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Full text of "History of the Nineteenth army corps"

GIFT OF 
D. C. Fes sen-! en 




HISTORY 



NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS 



BY 



RICHARD B. IRWIN 

FORMERLY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL U. S. VOLUNTEERS, ASSISTANT 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE CORPS AND OF 

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF 



G. P. PUTNAM S SONS 

NEW YORK LONDON 

2 7 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND 

&fje fimtherbockex |)ress 
1892 




oJ 



\SK 



COPYRIGHT, 1892 

BY 
G. P. PUTNAM S SONS 



Electrotyped, Printed, and Bound by 

Ube Iknicfcerbccfcer ipress, 1Wew Uor?? 
G. P. PUTNAM S SONS 



IN LOVING REMEMBRANCE OF THEIR 
LATE COMMANDER 

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM HEMSLEY EMORY 

AND OF THE MANY COMRADES 

WHO LAID DOWN THEIR LIVES IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY 
THIS HISTORY IS INSCRIBED BY THE 

SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE 
SOCIETY OF THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS 



M94884: 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER. 

INTRODUCTORY . 

I. NEW ORLEANS . 
II. THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG 

III. BATON ROUGE . 

IV. LA FOURCHE . 

V. BANKS IN COMMAND 

VI. ORGANIZING THE CORPS . 

VII. MORE WAYS THAN ONE . 

VIII. FARRAGUT PASSES PORT HUDSON . 

IX. THE TECHE 

X. BlSLAND . 

XL IRISH BEND 

XII. OPELOUSAS 

XIII. BANKS AND GRANT . 

XIV. ALEXANDRIA 

XV. BACK TO PORT HUDSON . 

XVI. THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MAY 

XVII. THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE . 

XVIII. UNVEXED TO THE SEA . 

XIX. HARROWING LA FOURCHE 

XX. IN SUMMER QUARTERS . 

XXI. A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS . 

XXII. WINTER QUARTERS . 

XXIII. THE RED RIVER 

XXIV. SABINE CROSS-ROADS 



i 

3 

17 
32 
43 
52 
66 
72 
77 
8$ 
94 
104 

121 

135 
M3 

152 

163 
I8 5 
209 

235 
2 5 6 
264 

277 
282 

2Q9 



VI 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER. 

XXV. PLEASANT HILL . * 

XXVI. GRAND ECORE 

XXVII. THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER 

XXVIII. THE DAM . . . . . 

XXIX. LAST DAYS IN LOUISIANA 

XXX. ON THE POTOMAC . . . . . 

XXXI. IN THE SHENANDOAH . 

XXXII. THE OPEQUON . . 

XXXIII. FISHER S HILL . . 

XXXIV. CEDAR CREEK . 

XXXV. VICTORY AND HOME , , . . . 

APPENDIX : 

ROSTERS .... . 

LOSSES IN BATTLE . . . / . . . 
OFFICERS KILLED OR MORTALLY WOUNDED, 
PORT HUDSON FORLORN HOPE . 
ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION . . 
NOTE ON EARLY S STRENGTH . . 
INDEX 



323 

328 

337 
344 
355 
368 

378 
396 



439 



464 

483 
488 
506 

507 
509 



MAPS AND PLANS. 



PAGE 

MAP OF LOUISIANA. SHEET I. .16 and 17 

" " II. . . . 3 2 33 

" III. . . . 80 " 81 

BATTLE PLAN OF BISLAND, APRIL 12-13, 1863 . 96 

BATTLE PLAN OF IRISH BEND, APRIL 14, 1863 . 112 

BATTLE PLAN OF PORT HUDSON. . . 192 

MAP OF LOUISIANA. SHEET IV. . 288 and 289 

BATTLE PLAN OF SABINE CROSS-ROADS, APRIL 8, 

1864. FROM GENERAL EMORY S MAP . 304 

BATTLE PLAN OF PLEASANT HILL, APRIL 9, 1864. 

FROM GENERAL EMORY S MAP . . 3 2 

BATTLE PLAN OF CANE RIVER CROSSING OR 
MONETT S BLUFF, APRIL 23, 1864. FROM GEN 
ERAL EMORY S MAP ... . 

THE RED RIVER DAM ... . 

MAP OF SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN. FROM 
MAJOR W. F. TIEMANN S "HISTORY OF THE 
159TH, NEW YORK ... . 

BATTLE PLAN OF OPEQUON, SEPTEMBER 19, 1864. 
FROM THE OFFICIAL MAP, 1873 34 aiid 

BATTLE PLAN OF FISHER S HILL, SEPTEMBER 22, 

1864. FROM THE OFFICIAL MAP . . 400 

BATTLE PLAN OF CEDAR CREEK, OCTOBER 19, 1864. 

FROM THE OFFICIAL MAP OF 1873 . 4 l6 and 4*7 



INTRODUCTORY. 

THE history of the Nineteenth Army Corps, like 
that of by far the greater number of the organizations 
of like character, in which were arrayed the great 
armies of volunteers that took up arms to maintain 
the Union, is properly the history of all the troops 
that at any time belonged to the corps or served 
within its geographical limits. 

To be complete, then, the narrative my comrades 
have asked me to write must go back to the earliest 
service of these troops, at a period before the corps 
itself was formally established, and must continue on 
past the time when the earlier territorial organization 
became merged or lost and the main body of the corps 
was sent into the Shenandoah, down to the peace, and 
the final muster of the last regiment. 

If hitherto less known and thus less considered 
than the proud record of those great corps of the 
Armies of the Potomac, of the Tennessee, and of the 
Cumberland, on whom in the fortune of war fell the 
heat and burthen of so many pitched battles, whose 
colors bear the names of so many decisive victories, 
yet the story of the Nineteenth Army Corps is one 
whose simple facts suffice for all that need be told or 
claimed of valor, of achievement, of sacrifice, or of 
patient endurance. I shall, therefore, attempt neither 
eulogy nor apology, nor shall I feel called upon to 



2 INTRO D UCTOR Y. 

undertake to criticise the actions or the failures of the 
living or the dead, save where such criticism may 
prove to be an essential part of the narrative. From 
the brows of other soldiers, no one of us could ever 
wish to pluck the wreaths so dearly won, so honor 
ably worn ; yet, since the laurel grows wild on every 
hill-side in this favored land, we may without trespass 
be permitted to gather a single spray or two to 
decorate the sacred places where beneath the cypresses 
and the magnolias of the lowlands of Louisiana, or 
under the green turf among the mountains of Vir 
ginia, reposes all that was mortal of so many thou 
sands of our brave and beloved comrades. 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



CHAPTER i: 

NEW ORLEANS. 

THE opening of the Mississippi and the capture of 
New Orleans formed important parts of the first 
comprehensive plan of campaign, conceived and pro 
posed by Lieutenant-General Scott soon after the 
outbreak of the war. When McClellan was called to 
Washington to command the Army of the Potomac, 
one of his earliest communications to the President 
set forth in general terms his plans for the suppres 
sion of the Rebellion. Of these plans, also, the cap 
ture of New Orleans formed an integral and important 
part. Both Scott and McClellan contemplated a move 
ment down the river by a strong column. However 
nothing had been done by either toward carrying out 
this project, when, in September, 1861, the Navy 
Department took up the idea of an attack on New 
Orleans from the sea. 

At the time of the secession of Louisiana, New 
Orleans was not only the first city in wealth, popula 
tion, and importance in the seceded States, but the 
sixth in all the Union. With a population of nearly 
170,000 souls, she carried on an export trade larger 

3 



4 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

than that of any other port in the country, and en 
joyed a commerce in magnitude and profit second 
only to that of New York. The year just ended 
had witnessed the production of the largest crop 
of cotton ever grown in America, fully two fifths of 
which passed through the presses and paid toll to the 
.factors of. New. Orleans. The receipts of cotton at 

1860-1861 were but little less than 
; bales/ t valued at nearly $100,000,000. Of 
SUgr> &airiLy:t&6 production of the State of Louisi 
ana, the receipts considerably exceeded 250,000 tons, 
valued at more than $25,000,000 ; the total receipts of 
products of all kinds amounted to nearly $200,000,- 
ooo. The exports were valued at nearly $110,000,- 
ooo ; the imports at nearly $23,000,000. It is doubtful 
if any other crop in any part of the world then paid 
profits at once so large and so uniform to all persons 
interested as the cotton and sugar of Louisiana. 
If cotton were not exactly king, as it was in those 
days the fashion to assert, there could be no doubt 
that cotton was a banker, and a generous banker for 
New Orleans. The factors of Carondelet Street grew 
rich upon the great profits that the planters of the 
"coast," as the shores of the river are called, paid 
them, almost without feeling it, while the planters 
came, nearly every winter, to New Orleans to pass 
the season and to spend, in a round of pleasure, at 
least a portion of the net proceeds of the account 
sales. In the transport of these products nearly two 
thousand sailing ships and steamers were engaged, 
and in the town itself or its suburb of Algiers, on 
the opposite bank, were to be found all the appli 
ances and facilities necessary for the conduct of so 
extensive a commerce. These, especially the work- 



NEW ORLEANS. 5 

shops and factories, and the innumerable river and 
bayou steamers that thronged the levee, were des 
tined to prove of the greatest military value, at first 
to the Confederacy, and later to the forces of the 
Union. For food and fuel, however, New Orleans 
was largely dependent upon the North and West. 
Finally, beside her importance as the guardian of the 
gates of the Mississippi, New Orleans had a direct 
military value as the basis of any operations destined 
for the control or defence of the Mississippi River. 

About the middle of November the plan took 
definite shape, and on the 23d of December Far- 
ragut received preparatory orders to take command 
of the West Gulf Squadron and the naval portion 
of the expedition destined for the reduction of New 
Orleans. Farragut received his final orders on the 
2Oth of January, 1862, and immediately afterward 
hoisted his flag on the sloop-of-war Hartford. 

The land portion of the expedition was placed 
under the command of Major-General Benjamin F. 
Butler. On the loth and i2th of September, 1861, 
Butler had been authorized by the War Department 
to raise, organize, arm, uniform, and equip, in the 
New England States, such troops as he might judge 
fit for the purpose, to make an expedition along 
the eastern shore of Maryland and Virginia to Cape 
Charles ; but early in November, before Butler s 
forces were quite ready, these objects were accom 
plished by a brigade under Lockwood, sent from 
Baltimore by Dix. On the 23d of November the 
advance of Butler s expedition sailed from Portland, 
Maine, for Ship Island, in the steamer Constitution, 
and on the 2d of December, in reporting the sailing, 
Butler submitted to the War Department his plan for 



6 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

invading the coast of Texas and the ultimate capture 
of New Orleans. 

On the 24th of January, 1862, McClellan, then 
commanding all the armies of the United States, was 
called on by the Secretary of War to report whether 
the expedition proposed by General Butler should 
be prosecuted, abandoned, or modified, and in what 
manner. McClellan at once urged that the expedi 
tion be suspended. In his opinion, "not less than 
30,000 men, and it is believed 50,000, would be re 
quired to insure success against New Orleans in a 
blow to be struck from the Gulf." This suggestion 
did not meet the approval of the government, now 
fully determined on the enterprise. 

Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, the chief engi 
neer of the Army of the Potomac, an engineer also of 
more than common ability, energy, and experience, 
was now called into consultation. On the 28th of 
January, 1862, he submitted to the Navy Depart 
ment a memorandum describing fully the defences of 
Forts Jackson and St. Philip and outlining a plan for 
a combined attempt on these works by the army and 
navy. The military force required for the purpose 
he estimated at 20,000 men. 

Meanwhile the work of transferring Butler s forces 
by sea to Ship Island had been going on with vigor. 
He had raised thirteen regiments of infantry, ten 
batteries of light artillery, and three troops of cavalry, 
numbering in all about 13,600 men. To these were 
now added from the garrison of Baltimore three 
regiments, the 2ist Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th 
Michigan, and the 2d Massachusetts battery, thus 
increasing his force to 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 
and 580 artillerists; in all, 15,255 officers and men. 



NEW ORLEANS. 7 

On the 23d of February, 1862, Butler received his 
final orders : " The object of your expedition," said 
McClellan, " is one of vital importance the capture 
of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Missis 
sippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered 
(perhaps the only one) is in the resistance offered by 
Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that 
the navy can reduce these works. Should the navy 
fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces 
and siege-train, and endeavor to breach the works, 
silence their guns, and carry them by assault. 

"The next resistance will be near the English 
bend, where there are some earthen batteries. Here 
it may be necessary for you to land your troops to 
co-operate with the naval attack, although it is more 
than probable that the navy, unassisted, can accom 
plish the result. If these works are taken, the city 
of New Orleans necessarily falls." 

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, the 
instructions went on to say, Butler was to reduce all 
the works guarding the approaches, to join with the 
navy in occupying Baton Rouge, and then to en 
deavor to open communication with the northern 
column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the 
necessity of occupying Jackson, as soon as this could 
safely be done. Mobile was to follow, then Pensa- 
cola and Galveston. By the time New Orleans should 
have fallen the government would probably reinforce 
his army sufficiently to accomplish all these objects. 

On the same day a new military department was 
created called the Department of the Gulf, and 
Butler was assigned to the command. Its limits 
were to comprise all the coast of the Gulf of Mexico 
west of Pensacola harbor, and so much of the Gulf 



8 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

States as might be occupied by Butler s forces. Since 
the middle of October he had commanded the expe 
ditionary forces, under the name of the Department 
of New England. 

Arriving at Ship Island on the 2oth of March, 
he formally assumed the command of the Department 
of the Gulf, announcing Major George C. Strong, 
as Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, 
Lieutenant Godfrey Weitzel as Chief Engineer, and 
Surgeon Thomas Hewson Bache as Medical Director. 
To these were afterward added Colonel John Wilson 
Shaffer as Chief Quartermaster, Colonel John W. 
Turner, as Chief Commissary, and Captain George A. 
Kensel, as Acting Assistant Inspector-General and 
Chief of Artillery. 

By the end of March all the troops destined for 
the expedition had landed at Ship Island, with the 
exception of the i3th Connecticut, i5th Maine, 
7th and 8th Vermont regiments, ist Vermont and 
2d Massachusetts batteries. Within the next fort 
night all these troops joined the force except the 
2d Massachusetts battery, which being detained 
more than seven weeks at Fortress Monroe, and 
being nearly five weeks at sea, did not reach New 
Orleans until the 2ist of May. Meanwhile, of the 
six Maine batteries, all except the ist had been di 
verted to other fields of service. 

While awaiting at Ship Island the completion of the 
preparations of the navy for the final attempt on the 
river forts, Butler proceeded to organize his com 
mand and to discipline and drill the troops composing 
it. Many of these were entirely without instruction 
in any of the details of service. On the 22d of 
March, he divided his forces into three brigades of five 



NEW ORLEANS. 9 

or six regiments each, attaching to each brigade one 
or more batteries of artillery and a troop of cavalry. 
The brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals 
John W. Phelps and Thomas Williams, and Colonel 
George F. Shepley of the I2th Maine. When finally 
assembled the whole force reported about 13,500 
officers and men for duty, and from that moment 
its strength was destined to undergo a steady diminu 
tion by the natural attrition of service, augmented, in 
this case, by climatic influences. 

The fleet under Farragut consisted of seventeen 
vessels, mounting 154 guns. Four were screw-sloops, 
one a side-wheel steamer, three screw corvettes, and 
nine screw gunboats. Each of the gunboats carried 
one i i-inch smooth-bore gun, and one 3O-pounder 
rifle ; but neither of these could be used to fire at an 
enemy directly ahead, and, in the operations awaiting 
the fleet, it is within bounds to say that not more 
than one gun in four could be brought to bear at any 
given moment. With this fleet were twenty mortar- 
boats, under Porter, each carrying one 1 3-inch 
mortar, and six gunboats, assigned for the service of 
the mortar-boats and armed like the gunboats of the 
river fleet. Farragut, with the Hartford, had reached 
Ship Island on the 2oth of February ; the rest of the 
vessels assigned to his fleet soon followed. Then 
entering the delta, from that time he conducted the 
blockade of the river from the head of the passes. 

The Confederacy was now being so closely pressed 
in every quarter as to make it impossible, with the 
forces at its command, to defend effectively and at the 
same moment every point menaced by the troops 
and fleets of the Union. Thus the force that might 
otherwise have been employed hi defending New 



io THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Orleans was, under the pressure of the emergency, 
so heavily drawn from to strengthen the army at 
Corinth, then engaged in resisting the southward 
advance of the combined armies of the Union under 
Halleck, as to leave New Orleans, and indeed all 
Louisiana, at the mercy of any enemy that should 
succeed in passing the river forts. At this time the 
entire land-force, under Major-General Mansfield 
Lovell, hardly exceeded 5,000 men. Of these, 1,100 
occupied Forts Jackson and St. Philip, under the 
command of General Duncan ; 1,200 held the Chal- 
mette line, under General Martin L. Smith, and about 
3,000, chiefly new levies, badly armed, were in New 
Orleans. Besides this small land-force, the floating 
defences consisted of four improvised vessels of the 
Confederate navy, two belonging to the State of 
Louisiana, and six others of what was called the 
Montgomery fleet. These were boats specially con 
structed for the defence of the river, but most of them 
had been sent up the river to Memphis to hold off 
Foote and Davis. The twelve vessels carried in all 
thirty-eight guns. Each of the boats of the river- 
fleet defence had its bows shod with iron and its 
engines protected with cotton. This was also the 
case with the two sea-going steamers belonging to the 
State, Of this flotilla the most powerful was the 
iron-clad Louisiana^ whose armor was found strong 
enough to turn an n-inch shell at short range, and, 
as her armament consisted of two 7-inch rifles, three 
9-inch shell guns, four 1 8-inch shell guns, and seven 
6-inch rifles, she might have proved a formidable 
foe had her engines been equal to their work. 

At the Plaquemine Bend, twenty miles above the 
head of the passes and ninety below New Orleans, the 



NEW ORLEANS. n 

engineers of the United States had constructed two 
permanent fortifications, designed to defend the 
entrance of the river against the foreign enemies of 
the Union. These formidable works had now to be 
passed or taken before New Orleans could be occu 
pied. Fort St. Philip, on the left or north bank, was a 
work of brick and earth, flanked on either hand by a 
water battery. In the main work were mounted, in 
barbette, four 8-inch columbiads and one 24-pounder 
gun ; the upper water battery carried sixteen 24- 
pounders, the lower one 8-inch columbiad, one 7-inch 
rifle, six 42-pounders, nine 32-pounders, and four 24- 
pounders. Besides these, there were seven mortars, 
one of 13-inch calibre, five of lo-inch, and one of 
8-inch. Forty-two of the guns could be brought to 
bear upon the fleet ascending the river. 

Fort Jackson, on the south or left bank of the river, 
was a casemated pentagon of brick, mounting in the 
casemates fourteen 24-pounder guns, and ten 24- 
pounder howitzers, and in barbette in the upper tier 
two lo-inch columbiads, three 8-inch columbiads, one 
7-inch rifle, six 42-pounders, fifteen 32-pounders, and 
eleven 24-pounders, in all sixty-two guns. The water 
battery below the main work was armed with one 
lo-inch columbiad, two 8-inch columbiads, and two 
rifled 32-pounders. Fifty of these pieces were avail 
able against the fleet, but of the whole armament of 
one hundred and nine guns, fifty-six were old 24- 
pounder smooth-bores. 

The passage of the forts had been obstructed by a 
raft or chain anchored between them. The forts once 
overcome, no other defence remained to be encoun 
tered until English Turn was reached, where earth 
works had been thrown up on both banks. Here at 



12 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Chalmette, on the left bank, it was that, in 1815, 
Jackson, with his handful of raw levies, so signally 
defeated Wellington s veterans of the Peninsula, 
under the leadership of the fearless Pakenham. 

Fort St. Philip stands about 700 yards higher up 
the river than Fort Jackson ; the river at this point is 
about 800 yards wide, and the distance between the 
nearest salients of the main works is about 1,000 yards. 
A vessel attempting to run the gauntlet of the bat 
teries would be under fire while passing over a dis 
tance of three and a half miles. The river was now 
high, and the banks, everywhere below the river level, 
and only protected from inundation by the levees, 
were overflowed. There was no standing room 
for an investing army ; the lower guns were under 
water, and in the very forts the platforms were 
awash. 

When the fleet was ready, Butler embarked eight 
regiments and three batteries under Phelps and Wil 
liams on transports, and, going to the head of the 
passes, held his troops in readiness to co-operate with 
the navy. On the i6th of April the fleet took up its 
position. The mortar-boats, or " bombers/ as they 
began to be called, were anchored between 3,000 and 
4,000 yards below Fort Jackson, upon which the 
attack was mainly to be directed. From the view of 
those in the fort, the boats that lay under the right 
bank were covered by trees. Those on the opposite 
side of the river were screened, after a fashion, by 
covering their hulls with reeds and willows, cut for 
the purpose. 

On the 1 8th of April the bombardment began. 
It soon became evident that success was not to be at 
tained in this way, and Farragut determined upon 



NEW ORLEANS. 13 

passing the forts with his fleet. Should he fail 
in reducing them by this movement, Butler was to 
land in the rear of Fort St. Philip, near Quarantine, 
and carry the works by storm. Accordingly, he 
remained with his transports below the forts, and 
waited for the hour. Shepley occupied Ship Island 
with the rest of the force. 

Early in March the raft, formed of great cypress 
trees, forty feet long and fifty inches through, laid 
lengthwise in the river about three feet apart, anchored 
by heavy chains and strengthened by massive cross- 
timbers, had been partly carried away by the flood. 
To make good the damage, a number of large 
schooners had then been anchored in the gap. On 
the morning of the 2ist of April this formidable 
obstruction was cleverly and in a most gallant manner 
broken through by the fleet. 

On the night of the 23d of April, Farragut moved 
to the attack. His fleet, organized in three divisions 
of eight, three, and six vessels respectively, was 
formed in line ahead. The first division was led by 
Captain Bailey, in the Cayuga, followed by the 
Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, Katahdin, 
Kineo, and Wissahickon ; the second division followed, 
composed of Farragut s flag-ship, the Hartford, Com 
mander Richard Wainwright, the Brooklyn, and the 
Richmond ; while the third division, forming the rear 
of the column, was led by Captain Bell, in the Sciota, 
followed by the Iroquois, Kennebec, Pinola, Itasca, 
and Winona. 

At half-past two o clock on the morning of the 24th 
of April the whole fleet was under way ; a quarter of 
an hour later the batteries of Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip opened simultaneously upon the Cayuga. It was 



14 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

some time before the navy could reply, but soon 
every gun was in action. Beset by perils on every 
hand, the fleet pressed steadily up the river. The 
Confederate boats were destroyed, the fire-rafts were 
overcome, the gunners of the forts were driven from 
their guns, and when the sun rose Farragut was 
above the forts with the whole of his fleet, except 
the Itasca, Winona, and Kennebec, which put back dis 
abled, and the Varuna, sunk by the Confederate gun 
boats. The next afternoon, having made short work 
of Chalmette, Farragut anchored off New Orleans, 
and held the town at his mercy. 

The casualties were 37 killed and 147 wounded, 
in all 184. The Confederate loss was 50, n killed 
and 39 wounded. The Louisiana, McCrea, and De 
fiance, sole survivors of the Confederate fleet, escap 
ing comparatively unhurt, took refuge under the 
walls of Fort St. Philip. 

Leaving Phelps, with the 3Oth Massachusetts and 
T2th Connecticut and Manning s 4th Massachusetts 
battery, at the head of the passes, in order to be 
prepared to occupy the works immediately on their 
surrender, Butler hastened with the rest of his force 
to Sable Island in the rear of Fort St. Philip. When 
the transports came to anchor on the morning of the 
26th, the Confederate flags on Forts St. Philip and 
Jackson were plainly visible to the men on board, 
while these, in their turn, were seen from the forts. 
Here the troops received the news of Farragut s 
arrival at New Orleans. On the morning of the 28th 
they saw the Confederate ram Louisiana blown up 
while floating past the forts, and on the same day 
Jones landed with the 26th Massachusetts and Paine 
with two companies of the 4th Wisconsin and a de- 



NEW ORLEANS. 15 

tachment of the 2ist Indiana, to work their way 
through a small canal to Quarantine, six miles above 
Fort St. Philip, for the purpose of seizing the narrow 
strip by which the garrison must escape, if at all. 
This was only accomplished by a long and tiresome 
transport in boats, and finally by wading. However, 
at half-past two on the afternoon of the 28th April, 
the Confederate flags over Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip were observed to disappear ; the national 
ensign floated in their stead ; and soon it became 
known that Duncan had surrendered to Porter. 

Porter immediately took possession and held it 
until Phelps came up the river to relieve him. Then 
Major Whittemore, of the 3Oth Massachusetts, with 
about two hundred men of his regiment, landed and 
took command at Fort St. Philip, while Manning 
occupied Fort Jackson. Almost simultaneously the 
frigate Mississippi came down the river, bringing 
Jones with the news that his regiment was at Quar 
antine, holding both banks of the river, and thus 
effectually sealing the last avenue of escape ; for at 
this time the levee formed the only pathway. On 
the 29th Phelps put Deming in command of Fort 
Jackson, intending to leave his regiment, the I2th 
Connecticut, in garrison there, and to place Dudley, 
with the 30th Massachusetts, at Fort St. Philip ; 
but before this arrangement could be carried out, 
orders came from Butler, designating the 26th Mas 
sachusetts as the garrison of the two forts, with Jones 
in command. Phelps, with his force, was directed to 
New Orleans 

On the ist of May Butler landed at New Or 
leans and took military possession of the city. Si 
multaneously, at five o clock in the afternoon, the 



1 6 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

3 ist Massachusetts with a section of Everett s 6th 
Massachusetts battery, and six companies of the 4th 
Wisconsin, under Paine, disembarked and marched up 
the broad levee to the familiar airs that announced the 
joint coming of "Yankee Doodle" and of " Picayune 
Butler." 

The outlying defences on both banks of the river 
and on the lakes were abandoned by the Confederates 
without a struggle. Forts Pike and Wood, on Lake 
Pontchartrain, were garrisoned by detachments from 
the 7th Vermont and 8th New Hampshire regiments. 
The 2ist Indiana landed at Algiers, and marching to 
Brashear, eighty miles distant on Berwick Bay, took 
possession of the New Orleans and Opelousas railway. 
New Orleans itself was occupied by the 3Oth and 3ist 
Massachusetts, the 4th Wisconsin and 6th Michigan, 
9th and i2th Connecticut, 4th and 6th Massachusetts 
batteries, 2d Vermont battery, and Troops A and B 
of the Massachusetts cavalry. At Farragut s approach 
Lovell, seeing that further resistance was useless, 
abandoned New Orleans to its fate and withdrew to 
Camp Moore, distant seventy-eight miles, on the line 
of the Jackson railway. 




MILES 



LOUISIANA 




SHEET I. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VIQKSBURG. 

WITH the capture of New Orleans the first and 
vital object of the expedition had been accomplished. 
The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined land 
and naval force was the next point indicated in 
McClellan s orders to Butler. Then he was to 
endeavor to open communication with the northern 
column coming down the Mississippi. McClellan 
was no longer General-in-chief ; but this part of his 
plan represented the settled views of the government. 

On the 2d of May, therefore, Farragut sent Craven 
with the Brooklyn and six other vessels of the fleet up 
the river. On the 8th, as early as the river transports 
could be secured, Butler sent Williams with the 4th 
Wisconsin and the 6th Michigan regiments, and two 
sections of Everett s 6th Massachusetts battery, to 
follow and accompany the fleet. The next day Wil 
liams landed his force at Bonnet Carre, on the east 
bank of the river, about thirty-five miles above the 
town. After wading about five miles through a 
swamp, where the water and mud were about three 
feet deep, the troops halted at night at Frenier, a 
station of the Jackson railway, situated on the shore 
of Lake Pontchartrain, about ten miles above Kenner. 
A detachment of the 4th Wisconsin, under Major 
Boardman, was sent to Pass Manchac. The Confed- 

2 I 7 



1 8 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

crates made a slight but ineffective resistance with 
artillery, resulting in trivial losses on either side. 
The bridges at Pass Manchac and Frenier being then 
destroyed, on the following morning, the loth, the 
troops marched back the weary ten miles along the 
uneven trestle-work of the railway from Frenier to 
Kenner and there took transport. After their long 
confinement on shipboard, with scant rations, without 
exercise or even freedom of movement, the excessive 
heat of the day caused the troops to suffer severely. 
The embarkation completed, the transports, under 
convoy of the navy, set out for Baton Rouge. 
There on the morning of the I2th of May the troops 
landed, the capitol was occupied by the 4th Wis 
consin, and the national colors were hoisted over 
the building. The troops then re-embarked for 
Vicksburg. 

Natchez surrendered on the i2th of May to Com 
mander S. Phillips Lee, of the Oneida, the advance of 
Farragut s fleet. On the i8th of May the Oneida and 
her consorts arrived off Vicksburg, and the same day 
Williams and Lee summoned " the authorities " to 
surrender the town and " its defences to the lawful 
authority of the United States." To this Brigadier- 
General Martin L. Smith, commander of the defences, 
promptly replied : " Having been ordered here to hold 
these defences, my intention is to do so as long as it 
is in my power." 

On the i Qth the transports stopped for wood at 
Warrenton, about ten miles below Vicksburg, and 
here a detachment of the 4th Wisconsin, sent to 
guard the working party, became involved in a skir 
mish with the Confederates, in which Sergeant-Major 
N. H. Chittenden and Private C. E. Perry, of A 



THE FIRST A TTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 19 

Company, suffered the first wounds received in battle 
by the troops of the United States in the Department 
of the Gulf. The Confederates were easily repulsed, 
with small loss. 

Almost at the instant when Farragut was deciding 
to run the gauntlet of the forts, Beauregard had begun 
to fortify Vicksburg. Up to this time he had trusted 
the defence of the river above New Orleans to Fort 
Pillow, Helena, and Memphis. 

When Smith took command at Vicksburg on the 
1 2th of May, in accordance with the orders of Lovell, 
the department commander, three of the ten batteries 
laid out for the defence of the position had been 
nearly completed and a fourth had been begun. 
These batteries were intended for forty-eight guns 
from field rifles to loinch columbiads. The garrison 
was to be 3,000 strong, but at this time the only 
troops present were parts of two Louisiana regiments. 
When the fleet arrived, on the i8th, six of the ten 
batteries had been completed, and two days later 
twenty-three heavy guns were in place and the 
defenders numbered more than 2,600. 

The guns of the navy could not be elevated suffi 
ciently for their projectiles to reach the Confederate 
batteries on the bluff, and the entire land-force, under 
Williams, was less than 1,100 effective. Even had it 
been possible by a sudden attack to surprise and 
overcome the garrison and seize the bluffs, the whole 
available force of the Department of the Gulf would 
have been insufficient to hold the position for a week, 
as things then stood. 

The truth is that the northern column with which, 
following their orders, Butler and Farragut were now 
trying to co-operate had ceased to exist ; Jackson 



20 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

meant Beauregard s rear ; and, as for any co-opera 
tion between Halleck and Williams, Beauregard stood 
solidly between them. On the I7th of April, the 
day before Porter s mortars first opened upon Forts 
Jackson and St. Philip, the whole land force of 
this northern column, under Pope, at that moment 
preparing for the attack on Fort Pillow, had been 
withdrawn by imperative orders from Halleck, and, 
on the very evening before the attack on Fort 
Pillow was to have been made, had gone to swell 
the great army assembled under Halleck at Corinth ; 
but as yet neither Butler nor Farragut knew any 
thing of all this. Save by the tedious roundabout 
of Washington, New York, the Atlantic, and the 
Gulf, there was at this time no regular or trustworthy 
means of communication between the forces descend 
ing the Mississippi and those that had just achieved 
the conquest of New Orleans and were now ascend 
ing the river to co-operate with the northern column. 
Thus it was that a single word, daubed in a rude 
scrawl upon the walls of the custom-house, meet 
ing the eyes of Paine s men after they had made 
a way into the building with their axes, gave to 
Butler the first intelligence of the desperate battle of 
the 6th and 7th of April, on which the fate of the 
whole Union campaign in the West had been staked, 
if not imperilled, and which in its result was destined 
to change materially the whole course of operations 
in the Gulf Department. That word was Shiloh. 

By the 26th of May the Oneida had been joined by 
the rest of the fleet, under the personal command of 
the restless and energetic flag-officer. On the after 
noon of this day the fleet opened fire. The Confed 
erates replied sparingly, as much to economize their 



THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 21 

ammunition and to keep the men fresh, as to avoid 
giving the Union commanders information regarding 
the range and effect of their fire. 

The river was now falling. The Hartford in com 
ing up had already grounded hard, and so remained 
helpless for fifty hours, and had only been got 
off by incredible exertions. Provisions of all kinds 
were running very low. On the 25th of May, after 
a thorough reconnoissance, Farragut and Williams 
decided to give up the attempt on Vicksburg as 
evidently impracticable. Farragut left Palmer with 
the Iroquois and six gunboats to blockade the 
river and to amuse the garrison at Vicksburg by an 
occasional bombardment in order to prevent Smith 
from sending reinforcements to Corinth. 

While Williams was descending the river on the 
26th, the transports were fired into by the Confed 
erate battery on the bluff at Grand Gulf, sixty miles 
below Vicksburg. About sixty rounds were fired in 
all, many of which passed completely through the 
transport La^^,rel Hill, bearing the 4th Wisconsin, 
part of the 6th Michigan, and the 6th Massachu 
setts battery. One private of the 6th Michigan 
was killed and Captain Chauncey J. Bassett, of the 
same regiment, wounded. The Ceres, bearing the 
remainder of the 6th Michigan and the 6th Massa 
chusetts battery, was following the Laurel Hill 
and was similarly treated. After a stern chase of 
about twenty miles, the convoy was overhauled, and 
the gunboat Kineo, returning, shelled the town and 
caused the withdrawal of the battery. During the 
evening Williams sent four companies of the 4th 
Wisconsin, under Major Boardman, to overtake the 
enemy s battery and break up the camp, about one 



22 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

mile and a half in the rear of the town. Boardman 
came upon the Confederates as they were retiring, 
and shots were exchanged. The casualties were 
few, but Lieutenant George DeKay, a gallant and 
attractive young officer, serving as aide-de-camp to 
General Williams, received a mortal wound. 

On the 2Qth the troops under Williams once more 
landed and took post at Baton Rouge. During their 
absence of seventeen days, the Confederates had im 
proved the opportunity to remove much valuable 
property that had been found stored in the arsenal on 
the occasion of the first landing of the Union forces. 

On his return to New Orleans Farragut received 
pressing orders from the Navy Department to take 
Vicksburg. He therefore returned with his fleet, re 
inforced by a detachment of the mortar flotilla, and 
Butler once more despatched Williams, this time with 
an increased force, to co-operate. Williams left Baton 
Rouge on the morning of the 2Oth of June with a 
force composed of the 3<Dth Massachusetts, Qth Con 
necticut, 7th Vermont, and 4th Wisconsin regiments, 
Nims s 2d Massachusetts battery and two sections of 
Everett s 6th Massachusetts battery. This time a gar 
rison was left to hold Baton Rouge, consisting of the 
2 ist Indiana and 6th Michigan regiments, the remain 
ing section of Everett s battery and Magee s Troop C 
of the Massachusetts cavalry battalion. On the 22d 
of June the transports arrived off Ellis s Cliffs, twelve 
miles below Natchez, where Williams found three gun 
boats waiting to convoy him past the high ground. 
Here he landed a detachment consisting of the 3Oth 
Massachusetts regiment and two guns of Nims s bat 
tery to turn the supposed position of two field-pieces 
said to have been planted by the Confederates on the 



THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 23 

bluffs, while a second force, composed of the 4th 
Wisconsin, gih Connecticut, the other two sections 
of Nims s battery, and the four guns of Everett s, 
marched directly forward up the cliff road. An aban 
doned caisson or limber was all that the troops found. 

On the 24th, anticipating more serious resistance 
from the guns said to be in position on the bluffs at 
Grand Gulf, Williams entered Bayou Pierre with his 
whole force in the early morning, intending to strike 
the crossing, about seventeen miles up the stream, of 
the railway from Port Gibson to Grand Gulf, and 
thence to move directly on the rear of the town. 
Half-way up the bayou the boats were stopped by 
obstructions and had to back down again. Toward 
noon the troops landed and marched on Grand 
Gulf in two detachments, one under Paine, consist 
ing of the 4th Wisconsin and Qth Connecticut 
regiments and a section of Nims s battery ; the other, 
under Dudley, embracing the remainder of the force. 
Paine had a short skirmish with the enemy near 
Grand Gulf, and captured eight prisoners, but their 
camp, a small one, was found abandoned. The same 
evening the troops re-embarked, and on the 25th 
arrived before Vicksburg. 

The orders from Butler, under which Williams 
was now acting, required him to take or burn Vicks 
burg at all hazards. Here, too, we catch the first 
glimpse of the famous canal upon which so much 
labor was to be expended during the next year with 
so little result. "You will send up a regiment or 
two at once," Butler said, " and cut off the neck of 
land beyond Vicksburg by means of a trench, making 
a gap about four feet deep and five feet wide." 

To accomplish this purpose Williams had with him 



24 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

four regiments and ten guns, making an effective 
force, in all less than three thousand, rapidly dimin 
ished by hard work, close quarters, meagre rations, 
and a bad climate nearly at its worst. 

On the 24th of June the Monarch, commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred W. Ellet, arrived 
in the reach above Vicksburg. This was one of 
the nondescript fleet of rams, planned, built, equip 
ped, and manned, under the orders of the War De 
partment, by Ellet s elder brother, Colonel Charles 
Ellet, Jr., but now acting under the orders of the 
Commander of the Mississippi fleet. Ellet promptly 
sent a party of four volunteers, led by his young 
nephew, Medical Cadet Charles R. Ellet, to com 
municate with Farragut across the narrow neck 
of land opposite Vicksburg. This was the first 
direct communication between the northern and 
southern columns. By it Farragut learned of the 
abandonment of Fort Pillow by the Confederates 
on the 4th of June, and the capture of Memphis on 
the 6th, after a hard naval fight, in which nearly the 
whole Confederate fleet was taken or destroyed. 
There Charles Ellet was mortally wounded. When 
the Monarch party went back to their vessel, they 
bore with them a letter from Farragut, the contents 
of which being promptly made known by Ellet to 
Davis, brought that officer, with his fleet, at once to 
Vicksburg. On the following day, June 25th, a de 
tachment of the 4th Wisconsin, sent up the river 
overland by Colonel Paine, succeeded in establishing 
a second communication with the Monarch, believing 
it to be the first. 

Farragut s fleet, now anchored below Vicksburg, 
comprised the flagship Hartford, the sloops-of-war 



THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 25 

Brooklyn and Richmond, the corvettes Iroquois and 
Oneida, and six gunboats. Porter had joined with 
the Octorara, Miami, six other steamers, and seven 
teen of the mortar schooners. The orders of the 
government were peremptory that the Mississippi 
should be cleared. The Confederates held the river 
by a single thread. The fall of Memphis and the 
ruin of the famous river-defence fleet left between St. 
Louis and the Gulf but a solitary obstruction. This 
was Vicksburg. 

Vicksburg stands at an abrupt turn, where within 
ten miles the winding river doubles upon itself, form 
ing on the low ground opposite a long ringer of land, 
barely three quarters of a mile wide. Opposite the 
extreme end of this peninsula, known as De Soto, 
the bluff reaches the highest point attained along 
the whole course of the river, the crest standing 
about 250 feet above the mean stage of water. Slop 
ing slowly toward the river, the bluff follows it 
with a diminished altitude for two miles. Here stands 
the town of Vicksburg, then a place of about ten thou 
sand inhabitants. Below the town the bluffs draw 
away from the river until, about four miles be 
yond the bend, their height diminishes to about 150 
feet. For the defence of this line, as has been 
already seen, a formidable series of batteries had 
been constructed, extending from the bluff at the 
mouth of Chickasaw Bayou on the north to Warren- 
ton on the south. These batteries now mounted 
twenty-six heavy guns, served by gunners com 
paratively well trained and instructed, and sup 
ported against an attack by land by about 6,000 in 
fantry under Lovell. Almost simultaneously with 
the arrival of Farragut and Williams, came Breckin- 



26 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

ridge with his division, augmenting the effective 
force of the defenders to not less than 10,000. On 
the 3Oth of May Beauregard evacuated Corinth and 
drew back to Tupelo ; Halleck did not follow ; and so 
35,000 Confederates were now set free to strengthen 
Vicksburg. Thus defended and supported Vicksburg 
was obviously impregnable to any attack by the com 
bined forces of Farragut and Williams. On the 28th 
of June, Van Dorn arrived and took command of the 
Confederate forces. 

After some preliminary bombarding and recon 
noitring Farragut, who was well informed as to the 
condition of the defences, determined upon repeating 
before Vicksburg his exploit below New Orleans. 
Accordingly, on the 28th of July, in the darkness of 
the early morning, under cover of the fire of Porter s 
mortar flotilla, Farragut got under way with his fleet 
to pass the batteries of Vicksburg. The fleet was 
formed in two columns, with wide intervals, the star 
board column led by the Hartford, the port column 
by the Iroquois. The battle was opened by the 
mortars at four o clock, the enemy replying instantly. 
By six o clock the Hartford and six of her consorts 
had successfully run the gauntlet, and lay safely 
anchored above the bend, while the rest of the fleet, 
through some confusion of events or misapprehension 
of orders, had resumed its former position below the 
bend. The losses of the navy in this engagement 
were fifteen killed and thirty wounded, including many 
scalded by the effect of a single shot that pierced the 
boiler of the Clifton. The eight rifled guns of Nims s 
and Everett s batteries having been landed, were 
placed in position behind the levee at Barney s Point, 
and replied effectively to the fire of the heavy guns 



THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 27 

on the high bluff, at a range of about fourteen hun 
dred yards. This slight service was the only form 
of active co-operation by the army that the circum 
stances admitted ; yet all the troops stood to arms, 
ready to do any thing that might be required. 

On the ist of July Davis joined Farragut with 
four gunboats and six mortar-boats of the Mississippi 
fleet. On the Qth Farragut received orders from the 
Navy Department, dated on the 5th, and forwarded 
by way of Cairo, to send Porter with the Octorara, 
and twelve mortar-boats at once to Hampton Roads. 
Porter steamed down the river on the loth. This was 
obviously one of the first-fruits of the campaign of 
the Peninsula just ended by the withdrawal of the 
Army of the Potomac to the James. Indeed, at this 
crisis, all occasions seemed to be informing against 
the Union plan of campaign, and the same events 
that drew the Confederate armies together served 
to draw the Union armies apart. Just as we have 
seen Pope called away from Fort Pillow on the eve of 
an attack that must have resulted in its capture, and 
taken in haste to swell the slow march of Halleck s 
army before Corinth, so now, when for a full month 
Corinth had been abandoned by the Confederates, 
Halleck s forces were being broken up and dispersed 
to all four of the winds, save that which might have 
blown them to the south. Halleck declared himself 
unable to respond to Farragut s urgent appeal for 
help. " I cannot," he said, when urged by Stanton ; 
" I am sending reinforcements to General Curtis, in 
Arkansas, and to General Buell, in Tennessee and 
Kentucky." Not only this, but he was being called 
upon by Lincoln himself for 25,000 troops to rein 
force the Army of the Potomac before Richmond. 



28 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

" Probably I shall be able to do so," Halleck told Far- 
ragut, "as soon as I can get my troops more concen 
trated. This may delay the clearing of the river, but 
its accomplishment will be certain in a few weeks." 

Meanwhile Williams was hard at work on the canal. 
In addition to such details as could be furnished by 
the troops without wholly neglecting the absolutely 
necessary portions of their military duties, Williams 
had employed a force of about 1,200 negroes, rather 
poorly provided with tools. The work was not confined 
to excavation, but involved the cutting down of the 
large cottonwoods and the clearing away of the dense 
masses of willows that covered the low ground and 
matted the heavy soil with their tangled roots. By the 
4th of July the excavation had reached a depth in the 
hard clay of nearly seven feet. The length of the 
canal was about one and a half miles. By the nth 
of July the cut, originally intended to be four feet 
deep and five feet wide, with a profile of twenty 
square feet, had been excavated through this stiff 
clay to a depth of thirteen feet and a width of eighteen 
feet, presenting a profile of 234 feet. The river, 
which, up to this time, had been falling more rapidly 
than the utmost exertions had been able to sink 
the bottom of the canal, had now begun to fall 
more slowly, so that at last the grade was 
about eighteen inches below the river level. In a 
few hours the water was to have been let in. 
Suddenly the banks began to cave, and before any 
thing could be done to remedy this, the river, still 
falling, was once more below the bottom of the cut. 
Although with this scanty and overworked force he 
had already performed nearly twelve times the amount 
of labor originally contemplated, Williams does not 



THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 29 

seem to have been discouraged at this ; his orders 
were to make the cut, and his purpose clearly was to 
make it, even if it should take, as he thought it would, 
the whole of the next three months. He set to work 
with vigor to collect laborers, wheelbarrows, shovels, 
axes, carts, and scrapers, and " to make a real canal," 
to use his own words, " to the depth of the greatest 
fall of the river at this point, say some thirty-five to 
forty feet." But this was not to be. 

Until toward the end of June, the Polk and Living 
ston, the last vestiges of the Confederate navy on the 
Mississippi spared from the general wreck at Memphis, 
lay far up the Yazoo River, with a barrier above 
them, designed to cover the building of the ram Arkan 
sas. This formidable craft was approaching completion 
at Yazoo City. The Ellets, uncle and nephew, with 
the Monarch and Lancaster, steamed up the Yazoo 
River to reconnoitre. The rams carried no armament 
whatever, but this the Confederate naval commander 
in the Yazoo did not know ; so, unable to pass the 
barrier, he set fire to his three gunboats immediately 
on perceiving Ellet s approach. On the i4th of July, 
Flag-Officers Farragut and Davis sent the gunboats 
Carondelet and Tyler, and the ram Queen of the West, 
on a second expedition up the Yazoo to gain infor 
mation of the Arkansas. This object was greatly 
facilitated by the fact that the Arkansas had at this 
very moment just got under way for the first time, 
and was coming down the Yazoo to gather informa 
tion of the Federal fleet. The Arkansas, which had 
been constructed and was now commanded by Captain 
Isaac N. Brown, formerly of the United States Navy, 
was, for defensive purposes, probably the most effective 
of all the gunboats ever set afloat by the Confederacy 



30 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

upon the western waters. Her deck was covered 
by a single casemate protected by three inches of 
railroad iron, set aslant like a gable roof, and heavily 
backed up with timber and cotton bales. Her whole 
bow formed a powerful ram ; the shield, flat on the 
top, was pierced for ten guns of heavy calibre, three 
in each broadside, two forward, and two aft. Had 
her means of propulsion proved equal to her power 
of attack and defence, it is doubtful if the whole 
Union navy on the Mississippi could have stood 
against her single-handed. The situation thus 
strangely recalls that presented by the Merrimac, or 
Virginia, in Hampton Roads before the opportune 
arrival of the Monitor. On board the Tyler was a 
detachment of twenty sharpshooters of the 4th 
Wisconsin regiment, under Captain J. W. Lynn, and 
on the Carondelet were twenty men of the 3Oth 
Massachusetts regiment, under Lieutenant E. A. 
Fiske. About six miles above the Yazoo the Union 
gunboats encountered the Arkansas. The unarmed 
ram Queen of the West promptly fled. After a hard 
fight the Carondelet was disabled and run ashore, and 
the Tyler was forced to retire, with the Arkansas in 
pursuit. The sharpshooters of the 4th Wisconsin 
suffered more severely than if they had been en 
gaged in an ordinary pitched battle, Captain Lynn 
and six of his men being killed and six others wounded. 
The Queen of the West, flying out of the mouth of 
the Yazoo under a full head of steam, gave to the 
fleet at anchor the first intimation, though perhaps a 
feeble one, of what was to follow. Not one vessel 
of either squadron had steam. The ram Bragg, 
which might have been expected to do something, did 
nothing. The Arkansas, so seriously injured by the 



THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG. 31 

guns of the Carondclet and Tyler that the steam 
pressure had gone from 1 20 pounds to the square inch 
down to 20 pounds, kept on her course, and proceeded 
to run the gauntlet of the Union fleet, giving and 
taking blows as she went. Battered, but safe, she 
soon lay under the guns of Vicksburg. 

This decided the fate of the campaign, and extin 
guished in the breast of Farragut the last vestige of 
the ardent hope he had expressed to the government 
a few days earlier that he might soon have the pleas 
ure of recording the combined attack of the army and 
navy, for which all so ardently longed. The river 
was falling ; the canal was a failure. Of the officers 
and men of the navy, two fifths, and of the effective 
force of the army nearly three fourths, were on the 
sick-list. There was no longer any thing to hope for 
or to wait for. The night that followed the exploit 
of the Arkansas saw Farragut s fleet descending the 
river and once more running the gauntlet of the 
batteries of Vicksburg. A flying attempt was made 
by each vessel in succession, but by all unsuccessfully, 
to destroy the offending Arkansas. 

On the 24th of July, Williams, with his small force, 
under convoy of Farragut s fleet, sailed down the 
river. So ended the second attempt on Vicksburg, 
usually called the first, when remembered. Its sud 
den collapse gave the Confederates the river for 
another year. 



CHAPTER III. 

BATON ROUGE. 

ON the 26th of July, the troops landed at Baton 
Rouge. In the five weeks that had elapsed since their 
departure their effective strength had been diminished, 
by privations, by severe labor, and by the effects of a 
deadly climate, from 3,200 to about 800. For more 
than three months, ever since their re-embarkation 
at Ship Island on the roth of April, they had under 
gone hardships such as have seldom fallen to the lot 
of soldiers, in a campaign whose existence is scarcely 
known and whose name has been wellnigh forgotten ; 
but their time for rest and recreation had not yet come. 

No sooner did Van Dorn see the allied fleets of 
Davis and Farragut turning their backs on one 
another and steaming one to the north and the other 
to the south, than he determined to take the initia 
tive. His preparations had been already made in 
anticipation of this event. He now ordered Breckin- 
ridge to hasten with his division to the attack of 
Baton Rouge, and even as the fleet got under way, 
the train bearing Breckinridge s troops was also in 
motion. 

Breckinridge received his orders on the 26th, and 
arrived at Camp Moore by the railway on the 28th. 
At Jackson he had been told that he would receive 
rations sufficient for ten days, but he could get no 

32 




LOUISIANA 




SHEET II. 



BATON ROUGE. 33 

more than half the quantity. Van Dorn had esti 
mated the Union force to be met at Baton Rouge at 
about 5,000, and had calculated that Breckinridge 
would find himself strong enough to dislodge the 
Union army and drive it away. In fact, Van Dorn 
estimated Breckinridge s division, including i,ooomen 
under Brigadier-General Ruggles, that were to meet 
him at Camp Moore, at 6,000 men. The Arkansas 
was to join in the attack, and she was justly consid 
ered a full offset to any naval force the Union com 
mander would be likely to have stationed at Baton 
Rouge. Breckinridge left Vicksburg with less than 
4,000. On the 3Oth of July he reports his total 
effective force, including Ruggles, at 3,600. The 
same day he marched on Baton Rouge, and on 
the 4th of August encamped at the crossing of the 
Comite, distant about ten miles from his objective. 
His morning report of that day shows but 3,000 
effectives, according to the method by which effective 
strength was commonly counted by the Confederates. 

The distance from Camp Moore to Baton Rouge 
is about sixty miles, and the march had been thus 
retarded to await the co-operation of the Arkansas. 
This Breckinridge was finally assured he might ex 
pect at daylight on the morning of the 5th of August. 
The Arkansas had in fact left Vicksburg on the 3d. 

Van Dorn s object obviously was by crushing Wil 
liams to regain control of the Mississippi from Vicks 
burg to Baton Rouge, to break the blockade of Red 
River and to open the way for the recapture of New 
Orleans. Williams was expecting the attack and 
awaited the result with calmness. 

At Baton Rouge the Mississippi washes for the 
last time the base of the high and steep bluffs that 

3 



34 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

for so many hundreds of miles have followed the 
coasts of the great river and formed the contour of 
its left bank, overlooking its swift yellow waters and 
the vast lowlands of the western shore. The bluff 
is lower at Baton Rouge than it is above and slopes 
more gently to the water s edge ; and here the high 
land draws back from the river and gradually fades 
away in a southeasterly direction toward the Gulf, 
while the surface of the country becomes more 
open and less broken. The stiff post-tertiary clays 
that compose the soil of these bluffs were in many 
places covered with a rich growth of timber, great 
magnolias and beautiful live oaks replacing the rank 
cottonwood and tangled willows of the lowlands, as 
well as the giant cypresses of the impenetrable 
swamps, with their mournful hangings of Spanish 
moss, and the wild grape binding them fast in a 
deadly embrace. 

Six roads led out of the town in various directions. 
Of these the most northerly was the road from Bayou 
Sara. Passing behind the town its course continued 
toward the south along the river. Between these 
outstretched arms ran the road to Clinton, the Green- 
well Springs road, by which the Confederates had 
come, the Perkins road, and the Clay Cut road. 

In numbers the opposing forces were nearly equal. 
The Confederates went into action with about 2,600, 
without counting the partisan rangers and militia, 
numbering 400 or 500 more. Williams had about 
2,500 fighting men. He had eighteen guns, the 
Confederates eleven. On both sides the men were 
enfeebled by malaria and exposure ; yet the Con 
federates had left their sick behind, while the Union 
force included convalescents that came out of the 



BATON ROUGE. 35 

hospital to take part in the battle. " There were not 
1,200," said Weitzel after the battle, "who could have 
marched five miles. None of our men had been in 
battle; very few had been under fire." Among the 
Confederates were many of the veterans of Shiloh 
and more of the triumphant defenders of Vicksburg. 
The advantage of position was slight on either side. 
On the one hand Williams was forced to post his left 
with regard to the expected attack of the Arkansas, 
so that in the centre his line fell behind the camps. 
To offset this his right rested securely on the gun 
boats. As it turned out the Arkansas was not 
encountered, and the gunboats told off to meet her 
were therefore able to render material assistance on 
the left by their oblique fire across Williams s front. 

Breckinridge commanded four picked brigades, 
three selected from his own division and one of Mar 
tin L. Smith s Vicksburg brigades, the whole organ 
ized in two divisions, under Brigadier-Generals Charles 
Clark and Daniel Ruggles. Clark had the brigades 
of Brigadier-General Bernard H. Helm and Colonel 
Thomas B. Smith, of the 2Oth Tennessee, with the 
Hudson battery and Cobb s battery. Ruggles had 
the brigades of Colonel A. P. Thompson, of the 3d 
Kentucky, and Colonel Henry W. Allen, of the 4th 
Louisiana, with Semmes s battery. From right to 
left the order of attack ran, Helm, Smith, Thomp 
son, Allen. Clark moved on the right of the 
Greenwell Springs road, and Ruggles on the left. 
Scott s cavalry was posted on the extreme left, four 
guns of Semmes s battery occupied the centre of Rug- 
gles s division, while in Clark s centre were the four 
guns of the Hudson battery and one of Cobb s ; the 
other two having been disabled in a panic during the 



36 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

night march before the battle. On the extreme right 
the Clinton road was picketed and held by a detach 
ment of infantry and rangers and the remaining sec 
tion of Semmes s battery. 

To meet the expected attack, Williams had posted 
his troops in rear of the arsenal and of the town, occu 
pying an irregular line, generally parallel to the 
Bayou Sara road, and extending from the Bayou 
Grosse, on the left, to and beyond the intersection of 
the Perkins and Clay Cut roads, on the right. On 
the extreme left, behind the Bayou Grosse, was the 
4th Wisconsin, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bean. Next, but on the left bank of the bayou, 
stood the 9th Connecticut. Next, and on the left 
of the Greenwell Springs road, the i4th Maine. 
On the right of that road was posted the 2ist 
Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Keith, with three 
guns attached to the regiment, under Lieutenant 
J. H. Brown. Across the Perkins and Clay Cut roads 
the 6th Michigan was formed, under command of 
Captain Charles E. Clarke, while in the rear of 
the interval between the 6th Michigan and the 
2ist Indiana stood the 7th Vermont. The ex 
treme right and rear were covered by the 3Oth 
Massachusetts, in column, supporting Nims s battery, 
under Lieutenant Trull. On the centre and left were 
planted the guns of Everett s battery, under Carruth, 
and of Manning s 4th Massachusetts battery. 

The left flank was supported by the Essex, Com 
mander William D. Porter ; the Cayuga, Lieutenant 
Harrison ; and the Sumter t Lieutenant Erben ; the 
right flank by the Kineo, Lieutenant-Commander 
Ransom, and Katahdin, Lieutenant Roe. 

These dispositions were planned expressly to meet 



BATON ROUGE. 37 

the expected attack by the ram Arkansas, and in that 
view the arrangement was probably the best that the 
formation of the ground permitted. But the fighting 
line was very far advanced ; the camps still farther ; 
the reserve on the right was posted quite a mile and 
a half behind the capitol, and, as at Shiloh, no portion 
of the line was fortified or protected in any way, though 
the field was an open plain and the converging roads 
gave to the attacking party a wide choice of position. 

About daylight Breckinridge moved to the attack 
in a summer fog so dense that those engaged could 
at first distinguish neither friend nor enemy. The 
blow fell first, and heavily, upon the centre and 
right, held by the i4th Maine, 2ist Indiana, and 
6th Michigan. As our troops were pressed back 
by the vigor of the first onset, the exposed camps 
of the 1 4th Maine, 7th Vermont, and 2ist Indi 
ana fell into the hands of the Confederates. The 
9th Connecticut, with Manning s battery, moved 
to the support of the I4th Maine and 2ist Indiana, 
on the right of the former, and the 4th Wisconsin 
formed on the left of the I4th. Further to the 
right, the 3Oth Massachusetts advanced to the sup 
port of the 2ist Indiana and 6th Michigan, cov 
ering the interval between the two battalions to 
replace the 7th Vermont. In the first fighting in 
the darkness and the fog this regiment had been 
roughly handled ; its colonel fell, a momentary 
confusion followed, and the regiment drifted back 
into a convenient position, where it was soon re 
formed, under Captain Porter. Nims brought his 
guns into battery on the right of the 6th Michigan. 

The battle was short, but the fighting was severe ; 
both sides suffered heavily, and each fell into 



38 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

some disorder. At different moments both wings 
of the Confederate force were broken, and fell 
back in something not very unlike panic. The 
colors of the 4th Louisiana were captured by 
the 6th Michigan. As the fog lifted, under the 
influence of the increasing heat, it became clear to 
both sides that the attack had failed. The force 
of the fierce Confederate onset was quite spent. 
The Union lines, however thinned and shattered, 
remained in possession of the prize. " It was now ten 
o clock," says Breckinridge. " We had listened in 
vain for the guns of the Arkansas : I saw around me 
not more than 1,000 exhausted men." The battle 
was over. Indeed it had been over for some hours ; 
these words probably indicate the period when the 
Confederate commander gave up his last hope. 

The Arkansas, disabled within sight of the goal 
by an accident to her machinery, was run ashore 
and destroyed by her commander to save her from 
capture. The Confederate losses were about 84 
killed, 313 wounded, and 56 missing; total, 453. 
Clark was severely wounded and made prisoner. 
Allen was killed, and two other brigade commanders 
wounded. Helm, Hunt, and Thompson had been 
previously disabled by an accident during the night 
panic. 

The Union losses were 84 killed, 266 wounded, and 
33 missing ; total, 383. The heaviest loss fell upon 
the 2ist Indiana, which suffered 126 casualties, and 
upon the i4th Maine, which reported 118. Of the 
killed, 36, or nearly one half, belonged to the i4th 
Maine, while more than two thirds of the killed and 
nearly two thirds of the total belonged to that regi 
ment and the 2ist Indiana. The 4th Wisconsin, 



BATON ROUGE. 39 

being posted quite to the left of the point of attack, 
was not engaged. 

Colonel G. T. Roberts, of the 7th Vermont, fell 
early in the action, and near its close Williams was 
instantly killed while urging his men to the attack. 
In him his little brigade lost the only commander 
present of experience in war ; the country, a brave and 
accomplished soldier. If he was, as must be confessed, 
arbitrary, at times unreasonable, and often harsh, in 
his treatment of his untrained volunteers, yet many 
who then thought his discipline too severe to be 
endured, lived to know, and by their conduct vindi 
cate, the value of his training. 

The Confederates appear to have suffered to some 
extent during the last attack, until the lines drew too 
near together, from the fire of the Essex and her con 
sorts. Ransom also speaks of having shelled the 
enemy with great effect during the afternoon from 
the Kineo and Katahdin, accurately directed by sig 
nals from the capitol ; but no other account even men 
tions any firing at that period of the day ; the effect 
cannot, therefore, have been severe, and it seems 
probable that the troops against whom it was directed 
may have been some outlying party. 

Cahill s seniority entitled him to the command after 
Williams fell, yet during the remainder of the battle 
Dudley seems to have commanded the troops actually 
engaged. Shortly after the close of the action Cahill 
assumed the command and sent word to Butler of 
the state of affairs. 

The Confederates were still to be seen upon the 
field of battle. Their force was naturally enough 
over-estimated. Another attack was expected during 
the afternoon, and reinforcements were urgently called 



40 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

for. Butler had none to give without putting New 
Orleans itself in peril. However, during the evening 
he determined to release from arrest a number of offi 
cers who had been deprived of their swords by Wil 
liams at various times, and for various causes, mainly 
growing out of the confused and as yet rather un 
settled policy of the government in reference to the 
treatment of the negroes, and to send all these officers 
to Baton Rouge. Among them were Colonel Paine 
of the 4th Wisconsin and Colonel Clark of the 6th 
Michigan. Since the nth of June Paine had been in 
arrest ; an arrest of a character peculiar and perhaps 
unprecedented in the history of armies. Whenever 
danger was to be faced, or unusual duty to be per 
formed, he might wear his sword and command his 
men, but the moment the duty or the danger was at an 
end he must go back into arrest. Paine, who was an ex 
tremely conscientious officer, as well as a man of high 
character and firmness of purpose, had from the first 
taken strong ground against the use of any portion of 
his force in aid of the claims of the master to the ser 
vice of the slave. Williams, strict in his idea of obedi 
ence due his superiors, not less than in his notions 
of obedience due to him by his own inferiors in rank, 
stood upon his construction of the law and the orders 
of the War Department, as they then existed ; hence 
in the natural course of events inevitably arose more 
than one irreconcilable difference of opinion. Paine 
was now ordered to go at once to Baton Rouge and 
take command: He was told by Butler to burn the town 
and the capitol. The library, the paintings, the stat 
uary, and the relics were to be spared, as well as the 
charitable institutions of the town. The books, the 
paintings, and the statue of Washington, he was to 



BATON ROUGE. 41 

send to New Orleans ; he was then to evacuate 
Baton Rouge and retire with his whole force to 
New Orleans. 

At midnight on the 6th of August Paine arrived at 
Baton Rouge. There he found every thing quiet, 
with the troops in camp on an interior and shorter 
line, but expecting another attack. There was 
in fact an alarm before morning came, but nothing 
happened. On the 7th Paine took command and 
set about putting the town in complete condition 
for an effective defence. With his accustomed care 
and energy he soon rectified the lines and en 
trenched them with twenty-four guns in position, and, 
in co-operation with the navy, concerted every measure 
for an effective defence, even against large numbers. 

Breckinridge, however, after continuing to menace 
Baton Rouge for some days, had, by Van Dorn s 
orders, retired to Port Hudson, and was now en 
gaged in fortifying that position. Ru^ gles was sent 
there on the i2th of August. The next day Breckin 
ridge received orders from Van Dorn, then at Jack 
son, to follow with his whole force. " Port Hudson," 
Van Dorn said, "must be held if possible." "Port 
Hudson," remarks Breckinridge, in his report of the 
battle of Baton Rouge, " is one of the strongest 
points on the Mississippi, which Baton Rouge is not, 
and batteries there will command the river more 
completely than at Vicksburg." 

Meanwhile Butler had changed his mind with 
regard to the evacuation of Baton Rouge, and had 
directed Paine to hold the place for the present. 
With- an accuracy unusual at this period, Butler esti 
mated Breckinridge s entire force at 5,000 men and 
fourteen guns. On the I3th the defences were com- 



42 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

plete, the entrenchments forming two sides of a 
triangle of which the river was the base and the 
cemetery mound the apex. The troops stood to 
arms at three o clock every morning ; one fourth of 
the force was constantly under arms, day and night, 
at its station. At two points on each face of the 
entrenchments flags were planted by day and lights 
by night, to indicate to the gunboats their line of fire. 

On the 1 6th of August Butler renewed his orders 
to burn and evacuate Baton Rouge. Its retention 
up to this time he had avowedly regarded as having 
political rather than military importance. Now he 
wrote to Paine : " I am constrained to come to the con 
clusion that it is necessary to evacuate Baton Rouge. 
. . . Begin the movement quietly and rapidly ; get 
every thing off except your men, and then see to it that 
the town is destroyed. After mature deliberation I 
deem this a military necessity of the highest order." 

Against these orders Paine made an earnest appeal, 
based upon considerations partly humane, partly 
military. He was so far successful that Butler was 
induced to countermand the order to burn. The 
movement was not to be delayed on account of the 
statue of Washington. However, the statue had 
been already packed. It is now in the Patent 
Office at the national capital. All the books and 
paintings were brought off, " except," to quote from 
Paine s diary, " the portrait of James Buchanan, 
which we left hanging in the State House for his 
friends." Finally, on the 2Oth, Paine evacuated 
Baton Rouge, and on the following day reached the 
lines of Carrolton, known as Camp Parapet, and 
turned over his command to Phelps. 



CHAPTER IV. 

LA FOURCHE. 

ON the 22d of August Paine was assigned to 
the command of what was called the "reserve bri 
gade " of a division under Phelps. The brigade was 
composed of the 4th Wisconsin, 2ist Indiana, and 
1 4th Maine, with Brown s battery attached to the 
Indiana regiment. But this was not to last, for 
the tension that had long existed between Phelps 
and the department commander, on the subject 
of the treatment of the negroes, as well as on the 
question of arming and employing them, finally 
resulted in Phelps s resignation on the 2ist of 
August. On the J3th of September he was succeeded 
by Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sherman, himself 
recently relieved from command of the Department 
of the South, partly, perhaps, in consequence of differ 
ences of opinion of a like character. 

On the 29th of September the division, then known 
as Sherman s was reorganized, and Paine took com 
mand of the ist brigade, composed of the 4th 
Wisconsin, 2ist Indiana, and 8th New Hampshire 
regiments with the ist and 2d Vermont batteries 
and Brown s guns of the 2 ist Indiana. Paine s com 
mand also included Camp Parapet. These lines 
had been originally laid out by the Confederates for 
the defence of New Orleans against an attack by 

43 



44 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

land from the north ; as, for example, by a force 
approaching through Lake Ponchartrain and Pass 
Manchac. They were now put in thorough order, 
and the Indianians, who had received some artillery 
instruction during their term of service at Fort 
McHenry, completed the foundation for their future 
service as heavy artillerists by going back to the big 
guns. In October and November the 8th New 
Hampshire and 2ist Indiana were transferred to 
Weitzel s brigade and were replaced in Paine s by the 
2d Louisiana and temporarily by the I2th Maine. 

The official reports covering this period afford 
several strong hints of a Confederate plan for the 
recapture of New Orleans. With this object, ap 
parently, Richard Taylor, a prominent and wealthy 
Louisianian, closely allied to Jefferson Davis by 
his first marriage with the daughter of Zachary Tay 
lor, was made a major-general in the Confederate 
army, and on the ist of August was assigned to com 
mand the Confederate forces in Western Louisiana. 
It seems likely that the troops of Van Dorn s depart 
ment, as well as those at Mobile, were expected to 
take part. 

On the 8th of August orders were issued by the 
War Department transferring the district of West 
Florida to the Department of the Gulf. West 
Florida meant Pensacola. Fort Pickens, on the 
sands of Santa Rosa, commanding the entrance to 
the splendid harbor, owed to the loyalty of a few 
staunch officers of the army and the navy the proud 
distinction of being the one spot between the Chesa 
peake and the Rio Grande over which, in spite of all 
hostile attempts, the ensign of the nation had never 
ceased to float ; for the works at Key West and the 



LA FOURCHE. 45 

Dry Tortugas, though likewise held, were never 
menaced. Though Bragg early gathered a large 
force for the capture of the fort, the only serious 
attempt, made in the dawn of the gth of October, 
1 86 1, was repulsed with a loss to the Confederates of 
87, to the Union troops of 61. Of these, the 6th 
New York had 9 killed, 7 wounded, 1 1 missing in 
all, 27. In December the 75th New York came down 
from the North to reinforce the defenders. Finally, 
after learning the fate of New Orleans, Bragg evacu 
ated Pensacola, and burned his surplus stores, and 
on the loth of May, 1862, Porter, seeing from the 
passes the glare of the flames, ran over and anchored 
in the bay. The advantage thus gained was held to 
the end. 

This transfer gave Butler two strong infantry regi 
ments, as well as several fine batteries and companies 
of the regular artillery, but at the same time corre 
spondingly increased the territory he had to guard, 
already far too extensive and too widely scattered for 
the small force at his disposal. 

Toward the end of September Lieutenant Godfrey 
Weitzel, of the engineers, having been made a briga 
dier-general on Butler s recommendation, a promotion 
more than usually justified by service and talent, a 
brigade was formed for him called the Reserve Bri 
gade, and consisting of the i2th and i3th Connecti 
cut, 75th New York, and 8th New Hampshire, 
Carruth s 6th Massachusetts battery, Thompson s ist 
Maine battery, Perkins s Troop C of the Massachusetts 
cavalry, and three troops of Louisiana cavalry under 
Williamson. From that time, through all the changes, 
which were many and frequent, Weitzel s brigade 
changed less than any thing else, and its history 



46 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

may almost be said to be the military history of the 
Department. 

Taylor, with his accustomed energy and enthusiasm, 
had collected and organized a force, primarily for the 
defence of the La Fourche country and the Teche, 
ultimately for the offensive operations already planned. 
Butler at once committed to Weitzel the preparations 
for dislodging Taylor and occupying La Fourche. 
This object was important, not only to secure the 
defence of New Orleans, but because the territory to 
be occupied comprised or controlled the fertile region 
between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya. The 
country lies low and flat, and is intersected by numer 
ous navigable bayous, with but narrow roadways along 
their banks and elsewhere none. Without naval 
assistance, the operation would have been difficult, 
if not impossible ; and the navy had in Louisiana 
no gunboats of a draught light enough for the service. 
With the funds of the army Butler caused four light 
gunboats, the Estrella, Calhoun, Kinsman, and 
Diana, to be quietly built and equipped, the navy 
furnishing the officers and the crews. Under Com 
mander McKean Buchanan they were then sent by 
the gulf to Berwick Bay. 

When he was ready, Weitzel took transports, under 
convoy of the Kineo, Sciota, Katahdin, and Itasca, 
landed below Donaldsonville, entered the town, and 
on the 27th of October moved on Thibodeaux, the 
heart of the district. At Georgia Landing, about two 
miles above Labadieville, he encountered the Con 
federates under Mouton, consisting of the i8th and 
33d Louisiana, the Crescent and Terre Bonne regi 
ments, with Ralston s and Semmes s batteries and the 
2d Louisiana cavalry, in all reported by Mouton as 



LA FOURCHE. 47 

1,392 strong. They had taken up a defensive 
position on both sides of the bayou. Along these 
bayous the standing room is for the most part nar 
row ; and as the land, although low, is in general 
heavily wooded and crossed by many ditches of con 
siderable depth, the country affords defensive posi 
tions at once stronger and more numerous than are 
to be found in most flat regions. Small bodies of 
troops, familiar with the topography, have also this 
further advantage, that there are few points from 
which their position and numbers can be easily 
made out. 

After a short but spirited engagement Mouton s 
force was compelled to retreat. Weitzel pursued for 
about four miles. 

Mouton then called in his outlying detachments, 
including the La Fourche regiment, 500 strong, 300 
men of the 33d Louisiana, and the regiments of Saint 
Charles and St. John Baptist, burned the railway 
station of Terre Bonne and the bridges at Thibo- 
deaux, La Fourche Crossing, Terre Bonne, Des 
Allemands, and Bayou Bceuf, and evacuated the 
district. By the 3Oth, every thing was safely across 
Berwick Bay. For this escape, he was indebted to 
an opportune gale that compelled Buchanan s gun 
boats to lie to in Caillou Bay on their way to 
Berwick Bay, to cut off the retreat. Mouton s re 
port accounts for 5 killed, 8 wounded, and 186 
missing; in all 199. Among the killed was Colonel 
G. P. McPheeters of the Crescent regiment. 

Weitzel followed to Thibodeaux, and went into 
camp beyond the town. He claims to have taken 
208 prisoners and one gun, and states his own losses 
as 1 8 killed, and 74 wounded, agreeing with the nomi- 



48 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

nal lists, which also contain the names of 5 missing, 
thus bringing the total casualties to 97. 

Arriving off Brashear a day too late, Buchanan was 
partly consoled by capturing the Confederate gunboat 
Seger. On the 4th and 5th of November he made a 
reconnoissance fourteen miles up the Teche with his 
own boat, the Calhoun, and the Estrella, Kinsman, 
Saint Marys, and Diana, and meeting a portion of 
Mouton s forces and the Confederate gunboat J. A. 
Cotton, received and inflicted some damage and slight 
losses, yet with no material result. 

Simultaneously with Weitzel s movement on La 
Fourche, Butler pushed the 8th Vermont and the 
newly organized ist Louisiana Native Guards for 
ward from Algiers along the Opelousas Railway, to 
act in conjunction with Weitzel and to open the 
railway as they advanced. Weitzel had already 
turned the enemy out of his position, but the task 
committed to Thomas was slow and hard, for all the 
bridges and many culverts had to be rebuilt, and from 
long disuse of the line the rank grass, that in Louisi 
ana springs up so freely in every untrodden spot 
above water, had grown so tall and thick and strongly 
matted, that the troops had to pull it up by the roots 
before the locomotive could pass. 

So ended operations in Louisiana for this year. 
Until the following spring, Taylor continued to 
occupy the Teche region, while Weitzel rested quietly 
in La Fourche, with his headquarters at Thibodeaux 
and his troops so disposed as to cover and hold the 
country without losing touch. On the Qth of Novem 
ber, the whole of Louisiana lying west of the Missis 
sippi, except the delta parishes of Plaquemine and 
Terre Bonne, was constituted a military district to be 



LA FOURCHE. 49 

known as the District of La Fourche, and Weitzel 
was assigned to the command. 

Meanwhile General Butler, with the consent of the 
War Department, had raised, organized, and equipped, 
in the neighborhood of New Orleans, two good regi 
ments of infantry, the ist Louisiana, Colonel Richard 
E. Holcomb, and the 2d Louisiana, Colonel Charles 
J. Paine, both regiments admirably commanded and 
well officered ; three excellent troops of Louisiana 
cavalry, under fine leaders, Captains Henry F. Wil 
liamson, Richard Barrett, and J. F. Godfrey ; and 
beside these white troops, three regiments of ne 
groes, designated as the ist, 2d, and 3d Louisiana 
Native Guards. This was the name originally em 
ployed by Governor Moore early in 1861, to describe 
an organization of the free men of color of New Or 
leans enrolled for the defence of the city against the 
expected attack by the forces of the Union. 

This action was taken by Butler of his own motion. 
It was never formally approved by the government, 
but it was not interfered with. These three regiments 
were the first negro troops mustered into the service 
of the United States. At least one of them, the ist, 
was largely made up of men of that peculiar and ex 
clusive caste known to the laws of slavery as the free 
men of color of Louisiana. All the field and staff 
officers were white men, mainly taken from the rolls 
of the troops already in service ; but at first all the 
company officers were negroes. As this was the first 
experiment, it was perhaps, in the state of feeling then 
prevailing, inevitable, yet not the less to be regretted, 
that the white officers were, with some notable ex 
ceptions, inferior men. Fortunately, however, courts- 
martial and examining boards made their career for 



50 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the most part a short one. As for the colored officers 
of the line, early in 1863 they were nearly all dis 
qualified on the most rudimentary examination, and 
then the rest resigned. After that, the government 
having determined to raise a large force of negro 
troops, it became the settled policy to grant commis 
sions as officers to none but white men. 

The ist and 26. regiments were sent into the district 
of La Fourche to guard the railway. 

Then, between Butler and Weitzel, in spite of con 
fidence on the one hand and respect and affection on 
the other, began the usual controversy about arming 
the negro. To one unacquainted with the history of 
this question and of those times it must seem strange 
indeed to read the emphatic words in which a soldier 
so loyal and, in the best sense, so subordinate as 
Weitzel, declared his unwillingness to command these 
troops, and to reflect that in little more than two years 
he was destined to accept with alacrity the command 
of a whole army corps of black men, and at last to 
ride in triumph at their head into the very capital of 
the Confederacy. 

With the exception of the levies raised by its com 
mander, the Department of the Gulf had so far re 
ceived no access of strength from any quarter. From 
the North had come hardly a recruit. In the intense 
heat and among the poisonous swamps the effective 
strength melted away day by day. Thus the num 
bers present fell 3,795 during the month of July; 
in October, when the sickly season had done its worst, 
the wastage reached a total of 5,390. At the time of 
the battle of Baton Rouge, Butler s effective force can 
hardly have exceeded 7,000. When his strength was 
the greatest it probably did not exceed, if indeed it 



LA FOURCHE. 51 

reached, the number of 13,000 effective. The condi 
tion of affairs was therefore such that Butler found 
himself with an army barely sufficient for the secure 
defence of the vast territory committed to his care, 
and for any offensive operation absolutely powerless. 
To hold what had been gained it was practically 
necessary to sit still ; and to sit still then, as always 
in all wars, was to invite attack. 

These things Butler did not fail to represent to the 
government, and to repeat. At last, about the middle 
of November, he received a few encouraging words 
from Halleck, dated the 3d of that month, in which 
he was assured that the " delay in sending reinforce 
ments has not been the fault of the War Department. 
It is hoped that some will be ready to start as soon 
as the November elections are over. Brigadier- 
generals will be sent with these reinforcements." 
With them was to be a major-general, the new com 
mander of the department ; but this Halleck did not 
say. 



CHAPTER V. 

BANKS IN COMMAND. 

WHEN the campaigns of 1862 were drawing to an 
end, the government changed all the commanders 
and turned to the consideration of new plans. With 
President Lincoln, as we have seen, the opening of 
the Mississippi had long been a favored scheme. His 
early experience had rendered him familiar with the 
waters, the shores, and the vast traffic of the great 
river, and had brought home to him the common 
interests and the mutual dependence of the farmers, 
the traders, the miners, and the manufacturers of the 
States bordering upon the upper Mississippi and the 
Ohio on the one hand, and of the merchants and 
planters of the Gulf on the other. Thus he was 
fully prepared to enter warmly into the idea that had 
taken possession of the minds and hearts of the 
people of the Northwest. From a vague longing 
this idea had now grown into a deep and settled sen 
timent. Indeed in all the West the opening of the 
Mississippi played a part that can only be realized 
by comparing it with the prevailing sentiment of the 
East, so early, so long, so loudly expressed in the cry, 
"On to Richmond!" 

That the President should have been in complete 
accord with the popular impulse is hardly to be 
wondered at by any one that has followed, with the 

52 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 53 

least attention, the details of his remarkable career. 
Moreover, the popular impulse was right. Wars 
take their character from the causes that produce 
them and the people or the nations by whom they 
are waged. This was not a contest upon some petty 
question involving the fate of a ministry, a dynasty, or 
even a monarchy, to be fought out between regular 
armies upon well-known plans at the convergence of 
the roads between two opposing capitals. The strug 
gle was virtually one between two peoples hitherto 
united as one, between the people of the North, 
who had taken up arms for the maintenance and the 
restoration of the Union, and the people of the 
South, who had taken up arms to destroy the Union. 
Of such an issue there could be no compromise ; to 
such a contest there could be no end short of ex 
haustion. For four long years it was destined to go 
on, and at times to rage with a fury almost unex 
ampled along lines whose length was measured by 
the thousand miles and over a battle-ground nearly 
as large as the continent of Europe. Looked at 
merely from the standpoint of strategy, and discard 
ing all considerations not directly concerning the 
movements of armies, true policy might, perhaps, have 
dictated the concentration of all available resources 
in men and material upon the great central line of 
operations, roughly indicated by the mention of 
Chattanooga and Atlanta, the road eventually fol 
lowed by Sherman in his triumphant march to the 
sea. Apart, however, from considerations strictly 
tactical, the importance of cutting off the trans- 
Mississippi region as a source of supply for the main 
Confederate armies was obvious ; while from the 
governments of Europe, of England and France 



54 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

above all, the pressure was great for cotton, partly, 
indeed, as a pretext for interfering in our domestic 
struggle to their own advantage, but largely, also, to 
enable those governments to quiet the cry of the 
starving millions of their people. 

Instructed, as well as warned, by the events of the 
previous summer, the President now resolved on a 
combined attempt by two strong columns. On the 
2 ist of October he sent Major-General John A. 
McClernand to Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, with 
confidential orders, authorizing him to raise troops 
for an expedition, under his command, to move 
against Vicksburg from Cairo or Memphis as a place 
of rendezvous, and " to clear the Mississippi River 
and open navigation to New Orleans." Perhaps 
because of the confidence still felt in Grant by the 
President himself, although within narrowing limits, 
Grant was not to share the fate of McClellan, of 
Buell, and of so many others. The secret orders were 
not made known to him, yet it was settled that he 
was to retain the command of his department, while 
the principal active operations of the army within its 
limits were to be conducted by another. Even for 
this consideration it is rather more than likely he 
was indebted in a great degree to the exceptional 
advantage he enjoyed in having at all times at the 
seat of government, in the person of Washburne, a 
strong and devoted party of one, upon whose assist 
ance the government daily found it convenient to 
lean. 

A few days later, on the 3ist of October, Major- 
General Nathaniel P. Banks was sent to New York 
and Boston, with similar orders, to collect in New 
England and New York a force for the co-operating 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 55 

column from New Orleans. On the 8th of Novem 
ber this was followed by the formal order of the 
President assigning Banks to the command of the 
Department of the Gulf, including the State of Texas. 

This assignment was wholly unexpected by Banks. 
It was, indeed, unsought and unsolicited, and the 
first offer, from the President himself, came as a sur 
prise. At the close of Pope s campaign, when 
the reorganized Army of the Potomac, once more 
under McClellan, was in march to meet Lee in 
Maryland, Banks had been forced, by injuries re 
ceived at Cedar Mountain, to give up the command 
of the Twelfth Army Corps to the senior division 
commander, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams. As 
soon as this was reported at headquarters, McClellan 
created a new organization under the name of the 
"Defences of Washington," and placed Banks in 
command. 

For some time after this Banks was unable to leave 
his room ; yet, within forty-eight hours, a mob of 
thirty thousand wounded men and convalescents, who 
knew not where to go, and of stragglers, who meant 
not to go where they were wanted, was cleared out 
of the streets of Washington, and pandemonium was 
at an end. Order was rather created than restored, 
since none had existed in any direction. The Fifth 
Corps was sent to join the army in the field ; within 
a fortnight, a full army corps of able-bodied stragglers 
followed ; the fortifications were completed ; ample 
garrisons of instructed artillerists were provided. 
These became "the Heavies" of Grant s campaigns. 
Almost another full army corps was organized from 
the new regiments. Finally the whole force of the 
defences, about equ- l in numbers to Lee s army, was 



56 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

so disposed that Washington was absolutely secure. 
The dispositions for the defence of the capital and 
the daily operations of the command were clearly and 
constantly made known to the President and Secre 
tary of War as well as to the General-in-chief. Thus 
it was that, less than two months later, in the closing 
days of October, President Lincoln sent for Banks 
and said : ll You have let me sleep in peace for the 
first time since I came here. I want you to go to 
Louisiana and do the same thing there." 

On the 9th of November Halleck communicated to 
Banks the orders of the President to proceed imme 
diately to New Orleans with the troops from Balti 
more and elsewhere, under Emory, already assembling 
in transports at Fort Monroe. An additional force 
of ten thousand men, he was told, would be sent to 
him from Boston and New York as soon as possible. 
Though this order was never formally revoked or 
modified, yet in fact it was from the first a dead 
letter, and Banks, who received it in New York, re 
mained there to complete the organization and to 
look after the collection and transport of the addi 
tional force mentioned in Halleck s instructions. In 
cluding the eight regiments of Emory, but not 
counting four regiments of infantry and five bat 
talions of cavalry diverted to other fields, the rein 
forcements for the Department of the Gulf finally 
included thirty-nine regiments of infantry, six batteries 
of artillery, and one battalion of cavalry. Of the 
infantry twenty-one regiments were composed of 
officers and men enlisted to serve for nine months. 
Even of this brief period many weeks had, in some 
cases, already elapsed. To command the brigades 
and divisions, when organized, Major-General Chris- 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 57 

topher C. Augur, and Brigadier-Generals Cuvier 
Grover, William Dwight, George L. Andrews, and 
James Bowen were ordered to report to Banks. 

The work of chartering the immense fleet required 
to transport this force, with its material of all kinds, 
was confided by the government to Cornelius Van- 
derbilt, possibly in recognition of his recent princely 
gift to the nation of the finest steamship of his fleet, 
bearing his own name. This service Vanderbilt per 
formed with his usual vigor, " laying hands," as he 
said, "upon every thing that could float or steam," 
including, it must be added, more than one vessel to 
which it would have been rash to ascribe either of 
these qualities. 

Before the embarkation each vessel was carefully 
inspected by a board of officers, usually composed of 
the inspector-general or an officer of his department, 
an experienced quartermaster, and an officer of rank 
and intelligence, who was himself to sail on the ves 
sel. This last was a new, but, as soon appeared, a 
very necessary precaution. When every thing was 
nearly ready the embarkation began at New York, 
and as each vessel was loaded she was sent to sea 
with sealed orders directing her master and the com 
manding officer of the troops to make the best of 
their way to Ship Island, and there await the further 
instructions of the general commanding. Ship Island 
was chosen for the place of meeting because of the 
great draught of water of some of the vessels. At 
the same time Emory s force, embarking at Hampton 
Roads, set out under convoy of the man-of-war Au 
gusta, Commander E. G. Parrott, for the same des 
tination with similar orders. 

For three months the Florida had lain at anchor 



58 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

in the harbor at Mobile, only waiting for a good 
opportunity to enter upon her historic career of de 
struction. Since the 2oth of August the Alabama 
was known to have been scourging our commerce in 
the North Atlantic from the Azores to the Antilles. 
On the 5th of December she took a prize off the 
northern coast of San Domingo. Relying on the in 
formation with which he was freely furnished, Semmes 
expected to find the expedition off Galveston about 
the middle of January. In the dead of night, " after 
the midwatch was set and all was quiet," he meant, in 
the words of his executive officer, 1 slowly to approach 
the transports, " steam among them with both bat 
teries in action, slowly steam through the midst of 
them, pouring in a continuous discharge of shell, and 
sink them as we went." Fortunately Semmes s infor 
mation, though profuse and precise, was not quite 
accurate, for it brought him off Galveston on the 
1 3th of January: the wrong port, a month too late. 
What might have happened is shown by the ease 
with which he then destroyed the Hatteras. 

To guard against these dangers, it had been the 
wish of the government, and was a part of the original 
plan, that the transports sailing from New York 
should be formed in a single fleet and proceed, under 
strong convoy, to its destination. However, it soon 
became evident that as the rate of sailing of a fleet 
is governed by that of its slowest ship, the expedition, 
thus organized, would be forced to crawl along the 
coast at a speed hardly greater than five miles an 
hour. This would not only have exposed three ships 
out of five, and five regiments out of six, for at least 

1 "Cruise and Combats of the Alabama by her Executive Officer, John 
Mackintosh Kell. " Century War Book," vol. iv., p. 603. 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 59 

twice the necessary time to the perils of the sea, in 
creased by having to follow an inshore track at this 
inclement season ; it would not only have introduced 
chances of detention and risks of collision and of 
separation, but the peril from the Alabama would 
have been augmented in far greater degree than the 
security afforded by any naval force the government 
could just then spare. Therefore, the slow ships 
were loaded and sent off first and the faster ones 
kept back to the last ; then, each making the best of 
its way to Ship Island, nearly all came in together. 
Thus, when the North Star, bearing the flag of the 
commanding general and sailing from New York on 
the 4th of December, arrived in the early morning of 
the 1 3th at Ship Island, nearly the whole fleet lay at 
anchor or in the offing; and as soon as a hasty 
inspection could be completed and fresh orders given, 
the expedition got under way for New Orleans. The 
larger vessels, however, like the Atlantic, Baltic, and 
Ericsson being unable to cross the bar, lay at anchor 
at Ship Island until they could be lightened. 

Truly grand as was the spectacle afforded by the 
black hulls and white sails of this great concourse 
of ships at anchor, in the broad roadstead, yet a 
grander sight still was reserved for the next day, a 
lovely Sunday, as all these steamers in line ahead, 
the North Star leading, flags flying, bands playing, 
the decks blue with the soldiers of the Union, majesti 
cally made their way up the Mississippi. Most of 
those on board looked for the first time, with mingled 
emotions, over the pleasant lowlands of Louisiana, and 
all were amused at the mad antics of the pageant- 
loving negroes, crowding and capering on the levee as 
plantation after plantation was passed. So closely 



60 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

had the secret been kept that, until the transports 
got under way from Ship Island for the passes, 
probably not more than three or four officers, if so 
many, of all the force really knew its destination. 
Nor was it until the two generals met at New Or 
leans that Butler learned that Banks was to relieve 
him. 

On the 1 5th of December Banks took the com 
mand of the Department of the Gulf, although the 
formal orders were not issued till the i7th. The 
officers of the department, as well as of the personal 
staff of General Butler, were relieved from duty and 
permitted to accompany him to the North. The new 
staff of the department included Lieutenant-Colonel 
Richard B. Irwin, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Lieu 
tenant-Colonel William S. Abert, Assistant Inspector- 
General ; Major G. Norman Lieber, Judge-Advocate ; 
Colonel Samuel B. Holabird, Chief Quartermaster ; 
Colonel Edward G. Beckwith, Chief Commissary of 
Subsistence ; Surgeon Richard H. Alexander, Medi 
cal Director ; Major David C. Houston, Chief 
Engineer ; Captain Henry L. Abbot, Chief of To 
pographical Engineers ; First-Lieutenant Richard M. 
Hill, Chief of Ordnance ; Captain Richard Arnold, 
Chief of Artillery ; Captain William W. Rowley, 
Chief Signal Officer. 

Banks s orders from the government were to go up 
the Mississippi and open the river, in co-operation 
with McClernand s expedition against Vicksburg. 
" As the ranking general of the Southwest," Hal- 
leek s orders proceeded, "you are authorized to 
assume control of any military forces from the upper 
Mississippi which may come within your command. 
The line of the division between your department 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 61 

and that of Major-General Grant is, therefore, left 
undecided for the present, and you will exercise su 
perior authority as far north as you may ascend the 
river. The President regards the opening of the 
Mississippi river as the first and most important of 
all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped 
that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it." 

Immediately on assuming command Banks ordered 
Grover to take all the troops that were in condition 
for service at once to Baton Rouge, under the protec 
tion of the fleet, and there disembark and go into 
camp. Augur was specially charged with the arrange 
ments for the despatch of the troops from New Orleans. 
Before starting they were carefully inspected, and all 
that were found to be affected with disease of a con 
tagious or infectious character were sent ashore and 
isolated. 

On the morning of the i6th the advance of Gro- 
ver s expedition got under way, under convoy of a 
detachment of Farragut s fleet, led by Alden in the 
Richmond. Grover took with him about 4,500 men, 
but when all were assembled at Baton Rouge there 
were twelve regiments, three batteries, and two troops 
of cavalry. The Confederates, who were in very small 
force, promptly evacuated Baton Rouge, and Grover 
landed and occupied the place on the 1 7th of Decem 
ber. After sending off the last of the troops, Augur 
went up and took command. The lines constructed 
by Paine in August were occupied and strengthened, 
and all arrangements promptly made for their defence 
in view of an attack, such as might not unnaturally be 
looked for from Port Hudson, whose garrison then 
numbered more than 12,000 effectives. The two 
places are but a long day s march apart. Since the 



62 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

occupation in August, the Confederate forces at Port 
Hudson had been commanded by Brigadier-General 
William N. R. Beall. On the 28th of December, how 
ever, he was relieved by Major-General Frank Gard 
ner, who retained the command thenceforward until 
the end. While the war lasted, Baton Rouge con 
tinued to be held by the Union forces without oppo 
sition or even serious menace. 

An attempt to occupy Galveston was less fortunate. 
This movement was ordered by Banks a few days 
after his arrival at New Orleans, apparently under the 
pressure of continued importunity from Andrew J. 
Hamilton, and in furtherance of the policy that had 
led the government to send him with the expedition, 
nominally as a brigadier-general, but under a special 
commission from the President that named him as 
military governor of Texas. On the 2ist of Decem 
ber, three companies, D, G, and I, of the 42d Massa 
chusetts, under Colonel Isaac S. Burrell, were sent 
from New Orleans without disembarking from the 
little Saxon, on which they had made the journey from 
New York. With them went Holcomb s 2d Vermont 
battery, leaving their horses to folloAV ten days later 
on the Cambria, with the horses and men of troops 
A and B of the Texas cavalry. Protected by the flotilla 
under Commander W. B. Renshaw, comprising his 
own vessel, the Westfield, the gunboats Harriet Lane, 
Commander J. M. Wainwright ; Clifton, Commander 
Richard L. Law ; Owasco, Lieutenant Henry Wilson; 
and Sachem, Acting-Master Amos Johnson ; and the 
schooner Corypheus, Acting-Master Spears, Burrell 
landed unopposed at Kuhn s Wharf on the 24th, and 
took nominal possession of the town in accordance 
with his instructions. These were indeed rather 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 63 

vague, as befitted the shadowy nature of the objects 
to be accomplished. " The situation of the people of 
Galveston," wrote General Banks, "makes it expedi 
ent to send a small force there for the purpose of 
their protection, and also to afford such facilities as 
may be possible for recruiting" soldiers for the military 
service of the United States." Burrell was cautioned 
not to involve himself in such difficulty as to endan 
ger the safety of his command, and it was rather 
broadly hinted that he was not to take orders from 
General Hamilton. In reality, Burrell s small force 
occupied only the long wharf, protected by barricades 
at the shore end, and seaward by the thirty-two guns 
of the fleet, lying at anchor within 300 yards. 

Magruder, who had been barely a month in com 
mand of the Confederate forces in Texas, had given 
his first attention to the defenceless condition of the 
coast, menaced as it was by the blockading fleet, and 
thus it happened that Burrell s three companies, per 
forming their maiden service on picket between wind 
and water, found themselves confronted by the two 
brigades of Scurry and Sibley, Cook s regiment of 
heavy artillery, and Wilson s light battery, with twenty- 
eight guns, and two armed steamboats, having their 
vulnerable parts protected by cotton bales. 

Long before dawn on the ist of January, 1863, 
under cover of a heavy artillery fire, the position of 
the 42d Massachusetts was assaulted by two storm 
ing parties of 300 and 500 men respectively, led by 
Colonels Green, Bagby, and Cook, the remainder of 
the troops being formed under Scurry in support. A 
brisk fight followed, but the defenders had the con 
centrated fire of the fleet to protect them ; the scal 
ing ladders proved too short to reach the wharf, and 



64 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

as day began to break, the baffled assailants were 
about to draw off, when, suddenly, the Confederate 
gunboats appeared on the scene and in a few moments 
turned the defeat into a signal victory. The Nep 
tune was disabled and sunk by the Plarriet Lane, the 
Harriet Lane was boarded and captured by the Bayoii 
City, the Westfield ran aground and was blown up by 
her gallant commander, and soon the white flag 
floated from the masts of all the Union fleet. Wain- 
wright and Wilson had been killed ; Renshaw, with 
his executive officer, Zimmermann, and his chief en 
gineer, Green, had perished with the ship. The sur 
vivors were given three hours to consider terms. 

When Burrell saw the flag of truce from the fleet, 
he too showed the white flag and surrendered to the 
commander of the Confederate troops. The Con 
federates ceased firing on him as soon as they per 
ceived his signal, but the navy, observing that the fire 
on shore went on for some time, notwithstanding the 
naval truce, thought it had been violated ; accord 
ingly the Clifton, Owasco, Sachem, and Corypheus put 
to sea, preceded by the army transport steamers Saxon 
and Mary A. Boardman. On the latter vessel were 
the military governor of Texas, with his staff, and the 
men and guns of Holcomb s battery. 

The Confederates lost 26 killed and 1 17 wounded ; 
the Union troops 5 killed and 15 wounded, and all 
the survivors (probably about 250 in number) were 
made prisoners save the adjutant, Lieutenant Charles 
A. Davis, who had been sent off to communicate with 
the fleet. The navy lost 29 killed, 31 wounded, and 
92 captured. So ended this inauspicious New Year s 
day. 

The transports made the best of their way to New 



BANKS IN COMMAND. 65 

Orleans with the news. The Cambria, with the 
Texas cavalry and the horses of the 2d Vermont 
battery, arrived in the offing on the evening of the 
2d of January. For two days a strong wind and high 
sea rendered fruitless all efforts to communicate with 
the shore ; then learning the truth, the troops at once 
returned to New Orleans. 

Orders had been left with the guard ship at Pilot 
Town to send the transport steamers, Charles Osgood 
and Shetucket, with the remainder of the 42 d, directly 
to Galveston. It was now necessary to change these 
orders, and to do it promptly. The bad news reached 
headquarters early in the afternoon of the 3d Janu 
ary : " Stop every thing going to Galveston," was at 
once telegraphed to the Pass. 



CHAPTER VI. 
ORGANIZING THE CORPS. 

MEANWHILE the new troops continued to come 
from New York, although it was not until the nth 
of February that the last detachments landed. The 
work of organizing the whole available force of the 
department for the task before it was pursued with 
vigor. In order to form the moving column, as well 
as for the purposes of administration, so that the one 
might not interfere with the other, the main body of 
troops was composed of four divisions of three bri 
gades each. The garrisons of the defences and the 
permanent details for guard and provost duty were 
kept separate. While this was in progress orders 
came from the War Office dated the 5th of January, 
1863, by which all the forces in the Department of 
the Gulf were designated as the Nineteenth Army 
Corps, to take effect December 14, 1862, and Banks 
was named by the President as the corps com 
mander. 

To Augur was assigned the First division, to Sher 
man the Second, to Emory the Third, and to Grover 
the Fourth. Weitzel, retaining his old brigade, be 
came the second in command in Augur s division. 
In making up the brigades the regiments were so 
selected and combined as to mingle the veterans 

66 



ORGANIZING THE CORPS. 67 

with the raw levies, and to furnish, in right of senior 
ity, the more capable and experienced of the colonels 
as brigade commanders. Andrews, who had been 
left in New York to bring up the rear of the expedi 
tion, became Chief-of-Staff on the 6th of March, and 
Bowen was made Provost- Marshal General. 

To each division three batteries of artillery were 
given, including at least one battery belonging to 
the regular army, thus furnishing, except for the 
second division, an experienced regular officer as 
chief of artillery of the division. The cavalry was 
kept, for the most part, unattached, mainly serving 
in La Fourche, at Baton Rouge, and with the moving 
column. The 2ist Indiana, changed into the ist 
Indiana heavy artillery, was told off to man the 
siege train, for which duty it was admirably suited. 
When all had joined, the whole force available for 
active operations that should not uncover New 
Orleans was about 25,000. Two thirds, however, 
were new levies, and of these half were nine months 
men. Some were armed with guns that refused 
to go off. Others did not know the simplest evo 
lutions. In one instance, afterwards handsomely 
redeemed, the colonel, having to disembark his men, 
could think of no way save by the novel command, 
" Break ranks, boys, and get ashore the best way you 
can." The cavalry, except the six old companies, 
was poor and quite insufficient in numbers. Of land 
and water transportation, both indispensable to any 
possible operation, there was barely enough for the 
movement of a single division. In Washington, 
Banks had been led to expect that he might count on 
the depots or the country for all the material required 
for moving his army ; yet Butler found New Orleans 



68 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

on the brink of starvation ; the people had now to 
be fed, as well as the army, and the provisions that 
formerly came from the West by the great river had 
now to find their way from the North by the Atlantic 
and the Gulf. The depots were calculated, and 
barely sufficed, for the old force of the department, 
while the country could furnish very little at best, 
and nothing at all until it should be occupied. 

Again, until he reached his post, Banks was not 
informed that the Confederates were in force any 
where on the river save Vicksburg, yet, in fact, Port 
Hudson, 250 miles below Vicksburg and 135 miles 
above New Orleans, was found strongly intrenched 
with twenty-nine heavy guns in position and garri 
soned by 12,000 men. Long before Banks could 
have assembled and set in motion a force sufficient 
to cope with this enemy behind earthworks, the 
12,000 became 16,000. Moreover, Banks was not in 
communication either with Grant or with McClernand ; 
he knew next to nothing of the operations, the move 
ments, or the plans of either ; he had not the least 
idea when the expedition would be ready to move 
from Memphis ; he was even uncertain who the 
commander of the Northern column was to be. On 
their part, not only were Grant, the department com 
mander ; McClernand, the designated commander of 
the Vicksburg expedition ; and Sherman, its actual 
commander, alike ignorant of every thing pertaining 
to the movements of the column from the Gulf, but, 
at the most critical period of the campaign, not one 
of the three was in communication with either of the 
others. Under these conditions, all concert between 
the co-operating forces was rendered impossible from 
the start, and the expectations of the government 



ORGANIZING THE CORPS. 69 

that Banks would go against Vicksburg immediately 
on landing in Louisiana were doomed to sharp and 
sudden, yet inevitable, disappointment. 

Grant, believing himself free to dispose of McCler- 
nand s new levies, had projected a combined move 
ment by his own forces, marching by Grand Junction, 
and Sherman s, moving by water from Memphis, on 
the front and rear of Vicksburg. 

Sherman set out from Memphis on the 2Oth of 
December in complete ignorance of Halleck s tele 
gram of the 1 8th, conveying the President s positive 
order that McClernand was to command the expedi 
tion. Forrest cut the wires on the morning of the 
1 9th just in time to intercept this telegram, as well 
as its counterpart, addressed to McClernand at 
Springfield, Illinois. On the 29th of December, 
Sherman met with the bloody repulse of Chickasaw 
Bluffs. On the 2d of January he returned to the 
mouth of the Yazoo, and there found McClernand 
armed with the bowstring and the baton. 

Where was Grant ? While his main body was still 
at Oxford, in march to the Yallabusha, Forrest, the 
ubiquitous, irrepressible Forrest, struck his line of 
communications, and, on the 2Oth of December, at 
the instant when Sherman was giving the signal to get 
under way from Memphis, Van Dorn was receiving the 
surrender of Holly Springs and the keys of Grant s 
depots. There seemed nothing for it but to fall back 
on Memphis or starve. Of this state of affairs Grant 
sent word to Sherman on the 2oth. Eleven days 
later the despatch was telegraphed to Sherman by 
McClernand ; nor was it until the 8th of January that 
Grant, at Holly Springs, learned from Washington 
the bad news from Sherman, then ten days old. As 



70 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

if to complete a very cat s-cradle of cross-purposes, 
Washington had heard of it only through the Rich 
mond newspapers. 

The collapse of the northern column, coupled with 
the Confederate occupation of Port Hudson, had 
completely changed the nature of the problem con 
fided to Banks for solution. If he was to execute 
the letter of his instructions at all, he had now to 
choose between three courses, each involving an im 
possibility : to carry by assault a strong line of works, 
three miles long, defended by 16,000 good troops ; 
to lay siege to the place, with the certainty that it 
would be relieved from Mississippi, and with the 
reasonable prospect of losing at least his siege train 
in the venture ; to leave Port Hudson in his rear and 
go against Vicksburg, upon the supposition, in the 
last degree improbable, that he might find Grant, or 
McClernand, or Sherman there to meet him and 
furnish him with food and ammunition. This last 
alternative appears to have been the one towards 
which the government leaned, as far as its intentions 
can be gathered, yet Banks could only have accepted 
it by sacrificing his communications, putting New 
Orleans in imminent peril, and creating irreparable 
and almost inevitable disaster as the price of a remote 
chance of achieving a great success. In point of fact, 
in the early days of January, McClernand, accompanied 
by Sherman as a corps commander, was moving tow 
ard the White River and the brilliant adventure of 
Arkansas Post. After capturing this place on the 
iith, McClernand meant to go straight to Little 
Rock, but Grant rose to the occasion and peremp 
torily recalled the troops to Milliken s Bend. " This 
wild-goose chase," as Grant not inaptly termed it, 



ORGANIZING THE CORPS. 71 

cost McClernand his new-fledged honors as com 
mander of "The Army of the Mississippi," and 
brought him to Sherman s side as a commander of 
one of his own corps ; a bitter draught of the same 
medicine he had so recently administered to Sher 
man. 

Had Banks marched straight to Vicksburg at the 
same time that McClernand was moving on Little 
Rock, with Grant cut off somewhere in northern 
Mississippi, the Confederate commanders must have 
been dull and slow indeed had they failed to seize with 
promptitude so rare an opportunity for resuming, at 
a sweep, the complete mastery of the river, ruining 
their adversary s campaign, and eliminating 100,000 
of his soldiers. 

Thus, almost at the first step, the two great expe 
ditions were brought to a standstill. They could 
neither act together nor advance separately. The 
generals began to look about them for a new way. 



CHAPTER VII. 

MORE WAYS THAN ONE. 

SINCE Port Hudson could neither be successfully 
attacked nor safely disregarded, the problem now 
presented to Banks was to find a way around the 
obstacle without sacrificing or putting in peril his 
communications. The Atchafalaya was the key to 
the puzzle, and to that quarter attention was early 
directed, yet for a long time the difficulties encoun 
tered in finding away to the Atchafalaya seemed well- 
nigh insuperable. The rising waters were expected 
to render the largest of the bayous that connect the 
Atchafalaya and the Mississippi navigable for steam 
boats of small size and light draught. Of these there 
were, indeed, but few, so that the work of transport 
ing troops from the one line to the other must have 
been, at the best, slow and tedious, yet, once accom 
plished, the army would have found itself, with the 
help of the navy, above and beyond Port Hudson, 
with a sufficient line of communications open to the 
rear, and the Mississippi and the Red River closed 
against the enemy. 

The Confederates had in Western Louisiana, near 
the mouth of the Teche, a small division of Taylor s 
troops, about 4,500 strong, with one gunboat. At 
first Banks thought to leave a brigade, with two or 
three light-draught gunboats, on Berwick Bay to 

72 



MORE WA YS THAN ONE. 73 

observe Taylor s force, and then to disregard it as a 
factor in the subsequent movements. This, while 
the Atchafalaya was high and the eastern lowlands 
of the Attakapas widely overflowed, might have been 
safely done, but all these plans were destined to be 
essentially modified by a series of unexpected events 
in widely different quarters. 

In the second week of January, Weitzel heard that 
Taylor meditated an attack on the outlying force at 
Berwick Bay, and that with this view the armament 
of the gunboat Cotton was being largely augmented. 
Weitzel resolved to strike the first blow. For this 
purpose he concentrated his whole force of seven 
regiments, including four of his own brigade, be 
sides the 2 ist Indiana, 6th Michigan, and 23d Con 
necticut, with Carruth s and Thompson s batteries, 
four pieces of Bainbridge s battery, Barrett s Troop B 
of the Louisiana cavalry, and Company B of the 8th 
New Hampshire, commanded by Lieutenant Charles 
H. Camp. The ist Louisiana held Donaldsonville 
and the ii4th New York guarded the railway. To 
open the way, as well as to meet the fire of the 
Cotton, there were four gunboats of the light-draught 
flotilla under Buchanan the flagship Calhoun, Es- 
trella, Kinsman, and Diana. 

At three o clock on the morning of the i3th of Jan 
uary the crossing of Berwick Bay began ; by half-past 
ten the gunboats had completed the ferriage of the 
cavalry and artillery ; the infantry following landed at 
Pattersonville ; then the whole force formed in line 
and, moving forward in the afternoon to the junction 
of the Teche with the Atchafalaya, went into bivouac. 
The next morning began the ascent of the Teche. 
The 8th Vermont was thrown over to the east or left 



74 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

bank of the bayou, while the main line moved for 
ward on the west bank to attack the Cotton, now in 
plain sight. The gunboats led the movement, neces 
sarily in line ahead, owing to the narrowness of the 
bayou. On either bank Weitzel s line of battle, with 
skirmishers thrown well forward, was preceded by 
sixty volunteers from the 8th Vermont and the same 
number from the 75th New York, whose orders were 
to move directly up to the Cotton and pick off her 
gunners. The line of battle moved forward steadily 
with the column of gunboats. Between the Union 
gunboats and the Cotton the bayou had been ob 
structed so as to prevent any hostile vessel from 
ascending the stream beyond that point. A brisk 
fight followed. Under cover of the guns of the navy 
and of the raking and broadside fire of the batteries, 
the 8th Vermont and 75th New York first drove off 
the land supports and then moving swiftly on the 
Cotton silenced her. In this advance the Vermonters 
captured one lieutenant and forty-one men. The 
Cotton retreated out of range. That night her crew 
applied the match and let her swing across the bayou 
to serve as an additional obstruction. In a few mo 
ments she was completely destroyed. 

Then, having thus easily gained his object, Weitzel 
returned to La Fourche. His losses in the movement 
were i officer and 5 men killed, and 2 officers and 25 
men wounded. Lieutenant James E. Whiteside, of 
the 75th New York, who had volunteered to lead 
the sharpshooters on the right bank, was killed close 
to the Cotton, in the act of ordering the crew to haul 
down her flag. Among the killed, also, was the gal 
lant Buchanan a serious loss, not less to the army 
than to the navy. 



MORE WA YS THAN ONE. 75 

During a lull in the naval operations above Vicks- 
burg, occasioned by the want of coal, eleven steam 
boats that had been in use by the Confederates on 
the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, 
took advantage of Porter s absence to slip up the 
Yazoo for supplies. There Porter s return caught 
them as in a trap. 

Toward the end of January Grant landed on the 
long neck opposite Vicksburg, and once more set to 
work on the canal. Porter now determined to let a 
detachment of his fleet run the gauntlet of the bat 
teries of Vicksburg for the purpose of destroying 
every thing the Confederates had afloat below the 
town. The ram Queen of the West, Colonel Charles 
R. Ellet, protected by two tiers of cotton bales, was 
told off to lead the adventure. On the 2d of Feb 
ruary she performed the feat ; then passing on down 
the river, on the 3d, ran fifteen miles below the mouth 
of the Red River, and the same distance up that 
stream, took and burned three Confederate supply 
steamboats, and got safely back to Vicksburg on the 
5th. Porter was naturally jubilant, for, as it seemed, 
the mastery of the great river had been the swift re 
ward of his enterprise. 

A week later Ellet again ran down the Missis 
sippi and up the Red, burning and destroying until, 
pushing his success too far, he found himself under the 
guns of Fort De Russy. A few shots sufficed to 
disable the Queen of the West, which fell into the 
hands of the Confederates, while Ellet and his men 
escaped in one of their captures. 

Below Natchez they met the Indianola coming 
down the river, after safely passing Vicksburg. On 
the 24th the Confederate gunboat Webb, and the ram 



76 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Queen of the West, now also flying the Confederate 
colors, came after the Indianola, attacked her off Pal 
myra Island, and sank her. Thus, as suddenly as it had 
gone from them, the control of the long reach of the 
Mississippi once more passed over to the Confederates. 
At this news Farragut took fire. Between him 
and the impudent little Confederate flotilla, whose easy 
triumph had suddenly laid low the hopes and plans 
of his brother admiral, there stood nothing save the 
guns of Port Hudson. These batteries he would 
pass, and for the fourth time, yet not the last, would 
look the miles of Confederate cannon in the mouth. 
Banks, whose movements were retarded and to some 
extent held in abeyance, from the causes already 
mentioned, promptly fell in with the Admiral s plans, 
and both commanders conferring freely, the details 
were soon arranged. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

FARRAGUT PASSES PORT HUDSON. 

WHILE Farragut was putting his fleet in thorough 
order for this adventure, looking after all needful 
arrangements with minute personal care, Banks con 
centrated all his disposable force at Baton Rouge. 
By the 7th of March, leaving T. W. Sherman to cover 
New Orleans and Weitzel to hold strongly La 
Fourche, Banks had a marching column, composed of 
Augur s, Emory s, and Grover s divisions, 15,000 
strong. On the Qth of March tents were struck, to 
be pitched no more for five hard months, and the 
next morning the troops were ready, but repairs de 
layed the fleet, the last vessels of which did not 
reach Baton Rouge until about the I2th. On that 
day, for the first time, Banks reviewed his army, on 
the old battle-ground, in the presence of the admiral, 
his staff, and many officers of the fleet. The new 
regiments, with some exceptions, showed plainly the 
progress already attained under the energetic train 
ing and constant work of their officers. The degree 
of instruction and care then apparent forecast the 
value of their actual service. The 38th Massachu 
setts and 1 1 6th New York were specially commended 
in orders. 

To hold Baton Rouge about 3,000 men were de 
tached, under Chickering, including the 4-ist Massa- 

77 



78 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

chusetts, 1 73d New York, i75th New York, ist In 
diana heavy artillery, 3d Louisiana native guards, 
Mack s battery, and Troop F of the Rhode Island 
cavalry. 

All arrangements being concerted for the passage 
of the batteries on the evening of the I4th of March, 
Grover set out on the afternoon of the i3th, fol 
lowed, at daybreak the next morning, by Emory, 
with Augur bringing up the rear. In the afternoon 
Grover went into camp, covering the intersection of 
the Bayou Sara road and the road that leads from it 
toward the river. Emory formed on his left, cover 
ing the branches of this road that lead to Springfield 
Landing and to Ross Landing, his main body support 
ing the centre at Alexander s plantation. Augur, on 
the right, held the cross-road that leads from the 
Bayou Sara road by Alexander s to the Clinton road 
at Vallandigham s. At two o clock in the afternoon 
the signal officers opened communication from Spring 
field Landing with the fleet at anchor near the head of 
Prophet Island, and a strong detachment was posted 
near the landing to maintain the connection. 

As the Confederates were known to have a force 
of about 1,200 cavalry somewhere between Clinton 
and Baton Rouge, strong detachments became neces 
sary to observe all the approaches and to hold the 
roads and bridges in the rear in order to secure the 
withdrawal of the army when the demonstration 
should be completed, as well as to guard the opera 
tion from being inopportunely interrupted. These 
dispositions reduced the force for battle to about 
1 2,000. 

It had been intended to concentrate nearly all the 
artillery near the river in the vicinity of Ross Land- 



FA RRA G UT PA SSES FOR T HUDSON. 79 

ing in such a manner as to engage, or at least divide, 
the attention of the lower batteries of Port Hudson ; 
but the maps were even more imperfect than usual, 
and when a reconnoissance, naturally retarded by the 
enemy s advance guard, showed that the road by 
which the guns were to have gone into position did 
not exist, the daylight was already waning. A broken 
bridge also caused some delay. 

At five o clock in the afternoon Banks received a 
despatch from Farragut announcing an important 
change in the hour fixed for the movement of the 
fleet. Instead of making the attempt " in the gray 
of the morning," as had been the admiral s first plan, 
he now meant to get under way at eight o clock in 
the evening. When darkness fell, therefore, it found 
the troops substantially in the positions already de 
scribed, yet with their outposts well thrown forward. 

About ten o clock the fleet weighed anchor and 
moved up the river. The flagship Hartford took 
the lead, with the Albatross lashed to her port side, 
next the Richmond with the Genesee, the Monongahela 
with the Kineo, and last the side-wheeler Mississippi 
alone. The Essex and Sachem remained at anchor 
below, with the mortar boats, to cover the advance. 
An hour later a rocket shot up from the bluff and in 
stantly the Confederate batteries opened fire. They 
were soon joined by long lines of sharpshooters. To 
avoid the shoal that makes out widely from the 
western bank, as well as to escape the worst of the 
enemy s fire, both of musketry and artillery, the 
ships hugged closely the eastern bluff; so closely, 
indeed, that the yards brushed the leaves from the 
overhanging trees and the voices of men on shore 
could be distinctly heard by those on board. Watch- 



8o THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

fires were lighted by the Confederates to show as 
well the ships as the range ; yet this did more harm 
than good, since the smoke, united with that of the 
guns ashore and afloat to render the fleet invisible. 
On the other hand, the pilots were soon unable to 
see. 

The Hartford, meeting the swift eddy at the bend, 
where the current describes nearly a right angle, 
narrowly escaped being driven ashore. The Richmond, 
following, was disabled by a shot through her engine- 
room when abreast of the upper battery at the turn. 
The Monongahelds consort, the Kineo, lost the use 
of her rudder, and the Monongahela herself ran 
aground on the spit ; presently the Kineo, drifting 
clear, also grounded, but was soon afloat again, and, 
with her assistance, the Monongahela too swung free, 
after nearly a half hour of imminent peril. Then the 
Kineo, cast loose by her consort, drifted helplessly 
down the stream, while the Monongahela passed up 
until a heated bearing brought her engines to a stop 
and she too drifted with the current. 

Last of the fleet, the Mississippi, unseen in the 
smoke, and therefore safe enough from the Con 
federate guns, yet equally unable to see either friend, 
foe, or landmark, was carried by the current hard on 
the spit ; then, after a half hour of ineffectual exertion, 
lying alone and helpless under the concentrated aim 
of the Confederate batteries, she was abandoned and 
set on fire by her captain. About three in the morn 
ing, becoming lighter, as the fire did its work, she 
floated free and drifted down the stream one mass of 
flames, in plain view, not merely of the fleet, but also 
of the army, condemned to stand to arms in sight and 
sound of the distant battle and now to look on idly 




LOUISIANA 




SHEET III. 



FARRAGUT PASSES PORT HUDSON. 81 

as, with a mighty flash and roar, the Mississippi 
cast to the heavens her blazing timbers, amid a 
myriad of bursting shells, in one mountain of flame : 
then black silence. 

Thus, when at last the gray of the morning came, 
the Hartford and Albatross rode in safety above Port 
Hudson, while the Richmond, Monongahela, Genesee, 
and Kineo, all battered and more or less injured, lay 
at anchor once more near Prophet Island, and the 
Mississippi had perished in a blaze of glory. 

Narrowly escaping the total failure of his plans and 
the destruction of his fleet, Farragut had so far suc 
ceeded in his objects that henceforth the Confederates 
practically lost the control of the Mississippi above 
Port Hudson, as well as the use of the Red River as 
their base of supplies. Save in skiff-loads, beef, corn, 
and salt could no longer be safely carried across the 
Mississippi, and the high road from Galveston and 
Matamoras was closed against the valuable and sorely 
needed cargoes brought from Europe by the block 
ade runners. 

As for the army, it had gained some facility of 
movement, some knowledge of its deficiencies, and 
some information of great future value as to the 
topography of the unknown country about Port 
Hudson ; more than this could hardly have been ex 
pected. Indeed, the sole object of the presence of the 
army was defeated by the movement of the fleet so 
many hours before the time agreed upon. This 
object was to make a diversion that might attract 
the enemy s attention and thus tend to reduce the 
fire of musketry on the exposed decks of the fleet, 
and to draw off or hold off the fire of the field- 
pieces that might otherwise be massed on the river 

6 



82 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

front. The disparity between the relative strength 
of Banks s army and that of the garrison was too well 
known to justify the thought of an actual attack upon 
the works. 

Such, however, was not the opinion of the govern 
ment, which to the last seems to have taken for 
granted that all that was needed to insure the surren 
der of Port Hudson was a desire to attack it. Even 
after the surrender, Halleck, in his annual report for 
1863, speaking of the position of affairs in March, 
said : " Had our land forces invested Port Hudson at 
this time, it could have been easily reduced, as its 
garrison was weak . . . but the strength of the 
place was not then known." In truth, the place was 
never so strong, before or after, as at this time ; nor 
is it often in war that the information tallies so nearly 
with the fact. The effective strength of the garrison 
was more than 16,000. Gardner s monthly report ac 
counts for 1,366 officers and 14,921 men present for 
duty, together 16,287, out f a total present of 20,388. 
Besides the twenty-two heavy guns in position, he had 
thirteen light batteries. 

Morning found the army alone and in a bad 
position, either for attack or defence. Nothing was 
to be gained by staying there, and much was to be 
risked. As soon, therefore, as word came through 
the ever-active and adventurous signal-officers that 
all was well with what remained of the fleet, Banks 
once more took up the line of march for Baton 
Rouge, and went into bivouac in great discomfort 
on the soggy borders of the Bayou Montesano, 
about eight miles north of the town. 

Meanwhile, what had become of Farragut ? The 
last seen of the Hartford and Albatross was on the 



FARRA G UT PA SSES FOR T HUDSON. 83 

morning of the i5th by the signal officers at Spring 
field Landing. The two vessels then lay at anchor 
beyond the bend above Port Hudson. Several 
attempts were made to communicate with the Admi 
ral across the intervening neck of lowland. The first 
was on the i6th, by Parmele, with the i74th New 
York and a squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry. 
Next, on the i8th, Banks, eager to advance the effort, 
took Dudley s brigade, two sections of Rawles bat 
tery, and Magee s troop, and joined Parmele. But 
for a time these efforts accomplished nothing, since it 
was impossible to see far over the flat and wooded 
country ; and the Confederates having cut the great 
levee at M organza, the whole neighborhood was under 
water and the bridges gone. Finally, on the iQth, 
Colonel Charles J. Paine went out with the 2d Louis 
iana, the 1 74th New York, and a small squad of 
cavalry, and leaving first the infantry and then most 
of the troopers behind, and riding on almost alone, 
succeeded in crossing the bend and gained the levee 
at the head of the old channel known as Fausse River, 
about three miles above Port Hudson. There he had 
a good view of the river, yet nothing was to be seen 
of the Hartford and Albatross. Again, on the 24th, 
Dudley sent Magee with his troop to Hermitage 
Landing. Pushing on with a few men, Magee got 
a full view of the reach above Waterloo for five 
miles, but he too learned nothing of the fleet. Far- 
ragut had in fact gone up the river on the I5th, 
after vainly attempting to exchange signals with his 
ships below and with the army, and was now near 
Vicksburg in communication with Admiral Porter, 
engaged in concerting plans for the future. Before 
getting under way he had caused three guns to be 



84 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

fired from the Hartford. This was the signal agreed 
upon with Banks, but for some reason it was either 
not heard or not reported. 

Just before separating at Baton Rouge, Banks had 
handed to Farragut a letter addressed to Grant, to 
be delivered by the Admiral in the event of success. 
This letter, the first direct communication between 
the two generals, Grant received on the 2Oth of 
March, and from it derived his first information of 
the actual state of affairs in the Department of the 
Gulf. After stating his position and force Banks 
wound up by saying : " Should the Admiral succeed 
in his attempt, I shall try to open communication 
with him on the other side of the river, and, in that 
event, trust I shall hear from you as to your position 
and movements, and especially as to your views as to 
the most efficient mode of co-operation upon the part 
of the forces we respectively command." 

With the Hartford and Albatross controlling the 
reach between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, as well 
as the mouth of the Red River and the head of the 
Atchafalaya, Banks might now safely disregard the 
movements of the Confederate gunboats. Accord 
ingly, while waiting for Grant s answer, he turned to 
the execution of his former plan. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE TECHE. 

IN effect, this plan was to turn Port Hudson by 
way of the Atchafalaya. For the original conception, 
the credit must be given to Weitzel, who seems in 
deed to have formed a very similar scheme when he 
first occupied La Fourche. However, his force was, 
at that time, barely sufficient for the defence of the 
territory confided to his care. Not only was there 
then no particular object in moving beyond the 
Atchafalaya, but any advance in that direction would 
have exposed his little corps to disaster on account of 
the great facilities afforded by the numberless streams 
for a movement by detachments of the enemy into 
his rear. It was largely to prepare for an advance 
into Western Louisiana, as well as to defend his oc 
cupancy of La Fourche, that Butler, upon Weitzel s 
suggestion, had created the gunboat flotilla. 

Soon after Banks took the command, Weitzel, who 
had opinions and the courage to enforce them, laid 
his ideas before his new chief. On the i8th of 
January, disturbed by hearing that Admiral Farragut 
meant to take one of the army gunboats, recently 
transferred to the navy, away from Berwick Bay, 
instead of sending more, Weitzel expressed himself 
strongly in a despatch to headquarters. 

85 



86 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

" With such a naval force in that bay, in co-operation with a 
suitable land force, the only true campaign in this section could 
be made. Look at the map. Berwick Bay leads into Grand 
Lake, Grand Lake into the Atchafalaya, the Atchafalaya into 
Red River. Boats drawing not more than four or five feet and 
in the force I mention [10 or 12], with a proper land force, could 
clear out the Atchafalaya, Red River, and Black River. All com 
munications from Vicksburg and Port Hudson cross this line in 
dicated by me. By taking it in the manner I propose, Vicksburg 
and Port Hudson would be a cipher to the rebels. It would be a 
campaign that 100,000 men could not so easily fight, and so suc 
cessfully. It is an operation to which the taking of Galveston 
Island is a cipher and the capture of the Mobile Bay forts a 
nonentity." 

With these views Banks was himself in accord, yet 
not in their entirety. The pressure of time led him 
to desire to avoid divergences into the Teche coun 
try. If it were possible, he wished to gain the Atch 
afalaya by some route at once speedier and more 
direct. While the explorations were in progress to 
discover such a route, Weitzel once more took occa 
sion to urge his original plan. On the i5th of Feb 
ruary, he wrote to Augur, his division commander : 

" I feel it a duty which I owe you and my country to address 
you at this late hour in the night on the present proposed move 
ment on Butte a la Rose and the Teche country. ... In all 
honesty and candor, I do not believe the present plan to be a 
proper one. . . . Sibley s Texan brigade is somewhere in the 
Opelousas country. . . . Mouton s main body is in rear of in- 
trenchments on Madame Meade s plantation, six miles below 
Centreville. If we defeat these two commands we form a junc 
tion with our forces near Vicksburg. By pursuing our success to 
Alexandria we may capture General Mouton s force, and with 
little loss, unless it form a junction with Sibley. If it forms 
a junction, we will meet them near Iberia and engage them in 
open field, and with a proper force can defeat them. General Em 
ory s whole division (moved to Brashear City) and my brigade can 
do this work. Let the light transportation, now with General 



THE TECHE. 87 

Emory, and all destined for and collected by me be collected at 
Brashear City. Let two of the brigades be moved to and landed 
at Indian Bend, while the other two are crossed and attack in 
front. If Mouton escapes (which I think, if properly conducted, 
will be doubtful) we form a junction at Indian Bend. We pro 
ceed to attack and with much superior force, because I do not 
believe Mouton and Sibley united will exceed 6,000 men. We 
can defeat them, pursue our success to Alexandria and of course 
get Butte a la Rose ; our gunboats to facilitate its fall, attacking 
it, as they cannot accompany us farther up than Saint Martin- 
ville. I believe this to be the true and only correct plan of the 
campaign." 

These views were unquestionably sound ; they were 
such as might have been expected of an officer of 
Weitzel s skill and experience and special knowledge 
of the theatre of operations. Supported by the strong 
current of events, they were now to be carried into 
effect. 

At the date of this despatch, Emory s division had 
been for several weeks near the head of the Bayou 
Plaquemine, with headquarters at Indian Village, en 
deavoring to find or force a waterway to the Atch- 
afalaya, while Weitzel was holding his brigade in 
readiness to co-operate by a simultaneous movement 
against Taylor on the Teche. Many attempts were 
made by Emory to carry out the object confided to 
him, yet all proved failures. Bayou Sorrel, Lake 
Chicot, Grand River, and the Plaquemine itself, from 
both ends of the stream, were thoroughly explored, 
but only to find the bayous choked with driftwood 
impossible to remove, and until removed rendering the 
streams impassable. Two of these drifts in Bayou 
Sorrel were carefully examined by Captain Henry 
Cocheu, of the 1 73d New York. The first he reported 
to be about a mile in length, "composed of one mass 
of logs, roots, big and small trees, etc., jammed tightly 



88 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

for thirty feet, the whole length of my pole." The 
second drift, just beyond, was found nearly as bad, 
and farther on lay another even worse. Moreover, a 
thorough reconnoissance showed the whole country, 
between the Mississippi and the Atchafalaya above the 
Plaquemine, to be impracticable at that season for all 
arms. After more than a month of this sort of work, 
Emory was called across the river to Baton Rouge to 
take part in the events narrated in the last chapter. 

Banks returned to New Orleans on the 24th of 
March, and the next day ordered Grover to embark 
and move down the river to Donaldsonville, and 
thence march down the Bayou La Fourche to Thibo- 
deaux. At the same time Emory was ordered, as soon 
as Grover s river transports should be released, to em 
bark his command for Algiers, and thence move by the 
railway to Brashear. Meanwhile, on the i8th of 
March, Weitzel learned of the presence of the Queen 
of the West and Webb in the Atchafalaya, and as this 
seemed to indicate an intention to attack him, and the 
navy had no more light-draught gunboats to spare for 
his further security, to avoid having his hand forced 
and the game spoiled, he discreetly fell back on the 
2ist to the railway bridge over Bayou Bceuf, and took 
up a position where he was not exposed, as at Brashear, 
to the risk of being cut off by any sudden movement 
of the enemy. 

On the 28th of March the Diana was sent to recon 
noitre the Confederate position and strength on the 
lower Teche ; but continuing on down the Atchafa 
laya, instead of returning by Grand Lake as intended, 
and thus running into the arms of the enemy, she fell 
an easy prey. The Calhoun went to her relief, but 
ran aground, and the Estrella had to go to the assist- 



THE TECHE. 89 

ance of the Calhoun. Acting-Master James L. 
Peterson, commanding 1 the Diana, was killed, and 
Lieutenant Pickering D. Allen, aide-de-camp to Gen 
eral Weitzel, was wounded. With the Diana there 
fell into the enemy s hands nearly one hundred and 
fifty prisoners. This gave the Confederates three 
rather formidable boats in the Atchafalaya and the 
Teche. 

The movement of the troops was necessarily slow, 
as well by reason of the extremely limited facilities*for 
transportation, as because of the state of the roads, 
but by the 8th of April every thing was well advanced, 
and on that day Banks moved his headquarters to 
Brashear. Weitzel, who had been reinforced by the 
siege-train, manned by the ist Indiana heavy artil 
lery, had already re-occupied his former front on Ber 
wick Bay. Emory was in bivouac at Bayou Ramos, 
about five miles in the rear of Weitzel, and Groverat 
Bayou Bceuf, about four miles behind Emory. Thus 
the whole movement was almost completely masked 
from the Confederates, who from their side of the 
bay saw only Weitzel, and knew little or nothing of 
the gathering forces in his rear. So little, indeed, that 
Taylor, with his usual enterprise, seems to have 
thought this a favorable moment for attempting upon 
Weitzel the same operation that Weitzel had been so 
long meditating for the discomfiture of Taylor. 

Emory marched early in the morning of the gth of 
April and closed up on Weitzel, who, an hour later, 
about ten o clock, began to cross. No enemy was 
seen save a small outpost, engaged in observing the 
movement. This detachment retired before Weitzel s 
advance, without coming to blows. Weitzel at once 
sent his Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain John B. 



90 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Hubbard, with Perkins s and Williamson s troops of 
cavalry and one section of Bainbridge s battery to dis 
cover the enemy s position. The Confederates were 
found to be in some force in front of Pattersonville, 
with their cavalry pickets advanced to within a mile 
of Weitzel s front. 

As soon as Weitzel had completed his crossing, 
and released the boats, Emory followed him. The 
four brigades bivouacked in front of the landing-place 
that night. The gunboats, having done the greater 
share of the ferriage, went back to the east bank for 
Grover. 

Grover, who had marched from Bayou Bceuf at 
nine o clock, just as Emory was arriving at Brashear, 
came there, in his turn, early in the afternoon. The 
plan had been that Grover should embark immedi 
ately, and, having his whole force on board by an 
early hour in the night, the boats should set out 
at daylight, so as to place Grover by nine o clock on 
the morning of the nth in position for the work cut 
out for him. With few pilots, and the shores un- 
lighted, it was out of the question to attempt the 
navigation of the waters of the Grand Lake during 
the night. However, it was not until the night 
of the iith that Grover was able to complete the 
embarkation of his division. To understand this it is 
necessary to observe that Emory and Weitzel, in 
making the passage of Berwick Bay, were merely 
crossing a short ferry, so that the boats engaged 
in the transfer could be loaded rapidly to almost any 
extent, so long as they remained afloat, and being 
unloaded with equal facility, were in a few minutes 
ready to repeat the operation. In Grover s case, 
however, the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and stores 



THE TECHE. 91 

had all to be taken care of at once, with every 
provision for fighting a battle. For this the artillery 
was considered indispensable, and it was not without 
great trouble and long delay that the guns and horses 
were got afloat. Fate seemed to be against Grover, 
for after all had been accomplished, by the greatest 
exertion on his part, as well as on the part of his 
officers and the corps quartermasters, a fog set in so 
dense that the pilots were unable to see their way. 
This continued until nine o clock on the morning of 
the 1 2th ; then at last the movement began. 

About noon, on the nth of April, Weitzel, leading 
the advance of the main column, moved forward. At 
once his skirmishers felt the skirmishers of the enemy, 
who retired slowly, without attempting any serious 
opposition. In the evening, Weitzel rested in line of 
battle a short distance above Pattersonville. Emory 
followed closely, and went into bivouac on Weitzel s 
left. The march had not been begun earlier, and the 
enemy was not pressed, because it was desired to keep 
him amused until Grover should have gained his rear, 
and Grover had not yet started. 

After the early morning of Sunday the I2th of 
April, had been spent in light skirmishing and in 
demonstrations of the cavalry, designed to observe 
the enemy, and at the same time to attract and hold 
his attention, word came that Grover was under way. 
Banks knew that the passing fleet must soon be 
in plain sight of the Confederates. Therefore, it 
was now necessary to move promptly, and to feel the 
enemy strongly, yet not too strongly, lest he should 
abandon his position too soon and suddenly spoil all. 
From this moment it is important to remember that, 
save in the event of complete success, no word could 



92 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

come from Grover for nearly two days. The first 
news from him was expected to be the sound of his 
guns in the enemy s rear. 

At eleven o clock the bugle again sounded the ad 
vance. The whole line moved forward, continually 
skirmishing, until, about four o clock in the afternoon, 
the infantry came under fire of the Confederate guns 
in position on the lines known as Camp Bisland. 
The line of march led up the right bank of the 
Atchafalaya until the mouth of the Teche was 
reached, thence up the Teche, partly astride the 
stream, yet mainly by the right bank. At first 
Weitzel formed on the right, Emory on the left, but 
as the great bend of the Teche was reached, about 
four miles below Bisland, and by the nature of the 
ground the front became narrowed at the same time 
that in following the change of direction of the bayou 
the line was brought to a wheel, Weitzel took ground 
to the left in two lines, while Emory advanced 
Paine s brigade into the front line on Weitzel s right, 
placed Ingraham in his second line, and made a third 
line with Gooding. 

Then finding the enemy beyond the Teche too 
strong for the cavalry to manage single-handed, 
Banks called on Emory to reinforce the right bank. 
Emory sent Bryan across with the i75th New York 
and a section of the ist Maine battery, commanded 
by Lieutenant Eben D. Haley. They were to push 
the enemy back, and to conform to the advance 
of the main line. 

The day was hot, the air close, and the march over 
the fields of young cane, across or aslant the heavy fur 
rows and into and over the deep ditches, was trying 
to the men, as yet but little accustomed to marches. 



THE TECHE. 93 

Fortunately, however, there was no need of pressing 
the advance until Grover s guns should be heard. 
About half-past five in the afternoon a brisk artillery 
fire began, and was kept up until night fell ; then 
Emory moved the 4th Wisconsin forward to hold 
a grove In front of a sugar-house, near the bayou, 
well in advance of his right, in order to prevent the 
Confederates from occupying it, to the annoyance of 
the whole line. 

After dark all the pickets were thrown well for 
ward in touch with those of the enemy, but the main 
lines were drawn back out of range, for the sake of a 
good night s sleep before a hard day s work. 



CHAPTER X. 

BISLAND. 

THE works behind which the Confederates now 
stood to battle were named Camp Bisland or Fort 
Bisland, in honor of the planter whose fields were 
thus given over to war. The defences consisted of 
little more than a line of simple breastworks, of rather 
low relief, thrown completely across the neck of dry 
land on either bank of the Teche, the flanks resting 
securely on the swamps that border Grand Lake on 
the left and on the right extend to the Gulf. The 
position was well chosen, for five miles below Cen- 
treville, where the plantation of Mrs. Meade adjoins 
the Bethel Place, the neck is at its narrowest. The 
Teche, passing a little to the left of the centre of the 
works, enabled the guns of the Diana, moving freely 
around the bends, to contribute to the defence, while 
the obstructions placed below the works hindered the 
ascent of the bayou by the Union gunboats. The 
Confederate right was also somewhat strengthened 
by the embankment of the unfinished railroad to 
Opelousas. On the other hand, from the nature of 
the ground, low and flat as it was, the works were in 
part rather commanded than commanding ; yet the 
difference of level was inconsiderable, and for a force 
as small as Taylor s, outnumbered as his was, any 
slight disadvantage in this way was more than com 
pensated by the shortness of the line. 

94 



BISLAND. 95 

Along the banks of the bayou were a few live oaks ; 
on either flank the swamp was densely wooded, mainly 
with cypress, cottonwood, and willow, with an out 
lying and almost impenetrable canebrake, while be 
tween the attacking columns and the Confederate 
position, on either bank of the bayou, stretched a 
field where the young shoots of the sugar-cane stood 
knee-high. This was crossed, at right angles with 
the bayou, by many of those wide and deep ditches 
by which the planters of Louisiana are accustomed to 
drain their tilled lowlands. 

Such was the scene of the action now about to be 
fought, known to the Union army as the battle of 
Bisland or Fort Bisland ; to the Confederates, as the 
battle of Bethel Place or Bayou Teche. 

During the whole of the night of the i2th a dense 
fog prevailed, but this lifting about eight o clock on 
the morning of Monday, the i3th of April, disclosed 
a day as bright and beautiful as the scene was fair. 
At an early hour the whole line advanced to within 
short musketry range, in substantially the same order 
as on the previous day. An attack by a detachment 
of Confederate cavalry upon the skirmishers of the 
4th Wisconsin, in advance of the sugar-house, was 
easily thrown off, and a later demonstration by the 
Confederate infantry upon Paine s position in the 
grove shared the same fortune. Emory moved first 
the 8th New Hampshire, and afterwards the i33d 
and 1 73d New York, to the support of the 4th Wis 
consin. At the same time Banks ordered Emory to 
send the other four regiments of Gooding s brigade 
and the two remaining sections of the ist Maine bat 
tery to reinforce Bryan with the i75th New York on 
the left bank of the Teche, in order to be prepared, 



96 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

not only to meet a flank movement of the Confeder 
ates from that direction, but also to carry the works 
on that side, should this be thought best. After 
these dispositions had been completed, the advance 
was steady and continuous, yet not rapid, until toward 
noon the last of the Confederates retired behind 
their breastworks and opened fire with musketry. 
The ditches already spoken of hindered the progress 
of the Union artillery, yet not seriously, while they 
afforded an efficient protection for the supports of the 
batteries and enabled the lines of infantry to rest at 
intervals : no small gain, for the sun grew very hot, 
and the march over the heavy windrows and across 
the deep ditches was exhausting. 

The Confederate gunboat Diana took position well 
in front of the works, so as to command completely 
the right flank of Emory and Weitzel as they ap 
proached by a fire that, had it not been checked, 
must have enfiladed the whole line. Just as this fire 
was beginning to be disturbing it was silenced by a 
fortunate shot from one of the two 3O-pounder Par- 
rott guns, served by the ist Indiana, posted in rear 
of Weitzel s left and trained upon the Diana, under 
the personal supervision of Arnold. The third shot 
from this battery, aimed at the flash of the Diana s 
guns, exploded in her engine room ; then above 
the trees, whose leafage full and low hid the vessel, 
was seen a flash like a puff of vapor ; a rousing 
cheer was heard from the sharpshooters of the 4th 
Wisconsin and 8th New Hampshire, who had been 
told off to keep down the fire of the gunboat ; and 
the Diana was seen to pass up the bayou and out of 
the fight. 

All risk of an enfilade fire being thus removed, the 




X 



BISLAND 

APRIL JZ-/3-/863 

ALSO CALLED F O RT BlSLAND OR CAMP BiSLAND 
AND BY THE CONFEDERATES 
BETHEL PLACE 



B ISLAND. 97 

whole Union line quickly closed with the Confeder 
ates, and the engagement became general with artil 
lery and musketry. On both sides of the bayou the 
firing was brisk, at times even severe. Save where 
the view was broken here and there by the trees or 
became lightly clouded by the smoke of battle, the 
whole field lay in plain sight. As the course of the 
Teche in ascending turned toward the left, Gooding, 
on the east bank, had the wheeling flank, while 
Weitzel formed the pivot. 

Gooding went forward in gallant style, his men 
quickening their pace at times to a run, in order 
to keep the alignment with the main body on the 
west bank. Perceiving on his extreme right, toward 
the lake, a fine grove or copse, Gooding threw out 
Sharpe with the i56th New York to examine the 
wood with a view of attempting to turn the left flank 
of the Confederate lines. These, as it proved, did not 
extend beyond the grove, but there ended in an un 
finished redoubt. Indeed, nearly the whole of the Con 
federate works on the east side of the bayou, although 
laid out long since, had been but recently and hastily 
thrown up, after it became known to Taylor that 
Banks was crossing to attack him. In the wood, 
about five hundred yards in advance of the breast 
works, Mouton had posted Bagby s 3d Texas regi 
ment. The Texans held their ground so stifBy that 
Gooding found it necessary to send his own regiment, 
the 3ist Massachusetts, to the support of Sharpe. 
Mouton supported Bagby with the left wing of the 
1 8th Louisiana and parts of Fournet s and Waller s 
battalions. Gooding s men carried the rifle-pits in 
the wood by a spirited charge, in which they took two 
officers and eighty-four men prisoners. His main line 



X 



98 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

in the open ground between the wood and the bayou 
was formed by the 38th Massachusetts, deployed as 
skirmishers, covering the front and followed, at a 
distance of about one hundred and fifty yards, by the 
53d Massachusetts, in like order. Behind the 53d, 
two sections of the ist Maine battery were posted 
to command two parallel plantation roads leading up 
the bayou, while the third section was held in reserve. 
After the 3ist Massachusetts had gone to the support 
of the right, the main line here was composed of the 
1 75th New York. Shortly after five o clock the 53d 
Massachusetts relieved the 38th, which had expended 
its ammunition, and was falling back under orders to 
replenish. When this was done, the 38th once more 
advanced and formed in support of the skirmish line. 

Meanwhile on the left of the Teche the main body 
moved forward in two lines of battalions deployed, 
Paine on the right and Weitzel on the left, while In- 
graham, in column of companies, formed the reserve 
for both. Paine s first line on the right, nearest the 
bayou, was composed of the 4th Wisconsin and 8th 
New Hampshire, his second line of the i33d New 
York and the i73d New York. Mack s 2O-pounders 
commanded the bayou road, and Duryea went into 
battery in advance of the centre, between Paine and 
Weitzel. 

Weitzel s front line was composed of the 8th Ver 
mont and ii4th New York, with the I2th Connecti 
cut, i6oth New York, and 75th New York in the 
second line. The guns of Bainbridge and Carruth 
went into battery near the left flank, and working 
slowly kept down the fire of the Confederate artil 
lery in their front. When the fire of musketry be 
came hot, Weitzel sent the 75th New York to try 



BISLAND. 99 

to gain the canebrake on the left, in advance of 
the enemy s works, with a view of turning that flank. 
Of this movement Taylor says in his report that 
it was twice repulsed by the 5th Texas and Waller s 
battalion, under Green, and the 28th Louisiana, Col 
onel Gray, aided by the guns of Semmes s battery and 
the Valverde battery. However, the counter-move 
ment on the part of the Confederates, being begun 
in plain view, was instantly seen, and Banks sent 
word to Weitzel to check it. With this object, Weit- 
zel ordered the i i4th New York to go to the support 
of the 75th. A brisk fight followed, without material 
advantage to either side. In truth, the canebrake 
formed an impenetrable obstacle to the combatants, 
who, when once they had passed within the outer 
edge of the tangle, were unable either to see or ap 
proach one another, although the struggle was plainly 
visible from the front of both armies. 

The reserve of Parrott guns, manned by the ist In 
diana and composed of four 3opounders and four 
2o-pounders, was posted under McMillan to cover the 
left flank and the broken centre where it was pierced 
by the bayou, as well as to watch for the return of 
the Diana to activity. Toward evening the remain 
ing guns of the ist Indiana, two 12-pounder rifles 
under Cox, after being posted in support of the cen 
tre, were sent to the left to assist Bainbridge and 
Carruth, whose ammunition was giving out. 

Banks, after gaining advanced positions in contact 
with the enemy, forbore to press them hard because, 
as has been seen, his whole purpose was to hold the 
Confederates where they stood until he could hear of 
Grover or from Grover. As the day advanced with 
out news or the long-expected sound of Grover s 



ioo THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

guns, Banks began to grow impatient and to fear that 
the adventure from which so much had been hoped 
had somehow miscarried. He therefore became even 
more anxious than before lest the Confederates should 
move off under cover of the coming night. Accord 
ingly, during the afternoon, although it had been his 
previous purpose not to deliver an assault until cer 
tain that Grover held the Confederate line of retreat, 
Banks gave discretionary orders to Emory and Weit- 
zel to form for an attack and move upon the Con 
federate works if a favorable opportunity should 
present itself. The exercise of this discretion in turn 
devolved upon the commanders of the front line, that 
is, upon Weitzel and Paine, for Gooding, being out of 
communication, except by signal, with the troops on 
the west bank, was occupied in conforming to their 
movements. Paine and Weitzel, after conferring, 
resolved to attack, and, having made every prepara 
tion, only waited for the word from the commanding 
general. 

The day was waning ; it was already past four 
o clock ; and Banks was still somewhat anxiously 
weighing the approach of night and the cost of the 
assault against the chance of news from Grover, when 
suddenly, straight up the bayou, and high above the 
heads of Banks and his men, a 9-inch shell came 
hurtling, and as it was seen to burst over the lines of 
Bisland, from far in the rear broke the deep roar of 
the Clifton s bow-gun. Soon from below the obstruc 
tions that barred her progress came a messenger 
bearing the long-expected tidings of Grover. At 
last he was on land and in march toward his position. 
With a sense of relief Banks recalled his orders for 
the assault and drew his front line back out of fire 



BISLAND. 



of the Confederate musketry so that the men might 
rest. To relieve the exhausted skirmish line, the 4th 
Massachusetts and the i62d New York of Ingraham s 
brigade were sent forward from the reserve, leaving 
him only the uoth New York. 

By dawn the next morning, at all events, Banks 
calculated, the turning column would be in place ; 
accordingly during the night he gave orders to as 
sault along- the whole front as soon as it should be 

o 

light enough to see. 

However, shortly after midnight, sounds were 
heard on the picket line, indicating some unusual 
movement behind the Confederate works. When, at 
daybreak, the various skirmishers moved forward in 
eager rivalry, they found the Confederates gone. 
Captain Allaire, leading his company of the i33d 
New York, was the first to enter the works ; the regi 
ment itself and the 8th New Hampshire followed 
closely, and the colors of the 8th were the first to 
mount the parapet, where they were planted by Paine, 
On the left bank, this honor fell to the 53d Massa 
chusetts. But in truth the surge was so nearly simul 
taneous that the whole line of entrenchments on both 
sides of the bayou, from right to left, was crossed 
almost at the same instant. 

It was nine o clock on Monday night when Taylor 
learned of Grover s movements and position, as nar 
rated in the next chapter. Taylor at once began to 
move out of the lines of Bisland and to direct his 
attention to Grover in order to secure a retreat. Just 
before daylight Green, to whom, with his 5th Texas, 
Waller s battalion, and West s section of Semmes s 
battery, Taylor had given the more than usually deli 
cate task of covering the rear, marched off the ground, 



riOi THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



leaving nothing behind save one 24-pounder siege 
gun and a disabled howitzer of Cornay s battery. 

Without losing an instant the pursuit of the retreat 
ing Confederates was begun, Weitzel leading the way, 
and was conducted with vigor and with scarcely a halt, 
notwithstanding the energetic opposition of the Con 
federate rear-guard, until early in the afternoon, just 
beyond Franklin, Emory s advance guard, under 
Paine, following the bayou road, ran into Grover s, 
under Dwight, approaching from the opposite direc 
tion. Weitzel, having entered Franklin without op 
position, kept the left-hand or cut-off road until he 
came to the burnt bridge over the Choupique, by 
which, as will presently be seen, the Confederates 
had escaped. 

Gooding, after occupying the works in his front, 
crossed the Teche by a bridge to the west bank and 
fell into Emory s column behind Ingraham. The 
Clifton, as soon as the obstructions could be removed, 
got under way and moved up the bayou abreast with 
the advance of the army. 

The losses of the Nineteenth Army Corps in this 
its first battle were 3 officers and 37 men killed, 8 
officers and 176 men wounded ; in all 224. The 38th 
Massachusetts headed the list with 6 killed and 29 
wounded, and Gooding s brigade, to which this regi 
ment belonged, reported 87 casualties, or 38 percent, 
of the whole. In the six light batteries 15 horses 
were killed and 12 wounded, and one caisson of the 
ist Maine was upset and lost in crossing the Teche to 
go into action. 

The losses of the Confederates have never been 
reported and no means are known to exist for estima 
ting them. 



BISLAND. 103 

The disparity of the forces engaged was more than 
enough to overcome the Confederate advantage of 
position, for Banks had 10,000 men with 38 guns, 
while Taylor reports but 4,000 men with four bat 
teries, estimated at 24 or 25 guns. To these must be 
added the Diana, until disabled on Monday morning, 
and to the Union strength the Clifton, after she 
arrived and opened fire at long range on Monday 
afternoon. 

At Bisland the new headquarters flags were for the 
first time carried under fire. These distinguishing 
colors, as prescribed in General Orders on the i8th of 
February, were guidons four feet square attached to a 
lance twelve feet long, made for convenience in two 
joints. In camp or garrison they served to indicate 
the quarters of the general commanding the corps, 
division, or brigade, while on the march they were 
borne near his person by a mounted orderly, commonly 
a trusty sergeant. The flag of the Nineteenth Army 
Corps was blue with a white four-pointed star in the 
middle, and on the star the figures 19 in red. From 
this the division flags differed only in having a red 
ground and the number of the division in black. The 
brigade flags had blue, white, and blue horizontal 
stripes of equal width, with the number of the brigade 
in black in the white stripe. Thenceforward these 
colors were borne through every engagement in which 
the corps took part. Not one of them was ever 
abandoned by its bearer or taken by the enemy. 



CHAPTER XL 

IRISH BEND. 

GROVER S instructions were to gain a landing on the 
shore of Grand Lake, and then marching on Frank 
lin, to cut off Taylor s retreat or to attack him in the 
rear, as circumstances might suggest. 

We have seen how, instead of being ready to move 
from Berwick Bay on the morning of the loth of 
April, Grover found his departure delayed by the 
various causes already mentioned until the morning 
of the 1 2th was well advanced. 

The flotilla, under Lieutenant-Commander Cooke, 
composed of the flag-ships Estrella, Arizona, Clifton, 
and Calhoun, having completed the ferriage of Emory 
and Weitzel over Berwick Bay, was now occupied in 
assisting the army transports to convey Grover to 
his destination, besides standing ready to protect his 
movement and his landing with its guns. 

About noon, when off Cypress Island, the Arizona 
ran hard and fast aground, and four precious hours 
were lost in a vain attempt to get her afloat. If, in 
the light of after events, this may seem like time 
wasted, it should always be remembered that all four 
of the gunboats were crowded with troops, while an 
attack from the Qticen of the West and her consorts 
was to be looked for at any moment. Finally, rather 
than to put the adventure in peril by a longer delay, 

104 



IRISH BEND. 105 

Cooke determined to leave the Arizona to take care 
of herself, and once more steaming ahead, at half- 
past seven o clock, the gunboats and transports came 
to anchor below Miller s Point, off Madame Porter s 
plantation. At this place, known as Oak Lawn, 
Grover in the orders under which he was acting had 
been told he might expect to find a good shell road 
leading straight to the Teche, and crossing the bayou 
about the middle of the bow called Irish Bend. Grover 
at once sent Fiske with two companies of the ist 
Louisiana ashore in the Clifton s boats to reconnoi 
tre. It was midnight when, after carefully examining 
the ground, Fiske returned to the gunboat and re 
ported the road under water, and quite impracticable 
for all arms. The fleet then got under way, and pro 
ceeding about six miles farther up the lake, anchored 
beyond Magee s Point. 

Before daylight Dwight sent two of his staff officers, 
Captain Denslow and Lieutenant Matthews, ashore, 
with a small detachment from the 6th New York, to 
examine the plantation road leading from this point 
to the Teche. The road being found practicable for 
all arms, the debarkation began at daybreak. 

Dwight landed first. As soon as his leading regi 
ment, the ist Louisiana, reached the shore, Holcomb 
threw forward two companies, under Lieutenant-Colo 
nel Fiske, as skirmishers, and formed the battalion in 
line to cover the landing. 

Taylor, when he first learned that the gunboats and 
transports had passed up Grand Lake, had sent Vin 
cent, with the 2d Louisiana cavalry and a section of 
Cornay s battery, to Verdun Landing, about four miles 
behind Camp Bisland, to observe and oppose the 
movement. This was about noon on Sunday, the 



106 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

1 2th. In the evening, hearing of the progress of the 
fleet, Taylor sent a second section of Cornay s battery 
to the lake, and going himself to Vincent ordered 
him to follow the movement and try to prevent a 
landing. The next morning Taylor sent Reily with 
the 4th Texas, to join Vincent and aid him in retard 
ing Grover s progress. 

Taylor seems to have censured Vincent for letting 
Grover land, yet in truth Vincent was not to blame. 
The line he had to watch was too long for his num 
bers, and the Union flotilla could and did move more 
rapidly on the lake than the Confederate troops by 
the roads. When he had stationed his pickets at the 
probable landing-places, and taken up a central posi 
tion to support them, he had done all that lay in 
his power. The range and weight of the 9-inch shells 
of the navy .were alone enough to put a serious oppo 
sition to the landing out of the question, but as soon 
as Vincent found where the attempt was to be made, 
he disposed his men and guns to retard it. Two of 
Cornay s guns even tried, ineffectually of course, to 
destroy the transports : Cooke quickly drove them off. 
As Holcomb s skirmishers deployed they were met 
by a brisk fusillade from Vincent s men strongly posted 
in ambush behind a high fence in the thick wood 
that skirts the shore ; but when Holcomb advanced 
his battalion Vincent s men fell back on their main 
body and left the wood to Holcomb, who immediately 
moved to the edge of the clearing and held it, obser 
ving the enemy on the farther border. This was 
Vincent with his regiment and the four guns of Cor- 
nay ; and from this moment all that was happening 
on the lake shore passed unseen by the Confederates. 
Meanwhile the landing went on very slowly, for the 



IRISH BEND. 107 

transports could not come nearer to the beach than a 
hundred yards, and, although the foot-soldiers were 
able to jump overboard and scramble ashore, and the 
horses could also take to the water, it was necessary 
to make a bridge of flats for the guns and caissons of 
the artillery. Thus it was four o clock in the after 
noon before the whole division found itself assembled 
on the plantation of Duncan McWilliams on the 
shore of the lake, with the Teche at the upper reach 
of Irish Bend four miles to the southward, and Char- 
enton in the hollow of Indian Bend lying but two 
miles toward the southwest. There were roads in 
either direction, but Irish Bend was the way to Frank 
lin, and to Franklin Grover was under orders to go. 

About nine o clock in the morning Dwight had bor 
rowed from Birge his two leading regiments, the I3th 
Connecticut and the i5Qth New York, to support the 
ist Louisiana. Grover also gave Dwight Closson s 
battery and Barrett s troop of cavalry. Toward noon, 
moving a detachment by his left, Dwight seized the 
bridge that crosses the Teche in approaching Madame 
Porter s plantation from the northward, just in time 
to extinguish the flames that Vincent s men had 
lighted to destroy it. After seizing the bridge at 
Oak Lawn, Barrett galloped down the left bank of 
the Teche and seized the bridge a mile or two below, 
by which the same plantation is reached from the 
eastward ; probably by the shell road that Grover had 
been told to take, and at which he had tried to land. 
Barrett was in time to save the bridge from Vincent, 
and to hold the advantage thus gained Dwight soon 
sent Holcomb with the ist Louisiana, i3ist New York, 
6th New York, 22d Maine, and Closson s battery. 

Meanwhile, the division being entirely without 



io8 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

wagons, save a few that were loaded with the re 
serve ammunition, still another wait took place while 
the men s haversacks were being filled with hard bread 
and coffee. All these delays were now having their 
effect upon Grover s own calculations. He now knew 
nothing of Banks s movements or of his situation. Of 
his own movements he was bound to suppose that 
Taylor had received early and full information. More 
over, the topography of the country where Grover 
found himself was obscure and to him unknown. In 
stead, therefore, of marching forward as fast as his 
troops could land, boldly and at all hazards to seize 
the roads by which Taylor must retreat, Grover now 
took counsel with prudence and concealing his force 
behind the natural screen of the wood, waited till his 
whole division should be fully ready. 

Thus it was six o clock and the sun stood low 
among the tree-tops when Grover, with Birge and 
Kimball, took up the line of march for the Teche. 
Crossing the upper of the two bridges, he went into 
bivouac on the right bank on the plantation of 
Madame Porter, and called in Dwight s detachment. 
Before setting out to rejoin the division Holcomb 
burned the lower bridge, under orders, and then 
marching up the left bank, crossed the upper bridge 
at a late hour of the night. In Grover s front stood 
Vincent alone, for Reily had not yet come ; but in 
the darkness it was impossible for Grover to make out 
the enemy s force, or even to find his exact position. 

When about nine o clock that night, as related in 
the last chapter, Taylor heard the news from Reily, 
he supposed Grover to be already in strong possession 
of the only road by which the Confederates could 
make good their retreat up the Teche ; yet desperate 



IRISH BEND. 109 

as the situation seemed, Taylor at once made up his 
mind to try to extricate himself from the toils. Send 
ing his wagon train ahead, soon after midnight he 
silently moved out of the lines of Bisland and marched 
rapidly on Franklin, leaving Green to cover the rear 
and retard the pursuit. These dispositions made, 
Taylor himself rode at once to his reversed front, 
a mile east of Franklin. With him were Reily, 
whom he had picked up on the road below Frank 
lin, Vincent who with the four guns of Cornay was 
still watching Grover, and Clack s Louisiana bat 
talion, which had come in from New Iberia just in 
the nick of time. The plantation with the sugar- 
house, then belonging to McKerrall, is now known 
as Shaffer s. The grounds of Oak Lawn adjoin it 
toward the east and north, and along its western 
boundary stand Nerson s Woods, whence the com 
ing battle takes the name given to it in the Confed 
erate accounts. Here, beneath the trees, along their 
eastern skirt and behind a stout fence, Taylor formed 
his line of battle, facing toward the east, and waited 
for the coming of Grover. South of the bayou road 
stood Clack ; on his left, two pieces of Cornay s bat 
tery, next Reily, then Vincent with a second section 
of Cornay s guns. The task before them was simple 
but desperate. They were to hold off Grover until 
all but they had safely passed behind the living 
barrier. Then they were to extricate themselves as 
best they could, and falling in rear of the main column 
of the Confederate army try to make good their own 
escape. Before this could happen, Grover might 
overwhelm them or Banks might overtake them ; yet 
there was no other way. 

As early on the morning of Tuesday the I4th of 



i io THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

April as it was light enough to see, Grover marched 
on Franklin by the winding bayou road. Preceded by 
Barrett and a strong line of skirmishers, Birge with 
Rodgers s battery led the column ; Dwight with Clos- 
son s battery, followed ; while Kimball with Nims s 
battery brought up the rear. 

The head of Grover s column had gone about two 
miles, and in a few moments more would have turned 
the sharp corner of the bayou and faced toward 
Franklin, when, on the right, near the sugar-house, 
Birge s skirmishers ran into those of Clack s battalion, 
and the battle of Irish Bend began. 

Between Birge and the concealed Confederate 
ranks, past which he was in fact marching, while his 
line of direction gave his right flank squarely to 
the hostile front, lay the broad and open fields of 
McKerrall s plantation, where the young sugar-cane 
stood a foot high above the deep and wide furrows. 
From recent ploughing and still more recent rains 
the fat soil was soft and heavy under foot, and here 
and there the cross-furrows, widening and deepening 
into a ditch, added to the toil and difficulty of move 
ment, both for men and guns. On the left flowed 
the dark and sluggish Teche. On the right lay the 
swamp, thickly overgrown and nearly impassable, 
whence the waters of the Choupique begin to ooze 
toward the Gulf. Along the southern border of this 
morass ran a great transverse ditch that carried off 
the gathered seepage of the lesser drains. In front, 
on the western edge of the cane-field, stood Nerson s 
woods, where, as yet unseen, the Confederates lay in 
wait ; while before them, like a screen, stretched a 
low fringe of brake and undergrowth. 

Birge s order of march placed the 25th Connecticut 



IRISH BEND. in 

in the advance, one wing deployed as skirmishers 
across the road, the other wing in reserve. Next 
came the 26th Maine with Bradley s section of 
Rodgers s battery, then the iSQth New York, then 
the remainder of Rodgers s battery, while the I3th 
Connecticut brought up the rear. When he saw his 
skirmishers briskly engaged and by the sound and 
smoke discovered the position of the enemy, Birge 
made the reserved battalion of the 25th Connecticut 
change front forward and move across the field against 
the Confederate left. Bissell led his men quickly to 
within a hundred yards of the wood, where they lay 
down under the partial cover of a ditch and began 
firing. Hubbard, with the 26th Maine, came up on 
Bissell s left and took up the same tactics. At once 
the enfilade fire of Cornay s section near the bayou 
on the right of the Confederate line became vigorous 
and annoying, until Bradley took his two guns at a 
gallop to the skirt of the undergrowth opposite the 
interval between the infantry battalions and, opening 
fire at five hundred yards range, engaged for a time 
the whole attention of the Confederate cannoneers. 
Then Grover, who rode with Birge, sent in the i5Qth 
New York on the left of the 26th Maine, with orders 
to take the wood, while the i3th Connecticut, march 
ing round the bend of the bayou, formed on the ex 
treme left between the stream and the road. 

Molineux promptly deployed his regiment, and 
gallantly led it forward at the double-quick over and 
beyond the left of the line already formed, until the 
men were within short point-blank range of the enemy s 
musketry ; there, finding them exhausted by the rapid 
advance over the rough and heavy ground, as well as 
suffering severely from the bullets of the enemy, he 



ii2 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

made the men throw off their blankets and overcoats, 
lie down, and open a vigorous fire. Perhaps under 
the stress of this, but more probably in preparation 
for the counter-attack, the Confederates slackened 
their fire, and Molineux, perceiving his opportunity, 
as it seemed, was in the act of uttering the command 
" Forward !" when a bullet struck him in the mouth 
and he fell, painfully wounded, leaving the command 
of the regiment, for the time, to Captain Dayton. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Draper had already fallen, and 
Major Burt was with Grover, serving on the staff. 

At the word the men sprang to their feet, but before 
the command could be carried out, suddenly came the 
crisis of the battle. About seven o clock, Gray had 
brought up the 28th Louisiana to Taylor s aid, and 
with it the news that the rest of the forces from 
Bisland were close at hand and all was well with them. 
Under cover of the wood, Taylor moved Gray quickly 
to the left, and perceiving that his line now overlapped 
Grover s right, promptly determined to gain the brief 
time he still needed for the safe retreat of his main 
body by a bold and vigorous attack with the whole 
force he had under his hand. The order was obeyed 
with spirit. Out of the wood beyond the right, and 
from the main ditch, well in the rear of the i5Qth, 
the Confederates came charging strongly, and halting, 
they poured in a hot volley. Seeing that the situation 
was critical Dayton ordered the regiment to retire. 
Under a severe fire it fell back quickly, yet in good 
order, to the road. There it promptly re-formed on 
its colors, and Burt rejoining took the command. 

In their retreat the New Yorkers swept over the 
position of the 26th Maine and the 25th Connecticut 
and carried these already shaken regiments with 



T IRISH BEND 

APRIL /4- T ?/863 
CALLED BY THE. CONFEDERATES 




IRISH BEND. 113 

them, in some natural disorder ; but this lasted hardly 
longer than was needed for Dwight to hear and obey 
the command that now came back from Grover, to 
deploy the first brigade and take up the broken battle. 

Bradley held his ground stoutly to the last moment, 
and when finally the choice was narrowed to retreat 
or capture, he retired in good order to a fresh posi 
tion, and there serving his canister with coolness and 
deliberation, held off the enemy s advance. At this 
point, Rodgers, who with his centre section was in 
the road on the left, engaged at 800 and 400 yards 
with Cornay s right section, turned his attention to 
the Confederate infantry on the right, and crossing 
with spherical case-shot the canister fire of his Lieu 
tenant, made good the check. 

Almost at the moment when Taylor s left was thus 
roughly bearing down the right of Birge, on his left 
his own 1 3th Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Warner, enveloped in a grove, was moving steadily on 
the Confederate right, where Clack stood and the 
two guns of Cornay. Emerging from the grove into 
an open field that still lay between them and the 
enemy in the wood, Warner s men instantly replied 
to the volleys of cannon and small-arms that greeted 
their appearance and pushed on, firing as they went. 
More fortunate than their comrades in the direction 
and the moment of their attack, they pressed back 
Clack, drove off Cornay s guns, and took two of his 
caissons, a limber, and a color presented to his bat 
tery by the ladies of Franklin. Nearly 60 prisoners 
at the same time fell into their hands. They were 
still advancing when Grover s orders recalled them to 
the restored line of battle of the brigade. 

As Birge s right retired, Dwight deployed in two 



1 14 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

lines, the 6th New York and the Qist New York in 
front, the 22d Maine, ist Louisiana, and i3ist New 
York in support, and advancing against Taylor s left 
flank and overlapping it in its turn pushed it back 
into and beyond the woods. In this movement D wight 
took 70 prisoners. The resistance he encountered 
was feeble compared with the vigor with which Birge 
had been met and turned back, for in that effort the 
Confederate line of battle had practically gained its 
main object and had now only to extricate itself and 
make good its own withdrawal. 

Birge, at the same time that he drew back the I3th 
Connecticut, once more moved forward his three other 
regiments and re-formed the brigade in two lines on 
Dwight s left. 

Kimball, whose brigade was in two lines in reserve, 
brought up the i2th Maine to the support of the I3th 
Connecticut. 

This done, Grover advanced the whole division 
through the woods to the open fields on their farther 
or western verge, and seeing the Confederates in force 
on the knoll beyond, to which they had retired, halted 
and began to observe and reconnoitre. 

To cover the right flank of the last Confederate 
position Semmes brought up the Diana, whose inju 
ries of the day before he had during the night partly 
made good by repairs. Her 3O-pounder Parrott now 
opened a slow fire without great effect other than to 
add to Grover s caution. 

Shortly after eight o clock Mouton rode up. To 
him Taylor turned over the command of the force 
confronting Grover, and then rode into Franklin to 
direct the retreat. By half-past nine Green with 
the rear-guard moved out on the direct road toward 



IRISH BEND. 115 

New Iberia. The last of Green s troopers had not 
quitted the little town at the upper end when the first 
of Weitzel s entered at the lower end. 

Some time passed before Mouton knew of this. 
Then for a brief space his peril was great ; but for 
tunately for him the unlooked-for situation of affairs 
raised a momentary doubt in the minds of Green s 
pursuers. Should they go to the right or to the left ? 
And where was Grover? After questioning prisoners 
and towns-people, Banks directed Weitzel to fol 
low by the cut-off road and Emory to move up the 
bayou. The interval, short as it was, enabled Mou 
ton to fall back quickly, and taking a by-way across 
country to strike into the cut-off road beyond the 
northern outskirts of Franklin. Not an instant too 
soon, for in the confusion Sibley had fired the bridge 
over the Choupique and across the blazing timbers 
lay Mouton s last hope of escape. Hardly had his 
men reached the north bank in safety when Weitzel s 
advance guard came in sight down the road. They 
galloped to the bridge only to find it impassable. 

Before retiring the Confederates blew up the Diana 
and applied the match to all their transport steamers 
on the Teche save the hospital boat, the Cornie, 
which loaded with the sick and wounded of Bisland 
fell into the hands of the Union forces. Captain 
Semmes, who had but the day before left his battery 
to command the Diana, was taken prisoner, with all 
his crew. He and Weitzel had been friends and 
classmates at West Point ; he now refused the offered 
courtesies of his captor, and a few hours later, finding 
himself rather loosely guarded, cleverly managed to 
regain his liberty. 

To return to Grover. The situation of the enemy s 



u6 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

force in his front, the vigorous resistance encountered 
in his advance, and lastly, the information gathered 
from the prisoners he had taken, had convinced him 
that he had to deal with Taylor s whole force, save a 
small rear-guard, and that Taylor had already suc 
ceeded in passing him, so that it was no longer possi 
ble to cut the Confederate line of retreat. Indeed, 
Grover seems rather to have thought that Taylor 
meant to attack him. It was while careful reconnois- 
sances were being conducted to develop the true facts 
that Taylor slipped away, as we have seen, having 
thus adroitly extricated himself from the net spread in 
his sight. 

About two o clock, however, as Taylor did not 
attack, Grover moved fonvard, and as he marched 
down the bayou road soon met Emory coming up, as 
related in the last chapter. 

Banks, seeing that the bridge could not be made 
passable before morning, and that nothing was to be 
gained by marching his tired troops over the long 
roundabout of the bayou road, went into bivouac early 
in the afternoon, covering the northern approaches 
of Franklin. Grover occupied his battle-field of the 
morning, Emory held the bayou road between Grover 
and the town, and Weitzel the cut-off road. 

Taylor crossed the Cypremort and having marched 
fifteen miles since quitting Franklin, or twenty-five 
since midnight, rested near Jeannerette. 

Grover reported his loss during the i3th, i4th, and 
1 7th as 53 killed, 270 wounded, and 30 captured or 
missing ; in all 353. In the battle of Irish Bend, ac 
cording to the nominal lists as compiled in the Official 
Records, his loss was 6 officers and 43 men killed, 1 7 
officers and 257 men wounded, and 30 men missing; 



IRISH BEND, 117 

in all 353 ; agreeing with the first statement covering 
the three days, yet differing slightly in the details. 
Of this total Dwight s brigade lost 3 killed and 9 
wounded on the i3th, i killed and 5 wounded on the 
1 7th, and only 2 killed and 1 3 wounded in the battle. 
Both statements seem to leave out the ist Louisiana, 
which had 2 men killed and the lieutenant-colonel and 
2 men wounded on the I3th. In Birge s brigade the 
loss in the battle, according to Grover s report, was 46 
killed, 2 36 wounded, 49 missing; in all 312. The official 
reports show 16 less in the columns of wounded and in 
the total : these are probably the 16 wounded officers 
accounted for in the nominal lists. Of the regiments 
engaged the heaviest loss fell upon the i59th New 
York, in which the nominal lists show 4 officers and 
15 men killed, 5 officers and 73 men wounded, and 
20 men captured or missing; in all 117. But this 
fine regiment suffered even more severely than these 
figures indicate, for besides having to mourn the death 
of the gallant and promising Draper, Molineux re 
ceived a grievous wound that for many weeks deprived 
the regiment of one of the best colonels in the service, 
while of the wounded officers two were mortally hurt 
and died soon afterward. Birge s loss was nearly one 
man in four or five, for his strength did not exceed 
1,500, and it is probable that his fighting line num 
bered not more than 1,200. 

Th Confederate loss is not reported. They left 
on the field, to be cared for by their adversary, 2 1 of 
their dead and 35 of their wounded. Among these 
were Gray, Vincent, and Reily. 

Taylor gives the number of his infantry engaged 

1 According to the regimental history (MS.), 4 officers and 22 men killed ; 5 
officers and 76 men wounded ; n men missing; in all, 118 : of the wounded, 
2 officers and 10 men mortally. 



u8 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

in the charge on Birge s right as less than 1,000. 
The disparity of the opposing forces in that affair 
was, therefore, not important, and Birge s somewhat 
greater numbers may fairly be considered as off-set 
by the advantages of Taylor s position and the famil 
iarity with the country common to nearly all the 
Confederate soldiers there engaged, while to their 
antagonists it was an unknown land. Grover s whole 
force was about 5,000, of all arms, but of these, 
though all are to be taken into account, nearly a 
third were in reserve, neither firing nor under fire, 
while another third met a resistance so light that its 
loss was no more than one per cent, of its numbers 
hardly more than it had suffered in the skirmishes of 
the day before. Grover had eighteen pieces of artil 
lery, of which but four were in action ; Taylor also 
had four guns of which he made good use, and these, 
toward the close of the battle, were reinforced by the 
five heavy guns of the Diana, of which, however, it 
is probable that but one, or at most two, could be 
brought to bear. 

The field of battle was so contracted that Taylor s 
strength sufficed to occupy its front, while Grover was 
hindered or prevented from deploying a force large 
enough to outflank and crush his antagonist at a blow. 

Viewed from a Confederate standpoint, the issue 
forms an instructive example of the great results that 
may be achieved by a right use of small forces. If, 
on the other hand, one turns to consider the lost 
opportunity of Grover, two things stand out in strong 
relief : the one, the positive disadvantage of employ 
ing forces too large for the affair in hand or for the 
scene of operations ; the other, that bold adventures 
must be carried boldly to the end. 



IRISH BEND. 119 

Instead of making the campaign with four brigades 
and twenty-four guns, as Weitzel s original plan had 
contemplated, Banks, for greater security, set out with 
seven brigades and fifty-six guns. So far as concerned 
the main body ascending the Teche, this excess of 
strength could do no harm, but it was otherwise with 
the turning column by the lake ; for to the needless 
augmentation of the artillery were directly due not only 
the day and night first lost, but also the still more pre 
cious hours of daylight consumed in landing guns that 
were not to fire a shot. Two brigades of infantry, with 
six guns at most, landing at Indian Bend, and march 
ing directly toward the Cypremort, and quickly en 
trenching across both roads at or near their upper fork, 
would have been enough to hold the position against 
the best efforts of the whole of Taylor s army, with 
Emory close on their heels ; and thus Taylor must 
have been lost and the war in Western Louisiana 
brought to an end. Consequences many and far- 
reaching would have followed. Moreover, when it 
was determined to use more than two divisions one 
of these was naturally Grover s, and thus it happened 
that to Grover, who knew nothing of the country, 
was assigned the delicate duty first cut out for Weit- 
zel, while Weitzel, who had studied to the last point 
every detail of the topography and of the plan, stayed 
behind as the third in command of the column des 
tined to butt its nose against the breastworks of Bis- 
land and wait for the real work to be done a day s 
march on their farther side. 

Grover has been often criticised and much misun 
derstood for alleged over-caution and for taking the 
wrong direction after quitting the borders of the lake. 
Both criticisms are unjust. Generals, like other men, 



120 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

act according to their temperaments. In the whole 
war no braver man than Grover ever rode at the 
head of a division, nor any more zealous, more alert, 
more untiring in his duty. No troops of his ever 
went into battle but he was with them. But he was 
by nature cautious, and the adventure was essentially 
one that called for boldness. Moreover, he was by 
nature conscientious. That his orders, based as they 
were on misinformation of a date much later than 
Weitzel s intelligence, required him to land at Irish 
Bend instead of at Indian Bend, as first arranged, 
and to march on Franklin instead of toward the 
Cypremort, was not his affair. Surely no soldier is 
to be blamed, least of all in combined and complex 
operations, for choosing to obey the clearly expressed 
orders of those set over him, rather than to follow the 
illusory inspirations of the will-o -the-wisp commonly 
mistaken for genius. 

As for the orders themselves, they were correct 
upon the information at hand when they were given 
and the state of affairs then existing. To land at 
Madame Porter s and to seize the roads at Franklin 
was better than to go farther afield to gain the same 
end ; for the distance was less, and while on the 
march Grover was enabled to offer his front instead of 
his flank to the enemy. But the information proved 
inexact ; when Madame Porter s road was tried it 
was found impassable, and with this and the unfore 
seen delays it happened that the orders became in 
applicable. 



CHAPTER XII. 

OPELOUSAS. 

COOKE, after detaching the Clifton to go up the 
Teche after the Diana, as already related, remained 
at anchor in Grand Lake opposite Grover s landing- 
place and awaited developments. He had not long 
to wait. The first news of Banks s movement across 
Berwick Bay had overtaken and recalled Taylor on 
his way up the Atchafalaya to bring down the Queen 
of the West and her consorts, the Grand Duke and 
Mary T, to join in the intended operations against 
Weitzel. Although Taylor at once sent a staff officer 
to urge despatch, yet from some cause more than two 
full days had passed before, on the afternoon of the 
1 3th, the distant smoke of the Confederate gun-boats 
coming down Lake Chicot was seen by the lookouts of 
the Union navy in Grand Lake. At daylight the Queen 
of the West and the Mary T, were seen approaching 
from Chicot Pass. Cooke at once got the Estrella, 
Calhoim, and Arizona under way, opened fire at long 
range, and forming his boats in a crescent began to 
close with the enemy. Soon, however, the Queen of 
the West was seen to be in flames, from the explosion 
of the Union shells, and, her consort having promptly 
taken to flight, Cooke ceased firing and lowered all 
his boats to save the crew of the burning vessel from 
drowning. Captain Fuller, who had formerly com- 



121 



122 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

manded the Cotton, was rescued with 90 of his men, 
but nearly 30 were lost. Then with a loud explosion 
the eventful career of the Queen of the West came to 
an end, leaving her five guns, however, once more in 
the hands of the Union navy. This fortunate stroke 
gave the mastery of the Atchafalaya into Cooke s 
hands with nothing save Butte-a-la-Rose and two 
feeble gunboats to hinder his taking possession. 

Once safely across the Cypremort, Taylor s army 
began to melt away and his men, as they passed their 
homes, to fall out without hindrance. Many were of 
the simple class called Acadians, with scant sympa 
thy for either side of the great war into which they 
found themselves drawn, and in all the regiments there 
were many conscripts. 

On the 1 5th of April, Taylor marched ten miles to 
New Iberia. While there, he had the unfinished 
ironclad gunboat Stevens, previously known as the 
Hart, floated two miles down the Teche, destroyed 
by fire, and the wreck sunk in the channel. 

On the 1 6th he marched twenty miles, crossed the 
Vermilion River, went into camp on the high ground 
on the north bank, and burned the bridges behind 
him. 

Early in the morning of the I5th of April, Banks 
took up the pursuit with his united force, now out 
numbering Taylor s as three to one. Weitzel led the 
advance of the main column on the direct road. 
Emory followed him, and Grover marching at first on 
the bayou road fell in the rear after passing the fork. 
The army halted for the night at Jeannerette. 

On the following afternoon Banks entered New 
Iberia. Here the ways parted, the right-hand road 
by Saint Martinsville following for many miles the 



OPELOUSAS. 123 

windings of the Teche, while the left-hand road leads 
almost directly to Opelousas, by way of Vermilion- 
ville, now called Lafayette. 

Beyond Indian Bend the lowlands, in many places 
below and nowhere much above the level of the 
adjacent waters, may be said to end and the plains to 
begin ; and soon after leaving New Iberia and Saint 
Martinsville the troops found themselves on the 
broad prairies of Western Louisiana, where the rich 
grasses that flourish in the light soil sustain almost in 
a wild state vast herds of small yet fat beeves and of 
small yet strong horses ; where in favored spots the 
cotton plant is cultivated to advantage ; where the 
ground, gently undulating, gradually rises as one 
travels northward ; where the streams become small 
rivers that drain the land upon their borders, instead 
of merely bayous taking the back waters of the 
Mississippi and the Red. Near the right bank of 
the Teche runs even a narrow ribbon of bluffs that 
may be said to form the western margin of the great 
swamps of the Atchafalaya. Along the streams live- 
oaks, magnolias, pecans, and other trees grow luxuri 
antly ; but, for the most part, the prairies are open 
to the horizon, and at this time, though the gin-houses 
were full of cotton, the fields were mainly given over 
to the raising of corn for the armies and the people 
of the Confederacy. 

From New Iberia Banks ordered Grover to send a 
detachment to destroy the famous Avery salt-works, 
on Petit Anse Island, distant about twelve miles toward 
the southwest. On the 1 7th of April, Grover accord 
ingly despatched Kimball on this errand, with his 
1 2th Maine, the 41 st Massachusetts, one company of 
the 24th Connecticut, and Snow s section of Nims s 



124 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

battery. This extremely rich natural deposit of rock 
salt was, at that time, in the hands of the Confederate 
government, being, indeed, the main source of supply 
of this indispensable article for the whole Confederacy, 
especially for the region between the Mississippi and 
the Atlantic. The works required for its extraction 
are, however, very simple, for the deposit lies close to 
the surface, and has only to be quarried in blocks of 
convenient size. These, always as clear and beautiful 
as crystal, have only to be crushed or broken to be 
ready for use for common purposes, and when pul 
verized, however rudely, yield the finest table salt. 
Kimball burned all the buildings, destroyed the 
engines and implements, with six hundred barrels 
of salt, and marched back to New Iberia, and, on the 
1 9th, rejoined Grover on the Vermilion. The Con 
federates having drawn off the detachment and the 
guns previously posted to guard the works, Kimball 
met with no opposition. 

On the 1 7th of April, Grover, with the main body 
of his division, reinforced by Gooding s brigade, tem 
porarily commanded by Colonel John W. Kimball, of 
the 53d Massachusetts, continued the pursuit toward 
Vermilion, while Banks, with Weitzel and Emory, 
marched to Saint Martinsville, on the Teche. 

Early in the afternoon Grover caught sight of 
Green s rear-guard of Taylor s retreating forces, then 
about two miles distant, and in the act of crossing 
the Vermilion. Before Grover could overtake them, 
the bridges were in flames. Dwight s skirmishers 
deployed on the right and left of the road, and, with 
the help of the guns of Closson and N ims, drove off 
the enemy, posted to hinder or prevent the work of 
reconstruction. In this affair D wight lost one killed 



OPELOUSAS. 125 

and five wounded. The next day, the iSth of April, 
was spent by Grover in rebuilding the main bridge. 

Then began to be felt the need of such a force of 
mounted troops as on these plains formed the main 
strength of Taylor s little army, and the source of its 
safety ; for Banks s cavalry, taken as a whole, with 
some splendid exceptions, was at this time greatly 
inferior, not only in numbers but in fitness for the 
work in hand, to the rough riders led by the restless 
and indomitable Green. A few more horsemen, under 
leaders like Barrett, Williamson, and Perkins, would 
have saved the bridge and insured the dispersion or 
the destruction of Taylor s force. 

Weitzel, who, as far as Saint Martinsville, had led 
the advance of the main column, followed by Emory 
with Paine and Ingraham, there took the road to the 
left and halted on the evening of the 1 7th of April 
at Cote Gelee, four miles in the rear of Grover. The 
next morning Weitzel moved up to Grover s support, 
while Banks, with Emory, rested at Cote Gelee to 
await the rebuilding of the bridge. 

From St. Martinsville, Emory sent the 1 73d New 
York, under Major Gallway, with Norris s section of 
Duryea s battery, to follow the Teche road to Breaux 
Bridge and endeavor to capture the bayou steamboats, 
five in number, that were still left to the Confederates. 
Five miles below the village of that name, Gallway 
met a small Confederate picket, and pushing it aside, 
soon afterward found the bridge over the bayou in 
flames. On the morning of the i8th he learned that 
four of the boats had been burned by the Confeder 
ates, and about the same time his farther advance 
was stopped by orders from Banks, despatched as 
soon as it was known that Grover had been brought 



126 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

to a stand. A courier from headquarters having lost 
his way in the night of the i8th, on the following 
morning Gallway found himself in the air without 
any apparent object. He accordingly marched along 
the banks of the Teche and the Bayou Fusilier, and 
taking the road to Opelousas, there rejoined Paine 
on the 2 1 st. 

On the i Qth of April the army crossed the Ver 
milion and the Carencro, and marched unopposed 
sixteen miles over the prairie to Grand Coteau. 
Gooding s brigade rejoined Emory during the day. 

On the 2Oth the march was continued about eight 
miles to Opelousas. Just outside the town the Corps 
went into bivouac, after throwing forward all the cav 
alry, the 1 3th Connecticut, and a section of Rodgers s 
battery, to Washington, on the Courtableau. 

On the same day, after a brief engagement, Cooke, 
with the gunboats Estrella, Arizona, and Calhoun, 
and a detachment of four companies of the i6th New 
Hampshire from Brashear, captured Fort Burton at 
Butte-a-la-Rose, with its garrison of 60 men of the 
Crescent regiment and its armament of two 32-pound- 
ers ; thus at last gaining the complete control of the 
Atchafalaya, and at the same time opening communi 
cation with Banks by way of Port Barre or Barre s 
Landing on the Courtableau, distant about nine 
miles northeasterly from Opelousas. Then Cooke 
steamed up the Atchafalaya to make his report to 
Farragut, lying in the Mississippi off the mouth of 
the Red River, and to seek fresh orders. 

At the outset of the campaign the i6th New Hamp 
shire had been detached from Ingraham s brigade of 
Emory and left at Brashear to guard the main depots 
and the surplus baggage. After the battle of Bisland, 



OPELOUSAS. 127 

the 4th Massachusetts was turned back to Brashear 
to relieve the i6th New Hampshire. This regiment 
having assisted in the capture of Butte-a-la-Rose, now 
formed the garrison of that desolate and deadly 
hummock. 

While at Opelousas the army could draw its sup 
plies from Brashear by the Atchafalaya and the Cour- 
tableau, but so long as the direction of the future 
operations remained uncertain, it was necessary to 
keep a firm hold of the communications by the Teche. 
Accordingly, the 1 75th New York took post at Frank 
lin and the 22d Maine at New Iberia. 

On the 22d of April the i62d New York, under 
Blanchard, with a section of the ist Maine battery 
and one troop of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry, marched 
to Barre s Landing, seized the position, and captured 
the little steamboat Ellen, the last of the Teche fleet. 

On the 23d of April the little Cornie arrived at 
Barre s Landing from the depot at Brashear, and the 
next day the first wagon-train came into camp laden 
with the supplies now sadly needed. At sight of the 
white-covered wagons winding over the plain, the 
men gave way to those demonstrations of delight so 
familiar to all who have ever seen soldiers rejoice. 
For fifteen days they had been subsisting upon an 
uncertain issue of hard bread, coffee, and salt, 
eked out by levies, more or less irregular, upon the 
countryside. They were sick of chickens and corn- 
bread, and fairly loathed the very sight, to say nothing 
of the smell, of fresh-killed beef ; tough at best, even 
in the heart of the tenderloin, the flesh had to be 
eaten with the odor and the warmth of the blood still 
in it, under penalty of finding it fly-blown before the 
next meal. Thus it was that, as Paine relates in his 



128 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Diary, the men now " howled for salt pork and hard 
tack." 

Although the army had now a double line of com 
munication with its base, yet the long haul from New 
Iberia and the scarcity of light-draught steamboats 
adapted to the navigation of the narrow and tortuous 
bayous made the task of supplying even the urgent 
wants of the troops both tedious and difficult. The 
herds near Opelousas were fast disappearing under 
the ravages of the foragers, authorized and unauthor 
ized, yet had it not been for the beef obtained from 
this source and for the abundant grass of the prairie 
men and horses must soon have suffered greatly. 

On the 24th of April, Banks reviewed his army in 
the open plain, near Opelousas. The troops, not as 
yet inured to the long and hard marches, were indeed 
greatly diminished in numbers by the unaccustomed 
toil and exposure, as well as by the casualties of 
battle and the enervating effects of the climate, yet 
they presented a fine appearance, and were in the 
best of spirits. 

On learning of Cooke s success at Butte-a-la-Rose, 
Banks detached Dwight, posted him at Washington 
in observation, and placed Grover with his remaining 
brigades at Barre s Landing, to secure the depots, 
while Emory and Weitzel covered Opelousas. 

Having by burning the Vermilion bridge gained a 
day s rest for his tired soldiers, Taylor resumed the 
retreat at noon on the i7th of April, and passing 
through Opelousas and Washington on the i8th and 
i gth, on the following day found himself with all his 
trains behind the Cocodrie and the Bceuf. On the 
2Oth he sent Mouton, with all the cavalry except 
Waller s battalion, westward over the prairie toward 



OPELOUSAS. 129 

Niblett s Bluff, on the Sabine. Then, with Waller 
and the frayed remnant of the infantry, day by day 
wearing away at the edges, Taylor continued his re 
treat toward Alexandria, halting with what may be 
called his main body at Lecompte. To hinder the 
pursuit he burned the bridges over the Bayou Coco- 
drie and the Bayou Bceuf. 

Opelousas, miles away from every thing, in the 
heart of a vast prairie, presented in itself no object 
for an invading army. Even the temptation of a 
good position was wanting. 

Banks meant merely to halt there a day or two for 
rest, and then, if it should be found practicable to 
obtain the necessary supplies, to push on rapidly to 
Alexandria, and dispose for the season of Taylor s 
disordered fragments. Whether this could have been 
done will never be known, for although the army had 
now far outmarched its supplies, and even from its 
secondary base at Brashear was separated by nearly 
a hundred miles, and although the campaign had so 
far been made upon less than half the regular rations 
for men and animals, supplemented from farm, sugar- 
house, and prairie, the country on the line of march 
was no longer to be counted on for any thing save 
sugar in plenty and a little corn ; nevertheless, it might 
have been possible, by great exertions, to replenish the 
trains and depots, as well as to fill up the haversacks. 
Moreover, a three days march would find the army 
on the banks of the Red River, with a new and ample 
source of supply open to them, and within easy reach 
of Grant, provided only the navy might be counted 
upon to control the waters of that stream and its 
larger tributaries. Of this Banks had no doubt what 
ever. To open communication with Grant and to 



130 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

dispose of Taylor had been the chief ends that Banks 
had proposed to himself in setting out on the cam 
paign. These ends he now held almost in his hand. 
But on the 2ist of April an event occurred that, slight 
as was its apparent importance, was destined, in its 
train of consequences, vitally to affect the operations 
of the Army of the Gulf. 

This was the arrival at headquarters of Lieutenant 
Joseph T. Tenney, one of Dudley s aides-de-camp, 
who had been sent by Augur to find Banks, where- 
ever he might be. With him Tenney brought impor 
tant despatches from Grant and Farragut. What the 
contents were and what came of them will be related 
in the next chapter. 

From Opelousas Bean, with the 4th Wisconsin, a 
section of Duryea s battery, and a squadron of the 
2d Rhode Island cavalry, went a day s march toward 
the southwest, to the crossing of the Plaquemine 
Brule, and discovered that Mouton was retreating be 
yond the Mermentau. From Washington, Dwight 
moved out twenty miles along the Bayou Bceuf to 
Satcham s plantation without finding the enemy in 
force. After learning these things, on the 25th of 
April, Banks turned over the command of the forces to 
Emory and went to New Orleans to give his attention 
to affairs of urgency, chiefly affecting the civil ad 
ministration of the department. He returned to head 
quarters in the field on the evening of the ist of May. 

Meanwhile Emory sent Paine, who, when crossing 
the Carencro, had seen the last of the Confederates 
disappearing in the distance, with his brigade and a 
section of Duryea s battery far out on the Plaquemine 
Brule road, in order to find and disperse some cavalry, 
vaguely reported to be moving about somewhere in 



OPELOUSAS. 131 

that quarter, a constant menace to the long trains 
from New Iberia. In fact Mouton, with the Texans, 
was now on the prairie, beyond the Calcasieu eighty 
miles away, in good position to retreat to Texas 
or to hang on the flank and rear of the Union 
army, as circumstances might suggest. On the 26th 
of April Paine marched sixteen miles to the Plaque- 
mine Brule, and on the following day sent four com 
panies on horseback twenty miles farther toward the 
southwest across Bayou Queue de Tortue, and another 
detachment to Bayou Mallet to reconnoitre. Seeing 
nothing of the enemy, on the 28th Paine rejoined his 
division and resumed the command of it at Opelousas. 
Some time before this orders had been given to mount 
the 4th Wisconsin, and when the army finally marched 
from Opelousas this capital regiment made its ap 
pearance in the new role of mounted infantry. To say 
nothing of the equipments, a wide divergence in the 
size, color, and quality of the horses, hastily gathered 
from the four quarters of the prairie, gave to these im 
provised dragoons rather a ludicrous appearance it 
must be confessed ; yet marching afoot or standing to 
horse, the 4th Wisconsin was always ready and equal 
to the work cut out for it. 

From his advanced camp, on Shields s plantation, 
twenty-three miles beyond Washington and twenty- 
nine from Opelousas, Dwight fell back on the 28th 
of April to his bivouac at Washington and waited for 
the movement of the army to begin. 

In preparation for this, on the evening of the ist of 
May, Bean, with the 4th Wisconsin, mounted, was sent 
forward to join the main body of the cavalry, under 
Major Robinson, in front of Washington. That 
night Dwight, with the cavalry, his own brigade, 



132 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

and a section of Nims s battery, marched out some 
distance to discover the position of the Confederate 
outposts. These, in the interval that elapsed, had been 
advanced to the junction of the Cocodrie and the 
Boeuf. After driving them in Dwight returned the 
next morning to Washington. 

The advance of the column from Franklin to Ope- 
lousas had been disfigured by the twin evils of strag 
gling and marauding. Before the campaign opened, 
Banks had taken the precaution to issue stringent 
orders against pillage, yet no means adequate to the 
enforcement of these orders were provided, and the 
marches were so long and rapid, the heat at times 
so intense, and the dust so intolerable, that compara 
tively few of the men were able to keep up with the 
head of the column. This contributed greatly to 
disorder of the more serious kind. One regiment, 
neither the best nor the worst, halting at the end 
of a particularly hard day s march, found itself with 
scarcely fifty men in the ranks. Then, too, the men 
were on short rations, in what they considered the 
enemy s country ; the whole region was sparsely popu 
lated ; and the residents had, for the most part, fled 
from their homes at the news of the approach of the 
Union army. 

With these disorders there sprang up a third, less 
prevalent indeed, but to the last degree annoying and 
not without its share of danger, for when the straggler 
chanced to find himself in easy range of any thing, 
from a steer to a chicken, that he happened to fancy 
for his supper, he was not always careful in his aim or 
accurate in his judgment of distance ; thus a number 
of officers and men were wounded and the lives of 
many put in peril. 



OPELOUSAS. 133 

As if to complete the lesson so often taught in 
all wars, that discipline, care, and efficiency go hand 
in hand, when the army moved out from Opelousas, 
though but a fortnight later, a different state of 
things was seen. This must be ascribed to the fact 
that immediately after entering Opelousas the most 
stringent and careful orders were given for the regu 
lation of future marches, and the punishment of strag 
glers and marauders. By these orders was provided 
for the first time a system adequate to their enforce 
ment, and sufficiently elastic to meet without annoy 
ance and difficulty all those cases, of hourly and even 
momentary occurrence in the movement of an army, 
that require officers or men to quit the column. In 
the rear of each regiment was posted a surgeon, 
without whose permission no sick man was allowed 
to fall out. In the rear of each brigade and division 
marched a detachment of cavalry, under the orders 
of the provost marshal of the brigade or division, 
charged with the duty of picking up as stragglers all 
men found out of the ranks without a written permit 
from the surgeon or the company commander. The 
vital importance of a strict enforcement of these 
arrangements was personally impressed upon the 
division and brigade commanders ; yet this was not 
now necessary, for there were but few persons in the 
column of any rank that did not realize, in part at 
least, the evil consequences resulting from the irregu 
lar practices that had hitherto prevailed. Thus the 
march to the Red River was made rapidly and in 
order, and now for the first time the soldiers of the 
Nineteenth Army Corps marched with that swift and 
regulated movement of the column as a unit that was 
to be ever afterwards a source of comfort to the men, 



134 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

of satisfaction to their officers, and of just pride to 
every one belonging to the corps. 

Unhappily, on the 25th of April, before the result 
of these arrangements had had a chance to show them 
selves, Dwight, while on detached service in the ad 
vance, caught an unfortunate man of the i3ist New 
York, Henry Hamill by name, absent from his regi 
ment under circumstances that pointed him out as 
a plunderer. Then, without pausing to communicate 
with the general commanding, Dwight took upon 
himself the task of trial and judgment on the spot, 
and becoming satisfied of the man s guilt, caused him 
to be shot to death at sunset in front of the brigade. 
This action Banks, who was just setting out for New 
Orleans, sustained in special orders as soon as he re 
turned. Indeed, between this course and the instant 
delivery of Dwight to punishment, Banks had practi 
cally no choice. Nevertheless, whatever may have 
been the excuse or how extreme the provocation, the 
act was altogether wrong. The rules and articles of 
war lay down the penal code of armies in all its se 
verity, in terms too clear to be misunderstood and 
too ample to warrant an attempt on the part of any 
one in the service, however exalted his rank, to 
enlarge or evade them. The offender should have 
been tried by court-martial. No emergency or exi 
gency existed to delay the assembling of the court. 
Had he been found guilty, his death might swiftly 
have followed. Then the terrible lesson would have 
been impressive. Then none would have thought it 
hasty, needless, violent, or unlawful. 

As it was, the wretched man s punishment fur 
nished chiefly matter for regret, and an example to 
be avoided. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

BANKS AND GRANT. 

THE first effect of the despatches from Grant and 
Farragut, referred to in the preceding chapter, was 
to cause Banks to reconsider his plan of campaign, 
and to put the direction of his next movement in sus 
pense. While waiting for fresh advices in answer to 
his own communications and proposals Banks halted, 
and while he halted Taylor got time to breathe and 
Kirby Smith to gather new strength. 

This correspondence has been so much discussed, 
yet so little understood, that, chronology being an 
essential part of history, the narrative of the events 
now at hand may be rendered clearer, if we turn aside 
for a moment to consider not only the substance of 
what was said upon both sides, but, what was even 
more important, the time at which it was heard. 

Farragut s letter, written from the Hartforddfoove 
Port Hudson on the 6th of April, was the first com 
munication Banks had received from Farragut, save 
a brief verbal message brought to him by the Admiral s 
secretary, Mr. E. C. Gabaudan, on the loth of April, 
just before the army set out from Brashear. Mr. 
Gabaudan had come straight from the Admiral, but 
without anything in writing, having floated past Port 
Hudson by night in a skiff covered with twigs so as 
to look like a drift log. Farragut s letter gave assur- 

135 



136 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

ance of the complete control of the Red River and 
the Atchafalaya by the navy of the Union. 

Grant s despatch bore date the 23d of March. It 
was the first writing received from him. It conveyed 
the answer to the letter addressed to him by Banks 
on the 1 3th of March, and placed in the hands of 
Farragut just before the Hartford ran the batteries 
of Port Hudson. Thus on either side began a cor 
respondence clearly intended by both commanders to 
bring about an effective co-operation between the two 
armies, aided by the combined fleets of Farragut and 
Porter. Yet in the end, while the consequences re 
mained unfelt in the Army by the Tennessee, upon 
the Army of the Gulf the practical effect, after the 
first period of delay and doubt, was to cause its com 
mander to give up the thought of moving toward 
Grant and to conform all his movements to the ex 
pectation that Grant would send an army corps to 
Bayou Sara to join in reducing Port Hudson. Thus, 
quite apart from the confusion and the eventual dis 
appointment, much valuable time was lost while the 
matter was in suspense ; and so was demonstrated 
once more the impossibility, well established by the 
history of war, of co-ordinating the operations of two 
armies widely separated, having different objectives, 
while an enemy strongly holds the country between 
them. 

When Banks wrote his despatch of the I3th of 
March, he was at Baton Rouge, about to demonstrate 
against Port Hudson. When Grant received this 
despatch he was on the low land opposite Vicksburg, 
with the rising river between him and his enemy, 
laboriously seeking a practical pathway to the rear of 
Vicksburg, and in the meantime greatly troubled to 



BANKS AND GRANT. 137 

find dry ground for his seventy thousand men to stand 
on. Grant s first idea, derived from Halleck s de 
spatches, was that Banks should join him before 
Vicksburg, with the whole available force of the Army 
of the Gulf. When he learned from Banks that this 
would be out of the question so long as Port Hudson 
should continue to be held by the Confederates, 
Grant took up the same line of thought that had 
already attracted Banks, and began to meditate a 
junction by the Atchafalaya, the Red, the Tensas, 
and the Black rivers. What Grant then needed was 
not more troops, but standing-room for those he had. 
Accordingly, he began by preparing to send twenty 
thousand men to Banks, when the Ohio River steamers 
he had asked for should come. 1 They never came, 
yet even after he had embarked upon the campaign, 
alike sound in conception and splendid in execution, 
that was to become the corner-stone of his great and 
solid fame, Grant kept to his purpose. 

On the 1 4th of April he penned this brief telegram 
to Banks : 

" I am concentrating my forces at Grand Gulf ; will send an 
army corps Bayou Sara by the 25th, to co-operate with you on 
Port Hudson. Can you aid me and send troops after the reduc 
tion of Port Hudson to assist me at Vicksburg ? " 

This message, although Banks and Grant were 
then only about two hundred miles apart, had to 
travel three thousand miles to reach its destination. 
Banks received it just before marching from Opelousas 

I sent several weeks ago for this class of steamers, and expected them before 
this. Should they arrive and Admiral Porter get his boats out of the Yazoo, so 
as to accompany the expedition, I can send a force of say 20,000 effective men 
to co-operate with General Banks on Port Hudson." Grant to Farragut, March 
23d ; received by Banks, April 2ist. The cipher message that followed seemed 
to Banks a confirmation of this. 



138 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

on the 5th of May, twenty-one days after it left 
Grant s hands. As received, the message was in 
cipher and without a date. As the prevailing practice 
was, in conformity with the orders of the Secretary 
of War, the only persons in the Department of the 
Gulf who held the key to the cipher were the Super 
intendent of Military Telegraphs and such of his 
assistants as he chose to trust, and Mr. Bulkley was 
at New Iberia, where the wires ended. The code 
employed was the route cipher in common use in the 
service, and with the help of the words " Bayou " and 
" Sara" as guides the meaning was not hard to make 
out. Banks did not trust to this, however, and waited 
until, late at night, he received from the Superintendent 
an official translation, still without date, as indeed 
was the original document received at headquarters 
from New Orleans. The 25th Banks naturally took 
to mean the 25th of May. Grasping eagerly at the 
first real chance of effective co-operation, he at once 
replied : " By the 25th probably, by the ist, certainly, 
I will be there." This despatch was not in cipher, 
because he had no code. Captain Crosby carried it to 
the Hartford at the mouth of the Red River. Cap 
tain Palmer, who was found in command, the Admiral 
having crossed Fausse Point and joined his fleet below, 
at once forwarded the despatch. Near Natchez 
Crosby met Captain Differs of Grant s staff and turned 
back with him bringing Grant s despatch of the loth 
of May, written at Rocky Springs. This Banks re 
ceived at Alexandria on the I2th of May. From it 
he learned that Grant was not coming. Having met 
the Confederates after landing at Grand Gulf and fol 
lowed on their heels to the Big Black, he could not 
afford to retrace his steps ; but he urged Banks to 



BANKS AND GRANT. 139 

join him or to send all the force he could spare " to 
co-operate in the great struggle for opening the Mis 
sissippi River." The reasons thus assigned by Grant 
for his change of mind were certainly valid ; yet it 
must be doubted whether in these hurried lines the 
whole of the matter is set forth, for three weeks 
earlier, on the igth of April, five days after the 
promise to send an army corps to Bayou Sara by the 
25th, Grant had reported to Halleck : " This will now 
be impossible." Moreover, until the moment when 
he crossed the river with his advance on the 3Oth 
of April he not only held firmly to his intention to 
send the twenty thousand men to join Banks at Bayou 
Sara as soon as the landing should have been secured, 
but the corps for this service had been designated ; it 
was to be made up of the main body of McClernand s 
corps and McPherson s, and Grant himself meant to 
go with it. It was indeed the 2d of May when Grant 
received at Port Gibson Banks s despatch sent from 
Brashear on the loth of April indicating his purpose 
of returning to Baton Rouge by the loth of May, and 
although Grant also attributes to this despatch the 
change of his plans, the loth of May had already 
come before he made known the change to Banks. 

All this time Banks bore with him Halleck s in 
structions of the Qth of November, and more than 
once studied with care and solicitude these significant 
words : " As the ranking general in the Southwest 
you are authorized to assume the control of any 
military force from the upper Mississippi which may 
come within your command. The line of division 
between your department and that of Major-General 
Grant is, therefore, left undecided for the present, 
and you will exercise superior authority as far north 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

as you may ascend the river." By the articles of war, 
without these words, Banks would have been entitled 
to the command they gave him, but the words showed 
him plainly what was expected of him by his govern 
ment. To the incentives of patriotism and duty were 
thus superadded one of the most powerful motives 
that can affect the mind of the commander of an 
army, the hope and assurance of power and promo 
tion. If, then, he held back from joining Grant in 
Mississippi, it was because he hesitated to take the 
extraordinary risks involved in the movement. In 
this he was more than justified. 

Since the miscarriage of Sherman s attempt at the 
beginning of the year, Grant had been engaged in a 
series of tentative efforts, steadily prosecuted in vari 
ous directions, yet all having a common object, the 
finding of a foothold of dry ground for a decisive move 
ment against Vicksburg. Four of these experimental 
operations had failed completely, and Grant was now 
entering upon a fifth, destined indeed to lead to a 
great and glorious result, yet in itself conveying 
hardly more assurance of success than the most 
promising of its predecessors, while involving perils 
greater than any that had been so far encountered. 
Of these the greatest danger was that the enemy, 
after allowing him to land on the east bank of the 
river and to penetrate, with a portion of his army, 
into the heart of Mississippi, might then concentrate 
all the available forces of the Confederacy in that 
region and fall upon him with vigor at the moment 
when his supplies should be exhausted and his 
communications interrupted. In such an event the 
fortune of war might have rendered it imperative for 
him to retire down the river ; but what would have 



BANKS AND GRANT. 141 

happened then if Banks, disregarding Port Hudson in 
his eagerness to join Grant before Vicksburg, should 
in his turn have abandoned his communications ? 
Both armies would have been caught in a trap of 
their own making, whence not merit but some rare 
stroke of luck could alone have rescued either. 

In the strong light of the great and decisive vic 
tory of Vicksburg, it is scarcely possible to reproduce, 
even in the mind of the most attentive reader, the 
exact state of affairs as they existed at the moment of 
Grant s landing below Grand Gulf. This phenome 
nal success was not foreshadowed by any thing that 
had gone before it, and it would have been the height 
of imprudence to stake upon it the fate of two armies, 
the issue of an entire campaign, and the mastery of 
the Mississippi River, if not the final result of the 
war. Nor should it be forgotten that Grant himself 
regarded this movement as experimental, like its fore 
runners, and that up to the moment he set foot on the 
soil of Mississippi, he had formed no conception of the 
brilliant campaign on which he was about presently to 
embark. But instead of concentrating and acting 
with instant determination upon a single plan with 
a single idea, at the critical moment the Confederates 
became divided in council, distracted in purpose, and 
involved in a maze of divergent plans, cross purposes, 
and conflicting orders. While events caused the Con 
federate leaders to shift from one plan to the other, 
with the chances of the day, Grant was prompt to see 
and quick to profit by his advantage, and thus the 
campaign was given into his hands. 

But on the 4th of May these great events were as 
yet hidden in the unknown future, and when, after 
waiting thirteen days at Opelousas, Banks began his 



142 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

march on Alexandria, it was with the earnest hope of 
a speedy meeting of the two Union armies on the 
Mississippi ; then came the cipher telegram to exalt 
this hope into a firm and just expectation of finding 
three weeks later an entire corps from Grant s army 
at Bayou Sara, and as Banks mounted his horse to 
ride toward the head of his column, it was with the 
fixed purpose of being with his whole force at the 
appointed place at the appointed time. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

ALEXANDRIA. 

EVERY one was in high spirits at the prospect of 
meeting the Army of the Tennessee, and, to add to 
the general good-humor, just before quitting Opelou- 
sas two pieces of good news became known. 

Grierson rode into Baton Rouge on the 2d of May 
at the head of his own 6th Illinois and Prince s 7th 
Illinois cavalry, together 950 horse, bringing the first 
intimation of his remarkable march. Leaving La 
Grange on the 1 7th of April, he had within sixteen 
days ridden nearly 600 miles around the rear of 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson and along the whole 
line of the Jackson and Great Northern railroad. 
Beside breaking up the railway and the telegraph, 
and destroying for the time being their value to the 
Confederate army, Grierson s ride had an indirect 
effect, perhaps even more important than the direct 
objects Grant had in view when he gave his orders. 
That the railway should be rendered useless for the 
movement of troops and supplies, and the telegraph 
for the transmission of orders and intelligence, was of 
course the essential purpose of the operation, yet no 
one could have foreseen the extent of the confusion 
that followed, aided by Grierson s rapid movements, 
amid the fluttering and distracted councils at Vicks 
burg. Thus it happened that, when he heard of Grant s 

143 



144 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

landing below Grand Gulf, Pemberton actually thought 
himself menaced by the advance of Banks, and this 
misapprehension was the parent of the first of those 
mistakes of his adversary of which Grant made such 
good use. 

Lieutenant Sargent, 1 the aide-de-camp sent to com 
municate with Admiral Farragut, as stated in the last 
chapter, found at the mouth of the Red River Ad 
miral Porter, with the gunboats Bcnton, Lafayette, 
Pittsburg, and Price, the ram Switzerland, and the 
tugboat Ivy, with which he had run the batteries of 
Vicksburg in preparation for Grant s movement. 
Porter brought, indeed, no despatches, but he brought 
the great news that Grant had secured his landing at 
Grand Gulf and had begun his victorious march on 
Vicksburg. When Sargent returned to headquarters 
at Opelousas, he brought with him a despatch from 
Porter, promising to meet the army at Alexandria. 

Banks had already broken up the depots at Barre s 
Landing and New Iberia. On the afternoon of the 
4th of May, he set Dwight in motion from his advance 
post at Washington. Weitzel marched from Opelou 
sas at five o clock the same afternoon, and Emory s 
division under Paine followed on the morning of the 
5th. Emory, who had been suffering for some weeks, 
had at last consented to obey his surgeon s orders 
and go to New Orleans for a brief rest. Grover fol 
lowed from Barre s Landing early in the afternoon of 
the same day. Banks himself remained at Opelousas 
until early in the morning of the 6th, having waited 
to receive and answer the translation of the cipher 

1 Professor Charles Sprague Sargent, of Harvard University, Director of the 
Arnold Arboretum, the distinguished author of the great book on Forest Trees 
of North America. At this time he was serving zealously as a volunteer aide- 
de-camp without pay. 



ALEXANDRIA. 14$ 

telegram from Grant ; then he rode forward rapidly 
and joined his troops near Washington. From this 
time the communications of the army were to be by 
the Atchafalaya and the Red River. 

On the 4th of May, while riding to the front to 
join the advance commanded by his brother, Captain 
Howard Dwight, Assistant Adjutant-General, was 
surprised and cut off at a sharp turn in the Bayou 
Boeuf by a party of armed men on the opposite bank. 
Having no reason to apprehend any special danger 
so far in the rear of the advance, the little party was 
proceeding along the road without precaution. At 
the moment of the encounter Captain Dwight was 
quite alone, concealed by the turn in the road from 
the ambulance and the few orderlies that were follow 
ing at leisure. Armed only with his sword, and 
seeing that escape was hopeless, he instantly declared 
his readiness to surrender. " Surrender be damned !" 
cried the guerillas, and, firing a volley without further 
parley, shot him dead. When the orderlies who were 
with the ambulance heard the firing they galloped 
forward, only to find poor Dwight s lifeless body lying 
in the dusty road. The murderers had fled. 

By this painful event the service lost a brave and 
promising young officer and the staff a pleasant and 
always cheerful comrade. The distinguished family 
to which this gallant gentleman belonged had given 
four brothers to the service of their country. Of 
these Howard himself most nearly resembled in char 
acter, looks, and bearing his elder brother Wilder, 
who fell at Antietam, honored and lamented by all 
that knew him. 

Upon hearing the news, Banks instantly sent orders 
to Brigadier-General Dwight to arrest all the white 



146 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

men he might find near the line of his march to the 
number of one hundred, and to send them to New 
Orleans to be held as hostages for the delivery of the 
murderers. " The people of the neighborhood who 
harbor and feed these lawless men," Banks wrote, 
" are even more directly responsible for the crimes 
which they commit, and it is by punishing them that 
this detestable practice will be stopped." There were 
not a hundred white men in the region through 
which Dwight was marching, but many were punished 
by imprisonment after this order a harsh measure, 
it must be admitted, yet not without the justification 
that the countryside was infested by men wearing no 
uniform, who acted in turn the part of soldiers in 
front of the Union army, of citizens on its line of 
march, and of guerillas in its rear. When, under a 
flag of truce, Dwight presently demanded from Tay 
lor the surrender of his brother s murderers, the Con 
federate officers not only disavowed but severely 
condemned the crime, declaring themselves, however, 
unable to pick out the criminals. 

Two miles beyond Washington the Bayous Bceuf 
and Cocodrie unite to form the Bayou Courtableau, 
out of which again, below the town, flows the Bayou 
Maricroquant, forming a double connection with the 
Teche at its head. For a long distance the Bceuf 
and the Cocodrie keep close company, each following 
a crooked channel cut deeply into the light soil. 
Crossing the Courtableau above Washington, the 
line of march now lay along the east bank of the 
Boeuf, by Holmesville and Cheneyville, through a 
country of increasing richness and beauty, gradually 
rising with quickened undulations almost until the 
bluffs that border the Red River draw in sight. 



ALEXANDRIA. 147 

Banks had promised that he would be in Alexandria 
on the morning of the Qth of May ; but no opposition 
was encountered ; the roads were good, dry, and easy 
under foot ; the weather fine, and the men were filled 
with a desire to push the march, and with an eager 
rivalry to be first in Alexandria. Early on the after 
noon of the 7th of May the brigades of Dwight and 
Weitzel, both under Weitzel s command, arrived at 
the beautiful plantation of Governor Moore, and 
went into bivouac. Here the cavalry, who had ridden 
well forward, returned, bringing the news that Porter, 
with his gunboats, was already in the river off Alex 
andria, where the fleet had cast anchor early that 
morning, a full day before its time. This made 
Banks desire to push on, and he at first ordered Paine 
to continue the march, preceded by all the cavalry. 
When Weitzel heard this, his spirit rose for the honor 
of his brigade, and in emphatic yet respectful terms 
he protested against being deprived at the last moment 
of the post he had held almost since leaving Brashear. 
Banks yielded to Weitzel s wishes, and his men, not 
less eager than their commander, notwithstanding the 
long march of twenty miles they had already made, 
at once broke camp and with a swinging stride set 
out to accomplish the twelve miles that still separated 
them from the river. One of the ever-present regi 
mental wits sought to animate the spirits and quicken 
the flagging footsteps of his comrades by offering a 
turkey ready trussed upon his bayonet to the man 
that should get to Alexandria before him. For a 
long part of the way the men of the 8th Vermont 
and the 75th New York amused themselves by taking 
advantage of the wide and good roadway to run a 
regimental race. As the eager rivals came swinging" 



148 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

down the hill, they found their progress checked by 
a momentary halt of the horsemen in their front, 
while watering their jaded animals. Then " Get out 
of the way with that cavalry," was the cry, " or we 11 
run over you ! " 

It was ten o clock at night when Weitzel s men led 
the way into Alexandria. A full ration of spirits was 
served out to the men, who then threw themselves on 
the ground without further ceremony and used to the 
full the permission to enjoy for once a long sleep 
mercifully unbroken by a reveille. Paine followed 
and encamped near Alexandria on the following 
morning ; Grover rested near Lecompte, about twenty 
miles in the rear. 

Beside his own vessels, Porter brought with him to 
Alexandria the Estrella and Arizona from the flotilla 
that had been operating on the Atchafalaya under 
Cooke. Porter was thus fully prepared to deal with 
any opposition he might encounter from the Confed 
erate batteries at Fort De Russy ; but, although only 
the day before the Albatross, Estrella, and Arizona 
had been driven off after a sharp fight of forty minutes, 
when, on the 5th of May, Porter arrived at Fort De 
Russy, he found the place deserted and the guns gone. 1 

On the 8th of May, finding that the river was 
falling, Porter, after conferring freely with Banks, 
withdrew all his vessels except the Lafayette, and 
descending the Red River, sent four of the gunboats 

1 Under orders from Kirby Smith to Taylor, dated April 22d : " The General 
is of the opinion that if a portion of the force pursuing you should move against 
Fort De Russy by the road from Hauffpaur, it would be impossible to hold it." 
See also Smith to Cooper, April 23d : " The people at Fort De Russy cannot 
stand a land attack. The advance of the enemy s column to the Hauffpaur 
. . . will ensure its speedy fall, with loss of guns and garrison. Under 
these circumstances, General Taylor has ordered the removal of the 32-pounder 
rifle and n-inch columbiads to a position higher up the Red River." 



ALEXANDRIA. 149 

seventy miles up the Black and its principal affluent, 
the Washita, to Harrisonburg. This latter expedition 
had no immediate result, but it served to show the 
ease with which the original plan of campaign might 
have been followed to its end. 

While Banks was still at Opelousas, Kirby Smith, 
taking Dwight s approach to signify a general advance 
of the Union army, had arranged to retire up the 
Red River and to concentrate at Shreveport. Thither, 
on the 24th of April, he removed his headquarters 
from Alexandria and called in not only Taylor but a 
division of infantry under Walker, and three regiments 
of Texans already on the Red River. All the troops 
that Magruder could spare from the 8,000 serving in 
Eastern Texas he was at once to put in march to the 
Sabine. These orders, though too late for the 
emergency, brought about the concentration that was 
presently to threaten the ruin of Banks s main cam 
paign on the Mississippi. 

Weitzel, with Dwight, followed the Confederate 
rear-guard to Lawson s Ferry, forty-one miles by the 
river beyond Alexandria, taking a few prisoners. 
Taylor himself appears to have had a narrow escape 
from being among them. 

During the week spent at Alexandria, Banks was 
for the first time in direct and comparatively rapid 
communication with Grant, now in the very heart of 
his Vicksburg campaign, and here, as we have seen, 
the correspondence was brought to a point. When 
he first learned that Grant had given up all intention 
of sending to him any portion of the Army of the 
Tennessee, Banks was greatly cast down, and his 
plans rapidly underwent many changes and perturba 
tions. At first he was disposed to think that nothing 



i 50 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

remained but to retrace his steps over the whole toil 
some way by Opelousas, the Teche, Brashear, New 
Orleans, and the Mississippi to Baton Rouge, and 
thence to conduct a separate attack upon Port Hudson. 
This movement would probably have consumed two 
months, and long before the expiration of that time 
it was fair to suppose the object of such an operation 
would have ceased to exist. What led Banks to this 
despondent view was the fact that he had been count 
ing upon Grant s steamboat transportation for the 
crossing of the Mississippi to Bayou Sara, and at first 
he did not see how this deficiency could now be met. 

Indeed, on the i2th of May, he went so far as to 
issue his preparatory orders for the retrograde move 
ment ; but the next day careful reconnoissances by his 
engineers, Major Houston and Lieutenant Harwood, 
led him to change his mind and to conclude that it 
would, after all, be possible to march to Simmesport, 
and there, using the light-draught boats of the* De 
partment of the Gulf, supplemented by such steamers 
as Grant might be able to spare for this purpose, to 
transfer the whole column to Grand Gulf and thence 
march to join Grant in the rear of Vicksburg. Ac 
cordingly, on the 1 3th of May, Banks gave orders for 
the immediate movement of his whole force in accord 
ance with this plan, and set aside all the preparations 
that had previously been made. 

When the news reached Washington that Grant 
had gone to Jackson and Banks to Alexandria, great 
was the dissatisfaction of the Government and emphatic 
its expression. On the i9th of May Halleck wrote 
to Banks : 

" These operations are too eccentric to be pursued. I must 
again urge that you co-operate as soon as possible with General 



ALEXANDRIA. 151 

Grant east of the Mississippi. Your forces must be united at the 
earliest possible moment. Otherwise the enemy will concentrate 
on Grant and crush him. Do all you can to prevent this. . . . 
" We shall watch with the greatest anxiety the movements of 
yourself and General Grant. I have urged him to keep his forces 
concentrated as much as possible and not to move east until he 
gets control of the Mississippi River." 

And again, on the 23d of May, still more pointedly: 

" If these eccentric movements, with the main forces of the 
enemy on the Mississippi River, do not lead to some serious 
disaster, it will be because the enemy does not take full advantage 
of his opportunity. I assure you the Government is exceedingly 
disappointed that you and General Grant are not acting in con 
junction. It thought to secure that object by authorizing you to 
assume the entire command as soon as you and General Grant 
could unite." 

When these despatches were penned, Grant and 
Banks were already committed to their own plans for 
the final campaign on the Mississippi. When they 
were received, Grant was before Vicksburg, Banks 
before Hudson ; each had delivered his first assault 
and entered upon the siege. The censure was with 
drawn as soon as, in the light of full explanations, 
the circumstances came to be understood. 



CHAPTER XV. 
BACK TO PORT HUDSON. 

ON the 7th of May Porter relieved Farragut in the 
guardianship of the Mississippi and its tributaries 
above the mouth of the Red River. This left Farra 
gut free to withdraw his fleet so long blockading and 
blockaded above Port Hudson. Accordingly he gave 
discretionary orders to Palmer to choose his time for 
once more running the gauntlet, and Palmer was only 
watching his opportunity when he yielded to the 
earnest entreaty of Banks, and agreed to remain and 
co-operate if the General meant to go against Port 
Hudson. 

Grover began the movement on the i4th of May ; 
Paine followed early on the morning of the I5th; 
while Weitzel, still retaining Dwight, was ordered to 
hold Alexandria until the 1 7th, and then to retire to 
Murdock s plantation, where the east and west road 
along the Bayou HaufTpaur crosses the road from 
Alexandria to Opelousas, and there await further 
orders. 

Besides the ordinary duty of a rear-guard, the object 
of this disposition of Weitzel s force was to cover the 
withdrawal toward Brashear of the long train of sur 
plus wagons for which there was now no immediate 
need, and which would only have encumbered the 
proposed movement of the Corps by water. All the 

152 



BACK TO PORT HUDSON. 153 

troops took the road by Cheneyville instead of that 
by Marksville, in order to conceal from the Confed 
erates as long as possible the true direction of the 
movement. 

Having given these orders, Banks embarked on 
one of the river steamboats on the evening of the 
1 5th and transferred his headquarters to Simmes s 
plantation on the east bank of the Atchafalaya oppo 
site Simmesport. Thence he proceeded down the 
Atchafalaya to Brashear, and so by rail to New 
Orleans. 

Grover broke camp at Stafford s plantation on the 
1 4th of May, and marched seventeen miles to Cheney 
ville ; on the 1 5th, fourteen miles to Enterprise; on 
the 1 6th, sixteen miles to the Bayou de Glaise ; and, 
on the morning of the 1 7th, twelve miles to Simmes 
port, and immediately began to cross on large flat- 
boats rowed by negro boatmen. To these were 
presently added a little, old, slow, and very frail 
stem-wheel steamboat, named the Bee, which, a short 
time afterwards, quietly turned upside down, without 
any observable cause, while lying alongside the levee ; 
then the Laiirel Hill, one of the best boats in the 
service of the quartermaster ; afterward gradually but 
very slowly the other steamers began to come in. 
Grover finished crossing on the morning of the i8th, 
and went into camp near the Corps headquarters. 

Paine, with the 6th New York added to his com 
mand for the few remaining days of its service, 
followed in the footsteps of Grover. Leaving Alex 
andria on the morning of the i5th, Paine marched 
twenty miles and halted at Lecompte. On the i6th, 
he marched twenty-five miles to the Bayou Rouge ; 
on the 1 7th, twenty miles to the Bayou de Glaise, 



154 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

where the Marksville road crosses it; on the i8th, 
seven miles to Simmesport, and on the following 
morning began to cross. 

Before leaving Alexandria, Weitzel, on the I4th of 
May, sent two companies of cavalry to reconnoitre a 
small force of the enemy said to be near Boyce s 
Bridge on Bayou Cotile. The Confederates were 
found in some force. A slight skirmish followed, 
with trifling loss on either side, and when, the next 
day, Weitzel sent the main body of the cavalry with 
one piece of Nims s battery, accompanied by the ram 
Switzerland with a detachment of 200 men of the 
75th New York, the Confederates once more retired 
beyond Cane River. 

Weitzel moved out of Alexandria at four o clock on 
the morning of the i7th of May, and, lengthening his 
march to thirty-eight miles during the night, encamped 
on Murdock s plantation on the following morning. 
The gunboats Estrella and Arizona and the ram 
Switzerland stayed in the river off Alexandria until 
noon of the 1 7th to cover Weitzel s withdrawal, and 
then dropped down to the mouth of the Red River 
and the head of the Atchafalaya. The Confederates 
slowly followed Weitzel at some distance, observing 
his movements, and, on the morning of the 2Oth, 
attacked his pickets. Then Bean, who commanded 
Weitzel s advance guard, consisting of his own 4th 
Wisconsin, mounted, the i2th Connecticut, and all 
the cavalry, threw off the attack and pursued the 
Confederates nearly to Cheneyville, where Barrett, 
advancing too boldly after the main body had halted, 
was cut off, with a detachment of seventeen of his 
troop, and, finding himself surrounded, was forced to 
surrender. Barrett himself and several of his men 



BACK TO PORT HUDSON. 155 

afterwards succeeded in making their escape. The 
attacking party of the Confederates consisted of 
Lane s regiment, fresh from Texas, Waller s battalion, 
and a part of Sibley s brigade, with a battery of 
artillery. 

On the morning of the 22d, Weitzel, having com 
pleted the object of his halt at Murdock s plantation, 
marched at a stretch the thirty-four miles to Simmes- 
port without further molestation, and arriving there 
on the morning of the 23d, at once began the crossing. 

Chickering marched from Barre s Landing on the 
morning of the 2ist of May. His force consisted of 
his own regiment, the4ist Massachusetts, commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Sargent and mounted on prairie 
horses, the 52d Massachusetts, the 22d Maine, the 26th 
Maine, the goth New York, the ii4th New York, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Per Lee, Company E of 
the 1 3th Connecticut, and Snow s section of Nims s 
battery. 

The QOth New York, Colonel Joseph S. Morgan, 
was among the older regiments in the Department of 
the Gulf, having been mustered into the service in 
December, 1861. In January, 1862, it went to Florida 
with Brannan, on his appointment to command the 
Department of Key West; and in June, 1862, it 
formed the garrison of Fort Jefferson on the Dry 
Tortugas and of Key West ; in November it was 
relieved by the 47th Pennsylvania, and joined Sey 
mour s brigade on Port Royal Island, South Carolina. 
In March, 1863, it was back at Key West. There 
both regiments remained together until May. Mean 
while the district, then commanded by Woodbury, 
had been transferred from the Department of the 
South to the Department of the Gulf by orders from 



i $6 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the War Office dated the i6th of March. These 
Banks received on the loth of April, just before 
leaving Brashear, and as soon as he learned the con 
dition and strength of the post, he called in the QOth 
New York. The regiment arrived at Barre s Land 
ing just in time to go back to Brashear with Chicker- 
ing. Morgan, though Chickering s senior in rank, 
waived his claim to the command and accepted a 
temporary brigade made up of all the infantry and 
the artillery. 

The IT 4th New York, after quitting the column on 
the 1 9th of April, before passing the Vermilion, and 
performing the unpleasant duty of driving before it 
to Brashear all the beeves within its reach, was so 
unfortunate as to arrive at Cheneyville, on the return 
march, on the i2th of May, at the moment when 
Banks had made up his mind to retire to Brashear, 
and so just in time to face about and once more 
retrace its weary steps. Passing through Opelou- 
sas and Grand Coteau, the ii4th turned to the left 
by the Bayou Fusilier and fell in with Chickering on 
the Teche. 

The way was by the Teche, on either bank. By 
this time Mouton, reinforced by a brigade of three 
regiments under Pyron, with a light battery, probably 
Nichols s, had recrossed the Calcasieu under orders 
sent him by Kirby Smith on the I4th of May, before 
he knew of Banks s latest movement, and was ap 
proaching the Vermilion just in time to harry the 
flank and rear of Chickering s column, scattered as it 
was in the effort to guard the long train that stretched 
for eight miles over the prairies, with a motley band 
of 5,000 negroes, 2,000 horses, and 1,500 beeves for 
a cumbrous accompaniment. With the possible ex- 



BA CK TO FOR T HUDSON. 1 57 

ception of the herd that set out to follow Sherman s 
march through Georgia, this was perhaps the most 
curious column ever put in motion since that which 
defiled after Noah into the ark. 

On the 2 ist of May, Chickering halted near Breaux 
Bridge ; on the 22d, above Saint Martinsville ; on the 
23d, above New Iberia ; on the 24th, at Jeannerette. 
On the following afternoon the column had halted 
five miles beyond Franklin, when a small force of the 
enemy, supposed to be part of Green s command or 
of Fournet s battalion, fell upon the rear-guard and a 
few shots were exchanged, with slight casualties on 
either side, save that Lieutenant Almon A. Wood, 
of the noth New York, fell with a mortal wound. 
However, although the troops had already traversed 
twenty-five miles, this decided Morga-n, who seems 
by this time to have taken the command, to push on, 
and the march being kept up throughout the night, 
the wearied troops, after a short rest for breakfast 
arrived at Berwick Bay at eleven o clock on the fol 
lowing morning. In the last thirty-one hours the 
command had marched forty-eight miles. In the 
forty-one days that had passed since the campaign 
opened the n/j-th New York had covered a distance 
of almost 500 miles, nearly every mile of it afoot and 
with but three days rest. The same afternoon the 
crossing began, and by the 28th every thing was in 
safety at Brashear. 

Banks had sent his despatches of the i3th of May 
to Grant by the hands of Dwight, with instructions 
to lay the whole case before Grant and to urge the 
view held by Banks with regard to the co-operation 
of the two armies. Dwight proceeded to Grand 
Gulf by steamboat, and thence riding forward, over- 



158 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

took Grant just in time to witness the battle of 
Champion s Hill on the i6th of May. That night 
he sent a despatch by way of Grand Gulf, promising 
to secure the desired co-operation, but urging Banks 
not to wait for it. The message arrived at head 
quarters at Simmes s plantation on the evening of the 
i yth, and was at once sent on to Brashear to be tele 
graphed to the commanding general at New Orleans. 
This assurance sent by Dwight really conveyed no 
more than his own opinion, but Banks read it as a 
promise from Grant, and once more convinced that 
it would be futile to attempt a movement toward 
Grand Gulf with the limited means of transport he 
had at hand, he again changed his plan and determined 
to go directly to Bayou Sara, hoping and trusting to 
meet there on the 25th of May a corps of 20,000 men 
from Grant s army. 

The effective strength of the force now assembled 
near the head of the Atchafalaya was 8,400 infantry, 
700 cavalry, 900 artillery; in all, 10,000. This great 
reduction was not wholly due to the effects of the 
climate, hardships, and long marches, but is partly to 
be ascribed to heavy detachments. These included the 
six regiments with Chickering, one at Butte-a-la-Rose, 
and one at Brashear. 

At Simmesport the Corps sustained its first loss by 
expiration of service. The 6th New York, having 
completed the two years term for which it had en 
listed, went by the Atchafalaya and the railway to 
New Orleans, and there presently took transport for 
New York to be mustered out. 

The movements of the army, though pressed as 
much as possible, were greatly retarded by the scanty 
means of water transportation and the pressing need 



BACK TO PORT HUDSON. 159 

of coal. From this cause the navy was also suffering, 
and urgent means had to be taken to supply the 
deficiency. 

Reconnoissances, conducted by Lieutenant Har- 
wood, in the course of which the enemy s cavalry was 
seen but not engaged, showed the roads from the 
Atchafalaya to Waterloo to be practicable for all 
arms. A detachment of cavalry sent out on the 1 8th 
to ascertain whether the Confederates had any force 
on the west bank of the Mississippi, encountered near 
Waterloo about 120 men of the ist Alabama regiment, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, who had been sent 
over the day before from Port Hudson in skiffs to 
prevent any communication between the upper and 
the lower fleets. A skirmish followed, with slight 
loss on either side. 

First placing Emory in command of the defences 
of New Orleans, and ordering Sherman to take Dow 
and Nickerson and join Augur before Port Hudson, 
Banks left the city on the 2Oth of May, rejoined his 
headquarters on the 2ist, and at once set his troops 
in motion toward Bayou Sara. At half-past eight 
o clock on the morning of the 2ist of May, Paine 
broke up his bivouac on the Atchafalaya and marched 
to M organza, after detaching the i3ist New York 
and the 1 73d New York with a section of artillery to 
guard the ammunition train. Grover followed by 
water as fast as the steamboats could be provided. 
At two o clock on the morning of the 22d of May, 
Banks and Grover, with the advance of Grover s 
division, landed at Bayou Sara without meeting any 
opposition from the enemy, who, up to this time, 
seems not to have suspected the movement. The 
other troops followed as rapidly as the means of 



160 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

transport permitted. Grover s division was sent 
ashore, followed by two brigades of Paine s division 
from M organza. The wagon train went on down the 
road to the landing directly opposite Bayou Sara, 
under the escort of the noth New York, and the 
i62d New York, with one section of Carruth s bat 
tery, all under the command of Benedict. 

Soon after the landing at Bayou Sara, a party of 
cavalry rode in, bringing the news of Augur s battle 
of the 2 1 st. Hearing that Augur was at that moment 
engaged with the enemy, Banks pressed forward his 
troops. In a violent storm of wind and rain Grover 
pushed on until he met Augur s outlying detachments. 
Then, finding all quiet, he went into bivouac near 
Thompson s Creek, north-west of Port Hudson. Paine 
followed, and rested on the Perkins plantation, a 
mile in the rear of Grover. Banks made his head 
quarters with Grover. Augur covered the front of 
the position taken up by the enemy after the battle 
of Plains Store. On the same day, the 22d, Sherman 
came up the river, landed at Springfield, and went 
into position on the Bayou Sara road on Augur s 
left. Thus at night on the 22d the garrison of Port 
Hudson was practically hemmed in. 

On the 1 8th, Banks had ordered Augur to march 
with his whole disposable force to the rear of Port 
Hudson to prevent the escape of the garrison. As 
early as the i3th of May, while yet the plan of cam 
paign was in suspense, Augur had sent Grierson with 
the cavalry and Dudley with his brigade to Merritt s 
plantation, near the junction of the Springfield Land 
ing and Bayou Sara roads, to threaten the enemy and 
discover his movements. Dudley then took post near 
White s Bayou, a branch of the Comite, and remained 



BACK TO PORT HUDSON. 161 

in observation, covering the road to Clinton and the 
fork that leads to Jackson. On the 2Oth of May 
Augur moved the remainder of his force up to Dudley, 
in order to be ready to cover T. W. Sherman s land 
ing at Springfield, as well as to meet the advance of 
the main column under Banks from Bayou Sara, now 
likely to occur at any moment. With Augur now 
were Dudley, Chapin, Grierson, Godfrey s squadron 
composed of troops C and E of the Louisiana cavalry, 
two sections of Rawles s battery, Holcomb s battery, 
and one section of Mack s commanded by Sergeant 
A. W. McCollin. At six o clock in the morning of 
the 2ist of May Augur marched toward the crossing 
of the Plains Store and Bayou Sara roads to seize the 
enemy s line of retreat and to open the way for Banks. 
When Grierson came to the edge of the wood that 
forms the southern boundary of the plain, his advance 
fell in with a detachment of the garrison under Colo 
nel S. P. Powers of the i4th Arkansas regiment, and 
a brisk skirmish followed. The same afternoon Gard 
ner sent out Miles, with his battalion, about 400 
strong, and Boone s battery, to feel Augur s advance 
and perhaps to drive it away. This brought on the 
action known as the battle of Plains Store. Unfor 
tunately, no complete reports of the affair were made 
and the regimental narratives are meagre. 

In the heavy forest that then masked the cross 
roads and formed the western border of the plain, 
Miles met Augur moving into position ; Dudley, on the 
right of the road that leads from Plains Store to Port 
Hudson, supporting Holcomb s guns, and Chapin on 
the left supporting Rawles s guns. For about an hour 
the artillery fire was brisk. The 48th Massachusetts, 
being badly posted in column on either side of the 



n 



1 62 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Port Hudson road, gave way in some confusion under 
the sharp attack of Miles s men coming on through 
the thicket, and thus exposed the guns of Beck s sec 
tion of Rawles. As the 48th fell back through the 
advancing ranks of the 49th Massachusetts, the prog 
ress of that regiment was momentarily hindered, but 
a brisk charge of the ii6th New York restored the 

o 

battle. On the right, a section of Boone s battery got 
an enfilade fire on Rawles and Chapin, and enabled 
Miles to draw off and retire behind the breastworks. 
Thus the affair was really ended before Augur, whose 
duty it was to act with prudence, had time to com 
plete the proper development of his division as for a 
battle with the full force of the enemy, which he was 
bound to suppose was about to engage him. Then 
he completed the task of making good his position, 
and proceeded to open communication with Banks and 
with Sherman. 

The main loss fell upon Chapin, Dudley s casual 
ties numbering but 18, Grierson s but 2. The total 
casualties were 15 men killed, 3 officers and 69 men 
wounded, and 25 men missing in all, 102. Miles 
reports his loss as 8 killed, 23 wounded, and 58 
missing in all, 89. 

When Augur quitted Baton Rouge he placed 
Drew with the 4th Louisiana Native Guards in Fort 
Williams to hold the place, supported by the fleet, 
and ordered Nelson with the ist and 3d Louisiana 
Native Guards to be ready to follow the division to 
Port Hudson. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MAY. 

PORT HUDSON was now held by Gardner with a 
force of about seven thousand of all arms. During 
the interval that had elapsed since its first occupation 
a formidable series of earthworks had been thrown 
up, commanding not only the river but all the inland 
approaches that were deemed practicable. The first 
plan for land defence was mainly against the attack 
expected to come from the direction of Baton Rouge. 
Accordingly, about four miles below Port Hudson a 
system of works was begun that, if completed, accord 
ing to the original trace, would have involved a 
defensive line eight miles in length, requiring thirty- 
five thousand men and seventy guns to hold it. As 
actually constructed, the lines were four and a half 
miles long, and ran in a semicircular sweep from the 
river near Ross Landing, below Port Hudson, to the 
impassable swamp above. Following this line for 
thirteen hundred yards after leaving the river on 
the south, the bluff is broken into irregular ridges 
and deep ravines, with narrow plateaus ; thence for 
two thousand yards the lines crossed the broad cotton 
fields of Gibbons s and of Slaughter s plantations ; be 
yond these for four hundred yards they were carried 
over difficult gullies ; beyond these again for fourteen 
hundred yards the course lay through fields and over 

163 



164 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

hilly ground to the ravine at the bottom of which runs 
Sandy Creek. Here, on the day of the investment, 
the line of Confederate earthworks stopped, the coun 
try lying toward the northeast being considered so 
difficult that no attack was looked for in that quarter. 
Sandy Creek finds its way into the marshy bottom of 
Foster s Creek, and from Sandy Creek, where the 
earthworks ended, to the river at the mouth of Fos 
ter s Creek, is about twenty-five hundred yards. Save 
where the axe had been busy, nearly the whole country 
was covered with a heavy growth of magnolia trees 
of great size and beauty. This was a line that, for 
its complete defence against a regular siege, con 
ducted according to the strict principles of military 
science, as laid down in the books, should have had 
a force of fifteen thousand men. At the end of 
March the garrison consisted of 1,366 officers, 14,921 
men of all arms present for duty, making a total of 
16,287. The main body was organized in 5 brigades, 
commanded by Beall, Buford, Gregg, Maxey, and 
Rust. The fortifications on the river front mounted 
22 heavy guns, from lo-inch columbiads down to 
24-pounder siege guns, manned by 3 battalions of 
heavy artillerists, while 13 light batteries, probably 
numbering 78 pieces, were available for the defence 
of all the lines : of these batteries only 5 were now 
left, with 30 guns. 

When, early in May, Pemberton began to feel the 
weight of Grant s pressure, he called on Gardner for 
reinforcements ; thus Rust and Buford marched to 
the relief of Vicksburg on the 4th of May, Gregg 
followed on the 5th, and Maxey on the 8th. Miles 
was to have followed Maxey ; in fact the preparations 
and orders had been given for the evacuation of Port 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MA Y. 165 

Hudson ; but now the same uncertainty and vacillation 
on the part of the Confederate chiefs that were to 
seal the doom of Vicksburg began to be felt at Port 
Hudson. Gardner, who had moved out with Maxey, 
had hardly arrived at Clinton when he was met by an 
order from Pemberton to return to Port Hudson with 
a few thousand men and to hold the place to the last. 
But ten days later, on the iQth of May, Johnston, 
who was then engaged in carrying out his own ideas, 
which differed radically from those of Davis and 
Pemberton, ordered Gardner to evacuate Port Hud 
son and to march on Jackson, Mississippi. This 
order, sent by courier as well as by telegraph, Gard 
ner received just as Augur was marching from Baton 
Rouge to cut him off. Then it was too late, and 
when on the 23d Johnston peremptorily renewed his 
order for the evacuation, even the communication was 
closed. 

The investment was made perfect by the presence 
in the river, above and below Port Hudson, of the 
ships and gunboats of the navy. Just above the 
place and at anchor around the bend lay the Hart 
ford, now Commodore Palmer s flagship, with the 
Albatross, Sachem, Estrella, and Arizona. Below, 
at anchor off Prophet s Island, were the Monongahela, 
bearing Farragut s flag, the Richmond, Genesee, Essex, 
and the mortar flotilla. Both the upper and the lower 
fleets watched the river at night by means of picket- 
boats in order to discover any movement and to in 
tercept any communication with the garrison. 

At the Hermitage plantation, on the west bank of 
the river, Benedict was stationed with his own regi 
ment, the i62d New York, the noth New York, and 
a section of artillery to prevent the escape of the Con- 



1 66 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

federates by water. As soon as Weitzel joined, on 
the 25th of May, Banks began to close in his lines 
along the entire front. Weitzel moved up to the 
sugar-house on the telegraph road near the bridge 
over Foster s Creek ; Paine advanced into the woods 
on Weitzel s left ; Grover moved forward on the north 
of the Clinton Railway, crossed the ravine of Sandy 
Creek, and occupied the wooded crest of the steep 
hill in front. Augur prolonged the line across the 
Plains Store road under cover of the woods, yet in 
plain view of the Confederate entrenchments. Sher 
man held the Baton Rouge road, occupying the skirt 
of woods that formed the eastern edge of Slaughter s 
and Gibbons s fields. 

The ist and 3d Louisiana Native Guards, under 
Nelson, having come up from Baton Rouge, were 
posted at the sugar-house near Foster s Creek, form 
ing the extreme right of the line of investment. 

Banks now placed Weitzel in command of the right 
wing of the army, comprising his own brigade under 
Thomas, Dwight s brigade of Grover s division under 
Van Zandt, together forming a temporary division 
under Dwight, the six regiments that remained of 
Paine s division after the heavy detachments, and the 
two colored regiments under Nelson. During the 
day of the 25th Weitzel gained the wooded slope 
covering the Confederate left front. The Confederate 
advanced guard on this part of their line, composed 
in part of the Qth battalion of Louisiana partisan 
rangers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wingfield, resisted 
Weitzel s advance stoutly, but was steadily and with 
out difficulty pushed back into the entrenchments. 

When night fell on the 26th of May the division 
commanders met at headquarters at Riley s on the 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MAY. 167 

Bayou Sara road to consider the question of an 
assault. No minutes of this council were kept, and 
to this day its conclusions are a matter of dispute. 
They may safely be regarded as sufficiently indicated 
by the orders for the following day. By at least one 
of those present any immediate movement in the na 
ture of an assault was objected to because of the 
great distance that still separated the lines of invest 
ment from the Confederate earthworks ; it was urged 
that the troops would have to move to the attack over 
ground the precise character of which was as yet un 
known to them or to their commanders, although it 
was known to be broken and naturally difficult and to 
be obstructed by felled timber. The general opinion 
was, however, that prompt and decisive action was 
demanded in view of the unusual and precarious 
nature of the campaigns on which the two armies of 
Grant and Banks were now embarked, the uncertainty 
as to what Johnston might do, and the certainty that 
a disaster at Vicksburg would bring ruin in Louisiana. 
Moreover, officers and men alike were in high spirits 
and full of confidence in themselves, and they out 
numbered the Confederates rather more than two to 
one. This was the view held by Banks himself. 
Upon his mind, moreover, the disapproval and the 
repeated urgings of the government acted as a goad. 
Accordingly, as soon as the council broke up he gave 
orders for an assault on the following morning. 

All the artillery was to open upon the Confederate 
works at daybreak. For this purpose the reserve 
artillery was placed under the immediate orders of 
Arnold. He was to open fire at six. 

Weitzel was to take advantage of the attacks on 
the left and centre to force his way into the works on 



1 68 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

his front, since it was natural to expect that, whether 
they should prove successful or not, these attacks 
would distract the attention of the enemy and serve 
to relieve the pressure in Weitzel s front. 

Grover was thus left with five regiments to support 
the left centre, to reinforce either the right or left, 
and to support the right flank of the reserve artillery, 
or to force his way into the works, as occasion might 
require. 

Augur, holding the centre, with Dudley s brigade 
forming his right and Chapin his left, and Sherman, 
at the extreme left, separated from Augur by a thick 
wood, were to begin the attack during the cannonade 
by advancing their skirmishers to kill the enemy s 
cannoneers and to cover the assault. They were 
to place their troops in position to take instant advan 
tage of any favorable opportunity, and, if possible, to 
force the enemy s works at the earliest moment. 

Each division commander was to provide his own 
means for passing the ditch. These, for the most 
part, consisted of cotton bags, fascines, and planks 
borne by detachments of men, furnished by detail or 
by volunteering. 

It will be observed that no time was fixed for the 
assault of either column nor any provision made to 
render the several attacks simultaneous. Moreover, 
although the order wound up with the emphatic decla 
ration that " Port Hudson must be taken to-morrow," 
an impression prevailed in the minds of at least two 
of the division commanders that there were still to 
be reconnoissances by the engineers, and that upon 
the results of these would depend the selection of the 
points of attack. 

There were no roads along the front or rear of the 



THE TWENTY- SEVENTH OF MAY. 169 

investing army, and the only means by which com- 
,6iunication was maintained between the left, the 
centre, and the right was either by wide detours or 
through dense and unknown woods and thickets. It 
was impossible to see the troops in front or rear or on 
either flank. On no part of the line was either divi 
sion in sight of the other. 

The forest approached within 250 yards at the 
nearest point on Weitzel s front, within 450 yards on 
Grover s, within 500 yards on Augur s, and within 
1,200 yards on Sherman s front. The field to be 
passed over was partly the cleared land of the plan 
tations, crossed by fences and hedges, but in many 
places, especially on Augur s approach, the timber 
had been recently felled, and, lying thick upon the 
ground, made a truly formidable obstruction. 

The morning of the 2 7th of May broke bright and 
beautiful. As the early twilight began to open out 
along the entire front the artillery began a furious 
cannonade. At first the Confederate guns replied 
with spirit, but it soon became apparent that they 
were overweighted, and, moreover, the necessity of 
husbanding their scanty store of ammunition no doubt 
impressed itself upon the minds of the Confederate 
commanders. 

About six o clock, when Weitzel judged that the 
movement on the left must be well advanced, he put 
his columns in motion through the dense forest in his 
front, forming his command, as far as the nature of 
the ground admitted, in column of brigades, Dwight s 
brigade under Van Zandt leading, followed by 
Weitzel s brigade under Thomas. Paine formed his 
division in two lines in support, his own brigade 
under Fearing in front, and Gooding s in reserve. 



1 70 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

The Confederate skirmishers and outposts continued 
to occupy the forest and the ravines on this part of 
their front, and the first hour was spent in pressing 
them back behind their entrenchments. Then 
Thomas moved forward through Van Zandt s inter 
vals, and deploying from right to left the i6oth New 
York, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petten ; 8th Vermont, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dillingham ; i2th Connecticut, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Peck ; and 75th New York, Lieu 
tenant-Colonel Babcock, advanced to the attack. Van 
Zandt, owing to the inequalities of the ground and 
the difficulty of finding the way, drifted somewhat 
toward the right. Thereupon Paine, finding his 
front uncovered, moved forward into the interval. 
Then began what has been aptly termed a " huge 
bushwack." 

Until within three days a part of the Confederate 
lines in front of Weitzel had not been fortified at all, 
the defence resting on the great natural difficulties of 
the approaches no less than of the ground to be held ; 
but in the interval Gardner had taken notice of the 
indications that pointed to an advance in this quarter, 
and had caused light breastworks to be constructed 
in all haste. This the great trees that covered the 
hill rendered an easy task. On the morning of the 
27th of May, therefore, the works that Weitzel was 
called upon to attack consisted mainly of big logs on 
the crest and following the contour of the hill, ren 
dered almost unapproachable by the felled timber 
that choked the ravines. Thus, while Weitzel s men 
could not even see their enemy, they were them 
selves unable to move beyond the cover of the hol 
lows and the timber without offering an easy mark 
for a destructive fire of small-arms, as well as of 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MAY. 171 

grape, shell, shrapnel, and canister. When finally, 
after climbing over hills, logs, and fallen trees, and 
forcing the ravines filled with tangled brush and 
branches, Weitzel had driven the Confederates into 
their works, he held the ridge about two hundred 
yards distant from the position to be attacked. 

Paine s position at this time was to the right and 
rear of battery No. 6, as shown on the map ; Weitzel 
and Dwight were on the same crest near batteries 3, 
4, and 5. The pioneers worked like beavers to open 
the roads as fast as the infantry advanced, and with 
such skill and zeal that hardly had the infantry formed 
upon the crest than the guns of Duryea, Bainbridge, 
Nims, Haley, and Carruth unlimbered and opened 
fire by their side. 

At length Thomas succeeded in making his way 
across the rivulet known as Little Sandy Creek, and, 
working gradually forward, began to fortify with logs 
the hill on the right, afterward known as Fort Bab- 
cock, in honor of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 75th 
New York. 

To support Weitzel s movement, Grover sent the 
1 59th New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Burt, and the 
25th Connecticut by a wide detour to the right to 
make their way in on Paine s left. Taking advan 
tage of the protection afforded by the ravine, at 
the bottom of which ran or rather trickled Sandy 
Creek, these regiments, after the most difficult and 
exhausting scramble through the brush and over the 
fallen timber, came to the base of a steep bluff, near 
the position afterward occupied by siege battery No. 
6. This, although the works directly opposite were 
as yet light, was naturally one of the ugliest approaches 
on the whole front. In spite of every exertion, it 



172 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

took the i5gth an hour to move half a mile. Just 
before reaching the foot of the hill over which they 
were to charge, they captured a Confederate captain 
and six skirmishers, who lay concealed in the ravine, 
cut off by the advance and unable to retire. So 
crooked and obscure was the path and so difficult 
was it to see any thing, even a few feet ahead, that 
the officers had to stand at every little turning to tell 
the men which way to go. At last the regiment 
formed, and, with a rush, began the assault of the 
bluff, but they could get no farther than the crest, 
where they were met by a destructive flank fire from 
the Confederate riflemen. There, within thirty yards 
of the works, the men sought shelter. 

To try the effect of a diversion, Grover put in the 
1 2th Maine, supported by the remaining fragment 
of his division, reduced to the i3th and 25th Connec 
ticut, against the partly exposed west face of the 
bastion that formed the left of the finished portion of 
the Confederate earthworks. The point of attack is 
shown at X. and XI., and the position whence Grover 
moved at i and 7. 

After the first attack on the right had wellnigh 
spent itself, and when its renewal, in conjunction with 
an advance on the centre and the left, was momen 
tarily expected, Dwight thought to create a diversion 
and at the same time to develop the strength and 
position of the Confederates toward their extreme 
left, where their lines bent back to rest on the river, 
and to this end he ordered Nelson to put in his two 
colored regiments. This portion of the Confederate 
line occupied the nearly level crest of a steep bluff 
that completely dominates the low ground by the 
sugar-house, where the telegraph road crosses Foster s 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MA y. 173 

Creek. Over this ground the colored troops had to 
advance unsupported to receive their first fire. The 
bridge had been burned when the Confederates retired 
into their works. Directly in front of the crest, and 
somewhat below it, a rugged bluff stands a little 
apart, projecting boldly from the main height with a 
sharp return to the right, so as to form a natural out 
work of great strength, practically inaccessible save 
by the road that winds along the bottom of the little 
rivulet at the foot of the almost perpendicular flank. 
This detached ridge is about four hundred yards in 
length. It was held by six companies of the 39th 
Mississippi regiment, under Colonel W. B. - Shelby, 
while behind, in the positions of land batteries III. 
and IV., were planted six field pieces, and still farther 
back on the water front the columbiads of Whitfield 
and Seawell, mounted on traversing carriages, stood 
ready to rake the road with their 8-inch and lo-inch 
shell and shrapnel. 

Shortly after seven o clock, Nelson sent in the ist 
Louisiana Native Guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bassett, in column, to force the crossing of the creek. 
The 3d Louisiana Native Guards followed in close 
support. Just before the head of the column came 
near the creek, the movement was perceived by the 
Confederates, who immediately opened on the negroes 
a sharp fire of musketry from the rifle-pits on the 
detached bluff ; at the same moment the field guns 
opened with shell and shrapnel, from the ridge 
behind, and as the men struggled on through the 
creek and up the farther bank they became exposed 
to the enfilade fire of the columbiads. When, in 
mounting the narrow gorge that led up the hill, the 
head of the column, necessarily shattered as it was 



i 



174 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

by this concentrated fire, had gained a point within 
about two hundred yards of the crest, suddenly every 
gun opened on them with canister. This was more 
than any men could stand. Bassett s men gave back 
in disorder on their supports, then in the act of cross 
ing the creek, and the whole column retired in confu 
sion to its position near the sugar-house on the north 
bank. Here both regiments were soon re-formed 
and again moved forward in good order, anticipating 
instructions to renew the attack ; yet none came, and, 
in fact, the attack was not renewed, although the con 
temporary accounts, some of them even official, dis 
tinctly speak of repeated charges. In this abortive 
attempt, Captain Andrew Cailloux and Second Lieu 
tenant John H. Crowder, of the ist regiment, were 
instantly killed. Cailloux, who is said to have been a 
free man of color, although all the officers of his race 
were at that time supposed to have resigned, fell at 
the head of the leading company of his regiment, while 
gallantly cheering on his men. The ist regiment 
lost, in this brief engagement, 2 officers, and 24 men 
killed and 79 men wounded in all, 105. The 3d, being 
far less exposed, as well as for a shorter time, lost i 
officer and 5 men killed, and i officer wounded in 

all, 7- 

The morning was drawing out when these move 
ments were well spent, and the advanced positions 
simply held without further effort to go forward. The 
hour may have been about ten o clock. Grover, 
Paine, and Weitzel listened in vain for any sounds of 
musketry on their left to indicate that either Augur 
or Sherman was at work, yet no sound came from 
that quarter save the steady pounding of the Union 
artillery. Now Weitzel believed that, by pursuing 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MA Y. 175 

his advance in what might be called skirmishing 
order and working his way gradually forward from 
the vantage-ground of Fort Babcock, he might gain, 
without great addition to his losses, already heavy, a 
foothold on the high ground held by the Confederate 
left ; yet of the character of the defences of this part 
of the line Weitzel knew but little, and of the nature 
of the ground behind these defences and the direction 
of the roads, neither he nor any one in the Union 
army knew any thing. The topography of the ground 
in sight afforded the only indication of what might be 
expected farther on, and this was confusing and diffi 
cult to the last degree. Weitzel had, therefore, strong 
reason for believing that his difficulties, instead of 
ending with the capture of the Confederate works, 
might be only beginning. There was, of course, the 
chance that the garrison along the whole front might 
throw down their arms or abandon their defences the 
moment they should find themselves taken in reverse 
at any point, for it was known that they had no 
reserves to be reckoned with after breaking through 
the line. Grover had been ordered to support either 
the right or the left, or to attempt to make his way 
into the works, as circumstances might suggest. This 
last he had tried, and failed to accomplish. On his left 
there was no attack to support. When riding toward 
the right he met Weitzel, who, although commanding 
the right wing, was his junior in rank as well as 
in experience, Grover gave Weitzel the counsel of 
prudence, and Weitzel fell in with these views. The 
two commanners decided to ask fresh orders or to 
wait for an assault on the centre or left before renew 
ing the attack on the right. 

All this time Augur stood ready, his division formed 



176 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

and all in perfect order, waiting for the word from 
Banks, who made his headquarters close at hand, 
and who, in his turn, waited for the sound of Sher 
man s musketry as the signal to put in Augur. With 
Sherman, Augur was in connection along the front, 
although not in easy communication. The precise 
nature of the causes that held Sherman back it is, 
even now, impossible to state, nor would it be easy, 
in the absence of the facts, to form a conjecture that 
should seem to be altogether probable and at the 
same time reasonable. The most plausible surmise 
seems to be that Sherman supposed he was to wait 
for the engineers to indicate the point of attack, and 
that he himself did not choose to go beyond what he 
conceived to be his orders to precipitate a movement 
whose propriety he doubted. Sherman was an officer 
of the old army, of wide experience, favorably known 
and highly esteemed throughout the service for his 
intelligence, his character, and his courage. He was 
known as one of the most distinguished of the chosen 
commanders of the few light batteries that the gov 
ernment of the United States had thought itself able 
to afford in the days before the war. Before coming to 
Louisiana he had commanded a department, and in 
that capacity had carried to a successful conclusion 
the brilliant operations that gave Hilton Head and 
Port Royal to the forces of the Union. Neither in 
his previous history nor in his conduct in the present 
exigency was there any thing to his personal discredit 
as a man or as a soldier. The fact remains, however, 
account for it how we may, that when about noon, 
greatly disturbed by the check on the right, and still 
more by the silence on the left, Banks himself rode 
almost unattended to Sherman s headquarters, he 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MA Y. 177 

found Sherman at luncheon in his tent, surrounded 
by his staff, while in front the division lay idly under 
arms, without orders. Hot words passed, the precise 
nature of which has not been recorded, and Banks 
returned to his headquarters determined to replace 
Sherman by the chief-of-staff of the department. The 
roads had not yet been opened, and it was half-past 
one before these orders could be given. Andrews 
rode directly to the left, accompanied by but a single 
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Fiske. When he came on 
the ground he found Sherman s division deployed, 
and Sherman himself on horseback at the head of his 
men, ready to lead them forward. Then Andrews, 
with great propriety, deferred the delivery of the 
orders placing him in command, and, after a few 
words, at a quarter past two Sherman moved to the 
assault. Andrews remained to witness the operation. 

Nickerson moved forward on the right in column 
of regiments. The i4th Maine, deployed as skir 
mishers, covered his front, followed by the 24th 
Maine, ijfth New York, and i65th New York in 
line. After emerging from the woods, Nickerson s 
right flank rested on the road that runs past Slaugh 
ter s house, near the position of battery 16. 

Dow formed the left of the division and of the 
army. He advanced at the same time as Nickerson, 
and in like order, his right resting near the position 
of battery 1 7 and his left near Gibbons s house, marked 
as the position of battery 18. The 6th Michigan led 
the brigade, followed by the i5th New Hampshire, 
26th Connecticut, and i28th New York. 

In the interval between the two brigades rode 
Sherman, surrounded by his whole staff and followed 
by his escort. 



178 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

No sooner had the line emerged from among the 
trees than the Confederates opened upon every part 
of it, as it came in sight, a galling fire of musketry and 
artillery. At first the troops moved forward steadily 
and at a good pace, but as they drew nearer to the 
enemy and the musketry fire grew hotter, their prog 
ress was delayed and their formation somewhat 
broken by four successive and parallel lines of fence 
that had to be thrown down and crossed. Once clear 
of the young corn, they found themselves entangled 
with the abatis that covered and protected the imme 
diate front of the Confederate works on this part of 
the line. This had been set on fire by the exploding 
shells, and the smoke and flame now added to the 
difficulty of the movement. Here the men suffered 
greatly, many being shot down in the act of climbing 
the great trunks of the fallen trees, and many more 
having their clothing reduced to tatters and almost 
torn from their bodies in the attempt to force their 
way through the entangled branches. The impetus 
was soon lost, the men lay down or sought cover ; 
numbers of Dow s men made their way to the grove 
in their rear and into the gulley on their left ; of 
Nickerson s, many drifted singly and in groups into 
the ravine on their right. 

Long before this, indeed within a few minutes after 
the line first marched out from the wood, Sherman 
had fallen from his horse, severely wounded in the 
leg ; under the vigorous fire concentrated upon this 
large group of horsemen in plain sight of the Con 
federates and in easy range both of the artillery and 
musketry, two of his staff officers had shared the same 
fate. This would have brought Dow to the command 
of the division ; but nearly at the same instant Dow 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MAY. 179 

himself was wounded and went to the rear, and so 
the command fell to Nickerson, who was with his 
brigade, and, in the confusion of the moment, was 
not notified. Thus, for some interval, there was no 
one to give orders for fresh dispositions among the 
regiments. Many officers had fallen ; the 12 8th New 
York had lost its colonel, Cowles ; the i65th New 
York, at last holding the front of Nickerson s line, 
had lost two successive commanders, Abel Smith and 
Carr, both wounded, the former mortally, while stand 
ing by the colors. To retire was now only less diffi 
cult than to advance. Nickerson s men, lying down, 
held their ground until after dark ; but Dow s, being 
nearer the cover of the woods, fell back to their first 
position. 

Andrews now took command of the division, in 
virtue of the written orders of the commanding gen 
eral, and prepared to obey whatever fresh instructions 
he might receive. None came ; there was, indeed, 
nothing to be done but to withdraw and to restore 
order. 

As soon as Banks heard the rattle of the musketry 
on the left, and saw from the smoke of the Confed 
erate guns that Sherman was engaged, he ordered 
Augur forward. Augur, as has been said, had been 
ready and waiting all day. His arrangements were 
to make the attack with Chapin s brigade, deployed 
across the Plains Store road, and to support it with 
Dudley s, held in reserve under cover of one of the 
high and thick hedges of the Osage orange that 
crossed and divided the fields on the right of the 
road. Chapin s front was covered by the skirmishers 
of the 2 ist Maine ; immediately in their rear were to 
march the storming column of two hundred volunteers, 



i8o THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

under Lieutenant-Colonel O Brien, of the 48th Mas 
sachusetts. The stormers rested and waited for the 
word in the point of the wood on the left of the 
Plains Store road, nearly opposite the position of 
battery 13. Half their number carried cotton bags 
and fascines to fill the ditch. On the right of the 
road the u6th New York was deployed ; on its left 
the 49th Massachusetts, closely supported by the 48th 
Massachusetts, the 2d Louisiana, of Dudley s brigade, 
and the reserve of the 2ist Maine. 

O Brien shook hands with the officer who brought 
him the last order, and, turning to .his men, who were 
lying or sitting near by, some on their cotton bags, 
others on the ground, said in the coolest and most 
business-like manner : " Pick up your bundles, and 
come on ! " The movement of the stormers was the 
signal for the whole line. A truly magnificent sight 
was the advance of these battalions, with their colors 
flying and borne sturdily toward the front ; yet not 
for long. Hardly had the movement begun when 
the whole force officers, men, colors, stormers, and 
all, found themselves inextricably entangled in the 
dense abatis under a fierce and continuous discharge 
of musketry and a withering cross-fire of artillery. 
Besides the field-pieces bearing directly down the 
road, two 24-pounders poured upon their flank a 
storm of missiles of all sorts, with fragments of rail 
way bars and broken chains for grape, and rusty nails 
and the rakings of the scrap-heap for canister. No 
part of the column ever passed beyond the abatis, nor 
was it even possible to extricate the troops in any 
order without greatly adding to the list of casualties, 
already of a fearful length. Banks was all for putting 
Dudley over the open ground directly in his front, 



THE TWENTY- SEVENTH OF MAY. 181 

but, before any thing could be done, came the bad news 
from the left, and at last it was clear to the most per 
sistent that the day was miserably lost. When, after 
nightfall, the division commanders reported at head 
quarters, among the wounded under the great trees, 
it was known that the result was even worse than the 
first accounts. 

The attempt had failed without inflicting serious 
loss upon the enemy, save in ammunition expended, 
yet at a fearful cost to the Union army. When 
the list came to be made up, it was found that 
15 officers and 278 men had been killed, 90 officers 
and 1,455 men wounded, 2 officers and 155 men 
missing, making the total killed 293, total wounded 
1,545, total missing 157, and an aggregate of 1,995. 
Of the missing, many were unquestionably dead. 
Worse than all, if possible, the confidence that but 
a few hours before had run so high, was rudely 
shaken. It was long indeed before the men felt the 
same faith in themselves, and it is but the plain truth 
to say that their reliance on the department com 
mander never quite returned. 

The heavy loss in killed and wounded taxed to the 
utmost the skill and untiring exertions of the sur 
geons, who soon found their preparations and supplies 
exceeded by the unlooked-for demand upon them. 
All night long on that 27th of May the stretcher- 
bearers were engaged in removing the wounded to 
the field-hospitals in the rear. These were soon 
filled to overflowing, and many rested under the 
shelter of the trees. Hither, too, came large numbers 
of men not too badly hurt to be able to walk, and to 
all the tired troops the whole night was rendered dis 
mal to the last degree by the groans of their suffering 



1 82 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

comrades mingled everywhere, the wounded with the 
well, the dying with the dead. 

Among the killed were : Colonel Edward P. Chapin, 
of the 1 1 6th New York; Colonel David S. Cowles, of 
the 1 28th New York; Lieutenant-Colonel William 
L. Rodman, of the 38th Massachusetts ; Lieutenant- 
Colonel James O Brien, of the 48th Massachusetts ; 
Captain John B. Hubbard, Assistant Adjutant-Gen 
eral, of Weitzel s brigade ; Lieutenant Ladislas A. 
Wrotnowski, Topographical Engineer on WeitzePs 
V staff. Lieutenant-Colonels Oliver W. Lull, of the 8th 
New Hampshire, and Abel Smith, Jr., of the i65th 
New York, were mortally wounded. The long list of 
the wounded included Brigadier-General Thomas W. 
Sherman, Brigadier-General Neal Dow, Colonel 
Richard E. Holcomb, of the ist Louisiana; Colonel 
Thomas S. Clark, of the 6th Michigan ; Colonel Will 
iam F. Bartlett, of the 49th Massachusetts ; Major 
Gouverneur Carr, of the i65th New York. 

Farragut s ships and mortar-boats, which had been 
harassing the garrison at intervals, day and night, 
for more than ten days, joined hotly in the bombard 
ment, but ceased firing, by arrangement, as soon as 
the land batteries slackened. The fire of the fleet, 
especially that of the mortars, was very annoying to 
the garrison, especially at first, yet the actual casual 
ties were not great. 

The Confederate losses during the assault are not 
known. In Beall s brigade all the losses up to the 
ist of June numbered 68 killed, 194 wounded, and 
96 missing; together, 358 ; most of these must have 
been incurred on the 27th of May. The Confederate 
artillery was soon so completely overpowered, that it 
became nearly useless, save when the Union guns 
were masked by the advance of assaulting columns. 



THE TWENTY-SEVENTH OF MA Y. 183 

Three 24-pounders were dismounted, and of these 
one was completely disabled. 

With the result of this day the last hope of a junc 
tion between the armies of Banks and Grant van 
ished. It may therefore be convenient to retrace 
our steps a little in order to note the closing incidents 
of this strange chapter of well-laid plans by fortune 
brought to naught. 

Dwight returned from his visit to Grant on the 
22d of May, and reported to Banks in person at his 
headquarters with Grover on Thompson s Creek. In 
his account of what had taken place, Dwight con 
firmed the idea Banks had already derived from 
the despatch that Dwight had sent from Grand Gulf 
on the 1 6th, before he had seen Grant. Grant 
would send 5,000 men, Dwight reported, but Banks 
was not to wait for them. Practically this had no 
effect whatever upon the campaign, and how little 
impression it made upon the mind of Grant himself 
may be seen from his description, written in 1884, of 
his interview with Dwight. It was the morning of 
the 1 7th of May, and Grant s troops were standing 
on the eastern bank of the Big Black ready to force 
the passage of the river : 

"While the troops were standing as here described, an officer 
from Banks s staff came up and presented me with a letter from 
General Halleck, dated the nth of May. It had been sent 
by way of New Orleans to Banks to forward to me. He ordered 
me to return to Grand Gulf and to co-operate from there with 
Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return with our com 
bined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the 
order came too late and that Halleck would not give it then if he 
knew our position. The bearer of the despatch insisted that I 
ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support 
his position when I heard great cheering to the right of our line, 
and looking in that direction, saw Lawler, in his shirt-sleeves, 
leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my 



1 84 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more 
of the officer who delivered the despatch, I think not even to this 
day." 1 

Here two mistakes are perhaps worth noting as 
curious rather than important : Dwight was not a 
member of Banks s staff, and the letter from Halleck, 
dated the i ith of May, which General Grant strangely 
supposed to have come by way of New Orleans, was, 
in fact, Halleck s telegram of that date, sent by way 
of Memphis, which Dwight had picked up as he 
passed through Grand Gulf, after Grant had cut his 
communications. Dwight s account may have taken 
color from his hopes, yet the course of events gives 
some reason to think he may have had warrant for his 
belief. 

On the i Qth of May Grant s first assault of Vicks- 
burg was repulsed with a loss of 942. Three days 
later he delivered his second assault, which likewise 
failed, at a cost of 3,199 killed, wounded, and missing. 
This drove him to the siege and put him in need of 
more troops ; yet when, on the 25th of May, he sat 
down to write to Banks, it was with the purpose of 
offering to send down a force of 8,000 or 10,000 
men if Banks could now provide the means of trans 
port. But even while Grant wrote, word came that 
Johnston was gathering in his rear ; and so the whole 
thing was once more given up, and instead, once again 
he called on Banks for help ; and this time he sent 
down two large steamers, the Forest Queen and Mod 
erator, to fetch the men. But Banks had now no 
men to spare ; he too was cast for a siege ; he could 
only echo the entreaty and send back the steamboats 
empty as they came. So the affair ended. 

1 " Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," vol. i., p. 524. 



CHAPTER XVII. 
THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 

BANKS at once ordered up the ammunition and 
the stores from the depot at Riley s, near the head 
quarters of the day before, and early on the morning 
of the 28th of May established his headquarters in 
tents at Young s, in rear of the centre, and began 
his arrangements to reduce Port Hudson by gradual 
approaches. At six o clock in the morning he sent 
a flag of truce to .Gardner, from Augur s front on 
the Plains Store road, bearing a request for a suspen 
sion of hostilities until two o clock in the afternoon, 
to permit the removal of the dead and wounded. 
To this Gardner at once refused to agree unless 
Banks would agree to withdraw at all points to a 
distance of eight hundred yards. He also demanded 
that the fleet should drop down out of range. Banks 
was unable to consent. A long correspondence fol 
lowed, twelve letters in all, crossing and recrossing, to 
the utter confusion of time. At length, shortly after 
half-past three o clock, Banks received Gardner s 
assent to an armistice extending till seven o clock. 
The conditions were that the besiegers were to send 
to the lines of defence, by unarmed parties, such of 
the Confederate killed as remained unburied, and 
such of their wounded as had not already been picked 
up and sent to the rear. The killed and wounded of 

185 



1 86 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the Union army, lying between their lines and the 
Confederate works, were to be cared for in the same 
way. 

Arnold was ordered to bring up the siege train, 
manned by the ist Indiana heavy artillery, and 
Houston to provide entrenching tools and siege 
materials. When all the siege artillery was in posi 
tion there were forty pieces, of which six were 8-inch 
sea-coast howitzers on siege carriages, eight 24- 
pounders, seven 3Opounder Parrotts, four 6-inch 
rifles, four 9-inch Dahlgren guns, four 8-inch mortars, 
three loinch mortars, and four 1 3-inch mortars. To 
these were added twelve light batteries of sixty pieces, 
namely, six 6-pounder Sawyer rifles, two lo-pounder 
Parrotts, twenty-six i2-pounder Napoleons, two 12- 
pounder howitzers, twelve 3-inch rifles, and twelve 
2O-pounder Parrotts. The Dahlgren guns were served 
by a detachment of fifty-one men from the Richmond 
and seventeen from the Essex, under Lieutenant- 
Commander Edward Terry, with Ensign Robert P. 
Swann, Ensign E. M. Shepard, and Master s Mates 
William R. Cox and Edmund L. Bourne for chiefs of 
the gun divisions. 

In the course of the next few days the eight 
regiments that had been left on the Teche and the 
Atchafalaya rejoined the army before Port Hudson, 
coming by way of Brashear, Algiers, and the river. 
This gave to the cavalry under Grierson one more 
regiment, the 4ist Massachusetts, now mounted, and 
henceforth known as the 3d Massachusetts cavalry, 
the three troops of the old 2d battalion being merged 
in it ; Weitzel got back the ii4th New York ; Paine 
recovered the 4th Massachusetts and the i6th New 
Hampshire of Ingraham s brigade, now practically 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE, 187 

broken up ; and Grover the 22d Maine and QOth New 
York of Dwight s brigade, the 52d Massachusetts of 
Kimball s, and the 26th Maine of Dirge s, while losing 
the 4 ist Massachusetts by its conversion into a 
mounted regiment. The i6th New Hampshire, 
however, had suffered so severely during its six 
weeks confinement in the heart of the pestilential 
swamp that it was reduced to a mere skeleton, without 
strength either numerical or physical. It was easy 
to see that officers and men alike were suffering from 
some aggravated form of hepatic disorder, due to 
malarial poison. Many were added to the sick- 
report every day. Few that went to the regimental 
or general hospital returned to duty, while of the men 
called well all were yellow, emaciated, and restless, 
or so drowsy that the sentries were found asleep on 
their posts at noonday. This unfortunate regiment 
was therefore taken from the front and set to guard 
the general ammunition depot, near headquarters. 
Without being once engaged in battle, so that it had 
not a single gunshot wound to report, the i6th New 
Hampshire suffered a loss by disease during its seven 
months service in Louisiana of 5 officers and 216 
men in all, 221; and nearly the whole of this occurred 
in the last two months. This regiment was replaced 
in Paine s division by the 28th Connecticut, from 
Pensacola. 

Dwight was now given the command of Sherman s 
division, relieving Nickerson, who had assumed com 
mand the morning after the assault of the 27th. 
Dow being disabled by his wounds, his brigade fell 
to Clark. The 2d Louisiana was transferred from 
Dudley s brigade to Chapin s, bringing Charles J. 
Paine in command. Halbert E. Paine s division was 



1 88 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

withdrawn from the earlier formation of the right 
wing under Weitzel, and was established in position 
on Grover s left, covering the Jackson road and the 
second position of Duryea s battery at No. 12. 
Grover was placed in command, from the afternoon 
of the 27th, of the whole right wing, but Dwight s 
brigade, under Morgan, remained with Weitzel as 
part of a temporary division under his command, 
Thomas retaining the command of Weitzel s brigade. 
Finally, the i62d New York and the i75th New York 
were temporarily taken from Paine and lent to Dwight, 
who, directly after the i4th of June, united them with 
the 28th Maine of Sherman s division to form a tem 
porary 2d brigade. At the same time he transferred 
the 6th Michigan to Nickerson s brigade, evidently 
meaning to take the command of the ist brigade 
from Clark ; but these arrangements were promptly 
set aside by orders from headquarters. The left wing, 
comprising Augur s division and Sherman s, now 
Dwight s, was placed under the command of Augur. 

Along the whole front the troops now held sub 
stantially the advanced positions they had gained on 
the 27th of May. This shortened the line, and, as it 
was on the whole better arranged and the connections 
asid communications better, Augur took ground a lit 
tle to the left and held, with Charles J. Paine s brigade, 
a part of the field that had been in Sherman s front on 
the 27th ; while Dwight, in closing up and drawing in 
his left flank, moved nearer to the river and covered 
the road leading in a southerly direction from the Con 
federate works around the eastern slope of Mount 
Pleasant and past Troth s house. 

The cavalry, being of no further use to the divi 
sions, but rather an encumbrance upon them, was 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 189 

massed, under Grierson, behind the centre, and as 
signed to the duty of guarding the rear, the depots, 
and the communications against the incursions of the 
Confederate cavalry, under Logan, known to be hov 
ering between Port Hudson and Clinton, and sup 
posed to be from 1,500 to 2,000 strong. Logan s 
actual force at this time was about 1,200 effective. 
Grierson had about 1,700, including his own regiment, 
the 6th Illinois, the ;th Illinois, Colonel Edward 
Prince, a detatchment of the ist Louisiana, the 3d 
Massachusetts cavalry, and the i4th New York. 

As fast as the engineers were able to survey the 
ground and the working parties to open the roads, 
Arnold and Houston chose with great care the posi 
tions for the siege batteries, and heavy details were 
soon at work upon them, as well as upon the long line 
of rifle-pits, connecting the batteries and practically 
forming the first parallel of the siege works. The 
positions of some of these batteries, especially on the 
left, were afterward changed ; but as finally con 
structed and mounted, they began at the north, near 
the position of the colored regiments on the right 
bank of Foster s Creek, and extended, at a distance 
from the Confederate works varying from six hun 
dred to twelve hundred yards, to the Mount Pleasant 
road, across which was planted siege battery No. 21. 
The first position of siege battery No. 20 is marked 
" old 20," and the three formidable batteries on the ex 
treme left, Nos. 22, 23, and 24, were not established till 
later, the attack of the Confederate works in their 
front being at first left to the guns of the fleet. Two 
epaulements for field artillery were thrown up on 
either side of the road at Foster s Creek to command 
the passage of the stream, but no siege guns were 



190 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

mounted there. The extreme right of the siege bat 
teries was at No. 2. 

While all eyes were turned upon the siege works 
and every nerve strained for their completion, Logan s 
presence in the rear, though at no time so hurtful as 
might fairly have been expected, was a continual 
source of anxiety and annoyance. To find out just 
what force he had and what he was about, Grierson 
moved toward Clinton on the morning of the 3d of 
June with the 6th and ;th Illinois, the old 2d Massa 
chusetts battalion, now merged in the 3d, a squadron 
of the ist Louisiana, two companies of the 4th Wis 
consin, mounted, and one section of Nims s battery. 
Grierson took the road by Jackson, and, when within 
three miles of that place, sent Godfrey, with 200 men 
of the Massachusetts and Louisiana cavalry, to ride 
through the town, while the main column went direct 
to Clinton. Godfrey pushing on briskly through Jack 
son, captured and paroled, after the useless fashion of 
the time, a number of prisoners, and rejoined the 
column two miles beyond. When eight miles west 
of Clinton, Grierson heard a report that Logan had 
gone that morning toward Port Hudson, but pushing 
on toward Clinton, after crossing the Comite Grier 
son found Logan s advance and drove it back on the 
main body, strongly posted on Pretty Creek. A three 
hours engagement followed, resulting in Grierson s 
retirement to Port Hudson, with a loss of 8 killed, 28 
wounded, and 15 missing ; 3 of the dead and 7 of the 
wounded falling into the hands of the enemy. Logan 
reports his loss as 20 killed and wounded, and claims 
40 prisoners. Among the killed, unfortunately, was 
the young cavalry officer, Lieutenant Solon A. Per 
kins, of the 3d Massachusetts, whose skill and daring 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 191 

had commended itself to the notice of Weitzel dur 
ing the early operations in La Fourche, and whose 
long service without proper rank had drawn out the 
remark : " This Perkins is a splendid officer, and he 
deserves promotion as much as any officer I ever saw." 

Banks determined to chastise Logan for this ; ac 
cordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 5th of 
June, Paine took his old brigade under Fearing, with 
the 52d Massachusetts, the Qist New York, and two 
sections of Duryea s battery, and preceded by Grier- 
son s cavalry, marched on Clinton by way of Olive 
Branch and the plank road. That night Paine en 
camped at Redwood Creek ; on the 6th he made a 
short march to the Comite, distant nine miles from 
his objective, and there halted till midnight. Then, 
after a night march, the whole force entered Clinton 
at daylight on the morning of the 7th, only to find 
that Logan, forewarned, had gone toward Jackson. 
Then Paine countermarched to the Comite, and, rest 
ing till sunset, marched that evening to Redwood, and, 
there going into bivouac, at two o clock on the follow 
ing morning, the 8th of June, returned to the lines 
before Port Hudson. On this fruitless expedition the 
men and horses suffered severely from the heat, and 
there were many cases of sunstroke. 

By the ist of June the artillery and the sharp-shoot 
ers of the besiegers had obtained so complete a mastery 
over the guns of the defenders, that on the whole line 
these were practically silent, if not silenced. In part, 
no doubt, this is to be ascribed to a desire on the part 
of the Confederate artillerists to reserve their ammu 
nition for the emergency, yet something was also due 
to the effect of the Union fire, by which, in the first 
week, twelve heavy guns were disabled. The loinch 



192 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

columbiad in water battery 4 was dismounted at long 
range. This gun was known to the Union soldiers, 
and perhaps to the Confederates first, as the " Lady 
Davis," and great was the dread awakened by the 
deep bass roar and the wail of the big shells as they 
came rolling down the narrow pathway, or searched 
the ravines where the men lay massed. The fire of 
the navy also did great damage among the heavy 
batteries along the river front. When the siege 
batteries were nearly ready, on the evening of the 
loth of June, Banks ordered a feigned attack at mid 
night by skirmishers along the whole front, for the 
purpose, as stated in the orders, " of harassing the 
enemy, of inducing him to bring forward and expose 
his artillery, acquiring a knowledge of the ground 
before the enemy s front, and of favoring the opera 
tions of pioneers who may be sent forward to remove 
obstructions if necessary." None of these objects can 
be said to have been accomplished, nor was any 
advantage gained beyond a slight advance of the lines, 
at a single point on Weitzel s front, by the i3ist New 
York. The full loss in this night s reconnoissance is 
not known ; in Weitzel s own brigade there were 2 
killed, 41 wounded, 6 missing in all, 49 ; in Mor 
gan s a partial report accounts for 12 wounded and 59 
missing, including two companies of the 22d Maine 
that became entangled and for the moment lost in the 
ravines. 

On the evening of the i2th of June, all arrange 
ments being nearly complete, Banks ordered a vigor 
ous bombardment to be begun the next morning. 
Punctually at a quarter past eleven on the morning 
of the 1 3th, every gun and mortar of the army and 
navy that could be brought to bear upon the defences 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 193 

of Port Hudson opened fire, and for a full hour kept 
up a furious cannonade, limited only by the endur 
ance of the Union guns and gunners, for the Confed 
erates hardly ventured to reply, save at first feebly. 
When the bombardment was at its fiercest, more than 
one shell in a second could be seen to fall and explode 
within the narrow circuit of the defences visible from 
the headquarters on the field. The defenders had 
three heavy guns dismounted during the day, yet suf 
fered little loss in men, for long before this nearly the 
whole garrison had accustomed themselves to take 
refuge in their caves and " gopher-holes " at the first 
sound of the Union cannon, and to await its cessa 
tion as a signal to return to their posts at the parapet. 
They were not always so fortunate, however, for more 
than once it happened that three or four men were 
killed by the bursting of a single shell. 

When the hour was up the cannonade ended as 
suddenly as it began, and profound silence followed 
close on the intolerable din. Then Banks sent a flag 
of truce summoning the garrison to surrender in these 
words : " Respect for the usages of war and a desire 
to avoid unnecessary sacrifice of life, impose on me 
the necessity of formally demanding the surrender of 
the garrison at Port Hudson. I am not unconscious, 
in making this demand, that the garrison is capable 
of continuing a vigorous and gallant defence. The 
events that have transpired during the pending in 
vestment exhibit in the commander and garrison a 
spirit of constancy and courage that, in a different 
cause, would be universally regarded as heroism. But 
I know the extremities to which they are reduced. 
. . . I desire to avoid unnecessary slaughter, and I 

therefore demand the immediate surrender of the 
13 



I 9 4 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

garrison, subject to such conditions only as are im 
posed by the usages of civilized warfare." To this 
Gardner replied : " My duty requires me to defend 
this position, and therefore I decline to surrender." 
In the evening the generals of division met in 
council at headquarters. In anticipation of what was 
to come, Dudley had already been ordered to send 
the 5oth Massachusetts, and Charles J. Paine the 
48th Massachusetts, to Dwight ; and Dudley himself, 
with the i6ist and i/4th New York, was to report 
to Grover. This left under Augur s immediate com 
mand only five regiments of his division, namely, one, 
the 3Oth Massachusetts, of Dudley s brigade, and four 
of C. J. Paine s. Shortly before midnight a general 
assault was ordered for the following morning At a 
quarter before three Augur was to open a heavy fire 
of artillery on his front, following it up half an hour 
later by a feigned attack of skirmishers. Dwight was 
to take two regiments, and, with a pair of suborned 
deserters for guides, was to try to find an entrance on 
the extreme left of the works near the river. But the 
main attack was to be made by Grover on the priest- 
cap. Its position is shown on the map at XV. and 
XIV., and the approach was to be from the cover of the 
winding ravine, near the second position of Duryea s 
battery, at No. 12. The artillery cross-fire at this 
point was to begin at three o clock, and was to cease 
at a signal from Grover. At half-past three the skir 
mishers were to attack. The general formation of each 
of the two columns of attack had been settled in orders 
issued from headquarters on the morning of the nth. 
Each column, assumed to consist of about 2,000 men, 
was to be preceded and covered by 300 skirmishers ; 
immediately behind the skirmishers were to be seventy 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 195 

pioneers, carrying thirty-five axes, eighteen shovels, 
ten pickaxes, two handsaws, and two hatchets ; next 
was to come the forlorn hope, or storming party, of 
300 men, each carrying a bag stuffed with cotton ; fol 
lowing the stormers, thirty-four men were to carry the 
balks and chesses to form a bridge over the ditch, in 
order to facilitate the passage of the artillery, as well 
as of the men. The main assaulting column was to 
follow, marching in lines-of-battle, as far as the nature 
of the ground would permit, which, as it happened, 
was not far. The field-artillery was to go with the 
assaulting column, each battery having its own pio 
neers. To the cavalry, meanwhile, was assigned the 
task of picketing and protecting the rear, as well as of 
holding the telegraph road leading out of Port Hud 
son toward Bayou Sara, by which it was thought the 
garrison might attempt to escape, on finding their 
lines broken through, or even to avoid the blow. 

As was the uniform custom k during the siege, all 
watches at division and brigade headquarters were 
set at nine o clock, by a telegraphic signal, to agree 
with the adjutant-general s watch. 

These final orders for the assault bear the hour of 
11.30 P.M. This was in fact the moment at which 
the earliest copies were sent out by the aides-de-camp, 
held in readiness to carry them. There were seven 
hundred and fifty words to be written, and eleven 
o clock had already passed when the council listened 
to the reading of the drafts and broke up. From 
the lateness of the hour, as well as from the distance 
and the darkness of the night, it resulted that one 
o clock came before the last orders were in the hands 
of the troops that were to execute them. Many 
arrangements had still to be carried out and many of 



i 9 <5 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the detachments had still to be moved over long dis 
tances and by obscure ways to the positions assigned 
to them. In some instances all that was left of the 
night was thus occupied, and it was broad daylight 
before every thing was ready. 

A dense fog prevailed in the early morning of 
Sunday, the i4th of June, strangely veiling, while it 
lasted, even the sound of the big guns, so that in 
places it was unheard a hundred yards in the rear. 
Punctually at the hour fixed the cannonade opened. 
It was an hour later, that is to say, about four o clock, 
when the first attack was launched. 

For the chief assault Grover had selected Paine s 
division and had placed the main body of his own 
division with Weitzel s brigade, in close support 
Paine determined to lead the attack himself. Across 
his front as skirmishers he deployed the 4th Wiscon 
sin, now again dismounted, and the 8th New Hamp 
shire. The 4th Massachusetts was told off to follow 
the skirmishers with improvised hand-grenades made 
of 6-pounder shells. Next the 38th Massachusetts and 
the 53d Massachusetts were formed in line of battle. 
At the head of the infantry column the 3ist Massa 
chusetts, likewise deployed, carried cotton bags, to 
fill the ditch. The rest of Gooding s brigade fol 
lowed, next came Fearing s, then Ingraham s under 
Ferris. In rear of the column was posted the artil 
lery under Nims. At a point on the crest of the ridge, 
ninety yards distant from the left face of the priest- 
cap, Paine s advance was checked. Then Paine, 
who had previously gone along the front of every 
regiment, addressing to each a few words of en 
couragement and of preparation for the work, passed 
afoot from the head of the column to the front of the 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 197 

skirmish line, and exerting to the full his sonorous 
voice, gave the order to the column to go on. At 
the word the men sprang forward, but almost as 
they did so, the Confederates behind the parapet in 
their front, with fairly level aim and at point-blank 
range, poured upon the head of the column a deadly 
volley. Many fell at this first discharge ; among them, 
unfortunately, the gallant Paine himself, his thigh 
crushed by a rifle-ball. Some of the men of the 
4th Wisconsin, of the 8th New Hampshire, and of 
the 38th Massachusetts gained the ditch, and a few 
even climbed the parapet, but of these nearly all 
were made prisoners. The rear of the column fell 
back to the cover of the hill, while all those who had 
gained the crest were forced to lie there, exposed to 
a pitiless fire of sharp-shooters and the scarcely more 
endurable rays of the burning sun of Louisiana, until 
night came and brought relief. In this unfortunate 
situation the sufferings of the wounded became so 
unbearable, and appealed so powerfully to the sym 
pathy of their comrades, that many lives were risked 
and some lost in the attempt to alleviate the thirst, 
at least, of these unfortunates. Two men, quite of 
their own accord, took a stretcher and tried to reach 
the point where Paine lay, but the attempt was un 
successful, and cost both of them their lives. These 
heroes were E. P. Woods, of Company E of the 8th 
New Hampshire, and John Williams, of Company D, 
3 ist Massachusetts. Not less nobly, Patrick H. Cohen, 
a private soldier of the i33d New York, himself lying 
wounded on the crest, cut a canteen from the body of 
a dead comrade and by lengthening the strap suc 
ceeded in tossing it within reach of his commander ; 
this probably preserved Paine s life, for unquestion- 



198 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

ably many of the more seriously hurt perished from 
the heat an-d from thirst on that fatal day. 

It was about seven o clock, and the fog had lifted, 
when Weitzel advanced to the attack on the right 
face of the priest-cap. The I2th Connecticut and the 
75th New York of his own brigade were deployed to 
the left and right as skirmishers to cover the head of 
the column. Two regiments of Morgan s brigade, 
loosely deployed, followed the skirmishers ; in front 
the 9 ist New York, with hand-grenades, and next the 
24th Connecticut, every man carrying two cotton bags 
weighing thirty pounds each. In immediate support 
came the remainder of Weitzel s brigade in column of 
regiments, in the order of the 8th Vermont, ii4th 
New York, and i6oth New York, followed by the 
main body of Morgan s brigade. Birge was in close 
support and Kimball in reserve. Finally, in the rear, 
as in Paine s formation, was massed the artillery of 
the division. 

Toward the north face of the priest-cap the only 
approach was by the irregular, but for some distance 
nearly parallel, gorges cut out from the soft clay of 
the bluffs by Sandy Creek and one of its many arms. 
The course of these streams being toward the Con 
federate works, the hollows grew deeper and the 
banks steeper at every step. At most the creeks 
were but two hundred yards apart, and the ridge that 
separated them gave barely standing room. Within 
a few feet of the breastworks the smaller stream and 
its ravine turned sharply toward the north and served 
as a formidable ditch until they united with the main 
stream and ravine below the bastion. This larger 
ravine near its outlet and the natural ditch throughout 
its length were mercilessly swept by the fire of the 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 199 

bastion on the right, the breastworks in front, and 
the priest-cap on the left. The smaller ravine led 
toward the south to the crest from which Paine s 
men had recoiled, where their wounded and their 
dead lay thick, and behind which the survivors were 
striving to restore the broken formations. 

Weitzel therefore chose the main ravine. Bearing 
to the right from the Jackson road, the men moved 
by the flank and cautiously, availing themselves of 
every advantage afforded by the timber or the irregu 
larities of the ground, until they gained the crest of 
the ridge at points varying from twenty to fifty yards 
from the works near the north face of the priest-cap. 
In advancing to this position the column came under 
fire immediately on filing out of the ravine and the 
wood in front of the position of battery No. 9. Then, 
in such order as they happened to be, they went for 
ward with a rush and a cheer, but beyond the crest 
indicated few men ever got. From this position it 
was impossible either to advance or to retire until 
night came. 

At the appointed hour Dwight sent the 6th Michi 
gan, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bacon, and the I4th 
Maine, to the extreme left to make an attempt in that 
quarter, the arrangements for which have been already 
described ; but either Dwight gave his orders too late, 
or the column mistook the path, or else the difficul 
ties were really greater than they had been thought 
beforehand or than they afterward seemed, for noth 
ing came of it. Then recalling this detachment to 
the Mount Pleasant road, Dwight tried to advance in 
that direction. The i4th Maine was sent back to its 
brigade and Clark deployed his own regiment, the 
6th Michigan, as skirmishers, supported by the i28th 



200 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

New York, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
James Smith. The i5th New Hampshire followed 
and the 26th Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Joseph Selden, brought up the rear. These two 
regiments went forward in column of companies on 
the main road, but as the Confederates immediately 
opened a heavy artillery fire upon the head of the 
column, they had to be deployed. However, the 
ground, becoming rapidly narrower, did not long 
permit of an advance in this order, so that it soon 
became necessary to ploy once more into column. 
About 350 yards from the outer works the Mount 
Pleasant road enters and crosses a deep ravine by a 
bridge, then destroyed. The hollow was completely 
choked with felled timber, through which, under the 
heavy fire of musketry and artillery, it was impossible 
to pass ; so here the brigade stayed till night enabled 
it to retire. Nickerson s brigade supported the move 
ment of Clark s, but without becoming seriously en 
gaged. Thus ended D wight s movement. It can 
hardly be described as an assault, as an attack, or 
even as a serious attempt to accomplish any valuable 
result ; yet indirectly it was the means of gaining, 
and at a small cost, the greatest, if not the only real, 
advantage achieved that day, for it gave Dwight 
possession of the rough hill, the true value of which 
was then for the first time perceived, and on the 
commanding position of its northern slope was pres 
ently mounted the powerful array of siege artillery 
that overlooked and controlled the land and water 
batteries on the lower flank of the Confederate 
defences. 

Of Augur s operations in the centre, it is enough 
to say that the feigned attack assigned to this portion 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 201 

of the line was made briskly and in good order at the 
appointed time, without great loss. 

The result of the day may be summed up as a 
bloody repulse ; beholding the death and maiming of 
so many of the bravest and best of the officers and 
men, the repulse may be even termed a disaster. In 
the whole service of the Nineteenth Army Corps 
darkness never shut in upon a gloomier field. Men 
went about their work in a silence stronger than words. 

On this day 21 officers and 182 men were killed, 
72 officers and 1,245 men were wounded, 6 officers and 
1 80 men missing ; besides these, 13 were reported as 
killed, 84 as wounded, and 2 as missing without dis 
tinguishing between officers and men, thus making a 
total of 216 killed, 1,401 wounded, 188 missing in all, 
i ,805. Among the wounded many had received mortal 
hurts, while of the missing, as in the first assault, 
many must now be set down as killed. 

Paine, as we have seen, fell seriously hurt while in 
the very act of leading his division to the assault. 
Nine days earlier he had received his well-earned 
commission as brigadier-general. He was taken to 
New Orleans, and there nine days later, at the Hotel 
Dieu Hospital, after vain efforts to save the limb, the 
surgeons performed amputation of the thigh. A few 
days after the surrender, in order to avoid the increas 
ing dangers of the climate, Paine was sent to his home 
in Wisconsin on the captured steamer Starlight, the 
first boat that ascended the river. Thus the Nine 
teenth Corps lost one of its bravest and most promis 
ing commanders, one who had earned the affection of 
his men, not less through respect for his character 
than by his unfailing sympathy and care in all situa 
tions, and who was commended to the confidence and 



202 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

esteem of his associates and superiors by talent and 
devotion of the first order joined to every quality that 
stamps a man among men. 

The fiery Holcomb, wounded in the assault of the 
27th, yet refusing to leave his duty to another, fell 
early on this fatal morning at the head of his regiment 
and brigade, in the first moment of the final charge of 
Weitzel s men. This was another serious loss, for 
Holcomb had that disposition that may, for want of a 
better term, be described as the fighting character. 
All soldiers know it and respect it, and every wise 
general, seeing it anywhere among his officers, shuts 
his eyes to many a blemish and pardons many a fault 
that would be severely visited in another ; yet in 
Holcomb there was nothing to overlook or forgive. 
As he was the most prominent and the most earnest 
of the few officers of the line that to the last remained 
eager for the fatal assault, so he was among the earliest 
and the noblest of its victims. 

Mortally wounded at the head of Weitzel s brigade 
fell Colonel Elisha B. Smith, of the ii4th New York. 
Barely recovered from a serious illness, his spirit could 
not longer brook the restraint of the hospital at New 
Orleans with the knowledge that his men were engaged 
with the enemy. Thomas was ill and had received a 
slight wound of the scalp ; this brought Smith to the 
head of the brigade ; his fall devolved the command 
upon Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petten, for though 
Thomas, unable to bear the torture inflicted upon him 
by the sounds of battle, rose from his sick-bed and 
resumed the command, his weakness again overcame 
him when the day s work was done. 

No regiment at Port Hudson approached the 8th 
New Hampshire in the number and severity of its 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 203 

losses, no brigade suffered so much as Paine s, to 
which this regiment belonged, and no division so 
much as Emory s, under the command of Paine. On 
this day, Fearing commanded the brigade, and later 
the division, and Lull having fallen in the previous 
assault, the regiment went into action 2 1 7 strong, led 
by Captain William M. Barrett ; of this number, 122, 
or 56 per cent., were killed or wounded. On the 27th 
of May, out of 298 engaged, the regiment lost 124, 
or 41 per cent. 

Next to the 8th New Hampshire on the fatal roll 
stands the 4th Wisconsin. This noble regiment, at 
all times an honor to the service and to its State, 
whence came so many splendid battalions, was a 
shining monument to the virtue of steady, con 
scientious work and strict discipline applied to good 
material. Bean had been instantly killed by a sharp 
shooter on the 29th of May ; the regiment went into 
action on the i4th of June 220 strong, commanded by 
Captain Webster P. Moore ; of these, 140 fell, or 63 
per cent. In the first assault, however, it had fared 
better, its losses numbering but 60. 

The eccentric Currie, who came to the service from 
the British army, with the lustre of the Crimea still 
about him, rather brightened than dimmed by time 
and distance, fell severely wounded on the same fatal 
crest. He was struck down at the head of his regi 
ment, boldly leading his men and urging them forward 
with the quaint cry of " Get on, lads ! " so well known 
to English soldiers, yet so unfamiliar to all Americans 
as to draw many a smile, even in that grim moment, 
from those that heard it. 

To the cannonade that preceded the assault and 
announced it to the enemy must be attributed not only 



204 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the failure but a great part of the loss. The wearied 
Confederates were asleep behind the breastworks 
when the roar of the Union artillery broke the still 
ness of the morning, and gave them time to make 
ready. Such was their extremity that in Grover s 
front they burned their last caps in repelling the final 
assault, and, for the time, were able to replenish only 
from the pouches of the fallen. 

Under cover of the night all the wounded that were 
able to walk or crawl made their way to places of 
safety in the rear ; while, disregarding the incessant 
fire of the sharp-shooters, heavy details and volunteer 
parties of stretcher-bearers, plying their melancholy 
trade, carried the wounded with gentle care to the 
hospitals and the dead swiftly to the long trenches. 
The proportion of killed and mortally wounded, 
already unusually heavy, was increased by the ex 
posure and privations of the long day, while many, 
whom it was impossible to find or to reach during the 
night, succumbed sooner or later during the next 
forty-eight hours. For although when, on the morn 
ing of the 1 5th, Banks sent a flag of truce asking 
leave to send in medical and hospital supplies for the 
comfort of the wounded of both armies, Gardner 
promptly assented, and in his reply called attention 
to the condition of the dead and wounded before the 
breastworks, yet it was not until the evening of the 
1 6th that Banks could bring himself to ask for a sus 
pension of hostilities for the relief of the suffering 
and the burial of the slain. But three days and two 
nights had already passed ; most of the hurt, and 
these the most grievously, were already beyond the 
need of succor. The same thing had already oc 
curred at Vicksburg. 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 205 

The operations at Vicksburg and Port Hudson 
were so far alike in their character and objects that 
no just estimate of the events at either place can well 
be formed without considering what happened at the 
other. In this view it is instructive to observe that 
Grant assaulted the Confederate position at Vicks 
burg within a few hours after the arrival of his troops 
in front of the place, on the afternoon of the iQth of 
May, when two determined attacks were easily thrown 
off by the defenders, with a loss to their assailants of 
942 men. On the 22d of May Grant delivered the 
second assault, in which about three fourths of his 
whole effective force of 4,3,000 of all arms were 
engaged. The full corps of Sherman and McPherson, 
comprising six divisions, were repulsed by four bri 
gades of the garrison, numbering probably 13,000 
effectives. In this second assault Grant s loss was 
3, 199. These are the reasons he gives for his decision 
to attack : 

" Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army 
not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I 
knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming 
to the assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my 
anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he did not pre 
vent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicks 
burg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so 
much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me 
to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of 
all was the troops believed they could carry the works in their 
front, and would not have worked so patiently in their trenches 
if they had not been allowed to try." Having tried, he now " de 
termined upon a regular siege to * outcamp the enemy, as it 
were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d 
convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to 
work on the defences and approaches with a will." * 

1 " Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," pp. 530, 532. 



206 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

It has also to be remembered, in any fair and candid 
consideration of the subject, that at this comparatively 
early period of the war even such bloody lessons as 
Fredericksburg had not sufficed to teach either the 
commanders or their followers on either side, Federal 
or Confederate, the full value, computed in time, of 
even a simple line of breastworks of low relief, or the 
cost in blood of any attempt to eliminate this value of 
time by carrying the works at a rush. Indeed, it may 
be doubted whether, from the beginning of the war 
to the end, this reasoning, in spite of all castigations 
that resulted from disregarding it, was ever fully im 
pressed upon the generals of either army, although 
at last there came, it is true, a time when, as at Cold 
Harbor, the men had an opinion of their own, and 
chose to act upon it. It is also very questionable 
whether earthworks manned by so much as a line of 
skirmishers, prepared and determined to defend them, 
have ever been successfully assaulted save as the re 
sult of a surprise. Sedgwick s captures of the Rappa- 
hannock redoubts and of Marye s Heights have 
indeed been cited as instances to the contrary, yet on 
closer consideration it is apparent that although in 
the former case the Confederates had been looking 
for an attack, they had given up all expectation of 
being called on to meet it that day, when, just at 
sunset, Russell fell suddenly upon them and finished 
the affair handsomely before they had time to recover. 
Marye s Heights, again, may be described as a moral 
surprise, for no Confederate officer or man that had 
witnessed the bloody repulse of Burnside s great army 
on the very same ground, but a few weeks before, 
could have expected to be called on so soon to meet 
the swift and triumphant onset of a single corps of 



THE FOURTEENTH OF JUNE. 207 

that army. Moreover, Sedgwick s tactical arrange 
ments were perfect. 

The truth is, the insignificant appearance of a line 
of simple breastworks has almost always caused those 
general and staff-officers especially that viewed them 
through their field-glasses, with the diminishing power 
of a long perspective, to forget that an assault upon 
an enemy behind entrenchments is not so much a 
battle as a battue, where one side stands to shoot and 
the other goes out to be shot, or if he stops to shoot 
it is in plain sight of an almost invisible foe. Euro 
pean examples, as usual misapplied or misunderstood, 
have contributed largely to the persistency of this 
fatal illusion, and Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos have 
served but as incantations to confuse many a mind to 
which these sounding syllables were no more than 
names ; ignorant, therefore, of the stern necessities 
that drove Wellington to these victories, forgetful of 
their fearful cost, and above all ignoring or forgetting 
the axiom, on which rests the whole art and science of 
military engineering that the highest and stoutest of 
stone walls must yield at last to the smallest trench 
through which a man may creep unseen. Vast, 
indeed, is the difference between an assault upon a 
walled town, delivered as a last resort after crowning 
the glacis and opening wide the breach, and any con 
ceivable movement, though bearing the same name, 
made as the first resort, against earthworks of the very 
kind whereby walled towns are taken, approached over 
ground unknown and perhaps obstructed. 

Even so, in the storm of Rodrigo the defenders 
struck down more than a third of their own numbers ; 
Badajos was taken by a happy chance after the main 
assault had miserably failed ; at both places the 



208 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

losses of the assailants were in proportion less, and in 
numbers but little greater, than at Port Hudson ; yet, 
in the contemplation of the awful slaughter of Badajos, 
even the iron firmness of Wellington broke down in 
a passion of tears. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 

WITH that quick appreciation of facts that forms so 
large a part of the character of the American soldier, 
even to the extent of exercising upon the fate of bat 
tles and campaigns an influence not always reserved 
for considerations derived from a study of the prin 
ciples of the art of war, the men of the Army of the Gulf 
had now made up their minds that the end sought was 
to be attained by hard work on their part and by starva 
tion on the part of the garrison. Criticism and denun 
ciation, by no means confined to those officers whose 
knowledge of the art of war is drawn from books, 
have been freely passed upon this peculiarity, yet both 
alike have been wasted, since no proposition can be 
clearer than that a nation, justly proud of the superior 
intelligence of its soldiers, cannot expect to reap the 
full advantage of that intelligence and at the same 
time escape every disadvantage attending its exercise. 
Among these drawbacks, largely overbalanced by the 
obvious gains, not the least is the peculiar quality 
that has been aptly described in the homely saying, 
" They know too much." When, therefore, the 
American volunteer has become a veteran, and has 
reached his highest point of discipline, endurance, and 
the simple sagacity of the soldier, it is often his way 
to stay his hand from exertions that he deems need- 
14 209 



210 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

less and from sacrifices that he considers useless or 
worse than useless, although the same exertions and 
the same sacrifices would, but a few months earlier in 
the days of his inexperience, have been met by him 
with the same alacrity that the ignorant peasant of 
Europe displays in obeying the orders of his heredi 
tary chief in the service of his king. 

After the I4th of June the siege progressed steadily 
without farther attempt at an assault. This was now 
deferred to the last resort. At four points a system 
of comparatively regular approaches was begun, and 
upon these labor was carried on incessantly, night and 
day ; indeed, as is usual with works of this character, 
the greatest progress was made in the short hours of 
the June nights. The main approach led from 
Duryea s battery No. 12 toward the priest-cap, fol 
lowing the windings of the ravines and the contour of 
the hill. When at last the sap had, with great toil 
and danger, been carried to the crest facing the 
priest-cap, and only a few yards distant, the trench 
was rapidly and with comparative ease extended tow 
ard the left, in a line parallel with the general direc 
tion of the defences. The least distance from this 
third parallel, as it was called by an easy stretch of 
the language, to the enemy s parapet was about 
twenty yards, the greatest about forty-five. 

About two hundred yards farther to the right of 
the elbow of the main sap, a zigzag ran out of the 
ravine on the left flank of Bainbridge s battery, No. 
8, toward the bastion. Upon this approach, because 
of its directness, the use of the sap-roller, or some 
equivalent for it, could never be given up until the 
ditch was gained. 

From the extreme left, after the northern slope of 



UN VEXED TO THE SEA. 211 

Mount Pleasant had been gained, a main approach 
was extended from the flank of Roy s battery of 20 
pounder Parrotts, No. 20, almost directly toward the 
river, until the trench cut the edge of the bluff, form 
ing meanwhile a covered way that connected all the 
batteries looking north from the left flank. Of these 
No. 24 was the seventeen-gun battery, including two 
9-inch Dahlgrens removed from the naval battery of 
the right wing, and commanded by Ensign Swann. 
On the 2d of July, Lieutenant-Commander Terry took 
command of the Richmond and turned over the com 
mand of the right naval battery to Ensign Shepard. 
These " blue-jacket " batteries, with their trim and 
alert gun crews, were always bright spots in the 
sombre line. From the river bank the sap ran with 
five stretches of fifty or sixty yards, forming four 
sharp elbows, to the foot and well up the slope of the 
steep hill on the opposite side of the ravine, where the 
Confederates had constructed the strong work known 
to both combatants as the Citadel. From the head 
of the sap to the nearest point of the Confederate 
works the distance was about ninety-five yards. 

From the ravine in front of the mortar battery of 
the left wing, No. 18, a secondary approach was 
carried to a parallel facing the advanced lunette, No. 
XXVII., and distant from it 375 yards. The object of 
this approach was partly to amuse the enemy, partly 
to prevent his breaking through the line, now drawn 
out very thin, and partly also to serve as a foothold 
for a column of attack in case of need. 

From the ravine near Slaughter s house a zigzag, 
constructed by the men of the 2ist Maine, under the 
immediate direction of Colonel Johnson, led to the 
position of battery No. 16, where were posted the ten 



212 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

guns of Rawles and Bains. The distance from this 
battery to the defences was four hundred yards. 

On the 1 5th of June, on the heels of the bloody 
repulse of the previous day, Banks issued a general 
order congratulating his troops upon the steady ad 
vance made upon the enemy s works, and expressed 
his confidence in an immediate and triumphant issue 
of the contest : 

" We are at all points on the threshold of his fortifications," the 
order continues. " Only one more advance, and they are ours ! 

" For the last duty that victory imposes, the Commanding 
General summons the bold men of the corps to the organization 
of a storming column of a thousand men, to vindicate the flag of 
the Union, and the memory of its defenders who have fallen ! 
Let them come forward ! 

" Officers who lead the column of victory in this last assault 
may be assured of the just recognition of their services by pro 
motion ; and every officer and soldier who shares its perils and its 
glory shall receive a medal to commemorate the first grand success 
of the campaign of 1863 for the freedom of the Mississippi. His 
name will be placed in General Orders upon the Roll of Honor." 

Colonel Henry W. Birge, of the I3th Connecticut, 
at once volunteered to lead the stormers, and although 
the whole project was disapproved by many of the 
best officers and men in the corps, partly as unneces 
sary and partly because they conceived that it implied 
some reflection upon the conduct of the brave men 
that had fought and suffered and failed on the 27th 
and the I4th, yet so general was the feeling of confi 
dence in Birge that within a few days the ranks of 
the stormers were more than filled. As nearly as can 
now be ascertained, the whole number of officers who 
volunteered was at least 80 ; of enlisted men at least 
956. Of these, 17 officers and 226 men belonged to 
the 1 3th Connecticut. As the different parties offered 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 213 

and were accepted, they were sent into camp in a 
retired and pleasant spot, in a grove behind the naval 
battery on the right. On the 25th of June Birge was 
ordered to divide his column into two battalions, and 
to drill it for its work. On the 28th this organization 
was complete. The battalions were then composed 
of eight companies, but two companies were after 
wards added to the first battalion. To Lieutenant- 
Colonel Van Petten, of the i6oth New York, Birge 
gave the command of the first battalion, and to Lieu 
tenant-Colonel Bickmore, of the i4th Maine, that of 
the second battalion. On that day, 67 of the officers 
and 826 men in all, 893, were present for duty in 
the camp of the stormers. Among those that volun 
teered for the forlorn hope but were not accepted 
were 54 non-commissioned officers and privates of 
the ist Louisiana Native Guards, and 37 of the 
3d. From among the officers of the general staff 
and staff departments that were eager to go, two 
were selected to accompany the column and keep up 
the communication with headquarters and with the 
other troops ; these were Captain Duncan S. Walker, 
assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Edmund 
H. Russell, of the Qth Pennsylvania Reserves, acting 
signal officer. 

Then the officers and men quietly prepared them 
selves for the serious work expected of them. Those 
that had any thing to leave made their wills in the 
manner sanctioned by the custom of armies, and all 
confided to the hands of comrades the last words 
for their families or their friends. 

Meanwhile an event took place, trifling in itself, yet 
accenting sharply some of the more serious reasons 
that had, in the first instance, led Banks to resist the 



214 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

repeated urging of the government to join Grant with 
his whole force, and afterward had formed powerful 
factors in determining him to deliver and to renew 
the assault. Early on the morning of the i8th of 
June a detachment of Confederate cavalry rode into 
the village of Plaquemine, surprised the provost guard, 
captured Lieutenant C. H. Witham and twenty-two 
men of the 28th Maine, and burned three steamers 
lying in the bayou, the Sykes, Anglo-American, and 
Belfast. Captain Albert Stearns, of the i3ist New 
York, who was stationed at Plaquemine as provost 
marshal of the parish, made his escape with thirteen 
men of his guard. The Confederates were fired upon 
by the guard and lost one man killed and two wounded. 
In their turn they fired upon the steamboats, and 
wounded two of the crew. Three hours later the 
gunboat Winona, Captain Weaver, came down from 
Baton Rouge, and, shelling the enemy, hastened their 
departure. In the tension of greater events, little 
notice was taken at the moment of this incident ; 
yet it was not long before it was discovered that the 
raiders were the advance guard of the little army with 
which Taylor was about to invade La Fourche, intent 
upon the bold design of raising the siege of Port 
Hudson by blockading the river and threatening 
New Orleans. 

Thus Banks was brought face to face with the 
condition described in his letter of the 4th of June to 
Halleck : 

" The course to be pursued here gives me great anxiety. If I 
abandon Port Hudson, I leave its garrison, some 6,000 or 7,000 
men, the force under Mouton and Sibley, now threatening 
Brashear City and the Army of Mobile, large or small, to threaten 
or attack New Orleans. If I detach from my command in the 



UN VEXED TO THE SEA. 215 

field a sufficient force to defend that city, which ought not to be 
less than 8,000 or 10,000, my assistance to General Grant is un 
important, and I leave an equal or larger number of the enemy 
to reinforce Johnston. If I defend New Orleans and its adjacent 
territory, the enemy will go against Grant. If I go with a force 
sufficient to aid him, my rear will be seriously threatened. My 
force is not large enough to do both. Under these circumstances, 
my only course seems to be to carry this post as soon as possible, 
and then to join General Grant. If I abandon it I cannot 
materially aid him." 

Taylor s incursion caused Banks some anxiety and 
appreciable inconvenience, without, however, exer 
cising a material influence on the fortunes of the 
siege ; accordingly, it will be better to reserve for 
another chapter the story of this adventure. 

About the same time, Logan again became trouble 
some. At first he seems to have thought of retiring 
on Jackson, Mississippi ; but this Johnston forbade, 
telling him to stay where he was, to observe and 
annoy the besiegers, and if pressed by too strong a 
force, to fall back only so far as necessary, hindering 
and retarding the advance of his assailants. By day 
light, on the morning of the i5th of June, Logan 
dashed down the Clinton road, surprised the camp of 
the 1 4th New York cavalry, who made little resist 
ance, and the guard of the hospital at the Carter 
House, who made none. In this raid Logan took 
nearly one hundred disabled prisoners, including six 
officers, and carried off a number of wagons, How 
ever, finding Grierson instantly on his heels, Logan 
promptly " fell back as far as necessary." On the 
evening of the 3Oth of June, while hovering in the 
rear of Dwight, Logan captured and carried off 
Brigadier-General Dow, who, while waiting for his 
wound to heal, had taken up his headquarters in a 



216 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

house some distance behind the lines. At daylight, 
on the morning of the 2d of July, Logan surprised 
the depot at Springfield Landing, guarded by the 
i62d New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Blanchard, and 
a small detachment of the i6th New Hampshire, 
under Captain Hersey. Careless picket duty was 
the cause, and a great stampede the consequence, 
but Logan hardly stayed long enough to find out 
exactly what he had accomplished, since he reports 
that, besides burning the commissary and quarter 
masters stores, he killed and wounded 140 of his 
enemy, captured 35 prisoners, fought an entire bri 
gade, and destroyed 100 wagons, with a loss on his 
part of 4 killed and 10 wounded ; whereas, in fact, 
the entire loss of the Union army was i killed, 
1 1 wounded, 2 1 captured or missing, while the stores 
burned consisted of a full supply of clothing and 
camp and garrison equipment for about 1,000 men. 
The wagons mentioned by Logan were part of a train 
met in the road, cut out, and carried off as he rapidly 
rode away, and the number may be correct. 

The end of June was now drawing near, and already 
the losses of the besiegers in the month of constant 
fighting exceeded 4,000. At least as many more were 
sick in the hospitals, while the reinforcements from 
every quarter barely numbered 3,000. There were no 
longer any reserves to draw from ; the last man was 
up. The effective strength of all arms had at no time 
exceeded 17,000.* Of these less than 12,000 can be 
regarded as available for any duty directly connected 

1 The figures here given do not agree with those of the monthly and tri- 
monthly returns for May and June. These returns are, however, simply the 
returns for March carried forward, owing to the impossibility of collecting and 
collating the reports of regiments, brigades, and divisions during active opera 
tions. 



UN VEXED TO THE SEA, 217 

with the siege, and now every day saw the command 
growing smaller in numbers, as the men fell under the 
fire of the sharp-shooter, or succumbed to the deadly 
climate, or gave out exhausted by incessant labor and 
privation. The heat became almost insupportable, 
even to those who from time to time found themselves 
so fortunate as to be able to snatch a few hours rest 
in the dense shade of the splendid forest, until their 
tour of duty should come again in the trenches, where, 
under the June sun beating upon and baking all three 
surfaces, the parched clay became like a reverberating 
furnace. The still air was stifling, but the steam from 
the almost tropical showers was far worse. Merely in 
attempting to traverse a few yards of this burning 
zone many of the strongest men were sunstruck daily. 
The labor of the siege, extending over so wide a front, 
pressed so severely upon the numbers of the besieging 
army, always far too weak for such an undertaking in 
any climate at any season, above all in Louisiana in 
June, that the men were almost incessantly on duty, 
either in digging, as guards of the trenches, as sharp 
shooters, or on outpost service ; and as the numbers 
available for duty grew smaller, and the physical 
strength of all that remained in the ranks daily wasted, 
the work fell the more heavily. When the end came 
at last the effective force, outside of the cavalry, 
hardly exceeded 8,000, while even of this small num 
ber nearly every officer and man might well have 
gone on the sick-report had not pride and duty held 
him to his post. 

This will seem the less remarkable when it is re 
membered that the garrison during the same period 
suffered in the same proportion, while from like causes 
less than a year before Breckenridge had, in a much 



218 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

shorter time, lost the use of half his division. Butler s 
experience had been nearly as severe. 

To the suffering and labors that are inseparable 
from any operation in the nature of a siege were 
added insupportable torments, the least of which were 
vermin. As the summer days drew out and the heat 
grew more intense, the brooks dried up ; the creek 
lost itself in the pestilential swamp ; the wells and 
springs gave out ; the river fell, exposing to the almost 
tropical sun a wide margin of festering ooze. The 
mortality and the sickness were enormous. 

The animals suffered in their turn, the battery 
horses from want of exercise, the train horses and 
mules from over-work, and all from the excessive heat 
and insufficiency of proper forage. There was never 
enough hay ; the deficiency was partly eked out by 
making fodder of the standing corn, but this resource 
was quickly exhausted, and after the 3d of July, when 
Taylor sealed the river by planting his guns below 
Donaldsonville, all the animals went upon half or 
quarter rations of grain, with little hay or none. At 
length, for two or three days, the forage depots fairly 
gave out ; the poor beasts were literally starving when 
the place fell, nor was it for nearly a week after that 
event that, by the raising of Taylor s blockade below 
and the arrival of supplies from Grant above, the 
stress was wholly relieved. 

The two colored regiments, the ist and 3d Louisi 
ana Native Guards, besides strongly picketing their 
front, were mainly occupied, after the 2/th of May, in 
fatigue duty in the trenches on the right. While the 
army was in the Teche country, Brigadier-General 
Daniel Ullmann had arrived at New Orleans from 
New York, bringing with him authority to raise a 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 219 

brigade of colored troops. With him came a full 
complement of officers. A few days later, on the 
ist of May, Banks issued, at Opelousas, an order, 
which he had for some time held in contemplation, 
for organizing a corps of eighteen regiments of col 
ored infantry, to consist, at first, of five hundred men 
each. These troops were to form a distinct com 
mand, to which he gave the name of the Corps d Af- 
rique, and in it he incorporated Ullmann s brigade. 
By the end of May Ullmann had enrolled about 1,400 
men for five regiments, the 6th, 7th, 8th, gth, and 
loth. These recruits, as yet unarmed and undrilled, 
were now brought to Port Hudson, organized, and set 
to work in the trenches and upon the various siege 
operations. 

About the same time the formation of a regiment 
of engineer troops was undertaken, composed of 
picked men of color, formed in three battalions of four 
companies each, under white officers carefully chosen 
from among the veterans. The ranks of this regi 
ment, known as the ist Louisiana engineers, were 
soon recruited to above a thousand ; the strength for 
duty w r as about eight hundred. Under the skilful 
handling of Colonel Justin Hodge it rendered valua 
ble service throughout the siege. 

Company K of the 42d Massachusetts, commanded 
by Lieutenant Henry A. Harding, had for some 
months been serving as pontoniers, in charge of the 
bridge train. During the siege it did good and hard 
work in all branches of field engineering under the 
immediate direction of the Chief Engineer. 

While at Opelousas, Banks had applied to Halleck 
to order Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone to duty 
in the Department of the Gulf. Stone had been 



220 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

without assignment since his release, in the preceding 
August, from his long and lonely imprisonment in the 
casemates of the harbor forts of New York, and, up 
to this moment, every suggestion looking to his em 
ployment had met the stern disapproval of the Secre 
tary of War. Even when in the first flush of finding 
himself at last at the top notch of his career, Hooker, 
in firm possession, as he believed, of the post he had 
long coveted, as commander of the Army of the 
Potomac, had asked for Stone as his Chief of Staff, 
the request had been met by a flat refusal. A differ 
ent fate awaited Banks s application. On the 7th of 
May Halleck issued the orders asked for, and in the 
last days of the month Stone reported for duty be 
fore Port Hudson. At first Banks was rather embar 
rassed by the gift he had solicited, for he saw that 
he himself was falling into disfavor at Washington ; 
the moment was critical ; and it was easy to perceive 
how disaster, or even the slightest check, might be 
magnified in the shadows of Ball s Bluff and Fort 
Lafayette. Moreover, Stone was equally unknown 
to and unknown by the troops of the Nineteenth 
Army Corps. Instead, therefore, of giving him the 
command of Sherman s division, for which his rank 
indicated him, Banks kept Stone at headquarters 
without special assignment, and made every use of 
his activity, as well as of his special knowledge 
and ready skill in all matters relating to ordnance 
and gunnery. 

On the evening of the 26th of June a strange thing 
happened. While it was yet broad daylight Colonel 
Provence of the i6th Arkansas, posted in rear of the 
position of battery XXIV, discovering and annoyed 
by the progress made on battery 16 in his front, sent 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 221 

out, one at a time, two bold men, named Mieres and 
Parker, to see what was going on. After nightfall, on 
their report, he despatched thirty volunteers, under 
Lieutenant McKennon, to drive off the guard and the 
working party and to destroy the work. The position 
was held by the advance guard of the 2ist Maine, 
under Lieutenant Bartlett, who, for some reason hard 
to understand, ordered his men not to fire. The Ar 
kansas party, therefore, accomplished its purpose 
without further casualty than having one man knocked 
down, as he was leaping the parapet of the trench, by 
a soldier who happened to consider his orders as in 
applicable to this method of defence. Then Major 
Merry, with the reserves of the 2ist, coming promptly 
to the rescue, easily drove out the enterprising assail 
ants, with whom went as prisoners Lieutenant Bart 
lett and five of his men, with fourteen muskets that 
had not been fired. 1 

As the saps in front of Bainbridge s and Duryea s 
batteries drew every day nearer to the bastion and 
the priest-cap, the working parties were harassed and 
began to be greatly delayed by the unceasing fire of 
the Confederate sharp-shooters. Moreover, in spite 
of the vigilance of the sharp-shooters in the trenches, 
their adversaries had so much the advantage of 
ground that they were able to render the passage of 
certain exposed points of the approaches slow and 
hazardous. At first, cotton bales were used to pro 
tect the head of the sap, but these the adventurous 
enemy set alight with blazing arrows or by sallies of 
small parties under cover of darkness. In the short 

1 Colonel Provence, in his report, claims 7 prisoners, and says : " The enemy 
fired but once, and then at a great elevation." (Official Records, vol. xxvi., 
part i., p. 150.) 



222 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

night it was impossible to raise a pile of sand-bags 
high enough to overlook the breastworks. Toward 
the end of June this was changed in a single night by 
the skill and ingenuity of Colonel Edward Prince, of 
the 7th Illinois cavalry. 

Happening to be at headquarters when the trouble 
was being talked about, he heard an officer suggest 
making use of the empty hogsheads at the sugar- 
house ; how to get them to the trenches was the next 
question. This he promptly offered to solve if simply 
ordered to do it and left to himself. Cavalry had 
never been of any use in a siege, he said ; it was 
time for a change. The order was instantly given. 
Prince swung himself into the saddle and rode 
away. Before daylight his men had carried through 
the woods and over the hills to the mouth of the 
sap, opposite the southern angle of the priest-cap, 
enough sugar hogsheads to make two tiers. The 
heads had been knocked in, a long pole thrust 
through each hogshead, and thus slung, it was easy 
for two mounted troopers to carry it between them. 
Quietly rolled into position by the working parties and 
rapidly filled with earth, a rude platform erected be 
hind for the sharp-shooter to mount upon, with* a few 
sand-bags thrown on top to protect his head, this 
was the beginning of the great trench cavalier, whose 
frowning crest the astonished Confederates awoke the 
next morning to find towering high above their heads. 
Afterwards enlarged and strengthened, it finally 
dominated the whole line of defence not only in 
its immediate front, but for a long distance on either 
side. 

Not less ingenious was the device almost instinct 
ively resorted to by the artillerists for the safety of 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 223 

the gunners when, after the siege batteries opened, 
the Confederate sharp-shooters began picking off 
every head that came in sight. The first day saw a 
number of gunners stricken in the act of taking aim, 
an incident not conducive to deliberation or accuracy 
on the part of their successors at the guns. The 
next sunrise saw every exposed battery, from right to 
left, protected by a hinged shutter made of flat iron 
chiefly taken from the sugar troughs, covered with 
strips of rawhide from the commissary s, the space 
stuffed tight with loose cotton, and a hole made 
through all, big enough for the gunner s eye, but too 
small for the sharp-shooter s bullet. Such was substan 
tially the plan simultaneously adopted at three or 
four different points and afterwards followed every 
where. The remedy was perfect. 

On the 3d of July arrangements were made for the 
daily detail of a brigade commander to act as Gen 
eral of the Trenches during a tour of twenty-four 
hours, from noon to noon. His duties were to super 
intend the siege operations, to post the guards of the 
trenches, to repulse sorties, and to protect the works. 
The works to be constructed were indicated and laid 
out by the Chief Engineer, whose duties, after the 
1 7th of June, when Major Houston fell seriously ill, 
were performed by Captain John C. Palfrey, aided 
and overlooked by General Andrews, the Chief of 
Staff. Daily, at nine o clock in the morning, the 
General of the Trenches and the Chief Engineer 
made separate reports to headquarters of everything 
that had happened during the previous day. Each 
of these officers made five reports, yet of the ten but 
two are to be found printed among the Official 
Records. These are the engineer s reports of work 



224 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

done on the 5th and 6th of July. They contain 
almost the only details of the siege to be gathered 
from the record, notwithstanding the fact that every 
paper, however small, or irregular in size or form, or 
apparently unimportant in substance, that related in 
any way to the military operations of the Army of 
the Gulf was carefully preserved on the files of its 
Adjutant-General s office, where, for safety as well as 
convenience, documents of this character were kept 
separate from the ordinary files covering matters of 
routine and requiring to be handled every day or 
hour. The proof is strong that these important 
records were in due time delivered into the custody 
of the War Office, where, for a considerable period 
after the close of the war, little or no care seems to 
have been taken of the documents thus turned in by 
the several Corps and Departments, as these were 
discontinued ; and although the care and manage 
ment of the War Records division of the Adjutant- 
General s Office at Washington has, from its earliest 
organization, been such as to deserve the highest 
admiration, yet many of these papers are not to be 
found there. The probability is that they were either 
mislaid or else swept away and destroyed before this 
office was organized. 

Palfrey s report for the 5th of July shows the left 
cavalier finished and occupied, and the right cavalier 
nearly finished, but constantly injured by a 24-pounder 
gun that had so far escaped destruction by the artil 
lery of the besiegers. The sap in front of Bain- 
bridge s battery, No. 8, was advanced about twenty 
yards during this day, and the parallel in front of the 
priest-cap extended to the left eleven yards ; work 
was greatly retarded by a heavy rain in the night. 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 225 

The mine was so far advanced that a shaft was begun 
to run obliquely under the salient, this course being 
chosen instead of the usual plan of a vertical shaft with 
enveloping galleries, as shorter in time and distance, 
although more dangerous. 

On the 6th the sap was pushed forward forty-two 
feet, and the parallel carried to the left sixty-five feet. 
The mine shaft, begun the day before, was carried 
about twenty-seven feet underground, directly toward 
the salient. The cavaliers were finished. 

During the 7th, although there is no report for that 
day, the shaft for the mine under the priest-cap was 
finished, the chamber itself excavated and charged 
with about twelve hundred pounds of powder, and the 
mine tamped with sand-bags. The mine on the left 
had been ready for some days ; it was now charged 
with fifteen hundred pounds of powder and tamped. 

Heavy thunder-storms, accompanied by warm rain, 
had been frequent of late, and the night dews had 
been at times heavy. Accordingly it was thought 
best not to trust so delicate an operation as the explo 
sion of the mines to the chance of a damp fuse. Day 
break on the Qth of July having been set as the hour 
for the simultaneous explosion of the mines, to be in 
stantly followed by one last rush through the gaps, 
Captain Walker was sent on the evening of the 7th, 
to the Richmond to ask for dry fuses from the maga 
zines of the Navy. 

Meanwhile events were moving rapidly to an end. 
In the early morning of Tuesday, the 7th, the gun 
boat General Price, came down the river bringing 
the great news that Vicksburg had surrendered to 
Grant on the 4th of July. Commodore Palmer, on 

board the Hartford, was the first to receive the news, 

15 



226 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

but for some reason it happened that signal com 
munication was obstructed or suspended between the 
Hartford and headquarters, so that it was not until a 
quarter before eleven that Colonel Kilby Smith, of 
Grant s staff, delivered to Banks the welcome message 
of which he was the bearer. 

In less time than it takes to tell, an aide-de-camp 
was on his way to the General of the Trenches bear 
ing the brief announcement, " Vicksburg surrendered 
on the 4th of July." This note, written upon the 
thin manifold paper of the field order-books, the Gen 
eral of the Trenches was directed to wrap securely 
around a clod of clay the closest approach to a 
stone to be found in all the lowlands of Louisiana 
and toss it over into the enemy s works. At the 
same time the good news was sped by wire and by 
staff officers to the commanders of divisions. At 
noon a national salute was to be fired and all the 
bands were to play the national airs ; but the men 
could not wait for these slow formalities. No sooner 
was the first loud shout of rejoicing heard from the 
trenches, where for so many weary nights and days 
there had been little to rejoice at, than by a sort of 
instinct the men of both armies seem to have divined 
what had happened. From man to man, from com 
pany to company, from regiment to regiment, the 
word passed, and as it passed, once more the cheers 
of the soldiers of the Union rang out, and again the 
forest echoed with the strains of " The Star-Spangled 
Banner" from the long-silent bands. Many a rough 
cheek, unused to tears, was wet that morning, and the 
sound of laughter was heard from many lips that had 
long been set in silence ; but when the first thrill was 
spent, it gave way to a deep-drawn sigh of relief. 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 227 

The work was done, all the toil and suffering was 
over. Nor was this feeling restricted to the outside 
of the parapet ; the defenders felt it even more 
strongly. At first they received the news with real 
or affected incredulity. An officer of an Arkansas 
regiment, to whom was first handed the little scrap of 
tissue paper on which the whole chapter of history 
was told in seven words, acknowledged the compli 
ment by calling back, " This is another damned Yan 
kee lie ! " Yet before many minutes were over the 
firing had died away, save here and there a scattering 
exception, although peremptory orders were even given 
to secure its renewal. In spite of everything the men 
began to mingle and to exchange story for story, 
gibe for gibe, coffee for corn-beer, and when night 
fell there can have been few men in either army but 
believed the fighting was over. 

That evening Gardner summoned his commanders 
to meet him in council. Among them all there was 
but one thought the end had come. 

Shortly after half-past twelve the notes of a bugle 
were heard on the Plains Store road sounding the sig 
nal, " Cease firing." A few seconds later an officer with 
a small escort approached, bearing a lantern swung 
upon a long pole, with a white handkerchief tied be 
neath it, to serve as a flag of truce. At the outpost 
of Charles J. Paine s brigade the flag was halted and 
its purpose ascertained. This was announced to be 
the delivery of an important despatch from Gardner 
to Banks. Thus it was that a few minutes after one 
o clock the hoofs of two horses were heard at the 
same instant at headquarters, yet each with a sound 
of its own that seemed in keeping with its story. 
One, a slow and measured trot, told of duty done and 



228 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

stables near ; the other, quick and nervous, spoke of 
pressing news. Two officers dismounted ; the clang 
of their sabres was heard together ; together they 
made their way to the tent where the writer of these 
lines lay awake and listening. One was Captain 
Walker, with the fuse, the other was Lieutenant Or- 
ton S. Clark, of the n6th New York, then attached 
to the staff of Charles J. Paine. The long envelope 
he handed in felt rough to the touch ; the light of a 
match showed its color a dull gray ; every inch of it 
said, " Surrender." 

When opened it was found to contain a request for 
an official assurance as to the truth of the report that 
Vicksburg had surrendered. If true, Gardner asked 
for a cessation of hostilities with a view to consider 
terms. At a quarter-past one Banks replied, convey 
ing an exact copy of so much of Grant s despatch as 
related the capitulation of Vicksburg. He told when 
and how the despatch had come, and wound up by 
regretting that he could not consent to a truce for 
the purpose indicated. In order to avoid all chance 
of needless excitement or disturbance, as well as of 
the premature publication of the news, the Adjutant- 
General carried this despatch himself, and, accom 
panied by Lieutenant Clark, as well as, at his own 
request, by General Stone, rode first to Augur s head 
quarters to acquaint him with the news and to borrow 
a bugler, and then to the outposts to meet the Con 
federate flag of truce. A blast upon the bugle brought 
back the little party of horsemen, with the lantern 
swaying from the pole ; but it was nearly daylight 
before they again returned with Gardner s reply. 
Meanwhile, right and left word had been quietly 
passed to the pickets to cease firing. 



UN VEXED TO THE SEA. 229 

In his second letter Gardner said : 

" Having defended this position as long as I deem my duty 
requires, I am willing to surrender to you, and will appoint a 
commission of three officers to meet a similar commission, ap 
pointed by yourself, at nine o clock this morning, for the purpose 
of agreeing upon and drawing up the terms of surrender, and for 
that purpose I ask a cessation of hostilities. Will you please 
designate a point outside of my breastworks where a meeting 
shall be held for this purpose ? " 

To this Banks answered at 4:30 A.M. : 

" I have designated Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, Colo 
nel Henry W. Birge, and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard B. Irwin 
as the officers to meet the commission appointed by you. They 
will meet your officers at the hour designated at a point near 
where the flag of truce was received this morning. I will direct 
that all active hostilities shall entirely cease on my part until 
further notice for the purpose stated." 

The division commanders, as well as the command 
ers of the upper and lower fleets, were at once notified, 
and at six o clock Captain Walker was sent to find 
Admiral Farragut, wherever he might be, and to de 
liver to him despatches conveying the news of the 
surrender, outlining Banks s plans for moving against 
Taylor in La Fourche, and urging the Admiral to send 
all the light-draught gunboats at once to Berwick Bay. 

Banks meant to march Weitzel directly to the near 
est landing, which was within the lines of Port Hud 
son, as soon as the formal capitulation should be 
accomplished, and to send Grover after him as fast 
as steamboats could be found. This called for many 
arrangements ; the occupying force had also to be 
seen to ; and finally, it was necessary that the starving 
garrison should be fed. Colonel Irwin was therefore 
relieved, at his own request, from duty as one of the 



230 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

commissioners, and Brigadier-General Dwight was 
named in his stead. This drew an objection from 
Weitzel, who naturally felt that there were claims of 
service as well as of rank that might have been con 
sidered before those of the temporary commander of 
the second division ; however, it was too late to make 
any further change, and when Banks offered to name 
Weitzel, whose protest had been not for himself but 
for his brigades, as the officer to receive Gardner s 
sword, the offer was declined. Among the officers of 
the navy, too, especially those of the higher grades, 
great cause of offense was felt that, after all their 
services in the siege, they were left unrepresented in 
the honors of the surrender. This feeling was natural 
enough ; yet before determining how far the com 
plaints based on it were just, it is necessary to 
consider how important was every hour, almost 
every moment, with reference to the operations 
against Taylor, while three and a half hours were 
required to make the journey between headquarters 
and the upper fleet, and four and a half hours to 
reach the lower fleet. Moreover, the Admiral had 
gone to New Orleans the evening before. 

At nine the commissioners met under the shade of 
the beautiful trees, nearly on the spot where O Brien 
had rested among his men while waiting for the word 
on the 27th of May. On the Confederate side the 
commissioners were Colonel William R. Miles, com 
manding the right wing of the garrison, Colonel I. 
G. W. Steedman, of the ist Alabama, commanding 
the left wing, and Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall J. 
Smith, Chief of Heavy Artillery. 

Among those thus brought together there was 
more than one gentleman of marked conversational 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 231 

talent ; the day was pleasant, the shade grateful, and, 
to one side at least, the refreshment not less so ; and 
thus the time passed pleasantly until two o clock, 
when the commissioners signed, with but a single 
change, the articles that had been drawn up for 
them and in readiness since six in the morning. The 
alteration was occasioned by the great and unexpected 
length to which the conference had been protracted. 
Five o clock in the afternoon had been named as the 
time when the besiegers were to occupy the works ; 
this had to be changed to seven o clock on the morn- 
of the 9th. The terms, which will be found in full in 
the Appendix, were those of an unconditional surren 
der. Gardner, who was in waiting conveniently near, 
at once approved the articles, and at half-past two 
they were completed by the signature of Banks. A 
few minutes later the long wagon-train, loaded with 
provisions, that had been standing for hours in the 
Plains Store road, was signalled to go forward. The 
cheers that welcomed the train, as it wound its way 
up the long-untravelled road and through the disused 
sally-port, were perhaps not so loud as those with 
which the besiegers had greeted the news from Vicks- 
burg, yet they were not less enthusiastic. From this 
moment the men of the two armies, and to some 
extent the officers, mingled freely. 

Andrews was designated to receive the surrender, 
and from each division two of the best regiments, with 
one from Weitzel s brigade, were told off to occupy 
the place. 

Punctually at seven o clock on the morning of the 
9th of July the column of occupation entered the 
sally-port on the Jackson road. At its head rode 
Andrews with his staff. Next, in the post of honor, 



232 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

came the stormers with Birge at their head, then the 
75th New York of Weitzel s brigade, followed by the 
1 1 6th New York and the 26. Louisiana of Augur s 
division, the i2th Maine, and the I3th Connecticut 
of Grover s division, the 6th Michigan and the i4th 
Maine of Dwight s division, the 4th Wisconsin and 
the 8th New Hampshire of Paine s. 1 With the col 
umn was Duryea s battery. The 38th Massachusetts 
was at first designated for this coveted honor, but 
lost it through some necessary changes due to the in 
tended movement down the river. Weitzel, with his 
own brigade under Thomas, on the way to the place 
of embarkation, closely followed the column and wit 
nessed the ceremonies. 

These were simple and short. The Confederate 
troops were drawn up in line, Gardner at their head, 
every officer in his place. The right of the line rested 
on the edge of the open plain south of the railway 
station ; the left extended toward the village. At the 
word " Ground arms " from their tried commander, 
followed by the command of execution from the bugles, 
every Confederate soldier bowed his head and laid his 
musket on the ground in token of submission, while 
Gardner himself tendered his sword to Andrews, who, 
in a few complimentary words, waived its acceptance. 
At the same instant the Stars and Bars, the colors of 
the Confederacy, were hauled down from the flagstaff, 
where they had so long waved defiance ; a detachment 
of sailors from the naval batteries sprang to the hal 
yards and rapidly ran up the flag of the United States ; 
the guns of Duryea s battery saluted the colors ; the 
garrison filed off as prisoners of war, and all was over. 

1 No record exists of these details, but the list here given is believed to be 
nearly correct. 



UNVEXED TO THE SEA. 233 

The last echo of the salute to the colors had hardly 
died away when Weitzel, at the head of the First 
Division, now for the first time united, marched off to 
the left, and began embarking on board the trans 
ports to go against Taylor. 

With the place were taken 6,340 prisoners of war, 
of whom 405 were officers and 5,935 enlisted men. 
The men were paroled with the exact observance of 
all the forms prescribed by the cartel then in force ; 
yet the paroles were immediately declared void by the 
Confederate government, and the men were required 
to return to duty in the ranks. The officers, in 
accordance with the retaliatory orders of the period, 
had to be kept in captivity ; they were, however, 
given the choice of their place of confinement. 
About 2 1 1 elected to go to Memphis, and were ac 
cordingly sent up the river a few days after the sur 
render, the remainder were sent to New Orleans with 
instructions to Emory to keep them safely under 
guard in some commodious house or houses, to be 
selected by him, and to make them as comfortable as 
practicable. 1 There were also captured 20 pieces of 
light artillery and 31 pieces of field artillery ; of these 
12 heavy guns and 30 light guns were in compara 
tively good order. 

The total losses of the Corps during the siege 
were 45 officers and 663 men killed, 191 officers and 
3,145 men wounded, 12 officers and 307 men captured 
or missing ; in all, 4,363. Very few prisoners were 
taken by the Confederates, and little doubt remains 



1 As evidence of the considerate manner in which these gentlemen were 
treated see the interesting article, " Plain Living on Johnson s Island," by 
Lieutenant Horace Carpenter, 4th Louisiana, printed in the Century for March, 
1891, page 706. 



234 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

that a large proportion of those set down as captured 
or missing in reality perished. 

Of the Confederate losses no complete return was 
ever made. A partial return, without date, signed by 
the chief surgeon, shows 176 killed, 447 wounded, 
total 623. In this report the number of those that 
had died in the hospital is included among the 
wounded. Nor does this total include the losses at 
Plains Store, which, according to the surgeon s return, 
were 12 killed and 36 wounded, or, according to Colo 
nel Miles s report, 8 killed, 23 wounded, 58 missing ; 
in all, 89. Major C. M. Jackson, who acted as assist 
ant inspector-general under Gardner, and, according 
to his own account, came out through the lines of 
investment about an hour after the surrender, reported 
to Johnston that the total casualties during the siege 
were 200 killed, between 300 and 400 wounded, and 
200 died from sickness. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 

IT will be remembered that when Banks marched 
to Opelousas, Taylor s little army, greatly depleted 
by wholesale desertions and hourly wearing away by 
the roadside, broke into two fragments, the main 
body of the cavalry retiring, under Mouton, toward 
the Sabine, while the remainder of the troops were 
conducted by Taylor himself toward Alexandria and at 
last to Natchitoches. As soon as Kirby Smith became 
aware that his adversary was advancing to the Red 
River, he prepared to meet the menace by concen 
trating on Shreveport the whole available force of the 
Confederacy in the Trans-Mississippi from Texas to 
Missouri, numbering, according to his own estimate, 
18,000 effective. He accordingly called on Magru- 
der for two brigades and drew in from the line of the 
Arkansas the division of John G. Walker. However, 
this concentration became unnecessary and was given 
up the instant Smith learned that Banks had crossed 
the Atchafalayaand the Mississippi and had sat down 
before Port Hudson. 

While this movement was in progress, Walker was 
on the march toward Natchitoches or Alexandria, by 
varying routes, according as the plans changed to 
suit the news of the day. Taylor observed Banks 
and followed his march to Simmesport, while Mouton 

235 



236 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

hung upon the rear and flank of Chickering s column, 
guarding the big wagon-train and the spoils of the 
Teche campaign. 

Then Kirby Smith, not caring as yet to venture 
across the Atchafalaya, ordered Taylor to take Walk 
er s division back into Northern Louisiana and try to 
break up Grant s campaign by interrupting his com 
munications opposite Vicksburg ; but this attempt 
turned out badly, for Grant had already given up his 
communications on the west bank of the Mississippi 
and restored them on the east, and Taylor s forces, 
after passing from Lake Catahoula by Little River 
into the Tensas, ascending that stream to the neigh 
borhood of Richmond and occupying the town on the 
3d of May, were roughly handled on the 7th in an 
ill-judged attempt to take Young s Point and Milli- 
ken s Bend. Then, leaving Walker with orders to do 
what damage he could along the river bank which 
was not much and if possible, as it was not, to throw 
supplies of beef and corn into Vicksburg, Taylor went 
back to Alexandria and prepared for his campaign in 
La Fourche, from which Kirby Smith s superior orders 
had diverted him. Meanwhile nearly a month had 
passed and Walker, after coming down to the Red 
River, a week too late, was once more out of reach. 

Taylor s plan was for Major, with his brigade of cav 
alry, to cross the Atchafalaya at Morgan s Ferry, while 
Taylor himself, with the main body under Mouton, 
should attempt the surprise and capture of Brashear : 
then, if successful, the whole army could be thrown 
into La Fourche, while in case of failure Major could 
easily return by the way he came. 

Major left Washington on the loth of June, 
marched twenty-eight miles to Morgan s Ferry, by a 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 237 

road then high and dry although in April Banks had 
found it under water, and crossing the Atchafalaya on 
the 1 4th rode along the Bayou Fordoche with the in 
tention of striking the river at the Hermitage ; but a 
broken bridge turned him northward round the sweep 
of False River toward Waterloo. Sage was at False 
Point with six companies of his noth New York, a 
squadron of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry, and a sec 
tion of Carruth s battery. As soon as he found the 
enemy approaching in some force he moved down 
the levee to the cover of the lower fleet and thus lost 
the chance of gaining and giving timely notice of 
Major s operation. Major on his part rode off by the 
Grosstete through Plaquemine, as already related, 
and so down the Mississippi to Donaldsonville, hav 
ing passed on the way three gunboats without being 
seen by any one on board. Making a feint on Fort 
Butler, Major, under cover of the night, took the cut 
off road and struck the Bayou La Fourche six miles X 
below Donaldsonville; thence he rode on to Thibo- 
deaux, entering the town at daylight on the 2ist of 
June. At Thibodeaux Major picked up all the Union 
soldiers in the place to the number of about 100, 
mostly convalescents. 

Soon after taking command in New Orleans, Emory 
had begun to look forward to what might happen in 
La Fourche, as well as to the possible consequences 
to New Orleans itself. The forces in the district 
were the 23d Connecticut, Colonel Charles E. L. 
Holmes, and the i76th New York, Colonel Charles 
C. Nott, both regiments scattered along the railroad 
for its protection, Company F and some odd men 
and recruits of the ist Indiana, under Captain F. W. 
Noblett, occupying the field works at Brashear, and 






238 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

two companies of the 28th Maine at Fort Butler. 
About this time Holmes, who as the senior colonel 
had commanded the district since Weitzel quitted it 
to enter on the Teche campaign, resigned on account 
of ill-health. Nott and Wordin, the lieutenant-colonel 
of the 23d, were on the sick-list. Finding the country 
thus feebly occupied and the service yet more feebly 
performed, as early as the 7th of June, Emory had 
chosen a very intelligent and spirited young officer of 
the 47th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Albert 
Stickney, placed him in command of the district, 
without regard to rank, and sent him over the line to 
Brashear to put things straight. In this work Stick 
ney was engaged, when, at daylight on the morn 
ing of the 2oth of June, he received a telegram from 
Emory conveying the news that the Confederates 
were advancing on La Fourche Crossing ; so he left 
Major Anthony, of the 2d Rhode Island cavalry, in 
command at Brashear and went to the point where 
the danger threatened. When, on the afternoon of 
the 2ist of June, the Confederate force drew near, 
Stickney found himself in command of a medley of 
838 men belonging to eight different organizations 
namely, 195 of the 23d Connecticut, 154 of the i76th 
New York, 46 of the 42d Massachusetts, 37 of the 
26th Maine, 306 of the 26th Massachusetts, 50 
troopers of the ist Louisiana cavalry, 20 artillery 
men, chiefly of the ist Indiana, and one section, 
with 30 men, of G row s 25th New York battery. 

The levee at this point was about twelve feet high, 
forming a natural fortification, which Stickney took 
advantage of and strengthened by throwing up slight 
rifle-pits on his flanks. These had only been carried 
a few yards, and were nowhere more than two feet 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 239 

high, when, about seven o clock in the evening, under 
cover of the darkness, Major attacked. The attack 
was led by Pyron s regiment, reported by Major as 
206 strong, and was received and thrown off by about 
three quarters of Stickney s force. For this result the 
credit is largely due to the gallantry and good judg- - 
ment of Major Morgan Morgan, Jr., of the i/Gth New 
York, and the steadiness of his men, inspired by his 
example. Grow s guns being separated and one of 
them without support, this piece was abandoned by 
its gunners and fell for the moment into the hands of 
the Confederates ; the other piece, placed by Grow 
himself to protect the flank, poured an effective 
enfilade fire upon Pyron s column. 

Stickney s loss was 8 killed and 41 wounded, includ 
ing Lieutenant Starr, of the 23d Connecticut, whose 
hurt proved mortal. The Confederate loss is not 
reported, but Stickney says he counted 53 of their 
dead on the field, and afterward found nearly 60 
wounded in the hospitals at Thibodeaux. The next 
morning, June 22d, their dead and wounded were 
removed under a flag of truce. 1 

While the flag was out, Cahill came up from New 
Orleans with the Qth Connecticut, a further detach 
ment of the 26th Massachusetts, and the remainder 
of Grow s battery. This gave Stickney about 1,100 
men, with four guns in position and six field-pieces. 
Cahill s arrival was seen by Major, who, after waiting 
all day in a drenching rain, began to think his condi 
tion rather critical ; accordingly, at nine o clock in 
the evening he set out to force his way to Brashear, 
where he was expecting to find Green. Riding hard, 

1 The history of the 23d Connecticut says : " We delivered to them 108 dead. 
We captured 40 prisoners."" Connecticut in the War," p. 757. 



240 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

he arrived at the east bank of Bayou Boeuf late the 
next afternoon, and, crossing by night, at daylight on 
the 24th he had completely surrounded the post of 
Bayou Bceuf, and was just about to attack, when he 
saw the white flag that announced the surrender of 
the garrison to Mouton. Before this, Captain Julius 
Sanford, of the 23d Connecticut, set fire to the 
sugar-house filled with the baggage and clothing of 
the troops engaged at Port Hudson. 

Meanwhile, for the surprise of Brashear, Mouton 
had collected thirty-seven skiffs and boats of all sorts 
near the mouth of the Teche, and manned them with 
325 volunteers, under the lead of Major Sherod 
Hunter. At nightfall on the 22d of June Hunter set 
out, and by daylight the next morning his whole party 
had safely landed in the rear of the defences of Bra- 
shear, while Green, with three battalions and two 
batteries of his command, stood on the western bank 
of Berwick Bay, ostentatiously attracting the atten 
tion of the unsuspicious garrison, and three more 
regiments were in waiting on Gibbon s Island, ready 
to make use of Hunter s boats in support of his 
movement. 

Banks meant to have broken up the great depot of 
military stores at Brashear, and to have removed to 
Algiers or New Orleans all regimental baggage and 
other property that had gone into store at Brashear 
and the Bceuf before and after the Teche campaign ; 
such were his orders, but for some reason not easy 
to explain they had not been carried out. Besides 
the Indianians, who numbered about 30 all told, there 
were at Brashear four companies D, G, I, K of 
the 23d Connecticut, two companies of the 17610 
New York, about 150 strong, and one company, or 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 241 

the equivalent of a company, of the 420! Massachu 
setts, making in all rather less than 400 effectives ; 
there were also about 300 convalescents, left behind 
by nearly thirty regiments. Notwithstanding the vast 
quantity of stores committed to their care, including 
the effects of their comrades, and in spite of all warn 
ings, so slack and indifferent was the performance of 
duty on the part of the garrison of Brashear that, on 
the morning of the 23d of June, the reveille was 
sounded for them by the guns of the Valverde battery. 
Thus sharply aroused, without a thought of what 
might happen in the rear, the garrison gave its whole 
attention to returning, with the heavy guns, the fire 
of Green s field-pieces across Berwick Bay. Soon the 
gunboat Hollyhock backed down the bay and out of 
the action, and thus it was that about half-past six 
Hunter s men, running out of the woods toward the 
railway station, and making known their presence 
with their rifles, took the garrison completely by sur 
prise, and, after a short and desultory fight, more than 
700 officers and men gave up their swords and laid 
down their arms to a little less than one half of 
their own number. Of the men, nearly all were 
well enough to march to Algiers four days later, after 
being paroled. Worse still, they abandoned a forti 
fied position with n heavy guns 24-, 30-, and 32- 
pounders. The Confederate loss was 3 killed and 18 
wounded. Hunter says the Union troops lost 46 
killed and 40 wounded, but about this there seems to 
be some mistake, for the proportion is unusual, and the 
whole loss of the 23d Connecticut in killed and wounded 
was but 7, of the i76th New York but 12. 

Green crossed Berwick Bay as fast as he could, and 
pushing on found the post at Bayou Ramos aban- 

16 



242 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

doned. The Union troops stationed there had retired 
to Bayou Boeuf, and so at daylight on the 24th, without 
feeling or firing a single shot, the united guards of the 
two stations, numbering 435 officers and men, with 
four guns, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Du- 
ganne, of the i76th New York, promptly surrendered 
to the first bold summons of a handful of Green s 
adventurous scouts riding five miles ahead of their 
column. Taylor now turned over the immediate 
command of the force to Mouton and hastened back 
to Alexandria to bring down Walker, in order to 
secure and extend his conquests. Mouton marched 
at once on Donaldsonville. 

When the Union forces at La Fourche Crossing 
found the Confederates returning in such strength, 
they made haste to fall back on New Orleans, and 
were followed as far as Boutte Station by Waller s 
and Pyron s battalions. 

On the 2 /th of June, Green, with his own brigade, 
Major s brigade, and Semmes s battery appeared be 
fore Donaldsonville, and demanded the surrender of 
the garrison of Fort Butler. This was a square 
redoubt, placed in the northern angle between the 
bayou and the Mississippi, designed to command and 
protect the river gateway to La Fourche, mounting 
four guns, and originally intended for a garrison of 
perhaps 600 men. The parapet was high and thick, 
like the levee, and was surrounded by a deep ditch, 
the flanks on the bayou and the river being further 
protected by stout stockades extending from the 
levees to the water, at ordinary stages. The work 
was now held by a mixed force of 180 men, com 
prising two small companies of the 28th Maine 
F, Captain Edward B. Neal, and G, Captain Augus- 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 243 

tine Thompson, besides a number of convalescents 
of various regiments. Major Joseph D. Bullen, of 
the 28th, was in command, and with him at the time 
was Major Henry M. Porter, of the 7th Vermont, 
provost-marshal of the parish of Iberville, whose 
quarters in the town on the other side of the bayou 
were no longer tenable. 

Farragut, who had gone down to New Orleans and 
hoisted his flag on the Pensacola, leaving Palmer and 
Alden in command of the upper and lower fleets be 
fore Port Hudson, had disposed his gunboats so as to 
patrol the river in sections. The Princess Royal, 
Lieutenant-Commander M. B. Woolsey, was near 
Donaldsonville ; the Winona, Lieutenant-Commander 
A. W. Weaver, near Plaquemine ; and the Kineo, 
Lieutenant-Commander John Watters, between Bon 
net Carre and the Red Church. As soon as the Con 
federates appeared before Donaldsonville, Woolsey 
was notified, and couriers were sent up and down the 
river to summon the Winona and the Kineo. 

Green brought to the attack six regiments and one 
battery, between 1,300 and 1,500 strong, 1 including 
three regiments of his own brigade, the 4th, 5th, and 
7th Texas, and three regiments of Major s brigade 
Lane s, Stone s, and Phillips s. The river, and there 
fore the bayou, were now low, exposing wide margins 
of batture, and Green s plan was, while surrounding 
and threatening the fort on its land faces, to gain an 
entrance on the water front by crossing the batture 
and passing around the ends of the stockades. 

J When Green says 800, he of course refers to the four regiments actually 
engaged in the assault ; for, after losing, as he says, 261 of these 800, he makes 
the four regiments of Major s brigade, with two sections of Faries s battery, 
number 800 ; while his own force, with one section of Gonzales s battery, he 
puts at 750. 800 +750 + 261 = 1,811. 



244 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

At ten minutes past midnight the red light of a 
Coston signal from the fort announced to the Navy 
that the enemy were coming. At twenty minutes past 
one the fight was opened by the Confederates with 
musketry. Instantly the fort replied with the fire of 
its guns, and of every musket that could be brought 
to the parapet. Five minutes later the Princess 
Royal, which, since nightfall, had been under way and 
cleared for action, began shelling the woods on the 
right of the fort, firing a few Q-inch and 3<>pounder 
shells over the works and down the bayou, followed 
presently by 3<>pounder and 2O-pounder shrapnel and 
9-inch grape, fired at point-blank range in the direction 
of the Confederate yells. The assault was made in 
the most determined manner. Shannon, with the 5th 
Texas, passed some of his men around the end of the 
river stockade, others climbed and helped one another 
over, some tried to cut it down with axes, many fired 

^ through the loopholes ; Phillips made a circuit of the 
fort and tried the bayou stockade, while Herbert s 
7th Texas attempted to cross the ditch on the land 
side. The fight at the stockade was desperate in 
the extreme ; those who succeeded in surmounting or 
turning this barrier found an impassable obstacle in 
the ditch, whose existence, strange to say, they had 

X not even suspected. Here the combatants fought 
hand to hand ; even the sick, who had barely strength 
to walk from the hospital to the rampart, took part in 
the defence. The Texans assailed the defenders with 
brickbats ; these the Maine men threw back upon the 
heads of the Texans ; on both sides numbers were 
thus injured. Lane, who was to have supported 
Phillips, somehow went adrift, and Hardeman, who 
was to have attacked the stockade on the bayou side, 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 245 

was delayed by his guide, but toward daylight he 
came up to join in the last attack. By way of a 
diversion, Stone had crossed the bayou to the east 
bank on a bridge of sugar coolers, and his part in the 
fight was confined to yells. 

At a quarter before four the yelling, which had 
gone on continuously for more than two hours, sud 
denly died away, the fire slackened, and three rousing 
cheers went up from the fort. A few minutes later the 
Winona came down and opened fire, and at half-past 
four the Kineo hove in sight. The fight was ended. 
" The smoke clearing away," says Woolsey, " discov 
ered the American flag flying over the fort. Gave 
three cheers and came to anchor." Yet the same 
sun rose upon a ghastly sight upon green slopes 
gray with the dead, the dying, and the maimed, and 
the black ditch red with their blood. 

Green puts his loss at 40 killed, 114 wounded, 107 
missing, in all 261. However, during the 28th, the 
Princess Royal and the Kineo received on board from 
the provost-marshal 124 prisoners, by actual count, 
including i lientenant-colonel, 2 majors, 3 captains, 
and 5 lieutenants ; and Lieutenant-Commander Wool 
sey says the garrison buried 69 Confederates and 
were " still at it." Among the Confederates killed 
was Shannon, and among the missing Phillips. Of 
the garrison, i officer, Lieutenant Isaac Murch, of 
the 28th Maine, and 7 men were killed, 2 officers and 
ii men wounded in all 21. The Princess Royal 
had i man killed, 2 wounded. The vessel was struck 
in twenty places by grape-shot. 

Green has been sharply criticised for the apparent 
recklessness with which he delivered his assault, even 
after having announced to Mouton his intention of 



246 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

waiting ; yet it is clear that he was sent there to 
attack ; if he was to attack at all, he had nothing 
to gain by waiting ; an assault by daylight would have 
been wholesale suicide ; while, on the other hand, the 
garrison would unquestionably be reinforced by troops 
and gunboats before another night. Having paid 
this tribute to his judgment, and to his daring and 
the intrepidity of his men the homage that every 
soldier feels to be his due, one may be allowed to 
quote without comment this passage from Green s 
report of the affair, in naked frankness hardly sur 
passed even among the writings of Signor Benvenuto 
Cellini : 

" At daylight I sent in a flag of truce, asking permission to pick 
up our wounded and bury our dead, which was refused, as I ex 
pected. My object in sending the flag so early was to get away 
a great number of our men, who had found a little shelter near 
the enemy s works, and who would have been inevitably taken 
prisoners. I must have saved one hundred men by instructing 
my flag-of-truce officer, as he approached the fort, to order our 
troops to steal away." 

Bullen s message to Emory has the true ring : 
" The enemy have attacked us, and we have repulsed 
them. I want more men ; I must have more men." 
Emory responded with the remaining two companies 
of the 28th Maine, that had been left near New 
Orleans when the regiment moved to Port Hudson, 
and Banks relieved the ist Louisiana on the lines and 
sent it at once to Donaldsonville, with two sections of 
Closson s battery under Taylor, and Stone to com 
mand. This put the place out of peril. 

Even this bright spot on the dull, dark background 
was not to be permitted to go untarnished, for, on the 
5th of July, Bullen, the hero of this heroic defence, 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 247 

whose name deserves to live in the memory of all 
that love a sturdy man, a stout heart, a steady mind, 
or a brave deed, was murdered by a tipsy mutineer of 
the relieving force. On Friday, the I4th of August, 
1863, this wretched man, Francis Scott, private of 
Company F, ist Louisiana, suffered the military 
penalty of his crime. 

Taylor now gave up the attempt to capture the 
position at Donaldsonville, and devoted his attention 
to a blockade of the river by establishing his batteries 
at various points behind the natural fortification 
formed by the levee. Seven guns, under Faries, 
were placed on Gaudet s plantation, opposite White 
hall Point, while the guns of Semmes, Nichols, and 
Cornay were planted opposite College Point and at 
Fifty-five Mile Point, commanding Grand View reach. 
On the 3d of July Semmes opened fire on the Union 
transports, as they were approaching College Point 
on their way up the river. The steamer Iberville 
was disabled, and from this time until after the 
surrender no transport passed up, except under con 
voy, and it was only with great difficulty that even 
the fastest boats made their way down with the help 
of the current. 

When this state of things was reported to Farragut, 
who had gone back to Port Hudson, he sent to New 
Orleans for his Chief of Staff, Captain Jenkins, to come 
up, in order that he himself might once more go down 
and give his personal attention to the affair. On the 
7th of July the Tennessee started from New Orleans 
with Jenkins aboard ; she had successfully run the 
gauntlet of the batteries, when, between eight and 
nine o clock in the evening, as Faries was firing his 
last rounds, a solid shot struck and instantly killed 



248 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Commander Abner Read. Captain Jenkins was, at 
the same time, wounded by a flying fragment of a 
broken cutlass. Of the crew two were killed and four 
wounded. 

On the 8th the Saint Marys, a fine seagoing 
steamer and one of the fastest boats in the depart 
ment, was carrying Lieutenant Emerson, Acting-As 
sistant Adjutant-General, with important despatches 
from headquarters to Emory and to the Chief Quarter 
master, when, about three o clock in the morning, she 
drew the fire of all the Confederate guns. The Prin 
cess Royal and the Kineo convoyed her past the upper 
battery, but from this point she had to trust to her 
speed and her low freeboard. In rounding Fifty-five 
Mile Point she was struck five times, one conical 
shell and one shrapnel penetrating her side above the 
water-line and bursting inboard. 

At half-past six on the morning of the Qth of July, 
Farragut, who had left Port Hudson on the Monon- 
gahela on the evening of the 7th, started from 
Donaldsonville with the Essex, Kineo, and Tennessee 
in company, ran the gauntlet of the batteries, swept 
and silenced them with his broadsides, and endured 
for nearly two hours a brisk musketry fire from the 
enemy without serious loss suffered or inflicted. At 
half-past one o clock on the morning of the loth of 
July, the gunboat New London, bearing Captain 
Walker, Assistant Adjutant-General, with a despatch 
announcing the surrender of Port Hudson, came 
under the fire of Faries s battery, opposite Whitehall. 
She was very soon disabled by a shot through her 
boilers, and was run ashore near the left bank, where 
the Tennessee and the Essex came to her assistance from 
below. Landing on the east bank, Captain Walker 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 249 

made his way afoot down the river along the levee 
until he came in sight of the Monongahela, when, at 
six o clock in the morning, his signals being perceived, 
he was taken aboard in one of the ship s boats and 
communicated to the admiral the good news that the 
campaign was at an end. To dispose of Taylor could 
be but a matter of a few days ; then once more, in 
the words of Lincoln, would the great river flow 
"unvexed to the sea." 

Taylor s plans were well laid, and had been brill 
iantly executed. In no other way, with the force at 
his disposal, could he have performed a greater service 
for his cause. Save the severe yet not material check 
at Donaldsonville, he had had everything his own 
way : he had overrun La Fourche ; his guns com 
manded the river ; his outposts were within twenty 
miles of the city ; he even talked of capturing New 
Orleans, but this, in the teeth of an alert and power 
ful fleet, was at best but a midsummer fancy. 

In New Orleans, indeed, great was the excitement 
when it became known that the Confederate forces 
were so near. In Taylor s army were the friends, the 
brothers, the lovers, the husbands, even the fathers of 
the inhabitants. In the town were many thousands 
of registered enemies, and of paroled Confederate 
prisoners of all ranks. At one time there were no 
Union troops in the city, save a detachment of the 
42d Massachusetts, barely two hundred and fifty 
strong. But the illness that had deprived Emory s 
division of its leader in the field had given to New 
Orleans a commander of a courage and firmness that 
now, as always, rose with the approach of danger, 
with whom difficulties diminished as they drew near, 
and whose character had earned the respect of the 



250 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

townspeople. These, though their hearts beat high 
and their pulses were tremulous with emotion, con 
ducted themselves with a propriety and an outward 
calmness that reflected the highest credit upon their 
virtue and their good sense. Yet, when all that was 
possible had been done, things were at such a pass 
that, on the 4th of July, Emory thought it imperative 
to speak out. " I respectfully suggest," he wrote to 
Banks, " that unless Port Hudson be already taken, 
you can only save this city by sending me reinforce 
ments immediately and at any cost. It is a choice 
between Port Hudson and New Orleans." 

Banks made the choice with serenity and without 
a moment s hesitation determined to run the remote 
risk of losing New Orleans for the moment, with the 
destruction of Taylor s army in reserve as a consola 
tion, rather than to insure himself against this peril 
at the price of instant disaster at Port Hudson, even 
on the very eve of victory. 

" Operations here," was the reply sent from head 
quarters on the 5th to Emory s urgent appeal, " can 
last but two or three days longer at the outside, and 
then the whole command will be available to drive 
back the enemy who is now annoying our communi 
cations and threatening New Orleans." So the event 
proved and such was now the task to be performed. 

Augur, who had been ill for some time, yet unwill 
ing to relinquish his command, now found himself 
unfitted for the summer campaign that seemed in 
prospect. He accordingly turned over his divi 
sion to Weitzel, took leave of absence on surgeon s 
certificate, and went North to recruit his health. 
Shortly afterwards he was assigned to the command 
of the Department of Washington and did not rejoin 
the Nineteenth Corps. 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 251 

Weitzel, as has been said, took transport on the 
gth of July immediately after the formal capitulation. 
Getting under way toward evening, he landed at 
Donaldsonville early the next morning. His presence 
there so threatened the flank and front of Taylor s 
forces, as to induce an immediate withdrawal of the 
guns from the river and the calling in of all detach 
ments. Morgan, with G rover s First brigade and 
Nims s battery, followed Weitzel about midnight on 
the loth, and Grover himself, with his other two 
brigades, on the i ith. During the night of that day, 
Grover therefore found himself before Donaldson 
ville, holding both banks of Bayou La Fourche with 
two divisions. He was confronted by Green with his 
own brigade and Major s, together with the batteries 
that had lately been annoying the transports and 
drawing the attention of the gunboats on the river. 
When, on the xoth, Green saw the transports coming 
down the Mississippi laden with troops, it did not at 
once occur to him that Port Hudson was lost ; he 
simply thought these troops were coming to attack 
him. Concentrating his whole force, he posted Major 
with four regiments and four guns on the left or east 
bank of the bayou, and on the right or west bank 
three regiments and two guns of his own brigade. 
Green s pickets were within two miles of Donaldson 
ville. As Grover developed and took more ground 
in his front, Green drew back toward Paincourtville. 

On the morning of the i3th of July, without any 
intention of bringing on a battle or of hastening the 
enemy s movements, but merely to gain a little more 
elbow-room and to find new fields for forage for the 
animals, Grover moved out an advance guard on either 
side of the bayou. " The enemy is evidently making 
preparation," he said in his despatch of the I2th 



252 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

before ordering this movement, " to escape if pur 
sued by a strong force or to resist a small one. Our 
gunboats can hardly be expected at Brashear City for 
some days, and it is evidently injudicious to press 
them until their retreat is cut off." Dudley, with two 
sections of Carruth s battery under Phelps and with 
Barrett s troop, marched on the right bank of the 
bayou, supported by Charles J. Paine s brigade with 
Haley s battery. Morgan, under the orders of Birge, 
temporarily commanding Grover s division, moved in 
line with Dudley on the opposite bank. They went 
forward slowly until, about six miles out, they found 
themselves upon the estate of the planter whose name 
is variously spelled Cox, Koch, and Kock. Here, as 
Dudley and Morgan showed no disposition to attack, 
Green took the initiative, and, favored by a narrow 
field, a rank growth of corn, dense thickets of willows, 
the deep ditches common to all sugar plantations in 
these lowlands, and his own superior knowledge of 
the country, he fell suddenly with his whole force 
upon the heads of Dudley s and Morgan s columns, 
and drove them in almost before they were aware of 
the presence in their front of anything more than the 
pickets, whom they had been seeing for two days and 
who had been falling back before them. Morgan 
handled his brigade badly, and soon got it, or suffered 
it to fall, into a tangle whence it could only extricate 
itself by retiring. This fairly exposed the flank of 
Dudley, who was making a good fight, but had 
already enough to do to take care of his front against 
the fierce onset of Green s Texans. The result of 
this bad management was that the whole command 
was in effect clubbed and on both banks driven back 
about a mile, until Paine came to its support ; then 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 253 

Grover rode out, and, seeing what had happened, 
drew in his whole force. 

Grover s losses in this affair, called the battle of 
Cox s Plantation, were 2 officers and 54 men killed, 7 
officers and 210 men wounded, 3 officers and 183 men 
captured or missing ; in all 465. To add to the 
reproach of this rough treatment at the hands of an 
inferior force, two guns were lost, one of the ist 
Maine battery and one of the 6th Massachusetts, but 
without the least fault on the part of the artillerists. 

After the close of the campaign Colonel Morgan 
was arraigned before a general court-martial upon 
charges of misbehavior before the enemy and drunk 
enness on duty, and, being found guilty upon both 
charges, was sentenced to be cashiered and utterly 
disqualified from holding any office or employment 
under the government of the United States ; but 
Banks disapproved the proceedings, findings, and 
sentence on the ground that the evidence appeared 
to him too conflicting and unsatisfactory. " The ex 
ecution of the sentence," his orders continue, " is 
suspended until the pleasure of the President can be 
known." When the record with this decision reached 
the Judge Advocate-General of the Army at Wash 
ington, he sent it back to Banks with instructions 
that, as no sentence remained for the action of the 
President, the proceedings were at an end and Colonel 
Morgan must be released from arrest. This was 
accordingly done on the 26th of October, 1863. 

Green puts his loss at 3 killed and 30 wounded, 
including 6 mortally wounded. The Union loss, he 
says, was " little less than 1,000 ; there were over 
500 of the enemy killed and wounded, of whom 200 
were left out on the field, and about 250 prisoners." 



254 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

When, on the evening of the i4th of July, at Port 
Hudson, Banks received this news, he went at once 
to Donaldsonville to confer with Grover and Weitzel 
on the situation and the plan of campaign. It was 
agreed on all hands that it was inexpedient to press 
Taylor hard or to hasten his movements in any way 
until time should have been allowed for the light- 
draught gunboats to re-enter Berwick Bay and thus 
gain control of Taylor s line of retreat. In thus 
refraining from any attempt to avenge promptly what 
must be regarded as a military affront, the depleted 
ranks and the wearied condition of the troops were 
perhaps taken into account, and, moreover, it must 
have been considered to the last degree inadvisable 
to entangle the command in the dense swamps that 
would have to be crossed, after pushing Taylor 
prematurely back from the fertile and comparatively 
high lands that border the Bayou La Fourche. Then 
Banks continued on to New Orleans, where he 
arrived on the i8th, and renewed his pressure on the 
admiral for the gunboats ; but, unfortunately, the gun 
boats were not to be had. Of those that had accom 
panied the army in the campaign of the Teche, only 
one, the feeble Hollyhock, had remained in Berwick 
Bay after the army descended the Red River, crossed 
the Atchafalaya, and moved on Port Hudson. The 
others, with the transports, had followed the move 
ment of the troops and had been caught above the 
head of the Atchafalaya when the waters fell. Thus 
they had long been without repairs, and not one of 
them was now in condition for immediate service. 
The water on the bar at the mouth of the Atchafalaya 
was now nearly at its lowest point, so that even of 
the light-draught gunboats only the lightest could 



HARROWING LA FOURCHE. 255 

cross. Accordingly it was not until the 22d of July 
that the Estrella and Clifton made their appearance 
in Berwick Bay and put an end to Taylor s operations. 

On the afternoon of the 2ist of July, knowing that 
the gunboats were coming, Taylor set the finishing 
touch to his incursion by burning the rolling-stock of 
the railway and running the engines into the bay. 
He had already destroyed the bridges as far back as 
Tigerville, thus rendering the road quite useless to 
the Union forces for the next five weeks. 

On the morning of the 25th the advance of Weit- 
zel s brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, consist 
ing of his own i2th Connecticut and the I3th Con 
necticut, commanded by Captain Comstock, arrived 
at Brashear by steamer from Donaldsonville, and, 
landing, once more took possession of the place ; but 
in the meantime Taylor had safely withdrawn to the 
west bank, and gone into camp on the Teche with all 
his army intact and all his materials and supplies and 
most of his captures safe. 



CHAPTER XX. 

IN SUMMER QUARTERS. 

BEFORE Banks parted with Grover at Donaldson- 
ville, he left orders for the troops to rest and go into 
"summer quarters" as soon as the pending operation 
should be decided. Accordingly, in the last days of 
July, Weitzel broke away from the discomforts of 
muddy, dusty, shadeless Donaldsonville, and march 
ing down the bayou, once more took up his quarters 
near Napoleonville and Thibodeaux, and encamped 
his men at ease among the groves and orchards of 
the garden of La Fourche. 

On the 1 6th of July the steamboat Imperial, from 
St. Louis on the 8th, rounded to at the levee at New 
Orleans in token that the great river was once more 
free. The next day she set out on her return trip. 

On the 5th of August a despatch from Halleck, 
dated the 23d of July, was received and published in 
orders : 

" I congratulate you and your army on the crowning success 
of the campaign. It was reserved for your army to strike the 
last blow to open the Mississippi River. The country, and 
especially the great West, will ever remember with gratitude their 
services." 

Afterwards, on the 28th of January, 1864, Congress 
passed a joint resolution of thanks 

256 



IN SUMMER QUARTERS. 257 

"to Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks and the officers and 
soldiers under his command for the skill, courage, and endurance 
which compelled the surrender of Port Hudson, and thus re 
moved the last obstruction to the free navigation of the Missis 
sippi River." 

Admiral Porter now came down the river to New 
Orleans in his flagship Black Hawk, and arranged to 
relieve Admiral Farragut from the trying duty of 
patrolling and protecting the river, so long borne by 
the vessels of his fleet. Farragut then took leave of 
absence and went North, leaving the West Gulf 
Squadron to Commodore Bell. 

When Port Hudson surrendered, two of the nine- 
months regiments had already served beyond their 
time. The 4th Massachusetts claimed its discharge 
on the 26th of June, the 5Oth four days later, insisting 
that their time ran from the muster-in of the last 
company; but, being without information from Wash 
ington on this point, Banks counted the time from 
the muster-in of the field and staff, and therefore 
wished to hold these regiments respectively eighty- 
one and forty-two days longer, or at all events until 
the receipt of instructions or the end of the siege. 
To this view officers and men alike objected, many 
of them so strongly that whole companies refused 
duty. They were within their lawful rights, yet, better 
counsels quickly prevailing, all consented to stay, and 
did good service to the last. Of seven other regi 
ments the term of enlistment was on the point of 
expiring. They were the 2ist, 22d, 24th, and 26th 
Maine, the 52d Massachusetts, the 26th Connecticut, 
and the i6th New Hampshire. These nine regi 
ments were now detached from the divisions to which 

they belonged and placed under the orders of An- 
17 



258 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

drews to form part of the garrison of Port Hudson 
until the transports should be ready to take them 
home by sea or river. 

As soon as the river was opened, Grant responded 
freely to all the urgent demands made upon him for 
steamboats, forage, beef, telegraph operators, and so 
on. He sent Ransom to occupy Natchez, and about 
the 25th of July Herron arrived at Port Hudson with 
his division of two brigades, 3,605 effectives, with 18 
guns. Herron s command, the victor of Pea Ridge 
and Prairie Grove, formerly known as the Army of 
the Frontier, had been called to the aid of Grant at 
Vicksburg. It came to the Gulf as Herron s division, 
but was presently, by Grant s orders, merged in the 
1 3th Corps as its Second Division. 

At the close of July, in response to Banks s urgent 
appeals for more troops to replace the nine-months 
men, Halleck ordered Grant to send down a corps of 
10,000 or 12,000 men. Accordingly, between the 
loth and 26th of August, Grant sent the reorganized 
Thirteenth Corps to Carrollton. Ord, the proper 
commander of the Thirteenth Corps, took sick leave, 
and the corps came to Louisiana under the command 
of Washburn, with Benton, Herron, Lee, and Lawler 
commanding the divisions, and Colonel Mudd the 
brigade of cavalry. All told, the effective strength 
of the corps was 778 officers and 13,934 men ; total, 

14,712- 

Chiefly in July and August the twenty-one nine- 
months regiments and in November the nine-months 
men of the 1 76th New York went home to be mus 
tered out. This left of the Nineteenth Corps thirty- 
seven regiments, having an effective strength, daily 
diminishing, of less than 350 men each ; in all, less 



IN SUMMER QUARTERS. 259 

than 13,000. From these it was indispensable to 
take one full and strong regiment for Key West and 
the Tortugas, another for Pensacola, and a third for 
Forts Jackson and Saint Philip. This disposed of 
2,000; 2,500 more was the least force that could be 
expected to do the police and guard duty of a hostile 
town so great and populous as New Orleans, contain 
ing the main depots of the army ; thus the movable 
force of infantry was cut down to 8,500, or, as Banks 
states it, 10,000, and for any operations that should 
uncover New Orleans, would be but half that number. 
In the reorganization of the Nineteenth Corps, 
thus rendered necessary, the Second division was 
broken up and ceased to exist, its First and Third 
brigades being transferred to the Third division, the 
temporary command of which was given to Dwight, 
but only for a short time. The First and Third 
brigades of the First division were thrown into one ; 
Weitzel s brigade at first resumed its original name 
of the Reserve brigade, and a new Second brigade 
was provided by taking Gooding s from the Third 
division, so that when a fortnight later Weitzel s 
brigade was restored to the First division, it became 
the Third brigade. The Fourth division, like the 
Third, was reduced to two brigades. Major-General 
William B. Franklin, who had just come from the 
North under orders from Washington, was assigned to 
the command of the First division, while Emory was to 
retain the Third and Grover the Fourth ; but when 
the Thirteenth Corps began to arrive, Banks found 
himself in the anomalous position of commanding a 
military department within whose limits two army 
corps were to serve, one, numerically the smaller, 
under his own immediate orders, the other under its 



260 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

proper commander. The approaching completion of 
the organization of the Corps d Afrique would add a 
third element. It was therefore found convenient on 
every account to name an immediate commander for 
the Nineteenth Corps, and for this post Franklin s 
rank, service, and experience plainly indicated him. 
The assignment was made on the i5th of August, and 
Franklin took command at Baton Rouge on the 2Oth. 
Then Weitzel was designated to command the First 
division. However, there were during the next few 
months, among the commanders of all grades, so 
many changes, due to illness or absence, that only 
confusion could follow the attempt to tell them all. 

The artillery of the corps was redistributed to 
correspond with the new organization, and the cavalry 
was concentrated at Baton Rouge, Plaquemine, Thi- 
bodeaux, and New Orleans, with orders that all de 
tails for orderly duty and the like were to be furnished 
from a single battalion, the i4th New York, attached 
to the defences of New Orleans. 

Weitzel s division, except his old brigade under 
Merritt, took post at Baton Rouge, where also 
Emory s division was encamped, successively com 
manded by Nickerson and McMillan, while Grover s 
division, assigned to the defence of New Orleans, 
was separated, Birge occupying La Fourche, with 
headquarters at Thibodeaux, and Cahill forming the 
garrison of New Orleans. 

At Port Hudson, after the departure of the nine- 
months troops, Andrews had the 6th Michigan 
newly converted into the ist Michigan heavy artil 
lery, ten troops of the 3d Massachusetts cavalry, 
Rawles s, Holcomb s, and Barnes s batteries ; and 
besides these the infantry of the Corps d Afrique, 



IN SUMMER QUARTERS. 261 

then in process of organization, including, at the end 
of August, the old ist and 3d regiments and the five 
regiments of Ullmann s brigade the 6th to the loth. 
The return of the post for the 3ist of August 
accounts for an effective force of 5,427 ; of these 
1,815 belonged to the white troops and 3,612 to the 
colored regiments. The whole number of infantry 
regiments of the Corps d Afrique, then authorized, 
was nineteen, of which only the first four were com 
pleted. Besides these there were two regiments of 
engineers, the ist full, the 2d about half full, and 
three companies of heavy artillery, making the whole 
muster of colored troops in the department about 
10,000. Towards the end of September the regi 
ments of infantry numbered twenty, with ranks fairly 
filled. The Corps d Afrique was then organized in 
two divisions of two brigades each, Ullmann com 
manding the First division and the senior colonel the 
Second. Rawles s battery was assigned to the First 
division and Holcomb s to the Second. This divi 
sion, however, never became much more than a 
skeleton, its First brigade being from the first de 
tached by regiments for garrison duty in the various 
fortifications. 

Andrews at once took up the work of organization 
and instruction in earnest, rightly conceiving it not 
merely possible, but even essential, to give to the 
officers and men of the colored regiments, thus formed 
into an army corps under his command, a degree of 
instruction, as well in tactics as in the details of a 
soldier s duty, higher than was to be found in any 
save a few picked regiments of the volunteer and 
regular service. The prejudice at first entertained 
against the bare idea of service with colored troops 



262 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

had not entirely disappeared, yet it had so far lost its 
edge that it was now possible to select from a number 
of applicants for promotion, especially to the higher 
grades, officers who had already shown their fitness 
and their capacity, while holding inferior commissions 
or serving in the ranks of the white regiments. Thus 
the original source of weakness in the composition of 
the first three regiments was avoided, and, small poli 
tics and local influence being of course absent, and 
Banks s instructions being urgent to choose only the 
best men, the colored regiments soon had a fine corps 
of officers. To the work now before him Andrews 
brought an equipment and a training such as few 
officers possessed. Experience had shown him the 
merit, the capacity, and the defects of the American 
volunteer officer. At the very bottom of these de 
fects was the looseness of his early instruction in the 
elements of his duty ; once wrongly taught by an 
instructor, himself careless or ignorant, he was likely 
to go on conscientiously making the same mistake to 
the end of his term. Realizing his opportunity, 
Andrews set about establishing uniformity in all 
details of drill and duty by establishing a school of 
officers. These he himself taught with the greatest 
pains and industry, correcting the slovenly, yet en 
couraging the willing, until the whole corps was 
brought up to a uniform standard, and on the whole 
a high one. 

Stone succeeded Andrews as Chief of Staff at de 
partment headquarters on the 25th of July. 

Franklin s staff, as commander of the Nineteenth 
Army Corps in the field, included Major Wickham 
Hoffman, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Colonel Ed 
ward L. Molineux, Acting Assistant Inspector-Gen- 



IN SUMMER QUARTERS. 263 

eral ; Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Chandler, Chief 
Quartermaster; Lieutenant-Colonel Henry D. Wood 
ruff, Chief Commissary of Subsistence ; Surgeon 
John H. Rauch, Medical Director; Captain Henry 
W. Closson, Chief of Artillery ; Lieutenant-Colonel 
Joseph Bailey, Acting Chief Engineer ; Captain Will 
iam A. Pigman, Chief Signal Officer. 



CHAPTER XXI. 

A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 

BANKS now wished and proposed to move on Mo 
bile, which he rightly supposed to be defended by 
about 5,000 men. 1 This had indeed been among the 
objects specially contemplated by his first instructions 
from the government, and in the progress of events 
had now become the next in natural order. Grant 
and Farragut were of the same mind ; but other ideas 
had arisen, and now the government, anxious to 
avert the impending risk of European complications, 
deemed it of the first importance that the flag of the 
nation should, without delay, be restored at some 
point in Texas. The place and the plan were left 
discretionary with Banks, but peremptory orders 
were given him to carry out the object. 2 

Texas had no military value at that moment. To 
have overrun the whole State would hardly have 
shortened the war by a single day. The possession 
of Mobile, on the other hand, would, besides its direct 
consequences, have exercised an important if not a 
vital influence upon the critical operations in the 
central theatre of war ; would have taken from the 

1 Banks to Halleck July 30 and August i, 1863: "Official Records," vol. 
xxvi., part I, pp. 66 1, 666. 

2 Halleck to Banks, July 24, .1863, July 3ist, August 6th, August roth, August 
I2th : " Official Records," vol. xxvi., part I, pp. 652, 664, 672, 673, 675. 

264 



A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 265 

Confederates their only remaining line of railway 
communication between the Atlantic seaboard and 
the States bordering on the Mississippi ; would have 
weakened the well-nigh fatal concentration against 
Rosecrans at Chickamauga and Chattanooga ; would 
have eased the hard task of Sherman in his progress 
to Atlanta ; and would have given him a safe line of 
retreat in the event of misfortune. What was it, 
then, that persuaded the government to put aside its 
designs on Mobile, to give up the offensive, to refrain 
from gathering the fruits of its successes on the Mis 
sissippi, in order to embark in the pursuit of objects 
avowedly " other than military " ? 

A series of acts and events, more or less menacing 
in character, seemed to indicate a concerted purpose 
on the part of some, at least, of the leading nations 
of Europe to interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
United States against the government of the United 
States. The powerful rams, intended for the recap 
ture of New Orleans, that were being almost openly 
built to the order of the Confederacy in the port of 
Liverpool, in the very shipyards whence the Alabama 
had gone to sea, were approaching completion. Other 
iron-clads, not less powerful, were under construction 
in France, with the personal connivance of the Em 
peror, upon the flimsy pretence that they were in 
tended for the imperial government of China. Finally, 
on the loth of June, casting all promises and pretexts 
to the winds, the French troops had marched into the 
capital of Mexico, made themselves masters of the 
country, vamped up a sham throne, and upon it set 
an Austrian puppet. That Napoleon III. nursed 
among his favorite dreams the vision of a Latin em 
pire in America, built upon the ruins of Mexican 



266 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

liberty and taking in at least the fairest portion of 
the Louisiana that his illustrious uncle had parted 
with so cheaply, was well known. Against the in 
convenient spread of this ambition the occupation of 
some part, of any part, of Texas, was intended as a 
diplomatic caution. That the warning cast its shadow 
even upon the dark mind of Louis Napoleon Bona 
parte there can be no doubt ; yet in the meantime 
there had occurred in quick succession three events 
that must have sounded in his ears with tones that 
even his dull imagination could not easily misunder 
stand. These were Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port 
Hudson. He had not the least notion of helping the 
unsuccessful. 

The whole Confederate force under Kirby Smith 
in the trans-Mississippi region numbered at this time 
about 33,000 effective. Of these, about 4,000 were 
in the Indian country, 8,000 in Arkansas, less than 
14,000 in Western Louisiana, and rather less than 
7,000 in Texas. Of the forces in Louisiana under 
Taylor, about 3,000 were in the extreme northern 
district. Magruder, whose headquarters were at 
Houston, and who commanded not only the whole 
of Texas but nominally New Mexico and Arizona 
besides, was keeping rather more than two thirds of 
his forces for the defence of Galveston and the line 
of the Sabine, while the remainder were distributed 
on the Rio Grande, at Corpus Christi, San Antonio, 
and Indianola ; he had not 2,000 men together any 
where, nor could even Kirby Smith have concentrated 
20,000 at any single point without giving up all the 
rest of the vast territory confided to his care. 

At the end of August Banks had nearly 37,000 
officers and men for duty. Of these, about 13,000 



A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 267 

belonged to the Thirteenth Corps and about 6,500 to 
that portion of the Nineteenth Corps, being the First 
and Third divisions, that was concentrated and ready 
for active service in the field. The defences of New 
Orleans, including La Fourche, absorbed 7,000 ; Port 
Hudson, 5,500; the rest were holding Baton Rouge, 
Key West, and Pensacola. 

Yielding his own views as to Mobile, Banks entered 
heartily into the project of the government for gain 
ing a foothold in Texas. Learning from the Navy 
that the mouth of the Sabine was but feebly defended, 
while the entrance was practicable for gunboats of 
light draught, he conceived the plan of descending 
suddenly upon the coast at that point with a force 
sufficient to march to Houston and take Galveston 
in reverse. He selected the troops, and collected the 
transports and the stores. When he was ready he 
gave the command of the expedition to Franklin, and 
caused Beckwith to replace Emory in command of 
the defences of New Orleans, to enable him to rejoin 
his division for service in the field. 

Franklin had the brigades under Love and Merritt 
of Weitzel s First division, with Bainbridge s, Clos- 
son s, and Bradbury s batteries, and the two brigades, 
Nickerson s and McMillan s, of Emory s Third divi 
sion, with Duryea s, Trull s, and Hebard s batteries. 
For cavalry there were the two squadrons of the ist 
Texas. Commodore Bell, who then commanded the 
West Gulf Squadron, gave the command of the gun 
boats, destined to keep down the fire of the shore 
batteries and cover the landing of the troops, to 
Lieutenant Frederick Crocker, from whose personal 
observation while serving on the blockade the infor 
mation that led to the choice of the point of attack 



268 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

had been largely drawn. Crocker, besides his own 
vessel, the Clifton, had the Sachem, Lieutenant Amos 
Johnson ; the Arizona, Acting-Master Howard Tib- 
betts ; the Granite City, Acting-M aster C. W. Lam- 
son. Crocker s belief was that the defences ashore 
and afloat consisted of two 32-pounder guns in bat 
tery, and two small steamboats converted into rams. 

Franklin s orders were to proceed to Sabine Pass ; 
there, if the Navy should be able to secure the land 
ing, he was to debark his whole force rapidly, take up 
a strong position, seize Beaumont, or some other 
point on the railroad to Houston, and then reconnoi 
tre the enemy to learn their position and strength. 
He was not to go farther into the country until re 
inforced. After landing, he was to turn back the 
transports to Brashear, where Benton s division of 
the Thirteenth Corps would be found waiting to join 
him. 

After many delays, due to the state and inadequacy 
of the transports, which, besides ten ocean steamers, 
fit and unfit, included six river steamers wholly of 
the latter class, Weitzel sailed from New Orleans on 
the evening of the 4th of September. Leaving the 
Southwest Pass on the morning of the 5th, under 
convoy of the Arizona, and steering westward, he 
was joined, early on the following morning, off Ber 
wick Bay, by the Clifton and the Sachem. A de 
tachment of about 100 sharp-shooters, mainly from 
Companies B and G of the 75th New York, under 
Lieutenants Root and Cox, was then sent aboard the 
Clifton, and to the Sachem an officer and 25 men 
from the i6ist New York. 

About daylight on the 7th, Crocker became con 
vinced that he had overrun his distance and gone 



A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 269 

beyond Sabine Pass ; but when all the vessels had 
put about and for three or four hours had been steer 
ing to the eastward, he found himself off the entrance 
to the Calcasieu, thirty miles east of the Sabine. 
Then he and Weitzel agreed that, under the circum 
stances, the best thing to be done was to intercept 
the remainder of the expedition, supposed to be fol 
lowing, under the immediate command of Franklin, 
and assembling the whole force where they were to 
wait until the next morning, the 8th of September, 
for the attempt at Sabine Pass. But the arrange 
ment had been that the attack by the gunboats 
to cover Weitzel s landing was to be made early on 
the morning of the 7th. Accordingly Franklin, with 
his part of the fleet, carrying the supporting force, 
had already passed Berwick Bay ; in fact, at eleven 
o clock he was off Sabine Pass ; and the Suffolk, 
bearing the headquarters flag of the Nineteenth 
Corps, had crossed the bar and was about to run in, 
the others following, when Franklin perceived that 
his advance had not yet come up, and therefore 
stopped the movement. In the afternoon Weitzel, 
seeing nothing of Franklin s fleet, made up his mind 
that he must have gone by, and once more setting 
his face toward the west, joined Franklin off the 
Sabine about nine o clock that evening. 

After the full and open notice thus given the 
enemy, all thought of anything like a surprise was 
at an end ; yet it was agreed to go on and make the 
attempt the next morning. Accordingly, at daylight 
on the 8th, Crocker, with the Clifton and the other 
gunboats, followed by Weitzel with the 75th New 
York on the transport steamer Charles Thomas, 
entered the harbor, and after reconnoitring the land- 



270 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

ing-place and the defences, signalled the rest of the 
fleet to run in. Weitzel put a picked force of five 
hundred men on the transport General Banks, and 
following in the wake of the four gun-boats, made 
ready to land about a thousand yards below the fort. 

Shortly before four o clock the gunboats moved to 
the attack. Above the swamp through which the 
Sabine finds an outlet to the Gulf, the shore lies low 
and barren. The fort or sand battery was placed at 
the turn about one half mile below the hamlet called 
Sabine City, opposite the upper end of the oyster reef 
that for nearly a mile divides the channel into two 
parts, each narrow and neither straight. The Sachem, 
followed by the Arizona, took the eastern or Louisi 
ana channel, and was hardly under fire before a shot 
struck her steampipe and completely disabled her. 
The Clifton moved at full speed up the western or 
Texas channel until, when almost directly under the 
guns of the fort, she also received a shot through her 
boilers, grounding at the same time ; and thus, nearly 
at the same instant, before the action had fairly 
begun, the two leading gunboats were completely 
disabled and at the mercy of the enemy. The Louisi 
ana channel was too narrow for the Arizona to pass 
the Sachem or to turn about ; so at the moment when 
the Clifton received her fatal injury, the Arizona 
was backing down the eastern channel to ascend the 
western to her assistance ; but in doing this she also 
took the ground. The Sachem hauled down her 
colors and hoisted the white flag at the fore, and 
after bravely continuing the fight for twenty minutes 
longer the Clifton followed suit. 

The place where the Clifton grounded was fairly in 
range of the beach where Weitzel was expected to 



A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 271 

land his troops. There may have been a minute, or 
even ten, during which it might have been possible 
for Weitzel, breaking away from the concerted plan, 
to have thrown his picked men ashore while the 
attention of the Confederates was fixed upon the 
Clifton ; yet, although this criticism has been sug 
gested by high authority, the point would have been 
a fine one at best ; and under the actual circum 
stances, with the Granite City in the channel ahead, 
the Arizona aground, and the guns of the Sachem 
and the Clifton about to be added to those with which 
the enemy had opened the action, the problem be 
comes one of pure speculation. What is clear is that 
the landing depended upon the gunboats ; that these 
were cruelly beaten before they had a chance to prove 
themselves ; and that nothing really remained to do 
but what was actually done : that is, to give up the 
expedition and go home. 

It is true that the orders under which Franklin was 
acting indicated that if he found a landing imprac 
ticable at Sabine Pass he was to attempt to land at 
some other place near by ; and it is also true that the 
infantry might have been set ashore almost anywhere 
in the soft salt marsh that serves for the neighboring 
coasts of Louisiana and Texas ; but this must have 
been without their guns and wagons and with no fresh 
water save what they carried with them until they 
should have moved successfully into the interior ; 
while on the transports the stock of water was al 
ready running so low that the men and animals were 
on short allowance. Therefore, with the loss of 3 
officers and 94 men captured, of the 75th New York, 
6 killed, 2 drowned, and 4 wounded, and 200 mules 
and 200,000 rations thrown into the sea, the expedi- 



272 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

tion returned to New Orleans, whence, by reason of 
unseaworthiness of transports, part of it had not yet 
started. The transports came back in a sorry plight, 
the Cahawba on one wheel, the river steamboat 
Laurel Hill without her smokestacks, and all the 
others of her class with their frail sides stove. The 
Clifton and the Sachem, whose losses are but partially 
reported, lost 10 killed, 9 wounded, and 39 missing. 
Nearly all the rest of their crews were taken prisoners. 

The Confederate work, known as Fort Griffin, 
mounted six guns, of which two were 32-pounder 
smooth bores, two 24-pounder smooth bores, and two 
32-pounder howitzers, manned by a single company 
of Cook s regiment of Texas artillery, whose strength 
is stated variously, though with great precision, as 40, 
41, 42, and 44 men. This company was commanded 
by Lieutenant Richard W. Dowling, and the post by 
Captain Frederick H. Odium. There was a support 
ing body of about 200 men, as well as the gunboat 
Uncle Ben, but Dowling s company was the only force 
actually engaged. They received, and certainly de 
served, the thanks of the Confederate Congress. 

Still intent on executing the instructions of the 
government, and having in mind Halleck s strong 
preference for an overland operation, Banks at once 
gave orders to concentrate at Brashear for a move 
ment up the Teche as far as Lafayette, or Ver 
milion, and thence across the plains by Niblett s 
Bluff into Texas. The route by the Atchafalaya and 
the Red River, Halleck s favorite, was now impracti 
cable, for both rivers were at their lowest stage, and 
the great length of this line put out of the question 
the movement of any large force dependent upon 
land transport. 



A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 273 

During the last fortnight of September, Banks con 
centrated Weitzel s and Emory s divisions of the Nine 
teenth Corps, under Franklin, on the lower Teche, 
near Camp Bisland, supporting them with Wash- 
burn s and McGinnis s divisions of the Thirteenth 
Corps, under Ord. The cavalry division under A. L. 
Lee covered the front towards New Iberia. 

Emory being forced to go North on sick-leave, his 
division was commanded by McMillan from the i7th 
of September until the 6th of October, when Grover 
relieved him after turning over the Fourth division 
to Beckwith. 

Birge, with his reorganized brigade, occupied La 
Fourche, with headquarters at Thibodeaux. 

Sharpe s brigade of Weitzel s division remained at 
Baton Rouge, with Gooding as the post commander. 

Burbridge s division of the Thirteenth Corps re 
mained at Carrollton, while Herron s, at the time of 
the Sabine Pass expedition, had been posted at M or 
ganza to observe and prevent any fresh movement 
by the Confederates across the upper Atchafalaya. 

This division was about 2,500 strong, and Herron, 
being ill, had just turned over the command to Dana, 
when on the 2Qth of September Green swept down 
with Speight s and Mouton s brigades and the bat 
talions of Waller and Rountree upon the outposts on 
Bayou Fordoche, at Sterling s plantation, killed 16, 
wounded 45, and took 454 prisoners, including nearly 
the full strength of the iQth Iowa and 26th Indiana. 
Green s loss was 26 killed, 85 wounded, and 10 miss 
ing ; in all, 212. 

On the 3d of October Franklin broke camp at 
Bisland and moved by easy marches to a position 
near the south bank of the Bayou Carencro, meeting 

i3 



274 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

with no resistance beyond slight skirmishing at the 
crossing of the Vermilion. On the nth the Nine 
teenth Corps encamped within two miles of the Ca- 
rencro, its daily marches having been, on the 3d to 
Franklin, twelve miles ; on the 4th to Sorrell s planta 
tion, eleven miles ; on the 5th to Olivier s, near New 
Iberia, thirteen miles ; on the 8th to the Vermilion, 
fifteen miles ; on the gth, crossing the Vermilion, 
eight miles; on the nth ten miles; in all, sixty-nine 
miles. 

Ord with the Thirteenth Corps, meanwhile aug 
mented by Burbridge s division from Carrollton, set 
out from Berwick at the same time that Franklin 
left Bisland, and, following at an interval of a day s 
march, encamped on the loth of October on the Ver 
milion. On the 1 4th Ord closed up on Franklin at 
the Carencro. A week later, Ord being ill, Wash- 
burn took command of the detachment of the Thir 
teenth Corps, his division falling to Lawler. 

Banks with his staff left New Orleans on the 7th of 
October. On the following afternoon he joined the 
forces near New Iberia, remaining near headquarters in 
the field until the evening of the 1 1 th, when he returned 
to New Orleans. Stone stayed two days longer and 
then followed his chief. This left Franklin in com 
mand of all the forces in Western Louisiana, number 
ing about 19,500 for duty, namely, 11,000 of the 
Thirteenth Corps, 6,000 of the Nineteenth Corps, 
and 2,500 of the cavalry division. Banks s object in 
returning to New Orleans was to organize a second 
expedition for the coast of Texas. The advance to 
the Carencro had not only brought his army face to 
face with Taylor s forces, but also with the well-known 
conditions that would have to be met and overcome 



A FOOTHOLD IN TEXAS. 275 

in the movement beyond the Sabine. All idea of 
this march of more than two hundred miles across a 
barren country, with no water in the summer and fall, 
while in the winter and spring there is plenty of 
water but no road, was now given up once for all. 
Besides the natural obstacles, there was Magruder to 
be reckoned with at the end of the march and Taylor 
in the rear. 

Taylor had now about 11,000 effectives in the 
divisions of Mouton, Walker, and Green, with eleven 
batteries. To occupy him and to push him farther 
away, Franklin marched to Opelousas on the 2ist of 
October, skirmishing by the way, and until the end 
of the month continued to occupy a position covering 
that town and Barre s Landing. 

On the 26th of October, with a force of about 
4,000 effectives of the Second division of the Thir 
teenth Corps under Dana, augmented by the I3th 
and 1 5th Maine, the ist Engineers and i6th infantry 
of the Corps d Afrique, and the ist Texas cavalry, 
Banks embarked at New Orleans for the mouth of 
the Rio Grande. After long delays and great peril 
from bad weather, the expedition landed at Brazos 
Santiago between the 3d and 5th of November, and 
on the 6th occupied Point Isabel and Brownsville, dis 
tant thirty miles on the main land. 

Having thus at last secured the foothold in Texas 
so urgently desired by the government, Banks, who 
had now entered heartily into this expansive scheme, 
set about occupying successively all the passes or in 
lets that connect the Gulf of Mexico with the land 
locked lagoons or sounds of the Texas coast from the 
Rio Grande to the Sabine. 

Accordingly, he sent for the rest of the Thirteenth 



276 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Corps, and by the end of December had taken posses 
sion of the fringe of the coast as far east and north 
as Matagorda Bay. So far he had met with little 
opposition, the Confederate force in this part of 
Texas being small. The Brazos and Galveston were 
still to be gained, and here, if anywhere in Texas, a 
vigorous resistance was to be counted on. Banks 
was bending everything to the attempt when, as the 
new year opened, the government stopped him, and 
turned his head in a new direction. 

During these operations on the Texan coast the 
1 3th Maine, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hes- 
seltine, and the i5th Maine formed part of the Second 
division of the Thirteenth Corps. Both regiments 
did good service, especially under Ransom, in the ex 
pedition that, led by Washburn, landed on Mustang 
Island on the i6th of November, took the Confederate 
battery commanding Aransas Pass, and then, crossing 
to Matagorda Island, rapidly reduced Fort Esperanza, 
and thus gained the control of Matagorda Bay before 
the month was out. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

WINTER QUARTERS. 

IN preparation for Washburn s departure on the 
27th of October, Franklin began to draw back from 
Opelousas to New Iberia. Lawler led off, and was 
followed on the ist of November by McGinnis, 
Grover, Weitzel, and the cavalry under Fonda, in 
the order named. Burbridge, followed by Mudd s 
cavalry brigade, took the Teche road, by Grand 
Coteau. 

On the 3d, while the Nineteenth Corps rested at 
the Vermilion and McGinnis at the Carencro, Bur- 
bridge, who was in camp on Bayou Bourbeau, was 
surprised by the sudden descent of Green with two 
brigades. Burbridge had with him only his First 
brigade, about 1,200 strong, with 500 men of the 
n8th Illinois mounted infantry and the I4th New 
York cavalry, under Fonda, Rice s 1 7th Ohio battery, 
and Marland s section of Nims s battery ; in all, 1,625 
men. The 23d Wisconsin, 96th Ohio, 6oth Indiana, 
and the gunners of Rice and Nims fought hard to 
prevent a rout and to save the wagon-trains and the 
artillery ; and, McGinnis coming up in good time, 
Green drew off, taking with him nothing save one of 
the Ohio lo-pounder Parrotts. At one moment both 
of Marland s guns, abandoned by their supports, 
were completely cut off by the Confederate cavalry, 

277 



278 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

but Marland, rising to the occasion, bade his can 
noneers draw their revolvers, and charged at a full 
gallop directly through the lines of Green s cavalry, 
to the complete astonishment of both armies, and 
came into battery on the right of the 46th Indiana. 
"The bringing off of the section of Nims s battery, 
commanded by Lieutenant Marland," says Washburn, 
" after the regiment sent to its support had sur 
rendered, extorted the admiration of every beholder." 

Marland s loss in this brilliant little affair was but 
two men missing. Burbridge had 25 killed, 129 
wounded, and 562 captured or missing; in all, 716. 
Green reports his loss as 22 killed, 103 wounded, and 
53 missing. Green s report shows that he had in the 
fight three regiments of infantry, seven of cavalry, 
and two sections of artillery. 

With frequent skirmishing, but without serious 
molestation, the march was continued, and on the 
1 7th of November, the Nineteenth Corps went into 
camp at New Iberia. 

By the end of December the Thirteenth Corps, 
except Sheldon s brigade which was at Plaquemine, 
had been gradually transferred to the Texas coast. 
Thus Franklin was left to hold the line of the Teche 
with little more than 5,000 men of the Nineteenth 
Corps and about 3,500 of Lee s cavalry. This, with 
the winter nights and the winter roads, was too small 
a force to hold a position so advanced and so exposed 
as New Iberia, even if there had been any longer an 
object in doing so. 

Accordingly, on the evening of the 5th of January, 
marching orders were issued for the following morn 
ing ; but in the night a drizzling rain came on and, 
freezing as it fell, coated the deep, dense mud with a 



WINTER QUARTERS. 279 

glaze of ice. The march was therefore put off a day, 
and on the morning of the 7th, through a frozen 
bog, a biting norther blowing, and the weather un 
usually cold for this region, the Nineteenth Corps 
floundered back to Franklin. The best of the roads 
were bad enough, but those across the bends, used in 
ordinary seasons as cut-offs, were now impassable 
sloughs, so the troops had to march nearly the full 
length of the bayou. Here a novel form of straggling 
was introduced through the ever industrious ingenuity 
of the lazy, many of whom contrived to leave 
the ranks, and, crossing the levee, seized canoes or 
made rafts, and tranquilly floated down the bayou 
ahead of their plodding comrades. 

On the morning of the gth of January the corps 
went into winter quarters at Franklin. Tents were 
not issued until a month later, but meanwhile 
the men built shelters and huts for themselves of 
such materials as they could find on the plantations 
or in the wooded swamps ; and with branches of live 
oak and boughs of laurel and the long gray Spanish 
moss, they constructed for their camps a lavish orna 
mentation of arbors and arches, mimic forts and 
sham monitors. 

The terms of service of the older regiments enlisted 
in the early days of 1861 being about to expire, the 
government now offered a bounty and a furlough for 
thirty days to all veterans who should again enlist for 
three years or during the war ; and in carrying out 
this plan Banks arranged to send home in each month, 
beginning with February, at least two regiments of re- 
enlisted veterans from each corps. Of the nineteen 
regiments and six batteries of the Nineteenth Corps 
raised in 1861, every one promptly embraced these 



280 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

terms. In some regiments nearly every man present 
re-enlisted. The 7th Vermont enrolled every survivor, 
save 59, of the original muster; in the i3th Connecti 
cut out of 406 present 400 signed ; the 26th Massa 
chusetts returned 546. To make up, in part, for the 
temporary loss to be accounted for from this cause, the 
government sent down four fine regiments, well com 
manded, the 2Qth Maine, the 3Oth Maine, the i53d 
New York, and the i4th New Hampshire, and, these 
being assigned to the Nineteenth Corps, the first 
three joined the First division, but the I4th New 
Hampshire came too late for the campaign, and was 
assigned to temporary duty near New Orleans. About 
the same time Nields s ist Delaware battery and 
Storer s 7th Massachusetts battery joined the corps. 
The idea of a foothold in Texas had been gradually 
swelling until at length it had attained the dimensions 
of an overland army of occupation. For this the 
nature of the region to be traversed, as well as the 
character of the enemy to be met, demanded a large 
mounted force. Therefore the government sent from 
Washington and from other Northern stations the 
2d New York veteran cavalry, the nth New York, 
the 1 8th New York, the 2d Maine, the 3d Rhode 
Island, the I2th Illinois, and the 3d Maryland, and 
from the West many horses. Banks also mounted 
seven more regiments of infantry, and having thus 
raised Lee s cavalry division, when all had joined, to 
nineteen regiments, they were finally organized in 
five brigades, with three batteries of horse artillery, 
namely, Duryea s, Rawles s, and Nims s. These three 
batteries were thus lost to the Nineteenth Corps, and 
with them four of the mounted infantry regiments, 
the 2d Louisiana, the 75th New York, the 8th New 



WINTER QUARTERS. 281 

Hampshire, and the 3ist Massachusetts; the last 
three only for a time. 

Returning from sick-leave, Emory relieved Weitzel 
in command of the First division on the i3th of De 
cember. Weitzel presently went North on special 
service and did not resume his command but was 
transferred in the spring to the Army of the James. 

In February, 1864, while the Nineteenth Corps lay 
in camp at Franklin, it was once more re-organized by 
breaking up the First, Third and Fourth divisions, 
and forming two new divisions, the First, commanded 
by Emory, comprising the brigades of Dwight, Me 
Millan and Benedict ; the Second division, commanded 
by Grover, composed of the brigades of Nickerson, 
Birge, and Sharpe. Emory s division was already 
concentrated on the Teche, but Grover s brigades 
were separated, Nickerson s being in the defences of 
New Orleans, Birge s in La Fourche, and Sharpe s at 
Baton Rouge. The first intention was to concentrate 
the division at Madisonville, and move it by rail to 
join Franklin ; but events interposed. 

The Corps staff serving at this time at headquar 
ters in the field included Colonel Charles C. Dwight. 
acting assistant inspector-general ; Surgeon Eugene F. 
Sanger, medical director ; Captain J. G. Oltman, topo 
graphical engineer ; Captain Thomas H. Annable, 
commissary of musters; Captain A. W. Chapman, 
judge-advocate ; Lieutenant John J. Williamson, 
ordnance officer; Captain Henry C. In wood, provost- 
marshal; Captain John P. Baker, Captain George M. 
Franklin, and Lieutenant David Lyon, aides-de-camp. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

THE RED RIVER. 

SEVEN months had thus been spent in desultory 
adventures and in multitudinous preparations without a 
serious military object, and still the capture of Mobile 
was to be put off, and still the dream of a foothold in 
Texas was to be pursued. As for Texas, if the 
government had, especially at this time, any settled 
plan, it is by no means easy to make out what it was. 
In the previous July the occupation of some point in 
Texas had been put forward by Halleck as an object 
of paramount importance. At first the particular 
place and manner were of no consequence ; yet, when 
the mouth of the Rio Grande had been seized, with 
the effect of cutting off the contraband trade of Mat- 
amoras, Seward, who may be supposed to have known 
the diplomatic purposes of the government, was 
frankly delighted, while Halleck, who must be re 
garded as expressing its military views, was as frankly 
disgusted. Finally, when not one foothold but many 
footholds had been gained along the coast of Texas, 
Halleck wound up the long correspondence * by renew 
ing his instructions of the previous summer, looking to 
a combined naval and military operation on the Red 
River upon a scale even greater than that originally 
contemplated ; for now, besides the great fleet of iron- 

1 January 4, 1864 Official Records, vol. xxxiv, part ii., p. 15. 
282 



THE RED RIVER. 283 

clads under Porter, the project was to absorb the 
available strength of three armies. Banks was to 
move northward by the Atchafalaya ; Steele was to 
advance from the line of the Arkansas ; and from 
Vicksburg Grant was to send Sherman, with such 
troops as he could spare. Grant, Banks, Sherman, 
and Steele, as well as Admiral Porter, received 
corresponding instructions at the same time, and, 
understanding them in the same sense, the Red River 
expedition was fairly launched. 

Once committed to the scheme, Banks devoted 
himself loyally to the arrangements necessary for 
prosecuting it on a scale at least commensurate with 
the magnitude of the undertaking and with the expec 
tations of the government, as he understood them. 
Texas was to be his objective, and he was to lead 
his army up the Red River, as the shortest and best 
way to Texas. From the outset he was committed to 
the use of a large body of cavalry able to operate on 
the plains that lie beyond the Sabine, as well as to 
overcome the opposition of the mounted forces of the 
Confederacy in that region. Not only was forage 
scarce in the Red River country, but, Shreveport 
once taken and passed, the march would lie for three 
hundred miles across a desert ; an immense forage 
train was therefore indispensable. It was also rea 
sonable to suppose that, before passing Shreveport, 
the combined armies of the Confederacy in the trans- 
Mississippi would have to be met and beaten, and for 
this end a large force of infantry and artillery must 
also form part of the expedition, at least as far as 
Shreveport. The co-operation of the Navy was 
necessary, in its turn, if only to keep open the 
long line of supply by the Red River. Finally the 



284 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

* 

usual time of the highest water in the upper Red 
River fixed the date of the movement. 

Sherman came from Vicksburg to New Orleans 
on the ist of March, and within a few hours reached 
a distinct agreement with Banks as to the aid ex 
pected from the Army of the Tennessee. Admiral 
Porter had already arranged to be at the mouth of the 
Red River with a large fleet of gunboats in time for 
the rising of the waters ; and now Sherman promised 
to send with the fleet ten thousand picked men of his 
army, to be at Alexandria on the i7th of March. 
Banks, on his part, agreed that his troops, marching 
north by the Teche, should meet Sherman s at Alexan 
dria. Steele, who was at Little Rock, undertook to 
move at the same time to meet the combined forces 
and the fleet on the Red River. Confronting Steele 
was Price ; across Banks s line of advance stood Tay 
lor ; with the whole or any part of his force, Sherman 
and Porter might have to reckon, and in any case 
Fort De Russy must be neutralized or reduced before 
they could get to Alexandria. 

Thus upon a given day two armies and a fleet, hun 
dreds of miles apart, were to concentrate at a remote 
point far within the enemy s lines, situated on a river 
always difficult and uncertain of navigation, and now 
obstructed and fortified. Not often in the history 
of war is the same fundamental principle twice vio 
lated in the same campaign ; yet here it was so, and 
even in the same orders, for after once concentrating 
within the enemy s lines at Alexandria, the united 
forces of Banks, Sherman, and Porter were actually 
to meet those of Steele within the enemy s lines at 
Shreveport, where Kirby Smith, strongly fortified 
moreover, was within three hundred miles, roughly 



THE RED RIVER. 285 

speaking, of either Banks or Steele, while Steele was 
separated from Banks by nearly five hundred miles of 
hostile territory, practically unknown to any one in 
the Union armies, and neither commander could 
communicate with the other save by rivers in their 
rear, over a long circuit, destined to lengthen with 
each day s march, as they should approach their com 
mon enemy in his central stronghold. 

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about all this 
was Sherman s ready and express assent to the disre 
gard of the first rule of the great art of which he had 
always been an earnest student and long past a mas 
ter : yet it is to be observed that Sherman knew the 
Red River country better than any one in the Union 
armies ; he knew well the scanty numbers and the 
scattered state of the hostile forces ; with him, as 
well as with Admiral Porter, this movement had 
long been a favorite ; he had indeed hoped and 
expected to undertake it himself ; but he evidently 
had in mind a quick and bold movement, having for 
its object the destruction of the Confederate depots 
and workshops at Shreveport, without giving the 
enemy notice, breathing space, or time to concen 
trate. But this was not to be. On learning, at New 
Orleans, that Banks meant to command in person, 
Sherman naturally gave up all thought of accompany 
ing the expedition, and went back to Vicksburg to 
get his troops ready. The contingent he had prom 
ised to send from the Army of the Tennessee he now 
made up of two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, 
united under Mower, with Kilby Smith s division of 
the Seventeenth Corps, and the command of the 
whole he gave to A. J. Smith. 

As early as the 2d of March Porter assembled at 



286 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the mouth of the Red River a great fleet of nineteen 
ironclads, including fifteen of the heavier class and 
four of the lighter. The fleet carried 162 guns, of 
which 62 were of the higher calibres, from Sopounder 
rifles up to ii-inch Dahlgrens, and the combined 
weight of projectiles was but little less than five tons. 
On the loth of March, A. J. Smith embarked his 
force at Vicksburg on an admirably organized fleet of 
nineteen river transports, controlled by a simple sys 
tem of signals from the flagship Clara Bell. When, 
the next day, Smith joined Porter at the mouth of 
the Red River, six days were still left until the time 
when Banks had agreed to be at Alexandria with his 

o 

army. Sherman s orders to Smith required him to 
make use of the interval by co-operating with the 
navy in an expedition up the Black and the Washita, 
for the destruction of Harrisonburg, but Porter had 
already done the work single-handed. Naturally sup 
posing that Banks s troops were in march up the 
Teche toward the point of meeting, although they 
knew that Banks himself was still detained at New 
Orleans, Smith and Porter determined at once to 
take or turn Fort De Russy, and then to push on to 
Alexandria. On the morning of the i2th of March, 
the combined fleet entered the Red River. At the 
head of the Atchafalaya, Porter, with nine of the 
gunboats, turned off to the left and descended that 
stream as far as Simmesport, followed by the army 
transports, while Phelps, with the East-port and the 
remainder of the fleet, continued the ascent of the 
Red River, with a view of threatening Fort De 
Russy, and occupying the attention of its defenders 
until Smith could land and march across country to 
attack them. 



THE RED RIVER. 287 

On the morning of the i3th of March Smith 
landed, and toward nightfall took up the line of 
march for Fort De Russy, distant by land twenty- 
eight miles, although by the windings of the river 
nearly seventy. In his front, Smith found Scurry s 
brigade of Walker s division partly entrenched on 
Yellow Bayou ; but Mower quickly brushed Scurry- 
aside, and Walker, after observing the strength of 
his enemy, concentrated on the Bayou De Glaize, to 
avoid being shut up in the elbow at Marksville, as 
well as to get Mouton in support ; and thus the way 
was open to Smith. On the afternoon of the i4th, 
Mower arrived before Fort De Russy, and just be 
fore nightfall the brigades of Lynch and Shaw swept 
over the parapet and forced a surrender, with a loss of 
3 killed and 35 wounded. The captures included 25 
officers and 292 men, and ten guns, of which two were 
9-inch Dahlgrens from the spoils of the Indianola 
and the Harriet Lane, once more restored to their 
first owners. 

Phelps, who had with great energy burst through the 
formidable raft nine miles below Fort De Russy, came 
up in the Eastport in time to fire one shot from his 100 
pounder Parrott, and to see the white flag displayed. 

When this news reached him, Porter at once 
ordered his fastest boats to hasten to Alexandria. 
The advance of the fleet arrived off the town on the 
1 5th of March, just as the last of the Confederate 
boats were making good their escape above the falls. 
Kilby Smith with his division followed on the trans 
ports with the remainder of the fleet, and, landing at 
Alexandria during the afternoon of the i6th, relieved 
the naval detachment sent ashore some hours earlier 
to occupy the town. On the i8th of March, A. J. 



288 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Smith marched in with Mower s two divisions. Thus 
the advance of Porter s fleet was at Alexandria two 
days, and the head of A. J. Smith s column one day, 
ahead of the appointed time. 

Walker retreated on Natchitoches, accompanied 
by Gray s brigade of Mouton s division from the 
Huffpower. Taylor, quitting his headquarters at Al 
exandria, called in Polignac s brigade from the line 
of the Tensas and concentrated his force at Carroll 
Jones s plantation, on the road between Opelousas and 
Fort Jesup, distant forty-six miles in a south-south 
easterly direction from Natchitoches, twelve miles 
south from Cotile, and twenty miles southwesterly 
from Alexandria. Here he was in a good position 
for receiving supplies and reinforcements, for cover 
ing Natchitoches, and for observing any approach of 
the Union forces either from Opelousas or from 
Alexandria. 

Meanwhile Banks had called in from Texas the 
divisions of Cameron and Ransom of the Thirteenth 
Corps and sent them to join Franklin on the lower 
Teche. The command of this detachment being 
given to Ransom, his division fell to Landram. Lee s 
cavalry was given the same direction, excepting Fon 
da s brigade, which stayed at Port Hudson. His last 
brigade, that of Dudley, marched from Donaldson- 
ville on the 6th of March, crossed Berwick Bay on 
the Qth, and arrived at the cavalry camp near Frank 
lin on the loth. Cameron s wagons reached him at 
Berwick on the i2th, and he marched to join the army 
in the field on the morning of the i3th. On the even 
ing of the same day Lee led the advance of the 
army from the town of Franklin, but, his column being 
quite nine miles long, it was not until the following 




LOUISIANA 




SHEET IV, 



THE RED RIVER. 289 

morning that his rear-guard filed into the road. On 
the morning of the I5th of March he was followed by 
Emory and Ransom. Lee arrived at Alexandria on 
the 1 9th, Emory on the 25th, and Ransom on the 
26th. The troops were, with some exceptions among 
the newly mounted regiments, in admirable condition, 
all were in fine spirits, and the long march of one 
hundred and sixty miles was well ordered and well 
executed, without confusion, haste, or delay, so that 
when, with closed ranks and bands playing, and with 
measured tread and all intervals observed, the column 
entered Alexandria, the appearance of the men drew 
exclamations of admiration even from critics the least 
friendly. 

When the news of A. J. Smith s and Porter s arri 
val in the Red River and of the capture of Fort De 
Russy reached New Orleans on the i6th of March, it 
found Banks himself preparing to set out on the fol 
lowing morning to join Franklin near New Iberia. 
He at once despatched Stone to Alexandria by the 
river, and following him on the 23d on the transport 
steamer Black Hawk, arrived at Alexandria on the 
24th, and took command of the combined forces of 
Franklin and A. J. Smith. 

Grover, as has been said, was to have moved with 
Franklin, or close upon his heels, but the 7th of 
March had come before the first preparatory orders 
were given for the movement of Sharpe s brigade from 
Baton Rouge, and not until the loth was Grover told 
to concentrate his division at Thibodeaux. His route 
was now changed to the river. Accordingly Sharpe s 
brigade debarked at Alexandria on the 26th, and the 
Second brigade under Molineux on the 28th, but 

Nickerson stayed for a fortnight longer at Carrollton. 
19 



2QO THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Vincent, who with the 2d Louisiana cavalry had 
been watching and reporting Lee s movement and 
regularly falling back before his advance, joined 
Taylor at Carroll Jones s on the igth. Then Taylor 
sent Vincent with his regiment and Edgar s battery to 
watch the crossing of Bayou Jean de Jean and to hold 
the road by which Banks was expected to advance on 
Shreveport. Vincent encamped on the high ground 
known as Henderson s Hill, commanding the junction 
of the Bayous Rapides and Cotile twenty-three miles 
above Alexandria. Here he was in the air, and A. J. 
Smith, realizing the importance of seizing the passage 
without loss of time, at once proceeded to dislodge 
him. Accordingly, on the 2ist of March he sent out 
Mower with his two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps 
and Lucas s brigade of cavalry. Mower made his 
dispositions with great skill and promptness, and that 
night, during a heavy storm of rain and hail, com 
pletely surprised Vincent s camp and captured the 
whole regiment bodily, together with four guns of 
Edgar s battery. A few of Vincent s men managed to 
escape in the darkness and confusion, but about 250 
were brought in and with them 200 horses. This was 
.a heavy blow to Taylor, since it deprived him of the 
only cavalry he had with him and thus of the means 
of scouting until Green should come from Texas. 
Mower returned to Alexandria on the 22d, and Taylor, 
probably unwilling to risk a surprise in his exposed 
position, withdrew about, thirty miles to Kisatchie, still 
covering the Fort Jesup road ; but a week later he 
sent his cavalry northward twenty-six miles to Natchi- 
toches and with his infantry retired to Pleasant Hill. 

Banks has been blamed for his delay in meeting 
A. J. Smith and Porter at Alexandria, yet, whatever 



THE RED RIVER. 291 

may be the theoretical merits of such a criticism, in 
fact no loss of time that occurred up to the moment 
of quitting Alexandria had the least influence on the 
course of the campaign, for even after the concentra 
tion was completed the river, though very slowly 
rising by inches, was still so low that the gunboats 
were unable to pass the rapids. The Eastport hung 
nearly three days on the rocks in imminent peril, 
and at last had to be hauled off by main force, a 
whole brigade swaying on her hawsers to the rhythm 
of the field music. This was on the 26th of March, 
and the Eastport was the first of the gunboats to pass 
the rapids, the Admiral being naturally unwilling to 
expose the boats of lighter draught as well as of 
lighter armament to the risk of capture if sent up 
alone. The hospital steamer Woodford, which was 
the first boat to follow the Eastport, was wrecked 
in the attempt. The next five boats took three days 
to pass, nor was it until the 3d of April that the 
last of the twelve gunboats and thirty transports, 
selected to accompany the expedition to Shreveport, 
floated in safety above the obstructions. Seve 
ral of the transports drew too much water to 
permit them to pass the rapids ; these, therefore, 
stayed below, and with them the remaining seven 
gunboats. 

And now occurred the first important departure 
from the original plan of operations. The season of 
high water had been looked forward to as insuring 
constant communication along the whole length of 
the Red River as far as the fleet should be able to 
ascend. But the Red is a treacherous river at best, 
and this year it was at its worst. There was to be no 
March rise worth speaking about. Thus the rapids 



292 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

presented an obstacle, impassable, or only to be 
passed with difficulty ; the bare rocks divided the fleet 
in twain, the only communication was overland by 
the road around the falls. The supplies had to be 
landed at Alexandria, loaded into wagons, hauled 
around, and re-shipped, and this made it necessary 
to establish depots in the town as well as above the 
falls, and to leave behind Grover s division, 4,000 
strong, to protect the stores and the carry. At the 
same time McPherson recalled Ellet s marine bri 
gade to Vicksburg, and thus the expedition lost a 
second detachment of 3,000 men ; but this loss was 
partly made up by Dickey s brigade of colored 
troops, 1,500 strong, which joined the column from 
the garrison of Port Hudson. Withal the force was 
ample, for at the end of March there were 31,000 
officers and men for duty, including about 4,800 un 
der Ransom, 6,600 under Emory, 9,000 under A. J. 
Smith, and Lee s cavalry, 4,600. Here was a superb 
fighting column of 25,000 officers and men of all 
arms, with ninety guns. This more than met the 
calculations of Banks and Sherman on which the 
campaign was undertaken. In the three columns 
there were to be 40,000 men ; of these, Sherman was 
to furnish 10,000, Banks 15,000, and Steele 15,000. 

Steele had already sent word that he could not be 
counted upon for more than 7,000, all told. He had 
expected to march from Little Rock by the i4th of 
March on Arkadelphia, there to be joined by Thayer 
moving at the same time from Fort Smith. Thayer 
marched on the 2ist with 4,000 effectives and 14 
guns, Steele on the 23d with 7,500 effectives and 
1 6 guns; besides these, he left Clayton with 1,600 
men and 1 1 guns to hold Pine Bluff. 



THE RED RIVER. 293 

We have seen how, in one movement, three di 
vergent ideas were being carried out without either 
having been distinctly decided on : a foothold in 
Texas, an overland occupation in force, and a swift 
raid by the river. To these there was now to be 
added a fourth idea, in itself sound, yet fatally incon 
sistent with the others. 

On the 27th of March, before setting out from 
Alexandria, Banks received, by special messenger, the 
orders of Lieutenant-General Grant, dated the i5th 
of March, on taking command of the armies of the 
United States. For the first time during the war, all 
the armies were to move as one, with a single purpose, 
ruled by a single will ; along the whole line, from the 
Mississippi to the Atlantic, a combined movement 
was to take place early in May, and in this the entire 
effective force of the Department of the Gulf was 
to take part. A. J. Smith was to join the Army of 
the Tennessee for the Atlanta campaign, and Banks 
was to go against Mobile. Sherman had lent A. J. 
Smith to Banks for thirty days. This limit Grant 
was willing to extend by ten or fifteen days, but if 
Shreveport were not to be taken by that time that 
is, by the 25th of April at the very latest, then Banks 
was to send A. J. Smith s detachment back to Vicks- 
burg in season to arrive there at the date originally 
named that is, by the loth of April, even if this 
should lead to the abandonment of the expedition. 
The orders for the expedition given by Halleck, 
while occupying nominally the supreme command 
that had now in truth fallen into the strong hand 
of Grant, were not revoked; the expedition was to 
go on ; only, to make sure that it should not be gone 
too long, it was to be put in irons. 



294 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Grant may easily be excused if, while as yet hardly 
warm in the saddle, he hesitated to revoke orders 
that he must have known to be those of the President 
himself ; yet, since a door must be either open or shut, 
it would have been far better to revoke the orders 
than to trammel their execution with conditions so 
hard that Banks might well have thrown up the 
campaign then and there. However, Banks on his 
part had good reason to know the wishes of the gov 
ernment and not less the consequences of disregard 
ing them ; moreover, as the case must have presented 
itself to him, there was an off chance that Kirby 
Smith might not be able concentrate in time to save 
Shreveport ; another, still more remote, that he might 
give up the place without a fight ; and a third, more 
unlikely than either, that Steele might join Banks in 
time to make short work of it, or at all events to 
make Banks strong enough to spare A. J. Smith by 
the appointed time. Two weeks remained until the 
earliest date set for A. J. Smith to be at Vicksburg; 
twenty-nine days to the latest day allowed for the tak 
ing of Shreveport. In his dilemma Banks decided to 
run these chances. 

After seeing the first of the gunboats safely over 
the falls, on the 26th of March Banks set his column 
in motion. A. J. Smith marched on Cotile Landing 
to wait for his boats. On the 28th Lee, with the main 
body of the cavalry, preceded Smith to Henderson s 
Hill, in order to hold the road and the crossing of Bayou 
Jean de Jean. Franklin with Emory and Ransom and 
the main supply trains followed on the same day. 

Twenty miles above Cotile Landing the Red River 
divides, and for sixty miles, until Grand Ecore is 
reached, its waters flow in two unequal channels ; the 



THE RED RIVER. 295 

most southerly of these, along which the road runs, is 
known as Cane River, or Old Red River. This was 
formerly the main stream, but the more northerly 
branch, at once deeper and less tortuous, now forms 
the only navigable channel, and is called the Rigolets 
du Bon Dieu, or more familiarly the Bon Dieu. 

Lee crossed Cane River at Monett s Ferry, and, 
recrossing above Cloutierville, entered Natchitoches 
on the 3ist of March. At Monett s Ferry on the 
29th, Cloutierville on the 3Oth, and again at Natchi 
toches he encountered slight opposition from the 
enemy s skirmishers. 

Franklin, marching by the same road, encamped at 
Natchitoches on the 2d of April. 

Embarking on his transports as they came, A. J. 
Smith set out from Cotile Landing on the 2d of 
April in company with Porter s fleet, and landed at 
Grand Ecore on the 3d. 

The river was still rising slowly, and it was not 
until the 7th of April that Porter considered the 
draught of water sufficient to justify him in going 
farther. Then, leaving at Grand Ecore the six heavy 
boats that had come with him thus far, he began 
the ascent of the upper reach of the river with the 
Carondelet, Fort Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho, 
and Chillicothe, convoying and closely followed by a 
fleet of twenty transports, bearing Kilby Smith s 
division and a large quantity of military stores of all 
kinds. Porter expected to be at Springfield Landing, 
no miles above Grand Ecore, on the 9th. On ar 
riving there, Kilby Smith was to reconnoitre towards 
Springfield, and if practicable, to send a regiment to 
seize the bridge across the Bayou Pierre in the direc 
tion of Mansfield. 



296 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

On the 6th of April, as soon as the movement of 
the fleet was decided on, Banks resumed the march 
on Shreveport. Shortly after leaving Natchitoches 
the main road, with which the road from Grand Ecore 
unites, strikes off from the river toward the west 
to avoid Spanish Lake, and, traversing a barren 
wilderness, affords neither position nor resting-place 
until Shreveport is reached. Banks meant to be at 
Mansfield, holding the roads that there converge, 
simultaneously with the arrival of the fleet at Spring 
field Landing. Lee, who was encamped at Natchi 
toches with the brigades of Lucas, Robinson, and 
Dudley, led the advance, and marching twenty-three 
miles encamped that night at Crump s Corner. Ran 
som broke camp at Natchitoches at six o clock in the 
morning, and marched sixteen miles. Emory fol 
lowed closely upon Ransom. A. J. Smith remained 
at Grand Ecore till the next day, to await the de 
parture of the fleet, and then marching eight miles 
on the Shreveport road fell into the rear of the 
column. Dickey s colored brigade formed the guard 
of the main wagon train, and Gooding s brigade of 
cavalry covered the rear and left flank. From this 
time Lee s movements were to be directed by 
Franklin. 

Meanwhile, between the 3d and 5th of April, Tay 
lor, after consuming the forage for twenty miles 
around Pleasant Hill, had withdrawn his infantry to 
Mansfield. Green s cavalry, long expected, was now 
beginning to come in, largely augmented, from Texas, 
whither it had been hastily sent, early in the winter, 
to meet the threatened invasion from the coast. 

On the morning of the 7th of April, Lee advanced 
on Pleasant Hill, Robinson leading, supported by 



THE RED RIVER. 297 

Lucas. Robinson easily drove before him the ad 
vance guard of the Confederate cavalry until about 
two o clock in the afternoon, at Wilson s farm, three 
miles beyond Pleasant Hill, he came upon the main 
body of Green s force, comprising Major s brigade, 
under Lane, posted in the skirt of the wood, on rising 
ground, behind a clearing. Robinson dismounted his 
men and engaged the enemy, who resisted so firmly 
that Lucas was sent to Robinson s support just in 
time to save him from being driven off the field by a 
determined charge. Lucas likewise dismounted his 
men, and the two brigades, charging together afoot, 
drove the Confederates from their position, and pur 
sued them to Carroll s saw-mill, on the southerly 
branch of Bayou St. Patrice, about seven miles be 
yond Pleasant Hill, where, toward nightfall, they 
made a strong stand. In this action, Lee took 23 
prisoners, and suffered a loss of 1 1 killed, 42 wounded, 
and 9 missing. 

Ransom marched at half-past five in the morning, 
and at two o clock in the afternoon the head of his 
column was at Pleasant Hill, nineteen miles distant, 
where he went into camp, having overtaken the cavalry 
train during the march, and Dudley s brigade at the 
close. Emory, closely following Ransom, arrived at 
Pleasant Hill about five o clock in the afternoon, and 
went into carnp. The last of the infantry and all the 
wagons were much retarded by a heavy storm that 
broke over the rear of the column and cut up the 
road badly. The night was far spent when Ransom s 
train joined him, and Emory s, in spite of every exer 
tion, could not be brought up until late on the follow 
ing morning. A. J. Smith was now a good day s 
march behind Ransom and Emory. 



298 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

When Lee found himself so obstinately opposed, 
and so hindered by these dilatory tactics, he sent a 
message to Franklin, through Banks s senior aide-de 
camp, who had been riding with the advance, asking 
that a brigade of infantry might be sent forward to 
his assistance. Lee s view was that the infantry, ad 
vancing in skirmish order, could make better progress 
than the cavalry, which, in a country so thickly 
wooded, found itself reduced to the same tactics, 
with the added drawback that as often as they dis 
lodged the enemy they had to run back after their 
horses before they could follow. Franklin declined 
to accede to this request without orders, justly re 
flecting that infantry thus advanced at night, after a 
hard day s march, must be worn out in the attempt to 
keep touch with the cavalry, while, in the history of 
these mixed forces, the instances are rare indeed in 
which the mounted men have not, after bringing on 
the action, left it, as the proper thing, for the infantry 
to finish. However, later in the evening Banks 
joined Franklin, and an hour or two before midnight 
ordered him to send a brigade to Lee, to report to 
him at dawn. Upon this Franklin directed Ransom 
to send either a brigade or a division, at his discre 
tion, and Ransom, in his turn, ordered Landram to 
take Emerson s brigade of his division and join the 
cavalry for the service indicated. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 
SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 

LANDRAM accordingly marched at three o clock 
on the morning of the 8th of April, and reported to 
Lee about five. 

Soon after sunrise Lee moved forward against the 
enemy, Lucas leading, with one regiment of his 
brigade dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, 
supported by two regiments of Landram s infantry, 
in line of battle. Green s men still adhering to the 
obstructive policy of the day before, after a time the 
two remaining regiments of Emerson s brigade were 
deployed and required to drive the enemy more 
rapidly, while the cavalry covered the flanks. About 
one o clock in the afternoon, when half the distance 
that separated Mansfield from his camp of the night 
before had been accomplished, Lee found himself 
at the edge of a large clearing on the slope of a hill, 
with the Confederates in force in his front and on his 
right flank. 

Ransom marched from Pleasant Hill at half-past 
five, and at half-past ten was ten miles distant on the 
northerly branch of the Bayou St. Patrice, designated 
as his camp for the day. He was just going into 
bivouac when, on a request from Lee for a fresh force 
of infantry to relieve the exhausted men of Emerson s 
brigade, Franklin directed Ransom to go forward 

299 



300 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

himself with Vance s brigade, and thus to make sure 
of Emerson s return. 

Franklin s arrangements for the day s march of his 
command, as well as Banks s for the whole force, con 
templated a short march for the head of the column 
and a longer one for the rear, so that at a compara 
tively early hour in the day the army would be closed 
up, ready to encounter the enemy in good order. 
Accordingly, shortly before three o clock in the after 
noon, Emory went into camp on the banks of the 
south branch of the St. Patrice, within easy support 
ing distance of Ransom, while A. J. Smith continued 
his march, until at night, having accomplished 
twenty-one miles, he went into bivouac about two 
miles before reaching Pleasant Hill. 

At last nearly the whole of Green s cavalry corps 
had joined Taylor, and at the same time two divisions 
of Price s army had come in from Arkansas and taken 
post in supporting distance of Taylor at Keachie, 
which is about half-way between Mansfield and 
Shreveport, or about twenty miles from either. 
With his own force, under Walker and Mouton, 
Green s Texans, Churchill s Arkansas division, and 
Parsons s Missouri division, Taylor now had at least 
sixteen thousand good men, with whom, if permitted, 
he might give battle in a chosen position, while 
Banks s force was stretched out the length of a long 
day s march on a single narrow road in a dense pine 
forest, with no elbow-room save such as was to be 
found in the narrow and infrequent clearings. In 
such a region excess of numbers was a hindrance 
rather than a help, and cavalry was worse than useless 
for offence. Banks was, moreover, encumbered by 
twelve miles of wagons bearing all his ammunition 



SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 301 

and stores, and was weakened by the necessity of 
guarding this long train through the barren wilder 
ness deep in the heart of the enemy s country. Of 
these conditions Kirby Smith was planning to take 
advantage, and it was to guard against such an enter 
prise that Banks s column was closing up in readiness 
to meet the enemy with its full strength, when sud 
denly on both sides events took the bit in their teeth 
and precipitated a battle that was in the plans of 
neither. 

It was about eleven o clock when Ransom set out 
to go to the front with Vance s brigade. The 
distance to be passed over was about five and a 
half miles. Riding ahead, Ransom himself arrived 
on the field about half-past one in the after 
noon. At this time, by Lee s orders, Landram had 
pushed forward the iQth Kentucky, deployed as skir 
mishers, and supporting it strongly with the rest of 
Emerson s brigade, had driven Green s troopers 
across the open ground, over the hill, and well into 
the woods beyond, and had taken position on the 
crest. Here he was joined by Nims, who brought 
his guns into battery across the road. On the left 
of Nims were placed two of Rottaken s howitzers, 
detached from the 6th Missouri cavalry. On the 
right and left of the horse artillery Emerson formed, 
and Vance, as soon as he came up, took position on 
Emerson s right, but as Banks undertook to hasten 
the movement through the direct action of his own 
staff-officers, it resulted that the regiments of the 
two brigades were sandwiched. Lucas, dismounted, 
extended the line of battle to the right. With him 
were a section of Rawles s battery and another of 
Rottaken s. 



302 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

To cover the flanks in the forest Dudley deployed 
as skirmishers the 8th New Hampshire on the right, 
and on the left the 3d and the 3ist Massachusetts, 
supported by the 26. Illinois. Robinson was with the 
cavalry train, which was rather closely following the 
march of its division, in order to clear the head of 
the infantry without starving the cavalry. 

Neither side could move forward without bringing 
on a battle. But Lee, instead of being able and ready 
to disengage his cavalry advance-guard and to fall back 
to a chosen field, was now anchored to the ground 
where he found himself, not alone by the concentra 
tion of the main body of the cavalry at the very front, 
but also and even more firmly by the presence of the 
infantry with its artillery and their employment, natu 
rally enough, to form the centre of his main line. 

The clearing, the largest yet seen by the Union 
Army since entering the interminable wilderness of 
pines, was barely half a mile in width ; across the 
road it stretched for about three quarters of a mile, 
and down the middle it was divided by a ravine. 

Directly in front of Banks stood Taylor in order 
of battle, covering the crossing of the ways that lead 
to Pleasant Hill, to Shreveport, to Bayou Pierre, 
and to the Sabine. On his right was the cavalry of 
Bee, then Walker s infantry astride of the main road, 
and on Walker s left Mouton, supported on his left by 
the cavalry brigades of Major and Bagby, dismounted. 
To this position, well selected, Taylor had advanced 
from Mansfield early in the morning, with the clear 
intention of offering battle, and, regardless of Kirby 
Smith s purpose of concentrating nearer Shreveport, 
had sent back orders for Churchill and Parsons to 
come forward. They marched early, and were by 



SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 303 

this time well on the way, but a distance of twenty- 
five miles separated their camp of the night before 
from the field of the approaching combat. 

As on the previous day s march, Stone had been 
with Lee s advance since the early morning, without, 
however, being charged with the views of his chief 
and without attempting to issue orders in his name ; 
but now Banks himself rode to the extreme front, as 
his habit was. Arriving on the ground not long after 
Ransom, and seeing the enemy before him in force, 
Banks at once ordered Lee to hold his ground and 
sent back orders to Franklin to bring forward the 
column. The skirmishing that had been going on 
all the morning, as an incident of the advance and 
retreat of the opposing forces, had become the sharp 
prelude of battle, and through the openings of the 
forest the enemy could be seen in continuous move 
ment toward his left. This was Major and Mouton 
feeling their way to the Union right, beyond which 
and diagonally across the front ran the road that 
leads from Mansfield to Bayou Pierre. 

Whether Taylor, as he says, now became impatient 
at the delay and ordered Mouton to open the attack, 
or whether, as others have asserted, Mouton attacked 
without the knowledge or orders of Taylor, is not 
quite clear, nor is it here material. About four 
o clock, when the two lines had looked at each other 
for two hours or more, Taylor suddenly delivered his 
attack by a vigorous charge of Mouton s division on 
the east of the road. Ransom s infantry on the field 
numbered about 2,400 officers and men ; including 
Lucas, Banks s fighting line fell below 3,500, and the 
whole force he had at hand was not above 5,000 
strong. Against this, Taylor was now advancing 



304 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

with nearly 10,000. It was therefore inevitable that 
on both flanks his line must widely overlap that of 
Banks as soon as the two should meet. 

When Ransom perceived Mouton s movement, he 
threw forward his right to meet it with such spirit 
that Mouton s first line was driven back in con 
fusion upon his second ; then rallying and returning 
to the charge, Mouton s men halted, lay down, and 
began firing at about two hundred yards range. The 
two batteries of Landram s division, Cone s Chicago 
Mercantile, and Klauss s ist Indiana, now came on the 
field, and were posted by Ransom on the ridge near 
the centre, to oppose the enemy s advance on the left, 
before which Dudley s men were already falling back. 
Bee and Walker had in fact turned the whole left 
flank, and were rapidly moving on, breaking in the 
line as they advanced. This soon left Nims s guns 
without support, and at the same time Klauss and 
Cone came under a fire so severe from Walker s men, 
that Ransom determined to withdraw to the cover of 
the wood in his rear at the edge of the clearing. 
Unfortunately, Captain Dickey, his assistant adju 
tant-general, fell mortally wounded in the act of com 
municating these orders, and thus some of the regi 
ments farther toward the right, being without orders, 
and fighting stubbornly against great odds, stood their 
ground until they were completely surrounded and 
taken prisoners. While aiding Landram to rally and 
reform the remnants of his division in the skirt of 
timber, Ransom was severely wounded in the knee, 
and had to be carried off the field. Vance and Em 
erson were wounded and taken prisoners, each at the 
head of his brigade. 

Meanwhile, shortly after three o clock, at his quar- 



SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 305 

ters, near Ransom s camp of the forenoon, Franklin 
received his first suggestion of an impending battle, 
in Banks s order to bring all the infantry to the front. 
First sending back word to Emory, Franklin set out 
at once and rode forward rapidly, followed by Cam 
eron s division. When, some time after four o clock, 
he entered the clearing and galloped to the hill where 
the guns of Nims still stood grimly defiant and Ran 
som s men were still desperately struggling to hold 
their first ground, the situation was already hopeless. 
Hardly had he arrived on the ground, than, by a 
single volley from Walker s advancing lines, Frank 
lin s horse was killed, and he himself and Captains 
Chapman and Pigman of his staff were wounded. 

Cameron came up just as Landram was striving 
hard to rally his men and to hold a second position in 
the lower skirt of the wood, to prevent the enemy 
from coming on across the clearing ; but for this, 
time and numbers and elbow-room were alike 
wanting. Moreover, every moment the Confederate 
troopers must be gaining on the flanks. Nor was 
Cameron s handful, barely 1,300, enough to enable 
the remnant of the Thirteenth Corps to hold for 
many minutes so weak a position against such odds. 
Cameron deployed his four battalions and tried hard, 
but the whole line soon crumbled and fell apart to 
the rear. 

Until this moment, Banks and Franklin, as well as 
every officer of the staff of either, beginning with 
Stone, had exerted themselves to the utmost to sec 
ond the efforts of Ransom and of Landram to save 
the day. The retreat once fairly begun, all attempt 
to stay its course was for a time given up as idle, for 
every man knew just how far back he must go to find 



20 



3 o6 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

room to form a line of battle longer than the road was 
narrow. Green s cavalry having been for the most 
part dismounted and on the flanks, as well as in the 
forest, the pursuit was not very vigorous and was 
now and then retarded by the successive covering 
lines of Lucas and of Dudley, so that the prospect 
seemed fair of bringing off the remnants of the fight 
ing force without much more loss, when about a mile 
behind the battle-field, at the foot of a slight descent, 
the retreating column came upon a knot of wagons 
inextricably tangled and stuck fast in a slough. This 
was the great cavalry train trying to escape. In 
stantly what had been a severe check became a seri 
ous disaster. Already, by holding so stiffly to his 
first position, in the front line, in the road, Nims had 
lost more than half his horses, and thus in quitting 
the field he found himself compelled to abandon 
three of his guns ; yet not until he had inflicted vast 
injuries upon his enemy, and to the last furnished 
a noble example of coolness in the performance of 
duty and the highest courage in the hour of trial. 
Now the remnant of this fine battery was swallowed 
up in the wreck of wagons, and scon fourteen more 
guns went to swell the ruin. Thus Rawles and 
Rottaken lost each a section, Cone and Klauss their 
whole batteries. In all twenty guns were lost ; three 
on the field and seventeen at the jam. With them 
went 175 wagons, n ambulances, and 1,001 draught 
animals. To pass the obstruction the infantry had 
to turn widely out of the road and for a long distance 
push their way through the woods. No semblance 
of order survived. After this there was only one 
mass of men, wagons, and horses crowding to the 
rear. 



SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 307 

How little expectation there had been of fighting 
a battle that day, especially on the line where the 
extreme outposts chanced to be, and how suddenly 
all was changed, is aptly shown by what was hap 
pening in Emory s camp when, at a quarter before 
four o clock, he received Franklin s order to go to 
the front. The wagons of the Thirteenth Corps were 
in the road in the act of passing the lines of the Nine 
teenth Corps on the way to join their proper com 
mand. Emory s wagons had been with him for some 
little time and several of the quartermasters were 
even engaged in issuing clothing when the summons 
came. There had been no heavy firing as yet, such 
as indicates a battle, and the exact degree of urgency 
may be best represented by saying that the marching 
orders were delivered to Emory in writing by a 
mounted orderly and were in these words : " Move 
your infantry immediately to the front, leaving one 
regiment as guard to your batteries and train. If 
your train has got up, you will take two days rations 
and the cooking utensils." The language of this 
order, which may fairly be taken as an authentic 
reflection of the oral message from Banks, on which 
it was directly based, would have justified Emory in 
taking an hour or more for the issue of the rations ; 
but Emory, whose nature it was to forecast danger, 
had from the first hour of the campaign been appre 
hensive of some sudden attack that should find 
the army unprepared ; and thus it was that, merely 
stopping to take a double ration of hard bread, twelve 
minutes later the head of his column filed into the 
road and marched to the front. At this hour the 
battle was just beginning, and the first sounds, rolling 
to the rear, served to quicken the march of Emory s 



308 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

men. About a quarter before five he was met by an 
aide-de-camp with orders to hasten, coupled with the 
first direct information that an engagement was in 
progress. A mile farther on an ambulance was met 
bearing Ransom to the rear. Emory exchanged a 
few words with the wounded officer, and then ordered 
his division to take the double-quick. A mile beyond, 
the usual rabble of camp followers and stragglers was 
encountered, and soon the road was filled with the 
swollen stream of fugitives, crying that the day was 
lost. 

And now from Emory down to the smallest drum 
mer-boy every man saw that the hour had come 
to show what the First division was made of. The 
leading regiments and flankers instantly fixed bayo 
nets ; the staff-officers drew their swords ; hardly a 
man fell out, but at a steady and even quickened pace, 
Emory s men forced their way through the confused 
mass in the eager endeavor to reach a position where 
the enemy might be held in check. This, in that 
country, was not an easy task, and it was not until 
the last rush of the flying crowd and the dropping of 
stray bullets here and there told that the pursuing 
enemy was close at hand, that Emory found room to 
deploy on ground affording the least advantage for 
the task before him. He was now less than three 
miles from the field where Lee had been beaten 
back and Ransom had been overwhelmed. The 
scene was a small clearing with a fenced farm, 
traversed by a narrow by-road and by a little creek 
flowing toward the St. Patrice. Here the Confede 
rates could be plainly seen coming on at such a pace 
that for some moments it was even doubtful whether 
Emory might not have delayed just too long the 



SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 309 

formation of his line of battle. Such was his own 
thought as in the dire need of the crisis he deter 
mined to sacrifice his leading regiment in order to 
gain time and room for the division to form. Hap 
pily the Confederates helped him by stopping to loot 
the train and to rejoice loudly over each discovery of 
some special luxury to them long unfamiliar. 

Then rapidly sending orders to Dwight to hold 
the road at any cost, to McMillan to form on the 
right, to Benedict to deploy on Dwight s left, Emory 
himself rode up to Kinsey, and together they led for 
ward the i6ist New York and deployed the regiment 
widely as skirmishers across the whole front of the 
division, in the very teeth of the Confederate line of 
battle, rapidly advancing with wild yells and firing 
heavily as they came. Not a man of the division, 
not one of the i6ist, but felt as well as Emory the 
imposing duty laid on that splendid regiment and 
the hard sacrifice expected of it ; yet they stood their 
ground so well and so long that not only had the 
whole division time to deploy, but, when at last the 
Confederate line of battle refused any longer to be 
held back by a fringe of skirmishers, it became a 
serious question whether friend and foe might not 
enter the Union lines together. Then, when Emory 
saw that his line was formed, he gave the word to 
Kinsey to retire. For some seconds his skirmishers 
masked fire of their own lines, but, as the Confede 
rates followed with great impetuosity, Dwight s whole 
line, kneeling, waiting, and ready, opened a fierce fire 
at point-blank range and soon threw off the attack 
with heavy loss to their assailants. The brunt of the 
attack was borne by the 2Qth Maine, holding the 
centre and the road. An attempt followed to turn 



3io THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Emory s right flank ; in this Dwight s right was 
pressed so heavily that Emory was obliged to deploy 
McMillan nearly at right angles to the main front, and 
thus the onset was easily checked. About the same 
time the Confederates, whose line was longer than 
Emory s, made a like attempt to turn the left, but 
Benedict held on firmly, and. although his position 
was a bad one, soon drove off his assailants. The 
whole fight was over in twenty minutes, but while it 
lasted it was sharp. It rolled back the pursuit and 
changed the fortunes of the evil day. 

In no other battle of the war was so little use 
made of artillery. In Ransom s fight only a few guns 
could be brought into action on either side, though 
these indeed were served with vigor. As for Emory, 
he left his batteries and his baggage to the safe 
keeping of the 1 53d New York and swept to the 
front with all the rest of his infantry, while the same 
jam of wagons that entrapped the guns of Lee and 
Ransom likewise held back the guns of Taylor. 
Thus Emory s fight was fought by infantry alone 
against infantry and dismounted cavalry, and no roar 
of cannon was heard to break the rattle and the wail 
of the musketry. 

So great a change had these few hours wrought 
that the same sun rose upon an army marching full 
of confidence that within two days Shreveport would 
be in its grasp, and set upon the same army defeated, 
brought to bay, its campaign ruined, saved only by 
a triumph of valor and discipline on the part of a 
single division and of skill on the part of its intrepid 
commander from complet e destruction at the hands 
of an enemy inferior in everything and outnumbered 
almost as two to one. The passage of a wood is the 



SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 311 

passage of a defile ; here, then, was a blind defile, 
where of six divisions four were suffered to be 
taken in detail and attacked in fractions on ground 
of the enemy s choosing. Hardly any tactical error 
was wanting to complete the discomfiture. Ransom 
was overwhelmed and doubly outflanked by two or 
three times his numbers ; even Emory had but five 
thousand against a force reduced by casualties and 
by straggling, yet still half as large again as his and 
flushed with victory ; moreover, his position was, 
whether for offence or defence, worthless beyond the 
passing hour. 

Banks s losses in the battle of Sabine Cross- Roads 
were as follows : 

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 

Cavalry Division ... 39 250 144 433 
Cameron s .... 24 99 195 318 

Landram s " .... 28 148 909 1,085 
Emory s .... 24 148 175 347 

Staff of Nineteenth Corps 0303 

In all . . . 115 648 1,423 2,186 
By Taylor the action is called the battle of Mans 
field. He puts his losses at 1,000, all told. Fore 
most among the slain, while leading the fierce onset 
against Ransom s right, Mouton fell, a regimental 
color in his hand, and with him perished many of his 
brave Louisianians. 

Clearly the next thing, whatever might be the 
next after, was to concentrate and reform on the 
first fair ground in the rear. Such were Banks s 
orders. Accordingly at midnight Emory marched 
in orderly retreat, with all his material intact, and at 
eight o clock the next morning, the Qth of April, 
went into bivouac at Pleasant Hill, where A. J. 



312 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Smith was found near his resting-place of the night 
before, and with him Gooding. Thither Lee and 
the shattered remnants of Ransom s Corps, now 
under Cameron, had already retired, and there they 
now reformed in comparative order. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

PLEASANT HILL. 

THE scenes and events of the 8th produced a deep 
effect on Banks. At first he was disposed to look on 
the campaign as lost. Whatever hope he might have 
had that morning of taking or even reaching Shreve- 
port within the time fixed for the breaking up of the 
expedition, was at an end before night fell. Not only 
must A. J. Smith be sent back to Vicksburg within 
two days, but Banks himself must be on the Missis 
sippi with his whole force ready to move against 
Mobile by the ist of May. Such were his orders from 
Grant, peremptory and repeated. Therefore Banks at 
once made up his mind to retreat to Grand Ecore, 
and sent messenger after messenger across the coun 
try to tell Kilby Smith and Porter what had happened 
and what he was about to do. In thus deciding he 
chose the second best course, and the one that Taylor 
wished for ; it would have been far better to cover 
Blair s Landing and thus make sure of the safety as 
well as the support of the gunboats and of Kilby 
Smith. 

Pleasant Hill was a village of a dozen houses dis 
persed about a knoll in a clearing. Beside the main 
highway between Natchitoches and Shreveport, by 
which Banks had come and was now going back, 
fairly good roads radiate to Fort Jesup and Many on 

313 



314 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the south to the crossings of the Sabine on the west, 
and on the north and east towards the Red River. 
The nearest point on the river was Blair s Landing, 
distant sixteen miles from Pleasant Hill by the road 
and forty-five miles by water above Grand Ecore. 

Though a good place to fight a battle, Pleasant 
Hill was not a position that could be held for any 
length of time, even if there had been an object in 
holding it. It was too far even from the immediate 
base of supplies, and there was no water to be had 
save from the cisterns in the village. These were 
merely sufficient, in ordinary times, for the storage of 
rain water for the daily use of the inhabitants. Now 
two armies had been drawing from them, and there 
was not enough left in them to supply the wants of 
Banks s men, to say nothing of the animals, for a single 
day ; and for this reason, if for no other, it was im 
possible for the army to stay there an hour longer 
than was really necessary to cover a safe and orderly 
withdrawal of the train. 

Accordingly, early on the 9th of April, Banks gave 
orders for the wagon train to be set in motion toward 
Grand Ecore, escorted by Lee with the cavalry and 
Dickey s colored brigade, and put his army into 
position at Pleasant Hill to cover the movement. 

Churchill with Tappan and Parsons had accom 
plished the march of twenty miles from Keachie to 
Mansfield too late in the evening- of the 8th to take 
any part in the battle of Sabine Cross -Roads. At 
two o clock the next morning he marched toward the 
front in order to arrive on the ground in time to renew 
the fight. By the earliest light of the morning Taylor 
saw that his adversary had already left the field. 
Then he promptly advanced his whole force, feeling 



PLEASANT HILL. 315 

his way as he went. Green led with the cavalry ; 
next came Churchill with his own division, under 
Tappan ; then Parsons, Walker, and Polignac. The 
morning was wellnigh spent when Taylor with the 
head of his column drew near Pleasant Hill and dis 
covered his adversary in position. The last of his 
infantry did not come up until after noon. Churchill s 
men were so fagged by their early start and their long 
march of forty-five miles since the morning of the 
8th that Taylor thought it best to give them two 
hours rest before attempting anything more. 

Two miles to the southward, across the main road, 
stood Emory, firmly holding the right of the Union 
lines. Dwight s brigade formed the extreme right 
flank, thrown back and resting on a wooded ravine 
that runs almost parallel with the road. Squarely 
across the road and somewhat more advanced, in the 
skirt of the wood before the village, commanding an 
open approach, was posted Shaw s brigade, detached 
from Mower s Third division, to strengthen the ex 
posed front of Emory. Benedict occupied a ditch 
traversing a slight hollow, the course of which was 
nearly perpendicular to the Logansport road, on which 
his right rested in echelon behind the left of Shaw. 
Benedict s front was generally hidden by a light growth 
of reed and willow, but his left was in the open and 
was completely exposed. Grow s battery, under South- 
worth, held the hill between Dwight and Shaw, and 
Closson s battery, under Franck Taylor, was planted 
so as to fire over the heads of Benedict s men. Mc 
Millan s brigade was in reserve behind Dwight and 
Shaw. The position thus occupied by Emory was a 
short distance north of the village in front of the fork 
of the roads that lead to Mansfield and to Logansport. 



3i6 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

About four hundred yards behind Benedict, and 
slightly overlapping his left, the line was prolonged 
by A. J. Smith, with the two divisions of Mower, 
strongly posted in the wood, to cover the crossing of 
the roads to Fort Jesup, to Natchitoches, and to 
Blair s Landing. Near Mower s right, Closson placed 
Hebard s battery. 

The extreme left flank on the Fort Jesup road 
was for a time held by Cameron ; but, through some 
uncertainty or misunderstanding of orders, he ap 
pears to have considered himself charged with the 
duty of protecting the right flank and rear of the 
retreating trains, rather than the left flank of the 
army. Accordingly five o clock found him with the 
wagons, two hours march from the field of battle. 

Lucas, with about 500 picked men of his own bri 
gade, taken from the i6th Indiana, the 6th Mis 
souri, and the i4th New York, and a like number 
from Gooding s brigade, was detached from the cav 
alry division for service under the immediate orders 
of Franklin. With these detachments Lucas skil 
fully watched all the approaches. 

Thus matters rested until the afternoon was well 
advanced, the long train steadily rolling on its way, 
and the prospects of being molested seeming to grow 
by degrees fainter as hour after hour passed and 
gave no sign of movement on the part of the Con 
federates. 

Taylor formed his line of battle and set his troops 
in motion between three and four o clock in the after 
noon. Bee with two brigades of cavalry was on the 
left or east of the Mansfield road, supported by 
Polignac, on whose division had fallen the heaviest 
losses of the day before. On the right or west of 



PLEASANT HILL. 317 

the road was Walker, while Churchill, with three regi 
ments of cavalry on his right flank, moved under 
cover and out of sight on the right or south of the 
upper road to the Sabine. 

As early as the previous evening Taylor had con 
sidered the chances of Banks s retreat on Blair s 
Landing, and had sent a detachment of cavalry to 
gather intelligence of such a movement and to seize 
the crossing of Bayou Pierre. Now, hearing nothing 
from this detachment, he sent Major, with his own 
brigade and Bagby s, to the right of the Union army 
in time to seize and hold the road to the landing. 

Taylor s intention was that Churchill should gain 
the Fort Jesup road and fall upon the flank and rear 
of the Union army, while at the same instant Walker 
was to deliver a direct attack in echelon of brigades 
from the right. As soon as Churchill should have 
thrown the Union left into disorder, Bee was to 
charge down the Mansfield road, while Major and 
Bagby were to turn the flank of Emory. 

It was after three o clock when Churchill took up 
his line of march through the woods, Parsons leading. 
Whether for \rant of a good map of the country or 
from whatever cause, it seems probable that, when 
the head of Churchill s column had gained the lower 
Sabine road, which enters Pleasant Hill from the 
southwest, he mistook it for the Fort Jesup road, 
which approaches the village from the south. Then 
changing front to the left, the double lines of 
Parsons and Tappan charged swiftly down on the 
left flank and diagonally upon the front of Benedict, 
instead of falling, as Taylor meant, upon the flank 
and rear of Mower. Emory says the attack began 
at a quarter after five ; other reports name an earlier 



3i8 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

hour. However that may be, night was approaching, 
and the Union army had practically given up the 
idea of being attacked that day, when suddenly the 
battle began. 

Benedict s position was, unavoidably, a bad one, 
and this oblique order of attack was singularly 
adapted for searching out its weakness. When once 
Benedict s skirmishers had been driven back through 
the skirt of the woods that masked his right and 
centre, Churchill s men had but to descend the slope, 
firing as they came on, but without checking their 
pace, and it was a mere question of minutes when 
the defenders of a line so exposed and overlapped 
must be crushed by the weight of thrice their 
numbers. For one brief moment, indeed, the fight 
was hand to hand ; then Benedict s men were driven 
out of the ditch, and forced in more or less disorder 
up the reverse slope. So they drifted to the cover 
of the wood, where Mower lay in wait, and there by 
regiments they re-formed and sought fresh places in 
the front of battle ; for Benedict had fallen, and the 
night followed so quickly that darkness had closed in 
before the discreet and zealous Fessenden had gath 
ered the brigade and held it well in hand. The 
whole brigade bore the searching test like good 
soldiers, yet conspicuous in steadiness under the 
shock and in prompt recovery were the 3Oth Maine 
and the i73d New York, inspired by the example 
and the leadership of Fessenden and of Conrady. 

When Green heard the sound of Churchill s mus 
ketry he launched Bee with Debray s and Buchel s 
regiments in an impetuous charge against the left of 
Shaw s line ; but this wild swoop was quickly stopped 
by the muskets of the I4th Iowa and the 24th Mis- 



PLEASANT HILL. 319 

souri at close range. Many saddles were emptied ; 
Bee, Buchel, and Debray were among the victims, and 
in great disorder the beaten remnants fled. 

Eighteen guns, among them, sad to say, trophies 
of Sabine Cross-Roads, concentrated their fire upon 
the six pieces of Southworth and presently overcame 
him by sheer weight. The giving way of Benedict had 
already exposed Shaw s left when Walker closed with 
him. Vigorously attacked in front, and menaced in 
flank, Shaw made a stout fight, but he was in great 
danger of being cut off. Not a moment too soon, 
A. J. Smith recalled him. 

When Shaw gave back, Dwight suddenly found 
himself attacked in front by Walker and in flank and 
rear by Major. At this trying moment the H4th 
New York and the i53d New York were covering 
the fork of the roads to Mansfield and to Logans- 
port, while beyond the Mansfield road, on the right, 
stood the 1 1 6th New York. To protect the left and 
right flanks of this little line, Dwight quickly moved 
the 2Qth Maine and the i6ist New York. Fortu 
nately his men stood firm under the trial of a fire 
that seemed to come from all quarters at once. For 
a moment, indeed, the exultant and still advancing 
Confederates seemed masters of the plain. Along 
the whole Union front nothing was to be seen in 
place save Dwight s men far off on the right, stand 
ing as it were on a rocky islet, with the gray floods 
surging on every side. 

But far away, out of sight from the plain, an event 
had already occurred that was to cost the Confeder 
ates the battle. Parsons, following up the overthrow 
of Benedict, offered his own right flank to Lynch, 
who stood alert and observant in the skirt of the 



320 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

woods, beyond the left of Mower. Lynch struck 
hard and began doubling up the Missourians. See 
ing this, and noting the condition of affairs on the 
other flank, A. J. Smith instantly ordered forward his 
whole line. Shaw had already re-formed his brigade 
on the right of Mower. Across D wight s rear Emory 
was leading McMillan from his position in reserve, to 
restore the line on Dwight s left. Then, just at the 
instant when to one standing on the plain the day 
must have seemed hopelessly lost, the long lines of 
A. J. Smith, with Mower riding at the head, were seen 
coming out of the woods and sweeping, with un 
broken front and steady tread, down upon the front 
and flank of the enemy. To the right of this splen 
did line McMillan joined his brigade, and among its 
intervals here and there the rallied fragments of 
Benedict s brigade found places. Under this impet 
uous onset, Parsons and Tappan and Walker melted 
away, and before anything could be done with Polig- 
nac, the whole Confederate army was in hopeless 
confusion. Their disordered ranks were pushed back 
about a mile, with a loss of five guns, and after night 
fall Taylor s infantry and part of his cavalry fell back 
six miles to the stream on which Emory had en 
camped on the morning of the previous day, while 
the cavalry retired to Mansfield, but Taylor himself 
slept near the field of battle with the remnant of 
Debray s troopers. In the superb right wheel, three 
of the guns lost at Sabine Cross-Roads were retaken. 
As soon as the news of the battle of Sabine Cross- 
Roads reached Kirby Smith at Shreveport, he rode 
to the front and joined Taylor after nightfall on the 
Qth of April. The earliest Confederate despatches 
and orders of Kirby Smith and Taylor claimed a 



I . 

*f-vf T-.* 1 



^^C^t , /^l V-rvt* 




PLEASANT HILL. 

APRIL 9, 1864. FROM GENERAL EMORY S MAP. 



PLEASANT HILL. 321 

signal and glorious victory, and to this view Taylor 
seems to have adhered ; but in a report dated August 
28, 1864, Smith says, in giving his reasons for not 
adopting Taylor s ambitious plan of pursuing Banks 
to New Orleans, that Taylor s troops 

" were finally repulsed and thrown into confusion . . . The 
Missouri and Arkansas troops, with the brigade of Walker s di 
vision, were broken and scattered. The enemy recovered cannon 
which we had captured, and two of our pieces were left in his 
hands. To my great relief I found in the morning that the enemy 
had fallen back during the night. . . . Our troops were 
completely paralyzed by the repulse at Pleasant Hill." 

In an article written in I888, 1 he adds : 

" Our repulse at Pleasant Hill was so complete and our com 
mand was so disorganized that had Banks followed up his suc 
cess vigorously he would have met with but feeble opposition to 
his advance on Shreveport. . . . Polignac s (previously Mou- 
ton s) division of Louisiana infantry was all that was intact of 
Taylor s force. . . . Our troops were completely paralyzed 
and disorganized by the repulse at Pleasant Hill." 

Again in an intercepted letter, very clear and 
outspoken, Lieutenant Edward Cunningham, one of 
Kirby Smith s aides-de-camp, is even more emphatic : 

" That it was impossible for us to pursue Banks immediately 
under four or five days cannot be gainsaid. It was impossible 
because we had been beaten, demoralized, paralyzed, 
in the fight of the Qth." 

The losses of the Union army in the battle of 
Pleasant Hill were 152 killed, 859 wounded, 495 
missing; in all, 1,506. Of these, nearly one half 
fell upon Emory s division, which reported 6 officers 
and 47 men killed, 19 officers and 275 men wounded, 

1 " Century War Book," vol. iv., p. 372. 
21 



322 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

4 officers and 374 men missing; in all, 725. The 
Confederate losses were estimated by Taylor at 1,500. 
Each side claims to have fought a superior force, 
yet the numbers seem to have been nearly equal. 
Including the thousand horsemen, who were not 
seriously engaged at any time during the day, and in 
the battle not at all, the Union army can hardly have 
numbered more than 13,000 nor less than 11,000. 
Taylor s force must have been about the same, for, 
although Kirby Smith s figures account for 16,000, 
on the one hand the attrition of battle and march is 
to be reckoned, and on the other hand Taylor himself 
owns to 12,000. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

GRAND ECORE. 

IN the first moments of elation that succeeded the 
victory, Banks was all for resuming the advance, but 
later in the evening, after consulting his corps and 
division commanders, he determined to continue the 
retreat to Grand Ecore. Unfortunately by some 
mistake the ambulances had gone off with the wagon 
train, so that there were no adequate means of reliev 
ing the wounded on the field. Indeed, all the 
wounded had not been gathered, and most of the 
dead lay still unburied, when, about midnight, Banks 
gave the orders to march. Then from each corps a 
detail of surgeons was ordered to stay behind, with 
such hospital stores as they had at hand, and two 
hours later, in silence and in darkness, unobserved 
and unmolested, the army marched to the rear, leav 
ing the dead and wounded of both sides on the 
ground. In the order of march Emory had the head 
of the column, Mower the rear. Early in the after 
noon of the loth, after a march of twenty miles, the 
column halted at the Bayou Mayon. At sunrise on 
the nth the march was resumed; and the same 
afternoon found the whole army in camp at Grand 
Ecore. 

Great was the astonishment of Taylor when day 
light revealed to him the retreat of the victors of 

323 



324 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Pleasant Hill. He sent Bee with some cavalry to 
follow, and this Bee did, yet not rashly, for in twenty 
miles he came not once near enough to Mower s 
rear-guard to exchange a shot. Green, with all the 
rest of the cavalry, was then brought back to Pleasant 
Hill to carry on operations against the fleet in the 
direction of Blair s Landing, while the main body of 
the infantry was drawn in to Mansfield to reorganize. 

The fleet was now in great peril. Pushing slowly 
up the river, constantly retarded by the low stage of 
water, the gunboats and the transports arrived at 
Loggy or Boggy Bayou at two o clock on the after 
noon of the loth of April. Kilby Smith at once 
landed a detachment of his men, and was proceeding 
to carry out his orders with regard to opening com 
munication with Banks by way of Springfield, when 
about four o clock Captain Andrews, of the i4th 
New York cavalry, rode in with his squadron, bring 
ing word of the battles of Sabine Cross- Roads and 
Pleasant Hill, and bearing a message from Banks to 
Kilby Smith that directed his return to Grand Ecore. 
He was at that moment consulting with Porter how 
best they might get rid of the obstructions caused by 
the sinking by the Confederates of a large steamboat, 
called the New Falls City, quite across the channel 
from bank to bank, and they had just decided to set 
fire to her and blow her up ; the bad news made it 
clear that nothing remained to be done but to go 
back down the river with all speed. 

The natural obstacle presented by the deep waters 
and by the steep banks of the Bayou Pierre would 
have formed a complete defence against any attack 
on the fleet from the west bank of the Red River, 
had it not been for the fact that there are three good 



GRAND ECORE. 325 

ferries across the bayou, approached by good roads. 
The upper of these ways led to the river a long 
distance above the point attained by the fleet ; the 
second struck the bank at Grand Bayou, fifteen miles 
below where the fleet stopped ; the third was the road 
from Pleasant Hill to Blair s Landing, which is fifty 
miles below Grand Bayou. Liddell was already 
watching the east bank of the river, and Taylor now 
sent Bagby across from Mansfield to Grand Bayou 
with his brigade and Barnes s battery, to cut off the 
fleet. However, Bagby did not start from Mansfield 
until after daybreak on the nth, so that his arrival 
at the mouth of Grand Bayou was many hours too 
late to catch the fleet, which at eight that evening 
tied up for the night at Coushatta Chute. Here 
Kilby Smith received a second order of recall from 
Banks, this time in writing, and dated " On the road, 
April loth." 

By noon on the I2th, Bagby, riding fast and making 
use of the short cuts, overtook the rear of the fleet ; 
and somewhat later Green, who had marched from 
Pleasant Hill early on the morning of the nth, with 
Woods s and Gould s regiments and Parsons s brigade 
of Texans, and the batteries of Nettles, West, Mc- 
Mahan, and Moseley, struck the river at Blair s 
Landing almost simultaneously with the arrival of 
the fleet. Here, about four o clock in the afternoon, 
in the bend between the high banks, Green caught 
the rear of the transport fleet at a disadvantage. 
Making the most of his opportunity, he attacked with 
vigor. Instantly Kilby Smith and Porter responded 
and a sharp fight followed, but by sunset they suc 
ceeded, without great loss, in driving off their assail 
ants. Indeed the total casualties in Kilby Smith s 



326 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

division above Grand Ecore were but 19, and Porter 
mentions only one. Chief among the Confederate 
killed was the brave, impetuous, and indomitable 
Green. 

About noon on the I3th, several of the boats being 
aground in mid-stream, they were attacked by Liddell, 
strongly posted on the high bluff known as Boule- 
deau Point. However, all passed by without loss or 
serious injury, and on the morning of the i4th, the 
fleet reached the bar at Campti, where A. J. Smith 
was met marching up the left bank of the river to its 
relief. But, although Campti is barely twenty miles 
above, so crooked and shallow was the river that it 
was midnight on the i5th before the last of the fleet 
lay in safety at Grand Ecore. 

Below Grand Ecore there was a bad bar. As the 
river continued to fall, the larger gunboats were sent 
down as fast as possible to Alexandria, whither Porter 
followed them on the i6th, leaving the Osage and 
Lexington at Grand Ecore, and the big Eastport 
eight miles below, where, on the i5th, she had been 
sunk to her gun-deck either by a torpedo or by a 
snag. The admiral brought up his pump boats and 
after removing the guns got the Eastport afloat on 
the 2 1 st. 

As Banks realized that his campaign was ruined, 
he grew earnest in trying to meet Grant s expecta 
tions and orders, requiring him to be on the Missis 
sippi by the first of May. For ten days he had been 
waiting at Grand Ecore, only to see the last of the 
fleet pass down in safety. Meanwhile he had en 
trenched his position, thrown a pontoon bridge across 
the river, placed a strong detachment from Smith s 
command on the north bank, and sent urgent orders 



GRAND ECORE. 327 

to Alexandria, to New Orleans, and to Texas for re 
inforcements. Birge, with his own brigade and the 
38th Massachusetts and the i28th New York of 
Sharpens brigade, embarked at Alexandria on the 
1 2th of April, and joined Emory on the i3th. Nick- 
erson s brigade came from New Orleans to join 
Grover at Alexandria. On the 2oth of April, learn 
ing that the Eastport was expected to float within a 
few hours, Banks sent A. J. Smith to take position 
covering Natchitoches, and when the next day he 
heard from the admiral that the Eastport was actually 
afloat, he lost not a moment in beginning the march 
on Alexandria. 

An hour later the Eastport again struck the 
bottom ; eight times more she ran hard aground ; at 
last on the 25th she lay immovable on a raft of logs, 
and the next day her crew gave her to the flames. 

For some time the relations between the command 
ing general and his chief-of-staff had been strained, 
and in spite of Stone s zeal and gallantry in the late 
battles, Banks had determined on a change, indeed 
had already announced it in orders, when on the i6th 
of April he received an order of the War Office bear 
ing date the 28th of March, whereby Stone was re 
lieved from duty in the Department of the Gulf, de 
prived of his rank as a brigadier-general, and ordered 
to go to Cairo, Illinois, and thence to report by letter 
to the adjutant-general of the army. For this action 
neither cause nor occasion has ever been made 
known. Then Banks recalled his own order and 
published this instead, and on the following day he 
made Dwight his chief-of-staff, the command of 
D wight s brigade falling to Beal. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER. 

BANKS broke camp at Grand Ecore at five o clock 
in the afternoon of the 2ist of April and turned over 
the direction and control of the march to Franklin. 

The cavalry corps, now commanded by Arnold, 
was separated by brigades. Gooding took the ad 
vance ; Crebs, who had succeeded to Robinson s com 
mand, rode with Birge ; E. J. Davis, with Dudley s 
brigade, covered the right flank ; and Lucas, report 
ing to A. J. Smith, formed the rear-guard. 

Birge led the main column with a temporary di 
vision formed of the I3th Connecticut and the ist 
Louisiana of his own brigade under Fiske, the 38th 
Massachusetts and the I28th New York of Sharpe s 
brigade under James Smith, and Fessenden s brigade 
of Emory s division. Next were the trains, in the 
same order as the troops. Emory followed with the 
brigades of Beal and McMillan and the artillery 
reserve under Closson. Then came Cameron, and 
last A. J. Smith, in the order of Kilby Smith and 
Mower. 

Crossing Cane River about two miles below Grand 
Ecore, the line of march traversed the length of the 
long island formed by the two branches of the Red 
River, and recrossed the right arm at Monett s Ferry. 

328 



THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER. 329 

For the whole distance the army was once more sep 
arated from the fleet. 

It was half-past one on the morning of the 22d 
before the last of the wagons had effected the first 
crossing of Cane River. By three o clock Emory 
was on the south bank, and A. J. Smith at five. 

As early as the i4th of April, at Mansfield, Kirby 
Smith had withdrawn Churchill and Walker from 
Taylor and sent them to aid in driving Steele back 
into Arkansas. This left Taylor only the infantry 
of Polignac, reduced to 2,000 muskets, and the re 
organized cavalry corps under Wharton, comprising 
the divisions of Bee, Major, and William Steele. 
With this handful, Taylor undertook to harry Banks 
by blocking his communications and beating up his 
out-posts ; but just at that moment Banks moved and 
thus, by the merest chance, brought Bee and Major, 
with four brigades and four batteries directly across 
his path, on the high ground at Monett s bluff, com 
manding the ford and the ferry. At three o clock 
in the afternoon of the 22d, Wharton with Steele s 
division, supported by Polignac, engaged Lucas 
sharply, compelling A. J. Smith to deploy and the 
rest of the column to halt for an hour ; and thus 
began a series of almost continuous skirmishes that 
lasted nearly to Alexandria, yet without material 
result. 

At seven o clock in the evening of the 22d of 
April, Birge halted for the night two miles beyond 
Cloutierville. Under orders inspired by the urgency, 
he had been pushing on at all speed to seize the 
crossing ; in spite of the heat and the dust, he had 
led the column at the furious pace of thirty-eight 
miles, perhaps forty, in twenty-six hours ; but Good- 



330 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

ing had already found the Confederates in strong 
possession, and now it seemed clear that the passage 
must be forced. At nine o clock Emory and Cam 
eron closed on Birge and halted, and at three in 
the morning A. J. Smith came up. 

At daylight on the 23d of April, Franklin moved 
down to the ferry and began to reconnoitre. His 
wound had now become so painful as to disable him ; 
accordingly, after maturing his plans, he turned over 
his command to Emory, with orders to dislodge the 
enemy and to open the way. With equal skill, care, 
and vigor, Emory instantly set about this critical 
task, upon which the fate of the army may almost be 
said to have depended, and with this the safety of 
the fleet. 

The ground on which the Union army found itself 
was, like the whole island, low and flat and largely 
covered with a thick growth of cane and willow. 
Near the river the soil was moreover swampy and 
the brakes were for the most part impenetrable. 
On the high bluff opposite, masked by the trees, 
stood Bee with the brigades of Debray and Terrell, 
Major with his two brigades under Baylor and Bagby, 
and the twenty-four guns of McMahon, Moseley, West, 
and Nettles. The position was too strong and too 
difficult of approach to be taken by a direct attack 
save at a great cost. Through the labyrinthine morass 
that lay between the ferry and the river s mouth Bailey 
and E. J. Davis searched in vain for a practicable ford. 
Nothing remained but to try the other flank. 

Birge with his temporary division augmented by 
Cameron s, without artillery and with no horsemen 
save a few mounted men of the i3th Connecticut, 
was to march back, to ford Cane River two miles 



THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER. 331 

above the bluff, and by a wide detour to sweep down 
upon the Confederate left. 

To amuse the enemy and to draw his attention away 
from Birge, Emory, who had yielded his division to 
McMillan, caused him to deploy the First and Second 
brigades under Beal and Rust, and to threaten the 
crossing directly in front, while Closson advanced his 
guns and kept up a steady and well judged fire 
against the Confederate position on the hill. 

Birge took up the line of march at nine o clock. 
His progress was greatly delayed not only by the 
passage of Cane River, where the water was waist- 
deep, but also by the swampy and broken ground, 
and by the dense undergrowth through which he had 
to force his way. Thus the afternoon was well ad 
vanced before he found the position of the Confed 
erates on a hill, with their right flank resting on a 
deep ravine, and their left upon a marsh and a small 
lake, drained by a muddy bayou that wound about 
the foot of the hill. Up to this point Fiske had led 
the advance. Now, in deploying, after emerging 
from the thicket, he found himself before the enemy s 
centre, while Fessenden confronted their left. Fiske 
formed his men in two lines, the I3th Connecticut 
and the ist Louisiana in front, supported by James 
Smith with the 38th Massachusetts and the i28th 
New York. To Fessenden Birge gave the duty of 
carrying the hill. 

Behind a hedge and a high fence Fessenden de 
ployed his brigade from right to left in the order of 
the i65th New York, the i;3d New York, the 3Oth 
Maine, and the 1626. New York. Directly before 
them, on the other side of the fence, was an open 
field inclining toward the front in a gentle slope, and 



332 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

traversed at the foot by a second and stouter fence, 
beyond which a sandy knoll arose, covered with trees, 
bushes, and fallen timber. On the crest the enemy 
stood, Bee having changed front to the left and rear 
as soon as he made out the movement of Birge. 

Stopping but to throw down the fence, at the word 
Fessenden s whole line ran across the field to the 
foot of the hill. There the brigade quickly re-formed 
for the ascent, and then, with Fessenden at the head, 
charged stiffly up the difficult slope straight in the 
teeth of the hot fire of Bee s dismounted troopers. 
Many fell, among them Fessenden with a bad hurt ; 
the 1 65th New York found itself hindered by the 
marsh, but gallantly led on by Hubbard, by Conrady, 
and by Blanchard the 3Oth Maine, the i73d New 
York, and the i62d New York won the crest and 
opened fire on the retreating foe. Once more halting 
to re-form his lines, Birge swept on, gained the 
farther hill without much trouble, and moving to 
the left uncovered the crossing. Birge s loss in this 
engagement was about 200, of whom 153 were in 
Fessenden s brigade, and of these 86 in the 3Oth 
Maine. In leading the charge across the open 
ground Fessenden was severely wounded in the leg, 
and the command of his brigade fell to Lieutenant- 
Colonel Blanchard. 

As soon as Emory, on the north bank of Cane 
River, heard the noise of the battle on the opposite 
heights, he posted five guns under Closson (two of 
H inkle s twenty-pounder Parrotts, one gun of Nields 
ist Delaware, one of Hebard s ist Vermont, and one 
of the 25th New York battery), to silence the Con 
federate artillery on their right, in front of the cross- 
ing, well supported by the n6th New York, and 



THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER. 333 

deployed his skirmishers as if for an assault. Tempted 
by the exposed position of these guns, Bee sent a 
detachment across the river to capture them, but 
Love easily threw off the attack; and seeing this, 
Chrysler, whose regiment, the 2d New York Veteran 
Cavalry, was dismounted in skirmishing order on 
the left, at once led his men in pursuit and seized 
the crossing. 

Bee retreated rapidly to Beasley s, thirty miles 
away to the southward, on the Fort Jesup road, with 
out making any further effort to stay or trouble the 
retreat of Banks. 

Word coming from Davis that he had been unable 
to find a crossing below, Emory, when he saw the 
enemy in retreat, sent Chrysler and Crebs in pursuit, 
supported by Cameron. However, this came to 
nothing, for Chrysler naturally enough followed the 
small Confederate rear-guard that held to the main 
road toward Alexandria. 

The pontoon bridge was at once laid, and being 
completed soon after dark, the march was continued 
by night, McMillan, with Beal and Rust, moving six 
miles to the reversed front to cover the train. 

About ten o clock on the same morning Wharton 
charged down on Kilby Smith, who was moving up 
to the rear of A. J. Smith s command and of the 
army, but was driven off after a fight lasting an hour. 

By two o clock on the afternoon of April 24th, Beal s 
men being on the south bank of Cane River, the 
bridge was taken up and the march continued without 
further molestation by Cotile and Henderson s Hill, 
the head of the column resting at night near the Bayou 
Rapides. 

Marching thence at six o clock on the morning of 



334 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the 25th of April, the head of the column arrived at 
Alexandria at two o clock that afternoon, and on the 
following day A. J. Smith brought up the rear. Here 
the fleet, with the exception of the ill-fated Eastport, 
was found lying in safety, yet unfortunately above the 
falls. 

Here, too, early on the 2;th came Hunter, with 
fresh and very positive orders from Grant to Banks, 
bearing date the 1 7th, requiring him to bring the ex 
pedition to an immediate end, to turn over his com 
mand at once to the next in rank, and to go himself 
to New Orleans. In truth, this was but the culmina 
tion of an earnest and persistent wish on Grant s part, 
shown even as far back as the beginning of the 
campaign, to replace Banks in command by Hunter 
or another. When, afterward, Grant came to learn 
of the perilous situation of the fleet, and moreover 
perceived that none of the troops engaged in the 
expedition could be in time to take part in the spring 
campaigns east of the Mississippi, he suspended these 
orders, and, without recalling that portion of them that 
required Banks to go to New Orleans, directed the 
operations for the rescue of the navy to go on under 
the senior commander present. In any case, however, 
it was now clearly impossible to abandon the fleet in 
its dangerous and helpless position above the rapids, 
with the river falling, and an active enemy on both 
banks. 

And Steele, where was Steele all this time? 
Having rejected Banks s advice to join him near Alex 
andria, marching by way of Monroe and so down the 
Onachita, Steele set out from Little Rock on the 24th 
of March, moved by his right on Arkadelphia, and 
arrived there on the 28th. His object in preferring 



THE CROSSING OF CANE RIVER. 335 

this direction was, not only to avoid the heavy roads in 
the low lands of the Ouachita, but to take up Thayer, 
who was already on the march from Fort Smith ; 
thus making a fourth concentration in the enemy s 
country. The exigencies of the wretched farce called 
a State election in Arkansas had reduced Steele s 
effective force by fully 3,000, so that he now moved 
with barely 7,000 of all arms, and six batteries. 
Opposed to Steele was Price, with the cavalry divi 
sions of Fagan and Marmaduke, the former at Spring 
Hill to meet the advance from Arkadelphia, and the 
latter at Camden, to guard the line of the Ouachita. 
To strengthen himself, Price drew in Cabell and 
Maxey, who with three brigades were at first engaged 
in watching Thayer. 

On the ist of April, hearing nothing from Thayer, 
Steele advanced from Arkadelphia, crossed the Little 
Missouri at Elkin s Ferry on the 3d, was joined by 
Thayer on the 6th, and on the loth had a sharp 
engagement with an outlying brigade, under Shelby, 
of Price s army. Price was then at Prairie d Ane, 
covering the crossing of the roads that led to Camden 
and to Shreveport, but on the evening of the nth he 
drew back beyond the prairie to a strong position 
eight miles north of Washington. To have followed 
Price would have been to put Steele s long and length 
ening line of communication at the mercy of Marma 
duke. This was what Price wanted ; but when, on the 
1 2th, Steele saw the road to Camden left open, he 
promptly took it, and, harried by Price in his rear, 
and not seriously impeded by Marmaduke in his 
front, he marched into Camden on the i5th, and 
occupied the strong line of the Confederate defences. 
This was four days after the return of Banks to Grand 



336 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Ecore, which of course put an end to any farther 
advance of Steele in the direction of Shreveport, and 
while he was waiting for authentic news, Price was 
busy on his line of communication with Pine Bluff, 
and Kirby Smith, with Churchill and Walker, was 
moving rapidly to join Price. On the 2oth of April 
Kirby Smith appeared before the lines of Camden ; 
but Steele had already begun his inevitable retreat a 
few hours earlier, and having destroyed the bridge 
across the Ouachita, gained so long a start that he 
was enabled to make good the difficult crossing of 
the Saline at Jenkins s Ferry, but only after a hard 
fight on the 3Oth of April with the combined forces of 
Smith and Price. Finally, the 2d of May saw Steele 
back at Little Rock with his army half starved, greatly 
reduced in men and material in these six ineffectual 
weeks, thinking no longer of Halleck s wide scheme 
of conquest, or even of Grant s wish to hold the line 
of the Red River, but rather hoping for some stroke 
of good fortune to enable him to defend the line of 
the Arkansas and to keep Price out of Missouri. 




STONE CRIB. 




TREE DAM. 




BRACKET DAM. 







ted of Ri 
THE RED RIVER DAM. 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

THE DAM. 

DIRECTLY after the capture of Port Hudson, Bailey 
offered to float the two Confederate transport steam 
ers, Starlight and Red Chief, that were found lying 
on their sides high and almost dry in the middle of 
Thompson s Creek. With smiles and a shrug or two 
permission was given him to try ; he tried ; he 
succeeded ; and this experience it undoubtedly was 
that caused his words to be listened to so readily 
when he now proposed to rescue the fleet in the same 
way. But to build at leisure and unmolested a pair of 
little wing-dams in the ooze of Thompson s Creek and 
to close the opening by a central boom against that 
sluggish current was one thing ; it was quite another 
to repeat the same operation against time, while sur 
rounded and even cut off by a strong and active 
enemy, this too on the scale required to hold back the 
rushing waters of the Red River, at a depth sufficient 
for the passage of the heaviest of the gunboats and 
for a time long enough to let the whole fleet go by. 
Yet, bold as the bare conception seems, and stupen 
dous as the work looks when regarded in detail, no 
sooner had it been suggested by Bailey than every 
engineer in the army at once entered heartily into the 
scheme. Palfrey, who had previously made a com 
plete survey of the rapids, examined the plan carefully, 

337 



338 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

and approved it. Franklin, to whose staff Bailey was 
attached, himself an engineer of distinguished attain 
ments and wide experience, approved it, and Banks at 
once gave orders to carry it out. 

Tn the month that had elapsed since the fleet 
ascended the rapids, the river had fallen more than 
six feet ; for more than a mile the rocks now lay bare. 
In the worst places but forty inches of water were 
found, while with seven feet the heavy gunboats 
could barely float, and in some places the channel, 
shallow as it was, narrowed to a thread. The current 
ran nine miles an hour. The whole fall was thirteen 
feet, and at the point just above the lower chute, 
where Bailey proposed to construct his dam, the river 
was 758 feet wide, with a fall of six feet below the 
dam. The problem was how to raise the water 
above the dam seven feet, backing it up so as to float 
the gunboats over the upper rapids. 

Heavy details were made from the troops, the 
working parties were carefully selected, and on the 
3Oth of April the work was begun. From the north 
bank a wing-dam was constructed of large trees, the 
butts tied by cross logs, the tops laid towards the 
current, covered with brush, and weighted, to keep 
them in place, with stone and brick obtained by tear 
ing down the buildings in the neighborhood. On 
the south bank, where large trees were scarce, a crib 
was made of logs and timbers filled in with stone 
and with bricks and heavy pieces of machinery taken 
from the neighboring sugar-houses and cotton-gins. 
When this was done there remained an open space 
of about one hundred and fifty feet between the 
wings, through which the rising waters poured with 
great velocity. This gap was nearly closed by 



THE DAM. 339 

sinking across it four of the large Mississippi coal- 
barges belonging to the navy. 

When on the 8th of May all was thus completed, 
the water was found to have risen five feet four and 
a half inches at the upper fall, giving a measured 
depth there of eight feet eight and one half inches. 
Three of the light-draught gunboats, Osage, Neosho, 
and Fort Hindman, which had steam up, took prompt 
advantage of the rise to pass the upper fall, and soon 
lay in safety in the pool formed by the dam ; yet for 
some reason the other boats of the fleet were not 
ready, and thus in the very hour when safety was 
apparently within their reach, suddenly they were 
once more exposed to a danger even greater than 
before. Early on the morning of the gth the tre 
mendous pressure of pent-up waters surging against 
the dam drove out two of the barges, making a gap 
sixty-six feet wide, and swung them furiously against 
the rocks below. Through the gap the river rushed 
in a roaring torrent. At sight and sound of this, the 
Admiral at once mounted a horse, galloped to 
the upper fall, and called out to the Lexington to run 
the rapids. Instantly the Lexington was under way, 
and as, with a full head of steam she made the 
plunge, every man in the army and the fleet held his 
breath in the terrible silence of suspense. For a 
moment she seemed lost as she reeled and almost 
disappeared in the foam and surge, but only to be 
greeted with a mighty cheer, such as brave men give 
to courage and good fortune, when she was seen to 
ride in safety below. The Osage, the Neosho, and the 
Fort Hindman promptly followed her down the chute, 
but the other six gunboats and the two tugs were still 
imprisoned above by the sudden sinking of the swift 



340 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

rushing waters ; the jaws of danger, for an instant 
relaxed, had once more shut tightly on the prey. 
Doubt and gloom took the place of exultation. As 
for the army, hard as had been the work demanded 
of it, still greater exertions were before it, nor was 
their result by any means certain, for the volume of 
the river was daily diminishing, and there would be 
no more rise that year. 

So far Bailey had substantially followed, though 
on a larger scale, the same plan that had worked so 
successfully the year before at Port Hudson. But 
against a weight, a volume, and a velocity of water 
such as had to be encountered here, it was now plainly 
seen that something else would have to be tried. No 
emergency, however great or sudden, ever finds a 
man of his stamp unready. As soon therefore as the 
collapse showed him the defect in his first plan, he 
instantly set about remedying it by dividing the 
weight of water to be contended with. At the upper 
fall three wing-dams were constructed. Just above 
the rocks a stone crib was laid on the south side, 
and directly opposite to this on the north side a tree- 
dam, like that already described when speaking of 
the original dam. Just below the rocks, projecting 
diagonally from the north bank, a bracket-dam was 
built, made of logs having one end sunk to meet the 
current, the other end raised on trestles, and the 
whole then sheathed with plank. By this means 
the whole current was turned into one very narrow 
channel, and a new rise of fourteen inches was gained, 
giving in all six feet six and one half inches of water. 
Every man bending himself to the task to his utmost, 
by the most incredible exertions this new work was 
completed in three days and three nights, and thus 



THE DAM. 341 

during the I2th and i3th the remainder of the fleet 
passed free of the danger. 

The cribs were washed away during the spring rise 
in 1865 ; but it is said that the main tree-dam survives 
to this day, having driven the channel towards the 
south shore, and washed away a large slice of the 
bank at the upper end of the town of Alexandria. 

For his part in the conception and execution of 
this great undertaking, Bailey received the thanks of 
Congress on the nth of June, 1864, and was after 
ward made a brigadier-general by the President. 

The troops engaged in constructing the dam were 
the 97th colored, Colonel George D. Robinson ; the 
99th colored, Lieutenant-Colonel Uri B. Pearsall ; 
the 29th Maine, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles S. Emer 
son ; the 1 33d New York, a detail of 300 men, under 
Captain Anthony J. Allaire; the i6ist New York, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. B. Kinsey ; the pioneers of 
the Thirteenth Army Corps, 125 in number, com 
manded by Captain John B. Hutchens of the 24th 
Indiana, and composed of men detailed from the i ith, 
24th, 34th, 46th, 47th, and 67th Indiana, the 48th, 
56th, 83d, and 96th Ohio, the 24th and 28th Iowa, the 
23d and 29th Wisconsin, i3Oth Illinois, and 1 9th Ken 
tucky ; 460 men of the 27th Indiana, 29th Wisconsin, 
I9th Kentucky, i3Oth Illinois, 83d Ohio, 24th Iowa, 
23d Wisconsin, 77th Illinois, and i6th Ohio, com 
manded by Captain George W. Stein of the latter 
regiment. 

Bailey was also greatly assisted by a detail from 
the navy, under Lieutenant Amos R. Langthorne, 
commanding the Mound City. Besides these offi 
cers, all of whom rendered service the most laborious 
and the most valuable, Bailey acknowledges his in- 



342 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

debtedness to Brigadier-General Dwight, Colonel 
James Grant Wilson, and Lieutenant Charles S. 
Sargent of Banks s staff ; to Major W. H. Sentell, 
i6oth New York, provost-marshal ; Lieutenant John 
J. Williamson, ordnance officer of the Nineteenth 
Corps ; and Lieutenant Sydney Smith Fairchild, 
i6ist New York. 

All this time the army lying about Alexandria, to 
secure the safety of the navy, was itself virtually in 
vested by the small but active forces under Taylor, 
who now found himself, not only foot loose, but once 
more able to use for his supplies the channel of the 
upper Red River, whence he had caused the obstruc 
tions to be removed as soon as the withdrawal of Banks 
relieved all fears of invasion, and turned the thoughts 
of the Confederate chiefs to dreams of conquest. 

On the 3ist of March Grant had peremptorily 
ordered the evacuation of the coast of Texas save 
only the position held at the mouth of the Rio Grande, 
and Banks, as soon as he received this order, had 
ordered McClernand to join him with the bulk of his 
troops, consisting of the First and Second divisions 
of the Thirteenth Corps. McClernand, with Lawler s 
brigade of the former, arrived at Alexandria on the 
29th of April ; Warren, with the rest of his division, 
was on his way up the Red River, when he found 
himself cut off near Marksville. Then he seized Fort 
De Russy and held it until the campaign ended. 

Brisk skirmishing went on from day to day between 
the outposts and advanced guards, yet Banks, though 
he had five men to one of Taylor s, 1 held fast by his 

1 Banks s return for April 3Oth shows 33,502 officers and men for duty. May 
loth, Taylor says : " To keep this up with my little force of scarce 6,000 men, 
I am compelled to eke out the lion s skin with the fox s hide. " (" Official Rec 
ords," vol. xxxiv., part i., p. 590.) He does not count his cavalry. 



THE DAM. 343 

earthworks without making any real effort to crush or 
to drive off his adversary, while on their part the 
Confederates refrained from any serious attempt to 
interrupt the navigation of the lower Red River until 
the evening of the 3d of May, when near David s 
Ferry Major attacked and, after a sharp fight, took 
the transport City Belle, which he caught coming up 
the river with 425 officers and men of the i2Oth Ohio. 
Many were killed or wounded, and many others taken 
prisoners, a few escaping through the forest. Major 
then sunk the steamboat across the channel and thus 
closed it. Early on the morning of the 5th of May 
Major, with Hardeman s and Lane s cavalry brigades 
and West s battery, met just above Fort De Russy 
the gunboats Signal and Covington, and the transport 
steamer Warner, and after a short and hard fight 
disabled all three of the boats. The Covington was 
set on fire by her commander and destroyed, but the 
Signal 33\& Warner fell into the hands of the Confed 
erates with many of the officers and men of the three 
boats, and of a detachment of about 250 men of the 
56th Ohio, on the Warner. These captured steamers, 
also, were sunk across the channel. 

On the 2d of May, Franklin s wound compelling 
him to go to New Orleans and presently to the North, 
Banks assigned Emory to the command of the Nine 
teenth Army Corps. This brought McMillan to the 
head of the First division and gave his brigade to 
Beal. Captain Frederic Speed was announced as 
Assistant Adjutant-General of the Corps. A few 
days later, in consequence of McClernand s illness, 
Lawler was given the command of the Thirteenth 
Corps. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

LAST DAYS IN LOUISIANA. 

ON the 1 3th of May Banks marched from Alex 
andria on Simmesport, Lawler leading the infantry 
column, Emory next, and A. J. Smith s divisions of the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps bringing up the 
rear. As far as Fort De Russy the march followed 
the bank of the river, with the object of covering the 
withdrawal of the fleet of gunboats and transports 
against any possible molestation. Steele s cavalry 
division hung upon and harassed the rear, Polignac, 
Major, and Bagby hovered in front and on the flanks, 
while Harrison followed on the north bank of the 
Red River, but no serious attempt was made to 
obstruct the movement. On the afternoon of the 
1 5th the Confederates were seen in force in front of 
the town of Marksville, but were soon driven off and 
retired rapidly through the town. 

On the morning of the i6th of May an event took 
place, described by all who saw it as the finest mili 
tary spectacle they ever witnessed. On the wide and 
rolling prairie of Avoyelles, otherwise known as the 
Plains of Mansura, the Confederates stood for 
the last time across the line of march of the retreat 
ing army. As battery after battery went into action 
and the cavalry skirmishers became briskly engaged, 
it seemed as if a pitched battle were imminent. 

344 



LAST DA YS IN LOUISIANA. 345 

The infantry rapidly formed line of battle, Mower on 
the right, Kilby Smith next, Emory in the centre, 
Lawler on the left, the main body of Arnold s cav 
alry in column on the flanks. Save where here and 
there the light smoke from the artillery hindered the 
view, the whole lines of both armies were in plain 
sight of every man in either, but the disparity in 
numbers was too great to justify Taylor in making 
more than a handsome show of resistance on a field 
like this, where defeat was certain, and destruction 
must have followed close upon defeat ; and so when 
our lines were advanced he prudently withdrew. 
Banks s losses were small, but Lieutenant Haskin s 
horse-battery F, ist U. S., being unavoidably ex 
posed in spite of its skilful handling, to a hot enfilade 
fire of the Confederate artillery, to cover their flank 
movement in retreat, suffered rather severely. 

In the afternoon the troops halted for a while on 
the banks of a little stream to enjoy the first fresh, 
clear water they had so much as seen for many 
weeks. At the sight the men broke into cheers, and 
almost with one accord rushed eagerly to the banks of 
the rivulet. That night the army bivouacked eight 
miles from the Atchafalaya, and early the next 
morning, the 1 7th of May, marched down to the river 
at Simmesport, where the transports and the gunboats, 
having arrived two days earlier, lay waiting. Near 
Moreauville on the i7th the rear-guard of cavalry 
was sharply attacked by Wharton ; at the same time 
Debray, lying in ambush with two regiments and a 
battery, opened fire on the flank of the moving col 
umn. While this was going on the two other regi 
ments of Debray made a dash on the wagon-train 
near the crossing of Yellow Bayou, and threw it into 



346 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

some momentary confusion. Neither of these attacks 
were serious, and all were easily thrown off. 

The next day, the i8th, A. J. Smith s command 
was in position near Yellow Bayou to cover the cross 
ing of the Atchafalaya, and he was himself at the 
landing at Simmesport, in the act of completing his 
arrangements for crossing, when Taylor suddenly 
attacked with his whole force. Mower, who com 
manded in Smith s absence, advanced his lines as 
soon as he found his skirmishers coming in, and thus 
brought on one of the sharpest engagements of the 
campaign. With equal judgment, skill, and daring, 
Mower finally drove the Confederates off the field in 
confusion and with heavy loss, and so brought to a 
brilliant close the part borne by the gallant soldiers 
of the Army of the Tennessee in their trying service 
in Louisiana. Mower s loss was 38 killed, 226 
wounded, and 3 missing, in all 267. Taylor reports 
his loss as about 500, including 30 killed, 50 severely 
wounded, and about 100 prisoners from Polignac s 
division. The Confederate returns account for 452 
killed and wounded. 

At Simmesport the skill and readiness of Bailey 
were once more put to good use in improvising a 
bridge of steamboats across the Atchafalaya. In his 
report, Banks speaks of this as the first attempt of 
the kind, probably forgetting, since it did not fall 
under his personal observation, that when the army 
moved on Port Hudson the year before, the last of 
the troops and trains crossed the river at the same 
place in substantially the same way. However, the 
Atchafalaya was then low : it was now swollen to a 
width of six hundred or seven hundred yards by the 
back water from the Mississippi, and thus the floating 



LAST DA YS IN LOUISIANA. 347 

bridge, which the year before was made by lashing 
together not more than nine boats, with their gang 
ways in line, connected by means of the gangplanks 
and rough boards, now required twenty-two boats to 
close the gap. Over this bridge, on the igthof May, the 
troops took up their march in retreat, and so brought 
the disastrous campaign of the Red River to an end 
just a year after they had begun, in the same way and 
on the same spot, the triumphant campaign of Port 
Hudson. 

On the 2Oth A. J. Smith crossed, the bridge was 
broken up, and in the evening the whole army marched 
for the Mississippi. On the 2ist, at Red River land 
ing, the Nineteenth Corps bade farewell to its brave 
comrades of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth. 

A. J. Smith landed at Vicksburg on the 23d of 
May too late for the part assigned him in the spring 
campaign of Sherman s army, and the operations on 
the Mississippi being now reduced to the defensive, 
.he remained on the banks of the river until called on 
to repulse Price s invasion of Missouri. Then, having 
handsomely performed his share of this service, he 
joined Thomas just in time to take part in the decisive 
battle of Nashville. 

At Simmesport Banks was met by Canby, who on 
the nth of May, at Cairo or on the way thence to 
Memphis, had assumed command of the new-made 
Military Division of West Mississippi, in virtue of 
orders from Washington, dated the 7th. The Presi 
dent still refused to yield to Grant s repeated requests 
that Banks might be altogether relieved from his 
command, nor did Grant longer persist in this ; accord 
ingly Banks remained the titular commander of the 
Department of the Gulf, with a junior officer present 



348 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

as his immediate superior and his next subordinate in 
actual command of his troops. 

The Thirteenth and Nineteenth Corps, the cavalry, 
and the trains continued the march, under Emory, 
and on the 226. of May went into camp at Morganza. 

From the Arkansas to the Gulf, from the Atchafa- 
laya to the Rio Grande there was no longer a Union 
soldier, save the insignificant garrison kept at Brown- 
ville to preserve the semblance of that foothold in 
Texas for the sake of which so much blood and 
treasure had been spilled into this sink of shame. 

When Steele s retreat to Little Rock had put an 
end to all hopes of a successful pursuit, Kirby Smith 
faced about and set Walker in rapid motion toward 
Alexandria with Churchill closely following. A day 
or two after Banks had left the place Walker arrived 
at Alexandria, too late to do anything more in 
Louisiana. 

Taylor quarrelled bitterly with Kirby Smith, who 
ended by ordering him to turn over his command to 
Walker. Leaving a small force to hold the country 
and to observe and annoy the Union army of occupa 
tion in Louisiana, Kirby Smith then gathered his 
forces, and passing by Steele s right flank, invaded 
Missouri. 

After arriving at Morganza, Emory, by Canby s 
orders, put his command in good condition for de 
fence or for a movement in any direction by sending 
to other stations all the troops except the Nineteenth 
Corps and the First division, Lawler s, of the Thir 
teenth Corps, as well as all the extra animals, wagons, 
and baggage of the army. For the sedentary 
defensive, the position at Morganza had many 
advantages, but except that good water for all pur- 



LAST DA YS IN LOUISIANA. 349 

poses was to be had in plenty for the trouble of 
crossing the levee, the situation was perhaps the 
most unfortunate in which the corps was ever en 
camped. The heat was oppressive and daily growing 
more unbearable. The rude shelters of bushes and 
leaves, cut fresh from the neighboring thicket and 
often renewed, gave little protection ; the levee and 
the dense undergrowth kept off the breeze ; and such 
was the state of the soil that when it was not a cloud 
of light and suffocating dust, it was a sea of fat black 
mud. The sickly season was close at hand, the field 
and general hospitals were filled, and the deaths were 
many. The mosquitoes were at their worst ; but 
worse than all were the six weeks of absolute idleness, 
broken only by an occasional alarm or two, such as 
led to the brief expedition of Grover s division to 
Tunica and Natchez. 

At first Canby intended to use the Nineteenth 
Corps as a sort of marine patrol or coast-guard, with 
its trains and artillery and cavalry reduced to the 
lowest point, and the main body of the infantry kept 
always ready to embark on a fleet of transports 
specially assigned for the service and to go quickly 
to any point up or down the Mississippi or the 
adjacent waters that might be menaced or attacked 
by the enemy. The orders for the organization and 
equipment of the corps in this manner form a model 
of forethought and of minute attention to detail, yet as 
events turned out, they were never put in practice. 

Toward the end of June the corps underwent at 
the hands of Canby the last of its many reorganiz 
ations. 1 The First and Second divisions were left 
substantially as they had been during the campaign 

1 Begun about June i6th. The final orders are dated June 27th. 



350 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

just ended, but the Thirteenth Corps being broken 
up, 1 seventeen of its best regiments were taken to 
form for the Nineteenth Corps a new Third division, 
under Lawler. Emory, who was suffering from 
the effects of the climate and the hardships of 
the campaign, had just applied for leave of absence, 
supposing that all idea of a movement during the 
summer was at an end, and Canby, having granted 
this, assigned Reynolds to command the corps, to 
which, in truth, his rank and record entitled him, and 
gave the First division, Emory s own, to Roberts, a 
total stranger. Upon this, and learning of the move 
ment about to be made, Emory at once threw up his 
leave of absence, and Reynolds, noting with the eye 
of a soldier the deep and widespread disappointment 
among the officers and men of the corps, magnani 
mously persuaded Canby to leave the command of 
the Nineteenth Army Corps, for the time being, to 
Emory, while Reynolds himself commanded the 
forces at Morganza. The brigades of the First divi 
sion were commanded by Beal, McMillan, and Cur- 
rie. Grover kept the Second division with Birge, 
Molineux, and Sharpe as brigade commanders, and 
afterwards a fourth brigade was added, made up of 
four regiments from the disbanded Thirteenth Corps, 
under Colonel David Shunk of the 8th Indiana, and 
comprising, in addition to his own regiment, the 24th 
and 28th Iowa, and the i8th Indiana. At this later 
period also the ist Louisiana was taken from Moli- 
neux s brigade to remain in the Gulf, and its place 
was filled by the nth Indiana and the 22d Iowa. 
Lawler s new Third division had Lee, Cameron, 
and Colonel F. W. Moore of the 83d Ohio for bri- 

1 By orders from Washington, issued at Canby s request, June nth. 



LAST DA YS IN LOUISIANA. 351 

gade commanders. This was a splendid division, on 
both sides congenial ; unfortunately it was not des 
tined to see service with the corps. 

Three great reviews broke the torrid monotony of 
Morganza. On the nth of June Emory reviewed 
the corps in a tropical torrent, which suddenly de 
scending drenched every man to the skin and reduced 
the field music to discord, without interrupting the 
ceremony. On the i4th the troops again passed in 
review before Sickles, who had been sent to Louisiana 
on a tour of inspection, and finally on the 25th 
Reynolds reviewed the forces at Morganza on taking 
the command. 

Grant s orders to Canby were the same as those he 
had given to Banks, to go against Mobile. 

This was indeed an integral and important, though 
strictly subordinate, part of the comprehensive plan 
adopted by the lieutenant-general for the spring 
campaign. Besides distracting the attention of the 
Confederates, and either drawing off a large part of 
their forces from Sherman s front or else causing 
them to give up Mobile without a struggle, the 
control of the Alabama River would give Sherman a 
secure base of supplies and a safe line of retreat in 
any contingency, while the occupation of a line from 
Atlanta to Mobile would, as Grant remarked, " once 
more split the Confederacy in twain." 

But while in Louisiana the troops stood still, await 
ing the full completion of Canby s exhaustive prepara 
tions, elsewhere events were marching with great 
rapidity. On the 3d of June Grant s campaign from 
the Rappahannock to the James came to an end in 
the bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, with the loss of 
12,737 officers and men. On the i4th he crossed the 



352 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

James and sat down before Petersburg. In the six 
weeks that had passed since the Army of the Poto 
mac made its way into the Wilderness, Grant had 
lost from the ranks of the two armies of the Potomac 
and the James nearly as many men as Lee had in the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 1 

While he was himself directing the movement of 
Meade and Butler against Richmond and Petersburg, 
Grant ordered Hunter, who commanded in the 
Shenandoah Valley, to march by Charlottesville on 
Lynchburg, and sent Sheridan, with the cavalry on a 
great raid to Charlottesville to meet Hunter ; but Lee 
sent Early to intercept the movement, and Early, 
moving with the speed and promptness to which 
Jackson s old corps was well used, got to Lynchburg 
in time to head Hunter off. Then Hunter, rightly 
deeming his position precarious, instead of retreating 
down the valley, made his escape across the mountains 
into West Virginia. This left the gates of the great 
valley thoroughfare wide open for Early, who, in 
stantly marching north, once more invaded Maryland, 
harried Pennsylvania, and menaced Washington. 

It was at this crisis, when nothing was being 
accomplished in Louisiana and everything was hap 
pening in Virginia, that Grant ordered Canby to 
put off his designs on Mobile and to send the Nine 
teenth Corps with all speed to Hampton Roads. 2 

1 From the 5th of May to the I5th of June Meade s losses were 51,908, and 
Butler s 9,234, together 61,142. The best estimates give 61,000 to 64,000 as 
Lee s strength at the Wilderness, or 78,400 from the Rappahannock to the 
James. " Century War Book," vol. iv., pp. 182-187. 

2 The first suggestion seems to have come from Butler to Stanton, May 2gth, 
Weitzel concurring. Grant disapproved this in a telegram dated 3 P.M., June 
3d : the second assault had been made that morning. The movement across the 
James for the surprise and seizure of Petersburg came to a stand-still on the 
i8th. On the 23d Grant made the request and the orders were issued the next day. 



LAST DA YS IN LOUISIANA. 353 

Canby understood this to mean the First and Second 
divisions, and placed Emory in command of this 
detachment. On the 3Oth of June the two divisions 
began moving down the river to Algiers, and on the 
3d of July the advance steamed out of the river into 
the Gulf of Mexico with sealed orders. When the 
steamer Crescent, which led the way, carrying the 
i53d New York and four companies of the ii4th, 
had dropped her pilot outside of the passes, Davis 
broke the seal and for the first time learned his desti 
nation. Within a few days the remainder of the 
First division followed, without Roberts, Emory ac 
companied by the headquarters of the expedition 
going on the Mississippi on the 5th of July, with the 
30th Massachusetts, the QOth New York, and the 
1 1 6th New York, but transferring himself at the 
Southwest Pass to the Creole, in his impatience at 
finding the Mississippi aground and his anxiety to 
come up with the advance of his troops. The Cres 
cent was the first to arrive before Fortress Monroe. 
The last regiment of the Third brigade sailed on the 
i ith. Grover s division began its embarkation about 
the loth and finished about the 2Oth. 

In this movement some of the best regiments of the 
corps were left behind, as well as all the cavalry and 
the whole o f the magnificent park of field artillery. 
Among the troops thus cut off were the noth New 
York, the i6ist New York, the ;th Vermont, the 
6th Michigan, the 4th Wisconsin, the ist Indiana 
Heavy Artillery, the ist Louisiana, and the 2d Louisi 
ana Mounted Infantry. Reynolds with the corps 
headquarters and the new Third division remained 
in Louisiana. Since this came from the old Thir 
teenth Corps, was afterwards incorporated in the 
23 



354 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

new Thirteenth Corps, formed for the siege of Mo 
bile, never saw service in the Nineteenth Corps and 
nominally belonged to it but a few days, and since 
the detachment now sent north was presently consti 
tuted the Nineteenth Corps, the title of the corps 
will hereafter be used in this narrative when speaking 
of the services of the First and Second divisions. 

On the 1 4th of June Major William H. Sentell, of 
the i6oth New York, was detailed by Emory as 
acting assistant inspector-general of the corps, and 
Captain Henry C. Inwood, of the i65th New York, 1 
as provost marshal. 

To regret leaving the lowlands of Louisiana at this 
sickly season, the poisonous swamps, the filthy water, 
the overpowering heat, and the intolerable mosqui 
toes, was impossible ; yet there can have been no man 
in all that host that did not feel, as the light, cool 
breezes of the Gulf fanned his brow, a swelling of the 
heart and a tightness of the throat at the thought of 
all that he had seen and suffered, and the remem 
brance of the many thousands of his less fortunate 
comrades who had succumbed to the dangers and 
trials on which he himself was now turning his back 
for the last time. 

1 In the official records wrongly printed as the i6oth. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

ON THE POTOMAC. 

GRANT had meant to send the corps to join the 
Army of the James under Butler at Bermuda Hun 
dred, but already the dust of Early s columns was in 
sight from the hills behind Washington, and the 
capital, though fully fortified, being practically with 
out defenders, until the Sixth Corps should come to 
the rescue, in the stress of the moment the detach 
ments of the Nineteenth Corps were hurried up the 
Potomac as fast as the transports entered the roads. 
It was noon on the nth when Davis landed the 
fourteen companies from the Crescent at the wharves 
of Washington, where he found orders to occupy and 
hold Fort Saratoga. 1 

At the hour when Davis was disembarking at the 
southern end of Sixth Street wharf, Early s head 
quarters were at Silver Spring, barely five miles away 
to the northward, and his skirmishers were drawing 
within range of the guns of Fort Stevens. Behind 
the defences of Washington there were but twenty 
thousand soldiers of all sorts. Of these less than 
half formed the garrison of the works, and even 
of this fraction nearly all were raw, undisciplined, 
uninstructed, and lacking the simplest knowledge 

1 About three miles N.-N.-E. from the Capitol, overlooking the Baltimore 
road and railway. 

355 



356 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

of the ground they were to defend. But five days 
before this, Grant had taken Ricketts from the lines 
of the Sixth Corps before Petersburg, and sent him 
by water to Baltimore, whence his superb veterans 
were carried by rail to the Monocacy just in time 
to enable Wallace, with a chance medley of garri 
sons and emergency men, to face Early on the 9th, 
and compel him to lose a day in crossing. Then, 
at last, made quite certain of Early s true position 
and plans, Grant hurried the rest of the Sixth Corps 
to the relief of Washington, and thus the steamboat 
bearing the advance of Wright s men touched the 
wharf about two hours after the Crescent had made 
fast. The guns of Fort Stevens were already heard 
shelling the approaches, and thither Wright was at 
once directed, but in the great heat and dust Early 
had pressed on so fast that his men arrived before the 
works parched with thirst and panting with exhaust 
ion. Moreover, evening came before the rear of his 
column had closed up on the front, and during these 
critical hours Wright s strong divisions of the veterans 
of the Army of the Potomac lined the works and 
stood stiffly across the path, while in supporting dis 
tance to the eastward was the little handful from the 
Gulf. Early, who had seen something of this and 
imagined more, waited, and so his opportunity, great 
or little, went. On the afternoon of the next day, 
the T2th of July, Early still not attacking, Wright 
sent out a brigade and roughly pushed back the Con 
federate advance. Then Early, realizing that he had 
not an hour to lose in extricating his command from 
its false position, fell back at night on Rockville. 

On the 1 3th of July the Clinton arrived at Wash 
ington with the 29th Maine and part of the i3th 



ON THE POTOMAC. 357 

Maine, the St. Mary with the 8th Vermont, the 
Corinthian with the remaining six companies of 
the 1 1 4th New York, the Mississippi with the QOth 
and 1 1 6th New York and the 3Oth Massachusetts, 
the Creole with the 47th Pennsylvania. As the de 
tachments landed they were hurried, in most instances 
by long and needless circuits to Tennallytown, where 
they found themselves at night without supplies or 
wagons, without orders, and without much organi 
zation. 

Now that the enemy had gone and there were 
enough troops in Washington, the capital was once 
more a wild confusion of commands and commanders, 
such as seems to have prevailed at every important 
crisis during the war. Out of this Grant brought 
order by assigning Wright to conduct the pursuit of 
Early. When, therefore, on the morning of the i3th, 
Wright found Early gone from his front, he marched 
after him with the Sixth Corps, and ordered the 
detachment of the Nineteenth Corps to follow. 
Grant wished Wright to push on to Edwards Ferry 
to cut off Early s retreat across the Potomac. At 
nightfall Wright was at Offutt s Cross-Roads, with 
Russell and Getty of the Sixth Corps, the handful 
of the Nineteenth Corps, and the cavalry. 

About 3,600 men of Emory s division had landed 
at Washington during the i2th and i3th of July, 
increasing the effective force of the Nineteenth Corps 
to about 4,200, most of whom spent the night in fol 
lowing the windings of the road that marks the long 
outline of the northern fortifications. On the morning 
of the 1 4th, the roll-call accounted for 192 officers and 
2,987 men of the corps, representing ten regiments, 
in the bivouacs that lay loosely scattered about Ten- 



358 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

nallytown. On the i4th these detachments marched 
ten miles and encamped beyond Offutt s Cross-Roads, 
where they were joined by Battery L of the ist Ohio, 
temporarily lent to the division from the artillery 
reserve of the defences of Washington. Emory him 
self arrived during the day and assumed command of 
the division, and Dwight, relieved from duty as 
Banks s chief of staff, came in the evening to rejoin 
the ist brigade. Gilmore, who found himself in 
Washington without assignment, had been given com 
mand of the Nineteenth Corps, but happening to 
sprain his foot badly he was obliged to go off duty 
after having held the assignment nominally for less 
than a day. Thereupon Emory once more took com 
mand of the corps, and the First division fell to 
Dwight. 

Moving by the river road, Wright, with Getty s 
division, was at Poolesville on the night of the I4th, 
with the last of the Nineteenth Corps eleven miles in 
the rear. But Early had already made good his 
escape, having crossed the Potomac that morning at 
White s Ford, with all his trains and captures intact, 
while Wright was still south of Seneca Creek. 

The next day Emory closed up on Getty at Pooles 
ville, and Halleck began sending the rest of the Sixth 
Corps there to join Wright. 

In the Union army the impression now prevailed 
that Early, having accomplished the main object of 
his diversion would, as usual, hasten to rejoin Lee at 
Richmond. Wright, therefore, got ready to go back 
to Washington, but Early was in fact at Leesburg, 
and word came that Hunter, whose forces were be 
ginning to arrive at Harper s Ferry, after their long 
and wide excursion over the Alleghanies and through 



ON THE POTOMAC. 359 

West Virginia, had sent Sullivan s division across the 
Potomac at Berlin to Hillsborough, where it threat 
ened Early s flank and rear while exposing its own. 
Therefore Wright felt obliged to cross to the support 
of Hunter, and on the morning of the i6th of July 
the Sixth Corps, followed by Emory s detachment of 
the Nineteenth, waded the Potomac at White s Ford 
and encamped at Clark s Gap, three miles beyond 
Leesburg. But Early, by turns bold and wary, slipped 
away between Wright and Hunter, marched through 
Snicker s Gap, and put the Shenandoah between 
him and his enemies. Caution had been enjoined on 
the pursuit, and the 1 7th was spent in closing up and 
reconnoitring. On the i8th the combined forces 
of Wright and Hunter marched through Snicker s 
Gap, and in the afternoon Crook, who, having 
brought up his own division, found himself in com 
mand of Hunter s troops, sent Thoburn across the 
Shenandoah below Snicker s Ferry to seize and hold 
the ferry for the passage of the army ; but when 
Thoburn had gained the north bank Early fell upon 
him with three divisions and drove him back across 
the river with heavy loss. Instead of risking any 
thing more in the attempt to force the crossing in the 
face of Early s whole force in position, Wright was 
meditating a turning movement by way of Keyes s 
Gap, but Duffie, after riding hard through Ashby s 
Gap and crossing the Shenandoah at Berry s Ferry, 
likewise came to grief on the north bank, and so the 
day of the igih of July was lost. 

Meanwhile Hunter, having seen nearly all the rest 
of his army arrive at Harper s Ferry, sent a brigade 
and a half under Hayes to march straight up the 
Shenandoah to Snicker s Ferry, while Averell with a 



360 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

mixed force of cavalry and infantry was sweeping 
down from Martinsburg on Winchester. Thus men 
aced in front, flank, and rear, Early, on the night of 
the i Qth of July, retreated on Strasburg. 

The next morning Wright crossed the Shenandoah, 
meaning to move toward Winchester, but when he 
learned where Early had gone he recrossed the river 
in the evening, marched by night to Leesburg, and 
encamped on Goose Creek, presently crossing to the 
south bank. On the morning of the 22d Wright 
marched on Washington, the Sixth Corps leading, 
followed by the Nineteenth. On the afternoon of 
the 23d Emory crossed the chain bridge and went 
into bivouac on the high ground overlooking the 
Potomac near Battery Vermont. So ended the 
" Snicker s Gap war." 

During this expedition Kenly s brigade of the 
Eighth Corps served with the Nineteenth. 

As soon as Early s withdrawal from Maryland had 
quieted all apprehensions for the safety of Washing 
ton, the orders that had met the advance of the 
Nineteenth Corps at Hampton Roads were recalled, 
and, reverting to his original intention, Grant sent the 
detachments of the corps as they arrived up the James 
River to Bermuda Hundred to join the right wing of 
his armies under Butler. Indeed, at the moment of 
its arrival at Poolesville, the First division had been 
ordered to take the same destination, but this the 
movements of the contending armies prevented. 
The first of the troops to land at Bermuda Hundred 
was the i5th Maine on the i;th of July. It was 
at once sent to the right of the lines before Peters 
burg, and within the next ten days there were assem 
bled there parts of four brigades McMillan s and 



ON THE POTOMAC. 361 

Currie s of the First division, and Birge s and 
Molineux s of Grover s. Part of Currie s brigade was 
engaged, under Hancock, in the affair at Deep Bottom 
on the north bank of the James on the 25th of July, 
losing eighteen killed and wounded and twenty-four 
prisoners. The work and duty in the trenches and 
on the skirmishing line were hard and constant, re 
minding the men of their days and nights before 
Port Hudson, but this was not to last long, and the 
loss was light. 1 

On the 2Oth of July at Carter s Farm, three miles 
north of Winchester, Averell, who was following 
Early, met and routed Ramseur, who had been sent 
back to check the pursuit. Early continued his re 
treat to Strasburg on the 22d, but when the next 
day he learned that Wright was gone, he turned 
back to punish the weak force under Hunter, and 
on the 24th overwhelmed Crook at Kernstown. 
Crook retreated through Martinsburg into Maryland, 
and marching by Williamsport and Boonsborough, 
took post at Sharpsburg, while Averell stayed 
at Hagerstown to watch the upper fords of the 
Potomac. 

To break up the Baltimore and Ohio railway and 
to ravage the borders of Pennsylvania were favorite 
ideas with Early. He now entered with zest on the 
unopposed gratification of both desires, and while he 

1 In Major William F. Tiemann s truly admirable " History of theisgth New 
York," he says: "July 26th we were camped near Major-General Birney s 
headquarters, not far from Hatcher s house between batteries five and six, 
one of which enjoyed the euphonious title of Fort Slaughter. . . . The 
works were built more strongly and with more art than at Port Hudson, but 
were not nearly as strong in reality, as Port Hudson was fortified naturally and 
the obstructions were much harder to overcome." (P. 87.) I think this book 
a model of everything that a regimental history ought to be ; above all, for the 
rare gifts of modesty and accuracy. 



362 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

himself bestrode the railway at Martinsburg with his 
army engaged in its destruction, he sent McCausland 
with his own brigade of cavalry and Bradley Johnson s 
on the famous marauding expedition that culminated 
in the wanton burning of Chambersburg in default of 
an impossible ransom, and at last resulted in the flight 
of McCausland s whole force, with Averell at his heels, 
and its ultimate destruction or dispersion by Averell, 
after a long chase, at Moorefield far up the south 
branch of the Potomac. 

When on the 23d of July he saw Wright back 
at Washington and Early at Strasburg in retreat, as 
was imagined, up the valley, Grant partly changed his 
mind about recalling the troops he had spared for the 
defence of Washington, and determining to content 
himself with Wright s corps, directed Emory to stay 
where he was. Emory now had 253 officers and 5,320 
men for duty. 

As one turn of the wheel had given the Nineteenth 
Corps to Butler, restoring to his command some of 
the regiments that had gone with him to the capture 
of New Orleans, so the next turn was to bring the 
corps under Augur, who since leaving Louisiana had 
been in command of the department of Washington. 
So at least run the orders of the 23d of July, yet 
hardly had Emory reported his division to Augur, 
when the whole arrangement was suddenly broken 
up, and the army that had just marched back to 
Washington with Wright was once more hurried off 
to meet what was supposed to be a fresh invasion by 
Early. In fact Early was quietly reposing at Bunker 
Hill, where he easily commanded the approaches and 
debouches of the Shenandoah valley, the fords of the 
Potomac, from Harper s Ferry to Williamsport, and 



ON THE POTOMAC. 363 

the whole line of the railway across the great bend of 
the Potomac. 

By this time Grant had found out that it often took 
twenty-four hours to communicate with Washington 
by telegraph, and that it was consequently impossible 
to control from the James the movements of his forces 
on the upper Potomac. On his suggesting this, the 
government confided to Halleck the direction of 
Wright s operations against Early. The Sixth Corps 
marched from Tennallytown on the morning of the 
26th of July, and immediately afterwards the Nine 
teenth Corps broke up its camp near the chain bridge 
and followed the Sixth. The line of march followed 
the road to Rockville, where Wright divided the 
column, sending a detachment to the left by way of 
Poolesville, while the main body pursued the direct 
road towards Frederick. Emory encamped that night 
on the Frederick road, four miles north of Rockville, 
after a march of nineteen miles. The next day, the 
27th of July, Emory, leading the column, marched at 
three in the morning, moved fifteen miles, and en 
camped beyond Hyattstown. On the 28th Emory 
took the road at five, marched to Monocacy Junction, 
where the Sixth Corps crossed the Monocacy, then 
filed to the right, and crossed at the upper ford, and 
passing through Frederick went into bivouac four 
miles beyond. The distance made was thirteen 
miles. On the 2Qth, an intensely hot day, Emory 
marched at eight, following the Sixth Corps, crossed 
the Potomac at Harper s Ferry, marched nineteen 
miles, and went into bivouac at Halltown. Here 
Wright was joined by Crook, who came from Sharps- 
burg by way of Shepherdstown. 

It was on the 3Oth of July that McCausland burned 



364 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Chambersburg. In the confusion caused by his rapid 
movements, Halleck imagined that Early s whole 
force was in Pennsylvania. Therefore he ordered 
Wright back into Maryland, first to Frederick and 
then to Emmettsburg, to hold the passes of the South 
Mountain against the supposed invader. About 
noon Wright faced about, taking Crook with him, 
and recrossed the Potomac. Toward evening Crook 
and Wright covered the passes, while Emory crossed 
the Catoctin and at one in the morning of the 3ist 
halted near Jefferson after a hard day s march of 
thirteen miles, during which the men and animals of 
all the corps suffered terribly from the heat and dust, 
added to the accumulated fatigue they had already 
undergone from a succession of long days and short 
nights. Reveille was sounded at five o clock, and at 
six the march was resumed. Emory passed through 
Frederick, moved about two miles on the Emmetts 
burg road and went into bivouac, having made thir 
teen miles during the day. The army was now 
concentrated at Frederick, holding the line of the 
Monocacy and observing the passes of the South 
Mountain. Fortunately for the men and horses, 
Halleck now learned from Couch, who commanded 
in Pennsylvania with rather less than a handful of 
troops, the exact dimensions of McCausland s raid. 
Accordingly Wright s troops were allowed to rest 
where they were. 

Grant ordered up a division of cavalry from the 
Army of the Potomac, and on the 4th of August set 
out in person for Frederick, avoiding Washington, to 
see for himself just what the situation was, and to make 
better arrangements for the future. On the 5th of 
August he joined Hunter on the Monocacy, and at 



ON THE POTOMAC. 365 

once ordered him to take Wright, Emory, and Crook 
across the Potomac, to find the enemy, and to attack 
him. 

Grover s division and the parts of Emory s that 
had been at Bermuda Hundred embarked on the 
James on the 3ist of July, and passed up the Poto 
mac to Washington, but too late to join Emory on the 
Monocacy. Thus, before beginning the new move 
ment, Emory had of his own division 4,600 effective 
and eight regiments of Grover s, numbering 2,750. 
These, being parts of four brigades, were temporarily 
organized into two, and as Grover himself had not 
yet joined, their command was given to Molineux. 

About this time, Battery L, ist Ohio, was relieved 
from duty with the Nineteenth Corps, and four other 
batteries joined it from the reserve park at Washing 
ton. Of these Taft s 5th New York was assigned to 
the First division, Bradbury s ist Maine, an old friend, 
to the Second division, Lieutenant Chase s D, ist 
Rhode Island and Miner s lyth Indiana to the Artil 
lery Reserve, commanded at first by Captain Taft, 
afterward by Major Bradbury. 

Crook led the way across the Potomac at Harper s 
Ferry on the evening of the 5th of August, Emory 
followed the next morning, and Ricketts with the 
Sixth Corps brought up the rear. Averell with the 
cavalry, as will be remembered, was still far away, 
engaged in the long chase after McCausland. Hun 
ter took up his position covering Halltown and pro 
ceeded to strengthen it by entrenchments. Crook s 
left rested on the Shenandoah, Emory extended the 
line to the turnpike road, and Wright carried it to 
the Potomac. 

On the very day Grant left City Point, Early 



3 66 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

marched north from Bunker Hill, meaning to cover 
McCausland s retreat and to destroy Hunter, and 
so, curiously enough, it happened that Early s whole 
army actually crossed the Potomac into Maryland at 
Martinsburg and Shepherdstown a few hours before 
Crook passed over the ford at Harper s Ferry into Vir 
ginia ; and, still more curiously, while, ten days before, 
the groundless apprehension of another invasion by 
Early had thrown the North into a fever and the 
government into a fright, here was Early actually in 
Maryland on the battle-field of Antietam without 
producing so much as a sensation. As soon as 
Early got the first inkling of what was going on 
behind him, he tripped briskly back to Martinsburg, 
and finding Hunter at Halltown resumed his old 
position at Bunker Hill. 

Grant had already proposed to unite in a single 
command the four distinct departments covering the 
theatre of war on the Shenandoah and on the upper 
Potomac ; as the commander he had first suggested 
Franklin and afterward Meade. Now, since no action 
had followed either suggestion, he sent up Sheridan, 
meaning to place him in command of all the active 
forces of these four departments, for the purpose of 
overthrowing Early or expelling him from the Shen 
andoah. Upon learning this, Hunter, to remove the 
difficulty, asked to be relieved ; and thus, on the 7th 
of August, Grant gained his wish, and an order was 
issued by the War Department, creating the Middle 
Military Division, to include Washington, Virginia, 
West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and part of 
Ohio, and Sheridan was assigned to the command. 

Amusing though it may have been to Early and 
his followers to note the panic and confusion into 



ON THE POTOMAC. 367 

which McCausland s predatory riders once more 
threw the capital and the border States, this absurd 
freak produced far-reaching consequences that were 
not in the thoughts of any one on either side. Its 
first effect was to stop the withdrawal of the Sixth 
Corps, and to put Wright and Emory once more in 
march toward the Shenandoah. It determined Lee 
to keep Early in the valley, where his presence 
seemed so effective ; and this shortly led to the con 
centration there, under a single commander, and that 
commander Sheridan, of the largest and best appointed 
Union army that had ever occupied that theatre of 
war, and thus at last in one short campaign worked 
the destruction of Early s army and the elimination 
of the valley as a feature in the war. 

Upon the officers and men of the Nineteenth 
Corps the change from the enervating climate of 
Louisiana to the bracing air, the crystal waters, the 
rolling wheatfields, and the beautiful blue mountains 
of the Shenandoah acted like a tonic. Daily their 
spirits rose and their numbers for duty increased. 
The excellence of the roads and the openness of the 
country on either side enabled them to achieve long 
marches with ease and comfort. Nor were they slow 
in remarking that they had never had a commissary 
and quartermaster so good as Sheridan. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 
IN THE SHENANDOAH. 

THE fourth year of the war was now well advanced, 
and the very name of the Shenandoah valley had 
long since passed into a byword as the Valley of 
Humiliation, so often had those fair and fertile fields 
witnessed the rout of the national forces ; so often 
had the armies of the Union marched proudly up the 
white and dusty turnpike, only to come flying back 
in disorder and disgrace. With the same rough 
humor of the soldier, half in grim jest, half in sad 
earnest, yet always a grain of hard sense lying at the 
bottom, the Union veterans had re-named as Harper s 
Weekly the picturesque landscape that appeared to 
them so regularly ; and Lee s annual invasion of the 
country beyond the Potomac had come to be 
known among them as the Summer Excursion and 
Picnic into Maryland. 

To mete out the blame for this state of things ; to 
apportion the precise share of the mortifying result 
due to each one of several contributing causes ; to 
show how much should be ascribed to division and 
subdivision of councils ; how much to the unfitness of 
commanders, too often disqualified alike by nature 
and training, for the leadership of men in emergen 
cies, or even for their temporary profession, and 
in truth owing their commissions, in Halleck s phrase, 

3 68 




SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 

FROM MAJOR W. F. TIEMANN S "HISTORY OF THE 159TH NEW YORK. 



IN THE SHENANDOAH. 369 

to "reasons other than military;" and how much 
finally to a dense ignorance or a fine disregard of 
the very elements and first principles of the art of 
war : all this lies outside of the scope of this history, 
curious, entertaining, and instructive though the 
inquiry would be. Certain it is that at no period 
was the problem at once comprehended and con 
trolled until Grant took it in hand, and equally so 
that the work was never done until he confided it 
to Sheridan. To this, in fairness, must be added 
three considerations of great moment. No com 
mander had previously enjoyed the undivided con 
fidence of the government as Grant did at this period ; 
the relations between Grant and Sheridan were those 
of perfect trust and harmony ; and the Army of the 
Shenandoah was for the first time made strong 
enough for its work. Moreover, though Early was 
a good and useful general, and was soon to prove 
himself the master of resources and resolution equal 
to the occasion, he was not Jackson ; and even had 
he been, no second Jackson could ever have fallen 
heir to the prestige of the first. 

The parallel ranges of the Blue Ridge, extending 
from the head-waters of the James to the Susque- 
hanna in mid-course, presented peculiar strategic con 
ditions of which the Confederates were as quick as 
the government of the United States was slow to 
take advantage. Rising in the southwest, the twin 
forks of the Shenandoah, wedged apart by the long 
and narrow range, or rather ranges, known as the 
Massanutten, unite near Front Royal, where the 
valley begins to widen to a plain, and pour their 
waters into the Potomac at Harper s Ferry. Of the 
two valleys thus formed, the easternmost, through 



370 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

which runs the South Fork, takes the name of Luray, 
or, in local usage, Page, from its chief county, while 
the more western and more important, in the lap of 
which lies the North Fork, preserves the name of 
Shenandoah, as well for the river as the county. 
Through this valley lies the course of the great 
macadamized highway that before the days of steam 
formed the chief avenue of communication between 
Pennsylvania and Virginia. Soon after the valley 
begins to widen, beyond Strasburg and Front Royal, 
the Opequon takes its rise in the western range, here 
known as Little North Mountain, and, flowing 
northeast, falls into the Potomac below Williamsport. 
The Cumberland valley continues the valley of Vir 
ginia into Pennsylvania, the two being separated by 
the Potomac, which in this part of its course is usually 
fordable at many points. Topography was by no 
means Grant s strong suit, yet he was not long in 
perceiving that the southwesterly trend of this great 
valley led and must always lead an invading column 
at every step farther away, not only from its base on 
the Potomac, but practically also from its objective at 
Richmond. Wherefore this zone was useless to the 
armies of the Union, while for the Confederates it 
had the triple advantage of a granary, an easy and 
secure way into Maryland and Pennsylvania, and on 
the flank toward Washington a mountain wall, cut by 
numerous gaps, of equal convenience in advance or 
retreat, besides being a constant menace to Wash 
ington as well as to the Union army operating between 
the Blue Ridge and the Potomac. Thus it was that 
the Confederate force was able to move speedily and 
unobserved to the north bank of the Potomac at 
Williamsport, and there, ninety miles north of Wash- 



IN THE SHENANDOAH. 371 

ington, equally distant from Baltimore and from 
Washington, and actually nearer to the Susquehanna 
than the capital is, held the whole country at its 
mercy until the Army of the Potomac could be 
hurried to the rescue. 

Grant s first orders to Sheridan were twofold : he 
was to move south by the valley, no matter where 
Early might be, or what he might be doing, in full 
confidence that Early would surely be found in his 
front ; and he was to devastate the valley so far as to 
destroy its future usefulness as a granary and a store 
house of the Confederate army of Northern Virginia. 

Following the instructions turned over to him by 
Hunter, Sheridan moved out from Halltown on the 
loth of August, and marching through Charlestown, 
took up a position threatening the crossing of the 
Opequon and Early s communications at Winchester. 
Crook, on the left, rested on Berryville, Emory held 
the centre, and Wright prolonged the line to Clifton. 
Torbert covered the right flank at Summit Point, 
which lies eleven miles east-northeast from Winches 
ter, and the left, with the main body of the cavalry, 
nine miles south by east from Winchester, at White 
Post, where his presence strongly emphasized the 
menace to Early s rear. The position thus held 
presently became known as the Clifton-Berryville 
line. While worthless for defence, it had the double 
advantage of covering the short roads to Washington 
through Snicker s Gap and Ashby s Gap, and of 
elbowing Early out of his favorite position at Bunker 
Hill, at the same time that by throwing back the 
right flank toward Clifton, Sheridan s road to Charles- 
town and Harper s Ferry was made safe. Early 
quietly let go his hold on the Baltimore and Ohio 



372 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

railway, and, just as Grant had anticipated, hastened 
to place himself across Sheridan s path at Win 
chester. 

On the morning of the nth of August, Sheridan 
took ground to the left, meaning to seize and hold 
the fords of the Opequon, Wright at the turnpike 
road between Berryville and Winchester, Emory far 
ther up the creek at the Senseny road, and Crook on 
Emory s left, probably at the Millwood pike. The 
cavalry covered the right of the Sixth Corps, and on 
both flanks threatened Winchester. Early, who had 
moved on the previous day from Bunker Hill to a 
position covering Winchester from the south, was in 
the act of retiring on Strasburg when Torbert ran 
into his cavalry. Sharp skirmishing resulted without 
bringing on a general engagement. At night Early 
held and covered the valley turnpike between New- 
town and Middletown, while Sheridan, who before 
crossing the Opequon had heard of Early s move 
ment, and had simply continued his own march up 
the right or east bank, rested between the Millwood 
crossing of the Opequon and Stony Point on the road 
to Front Royal. 

The melancholy failure attending the explosion of 
the mine before Petersburg and the continued reduc 
tion of Grant s forces, brought about by Early s 
diversions, coming on top of the losses since crossing 
the Rapidan, had brought affairs on the James to a 
dead-lock. While Grant in this situation was willing 
to spare the Sixth Corps and the Nineteenth and 
even to strengthen them by two divisions of cavalry 
from the Army of the Potomac, Lee on his part not 
only gave up all present thought of recalling Early, 
as had been the custom in former years, but even 



IN THE SHENANDOAH. 373 

sent Anderson with Kershaw s division of infantry, 
Fitzhugh Lee s division of cavalry, and Cutshaw s 
battalion of artillery, to strengthen Early, so as to 
enable him to hold his ground, and thus to cover the 
gathering of the crops in the valley, and perhaps to 
encourage still further detachments from the invest 
ing forces before Richmond and Petersburg. The 
first week of August found Anderson on the march 
and he was now moving down the valley. Therefore 
Early very properly drew back through Strasburg to 
wait for Anderson, and on the night of the i2th of 
August took up a strong position at Fisher s Hill. 
Its natural advantages he proceeded to increase by 
entrenchments. 

Sheridan, following, encamped in the same order 
as before on the left bank of Cedar Creek. On the 
1 3th Wright crossed Cedar Creek and occupied 
Hupp s Hill, and sending his skirmishers into Stras 
burg, discovered Early in position as described ; but 
at nightfall Sheridan, who now had information that 
caused him to suspect Anderson s movement, drew 
back and set the cavalry to guard the Front Royal 
road. Then Early advanced his outposts to Hupp s 
Hill, and so for the next three days both armies rested. 

On the 1 4th of August, Sheridan received from 
Grant authentic, rather than exact, information of 
Anderson s movement, for this was supposed to 
include two infantry divisions, instead of one. 
Coupled with this was Grant s renewed order to be 
cautious. 

With his quick eye for country, Sheridan soon saw 
that he had but one even tolerable position for de 
fence, and that this was at Halltown. The Confed 
erate defence, on the other hand, rested on Fisher s 



374 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Hill, and between these two positions the wide plain 
lay like a chess-board between the players. And now 
began a series of moves, during which each side 
watched and waited for the adversary to weaken 
himself, or to make a mistake, or for some chance 
encounter to bring about an unlooked-for advantage. 
Finding his position at Cedar Creek, to use his own 
words, " a very bad one," Sheridan was about to re 
tire to the extreme limit of the valley at the confluence 
of the Potomac and the Shenandoah ; and this was to 
be but the beginning of a series of seesaw movements, 
in which, as often as Sheridan went back to Halltown, 
Early would advance to Bunker Hill. Early, having 
taken the offensive, was bound to keep it, or lose his 
venture. Now, at this time, Early s objective was 
the Baltimore and Ohio railway ; but Sheridan s was 
Early. Thus, whenever he found Early at Bunker 
Hill, wreaking his pleasure on the railway and the 
canal, Sheridan had only to take a step forward to 
the Clifton-Berryville line in order to force Early to 
hasten back to Winchester, and to lay hold of the 
Opequon ; and so this alternating play might have 
continued as long as the war lasted, if other causes 
and events had not intervened. 

At eleven o clock on the night of the I5th of 
August, Sheridan s retreat began, Emory moving to 
Winchester, where he went into bivouac at six 
o clock on the morning of the i6th. At eight o clock 
on the evening of the i6th, Wright and Crook fol 
lowed, and on the 1 7th Early, who had now been 
joined by Anderson, marched in pursuit. The same 
evening Sheridan took up the Clifton-Berryville posi 
tion in the old order ; the cavalry, now strengthened 
by the arrival of Wilson s division, covering the rear 



IN THE SHENANDOAH. 375 

and flanks. At Berryville, at midnight, Grover joined 
Emory, from Washington by Leesburg and Snicker s 
Gap, with the remainder of the Nineteenth Corps 
from the James 1 ; and since the receipt of these 
reinforcements formed Sheridan s only reason for 
staying at Berryville, on the i8th he fell back to 
Charlestown, holding the roads leading thence to 
Berryville and to Bunker Hill. 

On the i Qth and 2Oth of August, Sheridan stood 
still while Early occupied Bunker Hill and Win 
chester ; but, on the 2ist, Early from Bunker Hill 
and Anderson from Winchester moved together to 
the attack. Rodes and Ramseur had a sharp fight 
with Wright, which caused Sheridan to bring up 
Crook on the left and Emory on the right ; but 
neither came into action, because Merritt and Wilson 
stood so stiffly that Anderson got no farther than 
Summit Point. During the night Sheridan fell back 
to Halltown. 

In retreating from Cedar Creek Sheridan began to 
put in force Grant s new policy of making the valley 
useless to the Confederate armies by burning all the 
grain and carrying off all the animals above Win 
chester. " I have destroyed everything eatable," are 
Sheridan s words. 

On the 25th of August, after three days spent in 
skirmishing, Early left Anderson to mask Halltown, 
and sent Fitzhugh Lee by Martinsburg to Williams- 
port, marching himself to Shepherdstown. A rough 
fight with Torbert s cavalry resulted near Kearneys- 
ville, in which Custer narrowly avoided the loss of 

1 Grover s men made the hard march of 69 miles from Washington in three 
days ; the last 33 miles in 13^ hours, actual time. See Major Tiemann s " His 
tory of the isgth New York," pp. 91, 92. 



376 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

his brigade by a rapid flight across the Potomac at 
Shepherdstown. Sheridan sent two divisions of cav 
alry under Averell and Wilson over the Potomac 
to watch the fords and to hold the gaps of the South 
Mountain. Thus when Fitzhugh Lee got to the Po 
tomac, he found Averell waiting for him, and Ander 
son being pressed back by Crook on the 26th, Early 
fell back beyond the Opequon to Bunker Hill and 
Stephenson s Depot. On the 28th of August Sheri 
dan advanced to Charlestown, and waiting there five 
days while his cavalry was concentrating and feeling 
the enemy, he again moved forward to the Clifton- 
Berryville line on the 3d of September, and encamped 
in the usual order. 

Two marked features had now become regularly 
established : as often as the troops halted, no matter 
for how short a time, of their own accord they in 
stantly set about protecting their front with the spade 
and the axe ; and, secondly, the depots of the army 
were fixed behind the strong lines of Halltown with 
a sufficient force to guard them, and thence, as 
needed, supplies were sent forward to the troops in 
the field by strongly guarded trains, and these, as 
soon as unloaded, were returned to Halltown, thus 
reducing to a minimum the impedimenta of the army 
as well as the detachments usually demanded for 
their care. For the Nineteenth Corps, Currie s bri 
gade of Dwight s division performed this service 
during the campaign. 

The contingency for which Grant and Sheridan 
were waiting was now close at hand. Anderson had 
been nearly a month away from Lee, and meanwhile 
Grant had not only kept Lee on the watch on both 
banks of the James, as well for Richmond as for 



IN THE SHENANDOAH. 377 

Petersburg, but had taken a fast hold on the Weldon 
railway. Unable to shake off Grant s clutch either 
on the James or on the Shenandoah, Lee greatly 
needed Anderson back with him. Accordingly, on 
the very day when Sheridan went back to Berryville, 
Anderson, seeking the shortest way to Richmond, 
ran into Crook in the act of going into camp, and 
darkness shortly put an end to a sharp fight that 
might otherwise have proved a pitched battle. This 
brought Early in haste from Stephenson s to Ander 
son s help, but when the next day Early saw how 
strongly posted Sheridan was, he fell back across 
the Opequon to cover Winchester, and finally, on 
the 1 4th of September, sent off Anderson by Front 
Royal and Chester Gap, but this time without 
Fitzhugh Lee. 

The interval was occupied in continual skirmishes 
and reconnoissances. Meanwhile Crook changed 
over from the left flank to the right at Summit Point, 
the cavalry covering the front and flanks from 
Snicker s Gap by way of Smithfield and Martinsburg 
to the Potomac. On the i6th of September, Grant, 
pressed by the government in behalf of the business 
interests disturbed by the enemy s control of the rail 
way and the canal, went to Charlestown to confer 
with Sheridan. In the breast-pocket of his coat 
Grant carried a complete plan of the campaign he 
meant Sheridan to carry out ; but when, having asked 
Sheridan if he could be ready to move on Tuesday, 
Sheridan promptly answered he should be ready 
whenever the General should say " Go in " at day 
light on Monday, if necessary, so delighted was 
Grant that he said not a word about the plan, but 
contented himself with echoing the words, " Go in ! " 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE OPEQUON. 1 

GRANT S approval of Sheridan s attack was founded 
on the withdrawal of Kershaw ; but on the i8th of 
September, just as Sheridan was about to move on 
Newtown, meaning to offer Early the choice of being 
turned out of Winchester, or being overwhelmed if 
he should stay, news came from Averell that he had 
been driven out of Martinsburg by two divisions of 
infantry. These were the divisions of Rodes and 
Gordon, with which, enticed at last into a grave error 
by the temptation of hearing that the railway was 
being repaired, Early had marched on the 1 7th to 
Bunker Hill and Martinsburg. When Sheridan 
heard of this, and perceived that Early s forces, al 
ready diminished, were strung along all the way from 
Winchester to Martinsburg, he stopped the execution 
of the orders he had already issued for the movement 
at four o clock in the afternoon of that day, the i8th 
of September, and replaced them by fresh arrange 
ments which led to the battle of the Opequon on the 
1 9th. Since last moving to the Clifton-Berryville 
line, Sheridan had used his cavalry to preserve in his 
front an open space fully six miles in depth, extend 
ing to the banks of the Opequon, meaning not only 
to have the first tidings of any offensive movement 

1 Also spelled " Opequan." Pronounced O-peck -an. 
37 8 



THE OPE QUO N. 379 

by the enemy, but also that when himself ready to 
move he might be able to take the enemy by surprise. 

On the evening of the i8th of September, part of 
Early s cavalry was at Martinsburg, Gordon occupied 
Bunker Hill, Wharton was at Stephenson s, with 
Rodes closing back on him, while Ramseur alone 
covered Winchester in the path of Sheridan s advance. 
Sheridan naturally supposed that in a quick move 
ment he would have two divisions to deal with after 
crossing the Opequon. 

At two o clock on the morning of Monday, the 
1 9th of September, on the very day when Sheridan 
had told Grant he would be ready to move, but just 
three hours earlier, Sheridan put his army in motion 
toward the Opequon, covering his flank by directing 
Merritt and Averell on Stephenson s. He sent Wil 
son rapidly ahead on the Berryville road to carry the 
ford and to seize the long and deep defile on the left 
or east bank through which the main column would 
have to advance. Wright was to lead the infantry, 
closely followed by Emory, who, in order to solidify 
the movement, was instructed to take his orders from 
Wright after reaching the ford. Crook, coming in 
from his more distant position, would naturally fall 
in the rear of the others, and he was to mass his men 
in reserve, covering the ford. Wright had to move 
partly across country, and had farther to go than 
Emory. Although both started punctually at the 
appointed hour, it happened that, about five o clock, 
the head of Wright s column ran into Emory s in 
march near the crest, whence the road sweeps down 
to the Opequon. There Emory halted, by Wright s 
orders, to let the Sixth Corps pass. Unfortunately, 
minute and thorough as Sheridan s plans and instruc- 



3 8o THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

tions were, he appears to have underrated the double 
difficulty of crossing the ford and threading the long 
defile, for to this cause must be attributed the pres 
ence of Wright s entire wagon-train in the rear of his 
corps, as well as the excess of artillery for the work 
and the field. The head of the column could move 
but slowly ; thus the rear was so long retarded, that, 
although the crossing began about six o clock, and 
the whole movement was urged on by Sheridan, 
Wright, and Emory, and indeed by every one, it 
wanted but twenty minutes of noon when the line of 
battle was finally formed on the rolling ground over 
looking the vale of the Opequon to the rear and 
Winchester to the front. Even as it was, Sheridan s 
eagerness being great, and the delay seeming inter 
minable, Emory felt obliged to take upon himself 
the responsibility of departing from the strict order 
of march, and directed Dwight to move his men to 
the right of the road and pass the train. Thus it had 
taken six hours to advance three miles and to form 
in order of battle, and the immediate effect of this 
delay was that Sheridan had now to deal, not only 
with Ramseur, or with the two divisions counted on, 
but with the whole of Early s army ; for between five 
and six o clock in the morning Gordon, Rodes, and 
Wharton were all at Stephenson s, distant only five 
miles from Winchester or from the field of battle, 
toward which they all moved rapidly at the sound of 
the first firing, due to Wilson s advance. 

Opequon Creek flows at the foot of a broad and 
thickly wooded gorge, with high and steep banks. 
The ravine through which the Berryville road rises to 
the level of the rolling plain, in the middle of whose 
western edge stands Winchester, is nearly three miles 



THE OPEQUON. 381 

long. Here and there the high ground is covered 
with large oaks, pines, and undergrowth, and is inter 
sected by many brooks, called runs. Of these the 
largest is Red Bud Run, which forms a smaller paral 
lel ravine flanking the defile on the north, while a 
still larger stream, called Abraham s Creek, after 
pursuing a nearly parallel course on the south side of 
the defile, crosses the road not far from the ford, and 
just below it falls into the Opequon. 

Wilson, after crossing the Opequon and complet 
ing his task of covering the advance of the infantry 
through the defile, had turned to the left on the high 
ground and taken post to cover the flank on the 
Senseny road, which, after crossing the Opequon 
about a mile and a quarter above the main ford, 
reaches the outskirts of Winchester at a point little 
more than three hundred yards from the Berryville 
road. The Sixth Corps formed across the Berryville 
road, Getty on its left, Ricketts on its right. Getty 
rested his left on Abraham s Creek. Behind him 
Russell stood in column in support. Emory pro 
longed the line of battle to the Red Bud on the right 
by posting Sharpe s and Birge s brigades of Grover, 
with Molineux and Shunk in the second line, the 
9th Connecticut deployed as skirmishers to cover 
the right flank of Birge. Dwight s two brigades 
formed on the right and rear of Grover in echelon of 
regiments on the right, in order not only to support 
Grover s line, but to cover the flank against any turn 
ing movement by the Confederates or an attack by 
their reinforcements coming straight from Stephen- 
son s. Beal s brigade held the right of Dwight s line, 
and the brigade line from right to left was formed in 
order of the ii4th New York, i53d New York, n6th 



382 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

New York, 2Qth Maine, and 3Oth Massachusetts. 
Beal covered his right flank by a detail of skirmishers 
taken from all his regiments and commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Strain, of the I53d New York. 
McMillan, on the left and rear of Beal, formed in 
order of the 47th Pennsylvania, 8th Vermont, i6oth 
New York, and i2th Connecticut, with five compa 
nies of the 47th Pennsylvania deployed to cover the 
whole right flank of his brigade and to move forward 
with it by the flank left in front. Crook had by this 
time crossed the ford and was massed on the left or 
west bank. 

In climbing the hill the Berry ville road follows 
nearly a northwesterly course, but soon after reaching 
the high ground bends rather sharply toward the 
left, crosses the ravine called Ash Hollow forming 
the head of Berryville Canon, and runs for nearly a 
mile almost westerly. Wright was following the road, 
but as Emory guided upon Wright, the alignment 
was to be preserved by Sharpe s keeping his left in 
touch with the right of Ricketts. While the ground 
in Wright s front was for the most part open, Emory 
was chiefly in the dense wood, where the heavy leaf 
age and undergrowth prevented him from seeing not 
only the enemy before him, but also the full extent of 
his own line. It should be observed with care that 
Ricketts was between Sharpe and the Berryville road, 
while the road was between Getty and Ricketts, and 
formed the guide for both ; for these facts, of slight 
importance though they may seem, were destined 
presently to exert an influence wellnigh fatal on the 
fortunes of the day. 

During the early hours of the morning Ramseur, 
on the Berryville road, and the cavalry of Lomax on 



THE OPEQUON. 383 

the Senseny road, had been the only Confederate 
force between Sheridan and Winchester. But first 
Gordon came up at nine o clock, and placed himself 
opposite Emory s right, his own left resting on the 
line of the Red Bud ; then Rodes, closely following 
Gordon, formed between him and Ramseur against 
the right of Emory and the left of Wright. 

About a quarter before twelve o clock, at the sound 
of Sheridan s bugle, repeated from corps, division, 
and brigade headquarters, the whole line moved 
forward with great spirit, and instantly became en 
gaged. Wilson pushed back Lomax, Wright drove 
in Ramseur, while Emory, advancing his infantry 
rapidly through the wood, where he was unable to 
use his artillery, attacked Gordon with great vigor. 
Birge, charging with bayonets fixed, fell upon the 
brigade of Evans, forming the extreme left of Gordon, 
and without a halt drove it in confusion through the 
wood and across the open ground beyond to the 
support of Braxton s artillery, posted by Gordon to 
secure his flank on the Red Bud road. In this 
brilliant charge, led by Birge in person, his lines 
naturally became disordered, and Grover, foreseeing 
the effect of an advance so swift and so tumultuous, 
ordered Birge to halt and re-form in the wood. This 
order Birge tried to execute ; but whether the words 
of command were not heard or were misunderstood, 
or in the wild excitement of the moment were wilfully 
disregarded by the men, certain it is that their officers 
found it impossible to restrain their ardor until they 
had followed on the run the broken fragments of 
Evans quite through the wood and beyond its 
farther skirt, where Braxton, using his guns with 
energy and skill, brought them to a stand. 



384 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Sharpe, advancing simultaneously on Birge s left, 
tried in vain to keep the alignment with Ricketts and 
with Birge ; for now the peculiar feature of the long 
alignment across the swerving road began to work, 
yet, by reason of the screen of timber, without the 
cause being immediately observed by any one. At 
first the order of battle formed a right angle with the 
road, but the bend once reached, in the effort to keep 
closed upon it, at every step Ricketts was taking 
ground more and more to the left, while the point of 
direction for Birge, and equally for Sharpe, was the 
enemy in their front, standing almost in the exact 
prolongation of the defile, from which line, still plainly 
marked by Ash Hollow, the road, as we have seen, 
was steadily diverging. In short, to continue the 
march parallel with the road compelled a left half- 
wheel, while the battle was with the enemy straight 
in front, so that even had it been possible for Emory 
to execute his orders literally he must have offered his 
wheeling flank fairly to Rodes and to Gordon. 

Sharpe, seeing that the gap between himself and 
Ricketts was growing every moment wider, in vain 
tried to cover it by more than one oblique movement 
to the left, and Keifer, whose brigade formed the 
right of Ricketts, being also among the first to 
perceive the fault, tried to make it good by deploying 
three of his regiments across the interval. 

Birge s advance had borne him far to the right, and 
as Sharpe, in the vain attempt to keep his alignment 
with Ricketts, was always drifting to the left, there 
came a second and smaller gap between the two lead 
ing brigades of Grover. Into this Molineux was 
quickly thrust, and, deploying in parade order, under 
a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, at once began 



THE OPEQUON. t 385 

firing in return with great effect on the advancing 
columns of the enemy. But, shortly before this hap 
pened, the interval between Ricketts and Sharpe had 
grown to be nearly four hundred yards wide, and 
Birge s advance being stayed at nearly the same 
instant, Early saw his opportunity and seized it by 
throwing against the diverging flanks of Sharpe and 
Ricketts the fresh brigade that Battle had that 
moment brought up from Stephenson s. This new 
impulse once more carried forward the rest of Rodes s 
division ; Ramseur rallied ; Early restored his forma 
tion ; and the whole Confederate line swept forward 
with renewed impetuosity, broke in the whole right of 
Ricketts and the left of Sharpe, surged around both 
flanks of Molineux, and swept back Birge. Sharpe s 
line, thus taken fairly in flank, was quickly rolled up. 
By this, the left regiment of Molineux, the gallant 
22d Iowa, being in quite open ground, was greatly 
exposed, so that it, too, was presently swept back. 
The iSQth New York and the i3th Connecticut, after 
holding on stiffly for a time under the partial cover 
of a sort of gully, were in like manner swept away, and 
on the right Birge s men paid the penalty of their own 
impetuosity. The left of Ricketts, less exposed to 
the shock, stood firm, and the right of Molineux, 
isolated as it was, held its ground ; but otherwise the 
whole front of the battle, from the road to the Red 
Bud, was gone. As the Confederates charged down 
upon a section of Bradbury s ist Maine Battery, 
posted about the centre of the division, Day, who 
under many drawbacks had brought up his regiment, 
the 1 3 ist New York, to a high standard of discipline 
and efficiency, took prompt and full advantage of the 
slight cover afforded by the little wooded ravine in 



386 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

which he happened to be. With equal coolness and 
readiness he changed front forward on his tenth 
company, yet held his fire until he could see the 
shoulders and almost the backs of the enemy ; then, 
pouring in a hot fire, and being immediately supported 
by the nth Indiana, part of the 3d Massachusetts, 
and the i76th New York, which had quickly rallied 
from Sharpens reverse, the attacking force was driven 
back in disorder ; but unfortunately, in retiring it 
swept across the remains of Molineux s left centre, 
which had been cut off in the gully, and took many 
prisoners, especially from among the officers who had 
stood to their posts through everything. 

Just as when victory had seemed about to alight 
on the standard of the Union, the very perch itself 
had been suddenly and rudely shaken by the tread of 
Early s charging columns ; so now, at the precise 
moment when defeat bitter, perhaps disastrous de 
feat seemed inevitable, the fortunes of the battle 
were once more reversed, and the day was suddenly 
saved by the prompt and orderly advance of Russell 
into the fatal gap. As he changed front from the 
wood to the right and swept on in splendid array, it 
happened that the charging line of Early, already 
disarranged by its own success, offered its right flank 
to Russell s front. Russell himself, bravely leading 
his division, fell, yet not until he had struck the blow 
that gave the victory to the defenders of his country, 
a noble sacrifice in a noble cause. 

But on the right a danger almost equally serious 
menaced the flank of Emory, for when Birge s men 
came streaming back, Shunk, who had been support 
ing Birge without having men enough to cover the 
whole ground, found his left uncovered to Gordon 



THE OPEQUON. 387 

by the giving way of Sharpe, while at the same time 
his line was nearly enfiladed from the right by a 
section or battery of Fitzhugh Lee s horse artillery 
on the north bank of the Red Bud. Seeing all this, 
Emory instantly ordered his own old division to 
deploy at the top of its speed, and to make good the 
broken line. " Have this thing stopped at once," 
were the terse words of his command to Dwight. 
Once more, as at the Sabine Cross-Roads, the ist 
brigade was called upon to yield up its leading 
regiment for a sacrifice, and again the lot fell to 
New York, yet this time upon the ii4th, and upon 
not one of all the good veteran battalions that held 
the field on that igth of September if indeed upon 
any in all the armies of the Union could the choice 
have rested more securely. To the left and front, 
far into the open field, through the wreck of Grover s 
right, into the teeth of the pursuing lines of Gordon, 
Per Lee led his regiment. No sooner had his men 
emerged from the cover of the wood than they came 
under the fire of Gordon s infantry and artillery, 
crossed with the fire of Fitzhugh Lee s guns beyond 
the Red Bud ; yet they were not able to fire a 
musket in return until their own defeated comrades 
had passed to the rear. Cruel as the situation was, 
the 1 1 4th marched steadily forward nearly two hun 
dred yards in front of the forest ; then, finding him 
self quite alone and unsupported, confronted by the 
line of battle of the enemy at the skirt of the timber 
opposite, Per Lee made his men lie down without 
other cover than the high grass, and there, loading 
on their backs and at every moment losing heavily, 
without yielding an inch, they held off the enemy 
until support came. That this was longer than 



3 88 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

usual in coming was no fault of their comrades, but a 
mere accident of the situation ; for Dwight s division 
being formed in echelon of battalions on the right, 
just as it had in the first instance been necessary to 
bring the ii4th into action obliquely to the left, so 
now Beal was forced to form the line of battle of his 
brigade by inversion, and this, moreover, in the 
woods, with the steep bank of the Red Bud hamper 
ing his right. Slow though it must have seemed to 
Per Lee, standing out there alone, this difficult move 
ment was in reality executed by Beal with great 
promptness and rapidity and in admirable order. As 
regiment after regiment, beginning with the i53d, 
came into the new line at the double-quick by the 
shortest path, each advanced with a shout to the rail 
fence on Per Lee s right and somewhat toward his 
rear, and, throwing down the rails, opened a rapid 
fire. This checked the enemy. Finding Beal unable 
to cover all the ground he was now trying to hold, 
Emory made Dwight take the i6oth New York from 
McMillan s brigade and posted it on the right of 
Seal s. 

McMillan had been ordered to move forward at the 
same time as Beal, and to form on his left. The five 
companies of the 47th Pennsylvania that had been 
detached to form a skirmish line on Red Bud Run, 
to cover McMillan s right flank, had somehow lost 
their way on the broken ground among the thickets, 
and, not finding them in place, McMillan had been 
obliged to send the remaining companies of the regi 
ment to do the same duty. This detail and the 
employment of the i6oth New York in Beal s line left 
McMillan but two of his battalions, the 8th Vermont 
and the I2th Connecticut; but although McMillan, 



THE OPEQUON. 389 

holding the left of the formation in echelon, had 
farther to go to reach his position, it was only neces 
sary for him to move straight to the front, and thus 
the 8th Vermont formed the right of his line and the 
1 2th Connecticut the left. Not a moment too soon 
did Thomas and Peck bring their good regiments to 
the support of Molineux s diminished and almost 
exhausted brigade, and thus complete the restoration 
of Emory s line of battle. Almost at the first fire 
Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, the brave, accomplished, 
and spirited soldier who had led the i2th Connecti 
cut in every action, fell mortally wounded by the 
fragment of a shell. 

The shaken regiments of Grover quickly rallied 
and re-formed in good order behind the lines of 
Dwight, and all pressing forward once more, took 
part in the countercharge begun by Russell, by which 
the whole Confederate line was driven back in con 
fusion quite beyond the positions from which they had 
advanced to the attack. To this line, substantially, 
Wright and Emory followed, and, correcting their 
position and alignment, waited for events or for 
orders. By one o clock the morning s fight was over. 
Fierce and eventful as it had been, it had lasted 
barely an hour. 

The Confederates, greatly outnumbered from the 
first, were now, after their losses and the rough han 
dling they had received, no longer in condition for 
the offensive, and from the defensive they had, as 
things stood, little to hope. Sheridan, on his part, 
with some reluctance, made up his mind that it would 
be better to give up his original plan of putting in 
Crook on the left to cut off Early s retreat by moving 
against the valley turnpike near Newtown, and instead 



390 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

of this to use Crook and the cavalry on the Red Bud 
line against Early s left. The time needed for this 
movement caused a comparative lull in the battle of 
about two hours duration. It was not so much that 
the battle died away, for the fire of artillery and even 
of musketry was still kept up, as that neither side 
moved in force against the other. While waiting for 
Crook to come into position on the right, Emory s 
restored line was formed by Beal on the right, pro 
longed toward the left by Shunk, Birge supported 
by Molineux, Day with the isist New York, Allen 
with the battalion of the 38th Massachusetts, the 8th 
Vermont, and the i2th Connecticut of McMillan 
supported by the i6oth New York, now withdrawn 
from the right, and finally Neafie, leading Grover s 
3d brigade in place of Sharpe, who had been carried 
off the field severely wounded. 

From his position in reserve, covering the Opequon 
ford, Crook moved up the right bank of the Red Bud 
to the rear of Dwight s first position, and then, divid 
ing his command, posted Thoburn on the right of 
Dwight, and sent Duval across the Red Bud to his 
point of attack. Then Thoburn, at Emory s request, 
relieved Beal s front line of battle, while Emory 
drew out the ii/j-th, the n6th, and the I53d New 
York and placed them under Davis to strengthen 
the centre. Beal himself was looking to his flank, 
held by the 47th Pennsylvania and the 3Oth Massa 
chusetts. 

Meanwhile Wharton had gone back from the des 
perate task of covering the flank at Stephenson s 
against Merritt s advance and had taken position in 
the rear of Rodes. 

As soon as Crook was fairly across the Red Bud, 



THE OPE QUO N. 391 

his movement silenced the battery on the left bank 
that had been enfilading Emory s line, and this served 
to tell Emory that Crook was in place and at work. 
Averell and Merritt could be plainly seen surging 
up the valley road far in Gordon s left and rear, 
furiously driving before them the main body of Fitz- 
hugh Lee s cavalry. About four o clock the cheers 
of Duval s men beyond the Red Bud served as the 
signal for Thoburn, and now as Crook moved for 
ward, sweeping everything before him, from right to 
left the whole army responded to the impulse. To 
meet Thoburn, Breckinridge placed Wharton in posi 
tion at right angles with Gordon and with the valley 
road. Duval, having easily driven before him every 
thing on the left bank of the Red Bud, waded through 
the marsh on his left, crossed the run, and united 
with Thoburn. Then Crook, with a sudden and 
irregular but curiously effective half-wheel to the left, 
fell vigorously upon Gordon, and Torbert coming on 
with great impetuosity at the same instant, the weight 
was heavier than the attenuated lines of Breckinridge 
and Gordon could bear. Early saw his whole left 
wing give back in disorder, and as Emory and Wright 
pressed hard, Rodes and Ramseur gave way, and the 
battle was over. 

All that remained to Early was to make good his 
retreat, now seriously compromised by the steady 
progress of Wilson toward and at last upon the Mill 
wood road. Early vainly endeavored to reunite his 
shattered fragments behind the lines constructed in 
former campaigns for the defence of Winchester on 
the east. About five o clock Torbert and Crook, 
fairly at right angles to the first line of battle, covered 
Winchester on the north from the rocky ledges that 



392 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

lie to the eastward of the town nearly to the first 
position of Braxton s guns. Thence Wright ex 
tended the line at right angles with Crook and 
parallel with the valley road, while Sheridan drew 
out Emory, who was naturally displaced by these 
converging movements, and sent him to extend 
Wright s line toward the south. 

The disorderly retreat of Early s men once begun, 
there was no staying it. Torbert pursued the fugi 
tives to Kernstown, where Ramseur faced about, but 
Sheridan, mindful that his men had been on their 
feet since two o clock in the morning, many of them 
since one, and had in the meantime fought with 
varying success a long and hard fight ending in a 
great victory, made no attempt to send his infantry 
after the flying enemy. 

For what was probably the first time in their lives, 
his men had seen every musket, every cannon, and 
every sabre put in use, and to good use, by their 
young and vigorous commander. They had looked 
upon a decisive victory ending with the rout of their 
enemy. Sheridan himself openly rejoiced, and catch 
ing the enthusiasm of their leader, his men went wild 
with excitement when, accompanied by his corps com 
manders, Wright and Emory and Crook, Sheridan 
rode down the front of his lines. Then went up a 
mighty cheer that gave new life to the wounded and 
consoled the last moments of the dying, for in every 
breast was firmly implanted the conviction that now 
at last the end was in sight, and that deep-toned 
shout that shook the hills and the heavens was not 
the brutal roar of a rude and barbarous soldiery, 
coarsely exulting over the distress and slaughter of 
the vanquished, but the glad voice of the American 



THE OPEQUON. 393 

people * rejoicing from the hill-top at the first sure 
glimpse of the final victory that meant to them peace, 
home, and a nation saved. 

When the President heard the news his first act 
was to write with his own hand a warm message of 
congratulation, and this he followed up by making 
Sheridan a brigadier-general in the regular army, and 
assigning him permanently to the high command he 
had been exercising under temporary orders. 

The losses of the Army of the Shenandoah, ac 
cording to the revised statements compiled in the War 
Department, were 5,018, including 697 killed, 3,983 
wounded, 338 missing. Of the three infantry corps, 
the Nineteenth, though in numbers smaller than the 
Sixth, suffered the heaviest loss, the aggregate being 
2,074, while the total casualties of the Sixth Corps 
were 1,699, and those of the West Virginia forces, 
794. The total loss of the cavalry was 451. The 
loss of the Nineteenth Corps was divided into 314 
killed, 1,554 wounded, 206 missing. Of this, far the 
heaviest share fell upon Grover s division, which 
reported 1,527 against 542 in D wight s division. 
Dwight reports 80 killed, 460 wounded, 2 missing ; 
Grover, 234 killed, 1,089 wounded, 204 missing; but 
Grover had four brigades in the action while Dwight 
had two, and this nearly represents the relative 
strength of the two divisions. Of the brigades, 
Birge s suffered the most, having 107 killed, 349 
wounded, 69 miss*ing together, 525 ; while Molineux, 
who came next, had 58 killed, 362 wounded, 87 miss 
ing together, 507 ; yet in proportion Sharpe fared 

1 " Hear that ! That s the voice of the American people ! " Thomas is said to 
have exclaimed on hearing the tremendous cheers of his men for their decisive 
victory of Nashville. 



394 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the worst, for his brigade, though but half as strong 
as Birge s, lost 39 killed, 222 wounded, 17 missing 
together, 278. The ii4th New York heads the fatal 
record for the day with 44 killed and mortally 
wounded, and 141 wounded together, 185 out of 
about 270 in action nearly sixty-five per cent. 

Dwight s report having been sent back to him by 
Emory for correction, and not again presented, no 
report is to be found from the First division or any 
portion of it, except McMillan s brigade and the i2th 
Connecticut. The most useful detailed accounts of 
the part taken by the division are to be found in the 
admirable histories of the " First-Tenth-Twenty- 
ninth Maine " by Major John M. Gould, and of the 
H4th New York by Assistant-Surgeon Harris H. 
Beecher. 

Prominent among the slain of the Nineteenth 
Corps, besides Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, already 
spoken of, were Colonel Alexander Gardiner, i4th 
New Hampshire, Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby 
Babcock, 75th New York, Major William Knowlton, 
29th Maine and Major Eusebius S. Clark, 26th 
Massachusetts. These were fine officers, and their 
loss was deeply deplored. 

Early lost nearly 4,000 in all, including about 200 
prisoners. Rodes was killed, Fitzhugh Lee severely 
wounded. Early was forced to leave his dead and 
most of his wounded to be cared for by the victors, 
into whose hands also fell five guns and nine battle- 
flags. 

Severe military critics have sometimes been dis 
posed to find fault with Early, not merely for scatter 
ing his army which, though certainly a fault, was 
handsomely made good by the rapid concentration, 



THE OPEQUON. 395 

but even for fighting his battle at Winchester at all. 
Weakened by the loss of Kershaw, Early should, 
these critics think, have fallen back to Fisher s Hill 
at the first sign of Sheridan s advance ; yet upon a 
broad view it is difficult to concede this. The odds 
against Early were the same that the Confederates 
had necessarily assumed from the beginning. They 
were desperate ; they could not possibly be otherwise 
than desperate ; they called for desperate campaigns, 
and these for desperate battles. Standing on the 
defensive at Fisher s Hill, Early would not only have 
given up the main object of his campaign and of his 
presence in the valley, but would have exposed him 
self to the risk of being cut off by a turning column 
gaining his rear by way of the Luray valley. Indeed, 
this would have been more than a risk ; sooner or 
later it would have been a certainty. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

FISHER S HILL. 

THE frowning heights of Fisher s Hill had long 
been the bugbear of the valley. The position was, 
in truth, a purely defensive one, its chief value being 
that there was no other. Except for defence it was 
worthless, because it was as hard to get out of as to 
get at ; and even for defence it was subject to the 
drawback that it could be easily and secretly turned 
upon either flank. In a word, its strength resided 
mainly in the fact that between the peaks of Massa- 
nutten and the North Mountains the jaws of the 
valley were contracted to a width of not more than 
four miles. The right flank of this shortened front 
rests securely upon the north fork of the Shenan- 
doah, where it winds about the base of Three Top 
Mountain before bending widely toward the east to 
join the south fork and form the Shenandoah River. 
Across the front, among rocks, between steep and 
broken cliffs, winds the brawling brook called 
Tumbling Run, and above it, from its southern 
edge, rises the rugged crag called Fisher s Hill. 
Here, behind his old entrenchments, Early gathered 
the remnants of his army for another stand, and 
began to strengthen himself by fresh works. The 
danger of a turning movement through the twin 
valley of Luray was in his mind, and to guard 

396 



FISHER S HILL. 397 

against it he sent his cavalry to Millford, while 
Sheridan, who was thinking of the same thing, 
ordered Torbert to ride up the Luray valley from 
Front Royal. 

On the morning of the 2Oth of September Sheridan 
set out to follow Early, and in the afternoon took up 
a position before Strasburg, the Sixth Corps on the 
right, Emory on the left, and Crook behind Cedar 
Creek in support. The next morning, the 2ist, 
Sheridan pushed and followed Early s skirmishers 
over the high hill that stands between Strasburg and 
Fisher s Hill, overlooking both, drove them behind 
the defences of Fisher s Hill, and took up a position 
covering the front from the banks of the North Fork 
on the left, where Emory s left rested lightly, to the 
crown of the hill just mentioned, which commanded 
the approach by what is called the back road, or 
Cedar Creek grade, and was but slightly commanded 
by Fisher s Hill itself. This strong vantage-ground 
Wright wrested from the enemy after a struggle, and 
felling the trees for protection and for range, planted 
his batteries there. The ground was very difficult, 
broken and rocky, and to hold it the Sixth Corps had 
to be drawn toward the right, while Emory, follow 
ing the movement, in the dark hours of the early 
morning of the 22d of September, extended his front 
so as to cover the ground thus given up by Wright. 

Sheridan now thought of nothing short of the cap 
ture of Early s army. Torbert was to drive the 
Confederate cavalry through Luray, and thence, 
crossing the Massanutten range, was to lay hold 
of the valley pike at New Market, and plant himself 
firmly in Early s rear on his only line of retreat. 
Crook, by a wide sweep to the right, his march 



398 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

hidden by the hills and woods, was to gain the back 
road, so as to come up secretly on Early s left flank 
and rear, and the first sounds of battle that were 
certain to follow the discovery of his unexpected 
approach in this quarter were to serve as a signal 
for Wright and Emory to fall on with everything 
they had. 

During the forenoon of the 22d, Grover held the 
left of the position of the Nineteenth Corps, his 
division formed in two lines in the order of Ma- 
cauley, 1 Birge ; Shunk, Molineux. Dwight, in the 
order of Beal, McMillan, held the right, and con 
nected with Wheaton. In taking ground toward 
the right, as already described, this line had become 
too extended, and, as it was necessary that the left of 
the skirmishers, at least, should rest upon the river, 
Grover shortened his front by moving forward Foster 
with the 1 28th and Lewis with the i;6th New York 
to drive in the enemy s skirmishers opposite, and to 
occupy the ground that they had been holding. This 
was handsomely done under cover of a brisk shelling 
from Taft s and Bradbury s guns. As on the rest of 
the line, the whole front of the corps was covered 
as usual by hasty entrenchments. In the afternoon 
Ricketts moved far to the right, and seized a wooded 
knoll commanding Ramseur s position on Fisher s 
Hill. In preparation for the attack Sheridan gave 
Emory the ground on the left of the railway, and 
Wright that beyond it, and Molineux moved forward 
to lead the advance of Grover. The sun was low 
when the noise of battle was heard far away on 

1 As the wounding of Sharpe left no officer present with his brigade of higher 
rank than lieutenant-colonel, Emory took Colonel Daniel Macauley, nth 
Indiana, from the 4th brigade and placed him in command of the 3d. 



FISHER S HILL. 399 

the right. This was Crook, sweeping everything 
before him as he charged suddenly out of the forest 
full upon the left flank and rear of Lomax and Ram- 
seur, taking the whole Confederate line completely 
in reverse. The surprise was absolute. Instantly 
Wright and Emory took up the movement, and, 
inspired by the presence and the impetuous com 
mands of Sheridan, descended rapidly the steep and 
broken sides of the ravine, at the bottom of which lies 
Tumbling Run, and then rather scrambling than 
charging up the rocky and almost inaccessible sides 
of Fisher s Hill, swarmed over the strong entrench 
ments, line after line, and planting their colors upon 
the parapets, saw the whole army of Early in dis 
orderly flight. Foremost to mount the parapet was 
Entwistle with his company of the 1 76th New York. 
To them the good fortune fell of being the first to lay 
hands on four pieces of artillery in battery, aban 
doned in the panic caused by the appearance of 
Crook, but almost at the same instant Wilson, gal 
lantly leading the 28th Iowa, planted the colors of 
his regiment on the works. That nothing might be 
wanting to the completeness of the victory, the Con 
federates, who, until that moment had felt their posi 
tion so secure that they had even taken the am 
munition boxes from the caissons, abandoned sixteen 
pieces of artillery where they stood. Early was 
unable to arrest the retreat of his army until he 
found himself near Edenburg, four miles beyond 
Woodstock. 

Sheridan s loss in this battle was 52 killed, 457 
wounded, 19 missing, in all, 528. Of this the Sixth 
Corps suffered nearly half, namely, 27 killed, 208 
wounded, 3 missing, in all, 238. Crook s loss was 8 



400 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

killed, 152 wounded, 2 missing, total 162, and 
Emory accounts for 15 killed, 86 wounded, 13 miss 
ing, together 114. All the casualties of the cavalry 
numbered but 14. Early reports his loss in the 
infantry and artillery alone as 30 killed, 210 wounded, 
995 missing, total 1,235 > but Sheridan claims 1,100 
prisoners. 

Now came Torbert s opportunity, but unfortu 
nately, after suffering a check from the two brigades 
of Fitzhugh Lee under Wickham, Torbert had on 
the 22d fallen back down the Luray valley toward his 
starting-point, and when on the afternoon of the 23d 
word came to him of what had happened at Fisher s 
Hill, although he again advanced, he was then too 
late. Thus for once the cavalry column completely 
failed. Sheridan, from the tenor of his despatches 
from Torbert, must have felt that this result was 
probable, but he did not let it disturb his own move 
ments, and without a halt he pushed forward his whole 
force in pursuit, with slight regard to organization, 
each regiment or brigade nearly in the order in which 
it chanced to file into the road. Devin s cavalry 
brigade trod closely on the heels of what was left of 
Lomax, and Emory, whose line had crossed the 
valley road, pushed up it as fast as the men could 
move over the ground. Wright moved in close sup 
port of Emory and personally directed the operations 
of both corps, the Nineteenth as well as the Sixth. 
So fast did the infantry march that it was ten o clock 
at night before Devin, from his place in line on the 
right of the Sixth Corps, was able to take the road 
abreast with the Nineteenth, and broad daylight be 
fore his or any other horsemen passed the hardy yet 
toil-worn foot-soldiers of Molineux, who were left all 



O/VT MILE 




FISHER S HILL. 

SEPTEMBER 22, 1864. FROM THE OFFICIAL MAP. 



FISHER S HILL. 401 

night to lead the swift pursuit. Molineux caused 
Day to deploy the i3ist New York as skirmishers on 
the right of the road, while the nth Indiana, led by 
Macauley, performed the same service on the left. 
About half-past eight the head of the column first 
came in contact with the rear-guard of the enemy, 
but this was soon driven in, and no further resistance 
was offered until about an hour later, at the crossing 
of a creek near Woodstock, a brisk fire of musketry, 
aided by two guns in the road, was opened on Moli- 
neux s front, but was quickly silenced. At dawn on 
the 23d of September Sheridan went into bivouac 
covering Woodstock, and let the infantry rest until 
early in the afternoon, when he again took up the 
pursuit with Wright and Emory, leaving Crook to 
care for the dead and wounded. Early fell back to 
Mount Jackson, and was preparing to make a stand 
when Averell coming up, he and Devin made so 
vigorous a demonstration with the cavalry alone that 
Early thought it best to continue his retreat beyond 
the North Fork to Rude s Hill, which stands between 
Mount Jackson and New Market. 

Sheridan advanced to Mount Jackson on the morn 
ing of the 24th of September, and before nightfall 
had concentrated his whole army there. He was 
moving his cavalry to envelop both of Early s flanks 
and the infantry, Wright leading, to attack in front. 
However, Early did not wait for this, but retreated 
rapidly in order of battle, pursued by Sheridan in the 
same order, that is by the right of regiments with an 
attempt at deploying intervals, through New Market 
and six miles beyond to a point where a country road 
diverges through Keezeltown and Cross Keys to Port 
Republic, at the head of the South Fork. Here both 



402 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

armies halted face to face, Sheridan for the night ; 
but Early, as soon as it was fairly dark, fell back 
about five miles on the Port Republic road, and again 
halted at a point about fourteen miles short of that 
town. 

Early s object in quitting the main valley road, 
which would have conducted him to Harrisonburg, 
covering Staunton, was to receive once more the re 
inforcements that Lee, at the first tidings from Win 
chester, had again hurried forward under Kershaw. 
On the 25th of September, therefore, Early retreated 
through Port Republic toward Brown s Gap, where 
Kershaw, marching from Culpeper through Swift 
Run Gap, joined him on the 26th. Here also Early s 
cavalry rejoined him, Wickham from the Luray valley, 
and Lomax, pressed by Powell, from Harrisonburg. 

Sheridan, keeping to the main road, advanced to 
Harrisonburg with Wright and Emory, leaving Crook 
to hold the fork of the roads where Early had turned 
off. At Harrisonburg Torbert rejoined with Merritt 
and Wilson. Then Sheridan sent Torbert with Wil 
son and Lowell by Staunton to Waynesboro , where, 
before quitting the valley by Rockfish Gap, the main 
road, as well as the railway to Charlottesville, crosses 
the affluent of the Shenandoah known as the South 
River. To divert attention from this raid Sheridan 
reinforced Devin, who, in the absence of Torbert s 
main body, had been following and observing Early 
near Port Republic without other cavalry support, 
and thus Merritt presently ran into Kershaw march 
ing to join Early at Brown s Gap. Early, having 
gone as far as he wished, turned upon Merritt and 
drove him across the South Fork, but just then 
getting the first inkling of Torbert s movements, 



FISHERS HILL. 403 

divined their purpose, and, to check them, marched 
with all speed, in compact order and with the greatest 
watchfulness in every direction, on Rockfish Gap. But 
Torbert, having a good start, won the race, and had 
accomplished his object when the advance of Early s 
column came up, and caused him to draw off. 

Sheridan, on his part, had gone nearly as far as he 
intended, but as he meant presently to begin with his 
cavalry above Staunton the work of destroying the 
value of the whole valley to the Confederate army, 
on the 29th he ordered Wright and Emory to Mount 
Crawford to support Torbert in this work. 

Grant, who, ever since he reached the James, had 
cast longing eyes upon the Virginia Central railway, 
as well as upon the great junction at Gordonsville, 
now strongly desired Sheridan to go to Staunton or 
Charlottesville, but Sheridan set himself firmly against 
the plan on account of the daily increasing difficulty 
of supplying his army and the great force that must 
be wasted in any attempt to keep open a line of com 
munication longer or more exposed than that he already 
had to maintain. As an alternative, Sheridan, who 
seems to have thought Early had quitted the valley 
for good, proposed to bring the Valley campaign to 
an end with the destruction of the crops, and then to 
move with his main force to join Grant on the James. 
Grant, at once agreeing to this, directed Sheridan to 
keep Crook in the valley and to transfer the rest of 
his force to the armies before Richmond. 

On the morning of the 6th of October Sheridan 
faced about and began moving down the valley, the 
infantry leading in the inverse order of its advance 
and the cavalry bringing up the rear in one long line 
that reached from mountain to mountain, busied in 



404 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

burning as it marched the mills, the barns, and every 
thing edible by man or beast. From the Blue Ridge 
to the Shenandoah Mountains, nothing was spared 
that might be of use to the Confederates in prolonging 
the war. 

When Early discovered this he followed on the 
morning of the 7th of October, with his whole force, 
including Kershaw, as well as the cavalry brigade of 
Rosser, sent by Lee from Petersburg. The command 
of all the cavalry being given to Rosser, he at once 
began treading on the heels of Torbert. On the Qth 
at Tom s Brook, Torbert, under the energetic orders 
of Sheridan to whip the Confederate cavalry or get 
whipped himself, turned upon Rosser, and, after a 
sharp fight, completely overwhelmed him and hotly 
pursued his flying columns more than twenty miles 
up the valley. Several hundred prisoners, eleven 
guns with their caissons, and many wagons tersely 
described by Sheridan "as almost everything on 
wheels" fell into the hands of the captors. But 
more important even than these trophies, confidence 
in Rosser s cavalry was destroyed at a blow, and its 
early prestige wiped out forever. 

On the loth of October Sheridan once more crossed 
Cedar Creek and went into camp, Emory holding the 
right or west of the valley road, Crook on the left or 
east of the road, and the cavalry covering the flanks. 
Wright took up the line of march by Front Royal 
on Washington. 

The first intention of the government was that he 
should take advantage of the Manassas Gap railway, 
which was again being restored under the protection 
of Augur s troops ; but this work was not yet com 
pleted, and while Wright waited at Front Royal, 



FISHER S HILL. 405 

Grant once more fell back on his first and favorite 
plan of a movement on Charlottesville and Gordons- 
ville. To effect this he wished Sheridan to take up 
an advanced position toward the head of the valley, 
and to this the government added its favorite notion 
of rebuilding the railways in the rear. Halleck even 
went so far as to instruct Sheridan to fortify and 
provision heavily the position Grant had directed him 
to occupy. All these ideas Sheridan combated with 
such earnestness that he was summoned to Wash 
ington for consultation. Grant at the same time re 
duced his call on Sheridan for troops for service on 
the James to the Sixth Corps, and Sheridan, having 
on his own motion stopped the work on the Manassas 
Gap railway, ordered Wright to march on Alexandria 
by Ashby s Gap. Wright set out on the i2th. 

Sheridan having lost touch with the main body of 
the Confederates in returning down the valley, he, in 
common with Grant and with the government, now 
thought that Early had quitted the region for good. 
Sheridan s information placed Early variously at 
Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and in the neighbor 
hood of Brown s Gap ; but in truth, though nothing 
had been seen of Early s troops for some days, they 
had never gone out of the valley, but had slowly and 
at a long and safe interval been following Sheridan s 
footsteps, so that on the I3th, while Wright was well 
on his way towards Alexandria, and Sheridan himself 
was getting ready to go to Washington, Early once 
more took post at Fisher s Hill, and sent his advance 
guard directly on to Hupp s Hill to look down into 
the Union camps on the farther bank of Cedar Creek 
and see what was going on there. The first news of 
Early s presence, within two miles of the Union 



406 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

camp, at the very moment when he was thought to 
be sixty miles away on the line of the Virginia Cen 
tral railway, was brought by the shells his artillery 
suddenly dropped among the tents of Crook. Tho- 
burn at once moved out to capture the battery whose 
missiles had presented themselves as uninvited guests 
at his dinner-table, but was met by Kershaw and 
driven back after a sharp fight. Custer, who was 
covering the right flank of the army, was assailed at 
the same time by the Confederate cavalry, but easily 
threw off the attack. At the first sound Torbert sent 
Merritt from the left to the support of Custer, and 
afterward Sheridan kept him there. 

When on the I2th of October Sheridan received 
Grant s definite instructions for the movement on 
Gordonsville and Charlottesville, he ceased to offer 
any further opposition, yet, realizing that he would 
need his whole force, he withdrew the order for 
Wright s movement on Alexandria and sent him 
word to come back to Cedar Creek. The head of 
Wright s column was wading the Shenandoah when 
these orders overtook it. Wright at once faced 
about, and on the next day, the i4th of October, 
went into camp behind the lines of Cedar Creek on 
the right and rear of Emory. No change was made 
in the positions of the other troops, because, until 
Sheridan s return from Washington, the policy and 
plan of the campaign must remain unsettled, and 
Wright might at any moment be called upon to 
resume his march. 

On the 1 5th of October Sheridan received fresh 
instructions from Grant, limiting the proposed move 
ment on Charlottesville and Gordonsville to a serious 
menace, instead of an occupation, and again reducing 



FISHER S HILL. 407 

the call for troops to a single division of cavalry. 
Sheridan at once set Merritt in motion toward Ches 
ter Gap, directing Powell to follow, and he himself 
rode with Merritt to Front Royal, meaning to pay 
his postponed visit to the Secretary of War at Wash 
ington ; but on the i6th, before quitting Front Royal, 
he was overtaken by an officer from Wright bringing 
the words of the strange message read off by our 
signal officers from the waving flags of the Con 
federates in plain sight on the crest of Three Top 
Mountain. 1 This message purported to have been 
sent by Longstreet to Early. " Be ready," it said, 
" to move as soon, as my forces join you, and we will 
crush Sheridan." The true story of this despatch has 
not until now been made public, 2 and many are the 
surmises, clever or stupid, that have been wasted 
upon the mystery. In fact, the message was, as both 
Sheridan and Wright naturally inferred, a trick in- 

1 According to Sheridan, agreeing with the general recollection of the 
survivors ; but Wright and Early both say Round Top, which is behind Fisher s 
Hill. Might not the message sent from Round Top have been repeated from 
Three Top ? 

2 To the courtesy and kindness of General Early, the author is greatly indebted 
for the key to the riddle. Under date of Lynchburg, Virginia, November 6, 1890, 
he writes : " The signal message . . . was altogether fictitious. As Sheri 
dan s troops occupied the north bank of Cedar Creek in such a strong position 
as to render it impracticable for me to attack them in front, I went to the signal 
station just in my rear for the purpose of examining the position, and I found 
the officer in charge of the station reading some signals that were being sent by 
the Federal signal agents. I then asked him if the other side could read his 
signals and he told me that they had discovered the key to the signals formerly 
used, but that a change had been made. I then wrote the message purporting 
to be from Longstreet and had it signalled in full view of the Federal signal 
men whom we saw on the hill in front of my position, so that it might be read 
by them. My object was to induce Sheridan to move back his troops from the 
position they then occupied, and I am inclined to think that if he had then been 
present with his command he would have done so. However, the movement 
was not made, and I then determined to make the attack which was made on 
the igth of October. The object of that attack was to prevent any troops from 
being returned to Grant s army." 



408 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

tended to deceive them ; Early thought to induce 
them to move back without waiting for the attack 
which, with his reduced strength, he wished to avoid. 
The effect was to put the Union commanders on 
their guard against what was actually about to hap 
pen. Therefore Sheridan instantly turned back all 
the cavalry save one regiment, which he kept for an 
escort, and rode on to Rectortown, and so went by 
rail to Washington first, however, taking the pre 
caution to warn Wright to strengthen his position, 
to close in Powell from Front Royal, to look well to 
his ground, and to be prepared. In his official report 
of the campaign, Sheridan, speaking of the events 
now to be related, said : 

" This surprise was owing probably to not closing in Powell or 
that the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed on 
the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there 
was but little danger of attack." 

But it is important to observe and remember that, 
although Wright, in sending Longstreet s message, 
had remarked 

" If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry he might, 
by turning to my right, give us a great deal of trouble. ... I 
shall only fear an attack on my right," 

yet Sheridan- in his reply made no allusion to any 
difference of opinion on his part as to the point 
of danger. His instructions to close in Powell, 
Torbert, under Wright s direction, executed by call 
ing in Moore s brigade to cover Buckton s Ford, on 
the left and rear of Crook. Powell, with the rest of 
his division, was left at Front Royal to hold off 
Lomax. 

Sheridan went on to Washington. Arriving there 
on the morning of the I7th, he at once asked for 



FISHER S HILL. 409 

a special train to take him to Martinsburg at noon, 
and having, between a late breakfast and an early 
luncheon, transacted all his business at the War 
Office, including the conversion of the government 
to his views, set out to rejoin his command. With 
him went two engineer officers, Alexander and Thorn, 
with whom he was to consult as to the best point, if 
any, in the lower valley to be fortified and held ; for 
this venerable error was not dead, merely sleeping. 

Torbert rejoined the army at Cedar Creek on the 
1 6th, and Merritt took up his old position on the 
right. On the same night Rosser took one of his 
brigades with a brigade of infantry mounted behind 
the horsemen, and, supported by the whole of Early s 
army, set out to capture the outlying brigade of Cus- 
ter s division, but found instead a single troop on 
picket duty. This he took, but it was a rather 
mortifying issue to his heavy preparations and great 
expectations, and a long price to pay for putting 
Torbert on the alert. 

For the next two days nothing was seen of Early, 
although the cavalry and both of the infantry corps of 
the main line kept a good watch toward the front. 
There was some probability that Early would attack, 
especially if he should have heard of Wright s de 
parture and not of his return. That Early must 
either attack soon or withdraw to the head of the 
valley was certain, for Sheridan had stripped the 
country of the supplies on which the Confederates 
had been accustomed to rely, and Early had now to 
feed his men and animals by the long haul of seventy- 
five miles from Staunton. It was thus that Wright 
viewed the situation, and in fact the same things were 
passing through the mind of Early. On the i8th of 



4io THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

October, Crook, by Wright s orders, sent Harris 
with his brigade of Thoburn s division, to find out 
where Early really was and what he was doing. 
How far Harris went is not certainly known, but 
when he returned at nightfall he reported that he 
had been to Early s old camps and found them evacu 
ated. In reality Early was at Fisher s Hill with his 
whole force, engaged in his last preparations for the 
surprise of the morrow, but the report brought back 
by Harris soon spread as a camp rumor among the 
officers and men of Crook, so that they may have 
slept that night without thought of danger near, 
and even the vigilance of their picket line, as well 
as that of the cavalry to whom they largely looked 
for protection against a surprise, may or may not have 
been inopportunely relaxed. 

For Early, warned of the strength of Sheridan s 
right, by the failure of Rosser s adventure, had since 
been studying the chances of an attack on the oppo 
site flank. To this indeed the very difficulty of the 
approach invited, for in all wars enterprises appa 
rently impracticable have been carelessly guarded 
against and positions apparently impregnable have 
been loosely watched and lightly defended, so that it 
might not be too much to say that every insur 
mountable difficulty has been surmounted and every 
impregnable stronghold taken. Such apprehensions 
as the commander of the Union army may be sup 
posed to have entertained were directed toward his 
right, where Torbert was, and where the back road to 
Winchester gave easy access to his rear. 

While Early was engaged in considering this plan, 
he sent Gordon, accompanied by Major Hotchkiss of 
the engineers, to the signal station on the crest of 



FISHER S HILL. 411 

Three Top Mountain to examine the position of the 
Union army and to study the details of the proposed 
movement. From this height these officers looked 
down upon the country about Cedar Creek as upon 
an amphitheatre and saw the Union camps as in a 
panorama. Every feature was in plain view ; they 
counted the tents ; they noted the dispositions for 
attack ; they made out the exact situation of the 
various headquarters ; and casting careful glances 
into the shadowy depths of the Shenandoah, winding 
about the foot of the mountain far below them, they 
perceived that the flank of Three Top afforded a 
footing for the passage of the infantry at least. Upon 
this information Early was not long in deciding upon 
his course. Under cover of the night he would send 
the divisions of Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram, 1 all 
under the command of Gordon, over the Shenandoah 
near Fisher s Hill, across the ox-bow, to the foot of 
Three Top. Thence picking his way over the foot 
of the mountain, Gordon in two columns was to cross 
the river a second time at Mclnturff s Ford, just 
below the mouth of Cedar Creek and at Bowman s 
Ford, seven hundred yards below. There he would 
find himself on the flank and in easy reach of the 
rear of Crook, and indeed of the whole Union army, 
with nothing but a thin line of pickets to hinder the 
rush. While Gordon was thus stealthily creeping 
into position for his spring, Early meant to take 
Kershaw and Wharton upon the valley road and 
quietly to gain a good position for assailing Crook 
and Emory in front, as soon as the rifles of Gordon 
should be heard toward the rear. Rosser was to 

1 Observe that Ramseur was now commanding the division that had been 
Rodes s ; Pegram having succeeded to Ramseur s old division. 



4 i2 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

drive in the cavalry on the right of the Union army, 
while Lomax, from the Luray, was expected to gain 
the valley road somewhere near Newtown, so as to 
cut off the retreat. Everything that could jingle or 
rattle was to be left behind, and the march was to be 
made in dead silence, while, as the rumble of the 
guns would be sure to reveal the movement, the 
whole of the artillery was massed at Strasburg, all 
ready to gallop to the front as soon as the battle 
should begin. 

A closer study of the trail showed Gordon that it 
would be possible, however difficult and risky, for 
dismounted troopers to lead their horses over the 
path already marked out for his infantry. Accord 
ingly the cavalry brigade of Payne was added to 
Gordon s column, and after surprising and making 
good the passage of the fords, the first duty of these 
horsemen was to ride straight to Belle Grove House 
and capture Sheridan. Early supposed Sheridan to 
be still present in command. 

Bold as was Early s design of surprising and at 
tacking the vastly superior forces of Sheridan, under 
conditions that must inevitably stake everything upon 
the hazard of complete success, it may well be 
doubted whether in the whole history of war an 
instance can be found of any similar plan so carefully 
and successfully arranged and so completely carried 
out in every detail, up to the moment that must be 
looked for in the execution of every operation of 
war, when the shock of battle comes and puts even 
the wisest prevision in suspense. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

CEDAR CREEK. 

THE ground whereon the Army of the Shenandoah 
now found itself was the same on which Sheridan 
had left it, the troops were the same, and the forma 
tions were in all important particulars the same 
as when he had been present in command, strength 
ened, however, by additional entrenchments. Twice 
before the army had occupied the same line, and 
on both occasions Sheridan had emphatically con 
demned it as a very bad one. Briefly, the position 
was formed by the last great outward bend of 
Cedar Creek before its waters mingle with those of 
the Shenandoah, the left flank resting lightly on the 
river, the centre strongly across the valley road, 
and the extreme right on the creek near the end of 
the bow. 

Crook held a high and partly wooded height or 
range of heights on the left or east * of the valley 
road, and nearly parallel with it. Thoburn occupied 
the most advanced spur overlooking the mouth of the 
creek, while on his left and rear Hayes and Kitching 
faced toward the Shenandoah with their backs to the 
road. As the road descended to cross Cedar Creek 

1 Strictly southeast, for the course of the turnpike toward Winchester is about 
northeast. 

413 



4H THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

by the bridge l and ford, it followed the course of a 
rivulet on its left, and three quarters of a mile from 
Crook, on the opposite side of this ravine and of the 
road, Emory was posted on a hill whose crest rose 
steeply a hundred and fifty feet above the bed of the 
creek. Here Emory planted nearly the whole of his 
artillery to command the bridge and the neighboring 
ford and the approaches on the opposite bank, but 
the slope and crest of this hill were completely and 
easily commanded from the higher ground held by 
Thoburn and by Hayes. From the valley road on 
the left, Emory s line stretched crescent-wise, until 
its right rested upon a natural bastion formed by 
the highest part of the hill, whence the descent is 
precipitous, not only to the creek in front, but on the 
flank to the gorge of Meadow Brook. This little 
stream rising some miles farther north near Newtown, 
and flowing now between high banks and again 
through marshy borders in a general direction nearly 
parallel to the road, empties into Cedar Creek about 
three quarters of a mile above the bridge. Just 
below the mouth of the brook Cedar Creek can be 
crossed by a ford lying nearly in a direct prolongation 
of the line of the valley road from the point where in 
descending it swerves to the east to pass the bridge, 
and midway between the bridge and the Meadow 
Brook ford is still another ford overlooked by 
Emory s right wing and commanded by the guns of 
his artillery. Dwight s division formed the right of 
Emory s line and Grover s the left. From right to 
left the front line was composed of the brigades of 
Thomas, Molinetix, Birge, and Macauley, with Davis 

1 The present bridge is a short distance above where the old one was. 



CEDAR CREEK. 415 

in reserve supporting Thomas, and Shunk, likewise 
in reserve, supporting Macauley and Birge. 1 

The fronts of Emory and of Crook overlooking the 
creek were strongly entrenched, and Crook was en 
gaged in extending his line of works toward the left 
and rear of Thoburn to cover the front of Pi ayes, 
but this fresh line was as yet unoccupied. Wright s 
corps, commanded by Ricketts during the absence of 
Sheridan, while Wright himself commanded the army, 
was held in reserve on the high ground known as 
Red Hill overlooking Meadow Brook from the east 
ward, the divisions encamped for convenience in a 
sort of irregular echelon, with Ricketts s, under Keifer, 
in front, Upton s, commanded by Wheaton, on the 
right and rear in close support, and Getty s on the 
left and rear of both, and thus nearer to the valley 
road than either. Behind the Sixth Corps, opposite 
Middletown, on the high ground on both sides of 
Marsh Run, was Merritt, and far away on his right, 
watching the approaches and the crossing by the 
back road, stood Custer. 

As the Sixth Corps held no part of the front, but 
formed a general reserve, its position was not en 
trenched. Torbert, Emory, and Crook each picketed 
and watched his own front, and there was not a 
horseman between the infantry and the supposed 
position of the enemy at or beyond Fisher s Hill. 

Emory had for some days been distrustful of the 
excessive tranquillity, and on the previous evening 
his uneasiness had rather been augmented by a report 

1 Dwight having been in arrest during the past fortnight by Emory s orders 
under charges growing out of criticisms and statements made in his report of 
the battle of the Opequon, McMillan commanded the First division, leaving 
his brigade to Thomas. Beal had gone home on leave of absence when the 
campaign seemed ended, and Davis commanded his brigade. 



416 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

that came to him from Thomas of a little group of 
men in citizens dress that had been seen during the 
day moving about on the edge of Hupp s Hill, as if 
engaged in noting with more intentness than is usual 
among civilians the arrangement of the Union camps. 
This incident Emory reported to Wright for what it 
might be worth, and Wright, on his part, being already 
doubtful of the exactness of the information brought 
in by Harris, ordered Emory and Torbert each to 
send out a strong reconnoitring party in the early 
morning, to move in parallel columns on the valley 
road and on the back road, with the significant cau 
tion that they were to go far enough to find out 
whether Early was still at Fisher s Hill or not. 

After crossing the Shenandoah and reaching the 
foot of Three Top, Gordon halted his men for a few 
hours rest before the hard work awaiting them. At 
one o clock he silently took up the line of march over 
the rugged trail toward Mclnturff s and Bowman s 
fords, and at five o clock seized both crossings, with 
the merest show of resistance from Moore s outlying 
brigade, and pressed on to Cooley s house, the white 
house he had noted from Three Top. This land 
mark, as he knew, was barely thirteen hundred yards 
from the nearest flank of his enemy. He passed 
nearly half that distance beyond the house and, as 
pre-arranged, silently formed his three divisions for 
the attack. Within five minutes he could be in 
Kitching s camp. 

At the last moment, hearing that Crook was 
strengthening his entrenchments, Early so far 
changed his plan as to part company with Wharton 
at Strasburg, and then, bearing off to the right, to 
conduct Kershaw to the banks of Cedar Creek at the 



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CEDAR CREEK 



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OCTOBER 19, 1864. 



CEDAR CREEK. 417 

ford that now bears the name of Roberts. This is 
about twelve hundred yards above the mouth of the 
creek ; and there, at half-past three in the morning, 
in the long shadows of the full moon, 1 Early stood 
with Kershaw at his back and the sleeping ranks of 
Thoburn directly in his front, and waited only for 
the appointed hour. At half-past four, Early again 
set Kershaw in motion. The crossing of Cedar 
Creek was unobserved and unopposed. Once on 
the north bank, Kershaw deployed to the right and 
left, and stood to arms listening for Gordon. 

Wharton, who had already formed under cover of 
the trees, on the edge of Hupp s Hill, crept down the 
slope to the front of the wood, and there, likewise 
in shadow, hardly a thousand feet from the bridge 
and the middle ford, he too watched for the signal. 

To crown all, as the dawn drew near a light fog 
descended upon the river bottom and covered all 
objects as with a veil. 

Almost from the beginning it had been the custom 
of the Nineteenth Army Corps, at all times when in 
the presence of the enemy, to stand to arms at day 
break. Moreover as Molineux was to go out on a 
reconnoissance by half-past five, his men had break 
fasted and were lying on their arms waiting for the 
order to march. Birge and Macauley were to be 
ready to follow in support after a proper interval, 
and Shunk was to cover the front of all three during 
their absence. McMillan had also been notified to 
support the movement of Grover s brigades. Emory 
himself was up and dressed, the horses of his staff 

1 Being actually three days past the full, the moon rose October 18-19, 1864 
at 8.5 P.M., southed at 2.25 A.M., and set at 8.45 A.M.. Daylight on the igth 
was at 5.40 A.M. ; the sun rose at 6.14, set at 5.16 ; twilight ended 5.50 P.M. 



41 8 THE NINE TEE NTH A RM Y CORPS. 

were saddled, and his own horses were being" saddled, 
when from the left a startling sound broke the still 
ness of the morning air. 

This was the roar of the one tremendous volley by 
which Kershaw made known his presence before the 
sleeping camp of Thoburn. In an instant, before a 
single shot could be fired in return, before the musk 
ets could be taken from the stacks, before the can 
noneers could reach their pieces, Kershaw s men, with 
loud and continuous yells, swarmed over the parapet 
in Thoburn s front, seized the guns, and sent his half- 
clad soldiers flying to the rear. Thus Kershaw, who 
a moment before had been without artillery, suddenly 
found himself in possession of the seven guns that 
had been planted to secure Thoburn s ground. Then 
upon Emory and upon Hayes, as well as against the 
flying fugitives, he turned the cannon thus snatched 
from their own comrades. 

At the first sound Molineux moved his men back 
into the rifle-pits they had left an hour before, and 
Emory, ordering his corps to stand to arms, rode at 
once to the left of his line at the valley road to find 
out the meaning of this strange outbreak. Knowing 
that Molineux was near and ready, Emory drew from 
him two regiments, the 22d Iowa and the 3d Massa 
chusetts, to support the artillery planted on the left 
to command the bridge. Hardly had this been done 
when the shells began to fall among the guns and to 
enfilade the lines of the infantry. What could this 
mean but the thing that had actually happened to 
Thoburn ? Grover joined Emory, Crook came from 
Belle Grove, and Wright from his camp beyond 
Meadow Brook. The fugitives from Thoburn s 
unfortunate division went streaming by. 



CEDAR CREEK. 419 

Then suddenly from the left and rear came the 
startling rattle of the rifles that told of Gordon s 
attack on the exposed flank of Hayes and Kitching. 
While all eyes were directed toward Kershaw, Gor 
don, still further favored by the fog, the outcry, and 
the noise of the cannonade, was not perceived by the 
troops of Hayes and Kitching until the instant when 
his solid lines of battle, unheralded by a single skir 
misher of his own, and unannounced by those set to 
watch against him, fell upon the ranks of Crook. He 
tried in vain to form on the road. Startled from 
their sleep by the surprise of their comrades on their 
right, and naturally shaken by the disordered rush 
of the fugitives through their ranks, his men, old 
soldiers and good soldiers as they were, gave way at 
the first onset, before the fire of Gordon had become 
heavy and almost without stopping to return it. 

Then swiftly Gordon and Kershaw moved together 
against the uncovered left and rear of Emory, while 
at the same time Early, who after seeing Kershaw 
launched, had ridden back for Wharton and the 
artillery, was bringing them into position for a front 
attack. Besides the sounds that had aroused Emory 
and Crook, Wright, from his more remote position, 
had listened to the rattle of Rosser s carbines, 1 but 
after a moment of natural doubt had perceived that 
the true attack was on the left, and accordingly he 
had ordered Ricketts to advance with Getty and 
Keifer to the valley road toward the sound of the 
battle. If this was to be of the least advantage, the 
valley road must be somehow held by somebody 
until Ricketts should come. Emory sent Thomas 
across the road into the ravine and the wood beyond, 

1 This was probably the first sound heard that morning. 



420 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

and bade him stand fast at all hazards. But the 
time was too short. Thomas, after a desperate 
resistance, was forced back by the overwhelming 
masses of Kershaw, yet not until this tried brigade 
had left a third of its number on the ground to attest 
its valor. About the colors of the 8th Vermont the 
fight was furious. Again and again the colors went 
down ; three bearers were slain ; before the sun rose 
two men out of three had fallen, that the precious 
emblems might be saved. 1 Thus were many priceless 
minutes won. Then, as there was no longer anything 
to hinder the advance of Kershaw on the left, and 
of Gordon on the rear, while Wharton and the forty 
guns of Early s artillery were beginning their work 
in front, from the left toward the right, successively 
the brigades of the Nineteenth Corps began to give 
way ; yet as they drifted toward the right and rear, 
in that stress the men held well to their colors, and 
although there may and must have been many that 
fell out, not a brigade or a regiment lost its organization 
for a moment. 

When the pressure reached Molineux and Davis 
on the reverse side of the entrenchments, both brigades 
began moving off, under Emory s orders, by the right 
flank to take position near Belle Grove on the right of 
Ricketts s division of the Sixth Corps, which had come 
up and was trying to extend its line diagonally to 
reach the valley road. To cover this position and 
to hold off the onward rush of Gordon, Emory had 
already posted the i i4th and the i53d New York on 

1 According to the regimental history (p. 218) over 100 were lost out of 159 
engaged ; of 16 officers 13 were killed or wounded. The monument erected 
September 21, 1885, says no were killed and wounded out of 164 engaged. 
The revised official figures are 17 killed, 66 wounded together 83 (including 
12 officers) ; besides these there were 23 missing ; in all, 106. 



CEDAR CREEK. 421 

the commanding knoll five hundred yards to the 
southward overlooking the road. When driven off 
these regiments rejoined their brigade before Belle 
Grove. Thither also came the detached regiments 
of Molineux, and there Neafie joined them with the 
3d brigade, after a strong stand at their breast 
works, wherein Macauley fell severely wounded, and 
the 1 56th and I76th had hard fighting hand-to-hand 
to keep their colors, at the cost of the staves. Birge 
retired along the line of works to the open ground 
beyond Meadow Brook, where Shunk joined him. 

In quitting their posts at the breastworks Haley, 
having lost forty-nine horses killed in harness, had to 
abandon three guns of his ist Maine battery, and 
Taft lost three pieces of his 5th New York battery 
at the difficult crossing of Meadow Brook. There, 
too, from the same cause, three guns of the i7th In 
diana and two of the Rhode Island battery were 
abandoned. The losses of the infantry were to be 
counted in thousands. Grover was slightly wounded ; 
Macauley, as has been said, severely. Emory had 
lost both his horses, and was for a time commanding 
the corps afoot. Birge rode a mule. Thus the 
Nineteenth Corps lost eleven guns. Crook had 
already lost seven, and the Sixth Corps was presently 
to lose six. 

With Gordon on his flank and rear, every moment 
drawing nearer to the mastery of the valley road, 
Wright had to think, and to think quickly, of the 
safety and the success of the army he commanded. 
For it there was no longer a position south of 
Middletown. What security was there that Custer 
and Powell would be able all day long to hold off, as 
in the event they did, the flank and rear attacks of 



422 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Rosser and of Lomax ? What if the Longstreet 
message were true and yet a third surprise in store ? 
Time, time was needed, whether to bring up the 
troops or to change front, to march to the rear past the 
faces of the advancing enemy, to hold him in check, 
and to re-form. Whatever was to be done was to be 
done quickly ; and Wright, throwing prudence into 
the balance, made up his mind for a retreat to a fresh 
position, where his line of communications would be 
preserved and its flanks protected. Middletown and 
the cavalry camp pointed out the ground. Accord 
ingly he gave the word to Getty, Ricketts being 
wounded, to retire on Middletown, guiding on the 
valley road, and to Emory to form on Getty s right 
that is, on the left of the Sixth Corps in retreat. The 
battle had been raging for nearly an hour when Wright 
gave this order to abandon Belle Grove. The retreat 
threw upon Getty s division, now under Grant, the 
severe task of covering the exposed right flank of 
the army in retreat, while the left was gradually 
swinging into the direction of the new line. Getty, 
having handsomely performed this service, crossed 
Meadow Brook abreast with Middletown and took 
position on the high and partly wooded ground that 
rises beyond the brook to the west of the village and 
on a line with Merritt s camp. Here, on the southern 
edge of the village cemetery and on the crest behind 
it, Getty planted his artillery, posted Grant to hold 
the immediate front, and somewhat in his rear, under 
the trees, following the contour of the hill as it rises 
toward the west, he placed Wheaton and Keifer. 

To reach his position on the left of Getty in re 
treat, Emory had to gain ground to the westward, to 
descend the hill from Belle Grove, to cross Meadow 



CEDAR CREEK. 423 

Brook, and climbing the opposite slope to face about 
and re-form his line in good order on the crest of Red 
Hill. Here, before Dr. Shipley s house, nearly across 
the ground where the men of Wheaton and of 
Getty had slept the night before, for the best part of 
an hour Emory stood at bay. Kershaw followed 
over the Belle Grove Hill, across Meadow Brook, up 
the slope of Red Hill, and formed line facing north ; 
but then, seeing the fighting part of Emory s infantry 
before him and the formidable array of Merritt s 
cavalry in close support, he refrained from renewing 
the attack until Early could send Gordon to his aid. 
Thus the bold stand at Red Hill gave the time the 
situation craved, and while Kershaw waited, Emory, 
following his orders from Wright, crossed over to the 
cemetery 1 and placed himself on the west of Getty. 
Thomas rejoined McMillan. Torbert meanwhile had 
moved over with Merritt to the left flank. Thus 
around the cemetery, about half-past seven, the un 
shaken strength of the Army of the Shenandoah 
was gathered, every eye looking once more toward 
the south. 

While awaiting the general attack for which Early 
was plainly preparing, Wright deployed his lines, 
according to the ground, from the south wall of the 
cemetery overlooking Meadow Brook on the left, in a 
rough echelon of divisions to Marsh Brook on the 
right, in order of Grant, Keifer, Wheaton, Grover, 
McMillan. Between the arms of Marsh Brook, in 
front and behind the Old Forge road, on open ground 
nearly as high as Getty s, Emory formed his corps in 

1 The official map, accurate as it is in general, errs in some important particu 
lars ; for one, in representing Emory as retreating in a direct line toward the 
north from Red Hill to the Old Forge line. This would actually have carried 
his force through the ranks of the cavalry. 



424 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

echelon of brigades. Here, not doubting that the 
decisive combat of the day was to be fought, Emory 
began fortifying his front with the help of loose rails 
and stones. 

To protect himself against the menacing move 
ment of the cavalry on his right in front of Middle- 
town, Early posted Ramseur with two batteries di 
rectly across the valley road, and when he saw Getty s 
stand near the cemetery, he brought Wharton directly 
down the road and sent him to the attack, but this 
Getty easily threw off and drove back Wharton in 
such confusion that before renewing the attempt 
Early waited to complete a new line of battle almost 
perpendicular to his first and therefore to the road. 
From the right at Middletown to the left at Red 
Hill the new line was formed by Pegram, Ramseur, 
Kershaw, and Gordon, with Wharton behind Pegram. 
On the right of this line also Early massed the forty 
guns of his artillery augmented by some of the twen 
ty-four pieces taken from the Union army. 

And now the increasing heat of the sun dissolved 
the fog, and revealed to the combatants the true sit 
uation of affairs. To Early the position of the Union 
army, its salient, as it were, lying directly before him 
where he stood, seemed so strong that he hesitated 
to hazard another attack until the concentrated fire 
of his artillery should have produced an impression ; 
while to Wright, not only was the menace of Early s 
artillery very obvious, but the weakness of his own 
left flank, broken by Meadow Brook and adhering 
lightly to the valley road, was still present. 

The force of Early s first onset was spent ; his one 
chance of seizing and holding the valley road in the 



CEDAR CREEK. 425 

rear of the Union army had slipped away, while his 
cavalry had utterly failed to accomplish any part of 
the task confided to it. Time and strength had both 
been lost to the Confederates by the uncontrollable 
plunder of the camps and the sutlers stores. 

The Old Forge road is but a country lane that 
crosses the field from the north end of Middletown. 
It afforded no position, its chief value being as uniting 
the wings of the army, and Wright s object in taking 
up this line was simply to gain time to develop a 
better fighting line still farther to the rear. Now, 
seeing that Getty had accomplished his purpose in 
holding on at the cemetery, Wright ordered him 
to move slowly, in line of battle, toward the north, 
guiding on the valley road, with Merritt s cavalry be 
yond it following and covering the operation, while 
Emory, taking up the movement in his turn, was to 
look to Wheaton for his guide. Wright s order 
found Emory s men in the act of completing their 
hasty defences, while Emory was moving about 
among them strongly declaring his purpose not to 
go back another inch. 

Getty began by withdrawing Grant, and when 
Grant had passed for some distance beyond the left 
of Keifer, his right in retreat, Keifer followed, while 
on his left, in retreat, Wheaton, and on Wheaton s 
left Emory marched, as nearly as may be, shoulder to 
shoulder in a solid line. Thus Keifer formed the 
centre of the retreating line of battle, with Ball on 
his right and Emerson on his left. Having to pass 
over rough ground and among trees, the line was 
broken to the reversed front by the right of regi 
ments, the head of each guiding on its right-hand 



426 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

neighbor. Thus it happened l that in passing through 
a thick wood, Keifer s division was split in two, his 
brigades losing sight of one another, so that on 
coming once more into the open field, Ball found 
himself alone with no other troops in sight on either 
hand ; but soon hearing the sound of Getty s guns 
over the right shoulder, he faced about and marched 
back to a stone wall upon a lane, where he found 
Getty already in position. Emerson, however, moving 
more quickly through the wood, because the ground 
was easier, continued his march toward the north, 
continually bearing to the right as he went, in order 
to regain the lost touch with Ball, while on the left 
Wheaton and Emory, knowing nothing of the break, 
naturally and gradually conformed to the movement 
of Emerson. Finally, when the left of the line once 
more entered the woods, Emerson, gradually changing 
the direction toward the right, drifted Wheaton away 
from Emory, and when this was perceived by the 
commanders, each began to look for his neighbor. 
It is also probable that when the separation took 
place the interval was gradually widened by Emory s 
movement with his right resting on a road that, 
while apparently following the true line of direction, 
really carried him every moment a little farther 
toward the left. However that may be, when almost 
at the same instant Wheaton and Emory halted and 
faced about, they found themselves about eight hun 
dred yards apart, a thousand yards behind the 
line that Getty had just taken up, on the westward 

1 " The Battle of Cedar Creek," by Col. Moses M. Granger, I22d Ohio, 
printed in the valuable collection of " Sketches of War History," published by 
the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, vol. iii., pp. 122-125. The 
author is likewise indebted to General Keifer for the opportunity to use in the 
manuscript his paper on Cedar Creek, prepared for the same series. 



CEDAR CREEK. 427 

prolongation of which Keifer had joined him with 
the brigade of Ball. 

The affair had now lasted five hours ; the retreat 
was at an end ; a tactical accident had carried it half 
a mile farther than was intended ; as it was, from the 
extreme front of Emory at daybreak to his extreme 
rear at eleven o clock, the measured distance was but 
four miles. Every step of the way had been tra 
versed under orders under orders that had carried 
the Nineteenth Corps three times across the field 
of battle, so that its march, from Belle Grove to 
the Old Forge road, might be represented by the 
letter N. 

When Early saw the Union line retreating, he 
moved forward to the cross-road beyond the ceme 
tery, and posted his troops behind the stone walls. 
Wharton extended the line on the east side of the 
turnpike, with three batteries massed between him 
and the road. Pegram covered the turnpike, his 
left resting on Meadow Brook, and beyond it Ram- 
seur, Kershaw, and Gordon carried the line to the 
east bank of Middle Marsh Brook. Early had now 
two courses open to him : one was to extricate his 
army from its position, with its enemy directly in 
front and Cedar Creek in rear, before the Union 
commander could take the initiative ; the other was 
to attack vigorously with all his force before the 
Union infantry should be able to complete the new 
line of battle now plainly in the act of formation. 
In either case, although he could easily see that on 
both flanks the line of his infantry far overlapped 
that of his antagonist, Early must have perceived 
that he had to reckon with the whole mass of the 
Union cavalry, unshaken and as yet untouched. 



428 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Moreover, his men had already done a long and hard 
day s work after a short night. 

Depleted as were the ranks of the Union infantry 
by the heavy battle losses of the early morning, and 
the still heavier losses by the misconduct of the 
stragglers of all the corps except the cavalry, it was 
not to be doubted that the men who stood by the 
colors on the Old Forge road meant to abide to the 
end. As all old soldiers know, the fighting line, 
granting that enough remain to make a fighting line, 
is never so strong as at the moment after the first 
shock of battle has shaken out the men that always 
straggle on the march and skulk on the field. When, 
therefore, the first compact line faced about, it was 
with determination and with hope ; yet scarcely had 
the fires of resolution been relit and begun to kindle 
to a glow than they were suddenly extinguished and 
all was plunged in gloom by the unlooked-for order 
to retreat. Upon the whole army a lethargy fell, 
and though every man expected and stood ready to 
do his duty, it was with a certain listlessness amount 
ing almost to indifference that he waited for what 
was to come next. In the sensations of most, 
hunger was perhaps uppermost, and while some 
munched the bread and meat from their haversacks 
and others waited to make coffee, many threw 
themselves upon the ground where they stood and 
fell asleep. 

Far down the road from among the crowd of 
fugitives, where no man on that field cared to look, 
came a murmur like the breaking of the surf on a far- 
off shore. Nearer it drew, grew louder, and swelled 
to a tumult. Cheers ! The cheers of the stragglers. 
As the men instinctively turned toward the sound, 



CEDAR CREEK. 429 

they were seized with amazement to see the tide of 
stragglers setting strongly toward the south. Then 
out from among them, into the field by the roadside, 
cantered a little man on a black horse, and from the 
ranks of his own cavalry arose a cry of " Sheridan ! " 
Through all the ranks the message flashed, and, as if 
it had been charged by the electric spark, set every 
man on his feet and made his heart once more beat 
high within him. 

This was Wednesday, and Sheridan, before finally 
setting out for Washington, had told Wright to look 
for him on Tuesday. Rapidly despatching, as has 
been seen, his business at the War Office, Sheridan 
left Washington by the special train he had asked for 
at noon on the i 7th, accompanied by the engineers 
charged with the duty of selecting the position that 
Halleck wished to fortify. They slept that night at 
Martinsburg, and rode the next day, the i8th of 
October, to Winchester. There Sheridan learned 
that all was well with his army and was also told of 
the reconnoissances projected for the next morning. 
He determined to remain at Winchester in order 
to go over the ground the next morning with the 
engineers. Aroused about six o clock by the report 
of heavy firing, he ascribed it to the reconnoitring 
column, and thought but little of it until, between 
half-past eight and nine, having finished his break 
fast, he became uneasy at the continued sound of the 
cannon. Then mounting " Rienzi," accompanied by 
his staff and followed by his escort, he rode out to 
join his army where he had left it, fourteen miles away, 
on the banks of Cedar Creek. The fight of the 
morning had come to an end an hour ago. Riding 
at an easy trot half a mile out on the hill beyond 



430 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Abraham s Creek, 1 he was shocked to see the tattered 
and dishevelled head of the column of stragglers, 
every man making the best of his way toward the 
Potomac, without his arms, his equipments, or his 
knapsack, carrying, in short, nothing but what he wore. 
Most of these must have been shaken out of the 
ranks when Kershaw surprised the camp of Thoburn. 
If this be so, they had travelled more than thirteen 
miles in little more than three hours. 

This appalling sight brought to Sheridan s mind 
the Longstreet message, " Be ready when I join you, 
and we will crush Sheridan." Should he stop his 
routed army at Winchester and fight there ? No, 
he must go to his men, restore their broken ranks, or 
share their fate. How he rode on has been made 
famous in song and story, yet never so well told as 
in the modest narrative, stamped in every line with 
the impress of the soldier s truthful frankness, than in 
the entertaining volumes that were the last work of 
the great leader s life. 2 

Once arrived on the field, about half-past ten or per 
haps eleven o clock, Sheridan lost no time in assuming 
personal command of the army. Establishing his 
headquarters on the hill behind Getty, he proceeded 
to complete the dispositions he found already in 
progress. He saw at a glance that the line on which 
Wright had placed Getty was well chosen ; and 
though knowing nothing of the break that had taken 
place during the accidental loss of direction by the left 
wing of Getty s corps, and so wrongly inferring from 
what he saw that Getty was a mere rear-guard, he 

1 Called Mill Creek in Sheridan s report and " Memoirs." There is a mill 
on the north bank. 

2 " Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan," vol. ii., pp. 75-83. The distance 
from Winchester to Getty s position is ten and three quarter miles. 



CEDAR CREEK. 431 

yet adopted the position for his fighting line, sent 
his staff officers with orders for the rest of the troops 
to form on that line, and thus actually completed the 
arrangements begun by Wright. It sufficed that 
Emerson, Wheaton, and Emory should face about, 
as they were already about to do, and should form 
on the prolongation of Getty s line. This they did 
promptly and in perfect order. Wright resumed the 
command of the Sixth Corps and Getty of his own divi 
sion. Then feeling his left quite strong enough under 
Merritt s care, Sheridan sent Custer, for whom he had 
other designs, back to the right flank. 

It was past noon before all this was accomplished. 
Then Sheridan, content with the position and appear 
ance of his own army, and perceiving that Early was 
getting ready to attack him, acted on the suggestion 
of Major George Forsyth, his aide-de-camp, and rode 
the length of the line of battle in order to show him 
self to his men. A tumult of cheers greeted him and 
followed him as, hat in hand, he passed in front of 
regiment after regiment, speaking a few words of 
encouragement to each. Sheridan possessed in a 
degree unequalled the power of raising in the hearts 
of his soldiers the sort of enthusiasm that, transmu 
ting itself into action, causes men to attempt impos 
sibilities, and to disregard and overcome obstacles. 
Almost from the moment of entering the valley he 
had gained the confidence of the infantry, to whom he 
had been a stranger. By the cavalry he had long 
been idolized. The feeling of an army for its gen 
eral is a thing not to be reasoned with or explained 
away ; once aroused, it belongs to him as exclusively 
as the expression of his face, the manner of his gait, 
or the form of his signature, and is not to be trans- 



432 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

ferred to his successor or delegated even to the ablest 
of his lieutenants, whatever the skill, the merit, or 
the reputation of either. The mere presence of 
Sheridan in the ranks of the Army of the Shenan- 
doah that day brought with it the assurance of 
victory. 

Emory at first formed his corps in two lines, the 
First division under Dwight, whom Sheridan had 
released from arrest, on the right, and Grover on 
the left ; but soon the whole corps was deployed 
in one line in the order from right to left by bri 
gades of McMillan, Davis, Birge, Molineux, Neafie, 
Shunk. 

When the line of the Old Forge road was aban 
doned by Wright, Early moved forward and occupied 
it. Between one and two o clock he advanced Gor 
don and Kershaw to attack Wheaton and Emory. 
Seeing that the weight of the attack was about to 
fall on the right, Sheridan sent Wheaton to the sup 
port of Emory. However, Gordon s onset proved 
so light that no assistance was needed, for, after 
three or four volleys had been exchanged, the attack 
was easily and completely thrown off. Kershaw s 
movement was even more feeble. 

Several causes now delayed the counter attack of 
Sheridan. Crook was endeavoring to re-form the 
stragglers on his colors behind Merritt. Apprehen 
sion of the coming of Longstreet was only dissipated 
by the information gained from prisoners during the 
afternoon, and finally arose a false rumor of the 
appearance of a column of Confederate cavalry in 
the rear toward Winchester ; and this seemed plausi 
ble enough until at last word came from Powell that 
he was still holding off Lomax. Then Sheridan 



CEDAR CREEK. 433 

gave the signal for the whole line to go forward 
against the enemy, beginning with Getty on the 
left, as a pivot, while the whole right was to sweep 
onward, and, driving the enemy before it, to swing 
toward the valley road near the camps of the 
morning. 

About four Getty started, and the movement 
being taken up in succession toward the right, in 
a few minutes the whole line was advancing steadily. 
From that moment to the end the men hardly 
stopped an instant for anything. The resistance 
of the Confederates, though at first steady, and here 
and there even spirited, was of short duration. For 
a few moments, indeed, the attack seemed to hang 
on the extreme right as McMillan, rushing on 
even more rapidly than the order of the combat 
demanded, found himself suddenly enveloped by the 
right wheel of the brigade of Evans, forming the 
extreme left of the division of Gordon and of the 
Confederate army. But while McMillan was thus 
attacked and his leading troops were called to meet 
the danger, this, as suddenly as it had come, was 
swept away by the swift onset of Davis directly 
upon the front and flank of Evans. To do this 
Davis had not only to act instantly, but also to 
change front under a double fire ; yet he and his 
brigade were equal to the emergency, and McMillan 
joining in, together they not only threw off the 
attack of Evans, but bursting through the re-entrant 
angle of Gordon s line, quickly swept Evans off the 
field. Knowing this to be the critical point of his 
line, because the wheeling flank, Sheridan was there. 
" Stay where you are," was his order, " till you see 
my boy Custer over there." 



434 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

Then upon the high ground appeared Custer at 
the head of his bold troopers, making ready to 
swoop down upon the broken wing of Gordon. 
Almost at the same instant, the whole right of the 
line rushed to the charge, and while Custer rode 
down Gordon s left flank, Dwight, with McMillan 
and Davis, began rolling up the whole Confederate 
line. Meanwhile, on the left centre the Union attack 
likewise hung for a moment, where Molineux, on the 
southerly slope of a wooded hollow, saw himself con 
fronted by Kershaw on the opposite crest, only to be 
reached by climbing the steep bare side of the " dirt 
hill." But the keen eye of Molineux easily saw through 
the difficulties of the ground, and when he was ready 
his men and Dirge s, rising up and together charging 
boldly out of the hollow, up the hill, across the open 
ground, and over the stone wall, in the face of a 
fierce fire, settled the overthrow of Kershaw and 
sent a panic running down the line of Ramseur. 
Wright attacking with equal vigor, soon the disorder 
spread through every part of Early s force, and in 
rout and ruin the exultant victors of the morning 
were flying up the valley. 

" Back to your camps ! " had been the watchward 
ever since Sheridan showed himself on the field. 
Dwight s men were the first to stand once more 
upon their own ground, but by that time Sheridan s 
army had executed, though without much regard to 
order, a complete left wheel. While the infantry 
took up its original positions, the cavalry pursued the 
flying enemy with such vigor that an accidental dis 
placement of a single plank on a little bridge near 
Strasburg caused the whole of Early s artillery that 
had not yet passed on, to fall into the hands of Sheri- 



CEDAR CREEK. 435 

dan. Thus were taken 48 cannon, 52 caissons, all 
the ambulances that had been lost in the morning, 
many wagons, and seven battle flags ; of the artillery 
24 pieces were the same that had been lost in the 
early morning. From every part of the abandoned 
field great stacks of rifles were gathered. The pris 
oners taken were about 1,200, according to the reports 
of Sheridan s officers, or something over 1,000 by 
Early s account. Early also gives his loss in killed 
and wounded, without distinguishing between the 
two, as i, 860, and reports the capture of 1,429 pris 
oners from the Union army in the early hours of the 
day. Of these he had made sure by sending them 
promptly to the rear. Ramseur was mortally wounded 
in the last stand made by his division, and died a few 
days later in the hands and under the care of his 
former comrades of Sheridan s army. 

Sheridan s loss was 644 killed, 3,430 wounded, and 
1,591 captured or missing ; in all, 5,665. Of these 
the Sixth Corps had 298 killed, 1,628 wounded to 
gether, 1,926 ; the Nineteenth Corps 257 killed, 1,336 
wounded together, 1,593. Crook lost 60 killed, 342 
wounded together, 402 ; the cavalry 29 killed, 224 
wounded together, 253. The missing were thus 
divided : Wright 194, Emory 776, Crook 548, Torbert 
43. The greatest proportionate loss of the day was 
suffered by the i i4th New York, which had 21 killed, 
86 wounded, including 17 mortally, and 8 missing in 
all, 115 out of 250 engaged. Its fatal casualties 
reached 1 5.2, and the killed and wounded 42.8 per cent, 
of the number engaged. These figures are from the 
corrected reports of the War Department. The miss 
ing exceed the captured, as set down in Early s 
report, by only 132. Among the killed and mortally 



436 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

wounded were Bidwell, Thoburn, Kitching, and that 
superb soldier and accomplished gentleman, General 
Charles Russell Lowell, who, although severely 
wounded in the morning, at the head of his bri 
gade held fast to the stone wall until, in the last 
decisive charge, his death-blow came. Grover re 
ceived a second severe wound early in the final charge 
that broke the Confederate left. Birge then took his 
division. 

Without a halt and with scarcely a show of organ 
ized resistance, Early retreated to Fisher s Hill. 
Merritt and Custer, uniting on the south bank of 
Cedar Creek, kept up the pursuit until the night was 
well advanced, but soon their captures became so 
heavy in men and material, that help was needed to 
take care of them, so, barely an hour after going into 
camp the jaded infantry of Dwight once more turned 
out and marched with alacrity to Strasburg. 

Toward morning Early withdrew his infantry from 
the lines of Fisher s Hill, and marched on New 
Market, leaving Rosser to cover the movement. In 
the morning, upon Torbert s approach, Rosser retired, 
closely pursued to Edenburg, sending Lomax into 
the Luray to guard the right flank of the retreating 
Confederates. 

The strength of the contending forces in this re 
markable battle may always give ground for dispute. 
No official figures exist to determine the question 
directly ; therefore on either side the numbers are a 
matter of opinion. The author s, formed after a 
careful consideration of all the authorities, is that when 
the battle began, Wright commanded an effective 
force of not more than 31,000 officers and men of all 
arms, made up of 9,000 in the Sixth Corps, 9,500 in 



CEDAR CREEK. 437 

the Nineteenth Corps, 6,000 in Crook s command, 
and 6,500 cavalry. The infantry probably numbered 
23,000: Ricketts 8,500, Emory 9,000, Crook 5,500. 
Of these, therefore, the hard fighting fell on 17,500. 
The losses in the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, nearly 
all incurred in the early morning, being about 4,500, the 
two corps should have mustered 13,500 for the coun 
ter-attack of the afternoon, yet the ground they then 
stood upon, from the road to the brook, measures 
barely 7,400 feet. With all allowances, therefore, 
Sheridan cannot have taken more than 8,000 of his 
infantry into this attack. This leaves out Crook s 
men bodily, and calls for 5,500 unrepentant strag 
glers from the ranks of Emory and Wright one man 
in three. After all is said, unhappily there is nothing 
so extraordinary in this, but strange indeed would it 
have been if many of these skulkers had come back 
into the fight, as Sheridan considerately declares they 
did. 

As to Early s force, the difficulty of coming to a 
positive conclusion is even greater. General Early 
himself says he went into the battle with but 8,800 
muskets. General Dawes, perhaps the most accom 
plished statistician of the war, makes the total pres 
ent for duty 22,000 : of these 1 5,000 would be infantry. 
The figures presented by the unprejudiced statistician 
of the " Century War Book" l call for 15,000 of all 
arms. Of these 10,000 would be infantry. 

Early may be said to have accomplished the ulti 
mate object of his attack at Cedar Creek, yet at a 
fearful cost, for although all thought of transferring 
any part of Sheridan s force to the James was for the 

1 Vol. iv., pp. 524, 532. And see appendix for the valuable memorandum 
kindly prepared expressly for this work by General E. C. Dawes. 



438 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

moment given up, on the other hand Early had com 
pleted the destruction * of his prestige, had suffered 
an irreparable diminution of numbers, and had seen 
his army almost shaken to pieces. 

Grant once more returned to his favorite project 
of a movement in force on Charlottesville and Gor- 
donsville, but Sheridan continuing to oppose the 
scheme tenaciously, it came to nothing. His own 
plan, eventually carried out, was to hold the lower 
valley in sufficient strength, and to move against the 
line of the Virginia Central railway with all his cav 
alry. The rails of the Manassas Gap line, so often 
relaid, were once more and for the last time taken up, 
from the Blue Ridge back to Augur s outposts at 
Bull Run, and so this will-o -the-wisp, that had danced 
before the eyes of the government ever since 1861, 
was at last extinguished, while from Winchester to 
the Potomac the railway, abandoned by Johnston 
when he marched to Bull Run, was re-constructed to 
simplify the question of supplies. 

1 Justly or unjustly ; unjustly I think, being unable to see how any one could 
have done better. 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

VICTORY AND HOME. 

ON the 7th of November, on the battle-field of 
Cedar Creek, Emory passed his corps in review be 
fore Sheridan. Sheridan spoke freely and in the 
highest terms of the soldierly bearing and good 
conduct of the officers and men. On the same day 
the President broke up the organization of the rem 
nant of the various detachments, still known as the 
Nineteenth Corps, left under the command of Canby 
in Louisiana and Mississippi, and appointed Emory 
to the permanent command of the Nineteenth Army 
Corps in the field in Virginia. 

The corps staff, mainly composed of the same 
officers who with lower rank had been serving at 
the headquarters of the Detachment, so called, since 
quitting Louisiana, included Lieutenant-Colonel 
Duncan S. Walker, Assistant Adjutant-General ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Sizer, Acting-Assistant 
Inspector-General ; Captain O. O. Potter, Chief 
Quartermaster ; Captain H. R. Sibley, Chief Com 
missary of Subsistence ; Captain Robert F. Wil 
kinson, Judge Advocate ; Surgeon W. R. Brownell, 
Medical Director; Captain Henry C. Inwood, Pro 
vost-Marshal ; Major Peter French, Captain James 
C. Cooley, and Captain James W. De Forest, aides- 
de-camp. 

439 



440 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

On the 1 7th of November Emory adopted a corps 
badge and a new system of headquarters flags. The 
badge was to be a fan-leaved cross with an octagonal 
centre ; for officers, of gold suspended from the left 
breast by a ribbon, the color red, white, and blue for 
the corps headquarters, red for the First division, blue 
for the Second. Enlisted men were to wear on the 
hat or cap a similar badge of cloth, two inches 
square, in colors like the ribbon. The flags were to 
have a similar cross, of white on a blue swallow 
tail for corps headquarters ; for divisions, a white 
cross on a triangular flag, the ground red for the First 
division, blue for the Second ; the brigade flags rec 
tangular in various combinations of red, blue, and 
white cross and ground, the ground divided horizon 
tally for the brigades of the First division, and per 
pendicularly for those of the Second division. 

On the Qth of November Sheridan drew back to 
Kernstown, meaning to go into winter quarters. 
Early eagerly followed as far as Middletown, intent 
on discovering what this might mean ; but when, on 
the 1 2th, Torbert once more fell upon the unfortunate 
cavalry of Rosser, on both flanks of the Confederate 
position, and completely routed it, while Dudley, ad 
vancing with his brigade * in support of the cavalry, 
showed that Sheridan was ready to give battle, the 
Confederate commander became satisfied that Sheri 
dan had sent no troops to Petersburg. Sheridan 
made all his arrangements to attack Early on the 
morning of the I3th, but Early did not wait for this, 
and when the sun rose he was again far on the way 

1 Beal s, of Dwight s division. Dudley, having rejoined November 2d, com 
manded it till November I4th, when Beal came back and relieved him ; again 
from November i8th to December yth, when a dispute as to relative and brevet 
rank was ended by Beal s receiving his commission as a full brigadier-general. 



VICTORY AND HOME. 441 

to New Market. It was during Dudley s movement 
that the Nineteenth Corps suffered its last loss in 
battle, the 2gth Maine having one man wounded, by 
name Barton H. Ross. 

When the approach of winter made active opera 
tions in the valley impossible, Lee, who had already 
detached Kershaw, called back to the defence of 
Richmond and Petersburg the whole of Early s corps, 
and at the same time, almost to the very day, Grant 
called on Sheridan for the Sixth Corps. Thus in the 
second week of December Wright rejoined the Army 
of the Potomac. Soon afterward Crook s command 
was divided and detached to Petersburg and West 
Virginia, leaving only Torbert and Emory with Sheri 
dan in the valley. Early, his force reduced to Whar- 
ton and Rosser, went into winter quarters at Staunton, 
with his outposts at New Market and a signal party 
on watch at the station on Massanutten. 

These reductions of force, together with the 
increasing seventy of the winter, made it desirable 
to occupy a line nearer the base of supplies at 
Harper s Ferry, and accordingly, on the 3Oth of 
December, after living for six weeks in improvised 
huts or "shebangs," as they were called, roughly put 
together of rails, stones, and any other material to 
be found, the Nineteenth Corps broke up its canton 
ment before Kernstown, called Camp Russell, and 
marching over the frozen ground, took up a position 
to cover the railway and the roads near Stephenson s. 
Here, at Camp Sheridan, it was intended to build 
regular huts, but on the last day of the year, when the 
men were as yet without shelter of any kind, a heavy 
snow storm set in, during which they suffered 
severely. As soon as this was over, the men fell to 



442 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS, 

work in earnest, and with lumber from the quarter 
master s department and timber from the forest, soon 
had the whole command comfortably housed. 

Meanwhile Currie s brigade, which had been so 
long detached, engaged in the arduous and thankless 
duty of guarding the wagon-trains, rejoined Dwight s 
division. Brigadier-General James D. Fessenden 
having succeeded Currie in command the 5th of 
January, 1865, the brigade was again detached to 
Winchester; McMillan was at Summit Point; and 
Beal, as well as the headquarters of Dwight and 
Emory, at Stephenson s. 

On the 6th of January Grover s division bade fare 
well to the Nineteenth Corps, and, embarking upon 
the cars of the Baltimore and Ohio railway, set out 
by way of Baltimore for some unknown destination. 
This presently proved to be Savannah, whither 
Grover was ordered to hold the ground seized by the 
armies under Sherman, while Sherman went on his 
way through the Carolinas. On the 27th of Feb 
ruary, Sheridan broke up what remained of his Army 
of the Shenandoah, and placing himself at the head 
of his superb column of 10,000 troopers, marched to 
achieve Grant s longing for Lynchburg, Charlottes- 
ville, and Gordonsville, and to rejoin the Army of 
the Potomac. 

Hancock now took command of the Middle Mili 
tary Division. Of the Army of the Shenandoah 
there remained only the fragment of the Nineteenth 
Corps. On the I4th of March the men of Emory s 
old division passed for the last time before their 
favorite- commander. A week later was published to 
the command the order of the President, dated 
March 20, 1865, by which the Nineteenth Army 



VICTORY AND HOME. 443 

Corps was dissolved. Then bidding them a tender 
and touching farewell, on the 3<Dth of March Emory 
quitted the cantonment at Stephenson s, and went to 
Cumberland to take command of the Military De 
partment of that name. 

In the early days of April the tedium of winter 
quarters was relieved by the good news of Grant s 
successes before Petersburg. It was evident that 
Lee s army was breaking up, and to guard against 
the possible escape of any fragment of it by the 
valley highway, on the 4th of April Hancock sent 
Dwight s division back to Camp Russell, but on the 
7th the troops were drawn in to Winchester and 
encamped on the bank of Abraham s Creek. Here, 
at midnight on the Qth of April, the whole command 
turned out to hear the official announcement of Lee s 
surrender. The next morning, in a drenching rain, 
Dwight marched eighteen miles to Summit Point. 
On the 2Oth of April the division moved by railway 
to Washington, where it arrived on the morning of 
the 2ist, and with colors shrouded in black for the 
memory of Lincoln, marched past the President s 
house and encamped at Tennallytown on the same 
ground the detachments of the corps had occupied 
on the night of the i3th of July the year before. 
Here the duty devolved upon the division of guard 
ing all the ways out of Washington toward the 
northwest, from Rock Creek to the Potomac, in 
order to prevent the escape of such of the assassins 
of the President as might still be lurking within the 
city. This was but a part of the heavy and continu 
ous line of sentries that stretched for thirty-five miles 
around the capital. A week later Dwight moved to 
the neighborhood of Bladensburg and encamped on 



444 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

the line the division had been ordered to defend on 
the afternoon of its arrival from New Orleans. In 
the first week of May heavy details were furnished 
to guard the prison on the grounds of the arsenal 
where the assassins were confined. 

The armies of Meade and Sherman were now 
concentrating on the hills about Washington, pre 
paratory to passing in review before President John 
son ; and Dwight being ordered to report to Willcox, 
then commanding the Ninth Army Corps, and to 
follow that corps on the occasion of the review, 
Willcox inspected the division on the I2th of May 
on the parade ground of Fort Bunker Hill. 

Sheridan, although he had brought up his cavalry 
for the great review, had been ordered to take com 
mand in the Southwest, and as Grant deemed the 
matter urgent, because of French and Mexican com 
plications, Sheridan was destined to have no part 
in the approaching ceremonies, yet he could not 
resist the chance of once more looking at what 
was left of the infantry that had followed him in 
triumph through the Shenandoah. When the men 
saw him riding at the side of Willcox, mounted once 
more upon " Rienzi"and wearing the same animated 
smile that had cheered and encouraged them in the 
evil hour at Winchester, before the cliffs of Fisher s 
Hill, and in the gloom of Cedar Creek, they were 
not to be restrained from violating all the solemn pro 
prieties of the occasion, but broke out into a tumult 
of cheers. 

On the 22d of May, Dwight broke camp near 
Bladensburg, and, marching to the plain east of the 
Capitol, near the Congressional Cemetery, went into 
bivouac with the Ninth Corps. Here the men, after 



VICTORY AND HOME. 445 

their long and hard field service, gave way to open 
disgust at hearing the order read on parade requiring 
them to appear in white gloves at the great review. 
On Tuesday, the 23d of May, the review took place. 
The men were up at three, and were inspected at half- 
past seven, but it was half-past ten before D wight 
took up the line of march in the rear of the Ninth 
Corps, followed by the Fifth. 

On the ist of June, 1865, the breaking up began. 
The H4th and n6th New York were taken from 
Real s brigade, and the i33d from Fessenden s, and 
ordered to be mustered out of the service of the 
United States. The 8th Vermont had already gone 
to the Sixth Corps to join the old Vermont brigade. 
The rest of Dwight s division embarked on transport 
steamers, under orders for Savannah, where they 
landed on the 4th of June. There they found many 
of their comrades of Grover s division. 

To return to Grover. Embarking at Baltimore 
about the nth of January, after some detention, the 
advance of his division landed at Savannah on the 
1 9th of January. The rest of the division gradually 
followed, and at Savannah the troops remained doing 
garrison and police duty until about the 4th of March, 
when Grover was ordered to take transports and join 
Schofield in North Carolina, in order to open com 
munication with Sherman s army, then advancing 
once more toward the sea-coast. Wilmington had 
fallen on the 22d of February. Then Schofield sent 
a force, under Cox, to open the railway from New- 
bern to Goldsboro, on the south bank of the Neuse. 
D. H. Hill met and fought him on the 8th, 9th, and 
loth, on the south side of the river ; but, the Con 
federates retreating to Goldsboro to oppose Sherman s 



446 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

march, Schofield occupied Kinston on the i4th and 
Goldsboro on the 2ist. In these movements the 
3d brigade, formerly Sharpe s, now commanded by 
Day, took part, while Dirge s brigade was posted 
at Morehead City, and Molineux s at Wilmington. 

On the ist of April, Schofield s force, composed of 
the Tenth Corps, under Terry, and the Twenty-third 
Corps, under Cox, was reconstructed by Sherman as 
the centre of his armies, and designated as the Army 
of the Ohio. The next day the troops of Grover s 
division, then in North Carolina, were attached to 
the Tenth Corps, reorganized into three brigades, 
and designated as the First division ; the command 
being given to Birge, and the brigades being com 
manded by the three senior colonels, Washburn, 
Graham, and Day. Some time before this, Shunk s 
4th brigade of Grover s division had been broken 
up and its regiments distributed ; the 8th and i8th 
Indiana to Washburn, the 28th Iowa to Graham, and 
the 24th Iowa to Day. The 22d Indiana battery 
formed the artillery of the division. All active opera 
tions coming to an end with the final surrender of 
Johnston on the 26th of April, about the 4th of May 
the division went back to Savannah. On the nth of 
May it marched to Augusta, leaving Day with all his 
regiments except the 24th Iowa and the i28th New 
York to take care of Savannah. 

Meanwhile, orders being issued by the government 
for disbanding the regiments whose time was to ex 
pire before the ist of November, and the re-enlisted 
veterans of Dwight s division beginning to arrive in 
Savannah on the 5th of June, Birge s brigade came 
down from Augusta on the ;th and Day marched on 
the Qth to replace it. 



VICTORY AND HOME. 447 

From this time the work of disintegration went on 
rapidly, yet all too slowly for the impatience of the 
soldiers, now thinking only of home, and soon sickened 
by the weary routine of provost duty in the first dull 
days of peace. What was left of the divisions of 
Dwight and Grover continued to occupy Charleston, 
Savannah, Augusta, and the chief towns of Georgia 
and South Carolina. 

When at last the final separation came, and little 
by little the old corps fell apart, every man, as with 
inexpressible yearning he turned his face homeward, 
bore with him, as the richest heritage of his children 
and his children s children, the proud consciousness 
of duty done. 



APPENDIX. 



449 



ROSTERS. 



I. 



DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF. 

As of March 22, 1862. 



FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General JOHN W. PHELPS 



8th New Hampshire 

gth Connecticut 

7th Vermont 

8th Vermont 

1 2th Connecticut 

I3th Connecticut 

1st Vermont Battery 

2d Vermont Battery 

4th Massachusetts Battery 



Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Captain 
Captain 
Captain 
Captain 
A 2d Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry, Captain 



SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General THOMAS WILLIAMS 



26th Massachusetts 

3ist Massachusetts 

2ist Indiana 

6th Michigan 

4th Wisconsin 

6th Massachusetts Battery 

2d Massachusetts Battery 

C 2d Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel GEORGE F. SHEPLEY 
1 2th Maine 
1 3th Maine 



Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Colonel 
Captain 
Captain 
Captain 
Captain 



HAWKES FEARING, Jr. 
THOMAS W. CAHILL 
GEORGE T. ROBERTS 
STEPHEN THOMAS 
HENRY C. DEMING 
HENRY W. BIRGE 
GEORGE W. DUNCAN 
PYTHAGORAS E. HOLCOMB 
CHARLES H. MANNING ] 
GEORGE G. TRULL 
S. TYLER READ 



ALPHA B. FARR 
OLIVER P. GOODING 
JAMES W. MCMILLAN 
THOMAS S. CLARK 
HALBERT E. PAINE 
CHARLES EVERETT 
ORMAND F. NIMS 
HENRY A. DURIVAGE * 
JONATHAN E. COWAN 



1 Resigned October 20, 1862. 



Lieutenant-Colonel W. K. KIMBALL 
Colonel NEAL Dow 
Colonel HENRY RUST, Jr. 

2 Dro-wned Aj>ril 23, 1862. 



451 



452 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

i4th Maine Colonel FRANK S. NICKERSON 

1 5th Maine Colonel JOHN McCLUSKY 

Colonel ISAAC DYER 

30th Massachusetts Colonel N. A. M. DUDLEY 

1st Maine Battery Captain E. W. THOMPSON 

B 2d Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry Captain JAMES M. MAGEE 



II. 
TECHE AND PORT HUDSON. 

As of April 30, 1863. 

FIRST DIVISION. 
Major-General CHRISTOPHER C. AUGUR 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel EDWARD P. CHAPIN 

n6th New York Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN HIGGINS 

2ist Maine l Colonel ELIJAH D. JOHNSON 

48th Massachusetts l Colonel EBEN F. STONE 

49th Massachusetts 1 Colonel WILLIAM F. BARTLETT 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General GODFREY WEITZEL 

8th Vermont Colonel STEPHEN THOMAS 

75th New York Colonel ROBERT B. MERRITT 

t6oth New York Colonel CHARLES C. DWIGHT 

1 2th Connecticut Colonel LED YARD COLBURN 

Lieutenant-Colonel FRANK H. PECK 
H4th New York Colonel ELISHA B. SMITH 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel NATHAN A. M. DUDLEY 

30th Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM W. BULLOCK 

2d Louisiana Colonel CHARLES J. PAINE 

50th Massachusetts J Colonel CARLOS P. MESSER 

i6ist New York Colonel GABRIEL T. HARROWER 

1 74th New York Colonel THEODORE W. PARMELE 

ARTILLERY : 

ist Maine Captain ALBERT W. BRADBURY 

Lieutenant JOHN E. MORTON 
6th Massachusetts Captain WILLIAM W. CARRUTH 

Lieutenant JOHN F. PHELPS 
A ist United States Captain E. C. BAINBRIDGE 

1 Nine-months? men. 



APPENDIX. 453 

SECOND DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General T. W. SHERMAN 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General NEAL Dow 

6th Michigan Colonel THOMAS S. CLARK 

1 28th New York Colonel DAVID S. COWLES 

26th Connecticut Colonel THOMAS G. KINGSLEY 

1 5th New Hampshire Colonel JOHN W. KINGMAN 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel ALPHA B. FARR 

26th Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel JOSIAH A. SAWTELL 

gth Connecticut Colonel THOMAS W. CAHILL 

47th Massachusetts Colonel Lucius B. MARSH 

42d Massachusetts l Lieutenant-Colonel JOSEPH STEDMAN 

28th Maine l Colonel EPHRAIM W. WOODMAN 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel FRANK S. NICKERSON 

i4th Maine Lieutenant-Colonel THOMAS W. PORTER 

1 77th New York Colonel IRA W. AINSWORTH 

i6sth New York Lieutenant-Colonel ABEL SMITH, Jr. 

24th Maine l Colonel GEORGE M. ATWOOD 

ARTILLERY : 

1 8th New York Captain ALBERT G. MACK 

G 5th United States Lieutenant JACOB B. RAWLES 

ist Vermont Captain George T. HEBARD 

THIRD DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General WILLIAM H. EMORY 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel TIMOTHY INGRAHAM, 38th Massachusetts 

i62d New York Colonel LEWIS BENEDICT 

noth New York Colonel CLINTON H. SAGF 

1 6th New Hampshire l Colonel JAMES PIKE 

4th Massachusetts ! Colonel HENRY WALKER 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel HALBERT E. PAINE 

4th Wisconsin Lieutenant-Colonel SIDNEY A. BEAN 

1 33d New York Colonel LEONARD D. H. CURRIE 

1 Nine-months^ men. 



454 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

1 73d New York Colonel LEWIS M. PECK 

8th New Hampshire Colonel HAWKES FEARING, Jr. 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel OLIVER P. GOODING 

3 ist Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. B. HOPKINS 

38th Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM L. RODMAN 

1 56th New York Colonel JACOB SHARPE 

1 75th New York Colonel MICHAEL K. BRYAN 

53d Massachusetts l Colonel JOHN W. KIMBALL 

ARTILLERY : 

4th Massachusetts Captain GEORGE G. TRULL 

F ist United States Captain RICHARD C. DURYEA 

2d Vermont Captain PYTHAGORAS E. HOLCOMB 

FOURTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General CUVIER GROVER 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General WILLIAM DWIGHT, Jr. 

6th New York 2 Colonel WILLIAM WILSON 

gist New York Colonel JACOB VAN ZANDT 

i3ist New York Lieutenant-Colonel NICHOLAS W. DAY 

22d Maine ! Colonel SIMON G. JERRARD 

ist Louisiana Colonel RICHARD E. HOLCOMB 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel WILLIAM K. KIMBALL 

1 2th Maine Lieutenant-Colonel EDWARD ILLSLEY 

4ist Massachusetts Colonel THOMAS E. CHICKERING 

52d Massachusetts ! Colonel H ALBERT S. GREENLEAF 

24th Connecticut l Colonel SAMUEL M. MANSFIELD 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel HENRY W. BIRGE 

25th Connecticut * Colonel GEORGE P. BISSELL 

26th Maine Colonel NATHANIEL H. HUBBARD 

1 59th New York Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX 

1 3th Connecticut Lieutenant-Colonel ALEXANDER WARNER 

1 Nine-months men. 

a Detached for muster out May 20, 1863. 



APPENDIX. 



455 



ARTILLERY . 

2d Massachusetts 
L ist United States 
C 2d United States 



Captain ORMAND F. NIMS 
Captain HENRY W. CLOSSON 
Lieutenant JOHN I. RODGERS 



OUTSIDE OF THE DIVISIONS. 



ist Louisiana Native Guards Colonel 

2d Louisiana Native Guards 2 Colonel 

3d Louisiana Native Guards J Colonel 

4th Louisiana Native Guards l Colonel 

1 3th Maine 2 Colonel 

23d Connecticut 3 , 7 Colonel 

1 76th New York 3 , 8 Colonel 

goth New York 4 Colonel 

47th Pennsylvania 4 Colonel 

28th Connecticut 5 , Colonel 

1 5th Maine 5 Colonel 

7th Vermont 5 Colonel 



SPENCER H. STAFFORD 
NATHAN W. DANIELS 
JOHN A. NELSON 
CHARLES W. DREW 
HENRY RUST, Jr. 
CHARLES E. L. HOLMES 
CHARLES C. NOTT 
JOSEPH S. MORGAN 

TlLGHMAN H. GOOD 

SAMUEL P. FERRIS 

ISAAC DYER 

WILLIAM C. HOLBROOK 



ARTILLERY : 

H 2d United States 6 

K 2d United States B 

1st Indiana Heavy l 

1 2th Massachusetts l 

B ist Louisiana N. G. Heavy 2 

1 3th Massachusetts 2 

2 ist New York 2 

2$th New York 2 

26th New York 2 



Captain FRANK H. LARNED 
Captain HARVEY A. ALLEN 
Colonel JOHN A. Keith 
Lieutenant EDWIN M. CHAMBERLIN 
Captain LOREN RYGAARD 
Captain CHARLES H. J. HAMLEN 
Captain JAMES BARNES 
Captain JOHN A. GROW 
Captain GEORGE W. Fox 



CAVALRY : 

ist Louisiana C and E l 
ist Louisiana A and B 6 
2d Rhode Island Battalion 6 
2d Massachusetts Cavalry 
talion A 2 

B 1 

C 

1 4th New York Cavalry 
ist Texas 2 

1 With Augur. 
a Defences of New Orleans. 
8 La Fourche District. 
* Key West. 



Bat- 



Captain J. F. GODFREY 
Captain HENRY F. WILLIAMSON 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. CORLISS 

Captain S. TYLER READ 
Captain JAMES M. MAGEE 
Captain JONATHAN E. COWAN 
Lieutenant SOLON A. PERKINS 
Colonel THADDEUS P. MOTT 
Colonel EDMUND J. DAVIS 

5 Pens cicala . 
With Weitzel. 

7 Nine-months men. 

8 Partly nine-months 1 men. 



456 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

m. 
AFTER PORT HUDSON. 

August, 1863. 

FIRST DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General GODFREY WEITZEL. J 
Brigadier-General WILLIAM H. EMORY.* 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel N. A. M. DUDLEY 

Colonel GEORGE M. LOVE 

3oth Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. BULLOCK 

2d Louisiana Colonel CHARLES J. PAINE 

i6ist New York Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. KINSEY 

1 74th New York Colonel BENJAMIN F. GOTT 

n6th New York Colonel GEORGE M. LOVE 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel OLIVER P. GOODING 
Colonel JACOB SHARPE 
3 ist Massachusetts Colonel OLIVER P. GOODING 

Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. B. HOPKINS 

38th Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel JAS. P. RICHARDSON 

1 28th New York Colonel JAMES SMITH 

1 5 6th New York Colonel JACOB SHARPE 

1 75th New York Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN A. FOSTER 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel ROBERT B. MERRITT 
1 2th Connecticut Colonel LED YARD COLBURN 

Lieutenant-Colonel FRANK H. PECK 

75th New York Captain HENRY B. FITCH 

H4th New York Colonel SAMUEL R. PER LEE 

i6oth New York Colonel CHARLES C. DWIGHT 

Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN B. VAN PETTEN 
8th Vermont Colonel STEPHEN THOMAS 

ARTILLERY : 

Captain E. C. BAINBRIDGE 

ist Maine Captain ALBERT W. BRADBURY 

1 8th New York Captain ALBERT G. MACK 

A ist United States Captain EDMUND C. BAINBRIDGE 

6th Massachusetts 8 Captain WILLIAM W. CARRUTH 

1 Tc December gth. a Front December i-$th. 

3 From A rtillery Reserve \ in December. 



APPENDIX. 457 

SECOND DIVISION. 
Broken up July loth. 

THIRD DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General WILLIAM H. EMORY. 
Brigadier-General CUVIER GROVER. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General FRANK S. NICKERSON 

I4th Maine Colonel THOMAS W. PORTER 

noth New York Colonel CLINTON H. SAGE 

i62d New York Colonel LEWIS BENEDICT 

i6sth New York Lieutenant-Colonel GOUVERNEUR CARR 

Captain FELIX AGNUS 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General JAMES W. MCMILLAN 
26th Massachusetts Colonel ALPHA B. FARR 

Major EUSEBIUS S. CLARK 
8th New Hampshire Colonel HAWKES FEARING, Jr. 

Captain JAMES J. LADD 

1 33d New York Colonel L. D. H. CURRIE 

Captain JAMES K. FULLER 
1 73d New York Colonel LEWIS M. PECK 

ARTILLERY : 
4th Massachusetts Captain GEORGE G. TRULL 

Lieutenant GEORGE W. TAYLOR 
F ist United States Captain RICHARD G. DURYEA 

Lieutenant HARDMAN P. NORRIS 
ist Vermont Captain GEORGE T. HEBARD 

Lieutenant EDWARD RICE , 

FOURTH DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General CUVIER GROVER. 
Colonel EDWARD G. BECKWITH. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel HENRY W. BIRGE 

1 3th Connecticut Captain APOLLOS COMSTOCK 

goth New York Colonel JOSEPH S. MORGAN 

Lieutenant-Colonel NELSON SHAURMAN 
1 3 ist New York Colonel NICHOLAS W. DAY 

1 59th New York Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX 



458 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel THOMAS W. CAHILL 

gth Connecticut Lieutenant-Colonel RICHARD FITZ GIBBONS 

ist Louisiana Colonel WILLIAM O. FISKE 

I2th Maine Colonel WILLIAM K. KIMBALL 

I3th Maine l Colonel HENRY RUST, Jr. 

1 5th Maine ! Colonel ISAAC DYER 

97th Illinois * Colonel FRIEND S. RUTHERFORD 

ARTILLERY : 

25th New York Captain JOHN A. GROW 

26th New York Captain GEORGE W. Fox 

C 2d United States Lieutenant THEODORE BRADLEY 

L ist United States * Captain HENRY W. CLOSSON 

Lieutenant JAMES A. SANDERSON 

CAVALRY : 
3d Massachusetts 4 Colonel T. E. CHICKERING 

Lieutenant-Colonel LORENZO D. SARGENT 
ist Texas 5 Colonel EDMUND J. DAVIS 

4th Wisconsin 6 Colonel FREDERICK A. BOARDMAN 

Major GEORGE W. MOORE 

RESERVE ARTILLERY : 

Captain HENRY W. CLOSSON 

2d Massachusetts Captain ORMAND F. NIMS 

6th Massachusetts 7 Captain WILLIAM W. CARRUTH 

L ist United States e Captain HENRY W. CLOSSON 

Lieutenant FRANCK E. TAYLOR 

OUTSIDE OF THE DIVISIONS. 

Headquarters Troops Compa- Captain RICHARD W. FRANCIS 
nies A and B * 
Troop C Captain FRANK SAYLES 

DEFENCES OF NEW ORLEANS. 

Colonel E. G. BECKWITH 

24th Connecticut 10 Colonel SAMUEL M. MANSFIELD 

3ist Massachusetts Captain ELIOT BRIDGMAN 

1 In -$d Brigade \ id Division, Thirteenth Corps \ December -$\st. 

* December y.st,from id Brigade, +th Division, Thirteenth Corfu. 
3 From A. rtillery Reserve , in December. 

* At Port Hudson. 
8 At New Orleans. 

6 At Baton Rouge. 

7 In First Division, December yst. 

8 In Fourth Division, December ^itt. 

9 Raised in Louisiana; re-enlisted nine-months mer,. 

10 Nine-months* men. 



APPENDIX. 459 


1 76th New York Colonel CHARLES C. NOTT 

Major MORGAN MORGAN, Jr. 

ist Louisiana Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel HARAI ROBINSON 

A 3d Massachusetts Cavalry Lieutenant HENRY D. POPE 
i4th New York Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel ABRAHAM BASSFORD 

I2th Massachusetts Battery Captain JACOB MILLER 
I3th Massachusetts Battery Captain CHARLES H. J. HAMLEN 
1 5th Massachusetts Battery Captain TIMOTHY PEARSON 
gist New York l Colonel JACOB VAN ZANDT 

PORT HUDSON. 

Brigadier-General GEORGE L. ANDREWS 
ist Michigan Heavy Artillery Colonel THOMAS S. CLARK 
2 ist New York Battery Captain JAMES BARNES 

Battery G 5th United States Lieutenant JACOB B. RAWLES 
2d Vermont Battery Captain P. E. HOLCOMB 



IV. 
RED RIVER. 

As of March 13, 1864. 

FIRST DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General WILLIAM H. EMORY 

FIRST BRIGADE: 

Brigadier-General WILLIAM DWIGHT, Jr. 

2gth Maine Colonel GEORGE L. BEAL 

H4th New York Colonel SAMUEL R. PER LEE 

Lieutenant-Colonel HENRY B. MORSE 

n6th New York Colonel GEORGE M. LOVE 

1 5 3d New York Colonel EDWIN P. DAVIS 

i6ist New York Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. KINSEY 

30th Massachusetts * Colonel N. A. M. DUDLEY 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General JAMES W. McMiLLAN 

I2th Connecticut a Lieutenant-Colonel FRANK H. PECK 

1 3th Maine Colonel HENRY RUST, Jr. 

1 5th Maine Colonel ISAAC DYER 

i6oth New York Colonel CHARLES C. DWIGHT 

Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN B. VAN PETTEN 
47th Pennsylvania Colonel TILGHMAN H. GOOD 

8th Vermont Colonel STEPHEN THOMAS 

1 Heavy Artillery. * On veteran furlough. 



460 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

9 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel LEWIS BENEDICT 

30th Maine Colonel FRANCIS FESSENDEN 

i62d New York Lieutenant-Colonel JUSTUS \V. BLANCHARD 

i6sth New York Lieutenant-Colonel GOUVERNEUR CARR 

1 73d New York Colonel LEWIS M. PECK 

Captain HOWARD C. CONRADY 
ARTILLERY : 

Captain GEORGE T. HEBARD 
25th New York Captain JOHN A. GROW 

Lieutenant IRVING D. SOUTHWORTH 

L ist United States Lieutenant FRANCK E. TAYLOR 

ist Vermont 2 Lieutenant EDWARD RICE 

ist Delaware 3 BENJAMIN NIELDS 

SECOND DIVISION. 

Brigadier-General CUVIER GROVER 
FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General FRANK S. NICKERSON 
9th Connecticut 4 Colonel THOMAS W. CAHILL 

1 2th Maine 4 Colonel WILLIAM K. KIMBALL 

I4th Maine 4 Colonel THOMAS W. PORTER 

26th Massachusetts 4 Colonel ALPHA B. FARR 

1 33d New York Colonel L. D. H. CURRIE 

1 76th New York Colonel CHARLES C. NOTT 

Major CHARLES LEWIS 
SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General HENRY W. BIRGE 
Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX 

1 3th Connecticut Colonel CHARLES D. BLINN 

ist Louisiana Colonel WILLIAM O. FISKE 

goth New York 6 Major JOHN C. SMART 

159th New York Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX 

Lieutenant-Colonel EDWARD L. GAUL 
i3ist New York Colonel NICHOLAS W. DAY 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel JACOB SHARPE 

38th Massachusetts Lieutenant-Colonel JAMES P. RICHARDSON 

1 28th New York Colonel JAMES SMITH 

1 56th New York Captain JAMES J. HOYT 

1 75th New York Captain CHARLES MCCARTHEY 

1 The \it,th consolidated with the 173^. 

3 In Reserve A rtillery, April y>th. 
8 In Reserve A rtillery , March yist. 

4 On veteran furlough. 
8 Three companies. 

6 In district of La Fourche^ Colonel Day commanding the district. 



APPENDIX. 



461 



ARTILLERY : 

Captain GEORGE W. Fox 

7th Massachusetts Captain NEWMAN W. STORER 

26th New York Captain GEORGE W. Fox 

F ist United States l Lieutenant HARDMAN P. NORRIS 

Lieutenant WILLIAM L. HASKIN 
C 2d United States Lieutenant JOHN I. RODGERS 

ARTILLERY RESERVE : 

Captain HENRY W. CLOSSON 

ist Delaware 2 Captain BENJAMIN NIELDS 

D ist Indiana Heavy Captain WILLIAM S. HINKLE 



V. 
SHENANDOAH. 

From June 27, 1864. 

FIRST DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General WILLIAM DVVIGHT 



FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel GEORGE 

2gth Maine 
3Oth Massachusetts 
goth New York 3 
1 1 4th New York 
1 1 6th New York 
1 5 3d New York 



BEAL 

Colonel GEORGE L. BEAL 
Colonel N. A. M. DUDLEY 
Lieutenant-Colonel NELSON SHAURMAN 
Colonel SAMUEL R. PER LEE 
Colonel GEORGE M. LOYE 
Colonel EDWIN P. DAVIS 



SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General JAMES W. McMiLLAN 



1 2th Connecticut 



1 3th Maine 4 
1 5th Maine 4 
i6oth New York 

47th Pennsylvania 
8th Vermont 



Lieutenant-Colonel FRANK H. PECK 
Captain SIDNEY E. CLARKE 
Lieutenant-Colonel GEORGE N. LEWIS 
Colonel HENRY RUST, Jr. 
Colonel ISAAC DYER 
Colonel CHARLES C. DWIGHT 
Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN B. VAN PETTEN 
Colonel TILGHMAN H. GOOD 
Major J. P. SHINDEL GOBIN 
Colonel STEPHEN THOMAS 



1 With the Cavalry i April 

2 In the ist Division, April -y*th. 

z On veteran furlough in A ugust and September. 

* On veteran furlough in August and September, at Martinsburg afterward. 



462 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel L. D. II. CURRIE 

3oth Maine Colonel THOMAS H. HUBBARD 

1 33d New York Colonel L. D. H. CURRIE 

i62d New York Colonel JUSTUS W. BLANCHARD 

i6sth New York Lieutenant-Colonel GOUVERNEUR CARR 

1 73d New York Colonel LEWIS M. PECK 

ARTILLERY : 

5th New York Captain ELIJAH D. TAFT 

SECOND DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General CUVIER GROVER 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General HENRY W. BIRGE 

gth Connecticut Colonel THOMAS W. CAHILL 

1 2th Maine Colonel WILLIAM K. KIMBALL 

i4th Maine Colonel THOMAS W. PORTER 

26th Massachusetts Colonel ALPHA B. FARR 

I4th New Hampshire Colonel ALEXANDER GARDINER 

75th New York Lieutenant-Colonel WILLOUGHBY BABCOCK 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX 

1 3th Connecticut 1 Colonel CHARLES D. BLINN 

3d Massachusetts Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel LORENZO D. SARGENT 

(dismounted) 

nth Indiana Colonel DANIEL MACAULEY 

22d Iowa Colonel HARVEY GRAHAM 

i3ist New York Colonel NICHOLAS W. DAY 

159th New York Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM WALTERMIRE 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel JACOB SHARPE 
Colonel DANIEL MACAULEY 

38th Massachusetts Major CHARLES F. ALLEN 

I28th New York Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. FOSTER 

i56th New York Lieutenant-Colonel ALFRED NEAFIE 

1 75th New York Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN A. FOSTER 

1 76th New York Colonel AMBROSE STEVENS 2 

Major CHARLES LEWIS 
FOURTH BRIGADE : 

Colonel DAVID SHUNK 

8th Indiana Lieutenant-Colonel ALEXANDER J. KENNEY 

i8th Indiana Colonel HENRY D. WASHBURN 

24th Iowa Colonel JOHN Q. WILDS 

1 On -veteran furlough in August and early September. 
* front November 19, 1864. 



APPENDIX. 463 

28th Iowa Colonel JOHN CONNELL 

Lieutenant-Colonel BARTHOLOMEW W. WILSON 
ARTILLERY : 

A ist Maine Captain ALBERT W. BRADBURY 

RESERVE ARTILLERY : 

Captain ELIJAH D. TAFT 

Major ALBERT W. BRADBURY 

D ist Rhode Island Lieutenant FREDERICK CHASE 

i yth Indiana Captain MILTON L. MINER 



DETACHMENTS LEFT IN LOUISIANA. 

The following troops served under Canby in the siege of Mobile, March 
20-April 12, 1865 : 
IST INDIANA HEAVY ARTILLERY. 

3 IST MASSACHUSETTS, as mounted infantry, from Pensacola, with Steele. 
20 MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY. Also engaged at Daniel s Plantation, Alabama, 

April ii, 1865. 

4TH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY. Afterward at Galveston. 
7TH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY. " " 

i STH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY. " 

4TH WISCONSIN CAVALRY. Afterward on Rio Grande in Weitzel s corps. 
IST MICHIGAN HEAVY ARTILLERY. 
i6iST NEW YORK, in Third brigade, First division, new Xlllth Corps, Kinsey 

commanding the brigade. Loss : 2 killed, i wounded. Afterward in 

Florida. 
7TH VERMONT, in First brigade, Third division, new Xlllth Corps. Loss : 

18 wounded, 43 captured. Afterward on Rio Grande in Weitzel s Corps 

of Observation. 
i8TH NEW YORK BATTERY. 
2 IST NEW YORK BATTERY. 
26TH NEW YORK BATTERY. 
BATTERY G, STH U. S. ARTILLERY. 



STH NEW HAMPSHIRE, as mounted infantry, served at Natchez and at Vidalia, 
opposite. 

giST NEW YORK, after returning from veteran furlough, September, 1864, 
went to Baltimore as part of Second separate brigade, Vlllth Corps. 
March, 1865, joined First brigade, Third division, Vth Corps, Army of 
the Potomac. Fought at White Oak Ridge, March 29-31, and Five 
Forks, April, 1865. Loss : 61 killed and mortally wounded, 152 wounded, 
17 captured or missing ; total, 230. 

IIOTH NEW YORK, at Key West, Florida, from February 9, 1864. 



3D MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY, detached to remount December 26, 1864 ; with 
Chapman s brigade ; in cavalry review May 23, 1865 ; afterward in 
Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado. 



LOSSES IN BATTLE. 



BATON ROUGE. 

August 5, 1862. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Id 

.- v 

w 


Aggregate. 


General officers, 


I 












I 

14 
126 
119 

18 
65 
15 

i 

5 
6 

13 


9th Connecticut 




I 
22 
36 
2 
15 




9 
91 
6 4 
12 
40 

9 
i 




4 

4 

12 


2ist Indiana . . 


2 


7 
7 
3 
4 
i 


I4th Maine 




3oth Massachusetts 


I 




6th Michigan 


I 


5 
5 


7th Vermont 




Troop B Massachusetts Cavalry.. . . 








2d Massachusetts Battery 








4 

5 
8 





i 


4th Massachusetts Battery 




j 




6th Massachusetts Battery ,,,,.... 




3 


i 




i 


Total 






4 


80 


23 


243 


I 


32 


383 





GEORGIA LANDING. 

October 27, 1862. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




jjj 

O 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Aggregate. 


1 2th Connecticut 




3 

i 
10 


I 


16 

18 
34 




; 

i 


20 

7 
20 
48 

2 


1 3th Connecticut 




ist Louisiana Cavalry, A, B, and C. 
8th New Hampshire. . 


2 


75th New York 


Total 










2 


16 


I 


73 


I 


4 


97 





464 



APPENDIX. 



465 



BISLAND. 

April 12-13, 1863. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Aggregate. 1 

1 


(j 

8 
i 




"O 

S a 

</) <U 

2* 
W 


lili 

O i W 


FIRST DIVISION, SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General GODFREY WEITZEL. 




; 
I 




7 
13 
5 
ii 

12 


8 
17 
7 
ii 

15 






2 
2 


2 












f 2th Connecticut 




2 


I 


Total Weitzel s Brigade 




7 | 3 


4 8 


58 


THIRD DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General WILLIAM H. EMORY. 

SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel HALBERT E. PAINE. 




. 


5 
4 

2 
2 


I 


8 
20 

5 
7 


13 

25 
7 
ii 

~56~ 










8th New Hampshire 




2 


Total Second Brigade 




13 


3 


40 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel OLIVER P. GOODING. 
3 ist Massachusetts . . 






I 




28 
18 
6 
9 


6 

35 

22 

7 

12 


38th Massachusetts 


i 

i 


5 
3 
i 


i 


156th New York 






53d Massachusetts 


i 


2 




Total Third Brigade 


3 


12 


i 
4 


66 


82 


Total Third Division 


3 


25 


1 06 


I 3 8 


ARTILLERY : 
A 1st U S 




4 




5 
5 
i 

3 

2 

3 


9 

5 

2 

4 

2 

3 


F ist U S 












I 






i 


1 8th New York Battery 








ist Indiana Heavy 








Total Artillery 




5 


I 


19 


25 


1st Louisiana Cavalry 










3 


3 


Total . . 








3 


37 


8 


176 


224 



466 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



IRISH BEND. 

April 14, 1863. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wou 

e 

s 
& 

o 


nded. Captured or \ 
missing. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Aggregate. 


FOURTH DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General CUVIER GRO- 

VER. 
FIRST BRIGADE : 

Brigadier - General WILLIAM 
DWIGHT. 
6th New York 
















gist New York 




2 


I 


10 

3 

i 






13 

3 

i 


I3ist New York 








22d Maine 












1st Louisiana 












Total First Brigade. . 




2 


1 


14 






17 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel HENRY W. BIRGE. 
25th. Connecticut 








2 


7 
ii 

15 
7_ 
40 


5 

5 
4 


72 
48 
73 
43 




IO 


96 
61 
117 

54 


26th Maine 


iSgth New York 


4 




2O 


1 3th Connecticut 


Total Third Brigade 


6 


16 


236 





30 


328 


ARTILLERY : 

Battery C 2d U. S 




i 1 i 

i l ! s 


Total 


6~ 


43 | 17 


257 




30 353 







PLAINS STORE. 

May 21, 1863. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


V 

rt 

< 


e 


T! 





8 : 


j 


Enlisted 
men. 


i 




fa 

w 


1 


^e 

M 






2 


I 

I 

I 


II 
3 
7 
4 
43 
68 




j 


14 

4 

20 

6 
56 


3Oth Massachusetts . . 






48th Massachusetts 




2 





II 

I 
I 


4gth Massachusetts 




Ii6th New York 




II 


Total . . 




15 


S 




14 


100 



APPENDIX. 
PORT HUDSON. 

May 23-July 8, 1863. 



467 



NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS : 

Major-General NATHANIEL P. 
BANKS. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 







a - 
II 

"c fc 
w 


j/j 


Is 
fa 

w 


i 
i 




*O 

S a 

|l 

W 


g 

1 
1 


FIRST DIVISION : 

Major-General CHRISTOPHER C. 

AUGUR. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 
Colonel EDWARD P. CHAPIN. 1 
Colonel CHARLES J. PAINE. 

2d Louisiana 




32 
14 

8 

17 
18 


5 
3 
7 

10 

4 


103 
60 
46 

73 

IOI 




4 
9 


144 

88 
62 

IO2 
130 


2ist Maine . . 


I 
I 
I 
2 


I 


48th Massachusetts 


4gth Massachusetts 




i 

5 


1 1 6th New York 




Total First Brigade 




5 


89 29 


383 


I 


19 


526 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General GODFREY 
WEITZEL. 

Staff 














I 
IOI 
107 

73 
41 
1 66 






18 

10 

10 

2 
24 


5 
4 
4 
4 
4 


78 
88 
56 
35 
128 






75th New York 




I 


4 

2 


I I4th New York 


I 


i6oth New York 




8th Vermont 


I 




9 


Total Second Brigade 




3 


6 4 


21 


385 


I 


15 


489 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel NATHAN A. M. DUDLEY. 
3Oth Massachusetts 






I 
I 


18 
4 
14 
9 






1 9 
5 
i? 
14 


5Oth Massachusetts 












i6ist New York 




3 

2 








3 
3 


Total Third Brigade 






5 


2 


45 




55 


ARTILLERY : 
1st Indiana Heavy 




4 
i 


I 


IO 

19 
i 




7 


22 
20 
I 

3 
19 
4 
69 


1st Maine Battery 




6th Massachusetts Battery 












1 8th New York Battery 








3 

12 
2 

47 






Battery A 1st U. S 




3 

2 
IO 


I 
2 





3 


Battery G $th U. S 




Total Artillery 








IO 


Total First Division 




8 


168 


54 


860 


2 i 47 


H39 



1 Killed M 



468 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




j 


li 

w 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


d 

rt 

I 

< 

2 

I 7 6 
I 49 

77 
129 

59 


SECOND DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General THOMAS W. 

SHERMAN. 1 

Brigadier - General WILLIAM 

D WIGHT. 
Staff 






2 

I 










FIRST BRIGADE : 
Brigadier-General NEAL Dow. l 
Colonel DAVID S. COWLES.* 
Colonel THOMAS S. CLARK. 

Staff 








I 
I 


14 
19 
17 

21 

5 


9 
5 
3 
3 
3_ 
24 


151 
124 

55 
97 
47 




I 








I 


2 

5 
3_ 
ii 


1 28th New York 


2 
I 


i62d New York 


Total First Brigade 


5 


76 


474 


I 


591 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General FRANK S. 
NICKERSON. 




5 


5 


23 
13 
8 
80 
38 
i? 






33 
13 

12 

106 

5i 
23 










28th Maine 




3 
15 
5 
3 


i 
7 
5 

2 




3 

2 


i65th New York 


i 
i 

i 


1 75th New York 




1 77th New York 




Total Third Brigade 
ARTILLERY : 
1st Vermont Battery 


3 


3i 


20 


179 




5 


238 




i 




6 






7 


Total Second Division 


8 


108 


4 6 


659 


I 


16 


838 


THIRD DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General HALBERT E. 

PAINE. 5 

Colonel HAWKES FEARING, Jr. 
Stiff 






I 








i 

62 
68 
37 
168 


FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel SAMUEL P. FERRIS. 
28th Connecticut 


2 
I 
I 


5 
7 
4 


I 

3 

2 

___ 


43 
57 

21 


, 


10 




i loth New York 


I 


9 


Total First Brigade 


4 


16 


121 


19 



Wounded May ^th. 



Wounded June 



Killed May *ith. 



APPENDIX. 



469 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. Captured or 
missing. 




jj 

1 


Enlisted 
men. 


i 

JL 

7 
5 
6 

9 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


d 

I 

1 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel HAWKES FEARING, Jr., 
Major JOHN H. ALLCOT. 


4 
i 

2 

3 


26 
22 
II 
4 6 


191 

85 
72 

108 
456 


2 


28 
2 

I 
52 


258 

H5 
92 
2I 9 








4th Wisconsin l 


I 




IO 


105 


27 


3 


83 


684 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel OLIVER P. GOODING. 


2 
2 


13 
13 
15 

3_ 
44 


2 

5 
7 

2 

~I6~ 


47 
85 
92 

25 






62 

108 

121 

30 
321 







3 

5 




i ^6th New York 






4 


249 




8 


ARTILLERY : 










2 






2 

3 

2 






i 






2 


2d Vermont Battery 








2 




Total Third Division 


18 


166 


50 


8 3 


4 


112 


1180 


FOURTH DIVISION : 

Brigadier - General C u v I E R 
GROVER. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 
Brigadier - General WILLIAM 
D WIGHT. 

Colonel JOSEPH S. MORGAN 


i 


30 
4 
7 
19 
20 


3 

2 
I 

8 

2 


86 
17 
42 

112 

86 




3 

5 


123 
29 
50 
149 
119 




1 








2 

I 


2 


8 

8 




Total First Brigade 


4 80 

i 


16 


343 


3 


24 


470 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel WILLIAM K. KIMBALL. 




H 

IO 

8 

32 


6 

2 
2 


46 

57 

12 






66 
70 
24 


1 2th Maine 







i 

2 


52d Massachusetts 




Total Second Brigade. . 





IO 


ii; 




1 : 160 



1 Includes losses at Clinton^ June 



470 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


1 - 

I 1 

20 

35 
ii 

53 


O 


"8 . 
.a S 

"5 6 
W 


Aggregate. 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel HENRY W. BIRGE. 
1 3th Connecticut 


I 


6 

5 
5 
17 


3 
4 

I 
I 




I 
2 

5 

2 


31 
4 6 
22 

73 
172 


25th Connecticut ... 




26th Maine 




1 5 gth New York 




Total Third Brigade 






I 


33 


9 


119 





10 


ARTILLERY : 
2d Massachusetts Battery 








2 
2 
I 





3 


5 
2 
I 


Battery L ist U S 








Battery C 2d U. S 












Total Artillery 



















5 




3 


8 


Total Fourth Division 










5 


145 

537 


35 


582 


3 


40 
215 


810 
3,967 


Total Nineteenth Army Corps 
CAVALRY : 

Colonel BENJAMIN H. GRIERSON 
6th Illinois 


39 


185 


2,931 


IO 








6 

4 
1 6 

5 
6 


i 


5 


13 
4 
40 

9 
28 


7th Illinois 








1st Louisiana 




5 

i 

2 







19 
20 


3d Massachusetts 


i 




1 4th New York 







Total Cavalry 






i 


9 




37 


i ^ 46 


94 


CORPS D AFRIQUE : 




i 

2 
I 


7 
32 

9 
i 

2 

5 

2 

4 




26 
92 

37 
i 




19 


53 
129 

5i 

2 

5 

12 
2 
10 


ist Louisiana Native Guards 


3 

i 




3d Louisiana Native Guards . 


i 


2 


6th Infantry 


yth Infantry , 




i 


3 

5 






8th Infantry 






I 


Qth Infantry 






loth Infantry 


I 





2 




3 


Total Corps d Afrique . 




5 


62 


5 


1 66 


i 


25 


264 


2d Rhode Island Cavalry.. . 






i 
191 


5 





2 


8 


Total Port Hudson 






45 


658 


3,139 


12 


288 


4,333 





APPENDIX. 



COX S PLANTATION, OR KOCH S PLANTATION, BAYOU LA 
FOURCHE, July 13, 1863. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




e 


lg 


fi 


|| 


1 


Enlisted 
men. 


Aggregate. 





aS 
W 


e 

o 


cS 
M 


FIRST DIVISION : 

Brigadier - General GODFREY 
WEITZEL. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel CHARLES J. PAINE. 
2d Louisiana 




7 

5 




21 

18 




9 

20 


37 

44 


n6th New York 


i 






Total First Brigade 






i 


12 




39 




29 


81 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel N. A. M. DUDLEY. 
3Oth Massachusetts 






8 
7 
17 


2 

I 
I 


37 
33 
28 




I 

7 

7 


48 
53 
54 


i6ist New York . .... 






1 74th New York 


i 




Total Third Brigade .... 




i 


32 


4 


103 




15 


155 

17 
i 

18 


ARTILLERY : 






i i 


14 
i 




i 


6th Massachusetts . . . 






Total Artillery 












i 


i 


15 




i 


Total First Division 






2 


45 





157 





45 


254 


FOURTH DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General CUVIER GROVER 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel JOSEPH S. MORGAN. 




3 

2 
2 


I 


14 
20 

10 


I 


13 

48 
42 


30 

7i 
55 


90th New York . 




I3ist New York 




Total Brigade and Division . . . 






7 


I 


44 


I 


103 


156 


Total Nineteenth Army Corps 




2 


52 


6 


2OI 


I 


148 


410 



472 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

SABINE CROSS-ROADS, April 8, and PLEASANT HILL, 
April 9, 1864. 

Compiled in the War Department from the nominal returns : impossible to separate the losses. 

for each day. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. Wounded. 


Captured or 1 
missing. 


Officers. 


ii 

|S 

w 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Id 
ffi 

w 


d 

rt 

I 


THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS (DE 
TACHMENT) : 

Brigadier-General THOMAS E. G. 

RANSOM, 1 

Brigadier - General ROBERT A. 
CAMERON. 

Staff 






2 








2 


THIRD DIVISION : 

Brigadier - General ROBERT A. 
CAMERON 
















I 

3 
3 


4 

21 

66 
9i 




126 

59 
186 


6 

166 

145 

317 


FIRST BRIGADE. 

Lieutenant-Colonel AARON M. 
FLORY l 


I 


12 
II 
23 


3 
6 

9 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel WILLIAM H. RAYNOR. . 


Total Third Division 




I 


7 


FOURTH DIVISION : 

Colonel WILLIAM J. LANDRAM. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel FRANK EMERSON. %i . 


I 
2 
I 


18 
5 
i 


4 
9 
i 


79 
50 

5 


28 

20 

2 


39 8 
438 

23 


528 
524 
33 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel JOSEPH W. VANCE 9 
Artillery 


Total Fourth Division 


4 


24 


14 


134 


50 


859 


1,085 


Total Thirteenth Army Corps 

NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS : 
Major - General WILLIAM B. 

FRANKLIN. 1 

Staff 


5 


47 


23 


225 


59 


1,045 


1,404 














3 















1 Wounded, A fir tilth. 



Wounded and cafiturtd April 






APPENDIX. 



473 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




O 


o 

c 

(/) V 

^S 

W 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Id 

1 1 
H 


& 

1 

<$ 


FIRST DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General WILLIAM H. 
EMORY. 
FIRST BRIGADE : 
Brigadier - General WILLIAM 
DWIGHT, Jr. 




I 

3 

2 
I 

8 


3 
2 

4 


26 
10 
27 

28 
39 






27 
20 

34 

33 
90 


H4th New York 







4 

3 
4 

38 


n6th New York 




1 53d New York * 




loist New York 


I 




Total First Brigade ... 




I 


15 


9 


130 




49 


204 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier - General JAMES W. 
MCMILLAN. 

I3th Maine 






5 
i 
6 
6 


i 

3 
4 


29 

13 
23 
34 




20 
ii 
9 


55 
28 

44 
41 









2 

I 














3 


18 


8 


99 




40 


168 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel LEWIS BENEDICT, 1 
Colonel FRANCIS FESSENDEN. 

3Oth Maine 




i 
3 


10 

13 

3 

4 

30 


3 
3 
3 

i 


55 
45 

21 

38 




69 
46 
70 

155 

340 


138 
in 
97 

200 


i62d New York 


I 


i65th New York 


1 73d New York 




2 


Total Third Brigade 


4 


10 


159 


3 


546 


ARTILLERY. 

New York Lirfit 2<?th Battery 




2 
2 


i 


3 
4 
i 

8 
396 






5 
7 
i 


































4 


i 


13 


Total First Division 




3 




8 


67 


28 


429 931 


Total Nineteenth Army Corps 


8 


67 


3i 


39 6 


3 


429 


934 



Killed* April gtk. 



474 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




j 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


to 4> 

~ 

H 


Aggregate. 


CAVALRY DIVISION l : 

Brigadier - General ALBERT L. 
LEE. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 
Colonel THOMAS J. LUCAS. 

i6th Indiana (mounted infantry). . . 


i 
i 


3 


2 


17 
ii 
10 
18 




32 
19 
3 
17 


55 
3i 
19 
42 








I 

4 


5 

i 


I4th New York 




2 


Total First Brigade ... 


2 


8 


8 


56 


2 


7i 


147 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel HARAI ROBINSON. 




4 
4 


2 

4 


13 
27 




2 

13 
15 


21 

49 

70 


1st Louisiana 




I 

I 


Total Third Brigade 




8 


6 


40 


FOURTH BRIGADE : 

Colonel NATHAN A. M. DUDLEY. 
2d Illinois 






2 

8 

3 

2 


i 

i 

i 


39 
51 

38 

22 
150 




3 
ii 

16 
31 


45 
7i 

58 
<tf 


3d Massachusetts . . ... 




3ist Massachusetts (mounted infan- 
trv) 






8th New Hampshire (mounted in 
fantry) 




I 

I 


Total Fourth Brigade 





15 


~~3 


61 


230 


FIFTH BRIGADE : 

Colonel OLIVER P. GOODING. 








l 
i 


5 

9 

i 






6 

14 

i 

21 


1 8th New York 


I 


I 




2 


3d Rhode Island (detachment) 




Total Fifth Brigade 


I 


I 


2 


15 




2 


ARTILLERY : 
2d Massachusetts Battery 






I 

4_ 

5 


2 
2 


16 
13 
29 
290 




I 


20 

_JL7 
37 


5th United States Battery G 






Total Artillery 








I 


Total Cavalry Division 
Grand total 


3 


37 


21 


4 


150 


505 


16 


151 


7 6 


qil 


66 


1,624 


2,843 



Losses at Wilson s Plantation, Afriljtk, also included. 



APPENDIX, 475 

SPECIAL FIELD RETURN AFTER SABINE CROSS-ROADS. 



TROOPS. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 


"3 

o 

H 


Effective strength 
next day. 


Officers. 


g 


Officers. 


a 

V 




Officers. 


a 
B 


Officers. 


d 

V 

% 


"i 




NINETEENTH ARMY 
CORPS : 
First Division (in 
fantry) 


2 


22 


IO 


138 


I 


174 


347 


243 

31 
9 


4,910 

60 5 
348 


5>I53 

636 
357 


1 53d New York Vol 
unteers (guard- 


First Division (artil- 
















L^i-y f* ... 

THIRTEENTH ARMY 
CORPS (detach 
ment) : 
General and staff 


I 




I 








2 

315 


Third Division : 
Infantry 


I 


23 


6 


78 


9 


198 


77 

2 


i,475 
173 


i,552 
^75 


Artillery 


Fourth Division : 
Commanding offi 
cer and escort. . 
Infantry 








i 






I 
I.IOI 

33 
3 


2 


23 


6 

i 

2 


82 

5 


59 
3 


9 2 9 
24 


56 

5 


1,418 
204 


i,474 
209 


Artillery . ... 


STAFF OF THE MAJOR- 
GENERAL COM 
MANDING 






Aggregate . . . 


















9,556 


6 


68 


27 


304 


72 


1,325 


1,802 


423 


9,133 



SPECIAL FIELD RETURN AFTER PLEASANT HILL. 



FIRST DIVISION, 
NINETEENTH ARMY 
CORPS. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 


"rt 
O 

H 


Effective strength 
next day. 


Officers. 


i 

x 


Officers. 


c 

V 

% 


Officers. 


c 
u 

% 


Officers. 


1 


1 


Infantry 


6 


43 
4 


18 

I 


261 

14 


3 


369 

5 


689 

25 


243 

8 


4,802 
33i 


5,045 
339 

5,384 


Artillery 


Aggregate . 




6 


47 


19 


275 


4 


374 


714 


251 


5,133 



476 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



PARTIAL RETURN OF LOSSES AT CANE RIVER CROSSING. 

April 23, 1864. 



THIRD BRIGADE, IST DIVISION : 
Colonel FRANCIS FESSENDEN. 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. BLAN- 

CHARD 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 


"rt 
o 
H 


Officers. 


d 
B 


Officers. 


d 

V 


Officers. 


d 

u 

2 


i62d New York 


I 


3 


I 


26 

3 
25 
64 


1 


I 
I 

I 

7 


32 

4 
31 

86 


i6sth New York 




1 73d New York 




3 
ii 


2 

2 




3Oth Alaine , . ... 


2 

3 




Total 




17 


5 


118 





10 


153 





THE OPEQUON, 
September 19, 1864. 



NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 
Brevet Major-General W T ILLIAM 
H. EMORY. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Id 

IS 

W 


Aggregate. 


FIRST DIVISION : 

Brigadier - General WILLIAM 
DWIGHT. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel GEORGE L. BEAL. 






I 

"i 

4 


23 
17 
156 

39 

55 






24 
22 

185 
48 
6 9 


3Oth Massachusetts 


I 
I 


4 

20 

9 

10 






I I4th New York 






1 1 6th New York 






1 53d New York 








Total First Brigade 








2 


43 


13 


290 






348 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier - General JAMES W. 

MCMILLAN. 

1 2th Connecticut 






3 

2 


7 
13 

i 

9 


to to 


57 
58 
8 
28 





I 
I 


71 
77 
9 

37 


i6oth New York 1 


47th Pennsylvania 










Total Second Brigade 






2 


5 


30 


6 


I5i 




194 


Total First Division 8 


7 


73 


19 


441 




2 


542 





1 Noitr-veterans ofyoth New York, attacked. * The Third Brigade guarding trains. 



APPENDIX. 



477 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




i 
is 
o 


i 1 




8 

a 


T3 

\i 

la 

w 


B 

8 

i 

o 


IS ^ 
H 


tj 

< 


SECOND DIVISION : 

Brigadier - General CUVIER 
GROVER. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 
Brigadier-General HENRY W. 
BIRGE. 
9th Connecticut 








I 






I 

112 
62 

139 

I 3 8 

73 


1 2th Maine . . 


2 
I 


12 

6 
38 
27 
17 


6 
6 
n 
9 
4 


77 
46 
69 
79 
4i 





15 
3 
J 9 

!9 
10 


14th. Maine. . . . . . 


26th Masachusetts 


2 
I 


I4th New Hampshire 


4 


75th New York . . 


Total First Brigade 




7 


100 


36 


313 


3 


66 


525 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX. 
I3th Connecticut 




6 
7 
9 

17 
9 

5 


2 

3 

3 
9 
4 


39 
56 
60 

84 
56 
46 


2 
I 


30 
3 
3i 


77 
70 
105 

106 
74 

75 


nth Indiana 


i 

2 
2 


22d Iowa 


3d Masachusetts Cavalry (dis 
mounted) 


I3ist New York , . . . 






i Sgth New York 




I 


19 


Total Second Brigade 

THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel JACOB SHARPED 
Lieutenant - Colonel ALFRED 
NEAFIE. 
38th Massachusetts 




5 


53 


21 


34i 


4 


83 


507 




8 
6 
20 
5 


3 
5 
3 
3 


44 
46 

88 
30 




8 


63 
57 
in 

47 


I28th New York 




1 5 6th New York 








I7oth New York 






9 


Total Third Brigade 






39 


14 


208 




17 


278 


FOURTH BRIGADE : 

Colonel DAVID SHUNK. 
8th Indiana 








2 

5 
9 
9 


i 

4 
8 


5 
3i 

53 
48 





2 


9 

38 

75 
87 


i8th Indiana 


i 

i 
i 


24th Iowa 




8 

21 


28th Iowa 


Total Fourth Brigade 




3 


25 


13 


137 


| 31 


209 



1 Wounded. 



478 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 




rt 

s? 


ARTILLERY : 

ist Maine Battery 




2 


I 


5_ 
1,004 






8 
1,527 


Total Second Division.. 


15 


2I 9 


85 


7 


197 


RESERVE ARTILLERY : 

Captain ELIJAH D. TAFT. 
1 7th Indiana Battery 














i 
4 


Battery D ist Rhode Island 








4 






Total Reserve Artillery 








5_ 
1,450 






5 


Total Nineteenth Army Corps 


22 


292 


104 


7 


I 99 


2,074 



FISHER S HILL. 
September 22, 1864. 



NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS : 
Brevet-Major General WILLIAM 
H. EMORY. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


Aggregate. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


O 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


FIRST DIVISION : 

Brigadier - General WILLIAM 
DWIGHT. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel GEORGE L. BEAL. 
29th Maine 






I 


3 
6 






4 
9 


3Oth Massachusetts 




3 






H4th New York 








n6th New York 




I 




9 

. 3 

21 






10 
3 


I53d New York 












Total First Brigade 














4 


I 




26 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Brigadier-General JAMES W. 

MCMILLAN. 

I2th Connecticut 






















i6oth New York * 
















47th Pennsvlvania 








2 

3 






i 
4 


8th Vermont 


1 


I 








Total Second Brigade 










I 


5 






6 



1 Including casualties incurred ov the list. * Non-veterans of gotA New York attachtd. 



APPENDIX. 



479 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 







Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Aggregate. 


ARTILLERY : 

5th New York Battery 






I 








I 
33 


Total First Division l 






2 




:..:. 






4 


27 


SECOND DIVISION : 
Brigadier - General CUVIER 
GROVER. 
FIRST BRIGADE : 
Brigadier-General HENRY W. 
BIRGE. 
oth Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . 






3 




10 






13 


1 2th Maine 
























26th Massachusetts 
















lAth New Hampshire 








I 




I 


2 


75th New York 












Total First Brigade 














I 


~I5 


i 




II 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX. 
I3th Connecticut 
















2 

8 
4 

i 
i 






2 

IO 

4 

3 
I 






2 

















3d Massachusetts Cavalry (dis- 




2 








I3ist New York 










I SQth New York 














Total Second Brigade 





4 




16 







20 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel DANIEL MACAULEY. 
38th Massachusetts 












i 

2 




2 

6 
4 






3 
20 

4 










12 


1 5 6th New York 




















1 76th New York 




I 




z 






2 


Total Third Brigade 




4 




13 




12 


29 


FOURTH BRIGADE : 

Colonel DAVID SHUNK. 








I 

4 

4 
5 






I 

6 

5 
5 


1 8th Indiana 






2 

I 






24th Iowa 










28th Iowa 










Total Fourth Brigade 






3 


14 






i? 


ARTILLERY : 

Maine Light, 1st Battery (A) 
















Total Second Division 




ii 


3^ 


54 




13 


81 



Tkird Brigade guarding trains. 



480 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Officers. 


s 


t 


H 




rt 


ll 

W 


J 




-52 

M 


M 

to 

< 


RESERVE ARTILLERY : 

Captain ELIJAH D. TAFT. 
1 7th Indiana Battery 
















Battery D ist Rhode Island 
















Total Nineteenth Armv Corus 





EC 












C 


8r 




M 


114. 



CEDAR CREEK. 
October 19, 1864. 



NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS : 
Brevet-Major-General WILLIAM 
H. EMORY. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 
missing. 




Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


g 

I 

O 


5 

S e 

</) 4) 

Ifl 

W 


| 

O 


Is 

*B E 

H 



< 


Corps Staff 






2 

4 
5 
3 
6 

4 

7 








2 

127 
108 

73 
H5 

59 

Si 


FIRST DIVISION : 

Brigadier-General JAMES W. 

MCMILLAN. 

Brigadier - General WILLIAM 
DWIGHT. 

FIRST BRIGADE : 

Colonel EDWIN P. DAVIS. 
2oth Maine 


I 
I 
2 

I 


17 
II 

3 
20 

8 
66 


105 
91 

43 
80 

39 
56 

414 






3Oth Massachussetts 






goth New York 


I 


22 

7 
9 
10 


1 1 4th New York 


I loth New York . . . ... 


1 53d New York 




Total First Brigade 


5 


I 


29 


48 


563 


SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel STEPHEN THOMAS. 
Brigadier-General JAMES W. 

MCMILLAN. 
1 2th Connecticut 


2 


20 

9 
36 
16 


5 
3 
i 
ii 


52 
3i 

88 

55 




93 
23 

28 

23 


172 
66 
154 
1 06 


i6oth New York 





47th Pennsylvania 


I 

I 


8th Vermont 


Total Second Brigade 
Total First Division 





4 


81 


20 


226 


167 


498 


9 


147 


49 


640 


I 


215 


i,o6r 





1 Third Brigade guarding trains. 



APPENDIX. 



481 



Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured or 












COMMAND. 


, 


s . 


2 


1 


i 


t . 


y 

E 




B 


.28 




.8 g 


| 


|| 


g 




m 


"5 S 


j 


c g 


| 


3 6 


M 




o 


W 


O 


W 


o 


W 


1 


SECOND DIVISION : 
















Brigadier - General CUVIER 
GROVER. 1 
















Brigadier-General HENRY W. 
















BlRGE. 
















Cfaff 






I 









I 


FIRST BRIGADE : 
















Brigadier-General HENRY W. 
















BlRGE. 
















Colonel THOMAS W. PORTER. 




















2 

6 


2 

3 


13 

20 


I 
I 


7 
50 


25 

81 




i 




i 


4. 





34 


I 


42 


82 




3 


2 


8 


16 


29 




::::: i \ 


48 i 17 


77 


7<th Ne\v York 


! 3 


I 


18 


33 


55 


Total First Brigade 


2 


26 


j i 


~I4J 


4 


165 


349 




1- 















SECOND BRIGADE : 

Colonel EDWARD L. MOLINEUX. 




2 

4 

i 

6 

2 
2 


i 

4 
6 

2 
I 
I 


16 

35 
43 

29 

21 
12 


2 


10 
10 

21 

39 
9 
6 


29 

53 
73 

76 
33 
23 








3d Massachusetts Cavalry (dis- 




i zqth New York 


2 


Total Second Brigade 


2 


17 


15 


I 5 6 


2 


95 


287 


THIRD BRIGADE : 

Colonel DANIEL MACAULEY. 
Lieutenant - Colonel ALFRED 
NEAFIE. 

Cfoff 






I 
I 

5 








i 

54 
95 
92 

3 
53_ 
298 


Mart 






18 
14 

3i 

2 
II 


2 


35 
74 
48 






5 
7 
i 




I 




iy6th New York 
Total Third Brigade 


I 


5 


4 


I 


3i 


2 


18 


ii 


7 6 


3 


188 


FOURTH BRIGADE : 

Colonel DAVID SHUNK. 


2 


2 

8 
8 


6 
6 

2 


33 
43 
37 
69 


4 
~4 


21 

27 

41 
10 


66 
Si 
92 
9 








28th Iowa 


I 


Total Fourth Brigade 


3 


23 


18 182 


99 


329 



1 Wounded. 



482 



NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



COMMAND. 


Killed. 


Wounded. Captured or I 
missing. 


Officers. 


1 
Id 

11 
M 


Officers. 


tj 

|1 
M 


o 


Enlisted 
men. 


io \ to Aggregate. 

O I oo 
to 


ARTILLERY : 

1st Maine Battery 


I 
10 


2 

86 


I 

57 


16 

57i 




8 
555 


Total Second Division 
RESERVE ARTILLERY ; 

Major ALBERT W. BRADBURY. 
1 7th Indiana Battery. . 


13 




5 


i 


8 
8 




3 
6 


16 
12 


Battery D ist Rhode Island 




Total Reserve Artillery .... 
Total Nineteenth Army Corps 







1 

5 


i 


16 
1,227 


28 


19 


238 


109 


14 


776 


2,383 



OFFICERS KILLED OR MORTALLY WOUNDED. 

BATON ROUGE. 

August 5, 1862. 

Brigadier-General THOMAS WILLIAMS 
Lieutenant MATTHEW A. LATHAM 2ist Indiana 

Lieutenant CHARLES D. SEELY 
Captain EUGENE KELTY 3Oth Massachusetts 

GEORGIA LANDING. 

October 27, 1862. 

Captain JOHN KELLEHER 8th New Hampshire 

Captain Q. A. WARREN 

BISLAND. 
April 12-13, 1863. 

Captain SAMUEL GAULT 38th Massachusetts 

Lieutenant GEORGE G. NUTTING 53d Massachusetts 

Lieutenant JOHN T. FREER i56th New York 

IRISH BEND. 

April 14, 1863 

Captain SAMUEL S. HAYDEN 25th Connecticut 

Lieutenant DANIEL P. DEWEY 

Lieutenant-Colonel GILBERT A. DRAPER I59*h New York 

Lieutenant ROBERT D. LATHROP 
Lieutenant BYRON F. LOCKWOOD 
Lieutenan JOHN W. MANLEY 

PLAINS STORE. 

May 21, 1863. 
Lieutenant CHARLES BORUSKY n6th New York 

PORT HUDSON. 

May 23-July 8, 1863. 

Captain JOHN B. HUBBARD, 1 Assistant Adjutant-General 
Lieutenant JOSEPH STRICKLAND 2 i3th Connecticut 

1 In the Assault of May ^th. * In the Assault of June 14*6. 

4S3 



4 8 4 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Captain JEDEDIAH RANDALL 
Captain JOHN L. STANTON l 
Lieutenant HARVEY F. JACOBS * 
Lieutenant MARTIN R. KENYON l 
Captain DAVID D. HOAG 9 
Lieutenant CHARLES DURAND * 
Colonel RICHARD E. HOLCOMB* 
Lieutenant MARTIN V. B. HILL 
Lieutenant JAMES E. COBURN 
Lieutenant J. B. BUTLER 
Captain ANDREW CAILLOUX ] 
Lieutenant JOHN H. CROWDER 
Major ADAM HAFFKILLE 
Lieutenant JOHN C. FULTON l 
Lieutenant CHARLES L. STEVENS 
Lieutenant AARON W. WALLACE } 
Captain HENRY CROSBY 
Lieutenant SOLON A. PERKINS 3 
Captain WILLIAM H. BARTLETT 2 
Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM L. RODMAN, 
Lieutenant FREDERICK HOLMES 2 
Lieutenant-Colonel JAMES O BRIEN 
Lieutenant JAMES McGiNNis 
Lieutenant BURTON D. DEMING 
Lieutenant ISAAC E. JUDD l 
Captain GEORGE S, BLISS 2 
Captain GEORGE H. BAILEY ] 
Captain JEROME K. TAFT 2 
Lieutenant ALFRED R. GLOVER 2 
Lieutenant JOSIAH H. VOSE 
Lieutenant FREDERICK J. CLARK 
Lieutenant-Colonel OLIVER W. LULL 
Lieutenant LUTHER T. HOSLEY 2 
Lieutenant GEORGE W. THOMPSON 
Lieutenant JOSEPH WALLIS 2 
Major GEORGE W. STACKHOUSE 
Captain HENRY S. HULBERT 2 
Lieutenant SYLVESTER B. SHEPARD 
Lieutenant VALOROUS RANDALL 2 
Colonel ELISHA B. SMITH 2 
Captain CHARLES E. TUCKER 2 
Colonel EDWARD P. CHAPIN J 
Lieutenant DAVID JONES 
Lieutenant TIMOTHY J. LINAHAN 2 
Colonel DAVID S. COWLES 
Lieutenant CHARLES L. VAN SLYCK ! 



26th Connecticut 



28th Connecticut 



ist Louisiana 

zd Louisiana 

ist Engineers, Corps d Afrique 

ist Louisiana Native Guards 

3d Louisiana Native Guards 
I4th Maine 

2 ist Maine 
22d Maine 

3d Massachusetts Cavalry 
4th Massachusetts 
1 38th Massachusetts 

48th Massachusetts 
4Qth Massachusetts 

52d Massachusetts 
53d Massachusetts 



6th Michigan 

8th New Hampshire 



gist New York 



noth New York 
H4th New York 

1 1 6th New York 



1 28th New York 



In the Assault of May zjth. 2 In the Assault of June 

3 In the affair at Clinton, June jo 1 . 



APPENDIX. 485 

Lieutenant NATHAN O. BENJAMIN 2 isist New York 

Lieutenant BENJAMIN F. DENTON 2 issd New York 

Lieutenant-Colonel THOMAS FOWLER is6th New York 

Major JAMES H. BOGART 9 i62d New York 

Lieutenant JOHN NEVILLE 

Lieutenant STEPHEN C. OAKLEY 

Lieutenant-Colonel ABEL SMITH, Jr. 1 i6sth New York 

Lieutenant CHARLES R. CARVILLE J 

Major A. POWER GALLWAY I73d New York 

Captain HENRY COCHEU 2 

Lieutenant SAMUEL H. PODGER 

Lieutenant MORGAN SHEA 2 

Colonel MICHAEL K. BRYAN 2 175th New York 

Captain HARMON N. MERRIMAN 177th New York 

Lieutenant JAMES WILLIAMSON 

Lieutenant STEPHEN F. SPALDING 5 8th Vermont 

Colonel SIDNEY A. BEAN 4th Wisconsin 

Captain LEVI R. BLAKE 3 

Lieutenant EDWARD A. CLAPP 1 

Lieutenant DANIEL B. MAXSON s 

Lieutenant GUSTAVUS WINTERMEYER S 

Lieutenant BENJAMIN WADSWORTH loth U. S. Volunteers, Corps d Afrique 



COX S (OR KOCH S) PLANTATION. 

July 13, 1863. 

Captain DAVID W. TUTTLE n6th New York 

Lieutenant DE VAN POSTLEY i74th New York 

THE RED RIVER CAMPAIGN. 
March id-May 22, 1864. 

Lieutenant Louis MEISSNER i3th Connecticut. 

Lieutenant CHARLES C. GROW 3oth Maine 

Lieutenant REUBEN SEAVY 

Lieutenant SUMNER N. STOUT 

Captain JULIUS N. LATHROP 38th Massachusetts 

Captain CHARLES R. COTTON i6oth New York, April gth 

Captain WILLIAM J. VAN DEUSBN 

Lieutenant NICHOLAS McDoNOUGH 

Lieutenant LEWIS E. FITCH i6ist New York, April 8th 

Colonel LEWIS BENEDICT i62d New York, April gth 

Captain FRANK T. JOHNSON 

Lieutenant MADISON K. FINLEY 

1 In the Assault of May vith. * In the Assault of June i^th. 

8 In the affair of Clinton , June -$d. 



486 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Lieutenant WILLIAM C. HAWS 
Lieutenant THEODORE A. SCUDDER 
Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM N. GREEN, Jr. 
Captain HENRY R. LEE 
Lieutenant ALFRED P. SWOYER 
Lieutenant James A. SANDERSON 



i62d New York, April gth. 

1 73d Infantry 

1 73d New York 

47th Pennsylvania, April 8th 

ist United States Artillery 



THE OPEQUON. 



September 19, 1864. 

Lieutenant-Colonel FRANK H. PECK 1 2th Connecticut 

Lieutenant WILLIAM S. BULKLEY " 

Lieutenant GEORGE W. STEADMAN " " 

Lieutenant WILLIAM S. MULLEN nth Indiana 

Captain SILAS A. WADSWORTH i8th Indiana 

Captain DAVID J. DAVIS 22d Iowa 

Captain BENJAMIN D. PARKS " 

Lieutenant JAMES A. BOARTS " " 

Captain JOSEPH R. GOULD 24th Iowa 

Lieutenant SYLVESTER S. DILLMAN " " 

Captain JOHN E. PALMER 

Captain SCOTT HOUSEWORTH " " 

Captain DANIEL M. PHILLIPS i2th Maine 

Captain SAMUEL F. THOMPSON " " 

Lieutenant WILLIAM JACKMAN i4th Maine 

Lieutenant AJALON GODWIN " 

Major WILLIAM KNOWLTON 

Lieutenant JASPER F. GLIDDEN 

Lieutenant JOHN F. POOLE 

Major EUSEBIUS S. CLARK 

Captain ENOS W. THAYER 

Lieutenant JOHN P. HALEY 

Colonel ALEXANDER GARDINER 

Captain WILLIAM H. CHAFFIN 

Captain WILLIAM A. FOSGATE 

Lieutenant ARTEMUS B. COLBURN 

Lieutenant JESSE A. FISK 

Lieutenant HENRY S. PAUL 

Lieutenant GEORGE H. STONE 

Lieutenant MOULTON S. WEBSTER 

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLOUGHBY BABCOCK 75th New York 

Lieutenant EDWIN E. BREED H4th New York 

Captain JACOB C. KLOCK I53d New York 

Lieutenant HERMAN SMITH 159th New York 

Captain Sir N. DEXTER i6oth New York 

Lieutenant B. FRANK MAXSON " " 



Maine 
3d Massachusetts Cavalry. 

26th Massachusetts 

3Oth Massachusetts 
I4th New Hampshire 



APPENDIX. 



487 



CEDAR CREEK. 
October 19, 1864. 

Captain JOHN P. LOWELL i2th Connecticut 
Lieutenant GEORGE M. BENTON 
Lieutenant HORACE E. PIIELPS 

Lieutenant-Colonel ALEXANDER J. KENNY 8th Indiana 
Captain WILLIAM D. WATSON 
Lieutenant GEORGE W. QUAY 

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM S. CHARLES nth Indiana 

Major JONATHAN H. WILLIAMS i8th Indiana 

Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN Q. WILDS 24th Iowa 

Captain JOHN W. RIEMENSCHNEIDER 28th Iowa 

Lieutenant JOHN E. MORTON ist Maine Battery 

Lieutenant HENRY D. WATSON i2th Maine 
Lieutenant-Colonel CHARLES S. BICKMORE I4th Maine 

Lieutenant JOHN L. HOYT 2gth Maine 

Lieutenant LYMAN JAMES 3d Massachusetts Cavalry (dis 
mounted) 

Lieutenant ALBERT L. TILDEN 26th Massachusetts 

Lieutenant GEORGE F. WHITCOMB 3oth Massachusetts 
Lieutenant WILLIAM F. CLARK, Jr. 

Major JOHN C. SMART goth New York 

Lieutenant THADDEUS C. FERRIS " " " 

Captain DANIEL C. KNOWLTON ii4th New York 

Lieutenant ISAAC BURCH " " " 
Lieutenant NORMAN M. LEWIS 

Lieutenant WILLIAM D. THURBER " " " 

Lieutenant CHRISTOPHER LARKIN i56th New York 

Lieutenant JOHANNES LEFEVER " " " 

Major ROBERT McD. HART i59th New York 

Captain DUNCAN RICHMOND " " " 

Lieutenant JULIUS A. JONES iy6th New York 

Captain EDWIN G. MINNICH 47th Pennsylvania 

Captain EDWARD HALL 8th Vermont 

Lieutenant NATHAN C. CHENEY " " 

Lieutenant AARON K. COOPER " " 

NOTE. Unfortunately, it has been found impossible to obtain a complete 
list of officers who fell in skirmishes or minor affairs. 



PORT HUDSON FORLORN HOPE. 

Officers and men who volunteered for the storming party under General 
Orders No. 49, Headquarters Department of the Gulf, June 15, 1863 : 

Colonel HENRY W. BIRGE, I3th Connecticut, Commanding. - 

STAFF. 

Captain DUNCAN S. WALKER, Assistant Adjutant-General. 3 

Acting-Master EDMOND C. WEEKS, U. S. Navy, A. D. C. 2 

Captain CHARLES L. NORTON, 25th Connecticut. 2 

Captain JOHN L. SWIFT, 3d Massachusetts Cavalry. 2 

First Lieutenant E. H. RUSSELL, gth Pennsylvania Reserves, Acting Signal 

Officer. 

Assistant-Surgeon GEORGE CLARY, i3th Connecticut. 2 
Lieutenant JULIUS H. TIEMANN, A. A. D. C., isgth New York. 2 

FIRST BATTALION. 4 

Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN B. VAN PETTEN, i6oth New York. 
Captain EDWARD P. HOLLISTER, 3ist Massachusetts, Senior Major. 
Captain SAMUEL D. HOVEY, 3ist Massachusetts, Junior Major. 
Captain ISAAC W. CASE, 22d Maine, Quartermaster. 

1 The original roll of the storming party ivas made up in duplicate. After the siege \ one 
copy was retained by General Birge, the other being turned in to the Adjutant-General s 
Office, Department of the Gulf, by Captain, afterward Brevet Brigadier-General Duncan 
S. Walker, Assistant Adjutant-General. The latter copy has not been found among the 
documents turned over to the War Department in 1865. All Birge s papers and records 
"were captured by the Confederates and among them his copy of the roll was lost. In 1886, 
front one of his officers he obtained a book containing a third copy of the roll, described by 
him as " complete and perfect" and placed it in the hands of Captain Charles L. Norton, 
v^th Connecticut (Colonel z^th Connecticut), himself one of the stormers, by whom the vol 
ume was delivered to Colonel D. P. Muzzey, President, and Captain C. IV. C. Rhoades, 
Secretary, of the Forlorn Hope Association. The list here printed is made up by collating- 
-with this roll the detached and obviously incomplete memoranda gathered into the XXVItk 
volume of the " Official Records" So many mistakes in names have been found in the 
certified copy of Birge s list as furnished to the author, that others are likely to exist 
among the names marked [*], that could not be compared with the records. For example, 
it is found that Privates F. L. Scampmouse and Levi Scapmouse, Company C, 156/7% New 
York are the same man and, Seven Soepson,same regiment, is Sven Svenson. 

2 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.,part I.,pj>. 57-66. 
8 Not on Birge 1 s duplicate roll. 

* The names of the Battalion Field and Staff Officers appear again under their proper 
regiments. 

488 



APPENDIX. 



489 



Captain WILLIAM SMITH, 2d Louisiana, A. D. C. 
Lieutenant G. A. HARMOUNT, I2th Connecticut, Adjutant. 
Surgeon DAVID IT. ARMSTRONG, i6oth New York. 

SECOND BATTALION. 1 

Lieutenant-Colonel CHARLES S. BICKMORE, i4th Maine. 
Major ALBION K. BOLAN, i4th Maine, Major. 
Lieutenant I. FRANK HOBBS, izjth Maine, Adjutant. 
Lieutenant EDWARD MARRENER, i74th New York, Quartermaster. 

I2TH CONNECTICUT. 



Company. 

Captain LESTER E. BRALEY, G 

Lieutenant A. DWIGHT McCALL, G 

STANTON ALLYN, S K 
GEORGE A. HARMOUNT 

(Adjutant), 

Private CHARLES J. CONSTANTINE, A 

Sergeant JOHN MULLEN, B 

Private CHARLES DUBOISE, B 

Corporal JOHN MOORE, C 

Private GEORGE T. DICKSON, C 

" WlLLOUGHBY HULL, C 

" WILLIAM PUTNAM, C 

CHRISTOPHER SPIES, C 

GEORGE W. WATKINS," C 

" JOHN P. WOODWARD, C 

Sergeant ALEXANDER COHN, D 

Corporal GEORGE SHAW, 2 D 

" JAMES ROBERTSON, Jr.,* D 

Private L. P. FARRELL," D 

" GEORGE KOHLER, D 

REUBEN MILES, D 

FREDERICK C. PAYNE, D 

" WILLIAM P. SMITH, 3 E 

EDWARD L. MILLERICK,* E 

Sergeant CHARLES E. MCGLAFLIN, G 



Company. 

Sergeant ANDREW H. DAVIDSON, 3 G 

Corporal JOHN T. GORDON, G 

Private OLIVER C. ANDREWS, G 

J. E. CHASE,- G 

JAMES DUNN, G 

PATRICK FITZPATRICK, G 

PATRICK FRANEY, G 

WILLIAM ToBiN, 2 G 

JOSEPH W. WEEKS/ 2 G 

Sergeant SOLOMON E. WHITING, J H 

JOHN W. PHELPS, H 

Corporal JOSEPH W. CARTER, H 

" CHARLES E. SHERMAN/ H 

Private EDWIN CONVERSE, H 

HUGH DONNALLY, - H 

" WARREN GAMMONS, H 

JOSEPH GRAHAM, 2 H 

MILES P. HiGLEY, 2 H 

" WILLIAM LENNING, H 

THOMAS McCuE, 2 H 

" MELVIN NICHOLS, H 

Corporal DANIEL B. LooMis, 2 K 

Private FRANCIS BEAUMONT, 2 K 

A. M. PERKINS, 3 K 



I3TH CONNECTICUT. 



Company. 

Captain APOLLOS COMSTOCK (com 
manding regiment), 
" CHARLES D. BLINN, C 

" HOMER B. SPRAGUE, H 

DENISON H. FINLEY, G 



Company. 

Captain CHARLES J. FULLER, D 

Lieutenant PERRY AVERILL, B 

FRANK WELLS, I 

CHARLES E. TIBBETS, A 

WILLIAM F. NORMAN, K 



1 The names of the Battalion Field and Staff Officers appear again under their proper 
regiments. 

3 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi. , part I., pp. 57-66. 
3 Not on Bir^s duplicate roll. 



490 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Company. 

Lieutenant CHARLES DANIELS, K 

CHARLES H. BEATON, E 

JOHN C. KINNEY, A 

Louis MEISNER, I 

NEWTON \V. PERKINS, C 

Louis BECKWITH/ B 

Corporal FRANCIS J. WOLF, A 

" CHRISTOPHER FAGAN, A 

" ANDREW BLACK, A 

Private WILLIAM BISHOP, A 

" MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, A 

WALTER EAGAN, A 

JOHN FAGAN, A 

" FRANCIS J. GAFFNAY, A 

" JAMES GILBERT, 1 A 

EDWARD LANTRY, A 

" JOHN McGuiRE, A 

" JOSEPH MACK, A 

" JOHN MARTINA A 

HENRY MORTON, A 

LOREN D. PENFIELD, A 

JOHN O KEEFE, 1 A 

JOHN QuiGLEY, 1 A 

" THOMAS REILLY, A 

" CHARLES R. ROWELL/ A 

" JOHN SMITH, A 

" EDWARD STONED A 

Sergeant GEORGE E. FANCHER, B 

" GEORGE H. PRATT, B 

" ALONZO WHEELER, B 

Corporal FRANCIS E. WEED, B 

" ROSWELL TAYLOR, B 

" ISAAC W. BISHOP, B 

Private GEORGE M. BALLING, B 

" JOHN J. BROWN, B 

WILLIAM B. CASEY, B 

" BALTHASAR EMMERICH, B 

" PETER GENTIEN, B 

" DENNIS HEGANY, B 

WILLIAM W. JONES, B 

" JOHN KLEIN, B 

BENJAMIN L. MEAD, B 

" JOHN MOHREN, B 

" CHARLES NICHOLS, B 

VICTOR PINSAID, B 

" GEORGE PRINDLE, B 



Company. 

Private MORANT J. ROBERTSON, B 

" SIDNEY B. RUGGLES, B 

" FELIX SCHREGER, 1 B 

LOUIS SCHMEIDT, B 

FREDERICK L. STURGIS, B 

Sergeant EVERETT S. DUNBAR/ C 

" CHARLES H. GAYLORD/ C 

JOHN N. LYMAN, C 

" JOHN MADDOX, C 

Corporal LEWIS HART, 1 C 

" HOMER M. WELCH, C 

Private WILLIS BARNES/ C 

" SEYMOUR BUCKLEY/ C 

CHAUNCEY GRIFFIN, C 

" CHARLES HOTCHKISS/ C 

" CHARLES MITCHELL/ C 

JOHN O DELL/ C 

" FREDERICK W. PINDAR, C 

JOSEPH H. PRATT, C 

GEORGE RORABACK/ C 

" MORTIMER H. SCOTT, C 

" JOSEPH TAYLOR, C 

" DANIEL THOMPSON, C 

Sergeant JOHN J. SQUIER/ D 

EZRA M. HULL, D 

Corporal EDWARD ALTON, D 

" WILLIAM FENNIMORE/ D 

ANDREW HOLFORD/ I) 

Private THOMAS B. ANDRUS/ I) 

ANTONIO ASTENHOFFER/ I) 

" HENRY F. BISHOP, D 

" CHARLES BLISS/ I) 

" JOHN CRAREY/ D 

JOHN DILLON, D 

JOHN FEE, D 

HENRY F. Fox/ D 

" GOTLEIB FALKLING/ D 

" THOMAS FITZPATRICK/ I) 

" JOSEPH GARDNER. D 

" NEWTON GAYLOR/ D 

" CASPAR HEIDSICK/ D 

" Louis HETTINGER/ D 

JULIUS KAMP/ D 

" HENRY KUHLMANER/ D 

" HENRY LONG/ D 

" GEORGE LOSAW/ D 



Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.^ part /.,//. S7- 66 - 



APPENDIX. 



491 



Company. 

Private LUKE McCABE, 1 D 

HENRY E. POLLEY/ D 

FREDERICK PousH, 1 D 

HORACE B. STODDARD, 1 D 

WILLIAM H. TUCKER, D 

" MARTIN TYLER, D 

" Louis WALTERS/ D 

" EDWARD WELDEN, D 

Sergeant NICHOLAS SCHUE, E 

" RICHARD CROLEY, E 

Corporal ROBERT C. BARRY, E 

" LEONARD L. DUGAL, E 

Private JACOB BROWN, E 

" ADAM GERZE/ E 

FREDERICK HANNS, E 

" GEORGE W. HOWLAND, E 

MICHAEL MURPHY, E 

CHARLES F. OEDEKOVEN, E 

FRITZ OEDEKOVEN, 1 E 

F. F. F. PFIEFFER, E 

" ANDREW REAGAN, E 

FREDERICK SCHUH, >E 

JOSEPH VoGEL, 1 E 

AUGUST WILSON, E 

Sergeant EUGENE S. NASH, 1 F 

* JOHN T. REYNOLDS/ F 

Corporal JAMES CASE, F 

Private JAMES BARRY/ F 

GEORGE BOGUE/ F 

DAVID H. BROWN/ F 

HENRY CLOUSINK/ F 

" JAMES COSGROVE, F 

BYRON CROCKER/ F 

" DAVID D. JAQUES/ F 

" ABEL JOHNSON/ F 

" PATRICK LEACH, F 

" PATRICK MARTIN/ F 

THOMAS R. MCCORMICK/ F 

JAMES O NEIL/ F 

" HENRY E. PHINNEY, F 

" THOMAS POWERS/ F 

ORRIN M. PRICE/ F 

" THEODORE SECELLE/ F 

" WILLIAM L. WEBB/ F 

Sergeant SAMUEL L. COOK/ G 

11 CHARLES B. HUTCHINGS, G 

1 Not on the roll as printed in Officit 



Company. 

Sergeant JOHN W. BRADLEY, G 

" FRANCIS HUXFORD, G 

Corporal MOSES GAY, G 

" Louis FEOTISH, G 

" EDMUND BOGUE, G 

" TIMOTHY ALLEN, G 

Private FRANK AUSTIN/ G 

" GEORGE I. AUSTIN, G 

" JOHN BRAND, G 

" OCTAVE CERESSOLLE, G 

" WILLIAM B. CRAWFORD/ G 

" CHARLES CULVER, G 

" JAMES GAY, G 

" ALBERT HOPKINS, G 

" JOHN HUNT, G 

" HENRY A. HURLBURT, G 

" ASAHEL I NCR AH AM, G 

" JEREMY T. JORDAN, G 

" MICHAEL KEARNEY, G 

" JOSEPH KEMPLE, G 

" ALBERT LELEITNER/ G 

WALTER MCGRATH/ G 

" JOHN MCKEON, G 

" WILLIAM M. MAYNARD, G 

DANIEL MOORE, G 

MORRIS NEWHOUSE/ G 

" TIMOTHY O CONNELL, G 

" WILLIAM H. REYNOLDS/ G 

" ELLIS B. ROBINSON/ G 

" HENRY ROBINSON, G 

" JOHN RYAN/ G 

" ANTON SCHLOSSER, G 

" MARTIN J. SHADEN, G 

" MARTIN SHEER, G 

" CHARLES SIDDERS, G 

" EDWARD SKINNER/ G 

" JOHN SUARMAN, G 

" ANSON F. SUBER/ G 

" SEBREEW. TINKER, G 

Sergeant WILLIAM H. HUNTLEY, H 

" DENNIS DOYLE, H 

" HERMAN W. BAILEY, H 

Corporal THOMAS HARRISON/ H 

Private PHILO ANDREWS, H 

" NIRAM BLACKMAN, H 

" JOHN BLAKE, H 

/ Records \ vol. xxvi., part I.^PP. 57-66. 



492 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Company. 

Private FRANK PATTERSON, H 

" GEORGE H. TWITCHELL, H 

WILLIAM H. SMITH, H 

Sergeant JOHN DURESS, I 

" ABNER N. STERRY, I 

" SAMUEL TAYLOR, I 

" ENGELBERT SAUTER, I 

Corporal FRANCIS W. PRESTON, I 

" JOSEPH FRANZ, I 

" GARRETT HERBERT, I 

Private WILLIAM ALBRECHT, I 

44 FRITZ BOWMAN, I 

" ULRICH BURGART, I 

" MICHAEL BURKE, I 

" JAMES DILLON, I 

11 PATRICK HINES, I 

41 THOMAS McGEE, I 

" CLIFFORD C. NEWBERRY, I 

" HENRY RELTRATH, I 

" EDWARD SMITH, I 

" EDWARD O. THOMAS, I 

44 HENRY WHITEMAN, I 

Sergeant MILES J. BEECHF.R, K 

GEORGE H. WINSLOW, K 



Company. 

Sergeant CHARLES E. HUMPHREY, K 
Corporal HERMAN SAUNDERS, 
" HERBERT C. BALDWIN 
" JOHN NUGENT, 
" ROBERT HOLLINGER, 
Private JOHN BENNETT, 

" BENJAMIN E. BENSON, 
" FRANK C. BRISTOL, 
" WILLIAM CALL, 2 
" GEORGE CLANCY, 

WILLIAM J. COJER, 
" THOMAS DUFFY, 
44 SAMUEL EAVES, 
44 EDWARD ELLISON, 

JOHN GALL, 
14 THOMAS GRIFFIN, 
44 WILLIAM KRAIGE 3 
44 PATRICK MAHONEY, 
44 THOMAS MORRIS, 
44 RICHARD O DONNELL, 

GEORGE C. RUSSELL, 
" BERNARD STANFORD, 
44 JOHN STOREY, 
" BARTLEY TIERNON 



25TH CONNECTICUT. 



Company. 
Lieutenant HENRY C. WARD 

(Adjutant). 

4< HENRY H. GOODELL, F 
Sergeant-Major CHARLES F. ULRICH. 



Company. 

Private ELI HULL, B 

" SAMUEL SCHLESINGER, F 

JOHN WILLIAMS, H 



Captain J. R. PARSONS, 
Lieutenant C. A. TRACEY, 

J. T. SMITH, 
Sergeant MICHAEL H. DUNN, 

JAMES YORK, 2 
44 GEORGE McGRAw, 
Corporal HENRY CARLE, 
44 JOHN EMPEROR, 
" Jos. A. SCOVELL, 

JOHN LOWER, 
Private CHARLES BAKER, 
44 RICHARD BALSHAW, 
44 PATRICK BRENNAN, 



1ST LOUISIANA. 

Company. Company. 

I Private JOSEPH BRIGGS, I 

I " LEONARD DEMARQUIS, I 

I " JOHN FAHY, I 

I " JOHN HUNT, I 

I 41 HENRY KATHRA, I 

I <4 ALEX. KiAH, 2 I 

I 4 JAMES MANAHAN, I 

I " JAMES McGuiRE, 1 I 

I <4 JOHN REAS, I 

I 44 JOSEPH REAMAN,* I 

I " JERRY ROURKE, I 

I 4 JAMES SMITH, I 
I 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records , vol. xxvi.^ part /., pp. 57-66. 



* Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



3 Probably Krug^ or Kramer. 



APPENDIX. 



493 



2D LOUISIANA. 



Company. 

Captain WILLIAM SMITH, 2 H 

Private LEWIS DIEMERT, A 

HENRY MAYO, A 

" FREDERICK A. MURNSON, A 

Sergeant ALBERT SADUSKY, B 

Corporal JOHN HOFFMAN, B 

Private JAMES CLINTON, B 

MICHAEL DUNN, 2 B 

BARNEY MCCLOSKY, B 

WILLIAM ROCHER, B 

" JAMES SULLIVAN, B 

Sergeant B. E. ROWLAND, 1 C 

" ANDREW HARRIGON, C 

Private PATRICK BROWN, J -* C 

JAMES DONOVAN, C 

" JOHN FRY, 2 C 

WILLIAM HAYES, C 

ADOLPH JoiNFROio, 1 C 

DANIEL THEALE, C 

WILLIAM WILKIE, C 

LEON PAUL, D 

" JOSEPH DUPUY, F 

WILLIAM GALLAGHER, F 



Private GEORGE TYLER, 

" EUGENE GALLAGHER, 
i Sergeant THEODORE LEDERICK, 



Company. 
F 
G 
II 

" BENJAMIN C. ROLLINS," H 

Corporal JACOB STALL, 2 H 

Private JOHN BRENNAN, H 

" PATRICK DEViNE, 2 H 

" JOHN ELDRIDGE, H 

PATRICK GARRiTY, 2 H 

" Louis HARRELL, H 

" JOHN HAYES, H 

LOUIS ICKS," 2 H 

" JOHN LANE, H 

" THOMAS R. BLAKELY,* I 

Louis L. DREY, I 

" JAMES E. MARINER, 2 I 

FRANCIS McGAHAY, 2 I 

EDWIN RicE, 2 I 

Corporal OTTO FoucHE, 2 K 

Private HENRY GORDON, 2 K 

" GEORGE SEYMORE, 2 K 

PAUL E. TROSCLAIR, 2 K 



1ST LOUISIANA NATIVE GUARDS. 



Company. 



Sergeant JOSEPH FRICK, 
" CHARLES DUGUE, 
" ERNEST LEGROSS, 
Corporal ARTHUR MEYE, 
Private VALCOUR BROWN, 
CAMILE CAZAINIER, 
EDMOND CHAMPANEL, 
EUGENE DEGRUY, 
" CLEMENT GALICE, 
" Louis LACRAIE, 
" PIERRE MARTIEL, 
JOSEPH MOUSHAUD, 
ARMAND ROCHE, 
FRANCOIS SEVERIN, 
HENRY SMITH, 
J. BAPTISTE SMITH, 
MARTIN WHITE, 
" JOSEPH LEWIS, 

1 Not on the roll as printed in ( 
* Not on forge s duplicate roll. 



Private ROBERT LOTSUM, 
Corporal JULES FRITS, 
Private JAQUES AUGUSTE, 
" HENRY BRADFORD, 

JOSEPH CARTER, 
" ISIDORE CHARLES, 
EMILE CHATARD. 



Company. 

G 

H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 



FREDERICK DERINSBOURG, H 

FRANCIS FERNANDEZ, H 

ARTHUR GUYOT, H 

SAMUEL HALL, H 

JOHN HOWARD, H 

JOSEPH JACKSON, H 

RICHARD JOHN, H 

JOE JOSEPH, H 

AUGUSTE LEE, H 

HENRY LEE, H 

OSCAR POINTOISEAU, H 



Ida! Records, vol. xxvi.^part /.,//. 57-66. 
3 Not on muster roll. 



494 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Company. 

Private JOSEPH PATTERSON, Sr., H 

" JOSEPH PATTERSON, Jr., H 

PERRY RANDOLPH, H 

JAMES RICHARDS, H 

BENJAMIN STRING, H 

" RALEMY WALSE, H 

Sergeant JOHN J. CAGE, I 

" JOHN W. BERWEEKS, I 

Corporal THOMAS ALEXANDER, I 

3D LOUISIANA 

Company. 

Private ABRAM FROST, A 

" HENRY MARSHEL, A 

Sergeant WADE HAMBLETON, C 

Corporal MASSALLA LOFRA, C 

WILLIAM MACK, C 

E. THOMINICK, C 

Private DANIEL ANDERSON, C 

" BRACTON, C 

" WILLIAM DALLIS, C 

JACK DORSON, C 

" WILLIAM FINICK, C 

SOLOMON FLEMING, C 

" WILLIAM GREEN, C 

" GEORGE JOSEPH, C 

" VICTOR LEWIS, C 

" SAUNDERS, C 

TAYLOR, C 

" WHITE, C 

Sergeant THOMAS JEFFERSON, E 



Company. 

Private CHARLES BRANSON, I 

" ALEXANDER JONES, I 

" WILLIAM MCDOWELL, I 

COLLIN PAGE, I 

THOMAS REDWOOD, I 

" WILLIAM WOOD, I 

GEORGE BURKE, K 

ED. MADISON, K 

CHARLES SMITH, K 

NATIVE GUARDS. 2 

Company. 

Private W. HENRY, E 

" BENJAMIN JOHNSON, E 

" JOSEPH MILLER, E 

" THOMAS SIMMONS, E 

" J. W. THOMAS, E 

" EDWARD BROWN, H 

" ISAAC GILLIS, H 

" JOHNSON, H 

" SILAS HUFF, H 

" LEWIS PAULIN, H 

" JOHN Ross, H 

J. SMITH, H 

SILAS DICTON, I 

" LOUDON McDANIEL, I 

" JOHN TALLER, I 

" ISAAC TWIGGS, I 

" GEORGE WASHINGTON, I 

11 WILLIAMS, I 



I2TH MAINE. 



Company. 

Captain JOHN F. APPLETON, ! H 

Lieutenant DANIEL M. PHILLIPS, H 

" MARCELLUSL. STEARNS, E 

Private JOHN COOPER, A 

" ISAAC R. DOUGLASS, A 

" ALMON L. GILPATRICK, A 

" JOHN WELLER, A 

Sergeant SEYMOUR A. FARRINGTON, E 

Corporal HENRY S. BERRY, E 



Company. 

Private EDGAR G. ADAMS, E 

" OLIVER D. JEWETT, E 

NATHAN W. KENDALL, E 

JAMES POWERS, E 

Sergeant WILLIAM M. BERRY, PI 

" JAMES W. SMITH, I 

" HENRY TYLER,* H 

Private FRANK E. ANDERSON,* H 



I3TH MAINE. 
Lieutenant JOSEPH B. CARSON. 

1 Not OH the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.^fart /., pp. 57-66. 
a Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



APPENDIX. 



495 



I4TH MAINE. 



Company. 
Lieutenant-Colonel CHARLES S. 

BICKMORE. 

Major ALBION K. BOLAN. 
Captain GEORGE BLODGETT, K 
Lieutenant JOHN K. LAING, F 
" I. FRANK HOBBS, G 
" WARREN T. CROWELL, K 
* MERRILL H. ADAMS, B 
" WILLIAM H. GARDINER, G 
" CHARLES E. BLACK- 
WELL,* I 
Sergeant-Major CHARLES W. THING.* 
Sergeant Jos. F. CLEMENT, A 
" GEORGE C. HAGERTY, A 
Corporal WILLIAM C. TOWNSEND, A 
OTIS G. CROCKETT, A 
" ALVA EMERSON, A 
Private PETER BEAUMAN, A 
" WILSON BOWDEN, A 
" RICHARD J. COLBY, A 
SETH P. COLBY, A 
PETER MISHER,* A 
" IRVIN MORSE, A 
" EDWIN ORDWAY, A 
" ALBERT WEBSTER, 9 A 
Sergeant JOHN DOUGHERTY, B 
" JAMES SHEHAN, B 
Corporal PETER EMMERICH/ B 
Private JOHN DARBY, 3 B 
" BENJAMIN DOUGLASS, Jr., B 
" JAMES ELDERS, B 
" GEORGE N. LARRABEE, B 
" JOHN DAILEY, C 
" SIMON BEATTIE, E 



Company. 

Sergeant F. H. BLACKMAN, 1 F 

Jos. W. GRANT, F 

Corporal WILLIAM M. COBB, F 

" WILLIAM F. JENKINS, F 

Private EDWARD BETHUM, F 

" WILLIAM E. MERRIFIELD, F 

" HORACE SAWYER, F 

Sergeant ARCHELAUS FULLER, G 

Corporal EDWARD BRADFORD, G 

Private SAMUEL CONNELLY, G 

" EZRA A. MERRILL, G 

Sergeant CALVIN S. GORDON, H 

Corporal Louis C. GORDON, 2 H 

Private JOHN CUNNINGHAM, I 
Sergeant C. PEMBROKE CARTER, 
SAMUEL T. LOGAN, 
JOHN S. SMITH, 
" WILLIAM L. BUSKER, l 
Corporal JOHN HAYES, 
Private WILLIAM R. HAWKINS, 2 
" Jos. PREBLE, 

" ALBERT B. MESERVY, I 

" BENJAMIN F. ROLESON, I 

Sergeant WILLIAM MULLER, K 

" ALEX. WILSON, K 

" BAZEL HOGUE, K 

Corporal JOHN MOORE, K 

" WILLIAM DARBY, K 

Private DANIEL CONNERS, K 

" BENJAMIN SANDON, 1 K 

" GEORGE WATERHOUSE, K 

" JULIUS WENDLANDT, K 

4< CHARLES WILKERSON, K 

ELLIOT WITHAM. K 



2 1ST MAINE. 



Company. 

Captain JAMES L. HUNT, C 

" SAMUEL W. CLARKE, H 

Private J. MiNK, 2 A 

" OTIS SPRAGUE, 9 A 

41 SEWELL SPRAGUE,* A 

" JOEL RICHARDSON, 2 B 



Company. 

Private ANDREW P. WATSON, 2 B 

" JOHN H. BROWN, C 

JOHN E. HEATH, C 

CHARLES T. LORD, C 

GEORGE F. STAGEY, C 

WILLIAM N. TIBBETTS, C 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records , vol. xxvi.^part /.,//. 57-66. 
* Not on Birgis duplicate roll. s Not on muster roll. 



49 6 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Company. 

Corporal GALEN A. CHAPMAN, D 

" ALONZO L. FARROW, D 

Private DAVID O. PRIEST, S D 

DAVID B. COLE, 2 E 

" CHARLES S. CROWELL,* E 

MELVILLE MERRILL," E 

WILLIAM DOUGLASS, 2 F 

" GUSTAVUS HlSCOCK, 3 F 



Company. 



Corporal MINOT D. HEWETT, 
Private LEANDER WOODCOCK, 
" FREDERIC Gouo, 2 
THOMAS WYM AN, 2 
" JOHN B. MoRRiLL, 2 
JAMES S. JEWELL/ 
FRANK S. WADE,* 



22D MAINE. 



Company. 
H 
E 



Captain ISAAC W. CASE, 

" HENRY L. WOOD, 
Lieutenant GEORGE E. BROWN, A 
Private VAN BUREN CARLL, B 

" DANIEL MCPHETRES , B 

24TH 

Company. 

Sergeant GEORGE E. TAYLOR, H 



Company. 

Corporal D. S. CHADBOURNE, 1 E 

Sergeant SAMUEL S. MASON, F 

Private TIMOTHY N. ERWIN, G 

" AMAZIAH W. WEBB, K 



MAINE. 



Private JAMES HUGHES, 



Company. 
H 



28TH MAINE. 
Private JAMES N. MORROW. 

3D MASSACHUSETTS CAVALRY. 



Company. 

Colonel THOMAS E. CniCKERiNG. 2 
Captain JOHN L. SWIFT, * C 

" FRANCIS E. BOYD, H 

Lieutenant WILLIAM T. HODGES, C 
" HENRY S. ADAMS 2 

(Adjutant). 

DAVID P. MUZZEY, G 

" CHARLES W. C. RHOADS, H 

Sergeant-Major WILLIAM S. STEVENS. 

Private FERDINAND ROLLE, A 

Sergeant NATHAN G. SMITH, C 

HORACE P. FLINT, C 

Corporal GEORGE D. Cox, 1 C 

Private JOSEPH ELLIOTT, C 

" EDWARD JOHNSON, C 

Corporal PATRICK DUNLAY, G 

Sergeant JASON SMITH, 1 G 

Private SIMON DALY, G 

" PETER DONAHUE, G 



Company. 



Private JAMES GALLAGHER, 2 
" JOHN GRANVILLE, 
" JAMES MCLAUGHLIN, 
Sergeant PATRICK S. CURRY, 
Private SOLOMON HALL,* 
Sergeant WILLIAM WILDMAN, 
" JOHN KELLY, 
" GEORGE E. LONG, 
Corporal WILLIAM S. CALDWELL, 
" RANDALL F. HUNNEWELL, 
" WILLIAM P. PETHIE, 
" CHARLES MILLER, 

WILLIAM R. DAvis, 2 
Private EDWIN T. EHRLACHER, 
" GROS GRANADINO, 
ELI HAWKINS, 
PATRICK J. MONKS, 
" JOHN VELISCROSS, 
" GEORGE WILSON, 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records \ vol. xxvi.,part /., pp. S7- 66 - 

2 Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



APPENDIX. 



497 



I3TH MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY. 
Private CESAR DuBois, | Private JOHN V. WARNER," 

26TH MASSACHUSETTS. 
Lieutenant SETH BONNER, 2 Company F. 



30TH MASSACHUSETTS. 



Company. 

Captain EDWARD A. FISKE, D 

Lieutenant THOMAS B. JOHNSTON, H 

" NATHANIEL K. REED, C 

FERDINAND C. PoREE, 2 C 

Sergeant W. H. H. RICHARDS, B 

Corporal GEORGE E. COY, B 

" THOMAS COURTNEY, B 

Private JAMES M. BROWN, B 

" ANDREW COLE, B 

" MARTIN HASSETT, B 

" GEORGE TOOWEY, B 

Sergeant LUTHER H. MARSHALL, C 

Private WLLIAM MCCUTCHEON, C 

" CHARLES B. RICHARDSON, C 

" GEORGE SUTHERLAND, C 

Sergeant GEORGE H. MOULE, D 

JOHN E. RING, 2 D 



Company. 

Corporal CHARLES D. MOORE, D 

Private JAMES BOYCE, D 

" WILLIAM KENNY, D 

* HORACE F. DAVIS, E 

Sergeant MURTY QUINLAN, F 

" THOMAS A. WARREN, F 

Corporal MICHAEL MEALEY, F 

Private J. SULLIVAN, . 3 F 

Sergeant JOHN LEARY, G 

" WlLLARD A. HUSSEY, H 

Private JOHN BATTLES, H 

" JOHN HIGGINS, H 

" PAUL JESEMAUGHN, H 

" WILLIAM F. KAVANAGH, H 

" JOHN WELCH, H 

" JOHN WILSON, H 

Sergeant SAMUEL RYAN, I 



3 1ST MASSACHUSETTS. 



Company. 

Captain EDWARD P. HOLLISTER, A 

" SAMUEL D. HOVEY, K 
Lieutenant LUTHER C. HOWELL 

(Adjutant). 

JAMES M. STEWART, A 

Private CHESTER BEVINS, A 

" PATRICK CARNES, A 



Company. 

Private FRANK FITCH, A 

" WILLIAM THORINGTON, A 

" PETER VALUN, A 

" ETHAN H. COWLES, B 

" WILLIAM J. COLEMAN, K 

" MAURICE LEE, K 



38TH MASSACHUSETTS. 
Lieutenant FRANK N. SCOTT, Company D. 



48TH MASSACHUSETTS. 
Private MICHAEL ROACH, Company G. 

1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.,pari I., pp. 57-66. 
2 Not on Birge^s duplicate roll. 3 Jeremiah, Co. B, James, /, or Michael, F? 

32 



498 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



4QTH MASSACHUSETTS. 2 



Company. 

Lieutenant EDSON F. DRESSER, F 

Private JAMES W. BASSETT, A 

WILLIAM E. CLARK, A 

WILLARD L. WATKINS, A 

GEORGE DOWLEY, B 

HENRY E. GRIFFIN, B 

CONRAD HEINS, B 

Corporal THOMAS H. HUGHES, D 

Private PETER COME, D 



Company 

Private EDWIN N. HUBBARD, D 

" FRANKLIN ALLEN, H 

" GEORGE KNICKERBOCKER, H 

Corporal JOHN KELLEY, I 

Private ZERA BARNUM, I 

" PHILANDER B. CHADWICK, K 

" THOMAS MALONEY, K 

" ALBERT F. THOMPSON, K 



50TII MASSACHUSETTS. 



Company. 



Corporal E. S. TUBES, 



Private JAMES MILLER, 



5 3D MASSACHUSETTS. 

Company. I 
Private PETER T. DOWNS, G | Private PETER DYER, 

6TH MICHIGAN. 



Company. 

G 



Company. 
H 



Company. 

Private ROBERT ATWOOD, A 

JOHN R. COWLES, A 

" JAMES E. ROOT, A 

Sergeant LESTER Fox, C 

" ALBERT B. CHAPMAN, 2 C 

Corporal WILLIAM A. PORTER, C 

Private WALTER B. HUNTER, C 

" JOSEPH W. ROLPH, C 

Corporal CHARLES ST. JOHN, D 

Private PETER DORR, D 

" HENRY PLUMMER, ! D 

" TOBIAS PORTER, 2 D 

Sergeant FREDERICK BUCK, E 

WILLIAM L. LEINRIE, E 

Corporal HARRY S. HOWARD, E 

WILLIAM KELLY," E 

" HENRY RHODES, E 

Private JOHN AUSTIN, E 

" DANIEL FERO, E 

" WILLIAM HOGUE, S E 

" JAMES R. JOHNSON, E 

" AUGUSTUS JONES, E 

" WILLIAM RAPSHER, E 

1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records , vol. xxvi.^part I., pp. S7- 66 - 
a Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



Company. 
E 
F 



Private JACOB URWILER, 
" ALFRED E. DAY, 

" GEORGE W. SPARLING, F 

Sergeant GEORGE H. HARRIS, G 

Corporal PETER A. MARTINA G 

" FRANCIS M. HURD, G 

Private GEORGE W. DAILEY, S G 

" FREEMAN HADDEN,* G 

JOHN W. McBRiDE, 2 G 

ROBERT PAYNE, 2 G 

" CHARLES E. PLUMMER,* G 

ENOCH T. SIMPSON, a G 

" OSBORN SWEENEY, 2 G 

" THEODORE WEED, 2 G 

Sergeant A. C. WmTCOMB, 2 H 

Private HENRY B. Dow, 2 H 

" GEORGE A. BENET, 2 I 

Corporal LEVI A. LoGAN, 2 K 

" JOHN H. WiSNER, 2 K 

Private SIMON P. BoYCE, 2 K 

DAVID H. SERVis, 2 K 

FRANCIS E. Tooo, 2 K 



APPENDIX. 



499 



STH NEW HAMPSHIRE. 



Company. 

Captain Jos. J. LADD, 2 D 

Lieutenant DANA W. KING, A 



Private JOHN RiNEY, 2 
Sergeant JOHN FERGUSON, ! 



Company. 
B 



I6TH NEW HAMPSHIRE. 



Company. 

Captain JOHN L. RiCE, 2 H 

Lieutenant EDGAR E. ADAMS, F 



Company. 

Corporal CLINTON BOHANNON, C 
Private ASA BURGESS, C 



EDWARD J.O DoNNELL,C Corporal WILLIAM A. RAND, 



Corporal DANIEL C. DACEY, A 

Private EDWARD J. WILEY, B 



Private RUFUS L. JONES, 



75TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Private EDSON V. R. BLAKEMAN, B 
" LEVI COPPERNOLL, B 

" LENOX KENT, B 

" ETHAN BENNETT, l I 



Company. 

Private MARTIN- NORTON, I 

" JONAS L. PALMER, I 

" CHARLES WRIGHT, 1 I 



90TH NEW 

Company. 

Captain HONORE DE LA PATURELLE, 

E 

Sergeant HENRY M. CRYDENWISE, A 

Private NICHOLAS ScHMiLAN, 1 A 

ALBERT BARNES, 1 B 

" GEORGE ROBINSON, l B 

Corporal JOHN NEIL, F 

Private JOHN McCoRMiCK, F 

MARTIN MCNAMARA, F 



YORK. 

Company. 

Private JAMES PROCTOR, 2 F 

Corporal WILLIAM DALLY, 1 G 

Private TIMOTHY QUIRK, l G 

" SERRILER, 1 G 

" CHRISTOPHER AUTENREITH,K 
" JOHN HERON, K 

" AMOS MAKER, K 

" NELSON ROOT, K 



9 1ST NEW YORK. 

Company. 



Private SAMUEL WEBSTER, 

Sergeant JAMES A. SHATTUCK, B 

Private JAMES T. McCoLLUM, 2 B 

Sergeant EDWARD R. CONE, C 

Corporal PLATT F. VINCENT, C 



Company. 

Private EDWIN DE FRATE, C 

Corporal CHARLES E. BOWLES, E 
Private Jos. C. WALLACE, E 

Corporal CHARLES KEARNEY, K 



I I4TH NEW YORK. 1 



Company. 

Sergeant WILLIAM H. CALKINS, I 
Corporal NATHAN SAMPSON, G 

C. L. WlDGER, I 



Company. 

Private HERBERT CHISLIN, G 

" WARREN H. HOWARD, G 
" WILLIAM POTTER, G 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.^part I.,J>j>. 57-66. 

2 Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



5oo 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Il6TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Corporal FRANK BENTLEY, A 

Private ISAAC COLVIN, A 

" ANDREW COOK, A 

" DANIEL COVENSPARROW, A 

" PHILIP LINEBITS, A 

JACOB BERGTOLD, 2 B 

" SYLVESTER GLASS, 2 B 

Corporal GEORGE W. HAMMOND, 2 C 

Private HENRY D. DANIEL, C 

" CHARLES FISHER, C 

FREDERICK HILDERBRAND, C 

" CHRISTIAN GRAWi, 2 D 

WILLIAM W. McCuMBER, 2 D 

CORNELIUS FITZPATRICK, E 

" JAMES GALLAGHER, E 



Company. 



Private THEODORE HANSELL, 
" THOMAS MALONEY, 
" HENRY C. MILLER, 
" FREDERICK WEBBER, 
Corporal JOSHUA D. BAKER, 
Private JACOB DEMERLY, 
" FREDERICK JOST, 
" WILLIAM MARTIN, 
" SAMUEL WHITMORE, 
" HENRY TRARER/ 
" JACOB TSCHOLE, 
" JACOB ZUMSTEIN, 
" PHILIP MARY, 
Corporal ALBERT D. PRESCOT, 
Private NICHOLAS FEDICK, 




E 

E 

F 
G 
C, 
G 
II 
II 
II 
I 
K 
K 



I28TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Captain FRANCIS S. KEESE. C 

Sergeant THEODORE W. KRAFFT, A 

" FREEMAN SKINNER, A 

Corporal MILO P. MOORE, A 

Private Jos. M. DOWNING, A 

" JOHN N. HAGUE, A 

JARED HARRISON/ A 

Jos. C. MOSHER, A 

41 JAMES MOSHERMAN, A 

" FREEMAN OSTRANDER, A 

Sergeant CHARLES W. McKowN, C 

HENRY A. BRUNDAGE, C 

JOHN H. HAGAR, C 

Corporal CLEMENT R. DEAN, C 

" DAVID H. HAUNABURGH, C 

ELIJAH D. MORGAN, C 

GEORGE F. SIMMONS, C 

Private ALBERT COLE, C 

GEORGE CRONK, C 



Company. 

Private EDWARD DELAMATER, C 

" PETER DYER/ C 

" ALBERT P. FELTS, C 

CHARLES MURCH, C 

" DANIEL NEENAN, C 

" GEORGE A. NORCUTT, C 

" JOHN R. SCHRIVER, C 

" JOHN L. DELAMATER, D 

" WILLIAM PLATTO, D 

CHARLES P. W T ILSON, D 

Corporal CHARLES BROWER, F 

Sergeant C. M. DAVIDSON/ H 

Private JOHN A. WAMSLEY/ H 

CHARLES F. APPLEBY, I 

" STEPHEN H. MOORE, I 

Corporal SYLVESTER BREWER K 

Private THOMAS RICE, K 

WILLIAM VAN BAK, K 



1 3 1ST NEW YORK. 

Company. 

Lieutenant EUGENE H. FALES, C 
EUGENE A. HINCHMAN,H 
JAMES O CONNOR, F 
Louis F. ELLIS, I 



Company. 

Lieutenant JAMES E. McBETH, K 

Private WILLIAM BURRIS, 

CHARLES CAMERON, 2 B 

NICHOLAS HANSLER/ B 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.^part I.^pp. 57-66. 

2 Not on Birgt?s duplicate roll. 



APPENDIX. 



501 



Company. 

Private GEORGE E. STANFORD, B 

Sergeant ROBERT W. REID, C 

Corporal JONAS CHESHIRE, C 

" EDWARD NORTHUP, C 

" ISAAC OGDEN, C 

Private HENRY AYRES, C 



Company. 

Private RICHARD M. EDWARDS, C 

" THEODORE KELLEY, . C 

CHARLES W. WEEKS, C 

JACOB HOHN, I 

FERDINAND NESCH, I 



I33D NEW 
Company. 



YORK. 



Captain JAMES K. FULLER, 2 C 

Lieutenant RICHARD W. BUTTLE, D 

HENRY O CONNOR, I 

Private NICOLAS PITT, B 

" NELSON BEANE, C 

" PATRICK BOYNE, C 

JOSEPH FINN, C 

PETER HUDSON, C 

" JAMES G. KELLY, C 

Corporal JOHN EISEMANN, D 

Private JOHN NEWMAN/ D 

" JOHN A. SHEPARD, 1 D 

PATRICK CALLANAN, E 



Company. 
F 
G 
G 



Private CYRUS TOOKER, 
Sergeant GEORGE GIEHL, 
Private JOSEPH J. BURKE, 

" GEORGE SCHLEIFER, G 

JAMES BRENNAN, I 

" JOHN H. DAWSON, I 

" JOHN H. GALE, I 

Sergeant GEORGE HAMEL, K 

Corporal WILLIAM STRATTON/ K 

Private PATRICK COSTELLO, K 

" HENRY HODINGER. K 

PHILIP READY, K 



Private INNUS A. GRAVES, 1 
" THOMAS HoRTON, 1 
" HENRY JONES, l 
" PHILIP LEWIS, 

BENJAMIN RoBERSON, 1 

" SIMON WASHBURN, 1 

Sergeant C. G. EARLE, 1 
" DANIEL B. DECS/ 
" CLEMENT Y. CARLE, 
Corporal J. B. BARLISON, 1 
Private STEPHEN R. AcKER, 1 
" MATHEW DIETS, 
" STEPHEN ERNHOUT, 1 

JOHN HERRINGER, 1 

A. JARVIS HATER/ 
" ABRAHAM KEYSER/ 
ALEXANDER LowN, 1 

F. L. SCAMPMOUSE, 1 
" A. C. SCHRIVER, 1 

W. SHADDUCK, 1 
" A. G. SLATER, 1 



I56TH NEW YORK. 

Company. Company. 

B Private J. R. SLATER/ C 

B " JOHN STRIVINGER, 1 C 

B " WILLIAM THADDUCK/ C 

B Corporal RICHARD ELLMANDORPH/D 

B " ARCHIBALD TERWILLI- 

B GER, 1 E 

C Sergeant JOHN D. FINK, F 

C " HIRAM S. BARROWS/ F 

C Corporal GEORGE BRADSHAW/ F 

C Private JAMES R. LANE/ F 

C " EDWARD LITER/ F 

C " MICHAEL McGoRM/ F 

C " CHARLES L. MEGUIRE/ F 

C Lieutenant EDWARD OLRENSHAW/ H 

C Private JOHN MARVELL/ H 

C Captain ORVILLE D. JEWETT/ I 

C Lieutenant JAMES J. RANDALL/ I 

C " CHARLES W. KENNEDY/ I 

C Sergeant EDWARD STEERS/ I 

C " WILLIAM S. COSTILYOU/ I 
C 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records^ -vol. xxvi.^part /.,//. 57-66. 

2 Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



502 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



Company. 

Sergeant THOMAS F. DONNELLY/ I 

" THOMAS SAUNDERS/ ,1 

Private JAMES BROUGHAM, 1 I 

WELKIN MOOREHOUSE, I 

JOHN PROVOST, I 

" JAMES WATSON, ] I I 

Sergeant CHARLES B. WESTON, K i 

HENRY ABBOTT, 2 K | 

Corporal IVAN NETTERBERG, K 

" ISAAC W. FULLAGER, K 

Private SIMEON FRITTER/ K 



Company. 

Private CHARLES GAY K 

" AUGUST LEONARD, K 

" NEIL NEILSON, K 

SAMUEL OUTERKIRK, K 

CHARLES PODRICK, K 

" SVEN SVENSON, 1 K 

CHARLES STUMP, K 

" AUGUSTUS SWENSON, K 

" JOSEPH VON MATT, K 

THEODORE WEBSTER, K 

ALEXANDER WEHL K 



I59TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Captain ROBERT McD. HART, F 

Lieutenant ALFRED GREENLEAF, Jr.,B 

DUNCAN RICHMOND, H 

Private AMOS HARK, B 

GEORGE W. HATFIELD, B 

" HUGH MCKENNY, B 

" JOHN TAYLOR, B 

Sergeant MICHAEL HOGAN, C 

Private CHRISTIAN SCHNACK, C 

Sergeant JAMES T. PERKINS, E 



Company. 

Private JOHN THORP, E 

Sergeant GILBERT S. GULLEN, F 

Private BARTHOLOMEW TOSER, F 

Corporal E. HoLLENBACK, 1 H 

Private H. MclLRAVY, 1 H 

D. C. McNEiL, 1 H 

" JAMES BRAZIER, 2d, I 

" GEORGE W. SCHOFIELD, I 

Sergeant THOMAS BERGEN, 1 K 



I60TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 
Lieutenant-Colonel JOHN B. VAN 

PETTEN. 

Assistant Surgeon DAVID H. ARM 
STRONG. 
Lieutenant WILLIAM J. VANDEU- 

SEN, A 

Lieutenant ROBERT R. SEELEY, I 

Private OSCAR CURTIS, - B 

A. A. HAMMER, C 

JOSEPH S. INSLEY, 2 C 

HENRY F. MC!NTYRE, C 

GEORGE MATTHIES, C 



Company. 

Sergeant J. SAHVEY, 1 E 

Private MICHAEL HILL, E 

" JOHN LONG, E 

JOHN O LAHEY/ 2 E 

Sergeant B. F. MAXSON, G 

ELON SPINK, G 

" SAMUEL KRIEGELSTEIN, G 

" JACOB MCDOWELL, K 

" MICHAEL HEWITT, K 

Private ARTHUR CLARKSON, K 

" LEWIS KRAHER, K 

" JOHN RAINCE, K 



l6lST NEW YORK. 
Company. 



Major CHARLES STRAWN. 2 
Lieutenant WILLIAM B. KINSEY 

(Adjutant). 

1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records , vol. xxvi.,part /.,//. 57-66. 

2 Not on Dirge s duplicate roll. 



Company. 

Captain BENJAMIN T. VAN TUYL, A 
Sergeant GEORGE E. ROSENKRANS,* A 
Corporal CLARK EVANS, A 



APPENDIX. 



503 



Company. 

Private WILLIAM JOLLEY, A 

" CORNELIUS OSTERHOUT, A 

" JAMES ANDERSON, B 

Sergeant LEWIS E. FITCH, C 

Corporal MAHLON M. MURCUR, C 

Private EDGAR L. DEWITT, C 

" HENRY W. MEAD, C 

GEORGE OLIVER, C 

" CHARLES SPAULDING, C 

Sergeant DENNIS LACY, D 

" BRADFORD SANFORD, D 

Private JAMES E. BORDEN, D 



Company. 

Private LUMAN PHILLEY, D 

" THOMAS A. SAWYER, D 

" JOHN VAN DOUSEN, D 

" MADISON M. COLLIER, E 

Sergeant BASKIN FREEMAN, F 

Private CHARLES ROBINSON, F 

Sergeant DE WITT C. AMEY, H 

Corporal SAMUEL ROBINSON, H 

Private JOHN F. YOUNG, H 

" JOHN REAS/ I 

Sergeant SILAS E. WARREN, K 

Private CHARLES A. HERRICK, K 



l62D NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Captain WILLIAM P. HUXFORD, G 

Lieutenant JOHN H. VAN WYCK, G 

" WILLIAM KENNEDY, E 
" R. W. LEONARD 

(Adjutant). 1 

Sergeant JOHN McCoRMicK, A 

" THOMAS BARRY,- A 

" JOHN E. BURKE, B 

" HENRY LANDT, C 

" FREDERICK SHELLHASS, C 

Private ANTON BLEISTEIN, C 

WILLIAM F. EISELE, C 

" JOHN ENGEL, C 

ALEX. HERRMAN, C 

" LEO KALT, C 

" CONRAD SIEGLE, C 

Sergeant THEODORE CHURCHILL, D 

" WILLIAM KELLEY, 1 D 

Corporal THOMAS McCoNNELL, D 

Sergeant JAMES STACK, E 

GEORGE W. KEILEY, E 

Corporal JOHN MCLAUGHLIN, E 

GEORGE W. WAITE, E 

JAMES BALL, E 

" LORENZO SULLY, E 

Private THOMAS CLAREY, E 

" PETER CORBETT, E 

" THOMAS DUFF, E 

DANIEL W. DUNN, E 



Company. 

Private PATRICK GINETY, E 

" DANIEL GRAY, E 

" LAWRENCE HALLEY, E 

" GEORGE LARMORE, E 

" JAMES MCCALL, E 

" MATHEW MULLEN, E 

" THOMAS PERRY/ E 

" PATRICK SWEENY, E 

Corporal GUSTAVE NORMANN, F 

Private JOHN G. THALMANN, F 

Sergeant GEORGE W. GIBSON, G 

" EDMUND NOURSE, G 

Private WILLIAM FERGUSON, G 

" WILLIAM KEATING, G 

Corporal EDWARD MURPHY, I 

" JOSEPH MARTINES, I 

" MAXAMILLIAN MILLER, I 

" DAVID HART/ I 

" GEORGE WELCH, I 

Private JAMES BRADY, K 

" PETER CHERRY, K 

EUGENE DETRICH, K 

" JOHN FRAZER, K 

Jos. GITEY, K 

" FLEMING KNIPE, K 

" DOMINICK MCCONNELL, 1 K 

JOHN MCDONALD, K 

" LEWIS YOUNG, K 



1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.,part /.,//. 

2 Not on Birge s duplicate roll. 



504 



THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



I65TH NEW YORK. 

Company. 

Captain FELIX AGNUS, A 

" HENRY C. INWOOD, E 

Lieutenant GUSTAVUS F. LINGUIST,C 



Sergeant WALTER T. HALL, A 

" WILLIAM T. SINCLAIR, A 

" JOHN FLEMING, A 

" JOHN W. DICKINS, A 

Corporal RICHARD BAKER, A 

" JOSIAH C. DIXON, A 

" GEORGE E. ARMSTRONG, A 

Private JAMES E. BARKER, A 

" PETER BEAUCAMP, A 

" SAMUEL DAVIS, A 

GUSTAV DRUCKHAMMER, A 

" THOMAS KERNEY/ A 

" DAVID LEWIS, A 

GEORGE MCKINNEY, A 

" GEORGE A. METZEL, A 

" ELIAS H. TUCKER, A 



Company. 

Private JOHN H. VALK, A 

" EDWARD VASS, A 

Drummer MICHAEL DoNOHUE, 1 A 

Private ELISHA E. DENNISON,* B 

" PATRICK H. MATTHEWS, B 

" JOHN CASSIDY, C 

" ROBERT HOBBEY, C 

LAURENTZ LANGE, C 

" JOHN LAUGHTMAN, C 

Corporal JAMES F. CAMPBELL, D 

Private EUGENE DEFLANDRE, 1 D 

" HENRY EDWARD, l D 

" HENRY R. LooMis, 1 D 

" THOMAS BELCHER, E 

" JOHN FEIGHERY, E 

" STEPHEN GILLEN, E 

" EDWIN A. SHAW, E 

" WILLIAM VERO, E 



I73D NEW YORK. 
Private ALEXANDER HENDRICKSON, Company C. 

YORK. 



I/4TH NEW 
Company. 

Lieutenant EDWARD MARRENER, I 

LATHAM A. FISH, E 

EUGENE E. ENNSON, C 

" CHARLES EMERSON, 2 I 

Sergeant SAMUEL WILSON/ A 

" MORRIS LANCASTER, A 

Corporal Louis HAGEMAN, A 

Private WILLIAM COOPER, A 

JOHN CULLEN, A 

" JOHN MALONEY, A 

Corporal GEORGE ANDERSON, B 

Sergeant JOHN GRAY, C 

Private JOHN KUHFUSS, C 

" GUSTAVUS HELLER, C 

" GEORGE W. JONES, C 

WILLIAM MCELROY, l C 

" ERNST SCHMIDT, C 

Sergeant JOHN KENNEY, E 

Corporal JOSEPH H. MURPHY, E 

1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records, vol. xxvi.,part /., //. 57-66. 

2 Not on Birge s duplicate roll. 



Company. 

Private THOMAS WILLIAMS, E 

" THOMAS FLETCHER, G 

" HENRY D. LASHER, G 

* CHARLES N. THOMPSON, G 

Sergeant CHARLES GARDNER, H 

Private THOMAS CARROLL, H 

" WILLIAM JOHNSON, H 

HENRY JONES, H 

" CORNELIUS MOHONEY, H 

" JOSEPH MESSMER, I 

" HENRY POOLER, I 

" RICHARD SCHOTTLER, I 

Sergeant CHARLES DRANER, K 

Private FREDERICK BANDKA, K 

" WILLIAM HEINRICHS, K 

" EDWARD KUHLMAN, K 

" JULIUS LADIGES, K 

" FREDERICK NILSEN, K 



APPENDIX. 



505 



I75TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Lieutenant SEIGMUND STERNBERG, i 
Sergeant Major ABRAHAM LOEB. 
Private FRANK MARKHAM, A 

Corporal TIMOTHY ALLEN, B 

Private OTTO DORNBACK, C 

" RICHARD O GORHAM, C 



Company. 

Private PATRICK MANERING, D 

Sergeant WILLIAM O CALLAGHAN, E 

" JAMES HILLIS," E 

41 JAMES H. CALLOR, 1 E 

Private JOHN O CONNER, E 

Corporal PHILIP DAUB, S K 



I/7TH NEW YORK. 



Company. 

Sergeant JOHN D. BROOKS, A 

Corporal PERCY B. S. COLE, A 

Private SEYMOUR D. CARPENTER, A 

" JOHN J. GALLUP, A 

" THOMAS J, GARVEY, A 

WILLIAM HEMSTREET, A 

JOHN HOUSEN, A 

BARNEY LA VARY, A 

" RICHARD C. MAIN, A 

" ADAM MILLIMAN, A 

HENRY VON LEHMAN, A 

" WlLLARD LOUNDSBERY, 1 A 

Corporal GEORGE A. MCCORMICK, B 



Company. 
B 
B 



Private EBEN HALLEY, 

" DAVID N. KIRK, 

" CHARLES M. SMITH, B 

" SAMUEL H. STEVENS, Jr., B 

" JOHN GORMAN, C 

" MOSES DE COSTER, D 

CHARLES W. LAPE, E 

Corporal ALONZO G. LUDDEN, G 

Private S. W. MEISDEN, 2 G 

" ELIAS NASHOLD, G 

" JEDDIAH TOMPKINS, G 

" RUSSELL W. COONEYS, H 

" GEORGE MERINUS, I 



8TH VERMONT. 
Captain JOHN L. BARSTOW, 1 - 2 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General. 



Company. 

C 
C 
C 



Private JOHN ADAMS, 1 
" JAMES K. BENNETT, 
" FRANCIS C. CUSHMAN, 

T. E. HARRIMAN/ C 

" FRANK LAMARSH, 1 C 

JOVITE PlNARD, 1 C 

Sergeant GEORGE G. HuTCHiNS, 1 E 

Corporal N. H. HiBBARD, 1 E 

" BENJAMIN F. BOWMAN, ! E 

Private THOMAS F. FERRIN, V E 

" THOMAS HOLLAND/ E 



Company. 

Sergeant BYRON J. HURLBURT, F 

Corporal EDWARD SAurus, 2 F 

Private GEORGE N. FANEUF, F 

" DAVID LAROCK, Jr., F 

" ABNER NILES, F 

Corporal ABNER N. FLINT, G 

Private SEYMOUR N. COLES, G 

LYMAN P. LUCE, G 

" ANDREW B. MORGAN, H 

PATRICK BOLAN, I 

" D. MARTIN, 1 I 



2D U. S ARTILLERY. 
Private J. D. HiCKLEY, 1 Company C. 

1 Not on the roll as printed in Official Records , vol. xxvi.^part /., pp. 57-66. 

2 Not on Birge s duplicate roll. 



506 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 



4TH WISCONSIN. 



Company. 

Lieutenant ISAAC N. EARL, C 

Corporal L. C. BARTLETT, C 



Company. 
Private PATRICK PIGEON, ! A 



NOTE. On the 28th of June, 1863, Birge reported to Headquarters, 2 
battalions of stormers, of 8 companies each, present for duty 67 officers, 826 
men, total 893. His duplicate roll, evidently of later date than June 28th and 
not later than July 7th, accounts for 10 companies with 71 officers and 865 
men, total 936. The list here printed gives 1,230 names, probably representing 
1,228 persons. 



ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION 2 

Proposed between the commissioners on the part of the garrison of Port Hudson, 
La., and the forces of the United States before said place, July 8, 1863. 

ARTICLE I. Maj.-Gen. F. Gardner surrenders to the United States forces 
under Major-General Banks the place of Port Hudson and its dependencies, 
with its garrison, armament, munitions, public funds, and material of war, in 
the condition, as nearly as may be, in which they were at the hour of cessation 
of hostilities, viz., 6 A.M., July 8, 1863. 

ART. II. The surrender stipulated in Article I. is qualified by no condition, 
save that the officers and enlisted men composing the garrison shall receive the 
treatment due to prisoners of war, according to the usages of civilized warfare. 

ART. III. All private property of officers and enlisted men shall be respected 
and left to their respective owners. 

ART. IV. The position of Port Hudson shall be occupied to-morrow at 7 A.M. 
by the forces of the United States, and its garrison received as prisoners of war 
by such general officer of the United States service as may be designated by 
Major-General Banks, with the ordinary formalities of rendition. The Con 
federate troops will be drawn up in line, officers in their positions, the right of 
the line resting on the edge of the prairie south of the railroad depot, the left 
extending in the direction of the village of Port Hudson. The arms and colors 
will be piled conveniently, and will be received by the officers of the United 
States. 

ART. V. The sick and wounded of the garrison will be cared for by the 
authorities of the United States, assisted, if desired by either party, by the 
medical officers of the garrison. 

1 Not on Birge s duplicate roll. 

2 See ante p. 231 and Official Records , vol. xxvi.^part I.^pp. 52-54. 



NOTE ON EARLY S STRENGTH. 
BY BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. C. DAWES, U.S.V. 

The return of the Army of Northern Virginia for October 31, 1864, gives 
the present for duty " in the Second Army Corps commanded by General 
Early, in the infantry divisions of Ramseur (Early s old division), Rodes, 

Gordon, Wharton, Kershaw, and the artillery as 12,516 

The cavalry division of General Lomax, by its return of September 

loth, numbered for duty 3.605 

The cavalry brigade of General Rosser l about i,3 

The cavalry division of General Fitz Lee 2 1,600 

The casualties of the army at Cedar Creek were 3> IOQ 

Total force engaged at battle of Cedar Creek 22,121 

Lomax s division probably lost 500 men in the different actions prior to 
Cedar Creek after its return of September loth. To offset this no account is 
made of the " Valley Reserves " (men over and boys under conscript age) and 
" detailed men " (those subject to conscription who were permitted to remain 
at home to do necessary work), who joined the army after its defeat at Fisher s 
Hill. General Lee wrote General Early 27th September : All the reserves 
in the Valley have been ordered to you." That the order was obeyed appears 
from the following extracts, from the diary of Mr. J. A. Waddell of Staunton, 
Virginia, printed in the " Annals of Augusta County, Va.," page 325 et seq. 

"Saturday, September 24 [1864]: A dispatch from General Early this 
morning assured the people of Staunton that they were in no danger, that his 
army was safe and receiving reinforcements. He however ordered the detailed 
men to be called out. . . . October 15 : Nothing talked of except the 
recent order calling into service the detailed men. . . . The recent order 
takes millers from their grinding, but men sent from the army undertake in 
some cases to run the machinery. Farmers are ordered from their fields and 
barns and soldiers are detailed to thresh the wheat. All men engaged in 
making horseshoes are ordered off so that our cavalry and artillery horses will 
have to go barefooted." 

The return of the Army of Northern Virginia for 3Oth November, 1864, 
confirms the figures given above. It shows " present for duty " in the infantry 

1 Rosser s brigade belonged to Hampton s old division. This division, "with Rosser s 
brigade, numbered for duty September 10, 1864, 2.942. On October 31^, without Rosser s 
brigade, 1,547. It is fair to assume the difference as Rosser s strength. 

2 Fitz Lee s division on return of August -$ist numbered for duty 1,683,- on y>th 
November, 1,524. 

507 



508 THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS. 

division of Ramseur, Rodes, Gordon, Wharton, and Kershaw, and the Second 

Corps artillery 15,070 

In the cavalry divisions of Fitz Lee and Lomax (2 brigades, Payne s 

and Rosser s, not reporting) 3,625 

Add for Rosser s and Payne s brigades 2,000 

Total of Gen. Early s army, November soth 20,695 

Kershaw had returned to Richmond, but the above figures include the 
organizations present at Cedar Creek. 

CINCINNATI, August 24, 1890. 



INDEX. 



Abbot, H. L., Captain, 60. 
Abert, William S., Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 60. 
Acadians, 122. 
Alabama (C), 58, 59, 265. 
Alabama, 1st (C), 159, 173. 
Albatross, 79, 81-84, 148, ^S- 
Alden, James, Captain U.S.N., 61, 

243- 

Alexander, Barton S., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 409. 

Alexander, Richard H., Medical Di 
rector, 60. 

Alexandria, La., 86 ; Banks marches 
to, 142, 144-148 ; quits, 152, 284, 
287-294 ; retreat to, 326-334 ; the 
dam, 337-342 ; evacuated, 344. 

Allaire, Anthony J., Captain, 101, 341. 

Allen, Charles F., Major, 390. 

Allen, Henry W., Colonel (C), 35; 
killed, 38. 

Allen, Pickering D., Lieutenant, 89. 

" American People, the voice of the," 

392, 393- 

American soldier, character of, 209, 
210. 

Anderson, R. H., Lieutenant-General 
(C), 373-378. 

Andrews, George L., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 57, 67, 177, 179, 223, 231, 
232, 257, 258, 260-262. 

Andrews, J. L., 1 Captain, 324. 

Anglo-American, transport, 214. 

Annable, Thomas H., Captain, 281. 

Anthony, Robert C., Major, 238. 

Aransas Pass, Tenn., 276. 

Arizona, 104, 105, 121, 126, 148, 154, 
165, 268-272. 

Arkansas, Confederate ram, 29 ; fights 
U. S. fleet, 29-31 ; at Baton Rouge, 
33, 35, 37, 38 J destroyed, 38. 

Arkansas, co-operating column from, 
(see Steele, Frederick?) 

Arkansas, nth (C), 189. 



Arkansas, I4th (C), 161. 

Arkansas, i6th (C), 220, 221. 

Arkansas, lyth (C), 189. 

Arkansas division (C) (see Churchill}. 

Arkansas Post, 70. 

Army of the Shenandoah, 366, 442. 

Army of the Tennessee, 142, 143, 284, 
285, 292 ; detachment of (see 
Smith, A. y.). 

Arnold, Richard, Captain, 60 ; Briga 
dier-General, 96, 167, 186, 189 ; 
commands cavalry, 328. 

Artillery left in Louisiana, 353. 

Assault, of May 27, 1863, 166-183 \ 
of June 14, 1863, 194-204. 

Assaults rarely succeed, 205-208. 

Atchafalaya River, 46, 72, 73, 85-88, 
122 ; Confederate Navy on the, 88, 
89 ; Banks crosses, 153, 154, 159 ; 
bridge of steamboats, 346, 347. 

Atlantic, transport, 59. 

Attakapas, 73. 

Augur, C. C., Major-General, 56, 57, 
61, 66, 77, 130 ; at Plains Store, 
160-162 ; at Port Hudson, 159-162, 
165, 166 ; first assault, 168, 169, 
174-176, 179-181 ; commands left 
wing, 1 88 ; second assault, 194, 
200, 228, 232 ; succeeded by Weit- 
zel, 233, 250, 362, 404. 

Augiista, 57. 

Averell, W. W., Brigadier-General, 
359, 361, 362, 365, 376, 378, 379, 
391, 401. 

Avery Salt Works, 123, 124. 

Avoyelles Prairie, affair on the, 344, 
345- 

Babcock, Willoughby, Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 170, 394. 

Bache, T. H., Surgeon, Medical 
Director, 8. 

Bacon, Edward, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
199. 



1 Probably James L. A ndet 
509 



5io 



INDEX. 



Bagby, A. P., Colonel (C), 63, 97, 

302, 317, 325, 330, 344. 
Bailey, Joseph, Lieutenant-Colonel, 

263, 330, 337, 338, 340, 341, 346, 

347- 

Bailey, Theodorus, Captain, 13. 
Bainbridge, E. C., Captain, 90, 98, 

99, 171, 210, 221, 224, 267. 
Bains, J. M., Lieutenant, 212. 
Baker, John P., Captain, 281. 
Ball, W. H., Colonel, 425-427. 
Baltic, transport, 59. 
Baltimore and Ohio Railway as an 

objective, 361, 362, 363, 371, 372, 

374, 377- 

Baltimore, troops from, 56. 

Banks, Nathaniel P., Major-General, 
assigned to command, 54-56, 66 ; 
at Washington, 55, 56 ; orders from 
government, 56, 60, 61 ; relieves 
Butler, 60 ; difficulties, 67, 68-71 ; 
staff, 69 ; and Farragut s plans, 
76-84 ; correspondence with Grant, 
84 ; Teche campaign, 85-134 ; cor 
respondence with Grant, 135-142, 
I 57> J 58, 183, 184 ; communica 
tion with Grant, 135-142, 149- 
I S I t J 57 > authorized to command 
united forces on Mississippi, 139 ; 
marches to Alexandria, 144149 ; 
changing plans, 149, 150 ; moves 
on Port Hudson, 152-162 ; opera 
tions against Port Hudson, 163- 
234 ; summons Gardner to surrender, 
193 ; calls for volunteers as stormers, 
212 ; correspondence with Halleck, 
214 ; Corps d Afrique, 219, 261, 
262 ; correspondence with Gardner, 
227-229 ; accepts surrender of Port 
Hudson, 231 ; thanked by Govern 
ment, 256, 257 ; plans to go against 
Mobile, 264 ; ordered to occupy 
Texas, 264-266 ; resulting opera 
tions, 266-276 ; winter quarters, 
277-281 ; mounts seven infantry regi 
ments, 280 ; in the Red River cam 
paign, 282-348 ; under Canby, 347. 

Banks s expedition, 57-60. 

Barnard, J. G., Brigadier-General, 6. 

Barnes, James, Captain, 260. 

Barney s Point, La., 26. 

Barre s Landing, La., 144. 

Barrett, Richard, Captain, 49, 73, 107, 
no, 125, 154, 252. 

Barrett, William M., Captain, 203. 

Bartlett, Ozias E., Lieutenant, 221. 

Bartlett, William F., Colonel, 
wounded, 182. 

Bassett, Chauncey J., Captain, 21 ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel, 173, 174. 



Baton Rouge, La., 7, 17, 18, 22 ; 

battle of, 32-42 ; described, 33, 34 ; 

losses, 38, 39 ; evacuated, 40-42 ; 

fortified, 41, 42 ; reoccupied, 61, 

77, 78. 

Batteries left in Louisiana, 353. 
Battle, C. A., Brigadier-General (C) 

385- 

Baylor, George W., Colonel (C), 330. 
Bayou Boeuf, La., 47 ; surrender, 

240, 242. 

Bayou Bourbeau, La., affair near, 

277. 

Bayou Carencro, La., 126. 
Bayou Choupique, La., 102, no, 115. 
Bayou City (C), 64. 
Bayou Cypremort, La., 116, 119, 120. 
Bayou Fordoche, affair near, 273. 
Bayou Fusilier, La., 126. 
Bayou Plaquemine, 87, 88. 
Bayou Ramos, La., 89 ; abandoned, 

241, 242. 

Bayou Sara, La., Grant s promise to 
meet Banks at, 136-139, 142, 151, 
158; Banks lands at, 158, 159. 

Bayou Sorrel, La., 87, 88. 

Beal, George L., Colonel, 327, 328, 

331, 333, 343, 350, 381, 382, 388, 
390, 398, 415, 440, 442, 445. 

Beall, W. N. R., Brigadier-General 

(C), 62, 164, 182. 
Bean, Sidney A., Lieutenant-Colonel, 

36, 130, 131, 154 ; Colonel, killed,, 

203. 
Beauregard, G. T., General (C), 19, 

20, 26. 

Beck, W. B., Lieutenant, 162. 
Beckwith, E. G., Colonel, 60, 267, 

273- 
Beecher, Harris H. , Assistant Surgeon, 

394- 

Bee, H. P., Brigadier-General (C), 
302, 304, 316-319, 324, 329, 330, 

332, 333- 

Belfast, transport, 314. 

Belle Grove House, Cedar Creek, 412, 
418, 420-423, 427. 

Bell, H. H., Captain, 13; Commo 
dore, 257, 267. 

Benedict, Lewis, Colonel, 160, 165, 
281, 309, 310, 315-320. 

Benton, 144. 

Benton, W. P., Brigadier-General, 
258, 268. 

Bermuda Hundred, Va., 355, 360, 

365- 

Berryville Canon, Va., 379-381. 
Berryville-Clifton Line, 371. 
Berryville, Va., 371, 377. 
Berwick Bay, La., 48, 73, 89. 



INDEX. 



511 



Bethel Place, 92-103. 

Bickmore, A. S., Lieutenant-Colonel, 
213. 

Bid well, D. D., Brigadier-General, 
436. 

Birge, Henry W., Colonel, 107, 108, 
no, in, 113, 114, 117, 187, 199 ; 
to lead stormers, 212, 229, 232, 252, 
260, 273, 281, 327-332, 350, 361, 
381, 383-386, 390, 393, 394, 398, 
414, 415, 417, 421, 432, 434, 436, 
446. 

Bisland, battle of, 92-103 ; Camp, 86. 

Bissell, George P., Colonel, in. 

Black Hawk, 257 ; transport, 289. 

Black River, La., 86, 286. 

Blair s Landing, La., 313, 314 ; affair 
near, 325. 

Blanchard, Julius W., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 216, 332. 

"Blue-Jacket" batteries, 186, 211, 
232. 

Boardman, F. A., Major, 17, 21, 22. 

Boardman, Mary A., transport, 64. 

Boggy Bayou, La., 324. 

Bonnet Carre, La., 17. 

Boone, R. M., Captain, 161, 162. 

Bourne, Edmund L., Master s Mate, 
186. 

Bowen, James, Brigadier-General, 57, 

67. 
Bradbury, Albert W., Captain, 175, 

252, 253, 267 ; Major, 365, 385, 398. 
Bradley, Theodore, Lieutenant, in, 

113- 

Bragg, Braxton, General (C), 45. 
Bragg, U. S. captured ram, 30. 
Brannan, J. M., Brigadier-General, 

155- 

Brashear, La., 48, 73, 86 ; surprise 
and surrender of, 236-241 ; re- 
occupied, 252, 254, 255. 

Braxton, C. M., Lieutenant-Colonel 
(C), 383, 392. 

Breaux Bridge, La., 125. 

Breckenridge, John C., Major-General, 
25, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 217, 39 1 - 

Bridge of steamboats, 346, 347. 

Brigades (see under Names of Com 
manders). 

Brooklyn, 13, 17, 25. 

Brownell, W. R., Medical Director, 

439- 
Brown, Isaac N., Commander (C), 29 ; 

destroys Arkansas (C), 38. 
Brown, J. H., Lieutenant, 36, 43. 
Brown s Gap, Va., 402. 
Brownsville, Tex., seized, 275. 
Bryan, Michael K., Colonel, 92, 95. 
Buchanan, James, portrait, 42. 



Buchanan, T. McKean, Commander, 
U.S.N., 46, 73; killed, 74. 

Buchel, A., Colonel (C), 318, 319. 

Buckley, W. W., Captain, 365, 421. 

Buford, Abraham, Brigadier-General 
(C), 164. 

Bulkley, Charles S., 138. 

Bullen, Joseph D. , Major, 243, 246, 247. 

Bunker Hill, Va., 366, 371, 374. 

Burbridge, S. G., Brigadier-General, 
273, 274, 277. 

Burrell, Isaac S., Colonel, 62-64. 

Burt, Charles A., Major, 112 ; Lieu 
tenant-Colonel, 171. 

Butler, B. F., Major-General, com 
mands expedition, 5-7 ; capture of 
New Orleans, 6 16 ; commands 
Department of the Gulf, 7, 8 ; first 
attempt on Vicksburg, 17, 19, 20, 
23 ; and battle of Baton Rouge, 39 
42, 45 ; occupies La Fourche, 46 ; 
equips gunboats, 46 ; raises Louisi 
ana regiments, 49 ; raises colored 
regiments, 49, 50 ; Halleck promises 
reinforcements, 51 ; relieved, 60, 
85, 218, 352, 360, 362. 

Butte-a-la-Rose, La., 86, 87, 122, 
126, 128. 

Cahawba, transport, 272. 

Cahill, Thomas W., Colonel, 39, 239, 
260. 

Cailloux, Andrew, Captain, 174. 

Calhoun, 46, 48, 73, 88, 89, 104, 121, 
126. 

Cambria, transport, 62, 65. 

Cameron, Robert A., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 288, 305, 311, 312, 316, 328, 
330, 333, 35i. 

Camp Bisland, La., 86, 92, 105, 109. 

Camp, Charles H., Lieutenant, 73 

Camp Moore, 16, 32, 33. 

Camp Parapet, 43, 44. 

Camp Russell, Va., 441, 443. 

Camp Sheridan, Va., 441. 

Campti, La., affair near, 326. 

Canal opposite Vicksburg, 23, 24, 28, 

29, 3 1 - 
Canby, E. R. S., Major-General, 354, 

439- 
Cane River, La., 295 ; crossing and 

battle, 328-333- 

Carondelet, U. S. gunboat, 29-31, 295. 
Carpenter, Horace, Lieutenant (C), 

233- 

Carr, Gouverneur, Major, wounded, 

179, 182. 
Carruth, W. W., Lieutenant, 36, 45, 

73 ; Captain, 98, 99, 160, 237, 252, 

253- 



512 



INDEX. 



Cavalry, 67, 125, 126, 131, 154, 186, 
189-191. 

Cavalry (C), 128, 189, 329. 

corps, Sheridan s (see also 

Torbert, A. T. A., and Merritt, 
Wesley), 374, 378. 

division, 274, 277, 280, 311 

(see Lee, A. Z.) ; commanded by 
Arnold, 328 (see Arnold} ; left in 
Louisiana, 353. 

Cayuga, 13, 36. 

Cedar Creek, Va., 373, 374, 404, 412 ; 
battle of, 410-438 ; Moon, Sun, 
arid Daylight, times of, 417 ; strag 
glers, 428, 429, 436, 437 ; the fight 
ing line, 428, 436, 437. 

Cemetery, the, at Cedar Creek, 423- 
425- 

Centreville, La., 86. 

Ceres, transport, 21. 

Chalmette, La., 10-14. 

Chambersburg, Penn., 363. 

Chandler, John G., Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 263. 

Chapin, E. P., Colonel, at Plains 
Store, 161, 162 ; at Port Hudson, 
168, 179, 180 ; killed, 182 ; suc 
ceeded by C. J. Paine, 187. 

Chapman, A. W., Captain, 281, 305. 

Chareriton, La., 107. 

Charles Osgood, transport, 65. 

Charles Thomas, transport, 269. 

Charleston, S. C., 447. 

Charlestown, Va., 371. 

Charlottesville, Va., 403, 405, 406, 
438, 442. 

Chase, Frederick, Lieutenant, 365. 

Chickasaw Bayou, Miss., 25. 

Chickasaw Bluffs, 69. 

Chickering, T. E., Colonel, 77, 155- 
158, 236. 

Chillicothe, 295. 

Chittenden, N. H., Sergeant-Major, 
18. 

Choupique Bridge, La., 102, 115. 

Chrysler, Morgan H., Colonel, 333. 

Churchill, T. J., Brigadier-General 

(C), 300, 302, 314, 315, 317-319. 

329. 348. 
Cipher code, 138. 
City Belle, transport, 343. 
Clack, F. H., Major (C), 109, in, 

113- 

Clara Bell, transport, 286. 
Clark, Charles, Brigadier-General (C), 

35 ; wounded, 38. 
Clarke, Charles E., Captain, 36. 
Clark, Eusebius S., Major, 394. 
Clark, John S., Colonel, 298. 
Clark, Orton S., Lieutenant, 228 



Clark, Thomas S., Colonel, wounded, 

182, 187, 188, 199, 200. 
Clayton, Powell, Colonel, 292. 
Clifton, 26, 62, 64, loo, 102-105, 

122, 255, 268-272. 
Clifton-Berryville Line, 371. 
Clifton, Va., 371. 
Climatic disease, extraordinary loss 

by, 187. 
Clinton, La., 78, 189 ; affairs at, 190, 

191. 

Clinton, transport, 356. 
Closson, H. W., Captain, 107, no, 

124, 246, 263, 267, 315, 316, 328, 

331, 332. 

Cobb s (Ky.) Battery (C), 35. 
Cocheu, Henry, Captain, 87. 
Cohen, Patrick, private, 197. 
Cold Harbor, 351, 352. 
Colored troops (C), 49. 
Colored troops (U), 49, 218, 219, 260- 

262. 

Comstock, Apollos, Captain, 255. 
Cone, P. S., Captain, 304, 306. 
Confederate forces, in Teche country, 

72, 275; trans-Mississippi, 266. 
Confederate navy, 10, 14 ; fleet at 

Memphis destroyed, 24 ; in Yazoo, 

29 ; on the Teche, 48, 88, 89. 
Congress votes thanks, 256. 
Connecticut, gth, 16, 22, 23 ; at Baton 

Rouge, 36, 37 ; at La Fourche 

Crossing, 239. 
I2th, 15, 16, 45, 73 ; at Bis-, 

land, 98, 154 ; at Port Hudson, 170, 

198, 255 ; Opequon, 382, 388-390, 

394- 

1 3th, 8, 45 ; at Irish Bend, 



107, in, 113, 114 ; in pursuit, 126, 
155 ; at Port Hudson, 172, 212, 
2 3 2 > 255 ; re-enlisted veterans, 280 ; 
at Cane River, 328, 330, 331 ; at 
Opequon, 385. 

23d, 73 ; at La Fourche Cross 
ing. 237-239 ; at Bayou Bceuf, 240 ; 
at Brashier, 240, 241. 

24th, 198. 

25th, at Irish Bend, 110-112, 

114 ; at Port Hudson, 171, 172. 

26th, at Port Hudson, 177, 

200, 257, 

28th, at Port Hudson, 187. 

Conrady, Howard C., Captain, 318, 
332. 

Constitution, transport, 5. 

Cooke, A. P., Lieutenant - Com 
mander, 104-106, 121, 122, 126, 
128. 

Cook, J. J. Colonel (C), 63. 

Cooley, James C., Captain, 439. 



INDEX. 



513 



Cooley s House, Cedar Creek, 416. 

Corinthian, transport, 357. 

Corinth, Miss., 20, 21 ; Confederates 

evacuate, 26, 27. 
Cornay, Florian O., Captain (C), 102, 

105, 106, 109, 111-113, 247. 
Cornie (C), transport, captured, 115, 

126. 
Corps d Afrique, 219, 260-262 ; 

Dickey s brigade, 292 (see also 

Louisiana Native Guards). 

i6th Infantry, 275. 

Corypheus, 62, 64. 

Cote Gelee, La., 125. 

Cotton, y. A. (C), 48, 73, 74, 122. 

Couch, D. N., Major-General, 364. 

Covingion, 343. 

Cowles, David S., Colonel, 179 ; 

killed, 182. 

Cox, C. H. Lieutenant, 268. 
Cox, Clayton, Captain, 99. 
Cox s Plantation, La., battle of, 251- 

253. 

Cox, W. R., Master s Mate, 186. 

Craven, T. T., Captain, 17 

Crebs, J. M., Lieutenant-Colonel, 
328, 333- 

Creole, transport, 353, 357. 

Crescent, transport, 353, 355, 356. 

Crocker, Frederick, Lieut., U.S.N., 
267-272. 

Crook, George, Brigadier-General, 
361, 363-367, 371, 372, 375, 377, 
379, 382, 389-394, 397-404, 4o6, 
408, 410, 411, 413-419, 421, 432, 

435, 437, 441. 

Crosby, J. Schuyler, Captain, 138. 
Crowder, John H., Lieutenant, 174. 
Cunningham, Edward, Lieutenant, 

321. 
Currie, Leonard D. H., Colonel, 

wounded, 203, 350, 353, 361, 376, 

442. 
Custer, George A., Brigadier-General, 

375, 376, 406, 408, 409, 415, 421, 

43i, 433, 434, 436. 
Cutshaw, W. E., Lieutenant-Colonel 

(C), 373- 
Cypremort, Bayou, La., 116, 119, 120, 

122. 
Cypress Island, La., 105. 

Dam, the, 337-342. 

Dana, N. J. T., Major-General, 273, 

275. 

Davis, Charles, A., Lieutenant, 64. 
Davis, Charles Henry, Flag-Officer, 

24, 27, 32. 
Davis, Edward J., Colonel, 328, 330, 

333- 



Davis, Edwin P., Colonel, 353, 355, 
390, 414, 415, 420, 432-434. 

Davis, Jefferson, 165. 

Dawes, E. C., Brevet Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 437. 

Day, Nicholas W., Colonel, 385, 386, 
390, 401, 446. 

Dayton, A. J., Captain, 112. 

Debray, X. B., Colonel (C), 318-320 ; 
Brigadier-General, 330, 345. 

Deep Bottom, Va., 361. 

Defiance (C), 14. 

De Forest, James W., Captain, 349. 

De Kay, George, Lieutenant, killed, 

22. 

Delaware, 1st battery (Nields s), 280, 

332. 

Deming, H. C., Colonel, 15. 
Denslow, W. J., Captain, 105. 
Department of the Gulf (see Gulf}. 
Depots, Sheridan s, 376. 
Des Allemands, La., 47. 
De Soto, La., 26. 
Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley, 

371, 375, 403, 404, 409- 

Devin, Thomas C., Brigadier-General, 
400-402. 

Diana, 46, 48, 73 ; captured, 88, 89^ 
94, 96, 99, 103, 114 ; blown up, 
115, 118, 121. 

Dickey, Cyrus E. , Captain, 304. 

Dickey,W. H., Colonel, 292, 296, 314. 

Dillingham, Charles, Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 170. 

Disease, extraordinary loss by climatic, 
187. 

Disorder on the march, 132. 

District of West Florida, 44. 

Divisions (see under Names of Com 
manders). 

Dix, John A., Major-General, 5. 

Donaldson ville, La., 46 ; attack and 
repulse, 237, 242-246. 

Dowling, Richard W., Lieutenant 
(C), 272. 

Dow, Neal, Brigadier-General, 159, 
177-179, 182, 187, 215. 

Draper, Gilbert A., Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 112, (k) 117. 

Drew, Charles W., Colonel, 162. 

Dr. Shipley s house, Cedar Creek, 423. 

Dry Tortugas, Fla., 45, 155. 

Dudley, N. A. M., Colonel, 15, 23, 
39, 83, 130, 168, 179, 180, 252, 
288, 296, 297, 302, 304, 306, 328, 
440, 441 ; at Plains Store, 161, 162, 
194. 

Duffie, A. N., Colonel, 359. 

Duganne, A. J. H., Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 242. 



INDEX. 



Duncan, J. K., Brigadier-General (C), 
10, 15. 

Duryea, Richard C., Captain, 126, 
171, 188, 191, 194, 210, 221, 232, 
267, 280. 

Duval, H. F., Colonel, 390, 391. 

Dwight, Charles C., Colonel, 281. 

Dwight, Howard, Captain, murdered, 
145, 146. 

Dwight, Wilder, Major, 145. 

Dwight, William, Jr., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 57, 102, 105, 107, 108, no, 
113, 114, 117, 124, 128, 130 
132 ; summary execution, 134 ; to 
Red River, 144-147, 149 ; bears 
despatches to Grant, 157, 158, 183, 
184 ; at Port Hudson, 166 ; first 
assault, 169, 171, 172 ; commands 
Sherman s division, 187, 188 ; his 
brigade falls to Morgan, 188 ; sec 
ond assault, 194, 199, 200, 215, 
230, 232, 281, 309, 310, 315, 319, 
320 ; chief of staff, 327, 358, 376, 
380-382, 387-390, 393, 394, 398, 
414, 415, 432, 434, 436, 442-445. 

Early, Jubal A., Lieutenant-General 

(Q, 352, 355-364, 369, 371-380, 

385, 386, 389-392, 394-398, 400-406; 
explains pretended Longstreet mes 
sage, 407-412, 416, 417, 419, 420, 
423-425, 427, 432-434, 438, 440, 441- 

Eastport, 286, 291, 326, 327, 334. 

Edenburg, Va., 399. 

Ellen (C), transport, 127. 

Ellet, Alfred W., Lieutenant-Colonel, 
24, 29. 

Ellet, Charles, Jr., Colonel, 24. 

Ellet, Charles R., Medical Cadet, 24, 
29 ; Colonel, 75, 292. 

Ellet s rams, 24, 29, 75, 76. 

Ellis s Cliffs, Miss., 22. 

Emerson, Charles, Lieutenant, 248. 

Emerson, Charles S., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 341. 

Emerson, Frank, Colonel, 298-301, 
304- 

Emerson, William, Colonel, 425, 426, 
431. 

Emory, William H., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 56, 57, 66, 77, 86, 87 ; in 
Teche campaign, 88-93 ; at Bis- 
land, 92, 93, 95-102, 104, 115, 116, 
119 ; in pursuit, 122, 125, 126, 130 ; 
illness, 144 ; Paine takes his division, 
144 ; commands at New Orleans, 
159, 203, 233, 237, 238, 246, 248- 
250, 259, 260, 267, 272, 273, 281, 
289, 292, 294, 296, 297, 299, 305, 
307-311, 315, 317, 320, 321, 323, 



327-333 ; commands Nineteenth 
Corps, 343-345, 348, 35O, 351, 353, 
354. Major-General : on the Poto 
mac, 355-365 ; in the Shenandoah, 
37i, 372, 374-376, 379-394, 397- 
401, 403, 404, 406, 411, 414-427, 
431-437, 439-441 I bids farewell to 
the Corps, 442, 443. 

Entrenchments at every halt, 376. 

Entwistle, James, Captain, 399. 

Erben, Henry, Lieutenant, U.S.N. 
36. 

Ericsson, transport, 59. 

Essex, U. S. S., 36, 39, 79, 165, 186, 
248. 

Estrella, 46, 48, 73, 88, 89, 104, 121, 
126, 148, 154, 165, 255. 

Evans, C. A., Brigadier-General (C), 
383, 433- 

Everett, Charles, Captain, 16, 23, 26, 
27. 

Execution, summary, 134, 247. 

Fairchild, Sydney Smith, Lieutenant, 
342. 

False River, 83. 

Faries, T. A., Captain, 243, 247, 248. 

Farragut, D. G., Admiral, 5, 9, 12, 
13 ; passage of the forts, 13, 14 ; 
takes New Orleans, 14-16 ; first 
attempt on Vicksburg, 17-22, 24- 
32 ; runs batteries at Vicksburg, 26 ; 
asks Halleck to help, 27 ; passes 
Port Hudson, 76-85, 126, 130, 135, 
136, 152, 165, 182, 229, 230, 243, 
248, 249", 257, 264. 

Fearing, Hawkes, Jr., Colonel, 169, 
191, 196, 203. 

Ferris, Samuel P., Colonel, 196. 

Fessenden, Francis, Colonel, 318, 
328, 331, 332. 

Fessenden, James D., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 442. 

Fighting line, the, at Cedar Creek, 
428, 436, 437. 

Fisher s Hill, Va , 373, 374, 395 
battle of, 396-400. 

Fiske, E. A., Captain, 30. 

Fiske, George A., Jr., Lieutenant, 
177. 

Fiske, W. O. Lieutenant-Colonel. 
105, 328, 331. 

Flags for corps headquarters, 103, 440. 

Florida (C), 57, 58. 

Florida, West, District of, 44. 

Fonda, John G., Colonel, 277, 288. 

"Foothold in Texas, a," 264-276, 
280, 282, 283, 348. 

Forlorn Hope, Port Hudson, 212, 213, 
232. 



INDEX. 



515 



Forrest, N. B. , General (C), 69. 

Forsyth, George A., Major, 431. 

Fort Babcock, La., 171, 175. 

Fort Bisland, La., 86, 92-103. 

Fort Burton, La., 126. 

Fort Butler, La., 237, 238, 242-246. 

Fort DeRussy, 75, 148, 284, 286, 287, 

289, 342, 343. 
Fort Esperanza, Tex., 276. 
Fort Griffin, Tex., 272. 
Fort Hindman, 295, 339. 
Fort Jackson, La., 6, 7, 10-15, 259. 
Fort Jefferson, Fla., 155, 259. 
Fort Pickens, 44. 
Fort Pike, 16. 

Fort Pillow, Tenn., 20, 24, 27. 
Fortress Monroe, Va., 56. 
"Fort Slaughter," Va., 361. 
Fort Stevens, D. C., 356, 357. 
Fort St. Philip, La., 6, 7, 10-15. 
Fort Taylor, Fla., 155, 259. 
Fort Wood, 1 6. 
Foster, James P., Lieutenant-Colonel, 

398. 
Fournet, V. A., Lieutenant-Colonel 

(C), 97, 157- 

France in Mexico, 265, 266. 
Franklin, George M., Captain, 281. 
Franklin, La., 102, 104, 107, 109, 

no, 113-116, 120, 278-281. 
Franklin, William B., Major-General, 

259, 260, 262, 267-269, 271, 273- 

2 75, 2 77- 2 79 281, 288, 289, 294, 

295, 297-300, 303, 305, 307, 311, 

3i6, 330, 338, 343, 366. 
Frederick, Md., 363, 364. 
Free men of color of Louisiana, 49. 
French, Peter, Major, 439. 
Frenier, La., 17, 18. 
Fuller, E. W., Captain (C), 121. 

Gabaudan, E. C., Rear- Admiral s 

Secretary, 135. 

Gallway, A. P., Major, 125, 126. 
Galveston, T., 58 ; abortive attempt 

on, 62-65, 276. 

Gardiner, Alexander, Colonel, 394. 
Gardner, Frank, Major-General (C), 

62, 82, 163-165, 170, 185, 194, 

227-229, 231, 232, 234. 
General Banks, transport, 270. 
Gene see, 79, 81, 165. 
Georgia Landing, La., battle of, 46, 

47- 

Georgia, service in, 445-447. 
Getty, George W., Brigadier-General, 

357, 358, 381, 382, 415, 419, 422- 

426, 430, 431, 433. 
Gillmore, Quincy A., Major-General, 

358. 



Godfrey, J. F., Captain, 50, 161, 190. 
41 Go in ! " 377. 

Gonzales, Thomas, Captain, 243. 
Gooding, O. P., Colonel, 95, 97, 100, 
102, 124, 126, 169, 196, 273, 296, 

312, 316, 328-330. 

Gordon, John B., Major-General (C), 
378-380, 383, 384, 386, 387, 391, 
410-412, 416, 417, 420, 421, 423, 
424, 427, 432-434- 

Gordonsville, Va., 403, 405, 406, 438, 
442. 

Gould, John M., Major, 394. 

Graham, Harvey, Colonel, 446. 

Grand Coteau, La., 126. 

Grand Duke (C), 121. 

Grand Ecore, La., 295 ; retreat to, 

313, 314, 323-326 ; retreat from, 
326-334. 

Grand Gulf, Miss., 21, 23, 138, 141, 
150. 

Grand Lake, La., 86, 104, 105, 121. 

Grand Review, 444, 445. 

Grand River, La., 87. 

Granger, Moses M., Colonel, 426. 

Granite City, 268-272. 

Grant, Lewis A., Brigadier-General, 
422, 423, 425. 

Grant, U. S., Major-General, 54, 61, 
6871, 75 ; correspondence with 
Banks, 84, 135-142, 157, 158, 183, 
184 ; communication between Banks 
and, 129, 130, 135-142, 144, 149- 
151, 157, 158 ; censured by Halleck, 
150, 151 ; letter from Halleck, 183 ; 
first assault at Vicksburg, 184, 205 ; 
second, 205 ; Vicksburg surrenders, 
225, 226, 228, 236, 258, 265 ; 
Lieutenant-General, 283, 293, 294, 
313, 326, 334, 342, 347, 351, 352, 
355-357, 36o, 362-366, 369-373, 
376-378, 403, 405, 406, 438, 441, 
444. 

Gray, Henry, Colonel (C), 99, 112, 
117, 288. 

Green, Thomas, Colonel (C), 63, 99, 
101, 109, 114, 115, 124, 125, 157, 
239-243, 245, 246, 251-253, 273, 
275, 277, 278 ; Brigadier-General, 
290, 296, 297, 299-301, 306, 315, 
318, 324-326. 

Gregg, John, Brigadier-General (C), 
164. 

Grierson, B. H., Colonel, arrives at 
Baton Rouge, 143 ; raid, 143, 144 ; 
at Plains Store, 161, 162 ; Brigadier- 
General, at Port Hudson, 160-162, 
186, 189-191, 215. 

Grover, Cuvier, Brigadier-General, 57, 
61, 66, 77 ; in Teche campaign, 88- 



S i6 



INDEX. 



93, 100, 101 ; at Irish Bend, 104- 
120 ; in pursuit, 122-125, I2 9 J 
inarch to Red River, 144, 148 ; to 
Port Hudson, 152, 153, 159, 160, 
166 ; first assault, 168, 169, 171, 
172, 174, 175, 187 ; commands right 
wing, second assault, 194, 196- 
199, 229, 232 ; at Kock s planta 
tion, 251-254, 256, 259, 260, 273, 
277, 281, 289, 292, 327, 349, 350, 
353 ; at the Opequon, 365, 375, 
381, 383, 384, 387, 389, 390, 393, 
398, 414, 417, 418, 421, 423, 432, 
436, 442, 445-447. 
Grow, John A., Captain, 238, 239, 

315. 

Gulf, Department of the, organiza 
tion, 7, 8, 66, 67 ; extended, 44 ; 
reinforcements for, 45, 49-51, 56, 
5-7, 280 ; sickness, 50 ; strength, 50, 
51, 67, 158, 258, 259, 261, 266, 267, 
292. 

Haley, E. D., Lieutenant, 92, 171, 
421. 

Halleck, H. W., Major-General, 19, 
20, 26 ; unable to help, 27 ; prom 
ises reinforcements, 51, 82 ; cor 
respondence with Grant, 139; with 
Banks, 139 ; censures Grant and 
Banks, 150, 151 ; congratulation, 
256, 258 ; Mobile and Texas, 264, 
265 ; Texas, 264-276, 280, 282, 
283 ; Red River, 282, 283, 293, 
363, 364, 405. 

Halleck s army, communication with, 
17, 19, 20, 27. 

Halltown, W. Va., 363, 365, 366, 
371, 373, 374- 

Hamill, Henry, private, summarily 
executed, 134. 

Hamilton, A. J., military governor, 
62-64. 

Hampton Roads, Va., 56, 57, 352 

Hancock, WinfieldS., Major-General, 
361, 442, 443. 

Hardeman, W. P., Colonel (C), 244, 

343; 

Harding, Henry A., Lieutenant, 219. 
Harper s Ferry, W. Va., 363, 365, 

366, 371. 

Harper s Weekly, 368. 
Harriet Lane, 62, 64, 287. 
Harrisonburg, La., 286. 
Harrisonburg, Va., 402. 
Harrison, Isaac F., Colonel (C), 344. 
Harrison, N. B., Lieutenant U.S.N., 

36. 

Harris, T. M., Colonel, 410, 416. 
Hart, afterward Stevens (C), 122. 



Hartford, 5, 9, 13, 21, 24, 26, 79-84, 
136, 138, 165, 225, 226. 

Harwood, Franklin, Lieutenant, 150, 
159- 

Haskin, William L., Lieutenant, 345. 

Hatter as, 58. 

Hayes, R. B., Brigadier-General, 
359, 414, 415, 418, 419. 

Headquarters flags, 103, 440. 

Hebard, G. T., Captain, 267, 316. 

Helm, Bernard H., Brigadier-Gen 
eral (C), 35, 38. 

Henderson s Hill, La., affair of, 290. 

Hermitage, La., 83, 165. 

Herron, Francis J., Major-General, 
258, 273. 

Hersey, A. J., Captain, 216. 

Hesseltine, Frank S., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 276. 

Hill, R. M., Lieutenant, 60. 

Hinkle, W. S., Captain, 332. 

Hodge, Justin, Colonel, 219 

Hoffman, Wickham, Major, 262. 

Holabird, S. B., Colonel, 60, 248. 

Holcomb, P. E., Captain, 161, 260, 
261. 

Holcomb, Richard E., Colonel, 49, 
105-107 ; wounded, 182 ; killed, 

202. 

Hollyhock, 241, 254. 

Holly Springs, Miss., 69. 

Holmes, C. E. L., Colonel, 237, 238. 

Hotchkiss, Jed, Major (C), 410. 

Houston, D. C., Major, 60, 150, 186, 

189, 223. 
Hubbard, John B., Captain, 89, 90 ; 

killed, 182. 

Hubbard, N. H., Colonel, in. 
Hubbard, Thomas H., Colonel, 332 
Hudson (Miss.) Battery (C), 35. 
Hunter, David, Major-General, 334, 

352, 358, 359, 36i, 364-366, 371. 
Hunter, Sherrod, Major (C), 240, 241. 
Hunt, T. H., Colonel (C), 38. 
Hupp s Hill, Va., 405, 406, 416, 417. 
Hutchens, John B., 341. 

Iberia, La. (see New Iberia). 

Iberville, transport, 247. 

Illinois, Chicago Mercantile battery 

(Cone s), 304, 306. 

2d cavalry, 302. 

6th cavalry, 143, 189, 190. 

7th cavalry, 143, 189, 191, 222. 

1 2th cavalry, 280. 

n8th, 276. 

Imperial, transport, 256. 

Indiana, 8th, 350, 446. 

nth, 350; at Opequon, 386, 

398, 401. 



INDEX. 



517 



Indiana, i6th, 316. 

i 8th, 446. 

2ist, 6, 15, 22 ; at Baton 

Rouge, 36-38, 43, 44, 67, 73 (see 
also \st Indiana Heavy Artillery). 

46th, 278. 

6oth, 277. 

ist heavy artillery, 67, 78, 89 ; 



at Bisland, 96, 99 ; at Port Hudson, 
186, 211, 212 ; at Brashear, 237, 
238, 240, 332 (see also 2,1st Indiana 
Infantry). 

ist battery (Klauss s), 304, 306. 

i yth battery (Miner s), 365, 



421. 



22d battery, 446. 
Brown s battery, 36, 43. 



Indian Bend, La., 87, 104-120. 

Indianola, ram, 75 ; sunk and cap 
tured, 76, 287. 

Indian Village, La., 87. 

Ingraham, Timothy, Colonel, 92 ; at 
Bisland, 98, 101, 102 ; in pursuit, 
125, 126, 186, 196. 

Inwood, Henry C., Captain, 281, 354, 

439- 

Iowa, I4th, 318. 
22d, 350 ; at Opequon, 385 ; 

at Cedar Creek, 418. 
24th, 350, 446. 



28th, 350; at Fisher s Hill, 399, 

446. 

Irish Bend, battle of, 104-120. 

Iroquois, 13, 21, 25, 26. 

Irwin, Richard B., Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 60, 180, 195, 228, 229. 

Itasca, 13, 14, 46. 

Ivy, tugboat, 144. 

Jackson, C. M., Major (C), 234. 

Jackson, Miss., 7. 

Jackson, " Stonewall," Lieutenant- 
General (C), 369. 

Jeannerette, La., 116, 122. 

Jenkins, Thornton A., Captain, U.S. 
N., 247, 248. 

Johnson, Amos, Acting Master, 62, 
268. 

Johnson, Bradley T., Brigadier-Gen 
eral (C), 362. 

Johnson, E. D., Colonel, 211. 

Johnston, Joseph E., General (C), 
165, 215, 234. 

Jones, E. F., Colonel, 15. 

Katahdin, 13, 36, 39, 46. 
Kearneysville, Va., 375, 376. 
Keifer, J. Warren, Colonel, 384, 415, 

419, 422, 423, 425-427. 
Keith, John A., Colonel, 36. 



Kell, J. M., Lieutenant, C.S.N., 58. 
Kenly, John R., Brigadier-General, 

360. 

Kennebec, 13, 14. 
Kenner, La., 17, 18. 
Kensel, G. A., Captain, 8. 
Kentucky, igth (U), 301. 

Cobb s battery, 35. 

troops (C), 3d, 35. 

Kernstown, Va., Crook s fight, 361 ; 

winter quarters, 440, 441. 
Kershaw, J. B., Major-General (C), 

373, 374, 378, 402, 404, 406, 411, 

416-420, 423, 424, 427, 432, 434, 

441. 
Key West, Fla., 44, 45 ; transferred 

to Department of the Gulf, 155, 

258. 

Kimball, John W., Colonel, 124. 
Kimball, W. K., Colonel, 108, no, 

114, 125, 126, 187, 198. 
Kineo, 13, 21, 36, 39, 46, 79-81, 243, 

245, 248. 
Kinsey, W. B., Lieutenant-Colonel, 

309, 341. 

Kinsman, 46, 48, 73. 
Kitching, J. Howard, Colonel, 416, 

419, 436. 

Klauss, Martin, Captain, 304, 306. 
Knowlton, William, Major, 394. 
Koch s plantation, La., 251-253. 
Kock s plantation, La., 251-253. 

Labadieville, La., 46. 

Lafayette, 144, 148. 

La Fayette, La. (see Vermilionville). 

La Fourche Crossing, La., 47 ; affair, 
238, 239, 242. 

La Fourche, District of, 48, 49. 

La Fourche, occupied, 45-50 ; opera 
tions in, 85 ; Taylor s raid, 213- 
215, 229, 235-255. 

La Grange, Miss., 143. 

Lake Chicot, La., 87, 121. 

Lamson, C. W., Acting Master, 268. 

Lancaster, Ellet ram, 29. 

Landram, W. J., Colonel, 288, 298, 
299, 301, 304, 305, 311. 

Lane, W. P., Colonel (C), 243, 297, 

343- 
Langthorne, Amos R., Lieutenant, 

U.S.N., 341. 

Laurel Hill, transport, 21, 272. 
Lawler, M. K., Brigadier- General, 

258, 274, 277, 342-345, 348, 350. 
Law, R. L., Commander, 62. 
Lawson s Ferry, La., 149. 
Lee, Albert L., Brigadier-General 

258, 280, 288-290, 292, 294-299, 

301-303, 308, 310-312, 314, 351. 



INDEX. 



Lee, Fitzhugh, Major-Gen eral (C), 
373, 375-377, 387, 39 1 , 394, 400. 

Lee, Robert E., General (C), 367, 
368, 372, 376, 377, 402, 404, 441, 

443- 

Lee, S. Phillips, Commander, U.S.N., 
18. 

Lewis, Charles, Major, 398. 

Lexington, 295, 326, 339. 

Liddell, St. John R., Brigadier-Gen 
eral (C), 325, 326. 

Lieber, G. N., Major, 60. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 52, 53, 56, 249, 

294, 443- 

Little Rock, Ark., 284, 292. 
Livingston, Confederate gunboat, 29. 
Locke, M. B., Lieutenant-Colonel (C), 

159. 
Lockwood, H. H., Brigadier-General, 

5- 
Logan, John L., Colonel (C), 189- 

191, 215, 216. 
Loggy Bayou, La., 324. 
Lomax, L. L., Major-General (C), 

382, 383, 399, 400, 402, 412, 422, 

432, 436. 
Longstreet, James, Lieutenant-Gen- 

eral (C), pretended message from, 

407, 408, 422, 430, 432. 
Louisiana (C), 10, 14. 
Louisiana, Northern, operations in, 

236. 
Louisiana troops (U), 1st infantry, 

49, 73 ; at Irish Bend, 105-107, 114, 

117 ; at Port Hudson, 182, 202, 

247 ; at Cane River, 328, 331. 
2d infantry, 44, 49, 83 ; at 

Port Hudson, 180, 187, 232 ; 

mounted, 280. 
ist cavalry, 45, 49, 73 ; at 

Irish Bend, 107, no, 154 ; at Port 

Hudson, 161, 189, 190, 238, 252. 
Louisiana Native Guards (U), ist, 48, 

49 ; at Port Hudson, 162, 166, 172- 

174, 213- 

2d, 49. 

3d, 49, 78 ; at Port Hudson, 

162, 166, 172-174, 213. 
4th, 162. 

ist engineers, 219, 261, 275. 

2d, 261. 

ist heavy artillery, 261. 

Louisiana troops (C), 4th, 35, 38, 233. 

i8th, 46, 97. 

28th, 99, 112. 

33d, 46. 

Clack s battalion, 109,110,113. 

Fournet s (loth) battalion, 97, 

157- 
Miles s Legion, 161, 162. 



173- 



166. 



Louisiana Crescent regiment, 46. 

La Fourche regiment, 47. 

St. Charles regiment, 47. 

St. John Baptist regiment, 47. 

Terre Bonne regiment, 46. 

Boone s battery, 161, 162. 

- Cornay s battery, 102, 105, 

106, 109, in, 113, 247. 

Edgar s battery, 290. 

Faries s battery, 247, 248. 

Ralston s battery, 46. 

Semmes s battery, 35, 36, 99, 

247. 
heavy artillery, I2th battalion, 

2d cavalry, 46, 105-109, 290. 
Wingfield s (gth) battalion, 

Scott s cavalry, 35. 

Louisiana, Western, early operations 

in, 44, 46, 48, 72. 
Love, George M., Colonel, 267. 
Lovell, Mansfield, Major-General (C), 

10, 16, 19, 25. 
Lowell, Charles Russell, Colonel, 402, 

436- 
Lucas, Thomas J., Colonel, 290, 296, 

297, 299, 301, 303, 306, 316, 328. 
Lull, Oliver W., Lieutenant-Colonel, 

killed, 182, 203. 
Luray Valley, Va., 370, 397, 400, 401, 

412. 

Lynch, W. F., Colonel, 287, 319, 320. 
Lynn, J. W., Captain, killed, 30. 
Lyon, David, Lieutenant, 281. 

McCausland, John, Brigadier-General 
(C), 262-367. 

McClellan, George B., Major-General, 
3, 6, 7, 17- 

McClernand, John A., Major-Gen 
eral, 54, 6p, 68-71; 138, 342, 343. 

McClernand s expedition, 54, 60, 68 

71. 

McCollin, A. W., Sergeant, 161. 

McCrea(C), 14. 

McGinnis, George F., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 273, 277. 

McKennon, A. S., Lieutenant (C), 

221. 

McKerrall s plantation, La., 109, no. 

McMillan, J. W., Colonel, 99 ; Briga 
dier-General, 260, 266, 273, 281, 
309, 310, 315, 320, 328, 331, 333, 
343, 350, 36o, 381, 382, 388, 394, 
398, 415, 417, 423, 432-434, 442. 

McPherson, James B., Major-General, 
138, 205, 292. 

McWilliams s plantation, La., Dun 
can, 107. 



INDEX. 



519 



Macauley, Daniel, Colonel, 398, 401, 
414, 417, 421. 

Mack, Albert G., Captain, 78, 98. 

Madisonville, La., occupied, 281. 

Magee, James M., Captain, 83. 

Magee s Point, La., 105. 

Magruder, J. B., Major-General, 63, 
149, 235, 266, 275. 

Maine, I2th, 44 ; at Irish Bend, 114 ; 
at Port Hudson, 172, 232. 

I3th, in Texas, 275, 276, 337. 

I4th, at Baton Rouge, 36-38, 

43 ; at Port Hudson, 177, 199, 213, 
232. 

1 5th, 8 ; in Texas, 275, 276 ; 

in Virginia, 360. 

2ist, at Port Hudson, 179, 180, 

211, 221, 257. 

22d, at Irish Bend, 107, 114, 

127, 155 ; at Port Hudson, 187, 
192, 257. 

24th, at Port Hudson, 177, 257. 

26th, at Irish Bend, in, 112, 

114, 155 ; at Port Hudson, 187 ; at 
La Fourche Crossing, 238, 257. 

28th, at Port Hudson, 214, 

238 ; at Donaldsonville, 242-247 ; 
murder, 246 ; execution, 247. 

2gth, 280 ; at Sabine Cross- 
Roads, 309 ; at Pleasant Hill, 319 ; 
dam, 341, 357 ; Opequon, 382, 394, 
441. 

30th, 280 ; at Pleasant Hill, 

318 ; at Cane River, 331, 332. 

ist battery, 45, 73 ; at Bisland, 

92, 95, 98, 102, 127 ; at Port Hud 
son, 171, 252, 253, 267, 365 ; at 
Opequon, 385, 395 ; at Cedar Creek, 
421. 

Major, James P., Brigadier-General 
(C), 236, 237, 239, 242, 243, 251, 
297, 302, 303, 317, 319, 329, 330, 

343, 344- 

Manning, Charles H., Captain, 15. 

Mansfield, La., 298-312. 

Mansura, La. , affair on the plains of, 

344, 345- 
Marauding, 132. 

March, disorders on the, 133. 
Marksville, La., affair near, 344. 
Marland, Edward, Lieutenant, 277, 

A..Q 

- /O. 

Martinsburg, W. Va., 366, 378. 
Maryland, brigade (U), Kenly s, 360. 

(U), 3d cavalry, 280. 

Picnic into, 368. 

Mary T. (C), 121. 

Massachusetts, 4th, at Bisland, 101 ; 

after, 127 ; at Port Hudson, 186, 

196, 257. 



Massachusetts, 26th, 15 ; at La Fourche 
Crossing, 238, 239 ; re-enlisted vet 
erans, 280 ; at Opequon, 394. 

3Oth, 15, 16, 22, 30 ; at Baton 

Rouge, 36, 37 ; at Port Hudson, 
194, 353, 357 J Opequon, 382, 390. 
3ist, 15, 16 ; at Bisland, 



at Port Hudson, 196, 197 ; mounted, 
281, 302. 

38th, 77 ; at Bisland, 98, 102 ; 



at Port Hudson, 196, 197, 232 ; at 

Cane River, 327, 328, 331 ; at 

Opequon, 390. 
4 ist, 77, 155 ; mounted, as 3d 

cavalry, 186, 187. 
42d, at Galveston, 62-65 ; 

pontonier detachment, 219 ; at 

La Fourche Crossing, 238 ; at 

Brashear, 241, 249. 

47th, 238. 

48th, at Plains Store, 162 ; at 

Port Hudson, 180, 194. 
49th, at Plains Store, 162 ; at 

Port Hudson, 180. 

50th, at Port Hudson, 194, 257. 
52d, 155 ; at Port Hudson, 

187, 191, 257. 
53d, at Bisland, 98 ; at Port 

Hudson, 196. 

2cl battery (Nims), 6, 8, 22, 



23, 26 ; at Baton Rouge, 36, 37 ; at 
Irish Bend, no, 124, 132, 155 ; at 
Port Hudson, 171, 190, 251 ; at 
Bayou Bourbeau, 277, 278, 280, 302. 

4th battery (Manning, Trull), 

16 ; at Baton Rouge, 36, 37, 267. 
6th battery (Everett, Carruth), 



16, 17, 21-23, 26 ; at Baton Rouge, 
36, 45, 73 ; at Bisland, 98 ; at Port 
Hudson, 161, 171, 237, 252, 253. 

7th battery (Storer), 280. 

cavalry, 2d battalion, 16, 22, 

45, 83 ; merged in 3d, 186, 190. 

cavalry, 3d, formerly 4ist in 
fantry, 1 86, 189, 190, 260, 302 ; 
dismounted : at Opequon, 386 ; at 
Cedar Creek, 418. 

Massanutten Mountains, Va., 369, 396. 

Matagorda, Texas, 276. 

Matthews, Oliver, Lieutenant, 105. 

Maxey, S. B., Brigadier-General (C), 
164, 165. 

Meade, George G., Major-General, 
366, 444- 

Meade s plantation, Madame, 86, 94. 

Memphis taken, 24, 25. 

Merritt, Robert B., Colonel, 260, 267. 

Merritt, Wesley, Brigadier-General, 
375, 379. 390, 39*. 4O2, 406-409, 
415, 423, 425, 431, 432, 436. 



520 



INDEX. 



Merry, Benj. G., Major, 221. 

Mexico, France in, 265, 266. 

Miami , 25. 

Michigan, 6th, 6, 16, 17, 21, 22 ; at 
Baton Rouge, 36-38, 73 ; at Port 
Hudson, 177, 188, 199, 232 ; be 
comes 1st Michigan heavy artillery, 
260. 

1st heavy artillery (previously 

6th Michigan infantry), 260. 

Middle Military Division, 366, 442. 

Middletown, Va., 421-425. 

Mieres, , private (C) 221. 

Miles, W. R., Colonel (C), 161, 162, 
230. 

Military Division of West Mississippi, 

347. 

Military telegraphs, 138. 

Miller s Point, La., 105. 

Milliken s Bend affair, 236. 

Miner, M. L., Captain, 365. 

Mississippi, 13, 15, 79-81. 

transport, 353, 357. 

Mississippi, opening the, 3-31, 52-255. 

troops (C), 39th, 173. 

Hudson s battery, 35. 

Missouri troops (U), 24th, 318, 319. 

6th cavalry, 301, 306, 316. 

division (C) (see Parsons], 

Mobile, Ala., 7, 44, 264, 265, 267, 
282, 293, 313, 351, 352, 354- 

Molineux, E. L., Colonel, Hi (w), 
112, 117, 262, 289, 350, 361, 365, 
381, 384-386, 389, 390, 393, 398, 
400, 401, 414, 417, 418, 420, 421, 
432, 434, 446. 

Monarch, ram, 24, 29. 

Monett s Ferry, La., 295 ; crossing 
and battle, 328-333. 

Monongahela, 79-81, 165, 248, 249. 

Moore, F. W., Colonel, 350. 

Moore s cavalry brigade, 408. 

Moore, Thomas, O., Governor, en 
rolls colored troops, 49, 147. 

Moore, Webster P., Colonel, 203. 

Moreauville, La., affair at, 345. 

Morgan, Joseph S., Colonel, 155-157, 
188, 192, 198, 251-253. 

Morgan, Morgan, Jr., Major, 239. 

Morganza, La., 83, 348, 351. 

Mortar boats, 9, 12, 22, 25, 27, 79, 
165, 182. 

Mound City, 341. 

Mount Crawford, Va., 403. 

Mounted infantry, 280. 

Mount Jackson, Va., 401. 

Mouton, Alfred, Brigadier-General (C), 
46-48, 86, 87, 97, 114, 115, 128, 129, 
131, 156, 235, 240, 242, 245, 273, 
275, 287, 288, 300, 302-304, 311. 



Mower, Joseph A., Brigadier-General, 
285, 287, 290, 315-320, 323, 324, 
328, 344-347- 

Mudd, John J., Colonel, 258, 277. 

Murch, Isaac, Lieutenant, 245. 

Mustang Island, Texas, 276, 

Napoleon III., schemes of, 265, 266. 

Natchez, Miss., 18, 22 ; occupied, 258. 

Natchitoches, La., 295. 

Navy (C), 10, 14. 

Navy Department, 3, 6, 22. 

Navy, U. S., at New Orleans, 3, 5, 7, 
9, 17, 20 ; occupies Pensacola Har 
bor, 45 ; at Vicksburg, 24, 31, 75 ; 
at Baton Rouge, 36-39, 61 ; La 
Fourche, 46-48 ; Galveston, 62-65 ; 
Cotton (C), 73, 74 ; below Vicks 
burg, 75, 76 ; passage of Port Hud 
son, 76-84 ; Teche, 88-91, 100 ; 
Grand Lake, 104, 105, 121, 122, 
126, 128 ; Red River, 144, 148, 
149, 152, 154 ; holds Baton Rouge, 
162 ; siege of Port Hudson, 165, 
182, 186, 189, 192, 2ii, 230, 
232 ; La Fourche raid, 214, 229 ; 
Brashear, 241, 254, 255 ; Donald- 
sonville, 243-245 ; below Donald- 
sonville, 247-249 ; at Sabine Pass, 
267-272 ; in Red River, 283-289, 
291, 295, 312, 324-327, 334 ; peril 
and rescue, 337~34i , 343, 345- 

Neafie, Alfred, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
390, 421, 432. 

Neal, Edward B., Captain, 242. 

Negroes, arming the, 43, 49 ; treat 
ment of, 40, 43. 

Nelson, John A., Colonel, 162, 166, 
172, 173. 

Neos ho, 295, 339. 

Neptune (C), 64. 

Nerson s Woods, La., 109, no; bat 
tle of (C), 104-120. 

New Falls City, transport (C), 325. 

New Hampshire, 8th, 16, 43-45, 73 ; 
at Bisland, 95, 96, 98 ; at Port 
Hudson, 196, 197, 202, 203, 232 ; 
mounted, 280, 302. 

I4th, 280 ; at Opequon, 394. 

1 5th, at Port Hudson, 177, 

200. 

i6th, 126, 127, 186, 187, 257. 

New Iberia, La., 86, 109, 115, 122- 
124, 144, 276. 

New London, 248. 

New Market, Va., 397, 401. 

New Orleans, importance of, 3-5 ; 
capture of, 3-16 ; Confederate 
plans for recapture, 33, 44, 46, 249, 
250; defences of, 159, 237,249, 250. 



INDEX. 



521 



Newtown, Va., 412. 

New York, 6th, at Santa Rosa Island, 

45 ; at Irish Bend, 105, 107, 114; 

joins Paine, 153 ; mustered out, 

158. 
75th, 45, 73, 74 ; at Bisland, 

98, 99, 147 ; at Port Hudson, 170, 

175, 198, 232, 268, 269, 271 ; 

mounted, 280 ; dismounted : at 

Opequon, 394. 

goth, 155, 156 ; at Port Hud 



son, 187, 353, 357- 

gist, at Irish Bend, 114 ; at 



Port Hudson, 191, 198. 

noth, at Bisland, 101, 157 ; 

at Port Hudson, 160, 165, 237. 

ii4th, 73 ; at Bisland, 98, 99, 



155-157 ; at Port Hudson, 1 86, 198, 
202 ; at Pleasant Hill, 319, 353, 
357 ; Opequon, 381, 387, 388, 390, 
394 ; at Cedar Creek, 420, 421, 435, 

445- 

n6th, 77 ; at Plains Store, 

162 ; at Port Hudson, 180, 228, 
232 ; at Pleasant Hill, 319 ; at 
Cane River, 332, 333, 353, 357 ; 
Opequon, 381, 390, 445. 

1 28th, at Port Hudson, 177, 



199, 200 ; at Cane River, 328, 329, 
331 ; at Fisher s Hill, 398, 446. 

1 3 ist, at Irish Bend, 114 ; 



shooting of Hamill, 134, 159; at 
Port Hudson, 192, 214 ; at Opequon, 
I3i, 385, 386, 390. 

I33d, at Bisland, 95, 98 ; at 

Port Hudson, 197, 203 ; dam, 341, 

445- 

I53d, 280, 310 ; at Pleasant 

Hill, 319, 353 ; Opequon, 381, 382, 
388, 390 ; at Cedar Creek, 420, 421. 

I56th, at Cedar Creek, 421. 

I59th, at Irish Bend, 107, in, 

112, 114, 117 ; at Port Hudson, 
170 ; at Opequon, 385. 

i6oth, 73 ; at Bisland, 98 ; at 

Port Hudson, 170, 198, 213 ; Ope 
quon, 382, 388, 390. 

i6ist, at Port Hudson, 194, 

268 ; at Sabine Cross-Roads, 309 ; 
at Pleasant Hill, 319 ; dam, 341. 

i62d, at Bisland, 101, 127 ; at 

Port Hudson, 160, 165, 188 ; at 
Cane River, 331, 332. 

165, at Port Hudson, 177 ; at 



Cane River, 331, 332. 
i73d, 78 ; at Bisland, 95, 98 ; 

in pursuit, 125, 159; at Pleasant 

Hill, 318 ; at Cane River, 331, 332. 
1 74th, 83 ; at Port Hudson, 

194. 



New York, I75th, 78 ; at Bisland, 92, 
95, 98, 127 ; at Port Hudson, 188. 

1 76th, at La Fourche Crossing, 

237-239 ; at Brashear, 240, 241 ; at 
Bayou Ramos and Bayou Boeuf, 
241, 242, 258 ; at Opequon, 386 ; at 
Fisher s Hill, 398, 399 ; at Cedar 
Creek, 421. 

1 77th, at Port Hudson, 177. 

New York artillery, 5th battery 
(Taft), 365, 398, 421. 

1 8th battery (Mack), 78 ; at 



Bisland, 98 ; at Port Hudson, 161. 

2 ist battery (Barnes), 260. 

25th battery (Grow), 238, 239, 



315, 319, 332. 
New York cavalry, 2d veteran, 280, 

333- 

nth, 280. 

I4th, 189, 260, 277, 316, 324. 

i8th, 280. 

Nichols, William H., Captain (C), 
156, 247. 

Nickerson, F. S., Brigadier-General, 
159, 177-179, 187, 188, 200, 260, 
266, 281, 289, 327. 

Nields, Benjamin, Captain, 280. 

Nims, Ormand F., Captain, 23, 26, 
27, 37, no, 124, 132, 154, 171, 190, 
196, 251, 277, 278, 280, 301, 304- 
306. 

Nine months regiments, 56, 257, 258. 

Nineteenth Army Corps, organized, 
66, 67 ; flags, 103 ; strength, 158, 
274, 292 ; reorganized, 258-260 ; 
marches to Opelousas, 273-275 ; 
winters at Franklin, La., 277-281 ; 
veteran re-enlistments, 279, 280 ; 
new regiments, 280 ; second reor 
ganization, 281 ; staff, 281 ; Emory 
commands, 343 ; as marine patrol 
or coast guard, 349 ; third reorgan 
ization, 349-350 ; 3d division, 
Lawler, 350, 351, 353, 354; Butler 
asks for, 352 ; to the James, 351- 
354 ; staff, 354 ; the Potomac, 355- 
365 ; the Shenandoah, 365-443 ; 
strength, 362, 365 ; remnant in 
Louisiana broken up, 439 ; new 
corps staff, 439 ; badge, 440; new 
flags, 440 ; last man wounded, 441 ; 
corps organization discontinued, 
442 ; breaking up, 445-447. 

Noblett, F. W., Captain, 237. 

Norris, Hardman P., Lieutenant, 
125. 

North Carolina, service in, 445, 446. 

Northern Column, communication 
with, 17, 19, 20, 27, 68-71 ; col 
lapses, 68-71. 



522 



INDEX. 



North Star, transport, 59. 
Nott, Charles C., Colonel, 237. 

Oak Lawn, La., 105, 107, 109, 120. 
O Brien, James, Lieutenant-Colonel, 

leads stormers, 180 ; killed, 182, 230. 
Octorara, 25, 27. 
Odium, Frederick H., Captain (C), 

272. 
Ohio, s6th, 343. 

g6th, 277. 

1 20th, 343. 

ist artillery, battery L, 358, 



365- 



1 7th battery, 277. 



Old Forge road, Cedar Creek, 423- 

425 ; line of battle on, 423-425, 

427. 

Oltman, J. G., Captain, 281. 
Oneida, 13, 18, 20, 25. 
Opelousas, La., 86, 121-135, I 4 I J 44- 
Opequon, battle of the, 378-395. 
Opequon Creek, Va., 370, 371, 378, 

380. 
Ord, E. O. C., Major-General, 273- 

276. 

Osage, 295, 326, 339. 
Owasco, 62, 64. 

Page Valley, Va., 370. 
Paincourtville, La., fight near, 251- 

253- 

Paine, Charles J., Colonel, 49, 83, 
187, 188, 194, 227, 228, 252 ; com 
mands Emory s division, 144 ; near 
Alexandria, 148 ; march to Port 
Hudson, 152, 153, 159, 160, 166 ; 
first assault, 169-171, 174, 186-188 ; 
expedition to Clinton, 191 ; leads 
second assault, 196-198 ; wounded, 
197 ; Brigadier-General, 201 ; loses 
leg, 201 ; character, 201, 203, 232. 

Paine, Halbert E., Colonel, 16, 23, 
24, 40 ; character, 40 ; commands 
at Baton Rouge, 40-42 ; commands 
reserve brigade, 43 ; commands ist 
brigade, Sherman s division, 43 ; at 
Bisland, 92, 93, 95-98, 100-102 ; 
in pursuit, 125, 126, 130, 131. 

Palfrey, John C., Captain, 223, 224, 

337- 

Palmer, James S., Commander, 21 ; 
Commodore, 138, 152, 165, 225, 

243- 

Parker, J. W., private (C), 221. 
Parmele, T. W., Colonel, 83. 
Parrott, E. G., Commander, 57. 
Parsons, M. M., Brigadier-General 

(C), 300, 302, 314, 315, 317, 319, 

320. 



Pass Manchac, 17, 18. 

Pattersonville, La., 91. 

Payne s cavalry brigade (C), 412. 

Pearsall, Uri B., Lieutenant-Colonel, 
34L 

Peck, Frank H. s Lieutenant-Colonel, 
170, 255, 389, 394. 

Pegram, John, Brigadier-General (C), 
411, 424, 427. 

Pemberton, J. C., Lieutenant-General 
(C), 144, 164, 165. 

Pennsylvania, 47th, 155, 357 ; Ope 
quon, 382, 388, 390. 

Pensacola, 13, 243. 

Pensacola, 7, 44 ; occupied, 45. 

Perkins, Solon A., Lieutenant, 45, 
90, 125 ; killed, 190, 191. 

Per Lee, S. R., Colonel, 155, 387, 
388. 

Perry, C. E., private, 18. 

Petersburg, Va., 360, 361, 365. 

Petersen, J. L., Acting Master, 89. 

Petit Anse, La., 123. 

Phelps, John F., Lieutenant, 252. 

Phelps, J. W., Brigadier-General, 9, 
12, 15 ; commands division, 43 ; 
resigns, 43. 

Phelps, S. Ledyard, Lieutenant-Com 
mander, 286, 287. 

Phillips, Joseph, Colonel (C), 243. 

Pigman, William A., Captain, 263, 
305- 

Pillage, 132. 

Pinola, 13. 

Pittsburg^ 144. 

Plains Store. La., battle of , 161, 162. 

Plaquemine, Bayou, La., 87. 

Pleasant Hill, La., 311, 313, 314 ; 
battle of, 313-322. 

Point Isabel, Tex., occupied, 275. 

Polignac, C. J., Brigadier-General (C), 
288, 315, 316, 320, 329, 344, 346. 

Polk, Confederate gunboat, 29. 

Pope, John, Major-General, 20, 27. 

Porter, D. D., Commander, 9, 15, 25- 
27, 45, 75, 83 ; Admiral, 136, 144, 
148, 149, 153, 257, 283, 289, 291, 

295, 313, 324-327, 339- 

Porter, Henry M., Captain, 37 ; 
Major, 243. 

Porter s plantation, Madame, 105, 
107-109, 120. 

Porter, William D., Commander, 
U.S.N., 36. 

Port Hudson, Confederates occupy 
and fortify, 41 ; natural strength, 
41, 61, 62, 68, 70, 72 ; Farragut 
passes, 76-84 ; demonstration, 77- 
84 ; garrison, 81, 82 ; turning move 
ment, 85-87, 136, 141 ; final move- 



INDEX. 



523 



ment on, 152-160 ; invested, 160, | 
163-166 ; assault of May 27th, 166- 
183 ; Confederate strength, 163, 
164 ; evacuation ordered, 164 ; navy 
at, 165, 182, 186 ; siege of, 185- 
234 ; naval batteries, 186, 211, 232 ; 
night attack, June loth, 192 ; bom 
bardment, June f3th, 192; sum 
moned, 193 ; refused, 194 ; assault 
of June 1 4th, 194-204 ; neglect of | 
killed and wounded, 204 ; compared j 
with Vicksburg, 208 ; siege works, I 
210-212, 221-225 ; stormers, 212, | 
213 ; surrender, 227-232 ; prisoners 
taken, 233 ; losses, 233, 234, 260. 

Port Republic, Va., 401, 402. 

Potomac, operations on the, 355-365. 

Potter, O. O., Captain, 439. 

Powell, William H., Colonel, 402, 
407, 408, 421, 432. 

Powers, S. P., Colonel (C), 161. 

Price, 144, 225. 

Price, Sterling, Major-General (C), 
284, 300, 334-336. 

Prince, Edward, Colonel, 143, 189, 

222. 

Princess Royal, 243-245, 248. 
Provence, David. Colonel, 220, 221. 
Pyron, Charles L., Colonel (C), 156, 
239, 242. 

Queen of the West, ram, 29, 30, 75 ; 
captured, 75, 76, 88, 104, 121, 122. 

Rams, Ellet s fleet of, 24, 29. 

Ramseur, S. D., Major-General (C), 
361, 375, 379, 33o, 382, 385, 39i, 
392, 398, 399, 411, 424, 427, 434, 

Ransom, George M., Lieutenant-Com 
mander U.S.N., 36, 39. 

Ransom, Thomas E. G., Brigadier- 
General, 258, 276, 288, 289, 292, 
294, 296-305, 308, 310, 312. 

Rauch, John H., Medical Director, 
263. 

Rawles, J. B., Lieutenant, 83, 161, 
162, 212, 260, 261, 280, 301, 306. 

Read, Abner, Commander, 248. 

Records, not found, 224. 

Red Chief, transport (C), captured, 

337- 

Red Hill, Cedar Creek, 423. 
Red River, blockade of, 33, 81, 84 ; 

first march to, 142, and back, 152 ; 

treacherous, 291, 292 ; divides, 294, 

295 (see Navy, for operations on). 
Campaign, first steps, 282- 

285 ; opening moves, 285-291 ; 

the march on Shreveport, 291-298 ; 



Sabine Cross-Roads, 299-312 ; 

Pleasant Hill, 313-322 ; the retreat, 

323-336 ; the dam, 337~342 ; the 

end, 342-348. 
Re-enlisted veterans, 280. 
Reily, James, Colonel (C), "106, 108, 

109, 117. 

Renshaw, W. B., Commander, 62. 
Review, grand, 444, 445. 
Reynolds, Joseph J., Major-General, 

350, 351- 
Rhode Island, artillery, ist, battery D 

(Buckley), 365, 421. 
cavalry, 2d battalion, 78, 8*3, 

127, 129, 237, 238. 

3d cavalry, 280. 

Rice, C. S., Captain, 277. 
Richmond, 13, 25, 61, 79, 165, 186, 

211, 225. 

Richmond, La., 236. 

Ricketts, James B., Major-General, 
356, 365, 380-382, 384, 385, 398, 
415, 419, 420, 436, 437. 

" Rienzi," 429, 430, 444. 

Rio Grande, mouth of, held, 275. 

Roberts, Benjamin S., Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 350, 353. 

Roberts, G. T., Colonel, killed, 37, 

39- 

Robinson, George D., Colonel, 341. 
Robinson, Harai, Colonel, 131, 296, 

297, 302, 328. 

Rockfish Gap, Va., 402, 403. 
Rodes, R. E., Major-General (C), 375, 

378-380, 383-385, 390, 39 1 , 394, 

411. 
Rodgers, J. L, Lieutenant, no, in, 

113, 126. 

Rodman, William L., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, killed, 182. 
Roe, F. A., Lieutenant U.S.N., 36. 
Root, W. H., Lieutenant, 268. 
Ross, Benton H., private, 441. 
Rosser, Thomas L., Major-General 

(C), 404, 409-411, 419, 422, 425, 

436, 440, 441. 

Rottaken, H. H., Captain, 301, 306. 
Round Top, signal message from, 407. 
Rountree, L. C., Colonel (C), 273. 
Rowley, W. W., Captain, 60. 
Roy, William, Captain, 211. 
Rude s Hill, Va., 401. 
Ruggles, Daniel, Brigadier-General 

(C), 33, 35, 4i. 
Russell, David A., Brigadier-General, 

357, 38i, 385, 389- 

Russell, Edmund H., Lieutenant, 213. 
Rust, Albert, Brigadier-General (C), 

164. 
Rust, Henry, Jr., Colonel, 331, 333. 



524 



INDEX. 



Sabine Cross-Roads, La., 296 ; battle 
of, 298-312 (Confederate name, 
Mansjield). 

Confederate name for the 

battle of Pleasant Hill, 313-322. 

Sabine Pass, attempt on, 267-272 ; 

fails, 270-272. 

Sachem, 62, 64, 79, 165, 268-272. 
Sage, Clinton H., Colonel, 237. 
Saint Martinville, La., 87, 122-124. 
Saint Mary s, 48. 

Cannoneers (see Louisiana 

troops (C), Cornay 1 s battery). 

transport, 248, 357. 



Salt works, Avery s, 123, 124. 
Sanford, Julius, Captain, 240. 
Sanger, Eugene F., Medical Director, 

281. 
Santa Rosa Island, Fla., 44, 45 ; 

engagement on, 45. 
Sargent, Charles S., Lieutenant, 144, 

342. 
Sargent, L. D., Lieutenant- Colonel, 

IBS- 
Savannah, Georgia, 442, 445-447. 
Saxon, transport, 62. 
Sciota, 13, 46. 

Scott, Francis, Private, executed, 247. 
Scott, Winfield, Lieutenant-General, 3. 
Scurry, W. R. (C), 63, 287. 
Seawell, W. B., Captain (C), 173. 
Sedgwick, John, Major-General, 206. 
Seger (C), 48. 
Selden, Joseph, Lieutenant-Colonel, 

200. 
Semmes, Oliver J., Captain (C), 99, 

101, 114, 115, 242, 247. 
Semmes, Raphael, Captain, C.S.N., 

58. 

Sentell, W. H., Major, 342, 354. 
Seventeenth Army Corps, detachment 

of, 285 (and see Smith, T. Kilby). 
Seward, William H., 282. 
Shaffer, J. W., Colonel, 8. 
Shannon, D. W., Colonel (C), 244. 
Sharpe, Jacob, Colonel, 97, 273, 281, 

289, 327, 328, 350, 381, 382, 384- 

387, 390. 393, 398, 446. 
Shaw, W. T., Colonel, 287, 315, 318- 

320. 

Shelby, W. B., Colonel (C), 173. 
Sheldon, Lionel A., Colonel, 278. 
Shenandoah, Army of the, 366, 442. 
Shenandoah Valley, 352, 359-376 ; 

the Opequon, 377-395 ; Fisher s 

Hill, 396-409 ; Tom s Brook, 404 ; 

Cedar Creek, 409-437 ; the end, 

438-443 ; devastation, 371, 375, 

403, 404, 409. 
Shepard, E. M., Ensign, 186, 211. 



Shepley, George F., Colonel, 9, 13. 

Sheridan, Philip H., Major-General, 
commands Army of the Shenandoah, 
366-442 ; devastation, 371, 375 ; 
depots, 376 ; entrenchments, 376 ; 
called to Washington, 405-409 ; 
correspondence with Wright, 407, 
408 ; rejoins his army, 428-432 ; 
enthusiasm, 431, 432 ; farewell, 444. 

Sherman, Thomas W. , Brigadier- 
General, commands division, 43, 
66 ; at New Orleans, 77 ; joins 
Banks at Port Hudson, 159-162 ; 
siege of Port Hudson, 166 ; first 
assault, 168, 169, 174, 176-179 ; 
wounded, 178, 182 ; succeeded by 
Dwight, 187. 

Sherman, William T., Major-General, 
68-71, 140, 205, 283-286, 292, 293, 
444. 

Shetucket, transport, 65. 

Shiloh, battle of, 20, 35, 37. 

Ship Island, Miss., 5, 6, 8, 13, 57, 59, 
60. 

Shipley s house, Dr., Cedar Creek, 423. 

Shooting of Henry Hamill, 134. 

Shreveport, La., 149, 283, 285, 291, 
293, 294, 296, 313. 

Shunk, David, Colonel, 350, 381, 386, 
387, 39, 398, 415, 417, 421, 432, 
446. 

Sibley, H. H., Brigadier-General (C), 
63, 86, 87, 115. 

Sibley, H. R., Captain, 439. 

Sickles, Daniel E., Major-General, 

351- 
Siege operations at Port Hudson, 

185-234. 
Signal, 343. 

Signal service, 60, 78, 82, 83. 
Simmesport, La., 150, 154, 158, 344- 

347 ; bridge of steamboats, 346, 

347- 
Sixteenth Army Corps, detachment of, 

285 (and see Mower, J. A.}. 
Sixth Army Corps, 355-367 (and see 

also Wright, Ricketts, Getty}. 
Sizer, John M., Lieutenant-Colonel, 

439- 

Slaves, treatment of, 40, 43. 
Smith, Abel, Jr., Lieutenant-Colonel, 

179; killed, 182. 
Smith, Andrew J., Major-General, 

285-290, 292-297, 300, 311-313, 

316, 317, 319, 320, 326-330, 333, 

334, 344-347- 
Smith, E. Kirby, Lieutenant-General 

(C), 148, 149, 156, 235, 236, 266, 

284, 294, 301, 302, 320-322, 329, 

336, 348. 



INDEX. 



525 



Smith, Elisha B., Colonel, killed, 202. 

Smith, James, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
200 ; Colonel, 328, 331. 

Smith, Marshall J., Colonel (C), 230. 

Smith, Martin L,, Major-General (C), 
10, 18, 19, 21, 35. 

Smith, Thomas B., Colonel (C), 35. 

Smith, T. Kilby, Colonel, 226 ; Brig 
adier-General, 285, 287, 295, 313, 
324, 325, 328, 333, 344, 345. 

" Snicker s Gap War," 358-360. 

Snow, W. K., Lieutenant, 123, 155. 

Soldier, American, character of, 209, 
210. 

South Carolina, 447. 

Southworth, Irving D., Lieutenant, 

315, 319- 

Spear, A. T., Acting Master, 62. 
Speed, Frederick, Captain, 343. 
Speight, A. W., Colonel (C), 273. 
Springfield Landing, La. (below 

Shreveport), 295, 296, 313. 
Springfield Landing, La. (near Port 

Hudson), surprised, 216. 
Stanton, Edwin M., tells Halleck to 

help against Vicksburg, 27. 
Starlight, transport (C), captured, 

201, 337- 

Staunton, Va., 402, 403, 409. 
Stearns, Albert, Captain, 214. 
Steedman, J. G. W., Colonel (C), 230. 
Steele, Frederick, Major-General, 

283-285, 292, 294, 329, 334-336, 

348. 
Steele, William, Brigadier-General 

(C), 329, 344. 

Stein, George W., Captain, 341. 
Stephenson s Depot, Va., 379, 380; 

winter quarters, 441. 
Sterling s plantation, affair at, 273. 
Stevens, previously Hart (C), 122. 
Stickney, Albert, Lieutenant-Colonel, 

238, 239- 
Stone, Charles P., Brigadier-General, 

219, 220, 228, 229, 246, 262, 274, 

289, 303, 305, 327- 
Stone, W. B., Colonel, 243. 
Stormers, Port Hudson, 212, 213, 

232. 
Stragglers at Cedar Creek, 428-430, 

436, 437- 
Straggling, 132. 

Strain, Alexander, Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 382. 

Strasburg, Va., 397, 398, 412. 
Strong, George C., Major, 8. 
Suffolk, transport, 269. 
Sullivan, J. C., Brigadier-General, 

359- 
Summer quarters, 1863, 256. 



Summit Point, Va. , 371. 

Sumter, 36. 

Swann, Robert P., Ensign, 186, 211. 

Switzerland, ram, 144, 154. 

Sykes, transport, 214. 

Taft, Alonzo, D., Captain, 365, 398, 
421. 

Tappan, James C., Brigadier-General 
(C), 314, 315, 317, 320. 

Taylor, Franck, Lieutenant, 246, 315. 

Taylor, Richard, Major-General (C), 
commands in Western Louisiana, 
44, 46, 48, 72, 73, 89, 94 ; at 
Bisland, 99, 101 ; Irish Bend, 104- 

106, 108, 109, 112-114, 116-119 ; 

retreat to Red River, 121, 122, 
124, 128-130, 146, 148 ; retires on 
Shreveport, 149 ; raids La Fourche 
and blockades the river, 214, 215, 
229, 233, 235, 236, 242, 247, 249- 
251, 254, 255, 266, 274, 275, 284, 
288, 290, 296, 300, 302-304, 310, 
311, 313-317, 320-323, 325, 329; 
342, 345, 346, 348. 

Teche Campaign, 46, 72, 73, 85-134 ; 
naval operations, 88, 89. 

Tennessee, 247, 248. 

Tennessee, Army of the, 54, 60, 61, 
68-71. 

2oth (C), 35. 

Tenney, J. T., Lieutenant, 130. 

Tenth Army Corps, 446. 

Terre Bonne, La., 47. 

Terrell, A. W., Brigadier-General (C), 
330. 

Terry, Alfred H., Major-General, 
446. 

Terry, Edward, Lieutenant - Com 
mander U.S.N., 1 86, 211. 

"Texas, A Foothold in," 264-276, 
280, 282, 283, 348. 

coast occupied, 275, 276 ; 

evacuated, 342. 

included in Department of the 

Gulf, 55. 

Texas troops (U), ist cavalry, 62, 
267, 275. 

Texas troops (C), ist Partisan regi 
ment (Lane s), 155, 243, 244. 

2d cavalry (Pyron), 156, 239, 

242. 

4th (Reily), 106, 109. 

3d Confederate Arizona bri 
gade (Phillips), 243. 

4th Confederate (Hardeman), 

245- 

5th (Green), 99. 

5th Confederate (Shannon), 

244. 



526 



INDEX. 



Texas, 6th Confederate (Stone), 243, 

245. 
7th Confederate (Herbert), 



244. 



Cook s regiment, 63, 272. 
Gould s regiment, 325. 
Rountree s battalion, 273. 



Waller s (i3th) battalion, 97, 

99, 128, 129, 155, 242, 273. 

Woods s regiment, 325. 

(W. H.) Parsons s cavalry 

brigade, 325. 

Scurry s brigade, 63, 287. 



Sibley s brigade, 63, 155. 

Barnes s battery. 

Gonzales s battery, 243. 

McMahan s battery, 325, 330. 

Moseley s battery, 325, 330. 

Nettles s battery, 325, 330. 

Nichols s battery, 247. 

Valverde battery, 99, 241. 

West s battery, 325, 330, 343. 

Wilson s batter} , 63. 

Thayer, J.M., Brigadier-General, 292, 

Thibodeaux, La., 46, 47. 

Thirteenth Army Corps, 139, 258, 
259, 268, 273-278, 288, 289, 305, 
307, 312, 341-343, 348, 350 ; new, 
354, 355- 

Thoburn, J. M., Brigadier-General, 
359, 39, 39 1 , 406, 414, 415, 417, 
418, 436. 

Thomas, George H., Major-General, 
393- 

Thomas, Stephen, Colonel, 48, 169- 
171, 188, 202, 232, 389, 414-416, 
^ 419, 420, 423. 

Thorn, George, Colonel, 409. 

Thompson, A. P., Captain, 45. 

Thompson, A. P., Colonel (C), 35, 
38. 

Thompson, Augustine, Captain, 243. 

Three Top Mountain, 396 ; signal 
message from, 407 ; Gordon and 
Hotchkiss reconnoitre, 410-412. 

Tibbetts, Howard, Acting Master, 
268. 

Tiemann, William F., Major, 361, 
375- 

Torbert, A. T. A., Major-General, 
371-377, 39-393, 397, 398, 400, 
402-404, 406, 408, 409, 415, 416, 
423, 427, 436, 437, 440, 441. 

Tortugas, Dry, Fla., 45, 259. 

Trans-Mississippi Department, Con 
federate, 266. 

Trull, George G., Lieutenant, 36, 267. 

Tupelo, Miss., Beauregard withdraws 
to, 26. 

Turner, J. W., Colonel, 8. 



Tyler, U. S. gunboat, 29-31. 

Ulffers, H. A., Captain, 138. 
Ullmann, Daniel, Brigadier-General, 

218, 219, 261. 
Uncle Ben (C), 272. 
Upton, Emory, Brigadier-General 

415. 
U. S. Artillery, A, 1st (Bainbridge), 

at Bisland, 98 ; at Port Hudson, 

171, 210, 221, 224, 267. 
F, ist (Duryea), at Bisland, 

98, 125, 130; at Port Hudson, 171, 

188, 191, 194, 210, 221, 267, 280 ; 

at Mansura, 345. 

L, ist (Closson), at Irish Bend, 



107, no, 124, 246, 267, 315. 

C, 2d (Rodgers), at Irish 

Bend, no, in, 113; in pursuit, 126. 
G, 5th (Rawles), 83, 161, 162, 



260, 261, 280, 301, 306. 

left in Louisiana, 353. 



U. S. colored troops, 97th, 341 
99th, 341. 

" Valley of Humiliation, The," 368. 
Vance, Joseph W., Colonel, 300-302, 

304- 
Vanderbilt) 57. 

Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 57. 

Van Dorn, Earl, Major-General (C), 
26, 32, 33, 41, 44, 69. 

Van Petten, John B., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 170, 202, 213. 

Van Zandt, Jacob, Colonel, 166, 169, 
170. 

Varuna, 13, 14. 

Verdun Landing, La., 105. 

Vermilion River, or Bayou, La., 
122, 124, 126, 128. 

Vermont, 7th, 16, 22 ; at Baton 
Rouge, 36, 37, 242 ; re-enlisted 
veterans, 280. 

8th, 8, 48, 73, 74 ; at Bisland, 

98, 147 ; at Port Hudson, 170, 357, 
382 ; at Opequon, 388-390 ; at 
Cedar Creek, 420, 445. 

ist battery (Duncan, Hebard), 

8, 43, 267, 316, 332. 

2d battery (Holcomb), 16, 43, 

62, 64, 65, 161, 260, 261. 

Veteran re-enlistments, 280. 

Vicksburg, defences of, 19, 25 ; de 
scribed, 25 ; first attempt on (But 
ler s), 16-31; second (Sherman s), 69, 
140 ; third (Grant s), 136, 140, 144, 
164, 183, 184, 204, 205 ; surrender, 
225, 226, 228, 236. 

Vicksburg expedition, co-operation 
with, 60, 68-71. 



INDEX. 



527 



Vincent, W. G., Colonel (C), 105- 

109, 117, 290. 
"Voice of the American People, 

The," 392. 
Volunteers, American, character of, 

209, 210. 

Wainwright, J. M., Commander, 62. 

Wainwright, Richard, Captain, 
U.S.N., 13. 

Walker, Duncan S., Captain, 213, 
225, 228, 229, 248, 249 ; Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 439. 

Walker, John G., Brigadier-General, 
(C), 235, 236, 242, 275, 287, 288, 
300, 302, 304, 305, 315, 317, 319, 
320, 329, 348. 

Wallace, Lewis, Major-General, 
356. 

Waller, E., Jr., Lieutenant-Colonel 
(C), 97, 101, 242, 273. 

Warner, Alexander, Lieutenant-Colo 
nel, 113. 

Warner, transport, 343. 

War Records office, 224. 

Warren, Fitz-Henry, Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 342. 

Warrenton, Miss., 18. 

Washburn, C. C., Major-General, 258, 
273-278. 

Washburn, Henry D., Colonel, 
446. 

Washburne, Elihu B., 54. 

Washington, D. C., defences of, 55 ; 
relief of, 355-357 ; grand review at, 

444, 445- 

Washington, La., 126. 

Washington, statue of, 40, 42. 

Washita River, La., 286. 

Waterloo, La., 83 ; skirmish, 159. 

W T atters, John, Lieutenant-Com 
mander, 243. 

Waynesboro , Va., 402. 

Weaver, A. W., Lieutenant-Com 
mander, 214, 243. 

Webb (C), 75, 88. 

Weitzel, Godfrey, Lieutenant, 8, 35, 
44, 66 ; Brigadier-General, 45 ; 
commands reserve brigade, 45 ; 
operations in La Fourche, 1862, 
46-48 ; commands district of La 
Fourche, 48, 49 ; objects to colored 
troops, 50 ; destroys Cotton (C), 
73, 74 ; in La Fourche, 1863, 77 ; 
plans, 85-87 ; in Teche campaign, 
88-93 ; at Bisland, 96-102, 104, 
115, 119-121 ; pursuit, 122, 125 ; 
march to Red River, 144, 147-149 ; 
to Port Hudson, 152-155, 166 ; 
first assault, 167, 169-171, 174, 175, 



186, 188, 192 ; second assault, 196, 
198, 199, 202, 229-233 ; commands 
ist division, 233, 250 ; at Kock s 
plantation, 251, 254-256, 259, 260, 
267-271, 273, 277, 281. 

Wellington at Badajos and Ciudad 
Rodrigo, 208. 

Westfield, 62, 64. 

West Florida, District of, 44. 

West, J. A. A., Lieutenant (C), 101. 

West Mississippi, Military Division 
of, 347- 

West Virginia, Army of (see Crook> 
George), 

Wharton, G. C., Brigadier-General(C), 
379, 38o, 390, 391, 411, 416, 417, 
420, 424, 425, 427, 441. 

Wharton, John A., Major-General 
(C), 329, 333, 345. 

Wheaton, Frank, Brigadier-General, 
398, 415, 422, 423, 425, 426, 431, 
432. 

White Post, Va.. 371. 

Whitfield, J. F., Captain (C), 173. 

Whittemore, H. O., Major, 15. 

Wickham, W. H., Brigadier-General 
(C), 400, 402. 

Wilkinson, Robert F., Captain, 439. 

Willcox, O. B., Major-General, 444. 

Williamson, H. F., Captain, 45, 49, 
90, 125. 

Williamson, John J., Lieutenant, 281, 
342. 

Williams, John, private, 197. 

Williams, Thomas, Brigadier-General, 
9, 12 ; first attempt on Vicksburg, 
17-31 ; digs canal opposite, 23, 28, 
29, 31 ; in Battle of Baton Rouge, 
33-39 ; killed, 39 ; character, 39, 
40 ; on treatment of negroes, 40 ; 
singular arrests, 40, 

Wilson, Bartholomew W., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 399. 

Wilson, Henry, Lieutenant U.S.N., 
62. 

Wilson, G. R., Captain (C), 63. 

Wilson, James Grant, Colonel, 342. 

Wilson, James Henry, Brigadier-Gen 
eral, 374-376, 379-381, 392, 402. 

Wilson s Farm, La., cavalry affair, 
297. 

Winchester, Va., Averell s fight, 361, 
371, 372, 374 ; Sheridan s battle, 
" the Opequon," 378-395. 

Wingfield, J. H., Lieutenant-Colonel 
(C), 166. 

Winona, 13, 14, 214, 243, 245. 

Wisconsin, 4th, 6, 16-18, 21-24, 30 ; 
at Baton Rouge, 36-38, 43 ; at. 
Bisland, 93, 95, 96, 98, 130 : 



528 



INDEX. 



mounted, 131, 154 ; at Port Hud 
son, 190, 196, 197, 203, 232. 

Wisconsin, 23d, 277. 
Wissahickon, 13. 

Witham, C. H., Lieutenant, 214. 
Wood, Almon A., Lieutenant, 157. 
Woodbury, D. P., Brigadier-General, 

155- 

Wood ford, transport, 291. 

Woodruff, Henry D., Lieutenant- 
Colonel, 263. 

Woods, E. P., private, 197. 

Woodstock, Va., 399, 401. 

Woolsey, M. B., Lieutenant-Com 
mander, 243, 245. 



Wordin, C. W., Lieutenant-Colonel, 
238. 

Wright, Horatio G., Major-General, 
356-367, 37i, 372, 374, 375, 379- 
386, 389, 391-393, 397-402, 404- 
410, 415, 416, 418, 419, 421-425, 
429-437, 441. 

Wrotnowski, L. A., Lieutenant, 
killed, 182. 

Yazoo River, Confederate gunboats 
in, 29, 30 ; naval fight in, 29, 30. 

Yellow Bayou, La., skirmish, 345 ; 
fight, 346. 

Young s Point, La., affair, 236. 



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