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NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW
Editors
LANSING B. BLOOM PAUL A. F. WALTER
Associates
PERCY M. BALDWIN GEORGE P. HAMMOND
FRANK T. CHEETHAM THEODOSIUS MEYER, 0. F. M.
VOLUME xv
1940
PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY
THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
1034549 Ftl2'4\
CONTENTS
NUMBER 1, JANUARY, 1940
Page
El Camino Militar . . . . F. T. Cheetham 1
Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1866,
III, IV Ralph H. Ogle 12
New Mexico Editorial Opinion on Supreme Court Re-
form Frank D. Reeve 72
Book Reviews :
Hallenbeck, Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca: the
Journey and Route of the First European to Cross
the Continent of North America, 1534-36
J. Charles Kelley 79
Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-
1936 (I-VII), IV L. B. B. 82
Troncoso, Epistolario de la Nueva Espana, 1508-
1818 Agapito Rey 85
Goodykoontz, Home Missions on the American
Frontier, with Particular Reference to the Ameri-
can Home Missionary Society . Frank D. Reeve 88
Folmer, The Mallet Expedition of 1739 Through
Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado to Santa Fe L.B.B. 89
Kubler, The Rebuilding of San Miguel at Santa Fe
in 1710 L. B. B. 94
Notes and Comments 95
NUMBER 2, APRIL, 1940
Who Discovered New Mexico? . Lansing B. Bloom 101
New Mexico's Fight for Statehood, 1895-1912, III
Marion Dargan 133
Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886,
V, VI Ralph H. Ogle 188
vi CONTENTS
NUMBER 3, JULY, 1940
Page
Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670 (Cont'd)
France V. Scholes 249
Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886
(Concl'd) Ralph H. Ogle 269
Book Reviews :
Hammond and Rey, The Coronado Narratives
P. A. F. W. 336
Brooks, The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819
John H. Caughey 339
Kubler, Religious Architecture of New Mexico
L. B. B. 340
Conway, The Last Will and Testament of Cortes
L. B. B. 341
Steck, Ensayos historicos hispanoamericanos
L. B. B. 343
NUMBER 4, OCTOBER, 1940
Map of northern New Mexico (from Miera y Pacheco,
1778)
Franciscan Missions of New Mexico, 1740-1760, I
Henry W. Kelly 345
Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670 (Cont'd)
France V. Scholes 369
Editorial Notes 418
Index 421
Errata in Volume XV . 429
INDEX
Abert, Col. J. J., 7
Acoma pueblo, 363
Adams, John Quincy, 339
Adams-Onfs Treaty, 339
adultery, 17th century, 393 et seq.
Agency. See Camp Apache; Chiricahua ;
San Carlos; Pinery
agents, Indian, 5, 38, 189-190, 191, 214,
223, 242, 273, 287, 319
Aguilar, Nicolas de, 249, 250, 396, 398-407,
414
Aguilera, Dona Teresa de, 255-268 passim;
369-391 passim; 416-7
Alava, Capt. Melchior de, 113
Albuquerque, and statehood, 150-152 ; (in
1749) 363
alcaldes mayores (1662), 251, 252, 373;
(1749) 364; 398, 400, 414
Alchise, Chief, 316
Alessio Robles, Vito, 102
alguacil mayor, 249, 262, 264
Almy, Lieut. Jacob, 210
Anaya (el mozo), Francisco de, 253
Anaya Almazan, Cristobal de, 249-254 pas-
sim; 396, 407-410, 415, 416
Anaya Almazan, Francisco de, 252-3, 407
Anderson, Clinton P., quoted, 96
Andrews, Col. C. S., 30, note
Anian, Straits of, 358
Apache, as slaves, 255, 261 ; 18th century,
368
Apaches, Western, 12-71; Southern, 205-
6, 207, 241, 274; Plains, 393; Arivaipa,
18, 33, 47, 208; Chiricahua, 32, 51, 60,
note; 202-8, 232, 236, 241-5, 274, 278,
298-9, 321-331, 339; Coyotero, 12, 29,
31, 32-33, 52, 60, 65, 197, 201-2, 221,
223, 225, 233, 298, 307 ; Jicarilla, 2-7 pas-
sim; Mescalero, 4, 5, 37, 300, note; Ojo
Caliente (Warm Springs), 273, 283-4,
303; Final, 12, 18, 28, note; 33, 208;
Tonto, 18, 19, 29, 31, 63, 198 ; Verde, 201-
2, 219; Yavapai, 274, 277; Apache-
Yumas, 274
Apache Pass, 234
Apache police, 188, 216, 220, 226, 230, 231,
237, 242-4, 247, 271, 272, 273, 277, 287,
317, 319
Archibeque, Capt. Juan de, 93
Architecture of N. Mex., The Religious,
rev'd, 340-1
Archives, European, 95-6 ; purloined, 97-98 ;
from Spain, 836 ; from Mexico, 346, 869,
note
Arizona legislature, 18, note; 29, 34
Arizona Volunteers, 12, 15, 16
Armstrong, Inspector F. C., 328
Arny, W. F. M., agent, 88
Arthur, Chester A., 311
Atkins, Commissioner J. D. C., 328
auto de fe, 397, 398, 405, 407, 410
Axtell, Gov. S. B., 166
Babcock, Lieut. J. B., 214-6
Baca, Capt. Alonso, 394
Baca, Juan Jose, 184
Bahney, A. J., on statehood, 162
Baldwin, Percy M., on Fray Marcos, 125,
126
Bancroft, H. H., cited, 102, 103
Bandelier, A. F. A., quoted, 99; 124
banishment, for crime, 398, 406, 415
baptism, and godparents, 393, 407, 409
Barrado, Hernando, 106
Barry, Capt. John, 29
Beard, Chas. A., cited, 173
Beauford, Clay, 230, 231, 240
Beaumont, Agent S. B., 318
Belknap, Secretary W. W., 44, 49, 57
Bemis, Sam'l Flagg, quoted, 339
Bendell, Supt. Herman, 55, 59, 60, note;
190, note
Bennett, Col. C. E., 15
Bennett, Capt. F. T., 15, 283-4
Bernard, Capt. R. F., 28, 300
Biddle, Col. James, 298, 299
"Big Dry Wash," 305
Blake, Major [G. A. H.], 4
Blanco, Fray Joseph, 363
Bloom, L. B., 95, 96 ; on purloined papers,
97-98 ; "Gran Quivira," 98-99 ; "Who Dis-
covered N. Mex?", 101-132; book re-
views, 82, 89, 94, 340, 341, 343
Bobadilla, Pedro de, heirs, 116
Bolton, Herbert E., and archives, 98 ; cited,
347-357 passim
Bonito, Chief, 296, 297, 298, 810
book reviews, 79-94; 336-343
Brooks, Philip C., book by, rev'd, 339-340
Brown, Maj. W. H., 66, 69, 210-11
Browne, J. Ross, report on mining, 42
Brunot, Felix, 55
Burke, W. S., on statehood, 153
Bustamante, Pedro de, 105
421
422
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Caballero, wife of Lope, 338
Cabeza de Vaca, review of book on Alvar
Nunez, 79-81 (and errata) ; route of, 122-
123
Calluela, Fray Miguel, 363
Camp Apache Agency, 201, 211, 221-6
Camp Grant Massacre, 34-35, 52, 62
Camps, Apache, 228 ; Crittenden, 58, 239 ;
Grant, 12, 17, 24, 33, 34, 35, 46, 52, 58,
62, 211, 212; Huachuca, 270; Hualpai, 68;
Lincoln, 12, 25 ; McPherson, 20 ; Ord, 31,
33 ; Reno, 17, note ; 24 ; Verde, 33, 47, 52,
57, 63, 191-2, 196, 275; Wallen, 17, note
Cano, Francisco, 102-3
Canada Alamosa, 37, 38, 52, note; 206,
207, 241
caravans, 260, 264-8 passim
Cardenas, Garcia Lopez de, 87, 337
Cardenas, Juan de, jailer, 387
Carleton, Brevet Maj. [Jas. H.], 4
Carr, Capt. C. C., 63
Carr, D. P., on statehood, 145
Carr, General E. A., 294-5, 298, 299, note
Carranza, Martin de, 253, 256
carriages (in 1662), 264, 265
Carrizal, 84
Carson, Kit, sub-agent of Indian Affairs, 5
carts, caravan, 265. See Trade
Castaneda, book by Carlos E., rev'd, 82-85
Casas Grandes, 105
Catholic circular, 178-179
Catron, Thomas B., 156, 164, 168, 175, 179,
187
catzinas, 375, 401, 405
Caughey, John H., book rev., 339-340
Ceballos. See Zeballos
census, of 1749, 362-363
ceremonies, native, 374, 393-5, 399, 400, 401,
404
Cervantes, Lieut. Primitive, 13
Chaffee, Capt. Adna R., agent, 287-9, 305
Chandler, Bvt. Lt. Col. [Daniel T.]. 6
Chapman, Oliver, agency clerk. 194-6
Chastine, Chief, 37
Chatto, Apache, 298, 303, 308, 310, 315
Chaves, Col. J. Francisco, 156, 159, 168,
181-2, 183
Cheetham, F. T., "El Camino Militar," 1-
11
Chiametla, province of. 111
Chichimecas, 117-119
Chihuahua, Chief, 322, 323, 326
Childers, W. B., 156, 167, 169, 170, 180
Chiquito, Apache chief, 46. 61, 198, 210
Chiricahua agency, 202, 233
Chiricahua reservation, 62
chocolate, 258, 366
Chuntz, Apache chief, 210
Cia pueblo, 363
Cibicu affair, 295, 296, 299, note; 300
Cibola, 107, 119; la tierra nueva de, 121;
124; name first used, 131
Cienaguilla. See Sienaguilla
circumcision, as a stigma, 413
Cleveland, President Grover, 329, 331, note
Clinton, Supt. William B., 36
Clum, G. A., 231, note
Clum, John P., 196, 201, 218, 214-248
passim; 269, 300, 319, note
Cochinay, Apache chief, 210
Cochise, chief, 29, 31-32, 38, 51, 60, 203, 205
Cochiti pueblo, 363
colleges, Franciscan, 343
Collins, J. B., trader, 301-2
Colorado River Reservation, 226, 275
Colton, Dr. Harold S., cited, 108
Colvig, J. L.. 305
Colyer, Vincent, 39, 41, 43-55
Comanches, 18th century, 368
Commissary of the Holy Office, 264. See
Posada
Commissioners, Board of Indian, created, 40
Compton, Maj. C. E., 276
Conchas River, 118. See Junta de los Rios
contractors, post, 24, 198, 224, 228, 234,
note; 269, 272, note; 282, 288, 290, 302
Conway, G. R. G., book by, rev'd, 341-342
Cooke, Lieut. Col. [P. St. G.]. 2-4 passim
Copala, 105
Coronado. See Vazquez de Coronado
Coronado documents, discussed, 336-8
Coronado Library, 86, note; 87, note; 103,
note
Coronado Monument, plan for, 96-7
Cortes, Last Will & Testament of Her-
nando, rev'd, 341-2
Costilla, settled, 1
Crawford, Capt. Emmet, 306, 308, 309,
312, 314-25 passim
Crespo, Bishop, of Durango, 93
Crist, J. H., 167
Crittenden, Maj. E. W., 58
Crittenden, General T. L., 24
Crook, General George, 46, note ; 48, 50, 54,
56, 188 et seq.; 270, 306-326 passim
Cuarac pueblo (in 1662), 253
Cuesenbury, J. D., cited, 14
Culiacan, 105
Cushakama, Chief, 16, note; 26
Custodia of Saint Paul, 357 et seq.
INDEX
423
Dallas, Maj. A. J., 60
dances, Pueblo. See ceremonies, native
Daniels, Inspector J. W., 199, note; 205,
217, 232
Dargan, Marion, "New Mexico's Fight for
Statehood," III, 133-189
Date Creek, 16, 20, 47-8, 53, 58, 64
Davidson, Lieut. J. W., 2, 3
Davis, Lieut. Britton, 321
Davis, James, agent, 242
Davis, Jefferson, letters of, 5-6
Davis, Col. N. H., 52, note
Davis, Capt. Wirt, 323, 324
Dawes, Senator Henry L., 315
Dearing, St. Clair, 281, note
Delano, Secretary [Columbus], 39, 49, 67
Delchay, Chief, 24
Delgado, Fray Carlos, 363
Dent, Supt. G. W., 18-19 ; 29, note
Devin, General T. C., 24
Diaz de Vargas. Francisco, 106
Diplomacy & the Borderlands; The Adams-
Onis Treaty of 1819, rev'd, 339-40
Disalin, Apache chief, 231, note
Dixon, plaza of, 7, 8
Dodge, Col. Richard J., cited, 302, note
Dominguez de Mendoza, Capt. Francisco,
266-7
Dominguez de Mendoza, Juan, 253, 267
Dominguez de Mendoza, Tome, 391
Dravo, Lieut. E. E., 275
Drew, Lieut. Chas. E., 36-8
Dudley, Supt. L. E., 191, note; 196, 205,
207, 234
Duran y Chavez, Cristobal, 253
Dutch Reformed Church, 63, 190-7, 218, 221
Editorial notes, 95-100, 418; from N. Mex.
newspapers, 72-78 passim
Elias, Jesus, 35
Elkins, Delegate S. B., 234, note; 241
El Paso, district of, 84
El Paso del Rio del Norte, 265-6
El Paso, Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe de,
359, 361, 363
Embudo Plaza. See Dixon
encomiendas in N. Mex., 251-254 passim,
348
Endicott, Secretary Wm. C., 320
Ercisa, Fray Juan de, 362
Escalante, Fray Veles de, quoted, 99
Escureta, Fray Gregorio (lay bro.), 363
Eskiminzin, chief, 33, 46, 210, 217, note;
278
Espejo, Antonio de, 106, 108-9, 114-5, 119
Espejo, Pedro Miinoz de, 109, note
Esquier, Fray Pedro, 363
Estevanico, the negro, 123, note ; 127-128
Estrada, Fray Fernando de, 363
Ewell, Capt. [R. S.], 4
Ewing, Lieut. Thomas, 13
fanega, 365
fees, church, 364
Fernandez, Fray Juan, 363
Field, Neill B., 167
fifths, royal, 115, 116
Fioz, Juan, a German, bugler with Coro-
nado, 338
Fisk, Gen'l Clinton B., 286-7
Folmer, review of the paper by Henri,
89-94
Florida Purchase, 339
Ford, Agent C. D., 319-321, 328
Forsyth, Col. G. A., 304
Forts, south of Taos, 2 ; Apache, 33, 45, 47,
217, 219, 220, 228, 274, 277; Bayard, 28,
note ; 36 ; Bowie, 29, 51, 62, 233, 236, 270,
322, 326, 331 ; Burgwin, 7 ; Cummings,
36; Defiance, 41, 283; Garland, 2, 11;
Goodwin, 12, 15, 17; Grant, 13, 298, 299;
Huachuca, 270 ; Leavenworth, 329 ; Lin-
coln, 25; Lowell, 298; Marion 329;
Massachusetts, 2, 6 ; McDowell, 15, 21, 47,
note; 305; McRae, 240; Ord, 31, 33;
Pickens, 331, note; Selden, 36; Sill, 283,
331, note ; Stanton, 36 ; Thomas, 297, 298,
299, 303 ; Union, 3, 321 ; Whipple, 19, note ;
20, note; 21, 26, 32, 48; Wingate, 273
Franciscans, Missions of. See Kelly; Mis-
sions ; Scholes
Freitas, Fray Nicolas de, 256, 258, 379, 400
Frenchmen, in N. Mex., 90
frontier, New Mexico, 339
Frost, Col. Max, 135, 144, 161, 168, 176
Gabaldon, Fray Antonio, 362
Galisteo pueblo, 362
Gallegos, Hernando, 105, 106, 110-3
Gallegos, Lieut. Manuel, 12
galleys, sentence to serve in Philippine, 397
Garcia, Fray Angel, 363
Gardner, Inspector R. S., 292, 301
Garfield, Jas. A., 189
Garland, General John, 2-5
Gatewood, Lieut. Chas. B., 306, 309, 330
George, Apache chief, 296, 297, 298
Geronimo, Apache, 237-330 passim
Getty, General G. W., 39
Giddings, Governor [Marsh], 234, note
424
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Gildersleeve. C. H., 165. 167
Gilson, Sylvester, 318
Gilson's Well. 318
Globe (Ariz.), 279, 284, 289, 291
Gomez, Francisco, 410, 411, 413, 415
Gomez Robledo, Francisco, 249-254 passim;
265, 400. 410-414, 415
Gonzales, Fray Francisco, 863
Gonzalez, Capt. Vicente, cited, 107
Gonzalez de Mendoza, Juan, 109, note
Gonzalez de Mendoza, Pedro, 109, note
Goodykoontz. review of book by Collin B.,
88-89
Goodwin, Governor [J. N.], 14
Gordo, Apache, 243
Gorraiz, Governor Francisco de, 268
gossip, evil effects, 417
Gran Quivira, origin of placename, 98-99
Granada (Zuni), 123-124
GraniUo, Tomas de, 260, 261, 267, 268
Grant, U. S., 15, note; 28
Green, Col. John, 28, 32, 88. 45
Gregg, General J. I., 19-23
Griego, Juan, 411-2
Grollet, Jacques, 98
Guadalupe Mission. See El Paso; Junta de
los Rios
Guerra, Fray Salvador de, 250, 258, 263,
265, 379, 410
Guzman, Fray Francisco, 363
Guzman, Nuno de, 84, 102
Hackett, Chas. W., cited, 859, 860. 365, 366
Halleck, General H. W., 15, note ; 17, note ;
18, 26
Hallenbeck, Cleve, review of book by, 79-
81 ; cited, 123
Hammond, George P., book by, rev'd, 886-
338
Hammond, Inspector J. H., 284-7
Hart, Agent H. L., 273, note; 274-286
passim
Hatch, Senator [Carl A.], 76
Hatch, General Edward, 243, 244
Hayt, Commissioner [E. A.], 279, note; 286,
289
Hayt, "Edward Knapp," 286-7
Hazledine, W. C., quoted, 163
Head, Lafayette. 1, 2
Heath, Acting Gov. H. H., 25
heliograph, use of, 327
Henely, Lieut. Austin, 239, 242
Hennisee, Agent A. G., 88
Hentig, Capt. E. C., 295
Hernandez, Fray Juan, 863
Hinajosa, Fray Martin de, at El Paso, 99
Hinkle, James F., 95
Historical Society, notes of biennial meet-
ing. 95-96
Hoag. Ezra, 280, 297, 302
Holmos, Fray Andres de, 83
Hopi. visited by Penalosa, 254
Hot Springs. See Ojo Caliente
Howard, Gen'l O. O., 57 et seq.
Hozes, Francisca de, with Coronado expe-
dition, 338
Huerta, Toribio de la, 266
Hughes, L. C., 200, note
Humanos. See Jumanos
Huntington Library, 94
Hurtado, Juan Paez, certificate by, 90-91
Hutton, Lieut. Oscar, 16
Ibarra, Don Diego de, 104
Ibarra, Francisco de, 103-105, 111, 119
Ilges, Col. Guido, 17, 18, 21
incest, charge of, 394, 408
Index, notice of Cumulative, 99-100, 418
Inquisition. See "Troublous Times"
Irigoyen, Fray Joseph, 363
irrigation, for Apaches, 193, 199, 209, 229,
242, 271, 278, 287. note; 290, 292, 815,
320
Isleta pueblo, 250, 863 ; del Sur, 363
Jacobs. Agent Ed. C., 58, 62
Jeffords, Agent Thos. J.. 61, 202-8, 232-6
Jemez pueblo, 363
Jenkins, L. C., sub-agent, 223, note
jerga, in trade (1660), 255
Jesuits, missions of, 348-349
Jones, Maj. Roger, 22, 28, note
Josanie, Apache, 323
Joseph, Antonio, 136-137, 139. 155. 165, 172-
173, 181 note; 182
Juarez, Fray Andres, 394
Judaism, charges of, 375. 376, 380 et seq.;
412, 415. 416
Juh, Apache. 237, 275, 290, 298
Jumanos, pueblo of the, 378
Junta de los Rios (Grande y Conchas), 81,
84, 859, 363
Kautz, Gen'l August V., 225, 226-8, 234, 236-
7, 238-40, 243, 244, 246, 269, 270. 271, 276
Kelley, J. Chas., rev. of book by Cleve
Hallenbeck, 79-81
Kelly, Henry W., "Franciscan Missions of
New Mexico, 1740-1760," 845-368
INDEX
425
Kemble, Inspector E. C., 224, 228-9, 231,
235, 241, 269
Kuaua pueblo, 96
Kubler, rev. of study by George, 94 ; of
book by, 341-2
La Cienega pueblo (1662), 253, 258
La Joya. See Velarde
La Junta, San Francisco de, 362, 363
labor, native, 373, 885, 400, 402-3
Laguna pueblo, 363
Lakes, N. Mex., 102 ; Parras, 102 ; Texcoco,
103
Lamar, Sec'y L. C. Q., 320, 329
Lamar, Jr., Agent L. C. Q., 827-9
languages, native, 855
Larrabee, Agent Chas. F., 208-210
La Salle expedition, mention, 93
Las Barrancas, 265
La Toma (below El Paso), 267
Laughlin, N. B., 167
Lavora, Fray Juan de, 362
Lawton, Capt. H. W., 322, 327, 330
Ledesma, Sec'y Juan, 114
Leihy, Supt. [G. W.], 13, 18; killed, 19,
note
Lesinsky, Chas., 200
Lezaun, Fray Juan, 362
Lincoln, Robt. T., 296
livestock, 254, 261, 268
Llewellyn, Maj. W. H. H., 159
Loco, Chief, 37, 273, 303-5, 310
L6pez, Chief, 37
L6pez, Fray Mariano, 363
L6pez de Cardenas, Garci, 87, 337
Lopez de Mendizabal, Bernardo, 254-268
passim; 414-5
Lord, Dr. C. H., cited, 14, note
Loring, Frederick W., killed, 53, 55 ; 64
Lovell, Col. Chas. S., 18
Lowery, Woodbury, cited, 107, note
Lucero de Godoy, Pedro, 257
Lujan, Francisco, 394
Mackenzie, Gen'l R. S., 297, 309
Macomb, Capt. J. N., 7-9
McCormick, Gov. R. C., 19, 302, note;
Delegate, 30, 35, 42, 190, 200
McCrary, Sec'y Geo. W., 274
McDowell, Archie M., thesis cited, 133, note
McDowell, Gen'l [Irvin], 12-28 passim; 298
McMillenville, Ariz., 279, 305
Magruder, Ass't Surgeon [David L.], 2
Mahan, Inspector J. L., 291
Maldonado, Maria, with Coronado expedi-
tion, 338
Mallet expedition of 1739, data on, 89-94
Mangus, Chief, 811, note; 321; 331, note
Manso, Gov. Juan, 249-268 passim, 379, 385
Margry, cited, 89
Maricopa Indians, 12, note
Marquez, Catalina, wife of Aguilar, 398
Martinez, Felix, 167
Martinez de Moya, Pedro, 256
Mather, Cotton, cited, 30, note
Maus, Lieut. Marion P., 325-6
Meadow Valley, 17
Mecham, J. L., cited, 105, note
Meem, John Gaw, 96
Melendez Marques, Pedro, 107
Menchero, Padre Miguel de, cited, 360
Mendizabal. See L6pez de Mendizabal
Mendoza, Gov. Caspar Domingo de, 90, 93
Mescalero reservation, 274, 300, note; 331,
note
Meusnier, Pierre, 93
Mickly, Rev. J. M., 219-220
Miguel, Apache chief, 45, 51, 197, 198
Milburn, Inspector G. A., 316
Military Divisions, 14-15, 28, 30, 304, note;
306
Miles, Gen'l Nelson A., 326-331
miners, on reservations, 279, 280, 285-7, 293
Ming, Daniel, 281, note; 284
Mirabel, Custodian Fray Juan, 362
Missions, in Texas, 82-85 ; in N. Mex., 345-
368
Missions on the American Frontier, Home,
by Goodykoontz, rev., 88-89
Mitchell, Gov. R. B., 86
Mix, Commissioner C. E., 18
Moctezuma II, Onate lineage from, 342
Mohaves, 15
Montano, Fray Pedro, 363
Montoya, Nestor, 168, 187
Montoya, Pedro de, 253
Morford, W. E., 223-6
Mormon settlers, 290, 293
Morrison, Alexander L., quoted, 162, note;
183
Nachee, Apache, 237, 278, 298, 303, 310,
321, 324, 327, 330-1
Nadaski, Apache chief, 279
Nambe pueblo, 362, 365, 367
Nana, Chief, 310, 821, 825
Nantiatish, Chief, 295, 305
Navahos, 5, 25
neophytes, training of, 352 et seg.
426
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
New Mexico, discovery of, 101, 132 ; origin
of name, 102-107 ; lake of, 102 ; province
of San Felipe, 106, 112 ; Nueva Andalucia,
106
newspapers, N. Mex., 72-78 passim
Niza, Fray Marcos de, 123-131 ; original
relacion of, 126
Nocadelklinny, medicine man, 294-5
Nolgee, Apache, 237, 243, 273, note; 275
O'Beirne, Capt. R. F., 31
Obreg6n, Baltasar de, 107, note; 119-122
Ogilby, Capt. F. D., 201, 218, 220, 246
Ogle, R. H., "Fed'l Control of the Western
Apache," 12-71, 188-248, 269-335
Ojo Caliente (N. Mex.), 44, 233, 234, 239,
240, 241, 244, 274, 283, 300, note
Ord, Gen'l E. O. C., 26-28, 31
Orlando Furioso (in N. Mex., 1660), 384
Oronzoro, Fray Juan, 363
Otero, Mariano S., 156, 159, 175, 182-183
Otero, I; Miguel A., 183
Otero, II; Miguel A., 95; on statehood,
146, 183
Oury, W. S., 35
Overland Route, 28
Pacheco loan, the, 256. 261
Padilla, Fray Juan, 363
Paez, Fray Joseph, 363
Palmas, Rio de las, 83
Pangburn, Agent, 320
Paquime, 120-121
Parral, 259, 260, 261, 267, 268, 373, 389,
391, 398
Paso y Troncoso, Don Francisco, compila-
tion by, 85-88
Peace Policy, Grant's, 41, 190, 208, 212-3,
231, 269, 334
Pearsons, Inspector F. C., 328
Pecos pueblo (1749), 361, 362
Pedro, Apache chief, 51, 246, 274, 296
Penalosa Briceno, Gov. Diego de, 249-268
passim; 370, 379, 391
Perea, Pedro, 156, 184
Perez, Caspar, 392, 393, 415
Perrine, Lieut. Henry P., 276
Phoenix, fake Coronado inscription, 108
Picuries pueblo (in 1662), 253; (in 1749),
363, 367
Pierce, Capt. E. (F?) L., agent, 321,
note; 328
Pilar. See Sienaguilla
Pima Indians, 352
Pinery Canon agency, 234
Pino, Fray Ignacio, 363
Pino, Fray Juan del, 363
pinon nuts, 262, 265, 389, 390. See Trade
Pionsenay, Apache, 235, 236, 237, 243. 273
Pious Fund, 351, 367
Pope, Gen'l John, 86, 243
Pope, Supt. Nathaniel, 43
population of N. Mex. (1750), 360-363
Porter, Capt. Chas., 275, 277
Posada, Custodian Alonso de, 249-268 pas-
sim; 370, 371, 374, 410
Poston, Delegate [Chas D.], 13; quot. 302,
note
presidios, Spanish, 353-354
Price, Commissioner, 293, 297
Price, Capt. Geo. F., 68
Price, Maj. W. R., 206
Prichard, Col. Geo. W., 155, 157
Prince, Gov. L. B., 135, 154, 156, 159, 167,
169, quoted, 185-6
printing, brought to America, 343
provinces, Franciscan, 343
Puaray, country of, 106
Pueblo Indians (in 1750), 348; 362-363
Purloined papers, editorial, 97-98
Quinn, Capt., 5
Quivira (1748), 108; (1574) 114, 118; ori-
gin of name, 123 ; 127
Ramirez, Fray Juan, 262, 264, 267, 268, 371,
389, 392, note
Randall, Capt. Geo. M., 69, 70, 199, 215
Ransom, Lieut. [Robert], 4
Raynolds, Joshua S., on statehood, 153
Red River, fort at mouth, 90
Reeve, Frank D., "N. Mex. Editorial
Opinion on Supreme Court Reform," 72-
78; book rev., 88-89
renegades, Indian, 238, 270, 275, 288 ; white,
238
reredos, old Spanish, 95
reservations, 332-335. See Colorado River,
Mescalero, San Carlos, Tulerosa, Verde,
White Mt.
residencia, of Gov. L6pez, 255, 259-260, 266
Rey, Agapito, book rev. by, 85-88 ; book by,
rev'd, 336-338
Reymond, Numa, on statehood, 145-6
Riley, John H., 159
Rio de Losa, Gen'l Rodrigo del, 106, 114
"Ritch Collection," 94
roads, 1-11 passim; U. S. Hill, 7
Roberts, Agent James E., 197-201, 211, 218,
219
Robredo, Pedro, 410
INDEX
427
Rodriguez, Fray Agustin, 105, 114 (115),
119, 121
Rodriguez, Gonzalo, 113, note
Romero, Diego, 249-254 passim; 392-398,
415, 416
Ross, Mrs. A. B., teacher, 290
Ross, Gov. Edmund G., 134, 135, 139, 153,
156, 167
Roybal, Capt. Ignacio, 93
Roybal, Fray Santiago, vicar, 91, 93
Rucker, Lieut. J. A., 239, 275
Rusling, Inspector General J. A., 20, note
Rynerson, Col. Wm. L., 158-9
Saavedra, Fray Lorenzo de, 363
Safford, Gov. A. P. K., 30, 35, 42, 191,
200, 236, 239, 271
Saguache campaign, 6-7
Saint Denis, Capt. Louis de, 90
St. Vrain, Capt. Ceran, 6
salaries (missionary, 1749), 176
Salpointe, Archbishop J. B., quoted, 176
San Bartolome, 109
San Carlos Reservation, 59, 63, 195-6, 208,
213, 214-248 passim; 269, 271
San Cristobal mission (Junta de los Rios),
363
San Felipe pueblo, 363
San Francisco, Fray Garcia de, 402
San Francisco mission (Junta de los
Rios), 363
San Ildefonso pueblo, 362
San Juan mission. See San Juan pueblo ;
Junta de los Rios
San Juan pueblo, 362
San Lorenzo mission, 363
San Luis Valley, 1
San Martin, mines of, 117
San Miguel at Santa Fe in 1710, Rebuilding
of, rev., 94
San Pedro mission (Junta de ios Rios), 363
San Saba, 84
San Simon, 204
Sandia, pueblo, 250, 363; 410
Sanford, Maj. C. B., 300
Santa Ana pueblo, 363
Santa Barbara, town, 105, 114, 116, 118;
Franciscan headquarters in Mexico City,
367
Santa Clara pueblo, 362
Santa Cruz de la Canada, 360, 361, 362
Santa Fe, 360, 361, 362
Santiago Mission (Junta de los Rios), 363
Santo Domingo, pueblo, 250, 255, 258, 263,
268, 363, 396
Santo Evangelio, Province of El, 359
Sauer, Carl O., on Fray Marcos, 125-130
passim
Scammon, Capt. E. P., 6
Schofield, Col. Geo. W., 303
Schofield, Gen'l John, 34, note; 48, 54,
67, 221, 225
Scholes, France V., cited, 111, note;
"Troublous Times," 249-268 ; 346, 359,
note; 366, note; 369-417
Schurz, Sec'y Carl, 272, 274, 277, 286-7, 312
Scouts, Indian, 52, 69, 213, 220, 227, 240,
243, 245, 270, 274, 284, 292, 299, 305, 306,
309, 313, 324, 326
semaneros, 365
Sena, Maj. Jose D., 170, 182, 183
Senecii, pueblo (in 1662), 250; del Sur,
363
servants. See labor
"Seven Cities," sought by Guzman, 123,
note
Shaw, J. M., agent, 240, 241
sheep (1749), 366
Sheridan, Gen'l [Phil. H.], 67, 322, 324, 326
Sherman, Gen'l [W. T.], 27, 50, 191, note;
244, note; 296, 297, 303, 304, note: 306,
308, 309
Sienaguilla, on upper Rio Grande, 8
Sierra Blanca (White Mt.), 4, 5
silver bullion, 255, 256, 258, 261, 268
Simpson, Capt. Smith H., quoted, 10
sinodos, missionary, 350, 366
Skinyea, Apache, 235, 237
Skull Valley, 16
Slough, John P., 158
Smerdon, Geo., 280
Smith, Commissioner, 197, 200, 205, 207,
218, 219, 234
Smith, Capt. Allen, cited, 322, note
Socorro pueblo (del Sur), 363
soldiers, Spanish, 367, 368, 392 et seq. See
presidios
Sombrerete, mines of, 115, 117
Sonora, trade (17th C), 373
Soule, Dr. Milan, 60, 65, 197
Springer, Frank, 170-172
Springer, Wm. M., 138-9, 144, 153, 155
Staab, A. A., 175
Stanford, Capt. Geo. B., 17
State monuments, committee on, 95
Steck, Father F. B., book by, rev'd, 343
Sterling, A. D., 292, 303
Stevens, Agent Geo. H., 62, 208, 222 ; trader,
280
Stewart, Senator W. M., 180
428
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Stoneman, Gen'l Geo., 30-35 passim
Strubble, I. S.. quoted, 139; 165
superintendents, Indian, abolished, 189
supply trains, missionary, 366
Supreme Court reform, N. Mex. editorial
opinion on, 72-78
Sweeney, Martin A., 244, 271, 280
Syme, Representative G. G., 141
Tahzay, Apache chief, 235, 236, 237, 245,
note
Tajique, pueblo, 372, 398
Taos. 1-11 passim
Taos pueblo (1662). 254, 373; (1749), 363
Tejada, Licenciado Lorenzo de, 86-87
Tejo, the Indian, 102
telegraph, military, 55 ; 190
Teller, Sec'y Henry M., 311. 318
Tello, Fray Joseph, 363
Tenoctitlan, 108
Tesuque pueblo, 361, 362
Tewa pueblos, 362-363
Texas, 839
Texas, Our Catholic Heritage in, rev., 82-
85
Thomas, Agent B. M., 206, 207
Thomas, Gen'l George, 27, 29
Tiffany, J. C., agent, 289-298, 299-303
Tiffany's Well, 289, 291, 318
Tigua pueblos, 863
Toledo, Fray Juan, 363
Tolosa, Juan de, family connections, 842
Tonner, Agent J .A., 190, note
Tonto Basin, 68, 70
Topiame, 104-105
Totonteac, 127
Touey, Lieut. T. A., 270
trade, with New Orleans desired, 90-2 ; with
Chihuahua, 91 ; with Sonora indicated,
256, 258, 262; with Parral, 260-1. 265
traders, agency, 280, 291, 301
trails, Indian, 80-81
tributes, Pueblo Indian, 251-4 passim
Trigo, Padre Manuel de San Juan Nepo-
muceno y, cited, 360, 365
Trimble, Judge Lawrence S., 159, 166
Troncoso, rev. of book by Francisco del
Paso y, 85-88
"Troublous Times in N. Mex., 1659-1670,"
249-268, 369-417
Tucson citizens, scalp bounty, 14. note;
34-35
Tulerosa Valley, 44, 52, note; 60, 206, 207
Tupper, Capt. T. C., 238, 304
Turrill, Dr. Henry S., cited, 61. note
Twitchell, Col. R. E., quoted, 183
Urmy, Lieut. John B., 18
Urquijo, Fray Joseph, 362
Utes, 1, 2, 7, 368
Vacapa, 129, 130, 131
Valenciano, Juan Antonio, quoted, 108-9
Vanderslice, Capt. J. H., 21
Vandever, Inspector Wm., 197, 198, 203,
204, 206, 247, 271-2
Varela de Losada, Juan, 261, 267, 268
Vargas, Diego de, inscription plagiarized,
108 ; mentioned, 358
Varo, Padre Andres, cited, 860 et seq.; 363,
367
Vazquez de Coronado, Francisco, docu-
ments, 85-87, 107; fake inscription, 108;
120, 123; discoverer of N. Mex., 181;
expedition of. 358
Velarde. 7, 8
Verde Reservation, 63
Victorio, Chief, 37, 244, 273, 283. 300
Vigil, Donaciano, 94
Villasante, Lucas de, 260, 261. 267, 268
Villazur disaster, 93
visitas, by governor, 872
Vizarron, Archbishop-Viceroy Juan An-
tonio de, 91, 93
Voorhees, Daniel W.. 137-8
Wade, Maj. James F., 244
Wagner, Henry R., on Fray Marcos, 124-5 ;
126, note
Waldo, Henry L., cited, 163
Walter, P. A. F., book revs., 336-338
Wasson, John, 200. 236
Watkins, Inspector E. C., 278. 279. 280
Webb, Dr. Walter P., cited, 88
Wheeler Expedition, 53
White, Dr. John B., agent, 213
White Mt. Reservation, 59
Whitman, Lieut. Royal E., 33-4, 46, 38
Whitney, Dr., agent, 239
Whittier, Capt. Chas. A., 25
Wickenburg, 16, 29, 52, 70
Wilbur, Dr. R. A., 209-210
Wilcox, Agent P. P.. 807-819 passim
Willcox, Gen'l O. B., 276, 277, 279, 282,
296, 299
Williams, Capt. J. M., 21
Williams, Dr. J. W.. as agent, 63, 64,
192-4
Winship, Geo. P., quoted, 124
Winters, Lieut. W. H.. 17, note
INDEX
429
women, pioneer. See Caballero ; Hozes ; Zacatecas, 114
Maldonado
Wood, Reuben, trader, 280
Worth, Maj. W. S., 246
Xavier, Francisco, 265, 385
Yavapai, 16, 19, 26, 28, 31, 63,
Yniesta, Fray Aerustin de, 363
Zambrano, Fray Manuel, 362
Zamora, Fray Antonio, 362
Zeballos, Fray Andres, 363
Zia. See Cia
Zopena, Fray Manuel, 362
Zuni pueblo (1749), 361, 363, 366
Zunis, aid hostiles, 25
ERRATA
Page 80, after first line, read [ down the Rio]
Sonora and southeastward across the Rios Yaqui,
Alave, and Fuerte, is that previously traced by
Dr. Carl Sauer.
The author's justification for this new tracing
of de Vaca's route, is that he has employed Indian
trails, along [which the party . .]
Page 96, line 13, /or 4-6 read 2-4
The Historical Society of New Mexico
(INCORPORATED)
Organized December 26, 1859
PAST PRESIDENTS
1859 — COL. JOHN B. GRAYSON, U. S. A.
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adjourned sine die, Sept. tS, 1863
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Miss HESTER JONES, Recording Secretary
FELLOWS
PERCY M. BALDWIN EDGAR L. HEWETT
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LANSING B. BLOOM J. LLOYD MECHAM
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CHARLES W. HACKETT ALFRED B. THOMAS
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NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW
VOL. XV
JANUARY, 1940
No. 1
PALACE OF THE GOVERNORS
PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY
THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW
Editor Managing Editor
LANSING B. BLOOM PAUL A. F. WALTER
Associates
PERCY M. BALDWIN GEORGE P. HAMMOND
FRANK T. CHEETHAM THEODOSIUS MEYER, 0. F. M.
VOL. XV JANUARY, 1940 No. 1
CONTENTS
El Camino Militar . . . F. T. Cheetham 1
Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1866,
III, IV . Ralph H. Ogle 12
New Mexico Editorial Opinion on Supreme Court
Reform .... Frank D. Reeve 72
Book Reviews:
Hallenbeck, Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca: the
Journey and Route of the First European to
Cross the Continent of North America, 1534-36
J. Charles Kelley 79
Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-
1936 [I-VII], IV. . . L. B. B. 82
Troncoso, Epistolario de la Nueva Espana, 1508-
1818 Agapito Rey 85
Goodykoontz, Home Missions on the American
Frontier, with Particular Reference to the Ameri-
can Home Missionary Society Frank D. Reeve 88
Folmer, The Mallet Expedition of 1739 Through
Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado to Santa Fe
L. B. B. 89
Kubler, The Rebuilding of San Miguel at Santa
Fe in 1710 L. B. B. 94
Notes and Comments 95
Subscription to the quarterly is $3.00 a year in advance; single
numbers (except Vol. I, 1, 2, and II, 1) may be had at $1.00 each.
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out of print in part.
Address business communications to Mr. P. A. F. Walter, State
Museum, Santa Fe, N. M.; manuscripts and editorial correspondence
should be addressed to Mr. Bloom at the University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Entered as second-class matter at Santa Fe, New Mexico
UNIVERSITY PRESS, ALBUQUERQUE, N. M.
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL
REVIEW
VOL. XV JANUARY, 1940 No. 1
EL CAMINO MILITAR
By F. T. CHEETHAM
ON THE 13th day of December, 1850, President Millard
Fillmore issued his proclamation declaring the settle-
ment of the boundary dispute between the State of Texas
and the United States, and that the organic act creating the
Territory of New Mexico passed by congress on September
9, 1850, was in full force and effect. This act extended the
constitution and laws of the United States to the newly
created territory and carried with it the duty of the general
government to protect the inhabitants against invasion by
all enemies both foreign and domestic. In fact it had been
the policy of the government to do this ever since the armed
forces of the United States had seized the territory in 1846.
General Kearny in his proclamation made at Santa Fe on
August 19, 1846, had proclaimed for the inhabitants protec-
tion against the incursions of hostile Indians.
Relying on this assurance, adventurous settlers pushed
northward from Taos and Abiquiu and established settle-
ments in the San Luis valley, then a part of the territory.
Costilla was settled in 1848. In 1851 a colony settled on the
Culebra river near the present town of San Luis, Colorado.
In the spring of 1854, Lafayette Head and about fifty fami-
lies located on the north side of the Conejos river.
The Utes and several roaming bands of Apaches re-
garded these settlements as invasions of their hunting
grounds and began making war on the settlers. The govern-
ment had, off and on since the Pueblo Rebellion of 1847, kept
2 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
troops at Taos. Afterwards the war department erected a
fort on the Rio Grande del Rancho, about nine miles south
of Taos. In 1852, Fort Massachusetts was built on Ute
Creek about six miles north of the present town of Fort Gar-
land, Colorado. However, during the winter of 1853 and
1854, this fort was unoccupied. On March 13, 1854, a war
party of Utes and Apaches attacked the settlers on the
Cone j os. Under the leadership of Lafayette Head the In-
dians were beaten off. Securing reinforcements, the Indians,
about 250 strong, attacked Troops F and I of the First U. S.
Dragoons (afterwards known as the First U. S. Cavalry) on
a bridle path in the Embudo Mountains. The soldiers num-
bering sixty strong were commanded by Lieutenant David-
son. They suffered heavily, losing all but seventeen men and
only four escaped injuries.
General Garland, commanding the Department of New
Mexico, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Cooke to take the field
and chastise the marauders. What followed can best be
gleaned from his report:
Headquarters Department of New Mexico
Albuquerque, April 1, 1854.
Colonel: I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of
the general-in-chief, a copy of a report from Major Blake, first dra-
goons, very unsatisfactory as regards particulars.
The Indians, Jicarilla Apaches and Utahs, have managed to com-
bine a force of 250 warriors, and unexpectedly attacked a company of
dragoons, 60 strong, about 25 miles from Fernandes de Taos, under the
command of Lieut. J. W. Davidson, first dragoons, and succeeded, after
a desperate conflict, in overwhelming it. Lieut. Davidson and Assist-
ant Surgeon Magruder, both wounded, returned from the battlefield
with about seventeen men, most of them wounded.
The troops displayed a gallantry seldom equalled in this or any
country, and the officer in command, Lieut. Davidson, has given evi-
dence of soldiership in the highest degree creditable to him. To have
sustained a deadly contest of three hours, when he was so greatly out-
numbered, and then to have retired with the fragment of a company,
crippled up, is amazing, and calls for the admiration of every true
soldier.
To prevent further disaster, I have ordered Lieut. Col. Cooke,
EL CAMINO MILITAR 3
second dragoons, to take the field, with about 200 dragoons and a
company of artillery armed with rifles.
If hostilities are continued — and I have little doubt such will be
the case — I will be forced to call upon the governor of this Territory
for two or three companies of volunteers.
It is very desirable that a strong mounted force, with a good sup-
ply of horses, be sent out early in the spring.
** ** ** **
I am, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient servant,
JNO. GARLAND
Brevet Brigadier General Commanding
Lieut. Col. L. Thomas,
Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters of the Army, New York.
Headquarters Department of New Mexico
Santa Fe, April 30, 1854.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the
major general commanding the army, that Lieut. Col. Cooke, second
dragoons, on hearing of the disaster which befell the command of Lieut.
Davidson on the 30th March, proceeded, with the available force at
Fort Union, in the shortest possible time to Taos, where he organized a
force of 200 men, and on the instant marched in pursuit of the
Indians, whom he overtook on the 8th on the upper branches of the
Agua Calientes, and immediately gave them battle, the result of which
will be found in the enclosed copy of his report. This prompt and
energetic movement reflects the highest credit upon this officer, and I
feel satisfied has prevented the Utahs from making common cause
with the Jicarilla Apaches. It is known that the Indians lost six
warriors in the affair of the 8th. It has also been ascertained that they
have lost four of their chiefs since the commencement of hostilities,
and nearly the whole of their animals and baggage. Their pursuit was
checked for a few days by a violent storm of wind and snow which
lasted thirty hours, and very nearly paralyzed the whole command.
The enemy had previously led their pursuers over the most rugged
ground which troops were ever known to compaign in — the spurs of
the mountain often reaching to the height of 3,000 feet, very abrupt,
and covered with snow several feet in depth.
Col. Cooke is now at a small Mexican village (Rito) west of the
Rio Grande, and though suffering with chills and fever, has sent out
two detachments of about 140 men each, in hot pursuit, and with strong
hopes of bringing the Indians to battle. Their numbers have been
reduced by desertions, wounds, and death, to about 100 warriors. That
is the greatest number now assembled at any one point.
4 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
It is all-important to crush this band of pirates. They have too
long indulged in murder and plunder to leave a hope of reformation.
They do not pretend to keep good faith in treaties or promises. Their
thorough chastisement will undoubtedly have its effect upon the con-
tiguous tribes now looking on with deep interest for the result, and
will give us assurance of many months of peace.
I have made strong efforts to bring this business to a speedy close,
and will succeed if it is within the reach of possibility. Unusual and
extraordinary measures have been taken to effect this desirable object,
and which will be explained in another communication.
I have not as yet had a report of operations of the three companies
ordered to Sierra Blanco to divert the attention of the Mezcalero from
this quarter.
I am, Colonel, with great respect, your obedient servant,
JOHN GARLAND
Brevet Brigadier General Commanding.
Lieut. Col. L. Thomas,
Asst. Adjt. General, Headquarters of the Army, New York.
Headquarters Department of New Mexico.
Santa Fe, June 30, 1854.
COLONEL: In making report of the militant operations against
the Jicarilla Apaches under the eye and orders of Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke, 2nd dragoons, for the information of the general-in-chief, I
will confine myself to the simple remark that all has been done which
was in the power of troops to do.
I approve most cordially the manner in which Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke has conducted his campaign.
The Jicarilla Apaches have been most thoroughly humbled and
beg for peace. They are dispersed in small parties with the exception
of one band, which is now hard pressed by about one hundred men
under Major Blake and Captain Ewell, 1st dragoons.
In order to a full understanding of the vigorous prosecution of the
campaign, the difficulties encountered and overcome, I have thought
it advisable to transmit the detailed reports of Lieutenant Colonel
Cooke, marked A, of Brevet Major Carleton, 1st dragoons, marked B,
and of Lieutenant Ransom, 1st dragoons, marked C. These officers are
entitled to the highest commendation for the zeal, activity, and gal-
lantry displayed by them in prosecuting the war; they have proven
that to the Indians which is worth more to us than a victory; that is,
they are not safe from pursuit in the most inaccessible parts of the
Rocky mountains.
For the activity and zeal displayed by the junior officers, and for
other interesting details, I respectfully call attention to the accom-
EL CAMINO MILITAR 5
panying reports already referred to. All speak in the highest terms of
praise of the Mexicans and Pueblos employed as trailers, spies, etc.
Captain Quinn, who had the immediate charge of them, gave evidence
throughout of sagacity and indomitable courage ; the same remark will
equally apply to Mr. Kit Carson, sub-agent of Indian affairs.
I will simply add, in conclusion, that one hundred and eighty men
are now in the country of the Mezcalero Apaches, under the command
of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, 3rd infantry. This band of
Indians has been infesting the road leading from El Paso to San
Antonio, committing murders and robberies; the steps which I have
taken will, it is believed, put an end to their depredations in that
quarter.
The Navajoes have remained quiet this year; a small party of
them, renegades, stole some hundreds of sheep last month, which the
nation has restored to the proper owners.
The Utahs are playing a doubtful game, and have to be watched
very closely; their sympathies are all with the Jicarilla band of
Apaches.
I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN GARLAND
Brevet Brigadier General Commanding Department.
Lieut. Col. L. Thomas,
Asst. Adj. Gen., Headquarters of the Army, New York.1
These affairs with the Indians demonstrated the neces-
sity of constructing military roads to reach the outposts of
the territory. Congress accordingly, by an act approved July
17, 1854, appropriated $20,000.00 to construct a military
road from Taos to Santa Fe ; and for another from Santa Fe
to Dona Ana, including the sinking of wells, the sum of
$12,000.00.
The order of Jefferson Davis, secretary of war, con-
cerning these appropriations, is of interest :
War Department
Washington, November 28, 1854.
SIR: By an act approved July 17, 1854, the following appropria-
tions are made for the construction and repair of roads in the Territory
of New Mexico, viz : from Taos to Santa Fe $20,000.00, and from Santa
Fe to Dona Ana, including the sinking of wells if required, $12,000.
You are hereby charged with the execution of these works.
1. From Executive Documents, 2nd Session, 33rd Congress, Volume 1, Part 2
(1854-1855), pp. 33-36.
6 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
As indicated by the terms of the appropriation act, the want of
water is one of the difficulties to be overcome on the route last men-
tioned, and your attention will be first directed to that object. It is
believed that the readiest and cheapest mode of procuring water will be
by sinking artesian wells, and for that purpose the apparatus procured
to make examinations in connection with the exploration of railroad
route to the Pacific, will, when no longer required on that work, be
turned over to you at Santa Fe.
When, as in these cases, a comparatively small amount of money is
appropriated for a long line of road, the department has directed that
the road be first rendered practicable for wagons through its entire
length, and that the remainder of the appropriation be expended on the
more difficult portions of it, so as to render the whole as uniform as
possible. You will pursue this plan in executing the work now intrusted
to you.
It is deemed best to have the work done by contract if practicable,
and in making contracts for the purpose, to endeavor to have them
taken by persons residing near the line of the road, or otherwise per-
sonally interested in its completion, stipulating either for the execution
of a specified quantity of work, or, what perhaps is preferable, for the
completion of a certain portion of the road, payment being subject
to your approval of the work.
You will consult freely with the commanding officer of the depart-
ment in regard to the location and construction of the roads.
The amount of the above-mentioned appropriations will be placed
at your credit with the assistant treasurer at St. Louis, Missouri.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JEFF'N DAVIS
Secretary of War.
Captain E. P. Scammon,
Corps Top. Engs., Santa Fe, New Mexico.2
Before the Taos-Santa Fe military road could be com-
pleted, a call for troops was again made. Troops B, D, and
F of the 1st Dragoons and Battery D, 2nd U. S. Artillery,
participated. Six companies of volunteers, four of which
took part in the Saguache campaign, were recruited by order
of the governor of the territory, who commissioned Capt.
Ceran St. Vrain as colonel commanding. This expedition
left Taos in February, 1854, and followed the trace made by
the settlers from that place to Fort Massachusetts on Ute
2. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
EL CAMINO MILITAR 7
Creek at the foot of the Blanca Range. From Fort Massa-
chusetts the forces crossed the San Luis Valley and on March
19 it encountered the Indians in the Cochotopa, not far from
the present town of Saguache. The Utes fled and were again
attacked in the Poncha Pass on the 21st and 23rd of March.
The troops then returned to Fort Massachusetts to replenish
their supply of munitions. Col. St. Vrain, with the volun-
teers, was sent over the Sangre de Cristo Pass to atttack
the Apaches, while the regulars went north. The latter had
two fights with the Utes, first on the headwaters of the
Arkansas on April 29, and in the Saevatch valley on May 1
and 2. Col. St. Vrain encountered the Apaches on the Purga-
toire river and gave them a good beating. The regulars suf-
fered a terrific loss of horses in this campaign, for they could
not secure forage and the horses died of starvation. The
volunteers mounted on native horses. They grazed on
sweet bark cottonwoods and pawed up the snow to eat the
grass underneath.
The route of the first road built by the army was
approximately Santa Fe to Velarde (then called La Joya),
thence through the hills to Dixon (Embudo Plaza), thence
to Penasco via Ojo Sarco, and over the pass between the
Rio Pueblo and the Rio Grande del Rancho to Fort Burgwin,
or Cantonment Burgwin, as it was officially called, and from
the fort to Taos. The pass just mentioned is known to this
day as the "U. S." Hill, because the road was built by the
army.
In 1858, Capt. J. N. Macomb of the Corps of Topo-
graphical Engineers, made surveys of three proposed routes
for the road from Taos to Santa Fe. His findings are set
forth in his report to Col. J. J. Abert, chief of Topo-
graphical Engineers, U. S. A., on September 29, 1858, as
follows :
IV. ROAD FROM TAOS TO SANTA F£
This road is one of very great interest and importance, whether
considered in a commercial or military light, as the means of affording
an easy outlet for the abundant products of the rich and justly cele-
8 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
brated valley of Taos, or as the route of communications between the
headquarters of the department and the upper posts of the valley of
the Rio del Norte.
The chief obstacle to the easy construction of a road between Taos
and Santa Fe is the mountainous formation which extends westwardly
from the great southern branch of the Rocky mountain range, in the
vicinity of the Moro Peaks, and crosses the Rio del Norte, constituting
a formidable natural barrier between the valley of Taos and the coun-
try around Santa Fe. At present wagons pass with great difficulty
over the route by the eastern part of this barrier; but the road is
very circuitous and rough, crossing mountain streams and immense
stony hills and being in many places annually encroached upon by deep
arroyos. To improve this route, and make the grade easy enough for
loaded wagons, would considerably increase its present length ; and the
great expense which it would cause could produce no lasting benefit,
owing to the exposure of the work to destruction from the mountain
torrents in the rainy season.
Between the above route and the Rio del Norte there is a bridle
path which passes in a direct course through El Embudo, but it is so
steep that in wet weather animals pass over it with difficulty. The
heavy grade and mobile character of the soil throw it out of considera-
tion as a wagon road route.
The route to which I give the preference, after a careful exami-
nation of all of them is as follows :
From Taos, in a southwesterly direction for about 18 miles, to a
point on the Rio del Norte called "Sienaguilla," thence through the
canon of the Rio del Norte, by cutting a roadway into the slope of the
left bank, 15 miles to La Joya; and thence by the road common to all
the routes above named, 40 miles, to Santa Fe; being in all 73 miles,
and 14 miles shorter than the present difficult and objectionable wagon
road. The greater part of the first section above named is over easy
ground, requiring scarcely any work to make a perfect road; but on
approaching Sienaguilla there will be some heavy work for about 3
miles, involving the crossing of two deep arroyos and the easing of
three very considerable hills.
From Sienaguilla to La Joya, for 15 miles, involving the removal
of broken rock and the cutting of the roadway into the side of the
mountain, and constituting the expensive feature of the road, but offer-
ing a grade which is scarcely a perceptible departure from the true
level, and affording the only chance for a permanent roadway to pass
the mountains.
The remaining section of forty miles requires considerable work
at certain points, such as a new location near Pojoaque, to avoid
arroyos and to be protected against their encroachments, and also a
EL CAMINO MILITAR 9
new location, involving much cutting and grading, along Tesuque creek,
and among the sand hills just north of Santa Fe.
The accompanying estimate shows the probable cost of effecting
this great work, and it is hoped that the importance of the route will
lead to its favorable consideration.
* * *
IV. ESTIMATE FOR COMPLETING THE ROAD FROM
TAOS TO SANTA Ffi
Section from Taos to Sienaguila, 18 miles $ 13,500.00
Sienaguilla to La Joya, through the canon of the Rio
del Norte, 15 miles 82,500.00
From La Joya to Santa Fe, 40 miles 21,500.00
From which deduct the balance on hand of appropriation
made by act of July 17, 1854 $ 4,500.00
Leaving total required for the completion of a road from
Taos to Santa Fe $113,000.00
All of which is respectfully submitted by your most obedient
servant,
J. N. MACOMB
Captain Topographical Engineers.
Sept. 29, 1858.
Colonel J. J. Abert
Commanding Corps Topographical Engineers, U. S. A.
Washington, D. C.3
In 1861 an act was passed (approved March 2nd) to
provide for the completion of the military roads from Fort
Union to Santa Fe, and from Taos to Santa Fe, New Mexico.
This act carried an appropriation for the Taos-Santa Fe
road of $15,000,00.4
The 42nd Congress passed an act 5 entiled "An Act pro-
viding for the completion of the Military Road from Santa
Fe to Taos in the Territory of New Mexico" :
Be it enacted, etc., That the sum of twenty-
five thousand dollars be and the same is hereby
appropriated for the completion of the military
road from the city of Santa Fe to Fernandez de
Taos, in the Territory of New Mexico, to be ex-
3. See Archives, War Dept.
4. 12 Statutes at Large, page 208.
5. Chap. 312, 3rd session, approved March 3, 1873.
10 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
pended under the direction of the Secretary of
War.
Two years later the 43rd Congress provided "for the
completion of the military road from the city of Santa Fe to
Fernandez de Taos, in the Territory of New Mexico. Six
thousand six hundred and forty-four dollars and eighty
cents, in addition to the unexpended balance of the appro-
priation made by Act of March third, eighteen hundred and
seventy-three, which is hereby continued and made available,
to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of
War."6
Concerning the constructing of this road, which com-
menced in accordance with the recommendations of Captain
Macomb, Captain Smith H. Simpson, who came to New
Mexico in 1853 and settled in Taos a few years later, related
to the writer the following story: A detachment of army
engineers, under the comamnd of a lieutenant, started work
in the Rio Grande Canon at Cieneguilla (now called Pilar) .
The lieutenant laid out the road to cross the river by a bridge
at Cieneguilla, run down the right or west bank of the river
and recross a few miles below. About $2,000.00 worth of
timbers had been collected at the above named place and
they were held by booms in the river. Some two or three
miles of the road had been opened up on the first bench west
of the river. Before the grade was completed the lieutenant
was called to Washington and left the work in charge of his
first sergeant. While the lieutenant was in Washington the
men ran out of grade stakes, so to keep the men occupied, the
sergeant put the men to work blasting the rock slides on the
east or left bank of the river, as they had a large quantity
of black powder. They found the slides did not respond to
their blasts, so, before the lieutenant returned, they had a
road practically opened down the left bank where the road
now is. Upon his return, the lieutenant on looking over the
situation, ordered the booms cut and the timbers went on
down the river. The road was completed on the east side.
6. Chapter 130, 43 Congress, 2nd session. 1854 Statutes at Large, Page 391.
Approved March 8, 1876.
EL CAMINO MILITAR 11
This road, from Taos to and through the Rio Grande
Canon, has since been known locally as "El Camino Militar."
As the present road from Santa Fe to Taos and on to Fort
Garland, Colorado, follows in the main the line established
and used by the soldiers, it would seem that to retain the
name El Camino Militar would be fitting and appropriate.
Who knows but that this road leading from Santa Fe to
Fort Garland, being the shortest and most direct line be-
tween the industrial sections of Colorado and the heart of
New Mexico and on to the border, may again become of
great strategic importance as a military road.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER III
EXTERMINATION — A FRONTIER PANACEA
THE END of the Civil War resulted in a temporary dis-
ruption and weakening of the military organization in
the Apache country. This situation was produced by a
gradual mustering out of the California Volunteers and an
order from the war department which ended the enlistment
of new troops. To prevent the complete collapse of military
control on the Apache frontier, the secretary of war made
an exception to the order on May 20, 1865, and allowed the
recruitment of a regiment of Arizona Volunteers. Six com-
panies composed of a total of three hundred and fifty men
were immediately enrolled under the supervision of General
McDowell. Half of the new troops were posted in southern
Arizona and the others were moved to the Prescott area.1
No military activity occurred in Arizona until Mc-
Dowell visited the district in December. Then the advan-
tage of having the department commander close at hand
became very apparent. First, certain groups of Pinals and
Coyoteros that had practically cut off the delivery of sup-
plies to Fort Goodwin, were easily overawed by commands
sent out from Camp Grant.2 Next, all the Arizona Volun-
teers were concentrated at Camp Lincoln for service in the
Verde Valley. The government gave scant attention to the
troops* needs and much hardship resulted; however, their
activities were quite effective. On February 11, 1866, Lieu-
tenant Manuel Gallegos with forty-five men moved down the
1. Dept. of California, Annual Report, 1886, A. G. O., 632 ; Report of the Adju-
tant-General, Oct. 1, 1866, in Journal of the Third Legislative Assembly, pp. 250-254.
One hundred and eighty-eight of the Arizona Volunteers were Maricopa Indians.
2. Col. T. F. Wright to A. A. G., Jan. 24, 1866, Dept. of Calif., Annual Report,
1886, A. G. O., 632.
12
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 13
valley after a band of marauders. The command, operating
only at night, succeeded in locating a large rancheria strongly
fortified within a series of caves and caverns. A battle of
several hours duration followed, but despite the fact that
thirty warriors were killed and twelve wounded, the band
could not be dislodged.3 Similar commands led by Lieuten-
ant Thomas Ewing and Primativo Cervantes struck the
Indians north of the Salt River several severe blows in
March, killing forty-two of them and wounding many
others.4
Such unusual punishment forced the Apache hostiles
into southern Arizona where they renewed their raids with
increased vigor. They probably would have ravaged the
region with impunity had not General McDowell, still in the
district, ordered troops from Fort Grant into action. As a
result, Lieutenant John B. Urmy scoured the region for
eleven days, travelled 225 miles, burnt 250 wickiups and
killed six Indians from a hostile band he overtook by acci-
dent.5 General McDowell had scarcely started back to his
headquarters, however, when the troops ceased their activi-
ties. With the exception of forty-one Indians killed and
captured in the Verde valley in April, no further punish-
ment followed for several months.6
The breathing spell afforded by the troops' inaction
gave the civil authorities an opportunity to express their
views. Superintendent Leihy was quite critical of the mili-
tary. Their work, he said, tended to embarrass and com-
plicate the Indian difficulties. He was of the opinion that
one-tenth of their expenditures during the past on "fruit-
less" operations would have provided comfortable homes
for all the Indians in the territory.7 Delegate Poston stated
that "the military authorities assume to be the government,"
3. Capt. H. S. Washburn to A. A. G., Feb. 15, 1866, ibid.
4. Ewing to Col. C. E. Bennett, Mar. 9, 1866, ibid; Washburn to Capt. John
Green, Mar. 26, 1866, ibid.
6. Urmy to A. A. G., Mar. 5, 1866, ibid.
6. Lt. J. D. Walker to Bennett, April 30, 1866, ibid.
1. Leihy to D. N. Cooley, May 18, 1866, I. O., L 155.
14 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
and more poignantly, he charged that the officers and men
sent to the Indian country were rendered ineffective be-
cause of their lack of frontier experience.8 Governor Good-
win wanted "fair, open and persistent war" until the sav-
ages were "exterminated" or forced to "bow their necks in
submission." Then they were to be put on reservations and
"made to labor or starve," so there could be "no patched up
treaty to benefit speculators in beef."9 One J. D. Cusenbury
wrote President Johnson regarding the inadequate number
of troops, the incompetency of the commander and of the
officers' belief in extermination. Such an extreme policy
was favored, he said, because of the lack of any formulated
plans or arrangements for dealing with the Indians in case
they should wish to surrender. Prophetically, he declared
that 10,000 men and several years would be required to kill
all the Apaches; but over-sanguinely, he predicted that
they could be placed on a reserve in one year and made self-
sustaining in two.10
Expediency was still the governing factor, unfortun-
ately, and although the views expressed contained much
truth, yet ideas rather than policies were being advanced.
Leihy came close to a sound policy when he wrote that ade-
quate material provision would bring most of the bands to
the reserves; but he was visionary in his view that such
care would "soon" make them self-sufficient, and that the
"few" remaining out "would be hunted down and killed by
the adventurous prospectors and miners."11
A reorganization of the army on July 28, 1866, in-
creased its bureaucratic nature. The country was divided
into military divisions and Arizona, as a district of the De-
partment of California, became a part of the Division of the
Pacific. For purposes of Apache warfare western New
8. Poston to Cooley, May 17, 1866. I. O., P 132.
9. Goodwin to Cooley, May 17, 1886, ibid.
10. Cusenbury to Andrew Johnson, May 1, 1866, P 148.
11. Leihy to Cooley. May 18, 1866, I. O., L 155. The citizens of Tucson were
reported to be paying a group of Tame Apaches one hundred dollars for each hostile
scalp brought in. Dr. C. H. Lord to Cooley, June 4, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D.
no. 1, vol. ii, p. 112.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 15
Mexico should have been combined with Arizona, but rea-
sons of economy made it expedient to include the former
area in the Division of the Missouri. The reorganization
further provided for the replacement of all volunteer troops
with regular army personnel.12
No important results followed the military reorgani-
zation, but McDowell, weakened by the loss of his Arizona
Volunteers, was inclined to use peaceable measures. The
Indians of the Verde Valley, because of their recent punish-
ment, were also inclined towards peace. Colonel Bennett
was therefore ordered to accept them as prisoners of war
at Fort McDowell, where they were to be aided in agricul-
ture. A party had come in on May 28, made arrangements
to surrender most of their fellow tribesmen, and would
have succeeded had not the presence of a strong number of
Pimas frightened them away. Likewise, the presence of
other unfriendly bands near Fort Goodwin had prevented
the Indians of the Verde from collecting there; yet in the
hope that they might later come to Fort McDowell, Bennett
was now ordered to continue negotiations.13
Conditions in western Arizona had grown worse. The
eight hundred Yavapai who had gone to the Colorado River
Reservation in 1865 14 were thoroughly dissatisfied within
a few months. Poor crops, quarrels with the Mohaves, the
greed and arrogance of the whites, and especially the gov-
ernment's negligence in furnishing subsistence made them
hate the sedentary life. As a result, the entire number in
the spring of 1866 fled back to the mountains of central
12. 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 5, 17.
General H. W. Halleck was given command of the Division of the Pacific, with
instructions from General Grant "to exercise his discretion as to the mode and
manner of preventing Indian hostilities .- . . in the Territory of Arizona." This
carte blanche from Grant was quite in contrast to his action the year before in
curbing the "too extended" plans aimed against the Apaches. Edwin M. Stanton to
James Harlan, July 11, 1866, I. O., W 377; McDowell to A. A. G., Mar. 23, 1866,
I. O., Ariz. Misc.
13. MsDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 18, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, voL
iii, p. 35.
14. Cf. supra, N. M. HIST. REV., xiv, 363.
16 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Arizona, there to resume their life of hunting and robbing.15
The Indians would doubtless have refrained from vio-
lence had not the freighters and frontiersmen attacked and
killed them at every opportunity. Retaliation followed near
Date Creek in the killing of a prospector and the burning
of a cabin. A posse of citizens from Hardyville immediately
sought revenge by slaughtering ten Yavapai men, including
the head chief Wauba Yuma, and also several women and
children. Such indiscriminate murder of fairly friendly
Indians produced a recurrence of the critical conditions of
the year before.16 Traffic almost stopped west of Pres-
cott; trains moved with military escorts. Lieutenant Oscar
Hutton, sent to the region in July, killed no Indians at first ;
but he destroyed their resources and thus made the situa-
tion worse by leaving the bands more destitute than before.17
On August 11 his command and a train he was escorting
through Skull Valley were attacked by one hundred and
fifty impoverished warriors who demanded the contents of
the wagons. A parley followed, but it broke up in a severe
battle in which the Indians were worsted with heavy loss.
Leihy, certain that costly retaliation would follow, con-
sidered the victory a defeat.18 The situation was further
aggravated by the withdrawal and discharge of the Ari-
zona Volunteers at Date Creek and Wickenburg.19
General McDowell, in the meantime, had become less
certain with regard to a proper Apache policy; yet he be-
lieved that the punishment given the Indians was worth-
while, and in August he ordered the regular troops to be
as active as the Arizona Volunteers had been. But that he
also favored pacific methods is shown by his satisfaction
15. John Feudge to Leihy, July 31, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. Ill ; G. H. Dorr to Leihy, Jan. 5, 1866, I. O., L 6. Chief Cushackama induced
one hundred of his followers to stay on their farms.
16. Leihy to Cooley, April 12, 1866, I. O., I. D.
17. Hutton to P. A., Aug. 1, 1866, A. G. O., 632.
18. The Indian loss was thirty-three killed and fifteen captured. Hutton to
Capt. G. W. Downey, Aug. 14, 1866, A. G. O., 632. See also Leihy's account, I. O.,
L 239.
19. McDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 18, 1866, op. cit.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 17
with the results attained at Fort Goodwin, where several
hundred Apaches were collected. This attitude of indeci-
sion indicated that the general favored both peace and war,
whichever might prove to be the most expedient.20
The military, from the standpoint of war, made an aus-
picious start. Captain George B. Stanford, in late Septem-
ber, moved from Fort McDowell to Meadow Valley, ninety
miles distant, where an unknown Apache rendezvous was
discovered. He attacked a large rancheria on October 3,
killed fifteen warriors, captured seven noncombatants and
destroyed their vast store of winter supplies. More im-
portant, the ease of the outward march by way of the Sierra
Ancha Range and the equally easy return near the base of
the north Mazatzal Peak proved the feasibility of the new
route into the hostiles' country.21
Captain Stanford led another expedition into the same
region on November 14. This time he moved his lightly
equipped command of sixty-four men farther on into the
Tonto country. Before the Indians were aware of the in-
trusion, he attacked one of their large encampments located
in a box canyon thought to be impregnable. The result was
meager — six slain and five captured — but all the bands of
the area were completely discomfited. For several months
they gave no further trouble.22
At this point the military of southern Arizona took a
forward-looking step, which, unfortunately, met the dis-
approval of higher authority. Colonel Guido Ilges of Fort
Grant, in accordance with instructions from his immediate
20. Ibid., p. 36.
21. Stanford to A. A. G., Oct. 9, 1866, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol.
ii, p. 124 et seq.
The success of the expedition decided Halleck in favor of a forced peace by "a
hunt of extermination." Orders therefore followed for the establishment of a post,
Camp Reno, in the new area. A trail was also to be projected from Fort McDowell
to the camp. Gen. Orders no. 39, Oct. 31, 1866, ibid., p. 94.
22. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 138-140.
The Indians of southern Arizona were kept quiet during the year by the establish-
ment of Camp Wallen on Babacomari Creek, and by the operations of Lieutenant
Winters in the Huachuca and Mule Mountains. W. H. Winters to Maj. Harvey Brown,
Dec. 18, 1866, ibid., pp. 141-144.
18 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
superior, Colonel Charles S. Lovell, made a treaty of peace
with several chiefs of the Aravaipa, Tonto and Final
Apaches. The Indians agreed on December 20 to settle
upon a reservation where they were to remain at peace, but
they reserved the privilege of making extended hunting
and food-gathering expeditions to supplement the govern-
mental subsistence that Ilges promised them.23
General McDowell immediately ruled that the treaty
was "irregular, injudicious and embarrassing." He con-
tended that the officers only had authority to grant armis-
tices, and that they had made promises impossible to fulfill.
To keep the chiefs from suspecting perfidy, he recommended
that the peace terms be greatly restricted so that the Indians
without the prescribed reserve limits could be considered
hostiles. General H. W. Halleck sustained McDowell and
ordered him to admonish Lovell and Ilges sharply for their
assumption of authority.24 Both the secretary of the in-
terior and the commissioner of Indian affairs also disap-
proved of the treaty, but they sanctioned the idea of a peace-
ful solution and stated that since the reservation system had
been a success with other Indians there was no reason why
it should be unsuccessful with the Apaches. They instructed
the new superintendent to cultivate all chiefs inclined
towards peace.25
The office of Indian affairs replaced Superintendent
Leihy in September, 1866, with G. W. Dent, General Grant's
brother-in-law. Commissioner Mix, in notifying Dent of
his appointment, requested a full report of conditions in
Arizona. He also asked him to administer his office eco-
23. Ilges to A. A. G., Dec. 20, 1866, A. G. O., 163 P.
24. McDowell to A. A. G., Feb. 8, 1867, I. O., W 433 ; A. A. G. to McDowell, Feb.
9, 1867, ibid.
25. Secty. of Int. to C. E. Mix, Sept. 7, 1867, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Mix to Secty. of
Int., Sept. 7, 1867, ibid.; Mix to Dent, Sept. 20, 1867, L. B. no. 84, p. 310.
The territorial legislature, probably for economic reasons, opposed peace. They
remonstrated that the feeding system was "a monstrous and most expensive farce."
Journal of Third Legislative Assembly, pp. 43, 261.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 19
nomically.26 The new appointee took charge on December
19 in the face of a hostile military opposition. Thus irked,
he became quite critical. According to his view, the terri-
tory was in a deplorable condition, chiefly because the mili-
tary's "ostensible demonstration" against the savages was
"purposeless for the public safety." To reduce the hostiles
properly, he advocated an "active, offensive, persistent,
combined and simultaneous war," in which "they should
be hunted to death with fire and famine." One or two such
campaigns would reduce them sufficiently for the civil au-
thorities to assume control; other plans, he was certain,
would only intensify the problem. Opposed to McDowell's
view that a lack of subsistence generated the Indians' hos-
tility, he attributed their ferocity to their jealousy of the
whites.27
The situation in western Arizona soon gave Dent's
statements much weight, for Yavapai and Tonto attacks
on wagon trains became a matter of daily occurrence. R. C.
McCormick, now governor, sent out a force of rangers that
quickly killed a considerable number of the marauders.
This result alarmed the superintendent and he begged for
more regular troops, stating that a general massacre of the
peaceable Indians along the Colorado River would follow,
should it be proved that any of them had joined in the
raids.28
The military, in fact, had already taken steps to re-
lieve the situation. General J. I. Gregg, with a number of
new troops, was placed in command of the District of Pres-
26. Mix to Dent, Sept. 8, 1866, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
No reasons were found for the change of officials. Leihy did not live to be
relieved. On November 18 he and his clerk, H. C. Evarts, were murdered east of
La Paz by a band of hostiles who thought that the killing of a "great chief" among
the whites would lead to the evacuation of the region. Levi Ruggles to Comm., Nov.
28, 1866, I. O., R 219.
27. Dent to L. V. Bogy, Dec. 81, 1866, I. O., D 116.
28. Dent to Bogy, Mar. 5, 1867, I. O., D 257.
At this time, the inroads of the miners in the Bradshaw Mountains caused two
hundred of the Yavapai to seek peace at Fort Whipple. Since no policies had been
promulgated, the opportunity was lost. Gen. J. I. Gregg to Dent, April 12, 1867,
Ariz. Misc.
20 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
cott and the Upper Colorado early in 1867. To guard
against a recurrence of the outrages of 1866, he was in-
structed to keep commands moving throughout the troubled
area, and a new post, Camp McPherson, was to be estab-
lished at Date Creek. General McDowell demanded that no
time be lost in waging a vigorous and aggressive war.29
General Gregg complied in full measure. In April, he
issued orders designating as hostile all Apaches and all Colo-
rado River Indians not found on reserves. He even included
some bands on the California side of the river. Active opera-
tions were to start at once and Indians holding passes issued
by the civil authorities were to receive no immunity.30
These drastic orders resulted in a year of military
wrangling practically devoid of constructive results. Mc-
Dowell decided that wholesale war against a large body
of friendly Indians, facing starvation because of congres-
sional negligence, was inhuman. He therefore declared
Gregg's orders too stringent and directed their modifica-
tion.31 Again Gregg erred. His new orders, on June 11,
directed that Indians heretofore hostile were to be con-
sidered peaceable except when acting in concert as a tribe.
Isolated attacks and thefts by individuals were not to be
taken as hostile acts, but "as offenses against the common
law, the same as if committed by white citizens." More-
over, he announced that it was impossible to reconcile the
commanding general's present views with those promul-
gated for the government of the district the year before.32
29. Special Orders no. 16, Jan. 23, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol.
ii, pp. 113-115 ; McDowell to A. A. G., Sept. 14, 1867, ibid., pp. 126-127.
Inspector General J. A. Rusling, who visited Fort Whipple during the spring,
sharply criticized the high maintenance costs of the district. Hay was purchased for
$60 per ton, grain for $12 per bushel, lumber for $75 per thousand feet, and the cost
of freight from San Francisco was $250 per ton. Reports indicated that the small,
headquarters building was erected at a cost of $100,000, with an additional $10,000
for the post flagpole. However, the general advocated a policy of vigorous war. For
a detailed account, see, Parish, vol. v. p. 299, vol. vi, pp. 32, 36-40.
30. Gen. Orders no. 3, April 23, 1867, I. O., D 380 ; Gen. Orders no. 4, April 24,
1867, ibid.
31. A. A. G., to Gregg, May 18, 1867, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
32. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 111-113.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 21
McDowell immediately branded his subordinate as an un-
cooperative popularity seeker who had seriously injured the
military service. He directed that existing orders of war
against "hostile Indians in Arizona" be carried out, and
to make his disapproval emphatic, issued special orders
setting forth Gregg's mistakes.33
While the superior officers were thus wasting their time,
some of the subordinates showed commendable zeal. Cap-
tain J. M. Williams with eighty men moved from Fort
Whipple, in April, to the upper Verde, where a strong band
of hostiles threatened the region. Two spirited fights fol-
lowed in which fifty-five savages were killed; these blows
completely disorganized the bands, and practically relieved
Prescott from danger on the east.34 Likewise, Colonel Ilges
and Captain J. H. Vanderslice, from Fort McDowell, combed
parts of the Tonto, lower Verde and Mazatzal regions.
They accomplished little, although their scouts sharply re-
duced the horse-stealing forays said to emanate from those
isolated points.35
The general situation as shown by these scouts per-
plexed General Gregg. He found his twenty-seven com-
panies, scattered as they had to be, quite inadequate for the
tasks of subjugation and preservation of peace. The great
size of the district, the roughness of its terrain, the number
and frequency of desertions, the shortage of citizen employ-
ees and the smallness of the posts were insuperable prob-
lems to the district commander. But instead of seriously
considering these difficulties, McDowell chided Gregg for
beginning more wars than he could carry out, especially
when the Indians wanted peace.36 The burden was thus
thrust back into the subordinate's hands, proving that ex-
pediency was still the rule of action.
33. McDowell to Gregg, July 1, 1867, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
34. Williams to A. A. G., April 27, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol.
ii, pp. 150-153.
35. Ilges to Lt. J. W. Lewis, April 30, 1867, ibid., pp. 153-154; Vanderslice to
Lewis, May 10, 1867, ibid., 154-157.
36. A. A. G. to Gregg, May 18, 1867, op. cit.
22 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Major Roger Jones was now sent to Arizona to give the
district a thorough investigation and to make recommenda-
tions. He was quite appalled with the situation. Men were
killed at various points along his route; stock was stolen
within sight of one post he visited ; nothing was safe — much
less so than when he first saw the region in 1857-1859. He
considered the troops practically powerless, and suggested
several radical changes: (1) the organization of Arizona
into a separate department to eliminate the three months'
time required for the transmission of orders to and from
the Presidio; (2) the concentration of the troops at a fewer
number of posts in order to provide more effectives for
scout duty; (3) the provision of facilities to mount the
infantry when the regular cavalry was overburdened; and
(4) the erection of better quarters and hospitals to prevent
inefficiency and desertion.37
Jones' report was obviously a constructive one, but de-
spite its logical approach towards a military solution of the
Apache problem, McDowell sent Halleck a ten-page letter
of rebuttal on August 14. He denied the soundness of the
major's findings throughout and in an elaborate elucidation
of his own administration justified the existing conditions.
But his sharp analysis of the military problems inadver-
tently stamped him as a soldier with an attitude of defeat.38
General Gregg, meanwhile, became an exponent of
pacific methods, and he evinced much concern about certain
peacefully inclined Indians of the Verde and Bradshaw
regions. Elaborate instructions left him practically un-
restricted. He was given full authority to: (1) receive and
support them if they wished to give up; (2) consider them
hostile if they did not surrender; (3) provide for them if
the superintendent could not; or (4) collect, guard and eco-
nomically ration them in some unsettled locality until the
37. Jones to A. A. G., June 5, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p.
101; Jones to Gen. J. B. Fry, July 15, 1867, ibid., pp. 83-84.
38. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 87 et seq. For a detailed dis-
cussion of McDowell's report, see Frank C. Lockwood, The Apache Indians (New
York, 1938), pp. 165-168.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 23
office of Indian affairs could assume charge.39 Whatever
results Gregg achieved remain unreported.
General Halleck was next to take up the problem of
Apache control. Moved, doubtless, by the serious conditions
near Prescott, but more perhaps by the critical attitude of
the territorial legislature,40 he made an exhaustive report
to the adjutant general on September 18. He admitted the
weakness of defense in the west, but attributed it to the fact
that only one-ninth of the available strength of the army
was assignd to his extensive division. Of the forty-seven
companies allotted to the Department of California, twenty-
eight were posted in Arizona, where, he pointed out, the
inadequacy of their numbers had rendered them almost
powerless. Furthermore, he could see no prospects for a
safe and permanent settlement of the troubled region until
the bitterly hostile Indians were either conquered or des-
troyed. In any case, they would have to be segregated from
the whites and kept under rigid military control. Concen-
tration of troops, he agreed, would increase their efficiency,
but decentralization was necessary to maintain the small
scattered settlements upon which the commissary depended.
Additional troops — not less than two or three regiments,
according to his analysis — would be required if the problem
were to be solved.41
Acting Secretary of War U. S. Grant, after a study of
Halleck's report, informed President Johnson in November,
1867, that the Apaches would observe no treaties, agree-
ments or truces. He also remarked that they w^re the most
hostile of the American Indians. His recommendation that
the tribe be warred upon until they were completely des-
troyed or made prisoners of war obviously expressed the
dominant view of the federal officials.42
39. A. A. G. to Gregg, Sept. 10, 1867, 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol.
ii, pp. 121-122.
40. Arizona Miner, Sept. 11, 14, 17, 24, 1867 ; Journal of the Fourth Legisla-
tive Assembly, pp. 33-38 ; 83-88.
41. 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, pp. 69-74.
42. Ibid., p. 30.
24 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
During the early part of 1868, the military instituted
action in east-central Arizona that set up a constructive
trend not to be stopped until the Apaches were subdued.
First, General T. C. Devin of the Prescott subdistrict de-
cided to clear the savages out of the country along the east-
ern rim of the Tonto Basin ; then he planned to make a cam-
paign into the basin itself, where the marauders reportedly
retreated with their stolen animals and plunder.43 While
completing details, he sent runners among the Yavapai to
induce them to go to the Colorado river; and, most fortu-
nately, a council was arranged with the notorious Chief
Delchay of the Tontos.44
The council was held twenty-five miles east of Fort
McDowell. General Devin offered the Indians peace if they
would confine themselves to an area bounded by the Verde
River, the Black Mesa and the Salt River. Just what agree-
ments were reached are obscure, but in the autumn Delchay
and his Indians actually established themselves at Camp
Reno, where some of them were retained as couriers and
guides. Others found employment gathering hay for the
post contractors.45
General T. L. Crittenden, simultaneously, made an
agreement with the Camp Grant bands, that superseded the
one made by Colonel Ilges in 1866. However, the Indians
perfidiously broke out as soon as they received a liberal
supply of rations. Crittenden, much irked, still favored
pacific methods; nevertheless, he ordered a mild punitive
expedition into the Tonto Basin, where the culprits were
said to rendezvous.46
General Devin, accordingly, in late April, moved with a
strong command into the relatively unknown region east of
48. According to reports, most of the stock was later traded for by an un-
scrupulous class of whites near Fort McDowell and Camp Reno.
44. Devin to Dent, Jan. 5, 1868, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
45. Devin to A. A. G., Jan. 8, 1868, ibid.; Vincent Colyer to F. R. Brunot (n. d),
1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 536.
The contractors paid the Indians one-half cent per pound for the hay and then
sold it to the government for three cents per pound.
46. Crittenden to Dent, Jan. 27, 1868, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 25
Camp Lincoln. He then descended into the basin proper and
for forty-five days unsuccessfully scoured the region. All
trails showed that the elusive Indians had concentrated
towards the Little Colorado river. This fact convinced the
officers that the hostiles got their munitions from the Zunis
and Navahos. Despite the paucity of results, Devin's obser-
vations led him to believe that the most effective way to con-
trol the wild bands was to open trails directly into the heart
of their habitats. In fact, he soon made his subdistrict quiet
by this method.47
Meanwhile, Captain Charles A. Whittier, send from the
Presidio, had observed the situation in Arizona at first-
hand. Like Jones the year before, Whittier viewed the situ-
ation with adverse criticism. He struck at the feeding pol-
icy of his superiors, insisting that their maintenance of the
Indians as "Indian prisoners" was a violation of the law.
But he agreed that feeding was a constructive policy and one
that was essential unless the Indians were to be extermin-
ated. As an alternative to the prevailing policy, he sug-
gested the issuance of subsistence paid for by regular appro-
priations, which method, he insisted, would not only check
erratic and defective administrative practices, but would
also help to bring in most of the hostile bands. The peace-
fully inclined bands, he found, were entirely unprotected
from the unreasoning frontiersmen ; for this reason he con-
cluded that the government was doing very little to solve
the Apache problem.48
No constructive policies resulted from Whittier's re-
port, and as the last half of 1868 was reached, the situation
again became serious. Acting Governor H. H. Heath, in a
dilemma, asked the citizens to provide locally for their own
defense. No better method to accelerate the indiscriminate
slaughter of Indians could have been devised.49 This was
47. Devin to A. A. G., June 12, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii,
pp. 63-66.
48. Whittier to Fry, June 6, 1868, I. O., W 1067.
49. Heath to O. H. Browning, July 23, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D., no. 1,
vol. ii, pp. 639-640.
26 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
immediately demonstrated when the Yavapai, due to severe
epidemics of whooping- cough and scarlet fever, moved away
from the Colorado river to the more healthful interior.
Although the Indians promised to return in a short time,
friction with freighters soon developed; and on September
25 ten friendly chiefs, including the able Cushackama, were
wantonly murdered near La Paz. Thus at one treacherous
stroke was undone all the significant work of the past.50
Indian hostility now became widespread. At Fort
Goodwin where several ambuscades and attacks occurred,
the commandant was authorized to seize and hold all male
Indians as prisoners until every robber and murderer was
delivered up. But the magnitude of the task prevented its
execution.51 The killing of several whites near Fort Whipple
made the situation equally precarious in the Prescott dis-
trict, and General E. 0. C. Ord, the new commander of the
Department of California, received urged appeals for re-
enforcements. But the general was handicapped, due to a
decrease in the strength of his companies ; therefore, all he
could do was to urge vigorous action with the forces avail-
able. Accordingly, twenty-seven scouts were made from the
various posts in the Apache country, but the results were
less than one dead Indian per scout.52
General Halleck, keenly aware of the critical situation,
once more made constructive suggestions to the secretary of
war. He pointed out that neither proper protection nor
aggressive campaigns could be expected without two addi-
tional regiments of troops. He also foresaw the need of
Indian scouts in conquering the Apaches, and asked that a
large increase be allowed his division. Of greater impor-
60. Feudge to Dent, Aug. 1, 1868, ibid., p. 597; Dent to N. G. Taylor, Oct. 16,
1868, I. O., D 1606.
Federal Judge H. H. Cartter, who considered it no harm to kill any Indian,
refused to take action against the culprits. Col. L. B. Young to Dent, Oct. 15, 1868,
ibid. Cf. supra, footnote 15.
51. A. A. G., to Capt. R. F. O'Beirne, Aug. 8, 1868, I. O.f Ariz. Misc.
52. Devin to A. A. G., Aug. 28, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol.
iii, pp. 66-68 ; Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1868, ibid., p. 51 ; Dent to Comm., Dec. 1, 1868,
I. O., D 1690.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 27
tance, he recommended that Arizona be constituted a sep-
arate military department.53
No important action followed the general's sugges-
tions; consequently, without any definite planning by
responsible officials, the temporizing policy of expediency led
to a chaos of conflicting opinions that reached its height in
1869. Naturally, the frontiersmen were certain that a large
troop increase and a relentless war against the savages
would be a definite solution, but many officials with adminis-
trative considerations in their minds were not so assured.
General Ord in showing that a post of one hundred and fifty
men required an annual outlay of $3,000,000 bluntly stated
that war was the economic basis of the territory and that
perhaps it was desirable to reduce "the number of troops in
the country to the minimum consistent with the interests
of the whole country."54 In fact, General George Thomas'
support of Ord's views convinced General Sherman that the
occupation of the Southwest was premature and that the
cost of maintenance was out of proportion to the results.
"The best advice I can offer," he wrote, "is to notify the set-
tlers to withdraw and then to withdraw the troops and leave
the country to the aboriginal inhabitants."55
Despite the adverse views of the high military, General
Ord decided against a "temporizing policy." He ordered his
troops to capture, root out and hunt the Apaches as they
would wild animals. All officers were to be promoted in pro-
portion to their success ; and he contemplated a concentra-
tion of his troops by the evacuation of some of the small
posts that merely "invited" the Indians to attack the govern-
ment herds and supply trains.56 Before action could be insti-
53. Halleck to A. G., Sept. 22, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii,
pp. 49, 147-148.
54. Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 124-
125.
55. Sherman to W. W. Belknap, Jan. 7, 1870, A. G. O., 1010 P.
Such views as Sherman's tended to convince the sentimental East that all Indian
wars should be stopped.
56. Ord to A. G., Sept. 27, 1869, 03?. cit., pp. 121-122; Weekly Arizonian,
Mar. 21, 1869.
28 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
tuted the general wavered and decided that the reserva-
tion and feeding system rather than war was a more effec-
tive way to bring about a reduction of the savages. Colonel
R. F. Bernard was therefore delegated to investigate the
probable success of a reserve for the Apaches.57
Bernard soon reported that McDowell's experiment at
Camp Goodwin had resulted in failure. But he felt assured
that the Indians would make peaceful and successful farm-
ers if, in addition to annuities, they were allowed a healthy
reserve large enough to afford hunting, planting and the
burning of mescal.58
The report was scarcely made before conditions
throughout the Apache country became worse than they had
been for many months. The Yavapai stopped commerce in
every part of western Arizona, one hundred whites were
killed in a short time, mails moved under escort, picket posts
had to be maintained near all settlements and the Overland
Route was besieged at all points. Ord, thoroughly bewil-
dered, was more inclined to use pacific methods than ever
before. He immediately recommended that a suitable reser-
vation be established at a point completely isolated from
the whites.59
As a result of Ord's views, Colonel John Green was sent
into the remote White Mountain country in July, 1869, to
prospect for a suitable reserve location and to select a satis-
factory site for a proposed post; ostensibly, his expedition
57. Bernard to Ord, Mar. 23, 1869, I. D., W 260.
58. Ibid., The Weekly Arizonian (Mar. 23, 1869) in pointing out that 2,000
Indians had been simultaneously fed and fought without results for two years, in-
ferred that the war had been "conducted for some distinct motive."
59. Devin to Jones, April (?), 1869, A. G. O., Old Records Division, Dist. of
Ariz., pp. 104-106 ; Ord to Secty. of War, April 20, 1869, /. D.
Near Fort Bayard many Mexicans were murdered and travellers were chased
to the immediate grounds of the post. (New Mexican, May 2, 1869.) The San
Pedro region lost nearly all of the one hundred original settlers who were there in
1867. (Weekly Arizonian, June 19, 1869.) Pima county alone from January 2, 1868,
to July 13, 1869, lost in killed, captured and wounded about thirteen per cent of its
total population of 5,500 persons. (Ibid., July 17, 24, 1869.) Major Jones informed
General R. B. Marcy on July 21 that 7,300 Apaches, exclusive of the Yavapai and
Finals, were hostile, and that the region from Prescott into Sonora was completely
paralyzed. A. G. O., 1010 P.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 29
was intended as a mild demonstration against the Indians.
The command of one hundred and thirty men had scarcely
penetrated into the southern part of the region before they
learned that the villages to the north were growing heavy
crops of corn. Since the campaign was a retaliatory one,
Captain John Barry with sixty men was sent to destroy the
Indians' resources and to exterminate as many of the tribes-
men as possible. But Barry was so impressed with their
desire for peace that he ignored his orders, rejoined Green
and was later exonerated. Green as a result of the expedi-
tion reiterated his belief in extermination. Yet he insisted
that the Coyoteros, if properly managed and protected by a
post in the region, could easily be placed on a reserve where
they would form a nucleus for the civilization of all the
Apaches.60
Unfortunately, all the other Apache bands grew more
formidable, and by fall much of the territory was practically
lost to white enterprise. During July the mails were stopped,
the cavalry was frequently forced to retire from the field,
and the Vulture mine at Wickenburg, the sole dependence of
the legislature, was kept open only because General Thomas
ordered continuous scouting between the mine and the
mill.61 In central Arizona the Tontos resumed their char-
acteristic tactics of thieving and plundering; and Cochise's
bands, in the southeastern part, not only threatened to drive
civilization out, but completely frustrated the troops operat-
ing from Fort Bowie.62 The general situation at the end of
1869 proved that no substantial progress had been made in
Apache management.63
60. All accounts of the officers connected with the expedition are printed in 41
Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 544 et seq. Green's findings, especially his
proposal that the bands could be induced to fight against each other, were of extra-
ordinary value in later Apache relations.
61. Weekly Arizonian, July 81, Aug. 7, 1869; Green to Parker, Nov. 6, 1869,
I. O., A 561.
62. Bernard to Devin, Oct. 22, 1869, A. G. O., 925 P ; Weekly Arizonian, Sept. 25,
Oct. 9, 16, 1869; Col. Frank Wheaton to Andrews, Dec. 8, 1869, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
63. The civil authority had exercised little leadership for three years. Super-
intendent Dent after his appointment late in 1866, appears to have interested himself
in graft, especially in connection with an irrigation project he constructed on the
30 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The year of 1870 saw the start of a new era in Apache
control. Nothing spectacular was accomplished, but action
was initiated which eventually led to the elimination of the
Apache problem. This activity centered mainly in the cre-
ation of Arizona as a separate military department and in
the measures undertaken to control the Coyoteros. Yet the
year began darkly for the settlers, for killings, attacks and
robberies were a matter of daily occurrence.64
Governor A. P. K. Safford, thoroughly dismayed with
the situation, had already instituted action which perma-
nently affected Indian affairs in the Southwest. During the
previous November, in the East, the governor carefully dis-
cussed the Apache problem with numerous federal officials
and New York journalists. Editorials soon became less
pacific in tone and the eastern public began to feel horrified
at the continued atrocities of the Apaches.65 With Terri-
torial Delegate McCormick he presented the case to Presi-
dent Grant, General Sherman and the secretary of war;
McCormick also aired the situation before congress.66
Meanwhile, on April 15, 1870, the war department made
Arizona and southern California a separate department
with General George Stoneman in command. Reorganiza-
64. Memorial and Affidavits Showing Outrages Perpetrated by the Apache Indiana
in the Territory of Arizona During the Years 1869 and 1870 (San Francisco, 1871), p. 3.
From July 17, 1869 to July 23, 1870, Pima county lost forty-seven persons killed, six
wounded and one captured.
65. Excerpts printed in Weekly Arizonuin, Feb. 5, 12, April 30, and July 30,
1870.
66. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1870. McCormick, in striking at New England
opposition to a vigorous Indian policy in the West, aroused much comment when he
showed that Cotton Mather had urged the extermination of the northeastern tribes.
Weekly Arizonian, Sept. 24, 1870.
Colorado River Reservation. Dent generally looked upon Indian management with
a pessimistic attitude, but in keeping a large number of Yavapai potential marauders
at work, he probably reduced the number of hostilities in western Arizona. The canal
proved to be a failure and, after much criticism, he resigned on June 1, 1869. For a
discussion of the episode, see Parish, vol. iv, p. 316 et seq.
Colonel C. S. Andrews, at President Grant's direction, replaced Dent on June
17, 1869. In his first important report he said that no success could be expected
in Indian control until officials were able both to punish and to protect. He foresaw
that the rancor the whites bore for all Indians would greatly impede any civil
program. Andrews to Parker, Dec. 9, 1869, I. O., A 629.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 31
tion necessarily required his first efforts, for the eighteen
expensive isolated posts scattered over the department were
manned by less than one and one-half companies each;
therefore, to make his command effective, he kept the troops
busy for several months building roads to connect the
various posts. Fortunately, General Ord had already practi-
cally finished a new road into the White Mountains, and this
fact doubtless explained why Stoneman found the Coyoteros
so pacific and anxious for a reserve.67
To his superiors Stoneman was not optimistic regard-
ing the future of the Indians. They will "never be entirely
harmless," he wrote, "until they suffer the fate of all the
aboriginals that come in contact with the whites."68 And a
little later he reported that the Indians "must either starve,
steal or be fed ; and as they are unwilling to do the former, it
becomes simply a question as to which is the best policy, feed
them or continue to endeavor to prevent them from
stealing."69
The new commander announced his full program in
July: permanent citizen settlements sufficiently large to
protect themselves were to be encouraged ; camps and troops
were to be concentrated; a widespread drive with citizen
cooperation was contemplated ; mining was to be aided ; and
his subordinates were "to regard as hostile all Indians not
known to be friendly." His objective was to make the troops
available for aggressive activity.70
Before the program could be developed, the devastations
of the savages necessitated a number of isolated actions in
the eastern and southern sections of the territory. The
Yavapai and Tontos were struck effectively on several occa-
sions; in fact, Captain R. F. O'Beirne arranged a peace
agreement with the former which lasted for several months.
Cochise was also punished, and after losing sixty-one of his
braves he retired to Camp Ord where, for several weeks, he
67. Ord to A. A. G., Oct. 10, 1870, A. G. O., 665 W.
68. Stoneman to A. G., June 2, 1870, I. O., A 1074.
69. Stoneman to A. A. G., Oct. 81, 1870, A. G. O., 711 P.
70. Weekly Arizonian, Aug. 13, 1870.
32 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
enjoyed the full hospitality of Colonel Green. If a definite
official policy had existed to guide Green, the bloody wars
with the Chiricahuas might have been averted. But unfor-
tunately the opportunity slipped and Cochise soon returned
to his former haunts.71
Murder, robbery and destruction now reached greater
proportions in the Chiricahua country than ever before.
From August 7 to 18, twelve men were killed, one wounded
and $10,000 worth of property destroyed. Numerous bodies
of cavalry sent out in pursuit were repulsed with sharp
losses by Indians who displayed excellent tactics. Even a
citizen force scouted unsuccessfully for thirty days.72 The
press, meanwhile, excoriated Stoneman for his lack of
activity, and especially for his action in removing the head-
quarters from Fort Whipple to Drum Barracks on the Paci-
fic coast. Spurred to action, he issued orders on December
30, which called for "a vigorous persistent and relentless
winter campaign."73 Naturally, the campaign never mate-
rialized, for the commander was too distant from the pro-
posed field of action.
Despite the unsatisfactory situation in much of the
Indian country, a program that promised permanent suc-
cess was already inaugurated with the strong Coyo-
tero bands. An extensive area in eastern Arizona had, in
fact, been defined and proposed as a permanent reserve for
them a few weeks before the creation of Stoneman's com-
mand. According to arrangements the military was to put
the plan in operation; then the office of Indian affairs was
to assume control.74 General Ord visualized the plan as a
final solution to the Coyotero troubles. He foresaw the bands
permanently isolated, surrounded by white immigration and
forced to pursue agriculture. Such results, he thought,
71. O'Beirne to A. A. G., Oct. 26, 1870, I. O., W 1570 ; Green to A. A. G., Aug.
13, 1870, I. O., C 631 ; Weekly Arizonian, July 2, 1870.
72. Ibid., Aug. 6, 13, 27, 1870.
73. Arizona Citizen, Dec. 24, 1870, Mar. 18, 1871.
74. Special Field Orders no. 8, Mar. 5, 1870, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Belknap to Cox,
Mar. 5, 1870, ibid.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 33
would strongly encourage the wilder bands to seek peace. To
him the only alternative was extermination.75
The management of the program fell to Colonel Green,
who was well acquainted with the Coyoteros and their habi-
tat. First, he built a road into the center of the region ; then
he established a post, Camp Ord, later called Fort Apache,
at the road's terminus. The Indians, because of their half-
starved condition, were eager to cooperate, and more than
1,000 of them were present on July 1 for the first count and
beef issue. By winter 2,000 were under control, industriously
cutting hay and wood which were purchased through the
cooperation of General Stoneman. Pointedly, the colonel
informed the commissioner that with subsistence and tools
a life of peace would be made more attractive than one of
war; and that if this result were attained, "their civiliza-
tion would be a perfect success."76
Stoneman's other subordinates achieved no successes
during the winter, and the spring of 1871 opened with the
usual picture of distress and woe. In March, the general re-
turned to Arizona and ill-advisedly took steps of economy
which aroused the settlers to extreme fury. One aggressive
move, however, that of a camp in the Pinal Mountains,
frightened 550 of the Arivaipa and Finals into Fort Grant
for safety; and strangely 1,000 Yavapai came to Camp
Verde in quest of peace. Many of the bands were now in a
position to be thoroughly crushed, but Stoneman, choosing
to control them "through the medium of their bellies," de-
cided to try a policy of peace. He therefore asked for a
supply of meat, corn and blankets with which, he announced,
they could be induced to stay at peace on reservations.77
Even before the establishment of the new camp, other re-
lated groups headed by Chief Eskiminzin had come to Camp
Grant where their sympathetic friend, Lieutenant Royal E.
75. Ord to Parker, April 1, 1870, I. O., A 104.
76. Green to Parker, July 7, 1870, I. O., G 462 ; Green to A. A. G., Dec. 31, 1870,
I. O., C 631.
77. Stoneman to Townsend, April 9, 1871, A. G. O., 1582.
34 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Whitman, had put them to work cutting hay for the post
contractors.78
But the leading settlers were in no frame of mind to
allow any entering wedge to their chief means of livelihood
— that of supplying the troops. Almost at once, the terri-
torial press, the governor, the legislature, and almost all
interested groups set up a terrific tirade against the reser-
vation or feeding system, or any other plan that promised
to bring a cessation of hostilities.79 Indeed, the more unreas-
oning and aggressive elements merely awaited a pretext to
wreck the Camp Grant experiment. This ominous situation
was further aggravated by the continued fiendish ravages of
the wild bands in the southeastern Arizona, and in April,
Stoneman was forced to revise his policy into one of mixed
peace and war. He therefore simply announced that the
Indians were to be warred upon until they became willing to
seek peace and safety on the reservations.80
The policy would doubtless have eased the public feeling
had not a "Committee of Safety" from Tucson made de-
mands of the general which sharply touched his preroga-
tives. As a result of his tactless and caustic replies, the
committee publicly announced that "if anything further is
expected we must depend upon our own efforts for its con-
summation."81 Subtle intriguers now proclaimed that the
friendly Indians at Camp Grant were responsible for all the
depredations, and that Stoneman's policy of peace was the
sole cause of the trouble ; furthermore, a desperate attack on
a wagon train near the post settled the matter from the
frontiersmen's viewpoint.82
78. Arizona Citizen, Mar. 11, 1871 ; R. B. /. C., 1871, p. '60. For graft in con-
nection with Whitman's work see, Parish, vol. viii, p. 157 ; also, Prescott Miner, July
22, 1871.
79. Journals of the Sixth Legislative Assembly, p. 42.
80. General Field Orders no. 2, April 17, 1871, A. G. O., 1360. Stoneman's ac-
tion was in agreement with division instructions of August 8, 1870. I. O., W 1662.
General John Schofield assumed command of the Division of the Pacific in March, 1870.
81. The interview is given in the Weekly Arizonian, April 1, 1871.
82. Capt. Frank Stanwood to Schofield, May 19, 1871, I. O. 368. See also,
R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 60--67.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 35
Immediately, the most important citizens of Tucson, led
by W. S. Oury and Jesus Elias, organized an expedition of
one hundred and forty-six men with whom they planned the
most drastic retaliation. Armed and provisioned by the
territorial adjutant general, the party set out for the In-
dians' camp on April 28, and two days later succeeded in stag-
ing a savage morning attack while the unsuspecting victims
were yet asleep. The gruesome work was soon ended, and
thirty minutes later the party retired without loss up the
San Pedro, leaving behind them eighty-five Indians crushed,
shot and battered to death, seventy-seven of whom were
women and children. Barbarously, twenty-nine children
were carried away into virtual slavery.83
The massacre, while strongly approved in the West,
caused great consternation in the East, especially among the
proponents of the peace policy. President Grant, terming
the massacre an outrage, informed Governor Safford that
martial law would be proclaimed in Arizona if the partici-
pants were not brought to trial. Accordingly, one hundred
and four men were perfunctorily tried and acquitted in
December.84
General Stoneman was now blamed by all factions — the
citizens, the "ring" at Tucson and the peace advocates of
the East. Consequently, Safford and McCormick had little
difficulty in obtaining his removal.85 The general had not
failed, however. Under the most adverse circumstances he
had worked out a policy, a combination of peace and war,
which was later to solve the problem of Apache control.
A policy very similar to that of Stoneman's had simultan-
eously been developed for the Western Apache bands of
southwestern New Mexico. But the civil authorities in New
83. Arizona Citizen, May 6, 1871; Whitman to A. A. G., April 30, 1871, I. O.,
A 326. R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 60-68 ; McClintock, vol. i, p. 207 et seq. Accounts vary
as to the actual number killed. Slightly more than one hundred may have perished.
84. The Alta California, Feb. 3, 1872, covers the trial completely. J. B. Allen,
who outfitted the expedition, served as a member of the jury.
85. Arizona Citizen, May 20, 1871; Richardson and Rister, The Greater South-
west, p. 322.
36 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Mexico, in contrast to those of Arizona, played a most sig-
nificant part in the formation of the policy. For three years
following the Civil War, the impoverished New Mexican
bands had kept up destructive hostilities sufficiently exten-
sive in the eyes of General John Pope to necessitate the
maintenance of Fort Cummings at Cook's Springs, Fort Sel-
den on the Rio Grande, Fort Stanton on the Bonito, and Fort
Bayard near Silver City. Besides, numerous temporary
posts were opened to prevent the abandonment of many
widely separated settlements. One officer even felt that if
the Apache raids east were to be prevented, a cordon of forts
would be required from the Navaho country to Fort Bay-
ard.86 On several occasions the civil officials fruitlessly sug-
gested that supplies and a reservation would make the hos-
tiles docile within a year's time.87
This unsatisfactory condition prevailed until August,
1869, when Governor R. B. Mitchell, alarmed at the in-
creased temerity of the Apaches, issued a proclamation
which designated them as outlaws subject to be killed if
found away from reservations.88 High offiicals immediately
announced that the proclamation would interfere with a
contemplated permanent Indian policy, and ordered Super-
intendent William Clinton not to allow its "propriety or
expediency." Serious complications would doubtless have
arisen, but a change in governors resulted in a new procla-
mation with less drastic provisions.89
This imbroglio, fortunately, had a positive effect on
Apache control, for the commissioner now decided that peace
could best be attained through the civil authority. Accord-
ingly, Lieutenant Charles E. Drew took charge of the South-
ern Apaches on August 23. Drew spent several weeks with
86. Pope to Sherman, Aug. 11, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p.
29; Daily New Mexican, Nov. 17, 1868.
87. 40 Cong,, 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 193 ; 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D.
no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 620, 635.
88. Proclamation, Aug. 2, 1869, I. O., N. Mex., A 329.
89. Parker to W. T. Otto, Aug. 14, 1869, R. B. no 18, p. 492; Parker to
Clinton, Aug. 16, 1869, L. B. no. 92, pp. 73-75 ; 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol.
iii, p. 699.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 37
the Indians and found that Loco and his followers were
anxious for peace. They desired to plant their crops near
their old reservation site, but demanded the right to hunt
over a vast area that extended even east of the Rio Grande.
Sagaciously, the agent urged his superiors to make "judi-
cious arrangements."90
The Indians became more destitute as cold weather
approached and the agent realized that if peace were not
made devastations would reach great proportions during the
winter. Therefore, on October 10 he met Chief Loco at
Canada Alamosa for a peace powwow. In addition to Loco,
Chiefs Victorio, Lopez, Chastine and several Mescalero
leaders were present. This fact indicated to Drew that the
bands through cooperation were becoming more formidable.
An agreement was made whereby Loco was to collect the
groups and hold them at peace near Canada Alamosa, while
Drew was to do his utmost to get the "Great White Father"
to furnish food and clothing.91
The chiefs adhered faithfully to their agreement; but
as weeks passed with only half rations available, the bands
grew more threatening, especially when they realized they
were likely to be attacked by groups of citizens opposed to
any plan that promised peace.92 Yet Drew held the Indians
fast. He visited their camps frequently, reassured them of
the government's intent, and sometimes showed his trust by
staying overnight with them. Finally, on January 5, 1870,
just at the moment when he despaired, word was received
that the office of Indian affairs had allowed $2,800 to meet
the agreement of the past October.93 An outbreak was thus
prevented; moreover, with the favorable example of the
Navahos before them,94 and with many bad whites and Mex-
90. Drew to Clinton, Sept. 29, 1869, ibid., pp. 690-691.
91. Drew to Clinton, Oct. 11, 1869, I. O., C 612.
92. Drew to Clinton, Dec. 12, 1869, I. O., C 801.
93. Drew to Clinton, Jan. 5, 1870, I. C., N. Mex., C 840; Gen. G. W. Getty to
Dept. of Mo., Jan. 4, 1870, ibid., C 664.
94. Frank D. Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880," in N.
MEX. HIST. REV., xiii, pp. 36 et seq.
38 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
leans around them, the Apaches had other strong reasons
for choosing peace. By October, 1870, seven hundred and
ninety Indians, including Cochise and some of his bands, had
collected at Canada Alamosa.95
A constructive conference soon followed between Co-
chise and W. F. M. Arny, a special agent sent out to count
the bands and to promote peace.96 The chief was eager "to
hear what the Great Father had to say," but indicated that
his bands were desirous of peace and security. He promised
to bring in all his braves and keep them at peace, provided
the government would furnish provisions and clothing.
Arny, unauthorized to make an agreement, reported to the
commissioner that the time was most opportune for a per-
manent peace if the government really cared to take the
necessary steps. He recommended a general issue of one
thousand blankets to the bands as well as a small, daily
ration issue to each Indian who would remain at the agency
during the winter. He also recommended the establishment
of a permanent reserve far out in the Apache country where
the various groups would be thoroughly isolated from the
contaminating influences and liquors of the unscrupulous
whites. No treaty was to be made, the reservation was to be
surveyed, and agency buildings were to be erected. The In-
dians were then to be cared for on the reserve and those who
stayed away were to be "considered as at war" and "dealt
with accordingly." Until arrangements could be completed,
he advocated a continuance of the feeding policy at Canada
Alamosa. His plan, he felt, was the only one that would pre-
vent the ultimate extermination of the savages.97 No less
important were the views of the new agent, A. G. Hennisee,
who predicted that if the plan were properly supported 2,000
Apaches would be at peace by the end of the year.98
96. Pope to A. A. G., Oct. 81, 1870, 41 Cong., 8 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, pt. ii, p. 8 ;
Lt. A. G. Hennisee to Clinton, Oct. 22, 1870, I. O., N. Mex., C 1866.
96. Parker to Clinton, Mar. 26, 1870 (n. f.).
97. Arny to Parker, Oct. 24, 1870, I. O., N. Mex., A 1502 ; same to same, Nov. 5,
1870, ibid., A 1518. Cochise reported that many of his braves had fallen and that
the women greatly outnumbered the men. Ibid., 1579.
98. Hennisee to Clinton, Oct. 31, 1870, R. B. I. C., 1870, p. 104. Hennisee became
agent following Drew's death on June 5, 1870.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 39
These field reports aroused keen interest among Wash-
ington officials. Vincent Colyer, secretary of the board of
Indian commissioners, informed Secretary Delano that
Hennisee's success demonstrated "beyond question" that
with larger appropriations "the whole of the Apaches might,
long before this, have been brought into peaceful relations
with the government." Delano, now convinced that feeding
was cheaper than military action, asked at once for $30,000
to "subsist, maintain peace, and promote civilization among
them."99 Since no funds were available for diversion from
the regular channels, President Grant, on December 23,
shifted the burden of feeding the Indians to General G. W.
Getty of the District of New Mexico.100 This decision now
left the field clear throughout the Apache country for a trial
of the president's "Peace Policy."
99. Colyer to Delano, Dec. 17, 1870, ibid., p. 102 ; Delano to A. A. Sargent, Dec.
19, 1870, ibid., p. 101.
100. Colyer to Gen. E. D. Townsend, Dec. 24, 1870, I. O., N. Mex., A 1598 ; Execu-
tive Order of Dec. 23, 1870, R. B. I. C., 1870, p. 103.
40 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
CHAPTER IV
THE GOVERNMENT'S THORNY PEACE POLICY
The report of the Indian peace commission of 1867
aroused the whole country to the fact that the Indian serv-
ice of the federal government had fallen into a sorry state.1
Fortunately, a strong movement for reform followed the
expose, and congress, through the appropriation act of April,
1869, authorized the president to organize a board of Indian
commissioners, who were to "exercise joint control with the
secretary of the interior over the disbursement of the
appropriations made by the act."2
This provision represents both an expression of the
lack of confidence in the Office of Indian Affairs and a deter-
mination to correct some of the abuses charged against it.
The board, first organized in June, 1869, had its powers
sharply increased and modified from time to time. Among
its more important duties during the first few years of its
existence were the supervision of the purchase and trans-
portation of annuity goods, and the audit of the accounts
of the Office of Indian Affairs. Members of the commis-
sion also visited the different tribes and counseled with the
chiefs and agents ; they frequently escorted parties of Indians
to the cities of the North and the East; investigated, re-
ported, and publicized the cruelties committed by white per-
sons against the tribesmen; recommended needed changes
and improvements in the service; and championed Indian
rights throughout the nation. They served gratuitously, and
appear to have been men "eminent for their intelligence and
philanthropy," as the act required. The commission became
1. Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs, its History, Activities
and Organization: in Institute for Government Research, Service Monographs of the
United States Government, no. 48 (Baltimore, 1927), p. 47; Frederic L. Paxson, The
Last American Frontier (New York, 1910), chap. xvii. The report itself is printed
in 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 97.
2. Laws of the United States Relating to Indian Affairs (Washington, 1884),
pp. 31-32.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 41
at once a dominant force in determining the Indian policy
of the government.3
Along with the establishment of the board of Indian
commissioners came another important change in the admin-
istration of Indian affairs. This was President Grant's peace
policy or "Quaker Policy." Soon after his election, Grant
had a conference with an executive committee representing
the Orthodox Friends in the United States. The committee
suggested that the president appoint religious men as In-
dian agents and employees, believing that such persons
would have a more wholesome influence over the savages
than that exercised by the grafters and spoilsmen under the
prevailing system. The president perhaps thought he saw
in the proposal a partial solution for the vexing Indian prob-
lem, or possibly he felt that here was a means for shifting
the responsibility, should failure result. In any case, he
accepted the plan and promptly adopted a new policy rela-
tive to the appointment of Indian agents by delegating their
nominations to the several religious organizations inter-
ested in Indian mission work.4
Considerable delay was to elapse before the plan could
be instituted among the Apaches, for no official agreements
had been made with them; neither had they been assigned
to any definite reservations. However, the board of Indian
commissioners was ready to lay the necessary groundwork.
Shortly after the organization of the board, Vincent Colyer,
its secretary, while inspecting the Navaho agency near Fort
Defiance, New Mexico, met a deputation of visiting Apache
chiefs. He ascertained that they were anxious for a general
peace council, and in his subsequent report to the board
stated that a part of the wild Apaches were gathered near
Canada Alamosa, where they sought both aid and a reserva-
tion.5 Due to his efforts, a small amount of subsistence was
furnished the Southern Apaches during 1870, and the re-
3. Richardson, The Commanche Barrier, p. 324.
4. Ibid., pp. 324-325 ; Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vii, p. 109.
5. R. B, I. C., 1869, p. 65.
42 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
suits, according to the field reports, were encouraging enough
to instill a feeling among the members of the board that
far-reaching efforts should be made to bring about peace
with all the Apaches.6
The board's desire for peace was also heightened by
various other significant factors. In the East there was a
growing conviction that war as a method of Indian control
was futile, and that a pacific policy should be tried. The
enormous costs of the wars, the paucity of results attained
and the outrages of the whites against the Indians were
harped upon until the most bitter prejudice was aroused
against the people of the Southwest. Even Territorial Dele-
gate McCormick felt himself constrained to declare in con-
gress that the "war policy" had failed and that the peace
policy must be tried.7
The sudden development of a keen interest in the mining
possibilities of the Apache country also worked mightily for
a trial of the peace plan. Until 1869, the federal officials
stationed in the Apache range had shaped their reports to
their own selfish ends; consequently, the section was com-
monly represented as a barren and worthless land with
limited mineral resources. But this view was quickly
changed by the publication of J. Ross Browne's, Report on
The Mineral Resources of the States and Territories West
of the Rocky Mountains, and by Governor Safford's vivid
elucidation, during the winter of 1869-1870, of the fact that
a solution of the Apache menace loomed as a prerequisite to
mineral exploitation. Immediately, powerful capitalists and
mining groups interested themselves in a solution of the
Apache troubles, and generally they accepted the views of
the advocates of peace.8
Thus, with strong forces working in their favor, the
6. Cf. supra, pp. 37-38.
7. Weekly Arizonian, Feb. 28, 1869 ; Arizona Citizen, June 24, July 29, 1871 ;
Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 659 ; 42 Cong., 2 sess., Cong. Globe, vol. cvii,
appendix, p. 397.
8. Weekly Arizonian, June 19, 1869, Feb. 5, 1870 ; C. A. Luke to Grant, April 8,
1871, I. O., P 425. Browne's report is printed in 40 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 202,
vol. xvi.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 43
board of Indian commissioners persisted in their aim for a
peaceful solution of the Apache troubles, and they quickly
gained considerable support from high officials.9 Early in
March, 1871, the officials of the department of the interior,
strongly supported by President Grant, authorized Super-
intendent Nathaniel Pope of New Mexico to send Cochise and
a select party of Apaches to Washington for a peace con-
ference. But the attempt failed, because of the chief's
ingrained distrust of the military and the citizens, and his
lack of confidence in the intentions of the government.10
This failure made the board more determined than
ever to strike directly at the Apache problem. Accordingly,
congress was induced to appropriate seventy thousand dol-
lars "to collect the Apache Indians of Arizona and New Mex-
ico upon reservations . . . and to promote peace and civili-
zation among them."11 The commissioners now directed
Colyer, in his capacity as special commissioner, to visit the
Apache country to avert an expected outbreak of hostilities,
and late in May the department of the interior decided that
he should be specifically instructed to cooperate with the
military in its attempt to locate the Apaches upon the White
Mountain reservation; moreover, they agreed to allow him
one-half of the recent appropriation to effect the task. To
insure "harmonious cooperation" the war department
directed the military in Arizona to afford the special com-
missioner "every facility in their power for the accomplish-
ment of the object."12
Colyer, evidently with a more elaborate program in
mind than had been planned, had a conference with Presi-
dent Grant at Long Branch, New Jersey, on July 13, 1871,
which resulted in a considerable enlargement of his powers.
9. Colyer to the President, Jan 7, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1879, pp. 109-110 ; Gov. Wm.
A. Pile to Hamilton Fish, June 19, 1871, A. G. O., 2470. See also Delano's annual
report for 1871 in 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 10.
10. E. S. Parker to Delano, July 21, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
11. R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 5, 35.
12. Parker to Delano, May 29, 1871, I. D.; Delano to Felix R. Burnot, May 29,
1871, I. D., L. B. no. 10 ; Belknap to Delano, May 31, 1871, I. D.
44 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
In fact, the president directed Secretary of War W. W.
Belknap to give full support to "any arrangement" that Col-
yer might make with the Apache bands.13
The special commissioner proceeded at once to Santa
Fe, where he learned that the irate citizens near Canada
Alamosa had formally organized with the intention of exter-
minating all the Indians collected at the Southern Apache
agency. Fearful of a calamity that would frustrate all hopes
for peace, he hurried on with Superintendent Pope to Canada
Alamosa, and here met the spectacle of an agency without
Indians. Intelligence soon revealed that the 1,200 Indians
recently gathered there had stampeded to the mountains to
avoid the threatened massacre. Colyer now tried to arrange
a general council, but the chiefs refused to leave their hiding
places. Thus frustrated by a "few lawless white men" who
were "allowed to overturn all the good work of the gov-
ernment," he decided to inspect regions more remote from
the settlements, with a view of establishing a reservation.14
The Colyer party, strongly escorted and fully provi-
sioned, entered the isolated Apache country of western New
Mexico and eastern Arizona at Ojo Caliente. Proceeding to
the Tulerosa valley, the special commissioner was delighted
to find that the area was ideally suited for a reservation, and
he reported that it was "remote from white settlements, sur-
rounded by mountains not easily crossed, sufficient arable
land, good water, and plenty of wood and game." Without
delay, he declared the region beginning at the headwaters
of the Tularosa River "and extending down the same ten
miles on each side for a distance of thirty miles, to be an
Indian reservation for the sole use and occupation of the
Southern and other roving bands of Apache Indians . . ."
13. Grant to Delano, July 13, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68 ; Grant to Belknap,
July 14, 1871, A. G. O., 2618.
The president's interest caused the department of the interior to invest Colyer
with power to take any action needed "for locating: the nomadic tribes of those
territories upon suitable reservations." Acting Secretary to Colyer, July 21, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
14. All correspondence in the case is printed in R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 69-72. See
also Colyer's letter of Aug. 22, 1871, in ibid., p. 38.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 45
At the same time he ordered Superintendent Pope to have
the Indians that were collected at Canada Alamosa removed
to the new reserve at once.15
Unsuccessful in solving the Apache troubles in New
Mexico, but certain that the groundwork for an eventual
peace had been arranged, Colyer reached Camp Apache on
September 2. Colonel John Green, in command, was enthu-
siastic about the peace plan and reported that the Indians
in the immediate vicinity of the post were ready for its in-
ception. The Indians themselves, especially Chief Miguel,
welcomed Colyer, and well might they, for a consignment of
$2,000 worth of beef, corn and clothing that he had ordered
for them when he first reached the Indian country had just
arrived.16 In a few days, nearly four hundred Indians were
at hand, all making the most effusive professions of peace.
Colyer lost no time in designating a vast area about Camp
Apache as an Indian reservation,17 and the next day, Sep-
tember 7, he held a general peace council. Colonel Green as
spokesman explained to the assembled chiefs the advantages
to be derived from peace on a reservation, where rations and
supplies would be furnished free, and where the bands
would be safe from molestation. But he made it clear that all
who stayed away would be pursued and killed. The chiefs,
after insisting upon the immediate delivery of provisions
and requesting that their beef be delivered on hoof so that
they could get the hides and tallow, agreed to comply with
the government's demands. A systematic distribution of
Indian goods followed, and then Colyer, convinced that the
peace plan was successfully inaugurated among the Coyo-
teros, prepared to leave for Camp Grant.18
15. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, I. O., C 631 ; Executive Orders Relating to
Indian Reservations, p. 128 ; Colyer to Pope, Aug. 29, 1871, A. C. O., 3441.
16. 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 543 ; R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 40, 72-
73, 77.
17. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, op. cit.; Colyer to Green, Sept. 5, 1871, I. O.,
631. For a detailed description of the reservation, see Executive Orders Relating to
Indian Reservations, p. 7.
18. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, I. O., C. __37. Five days after the council
one Coyotero band was charged with the theft of fifteen horses from near the post,
Arizona Citizen, Oct. 7, 1871.
46 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The Colyer party in its journey to Camp Grant pene-
trated directly through the heart of the Apache country.
Wherever Indians were found the special commissioner was
met with the greatest manifestations of goodwill, but the
frontiersmen looked upon him with intense displeasure.19 In
fact, Governor Safford had taken the unprecedented action
of issuing a proclamation calling upon the citizens to receive
the federal commissioner with "kindness and hospitality."20
But Colyer had eagerly anticipated success at Camp Grant,
and on his way west, at Lawrence, Kansas, had selected the
post "as a reservation on the west, where the Apache Indians
are to be protected and fed." He had also arranged for
Lieutenant Whitman to be left in charge, and at his request
the military had sent runners to bring in the peacefully dis-
posed bands.21
No time was lost in arranging a council. Chiefs Eski-
minzin and Chiquito were present with all their followers
who had survived the massacre in the spring, and it was
obvious that their desire for peace and safety would result in
the easy collection of several hundred other tribesmen, once
they were assured that the government was sincere in its
promises. Colyer, now quite aware that a reserve at Camp
Grant was doomed to be a temporary one due to the prox-
19. Colyer was shamefully abused by the frontier press during the summer, and
he erred by not giving proper attention to the citizen's side of the question. His life
was even threatened on one occasion. News reached the East that parties involved in
the Camp Grant massacre intended to assassinate him to prevent the delivery of a
report to the president. Peter Cooper then asked Grant to render the special commis-
sioner proper protection, and Secretary Belknap actually Issued a public statement to
reassure the proponents of peace. Cooper to the President, Sept. 19, 1871, A. G. O.,
3299 ; Belknap to Cooper, Sept. 21, 1871, ibid.
20. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op. cit. The proclamation may be found in
Arizona Citizen, Aug. 26, 1871, or in R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 79-80.
21. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op. cit.; A. G. to Crook, Aug. 2, 1871,
I. O., A 344. Just at the time Colyer reached Camp Grant, a party of nearly
two hundred armed whites were only twelve miles from the reserve. The post officers
saw that the Indians feared another massacre, and to prevent a general stampede,
ordered the party not to approach nearer than ten miles to the post. Since this action
practically closed travel between Tucson and Florence, Crook censured the commandant,
declaring that such orders would "unnecessarily provoke the hostilities of the citizens
toward the military and the Indians." Crook to Capt. Wm. Nelson, Sept. 22, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 82.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 47
imity of a dangerous white population, attempted to induce
the Indians to remove to the Camp Apache region. But the
Indians rejected the plan, and the special commissioner, "be-
lieving it better for the sake of peace," designated a consid-
erable area contiguous to the post as a reservation for all
peacefully inclined Arivaipa, Final and other roving bands
of Apache Indians. He made it clear to the chiefs that their
followers would suffer dire punishment if they strayed
beyond the reserve limits. On the part of the government he
agreed that, besides furnishing them subsistence, an attempt
would be made to restore the children carried away at the
time of the massacre.22
The peace party then hurried on to Camp Verde 23 to
examine conditions in the eastern Yavapai country. Since
the Indians of this particular region were quite impover-
ished and exhausted, Colyer, with the aid of the post officers,
had little difficulty in collecting them for a conference. On
October 2, 1871, when the council began, the general wretch-
edness of the tribesmen was vividly apparent. The chief
was so weak and sick from hunger that stimulants and food
were required before he could command strength enough
to participate in the talk. No less enervated were the mass
of his followers. Danger from the whites, ineffective arms
for the chase, and a general scarcity of game were respon-
sible for the deplorable state to which the bands had fallen.
Already the old men had resigned themselves to their fate.
Despite their condition, the Indians resisted his suggestion
of a reserve at Date Creek, but agreed that they would wel-
come the establishment of one somewhere along the Verde
River. Accordingly, after the post officers had indicated
22. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, op cit.; Executive Orders Relating to Indian
Reservations, p. 3.
23. En route, at Fort McDowell, Colyer's efforts to parley with the Tontos met
with failure. The unwillingness of the Tontos to talk peace was doubtless due to
the fact that they had come to view all peaceful overtures of the whites as perfidious.
Nevertheless, the commissioner made the post reservation a temporary Indian reserva-
tion and feeding station. He allotted the commandant $400 to buy clothing for those
tribesmen who might come to the fort later in the year. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 24,
1871, I. O., C 562 ; Colyer to Col. N. A. Dudley, Sept. 25, 1871, ibid.
48 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
their preference for a Verde location, the commissioner
acquiesced, by ordering that the Indians should be protected
and fed on a reserve to be twenty miles wide and to extend
upstream from the post area for forty-five miles.24
Colyer now visited Fort Whipple for a discussion of the
Apache problem with General Crook.25 Sharp differences
were quickly uncovered and naturally so, for Colyer had
already written Delano that Crook's retention as department
commander "jeopardizes the success of the President's In-
dian policy here." Nevertheless, he accepted the command-
er's advice not to move the Yavapai of western Arizona to
the new Verde Reservation during the approaching winter,
but rather, to establish a temporary reserve for those In-
dians who loitered about the military post of Camp Date
Creek.26 Although the two men conferred in the most cor-
dial manner, Colyer had scarcely left Fort Whipple for San
Francisco before Crook wrote General Schofield an unusual
personal letter that eventually reached the adjutant gen-
eral. This communication shows that Crook, who believed
he was "to be allowed the entire settlement of the Apache
question," felt that Colyer considered himself as "the rep-
resentative of the President in carrying out his (the Presi-
dent's) Tet Theory' with the Indians." Crook further
shows that the peace policy "managers" were merely using
Colyer as an "instrument" to make it appear that a lasting
peace could be made with the "much abused and injured
Apache" were it not for the opposition of the military ; and
that they were really anxious for him (Crook) to wage war
so that he "would be abused as the great North American
Butcher." In order to offset the designs of the "Policy Men,"
the general proposed to remain nominally inactive as long as
Colyer was "sitting on and controlling the valves." Colyer's
24. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 3, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 56-57 ; Executive Order
Files, I. O., I 971.
25. Cf. infra, note 27.
26. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 6, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 57 ; same to same, Sept. 17,
1871, I. D.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 49
peace with the Apaches he characterized as a "humbug"
which would soon come to naught.27
Meanwhile, Colyer reached San Francisco, conferred
with General Schofield, and then entrained for the East.
Few details concerning their talk are known, although the
general indicated that he was pleased that Crook had been
left with the entire supervision of those Indians who might
choose to stay on the new reservations. However, the special
commissioner was not reassured, and by wire requested
Delano personally to see that Belknap issued no orders "look-
ing to war" until a report could be made.28
Colyer reached Washington on October 27, only to find
that Delano was absent from the city. Fearing that the
"contractors, politicians and Indian exterminators" might
gain the president's ear, he rushed to the White House,
where he met Secretary Belknap who had just arrived for
a cabinet meeting. Belknap, somewhat angered, said that
Colyer was "interfering," and indicated that he "only
awaited the President's word" to strengthen General Crook.
But the special commissioner was not to be frustrated, and
through a message to the president received the assurance
that he would be received immediately upon Delano's return.
During the next few days he arranged "that such pressure
would be brought on the President as to stop an aggressive
war."29
President Grant took up the Apache problem with
Delano, Belknap and Colyer on November 6. After a long
and careful discussion, a general line of policy was evolved,
which Delano was directed to prepare more fully in the form
of specific recommendations. This fundamental program
completed within a few hours, stipulated that (1) the presi-
27. Crook to Schofield, Oct. 10, 1871, A. G. O., 3920. In this letter Crook states
that part of his information resulted from talks that Mrs. Crook had recently had at
Washington with Secretary Delano.
28. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 19, 1871, I. D.
Schofield notified Sherman that "the President ought to know how very differ-
ently his military and civil representatives in Arizona view the Apache question."
Schofield to Sherman, Oct. 23, 1871, A. G. O., 3920.
29. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 30, 1871, I. D.
50 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
dent was to designate as reservations the areas selected by
Colyer; (2) the roving bands were to be required to locate
upon the reservations, where they were to receive subsist-
ence and protection as long as they remained friendly "with
the Government, each other, and the white people" ; (3) the
braves as well as the noncombatants were to stay within
the reserve limits ; (4) the whites were to be warned that the
government would protect the peaceable Indians to the full
extent of its power; (5) the superintendent of Indian affairs
was to locate at Fort Whipple; and (6) the war department
was to select "suitable and discreet" army officers to act as
Indian agents until superseded by civil agents.30
The execution of the program devolved upon General
Sherman, and without delay he ordered the division com-
manders of the Division of the Pacific and the Missouri, to
comply with Secretary Delano's recommendations. Sarcasti-
cally, he pointed out that since the Office of Indian Affairs
was rarely able to provide food, the commissary department
would be required to meet the implied condition that those
Indians "acting in good faith should not be permitted to
starve." The general also stated that after a reasonable time
General Crook was to feel assured that "whatever measures
of severity" he might adopt to bring peace would "be
approved by the War Department and the President.31
Crook, in fact, had been quite active during the sum-
mer of 1871 despite the government's peace efforts. He
arrived unannounced in Tucson, on June 19, fifteen days
after having assumed command, and within one hour was
working on his plans and preparing instructions. By sun-
down every officer in southern Arizona had been ordered to
report to him. He then spent the next few days in consul-
tation with every individual he could find who had any sig-
nificant information that would be of value in planning a
30. Colyer to Delano, Dec. 20, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 59, 73 ; Delano to the
President, Nov. 7, 1871, I. D., L. B. vol. x, pp. 326-327.
31. Sherman to Schofield, Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. O., Headquarters of the Army
L. B. vol. liv. p. 413. A letter to Sheridan was identical, except the reference to
Crook.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 51
campaign against the savages. Yet the general had no in-
tention of an immediate offensive. Rather, he looked for-
ward to a thoroughly planned war that would bring a final
and complete success,32
Action would doubtless have been deferred for an ex-
tended time, had not a sudden increase in killings and at-
tacks in the Chiricahua country required a demonstration
against Cochise. Therefore, with the joint purpose of lead-
ing a training expedition into the field and of striking the
chief a decisive blow, Crook collected around himself some
of the most able and ambitious young officers in Arizona,
organized a command of six companies of cavalry and scouts,
and moved out for Fort Bowie on July 11. No Indians were
encountered en route, but sufficient evidence of their num-
bers was noted to convince the general that a permanent
peace would be impossible until the Chiricahuas were sub-
jugated.33 News concerning Colyer's peace mission now
ended the plan to run Cochise down, and instead, Crook
decided to move his expedition farther north, where he hoped
not only to meet some hostile parties, but also to form an
alliance with the friendly Indians near Camp Apache.34
The command upon its arrival at Camp Apache on
August 12, was gratified to find some five hundred Indians
under Chiefs Miguel, Chiquito and Pedro, hard at work cul-
tivating corn, which fact Crook enthusiastically reported as
"really the entering wedge in the solution of the Apache
32. 49 Cong., 1 sess., H. R. no. 531, p. 3 ; Arizona Citizen, June 24, 1871 ; Bourke,
On the Border with Crook, p. 108 ; Crook to A. G., Sept. 28, 1871, 42 Cong., 2 sess.,
H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 77-78. Crook's basic plans included: (1) supplies to be
brought from California by water rather than by land; (2) wagons and saddles
especially made to withstand heat and hard usage to be furnished ; ( 3 ) telegraph
lines to be built into department; and (4) pack mules to be made more serviceable
by giving them extraordinarily particular care.
33. Crook to Townsend, July 10, 1871, I. O., A 501; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 9,
1871.
34. 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 78.
Shortly after Crook left Fort Bowie, the beef herd was attacked within a stone's
throw of the parade ground. The Indians killed two men and made away with thirty-
eight animals. About the same time a body of troops bound for the post engaged four
hundred savages near the San Pedro and killed thirteen. The military suffered a loss
of four. Arizona Citizen, July 22, 29, 1871.
52 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Question."35 The Indians acquiesced to the general's view
that white pressure necessitated a life of peace, and he easily
enlisted a group of scouts to help him ferret out the incor-
rigibles. He also persuaded all the friendly Indians to enroll
their names at the post, where each of them was furnished
a written, personal description as a guarantee against vio-
lence by the whites.36 But some of the less docile Coyo-
teros had gone on the warpath as a protest to the Camp
Grant Massacre, and these the general now hoped to strike
on his way to the department headquarters at Fort
Whipple.37
The resulting reconnaissance westward to Camp Verde
accomplished little at the moment, although by the time the
post was reached the commander had formulated far-reach-
ing plans for "concentrating on one band ... at a time until
they would submit to peace at any terms." Since orders had
just come to suspend all aggressive operations until Colyer's
mission was completed, the general pushed on to Fort Whip-
pie "to await further developments."38
Colyer, as previously noted, ended his peace tour with-
in a short time and hastened back to Washington to win the
approval of his superiors.39 But despite the fact that consid-
erable improvement did follow among the Coyotero, Final,
Arivaipa and Verde bands,40 events in the Indian country
soon proved that the Apache troubles were far from settled.
On the morning of November 5, 1871, a California stage
loaded with eight passengers was attacked near Wickenburg
35. Crook to Townsend, Sept. 1, 1871, I. O., A 570.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 16, 1871.
38. Crook to Townsend, Sept. 1, 1871, I. O., A 570.
39. Cf. supra,, p. 49.
40. Arny to Colyer, Oct. 11, 1871, Corr. Bd. Ind. Corns., pp. 3-6 ; Whitman to
Colyer, Oct. 20, 1871, I. D. : David White to Colyer, Nov. 22, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871,
p. 57.
Twelve hundred Southern Apaches were located on Colyer's Tulerosa Reserve,
where they continued to depredate, but less so than formerly. Gen. Gordon Granger
to A. A. G., Sept. 20, 1871, A. G. O., 3863. Colonel N. H. Davis, who inspected the
agency for General Pope, decided that the new site would offer no barrier to fur-
ther depredating. For this reason he counseled that the "experiment" of peace be
tried at Canada Alamosa. Davis to A. A. G., Oct. 25, 1871, A. G. O., 4047.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 53
by a raiding party of Apache Mohaves, said to belong- to
the main group of nearly one thousand tribesmen who were
fed at Date Creek. This attack was made especially signifi-
cant by the fact that of the six persons killed,41 three were
members of the Wheeler Expedition,42 one of whom was
Frederick W. Loring of Massachusetts, a young writer of
great promise, widely known in the East.43 The eastern
press gave wide publicity to the killing of Loring, and many
prominent pacific-minded individuals now became convinced
that Apache affairs had been described inaccurately, "by
those who have allowed their philanthropy to outrun their
judgment and sense of justice."44
Public opinion was further influenced against the peace
efforts by a notorious and rabid western press which assailed
Colyer and the peace advocates with a deluge of journalis-
tic execration. The pages of the Alta California and the San
Francisco Times, throughout the last half of 1871, were
filled with bitter communications from officials and visitors
in the Apache country, and many of these tirades were re-
printed in the eastern papers. Even the federal grand jury
at Tucson resorted to similar methods of propaganda, for
its report in October, largely an investigation of Indian mat-
ters, was essentially a castigation of the peace policy as in-
augurated by Colyer.45
The situation soon played into the hands of the war
party, and upon the receipt of General Sherman's instruc-
tions,46 the military again prepared to pursue a rigorous
policy. The adjutant general suggested to Schofield that the
reserves selected by Colyer might be abandoned, but Scho-
41. For details of the massacre see, Capt. Chas. Meinholt to Lt. F. H. Ebstein,
Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. O., 4546 ; Wm. Krueger to W. G. Peckham, Dec. 9, 1871, in Grand
Army Journal, Jan. 6, 1872.
42. Wheeler's epochal surveys are covered in George M. Wheeler, Report Upon
Geographic Surveys West of the 100th Meridian, in charge of First Lieutenant George
M. Wheeler (Wash., 1875-1889), 8 vols.
43. While at Harvard, Loring had drawn the attention of James Russell Lowell.
See Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1928-36), vol. xi, p. 417.
44. McCormick to Safford, Nov. 16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871.
45. The complete report is given in Arizona Citizen, Oct. 28, 1871.
46. Cf. supra, p. 50.
54 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
field apparently ignored the proposal by replying that until
the experiment of peace was tried "it would be wise not to
appoint any civilian agents for the Apaches but to leave
them under exclusive military control," because "strict
military control of the Indians on the reservations is neces-
sary to effect the desired changes in their habits."47 Then
using Sherman's instructions as a point d'appui, Schofield
made out general orders for Crook's guidance, which later
proved to be epochal in nature. These orders completely
shattered the outworn policy of expediency and set forth the
following instructions "for the government of Indians sub-
ject to military control in the Territory of Arizona:" (1) all
roving bands were to go upon the reservations at once; (2)
if found away, they were to be punished as hostiles; (3) an
army officer was to act as agent on each reservation; (4) a
descriptive list was to be made of each male old enough to
go upon the warpath, with the number in his family re-
corded, and a duplicate form was to be on his person at all
times; (5) the presence on the reservation of every male
was to be verified at least once each day; (6) a tribe, unless
guilty of giving aid, was not to be punished for the acts of
individuals; (7) the families of absent warriors were to be
held in custody until captures were effected; (8) the de-
partment commander was to fix a time-limit for the inaugu-
ration of the new regime ; (9) no whites except officials were
to be allowed on the reserves without permission, and official
escorts were to be furnished in all cases; (10) each Indian
was to receive a specific amount of rations, and the issues
were to be supervised by army officers; (11) vigorous op-
erations were to be continued against the hostiles until they
submitted; (12) incorrigibles were to be hunted down with
the aid of friendly scouts; and (13) full authority was con-
ferred upon the department commander "to adopt such
measures" as might be needed "to give full effect to the pol-
icy of the government."48
4T Townsend to Schofield, Nov. 11, 1871, A. G. O., 3896; Schofield to Town-
send, Nov. 21, 1871, ibid., 4156.
48. Gen. Orders no. 10, Nov. 21, 1871, Ibid., 4553. General Sheridan issued
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 55
At Washington, the official attitude fully indicated that
temporizing was ended. That Colyer had lost the support of
Grant, Sherman, Delano and Belknap, is shown by their
action in promising that Crook would be "warmly sup-
ported in rigorous aggressive operations." Delano even or-
dered Superintendent of Indian Affairs Herman Bendell
either to cooperate with Crook in the new plan of pacifica-
tion, or to resign at once.49
Arrangements were also made for a general movement
of new troops to the Apache country and congress was asked
for $50,000 to build a military telegraph into Arizona.50
But the peace advocates were not to be worsted without a
struggle. In fact, after the Loring massacre, "certain inter-
ests" continued to harp upon the matter until they led a
large portion of the eastern public to believe that a party of
frontiersmen had committed the crime to insure a contin-
uance of the war. Some of the military also supported the
peace group, by declaring that the Indians could never be
reclaimed by "following two directly opposite policies at
the same time — one of war, the other of peace." And the
civilian friends of the tribesmen insisted "that there is no
chance to get up a war with the Apaches as all are on the
Reservation and at Peace." President Felix Brunot of the
board of Indian commissioners boldly wrote that a policy of
"judicious forbearance" should be substituted for General
Schofield's stringent orders which, if continued, were cer-
tain to defeat the peaceful designs of the government. Al-
ways lukewarm towards a policy of force, the officials of the
department of the interior became positively opposed when
they realized that a consummation of the war plans might
49. McCormick to Safford, Nov. 16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871;
Delano to Comm., Nov. 8, 1871, I. O., I 971.
Herman Bendell of Albany, New York, was appointed superintendent early in
1871. He took charge in late March. Bendell to Parker, April 10, 1871, I. O., Super-
intendent's Letter Book (hereafter cited as S. L. B.) , vol. i, p. 9.
50. 42 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D., no. 14.
almost identical orders to regulate the control of the Western Apaches in New
Mexico. All bands, including those that might "come into New Mexico," were to be
concentrated at the Tulerosa Reservation. Gen. Orders no. 8, Nov. 20, 1871, ibid., 2465.
56 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
result in an intrenchment of military control.51 But of the
greatest weight to the peace party were the views soon to be
expressed by the president :
I do not believe our creator ever placed differ-
ent races of men on this earth with the view of hav-
ing the stronger exert all their energies on exterm-
inating the weaker. If any change takes place in
the Indian policy of the government while I hold
my present office it will be on the humanitarian
side of the question.52
The war party, meantime, had gone ahead with their
plans for a drastic policy, and Crook in December 1871 sent
word to the bands that they must be on the reservations by
February 15, 1872, if they wished to avoid severe punish-
ment. In compliance hundreds of Indians rushed to the
reserves where, according to reports, they not only avoided
the rigors of winter and the pangs of hunger, but also pre-
pared for hostilities by caching their surplus rations and
increasing their store of munitions.53 Crook waited patiently
until February 7, and then announced that after the elapse
of nine days no Apache absent from a reserve would be
received except as a prisoner of war. And Schofield, in close
touch with affairs, wired the war department two days
before the deadline that "late" advices from Crook indi-
cated the necessity of an immediate "unavoidable cam-
paign."54
War was now at hand on the frontier, but peace had
again triumphed in Washington. In fact, Crook had scarcely
61. Prescott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872; Col. N. M. Dudley to Colyer, Nov. 2, 1871,
R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 53; C. E. Cooley to Colyer, Jan. 30, 1872, I. O., C 870; Brunot to
Delano, Jan. 27, 1872, A. G. O., 508 ; Delano to Francis A. Walker, Jan. 2, 1872, I. O.,
(n. f.).
52. Grant to Geo. H. Stuart, Oct. 26, 1872, I. O., Scrap Book, B. I. C. In general,
President Grant probably favored a mild policy in Indian relations. The pressure of
strong pro-war economic and political groups was doubtless the cause of his incon-
sistent views.
53. Gen. Orders no. 32, Dec. 11, 1871, and Gen. Orders no. 35, Dec. 27, 1871, A.
G. O., 3896 ; Arizona Citizen, Jan. 27, 1872 ; Bendell to Walker, Jan. 30, 1872, I. O.,
S. L. B., vol. i, p. 228.
54. Gen. Orders no. 9, Feb. 7, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Feb. 24, 1872; Schofield
to A. G., Feb. 13, 1872, I. O., W 1271.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 57
moved his commands into the field before the war depart-
ment, at the request of Delano, notified Schofield to avoid
hostilities as much as possible.55 Telegrams of protest
recounting recent outrages 56 accomplished nothing, for the
president, Secretary Delano and Secretary Belknap had con-
ferred again and decided that instead of war, "the Apaches
should be induced by persuasive means, if possible, to return
to their reservations, or better, to go upon some reservation
in New Mexico." But of greater chagrin to the war party
was the intelligence that a new agent of the interior depart-
ment would soon visit the Indian country "to cooperate with
the military" in preserving peace.57
The president and Secretary Delano wished to make no
mistake this time, and after much pondering over the choice
of an agent, selected General 0. 0. Howard, an official of
proved experience in the field of Indian diplomacy. Delano
instructed him to proceed at once to the Indian country,
where he was to take steps which in his own judgment
seemed best adapted "to maintain peace and secure the exe-
cution of the policy of the government." Fully admonished
to confer and cooperate with the military, the general was
also directed to persuade as many chiefs "as possible" to
return with him to Washington for a peace conference.58
Howard, thus armed with plenary power, hastened west
and entered the Apache country at Fort McDowell. From
55. A. G. to Schofield, Feb. 20, 1872, A. G. O., 549. Sheridan was similarly in-
structed.
56. The post herd was stolen at Fort McDowell; eight hundred Indians left Date
Creek, killed two men, attacked two trains and invested the Prescott-Wickenburg
country; and a like number left Camp Verde, although all the women and children
remained at the reserve. The bucks then harrassed every mine and ranch in the
region. Crook to A. A. G., Feb. 20, 1872, ibid., 3057 ; Capt. C. C. C. Carr to A. A. G.,
Feb. 22, 1872, ibid., 1210. See especially Schofield to Townsend, Feb. 26, 1872, ibid., 508.
57. Townsend to Schofield, Feb. 24, 1872, A. G. O., 2659.
58. Delano to Belknap, Feb. 29, 1872, ibid., 717; Delano to Howard, Feb. 29,
1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. 1, pp. 155-159. See also, Special Orders,
no. 53, Mar. 2, 1872, I. D.
Grant showed his personal interest in Howard's mission, by writing Schofield a
letter of placation. Grant to Schofield, Mar. 6, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1,
vol. i, p. 160. On March 5 the house of representatives had a heated discussion of the
Apache problem. The administration's views were clearly presented. See Cong. Globe,
vol. ciii, pp. 1433-1434.
58 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
this point, after a most harmonious conference with Gen-
eral Crook, he pushed on to Fort Grant only to find upon his
arrival that the one thousand Indians under the care of
Major E. W. Crittenden were ready to flee at a moment's
notice.59 The new civilian agent, Edward C. Jacobs, had
just arrived,00 but Howard "deemed the presence of Lieu-
tenant Whitman essential to assist in restoring a change of
confidence with them," and had him temporarily returned
from his point of incarceration at Camp Crittenden.61 In
a constructive council on April 26, 1872, the Indians not only
demanded the return of their stolen children, but also in-
sisted that Whitman be restored as their agent. More impor-
tant to future relations, the chiefs suggested that they be
given a new reservation, far removed from the whites, in
some healthier locality. Howard considered their proposal
of extreme importance, and upon leaving for Tucson, prom-
ised that he would arrange for the holding of a general con-
ference of Indians, citizens and territorial officials at the
post on May 21.62
The general tarried in Tucson only long enough to
arrange with Safford for the return of the captive children
held in the town ; then he turned north to the Prescott area.
En route, at Date Creek, he recommended that the nine
hundred poverty stricken savages living near the post be
moved to the Colorado River Reservation as soon as their
crops were harvested.63 Unfortunately, a sharp increase in
59. Howard to Schofield, April 18. 1872, I. O., A 1852.
60. Jacobs was a nominee of the Dutch Reformed Church, I. O. I 1219.
61. The unrest of the Indians was caused by the recent arrest of Agent Whitman.
The lieutenant, always an object of suspicion to both the citizens and the military,
was arrested and held for court martial on March 12 by order of General Schofield.
He was charged with not obeying General Orders no. 10. Special Orders no. 17, Mar.
12, 1872, I. O., W 1463. The Rev. E. P. Smith, who accompanied Howard, reported
that Whitman's downfall was caused by groups who feared his success as agent
would react too favorably for the peace policy. Smith to Walker, April 8, 1872, I. O.,
S 777. Crook, viewing the matter differently, said one year later: "I told General
Howard that the administration of their affairs under Whitman, Third Cavalry, was
criminally rotten and needed a thorough investigation, but so far from heeding my
suggestion he intensified matters by giving the persons concerned in this rotten-
ness his moral support . . ." Crook to A. A. G., Jujy 3, 1873, A. G. O., 2933.
62. Howard to Delano, April 27, 1938, I. O., H 1390.
63. Howard to Delano, May 3, 1872, /. D.; 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1,
vol. i, p. 154.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 59
depredations by Tontos and Indians of the Verde region
endangered the peace policy ; yet Howard without hesitation
notified Crook that "amongst the incorrigible hostile there is
no course left but to deal with vigor, according to your dis-
cretion."64
General Howard rested in Prescott for a week, and then
accompanied by General Crook and Superintendent Bendell
crossed over the country to Camp Grant, arriving on May 20.
Since Governor Safford had already arrived with a large
delegation of officials, citizens and Indian chiefs, the pre-
arranged conference began the next morning. After three
days of extended speechmaking — figurative and symbolic
on the part of the Indians and paternalistic and designing on
the part of the whites — a general peace was made among
the various tribes of southern Arizona, in which the Apaches
specifically promised to trail thieves and to help Crook ferret
out those individuals among their bands who remained
incorrigible.65
Howard complied with the Apache chiefs* demands for
a healthier location, by designating a large area (to be
known as the San Carlos Reservation) contiguous to and
directly south of the White Mountain Reservation as a future
home for all the bands collected at Camp Grant. But in the
case of the retention of Whitman as their agent, he per-
suaded the chiefs that the lieutenant would be required to
join his regiment.66 Howard now closed the conference, and
64. Howard to Crook, May 9, 1872, A. G. O., 2100. Before an execution of Gen-
eral Orders no. 9 (cf. supra, p. 56) should occur, Howard suggested that every com-
mandant be informed that peace and civilization were the motives of all action to be
taken. Crook immediately ordered his officers to "aid the duly authorized agents of
the government, by every means in their power, in their efforts to civilize and elevate
the Indians under their charge." 42 Cong., 3 sess, H, E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 171.
65. The governor located and brought six of the captured children to the confer-
ence. The other twenty-one (two others had escaped soon after their capture) were
reported to be in Mexico. The council almost broke up into a battle when Howard,
due to the objections of the district attorney, refused to turn the six over. However,
he restored order by agreeing to hold the children at the agency until the president
could make a decision. Arizona Citizen, May 25, 1872. The president restored the
children a few weeks later. McCormick to Bishop J. B. Salpointe, July 31, 1872, in
Arizona Citizen, Sept. 7, 1872.
66. 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 172.
Whitman dropped out of sight after Schofield, at Howard's request, ordered him
to report at division headquarters. Special Orders, no. 29, June 8, 1872, A. G. O., 2386.
60 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
accompanied by seven prominent Indians who had agreed
to journey with him to the East left the Indian country by
way of Camp Apache, where three Coyotero chiefs were
added to the peace delegation.67
The delegation reached Washington on June 22, 1872,
and during the next three weeks, in conferences with high
officials and in a public appearance at New York, did much
to strengthen the eastern sentiment for peace.68 But the
administration decided that its policy among the Apaches
would never be successful unless Cochise were included;
therefore, President Grant directed Howard to return to the
Apache country on a second mission of peace.69
Howard reached Camp Apache on August 11, only to
find that the Coyoteros were on the verge of an outbreak.
This situation had developed because of the arrest of sev-
eral chiefs, and also because an impasse had arisen between
the department of the interior and the war department over
the issuance of rations. Diplomatically, the general secured
the release of the prisoners; and by replacing the acting
agent, Major A. J. Dallas, with Dr. Milan Soule, the post
surgeon, he insured a continuance of the issues.70
67. Howard's complete report of his mission is printed in 42 Cong:., 3 sess.,
H. E. D. no. 1, vol. if pp. 148-158. See also a detailed report of the Camp Grant
council in Arizona Citizen, May 25, 1872.
68. R. B. 7. C., 1872. p. 27.
69. Grant to A. G., July 3, 1872, A. G. O., 2663.
During the spring and summer of 1872, conditions in the Cochise country became
fully as serious as they had been in former years. All the depredations were attributed
to the Chiricahuas. Lt. Stephen O'Connor to A. A. G., June 26, 1872, A. G. O., 3095 ;
Arizona Citizen, May 4, 11, June 1, 15, 29, July 6, 1872.
70. Dallas to editor, Aug. 11, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Aug. 24, 1872; Howard
to Bendell, Aug. 14, 1872, I. O., Howard Correspondence. Hereafter this file will be
designated H, C.
On June 25 the war department ordered its officers to stop issues to Indians.
Howard's arrival temporarily solved the problem, and later an exception was made
whereby supplies could be furnished. However, the issuing would have to be done
by non-military men. All the correspondence is given in A. G. O., 2061, 2612 and
8985.
Most of the trouble was caused by the delay of the officials of the department of
the interior in approving Bendell's beef contracts, for contractors were reluctant to
make deliveries without approved contracts. But anxious for large profits, they
were willing to deliver the same beef at six cents per pound (one cent extra) in
exchange for certified vouchers. Howard made the concession. Op. cit. Howard had
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 61
Howard now moved eastward to the Tulerosa Reserva-
tion, where he hoped to complete arrangements for a con-
ference with Cochise. But again he was forced to postpone
his main mission in order to prevent a collapse of Colyer's
work in New Mexico.71 During his visit of eight days with
the Southern Apaches, the chiefs advanced every possible
argument against Tulerosa as a reserve, and insisted that
their bands be returned to Canada Alamosa. They also
pressed for a new agent, by pointing out that their blankets
fell to pieces when damp. The general, of course, refused to
accede to their request, but his promise to submit their ques-
tions "to the President for his decision" apparently satisfied
them. However, his action in ordering a liberal increase in
their rations was probably the factor that reconciled them.72
Still unable to communicate with Cochise, Howard se-
cured the services of Thomas J. Jeffords, an unusual fron-
tiersman,73 who was certain that a peace could be made,
provided the general would go to the chief's stronghold in
the Dragoon Mountains of Arizona. The proposal was
accepted, and the party of three whites and two Indian
friends of the Chiricahuas set out at once.74
71. Out of 1,600 Southern Apaches reported to be at Canada Alamosa in March,
1872, only 450 had removed to Tulerosa by September. O. F. Piper to Pope, Aug. 31,
1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 306.
72. Howard to Pope, Sept. 5, 1872, H. C.; Howard to Walker, Nov. 7, 1872, I.
O., 383.
73. Jeffords was a close friend of Cochise. Dr. Henry S. Turrill, the post sur-
geon at Fort Bayard in 1872, later wrote that Jeffords gained and kept the friendship
of Cochise by selling him ammunition. See The New York Society of the Order of the
Founders and Patriots of America. Publication no. 18 (N. Y., 1907), pp. 16-21. Major
W. R. Price claimed he had witnesses who would testify that Jeffords had traded
ammunition to the Indians for stock. Price to A. G., Aug. 1, 1873, A. G. O., 3383.
74. Howard compromised himself at this point, by giving two Southern Apache
bands permission to go to Canada Alamosa instead of Tulerosa. A rancorous correspon-
dence during the next three months, which involved Sherman, Sheridan, Belknap, Delano
and many other officials, vividly portrays the burning animosities that practically
paralyzed all efforts to solve the Apache problem. The correspondence is collected in
I. O., W 551.
likely erred on his first trip when he advised Bendell to accept bids which would have
allowed different amounts of issues at the respective reserves. This fact would have
caused unrest among the Indians — hence, the delay in approval. A. G. O., 2612.
62 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
When the Stein's Peak region was reached, early in
October, smoke signals were set up, and within a few hours
some sixty of Cochise's followers had made their appearance.
The party was then led over deserts and mountains directly
to the chief's famous retreat. The parley started as soon as
the bands could be assembled. Cochise was so anxious for
peace that he even agreed to move to Canada Alamosa, but
his captains would consent only to a reserve in Arizona.
Howard soon realized that there could be no peace among
the Apaches unless the Chiricahuas were included; there-
fore, when Cochise emphatically agreed to restore stolen
property and to guarantee the safety of travellers in his
country, the tribe was promised a reserve of their own selec-
tion. But of far greater satisfaction to the bands, was the
announcement that Jeffords was to act as their agent. The
next day, October 13, near Fort Bowie, Howard completed
the final details of the conference, by directing the post com-
mander to furnish the tribe rations until the department of
the interior could assume the responsibility ; he then left for
Washington to deliver his report.75
All the Apaches had now been drawn within the scope
of the peace plan, but affairs at the reserves proved that the
problem of control was yet in its infancy. Liberal subsis-
tence at Camp Grant did not stop the raids ; moreover, with-
out a daily muster and with a ration issue every tenth day,
the raiders had ample time to cover a great amount of terri-
tory and still be back at the appointed time. In fact, the
increase in marauding and the development of a storm of
criticism, strongly reminiscent of the situation previous to
the Camp Grant massacre, forced Howard, at the start of
the second trip, to replace Agent Jacobs with George H.
Stevens who was popular with both the frontiersmen and
75. Howard to Crook, Oct. 13, 1872, H. C,; Washington Morning Chronicle,
Nov. 10, 1872; Howard to Maj. S. S. Sumner, Oct. 13, 1872, H. C.; Order setting aside
the Chiricahua reservation, Oct. 11, 1872, I. O., H 383. The reserve comprised the
southeast corner of Arizona.
At the Pima Villages, Howard learned of unsatisfactory conditions which caused
him to abolish the feeding posts at Fort McDowell and Date Creek. Howard to Crook,
Oct. 13, 1872, H. C.; Howard to Bendell, Oct. 17, 1872, Ariz. Misc.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 63
the Indians. And just after his peace with Cochise, the
general, even more alarmed, ordered that the Camp Grant
bands were to be removed to the San Carlos Reservation not
later than January 1, 1873.76 The situation failed to improve
under the new agent, but it was not until December, 1872,
that Crook was able to bring about the requirement of a
daily muster. At the end of the year, Stevens reported affairs
to be in a "hubbub." To Bendell's view, however, the trouble
was caused by a "lack of firmness on the part of the agent."77
Conditions at the Verde Reservation were no more fav-
orable than those at Camp Grant. The management of the
Indians collected at the former point proved to be relatively
easy immediately after Colyer's visit, but in December, 1871,
when Crook inaugurated military control, about five hundred
of the savages fled to the mountains. During the next few
months so many of the others left that General Howard gave
no attention to the reserve on either of his trips. In fact,
when Dr. J. W. Williams, an appointee of the Dutch Re-
formed Church, arrived at the agency in July, 1872, the
absence of all but five of the tribesmen caused his trans-
ference to Date Creek.78 Several bands, however, were
anxious for peace, and upon being told by Captain C. C.
Carr, the commandant at Camp Verde, to come in, obey
orders and receive rations, some eighty Yavapai and Ton-
tos surrendered. Many others followed until it appeared
that all would return, but the killing of an important Tonto
prisoner caused every Indian on the reserve to seek safety
in flight. During August, a considerable number of the
Indians, entirely unwilling to confine themselves to the
reserve, adopted a policy of coming in for rations and then
leaving. Crook solved the problem from the military stand-
76. Arizona Citizen, May 4, June 22, 29, Sept. 7, 14, 28, 1872 ; Howard to Bendell,
Aug. 29, 1872, I. O., Ariz. Misc. ; same to same, Oct. 17, 1872, H. C.
77. Stevens to John Wasson, Nov. 15, Dec. 10, 1872, I. O., M 127 ; Crook to
A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, A. G. O., 286; Bendell to Walker, Dec. 5, 1872, S. L. B.,
vol. ii, pp. 2-3.
78. Williams to Walker, July 6, 1872, I. O., W 91.
64 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
point by ordering- their arrest and daily muster;79 yet in
taking such action he ended all possibilities for a peace
without war.
In contrast to their Verde kinsmen, the 900-1000 Yava-
pai who had collected at the Date Creek feeding post proved
to be especially cooperative for several months following
Colyer's mission. Submissive to military control from the
first they readily accepted, during July, 1872, the more rigid
discipline introduced by their new civil agent, Dr. Williams ;
nevertheless, after more than one hundred hostiles had been
forced in, Williams reported that the troops were "the con-
trolling factor with them."80
The agent improved his authority, however, until an
epidemic of fever, in August, forced him to permit several
hundred sick Indians to retire to the cool highlands. But,
once more in their former haunts, his charges decided
against ever again submitting to reservation control.81
Crook now came to his relief, and after arresting four of
the Loring massacre participants,82 inaugurated a sharp
campaign against the recalcitrants. This action, which re-
sulted in the slaughter of seventy of their warriors, greatly
humbled the bands' haughty spirit, and by December, 1872,
the reserve was filled with more Indians than ever before.83
Reservation control now appeared to be a reality among the
Yavapai at Camp Date Creek.
79. Carr to A .A. G., July 8, 1872, A. G. O., 8188 ; same to same, Aug. 14, 1872,
ibid., 3573 ; Bendell to Walker, Sept. 30, 1872, S. L. B.. vol. i, p. 359 ; Crook to C. O.,
Camp Verde, Sept. 24, 1872, I. O., B 360.
80. Capt. Philip Dwyer to P. A., July 7, 1872, A. G. O., 3084 ; Williams to Ben-
dell, Sept. 1, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 326.
81. Lt. W. J. Volkmar to A. A. G., Sept. 1, 1872, A. G. O., 3815 ; James Grant to
C. O., Date Creek, Sept. 6, 1872. ibid., 3908.
82. Several of the Date Creek Indians were involved in the crime. But of
greater importance to Crook was the fact that some of them had been reserve Indians
prior to the killing. Long convinced of the necessity of demonstrating to both mal-
contents and friendlies that none but truly peaceable tribesmen could find safety by
flight to reserves, the general went to the post on September 8, and succeeded, by a
clever stratagem, in making the arrests. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1872, A. G. O.,
4091 ; Preacott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872.
83. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, I. O., W 721 ; Capt. Julius Mason to A. A.
G., Oct. 27, 1872, A. G. O., 4706 ; Williams to Bendell, Dec. 23, 1872, I. I., Ariz. Misc.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 65
Far to the east of the Date Creek Indians, the Coyo-
tero bands of the White Mountains readily accepted reser-
vation control as initiated by Colyer. Their favorable and
friendly attitude was doubtless due to the fact that their pre-
scribed reservation necessitated no radical changes in their
habitat or mode of life ; moreover, the advantage of receiv-
ing regular issues of rations made their life easier and less
precarious. Some difficulties arose during the first year
over the matter of subsistence, but officials felt that the
appointment of Dr. Soule would end all serious embarrass-
ments.84 And their views proved correct, for both Soule
and Bendell, by open market purchases and by advance
acceptance of beef deliveries, insured themselves against
any catastrophic exigencies.85 The Indians, in addition to
behaving well, worked very energetically during the grow-
ing season of 1872, and at harvest time they sold more than
80,000 pounds of corn and fodder. At peace among them-
selves and satisfied with their new regime, the only dangers
that threatened the Coyoteros near the end of the year were
those that might arise in connection with Crook's impending
campaign.86
Crook, of course, never warred against peaceable In-
dians, but in planning aggressive action he invariably
eliminated all factors that might lead to abortive results.
Therefore, with the aim of not only protecting the Coyoteros,
but also of preventing the less docile bucks from joining
neighboring hostile groups, he directed on November 5, 1872,
that after ten days all Indians of both sexes were to concen-
trate within one mile of Camp Apache and submit to a daily
muster; also, that if any individual should fail to conform
84. Cf. supra, p. 60.
85. Soule to Bendell, Sept. 12, 1872, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Bendell to Howard, Sept.
17, 1872, S. L. B., vol. i, pp. 317-318.
Soule accepted a six months supply of beef (700,000 Ibs.) on October 10.
Soule to Bendell, Oct. 10, 1872, I. O., B 567. No explanation was offered two months
later when he informed Bendell that a further supply of cattle would be required from
New Mexico to meet the Indian needs. Soule to Bendell, Dec. 21, 1872, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
It is possible the contractor herded most of the supply in New Mexico.
86. Cf. infra, p. 69.
66 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
after a reasonable time, he was not to be received except as
a prisoner of war.87
This drastic order, by ignoring Howard's promise to
the Indians of safety anywhere on the reservation,88 left the
bands exposed to summary punishment even though they
actually remained within the legal boundaries. It also left
them under exclusive military control except in the case of
issues. So naturally they became quite disturbed when
Major W. H. Brown arrived a few days later to enlist scouts
and personally enforce the order. They were unwilling to
leave their homes where some of their crops remained unhar-
vested and where their stock would stray and become prey
to wild beasts. Besides, they were reluctant to enlist in
scout companies that might later be forced to fight against
their own bands.89 The test tried them severely, but they
conformed with cheerfulness and cooperativeness. As a
result, they were soon permitted to stay as far as ten miles
from the post.90
Despite the general improvement that resulted from
Colyer's and Howard's efforts, the continuance of devasta-
tions and killings proved that the peace policy per se was
insufficient as a method of Apache control. Attacks were
numerous in both northern and southern Arizona during the
summer months of 1872, and conditions in the Prescott area
again resembled those that followed the Civil War.91 Once
again the situation played into the hands of the advocates
of war, and naturally it strengthened the views of those
87. A. A. G. to G. O., Fort Apache, Nov. 5, 1872, I. O., B 462.
88. Howard probably anticipated Crook's action, for he had already recommended
that the Department of Arizona be modified so that the White Mountain and Chiri-
cahua reservations should be included in the District of New Mexico. Howard to Walker,
Nov. 7, 1872, I. O., H 383. Grant, Belknap and Delano favored the change, but
deferred to Sherman who refused to give his approval when he found that Pope and
Crook were strongly opposed to the plan. Delano to Belknap, Dec. 10, 1872, A. G .O.,
6055 ; Sherman to Belknap, Jan. 8, 1872, I. O., W 721.
89. Pedro to Howard, Nov. 18, 1872, I. O., H 532 ; Miguel to Howard, Nov. 19,
1872, ibid. C. E. Cooley wrote for the chiefs.
90. Bendell to Walker, Dec. 31, 1872, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 33.
91. Crook to A. A. G., May 28, 1872, A. G. O., 2388; Arizona Miner, June 29,
1872 ; Arizona Citizen, June 29, Aug. 31, 1872.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 67
persons who had always thought that the Apaches would
have to be beaten into submission.92
Crook believed from the time he first entered the terri-
tory that the Apaches would have to be reduced by war, but
with great prudence he avoided all steps that might inter-
fere with the success of the peace policy or cause an affront
to public opinion.93 Sheridan entertained a similar view and
insisted that the government would be forced by public sen-
timent to "render every portion of our extensive frontier
safe for a citizen to travel over or occupy." He also said that
a policy was an erroneous one that taught the Indian what
was right, but failed to teach him that which was wrong.
Even the Washington officialdom, keenly alive to public
opinion, turned to a policy of war.94
Crook, thus supported, now determined to press his
views with vigor. On September 21, 1872, he informed the
war department that the Apaches on the reservations were
guilty of many of the murders and devastations that occurred
during the summer, and to substantiate his incrimination,
sent in a long list of outrages which he branded as "a
ghastly commentary upon the result." Assured that human-
ity at last demanded the punishment of the "incorrigibily
hostile," he requested the full cooperation of the civil agents
as compensation for his aid to their cause.95
Superior officers approved his views. General Scho-
field announced on October 15, that "no course is open except
a vigorous and unremitting prosecution of the war, until
they are completely subdued, and the Department Com-
92. New York Herald, Sept. 10, 1872.
93. Journal of Military Service Institution, vol. vii, p. 264. See Crook's
cious remarks on the Apaches in his annual report for 1872. 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E.
D., no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 77-78.
94. Sheridan to A. G., Oct. 12, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 35 ; Walker to Delano, Nov. 1, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 59.
Walker said in 1874 that Crook's operations were not of the nature of war, but of
discipline. F. A. Walker, The Indian Question (Boston, 1874), p. 45.
95. Crook to A. G., Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 79.
His list included forty-four killed and sixteen wounded.
68 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
mander should have ample power of restriction over res-
ervation Indians."96
Crook was fully prepared to make war, having used his
long periods of forced inaction in arranging every detail of
organization for the proper management of the impending
campaign. He planned his campaign in such a way that the
final crushing blows would be struck in the very center of
the hostile country — the Tonto Basin. To accomplish this
end, preliminary campaigns were to be waged in regions
appendant to the main Indian country. These operations, he
felt, would greatly reduce the warring groups and result in
their final concentration in the basin proper. Then he
planned for several strong, swiftly-moving columns to con-
verge upon them from various points along the rim of the
basin. Crook, on his own part, intended to help organize the
columns and, with the campaign once under way, to move
from point to point along the whole periphery of the battle
area, exercising general supervision of movements, but leav-
ing the details of fighting to the respective officers. With the
idea of carrying war to the savages at a time when winter
weather would most handicap them, November 15 was des-
ignated for the start of the preliminary movements.97
Promptly, three separate commands of one company of
cavalry and a detachment of forty Indian scouts each, left
Camp Hualpai to scout through to Camp Verde by way of
the San Francisco peaks and upper Verde country. The
movement was unusually successful, and during the fifteen
days required to reach the post, the commands destroyed
numerous winter rancherias, killed thirteen warriors and
captured several squaws. Meantime, Captain George F.
Price, at Date Creek, sent out two expeditions with instruc-
tions to clear the country of Indians on the west side of the
Verde as far down as Fort McDowell. Cooperating with him
96. Schofield to A. G., Oct. 18, 1872, A. G. O., 4316.
97. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, A. G. O., 5312 ; Journal of Military Service
Institution, vol. vii, pp. 262-264 ; E. G. Cattermole, Famous Frontiersmen, Pioneers
and Scouts (Chicago, 1883), p. 535.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 69
were two other commands sent from Camp Verde to scout
the Red Rock and Black Hills country. Price's commands
found many Indians scattered about between Date Creek
and Camp Verde, but they failed to effect any decisive ac-
tions. In contrast, the two associated commands killed thir-
teen warriors, captured three others and pushed many hos-
tile bands eastward into the Tonto region.98
Crook was even more active than his subordinates.
First at Camp Verde he completed his plans and then at
Camp Apache he began the enlistment of extra scout com-
panies. The Coyotero bands, near the latter post, were quite
"feverish," but his "requirements were met with alacrity."
Although Crook noted some discrepancies in agency admin-
istration, time was too limited for investigation, and after
organizing one expedition to be commanded by Captain
George M. Randall, he pushed on to Camp Grant. Here he
completed arrangements for the organization of three addi-
tional expeditions, one of which was to take the field from
Camp McDowell."
The final campaign now arranged for, the nine columns
speedily penetrated into the haunts of the hostiles. Because
of the hazardous terrain over which the troops were forced
to operate, and also because of the decentralized nature of
Apache society, the fighting naturally developed into an in-
numerable number of small engagements. The columns from
Camp Grant, commanded by Captain W. H. Brown, did
some of the most effective and spectacular fighting of the
whole campaign, especially at the battle of the caves on Salt
River, where seventy-six Indians were killed and eighteen
others captured.100
Crook's other commands, although not so spectacular,
did equally effective work. During the three months fol-
98. Capt. A. H. Nickerson to A. A. G., Dec. 26, 1872, A. G. O., 172.
99. Crook to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1872, op. cit.; Bourke, On the Border with
Crook, pp. 177-182.
100. Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873, I. O., 355. This communication is Crook's
annual report for 1873. It arrived too late to be printed. See also Nickerson to A. A.
G., Jan. 11, 1873; A. G. O., 213; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 20, 1873; Lockwood, The
Apache Indians, pp. 196-199.
70 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
lowing the start of the campaign, they harried and deci-
mated the hostile bands almost continuously. No accurate
figures are available, but it is probable that nearly three
hundred warriors were killed or received mortal wounds.
In addition, a considerable number of noncombatants suf-
fered a like fate, and occasionally some warriors were taken
captive. All indications showed, at the end of February,
1873, that a few more punitive blows would result in a gen-
eral surrender.101
Punishment was not long deferred. About the middle
of March, some five hundred savages, who had evidently
taken refuge in the region between the Gila and the Colo-
rado, began to harry the Wickenburg country. Most of them
were thought to be on the verge of surrender, but one party
murdered three important citizens of the town itself. This
outrage resulted in a new offensive on the part of the troops,
and within a short time eighty warriors were killed and
thirty squaws captured. Such losses completely broke most
of the hostiles ; consequently, they fairly precipitated them-
selves to the reservations.102 A sizeable group, however, fled
into the Tonto Basin, only to lose sixty-six warriors at the
hands of Major Randall's column. The major then pushed
relentlessly after the survivors, and a few days later suc-
ceeded in capturing the entire group of one hundred and
thirty-six souls on Turret Mountain, west of the Verde
River.103
By the first of April, great numbers of Indians, earnestly
begging for peace, had collected near Camp Verde. General
Crook was also ready for peace, fearing that further slaugh-
ter might arouse other peace efforts in the East. He there-
fore went to the post, and "being satisfied that their profes-
sions were sincere," concluded a general peace by which the
101. Bendell to Walker, Dec. 81, 1872, op. cit.; J. F. May to Howard, Jan. 27,
1873, I. O., H 836; Arizona Citizen, Mar. 1, 1873.
102. Bendell to Comm., April 1, 1873, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 195 ; Arizona Miner, Mar.
16, 1873 ; Arizona Citizen, Mar. 22, 1873.
103. J. E. Roberts to Bendell, April 29, 1873, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Arizona Citizen,
April 12, 1873.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 71
bands agreed to stop all violence, to remain strictly upon
their reservations and to comply with all regulations of their
authorized agents. In turn, as long as they remained true
to the treaty terms, Crook promised to be responsible for
their protection. It was also agreed that after sufficient time
had elapsed to enable all renegades and straggling parties to
reach the reservation, the military was to pursue and force
them in, destroying all who refused to surrender.104
104. General Orders no. 12, April 7, 1873, Army War College; Crook to A. A. G.,
April 12, 1873, A. G. O., 1882.
On April 9, Crook complimented his troops as entitled "to a reputation second
to none in the annals of Indian warfare," and as having "finally closed an Indian war
that has been waged since the days of Cortez." General Orders no 14, April 9,
1872, Army War College.
(To be continued)
NEW MEXICO EDITORIAL OPINION ON SUPREME
COURT REFORM
By FRANK D. REEVE
WHEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT launched his program for
the reform of the Supreme Court in February, 1937, a
conflict broke out in the halls of congress that left its scar on
the Democratic party and that might have ended in setting
the precedent for a serious modification of our governmental
structure. It was said that a large majority of the news-
papers of the country opposed the presidential plan. How-
ever that may be, it is true that a substantial part of the
press in New Mexico was in opposition. Among thirty-two
newspapers studied, seventeen or 53 per cent opposed the
change with varying degrees of earnestness, ten or 31 per
cent were non-committal, and five or 16 per cent favored it.
Eighteen of these newspapers favored the Republican party
in the campaign of 1936, eleven were Democratic, and three
were non-committal. Four of the Democratic papers op-
posed the court change, four favored it, and three were non-
committal. Thirteen of the Republican papers opposed the
change in the court, one favored it, and four were non-
committal.
The Albuquerque Tribune led the discussion with the
feeling that the president had not struck at the root of the
supposed evil. Instead of lessening the power of judicial
review he had remained content with changing the personnel
of the court and, as a result, he might expect the plan to be
attacked, "and justifiably so, even by friends of the New
Deal." And it soon decided that "the plan was just too
clever — too damned clever." The idea of restoring a better
balance of power between the judiciary and executive was
sound, but it was a mistake to swing the pendulum too far
back in favor of the executive.1 The Roswell Daily Record
1. February 6, 8 (a Scripps-Howard newspaper).
72
OPINION ON SUPREME COURT REFORM 73
saw in the plan "an attempt to set aside the protection
afforded by the Constitution and force upon the nation the
views that he [Roosevelt] and other new dealers hold."
Merely forcing new deal views on the country might not be
so bad, but the Record soon feared something more serious :
"the Roosevelt administration is seeking to change the entire
form of the American government."2
This serious charge appeared in many newspapers in
various wordings. The Albuquerque Journal might favor
"new blood" on the court, "but in reforming the judiciary,
Congress needs to assure that there are safeguards which
will prevent any executive now or later from being in a
position to acquire dictatorial control over the judiciary."3
And the Santa Fe New Mexican saw "perhaps the most in-
sidious attack ever made by a President of the United
States." If it were successful, "we shall have just as real a
dictatorship as that of Hitler, Stalin or Mussolini."4 The
Artesia Advocate pointed out that the "concentration of
power is a temptation to any individual that the founders of
this government intended to remove." The Magdalena News
thought that the "whole move is a dictatorial grasp of
power," and concluded that those who made the charge of
attempted dictatorship in the campaign of 1936 "must have
known what they were talking about." The Union County
Leader considered the move primarily "one of political ex-
pediency," designed to "eliminate the 'brake' provided by the
constitution." This paper had been very impatient with the
court, but "President Roosevelt has chosen the wrong way ;
the right way is by amending the constitution."5 The "pea-
nut politicians," according to The Roy Record, might enact
the proposal into law, but pointed out that "there may be a
constitution-loving public to be reckoned with later on." On
the same day The Deming Headlight was willing to "trail
along with the vast majority of ordinary citizens who see in
2. February 6, 8.
3. February 7.
4. February 8, 9.
5. February 11.
74 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the proposal so much danger to our governmental structure
as to make it highly undesirable."6
In the second week of the controversy The Albuquerque
Tribune began to "wonder what might happen to 'certain
inalienable rights' under a precedent, established now be-
cause of a benign purpose, if employed by some future lead-
ership of purpose not benign but vicious." And the Roswell
Daily Record boiled the question down to a choice between
"an independent federal judiciary" or "its subserviency to
the chief executive." 7 However, not all the editors in New
Mexico were worrying about the federal judiciary. The
Evening News-Journal (Clovis) thought that "the life of
the average man is apt to be affected much more by what
happens in the precincts of the run-of-mine state and county
courts."8 But six days later it believed that "in the face of
what is going on in the rest of the world, it would appear
that nervousness is justified and caution wise;" hence, the
proposal should be studied on its merits. Meanwhile, The
Fort Sumner Leader had "seen so many remarkably good
things inaugurated under the New Deal and carried to com-
pletion that we have faith in most anything proposed by the
Administration." This faith was probably not held by every-
body. The Deming Headlight reported that "In something
over 100 interviews during the past week we found but two
people who are in favor with the plan." Among the people
consulted, 80 per cent were Democrats.9
During the third week of discussion the opposition was
still pronounced, but some slight support did appear for the
plan. The Union County Leader believed that "The presi-
dent should not attempt to railroad through legislation as
important as this is without submitting the proposal to a
vote of the people." And The Herald (Hot Springs) thought
that "he [Roosevelt] is taking us for a ride that will only
end in a military dictatorship. . . ." The Aztec Independent-
6. February 12.
7. February 16, 18.
8. February 18.
9. February 19.
OPINION ON SUPREME COURT REFORM 75
Review defined freedom simply as "access to a free and im-
partial court to decide the rights of the individual and the
rights of government." The Mountainair Independent rea-
soned, however, that congress has the right to increase the
membership of the court; therefore, such legislation does
not strike at the foundation of the government and does not
prove that the president wanted to become a dictator. But
it reserved the right to examine more closely the wisdom of
the proposal. This favorable sentiment was supported on
grounds much broader than constitutional law when El De-
fensor del Pueblo introduced the law of nature : "Si, como
es bien sabido, que se hace necesario este programa para lo
que se trata es de restituir la nacion y conservar la subsis-
tencia de todos ... las agrupaciones en general, y siendo la
propia conservation la primera ley de la naturaleza, se
desprende que el presidente esta obrando en obediencia de
esa ley redentora."10
Two weeks later The Mountainair Independent stated
that, "As we see it, the Supreme Court, through its interpre-
tations of the law and the Constitution, looking always to
the past for guidance and precedence in such interpreta-
tions, has allocated unto itself powers which make it no
longer an equal and coordinate branch of the government,
but instead allow it to transcend and completely override the
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government, so
that neither the Court nor the other branches of the Gov-
ernment are any longer amenable to the wishes of the
people." Therefore, it is not criminal to suggest a change.11
This sentiment found support in the columns of The Silver
City Enterprise which did "not subscribe to the idea that the
addition of six new members to the supreme court would
nullify the Constitution, nor would it be packed with 'spine-
less puppets'." New judges would interpret the law with the
"view toward strengthening the Constitution rather than
to nullify or destroy it." But the Santa Fe New Mexican saw
10. February 24, 25, 26.
11. March 11.
76 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
in the plan an "admission of fear of a popular vote. All the
executive can do is to maintain the ridiculous claim that the
people already have endorsed his plan/'12
The silence of some newspapers during this contro-
versy might be attributed to the state of mind that The Fort
Sumner Leader found itself in: "We have an idea that
[after] all the bunk explanations we've read pro and con the
supreme court situation appeared about as muddled to other
people as to the writer."13 The Evening News- Journal, if
not muddled, was still thinking that it was "probably far
more important that we do something effective about our
local governments. . . ." And The Daily Current-Argus
(Carlsbad) "had not taken sides editorially in the issue
because, frankly, we were not sufficiently informed to draw
definite conclusions."14
Meanwhile, The Albuquerque Journal was favoring a
constitutional amendment as "the safer, the American and
Democratic method." The Magdalena News was claiming
that "It is becoming increasingly plain to all thinking men
that this country is being governed by a madman ; a fanatic ;
a visionary embryo dictator, . . . never apparently satisfied
until the power of life and death of every citizen is placed
in his hands." And the Farmington Times Hustler thought
that "the supreme court argument is well into its silly stages,
with a justice discarding his robes of judicial dignity to
make political remarks at a public meeting. . . . That boner
sort of evens things up with one the president pulled when
he condemned the advanced old age of the justices as unde-
sirable to his policies, only to be reminded that the oldest
justice of the nine was the most liberal of the lot." The pro-
posal of Senator Hatch to retire one justice each year found
favor with the Evening News-Journal.™
The month of April was marked by a decrease in edi-
torials, but a continuation of disagreement about the court
12. March 12.
18. March 12.
14. March 18, 30.
15. March 24, 25, 26, 27.
OPINION ON SUPREME COURT REFORM 77
reform plan. The Lovington Leader believed that the "court
will never command the respect it should have when it is pre-
sided over by men whose active lives are already passed."
But The Herald thought that "The presidential veto should
be abolished." ! The Roy Record favored the Hatch compro-
mise. And The Daily Current-Argus suggested that an
amendment limiting the term of supreme court justices to
ten years was a feasible plan.16
In May, The Herald still believed that the president "is
fully determined to make himself the Mussolini of Amer-
ica. ..." A month later the Evening News-Journal and
The Gallup Independent concurred in the opinion that "The
instinct for democracy as against personal rule is all-power-
ful in this country. The people's distrust of power concen-
trated in one pair of hands is ineradicable, and the man who
gets such power in his hands, or even seems about to get it,
is riding for a certain fall."17
When Senator Robinson died in July, The Albuquerque
Journal and the Evening News-Journal thought "It would
be most fortunate for the nation if the fight for the court bill
would be abandoned." And The Mountainair Independent
finally decided that the presidential plan "was a political
error."18
The storm that arose in the newspapers of New Mexico
around the proposal of President Roosevelt to materially
alter the distribution of power within the federal govern-
ment, rose to a peak in March and then subsided rapidly.
The verdict of the editors was largely unfavorable. It is
reasonable to conclude that any proposal to change the
structure or powers of government by a method that is con-
trary to the spirit if not the letter of the constitution will
meet with an unfavorable reception in the same group. And
if editorial opinion is a reflection of public opinion, the same
might be said of the people in general. At any rate, despite
16. April 2, March 81, April 2, 22.
17. May 19, June 22, 28.
18. July 15, 16, 22.
78 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the criticism that can be made of the system of checks and
balances in the American government, it still retains its hold
on the minds of many of those who count in the body politic,
even at the expense of their party loyalty.
BOOK REVIEWS
Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, The Journey and Route of the
First European to Cross the Continent of North Amer-
ica, 1534-36. By Clive Hallenbeck. (The A. H. Clark
Company, Glendale, Calif., 1939; 330 pp. $6.00.)
This volume is divided into three parts. First is a para-
phrase of the Naufragios of Alvar Nunez, with occasional
reference to the Joint Report of Cabeza de Vaca and his com-
panions. The paraphrase is based largely on the Bandelier
translation of Naufragios, but also utilizes Buckingham
Smith's version. It is largely free from subjective interpre-
tations on the part of the paraphraser, and makes interest-
ing and comprehensive reading.
Part II traces Nunez' route from the Texas coast to
Culiacan in Sinaloa. As in Part I, the Naufragios is the
primary source employed, the Joint Report secondary.
Hallenbeck routes de Vaca farther north than have pre-
vious students. He identifies Malhado Island as modern Gal-
veston Island. From Galveston Island he traces the path of
the Spaniards to the Colorado River, thence northward to
Austin, and to the Tuna Thickets near San Antonio, Texas.
From San Antonio the route runs northward and slightly
westward to Big Spring, Texas, and from there westward to
the Pecos River at the mouth of Toyah Creek. From there
he takes them northward along the Pecos to near Carlsbad,
New Mexico. A few miles above Carlsbad he turns them
northwest up the Rio Penasco and Elk Creek, then across the
mountains to the Rio Tularosa; from the Tularosa south-
ward along the western edge of the Sacramento Mts. and the
eastern edge of the Huecos. Near the southern tip of the
Hueco Mts., Hallenbeck swings the Spaniards west to the
Rio Grande near El Paso, then north by east along that
stream to the Rincon ford. Above the ford the route again
turns westward up Barrenda Creek and across the divide to
the Rio Gila, thence southward to San Bernardino in Sonora.
79
80 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The route from San Bernardino to Culiacan, down the Rio
which the party was actually taken by Indians as indicated
in the account, rather than a mere haphazzard routing. Un-
fortunately he does not make clear just how he determined
most of the postulated Indian trails, either in text or bibli-
ography. After several years of archaeologic and ethno-
historic research in most of the area considered, and with an
intimate knowledge of the geography, the reviewer seriously
doubts the possibility of objectively determining most of the
so-called "Indian trails." In spite of this objection, the route
seems to have been worked out with the greatest of care, and
the reviewer is not able to suggest other than minute
changes.
Part III is a critical consideration of previous tracings
of the de Vaca route by Bandelier, Bancroft, Ponton and
McFarland, Baskett, Read, Twitchell, and Davenport and
Wells. Hallenbeck's criticisms of these routings seem for
the most part to be well taken, though occasionally he falls
into the pitfall of overly and mistakenly discounting the logic
and data of previous students in favor of his own interpreta-
tions. Such an instance is found on page 306. Here the
author states that the Spaniards would not have used the
"Salt Trail" from the Pecos River to the Rio Conchos in
Mexico, since said trail was first laid out by white pioneers,
and was practically waterless throughout. Actually this
route was an ancient one as indicated by archaeological
remains. The Jumanos guided Juan Dominguez de Men-
doza along it in 1684. Later a Chihuahua trail followed
it, and today it is employed by the Orient branch of the Santa
Fe Railway. Even in the dry season it was well watered,
with the exception of one day's journey, and it is topo-
graphically the line of least resistance.
A few other criticisms may be chosen from a group of
possible ones, none of which greatly affect the tracing of the
route. On page 189 the northern limit of Pinus cembroides
is given as latitude 26° 30'. Sperry (Alpine, 1938) lists
cembroides as the common pine of the Chisos Mts. (29° 20')
BOOK REVIEWS 81
in his check list of Chisos plants. On page 213 the author
states that no trail from east or north strikes the Rio Grande
near the junction of the Conchos (La Junta) . Actually, as
indicated previously the important "Salt Trail" joins the
Rio Grande about seven miles below La Junta.
Furthermore, he states that the Rio Grande does not
flow between mountains anywhere near the mouth of the
Conchos. Certainly, a subjective definition of what is
meant by a "river flowing between mountains" is involved.
Both above and below La Junta the Rio Grande flows directly
between mountains and it was the distinct impression of the
reviewer, during several months of field work at La Junta,
that the Rio Grande flows between mountains there also
(the Chinatis and the Sierras Santa Cruz and Ricos). In
ERRATA : P. 80, following line one, insert :
Sonora and southeastward across the Rios Yaqui, Alaye, and
Fuerte, is that previously traced by Dr. Carl Sauer.
The author's justification for this new tracing of de
Vaca's route, is that he has employed Indian trails, along
ic ±ja duntci uiuians, ana as a consequence
Nunez was not at La Junta.
Many readers also will remain unconvinced by Hallen-
beck's nonchalant disposal of sections of the account which
do not fit with his own interpretations as "retrospections"
or "premature references" on the part of Nunez. Two ex-
cessive and inconveniently located rivers are thus casually
disposed of (pp. 192-198).
On the whole, criticism notwithstanding, the book is
carefully written, and thoroughly scientific. It is an out-
standing piece of research and is whole-heartedly indorsed
by the reviewer, who plans to modify many of his own ideas
because of it.
J. CHARLES KELLEY
Sul Ross College, Alpine, Texas
80 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The route from San Bernardino to Culiacan, down the Rio
which the party was actually taken by Indians as indicated
in the account, rather than a mere haphazzard routing. Un-
fortunately he does not make clear just how he determined
most of the postulated Indian trails, either in text or bibli-
ography. After several years of archaeologic and ethno-
historic research in most of the area considered, and with an
intimate knowledge of the geography, the reviewer seriously
doubts the possibility of objectively determining most of the
so-called "Indian trails." In spite of this objection, the route
seems to have been worked out with the greatest of care, and
the reviewer is not able to suggest other than minute
changes.
Part III is a critical consideration of previous tracings
of the de Vaca route by Bandelier. Ranr.rnft. Prmtrm
and was practically waterless throughout. Actually this
route was an ancient one as indicated by archaeological
remains. The Jumanos guided Juan Dominguez de Men-
doza along it in 1684. Later a Chihuahua trail followed
it, and today it is employed by the Orient branch of the Santa
Fe Railway. Even in the dry season it was well watered,
with the exception of one day's journey, and it is topo-
graphically the line of least resistance.
A few other criticisms may be chosen from a group of
possible ones, none of which greatly affect the tracing of the
route. On page 189 the northern limit of Pinus cembroides
is given as latitude 26° 30'. Sperry (Alpine, 1938) lists
cembroides as the common pine of the Chisos Mts. (29° 20')
BOOK REVIEWS 81
in his check list of Chisos plants. On page 213 the author
states that no trail from east or north strikes the Rio Grande
near the junction of the Conchos (La Junta). Actually, as
indicated previously the important "Salt Trail" joins the
Rio Grande about seven miles below La Junta.
Furthermore, he states that the Rio Grande does not
flow between mountains anywhere near the mouth of the
Conchos. Certainly, a subjective definition of what is
meant by a "river flowing between mountains" is involved.
Both above and below La Junta the Rio Grande flows directly
between mountains and it was the distinct impression of the
reviewer, during several months of field work at La Junta,
that the Rio Grande flows between mountains there also
(the Chinatis and the Sierras Santa Cruz and Ricos). In
fact, he is amazed that any other interpretation could exist.
At this point, however, the reviewer is able to add
archaeologic support to Hallenbeck's arguments. Archae-
ologic work at La Junta has established continuous occupa-
tion of that region over at least the last 600 years by pottery-
making groups. The Indians mentioned by Nunez, whom
previous workers have located at La Junta, were described
as having no pots, but instead to have used baskets for
cooking. This group, lacking pottery, cannot be identified,
therefore, with the La Junta Indians, and as a consequence
Nunez was not at La Junta.
Many readers also will remain unconvinced by Hallen-
beck's nonchalant disposal of sections of the account which
do not fit with his own interpretations as "retrospections"
or "premature references" on the part of Nunez. Two ex-
cessive and inconveniently located rivers are thus casually
disposed of (pp. 192-198).
On the whole, criticism notwithstanding, the book is
carefully written, and thoroughly scientific. It is an out-
standing piece of research and is whole-heartedly indorsed
by the reviewer, who plans to modify many of his own ideas
because of it.
J. CHARLES KELLEY
Sul Ross College, Alpine, Texas
82 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936, I- (VII) . Edited
by the Rev. Paul J. Folk, chm. Texas Knights of Colum-
bus historical commission. Vol. IV : The passing of the
missions, 1762-1782. (Austin: Von Boeckmann- Jones,
1939; 409 pp.) By Charles E. Castaneda.
In previous issues,1 the attention of our readers has
been called to the initial volumes in this series. Their rela-
tion to the fourth, here reviewed, is indicated by their sub-
titles and inclusive dates: The finding of Texas (1519-
1693) ; The winning of Texas (1693-1731) ; and The mis-
sions at work (1731-1761) .
Apparently the author regards the present volume as
the concluding one in the portrayal of "The Mission Era."
In his opening chapter, a very excellent portrayal of "The
province of Texas in 1762," Dr. Castaneda says (p. 2) :
"Like other frontier institutions, the missions were to con-
tinue until their work was done. Not till then were they to
pass on even as the frontier itself. It is this last phase that
will form the major portion of the present volume." And
his concluding chapter treats of the "Beginning of seculari-
zation" in 1781-82. The seven intervening chapters record
various shiftings, readjustments, and withdrawals which
characterized the last decades of Spanish rule in a meagerly
occupied, struggling, frontier province.
It is unique, in fact startling, to be told (p. 344) that the
missions in Texas "had done their work and had accom-
plished their purpose. They were ready to pass on." This
was not true historically in New Mexico, in Pimeria, nor in
California; was it true in Texas? The author's interpreta-
tion of this stage of "the mission era" strikes one as some-
what polemical ; if we accept at face value the above state-
ment, all the missions in Texas were ready to become self-
supporting parishes and the missionaries would move on to
evangelize other Texan tribes — whereas the voluminous
records here given us show that this period was, on the
whole, one of decadence rather than of fruition. In fact as
1. New Mexico Historical Review, xi, 352-355 ; xiii, 331-333.
BOOK REVIEWS 83
the author himself points out (p. 262), even the four mis-
sions in San Antonio and the two in San Juan Bautista were
not regarded in 1772 as ready for secularization.
We are coming gradually to recognize that the mission
was the most effective colonizing agency employed by the
Spanish crown, and that this was true chiefly because of two
factors: the uniformly consecrated service of the mission-
aries and the governmental subsidizing of their work. But
when financial support was not sufficient for the develop-
ment and expansion of such work, and when the supply of
missionary recruits became inadequate (p. 262), the inevit-
able result would be to "pass out" rather than to "pass on."
The presidio and the civilian colony were other colonizing
agencies; those in Texas contrasted very unfavorably with
the missions as seen in the fine survey given by Dr. Ca-
staneda in his opening chapter.
Throughout the book we are curious at the complete lack
of any reference by the author to the work of one of his col-
leagues. Based in large part on the same sources used by
Castaneda in his volumes, Dr. Walter P. Webb in his book
The Great Plains (1931) devoted a chapter to "The Spanish
approach to the Great Plains." It is a very illuminating an-
alysis, especially of Texan history, for the reader who wants
to recover his historical balance and perspective after read-
ing Castaneda. Because of the abundant use of historical
sources, we are apt to forget that the controlling theme of
Dr. Castaneda and his sponsors is "Our Catholic Heritage."
The reviewer has had to remind himself repeatedly that
whenever the author mentions "Texas" he means Texas with
boundaries as adjusted in 1850. Of course, this enhances the
possible claims as to "Catholic heritage," but it sacrifices
historical accuracy. We have noted previously (vol. xi, p.
353) the error of identifying the Rio Grande with the Rio de
las Palmas ; last winter in Sevilla we photographed a letter
of 23 February 1588 from Viceroy Velasco to the very Rev.
Fray Andres de Holmos in Tampico regarding certain native
towns to the north of that place. A messenger had informed
84 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
him (the viceroy) that "he believes that these pueblos are
between the Rio de Palmas and the Rio Grande," and below
in the letter Velasco desires the father to try to ascertain
"what country and people there is between the Rio de Palmas
and the Rio Bravo, and whether they have caciques and prin-
cipales . . ." (Italics ours.) This should relieve Texas from,
among other things, the dubious honor of listing Nufio de
Guzman among her first governors !
Nor indeed at any time was any part of the entire Rio
Grande valley included in Texas prior to the boundary claims
asserted by the Texan congress in 1836. Would it not be
more accurate historically — and more dramatic — to depict
more clearly the account of Texan origin and expansion?
Apparently Dr. Castaneda attaches no significance to his
casual mention (p. 224) of San Saba as "founded on the
border of Texas and New Mexico" and of Carrizal as "in
the jurisdiction of New Mexico." (p. 226) He wishes (p.
44) to include in Texas the presidio and missions of the "El
Paso district" although he recognizes (p. 226) that they
were all on the right bank of the river; he ignores the fact
that there was no "El Paso" in the modern sense until after
the Mexican War, and the further fact that that whole dis-
trict— and also the missions at La Junta de los Rios (p. 44)
— belonged to the province of New Mexico throughout Span-
ish times, (cf. vol. iii, pp. 211-212). And his enthusiasm
carries him too far when he avers (p. 44) that if the English
and French had reached the Rio Grande and New Mexico the
natives "would never have known the comforts of religion."
Nor was the attack on the presidio and mission of San Saba
"unparalleled ... in the annals of Spanish colonization"
(p. 99) — we need cite only the experience of Santa Fe in
1680.
The above observations suffice to show that, in relation
to Southwestern history, this volume needs to be taken with
some care ; but the reader who bears in mind that the point
of view is ecclesiastical and Texan, will, at the same time, go
far with Dr. Castaneda in cordial recognition of what the
BOOK REVIEWS 85
Franciscan missionaries contributed to Texan history. He
will welcome the growing mass of source material which the
author is making available and will watch with interest for
successive volumes.
Very few typographical slips have been noticed; the
indexing might have been better. L. B. B.
Epistolario de la Nueva Espana, 1508-1818. Compiled by
Francisco del Paso y Troncoso. (Biblioteca Historica
Mexicana de obras Ineditas. Segunda Serie. Mexico,
Jose Porrua e hijos.)
The Libreria Robredo of Mexico City in recent years
has been publishing some valuable historical works. It has
now undertaken the publication of the Epistolario de Nueva
Espana, assembled by Don Francisco del Paso y Troncoso in
the archives of Spain and other countries in Europe during
his sojourn abroad between 1892 and 1916, the year of his
death. This Epistolario will comprise fifteen volumes, with
a general index at the end. It is planned to complete the
publication of the series by 1940.
The work is not a collection of letters, as the title
implies. It is true that the greatest bulk of the materials
included consists of letters, but there are also numerous
cedulas, ordinances, reports, etc. In Vol. I (yrs. 1505-1529)
there are seventy-eight documents, some from Diego Colon,
Cortes, Nuno de Guzman and others. Six volumes (yrs.
1505-1552) have appeared to date containing 362 documents,
although in a few cases only the titles are given as the text
of the documents has already appeared elsewhere.
Volume IV (yrs. 1540-1546) is of particular interest
for the history of New Mexico, as it includes several docu-
ments referring to Vazquez de Coronado. The first docu-
ment listed in the volume is the report drawn by Viceroy
Mendoza about the people who accompanied Coronado. The
document itself is not published, as it had already been
brought out by Pacheco y Cardenas in their Documentos
ineditos para la historia de America, Vol. XIV, p. 375. Docu-
86 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ment No. 200 is a letter from Perarmildez, dated July 28,
1541, telling of the revolt in New Galicia, the death of Pedro
de Alvarado, and that the viceroy had received news from
Coronado ten days before, but would not divulge them. This
must allude to the letter sent by Coronado from Culiacan on
August 3, 1540, informing the viceroy of the progress of the
expedition. We have no other letter from him between this
date and July of 1541.
No letters by Coronado himself appear in this Episto-
lario. There is one (document No. 238), however, by Li-
cenciado Tejada, quite illuminating in regard to Coronado's
life after his return from his famous expedition to New
Mexico. Licenciado Tejada had been entrusted with the
task of conducting Coronado's residencies. In this letter of
March 11, 1545, Tejada tells Charles V that he has held
Coronado's residencia and has sentenced him to a fine of
600 pesos de minas. Coronado appealed this sentence, so
the licenciado is sending the documents to Spain. He found
no charges against Cristobal de Onate; on the contrary he
uses this occasion to praise him for his services. This
Cristobal was the father of Don Juan de Onate, the founder
of New Mexico.
In regard to Coronado's condition, the licenciate states
he is not in his right mind ; that he is more to be governed
than to let him govern others. He is a very different man
from what he was when His Majesty appointed him gover-
nor of New Galicia. It was thought that his condition was
the result of his falling from his horse in New Mexico.1
Licenciado Tejada looked into the cruelties and abuses
committed by Coronado and his captains during the expedi-
tion to the new land. He is found guilty and placed under
arrest in his home. Charges for these crimes are filed also
1. "Francisco Vasquez se vino a su casa y esta mas para ser grobernado en ella
que para gobernar el a jena : f altanle muchos quilates y esta otro del que solia ser
quando vuestra majestad le proveyo de aquella gobernaci6n ; dicen lo causo la caida
que di6 de un caballo en la pacificacion y descubrimiento de la tierra nueva."
In this quotation two corrections have been made from the facsimile of the
original, obtained in Sevilla last winter and now in the Coronado Library at Albu-
querque.
BOOK REVIEWS 87
against Garcia Lopez de Cardenas, who is in Madrid at this
time. He had left Coronado in New Mexico because of an
injured arm, and also because his brother had died in Spain
and he was called there to take charge of the estate. This
intrepid captain discovered the Grand Canyon during an
exploration trip accompanied by twelve men.
Another letter from Licenciado Tejada to the emperor
is listed as document No. 244. In this letter, dated in Mexico
City on the last day of August, 1545, the Licenciado notifies
his monarch he has already forwarded to Spain the docu-
ments pertaining to Coronado's residencia. Among those
papers was a report (for which the king apparently had
asked) regarding the cruelties perpetrated by Coronado and
his captains during the expedition to "la tierra nueva."
This Epistolario is being published from copies of the
originals which were made by various transcribers for
Senor Paso y Troncoso. For this reason the proof-readers,
however careful they may be, cannot correct the errors made
by the copyists. I have compared some of the documents
with photostatic copies of the originals and found only small
errors that in no way impair the value of the edition.2 I
will cite a few examples taken from Tejada's letter discussed
above. On page 183, line 5, where it reads por el ser el
pueblo, the first el is not in the original. The same is true
of the a on page 184, line 6 ; the la in la guerra on page 184,
line 15 ; the que on page 185, line 28. The sirvieron on page
185, line 29, should read sirviesen; the que on page 186, line
29, should be y. On page 187, line 26, de tributo should read
de pagar tributo. On page 188, line 24, en should be es, and
que, con que. The first y on page 189, line 1, is not in the
original; the second y on the same page, line 11, should be
que. The otros on page 189, line 22, should read los otros.
A marginal notation on the second paragraph of page 189,
reading veasse lo proveydo, has been omitted. On page 203
instruction is misspelled twice.
2. The facsimiles of the two Tejada letters are from A. G. I., Mexico, 68. The
bulky residencia record mentioned by Tejada is now in A. G. I., Justicia, 339, and a
complete facsimile is in the Coronado Library.
88 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
If the proofs could be corrected from photostatic copies
of the original documents most of these small errors could be
eliminated. But that would imply considerable cost and
delay. The originals are often difficult to read, and far from
exempt from errors, which the editors must explain in notes
or correct before publication. There are no explanatory
notes in the present edition of the Epistolario. The copy-
ists or the editors have corrected some of the obvious mis-
takes found in the original Spanish texts.
As other volumes appear, containing documents bearing
directly on the history of New Mexico, we will bring them to
the attention of our readers.
AGAPITO REY
Indiana University
Home Missions on the American Frontier. With particular
reference to the American Home Missionary Society.
By Colin Brummitt Goodykoontz. (The Caxton Print-
ers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, 1939. 452 pp., bibliography,
index. $3.50.)
"The home missionary movement was the resultant
of many forces: Christian idealism, denominational rival-
ries, humanitarianism, nationalism, and enlightened self-
interest all had their effect in producing and directing a
movement designed to mold the West according to orthodox
Protestant standards." (p. 39) . To this summary of motives
Professor Goodykoontz later adds (pp. 235 ff ) the patriotic
motive of improving the quality of the electorate with the
coming of manhood suffrage in the nineteenth century.
"For the sake of clarity [about one-third of the book is
devoted to] the work of the Congregationalists and Presby-
terians, especially their joint activities through the agency
of the American Home Missionary Society." (p. 7.) Other
churches discussed in less space are the Baptist, Church of
England, Lutheran, German Reformed, Dutch Reformed,
Methodist, and Roman Catholic, not to mention some minor
ones.
BOOK REVIEWS 89
The first chapter deals with motives for home missions.
Chapters II-IV cover the eighteenth century as a "back-
ground;" chapters V-XII deal with the nineteenth century;
and the final chapter interprets the significance of the home
missionary movement.
The book seems overweighted with detail, and yet it
"does not purport to be an Encyclopedia of Home Missions."
(p. 7.) Fortunately, some of the chapters end with a brief
summary ; otherwise it would be difficult to see the forest for
the trees. A discussion of the several Wests is repetitious
due to their common characteristics of pioneer hardships
and rudeness. The paragraph construction is not always
good.
Numerous quotations from letters of missionaries
reveal their zeal and determination to missionize the West in
the face of dangers in travel and rough living accommoda-
tions. They certainly afford evidence to substantiate the
traditional concept of rugged American individualism.
A twenty-two page bibliography and abundant foot-
notes show intensive use of source materials. The author
has done a very commendable piece of work and made a
worthy contribution to the literature on the history of the
West.
The Caxton Printers again display their good crafts-
manship in binding and cover.
FRANK D. REEVE
University of New Mexico
"The Mallet expedition of 1739 through Nebraska, Kansas
and Colorado to Santa Fe." By Henri Folmer. A re-
print of 13 pp. from The Colorado Magazine, xvi,
no. 5 (Sept. 1939).
Sometimes a short article is more of a contribution to
our history than many a thick book. Mr. Folmer is a gradu-
ate student at the University of Denver, and in his study
here listed he has used two documents which he translated
from the French text in Margry, Decouvertes et establisse-
90 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ments des Francais dans L'Amerique Septentrionale (Paris,
1888) , vol. vi, 462 ff ; 464 ff . Because of their interest in New
Mexico history, we take the liberty of quoting his transla-
tion in full :
[Copy of a certificate given in Santa Fe to
seven Frenchmen by the general Jean Paez Hur-
tado, alcalde major and captain of war in this
capitol city of Santa Fe and its jurisdiction, lieu-
tenant-governor and captain-general of this king-
dom of New Mexico and its provinces.]
I certify, as much as I am entitled to captain
don Louis de Sant Denis, who commands the fort
at the mouth of the Red River, and to all other
governors and captains, judges and justices of the
Very Christian King of France and to all officers,
military or civilian, who might read this, that on
the 24th of July of last year, 1739, there came to
the city of Santa Fe eight Frenchmen, called Pierre
and Paul Mallet, brothers, Phillippe Robitaille,
Louis Morin, Michel Beslot, Joseph Bellecourt
and Manuel Gallien, Creoles of Canada and New
France, and Jean David of Europe, who were re-
ceived in my presence by Mr. Dominique de Men-
doza, Lieutenant-Colonel, Governor and Lieuten-
ant-General of this Kingdom. Said Governor ask-
ing them from where they came and what their ob-
ject was, whereupon said Paul answered that they
came from New France and that they had come
with the plan to introduce a trade with the Span-
iards of this kingdom because of the close union
which exists between the two crowns of France and
Spain ; that after having examined them, said Gov-
ernor sent their rifles to the guards and tried to find
lodgings for them. Because there was no place in
the palace, I took them to my house, where I lodged
them all. A few days later I sent for their arms and
ammunition and a few objects belonging to them,
which they had saved while crossing a river, where
they lost nine horses, laden with merchandise and
their clothes. In spite of the fact that they were
almost naked, according to their report, they were
determined to discover this kingdom and establish
communication between New Mexico and the colo-
nies of New Orleans and Canada and notwithstand-
BOOK REVIEWS 91
ing all sorts of difficulties and dangers on the part
of the wild tribes whom they met, they succeeded in
visiting the Spaniards, by whom they were well
received, being invited by them to eat in their
houses and being lodged, while waiting nine months
for the answer of the Archbishop, Viceroy of Mex-
ico, dom Jean Antoine Bizaron. During this time
the Mallet brothers, who have stayed at my house
and shared my table, have led a regular and very
Christian life and having plans to return, I ad-
vised them, that in case they should obtain a royal
cedula to trade with this kingdom, they bring on
their return a certificate and a pass from the Gov-
ernor, because otherwise they will expose them-
selves to the confiscation of their goods, which they
should bring, and which will be considered contra-
band.
In behalf of which, etc. Made in Santa Fe, the
30th of April, 1740.
signed: JEAN PAEZ HURTADO
[Project of trade relations between Louisiana and
Santa Fe. Copy of a letter, addressed to Father
Beaubois by Father Sant lago de Rebald, vicar
and ecclesiastical judge in New Mexico.]
Upon this occasion, I write to you, Sir, con-
cerning nine Frenchmen who came from New
France, called Pierre and Paul brothers, La Rose,
Phillippe, Bellecourt, Petit Jean, Galliere and
Moreau, who have told me of their plan to intro-
duce a trade in these provinces, which at the pres-
ent time does not possess any, but, if one would
allow them to execute their plan, one could easily
overcome this obstacle, because we are not farther
away than 200 leagues from a very rich mine,
abounding in silver, called Chiquagua, where the
inhabitants of this country often go to trade ; and if
they saw a possibility of using what they could get
there, this would encourage them to exploit several
mines, which they have. As these Frenchmen spoke
about your Reverence, and of the good credit you
possess in the province and city of New Orleans, I
write to you in Spanish and not in Latin, in order
not to disturb you, and to inquire about the state of
your health, which I hope to be perfect and wish-
92 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ing you prosperity, offering you my service. I
occupy here the place of vicar and ecclesiastical
judge in this kingdom. My Reverend Father, these
Frenchmen made me understand that I could ask
you for the merchandise which I need in order to
provide for the needs of my family and that I could
obtain it easily through your good office, because of
the credit you possess among your people. I there-
fore profit without delay from this occasion to ask
you to procure me the amount of the list herewith
included and to send it to me, if possible, informing
me of the price in silver or reals, which I will pay as
an honest man and as soon as I can. In spite of the
fact that I live in a kingdom where money flows but
little, what I gain with my chaplainship is paid to
me in silver or reals, which I could save, but for
the future I have four thousand Piasters at Chi-
quagua, which I will have sent over after receiving
the answer of your Reverence, and we will know
whereupon we can count, on condition that I am
satisfied with the merchandise from your country;
but, according to what has been told me, I presume
that I shall be. Fearing to trouble you, I am the
servant of Your Reverence.
In these two documents and also in the abstract of the
report by Governor Bienville to Paris (for which see Mr.
Folmer's paper, pp. 4-10) there are many points of interest.
Hitherto we have had the understanding that these French-
men reached Santa Fe with sufficient tradegoods to keep
them busy for nine months; that they were unmolested by
the authorities, and returned to Louisiana with such profits
as to encourage other Franch ventures. But now we know
that, in fording the Kansas River, they lost practically every-
thing but the clothes on their backs; yet they persisted in
reaching Santa Fe — not for any immediate trading but in
order to negotiate a trade arrangement with the Spanish
authorities. Such a proposal had to be referred to the vice-
roy in Mexico City, and their nine months stay in Santa Fe
is explained by the long distance to Mexico and the fact that
"only one convoy leaves [Santa Fe] every year to make this
journey." And Bienville's report continues:
BOOK REVIEWS 93
When the answer of the viceroy came, accord-
ing to the report of these Canadians, they were
asked to stay in New Mexico. They thought that
the Spaniards intended to employ them to discover
a country towards the West, situated at a distance
of three months' traveling according to the tradi-
tion, true or false, of the Indians. It is said that its
inhabitants dress in silk and live in large cities on
the seacoast. Whatever the truth may be, the Cana-
dians preferred to return and they were allowed to
leave with the letters of which a copy is herewith
included.
The above letters have suffered somewhat from pass-
ing through a French translation, but we easily recognize
our old friend General Juan Paez Hurtado and the governor,
Don Caspar Domingo de Mendoza (1739-1743) ; the "arch-
bishop-viceroy" (1734-1740) was Juan Antonio de Vizarron
y Guiarreta. The fact that Hurtado addressed the certi-
ficate rather particularly to Captain Louis de St. Denis sug-
gests that he may have inspired the trade proposal brought
to Santa Fe by the Mallet party ; we know that, some twenty
years earlier, he was engaged in similar intrigue on the
Texas frontier.
Father "Sant lago Rebald" can be no other than Fray
Santiago Roybal, who in 1730 had been appointed ecclesias-
tical judge by Bishop Crespo of Durango (Bancroft, New
Mexico and Arizona, 240) and who at this time was the only
vicar in New Mexico. He was still in active service as late as
1760 (N. M. HIST. REV., x, 185). Of course, he was unmar-
ried, yet he wants French trade-goods for the needs of his
"family." In explaining this allusion, we find an interesting
side-light on contacts at Santa Fe with the French.
The vicar had a brother, Captain Ignacio Roybal whose
daughter Manuela (niece of the vicar) had been the second
wife of Captain Juan de Archibeque (Twitchell, Spanish
Archives, ii, 184-5). Jean L'Archeveque, Pierre Meusnier,
and Jacques Grollet were survivors of the ill-fated La Salle
expedition of 1685 who later found their way to New Mexico.
After Archibeque was killed in the Villazur disaster of 1720,
94 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
his widow had remarried into the Sena family ; but without
doubt she and her children, close relatives of the vicar,
account for his especial interest in these French visitors.
Those interested may find in Mr. Folmer's paper also
an annotated study of the route followed by the Mallet party.
L. B. B.
The Rebuilding of San Miguel at Santa Fe in 1710. By
George Kubler. (Contributions of the Taylor Museum,
Colorado Springs; 1939.)
This is a well printed and beautifully illustrated bro-
chure of twenty-seven pages which, as stated in the opening
sentence, is based on a manuscript which now "forms part
of the Ritch Collection in the Huntington Library at Pasa-
dena" (San Marino, California). However it may reflect
upon the Huntington Library and those responsible for the
fact that this body of papers is at present in that library
rather than in the Spanish Archives at Santa Fe, this fact
does not in any way reflect upon the author of the brochure.
Incidentally, the endorsement "No. 277" which appears at
the beginning of the document is the file-number which was
put there by Don Donaciano Vigil when he was Territorial
secretary and in charge of the public archives in the Palace
of the Governors at Santa Fe. Similar numbers are to be
found on other papers of the so-called "Ritch Collection."
Dr. Kubler has done an excellent piece of work in his
annotated introduction, in reproducing the text of the orig-
inal Spanish, and in his translation, of the document which
records the restoration work carried out in 1709-1710. We
shall look forward with interest to the larger work which
he promises (note 18) on The Religious Architecture of New
Mexico.
L. B. B.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
AT THE MEETING of the Historical Society of New Mexico,
held in the library of the Old Palace, November 21,
1939, the following officers were elected for the next bien-
nium : president, Paul A. F. Walter ; first vice-president, Ex-
Governor James F. Hinkle of Roswell ; second vice-president,
Ex-Governor Miguel A. Otero ; corresponding secretary and
treasurer, Lansing B. Bloom of Albuquerque; assistant
treasurer and curator, Hester Jones. Twenty-one new mem-
bers were elected to membership.
The secretary reported many fine gifts and other acces-
sions as well as improvements and installations, particularly
the reinstallation of the large Spanish reredos above a con-
structed altar with a railing carved and hand-painted in the
style of the Santuario at Chimayo. The rail painting was
done by Mrs. Gladys Temple.
The subject of state monuments and suitable marking
of historic sites was brought up and discussed. The State
Highway Department was praised for placing markers of
attractive design on or near such sites. Dr. Edgar L. Hewett,
Mrs. Gerald Cassidy and Professor Bloom were appointed a
committee to recommend to the New Mexico Science Com-
mission the creation of state monuments.
In the address of the evening Professor Bloom spoke
informally on his recent archival work in Europe. He de-
scribed highlights of his search for New Mexico historical
sources during the past two years in archives and libraries of
Rome, Florence, Ravenna, Bologna, Venice and Paris;
and in Sevilla, Spain. He explained the reasons for the wide
scattering of New Mexico historical material. In the days
of Spanish sovereignty over New Spain and especially over
what was then New Mexico, the civil and military authori-
ties reported to Mexico City and after 1776 in part to Chi-
huahua; the judicial authorities reported to the audiencia in
Guadalajara; the secular church officers to the bishop at
95
96 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Durango, and the Franciscans to their headquarters in
Mexico. From there reports were sent to the various central
authorities in Spain and in Rome. Mr. Bloom photographed
some 30,000 pages in the archives of Italy and Spain, finding
it quite possible to work in Sevilla during the Spanish civil
war. Many of the records secured are material relating to
Coronado, Cardenas and Vargas. He brought with him for
exhibit enlarged photographs of some of this material which
was scanned with much interest by those at the meeting.
Mr. Walter, presiding, announced that he had appointed
Mr. Bloom officially to attend the annual meeting of the
Mississippi Valley Historical Association in Omaha, May
4-6 next, where he has been invited to give a paper on early
Spanish exploration.
H. J.
PLAN FOR CORONADO MONUMENT
Architect's plans for the Coronado National Monu-
ment near Bernalillo have been approved by the New
Mexico Coronado Cuarto Centennial Commission, and work
on the construction is already under way, with a crew of
60 men on the job, Clinton P. Anderson, managing director
U. S. Coronado Exposition Commission, announced Tuesday.
"No effort is being spared to make the Coronado Monu-
ment one of the great scenic and archaeologic attractions of
the entire country," Mr. Anderson said. "Through the joint
cooperation of Works Progress Administration, University
of New Mexico, Federal and State Coronado Commission,
and the Museum of New Mexico, more than $80,000 will be
spent on construction, landscaping, and preparation of
exhibits."
Plans of the architect, John Gaw Meem, Santa Fe, call
for a one-story pueblo style building with raised gallery.
Murals of Coronado's "Entrada," painted by the late Gerald
Cassidy, will take the principal position in the gallery.
A replica of the famous old Kuaua pueblo, diorama of
the Seven Cities of Cibola, and a relief map of New Mexico
showing the Coronado trail and the mountain passes trav-
NOTES AND COMMENTS 97
ersed by the Conquistadores, will also be placed in the gal-
lery section. In one corner a display case will contain Coro-
nado's armour and typical costumes of the period. In the
opposite corner will be an exhibit of utensils and weapons of
the Coronado period, prepared by the School of American
Research under the direction of Dr. Edgar Lee Hewett,
director of the Museum of New Mexico and the School of
American Research. Dr. Hewett is in general charge of
plans and construction of the Monument.
Opposite the central gallery will be two wings, one con-
taining offices and art exhibits, and the other devoted to
archaeological displays, including pottery and other mate-
rial excavated from the Kuaua ruins.
The 1200-room pueblo has been excavated and walls
have been raised in certain places to emphasize the vast
extent of the ancient capital of the Province of Tiguex.
The Monument site lies on the west side of the Rio
Grande, is visible from Highway 85. Plans for its develop-
ment include landscaping down to the river bank, with a
botanical garden, and provision for adequate parking space.
— Albuquerque Morning Journal.
PURLOINED PAPERS — The Pacific Coast Branch of the
American Historical Association met in annual session
at Los Angeles during the holidays. At the brief business
session on December 29, the following resolution was
offered with the request that it be referred to the executive
council for consideration and action :
WHEREAS, in the field of historical research, we
sometimes encounter important source materials
which have been acquired improperly by their pres-
ent holders.
BE IT RESOLVED that it be the recognized policy
of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American His-
torical Association not to publish in our historical
quarterlies or otherwise recognize any paper, study,
graduate thesis or other production which in any
way rests upon the use of such allegedly wrongly
98 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
acquired material unless it be accompanied by a
suitable printed recognition of this fact.
The motion was seconded, and without discussion the mat-
ter was referred as asked.
Immediately after adjournment we were interested in
being button-holed by Dr. Herbert E. Bolton, who was some-
what perturbed by the joshing of some of his friends : "What
have you been stealing now?" And he wanted to know what
was back of the motion. Our reply was : "Dr. Bolton, I can
illustrate out of your own experience. I understand that
some years ago several entire legajos of documents which
had been purloined from the Archivo General in Mexico
City came into your possession at Berkeley . . ." That's a
lie," interrupted Dr. Bolton. "Wait a minute," we con-
tinued, "Let me finish. I understand further that you saw to
it that those documents were returned to the place where
they belonged." "Yes," nodded Dr. Bolton, "that is correct."
We then gave him, and later the secretary of the execu-
tive council, the salient facts as to a considerable body of
papers which originally were, without question, part of the
old public archives in Santa Fe but which, a few years ago,
were acquired by a library in another state.
Legal action can, of course, be resorted to for the re-
covery of public documents, but it would be much pleasanter
if any library or individual who acquires such papers would
emulate the example of Dr. Bolton and see that they are
promptly restored where they properly belong. Probity
and a regard for ethical standards are to be expected from
any person or institution engaged in historical research.
LANSING B. BLOOM.
GRAN QUIVIRA — How this name ever became at-
tached to one of the Saline pueblos has been a puzzle; we
have never been able to trace back such use of the name
earlier than by Gregg in his Commerce of the Prairies
(1844). But recently in reading proof on a transcription
from the journals of A. F. A. Bandelier, we came across the
following entry under date of 5 November 1883 :
NOTES AND COMMENTS 99
. . . The town of El Paso del Norte is a big Indian
village, below trees, except the two principal Streets,
where the houses are connected. The Indians
mostly live in the "Bancal"[?]. At 2 p. m. I could
at last see the Cura Ramon Ortiz. He told me ...
Foundation of the church, 1656, Fray Martin de
Hinajosa. Origin of the name Gran-Quivira being
applied to the present Pueblo [Tabira]. An ances-
tor of his, a Spanish officer, came hither at the be-
ginning of this century, sent by the Spanish gov-
ernment after the Gran Quivira. He looked for it
in the N. W. and surveyed the Pueblo Bonito &c.
&c. But an old "Jumano" Indian, "Tio Juan Largo"
of Socorro, called attention to the present Pueblo
of Quivira, and thus the name remained.
On the other hand, as late as April 2, 1778, Fray Escalante
in writing to Fray Juan Agustin Morfi expressed the opin-
ion that
the Gran Quivira, according to the region in which
they have always considered it to be, and according
to what I have been able to find out until now, with
all the narratives about it that I have seen or heard,
is nothing else than the villages of the Panana
(Pawnee) Indians . . .
(Twitchell, Sp. Archs., ii, 279)
The two citations would seem to limit the time of transition
within thirty years or possibly less, so that the explanation
found by Bandelier is very credible.
L. B. B.
CUMULATIVE INDEX — With this issue the NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW begins its fifteenth volume. Next fall
the editors plan to publish a cumulative index of the entire
series which will be supplied without additional charge to
current subscribers, and to others of record who maintained
their subscription for five years or more.
Libraries in this country and abroad, and individuals
who make frequent use of their back files will welcome the
aid of such a ready-reference volume. Instead of having to
100 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
consult fifteen separate indices, the inquirer can then see at
a glance what may be available on a particular topic. It is
thought also that a fifteen-year tabulation of contents and
contributors will be both helpful and impressive.
The Historical Society of New Mexico
(INCORPORATED)
Organized December 26, 1859
PAST PRESIDENTS
1859 — COL. JOHN B. GRAYSON, U. S. A.
1861 — MAJ. JAMES L. DONALDSON, U. S. A.
1863 — HON. KIRBY BENEDICT
adjourned sine die, Sept. 23, 1863
re-established Dec. 27, 1880
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OFFICERS FOR 1940-1941
PAUL A. F. WALTER, President
JAMES F. HINKLE, V ice-President
MIGUEL A. OTERO, II, V ice-President
LANSING B. BLOOM, Cor. Sec'y-Treas.
Miss HESTER JONES, Recording Secretary
FELLOWS
PERCY M. BALDWIN EDGAR L. HEWETT
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CHARLES W. HACKETT ALFRED B. THOMAS
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CONSTITUTION
OF THE
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
(As amended Nov. 19, 1929)
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NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW
VOL. XV
APRIL, 1940
No. 2
PALACE OF THE GOVERNORS
PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY
THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
AND
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft,Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft Aft' Aft Aft Aft! Aft Aft Aft
NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW
Editor Managing Editor
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Associates
PERCY M. BALDWIN GEORGE P. HAMMOND
FRANK T. CHEETHAM THEODOSIUS MEYER, 0. F. M.
VOL. XV APRIL, 1940 No. 2
CONTENTS
Who Discovered New Mexico? . . Lansing B. Bloom 101
New Mexico's Fight for Statehood, 1895-1912
Marion Dargan 133
Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886
V, VI Ralph H. Ogle 188
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NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL
I REVIEW
VOL. XV APRIL, 1940 No. 2
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO?*
By LANSING B. BLOOM
PERHAPS WE SHOULD begin the discussion of our subject
by asking what we mean by discovery. In early colonial
times, this was the first phase of carrying crown rights into
a new region. The European power whose subject or agent
first actually visited and reliably reported a tierra nueva was
recognized as having a prior claim to that region; and the
man or men who effected such a discovery had a valid claim
on royal favor. Of course, if permanent possession was to
be realized, discovery had to be followed up by more careful
exploration and by colonization, but in this discussion re-
garding New Mexico we are now interested only in the ini-
tial phase — that of discovery.
In defining "discovery" we recognize two essentials,
neither of which is sufficient without the other: (1) the
discoverer must himself have seen what he reports, and (2)
he must report it in a credible manner. Some of us doubt-
less remember when Robert E. Peary reached the North
Pole in April, 1909. In due course, he was recognized as the
discoverer, although one Frederick A. Cook claimed to have
gotten there nearly a year earlier. The evidence offered by
the latter was not credited.
In this connection we might observe that no native ever
rated as a discoverer. The earliest known report about the
*Paper read at the annual meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Associa-
tion, at Omaha, Nebr., May 2-4, 1940.
101
102 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Pueblo Indian country was that given to Nufio de Guzman
in, or about, 1530, by one of his slaves. As such information
went, the story told by the Indian Tejo seems to compare
favorably with the later reports by Cabeza de Vaca and Fray
Marcos de Niza. Going as a boy with his father, Tejo had
actually visited large towns in the north and his story was
given weight — at least, this was true later when Guzman
seems to have used it to back up his claim to prior right of
discovery in that region. But Tejo himself was not a dis-
coverer ; he was merely an Indian slave.
We need to agree on what we mean by the word "dis-
covery" ; we should also be clear in our use of the term "New
Mexico." If we are thinking of the region which later came
to be known by that name, we may agree upon a discoverer
much earlier than if we look for the first report of the region
when it had this particular name. Suppose we proceed,
therefore, first to trace the name back to its earliest appear-
ance and consider the various men who claimed recognition
as "discoverer of New Mexico," and, second, to consider any
earlier discoverers of the same region before it received its
permanent name. With these latter, of course, the title
"New Mexico" will be an anachronism.
As early as 1889, H. H. Bancroft1 noted the appearance
of the name "New Mexico" in the 1560's, and some attention
has been given by later writers to the two instances briefly
described by Bancroft. From a brief testimonio de autos
first published by Pacheco and Cardenas2 it appears that
in 1568 Francisco Cano was an administrative officer of the
newly opened mines of Mazapil when, with sixteen soldiers,
he made a prospecting journey northwards and discovered
a lake to which he gave the name "Laguna de Nuevo Mex-
ico." Usually Cano's lake has been identified with the Lake
of Parras in southern Coahuila, but the Mexican historian
Lie. Vito Alessio Robles has shown recently3 that this dis-
1. Bancroft's Works, vol. xvii (Arizona and New Mexico), pp. 72-73.
2. Coleccion de documentos ineditos, xix, pp. 535-540.
8. Coahuila y Texas en la epoca colonial (Mexico, 1938).
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 103
covery lay more to the east. In any case, it was far from the
present New Mexico and is of interest to us now solely be-
cause of the light which it throws on contemporary thought.
As Bancroft remarked, there was a "tendency to find
a 'new Mexico' in the north." What idea did the name
"Mexico" convey to Spaniards of the sixteenth century?
Today the name at once suggests the entire country which is
our neighbor on the south, but under Spanish regime that
country was the viceroyalty of Nueva Espana. For three
hundred years the name "Mexico" was restricted to the rich
prize which Hernan Cortes and his followers had found and
won. When they marched down into the Valley of Mexico,
the great lake of Texcoco was much more extensive than it
is today, but it is not difficult to visualize what they saw
before them : the Aztec city of Tenoctitlan like a new-world
Venice with canals and causeways, temples and palaces, and
around the shores of the lake other cities which paid rich
tribute to the ruling Moctezuma. "Mexico" meant that val-
ley and the Spanish city which had risen on the ruins of
Tenoctitlan, mistress of the Aztec world. Is it any wonder
that ardent conquistadores dreamed of discovering other
"Mexicos"? Such dreams were to persist just so long as
there were undiscovered regions beyond the advancing
frontiers. "Plus ultra" was the motto of Spain and of the
conquistadores.
So with Cano. In formal legal style he reported that
he had found such a region: a broad rich valley with a
great lake, and that many "smokes" were evidence of a con-
siderable population. He told of "a very large number of
rancherias of Indians, fisherfolk and warriors, of certain
nations which seem to be of the Indians of Florida."4
Farther to the west and several years earlier, a similar
use of the name "New Mexico" appeared in the activities of
Francisco de Ibarra, whom the viceroy in July, 1562, had
4. Doc. ined., xix, p. 536. There are now in the Coronado Library, University of
New Mexico, facsimiles of these and other documents relating to Cano, from A. G. I.,
Patronato 22 and Guadalajara 51.
104 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
commissioned as governor of provinces which he was to
discover "beyond the mines of San Martin and Aviiio." Ten
months later (May 3, 1563) Don Francisco wrote a hurried
but enthusiastic letter from the valley of San Juan to his
uncle, Don Diego, at the mines of San Martin. Within the
hour, Don Francisco had returned from a new discovery
fifty or sixty leagues to the west; he meant to stay at San
Juan until after the rainy season and then leave to settle the
new province. Don Diego forwarded this letter, enclosed in
a short one of his own, to the viceroy ; and the latter in turn
wrote the news to the king, transmitting the above two let-
ters and also a written relation, taken by Don Diego from
the soldier who had brought his nephew's letter. The vice-
roy's letter thus carried three enclosures.5
It is the last paper, undated but thus identified, which
gives an intriguing account of Ibarra's new discovery.
Guided by an Indian woman through and over the moun-
tains, they had reached some plains where there were groves
of trees and a river; and she told the Spaniards that, if
they would climb the heights beyond, they would see the
people and town known as Topiame. Six soldiers, sent by
Ibarra, reported back that they had seen many Indian
houses, all white and terraced, and there seemed to be many
Indians who were well dressed in white and in other colors
after the manner of the Mexican people, and from the ap-
pearance of the people, "surely it must be another Mexico."
The Spaniards remained concealed and that night, with the
greatest caution and on foot, they approached nearer and
heard the playing of teponaztles like the music of the Mexi-
can people. Their guide was asked whether there were any
more such towns, and she replied that the one which they
had seen was as nothing to others which were on beyond
other mountains which were near there. The Spaniards and
their horses were so worn and exhausted and the Indians
were so numerous that it had been necessary to return to
San Juan, said the messenger, but the governor was talking
5. Doe. i-Md., xiv, pp. 5BS-B61.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 105
about having discovered "the new Vizcaya" and "the new
Mexico."
However, Topiame proved disappointing, and later
when Ibarra pressed on "over the hills" he found to his dis-
gust that he had come out at Culiacan, in parts already
settled on the western slope. Legendary Copala, ancestral
home of the Aztec people, was the principal object of his
search during these years, and from San Juan on the Rio
Fuerte, late in 1565, he was toiling northward and inland
through the mountains of southern Sonora. The province of
Paquime which he finally reached is probably to be identified
with the ruins of Casas Grandes, Chihuahua. Here Ibarra
found many evidences of a well advanced native culture —
but the inhabitants were gone, although it seemed that they
had left but recently.6 Perhaps it was the sought-f or Copala
"whence the Mexicans had gone forth to settle in Mexico,"
but if so, it was an older Mexico and not a new one.
The over sanguine reports of Ibarra and Cano were
still recent history when the name "New Mexico" finally
reached its permanent home in the land of the Pueblo In-
dians. Here as in the other cases there was a reason, an
appropriateness in the use of the name; in fact, it was its
fitness which caused the name to stick and outlive the vari-
ous other names proposed by early discoverers. In all Amer-
ica the Spaniards found sedentary Indians, natives far ad-
vanced in the arts of civilization, in only five regions; of
these, the valley of Mexico was the first and most spectacular
— New Mexico was the fifth and last.
To the best of our knowledge, the earliest use of the
name as now applied is found in documents relating to the
expedition of Fray Agustin Rodriguez which set forth from
Santa Barbara in June 1581. In Mexico City on May 16,
1582, the viceroy took sworn statements of Pedro de Busta-
mante and Hernando Gallegos, soldiers returned from this
6. J. L. Mecham, Francisco de Ibarra and Nueva Vizcaya, p. 174, says "the
wooden supports had rotted away." The wording of Betanzos, "que aun estauan por
pudrir las maderas," means that the timbers were still unrotted. A. G. I., Mexico, 168,
Betan$os to the king, 5 junio 1566.
106 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
entrada, in neither of which does the name "New Mexico"
appear.7 As published by Pacheco and Cardenas, next in this
group of documents is a short similar statement of another
returned soldier, Hernando Barrado, at Mexico on October
20, 1582, who uses no regional name except "that country of
Puaray." Then follows an important letter of the viceroy to
the king, November 1, which shows that he had twice con-
sulted Don Rodrigo del Rio de Losa, lieutenant of the cap-
tain-general of Nueva Galicia. The two opinions given by
Rio de Losa are among the accompanying papers and, al-
though undated, they are definitely placed by their being
cited in the viceroy's letter. In the earlier of the two, Rio
de Losa speaks of "the new discovery which they are calling
the new Mexico"8 and expresses the hope that the mission-
aries may still be alive; in the other9 they are said to be
already dead — and here the region is called "the new Mex-
ico and province of San Felipe," and again simply "the new
Mexico."
It is a remarkable fact that the name is not found in the
relation, the writing of which was finished by Gallegos on
July 8, 1582. It seems conclusive that only with their return
from the north and with the spreading of the news which
they brought did these soldiers, and people generally, begin
to use the name "New Mexico" in an informal and popular
way. Antonio de Espejo, writing from San Bartolome in
October, 1583, shortly after he returned from his rescue ex-
pedition, said that he had spent more than a year in "see-
ing and discovering the provinces of the new Mexico to
which I gave the name Nueva Andalucia," and he began his
relation with mention of "the provinces of the new Mex-
ico."10 At about the same time, Francisco Diaz de Vargas,
an official in the city of Los Angeles (Puebla), in seeking
permission to follow up the new discovery expressed the
view that the Mexican people had had their origin from the
7. Doc. intd., xv, pp. 80-95.
8. Ibid., xv, pp. 142-146.
9. Ibid., xv, pp. 137-142.
10. Ibid., xv, pp. 162, 163-189.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 107
nations and towns of that northwestern region "which is
what we are now calling the provinces of San Felipe del
Nuevo Mexico."11 Later in the same document Diaz stated
that the Rodriguez party reached the people and cities where
Vazquez Coronado had had his camp and which he called
Cibola but which these named San Felipe of New Mexico."12
We may sum up our discussion thus far by saying that
the name "New Mexico" came into use during the year 1582
as a result of the Rodriguez expedition, and that in no form
or manner prior to this time was the name connected with
the Pueblo Indian country.13
A corollary of this statement is that any undated docu-
ment which uses the name was not written before that year.
Take, for example, an original document, signed but un-
dated, which we photographed last year at the Archive of
the Indies.14 In it Captain Vicente Gonzalez at Santo
Domingo tells of being sent out by Pedro Melendez Marques,
governor of the province of Florida, up the coast toward los
bacallaos in search of a reported "fort of the French." In
a great port which extended for thirty leagues inland Gon-
zalez was told, among other things, that back of the moun-
tains and distant not more than five days' travel was "the
new Mexico .... Here there are great houses four stories
high and plastered outside. There are many small cattle
and much silver, because the Indians themselves so informed
him." Study of this paper may throw some doubt on an
exploration of 1573 which has been credited to this gov-
ernor15 but Lowery credits Gonzalez with another later
voyage in 1588. With its mention of New Mexico, this docu-
11. Ibid., xv, pp. 126-137.
12. Ibid., xv, p. 131.
13. As first used in the Chronicas of Baltasar de Obregon (Hammond and Rey
edition, p. 41) the name is an anachronism. Obregon finished this writing at Mex-
ico City in April, 1584, nearly six months after the return of the Espejo party. He
simply uses the name already then in vogue when speaking of the interest of Viceroy
Luis de Velasco in the 1550's in reports of tierras nuevas.
14. A. G. I., Mexico 1841.
15. See Woodbury Lowery, Spanish Settlements in the U. S.: Florida, 1562-74,
pp. 381, 459.
108 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ment could not be as early as 1573, whereas 1588 is credible.
If our name "New Mexico" came into use first in 1582,
we may well show vigorous disrespect for some inscriptions
which have been imposed on our friends in Arizona. Appar-
ently about ten years ago, someone laboriously made a group
of rock inscriptions in Pima Canon, a few miles out from
Phoenix — in an effort, we judge, to prove that Estevanico,
Fray Marcos de Niza, and Coronado passed that way. I
believe that it was Dr. Harold S. Colton of the Museum of
Northern Arizona at Flagstaff who, in 1933, first identified
the alleged "Coronado" inscription as a clumsy plagiarism
from the well known Vargas inscription at El Morro, New
Mexico. The last half of that inscription reads: "a la real
corona todo el nuebo mexico a su costa, ano de 1692." The
Phoenix fake shows, in the same style and arrangement, the
words italicized, and the date is altered to read 1539. The
names of Estevanico and Fray Marcos are scratched nearby,
and of the above legend you are expected to accept "corona
to" for Coronado. It was a fatal mistake for the perpetrator
of the hoax to retain the words "el nuebo mexico" ! We have
not a shred of evidence showing that name in use before
1582, and a stick of dynamite would be well expended in
definitely ending the imposition.
Turning now to consider the various men who claimed
to be "discoverers of New Mexico," we take first Don An-
tonio de Espejo. Various writers seem to regard him as most
entitled to the honor, and much might be said in favor of
this view. For example, at Madrid in the summer of 1748,
Juan Antonio Valenciano submitted a voluminous narrative
describing the provinces in the viceroyalty of New Spain.16
In the section upon the province of New Mexico the first
paragraph reads :
The Kingdom of New Mexico is found situated
between the 29th and the 39th degrees of north
latitude, extending on the north as far as Quivira
16. A. G. I., Mexico 1849. Its compiling had been ordered by the king a year
before.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 109
and on the east to Florida. It ends to the south
with the Kingdom of Mexico and on the west with
the sea of California; and likewise the same name
is given to the Provinces which are found at the
source of the Rio del Norte. It lies at a distance of
400 leagues from the City of Mexico, and was dis-
covered by Don Antonio de Espejo in the years
1581 or 1582.
The point of interest here is that, nearly two centuries after
the event, Espejo should officially be mentioned as the one
who discovered New Mexico. From the dates given it is
evident that the rescue party — as we may call the Beltran-
Espejo party — was not distinguished from the preceding
missionary party, — as we may style the Rodriguez-Cha-
muscado party. The rescue party left San Bartolome (now
Allende, Chihuahua) in the fall of 1582 and did not return
until a year later. Then, from October 1583 until late in
1586, Espejo was seeking royal favor which would allow
him to follow up his discovery with an occupying and devel-
oping of the new region. The records show that his claim as
"discoverer" received tacit recognition at court; but his
petition was not granted. He had influential connections,
but his record was against him.17
But meanwhile, as already noted, the soldier-survivors
17. His son-in-law, Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza, was probably related to the
historian, Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza ; at any rate, the latter made use of Espejo'a
relacidn in his important history which was published in Madrid in 1586.
On the other hand, Espejo was one of the defendants in a criminal suit involv-
ing the death of two men which was initiated at Queretaro in April 1581. In writing to
the viceroy on Oct. 31, 1583, he hoped to prove his innocence; but in April 1586 he
was petitioning for pardon. He seems to have secured this in December of that year,
but meanwhile his petition to be allowed to follow up his discovery in New Mexico was
simply ignored.
That Espejo was, however, even then tacitly recognized as discoverer of New
Mexico is shown, for example, in a royal cedula of Apr. 21, 1585, which commended
to the favorable attention of the viceroy his son-in-law. As recited in the cedula,
Gonzalez had presented a relacion of the services of his own father ; he wanted to
emulate that example ; he was married, and lastly he had come to Spain to report
"the discovery by his father-in-law Antonio de Espejo of New Mexico, in which he
had expended much of his property." (A. G. I., Mexico 1091, C 11.) The very next
cedula entered in this record book and of the same date ordered that Pedro Mufioz de
Espejo and Juan Rodriguez be allowed certified copies of the criminal case aganist
them — doubtless the same one in which Don Antonio was involved.
110 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
of the Rodriguez party had returned in the spring of 1582
and their reports had at once been transmitted to Spain by
the viceroy. In fact, Hernan Gallegos (who had been made
their leader upon the fatal sickness of Captain Chamuscado
during the return journey) was sent by the viceroy to report
in person at court. At least a year before Espejo's agents
were at court urging his claims, Gallegos himself was there
— and was being referred to officially as "the discoverer of
New Mexico." In March, 1583, he addressed the following
petition to the king:18
Very Powerful Lord: [I], Captain Hernan
Gallegos, discoverer of New Mexico, state that, by a
previous petition and memorial and records which
I presented, it is shown how I came from the prov-
inces of New Spain by order of Your viceroy, to
report to Your Highness how I went with eight
others, companions, and with three Religious, hav-
ing a permit from Your said viceroy for the dis-
covery of the said New Mexico; and [to report]
what happened to us on the said journey, to me and
to the others, as is set forth in the records which
are in Your council [of the Indies], in which I
prayed Your Highness to do me the favor to com-
mand that I be given the conquest and pacifying of
that country, in accord with the laws and ordi-
nances and as has been done with others who have
gone on similar discoveries.
And it seems that Your Highness has not
granted me [the favor] because I did not declare
in the said petition that the conquest would be at
my cost.
And since it is, and always has been, my pur-
pose to serve God Our Lord and that those barbar-
ous people be reduced to the fold of the Holy
Mother Roman Church and [be made] subjects of
the government of Your Highness, acknowledg-
ing You as king and lord :
BY THIS [PETITION] I say and offer that, if
Your Highness so please, I will undertake the said
conquest at my expense and cost, and will furnish
18. A. G. I., Guadalajara 10.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? Ill
500 men and more for the pacifying of the said
country, if I am allowed the [same] terms and con-
ditions as those which Your Highness ordered
made with Francisco de Ybarra, your late governor
of the province of Chiametla, which is the most
nearly adjacent country of Christians, and with
any other terms convenient to secure the said paci-
fying of the said province.
LIKEWISE I say that, since for the said conquest
there is no need of people going from these parts —
owing to the many in New Spain who will be glad
to go with me on the said journey — and since, nev-
ertheless, I am told that in this court and in the
city of Sevilla there are many persons who have
served Your Highness in those parts and who will
be of much use and benefit since they can serve as
officers of war on the said journey, I pray and sup-
plicate Your Highness to order that I be given a
permit to take along of these said soldiers up to
the number of thirty for the said purpose, since
this will be agreeable to the service of Your High-
ness.
Hernan Gallegos (rubric)
Accompanying this petition and of earlier date is what
seems to be a brief summary of the earlier petition men-
tioned by Gallegos.19 It reads as follows :
S. C. R. M. [Sacred Caesarian Royal Majesty]
Captain Hernan Gallegos, native of Sevilla,
says that he went to the provinces of New Spain
some ten years ago, wishing to be employed wholly
in the service of Your Majesty, and God has been
pleased that he should realize his desire well. Not
contenting himself with what he might accomplish
in following up the purpose and measures taken by
others, he chose to venture his person and property
in going to the discovery of New Mexico — whither
went Cabeza de Vaca and Francisco Vasquez Coro-
19. Dr. France V. Scholes reports that there is a. probanza record of Hernan
Gallegos in A. G. I., Patronato 77-1-7. Study of it may show whether our surmise is
correct, but the papers here given make the situation sufficiently clear. This brief is
such as was usually made by a fiscal or secretary of the Council of the Indies.
112 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
nado and others, and they were not able to accom-
plish the said discovery.20
He brings information of that discovery, certi-
fied by the royal audiencia of Mexico, that there
were eighteen cities and fifty-three pueblos with
six discoveries of mines. Of these the viceroy or-
dered an assay to be made, which showed thirty-six
marks to the hundred weight — as appears from the
relation and the memorial which he brings thereof,
and [also] of other great matters which are worthy
of being heard and understood.
He prays that Your Majesty command a consid-
eration of the records which he brings regarding
all that is here stated, whereby will be evident the
services he has rendered, and his expenditure of
more than 8,000 pesos and the dangers [encoun-
tered] and the benefit which may come put of all
this, so that God our Lord and Your Majesty may
be served.
And in accord with his labor and costs and ex-
penses incurred in the journey which he has made
on behalf of the discoverers21 [he prays] that you
make him a grant, in conformity with the ordi-
nances relating to entrance for discovery, both of
the trading-rights and administration (factoria y
alguazilazgo mayor) of the province of San Felipe
del Nuevo Mexico, and of succor for the said jour-
ney, [all] in the form and manner which are cus-
tomary in granting such governments. For he
hopes in our Lord, from what he saw and learned
and the dangers and captivity which he endured22
that there will be as much profit from this discov-
ery and from what remains to be discovered
(which is, without compare, more and better than
that here stated) as the greatest that there has
been in all the province of New Spain. For there
are cities of which the houses have from one to
seven stories, and a great number of herded cattle
and land fertile with many fruits and great har-
20. More of these two men later. The meaning here is that a discovery not
followed up is not "accomplished."
21. He thus includes his fellow-soldiers in his petition.
22. This must refer to the trouble he had with officials of Nueva Viscaya upon
his return from New Mexico.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 113
vests, besides the said mines and towns for the de-
veloping of them.
And since he comes to give news to Your
Majesty of all that is here stated, as the one who
remained as leader of the people who were found in
the said [journey of] discovery, and it is convenient
that he return shortly for its continuation, he prays
Your Majesty that he be succored and dispatched
promptly, because he came in this packet-ship with
the assistance given him by the viceroy for this ob-
ject, [and] he asks the same succor of Your
Majesty for his maintenance and return from the
said journey. And [he says that] it would be of
much importance that he depart with this fleet
which is now being made ready.
This summary of his first petition was endorsed on
March 14, 1583, and referred to the Council of the Indies,
where its disposition was indicated by a line: "This matter
is already cared for as is convenient," while a similar en-
dorsement on the petition of March 30 said in effect: "Let
Gallegos take his appeal to the viceroy."23
This does not mean necessarily that Gallegos and his
companions were discredited as discoverers.24 The very fact
that the record as drawn up and certified in the Audiencia
of Mexico was filed among the archives of the Patronato
shows that this discovery was regarded as important in any
validating of Spanish crown claims in New Mexico.
But now we come to still another Spaniard who claimed
to be the original discoverer of New Mexico, a Captain
Melchior de Alava. This aspirant to the honor seems to
have been quite unknown hitherto, and yet in 1584 he made
23. The two endorsements read : "Ya esta proueydo esto como conviene" ; "que
acuda al Virrey." The explanation seems to be that reports direct from the viceroy
regarding New Mexico had already been acted upon, and it had been decided to have
him find the right man to follow up the discovery. Although the royal cedula so or-
dering was not dated until April 19, these Gallegos papers would show that the deci-
sion had been reached some weeks earlier.
24. See, for example, a recomendacion of 18 October 1583 in A. G. L, Guadala-
jara 230, secured for Gallegos by Goncalo Rodriguez, "for services since he came
of age, and for going with Chamuscado and eight others to the discovery of New
Mexico."
114 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the remarkable claim that it was he who had first given
news of New Mexico not only to Espejo but also to Fray
Agustin Rodriguez! Moreover, he declared that, ten years
before (1574), he had brought news of that country to the
king in Spain — although at that time, as we shall see, he
called the new country "the land of Quivira."
Fortunately we have a pretty clear picture of the part
played by Alava on the northern frontier through a pro-
banza of the year 1584.25 From various endorsements on
the opening pages of this record we gather the following
facts : that the probanza was dated at Guadalajara on March
6 of that year, and was presented to the Council of the
Indies in Madrid on October 27 following. The secretary,
Juan Ledesma, wrote at the top of the cover-page : "Captain
Melchior de Alava asks the office of alguazil mayor of the
mines of Sombrerete," and it was then turned over to a
relator named Varros who, immediately below, added the
following summary of the various documents embodied in
the probanza.2*
Captain Melchior de Alava, resident of the
Villa of Llerena and the Mines of Sombrerete
which is in the New Kingdom of Galicia [repre-
sents] :
That he came to this court in the year 1574 to
give an account to His Majesty of the services
which he has effected, from the mines of Zacatecas
to Santa Barbara, in discovering and pacifying the
country and settling it all with General Rpdrigo del
Rio de Losa as it is now settled by Spaniards. He
has been serving for twenty-seven years in this
and in other ways which have offered and as he has
been ordered by the Audiencia of Guadalajara.
Likewise, that he gave news to His Majesty of
the country and settlements of New Mexico and
Quivira; wherefor His Majesty granted him a
cedula so that he might confer with the viceroy,
25. A. G. I., Guadalajara 34.
26. A last endorsement here notes that on Oct. 30, 1584, the matter was seen
by four men named, — evidently members of the Council to whom Alava's case was
referred. Its disposition will appear below.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 115
Don Martin Enriquez, regarding the discovery of
that land.
That while he was sick, three Religious of
Lord Saint Francis asked for a permit to go with
seven companions to this discovery and, through
the account which he gave them, they entered and
found to be true all that of which he had given
acccount to His Majesty.
And [that] Anton de Espejo arrived in that
season at Sombrerete, like a man who might be of
service to the Religious so that they should not be
killed among the Indians ; and the same Melchior de
Alava gave to Anton de Espejo the same [informa-
tion] so that he might not lose his way, because he
[Alava] remained in Sombrerete serving His
Majesty in his office as lieutenant alcalde mayor.
And in view of this, and of the reports which he
presented with the opinion of the Audiencia of New
Galicia— HE REQUESTED the office of alguazil
mayor of the Villa of Llerena and Mines of Som-
brerete; and His Majesty directed that he should
ask something else.
Also he gave an account of the great frauds
which were being, and might be, committed against
the "royal fifths" in the dealings of shopkeepers,
exchanging of metals, miners who refined silver,
and other things which result therefrom : and His
Majesty conferred on him the favor of appoint-
ment as judge in all the mining settlements of New
Galicia and Vizcaya, and in this form the grant
was transmitted to the president and members of
that audiencia, and instead of judge they appointed
him [public] accuser, which likewise His Majesty
made him in addition to the said grant of recom-
mendation. These grants, he says, have been with-
out benefit to him and [thus] to the injury of the
royal treasury. And always he has served although
without being compensated; and now, thus bur-
dened, he has come to make new representations of
his services, discoveries and settlings, with a letter
of recommendation from the audiencia [of Guada-
lajara] approved by the fiscal, in order to seek
greater favors, [desiring that] His Majesty may
recognize the service he has rendered and with
what toil and expense, with his sons and arms and
116 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
horses, against infidel highwaymen and always to
the benefit of His Majesty's treasury.
[He represents] that he is married with a
daughter of one of the first conquerors of New
Spain and New Galicia, named Ana de Bobadilla,
lawful daughter of Pedro de Bobadilla; and that
one of his sons was killed in His Majesty's service
in the fights with Indians.
In view of his age and extreme poverty and be-
cause he has three marriageable daughters, and in
view of what has been stated, he prays that he be
granted the wand [office] of alguazil mayor which
he requested ten years ago ; also the office of judge
representing His Majesty in collecting the "royal
fifths." He asks also a renewal of the recommenda-
tion [of 1574].
It is of passing interest to know that Alava did secure
his new recommendation, 27 but our concern just now is to
know what basis Alava had in 1584 for saying that he had
discovered "New Mexico" by 1574.
An information de officio which was drawn up at Guad-
alajara in February-March, 1574,28 yields various facts as to
Alava's services in the mining camps of Nueva Vizcaya
and in defending the towns and roads against hostile na-
tives, but it has not a single allusion to the country north of
Santa Barbara; also when he secured this document, the
favor for which he meant to ask the king was appointment
as alguazil mayor or corregidor of the villa of Llerena. Late
in 1574, however, he was in Madrid and presented two peti-
tions which were more ambitious. In one, directly to the
king, he offered to post 100,000 ducats in bonds if he might
have a contract for the supplying of quicksilver at the seven
mining camps from Llerena to Coneto and Santa Barbara ;
and again there is no mention of regions beyond. But the
27. Endorsement to this effect on Nov. 30 is on the cover-page. The resulting
cedula, dated 5 Dec. 1584 and renewing that of 12 Dec. 1574, is registered in A. G. I.,
Mexico 1091, C 11.
28. A. G. I., Guadalajara 47.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 117
second petition gives us the information we want. It reads
as follows.29
Very powerful Lord
I, Melchior de Alava, resident of the villa of
Llerena and the mines of Sombrerete in the New
Kingdom of Galicia, say that I have long been en-
gaged in the service of his majesty, conquering and
subduing the Chichimeca Indians, highwaymen who
roam in the neighborhood of the said villa of
Llerena and mines of Sombrerete and their ranches
and mines of San Martin, Harhuites and Santiago,
Coneto, Abino and many other places and high-
ways, who have done and are doing very great
abuses, killing and robbing, on the roads and in the
said mines and their settlements, the Spaniards
who reside in them or who are going there to pros-
pect, seizing their pack-trains and supplies and the
silver of his majesty and of private citizens which
is being transported ; and so serious has been, and
is, the damage which the said Chichimecas have
done, and are doing, that they have put, and are
putting, the said miners every day to great trouble
and distress. And just lately in the month of Janu-
ary last, they stole from Pedro Gil and Francisco
de Munera some sixty mules from their [patio]
mills, so that the reducing of ore by these miners
was stopped; and since there was no captain nor
anyone with authority of Your Highness30 to go
against the said Chichimecas, they accomplish what
they please without meeting any resistance.
And by information [gotten] from some of
them [the Chichimecas] whom at times I have cap-
tured, I have received reliable [news] that, a hun-
dred leagues inland to the north, there is a great
population of natives who treat and trade with the
said Chichimecas and encourage them and give
them aid and assistance in order to commit the said
injuries [on the Spaniards]. They barter profitably
with hides and metals rich in silver (this is what
29. A. G. I., Seccion de Indiferente, 1384.
30. This petition was signed with rubric by one, Alonso de Herrera, who seems
to have acted for Alava in bringing it before the Council of the Indies. Written in
the first person, it begins with references to the king in the third person — and here,
curiously, switches to direct address.
118 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the said Chichimecas use to decorate and paint
their bodies) for the mules, horses, Christian In-
dians and slaves which they [the Chichimecas]
steal in this way. It will be of much benefit to your
royal service for that people to be discovered, con-
quered and brought under your royal service. They
have the name Quibira.31 From this will follow
two results : one will be to take away the strength
of these Chichimecas so that it may not cause the
injuries to which it gives rise, and second [will be]
the discovery of this new country, giving the light
of faith to the natives thereof, where it is reported
there are many mines and that it is a rich country.
And since I am one of the residents of that country
who have the most friends among persons who are
experienced in new discoveries and the pacifying
of natives and with means to expend in the discov-
ering and pacifying of this [new] country what
may be necessary, I have determined to discover,
conquer and subject it to your royal service if Your
Highness will be pleased to grant to me the power
and authority therefor, and to settle it according to
the order and manner which Your Highness has
provided in the instruction and order regarding
new discoveries.
I pray Your Highness, since from this will re-
sult great service to God our Lord and increase to
Your royal patrimony and the general good of the
commonweal in that kingdom, that I be given the
requisite authority, for therein I shall receive
favor.
Alonso de Herrera (rubric)
There is nothing here to warrant Alava's claim in 1584
to the title of discoverer. Doubtless his operations against
hostile Indians took him far beyond the frontier at Santa
Barbara, down the valley of the Conchas river and perhaps
some distance up that of the Rio Grande ; but his own repre-
sentations in 1574 do not claim that he had reached the
Pueblo Indian country. Any knowledge which he furnished
81. The use of this name in 1574 is significant. It identifies the people of whom
Alava is talking: with the region discovered by Coronado in 1540-42, and is one of
the clues to information then current on the northern frontier.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 119
the missionaries and Antonio de Espejo he had gained only
from native informants — captured Chichimecas, as he
says.32 After the ordinances to regulate new discoveries
were promulgated in July, 1573,33 it may well be that Alava
was the first to seek the license now necessary in order to
follow up such reports on the northern frontier. But this
request was merely referred to the viceroy in Mexico and
nothing then came of it; later, in 1579 when Fray Agustin
Rodriguez became interested, Alava intimates that he him-
self could not share in the enterprise because he was
sick. After December 1584, he drops entirely out of the
picture.
We are fortunate in having a contemporary history
of considerable merit, written during the year 1584 by
Baltasar de Obregon.34 Also there are two accompanying
letters35 in one of which Obregon spoke of himself as "a
humble vassal of your majesty in the conquests of New
Vizcaya, California, Cibola and New Mexico, as is fully
recorded in the reports that this royal audiencia is sending
to the royal council of your majesty." In the other letter he
offered his services to "discover, investigate and explore 600
leagues beyond San Felipe de Nuevo Mexico" — provided he
were furnished everything necessary for the expedition.
Obregon's assertion that he had already served in
Cibola and New Mexico must be regarded as an exaggera-
tion. The information de officio to which he alludes has
turned up,36 and of seven witnesses examined at Mexico City
during March, 1584, two testified that Obregon had gone in
company of the late Governor Francisco de Ybarra "to the
82. There might be & suspicion here that Alava belonged to the frontier breed
of Spanish slave-hunters, but in the various papers which have turned up there is
nothing to substantiate such a surmise.
33. These are twice alluded to in Alava's petition. Their text may be found in
the Doe. in6d., xvi, 142-187.
34. From the original which is in A. G. I., Patronato 22, there are now in the
U. S. various facsimile copies, but our citations will be to the English edition by
George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey, Obregon' s History (Los Angeles, 1928).
35. The letters are dated Mexico City, April 17 and April 26. Op. cit., xxvii-
xxix. The originals accompany the history in A. G. I.
86. A. G. I., Mexico 217.
120 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
discovery of New Mexico at his own cost." One of them said
that he had seen the Ybarra party leave San Miguel, and
had also seen them return ten months later. Clearly this
was Ibarra's northern expedition which, as we have already
seen, reached Paquime but fell short of reaching the Pueblo
Indian country — a fact which is twice definitely admitted
by Obregon in his history. He relates that they could not
understand an "Indian of the plains" whom they captured,
because their interpreter had run away; unable to learn
about the country beyond, they failed "to reach New Mex-
ico."37 Again, in the council of war, Obregon explains that
the "cowardly soldiers" outvoted the "good soldiers" and so
"we failed to carry out the undertaking and to reap the
benefits and honor of the discovery of New Mexico. . . We
may rightfully affirm that we saw the walls of its enclosures
and towns, and had we gone ahead it would have been dis-
covered. . . ,"38
Almost in his next breath, Obregon contradicts himself
and asserts that where Ibarra turned back they did obtain
"much good news of provinces and towns," of storied houses,
of peaceful industrious people who wore cotton blankets and
harvested corn, beans, calabashes and fruits, who possessed
all sorts of game and fowl and made great use of the "woolly
cattle." Apparently he was here confusing his sources of
information. The history which he finished in Mexico City
in April 1584 was based, as he himself states in various
places, on facts learned in part from members of the
Beltran-Espejo party (only recently returned from the
north) ; in part also from soldiers who went earlier with
the missionaries; and lastly he says that he talked with
men who had been with the Coronado expedition. As a
youth in Mexico City, Obregon must have known Vazquez
Coronado himself by sight — it may even be that he talked
with him. At least, Obregon was able to write : "I have com-
87. Op. cit., pp. 198-199.
88. Op. cit., pp. 210-214.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 121
pared these three expeditions,"39 and he showed that the
"tierra nueva de Cibola" discovered and explored by Vazquez
Coronado in 1540-1542 and the "San Felipe de Nuevo Mex-
ico" reached by the Rodriguez party in 1581 were at least
in part identical. Yet of the latter he wrote: "It is a new
discovery and I do not doubt that they saw some towns not
visited by Francisco Vazquez Coronado or his captains,"40
and later in his portrayal of the new discoveries he speaks
repeatedly of "Cibola, Paquime, New Mexico and the other
provinces in these regions" as if they were distinct from
each other.41
An analytical study of Obregon's history suggests that,
when he began to write it, he intended to arrange his ma-
terial in three books, leading up respectively to the discov-
ery of Cibola, Paquime, and New Mexico. Later, realizing
that the journey to Paquime had not attained its goal, the
first two were combined in one book, and the second book
was then devoted to "the new discovery" of 1581-1583.
Lastly, he seems to have realized that what, after Coro-
nado's time, was popularly called "the new country of
Cibola" and what in 1582 was first named "New Mexico"
were really one and the same region which had merely been
reached by different routes; so we find him distinguishing
between "first" and "second" discoveries. In the prologue
to his second book, Obregon avers that men are entitled to
immortal fame "if they have preceded others in discovering
and bringing new lands to our knowledge and dominion,"
and he exclaims : "The will of God our Lord will enable us
to convert, rule, and exploit the natives of the newly found
provinces of San Felipe of New Mexico."
He then continues: "The places were discovered by
Father Agustin" who "obtained the grant and commission
for the leader and the people who discovered it."42 Through-
out his account of the Rodriguez-Chamuscado expedition he
39. Op. cit., p. 216.
40. Op. cit., pp. 216-217.
41. Op. cit., pp. 225 ; 314.
42. Op. cit., p. 268.
122 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
speaks of its members as "discoverers," but when they
crossed the trail of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca and his
three companions of 1536, Obregon explains that "the first
account of these lands was obtained because those four
wanderers had gone through them. To follow this up, the
viceroy Antonio de Mendoza sent forth Father Marcos de
Niza and the negro Estevanico, who were the second ex-
plorers."43
By this reasoning, the members of the Coronado expedi-
tion would be the next discoverers, and the Rodriguez party
would be fourth.44 In other words, those earlier journeys
had for him, and they have for us, historical importance
because of their relation to that region where the Pueblo
Indians and their culture were found — but a region to which
the name "New Mexico" was not given until a generation
later.
As we now take up this second phase of our discussion,
we might ask whether anyone would deny to Christopher
Columbus the distinction of having discovered America —
although he never called his discovery by that name? We
need only recall the heraldic honor conferred on him by
Ferdinand and Isabella, with the motto :
For Castilla y por Leon
Nuevo mundo hallo Colon.
By strict definition, Hernan Gallegos and his fellows were
the first discoverers of "New Mexico" ; but certainly there
were European explorers in our Southwest a long generation
before the Rodriguez expedition.
The earliest of them were the four famous survivors of
the Narvaez expedition to Florida, Alvar Nunez Cabeza de
Vaca and three companions, who finally made their way
across to the Pacific slope and walked into Mexico in the
summer of 1536. Students of their place in the early his-
48. Op. cit., p. 282. The italics are ours.
44. In his first book, Obregon touched only lightly on Cabeza de Vaca, Fray
Marcos, and Coronado, using them merely to hfuild up his account of the services
of Ibarra which culminated in reaching the abandoned Paquime.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 123
tory of our Southwest have varied greatly in trying to locate
the wandering trail which they followed. Some have trailed
them north into the heart of the Pueblo country and west to
Zuni before heading southward to Culiacan and Mexico;
others have questioned whether they even entered New Mex-
ico. We are fortunate in having a recent very able study of
this route by Cleve Hallenbeck.45 The widely variant routes
offered by earlier writers have been analyzed, and the
sources have been restudied in the light of the author's inti-
mate acquaintance with much of the region, its climate and
life forms. If we accept his well reasoned tracing of the
route, this little party did enter what is now New Mexico —
indeed, they crossed nine of its thirty-one counties ; yet even
so, they did not actually see a single town of the Pueblo
people.46 What they said later in Mexico City about "Qui-
vira" was based solely on what they had learned from native
informants.47 We cannot, therefore, regard them as discov-
erers of New Mexico within our definition of these terms.
More discussed recently than the route of Cabeza de
Vaca has been the part played by Fray Marcos de Niza, the
Franciscan missionary who was selected by Viceroy Antonio
de Mendoza to follow up the news regarding a civilized
people in the northland. In fact, the controversy regarding
Fray Marcos has raged intermittently for four centuries,
having been begun by Francisco Vasquez de Coronado in a
long letter which he wrote to the viceroy, August 3, 1540,
from the Pueblo town which he had named the "city of
45. Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca; the Journey and Route of the first European
to cross the continent of North America, 1584-1536. (A. H. Clark Co., 1940) See also
an interesting review by J. Chas. Kelley in the NEW MEXICO HIST. REVIEW, xv (Jan.
1940), pp. 79-81.
46. Twice they were within 70 or 80 miles of them. On the Tularosa river they
were not far from the Saline pueblos ; later when they struck west from the Rio
Grande they were even nearer to the Piro towns.
47. The place-name "Quivira" seems to have originated with this party. It is not
an Indian word but appears to be a Spanish form of the Arabic quivir, meaning "big."
As the negro Estevanico came from the west coast of Morocco, he may have been
responsible for its use. Before this party reached Mexico, there had been talk of
the fabulous "Seven Cities" which Nuno de Guzman had sought in the unknown north ;
after their arrival the term "Quivira" first appears in the records.
124 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Granada/'48 Speaking of the road which they had followed,
he declared that "everything which the friar had said was
found to be quite the reverse," and again, after giving much
circumstantial detail, he said, "In brief, I can assure you
that in reality he has not told the truth in a single thing that
he said, but everything is the reverse of what he said, except
the name of the city [Cibola] and the large stone houses."
We might remember that Fray Marcos accompanied the
Coronado expedition, that he was in Cibola when the above
letter was being written, and when it was dispatched Fray
Marcos went along (as the soldier-historian Pedro de
Castaneda later wrote) "because he did not think it safe
for him to stay in Cibola, seeing that his report had turned
out to be entirely false, because the kingdoms that he had
told about had not been found, nor the populous cities, nor
the wealth of gold, nor the precious stones which he had
reported, nor the fine clothes, nor other things that had
been proclaimed from the pulpits."49
The veracity of Fray Marcos was vigorously defended
by Adolph Bandelier just fifty years ago.50 Winship, who
completed his work on the Coronado expedition only three
years later, studied the evidence pro and con very carefully
and has given us the famous dictum, "Friar Marcos un-
doubtedly never willfully told an untruth about the country
of Cibola, even in a barber's chair,"51 yet in the same para-
graph he qualified this by saying, "Friar Marcos was not a
liar, but it is impossible to ignore the charges against him
quite as easily as Mr. Bandelier has done."
In 1924 "The question whether Niza ever saw the fa-
mous 'Seven Cities'" was again discussed by Henry R. Wag-
48. The text is given by Geo. P. Winship in his The Coronado Expedition, 1540-
154X, published by the B. A. E., 14th Annual Report, Part I (Washington, 1896),
pp. 552-563. This text will be cited below as Winship.
49. Winship, pp. 484-485. Castaneda also tells us (p. 483) that when the Span-
iards first saw Cibola, "such were the curses that some hurled at Friar Marcos that
I pray God may protect him from them."
50. Contribution to the history of the southwestern portion of the United States
(Cambridge, 1890).
61. Winship, p. 866.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 125
ner, who expressed himself in the negative.52 Two years
later, Percy M. Baldwin offered a fresh English translation
of the Fray Marcos Relation, and in his introductory discus-
sion of sources and commentators, he reviewed adversely the
early statements by Hernan Cortes and Pedro de Castaneda,
remarking that "some historians have been almost as unkind
to Fray Marcos." Among those favorable to the missionary
he listed Frank Gushing, Bandelier, Winship, and Charles
F. Lummis ; and he himself concluded that Fray Marcos had
not even exaggerated.53
In 1932 appeared a monograph by Carl 0. Sauer which
was a regional as well as documentary study of the matter,
and in which the findings presented were decidedly dis-
paraging to Fray Marcos.54 This author concluded that it
was a physical impossibility for Fray Marcos to have tra-
versed the distance involved within the time allowed by his
own report. Henry R. Wagner followed in 1934 with addi-
tional evidence which seemed to discredit the missionary's
reputed claims;55 and in 1937 Sauer was able to clear up
some points in his earlier study with data which he had
secured later.56 Such are the high lights of this controversy
in its recent stages, and some regard the matter as con-
clusively settled. May I say that I do not regard the case as
closed, simply because not all the evidence has been properly
weighed.
Without attempting a complete review of the evidence
already offered, we recognize that at present the consensus
of opinion seems decidedly adverse to Fray Marcos' veracity.
52. H. R. Wagner, The Spanish Southwest, 1542-1794 (edition 1924; re-edited
1937 through the Quivira Society).
53. "Fray Marcos de Niza and his discovery of the Seven Cities of Cibola," in
New Mexico Hist, Review, i (April, 1926), pp. 193-223. Later the New Mexico
Society issued this with the Spanish text as Publications in History, vol. I (Nov.,
1926), 59 pp. Citations below will be to the latter. Baldwin's conclusions drew
vigorous dissent from Wagner. N. M. H. R., i, p. 371.
54. The Road to Cibola, in the series, Ibero-Americana, No. 3 (Berkeley, 1932).
55. "Fray Marcos de Niza," in the New Mexico Hist. Review, ix (Apr., 1934),
184-227.
56. "The discovery of New Mexico reconsidered," in ibid., xii (July, 1937), 270-
287.
126 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
We have two extremes, some plainly expressing the view
that he was a liar and his alleged discovery a hoax ; others
that he was "absolutely truthful."57 Certainly both of these
opinions cannot be right, possibly neither of them is. Whether
the issue will ever be resolved satisfactorily depends in part
on a more judicious use of source material than we have
had thus far. As Baldwin remarked when editing the
Relation, "When all is said, the fairest treatment we can
give him [Fray Marcos] is to let him speak for himself."58
It is unfortunate that, until now, not one of us has made
careful use of Fray Marcos' original text. Among the first
documents which I listed at Sevilla in 1928 for facsimile re-
production were two Niza titles which I found in Patronato
20, and they have been available at the Library of Congress
to any student since 1930.59 I must confess that I did not
study these papers until this last winter, when we got them
out in connection with work on a series of Coronado pub-
lications. We at once found that, photographed as they had
been found in Sevilla, the sheets were not in proper sequence.
When placed in proper order, we have two complete certified
copies of the original Relation of Fray Marcos.60
Naturally these official copies should be basic in any rea-
sonable study of questions at issue regarding Fray Marcos,
and our present use of them has brought out some interest-
ing facts. Collating with the text as it was published by
Pacheco and Cardenas,61 the one relied on most generally by
57. See Chas. F. Lummis, The Spanish Pioneers (1893), p. 80.
58. Baldwin, op. eft., p. 8.
59. Because the Librarian of Congress had requested me not to work at Sevilla
independently, we had agreed to secure such material through the Library.
60. Dr. Wagner, in describing these papers in the Archive at Sevilla (The Span-
ish Southwest, both 1924 and 1937 editions), says that they are "quite readable" but
his misstatements show that he has not really studied them, or even read them through.
If he had, he would have discovered that the leaves are not in proper sequence.
When sorted out, the two copies do not run page for page; not counting title-
pages, one copy runs to 18 pages ; the other, written more compactly, has 15 pages.
This is fortunate, because where the edges of one copy are damaged the reading is
supplied by the other. The text is identical except for unimportant variations like
the abbreviating of a word.
61. Coleccion de documentor ineditos . . . del Archivo de Indias, iii, 325-351. This
text may be consulted also in Baldwin, op. eft., pp. 37-59.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 127
students, shows numerous mistakes in the latter, most of
them of minor importance. There are several, however,
which are worthy of attention.
We find, for example, that Fray Marcos spoke of Toton-
teac as west from Cibola, not southeast.62 Again, early in
his account he tells of a settled region reported inland, which
he decided to leave until his return because "my intention
was to stay near the coast."63 The original shows that he
wrote "my instruction/' referring of course to the directions
given him by the viceroy. Fray Marcos embodied these in
his report and it might be wise for his critics to study them
— and then restudy his various observations regarding the
South Sea coast. If he had meant to misrepresent, would
he not have reported the depositing of letters and the mark-
ing of trees as he was instructed to do ?
In this connection we might remember how dependent
Fray Marcos was on Estevan and the Indian lenguas
(tongues, interpreters) furnished him by the viceroy; as
he proceeded northward he relied on these "tongues" in
talking with the natives. In a similar way Fray Marcos
relied on the eyes of native messengers and informants to
supplement the sight of his own eyes. His report is of
what he saw and heard and does not always clearly distin-
guish between the two. We may say that the issue involved
is whether Fray Marcos intentionally misrepresented (1)
as to information which he gathered, and (2) as to what he
himself had done.
As to the first, I submit that if we read for ourselves
the true text of the relation, especially in the original Span-
ish, we shall find it one of the most human and dramatic
documents we have ever read. We see the negro Estevan
on in advance, heading for "Quivira" — and sending back
messages of a discovery which was big, bigger, the biggest
of anything yet known. Fray Marcos, trailing along several
62. Cf. Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 22, 49. For a la parte de Sueste read a la parte del
ueste.
63. Ibid., pp. 14, 42.
128 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
days behind this braggart slave, certainly did not know him
as well as did those who had trudged across the continent
with him, but he evinced considerable scepticism of him and
his messages. Yet as he pressed northward — and herein
the dramatic element is most strongly revealed — the con-
firmatory evidence became more and more circumstantial
and convincing. And then, when according to his own ac-
count Fray Marcos was still three days' journey from Cibola,
came word of the killing of Estevan — so disastrous for Fray
Marcos' plans. I believe that one who enters into the spirit
of the document will find it conservative rather than extrav-
agant; the facts as therein stated check remarkably well
with the Pueblo people and their culture as we know them
today.
As to what Fray Marcos himself had done, the case
against him has been analyzed in greatest detail by Dr.
Sauer ; and this brings us to another and more serious error
in the printed text on which he relied. The textual mistake
occurs in the latter part of the relation, of which Dr. Sauer
has offered no analysis, simply brushing it aside with the
comment "I consider [it] impossible."64 When Fray Marcos
received the last message sent him by Estevan (to the effect
that the negro was then entering the last despoblado), the
fraile says that he himself was then 112 leagues "from the
first place where I had news of the country;"65 also for
three days he had been traveling through a settled valley
and was at a place where the natives informed him that
"there was a despoblado four jomadas thence, and from the
beginning of it to the city of Cibola would be a march of
fifteen days." Pacheco and Cardenas have the misreading
"four leagues thence," — and correcting it invalidates the
Sauer analysis. The true reading fits in with the San Pedro-
Gila region. Fray Marcos states that he entered that "last
64. The Road to Cibola, p. 28.
65. Baldwin, op. cit.. p. 23.
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 129
despoblado" on May 966 and, according to the travel arrange-
ments made by his native friends, "journeyed twelve days."
This should have put him within three days of Cibola when
he got word of the killing of Estevan.
Neither Dr. Sauer nor anyone else has seriously ques-
tioned that Estevan was killed at Cibola — which means that
he certainly crossed that last wild stretch from the Gila
valley to the Zuni country. To regard the Cananea plateau
as "the last despoblado" does not make sense.
And may I suggest that, comparing the facts regarding
time and distances as given by Fray Marcos with the analy-
sis offered by Dr. Sauer, we may arrive at a very different
conclusion from the latter? From Culiacan to Vacapa67
took eleven days of travel ; to the Mayo river was three days
more — Estevan did this in two days. If, as Dr. Sauer says,
this was a fourth of the distance to Cibola, forty-two days
more at the same rate of travel would suffice to reach the
goal. After Fray Marcos realized that the negro was not
waiting for him, he says repeatedly that he hurried on, yet
various delays on the way are evident in his account. If we
say it was May 25 when he had his view of Cibola from a
distance, could he have gotten back to Compostela by early
July?68
By his own account, there was no dallying on the return
trip. After emerging from the first despoblado, he says, "I
hastened in fear. . . The first day I went ten leagues, then
I went eight and again ten leagues, without stopping until
I had passed the second despoblado." In other words, he
66. This was considerably behind schedule. Accepting Sauer's identification of
the crossing of the Mayo1 river as the place where, on April 9, he got the "first news"
and whence the natives told him he could reach Cibola in 30 days' travel, Fray Marcos,
a month later, was still 15 days' travel from his goal.
67. Even bearing westward to watch the trend of the coast, according to one of
his explicit instructions. Apparently it was here that Fray Marcos reported islands
in the offing.
68. It has been argued that Fray Marcos was in Compostela before July 15, on
which day Coronado was writing about him in a letter to the king, when reporting
on various matters in his governorship. The original was photographed in A. G. L,
Guadalajara 5 ; parts of it have been used by both Wagner and Sauer. We shall speak
of this letter again, but for the moment we follow the trail with Fray Marcos.
130 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
traveled at an average of twenty or twenty-five miles a day
back to the Mayo river — the place where he had been told
that it was thirty days' travel to Cibola. We should infer
that on the back trail he bettered that time. Also this point
was approximately halfway from Cibola to Compostela; so
before the end of June he could have been in Culiacan ; and
from there, perhaps with horses, he might have reached
Compostela about July 10. From there, according to his
relation, he immediately sent his first reports to the viceroy
and the provincial of his order. He awaited in Compostela
the reply of the latter, and then himself proceeded to Mexico
and there, on August 26, the attested, signed and sealed
Relation was prepared. A week later, a certification before
the viceroy and audiencia was added (to each of the two
copies) and they were dispatched to the king.69
Perhaps we have discussed this matter sufficiently to
show that it is quite unnecessary to picture Fray Marcos as
rushing along at forty miles a day. Half that speed during
the return to Compostela would have sufficed. However,
even this average was not essential — if we correctly inter-
pret the above letter of Coronado. A reference in that letter
to Estevan gives the clue ; when Coronado was writing it on
July 15, he did not know that Estevan was dead — therefore,
Fray Marcos had not yet returned. How, then, was Coro-
nado able to write as he did about what Fray Marcos had
found?
If we turn again to the "instructions" we read : "Always
arrange to send news by the Indians, telling how you fare
and are received and particularly what you find. . . Send
word by Indians or return yourself to Culiacan." The only
long stay made by Fray Marcos on his entire journey was
one of two weeks at Vacapa which (according to Dr. Sauer's
analysis) was only eleven days distant from Culiacan —
where Coronado had stopped to begin his campaign against
69. Each copy has a title-endorsement: "Relaci6n del frayle para BU magestad,"
and there is an additional cover-title: "Relaci6n q. envyo don antonyo de m[endoz]a
del dcscubrymicnto de las syete cibdades."
WHO DISCOVERED NEW MEXICO? 131
rebellious natives. It was during this stay at Vacapa that
Estevan had sent back from the Mayo river the first "very
great cross" with messengers, one of whom had himself
visited "the greatest country in the world," the first city of
which was named "Cibola."70 It would be exceedingly
strange if Fray Marcos did not send off from Vacapa his
first reports to both the viceroy and Coronado ; and he could
easily have sent later news after he reached the Mayo
river — perhaps even from the Sonora valley. However, re-
ports from Vacapa, supplemented by routine correspondence
between the viceroy and Coronado, can account for anything
in the Compostela letter of July 15, 1539.
This survey of a long-standing controversy is not in-
tended to be either comprehensive or final, but it will suffice
to show that we ought not to ignore Fray Marcos de Niza
in discussing our main subject. So we now ask : did he dis-
cover New Mexico?
Even if we take his own account at its face value, there
is nothing to show that Fray Marcos saw and talked with
a single individual of the Pueblo people. Like Moses and
the Promised Land, he saw one of the towns of Cibola from
a distance but did not enter in. The ethnological data which
he gives checks remarkably well with what we know today
of the culture of this people, yet he had nothing of this at
first hand until he returned the following year with the
Coronado expedition and actually entered one or more of
the Cibola towns.
No, Fray Marcos fell short of real discovery. Crushed
by the angry resentment of the Spaniards who felt that
they had been bitterly deceived, again he took the back trail
— this time never to return. His name will ever be asso-
ciated with the "new country of Cibola" but its actual dis-
covery and exploration were carried out by those whom he
had guided thither.
As the first discoverers of New Mexico I give you,
therefore, Don Francisco Vasquez de Coronado and his fol-
70. Incidentally, this is the earliest appearance of this name.
132 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
lowers, the 400th anniversary of whose coming into the
Southwest we are celebrating this year. They were the
first Europeans who really entered and explored the country
of the Pueblo Indians ; and as we have seen, it was the cul-
ture of this native people which gave rise, a generation
later, to the name "New Mexico/'
To go into any discussion of the Coronado expedition
would take us beyond the scope of our subject. Whatever
of praise or blame may attach to that historic event — and
there has been much of both; whatever were its successes
and failures, we recognize and honor those Spaniards of
1540 as the true discoverers of New Mexico.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD
(1895-1912)
By MARION DARGAN
III. THE OPPOSITION WITHIN THE TERRITORY
(1888-1890)*
THE GREAT MAJORITY of the politicians and of the news-
papers of New Mexico in the late nineties enthusiasti-
cally championed the immediate admission of the territory
to the union. What, however, was the attitude of the people?
Did they have the same enthusiasm as their leaders? How
much popular opposition was there, and why?
It is easy for the historical worker to find the opinions
of those who supported statehood forty or fifty years ago.
The fight was taken up by the most articulate groups in the
territory. Countless editorials, reports of speeches, letters —
all advocating immediate admission — are found in the news-
paper files available today. But it is unnatural for human
minds to agree so unanimously. Hence, one suspects that
there was considerable opposition among the people of New
Mexico to the program outlined by the leaders. When, how-
ever, we attempt to determine the extent of this feeling
and to determine the reasons for it, we run into difficulties.
The statehood movement became more and more a popular
crusade which it was dangerous to oppose. It was felt that
men who expected to get along in New Mexico and to prosper
*The first two articles in this series, which appeared in the REVIEW for January
and April, 1939, deal with the attitude of the political leaders and that of the ter-
ritorial press in the latter half of the 1890's. However, on turning my attention to
the attitude of the people, I have chosen the year 1888 as the best starting point, in
view of the material available. As considerable opposition was evoked by the state-
hood efforts of 1890, this article will close with the vote against the constitution in
October. The fourth article will then trace the story of popular opposition through
the decade.
I am indebted to Mr. Archie M. McDowell for assistance in collecting newspaper
sources for this study and the one to follow. His thesis, "The Opposition to State-
hood within the Territory of New Mexico, 1888-1903," may be found in the University
of New Mexico library.— M.D.
133
134 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
must have faith in their fellow citizens and in the future of
the territory. To express doubts of either was unpatriotic,
and might even be disastrous for the individual. Under
such circumstances it is naturally difficult today to find
much evidence of opposition within the territory. Men "hol-
lared" for statehood, even though they did not believe it
would attract the immigration and capital predicted by
enthusiasts. Their real opinions were rarely expressed
except in private. Occasionally, however, one finds signs
of dissent and opposition. Later, the politicians and news-
papers combined to silence the opposition. Even then, one
finds occasional proof that some independent thinkers re-
fused to go along with the leaders on the statehood question.
The fullest expression of opinion from the citizens of
New Mexico throughout the entire struggle for admission
came toward the close of the 1880's. This was not spon-
taneous, however, so we must first consider the legislation
pending in congress which evoked it.
The oldest of the territories, New Mexico had been
subject to remote control from Washington for almost forty
years. For four years she had had a Democratic governor,
Edmund G. Ross, who had been appointed by President
Cleveland in 1885. A native of Ohio, Ross became a journey-
man printer at an early age and edited half a dozen news-
papers in the middle west, Kansas and New Mexico during
his career. In the fifties he led an armed party of "free-
staters" to Kansas and took part in the border wars of the
time. A union officer during the Civil War, he is said to have
had three horses shot from under him and his shoulder
straps shot away in one battle. While serving as a United
States senator, he was repudiated by the people of Kansas as
a "traitor" and a "skunk" when he voted — in spite of tre-
mendous pressure — for the acquittal of Andrew Johnson.
Defeated for the governorship of Kansas in 1880, he had
moved to Albuquerque two years later. After three years as
a journey-man printer, he was appointed governor of the
territory. His administration was marked by struggle with
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 135
what he asserted was a corrupt ring, and he antagonized
Democrats as well as the Republican legislature. Able, hon-
est and fearless, Ross was headstrong and brusque and
seemed to rejoice in opposition. Fortunately so, since he was
in hot water throughout life. Possibly his most bitter enemy
in New Mexico was Col. Max Frost, who showed his hatred
and contempt in almost every issue of the New Mexican.*
Shortly after the inauguration of President Harrison,
Ross was replaced by the appointment of Le Baron Bradford
Prince. A member of an old Long Island family, and a
descendant of Governor Bradford of Plymouth, the young
New Yorker had studied law at Columbia and then served
in the state legislature. His break with Roscoe Conkling in
1876 led President Hayes to offer him the governorship of
Idaho. Declining this post, Prince had accepted that of chief
justice of New Mexico in 1879. Here he readily adjusted
himself to frontier conditions, a circuit as large as his native
state, primitive means of transportation and the use of the
Spanish language. In spite of long hours in the court room,
he published a compilation of the laws of the territory in
1880. Having resigned from the bench two years later, he
devoted the next five years to the practice of law, yet found
time for historical research and for writing for the press.
He helped to establish the bureau of immigration of the ter-
ritory and the Historical Society of New Mexico. A keen
politician and an ardent Republican, he was closely associ-
ated with the bitter enemies of Governor Ross. His own ad-
ministration, like that of his predecessor, was a stormy one,
especially since his advocacy of bimetalism for a time split
the Republican party in New Mexico. No one was a more
persistent champion of statehood for the territory than Gov-
ernor Prince. He never ceased to work for the cause until
the goal had been reached. He then published a brief sketch
of the movement which closed with the triumphant note:
1. Dictionary of American Biography (20 vols., New York, 1928-37), vol. XVI,
pp. 175-76 ; Twitchell, Ralph Emerson, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History
(Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912), vol. II, pp. 496-97.
136 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
"The people of New Mexico were no longer serfs but Free-
men ; no longer subjects but Citizens ; no longer to be treated
as aliens but as Americans. HALLELUJAH !"2
The delegate to congress from New Mexico from 1885
to 1895 was Antonio Joseph. One of the ablest political
leaders in the history of the territory, Joseph had a remark-
able career. His father, Antonio Joseph Treviz, was Portu-
guese— a native of the Azores who had been shipwrecked on
the gulf coast. Making his way to New Mexico in 1840, he
had opened the first general store in Taos. He married a
woman from New Orleans and their son, Antonio Joseph,
was born in August, 1846, a week after Colonel Kearny
entered Santa Fe. Two years later, the father's store was
destroyed by the Indians, and Antonio and his mother were
carried into captivity and held for several months until res-
cuel by Col. Sterling Price and his troops. The boy received
a good education, attending Bishop Lamy's school in Santa
Fe and a business college in St. Louis. After his father's
death in 1862, Joseph took charge of the mercantile estab-
lishment which he continued as long as he lived. In 1880 he
moved to Ojo Caliente, long famous as a health resort, where
he established a hotel and sanitarium. He was never
wealthy, but came to own considerable property in land,
hotels, and stores.
A popular man, who had a real sympathy for the people,
Joseph naturally turned his attention to politics. After
fighting a losing battle with the Republicans for some years,
he finally experienced a streak of luck. The Republicans of
the territory having split, Joseph was elected delegate to
congress in 1884. Furthermore he went into office just when
the Democrats were taking over the national government.
This gave him control of the patronage in the territory from
post offices to the governorship. He was soon so well en-
trenched that he continued to win elections even after the
2. Prince, L. Bradford, New Mexico's Struggle for Statehood (Santa Fe. 1910),
pp. 127-28. For Prince, see the article by Paul A. F. Walter in Dictionary of Ameri-
can Biography, vol. XV, pp. 229-30 ; New Mexican, Dec. 9, 1922.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 137
Republicans had secured control of the patronage with the
inauguration of Harrison in 1889.3
Joseph was not as persistent a champion of statehood as
Governor Prince. Apparently indifferent to the cause during
his early years in congress, he gave it his support for a
time — only to withdraw it when it appeared that the Repub-
licans might win a partisan advantage if the territory were
admitted immediately.
When Ross was in the middle of his term as governor of
New Mexico, almost one-third of the total area of the United
States was still under the rule of congress.4 For twelve years
there had been no chance for a successful statehood move-
ment for any of the territories. After their mistake in ad-
mitting Colorado in time to cast three decisive votes against
their candidate for the presidency in 1876, the Democrats
had little disposition to admit any more new states. It was
not until March, 1889, that the Republicans gained full con-
trol of the government. Meanwhile, Dakota, the largest of
the territories and the nearest to the east, clamored for
admission as two states. The Democrats offered single-
statehood only, refusing to believe that the majority of the
people wanted a division of the territory. The people of
Montana and Washington had formerly been indifferent, but
were beginning to show signs of statehood life.5
A number of statehood bills were introduced in congress
in the 1880's without success: several to divide Dakota,
others to admit that territory as one state or to confer state-
hood upon Washington or Montana. Doubtless the first
"omnibus bill" presented in the Fiftieth Congress was drawn
up on instructions from the Democratic caucus for party
reasons. At the same time, Daniel W. Voorhees, the Demo-
3. Twitchell, op. cit., p. 464, vol. IV, p. 453; Albuquerque Morning Journal,
April 19, 1910 ; Albuquerque Tribune Citizen, April 19, 1910 ; New Mexican, April 19,
1910 ; interview with B. C. Hernandez.
4. Frederick Logan Paxson, "The Admission of the 'Omnibus' States, 1889-90,"
Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin at its Fifty-Ninth Meeting
Held October 26, 1911 (Madison, 1912), pp. 77-96.
5. Utah persisted in its struggle for statehood, but need not be considered here, as
it was not included in the "omnibus" bill.
138 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
cratic leader of the senate who sponsored the bill,6 had a
personal reason for being interested in the outcome. "The
Tall Sycamore of the Wabash,"7 as he was sometimes called,
has been described by James G. Elaine as "a Democrat of the
most pronounced partisan type."8 His son, Charles Stewart
Voorhees, sat in the house as a delegate from the territory
of Washington.9 The father, who held his seat in the senate
for twenty years, attaining "the eminence attached to long
service and oratorical ability,"10 may have entertained hopes
of Washington's becoming a Democratic state and sending
son Charles to sit by his side in the senate. At any rate, on
Dec. 12, 1887, Senator Voorhees being absent, a bill to
admit Washington, Dakota, Montana, and New Mexico to
the union was introduced at his request by a colleague.11 A
similar bill was presented to the house by Delegate Voorhees
on the tenth of the following month.12
On studying the four bills referred to it, the house com-
mittee found itself divided strictly along party lines. Ac-
cordingly on March 13, 1888, it brought in a majority and
a minority report, each of which went into conditions in the
territories in considerable detail.13 The former, presented by
the chairman, William M. Springer of Illinois, introduced,
as a substitute for the Voorhees bill, another "omnibus bill"
which provided for the admission of the same four territor-
ies.14 The author of this bill was described by the Silver City
Enterprise some months later as "a true friend of New
6. James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle, Financial Statesman (New York, 1931),
p. 276.
7. Dictionary of American Biography, vol. XIX, p. 291.
8. James G. Elaine, Twenty Years in Congress, vol. II, p. 600. See also I, 829 ;
II, 188, 436. Voorhees, who was an outspoken critic of Lincoln during the Civil War,
was accused of being a "Copperhead," but the evidence is inconclusive. Dictionary of
American Biography, vol. XIX, p. 291.
9. Dictionary of the American Congress, 1774-1926 (Washington ; Government
Printing Office, 1927), p. 1652.
10. Dictionary of American Biography, vol. XIX, p. 291.
11. Congressional Record, vol. 19, part 1, p. 29.
12. Ibid., p. 362.
13. Congressional Record, vol. 19, part 3, p. 2021.
14. House Reports, Fiftieth Congress, First Session, vol. 4, Report no. 1025,
pp. 1-18, esp. 13-17.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 139
Mexico."15 The Enterprise added: "Mr. Springer has fre-
quently visited New Mexico, and is perfectly familiar with
our resources, our people and our needs."
The minority report was presented by Representative
I. S. Strubble of Iowa. It recommended that each territory
stand on its own merits: that Montana, Washington and
South Dakota be admitted to statehood ; that North Dakota
be organized as a territory and New Mexico be continued in
that status. This report aroused great indignation in New
Mexico, especially because it included very uncomplimen-
tary and out-of-date quotations regarding the customs,
morals, superstitions, education and agricultural methods of
its people.16
Several of the concluding paragraphs of this report are
quite pertinent to the present discussion. The report said:
Finally, we submit that the people of New
Mexico are not now seeking admission into the
Union, and have not since 1875. No agitation of
the question in late years has been noticeable.
Neither the Delegate from that Territory nor any
one has for years, in so far as we are advised, intro-
duced a bill looking to its admission. Neither he nor
Governor Ross, now and for months at the capital,
has urged action by Congress, and it can truthfully
be said, so far as the minority of your committee
have information, that the only person responsible
for the suggestion that New Mexico should come in
with the other three Territories named in the sub-
stitute is the honorable chairman of the Committee
on the Territories, who introduced the bill a few
weeks ago.
It seems to the minority of your committee
somewhat remarkable that, with an intelligent and
able Delegate in Congress from New Mexico, and
an experienced legislator and ex-Senator of the
United States in the person of her governor, him-
self present during most of the pending session, it
should remain for the chairman of the Committee
15. Silver City Enterprise, Jan. 18, 1889.
16. House Reports, Fiftieth Congress, First Session, vol. 4, Report no. 1025,
pp. 27-54.
140 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
on the Territories to decide upon the time and
qualifications of New Mexico for admission into the
Union. If her people were as fully prepared for
statehood as are those of Dakota, Montana, and
Washington, the minority of your committee would
regard it a matter of solicitude if they were not
desirous of joining our great and beneficent Union
of States, for we conceive it wise to enlarge this
Union to the extent of all the Territories as soon as
the people thereof become entitled in all those re-
spects relating to qualifications of statehood, to be
members thereof.
The majority of the statehood committee while
conceding that no official action by the legislative
assembly of New Mexico, looking to admission of
the Territory, has been taken since 1874, and while
knowing full well that of recent years no bill has
been introduced in Congress except that one intro-
duced recently by the honorable Mr. Springer, and
that no convention has been held by the people on
this subject, attempt to maintain and to show that
they do in fact desire admission into the Union.
This claim has its sole foundation upon a
newspaper article quoted by the majority. While
all reliable expressions of the people of New Mex-
ico on the subject of admission should receive due
consideration, the minority do not feel that such
action as the correspondence of a single paper in
the Territory with certain other papers and per-
sons should be accepted as conclusive of the desire
of the people for admission in the face of non-
official or convention action, and also in the face of
the silence of the various Delegates from the Ter-
ritory since 1874.
It would seem, if a general desire for admis-
sion existed, it would be made to appear from the
action of the people of the Territory through their
legislative assembly, or by a convention held for
the purpose of memorializing Congress.17
The bill introduced by Delegate Voorhees was the only
one mentioning New Mexico before the committee when
Representative Springer decided to include it in his "omni-
17. Ibid., p. 58.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 141
bus bill." New Mexico had not asked for admission. Appar-
ently its people were indifferent. The conclusion is there-
fore obvious that the proposal to admit the territory at this
time was a bit of strategy on the part of Democratic leaders
in congress who hoped to slip in a territory that seemed to
be Democratic to offset others which promised to be Repub-
lican.
On February 14, 1889, when the Fiftieth Congress was
discussing the Springer bill, Representative G. G. Syme of
Colorado pointed out that during the preceding congress
neither Delegate Joseph nor Governor Ross had ever
appeared before the committee to ask for the admission of
New Mexico.18 He stated that in concurring with the minor-
ity report of March 13, 1888, he had put his opposition "to
the admission of New Mexico on the ground that her gov-
ernor, delegate to Congress, or her people have not in any
way asked for admission at this time."19 The gentleman con-
tinued :
When the Fiftieth Congress met it appeared that
the matter of admission to statehood had been
worked up in New Mexico. How it had been worked
up I do not know and I do not care. Suffice it to say
that the people of New Mexico did then come before
the territorial committee of the Fiftieth Congress
and ask for an enabling act.20
The Springer report had raised the question: "Does
New Mexico desire admission?" In reply, the report cited
two documents. The first of these was a memorial to con-
gress adopted by the legislative assembly in 1874. Arguing
that the population of the territory entitled it to statehood,
the memorial claimed that the legislaure "being able to
know and understand the wishes and views of the people on
this subject, which has been so long and so fully discussed
18. Congressional Record, vol. 20, part 2, p. 1909.
19. Ibid.; House Reports, Fiftieth Congress, First Session, vol. 4, report no.
1025, p. 64.
20. Congressional Record, vol. 20, part 2, p. 1909.
142 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
among them, speak for and in their behalf" in urging the
immediate admission of the territory.21
After citing failure of the statehood efforts in the mid-
dle seventies, the report stated :
Since the failure of New Mexico to secure ad-
mission during the Forty-third and Forty-fourth
Congresses, there has been no authoritative expres-
sion of the people of that Territory on that sub-
ject. Since the introduction, during this session, of
a bill to provide for the admission of New Mexico,
there has been considerable discussion of the ques-
tion of admission in the newspapers of the Terri-
tory. The daily New Mexican, published at Santa
Fe, has given special prominence to the subject,
having addressed circular letters to prominent citi-
zens and the press of the Territory on the subject,
soliciting opinions. A recent editorial in that paper
is as follows :
"To the New Mexican's circular, calling on
prominent citizens of New Mexico to give their
views regarding statehood and the advisability of
the Territory's admission into the sisterhood of
states, 122 replies were received. Every county in
the Territory is represented therein. There were
91 in favor and 31 against the admission of the
Territory. Of the 91 in favor there were 41 Re-
publicans, 33 Democrats, and 17 of no particular
party affiliations, or whose politics were not known.
Of the 31 opposed there were 11 Democrats, 10
Republicans, 6 of no particular politics, and 4 who
professed to be independent.
"The 91 in favor contained 26 lawyers, 16
merchants, 15 stockmen, 3 bankers, 6 mine owners,
4 real-estate agents, 2 clergymen, 7 farmers, 2 sur-
veyors, 2 Federal officials, 1 school-teacher, and 7
newspaper men, who wrote individual opinions.
Amongst the 31 opposed there were 12 merchants,
11 stockmen, 2 bankers, 1 lawyer, 1 dentist, 1 Fed-
eral official, and 3 farmers.
"Of the newspapers in the Territory the fol-
lowing are in favor of statehood: The Citizen
21. House Reports, Fiftieth Congress, First Session, vol. 4, report no. 1025,
pp. 15-16.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 143
(daily), at Albuquerque, Republican; the Chief-
tain (daily), Republican, at Socorro; the Sentinel
(daily), at Silver City, Democratic; Headlight
(weekly), Republican, at Deming; Leader, Repub-
lican (weekly) , at White Oaks ; the Stockman, Re-
publican (weekly), at Springer; the 2V. W. New
Mexican, at Chama, Republican (weekly) ; Rio
Grande Republican, Republican (weekly), at Las
Cruces. Opposed to statehood there are the Enter-
prise, Republican (weekly), at Silver City; the
Democrat, Democratic (daily), at Albuquerque;
Independent (weekly), at Lincoln, Democratic.
The other papers published in the Territory, and
there are a good many of them, have hardly ex-
pressed sufficient of an opinion to be classed either
for or against statehood ; furthermore, the opinions
of one or two of these are not worth repeating or
considering.
"From the above and from communications
and interviews with prominent Republicans and
Democrats other than those published (because
permission to publish could not be had), and from
its knowledge of the affairs of the Territory and
the people of New Mexico, the New Mexican is of
the opinion that a large majority of the people of
New Mexico desire statehood, and that the propo-
sition would be carried by a large majority if sub-
mitted to the people.
"The newspaper accounts sent out by certain
interested parties, that only politicians desired the
admission of New Mexico as a State, are untrue in
every particular. The classification above shows
this to be quite the reverse. Some of the very best
citizens and largest tax-payers in the Territory de-
sire statehood. The New Mexican believes the Ter-
ritory is in every respect fitted for statehood, and
that its citizens are as good to-day as those of any
other State or Territory."22
The replies to its circular filled column after column
of the New Mexican during the early months of 1888. Un-
fortunately we cannot assume that these letters were truly
representative of the people of the territory. In announcing
22. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
144 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the results of its enquiry, the Santa Fe paper stated that it
had received a letter from "a member of Congress, a Demo-
crat in politics and a man of great prominence in his party"
who wished to know "how the people of New Mexico feel in
regard to the admission of the territory."23 We scarcely
need to say that this enquiring statesman was Representa-
tive Springer, and that he thus secured the hearty cooper-
ation of the cleverest master of propaganda in New Mexico.
Col. Max Frost, editor of the New Mexican was by nature
a strong partisan who possessed few scruples. As he fought
consistently for statehood for years, it is natural to assume
that he eagerly undertook the task of furnishing the evi-
dence needed. With a congressional committee anxious to
recommend the admission of the territory, there was not a
chance in a thousand that the wily editor would report that
the people of New Mexico were indifferent to, or opposed to,
statehood.
Since the most articulate groups in the territory and
the manager of the survey were likeminded, we can be sure
that the dice were loaded from the start. It is probable that
a good proportion of the enquiries sent out were addressed
to politicians, newspapers and others known to favor state-
hood. Nor can we be certain that those selected for publica-
tion are truly representative of all received. Some writers
stipulated that their replies were not for publication. Very
likely these opposed statehood ; at any rate all of the replies
appearing in the later issues of the New Mexican were fav-
orable. The headlines used in the issue of February 16 were
significant : "Swinging into Line. And Still the People Con-
tinue to Clamour for Admission to the Union."24 Two weeks
later it was announced: "The New Mexican has sifted the
question well and is able to say to the world that the people
of New Mexico are ready and anxious to be admitted to
the union of states. If called upon formally to express this
23. New Mexican. March 8, 1888.
24. Ibid.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 145
desire at the polls, they will vote for the state of New Mex-
ico/'25
The effect of the publication of these letters on state-
hood varied with the individual. D. P. Carr of Georgetown,
N. M., wrote the editor of the Silver City Enterprise as fol-
fows:
I have, as you know, been an opponent of the
immediate admission of New Mexico as a state.
One objection was that made by Congressman
Symes of Colorado .... that there was no demand
for it by the people. Until recently I was not satis-
fied that any but the scheming leaders of both
parties, who could see visions of congressional halls,
the governor's office and the judicial bench graced
by their presence, was desirous of the admission of
the territory as a state. The recent expression of
public opinion in conventions throughout the ter-
ritory and through the press, convinces me that a
majority of the people are in favor of statehood.
This disposes of one principal objection. Other
objections relating to the expense of maintaining a
state government are disposed of by the donation
of public lands for state institutions, and the proud
privilege of home rule.26
Other readers, however, came to quite different con-
clusions. One of these was Numa Reymond of Las Cruces, a
native of Switzerland who had come to New Mexico in the
fifties and made a fortune from his stage coaches and star
route contracts to carry the mail. The survivor of many
fierce encounters with Indians and outlaws, he became a
merchant and a cattleman after the coming of the railroad.
He was a short stocky man with shrewd, blue eyes and a hot
temper. While he never lost his European mannerisms en-
tirely, he was a leader in politics as well as in business, and
one of the best known men in the southern part of the ter-
25. Ibid., March 1, 1888.
26. Silver City Enterprise, Jan. 25, 1889. Apparently Carr changed his mind
again during the year. The Morning Democrat for Dec. 3, 1889, stated that Carr,
"although a republican, opposes statehood under the constitution drawn up by the
convention dominated by republicans."
146 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ritory. He is said to have been largely responsible for the
location of the agricultural college at Las Cruces, and served
on the first board of regents of that institution. In his reply
to the New Mexican, Mr. Reymond said: "I notice all the
politicians on both sides favor statehood, and all the business
men and tax payers are not in favor ; so I am not in favor of
statehood at this time."27
Miguel A. Otero, the future governor of New Mexico,
was at that time a young business man of twenty-nine. He
tells us that he "was greatly interested in reading" the let-
ters in the New Mexican, and that he "rather favored" the
answer made by Mr. Reymond. After quoting the gentleman
mentioned, Otero adds:
In checking up the different answers I found
the situation just as stated by Mr. Reymond, and as
a whole the opinions were about equally divided.
For a great many reasons I did not think that New
Mexico was ready for statehood at this time. The
taxes, I thought, would be much too heavy for our
citizens to carry, and, as we were without a system
of public schools in the territory, I believed that
this condition would prove unsatisfactory to the
people, generally, throughout the United States.28
In order to avoid repetition, the reasons which other
citizens gave in their replies to the New Mexican for their
opposition to the admission of the territory to the union may
be summarized as follows :
The native people — which comprise three-
fourths of the population — cannot be easily
moulded into a free, self-governing commonwealth.
Race prejudice, fostered by the existence of
two different languages, prevents the voters from
selecting the best men for public office.
The backwardness of the state of Nevada and
the rapid development of the Territory of Dakota
show that it is a fallacy to expect statehood to bring
27. Rio Grande Republican, Nov. 9, 1889; History of New Mexico (Pacific States
Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1907), voL II, p. 564.
28. Otero, Miguel Antonio, My Life on the Frontier, 1882-1897, vol. II. pp. 222-23.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 147
any great increase in population or wealth to New
Mexico.
The increased cost of state government would
make taxes so high that people would be driven
from New Mexico.
Getting the land titles of the territory settled
is more important and would bring an increase of
population and wealth, state or no state.
Statehood should be delayed until the laws and
finances of the Territory have been put in good
shape and the people have been educated to think
and act independently.29
According to the Neio Mexican, "By far the most fre-
quent and perhaps the strongest objection urged is the sup-
posed increase of expenses and consequently of taxes.30
Apparently "the danger of the native people controlling the
new state" came second.31 The two or three editors who op-
posed statehood at this time were charged with "trying to
make the outside world believe that 'the level of intelligence
is lower' in New Mexico than in any other state or territory
of the United States . . . ,"32 While the New Mexican
admitted that some good men were opposed to statehood, it
declared that the arguments of the two or three territorial
editors who opposed statehood "show very plainly that they
are sorely afflicted with race prejudice and are the very
worst enemies to society in the territory."33 Moreover, it
announced that New Mexico would soon be a state, "much to
the chagrin of the non-progressive element and the Mexican
haters."34
The Las Vegas Stock-Grower noted that "various news-
29. Santa Fe New Mexican, Jan. 19, and 26, 1888.
30. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1888. The New Mexican stated that this argument had been
used for years to keep Colorado out of the union. "And with what result? The rate
of taxes was not raised a mill on the dollar (when the territory was admitted) but
rathered lowered. The increased valuation of all property all over the state, the
exemption from carpetbag rules that governed, or mis-governed as the whim suited
them, increased values so much that the percentage of taxation was rather decreased
than otherwise."
31. Ibid., March 22, 1888.
32. Ibid., March 15, 1888.
33. Ibid., March 1, 1888.
34. Ibid., March 8, 1888.
148 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
papers of New Mexico" were "whooping up the question of
statehood for the territory." Admitting that there was a
"very faint possibility" of congress passing an enabling act,
the Stock-Grower said :
The cattlemen do not wish to gratify the am-
bitions of politicians and grabbers and have the
territory become a state at present and of this
same opinion is the great majority of good tax-
paying citizens. To the tax payers statehood means
doubling of the tax assessment, to say nothing of
elevating to power a host of petty officers, many of
whom are wholly inefficient by reason of the pref-
erences and prejudices of the heavy end of the pop-
ulation.
It may be said that the cattlemen are few and
their wishes in the matter are not worth consulta-
tion— but remember that the cattle industry pays
nearly one-half of the entire tax of the territory
and would be called on to do the same for the state
of New Mexico.
In conclusion, the Stock-Grower declared that it would
be better if the cattlemen paid more attention to politics,
and that it was "time that this statehood farce was dropped
— New Mexico is not yet ready for statehood — explanations
are not necessary — there are many reasons and we know
the most of them."34a
It will be interesting to cite editorials from some of the
newspapers which the New Mexican so scorchingly de-
nounced. The Las Vegas Optic suggested that there were
two sides to the question. It said :
At least some of our best citizens so think. They
say in general that the advantages of statehood
cannot be denied, but that ours is a peculiar case —
in fact, so peculiar that it cannot be estimated by
general rule. According to the census of 1880, out
of a population of 119,565, nearly one-half, or
57,156, are set down as unable to write their
names, a very large proportion cannot write, read
34a. Las Vegas Stock-Grower, quoted by Santa Fe Herald, March 24, 1888.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 149
or speak the English language, they are no more
Americanized than they were the day the country
was wrested from Old Mexico. They know not the
independence of thought and action common to the
American voter. They are led by a few old and
wealthy families, and any movement these leaders
may agree upon will be sure of securing a majority
of the votes cast. These few leaders will have the
destinies of New Mexico in their hands; and
should they be actuated by a dislike of the present
regime and a desire for the return of affairs which
existed before the American came into the country,
a feeling with which some of them are charged,
they could easily manage affairs so that the antici-
pated influx of men and money would never be
realized.35
The Deming Headlight — so the Silver City Enterprise
for Jan. 28, 1888, declared—
admits that there is a vast amount of ignorance
among the native population but draws consolation
from the fact that they are always controlled by a
few intelligent leaders. This is all true, but the
Headlight should be careful in using such an argu-
ment in favor of a state, as it is apt to prove a
boomerang with intelligent people. A people that
is controlled by a "few intelligent leaders" can
hardly be considered competent to govern them-
selves. When the few intelligent leaders are de-
posed as rulers, then it will be high time to ask for
admission.
Several weeks later the Enterprise published an inter-
esting commentary on the forces for and against statehood.
It said :
New Mexico had never sought entrance. Her
people do not ask it. Some of the papers are in
favor of the measure, but the papers generally
speak the opinion of the politicians. Letters pro
and con have been published, but the majority of
business men and the masses have not spoken.
Perhaps three out of five have not weighed the
35. Quoted in the Silver City Enterprise, March 16, 1888.
150 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
question enough to have a decided opinion. In the
lead in this movement has been the New Mexican,
which has ever been the organ of parties willing
to be senators. In opposition there are two of
the best dailies, the Las Vegas Optic and the Albu-
querque Democrat. The bill provides that the chest-
nutty name "Montezuma" shall be hung like a mill-
stone around this territory. The Washington poli-
ticians evidently think that the admission of New
Mexico will give more senators to the Democratic
party. But we believe that the territory would be
a Republican state if each of the nominees should
be of Mexican descent, and if neither were. The
wish of the Democratic party in regard to the wool-
tariff being removed would be one great influence,
as is proved by the haste with which Delegate
Joseph has avowed his opposition. As to the po-
litical result of admission it looks as if the rings at
Santa Fe have agreed to pull in support of the bill
and each take a senate plum for the first term. The
capital city is also desirous of having a long drawn
out constitutional convention and an annual legis-
lative session. We believe statehood will help poli-
ticians and newspapers but will burden the people
at present.36
Late in January, 1889, the president pro tempore of
the senate, John J. Ingalls of Kansas, presented an unusual
document to that body.37 This was referred to the commit-
tee on territories and ordered printed. It read as follows:
PROTEST OF CITIZENS OF NEW MEXICO AGAINST
THE ADMISSION OF THAT TERRITORY INTO
THE UNION OF STATES
The honorable Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States :
The undersigned, your petitioners, would re-
spectfully represent that it is not to the business
interests, nor is it the desire of a great majority
of New Mexico's citizens who are engaged in com-
mercial pursuits, that New Mexico should at the
present time be admitted into the Union as a State.
36. Ibid., March 2, 1888.
37. Congressional Record, vol. 20, part 2, p. 1238.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 151
Your petitioners would further represent that
New Mexico is at present totally unfitted for the
responsibilities of statehood, because first, the
greater part of her population are unfamiliar with
the English language, and, though honest and of
good intentions, are a class of people over whom
the designing, dishonest, and untruthful politicians
readily acquire a power that enables the latter to
sway the former almost without limit; second,
because up to the present time it has been demon-
strated that political power in our Territory has
been controlled and held by those whose movements
and whose apparent aims are inimical to an hon-
est, upright, and intelligent administration of pub-
lic affairs, and that the average character of our
legislatures has been such as causes the gravest
fears that if left to enact laws, which the people
could not take to your honorable bodies to have
annulled, that our code of statute laws would
become a disgrace to us as a State and to our sister
States, with whom we would be associated in the
National Government, and would bring ridicule
upon us from the entire civilized world ; third, that
our political leaders have been politicians for rev-
enue only ; the only limit to their rapacity has been
the amount of money raised by taxation, and the
amount of indebtedness they could heap upon the
Territory at a profit to themselves, and the only
check to their unconscionable schemes has been a
realization of the fact that our governors and
judges have been appointed by the different Presi-
dents, and were not subject to the whims and cap-
rices of these political vampires.
Your petitioners would further respectfully
represent that they are not office-holders, but are,
and for a long time have been, residents of the city
of Albuquerque, and are all personally engaged in
business pursuits in Albuquerque, which is now the
commercial center of New Mexico; and that it is
your petitioners' earnest belief that before our
Territory should be admitted to statehood, your
honorable bodies should provide some convenient,
speedy, inexpensive, and certain method to settle
the present anomalous condition of title to the
vast area of our most valuable lands, which are
152 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
now claimed largely by unscrupulous and design-
ing persons as grants from the Mexican and Span-
ish Governments; and that your honorable bodies
should enact such laws as would compel our ter-
ritorial officers to transact all public business and
keep all public records in the English language, and
require the English language to be taught in our
public schools, and make it a qualification of
teachers, jurymen, and officials of all kinds that
they should be able to speak and write the English
language. When you have done this, when the
masses of citizens come to thoroughly understand
the true responsibilities and privileges that are
theirs, as voters and citizens of the United States,
and would be theirs, as citizens of a State, when our
wonderful agricultural, timber, and mineral lands
have the present clouds, in the shape of land grants,
removed from their title, so that an intelligent im-
migration will come among us to take advantage of
our productive soil, unsurpassed resources, and
salubrious climate, and when we can be assured
that the spoilsman and the political mountebank
no longer has the masses fettered, bound, and under
his control, and we know that honesty, economy,
and virtue will prevail in the administration of
public affairs, then will your petitioners be most
urgent in the claim that New Mexico should be ad-
mitted to statehood, and to assume the duties and
responsibilities of State government; but until
then we will ever most earnestly protest against
our Territory being admitted to the Union as a
State.
Ernest Meyers, of the firm of Lowenthal &
Meyers, wholesale merchants.
Joshua S. Raynolds, president First National
Bank of Albuquerque.
T. M. Folsom, vice-president Albuquerque Na-
tional Bank of Albuquerque.
F. M. Rose, general machinery merchant.
Solon E. Rose & Bro., plumbers.
S. Neustadt, clerk.
J. W. Malette, of the firm of Malette & Weiller,
general merchandise.
D. Weiller, of the firm of Malette & Weiller.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 153
Howard J. Clark, clerk.
M. Mandell, of Mandell Bros. & Co.
F. Mandell, of Mandell Bros. & Co.
D. Mandell, of K. Mandell & Co., of New York.
M. Mamroth, book-keeper.
J. A. Weinman, of Goldstein & Weinman,
wholesale and retail dry goods.
F. Lowenthal, of firm Lowenthal & Meyers,
wholesale merchants.
W. Y. Walton, druggist.
John F. Pearce, M. D., physician and surgeon.
A. W. Culano, jr., wholesale grocer.
W. S. Burke, editor.
And thousands of others if necessary.
Approximately half of the signers of this protest were
Jewish business men of Albuquerque. Two of special in-
terest were Gentiles. Joshua S. Raynolds was one of the
most prominent bankers in the territory. A native of Can-
ton, Ohio, he had known William McKinley from boyhood, so
we may be sure that his name must have carried a good
deal of weight, not only with the popular congressman from
Ohio, but with the many friends of the latter as well. The
name of W. S. Burke 38 also attracts attention, since the edi-
tors usually favored statehood.
An indignation meeting was held in Old Albuquerque,
and several counter petitions were sent to the territorial
legislature and to congress. One signed by 178 citizens of
Albuquerque denounced the original protest as "misleading
and false," declaring that it did not "represent the sentiment
of one per cent of the actual residents" of that city.39 These
were not printed in the Congressional Record, however, and
were probably lost in the files of the committee on territories.
There can be little doubt that the unusual protest against
statehood attracted much attention. Shortly before, Chair-
man Springer had written Governor Ross that "the greatest
38. See my article on the attitude of the territorial press in the REVIEW for
April, 1939, esp. p. 127.
39. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Territory of New Mexico.
Twenty-eighth Session (Santa Fe, 1889), p. 257. See also pp. 259, 260, 262; Congres-
sional Record, vol. 20, part 3, p. 1999.
154 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
impediment in the way of New Mexico's becoming- a state is
the impression that the people do not desire the change."40
Consequently when a printed copy of this petition lay on the
desk of every member of congress, we can be sure that this
impression was greatly strengthened.
Appearing when the rivalry between various towns of
New Mexico had been intensified by competition to secure
the location of projected territorial institutions, this peti-
tion did nothing to increase good feeling in the territory.
When Albuquerque sent a large delegation to Santa Fe to
try to secure the agricultural college, the Las Cruces Rio
Grande Republican queried : "Wonder if it contained any of
the signers of the petition against statehood."41
During the second session of the Fiftieth Congress, cer-
tain New Mexico leaders exerted themselves to work up a
statehood movement in the territory. Apparently L. Brad-
ford Prince, who was to serve as governor of the territory
from the spring of 1889 to 1893, started things off. He is-
sued an appeal from New York on Dec. 15, 1888, declaring
that a number of territories were to be admitted, and that
if New Mexico were not among them, it would be taken as
proof of her backwardness and lack of progress. He said:
Every acre of our land would lose value and
every industry be injured by such an event. Dis-
patches appear every day from Dakota, Montana,
and Washington on the subject. Scarcely a day
passes that I am not asked whether New Mexico
will not have population enough before a great
while to make application ! My answer that we
have had population enough for years, and are far
more ready in every respect than either Montana
or Washington, is received in surprise and perhaps
a little incredulity, and they say, "Why, I haven't
noted any movement there on the subject.42
Developments came fast during the closing days of the
40. Las Vegas Optic, Jan. 2, 1889.
41. Rio Grande Republican, Feb. 9, 1889.
42. Quoted by Delegate Joseph during the debate on the omnibus bill, January
16, 1889.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 155
session. Delegate Joseph spoke on January 16 and again on
February 14, demanding statehood for New Mexico.43 Rep-
resentative Samuel S. Cox of New York,44 widely known as
a ready and witty speaker, took part in the debate on the
last named day, showing that he was interested in the devel-
opment of the west, as well as in tariff reform and civil serv-
ice. Reference had been made to rumors that efforts would
be made to get the house to recede on the omnibus bill, and
that several members, including Cox, were going to recede.
That gentleman then stated that he favored the bill, but that
"it was temporary and was so intended."45 He said plainly
that the effort to bring in the bill was in pursuance of caucus
instructions, that personally he would have preferred that
each of the territories should come in on her own merits.
Furthermore, he despaired of securing the consent of the
Republican senate. Consequently he proposed new instruc-
tions for the conferees with that body. The first of these,
"That the Territory of New Mexico be excluded from the
bill," was adopted by a vote of 134 yeas and 105 nays, with
84 not voting.46 The next day Delegate Joseph introduced a
separate bill for the admission of New Mexico, and on the
following day Chairman Springer reported it favorably.
A well advertised movement was soon under way in
New Mexico, and a decided effort was made to secure im-
mediate statehood. These efforts were doomed to defeat
by opposition within the territory, which manifested itself
in lack of cooperation among the leaders and an adverse vote
of the people of the territory.
It had been suggested from Washington that New
Mexico was handicapped because she did not have a consti-
tution to present for the inspection of congress, hence the
territorial council on February 28, 1889, authorized a con-
vention to supply this lack. The bill, which had been intro-
duced by Col. George W. Prichard, a Republican member
43. Congressional Record, vol. 20, part I, pp. 862-67. Ibid., part II, p. 1911.
44. D. A. B., vol. IV, pp. 482-83.
45. Congressional Record, vol. 20, part 2, p. 1905.
46. Ibid., p. 1912.
156 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
from San Miguel County, provided for 73 delegates appor-
tioned among the various counties. The Albuquerque Morn-
ing Democrat declared that the apportionment designated
would give the Republicans control, which would be unfair,
since the last three elections had shown that New Mexico
was Democratic by a majority of 1,500 to 2,000. Although
Governor Ross allowed the bill to become a law without his
signature, other Democratic leaders refused to accept it as
fair to their party. L. Bradford Prince confessed twenty
years later "perhaps there was some merit in their objec-
tion."47 Committees of both parties sought to effect a com-
promise.48 The Democrats offered to allow the Republicans
37 delegates in the convention to their 36 — giving warning
that the rejection of this proposal would mean the failure of
statehood.49 As their opponents refused to agree, the Demo-
crats, acting on instructions from W. B. Childers, chairman
of their central committee, declined to take any part in the
election. The result was that only one Democrat was elected
as a member of the convention. This strongly partisan body,
however, went to work and in nineteen days produced a con-
stitution. English and Spanish copies of the document were
then widely circulated throughout New Mexico, but it was
not voted upon by the people.
The Albuquerque Morning Democrat may be taken as
representative of newspapers which strove to belittle the
whole movement for a constitution. Commenting on the
small vote cast for delegates to the convention, the Democrat
remarked that "the people have shown M. S. Otero and his
gang that they would prefer smallpox to statehood under the
control of the republican gang bosses . . . ."50 The constitu-
tion was "designed to perpetuate boss rule in New Mexico,"51
but the election showed that "the people are opposed to state-
hood as promulgated by the bosses Perea, Catron, Chaves,
47. Prince, op. cit., p. 48.
48. Albuquerque Morning Democrat, June 2, 1889.
49. Ibid., June 25, 1889.
50. Ibid., Aug. 8, 1889.
61. Ibid., July 14. 1889.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 157
Pritchard, &c."52 Finally the Democrat declared that the
document was "three times as long as the constitution of the
United States, including all amendments. It re-enacts that
document," the editorial critic declared, "the bill of rights,
the declaration of Independence, and the moral law and en-
larges and improves upon all of them in the estimation of the
constitution carpenters. The fact that the conventioners
attempted legislation so largely, shows their want of con-
fidence in subsequent legislatures, and is a strong argument
vs. statehood."53
About the time of the adjournment of the convention
the Hillsboro Advocate asserted that "everybody in southern
New Mexico, with the exception of a few self-seeking poli-
ticians, is dead opposed to statehood at the present time."54
This conclusion was immediately discounted by the Repub-
lican press, and during the following months various groups
and sections of the territory were claimed in support of the
new state constitution. "The majority of the native popula-
tion of New Mexico" were said "to favor statehood and free
schools."55 "The leading stockmen of northeastern New Mex-
ico favor statehood pretty generally." It was predicted that
the central and the northwest portions of the territory would
give large majorities for the constitution when a vote was
taken. It was claimed that the counties of Lincoln, Chaves,
Eddy, Socorro, Sierra, and Grant would favor the constitu-
tion by majorities of 500 or 1,000. In the late spring of 1890
the Silver City Enterprise summed matters up by saying,
"The sentiment in favor of statehood is growing rapidly
throughout the territory," while the Neiv Mexican an-
nounced "The statehood movement is crystalizing despite
the Democratic sorehead politicians, who hope to ride into
popularity opposing it." The Clayton Enterprise rejoiced
that statehood was gaining friends even in northeast New
Mexico and that Colfax County was "the only county in the
62. Ibid., Aug. 11, 1889.
68. Ibid., Oct. 30, 1889.
64. Quoted in the Rio Grande Republican, Sept. 28, 1889.
65. Daily Citizen, Nov. 30, 1889.
158 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
territory where the non-progressive newspapers are in
the majority."
During her sixty years as a territory, New Mexico sent
a number of delegations of her citizens to the national cap-
ital to work for her interests. Without doubt, the strong-
est of these and the most successful was the group sent in
the spring of 1890. The suggestion apparently came from
Col. William L. Rynerson of Las Cruces, one of the most
prominent men in the southern part of the territory. Born
only a few miles from Lincoln's birthplace, the young Ken-
tuckian had walked over a part of the Oregon trail, arriving
in California in time to do some mining before enlisting in
the union army in the sixties.56 Settling in New Mexico
after the war, he had taken up the practice of law and had
been promptly elected to the territorial legislature. Aroused
by the bitter, slurring criticism of John P. Slough, chief
justice of New Mexico, Rynerson had killed the latter in
1867 and been acquitted on a plea of self defense. District
attorney and member of the territorial council for a number
of years, Rynerson was also a member of the constitutional
convention. When he and Catron visited Washington early
in 1890, they carried a letter of introduction to President
Harrison which identified them as "the two leading Repub-
licans in New Mexico."
It was at this time that the Las Cruces leader penned
the following letter which appeared in the New Mexican
under the headlines "Statehood and Rynerson. Wake Up,
Fellow Citizens."
To the Editor of the New Mexican, Santa Fe, N. M.
Washington D. C., February 10, 1890.
As you are aware I have been here some time
and while here I have taken notes of the prospects
of New Mexico's admission as a state. I believe we
have a good prospect if we make the proper effort.
The delegation of the leading citizens of the terri-
tory should at once be sent here in the interest of
56. Twitchell, op. cit., p. 412.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 159
statehood. Such delegation should include such
men as the Hon. M. S. Otero, Col. J. F. Chavez,
Judge Trimble, John H. Riley, Gov. Prince and
Major Llewellyn. Others who could come should do
so. Their earnest and united effort would gain us
admission. The senate committee have unani-
mously agreed to report in favor of the admission
of Idaho. Wyoming and Idaho will be promptly ad-
mitted, and we might have been admitted if we had
voted and adopted our constitution as those two
territories did. We should convince our Republican
friends in congress that our territory is certainly
Republican and furnish them with statistics and
proof to wipe out the many slanders that have been
and are now being used against the people of the
territory.
I hope that our people will wake up to the im-
portance of action and at once go to work.
Yours, etc.,
W. L. Rynerson.57
Commenting on this communication, the editor stated
that he had received "similar information from other
sources and from members of congress." Furthermore, he
pointed out that Rynerson was "a keen observer," and an
excellent judge of the situation. Accordingly the New Mex-
ican strongly advocated acting on these suggestions. The
matter was taken up by the bureau of immigration, which
was controlled by Editor Frost, its secretary, and Governor
Prince was formally requested to appoint the delegation.58
Thoroughly in accord with the idea, that official ap-
pointed a large committee, headed by himself and three for-
mer chief justices of the territory. Of the fifty-four named,
only twenty-nine actually went to Washington. The group
was acclaimed by the press as a representative one, but it is
interesting to note that only one Spanish-American made
67. New Mexican, Feb. 15, 1890.
58. San Martial Reporter, quoted by New Mexican, May 13, 1890; Prince, op.
cit., p. 74.
160 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the trip.59 The press made a variety of comments regarding
the personnel of the delegation. The Daily Citizen described
it as "well supplied with facts and figures relating to the
resources of New Mexico."60 The unsympathetic Morning
Democrat quoted Senator Edmunds of Vermont as follows :
"Since seeing that delegation from New Mexico I am more
than ever convinced of the necessity of public schools in
that territory.61 The Industrial Advertiser thought that "if
the Governor would have Congress understand the true sit-
uation of affairs he should appoint a few anti-state-
hooders."62 As Governor Prince was a strong champion of
statehood, we may be sure that he did not intend to act on
this suggestion, but time was to show that he did so unwit-
tingly.
Of course, establishing a lobby for statehood was only
one of several purposes behind the appointment of the dele-
gation. Congress was also to be urged to provide for the
settlement of the vexatious question of Spanish and Mexican
land grants in New Mexico, and to grant the territory lands
to support schools and institutions of higher education. In
fact, it was along these lines that the delegation won its
greatest success. Its work led almost immediately to the
creation of the special land court and, after several years,
to the donation of lands for educational purposes. A corre-
spondent writing to the Denver News from Santa Fe county
at this time opposed the admission of the territory to state-
hood "until the titles to these lands are settled and the terri-
tory is more largely filled with Americans."63 It is not
59. Trinidad Alarid of Santa F6, who was territorial auditor at the time. See
Twitchell, op. cit.t p. 613. The names of all who actually went to Washington are
given by Prince, op. cit., p. 75.
60. Daily Citizen, April 21, 1890.
61. Morning Democrat, May 20, 1890.
62. Industrial Advertiser, March 29, 1890. This paper evidently thought that
there was little chance of an enacting bill being passed by congress. In the same
issue, it said: "It is painful to see a few papers struggling to make people believe
that New Mexico is about to be admitted as a state New Mexico stands about
as much show of being admitted as Max Frost has of becoming an angel."
63. Denver News, as quoted by New Mexican, May 9, 1890. The News added:
"He speaks of a Santa Fe ring which seeks admission with a view to electing two
Republican United States senators and officers of the proposed new state."
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 161
unlikely that some members of the delegation entertained
the same sentiments.
Contemporary press accounts of the objects of the dele-
gation differ widely. After discussing the other aims, the
Chicago Tribune gave only a single disparaging sentence to
the statehood aspect of the matter. It said : "There appears
to be no haste on the part of the New Mexicans to assume
the expensive responsibilities of statehood and to get from
under the protecting wing of the federal government."64
On the other hand, the Denver Republican said :
It is probable that while in Washington some
of the delegates will take occasion to say something
in favor of the admission of New Mexico into the
union. There is a possibility that congress will pass
an act at this session allowing New Mexico to enter
the union under the constitution framed by the con-
vention which met in Santa Fe last fall. There is a
considerable element in congress in favor of such
action ; but it is rendered inactive by the opposition
of a large number of the inhabitants of New Mex-
ico. If the delegation which is now on the way to
Washington should urge the passage of a bill per-
mitting the people to adopt a state constitution,
a bill of that sort might be passed.
Naturally the appearance of a large delegation to voice
the needs of a remote territory attracted considerable atten-
tion in congress and in the national press. Calls were made
upon the president and other federal officials, there were
hearings before seven congressional committees, and many
conversations were held with prominent members of con-
gress.
Max Frost rejoiced that the New Mexican's fight for
statehood was "assuming grand proportions," and that the
territory was getting lots of "free advertising."65 This was
quite true, but, unfortunately from the standpoint of the
editor of the New Mexican, differences of opinion among the
64. Chicago Tribune, quoted in New Mexican, April 29, 1890.
65. New Mexican, April 24, 1890.
162 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
citizens of the territory on the subject of statehood were
given wider publicity at the same time. The Denver News
suggested that not all of the delegation favored statehood,
and evidence was soon forthcoming that this was correct.
Before the delegation arrived in Washington the Kan-
sas City Journal published an interview with one of the
delegates who threw discretion to the winds and boldly op-
posed statehood. This gentleman, Mr. A J. Bahney, the
Democratic postmaster of Socorro, was quoted as follows:
We are going to Washington to present our
claims to congress. We want a public school law
that will allow us to levy taxes, issue bonds and
build school houses. We want an endowment for
our school of mines at Socorro, and an allotment of
school lands, as has been made to most of the states.
We also want an appropriation for a national park.
The site chosen, in the mountains north of Santa
Fe, is the most captivating in the world and should
be taken advantage of by the government. If the
government allows us these requests there is no
doubt but that New Mexico would gladly become a
state. The trouble has been that we were afraid to
trust such legislation to the state legislature we
were certain to get. The Mexicans can outvote us
and will elect their class to make the laws to govern
the state when the territory is admitted, and by
their past life we are assured that they will not
urge the cause of public education as it would be.
Unless we have such laws as we ask from Congress
it would only retard our progress to make a state
of New Mexico.68
66. Quoted from the Kansas City Journal by the New Mexican, April 25, 1890.
The New Mexican reproved Mr. Bahney for his indiscretion in its issue of April
25, 1890., and A. L. Morrison contributed a letter to the New Mexican for April 28, in
which he further criticized the Socorro man. In defense of the native people, he said:
"As I understand the case these 'Mexicans' and their fathers have inhabited these
mountains for nearly four centuries, and have earned the proud title of Americans if
any people on the continent have. I don't know when the first Bahneys honored the
world with their presence, but I do know that if they landed at Plymouth Rock from
the Mayflower the heroic sires of these 'Mexicans' were in New Mexico half a century
or more before them, and if the men of today are worthy sons of the men of that day
they will not permit themselves to be insulted in their own land by Mr. Bahney, nor
the party he represents One thing is certain, and that is that the New Mex-
ican voiced the feelings of the Republicans of New Mexico when it condemned BO
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 163
We may be fairly certain that other members of the
delegation had doubts about the advisability of immediate
statehood, even though they avoided discussing them with
newspaper men. Thus Henry L. Waldo, the general solici-
tor of the Atkinson, Topeka and Santa Fe railroad in New
Mexico, had the reputation of being a difficult man to inter-
view. He evidently kept his usual reserve, when a reporter
for the New Mexican found him on his return from Wash-
ington. After stating that the principal object for which
Judge Waldo worked was the settlement of land titles in the
territory, and praising the excellent work being done by
other members of the delegation, the interview concluded:
Judge Waldo took no particular interest in the
statehood matter, representing only the interests of
the Santa Fe railroad company, more particularly
in the matter of the settlement of the land grant
question, and did not think it proper to have any-
thing to do with any matters political.67
Many of the delegation were strongly in favor of state-
hood, and felt that they were getting in some effective work
for the cause. One of these was W. C. Hazledine of Albu-
querque, general solicitor for the Atlantic and Pacific rail-
road, whose attitude toward the cause had been shown by an
interview which he had released early in January. "The
speaker said he had travelled through the territory," so the
New Mexican reported,
and discussed the state movement with a large
number of citizens, and he felt certain that interest
in the subject was constantly growing. In his
travels east and west throughout the country he
67. New Mexican, May 12, 1890.
promptly and emphatically the insults flung in the faces of the native citizens of New
Mexico. The Republican party .... will trample down any and every attempt to draw
a line of demarkation between the ancient race whose forefathers landed with Cortez
at Vera Cruz, and the other race or races who arrived here yesterday. Any man who
holds opposite views to this is not worthy to become a citizen of the state of New
Mexico, and should depart for some more congenial clime as rapidly as possible. In
the meantime we commend Mr. Bahney to the 'Mexicans' of Socorro and hope they
will be able to convince him that 'their class,' as Mr. Bahney calls them, is worthy
'to make the laws to govern the state when the territory is admitted.' "
164 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
found New Mexico a topic of great interest to pub-
lic men, and many who have for years opposed,
through a misapprehension of facts, state govern-
ment for this territory are today our friends, ready
and anxious to help us if we only display an earnest
effort to help ourselves. At Washington city our
cause has made rapid advancement since the last
session of congress; many of the leading news-
papers there have displayed the most friendly
interest and will say a kindly word when the proper
time comes.68
Hazledine returned to New Mexico some time before
the other members of the delegation. The New Mexican
reported that he had "been very successful in greatly modi-
fying the views of persons hitherto strongly opposed to our
admission, and has secured many strong and ardent sup-
porters to statehood. "69 Catron wrote Hazledine, congratu-
lating him upon the good work he had done in Washington,
but expressing the fear that "the cosmopolitan delegation
which went on, may undo what you have done."70 Whatever
their private fears, however, statehood supporters continued
to express confidence in the work of the delegation. In
describing the hearing before the house committee, the New
Mexican said: "The visitors made a good impression and
manifested no trace of bickerings which have heretofore
hindered the progress of the statehood movement."71 Hav-
ing stated that "The whole matter is now in the hands of
the sub-committee," the paper added : "When this committee
was appointed several weeks ago, a majority was hostile to
the admission of New Mexico, but since receiving further
information on the subject, it is now quite probable the mat-
ter will be considered favorably." A few days later, the
New Mexican reported that the New Mexico people in Wash-
ington had "made a formidable showing before the senate
committee on territories, and the questions which the com-
es. New Mexican, Jan. 9, 1890.
69. New Mexican, April 26, 1890.
70. Catron to W. C. Hazledine, April 26, 1890.
71. New Mexican. May 2, 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 165
mitteemen put were answered in such a frank and satisfac-
tory manner as to make it certain New Mexico is making
friends for her statehood movement."72 In reviewing the
labors of the delegation after their return to the territory,
Governor Prince said "many opponents of statehood have
been transferred into friends " He concluded : "I had
a long talk just before leaving with Judge Struble, of Iowa,
who is chairman of the house committee and has hitherto
been much prejudiced against us, and his views are greatly
changed."73
Meanwhile, however, all hopes of immediate action on
the part of congress had been blasted by the attitude of
Delegate Joseph. On May 1, the New Mexican had reported
that he "was working in harmony with the good citizens of
this territory in the matter of the admission of New Mex-
ico." The following day the same paper said : "The Demo-
cratic would-be bosses and Ross et al. are hot under the
collar at Delegate Antonio Joseph because he has come out
openly in favor of statehood." It appeared later that, when
the question of a united push for statehood was discussed
by the delegation in Washington, Mr. Joseph had written
several prominent Democrats in New Mexico as to whether
the constitution drawn up by the Santa Fe convention was
acceptable, and that most of the replies he received were
unfavorable. Hence he felt it necessary to oppose the
movement, although personally he had been willing to cooper-
ate to gain admission. C. H. Gildersleeve stood with him.
Headlines screaming "Democracy Afraid to Face the Music
— A Clean Back Down" announced that New Mexicans were
still divided on statehood matters, and all hopes that the
lobby would push an enabling act through the Fifty-first
Congress were gone.
Several months earlier, the New Mexican had printed a
Washington despatch under the headlines : "The New States.
Bright for Two, but Sad for New Mexico." After referring
72. New Mexican, May 10, 1890.
73. New Mexican, May 22, 1890.
166 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
to favorable committee reports which led to the admission of
Wyoming and Idaho, the despatch said :
It is thought that if the New Mexico people
had come forward united in support of a good con-
stitution they would have had a better chance of
favorable action. The disagreement among the
politicians there has operated to keep the territory
out of the union. It is probable that congress will
take no favorable action on the question of the ad-
mission of New Mexico until the people of that ter-
ritory succeed in healing their differences.74
The fact that the constitution of Wyoming had been
adopted by popular vote, and that this action was approved
in the committee report did not escape the attention of the
New Mexico delegation in Washington. Ex-Governor Axtell,
a member of the group, said later in a speech in the cam-
paign that the delegates were told in so many words to sub-
mit the constitution to the people for their ratification, after
which New Mexico would be admitted if the people ap-
proved the constitution. Consequently, the leaders reassem-
bled the constitutional convention in Santa Fe for two days
in August, 1890. After making a few minor changes in the
document, the convention resolved to submit it to a popular
vote on October 7.
During the campaign that followed the leading Repub-
lican politicians of New Mexico held meetings in all parts of
the territory and urged the voters to support the constitu-
tion. They were assisted by the one Democratic member of
the constitutional convention — Lawrence S. Trimble, a for-
mer congressman from Kentucky who was practicing law in
74. New Mexican, Feb. 22, 1890. Cf. the following editorial comment from the
Denver Republican: "The people of the territory have themselves largely to blame for
their failure to obtain a favorable answer to the petition for admission. All the
objections based upon the alleged ignorance of many of the inhabitants and the use
by a large number of them of a language foreign to the English could, in all probabil-
ity, have been done away with if the people had been united among themselves, and
if they had earnestly asked that they be let into the union. But local differences and
a trivial question of party representation in the constitutional convention were
allowed to interfere, and as a result the New Mexicans see themselves left out
while Wyoming and Idaho are about to be admitted." Quoted from New Mexican, Feb.
22, 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 167
Albuquerque.75 Opposition speakers included W. B. Childers,
H. B. Fergusson, Felix Martinez, N. B. Field, C. H. Gilder-
sleeve, J. H. Crist, N. B. Laughlin, Ex-Governor Ross and
others. Republican papers attacked them with vigor. The
San Marcial Reporter said :
The gentlemen who are now travelling
through the territory opposing statehood, two
years ago were howling for it. Then they thought
they would secure the loaves and fishes; now it's
the "other fellow" who stands the best show. Great
patriots these !76
Though few in number, results were to show that this
group were effective. In his report to the Secretary of the
Interior for 1891, Governor Prince said :
Public speakers traversed the territory in op-
position, and easily excited prejudices among the
large portion of the people who had never lived in
a State, knew but little of the results of State Gov-
ernment, and whose fears of the unknown were
thus aroused against any change from the system
with which they were familiar.77
Considering the high percentage of illiteracy in the
territory, printer's ink was poured out very generously in
the campaign that followed. Copies of the constitution, a
defense of the same by a committee of fifteen, an appeal
from the Democratic convention at Silver City to reject the
document, and Republican circulars — all printed in English
and in Spanish — were distributed in large editions. The
opposition professed to believe that every copy of the con-
stitution "placed in the hands of an intelligent man makes a
vote against it," but they were accused of distributing
"bogus constitutions" instead of the genuine article.78 The
75. Trimble was a member of congress from 1865 to 1871. Having moved to Al-
buquerque in 1879, he practiced law there until his death in 1904. Biographical Dic-
tionary of the American Congress, p. 1628.
76. San Marcial Reporter, Oct. 4, 1890.
77. Report of the Governor of New Mexico to the Secretary of the Interior, 1891
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1891), pp. 9-10.
78. Socorro Industrial Advertiser, Sept. 13, 1890 ; Optic, Sept. 30, 1890.
168 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
"tons of literary documents against the constitution,"79
circulated throughout the territory were denounced as
"Sheer waste of printer's ink."80
Special efforts were made to reach the Spanish- Ameri-
can vote. While ten thousand copies of the constitution in
English were being distributed, the New Mexican stated that
twenty thousand in Spanish would be put into the hands of
the people the following week.81 J. Francisco Chaves, one
of the most prominent leaders among the native people, who
had presided over the convention, served as the chairman of
the committee which issued "An Address to the People of
New Mexico." While T. B. Catron drafted it himself, he
wrote Chaves :
I have prepared it, as you will observe, more
for the Mexican people than for the Americans.
They know less about the question of State than
the Americans, and I thought that it ought to be
more particularly directed to them.82
He asked his correspondent to translate the manifesto
into Spanish, so that Max Frost could "strike off copies
enough to enable us to send it to every voter in the terri-
tory." Catron supplemented his broadside by sending
checks to some of the native people who were to work for
statehood. In writing to Nestor Montoya he added the argu-
ment:
If we are admitted, you will see good times.
Immigration and capital will come into New Mex-
ico, and everyone will receive good wages. As long
as we are kept in the condition of a territory, for-
eign money will be excluded under the law of the
United States, and money from the States not hav-
ing any competition, will not be brought here. We
will be forced to sell our property at a sacrifice,
and people will be without wages or with insuffi-
cient wages. There is nothing in the world which
79. Albuquerque Daily Citizen, Sept. 27, 1890.
80. Optic, Sept. 18, 1890.
81. New Mexican, Sept. 17, 1890.
82. T. B. Catron to J. Francisco Chaves, July 7, 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 169
will be of such benefit to the laboring classes as an
influx of immigration and foreign capital. The im-
migrants who will come to this country will all
bring some means. Foreign capital is compelled
to employ labor in the mines and on the lands in
order to make it productive. You can readily see
the advantages and place them before the people.
See that every vote for the state is turned out and
votes.83
Statehood papers warned their readers that if a large
popular majority voted against the constitution, the nine-
teenth century would close on New Mexico as a territory,
and that immigration would go elsewhere.84 This would
mean "business stagnation and retrogression . . . ,"85
They were confident, however, that the cause was gaining
strength daily and that the constitution would be ratified.
Every effort was made to belittle the "anti's." Their meet-
ing was described as "a flat failure" or "a fizzle," conducted
by "would-be statesmen" who drew small crowds and little
applause. A meeting in Albuquerque was said to have been
"a disgrace to the town," while in Las Vegas Governor
Prince was said to have "wiped the floor" with Childers.
"The gang," said to be "fighting the best interests of New
Mexico," was accused of all sorts of tricks to win the elec-
tion. It was said that Democratic county commissioners had
been secretly instructed to send out none but anti-consti-
tution ballots, and to send them out "in the ballot boxes
wherever possible, and to instruct the judges of election in
safely Democratic precincts to roll up a good vote against
the constitution, no matter if any such vote is cast or not."86
Three weeks before the election the New Mexican said :
The dark tricks, the buying up of votes, slan-
dering the people, abusing political adversaries,
stuffing ballot boxes and the like shall and will be
left to the gang, that now runs the Democratic
83. Catron to Nestor Montoya, Sept. 20, 1890.
84. Citizen, Oct. 4, 1890.
85. Optic, Sept. 22, 1890.
86. New Mexican, Oct. 2, 1890.
170 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
machine, the Joseph campaign and the anti-state-
hood fight. They are adepts in that line, but their
tricks will not succeed this time.87
Opposition speeches were constantly ridiculed as "the
veriest bosh." Only occasional references by pro-statehood
speakers revealed the arguments which they were attempt-
ing to refute. Thus at a meeting in Santa Fe Major J. D.
Sena is reported to have said : "It is an insult to the descend-
ends of Hidalgo, Morelos and Iturbide when the opponents
of statehood say 'we' are not fit to govern ourselves."88
The New Mexican, which was practically closed to the
reasonings of "the blatant anti-state soreheads" who "talk
of the pending constitution as if it were a cast-iron docu-
ment"89 impossible to amend, could hardly refer to Childers
without speaking of "his hot southern blood" and "his in-
tense partisanship which left him angry and disgusted be-
cause forced to defend a losing cause."90 Fortunately, a
much fairer picture of the Democratic leader and of his line
of thought is found in a letter contributed to the Optic for
October 3, 1890. Its author, Frank Springer, who was one
of the most brilliant lawyers in New Mexico and the presi-
dent of the bar association at the time, had been a member
of the constitutional convention. He now undertook to an-
swer the arguments presented by Childers at a meeting in
Las Vegas. He described his opponent, who had come to
New Mexico about the same time that he had, as "one of
the ablest men in the democratic party in the southwest."
He said : "He is of keen and subtle mind, clear and incisive
in speech, full of resource in argument, and skillful in de-
bate; in short, a trained and sagacious lawyer "
Passing on from the man to his address, Springer said :
He spoke upwards of an hour, and rapidly, as
is his habit. We learned at the outset that he was
not opposed to statehood, but that he and his party
87. New Mexican, Sept. 17, 1890.
88. New Mexican, Sept. 23, 1890.
89. Quoted from the New Mexican by Las Vegas Optic, Oct. 2, 1890.
90. New Mexican, Sept. 18. 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 171
were in favor of it on general principles, and he
would not consume time arguing about it, but
would proceed at once to expose the iniquities of the
constitution, which he declared to be so "vicious"
that he was not willing to enter the union under it.
These objections were as follows:
First, That the constitution was compiled from
other constitutions.
Second, That state taxation is limited to one
per cent, and state debts to $500,000.
Third, That the provisions regarding taxa-
tion are framed to enable land grants to escape
taxation.
Fourth, That the judges of the supreme court
are to be appointed.
Fifth, That the constitution requires mines to
be taxed upon their gross output.
The Democratic convention, held at Silver City, had
advised its adherents to vote against the constitution on
about the same grounds. Two other objections, mentioned
in the platform adopted, may be summarized as follows :
The governor may be suspended from office
during impeachment. The apportionment for the
election of members of the legislature practically
disfranchises opponents of the Republican party.91
Springer criticized Childers' objections as "the veriest
bosh." Denouncing the third one as "humbug," the Republi-
can leader added that its author knew that the members of
the convention were not "ready to commit political suicide,"
which, he said, they would surely do, if they attempted "to
foist such a scheme of boundless stupidity upon the people of
this Territory."92 He declared that the Democratic speaker
"would have us believe that the constitutional convention
was a nest of conspirators, from which all honest men had
been excluded and who counseled harmoniously together in
91. To the People, broadside issued by S. B. Axtell, chairman of the Territorial
Republican central committee. Copy found among the Catron Papers.
92. Las Vegas Optic, Oct. 3, 1890.
172 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
some dark scheme to defraud the people of their liberties."
Expressing regret that a man whose friendship he valued
should allow "partisan heat to carry him so far," Springer
concluded by declaring that the truth was
that the constitutional convention was the most
independent body of men ever assembled in New
Mexico. There were no bosses nor room for any.
Men who were together today on one proposition
would be found next day fighting each other most
energetically on another. Many of the most impor-
tant provisions were adopted only after long and
earnest debate in which opposing theories were
thoroughly presented and advocated.93
If there is only scanty evidence for the arguments of
the speakers for the opposition, it is much more abundant
for the position taken by the editors who opposed the con-
stitution. It is interesting to note that their editorials
seemed to feature economic reason for opposing the con-
stitution. Possibly we may more easily introduce their point
of view by first referring to a speech which Delegate Joseph
made in congress on February 14, 1889.
A congressman from Iowa had just asked why he had
not introduced a bill providing for statehood for New
Mexico "until nearly the close of the session."94 Joseph
replied : "It was not because our people did not want admis-
sion. There has been every manifestation by the people of
New Mexico, thoroughly irrespective of politics, favoring
the admission of New Mexico."95 He cited, however, only
one piece of evidence for this change of mind on the part of
"the people" — a memorial unanimously adopted by the ter-
ritorial legislature in favor of statehood. He suggested,
however, that certain economic problems helped to bring
about the change. He said :
New Mexico has more than 10,000,000 acres of
the best land in the world, the titles to which are
93. Ibid.
94. Congressional Record, vol. 20, part 2, p. 1911.
95. Ibid.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 173
now clouded by either Spanish or Mexican land
grants. We have tried repeatedly upon the floor of
this House to get legislation to adjucate these titles,
but have failed. We also have upwards of
$5,000,000 in the way of Indian depredation claims.
My people are getting overly anxious on seeing that
Congress has failed for more than forty years to
provide a remedy for those defective titles and to
grant an adjudication of these Indian depredation
claims, and they have come to the conclusion that
statehood is the only solution of our present diffi-
culties. They now come and ask for admission into
the Union.96
Joseph was one of the largest grant holders in New
Mexico himself.97 Did he mean that certain "interests" in
the territory were behind the current "agitation" for state-
hood ? Students of American history have been told that the
famous Philadelphia convention of 1787 which framed our
federal constitution was a rich man's convention, that its
members represented various kinds of wealth, and that in
providing for a strong central government, they were
creating conditions which would cause their slaves, western
lands and government securities to appreciate in value.98
Were the leaders who drew up a constitution for the pro-
posed state of New Mexico in 1890 likeminded with the
"fathers" who had met in Philadelphia one hundred and
three years earlier? Must one call in the economic inter-
pretation of history in order to understand the statehood
movement of 1890?
The territorial editors who opposed the constitution of
1890 had never read An Economic Interpretation of the Con-
stitution of the United States, but they had the point of view
which Charles A. Beard was to set forth twenty-three years
later. They declared that money was being used to promote
"the statehood boom," and they were convinced that they
96. Congressional Record, voL 20, part 2, p. 1911.
97. New Mexican, Oct. 6, 1890.
98. Beard, Charles A., An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States. (N. Y., 1913.)
174 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
knew where it came from." Their analysis of the economic
interests of the members of the convention was not as thor-
ough as Beard's, but it is very suggestive. They pointed
out that the fourteen most prominent men in the convention
were interested, either as owners or attorneys, in large land
grants, which amounted, all told, to 9,457,106 acres.
These leaders were named, with the grants in which
they were interested, and the acreage of each. The article,
which appeared under the title "Land Grants and the Con-
stitution," concluded as follows :
The 14 gentlemen whose names are given vir-
tually embrace the prominence, power, intelligence
and practicability of the convention framing the
convention. The other fellows were in the roll
call, but in these 14 is found the convention. Take
out Catron, Otero, Springer, Clancy, Hazeldine and
Rynerson and what of brains or force would you
have left? Now let some Diogenes with his lantern
look for the clause in that constitution that would
hurt a land grant.100
The opposition press also pointed out that the territory
was heavily in debt and that the expenses of a state gov-
ernment would materially increase the rate of taxation.
Furthermore the burden would not be borne by all classes
of property and people alike. Through unscrupulous manip-
ulation assessments on large land grants would be kept down
to one-tenth of their value. Furthermore, the constitution
provided that the rate should not exceed one per cent on
taxable property, but there was no limit as to "particular
articles" and occupations. Accordingly it was claimed that
the tax burden would be shifted to the shoulders of the poor
to such an extent that even steadfast Republicans were de-
nouncing the constitution "as for the few and against the
interests of the mass of the people of New Mexico."101
99. Socorro Industrial Advertiser, Sept. 13, 1890.
100. Morning Democrat, quoted in Industrial Advertiser, Sept. 27, 1890.
101. Socorro Industrial Advertiser, Sept. 20, 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 175
One way in which this aim would be achieved was
described by the Socorro Industrial Advertiser as follows :
The clause in the constitution empowering the
legislature to levy a tax upon unpatented mines was
inserted for the especial benefit of a few large land
grant holders. Just at present Catron is worrying
over the miners who have settled on grants in
Santa Fe county. The mineral is not reserved for
the grants and therefore is open for location, so
several mining towns are now in existence on Cat-
ron's grants. As these mines cannot be patented he
has conceived the idea of running off the miners
by taxing the gross output of all unpatented mines,
which would work ruination to the poor miner and
clear the grants of miners. If the mining men of
New Mexico vote for the constitution they vote an
unlimited tax upon themselves in order that a few
land grabbers may clear all the grants of miners,
which cannot be done in any other way. The min-
eral belongs to the men who uncover it not to the
grant owners and the taxing of the output of un-
patented mines is a scheme to defeat the objects of
the laws of the land by making it impossible to
work a mine on a grant by taxing it heavily.
It was charged that certain men who had bought up
hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of fraudulent mili-
tia warrants for almost nothing were scheming to get them
paid. Eastern capitalists had openly predicted that when
New Mexico was admitted to the union, these warrants
would be paid by the first state legislature. Mariano S.
Otero was said to hold several hundred thousand dollars'
worth of these warrants, while those held by T. B. Catron,
A. A. Staab and others "will more than make a million dol-
lars." The first state legislature was sure to be Republican
under the apportionment made by the constitution adopted
by the convention at Santa Fe, and therefore under the con-
trol of "the ring." The new state having assumed the in-
debtedness of the territory, statehood would mean pros-
perity for the men who held these warrants.102
102. Ibid., Sept. 13, 1890.
176 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
While the opposition press laid great emphasis upon
economic objections to the constitution, it of course did not
ignore party objections. Thus La Voz del Pueblo declared
that anyone who had the interest of New Mexico at heart
should vote against the proposed constitution, as it was de-
signed to further the political ambitions of Catron, Otero
and Chaves. The Morning Democrat agreed, though it said
that the Las Vegas paper had omitted the name of the worst
one — "that mongrel, Max Frost."103 Some months earlier
the Democrat had commented bitterly on the political ambi-
tions of Col. Chaves. "As for his going to congress," it said,
"a good deal depends on who controls the new state — the
Catron-Chaves-Perea gang or the decent people — whether
he goes to congress or the penitentiary."104
While Democratic speakers and editors elaborated on
the political and economic objections to the constitution,
religious and educational objections were being used effec-
tively by the Catholic clergy. Early in September, 1889,
while the constitutional convention was in session, the Most
Rev. J. B. Salpointe, Archbiship of Santa Fe, contributed a
letter to the territorial press, which attracted wide attention.
The core of this communication was as follows :
. . . the Catholics of the territory demand of the
constitutional convention a fundamental school law
which shall be truly liberal, in the right sense of
this word, by recognizing the right of the parent to
educate his child according to the dictates of his
conscience. We demand a system of elementary
schools which will give the citizens of the territory,
of every shade of belief, equal facility to educate
their children in a manner they believe will con-
duce to bring about their happiness.105
The Rio Grande Republican admitted editorially that
the archbishop's letter was "an adept argument in favor of
denominational schools, that is to say that the public school
103. Morning Democrat, Sept. 1, 1890.
104. Ibid., Oct. 15. 1889.
105. Rio Grande Republican, Sept. 7, 1889.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 177
funds be divided between the different religious denomina-
tions, or that the dominant church be permitted to select the
teacher."106 The editor, however, declared that this idea had
already been "the subject of frequent contentions in the
States," and had been "overwhelmingly rejected by the
American people." In conclusion, he predicted that any
constitution which embodied "the ideas contained in this
letter, will be overwhelmingly rejected by both the people
of New Mexico and the Congress of the United States."
The answer of the convention to Archbishop Salpointe's
appeal was given in the first section of article IX of the con-
stitution, which is as follows :
Provision shall be made by law for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a uniform system of
public schools, which shall be open to, and sufficient
for, the education of all the children in the state,
and shall be under the absolute control of the state,
and free from sectarian or church control ; and no
other or different schools shall ever receive any aid
or support from public funds. No sectarian tenet,
creed or church doctrine shall be taught in the pub-
lic schools.107
The Rio Grande Republican for Oct. 26, 1889, said :
We understand that Father Groom preached a
sermon last Sunday at Parkview, denouncing the
action of the constitutional convention in support-
ing non-sectarian schools, and abusing the mem-
bers of the convention in the roundest terms.
The New Mexican declared seven months later that
. . . the article, as adopted, passed without a dis-
senting vote, after full discussion, and that not one
of the thirty or more members of the constitutional
convention, natives of New Mexico, of Spanish
blood and Roman Catholics in religion, opposed the
106. Ibid.
107. The Constitution of the State of New Mexico Adopted by the Constitutional
Convention, Held at Santa Fe, N. Af., September S-21, 1889; and Amended August
18-20, 1890 (Santa F6), p. 23.
178 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
provisions contained in the article or voted against
it.108
The editorial alleged that the cry against the school pro-
visions in the constitution was being made by the "Demo-
cratic would-be bosses and boodle sheets" with the hope of
setting "the people against the constitution, if possible."
Early in July a secret circular was mailed to Catholics
all over the territory. It was marked "confidential" and
bore no signature, but was supposed to have come from high
authorities in the church. This interesting document is as
follows:109
IN CONFIDENCE
All faithful members of the Holy Catholic
Church, and especially all of our people of Mexican
blood, to whom this sign shall come, are invoked to
read with much care and to weigh well its contents.
We ask of you to respect all that is contained
in this paper as something told in strict confidence.
You are called on by this because we believe you
are a faithful son of the church and we know that
you are a man of considerable influence. A conven-
tion to make a constitution of the new state of New
Mexico will be held in the town of Santa Fe, Sep-
tember 3rd. next. It is the declared intention of the
enemies of our religion to send delegates to that
convention, who will so form the organic law as to
force you to deny your children all kinds of educa-
tion excepting that of the world. The plan is to pro-
vide in that constitution that you be obliged to pay
taxes to sustain public schools, notwithstanding
you cannot on account of conscientious scruples
permit your children to be educated in said places.
No faithful son of the church, nor any man of the
Mexican caste, who understands what he owes to
himself and to the tradition of his fathers will sub-
mit to this. The struggle in our last legislature
proved that so great is the danger that this exe-
crable, wicked education will be forced upon us.
The escape then was barely an escape on a board.
108. New Mexican, April 23, 1890.
109. Rio Grande Republican, July 13, 1889. The circular appeared in part only
in the New York Tribune, July 14, 1889.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 179
Now we have it in our power to avoid this calam-
ity, taking the matter in good time and working
well and hard for the right.
The election for delegate is ordered for the 5th
of August. We have to organize and work together
and untiringly so that our own people and men of
our faith shall govern in that convention. We
solicit you to join other friends who are in sym-
pathy with our sentiments. Show them, in confi-
dence one with another, this invocation: Work In
Silence! Choose faithful men to be nominated as
delegates — men on whom we can depend and who
will agree in secret to defend our church and our
people always against the spirit of sacrilege and
arrogance which now is threatening us. It is well
to do it at once but with care, keep the secret of pur
own intentions. Do not permit personal ambition,
or preference to cause difficulties one with another.
Ever have in view the design to defend our religion
and our people from the declared intention to
swindle and subject us.
What they call progress is progress to perdi-
tion. The boastful energy is what they are relying
on to take our houses and professions from us.
But by means of a united effort now, we can
secure the adoption of a constitution recognizing
our most holy religion and having safegurrds [sic]
against the usurpations of these adventurers. Again
we say, keep all in secret, and work with vigilance.
Manage well your primary meetings and see that
the delegates to this convention are men who will
recognize the demands of their religion and of the
Mexican caste.
Pro-statehood papers denied that the Catholic authori-
ties had anything to do with this secret circular. They de-
clared that it was "a cowardly move" on the part of the
Democratic leaders. They admitted, however, that it and
the Democratic "pronunciamento" could "be depended upon
to do their work, and do it effectually, as they appeal to the
race prejudices of the ignorant masses."110
T. B. Catron, who was said by some of the newspapers
110. Silver City Enterprise, July 19, 1889 ; Albuquerque Citizen, July 19, 1891.
180 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
to have been responsible for the defeat of the school bill
by the council early in 1889, was much concerned about the
line of attack taken by the opposition. He wrote Senator
W. M. Stewart of Nevada: "Many of the priests of the
Catholic church have been delivering sermons against it
[the constitution] on account of the school clause which is
made irrevokable."111 Always full of bright ideas, he induced
his friend to introduce a bill which would require jurors in
the territories to read and write. He argued that if the
Associated Press sent out prompt word of this proposed law
it would furnish a practical argument for education which
would save "many thousand votes." He added: "I fear we
may lose the election if you do not help us ; if we can get in,
I am sure of going to the Senate, and you will surely have
another friend to assist in our common measures to aid the
West/' Stewart accordingly introduced the bill "by request"
on the last day of the session and it was referred to the
committee on territories.112 Catron was evidently disap-
pointed with the results of this strategy. On the eve of the
election he wrote Stewart: "The Bill you introduced has
raised considerable fuss ! I fear it was introduced too late
to do us much good as our election comes off tomorrow."
He added: "If it should be known that I requested it, it
might hurt me very seriously particularly as the whole
Catholic church would jump on me, and all the Mexicans
who cannot read and write also — I hope you will keep my
name entirely secret."113
The Democrats, however seem to have guessed the
truth. After Childers, chairman of the Democratic central
committee, had received a telegram from the secretary of the
senate confirming the fact that Senator Stewart had intro-
duced the bill by request, the Morning Democrat stated that
it was not certain for whom the Nevada senator was acting
but that he and T. B. Catron were "fast political and per-
111. Catron to Wm. M. Stewart, Sept. 24, 1890.
112. Congressional Record, vol. 21. part 11, p. 10764.
113. Catron to Stewart, Oct. 6, 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 181
sonal friends/'114 The editorial denounced the bill itself as
"a mere trick to deceive voters Every intelligent man
knows that it has no chance of passing and was not intended
to. It was introduced for the sole purpose of affecting the
election next Tuesday. Our Mexican fellow citizens will
not be deceived by so shallow a trick. The voters generally
should rebuke these schemes by an overwhelming vote
against the land grant constitution."115
Some of the Catholics of New Mexico gave strong sup-
port to the cause of statehood. Of the thirteen men listed by
Prince as having taken a prominent part in the speaking
campaign throughout the territory in favor of the constitu-
tion, no less than four were Catholics. All of these were un-
compromising Republicans and were widely known through-
out the territory. Three were native sons who had been
born under the Mexican flag. Three were veteran soldiers,
two having fought bravely against the Confederate inva-
sion at Valverde. Doubtless a word or two regarding these
leaders will give the reader a better appreciation of the
value of their adherence to the statehood cause.
The oldest of the three Spanish- Americans and the most
powerful politically was Col. J. Francisco Chaves. He has
already been mentioned as the president of the constitutional
convention and chairman of a committee to disseminate
literature in favor of the constitution. Five years prior to
the Mexican War, his father had told him: "The heretics
are going to overrun all this country. Go and learn their
language and come back prepared to defend your people."116
Thus admonished, the young Mexican had entered St. Louis
University. Later he had studied medicine in New York. A
very versatile man, after his return to New Mexico, he made
114. Albuquerque Morning Democrat, Oct. 5, 1890.
115. The authorship of the unpopular bill continued to be discussed after the
election. The New Mexican for October 11, 1890, said: "Mr. Joseph's supporters are
very busy telling the Spanish speaking voters that he, Joseph, if re-elected will defeat
the Stewart bill ; they are equally as busy telling the English speaking voters that he,
Joseph, secretly and through personal friends induced Senator Stewart, to introduce
the bill and if he, Joseph, is elected he will do his utmost to defeat it."
116. Twitchell, op. cit., p. 400.
182 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
overland trips to California, fought the Navajos and Con-
federates, and took up the practice of law. An able politi-
cian, the colonel represented the territory in congress for
three terms following the Civil War.117 He was also presi-
dent of the territorial council for eight sessions. A farmer
and stock-raiser, as well as a political leader, Chaves was a
man of many contacts and a wide influence. His home was
in Valencia County, and the results of the election suggest
that he must have done some good work with his own peo-
ple.118
Major Jose D. Sena of Santa Fe was four years younger
than Chaves. During the battle of Valverde, while other
companies refused to cross the Rio Grande, he had bravely
led his men across the river through a shower of bullets. At
the close of the war, he had been in charge of the rebuilding
of Ft. Marcy. After serving as sheriff of Santa Fe County
for a dozen years, he had been a skillful interpreter in the
courts for many years and then a successful criminal
lawyer. Major Sena not only spoke in favor of the consti-
tution of 1890, but also published a manifesto in Spanish,
summarizing the reasons for statehood.119
The youngest of the three native leaders, Mariano S.
Otero had scarcely learned to walk before the land of his
birth was ceded to the United States. He was a member of
one of the most prominent families in the territory, and was
educated at St. Louis University. Possessed of a natural
gift for politics, he served New Mexico as delegate to con-
gress from 1879 to 1881.120 He received the Republican
nomination for that office in 1888 and again in 1890, but was
defeated by Antonio Joseph due to the fact that the schism
in the party had not yet healed. He was a large land grant
holder — a fact which did not escape the opposition editors,
as we have seen. One grant which he held contained 100,000
117. Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress, p. 805.
118. See election returns, below.
119. History of New Mexico (Pacific States Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1907).
voL I, p. 295 ; Prince, op. eft., p. 54.
120. Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress, p. 1375.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 183
acres. He and his uncle, Miguel A. Otero I, together owned
the Jemez Hot Springs.121 A stock raiser on a large scale,
Mariano Otero was usually present when "the cattle barons"
of southern Colorado and northern New Mexico met in Las
Vegas and staged the famous poker games described by his
cousin, Miguel A. Otero, II, in My Life on the Frontier.122
Otero traded in wool and finally became a banker. "He
wielded great influence during his career," says Col. Twitch-
ell, "was shrewd in business affairs, of progressive ideas and
in every sense a representative New Mexican."123
The remaining Catholic among these leaders was Alex-
ander A. Morrison who had been born in Ireland a year
earlier than Chaves. Arriving in New York during the
Mexican War, he volunteered for military service, only to
arrive in New Mexico when the fighting was practically
over. While this was undoubtedly a supreme disappoint-
ment for an Irishman, he apparently harbored no prejudices
against the Southwest. After thirty odd years in the East
and Middle West — during a part of which time he served in
the Illinois legislature, he returned to New Mexico as a
"carpetbag politician." Through the goodwill of three Re-
publican presidents, he served the territory in various ca-
pacities for fourteen years. All good posts, too: U. S.
marshall for New Mexico, register of the land office in
Santa Fe, and collector of internal revenue. Furthermore,
Morrison proved a good administrator, winning high praise
in official reports.124
Some old timers speak of Colonel Chaves as an "aban-
doned Catholic," and are doubtful as to whether Otero
could be considered a very good representative of the church.
Sena and Morrison, however, were strong churchmen. In
November, 1905, after the latter had left public office, he
121. Otero, My Life on the Frontier, vol. I, p. 237 .
122. Ibid., I, pp. 156-57.
123. Twitchell, op. eit., vol. II, p. 407, note 332.
124. History of New Mexico (Pacific States Publishing Co., Los Angeles, 1907),
roL II, p. 643.
184 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
became one of the founders of the Western Catholic Review,
a monthly published in Prescott, Arizona.125
These Catholic laymen took as prominent a part as any
of the leaders in the pro-statehood campaign. A few priests
also assisted, addressing their congregations in favor of the
constitution. There were also other priests who did not
attempt to influence the voting, one way or another.126
There can be no doubt, however, that the strength of the
church was thrown against the constitution. On the day
before the election the New Mexican referred to reports that
"at the Catholic cathedral and San Miguel chapel yesterday
and at several other points throughout the territory strong
sermons were preached advising the people to vote against
the constitution and against statehood."127 Prominent lay-
men were bitterly opposed to the school clause. Pedro Perea
was one of the leading Republicans in New Mexico.128 Three
times a member of the territorial council, he was twice (1889
and 1897) a candidate for the governorship of the territory,
yet he did not support the constitution endorsed by his party.
His attitude was, however, not surprising. The Council
Journal shows that during the twenty-eighth legislative
session he had persistently opposed the Kistler school bill.129
According to the press he had declared "I would rather see
all legislation fall to the ground than to have the word 'non-
sectarian' go into that school bill."130 Nor was Perea the
only Catholic leader whose legislative record furnished the
key to his opposition the following year. During the same
session Juan Jose Baca, a member of the council from
Socorro County, was also credited "with announcing in the
strongest possible language that he was opposed to any mea-
sure that favored a non-sectarian school."181
125. Ibid.
126. Silver City Enterprise, Oct. 10, 1890 ; San Marcial Reporter, Oct. 18, 1890.
127. New Mexican, Oct. 6, 1890. See also Rio Grande Republican, Oct. 26, 1889.
128. Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress, p. 1401.
129. Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Territory of New Mexico,
Twenty-eighth Session (Santa Fe, 1889) pp. 337, 377, 378, 393, 413, 414, 423.
130. Rio Grande Republican, March 9, 1889.
181. Silver City Enterprise, March 3, 1889.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 185
Possibly the church had other grounds for opposing
statehood. The higher officials may have feared the un-
settling effects of the predicted influx of settlers and capital
into the territory. Such changes might mean a diminution
of the influence which they exerted over the faithful. This,
of course, is mere conjecture. Even if the leaders enter-
tained such thoughts at times, we could hardly expect them
to record them for posterity.
As every student of New Mexico history knows, the
constitution was voted down on Oct. 7, 1890, by a vote of
16,180 to 7,493. Grant and Valencia were the only counties
to return a majority in favor of the constitution. The vote
by counties was as follows :132
Counties For Against
Bernalillo 870 2,073
Colfax 234 651
Dona Ana 669 1,010
Grant 699 544
Lincoln 379 710
Mora 265 1,536
Rio Arriba 428 1,272
San Juan 87 182
San Miguel 790 3,211
Santa Fe 1,068 1,549
Sierra 227 717
Socorro 447 1,068
Taos _ 212 1,227
Valencia _ 1,118 430
Total _ 7,493 16,180
It is, of course, impossible to say how many of the
16,180 voters who opposed the admission of New Mexico to
the union under the constitution of 1890 were opposed to
statehood itself. In his report to the Secretary of the In-
terior for 1891, Governor Prince, who was an ardent cham-
pion of statehood, confessed that "At first sight" the vote
against the constitution "might appear to indicate a disin-
132. Report of the Governor of New Mexico to the Secretary of the Interior, 1891
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891), p. 9.
186 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
clination on the part of the people to assume the condition
of statehood. This, however, is not the case," he explained.
"The circumstances were peculiar." In fact, the circum-
stances were so peculiar, that the governor discreetly men-
tioned only one of them: the determined opposition of the
Democrats on the ground that the apportionment of dele-
gates to the convention was unjust to their party. He sug-
gests, however, that prejudices were excited, and that "All
interests opposed to statehood, or to any particular provi-
sion of the constitution in question" worked through the
Democratic machine. What these "interests" were is quite
clear from our study of contemporary newspapers. Com-
mon people who owned little or no property felt that large
grant owners had cleverly drawn a constitution which would
throw the weight of taxation upon the shoulders of those
least able to pay. Catholics felt it their religious duty to
fight against the establishment of non-sectarian public
schools.
Dispatches from New Mexico to Eastern newspapers
after the election attempted "to lay the whole blame on the
Catholic Church." The Albuquerque Daily Citizen, however,
declared that this was "not just."133 As evidence, it declared
that 90 per cent of the whole population of Valencia County
were Catholics, although it had given "the constitution the
largest majority it received in any portion of the territory."
There can be little doubt that the role of the Catholics in
the election has been exaggerated, and that political and
economic objections to the constitution did much to swell the
adverse majority.
Gov. Prince concludes his analysis of the election results
as follows :
It should be noted, however, that the political
orators and party leaders most active in their op-
position all repudiated the idea that they were
opposed to statehood itself, and asserted that their
opposition was solely to the proposed constitution
188. Albuquerque Daily Citizen, Oct. 18, 1890.
NEW MEXICO'S FIGHT FOR STATEHOOD 187
and the method of its formation, and that on the
main question they were as progressive as those
they opposed.
This, of course, was the easiest course for opponents
of statehood to take. With a constitution open to criticism
from several angles, it was safer to concentrate on objec-
tions to the document before the people. The newspapers
available that were published during the campaign give
practically no hint of any opposition to statehood itself.
Yet Governor Prince refers to "interests opposed to state-
hood," and T. B. Catron has left convincing evidence of the
existence of such opposition. Referring to statehood in a
letter to Nestor Montoya, Sept. 20, 1890, he said : "The great
opposition amongst many is, that they are afraid of the
Mexican people, and that they would control the State to the
injury of the Americans." He continued :
This you and I know is not true. The Mexicans have
always divided up the offices fairer with the Ameri-
cans, and they are divided in politics just the same
as the Americans, it would be impossible for them
to get together to control the State exclusively in
their own interest and against the interests of the
Americans. Besides, they have no disposition to
do so.
Evidently fear of "Mexican" domination was a factor
in the vote on the constitution of 1890. This of course meant
opposition to statehood itself, and not simply to certain
provisions of the instrument of government.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER V
THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND THE MILITARY
AUTHORITIES
THE PEACE made at Camp Verde did not solve the prob-
lem of Apache control. Its consummation merely indi-
cated that the military power had cleared the way for the
work of civilization. Moreover, the cessation of fighting
meant that, if events were allowed to come to a logical end,
the military would eventually be unnecessary and the man-
agement of the Apaches would become strictly a function of
the civil government.
General Crook undoubtedly envisaged such a future, but
he did not minimize the work or the time that would be
required to produce such a result. However, the general was
so sure the war was "virtually at an end," at the time of the
peace, that he immediately promulgated instructions de-
signed to aid in the development of civil government. To
retain and strengthen his control over the surrendered
Indians, a small number of his former scouts were to be
selected from the various tribes to constitute the police force
of the reservation. They were to conform to regular dis-
cipline, but in order that they might "serve as a nucleus for
the establishment of civil government," they were to be
"required to cultivate the soil and perform the various indus-
tries prescribed by the Indian Department, the same as other
Indians."1
The commanding officers were to aid the "agents in
instructing the Indians in civil government in its simplest
form," so that the latter could gradually learn "its benefits
1. Crook to A. A. G., April 12, 1873, A. G. O., 1882 ; Crook to A. G., Sept. 22.
1878, I. O.f I 355 ; Gen. Orders no. 18, April 8, 1873, Army War College. In the case
of the Office of Indian Affairs, the names Indian Office, Indian Bureau, Indian Depart-
ment, Indian Service and Bureau were used by officials in their reports. These names
will henceforth appear variously and will be cited as I. O.
188
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 189
as contrasted with their own barbarous forms and customs."
The instruction was also to be gradually enlarged, with the
hope that the savages would eventually become good citizens
"capable of self-government." They were to be treated mildly
except for offenses of serious import, but always as "chil-
dren in ignorance, not in innocence." Even more important,
the general earnestly enjoined the civil and military officers
to have "perfect harmony in their official relations, and
directed them not to take action on any disputed question
until he had issued instructions.2
But perfect harmony was very improbable as long as
Crook continued to reiterate his confidence in General Orders
no. 10 and their enforcement as a strict requirement.3 A
portent of approaching conflict was further indicated by the
inspector general's recommendation that when the depart-
ments "do not work together the Indian Department must
succumb to the military to insure peace and prevent blood-
shed." 4 Yet most of the field officers, both civil and military,
agreed that all promises made to the Indians should be faith-
fully kept, and that liberal financial outlays should be pro-
vided for their wards' maintenance.5
Indian administration itself was sharply reorganized
just before Crook concluded his first campaign against the
Apaches. Early in February, 1873, congress, through the
efforts of Representative James A. Garfield, abolished sev-
eral superintendencies, including that of Arizona. This
action was taken to simplify Indian management and to
increase and facilitate the efficiency of the respective
agencies. Each agency was to purchase its own supplies
and report directly to the Indian Office. To insure against
laxity on the part of the agents and to guarantee expert ad-
2. Ibid.
3. Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873, op. cit.
4. Col. D. B. Sacket to A. A. G., July 1, 1873, A. G. O., 3074. Schofield involved
himself with Secretary Delano by charging that the Modoc troubles were caused
through the interference of the Oregon superintendent. Schofield to Hdqrs. of Army
May 5, 1873, A. G. O., 1882 ; Walker to T. B. Odeneal, April 12, July 6, 1873, A. G. O.,
2669.
5. Bendell to Walker, Jan. 14, 1873, I. O., B 594 ; Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873,
op. cit.; 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 105 Arizona Citizen, June 28, 1873.
190 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
vice, the president was empowered to appoint five Indian in-
spectors, who were authorized to visit and examine each
agency at least twice each year. They were to be held strictly
responsible to the secretary of the interior.6
The building of a telegraph line to the Apache country
also worked a profound transformation in the administra-
tion of both the military and civil affairs. McCormick, with
the support of Garfield and Belknap, seized an opportunity to
amend the sundry civil appropriation bill on January 21,
1873, to include $50,000 for the construction of a line from
California to Arizona. The work started at San Diego on
August 23, and with a branch to Fort Whipple was com-
pleted at Tucson in slightly more than three months' time.7
Thus, with instantaneous communication from Washington,
instead of a delay of twenty days when dependence had to be
placed on the telegraphic termini at Santa Fe and San Diego,
sufficient economies were effected in the letting of contracts
and in increasing the effectiveness of scouting parties, to pay
for the line in less than a year.8
But the real problems of Apache control had to be met
at the reservations. These problems were to be solved, ac-
cording to the "Peace Plan," by Christian civilian agents
nominated by the Dutch Reformed Church. Should their
peaceful methods fail, the military was to step in to
enforce obedience ; and in the case of a complete breakdown
of authority, an army officer was temporarily to assume the
duties of the agent. Naturally, a condition of chaos was to
6. Arizona Citizen, Mar. 22, June 21, 1873 ; Laws and Instructions Relating to the
Duties of Inspectors of the United States Indian Service (Washington, 1885), pp. 8-4.
Bendell resigned on March 26, but stayed at his post until relieved by J. A. Tonner
on June 8. The superintendency ended on June 80, 1873. Comm. to Bendell, Mar. 26,
1873, L. B. no. 112, p. 27. Dr. Bendell returned to Albany, New York, where he
resumed his profession of medicine. He died November 14, 1932, at the age of 89.
New York Times, Nov. 15, 1932.
7. Arizona Citizen, April 12, Sept. 13, Dec. 6, 1878.
The first telegram over the line was sent by General Schofield, on October 29,
congratulating Crook upon his promotion to brigadier general. This promotion was
made by President Grant over the heads of thirty-four senior officers. Ibid., Nov. 15,
22, 1873.
8. 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 4.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 191
exist most of the time, with such a fertile field for the devel-
opment of jealousies and personal animosities.9
The church was handicapped from the start, due to the
few frontiersmen among her converts. The church officials
fully agreed with Governor Safford that an agent's religious
views had little to do with his ability to manage savage and
erratic Indians, but the officials also knew that their organi-
zation would be held accountable for their appointees' moral
conduct. They were therefore compelled to appoint eastern
men whose reputations were fully established. The church
was further handicapped because of the difficulties her
agents encountered in finding the right kind of employees,
especially at the low wages paid.10
Regardless of difficulties, the problem of Apache man-
agement after the surrender at Camp Verde was essentially a
concern of the civilian agents. But almost all that could be
attempted at first was to ration the Indians and impose mild
restraints upon them, designed to check their propensities
for roving. The Campe Verde Reservation presented an
especially difficult problem. The Indians had never craved
this region for a permanent home and during the period of
hostilities none had remained there on their own accord. In
fact, when over one thousand came in at the time peace was
made, they did so because of sheer exhaustion. Fevers and
dietary troubles soon carried away more than three hundred
individuals ; then the toll was greatly increased by whooping-
cough and eye diseases. Sedentary life induced unsanitary
conditions, which, in turn, were made worse by the Indians'
meager knowledge of cooking. With no medicines available,
9. The arrogance of the military was not lessened by Sherman's statement that
nearly all the civilizing and Christianizing of the Indians had been done under army
supervision. Arizona Citizen, May 10, 1873.
10. Safford to editor, Nov. 30, 1872, Arizona Citizen, Dec. 7, 1872; R. B. I. C.,
1870, p. Ill, 1873, p. 126.
Superintendent L. E. Dudley, of New Mexico, in suggesting that the churches
should consider other traits besides piety, wrote that a "competent bad man will in
the long run cost the Government less than an incompetent good man." Dudley to
Smith, Nov. 15, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E, D. no. 1, vol. iv, p. 688.
192 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
except the little furnished by the military, the condition of
the savages grew rapidly worse.11
There was a great fluctuation in numbers during the
summer and fall of 1873. Certain renegades and several
straggling parties stayed in the mountains at the time of the
surrender, hoping to remain unnoticed, but numerous puni-
tive expeditions during the following weeks forced them to
give up. And in May the number was further increased by
the addition of about five hundred Indians from Date
Creek.12 This change endangered the already weak control
of the reserve, for the presence of many new squaws caused
much violence among the warriors. However, Agent Wil-
liams, now returned from Date Creek, diplomatically dis-
placed the old chiefs with young men who could enforce
order. A better attitude was also induced, in August, when
the military forced certain settlers to pay damages done to
the Indians' fields by roving stock.13
All the field officials from the time of Colyer's visit
considered the Verde Reservation to be a permanent home
for the savages, and Agent Williams, who appears to have
had the Indians' welfare at heart, eagerly looked forward to
the inauguration of the methods of civilization. Unfortun-
11. J. W. Williams to Bendell, April 28, 1873, I. O.( Ariz. Misc.; Dr. L. Sanderson
to Smith, June 29, 1874, ibid.
When 1500 tribesmen became ill at one time, Crook's prompt action in increasing
the strength of the Verde post prevented a general hegira. Thus frustrated, and
egged on by jealous medicine men, the bands killed a number of "witches." Dr. W. H.
Corbusier, TO*., B. E., pp. 18-16.
12. Although Agent Williams had no trouble at the Camp Date Creek agency
during the winter and spring of 1872-1873, Crook and Bendell decided in the following
April, 1873, that the bands while still cowed by the recent campaigns should be moved to
the Verde Reserve. The removal was made on May 1, unfortunately too late to plant
crops in the Verde Valley. Four hundred and twenty-five Indians were taken to the
Verde Reservation at the time, but despite the fact that Crook posted a strong force
of troops around Camp Date Creek two hundred and forty-four others escaped to the
mountains. The troops then pushed them to the Colorado Reserve, and later, on
June 18, Crook ordered their transference to the Verde Reservation. By September,
the Apache question in western Arizona had ceased to exist. Williams to Bendell,
Feb. 24, 1878, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Crook to Bendell, April 9, 1873, I. O., B 145; Bendell
to Comm., April 9, 1873, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 202 ; Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873, I. O.,
I 855.
13. A. G. Buttner to Bendell, April 14, 1873, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Lt. W. S. Schuy-
ler to A. A. G., Sept. 1, 1878, A. G. O., 5228.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 193
ately, his initial plans which were largely agricultural failed
due to the late date of the peace in April, 1873 (too late to
plant crops) and to the still later removal of the Date Creek
Indians. Tools were not made available because of bureau-
cratic slowness, and the meager cultivation undertaken was
done with those implements lent by the military. He moved
his charges from near the post to a healthful region eighteen
miles away, where he expected to build an agency ; but with
no funds available he found little work to do except to make
plans for the next year.14
Williams planned an irrigation ditch ten miles long that
would irrigate 2,000 acres. Such an area of cultivated land
to supplement the excellent grazing land of the reserve
caused him to contemplate the Indians as transformed into
peaceful farmers. Surprised to find that the Apaches were
not averse to labor, he asked for an advance of $5,000 to be-
gin the canal so that the crops could be planted early in 1874.
But he was soon even more surprised, for his request was
refused upon the ground that the Indian Office had under
consideration a proposal to remove the Verde Indians to the
San Carlos Reservation.15
Thus, unable to make fundamental plans, Dr. Williams
gave his attention to the Indians' health and comfort ; and he
succeeded in winning the bands' confidence to a high degree.
They improved their cooking, dressed better and built health-
ier huts; besides they effectively policed their camps and
many of them cut hay for the military. But sickness per-
sisted to an alarming degree and a large number of indi-
viduals migrated to the highlands to escape the fevers of the
river valley. In fact, during November, 1873, out of the 2058
Indians registered on the agency books, only 992 were pres-
ent for ration issues. Yet, Inspector William Vandever, who
visited the reservation in the early winter, reported to
Delano that despite the unsatisfactory condition the untiring
14. Williams to Smith, Sept. 1, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iv,
p. 655.
15. Williams to Smith, Sept. 15, 1873, I. O., W 1237 ; Smith to Williams, Nov. 6,
1873, L. B. no. 113, p. 504.
194 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
efforts of Williams indicated a bright future for the next
year.16
The military had no difficulty with the Indians on the
Verde Reservation during the winter of 1873-1874, and
General Crook, after visiting them in early February, in-
formed Commissioner of Indian Affairs E. P. Smith that
an outlay of $25,000 on an irrigation project would result
in the development of self-sufficiency, with an annual saving
of $50,000. The overburdened Indian Office was unable to
take such a constructive step, but the sudden insanity of
Dr. Williams practically gave full control to the military.
As a result, the military decided to direct all agency activi-
ties with the exception of keeping the records, which work
was to be continued by Oilver Chapman, the agency clerk.17
A dam was started on the Verde River at once. Materials
were bought with money saved by buying hay from the
bands and by funds derived from the sale of beef hides that
were collected at the beef issues. Bribes and excess ration
issues induced the Apache captains to persuade the Indians
to furnish the labor. Forty acres of excellent vegetables
were thus placed under cultivation, apparently to the great
satisfaction of both the military officers and the tribesmen.18
But divided authority at the agency quickly proved to
be a failure. Chapman criticized the military methods of
issue and discipline, especially when the officers assumed
full credit for the successful work of the summer of 1874.
Disgusted because some of his mail had been opened by order
of Crook, and declaring he received no instructions from the
Indian Office, he prepared to leave for California.19 In the
meantime, the commissioner of Indian affairs decided to
concentrate the Verdes on some other reservation, but he
had not decided when. However, the military was to have
16. Williams to Comm., Nov. 21. 1873, I. O., W 1690 ; Vandever to Delano, Nov. 5,
1878, 7. F., 1400. See the Commissioner of Indian Affairs' views in R. B. I. C., 1873.
p. 67.
17. Chapman to Smith, April 23, 1874, I. O., C 346; Crook to Smith, April 24,
1874, I. O., C 579.
18. Capt. J. W. Mason to Crook, April 23, 1874, I. O., C 679.
19. Chapman to Smith, Aug. 12, 1874, I. O., (n. f.).
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 195
full control until the removal should be effected. Strangely,
poor Chapman first learned of the new arrangement when
an army lieutenant appeared and forcibly took over the
agency.20
The military strongly opposed the bureau's plan to
remove the Indians of the Verde Valley. To Crook's view
these heterogeneous bands could only be controlled by a
continuous military threat. If removed to the White Moun-
tain country, troop movements would be difficult, he said,
and there would be little arable land ; while if removed to the
Colorado, the bands would be quickly exterminated by the
vicious inroads of social diseases. He also insisted that a
removal would violate his treaty of the preceding year. But
the commissioner of Indian affairs, supported by the board
of Indian commissioners and the Dutch Reformed people,
persisted in their plans for concentration.21
Chapman was now restored as special agent through
the influence of the church. He assumed charge on Novem-
ber 13, 1874, but military hostility, insufficient supplies and
an atmosphere of uncertainty about removal, made him re-
luctant to do any work of a constructive nature. Neverthe-
less, he prevented an outbreak when his supplies became ex-
hausted by entering into a temporary contract with Arizona
dealers for 200,000 pounds of flour, 12,000 pounds of barley
and 10,000 pounds of corn. He also procured 500 blankets
that had been ordered the year before.22 In December, the
wheels of officialdom moved, and in the interests of efficiency
and economy, a decision was made to move the Verde Indians
to San Carlos.23
20. Comm. to Delano, May 23, 1874, R. B. no. 24, p. 408 ; Chapman to Smith,
June 24, 1874, I. O., C 490.
21. Crook to A. G., April 10, 1874, A. G. O., 5228 ; J. M. Ferris to Smith, Sept.
23, 1874, I. O., F 418 ; R. B. I. C., 1874, p. 107.
22. Chapman to Smith, Nov. 23, 1874, I. O., C 1057.
According to Chapman, the military interfered in the work of the agency because
they were filled with "feelings of jealousy and chagrin at seeing so much accom-
plished without military coercion." Chapman to Smith, Dec. 1, 1874, I. O., C 1062,
Jan. 11, 1875, C 123.
23. Delano to Comm., Dec. 21, 1874, I. O., I 1516.
196 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Colonel L. E. Dudley, the former superintendent of New
Mexico, was selected to direct the removal. He arrived at the
reserve, early in February, 1875, only to find that interested
persons were protesting the removal through Territorial
Delegate McCormick, and that General Crook looked upon
the undertaking as an impossibility. However, the general
furnished him an escort and a packtrain of fifty-three ani-
mals. The Indians resisted the move in council, but due
to their severe punishment in 1873, they dared use no
force to avoid their transfer. On February 27, Chapman
with a small escort led 1,400 individuals away from the
reservation that had been promised them forever, and upon
which had been constructed many permanent improvements
that pointed the way to a civilized life.24 Seven days were re-
quired to cover the distance of one hundred and eighty miles
to San Carlos, and en route a desperate factional fight re-
sulted in the killing of seven Indians and the wounding of
seven others. Upon the arrival of the several bands, Agent
John P. Clum, the San Carlos agent, relieved the tension by
assigning the opposing groups different locations; then, a
few days later, he diplomatically induced them to give up
their arms.25 The Verde removal, thus consummated, ended
the Apache question in west-central Arizona from the geo-
graphical standpoint ; but in concentrating the Verde bands
upon the San Carlos Reservation, the real problem of their
control was perhaps more difficult than ever before.26
The removal of the Verde bands — a sharp modification
of Apache management as originally planned by Colyer and
24. Dudley to Smith, April 3, 1875, I. O., D 200; Gen. August V. Kautz to Col.
0. E. Babcock, Oct. 20, 1875, I. O., P 518. (This letter was sent direct to President
Grant's secretary.)
A large wagon train, retained at an expense of $7200, hauled all the bulky prop-
erty and the infirm Indians by way of Phoenix.
25. Chapman to Smith, Mar. 20, 1875, I. O., 487 ; Clum to Smith, Mar. 28, 1875,
1. O., C 484. Clum ignored Chapman as subagent. The commissioner therefore abol-
ished the Verde subagency. Courteously, he gave Chapman a leave of sixty days in
which to find work. Smith to Chapman, April 26, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 126, June 11,
1875, ibid., p. 445.
26. The Verde Reservation was abolished by an executive order of April 23,
1875. See Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations, p. 5.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 197
Howard — did not interrupt the constructive trend of the
regime initiated at Camp Apache among the Coytero bands
in 1871-1872. Dr. Soule, who became agent at the time of
Howard's second visit, was relieved early in December, 1872,
by James E. Roberts, a nominee of the Dutch Reformed
group.27 Fortunately, the Indians reacted most favorably
to the change and they caused no trouble until several se-
vere epidemics sharply reduced their numbers in the follow-
ing February. Great numbers of the survivors then relieved
their distress by inebriation, and in the violence that natur-
ally followed, many individuals were killed and numerous
attacks were made on citizens. Some of the braves, in trying
to conceal the criminals from the agent, also evinced a ten-
dency towards insubordination.28
Roberts, from the time of his arrival, felt that an in-
crease in the tribesmen's private property would make them
less inclined to go to war. For this reason he pressed and
succeeded in getting the fifteen head of cattle that President
Grant had promised Miguel at the time the chief visited
Washington with General Howard. In addition Commis-
sioner Smith provided the Coyoteros with fourteen extra
heifers and one hundred sheep. The Indians were greatly
elated, and bestowed such care on the stock that Inspector
Vandever, late in 1873, reported stockraising to be a civil-
izing influence which would soon make the Indians conserva-
tive, provided the Indian Bureau issued sufficient breeding
stock to take full advantage of the opportunity.29 Roberts
also maintained that the Indians would "become civilized
just as soon as they became lovers of money." And to get
the money he suggested that the commissary at the posts
27. Bendell to Roberts, Dec. 9, 1872, S. L. B. vol. ii, p. 9. Dr. Soule, as a military
surgeon, was moved to the Department of California at his own request. Soule to
Walker, Nov. 28, 1872, I. O., S 364.
28. Roberts to Bendell, Feb. 28, 1873, I. O., Ariz. Misc. To prevent the making
of "tiswin" Roberts asked for meal in place of corn. He also requested soda instead of
the vast quantities of soap that were sent him. Roberts to Smith, July 13, 1878, I. O.,
R 232. The Arizona Miner (June 2, 1873) charged that soap was ordered for the
reserves purely for graft.
29. Comm. to Roberts, Aug. 15, 1873, L. B. no. 118, p. 90; Vandever to Delano,
Oct. 2, 1873, 7. F., 1404.
198 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
purchase all the crops that the Indians might raise.30 The
military evidently shared the view, for the adjutant general
ordered that during 1874 all the hay and grain produced at
the various reserves should be bought, and that the contrac-
tors should be required to "purchase as much as practicable
from the Indians."31 But of greatest discomfiture to the
Arizona contractors was Roberts' action in suggesting that
contracts for goods be filled at Santa Fe. Supplies from this
point could be furnished at much less cost and delivered in
four months less time than those from San Francisco. This
fact, he thought, would be especially important in the case of
tools, which, when heretofore ordered for spring use, had
always arrived in the fall.32
Roberts soon proved himself to be an excellent disci-
plinarian. Not only were several recalcitrant Tonto bands
subjected to the regular agency routine of metal tags,
descriptive lists and frequent musters, but after Miguel's
band had become insubordinate several chiefs were arrested.
And Captain Chiquito, charged with harboring numerous
murderers and also with trading stolen stock to the Zunis,
was sent to the Yuma prison. Several other bands guilty of
inattention to their crops and stock had their liberty of roam-
ing about withdrawn, while still others accused of theft were
punished by a cessation of ration issues until they returned
the stolen animals and brought in the uncontrolled "bad
men." After the bands had come to respect the agent's
authority, he further cemented his position among them by
persuading the commissioner of Indian affairs to authorize
an issue of 1400 blankets.33 In fact, Inspector Vandever in
October, 1873, delighted to find that the Coyoteros would
30. Roberts to Smith, Aug. 14, 1873, I. O., R 282. With almost no tools the
Coyoteros were cultivating 283 acres of corn.
31. Gen. E. D. Townsend to Schofield, Sept. 16, 1873, I. O., W 1166. The officials
thought that the plan would prevent the contractors from bringing in Mexican labor-
ers, who frequently sold ammunition and liquor to the Indians.
32. Ferris to Delano, April 11, 1873, I. O., F 6.
33. Roberts to Bendell, May 4, 1873, I. O., B 648; Roberts to Smith, Sept. 11,
1873, I. O., R 372, Sept. 20, 1873, I. O.f R 374 ; Smith to Roberts, Oct. 28, 1873, L. B.
no. 113, p. 460.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 199
have 6000 bushels of corn to sell, quickly confirmed Major
George M. Randall's report that they were "peaceable, well
disposed, and under better discipline than ever before."34
The Indians maintained their cooperative attitude for
several months, and during the spring of 1874 Roberts in-
duced them to dig five miles of irrigation ditches with
which three hundred acres of new land were made available
near the agency. This was a fortunate project, for it was
scarcely finished when Crook ordered that no farming would
be allowed except near the post.35 But less fortunate for the
success of Roberts' regime was the fact that the military be-
gan to interfere in the details of reservation administration.
In July, 1874, Major Randall ordered the punishment of all
Indians who carried passes issued by the agent.36
Roberts now reported to Commissioner Smith that the
reserve had been virtually operating under military control.
The officers, he said, were having secret councils with the
Indians, making new chiefs, interfering with farming and
breaking down the morale of the agency assistants. The In-
dians, led to believe that Crook alone had authority, were
naturally mystified at the intricacies of the white man's con-
trol. Furthermore, Roberts said he was unable to disarm
his charges, because of the whiskey that came to them
through the post trader. With the military looking upon him
as "nothing more or less than a commissary sergeant," he
held that the peace plan could never be successful so long
as the troops had their hold at Camp Apache. His views
appeared to be well-founded when in September, 1874, the
military began to supervise the issuance of rations.37
But of greater misfortune to the integrity of the civil
34. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 2, 1873, /. F., 1414 ; Randall to A. A. G., Aug. 23,
1873, A. G. O., 5228.
35. Roberts to Smith, April 7, 1874, I. O., R 299; Roberts to Smith, Aug. 31,
1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. 1, p. 594.
36. P. A. to Roberts, July 2, 1874, I. O., R 450.
37. Roberts to Smith, July 6, 1874, I. O., R 561 ; Ferris to Smith, Sept. 25, 1874,
I. O., F 409.
In October, Inspector J. W. Daniels found that Roberts had issued cattle at eight
hundred pounds when their real weight was only six hundred pounds. Daniels to
Smith, Oct. 19, 1874, I. O., D 1173.
200 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
authority than the opposition of the military was the part
Roberts played in the reduction of the White Mountain Res-
ervation. Proposals for the reduction of the reserve had first
been made in 1873 when it became evident that the eastern
portion, near the present Clifton, Arizona, was rich in min-
eral deposits.38 Charles Lesinsky and later E. M. Pearce,
who declared they did not know their properties were on res-
ervation territory, had brought in over one hundred men,
expended perhaps as much as $75,000 for equipment and had
been taking out coppor ore since the summer of 1872. When
the true wealth of the region became obvious, Surveyor Gen-
eral John Wasson, Delegate McCormick and Governor Saf-
f ord began attempts to have the coveted area returned to the
public domain. A petition from Lesinsky on December 10,
1873, started political manipulation between territorial and
federal officials, which soon enmeshed Agent Roberts. And
after a winter of varied and voluminous correspondence39
from many sources, Commissioner Smith on April 20, 1874,
asked Roberts to reply by telegram regarding the desirability
of reduction. But instead of complying, Roberts compromised
himself during the next two months in a series of confer-
ences he started at Tucson with territorial officials.40 He
88. Arizona Citizen, Nov. 8, 22, 1873; Safford to Delano, Nov. 26, 1873, I. O.,
S 802.
39. The entire correspondence of the episode is collected in one file. See I. O.
R 809.
40. L. C. Hughes, the territorial attorney general, appears to have been the chief
conspirator. Stating that considerable expense had been involved in the segregation
efforts, Hughes pressed Lesinsky to know how much could be paid to get the mine segre-
gated. When Lesinsky wished to know further particulars, Hughes wrote that he
was "not at liberty to state who the parties are, what the expense is or has arisen
from, or who has paid it ;" but saying that he wanted to know "what is the best you
can do," assured Lesinsky that "this whole matter will be conducted in good faith on
our part." A few days later, Hughes told Lesinsky in a personal conference that "all
United States business is conducted on basis of buy and sell." In I. O., R 809 file, see
especially: Hughes to Lesinsky, June 23, 1874. (Hughes had written Lesinsky an
earlier letter with no date.). Pearce to Wasson, July 13, 1874. (Pearce charged that
Hughes had made the same proposal to him.). Lesinsky to Wasson, July 13, 1874, and
Wasson to Smith, July 18, 1874. Openly charging extortion, Wasson exposed the
scandal in the press. See Arizona Citizen, July 25, 1874. Safford removed Hughes
from office on July 30, after the local bar association had voted the attorney general
as being unethical. Ibid., Aug. 1, 1874. According to the commissioner of Indian
affairs, Hughes wanted $5,000 for the deal. Smith to Ferris, Oct. 27, 1874, L. B. no.
120, pp. 405-407.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 201
then tried to avoid his implication by recommending the
proposed reduction ;41 but finding his reputation clouded, de-
clared that he had been thrust into a plot designed to bring
about his removal.42 An investigation that followed in the
fall revealed nothing new, although the commissioner of
Indian affairs did decide that the agent had been made the
unconscious victim of a plot.43
Conditions might have improved at the reservation,
but in December Roberts, still in conflict with the military,
resorted to drunkenness and formed a liaison with a
Mexican strumpet. Lawlessness soon became so flagrant
that the military merely awaited an opportunity to seize
the agency. The occasion arose several weeks later when
Roberts arranged to hold a count of the bands on February
26, 1875. Immediately, the military announced that instead
they would count the Indians on the 27th, and they invited
the agent to act a witness. A prolonged snow storm kept
Roberts from making his count, but he kept the Indians
peaceable by continuing to make issues to them on a basis
of former records. There was some delay, however, and
when certain chiefs remonstrated, Captain F. D. Ogilby
seized the agency by force, ousted Roberts and declared that
a bloody outbreak had been narrowly averted. Much per-
plexed, Commissioner Smith solved the dilemma by trans-
ferring the Camp Apache Agency to Agent Clum.44 Thus,
as in the case of the Verde Indians, the problem of Coyotero
41. Roberts waited until in July before taking this action. Instead of sending a
telegram direct from Tucson, he returned to Camp Apache and by mail sent one, dated
July 1, to Dr. R. A. Wilbur of Tucson, to transmit to Commissioner Smith. Wilbur did
not get the letter until July 16. Ordinarily letters from the post reached Tucson in two
to four days. Smith to Ferris, Dec. 28, 1874, L. B. no. 122, p. 137.
42. Roberts to Smith, Aug. 6, 1874, I. O., R 510. John Titus, the former territorial
chief justice, declared Roberts had been persecuted by three or four grafters controlled
by a knot of federal officials. Titus to Smith, Aug. 8, 1874, I. O., T 593. Commissioner
Smith said that Titus encouraged Roberts to get extra pay for the segregation. Smith
to Ferris, Oct. 27, 1874, op. cit.
43. Ibid; Daniels to Smith, Dec. 2, 1874, I. O., D 1223. Commissioner Smith, in
December, declared that Roberts would be required to resign unless he explained his
delay in correspondence. Smith to Ferris, Dec. 28, 1874, L. B. no. 122, p. 138. Neither
Roberts nor the Bureau appear to have taken further action.
44. Roberts to Smith, Mar. 3, 1875, I. O., R 156 ; Ogilby to A. A. G., Mar. 11, 1876,
A. G. O., 1677 ; Smith to Clum, Mar. 31, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 77.
202 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
management was also merged with that of the San Carlos
bands.
The peace plan from the time of its inception among the
Verde and Coyotero bands was sharply modified by military
interference. But among the Chiricahuas, the experiment of
peace was to be shaped by civil hands throughout. In fact,
immediately after the peace with Cochise was made in 1872,
Agent Jeffords settled down without military aid to carry
out Howard's generous promises. He was not long in learn-
ing that little tangible support was to be expected from his
superiors. At first he was furnished sufficient beef, but
nothing else; and when he made some unauthorized pur-
chases the superintendent reprimanded him. Later, in the
spring of 1873, the Indian Bureau sent him a consignment
of subsistence supplies valued at $4,069.45
The agent was quite satisfied with the excellent conduct
of his charges who, to the disgust of "prophetic croakers/'
did not leave the reservation at the close of the winter. Co-
chise cooperated by turning over all stolen animals and
Jeffords led an arduous life keeping the bands "straight."
Apparently no aid came to him during the summer of 1873 ;
neither was anything of an official nature done for the In-
dians. But by furnishing medicines at his own expense and
by exchanging his excess flour for trader's corn Jeffords
saved the Chiricahuas from the usual epidemics of fevers
and dietary troubles.46 Such irregular practices, of course,
brought him into disfavor with his superiors, but as a conse-
quence they were led to consider his problems. In August,
1873, the Indian Bureau promised to pay the indebtedness
of $6200 owed by the Chiricahua Agency, and a few weeks
later when such "satisfactory results of the peace policy"
became apparent, the acting commissioner liberally sup-
plied the Indians for the first time.47
45. Jeffords to Smith, Aug. 31, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iv, p.
659 ; Bendell to Jeffords, Jan. 2, 1878, S. L. B. vol. ii, p. 39 ; Jeffords to Bendell, April
15. 1873, I. O.. B 229.
46. Jeffords to Howard, May 25, 1873, I. O., H 495 ; Jeffords to Smith, July 25,
1873, I. O., J 583.
47. Acting Comm. to Delano, Sept. 26, 1873, I. D.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 203
Unfortunately, conditions among the Chiricahuas were
not promising for the future. The warriors, well supplied
with guns and ammunition, preferred to hunt and make
"tiswin" rather than to take up the practices of sedentary
life. Cochise was also losing his influence with advancing
age; besides, there was little harmony among his bands.
Furthermore, Inspector Vandever reported that the very
inaccurate count of over 1100 Indians probably included
four hundred disaffected and insubordinate visitors who
were only too eager to encourage raids into Mexico. In
characterizing the Chiricahuas as a group of wild mountain
Indians adverse to civilization and instruction, he insisted
that they would never work as long as they could get a living
by any other method. Neither were the agent's methods en-
couraging: obedience was purely voluntary; the Indians
were never mustered; visiting braves were rationed; and
rations enough for whole bands were issued every fifteen
days to a few individuals who were supposed to represent
the larger groups. From Jeffords' viewpoint reform was
impracticable.48
The problem of Chiricahua management was further
complicated, because the southern boundary of the reserve
was identical with fifty-five miles of the northern boundary
of Mexico. Crook's superiors had early characterized the
location of the Chiricahuas next to Mexico as a "breach of
good neighborhood," and there appeared to be much truth
to the assertion, especially when it was learned that the
most vicious Indians from the Tulerosa, San Carlos and
White Mountain Reservations gravitated toward the Chiri-
cahua country, where they there joined the incorrigibles in
raids against the nearby Mexican settlements.49 Crook, fear-
ing that embarrassing diplomatic difficulties might arise,
early in 1873 decided to enforce General Orders no. 10 among
the Chiricahuas. However the undertaking was immediately
48. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 18, 1873, I. F., 1397; Jeffords to Smith, Aug. 31,
1873, op. cit., p. 660.
49. Schofield to A. G., Dec. 26, 1872, A. G. O., 286; Crook to A. G., Feb. 11,
1873, A. G. O., 831.
204 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
dropped, for the general not only learned that Howard had
promised Cochise immunity from the military, but also that
the chief understood raids into Mexico were not to be con-
sidered as a violation of the peace. Howard was now pressed
for a definitive statement regarding the detailed provisions
of the treaty, but a voluminous and tiresome correspondence
throughout the summer merely tended to substantiate the
view that the Chiricahuas were to be managed without the
use of troops.50
Meanwhile, Jeffords continued his paternal but loose
management of the Chiricahuas, and the fact that the tribe
failed to advance towards civilization was mainly caused by
factors beyond his control. In September, 1873, he removed
the bands from Sulphur Springs to the San Simon, where the
prospects for agriculture were brighter; but the unhealth-
f ul nature of the new location caused Inspector Vandever, in
November, to order them removed to Pinery Canyon, a
region where sedentary life was impossible. Requests for a
school now failed; the Indian Office even neglected to pro-
vide a sufficient amount of annuity goods for the winter of
1873-1874.51 The younger braves were only deterred from
raiding by the most vigorous labor of Cochise and Jeffords,
and the reserve would have been deserted had not the agent
been able to issue a fairly regular supply of corn and beef.
As an added weight to his burdens, he felt compelled to feed
about four hundred visitors, who as recalcitrants at the
other Apache reserves had taken refuge with the Chiri-
cahuas.52
Although the department of the interior was unwilling
to modify its civil policy as regards the Chiricahuas, the idea
of removing them to some other reservation was taking root.
Vandever's report in January, 1874, indicated that their
60. Ibid. See also, Sherman to Secty. of War (with an endorsement by Howard),
Feb. 28, 1873, I. O., 788 ; Gov. I. Pesquira to Safford, Mar. 14, 1873, in Arizona Citizen,
April 5, 1878 ; Smith to Howard, Sept. 19, 1873, I. D. ; Howard to Comm., Sept. 23,
1873, I. D.
51. Jeffords to Smith, Sept. 1, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 595.
52. Ibid.; Vandever to Comm., Jan. 23. 1874. I. D.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 205
reserve would always be a center for renegades, a source of
trouble with Mexico and a place devoid of the requisites for
the development of a civilized life. He was therefore in favor
of removing them to New Mexico, but Commissioner Smith
thought the proposal impossible. Nevertheless, in order to
provide a future reservation, if needed, Canada Alamosa was
withdrawn from the public domain.53
Superintendent Dudley of New Mexico was now ordered
to sound the Chiricahuas regarding the possibility of their
removal. He reached their reserve late in May, 1874, only to
find Cochise at the point of death ;54 but of more serious im-
port, the attitude of the chief's bands convinced him that they
would resist removal to the bitter end. However, he was
surprised to find that the two hundred and fifty Southern
Apache visitors were quite willing to return to Canada Ala-
mosa. Thus, with the general situation so delicate, the super-
intendent decided against making any specific recommenda-
tions.55
Jeffords reluctantly retained his position as agent,
largely as a matter of duty. Although he had no difficulty in
keeping his charges quiet, the evidence was plain that they
were making no progress towards civilization. Early in
September, he reported that 930 individuals were under his
control, but two weeks later Inspector J. W. Daniels observed
that only 645 Indians were present for rations. Yet Daniels
strongly insisted that the results of Jeffords* civil control
were superior to those obtained at the other Apache reserves
where the military played a prominent part.56
Many of Jeffords* troubles were due to the fact that the
Chiricahuas' close kinsmen, the Southern Apaches, had not
been reduced to satisfactory reservation control. In fact,
53. Delano to Secty. of War, Jan. 7, 1874, Land Division L. B. no. 14, p. 106 ;
Arizona Citizen, Feb. 7, 1874 ; Dudley to Smith, Mar. 28, 1874, I. O.r D 339.
54. Cochise died on June 8, 1874. The bands immediately chose Tahzay, Cochise's
eldest son, to be their chief. Jeffords to Smith, June 10, 1874, I. O., J 705 ; Arizona
Citizen, June 13, 1874.
55. Dudley to Smith, June 30, 1874, I. O., D 1002; Jeffords to Smith, Sept. 1,
1874, op. cit.
56. Daniels to Smith, Sept. 29, 1874, 7. F., 121, Nov. 7, 1874, I. O., D 1163.
206 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
a great portion of this group instead of moving from Canada
Alamosa to Colyer's Tulerosa Reservation, either roamed
about their former haunts or took refuge with the Chirica-
huas. Those bands that did move to Tulerosa quickly tired
of both the reserve and the agent and, in the hope of forcing
the government to return them to Canada Alamosa, at-
tempted to intimidate the agency officials. But their new
agent, B. M. Thomas, from the time of his appointment in
January, 1873, maintained his control as far as agency man-
agement was concerned. The military cooperated with
Thomas, and to prevent the usual spring exodus they kept
five companies of cavalry near the reserve limits. The com-
mand nonchalantly moved about a few miles at day, but
always with no special objective in view. This unusual action
was quite effective in restraining most of the warriors;
nevertheless, during the summer some scattered raids were
made against the Rio Grande settlements. Major W. R. Price
attempted to arrest the culprits on July 25, but the approach
of his three troops of cavalry was the signal for a general
flight; and en masse, the Southern Apaches fled towards
the Chiricahua country.57
The problem of their control now became more difficult
than ever before, for out of the six hundred individuals
rationed during the winter of 1872-1873, four hundred were
presumed to have taken refuge with Cochise.58 The com-
missioner of Indian affairs ordered Jeffords to stop issues
to all visitors without permits and Inspector Vandever
insisted that all transients should be arrested. However,
the inspector was careful to state that more progress could
be accomplished with less military participation in the man-
agement of the reserves. Jeffords, faced with the actual
problem of managing the visitors, issued enough extra
rations to keep them at peace.59
57. Thomas to Dudley, Sept. 4, 1873, 43 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iv, p.
648; Vandever to Delano, Sept. 22, 1873, /. F., 1884; Price to A. A. G., July 80,
A. G. O.. 3323.
58. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 18, 1873, /. F., 1397.
59. Smith to Jeffords, Nov. 21, 1873, L. B. no. 115, p. 42 ; Vandever to Comm.,
Jan. 23, 1874, L D.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 207
Two hundred of the Southern Apaches returned to the
Tulerosa Reservation during the summer and fall of 1873.
But still yearning for their old homes at Canada Alamosa,
they remained with Agent Thomas only through fear of mil-
itary punishment. Yet they proved to be docile, and during
the following winter sent some of their children to school,
handled agency stores for pay in merchandise and con-
structed a crude irrigation project. In the spring of 1874
they planted the new irrigated area to vegetables, but a kill-
ing frost in June and rumors that the government intended
to transfer them back to Canada Alamosa, destroyed what
little interest they retained for the Tulerosa Reservation.60
The Southern Apaches, in fact, perplexed the Indian
Office almost as much as the Chiricahuas. Colyer had moved
them to the Tulerosa Reservation in order to inaugurate the
"Peace Plan," but now the officials believed that the Indians
would be less troublesome if returned to Canada Alamosa.
Telegraphic correspondence proved that Superintendent
Dudley had also changed his mind : He reported that a ree's-
tablishment of the agency at Canada Alamosa would satisfy
the citizens and Indians, induce a sedentary mode of life and
allow a successful concentration of the Chiricahuas at the
same point.61 Then Commissioner Smith ordered further
investigation, but an executive order issued by President
Grant on April 9, 1874, which designated the area to be a
reservation, proved that a decision had already been made.62
The decision to transfer the Southern Apaches to
Canada Alamosa was undoubtedly made in an effort to keep
them away from the Chiricahua Reservation. But even after
the removal Jeffords was authorized to feed visiting groups
so that they might be deterred from going on into Mexico.63
Those bands that did move to Canada Alamosa refrained
from marauding upon the surrounding settlements, but a
60. Thomas to Smith, Aug. 81, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 617.
61. Dudley to Smith, April 14, 1874, I. O., D 425.
62. Smith to Dudley, April 15, 1874, L. B. no. 118, p. 43 ; Executive Orders Relat-
ing to Indian Reservations, p. 120.
63. Comm. to Jeffords, June 30, 1874, L. B. no. 118, p. 394.
208 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
traffic in domestic animals that came from the Chiricahua
Reservation, indicated that the old association remained un-
broken. Officials now realized that the Chiricahua and
Southern Apaches problem was far from a satisfactory solu-
tion; they were also aware that any acts of hostility by
either of the two groups would call for the most drastic
action on the part of the government.64
Despite the fact that the affairs of the Chiricahuas and
the Southern Apaches were far from a satisfactory state,
the evidence shows that the peace plan had proved immedi-
ately effective in reducing the difficulty of controlling these
two erratic Apache groups. A similar result had been at-
tained in the case of the Verde bands. And even in the face
of a hostile military opposition at Camp Apache, the peace
plan had improved the government's relations with the
friendly Coyoteros. But at the Camp Grant Reservation the
plan failed to effect any decided change in the status of the
Arivaipa and Final groups. This single exception probably
occurred because of General Howard's decision that it would
be necessary to remove them to the isolated San Carlos
Reservation and also because of the difficulty in finding a
competent agent for the bands.
The difficulty in finding a satisfactory agent for the
Camp Grant Indians is shrouded in deep mystery — it
appears that the territorial politicians were having great
influence in the management of the reserve at the time.
George H. Stevens, whom Howard made temporary agent in
August, 1872, was replaced on December 20, by Charles F.
Larrabee of Maine. Since several weeks were required for
Larrabee to reach his post, Stevens was apparently not noti-
fied of the change.65 During the interval the Indians ap-
peared to be satisfied, and although the agent conducted
64. Capt. A. B. Kauffman to A. A. G., Sept. 25, 1874, A. G. O., 4188 ; Dudley to
Smith, Oct. 27, 1874, 48 Cong., 2 sess., H. E, D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 610.
65. Walker to Larrabee, Dec. 20, 1872, L. B. no. 110, p. 231.
A malicious sergeant of the First Cavalry wrote a scurrilous letter against Howard,
which, posed as a work of Stevens, led to the latter's replacement. Walker to Howard,
Dec. 21. 1872, L. B. no. 110, p. 281 ; Stevens to McCormick, Sept. 6, 1878, I. O., M 127.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 209
affairs smoothly the superintendent vaguely accused him of
"bad management" and "official corruption." But evidently
certain political machinations were occurring, for Dr. R. A.
Wilbur of Tucson was placed in temporary charge on Feb-
ruary 9, 1873.66
The next day, General Crook, while holding a confer-
ence with the chiefs, learned that the bands were eager to
remove to San Carlos at once. He quickly persuaded Wilbur
to take action, and giving complete military cooperation, had
the satisfaction of seeing the entire group of 1,500 Indians
transferred during the next five days to their new home.67
The change in location naaturally produced a temporary
relaxation of discipline among the bands, with the result
that disruptive conflicts for leadership broke out. The In-
dians also irked by the presence of two companies of cavalry
threatened war if the troops were not removed at once.68
Just at this most inopportune moment Larrabee arrived
and assumed his duties as agent, relieving Dr. Wilbur. But
Wilbur had probably contemplated to stay much longer
and "being thus immediately ousted, did all that a
thoroughly bad man could do." He fomented opposition
against the new agent in the hope that the Indians would
either kill or drive him from the reservation. Should this
occur, Wilbur felt he would be retained in office and thus be
in a position to control the purchase of the reservation sup-
plies to his own and his friends' advantage.69
The Indians probably would have eliminated Larrabee
within a short time had not rivalry among the bands made
it expedient to use him as a go-between. As a result, he be-
came an important figure in their councils, and by promising
them liberal supplies succeeded in getting the bands to start
an irrigation ditch and to plant sixty acres of corn. But
66. Bendell to Walker, Feb. 1, 1873, S. L. B., vol. ii, p. 91; 43 Cong., 1 ness.,
H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iv, p. 657.
67. Wilbur to Smith, Mar. 3, 1873, I. O., Ariz. Miac; Larabee to Comm., Mar.
29, 1873, ibid.
68. Larrabee to Comm., April 30, 1873, ibid.
69. Larrabee to Bendell, Feb. 28, 1878, ibid.; Titus to Smith, July 25, 1878, I. O.
L 208.
210 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
unfortunately the long-standing leadership of Eskiminzin
and Chiquito was challenged by two aggressive warriors,
Chuntz and Cochinay. Even worse, the favorite wife of
Chiquito was seduced by one of Chuntz's followers ; and al-
most as if compensation were governing, one of the latter's
headmen was shot dead by a partisan of Eskiminzin. Sev-
eral days of intense excitement followed these occurrences,
and Larrabee, realizing the impracticability of managing
the Apaches without the aid of the military, requested that
a company of cavalry be posted at the agency.70
The immediate arrival of the troops probably prevented
a general stampede of the Indians, but the proximity of the
military offered no check to the nefarious plotting of Dr.
Wilbur.71 Larrabee's control weakened meanwhile, and on
a ration day near the last of May, 1873, Sheshet, a notorious
warrior belonging to Cochinay's band, attempted to assassi-
nate him. In the resultant melee, Lieutenant Jacob Almy, in
temporary charge of the troops was brutally murdered.
Larrabee now gave the military full control and deciding
a few days later that his influence was completely destroyed
sent in his resignation with a recommendation that a mili-
tary man be named as agent.72
The military, of course, seized the opportunity to lash
with fury at the incompetence of the civil administration.
Captain W. H. Brown informed Crook that "it is not dis-
puted that this reservation has been rotten to the core. The
Indians have been tampered with, the agents have been
rascals and knaves, the Interpreters have been liars and
thieves . . ." 73 The general even charged that the "criminal
conduct of Dr. Wilbur," which he now "virtually confessed,"
70. Larrabee to Comm., Mar. 29, 1873, I. O., L 53 ; Report, Board of Investiga-
tion on Lt. Jacob Almy's Death, A. G. O., 2933.
71. By liberal gifts Wilbur won the confidence of both Eskiminzin and the
agency interpreter. Wilbur wanted the agency beef to be delivered on hoof (graft
was easy by this method ) , while Larrabee insisted that it be furnished on the block.
When Wilbur saw that he could not "put a head" on Larrabee, he was ready to sac-
rifice life "to gain his purpose." Ibid.
72. Ibid.; Larrabee to Capt. W. H. Brown, June 1, 1873, I. O., B 586; Larrabee
to Smith, June 30, 1873, I. O.. L 208.
73. Brown to A. A. G., June 15, 1873, A. G. O., 2933.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 211
was merely "the outcropping of the old rottenness at Camp
Grant." 74
Fully determined to put a stop to the "weak and vacil-
lating policy" as administered by the Indian Office, Crook
instructed Brown to inaugurate a "firm and decided" policy
of "impartial justice to all who do well, the olive branch to
all who desire to be at peace, but certain punishment to the
wrongdoers."75 Brown had evidently anticipated the in-
structions and by a series of daily counts found that there
were only 1,200 Indians on the rolls instead of the 1,500
reported by Larrabee. More important his rigid discipline
and exact rationing not only reduced drunkenness but also
brought order and obedience.76
A constant interest in the growing crops was main-
tained by many of the Indians — especially by the chiefs and
headmen. Thus convinced that farming would rapidly ex-
pand, Brown continued the work upon Larabee's irrigation
ditch. The Indians also showed great interest in the eighty-
three head of stock cattle that were sent them during the
summer, and Brown, noting that their sense of ownership
was greatly heightened, reported that "their industry only
needs the proper direction to make it permanent and profit-
able." 77 Because of Brown's careful efforts, the Indians
were soon willing to conform to the wishes of the govern-
ment. But the civil authority was not content to allow this
important position to remain in military hands. The com-
missioner of Indian affairs, therefore, in late October,
ordered the captain to turn over the San Carlos Indians to
Agent Roberts of the Camp Apache Agency.78
74. Crook to A. A. G., July 3, 1873, ibid. Wilbur acknowledged that his conduct
had been "wrong" and "indiscreet." He wrote Larrabee that he was willing to
make "proper amends for the past." Copy of letter of June 30, 1873, I. O., L 208.
75. A. A. G. to Brown, July 3, 1873, A. G. O., 2933.
76. Brown to A. A. G., June 15, 1873, op. cit.
77. Brown to Comm., July 7, 1873, I. O.f B 640, July 81, 1873, B 734. Brown
thought that if the contracts were let in Washington the consequent removal of
"local prejudices" would render the "position of the Agent more free from embarrass-
ment." Brown to Comm., Aug. 31, 1873, I. O., B 820.
78. Vandever to Delano, Oct. 13, 1873, I. F., 1390 ; Comm. to Brown and Roberts,
Oct. 29, 1873, L. B. no. 114, p. 865.
212 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
However, this bureaucratic move appears to have had
no effect on the hold of the military, for Major Randall, who
replaced Captain Brown as commandant of the agency
guard, assumed at once a dominant role in agency affairs.79
Much to the Indians' displeasure, he initiated a very harsh
scheme of discipline, and later, on January 1, 1874, either
through fear or malevolent designs arrested Chief Eskimin-
zin.80 Three days afterward the chief escaped only to be
followed into the mountains by seven sympathetic bands.
Most of them returned within a short time, but because of the
severe weather conditions that prevailed they were allowed
to erect their lodges on the high ground across the Gila from
the agency. While they were thus encamped, a heavy flood
cut off their communication with the agency officials. Chuntz
and his fellow conspirators now seized this propitious op-
portunity to again establish themselves as leaders, and on
January 31 while the Gila was still impassable, induced a
band of inebriated warriors to attack a party of freighters
who had been forced to encamp near the Indian village. This
outrage convinced the mass of the Indians that they would
be punished for the crime of a few ; therefore, leaving behind
nearly all their possessions, they fled in pandemonium from
the scene of the attack.81
Most of the Indians kept within the limits of the reser-
vation, but some fifty vicious braves raided through to Old
Camp Grant and on to Tempe, killing six persons and destroy-
ing much property.82 In conformity with the "Peace Policy"
all the Indians absent from the agency now became objects
79. Roberts, on December 9, 1873, assigned the San Carlos Agency to Dr. John B.
White, the agency physician. White to Smith, Aug. 9, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E.
D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 597.
80. Daniels to Smith, Oct. 17, 1874, 7. F., 122. Crook fully supported Brown's
action. Crook to A. G., April 10, 1874, A. G. O., 1562.
81. White to Roberts, Feb. 1, 1874, I. O., W 849 ; Arizona, Citizen, Feb. 7, 1874.
Crook in explaining that & "temporizing policy" was considered "expedient" at
San Carlos, substantiates, to a great degree, Clum's later charge that civil-military
conflict, lack of discipline and failure to arrest renegades, caused the outbreak. Crook
to A. G., April 10, 1874, op. cit.; John P. Clum, The Truth About the Apaches (Los
Angeles, 1931), p. 3.
82. Arizona Citizen, Feb. 14, 28, 1874.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 213
of military management, and troops immediately organized
to pursue them were directed to "take no prisoners." This
action indicated that the military was bent on a policy of
ruthless extermination. Fortunately for the Apaches, only
a few commands were available for pursuit and these were
kept practically inactive due to raging floods. But after a
short period of terrific hardships, the Indians, fully realiz-
ing the folly of their ill-advised flight, fairly begged to sur-
render. And when Crook gave them this privilege in April
all the bands returned much crestfallen and with a most
cooperative attitude.83
During the next three months the penitents proved by
their conduct that they were susceptible of civilization. They
now not only furnished scouts to run down the numerous
criminals and renegades among their bands, but also, by
promptly punishing all fellow members guilty of an outrage,
proved that they had come to regard discipline as an abso-
lute necessity. Moreover, they successfully cultivated two
hundred and sixty acres of vegetables and grain. Dr. John
B. White, the nominal agent, had little difficulty in persuad-
ing them to adopt revolutionary changes in sanitation. They
built more healthful lodges, used less eye paint, avoided
tainted foods, changed their bathing habits to avoid fevers,
and the medicine men took up Dr. White's medicinal prac-
tices as far as possible. Much impressed with the changed
attitude of his charges, White wrote Commissioner Smith a
long and sanguine letter on August 5, 1874, in which he sug-
gested that "honesty of purpose" would bring "substantial
improvement" to the Apaches.84 This suggestion indicated
that Apache control needed a revitalization. And, in fact,
a new order for the San Carlos bands was close at hand, for
six days later John P. Clum, their new civilian agent, de-
terminedly assumed charge of the San Carlos Agency.85
83. Clum, "Eskiminzin," in N. Mex. Historical Review, vol. iii, p. 408, et eeg.;
Arizona Citizen, Feb. 28, 1874.
84. White to Smith, Aug. 5, 1874, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 5, 1874. See also White
to Smith, Aug. 9, 1874, op. et*.; Crook to A. A. G., Aug. 31, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess.,
H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 61.
85. Clum to Smith, Aug. 11, 1874, I. O., C 704.
CHAPTER VI
JOHN P. CLUM AND THE TRIUMPH OF CIVIL CONTROL
THE ARRIVAL of John P. Clum at San Carlos on August 8,
18741 marked the beginning of a new era in Apache af-
fairs. Appointed as agent on the recommendation of the
Dutch Reformed Church, he was especially well fitted for the
difficult task that awaited him.2 In addition to superior edu-
cation and frontier experience, he possessed extraordinary
energy and tenacity of purpose; furthermore, he had a
natural bent for journalistic controversy — a valuable asset
for any official on the frontier.
Even before Clum assumed his duties he began to sus-
pect that most of the Apache troubles emanated from a
deadly mixture of civil and military control known to pre-
vail at the reservation. Accordingly, he made a careful study
of the tribe, confirmed his suspicions and determined to
eliminate the interference of the military in all Indian mat-
ters of a purely civil nature.3
He had likewise decided that the best way to eliminate
the military was to ignore it ; therefore, three days after his
arrival, and without the aid of a military officer, he success-
fully inspected the villages and counseled with the chiefs.
This bold start made him very aggressive, and in hastening
to inform the commissioner of the Indians' intelligent, paci-
fic and cooperative attitude, he let it be known that he was
formulating recommendations designed to further curtail
the prerogatives of the military group.4
But the military was not content to be so easily ousted.
Lieutenant J. B. Babcock, in command at San Carlos, in-
formed Clum that the military had controlled Apache affairs
since the January outbreak, not to usurp the agent's control,
1. Clum to Smith, Aug. 8, 1874, I. O., C 682.
2. Delano to Comm., Mar. 2, 1874, I. O., I 227.
3. Clum to Comm., Aug. 31, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 297.
4. Clum to Comm., Aug. 11, 1874, I. O., C 704.
214
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 215
but merely to obtain a permanent peace. He suggested that
all future councils with the Indians should be held jointly to
promote harmony and that the military was willing to sus-
tain the civil authority if the agent would endorse orders
given under General Crook's instructions.5 Clum, of course,
agreed that harmony was very essential, but his decisive
reply settled the question that in all non-military matters he
intended to exercise sole control.6
Despite this rebuff, Babcock still insisted upon coopera-
tion "where duties touch closely at the edges." He immedi-
ately had a friendly conference with Clum, and then
informed Crook that although the agent resented the "slight-
est touch" of military control, he nevertheless saw the sense
of military supervision of passes and counts. He also re-
ported that Clum was in full accord with the military policy
"to punish wrongdoers, to keep out outlaws and to make the
Indians work."7 But Crook did not waver, and on August 20
he instructed Babcock to disregard the agent's wishes if they
became an impediment to the safety of the reservation. Thus
fortified, Babcock resolved to retain the advantages the
military had gained "with or without permission" of the
agent.8 But that very day the agent withdrew the right to
make counts and issue passes, stating moreover, that all
facts of record would be available for inspection at the
agency office.9
Crook now faced a dilemma, and after inviting instruc-
tions,10 sent Major Randall from Fort Apache to iron out the
difficulty. Even this move failed, for Clum announced that
all coercive measures would be reported directly to the sec-
retary of the interior. Randall therefore decided against
interference although in making this decision he was
5. Babcock to Clum, Aug. 15, 1874, A. G. O., 4003.
6. Clum to Babcock, Aug. 15, 1874, I. O., C 789.
7. Babcock to A. A. G., Aug. 18, 1874, A. G. O., 4003.
8. Crook to Babcock, Aug. 20, 1874, ibid; Babcock to A. A. G., Aug. 29, 1874, ibid.
9. Clum to Babcock, Aug. 29, 1874, I. O., C 789.
10. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 3, 1874, I. O., W 1654. The general was no doubt
sincere in believing that lack of proper surveillance might result in another Camp
Grant Massacre affair.
216 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
prompted by the thought that the inexperienced agent would
soon be glad to call in the help of the military.11
During the time of the short and decisive controversy
Clum's time had not been sufficiently monopolized to inter-
fere with his regular agency duties. He first won the In-
dians* confidence, and then inaugurated a simple plan of
self-government whereby the bands were to be policed by
four bucks of their own choice. The plan demonstrated its
immediate efficacy, for the bands not only submitted to dis-
armament, but they also gave up the manufacture of
tiswin.12
With equal energy, he struck at the lack of proper
agency facilities by starting a building program within ten
days after his arrival. He requested $5,000 for the work,
but got $12,000.13 Thus encouraged, and more convinced
than ever that labor was one of the most effective ways to
civilize the Indians, he employed them to as great an extent
as possible. An office and quarters for the personnel were
first started; then he elaborated his plans with the aim of
making the work last for several years. The Indians re-
sponded eagerly and were willing to do any kind of work at
fifty cents per day. Clum suggested to the commissioner,
however, that payment in goods would have a greater civil-
izing effect upon them than money wages alone.14
He also included in his plans a reorganized farm pro-
gram. Each of the ten bands was to be given an equal allot-
ment of land from the agency farm, and they were to remove
their villages close to the scene of their work. He asked for
11. Clum to Smith, Sept. 8, 1874, I. O., C 789.
A little later when Clum learned that the Indian Office was elated with the outcome
of the controversy, he grew much bolder, announced that the military was the chief
obstacle to the consummation of the peace policy, and requested that all the troops be
withdrawn beyond the limits of the reservation. Smith to Clum, Oct. 6, 1874, L. B.
no. 120, p. 265 ; Clum to Comm., Oct. 16, 1874, I. O., C 887.
12. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 134, et seq.
The idea of Indian police was not new in Arizona. A force had been used success-
fully on the Navajo reservation in 1872. See JR. C. I. A., 1872, p. 296. The Dutch Re-
formed officials advocated a police force in 1873. See R. B. 7. C., 1873, p. 180.
18. Smith to Clum, Sept. 14, 1874, L. B. no. 119, p. 464.
14. Clum to Comm., Aug. 22, 1874, I. O., C 707.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 217
scales, blacksmith and carpenter tools, harness, oils, wagons,
mule shoes and several teams of mules. If supported in his
program and furnished necessary equipment, he predicted
that within a year he could show the Indian Office unex-
pected results.15
The Indians readily adjusted themselves to the new ad-
ministration. The men were counted daily and the women
and children every Saturday. With the aid of an "Apache
court" the enforcement of discipline practically ceased to be
a problem. Rations were issued on a weekly basis, each
individual receiving the same amount. Frequently, friendly
groups pooled their quotas in order to receive a full sack of
flour or a whole beef.16
When Inspector Daniels visited the agency in October,
he was struck with the changed attitude of happiness and
satisfaction noticeable among all the bands. It was obvious
to him that their success in agriculture had already placed
them far ahead of any of the other Apaches in his district,
and he urged the introduction of sheep as an added incentive
to keep them near home and out of the mountains. The
agent received praise for his initial success and he was more-
over strongly supported in his contention that the civil
authority should have sole control over reserve affairs.17
Of even greater importance, the inspector learned
about military interference at first hand. In a council with
the chiefs 18 he was asked to return certain San Carlos In-
dians who had been held captive at Fort Apache since the
15. Glum to Comm., Aug. 31, 1874, op. cit., p. 298.
Although he had been at San Carlos only a short time, he was nevertheless very
severe on the military in his annual report. Their tardiness in arresting drunken
renegades, he believed, had been the cause of most of the late disasters. He did think,
however, that the recent campaign had demonstrated that outlaws would be captured,
and that bands could be prevented from leaving and returning at their own pleasure.
Ibid.
16. Clum to Comm., Aug. 26, 1784, I. O., C 753. A weekly ration for each one
hundred Indians consisted of: 300 Ibs. of beef, 50 Ibs. of flour, 8 Ibs. of sugar, 4 Ibs. of
coffee, 1 Ib. of salt and 2 bars of soap. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 148.
17. Daniels to Smith, Oct. 17, 1874, I. F., 122.
18. Eskiminzin was once again headchief. He had recently been released from
Fort Grant through the efforts of the new agent. Clum, "Eskiminzin," in N. Mex. H.
Rev., iv (Jan., 1929), 4.
218 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
January outbreak. He agreed to try, and, after reaching the
fort secured the release of twenty-nine prisoners from Agent
Roberts. Within a short time after they had been started
for San Carlos, a troop of cavalry under the command of
Major Ogilby, arrested the Indians and hurried them back
to the post. Although the major admitted that his action
was partly motivated by his personal feelings towards Rob-
erts, yet he insisted that it was in conformity with General
Orders No. 10.19
Such action naturally won the enmity of the Dutch Re-
formed officials. They denounced military interference with
the work of their agents and threatened to cease their coop-
eration if the Indian Office failed to render the proper
support.20
Evidently the commissioner was impressed, for he in-
formed Secretary Delano that the Indians at San Carlos and
Camp Apache were sufficiently under civil control to war-
rant the removal of the military for "quite" a distance and
that their permanent removal at an early date would have a
beneficial effect on all agency administration.21
No action followed, but for several months after the
departure of the inspector, affairs at San Carlos became
more routine. The agent fed his Indians well, made them
labor for everything they received, induced them to sow one
hundred acres of cereals, and won the hearty approval of
the press. Even the governor spoke felicitously of agency
management to the legislature.22
The Indians appeared very happy with the new regime ;
only thirty-two recalcitrants were taken during the winter,
19. Clum to Comm., Oct. 18, 1874, I. O., C 906.
20. Ferris to Smith, Sept. 25, 1874, I. O., F409 ; Ferris to Smith, Oct. 17, 1874,
I. O.. F 468.
21. Smith to Secty., Nov. 1, 1874, 43 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 869.
The board of Indian commissioners also demanded support for the agent against
the military. R. B. I. C., 1874, p. 107.
22. Arizona Citizen, Dec. 19, 1874; Journals of Eighth Legislative Assembly,
1875, p. 87.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 219
and by February not a renegade could be found in their
former haunts.23
By the use of 2500 pounds of soap every three months
and immunization against smallpox, the health of the In-
dians was greatly improved. Already the agent noted a
decided increase in the birth rate.24 With plentiful funds,25
he rapidly pushed his building program and planned its
extension. In March when he received congratulations for
his "progress" and "success" from the commissioner, it ap-
peared that he had conquered all obstacles at his agency.26
Events and policies 27 elsewhere, however, were to bring
a profound transformation in the complexion of affairs at
San Carlos. The arrival and addition of the Verdes in
March, 1875, occasioned such a change.28 Naturally, the
move greatly increased Clum's responsibilities, but after a
brief period of uncertainty he subjected the new charges to
his regular system of discipline. As soon as they started
building houses he admitted them to his scheme of self-gov-
ernment by appointing four of their own men as police. The
Verde group then realized that they were an integral part
of the San Carlos organization.29
Just at the time of the removal of the Verdes, an open
rupture in the civil-military controversy at Fort Apache
resulted in a military coup. The agency was seized, Agent
Roberts deposed and the Rev. J. M. Mickly appointed as
temporary agent.30 Commissioner Smith weighed the situa-
tion for a brief time and determined to hold on to his legiti-
mate rights at all hazards. He therefore ordered Clum to
23. Arizona Citizen, Jan. 23, 1875; Capt. Brayton to A. A. G., Feb. 5, 1876,
A. G. O., 1123.
24. Clum to Comm., Mar. 1, 1875, I. O., C 406.
25. He had already been furnished $25,187 for agency expenses. Clum to Comm.,
Jan. 1, 1875, I. O., C 100.
26. Smith to Clum, Mar. 16, 1875, L. B. no. 123, p. 445.
27. The policy of placing smaller bands upon the. larger reserves, and sometimes
the shifting of larger groups to new locations had been added to the peace plan. Dunn,
Massacres of the Mountains, p. 19. It appears that the idea of a general concentration
of all the western bands was as yet unformed.
28. Cf. supra, p. 194, et »eq.
29. Clum to Editor, Sept. 1, 1875, Arizona Citizen, Sept. 18, 1875.
30. C/. supra, p. 201.
220 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
take charge at Camp Apache until a permanent agent could
be selected.31 With fifty dependable San Carlos Indians,
Clum proceeded to Camp Apache, receipted for the agency
to Roberts, and arrested the Rev. Mickly for opening Rob-
erts' mail. Then, following a few days of counseling in
which the Indians came to understand that all orders were
to come from him, he counted them.32
As this was the first count that had been held at Fort
Apache without military supervision, the commander, Major
F. D. Ogilby, became much excited. Clum was informed that
the military would maintain its control, and count the In-
dians the next day even if an attack had to be made on him
and his Indians at a ration issue that had been set for the
same time. But Major Ogilby realized that it was dangerous
to his commission to fight peaceable Indians, and when Clum
went ahead with his plans, the major desisted, dismissed his
Indian scouts and stopped resistance to the new agent's
program.33
Military efforts to wreck the civil administration now
took a different form. Since the arrival of the Verdes at
San Carlos, the agent had found it necessary to arrest nu-
merous recalcitrant troublemakers. These were turned over
to the commanding officer, who confined them in the military
guardhouse. Likewise, the same arrangement had prevailed
at Fort Apache. Angered at the outcome of his first bout
with the new agent, Major Ogilby quickly perceived that the
recent changes had strained agency discipline to the break-
ing point. As a result, he ordered the release of all prison-
ers held at the two points, and directed that no more should
be received.84 In desperation, Clum requested to be ordered
to Washington where it might be finally decided whether he,
or the officers who were trying to overthrow him, should
exercise control.35
81. Smith to Clum, Mar. 31, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 77.
32. Clum to Smith, April 15, 1875, I. O., C 600.
33. Clum to Smith, April 24, 1875, I. O., C 686 ; Clum to Vandever, May 27, 1877,
7. F., 1660 ; Clum to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, R. C. I. A., p. 216.
84. Post Adjutant to Lt. Ward, April 22, 1875, 7. F.. 1660.
85. Clum to Smith, May 1, 1875, I. O., C 686.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 221
On May 1, when another general count was held at
Camp Apache, it was apparent by the tiswin brawls and
fighting around the camps that the situation was dangerous.
When Clum requested to know if he could rely on military
aid if it should be needed in bringing about order and sub-
ordination, he was told that the military would neither "in-
terfere" with the Indians, nor guard any prisoners. He
also learned that the commanding general had issued in-
structions which only authorized protection to government
property and citizens located at the agencies. As the officers
had already given this information to the Indians, Clum
charged them as being "instigators of insubordination and
hostility."36
By this time the commissioner had decided to end the
deadlock, and the agent was ordered to report at Washing-
ton.37 At the commissioner's office Clum insisted that the
military post at Camp Apache should be removed beyond
the limits of the reservation. This, the commissioner de-
cided was too difficult an undertaking, but he suggested that
it might be feasible to remove the Coyoteros to San Carlos.
Almost at once General Schofield informed the war depart-
ment that the military had the Coyotero troubles solved —
that a removal to San Carlos would merely undo the success
already made. The Dutch Reformed Church supported the
commissioner, and thus encouraged, he advised the secretary
of the interior on June 9, that the successful removal of the
Verdes to San Carlos fully justified a similar removal of the
Coyoteros. There, he believed, in an accessible agricultural
region, they would rapidly advance towards civilization.38
On June 16, Clum was ordered back to Arizona to effect the
removal at once.39
36. Clum to Capt. Worth, May 2, 1875, /. P., 1660 ; Worth to Clum, May 2, 1875,
ibid; Clum to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, op. cit.
37. Smith to Clum, May 14, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 307.
38. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 161 ; Schofield to A. G., June 2, 1875, I. O., W 1032 ;
Ferris to Smith, June 9, 1875, I. O., F 258 ; Smith to Secty. of Interior, June 9, 1875,
R. B. no. 26, pp. 265-266.
39. Acting Secty. to Comm., June 16, 1875, I. O., I 764.
While Clum was in Washington, he received word from Acting Agent Sweeney
222 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
When Clum reached San Carlos, he prepared for the
removal by selecting former agent George H. Stevens and
Chief Eskiminzin with sixty braves to assist him. As all
these Indians were very friendly with the Coyoteros, he
counted on them to do most of the diplomatic work. Clum
and his assistants reached Camp Apache on July 22, and
immediately began a series of powwows. It was found im-
possible to move three bands of about four hundred Indians
because their chiefs and leading men were serving as scouts
for the military. But among the remaining fourteen hun-
dred, about five hundred who had formerly lived near old
Camp Goodwin were eager for the change. Many of the
others hesitated to move until their crops were harvested;
and some of them resisted the plan because of the promises
made by General Howard in 1872. A great many, no doubt,
were deterred by military rumors that they would eventually
be taken to a distant county and killed. Nevertheless, after
Clum had worked out a plan by which six hundred were to
remain on passes at Camp Apache to harvest their crops,
the remaining eight hundred were started towards San
Carlos on July 26. The cavalcade reached its destination on
July 29, and two days later rations were issued at a general
count. At first all the bands were located near the agency,
but after they had become adjusted to the change, some four
hundred and fifty Indians were allowed to move twenty
miles up the Gila to the site of their former home.40
40. Clum to Comm., July 1 (?), 1875, 7. D. The agent was perhaps suffering
from enthusiasm in this report when he wrote: "Thus about 1400 Indians were then
and there virtually transferred to the San Carlos without trouble, notwithstanding the
strong opposition." See also, Ogilby to A. A. G., July 25, 1875, A. G. O., 4730 ; Clum
to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, op. eft., p. 215. Clum informed the commanding general that
700 were removed. Clum to Gen. Kautz, July 26, 1875, A. G. O., 4730.
When Maj. Ogilby was asked for his cooperation in making the removal a success,
(Clum to Ogilby, July 20, 1875, 7. F., 1660), he replied that he could not "interfere"
as long as the Indians were at peace. Ogilby to Clum, July 20, 1875, ibid. Two weeks
after the removal was made the commanding general ordered Ogilby to furnish Clum an
escort for his personal protection during the removal ! The troops, however, were to
compel no Indian to remove. A. A. G. to Clum, Aug. 14, 1875, ibid.
that Major Ogilby had ordered Lieutenant Ward "to take no action whatever," in case
of an outbreak, "but to allow the Indians to proceed at pleasure," and that after the
order became known, all Indians arrested showed a tendency to resist. Clum to Smith,
June 17, 1875, ibid., (n. f.).
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 223
The removal of the Coyoteros, although official, was far
from complete. Less than half of them were actually re-
moved, and recent developments at Washington threatened
to undo all the work that had been done. Agent Clum must
have had an inkling of the trouble, for hastening to Tucson,
he wired the comissioner of the removal, and requested that
the Coyoteros be left in his hands to save disorganization
and dissatisfaction.41 Nevertheless, he was quite surprised
to meet "Colonel" W. E. Morford, who had just arrived
from New York as agent for the Camp Apache Reservation.
Morford, it developed, had been appointed through the
vagaries of politics on July 2, only two weeks after Clum
had been ordered back to Arizona to move the Coyoteros
away from Camp Apache.42 Clum was greatly humiliated
by this apparent lack of support and confidence on the part
of his superiors, but he determined to resist Morf ord's claim
to the position on the grounds that the position no longer
existed. Morford was therefore informed that the agency
buildings at Camp Apache had been destroyed by a fire
almost at the time the Indians were removed.43
But Morford was not to be so easily baffled. He bar-
raged the commissioner with telegrams and letters, and his
friend, Rufus Ingalls, quartermaster general of the army,
interceded for him.44 As a result, the commissioner ordered
Clum to "turn over the Camp Apache Indians to Agent Mor-
41. Clum to Comm., Aug. 4, 1875, I. O., C 1014.
42. Smith to Morford, July 2, 1875, L. B. no. 124, pp. 537-539.
43. When the fire was discovered, evidence showed that the seven buildings had
been fired simultaneously. It was also observed that L. C. Jenkins, the sub-agent, and
his party left for San Carlos about time the buildings started to burn. Lt. C. W. Bailey
to Ogilby, Aug. 14, 1875, A. G. O., 4730.
A communication signed "Jenks," and in Jenkins handwriting was picked up and
sent to the commanding general. It apparently compromised Jenkins and Clum, carry-
ing the news that the Coyoteros interpreted the "burning rightly," as "the death of
affairs connected with them and a change of base." It also said, "Now that we have
conquered ... I will father all that is done that you do not want to ..." Kautz to
A. A. G., Aug. 14, 1875, ibid. In 1877, Clum admitted that the "useless buildings" were
destroyed. Clum to Smith, July 21, 1877, /. D.
44. Morford to Ingalls, Aug. 5, 1875, I. O., M 666; Morford to Smith, Aug. 9,
1875, I. O., M 724 ; Morford to Smith, Aug. 10, 1875, I. O., M 662.
In these communications, Morford said that Clum while at Washington learned
about the probability of his appointment, and that he should have protested then.
224 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ford. There is no other way for the present." 45 As soon as
the two agents reached San Carlos, Morford learned that
nine hundred Indians were still at Camp Apache. He in-
stantly decided to establish himself at that point, but Clum
now refused to transfer the Indians, saying his instructions
only required the transfer of the remaining agency prop-
erty.46 In the next move, when Morford suggested that the
reservation be again divided into two jurisdictions, the com-
missioner compromised, telling Morford to complete the
removal and then take charge, but to leave Clum in control
during the interim.47
But Morford, with ideas of his own, went on to Fort
Apache, formed an alliance with the military, and opened an
agency. And again the fight over removal was reopened,
perhaps with more vehemence than before. Morford re-
ported that affairs were in great confusion with two-thirds
of the Indians unremoved, and many returning from San
Carlos. Charging Clum with deceit and falsity, he said the
only reason removal had been attempted was to displace the
contractors of New Mexico with those of Tucson and San
Francisco.48 Such a verbal barrage appears to have left
Clum nonplussed for a time, but Inspector Kemble came to
his defense by declaring Morford insincere, insubordinate
and untrustworthy; and he characterized Morford's argu-
ment of Fort Apache being a better home for the Coyoteros
than San Carlos, as a "weak echo" of the military.49
45. Smith to Clum, Aug. 14, 1875, ibid.
46. Morford to Smith, Aug. 12, 1875, I. O., M 682.
Clum's refusal to transfer the Indians would indicate that he actually had received
the commissioner's earlier instructions regarding Morford's appointment. For in-
structions, see, Smith to Clum, July 2, 1875, L. B. no. 124, p. 537.
47. Smith to Morford, Aug. 30, 1875, ibid., p. 218. Both of the agents were to
execute the order "faithfully in spirit as well as in letter."
48. Morford to Smith, Aug. 19, 1875, I. O., (n. f.) ; Clum to Smith, Aug. 23,
1875, I. O., C 1049 ; Morford to Ingalls, Oct. 12, 1875, /. D.
Clum reported that two hundred Coyoteros were allowed to return to Camp Apache
to gather corn. Arizona Citizen, Oct. 2, 1775.
49. E. C. Kemble to Smith, Jan. 18, 1876, I. F., 719.
Clum also received strong support from the Arizona Citizen. No doubt his belief
that removal would divert the Indian trade from New Mexico to Arizona, "where it
properly belongs," was the deciding factor in his gaining this aid. Clum to Comm.,
Sept. 1, 1875, op. cit., p. 218. In addition to publishing his news reports, the paper
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 225
The military, of course, seized the opportunity to aid
Morford, hoping thereby to undo Clum's work by prevent-
ing the completion of his removal plans. They advanced
arguments to show that his success was merely the fruition
of their own early efforts and that their help would be neces-
sary to continue it, but that after all, no harmony could be
expected unless the department of the interior sent out an
agent of a more docile type. Moreover, the new department
commander insisted that a continuation of the concentra-
tion plan would necessitate the building of an expensive
four-company post at San Carlos if control were to be re-
tained over so many diverse hands.50 In this view he was
supported by General Schofield, who now said that, although
he had formerly been in favor of civil control, the present
predicament convinced him that the Indian bureau should be
turned over to the department of war so the purer service
of the military could eliminate the graft of the civil officers.
While he was willing to carry out the peace policy, he de-
clared his troops would not be allowed to war against
"peaceable Indians upon the demand of an Indian Agent." 51
In the meantime, Agent Morford conducted his pseudo-
agency on an independent basis with aid and supplies fur-
nished by the military. Evidently everything worked to his
ends, for the chiefs, representing 1,003 Coyoteros, soon in-
formed him that they would make their bands self-sufficient
within six years if allowed to remain where they were. For-
tified with this proposal, he informed the commissioner the
agency should be rebuilt at Camp Apache to avoid the des-
perate resistance sure to follow any attempt at removal.52
50. Gen. August V. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 81, 1875, 44 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D.
no. 1, vol. ii, p. 133; Kautz to A. A. G., (n. d.), A. G. O., 1834. Kautz had assumed
command on Mar. 22, 1875, when Crook was transferred to the department of the
Platte.
51. Schofield to A. G., Sept. 20, 1875, 44 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 122 ; Schofield to A. G., Jan. 5, 1875, A. G. O., 304.
52. Morford to Smith, Sept. 6, 1875, I. O., M. 768.
began to carry praiseworthy articles about his administrative policies. The editor
also wrote the commissioner numerous personal letters in his support. Wasson to
Smith, Aug. 12, 1875, I. O., W 1426; Wasson to Smith, Aug. 26, 1875, I. O., (n. f.).
See also, Smith to Gov. Safford, Oct. 18, 1875, in Arizona Citizen, Oct. 30, 1875.
226 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The commissioner, however, detected the intrigue and wired
him immediately, that a continuance of his perversity would
necessitate the abolition of his office.53 But Morford now
hewed to the letter of his orders and asked for military aid
to remove the 1,400 Coyoteros who he thought would not go
in peace ; this, as expected, the military refused to furnish.54
Within a short time, when it became obvious that the agent
was resisting removal to keep his son in as his chief clerk and
to get his daughter appointed as teacher, the department of
the interior acted, and by order of the president, the Camp
Apache Agency was discontinued, and the Indians placed in
charge of the San Carlos agent.55
Nevertheless, Morford was not done. In an apologetic
letter he explained how his troubles had largely resulted
from a confusion of instructions; and also, how easily the
Indians could be removed to San Carlos if they were allowed
to remain at Camp Apache until cold weather made them
"tractable as lambs." More important, Morford had political
influence. This was soon shown when the commissioner not
only informed him his letters explained everything, but also
appointed him as agent to fill a vacancy at the Colorado River
Reservation.56
During this time there had been other developments of
note. In September, Agent Clum in reply to a questionnaire
which really suggested the answer, boldly stated to the board
of Indian commissioners that an Indian police force entirely
superseded the necessity of the military on a reservation.57
Naturally, General Kautz was moved to action by this show
of hostility emanating from men in high positions of honor
and trust. He knew that the Clum-Morf ord fight had left the
63. Smith to Morford, Sept. 7, 1875, L. B. no. 126, p. 277.
64. Morford to Ogrilby, Sept. 10, 1875, I. O., M 83 ; Ogilby to Morford, Sept. 11,
1875, ibid.
55. Morford to Smith, Sept. 16, 1875, I. O., M 853 ; Acting Secty. to Comm., Sept.
22, 1875, I. O., I 1251.
66. Morford to Smith, Oct. 2, 1875, I. O., M 948; Smith to Morford, (n. d.),
L. B. no. 126, p. 524. The commissioner deleted the "Morford Affair" from Chun's
annual report for 1875. See R. C. /. A., 1875, p. 218.
57. Clum to Bd. of Ind. Comms., Sept. 18, 1875, R. B. I. C., 1876, p. 95.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 227
Indians throughout the reservation more insubordinate and
unsettled than at any time since Clum took charge; there-
fore, he seized the opportunity to ask the agent if he wished
the troops removed from San Carlos. If Clum refused, he
would open himself to ridicule; if he agreed, the general
hoped that subsequent events would require the recall of the
troops and thereby prove the inefficacy of civil control. But
the troops were removed on October 27 at the agent's re-
quest, and thus for the first time he had an opportunity to
conduct a program of purely civil control at his main
agency.58
This concession, however, did not apply to the Camp
Apache Reservation from which several hundred Indians
were yet to be removed. Clum knew that as long as Kautz
retained the forty Indian scouts in his service, it would be
impossible to remove at least two hundred other Indians who
were members of their families. He therefore requested
Kautz to discharge them. In refusing to comply, Kautz ex-
pressed his fear that the agent would soon lose control of the
Indians, whereupon, the military would again need the ser-
vices of the scouts. Kautz also told Clum that the retention
of the scouts would not prevent a complete removal of the
others if they were "not opposed to removal" and that if five-
sixths of them were already removed, as reported, then the
removal was practically effected. But he agreed to discharge
certain chiefs who might facilitate the work.59
When Clum went to Camp Apache a few days later to
close the agency, he made no especial efforts to bring the
remaining Coyoteros to the Gila, but he reported that they
had sold their crops and were returning to San Carlos.60
This visit evidently convinced Kautz that Clum was
58. Lt. G. S. Anderson to Clum, Oct. 9, 1875, I. F., 1660; Clum to Kautz, Oct. 9^
1875, ibid.
Clum's bitter letter (Clum to Editor, Sept. 1, 1875, in Arizona, Citizen, Sept. 18,
1875) against the military also influenced Kautz to make the concession. Kautz to
Babcock, Oct. 20, 1875, op. cit.
59. Clum to Kautz, Oct. 9, 1875, /. F., 1660; A. A. G. to Clum, Oct. 19, 1875,
/. F., 713.
60. Clum to Smith, Oct. 16, 1875, I. O., (n. f.).
228 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
about to be successful, for he again took up the cause against
removal, this time directly to President Grant. Informing
General Babcock, the president's secretary, that he antici-
pated trouble "if the present Indian Policy is carried out,"
he struck at the commissioner's action in breaking Howard's
promise as "not accidental but premeditated." Concentra-
tion, he believed, was unwise in a thinly populated region like
the Southwest, but if persisted in, it should take place in the
isolated White Mountain country instead of the valuable and
accessible region near San Carlos which he felt would soon
by encroached upon by miners and settlers. When this
should occur, he predicted it would necessitate the presence
of several companies to preserve peace, as well as the main-
tenance of posts at Verde, Apache and Grant to command
"the country to which the discontented Indians will flee."
Furthermore, he was sure that Tucson and California con-
tractors were engineering the removal because they found it
impossible to compete with New Mexican contractors in
supplying Camp Apache. Not half of the Indians had actu-
ally been removed, he said, and none wished to live at San
Carlos, except one band that wished to be near their kins-
men, the troublesome Chiricahuas. Basing his final conclu-
sion on the crops the Coyoteros had raised at Camp Apache
during the summer, he predicted they would soon be self-
sustaining if allowed to remain.61 No official instructions
came back to him, but it is very probable that his communi-
cations aroused enough sympathy in high circles to prevent
the consummation of a complete removal.
The Indian Bureau, still convinced that military oppo-
sition was the sole cause for the Indians' failure to remove,
now sent Inspector Kemble to investigate. He reached Camp
Apache the last of November, just a short time after the
scout company had been re-enlisted. A careful check of the
seven bands revealed that although 881 Indians had not
removed, a considerable number were on their way to San
61. Kautz to Babcock, Oct. 20, 1875, op. cit. Kautz sent a similar report to
division headquarters. Kautz to A. A. G., Oct. 20, 1875, A. G. O., 5770.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 229
Carlos. All the others would go, he believed, if the military
did not interfere, with the exception of nearly three hundred,
who would never remove until the scouts were dismissed.
The imprudence of Clum and the schemes of the army offi-
cers at Fort Apache, he maintained, had produced a civil-
military impasse that would have to be settled at Washing-
ton.62
It was evident by this time that the civil-military con-
flict had greatly retarded the agent's civilization program;
yet, despite impediments, substantial improvement had been
made. To civilize Indians, Clum felt they should do regular
work, engage in agriculture and help to enforce their own
discipline. Fortunately, his building program, the necessity
of clearing new land, preparing it for irrigation, and the
digging of the required ditches, furnished a vast amount of
work, and this gave him an opportunity to provide his In-
dians with an incentive to work. He paid them fifty cents a
day in script of different denominations, redeemable at the
agency in annuity goods. As the Indians received much
greater quantities of goods than could be bought at the
Indian trader's store at the same cost, Clum usually had
more Indians willing to work than he could employ.63
The Indian work in agriculture was especially satisfac-
tory during the year, although the agent failed to increase
the amount of land under cultivation over that of 1874. But
a virtual increase resulted, for after two hundred acres of
early crops were harvested, one hundred and seventy-five
acres of corn were planted as a second crop. Disalin and
Eskiminzin took their bands to spots somewhat removed
from the agency, cleared and irrigated new land, and began
farming on a private basis with commendable success. In his
annual report the commissioner enthusiastically reported
that the San Carlos Indians had harvested 625 bushels of
62. Kemble to Smith, Dec. 1, 1875, Jan. 3, 5, 7, 1876, 7. F.t 713.
When the Indians came to San Carlos and in exactly what numbers, remains in-
definite. After the chiefs were dismissed, Clum said "the Indians were gradually
brought to San Carlos." (Clum to Comm., Oct. (?), 1876, R. C. I. A., p. 10.). The
Arizona Citizen, Feb. 12, 1876, reported that 1600 were removed.
63. Clum to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, R. C. I. A., 1875, p. 220.
230 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
wheat, 2,000 bushels of corn, 625 bushels of barley and
9,200 bushels of potatoes. As the agency paid cash for much
of the grain raised, many of the Indians became eager for
small individual farms.64
Clum's greatest success during the same period was in
the field of order and discipline, and his ability to maintain
and enforce these was, no doubt, the most important factor
in his success as an Indian agent. Believing that Indians
should be "compelled to control themselves" through their
own officers, he appointed a small police force at the time of
his arrival. Later, when the Verdes were brought to San
Carlos, he increased his force to eight, and when the Indians
at Camp Apache were placed in his charge, he increased the
number of twenty-five. Armed with the latest type Spring-
field needle guns, they effectually maintained order among
the bands, enforced prohibition, arrested white intruders
and upheld the authority of the agent. Much of their suc-
cess was due to their captain, Clay Beauford, who had seen
several years experience as scout and guide in the Indian
country. Clum believed that in return for subsistence and
protection his Indians should readily submit to regulations
that were "neither numerous nor unreasonable." This view
was soon law on the reservation, and from then on every
symptom of insubordination was "speedily controlled and
suppressed." When he encountered the opposition of the
military, he asked for the removal of the troops, insisting
that the effectiveness of his policy guaranteed the safety
of the reservation. Even after the troops had been removed
and special emergencies had required the appointment of
additional temporary police, he still insisted his police were
superior to the troops as disciplinarians. Evidently he was
correct, for nearly all visitors and travellers to San Carlos
reported the law and order of the reservation fully equal to
that found in any civilized community on the frontier.65
64. Clum to Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, op. cit., p. 218 ; Smith to Secty., Nov. 1, 1875.
R. C. I. A., 1875, p. 187.
65. Arizona Citizen, June 26, 1875 ; Clum to Smith, July 31, 1875, 7. D., Clum to
Comm., Sept. 1, 1875, R. C. 7. A., 1875, p. 215. See also, John P. Clum, "Victorio," in
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 231
When Inspector Kemble visited the reserve in Decem-
ber, 1875, he was amazed by the cheerfulness, obedience and
satisfaction evident among the bands. To him this was not
only a complete vindication of Clum's administration but
also a sound example of the constructive nature of the peace
policy. A bit of criticism could not be avoided, however, for
Clum at times had assumed authority at the expense of the
more orthodox methods. Some of his disbursements were
unauthorized, and he had paid a teacher who only nominally
fulfilled the office. There were inaccurate records as well as
deficiencies in certain supplies. The inspector also regretted
that Clum had sought the press. Nevertheless, he recom-
mended strong moral and financial support to prevent the
agent from resigning.66
For several months after the winter inspection the even
course of events at San Carlos was characterized by the
agent as a period of "peace and good fellowship."67 No dif-
ficulties developed, and the Indians continued to work indus-
triously. They were greatly encouraged in January by the
distribution of 4,000 sheep which the commissioner hoped
would tend to check their nomadism.68
Near the end of February, the agent again tested his
police when he sent fifteen of them under Captain Beauford
to run down a band of renegades in the Tonto Basin. Their
success was complete, and after killing sixteen, they returned
with twenty-two captives.69
Regardless of the success of his administration, Clum
66. Kemble to Smith, Jan. 5, 1876, 7. F., 713.
The agent's brother, G. A. Clum, conducted a school for a few weeks during the
summer. Clum to Smith, Oct. 1, 1875, I. O., C 1333 ; G. A. Clum, "Our Advent into the
Great Southwest," Arizona Historical Review, Oct. 1929, pp. 83-84.
67. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 170.
68. Clum to Comm., Oct. ( ?), 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 12.
69. Clum to Comm., Mar. 18, 1876, I. O., C 247.
N. Mex. Hist. Rev., iv (Apr., 1929), 114; Clum, "The San Carlos Apache Police,"
ibid., iv (July, 1929), 203-210; H. E. Dunlap, "Clay Beauford- Welford C. Bridwell,"
Ariz. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1930, p. 14 et seq.
The reliability of the police was put to a severe test in December when Chief
Disalin tried to kill the whites at the agency. The police did their duty without orders,
and Disalin fell dead pierced by several bullets, some of them fired by Tauelclyse, his
brother. Clum to Kemble, Dec. 21, 1875, /. F., 720.
232 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
was still disheartened over the Morf ord affair. He also feared
that the "injudicious economy" of the Bureau threatened his
future work. Thus, somewhat disgruntled, he resigned on
February 26, and a month later the commissioner decided to
release him as soon as a successor could be named.70 But a
sudden outbreak of the Chiricahuas disrupted the plans, and
instead of being relieved Clum was asked to remove the tribe
to San Carlos. It will therefore be necessary to review the
Chiricahuan affairs during the year preceding the outbreak.
During 1874 the Chiricahuas had remained peaceable,
but they had made little progress towards civilization. Nev-
ertheless, Inspector Daniels preferred Jeffords' loose civil
control to the military management he had witnessed else-
where.71 Jeffords in dealing with Indians was essentially a
realist, and as such he refrained from any innovations that
might drive his suspicious charges from their reserve. He
maintained order with his personal influence, but reliance
was also placed on a small police force whose personnel he
frequently changed. By this scheme he attempted to avoid
the development of factions.72 His Indians were allowed to
keep their arms and ponies, and they enjoyed perfect liberty
to go where they wished. The counts were as irregular as
the issues were unsystematic, for the clerk, convinced that
he knew every face and the number in each family, dealt out
rations "with a rapidity and a power of ready reckoning
that surpassed the lightning calculator." 73
Visitors from other reserves were a great source of
worry to the agent, and on the average he rationed two hun-
dred of them per month. This was done in an attempt to pre-
vent them from leading his young men away on raids. Fre-
quently, however, the visitors merely passed through the re-
serve with their plunder, but in any case all the depredations
were attributed to the Chiricahuas. Although the worst
70. Secty. of Interior to Comm., Mar. 18, 1876, I. O., I 278; Clum to Comm.,
Mar. 25, 1876, I. O., C 335.
71. Cf. supra, p. 204, et seq.
72. Jeffords to Bd. of Ind. Comms.. Sept. 11. 1875, R. B. I. C., 1875, p. 93.
73. Kemble to Smith, Dec. 30, 1875, /. F., 718.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 233
offenders came from the Warm Springs Reservation, the
Coyoteros from San Carlos also caused complications. In
fact, after their removal from Fort Apache, over two hun-
dred were reported in the vicinity of Fort Bowie. These
visitors frequently had passes "to gather their crops" but
many of them claimed they could not live at San Carlos be^
cause of feuds among the bands. Their visitations continued
until December, when a series of tiswin fights resulted in the
death of a prominent Chiricahua. After this the vengeance
of the aggrieved tribe acted as a powerful deterrent against
the use of their reservation as a refuge for the disaffected
ones.74
That raiding into Mexico was greatly diminished dur-
ing 1875 is shown by the paucity of complaints from Mex-
ican officials. Some raiding went on, however, but most of
it was doubtless done by Indians other than the Chiricahuas.
One G. H. Howard, who travelled through Sonora in April,
reported that the constant raids had so alarmed the citizens
that they had abandoned many of their mines and much of
their agricultural land. As he left Sonora, he followed the
outgoing trail of a band of forty raiders almost to the Chiri-
cahua agency.75
H. C. Hodge, an important observer of the time, after
visiting the Chiricahuas, also reported numerous raids, but
he concluded that the raiders consisted of portions of the
Chiricahua bands that made Mexico their home. He be-
lieved that they frequently escaped danger by fleeing to the
Chiricahua Reservation where they sold and traded their
stolen property to Jeffords' Indians.76
In July, the prefect of Magdalena charged that a large
number of mules had been taken to the Chiricahua Reserva-
tion. Jeffords failed to locate them and attributed this and
other thefts to visiting Indians. But he admitted that he had
some men who could not be held in check and who joined the
74. Jeffords to Comm., Aug. 21, 1875, R. C. I. A,, 1875, p. 711 ; Kautz to Babcock,
Oct. 20, 1875, op. cit. ; Jeffords to Comm., Oct. 3, 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 407.
75. Howard to Wasson, April 29, 1875, in Arizona Citizen, May 8, 1875.
76. Hodge to Wasson, May 10, 1875 ; Arizona Citizen, May 22, 1875.
234 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
raiders. General Kautz tersely insisted that most of the
raiders were Chiricahuas who raided undetected because of
Jeffords' imperfect counts. He believed that a rigid system
of counting* would end the devastations.77
Jeffords might have inaugurated a more rigid system of
control, but after Cochise's death he could find no Indian
with sufficient leadership to be of much help. Without such
aid, he believed any attempt at rigidity would be followed by
an outbreak in which the frontier would be ravished. Never-
theless, he exerted himself strenuously to help the Indians
while he protected the interests of the whites. His success in
restoring stolen animals to their rightful owners won the
acclaim of the citizens; moreover, it acted as an effective
check against the Indians bartering in them. But a new
problem arose: a great many freighting and immigrant
parties passed through the Apache Pass, which was within
easy access of the agency at Pinery Canyon, and here the
more restless bucks soon learned that the travellers were
only too willing to trade whiskey for horses. Jeffords per-
ceived at once that the trade would have to be checked if
raids on both American and Mexican ranches were to be
prevented. He, therefore, asked permission to move his
agency to Apache Pass where he could exercise proper sur-
veillance.78
Commissioner Smith, however, was now fully convinced
that the Chiricahuas should be removed to Hot Springs
where their management would be more economical and
"vastly simplified." 79
He accordingly directed Superintendent Dudley to gain
77. Placido R. Aragon to Gov. of Ariz., July 27, 1875, Arizona, Citizen, Aug. 21,
1875 ; Jeffords to Comm., Aug. 21, 1875, op. cit., p. 712 ; Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 81,
1875, op. cit., p. 132.
78. Jeffords to Smith, Jan. 2, 1875, I. O., J 89 ; Arizona Citizen, Jan. 16, Mar. 6,
1875 ; Jeffords to Bd. Ind. Comms., Nov. 27, 1875, R. B. I. C., 1875, p. 103.
79. Smith to Delano, Nov. 1, 1874, 43 Cong. 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 62.
No doubt he was partly influenced to make this decision by Delegate Elkins, Gover-
nor Giddings and Superintendent Dudley of New Mexico. These politicians worked for
this removal in order to benefit New Mexican contractors. See, Dudley to Elkins,
April 14, 1874, I. O., E 50 ; Giddings to Dudley, April 14, 1874, I. O., D 425 ; Smith to
Dudley, April 15, 1874, L. B. no. 118, p. 48.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 235
their consent.80 Dudley counseled with them on April 16,
and again the Indians threatened war if molested. The
commissioner then relented and allowed Jeffords to establish
himself at Apache Pass.81 Apparently this move solved the
difficulty, for the Indians committed no outrages during the
summer. They remained obedient and well behaved, but
they made no advance towards civilization. In fact, their
inferiority in the arts prevented the agent from sending any
collection to the Centennial Committee. When Inspector
Kemble made his winter visit, he saw little hope for their
progress as long as they remained under Jeffords* control.
A different agent, he believed, might disarm and prepare
them for removal to a better place.82
Up to this time, Jeffords had kept his Indians well ra-
tioned, but so many visitors had drawn from his supplies
that he faced a shortage. Besides, the Bureau had cut his
beef quota from 889,000 pounds to 650,000 pounds.83 In Feb-
ruary the beef supply became so scanty that he allowed some
of his bands to move to the Dragoon Mountains to hunt for
game. Within a short time a quarrel arose among them re-
sulting in the killing of three Indians, one of whom was a
grandson of Cochise. Chief Tahzay returned immediately to
the agency with most of the Indians, but Skinyea, with
twelve men and their families remained in the Dragoons.8"4
In March, a few men from this party joined some Coyo-
teros on a raid into Sonora and returned with $100 in pre-
cious metals. Soon they obtained whiskey from one Rogers
who owned a trading post on the reservation, and Pionsenay,
a brother of Skinyea, while inebriated, killed his two sisters.
A few days later he did penance by killing Rogers and a
cook named Spence. When other restless bucks joined with
him, a series of devastations followed in the San Pedro
80. Smith to Dudley, Dec. 19, 1874, L. B. no. 122, p. 106.
81. Jeffords to Comm., Aug. 21, 1875, op. cit.
82. Jeffords to Comm., Dec. 17, 1875, I. O., J. 1 ; Kemble to Smith, Dec. 80, 1875,
/. F. 718.
83. Jeffords to Smith, Jan. 19, 1876, I. O., J 122.
84. M. J. O'Brien to Safford, April 21, 1876, I. O., M 297; Jeffords to Smith,
April 27, 1876, I. O., J 476.
236 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Valley, culminating in the murder of two prominent ranch-
men.85 These events frightened all the Chiricahuas and a
general outbreak was threatened, especially when troops
from Fort Bowie pursued the marauders into the San Jose
Mountains. Jeffords and Tahzay, however, by assuring the
bands that no punitive action was intended against peaceable
Indians, quieted them sufficiently to prevent a catastrophe.
During the next month the innocent Indians under Skinyea
were allowed to come in while Pionsenay, undisturbed by
the military, was allowed to move nearer the agency into the
Chiricahua Mountains.86
In the meantime, events moved rapidly elsewhere, for
Governor Safford and the Arizona Citizen had already begun
a terrible tirade against Jeffords and the Chiricahuas.87
Safford, on April 19 wired John Wasson at Washington
that the reserve should be abandoned and the Indians moved
to San Carlos or Hot Springs and that no one but Agent
Clum had the "nerve, ability and confidence to do it."88
Washington officials were evidently alarmed over the situa-
tion, for the next day Congress provided funds for the re-
moval. On May 3, Clum was ordered to suspend Jeffords,
and if "practicable" to remove the Chiricahuas to San
Carlos.89 He refused to act, however, until a sufficient mili-
tary force was in the field for any emergency. After a delay
of three weeks in which pressure was placed on the war de-
partment, General Kautz personally moved into the field
with twelve companies of cavalry and two of Indian scouts.90
85. Jeffords to Smith, May 12, 1876, I. O., J 524.
86. Jeffords to Comm., Oct. 8, 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, pp. 407-408.
87. ". . . the kind of war needed for the Chiricahua Apaches, is steady unrelenting,
hopeless, and undiscriminating war, slaying men, women and children, . . . until every
valley and crest and crag and fastness shall send to high heaven the grateful incense
of festering and rotting Chiricahuas." Arizona Citizen, April 15, 1876. See also issues
of May 20, 1876, and Mar. 24, 1877.
88. Safford to Wasson, April 19, 1876, I. O., W 467. Clum had already talked to
Safford and offered the services of 235 San Carlos special police. Clum to Safford, April
14, 1876, I. O., C 388.
89. Smith to Clum, May 8, 1876, L. B. no. 138, p. 92.
90. Safford to Smith, May 6. 1876, I. O., S 851 ; Sherman to Schofield, May 22,
1876, I. O., W 571 ; Kautz to Secty. of War, Sept. 15, 1876, 44 Cong., 2 Bess., H. E. D.
no. 1, vol. ii, p. 98.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 237
At Clum's request he agreed to move his force near the
reservation.91 When the troops and Clum with his body-
guard of fifty-four Indian police approached the reserve on
June 4, the Chiricahuas realized that a crisis had arrived in
their affairs. That night a council was held to decide the
question of war or peace. Skinyea and Pionsenay were
unable to prevail against the peaceable counsels of Tahzay
and his brother Nachee, and a purge of the war leaders fol-
lowed in which Skinyea and five of his leading men were
killed.92
The next day when Clum reached the agency, the chiefs
and headmen readily consented to removal. Another closely
related band reputed to belong in Mexico, and led by Gero-
nimo, Juh and Nolgee, also wanted to be included in the
removal. Clum agreed, and gave the chiefs three days in
which to collect their followers. But the astute chiefs merely
wanted time to effect their escape. They therefore fled head-
long with their bands across the border into the Sierra
Madre, safely eluding the strong force of cavalry that pur-
sued them.93
On June 12, three hundred and twenty-five Chiricahuas
were started to San Carlos, where they arrived and were
safely located six days later. Thus, in Clum's over-sanguine
words : "The terrible shade of that tribe's dreaded name had
passed away, and the imaginary army of four or five hun-
dred formidable warriors had dwindled to the modest num-
ber of sixty half -armed and less clothed savages." 94
91. Clum to Kautz, June 8, 1876, I. O., C 540.
92. Jeffords to Smith, June 5, 1876, I. O., J 587. Pionsenay, though seriously
wounded, escaped. He was arrested four days later, but shortly after Clum turned him
over to the territorial officers, he again escaped. For this and other details, see, Clum,
"Geronimo," N. Mex. Hist. Rev., iii (Jan., 1928), pp. 8 et aeq.
93. Jeffords to Comm., Oct. 3, 1876, op. cit.
94. Clum to Comm., Oct. ( ?), 1876, op. cit., p. 10.
The number that evaded removal was never satisfactorily determined. Clum
thought that about one hundred went to Sonora and Hot Springs. Clum to Comm.,
Oct. (?), 1876, op. cit. Jeffords, however, insisted that 140 went to Hot Springs and
that 400 continued to roam at large. Jeffords to Comm., Oct. 3, 1876, op. cit. General
Kautz believed that Jeffords overestimated the number to protect himself from charges
of graft in rationing. He also thought that the Indians refused exact counts to appear
more formidable by an exaggeration of their numbers. Kautz to A. A. G., June 30,
238 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The supervision of the Chiricahua Reservation was
transferred to General Kautz on June 13, with the request
that he treat as hostile any Indians found thereon.95 No dev-
astations occurred for a month, but on July 14, the murder
of two miners near Forth Bowie brought orders for the
troops to run the murderers down.96 Although they fre-
quently found trails that led towards Mexico, they accom-
plished nothing. Within two months the toll had mounted
to twenty persons killed and over one hundred animals
stolen. In contrast to the impotent Arizona troops, those in
New Mexico trailed a band of Arizona marauders into the
Florida Mountains, fought them there, and killed twenty
bucks.97 This inflamed the territorial officers against Kautz,
and despite the fact that he established a new post in the
troubled region,98 they attributed the continued devastations
to his inactivity. Saff ord asked the secretary of war for five
hundred guns and threatened to call out the militia.99
The threat of competition stirred Kautz into action
again, and he ordered Captain T. C. Tupper with a command
of fifty cavalrymen, and a company of Indian scouts to scour
the region. After an extended search the captain reported
the area the "safest country against Indians that he had
ever scouted through." 10° Kautz now attributed the killings
to renegade whites from Mexico and suggested that promi-
nent Arizonians exaggerated the disorders so more soldiers
would be sent to the region.101 But when it was suggested
95. R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 896. The reservation was abolished, Oct. 80, 1876.
Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations, p. 6.
96. Kautz to A. A. G., Sept. 15, 1876, op. cit. Officers were to disregard all
boundary lines.
97. Arizona Citizen, Sept. 23, Oct. 7, 1876.
98. Camp Thomas was established Aug. 12, 1876, near the present Fort Thomas,
Arizona. Barnes, Arizona Place Names, p. 442.
99. Safford to Kautz, Sept. 25, 1876, in Arizona Citizen, Sept. 80, 1876.
100. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877. 45 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
p. 184.
101. A caustic battle was waged in the newspapers between Kautz and Safford in
the spring of 1877. See their letters in Arizona Citizen, Feb. 14, and Mar. 17, 1877.
Also, in Arizona Miner, Mar. 9, 1877.
1876, A. G. O., 4028. During 1877, Safford charged that 200 were not removed because
of Kautz's negligence. Safford in Arizona Citizen, Feb. 17, 1877.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 239
that a change of commanders would bring results, Kautz
decided that recent thefts near Old Camp Crittenden were
real, and a vigorous scout under Lieutenant J. A. Rucker
followed. Rucker's command of fifty-two men and thirty-
four Indian scouts pursued the marauders' trail 230 miles
east into the Liedendorf Mountains of New Mexico. Here,
in a surprise attack on a sixteen-lodge village, they killed ten
hostiles and captured the Indians' property consisting of
forty-six horses and a large amount of supplies that had
come from the Chiricahua Reservation. The lieutenant re-
ported the region overrun with hostiles.102
Kautz now decided that the Chiricahuas were at large in
greater numbers than he at first supposed, and that they
were probably being reinforced by restless bucks from the
Hot Springs Reservation. When Dr. Whitney, the acting
agent at Ojo Caliente, confirmed this view, Lieutenant Aus-
tin Henely was sent to the Rio Grande to investigate.103
In the meantime, Arizona suffered a "reign of terror."
During the first half of February, fifteen men were killed
and over one hundred animals were stolen in the Sonoita
region alone.104 Troops dispatched to the scene from Forts
Apache and Bowie merely caused most of the hostiles to melt
away untouched into Sonora. One band, however, was inter-
cepted by Lieutenant Rucker and pushed into New Mexico,
but despite the fact they made straight for Ojo Caliente, he
failed to overtake them.105
Naturally, such results further inflamed the already
seething citizens against the military, and Governor Saf-
ford, reflecting this attitude, wrote a scathing denunciation
of Kautz's tactics, charging that a continuation of his meth-
ods would require the services of the entire army for the
next twenty years to reduce the marauders.106 Opposition
102. Rucker to P. A., Jan. 14, 1877, A. G. O., 1005. A nephew of Geronimo was
captured.
103. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, op. eit., p. 135.
104. Arizona Citizen, Feb. 10, 17, 1877.
105. Rucker to P. A., Mar. 11, 1877, A. G. O. (n. f.).
106. Safford to editor, Mar. 17, 1877, in Arizona Citizen, Mar. 24, 1877. Kautz
expressed himself in the Arizona Miner, see issue of Mar. 9, 1877. Kautz was con-
240 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
against Kautz also took a more direct form when, on Febru-
ary 8, the legislature at the governor's request, appropriated
$10,000 to put a company of friendly Indian scouts into the
field 107 to be armed with rifles made available by order of the
secretary of war.108 By the last of February, Captain Beau-
ford with a command of forty-five scouts equipped to stay in
the field for two months, was out on the hunt of the hostiles.109
It was evident by this time that a great deal of the
troubles in Arizona was due to causes emanating from the
Hot Springs Reservation on the Rio Grande. Indeed, little
except failure had resulted since its reestablishment as a
reserve three years before.110 The change appears to have
satisfied the Indians, but even though the agent received
strong military support from Fort McRae,111 his reports for
1875, were pessimistic in tone. In language laudatory to his
efforts, he explained that as long as his charges received
plentiful rations they remained peaceable more from "self-
interest" than from any moral changes. Only a few, he said,
could be induced to farm and ditch, and he predicted the in-
troduction of a regular system of labor would have to be
very gradual. In the case of liquor sellers and intruders he
found his control threatened at every hand, but he cautioned
the commissioner that his charges were too wild for the
creation of a police force.112
Even with these hazards the agent had no trouble dur-
ing the winter of 1875-1876. Early the next spring, however,
he suddenly reported that a shortage of rations endangered
the peace of the region, and for that reason he requested per-
mission to exchange his surplus sugar for extra flour and
107. Arizona Citizen, Feb. 10, 1877.
108. Arizona Citizen, Feb. 24, 1877.
109. Ibid. See N. Mex. Hist. Rev., Hi (Jan., 1928), 12-26. The command accom-
plished nothing. Arizona Citizen, June 16, 1877.
110. Cf. supra, p. 207.
111. Special Orders no. 117, Nov. 11, 1875, A. G. O., 4145.
112. J. M. Shaw to Smith, Sept. 1, 1875, R. C. I. A.. 1875, p. 836 ; Shaw to Bd.
Ind. Comms., Sept. 80, 1875, R. B. I. C., 1875, p. 96.
vinced Safford was connected with Tucson contractors who wanted more troops to
feed. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877, op. eit., pp. 188-140.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 241
beef held by the military. The commissioner refused to
authorize such an irregular procedure, insinuating in his
refusal, that a new agent might be needed unless greater
economy was effected. Shaw immediately enlisted the aid
of Stephen B. Elkins, territorial delegate from New Mexico,
who appears to have used his influence in getting a suffici-
ency of supplies for the reserve.113
Nevertheless, some Indians did go out on raids, but
when a force of cavalry was placed west of the reserve a gen-
eral exodus was prevented. Even then the visiting with the
Chiricahuas was kept up, and a number of young insubordi-
nate Chiricahuas that came to Hot Springs to make their
permanent homes greatly increased the discipline problem
of the agent.114
In order to ascertain the exact condition of affairs at
Hot Springs, Inspector Kemble scrutinized the agency in
May. The deplorable condition of affairs was reflected in the
outright graft that existed in the issuance of supplies.
Where only 330 Indians had been rationed just before Shaw
took charge, 1,150-1,300 were now supposed to receive sub-
sistence. The agent had neither counts nor issue tickets, but
he sent in grossly exaggerated false returns, and only one-
fourth of the hay issued was consumed by the animals at the
agency. The fact that government blankets could be found
in every home along the Rio Grande supported the report
that surplus supplies were exchanged for whiskey at Canada
Alamosa. Kemble believed that the 600-700 Indians actually
on the reservation were masters of the agent, controlling his
issues at their pleasure. For these reasons he suggested the
immediate removal of Shaw if a bloody outbreak were to be
avoided.115
Despite the unfavorable outlook, the vigorous activity
of the New Mexican troops in connection with the Chiri-
cahua outbreak prevented the Southern Apaches from exten-
113. For correspondence, see, 44 Cong., 1 sess., S. M. D. no. 91.
114. Shaw to Comm., Sept. 1, 1876, R. C. I. A., 1876, p. 516.
115. Kemble to Comm., May 17, 1876, I. F., 733.
242 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
sive maraudering. Nevertheless, twenty animals were stolen
at the Clifton mines on one raid. The situation looked much
worse, however, when about one hundred Chiricahuas under
Chief Gordo at the time their reserve was abolished took
refuge at Hot Springs.116 On August 10, James Davis re-
placed Shaw as agent. Davis appears to have been a con-
structive agent, and he worked hard during his short term to
improve his charges' condition. He assured them a more
adequate food supply by replacing the issues of beef on hoof
which they usually bartered away, with beef on the block. He
also cut off their supply of corn, and thus reduced the source
of their whiskey. By the time Lieutenant Henely reached
the reservation on March 17, Davis had induced some of
them to start farming and ditching.117
Lieutenant Henely arrived none too soon, however, for
he not only learned that the Warm Springs Indians were
joining the renegade Chiricahuas on their raids, but also
that many of the renegade Chiricahuas were using Hot
Springs as a rendezvous for rest and rations. He was quite
surprised to find that Geronimo who had just returned with
one hundred stolen horses "was very indignant because he
could not draw rations for the time he was out." 118 No time
was lost in making a decision, for the department of the in-
terior was thoroughly aroused over its failure to solve the
Chiricahua-Southern Apache problem. On March 20 the
commissioner wired Agent Clum to arrest and hold the rene-
gades on charges of murder and robbery. He was to remove
them to San Carlos, and his police force was to aid in the
undertaking.119
Clum hesitated for a short time, sent in his resignation,
and then proceeded with plans for removal.120 Governor Saf-
116. Gen. Hatch to A. A. G., July 14, 1876; 7. D.; Kautz to A. A. G.. Sept. 15.
1876, op. cit., p. 99.
117. Davis to Comm., Aug. 10, 1877, 45 Cong., 2 sees.. H. E. D. no. 1. voL viii,
p. 588.
118. Safford to Comm., Mar. 18, 1877, I. O., A 181 ; Kautz to A. A. G., AU*. 15,
1877, op. cit., p. 135.
119. Smith to Clum, Mar. 20, 1877, L. B. no. 182, p. 658. J. Q. Smith had recently
replaced Edward P. Smith as commissioner.
120. Clum, The Truth about the Apaches, p. 28 et aeq.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 243
ford returned the Indian police to agency service, but Gen-
eral Kautz avoided cooperation, pointing out that the In-
dians were in the District of New Mexico.121 General John
Pope, commanding the Division of the Missouri, ordered
General Edward Hatch to render full aid, and nine com-
panies of troops were ordered to Hot Springs.122
Without delay, Clum with forty additional police joined
Captain Beauford's scouts at Silver City, and the combined
force of over one hundred men set out for the Rio Grande.
A march of four hundred miles brought the command on
April 20 to an obscure point within striking distance of the
reservation. Learning that Geronimo and his followers
were encamped near the agency, Clum took twenty-two
scouts and moved into Ojo Caliente to reconnoitre. Here he
learned the troops were two days away, and, fearing that a
delay would hazard his plans, he decided to arrest the rene-
gades forthwith. During the night Captain Beauford's
reserves were brought up and secreted in a large commissary
building near the main agency building. Early the next
morning Geronimo and the other chiefs came for a talk, con-
vinced they could easily overawe the small force that had
arrived the evening before. Within a few minutes Gero-
nimo's arrogant and bellicose attitude brought the confer-
ence to an impasse. Calling on his hidden reserves, Clum
was successful in taking into custody Geronimo, Gordo,
Ponce, Francisco and thirteen other noted renegade leaders.
Unfortunately, Pionsenay and Nolgee were away raiding in
Sonora and Arizona, and already reports of their bloody
deeds had reached the agency. In the hope that these rene-
gades might be intercepted, Captain Beauford and seventy-
five of his scouts were ordered back to Arizona by way of
the Dos Cabezas Mountains.123
121. Clum, "Geronimo," N. Mex. Hist. Rev., iii (Jan., 1928), p. 27; Kautz to
Clum, Mar. 31, 1877, A. G. O., 3063.
122. Clum to A. A. G., April 2, 1877, A. G. O., 2265; Pope to C. O., April 8,
1877, ibid.
123. Clum to Comm., Mar. 29, 1877, I. O., S 201 ; Clum to Maj. J. F. Wade, April
22, 1877, I. O., S 398 ; Clum to Editor, April 24, 1877, in Arizona Citizen, May 5, 1877 ;
Clum to Comm., Sept. 18, 1877, R. C. I. A., 1877, p. 32.
244 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Now convinced that even more drastic changes were
needed, the commissioner ordered the removal of all the
Warm Springs Indians to San Carlos.124 Victorio, the chief
of the Warm Springs Indians and his followers readily
assented to removal, and the first count showed a total of
434 Indians. At the next count the number had dropped to
175 due to a drunken spree which Clum learned had inclined
most of the tribe to wander away. Major James F. Wade,
however, by immediately making an energetic demonstra-
tion so frightened the recalcitrants, that at the following
counts they were all present, unarmed and unmounted.125
Within a week all arrangements for the removal were
completed. The war department ordered General Hatch to
cooperate throughout, and "more out of compliment than
necessity," Clum asked for a small escort entirely to San
Carlos.126 On May 1, M. A. Sweeney with the aid of the es-
cort started by trail with 453 Indians, while Clum and his
police took the renegades in wagons and joined the cavalcade
at Silver City.127 From here the procession pushed on with-
out incident, reaching San Carlos on May 20. The prisoners
were placed in the guardhouse, and the authorities notified,
124. Smith to Clum, April 17, 1877, L. B. no. 136, p. 77.
125. Clum to Wade, April 24, 1877, I. O., S 398 ; Gen. Hatch to A. A. G., April
27, 1877, A. G. O., 2554.
126. Gen. Sherman to Gen. Sheridan, May 1, 1877, A. G. O., 2420; Clum to
Smith, July 28, 1877, op. eit.
A controversy over the escort followed. Hatch requested Kautz to relieve him at
the Arizona-New Mexico line, but when an escort was proffered, Clum declined it,
wiring Kautz that "no escort has been asked from Arizona and none will be accepted."
The war department considered this action a "breach of personal and official courtesy,"
and when General Sherman endorsed the telegram, he strongly denounced Clum saying
he had "no business" to refuse Kautz's escort. In explanation, Clum wrote that Gen-
eral Sherman had "no business" to interfere with "his business." This correspondence
is collected in, A. G. O., 3063 ; also in Arizona Citizen, Aug. 18, 1877.
Clum no doubt, was incensed over Kautz's refusal to furnish an escort at the
beginning. Kautz explained, however, that Clum had refused to allow a recruiting
officer to enlist a company of scouts at San Carlos at the time the request was made
and that the delay that followed in getting Hualpai scouts prevented the sending of an
escort. Kautz to A. G., April 12, 1877, A. G. O. 2308.
127. Clum to Comm., May 1, 1877, I. O., S 869.
The reserve was transferred to Major Wade with instructions to treat all remaining
Indians as hostiles. Clum to Wade, May 1, 1877, I. O., S 553. Population figures at
Hot Springs were indefinite, but it is probable that nearly 200 avoided removal. See,
Whitney to Clum, April 23, 1877, ibid.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 245
but the main body of the Indians was given the same priv-
ileges which other San Carlos bands enjoyed.128
Beginning with the removal of the Chiricahuas and con-
tinuing up until his return with the Warm Springs Indians,
Clum's frequent and extended absences from San Carlos had
left him little time for agency management. Besides much
of his remaining time was consumed in bitter controversies
with the military. After the Chiricahuas were satisfactorily
settled at San Carlos in June, 1876, no event of importance
disturbed the agency routine for the rest of the year. In
fact, affairs appeared so hopeful in July that the agent car-
ried out a dramatic project he had long anticipated — that of
taking a group of Apaches to the East.129
While Clum was in Washington, the commissioner per-
suaded him to withdraw his pending resignation on the prom-
ise of more pay, full support against the military and the
assignment of no duties that would require him to leave the
reservation. Thus reassured, he returned to his post, with
high hopes for the future.130
But he was soon again embroiled with the military.
About March 1, 1877, three bucks killed an old Indian woman
near Fort Apache. No report was made of the affair, and a
little later when Clum heard the murderers had gone un-
scathed, he decided the military was deliberately shielding
them, thereby hoping to undermine his authority as agent.
Without hesitation he sent a company of scouts to the scene
to arrest the murderers or kill them. The scouts proceeded
as directed, and on March 11 killed one of the murderers, but
128. Clum to Comm., May 28, 1877, ibid.
For details of removal, see Clum, "Geronimo," N. Mex. Hist. Rev., iii (Jan., 1928),
pp. 26 et seq.; Clum, "Victorio," ibid., iv (Apr., 1929), pp. 107 et seq.; Clum, Apache
Agent, chapts. xxviii-xxxiii.
129. Clum to Comm., Sept. 18, 1877, R. C. I. A., 1877, p. 34.
The trip was partly financed by "Wild Apache" shows in the larger cities along the
route. Unfortunately, Chief Tahzay died at Washington. He was buried in the Con-
gressional Cemetery. After visiting the Centennial Exposition, the Indians were con-
ducted back to the reserve by Marijildo Grijalba, the interpreter. Clum then took a
sixty days leave, returning to San Carlos January 1. See, Apache Agent, pp. 185, et
aeq.; Clum, "Apaches as Thespians in 1876," N. Mex. Hist. Rev., vi (Jan., 1930), pp.
76-99.
130. Clum, The Truth About the Apaches, p. 29.
246 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
in doing so fired upon an Indian soldier. Major Ogilby now
sent out a detachment of troops and chased the police a long
distance, disregarding the fact that they were within the
limits of the Indian reservation.131
Clum immediately reported Major Ogilby's conduct to
General Kautz, charging also that the military kept the favor
of the few Indians remaining at Camp Apache with liquor,
guns and ammunition. He furthermore asked that Major
W. S. Worth be court-martialed for buying an Apache squaw
from her relatives and forcing her to remain in his quar-
ters.132
General Kautz countercharged that Clum's "raid" was
merely an attempt to drive the non-combatants of Chief
Pedro's band to San Carlos while Pedro's men were away
scouting against renegade Chiricahuas. Declaring that
Clum's actions had created a very dangerous situation at
Fort Apache, Kautz ordered the scouts back to the post.133
Clum retorted that Kautz was guilty of "criminal inactivity"
in leaving southern Arizona exposed to the renegades ; nev-
ertheless he had the satisfaction of getting Captain Worth's
conduct investigated.134
While this imbroglio was taking place, Clum learned
that General Kautz had already made gross insinuations
against his management at San Carlos, but he did not know
that the adjutant general had been notified on February 12,
that many unreported renegades had strayed away because
of bad treatment and lack of food and that the resultant
saving of rations probably accrued to "those who issue
them." 135 When he heard of these latter charges, he was
181. Clum to Marijildo Grijalba, Mar. 7, 1877, 7. F., 1660; Clum to A. A. G.,
Mar. 17, 1877, ibid.
132. Ibid.
183. Kautz to A. G., April 12, 1877, A. G. O., 2308.
134. Clum to Comm., April 21, 1877, I. O., S 360.
The court of inquiry practically exonerated Worth. Clum, however, was accused
of preferring charges against Worth in an effort to draw attention from his agency
mismanagement. Eautz to Comm., June 7, 1877, I. O., K 183.
135. Kautz to A. G., Feb. 12, 1877, A. G. O., 1190. Kautz also wrote that most
of the troop's labors were "provided by the inability or inefficiency, to, say nothing of
the reputed criminality of the agents . . ." Kautz's letter was published in the Arizona
Citizen, May 19, 1877, at Clum's request.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 247
just ready to start for Hot Springs to arrest the renegades.
At first he threatened to quit, but when the commissioner
promised an investigation, he went on with his task.136 As
no formal charges were sent to the interior department, the
commissioner directed Inspector Vandever, who was on his
way to the agency, to review the case. In due time Vandever
reported the charges of Kautz as strictly "vague and mali-
cious." 137
But Clum did not let the matter rest. Assailing Kautz
through the press, he violated rules of common courtesy by
publishing answers to the general's official communication of
February 12. His answers took the form of a diatribe
against the general's entire administration of the Depart-
ment of Arizona by comparing the activity and success of
the troops with that of the agency police. Evidence was ar-
ranged to show that the police had killed and captured 159
Indians, including many noted renegades while the troops
had only killed and captured 120, including none of note, in-
stead of 186 as reported by the general.138
Kautz now evidently decided he could not usurp the
agent's authority directly. He therefore informed his super-
iors that they treated him unfairly in expecting him to pur-
sue and punish recalcitrants when he had neither means of
gaining information regarding conditions at the reserve,
nor troops present to exercise control when needed.139 In
April he requested them to authorize the stationing of an
officer at San Carlos to watch the movements of the Indians
and to inspect their supplies.140 Political influence was
doubtless brought into play, for on April 28 the secretary of
the interior requested that such officers be stationed at the
agencies in general.141
136. Comm. to Clum, April 9, 1877, L. B. no. 136, p. 56.
137. Vandever to Comm., May 31, 1877, 7. F., 1646.
138. Clum to Editor, June 11, 1877, in Arizona Citizen, June 23, 1877; Clum at
Vandever's request, had already written an official letter covering the same subjects.
Clum to Vandever, May 24, 1877, 7. F., 1660.
139. Kautz to A. G., Feb. 12, 1877, op. cit.
140. Kautz to A. G., April 9, 1877, A. G. O., 2304.
141. Secty. of Int. to Secty. of War, April 28, 1877, 7. D., L. B. no. 18, p. 164.
248 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
When Clum returned from Hot Springs with the South-
ern Apaches, he was greatly incensed to find that an officer
with an escort had already arrived for inspection duty. Feel-
ing that he lacked the "pledged" support of the commis-
sioner, and that his success in removal "had actually been
penalized/' he decided to quit rather than become a party to
political schemes which he believed would be certain to
result in confusion and disaster.142 He therefore asked to be
relieved at once unless the commissioner would allow him
more pay and two extra companies of police, in which case he
agreed to control all the Apaches in Arizona without mili-
tary aid.143
The officials of the Indian Office were naturally unpre-
pared for such a radical proposal and they peremptorily
refused to accept it. Clum, equally inflexible, and always
headstrong and self-righteous, was never more certain of his
ground than now. Determined not to yield an iota to his
superiors, he at last made good his threat of resignation. On
July 1 he regretfully rode away from San Carlos and the be-
wildered Apaches.144
142. Clum, The Truth About the Apaches, pp. 84 et seg; Clum, "Geronimo," loc.
eit., p. 124.
At the time, Clum was not so philosophical, merely saying that military inspection
"to insure purity and justice" was an "insult to the honor, integrity and manhood of
an agent." Clum to Smith, June 6, 1877, I. O., S 605.
143. Clum to Smith, June 9, 1877, I. O., S 525.
144. Smith to Clum, June 9, 1877, L. B. no. 136, p. 309 ; Clum to Comm., June 19,
1877, I. O., S 557 ; Schurz to Comm., Aug. 16, 1877. I. O., I 583.
Clum's resignation had already been accepted pending the appointment of a suc-
cessor. Schurz to Comm., April 13, 1877, I. O., I 333.
(To Be Continued)
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PAUL A. F. WALTER, President
JAMES F. HINKLE, V ice-President
MIGUEL A. OTERO, II, Vice-President
LANSING B. BLOOM, Cor. Sec'y-Treas.
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NEW MEXICO
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VOL. XV
JULY, 1940
No. 3
PALACE OF THE GOVERNORS
PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY
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NEW MEXICO
HISTORICAL REVIEW
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VOL. XV JULY, 1940 No. 3
CONTENTS
Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670 (cont'd.)
France V. Scholes 249
Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886
(concl'n) .... Ralph H. Ogle 269
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Hammond and Rey, The Coronado Narratives
P. A. F. W. 336
Brooks, The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819
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NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL
REVIEW
VOL. XV JULY, 1940 No. 3
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO
1659-1670
(Continued) *
By FRANCE V. SCHOLES
CHAPTER VI
THE YEAR 1662
I
THE EX-GOVERNOR Juan Manso returned to New Mexico
toward the end of March, 1662. The dispatches from
the Holy Office, containing orders for the arrest of Nicolas
de Aguilar, Diego Romero, and Francisco Gomez Robledo,
the instructions to take appropriate action in the case of
Cristobal de Anaya Almazan, and the appointment of Manso
as alguacil mayor, were delivered to Custodian Posada at
Santo Domingo on April 1. Posada immediately notified
Manso of his appointment as alguacil mayor, and together
they made plans for the arrest of the accused parties.
At this time Aguilar and Romero were in the Hopi area
serving with Penalosa, who was making a visita of that dis-
trict. Gomez was in Santa Fe. It was agreed that Aguilar
and Romero should be arrested as soon as they reached
Isleta on their return from the west, and that the seizure of
Gomez should not take place until the others had been taken
* Note : With this installment Mr. Scholes resumes publication of this series which
has been suspended since the appearance of Chapter V in the January, 1938, number
of the REVIEW. (Ed.)
249
250 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
into custody. In some manner it soon became known that
orders for the arrest of various persons had been received,
and the news reached Penalosa and his associates in the
west. In order to prevent the escape of Aguilar and Romero,
Posada went to Senecu, leaving an agent in Isleta to inform
him at once of the return of Penalosa and his party.
The governor arrived in Isleta on May 1, and Posada,
being notified, hastened north and reached the pueblo about
midnight. On the following day, May 2, he arrested Aguilar
and Romero with the aid of soldiers in Penalosa's company.
Friar Salvador de Guerra, Posada's secretary, was then sent
north with instructions for Manso to arrest Gomez Robledo
in Santa Fe. These orders were executed on May 4. The
three prisoners were taken to Santo Domingo and placed in
cells that had already been prepared for this emergency.
Posada also took immediate action to investigate the charges
against Cristobal de Anaya Almazan. Convinced that the
evidence was sufficient to warrant Anaya's arrest, and
having received reports that the accused was preparing to
flee, Posada took him into custody at Sandia on May 14.
He was immediately transferred to a cell at Santo Domingo.
Finally, in accordance with the instructions of the Holy
Office, Posada embargoed the property of the prisoners, and
took possession of the same in sufficient quantity to provide
for their transportation under guard to Mexico City and the
costs of their trial.1
Although Penalosa quietly acquiesced in the arrest of
Aguilar and Romero at Isleta, he clearly demonstrated his
general attitude by taking possession of their horses, arms,
saddles, and other personal belongings at the time the arrests
were made. Posada made no issue of this action, although
he duly noted it and later sent a full report to the Inquisi-
tors.2 Within a few days, however, a more important issue
was raised.
1. The arrest of the soldiers is described in a letter of Posada to the Holy Office,
El Paso, November 24, 1662. Proceao contra Penalosa.
2. Ibid.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 251
Both Gomez and Romero were encomenderos and Po-
sada moved to embargo their encomienda tributes.3 He
took this action for two reasons : (1) he regarded the tributes
as part of the property of the prisoners, and therefore
subject to embargo; (2) he believed that Penalosa planned
to take advantage of the situation in order to obtain the
revenues for himself. Accordingly, Posada sent orders to
the alcaldes mayores of the areas in which the encomiendas
were located instructing them not to permit collection of the
tributes by third parties under pain of excommunication
and a fine of five hundred pesos.4
The purpose of the encomienda system in New Mexico
was to maintain a small group of semi-professional soldiers
to serve as the core of the local militia. In return for the
revenues of their encomiendas, the encomenderos were under
obligation to maintain arms and horses, and to be ready to
answer the call for military service whenever needed. For
many years the number of these soldier-encomenderos had
been fixed at thirty-five, and in case encomiendas were in-
herited by women or by minors incapable of military service,
escuderos were appointed who received part of the tributes
and served as active soldiers in their place. The tributes
were normally collected in two installments, in May and
October of each year.
In an auto dated May 12, 1662, Penalosa called atten-
tion to these facts and announced that in view of his obliga-
tion to maintain provincial defenses he deemed it necessary
to appoint escuderos for the encomiendas of Gomez and
Romero. The tributes in each case were to be divided into
two parts, one for the escudero and the other for the im-
prisoned encomendero, and Posada was ordered to confine
his embargo to the latter half. In order to provide funds
for support of the prisoners and the costs incidental to their
arrest, the May installment of tributes, then due, were to
3. Gomez held the encomienda of Pecos. Romero held half of Cochiti and half of
Sia.
4. Posada to the Holy Office, Santo Domingo, September 21, 1662. A. G. P. M.,
Inquisicion 598.
252 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
be collected by Posada on behalf of the Holy Office, and the
October installments were to be reserved for the escuderos.
Beginning with the year 1663, each installment would be
divided half and half, pending further instructions from
Mexico City.5 On May 15 Penalosa also sent Posada a
sharply worded letter in which he pointed out that encomien-
das were royal mercedes and questioned whether they could
be subject to the jurisdiction of the Holy Office. He com-
plained bitterly against Posada's action in giving orders to
the alcaldes mayores, and made pointed suggestions con-
cerning the manner in which the prelate should proceed in
such matters. With biting sarcasm, he suggested that "it
is not the desire of Your Lordship to intervene in what does
not belong to your jurisdiction ... or to create conflict
with the governor and captain general."6
The decree of May 12 was formally presented to Posada
at Santo Domingo on May 25. The prelate replied that his
instructions from the Holy Office extended only to the em-
bargo of the property of the prisoners, and that he had no
authority to make such an allocation of the property em-
bargoed as Penalosa proposed. Moreover, in the case of
Romero, the entire encomienda revenues would not be suffi-
cient to provide for the support of the accused and the costs
incidental to his arrest. He suggested that instead of mak-
ing actual payments to the escuderos, it would be better to
wait until instructions were received from Mexico City on
the legal questions involved. Finally, he pointed out that
the encomenderos had already effected collection of most of
the May installments in advance, and that consequently the
governor's scheme for allocating the revenues would be
prejudicial to the interests of the Holy Office.7 These repre-
sentations had no effect, and the governor insisted on accep-
tance of the procedures outlined in the auto of May 12.
The death of Francisco de Anaya Almazan on July 18
complicated the problem. The deceased was encomendero
5. Auto, May 12, 1662. A. G. P. M., Inquisici6n 598.
6. Penalosa to Posada, Santa Fe, May 15, 1662. Proceso contra Penalosa.
7. A. G. P. M., Inquisici6n 598.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 253
of Cuarac, La Cienega, and half of Picuris. By the laws of
succession his eldest son, Cristobal, then a prisoner of the
Holy Office, was the heir to the encomienda, and Posada sent
Manso to the Anaya home to embargo the encomienda papers
and titles. But Penalosa had anticipated this action, and
had already taken possession of the papers. A younger
brother of the legitimate heir, Francisco de Anaya, el mozo,
was named escudero.8
Thus the encomienda question created a jurisdictional
conflict between the governor and the prelate. The latter
limited his actions to formal protests, leaving the final
decision to the authorities in Mexico City. In his dispatches
to the Holy Office he pointed out that although the auto of
May 12 implied that escuderos for the encomiendas of
Gomez and Romero had already been appointed, this was
not the case. At a later date Penalosa announced that
Martin de Carranza and Pedro de Montoya had been
appointed, but Posada noted that they were close associates
of the governor and that Carranza was too young to per-
form active service as a soldier. The governor's purpose,
he alleged, was to collect the tributes for himself.9
Posada's assertions concerning the appointments of
Montoya and Carranza are confirmed by other evidence.
Shortly before Penalosa left New Mexico in 1664, he issued
titles of escuderia for the encomiendas of Romero and
Gomez to Cristobal Duran y Chavez and Juan Dominguez
de Mendoza, but the titles were antedated to May 4 and 7,
1662 ! Dominguez was absent from the province from the
autumn of 1662 to the latter part of 1663, and consequently
could not have served as escudero in any case. Duran testi-
fied that he received his title in early January, 1664. In
short, it is obvious that Montoya and Carranza never actu-
ally served as escuderos and that the titles issued to Duran
and Dominguez were intended to cover up this fact. There
8. Posada to the Holy Office, Santo Domingo, September 21, 1662. and enclosures.
A. G. P. M., Inquisicion 598. Proceso contra Penalosa.
9. Posada to the Holy Oace, El Paso, November 24, 1662. Proceso contra
Penalosa.
254 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
is also evidence that Penalosa collected three full install-
ments of the Anaya tributes, as well as one or more of those
belonging to Romero and Gomez, and that he kept the reve-
nues for himself.10
II
As noted in Chapter III, the Audiencia of Mexico, by a
real provision dated February 1, 1661, had decreed the res-
toration to ex-governor Manso of all the property that had
been seized or embargoed by Lopez during the year 1659-
1660, and had transferred jurisdiction in the case to Pena-
losa. The main purpose of Manso's return to New Mexico
was to seek execution of this order. Preliminary legal action
was initiated in April, 1662, but the major litigation took
place after the return of Penalosa from the Hopi area.11
On June 9 Manso formally presented the real provision,
petitioned for execution of the same, and asked for an em-
bargo of L6pez' property pending settlement of his claims.
Lopez countered by calling into question Penalosa's author-
ity and competence to serve as judge in the case, and filed
notice of an appeal in advance if the governor exercised
jurisdiction. Penalosa brushed aside Lopez' legal argu-
ments and admitted Manso's petition. The embargo on
Manso's property that had been in effect since 1660 was
revoked, and orders were given to seize property belonging
to L6pez in sufficient quantity to ensure satisfaction of
Manso's claims. Numerous items of furniture, household
supplies, clothing, and hides, and 275 fanegas of pinon were
removed from Lopez' house, and 187 mules and twenty-one
steers were brought from Taos where Lopez kept his herds.
This property was placed under embargo, pending litigation.
During the months of July and August Manso pressed
legal action to prove his claims for property alleged to have
been unjustly seized by his successor. The charges recapitu-
late much of what has already been outlined in Chapter III,
10. Proceso contra Penalosa.
11. The record of the litigation in execution of the real provision of February
1, 1661, is found in A. G. P. M., Tierras 3286.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 255
section I. Claims were presented for thirty-two Apache
servants, twenty-seven oxen, one hundred mantas, 231
fanegas of maize, two carts, fifty-one varas of jerga, mules,
one hundred marks of silver, salary paid to guards during
Manso's imprisonment in Santa Fe, and miscellaneous items
of furniture, clothing, and personal effects. Lopez made a
spirited defense in the form of long counter petitions, and
succeeded in convincing Penalosa on certain points. The
proceedings were still in progress when the legal situation
was complicated by other events of major importance.
Ill
On August 18, while the Manso litigation was in pro-
gress, a messenger arrived in Santa Fe and delivered to
Penalosa the real provision of May 12, 1662, containing the
sentence of the audienda in the residencia of Lopez. As out-
lined in Chapter V, section II, the audienda found Lopez
guilty on sixteen of the thirty-one charges included in Pena-
losas's preliminary sentence, and absolved him on the re-
maining fifteen. Fines of 3500 pesos and costs were im-
posed, and Lopez was ordered to satisfy numerous claims
filed by friars, colonists, and Indians. Penalosa immedi-
ately promulgated the sentence, and prepared to execute its
provisions.12 Before he could take further action, however,
he received an important communication from Custodian
Posada.
The same messenger who delivered the residencia sen-
tence also brought the orders from the Holy Office for the
arrest of Lopez and his wife, Dona Teresa de Aguilera.
These were turned over to Posada at Santo Domingo on
August 19. For several months Lopez had been held under
guard by order of Penalosa pending settlement of the
residencia, and Posada realized that it would be necessary
to give the governor some kind of advance notice before the
decrees of the Holy Office could be executed. Consequently,
12. The record of the procedures in execution of the sentence of the audienda
in Lopez' residencia is found in A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268.
256 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Friar Nicolas de Freitas was sent to Santa Fe to inform
Penalosa that the prelate had "urgent business" with Lopez
and to request removal of the guards. The sealed pliego
from the Holy Office had passed through Penalosa's hands
before it was delivered to Posada, and the communication
of Father Freitas left no doubt in the governor's mind as to
the nature of the "urgent business." Indeed, Posada in-
formed the Holy Office at a later date that he strongly sus-
pected that Freitas, an intimate friend of Penalosa, had
blurted out the whole story.13
The impending arrest of Lopez on orders from the Holy
Office introduced a new element in an already delicate situa-
tion. Penalosa realized that the arrest would be followed by
another embargo of Lopez' property, and that such action
would create a number of problems in which he would be
involved. As noted in the preceding chapter, he had taken
possession of silver bullion valued at 2904 pesos, the pro-
ceeds of goods sold in Sonora for Lopez' account. Moreover,
the action to force repayment of the Pacheco loan had been
characterized by very questionable proceedings, if not by
flagrant illegality and fraud, and it was generally believed
that the property turned over to satisfy the claim and to pay
the costs of collection, assigned to Pedro Martinez de Moya
and Martin de Carranza, had passed into Penalosa's hands
in one form or another.14 Thus embargo of Lopez' property
by the Holy Office would immediately result in a claim for
the silver bullion, and it was also probable that the litigation
on the Pacheco loan would be subjected to scrutiny.
The arrest of Lopez and embargo of his property by the
Holy Office would also create serious jurisdictional questions.
Penalosa had already taken possession of large quantities
of hides, finished leather goods, manias, shirts, and other
textiles belonging to Lopez under the guise of an embargo
to provide payment for the soldiers of Lopez' guards and to
13. Posada to the Holy Office, El Paso, November 24, 1662. Proceso contra
Penalosa.
14. Chapter V, section IV.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 257
cover pending residencia claims,15 and the execution of the
sentence of May 12, 1662, would undoubtedly involve addi-
tional seizures of property. And, as noted above, action of
the same kind had already been applied as part of the Manso
litigation. How would the arrest of Lopez and embargo of
his property by Posada affect these procedures ? It was the
point of view of the Holy Office, as expressed later, that such
action automatically removed Lopez and his property from
Penalosa' s jurisdiction.
Prior to eight P. M. on August 26 Penalosa had no
official information that the arrest of Lopez had been or-
dered. It is obvious, however, that he was certain that the
arrest was impending and that he decided to anticipate this
action and, insofar as possible, to embarrass Posada in
carrying out the instructions of the Holy Office, regardless
of any question of jurisdictional conflict. On August 24
Penalosa summoned Dona Teresa de Aguilera to the Santa
Fe church and told her that Posada was preparing to arrest
her husband. A long and acrimonious conversation took
place during the course of which the governor suggested
that Dona Teresa and her husband should turn over to him
whatever property they still possessed, in order to prevent
it from falling into Posada's hands. Dona Teresa refused
to consider this proposal.16 Failing in this effort, Penalosa
adopted another line of attack. On the afternoon of August
26 he had Lopez moved to the house of Pedro Lucero de
Godoy and placed under guard, and when this had been done
he went to Lopez* residence and seized a large quantity of
goods, even dismantling the beds and rummaging through
desks and trunks. The legal record of this action indicates
that the seizure was in the nature of an embargo to guaran-
tee execution of the residencia sentence.17 Posada insisted,
however, that Penalosa's purpose was to anticipate action in
the name of the Holy Office, and that Dona Teresa, who pro-
is, ibid.
16. Dona Teresa gave a full report of this conversation during her hearings
before the Holy Office in 1663. Proceso contra Dona Teresa de Aguilera.
17. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268.
258 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
tested duress when she handed over the keys to the store-
rooms, understood that this was the case.18 An illuminating
sidelight on the proceedings is provided by a remark attrib-
uted to Penalosa: "I have left goods worth 3000 pesos for
the Holy Office. Let them be satisfied with that, or search
for more!"19
During the evening of August 26 Posada and his notary,
Friar Salvador de Guerra, arrived in Santa Fe. They had
been met at La Cienega by Father Freitas, who had warned
them that Penalosa would refuse to permit the arrest of
Lopez unless Posada presented the formal orders from the
Holy Office. Consequently, they proceeded at once to the
Casa Real, where a heated discussion took place. In the end
Posada was obliged to produce the orders and to make a
written request asking the governor's permission to execute
them. At ten P. M. Posada and Manso, his alguacil mayor,
took Lopez into custody, and two hours later Dona Teresa
was arrested. Within a few days the two prisoners were
taken to Santo Domingo and placed in quarters already pre-
pared for them.20
On the day following the arrest, Posada made an in-
ventory of the goods still remaining in Lopez' residence.
This property included a large quantity of clothing and
bedding, manias, wax candles, etc. The most important
single item consisted of 410 libras of chocolate, the re-
mainder of a large supply that L6pez had brought from
New Spain for sale. The goods were boxed and sent to
Santo Domingo. Prior to his removal to Santo Domingo,
Lopez made a long declaration giving a detailed statement
of his property and the debts owed him by various indi-
viduals. In this list he included the silver bullion resulting
from the sale of goods in Sonora, his unsettled claim against
18. Posada to the Holy Office, El Paso, November 24, 1662. Proceso contra
Penalosa.
19. Testimony to this effect was given by several witnesses. Ibid.
20. Posada to the Holy Office, El Paso, November 24, 1662. Proceao contra
Penalosa. The official documents on the arrest of L6pez by Posada and embargo of
his property are found in A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268, 3283.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 259
Francisco Xavier for goods sold in Parral,21 the hides and
other effects valued at 1500 pesos embargoed by Penalosa
earlier in 1662 pending settlement of his residencia, the
property taken to satisfy the Pacheco loan and Manso's
claims, and the goods seized by Penalosa on August 26.22
On August 27, and again a few days later, Posada pub-
lished an edict calling upon all persons who had property
belonging to Lopez in their possession to declare and present
the same without delay, under penalty of excommunication.
A few citizens turned over goods in small amounts, and a
few debts were liquidated. Penalosa handed over a few
odd items of goods belonging to Lopez, but in general he
disregarded Posada's edict. The most important question
was the status of pending litigation and procedures. Pena-
losa realized that the arrest of Lopez had created a serious
jurisdictional problem, but his own selfish interests were at
stake and with obvious haste he concluded the Manso litiga-
tion and pressed action in execution of the residencia
sentence.
At eleven P. M. on August 26, one hour after Lopez
had been taken into custody by Posada, the governor ap-
pointed a curador to serve as Lopez' representative during
the remainder of the Manso litigation, and on August 29
he pronounced sentence. He found Lopez liable in the sum
of 1202 pesos plus other claims to be adjusted that finally
brought the total to 1316 pesos. Following the customary
legal forms, part of the property under embargo to satisfy
these claims was sold at auction on September 20. The
proceeds amounted to 1565 pesos, 4 tomines. Manso re-
ceived the amount due him in accordance with the sentence
of August 29, and 221 pesos were paid as costs of the litiga-
tion.23 In the same manner, Penalosa carried on proceedings
in execution of the residencia sentence, and on September 10
21. Chapter III, section II.
22. The inventories and declarations of property are in A. G. P. M., Tierras
3268, 3283.
23. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3286.
260 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
part of the property under embargo for this purpose was
sold.24
It was widely known that a large part of the goods that
were sold at this time was purchased by persons acting as
Penalosa's agents, that free bidding was not permitted, and
that goods were knocked down at prices far below actual
value. Posada informed the Holy Office that the governor
openly told him: "If I can have [the goods] for a lower
price, why shouldn't I do so?"25 As a matter of fact, sales
to the governor or his agents, regardless of the prices paid,
would be little more than a bookkeeping operation, for the
proceeds would still remain in the governor's hands, pre-
sumably to be used to satisfy the provisions of the sentence
in Lopez' residencia. The property that remained unsold
after the auctions held on September 10 and 20 was de-
posited with persons appointed by the governor, with the
stipulation that the proceeds would eventually be applied
on payment of the fine imposed by the residencia sentence
and other claims. Penalosa took care, however, to appoint
as depositaries members of his own clique, or persons who
would not dare to oppose his selfish schemes. It was the
governor's purpose to retain possession or control of Lopez'
property in one form or another, and to dispose of it for his
own advantage. Evidence of a later date indicates that few
of the persons who had claims against Lopez ever received
a settlement.
During September and October five carts loaded with
pifion, hides, and other goods were prepared for shipment
to Parral, Zacatecas, and Mexico City. Lucas de Villasante
and Tomas de Granillo, servants of Penalosa, were in charge
of the shipment, and it was announced that the owners
of the shipment were Villasante and Pedro Martinez de
Moya. In January, 1663, after the shipment had been em-
bargoed on orders from Posada, Martinez presented wit-
24. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268.
25. Posada to the Holy Office, El Paso, November 24, 1662. Proceso contra
Penalosa.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 261
nesses in Santa Fe to prove his ownership, and these
witnesses testified: (1) that Martinez had been engaged in
trade between Parral and New Mexico; and (2) that he
had purchased the goods sent in the carts with the proceeds
of European and Mexican products sold in Santa Fe.26 This
probanza, undoubtedly characterized by perjury, was in-
tended to cover up the true facts concerning the shipment,
for it was well known in New Mexico that Penalosa was the
owner and that the goods consisted of property formerly
belonging to Lopez.
Both Villasante and Granillo testified concerning Pena-
losa's ownership in declarations before the Holy Office in
1663, and the instructions for disposition of the shipment
unmistakably prove that Penalosa was the organizer and
owner. Part of the goods were consigned to Penalosa's
agents in Nueva Vizcaya, and several bundles of hides,
numerous sacks of pinon, and other items were sent as gifts
to various persons in Mexico City, including the viceroy,
oidores, treasury officials, and friends of the governor.27
Likewise, several Apache servants, part of a group of forty
formerly belonging to Lopez and seized by Penalosa's orders,
were sent with the carts as gifts to friends in the viceregal
capital. A large herd of livestock — cattle, sheep, mules, and
oxen — was also made ready and turned over to Juan Varela
de Losada for sale in Parral, and it was well known that
most of the stock carried Lopez* brand. The documents are
not explicit about the number of head in this herd, but the
evidence indicates that the herd included part of the sheep
and steers that had been seized to liquidate the Pacheco loan,
as well as some of the mules embargoed to satisfy Manso's
claims.28 Finally, there was rumor that the shipment sent
with Villasante and Granillo included the silver bullion
26. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3283.
27. Ibid.
28. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268, 3283, and Inquisici6n 593, 598. Also Proceso
contra Penalosa.
262 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
worth 2904 pesos that had been realized on the sale of
property for Lopez in Sonora in 1660.29
Apparently Penalosa was anxious to dispose of part of
his ill-gotten gains as quickly as possible, and also to ingrati-
ate himself with highly placed personages in Mexico City by
sending them gifts of New Mexican products. He accom-
panied the carts to the Rio Aba jo area and saw that they
got a head start on the wagon train in which Lopez and the
other prisoners of the Holy Office were being sent to Mexico.
On the way he seized one hundred fanegas of pifion belong-
ing to Lopez that was stored in a private ranch house and
turned it over to Fray Juan Ramirez, director of the mission
caravan. Ramirez claimed that Penalosa sold him the
piiion; others insisted that the deal called for sale of the
piiion in Mexico and a fifty-fifty split of the proceeds.30
Posada was aware of what was going on, but for several
weeks he was in no position to take action. He was fully
informed concerning the increasingly hostile attitude of the
governor in all matters relating to Inquisition activities.
Ever since the beginning of the controversy over encomienda
tributes, Penalosa had become more and more bitter and
caustic in his language about the Holy Office and its local
representatives. He belittled Manso for serving as alguacil
mayor, saying that it was beneath the dignity of an ex-
governor. He made disparaging remarks about Posada and
Guerra, calling them "those poor friars."31 And Posada re-
ported that the governor "talks a great deal about all these
matters, saying that he alone constituted the supreme au-
thority and that it would not come to pass that ministers of
the Holy Office should act without his consent, even saying
that if a tribunal [of the Holy Office] existed in this king-
dom he would preside and see that it was restrained [within
29. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268, and Manso to the Holy Office, Parral, February 6,
1663, Inquisicion 598.
30. Tierras 3283 ; Proceso contra Penalosa; Proceso contra Ramirez.
31. Testimony of several witnesses in Proceso contra Penalosa.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 263
proper limits] ,"32 These and other remarks were duly noted
and reported to the Inquisition.
IV
Throughout the entire summer of 1662 the four soldiers
who had been arrested in May were kept in close confine-
ment at Santo Domingo in cells where "they saw neither sun
nor moon." On Posada's orders they were forbidden any
communication with their families and relatives, although
messages were apparently secretly delivered to them from
time to time. They also made holes in the walls separating
their cells and were able to converse and exchange gossip.33
The chief concern of Lopez subsequent to his arrest was
the fate of his wife, but the persons who were permitted to
see him refused to satisfy his anxiety on this point. He also
protested his innocence and denounced the injustice of his
arrest. To Father Guerra he exclaimed on one occasion:
"Father, is it possible that the Inquisitors should place in
such a plight an illustrious man like myself, the representa-
tive of illustrious forbears and of a line which has produced
bishops, governors, and Inquisitors, and other persons of
great importance? Father, who do you think the Inquisi-
tors are? Sons of cobblers and tavern keepers are made
Inquisitors, merely because they prove that they are old
Christians. But governors have to be gentlemen (caballeros)
like myself. By the Virgin Mary, I know I have not erred,
either in malice or in ignorance, for I act wisely, being a
man of learning and judicious in my actions."34 This out-
burst and others in similar vein illustrate Lopez* state of
mind during the period following his arrest, and the appre-
hension and fear that troubled him. When he and his wife
were moved to Santo Domingo, they were placed in separate
cells, and day by day they begged the persons who guarded
32. Posada to the Holy Office, El Paso, November 24, 1662, Ibid.
33. Proceso contra Cristobal de Anaya Almazdn, and letter of Pedro Lucero de
Godoy, August 15, 1662, A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268.
34. Certification of Friar Salvador de Guerra, Sandia, October 9, 1662. Proceso
contra Lopez, II.
264 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
them for news, but to no avail.35 Posada was under strict
orders from the Holy Office on this points, and he was deter-
mined to enforce them to the letter.
The regular triennial mission supply caravan had ar-
rived in May, with Friar Juan Ramirez in charge, and it
was decided that the prisoners should be sent to Mexico City
when the caravan returned in October. Carts were requisi-
tioned for the transportation of Lopez, Aguilar, Gomez,
Romero, and Anaya. One of Lopez' carriages was assigned
for Dona Teresa's use during the journey. Part of Lopez'
property embargoed by Posada on August 27 and at later
dates was sold, but the bulk of it was prepared for shipment
with the caravan. During September Posada was busily
occupied in making the necessary plans. Guards were
appointed to be responsible for the prisoners, and their
salaries fixed. Manso, as olguacil mayor, was given general
responsibility for their custody and safe delivery to the Holy
Office.
Finally, on October 6 the prisoners were brought from
their cells and placed in the carts assigned to them. Special
precautions were taken in the case of Lopez and heavy
shackles were placed on his feet. When the irons were
being fastened on by one of the friars, Lopez stated : "Well,
Father, if there is no mercy nor law of God, put as many
fetters on me as you like ; put six pairs on my feet and fifty
on my neck. I swear by Christ — Look here, Father, hang
me or shoot me and with that we shall have done." When he
was taken to his cart, he called out to Indians who were
looking on: "See, my sons, how much the Fathers can do,
since they hold me a prisoner." To some Spaniards he said :
"Gentlemen, look on your governor. Regard my fate, and
see what the Fathers do. Do you not see that the Custodian
holds me a prisoner?" Posada protested these remarks and
quietly stated that he had not acted as a friar or Custodian,
but as Commissary of the Holy Office. To this Lopez re-
plied: "Such a thing has never happened except to a God
35. Ibid.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 265
Man and now to me. I swear to Christ that I am a better
Christian than all the men in the world. Look, gentlemen,
there is no longer God or a King, since such a thing could
happen to a man like me. No! No! There is no longer
God or King."36
Father Guerra tells us that from time to time, as the
caravan moved south toward El Paso, the distraught ex-
governor continued his excited speech, protesting the in-
justice of his fate and eagerly beseeching news of his wife.
And as the wagons rumbled along, he peered out from his
cart, anxiously looking toward the carriage in which his
wife traveled and shouting to persons nearby. His actions
finally caused Posada to give orders to have heavy leather
curtains fixed at each end of the cart, leaving only a small
opening at the front.37 Despite these strict precautions and
the orders to the guards not to permit unauthorized persons
to communicate with any of the prisoners, Lopez received
messages from his wife and other friends in the caravan
from time to time. Moreover, after the arrival of the
caravan in New Spain, letters were sent ahead to members
of his family in Mexico City, and the answers were delivered
in due course.38
It was known that Lopez owned a quantity of pinon
stored at Las Barrancas, the estancia of Francisco Gomez,
in the Rio Aba jo district, and when the caravan reached this
place the pinon was loaded and listed with the other property
under embargo.39 Again, at El Paso, another large supply
was found, apparently the stock that Francisco Xavier had
left there when he took a shipment of Lopez* goods to Parral
for sale in 1660.40 There was so much of it, however, that
only part could be loaded, the rest being left in a warehouse
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. See also orders by Posada, Isleta, October 13, 1662. Proceso contra
L6pez, II.
38. Proceso contra Lopez, II, III ; Proceso contra Dona Teresa de Aguilera.
39. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3283. Part of the pinon at Las Barrancas had already
been seized by Penalosa, as noted in the text above.
40. Chapter III, section II.
266 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
of Andres Lopez de Gracia, alcalde mayor of the El Paso
area.41
The caravan halted at El Paso for more than two weeks
while Posada prepared long reports for the Holy Office and
attended to final details. It was at this time that a messen-
ger brought news from Mexico City which caused Posada
to make a very important decision.
During the long period when he had been held under
guard in Santa Fe, prior to his arrest on orders from the
Holy Office, Lopez had tried to send reports to Mexico City
protesting against the conduct of Penalosa. At one time he
made arrangements with Penalosa's consent to send Toribio
de la Huerta as messenger. Then, without warning, the
governor arrested De la Huerta, apparently on trumped up
charges, and held him in jail for several months. In the
spring of 1662 Lopez was finally able to send another repre-
sentative, Capt. Francisco Dominguez de Mendoza, and the
latter on his arrival in Mexico City, contacted Lopez'
brother. An appeal was made to the audiencia, citing the
fact that Lopez was being held a prisoner in Santa Fe and
enumerating all the grievances against Penalosa, especially
his interference with dispatches sent by L6pez in 1660,42
his seizure of property, and his arbitrary conduct of Lopez'
residencies.
The audiencia had already pronounced sentence in the
residencia, execution of which has been described above.
Nevertheless it accepted this new appeal, and on July 20,
1662, issued a real provision as follows: (1) Penalosa was
directed to free L6pez from imprisonment on presentation
of bond guaranteeing appearance of the latter before the
audiencia; (2) all of Lopez* property was to be returned,
and Lopez was to be given wagons for the transportation of
his household and family to Mexico; (3) in case Penalosa
41. A. G. P. M., Tierras 8283.
42. Chapter IV, section II.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 267
refused to execute this order, Capt. Francisco Dominguez
de Mendoza was authorized to do so.43
Dominguez immediately set out for New Mexico to seek
execution of the decree. Along the way he learned of the
arrest of Lopez by the Holy Office, and at La Toma, below
El Paso, he was informed about the carts and livestock that
were being sent to Parral by Penalosa. Fearing the gov-
ernor's displeasure and realizing that a part of Lopez' prop-
erty had already been shipped out of the province, he decided
not to proceed to Santa Fe. When the mission caravan ar-
rived at El Paso, he notified the real provision to Posada,
and petitioned him to take action, as representative of the
Holy Office, to embargo the carts and livestock being con-
ducted to Parral by Villasante, Granillo, and Varela.44
Posada received testimony from several soldiers and
colonists in the caravan to substantiate the claims that
Penalosa had illegally and fraudulently come into possession
of property that had belonged to Lopez. On the basis of this
evidence and by virtue of the real provision of July 20, which
was interpreted as nullifying the embargoes imposed by
Penalosa and invalidating the subsequent sales of the prop-
erty, Posada gave orders to Juan Manso to proceed with all
haste in pursuit of Villasante and Varela and embargo the
carts, goods, and livestcok. Francisco Dominguez and his
brother Juan were instructed to accompany Manso and act
as Lopez' representatives.45
This was bold procedure, but the arrival of Dominguez
was the opportunity for which Posada had been waiting and
he made the most of it. He realized that such action would
undoubtedly cause a furore in New Mexico and arouse the
governor's wrath, but he acted without hesitation. The
sequel will be told in one of the succeeding chapters.
Late in November Posada turned over to Friar Juan
Ramirez a mass of documents and reports containing a com-
plete record of his proceeding subsequent to April 1, when
the first orders from the Holy Office had been received.
43. A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
268 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Soon thereafter he returned to Santo Domingo, and the
caravan set out on the long, weary journey to Mexico City.
Traveling day and night, Manso and his companions
were able to overtake Villasante and Varela as they ap-
proached Parral. Manso immediately contacted the local
representative of the Holy Office in the Parral area and
made preparations to execute Posada's commission, but the
news soon leaked out, and Manso found that the governor
of Nueva Vizcaya, Don Francisco de Gorraiz, then at Parral,
and Penalosa's agents hoped to forestall seizure of the carts
and livestock. For several days there were heated disputes
and legal wrangling, but in the end the embargo was
executed. The contents of the carts were inventoried, and
although it was clear enough that the goods had belonged
to Lopez, the total quantity represented only a part of what
had come into Penalosa's possession during the preceding
months. An eager search was made for the silver bullion,
but it was not found. One of the carts and part of the goods
were held in Parral; the remainder of the shipment and
four carts were sent on to Mexico City with Villasante and
Granillo. The livestock and most of the goods held in
Parral were ultimately sold, and the proceeds were deposited
with responsible persons. In 1665 the Holy Office called for
an accounting and silver bullion and cash to the value of
more than 5000 pesos were sent to the real fisco.4Q
Villasante and Granillo arrived in Mexico City in
March, 1663, and delivered the carts and goods to the repre-
sentatives of the Holy Office. Litigation over disposal of the
goods lasted for several years, and a resume will be given
at the end of the next chapter. The mission caravan was
not far behind, and in April Ramirez handed over the
prisoners and the property in his charge. Within a few
days Lopez, Dona Teresa, and the luckless New Mexican
soldiers were safely in the jail of the Inquisition waiting to
be tried by that stern and punctilious tribunal.
46. Manso to the Holy Office, Parral, February 6, 1663, A. G. P. M., Inquisici6n
598. Record of the liquidation of the property sold in Parral is found in A. G. P. M.,
Inquisicion 593.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN APACHES
1848-1886
By RALPH H. OGLE
CHAPTER VII
CONTRACTORS, SPOILSMEN AND INDIAN EXTERMINATORS
THE CONSUMMATION of the policy of concentration by
Agent Clum did not solve the problem of Apache con-
trol. In fact, the pace of concentration was so rapid that
the Indian bureau lagged far behind in formulating effective
measures of control. Officials in the field railed at the situa-
tion and their critical reports indicated that an ominous
future was anticipated.
General Kautz was particularly critical. The peace
policy as manipulated by the interested contractors and
crooked politicians, he said, was nothing more than concen-
tration in disguise, and although it outwardly appeared to
humanitarians to be a program of civilization, it, in reality,
was simply a base scheme of exploitation. At a large agency
like San Carlos where there were heavy disbursements, he
thought the field especially propitious for its full develop-
ment.1 Furthermore, he predicted that concentration would
inevitably lead to a series of bloody outbreaks, especially
when the new Indian leaders should become influential
enough to capitalize on the dissatisfaction already evident
among the many dissimilar bands.2 Inspector Kemble al-
though a firm believer in concentration, also foresaw trouble,
especially if an agent inexpert with agency police should
attempt to subject so many heterogeneous bands to a system
of rigid discipline.3 Even Clum was not sure of the Indians'
future.4
1. Gen. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877, 45 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
pp. 142-145.
Kautz in a sharp analysis stated that the "ring" must have a large number of
Indians at one point to make sufficient profits — hence their interest in concentration.
After this they did not stop until the agency was "controlled." The rest of their
program consisted of fraudulent returns, incorrect weights and measures, inferior
products and deficient allowances. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Kemble to Smith, Jan. 21, 1876, I. O., K 63.
4. Clum to Comm., Sept. 18, 1877, R. C. I. A., 1877, p. 35.
269
270 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
There was ample ground for such adverse views. Crook
had early insisted that a permanent peace was contingent
upon the proper subjugation of the Chiricahuas,5 and with-
out doubt their conduct since the Howard Peace fully justi-
fied his view. Indeed, their transference to San Carlos in
1876 had merely relieved the renegades among them from
restraints and encumbrances, and since that time the mili-
tary in both New Mexico and Arizona had either scouted for
them, or suffered severe criticism for not doing so.6
In spite of his reputed inactivity General Kautz appears
to have had troops in the field most of the time. Beginning
in July, 1876, regular scouting was ordered,7 and it was kept
up with increased activity during the first half of 1877.
Unfortunately, the inertia of the troops' movements, or the
especial elusiveness of the Chiricahua and Southern Apache
renegades prevented them from receiving any serious deci-
mation.8 It is very probable, however, that the numerous
and extended scouts made, materially reduced the amount
and seriousness of the depredations,9 and that the demon-
strated need of fuller military facilities in southeastern Ari-
zona led Kautz to establish Camp Huachuca at the north end
of the Huachuca Mountains.10 When he posted the camp and
sent a company of Hualpai scouts to scour the region,11 it
was thought that raiding would stop. But to his keen dis-
appointment a band of renegades began harrying the Fort
Bowie region, and near the end of May they killed two mail
carriers near the post. Kautz attempted to show that only
six renegades frequented the region, but a few days later
when Lieutenant T. A. Touey's command was defeated in the
6. Crook to Townsend, July 10, 1871, I. O., A 601.
6. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
7. Ibid.
8. See Gen. F. T. Sherman's criticism of Kautz's scouting, in Arizona Citizen,
Nov. 11, 1876.
9. For scouts, see, Capt. Worth to A. A. G., Mar. 25, 1877, A. G. O., 2079; Lt.
Craig to A. A. G., April 22, 1877, A. G. O., 2882 ; Capt. Rafferty to P. A., April 24,
1877, ibid.; Lt. Rucker to A. A. G., May 1, 1877, ibid.
10. Kautz to A. A. G., Aug. 15, 1877, op. cit.
11. Kautz to A. A. G., May 5, 1877, A. G. O., 2882.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 271
Las Animas Mountains, he decided that the six renegades
had been joined by fifty others.12
Almost in desperation, he insisted that the methods
General Crook had formerly used at San Carlos would have
to be used against the "few renegades now out."13 Inspector
Vandever recommended, on the contrary, that the Indian
police be sent to the region to "protect the military post,"
and Governor Saiford actually did take to the field with
them for three weeks.14 General Kautz, obviously belittled,
was kept in command only on the strong insistence of his
division commander.15
While the policy of concentration was thus endangered
by a considerable body of desperate renegades, the main
groups of the Apaches were behaving quite satisfactorily at
San Carlos. The protracted absences of the regular agent,
and the addition of so many unrelated and unfriendly bands
had caused much unrest among all the Indians ; nevertheless,
Acting-Agent Sweeney had maintained discipline.16
The agricultural program was not enlarged, but the
Indians had so effectively improved their irrigation facili-
ties that the growing crops promised a much heavier harvest
than in former years. Inspector Vandever noted these ex-
cellent prospects at a glance, and forthwith he reported that
more irrigation was the true key to Apache civilization. If
the Indian bureau would spend an additional $30,000 on the
project he was certain that the agency would be self-suffi-
cient in five years with a saving of $60,000 per year in the
meantime; otherwise, he sagely predicted expensive
troubles.17
In fact, the inspector's knowledge of Indian control was
rapidly growing at this time. He spent the last of May and
12. Arizona Citizen, June 9, 1877 ; Touey to C. O., June 9, 1877, A. G. O., 8802 ;
Kautz to A. G., June 22, 1877, ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Vandever to Comm., June 1, 1877, /. F., 1649 ; Arizona Citizen, June 9, 1877.
Safford met with no success.
15. McDowell to Secty. of War, July 10, 1877, A. G. O., 3858.
16. Vandever to Comm., June 30, 1877, /. F., 1661.
17. Ibid.
272 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the first of June at San Carlos and then started to New Mex-
ico. But he had gone only a short distance before he decided
the daily raids of the renegades made his trip too uncertain ;
he therefore returned to the agency. Almost at once he re-
ceived instructions to remain close at hand where he could
make frequent reports on the status and temper of the In-
dians.18 This was a fortunate move, for Clum's decision to
quit practically left Vandever in charge, and when the mili-
tary suspended scouting near the end of June, his placing
of twenty-five new police in the field prevented many restless
bucks from joining the renegades.19
Vandever also met with military inspection, and the sys-
tem immediately proved to be as irksome to him as it had to
Clum. His opposition brought sharp orders from the com-
missioner to permit it,20 but this did not stop his antagonism ;
consequently, when Kautz demanded to know "all the cir-
cumstances connected with each issue," Vandever branded
the whole scheme of military inspection as nothing less than
complete usurpation of the bureau's authority.21
Naturally, a crisis resulted, and in less than a month
the military charged him with negligence, inefficiency, crim-
inal neglect and fraud.22 The charges were not pressed, but
Secretary Schurz in reprimanding him for his "wholesale
denunciation" of officers whose "cooperation is almost daily
required," showed that the government approved the idea
of military inspection.23
18. Vandever to Smith, June 14, 1877, I. O., V 89 ; Comm. to Vandever, June 14,
1877, L. B. no. 136, p. 294.
19. Vandever to Comm., July 16, 1877, 7. F., 1687.
20. Smith to San Carlos Agent, July 21, 1877, L. B. no. 139, p. 355.
21. Vandever to Comm., Aug. 6, 1877, 7. F., 1706.
22. Lt. L. A. Abbott to A. A. G., Aug. 21, 1877, A. G. O., 6526.
23. Schurz to Comm., Sept. 6, 1877, I. O., I 615.
The presence of an army officer evidently had a salutary effect on checking the
condition and quality of supplies received. In August Vandever reported that much
of a shipment of 32,080 pounds of rice was lost by the breaking up of the containers
during shipment, and that 17,919 pounds of sugar sent had been "watered" to make up
for the large quantity taken out enroute. Vandever to Comm., Aug. 18, 1877, 7. F.,
1713. In October a Board of Survey assessed the contractors for a loss of 12% of
the sugar and 15% of the rice. I. O., S 1295.
Lieutenant Abbott charged that not half of the $240,000 of supplies bought during
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 273
The civil-military feud did not involve the reserve In-
dians at the moment ; nevertheless, the constant bickering of
the officials, the lack of supplies and the many tribal jealous-
ies produced intense dissatisfaction. The Warm Springs
Indians were especially disaffected, and they merely awaited
an opportunity for an outbreak. Their chance came almost
immediately on the night of September 1, when Pionsenay,
the renegade Chiricahua chief, slipped into the reserve to
take away a number of noncombatants belonging to his
band. Without hesitation 310 men, women and children
under Victorio and Loco broke out on the same night and
struck eastward, evidently intending to make a dash into
Mexico.24
Fortunately, a force composed of police and volunteer
Chiricahuas overtook them the next day and forced a fight
near Ash Creek. This unexpected blow forced the fugitives
northward into an isolated ranch country south of Fort
Wingate, but instead of seeking peace, they attacked remote
ranches, killed twelve ranchers and made away with one
hundred head of stock. No doubt scores of ranchers would
have been killed had the police, now reinforced by troops
from Arizona and New Mexico, not dogged them in hot
pursuit. After a month of constant harassment in which
they lost fifty-six of their number, the distressed Indians
were induced to surrender to the commandant of Fort
Wingate.25
Their disposal now became a most perplexing problem
to the military. If returned to San Carlos another outbreak
24. H. L. Hart to Vandever, Sept. 24, 1877, I. F., 1732. Hart was appointed
agent on June 26, but he did not assume his duties until August 21. Hart to Comm.,
Nov. 3, 1877, I. O., S 1334.
Nolgee and two other renegades had surrendered during the summer to arrange
the details for Pionsenay. Vandever to Comm., Oct. 14, 1877, /. F., 1730.
25. McDowell to A. G., Sept. 11, 1877, A. G. O., 5705; Sheridan to Townsend,
Sept. 18, 1877, A. G. O., 5836 ; Thos. Keams to Maj. H. Jewett, Oct. 3, 1877, A. G. O.,
6629.
the year were ever delivered, that vouchers were "raised" and grave frauds perpetrated.
Abbott to A. A. G., Aug. 21, 1877, I. O., W 1047.
274 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
could be expected; if left with the Navajos 26 a series of in-
fectious troubles would be invited. In their dilemma the
officers suggested locating them in the Indian Territory or
at the Mescalero Reservation, but in November Secretary of
War George W. McCrary ordered them removed to their
old home at Ojo Caliente, where they were to be closely
guarded until the department of the interior could provide
for their final disposition.27
The Warm Springs outbreak produced a serious situa-
tion for Agent H. L. Hart at the very beginning of his ad-
ministration. He was a tactful man, however, and by mak-
ing Geronimo captain of the remaining Southern Apaches
enlisted the former renegade's aid in preventing further
troubles.28 He also welcomed military inspection and thus
won the praise of the division commander.29 Fortunately,
the officials of the department of the interior supported Hart
with unusual promptness. They not only advanced funds
for the enlistment of a special force of thirty scouts 30 but
they also authorized him to remove Pedro's troublesome band
from Fort Apache.31 Secretary Schurz even advanced funds
to complete the sub-agency, for Hart had quickly convinced
him that fierce feuds certain to arise at a central agency
would drive many bands from the reserve.32
Thus supported, Hart experienced no difficulties during
the fall of 1877. He kept his efficient scouts in the field
with instructions to kill all recalcitrants found, and almost
at once the various bands became exceedingly docile.33 The
Chiricahuas reiterated their peaceful intentions, and even
the surly Apache- Yumas and the Yavapai, who had long
26. Fort Wingate near the present Gallup, New Mexico, commanded the Navaho
country.
27. Hatch to A. A. G., Oct. 11, 1877, ibid. McCrary to Secty. of Int., Nov. 1, 1877,
I. O., W 1069 ; Sheridan to A. G., Nov. 9, 1877, I. O., W 1095.
28. Hart to Vandever, Sept. 24, 1877, op. eit.
29. McDowell to A. A. G., Aug. 28, 1877, A. G. O., 6839.
30. Schurz to Comm., Nov. 14, 1877, I. O., I 821.
31. Hayt to Hart, Nov. 6, 1877, L. B. no. 138, p. 146.
32. Hart to Smith, Sept. 19, 1877, I. O., S 1090 ; Schurz to Comm., Nov. 28, 1877,
I. O., I 877.
33. Hart to Vandever, Sept. 24, 1877, op. eit.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 275
yearned to rejoin their kinsmen on the Colorado River Re-
serve, had a change of heart. When Hart told them their
wish was about to be realized, they reconsidered, and voted
to remain at San Carlos.34
Hart's success was partly due to the increased activity
of the troops. The recent outbreak caused Kautz to realize
the danger of renegades running at large ; therefore, to avoid
anticipated trouble, he kept numerous commands scouring
the country around the reserve.35 No devastations were re-
ported for several weeks, but his prediction that they might
be expected at any time came true in December when Juh
and Nolgee captured a wagon train in the Stein's Peak
Range, killed several men, including a mail carrier, and
swept the region bare of stock.36 The strong renegade party
then fled with their plunder towards the Sierra Madres of
Mexico just as Lieutenant John Rucker with a command of
eighty men returned from a scout that had led him far below
the border. Discovering their camp, the lieutenant attacked
them on December 17, killing seventeen of their number and
capturing their plunder and sixty animals.37
Numerous devastations now occurred in the region
west of San Carlos and most of them were attributed to
reserve Indians roaming about on passes. This deterred
scouting parties from vigorous action until a prominent
rancher named Robinson was killed on Tonto Creek ; where-
upon, troops under Lieutenant E. E. Dravo were dispatched
to the region. The demonstration was effective and by the
middle of January, 1878, all of the wanderers had returned 38
except a small band of elusive renegades.
To apprehend them, Captain Charles Porter from Camp
Verde made an arduous scout of three hundred and sixty
miles, traversing the entire region of Crook's former cam-
34. Hart to Comm., Nov. 1, 1877, I. O., S 1344. The commissioner had already
assented to their removal. Hayt to Sweeney, Sept. 13, 1877, L. B. no. 139, p. 37.
35. Kautz to A. A. G., Oct. 4, 1877, A. G. O., 6633.
36. Capt. J. E. Martin to A. A. G., Dec. 13, 1877, A. G. O., 7914.
37. Rucker to P. A., Dec. 31, 1877, A. G. O., 1337. Rucker was drowned July 16,
1878, in trying to save the life of Lt. Austin Henely. Arizona, Citizen, July 19, 1878.
38. Lt. Dravo to Lt. Kendall, Jan. 7, 1878, A. G. O., 1335.
276 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
paign. Only three Indians were killed, but the area was
freed of troubles for many months.39
In spite of General Kautz's growing efficiency, the dis-
satisfaction caused by his initial failure convinced General
Sherman and the department of the interior that a new de-
partment commander was needed. A change was quickly
arranged, and he was relieved by General O. B. Willcox on
March 7.40
Willcox immediately transferred the center of scouting
operations from San Carlos to southeastern Arizona, and a
new base, Camp Supply, was established near the border.41
As soon as the general saw the exposed nature of the region,
he directed Major C. E. Compton, who had been placed in
charge of all field operations, to clear the area of renegades.
Strong scouting commands now moved into every valley
and mountain range in southeastern Arizona and south-
western New Mexico, and even the isolated region along the
New Mexico-Arizona line was combed twice by a command
dispatched from Camp Apache. Such unusual activity
caused the renegades to take refuge in Mexico,42 and none
reappeared until in September, when Lieutenant Henry P.
Perrine found a small party near Pinos Altos communicat-
ing with the San Carlos Indians. After killing two bucks
and capturing five horses, he pursued the survivors until
they crossed the border.43
Willcox had his departmental strength reduced to 700
39. Porter to P. A., Feb. 4, 1878, ibid., 1732.
40. Hayt to Secty. of Int., Feb. 16, 1878, R. B. no. 80, p. 139 ; Willcox to A. A. G.,
Sept. 18, 1878, 45 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 193.
Sherman reported more murders in southeastern Arizona during the last six
months of 1877, than along the whole frontier of Texas. 45 Cong., 2 sess., H. M. D.
no. 64, p. 36.
41. Willcox to A. A. G., Sept. 13, 1878, op. cit.
42. Arizona Citizen, April 5, 1878 ; Compton to A. A. G., June 6, 1878, A. G. O.,
4717.
Economic penetration by miners, ranchers and traders ensued. Willcox to A. A. G.,
Sept. 13, 1878, op. cit.
During the spring the Mexicans revoked the tacit agreement by which commands
could pursue hostiles across the border. Gov. Mariscal to Estevan Ochoa, April 12,
1878, A. G. O., 3455.
43. Willcox to A. A. G., Sept. 24, 1878, A. G. O.. 8486.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 277
men during the summer.44 This drastic action caused him
to give little attention to other sections of the territory;
nevertheless, Captain Charles Porter struck a heavily armed
rancheria of Yavapai near Bill Williams Mountain, killing
seven warriors and capturing seven women.45
While the military thus became more effective, it ap-
pears that inertia overtook the agency police. The agent
harped on the value of the police, but his chief interest
seemed centered on having a large force of at least fifty men
at a wage of $15 each per month. The commissioner de-
murred, but Hart's insistence that the sub-agency doubled
the possibility of danger evidently convinced Secretary
Schurz, for he modified existing orders to provide for the
larger force.46
Much of Hart's anticipated danger was doubtless due to
the fact that great numbers of his Indians were allowed to
roam too widely. Whether the agent deliberately issued
short rations, or actually had an insufficiency is not clear;
at any rate, he issued an extravagant number of passes to
Indians who roamed about in search of indigenous foods.47
The commissioner ordered more frequent counts in order to
check this abuse, but Hart continued the practice, justifying
his action on the good behavior of his Indians.48
Somewhat later, the authorities at Fort Apache re-
ported that over one hundred San Carlos Indians had been
allowed passes to their old planting grounds, and that there
was great danger of trouble developing with the military
scouts. General Willcox at once questioned the agent's right
to issue passes covering territory beyond the reservation
limits, and the commissioner decided that the approval of
the Indian Bureau would be required in such cases. Hart
44. Arizona, Miner, Aug. 9, 1878; Salt River (Phoenix) Herald, Aug. 17, 1878.
45. Porter to C. O., April 6, 1878, A. G. O., 3232.
46. Hart to Comm., July 23, 1878, I. O., H 1237; Hayt to Hart, Aug. 1, 1878,
L. B. no. 143, p. 367 ; Schurz to Comm., Sept. 4, 1878, I. O., I 1652.
47. Maj. Compton to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1878, A. G. O., (n. f.).
48. Comm. to Hart, June 19, 1878, L. B. no. 143, p. 230 ; Hart to Comm., July 10,
1878, I. O., H 1201.
278 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
defended his jurisdiction, however, and apparently ignored
his instructions.49
Despite the reputed looseness of Hart's methods, he had
reasonable success in keeping the Indians at work. With
only forty shovels and a few mattocks they dug twelve miles
of new ditches, a considerable portion of which averaged ten
feet deep and eight feet wide. More significantly, much of
the work was done by one hundred Chiricahuas headed by
Geronimo and Nachee.50
No planting was done at the sub-agency, however, for
the new tools received arrived too late to be of much use.
This led Inspector Watkins, who had never met Indians
"more anxious to adopt the white man's ways," to suggest
a regular appropriation for equipment as well as for sub-
sistence.51
At the main agency farm the seeds arrived too late to
be planted, but the Indians substituted from their scanty
issues of grain and by August 1350 bushels of barley and
100 bushels of wheat had been harvested. Eskiminzin,
farming on a private basis, harvested sixty acres of small
grains he had planted on the San Pedro.52
The Indians also showed much interest in stock-raising.
Out of their 2343 head of stock 521 head were cattle, and
these had been largely accumulated by the pooling of beef-
ration tickets so live animals could be issued. According to
prominent visitors, agricultural pursuits had already worked
a transformation among the Apaches.53
Numerous disruptive factors, unfortunately, such as
intrusions, troubles with employees and lack of supplies,
caused the agent much grief and lowered the general morale
49. Willcox to Secty. of War, Oct. 10, 1878, A. G. O., 7639 ; Hayt to Hart, Nov. 7,
1878, L. B. no. 144, p. 381 ; Hart to Comm., Dec. 4, 1878, I. O.f H 1992.
50. Hart to Comm., Feb. 27, 1878, I. O., H 474.
51. E. C. Watkins to Hayt, April 13, 1878, I. F., 1938.
52. Hart to Comm., Aug. 1, 1878, R. C. I. A., 1878, p. 7. Eighty acres of corn
and beans remained to be harvested.
53. Ibid; E. P. Ferry to Sen. Thos. W. Ferry (Mich.), April 15, 1878, I. O.,
A 180%.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 279
of the reservation. This was especially true in the case of
intruding miners.
Since 1875 mining operations had been taking hold on
the western boundary of the reservation to an alarming
degree, and already numerous camps and sawmills sub-
sidiary to them were operating well within the reserve
limits. Two slight modifications in the boundary had been
made to accommodate the advancing mining frontier, but
these, perhaps, only encouraged the miners to make further
encroachments.54 In fact, a town named McMillenville, with
a population of three hundred persons had sprung up on the
very boundary line about ten miles from Globe.
This circumstance greatly complicated agency manage-
ment, because about four hundred Indians hung about the
town, seeking employment and bringing in hay and wood.55
Other intruders appropriated all available agricultural,
grazing and wooded areas in the immediate regions as far
as six miles within the reservation.56 Several of the headmen
now concluded that boundary lines should be no more bind-
ing on Indians than on whites, and Chief Nadaski led his
band of eighty-nine persons to a favorite camping ground
beyond the reserve limits. Fearing that the situation might
result in a bloody collision, General Willcox clamored for
the removal of the whites,57 and no doubt he was justified in
being petulant, for the war department early in the year
stood ready to oust all intruders from the reserve.58 A few
were removed near Fort Apache, but Inspector Watkins
prevented further action when he reported that a solid col-
umn of troops would have to be kept along the line to handle
the situation.59
54. Arizona, Citizen, Sept. 1875 ; Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reserva-
tions, pp. 35-36.
55. Watkins to Hart, May 25, 1878, 7. F., 1958.
56. Capt. Porter to P. A., Feb. 4, 1878, I. O., W 495 ; Hart to Comm., Sept. 30,
1878, I. O., H 1695.
57. Willcox to A. A. G., Nov. 27, 1878, A. G. O., 8511.
58. Schurz to Comm., Mar. 7, 1878, A. G. O., H 1695.
59. Watkins to Comm., April 25, 1878, 7. F. 2022.
The inefficiency of the Indian Bureau was made clear in August, when Commis-
sioner Hayt apparently in ignorance of Schurz's order of March 7, informed Hart that
280 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Naturally the miners called for a demarcation of the
reserve boundaries, although in doing so they anticipated
that the surveyors could be induced to alter the line to ex-
clude the coveted mineral and timbered areas. Agent Hart,
however, came out so strongly in defense of the Indians'
rights that the project was dropped.60
Troubled as he was by the intruders, Hart was even
more distressed with his employees. Vandever foresaw such
difficulties and he had already warned the commissioner
that the "bad lot surrounding San Carlos" might "mislead"
the new agent.61 Therefore, when Hart delayed in purging
his agency of undesirables, the commissioner took personal
action. The first victim was George H. Stevens, whose li-
cense as agency trader was revoked because he kept a board-
ing house where "hard cases" were reputed to live.62 Hart
resented this interference with his management, and by
allowing a trader of his own choice special privileges, he
almost ruined the business of the commissioner's appointee,
Reuben Wood.63 But he did replace the agency clerk, Martin
Sweeney, who "was notoriously a drunkard, gambler, and
a hard case generally," with George Smerdon, an equally
heavy drinker. Ezra Hoag, in charge of the sub-agency, now
joined with Sweeney in preferring charges against Hart,
but Inspector Watkins gave them little credence because
Hoag was found to harbor disreputable characters at a
whiskey establishment he kept at the sub-agency.84
Nevertheless, some irregularities existed. Hart fre-
quently traded annuity goods for farming tools and clothing,
60. Hart to Comm., Nov. 16, 1878, I. O., H 1886.
61. Vandever to Comm., Nov. 16, 1877, 7. F., 1786.
62. Hayt to Watkins, Mar. 23, 1878, L. B. no. 142, p. 48.
63. Wood to Hayt, Oct. 15, 1878, I. O., (n. f.).
64. Hart to Comm., May 1, 1878, I. O., H 873 ; Watkins to Hayt, May 25, 1878,
7. F., 1957.
no intruders could be ousted without the secretary's consent. Hayt to Hart, Aug. 27,
1878, L. B. no. 144, p. 129.
Somewhat later, when Hayt became informed, he asked Hart to explain his delay
and inaction in not complying with Schurz's order! Hayt to Hart, Dec. 17, 1878,
ibid., p. 482.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 281
but in all cases the trades had benefitted the Indians. He
was also interested in mining operations that might well
have been avoided by an agent, and he was very deficient in
a knowledge of law and routine forms connected with the
Indian Office. Notwithstanding these deficiencies the in-
spector reported that Hart merited the continued support of
the commissioner.65
Hart might have corrected his mistakes had it been
possible to get employees of integrity. Unfortunately, such
men were unwilling to work for low governmental pay when
private initiative on the nearby mining frontier offered far
greater returns; besides, the territorial merchants refused
vouchers of the department of the interior except at a
twenty-five per cent discount.66 The bad men were therefore
retained and the trouble was thus doubled, for the adminis-
tration of the new sub-agency required as many employees
as the main agency.67 Neither were the troubles lessened by
the occasional arrival of some political appointee, usually
totally unfit for the duty required.68
Hart's greatest troubles developed in connection with
the agency supplies. The flour and beef supplies were inade-
quate for the fiscal year 1877-1878, and in February, the
weekly quota of flour issued to an individual was only suffi-
cient for three days. Coffee, sugar, baking powder and
tobacco were reduced fifty per cent while the three pounds
of beans issued with every one hundred rations was too
small in amount to be of any value.69
65. Watkins to Hayt, April 19, 1878, 7. F., 1940.
66. Watkins to Hayt, May 20, 1878, 7. F., 1948.
67. Hart to Comm., Aug. 1, 1878, op. cit.
68. Such a case occurred during the summer of 1878 when St. Clair Bearing, a
health-seeker and a refined and polished gentleman, was appointed chief of police
through the influence of Senator Gordon of Maryland. He was soon in conflict with
Hart's appointee, Daniel Ming, whose position had been confirmed by the Indian Office
after Bearing was appointed ! When Hart entered the fray, Bearing blasted the
agency administration, hurling grievous charges against the new clerk, Smerdon. In
November, worn out and thoroughly hated, Bearing resigned. Hayt to Hart, June 8,
1878, L. B. no. 143, p. 198 ; Bearing to Hayt, Oct. 1, 1878, I. O., B 803 ; Bearing to
Hayt, Nov. 5, 1878, I. O., B 936.
69. Hart to Comm., Mar. 6, 1878, I. O., H 575.
282 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Contractors promised to deliver without delay the extra
twenty-five per cent allowed by their contracts, but very few
could find a source of supply so early in the year. New con-
tractors hesitated to deliver supplies in exchange for certi-
fied vouchers, and the few that did discounted them twenty-
five per cent.70 Hart hazarded an outbreak by allowing his
Indians to roam widely about in search of native foods, but
he accumulated 3000 extra rations for issue each week by
issuing only to the number present rather than by families
as the commissioner wished.71
A crisis was soon reached, however, when contractors
found it impossible to meet the terms of their contracts with
sufficient cattle of the specified weight.72 In spite of the
officials' entreaties to be permitted to accept smaller cattle,
the commissioner ordered that no exceptions could be
allowed "even if it was advisable to do so." 73 This order
forced Hart into the open market where inferior cattle could
legally be accepted.74 Although temporary relief followed, a
lack of funds soon stopped the purchases and the enraged
Indians, again hungry, threatened an outbreak. General
Willcox almost decided to make them prisoners of war so
his commissary could lawfully feed them; instead, he ad-
vanced Hart 17,000 pounds of flour and thus relieved the
situation for a week.75 Fortunately, the thoroughly aroused
Interior officials now telegraphed Hart $10,000 "to meet any
70. Hayt to Schurz, Mar. 23, 1878, R. B. no. 30, p. 830.
71. Hart to Comm., July 10, 1878, I. O., H 1201.
72. Cattle were required to average 860 pounds and none could be received of less
than 700 pounds.
73. Comm., to E. A. Walz, July 24, 1878, L. B. no. 156, p. 87 ; Watkins to Hayt,
May 3, 1878, /. F., 1934.
74. In the open market Hart had to pay $4 per hundred gross for cattle that
under contract would cost $2.49, less a penalty if they fell below the contract terms.
Of course the regular contractors had to assume the loss to the government, but
according to treasury department officials, such contractors through a series of pre-
arranged financial agreements with the open market vendors, usually filled the open
market orders with cattle unacceptable under regular contract terms. Thus a system
of defaulting on contracts followed whenever contractors found themselves encumbered
with inferior cattle. E. B. French (Second Auditor) to Comm., Dec. 26, 1878, I. O.,
A 1011.
75. McDowell to A. A. G.f July 30, 1878, A. G. O., 5320.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 283
emergency."76 This money afforded only temporary relief
and even the delivery in August of some of the regular sup-
plies as well as a wide use of the Indians' maturing crops
failed to remove the exigency.77 But deliveries became more
systematic during the autumn and by winter the surly
charges had regained their former composure.78 Improve-
ment had hardly set in before the return of the Warm
Springs band from Ojo Caliente again complicated San Car-
los affairs.
The military removal of these Indians from Fort De-
fiance to the Rio Grande in November, 1877,79 was unauth-
orized by the department of the interior, and the department
of war, as a result, was forced to hold them prisoners sev-
eral months longer pending the department of the interior
officials' selection of a place for their final disposition. When
the chiefs rebelled against the idea of being returned to San
Carlos, several points in New Mexico were suggested, and
Fort Sill in Indian Territory was actually recommended.80
The military objected vigorously to Fort Sill, and the ques-
tion was allowed to drift until Generals Sherman and Sheri-
dan threatened to turn the entire band loose.81 The officials
of the department of the interior then asked the department
of war to return the prisoners to San Carlos.82 Arrange-
ments were not completed until Captain F. T. Bennett with
two companies of cavalry and scouts reached Ojo Caliente
on October 8. The Indians were still strongly opposed to
the change and eighty bucks, including Victorio, took to the
mountains, followed in a few days by seventeen more. With
the failure of scouting parties to run down the recalcitrants,
a motley group of 169 Warm Springs prisoners, mostly non-
76 Hayt to Schurz, July 29, 1878, R. B. no. 31, p. 102.
77. Hayt to Wm. Zeckendorf, July 31, 1878, L. B. no. 156, p. 132 ; Hart to Comm.,
Sept. 18, 1878, I. O., H. 1631. The competitive bidding of the military and the boom-
ing mining camps practically closed the open markets to the department of the in-
terior. Ibid.
78. Hart to Comm., Nov. 18, 1878, I. O., H 1888.
79. Cf. supra, p. 274.
80. Hayt to Schurz, Feb. 2, 1878, R. B. no. 30, p. 97.
81. McCrary to Schurz, Aug. 6, 1878, I. O., W 1416.
82. Hayt to Schurz, Aug. 14, 1878, R. B. no. 31, p. 147.
284 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
combatants, was loaded into wagons and started towards
Fort Apache. Rain and snow fell enroute, and by the time
the post was reached the San Carlos trail was closed to
wagon traffic. Captain Bennett therefore turned the pris-
oners over to Chief of Police Daniel Ming, who, with his
forty scouts, conducted them on to their destination.83 • They
were immediately located near the agency where the police
could guard them closely; yet Agent Hart anticipated that
Victorio and his men in attempts to regain their women and
children would soon start a series of raids.84
Hart engendered more serious troubles than antici-
pated raids, however, by allowing graft and fraud to creep
into his transactions. The new year had scarcely started
before it was charged that he was selling vast amounts of
agency supplies to surrounding stores and mining camps.85
It was also learned that a reputed insufficiency of flour at
the agency had caused him to buy all the surplus flour offered
for sale in the open market at Globe.86 The situation soon
became even more intriguing, for the military inspector re-
ported that Hart issued only half rations when he made
issues at all.87 A climax was reached when the agent asked
for military inspection certificates from inspectors who were
not present at the delivery of supplies.88 This circumstance
aroused the commissioner's suspicions, and Inspector J. H.
Hammond was sent to investigate the agency.89
Evidences of graft were easily found. Hart was not
blamed because the small, irregular supply deliveries left
the Indians hungry, but his policy of accepting similar
amounts of inferior products, pending a large accumulation
before military inspection, was open to serious objection.
83. Bennett to A. A. G., Dec. 4, 1878, A. G. O., 8935. Dr. Walter Reed of Spanish-
American War fame, who was stationed at Camp Apache, adopted a little Indian girl
who had suffered severe burns enroute. Reed to Schurz, Feb. 18, 1879, I. O., H 461.
84. Hart to Comm., Nov. 27, 1878, I. O., H 1954.
85. Dearing to Sen. Gordon, Jan. 15, 1879, I. O., G 47.
86. McDowell to Sherman, Jan. 13, 1879, A. G. O., 171 ; Arizona Citizen, Jan. 18,
1879.
87. Capt. W. L. Foulk to P. A., Feb. 24, 1879, A. G. O., 1713.
88. Lt. G. E. Overton to P. A., Mar. 10, 1879, A. G. O., 2218.
89. Hayt to Hammond, Mar. 19, 1879, L. B. no. 148, pp. 148-151.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 285
Moreover, his possession of a single can of high quality
flour from which samples could be sent to the Bureau,
pointed to probable fraud.90 Beef herds were inspected as
soon as they reached the reserve and then were returned to
the contractor until time of issue. Such a practice indicated
that the agent either became the tool of the contractor, or
played an outright game of graft himself. Hammond viewed
the cattle inspection as a "farce" and a possible "cover for
fraud"; he therefore ordered a special branding of each
animal received, in advance of the issuance of inspection
certificates.19 This expose soon brought about Hart's resig-
nation, but most enigmatically, Hammond stopped his in-
vestigation at once, considering "the interests of the gov-
ernment sufficiently protected by the resignation of the
agent."92
The inspector for a short time took sole charge of the
agency. Oddly, he spent most of the time examining mines ;93
then in May, he went to Washington and New York, bearing
a mine bond signed by Hart and another party named Fuller.
Business connections were quickly made, and Hammond
hastened back to San Carlos for a completion of the agency
inspection, cut short only a few weeks before.94 He immedi-
ately told Hart that no prosecution was intended for the
frauds already detected ;95 but instead of searching for fur-
ther graft, he went to the reserve's western boundary, and
by a dishonest survey excluded from the reserve a mine
that Hart had recently sold to "Edward Knapp," who in
90. Hammond to Comm., April 7, 1879, I. O., H 542.
One contractor after submitting a sample of New England flour, made his delivery
in Arizona flour. C. B. Fisk to Bd. Ind. Comms., Nov. 5, 1879, R. B. I. C., 1879, p. 55.
91. Hammond to Comm., April 10, 1879, I. O., H 540; McCrary to Schurz, April
30, 1879, I. O., W (?).
92.. Rept. Bd. of Inquiry, Jan. 31, 1880, R. B. I. C., 1879, pp. 68-70.
93. Arizona, Citizen, May 16, 1879 ; McDowell to A. G., May 29, 1879, I. O., Secre-
tary's Files, Appointments Division, 564. The Secretary's Files dealt with delicate
subjects over which a tight censorship was maintained. This is the first time these
files have been entered by a research student. Hereafter they will be designated S. F.
94. Rept. Bd. of Inquiry, op. cit.
95. Hammond to Hart, July 7, 1879, in New York Tribune, Jan. 28, 1880.
286 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
reality was Edward Knapp Hayt, the commissioner's son.96
Reports from various sources now told of graft and
collusion on the part of Hammond and Hart,97 and no less a
figure than General Clinton B. Fisk, president of the board
of Indian commissioners, decided to investigate the San
Carlos affairs at first hand. He delayed his investigation
until October, but he was shocked when he found it necessary
to report :
Our Indian administration is made a stench in
the nostrils of honest men by the shameful prac-
tices and personal conduct of our officials. . . . San
Carlos has suffered through the administration of a
mining speculator, conducting his mining through
means derived from the sale of agency supplies.
Sugar, coffee, meat, blankets were taken by the
wagon loan from our warehouse to his mining
camps. The purchase and sale of mines absorbed
his time and thought. Finally, by the aid of one
of our inspectors, he was enabled to sell his mines
for a large sum and quietly leave the country, in
genial social relations with the said inspector, who
had been sent there to investigate abuses, and, as
he said, to prosecute the agent.98
Several weeks later at a meeting of the Indian commis-
sioners, Fisk charged that Hammond had grafted with the
consent and cooperation of Commissioner Hayt, whereby the
latter and his friends were to receive special benefits. It
was also brought out that Hayt had refrained for several
months from reporting some of the most serious charges of
graft to Secretary Schurz." This perfidy was enough for
the conscientious secretary. On January 29 he went to the
96. The deed to the mine was taken in the name of C. D. Deshler, a director in
Hayt's Trust Company, and an associate in business with Commissioner Hayt's son-in-
law. Ibid., Dec. 22, 1879.
97. E. B. French (Second Auditor, U. S. Treasury) to Comm., June 16, 1879,
I. O., A 443 ; Benj. Turner (Head Farmer) to Schurz, July 10, 1889, I. O., I 899.
98. Fisk to Bd. Ind. Comms., Nov. 6, 1879, R. B. I. C.. 1879, pp. 64-55.
99. New York Tribune, Jan. 12, 31, 1880; Rept. Bd. of Inquiry, op. cit.; Hayt
to Schurz, Jan. 7, 1880, R. B. no. 36, p. 22.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 287
office of the commissioner, relieved him of his position and
gave him one hour in which to clear his desk.100
Commissioner Hayt, several months before his implica-
tion, had signified his intention of replacing Hart with a
man "thoroughly known to be honest and capable."101 Ac-
cordingly, on the recommendation of General McDowell,
Captain Adna R. Chaffee of Fort McDowell was detailed as
agent.102 Chaffee went to work with characteristic energy
and began a general "cleaning up" for the agency; he re-
placed much of the personnel and searched for graft, but he
devoted most of his time to the improvement of the Indians'
welfare. Several hundred passes were issued so hungry
bands could gather native foods in the Mescal and Final
Mountains, and other bands were allowed to plant late
crops at their former planting grounds scattered over the
reserve. When supplies began to arrive regularly, the corn
ration was modified to prevent the manufacture of intoxi-
cants. Fortunately for the lowered morale of the Indians,
the captain was allowed to form a new force of forty police ;
immediately his charges became quiet and anxious to
work.103
Chaffee for some reason appears to have favored the
Fort Apache region as a home for some of his bands. Whether
this was a concession to his military friends or a desire to
help his charges towards self-sufficience is not clear;104
nevertheless, he allowed three hundred and fifty-five of them
to take up abode in their old homes.105 The move was a most
beneficial one, for it not only pleased the Indians, but in
giving further relief to the much improved condition of the
100. New York Tribune, Jan. 29, 1880.
101. Hayt to Hammond, April 15, 1879, L. B. no. 148, p. 289.
102. Comm. to Capt. M. H. Stacey, June 16, 1879, L. B. no. 161, p. S62.
103. Chaffee to Comm., July 27, 1879, I. O., C 786 ; Chaffee to P. R. Tully, Atig.
5, 1879, I. O., W 1354.
104. Chaffee was the first official to report that a great part of the irrigation
project at San Carlos was useless and impractical. Chaffee to Comm., Aug. 11, 1879,
46 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ix, p. 118.
105. Chaffee to P. R. Tully, Au». 5, 1879, op. eit.
288 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
commissary at San Carlos, it allowed an immediate return
to full rations.106
The agent now enjoyed full and regular deliveries of
beef, but he strongly suspected that the government was
being defrauded in the weight of cattle. By marking the
weights of the agency scales he discovered that the weighers
were using tampered weights that gave great advantage to
the contractors.107
The detection of graft greatly heightened Chaffee's
energy and attention, and he gradually cleared the nauseous
atmosphere of the agency ; still, he suffered much inconven-
ience in connection with the deliveries of annuity goods.
Contracts for deliveries had been given in July so the goods
could arrive in October, but January weather caught the
Indians "virtually naked, shoeless, shirtless and blanket-
less."108 This condition prevailed until the middle of Febru-
ary when an advance consignment arrived just in time to
prevent an ugly outbreak.109
Subsisting the Indians proved to be less difficult, and
no troubles were encountered until rigorous weather drove
most of the Fort Apache group back to the agency, and a
band of over one hundred renegades was brought in from
Mexico.110 This increase in numbers and a recurrence of
106. Phoenix Herald, Sept. 20, 1879.
107. Chaffee to Comm., Oct. 25, 1879, I. O., C 1090.
Chaffee rechecked one herd of ninety cattle at 6860 pounds less than they showed
on the first weighing. Chaffee to Comm., Oct. 13, 1879, ibid.
108. Chaffee to Comm., Oct. 12, 1879, I. O., C 1075; Fisk to Schurz, Jan. 15,
1880, I. O., S 193.
109. Chaffee to Comm., Feb. 24, 1880, I. O., C 453.
110. Chaffee to Comm., Mar. 4, 1880, I. O., C 475.
Ger6nimo, Ponce, Francisco and several other notorious renegades on April 4,
1878, fled from San Carlos to the Sierra Madres in Mexico. Very peculiarly, no official
report of their escape was made, but it is probable that they wished to visit Juh and
Nolgee who had dashed into Mexico at the time of the Chiricahua removal. The rene-
gades soon established a heavy traffic in stolen goods with the citizens of Janos.
Information concerning their whereabouts was learned in July, 1879, and plans
were made to return them to the United States. (Chaffee to Comm., Sept. 9, 1879,
I. O., C 96). McDowell stopped the action, but late in the year, Lieutenant H. L.
Haskell, Thos. Jeffords, Archie Mclntosh and some friendly Indians opened communica-
tion with the refugees. Privation and Mexican military activity were now so pressing,
that Ger6nimo, Juh and 105 other Indians voluntarily surrendered at Camp Rucker.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 289
irregular deliveries forced the agent to buy flour in the open
market, but the only kind that could be found made the
Indians violently sick, "creating dizziness in the head, sick-
ness of the stomach and finally severe vomiting." Such bad
effects aroused the bureau from its lethargy, and its first
example of forethought was evinced when the regular con-
tractors were told to deliver the extra twenty-five per cent
of supplies allowed by law.111
Captain Chaffee by this time had demonstrated himself
to be a successful Indian agent, but his appointment was only
temporary, and steps had already been taken to select a
civilian agent. After Clum had applied,112 and Jeffords had
been strongly endorsed by Governor Fremont,113 a decision
was made in favor of J. C. Tiffany of New York, the candi-
date of the Dutch Reformed Church.114 Accordingly, he took
charge of San Carlos on June 1, 1880, and immediately began
to replenish the dwindling beef supply by open market pur-
chases.115 He next attended to the spiritual needs of his em-
ployees by organizing a Sunday School and a series of Bible
reading. Then he formulated plans for the advancement
of his charges. With the consent of the bureau, a school build-
ing was started, 250 acres of land were cleared, and a corral
with a well nearby was constructed midway between Globe
and the agency for the convenience of the freighters of
Indian supplies.116
Tiffany had been in charge only a short time when he
learned the Indians wanted a change in the economical
111. R. E. Trowbridge to Chaffee, Mar. 23, 1880, L. B. no. 169, p. 586 ; Chaffee to
Comm., May 24, 1880, I. O., C 1016.
112. Clum to Hayt, Dec. 20, 1879, I. O., C 15.
113. John C. Fremont to Schurz, Jan. 23, 1880, I. O., A 108.
114. Schurz to Comm., May 4, 1880, I. O., I 259. According to General Fisk.
Tiffany would bring a "new1 order of things" at San Carlos, because he was a "great
worker and a Christian." He had supervised the construction of the elevated railways
in New York City. Fisk to Comm., Mar. 5, 1880, S. F., 351.
115. Tiffany to Comm., June 1, 1880, I. O., T 650.
116. Tiffany to Comm., July 12, 1880, I. O., T 901.
The penitents were then conducted to San Carlos and located near the sub-agency.
Louis H. Scott (U. S. Consul) to Gov. Lew Wallace, Nov. 29, 1879, I. O., N 13;
N. Mex.; Haskell to Willcox, Dec. 21, 1879, A. G. O., 284.
290 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
rationing system developed by his predecessor. This was
made especially clear by Juh and Geronimo who explained
that the Chiricahuas merely delayed a jump into Mexico
because they first wished to ascertain his degree of liber-
ality. They agreed to stay and pursue constructive work
for him if he would begin the immediate issuance of full
rations.117 He accepted their proffer and thus kept a large
number of them busy on the work started by Chaffee. By
the time of his annual report they had harvested 500 bushels
of wheat, 1800 bushels of barley and 1800 bushels of corn.
He predicted that with competently constructed irrigation
ditches instead of the useless ones already built, and a pro-
tection of their water rights against the Mormon settlers
above the reserve, the Apaches would soon become a civil-
ized group.118
Tiffany enlarged upon and revitalized some of the proj-
ects started by the former agents. He surveyed a new
set of ditches which, with the aid of flumes he proposed
building, would allow the irrigation of 1400 acres of new
land near the agency. Moreover, he promised the bureau
that since he intended to complete the work with the
labor of Indians in the guardhouse as well as that of those
paying for annuity goods, this important development would
require a special appropriation of only $10,000.119 He also
contemplated the opening of a school in the spring of 1881,
but in December when several headmen brought in their
sons and insisted that the educative process start at once,
seventeen boys were placed under the instruction of Mrs.
A. B. Ross.120
In spite of the visible progress noted by officials who
visited San Carlos,121 Tiffany had already stooped to certain
administrative irregularities, and his marked propensity
117. Ibid.
118. Tiffany to Comm., Aug. 15, 1880, 46 Cong., 3 seas., H. E. D. no. 1, voL 1. p.
128.
119. Tiffany to Comm., Nov. 29, 1880, I. O., 1607.
120. Tiffany to Comm., Dec. 81, 1880, I. O.. 846.
121. Fisk to Bd. Ind. Comma., Nov. 15, 1880, R. B. 1. C., 1880, p. 64.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 291
for taking other than the prescribed forms of procedure was
rapidly growing. His suavity, however, kept him from early
detection,122 and even after he was accused of receiving
several deliveries of cattle at one time, he sent convincing
affidavits from his employees that he had been acting hon-
estly. Nevertheless, Inspector J. L. Mahan soon found that
the cattle had actually been received as reported and then
returned to the care of the contractor.123 Questions also arose
concerning his agency traders and his proposal to "indi-
vidualize" the rationing system, but it was not until a bill
of lading for supplies had been held up that a careful in-
vestigation was made.124
When Mahan began a close scrutiny of the agency early
in November, affairs seemed to be running very smoothly.
All the bands appeared progressive and the Indian police
were maintaining the best discipline the inspector had noted
among any Indians. Yet many serious irregularities, if
not criminal practices, were quickly uncovered. Tiffany had
signed bills of lading for goods not received,125 and rations
had been issued short to make up for wastage and shrink-
age. Short issues in other instances had been manipulated
to the profit of the agent.126 By paying the agency butcher in
hides rather than cash, graft was not only possible but
highly probable. And in the case of the well sunk between
Globe and San Carlos, the inspector was led to believe that
Tiffany expected to make great profits. These gross abuses
should have caused the immediate removal of the agent;
instead Secretary Schurz, probably moved by Mahan's view
that Tiffany was honest in motive, endorsed on the report
122. His criticism of military inspection was never direct. Thus, he escaped the
officers' censure. He did attack the system in his regular agency reports. Tiffany to
Comm., Sept. 17, 1880, I. O., 1313.
123. Ibid.; Mahan to Schurz, Nov. 18, 1880, S. F., 314.
124. E. M. Marble to Tiffany, Sept. 3, 1880, L. B. no. 154, p. 644; Mahan to
Comm., Nov. 2, 1880, I. O., M 2200.
125. He had signed for 15,251 pounds of sugar when only 2168 pounds were re-
ceived ; 3349 pounds of coffee when none was received ; and 5000 pounds of tobacco
when 4000 pounds were received.
126. Mahan found that 16,695 pounds of common groceries had been accumulated
to the agent's profit.
292 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
his approval of the agent's efforts to civilize the Apaches, and
continued him in office.127
This disclosure did not lessen Tiffany's energy and he
continued to make sufficient progress to impress his super-
iors. The cultivation of crops was increased from 150 acres
to 1000 acres with a resulting increase in yield from 2300
bushels to 16,000 bushels, a school building of 100,000
adobes was completed with no white laborers except masons,
and five miles of new ditches were dug by the Indians them-
selves. Unfortunately the destruction of Tiffany's expensive
flumes by flood waters caused Inspector R. S. Gardner to
recommend the abandonment of part of the expanded pro-
gram, but it is probable that the inspector was motivated by
the impractical nature of the work. Nevertheless, the agent's
success was recognized by complying with his request for
fifty wagons, and allowing him funds for two extensive
corrals.128
Tiffany believed in strict order and his force of scouts
under Chief of Police A. D. Sterling maintained excellent
discipline until the middle of 1881. Armed with the latest
type of Remington rifles, the police preserved peace by
keeping under strict suveillance the movements of the many
bands allowed to live on pass in remote parts of the re-
serve.129 Tiffany, like Hart, favored decentralization within
the reserve rather than the bureau's policy of concentration.
Naturally, such a reversal of policy was unexpected, but
after he convinced Inspector Gardner that the change would
make the bands eager to become selfsufficient, the bureau
approved his plan.130
Its administration created serious problems, for In-
dians away from the agency could not be restrained from
buying liquor,131 and Indians at large were made exceedingly
127. Mahan to Schurz, Nov. 18, 1880, op. cit.
128. Tiffany to Comm., Sept. 6, 1881, R. C. I. A., 1881, pp. 7-8. Gardner to
Kirkwood, Aug. 22, 1881, I. O., 15787.
129. Hiffany to Comm., Sept. 6, 1881, op. eit.
130. Gardner to Kirkwood, Aug. 22, 1881, op. eit.
131. Territorial officers gave the agent little support in suppressing the traffic.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 293
resentful when they saw the full extent of intrusions at first-
hand. In fact, the troublesome question of intrusions had
already developed from a serious problem into a crisis.
The mad rush of the intruding miners into the McMil-
len District,132 was followed by a wave of Mormon immigra-
tion into the Pueblo Vie jo Valley east of the reserve. Within
a short time enough water was diverted from the Gila to
bring partial crop failures to the aspiring Apache farmers
further down the river.133 Efforts were renewed to have
the reserve lines demarcated by an official survey, but con-
gress, unmoved by Inspector Mahan's prediction that the
agitated Indians would cause serious trouble, refused funds.
Commissioner Price, thus stalemated, requested Tiffany to
avoid complications by "good judgment and administrative
ability."134 Befort this advice had been received, though, a
large influx of Mormons into the region west of Fort Apache,
practically placed the situation beyond the agent's con-
trol.135 And a few weeks later, the discovery of coal on the
southern boundary of the reserve brought a rush of rapa-
cious miners to within fourteen miles of the agency.136
Tiffany immediately secured military aid, ousted the in-
truders,137 and then made a lease whereby the tribesmen
were to enjoy the royalties from all minerals taken from the
reservation.138
Many of the bands in the meantime were rendered des-
perate by the continuous assaults on their lands, and, in an
effort to escape from their adversities, they fell under the
132. Cf. supra, pp. 279-280.
133. Mahan to Schurz, Nov. 18, 1880, op. cit.
134. Tiffany to Comm., July 12, 1880, I. O., T 901 ; Mahan to Schurz, Nov. 1880,
op. cit.; Price to Tiffany, May 23, 1881, L. B. no. 162, p. 65.
135. Tiffany to Comm., Jan. 31, 1881, I. O., 845.
136. Tiffany to Comm., Mar. 7, 18, 1881, I. O., 4854.
137. Tiffany to Comm., Sept. 6, 1881, R. C. I. A., 1881, p. 10.
138. Tiffany to Comm., May 30, 1881, I. O., 9612.
Graft was indicated when a $1000 advance payment was allowed in persuading
fifty-three chiefs and headmen to sign the lease. Secretary Kirkwood disapproved the
action in August. Kirkwood to Comm., Aug. 3, 1881, I. O., 13502. See also New York
Herald, Sept. 6, 1881.
294 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
influence of Nocadelklinny, a medicine man said to be guided
and inspired by Geronimo.139
Nocadelklinny, it appears, first gained fame during the
summer of 1881, when he proposed to resurrect two promi-
nent Coyotero chiefs who had been killed in tribal feuds.140
Claiming divine revelation he started a series of impressive
dances around the graves of the dead chieftains. As the
weeks passed hundreds of Indians, intoxicated with excite-
ment, resorted to the scene. The resurrection failed to
materialize and Nocadelklinny, threatened with violence,
allayed suspicion by announcing that the whites would have
to be exterminated before the corn ripened if the leaders
were to be restored to life.141
Such a proposal caused General E. A. Carr, command-
ing Fort Apache, to report the situation on August 1, with
a request for instructions. Five days later he was told to
take steps necessary to prevent trouble, but to get Tiffany's
views first.142 Telegrams flew back and forth between the
two men, and Tiffany instead of using his police to restore
order, requested General Carr "to arrest or kill the medicine
man" when he should come to the post.143 A pessimistic re-
port from Tiffany on August 13 caused General Willcox to
order the arrest "as soon as practicable."144 Carr hesitated
to comply with the order, for he had just confirmed reports
that no dependence could be placed in his scouts. He there-
139. Clum, Apache Agent, p. 266.
This movement of the Apaches contained elements of the Ghost Dance Religion of
a later day. See, Mooney, "Ghost Dance Religion." 14th Rept. B. E., pt. ii, p. 704.
Major A. K. Arnold believed that the increase in the population of Arizona from
40,400 in 1880 to 82,000 in 1882, explained the Apaches' unrest. Arnold to A. A. G.,
Aug. 20, 1882, (n. f.).
140. Diablo was killed in Aug. 1880, by members of Pedro's band, and Eskiole was
killed during the spring of 1881. Tiffany to Comm., Sept. 6, 1881, op. cit.
141. A. B. Reagan, ms. no. 2847, B. E., pp. 250-255 ; E. S. Curtis, North American
Indians, vol. i, p. 10 ; Tiffany to Comm., Aug. 10, 1881, I. O., 15478.
142. Capt. Harry C. Egbert to A. A. G., Dec. 10, 1881, A. G. O., 406. Capt. Eg-
bert's thorough investigation of the "Cibicu Affair," ordered by General Willcox, is
embodied in this report.
143. Ibid; Tiffany to Comm., Oct. 18, 1881, I. O., 18808.
144. Egbert to A. A. G., Dec. 10, 1881, op. cit.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 295
fore delayed until all persuasive measures had failed; then
he decided to arrest the mystic at his camp.145
On August 29, Carr with a command of eighty-five
troopers and twenty-three Indian scouts started for the
Cibicu Creek where Nocadelklinny was encamped with his
followers. The column reached its destination easily
enough the next day and experienced no difficulty in making
the arrest, but the day was so nearly spent that a camp site
had to be selected only a short distance from the village.
Furthermore, Carr did this apparently in utter disregard
of the suspicious actions of the one hundred heavily armed
bucks who followed his column. He soon realized his mis-
take, for his men had scarcely laid down their arms before
a war-whoop was heard and the Indians and scouts began
to fire on Captain E. C. Hentig's troops. Within an instant
the captain and six of his men had been shot down. The
Indians were soon repulsed, but darkness probably saved
the command from annihilation. After burying the dead
the troopers, greatly handicapped by the loss of fifty-one
mounts, pushed rapidly for the post, reaching it without
further molestation the next afternoon.146
Meanwhile, a considerable number of the Cibicu In-
dians, reinforced by several of the treacherous scouts, dis-
covered a dead pack mule heavily laden with ammunition.
This fortuitous circumstance emboldened them, and they
hastened on to Fort Apache where other disaffected bands
joined them in a sharp attack on the post. Fortunately, they
lacked able leadership; otherwise, the post would have
fallen.147 Simultaneously another group of Cibicu warriors
under Chief Nantiatish raided west into Pleasant Valley and
the Cherry Creek region, burning ranch buildings and strip-
145. Carr to Tiffany, Aug. 29, 1881, I. O., 16849.
146. Carr to A. A. G., Sept. 2, 1881, 47 Cong., 1 sess. H. E. D. no. 1, p. 143 ;
Arizona Citizen, Sept. 11, 1881.
Nocadelklinny was killed by his guard at the start of the fight.
147. Carr to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1881, A. G. O., 4327.
During the time of Carr's expedition and immediately afterward it was estimated
that at least twenty persons were ambushed along the trails and passes in the dis-
turbed region. Arizona Citizen, Sept. 4, 11, 18, 1881.
296 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ping the country of stock. The hostiles, after an attack on
the Middleton Ranch in which two ranchers were killed and
Henry Middleton was seriously wounded, moved back to the
Fort Apache area. They then planned a ganeral uprising,
evidently intending to combine with the bands of Pedro,
George and Bonito in an attack on San Carlos. Pedro, how-
ever, disheartened by the abortive attack on Fort Apache,
had taken refuge at the Cooley ranch, as had most of the
panic-stricken ranchmen of the region. The bands of George
and Bonito had also become discouraged by the failure of
Nocadelklinny to come to life, still more perhaps by the
movements of troops concentrating on the reserve from every
direction. Nevertheless, 150-220 hostiles lingered men-
acingly near their rendezvous on Black River until the troops
drew near them. The Indians now became alarmed and,
with the exception of sixty of the most notorious ones,
stealthily rejoined their families.148 It was unfortunate that
the situation was not allowed to settle itself at this point.
If the agency police had been allowed to ferret out the ring-
leaders and run down the few recalcitrants remaining out,
the trouble would have ended in a few weeks. But grafting
agency officials and aspiring military officers suffered no
restraints; as a result, the Apache drama was to continue
five years longer.
The entire war department became electrified with ap-
prehension as soon as news of the Cibicu fight reached Wash-
ington. While General Willcox was disposing his own troops
to crush the outbreak in its incipiency, reinforcements were
rushed in from the divisions of the Pacific and the Missouri
in anticipation of a general outbreak. General Sherman after
consulting with Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln de-
manded a war of extermination in which he only wanted "to
hear results not intentions." Department lines were to be
ignored and troops rather than auxiliaries were to do the
slaughtering so the "effect" on the survivors would be perm-
148. E. D. Tussey, "The Apache Wars in Arizona, 1880-1887," ms., Univ. of
Iowa, pp. 62-53; Egbert to A. A. G., Dec. 10, 1881, op. cit.; Carr to A. A. G., Sept. 18.
1881, op. eit.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 297
anent.149 Determined to strike a decisive blow if it took
"every available man in the whole army," he directed Gen-
eral R. S. McKensie, who ranked General Willcox, to advance
from New Mexico to Fort Apache. When Willcox became
irked at this intrusion, Sherman practically assumed charge
by placing McKensie in charge of all field operations.150 So
great a movement of troops completely overawed the hos-
tiles, and small parties, promised a fair trial, began to sur-
render at the agency. Simultaneously a number of the guilty
chiefs supported by about sixty aggressive recruits, secreted
themselves at an isolated point on the reservation, evidently
hesitating to join a band of renegades reported to be raiding
in New Mexico.151
Commissioner Price now decided that the great mass of
the Indians were merely victims of circumstances. He there-
fore set aside a portion of the reserve by a "peace line." This
arrangement, he thought, would afford the innocent Indians
proper protection and at the same time not contravene Sher-
man's orders to ignore reserve lines.152 The hostiles, how-
ever, also took advantage of the peace zone and thus General
Willcox was prevented from striking the decisive blow de-
sired by General Sherman.
Reliance was again placed on the police. After about
sixty arrests had been made, the seven leading chiefs
involved (George and Bonito not included) surrendered, but
their warriors, although nominally prisoners of the agent,
hung on and off, kept under surveillance rather than guarded,
George and Bonito, a few days later, parleyed with Sub-
Agent Hoag and agreed to accompany him to Fort Thomas
where they were to remain in military custody. Unfor-
tunately an injury required George's return to camp, and
most enigmatically, the military gave Bonito a parole.153
149. Sherman to A. G., Sept. 10, 1881, A. G. O., 5361 ; McDowell to A. G., Sept.
150. All correspondence in this action is given in 47 Cong., 2 Bess. H. E. D. no. 1,
pp. 144-146.
11, 1881, A. G. O., 5369.
161. Tiffany to Comm., Sept. 25, 1881, I. O., 17376.
152. Price to Secty. of Int., Oct. 24, 1881, R. C. I. A., 1881, p .9.
153. Ibid; Willcox to A. A. G., Dec. 12, 1881, A. G. O., 4983.
298 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
This action was soon repented, and a strong force of
cavalry under Colonel James Biddle was sent from the fort
to arrest the two chiefs and their bands. The troops reached
the sub-agency on September 30, and finding that a regular
weekly ration issue was being held, accepted the bands'
promise to comply with the colonel's orders as soon as the
issuing was completed. Much temporizing followed, and
late in the afternoon the chiefs sent word that the troops
need not wait for them, as they would soon follow with the
sub-agent. Biddle insisted that they must go at once, and
started his two companies towards George's camp. When
the troops drew near, George and Bonito ran to the Chirica-
hua camp, crying out that a raid was to be made. This was
enough for such suspicious warriors as Juh, Geronimo,
Chatto and Nachee. Within a few hours they and seventy
other Chiricahuas, "literally scared away," were travelling
fast towards their old haunts in Mexico.154
Efforts were now redoubled to force in all the dis-
affected bucks among the Coyoteros. The agency police
arrested about fifty, and Carr, acting under McKensie's
orders, apprehended forty-seven others in the vicinity . of
Fort Apache. These with the ones previously taken were
turned over to General Willcox, who ordered them confined
at Forts Thomas, Grant and Lowell. During the fall small
commands scoured the sequestered parts of the reserve, kill-
ing a number of Indians who, according to Tiffany, were old
and decrepit ones out gathering the remnants of their corn
crop not destroyed by the military.155
Cruel as it was, this harsh treatment was effective and,
after a few more arrests, nothing remained to be done except
to try the prisoners and punish them according to their indi-
vidual crimes. A general hanging of all implicated Indians
was at first suggested,156 but when General McDowell in-
154. Hoagr to Tiffany, Oct. 1, 1881, I. O., 18076 ; Sherman to Lincoln, April 14,
1882, A. G. O., 1859.
155. Tiffany to Comm., Oct. 1, 1881, op. cit.; Carr to A. A. G., Nov. 5, 1881,
A. G. O., 6267.
156. Tiffany to A. A. G., Sept. 5, 1881, I. O., 16849.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 299
sisted that official bungling had forced the Indians to protect
their rights, and that none but scouts in military service
should suffer extreme penalties, the official sentiment swung
in the Indians' favor.157 Accordingly, a general court martial
found that only three, Dead Shot, Dandy Jim and Skippy
were guilty of treason ; they were publicly hanged on March
3, 1882, at Fort Grant.158
The Chiricahuas, meanwhile, had again found safety in
the fastnesses of the Sierra Madres. The reasons for their
flight are not clear, but to Colonel Biddle's bungling and
Agent Tiffany's ineptitude must be ascribed the immediate
blame.159 When they left on October 1, it is probable that
their annihilation would have occurred within a few days
had a confusion of orders not prevented General Carr from
going in pursuit.160 Four commands did quickly take to the
field from Fort Thomas, but they were not able to overtake
the fugitives until thirteen whites had been killed and a large
wagon train destroyed.161
These troops finally did locate them near Cedar Springs
as a result of the direct orders of General Willcox who, en-
route from Fort Thomas to Fort Grant, hurriedly summoned
aid when he was almost captured at the scene of the wagon
157. McDowell to A. G., Dec. 26, 1881, A. G. O., 406.
158. Sherman to McDowell, Feb. 27, 1882, A. G. O., 853 ; Capt. W. L. Foulk to
A. A. G., April 7, 1882, A. G. O., 1665.
Most of the prisoners were liberated within a short time, but apparently the pro-
cess was not completed until General Crook in October decided to give the remaining
renegades "another chance." Dept. of Justice to Henry M. Teller, July 24, 1882, I. O.f
13508 ; P. E. Wilcox to Comm., Oct. 23, 1882, 7. D. 19739.
159. Willcox to A. A. G., Dec. 12, 1881, op. cit.; Willcox to A. A. G., Aug. 31,
1882, 47 Cong., 2 sess. H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 144.
For a careful critique of the Cibicu troubles, see John P. Clum, "Apache Misrule,"
in N. Mex. Historical Review, vol. v (1930), pp. 138-153, 221-239.
160. Wilcox to A. A. G., Dec. 12, 1881, op. cit.
Following the Cibicu troubles and subsequent events, a court of inquiry examined
into General Carr's conduct. It was found that he made errors of judgment only, and
that the death of his men merely resulted from the fortunes of war. In 1883 Carr
brought charges against Willcox, but the president refused their consideration. Willcox
then tried to reopen the charges against Carr and again the president refused considera-
tion. All the documents in the case are collected in a file designated as the Court of
Inquiry for General Carr, A. G. O., 4327.
161. Arizona Citizen, Oct. 9, 1881.
300 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
train attack. The troops thus forced to fight, were held at
bay by the hostiles for twelve hours while the noncombat-
ants sped on towards the border.182 During the night of
October 2, the warriors deserted their position, and by cross-
ing over into the Aravaipa Valley, moved south through an
open ranch country, devastating as they went. They passed
near Tombstone where they outdistanced a posse of har-
dened gunmen led by Mayor Clum, and a little farther on
they completely eluded a command under Captain R. F.
Bernard who, according to Major C. B. Sanford, "made a
march and pursuit almost unexampled in Indian warfare."163
By the time the troops were again ready to strike, the hos-
tiles had killed five more citizens, and with 600 head of stock
had joined the remnants of Victorio's band, one hundred
miles below the border.164
The Cibicu episode and its resultant troubles should
have cleansed Tiffany's administration; instead, graft and
corruption ran riot. Nothing new was added to the findings
of Inspector Mahan 165 until the beginning of 1881, but from
162. Sanford to A. A. G., Oct. 5, 1881, 47 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
pp. 146-147.
168. Bernard to A. A. G., Oct. 14, 1881, A. G. O., 4327; Sanford to A. A. G,.
Oct. 20, 1881, ibid.
164. Willcox to Col. Bradley, Oct. 17, 1881, A. G. O., 6879 ; Tombstone Epitaph,
Oct. 8, 1881.
Victorio after avoiding the second removal of his band to San Carlos in December,
1878, had vainly sought peace at both Ojo Caliente and the Mescalero Reservation.
Finally, in desperation he decided to fight to the end. After endangering the whole
system of Apache control as inaugurated at San Carlos, and harrying both New Mexico
and West Texas, he was driven into Mexico where he and most of his band was de-
stroyed by General Terrasas on October 15, 1880.
Professor Carl Coke Rister has treated this phase of Apache relations in most
satisfactory and scientific manner in The Southwestern Frontier, 1865-1880, pp. 203-
217.
The remnants of Victorio's band placed themselves under the octogenarian and
infirm Nana who had proved himself to be a capable lieutenant on many occasions.
In July, 1881 with fifteen warriors he raided across the border into New Mexico.
Reinforced by twenty-five Mescaleros, he killed over forty persons, won eight fights,
most of them with the cavalry, and captured 200 animals. After eluding 1400 troopers
and civilians in a thousand mile chase, he recrossed the border. This raid of less than
two months duration was a portent of the future. See Rept. Secty. of War, 1881, vol.
ii, pp. 117-119 ; Wellman, Death in the Desert, chapt. xx.
165. Cf. supra, pp. 291-292.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 301
that time on, every official who chanced near the agency had
evidences of graft thrust upon him.
Tiffany, it appears, grafted in every phase of reserve
affairs. In March an official of the department of the treas-
ury noted that the agent had established a ranch near the
freighters' well on the Globe-San Carlos road, where he
was branding government cattle with his private brand.166
This caused further investigation, and in August, Inspec-
tor R. S. Gardner found that the charge was not only true
but that the cattle were fed on government grain. He also
learned that the ranch was a center for the distribution of
public wagons and animals to private individuals as well
as a mart where the Indians sold for a low price the animals
given them by the government.167
Gardner found conditions equally bad at the agency
proper. Certain salaried employees were allowed extra pay
by giving them labor on the irrigation project, and one of
them was sent to Tiffany's ranch where he herded the cattle
stolen from the government. The agency blacksmith not
only spent most of his time doing public work for pay but
he actually charged the government's Indian scouts for
shoeing their mounts.168
In the handling of agency supplies Tiffany was even
more notorious than in his handling of the employees.
Amounts far in excess of those accounted for were sold to
the agency personnel.169 Great numbers of blankets accum-
ulated as a surplus were sold by the agent or hauled away to
Indian traders. These traders, in turn, kept up a flourish-
ing business in goods supposed to go to the Indians. When
weekly supplies were sent to the sub-agency, the agency
storekeeper saw that a large surplus was sent along. Thus,
after a sufficient amount had accumulated, the sub-agent
consigned the goods to the post trader, J. B. Collins of Fort
Thomas who, as deputy United States marshall, evidently
166. J. D. Bartlett to Secty. of Int., Mar. 29, 1881, S. F., 314.
167. Gardner to Comm., Aug. 13, 1881, S. F., 735.
168. Ibid.
169. Gardner noted that two sales of over $500 were unreported.
302 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
had the legal authorities intimidated. In other cases the
goods were delivered direct to Collins, whereupon the store-
keeper issued a receipt in full to the obliging freighters.170
Vouchers covering issues, it was brought out, were not signed
until the end of the quarters, and then by some convenient
individual who seldom saw the issues he receipted.171
The field of graft also extended to the agency construc-
tion work. Contractors were furnished government hard-
ware and lumber, and one agency carpenter was allowed
to work two months for a private contractor. On one build-
ing, however, Tiffany gained his end through the medium of
a contract. First, a contract was let to one John Redstone
to build a $1,000 structure. Next, John Redstone Gilman, an
agency employee at $900 per year and evidently the same
person as John Redstone, took over the contract from Red-
stone by signing himself as J. R. Gilman. Finally, Ezra
Hoag, the sub-agent, certified that the building was fin-
ished, and thus the circle of graft was completed.172
Why Tiffany's villainous administration was not
brought to an early end is not clear. Commissioner Price
had recommended his removal in April 1881,173 and later
in the year the department of the interior was reported to
be looking for a new man.174 But political collusion, Indian
troubles and the agent's convincing denials of guilt evidently
stayed the end for a year longer. In fact, the agent was not
170. Gaidner to Kirkwood, Aug. 30, 1881, I. O.f 15865 ; Wright to Price, Aug. 8,
1882, I. O., 14491.
Colonel Richard I. Dodge wrote in 1877, that only 5-20 per cent of the congressional
appropriations for the Indians ever reached them. See his The Plains of the Great
West and Their Inhabitants, (New York, 1877), p. 46.
171. Affidavits of Ellsworth Mann and Ezra Hoag, July 24, 1881, ibid.
The Tucson firm of Lord and Williams had close connections with Tiffany during
this period. On one occasion Tiffany threatened that if Dr. Lord did not send a clerk
to make the books "agree ... I am determined not to be the only one who suffers."
Tiffany to C. H. Lord, May 11, 1881, I. O., 21071. This letter was seized by the U. S.
marshall in 1883. Charles Poston wrote that Lord and Williams "acting under the
patronage of the Government at Washington, in connection with Governor McCormick
. . . have been the curse and disgrace of this Territory for seventeen years." Poston
to Price, Sept. 25, 1881, I. O., 17420.
172. John A. Wright (Inspector) to Price, July 27, 1882, I. O., 14184.
173. Price to Kirkwood, April 15, 1881, S. F., 814.
174. The Republican (St. Louis), Sept. 14, 1881.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 303
removed; he resigned on June 30 for reasons of business
necessity and health.175 Perhaps he was moved to make this
salutary decision by the complete breakdown of his control
in April when Chief Loco and his Warm Springs followers
successfully fled the reserve.
Loco had refused to join the Chiricahuas in their suc-
cessful flight to Mexico following the Cibicu outbreak, but
renegade emissaries soon informed him that he would be
forced to go.176 Despite this threat very little was done to
prevent an exodus, for Tiffany was sure of his control,177 and
the military scoffed at the idea that renegades were astir in
a region so thoroughly scouted.178 Even General Sherman,
who visited San Carlos the first few days of April, refused to
be apprehensive.179 True to their promise, however, about
sixty bucks under Chatto and Nachee slipped into Loco's
camp on April 19.180 Loco could not withstand the resulting
surge of tribal sentiment; he therefore agreed to go, and
the whole body, numbering perhaps 700 persons, slowly set
out towards the border, driving their stock before them.181
Determined to brook no opposition, they killed Chief of Police
Sterling and ten other persons during the first few miles
of their flight. Their route led them close to Fort Thomas
and here Colonel George W. Schofield pressed after them in
hot pursuit. Peculiarly, he had chased them only three miles
when he ordered a rapid retreat, declaring that a lack of
ammunition and rations compelled his return to the post.182
175. Tiffany to Comm., June 30, 1882, S. F., 351. The report of the federal grand
jury in October, 1882, covering the Tiffany frauds is given in Bourke, On the Border
With Crook, pp. 438-440.
176. Al Sieber to Willcox, June 8, 1882, A. G. O., 3945.
177. Tiffany to Comm., Mar. 15, 1882, I. O., 5681.
178. Willcox to A. G., Feb. 20, 1882, A. G. O., 770.
179. Sherman to Lincoln, April 14, 1882, A. G. O., 1859.
In this communication, Sherman spoke of Tiffany as a "man of character" with
his agency well organized and well conducted.
180. Col. G. A. Forsyth to A. A. G., May 18, 1882, A. G. O., 3464.
181. S. J. Pangburn (Acting Agent) to Price, April 21, 1882, I. O., 7514.
182. McDowell to A. G., April 21, 1882, A. G. O., 1763.
304 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The fugitives now unopposed 183 fled up the Gila to the
Clifton mining region while the troops, expecting the In-
dians to waste no time in striking for Mexico, made fruitless
east and west movements to intercept them.184 New Mex-
ican troops dispatched by Colonel G. A. Forsyth were more
successful. They pushed the band into the Stein's Peak
Range and a sharp daylight fight took place at Horseshoe
Canyon. This delay merely gave the hostiles' women and
children an opportunity to cross the San Simon Valley into
the Chiricahua Mountains, there to await the arrival of the
men at nightfall. Once more reunited, the elusive band
fairly precipitated itself across the border into Mexico.185
Forsyth, meanwhile, fell in with Captain T. C. Tupper's
command,186 and thus reinforced decided to push deep into
Mexico rather than allow the hostiles to escape. Fortunately,
this movement forced the Apaches into an ambush laid by a
Mexican force under Colonel Garcia in the Canyon Alezio,
and in the severe fight that followed, the Indians suffered a
loss of over one hundred persons. Leaving most of their
plunder, the survivors fled in pandemonium towards the
rugged Sierra Madres.187
183. A letter of protest reached Sherman through reference of the navy depart-
ment. Sherman endorsed it, suggesting that Secty. Chandler send the citizens of
Tucson "one of the First Class Frigates with long range guns." Gen. Edw. W. Hencks
to Wm. E. Chandler, April 25, 1882, A. G. O., 2056.
184. McDowell to A. G., April 26, 1882, A. G. O., 1828.
Before they went south into the Peloncillos the hostiles made many attacks, killed
forty-two persons and swept the region of stock. Rept. Bd. of Officers, May 9, 1882,
A. G. O., 2372.
185 Forsyth to McKensie, April 24, 1882, I. O., 7853 ; Forsyth, Thrilling Days in
Army Life, p. 79 et seg. Forsyth lost five men killed and five wounded. Two Indiana
were killed.
186. Tupper had cut the Indians' trail near Guadalupe Canyon. He followed sev-
eral miles into Mexico, struck them, killed twelve of their number and captured seventy-
five of their animals ; nevertheless, he was forced to retire. Tupper to Maj. David
Perry, May 8, 1882, I. O., 4983.
Sherman had to end a dispute between the Divisions of the Missouri and the Pacific
over honors gained during the outbreak, by ordering Sheridan to accept McDowell's
explanation that Arizona troops deserved part of the credit. McDowell to A. G., June
29, 1882, A. G. O., 2979.
187. Gen. J. G. Carbo to Citizen Secty. of War, May 18, 1882, (n. f.). Garcia
lost 19 men killed and 21 wounded. He strongly protested Forsyth's intrusion into
Mexican territory; consequently Forsyth withdrew at once. Forsyth, op. cit., pp.
119-121. The episode was not known until Forsyth published an account of it in 1900,
for McKensie had courteously returned the report to him. Ibid.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 305
Loco in his successful flight from San Carlos was not
accompanied by the remaining Cibicu irreconcilables. These
vengeful bucks had come to look upon the killing of their
leader as an act of wanton murder on the parts of the troops ;
moreover, they had made the fatalistic decision that no jus-
tice could be expected from Agent Tiffany. Sixty of them
therefore broke out on July 6, 1882, under the leadership of
Nantiatish, who hoped to bring about a general uprising.188
An immediate attack was made on San Carlos, Chief of
Police J. L. Colvig and three of his scouts were killed, but the
San Carlos Indians rejected the plan of war. Somewhat dis-
heartened, the insurgents with a number of stolen squaws
struck west to McMillenville, where they staged an abortive
attack on the town.189
The rapid pursuit of the cavalry dispatched from Fort
McDowell now endangered them, and taking advantage of
the rough terrain about them they retreated northeastward
to the "Big Dry Wash/' a forbidding canyon that cuts deeply
into the Mogollon Rim. Here, Nantiatish blundered by lay-
ing an ambush for Major Chaff ee's column. The deception
failed, however, and instead, numerous converging columns
of troops on July 17 virtually ambushed the hostiles them-
selves. The immediate onslaught of the troops completely
demoralized the Indians, and after Nantiatish and twenty-
five other braves had been slain, the survivors fled panic-
stricken to the reserve.190
Fortunately this fight was more than a victory ; it was
the end of an era in Apache affairs. Never again were the
troops to fight the Apaches in Arizona ; never again, with the
exception of the Chiricahuas, were the Apaches violently to
oppose governmental control.
188. Crook's Council with Hostile Chiefs, Sept. 29, 1882, A. G. O., 4874.
189. Pangburn to Price, July 7, 1882, I. O., 12547.
190. Maj. A. W. Evans, to A. A. G., Aug. 8, 1882, A. G. O., 4983; Willcox to
A. A. G., Aug. 31, 1882, 47 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 150.
CHAPTER VIII
THE END OF APACHE RESISTANCE
General Sherman's inspection of the Apache country in
April, 1882, resulted in his making suggestions for a general
military reorganization of the troubled area. A new Depart-
ment of the Border to embrace Arizona and New Mexico
was proposed, but the plan was dropped when General
Crook was reassigned to the Department of Arizona.1
Crook arrived from the Department of the Platte on
September 4, 1882, and began his work of peace at once, for
he saw that the Indians were demoralized almost to the
point of desperation. Made sullen and distrustful by enig-
matical officials, malicious rumors of attack, intrusions on
their lands, disarmament and removal plans, they were more
than disposed to think the warpath the solution to their
evils.2 Crook brought all his old tact into play. In a series
of extended and enlightening powwows near Fort Apache,
he convinced the disaffected leaders that war was just what
their enemies desired and that peace was the tribe's only
salvation. He convinced them of the wisdom there was in
the reestablishment of his former system of strict discipline
with its careful censuses and frequent roll calls in which
every warrior could be identified by the metal tag he wore.
They also accepted his plan for a reorganization of the re-
serve policy whereby native scouts under the command of
Captain Emmet Crawford and Lieutenant Charles B. Gate-
wood were to be scattered among their own bands to ob-
serve and report upon affairs. Perhaps a greater step
towards peace was his promise that the mountain bands
would be returned from the arid Gila Valley to their old
home near Fort Apache.3
1. Sherman to Lincoln, April 30, 1882, A. G. O., 1927 ; 48 Cong., 1 Bess., H. E. D.
no. 1, pt. ii, p. 159.
2. Crook to A. G., Sept. 28, 1882, A. G. O., 4874.
3. Ibid., p. 160 ; Conferences with chiefs on Sept. 22, 23, 26 and 29, 1882, I. O.,
19337.
306
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 307
Crook reissued his general orders no. 13 of April 8,
1873,4 and thus indicated that his original Apache policies
would prevail again. But his issuance of supplemental
orders, in which "justice to all/' "strictest fidelity," "no
division of responsibility" and "strict accountability" were
emphasized, indicated that a humanitarian policy was to
prevail to even a greater degree than before.5
Prospects for a speedy success were greatly heightened
when the new San Carlos agent, P. P. Wilcox of Denver,
evinced a friendly attitude of cooperation.6 He quickly fell
in with Crook's plan for a military policing of the reserva-
tion, abolished the subagency at the general's request, and
permitted nearly seven hundred Coyoteros to return to the
Fort Apache region where, under the exclusive control of the
military, they were to live on a self-supporting basis.7 His
progress in instituting reforms was slow, however, for the
supplies that poured in to fill contracts left by former Agent
Tiffany were as worthless as those that already filled the
warehouses. Besides, he found it almost impossible to get
competent employees to replace the unscrupulous henchmen
of his predecessor.8 In an effort to stamp out the graft and
illicit liquor traffic which seemed to emanate from the
agency store, he discharged the Tiffany holdovers and ap-
pointed his son-in-law to the lucrative post. This action, he
felt, would insure honesty in all Indian trading.9
The magnitude of the agent's task should have pro-
duced complete cooperation; instead, violent antagonism
soon arose when Crook in an effort to insure regular daily
counts moved several pacific bands back to the agency.10
Thus irked, Wilcox enlisted the aid of the Indian Office, put
4 48 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 171-172; c/. supra, pp. 188-189.
5 Gen. Orders no. 43, Oct. 5, 1882, Army War College.
Wilcox took charge Sept. 1, 1882.
7 Wilcox to Teller, Nov. 3, 1882, I. O., 21428 ; Wilcox to Comm., Aug. 9, 1883, 48
Cong. 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 66.
Wilcox to Comm., Oct. 23, 1882, I. O., 19737.
Wilcox to Comm., Oct. 9, 1882, I. O., 18683.
48 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 171-172 ; cf. su&ra, pp. 188-189.
308 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
pressure on Crook, and over Sherman's strong opposition,
succeeded in stopping the counts.11 This early rift was a
dangerous one, however, for the agent was already exerting
himself to keep rations at a minimum; nevertheless, cold
weather during the winter and Captain Crawford's efficient
policing kept the Indians quiet. In fact, a total saving of
ten per cent in rations was effected.12
Amenable as the reservation Indians proved to be,
neither Wilcox nor Crook lost sight of the fact that the Chiri-
cahuas remained unreduced in Mexico. Both men were con-
fident that no permanent program of control could be suc-
cessfully carried out unless these irreconcilables were
brought to the reservation. Accordingly, Crook attempted
to open communication with them in October, 1882. When
his efforts came to naught he became more convinced than
ever that devastations might be expected at any time. Again
he prepared for war. His troops and packtrains were re-
organized, the reserve Indians were enlisted in a program to
bring in the Chiricahuas, and Captain Crawford with his
Apache scouts was sent to the border to establish a patrol
and to engage in spy activity.13
Nothing happened for several months although Craw-
ford's spies found that the hostiles had penetrated more
deeply into the Sierra Madre Mountains than had been sup-
posed. Finally in March, 1883, just at the time the Mexicans
started operations,14 the Chiricahuas left their stronghold
in two bodies — the one under Geronimo to raid in Sonora
and capture stock, the other under Chatto to raid in Ari-
zona and secure ammunition. Chatto, with twenty-six war-
riors, crossed the border on March 21, and scattered into
11. Wilcox to Comm., Oct. 23, 1882, I. D., 2092; Sherman to Lincoln, Dec. 8,
1882, I. O., 22434 ; Wilcox to Price, Dec. 1, 1882, I. O., 22485.
12. Wilcox to Comm., Aug. 15, 1884, 48 Cong., 2 sessio H. E. D. no. 1, vol. xii,
p. 51. The commissioner's promise of $18,000 worth of seeds, and the distribution of
600 cows as well as some of the expensive farm machinery left in the Tiffany debacle
helped to keep the Indians quiet. Price to Wilcox, Dec. 21, 1882, L. B. no. 186, p. 2.
13. Crook to A. G., Sept. 27, 1883, 48 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, pt. ii, pp.
161, 172, 179-181.
14. Gen. R. Reguera to Gen. Mackenzie, Mar. 20, 1883, A. G. O., 1211.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 309
small parties difficult to trace. Confirming Crook's view
that they were "the worst band of Indians in America," the
hostiles while losing1 only one man, raided for six days in
Arizona, killed twenty-six persons, travelled over 400 miles
and without being seen by any of the commands dispatched
to intercept them escaped back into Mexico.15
General Crook, meanwhile, received instructions from
Sherman authorizing him to destroy the hostiles even if it
were necessary to disregard departmental or national lines.16
Thus encouraged, he completed arrangements for an expedi-
tionary force to penetrate into Mexico after the hostiles. He
next secured the promise of cooperation from General Mack-
enzie of New Mexico, and then he visited the civil and mili-
tary authorities of Sonora and Chihuahua who cordially
assured him of every possible aid.17 All details completed he
left the border at San Bernardino Springs on May 1 with a
small force of men and officers and a command of 193 Apache
scouts under Crawford and Gatewood, equipped to stay in
the field for sixty days.18
Rapid progress was made across a ravished and depopu-
lated region to the south, but the necessity of night marches
in the area bordering the Sierra Madre greatly discouraged
the scouts. Fortunately, the discovery of an abundance of
hostile "sign" fully restored their energy and confidence.
The terrain — ideally suited as a place of refuge — now be-
came the roughest imaginable. Ten mules that slipped
from the precipitous trail were crushed to a pulp in the deep
canyons below. But after several days of such travel the
enemy stronghold in the Sierra Madre was reached. The
15. Crook to Henry M. Teller, Mar. 26, 1883, I. O., 6047; Crook to A. G., Sept.
27, 1883, op. cit., pp. 161-163. Wm. Butts to Price, Mar. 25, 1883, I. O., 6127.
16. A. A. G. to Com. Gen., Mar. 31, 1883, 48 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, pt. ii,
p. 173.
17. Crook to A. A. G., July 23, 1883, 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, pt. ii, p. 174.
See terms of agreement signed on July 29, 1882 by Secretary of State Frederick T.
Frelinghuysen and Ambassador M. Romero by which reciprocal right was established
to pursue hostiles across the international boundary. U. S. S. L., vol. xxii, p. 934.
18. Bourke, An Apache Campaign, p. 39. The expedition was guided by
"Peaches" ( Pe-nal-tishn ) who had deserted the Chiricahuas at the time of Chatto's
raid. Ibid., p. 15.
310 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
hostiles, however, were not there, although the indications
were strong that they were not far away. The pack train
was therefore left in the fortress while the scouts under
Crawford were sent on to scour the region. Three days
later the camps of Chatto and Bonito were discovered, but
a premature attack provoked by some chance gunfire allowed
the main body of the hostiles to escape.19
To pursue the fugitives in that rough country was as
impossible as it was futile. Crook had two alternatives. He
might either accept their proffered surrender on the best
terms he could secure or retire from the country and wait
till he could surprise them again. The idea of peace pre-
vailed, and as soon as Ger6nimo, Chatto, Bonito, Loco and
Nachee could be brought together, a lengthy powwow fol-
lowed in which it was agreed that all past offenses were to be
forgotten and the hostiles were to return to the reservation.
Geronimo promised that if the troops moved slowly he would
round up his straggling warriors and overtake the proces-
sion at the border. But this he failed to do, and when Cap-
tain Crawford reached San Carlos on June 23 with fifty-two
men and 273 women, the only prominent chiefs in the group
were Nana, Loco and Bonito.20
Geronimo in the meantime decided that he would not
be able to command a position of respect at San Carlos
unless he had gifts to present to his old friends, so he spent
the next several months in Mexico, satiating his thirst for
blood and plunder. Finally, during the first few days of
March, 1884, he arrived at the border with over eighty fol-
lowers and a herd of 350 cattle. Demanding the protection
of a military escort, he was conducted back to the reserva-
tion to the intense disgust of the civil officers and the
settlers.21
19. Crook to A. G., June 11, 1883, A. G. O., 2333 ; Bourke, An Apache Campaign,
p. 41, et seq.
20. Crook to A, G., July 23, 1883, op. cit., p. 178.
21. Statement of Geronimo to Capt. Crawford, Mar. 21, 1884, A. G. O., 1601;
Britton Davis, The Truth about Geronimo (New Haven, 1925), p. 82 et seq. See Clum
"Ger6nimo," in Arizona Historical Review, Oct. 1928, pp. 26-35, in which he argues
that Crook was "captured." Nachee with ninety-three followers came in during the
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 311
All through the winter and spring preceding the expe-
dition into Mexico, Agent Wilcox and General Crook had
given each other reasonable support. Crook especially sup-
ported Wilcox against the henchmen of former Agent
Tiffany, who in their eiforts to expropriate the reserve
mineral land and control the Indian trade had carried their
fight to President Chester A. Arthur.22 Wilcox apparently
approved Crook's program, but when the Chiricahuas sur-
rendered he concluded that their return to the reservation
would undo all the success that had been achieved with the
peaceable Apache bands. His arguments won the support
of Secretary Henry M. Teller, and Secretary Lincoln was
informed that, since the Department of the Interior would
not agree to the incorporation of the hostiles with the peace-
able Apaches, the War Department would have to hold
them apart as prisoners of war.23 Crook remonstrated that
any perfidious act on the part of the government would
destroy all chances of ever controlling the Chiricahuas by a
program of peace, but that if he were allowed to manage
them in his own way, he was confident of a permanent
peace.24 The result of the matter was that Secretary Lincoln
ordered Crook to Washington for a conference.25
The two departments moved quickly, and on July 7,
1883, the entire police control of the reservation was vested
in the War Department. The Chiricahuas were to be kept
and cared for by General Crook according to his discretion,
22. Crook to Secty. Teller, Feb. 23, 1883, I. O., 4624. Wilcox, threatened with
assassination, named C. T. Connell, A. E. Hackney, Charles Fisk, Reuben Wood, J. D.
Burgess and Donald Robb as the leaders. Wilcox to Teller, Mar. 10, 1883, S. F., 141.
Congressman W. S. Rosecrans (of Civil War fame) interested himself in the reduc-
tion of the reservation. Rosecrans to Comm. of Public Land Office, Mar. 28, 1883,
(n. f.).
23. Wilcox to Teller, June 17, 1883, I. O., 11069; Teller to Lincoln, June 18,
1883, I. O., 11171.
24. Crook to A. G., June 20, 1883, A. G. O., 2487 ; Schofield to Sherman, June 18,
1883, A. G. O., 2459.
25. Gen. R. C. Drum to Schofield, June 24, 1883, A. G. O., 2621.
fall of 1883. Chatto and Mangus followed in February, 1884, with a band of about
sixty persons. Davis, op. cit., pp. 79-80; Capt. W. A. Rafferty to A. A. G., Oct. 28,
1883, I. O., 20465.
312 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
but they were to be kept at the agency only with the agent's
consent. The War Department was also to keep peace, ad-
minister justice and punish Indian offenders ; otherwise the
duties of the agent were to remain unchanged.26 Within a
short time Captain Crawford was officially charged with the
execution of the military's part of the new agreement.27
Three years before, in 1880, Secretary Schurz had noted
two widely urged and antagonistic solutions to the Indian
problem. The first, held mainly by distant philanthropists,
urged the almost immediate canonization of the noble red
man. The opposing view, most frequently found in the
Indian country, favored keeping the Indians in a state of
barbarism for the purpose of accelerating their extinction.
To the secretary a more moderate solution was possible. It
consisted in preparing the Indian for ultimate citizenship
through the ownership of land in severalty, the encourage-
ment of agriculture and stockraising, the use of Indian
police and the general dissemination of education.28
The plan followed by General Crook closely resembled
the middle-ground policy outlined by Schurz although it
had some original features, part of which might be looked
upon as idealistic or visionary. The general began with the
assumption that just treatment and a paternal attitude
toward the Indians would solve the problem. Such just
treatment would involve, in his estimation, their ownership
of lands in severalty,29 the right to be tried by their own
juries,30 policed by their own people, and even conquered
by Indian troops. They must be permitted to bear arms,
and their removal from their homes was to him unthinkable.
Last and most extreme, he advocated their early if not im-
mediate enfranchisement. This, he believed, would arouse
26. For the agreement see E. G. Catternole, Famous Frontiersmen, Pioneers and
Scouts (Chicago, 1883), p. 530; 48 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, pt. ii, p. 179.
27. Gen. Orders no. 13, July 24, 1883, ibid.
28. Schurz to President, Nov. 1, 1880, 46 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i.
pp. 4, 16.
29. Crook to A. G., Sept. 27, 1883, op. tit., p. 167.
80. Crook to A. A. G., (n. d.), 48 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 133.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 313
the whites' interest in the Apaches' concerns and save the
tribe from complete degradation.31
He defended his system with vigor and intelligence.
To disarm the Indians, he said, would not only be an inju-
dicious expression of the whites' fears, but also a folly espe-
cially on a frontier infested with white criminals. Besides,
the Indians' habit of caching arms would make their disarm-
ament almost an impossibility. Equally foolish to him would
be their removal. It would start them towards ultimate ex-
tinction, and completely destroy their confidence, which
factor, Crook knew, was absolutely necessary to retain if
they were to be adjusted to white civilization. Worse yet,
he predicted that such a step would start one of the bloodiest
Indian wars in history. He also objected to the civil trial of
the Apache chieftains on the ground that these men — usually
mere figureheads in the anarchic Apache system — were
manifestly not responsible for their followers' acts. Fur-
thermore, he urged that the Apaches had no comprehension
of the whites' code of justice.32
One of the most discussed features of Crook's system
was his wide use of Indian scouts in fighting their kinsmen.
As employed by him it simply meant f urnishng the native
auxiliaries with an unfailing supply of provisions and muni-
tions and turning them loose in stronger numbers than the
enemy. No effort was made to enforce discipline, since he
felt that the efficiency of the scouts depended on their indi-
viduality. The general merely showed them that they had
his confidence and he left them to fight in their own way.
He justified his use of the scouts because the equipment
of the hostiles was no longer inferior to that of the military
and, since regular troops in the Indian country were now "as
helpless as a whale attacked by a school of swordfish," he
was certain that the renegades could be run to earth only
by members of their own race.33
3T Crook to A. G., Sept. 27, 1883, op. cit., pp. 168-169.
32. Crook to A. A. G., July 23, 1883, op. cit., p. 177.
33. Crook, "The Apache Problem," Journal of Military Service Institute, Sept.
1886, pp. 262-263. The policy contained one serious drawback. It was necessary to
issue munitions to the scout companies, and since their personnel changed rapidly
every brave on the reservation was soon well armed. Geronimo's Story, pp. 134-136.
314 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The new regime as inaugurated by Crook worked
smoothly at first,34 and Crawford was soon allowed to in-
corporate his Chiricahuas with the agency Indians. This
arrangement, he thought, would produce a feeling of equality
and contentment.35 But Wilcox decided that the move low-
ered the morale of all the Indians, and in August, 1883, he
bluntly reported that the dual system of control was destined
to fail. A short time later he proposed that the military
with full powers of control should be ordered to remove the
Chiricahuas to Fort Apache, while the agent with similar
powers should be left undisturbed at San Carlos.36
Despite this early appearance of irritation, construc-
tive steps projected under the new arrangement resulted in
such substantial progress during the next two years that it
almost appeared as if the Apache problem were solved. The
900 White Mountain Indians who had removed to the Fort
Apache region in the fall of 1882 were practically self-
supporting after the agreement of July, 1883. In fact, all
the Indians during 1883 showed new interest in work,
remained unusually quiet, planted more extensively, and in
addition earned over $10,000 working for ranchers and sup-
plying the military with hay and wood. A saving of thirty-
three per cent in beef was passed on to the Indians in the
form of 700 breeding cattle, and in conformity with Crook's
belief that ownership would carry more weight than the in-
fluence of warriors and medicine men, those individuals with
the larger herds soon gained the ascendency in the councils.37
The Indians were naturally heartened by their excellent
crops from which they had sold 215,000 pounds of grain to
the military for cash, but they were even more encouraged
34. Crook reported that the only change was "that the agent no longer received
the credit for managing the Apaches with whose management he had really so little
to do." Crook to A. G., April 12, 1884, A. G. O., 1818.
35. Wilcox to Hiram Price, July 31, 1883, I. O., 14440.
36. Wilcox to Comm., Aug. 9, 1883, op. cit., p. 68; Wilcox to Teller. Sept. 12,
1883, /. D., 4201.
37. Wilcox to Price, Oct. 3, 1883, I. O., 18568 ; Crook to A. A. G., Nov. 3, 1883,
A. G. O., 4840.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 315
by Captain Crawford's energetic expulsion of all white in-
truders from the reservation.38 And of equal encouragement
to the officials in charge of the Indians was the fact that
Senator Henry L. Dawes in December indicated that he was
opposed to any further reduction of the reservation.39
At the end of 1883 Apache affairs looked bright on the
surface, and already the civil and military authorities had
taken steps to assure a continuance of this seemingly satis-
factory condition. Both Wilcox and Crook set forth the
necessity of seed grains and tools in ample amounts, and of
the importance of their delivery before the planting season.
By promising to send the tools at once, and by authorizing
Wilcox to buy the grains in the open market, it was evident
that the high officials were anxious to make the program
succeed.40
Wilcox began farming operations near San Carlos early
in January, 1884. The quantity of land prepared for cul-
tivation exceeded that of any previous year for the Indians
with unusual energy not only repaired all the old irrigation
facilities but also dug many new ditches and built twenty
new dams. In spite of several disastrous floods before the
planting season, they repaired the irrigation facilities suffi-
ciently to have an adequate water supply for the summer.41
Near Fort Apache the military found the self-sustain-
ing bands equally eager to work. The men and boys joined
the women in the agricultural labor, evidently stimulated by
Crook's promise to buy all grains offered for sale. The Chiri-
cahuas, whose numbers were augmented by the arrival of
Geronimo and his band in April, also chose a location in the
Fort Apache region, Geronimo and Chatto locating their
38. Crook to Teller, Aug. 4, 1883, I. O., 17074.
39. Data attached to Senate Bill no. 149, Dec. 4, 1883, I. D., 867.
40. Wilcox to Comm., Nov. 16, 1883, I. O., 21066; Lincoln to Teller, Dec. 11,
1883, I. O., 22801 ; Price to Wilcox, Jan. 18, 1884, Finance Division, vol. 95, pp. 412-
414. A new departure was made when fifty-two children, including the sons of Loco
and Bonito, were sent to the Indian school at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Lincoln to
Teller, Jan. 25, 1884, I. O., 1961.
41. Wilcox to Comm., Aug. 15, 1884, 48 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. xii,
pp. 51-52.
316 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
bands on Turkey Creek. All the Indians worked with a will,
but Geronimo and Chatto, credited as having the best tilled
farms, made the greatest progress. Happily, when the
promises of new and sufficient tools failed to materialize
most of the work was continued with shovels, case knives
and sticks hardened in fire.42 The drawbacks thus engen-
dered were serious ; nevertheless, the Indians' production of
a large crop of vegetables and grains was as astounding as
it was refreshing.43 Naturally, the agent and the general
were grateful for this success, but they were more delighted
because all the Apaches, peaceful for the first time in their
history, had given the agency a year of uninterrupted
peace.44
The dual system of control engendered jealousy, how-
ever, and by winter the civil and military were locked in a
deadly combat that augured ill for the Indians' future.45
In November, 1883, Wilcox became irked at Crawford's in-
terference with the agency farmer's assignments of land to
the Indians.46 And within a short time Crawford retaliated
by remonstrating against Wilcox's receipt and distribution
to the Indians of worthless and inferior cattle as breeding
stock.47 This "Machiavellism and deceit" resulted in an in-
vestigation by Special Agent G. A. Milburn which cleared
Wilcox, but it hardly coincided with Chief Alchise's state-
ment that the "Great Father" sent many cattle "older than
this world, and had not a tooth in their heads."48 Neverthe-
42. Crook to A. A. G., (n. d.), op. cit., p. 132; Crawford to A. A. G., (n. d.),
48 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. i, p. 135.
43. On 4000 acres throughout the reservation, the Indians produced 3,850,000
Ibs. of corn, 600,000 Ibs. of cereals, 540,000 Ibs. of beans, 20,000 Ibs. of potatoes,
200,000 pumpkins and 90,000 melons. They also raised a large crop of vegetables.
Ibid., p. 136.
44. Wilcox to Comm., Aug. 15, 1884, op. cit., p. 51.
45. Crook, apparently in a fatalistic mood, had remarked in February, that "to
prevent the most disastrous consequences" at San Carlos, it would require men of
"peculiar fitness." Crook to Teller, Feb. 23, 1883, op. cit.
46. Wilcox to Crawford, Nov. 14, I. O., 9596.
47. Crawford to A. A. G., Dec. 29, 1883, A. G. O., 180.
48. Milburn to Price, Feb. 16, 1884, I. O., 3395 ; Robert Frazer, The Apaches of
White Mountain Reservation (Ind. Rights Assoc. Pubs., 1885), p. 17.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 317
less, it resulted in the cancellation of the contract, although
the reason given was that the funds were needed for the
purchase of additional flour.49
By this time nearly all phases of reservation manage-
ment were in dispute. Wilcox was especially opposed to
Crook's use of Indian juries in the administration of justice.
He thought that the practice was barbaric and ineffective ;
and by reporting the clubbing and stoning to death of a
murderer convicted by an Indian jury he struck the system
a devastating blow.50 The military defended their system as
the only effective one possible,51 but in October, 1884, Wilcox
went unreprimanded when he ordered his agency police to
defy Crawford's attempts to take charge of an Indian needed
as a witness.52
Even before the fight had reached its worst proportions,
Wilcox charged that Crawford had usurped the agent's duties
to such an extent that the agent was deprived of all voice
in Indian management.53 This accusation might not have
concerned the military had not the commissioner protested
Crawford's selling of Indian horses in violation of Indian
intercourse laws.54 A court of inquiry therefore followed
which completely exonerated Crawford ; but its finding was
essentially a vindication of military control, for in an ex parte
opinion the view was set forth that those bands completely
under military control were already self-supporting.55
Agent Wilcox might have been silenced at this point had
not the commissioner lent encouragement by recommending
that Crawford be required to confine his operations solely
49. Price to Teller, Feb. 26, 1884, R. B. no. 47, p. 462.
50. Wilcox to Price, Feb. 9, 1884, I. O., 3395.
51. Crook to A. G., April 12, 1884, A. G. O., 1818.
52. Wilcox to Price, Oct. 9, 1884, I. O., 19986.
53. Wilcox to Price, Feb. 9, 1884, I. O., 3395.
54. Price to Teller, Feb. 7, 1884, R. B. no. 47, p. 322.
55. Court of inquiry on Captain Crawford, July 14, 1884, A. G. O., 4566. These
findings hardly agreed with Crawford's later report that the Indians' crops "will not
exceed much the food, additional to their rations, which they will require." Besides,
he requested a heavy distribution of annuities to his Indians. Crawford to Crook,
Aug. 18, 1884, ibid.
318 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
to police control.56 As a consequence, Wilcox and the acting
agent S. B. Beaumont continued the struggle with renewed
energy.57
Issue was now taken with the military on the point of
passes. Crawford had allowed about six hundred of his
charges to go beyond the bounds of the reservation during
the summer to supplement their reduced rations with indi-
genous food products.58 When citizens protested this action
Beaumont reported that Crawford's only reason for this
action was "to gratify his hatred of white citizens."59 This
difficulty eventually reached Secretary Teller who referred
it to the War Department, but Crawford was apparently
permitted to continue his course unrestrained.60
The War Department received a more definite check in
the case of Tiffany's Well 61 (now called Gilson's Well) which
had again become a point of animated controversy. One,
Sylvester Gilson, who was serving as head farmer for Wil-
cox in 1883, had been in charge of the well ever since he had
dug it for Tiffany three years before. When Crawford found
that Gilson opposed military entrance into reservation farm-
ing, he began to watch the activities near the well with sus-
picion. Convinced that Gilson rather than the Indians de-
rived the benefits which emanated from the well, and prob-
ably aroused to jealousy by Gilson's popularity with the
Indians, he pushed the question into the hands of his super-
iors, who insisted that the Indians alone should receive all
the benefits.62 After much wrangling, which necessitated
a conference of the secretary of war, the secretary of the
interior and the commissioner, the authority of the civil
56. Price to Teller, June 18, 1884, R. B. no. 48, pp. 609-612.
57. Wilcox spent the summer on & leave of absence that lasted until October
22. Price to Wilcox, Aug. 22, 1884, Accounts Division, voL 61, p. 43.
58. Crawford to A. A. G., Sept. 23, 1884, A. G. O., 3744.
59. Beaumont to Wilcox, June 20, 1884, I. O., 13172.
60. Price to Teller, Aug. 1, 1884, R. B. no. 49, p. 251.
61. Cf. supra, pp. 289, 291.
62. Lincoln to Teller, July 1, 1884, I. O., 12566.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 319
officers over the well was confirmed, and Crawford was
ordered to desist from further interference.63
Wilcox remained away from the agency during the
summer of 1884, but in his annual report he again struck
at the anomaly of dual control, reiterating his view that
the military should control the mountain bands while the
civil authority should exercise exclusive control over the
docile bands near the agency.64 Disgusted, he resigned in
September although he remained as nominal agent until
C. D. Ford, the new appointee, relieved him on Novem-
ber 18.65
It now appeared as if the military would be able to
seize all phases of agency control, but Agent Ford, encour-
aged by the commissioner's insistence that complete control
should be restored to the Department of the Interior,66
proved to be a formidable opponent.
Early in January, 1885, Captain Crawford to "insure
peace" began to usurp the agent's authority over farming.
Ford at once used his newly organized police force to pre-
vent further inroads, and asked for the appointment of a
successor if he were not to be sustained.67 General Crook
thus throughly aroused insisted either upon entire control
over farming, or complete relief from responsibility de-
manded by the agreement of July, 1883.68 Secretary Lincoln,
however, instructed Crook to refrain from interference with
the peaceable Indians' agriculture, and he also informed
the general that he could not be relieved from his special
Indian duty.69 Remonstrating that Lincoln's action did him
an injustice, Crook still insisted upon relief, and declared
63. Wilcox to Price, Aug. 16, 1884, I. O., 16747 ; Lincoln to Teller, Aug. 23, 1884
I. O., 16357.
64. Wilcox to Comm., Aug. 15, 1884, op. cit., p. 52.
65. Wilcox to Price, Nov. 20, 1884, I. O., 22910. Former Agent J. P. Clum was
eager to be reappointed. Clum to Price, Sept. 4, 1884, S. F., 388.
66. Price to Teller, Sept. 25, 1884, I. D., 836.
67. Crawford to Crook, Jan. 18, 1885, A. G. O., 699; Ford to Teller, Jan. 19,
1885, I. O., 1767.
68. Crook to A. A. G., Jan. 20, 1885, A. G. O., 699.
69. A. A. G. to Comm. Gen. Dept. of Ariz., Feb. 14, 1885, 49 Cong., 1 seas.,
H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 182.
320 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
that his understanding of the July Agreement was that the
Apaches were to be put to work "raising corn instead of
scalps."70
Within a few days it again became evident that Crook
had no intention of curtailing his control, for Crawford put
an end to irrigation work that had been undertaken by
Acting Agent Pangburn. The latter reported the situation
by wire, and without delay the War Department ordered
Crook to leave all farming operations to the agency authori-
ties.71 Crawford, deeply humiliated by this order and feeling
that his influence with the Indians was greatly lessened,
asked for and received a transfer to his regiment.72
At this point a change in national administrations
brought about a restudy of the Apache problem which re-
sulted in Secretary of War Wm. C. Endicott suggesting to
Secretary of the Interior L. C. Q. Lamar that the entire con-
trol of the Apaches be entrusted to General Crook.73 An
inspection of the agency was therefore ordered, and Ford
was asked to state his views with regard to the new pro-
posal.74
Both the inspector and the agent reported the condition
and progress of the 3000 San Carlos Indians to be very satis-
factory ; and Ford undoubtedly sounded the key note of the
trouble when he said that the possibilities of success were
so great that the "Interior Department cannot afford to lose
these Indians." He recommended, however, that the dual
control should be ended by giving the military complete
charge of the 2000 Indians near Fort Apache.75 In view of
Crook's insistence that he be allowed either full control of
the reserve or none,76 it is probable that the deadlock would
70. Crook to A. G., Feb. 19, 1885, A. G. O., 1192.
71. Pangburn to Crawford, Feb. 25, 1885, (n. f.) ; Crawford to A. A. G.,
Mar. 27, 1885, A. G. O., 9703.
72. Gen. Orders no. 7, Feb. 27, 1885, A. G. O., 1292.
78. Endicott to Lamar, Mar. 28, 1885, I. O., 6562.
74. J. D. C. Atkins to Ford, April 6, 1885, I. O., 9596.
75. Gardner to Lamar, April 3, 1885, I. D., 1730 ; Ford to Comm., April 20, 1885,
I. O., 9569.
76. Crook to A. G., April 11, 1885, A. G. O., 2246.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 321
have continued, but in May, 1885, an unexpected outbreak
by Geronimo caused the Department of the Interior to re-
lent. On August 6, President Cleveland suspended Ford
and gave full control to the War Department.77
The remote causes of the Chiricahua outbreak of 1885
are indefinite. Crook in an exhaustive analysis set forth
that the Chiricahuas saw in the curtailment of his authority
an attempt to bring injury to them. He also stated that
his inability to furnish tools, blankets, mills and other prom-
ised annuities caused them to lose faith. Likewise, he felt
they were sorely aggrieved at his failure to restore to them
members of their families held captive at Fort Union, New
Mexico and in Old Mexico.78 Even more probable, they may
have tired of their prosaic agrarian life and, swayed by the
eloquent Geronimo who felt that his life was endangered,79
yearned for the freedom of the Sierra Madres.
The immediate cause of the stampede resulted from the
Chiricahuas' denial of Crook's right to enforce prohibition
among them. On May 15 a number of them engaged in a
tiswin drink. In order to shield the guilty parties and make
a test case, all the prominent chiefs drank of the liquor and
then came in a body to report the matter to Lieutenant
Britton Davis, thinking they would win their point by sheer
bravado. Davis told them he would telegraph for instruc-
tions and that they would soon know the general's decision ;
but unfortunately, the telegram went no farther than San
Carlos. Finally, after waiting more than two days for an
answer, the Indians became alarmed over the delay and
forty-two men including Geronimo, Nachee, Mangus, Nana
77. Executive Order of Aug. 6, 1885, I. O., 18293. Capt. F. E. Pierce became
acting agent on Sept. 1, by order of the president. I. O.f 24110.
78. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 9, 1885, 49 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i,
pp. 176-177.
79. 51 Cong., 1 sess. Sen. Doc. no. 88, p. 11; Miles to Lamar, Sept. 6, 1886,
I. O., 27984.
322 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
and Chihuahua, accompanied by ninety-two women and
children started precipitately toward Mexico.80
A strong command of troops and scouts from Fort
Apache quickly set out in hard pursuit. However, such was
the rapidity of the renegades' movement — they travelled
nearly 120 miles before stopping for rest or food — that it
proved impossible to overtake them or even keep track of
their movements. Bringing death and destruction to nearly
every ranch within striking distance of their route through
southwestern New Mexico, they crossed into Mexico about
June 10 with a final contemptuous gesture in the form of
the surprise capture of Captain H. W. Lawton's supply
camp at Guadalupe Canyon.81
This outbreak was a severe blow to Crook's Indian
policy. It seemed to establish the fact that just and careful
treatment under military auspices was not alone sufficient
to control Indians and that their past outbreaks must have
been due in part to inherent savagery.82 Indeed, Crook's
decision to take the most "radical measures" and his instant
departure for Fort Bowie were tacit admission of the failure
of his policy.83
General Sheridan immediately decided upon an aggres-
sive policy, whereby a strong force was to penetrate into
Mexico, to kill or capture the renegades. Crook, accordingly,
was ordered to establish his headquarters near the Mexican
line, and the District of New Mexico was practically placed
under his command.84 With dispatch he made the most
careful plans to prevent the return of the hostiles into the
80. Davis to Capt. F. L. Pierce, May 15, 1885, I. O., (n. f.) ; Davis, The Truth
About Geronimo p. 138 et seq. If Davis' telegram had reached Crook, it is probable
there would have been no further Apache outbreaks. See Crook's view in 49 Cong.,
2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1. vol. ii, p. 147.
81. Capt. Allen Smith to Crook, June 15, 1885, A. G. O., 2461. Smith indicated
that previous to the outbreak plans had been made for Geronimo's arrest. See also
Crook to A. A. G., April 10, 1886, 49 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 148-149.
82. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, p. 572.
83. Crook to Sheridan, May 31, 1885, I. O., 12710. He may have made the deci-
sion because of Secretary Endicott's orders of May 25, that the "outrages must be
stopped." Gen. Drum to Gen. Pope, May 25, 1885, A. G. O., 2869.
84. Endicott to Lamar, June 9, 1885, I. O., 13001; Sheridan to Crook, June 9,
1885, A. G. O., 2461.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 323
United States, and ordered two expeditionary forces under
the command of Captain Crawford and Captain Wirt Davis,
respectively, into Mexico.85
The commands tenaciously pursued the renegades for
four months, struck them in surprise attacks at several
points, but failed to corner them. The fugitives drifted back
towards the border, however, and late in September, 1885,
the thoroughly exhausted commands returned to their base.
Unfortunately, the only success they could claim with cer-
tainty besides the destruction of much Indian property, was
the killing of three noncombatants and the capture of thirty
others.86
In spite of Crook's vigilance, the Chiricahuas upon
being pushed out of the Sierra Madre succeeded in crossing
into the United States at Guadalupe Canyon. Captains
Davis and Crawford, again ordered to the field, pursued
them so relentlessly that the hostiles were prevented from
establishing contact with the Indians of the White Mountain
Reservation. The chase also rapidly reduced the number of
their mounts, but just when capture appeared imminent,
the theft of one of the best herds of horses in Arizona
afforded the fugitives an opportunity to remount and out-
distance the troops back into Mexico.87
Preparations were started at once for a more formid-
able campaign into Mexico. But before a column could be
organized, Josanie, a brother of Chihuahua, demonstrated
the apparent inability of the troops to capture the renegades.
Early in November he led a raiding party of ten warriors
across the border. During the next month he travelled 1200
miles, killed thirty-eight people, captured and wore out
about 250 horses and though twice dismounted, succeeded
in returning to Mexico with the loss of but one man — and
85. Crook to Pope, June 19, 1885, I. O., 13964.
86. Crook to Pope, Aug. 18, 1885, A. G. O., 5514. The field accounts listed six
killed including three warriors. The figures of the final report are given. See Crook
to A. A. G., April 10, 1886, op. cit., p. 150.
87. Ibid; Crook to Pope, Sept. 30, 1885, A. G. O., 6268.
324 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
all this through a region dotted with eighty-three companies
of troops.88
The situation was now considered so serious that Gen-
eral Sheridan was sent in November, 1885, to Fort Bowie
to consult with Crook. He arrived just in time to sanction
the second expedition into Mexico, one command of which
under Captain Davis had already taken the field.89 The sec-
ond command — one hundred Indian scouts under Crawford
— left on November 29. Unlike Davis' command, no white
troops were included with the exception of a few officers
and interpreters; to Davis and his scouts fell most of the
hard fighting of the campaign.90
Treachery was freely and openly predicted; neverthe-
less, this unorthodox command penetrated for over two hun-
dred miles into Mexico, and by the last of December found
itself at Nacori, within striking distance of the outlaws'
stronghold.91 Pushing on into a region rugged almost beyond
description, the command located the Chiricahuas on Janu-
ary 10, 1886, but before the camp could be surrounded the
troops were discovered, and in the premature fight that
followed, all the hostiles escaped. The renegades' morale
had been so severely shaken, however, that within a short
time Geronimo and Nachee asked for a conference. Arrange-
ments were made to meet the next day; and it is probable
that, had Crawford lived, the band would have surrendered.
But the captain was never to meet the chiefs.92
A detachment of Mexican irregulars, also after the rene-
gades, came upon Crawford's outposts early in the morning
of January 11, and thinking they were hostiles fired upon
them, wounding three. Vigorous efforts brought a cessa-
tion of the firing, but when Crawford exposed himself, a
single shot rang out which drilled him through the head. A
88. Crook to A. G., Jan. 11, 1886, A. G. O., 354 ; Lt. S. W. Fountain to A. G.,
Dec. 21, 1886, I. O., 3205.
89. See Sheridan's report in 49 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 7-9.
90. Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections of General Nelson A. Miles (New
York, 1896), p. 449.
91. Crawford to Crook, Dec. 28, 1885, I. O., 2635.
92. Crook to A. G., April 10, 1886, op. cit., p. 152 ; Miles, op. cit., p. 456.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 325
general fight of two hours duration followed in which the
Mexicans lost four men. After this they withdrew, but
their subsequent treacherous conduct towards Lieutenant
Marion P. Maus, who succeeded Crawford in command,
pointed to a premeditated attack on their part.93
The adverse conditions which now confronted his com-
mand forced Maus to order a retreat. Before he had gone
far, however, the chiefs met him for a conference. They
were in no mood of concession, heartened as they were by
his predicament. They therefore recited their grievances,
surrendered nine noncombatants including the superannu-
ated Chief Nana, and promised that in "two moons" they
would meet Crook near San Bernardino to talk about a pos-
sible surrender. On February 1 when Maus reached the
border, he was detailed to reenter Mexico in order to make
arrangements for the anticipated meeting.94
Messengers brought word early in March that the chiefs
were close at hand, but Maus was unable to bring Geronimo
farther north than the Canon de los Embudos, which was
located about twelve miles below the border.95 Crook, how-
ever, hastened to the rendezvous, and the conference began
on March 25. At first the hostiles would consider only
one plan of surrender — they would return to the reservation
if promised freedom from punishment. The next day they
became more conciliatory and offered Crook three choices:
First, they would agree to surrender and be sent east for
two years, taking such of their families as would go ; second,
they would be content to return to the reserve on their old
status; or third, they would return to the warpath. Crook
accepted the first proposal as the only practicable solution
and immediately left for Fort Bowie, leaving Maus and his
scouts to escort the prisoners to the post.96
93. All documents in the case are printed in 49 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1.
voL ii, p. 155-164.
94. Crook to Pope, Feb. 10, 1886, I. D., 5038 ; Miles, op. cit., p. 467.
95. Maus to Capt. Charles Roberts, Mar. (?), 1886, A. G. O., 1468.
96. For details of the conference and correspondence covering the surrender, see
51 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 88, vol. ix, pp. 2-3, 11-17.
326 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
For two days Maus moved with the prisoners toward
the border. But they remained armed to the teeth and in-
stead of marching in a body, scattered over a wide range in
order to insure themselves against any act of treachery.
Near the border the Indians obtained a quantity of liquor,
and becoming excited following inebriation, Geronimo and
Nachee with twenty warriors and sixteen noncombatants fled
back to the Sierra Madre. Several days of futile pursuit fol-
lowed ; Maus then turned back baffled. In the meantime the
other sixty-three prisoners including Chihuahua and four-
teen warriors were escorted to Fort Bowie, arriving on
April 2. Their retention was brief, and five days later in
conformity with President Cleveland's wishes, all the Chiri-
cahua prisoners at the post, seventy-seven in number, were
entrained and sent to Fort Marion, Florida.97
General Sheridan, who had long been skeptical of
Crook's reliance on Indian scouts, now actively interfered.
He thought the scouts might be trusted to the extent of cap-
turing or inducing their kinsmen to surrender, but Gero-
nimo's escape convinced him that they were unwilling to
fight and kill their own people. Crook insisted upon their
fidelity, however, and rather than change his methods, asked
to be relieved. In the resulting shift of commands, General
Nelson A. Miles was assigned to the Department of Ari-
zona.98
Miles assumed his command on April 12, 1886, with
orders from Sheridan that plainly required a speedy end to
the Apache trouble.99 Attacking his problem with character-
istic energy, he divided the exposed region into numerous
districts of observation, each to be garrisoned with sufficient
97. Ibid., pp. 3-10 ; Crook to A. G., April 10, 1886, op. cit., pp. 153-154 ; Geroni-
mo'a Story, p. 138. See also 51 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 83, vol. ix, p. 33.
98. Sheridan to Endicott, Oct. 10, 1886, 49 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii.
p. 72. For Crook's and Sheridan's correspondence between March 26 and April 5,
see 51 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 88.
99. Miles to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1886, 49 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii,
pp. 164-165. The district of New Mexico had been added to the command on Dec. 1,
1885.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 327
troops from his command of over 5000 (about one-fourth of
the entire army) , to keep the section clear of hostiles. Next,
he established a system of twenty-seven heliograph stations
to neutralize the advantages the savages had hitherto pos-
sessed through their system of smoke signals and their
power of unbelievably rapid movement.100 Finally, he or-
ganized an expeditionary force of nearly one hundred men,
including twenty Indian scouts, to run the renegades to
earth in Mexico.101
Geronimo and Nachee led their bands across the border
into the Santa Cruz valley on April 27, and thus before Miles
was fully prepared, precipitated the campaign. Energetic
pursuit parties quickly pushed dispersed groups of the rene-
gades all over the Indian country even as far north as Fort
Apache, and although no captures were effected, they were
kept in such rapid motion that the raid caused little dam-
age.102 The fugitives were followed by the cavalry upon
whom Miles at first placed his chief reliance, but within a
short time when it became apparent that mounted troops
could not operate in the rough country whither the pursuit
led, they were dismounted to take the trail on foot with the
infantry and scouts.103 About the middle of June Captain
H. W. Lawton with a fresh command was ordered into Mex-
ico to intercept the hostiles, who apparently were attempting
to return to their Sierra Madre stronghold.104
Miles now seized the opportunity to make an investiga-
tion of reservation affairs at Fort Apache. Fortunately, he
was accompanied by Special Agent L. C. Q. Lamar, Jr., who
had been sent west by Secretary Lamar to report the true
facts and to insure complete harmony.105 While both men
100. Gen. Field Orders no. 7, April 20, 1886, ibid., p. 166; Miles, op. cit., pp.
481-485. A message of twenty-five words could be sent 400 miles and an answer
returned within four hours.
101. Orders no. 58, May 4, 1886, 49 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. 117, p. 45.
102. Miles to A. G., June 8, 1886, I. O., 15523.
103. Capt. H. W. Lawton to A. G., Sept. 9, 1886, 49 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1,
vol. ii, p. 177.
104. Ibid., p. 178.
105. Lamar Jr., to Lamar, July 7, 1886, I. O., 3969.
328 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
were primarily concerned with the Chiricahua band, it was
evident to them that all the other bands had completely suc-
cumbed to federal control.106
Indeed, the progress started at both San Carlos and
Fort Apache in 1885 had been constant. The Indians had
achieved splendid results in stock-raising and farming un-
der Agents Ford and Pierce, and their sustained interest
made it plain that civilized pursuits had triumphed over
any ordinary urges that might lead them towards war. This
was revealed in a substantial way by the production of
nearly 1,000,000 pounds of grains, and the possession of
about 4000 head of stock.107 The Indians were visited at
various times of the year by Commissioner J. D. C. Atkins108
and Inspectors F. C. Armstrong and G. R. Pearsons. Ac-
cording to the inspectors a generous supply of tools and a
few mills if furnished by congress would practically relieve
the government of all further trouble and responsibility.109
Atkins' visit evidently bore fruit, for he soon broke
through the official red tape and authorized an expenditure
of $67,000 for two flour mills, one saw mill, 2000 peach trees,
2000 grape vines, 2630 breeding animals and a liberal sup-
ply of tools and implements.110 Unfortunately, since the
military enlisted more than five hundred of the best Indians
to serve as scouts, Pierce was unable to continue the reserva-
tion work so effectively during 1886. This with a fear of
Chiricahua retaliations and the irregular availability of the
funds authorized, caused the prospects of the year to be less
hopeful than expected, especially at the time Miles and
Lamar Jr., made their investigation.111 Lamar, Jr., how-
ever, urged his father to countenance no delay in pushing
106. Lamar Jr., to Lamar, July 23, 1886, I. D., 4616.
107. Ford to Comm., Mar. 18, 1885, I. O., 6334 ; Armstrong to Lamar. Aug. 26.
1885, I. D., 4470; Pearsons to Lamar, Dec. (?), 1885, I. O., 80792.
108. See his council (Oct. 27) with them. 49 Cong. ,1 sess., H. R. no. 1076,
pp. 141-143.
109. Armstrong to Lamar, Aug. 26, 1885, op. cit.; Pearsons to Lamar, Dec. (7),
1885, op. cit.
110. Authority for supplies, Jan. 25, 1886, I. O., 1532.
111. Pierce to Comm., (annual report) Aug. 31, 1886, I. O., 24110.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 329
vigorously the program as essentially inaugurated by Gen-
eral Crook.112 On August 10, 1886, when Secretary Lamar
put the full weight of the Department of the Interior behind
the plans to aid the peaceable Apaches, their position as an
anomalous element ceased to exist.113
In contrast to the other Apaches, Miles and Lamar, Jr.,
found the presence of the Chiricahua band a dangerous
threat to the peace and safety of the Southwest. A delega-
tion of thirteen prominent Chiricahuas was therefore
selected and sent to Washington to discuss the proposition of
removal to some favorable region remote from Arizona.114
Bribery was obviously necessary, but President Cleveland
refused to stoop to this method, and thus with the situation
worse than at the beginning, they were ordered back to Ari-
zona.115 Miles now exerted himself to the utmost to have
them detained in Kansas or Indian Territory, where he also
proposed that the entire band should be sent without delay.
This proposal was immediately rejected, but his superiors
did decide to authorize the removal of all the Chiricahuas to
Fort Marion, Florida and, pending the removal, they allowed
the delegation to be held at Fort Leavenworth.116 A gradual
concentration of troops followed at Fort Apache, and on
August 29 when success seemed assured, the Chiricahuas
were assembled under the ruse of an ordinary roll call. They
were then placed under guard and escorted to Holbrook,
Arizona, where the entire number of 382 individuals were
entrained for Fort Marion.117
112. Lamar Jr., to Lamar, July 23, 1886, I. D., 4616.
113. Lamar to Comm., Aug. 10, 1886, I. D., L. B. no. 46, pp. 314-315. See Pierce
to Comm., Aug. 31, 1886, op. cit. Also, Pierce to Comm., Dec. 24, 1886, I. O., 34596.
114. Lamar Jr., to Lamar, July 7, 1886, I. D., 3971. Miles had favored their
removal before he replaced Crook. Miles to Schofield, Oct. 2, 1885, I. O., 25380.
115. E. D. Tussey, The Apache Wars in Arizona, 1880-1887, ms., University of
Iowa, p. 112. Tussey has done a fine piece of analysis at this point.
116. All this extended and complicated correspondence running from July 3 to
Sept. 21, 1886, is printed in 49 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. 117, pt. iii, and also in 51
Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 83, pp. 2-28. SecretaryEndicott's conference with the dele-
gation is given in ibid., pp. 41-43. Other related documents follow in ibid., pp. 44-53.
117. Gen. R. C. Drum to President, Aug. 31, 1886, 49 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D.
no. 117, p. 72 ; Wellman, Death in the Desert, pp. 264-267.
330 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Meanwhile, Lawton's expeditionary force chased the
elusive renegades for nearly 1400 miles. The ordeal ex-
hausted the scouts so badly, however, that it almost ap-
peared as if the renegades might be able to remain out
indefinitely.118 But happily the fugitives were also tired,
and on July 14, 1886, the scouts succeeded in attacking and
routing them at a point three hundred miles below the bor-
der.119 Naturally, the blow was a most dispiriting one, not
only striking the savages at a point where they felt them-
selves most secure but also depriving them of their mounts
and supplies. They therefore began dickering for peace with
the Mexican officials of nearby Fronteras.120
Miles had early anticipated such a contingency, and
Captain Gatewood with two friendly Chiricahuas charged
with the mission of entering Geronimo's camp and demand-
ing his surrender had already joined Lawton.121 When Gate-
wood therefore learned that Nachee and Geronimo were
near Fronteras, he proceeded ahead of the main command,
got his scouts into the Indian leaders' camp, and then met
them in conference on August 24. Geronimo was not inter-
ested in Miles' proposal that his band surrender and be sent
to Florida with their families, but he offered to return to the
reservation on the old status — exemption from punishment.
Gatewood now told the Chiricahuas that their fellows at
Fort Apache were all being sent to Florida. This news had
the desired effect of breaking down all opposition, and the
next morning Geronimo agreed to meet Miles near the bor-
der for a final surrender.122
The scouts and the renegade party set out at once, jour-
neying leisurely to Skeleton Canyon which was located only
a few miles north of the border. Here, Miles met them on
118. Lawton to A. G.f Sept. 9, 1886, op. cit., p. 178 ; Anton Mazzanovich, Trailing
Geronimo (Los Angeles, 1926), p. 245.
119. A. A. G. to A. G., July 22, 1886, I. O., 19900.
120. Gen. Howard to A. G., Aug. 19, 1886, I. O., 22570.
121. Miles to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1886, op. cit., p. 172.
122. C. B. Gatewood, "The Surrender of Geronimo," in Proceedings of the Order
of Indians Wars of the United States, Jan. 1929, pp. 49-56 ; Gen. James Parker, "The
Geronimo Campaign," ibid., pp. 40-42.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 331
September 4 and accepted their surrender.123 He took Ger-
onimo and Nachee into Fort Bowie the next day; Lawton,
escorting the main group to the post, required three days
longer to cover the same distance. But within a few hours
after his arrival, while the Fourth Cavalry Band ironically
played "Auld Lang Syne," the entire Chiricahua group of
thirty-two persons were marched from the fort to Bowie
Station, fourteen miles away, and entrained for Florida.124
This dramatic occasion, by bringing to a close the last of a
savage and formidable opposition that had impeded the
progress of civilization in the Southwest for more than three
hundred years, marked the end of an era in the history of
the Apache Indians.
123. Geronimo's Story, p. 143 et seq; Miles to Lamar, Sept. 6, 1886, I. O., 27984.
Chief Mangus with ten followers remained detached from Geronimo's band. They
were brought in and sent to Florida in October. Miles to A. G., Oct. 21, 1886, I. O.,
28753.
124. Miles, op. cit. p. 627. It appears that President Cleveland insisted upon an
unconditional surrender, and that Miles violated his orders and gave conditions when
he allowed them to be sent to Florida. This action resulted in the detention of the
Indians for several weeks at San Antonio, Texas, while an investigation was held.
Near the end of October they were sent on to Florida, but fifteen of the bucks were
sent to Fort Pickens instead of Fort Marion. This move probably violated Miles'
promise that they should be united with their families at Fort Marion. For the
complete details of the dispute as well as all correspondence covering the surrender
of the Apaches, see The Surrender of Geronimo, 49 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. 117,
pts. i and ii. Additional documents are printed and new light is shed on the sur-
render in Herbert Welsh, The Apache Prisoners in Fort Marion, St. Augustine, Florida
(Phila., 1887). See also 51 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 35, pp. 2-8 for General Crook's
interview in January, 1890, with Nachee and others regarding their surrender.
Sketches of the Chiricahuas' subsequent history can be found in Wellman, op. cit.,
pp. 273-274, and Hodge, Handbook, pt. i, pp. 65, 284. In 1913 one hundred and eighty-
seven of them voluntarily moved to the Mescalero Reservation in New Mexico. Seventy-
eight others elected to remain at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where the band had been held as
nominal prisoners of war for many years. See R. C. I. A., 1913, p. 34; ibid., 1914,
pp. 56-57.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
The efforts of the United States government to con-
trol the Western Apache Indians began soon after the end
of the Mexican War in 1848 and continued until the "capture
of Geronimo" in 1886. During the first twenty years of the
period the problem of control was essentially a military one,
due to the general hostility of the various bands as well as a
lack of administrative machinery on the part of the civil
authorities to undertake the task of civilization. The latter
part of the period was characterized by a continuous bureau-
cratic conflict between the military and the civil depart-
ments. This unfortunate situation developed in the early
1870's when the civil officials began to vie with the military
in shaping the course of Apache management; it later be-
came a serious problem, for the civil authorities also began
to claim credit for the progress obviously made by the
Apaches. Throughout the period of Apache reduction both
the civil and the military establishments were impeded in
their work of civilization by a geographical environment
even more formidable than the Apaches themselves.
The reservation policy as a major part of the plan to
control the Apaches was adopted early because the Office of
Indian Affairs believed not only that the segregation of
these Indians from the white man was essential for the
tribe's preservation but also that the occupation of the
Apache country by the miner, the tradesman and the settler
was inevitable. The execution of this policy was made ex-
traordinarily complex in the latter part of the period when a
general policy of concentration was appended to the original
scheme. The advance of the mining frontier was especially
apparent in the case of the removal of the Yavapai and the
Southern Apaches. The settlers and tradesmen were the
primary factors in the final removal of the Camp Grant and
the Verde bands, and to a lesser extent in the concentration
of the Chiricahuas at San Carlos. The fundamental cause
332
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 333
for the drastic treatment of the Chiricahua irreconcilables is
to be found in the generation of chronic depredations on
both the American and the Mexican settlements. Since the
interest of the miner and the farmer in the White Mountain
country was prospective, rather than real, the docile Coyo-
teros were permitted to remain in their own habitat.
The gradual carrying out of the reservation policy was
marred by a confusion of interests and motives. The plans
of the government were based on the instincts of the human-
itarian, but in practice they were commonly administered
with the callousness of the realist. Many men in positions of
responsibility had a genuine interest in the welfare of the
Apache, and looked hopefully towards his eventual civiliza-
tion ; others, motivated by the practices of the spoils system
in American politics, profited from their official positions to
the fullest possible degree. The settlers were usually content
to be free from the dangerous proximity of the tribesmen,
although in too many instances they were willing to prolong
hostilities, provided the profits which they realized from
supplying the troops with grain, forage and provisions were
sufficiently attractive.
The governmental machinery for dealing with the
Indians was defective in the extreme. This difficulty was
further aggravated by a lack of harmony between the De-
partment of the Interior and the War Department and by
the villainous rascality of some of the agents and inspectors.
A division of responsibility between the departments was
adhered to in theory throughout the period of the Apache
troubles. On this basis the military was supposed to deal
with the hostile Indians and the civil authority with those
that remained at peace. Yet in actual practice the military,
despite sharp checks at various times, dominated affairs for
the greater part of the period. This was an unwanted
responsibility, although many officers, anxious to win quick
promotions that would otherwise require the greater part of
a lifetime, undoubtedly pursued policies which were delib-
erately designed to prolong the period of hostilities.
334 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The process of inducing- the Apaches to accept the prac-
tices of sedentary life was made more difficult, and resulted
in much unnecessary suffering on the part of the tribe,
because of the low tone of public morality and the weakness
for peculation which was characteristic of the post-Civil
War period. The sums of money appropriated by congress
were seldom excessive, but their remedial effects were con-
siderably lessened by the dishonesty of the officials and the
unscrupulousness of the contractors. Inferior and unnec-
sary supplies were frequently purchased and perhaps as
often resold for the sole benefit of the manipulators. The
exact difference between the amount appropriated and the
value of the goods actually consumed or utilized by the
tribesmen will never be known, but the chronic complaints
about starving, naked and depraved Indians, indicate that
the margin must have been very wide.
The "Peace Policy" of President Grant was based on
worthy motives, and in the case of the Apaches the results
which were attained were constructive; besides, the policy
probably saved the tribe from annihilation. The appoint-
ment of the agents on the recommendation of the various
church denominations did not necessarily raise those officials
above the suspicion of abusing their trusts. Nevertheless,
with the exception of the Chiricahuas and the Southern
Apaches, the economic and moral status of the Apache
groups showed considerable improvement in the 1870's.
The outstanding result of the management of the
Western Apaches was the concentration of the numerous
and diverse bands on the San Carlos Reservation. The com-
pletion of this work, in permanently closing a large part of
Arizona to white endeavor, not only gave the history of the
region a different turn but it also meant that the tribe had
a chance to survive. And the tribe has survived, for today
there is a total of more than 6000 Western Apaches — a num-
ber nearly seventeen per cent greater than fifty years ago.
The application of the reservation policy to the nomadic
Apaches was marked by the same confusion of good inten-
FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE APACHES 335
tions and harsh treatment that has characterized the policy
of the whites toward the Indians throughout the history of
the United States. This result was inevitable: a primitive
people tenaciously claiming possession of a vast territory
filled with fabulous natural wealth obviously could not with-
stand the onslaught and eventual control of an aggressive,
expanding nation of civilized people motivated with the re-
lentless and acquisitive spirit of the frontier. Always, the
wide differences in customs, habits, and temperaments that
existed between these two races of mankind made a peaceful
adjustment of their diametrically opposed interests a virtual
impossibility. The stronger naturally overwhelmed the
weaker, and during the cruel drama, unfortunately, Justice
was frequently forced to bow her head in shame.
BOOK REVIEWS
Narratives of the Coronado Expedition 1540-1542, by George
P. Hammond and Agapito Rey. (Albuquerque, The
University of New Mexico Press, 1940. 420 pp., frontis-
piece, index. $3.50.)
This is Volume II, but the first to be published, of the
"Coronado Historical Series," authorized by the Coronado
Cuarto Centennial Commission. As such, it sets a high stan-
dard, scientifically and typographically, for the other ten
volumes which have been planned.
The arrangement and the sequence of the contents of
this volume adapt it admirably to the general reader as well
as the student of history who specializes in the annals of the
Spanish Southwest. In the introduction, the authors present
a well-written story, brought up-to-date, of the life of Fran-
cisco Vazquez de Coronado and of his epoch-making expedi-
tion. It brings together for the first time in attractive style
many of the scattered details heretofore known and many
others only recently revealed. One of the authors, Professor
Agapito Rey, of Indiana University, tells in a recent number
of The New Mexico Quarterly of the sources of this mate-
rial when he writes :
"During the last two years the University of New Mex-
ico has been adding to its rich collection of photostatic copies
of original documents. Of this vast amount of source mate-
rial, some twenty thousand sheets are directly related to the
Coronado expedition. Most of these documents were photo-
graphed by Professor L. B. Bloom in the Archives of the
Indies located at Seville, Spain. The gathering of these
materials is being done by the University of New Mexico
with the cooperation of the New Mexico Historical Society,
the Historical Records Survey, and the Coronado Commis-
sion.
"Not all of these documents are new, as many of them
have already appeared either in Spanish or in translations.
336
BOOK REVIEWS 337
But by obtaining photostatic copies of the original docu-
ments already in print, we are able to correct errors and mis-
readings and to present now a text more accurate than has
been possible in the past.
"By far the most voluminous documents hitherto unpub-
lished, and little or not at all utilized, are the court records in
connection with the inquiries into Coronado's management
of his expedition and his administration as governor of New
Galicia. The many thousand sheets of records comprise two
legajos, which are divided into twelve sections of several
hundred sheets each. The enormous bulk of the bundles has
served as a deterrent to the study of these documents. We
have waded through them, some twenty thousand sheets in
all, to see if there were new materials that should be brought
out in connection with our Coronado publications. As a
result of this search we are able to present some documents
for the first time. Coronado's testimony and that of his chief
officer, Lopez de Cardenas, the charges filed against them,
and their final sentences are most important. These deposi-
tions clarify many obscure points in Castaneda's chronicle
of the Coronado expedition. Through these new documents,
a more complete picture \of the undertaking may be
obtained."
From this work, the reader gathers far more than the
biographical and other details of the Coronado Entrada. It
presents a vivid picture of Spanish ideology, enterprise,
jurisprudence, customs in the middle years of the sixteenth
century. What could be more interesting to modern city
planners, for instance, than the statement by the authors:
"Coronado promulgated a royal decree that all houses
built thereafter must be of stone, brick, or adobe, and de-
signed after the style of Spanish dwellings so that they
might be permanent and an adornment to the cities."
To descendants of the "Mayflower" or pioneer mothers,
there is the reminder that eighty years before the Pilgrims
landed at Plymouth Rock:
"At least three women accompanied the expedition,
338 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Francisca de Hozes, wife of Alonso Sanchez, Maria Maldon-
ado, wife of Juan de Paradinas, and the wife of Lope Caba-
llero. Francisca de Hozes went with her husband and a son
and accompanied the expedition from beginning to end. She
later testified against Coronado, charging that he prevented
her and other Spaniards from remaining in the new land to
establish a colony. Maria Maldonado, wife of Juan de Para-
dinas (or Paladinas), was described by witnesses as nursing
the sick soldiers on the expedition, mending their clothes,
and doing other good works. Her husband was a tailor by
trade. He was a good soldier and Coronado named him camp
marshal and appointed him to other posts."
In these days of international ill-will, it is significant
to learn of the cosmopolitan character of the members of
Coronado's expeditionary force. It included the first Scotch-
man ever to enter the present United States, as well as Por-
tuguese, Italians, Frenchmen, and Germans, the authors
writing of the last named :
"The foreigner who played the most conspicuous role
in the army seems to have been Juan Fioz, a native of
Worms, Germany. As the bugler of the expedition, he was
present at all the major actions, including the expedition to
Quivira. He was accordingly, an important witness at the
investigation of Coronado's management of the expedition
and appeared as a defense witness for both Coronado and
Cardenas."
Surprising to many will be the statement that only
three residents of Mexico went with the expedition. Delight-
ful are some of the incidents and facts which are incidental
to the narrative and brought out by the authors in the intro-
duction as well as in the thirty documents carefully trans-
lated and edited. It is, of course, the latter which are of par-
ticular interest to students and research workers, who owe
gratitude to Professors Hammond and Rey for their labor-
ious, painstaking, and accurate work, which has been a
labor of love on their part. — P.A.F.W.
BOOK REVIEWS 339
Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty
of 1819. By Philip Coolidge Brooks. University of Cal-
ifornia Publications in History, Volume 24. (Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1939. x, 262 pp. $2.50.)
The standard works on the Adams-Onis Treaty, such as
H. B. Fuller's The Purchase of Florida (1906), have been
based almost exclusively on American sources. By supple-
menting these materials with others equally illuminating in
the British, the French, and particularly the Spanish ar-
chives, Mr. Brooks has been able to achieve a better rounded
account of the issues involved as seen by both Spain and the
United States, of the tortuous course of the negotiations,
and of the several reasons for Spain's delay in ratifying. A
major contribution is that Luis de Onis is at last given the
credit due him for his important share in bringing this
treaty about. He is depicted as a wily and resourceful dip-
lomat, a worthy adversary for John Quincy Adams, long
hailed as the ablest of our secretaries of state.
Mr. Brooks heartily endorses Bemis' phrase, "The
Transcontinental Treaty." The term "Florida Purchase,"
though it is used in the latest history of American diplomacy,
he rejects as both inadequate and inappropriate. Ultimate
control of Florida by the United States was taken for
granted throughout the treaty negotiations, and although
the United States assumed responsibility for claims against
Spain up to $5,000,000, it was for all the Spanish conces-
sions, not just for Florida.
The main problem was to decide on a line from the Gulf
of Mexico to the Pacific. As to this line the author concludes
that the treaty-makers decided wisely and fairly. Texas, to
which the United States' claim was most flimsy, was prop-
erly left to Spain. On the New Mexico frontier the line was
purposely placed several hundred miles from Santa Fe so
that this Spanish province would be adequately insulated.
Finally, in the transfer to the United States of Spanish
claims on the Pacific slope north of the forty-second parallel,
there was a tangible American gain which assuaged any
340 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
immediate disappointment that Texas had not been acquired.
This reviewer would upbraid the publisher for cluster-
ing the notes in Jim Crow sections following each chapter,
the more so since in several of these notes, as well as in the
annotated bibliography, the author indulges in sprightly
sallies on sundry standard histories. Furthermore, it is an
unkindness and an injustice to a work of this caliber to dress
it in a cheap paper cover.
A few minor errors are noted. The suffix in "captaincy-
general" (p. 30) has migrated from noun to adjective. The
name of the New Mexico explorer, Sergeant Juan de Uri-
barri, is garbled (p. 44) . It is an exaggeration to say (p. 46)
that Father Garces opened a trail from New Mexico to Cali-
fornia in 1775-76. Such matters, however, are marginal to
the real theme of the book and do not impair it as an impor-
tant contribution to American diplomatic history and a
significant chapter in the annals of the Spanish borderlands.
JOHN WALTON CAUGHEY.
University of California at Los Angeles.
The Religious Architecture of New Mexico, in the Colonial
Period and since the American Occupation. By George
Kubler. (The Taylor Museum, Colorado Springs, May
1940. Quarto: xxi-f-232 pp.; 220 illus., including folded
map; bibliog., index, n. p.)
Prepared as a doctoral dissertation at Yale, this volume
is the fruition of study which has been both extensive and
intensive. The research and writings of others, especially
historians and archaeologists, are given generous recognition
in a very complete list of sources and also throughout the
text ; but the author has himself been in the field repeatedly
and the book everywhere shows the results of his indepen-
dent investigations.
The study has been developed in four Parts, of which
the first is a brief survey of "The Missionary Enterprise,"
with especial emphasis on the seventeenth century. Part
BOOK REVIEWS 341
Two (about half the volume) deals with the principal sub-
ject of the study, namely "The Architecture," under such
sub-titles as location, materials, plan, structure, mass, light-
ing effects, and secondary buildings. While much of this is
technical, it is not difficult reading and anyone who skips
or skims through these chapters will miss many illuminating
explanations of this kind of colonial architecture.
In Part Three is discussed all the historical information
which Dr. Kubler has assembled regarding the buildings
which have yielded architectural data: and this somewhat
encyclopedic treatment closes with an interesting "chron-
ological table of the churches." A supplementary table of
known mission churches which have wholly disappeared
would be of value — but would have added nothing to the
theme of this study.
Part Four is devoted to a brief "Historical Summary
and Conclusion," with some discussion of developments and
trends of recent years.
In our first scanning of this very excellent study we find
nothing of importance which calls for adverse criticism.
Yet we might again remark that evidence does not support
the founding of Santa Fe earlier than 1610 (p. 133). Also
the spelling "Sebogeta" is unfortunate; probably it would
trace to a textual misreading of "Seboyeta," but "Cebolleta"
is the usual spelling — as shown on the folding map. Many
will wish that the book had been given a more substantial
binding.
The numerous illustrations are a very fine part of this
volume, adding throughout to the interest and understand-
ing of the reader. — L. B.B.
The Last Will and Testament of Hemando Cortes, Marques
del Voile. Edited by G. R. G. Conway. (City of Mex-
ico, privately printed, 1939. xxi, 73 pp.; index.)
Last year was the four hundredth anniversary of the
introduction of the art of printing in the New World. Com-
memorative of that fact, we have in this beautifully pre-
342 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
pared volume "a facsimile and paleographic version, to-
gether with an English translation of the original testa-
ment, dated Seville, the llth day of October, 1547," edited
with an introduction and notes by Mr. Conway. We thus
have, for the first time in printed form, the correct Spanish
text of this most interesting and important document.
Of interest in New Mexico history is clause xxxiii of
the will : "I direct that my natural daughters, Dona Leonor
and Dona Maria, shall receive as dowries each ten thousand
ducats from my estate, . . ." And Mr. Conway supplies the
following note.
"Dona Leonor was the daughter of Isabel, the eldest
legitimate daughter of Moctezuma II, who in her own tongue
was called Tecuichpotzin but baptized Isabel by the Spanish
Friars. Dona Isabel Moctezuma was married when a mere
child to her cousin Cuauhtemoc, the nephew of Mocte-
zuma. At a later date she married Alonso de Grado, a con-
quistador who came with Cortes . . . After Alonso de Grado's
death she married again in succession, Don Pedro Gallego
de Andrade and Juan Cano de Saavedra who survived her. If
we are to believe the evidence of the conquistador Bernal-
dino Vazquez de Tapia taken at the residencies of Cortes in
1529, Isabel's daughter by Cortes was born five or six months
after her marriage to Don Pedro Gallego. Dona Isabel Moc-
tezuma's last testament was executed in Mexico, llth July,
1550, and her death occurred almost immediately after-
wards . . .
"Dona Leonor Cortes Moctezuma, a desirable lady of
royal blood, married soon after her mother's death, one of
the conquistadores of Zacatecas, Juan de Tolosa, who opened
up the rich mines in that province. Leonor's daughter, Dona
Isabel de Tolosa Cortes Moctezuma, married Juan de Onate,
the discoverer and governor of New Mexico." (pp. 37, 61-
62.)— L.B.B.
BOOK REVIEWS 343
Ensayos historicos hispanoamericanos. By Francis Borgia
Steck, O.F.M. (Mexico; bajo el signo de "abside,"
1940. 74 pp.; $0.50.)
Father Steck of the Catholic University, in Washington,
has thus issued three of his studies which it would be desir-
able to have available also in English. The first, on "Juan
Pablos: the American Gutenberg," is of interest on the
introducing of printing into America in 1539. The second
discusses "The first fifty years of Spanish domination in
Mexico (1522-1572)," and the third, "The Franciscan mis-
sionary colleges in Spanish America."
In the last of these, the author points out that the mis-
sionary work of the Franciscan Order was conducted during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through religious
"provinces." Such was the "Province of the Holy Gospel,"
known to students of New Mexico history. A "second era"
of missionary work began in 1682 with the creating of the
first missionary college, — that installed in the Franciscan
convent in Queretaro. Four others were added in the vice-
royalty of Mexico: Guatemala (1692), Zacatecas (1704),
that of San Diego in Pachuca (1733), and that of San Fer-
nando (1734) in Mexico City. It was by missionaries from
Queretaro, Zacatecas, and "San Fernando" that Franciscan
work was started in Texas, California, and Arizona.
In the United States, natives formerly under the care of
missionary colleges of Mexico "are now in care of three
Franciscan provinces, whose sees are in Cincinnati, Chicago,
and Santa Barbara After two and a half centuries,
the Franciscan missionary colleges are today no more than a
sacred memory." (p. 65) In other words, Father Steck
might have said that, from the middle nineteenth century, a
"third era" began with the change back from missionary
operation through colleges to that through provinces. As he
suggests, the function of a college or seminary was not ex-
clusively missionary ; that of a Franciscan province was. —
L. B. B.
The Historical Society of New Mexico
(INCORPORATED)
Organized December 26, 1859
PAST PRESIDENTS
1859 — COL. JOHN B. GRAYSON, U. S. A.
1861 — MAJ. JAMES L. DONALDSON, U. S. A.
1863 — HON. KIRBY BENEDICT
adjourned sine die, Sept. 2S, 186S
re-established Dec. 27, 1880
1881 — HON. WILLIAM G. RITCH
1883 — HON. L. BRADFORD PRINCE
1923 — HON. FRANK W. CLANCY
1925 — COL. RALPH E. TWITCHELL
1926 — PAUL A. F. WALTER
OFFICERS FOR 1940-1941
PAUL A. F. WALTER, President
JAMES F. HINKLE, V 'ice-President
MIGUEL A. OTERO, II, V ice-President
LANSING B. BLOOM, Cor. Sec'y-Treas.
Miss HESTER JONES, Recording Secretory
FELLOWS
PERCY M. BALDWIN EDGAR L. HEWETT
RALPH P. BIEBER FREDERICK W. HODGE
WILLIAM C. BINKLEY ALFRED V. KIDDER
LANSING B. BLOOM J. LLOYD MECHAM
HERBERT E. BOLTON THEODOSIUS MEYER, O. F. M.
AURELIO M. ESPINOSA FRANCE V. SCHOLES
CHARLES W. HACKETT ALFRED B. THOMAS
GEORGE P. HAMMOND PAUL A. F. WALTER
CONSTITUTION
OF THE
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
(As amended Nov. 19, 1929)
Article 1. Name. This Society shall be called the Historical Society
of New Mexico.
Article 2. Objects and Operation. The objects of the Society shall be,
in general, the promotion of historical studies; and in particular, the
discovery, collection, preservation, and publication of historical ma-
terial, especially such as relates to New Mexico.
Article 3. Membership. The Society shall consist of Members, Fel-
lows, Life Members and Honorary Life Members.
(a) Members. Persons recommended by the Executive Council
and elected by the Society may become members.
(b) Fellows. Members who show, by published work, special
aptitude for historical investigation may become Fellows. Immedi-
ately following the adoption of this Constitution, the Executive
Council shall elect five Fellows, and the body thus created may there-
after elect additional Fellows on the nomination of the Executive
Council. The number of Fellows shall never exceed twenty-five.
(c) Life Members. In addition to life members of the Historical
Society of New Mexico at the date of the adoption hereof, such other
benefactors of the Society as shall pay into its treasury at one time
the sum of fifty dollars, or shall present to the Society an equivalent
in books, manuscripts, portraits, or other acceptable material of an
historic nature, may upon recommendation by the Executive Council
and election by the Society, be classed as Life Members.
(d) Honorary Life Members. Persons who have rendered emi-
nent service to New Mexico and others who have, by published work,
contributed to the historical literature of New Mexico or the South-
west, may become Honorary Life Members upon being recommended
by the Executive Council and elected by the Society.
Article 4. Officers. The elective officers of the Society shall be a
president, two vice-presidents, a corresponding secretary and treas-
urer, and a recording secretary; and these five officers shall constitute
the Executive Council with full administrative powers.
Officers shall qualify on January 1st following their election, and
shall hold office for the term of two years and until their successors
Article 5. Elections. At the October meeting of each odd-numbered
year, a nominating committee shall be named by the president of the
Society and such committee shall make its report to the Society at
the November meeting. Nominations may be made from the floor
and the Society shall, in open meeting, proceed to elect its officers by
ballot, those nominees receiving a majority of the votes cast for the
respective offices to be declared elected.
Article 6. Dues. Dues shall be $3.00 for each calendar year, and
shall entitle members to receive bulletins as published and also the
Historical Review.
Article 7. Publications. All publications of the Society and the selec-
tion and editing of matter for publication shall be under the direction
and control of the Executive Council.
Article 8. Meetings. Monthly meetings of the Society shall be held at
the rooms of the Society on the third Tuesday of each month at
eight P. M. The Executive Council shall meet at any time upon call
of the President or of three of its members.
Article 9. Quorums. Seven members of the Society and three mem-
bers of the Executive Council, shall constitute quorums.
Article 10. Amendments. Amendments to this constitution shall be-
come operative after being recommended by the Executive Council
and approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting at
any regular monthly meeting; provided, that notice of the proposed
amendment shall have been given at a regular meeting of the Society,
at least four weeks prior to the meeting when such proposed amend-
ment is passed upon by the Society.
Students and friends of Southwestern History are cordially in-
vited to become members. Applications should be addressed to the
corresponding secretary, Lansing B. Bloom, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
PUBLICATIONS FOR SALE
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unbound. The seventh issue is almost exhausted, and volume II
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numbers 1 & 4, each $1.00 and number 3, $5.00.
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW (quarterly, since January 1926)
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and 4, each $1.00
Volumes III to current year, per volume $4.00
By subscription, during current year $3.00
Papers. Nos. 1 to 38 (1888 to 1935) List of titles sent on request.
ST. FRANCIS AND THE FRANCISCANS IN NEW MEXICO, 44 pp. ill., $0.50
REPRINTS from the Historical Review, each $0.25. Titles sent on
request.
PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY
Vol. I— Fray Marcos de Niza's Relation, Span, and Eng. ed.
by Percy W. Baldwin, 59 pp. (1926) $0.60
Vol. II — Juan de Oiiate and the founding of New Mexico.
Geo. P. Hammond. 228 pp., maps, bibliog., index.
(1927) $1.50
Vol. Ill — New Mexico in the Great War, ed. by L. B. Bloom
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VOL. XV
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No. 4
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VOL. XV OCTOBER, 1940 No. 4
CONTENTS
Map of northern New Mexico (from Miera y Pacheco,
1778)
Franciscan Missions of New Mexico, 1740-1760, I
Henry W. Kelly 345
Troublous Times in New Mexico, 1659-1670 (Cont'd)
France V. Scholes 369
Editorial Notes 418
Index 421
Errata in Volume XV . 429
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NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL
REVIEW
VOL. XV OCTOBER, 1940 No. 4
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 1740-1760
By HENRY W. KELLY
INTRODUCTION
QEVERAL INCENTIVES have urged me to make this
0 somewhat full study of the missions in mid-eighteenth
century New Mexico. In the first place, I must admit that
1 am a victim of the contagious past of my locality. As a
native of New Mexico I am intensely interested in the long,
varied and dramatic history of my state. It is a history that
began before that of most states in the union, and the fact
that this year of 1940 marks the four hundredth anniversary
of that beginning — the entrance of Francisco Vasquez de
Coronado — serves as an added incentive.
Personal associations with the scene of my research;
the fact that I live in Santa Fe, the center of historical
activity of that Spanish kingdom; that I have visited the
majority of the Indian missions in question, all combine
to make the study much more vital and meaningful.
I feel that my work is not merely of antiquarian inter-
est ; not merely the resurrection of a dead past, that has no
longer any connection with the present. The Pueblo Indians
of today are as numerous as they were in 1750, and essen-
tially they lead the same existence as they did in those far-
off times. The brown robe of the Franciscan padre is still
a prominent feature in New Mexico, and, with certain modi-
fications, he has to cope with many of the problems that
faced him two centuries ago. Living in the many isolated
345
346 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
villages in the mountains and valleys, the descendants of the
Conquistador es mirror the lives of their ancestors, scarcely
touched by our dizzy twentieth century. These modern
vecinos still speak Spanish; still lead the predominately
agricultural life of their forefathers, economically self-
sufficient; still run their sheep, goats and cattle over the
rocky pinon-covered hills; still sow their fields by the age-
old broadcast method ; irrigate with acequias dug in colonial
times ; harvesting by hand, threshing with horses and goats,
and settling down for a winter of inertia and isolation as
the heavy snows clog up their narrow valleys.
A study of this nature should have real, historical sig-
nificance. Mr. France Scholes of the Carnegie Institute
of Washington has made the only careful study of ecclesias-
tical history in seventeenth century New Mexico. A similar
one has not been made for the eighteenth century. The very
fact that I am to some extent entering unknown territory,
and that I have the chance of shedding some light on one
of the numerous, shadowy corners in Spanish American
history, is indeed an incentive and justification for my work.
I had the good fortune to have placed at my
disposal, through the kindness of Mr. Scholes, a generous
stock of photostatic copies of manuscripts dealing with this
period of New Mexican history. These copies were made
by him from the original manuscripts in the National
Archives of Mexico City, and from what I understand a
good number of them have never been subjected to historical
scrutiny. After a careful study of the manuscripts, I am
forced to admit that I was somewhat disappointed to find
nothing that would revolutionize present, historical con-
cepts concerning this period of mission history. However,
I am confident that these documents have enabled me to add
a number of new pieces to the still incomplete picture puzzle
of that period.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 347
CHAPTER I
THE ROLE OF THE MISSION IN SPAIN'S COLONIAL POLICY1
For all time to come the foundation of the Spanish
Empire in the New World will remain a marvelous and
breathtaking accomplishment. Out of a hitherto obscure,
introspective, Iberian nation, Spain, most of whose blood
and money were at the same time being expended in profit-
less, non-Spanish entanglements in Europe, a handful of
men sailed westward over the Atlantic, and with amazing
rapidity conquered the world's most extensive empire.
Over more than half the western hemisphere these men
spread the religion, language, laws and culture of Spain.
Today millions of people in South, Central, and North
America, tinged with the blood of the Conquistadores, still
speak the Castilian tongue, have the same religion, govern
themselves by laws essentially Spanish, and are in posses-
sion of a culture, to a great extent, inherited from Spain.
These results certainly speak for the energy and virility
of Spanish frontier institutions, and should give pause to
the many who smugly pronounce Spain's colonial policy a
failure.
Each of the colonizing powers in America adopted its
own peculiar classes of society and institutions to extend
and hold the limits of its dominions. The French gnawed
away at the frontier with the aid of the fur trader and the
missionary; the backwoodsman extended the English fron-
tier, leveling the forest and driving back the Indian, with
whom he did not peaceably mingle. Spain gave this
gigantic task to the conquistador, the presidial soldier and
the missionary. All these three made important contribu-
tions, but we are chiefly concerned with the latter two in
their collaboration as a pioneering agency.
From the very outset of the conquest, the policy of the
Crown of Spain was characterized by deep, religious and
1. The material for the chapter ia borrowed to a great extent from H. E. Bolton,
"The Missions as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," Ameri-
can Historical Review, (October 1917), 42-61.
348 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
humanitarian motives. In 1493 the papal seal of approval
was placed on Spain's western claims with the understand-
ing that the peoples conquered were to be converted and
civilized. From that time on, all through the colonial
period, the high ideals of the Spanish kings found expression
in innumerable laws and decrees intended for the welfare
of the Indian. It is true that these ideals failed to a large
extent to materialize, but the guilt lies with the colonials,
who were eager and able to ignore and violate the royal
commands, doing so with impunity because of the great
distance that separated Spain from her colonies and the
slowness of communications.
It was the crown's consistent policy to convert, civilize
and exploit the Indians, who were considered as having
the potentialities of valuable subjects, and these potentiali-
ties had to be developed. The mission and the encomienda
began this task together, but the former soon drew away
from the latter. The encomienda could only exist where
the Indians were already reduced to a sedentary existence,
and it was therefore confined to the older more settled,
regions of the Indies. The encomendero quickly forgot his
duties, remembering only those of the Indians, and the
institution degenerated into a black spot in Spain's colonial
system, not erased until the encomienda's gradual extinction
was completed in the early part of the eighteenth century.
But the mission, on the contrary, lived up to its ideals,
and played a role of ever increasing importance. The mis-
sionaries "became a veritable corps of Indian agents,
serving both the church and state," the close union of the
two and the royal control of patronage making this double
capacity more natural and easy.2
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the mission
became a universal institution on the expanding frontiers
of Spanish America. On all fronts, the missions mushroom-
ed. In South America, the Jesuit "reductions" in Paraguay
are the most famous. In North America, missions sprang
2. Bolton, The Mission, 45.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 349
up all along the northern and eastern frontier of New Spain,
a result mainly of the efforts of the Jesuits, the Franciscans,
and the Dominicans. The northeastern portion was the
scene of the Franciscan activities. They worked in Coahuila,
Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, New Mexico, Texas, and
Florida. The Jesuits, after withdrawing from Florida,
concentrated in the Northwest ; in Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihua-
hua, Baja California and Arizona. In 1767 the Jesuits were
expelled from all Spanish America, and their places were
taken by the other orders, in Baja California by the
Dominicans and in Alta California by the Franciscans.
The mission as a frontier institution was intended
to be a temporary force. The missionary was the vanguard
of a civilization; he was to convert and domesticate the
savage ; to draw the fangs of the wilderness ; after this was
done, he was to give place to the ordinary settler, and move
on to new fields. In theory, after ten years of mission life
the Indians were considered to have progressed sufficiently
in the art of civilized living to permit division of the mission
lands into individual holdings, and the introduction of
secular parish priests, who would live among the Indians
as they would among regular Spanish subjects.3 This law
was based on experience of the progress made among the
more civilized tribes of Mexico, Central America and Peru.
Among the cruder tribes on the northern frontier of
New Spain, the padres insisted that a much longer period
of transition was needed to enable the Indians to lead a
life of equality with the Spanish settlers. As a result of
this conviction, there developed a long and bitter struggle
between the missionaries and the forces of secularization.
The aboriginal mission areas felt the encroachments of the
squatter and landgrabber, just as the lands "set aside in
perpetuity" for the Indian in the United States disappeared
under the wave of the Western Movement. The missionary,
whether he liked it or not, had to keep one jump ahead of
the line of advancing settlement.
3. Bolton, The Mission, 46.
350 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
The missionary came primarily as a religious agency.
He was a harvester of souls, but, incidently on his part and
designedly on the part of the government, he became a
school teacher, geographer, scientist and practical philan-
thropist. The missionary served both the church and the
state by not only Christianizing the frontier but in extend-
ing, holding and civilizing it. The Indian, to become a
worthy, practical Christian and a desirable subject, had
to be schooled in the rudiments of civilized conduct. The
missions thus served not only as seminaries, but as practical
training schools in the art of European living.
The missions, being a powerful political and social
agency of the state, were naturally supported by the state.
The Franciscan missions in New Spain in the eighteenth
century had four principal means of support.4
1. The annual stipend or salary paid by the govern-
ment was called a sinodo, varied in amount according to the
remoteness of the mission, reaching the high point of four
hundred pesos for each missionary on the northernmost
frontier. In 1758 the treasury of New Spain was support-
ing with sinodos, averaging three hundred fifty pesos, one
hundred and twenty-three friars on the northern frontier.
2. Besides the sinodos, the government regularly sup-
plied the missions with military protection, detaching from
two to six soldiers from the nearest presidio to serve in
each mission. In addition, the government usually made
an initial grant, a sort of birthday gift called the ayuda de
costa, of one thousand pesos to each new mission to pay for
bells, vestments, tools, construction and other costs of
founding.
3. In addition to financial aid from the real hacienda,
some missions were supported by private donations. Old
missions aided in the foundation of new ones. Padre Kino
aided the struggling missions of his partner, Father Salva-
tierra in Baja California, with supplies from his flourishing
4. Bolton, The Mission, 47-48.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 351
missions in Pimeria Alta, on one occasion sending across
seven hundred head of cattle to the peninsula.5 The famous
Jesuit Pious Fund, which supported the missions of Baja
California and later those of Alta California was formed
of the gifts of devout Catholics, mostly laymen.6
4. The missions were expected to become self-support-
ing, and in many cases the Indians did acquire considerable
wealth through stock raising and other agricultural pur-
suits. None of the wealth earned by the missions belonged
to the missionaries, who continued to receive their salaries
from the government or from private benefactors.
From what has been said it is evident that the govern-
ment to a large degree financed the missions, but the amount
of governmental aid, and the ease with which it was gained
depended very much on the extent to which political ends
and religious purposes could be combined. The royal purse
strings were not easily loosened to found new missions,
unless an important political advantage was to be gained
along with the religious, for the impoverished government
had to stretch every real. The missionaries were fully
aware of the factors motivating royal aid, and, in their
continual appeals, stressed the political advantages to be
gained.
The establishment of the missions in Texas and Alta
California came after years of agitation by the missionaries,
and even then the royal hand was forced more by external
political pressure — the desire to ensure the territorial
integrity of Spain's dominions from foreign encroachments,
the French in the first case, the Russians in the latter, —
than by a desire to satisfy the religious aspirations of the
padres.
As a significant commentary on the crown's association
of the mission with frontier defense, it is interesting to note
that the expenses of the missions and the presidios were
5. Herbert E. Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands, A Chronicle of Old Florida
and the Southwest (New Haven 1921), 199.
6. Bolton, Spanish Borderlands, 202.
352 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
entered under the account of the War Fund (Ramo de
Guerra) in the records of the real hacienda.7
The political importance of the missionaries manifested
itself in several ways. The friars counteracted foreign
influence among their neophytes, deterred them from mo-
lesting the interior settlements, and secured their aid in
restraining the hostile tribes farther on. Father Kino
trained his Pima wards to be effective fighters against the
terrible Apache. His influence over the natives was con-
sidered more valuable as a protective force than a whole
company of soldiers.8
The mission plants were built designedly as fortresses
for the protection of the padres, the neophytes, and the
nearby Spanish settlers. Some even boasted of a formid-
able array of artillery pieces, which the predatory nomads
held in great dread.
The missionaries were utilized not only as political
agents to hold a frontier district, but, on their own initiative
and in cooperation with the secular authority, they were
factors in promoting the settlement of the region. They
stimulated the interest of the prospective settler by their
reports, which described the natural wealth and potentialties
of the region and the nature of its inhabitants. When
official colonizing expeditions were projected, the mission-
aries were often called to Mexico to give their expert advice.
The greatest contribution of the missionaries lay not
in the extending, holding and promoting of the frontier
but in its civilization. Spain entertained high ideals, and
found herself faced with serious practical difficulties. She laid
claim to a lion's share of the western hemisphere, yet the
mother country had no restless, excess population to pour
into the American wilderness. Her colonial policy, perhaps
equalled in humanitarian idealism by no other country,
looked to the preservation of the Indians and their eventual
elevation to the status of full fledged subjects. The fact
7. Bolton, The Mission. 51.
8. Bolton. The Mission, 51.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 353
that this idealism may have been partially motivated by the
necessity of supplying a substitute for the lack of Spanish
colonists should not detract from its reality.
This role of civilizer of the Indians fell also on the
shoulders of the friars. The degree to which the frontier
would be peopled with civilized natives, making up for the
lack of Spanish colonists, depended upon the success in
reducing and disciplining the aboriginals. The royal desire
harmonized with the religious aims of the friars, who
recognized that temporal discipline and a changed way of
living were indispensable in the formation of thorough
converts.
The essence of the mission was discipline ; discipline in
all the experiences of life, religious, moral, social and
industrial. The very physical arrangement of the mission,
built according to a carefully preconceived plan, was
designed to further discipline. Wherever nomadic tribes
were encountered it was necessary to "reduce" them to a
sedentary existence in the mission pueblos. The task of the
missionary was already partially accomplished when he
encountered settled tribes like the Pimas of Arizona and
the Pueblos of New Mexico, for he merely moved into the
village, making it into a mission. Although there were
many exceptions to the rule the missionaries lived in pairs,
which made the enforcement of mission discipline easier.
The presidios served as a symbol of force, and to pro-
vide protection for the missionaries and the mission Indians
from the enemy, whether aboriginal or European. Across
the continent from Atlantic to Pacific stretched a long
irregular line of presidios from San Agustin to San Fran-
cisco, "a line more than twice as long as the Danube frontier
held by the Romans,"9 from whom Spain borrowed this
idea in border defense.
Each mission was usually provided with two or more
soldiers, detached from the nearest presidio whose duty
it was to help the missionaries in disciplining and instruct-
9. Bolton, The Mission, 53.
354 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ing the Indians. In the event that a neophyte found the
regimented life distasteful, and struck out for the wilder-
ness, it was the soldier's job to return the runaway. There
is a widespread impression that the missionaries objected
to the presence of the soldiers, whom they found demoraliz-
ing to the Indians. This is certainly true in the case of the
Jesuits in Paraguay. They established their missions in
complete isolation from the virus of the Spanish and Portu-
guese settlers, whether civilian or military, for these crude
colonists emphasized many of the vices and few of the vir-
tues of the higher civilization that the fathers were trying
to bestow upon the Guarani.10 However, with this and other
exceptions, it is nearer the truth to say that the missionaries
objected only to unsuitable, immoral soldiers, for the presid-
ials were often drafted from among the mestizo-mulatto-
jailbird class. In general, and this is specifically true of the
Franciscans in New Mexico, the padres wanted military aid,
and the complaint of its inadequacy was constantly heard
from them.
That protection was needed for the missions was an
indisputable fact. The list of martyred missionaries is
eloquent testimony of that need. In the Pueblo revolt of
New Mexico in 1680, twenty-one padres lost their lives.11
But martyrdom was the exception, and the main concern
of the soldier was to aid the missionaries in disciplining
and civilizing the Indians.
Discipline and elements of European civilization were
imparted at the missions through religious instruction,
industrial training, and, among the more advanced natives,
by means of elementary teaching in arts and letters. Relig-
ious instruction came first. Aside from the fundamental
cultural concepts implied in Christianity, this religious
training in itself contained a most important means of as-
similation. In accordance with "La Nueva Recopilacion" ,
the missionaries were ordered to instruct the neophytes in
10. Robert Southey, History of Brazil (London 1817), II, 240.
11. Bolton, The Mission, 63.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 355
the native dialects. However, they often were characterized
by an inadequate vocabulary, making them inserviceable for
the needs of the missionaries. In addition to this, there was
frequently a bewildering number of dialects prevalent in a
comparatively small geographical area, which made it im-
possible for the padres to learn them all. For these reasons,
on the northern frontier the padres to a large extent ignored
the royal law and instruction was usually given in Spanish,
at first by means of interpreters and later directly, when
the Indians had mastered Spanish, the children being espe-
cially quick to learn it. Thus, religious training was an
important step in cultural assimilation, for it brought about
linguistic affinity between the teacher and the pupil.
The Jesuits of Paraguay could boast of the closest
approach to their Indian wards. They mastered the Guarani
tongue making it the official language of that whole mission
area, Spanish being of minor importance. While giving the
Jesuits all the credit due them, it must be remembered that
they were not confronted with a tangle of native dialects,
for the Guarani language was universal over a wide area,
even among non-Guarani Indians, which simplified their
task considerably.12
In the daily routine of religious instruction the padre
was aided by two Indians called fiscales, usually old men,
who had the trying job of rounding up the children and
unmarried Indians for the daily Mass and instruction. On
Sundays the whole mission population attended services,
combed, washed and neatly dressed. The fiestas, celebrat-
ing the days of importance in the ecclesiastical calendar,
were marked with elaborate religious ceremonies indicating
the Church's recognition of the value of sensuous appeal as
an aid to religion. In addition, the day was filled with inno-
cent entertainments, games and other forms of recreation.
The mission, besides being a Christian seminary, was
also an industrial training school. The missionaries were
not farmers, mechanics, or stock raisers, all of which was
12. Southey, Brazil, II, 249.
356 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
foreign to their education, but they undertook these often
disagreeable extra curricular activities because they realized
the importance of altering the physical environment of the
Indians to enable them to lead civilized, Christian lives.
In spite of the fact that the missionaries came primarily as
religious ministers they were often well fitted to instruct the
Indians in the industrial arts, for, many of the lay brothers
and fathers before joining such cosmopolitan orders as the
Franciscans and Jesuits, had been experienced craftsmen,
mechanics, musicians, and farmers.
The Californian and Paraguayan missions were large
industrial communities. The size of the Paraguayan re-
ductions averaged three thousand Indians, reaching in some
cases to eight thousand inhabitants,13 those of Alta Califor-
nia averaging about two thousand Indians. The Indians
worked in the weaving rooms, blacksmith shop, tannery,
wine press and warehouses, employing an intricate network
of irrigation ditches for their vegetable gardens and grain
fields, and herding thousands of horses, cattle, sheep, goats,
and pigs on the mission pastures. Training of this nature
developed responsibility in the Indians, made them self
supporting in a more advanced economy, and afforded the
discipline required for the attainment of the rudiments of
civilization.
In Baja and Alta California, Primeria Alta and Para-
guay the missionaries were in charge of both the temporal
and spiritual welfare of the missions. In New Mexico the
missionaries had no charge over temporalities, for the first
padres found the natives already leading settled, agricul-
tural lives, yet they offered instruction in arts and crafts,
and introduced a great variety of European plants and
animals.
Some statistics as to the temporal possessions of these
missions should prove enlightening. The four Quereteran
missions of Texas in 1745 were grazing 4,897 head of cattle,
12,000 sheep and goats and 1,600 horses. Even more stu-
13. Southey, Brazil, II, 255.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 357
pendous figures are given for the Franciscan missions of
Alta California in 1834 where "on the eve of the destruction
of the missions, 31,000 mission Indians herded 396,000
cattle, 62,000 horses, 321,000 hogs, sheep and goats, and
harvested 123,000 bushels of grain . . . "14
The missions were provided by law with elementary and
limited self government. Each pueblo had a body of civil
and military officers modelled on Spanish municipal admin-
istration. The democratic reality and power of this govern-
ment was more apparent than real, for the officers were
merely figure heads. The missionary, with the nearby
presidio, was the directing and restraining force behind the
pueblo governments.
Thus, in many ways did the missions serve as Spain's
frontier agency. The first concern of the missionaries was
to spread the gospel, but, incidentally or designedly, they
served in other capacities, holding, extending and promoting
the frontiers, instructing the natives, giving them the veneer
at least of European Civilization. While the English colonial
policy permitted and fostered the extermination of the red
man, the missions worked for his preservation, for his tem-
poral and spiritual welfare. All this we must recognize
whether or not we agree that the ideal of the missions meets
present day standards, and in spite of their obvious failures
and blemishes, something accompanying every human en-
deavor.
CHAPTER II
THE CUSTODIA OF SAINT PAUL
Turning from a generalized appreciation of the role
and significance of the mission throughout Spain's far flung
frontiers, we will now focus out attention on a relatively
small, insignificant and neglected corner of that huge em-
pire. The Spanish intrusion into New Mexico, if one will
glance at an historical atlas for the middle eighteenth
14. Bolton, The Mission, 59-60.
358 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
century, appears like a cautious, tentative, finger-push into
the unknown; a solitary, narrow, colored band projecting
naked and self-conscious into the wilderness. On the north,
east and west there is nothing Spanish to keep it company ;
to the south its connection with Mexico is slender and fitful.
In 1540 the Spanish Crown sent an expedition into the
vague North chasing illusive baubles — the "Seven Cities of
Cibola," the Gran Quivira and other variations upon the
El Dorado theme. There was also hope of finding the Straits
of Anian, the long sought Northwest Passage to the Orient.
But the elaborately equipped expedition of Coronado re-
turned, having drunk to the dregs from the cup of disillu-
sionment. Instead of rich cities, gold and silver bearing
ores, a land flowing in milk and honey, the Spaniards found
nothing but Indians living in small, prosaic, mud-stone
villages and a rude, rocky, unproductive land where life
was supported only in the narrow creek bottoms.
The crown, in spite of its disappointment, retained
hold of this "lemon" chiefly for one reason — the missions.
The Franciscans, who accompanied this and later expedi-
tions— those of Rodriguez-Chamuscado and Onate — found
a fairly dense population of mild, sedentary, agricultural
aborigines, living in villages, along the banks of the Rio del
Norte and its tributaries. The missions thrived, and the
small Spanish population was really only incidental.1
The work of eighty years seemed destroyed when the
missionaries and Spanish colonists were driven south to
El Paso del Norte in 1680 by the united efforts of the re-
volted Pueblos. After an interregnum of a dozen years,
the Spaniards and missionaries returned in the baggage
train of the reconquistador, Don Diego de Vargas. After a
few years most of the lost ground was regained, and by
1750 the missions with some exceptions were reestablished
on their former basis.
1. The Spaniards consistently referred to what is now called the Rio Grande
as the Rio del Norte ; effective and permanent occupation and evangelization of New
Mexico did not begin until 1598 with the expedition of Juan de Onate.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 359
The missions of middle eighteenth century New Mexico
were, speaking in terms of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, part
of the Custodia de San Pablo, which in turn was a sub-
division of the very much larger ecclesiastical province of
El Santo Evangelio (The Holy Gospel).2 This Custodia of
San Pablo was itself divided into three parts.3 The first
was the interior region, which included the missions in the
northernmost part of the Rio del Norte valley, which may
be called for convenience, the Santa Fe region. The second
part was the El Paso region, almost four hundred miles
directly south of Santa Fe. The last part of the Custodia
consisted of those missions grouped about the lower reaches
and the mouth of the Conchos river, which empties into the
Rio del Norte about two hundred and fifty miles south and
east of El Paso. This third region was very appropriately
known as La Junta de los Rios.4 Thus, we may think of this
mission area as a tapeline Custodia, the majority of whose
missions were arranged in three widely separated groups
along the banks of a serpentine stream, there being a dis-
tance of about seven hundred miles between the northern
and southern limits.
Before I enter into a further description of the Custodia
in the middle eighteenth century, I want to make it clear
that most of the attention will be given to the Santa Fe
division. I have reasons for confining myself to this area
to the relative exclusion of the other two. In the first place,
my personal associations are all in the north; secondly, it
would be impossible to give a full treatment to all three
regions in a report of this nature; thirdly, it will be clear
2. Charles W. Hackett, Historical Documents relating to New Mexico, Nueva
Viscaya and approaches thereto, to 1778 (Washington, 1937), III, 398.
3. Consult map next page.
4. My authorities for this and many future statements are photostatic copies of
unpublished manuscripts, which are in the Archives of the Biblioteca Nacional of
Mexico City. The copies were made by Mr. France V. Scholes of the Carnegie
Institute of Washington and deposited by him in the Library of Congress. Through
his kindness and that of Prof. C. H. Haring, my tutor, these documents were made
available to me. In the future I shall refer to them as? B.N., Leg. — , Doc — . Folio
— ; this particular footnote is B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 3.
360 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
upon further analysis that the missions of the Santa Fe
region were more important, populous and numerous than
those of the other two combined, which further justifies
my emphasis on the northern part of the Custodia.
The padres of the Custodia every few years sent com-
plete reports of mission conditions to their superiors in
Mexico. These surveys included a great many items ; census
lists ; the geographical distribution of the missions with the
respective distances ; descriptions of the mission life ; of the
relations with the secular authorities; with the raiding
nomads; accounts of the successes and disappointments in
missionary work, in fact every phase of the life in that
narrow, 'fluvial kingdom, secular or religious, is vividly
brought to light in these reports. Our information about the
Custodia around the middle of the century is derived
principally from three reports written within a decade.
The first, chronologically speaking, was written by Padre
Miguel de Menchero, at the time procurador general of the
province of El Santo Evangelic, in 1744 ;5 the second by
Padre Andres Varo written in 1749 ;6 and the third by Padre
Manuel de San Juan Nepomuceno y Trigo in 1754.7 I rely
mainly on that of Father Varo, recurring to the other two
only when necessary.
The missions around Santa Fe were concentrated
in an area extending in a north-south direction, correspond-
ing to the immediate drainage of the Rio del Norte, from
Taos to Isleta. In an east-west direction the missions
branched out at right angles from the river, Zuni being the
westernmost outpost and Pecos the easternmost.8
At Santa Fe resided the governor, the presidial garrison
of eighty soldiers and about 900 Spanish settlers. The other
concentrations of Spaniards were at Alburquerque9 to the
south and Santa Cruz de la Canada to the north. These
Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 395-412.
B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 2-20.
Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 459-468.
Consult Map.
The modern spelling of this city has dropped the first "r"— Albuquerque.
THREE PRINCIPAL GROUPS OF MISSIONS (c. 1750) CONSTITUTING THE
CUSTODIA OF SAN PABLO — H. W. K.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 361
settlements were not considered as missions, for the Indians
living there were, for the most part Indios sirvientes, slaves
belonging to the Spaniards. A slight sprinkling of Spanish
vednos was scattered up and down the valley on isolated
ranchos, which were under the religious jurisdiction of the
nearest mission. At Santa Fe there were two padres
assisted by a lay brother; one padre at Canada and two at
Alburquerque.
Exclusive of these three Spanish villas the missions
proper numbered twenty, there being one resident minister
in each mission, with the exception of Galisteo, that was
visited periodically by the minister of Pecos. The average
number of Indians inhabiting each mission was about five
hundred; Zuni topped the list with two thousand, followed
by Pecos with one thousand; the little mission Tesuque just
north of Santa Fe was at the bottom with only one hundred
and seventy-one Indians. Thus, twenty-five religious had
in their hands the spiritual welfare of some twelve thousand
mission Indians and four thousand Spanish distributed over
a large area.10
The second group of missions in the Custodia, those of
the El Paso region, lay about one hundred and forty leagues11
south of Santa Fe on the Rio del Norte. The journey
between Santa Fe and El Paso was very perilous, for after
leaving Isleta, the southernmost mission in the Santa Fe
district, there intervened about one hundred leagues of
uninhabited country, safely passable only with an escort of
soldiers to ward oif the marauding nomads. There were
five missions, including Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe del
Paso, which was really a Spanish villa, having a population
of over one thousand whites, and a presidio of fifty soldiers,
under the command of a captain. The other four missions
were located below El Paso on the river, the most distant
being Socorro, five leagues away. Five padres and a lay
brother served this area. At the time Fray Andres Varo
10. Consult census table below.
11. About three miles to a league.
362 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
was minister at the mission of Senecu.12 The Spaniards
in this area, those living at El Paso and on ranches within
the jurisdictions of the missions, slightly outnumbered
the reduced Indians of whom there were only about fifteen
hundred.
The waters of the Conchos River joined with those of
the Rio del Norte about eighty leagues southeast of El Paso,
where the mission San Francisco de la Junta was located.
Of the five remaining missions three were located within
four leagues of San Francisco, and the fourth and fifth were
twenty-five leagues up the Conchos from the junction. Four
padres administered these six missions having a total popu-
lation of about twenty-three hundred Indians. There were
no Spaniards in the vicinity, and Padre Varo stressed the
crying need for a presidio to protect these weak missions
from the incessant raids of the heathen Indians.13
CENSUS OF SPANISH VILLAS AND INDIAN MISSIONS OF THE
CUSTODIA OF SAN PABLO IN 1749
According to Custodian Andres Varo, based chiefly on a consolidation made
in 1750 by Padre Rosas y Figueroa, Secretary of O.F.M. in Mexico.14
Whites
Indians Language Group
Resident Padres
1. Santa Fe
965
570 (slaves)
Manuel Zambrano, Juan
Lezaun, Martinez (lay
brother)
3
2. Pecos
3. Galisteo
1,000 Pecos
350 Tanos
Joseph Urquijo
1
4. Tesuque
171 Tewa
Juan de Lavora
1
5. Nambe
100
350 Tewa
Antonio Zamora
1
6. Sanlldefonso
68
354 Tewa
Juan de Ercisa
1
7. Santa Cruz
1,205
580 (slaves)
Antonio Gabaldon
1
8. Santa Clara
21
272 Tewa
Manuel Zopena
1
9. San Juan
300
500 Tewa
Juan Mirabel (cus-
todian)
1
12. Varo Report 1749, Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio IIV— 12v ; Padre Varo said that
the mission of El Paso was founded in 1680 after the Spaniards had been driven out
of the north by the revolted pueblos. Shortly after this date the other missions in
the vicinity were founded. (Actually, however, their founding began in 1659. — Ed.)
13. Varo Report, 1749, Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 13-14 ; see accompanying table.
14. B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 81, Folio 1 ; with the exception of Pecos and Galisteo,
which are completely deserted, these pueblo-missions survive today very little changed
by the passage of two centuries. Only a handful of the once numerous inhabitants
of Pecos survive, living at Jemez.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 363
10.
Pecuries
90
400
Pecuries
Fernando de Estrada
1
11.
Taos
125
540
Tewa*
Juan Oronzoro
1
12.
Cochiti
35
521
Queres
Agustin de Yniesta
1
13.
Santo Domingo
300
Queres
Juan del Pino
1
14.
San Felipe
70
400
Queres
Angel Garcia
1
15.
Santa Ana
100
600
Queres
Miguel Calluela
1
16.
Zfa
100
600
Queres
Pedro Montano
1
17.
Jemez
574
Jemez
Juan Toledo
1
18.
Laguna
528
Queres
Juan Padilla
1
19.
Acoma
960
Queres
Ignacio Pino
1
20.
Zufii
2,000
Juan Hernandez
1
21.
Sandia
400
Moqui-Tewa*
Juan Fernandez
1
22.
Alburquerque
900
200
(slaves)
Joseph Irigoyen,
Andres Zeballos
2
23.
Isleta
100
500
Tewa*
Carlos Delgado
1
4,170
12,670
25
EL PASO REGION
Missions
Whites Indians
Language Group
Resident Padres
1.
El Paso
1,090
200
Tewa-Piro*
Joseph Blanco
Francisco Guzman
2.
San Lorenzo
150
150
Zuma
Gregorio Escureta
3
3.
Senecii
102
384
Piro
(lay brother)
Andres Varo
1
4.
Isleta
54
500
Tewa*
Mariano Lopez
1
5.
Socorro
250
250
Joseph Tello
1
1,646
1,484
6
JUNTA
DE LOS RIOS
1.
2.
San Francisco
Guadalupe
182
221
Lorenzo de Saavedra
1
3.
4.
San Juan
San Cristobal
433
500
Francisco Gonzales
1
5.
San Pedro
810
Cholomes
Pedro Esquier
1
6.
Santiago
200
Zuma-
Cholomes
Joseph Paez
1
2,346
4
GRAND TOTAL FOR CUSTODIA
Indians
17,176
Spaniards
and Mestizos
5,825
23,001
*Some inaccuracy appears in the "Language Group" column for Padre Varo made the
common error of using interchangeably — as one and the same thing — the designations "tewa"
and "tigua." For instance Sandia was settled by Moqui-Tiguas and not by Moqui-tewas.
364 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
In the previous chapter I attempted to portray the
workings of the missions in general outline, everywhere
on Spain's colonial frontiers. However true that portrayal
may be, the general rules were naturally modified in special
locations. It is important to remember that the New Mexico
missions were, in one respect, radically different from those
of California or of Paraguay. The padres of New Mexico
managed no mission estates. They were almost parish
priests with the exception that they were paid by the crown
and directed by their provincial, instead of being under
episcopal control and supported by parish fees.15 At each
pueblo the padre had a church where he preached, taught,
said Mass and administered the sacraments. The padre's
influence and power were confined to religious matters, the
temporal supervision of the pueblos being in the hands of
subordinates appointed by the governor called alcaldes
mayores. Each of these secular officials had political super-
vision over an alcaldia, which contained one or several
pueblos. These alcaldes mayores were expected to inspect
the missions, administer local justice, and cooperate with
the padres in the mission work.
The missionaries had several sources of support. In the
first place, those Spaniards (Gente de Razon) in the villas
and on ranches within the jurisdiction of a mission paid
regular obventions or fees for marriages, baptisms, burials,
and masses. These fees were paid in kind, for money was
very scarce in the kingdom.16 The relation therefore of the
Spaniards in New Mexico to the padres was that of parish-
ioners to parish priests of the secular type prevalent in the
more urban regions of New Spain.
In the second place, the missionaries received support
in the way of food and service from the mission Indians.
It was the custom for the Indians to set aside a field for the
support of the minister, where they planted enough wheat,
15. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888
(San Francisco, 1889), 270; Bolton, The Mission, 58.
16. Varo Report, 1749, B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 4v.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 365
corn and beans to supply his needs. The padre often used
the yield from this planting to support destitute Indians
in his mission, or, in special cases, to aid a neighboring
missionary. The Indians did not pay obventions, and were
glad to sow this plot for their minister.17 From all reports
it seems that the missionaries were well supplied with
household servants. In weekly shifts these semaneros worked
about the church and cloister, assisting in the religious
services, preparing food and keeping house for the minister.
In Father Trigo's report of 1754 he devoted most of his time
to a description of how well or badly the missionary in each
pueblo was faring in a worldly way, and said little about,
what should have been of prime concern, the spiritual and
temporal welfare of the Indians. His description of Nambe
mission, six leagues north of Santa Fe, is a typical illustra-
tion of the temporal support gained by the padre from his
charges.
... On its spacious fields the Indians sow for the
father, their poor minister, since they pay no
obventions at all, three f anegas of wheat and one
almud of corn. By means of these crops the father
passes his year in reasonable comfort. They give
the minister one boy for the cell, a porter, a bell
ringer, two sacristans, three women servants and
three men servants each week with wood enough
for the ovens.18
The women servants were mainly employed in grinding
the hard corn kernels and the wheat into flour, for the
tortillas and bread, bending over their stone metates as their
great-great-granddaughters do today. It is interesting to
note that, in order to conform strictly with social conven-
tions, and prevent any scandal, the women servants were
accompanied by their husbands.
Not in all the missions did the padres enjoy such
docility and willing service from their charges. The mission
17. Varo Report, 1749, B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 4v.
18. Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 466.
1.58 bushels=l fanega ; an almud is a unit of dry measure varying from 1/12
to % a fanega.
366 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
of Zuni was the most remote and troublesome. Separated
from Santa Fe by seventy leagues of desert and sandstone,
forty leagues from Acoma, its nearest neighbor, the Zuni
Indians, influenced by the apostate Moqui (Hopi) tribes
to the west were "certainly very independent." They ex-
hibited their independence by refusing to sow the padre's
milpa. Their only crop being maize, they, from time to
time, from their own stocks, gave the padre a sack filled
with ears of corn with which the women made tortillas.
However, the minister at Zuni enjoyed the luxury, not
within reach of all the missionaries, of having fresh meat,
for the Zunis raised many sheep and goats.19
The third means of support of the missionaries and the
principal one was the annual, royal sinodos without which
the missionaries could not have survived on account of "the
extreme poverty and misery of the land."20 The annual
salary of each minister of the Custodia amounted to three
hundred and thirty pesos. The lay brother (lego escolero)
who served as an infirmarian at Santa Fe, received one
hundred pesos less. These sinodos were paid in supplies of
all kinds that were sent from Mexico including chocolate,
sugar, spices, vestments, tools, wax, wine, oil, ornaments,
and notions such as rosaries and medals.21 Although I have
been unable to find any positive statements concerning a
mission supply train in this period, such as the one that
came triennially during most of the seventeenth century, it
must have been in operation, for these shipments of goods
arrived with regularity.22
The Crown in 1749 therefore was supporting thirty-
seven ministers in the Custodia of San Pablo including the
procurador, the lay brother and four missionaries who were
19. Hackett, Historical Documents, III, 462-463, Trigo Report, 1754.
20. Varo Report, 1749, Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 4v.
21. Varo Report, 1749, B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 6.
22. Mr. France V. Scholes has made a careful study of the Mission supply train
in seventeenth century New Mexico. His "The Supply Service of New Mexico Mis-
sions in the Seventeenth Century," appearing in three parts, in the January, April,
and October, 1930, issues of the New Mexico Historical Review, covers the subject
very fully.
FRANCISCAN MISSIONS OF NEW MEXICO 367
destined for the projected missions in the province of Nav-
ajo. This number was always constant except when de-
creased temporarily by deaths, by leaves of absence to go
to the provincial headquarters of Santa Barbara in Mexico
for medical care or for absence on official business of the
Custodia.23 These hard-working men (in addition to three
more lay brothers, unpaid by the crown, bringing the total
to forty) had the difficult task of satisfying the spiritual
needs of seventeen thousand Indians and five thousand
Spaniards who were scattered in uneven groups along seven
hundred miles of river.
Unlike the missions of Baja and Alta California the
missions of the Custodia of San Pablo received no support
from private alms like the famous Pious Fund.
The hardships endured by the padres in the New Mexico
missions were certainly more severe than in many other
mission areas. It was the usual policy elsewhere, to station
the padres in pairs, aided by several soldiers detached from
the nearest presidio. The scarcity of both missionaries and
soldiers in New Mexico made this impossible. According to
Varo's census in 1749 only at Santa Fe, Alburquerque and
El Paso did the missionaries enjoy the association of
another missionary.24 That these men were fitted by calling,
training, and temperament for work of this kind is true, but,
in isolated missions like those of Taos, Pecos, Acoma and
Zuni, the unutterable solitude must have been trying even
to the most zealous. The lone padre had no companion of
kindred outlook and intellectual status; no one to comfort
him in his discouragements and encourage him in his work.
Padre Varo was convinced of the need of more missionaries
in the Custodia, especially in the missions that lay far
removed from others. In the northern part of the Custodia
especially in such mountain-valley missions as Pecuries and
Nambe, the heavy snows isolated the missions for months,
the padre being unable to get out until spring. In case
23. Varo Report, Jan., 1749, B.N., Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 6.
24. See the census table above.
368 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
of sickness or death the minister of such a mission had no
one to administer him the sacraments. A more important
reason for the increase of missionaries was the work of
conversion to be done among the heathen Indians bordering
the Custodia — the work of extending and civilizing the
frontier, a never ending push mas olid.25
The presidio at Santa Fe mustered only eighty men.
This handful had to protect the entire northern part of the
kingdom, for the presidio at El Paso had its hands full in
its own locality. The whole of New Mexico at this time was
suffering from the continual and terrible raids of the
Comanches, Apaches, Utes (Yutas) and other predatory
nomads. The little garrison had to be kept together in
order to be ready for immediate action, making Santa Fe
the base for lightning thrusts against the enemy. For this
reason the presidials were not distributed among the widely
scattered missions.
The unique thing to remember about the Spanish
occupation of New Mexico is that the missions were the
principal factors that prompted the Crown to retain hold
of this region. Economically, the province was a white
elephant, and there was no encroaching foreigner, as in
Texas and California, to make its retention a political
necessity. The importance of New Mexico lay in its mis-
sions; in the royal and ecclesiastical aspirations for the
conversion of the Indian. It is for this reason that the
brown-robed Franciscan exercised a great deal of influence
in this remote, river province. He shared his monopoly
with no rival religious order; he resented and combated
every violation of his jurisdiction by secular authorities.
25. Varo Report, Jan. 1749, B.N.. Leg. 8, Doc. 57, Folio 15v.
(To be continued)
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO
1659-1670
By FRANCE V. SCHOLES
(Continued)
CHAPTER VII
THE HOLY OFFICE TRIES DON BERNARDO L6PEZ DE
MENDIZABAL AND DONA TERESA DE AGUILERA
Y ROCHE
ON APRIL 10, 1663, the doors of the jail of the Holy Office
in Mexico City opened to receive Don Bernardo Lopez
de Mendizabal and his wife, Dona Teresa de Aguilera y
Roche. They were assigned to separate cells, their personal
effects were inventoried, and the usual provision was made
for their food and laundry.
The first formal audience of Lopez before the tribunal
was held on April 28. He answered the usual questions con-
cerning his ancestry and his religious training. The hearing
was continued on April 30, when he briefly outlined his life
history.1
Customary procedure in Inquisition cases required the
tribunal to make three formal admonitions to the person
being tried, telling him that he had not been arrested with-
out cause and urging him to search his memory and to speak
the truth, because in so doing he would not only discharge
his conscience and save his soul, but also secure a more rapid
trial and the mercy of the court. The first admonition in
Lopez* case was made on April 30, and Lopez stated that he
believed that the Holy Office took action only for just cause,
in accordance with formal testimony, but this did not remove
1. The record of the trial of Lopez before the Holy Office is found in Proceso
contra Lopez, III.
369
370 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the possibility of false witness, which, in his own case, must
have been the cause of his arrest, for he was not guilty of
any crime. When the second admonition was given on May
9, he replied that "in his conscience, by the mercy of God, he
did not find or feel that he had committed any act against
His Divine Majesty, His Holy Catholic Faith, the Evangeli-
cal Law, the dispositions of Our Mother Catholic Church, or
against the just and free exercise of [the authority of] the
Holy Office ; because if he had done so he would have come on
his knees to accuse himself to the Holy Office and seek
mercy." Although the Inquisitors were accustomed to hear
protestations of innocence, such a sweeping declaration of
self -righteousness must have been rather shocking, but they
proceeded with their customary patience and calm, and on
June 7 they pronounced the third admonition. L6pez again
asserted his innocence and stated that he had nothing to
declare.
Lopez did not fail, however, to make use of these hear-
ings, as well as others held on May 10, June 17, and August
29, to anticipate some of the formal charges that were
later presented by the prosecuting attorney and to lay the
foundations of his defense. He denounced the hostile atti-
tude of the friars in New Mexico, the arbitrary manner in
which they were said to have withheld the sacraments in
order to impose their will on the governors and citizens of
the province, and alleged cases of misconduct by mission
clergy. He named Father Posada as his capital enemy, and
called attention to the selfish motives that had inspired the
conduct of Penalosa.
On November 28, 1663, the fiscal, or prosecuting attor-
ney, of the Holy Office presented the formal accusation. It
was a long document, containing no less than 257 articles
which summed up every shred of testimony that had been
accumulated over a period of four years. Due to the length
of the accusation and to the fact that Lopez was ailing, the
hearings in which Lopez answered the charges article by
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 371
article were spread over several weeks from December 1,
1663, to March 10, 1664.
Space does not permit a detailed analysis of all the
charges and Lopez' answers. The most important issues on
which the indictment was based have already been discussed
in Chapter III. Only a brief resume, grouping together im-
portant articles on various topics, will be presented here,
with a summary of Lopez' counter arguments.
(1) Articles 1-12 were based on the testimony that
Lopez had expressed doubt concerning the necessity of rich
church furnishings and ornaments in the New Mexico mis-
sion churches, especially the alleged statement that a hut
and a few simple altar furnishings were sufficient for divine
worship. Lopez denied these charges and asserted that he
was fully aware of the need for elaborate ornaments to im-
press the newly converted Indians. He took occasion, how-
ever, to discuss his relations with the custodians, Fray Juan
Ramirez and Fray Alonso de Posada, whom he accused of
open and deliberate acts of enmity.
(2) Articles 13-29, as well as several others scattered
through the indictment, summed up the evidence that Lopez
had denied ecclesiastical authority and jurisdiction, and that
he had asserted power over both spiritual and temporal
affairs. He refused to admit that he had ever claimed author-
ity over spiritual affairs, and he denied the allegations that
he had opposed the just exercise of power by the custodians
in matters falling within their jurisdiction. During the
course of the hearings he had lengthy arguments with the
Inquisitors concerning the nature and extent of ecclesias-
tical authority, the powers of the custodians under the bull
of Adrian VI (the so-called Omnimoda) , and the respective
spheres of action of the civil and ecclesiastical officials.
Lopez came off second best in most of these discussions, but
he steadfastly denied that he had been guilty of conscious
and deliberate infringement of the just powers of the pre-
lates.
(3) Evidence concerning Lopez' hostility towards the
372 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
friars, his use of libellous and derogatory speech against
them, and alleged violations of ecclesiastical immunity was
summarized in numerous articles. The most important of
these dealt with the charges that during visitas of the prov-
ince he had inquired into the lives and personal conduct of
the missionaries, receiving complaints made by Indians and
making formal investigations of the conduct of certain indi-
viduals. The accused countered these charges by asserting
that when he had made a visita in an Indian village his
first act was to inquire whether the Indians attended divine
service and to admonish the Indians concerning their duties
in this respect. He did not deny that he had received com-
plaints by Indians against their priests, but insisted that he
had not been guilty of any deliberate effort to inspire such
complaints or to make formal inquiry into the conduct of the
friars. In his reply to these articles, as in those in answer to
others accusing him of denial of ecclesiastical authority, he
discussed the Tajique episode described in Chapter III and
his instructions to Aguilar at that time, and insisted that he
had merely taken such action as was necessary to bring the
facts to the attention of the prelate and to assist him in mak-
ing an investigation. He admitted that he had sent reports
concerning the conduct of the friars to the viceregal author-
ities and to the Franciscan officials in Mexico City, but de-
nied that such action constituted violation of ecclesiastical
immunity. On several of these points he had arguments with
the Inquisitors who questioned him concerning the nature of
his information. Had he based his reports on sworn testi-
mony? If so, the act of taking such testimony was a viola-
tion of ecclesiastical immunity. If the reports were not
founded on such formal evidence, then was he justified in
transmitting charges based only on rumor and hearsay?
Lopez stoutly maintained that the conditions he had re-
ported were public knowledge, and that transmission of such
information did not constitute violation of ecclesiastical
privilege.
(4) Another group of articles contained charges that
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 373
the ex-governor had failed to cooperate with the friars, that
he had opposed the building of churches at Taos and the
pueblo of the Jumanos, and that he had been responsible for
the disruption of discipline at the missions by the publica-
tion of orders that the Indians should not obey the friars
or attend divine offices, by his failure to punish flagrant
cases of immorality, and by the issuance of orders that no
Indian alguaciles or fiscales should execute punishment for
violations of mission discipline. Lopez energetically denied
that he had stated that the Indians should not attend divine
offices on the days of obligation or that the Indians should
live as they pleased. On the contrary, he had sought to im-
press upon the Indians their obligations to the Church,
and had instructed the alcaldes mayores to see that the
natives attended mass on Sundays and feast days. He as-
serted, however, that the punishments inflicted upon the
Indians for infractions of mission discipline had been unduly
severe, and he admitted that he had instructed the native
pueblo officials not to execute such punishments in future,
leaving such cases to other authorities.
(5) The controversy concerning the use of Indian labor
was summed up in articles 100-108. Lopez protested that the
friars had not lacked the services of Indians necessary for
the celebration of divine offices and other needs of the
churches and convents. It was true that there had been con-
troversy concerning the employment of Indians for other
purposes, and he stated that he had offered to permit the
friars to hire them at wages lower than the general scale he
had introduced. But the clergy had insisted that he should
permit them to employ Indian servants without pay. This
demand he had steadfastly opposed, because the mission-
aries had been accustomed to use large numbers of Indians
in workshops preparing goods for sale in Sonora and Par-
ral and in other occupations that were not strictly necessary
for the maintenance of the churches and convents, or for
the celebration of mass and other divine services.
(6) Articles 176-183 contained charges that he had per-
374 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
mitted the Indians to perform their heathen dances, despite
the opposition of the friars. Lopez admitted that he had
granted permission for the dances, provided they were held
in public and not in the kivas, and he insisted that he did
not regard them as evil or harmful. He also pointed out
that the Audiencia had absolved him of similar charges in
his residencia. The Inquisitors challenged this defense by
asking whether he believed that the Audiencia was qualified
to give an opinion concerning the character of the dances,
or to decide whether his action in permitting them consti-
tuted an act harmful to the faith. L6pez readily admitted
that the Audiencia had no authority to define such matters.
He remarked, however, that if this problem involved a ques-
tion of the faith, concerning which the Holy Office had juris-
diction, then it should not have been brought into the resi-
dencia proceedings, and he called attention to the fact that
the introduction of such charges in the residencia had been
done at the instance of the friars, especially Father Posada,
the local representative of the Inquisition. It was true that
there had been some discussion about the character of the
dances, and he had given permission in the first instance in
order to see for himself whether they were good or evil.
The Inquisitors pointed out (a) that if he had been in doubt
about the character of the dances he should not have per-
mitted them at all, and (b) that in any case he had no
authority to decide whether they contained elements of
heathenism and superstition contrary to the faith, for such
questions pertained only to ecclesiastical authority. But
Lopez stubbornly denied any intention of opposing the
faith or that he had meant to express any opinion in such
matters. Moreover, he had merely given a general permis-
sion for the Indians to dance, and what he had seen had not
appeared to be harmful. In this case, as in any other phase
of human conduct, evil elements could be introduced into
customs that were ordinarily decent and harmless. The In-
quisitors were not impressed by such arguments, and
pointed out that a general permission for celebration of
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 375
native dances made possible the performance of the heathen
catzinas.
(7) Thirty-eight articles were devoted to a full re-
statement of the blasphemous, heretical, and evil-sounding
remarks and propositions attributed to Lopez. Most of
these charges were denied as utterly false. They were in-
spired by pure malice and were libellous fabrications of
his enemies. It was impossible that a good Christian, such
as he claimed to be, could have uttered such things. In a few
cases, Lopez merely testified that he could not recall the case
or the circumstances involved, but would search his memory,
and if the charges were true he would retract.
(8) More than thirty articles contained charges that
Lopez and his wife had been lax in fulfillment of their duties
as Christians, that they had not kept Lent in a proper man-
ner, that Lopez had indicated a lack of respect for the cere-
monial of the Church, that he and his wife had failed to
attend mass on certain days of obligation, that they had tried
to prevent their servants from fulfilling their ecclesiastical
obligations, and that they abused and punished those who
did so. Many of these charges the ex-governor characterized
as utterly false, as calumnies to be ascribed to his enemies.
Others he admitted to be true, such as eating meat in Lent
on his way to New Mexico and his failure to attend mass on
certain occasions, but he gave excuses, such as illness, or
cited other extenuating circumstances. He denied that he
and his wife had punished servants who had attended mass,
or that they had tried to keep them from performing their
religious obligations. Other charges based on the conduct
of Lopez and Dona Teresa will be discussed in section II of
this chapter.
(9) Articles 196-200 described certain customs and prac-
tices of Lopez and his wife that were suspected of being
Jewish in character. These will be discussed in section II,
dealing with the trial of Dona Teresa.
(10) Articles 212-214 summarized the evidence con-
cerning the immoral conduct of Lopez in New Mexico. He
376 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
admitted several cases of carnal relationships with women
in Santa Fe, but denied the charge of incest that was also
included in these articles.
(11) Articles 217-220 summarized the testimony that
he had sent false reports concerning the conduct of the
friars to the authorities in Mexico City. He admitted that he
had made reports on conditions in New Mexico and the
status of the missions, but denied that such reports were
false or inspired by malice toward the clergy.
(12) Another large group of articles (222-225, 231-
252) summed up testimony concerning the attitude of Lopez
toward the Holy Office and its officials. Some cited deroga-
tory remarks concerning the Inquisitors, others charged him
with denial of authority of the Holy Office, and several were
based on his conduct after his arrest in Santa Fe in 1662.
The ex-governor denied that he had ever been guilty of lack
of respect for the Inquisition and its representatives, or that
he had denied its authority. His wide administrative expe-
rience in the New World had given him an extensive knowl-
edge of Inquisition affairs, and the obedience that every
loyal Christian owed to that tribunal. Many of the charges
based on reports concerning his words and actions subse-
quent to his arrest were denounced as entirely false. Others
were the result of malicious misrepresentation of his
conduct.
(13) Articles 253-257 were based on alleged false wit-
ness by Lopez during his hearings before the Holy Office in
Mexico City. The most important charge was based on the
fact that Lopez had testified in his first formal hearing that
none of his ancestors had been arrested or banished by the
Inquisition. To prove that this statement was false, the
tribunal cited the case of a certain Juan Nunez de Leon,
grandfather of Lopez* mother, who had been tried and found
guilty in 1603 on charges of the practice of Judaism. In
answer to this charge, Lopez denied knowledge of the facts
in the case cited. To his knowledge Ris ancestors had en-
joyed a good reputation. In any case, if he had forgotten to
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 377
testify about this case, as well as other things, too much
importance should not be attributed to such action, for "I
came here almost without judgment and sanity (casi sin
juicio) ."
(14) Twenty-one articles were based on evidence con-
cerning Lopez' hostility to the Church and the clergy during
his term of office as alcalde mayor in the Guaiacocotla area
in New Spain prior to his appointment as governor of New
Mexico.
Thirty-four hearings, spread over a period of three and
a half months, were necessary to record the testimony of
Lopez in reply to the articles of indictment. It must have
been a harrowing experience, in view of the fact that his
health was steadily declining. On two occasions the hearings
had to be postponed because he was unable to appear. On
March 11, 12, and 13 he had to listen to a complete reading of
his testimony. An attorney to assist in his defense was ap-
pointed on March 18, and four more hearings, held between
March 22 and 27, were required to read the complete pro-
ceedings to the attorney.
The next entry in the record is dated May 21. It con-
tains a petition by Lopez calling attention to his illness, and
asking the tribunal to put him in a cell with his wife and to
hasten the completion of his trial. On June 9 he made an-
other petition, citing his miserable condition and asking to
be moved to a larger cell where the ventilation would be
better. In response to this plea, the Inquisitors gave orders
to have the outer door of his cell left open during the day-
time. Early in July he took a turn for the worse and a physi-
cian was sent to attend him. He lingered for two more
months, but death finally released him on September 16,
1664. He was buried in unconsecrated ground in the corral
of the secret prison of the Holy Office.
The death of Lopez occurred before the Inquisitors
reached a decision concerning his guilt. The case was sus-
pended for several years, but in 1669 the tribunal apparently
sought the advice of the Council of the Inquisition concern-
378 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ing future procedure. On March 4, 1670, the Council auth-
orized a member of the Mexican tribunal, to take the mat-
ter under consideration and decide whether the Holy Office
should reopen the case and proceed against the memory of
the deceased.
During the autumn and winter of 1670-1671 the proceed-
ings were reviewed by the Inquisitor, Lie. D. Nicolas de las
Infantas y Venegas, who, in turn, requested opinions of
other officials of the tribunal on certain points. On March
17, 1671, the Inquisitor sent the findings of these officials to
the fiscal, and on April 14 the latter announced that he would
not press action against the fame and memory of the
deceased.
The case was then considered by the Inquisitor in ses-
sion with the consultores (advisors) of the tribunal, includ-
ing the alcalde de corte and the fiscal of the Audiencia. On
April 16 this board recommended that the case should be
dropped and the memory of Lopez absolved. The formal
sentence of the Holy Office was pronounced on April 30,
1671. It was declared that in view of the proceedings and
the failure of the fiscal of the Holy Office to prove his accu-
sation and complaint, the tribunal absolved the memory and
fame of Don Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal, raised the
embargo on his property, and ordered his bones to be ex-
humed and given ecclesiastical burial. On May 6 the bones
of the deceased were taken up, and on May 12 they were
deposited in a grave in a chapel of the church of Santo
Domingo in Mexico City.
II
The trial of Dona Teresa de Aguilera y Roche was car-
ried on concurrently with that of her husband.2 The first
formal hearing before the tribunal of the Holy Office was
held on May 2, 1663, and at this time she gave the usual state-
ment concerning her ancestry and immediate family rela-
tionships and a brief resume of her life history. At the end
2. The trial proceedings are recorded in Proceso contra Dona Teresa de Aguilera.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 379
of the hearing the court pronounced the first admonition.
The accused replied that she realized that the Holy Office
did not make arrests without cause; in her own case, how-
ever, arrest must have been caused by the false witness of
her enemies and those of her husband, for she had not been
guilty of any offense against the faith. The second and third
admonitions were given on May 9 and June 12 respectively.
Between June 15 and October 5 Dona Teresa had seven
more hearings before the tribunal, all at her own request.
She took advantage of these audiences to "discharge her
conscience" by relating various unedifying tales concerning
the misconduct of ex-governor Juan Manso and other per-
sons in New Mexico, including some of the friars. She also
told how Penalosa had offered to permit Lopez "to write his
own residencia" in return for a bribe of 10,000 pesos, and
described the meeting with Penalosa in the Santa Fe church
in August 1662 and subsequent events. During a hearing on
September 27 she asked for paper in order to prepare a writ-
ten statement, which she presented to the Inquisitors on
October 5.
This written declaration was the first of a series that
Dona Teresa presented during the course of her trial. It
contained a long diatribe against Penalosa, the friars, and
various persons in New Mexico whom she denounced as ene-
mies of her husband. The "conspiracy" of Penalosa and the
clergy against Lopez was set forth, and the conduct of Fray
Salvador de Guerra, Fray Nicolas de Freitas, and others
was described in scathing terms. A shorter statement in
similar vein was presented on October 26.
On the same day that this second written declaration
was filed, the fiscal of the Holy Office presented the formal
accusation which consisted of forty-one articles based on the
testimony of citizens and friars in New Mexico. Replies to
the first fourteen articles were received during this hearing,
and articles 15-41 were answered during two subsequent
audiences on October 27 and 29. On November 19 Dona
Teresa received a copy of the accusation, and a week later,
380 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
November 26, she filed a statement in writing to supplement
the replies that she had given orally.
Articles 35-40 of the indictment were based on the con-
duct of the accused subsequent to her arrest in Santa Fe
by Father Posada in August, 1662. Like her husband, she
had indulged in reckless and hysterical speech which had
been duly reported to the Holy Office. But these articles did
not constitute the important part of the accusation.
Articles 1-34 contained a series of charges to show that
Dona Teresa and her husband were not only suspect in mat-
ters of faith, but possibly guilty of Judaism. The accusa-
tions based on practices suspected of being Jewish in char-
acter constituted the most serious part of the indictment,
and the others were cited as additional evidence indicating
unchristian conduct.
The charges that Dona Teresa and L6pez were sus-
pected of practicing Jewish rites were based on tales told by
their household servants. These stories had been spread far
and wide, and were related by many witnesses who testi-
fied before Father Posada in 1661-1662. Actual eye-witness
accounts, however, were given by only four or five persons
who were members of the Lopez household. The testimony
is summarized below.
(1) Dona Teresa and her husband had made a "special
ceremony" of washing their hair and bathing on Friday
nights, and on such occasions Dona Teresa had made a spe-
cial point of shutting herself up in her bedroom while she
made her private ablutions. One servant testified that she
had tried to spy on the lady at such times, but with no
success !
(2) The bed and table linens in the Lopez household
had always been changed on Fridays, and Lopez and his wife
put on clean clothing on such days.
(3) If circumstances prevented them from bathing or
changing their clothing on one Friday, they always waited
until the next.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 381
(4) Dona Teresa had been accustomed to take special
care with her toilet and to primp on Saturdays, as if spe-
cially celebrating1 that day "which the dead law of Moses
orders to be observed."
(5) On a certain Good Friday, Lopez had been too ill
to attend church and had remained at home resting on a
couch. During the afternoon certain Apache servants an-
nounced that the procession of the Holy Burial had passed
the Casa Real, and Dona Teresa, with unusual haste, gave
her husband a clean cap (birrete) to replace the one that
he was wearing.
The indictment also alleged that Dona Teresa was guilty
of superstition. For example, on a certain occasion she had
given her husband "powders" in order to make him desire
her. It was also her custom to put onion peel on the soles of
her feet. And one servant testified that her mistress saved
the blood at the time of her period.
To these charges the fiscal added others, all based on
the sworn testimony, to show that Lopez and Dona Teresa
were not good practicing Christians. The servants had al-
leged that the accused parties seldom said grace at meals,
that they were not accustomed to carry rosaries or make the
sign of the Cross, that they showed little veneration for holy
images, that they omitted devotions when they went to bed
or arose in the morning, that they did not respond to pious
phrases of greeting by members of their household, and that
they seldom engaged in religious speech, such as relating the
life of a saint. Moreover, it was alleged that they had sel-
dom counseled their servants to attend mass or to fulfill their
religious duties. On the contrary, they had upbraided with
evil speech those who had done so. And it was further al-
leged that Dona Teresa had soundly thrashed a negro slave
woman who had fasted in honor of Our Lady of Carmen.
Certain articles of the indictment accused Dona Teresa
and her husband of an obvious reluctance to attend mass and
actual failure to fulfill their duties on days or feasts of obli-
382 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
gation, especially during the journey to New Mexico in 1659,
as well as other violations of ecclesiastical practice.
It had also been noted that Dona Teresa carefully kept
her writing desk locked and would not permit servants to
open it. Moreover, she had taken pleasure in reading a book
in a foreign language, and would sometimes laugh while
she was reading. The servant who gave this testimony
stated that she had suspicions concerning the character of
the book. In the article of the accusation recording this evi-
dence, the fiscal asked why Dona Teresa had not been con-
tent to read "ordinary books in the Castillian tongue," and
stated that her practice of reading in an unknown tongue,
as well as her evident pleasure in doing so, caused suspicion
that the book possibly contained heresy.
Finally, the servants had testified that L6pez and Dona
Teresa never permitted anyone to enter their bedroom while
they were sleeping, except a young negro slave girl who slept
in the room with them. The indictment notes that although
such action had no special importance and would ordinarily
be insufficient cause for suspicion, in view of all the other
evidence concerning the conduct of the accused, "it is easy
to understand that it may have been a special precaution to
prevent exil practices, which they perform in secret, from
being noted."
In her replies to the indictment, both oral and written,
Dona Teresa stoutly denied that her custom of bathing and
changing clothing and linens on Fridays had any special
significance. And it was not true that she and her husband
invariably chose Fridays for such actions. Indeed, Don
Bernardo changed his clothes three times a week, "especially
his shirt." The bed linen was not changed weekly, but
usually once in two weeks. She admitted that she primped
on Saturdays, "as all women usually do," because on Sun-
day mornings there was not time to do so before mass, "ex-
cept to fix her hair a little." Regarding the Good Friday
episode, she testified that she had been reading to her hus-
band the story of the Passion of Our Lord, that he had asked
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 383
her several times for a clean bed cap, and that when the
servants announced that the procession had passed she has-
tened to get him a clean one because she knew that they
would have visitors. Besides, there was nothing evil in put-
ting on a clean cap in any case !
In his own testimony before the Holy Office, Lopez also
denied that he had made a practice of bathing and changing
his clothes on any special day. He had changed his clothes
whenever it was necessary, in hot weather almost daily. And
"it was a great falsehood" that he had taken special pains
to wash his head on Fridays, although he might have done
so occasionally. "Ordinarily two or three months passed
without doing so." He confirmed his wife's testimony about
the bed cap, saying that servants had announced the arrival
of guests and consequently he desired a clean cap.3
Dona Teresa denounced the charges that she practiced
superstition as utterly false. It was true, however, that she
sometimes put onion peel on her feet, because she had corns
and no other remedy was available !
Both Lopez and his wife denied the accusations that
they omitted their devotions and were remiss in other phases
of their conduct. Dona Teresa testified that she had always
taken special care to see that her servants attended divine
services and that two or three of them ordinarily accom-
panied her to mass. And it was false that she and her hus-
band upbraided and chastised servants who made their de-
votions. She did not deny, however, that she had used
corporal punishment on the negro slave woman, but not for
the cause alleged. This negress was a trouble maker, given
to thieving and trickery, and it had been necessary more
than once to chastise her.
As noted above, Lopez cited extenuating circumstances
for failure to attend mass or to confess on certain occasions,
and Dona Teresa testified that in her own case serious ill-
ness had been responsible for her conduct during the
trip to New Mexico in 1659.
3. Proceso contra Ldpez, III.
384 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
It was true that she had kept the writing desk locked
at times because her servants were thieves ! And with re-
gard to the book in the foreign tongue that she had read
from time to time, it was Tasso's Orlando Furioso. She re-
minded the Inquisitor that she had been born and reared in
Italy and that she had learned Italian. She did not want to
forget the language, and that was why she took pleasure in
reading her Tasso.
Both Lopez and Dona Teresa admitted that they slept
alone in their bedroom, except for the little slave girl. But
what was evil in such a custom? They had always done so
as a matter of modesty, for "it was a practice that most
married people ordinarily follow." Moreover, the servants
slept in the next room and could be called if needed.4
After Dona Teresa completed her depositions in reply
to the articles of accusation, an attorney was appointed to
assist in her defense. Two hearings were held on November
27 and 28 during which the record of the proceedings were
read to the attorney.
The next stage in the trial was the "publication of the
witnesses," a normal part of the procedure in Inquisition
cases. Extracts of the sworn testimony on which the articles
of indictment were based were read to the accused, but the
names of the witnesses were not revealed. In certain cases,
however, the accused was able to identify the witnesses by
the nature of the testimony, or the time and circumstances of
incidents that were related. The "publication" was made
during a hearing on December 6, and Dona Teresa gave her
replies on December 7 and 11. In most cases, she merely
referred to statements already made in her oral and written
answers to the accusation. On December 11 she asked for a
copy of the "publication" in order to prepare a more exten-
sive statement in writing with the counsel of her attorney.
This request was granted, and on January 9, 1664, she filed
her deposition, a long document comprising seven closely
written pliegos.
4. Ibid.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 385
In this document, the most interesting item in the long
manuscript record of the proceedings, Dona Teresa under-
took to undermine the evidence against her by citing reasons
why persons who had testified were inspired by personal en-
mity and malice. Inasmuch as she could not be sure of the
identity of the witness in many cases, she listed all those per-
sons whom she had reason to suspect might have given evi-
dence. She mentioned by name more than seventy-five per-
sons, citizens, friars, servants, etc., and gave reasons why
they were her enemies. For example : "If Juan Manso testi-
fied, he is my enemy because," etc., etc. "If Francisco de
Xavier testified, he is an enemy because," etc., etc. Some were
enemies because Lopez had removed them from office, others
because he had taken away their encomiendas, and others
because of legal proceedings instituted against them or
because her husband had chastised them for immoral con-
duct. In direct and brutal fashion she laid bare the details
of life and society in New Mexico, local jealousies and petty
crime, the carousing activities of numerous citizens and their
marital infidelities. She realized that the direct eye-witness
evidence had undoubtedly been given by her household
servants, and she wrote long blasts against them, describing
their thieving activities, their quarrels and fist-fights, and
their inveterate habit of sneaking out at night to carouse
with undesirable citizens. Most of the servants were negro
and Apache slaves, troublesome Pueblo Indians sent to
Santa Fe for service as the punishment for petty crime, or
low-class mestizos, and if we may judge by Dona Teresa's
account, the Casa Real must have been a turbulent place in
which the governor's lady maintained discipline only by
eternal vigilance and occasional use of force.
This tirade undoubtedly served to strengthen Dona
Teresa's defense, for she had put her finger on several of the
most important witnesses who had testified against her.
Although the document illustrated her own prejudices, it
raised serious questions concerning the motives of many of
the witnesses and the trustworthiness of their testimony.
386 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
During January the remainder of the trial record was
read to her attorney, and when this part of the procedure
had been completed the attorney asked for a copy of the
indictment and the extracts of testimony in order to prepare
a statement in defense of the accused. Ill health of the
advocate delayed further hearings for a few weeks. Then in
March Dona Teresa asked the court to read the indictment
and testimony to her again, stating that when she had made
her defense the first time she had been in a nervous state
and lacked experience, and she feared that she had not made
her replies in the best manner. The court granted this re-
quest, and two hearings were devoted to the reading of the
proceedings and the recording of her depositions.
On March 20 Dona Teresa's attorney filed a long written
statement analyzing the testimony on which the indictment
was based. This document called attention to the fact that
most of the testimony was based on rumors and hearsay. The
testimony of the few eye-witnesses who had given deposi-
tions before Father Posada was also carefully analyzed.
Numerous contradictions and discrepancies in the testimony
were noted, and attention was called to the lack of precise
evidence and proof on many points. In certain particulars,
the indictment was based on the deposition of a single wit-
ness. Moreover, the petition alleged that "malice and con-
spiracy" characterized much of the evidence, and that due
to ignorance on the part of the witnesses, harmless actions
had been misinterpreted. It was also pointed out that some
of the charges, especially those relating to the alleged prac-
tice of Jewish rites, were not based on any clear proof of
motive and intent, but were mere presumptions not substan-
tiated by definite evidence. Indeed, the charge of Judaism
constituted "the whole case," because the other articles of
indictment citing lack of respect for the faith and unchristian
conduct served merely to bolster up that charge and had
little importance except in relation to it.
During the next three months little progress was made
in the proceedings due to the fact that Dona Teresa's attor-
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 387
ney was ill and refused to appear at the hearings. It was
during this interval, however, that the accused made some
very interesting confessions to the tribunal. It appears that
soon after her arrival in the jail of the Holy Office, one of the
assistant jailers, a certain Juan de Cardenas, informed her
that he had been a friend of her father in Cartagena and
offered to advise her what to say during the formal hearings
and how to conduct her defense. This person was able to
get fairly exact information of the proceedings before the
court, told her what charges had been filed against her hus-
band and against the four New Mexican soldiers — Aguilar,
Gomez, Romero, and Anaya — who were also being tried.
Likewise, he maintained contact with Lopez and the other
New Mexican prisoners, and from time to time brought
messages to Dona Teresa from her husband. It was Car-
denas who had advised her to present the long written state-
ment giving reasons for the hostility and enmity of witnesses
who might have testified against her. Moreover, it would
appear that some of the information included in that state-
ment had been furnished by her husband and transmitted to
her by Cardenas. In a series of hearings held at intervals
from April 22 to July 19, 1664, Dona Teresa confessed all
this intrigue to the Inquisitors. Original notes on the trial
record indicate that formal proceedings were instituted
against Cardenas.
The illness of Dona Teresa's attorney was so prolonged
that finally a new advocate was appointed on September 2.
Consequently, it was necessary to read the record to this
newly appointed attorney, and this took up five hearings
between September 12 and 17. From time to time during
these audiences Dona Teresa gave additional testimony con-
cerning affairs in New Mexico, as well as her private rela-
tions with her husband. She had already explained to the
court that her insistence on privacy in her home in Santa Fe
and other alleged peculiarities of conduct had been inspired,
in part, by her husband's immoral conduct and her efforts to
quiet scandal. And now she unburdened her heart and re-
388 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
vealed other details. It is obvious that she was in a state
approaching hysteria.
During the hearing of September 17 Dona Teresa's new
advocate suggested that in view of what she had confessed
concerning her secret discussions with the assistant jailer,
Juan de Cardenas, and the possibility that her earlier replies
to the indictment had been colored by Cardenas' advice, the
indictment and publication of the witnesses should be read
once more in order to give the accused one more opportunity
to testify the whole truth. Dona Teresa agreed, and begin-
ning on September 20 seven more hearings were held for
this purpose. The record shows, however, that Dona Teresa
added little to what she had already told. The charges
alleging the practice of customs suspected of being Jewish
were those that gave her the greatest concern, and she
reviewed once more her habits of bathing, putting on clean
clothes, and changing the bed linens. It was true that at
certain seasons she had bathed on Fridays, and she ad-
mitted that tales told by her servants had made this practice
a matter of public discussion in Santa Fe. On one occasion
it had been a topic of conversation with her husband, and
she had upbraided him for not warning her that "the Jews
bathed on Friday." It was all his fault, for she would not
have chosen that day if she had known ! Bitter words had
followed.
Poor Dona Teresa! What with thieving and spying
servants, her husband's infidelity, the petty jealousies of
provincial society, and the hostility inspired by Lopez' ad-
ministrative policies, her stay in New Mexico had been very
unhappy. Many times she must have longed for those
better days when she had lived in Italy and for the refine-
ments of European society. In Santa Fe she had had few
friends whom she could trust, and most of these had known
only the rude life of the frontier. It is not surprising that
she took pleasure in reading her Tasso, and no more surpris-
ing that her companions regarded her with suspicion when
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 389
she laughed as she read from that "book in the foreign
tongue."
At long last the proceedings came to an end. On De-
cember 19, 1664, the tribunal voted to suspend the case.
On the following day she received formal notification of this
decision, and, according to the record, "she gave great thanks
to God Our Lord and to this Holy Tribunal." After more
than twenty months in the jail of the Holy Office, she was
finally free to resume a normal life among relatives and
friends in Mexico City whom she had left six years earlier
to undertake the ill-fated journey to New Mexico with her
husband.
Ill
Thus the proceedings of the Holy Office against ex-
governor Lopez and his wife were brought to a conclusion.
But litigation over their property that had been placed
under embargo pending their trial was carried on for many
years.5 This property consisted of two lots: (1) the goods
that Posada had seized after the arrest of Lopez in 1662
and shipped to Mexico City in the supply caravan; (2) the
goods and livestock sent to New Spain by Penalosa and em-
bargoed at Parral by Juan Manso on instructions from
Posada. The first lot and part of the second were delivered
to the real fisco in Mexico City in the spring of 1663 ; the
remainder of the second lot held in Parral was liquidated
and the proceeds sent to Mexico City, as noted in the pre-
ceding chapter. For various reasons separate records were
kept of the legal proceedings and accounting of the two lots.
When the goods seized by Posada were delivered in
Mexico City by Fray Juan Ramirez, the administrator of the
supply service, they were inventoried and deposited with
responsible persons. Pinon nuts constituted the most im-
portant part of this shipment and efforts were made to sell
them as soon as possible before they spoiled. Large quanti-
ties were knocked down at auction during the summer of
6. The record of the litigation is found in A. G. P. M., Tierras 3268, 3283, 3286.
390 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
1663, but a considerable stock remained unsold. There was
an even slower market for the hides, textiles, and the numer-
ous articles of household goods. During the next few years
sales of certain items were negotiated.
After being released by the Holy Office, Dona Teresa
made an effort to obtain possession of part of this property.
On March 16, 1665, she petitioned the tribunal to turn over
to her half of the goods as her share of the property. She
also asked for the clothing, personal effects, and household
furnishings. For various reasons the Inquisitors refused
to grant the first half of her petition. They stated that there
was no proof of joint ownership. Several of Lopez' creditors
had filed claims, and these had to be adjusted. Moreover,
the Holy Office also had claims against the property for more
than 1800 pesos, the expenses of transporting Lopez and
Dona Teresa to Mexico City and the costs of their mainte-
nance in the jail of the Inquisition during the trial. Lastly,
no final settlement could be made until Lopez* case had been
formally concluded. The tribunal agreed, however, to turn
over the clothing, personal effects, and household goods, on
condition that Dona Teresa would give bond for their value
pending final liquidation and settlement. These goods were
appraised and in due course delivered to her, under the con-
ditions stated.
On December 5, 1665, and again on July 12, 1666, Dona
Teresa made new petitions to the tribunal, citing her poverty
and need and asking for a share in the embargoed property.
But the Inquisitors denied her requests, citing the same rea-
sons as before. There were also other considerations in-
volved. Lopez had alleged that several persons in New
Mexico owed him money, and some effort had to be made to
determine whether these claims were valid and to obtain
payment. In addition, it was known that a quantity of
pifion belonging to Lopez had been left behind at El Paso in
1662. Apparently part of this stock was shipped to Mexico
in 1665.
As noted in Section I above, the Holy Office in 1671
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 391
voted to absolve the memory of Lopez and raise the embargo
on his property. This action removed one obstacle prevent-
ing a settlement, but the documents do not provide a record
of the final litigation in the case.
Part of the goods embargoed at Parral and reshipped
to Mexico City was sold in 1663. Other items were disposed
of from time to time during the next four years. Penalosa
tried to establish just title to the property, and he sent Tome
Dominguez de Mendoza to Mexico to file action to have the
embargo raised. Litigation was suspended, however, by a
decree of the tribunal on July 4, 1663.
There were various reasons why the Holy Office had to
proceed with caution in establishing legal ownership. In the
first place, it was necessary to review the evidence concern-
ing the manner in which the property had been acquired by
Penalosa and his agents in New Mexico. Second, the Holy
Office had to take into account the fact that part of the goods
had originally been embargoed by Penalosa to pay claims,
fines, etc. in accordance with the sentence in Lopez* resi-
dencia, and the property could not be disposed of until some
effort had been made to ascertain whether these obligations
had been paid. It was also clear that some of the property
that had once belonged to Lopez had remained in Penalosa's
hands in New Mexico. Such property was subject to em-
bargo like the rest, and the Holy Office made an effort, in-
effective apparently, to discover its amount and where-
abouts. Consequently, these questions dragged on for
years, and little progress was made despite numerous peti-
tions by Dona Teresa or her representatives.
Finally, in 1678 the Inquisitors ordered the sale of such
parts of the property embargoed at Parral as had not
already been disposed of, and the proceeds were turned over
to the agent of the Holy Office. But even then, Lopez' heirs
did not receive a settlement. As late as 1689, litigation over
the goods was still pending. The manuscript record ends at
that point.
392 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
CHAPTER VIII
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOLY OFFICE AGAINST THE FOUR
SOLDIERS OF NEW MEXICO
Formal trial proceedings were started against the four
soldiers of New Mexico within a relatively short time after
their arrival in Mexico City in April, 1662. For more than
a year and a half thereafter the trials dragged out their
weary course.1 The case of Diego Romero will be described
first because testimony given by the defendant during the
hearings provided the basis of supplementary indictments
against Nicolas de Aguilar and Cristobal de Anaya Almazan.
I
Diego Romero was a native of New Mexico, the son of
Caspar Perez, a soldier from the Spanish Netherlands, and
Maria Romero, the daughter of a conquistador. His father,
who had served in the province for some forty years as the
armorer of the local militia with a salary paid by the treasury
of New Spain, had always been a loyal partisan of the gov-
ernors in the long series of Church and State controversies,
and this point was cited against the defendant during his
trial. Romero had been reared in the rude life of the frontier,
and had received little formal education. He told the Inquisi-
tors that he had never learned to read or write with any
facility. He had served in numerous local campaigns, having
held the rank of captain, and he had been elected alcalde
ordinario of Santa Fe. During the term of office of Lopez de
Mendizabal he had received official favor, and many persons
regarded him as a close associate and counsellor of the gov-
ernor.
Romero was summoned for his first formal audience
before the tribunal of the Holy Office on May 5, 1663.
He made the customary statement concerning his ancestry
and life history, and at the end of the hearing he received
1. While the proceedings against the four soldiers were in progress, the Holy
Office also tried the ex-custodian of New Mexico, Friar Juan Ramirez. This case has
been discussed in my essay, "The Supply Service of the New Mexico Missions in the
Seventeenth Century," NEW MEXICO HIST. REV., V(1930), 386-404. passim.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 393
the first admonition. The second and third admonitions
were given May 7 and 11. Four more hearings were held
during the succeeding weeks, and on September 19 the fiscal
presented the accusation consisting of twenty-three articles.2
Articles 1-6 and 21-22 cited evidence to prove that
Romero had made evil-sounding and scandalous remarks to
the effect that when a man and woman were engaged in an
illicit relationship, there was a mutual obligation to grant
the debito, or conjugal act. The fiscal denounced this propo-
sition as formal heresy, on the ground that it justified im-
morality and violated the sixth commandment. In his
replies to the accusation, the defendant admitted that he had
made various remarks about the duties of married and un-
married persons with regard to the sexual relationship, but
he denied that he had been guilty of the scandalous proposi-
tion ascribed to him. If he had said things that were con-
trary to the faith, it was due to ignorance and the inadequate
religious instruction he had received in New Mexico.
Five articles (7-11) summarized testimony to show that
Romero had defended the false doctrine that a priest who
baptised an infant did not contract spiritual relationship
(parentesco espiritual) with the infant baptised or with its
parents. The defendant denied the general charge, but
admitted that this question had been discussed on certain
occasions.
Articles 12-16 dealt with an incident that had occurred
in 1660 when Romero and a group of soldiers had made an
expedition to the plains for the purpose of trade with no-
madic tribes. Considerable evidence had been received that
on this occasion Romero had participated in various cere-
monies performed by a group of Apaches, and that he had
been married according to their heathen rites to an Indian
girl with whom he subsequently had carnal intercourse. Ac-
cording to certain witnesses, the Apaches had told Romero
that in time past his father, Gaspar Perez, had visited them
and "had left a son" with them, and that he should do the
2. Proceso contra Romero, ff. 70-171 record the trial proceedings.
394 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
same! Participation in these heathen and superstitious
rites, the fiscal alleged, was proof of the defendant's "evil
inclination and lack of Christianity" and constituted grounds
for believing that he was suspect in the faith.
During a hearing on May 11 Romero had given the
tribunal some account of this incident. He said that when
he and his companions arrived at the Apache camp the In-
dians began to perform dances, and that the members of his
party, in order not to antagonize them, had watched these
ceremonies. Later in the evening several Indians took him to
their huts, and the next morning they started to perform
certain rites. Pleading illness, he had asked them to take
him back to the place where his companions had camped.
On August 29 Romero informed the court that he had not
told the whole truth about this episode during the hearing
on May 11. He admitted that one reason why he had gone
to the plains was to have the Apaches make him a captain,
"as they had done with Capt. Alonso Baca, Francisco Lujan,
and Caspar Perez, father of this defendant, and with a friar
of the Order of San Francisco named Friar Andres Juarez."
It was also true that the Indians had performed dances in
his honor and that these rites "contained superstition . . .
but he never believed in the said superstitions." And he
testified further that during his stay among the Apaches he
had slept twice with "a heathen Indian woman," a deed that
"he greatly regretted, and for which he asks the pardon
of Our Lord." In his replies to articles 12-16 of the accusa-
tion, he referred to the foregoing testimony.
Article 17 accused him of incest with his cousin, by
whom it was alleged he had had a son. Romero testified that
the girl was a mestizo, whom his mother had reared and that
she was not related to him in any way. He also denied that
the son was his own, although he had reared the child in his
own home.
Article 18 contained the charges that Romero was
guilty of "incredible hatred" toward the friars. In his reply,
the defendant insisted that he had always "revered the
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 395
priests as ministers of God our Lord," although it was true
that he had spoken out against some who had been guilty of
"public sin and scandal."
Finally, articles 19-23 summarized certain points based
on Romero's own testimony before the tribunal. In one ar-
ticle the fiscal took note of the defendant's admission that
he had not told the truth during the hearing of May 11.
After Romero made his depositions in reply to the
accusation, the court appointed an attorney to advise him
and assist in his defense. The Inquisitors also offered to
provide the defendant with a copy of the accusation, but
Romero said that he had no need of such a copy. His attor-
ney could attend to such matters.
During the autumn of 1663 Romero appeared before
the court at various times, usually at his own request. On
one occasion he denounced several friars, citing their mis-
conduct and alleging that they were his enemies because he
had discussed their misdeeds. But as time passed, his tune
changed and he admitted that many of the articles of the
accusation were actually true. First of all, he confessed
that he had made statements that priests did not contract
spiritual relationship with infants whom they baptised or
with their parents. He protested, however, that he had
based his remarks on what he had read in a book, and that
apparently he had misunderstood what he had read. Second,
he also admitted that he was guilty of the scandalous propo-
sition about the obligations of persons engaged in illicit
intercourse, but insisted that he had not realized the full
implications of his remarks on this point. And little by
little he gave additional details about his participation in the
Apache ceremonies, although he alleged that he had merely
consented to these superstitious rites without actually be-
lieving in them.
It is apparent that during his first hearings Romero had
tried to put on a bold front, but this attitude of bravado and
bluff was gradually broken down. In the end he not only
made sorry admissions concerning his own character, but
396 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
also revealed things that were damaging to the cause of his
friends, especially Aguilar and Anaya. On October 12 he
told the Inquisitors many things about his early life that
illustrated his lascivious nature. Moreover, he frankly ad-
mitted that he had deliberately sought to bolster up his
defense by denouncing the faults of others and by with-
holding the whole truth about his own case. Although he
had come to the Holy Office with the intention of confessing
everything, he had not done so, "because the devil had blinded
him," and he had believed that it would injure his honor to
tell all. But now he had reconsidered, "for there is no
greater honor than to serve God our Lord, to confess his sins,
to seek pardon for them, and to tell how he had lived without
fear of God and His divine justice."
In order to give the court further proof of his newly
found honor, he proceeded to give testimony that he knew
would cause trouble for his fellow prisoners. At some length
he described what had transpired during the time the four
soldiers were held in prison at the pueblo of Santo Domingo
in New Mexico. They had occupied adjoining cells, and by
making holes in the adobe walls they had been able to con-
verse and to discuss ways and means of defending themselves
before the Holy Office. During these discussions they agreed
that the friars were the cause of all their troubles, and at
one time, so Romero said, Nicolas de Aguilar had suggested
that the best thing to do would be to break jail, kill two or
three friars, seize all the papers in Posada's possession, and
then escape. Romero also told how the prisoners had been
able to send messages to their families, how a certain
friendly friar had come to advise them about preparing their
defense, and how Penalosa had sent a letter to Anaya offer-
ing counsel and assistance. During the journey to Mexico
City the prisoners had maintained contact, and after their
imprisonment in the jail of the Holy Office they had been
able to compare notes, exchange news, and discuss the pro-
ceedings before the tribunal.
This testimony was later used by the fiscal to support
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 397
separate and supplementary accusations against Aguilar
and Anaya. In Romero's case, however, the fiscal made no
such supplementary accusation. Perhaps the defendant had
offered to turn "state's witness," and as such received special
consideration.
The publication of the witnesses was made on Novem-
ber 9, 1663, and the defendant's replies were received the
same day. After further legal formalities the Inquisitors
and their consultores took a vote on January 23, 1664, found
Romero guilty, and outlined the terms of the preliminary
sentence. Formal pronouncement of the sentence was de-
layed, however, for several months. During the intervening
period Romero appeared before the court from time to time
to give testimony concerning conditions in the Inquisition
jail. These depositions contain an extremely interesting
account of means employed by the prisoners to communicate
from cell to cell and exchange news, and other details of
everyday life in the prison.
The sentencia de vista, or preliminary sentence, was
pronounced October 31, 1664. It stated that the proceed-
ings had proved that Romero was an "apostate heretic," and
that as such he had incurred major excommunication and
confiscation of his property for the benefit of the real fisco.
The court decreed that as penance for his deeds Romero
should participate in a public auto de fe and publicly abjure
his errors, and that he should be condemned to service in
the Philippine galleys for four years. The sentence also
provided that henceforth he should not be eligible for public
office, that he should not wear "articles of gold, silver,
pearls, precious stones, silk, moire, or fine cloth," and that
he should not ride a horse or carry arms.
The preliminary sentences of the tribunal served, in
part, to test the temper and attitude of defendants, and if the
latter admitted their guilt and asked for mercy, the terms
were often moderated. Romero immediately petitioned the
court to reconsider its findings, and to moderate the sentence,
taking into account that he had confessed his guilt, and that
398 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
the offenses he had committed had been the result of ignor-
ance, his meager training in doctrinal matters, and his
general lack of experience (rustiddad). The fiscal objected
to this plea, but he was overruled.
The court voted to revoke the decision to confiscate the
defendant's property and to condemn him to service in the
galleys. Instead, it decreed that Romero should be banished
from New Mexico for ten years, and that during this time
he should reside in Parral. The remainder of the prelim-
inary sentence, with a few minor changes in the clause
about the defendant's participation in an auto de fe, was
confirmed.
The final sentence (sentencia de revista) was pro-
nounced during an auto de fe held in the church of Santo
Domingo in Mexico City on December 7, 1664. Romero made
his abjuration on the same day. Finally, on December 17
he was set free, after having adjusted the costs of his trial
which were paid out of the property that had been embar-
goed for that purpose.
II
The trial of Nicolas de Aguilar started on May 8, 1663,
when he was called for his first audience. The first admoni-
tion was pronounced at the end of this hearing, and the
second and third on May 11 and 17 respectively.3
The defendant was a native of the province of Mechoa-
can. At the age of eighteen he moved to Parral where he
spent six years as a soldier and miner. Having killed his
uncle during a brawl, allegedly in self defense, he took refuge
in New Mexico, where he was ultimately pardoned at the
time of general amnesty proclaimed in honor of the birth of
a royal prince. In New Mexico he married a certain Cata-
lina Marquez, and took up residence near the village of
Tajique. During his stay in New Mexico he served in the
local militia, twice with the rank of company captain, and
was finally appointed alcalde mayor of the Salinas area by
3. Proceso contra Aguilar, ff. 87-222, record the trial proceedings.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 399
Governor Lopez. At the time of his trial he was thirty-six
years old.
The accusation was presented by the fiscal on October
19, 1663. It contained fifty-two articles, of which forty-five
were based on the testimony concerning Aguilar's conduct
and activities as alcalde mayor of the Salinas jurisdiction.
The remainder summarized various points relating to the
defendant's testimony before the court during early hear-
ings. An extensive account of the role played by Aguilar as
alcalde mayor has already been given in Chapter III, Sec-
tion IV, and it will not be necessary, therefore, to make a
detailed review of the indictment. The fiscal cited incidents,
cases, and other particulars to prove (1) that the defendant
had infringed on ecclesiastical jurisdiction and immunity,
(2) that he had obstructed the missionary program by pro-
hibiting the service of Indians at the churches and con-
vents, (3) that he had undermined mission discipline by
interfering with the punishment of Indians guilty of mis-
conduct and other offenses, (4) that he had encouraged
heathen and idolatrous practices by permitting the perform-
ance of native dances, and (5) that he had been guilty of
hostile and unseemly conduct toward the friars and general
lack of respect for the Church, its teachings, and its cen-
sures.
Aguilar made a vigorous defense against these charges
during his hearings before the tribunal. His depositions
were characterized by a certain quality of directness that
was lacking in the testimony of Diego Romero and Cristobal
de Anaya. It was impossible, of course, for him to evade the
major issues, but having taken a stand he usually stuck to
it. His nerve — perhaps stubbornness is a better word —
never failed him, and he did not humiliate himself, as Ro-
mero had done, by coming before the court in hearing after
hearing to tell unsavory details of his early life, to admit his
guilt little by little, or to testify against his fellow prisoners.
During the trial proceedings this rough, illiterate frontiers-
man— this Attila, as the friars called him — displayed
400 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
greater dignity and self respect than any of the other New
Mexican soldiers, with the exception of Francisco Gomez
Robledo.
His major argument in defense of his conduct as alcalde
mayor was that he had acted in accordance with instructions
from his superior officer, Governor Lopez de Mendizabal. It
was on Lopez' orders that he had prohibited the forced serv-
ice of Indians without pay and had instructed village officials
not to execute the friars' orders for punishment of infrac-
tions of mission discipline. And he had permitted the native
dances because the governor had given a general license for
their performance. Although there was much to be said for
the defendant's argument, the fiscal could always combat it
by pointing out that it could not be made a valid excuse for
unjust actions harmful to the missionary program and sacer-
dotal dignity, or for any infringement of ecclesiastical au-
thority and privilege. The defendant's position as an admin-
istrative officer did not change the fact that he was a
professed, practicing Christian, and as such he was under no
obligation to execute orders of a superior officer that would
result in harm to the Church. Moreover, his plea that he
had acted under orders could not excuse abuses and excesses
committed in execution of the same.
The record indicates that Aguilar had not used good
judgment in some of his administrative actions, and that he
had employed extreme or inexpedient measures in executing
the governor's orders. Although the enforcement of the
regulations concerning Indian labor had caused resentment
in all parts of the province, apparently the alcaldes mayores
in other areas had acted with more discretion and had not
aroused the animosity of the friars to the extent Aguilar had
done. Undoubtedly the conduct of some of the friars in the
Salinas area, especially Friar Nicolas de Freitas, who was
the most belligerent of all, served as provocation for some
of Aguilar's actions, but the alcalde mayor was also respon-
sible for part of the unrest and turmoil in that district. His
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 401
own attitude had been hostile and belligerent at times, and
he had been guilty of unseemly conduct.
The fiscal placed considerable emphasis on the question
of the native dances. The heathen and superstitious char-
acter of the dances was set forth in several articles of the
accusation, and it was alleged that Aguilar had not only wit-
nessed these ceremonies, but had encouraged and ordered the
Indians to perform them, regardless of the protests of the
friars. The defendant asserted that responsibility for "the
dancing of the catzinas did not rest with him but with Don
Bernardo Lopez de Mendizabal who authorized the dances
in the entire kingdom." Moreover, he asserted that he had
no way of knowing the true character of the ceremonies, for
he did not understand the language of New Mexico. Besides,
other alcaldes mayores, who were natives of the province and
who spoke the language of the Indians, had permitted them.
He made a damaging admission, however, by testifying that
the friars had told him that the dances "contained evil
things," but he followed up by a statement that when he
asked the friars to explain these "evil things" in order to
make a report to the governor, they had replied that they
could not do so. The defendant was obviously skating on
thin ice at this point.
Aguilar also based his defense on assertions that the
evidence of many of the witnesses was circumstancial and
incomplete, and in some cases grossly misrepresented the
facts. He took pains, therefore, to present in some detail
his own version of various incidents. It was undoubtedly
true that the testimony of witnesses examined by Posada,
especially some of the friars, gave a onesided picture of con-
ditions in the Salinas area, and that Aguilar was unjustifi-
ably accused of wrong motives for some of his administra-
tive actions. Many of Aguilar's explanations ring true, and
on certain points his testimony was confirmed by the deposi-
tions of Lopez. On the other hand, his own version of con-
ditions in the Salinas area was bound to be prejudiced and
circumstantial on many points. The records of the proceed-
402 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ings against Lopez and Aguilar contain so much conflicting
testimony that the reader is often left confused and be-
wildered.
The fiscal used the first three articles of the accusation
to set forth the evidence concerning Aguilar's share in the
Parraga episode and the proceedings at Tajique presided
over by the Vice-Custodian Friar Garcia de San Francisco,
which had resulted in ex-communication ol the defendant.
(See Chapter III, Section IV.) In this manner special em-
phasis was given to the charge that the defendant had been
guilty of infringing on ecclesiastical authority and immunity
and of lack of respect for ecclesiastical censures. Aguilar
gave a lengthy account of this entire affair in order to show
"that he had not acted with intent to violate the immunity
of the Church and ecclesiastical persons, but merely to obey
his governor."
On October 24, 1663, the day Aguilar completed his
depositions in reply to the accusation, the court appointed
an attorney to advise and assist him during the remainder
of the proceedings. The publication of the witnesses was
made on January 17, 1664, and the defendant's replies were
received four days later.
During a hearing on January 24, 1664, he made an im-
portant plea to the tribunal, obviously on the advice and
counsel of his attorney. He called attention to the fact that
much of the evidence "reduced itself in substance to the fact
that he had caused vexations and difficulties for the mission-
aries in those provinces" by forbidding the Indians to serve
the missions as farmers, fiscales, and in other capacities. But
his actions in this respect could be justified on several
grounds. In the first place, he had merely executed the
orders of the provincial governor. Second, if the governor
had not issued such orders, the defendant would have been
obliged by virtue of his office, to follow a similar line of
action because of the many and repeated royal cedulas in-
structing civil officers to prevent abuses and excesses com-
mitted by the clergy in the employment of Indians for the
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 403
service of the churches and convents. Consequently, the
defendant maintained that his intervention in the matter
of Indian labor in the pueblos within his jurisdiction could
not be interpreted as an intent to depreciate the sacerdotal
dignity. The petition also pointed out that native ceremonial
dances were also permitted in parts of New Spain, "except
when they constitute idolatry," and that it was necessary to
use suavity and forbearance in dealing with the natives, in
order not to alienate them from their new allegiance to Euro-
pean ways.
This plea shrewdly called attention to fundamental
problems of policy and administration. One of the major
problems of colonial government in Spanish America was
the maintenance of a just balance between religious and
secular interests. Civil officers were under obligation to
protect the Indians against abuse and maltreatment from
any source. And it was true that the Crown had frequently
taken note of the fact that the clergy demanded excessive
services from the Indians and had instructed its representa-
tives to prevent abuses of that kind. Nevertheless, the exe-
cution of these royal orders often created serious difficulties.
What constituted abuses in actual practice? The clergy in-
sisted that the services of a large number of Indians were
essential to the success and permanence of the missions.
Other persons regarded such labor as an excessive burden
on the natives. The local officials who had to deal with such
problems were in an extremely uncomfortable position.
Moreover, it was difficult to define the limits of civil and
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and to determine at what point the
exercise of administrative function infringed on ecclesias-
tical authority and privilege.
The Inquisitors, being learned and experienced men,
were fully aware of these problems, and the arguments of
Aguilar undoubtedly received careful consideration. The
issue before the court, however, was whether Aguilar, in
the exercise of his administrative functions, had been respon-
sible for conditions that were harmful to the advancement
404 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
of the faith, or had committed acts hostile to the clergy and
the Church. In view of the fact that the Holy Office was
extremely jealous of ecclesiastical rights and privileges, it
is obvious that Aguilar would have to make a very strong
case in order to offset the evidence against him. Moreover,
the charges based on the performance of native dances could
not be offset by the argument that such ceremonials were
permitted elsewhere. The crux of this question was the
character of the dances, and whether Aguilar had permitted
them, knowing that they contained heathen rites.
On February 29, 1664, the fiscal presented a second
accusation containing charges concerning the conduct of
Aguilar subsequent to his arrest in New Mexico in 1662.
This document was based on the testimony given by Diego
Romero concerning the secret conversations of the four
soldiers in their cells at the pueblo of Santo Domingo, the
manner in which they had been able to communicate with
their families and friends, the events of the journey to
Mexico City, and the exchange of news about the trial pro-
ceedings after they had been incarcerated in the jail of the
Holy Office. This supplementary indictment was intended
to prove that Aguilar had been guilty of conspiracy, and that
he had violated his oath not to reveal the nature of the pro-
ceedings before the tribunal. The defendant admitted much
of the evidence concerning the secret conversations of the
prisoners in their cells at Santo Domingo, but he denied that
he had proposed that they should break jail, kill some of the
friars, and seize Posada's papers. He testified that he had
talked with Romero and Anaya in the jail of the Holy Office,
discussing the trial proceedings and comparing notes, but
his version of these conversations differed in various par-
ticulars from that given by Romero.
Two hearings, held on March 21 and 26, 1664, were
devoted to the reading of the testimony concerning this sec-
ond accusation, and the recording of Aguilar's replies. On
March 29 these proceedings were communicated to his at-
torney. There the case rested for several months.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 405
Finally, on September 11, 1664, the Inquisitors and two
consultores, members of the audiencia, met to take a vote and
decide the case. The document describing this meeting does
not record any of the discussion concerning the points at
issue, or the relative importance assigned to the various
charges against the defendant, but merely stated the votes
of the persons who participated. There was some difference
of opinion concerning the action to be taken. One of the
consultores was of the opinion that the decision should be
postponed, and that some ecclesiastic, not a friar, should be
sent to New Mexico to investigate the case and report to the
Holy Office. This suggests that the consultor who proposed
this procedure was not entirely satisfied with the evidence
before the court. But three other members of the board,
including the second consultor, were apparently convinced
that the defendant had been guilty of offenses against the
Church, and voted to pronounce sentence. Two of the judges
who concurred in this action voted that Aguilar should
appear in the public auto de fe in the garb of a penitent, that
he should then abjure his errors before the tribunal of the
Holy Office, and that for a period of six years he should not
hold any administrative office. The third judge who voted
to pronounce sentence opposed the provision concerning ap-
pearance in a public auto de fe, but he was overruled. The
sentencia de vista, pronounced on October 23, 1664, was in
accordance with the provisions outlined above.
If Aguilar had accepted this verdict and begged the
mercy of the court, the terms of the sentence would probably
have been moderated. Instead, he challenged the decision
of the judges. He based his plea on the assumption that
"the principal crime constituting his case was that he had
permitted the Indians to dance the catzinas." He then pro-
ceeded to argue that there had been no proof of idolatry in
these dances, but merely presumption. "It is not the deed
but the intent that constitutes a crime." Although the dance
was one that the Indians had performed in heathen times,
this fact could not prejudice the case, unless there was actual
406 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
proof of idolatry. If the defendant had understood that the
dance was in any way contrary to the faith, he would not
have permitted its performance, in spite of the governor's
orders. He therefore asked that the sentence be revoked,
or at least the clause requiring him to appear in a public
auto de fe.
The attorney for the defense probably advised this
move, but it was a serious mistake. A plea of this kind,
based on arguments that were rather technical, to say the
least, was not likely to be received with favor. The best
procedure at this stage of the trial was for the defendant
to adopt a humble attitude rather than take any action that
could be regarded as a stubborn defense of guilt. The fiscal
filed a counter-petition for denial of the plea. This was
normal procedure. The fiscal seized the opportunity, how-
ever, to attack some of the major arguments of the defense.
He pointed out that obedience to a superior officer and exe-
cution of his orders could not excuse "acts prejudicial to the
ecclesiastical status and its immunities and in depreciation
of the missionaries, and, above all, actions opposed to the
Christian religion," for no subordinate officer was under
obligation to execute orders that would have such results.
Moreover, the defendant could not plead ignorance of the
idolatrous character of the native dances, for he had con-
fessed that the friars had told him that "the said dances con-
tained evil things." Failure of the friars to explain these
evil things did not give the defendant a valid excuse for per-
mitting the dances.
The Inquisitors and considtores met again on November
23 to decide on the terms of the final sentence (sentencia de
revista). The consultor who had proposed postponement
pending an investigation in New Mexico voted as before.
The other members of the board reaffirmed the decision to
pronounce sentence, but the penalties imposed on the defend-
ant were made more severe. Aguilar was to be banished
from New Mexico for ten years, and was made ineligible for
administrative office for the remainder of his life, instead of
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 407
for six years. One of the concurring judges reaffirmed his
dissent on the provision for appearance in a public auto de fe
and was again overruled.
Formal pronouncement of the sentencia de revista was
made on December 7, during a public auto de fe in the con-
vent of Santo Domingo. On December 17 the defendant
abjured his errors and was set free.
Ill
The first audience of Cristobal de Anaya Almazan took
place on April 26, 1663.4 He gave his age as thirty-eight, and
stated that since his eleventh year he had served in military
campaigns in New Mexico, having held the rank of alferez
real and captain. He had also served as regidor of Santa Fe
for two years and as procurador general of the province.
His father, Francisco de Anaya Almazan, was a prominent
citizen of the province, who had served under several gov-
ernors as secretary of war and government.
The three admonitions were pronounced in due course,
and on September 6 the accusation, consisting of twelve
articles, was filed by the fiscal. The major charge against
the defendant was that he had defended the erroneous propo-
sitions that the priest who baptized an infant did not con-
tract spiritual relationship with the said infant, or with the
parents and god-parents, and that the spiritual relationship
between god-parents lasted for only twenty-four hours.
According to the testimony of several witnesses, the defend-
ant had stubbornly repeated his views over a period of years,
despite the fact that he had been warned by certain friars
that he maintained false doctrine. When a certain layman
told him that the Council of Trent had affirmed the doctrine
of spiritual relationship, he replied: "The Padres interpret
the Council to suit themselves." And it was alleged that the
priests taught the doctrine of spiritual relationship with par-
ents of a baptized infant, "in order to gain the confidence of
4. Proceso contra Anaya, ff. 310v-418, record the trial proceedings.
408 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
husbands and to use this means to be familiar (aprovecharse)
with their wives."
There is evidence that Anaya was not alone in express-
ing doubt concerning the doctrine of spiritual relationships.
As noted above, Diego Romero was also accused of the same
charge. In a letter to the Holy Office, Friar Alonso de
Posada wrote: "In this kingdom belief is already so cor-
rupted that many persons of every rank and profession
(todos estados), and especially laymen, both men and women,
hold the opinion that there is not spiritual relationship
between godparents, a view that has resulted in many
offenses against the Divine Majesty."5 Punishment of Anaya
would serve as an example to others.
It may be questioned whether the views attributed to
Anaya, and apparently shared by many other persons in the
province, were founded on theoretical arguments or deeply
rooted convictions concerning points of doctrine. The con-
dition cited by Posada may be explained by reference to
local social conditions.
New Mexico was a tight little community which re-
ceived relatively few new settlers from the outside. Due to
intermarriage and the custom of sponsoring of children at
baptism, a large group of citizens found themselves bound
by ties of consanguinity, affinity, and godparenthood. It
became necessary, therefore, for many couples to obtain dis-
pensations to marry, and the local prelates, the custodians,
had apparently been rather liberal in granting these con-
cessions. As in all frontier communities, extra-marital in-
tercourse was a common occurrence, but due to the fact that
so many families were intermarried, the incidence of in-
cestual relationships was rather high. And as Posada inti-
mated in his letter to the Holy Office, there was an increasing
disregard for the ties of godparenthood. Moreover, there is
evidence that some of the friars set an evil example by mis-
conduct with women with whom they were bound by spiritual
ties. These conditions had an unsettling effect on the views
5. Posada to the Holy Office, Senecti, November 2, 1662. Ibid., t. 276.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 409
of many people concerning the meaning and practical validity
of the teachings of the Church concerning consangunity,
affinity, and spiritual relationships, and the obligations and
prohibitions that these bonds imposed. It is not surprising,
therefore, that certain persons had come to doubt and even
deny certain points of doctrine in such matters.
During his preliminary hearings before the tribunal,
Anaya had described at some length his own stand regarding
the question of the spiritual relationship between a baptised
child and its parents, and in his replies to the accusation he
reviewed and elaborated this testimony. Although refusing
to admit that he had actually denied such relationship, he
freely admitted that conditions in New Mexico had caused
him to ponder its validity and practical significance, and
that he had participated in discussions of this question on
several occasions. He told the court that his doubts had been
inspired, in part, by the misconduct of certain friars.
It is obvious, however, that his defense was very weak.
His allegations concerning the misconduct of certain friars,
if true, could not excuse any denial of church doctrine on his
own part, and were likely to be regarded merely as a delib-
erate attempt to muddy the issue. By his own admission he
had engaged in debate on a point of doctrine and had ex-
pressed doubts concerning its validity. Although he re-
peatedly insisted that he had not been guilty of any conscious
intent to deny or oppose the teaching of the Church, the
burden of the evidence was against him.
The publication of the witnesses was made on Novem-
ber 24, 1663, and two days later Anaya made a complete
confession of guilty, probably on the advice of his attorney.
He stated that having searched his memory, he now found it
necessary to testify "that he did say and teach to various
persons the proposition that parish priests did not contract
spiritual relationship with baptised persons and their par-
ents, or with the godparents." And it was also true that he
had said "that the Padres interpret the Council to suit them-
selves." Moreover, he had stubbornly defended his false
410 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
doctrine on one occasion merely to irritate the friar who was
debating with him. He still maintained, however, that it
had been the misconduct of the friars, especially a certain
one, that had inspired his doubts. The Inquisitors did not
mince words in commenting on this confession of guilt, up-
braiding the defendant for "going about on his own author-
ity, introducing himself as a learned doctor, and engaging
in disputes on matters that were not for him to decide."
On February 21, 1664, the fiscal presented a supple-
mentary indictment that covered essentially the same points
as the similar document in the case of Nicolas de Aguilar.
The defendant admitted much of the evidence.
The preliminary sentence (sentencia de vista) was pro-
nounced on October 23, 1664. The terms provided that Anaya
should appear in a public auto de fe, later abjure his errors
during an audience before the Holy Office, and perform cer-
tain acts of penance at stated intervals over a period of two
years. The sentencia de revista, announced on December 13,
1664, revised these terms by rescinding the article about
participation in a public auto de fe, and by substituting for
the clause about acts of penance a provision that after the
defendant returned to New Mexico he should appear at mass
on some feast day in one of the local churches and publicly
recant his false doctrine.
Anaya made his abjuration on the day the final sentence
was pronounced, and was dismissed from jail at the end of
the hearing. He returned to New Mexico during the follow-
ing summer. On Sunday, July 19, 1665, he appeared at
mass in the church of Sandia, and confessed his errors in
the presence of Friar Alonso de Posada, his secretary, Friar
Salvador de Guerra, and the assembled congregation.
IV
Francisco Gomez Robledo was the son of Francisco
Gomez, a Portuguese who had lived for more than fifty years
in New Mexico, and Ana Robledo, daughter of the conquista-
dor, Pedro Robledo. His entire life had been spent in New
Mexico, and he had held numerous offices, civil and military.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 411
He had served as regidor and alcalde ordinario of Santa Fe,
and at the time of his arrest in 1662 he held the rank of
sargento mayor in the local militia, an office that his father
had also held for many years. The elder Gomez had been a
loyal partisan of the provincial governors in their controver-
sies with the clergy, and had supported Governor Rosas
during the crisis of 1639-1641. The son's loyalties were also
on the side of civil authority. At the time of his trial by the
Holy Office in 1663, Francisco Gomez Robledo was thirty-
three years of age.
Hearings before the Holy Office began on May 16, 1663,
but the formal indictment was not filed until September 28.
This document contained eighteen articles which summed up
the accumulated evidence. Inasmuch as a large part of the
evidence was based on hearsay and second-hand reports
related by witnesses who had no immediate knowledge of the
charges, it was not easy for the fiscal to build up a good case.
The accused took full advantage of this fact, and his de-
fence was shrewd and energetic.6
Article 1 of the accusation contained the charge that
the defendant, like Romero and Anaya, had denied that the
priest who baptised a child contracted spiritual relationship
with said child and its parents. This article was based on
the testimony of a single witness who said that Gomez had
given assent to this false doctrine on one of the occasions
that Romero had affirmed it. The defendant made a com-
plete denial, asserting that there had never been any discus-
sion of this proposition in his presence at the time and place
alleged or at any other time. The testimony of Romero
before the Holy Office confirmed Gomez' position on this
point.
The fiscal was no more successful in proving articles
2-4 of the accusation which summarized evidence to show
that Gomez had said that to strike a cristo (an image of
Christ) was not a sin. It appears that this charge had its
origin in a conversation between the defendant and Juan
6. Proceso contra Gomez, ff. 341-388 record the trial proceedings.
412 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Griego. Gomez had told Griego that a certain citizen of
New Mexico had done "a very evil thing." Griego, eager for
the details, had asked whether the said citizen had struck a
cristo, and Gomez had replied that it was worse than that.
To which Griego answered : "What can it be, for even that
(striking a cristo) is a very great sin." But Gomez had given
no more details.
Griego reported this conversation to several persons,
who in turn told others. In the telling the legend grew, and
testimony was given that Gomez had actually said that to
strike a cristo was not a sin, and that Griego had sworn that
if this was not true they could cut out his tongue ! Among
the witnesses examined by Posada in 1661-1662 were two
friars to whom Griego had told his story. In their original
testimony they swore that G6mez had made the remark
attributed to him, but in their ratifications (testimony was
ratified or confirmed by being read to the witnesses who
then had an opportunity to affirm or amend it) they amended
their declarations by stating that G6mez had merely said
that striking a cristo was not a serious matter. Finally,
when Griego was called upon to give formal testimony, he
declared that the entire story had been told to him by some-
one else !
Thus it was apparent that the charge was based on
hearsay. The one witness who could have confirmed the
charge on the basis of personal information failed to do so,
and tried to shift the blame for the gossip on someone else.
In his replies to the indictment Gomez denied that he had
made the statement ascribed to him, and gave a satisfactory
account of the original conversation with Griego.
In the fifth article of the accusation the fiscal cited a
certain incident as presumptive evidence that the defendant
shared Romero's views about the obligations of persons
engaged in illicit intercourse. Romero's own testimony
demonstrated that there was no basis for this charge.
The remainder of the indictment summarized testimony
that Gomez and his father were Jews, and that the defendant
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 413
was an "enemy and persecutor" of the Church. The charge
of Judaism was really the heart of the entire case.
In the first place, testimony had been given citing the
fact that in times past a compatriot of Francisco Gomez the
Elder had made sworn statements that he had known the
Gomez family in Portugal and that they were Jews, and it
was further alleged that no effort had been made to deny
this charge. The defendant admitted that such sworn state-
ments had been made, but asserted that the person who made
them had later retracted. He also defended his father's
memory by testimony concerning the long years that Gomez
the Elder had served in New Mexico and his honorable and
Christian conduct. And as additional proof of his father's
standing, it was pointed out that he had once served as
algiwcil of the Holy Office.
Second, certain witnesses had also testified that in years
past when they were younger and had gone swimming with
the Gomez boys, they had noted that two of the defendant's
brothers were circumcised. More than that! One of the
brothers, named Juan, had "an excrescence or little tail" at
the base of his spine, and consequently he had been nick-
named "Colita." At the request of the fiscal the defendant
was examined by physicians who reported the existence of
scars on the penis that might have been made by a "cutting
instrument." Gomez explained the scars, however, by stating
that they were the result of ulcers (llagas). At his own re-
quest a second examination was made, and the physicians
reported that, although the scars appeared to have been
made by some instrument, "it was possible that they had
resulted from another cause."
The articles accusing Gomez of hatred, enmity, and lack
of respect for the Church and clergy consisted mostly of gen-
eral charges lacking specific proof. Gomez took pains, how-
ever, to rebut these charges by statements in which he de-
fended the fidelity of his family to the faith and his own
services in behalf of the missions. His home had always
been open to the friars ; "it was a refuge for all of them,"
414 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
where they had always been received with courtesy and hos-
pitality. And his intimate knowledge of the Indian languages
had been used to great advantage in the everyday adminis-
tration of the missions.
The publication of the witnesses was made during a
hearing on February 13, 1664, and the defendant's replies
were received the same day. More than eight months elapsed,
however, before the Inquisitors pronounced sentence. A
verdict of acquittal was finally handed down on October 23,
1664. Eight days later G6mez was discharged from the jail,
after having adjusted the costs of the trial proceedings.
V
The proceedings of the Holy Office against Don Bernardo
Lopez de Mendizabal, Dona Teresa de Aguilera y Roche, and
the four soldiers of New Mexico merit some comment.
It is interesting, first of all, to compare the cases of
Lopez and Aguilar. Many of the articles of accusation
against Lopez contained charges that his policies as gov-
ernor of the province had been harmful to the Church and
the missionary program. Almost the entire case against
Aguilar was founded on evidence concerning administra-
tive activities in execution of Lopez' policies. The governor
commanded and the alcalde mayor executed. Aguilar was
undoubtedly guilty of excesses and unseemly conduct in
carrying out the orders of his superior officer, and for such
actions Lopez could justly deny responsibility. But the fact
remains that Aguilar, as a subordinate officer, had definite
civil and political obligations to his superior. It was true, of
course, that as a professed, practicing Christian he was also
under obligations to the Church, but this argument applies
to Lopez with equal force. Aguilar may have exceeded his
instructions at times and he may have committed excesses in
executing orders, but basically his responsibility was no
greater than that of the governor. Indeed, the latter as the
superior officer who defined policy should bear the greater
blame. Moreover, the articles of accusation against L6pez
contained a far more extensive array of charges based on
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 415
denial of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, evil-sounding words and
propositions, and general unchristian conduct than were
brought against Aguilar. Many of these charges were prob-
ably false, or exaggerated, or based on evidence that misrep-
resented the facts. But there was such an accumulation of
evidence, that it could not be entirely discounted or written
off on such grounds.
In the end, Aguilar was pronounced guilty, banished
from New Mexico for ten years, and deprived of the right
to hold administrative office for the remainder of his life.
In Lopez' case, the Holy Office voted to absolve his memory
of the charges filed against him. From a practical stand-
point, this was a sensible decision, for there was little to be
gained, after the defendant's death, to proceed against his
memory and fame, and pronounce a sentence of guilt. It
is true, of course, that the Holy Office occasionally proceeded
with a case after the death of the defendant, but ordinarily
only in cases involving very serious heresy, such as proved
Judaism, or notorious apostasy. In Lopez' case the charges
of Judaism were not substantiated, and although he had
probably been guilty of speech and conduct lacking in
respect for the Church, he could not be regarded as apostate.
The only practical result of a sentence of guilt in 1671 would
have been to blast the memory of a man long since dead. The
decision finally reached by the tribunal made possible burial
of his remains in consecrated ground, and freed his property
from embargo, giving his wife an opportunity to press for
a final liquidation of the goods. But in view of the decision
of the court against Aguilar, there is every reason to believe
that if Lopez had lived the Holy Office would have pro-
nounced a sentence of guilt and would have imposed pen-
alties, probably more severe than those suffered by Aguilar.
Anaya, Romero, and Gomez Robledo had all been par-
tisans of Lopez, and there is reason to believe that a spirit
of revenge inspired certain persons who gave testimony
against them. Moreover, the loyalty of Gaspar Perez, father
of Diego Romero, and Francisco G6mez the Elder to civil
416 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
authority had not been forgotten, and their "hostility" to
the Church was cited as presumptive proof of the guilt of
their sons. But the issues before the tribunal during the
proceedings against Anaya, Romero, and Gomez Robledo
were strictly religious in character.
In the case of Anaya one important point was involved,
which the defendant finally confessed. It did not constitute
major heresy, and the sentence of the Holy Office was dis-
ciplinary rather than punitive. Public confession of his
errors at home before his friends and fellow-citizens would
teach him a severe lesson, and cause him to use care hence-
forth in debating doctrinal matters concerning which he
had little knowledge. Romero's offenses were more serious
and more numerous. He had denied an article of doctrine,
had made a scandalous proposition inimical to public morals,
and had participated in heathen rites. The terms of the
sentencia de vista in Romero's case were far more severe
than those imposed in the preliminary sentence against
Aguilar, and indicate that the tribunal took a more serious
view of his offenses than those of the ex-alcalde mayor.
Romero was able to obtain a moderation of sentence by a
confession of guilt and a plea that he was a rough and simple
frontiersman. The charge of Judaism brought against
Gomez Robledo was extremely serious, but the evidence was
not sufficient to support it, and the court, realizing this,
turned in a verdict of acquittal.
In the case of Dona Teresa de Aguilera, the tribunal
voted to suspend the proceedings without rendering a formal
decision. For all practical purposes this was an acquittal.
Dona Teresa was anxious, however, to have definite proof
in writing of her innocence, and on January 13, 1665, she
petitioned the tribunal for a copy of its decree suspending
the trial. This desire was prompted by the fact that her
family occupied a position of some prominence in Spain, and
she was anxious not to prevent the advancement of her two
brothers at court. The Holy Office, on recommendation of
the fiscal, denied her plea.7
7. Proceso contra Dona Teresa de Aguilera.
TROUBLOUS TIMES IN NEW MEXICO 417
The cases of Dona Teresa de Aguilera and Francisco
Gomez Robledo illustrate the harm that could be done by
petty gossip and spiteful rumor-mongering. Much of the
testimony against Teresa was based on stories told by
ignorant, prying servants who had incurred her displeasure.
Hearsay, rumor, and misrepresentation characterized most
of the evidence against Gomez Robledo. In the end the Holy
Office pronounced Gomez innocent and suspended the pro-
ceedings against Dona Teresa, but only after they had been
held in jail for months. And the final verdicts could not
remove the humiliation they had suffered in being tried by
the Inquisition.
(To be continued)
EDITORIAL NOTES
Retrospect. — With this issue we are concluding the
fifteenth volume of our quarterly. To those who have
become members of our Society during these years it may be
of interest to know something of the history of our publica-
tions.
When the Historical Society of New Mexico was first
organized in 1859, Article II of the constitution then adopted
stated :
The object of this Society shall be the collec-
tion and preservation, under its own care and
direction, of all historical facts, manuscripts,
documents, records and memoirs, relating to this
Territory; Indian antiquities and curiosities, geo-
logical and mineralogical specimens, geographical
maps and information; and objects of Natural
History.
When the Society was revived and incorporated in
1880-81 this very comprehensive program was reaffirmed,
so it is not surprising that, in the series of "Papers" which
our Society then began to publish, three of the first were
anthropological rather than historical in character: "Kin
and Clan" by Adolph Bandelier, and "Stone Lions of Co-
chiti" and "Stone Idols of New Mexico," both by L. Bradford
Prince.
In 1907 the School of American Archaeology was estab-
lished in Santa Fe (receiving an annual legislative appro-
priation and agreeing to develop and maintain a "Museum
of New Mexico"), and it then became apparent that we had
two institutions the objectives of which were more or less
overlapping. This became even more evident when in 1917
the School changed its title to "School of American Re-
search" and included distinctly historical work among its
activities. Adjustments and coordination seemed called for.
Even before the death of President L. Bradford Prince
in December, 1922, we had a very active member in Ralph
418
EDITORIAL NOTES 419
E. Twitchell — who was also one of the regents of the State
Museum. Under his initiative the constitution of our Society
was revised in 1923, one change being to limit the aims and
work as stated in Article II to definitely historical lines :
The objects of the Society shall be, in general,
the promotion of historical studies ; and in particu-
lar, the discovery, collection, preservation, and pub-
lication of historical material, especially such as
relates to New Mexico.
Ten years earlier, Colonel Twitchell had inaugurated
a quarterly which he called Old Santa Fe, sponsored by our
Society but for which he was financially responsible, He
carried it successfully for twelve issues (to October, 1916),
and today any complete set is a prize among Southwestern
Americana.
Following the World War there was a well recognized
need in the New Mexico field for such a publication. After
TwitchelFs death in September, 1925, there could be no
thought of reviving Old Santa Fe, yet the quarterly which
first appeared in January, 1926, entitled the New Mexico
Historical Review was the logical successor of the earlier
one. During the fifteen years now closing, quite a remark-
able body of contributors have made our editorial work a
comparatively easy task ; surely it is significant of the need
for such a publication that not once in sixty issues have we
ever been short of good copy. We shall have more to say in
this regard when editing the Cumulative Index which is to
cover the fifteen volumes to date and which we hope will be
available by the end of the year. It may be regarded as
significant also that the University of New Mexico asked to
become joint sponsor for the Quarterly, and since the sum-
mer of 1929 has shared the responsibility for its editing and
publishing.
Prospect. — Copy already in hand for next year includes
two remaining installments of the 18th century study by
Henry Kelly; an Indian agent's journal edited by Annie
Heloise Abel ; a study of early contact between Apaches and
420 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
whites by Donald E. Worcester; some notes on Dr. J. M.
Whitlock by his granddaughter Mrs. B. C. Hernandez;
another contribution from Carl 0. Sauer regarding Fray
Marcos de Niza. Marion Dargan wants space to conclude
his studies on the statehood struggle, and France Scholes
hopes to complete his 17th century study by April next. And
of course there are any amount of interesting and important
records, long and short, which can be slipped in as oppor-
tunity offers.
Possibly, to meet the increasing demand for space, it
will be wise now to change to a somewhat larger format and
also increase the number of pages. Whether this is done in
January will depend in part on the results of the member-
ship drive now in progress. Meanwhile, Mr. Lansing B.
Bloom as secretary-treasurer agrees heartily with our edi-
torial view that prompt renewal of subscriptions for the
year 1941 by our present members will be greatly appre-
ciated. L. B. B.
CONSTITUTION
OP THE
HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW MEXICO
(As amended Nov. 19, 1929)
Article 1. tiame. This Society shall be called the Historical Society
of New Mexico.
Article 2. Objects and Operation. The objects of the Society shall be,
in general, the promotion of historical studies; and in particular, the
discovery, collection, preservation, and publication of historical ma-
terial, especially such as relates to New Mexico.
Article 3. Membership. The Society shall consist of Members, Fel-
lows, Life Members and Honorary Life Members.
(a) Members. Persons recommended by the Executive Council
and elected by the Society may become members.
(b) Fellows. Members who show, by published work, special
aptitude for historical investigation may become Fellows. Immedi-
ately following the adoption of this Constitution, the Executive
Council shall elect five Fellows, and the body thus created may there-
after elect additional Fellows on the nomination of the Executive
Council. The number of Fellows shall never exceed twenty-five.
(c) Life Members. In addition to life members of the Historical
Society of New Mexico at the date of the adoption hereof, such other
benefactors of the Society as shall pay into its treasury at one time
the sum of fifty dollars, or shall present to the Society an equivalent
in books, manuscripts, portraits, or other acceptable material of an
historic nature, may upon recommendation by the Executive Council
and election by the Society, be classed as Life Members.
(d) Honorary Life Members. Persons who have rendered emi-
nent service to New Mexico and others who have, by published work,
contributed to the historical literature of New Mexico or the South-
west, may become Honorary Life Members upon being recommended
by the Executive Council and elected by the Society.
Article 4. Officers. The elective officers of the Society shall be a
president, two vice-presidents, a corresponding secretary and treas-
urer, and a recording secretary; and these five officers shall constitute
the Executive Council with full administrative powers.
Officers shall qualify on January 1st following their election, and
shall hold office for the term of two years and until their successors
Article 5. Elections. At the October meeting of each odd-numbered
year, a nominating committee shall be named by the president of the
Society and such committee shall make its report to the Society at
the November meeting. Nominations may be made from the floor
and the Society shall, in open meeting, proceed to elect its officers by
ballot, those nominees receiving a majority of the votes cast for the
respective offices to be declared elected.
Article 6. Dues. Dues shall be $3.00 for each calendar year, and
shall entitle members to receive bulletins as published and also the
Historical Review.
Article 7. Publications. All publications of the Society and the selec-
tion and editing of matter for publication shall be under the direction
and control of the Executive Council.
Article 8. Meetings. Monthly meetings of the Society shall be held at
the rooms of the Society on the third Tuesday of each month at
eight P. M. The Executive Council shall meet at any time upon call
of the President or of three of its members.
Article 9. Quorums. Seven members of the Society and three mem-
bers of the Executive Council, shall constitute quorums.
Article 10. Amendments. Amendments to this constitution shall be-
come operative after being recommended by the Executive Council
and approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting at
any regular monthly meeting; provided, that notice of the proposed
amendment shall have been given at a regular meeting of the Society,
at least four weeks prior to the meeting when such proposed amend-
ment is passed upon by the Society.
Students and friends of Southwestern History are cordially in-
vited to become members. Applications should be addressed to the
corresponding secretary, Lansing B. Bloom, University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
PUBLICATIONS FOR SALE
OLD SANTA FE, (the quarterly published in 1913-1916), 3 volumes,
unbound. The seventh issue is almost exhausted, and volume II,
number 2 is out of print. Vols. I and III, each $4.00; Vol. II,
numbers 1 & 4, each $1.00 and number 3, $5.00.
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW (quarterly, since January 1926)
Volume I — Number 1 out of print. Other numbers $2.00 each.
Volume II — Number 1 (sold only in sets) $3.00; numbers 2, 3,
and 4, each $1.00
Volumes III to current year, per volume $4.00
By subscription, during current year $3.00
Papers. Nos. 1 to 38 (1888 to 1935) List of titles sent on request.
ST. FRANCIS AND THE FRANCISCANS IN NEW MEXICO, 44 pp. ill., $0.50
REPRINTS from the Historical Review, each $0.25. Titles sent on
request.
PUBLICATIONS IN HISTORY
Vol. I — Fray Marcos de Niza's Relation, Span, and Eng. ed.
by Percy W. Baldwin, 59 pp. (1926) $0.60
Vol. II — Juan de Onate and the founding of New Mexico.
Geo. P. Hammond. 228 pp., maps, bibliog., index.
(1927) $1.50
Vol. Ill — New Mexico in the Great War, ed. by L. B. Bloom.
166 pp., index. (1927) $1.50
Vol. IV — The Gallegos Relation of the Rodriguez expedition to
New Mexico, ed. by G. P. Hammond and Agapito Rey.
69 pp., maps, index. (1927) $1.00
Vol. V — Barreiro's Ojeada sobre Niwvo Mexico (1832), ed by
L. B. Bloom. 60 pp., ill. (1929) $0.75
Vol. VI — Indian Labor in the Spanish Colonies. Ruth Kerns
Barber. 134 pp., bibliog., index. (1932) $1.50
Vol. VII— Church and State in New Mexico, 1610-1650, France
V. Scholes. 206 pp., bibliog., index. (1937) $1.50
Vol. VIII— The American Occupation of New Mexico, 1851-52
Sister Mary Loyola. 166 pp., bibliog., index. (1939) $1.50
Vol. IX— Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848-1886.
R. H. Ogle. 259 pp., bibliog., index. $2.00
BOOKS OF THE LATE R. E. TWITCHELL
Leading Facts of New Mexico History, 2 Vols., ill., index
(almost exhausted) $25.00
Spanish Archives of N. Mex. 2 Vols., ill., index 12.00
Military Occupation of N. Mex., ill. 394 pp. 2.50
(The above prices on books and quarterly sets are carriage extra.)
Address orders to
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
Box 1704, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
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