bill then pending for the increase of the German Navy) only

240 APPENDIX II.

if we could conclude an agreement guaranteeing neutrality
of a far-reaching character and leaving no doubt as to any
interpretation. He admitted that the Chancellor's require-
ment amounted to a guarantee of absolute neutrality, failing
which the Novelle must proceed.

Count Metternich stated that there was no chance of
the withdrawal of the Novelle, but said that it might be
modified ; it would be disappointing to the Chancellor if we
did not go beyond the formula we had suggested.

Sir Edward Grey said that he could understand that
there would be disappointment if His Majesty's Govern-
ment were to state that the carrying out of the Novelle would
put an end" to the negotiations and form an insurmountable
obstacle to the better relations. His Majesty's Government
did not say this, and they hoped the formula which they
had suggested might be considered in connection with the
discussion of territorial arrangements, even if it did not
prove effective in preventing the increase of naval expen-
diture.

Sir Edward Grey added that if some arrangement could
be made between the two Governments it would have a
favourable though indirect effect upon naval expenditure as
time went on ; it would have, moreover, a favourable and
direct effect upon public opinion in both countries.

A few days afterwards Count Metternich communicated
to Sir Edward Grey the substance of a letter from the Chan-
cellor in which the latter said that, as the formula suggested
by His Majesty's Government was from the German point oi
view insufficient, and as His Majesty's Government could
not agree to the larger formula for which he had asked, the
Novelle must proceed on the lines on which it had been pre-
sented to the Federal Council. The negotiations then came
to an end, and with them the hope of a mutual reduction in:
the expenditure on armaments of the two countries.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN.

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