}0
S. Hrg. 103-29
NOMINATION OF WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER TO
BE SECRETARY OF STATE
Y 4. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-29
Nonination of Marren H. Christopher...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JANUARY 13 AND 14, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
MAY 2 4
©S3
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-«22cc WASHINGTON : 1993
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-040654-4
J S. Hrg. 103-29
NOMINATION OF WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER TO
BE SECRETARY OF STATE
Y 4. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-29
HoninitioD of Marren H. Christopher...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JANUARY 13 AND 14, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
-
may 2 4
1993
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-822cc WASHINGTON : 1993
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-040654-4
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
PAUL SIMON, Illinois
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
HARLAN MATHEWS, Tennessee
Geryld B. CHRISTIANSON, Staff Director
JAMES W. NANCE, Minority Staff Director
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
HANK BROWN, Colorado
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
(ID
-■'•
CONTENTS
January 13, 1993
Page
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California 3
Christopher, Hon. Warren M., of California, Nominee for Secretary of State ... 19
Prepared statement 29
Dodd, Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement 13
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from California 2
Pell, Claiborne, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island, prepared statement 1
Pressler, Larry, U.S. Senator from South Dakota, prepared statement 12
Appendix
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by:
Senator Helms 195
Senator Dole 224
Senator Murkowski 225
Senator Coverdell 227
Senator Pressler 228
Senator Brown 230
Senator Jeffords 232
Prepared Statement of James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator from Vermont 232
Prepared Statement of Carl Olson, Chairman, State Department Watch 233
Letters to Senator Pell from:
Dan C. Tate 235
Jerome J. Shestack of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen 236
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith 237
(III)
NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE WARREN
M. CHRISTOPHER OF CALIFORNIA TO BE
SECRETARY OF STATE
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1993
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Simon,
Moynihan, Robb, Wofford, Feingold, Mathews, Helms, Lugar,
Kassebaum, Pressler, and Coverdell.
Also present: Senators Feinstein and Boxer
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to
order.
It is with great pleasure that we welcome Warren Christopher to
our committee today as the nominee to be Secretary of State. I
know Mr. Christopher to be a singularly intelligent, wise, honor-
able, and talented man. My own view is that our Nation is lucky
to have a person of his caliber willing to serve at this critical posi-
tion. We welcome you here, and I think first I would ask my col-
leagues to introduce you.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Pell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Pell
It is with great pleasure that I welcome Warren Christopher to the Committee
today as President-elect Clinton's nominee to be Secretary of State.
Mr. Christopher served with distinction as Deputy Secretary of State from 1977-
81, and we look forward to obtaining his views about a world that has changed
greatly since he was last in government.
In many ways, we find ourselves in a situation similar to the one that existed in
1945. In the wake of a catastrophic world war, the old order had collapsed and new
institutions and ways of thinking had to be devised. Now, after a Cold War lasting
more than four decades, we face the task of devising or revising mechanisms to deal
with new circumstances. In particular, we have an opportunity to reclaim the dream
of the U.N. as an effective agent for world peace. We must also think in new ways
about the dangers and challenges of today, which are different from those of the
Cold War.
Our top priority must be dealing with the results of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War. These include the implementation of arms con-
trol agreements to ensure that only Russia is a nuclear weapons state and to reduce
drastically the number of nuclear weapons. Second, we must do what we can to en-
sure the success of democracy in Russia, the other countries of the former Soviet
Union, and the other countries of the old Soviet bloc. This will require leadership
and resources. But, I can think of no more critical expenditure on behalf of our na-
tional security.
(1)
We must also address more effectively the issues of ethnic conflict and striving
for self-determination that are likely to dominate international relations in the Clin-
ton era. Across the planet peoples seek self-rule, often through demands for new
states. How we deal with these aspirations will decide how peaceful a world we will
see in the 1990's. If our response to the breakdown of international law in Bosnia
is any guide, I am not optimistic.
Finally, we must address a whole series of global problems that were too often
ignored during the Cold War. These include the deterioration of the global environ-
ment, the continuation of massive global poverty, the proliferation of the tech-
nologies of mass destruction, and the burgeoning growth 01 human population.
Mr. Christopher, you will take office at a time when you can truly reshape the
world. I envy your opportunities but not the burdens you will have to shoulder.
I will now ask the Ranking Minority Member to make a statement, and then
other Members will have an opportunity to make opening statements as well. This
is a divergence from our usual practice, but this is also a special occasion. I hope
that we will not keep Mr. Christopher waiting too long to make his statement and
respond to questions. So I urge everyone to be brief.
The Chairman. I think Senator Feinstein has a statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, mem-
bers of the committee. I am very pleased to be able to share with
my colleague Barbara Boxer this very important introduction of
Warren Christopher for a confirmation as Secretary of State. If you
ask me, Mr. Chairman, to summarize the most outstanding charac-
teristics of the person Warren Christopher, it would be that he is
a man of high competence and intellect, strong character, with ma-
ture and reasoned judgment, all of which are packaged in an unas-
suming demeanor. I believe he has all the qualities required to be
a fine Secretary of State.
These personal characteristics were recently put to the test in
California when he led a challenging and politically sensitive com-
mission to review the performance of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment in the wake of the Rodney King incident known as the
Christopher Commission. This body's findings led to comprehensive
reform of the department, and the voters overwhelmingly approved
the recommendations of the Christopher Commission at a general
election.
His outstanding record of leadership has been achieved through
a lifelong dedication to public service. Born in Scranton, ND, War-
ren Christopher first entered public service as a member of the
Naval Reserve in World War II, with active duty as an ensign in
the Pacific theater.
After earning his undergraduate degree from the University of
Southern California and his law degree from Stanford University,
Warren Christopher served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas in 1949. He then joined the law firm of
O'Melveny & Myers, becoming a partner within 8 years.
He served as vice chairman of the McCallum Commission that
investigated the 1965 Watts riots. He was the special consultant to
Under Secretary George Ball on foreign economic problems from
1965 to 1967. He served as Deputy Attorney General of the United
States from 1967 to 1969. He served as Deputy Secretary of State
from 1977 to 1981.
His crowning achievement was the safe release of 52 hostages
from Iran to America in 1981. He received the Medal of Freedom,
our Nation's highest civilian award, for his achievement in bringing
this terrible hostage incident to a successful conclusion.
In his spare time, Mr. Christopher has participated in many pro-
fessional and civic activities: president of the Los Angeles County
Bar Association; chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fed-
eral Judiciary of the American Bar Association, and member of the
Board of Governors of the State Bar of California reflect just a por-
tion of his many professional activities.
His diverse civic and business activities include positions as a
member of the Board of Trustees of Stanford University, director
of Lockheed Corp., chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Carne-
gie Corp., and a Fellow of the American Academy of the Arts.
Warren Christopher, as you can see, has dedicated his life to
serving the people of this country. No one knows for sure the chal-
lenges that we face during this tremendous time of change and po-
tentially dangerous instability. But the people of our country must
know that our leader on foreign affairs and national security issues
is someone of the highest competence and character. I believe that
we have that man before us today, and he is Warren Christopher.
Thank you, very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much. Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the com-
mittee. I want to add what a privilege it is for me to join with my
colleague Senator Feinstein in introducing Warren Christopher to
this very distinguished committee.
Many of you do not need an introduction to Warren Christopher
because you remember hem when he served in the Carter adminis-
tration. But that was over a decade ago, when the great struggle
between the superpowers dominated world affairs.
Now, we stand at the dawn of a new era. The possibilities of giv-
ing meaning to the term new world order are limitless. I believe
that President-elect Bill Clinton was elected by the American peo-
ple to restore this country's economic health. But I also believe he
recognizes that our economic and political strength depend upon
our leadership in world affairs. We need a stable and a peaceful
world so that our energies and our resources can be directed and
focused on important domestic priorities, and that is why I believe
Bill Clinton chose Warren Christopher for this particular job.
Our economic well-being is certainly connected to the world econ-
omy. Our economic security is threatened by the proliferation of
dangerous weapons. Our natural resources are threatened by glob-
al environmental conditions. Our inner cities are plagued by the
scourge of drugs that flood our shores from abroad. In my view, no
American is more prepared to help Bill Clinton face these and
other challenges from Warren Christopher.
In numerous positions — Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Attor-
ney General, chairman of the independent commission on the Los
Angeles Police Department, Warren Christopher has demonstrated
grace and good judgment under real pressure. During the Carter
administration, Warren Christopher adeptly handled many impor-
tant assignments, and Senator Feinstein has gone through those.
I will not repeat them.
At a time of great peril in one of our greatest cities, Los Angeles,
in a State of 30 million people, Mayor Bradley turned to Warren
Christopher to lead a bipartisan commission to get to the bottom
of the problems of excessive force and bias within the Los Angeles
Police Department. And although the commission was divided
along sharply political lines, Mr. Christopher's courage and skill
made it possible to produce unanimous bipartisan recommenda-
tions for sweeping changes in the Los Angeles Police Department.
I have served in the Congress for 10 years before being given this
honor to be in the Senate, and I can tell you, I know how tough
it is sometimes to move forward, with the two parties at the dif-
ferent ends of the spectrum sometimes. But this is a man who can
bring us all together. It is no exaggeration to say that Warren
Christopher has all the skills needed to be an excellent Secretary
of State, a brilliant intellect, integrity, honesty, negotiating skills
honed by years of legal practice and diplomacy. He is coof under
fire, he is clear in his goals, and those goals are to ensure that the
United States continues to be a strong world leader with vision and
know-how.
So I am not going to repeat all the things that he has done in
his life. I commend him to you. I strongly urge you to recommend
his confirmation to the full Senate.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much, the Senators from Cali-
fornia. You are good to be with us. You may stay or you are ex-
cused, whatever you wish.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. In many ways, I think today we find ourselves
in a situation similar to that that was in 1945 in the wake
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, would you forgive me for inter-
rupting? I promised the President and the former President that I
would be present this morning at the White House. I am going to
run down there for the award, and I will be right back, and I would
like for you to reserve my time for my opening statement, and of
course, I will take my place in the questioning.
The Chairman. Fine. When you come back, you will be recog-
nized.
Senator HELMS. Yes, sir. I thank you very much.
Senator BlDEN. Mr. Chairman, a 30-second interruption.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator BlDEN. Before our colleagues leave, I want to point out
to the Secretary-designee that this is truly a historic occasion. You
are the first man in American history to be introduced by two
women Senators, and I want to know that I understand that and
understand the significance and impact of that.
Mr. Christopher. I was very conscious of that, Senator Biden.
I think it is a very good omen.
Senator Biden. So do I.
The Chairman. In any case, we now have an opportunity to re-
claim the dream of the U.N. as an effective agent for world peace.
The U.N., people sometimes forget, was born in San Francisco, in
the State from which all three of you at the table come from.
Our top priority must be dealing with the results of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, and these include
the implementation of arms control agreements to ensure that only
Russia is a nuclear weapons state, and to reduce dramatically the
number of nuclear states.
And second, we must do what we can to ensure the success of
democracy in Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet
Union and the other countries of the old Soviet bloc. This is going
to require leadership and resources.
Finally, we must address more effectively the issues of ethnic
conflict and the striving for self-determination that are likely to
dominate international affairs in the coming years. Across the
planet, people seek self-rule, often with demands for new states.
How we deal with these aspirations will decide how peaceful a
world we will see in the 1990's. If our response to the breakdown
of international law in Bosnia is any guide, I am not optimistic.
Finally, we have a whole series of global problems, often ignored
during the cold war, the deterioration of tne global environment,
the continuation of massive global poverty, the proliferation of the
technologies of mass destruction, the burgeoning growth of human
population. You will be taking office, sir, at a time when you can
truly help to reshape the world. Your opportunities are legion, but
I do not envy you the burdens you have to shoulder.
The ranking minority member will come back to make his open-
ing statement later. I have invited, because of the historic nature
of this hearing, my colleagues, if they care to make a statement,
to do so. The normal practice of our committee is for the ranking
member and I to make a statement, and then other members'
statements are deferred until their question period. I would also
add that we will have a longer question period, 15 minutes instead
of 10 minutes, which will give us more of a chance to go into depth.
So at this point, I would defer to any of my colleagues who would
like to make a brief opening statement.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Christopher, I join the chairman, the ranking member, and
other members of the committee, in welcoming you to this commit-
tee. President-elect Clinton has emphasized the need to redirect
our national resources to shore up and strengthen our domestic in-
frastructure and to attend to many internal economic and social
priorities.
But more than ever before, our domestic well-being is tied to the
well-being of the world, whether this is measured in security, poli-
tics, trade, the environment, technology, or ideas. In determining
our national priorities, the choice we nice must not be posed as a
choice between national security and domestic spending. We need
to be as vigilant about our international well-being as we are about
our domestic well-being, because they shape and condition each
other comprehensively.
I believe that the foreign policies of the Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations provide a sound foundation for the foreign policy of the
incoming administration. Although there were partisan differences
and occasionally contentious disagreements, the foreign policy
achievements of the Reagan and Bush administrations depended in
6
good part upon active consultation and cooperation between the
White House and the Congress. I hope that this will continue.
Unfortunately, world events do not conform to our domestic time-
table. Quite the contrary. There are international and regional cri-
ses the new administration will inherit, and new threats to our na-
tional security will arise. As a general principle, I believe the Unit-
ed States must stay actively involved abroad and for the foresee-
able future must take the lead in managing the transition to the
post-cold war era. There is no other country, international organi-
zation, or mechanism that can measure up to that task.
This does not mean that the United States must be the police-
man of the world or that we must act or react to every challenge
or that we must go it alone when and if we do not act.
It does mean that we must be prepared to act if and when we
must, and success will depend upon the coupling of skillful diplo-
macy and the retention of a visible and credible military capability
with the will to use military force when necessary.
The goal of the U.S. leadership should be, at a minimum, to
manage a dangerous world with the assistance of other nations, the
U.N., regional organizations, and our alliances. At the core, our ob-
jectives should be to support democracy and freedom where we can,
to further human rights wherever possible, promote free market
economic principals and practice in other countries, seek the free
movement of goods and services between nations, and to punish ag-
gression when it occurs.
Our ability to achieve success in these areas will depend on a
strong military capability, acting with great diplomacy under na-
tional consensus on our national interests. There are a number of
flashpoints around the world that await the new administration.
The U.S. responses to some of them such as Somalia are proceeding
well. Other situations such as Iraq, which require military action
in response to repeated violations, provocations, and the flouting of
U.N. resolutions. Still others, such as the Middle East peace proc-
ess, will require a jump start to maintain momentum in that trou-
bled part of the world.
The crises in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet
Union, however, merit special attention. If either is allowed to de-
teriorate further we could face threats to our security, our pros-
pects for economic growth, our ability to create jobs, and our capac-
ity to rebuild our human and physical infrastructure here at home.
Bosnia could be a major national security crisis for the new ad-
ministration. I believe we need to be much more bold in our efforts.
I believe the future of Europe is at stake in Bosnia. Already, the
problems in Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia are rico-
cheting around the Balkans and Europe. Expansion of the Bosnian
conflict to Kosovo or the Sandzak region of Serbia and to Macedo-
nia and beyond is a strong possibility. It is best to act now to con-
tain the conflict and forestall further genocidal behavior. The moral
imperative and the security imperative both cry out for action.
Regrettably, I do not believe it will be an acceptable or lasting
resolution of the Bosnian crisis short of outside military interven-
tion. As heroic as the peace efforts of Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen
have been in Geneva, I am pessimistic their efforts would lead to
a just settlement in Bosnia. For this reason, I support enforcement
of the no-fly zone over Bosnia, the lifting of the arms embargo on
Bosnia, preparations for war-related trials for those responsible for
genocide, the destruction of heavy weapons in Bosnia by airstrikes,
and a NATO-led plan to deploy substantial ground forces in Bosnia
for the purpose of imposing law and order and ensuring the safe
return of refugees.
A failure to introduce sufficient military force into the Bosnian
equation will, I fear, prolong the agony and allow the conflict there
to grow and to threaten our national security interests. A great
threat to the United States and our allies still exists in the thou-
sands of nuclear warheads mounted on intercontinental ballistic
missiles in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. They are
still aimed at the United States, still capable of being launched
without warning against our cities and our people. The threat of
a surprise attack may be at a historic low point, but an unauthor-
ized launch or nuclear accident is distinctly possible because of the
decomposition of the former Soviet Union which resulted in four,
not one, nuclear states.
Each of these states faces severe economic, political, and ethnic
strains which can undermine effective centralized control over its
nuclear weapons or the safety of the nuclear reactors. No less omi-
nous is the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
nuclear technology and materials, and know-how. Many of the na-
tions hostile toward the United States are also among the most ag-
gressive in seeking nuclear technology or weapons themselves.
The current administration has been active in providing humani-
tarian and technical assistance and in establishing diplomatic mis-
sions in the former Soviet states. We need to integrate all aspects
of our policy toward the former Soviet Union. We need to do so
without delay. Integration would include, for example, the appoint-
ment of a high-level coordinator to pull together official and non-
governmental efforts into a cohesive strategy for policy coordination
and implementation.
Our main goals must be the safe dismantling and destruction of
strategic nuclear weapons, ratification of START I, adherence to
the nonproliferation treaty by all parties, and the prompt review by
the Senate of the START II Treaty. But coupled with these prior-
ities, we should assist in the building of democratic institutions
and practices, the strengthening of civilian control over the mili-
tary, and the promotion of economic stabilization and reform.
We should also provide direct assistance to such critical areas as
energy, housing, and defense conversion. Wherever possible, we
should use our moral authority to ease ethnic tensions and con-
flicts. Much of this will require beefed-up embassies in the new
states of the former Soviet Union. We have a historic opportunity
which requires a comparatively small investment to ensure that
our children and grandchildren will not be confronted with a nu-
clear threat from the territory of the Soviet Union. This imperative
lies at the core of our vital national security interests and should
be placed at the top of our list of national priorities.
Finally, I predict that our domestic economic growth and pros-
perity will be enhanced substantially by the successful completion
of the GATT Uruguay Round and by the approval of the North
American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]. Both will ensure great-
8
er wealth among nations and for ourselves. I would hope that a
successful NAFTA agreement would be coupled with a free trade
momentum already underway and the Central American Common
Market and the MERCOSUR in the southern cone countries of
South America.
I support retention of the fast track negotiating procedure, and
I would be remiss if I did not also mention that greater emphasis
should be given to our Pacific rim trade partners. We must work
to open their markets as we address more vigorously the changing
security environment of the region, with certainty of continued
American presence. I hope that these thoughts correspond closely
with those of the new administration.
Once again, Mr. Christopher, I welcome you to the committee. I
look forward to your statement and your responses to our ques-
tions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Senator
Biden.
Senator Biden. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. You are going to be a
bit surprised here today. For example, you are going to be sur-
prised that Senator Lugar suggested that he hopes the administra-
tion's thoughts and concerns parallel his. It may hurt his reputa-
tion, but mine parallel his, and I think you will find some unholy
political alliances here, but that is good.
You will also, I suspect, Mr. Secretary, hear a lot of questions
about things that occurred 20 years ago, 30 years ago, and God
only knows how many years ago. That is legitimate, but your recol-
lection and my recollection coincide.
I was here on the Foreign Relations Committee and on the Intel-
ligence Committee at the time when questions were raised about
October Surprise and about your role as a deputy in the Attorney
General's office back in the bad old days or the good old days, de-
pending on one's perspective. And I am here to tell you, although
I think these are legitimate questions to raise, I do not have any
concern about them; my recollection has been refreshed by my staff
and records.
But I do have serious concerns, as I expressed to you when you
were kind enough to come by my office, about what the Clinton ad-
ministration's foreign policy will be, what the so-called new world
order will look like.
As you and I have discussed, I believe the new administration
faces two overarching imperatives: to revitalize the American econ-
omy and to foster the creation of a new world order. Neither task
can be neglected or postponed, but must be pursued with equal en-
ergy.
You know that my own concept for shaping a new world order
has four components. The first — cementing the Democratic founda-
tion— means promoting democracy everywhere we can, but espe-
cially among the major powers.
Our first priority must be the former members of the Warsaw
Pact. American national security interests depend on the survival
and success of Russian democracy. Investing wisely in Russian de-
mocracy is investing in American security. We should also, I be-
lieve, promote democracy in China through a powerful and proven
9
weapon: "freedom broadcasting," as mandated by the legislation
this committee approved last fall.
The second leg is forging a new strategy of containment. It
means empowering multilateral agencies and regimes to stop the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must direct this
containment strategy not against a particular nation or ideology,
but against a pernicious technological threat. To pursue this strat-
egy will require reorganizing our own Government to give prolifera-
tion a priority that this threat demands.
Third — organizing for collective security — means strengthening
the U.N. by assigning to the Security Council certain predesignated
military forces and facilities: a conception unanimously endorsed by
this committee last October. It also means converting NATO into
a military instrument for peacekeeping, and peacemaking, under
U.N. or CSCE auspices.
Collective security, a multinational commitment to repel aggres-
sion and defend the peace, was the central precept of Woodrow Wil-
son's vision. Wilson recognized it as a principle so essential to
world order that he would not yield it in the fight over the ratifica-
tion of the Versailles Treaty. It is the principle that the Senate fi-
nally accepted in 1949 with the advent of NATO, though it took the
carnage of the Second World War to prove Wilson right. And it is
that principle we must now extend, by empowering the U.N. and
transforming the Atlantic alliance.
Fourth, launching an economic-environmental revolution, means
protecting and perfecting the free trade regime by completing the
new GATT agreement, and then acting to reorient the world econ-
omy to environmentally sound methods of production and consump-
tion. And I would point out that I think that Governor Clinton is
off to a good start with his meeting with President Salinas by indi-
cating that NAFTA must, in fact, better embody that environ-
mentally sound notion than it currently does.
Today we stand at the threshold of this new world order. I be-
lieve the people and governments, in growing numbers worldwide,
recognize what needs to be done. And I believe the American peo-
ple are prepared to see the United States take the lead in engineer-
ing sweeping, visionary change.
Americans recognize their interest in supporting democracy in
Russia and elsewhere, stopping proliferation, protecting the global
environment, and preventing tragedies like Bosnia that offend
American values and imperil world stability. Americans see the
need to meet these challenges. Meeting them will be the historic
foreign policy mission awaiting the Clinton administration and if
confirmed, the monumental task with which you will be entrusted.
Mr. Secretary, the Clinton administration advances a compelling
vision for a new world and begins the necessary transformation of
our international institutions to meet the demands of that new
world. I believe you can expect Congress to support you ener-
getically and enthusiastically on both sides of the aisle. I sincerely
urge you, as I did in our private meeting, to be bold. I sincerely
urge you to suggest to the President of United States, when con-
firmed, that this is not a time for timidity, this is a time for bold
vision.
10
Without U.S. world leadership, I think there is no real possibility
of putting together a new world order that bodes well for our chil-
dren and our grandchildren.
And I thank the chairman for his indulgence. I thank you and
I thank you, Senator Boxer, for being here to introduce the Sec-
retary.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Kassebaum.
Senator Kassebaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chris-
topher, welcome and congratulations. You bring an impressive set
of credentials, and there certainly is no one who better understands
the responsibilities that you face. I have high regard for your integ-
rity and your discretion, which I think are key essentials to nego-
tiating and management skills. And your reputation that precedes
you certainly has acknowledged your commitment to diplomacy,
and I would also add a high respect and regard for our foreign
service, which I share.
Foreign policy captured little attention during the campaign. In
fact, everybody really tried to avoid it in some ways. And as a re-
sult, I think we are ever more perplexed about the disintegration
of Yugoslavia and the continuing crisis in Russia.
The President-elect has promised to focus like a laser on the
economy and our domestic problems. No one would dispute the im-
portance of our domestic priorities, but we are also, I think, keenly
aware of the close connection between our domestic concerns and
world events. Whether it is the slowdown in the global economy,
which certainly affects American jobs, or an upheaval abroad that
could affect our security, I think we have an enormous stake in
maintaining our role as a world leader, which has already been
spoken to and which I know you well understand.
However, the challenge since the cold war to providing leader-
ship becomes ever more difficult and intricate, and there are days,
I think, that we must feel that the world has been made safe for
mayhem, as we review the trouble spots around the world. But for
40-some years, the consensus that pulled the world together within
a framework was, of course, the containment of communism.
And now in this new era, as we search for new markers, I guess
that I would like to hear you address, as we go from trouble spot
to trouble spot, whether we will have to just adjust to ad hoc policy
or whether there is some single theme, some guiding principles
that we can put before us. I believe that for us to benefit from the
many changes taking place, that we as a Nation must have a
strong sense of identity and direction, and I look forward to review-
ing this with you today.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, I will be very brief because I am anxious to hear Mr.
Christopher's statement to the committee and then to have the op-
portunity to engage in an exchange of views with him. But I do
want to say I am very pleased to join my colleagues in welcoming
Warren Christopher back before this committee.
Warren Christopher is well equipped by experience, by back-
ground, by personal disposition, to give direction and substance to
our Nation's foreign policy. The world we face is not one in which
public pronouncements will, like some magic wand, wave the prob-
11
lems away. It is a world that requires skillful diplomacy and nego-
tiating skills to bring adversaries to the table of peace. It is a world
that requires a new view and a broad understanding of the role of
national and international institutions to deal with the world as it
is now, and not with the world as it was.
You have demonstrated throughout your career great skill in
dealing with seemingly intractable problems or crises. Time and
again your determination, patience, and wise judgment have moved
people to solutions. I have great confidence that the interests of
this Nation will be well served by your leadership at the Depart-
ment of State, and I look forward to working with you in the years
ahead.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. Sen-
ator Pressler.
Senator Pressler. Thank you very much. I welcome you here
and look forward to hearing from you. I am very interested in hear-
ing your views on the U.N., which I think will play a key role in
American foreign policy objectives. I am a strong supporter of the
U.N., but I have been a critic of its organization. I think it needs
an inspector general, which Boutros Boutros-Ghali has resisted, as
well as some internal reforms.
Also, I think that the U.N. troops must fight and do their job.
U.N. troops are afraid of getting shot at in some areas. In Cam-
bodia they are staying in their barracks, 17,000 of them. In Soma-
lia we had paid to train three battalions, one from Nigeria, one
from Belgium, and one from Egypt, and they did not carry out the
functions they are supposed to.
So the point I am making is I think that we have to have some
burden sharing here. The United States cannot do everything. The
American taxpayer cannot do everything. We already are paying
the U.N. a good portion of the peacekeeping — about a third of that,
to train soldiers and to have them available for deployment.
I also have questioned our involvement in Somalia in terms of
the cost and in terms of priorities. Everybody wants to help people
get food, but there are so many other priorities on our lists and we
already had paid U.N. troops to do that, and I will be asking you
specific questions about that.
Finally, I am very interested in the subject of agricultural trade
as it affects GATT. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
Treaties have been held up because of a dispute over agricultural
subsidies in Europe. Europe has refused to lower those subsidies.
We have lowered some of ours, and I have been one of those who
supports fair play when it comes to agricultural trade, which is a
key part of GATT,
The State Department plays a big role in agricultural trade, and
I am always worried that some morning I am going to wake up and
agriculture will be dropped quietly from the GATT negotiations
and the American farmer will be left to compete unfairly. We all
have to remember that agricultural products are our biggest export
in this country, and it is something that the State Department
plays a key role in. I know that the U.S. Trade Ambassador's Office
does and the Agriculture Department does, but the State Depart-
ment also plays a key role in that.
12
And this committee can play a role also, because all trade trea-
ties come through this committee. If we ever have a major trade
treaty during this 103d Contress, it will be before this committee.
But I think that firmness on the part of the State Department and
this administration to stick to a free and fair trade policy, as I feel
Carla Hills did on agricultural trade, will be very important.
I welcome you here and I look forward to hearing your views.
[The prepared statement of Senator Pressler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Pressler
Let me begin by thanking the Chairman for calling these hearings and for wel-
coming Mr. Christopher to the Committee this morning. With the collapse of Soviet-
style communism, an end to the Cold War, and the opening of free market econo-
mies in many formerly state-run countries, a new global order has emerged with
the United States as the preeminent power. In this dynamic, unfolding global
drama, the role the United States plays in current international struggles will set
a precedent for future U.S. actions. This is true whether the United States opts to
play the lead role as the head of a global police force or to take a supporting role
as an interested, morally-obliged deputy.
The current role chosen by the United States in providing aid to Somalia, for ex-
ample, certainly will influence future U.S. involvement on the international stage.
And if this role is continued by the Clinton Administration, it will be an inter-
national precedent with serious domestic implications. With a huge federal budget
deficit, serious small city and urban problems, senior citizen concerns, and countless
other domestic needs, our leaders should be cautious in their international commit-
ments. Unless the United States strongly stand urges other capable nations to assist
with global projects, the world stage will be set for the United States to continue
taking primary, if not full economic responsibility in future world crises.
In recent letters to President Bush and President-Elect Clinton, I have urged
them to call for a stronger European and Japanese presence in managing global con-
flicts. The United States, although it remains the world's sole superpower, no longer
should be held responsible for providing the bulk of financial and military assistance
to the world's war-torn regions. Japan, the rich oil producing countries, and the
wealthy European nations also are fully capable of providing assistance for the trou-
bled regions of the world. They, too, have a moral obligation to lead in a global war
against hunger, disease, and tyranny.
In the days ahead, Mr. Christopher and President-Elect Clinton may establish
new precedents for future efforts to alleviate the plagues of violence and famine. I
woula advise the Administration to establish two guidelines: First, remain cautious
about making world commitments; and second, future commitments should be based
on a multinational strategy. Can the United States really afford to accept far more
than its proportionate share of world responsibilities? What is our fair share of
these burdens? With an agenda focused heavily on our domestic affairs, the Clinton
Administration must be ready to answer this question.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And let me join, Mr. Christopher, in welcoming you to the com-
mittee this morning and congratulating you and President-elect
Clinton for, in his case, the nomination and yours for accepting the
nomination. It has been said, I know, by others here this morning.
This is a unique opportunity.
I mentioned to you the other day, Dean Acheson in his autobiog-
raphy entitled Present at the Creation, describing the events in the
immediately postwar — World War II period. And I suspect at some
future point you may decide to engage in that same activity of de-
scribing the events of your life, which have been momentous up to
now, and certainly these next 4 years will offer you incredible new
opportunities.
But in many ways we are all present at a new creation, and this
is a tremendous opportunity for this country to help rewrite the
13
rules of international law. We are confronted as we speak here this
morning with challenges to that in the Middle East and elsewhere.
So I am very excited about your nomination. I think the Presi-
dent chose wisely and I pledge to you, as I am sure my colleagues
who are here this morning, if they have not already, to be coopera-
tive and supportive in helping conduct the foreign policy 01 this
country in the coming 4 years. So I welcome vou.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Dodd
Mr. Christopher, I too would like to welcome you here this morning and to wish
you well in your upcoming assignment. Your selection and the selection of the other
cabinet appointments give me great confidence that the Clinton Presidency will be
an outstanding one.
Like many of my colleagues, I had an opportunity to chat with you last week
about some of my interests and concerns as we look to the coming year. As I indi-
cated to you at that time, I think that President-elect Clinton takes office at a ter-
ribly propitious point in world history.
The old world order — that bipolar balancing act of two largely hostile superpowers
that kept things more or less on a predictable course — has dissolved. And, its most
well known icons — the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics — have now all been relegated to museum displays or the pages of diplo-
matic history books.
What is not yet clear is what's to replace the old order. Things are clearly in flux
* * * in Russia and the other former Soviet Republics * * * in what was once
Yugoslavia. That state of flux is clearly a threat to international peace and order.
Levs face it, there are some pretty terrible things going on around the world today —
actions that defy the imagination — ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tribal
warfare and outright looting in Somalia while an entire nation starves to death,
Iraqi acts of genocide against its Kurdish minority.
We clearly need a new world order to deal with these unspeakable acts. The start-
ing point for constructing that new order is for the new administration to restore
confidence in U.S. adherence to internationally-accepted legal norms. Such con-
fidence is absolutely essential if we and the community of nations are to build a
more stable international order: one that is based upon the observance and enforce-
ment of the rule of law, rather than the possibility of nuclear annihilation.
To make that happen will require, among other things, that the new administra-
tion work to strengthen international institutions that can then act as impartial
guardians of this new world order. While I know that none of us wants to dwell
upon past grievances against the last two administrations, the fact remains that
U.S. policy during the 1980's gave short shrift to international legal standards. Be
it the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, the abdication of the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, Iran-Contra, advocacy of international kidnapping as
part of the law enforcement process, Iraq-gate, government negligence and/or com-
plicity in the BCCI and BNL (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) scandals, or most re-
cently the politicization of the State Department in the so called passport-gate scan-
dal * * * each of these events robbed us of the moral authority to be the standard-
bearer of the rule of law internationally.
With your leadership, the new administration is poised to change that unfortu-
nate perception and to give some shape and coherence to the world in which we live.
As part of that * * * as I mentioned to you when we talked last week * * * de-
spite opposition in the past by the Bush Administration, I am firmly convinced that
the time is particularly auspicious for the United States to call for the establish-
ment of a permanent international crimes tribunal. Such a body could act as the
forum for bringing international criminals to justice * * * perpetrators of war
crimes, international narcotics traffickers, international terrorists. Such an inter-
national court could provide a uniform mechanism to address such criminals whose
crimes transcend borders or require the coordinated effort of more than one nation
to prosecute. Recent events suggest that a crimes tribunal is a critical element to
restoring and maintaining the international rule of law.
Establishing a new tribunal is only one component of the international foundation
that will be needed to act as the strong underpinnings of this new world order. So
too, the Clinton administration will need to continue the initiatives undertaken dur-
ing the Bush administration to make international bodies such as the United Na-
tions and the Organization of American States truly function as their founders envi-
14
sioned they would. This will entail working with friends and allies around the world
to encourage their active participation in these organizations, as well as their com-
mitment to provide adequate resources to them so that they can effectively carry
out their mandates.
As we discussed the other day, Mr. Christopher, here is an opportunity to be
"present at the creation" * * * present at the creation of a new world order * * * .
I am confident that you and your colleagues in the Clinton Administration will
make the most of this opportunity. If President Clinton can look back on his first
term in office having accomplished these foreign policy objectives, he will have
served our nation and other nations of the world well.
The Chairman. Thank you very much indeed. And now I would
like to recognize Senator Coverdell and also welcome him to the
committee and look forward to working with him. Senator
Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too welcome
you, Mr. Christopher, to your appearance before the committee. As
the former Director of the U.S. Peace Corps, I once sat in the chair
you occupy for my confirmation hearing, and I must say I have
great empathy for your task.
As others have noted, the world has changed dramatically since
you last served the State Department. For over half a century our
country has led the fight in the cold war. Presidents Reagan and
Bush and their intensified efforts certainly helped bring the cold
war to a close. We enter a period of redefinition, much of which will
fall on your watch. Now it is your task to devise and carry out a
foreign policy to keep America strong and protect our interests.
I cannot think of a more exciting change in the world than the
emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and
the rest of the world, and the former Soviet Union. America fought
hard to end Communist tyranny and we will have to work just as
hard to ensure that the new democracies succeed. You are familiar
with the obstacles to stability and prosperity in these new democ-
racies. I urge you to be attentive to these countries and to be atten-
tive to their struggles.
I also hope you will encourage our world allies to accept their fair
share of the responsibility of nurturing the development of democ-
racies and free markets in these countries. The days are gone when
the United States could shoulder the burden alone. We simply do
not have the money. Massive foreign aid programs may well be-
come a thing of the past, and in any event the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are just too large
and their problems are simply too difficult to solve with cash infu-
sions.
We need to find creative ways to empower the people and their
institutions. We need to help them learn how to run businesses and
work efficiently. These are the keys to independence and self-suffi-
ciency. The last thing we want is to cause these countries to be-
come dependent upon grants, handouts, et cetera.
I know something about the way to empower people through my
work at the Peace Corps. I look forward to assisting you in any way
possible to help these countries become free and prosperous, but
the American people expect the Clinton administration and the
Congress to accomplish this in a cost-effective way.
President Kennedy established both the Peace Corps and the
Agency for International Development. The Peace Corps is based
on the spirit of volunteerism and enjoys broad support across
15
America. Of course, it has, on this committee, a former distin-
guished volunteer in Senator Dodd and the original staff in Senator
Wofford.
But I must tell you that few of my friends in Dalton, Waycross,
Gainesville, and Atlanta support the kind of handouts that have
characterized our foreign aid efforts for decades. I believe it is time
to take a hard look at our foreign aid programs. The end of the cold
war presents us with a golden opportunity to reexamine our foreign
policy, including foreign aid.
Again, I am eager and I am sure this committee is ready to work
with you. And I must mention in conclusion that, of course, the
centennial Olympiad will occur in Atlanta in 1996, the summer
games, and I am sure that that will bring about and cause consid-
erable work and cooperation between this office and this committee
and the State Department.
So, again, I welcome you today. I look forward to hearing how
the administration plans to tackle these tough challenges that face
us and your vision of America's place in the new world. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it occurs to me that enduring our opening state-
ments is the first test of your diplomatic patience and presence.
But in all seriousness, I think that, as you well recognize, this com-
mittee snares considerable power and license in the formation and
implementation of our foreign policy. So I think it is an important
tradition and also an important part of the dialog to lay down, if
you will, some markers of our sense of the challenges that you face
and also our view of these issues.
I would begin by joining colleagues in expressing my admiration
for you personally, for your prior service, and my deep confidence
in your capacity to meet the challenges that have been defined by
other colleagues. As all of us know, you could well have been cho-
sen to fill any one of several jobs in this administration, all at the
highest level. I think most of us are pleased that you were chosen
to fill this one, because in many ways I think we share a belief that
this is the best match, that this is the right place for you and the
appropriate time.
I would simply like to observe, Mr. Secretary, that you are ac-
cepting this job, and there is no question that you will be confirmed
for it, at a time when this country is in many ways more inward
looking than at any time in recent memory. There is a strong and
growing vein of sentiment within this country, that you are well
aware of, that simply does not want to see American dollars or
American servicemen heading overseas for almost any reason, no
matter how noble or urgent the cause may seem to appear.
And we have traditionally, in our history, recognized this tension
as to involvement abroad. There is an increasing mood that says
let us take care of our problems here at home, let us get our own
house in order, let us leave the role of global Samaritan or global
risk taker to somebody else or at or least look for greater sharing
in that process.
I do not think any of us have to spell out the reasons for this.
The President-elect made it very clear with his sign in the course
of the campaign: "it's the economy, stupid." And all of us under-
16
stand that the fear people feel about the loss of jobs, about the fu-
ture, is exacerbating this. So there is this rightful expression, both
rightful by virtue of the priority and the rationale for it, people
want to face the problems here.
I think everyone on this committee, and you have heard it in the
prior opening statements, feels very very strongly, as do many
members of the U.S. Congress, that neither our history nor our
character nor, most importantly, our self-interest will allow us to
withdraw from the center stage of global, political, and economic
life.
And I think that we are going to have a very special task — you,
the administration, this committee, and the Congress and the
media and others — to try to define to the American people accu-
rately and compellingly why it is that it is not in our self-interest
to turn our backs on the world and to try to overcome this enor-
mous growing reluctance to look outwards.
In many ways it seems to me, Mr. Secretary, and I think you
share this from the conversation that we had previously, that there
is really no more immediate or local issue than whether or not the
sons and daughters of this country may have to go abroad to stop
a madman in the Middle East, or whether or not we are going to
find ourselves in a couple of years making huge new expenditures
because of a new arms race or because we did not respond ade-
quately, as Senator Biden mentioned and Senator Lugar men-
tioned, to the challenges of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
In addition, it seems to me there is no greater local issue than
whether or not our children are going to grow up in a world where
there is a respect for the concept of nonviolence. Where there is a
uniformity of nations standing up against anarchy and chaos, and
one that is respectful of the law and not contemptuous of it.
So for these and other reasons, Mr. Secretary, the world is obvi-
ously watching what you are going to say today with great interest.
But much more importantly, they will be watching the early days
of the administration as we form this partnership and try to com-
municate these urgent needs to the country.
For my part, Mr. Secretary, I would just say very quickly, I am
confident that you and the administration are going to show stead-
fastness where it is needed. I am confident you will be steadfast
on Iraq. I am confident in Somalia, in arms control negotiations,
and in the pursuit of Middle East peace.
But the question does loom large. Where will there be change
with this new President and new administration? And I would like
simply to say that it is my hope that you will respond to some
places where there is an urgent need for change.
First of all, I think many of us would like to see a much higher
priority placed on environmental protection, and a recognition of
the growing relationship between development and economics and
the need for world leadership in that area.
Second, a speedier, steadier, more principled commitment to de-
mocracy and human rights consistent with our own principles and
our own record.
And third, and perhaps most critical in the implementation of
both of those former priorities, and it has been mentioned by col-
17
leagues, but I reiterate it, an all-out effort to strengthen inter-
national institutions in ways that will render them truly effective.
Mr. Secretary, I think it is obvious that it is partly the failure
of existing international institutions that has left us negotiating to
reward, not punish, Serbian aggression, and atrocities, and has left
a collection of thugs and drug runners exercising real power in
Haiti, and that has left the peacekeeping effort in Cambodia at
least partially hostage to the Khmer Rouge.
So the question of the future for this committee, and for you, and
for the Nation is how amid this tumult and chaos and change we
will be able to keep our bearings, and whether we will lead the
international community in the effort to establish those priorities
that at least this Senator believes must be at the top of the inter-
national agenda as we face this obvious moment of change and
transition.
I welcome your nomination, and look forward to working with
you, and look forward to your comments on these areas and others
in the course of this morning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Simon?
Senator Simon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to
join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our new colleagues from
Tennessee and Wisconsin and Georgia. I think you will find service
on this committee stimulating.
The President has made a superb appointment in choosing War-
ren Christopher, and I am pleased that Warren Christopher made
the decision to accept the President-elect's request. I have conveyed
privately to the Secretary-designate my concerns. I will be getting
into them in the question period. It will not be a great disappoint-
ment to him that I do not have an opening statement, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. Nor to me. Thank you very much. [Laughter.]
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that precedent
established, Mr. Secretary, you may be pleased to know at the con-
clusion of almost 1 hour, we are going to have an opportunity to
hear from you.
I join my colleagues in welcoming you to this committee, welcom-
ing you to the post. All of us have nad an opportunity to visit with
you personally, even in recent days prior to this appearance, and
will have an opportunity to engage in a dialog to follow.
But I will conclude, yield any time remaining, in hopes that we
might hear from you soon, and to continue the precedent estab-
lished by my good friend from Illinois.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Wofford?
Senator Wofford. Mr. Chairman, last year Senator Lugar and
I were asked to write articles on what the new Secretary of State
should do, for Foreign Policy magazine. We were not too far apart,
but it seems to me all you really have to do is read our two pieces
and then do what we say. [Laughter.]
Senator Sarbanes. Even when it is contradictory. [Laughter.]
Senator Wofford. A little while ago, a kindly newspaper said of
me that I had a record of integrity for 30 years, which left 36 years
in doubt. I realized, looking back, that I have known, respected,
18
and admired you for at least 30 years. And I cannot think of a bet-
ter Secretary of State for this new era.
You have good judgment, unshakable steadfastness, foresight,
farsightedness, which is to say vision, and I look forward to getting
a little of all of these from you this morning.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. And I would like to wel-
come Senator Feingold and Senator Mathews to our committee,
new members on the Democratic side. I look forward to working
with you through the coming period of time. Senator Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Thank you. As I am the first Wisconsin Sen-
ator for 30 years to serve on the Foreign Relations Committee, I
am going to say a word or two, and welcome you, and say thank
you to the chairman and members of the committee. I am delighted
to be here today as a new member of the Senator Foreign Relations
Committee. I join in welcoming Mr. Christopher, the distinguished
nominee.
These hearings are providing me not only with an opportunity to
pose questions to the nominee, but also to listen to my colleagues
on the committee as they inquire into a broad range of issues of
paramount importance to our country around the globe.
As I prepared for the hearing I, like everyone else, has been
struck by the enormous challenges that lie ahead in the foreign pol-
icy field in a very changing world. For nearly 50 years, American
foreign policy has had a single defining principle — to contain the
Soviet Union's threat to world peace and America's vital interests.
This doctrine, which helped to separate the world quite simply
into friend and foe, dominated our foreign policy, determined the
development and deployment of weapons systems, and in some
ways, most importantly to me, dictated to an inordinate degree our
Federal spending priorities.
Today, the world has changed, as everyone has pointed out. We
won the cold war but now we face a new set of challenges, new
threats to world peace and stability. But these changes provide an
extraordinary opportunity to find a new foreign policy and defense
strategy; an opportunity to do some forward thinking about what
America's international role should be in today's world, not yester-
day's.
So, I look forward to working with the members of this commit-
tee and the new administration in developing new approaches to
meet the new challenges.
The only other thing I would like to just briefly say is that I'm
going to stress here a perspective that I intend to take in this com-
mittee and every opportunity that I have in my work in the Senate.
There is a challenge to our way of life in this country that is as
dangerous as armed conflict. It is the Federal deficit, the weak-
nesses in our educational system, and our economic deterioration.
America's strength abroad is measured by our strength at home.
We have got to find ways to bring down the Federal deficit so that
we can make the investments in this country that need to be done.
Reducing the Federal deficit is the issue that my constituents in
Wisconsin raise with me most often. In order to reduce the deficit,
we have got to look at the every line in the Federal budget to de-
termine where savings or efficiencies can be achieved.
19
I know that foreign assistance in international programs and ex-
penditures represent a relatively small portion of that budget. But
we are going to have to do everything we can to identify places
where savings can be achieved. That means eliminating waste and
duplication wherever possible, and in some cases cutting back on
otherwise worthy programs that we simply cannot afford at this
time.
I, too, really look forward to working with you, and look forward
to supporting your nomination.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Welcome to Senator
Mathews.
Senator Mathews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the risk of
leaving the South without a voice in the opening statement, I too
am going to choose to pass up the opportunity to make a statement
this morning.
Rather, I would I like to take just a moment and congratulate
the President on his choice of a person to fill this distinguished
post. It appears to me, as a freshman, that over a period of time
we have been rewriting the history in the world. Without question
we are going to have new challenges, and we are going to have dif-
ficult tasks facing this country and this committee.
And it is for this reason that I am glad that at the time in his-
tory, at this time that we begin a new administration, that Presi-
dent Clinton has chosen a person — an individual with experience,
with a steady hand, Warren Christopher, to lead us in this depart-
ment.
I look forward, Mr. Secretary, to working with you and support-
ing you as you lead our Nation in this difficult time. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Mathews. And
now, we would welcome the Secretary of State-designate, and look
forward to hearing his statement. Secretary-designate, Mr. Chris-
topher.
STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER OF
CALIFORNIA, NOMINEE FOR SECRETARY OF STATE
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. It is a great honor to appear before you today as Presi-
dent-elect Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing
room, I cannot help but feel, is a long ways from Scranton, ND,
population 300, where I was born and raised. I must say I am
deeply moved by being here in these circumstances.
Looking at the members of the committee, I recall how much you
have contributed by way of leadership and wisdom to the Nation's
foreign policy over the past decade. And that makes me especially
pleased and touched by your remarks here this morning whicn
have been exceedingly generous.
Let me say at the outset that I look forward to establishing a
close and cooperative relationship with each of you. I also look for-
ward to your questions, and will answer them with the ruthless
candor the diplomats are famous for. [Laughter.]
In the 3 weeks since I have been nominated by President-elect
Clinton, I have received about as much commiseration as I have
congratulations. Friends point to the new world's raw conflicts and
20
stress our own limited resources. They tell me I have drawn an im-
portant but unpleasant assignment. I appreciate their concern, but
frankly I dispute their assessment.
I believe we have reached a uniquely promising moment in the
history of our country. The signature of this era is change, and I
believe that many of the changes are favorable ones. The cold war
is over; 40 years of sustained effort on behalf of collective security
and human dignity have been rewarded. Millions who lived under
the stultifying yoke of communism are free.
The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central
America. Freer markets are expanding the reach of prosperity all
over the world. The nuclear nightmare is receding. And in this con-
nection, I particularly want to congratulate President Bush and
President Yeltsin on their successful negotiation of the START II
Treaty. We now have the opportunity to create a new strategy to
direct America's resources at something other than superpower
confrontation.
Neither President Clinton nor I have any illusions about the per-
ils that lurk in many of this era's changes. The end of the cold war
has lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long simmering conflicts.
The bloody results are evident in Yugoslavia, former Yugoslavia,
and many other places. Nor will this era lack for its ruthless and
expansionist despots. Saddam Hussein confirms that fact almost
every day.
And it is also true that we are now relatively more powerful, and
physically more secure than before.
So, while we must be alert to the era's dangers, we nonetheless
approach it with an underlying sense of considerable optimism.
Not since the late 1940's has our Nation faced the challenge of
shaping an entirely new foreign policy for a world that has fun-
damentally changed. Like our counterparts, we need to design a
new strategy for protecting American interests around the world by
laying the foundations for a more just and a more stable world.
That strategy must take into account and reflect the fundamen-
tal changes that have been made in the world in recent times.
These include: the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious,
and sectional conflicts, especially in the former Soviet bloc; the
globalization of commerce and capital; a worldwide democratic rev-
olution fueled by new information technologies that amplify the
power of ideas; new and old human rights challenges including pro-
tecting ethnic minorities as well as political dissidents; the rise of
new security threats, especially terrorism, and the spread of ad-
vanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction; and global
challenges including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees,
AIDS, drug trafficking, and other threats to the world's environ-
ment.
To adapt our foreign policy and institutions to these changes,
President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on
three pillars. First, we must elevate America's economic security as
a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we must preserve our
military strength as we adapt our forces to new security challenges.
And third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of
promoting the spread of democracy and free markets abroad.
21
As we adapt to these new conditions, it's worth underscoring the
essential continuity in American foreign policy. Despite a change of
administration, our policy in many instances will remain constant,
and will be built on the accomplishments, considerable accomplish-
ments of our predecessors.
Examples of this include the Middle East peace process, firm en-
forcement of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, ratification and im-
plementation of the START II Treaty, and the continuing need for
U.S. power to play a role in promoting stability in Europe and the
Pacific.
Mr. Chairman, if I could depart from my text for just a moment,
with the committee's permission I would like to add a few words
to my prepared testimony.
Iraq continues to violate U.N. security resolutions, and test the
will and strength of the international community. I say with great
determination Saddam Hussein should not doubt for a second that
we, the incoming administration, will meet that test. President
Clinton will insist upon the unconditional compliance with the U.N.
resolutions. We have repeatedly made it clear that we stand shoul-
der-to-shoulder with the current administration in our determina-
tion to make sure that Saddam Hussein does not miscalculate
America's resolve again.
I thought I would go outside my text this morning, Mr. Chair-
man, because of the determination that I have, and I know Presi-
dent Clinton has, on this issue.
Even though there is much continuity in our foreign policy, nev-
ertheless, our administration, our new administration, inherits the
task of defining a strategy for U.S. leadership after the cold war.
We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a
new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises like those in
Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply manage them.
Our support for democratic institutions and human rights can
help diffuse political conflicts, and our support for sustainable de-
velopment and global environmental protection can help prevent
human suffering on a scale that demanded our intervention, for ex-
ample in Somalia. We cannot foresee every crisis in the world, but
I strongly believe that preventive diplomacy can free us to devote
more time and effort to facing problems here at home.
It is not enough, Mr. Chairman, to articulate a new strategy. We
must justify it to the American people. Today, foreign policymakers
cannot afford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that
then the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal of con-
taining the Soviet Union's power will have to be replaced by more
complex justifications to fit the new era. We need to show that in
this new era, foreign policy is no longer foreign.
Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget that their ultimate
purpose is to improve the daily lives of the American people. They
assume that foreign policy is too complex for the public to be in-
volved in its formation. That is a very costly conceit. From Vietnam
to Iran-Contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects
of foreign policies hatched by experts without proper candor, and
without proper consultation with the public and their representa-
tives.
22
More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to
have clientitis — a malady characterized by undue deference to the
potential reactions of other countries. I long thought the State De-
partment needs an American desk, and this administration will
have one, and I will be sitting right behind it.
I will not attempt, Mr. Chairman, to try to fit the foreign policy
of the next 4 years into the straitjacket of some neatly tailored doc-
trine. Yet America's actions must be dictated by consistent prin-
ciples. And as I have noted before, there are three that should
guide foreign policy in this new era.
First, we must advance America's economic security with the
same energy and resourcefulness that was devoted to waging the
cold war. The new administration will shortly propose an economic
program to empower American firms and workers to win in world
trade markets, to reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and to
increase our ability to sustain foreign commitments.
Despite our economic woes, we remain the world's greatest trad-
ing power, its largest market, and its largest exporter. That is why
we must utilize all of the tools at our disposal, including a new
GATT agreement and a new North American Free Trade Agree-
ment that serves the interests of American firms, workers, farmers,
and communities.
In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological
rivalry, it is time for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for U.S.
business to expanding global markets. This does not mean that
commercial goals will trump our other important concerns like non-
proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in the
Third World, but for too long we have made economics the poor
cousin of our foreign policy, and we will stop doing that.
For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern
bloc, nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of
great growth, we have for years assigned only one foreign service
officer to assist U.S. companies. In the case of Russia, that means
one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million. Other economic
powers, German and Japan for example, devote far more personnel
to promoting their firms, their industries, and their economic con-
cerns.
The Clinton administration intends to harness our diplomacy to
the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers.
We will not be bashful about linking our high diplomatic goals with
our economic goals. We will ask missions to do more to gather cru-
cial information about market opportunities and barriers and ac-
tively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad.
Second, Mr. Chairman, we must maintain a strong defense as we
adapt our forces to new and enduring security challenges. As a re-
sult of efforts begun in the late 1970 s under President Carter and
continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our administration
fortunately inherits the best fighting force in the world.
But the world is changed and we face a paradox. The collapse of
the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our cold war military forces,
but it also leaves American forces as the main ballast in an unsta-
ble and dangerous world.
Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of
international relations will depend upon a tenacious diplomacy
23
backed by credible strength. President-elect Clinton and Secretary-
designate Aspin have described how we must adapt our armed
forces to new missions.
I agree with President-elect Clinton's statement that we will re-
solve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and always to win.
As you all know and some of you have acknowledged this morn-
ing, I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms
of diplomacy, negotiation, and problem solving, from the effort to
secure the release of the hostages in Iran to responses to urban un-
rest and police brutality, to the practice of law over four decades.
I have argued and still believe that diplomacy is a neglected im-
perative. I oelieve we must apply new dispute resolution tech-
niques and forms of international arbitration to the conflicts that
plague the world.
Mr. Chairman, I also know from experience, that nations do not
negotiate on the basis of goodwill alone. They negotiate on the
basis of their interests, and therefore on the basis of the calcula-
tions of power.
As I reflect on our experience in the cold war, it is clear that our
success flowed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power to-
gether, both the modernization of our forces and negotiations for
arms control, both the advocacy of human rights and covert and
overt opposition to Soviet expansion.
In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing
questions about the use of force, decisions about whether to inter-
vene in border disputes, civil wars, outright invasions and cases of
possible genocide; about whether to intervene for purposes that are
quite different from the traditional missions of our armed forces;
for purposes such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian as-
sistance, evacuation of Americans abroad, and efforts to combat
drug smuggling and terrorism.
While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do be-
lieve, Mr. Chairman, that the discreet and careful use of force in
certain circumstances, and its credible threat in general, will be es-
sential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy.
And although there will be differences at the margins, I believe
we can and must craft a bipartisan consensus in which those ques-
tions concerning the use of force will no longer divide our Nation
as they have in the past.
That being said, I also want to say that we cannot respond our-
selves to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that
we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for
the use of the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis around
the globe become a choice between inaction or American interven-
tion. It will be our administration's policy to encourage other na-
tions and the institutions of collective security, especially the U.N.,
to do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffer-
ing, and to keep the peace. In that regard, we will work with Sec-
retary General Boutros-Ghali, and members of the Security Council
of the U.N., to ensure that they have the means to carry out their
tasks.
The U.N. has recently shown great promise in mediating dis-
putes and fulfilling its promise of collective security, in Namibia,
Cambodia, El Salvador, and elsewhere. But the U.N. cannot be an
24
effective instrument for sharing global burdens unless we share the
burden of supporting it. And I work to ensure that we pay our out-
standing obligations at the U.N.
Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always
reserve our option to act alone. As President-elect Clinton has said,
our motto in this era should be together where we can, on our own
where we must.
One of the main security problems in this era that I know this
committee has been very much aware of is the proliferation of very
deadly weapons — nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced con-
ventional weapons as well as their delivery systems. The Gulf war
has highlighted the problem of a fanatical aggressor developing or
using weapons of mass destruction.
We must work assiduously with other nations to discourage pro-
liferation through improved intelligence, export controls, incentives,
sanctions, and even force when necessary. Overall, this administra-
tion will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as we
enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period.
Third, Mr. Chairman, our new diplomacy will encourage the
global revolution for democracy that is transforming the world. Pro-
moting democracy, of course, does not imply a crusade to make the
world exactly in our own image. Rather, support for democracy and
human rights abroad can and should be a central tenet of our ef-
forts to improve our own security.
Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely
to protect human and minority rights, they are also much more
likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a
peaceful manner. And they are also much more likely to be reliable
partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and global environ-
mental protection.
A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we
coordinate all of our leverage. Such elements as trade, economic
and security assistance, and debt relief, must all be used in the
promotion of democracy. By enlisting international and regional in-
stitutions in the work of promoting democracy, the United States
can leverage its own limited resources and avoid the appearance of
trying to dominate others.
In the information age, we will support the creation of Radio
Free Asia that Senator Biden spoke about, to ensure that the peo-
ple of all Asian nations will have access to uncensored information
about their societies and about the world.
Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down, but must be
built from the bottom up. Our policies should be to encourage pa-
tient, sustained efforts to help others build the institutions that
make democracy possible — political parties, free media, laws that
protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor
unions, and voluntary associations that stand between the individ-
ual and the state.
As we look at Eastern Europe, we recognize how essential these
institutions are. American, private and civic groups are particularly
well-suited to help in this regard. We will move swiftly to establish
the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in contact with
the grassroots democratic leaders in foreign countries, and to also
strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment for Democracy.
25
We simply must improve our institutional capacity to provide
timely and effective aid to people struggling to establish democracy
and free markets. To that end, as has been noted by some Senators
here this morning, we need to overhaul the Agency for Inter-
national Development. That agency needs to take on fewer mis-
sions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bu-
reaucratic.
As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion,
we simply must extract from AID's past successes and failures, to
make it stronger in the future.
In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out
the Nation's foreign policies have the resources they need to do
their job. I want to work with you, all members of the committee,
to ensure that our foreign service officers and the people who serve
the State Department nave adequate training, facilities, informa-
tion systems, and security.
We also need to take a new look at the way the State Depart-
ment is organized in this area and the way our policy is formu-
lated. In the coming weeks I would like to consult with you, and
I've already begun this, about my intentions to streamline the
State Department, to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues
that transcend national boundaries, and to improve international
competitiveness of American business.
The Clinton administration will put America back in the fore-
front of global efforts to achieve sustainable development and in
the process, leave our children a better world. We believe that
sound environmental policies are a precondition to economic
growth, not a brake on it. These three pillars of our foreign policy,
economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy, are
mutually reinforcing.
A vibrant economy will strengthen America's hand abroad while
permitting us to maintain a strong military without sacrificing do-
mestic needs. And by helping others forge democracy out of the
ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones,
and create new markets for U.S. trade and investment.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me take just a few minutes to consider
how this strategic approach applies to the principal security chal-
lenges that America faces in the 1990's. None of these challenges
is more important than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, in-
vigorate its economy, and develop representative political institu-
tions.
President Yeltsin's courageous economic and political reforms
stand as our very best hope of reducing the still formidable arsenal
of nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and the other states of
the former Soviet Union, as has been referred to by some members
of the committee.
These arms are in Russia and the other states of the Soviet
Union and when we can reduce them, when we can feel secure that
they have been reduced, this in turn permits reductions in our own
defense spending.
A collapse of the Russian economy, which is in bad shape and
contracted 20 percent last year, could fatally discredit democracy,
not only in the eyes of the Russians, but also in the eyes of their
neighbors as well. Our administration will join with our G-7 part-
26
ners to increase support for Russia's economic reforms, support
that must be conditioned on the willingness of Russia to continue
the difficult, but essential steps necessary to move from a command
economy to a market-oriented one.
We'll also place in our administration high priority on direct and
technical assistance for Russia's efforts to dismantle its weapons
and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to provide civilian
employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized
forces.
We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the
democratic nations stand with them and that the world's experi-
ence in coping with similar problems is available to them. We
should also orchestrate similar international action to help
Ukraine, the other newly independent states, the Baltic, and the
nations of East and Central Europe.
In Europe, we maintain our commitment to NATO, history's
most successful military and political alliance, even as we support
the evolution of new security arrangements that incorporate the
emerging democracies to the East. Our administration will support
the efforts by the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, to promote human rights, democracy, free elections,
and the historic reintegration of the nations of Eastern and West-
ern Europe.
I can also assure you that this administration will vigorously
pursue concerted action with our allies and international bodies to
end the slaughter in Bosnia, a slaughter that's claimed tens of
thousands of lives and threatens to spread throughout the Balkans.
Europe and the world community must bring real pressure, eco-
nomic and military, on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage
policy of murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing.
In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In par-
ticular, as President Clinton stressed during the campaign, there
is a complex blend of new and old forces in China that regards us
to readjust our thinking.
On one hand there's a booming economy in China, based upon
increasingly free markets which are giving hundreds or millions of
Chinese an unprecedented degree of prosperity and a thirst for eco-
nomic as well as political reform.
On the other hand, we simply can't ignore the continuing reports
of Chinese exports, of sensitive military technology to troubled
areas. We can't ignore their widespread violations of human rights.
And we can't ignore their abusive practices that have contributed
to a $17 billion trade imbalance between our two nations.
Our policy will be to seek to facilitate a broad, peaceful revolu-
tion in China, from communism to democracy, by encouraging the
forces of economic and political liberalization in that great and
highly important country.
Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific rim are becoming
a global economic dynamo. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade ex-
ceeded $316 billion, dwarfing the $221 billion that we have with
Western Europe. We must devote particular attention to Japan.
Japan has recently taken important steps to begin to meet more of
its international security responsibilities, examples being the as-
sistance to our peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia and Somalia.
27
But now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as
well, to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy
to competition. Together, Japan and the United States account for
a third or more of the world's economy. That obligates both of us
as nations to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and to avoid
the rise of regional trading blocs that could sink the prospects for
global growth.
We also have an obligation to America's firms and workers to en-
sure that they are able to benefit from the growth of Japan's econ-
omy, just as the strength and openness of the American economy
has helped Japan fuel its prosperity over many decades.
In South Korea we will continue to maintain our military pres-
ence as long as North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on
Asia's subcontinent, our interests include combating nuclear pro-
liferation in both Pakistan and India; restoring peace to Afghani-
stan; seeing an end to communal strife that threatens India's de-
mocracy; and promoting human rights and free elections in Burma,
Pakistan, and elsewhere.
In the Middle East, we come to another very important region of
freat interest to all of us. We must maintain the momentum be-
ind the current negotiations over peace and regional issues. Presi-
dent Bush and Secretary Baker deserve great credit for bringing
the Arabs and the Israelis to the bargaining table. And the Clinton
administration is committed to carrying on those negotiations, tak-
ing advantage of this historic breakthrough.
Our democracy-centered policy underscores our special relation-
ship with Israel, the region's only democracy, with whom we're
committed to maintain a strong and vibrant strategic relationship.
We also believe that America's unswerving commitment to Israel
and Israel's right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a
just and lasting peace. We'll continue our efforts with both Israel
and our Arab friends to address the full range of that region's chal-
lenges.
Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work
toward new arms control agreements, particularly concerning
weapons of mass destruction. We will maintain a vigilant stance to-
ward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow violence
and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region
as well, we will champion economic reform, more accountable gov-
ernance, and increased respect to human right.
And following a decade in which over 1,000 Americans were
killed, injured, or kidnapped by perpetrators of international ter-
rorism, we'll give no quarter to terrorists or to the states that spon-
sor their crimes against humanity.
Nowhere has the march toward democracy and against dictators
been more dramatic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-
interest to help Latin America consolidate a decade of hard won
progress. In the past several years, as democracy has spread and
market economies have been liberalized, our exports to Latin
America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric
partners, Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend
the trade agreements that have been reached with those two coun-
tries to other Latin American nations that are opening their econo-
mies and political systems.
28
At the same time, we expect to complete understandings of North
America Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clin-
ton. We also need to make the Organization for American States
[OAS] a more effective forum for addressing that region's problems.
In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the U.N.
and the OAS to restore democracy in that very troubled country.
In Cuba we will maintain the embargo to keep the pressure on the
Castro regime. We fully support national recognition and full im-
plementation of the peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
And in the Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be
broken to free their people, and ours, from the corrupting influence
of the narcotics trade.
In Africa, a new generation is demanding the opportunities from
multiparty democracy and open economies. They deserve our un-
derstanding and support. We need to assist their efforts to build in-
stitutions that can empower Africa's people to husband and benefit
from the continent's vast resources, to deal with its economic, so-
cial, and environmental problems, and to address its underlying
causes of instability.
We will be equally committed to work with the Congress to redi-
rect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable devel-
opment and private enterprise in Africa. And in South Africa, we
shall work actively with blacks and whites who are striving to dis-
mantle the hateful machinery of apartheid and working with deter-
mination to build, at last, a multiracial society.
Mr. Chairman, as I said on the day that Governor Clinton nomi-
nated me to be Secretary of State, in the days when I was in law
school, two of my heroes were Gen. George Marshall and Dean
Acheson. I'm enormously honored, with your concurrence, to have
an opportunity to occupy the post held by them and by many of the
most revered names in our Nation's history.
Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized that at
the dawn of the cold war America could not remain safe by stand-
ing aloof from the world. The triumph of freedom in that great
struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign policy they shaped to
project our values and protect our interests.
Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of de-
veloping a new foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded on
America's enduring interests. It must be informed by a realistic es-
timate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped by the democratic
convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must rest
on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home.
The ultimate test of the security strategy that I've outlined will
be in the benefits that it delivers to the American people. Its worth
will be measured, not by its theoretical elegance, but by its results.
If it makes our people more prosperous and increases their safety
abroad; if it expands the stabilizing and ennobling reach of demo-
cratic institutions and freer markets; it if helps protect the global
environment for our children; if it achieves these kinds of benefits,
then we will have discharged our responsibilities to our generation
just as Marshall, Acheson, and the other architects discharged
theirs.
They've given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew
the global requirements for U.S. leadership. I look forward to work-
29
ing with both parties in Congress and all the members of this com-
mittee to construct a new framework for that leadership, a frame-
work within which healthy debate will occur, but within which we
can build a strong bipartisan consensus that will help us coopera-
tively pursue the national interests at home and abroad.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christopher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Christopher
Mr. Chairman: It is a great honor to appear before you as President-elect Clin-
ton's nominee for Secretary of State. This hearing room is a long way from Scran-
ton, North Dakota, population 300, where I was born and raised, and I am deeply
moved by being here in these circumstances.
You and the Members of this Committee have contributed much leadership and
wisdom to our nation's foreign policy over the past decade. Let me say at the outset
that I look forward to a close and cooperative relationship with you. I also look for-
ward to your questions and will try to answer them with the ruthless candor for
which diplomats are famous.
In the 3 weeks since President-elect Clinton asked me to serve as his Secretary
of State, I have received about as much commiseration a3 congratulation. Friends
point to this new world's raw conflicts and stress our own limited resources. They
tell me I have drawn an important but unpleasant assignment.
I appreciate their concern. But I dispute their assessment. I believe we have ar-
rived at a uniquely promising moment. The signature of this era is change, and I
beHeve many of the changes work in our favor. The Cold War is over. Forty years
of sustained effort on behalf of collective security and human dignity have been re-
warded. Millions who lived under the stultifying yoke of communism are free. The
tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet to Central America. Freer mar-
kets are expanding the reach of prosperity. The nuclear nightmare is receding — and
I want to congratulate President Bush and President Yeltsin on their successful ne-
gotiation of the START II treaty. We now have the opportunity to create a new
strategy that directs America's resources at something other than superpower con-
frontation.
Neither President-elect Clinton nor I have any illusions about the perils that lurk
in many of this era's changes. The end of the Cold War has lifted the lid on many
cauldrons of long-simmering conflict. The bloody results are evident in the former
Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Nor will this era lack for ruthless and expansionist des-
pots. Saddam Hussein confirmed that fact. Yet it is also true that we are now rel-
atively more powerful and physically more secure. So while we are alert to this era's
dangers, we nonetheless approach it with an underlying sense of optimism.
Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced the challenge of shaping an entirely
new foreign policy for a world that has fundamentally changed. Like our counter-
f>arts then, we need to design a new strategy for protecting American interests by
aying the foundations for a more just and stable world. That strategy must reflect
the fundamental changes that characterize this era:
— the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts, espe-
cially in the former Soviet bloc;
— the globalization of commerce and capital;
— a worldwide democratic revolution, fueled by new information technologies that
amplify the power of ideas;
— new and old human rights challenges, including protecting ethnic minorities as
well as political dissidents;
— the rise of new security threats, especially terrorism and the spread of advanced
weaponry and weapons of mass destruction;
— and global challenges, including overpopulation, famine, drought, refugees,
AIDS, drug trafficking, and threats to the earth's environment.
To adapt our foreign policy goals and institutions to these changes, President-elect
Clinton has stressed that our effort must rest on three pillars: First, we must ele-
vate America's economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we
must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security chal-
lenges. Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting the
spread of democracy and markets abroad.
As we adapt to new conditions, it is worth underscoring the essential continuity
in American foreign policy. Despite a change in administrations, our policy in many
specific instances will remain constant and will seek to build upon the accomplish-
ments of our predecessors. Examples include the Middle East peace process, firm
enforcement of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, ratification and implementation of
/TO OOO /-\
30
the START II treaty, and the continuing need for U.S. power to play a role in pro-
moting stability in Europe and the Pacific.
Nevertheless, our administration inherits the task of defining a strategy for U.S.
leadership after the Cold War. We cannot afford to careen from crisis to crisis. We
must have a new diplomacy that seeks to anticipate and prevent crises, like those
in Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia, rather than simply to manage them. Our support for
democratic institutions and human rights can help defuse political conflicts. And our
support for sustainable development and global environmental protection can help
prevent human suffering on a scale that demands our intervention. We cannot fore-
see every crisis. But preventive diplomacy can free us to devote more time and effort
to problems facing us at home.
It is not enough to articulate a new strategy; we must also justify it to the Amer-
ican people. Today, foreign policy makers cannot afford to ignore the public, for
there is a real danger that the public will ignore foreign policy. The unitary goal
of containing Soviet power will have to be replaced by more complex justifications
to fit the new era. We need to show that, in this era, foreign policy is no longer
foreign.
Practitioners of statecraft sometimes forget their ultimate purpose is to improve
the daily lives of the American people. They assume foreign policy is too complex
for the public to be involved in its formation. That is a costly conceit. From Vietnam
to Iran-Contra, we have too often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign policies,
hatched by the experts, without proper candor or consultation with the public and
their representatives in Congress.
More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have clientitis, a
malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other coun-
tries. I have long thought the State Department needs an "America Desk." This ad-
ministration will have one — and Fll be sitting behind it.
I will not attempt today to fit the foreign policy of the next 4 years into the strait-
jacket of some neatly tailored doctrine. Yet America's actions in the world must be
guided by consistent principles. As I have noted, I believe there are three that
should guide foreign policy in this new era.
First, we must advance America's economic security with the same energy and re-
sourcefulness we devoted to waging the Cold War. The new administration will
shortly propose an economic program to empower American firms and workers to
win in world markets, reduce our reliance on foreign borrowing, and increase our
ability to sustain foreign commitments. Despite our economic woes, we remain the
world' s greatest trading nation, its largest market, and its leading exporter. That
is why we must utilize all the tools at our disposal including a new GATT agree-
ment and a North American Free Trade Agreement that serves the interests of
American firms, workers, and communities.
In an era in which economic competition is eclipsing ideological rivalry, it is time
for diplomacy that seeks to assure access for U.S. businesses to expanding global
markets. This does not mean that our commercial goals will trump other important
concerns, such as non-proliferation, human rights, and sustainable development in
the third world. But for too long, we have made economics the poor cousin of our
foreign policy. For example, in nearly all the countries of the former Eastern bloc —
nations whose economies and markets are on the threshold of growth — we have for
years assigned only one foreign service officer to assist U.S. companies. In the case
of Russia, that means one commercial officer for a nation of 150 million people.
Other economic powers, such as Germany and Japan, devote far more personnel to
promoting their firms, industries, and economic concerns.
The Clinton Administration intends to harness our diplomacy to the needs and
opportunities of American industries and workers. We will not be bashful about
linking our high diplomacy with our economic goals. We will ask our foreign mis-
sions to do more to gather crucial information about market opportunities and bar-
riers and actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad.
Second, we must maintain a strong defense as we adapt our forces to new and
enduring security challenges. As a result of efforts begun in the late 1970s by Presi-
dent Carter, and continued under Presidents Reagan and Bush, our administration
inherits the best fighting force in the world. But the world has changed.
We face a paradox: the collapse of the Soviet Union enables us to reduce our Cold
War military forces. But it also leaves American power as the main ballast for an
unstable world. Our ability to manage the transition to a more stable system of
international relations will depend on tenacious diplomacy backed by credible
strength. The President-elect and Secretary-designate Aspin have described how we
must adapt our armed forces to new missions. And I agree with President-elect Clin-
ton's statement that "we will resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, and
always to win."
31
I have spent a good portion of my life practicing various forms of diplomacy, nego-
tiation, and problem solving, from the effort to secure the release of the American
hostages in Iran, to responses to urban unrest and police brutality, to the practice
of law over four decades. I have argued, and still believe, that diplomacy is a ne-
f fleeted imperative. I believe we must apply new dispute resolution techniques and
orms of international arbitration to the conflicts that plague the world.
I also know from experience that nations do not negotiate on the basis of good
will alone; they negotiate on the basis of interests, ana therefore on calculations of
Sower. As I reflect on our experience in the Cold War, it is clear that our success
owed from our ability to harness diplomacy and power together — both the mod-
ernization of our forces and negotiations for arms control; both advocacy for human
rights and covert and overt opposition to Soviet expansionism.
In the years to come, Americans will be confronted with vexing questions about
the use of force — decisions about whether to intervene in border disputes, civil wars,
outright invasions, and in cases of possible genocide; about whether to intervene for
fmrposes that are quite different from the traditional missions of our armed
brces purposes such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance,
evacuation 01 Americans abroad, and efforts to combat drug smuggling and terror-
ism. While there is no magic formula to guide such decisions, I do believe that the
discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances — and its credible threat
in general — will be essential to the success of our diplomacy and foreign policy. Al-
though there will always be differences at the margin, I believe we can — and must —
craft a bipartisan consensus in which these questions concerning the use of force
will no longer divide our nation as they once did.
However, we cannot respond to every alarm. I want to assure the American peo-
ple that we will not turn their blood and treasure into an open account for use by
the rest of the world. We cannot let every crisis become a choice between inaction
or American intervention. It will be this administration's policy to encourage other
nations and the institutions of collective security, especially the United Nations, to
do more of the world's work to deter aggression, relieve suffering, and keep the
peace. In that regard, we will work with Secretary General Boutros Ghali and the
members of the Security Council to ensure the U.N. has the means to carry out such
tasks.
The U.N. has recently shown great promise in mediating disputes and fulfilling
its promise of collective security — in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and else-
where. But the U.N. cannot be an effective instrument for sharing our global bur-
dens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I will work to ensure that we pay
our outstanding obligations.
Ultimately, when our vital interests are at stake, we will always reserve our op-
tion to act alone. As the President-elect has said, our motto in this era should be:
"together where we can; on our own where we must."
One of the main security problems of this era will be the proliferation of very
deadly weapons — nuclear, chemical, biological, and enhanced conventional weap-
ons— as well as their delivery systems. The Gulf War highlighted the problem of a
fanatical aggressor developing or using weapons of mass destruction. We must work
assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intel-
ligence, export controls, incentives, sanctions, and even force when necessary. Over-
all, this administration will give high priority to the prevention of proliferation as
we enter a new and exceedingly dangerous period.
Third, our new diplomacy will encourage the global revolution for democracy that
is transforming our world. Promoting democracy does not imply a crusade to remake
the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad
can and should be a central strategic tenet in improving our own security. Demo-
cratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and
minority rights; they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial
disputes in a peaceful manner, and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms
accords, and global environmental protection.
A strategic approach to promoting democracy requires that we coordinate all of
our leverage, including trade, economic and security assistance, and debt relief. By
enlisting international and regional institutions in the work of promoting democ-
racy, the U.S. can leverage our own limited resources and avoid the appearance of
trying to dominate others. In the information age, public diplomacy takes on special
importance — and that is why we will support the creation of a Radio Free Asia to
ensure that the people of all Asian nations have access to uncensored information
about their societies, and about the world.
Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down, but must be built from the bot-
tom up. Our policy should encourage patient, sustained efforts to help others build
the institutions that make democracy possible: political parties, free media, laws
32
that protect property and individual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions, and
voluntary associations that stand between the individual and the state. American
private and civic groups are particularly well suited to help. In this regard we will
move swiftly to establish the Democracy Corps, to put experienced Americans in
contact with foreign grassroots democratic leaders, and to strengthen the bipartisan
National Endowment for Democracy.
We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide timely and effective
aid to people struggling to establish democracy and free markets. To that end, we
need to overhaul the Agency for International Development. The agency needs to
take on fewer missions, narrow the scope of its operations, and make itself less bu-
reaucratic. As a matter of enlightened self-interest as well as compassion, we need
to extract lessons from ADD's past successes and failures, to make its future efforts
stronger.
In all this work, we must ensure that the people who carry out our nation's for-
eign policy have the resources they need to do the job. I want to work with you to
ensure they have adequate facilities, training, information systems, and security.
We also need to take a new look at the way our State Department is organized and
our policy is formulated. In the coming weeks, I intend to streamline the Depart-
ment of State to enhance our capabilities to deal with issues that transcend national
boundaries and to improve the international competitiveness of American business.
The Clinton Administration will put America back in the forefront of global efforts
to achieve sustainable development, and in the process, leave our children a better
world. We believe that sound environmental policies are a pre-condition of economic
growth, not a brake on it.
These three pillars for our foreign policy — economic growth, military strength, and
support for democracy — are mutually re-enforcing. A vibrant economy will strength-
en America's hand abroad, while permitting us to maintain a strong military with-
out sacrificing domestic needs. And by helping others to forge democracy out of the
ruins of dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new ones, and create new
markets for U.S. trade and investment.
Let me take a few moments to consider how this strategic approach applies to the
principal security challenges that America faces in the 1990s. None is more impor-
tant than helping Russia demilitarize, privatize, invigorate its economy, and develop
representative political institutions. President Yeltsin's courageous economic and po-
litical reforms stand as our best hope for reducing the still formidable arsenal of
nuclear and conventional arms in Russia and other states of the former Soviet
Union, and this in turn permits reductions in our own defense spending. A collapse
of the Russian economy, which contracted by 20 percent last year, could fatally dis-
credit democracy, not only in the eyes of the Russians, but in the eyes of their
neighbors as well. Our administration will join with our G-7 partners to increase
support for Russia's economic reforms. That aid must be conditioned on the willing-
ness of Russia to continue the difficult but essential steps necessary to move from
a command economy to a more market-oriented one.
We shall also place high priority on direct and technical assistance for Russia's
efforts to dismantle its weapons and properly dispose of its nuclear materials, to
{>rovide civilian employment for defense technicians, and to house its demobilized
brces. We must say to the democratic reformers in Russia that the democratic na-
tions stand with them and that the world's experience in coping with similar prob-
lems is available to them. We should also orchestrate similar international action
to help Ukraine, the other Commonwealth states, the Baltics, and the nations of
East and Central Europe.
In Europe, we remain committed to NATO, history's most successful military and
political alliance, even as we support the evolution of new security arrangements
that incorporate the emerging democracies to the east. Our administration will sup-
Sort efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote
uman rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic re-integration of the na-
tions of Eastern and Western Europe. I can also assure you that this Administration
will vigorously pursue concerted action with our European allies and international
bodies to end the slaughter in Bosnia — a slaughter that has claimed tens of thou-
sands of lives — and that threatens to spread throughout the Balkans. Europe and
the world community in general must bring real pressures, economic and military,
to bear on the Serbian leadership to halt its savage policy of ethnic cleansing.
In Asia, we confront many challenges and opportunities. In particular, as Presi-
dent-elect Clinton stressed during the campaign, a complex blend of new and old
forces requires us to rethink our policy toward China. On the one hand, there is
a booming economy based increasingly on free market principles, which is giving
hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens an unprecedented degree of prosperity and
a thirst for economic as well as political reform. On the other hand, we cannot ig-
33
nore continuing reports of Chinese exports of sensitive military technology to trou-
bled areas, widespread violations of human rights, or abusive practices that have
contributed to a $17 billion trade imbalance between our two nations. Our policy
will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy
by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that great coun-
try.
Elsewhere in Asia, the countries of the Pacific Rim are becoming a global center
of economic dynamism. In 1991, our trans-Pacific trade exceeded $316 billion, dwarf-
ing our $221 billion trade with Western Europe. We must devote particular atten-
tion to Japan. Japan has recently taken important steps to meet more of its inter-
national security responsibilities, such as assisting in peacekeeping efforts from
Cambodia to Somalia. Now it must do more to meet its economic responsibilities as
well — to lower trade barriers more quickly and to open its economy to competition.
Together, Japan and the U.S. account for a third or more of the global economy.
That obligates us both to steer clear of the reefs of recrimination and the rise of
regional trading blocs that could sink prospects for global growth. But we also have
an obligation to America's firms and workers to ensure they are able to benefit from
the growth of Japan's economy, just as the strength and openness of the U.S. econ-
omy has helped fuel Japan's prosperity over many decades.
In South Korea, we will continue to maintain our military presence as long as
North Korea poses a threat to that nation. And on Asia's subcontinent, our interests
include combating nuclear proliferation, restoring peace to Afghanistan, seeing an
end to communal strife that threatens India's democracy, and promoting human
rights and free elections in Burma, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
In the Middle East, we must maintain the momentum behind the current negotia-
tions over peace and regional issues. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker
deserve great credit for bringing Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table, and the
Clinton Administration is committed to building on that historic breakthrough. Our
democracy-centered policy underscores our special relationship with Israel, the re-
gion's only democracy, with whom we are committed to maintaining a strong and
vibrant strategic relationship. We also believe that America's unswerving commit-
ment to Israel s right to exist behind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting
peace. We will continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arab friends to address
the full range of that region's challenges.
Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, we will work toward new arms
control agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. We will
assume a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran, which seem determined to sow
violence and disorder throughout the region and even beyond. In this region as well,
we will champion economic reform, more accountable governance, and increased re-
spect for human rights. And following a decade during which over 1,000 Americans
were killed, injured, or kidnapped by perpetrators of international terrorism, we will
give no quarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimes against human-
ity.
Nowhere has the march against dictators and toward democracy been more dra-
matic than in our own hemisphere. It is in our self-interest to help Latin America
consolidate a decade of hard-won progress. In the past several years, as democracy
has spread in the region and market economies have been liberalized, our exports
to Latin America have doubled. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners,
Canada and Mexico, we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to
Latin American nations that are opening their economies and political systems. At
the same time, we expect to complete understandings regarding the North American
Free Trade Agreement as outlined by President-elect Clinton. We also need to make
the Organization of American States a more effective forum for addressing our re-
gion's problems. In Haiti, we strongly support the international effort by the U.N.
and the OA.S. to restore democracy. In Cuba, we will maintain the embargo to keep
pressure on the Castro regime. We will strongly support national reconciliation and
the full implementation of peace accords in El Salvador and Nicaragua. And in the
Andean countries, the power of the drug lords must be broken to free their people
and ours from the corrupting influence of the narcotics trade.
In Africa as well, a new generation is demanding the opportunities that flow from
multi-party democracy and open economies. They deserve our understanding and
support. We need to assist their efforts to build institutions that can empower Afri-
ca s people to husband, and benefit from, the continent's vast resources, deal with
its economic, social, and environmental problems, and address its underlying causes
of political instability. We will be equally committed to working with Congress to
redirect our foreign assistance programs to promote sustainable development and
private enterprise in Africa. In South Africa, we shall work actively to support
34
those, black and white, who are striving to dismantle the hateful machinery of
apartheid and working with determination to build a multi-racial democracy.
As I said on the day President-elect Clinton nominated me to be Secretary of
State, back when I was in law school, two of my heroes were General George Mar-
shall and Dean Acheson. And I am enormously honored by the opportunity to oc-
cupy the post held by them, and by many of the most revered names in our nation's
history. Marshall and Acheson were visionaries who recognized at the dawn of the
Cold War that America could not remain safe by standing aloof from the world. And
the triumph of freedom in that great struggle is the legacy of the activist foreign
policy they shaped to project our values and protect our interests.
Now, as in their day, we face a new era and the challenge of developing a new
foreign policy. Its activism must be grounded in America's enduring interests. It
must be informed by a realistic estimate of the dangers we face. It must be shaped
by the democratic convictions we share. And, to command respect abroad, it must
rest on a sturdy, bipartisan consensus here at home.
The ultimate test of the security strategy I have outlined today will be in the ben-
efits it delivers to the American people. Its worth will be measured, not by its theo-
retical elegance, but by its results. If it makes our people more prosperous and in-
creases their safety abroad; if it helps expand the stabilizing and ennobling reach
of democratic institutions and freer markets; if it helps protect the global environ-
ment for our children — if it achieves these kinds of benefits, then we will have dis-
charged our responsibilities to our generation as Marshall, Acheson, and the other
architects of the post-war world discharged theirs.
They have given us a high standard to emulate as we define anew the require-
ments of U.S. global leadership. I look forward to working with both parties in Con-
gress to construct a new framework for that leadership, a framework within which
healthy debate will occur, but within which we can also build a strong consensus
that will help us cooperatively pursue the national interest at home and abroad.
Thank you.
Mr. Christopher. Before taking any questions, Mr. Chairman, I
would like, with your indulgence, to respond very briefly to the
question raised by the committee concerning my testimony before
this committee during my confirmation hearings in 1977 for Dep-
uty Attorney General.
During those hearings the question arose about my knowledge of
covert intelligence operations conducted by the Army in 1967 and
1968 when I was Deputy Attorney General; operations such as in-
filtrating domestic organizations and stealing their documents. I
told the committee then that while I was aware that the Army had
been engaged in gathering information as part of its responsibility
in dealing with domestic violence, I had no knowledge of the covert
surveillance and infiltration that came to light after I left office.
Let me repeat: I had no knowledge of the covert surveillance and
infiltration that came to light after I left office. I also told the com-
mittee that I condemned those kinds of activities and would have
opposed them had I known about them. I wish to assure the com-
mittee that I stand by that testimony and I will not tolerate any
such improper activities at the State Department or elsewhere, if
I see it, in the Government.
The committee counsel has asked me to respond to several docu-
ments in my files as Deputy Attorney General which I had placed
at the Lyndon Johnson Library many years ago and were found
there. I have submitted a detailed response to the committee ana-
lyzing those documents and will summarize it here simply by say-
ing that those documents have nothing in them that would lead me
to modify my earlier testimony that I knew nothing at that time
of the covert infiltration and surveillance that came to light after
I left office.
35
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the committee for its indulgence
in a statement that might seem rather long, but since I am here
for the first time I wanted to have a chance to lay out my vision,
my concept of American foreign policy as I enter, I hope, this im-
portant office.
[The biographical summary of Mr. Christopher follows:]
Biographic Summary
Name Warren Christopher
Position for which considered .... Secretary of State
Present position Chairman, CMelveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
Legal residence California
Office address CMelveny & Myers, 400 South Hope St., Los An-
geles, CA 90071-2899
Date/place of birth October 27, 1925, Scranton, ND
Marital status Married
Name of spouse Former Marie J. Wyllis
Names of children Scott, Thomas, Kristen, and Lynn
Education B.A. (magna cum laude) University of Southern
California, 1945
LL.B., Stanford University (Order of Coif), 1949
Language ability None
Military experience United States Naval Reserve, 1943—46
Work experience:
1981 to present Lawyer, then Chairman, OMelveny & Myers, Los
Angeles, CA
1977 to 1981 Deputy Secretary of State, Washington, DC
1969 to 1976 Lawyer, 0"Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
1967 to 1969 Deputy Attorney General of the United States,
Washington, DC
1950 to 1967 Lawyer, CMelveny & Myers, Los Angeles, CA
1949 to 1950 Law Clerk to United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice William O. Douglas, Washington, DC
Professional activities President, Los Angeles County Bar Association
(1974-75)
Chairman, Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary of the American Bar Association
(1975-76)
Chairman, Standing Committee on Aeronautical
Law of the American Bar Association (1966-67)
Member, Board of Governors of the State Bar of
California (1975-76)
Special Counsel to the Governor of California
(1959)
Civic activities Member, Board of Trustees of Stanford Univer-
sity (1971-77, 1981-91, 1992-93) (President
1985-88)
Director, Southern California Edison Co. (1971-
77, 1981-93)
Director, First Interstate Bancorp (1981-93)
Director, Lockheed Corp. (1987-93)
Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences (1988-93)
Chairman, Carnegie Corp. of New York Board of
Trustees (1990)
Chairman, Independent Commission on the Los
Angeles Police Department, 1991
Director and Vice Chairman, Council on Foreign
Relations (1982-91)
36
Biographic Summary — Continued
Director, Los Angeles World Affairs Council
(1987-93)
Member of the Trilateral Commission (1975-77,
1981-88)
Member of the Executive Committee on the
American Agenda (1988)
Member of the Board of Bar Examiners of the
State Bar of California (1966-67)
Member of the California Coordinating Council
for Higher Education (1963-69), President
(1963-65)
Vice Chairman of the Governor's Commission on
Los Angeles Riots (1965-66)
Awards Jefferson Award, American Institute for Public
Service for the Greatest Public Service Per-
formed by an Elected or Appointed Official
The UCLA Medal
Harold Weill Medal, New York University
Thomas Jefferson Award in Law from the Univer-
sity of Virginia Law School
Louis Stein Award, Fordham Law School
The Chairman. Thank you very much indeed. I would say that
I have received your five-page statement which, without objection,
will be made a part of the record of this hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]
On January 11, 1993, counsel for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations sent
me certain memoranda relating to domestic Army surveillance operations during
1968 and asked me to provide a detailed statement addressing [my] knowledge oi
the memoranda and any clarification of [my] February 24, 1977 testimony which [I]
may wish to make." I have examined these memoranda carefully. I have no present
recollection of receiving or reading them, although one bears my initials and another
appears to bear some markings by me. I thus believe that I must have read those
two documents, which are the memoranda from Mr. Paul Bower to me. As to the
other two documents, from Mr. Kevin Maroney to Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
I was "cc'd" and neither document contains any initials or marks by me. I thus be-
lieve that I did not read either of the documents by Mr. Maroney, which would have
been consistent with my general practice of not reviewing "cc's" that did not require
action by me. Having now reviewed these four documents, moreover, I wish to make
clear that I see no reason to amplify or amend my prior testimony before this Com-
mittee.
On February 24, 1977, I appeared before the Committee to testify in connection
with my nomination to be Deputy Secretary of State. At that time, the Committee
inquired into my knowledge about Army domestic intelligence activities conducted
during 1967 and 1968, when I served as Deputy Attorney General of the United
States. In particular, I was asked to respond to a report by the Congressional Re-
search Service of the Library of Congress, which had been prepared for the Commit-
tee, regarding my role with respect to "covert surveillance activities" by the Army.
(Hearing Record at p. 17) The covert activities at issue were described in the report
as follows: "[T]he Army frequently established petty harassment groups which trav-
eled around the country allegedly stealing petitions and handbills ana heckling pro-
testers. The Army also actively infiltrated such groups as SCLC (Southern Christian
Leadership Conference), the National Mobilization Committee, the Young Adults
Project in Colorado and the Black Studies Program at NYU, among a long list of
other peace and civil rights organizations." (Hearing Record atp. 19.)
I told the Committee in 1977 that, during the time I was Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, I had no knowledge that the Army had engaged in such covert surveillance
or any other form of covert activity." (Hearing Record at p. 10.) I also told the Com-
mittee that I had been aware that the Army was involved in other kinds of intel-
ligence activities, such as gathering information from local police departments.
Against that backdrop, I would like now to turn specifically to the four documents
provided to me by the Committee. The first is a July 23, 1968, memorandum to me
37
from Paul G. Bower, who was a special assistant in my office. The memo bears my
handwritten initials, along with the word "Noted," and, although I have no current
recollection of the memo, those markings convey to me that I read it at the time.
The memo details a meeting hetween Mr. Bower and the Deputy Mayor of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. According to the memo, "the problem that gave rise to the * * *
meeting was not intelligence but rather the lack of adequate communication" during
the riots after Dr. King^s murder. (Emphasis added.) The memo notes that the May-
or's office received intelligence information from the 116th Military Intelligence
Group, and reports that this Group received some information from local police de-
partments, but also had "operatives" in the area.
Nothing in this memorandum states or implies that the 116th MI Group was en-
gaging in covert activities such as those discussed in the Library of Congress report.
The word "operatives," which was fastened upon in a recent press report, is fully
consistent with my 1977 testimony indicating my awareness that the Army had en-
gaged in non-covert intelligence efforts. Indeed, the memo itself states that "the only
present need for intelligence collecting was the service of a helicopter. Evidently in
the past the Army has furnished such service to the District government * * *.* Far
from suggesting covert activities or infiltration by the Army's "operatives," this type
of intelligence gathering was not only open and obvious but, as the memo indicates,
was used during a civil disturbance for disorder control.
The next document is an October 14, 1968, memorandum to me from Mr. Bower.
It contains a check mark at the top and some markings in the margin, which appear
to be my markings. I thus believe that, while I have no current recollection oi the
memo or its contents, I likely reviewed it at the time.
This memorandum describes a briefing given by a military officer at an October
10, 1968, meeting of the Civil Defense Steering Committee — an interagency group
made up principally of military officers and civilian Defense Department officials.
The memo describes the contents of the briefing, which involved a report on certain
minor incidents of civil disorder; a brief "rundown of some of the principal figures"
of the so-called "new left"; a report on the violence at the Chicago Convention; and
a disagreement as to whether the District of Columbia police force responded ade-
quately to the April 1968 riots. The memo also details plans and costs for a new
command center at the Pentagon." Nothing in this memorandum indicates in the
slightest that the Army was engaging in infiltration or other covert action against
dissident groups.
The third and fourth documents are memoranda from Kevin T. Maroney, to Attor-
ney General Ramsey Clark dated August 21, 1968, and August 22, 1968, respec-
tively. I was "cc'd" on both memoranda. I do not believe that I would have react ei-
ther document in 1968. I say this for two reasons. First, I did not routinely review
documents that I was "cc'd" on. Rather, they would have been looked at by my staff,
who would have brought necessary information to my attention. Second, in clear
contrast to the two memos from Paul Bower to me, these documents contain no
markings or initials, which would normally be on a document that I had reviewed.
I should also add that, while both documents discuss information provided by
Army intelligence concerning domestic activities, neither document indicates the
source of this information. It is entirely possible therefore — and there is no reason
to think that a reader of the memorandum in 1968 who had no knowledge of covert
Army activities would have thought otherwise — that the information was supplied
to the Army by third parties, such as a local police official or other sources. I indi-
cated in my 1977 testimony that I was aware that the Army was engaged in non-
covert intelligence gathering and nothing in these two memoranda demonstrate oth-
erwise.
In summary, having reviewed the documents supplied to me, I see no reason to
alter or amend my earlier testimony that I had no knowledge that the Army was
engaged in covert intelligence operations, such as infiltrating civilian organizations
or stealing their petitions or handbills. I also wish to reiterate that, as I told the
Committee in 1977, I would have been strongly and firmly opposed to this kind of
activity had I known about it.
The Chairman. We appreciate your addressing the issue of the
surveillance so directly and I have no questions at this time.
Before going into questions I would like to recognize the ranking
minority member, who has returned for his opening statement.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Mr. Christopher.
There is no question about all of us joining in welcoming you to the
38
hearing this morning. Now, there may be some penetrating ques-
tions or there may not, but my own questioning will be for the pur-
pose of giving you an opportunity to explain a lot of things that are
being said.
Now, most of us have known Mr. Christopher, and some of us
have worked with him previously when he was at the State De-
partment during the Carter administration, and it may be appro-
priate for me to comment that there were times back then when
we had to agree to disagree agreeably on various matters. But I
never doubted Mr. Christopher's sincerity and good intentions, and
I do not know.
Having said that, it perhaps should be noted that Mr. Chris-
topher and virtually all of President-elect Clinton's other foreign
Eolicy nominees are associated with a period in U.S. foreign policy
istory that not many, if any, Americans regard as our country's
finest hour. It was the period that saw the giveaway of the Panama
Canal, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the undermining of the
Shah of Iran, and the consolidation of Soviet influence on our hemi-
sphere's doorsteps in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the world.
It was a time when to much of the world the United States ap-
peared to be in retreat. And as Deputy Secretary of State during
that depressing period, Mr. Christopher played a key role in shap-
ing U.S. foreign policy, and therefore I would be less than candid
if I did not acknowledge some reservations about his nomination.
He knows that; we have talked previously.
Mr. Christopher, the world today is very different from the time
when you last held a senior foreign policy position. Despite the his-
toric changes of the past few years, I doubt that anybody does not
anticipate that there will be a great deal of instability in the years
ahead. Indeed, the decade ahead may well be a bloody one and it
will be your responsibility to help define America's role in that very
changed world.
As Secretary of State, you will be America's voice to almost 200
countries in this world, most of which are likely to be clamoring for
money and attention. But the United States surely has now
learned that we cannot solve every problem in every corner of the
world, and I was gratified to notice your comment in that regard.
The American taxpayers simply do not have the resources to pro-
vide handouts to every outstretched hand around the world.
But let me say this without any equivocation; before spending
one cent of America's taxpayers' dollars on foreign program, wheth-
er it be sending American jobs overseas or building lavish homes
and tennis courts for diplomats, the new administration, I hope,
will ask will this expenditure further the interests of American citi-
zens.
I am delighted to note that you called for an American desk at
the State Department. That was not original with you, that was
not original with me; Herman Talmadge said it over and over again
on the Senate floor and I applauded every time he said it. Senator
Talmadge many years ago raised that question because he was .jus-
tifiably dismayed that too often foreign service officers seemed to
be protecting foreign interests rather than American interests. So
Herman Talmadge was right then, and sad to say, the situation
continues to be a bipartisan folly today, a disease tnat has reached
39
epidemic proportions at Foggy Bottom, no matter which party is in
charge.
I think there is a rather simple cure for this malady. Every sin-
gle U.S. Embassy should be an outpost with the sole mission of
protecting and promoting American interests. Also promoting and
protecting ideals, and this demonstrably is not the case today, and
I say that having disagreed very often with my own party and the
Republican Secretaries of State.
For example — and let me give you an example and I want you
to comment on it some time during your visit here — the Embassy
staff, U.S. Embassy staff in Managua has done absolutely noth-
ing— nothing to press the claims of 554 American citizens whose
properties were stolen by the Sandinista and Chamorro govern-
ments. Now, one American citizen told me that when she sought
help in the U.S. Embassy in Managua concerning her property
claim she felt like she was visiting the Nicaraguan Foreign Min-
istry.
Foreign aid is so unpopular with the American people and has
been so ineffective in furthering American objectives overseas that
there is growing support for the complete abolition of the Agency
for International Development. Do not give the American people a
vote if you want AID to survive. They will vote you down, and I
say it is about time that somebody grabbed this question and
worked on it sincerely and effectively.
What I am saying, I think, is that too often the foreign policy es-
tablishment is out of touch with mainstream America. And as I
said earlier and as you said earlier, the world has changed. And
it is time, I think, for the State Department to get with the pro-
gram and decide what your priorities really are going to be. You
cannot specifically escape questions like these being asked by more
and more Americans every day.
One, does the State Department need embassies in virtually
every country in the world in a time of enormous budgetary prob-
lems at home? Why cannot the staffing at many U.S. Embassies be
reduced? I wonder how many Americans know that the tiny coun-
try of Sierra Leone has at least 220 people on the American payroll
there or how about Kenya with 592 people on the American payroll
or Uruguay with 120 people on the American payroll. And it is the
same all over the world.
Another question, why does the U.S. Government provide more
than $1 billion every year to multilateral banks that lend millions
of dollars to corrupt regimes. How many Americans know that,
without exception, the terms of these loans are much more favor-
able than any loan the average American family can get down at
the local bank?
Question, why do many senior foreign service officers live in lux-
urious conditions overseas that rival those of the wealthiest Ameri-
cans? Why does the State Department insist on violating U.S. law
which absolutely forbids, without any question, without any per-
adventure, sending any foreign aid to any government which re-
fuses to return confiscated properties belonging to American citi-
zens.
40
Question, why does the U.S. Government continue to give away
millions of dollars in foreign aid to countries of no strategic impor-
tance?
Apart from these questions — and there are many others and I am
going to ask some of them as we go along. But apart from these
questions, we must not forget that if there is one thing that Amer-
ica stands for in this world, it should be, it had better be freedom.
So can we put an end to this bipartisan folly that I mentioned a
few moments ago and can we stand with the forces of liberty in
Cuba, in Nicaragua, in China, in North Korea, in Syria, and Iraq.
This is what the American people want and they want to know
whether the State Department, under your stewardship, will stand
with them.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me express the hope that — and I know
that Mr. Christopher agrees with this — that we will not attempt to
race through this nomination. I am going to have to have several
rounds of questions, because the record should be, in fairness to
Mr. Christopher, as complete as possible. So I may need 8 or 10
or 12 rounds, and if that means staying here until Saturday or
next Monday, so be it. But in any event, I know that Mr. Chris-
topher wants to be in a position to take care of any doubts any
member may have, so I am giving fair notice, I hope, that I am pre-
pared to stay here for as long as it takes.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Helms, and as chairman I
am perfectly content to stay with you and preside, but I think that
you may find yourself a little lonely as time goes on. [Laughter.]
Senator Helms. It will not be a novelty, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. In any case, I think we have reached a point now
where questions start, and we obviously are not going to get
through before lunch so I would suggest we go through questions
and then break about 1 p.m., maybe take 1 hour and 15 minutes
for lunch, and come back here at 2:15 p.m.
I will start out the questioning, and we are going to allow 15
minutes so that each Senator will have more of an opportunity to
ask questions in depth. This little red light will go on after 15 min-
utes, as will a bell that will ring, which will remind us that the
time has expired.
Just to start out with, I have a few questions here. First, bring-
ing up the subject of Iraq which you brought in extemporaneously
in your statement, as you may know, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee possesses 14 tons of captured Iraqi secret police docu-
ments. These documents are a record of torture and execution and
are critical evidence in a possible genocide case against Iraq.
Is it your thought that the United States will bring or participate
in a genocide case against Iraq in the ICJ, the International Court
of Justice?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would support such a
case very strongly.
The Chairman. Thank you. Should a case against individual
Iraqis for crimes against humanity and genocide be brought in a
specially constituted court, or even in a U.S. court? In other words,
should it be a United States, a specially constituted court, or the
ICJ?
41
Mr. Christopher. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a fixed view
about the forum for such proceedings. I do think these war crimes,
atrocities, genocide crimes ought to oe pursued in the best possible
forum, whether it be the ICJ or a new forum set up for that pur-
pose. I do not have a fixed view on that. I do have a view that the
matter ought to be pursued vigorously.
The Chairman. Thank you. I would, obviously, concur with you.
Last month I was in Somalia and I was impressed by the work the
U.N. forces are doing in relieving the suffering, but I am concerned
about whether, and if so, how soon, the U.N. forces will be sent in
to replace U.S. forces to deal with the longer term.
Because, as you know as well as I do, there is a difference be-
tween peacekeeping and peacemaking. We have gone in there hope-
fully for famine relief and peacekeeping purposes. It looks as if we
are getting into a peacemaking cycle, and I was curious as to how
you felt we could extricate ourselves.
Mr. Christopher. Mr. Chairman, first let me say how much I
admire the work that our armed forces are doing in Somalia. It is
another example of the high quality of the American servicepeople
and the job they are doing all over this world.
When we entered Somalia, Governor Clinton and those of us
around him were strongly supportive of the Bush administration's
endeavor as a humanitarian effort, and we continue to be so. It
seemed to me then, and it seems to me now, that the peacemaking
efforts of the U.S. forces there will have to continue for a period
of time that can only be judged by events on the ground. Artificial
deadlines are really not suitable in that situation.
I hope that the U.S. forces can be removed in the near future,
and there is some indication that we may have reached the ceiling,
but I do not think that the conditions yet are ready to have the
forces turned over — have the country turned over to peacekeeping
forces, though I hope that will soon come.
I would also say, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that when we
turn from peacemaking to peacekeeping, that probably the peace-
keeping forces will have to be more robust, more muscular than
they have been in some other instances. Because the transition
from peacemaking to peacekeeping in that country will not be one
where there is just a curtain that comes down that makes it clear
that there is no longer a security danger. There will be some secu-
rity danger, but it seems to me that a robust, muscular peacekeep-
ing force provided by the U.N. can step in there and take charge
in the near future, but that can only be determined by events on
the ground.
The Chairman. I must say I was very impressed there by the
tough conditions that the Marines were under when they were
there. It was not generally recognized that amongst the Marines,
integrated with them, were women Marines and they were doing
a fine job.
On another subject, not long ago during a speech at the U.N.,
President Bush has some positive things to say about closer co-
operation with the Security Council and peacekeeping operations.
He stopped short of the idea of putting the units at the disposal
of the Security Council as provided for in article 43, but he didn't
rule it out.
42
And in this regard, I guess the most exciting thing in my time
in the Senate, has been seeing something that had been worked on
very hard in 1945 in your native city of San Francisco, when some
of us were working on Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, to see it go
into cold storage all these years with the cold war and now finally
the aspirations and hopes we had for the charter are coming to
bear all these years later. I carry the charter around with me as
much as possible ever since.
The lead in this has been taken by Senator Biden and Senator
Boren, too, is very interested in this subject. I was just curious if
you saw the possibility of security forces under article 43 during
your tenure as Deputy Secretary being made available to the Secu-
rity Council.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, I do. I think the emergence of article
43, just as you do, is a very promising and exciting event. I thought
that the statement issued at midyear last year by Boutros-Ghali
with respect to his overview of the U.N.'s composition and its po-
tential for the future was a very promising charter for the future.
I think we have to find ways to make available to the U.N. a
rapid response force so that the U.N. can go into situations and not
leave it to the United States to be the action officer in the situa-
tion.
The Chairman. I would just like to say, publicly, how much I
look forward to supporting Senator Biden and his resolution which
provides for exactly that.
In connection with Haiti, I was just curious what strategy you
have devised to avoid Florida being invaded by a fleet of newly
built boats on January 21.
Mr. Christopher. You are certainly covering all the interesting
places, Mr. Chairman. Our incoming administration has been
working unusually closely with the outgoing administration in con-
nection with Haitian problems, because they are so urgent in na-
ture. In most instances, we simply have stood aside and tried to
determine what the outgoing administration was doing and it fol-
lowed very carefully the rule that there only can be one govern-
ment at the time.
But in Haiti we've been working very closely together following
a long breakfast meeting that I had with Secretary Eagleburger.
We have been strongly supporting the efforts of the OAS and the
United States to produce a democratic result in Haiti, to produce
a situation which would cause the people of that country to want
to remain there under conditions of peace and security.
And those efforts, I think, are quite promising this week, Mr.
Chairman. They by no means have come to fruition, but the U.N.
and the OAS, working with President Aristide and the statements
he's been making in the last 2 or 3 days, I think give high promise
that that situation within Haiti may be moving in the right direc-
tion.
At the same time, Governor Clinton has been making efforts to
begin to carry out his commitment that the people of Haiti will
have greater opportunity to have a process under which they can
determine whether or not they are appropriate refugees for admis-
sion to the United States. This will take a number of forms and I
43
think that you can expect to see developments about this over the
next several days.
As you know, his commitment during the campaign was to en-
sure that the people of Haiti would have an opportunity to pursue
their right to asylum in the United States. They would have the
right to pursue their determination to come to the United States
under conditions that were more favorable than they've had in the
past. And that's an ongoing effort as the new administration comes
into office.
But that is a very grave problem, Mr. Chairman, and I think we
can only watch developments over the next several days and weeks
with, I think, quite high promise that the U.N. and the OAS en-
deavor, with our strong support — that is, both the outgoing and in-
coming administrations — may finally be moving in the right direc-
tion.
The Chairman. I guess the difference between an economic and
a political refugee is like a glass of water. Is it half full or half
empty? But I do hope that these Haitians will be given the oppor-
tunity to make their case.
Mr. Christopher. Well, Governor Clinton has emphasized that
the admission to the United States will depend upon their estab-
lishing their criteria under existing standards, that they will have
to be able to show that they are the subject of persecution in Haiti.
That is the reason why he has indicated a determination to find
ways for them to establish whether or not they fall within that cat-
egory under more satisfactory conditions than they have in the
past, particularly within the island of Haiti.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Returning to another island, Cyprus, it was about 19 years ago
that Turkey invaded Cyprus. She is still there. The spirit of Davos
seems to have pretty well disintegrated. What will be the priority
of the Cyprus situation in the new administration?
Mr. Christopher. Mr. Chairman, that's a matter that I remem-
ber from my prior service in government. It goes back a long way.
The U.N. has taken some positive action there and there seems to
be some progress among the parties.
There's an election about to take place in Cyprus, I understand,
with three competing candidates and no certain winner. And the
matter is on hold temporarily until the outcome of that election.
But I can tell you once again that our administration will be pursu-
ing that as vigilantly as we can in an effort to encourage the par-
ties to reach a conclusion.
As you know, it's a three-cornered negotiation, with the people
of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece and Turkey being
importantly involved. But we hope to see a situation reached there
where the occupation forces of Turkey would leave the island and
there could be a free and independent Cyprus without the occupa-
tion and without the threats that have existed in the past.
The Chairman. Thank you. Turning to another situation, I refer
to East Timor.
Last summer I tried to visit East Timor with Senator Boren. We
were turned down by the Indonesian Government because of its
concern about the human rights situation. I was curious as to what
you thought could be done to be of help there, if anything?
44
Mr. Christopher. That's one of the longstanding human rights
problems. And I think the most we can do is to continue to exert
diplomatic pressure on Indonesia to finally try to gain some rec-
ognition of the severe human rights problems that are there and
have been there for a long time and have been recognized in
human rights reports extending back at least to the time when I
was last in government, between 1977 and 1981.
But I don't have any magic solution for that problem except to
continue to put diplomatic pressure on parties there who might
have the capacity to improve the conditions of the people in that
very troubled area.
The Chairman. I know that I directly asked President Suharto
of Indonesia whether Senator Boren and I could go and he very po-
litely but very firmly said, no. I would hope that might change.
The law of the sea is a subject that has been of some interest,
I think to you, in your previous incarnation in government. I know
it has been for me for many years. It's languished under the pre-
vious administrations and as you know, we have the Prepcom
meeting in Kingston, but we don't send an observer there. I was
hoping that that might be in your thoughts as being dusted off and
revived. What are your views about that?
Mr. Christopher. Well, I do have a longstanding interest, Mr.
Chairman, in the Law of the Sea Treaty and I hope we can do
something to revive that. As I'm sure you know better than I, I'm
just getting reacquainted in that area.
There's only one aspect of the Law of the Sea Treaty to which
we have not oeen able to give approval, and that I believe is the
deep sea bed regime.
The Chairman. Part 11, 1 think.
Mr. Christopher. Your memory of those numbers is better than
mine. But I do understand that there may be some movement in
that deep sea bed regime and there is some hope that there may
be a restatement or perhaps some revision of that article that
would make it more acceptable to the United States and the inter-
ests here.
It's unfortunate with all of the positive things there are in the
Law of the Sea Treaty, that we've been unable to adhere to that
and without knowing about it in detail, Mr. Chairman, or wanting
to pose as an expert of the character of Elliott Richardson on the
subject, I will assure you that we will see if we can't reactivate in-
terest in the Law of the Sea in a way that protects U.S. interests.
Of course, the reason that we have not adhered is because we
feel that our interests are not adequately protected under the law,
under the deep sea bed article.
The Chairman. I would agree with you. Except for the deep sea
bed provisions, I would accept the rest of the provisions as they are
written. The deep sea bed does, on reflection, contain elements in
it adverse to the United States. And I would hope that that part
could be handled by a protocol or a separate side arrangement.
Going back to Africa for a moment — excuse my jumping around
this way— but the U.N. Secretary General recently suggested that
a peacekeeping force should be organized and sent to Mozambique.
Others have suggested that the U.N. should play a role in Liberia,
even though there's already a multinational African force there.
45
That force is I believe, primarily Nigerian, but the Liberians do not
like the Nigerians, so it is not able to do a very effective job.
What in your view can be done there, if anything?
Mr. Christopher. Mr. Chairman, I think Liberia is one of those
instances where a regional group is addressing the problem, trying
to do their best to deal with the problem and, in the complex world
we live in, I think we ought to give every encouragement to re-
gional organizations to deal with problems of that kind.
The U.N.'s plate is very full at the present time and I would not
have any disposition, I think, to want to try to take over the Libe-
rian problem or have the U.N. take over the Liberian problem.
It's a grave and difficult problem and very unsatisfactory in
many respects, but I have long thought that a country's neighbors
may be most able to help it through difficult times if they approach
the matter with a sense of fairness and reason. And I hope that
the regional organization is working effectively in Liberia.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. The yellow light is on. My
time has expired.
I turn to the ranking minority member.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christopher, as
you know, I went down to the White House this morning, ducked
out of this meeting at the first of it. And there was sort of an emo-
tional moment, certainly for me, when I saw Ronald Reagan receive
the Medal of Freedom.
Now here's a guy that's kicked around by the left wing news
media and the liberal politicians. They throw mud at him every
time they get a chance and none of it sticks. The American people
still love and trust Ronald Reagan. And I think that's appropriate.
But I thought on the way back how ironic it is that while that
ceremony was happening at the White House, over in the House of
Representatives Congressman Lee Hamilton and Henry Hyde re-
leased the House October Surprise report. Now some of us last
year, along about this time, tried to say, look, this is just a political
gambit. Do not waste the taxpayer's money because there is noth-
ing to it.
But I heard all of these self-righteous comments about, how we
have got to do this. The character of this government lies at stake.
And I said, bullfeathers.
But anyway, the report was released this morning — and it is a
Democrat report, I might stipulate, even though it is called biparti-
san— nothing, I repeat, nothing was found to support the theory
that was broadcast across the land time and time and time again
that the 1980 Reagan campaign asked Iran to delay releasing our
hostages until Reagan became President.
Speculation — sometimes it was broadcast and printed as an abso-
lute fact — said that the Reagan campaign agreed to sell Iran arms
to get the hostages released. Do you remember any of that?
Mr. Christopher. I know that charge was made.
Senator Helms. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. And I believe that there are
a good number of people out there across American land that o*ve
Ronald Reagan and the taxpayers of America an apology, pref-
erably on bended knee. But that will not happen.
What I am saying is that the various fishing expeditions which
comprised the October Surprise witch hunt cost the American tax-
46
payers at least $4 million. And what did they come up with? A
water hole.
And let us lay aside for a moment that it was made as a political
judgment this year, in 1992, to withhold the release of this report
until after the November election. Oh, that is not politics. Oh, no,
no, do not consider that. But it was held up. Now it was pretty well
known at the time that decision was made that the report gave
Reagan and Bush an absolute clean bill of health.
Now that is not your fault. I am not saying that it is. But I do
want to ask you about your own views about the October Surprise.
Because about a year ago, back in February — I believe it was along
about February 8 — Warren Christopher said, I believe there are
enough suspicious circumstances to warrant a bipartisan investiga-
tion by Congress. Do you remember saying that?
Mr. Christopher. Yes.
Senator Helms. And in light of the fact that even the Democrats
in the House of Representatives now say that there were not any
suspicious circumstances and it took them $4 million and a year to
reach that conclusion, you do not think now that it was a good idea
to spend $4 million, do you?
Mr. Christopher. Senator Helms, I'm rather surprised you're
asking me this question at this point. This committee, your com-
mittee, conducted an investigation
Senator Helms. Against my — over my objection, absolutely.
Mr. Christopher. Well, sir, I was asked to cooperate with that
committee and
Senator Helms. I do not question that, Mr. Christopher. I am
talking about what you said, the contribution you made.
Mr. Christopher. Well, the reason I was surprised, Mr. Helms,
is that I spent many hours with that committee in Los Angeles and
then I came back here and testified before the committee. The com-
mittee report documents what I said at that time. And if you want
to see my views in detail, conducted in private session, it's there
in the report of this very committee. So I'm a little surprised that
that question is being addressed to me today, but I'll certainly try
to answer it.
Senator Helms. Very well. I am tempted to ask you if there is
anything you would like to say in closed session that you would
just as soon not talk about in open session.
But let me ask this, in 1980 or early 1981, did you warn the Ira-
nian Government that, unlike Carter, Reagan might not be willing
to swap Iran's frozen assets for the hostages?
Did you ever say anything like that?
Mr. Christopher. Senator Helms, in December 1980, after Presi-
dent Reagan had been elected, I was using every argument at my
command to try to get the release of our hostages, and one of the
arguments I used was that the Reagan administration's viewpoint
on this subject would be very unpredictable.
Senator Helms. So the answer is yes to my question, you did say
that.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, but I did not say it in the terms that
you mentioned, Senator. That is why I was trying to restate it.
What I did was to urge them to settle the matter now, because
President Reagan's handling of the matter was unpredictable. That
47
is a little different than you stated, but that is what I told the Ira-
nians.
Senator Helms. So this was, as you now say, a strategy on your
part to rescue the hostages. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Helms. You did not — it did not occur to you that it
might be helpful to rescue the Carter administration from history's
judgment on handling the hostage crisis as a whole. Nothing like
that entered in your mind at all at any time.
Mr. Christopher. Senator Helms, every day that those hostages
were kept was really a burden to me. I nad selected a number of
them to go to Iran to serve in our Embassy there. They had been
there a long time, and as we got down toward the end of the ad-
ministration, no one day was more important than the other. I kept
working for their release.
Senator Helms. Well, I guess that answer is relevant to some-
thing, but not to the question that I tried to ask, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Christopher. Well, would you restate your question, Sen-
ator?
Senator Helms. Oh, let me go on. I do not want to tilt at wind-
mills with you.
Did not President Carter himself make an arms-for-hostage
offer?
Mr. Christopher. I am glad to have a chance to explain that,
Senator Helms.
The hostages were taken in November 1979. A few days after the
hostages were taken, President Carter froze all Iranian assets in
this country. That was about $12 billion worth of Iranian assets
that included mostly cash but also some oil well equipment, various
other kinds of commercial equipment, and a substantial amount of
spare parts.
Senator Biden. Military spare parts.
Mr. Christopher. Military spare parts, yes — thank you, Senator
Biden — and other military equipment that had been on order and
paid for by the Iranians. It belonged to the Iranians, and it was
frozen just as their cash in the banks was frozen.
From the very first time that he froze those assets, President
Carter said that after the hostages were returned, those frozen as-
sets would be returned to Iran, and in the course of the negotia-
tions it was my job to try to obtain the release and return of the
hostages and to preserve as much of the U.S. interest, to prevent
as many claims against the United States as possible.
When the matter was finally concluded, we returned $8 billion
of the $12 billion that had been frozen. We returned a certain
amount of commercial equipment, and we agreed to return the
military spare parts, but subject, Senator Helms, right in the Al-
giers declarations, to a provision that they would not be returned
unless U.S. munitions control — unless the laws of the United
States — permitted them to be returned.
Now, this was the way President Carter began in the matter.
That is, when he froze the assets, he said the assets will be
unfrozen when the hostages come home, and that was the context
of the negotiations. I can take you through it almost on a day-by-
day basis.
48
Senator Helms. No, no. I am trying to give you some latitude in
answering, but do you remember what my question was?
Mr. Christopher. The question was whether President Carter
traded arms for hostages, and the fact is
Senator Helms. Is it yes or no?
Mr. Christopher. The answer is no.
Senator Helms. At no time.
Mr. Christopher. At no time did he trade arms for hostages.
What he did was to release equipment that had been — including
military spare parts — that had been frozen and paid for by the Ira-
nians at the time the hostages were released, but that is far dif-
ferent from the trading of new arms, new military equipment,
which was what President Reagan did. That is a vastly different
situation, Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Oh, here, now we are getting down to the brass
tacks. You are comparing Reagan with Carter, and all of these
things have been batted around and have been proved to be un-
true.
During the entire period of the Reagan administration, the total
value of U.S. arms shipped to Iran — and this was according to the
official report on Iran-Contra — was $48.1 million, less than one-
third of what the Carter administration, whether it be you or oth-
ers, offered in 1980. Do you disagree with that?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, there was a large amount that was
frozen at the time of the freeze, and what President Carter did
from the moment they were frozen was to say: you took our hos-
tages, we are going to freeze your resources; once the hostages are
returned, your resources will be returned. That is certainly not the
kind of a trade that you are describing.
Senator Helms. Well, let us get — just as a matter of philosophy
or policy, or whatever you want to call it, do you think there are
any circumstances under which the United States should offer a
quid pro quo to terrorists?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir.
Senator Helms. No circumstances.
Mr. Christopher. I am opposed to offering bribes or dealing
with terrorists by making payments to them. That has been the
longstanding policy of the State Department, and it was carried
out
Senator Helms. Well, the point I am making is, you have
changed your mind since those days, because you definitely — you
said yourself that you offered — made an offer to the Iranians.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I did not say I made an offer to the
Iranians. I said that President Carter agreed to unfreeze the frozen
assets when the hostages came home.
Senator Helms. Well, there may be a difference without a dis-
tinction.
Mr. Christopher. There is a difference to me, Senator.
Senator Helms. So you are on record as saying that we should
or should not negotiate with terrorists.
Mr. Christopher. I am on record as saying that we should not
pay ransom of any kind to terrorists. It may be necessary to talk
to them to work out the modalities of getting our people back. I
49
would not rule out talking with them, but I would rule out paying
any kind of ransom or treasure to them.
Senator Helms. Have you ever had somebody on your staff hand
you something in an embarrassing moment?
Mr. Christopher. Well, it sometimes helps, does it not, Senator.
Senator Helms. It sure does. Forgive me. I have got to ask her
what she showed me. [Pause.]
The point she is making is that Brzezinski said that such an
offer would be a quid pro quo, and that is not exactly the most im-
portant aspect of this thing, but you are not Mr. Brzezinski and
you did not say it, but anyway, it is there.
Senator Biden. Could the Senator suggest what page in that re-
port he is looking at?
Senator Helms. Page 43.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Helms. Now, I am certain you remember the Wisconsin
primaries in 1980. Do you have any recollection of that?
Mr. Christopher. No. I am not from Wisconsin, but I do recall
that they took place sometime during the fall of 1980, yes, Senator.
Senator Helms. It was at a time when Mr. Carter was pretty
worried about losing those polls so soon after losing the New York
and Connecticut primaries to a fellow named Ted Kennedy, but in
the early hours on the morning of that primary President Carter
made a surprise announcement that the Iranian militants would
likely release the hostages to the Iranian Government, and you
wrote a statement to that effect for President Carter, did you not?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I think I was the draftsman of the state-
ment that was released that morning, Senator.
Senator Helms. You wrote that hopeful statement — and I am not
being particularly critical of you. I just want to get the record
straight. You wrote that hopeful statement with Ted Kennedy look-
ing, you know, down the barrel at you.
Mr. Christopher. I do not think Ted Kennedy was there, Sen-
ator.
Senator Helms. Well, he was looking across the country at you.
There was a political primary, and that statement was written de-
spite the fact that the Ayatollah Khomeini, whom all of you knew
to be the real decisionmaker in Iran, had totally rejected the trans-
fer of the hostages. Now, that is a matter of record.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I remember that event fairly well,
and if you would just give me a minute I would like to tell you —
to put it in a little bit more context.
Senator Helms. I can give you the original memorandum, if you
want it, but you go right ahead.
Mr. Christopher. Let me try to explain.
Senator Helms. Yes, sir.
Mr. Christopher. First, let me challenge your premise with re-
spect to the Ayatollah. Many people spoke for the Ayatollah in that
period. Sometimes his relatives did, sometimes his Cabinet did, and
quite often, what the Ayatollah said one day would prove to be in-
accurate the next day.
Now, what triggered my statement on that morning was the fact
that we had been working for days and days with the civilian lead-
ership in Iran to try to get the transfer of the hostages into their
50
control, take them away from the students and put them in Gov-
ernment control, which was a big step, because we thought — no
doubt wrongly, or at least it did not turn out to be right for some
time — we thought that if they got into government control we
would have a better chance of getting them back.
What happened on that morning was there was a statement by
those in civilian control in Iran that they would return the hos-
tages to government control within the next few days. That was a
very encouraging event for us at that time, Senator.
Now, it is hard to put yourself back in that picture in 1980, when
we were doing everything we could to try to get the release of those
hostages. Frankly, I have never been deeply into politics, as I think
you know, and that statement was written by me that morning be-
cause I thought there was an important change in Iranian govern-
mental policy, and I wanted — at least I was the President's rep-
resentative that morning — to confirm that and accept that proposal
by saying, good, we see you have made an important statement and
we want to endorse it, embrace it. That is the reason that state-
ment was written that morning.
Senator Helms. Well, my time is up. It was an important state-
ment, perhaps, but it was not an accurate statement. We can con-
tinue this in the next round.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Biden.
Senator BiDEN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I had not planned on plumb-
ing this issue. This report was released this morning, and I am
looking at it for the first time. I do want to ask you questions in
another area, but I suspect some of us will come back to this.
With regard to Brzezinski and his use of the phrase quid pro
quo, I would like to read the entire quote. This is from page 43 of
the Joint Report on the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allega-
tions, et cetera.
It says, indeed, Brzezinski described to the task force the Carter
administration's approach to the spare parts issues as:
Our position was, you have grabbed our people, we have grabbed your stuff in re-
taliation. You release our people, we will release your stuff.
Since some of that stuff was military equipment and they were now under duress
with the Iraq invasion, our thinking was they may be more susceptible to entertain-
ing the idea of a quid pro quo.
That is the context of the quid pro quo quote, and I might point
out that I always thought the term ransom included giving some-
body something that he did not already have, or was not entitled
to. I did not realize that it was put in the context of frozen assets
being released in response to releasing hostages, but I am sure we
are going to hear a lot about this for the remainder of this hearing,
or in the next day, and I will refrain from going any further.
Senator Sarbanes. Would you just yield for one quick question?
Senator Biden. Sure.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Secretary, am I correct, the Iranians had
bought and paid for this equipment?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, it had been bought. Yes, Senator, it
had been bought and paid for. Indeed, from time to time the United
States would sell the equipment because it was becoming obsolete,
and then they would put the money in an escrow fund which would
51
then become part of the frozen funds, so it had all been bought and
paid for.
Senator Sarbanes. So they had bought and paid for it. It simply
had not been shipped, and President Carter froze it and prevented
any shipment of it, is that right?
Mr. Christopher. Exactly.
Senator Biden, I want to say to you that I have not seen the re-
port either. Senator Helms seemed to be concerned that it was not
released before the election. This is not the ideal day from my
standpoint to have it released, but no doubt I will see it at some
point. But I have not seen it, either.
Senator BlDEN. Let me now move on, if I may. First of all, thank
you for a very good and thorough statement on this administra-
tion's attitude toward shaping the new world order, and I com-
pliment you on your statement and thank you for making it here
this morning.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a gentleman with whom you dealt
in this transition period, Secretary Eagleburger, and I just want to
publicly pay tribute to him. I think Secretary Eagleburger is one
of the most competent men with whom I have ever dealt in my 20
years in the U.S. Senate.
I think he was a fine Secretary of State, and I hope, and believe,
that you will continue to take advantage of his expertise and his
ideas. He need not have me say that, but I want to because I think
so highly of him.
Mr. Christopher. I join you in those comments, Senator.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned Bosnia, and I was
very encouraged by the intensity and strength of your statement
and the characterization of the Serbian action in Bosnia, with your
reference to the possible use of military force as well as diplomacy.
I am deeply concerned about what the West has allowed to occur,
Mr. Secretary. We can all engage in hindsight as to how we and
the Europeans might have done things differently with regard to
recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. Perhaps a wiser western
diplomacy may have averted or impacted in some way the outbreak
of the fighting, perhaps not. Historians will debate that for some
time to come, but I think what is beyond debate is the lack of
strength of the western response once this tragedy began to unfold
in full horror.
With regard to the current talks in Geneva, I will be the first to
applaud if these negotiations succeed, but I am not at all optimis-
tic, Mr. Secretary, and I believe we cannot continue to place our
faith in negotiations alone. I must say I find it a bit bizarre that
we are continuing to negotiate with persons who have already been
labeled war criminals and who should be subject to prosecution
under international law. Now, I would like to discuss these negotia-
tions.
I have two questions. First, are you concerned that the Geneva
peace plan and the new ethnic map it creates would in effect ratify
the atrocities of ethnic cleansing committed by the Bosnian Serbs?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I do have a personal concern along
those lines, but we are not direct parties to those negotiations. The
parties to those negotiations are the elements of Bosnia, and I
think some deference has to be given to their point of view. They
52
are the ones that are continuing the negotiations, not the United
States.
I hope the negotiations will succeed, and if they do succeed, if
they can bring peace to Bosnia, it certainly will be a major step for-
ward, but I do not think we can make those negotiations our sole
reliance, Senator. I think we have to have an independent position
with respect to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia countries, be-
cause the stakes are too large for us to rely solely on the negotia-
tions taking place at Geneva, much as I hope they will succeed.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I suspect Senator Lugar and my-
self and a few others feel the need to make clear that part of this
equation has to be a credible threat of the use of military force in
order to bring about any successful negotiations.
You are a celebrated negotiator, Mr. Secretary, and we all know
that negotiations require carrots and sticks. Is it appropriate for
me to read into your statement today where you mention the mili-
tary that we should be considering the coordinated use of military
force if the negotiations fail?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, this is what you can read into my
statement. Governor Clinton, since about last August in the cam-
paign, has been urging that the United States take a stronger posi-
tion with respect to the conduct that is going on in Bosnia. The
conduct of the Serbians is outrageous, and every day, or almost
every day, it seems to have a new form of outrage that is on the
international scene.
In the context of Governor Clinton's desire that we take a strong
position, as you know, he supports enforcement of the no-fly zone.
There is a decision now to have a no-fly zone, but there is no en-
forcement of it, and Governor Clinton has been arguing for the en-
forcement of the no-fly zone.
When Governor Clinton becomes President Clinton on January
20, I can assure you that this problem will receive priority atten-
tion on his part. It is clearly a problem that calls out for multilat-
eral attention.
As your comment indicated, the European countries are closer to
the situation, have a very personal stake in it, but what I can as-
sure you is, at least to the point of enforcing the no-fly zone, that
Governor Clinton is committed to that, and I can also tell you that
it is a problem that will receive priority attention from our admin-
istration when we take office, in considerable part prompted by the
growing tragedy that we see almost every day in the news of
slaughter, rapes, ethnic cleansing, of a kind that is just sickening.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your answer. I would
like to pursue it just a little more, although I realize you are not
in a position to lay out the entire administration's policy and all
the diplomatic and other initiatives at your disposal to deal with
the situation in Bosnia.
I do not believe it is going to be adequate to draw a line in
Kosovo, to allow the rape of Bosnia to continue. It is all too similar
to Hitler's annexation of Czech lands, in my view, hoping that rhet-
oric and sweet talk would stop him later in Poland.
In Bosnia, I think we have to act in several ways and without
delay.
53
First, it seems to me we have to issue an ultimatum to the U.N.
to act to sequester or destroy all weapons throughout Bosnia, and
by this I mean primarily tanks and artillery.
Second, I believe the U.N. should identify all air power necessary
not only to enforce the no-fly zone but to eliminate heavy weapons
in Bosnia and military installations that are supporting the Serb
militias.
Third, it seems to me we should act immediately to lift the arms
embargo which would release the $50 million in military equip-
ment mat the Congress authorized last October. If that occurs, and
if guerrilla warfare is necessary, the Bosnians themselves appear
ready and willing to carry that burden rather than unmilitary per-
sonnel.
Finally — U.S. personnel. It seems to me we have to do what is
necessary with multilateral forces and American participation in
multilateral ground forces if need be to break the siege in key
Bosnian cities.
Mr. Secretary, I also would point out that today in the Washing-
ton Post — I think this is incredible, assuming it is even remotely
true. On the first page, it says, a cry for help from Bosnia, a cry
for help from a frozen hell, besieged Bosnian town loses radio link
to express its agony.
This article goes on to point out that there are twice daily com-
munications coming from Zepa — a town of some 28,000 people,
where there is vivid description of the conditions, including the pos-
sibility of cannibalism, because there is no food, there is no water,
there is no housing, there is no clothing, there is no medicine.
For the life of me, I cannot understand why President Bush at
this moment — and I must ask you if the moment after you become
Secretary of State and the new President is sworn in, would we not
provide an airlift of food and clothing and medical supplies imme-
diately to drop into that town?
I truly do not understand this at all. We are not asking to put
in 500,000 ground troops or anything comparable to that. There is
a threat of cannibalism, it is just incredible, and we are here just
talking about it.
Now, this is not yet your responsibility, so my question is, first,
if no action is taken between now and then to give relief to the
town, assuming something is left, would you consider recommend-
ing to the President that we as part of a multilateral force or other-
wise provide an airlift to try to get food in to these people?
Second, would you please comment on some of the specific rec-
ommendations that I have raised. I am not asking you to endorse
them, but what you think of the general approach of us doing
more?
I apologize for the rambling question, but I think it is just out-
rageous, what is happening.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I read that story this morning, too,
and I was just horrified by it, and perhaps for the same reason as
you, because relief in that situation is within existing policy.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Mr. Christopher. We have a multilateral commitment to pro-
vide that kind of humanitarian relief, so I was startled by the
story, and I cannot imagine that that story will not produce some
54
action within existing policy, but if it does not, I can assure you
that we will certainly take a look at it and see what is logistically
possible.
On the broader question, Senator Biden, let me say this. Both
when I met with you and when I met with Senator Lugar, I was
greatly impressed by the depth of your knowledge and your inter-
est in this subject. I think the most that I can do today is to assure
you that we will want to consult with you and other members of
the committee as we begin to develop the policy of the Clinton ad-
ministration in this area.
We are not at the point now of being able to express our views
on specific steps that might be taken, except I do, once again, em-
phasize the context that Governor Clinton has been emphasizing
ever since last August, that the United States ought to be taking
a stronger position with respect to Bosnia and with respect to the
humanitarian problems that are created there by the Serbian activ-
ity.
Perhaps I could add that there are very few angels in that en-
deavor.
Senator Biden. That is clear.
Mr. Christopher. No one party is blameless, but the Serbian ac-
tivity seems to be the most outrageous and calls for some early at-
tention. We will be giving it priority attention, but I am not able
to comment on any specific — any one of the specific steps that you
or Senator Lugar has proposed.
Senator Biden. I thank you. I understand the answer. I take
some comfort in knowing from my very brief discussion with then-
Governor, now President-elect Clinton, of his concern about the de-
gree of our effort employed by both the United States and the Eu-
ropeans.
My last question, Mr. Secretary, is this. I can see from your
statement that you and I agree, as do many others, on the priority
we must place in stopping proliferation, and I have two points.
First, I urge you to obtain as soon as possible a full briefing on re-
cent Chinese proliferation activities, if you have not done so al-
ready.
Second, I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts on
how we should reorganize, if we should reorganize, our Govern-
ment, to contain the weapons proliferation problem that we now
face.
You may know that I, along with others have put forward some
legislation, in an attempt to suggest the possibility of structurally
reorganizing, from the administration side, a mechanism to deal
with proliferation in the same way that we have so intently set up
mechanisms that deal with the issue of parity — nuclear parity with
the former Soviet empire. Do you have any comments on the need
for that?
Mr. Christopher. As I said in my statement, Senator Biden, I
have various plans for streamlining and reorganizing the State De-
partment to bring it more in tune with the problems we are facing
today. It is still organized — and I am not criticizing anybody for
this — more or less in the same mode it was when I was there in
the late 1970's.
55
One of the things that I intend to do is to reorganize the office
of the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs to add
proliferation as a major component in that office. I have talked to
the prospective appointee there about the high priority that I wish
to give — that the President wishes to give to nonproliferation.
In addition to that, in the Politico-Military Bureau, I have em-
phasized the need to have that divided into basically two sections.
One would be a nonproliferation area, and the other the military
security area, which has been that, too, in the past.
Also, Senator Biden, I had a meeting recently with Congressman
Aspin, Secretary of Defense-designate Aspin, and National Security
Advisor Anthony Lake, and one of the primary topics we had was
the selection of our top nonproliferation personnel so that they
would be people who work well together. I think the coordination
between the Defense Department and the White House and the
State Department in this arena is very important, and I think we
are working very well and effectively together to that end.
Senator Biden. That is very encouraging, and I thank you. I did
not mean to imply, Mr. Chairman, by my question, any criticism
of the present administration. So much has happened so quickly
that it would be very difficult for them to have simultaneously re-
organized.
I will end on this. I am happy to see your approach, Mr. Sec-
retary. I am fully confident that you understand how much has
changed in the world and are capable of understanding the appara-
tus, as well, to deal with those changed conditions. I am excited
about your nomination.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I would add that there are some very experts who are not par-
ticularly partisan who are doing the work now that you may want
to keep on.
I will now recognize Senator Lugar and then Senator Sarbanes,
and then we will recess for lunch. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chris-
topher, in March, Gen. William Burns, representing the Depart-
ment of State, Defense, and Energy, accompanied Senator Nunn,
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senators Warner,
Bingaman, and me to the Ukraine and Russia.
As a part of the conversations during that trip, an idea was for-
mulated which has been pursued, and is still being pursued by
General Burns as our chief negotiator, to purchase on behalf of the
Department of Energy all of the highly enriched uranium that
comes from the destruction of the tactical nuclear weapons now col-
lected from all of the republics and reposing in Russia, where they
are being destroyed systematically.
The agreement will be to buy all of the highly enriched uranium
that comes from that destruction as well as from the strategic
weapons as they are destroyed and warheads are dismantled in
Russia.
It is estimated 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and the sum
of $5 billion to $6 billion might be involved over 20 years of time,
and that it might involve revenue-sharing with the Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, of the portions of the highly enriched
56
uranium that came from the weapons on their soil that have been
reposed in Russia.
I know you are aware of these negotiations, so my question is
simply this: Would it be the intent of you and the administration
to continue to pursue avidly these negotiations if they should not
be consummated before January 20? Specifically, would you do so
on the basis that they are tremendously important in terms of the
safety of Russia, of the United States, and the rest of the world
that we have this highly enriched uranium in our possession, and
that it be denatured in the United States and used for peaceful
purposes in a commercial agreement with which the commercial
energy resources of this country are supportive?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I hope that agreement is concluded
even before we get into office, but if it is not, we will certainly join
you in pursuing it.
Senator Lugar. I would appreciate that, and as we have opportu-
nities, if it is not consummated before January 20, I would appre-
ciate the opportunity from time to time to query as to how things
are going.
I feel, as do many Senators, that this is tremendously important
to pursue and to finalize, given all of the interrelationships that
are involved.
Mr. Christopher. That whole set of problems are among the
most important and dangerous in the world, as I said in my state-
ment, so I certainly endorse your efforts.
Senator Lugar. In another piece of unfinished business, Senator
Bradley and I introduced in the 101st Congress, and we have tried
to champion on various other occasions, resolutions in behalf of the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the General As-
sembly adopted November 20, 1989.
For a variety of reasons, this administration did not send that
treaty to the Senate for consideration by the Foreign Relations
Committee. It would be my hope that you and the incoming admin-
istration would do so. Do you have any views on that deliberation?
Mr. Christopher. Senator Lugar, I will not be able to name
them, but I think there are probably several treaties of that char-
acter that have not yet been sent up for confirmation or approval.
As I looked over that list the other day, it seemed to me that the
Treaty on the Rights of the Child, if I have named it correctly,
would take a very high priority and without absolutely committing
myself, I think it needs to be one of the very next ones to come.
As you know, there is a history of delay in the approval of such
treaties after they have been negotiated. It is a matter of timing
here in the Senate, whether your plate is empty enough to enable
you to handle the matters, but that is one that did reach out to me,
and I felt that we ought to do that as soon as we possibly could.
Senator Lugar. I believe the treaty has a strong bipartisan sup-
port. I will certainly continue to be an advocate of it, and I appre-
ciate your response.
Mr. Christopher, I had not intended to get into October Surprise,
but let me just say for the sake of the record that the desire of this
committee to pursue that particular inquest following publication
of the book by Mr. Gary Sick and publicity attending that book es-
57
sentially was, I think, an unfortunate turn of events in the commit-
tee.
There are few occasions in which I have expressed such anger in
an open session, but that was one of them, in which I believe that
the committee was impugning the integrity of Presidents Reagan
and Bush, and indirectly accusing them of treason if the finding
was that somehow or other either or both had been involved in
keeping our hostages in Iran while they followed crass partisan
purposes. It seemed to be an outrageous situation.
Now, having said that, the committee voted 9 to 8 to pursue it,
with all Democrats supporting the resolution except for Senator
Dodd, who voted no, ana all Republicans opposing except for Sen-
ator Jeffords, who voted yes. On that basis, by a one-vote margin,
the money for the investigation by the committee was sought.
Now, the Senate as a whole denied the money through a fili-
buster in the latter part of that Congress, and therefore no money
was appropriated. You can imagine my surprise on coming back
the next year to find out that the committee was still pursuing it,
largely through a reallocation of money on the Democratic side.
I came into the situation reluctantly because Senator Helms was
ill and had to have surgery and asked me to try to take charge on
our side, and I appreciate the chairman accommodating my hopes
that he and I might take a role to try to bring this thing to a suc-
cessful conclusion.
We did so. I attended all of the hearings, including the one in
which you testified, and I appreciated your testimony. I share the
agony that you and others had in trying to get our hostages out of
Iran. I would hope in a bipartisan way that feeling has been shared
by all, with some compassion for President Reagan as he tried to
think through that difficult proposition.
Whether the arms were new or old, or whether they had been
bought and paid for by the Shah, not the Ayatollah Khomeini,
seems to me to be immaterial to the fact that tne American people
wanted the hostages freed and in a bipartisan way many of them
tried to do that. Without exonerating anybody, let me just say that,
having heard all of the testimony, it was apparent to me that there
was no more in the story in 1991 or 1992 than there had been in
1980 or 1981.
I regret that Mr. Sick found it necessary to publish the book and
in a highly publicized way give some further credence to his rep-
utation and to these rumors. But, nevertheless, that occurred. The
Senate report was, in fact, filed in November. It was criticized for
being truncated by lack of travel by the staff or lack of time when,
in fact, no further travel all around the world, back and forth, or
months would have made any difference in the conclusions.
The House, having spent however much money, $1V2 million, or
$4 million, as the press alleges today, and went thoroughly back
and forth through the same issue, came to the same conclusions.
Let me just comment that I have no question of you with regard
to this particular situation. You have given your testimony. It is an
indication, however, of how bipartisanship in foreign policy can
rapidly be disrupted when persons, for best reasons of their own,
decide to pursue avidly a very partisan, and I think, nasty set of
rumors throughout a political campaign when there was almost no
58
foundation for them, while operating under the idea that almost
any rumor that comes up deserves the final disposition of this com-
mittee.
I hope that you and your administration will not generate fur-
ther nonsense of this variety, and clearly I hope that by putting
this issue to bed during this administration, we are done with it.
But in any event, I would hope likewise that as you consider ap-
pointees to the State Department or to the administration, people
such as Mr. Sick or others who have been involved in what I think
are irresponsible activities will not come under high consideration
for such posts.
And you will have to make your own judgment as to their com-
petence otherwise, but it seems to me that finally people have to
be responsible for things they write, for books they write, for arti-
cles they write, for letters to the editor that they write. There has
to be some responsibility, and it seems to me that needs to be un-
derlined as we come, hopefully, to the end of this unfortunate chap-
ter.
Let me shift to a better subject, Mr. Secretary, just to say I agree
entirely with your statement on page 6, that from Vietnam to Iran-
Contra we have often witnessed the disastrous effects of foreign
policy hatched by experts without proper candor or consultation
with the public and the Congress.
Now, specifically, we are in a military situation in Somalia now.
Questions have been raised by some Members, although we have
been out of session and we have not had consultation on this issue,
as to whether the administration should have asked for authoriza-
tion from the Congress to put Americans in harm's way in Somalia.
If our goals are changing in Somalia, and if it is probable they will
have to change some more from securing the ports and humani-
tarian service to starving people to what amounts to a probably
necessary but, far-ranging goal involving a struggle with elements
in Somalia and to bring back a failed country to some vitality.
At what point would you favor coming to the Congress, setting
forth what you believe are the U.S. vital interests in Somalia, and
the potential extent of U.S. involvement over the course of weeks
or months, or however it is likely to take, and asking for a degree
of authorization so that you know you have on the board the votes
of Members of Congress, and that there is no invocation of the War
Powers Act at some arbitrary point? Or, on the other side, to be
alert to the tendency of Congress to support the administration
while things are going well and not when things are going poorly.
What is your view on any of this?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I wonder if I could ask you whether
the current administration has provided notifications to you under
the War Powers Act? I am sorry to ask a question in response to
a question to me, but I had understood that there had been con-
sultation with the Congress with respect to the activities in Soma-
lia, but that is just from reading the press on that subject. Am I
wrong about that?
Senator Lugar. That is my understanding.
The Chairman. We have not had consultation.
Senator Lugar. Well, the leadership, I gather, of the Congress
had some consultation.
59
The Chairman. At a higher level than we are.
Senator Lugar. But not ourselves. We have not been involved as
a committee. But in any event, Mr. Christopher, as you know even
if the strict terms of the War Powers Act were followed through
and a notification has come at a certain number of days the admin-
istration has to come back and ask for a declaration of war, or an
authorization at least to continue what it was doing. And the clock
is ticking, and the predictions are now, widely, that everything may
not be resolved in Somalia in a reasonable measure of time.
Mr. Christopher. Let me say several things about that, Senator.
I would hope that whenever we undertook that kind of an action
we would consult very broadly. It may be unfortunate timing with
it being over a holiday period that there has not been adequate
consultation. But one of my primary missions will be to ensure con-
sultation with appropriate people in Congress.
I find that I learn something every time I meet with a Member
of Congress. And I think we ought to meet with them regularly and
learn from them because of their deep experience.
I would also say that our administration will, on a voluntary
basis, provide the notifications that are required under the War
Powers Act, and not put ourselves out of compliance with the law.
With respect to the point at which we come to the Congress and
ask for specific authority, I really would like to ask for an oppor-
tunity to study that question further before responding.
Senator Lugar. Well, please do because I think the question will
reoccur, and probably very soon. And the question will be whether,
having inherited the Somalian situation, what you will you do on
Somalia which most of us believe should have occurred. I would
support that; support the administration, and having the latitude
to do the right thing with regard to the safety of Americans, and
likewise the fulfillment of policy. But I can see things becoming
stretched.
This afternoon, when we have more questioning, I will ask a
similar line of questioning on Bosnia in Yugoslavia, where we real-
ly start in a different way. In essence, there the issue is the defini-
tion of our security goals and the reason why the American people
would support substantial military intervention. Probably it has
not been made by this administration. It will certainly be made by
yours. And so I want to explore at that time, really, how we might
progress in that situation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Inciden-
tally, there is a press flash from Reuters that the United States
and its allies are now attacking Iraq.
I will turn at this point to Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First
of all, this is tangential to Secretary Christopher.
While this is tangential to Secretary Christopher, I just want for
a moment to address this Iran-Contra issue, and the October Sur-
prise, which have come up in this hearing. I want to be very clear
that it is tangential to the nominee. But since it has been raised,
I would like to address the issue for just a moment.
There were a number of allegations that had been made, which
if true, would be very serious. They were gaining considerable cov-
60
erage in the press, and speculation not only in this country but
abroad. I think the question was whether to simply allow that situ-
ation to fester or try to address it in some thorough and responsible
way.
Chairman Hamilton, who headed up the House study, which just
concluded this morning, stated early on that to have left these alle-
gations to fester would have been inexcusable if they were true,
and terribly unfair if they were false. And, of course, he set out to
undertake a thorough study in the House, along with Congressman
Hyde who headed up the Republican side.
Apparently their study, which was much more complete than
ours, was able to obtain previously classified and unavailable infor-
mation, including CIA and NSA intelligence information. They
were able to take the statements of many witnesses who had never
been interviewed under oath, many of whom had not been inter-
viewed at all. It seems to me that, having done this and having
reached a conclusion, it really clears the air and puts that issues
effectively behind us. And that ought to be welcomed by everyone.
The alternative would have been to simply let this matter hang
out there, with the kind of coverage it was receiving which was not
insubstantial, therefore spreading hypothesizing and speculation
through the body politic, not only in this country, but overseas as
well. And it seems to me the kind of study that was done served
an important public purpose. I simply want to register that for the
record.
Secretary Christopher, I want to thank you for your statement.
I thought it was perceptive and wide ranging. I thought it was
geared to guiding principles, which is important, and principles
which reflect the nature of the changing international scene in
which we find ourselves. At the same time, it reflected an under-
standing of the realities that we confront abroad as we concern our-
selves with protecting our interests.
Listening to the statement and observing your responses to ques-
tions thus far, I have to say that one of your strongest features,
which gives me a sense of confidence with your expected steward-
ship of the Department of State, is I think you will make wise
judgments. You have the capacity to understand the complexities
of situations, to think ahead as to where they might go, where they
might lead, what the consequences will be, and reach a strong and
prudent judgment as to what we ought to do.
Often you get people who say, "well, you know, make a quick de-
cision, whatever it may be, even if it is wrong, just to make a quick
decision." I have never understood that kind of thinking, particu-
larly in the arena in which you are at work, because if you make
the wrong decision it can have very serious consequences, including
the needless death of American men and women.
I have a lot of confidence that you will make the right decisions,
and that they will be made with the degree of prudence and careful
thought that such weighty decisions require.
I have just a few questions I want to ask you before the lunch
break. I want to pick up on your statement. First of all, you stated:
"It is not enough to articulate a new strategy, we must also justify
it to the American people." Today, foreign policymakers cannot af-
61
ford to ignore the public, for there is a real danger that the public
will ignore foreign policy.
I think that is a very perceptive statement. And the question it
leads me to ask you is, how much of a commitment do you think
you might be able to make in traveling in this countiy — not abroad,
in this country — to explain and articulate our policy?
Let me just make this point to you. According to the 1990 census
profile, a third of the American people live in the 14 largest metro-
politan statistical areas — a third. In other words, a speech a little
better than once every 4 weeks in each of them would reach a third
of our people. You would be present, on the scene, presenting an
articulation of our foreign policy. And that encompasses 20 States,
one way or another. A half of our people live in the 39 largest met-
ropolitan areas. A half of the American people.
That encompasses 30 States, or parts of 30 States, because these
statistical areas go across States. Many of these jurisdictions have
their own local councils of foreign affairs or foreign relations which
hold sessions. There are other sponsorship groups and universities
that are available. I have a personal interest in this. We have one
in Baltimore where we would like to have you appear as Secretary
of State to articulate foreign policy.
In laying out this thinking and in talking about sitting behind
a desk that is labeled "the America desk," have you thought about
the need or the desirability of the Secretary of State to move out
into our countryside more frequently than has been the case in
order to make major presentations about U.S. foreign policy?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, Senator, I have. Public diplomacy, I
think, would be a high priority with me. I think it involves me, as
well as other high officials in the State Department. I do not aspire
to exceed Senator Baker's record of foreign travel. I admire so
much what he achieved in the Middle East, but it seems to me that
it would be quite desirable for me to stay here in the United States
and to, so far as I can, try to explain American foreign policy to
the people of the United States to engender support for that.
Now, I will work for the President if you confirm me, and I will
go where he wants me to go, and that inevitably will involve a cer-
tain amount of foreign travel. But my own commitment to myself
is when the President enunciates a new policy or when we are ex-
ploring a new policy, to get around the country and to find out
what the people are thinking, as well as to try to explain to them
what I am thinking.
So I very much hope to achieve that, Senator, and perhaps a year
from now you and I can assess whether I have been able to live
up to that role.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I certainly encourage you to do so. My
recollection, as you went back to the Marshall-Acheson eras, is that
the Secretaries of State used to get out. The demands for them to
go abroad now have intensified. The introduction of the concept of
shuttle diplomacy to be conducted personally by the Secretary of
State in some region of the world has greatly increased. It used not
to be expected or anticipated that a Secretary of State would be
doing that sort of thing. It is tremendously time-consuming. Of
course, what it means is the Secretary focuses on only one issue
62-822 0-93-3
62
as the head of a department that has a whole range of issues to
cover.
But it seems to me that frequent and well-planned visits across
America to make major foreign policy addresses certainly will get
the exposure of the thinking, and at the same time, begin to in-
volve tne American people in a much more direct and intimate way
with foreign policy — I encourage you to do that.
Mr. Christopher. I share that feeling very much, Senator, and
my own concern is that there is a real danger in an over-preoccupa-
tion by the Secretary with a single issue. This is a big world with
problems all over and if the Secretary is concentrating 80 or 90
percent of his time on a single issue, there is a real danger that
other issues will go unattended or that other opportunities around
the world will be missed.
Now, it is a very delicate balance because some problems demand
the attention of the Secretary of State, but I would hope there
would be understanding that one of the principal jobs of the Sec-
retary of State is to look all over the globe nearly every day and
try to determine what the main risks for the United States are and
not to be so preoccupied with a single problem that the country is
deprived of the benefit of his judgment as to new problems that
may be springing up.
I would like very much to be known as someone who is involved
in preventive diplomacy. Crisis management is, of course, impor-
tant and I am sure there will have to be a lot of crisis manage-
ment. But I would like very much to be a crisis preventer, if I pos-
sibly could be.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, we certainly welcome that, and I want
to note that in your statement you specifically made reference to
the problems on the African Continent which are often neglected
because we do not have the same kind of direct economic interests
in Africa that we have in Europe and in Asia, and even in Latin
America. I think that does reflect a breadth scope that I think is
highly desirable.
I want to make just one comment. I welcome your statement on
page 11 that the U.N. cannot be an effective instrument for sharing
our global burdens unless we share the burden of supporting it. I
will work to ensure that we pay our outstanding obligations.
It is a matter of very deep concern to me that the United States
is the major delinquent at the U.N. in meeting its dues obligations.
We are on a timetable to try to close them out and we constantly
are subjected to criticism at the U.N. by other nations who are cur-
rent in paying their dues. I am not talking about assuming addi-
tional obligations. I am talking about meeting the obligations that
we already undertook and failing to do so.
In other words, we are not meeting our requirements, and I
think it undercuts our ability to exercise influence within the orga-
nization, particularly at a time when the U.N. has become a very
effective instrument for achieving important objectives to which the
United States subscribes. So I very much encourage you to try to
deliver on that statement, if possible, and early on in the course
of this administration.
In the total picture, the money is not large but I think it would
have a dramatic impact on the perception of the United States in
63
the international scene and would enable us to come to the table,
enabled there to articulate a much more strong and vigorous pos-
ture, preventing criticism that we have not even met our obliga-
tions.
Mr. Christopher. I agree with that completely, Senator. I know
it is a very large portion of the State Department's budget, and this
gives me an opportunity to say that it seems to me that peacekeep-
ing, peacemaking under the U.N., has reached the point where it
ought to be drawn, at least in part, from the defense budget or
from defense savings.
The U.N. has become such an important instrument of American
foreign policy, or at least such an important aspect of American for-
eign policy, that it seems to me that the Department of Defense
budget ought to be at least partly responsible for helping us make
up that arrearage and for producing the necessary funds as we
place more and more burdens on the U.N. You look through my
statement and you will see a number of places where I, just echo-
ing the words of this committee and many others, am asking the
U.N. to do more and more things, and in that context, it seems to
me that we ought to be paid up, as you said so eloquently, and
within our own governmental structure I would argue for some
sharing of the burden by the Department of Defense.
Senator Sarbanes. Finally, the time for this round is drawing to
a close so I want to address just briefly the question of ambassa-
dorial nominations. This is an issue which, as my colleagues on the
committee know, I have taken some interest in over the last 2
years. And I have been very concerned by the — well, let me express
it in a couple of ways.
First of all, I think that a fairly high percentage of our Ambas-
sadors should be drawn from the career service. We, after all, have
a career service. These are people who spend a lifetime developing
the skills and competence to handle those responsibilities. Many of
the other leading countries draw all of their Ambassadors out of
the career service, and are, in effect, staggered, if not shocked, at
the American process.
I do not go that far. I think there are reasonable bases on which
from time to time to nominate and confirm Ambassadors who are
not out of the career service and are drawn more broadly from our
society. I do not think that number should be large and, in fact,
in the early part of the previous administration, it had very heavily
tilted the nominations made to noncareer people, in sharp contrast
with anything that had occurred prior, including both Democratic
and Republican administrations. Later, in fairness to them, that
imbalance was corrected.
That is the first point. The second point is that people drawn to
be Ambassadors who are not in the career service, it seems to me,
must bring to the table a record in terms of their competence, their
experience, their abilities which leads one to see a justification for
being named as an Ambassador. I do not want to work through, as
I have done in past years, a resume and wonder all the way
through why this person is being nominated to be Ambassador to
country x and find the answer in appendix B where they are re-
quired to list their campaign contributions.
64
Now, I do not preclude campaign contributions. In fact, I have
told some witnesses at the table on their ambassadorial nomina-
tions that we welcome that kind of citizen involvement, but before
you ever get to appendix B there ought to be a justification in that
resume for this person receiving this ambassadorial nomination. I
think it is an important point.
Many people dismiss Ambassadors and say they are irrelevant in
the world of fast communications. I disagree very strongly with
that. Too often, the perspective is if someone who is sent does not
have these abilities and they make it through their tenure without
a major crisis happening, everyone says "you see, no harm done"
because they are bailed out by the foreign service people all around
them, the DCM and everybody else.
No one ever measures the opportunity costs that were lost in
terms of the good that an able and skillful Ambassador, career or
noncareer, could have achieved for the United States. And I strong-
ly believe that a highly competent and skillful Ambassador in a
country can make a difference, a positive difference, for American
interests. I very strongly put this case to you to ensure that the
Ambassadors that are going to be sent to this committee are people
of very high competence. We are only talking about a limited num-
ber of positions, a significant number of them drawn from the ca-
reer service. The balance who come from the outside should bring
with them a basis that would warrant such an appointment.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I associate myself with all or vir-
tually everything that you have said, and I assure you that Gov-
ernor Clinton, in the conversations we have had about that, wants
to maintain very high standards for the appointment of Ambas-
sadors abroad. I do think that noncareer Ambassadors do bring a
leavening to the process. We have had some outstanding noncareer
Ambassadors, as you yourself indicated, but they have to bring
something to the post, some piece of background, some language
skill, or something else that gives assurance that they will make
a real contribution, as well as having the right temperament and
the right attitude about being an Ambassador.
An Ambassador is a very important person for the United States
in the country where they have gone. They carry our flag, they rep-
resent us, the other country judges us by them, as well as being
able to interpret for the President the attitudes and moods in that
country.
I am not one that buys the idea that because somebody can para-
chute in for a negotiation we do not need an Ambassador. One ex-
ample of that is the importance of our having Ambassadors in the
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union now. We have
had to look hard to find people with even language skills to get
through those tasks. Nevertheless, it is important for the United
States to be represented there, and I will disagree with Senator
Helms in his presence when he is here, I think it is very important
for us to have Ambassadors, especially in such newly independent
countries as those of the former Soviet Union.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much. Just to clear the record,
I was out of the country at the time, we were notified about the
65
Somalia operation by the administration and the chairman of the
African subcommittee, Senator Simon, was notified.
I congratulate the witness on the precision and stamina he has
shown and suggest we recess now for a bite to eat. Be back here
at halfpast 2.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee recessed.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Simon,
Moynihan, Robb, Feingold, Mathews, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum,
Pressler, and Coverdell.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today at 3
p.m., our President is going to make a statement concerning mili-
tary action against Iraq. I would like personally to express my full
support for his decision to strike military targets there.
Iraq had deployed missiles in violation of the Gulf War cease-fire
and the two no-fly zones. The missiles were a threat to American
planes and had to be removed. The no-fly zones were established
to protect the Iraqi people, and in this regard the decision to hit
the missiles is an action taken in defense of the Iraqi people
against a brutal dictatorship. The necessity of this action under-
scores our failure to have supported the Iraqi people during the
March 1991 uprising, and should lead us to redouble our efforts to
assist the Iraqi people in the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein re-
gime.
I welcome the witness back and congratulate him on his testi-
mony so far in its succinctness and depth, and turn now to Senator
Kassebaum, whose turn it is.
Senator Kassebaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would
join with you in your comments regarding the need to be vigilant
and firm in our response to Saddam Hussein's efforts to continually
move the goalposts and more or less thumb his nose at the rest of
the world.
Mr. Christopher, I would like to start with Africa again for a mo-
ment. Since 1981 when I came on this committee, I have either
chaired the African subcommittee or been the ranking member
since 1986. And the dedicated work of the chairman, Senator
Simon, of that subcommittee has been, I think, very important and
we have worked well together. And through those years in the na-
tions of sub-Sahara Africa there have been many peaks and valleys
in both political and economic affairs, probably more valleys than
peaks.
But I think it is important not to give up, and I would like to
ask first about Sudan. I have been particularly concerned about the
situation there under, I think, the excellent leadership of our As-
sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Hank Cohen. He has
provided, I think, fine leadership on African matters.
And our Government has expressed concern about the situation
in Sudan where the government at Khartoum has really systemati-
cally wanted to try and, again, move out people that ethnically
66
were not agreeable with them from the south. And the people in
the south in many ways are very vulnerable, the population there,
between the SPLA rebels and the government.
And I do not know if you have had a chance to give any thought
to that, but is there further pressure that can be brought to bear
against the Sudanese Government to allow at least relief efforts to
get through?
Mr. Christopher. Senator Kassebaum, I have done just a little
reading on the Sudan since I have come back to government, and
I tend to feel it is one of those serious problems that has not gotten
as much international attention as it should. It is one of the trage-
dies of Africa that the tragedies of that continent compete for at-
tention with one another.
And although its governmental structure is not as totally chaotic
as Somalia, nevertheless, it is a government that is very coercive
and very harsh on its people, and there is a certain amount of eth-
nic intolerance, to put it very, very mildly. One of the things that
I am not sure of is the degree of our leverage in connection with
Sudan; I think our aid programs have become very modest there.
And all I would be able to say at this time is that it seems to
me that our African Bureau ought to continue to press the Sudan
for more tolerance and understanding of the different ethnic
groups. Of course, the history of that country, which I am sure you
know many times better than I, is one of very strong tribal conflicts
and inability of the north and the south to agree. But we will con-
tinue to try to pursue a policy of encouraging the government to
tolerate the other minorities within the country.
More broadly speaking, of course, that is so dramatically nec-
essary all around the world. Before I stop let me just salute you,
Senator, for your service on that subcommittee. I think you and
Senator Simon have rendered characteristically selfless service on
that committee.
Senator Kassebaum. Thank you. Well, true, our leverage is not
great there, but I wish that the Organization of African Unity, the
OAU, would, in itself, step forward at least to make a demand that
the relief agencies be able to get through with the delivery of their
relief.
Just to go back to Somalia a minute — and Senator Lugar, of
course, raised some questions regarding that earlier — it seems to
me that what could be most important, perhaps, about Somalia at
this point is the handoff from the United States to the U.N. in
their peacekeeping role. And I was struck with your comment
about the need for it to be more — the forces in the U.N. peacekeep-
ing be more robust and more muscular.
There was an editorial in the Hutchinson News in Hutchinson,
KS, a couple of days ago about wondering if U.N. soldiers were
mere potted plants. And I think that perhaps it stems from, one,
all of us around the world expecting too much of the U.N. as we
turn to it for a number of these troubled stops, and too soon. But
as our expectations have been dashed a bit, how do we restore that
muscle which I think needs to come if we can — if we hope to be
able to see success under the U.N. jurisdiction.
67
And I guess I would like to ask specifically, do you support the
establishment of a permanent standby force for peacekeeping oper-
ations and how aggressively should we be involved?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, my general feeling is to support that or
least support the exploration of how that can be done. And I think,
Senator Kassebaum, that a great deal has to do with the kind of
expectations that are created when you bring people into such a
force.
If you ask for volunteers from various countries and assure them
that they are not going to be in harm's way, then you will get peo-
ple who are very reluctant to carry out their duties aggressively.
On the other hand, if you describe it as a noble but somewhat dan-
gerous endeavor, then you are likely to get a different kind of per-
son who is not so surprised by the need to be in a battle of one
kind or another. And I have a strong conviction that the U.N. has
got to begin to recruit some people for that endeavor who are pre-
pared to take the risks, to undertake the agony of sometimes losing
some members from their force in what I think is a very noble
cause.
Senator Kassebaum. Well I do too, but I think that if it is to suc-
ceed we and our other allies are going to have to invest a great
deal of time and effort in helping, as you say, provide some of the
muscle there to get that done.
And then if I may move from Somalia to Bosnia simply because
some of the same issues are there, I tend to feel very comfortable
with the U.N. mandate which enabled us to go into Somalia, and
that was to secure an environment for the humanitarian relief. I
think it was very well defined. I think that obviously it is going to
take a long time to restore order in that country; there is nothing
there. But our initial mission was well defined and as we move be-
yond that, I still think we can define it so that it does not leave
us there in a quagmire.
But moving to Bosnia for a moment, if we are to become involved
militarily, and certainly I tend to feel that our options and the
world's options are about to run out, this is something that I think
NATO must be aggressively involved in and the European coun-
tries should stand up and be counted far more than they have.
But how would you define our objective there? Would it be hu-
manitarian? Would it be to stop the fighting or to evict the Serbs
from territory that they gained by force, or something else? Have
you given any thought to what objectives there should be there?
Mr. Christopher. I have certainly pondered the difficulty of
finding an objective. If one of the several tests for the use of mrce
is to have a clear objective, although perhaps albeit a limited objec-
tive, that is one of the most difficult parts of the analysis in connec-
tion with Bosnia, especially if your second test is whether or not
you can achieve the objective in reasonable terms.
And I think that is what will make our task, when we address
this more aggressively after January 20, a very difficult task. The
no-fly zone and enforcement of it is, once again, a nice, clearly de-
fined task. But once you get into dealing with the situation on the
ground or even especially, I guess, aerial bombings to try to remove
various batteries, the question is what is the ultimate objective you
are trying to seek.
68
And I do not want to appear by this conversation to indicate that
Governor Clinton has traveled down any of these roads, but, as I
think about it I think one of the hardest problems for us, and I am
not prepared to answer it today, is what would our objective be if
we go into Bosnia. You can look at the situation and see the horror
of it, but the next part of the analysis is very difficult.
Senator Kassebaum. Well as Senator Biden pointed out, of
course, in the dramatic story this morning, I just think there are
many people in this country who feel that we cannot turn our
backs on that kind of tragedy either, but how do we work with it
because it is a different situation than Somalia, even though the
tragedy is just as great or greater, depending on one's ties to the
peoples there.
But I have heard some who have expressed some concerns about
any peace agreement that may be worked out — and that is a possi-
bility although it seems like a fragile reed to me at this point. But
that it will not work unless there is also a war crimes tribunal set
up at the same time. It has been expressed that unless there is
some means to answer revenge, that that will just continue on
under any peace plan, and I wonder if there is a way, from just
the legality of it, that a tribunal can be agreed to in any peace
agreement and set up immediately?
Mr. Christopher. I think from the standpoint of international
law, you know, the creation of the war crimes tribunal after World
War II was simply an act of the victorious allies. But we do not
have a great deal of precedent about that.
It is clear that under the ICJ — the International Court of Jus-
tice— it might be possible to set up a war crimes tribunal. But I
think that a number of multilateral institutions have the capability
to set up plausible war crimes tribunals. The European Community
could possibly do it. I do not know whether it is foreign to the char-
ter of CSCE; my guess is it probably is foreign to the charter of
CSCE.
The political will to do something in Bosnia, though, I think is
probably a more difficult question than the problem of the various
techniques of establishing a war crimes tribunal. I think if you de-
cided that you had the political will and were going to find the peo-
ple and round them up, that you could develop in some way an
adequate tribunal.
Senator Kassebaum. But it seems to me, as much as I think it
is important and I can understand the importance of it, it is going
to be very difficult, as you say. To set it up as a mechanism as part
of any peace agreement would probably be almost impossible.
Mr. Christopher. Peace agreements quite often produce amnes-
ties, widespread amnesties, rather than war crimes trials, so that
is part of the tension in the situation.
Senator Kassebaum. I would like to move to the question of pro-
liferation for a moment. In your statement you said regarding the
proliferation of deadly weapons, we must work assiduously with
other nations to discourage proliferation, and so forth.
It has been reported that China may have exported M-ll mis-
siles to Pakistan and M-9 missiles to Syria. This would be a viola-
tion of law which would call for sanctions on our part. If this is in-
deed the case, are we prepared to invoke sanctions?
69
Mr. Christopher. Well as I said in my statement, on the balance
sheet with respect to China, we certainly have to put very strongly
on the negative side their willingness to provide weapons of mass
destruction, or at least very, very difficult weapons, to a number
of countries where they just enhance the danger enormously by
providing those weapons.
And I think any of our dealings with China are going to have to
take that into account. I do not think we can have a relationship
with China that does not recognize not only the human rights vio-
lations, but their strong tendency in recent months, at least in the
reports I have received, to be willing to sell arms or weapons of
mass destruction and missiles to places where it is most improper
for them to do so.
Senator Kassebaum. Would it be useful — in regarding prolifera-
tion, our sort of informal arrangements have been the Australian
group or the MTCR, the missile technology control regime. Would
it lend any muscle to those efforts to institutionalize them, because
they have been more or less an informal arrangement? Is there
some way to get some muscle into this so when there is a violation,
we have a group that is there?
Mr. Christopher. One of the things we will be looking for is
ways to multilateralize this problem. As you know, the U.N., on a
five-power basis, began to explore limitations on arms sales. That
effort did not get very far because, among other things, the U.S.
sale to Taiwan caused the Chinese to be very reluctant to go ahead
with the five-power talks in the U.N.
This is a strange — maybe not strange but paradoxical — position
for the Chinese to be taking if the reports of their widespread sales
are true, but countries are quite capable of taking paradoxical posi-
tions where it serves their purpose.
Senator Kassebaum. That is true, but it seems to me this is one
of the most important issues for us now. Because obviously it really
applies to Russia and they try and sell their arms. China has be-
come ever more aggressive and we ourselves, of course, are selling
arms as such. And it is not to say that those sales cannot or should
not be accomplished, but when it is of deadly weapons, weapons of
mass destruction, some means of putting muscle behind what we
say or what a group would say such as any arrangement such as
the Australian group, I think is terribly important.
Mr. Christopher. This is uniquely a situation where a country
cannot act alone very effectively because if you act alone you are
simply injuring the manufacturers within your country and it is
picked up by another country immediately. So it cries out for a
multilateral approach, and that was an encouraging start at the
U.N. but it was — I think it has faltered because of sales that have
been made by some of the five members, or at least promised.
Senator Kassebaum. Thank you. My time has run out.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you very much.
The CHAffiMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr.
Christopher, let me join my colleagues in commending you for a
very thoughtful and concise opening statement, considering the
magnitude of the issues that need to be addressed and will be ad-
dressed on your watch.
70
I just want to mention, if I could, briefly a couple of matters that
have been raised already and to underscore them.
For one, I was somewhat surprised that the so-called October
Surprise issue would be a subject for your confirmation. But there
are those, I guess, who want to pursue whatever avenue they can.
Senator Lugar properly pointed out that, much to the disappoint-
ment I know of my colleagues on this side, I voted against the for-
mation of a committee because of my concerns about whether or
not anything worthwhile would come of it. I was particularly reluc-
tant to have this committee, as a foreign policy committee, be en-
gaging in something that I thought, while there may have been
merit to look at it, did not necessarily belong under the auspices
of this committee.
But my hope would be that just as there were those of us who
expressed our opposition then to that issue, that this would not be
the subject of prolonged discussion in terms of your confirmation
hearing.
Second, I want to underscore what Senator Sarbanes raised with
you about Ambassadors. And he has done an excellent job on behalf
of this committee, indeed, on behalf of all of us in this country, in
raising very legitimate concerns. I think Senator Sarbanes raised
the issue of language ability. I think you did as well, and I want
to underscore that point. There is little or no reason, with some ob-
vious exceptions, why people who seek to represent our Nation in
most parts of the world cannot be if not totally fluent at least con-
versant in the language of the nation in which they will be resid-
ing. That is extremely, extremely important.
Senator Sarbanes also picked up on what I thought was an excel-
lent statement in your opening remarks, not only about the public
supporting foreign policy, but that there is nothing foreign about
foreign policy. And I think that is critically important.
I suspect that Senator Helms is correct that if there were a ref-
erendum this afternoon on whether or not we ought to have a for-
eign aid program, the American public would probably reject it.
But they would reject it in ignorance, in my view, for failure to
understand how critically important it is for our economic well-
being — even in strict fiscal terms, disregarding everything else. In
strict fiscal terms, the economic well-being of this Nation, and cer-
tainly its economic well-being in the years to come, will be directly
dependent on our ability to trade and to engage in the commerce
of the world.
And so it is critically important that we try and reverse this
trend. Out of ignorance, I believe, more than anything else, the
American public fails to understand this direct linkage. As you
have said, there is nothing foreign about foreign policy.
In that regard, I think beefing up commercial offices and trying
to do what can be done to deal intelligently with export licensing
makes a great deal of sense. And I will not ask you necessarily to
comment on it. You have stated it, but I wanted to underscore it
for my own perspective.
Now, most of my colleagues are asking, I think, very important
questions regarding Bosnia and Somalia and Iraq, and the specif-
ics. These are case specific. I would like to go beyond that.
71
Senator Kassebaum talked about holding a Nuremburg type of
trials in the case of Saddam Hussein or even possibly Milosevic and
others. It was exactly 51 years ago today, on January 13, 1942,
that a group of representatives of the allied powers met at St.
James Palace in London and announced that the crimes of the Nazi
regime would not go unpunished. And as result of that statement,
51 years ago today, the Nuremburg trials emerged. A recent book
by Telford Taylor and others have documented the value of those
trials.
Certainly today the facts are entirely different. You do not have
a vanquished nation, you do not have your hands on Saddam Hus-
sein or Milosevic or others that you may decide deserve to be
brought before an international court of justice. But I think Elie
Weisel has said it well. It is not just a question that those who en-
gage in the violation of human rights be apprehended, but that
their crimes be exposed to the world. And that may mean, in some
cases, you do not actually have your hands on the individuals.
You so appropriately talk about General Marshall and Dean Ach-
eson, and even I was not aware of your own strong feelings about
them, but I could not agree with you more about examples in re-
cent history of individuals who understood the importance of a
world order and trying to resolve matters through diplomacy.
I think this is a wonderful, unique opportunity, going beyond the
particular situations of Bosnia and Iraq. There will be other
Bosnias and other Iraqs as sure as we are all sitting here today.
And the fact that we have not been able, successfully, to establish
a permanent court of international criminal justice with teeth to it,
this ought to be an opportunity to establish an era of law that
many have tried over the years.
There is an opportunity. Just in the last few years, a U.N. Com-
mission has adopted a draft international criminal code. That Com-
mission is now ready to prepare a statute for an international
criminal court. Many are hesitant about it, and should look at it
carefully for obvious reasons, including our own country. But it is
an idea we must pursue, in my view.
I wonder if you might take a few minutes and comment on the
wisdom of taking advantage of this new opportunity presented to
us, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war,
the degree of uncertainty that exists, and instead of dealing with
this on an ad hoc basis, trying to establish some new set of
Nuremburg trials as each situation warrants, whether or not we
might take this opportunity to try and establish that permanent
international court on criminal justice?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I have had some interest over the
last couple of years in looking at the various elements of the U.N.
system which might be engaged in dispute resolution. I came at it
from that side of the picture. And one of the elements that was
suggested for discussion at that time was the establishment of the
criminal court.
And I think that it is a good time now, with leadership at the
U.N. prepared to think new thoughts and develop new ideas, to see
if we cannot find some permanent mechanism, rather than having
to set up an ad hoc mechanism each time.
72
It ties in too, Senator, with my deep concern about the
ethnocentricism of the world. The fact that in many countries there
is a drive to a kind of an ethnic purity which creates impossible
conditions for the minorities in those countries. If we do not find
some way so that the different ethnic groups can live together in
a country, we are going to have — how many countries will we have?
We will have 5,000 countries in the world rather than the 100-plus
that we now have.
Part of that is to have some enforcement machinery with teeth
so that if people do take action well beyond civilized norms against
their minorities, there is an international tribunal that they might
be forced to respond to.
Now, you can see from the halting way that I have addressed
this that these are very preliminary thoughts on my part. But I
think it is the time to look at the U.N. structure, to look at the
court structure. That is one of the opportunities we have in the
post-cold war period. And I would be very interested, when we des-
ignate a legal adviser, to ask for work to be done in that area so
that the United States can begin to formulate its own position.
Senator Dodd. I appreciate that, and I did not expect for you to
go beyond that because it is an issue that needs serious thought.
But it will never happen, in my view, unless the United States
takes the leadership role in this issue.
The great irony of ironies was that it was the United States, in
a bipartisan way, that pursued the Genocide Convention at the end
of World War II; tragicly, in my view, we were one of the last na-
tions of the world to ratify it some 40 years later. It was leadership
in the late 1940's — it was the Marshalls and the Achesons and the
Vandenbergs and others that fought for those things so hard. And
then it was the opponents fighting harder than the proponents for
three decades that caused us to fall back.
And unless we fight for this and make it something we really be-
lieve is important, it just will not happen. And, again, I deferred,
obviously, to the question of looking at this carefully. But I would
hope that that would be the case if at all possible.
In that regard, I might add another convention that falls into
that category, the American Convention on Human Rights. The
ratification of that convention occurred in 1978 by President
Carter, as I am sure you are aware of. Again, this is one that has
some problems. I am not going to suggest to you that it is perfect.
But human rights is an ongoing problem and will be.
It would send, in my view, a very important signal in this hemi-
sphere about our commitment to those issues. Certainly, what oc-
curs in Cuba and elsewhere today would warrant looking at under
the Human Rights Convention. I would hope that we might pursue
that. And I would ask you to comment, if you might, on it. Again,
I believe you may have had some personal experience with that
convention.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I have, and I think it is unfortunate that
our record is not better. Indeed, our record across the board is fair-
ly abysmal. In the International Court of Justice, our refusing to
seat or grant jurisdiction and our retaining the right of unilateral
withdrawal is one of the things that sets back the entire enterprise.
If the leading nation in the world feels that when it does not want
73
to risk a bad outcome it simply picks up its marbles and goes
home, that is a very unsatisfactory result.
We do have a tendency to agree to treaties and then leave them
sitting there without ratification; without coming into effect. I
would put your question in that category.
I have been away from here for a number of years. I know the
realities of the crowded schedule here. And I guess there are also
realities of entrenched opposition. But I think the United States,
as the leading power in the world now, has special responsibilities
that we ought to undertake to carry out.
Senator Dodd. Well, I said ratify. It was signed, we did not rat-
ify.
Mr. Christopher. It was signed. We did not ratify it.
Senator Dodd. I understand that, and you are absolutely correct.
Senator Helms and I actually worked out the Genocide Convention
to the point where our consent to ratification was given here — and
it was supported, not to the full satisfaction, I might add, to this
Senator or to him, I presume. But nonetheless, we worked it out.
I think you might find that if the administration will show some
real interest, there are those of us up here who are willing to do
a lot of the work to try and help it to achieve ratification. And I
would just mention to you, this afternoon, that certainly on this
particular one I would be prepared to roll up my sleeves and go to
work on it. But I would need to know that the administration cared
about it as well.
Mr. Christopher. One of the things I have learned from testify-
ing here before is the importance of going back over the transcript
to make sure that when we get back downtown, we remember the
things that
Senator Dodd. That were committed. You know the staff will go
over the transcript very carefully up here.
Mr. Christopher. Right. I have to try to keep one step ahead of
them, but that is impossible.
Senator Dodd. We all try to do that, I think. Let me move, if I
can, to something you said in your statement, and I want to ask
you a bit more about it. On page 14 of your prepared statement,
you said: "We also need to take a new look at the way our State
Department is organized. I intend to streamline the Department of
State to enhance our capabilities to deal with the issues that tran-
scend national boundaries, and to improve the international com-
petitiveness of American business."
It seems to me that over the years, and again you have firsthand
awareness of this, with all good intentions we have watched var-
ious appendages occur to the structure of the State Department.
Someone has had a great idea on a commission or some new task
force or cluster or whatever else they call them, and they end up
sort of growing over the years. It seems to me, as I look at it, the
structure is rather unwieldy. It would seem by your statement that
you at least agree in part with that.
And I would like to ask if you might comment a bit more on that.
I would like to strongly urge you to take a good, hard look at that
structure and see if we cannot make it far more efficient than it
presently is.
74
Mr. Christopher. I certainly hope to do that, and I do have
some preliminary thoughts, Senator. You know, there is always the
danger in a forum like this which is so public, that if you put out
a preliminary thought it suddenly becomes set in concrete, and peo-
ple are dismayed if it is not carried through in precisely the same
way.
With that caveat, and with a hope for understanding, I think I
might mention that I am quite enthusiastic about the idea of creat-
ing another under secretaryship, this time for global affairs. It
seems to me there are so many issues that cut across borders and
across continents that it would be desirable for the State Depart-
ment in the future to have an Under Secretary for Global Affairs
which would have responsibility for the Oceans, Environment, and
Science Bureau, the Human Rights Bureau, the Refugees Bureau,
and perhaps the Antiterrorism and Narcotics Bureaus. It seems to
me those are all issues that know no boundaries, and that it would
be quite desirable to try to combine them into a group that can
work effectively together.
I feel, with respect to the second point you made, reading from
my statement, that we can greatly strengthen the Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs in his or her ability to deal effectively with en-
couraging American business abroad. Now, that signal is going to
have to come from the President and from me if it is going to be
carried out in the Embassies around the world.
Just one more comment, and without getting too organization
conscious, the Secretary's span of control at the present time is
enormous. There must be 25 and 30 direct reports to the Secretary
of State. And that probably is an unhealthy situation. And without
going much beyond that, I would like to look at that.
Now, that is one of those customary balances. You want to have
people who are in important positions to have access to you. On the
other hand, they frequently need the inspiration and leadership of
a group, and we will try to balance those. I do think it is time to
look at an important reorganization at the State Department and
one that can be done without legislation in the large part.
Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate that. And I presume as you go
through those thoughts that discussions with members of this com-
mittee who I know over the years have had a real interest would
probably be valuable. And given your earlier comments about
wanting to work closely with the committee it is something that we
can expect to happen.
Mr. Christopher. I have already had a preliminary discussion
with Senator Kerry about that subject, and will certainly look for-
ward to talking to the committee as a whole about it.
Senator Dodd. I will come back to some other areas, but I want
to hit on Haiti quickly, because I know this is a pressing, imme-
diate issue and it falls within the concern of my subcommittee.
First of all, let me commend the Bush administration, and you,
and President-elect Clinton, and others for working as closely as
you have together on this as you have on other matters. I feel it
is very, very important that the election of President Aristide not
be retreated from. That we make it abundantly clear that we feel
it is very important that President Aristide's election is something
75
that we appreciate. It was the overwhelming choice of the Haitian
people. And to depart from that would be, I think, a travesty.
There has been an appointment of Dante Caputo, a former For-
eign Minister of Argentina whom I know, and who has an excellent
reputation as a diplomat as the Special Assistant to the Secretary
General on Haiti. Anyway, I would like to ask whether or not you
would agree that President Aristide's return to Haiti is an essential
element, the solution of the current crisis, and what enhanced role
you might see the U.N. play in concert with the OAS in dealing
with this particular situation?
And, last, if you can comment on quickly the issue of visas and
the potential tragedy of the boat people, people who are using
whatever means to escape Haiti, and how we might process those
people rather than have them run the risk of losing their lives?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, those are a lot of questions, and
whenever you get a barrage you wonder whether you are going to
remember them all.
First with respect to Mr. Caputo, I have made an exception in
his case. I have not been meeting with Ambassadors because I
though it was inappropriate to do so until I had this hearing, but
that situation seemed to be sufficiently urgent so that I ought to
meet with him. I have met with him and urged him to pursue his
diplomacy with just as much determination and haste as he could,
and I think he is doing so.
With respect to President Aristide, there is no question in my
mind that, because of the election, he has to be part of the solution
to this. I do not have a precise system worked out in my mind as
to how he would be part of the solution, but certainly he cannot
be ignored in the matter.
With respect to the U.N. and OAS, I could foresee their having
people in country to ensure that the procedures be carried out, or
more fully and carefully carried out, there. For example, to ensure
that people who are returned to Haiti are not subject to improper
attitudes or improper treatment when they have returned.
On the last part of your question, Senator, if I am remembering
them correctly, I do think there is a great deal that can be done
to improve the in-country processing of these requests for asylum.
As I understand it, right now the only processing is being done in
Port au Prince, and it is very difficult for people living on the other
parts of the island, for very poor people with difficulty of travel,
they have virtually no chance, very little chance.
When you add to that the bureaucratic problems of seeking asy-
lum, it seems to me that it would be strongly in the U.S. interest
to improve the capacity of people to seek asylum there on the is-
land of Haiti. That will require cooperation, but I am encouraged
to think that cooperation might be forthcoming.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.
Senator Pressler. Thank you very much. Let me run through a
series of issues. First of all, in 1985 the Congress passed an amend-
ment barring aid to Pakistan if Pakistan had a nuclear bomb. It
was determined that Pakistan had one; they subsequently admitted
they have it. It was an amendment that I sponsored. Will you sup-
port keeping that law in place?
76
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I am strongly in favor of
antiproliferation legislation and legislation that imposes substan-
tial sanctions if there is a violation. I have not studied that particu-
lar case in recent years, although my memory goes back to the
problems with Pakistan and their obsession with getting a nuclear
capability and what I read now indicates that they have probably
crossed that threshold.
So I would be very supportive in general of legislation. I am not
committing to the interpretation of any given piece of legislation;
I know there is an issue there. But in an overall sense, I would be
prepared to support the continuation of strong antiproliferation leg-
islation with teeth for people who violate international standards
and try to go nuclear.
Senator Pressler. Good, I am glad to hear that. Let me say that
I am going to skip around here a little bit in some areas that have
not been covered.
In regards to Somalia, it has been my strongest feelings, espe-
cially when I was at the U.N. this fall, that the U.N. is not using
the troops that we helped them train. And it was my feeling that
the Belgian battalion and the Nigerian and the Egyptian soldiers
who were supposed to come from the U.N. should have done the
job that the U.S. soldiers are doing. I oppose the degree of our in-
volvement in Somalia, the way we did it in the sense that we took
the whole burden, and the American taxpayer took the whole bur-
den as a result.
Is there a way we can get the U.N., Europe, and Japan to as-
sume more of these humanitarian operations in the future? How
will Bill Clinton and you handle situations like that?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, perhaps you were out of the room a
few minutes ago when I said it seemed to me that the U.N. was
going to have to recruit people for peacekeeping who would be pre-
pared to take more risks than they have been in the past. And I
think that has been part of the problem. People have been condi-
tioned to feeling they were going into a very low-risk environment,
whereas that is not likely to be true.
I think the best thing that we can do is to work with the Sec-
retary General to try to carry out some of the very interesting ideas
in the monograph that he produced last year with respect to chang-
ing directions at the U.N., to try to have the U.N. become much
more effective in the field of peacemaking as well as peacekeeping.
Senator Pressler. Skipping to the issue of Kosovo, I am very
concerned, as you are and we discussed this in my office the other
evening, about the Serbs taking action there. I know that the Ge-
neva peace talks are ongoing but I am curious to get your feelings
about a strong stand against Serbian aggression in Kosovo. Do you
support the establishment of a multinational preventative force in
Kosovo to deter possible Serb aggression in that area? Indeed, I
think we all know that if Kosovo were to explode, it could become
a regional war.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I know you have been one of the
leaders and one of those who has early on recognized the problems
of the Albanians in Kosovo, and I commend you for that. Governor
Clinton, I think, has not gotten to the point of taking a precise po-
sition with respect to Kosovo, but it is, I think, within the umbrella
77
of the need to take stronger action to prevent further incursions by
the Serbs.
As I understand it, the current administration has drawn a line
just to the north of Kosovo, and, if that is the fact, that would cer-
tainly be a precedent for a future position along those lines, but I
am not able, until we are in office and study the whole situation,
to give you any feeling with assurance as to what President-elect
Clinton will do.
Senator Pressler. Last summer I was in Uzbekistan and on the
day I was there a Mr. Pulitov, the head of their human rights asso-
ciation, was beaten up by the President's police, and I visited him
in the hospital. And just today I have been handed news that he
again has been imprisoned.
The President of Uzbekistan is seeking to visit the United States
in an official capacity. I wrote letters to President Bush strongly
opposing letting the President of Uzbekistan come here in an offi-
cial capacity until this human rights matter has been resolved.
Specifically an accounting for the actions taken against Mr.
Pulitov, the head of Uzbekistan's human rights association, is
needed. Will you oppose a visit of Uzbekistan's President until Mr.
Pulitov's situation is resolved?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I hope you will not be too dis-
appointed in me if I tell you I do not know that particular case.
But we will look into it and, as you describe it, it certainly is an
egregious case. But since I do not know the case, I would not like
to make a firm commitment here as to what we would do. What
we will make a commitment to is to look into the matter, and if
the prior administration has taken that position that would, of
course, be an important precedent for us.
Senator Pressler. Now, the U.S. Embassies in Russia and Ar-
menia do not have Ambassadors. When do you expect the President
will send nominations for these two posts to the Senate, and espe-
cially Armenia?
Mr. Christopher. I hesitate to be too expert on matters of great
detail, but as I understand it an Ambassador was nominated for
Armenia, Mr. Gilmore, last year, and he was not confirmed by the
Senate. I am not sure whether it was that his papers were not com-
pleted, but at least that is the information I have, Senator Pressler.
Senator Sarbanes. If the Senator would yield, he was not con-
firmed simply because the nomination came at such a late date
that there was not sufficient time to process the nomination. I do
not think it represented any judgment about Mr. Gilmore. In fact,
I think many people here have a high opinion of his abilities; he
has rendered some very distinguished service in his career. But in
any event, the fact that he was not moved out there was that the
nominations came quite late, near the end of the session, and there
was not time to do the job.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. That does con-
firm the information I had. Actually, I have been concerned about
our ambassadorial representation in all the countries, the newly
independent states, and had a memorandum prepared on that sub-
ject in the last few days and noticed his name. And we will try to
move again on that, and I was certainly not suggesting anything
78
adverse about him, nor nothing adverse about the process, it was
just a timing matter.
With respect to Russia, we are hard at work on rinding an am-
bassadorial candidate for that country. It is perhaps our highest
priority because we think it is highly important that we have an
outstanding Ambassador there to work with President Yeltsin and
to give him the support of the presence of a leading American.
That being said, I have the highest regard for our deputy chief
of mission wno is there manning the post while the ambassadorial
slot is vacant, but there is no substitute for having a confirmed
Ambassador there and we are going to move on that just as soon
as we can.
Senator Pressler. I know you covered Cyprus to some extent,
but if there is no forward movement in getting the Turkish troops
out of Cyprus, would you join in supporting legislation or an effort
to reduce aid to Turkey until such time as the troops start to come
out?
Mr. Christopher. That is a very complicated subject. The ratio
of aid between Greece and Turkey has been at a 7 to 10 ratio for
a long time, and I think that probably from the standpoint of both
parties it would take an important circumstance to change that, so
I do not want to commit to making any change in that ratio. Tur-
key is an important NATO ally of ours, and you would have to bal-
ance that with what they have done in other places. I will say that
it seems to me that the Government of Turkey ought to be using
its good offices, and maybe more than that, to encourage Mr.
Denktash to reach a settlement in Cyprus.
Senator Pressler. Will you have a special envoy to reinvigorate
the Middle East peace process?
Mr. Christopher. You do have a number of hard questions, don't
you, Senator. Well one thing I will commit to is to take very deter-
mined steps to reinvigorate that process, or to make sure that that
process goes forward if it does not need a special push at the
present time. I think there is some difference of view as to whether
that is best done by a special envoy or by someone who is within
the State Department at the present time perhaps, present com-
pany not excluded.
But without wanting to commit in this forum as to whether it
will be a special envoy or be done in some other way, I will say
that very high on my list is seeking ways to make sure that that
momentum is not lost in the Middle East peace process.
Senator Pressler. Will you support the export-enhancement pro-
gram for the sale of our agricultural products abroad?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I will.
Senator Pressler. Good, I am glad to hear that. Some of the Eu-
ropeans have been saying that this program is a violation of GATT.
Mr. Christopher. Well, of course, if that is true then that would
have to be looked at, but I had understood that that program has
gone forward and that it has been part of the negotiation. Maybe
you can educate me about that, Senator Pressler. Has that been
part of the GATT discussions?
Senator Pressler. Yes, yes, very much so. The Europeans have
their subsidized exports, which are far in excess of our enhanced
sales, and we have tried to answer their subsidies a little bit. We
79
are going to have to get into an export subsidy war if they do not
agree to reduce their export subsidies. I would rather not see us
do that, but that is going to be the only alternative that we have
and it is a very sad alternative.
Let me touch briefly on what specifically-— I know that during his
campaign Bill Clinton said that the administration would vigor-
ously work to end the Arab parties boycott of Israel. Are you going
to vigorously work to do that, and what is the administration spe-
cifically going to do?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I remember his campaign statements to
that effect and I will do my best to carry them out. The main
means for doing that will have to be diplomatic contacts with our
Arab friends. I would expect that I will be meeting with them in
the relatively near future, either in their capitals or our capital.
One of the things I want to do is to begin to take soundings with
my opposite numbers in other countries in view of the President's
commitment, but also because I would like to see it happen. That
is one of the things that will be on the list.
Senator Pressler. Now what specific steps can you take, either
by Executive order or by some other action, to prevent our Euro-
pean allies, Russia, and the affected former Soviet Republics, from
selling nuclear technology to governments like Iran, Iraq, and even
rogue paramilitary organizations in that region?
Mr. Christopher, without being able to make a catalog of the
various things that can be done, I think we need to use all of our
leverage to keep that from happening. We have the customary
tools: aid of various kinds, trade, votes in multilateral institutions.
I think we ought to examine the full range of our options in order
to accomplish those nonproliferation purposes. I would not make
Russia exempt from our desire that proliferation be avoided any
place.
Senator Pressler. During the last two administrations there
was a lot of criticism of giving political appointees the best Embas-
sies— in a sense the most comfortable places to live, maybe. And
people who gave huge political contributions were criticized if they
came up as Ambassadors. Is that practice going to be continued?
Mr. Christopher. Well, I would have to say that it is a biparti-
san failing, I think, that that happened too often in the past.
And as I have said to Senator Sarbanes and others this morning,
qualifications for those jobs ought to be very high, whether it is a
career person or a noncareer person. And noncareer appointees
ought to have some special qualification for the country to which
they are going, and that has not always been the case. I will use
all of my influence, and I know Governor Clinton is committed to
this as well, to find fully qualified people, whether they be career
or noncareer, to go to posts around the world.
Senator Pressler. Good. Thank you very much.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I apologize for not being here earlier. We issued
the POW/MIA report today at 1 p.m., so I feel like a newly liber-
ated human being and have gained back maybe 50 percent of my
life. Now the question is, what to do with it?
80
One of the things that we want to do is, Senator Kassebaum and
I talked last year about this whole question of reorganization and
the structure of the State Department in the post-cold war world,
and I think it is long overdue that we took a look at that. We chat-
ted about that when you were kind enough to come around, as you
did with all the members of the committee, and I appreciate it.
We will begin that process shortly in our subcommittee which
has jurisdiction over it, of looking at this question of structure, and
I do want to ask you some questions about structure without trying
to pin you down or anything, just get some general views on it, but
I would like to ask about a couple of other areas first, if I may.
A number of us on the committee have followed closely, visited,
and been deeply concerned about events in Cambodia. I have been
personally sort of a reluctant bride to the peace process because of
the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge. I felt some time ago that the al-
ternative course of dealing more forthrightly with Hun Sen might
have preserved the process and been a much better approach to the
region.
That is now water under the bridge, but the issue remains, trag-
ically. Experts tell us that the Khmer Rouge may well be in a posi-
tion to literally control the country by the end of the year. I believe
they have no interest in peace. I do not think they have any inter-
est in elections, and very little interest in the current process.
The question therefore will loom quickly: One, would you assert
that it would be U.S. policy to find unacceptable Khmer Rouge as-
cendancy through force to control the country, and two, would you
think that in the interests of strengthening the peace process we
might be well-advised to consider a change in U.N. rules of engage-
ment so as to permit U.N. forces to react with greater strength to
current Khmer Rouge provocations?
Mr. Christopher. I believe the answer to both those questions
is yes, Senator Kerry. I do think it is unacceptable to have the
Khmer Rouge refuse to cooperate in the process that is going on
there now, and lay back and in effect assert their power and take
over the country, so I do think that would be most unfortunate
and, as I say, unacceptable.
On the second half of your question, let me say that I view Cam-
bodia as quite an important test for the U.N. I do not like to make
it the sole test. I would not say the U.N. is fatally defective if it
does not succeed there, but it would be an important failure if this
process does not go forward after it has been laid out with such ex-
cruciating care and commitment of time as well as money.
As you can perhaps tell from the answers I gave to some other
questions, I do think that we are going to have to have more risk-
taking at the U.N. if it is going to carry out the duties that were
prescribed for it by the Secretary General in his very interesting
paper in the middle of last year.
Senator Kerry. With respect to the U.N. role, since you bring it
up now — this is a little bit on the reorg effort, but have you had
a chance at all to discuss with Secretary-designate Aspin the ques-
tion of funding for peacekeeping efforts? Obviously, this committee
believes very strongly that peacekeeping remains within the State
Department s prerogatives, and that the best solution to the prob-
81
lem may be simply to shift the budget appropriately. Has that been
discussed, because that is obviously a major problem today?
Mr. Christopher. I have not discussed that with Secretary-des-
ignate Aspin. I did mention it earlier today here, in this committee
room. I feel strongly that that burden ought to be borne, and when
you look at the size of our respective budgets, it would not be dif-
ficult to find some money for support, one would think, in the sav-
ings in the defense budget.
Our budget is extremely small, really quite small, and burdened
in so many different ways. I am going to find an early time to try
to talk to Secretary Aspin about tnat and try to find him in a good
mood. He is usually in a good mood. I do not want any inference
to be made that his mood is not usually a good one.
Senator Kerry. To try to find him in his usual good mood.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kerry. With respect to Bosnia, you have discussed it
somewhat, obviously. Would you help us to define what the moral
imperative and pernaps political imperative, diplomatic imperative
is, when 20,000 women are raped as a matter of war strategy and
when people are openly viewed in images freezing, as they are
today, in the cold?
What do you feel our responsibility is for that, and particularly
in light, if you will, of the World War II experience, do you think
that that is relevant to any moral imperatives we might feel?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I do, Senator. I think we ought to learn
from the lessons of history. At least we ought to learn that much.
One of the fascinations about the period we are going through is
that the definition of the acceptable reasons for the use of force is
expanding very rapidly. Somalia expands the definition to include
humanitarian causes, and desirably so, I think.
All of the other analysis has to go forward, all of the other ques-
tions you ask, and factors, will have to be put into the mix, but
what is raised in Bosnia is whether or not genocide, or something
very akin to genocide, is also a proper basis for the use of force
where the other aspects of the test can be met.
I guess in my own thinking genocide would be if the other tests
are met, but as I say, one of the fascinations of this period is the
expansion of what the vital interests of the United States are. The
use we thought of in the cold war period is almost exclusively mili-
tary, or exclusively self- defensive. Clearly, the definition is ex-
panding.
Senator Kerry. Do you anticipate — has President Clinton given
you an indication, or do you anticipate based on your own knowl-
edge of his position or your own gut that you would approach some-
what differently the question ofleadership within Europe and the
world, as to our response in that region?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I did not quite catch the end of that
question. Would I approach differently
Senator Kerry. The question of our current response to the pre-
dicament in that region. In other words, there are many people
who think we may come to a greater confrontation with the ques-
tion of enforcement of the no-fly zone, perhaps troops.
The issue is obviously ripe as to what happens. President Bush
said that if the Serbs pressed into Kosovo, clearly if Macedonia and
82
Albania become embroiled, this raises the stakes, but the issue is
also on the table as to how you might marshal the forces of Europe
to respond to aggression against an ethnic minority in Kosovo
which would not raise an issue of sovereignty, when some of these
other countries — Britain, Spain, et cetera— have their own prob-
lems of separatist movements, ethnicity, and so forth.
Would you anticipate us approaching this question of enforce-
ment of a response to the moral imperative you have defined in a
different way from that which President Bush and Secretary Baker
have?
Mr. Christopher. Let me try this. I think that what Governor
Clinton has said, Senator Kerry, is that he feels that our response
to this whole host of problems should have been stronger. I say
should have been stronger, and should be stronger. How many lost
opportunities there have been only history will determine, and
probably not with any great precision or accuracy.
If the other part of your question is whether the United States
would act unilaterally in the former Yugoslavia area, I do not like
to rule out anything. Governor Clinton's remark, together when we
can, alone when we must, obviously has to be my guidepost, but
it is very difficult for me to envision a situation in which we would
take action to use force in Yugoslavia on a unilateral basis. It is
so much a European problem that I think for us to array our forces
that distance from home, in an area where the European countries
have such a strong interest, for us to act unilaterally there, if I am
picking up your question correctly, I think would be a most un-
usual situation, although, as I say, I do not want to rule anything
out in view of the overall comments made by Governor Clinton.
Senator Kerry. Would you contemplate the United States press-
ing through the international institutions, particularly the U.N.,
for a multilateral response that might include force?
Mr. Christopher. Absolutely. If we reached a conclusion here in
our Government that we thought it was desirable to take some ac-
tion, I cannot imagine that we would not go to multilateral institu-
tions, and especially the U.N.
I do say about this, Senator, not wanting to be evasive, I want
to get around and talk with some of my counterparts in Europe,
do that either here or there, to try to understand better why it is
that they have been so reluctant on this issue, whether they are
not as much concerned about the near-genocidal conditions, or per-
haps genocidal conditions, as it looks from a distance.
So I want to try to understand that issue better over the next
month or so, but I am very deeply concerned about it.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, I had the privilege of traveling to
Rio with now Vice President-elect Gore and Senator Wirth and oth-
ers, and have shared with them a number of international efforts,
the First Interparliamentary Conference, and so forth.
As you well know, the world population is at 5.3 billion. Next
year it goes to 6.3 billion; 95 percent of that growth will be in less-
developed countries. If Somalia is a problem today which requires
American troops because people are fighting over food as a com-
modity of distribution and power, it seems as though that will only
magnify itself in these next years.
83
The issue of sustainable development has been on the table, but
frankly little advanced. You have mentioned the notion of a Global
Affairs Secretary. I wonder if you could share with us perhaps a
little more your vision of some of the options, or some of the initia-
tives, that you think we really ought to take to address what many
of us believe is now — is the new paradigm of international politics,
economics resource allocation and use, and the tensions brought
about by them, and population growth tied to it.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I will probably be better giving you
for instances than giving you anything like a catalog.
Senator Kerry. I understand. I know you cannot deal with that
whole issue in this timeframe, but just a sense, so that we would
have it.
Mr. Christopher. I do think that our policies on population have
been antiquated and worse, and I would hope that one of the first
things that is done is that we reverse our refusal to support sen-
sible family planning efforts and other population efforts around
the world.
Population is really an area where we can be effective. It is also
closely tied to education, especially education of women. Now, that
has to be given real weight as well.
In connection with sustainable development, my own feeling is
that AID needs to be rethought, revamped, retooled, and done over
again. Its purposes, which I think are now 32 or 33, ought to be
narrowed, and our funds used far more effectively with much more
targeted effort.
For myself, one of the principal efforts ought to be in the direc-
tion of sustainable development. We have an assistance program
that is largely attuned to the cold war period, where most of the
analysis was whether or not the aid would somehow advantage us
vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union, and that is no longer a very rel-
evant consideration, so I would certainly put a lot of emphasis on
sustainable development there.
There are a number of new techniques that are being developed
by nongovernmental organizations. Until — I guess until the 19th of
this month — I have taken a very active interest in the Carter Cen-
ter in Atlanta, GA, President Carter's Center, what they have done
to help relieve famine in Africa through the use of new varieties
of seed.
How much can be done in the agricultural area by nongovern-
mental organizations perhaps sponsored by governmental organiza-
tions is just breathtaking, when you see what a single country can
do if the leader of that country is turned on to ideas like that, so
I think we ought to press ahead on fronts like that.
The water shortages around the world are areas that I think de-
serve quite a high priority. In so many places you see
desertification as areas are turned into deserts, and we are losing
a great deal of the land mass that can contribute to the feeding of
people.
That is just a few instances that come into my mind as I see this
new Under Secretary for Global Affairs, and think what an exciting
assignment he might have.
Senator Kerry. I think it is an extraordinary assignment with
great potential, and I am glad to hear you talking along that line.
84
Just one last question. As the yellow light is on, I would like to
ask a last question. In the course of my investigations into General
Noriega and BCCI, it became patently clear to those of us who
were engaged in it that there is really a disturbing increase in the
power of criminal enterprises internationally to subvert whole gov-
ernments, Nation-states, even, if you look at Colombia, you look at
Syria and other places, Burma and so forth, and this can have a
deeply destabilizing impact on foreign policy and on our national
interest.
Moreover, we seem to be very badly organized to deal with it. If
you go into the Embassies of our Government around the world,
you have DEA agents, FBI, Customs, people stumbling over each
other, and we are badly organized in this country. We have 13 dif-
ferent entities not really reporting, and we have this drug czar at
a sub-Cabinet level, tragically, and I do not think it has worked.
Are you thinking in terms, perhaps, of a new concept of an entity
for the administration of criminal justice and linking some of our
aid programs to those nations that want to be serious about the ef-
forts to have financial accountability and the transfer of funds,
money laundering, drug enterprises, and so forth, because right
now what is happening is really a joke. We are just wasting money,
millions of dollars, in enterprises that are going to military re-
gimes, people not engaged in it.
I think it is a very, very serious issue in terms of our policy and
interest in the long run. Could you just comment generally?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, that is a problem for which I have no
ready answer. As you were spelling out the issue, I wondered
whether you thought perhaps I was here in my old incarnation as
Deputy Attorney General, because in so many ways it is a problem
for the Attorney General.
But since you are dealing with foreign entities, it is clearly a
problem for the State Department. I have considered reorganizing
the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Affairs to in-
clude terrorism and other comparable illegal acts abroad, but that
probably does not get at your problem either, because this is going
to take a combined effort of the intelligence services and the De-
partment of Justice for prosecutions here in the United States to-
gether with the State Department, which has some resources, but
woefully few resources in that field.
The best thing I can perhaps say to you is not to pretend to know
the answer, but to take that problem with me as a serious one. I
would like to talk to you about it further, because you are certainly
right.
You know, when a criminal enterprise controls a foreign country,
it changes our whole relationship with it. We cannot have a normal
diplomacy with them.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Coverdell?
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The preliminary
questions with regard to our Ambassadors seem to be suggesting
that more and more frequently we ought to move toward an exclu-
sivity to foreign service.
85
I have worked with and met, I would guess, about one-third of
our Ambassadors. Nearly without exception, I found them to be ex-
traordinary Americans, serving their country extremely well, and
with enormous dedication. I believe that there is something to be
said for an inclusion of mainstream America in the ambassadorial
corp for two reasons.
One, I think it is useful for foreign governments and representa-
tives of those governments to have the opportunity to meet Ameri-
cans that perhaps have not been trained — this is an overstate-
ment— to sterility. No. 2, I think it is good for the foreign service
itself to be regularly exposed to Americans coming from the main-
stream of life in our country.
So with all the admonishments you have heard here today, I
would like to raise my voice that we should not move exclusively,
or too exclusively, away from the process of utilizing Americans
from multiple walks of life in this great endeavor of representing
the United States around the world.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I misspoke if I indicated I was mov-
ing in the direction of entirely career Ambassadors. That percent-
age of noncareer Ambassadors has vacillated between sometimes in
the low twenties and sometimes as high as the high thirties, per-
haps even 40 percent.
And I think one can make judgments within that range, but I
think it is very important we have a continuation of the tradition
we have in the United States of noncareer Ambassadors leavening
the process and adding something to the relationships, not only
with the country but with the other Ambassadors.
That being said, Senator, you and I could perhaps have a friend-
ly difference of view as to whether the person shouldn't have some
special qualifications for the country that he's going to. I don't
mean that he has to be an expert in the country that he is going
to, but to send somebody whose only qualifications are campaign
contributions, even if he brings a good main street quality about
him, I think would not serve us especially well or would not be
well-received by the country.
It doesn't take a great deal, language, longstanding interest or
connection, academic studies, but just something to show that the
person involved has had some real interest in being in that country
other than in occupying the ambassadorial residence.
Senator Coverdell. We do not disagree on that point, other
than to say that I think there are many facets of the life experience
that ought to be included. If it is only in appendix B, or whatever
the appendix is that was referred to, I think that is fair enough.
But I do think we should continue to exercise considerable flexi-
bility about what experience is required to represent the United
States.
Mr. Christopher, I would like to, if I might, go back to your state-
ment. Unlike Senator Pressler's question, these questions will be
more open and tonal. But if I can, I am wondering if I might en-
courage you to expand upon some of the comments that you have
made nere.
On page 5, you said: "Our administration inherits the task of de-
fining a strategy for the U.S. leadership after the cold war. I think
86
we have heard virtually a unanimous chorus that we are in a very
definitional period. It will begin onyour watch."
You go on to say, "we cannot afford to careen from crisis to cri-
sis." You say, "we must have a new diplomacy that seeks to antici-
pate and prevent crisis."
This new diplomacy, does it envision a beefing of the intelligence
systems and network within the State Department? What are the
institutional devices that frame or put parameters around new di-
plomacy?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think that is a fair question. It's a
good question. I think all of our intelligence efforts around the
world should be geared more to crisis prevention. Naturally, our in-
telligence efforts, until the end of the cold war, had to be focused
very heavily on the Soviet Union and its allies. And of course, we
didn't want to drop our guard on that.
But I think that there can be a new direction toward intelligence
efforts to determine when crises are likely to arise of a different
character, a nonmilitary character.
The new diplomacy, in addition to the intelligence aspect of it,
I think would just place a much greater emphasis on problem pre-
vention rather than crisis management. Each one of the examples
I mentioned there, I think if there had been more attention by our
Government and particularly by the State Department, I think we
might well have had an opportunity to head off those crises or at
least to call them to the world's attention at an earlier time.
I think we just need, through the exercise of good leadership
from me on down, to focus our foreign service officers and our desk
officers and our Assistant Secretaries of State on not being compla-
cent. If there isn't a conflict already broken out, to try to find how
they can improve the lot of the people in the country and ensure
that a conflict won't break out.
As I say, in each one of those instances, I think there's the pros-
pect that something might have been done if the problem was ad-
dressed earlier.
Senator Coverdell. Using the examples that you have cited
here, do you think that it was a question of predetermination or
earlier analysis? Or do you believe, as I do, that it might be more
likely that it was a question of when to exercise force and when
not to exercise force. Perhaps the fact that quicker action did not
arise might deal with new definitions?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I certainly would not want to indi-
cate that force was the exclusive or even the preferred course of ac-
tion in dealing with those situations. In the Somalia situation, I
can go back to the time 12 years ago when I was in government
and it was clear that the leadership in Somalia was very flawed.
You probably know that from your service as well.
But we continued to support a dictator there for too long a period
of time and built up this situation that when he left, there was no
governmental structure left at all. I'm not a certified expert on So-
malia, but I have a very strong recollection of having deep reserva-
tions about the earlier leadership in Somalia. I'm not sure I could
have done anything about it, but we certainly have tolerated and
supported dictators too long in too many countries.
87
And I would say that that was certainly a problem in Iraq as
well. The period leading up to the invasion of Kuwait was a time
when we tried to do business with Saddam Hussein and it turned
out to be a terrible mistake, a very serious mistake, as Senator
Gore has outlined during the course of the campaign.
This is a bipartisan failing. I'm not saying that it was only the
last administration. We consistently have stayed too long with dic-
tators and then reaped the whirlwind later on. And whatever we
can do to avoid that syndrome, we ought to.
Senator Coverdell. On page 7, you refer to GATT and the
North American Free Trade Agreement. It says, "that is why we
must utilize all the tools at our disposal, including a new GATT
agreement and a North American Trade Agreement that serves the
interest of American firms, workers, and communities." In my re-
gion, they would have taken note that we are not talking — and I
am sure that it is in consideration of the American farmer.
My request for elaboration refers somewhat to some of the com-
ments which the other Senators have made. I think Senator Dodd
referred to a lack of information on the part of many Americans
about foreign policy. I have to tell you that when you raise the
word GATT or NAFTA, in many communities that I represent,
there is unbridled fear. There is a preponderance of a view that we
consistently come up on the short end or that these treaties will
indeed leave segments of manufacturing or segments of our farm
community improperly represented in the treaty.
Would you want to comment on that?
Mr. Christopher. Well, I know that there are many sectors of
American society that are very reserved about these international
arrangements and I think that they all have to be taken into ac-
count. That's why being special trade representative is such an im-
portant and difficult job.
For myself, though, I think on balance, both of these agreements
are very desirable from the standpoint of the United States. In a
sense, they are both at a similar stage. The NAFTA agreement is
in a condition where — the position of Governor Clinton — of course
my position is that it's a very good agreement, but it needs
strengthening in several respects to protect American interests and
American workers and environmental interests.
The GATT agreement is nearer to conclusion in some respects,
because evidently the breakthrough in November on agricultural
products was very significant. On the other hand, there are still
areas that have not been decided. The intellectual property area,
I think is one of them, which is a very important area to — a seg-
ment of our national life that I happen to hear something about
when I'm in California, just as you hear from the farming segment
in Georgia.
But I think the main goal here has to be to have a balanced pro-
tection of all elements of American life, so that we can encourage
trade and prosperity. The lead up to that sentence, though, I think
emphasizes, Senator, that because we are so powerful economically,
because exports and imports are so important to us, we really can't
afford to walk away from these international arrangements. They
are essential to us as the biggest player and we have to find some
88
way to try to reassure various sectors of our society that they are
not harmful to them.
But I would not be in favor of the isolating effect that would re-
sult if the United States tried to walk away from such agreements.
Senator Coverdell. On the same page, you point out and give
this example in the case of Russia; we had one commercial officer
for a nation of 150 million people. You point to the fact that other
industrialized nations have invested far more on the commercial
aspects of their foreign service.
A number of my colleagues have spoken on this issue. Do you en-
vision— and you might elaborate on how you envision — building a
force on the commercial side in business development. Will that
occur by reordering of priorities within the State Department or do
you envision adding yet a new section to deal with this activity?
Mr. Christopher. The budgetary situation being what it is, Sen-
ator, I'm sure that this is going to have to be a reallocation and
reordering of priorities. I think this is, in many respects, a leader-
ship problem. If I and my senior colleagues in the Department put
emphasis on our Embassies assisting businessmen, they will do so.
And if we fail to do it, they may go their way.
There's been this long tradition in American Embassies that they
prefer dealing with political issues, not in the pejorative sense, but
in the sense of international political issues, to assisting American
businessmen. And I think we have to change that concept.
Senator Coverdell. During the course of the hearing, there
have been several questions relating to Bosnia, Somalia, and the
work ahead with regard to redefinition of the use of American
force. You have made several statements here today with regard to
countries that have been taken over, for all practical purposes, by
drug dealers and narcotic cartels.
And you have correctly stated that it completely alters our ability
to engage in normal foreign policy. Do you envision that condition
as being one of the new areas or arenas for measurement of force?
Mr. Christopher. I wouldn't exclude it. The difficulty that you
encounter there is that a whole country may be under the sway of
a corrupt or criminal private organization and that may be so de-
fused that it would hard to meet the tests for the use of force.
But as I said earlier, Senator, I think that one of the fascinations
of this period is that the criteria for the use of force have been
broadened by examples such as Somalia At the same time, we have
to be very careful not to respond to every alarm or, more impor-
tantly in my judgment, to think that force is the preferred antidote.
Despite my comments that the discrete use of force is important
and justified, I still think that by far, more problems are going to
be solved by the effective use of diplomacy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Simon?
Senator Simon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sec-
retary, we welcome you here. I was interested in the fact that you
opened your statement by referring to growing up in Scranton, ND,
population 300. I come from Makanda, IL, population 402. And in
Scranton, ND, and Makanda, IL, most people understand that they
are in this thing together, that there is a sense of community, that
if someone gets hurt, ultimately everyone gets hurt. And in a very
real sense, I think that is a pretty good background for a Secretary
89
of State to have. Because what is true of Scranton, ND, is true of
the world.
Let me now get into some specifics. You refer in your statement
to an unstable world, and I think that is what we really have shift-
ed to — where the umbrella for foreign policy is no longer
anticommunism, because communism, for all practical purposes,
has collapsed, but it is instability.
And in that connection back in 1989 the then-Deputy Attorney
General made a determination that it was legal for the FBI to go
into Mexico and seize two citizens, notwithstanding our inter-
national agreements. And the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision,
and one I think was a terrible decision, said that was legal. Inter-
estingly, last month the principle party was acquitted on all counts
and repatriated to Mexico.
We had a barrage of protests from countries around the world to
that action. I am curious what your reaction is to the Supreme
Court decision and to the fundamental theory there?
Mr. Christopher. Well, in my foreign policy capacity, I dis-
agreed with the policy, and as a lawyer I disagreed with the deci-
sion.
Senator Simon. That is an excellent answer, and I am pleased
to hear it. I had a whole series of followup questions there, but I
do not need to go any further. [Laughter.]
Senator Kassebaum asked about Africa, and let me just com-
mend Senator Kassebaum, who has made a real contribution
Mr. Christopher. And you too, Senator.
Senator Simon [continuing]. In this area. Thank you, Mr. Sec-
retary. I would like to first, in connection with Somalia, disagree
strongly with my colleague from South Dakota, Senator Pressler,
who said the United States should not have been involved in lead-
ing on that. Had the United States not led, nothing would have
happened. And the reality is 350,000 people starved to death, an-
other 2 million were in peril of starvation. Had we not led, we
would have had the largest massive starvation in the history of
mankind since the Irish famine of the 1840's.
For The United States to sit back and not provide leadership, I
think would have been absolutely irresponsible. I do think that —
and you may want to consult with your colleagues — we may need
some kind of resolution authorizing and approving what has taken
place. I think there are even some technical questions about wheth-
er U.S. residual forces who may have to stay there to help with
water and other things, whether they can, under the present stat-
utes, stay there under non-U.S. command. I am just curious about
your reaction to that.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, there was a question that moved in
that direction this morning, and I thought about it a little bit but
have not had any time to inquire into it. But let me just say that
I would welcome an opportunity to work with you and with the
members of the committee on such a resolution. And let me broad-
en that to say that I know that Senator Biden has been a leader
in analyzing when congressional action is necessary when force has
been used or when our troops are in eminent danger, and I would
be glad to work with him and this committee to see whether a
90
more pragmatic approach can be developed to that whole set of is-
sues.
Senator Simon. And let me just say I welcome that. I think time
is an element here. We have to be moving fairly rapidly on that.
I would simply underscore what Senator Kassebaum had to say on
the Sudan.
On Liberia, I do not disagree with what you said, but I think we
have to also underscore that the United States has special respon-
sibilities there. We have spent more on a per capita basis in aid
to Liberia, by far, than any other African country. Liberia is the
only country, really, in Africa with long-term ties to the United
States.
And Senator Robb and I were in Liberia — I do not remember ex-
actly when, last year. Anyway, we met with Amos Sawyer on the
one side and went through, literally, 12 checkpoints to meet with
Charles Taylor on the other side. And after that there was a meet-
ing in the Ivory Coast in Abidjan of the two parties. But I think
it is essential that the United States continue — not to send troops,
but that we continue to provide significant leadership and that
there be a clear-cut sense of responsibility on our part.
Mr. Christopher. I agree that the regional group needs to have
constant stimulation and support, in at least rhetorical terms, and
that they are not doing a fully adequate job at the present time.
The other options are most difficult but, as you say, Senator, it is
of particular concern because Liberia, in a way somewhat com-
parable to the Philippines, is a country for which we have a special
responsibility, and it is not going very well.
Senator Simon. Absolutely. And the Philippines analogy is a good
one because Samuel Doe, just like Marcos, was helped by the Unit-
ed States a long time after he assumed dictatorial powers.
We are — Senator Kassebaum and I have been urging this admin-
istration, and we urge the new administration, to be more forth-
right in saying Mobutu is no longer on good terms with the United
States, we need a change in government, and he should, for the
sake of the people of Zaire, leave. The corruption is blatant. The
abuse of his people is blatant. I think that we ought to be firm
there. I would hope you would consider some forthright statement
either by yourself or by the President once January 20 is here.
Mr. Christopher. You have my support in that. I share your
feelings and attitude toward Mobutu.
Senator Simon. Great. You are doing very well on my scorecard
so far. [Laughter.]
Angola has had an election. They have a freely elected govern-
ment. We recognize — with the exception of three or four cases
around the world, we recognize every dictator. It does seem to me
the time is appropriate for us to formally recognize the Govern-
ment of Angola. Any reaction?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I read a little bit about Angola in the
last few days and do not know the degree to which the new govern-
ment has control of the area. But subject to examining that, I am
very sympathetic to the point you make.
As you know, one of the standards for recognition is whether the
government is able to maintain control within the borders that it
purports to control, and I just do not know whether that test is
91
met. But I suspect that it probably is. It is probably my own igno-
rance that keeps me from that.
Senator Simon. I would say I think that test is not completely
met, but part of meeting that test may be recognition. That by the
recognition we, in fact, help to reinforce the government that ex-
ists.
If I can follow up on a question that Senator Sarbanes and Sen-
ator Kerry had on the costs of U.N. peacekeeping, I introduced a
bill about a year ago to have these costs come out of the defense
budget. What I did not realize is there are major jurisdictional con-
cerns and you get into turf battles both in the executive branch
and, as Senator Pell can tell you from my discussions with him and
with Senator Nunn, also in the legislative branch.
We finally worked out — when I say we, Senator Levin worked on
this also. Senator Levin and I worked out so that in the current
fiscal year the Defense Department is authorized to take up to
$300 million of Defense Department money for U.N. peacekeeping
purposes. Something along that line seems to me to be a desirable
thing. You have already indicated that you favor that, but I just
thought I would mention there are some problems as you go down
that road, and I think there is a way of sharing that so that you
are not stuck with the full bill, and I think we have set a precedent
on that.
Mr. CHRISTOPHER. I think an organization with the initials OMB
probably gets into this struggle as well. [Laughter.]
Senator Simon. All of us appreciate the statement you made on
Iraq this morning, and in view of what has happened since that
time I think it is significant and we appreciate it.
One small thing, and it may not be small. The Prime Minister
of Great Britain has said we would like to see a democracy in Iraq.
The President of France has said we would like to see a democracy
in Iraq. Even, believe it or not, the King of Jordan has said we
would like to see a democracy in Iraq. The President of the United
States has yet to say we would like to see a democracy in Iraq.
Now I am told by people in the Department you shall soon be
heading that we do not want to discourage some other potential
military dictator from taking over. I frankly do not — I want to get
rid of Saddam Hussein, but if I am to replace Saddam Hussein
with some other military dictator, I do not know that that is a huge
victory. I would like to see the Secretary of State and the President
of the United States join other leaders in saying we want to have
a democracy in Iraq.
Mr. Christopher. Considering our commitment to democracy, as
I have reflected in my speech, that is very appealing to me. I would
have to hear a very strong argument to the contrary.
Senator Simon. You are still scoring well here. Senator Pressler
mentioned the possibility of designating someone on the Middle
East as a special Ambassador. I think you may have to look at
that. Now maybe we can get by without it, but I think that may
be necessary.
And my own instinct is that it should be someone of significant
stature, that it ought to be a George Shultz or — I do not know who
that person should be, but I do not think you can just take some-
one who is highly competent but is not a respected international
92
figure, and put that person into that slot. I just pass that along for
whatever interest you may have on that.
Proliferation, one of the areas where I think personal leadership
will be needed by you is to pull Pakistan, India, and China to-
gether. It is the one area of the world where I think there is the
possibility of disaster in terms of the use of nuclear power, and
there will not be any movement unless you get all three working
together. And I think that probably involves getting Russia to help
pull the thing together. Any reaction?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, you are probably right, but I would
hesitate to rule out the possibility of Pakistan and India being able
to come to some accord that would pull them back from the nuclear
threshold without being able to achieve any comparable result in
China. And I think you would have to have an agreement not to
seek supplies from China and perhaps some forbearance on China's
part in selling, because they seem to be a supplier of nuclear parts,
especially to Pakistan.
But I guess I would like to approach it with a little less gloomy
view than you. I have entertained for some time the hope that di-
plomacy might have some prospect of improving relations between
Pakistan and India. I see Senator Moynihan moving up in his
chair, and I think probably I am going to get a lecture on this sub-
ject in the near future as to the impossibility or possibility, and I
am looking forward to it. [Laughter.]
Senator Simon. I probably should defer to him at this point, but
I will wait until his time comes. I have to say I am more pessimis-
tic than you are on this. I do not believe unless China joins in this,
that you are going to see any de-escalation on the nuclear front
there.
You mentioned AID and reforming AID. One of the things I hope
we will do — and I see this is my last question on this round — I
hope we will keep in mind that there should be an emphasis on as-
sistance to the poor. It becomes very easy for AID to sign consult-
ing contracts and do all kinds of other things that really do not de-
liver the product.
Back when I was in the House I got an amendment adopted that
50 percent of AID effort has to go the poor. That was brought down
in conference to 40 percent and the 40-percent rule is still used. I
would like to see, frankly, the 40 percent lifted, but we at least
ought to keep that. And so as you reorganize AID, and my assump-
tion is you will have a voice in that, I hope that emphasis will be
kept in mind. And I would just ask you for any reaction and then
I will defer to the chairman.
Mr. Christopher. I think the emphasis on the poor, without
committing to any particular percentage, is a wise and necessary
one.
Senator Simon. I thank you very very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, indeed. And I would ask
the witness to please pull the microphone a little bit closer.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I have been slipping back. I am sorry.
The Chairman. Senator Moynihan?
Senator Moynihan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
the question has arisen about Somalia. Could I simply record one
observer's view that it clearly was necessary that something be
93
done there. And had it not been for Senator Simon leading a dele-
gation of this committee to Somalia in November, I very much
doubt it would have been done. I know that and I hope the world
knows that.
Senator Simon. Thank you.
Senator Moynihan. I was leaning forward when Senator Simon
spoke of the India-Pakistan confrontation only in response to the
thought that the situation was unstable enough. But it has become
profoundly, significantly more so as both of those countries dissolve
into ethnic, communal conflict, which is a characteristic of this
post-cold war world that you describe. You know, Bombay is "un-
inhabitable" today, although there are 12 million people inhabiting
it, as it were.
We are seeing, as you put it, the surfacing of long-suppressed
ethnic, religious, and sectional conflicts. They have been less con-
spicuous than they are now but they have been there all along.
And if I could make just one anecdote, in 1965 the U.N. held a
"seminar," that was as much as they dared call it, on "the multi-
national state." The first the U.N. had ever done. And the Yugo-
slavs offered to be the host, and it was held at Ljubljana, and no-
body in the Department of State wanted to go. It is a nice place
to go, Ljubljana. It just did not seem worth anybody's attention.
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State — I was then As-
sistant Secretary of Labor — asked me if I would go. And when I
came back I said, that country is not going to stay together. They
are fair to pleading for help in anticipation of what might happen.
And so to that situation, on November 25, which is 8 weeks ago,
perhaps, on behalf of this committee, I was in Sarajevo with Mr.
Galbraith of our staff. I regret to say, our Government did every-
thing it could do to prevent our getting in there. They did not want
us to see what we saw.
We flew in. The Canadians flew us in one day, and the British
flew us out the next day, and we spent the night at the head-
quarters of UNPROFOR. We met with General Morrillon. Maj.
Pierce-Butler briefed us.
And what we saw was genocide. I mean, it is the real thing. The
artillery, the heavy machineguns on the hills, all night, all day.
They are not there mounting a siege effort intent on capturing the
city. It is so evident if you are there. They just want the people in
that city to die. If they are dead by spring, the purpose will have
been achieved, and the ethnic balance will have been changed, and
so forth.
Could I just ask you, do you not feel there was something inad-
equate in an American diplomacy that so completely failed to see
the breakup of this whole enterprise? And now that we have it in
front of us, how difficult it has been to do anything. Your distin-
guished predecessor George Shultz, at a dinner for the Inter-
national Rescue Committee said, you know, we used to say after
the Holocaust "never forget, never again." And then he said, "what
is it we were not supposed to forget?'
And we have had a blockade there for 7 months. It has not done
anything of consequence. And we are not just looking at ethnic
strife, we are looking at the central horror of this century, geno-
94
cide. And I do not want to put any question to you, but would you
want to comment?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I agree with you completely. It is the
most horrifying situation in recent memory for me. This is not just
unpleasantness, this is slaughter and murder for purposes of ethnic
cleansing. This is rape being used as a tool of ethnic cleansing or
as a tool of terror. It really the most uncivilized kind of conduct.
As I said earlier today, there are few angels in that situation, but
the conduct of the Serbs overall I find, based upon the reading that
I have done, to be absolutely outrageous.
Senator Moynihan. I think there are some people that we should
admire. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, a man named
Jeremy Blade, and two people are feeding a third of a million peo-
ple. There is no food left. What comes in today is eaten the next
day. And surely it could be made more clear by the Europeans that
they will not have this. How could they have been so snake bit on
something that we thought a lesson had been learned? Or perhaps
I ask you make gratuitous comments about people you will be deal-
ing with. Maybe you can make them now. [Laughter.]
Mr. Christopher. Well, this has certainly not been a credit to
anyone in the area. Yes, I would like to amend my remarks. There
are some angels. The relief organizations. The people trying to ac-
complish the feeding. The U.N. What I meant, Senator, was that
none of the ethnic groups there are without some blame. But you
have to assess in that kind of situation comparative fault, and
where the provocation comes from, and who the principal perpetra-
tors are. And I think that is pretty clear.
It is a situation where Europe has performed in, I think, an
abysmal way. I see the French now want to take a much stronger
role, apparently having awakened to the situation. Some countries
have taken a number of refugees, perhaps feeling that that is the
principal contribution that they need to make. But it is a situation
that cries out for multilateral attention.
I said, perhaps when you were out of the room, Senator, I doubt
that this is a place where the United States should proceed unilat-
erally. But, in some way, we must evoke a stronger reaction, as
Governor Clinton has been saying for months.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Sir, could I just point out something you
know, which is that the U.N. Charter, chapter VII, deals with
breaches of the peace. We have an international conflict there;
Bosnia is a recognized country. Chapter VII has an intermediate
stage between economic embargoes and all-out war, which is "dem-
onstrations" of use of force. Article 42 refers specifically to "dem-
onstrations" of force. I do not know why there is bridge left in Bel-
grade. I mean, it is possible and the charter anticipated some spe-
cific use of force.
I do not know how they will survive this winter, and it has only
just begun. I did not want to press you. I know your own feelings
on this, and George Shultz, I think, speaks for a lot of people.
If I could just say, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my per-
sonal gratitude to Peter Galbraith for getting me out of there. It
is a lot easier to get in than get out. He did it. Thank you, Mr. Sec-
retary, we are so proud of you.
95
The Chairman. Our congratulations to Peter Galbraith, too. We
are very glad you are back.
Senator SlMON. Mr. Chairman, you should note that the motion
to thank Peter Galbraith passed by an 8 to 7 vote here. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Robb?
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join in thanking
Peter Galbraith in getting, I guess, every member of the committee
out of someplace at one time or another; not quite as difficult per-
haps as the circumstances that Senator Moynihan encountered.
Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for being with us this morning.
I would like to focus pretty much on the area of the world that I
am going to have the privilege of directing a subcommittee, in East
Asia. And you and I talked about that pretty much exclusively dur-
ing our visit, which I thank you for as well.
Before I do, let me add, as I think Senator Simon and others
have said, thank you for amending or adding to your statement
this morning to indicate that you do, indeed, stand shoulder-to-
shoulder with the current administration with respect to what was
actually being initiated in the Persian Gulf at the time that you
were making that statement. All of us have since had at least some
briefing both officially and unofficially on that topic. And I think
that the degree of continuity and resolve on the part of the United
States demonstrated by President Clinton serves all of us well.
Let me begin with a couple of general questions about the area
of East Asia, if I may. There are a number of academics that have
suggested from time-to-time that the Asian style democracies — the
soft authoritarian-type that you find in Thailand, Indonesia, and
Singapore are the only way tnat countries in this particular region
can be effectively governed. I wonder if you subscribe to that view,
or if you believe that something more akin to a Western-style de-
mocracy is ultimately going to be necessary, or something in be-
tween?
Mr. Christopher. Well, I have a natural preference for our kind
of democracy, without wanting to try to implant all of our institu-
tions elsewhere. I think there are some transitional situations. But
I cannot help but take a great deal of satisfaction, not pride but
satisfaction, in what has happened in Korea, where they had an
open, free election and it seems to have worked well there. And
they have gone through, under the leadership of No Tae Woo, a
real transition. And it seems to me that that is an example of a
country that has moved a long ways in that direction, and I hope
that others will as well.
I do not subscribe to the view that there are some ethnic charac-
teristics that require a certain kind of governing. That goes against
my grain to think that somehow the Asians are only fit for one
kind of government. I am naive enough or idealistic enough to
think that a representative form of government, not exactly like
ours but in that direction, is the highest advance we have come to
in governing. We have got lots of faults, but it does give people of
the country an opportunity to participate from time to time in a
peaceful change of government when they wish to do so. And so I
would not be satisfied with the characterization that somehow
Asians have to have only a soft form of democracy. I would like to
think of that as being transitional.
96
Senator Robb. One of the principal differences between the Euro-
pean area and the Asian area that we are discussing at the mo-
ment would be the lack in the latter of the kind of security agree-
ment that Europe has in terms of NATO. And I wonder if you
would comment on whether or not you think that kind of a security
framework is something that ought to be approached, and how that
would relate to our current forward basing strategy, and whether
or not we ought to consider removing any of the troops as we are
doing in Europe from, say, Korea or Japan?
Mr. Christopher. That is a large question, Senator. Let me try
to take it in smaller bites. NATO was created for a particular pur-
pose— to respond to the threat of the Soviet Union — and I think it
served that purpose very well. I believe there is a role for NATO
in the future, but it needs to be reorganized toward a different pur-
pose.
But I do not think that we ought to try to see an exact counter-
part in Asia. I would much rather see an Asia organized around
economic units, and that is the direction that it is going. The
ASEAN group has been a powerful economic force, and the new
economic group in the Pacific is, I think, although brand new and
a fledgling, is nevertheless very promising. So, I would not, I think,
be advocating a replication of NATO in the Pacific Basin unless
there is some major change in the force conditions there.
With respect to Korea, I think we need to keep troops in Korea
so long as North Korea is a threat. And the threat has not dimin-
ished from North Korea, and hence, although I do not want to
speak for all time, my own feeling is that we need to maintain a
significant force posture in South Korea.
And with respect to Japan, it seems to me that we need to have
forces arrayed there, especially now with our bases gone in the
Philippine Islands. We are a Pacific power, and the arrangements
with Japan are ones that are cooperative. The Japanese supply, I
think, about half of the cost of our military bases there. Of course,
they get a good deal in return in the way of enabling them to have
a smaller defense structure.
But I would not be inclined to change either of those. At the
same time, I would not be inclined to try to turn that into an alli-
ance comparable to NATO. I hope that relations between the old
ANZUS powers can be brought back to where they were before, al-
though out of the context of the cold war there might not be quite
as strong an impetus.
That is a pretty quick sweep of the issues that were generated
by your question.
Senator Robb. Well, I suspect there will be ample opportunity for
refinement, especially after you get over to your offices in Foggy
Bottom.
I did not mean that as a threat. I just meant that in terms of
the evolution of policy and the opportunity to be more explicit in
some of those areas.
Mr. Christopher. Perhaps you are looking at some of my staff
behind me. Were they wincing?
Senator Robb. There was a sort of a wane smile evident on Mr.
Donilon's face, I believe, among others.
97
But let me follow up, if I may, on the economic point. At this
point, the United States actually has about a third more trade
across the Pacific than across the Atlantic. And it sells more to
Japan than it does to Germany, France, and Italy combined. Is eco-
nomic diplomacy really, at this point, replacing political diplomacy
in terms of the relative importance of the two?
Mr. Christopher. Yes. I think now that the superpower con-
frontation has been eased, I think economic diplomacy becomes
more and more important. The campaign certainly emphasized eco-
nomics as a key ingredient in all, both national and international,
decisions.
Senator Robb. What kind of actions might you contemplate as
Secretary of State to enhance the economic or commercial diplo-
macy in that region?
Mr. Christopher. Well, as in other regions, I think our Embas-
sies have to be inspired to do much more to help American busi-
ness— to help American business find new markets, not to be shy
or bashful about rolling up their sleeves and getting in and helping
both industries and specific businesses obtain orders and new mar-
kets there.
I also think that our diplomacy ought to try to ensure that those
markets are open to us, and that we have a full opportunity to par-
ticipate in them. That is particularly true of a number of countries
in the region that will soon be within your particular ambit. I
speak of China and Japan, perhaps to a lesser extent, Korea. In
China, I think the balance of trade is about $18 billion in their
favor at the present time, and that really cannot last. I think they
have had some abusive trade practices that need to be examined
with great care.
Senator Robb. I would like to follow up. Let me just follow up
one other aspect, or one other thing with respect to Korea, and
then I would like to move to China specifically.
The Korean unification talks have been pretty much stymied for
over a year because of the stalling on the inspection arrangements.
With respect to the leadership on either side, Kim II Sung or his
potential successor, or the succession that you have just alluded to
with No Te Woo and with Kim Yu ong Sam having just been elect-
ed to take his place, where do you see those particular talks going,
and what should the U.S. role be in trying to influence or assist
in anything that might develop, specifically with respect to unifica-
tion?
Mr. Christopher. Well, I think the unification talks need to be
encouraged, but the United States has to play a careful role there
and remember that there are serious tensions, and that we cannot
press too hard.
My own feeling about it — and this is instinctive, not well-
schooled — is that until the leadership situation is clarified in North
Korea, it will be very hard to reach a dependable agreement.
Senator Robb. With respect to South Korea, let me digress for
just a moment, because you made reference to a second democratic
election. I happened to oe over in Korea just before the first com-
plete democratic election with the peaceful transfer of power that
took place, and I still remember meeting separately with both Kim
Dae Jung and Kim Yu ong Sam among others, who were each sug-
98
gesting at that point that they would resolve their differences be-
fore the election and one of them — and only one of them would
stand for election — would come with an even more democratic
force, as they saw it, but then they each privately assured me that
they were the one that was going to represent that particular vot-
ing bloc, and we all know what happened.
With respect to that situation, Kim Yu ong Sam in his election
did talk about a rice barrier. Are there things that we can do to
try to discourage the creation of additional barriers in terms of our
trade relationships with South Korea?
Mr. Christopher. I think it is a place for determined diplomacy.
The South Koreans know that there are many advantageous rela-
tionships with the United States, and one of the things we do not
need in this world is the creation of new barriers. Entrenched for-
eign interests are a problem in trading around the world. Not that
farmers do not deserve great respect and concern, but I think that
creating a new rice barrier would certainly be an unfortunate
move, and my guess is that the new Korean President ought to be
subjected to some quiet diplomacy.
Senator Robb. We certainly learned the effect or the political
strength of the agricultural community in the European situation,
and I have marveled at their ability to continue to make their
weight felt out of all proportion to their representation in society.
Let me move to China for just a minute. We have talked about
it a little bit in a couple of questions, but I do not know whether
you have addressed head on at this time, at least in your public
testimony here today, the question specifically of whether or not
you will be making a recommendation for MFN with or without
conditions as things now stand.
I know you made reference in your opening statement to a num-
ber of things that were of concern, but of course, those come to
focus when we confront as a Congress this issue — and indeed, Sen-
ator Mitchell said I think last Sunday on Meet the Press that he
was going to reintroduce the legislation that he introduced on the
Senate side, and that Congresswoman Pelosi introduced on the
House side, and I would welcome any comment that you have with
respect to the administration's position on that.
Mr. Christopher. I think we need to work hard to try to achieve
some improvement in the various problems we have with China: on
the proliferation front — that is, their export of various nuclear ma-
terials; and their human rights approach both to their own citizens,
to dissidents as well as to the problems with Tibet. But I do not
think we need to think that MFN is our only tool. We ought to try
creative diplomacy on these subjects, remembering the advantages
of conditional MFN as we move through the year. I recall that
comes up in June. Am I right about that?
Senator Robb. June I believe is the month, yes.
Mr. Christopher. My own hope is that we do not, just as we
sometimes do, just put everything over until June and make every-
thing depend upon one piece of leverage. We have other, diplomatic
leverage that I think we ought to try to use to see if we cannot get
any improvement in some of the other conditions.
99
Senator Robb. I can understand your desire not to be terribly
specific on that question. I will not follow up at this particular mo-
ment.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
Senator Robb. But let me ask you perhaps a more general ques-
tion. Are you optimistic about the next generation of leadership?
We continue to discuss the old men, if you will, it being a largely
patriarchal society in that regard, but there is always the hope that
the next generation of leadership will be more tuned to some of the
things that the West considers important and that the inter-
national community is increasingly placing value on.
Do you have some sense of the quality of leadership that is going
to emerge and our ability to work with that leadership?
Mr. Christopher. I am a little sensitive, Senator, about the
older generation's leadership. [Laughter.]
Senator Robb. When we have an incoming 46-year-old President,
I think everybody is concerned about being cast in terms of any
particular chronological place in history.
Mr. Christopher. You know, one of the endearing truths about
China as far as I am concerned is that I do not understand the
leadership situation there adequately. Maybe I will after I have
been in this new position for a time, but there are so many layers
of leadership, and I think the leadership is so pegged to us here
in the United States that I would not want to oner a glib comment
that the next generation of leadership is going to be substantially
different. I have not been educated on that subject recently.
Maybe the agencies that will help educate me know more than
I do, but I am pretty skeptical of our full ability to understand ex-
actly what kind of leadership is likely to succeed there and when.
Senator Robb. Well, skipping just a little bit west, you men-
tioned Tibet both in your opening statement and just a moment
ago. About a year ago, I think it was, the Dalai Lama was here.
He had probably as many representatives of the congressional lead-
ership on both sides of the aisle here to welcome him, but he was
not accorded the honor that we give many heads of state and world
leaders of a joint session of Congress.
We met, I think it was, in Statuary Hall, if I remember correctly,
and he addressed an overflow crowd. You expressed some opti-
mism, but of course, the situation there is still a matter of ongoing
concern. Would you be just a little bit more expansive, and I will
save Japan for another round.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think that is one of the major
human rights problems we have with China. We ought to be more
effective with China with respect to Tibet, but I do not foresee the
United States taking any action such as unilateral recognition, for
example, of Tibet, because of the high costs that it would invoke
in other areas. I do think we have to be as determined as we can
be, because the violations of human rights there are very striking.
Senator Robb. Were I sitting in your seat, Mr. Secretary, I do not
think I would be any more specific in my answers than you were,
but I look forward to working with you on those and a number of
topics.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you very much.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
100
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Robb. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Christopher,
I have gained a great deal from just listening to you today, and I
am going to follow with just a few questions relating to my brief
remarks earlier having to do with deficit reduction.
I recognize, as you have, that your Department would not be the
biggest spender in our Government by any means, but I am inter-
ested in pursuing a couple of items with you.
In the area of eliminating waste, I think you referred in your re-
marks to a need to overhaul the Agency for International Develop-
ment. Senator Simon made some reference to that organization and
its purposes. There has been a great deal of criticism regarding the
operations of the AID programs. GAO identified some specific prob-
lem areas.
One that has been brought to my attention is one GAO study
found that some $300 million in a pipeline that was not pro-
grammed to be spent within 2 years, and another $8 million for
projects that had already been completed.
There have also been proposals, I am told, to abolish AID and
bring their operations directly within the Department of State. Do
you nave any views on reforms that would correct some of these
problems, and do you have any thoughts on this idea of abolishing
AID and putting it directly within the Department of State?
Mr. Christopher. Well, with respect to reforms, it is clear to me
that the purposes are too diverse, that programs are too many, and
thus it is not possible to maintain adequate controls over them. I
would hope that a newly reorganized AID could not only be more
effective but also more efficient.
I think also, Senator, it is time to reconsider some of our prior-
ities. It may be that there are some countries that we can lower
our aid amounts to now that we are out of the cold war period. On
the other hand, I do believe in the overall concept of aid and would
not like to see us abandon that concept, both for humanitarian, as
well as enlightened self-interest.
If I was in a very aggrandizing mood, perhaps I would think that
AID ought to be brougnt into the State Department, but that is a
subject with a long history, and I think I would like to postpone
any judgment on that until those who are considering the reorga-
nization have a greater time to get into the matter. Operating at
its best, there need be no hostility or inconsistency between AID
and the State Department, which is somewhat analogous to that
between State Department and USIA and the State Department
and ACDA. You can make a case in each instance that they should
be brought into the Department, but you can also make the other
case.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. With regard to the programs we
might classify as "otherwise," within the programs you have sug-
gested are there some areas where we could cut foreign aid, or per-
haps not necessarily specific countries but areas of foreign assist-
ance in general. Can you help me at all with what some examples
of those might be?
Mr. Christopher. I think where we have military supply rela-
tionships with countries through the multilateral programs, that
some of those can almost certainly be cut back, now that we are
101
out of the cold war era. I ought to say, though, that a tremendous
proportion — I am not sure how high the number is but it is very
high — of our aid goes to Israel and Egypt. There is a very strong
case for the maintenance of aid at those existing levels, a case that
is usually strongly put and strongly felt here on Capitol Hill.
Senator Feingold. With regard to the trade issue that has been
brought up, obviously, this is not an area in which you have pri-
mary responsibility if you are Secretary of State, but there is some
involvement. I share the comments of Senator Coverdell that back
home in my State I have heard a fair amount of concern about
NAFTA and GATT from dairy farmers, from working people who
may not in every case understand all the implications of the pro-
posed agreements, but we even have some specific examples of
where we think the way these things are drafted may be harmful.
But I was pleased to hear your comments that it is time for the
diplomacy that we have in this country tc assure access of U.S.
businesses to global markets. And in that regard, I would like to
ask you about the concept which some have called trade for aid.
That is a little more specific than the notion of economic diplomacy
that Senator Robb was talking about, but what are your views on
a greater linkage between our trade interests and foreign assist-
ance activities, and to what extent can we actually link American
trade interests to our foreign policy decisions?
Mr. Christopher. I think that there can be a close nexus be-
tween aid and trade. Frequently, grants of aid required a certain
percentage of purchases from the United States, unless my memory
is falling far short, and perhaps that can be increased. However,
I do think that we need to take a long-term view of that, Senator.
We give aid so that countries can improve their situation, become
more successful, and thus become real customers of ours.
The same thing is true of democracy, generally speaking, and
market economies. We promote market economy not just out of a
sense of it being the right thing or the moral thing to do, but rath-
er that market economies tend to be better customers of ours. And
so it is with successful countries. And if you insist on a one-to-one
linkage you may prevent a country from moving into a place where
it becomes an important customer.
In my statement, I indicated that our sales to Latin America
have about doubled in recent years. Well, part of that is because
some of those countries are thriving and they become good cus-
tomers of ours. So I would tell you there may k>e some direct link-
age, but we ought to take a long-term view of that, as well as a
short-term view.
Senator Feingold. I certainly agree with that on the positive
side of building relationships. Let us just take the example, though,
of the China situation, the most-favored-nation statusthat Senator
Robb was discussing with you. You mentioned proliferation and
human rights, and of course, the Tibet issue. To what degree do
you believe the issue specifically of trade imbalance should, along
with these other concerns, be a factor in determining extension of
MFN?
Mr. Christopher. I think it should be a very important factor.
The trade imbalance at a $18 billion level cries out for correction.
102
Senator Feingold. That would be part of the decisionmaking on
MFN?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. Let me turn again, as many members of the
committee have, to Bosnia. One of the most telling and disturbing
comments today by Senators Biden, Lugar, Moynihan, had to do
with that situation. And the situation not only in Bosnia but all of
former Yugoslavia is of heightened concern in the State of Wiscon-
sin. We have many people in the State who tie their roots to that
area of the world. There are 70,000 people in Wisconsin of Croatian
descent, 12,000 to 15,000 people in the Milwaukee area alone of
that background, also that many of Serbian descent. It was per-
haps the only real foreign policy issue that came up regularly dur-
ing our election campaign in Wisconsin. So I am actually asked
questions on almost a daily basis about what is going on over there
and I could use a little help in trying to understand some of these
terms that are thrown around because people back home want to
know what they mean.
For example, what do you think would be the realistic impact of
enforcement of a no-fly zone? What could that really do in that
area?
Mr. Christopher. Well, it would have limited utility, I would
say, in terms of its compelling character in realistic terms. On the
other hand, the people of Bosnia, the Bosnians clearly want it.
They think it will give them freedom of maneuver to level the play-
ing field.
There are perhaps not a great deal of activity by Serbian aircraft
at the present time, but the threat of them is ever present, and I
think an assurance that the Bosnians would be able to operate
without fear of air interdiction would be a very positive factor.
I also think it would be a very significant psychological factor for
the United States and our allies in Europe trying to move that ad-
ditional step to level the playing field. So while I would not pretend
that it is a cureall, it is one way to reflect our wanting to take a
stronger role toward the solution of those problems.
Senator Feingold. The second item that is asked of me about
Bosnia has to do with the lifting of the arms embargo for Bosnia,
and I guess — perhaps this would be a more dramatic thing than
the no-fly zone? I do not know. But what — give us your feeling —
would be the impact of lifting that embargo?
Mr. Christopher. I do not have a specific comment on that, Sen-
ator. You can go down this list of things, and I am going to dis-
appoint you I know because we are not yet in office and we have
not had the chance to have the kind of disciplined discussion of
those various alternatives that will be essential. The outgoing ad-
ministration clearly has wanted to stand clear of options like that,
and we need to understand what options are open to us, which can
be most effectively carried out, which ones would justify action by
the United States. So I am sorry to disappoint you, but I have gone
about as far as I can go within the limits of our not yet being in
office and not having the kind of disciplined discussion at the Cabi-
net level with recommendation to the President that will be nec-
essary to address with finality that kind of a question.
103
Senator Feingold. Of course, I respect that and recognize the
complexity of the situation. Let me just finish with one other piece
on Bosnia. Of greatest concern to people, of course, throughout the
country is whether or not there would be ground troops, U.S.
ground troops, committed to the situation, and I recall reading
some of the editorials at the time of the Somalian action, people
trying to define, as you and others are, what are the appropriate
circumstances for American intervention in this new era.
One comment in the New York Times editorial is that you should
consider just how difficult the situation would be for American
troops in Somalia versus getting involved in former Yugoslavia,
what the losses are likely to be. Is that a legitimate consideration
as a part of an overall decision of whether ground troops would
ever be committed?
Mr. Christopher. Ground troops are not contemplated, not with-
in the current range of options. Let me give you just some of the
factors that I think would have to be involved in considering that
kind of a question.
First, you would have to have a very specific objective, one that
was tangible and could be stated in a way that it would be under-
stood by the American people. And that would not be easy to do.
Second, you would have to have a strong likelihood that your ob-
jective could be achieved, that you would not want to go into that
unless you could win.
Third, I think you would have to weigh whether or not the bene-
fits of what you did outweighed the costs and the risks, the costs,
both in terms of lives and dollars.
And, finally, you would have to ask whether or not you would
have for the support of that kind of an endeavor — the support of
the American people as well as our allies abroad.
Those are very stern tests to meet, and as I say, there is no
present contemplation, as far as I know, of ground troops.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I want to assure you that my
questions do not suggest that I am eager to see that happen. Of
course, I am very eager to see that not happen, and that is the
view that has been expressed by many people to me.
In the area of arms control, just a couple of questions. The
Chemical Weapons Convention, I understand, will be open for sig-
nature in a few days and I think it should be a priority of the ad-
ministration. When do you expect this to be submitted to the Sen-
ate for advice and consent, and are there any major steps that have
to be taken before it is submitted?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, the submission of that is going to
have to be considered in light of our other submissions to Congress.
We have Start II coming along, and we will just have to see how
much the circuits will bear and do that in consultation with the
members of this committee and also the leadership. So on that, I
am just going to have to beg off by saying that is a very important
issue, and the decisions as to exactly what legislative program
President Clinton is going to have is a decision that I could not —
or would not — want to unilaterally comment on.
Senator Feingold. One other question on that. Are there any
countries that are reluctant to join that convention? I have heard
104
that that may be the case. What steps can we take to persuade
them to participate?
Mr. Christopher. Well, my understanding is that generally
speaking, and I do not want to make this too inclusive, but a num-
ber of Arab countries are not prepared to sign, and I do think that
is a very unfortunate step on their part. We ought to use our diplo-
macy and our persuasion to try to get them to rule out that addi-
tional means of mass destruction.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, I appreciate your responses.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you very much, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Mathews.
Senator Mathews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know the hour
is drawing late, so I will try not to be too overbearing here or to
take up too much time, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Mathews. Let me start by saying that I applaud the
strong commitment that you made to the linking of diplomacy, and
the offering of opportunities for U.S. industry, and I think that for
too long too many of our jobs and too many of our opportunities
have gone elsewhere.
In tnis respect, I would like to read a statement that you made
earlier and ask you to elaborate on it somewhat if you would.
You said this morning in your opening statement, we need to
overhaul the Agency for International Development. The Agency
needs to take on fewer missions and narrow the scope of its oper-
ations and make itself less bureaucratic. As a matter of enlight-
ened self-interest as well as compassion, we need to extract a les-
son from AID's past successes and failures to make its future ef-
forts stronger.
Now, you may or may not be aware that during the course of the
recent campaign — and I do not convey any partisan overtones to
what I am going to say, but during the course of this campaign in
the State of Tennessee we were the victims of the very reverse of
what this statement says. The Agency for International Develop-
ment exported the principal industry of one of our small towns to
a Central American country, I believe, and the little community in
Tennessee is continuing to suffer.
Does your statement here indicate to us that you will be looking
at this type of situation and that you will be reallocating resources
to a more useful purpose?
Mr. Christopher. That was one of the failures of AID, Senator.
I will be perfectly clear on that subject. There will be no repetition
of that under our administration if it can possibly be avoided. I just
think it was an improper use of aid, and I can understand why the
people of Tennessee as well as the people of the country were upset
by it.
Senator Mathews. Thank you. Just one other question, Mr.
Chairman, and then I will relinquish the floor.
In this one, I want to talk a little bit about the situation related
to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iraq. I am told that since 1990,
when the original Persian Gulf crisis began to develop, that we
have sold — our country has sold to these countries in the Middle
East some $36 billion worth of arms, and it appears that the
amount of sales has been greater than what might have been need-
105
ed for defensive purposes, and I hear that some of it might have
been for economic reasons and has no real basis other than eco-
nomic reasons.
I have two questions along that line. First, do you feel that the
administration will be more selective in this process, in the sale —
will be a little more selective as to what amounts are sold, and sec-
ond, as I understand it the Arms Export Control Act does convey
that this body — that the Congress of the United States has some
involvement in the arms sale. Do you anticipate that you will be
conferring with the Congress under the aegis of this requirement
or suggestion?
Mr. Christopher. Well, there have been very considerable arms
sales to the Middle East. The sales to Saudi Arabia, I believe, were
supported by Governor Clinton during the campaign.
The regime that was begun in the U.N., the five-power regime
to try to set standards for sales to the Middle East, has been some-
what set to one side particularly because of the Taiwan sale having
upset the Chinese, but I think we have to get back to regimes like
that if we are going to get some control, at least, of the sale of
weapons that escalate the likely confrontation and conflagration in
those areas.
Selling higher levels of weapons in an area where they are not
yet present produces serious problems. I think you will find, Sen-
ator, that there is a very extensive need to confer with the commit-
tees of Congress. With respect to sales of that character, they have
to be reported to Congress and there is a period of consultation
that will provide a full opportunity for Congress to act. Whether
Congress chooses to act, of course, will be a decision for Congress.
Frequently, there are explanations for the need to make such
sales that do not appear right on the surface, and I think that Con-
gress also recognizes that, in the exercise of foreign policy leader-
ship, the President is entitled to a certain presumption that the
sale makes some sense. Quite often, sales are balanced one against
another, but I think the Congress will have a full opportunity to
exercise its leadership in that regard.
Mr. Chairman, would you endorse what I have just said there?
The Chairman. I was not following you as closely as I should,
but I am sure I would if I were.
Senator BlDEN. Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask a question
along those lines, but I would fully endorse what you said, Mr. Sec-
retary, that we do have that responsibility, opportunity, and au-
thority.
Mr. Christopher. I was just afraid, Mr. Chairman, that my in-
formation was out of date, but I am glad to have Senator Biden
confirm that I am not way out of date on that.
Senator Biden. No, you are not out of date. We have just usually
been out of step.
The Chairman. And I would support your statement very much.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
The Chairman. We have now finished the first round of question-
ing, and I think if the witness — the Secretary-designate is going to
go on to continue for a while, would you like a break for 5 minutes?
106
Mr. Christopher. A 5-minute break would be fine, but I would
just as soon the 5-minute break did not turn into a 15-minute
break, because I would like to get out.
The Chairman. Well, let us agree to be back here in 5 minutes,
and we will recess, and then after that we will have 10-minute
questions, not 15, to try to make it roll along a little faster.
We will recess for 5 minutes.
[A brief recess was taken.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. For the sake
of expeditious movement I will forego my turn here at questions
and will turn to the ranking minority member, who I believe may
have some.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Helms. Where did the crowd go, Mr. Chairman? Did you
drive them away?
The Chairman. Oh, I do not know.
Senator Helms. Mr. Christopher, let me go back to where we left
off when my time expired in the first round. You do not wear a
hearing aid now, do you?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir.
Senator Helms. I hope you never do. As I recall, the upshot of
what you said was that the Carter administration was going to
give arms when the hostages were released.
Mr. Christopher. It was that we were going to release the arms
that had been embargoed, or frozen. They were not going to give
them. They had been sold and paid for.
Senator Helms. Well, OK I will buy that. I must say, it is a dif-
ference without a distinction.
Mr. Christopher. No, sir. The word "give" has a particular con-
notation, Senator.
Senator Helms. Well, yes. You have it your way and I will have
it mine.
Mr. Christopher. All right, sir.
Senator Helms. Then, Dick Lugar, I am told when I was down
at the White House, pointed out whether the arms were spare
parts or not was not relevant, and he said, as I am told, that what
is relevant is that you were willing to anti-up arms paid for by our
ally the Shah to the Ayatollah. Am I on base so far with my under-
standing?
Mr. Christopher. All I can do is to repeat what I said before,
that the arms paid for by the Government of Iran and in storage
here and frozen could be returned after the hostages returned, but,
Senator, subject to U.S. munitions control.
I was able to get into the agreement at the last minute a provi-
sion indicating tnat only those arms that U.S. munitions control
permitted would be turned over to the Iranians. So there continued
to be a check that the Reagan administration was entitled to use
to prevent even those previously paid for arms from going forward,
and if you look at the declarations of Algiers, you will see that writ-
ten in.
Senator Helms. OK, but in any case, you are talking about arms
that were accumulated, if that is the word, by an ally of the United
States and a friend of the United States, specifically the Shah of
Iran, and you are going to turn them over to the Ayatollah now.
107
Anyway, I do not want to overburden the subject, but we have
still got the $48 million that the Reagan administration shipped in
arms compared to three times that much of what the Carter ad-
ministration— and what I am driving at, and it is perfectly clear,
all of this stuff, the October Surprise, they were engaging and they
were planting stories in the news media saying that Reagan did
this and Reagan did that, and here comes a report, and it was held
up until after the election, a report that completely exonerated
Ronald Reagan and George Bush, and so if we are going to talk
about politics, let us talk about it both ways.
Anyway, I think that sort of wraps up the question of who was
willing to give arms for hostages.
Now, the other main allegation of the October Surprise crowd, if
I could use that word, is that it was Reagan who used the hostages
for political purposes, yet on the night of March 31 you agreed this
morning, if I remember correctly, that you were with President
Carter and that you wrote a speech for President Carter saying
that the hostages were going to be transferred to Government con-
trol despite the fact that the Ayatollah said they would not.
Now, let us go back to the question of the Ayatollah. You agreed
this morning that he was the main decisionmaker. A lot of other
people were doing the talking, but he was the guy who called the
shots.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, that is not what I said this morning.
What I said this morning was, you could not depend upon views
that were attributed to the Ayatollah. One of the things we learned
during that period was to be highly skeptical.
When there would be a report that something had been said by
the Ayatollah, it might have been said by a member of his family,
it might have been misattributed to him, it might have been said
by a member of his Cabinet and taken back the next day, so we
had no basis for being certain about the accuracy of the Ayatollah's
views because there were so many indications of inaccuracy.
The civilian Government officials who we were dealing with at
that time purported to be acting in the name of the Government
of Iran.
Senator Helms. Well, Ham Jordan quoted President Carter as
saying everybody is on board except the one person who can free
the hostages — Khomeini.
Mr. Christopher. When did he say that?
Senator Helms. March 25. Do vou want to see the document?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir. I take your word for it.
Senator Helms. OK.
Mr. Christopher. Well, we thought it was an important step for-
ward when — I believe it was Bani Sadr who indicated that the hos-
tages would be moved into governmental custody.
Senator Helms. Who indicated?
Mr. Christopher. The then civilian leader of Iran, who I believe
was Bani Sadr, and I continue to feel, Senator, that it was impor-
tant for the United States to acknowledge that, to try to give addi-
tional concreteness to that promise that was made by the head of
the civilian Government of Iran.
Senator Helms. Well, here again, I guess I am just sensitive be-
cause all year long, beginning when tnis Foreign Relations Com-
108
mittee met in S-116 of the Capitol and agreed to set up an October
Surprise Committee and financed it and all the rest of it — I forget
the details — there were some of us saying, look, this is a waste of
money, a waste of time, and it is going to be a political thing, and
that is what it turned out to be all year long.
Now, I am not charging you with that.
Mr. Christopher. Good.
Senator Helms. But I am saying that you did write that state-
ment, and Mr. Christopher, please forgive me, but if you say that
you did not write that statement in Wisconsin for political pur-
poses, I want to sell you some land down in North Carolina that
is under water.
Of course it was political. Why did you choose that place to write
that statement for Jimmy Carter? Of course it was political.
Mr. Christopher. Why did I choose what place? I was called to
the White House at 5 a.m., when we received a message from Iran
indicating that Bani Sadr had promised to move the hostages into
governmental custody.
Senator Helms. Well, the President went on television and an-
nounced all that good news, right?
Mr. Christopher. What I did was to try to summarize the effect
of this event. I did not write the statement that he read on tele-
vision. What I did was to put in writing, in the most succinct terms
that I could, the effect of those events. I was there at the White
House that morning, but I was not a part of the political system.
I think that it is very healthy, and I, if I become Secretary of State,
will stay out of politics.
Senator Helms. Dick Lugar meant Gary Sick. Do you know who
I am talking about?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Helms. Was Gary Sick taking notes that late night at
the White House meeting with Jimmy Carter?
Mr. Christopher. I suppose Gary Sick might well have been in
that meeting. I do not happen to remember.
Senator Helms. Well, since Dick Lugar — Senator Lugar men-
tioned Gary Sick, I want to pursue that a little bit.
What has been specifically your relationship with him?
By the way, I guess we ought to identify for the record that he
was the main proponent of the October Surprise theory.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I served in Government with Gary
Sick between 1977 and 1980, and I may have seen him once or
twice since then, but I do not have a continuing relationship with
him. I thought he served with patriotism during that period, and
I have looked at his book, although I do not think I read it all.
Senator, I would like to go back to the Octobet Surprise Commit-
tee set up by this committee and just again express surprise that
you are not aware of my extensive testimony before that commit-
tee. I met with the committee, devoted many hours to it in Los An-
geles, and then came at my own expense because I thought it was
my public duty, and testified here in Washington.
Senator Helms. What committee specifically? Who were the
members of the committee you met with in California?
Mr. Christopher. That was the staff of the committee, sir.
Senator Helms. Pardon?
109
Mr. Christopher. The staff of the committee.
Senator Helms. I thought you said the committee.
Mr. Christopher. They were representatives of the committee.
They were sent by the committee to interview me. The committee
had a legal staff, and as I recall, there were three or four people
present.
Senator Helms. Oh, I am sure they spent a lot of money chasing
the rabbit.
Mr. Christopher. If you had read the report of the committee
and read my testimony, if you had been present in the hearing
room, I think you might not be making some of the allegations you
are making here with respect to my attitude about that.
I was very clear that I had no evidence of there being an October
Surprise. I think Senator Lugar was there. I think perhaps he
might confirm to you, but it is surprising to me you are pursuing
this line of questions when there in the report of this very commit-
tee is a summary of my testimony and also a summary of the
memorandum that was prepared after the extensive meeting in Los
Angeles.
Senator Helms. Well, just summarize for me what you said to
the staff members who came out to California. What did you say
about this investigation? How did you feel about it?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I told them I had no position as to
whether or not there was any validity to Gary Sick's thesis. I did
not support it. I simply gave them a chronological account of my
negotiations, which commenced with meetings in Germany on Sep-
tember 15 and 17.
I can go through that in some detail, those events happen to be
etched in my memory, but I do not think that will be particularly
relevant here. It was useful to them in their account and it was
useful to them, I think, in showing that there was no October Sur-
prise, or in their reaching the conclusion there was no October Sur-
prise.
Senator Helms. Well, that is not quite what you said to the New
York Times, though. And I think what you said to the New York
Times is why they sent these staff members from the Senate. I did
not have anything to do with that. I was opposed to the damn com-
mittee.
Mr. Christopher. Well, what I said to the New York Times is
very close to what Senator Sarbanes said here. There was an im-
portant book that was being widely discussed. There were impor-
tant changes that a negotiation that I had conducted had been
somehow rigged, and I was quite interested in getting to the bot-
tom of it. And, frankly, it seems to me that these two investigations
have established that there was no October Surprise and I think
that is quite a healthy thing to have happened in our society. I
agree with Senator Sarbanes on that.
Senator Helms. Well, I do not know if it is healthy to be accused
for a whole year, but let me ask you one quick question, yes or no;
have you recommended Mr. Sick to be given a role in the Clinton
administration?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Helms. Do you plan to do so?
110
Mr. Christopher. No, sir. I have no — it is not within my area
of concern. I mean he was in the National Security Council and I
do not know what his role is going to be, if any. That name has
not come to my attention.
Senator Helms. You do know him, though, don't you?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I do know him. As I said, I worked with
him for 4 years.
Senator Helms. Yes. Was that when you were with Ramsey
Clark?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir. It was when I was with President
Carter. He was in the White House, in the National Security Coun-
cil under Dr. Brzezinski between 1977 and 1980.
Senator Helms. Well, we will revisit this a little later.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Biden.
Senator Kassebaum. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could yield off
my time just a moment to an addendum. And I do not like to weigh
into this, but Gary Sick is a Kansan [laughter] so I have a certain
parochial interest here. I did not support the October Surprise
Commission. I think it was a mistake to weigh into that as we did.
But I have always valued Gary Sick's understanding of the Middle
East, and I think through the years he has offered some very valu-
able assessments of the Middle East, and I would just like to inter-
ject that at this point, rather than have it look as if he was sort
of nobody.
Senator Helms. He is from Kansas, you say.
Senator Kassebaum. Yes, he is.
Mr. Christopher. Senator Kassebaum, his book All Fall Down,
I think is a very valuable account of the Iranian revolution. And
as I said before, I think he served with patriotism during the years
1977 through 1980. I just do not regard him as an intimate friend.
I do not see him.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I am a little confused here.
Senator Helms. That is all right, you will get over it.
Senator BlDEN. The Senator from North Carolina says I will get
over it, but not through his questioning, it confuses me more.
As I understand it, you just sat here and said that you at the
time told this committee and its investigators that you had no evi-
dence, no concrete evidence. You did not speculate for them that
there was an October Surprise. You had no first hand evidence, or
I assume second or third hand, that there was an October Surprise.
And you have just said, sitting there under oath, you believe now,
based on the investigation that has gone forward, that there was
no October Surprise.
And so I am confused, and I ask my friend from North Carolina
what other than making the point that Ronald Reagan did not en-
gage in an October Surprise — what is the relevance of the ques-
tions to the Secretary?
Senator Helms. Well, there is a great deal of relevance be-
cause— do you want to yield to me?
Senator Biden. Sure, I would be happy to.
Senator Helms. OK.
Senator Biden. I do not want to have to sit through 2 more days
engaged in this line of questioning.
Ill
Senator Helms. I could say — and I am not charging this, I am
just — we are getting all sorts of calls from credible people, and I
said at the outset this morning that he ought to be given an oppor-
tunity to explain. But there are all sorts of ways of saying to staff
members, well, you know, I have got no evidence of this, so and so
and so and so, and it is a tons of voice.
I have not read that statement because it was not released until
today.
Senator Biden. Got you.
Senator Helms. And I intend to read — I have not read it yet, but
I intend to read it. But in the meantime I think that he ought to
be given an opportunity to explain in detail some of the things that
are being said.
Senator Biden. If the Senator would yield, the one thing that I
have never heard the Secretary-designate accused of is being loose-
lipped or exceedingly forthcoming.
Senator Helms. I did not say that.
Senator Biden. I have not heard anybody suggest that there was
any — by body language, by indirect reference — indication that War-
ren Christopher at any time said, you know, I think there is an Oc-
tober Surprise and you should go investigate that. I do not hear
anybody said that. Is somebody telling you he said that?
Senator Helms. They are saying all sorts of things. You asked
about the overall relevance.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Senator Helms. OK The overall relevance is that President
Carter offered arms for hostages.
Senator Biden. No, that is not true, Senator.
Senator Helms. Yes it is.
Senator Biden. No, it is not, Senator.
Senator Helms. All right. And he used politics in this thing. And
it is understandable to me because he was in bad shape politically
and he was trying to recover. He was first in bad shape within his
own party, and then he ran into a tractor-trailer truck in Ronald
Reagan in the fall.
Senator Biden. George Bush can tell you about tractor-trailers.
Senator Helms. And the point the people are making is that Mr.
Christopher helped him do this, the playing politics and so forth.
Senator Biden. I see.
Senator Helms. AndTTam giving him an opportunity to say it
ain't so.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I think he has done it very effectively.
Senator Biden. Now that is a specific question. Can you say it
ain't so? And I know that is hard, probably, for you to say, but can
you say it is not so?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I can say it ain't so.
And the point I would like to make again, I think the Senator
would be reassured if he would simply read the transcript of my
testimony before the October Surprise Committee. I think those
who were present felt that I had given a fair account and it helped
them reach the conclusion that there was no October Surprise.
That is why I am just kind of dazzled by this set of questions,
Senator. I went to a lot of trouble to produce facts that helped the
112
committee reach the conclusion that there was no October Sur-
prise, and now I find you charging me with just the opposite.
Senator Helms. I am not charging you. I have aslted you ques-
tions.
Senator Biden. Well, I thank my colleague for answering my
question. I thank him very much and I thank you.
Let me — in the few minutes that I have left — shift gears here.
We talked about international institutions and the considerations
that you have underway, at least in the conceptual stage on the
international community's preparedness to use force.
It was discussed and, as usual, our chairman is exceedingly mod-
est. I came here when Sam Ervin was still here, Mr. Secretary, and
he carried a copy of the Constitution. From the time I have gotten
here, the chairman of this committee has literally carried a copy
of the U.N. Charter in his pocket. It is dogeared.
I will never forget, it must be 13, 14 years ago, this man sug-
gested to me that article 43 was not used appropriately, we did not
understand it, the world did not respond to it properly, and so on.
And now he is sitting here giving me credit for initiating some con-
gressional activity relating to article 43.
But having said that, and ending this mutual admiration society,
I would like to discuss the need to fulfill the potential of article 43
of the U.N. Charter. And if you act to do so, you will clearly have
the support of this committee based on our votes, notwithstanding
the fact that I do not know how the three new members would
vote, but the remainder of the committee has voted so.
This brings me to NATO. I think it is little recognized but pro-
foundly important that the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance are
now negotiating among themselves the precise terms under which
NATO will be made available to implement decisions in the CSCE
or the U.N. Security Council. And this will represent a new and
broader application, if it occurs, of the principle of collective secu-
rity.
The truth is that if collective security is to work, this trans-
formation of NATO, in my view, must succeed. For in practical
terms, NATO is the one organization in the world that unifies and
coordinates the military power of the major Western democracies.
As we are seeing, as the world community today, and in Desert
Storm, responded to Saddam Hussein.
So what I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, is this. This
NATO transformation has been slowed, among other things, by the
foot dragging on the part of the French, who are reluctant, in my
view to see NATO accorded a major role as compared to institu-
tions like the EC and the WEU,the Western European Union,
where they have a greater role.
And I want to make it clear I am distinguishing between the
French attitude on NATO and the French attitude of whether the
West should intervene in Bosnia; they are two separate issues. On
transforming NATO to a role in the new world order, the French
are dragging their feet and on Bosnia they are not.
But I would like to get — it is a long preamble to my question,
which is, do you see an essential connection between NATO trans-
forming its role and the ability to give any impetus to, or teeth to
the implementation of article 43? Because it seems to me they go
113
hand-in-hand, and I wonder if you could just, without committing
to any particular position, discuss with me that relationship.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think that the promise of article 43
can be fulfilled in a number of different ways. One of the most in-
teresting options is to use organizations like NATO to fulfill it.
NATO is really in search of a role. I don't mean that in any critical
way, but NATO's principal role has been fulfilled, and we ought to
all commend NATO and ourselves for that having been done. But
as NATO searches for a new role, I would think assisting the U.N.
through article 43 is one of the fascinating possibilities.
Senator Biden. It seems to me, Mr. Secretary, if I could lobby for
a moment, the Western world is unlikely to act collectively absent
U.S. leadership and participation. And we have a 30-year-plus his-
tory of that cooperation, coordination, and participation in a 16-
member organization. And so I would hope that as you flesh out
the administration's policy in dealing with a fundamentally dif-
ferent world than you faced when you were Under Secretary in the
Carter administration, and than we faced even 5 years ago, that
we would think in terms of using that which works and has worked
well as an integral part in the necessary transformation of the
international community with regard to peacekeeping and peace-
making initiatives.
And as you know better than I, the process of discussion, at
least, is underway within NATO as we speak, but I am convinced
that nothing is likely to happen absent the President of the United
States and the Secretary of State suggesting that this is an impor-
tant decision and consensus must be arrived at.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you. You are certainly right that this
is an organization that works, and we ought not to discard it un-
less we have very good reason to do so.
Senator Biden. I understand that during my absence one of my
colleagues, Senator Lugar, made reference to the War Powers Act.
I respectfully suggest that it is important. As Senator Lugar
says, we are going to be confronted, whether he agrees with my ap-
proach or not. And in this, we are going to be confronted time and
again in the near term with the question of the role under the con-
stitution of the Congress and the President with regard to the use
of force.
And I would respectfully suggest it would greatly enhance the
President's capacity to lead in this area if we could establish better,
clearer ground rules so that we had less — to use a phrase that has
become very popular in Washington, unfortunately in the last 4
years, gridlock, and we can act with greater dispatch and less con-
troversy.
Once you get situated, I would respectfully suggest that you
might point me and others who have an interest in this to one of
your subordinates so that we might work out a legislative accom-
modation, to make this a much smoother path.
Mr. Christopher. I think we ought to explore that because what
we have now is maybe the best we can do, but it is not working
very well.
Senator Biden. I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Lugar?
114
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I agree
with Senator Biden that discussion in this area would be useful,
and you have indicated an eagerness to do this. Let me carry it a
step further, just to gain your own thinking. Clearly, you may still
be in the process of thinking these things through with the Presi-
dent-elect and others in the administration.
The situation of Iraq is topical because of the airstrikes today.
My own view, although it is still to be seen, I suppose, as to what
the effectiveness of this activity was today, is that Saddam Hussein
is likely to continue to test the U.N. alliance, and ourselves as a
part of that alliance. That clearly the provocations that led to the
U.N. resolution and our activity on that basis is apparently occur-
ring in various other forms in Iraq and my view is that Saddam
Hussein is a resilient leader, to say the least, who is likely to test
the new President in the same way that he has been testing this
one.
Now, it may be that the response of your administration will be
to proceed to have airstrikes, to knock out a specific surface-to-air
missile battery or even an airfield that threatens American avi-
ators, but you might come to a conclusion that the termination of
Saddam's leadership was really important, going well beyond the
current U.N. resolutions, but you might want to take an initiative
at the U.N. and say, this situation will not work. We are tired of
being badgered week in and week out, waiting for the day, the
month, the year that Saddam finally finds that the U.N. alliance
has cracked or that our own will is gone, or that we are tired of
the situation.
Now, if you decided to do that, that would be, of course, a very
different course. I am just curious. What sort of consultation would
you envision with the Congress, or would you believe that it would
be useful for the Congress to pass resolutions of support, either au-
thorizing a much more extensive military action in Iraq — I am sim-
ply curious as you plow into new ground, because I think that
these are not boldly hypothetical situations. And the best case,
Saddam will find after today's strike that he is simply tired of test-
ing us and his will will collapse, but I do not think that is credible,
nor do I suspect you believe that is the most likely scenario.
And, therefore, if the Clinton administration is to change the
pace of things, what would be the course of your activity in dealing
with the Congress, specifically in consultation or in seeking meas-
ures of legislative support?
Mr. Christopher. This is new for me, Senator, in this sense. We
have been discussing the support that we want to give the current
administration in its efforts to enforce the U.N. resolutions, and we
have reached the firm conclusion, Governor Clinton has, that he
wants to give fulsome support on that, and that there not be even
a shadow of daylight between himself and President Bush. And we
appreciate very much the degree of consultation. There was con-
sultation between the two of them before today's events, as I am
sure has been reported by now.
We will come into office determined to carry out the U.N. resolu-
tions; determined to be just as firm, just as tough as President
Bush's administration has been. And if we are tested, we will not
115
be found wanting, at least not deliberately. We intend to be firm
and resolute about that.
Now, you are taking me to a new level, and that is suppose we
find ourselves frustrated and want to go back for a new resolution.
And you were speaking about a new congressional resolution as
well. At this point, of course, we are following the U.N. resolutions,
and I would think that we would want to continue to act on a mul-
tilateral basis.
So, I am really not quite ready to respond to that question, Sen-
ator. I think it is an interesting question. I think it is worth think-
ing about as to whether there are some things that cannot be done
under the U.N. resolutions at the present time that might be useful
in bringing this matter to a termination.
And that, I will iust have to confess to you — we have been fo-
cused on lending all of the support we could and following with the
same determination the matter of enforcing the U.N. resolutions.
If we need new resolutions, clearly that would be a matter of con-
sultation both here and at the U.N., but I would think we would
want to come to Congress if we decided we wanted to dramatically
change the rules of engagement.
Senator Lugar. I understand your position, and I appreciate the
final sense, which is important, that you would come here without
defining who would be consulted or the form of the situation. I will
just say that I just suspect the situation is one in which this ago-
nizing testing and retesting eventually may find a situation in
which some of our allies flake off, or we still are left with the U.N.
resolution, but the United States is the only party that really
wants to enforce it.
And in one resolution of this could be that we finally, just quietly
decide that Saddam is not that bad. There are all sorts of other
evils out there. But that would certainly be unsatisfying, I think,
to most people in the country, and probably unsatisfying to Presi-
dent-elect Clinton as he takes a look at it.
I just see a need at some point to approach the Iraq situation in
a new frame of reference, and that was the reason I requested your
thoughts as to how you would do that, if you come to that conclu-
sion.
In the case of Bosnia, I mentioned at the latter part of my ques-
tioning this morning, the United States already had committed it-
self to try and enforce the no-fly zone, and we have been held back
by allies who are not inclined to do that without further warning,
or some suggested they had troops in harms way, and other such
problems. And you have indicated that you were in favor of moving
ahead, and indicated that President Clinton would agree.
But I suspect in that area, and we have not seen the text of
President Bush's letter to President Milosevic, he indicated that if
activity of an aggressive character occurred in the Kosovo region,
then you could expect the use of military force by the United
States. Now, this is a letter from the President of the United
States, one that is heading out. President Clinton may or may not
subscribe to that point of view.
I am curious with regard to Bosnia as to how you will approach
this. It could be one step at a time. Try out the no-fly zone, and
that may or may not make any difference. Arming Bosnians might
116
or might not help, or incrementally it may help. Or tightening eco-
nomic sanctions, or trying out for size various steps that short of
massive intervention, but introduce substantial ground forces,
which the world is reticent to get into, all countries, including this
one.
But I get back to a point that Senator Biden and I have dis-
cussed privately as well as publicly, that this is a testing time for
NATO, and for our ability as a member of NATO and as part of
the European Community to try to bring some order into that area.
This may mean, leadership would have to be taken by President-
elect Clinton and yourself to reenergize NATO, to refocus even the
Germans, who have not had their constitutional debate, and per-
haps don't want to have it, to do a number of things that finally
make it possible, if this is a good idea, to make certain that sub-
stantial ground forces of NATO were available to secure cities or
bases or roadways in Bosnia — in a much less elaborate way we
have been securing them in Somalia. The two situations are not to-
tally dissimilar, despite the geography.
And in order to get to that point, though, this requires consider-
able leadership on our part. I cannot imagine any other country,
any other president or leader elsewhere is going to do this kind of
thing.
If you were of a mind to do that, and you saw the world the way
I see it or am trying to project today, that this could mean a kind
of organization cnange in NATO's mission — change in our own pre-
supposition because the United States, I presume, would have
ground forces as a part of NATO. I presume we could be based in
Sarajevo the same way we are now based in Germany. And it could
very well be that we would be there for quite a while.
How would the administration approach the Congress on some-
thing that really is a massive change theoretically, as opposed to
an incremental change, in our policy with the U.N. in Iraq, or with
extension of our mission slightly in Somalia, to recognize the need
for diplomacy?
What would be the process in the administration, and then vis-
a-vis the Congress, and would it include, as I would hope it would,
at the end of the trail a demand for a vote on the part of the Sen-
ate and the House to support the use of military force if that was
required so that the whole country has had the debate, and we are
all aboard. This, then, would not be a so-called elitist plan as you
suggested sometimes has been the trouble in the past, but, rather,
one Dased on an understanding of the way the world works, the se-
curity interests of the United States, and how our domestic inter-
ests are involved as well as our foreign ones?
As I say it is a full plate to try to take on, but I see this sort
of thing coming along the tracks of this administration, and I
would just like your discussion, if you would, of how you approach
it?
Mr. Christopher. Well, to take the easy part first, Senator,
within the administration, as I have said earlier today, this would
be one of the priority issues after January 20. We will be consider-
ing the matter among those agencies that are responsible, the par-
ticipants in the National Security Council process, both the statu-
tory members and the advisory members I am sure, working
117
through the customary procedures. We will be considering this
issue among many, but I am not giving away any secrets when I
say that this will be one of the priority issues.
If we were to reach the kinds of conclusions you have mentioned,
the sweeping suggestion, for example, that NATO should attempt
to use ground forces which, as I say, has not been contemplated by
us at the present time, it would clearly be an occasion for consulta-
tion at the highest levels of the Congress. It is hard for me to en-
visage that we would take that kind of a step without consultation
with the key leaders of Congress. And that is a rather elastic con-
cept. The more serious the step, I suppose in some ways, the larger
the group that must be consulted.
Where we go from there is really more up to the Congress than
it is up to the administration as to whether the Congress wants to
continue the process, or whether it is prepared on the basis of con-
sultation to have the administration go forward. The War Powers
Act, obviously, comes into play here. As I said earlier, we would be
prepared to make the notifications required by the War Powers Act
on a voluntary basis, and that is part of the unsatisfactory char-
acter of that I suppose.
There is the residue of Presidential power that has always
caused every President to drop back from full endorsement. That
is about as far as I can go, that is to say that with that kind of
significant change, I think the significance would require extensive
consultation.
Senator Lugar. Let me just add, if I may, parenthetically, Mr.
Chairman, that I understand that and it may be, as you say, you
throw the ball in the Congress' court. My only hope is drawn from
the memoirs as well as the historical records of Lyndon Johnson's
problems in the Vietnam War and Harry Truman's problems with
the Korean War, which many of us reviewed prior to the vote on
participation in Desert Storm, that both Presidents regretted that
they did not really get the Congress to vote.
It was not just a question of consulting or whispering into the
ear of a few at the high levels, but having the agonizing yeas and
nays of every Member and the kind of debate that was on the floor
of the Senate and the House in which almost every Senator spoke.
It was on that kind of commitment that there was a national
unity and a focus that was very constructive, I think, in Desert
Storm. I believe that would be important if we are in the Bosnia
or Yugoslavian predicament down the trail or if we expand the
focus in Iraq or in Somalia or wherever else. And this is why te-
diously I keep making this point, that I hope that that will always
be a part of your options.
President Bush early on wanted that kind of a vote, but the Sen-
ate and the House tried to escape him for months, and they were
determined not to have the vote, or after the election, claim that
new members had come in and it could not occur.
It took a long time, 4 days before the January 15 deadline before
things finally came to a point in the Senate and the House, and
it may take some pushing on your side if that type of requirement
is to be fulfilled.
118
Mr. Christopher. Well, without — Senator, without knowing all
the twists and turns of that, I thought the final debate and the
vote was one of the finest hours of this great body.
Senator Lugar. I agree.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
be very brief because I know we want to move along here on this
round. I just wanted to make a couple of observations.
First of all, I do not have the NATO treaty before me, but I am
struck by how loosely we seem to assume that whatever obligations
are contained within the NATO treaty can simply be broadened out
in a geographic sense. Now, maybe the NATO treaty was written
that broadly, and I want to take a look at it, but it does not strike
me just on the face of it that that would automatically follow.
I do want to make the observation on the Bosnian situation, as
I understand it, both the British and French actually have ground
troops in Bosnia now, is that not correct?
Mr. Christopher. That is correct.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you have any idea of the magnitude of
those forces?
Mr. Christopher. Several thousand each, I think.
Senator Sarbanes. I think the French presence is even larger
than that, if I am not mistaken. But they do have troops in there
now, and I wanted to just get that observation on the record. It is
of some note.
Mr. Christopher. Well, it certainly gives a good deal of weight
to their concern about the effect of the no-fly zone. There is a natu-
ral and appropriate concern on their part about the effect of the no-
fly zone on their own troops.
Senator Sarbanes. Well I think that is perfectly understandable,
and may take one point of view, but we do not actually have our
own forces in there at the moment, subject to those circumstances.
I wanted to observe on the trade imbalance with China, which
came up in the discussion, because I think it is very important. The
trade imbalance is a consequence of manipulative trade policies on
the part of the People's Republic of China. It is not the natural out-
growth of the working of fair trade competition. In fact, the Bush
administration's own Treasury Department reported that the Chi-
nese were manipulating the currency, manipulating the licensing
arrangements, all designed and ordered to give them an unfair ad-
vantage in the trade relationship. They have taken that trade rela-
tionship from a balanced position in 1986 to where it is now an al-
most $15 billion trade deficit.
Mr. Chairman, the final observation I want to make is I do want
to express my appreciation to Mr. Christopher for the very forth-
right and candid way in which he has responded to the questions
that have been put to him today by the members of this committee,
and I, for one, appreciate it very much. I yield back the balance of
my time.
The Chairman. OK. Senator Kassebaum.
Senator Kassebaum. Mr. Christopher, you have been so patient,
I am almost embarrassed to have other questions. But we have
touched very little on the former Soviet Union. Senator Lugar men-
tioned it in his opening statement and you made some strong com-
119
merits in your statement. I still, of course, feel, as I am sure we
all do, that what happens in the evolution of the former Soviet
Union is of great importance.
I was pleased to see your strong support, of course, to assisting
in the demilitarization of Russia. That is something that Senator
Lugar and Senator Nunn have both been real leaders on, and I
think in a very constructive way.
But my question is as the reformers now in Russia are criticizing
the West for what they view lack of support, the hardliners, on the
other hand, are saying that President Yeltsin has embraced by far
too much, the West. So there is that division that has evolved.
I guess I would ask you how much slack would the Clinton ad-
ministration be prepared to give President Yeltsin as he takes
steps to try and distance himself from the West in order to peal
to the more hardline elements of his government? And the second
part of that is should not we be also mindful of the importance of
the other nations, states of the former Soviet Union, and also other
leaders in Russia.
There is always, supposedly, a concern that sometimes we focus
on just one or two leaders, and that we should be careful and not
put all of our eggs in one basket. There are others that we should
recognize in importance.
Mr. Christopher. Well, taking them in order, Senator, if I re-
call, we think that President Yeltsin is by some margin the out-
standing leader in that country, a strong force for democracy and
market-oriented economy. We think that he is moving as skillfully
as anybody could be under those circumstances, dealing with the
many, many ethnic groups in Russia and the many elements of
that society.
We think he is doing a commendable job and we will support him
extensively. I am not exactly sure how to say how much slack we
will give him — 1 foot or 2 feet or 3 feet — but I think we understand
he has got serious problems and are going to try to be appreciative
of the tensions and pressures that he feels.
On the other newly independent states, clearly, it is very impor-
tant that we maintain good contacts with all of those countries.
Those states in the ring around Russia need to be carefully encour-
aged by us, cultivated in the best sense of the word. Ukraine is a
powerful country, and of course you have Kazakhstan with very
substantial nuclear assets at the present time, and the same with
Belarus. We hope each of them will support START II and that
they will move very quickly to return their nuclear arsenals.
On your other point, certainly, we need to keep in contact with
all the leaders in Russia and the former Soviet Union, opposition
as well as those in government. That is one of the reasons why you
have such a high priority to getting an Ambassador back in resi-
dence.
Senator Kassebaum. Speaking of Ukraine, as you know, of
course, one of the real stumbling blocks in the START II accord is
that Ukraine needs to ratify START I.
Mr. Christopher. Right.
Senator Kassebaum. And if that is not done within the next
week, during the Bush administration, you will continue to press,
of course, Ukraine in ratification of START I.
120
Mr. Christopher. Absolutely. And we believe we promised to do
so, and we hope they will move to keep their promise.
Senator Kassebaum. Just a final comment. I was so pleased to
hear your comments about streamlining the State Department and
also for reforming AID. It is something I have long been interested
in. I have introduced legislation through several Congresses, it
seems, and I have never picked up a lot of support because I would
end all earmarking. You have heard some comments about ear-
marking here, and obviously that causes problems. But I have al-
ways felt it took away from the flexibility that I thought was nec-
essary at the State Department.
Just to comment, there is a GAO report that was addressing the
need for reform at AID and notes that AID's traditional role as the
lead agency for administration U.S. economic assistance is being
eroded, and other agencies such as the Department of State, Treas-
ury, Commerce, and EPA have begun to take the lead in imple-
menting specific new programs. This report takes no — it says it
withholds judgment on the recommendation to merge AID into the
State Department, and I am not asking you really for any response
other than to say I think what is done in reforming AID, it is —
and we cannot just shift the chairs on the Titanic, so to speak. I
think we really have to do careful thought about what initiatives
are taken, and I would look forward to working with you on that
effort because I think it is so important.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, thank you, very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. I would like to just get your quick comment if you
could on NAFTA.
Senator Helms. Chris, would you forgive me for interrupting?
He and I were talking — the Chairman — and may I inquire, do
you anticipate another round after this one?
The Chairman. I would like to go on indefinitely. I think that is
also the wishes of the witness.
Mr. Christopher. Yes.
The Chairman. But what is the will of the committee? I ask the
ranking minority member.
Senator Dodd. My view is we should probably just proceed as
long as Mr. Christopher is comfortable, obviously. But my view is
to try and get as much done. We have got a lot of people sticking
around, and we are going to be here tomorrow, I gather. We will
just try to keep going if we can.
Hopefully, these questions of mine will be in that 10-minute
timeframe to get it along, just really some more comments so we
can move the process along.
The CHAmMAN. Is there any reaction from here?
Senator Kassebaum. I am through. I just say probably people
would be grateful if some of us would leave.
Senator Dodd. I notice you say that after you have finished your
questions.
Senator Kassebaum. Well, that is right. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, why do we not complete this round, Sen-
ator Coverdell and Simon.
Senator Sarbanes. Should we do another round?
121
Senator Dodd. Well, Mr. Chairman, can we maybe get an agree-
ment?
Senator Helms. Well, the only thing, my doctors have advised
me not to work exceptionally long days. But by golly, if that is
what you all want to do, we will do it.
Senator Dodd. Well, maybe, Mr. Chairman, I might suggest— J
just think in terms of time — maybe if I could offer a suggestion, if
we could get an agreement this evening about what time we might
finish tomorrow, then the need to go on this evening becomes less
of a concern. If it is going to go on for several days, then it seems
to me we ought to try to get this done.
But I would make a suggestion that let us say we vote tomorrow
at 1 p.m., or we complete the thing at 1 p.m.. I will make that as
a proposal, if I mav, that we complete the hearing at 1 p.m., 1 p.m.
tomorrow, and if tnat is the case, then I would be prepared to fore-
go some rounds this evening and pick up in the morning.
Senator Helms. Well, look, Bud Nance just reminded me that we
have just gotten the papers, and I do not know what the rush is
because you took 5 days on Al Haig — 5 days. Now, nobody has pro-
posed to take that long a time on this.
Senator Dodd. Well, I would just say to my colleague, both on
the question of Shultz and Baker, we were about a day and a half
each. On Al Haig there were some unique circumstances. I was
here as a freshman Member that year. It took a little longer, but
in the last two cases we moved quickly.
Senator Helms. Well, there are a lot of unique circumstances
with any nominee, Chris.
Senator Dodd. But I think you know, Jesse, in the last two cases
we were very quick.
Senator Helms. Well, you will not punish me for having to ask
a lot of questions. That is fine. I will stay here till midnight or 3
a.m. with you. But also, I will remember it because you may get
sick some times.
Senator Dodd. You are putting this on personal terms, Jesse.
Senator Sarbanes. I thought Senator Dodd was trying to be con-
siderate of your situation. As I understood his proposal, it was not
that we would stay on indefinitely. I thought he was trying to re-
spond to the concern that you expressed and showed, and sensitiv-
ity to it, and I really commend him for that. His suggestion was
that we reach some sort of understanding now about when we
would draw this to a conclusion for tomorrow. It seemed to me that
that was an effort to try to respond to the very point that was
made.
Senator Simon. I agree with my colleague from Maryland. If I
could ask, Jesse, do you have any suggestion in terms of 1 o'clock
not being as acceptable as 2 or 3 o'clock?
Senator Helms. Just that we not limit ourselves in asking ques-
tions but operate in good faith, which I am certainly going to do.
We have been in session from 10 o'clock to what? 1:30 p.m.? All
right. What is that, Mr. Chairman? That is 3Vz hours.
The Chairman. Three and a half.
Senator Helms. Then, that is another 3 hours. That is not much
time. But I am saying you know the President has not even been
inaugurated. We have got a bunch of papers coming in from the
122
LBJ facility down in Texas that are not even here yet that people
have asked us to look at, and I am going to look at them.
Now, one way or anotner we are going to ask the questions, and
I am going to do it as expeditiously as I can, but you are not going
to ride roughshod over me. And I have heard some of the com-
ments, well, how are we going to stop Helms? It is already been
said. Well, the truth is you ain t going to stop Helms.
You need to get that through your head.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, let me just reclaim my time.
There is no suggestion of trying to stop anybody. We have got — ob-
viously, the Senator from North Carolina has every right in the
world to be able to question as long as he wants.
Senator Helms. I suggest we make an agreement, Chris.
Senator Dodd. Jesse, my suggestion was to accommodate your
concerns — and I appreciate the physical question, but we all nave
obligations we are trying to serve. We have got other confirmation
hearings, and we are trying to figure out some means by which we
have a framework within which to proceed.
My mere suggestion was to see if there was some way in which
we could try and wrap this up in a reasonable time and conclude
early enougn this evening. Now, we could make it 6 o'clock tomor-
row and vote. And I would, for my own part, finish up my rounds
here in the next few minutes and leave all the time to you to raise
the questions tomorrow. But that is the only purpose, Jesse, to try
and move it along.
The Chairman. Could we agree that we would finish our ques-
tioning by tomorrow afternoon. That would give you ample time.
Senator Simon. I cannot hear you over here.
The CHAmMAN. I was saying could we agree that we would finish
the questioning by tomorrow afternoon. That would give ample
time to see if the mail service works; Mr. Christopher's papers are
coming up from Texas.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I have said many times that I
have never known a finer gentleman than you in the operation of
this committee. I will ask you a question in response to your ques-
tion. What is the rush? I mean what is wrong with going into Fri-
day if it becomes necessary?
I am not anxious to go into Friday. I want to get through as well.
But I also want to satisfy the need, as I see it, for asking questions
and getting this gentleman on the record, because a lot of people
are apprehensive about this nomination. Now I know that there
are very few, if any, on this committee, but I am concerned pending
responses to questions. And as I say again, that at a very minimum
the nominee is entitled to have for the record his responses to ques-
tions asked of him about various matters in which he has partici-
pated, or maybe that he has not participated in.
So that is the way I feel about it. I am not going to prolong it,
but neither am I going to subject myself to a limitation which I be-
lieve to be unrealistic in view of the fact that the documents that
we have coming are not even here yet.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAmMAN. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Of course, the problem then is that some of
us have made other arrangements for Friday. I mean you an-
123
nounced this hearing for today and tomorrow. That certainly seems
more than adequate time, particularly in view of the fact that the
two previous nominations for Secretary of State took significantly
less time than that in their consideration by this committee.
Therefore I guess one, in thinking of cutting this thing off early
now, is influenced by, the proposition that it may carry over yet an-
other day. If that is the case, I would prefer to press on and try
to complete as much of the work in the expectation that we would
then be able to complete it tomorrow.
I am trying very hard to be sensitive to the concerns raised by
my colleague from North Carolina which I thought Senator Dodd
was trying very hard to do. It does add a new dimension if we are
now talking about throwing it over yet another day in terms of
other obligations that members may have undertaken.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms' questions are not
going to be assuaged by how long we go this evening. The problem
is the papers from Texas and other materials that the minority has
called for.
I am wondering if it is not a reasonable course of action that to-
morrow— and we would have a period from 10 a.m., to 1 p.m., for
questions of members, those who still are interested, and from 2
p.m., to 5 p.m., in the afternoon. And that may conclude. Every-
body may have had enough by that time; that is a long stretch.
But at the same time there would be the option that if that has
not been sufficient, that the committee would then meet again on
Friday from 10 a.m., to 1 p.m., and in the afternoon from 2 p.m.,
to 5 p.m. It might mean that you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking
member, Mr. Helms, would be here together for a portion of that
time, and that is a burden upon both of you. Some of the rest of
us might be available.
But since the purpose of this period is the raising of questions
rather than debate among the members of the committee, it really
does not require all of us to be present if members have had their
fill of questions and answers, and it does offer an opportunity for
additional evidence to come in, if that seems to be required, with
the committee then having the vote on Tuesday, as was originally
planned, as I understand, after the full collection has occurred in
this time.
And I would hope that might be a reasonable period of time that
members could anticipate, so that they can plan their schedules
and the Chair and the ranking member can plan their schedule if
necessary, and hopefully this would not be too onerous a burden
upon our major witness.
Senator Sarbanes. Could I make an inquiry? I am informed that
the documents are here.
The Chairman. The Senator is correct.
Senator Sarbanes. Is that correct?
The Chairman. The records are here, and the majority and mi-
nority need
Senator Sarbanes. They have been here since 1 p.m., this after-
noon.
124
The Chairman. And have been here since 1 p.m., this afternoon.
So presumably they are being examined at this point. I think the
suggestion of the Senator from Indiana is quite sensible. If we
could reach an agreement to vote on Tuesday definitely and hope-
fully wrap up tomorrow.
Senator Helms. Well, there never has been any question about
that and I think his suggestion is good. But I think you would want
to maintain some latitude yourself, Mr. Chairman, in the unlikely
event that some of these documents yield information about which
you have not been aware and I have not been aware, that maybe
you would want to have some question period yourself.
I just do not feel that I want to be limited in my time, even
though I want to get through with it. I want to say bye-bye, you
know, let him go. But not before I ask all the questions that I feel
it is my responsibility to ask.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, Mr. Chairman, I mean some of us have
made other plans on the basis of the schedule you handed out.
Senator Helms. Well, just go on.
Senator Sarbanes. No, we want to be here for this hearing. It
is an important hearing. I think if we are going to be here tomor-
row, we ought to press on if questions remain at the end of the
afternoon.
Senator Helms. Well, you are going to be here tomorrow.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that. But I think if we go
to 5 p.m., tomorrow and there are still questions remaining, we
ought to press on with the questions and try to complete the near-
ing tomorrow.
The Chairman. Let us agree on that and complete this round. I
am conscious of the ranking member's open heart surgery a few
weeks ago.
Senator Helms. Look, I don't want anybody to think I am an in-
valid. I am just operating on the advice of my doctors, and they tell
this to everybody who has this operation, do not work too long a
work day. They said that 12 hours was about enough, and I have
been working since about 7 a.m., including in my office at home
this morning.
The Chairman. Well, let us wrap up this round now.
Senator Helms. But I am not an invalid and I can take it.
The CHAmMAN. All right. I am not saying you are.
Senator Helms. And if you want to dish it out I can take it. I
am not talking about you.
The Chairman. OK, let us wrap up this round now, but agree
that tomorrow we will wrap up the questioning. And that if you
cannot do it, you will deputize one of your members to ask the
questions, and that will permit us to wrap up tomorrow night. Does
that seem sensible?
Senator Simon. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I heard over here.
But if the attempt is to wrap up tomorrow, then I am all for that.
I want to protect the rights of my colleague from North Carolina,
but I do not want to give him the sole rights on Friday of having
questions. If he is going to have questions, then the rest of us
ought to have the option.
The Chadiman. No, let us agree to wrap up the questioning to-
morrow night.
125
Senator Simon. I am not opposed to that.
The Chairman. And we can hopefully finish at 5 p.m., or 6 p.m.,
and agree on that and vote next week on Tuesday.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I am still not able to understand
why there could not be an opportunity for Senators to ask ques-
tions, whoever wishes to do so, on Friday. I see no reason why that
day ought not to be available to the committee in the event that
the questions have not been finished tomorrow.
I cannot imagine, if we have 6 hours of questioning tomorrow,
that there will be many Senators with many questions remaining,
but at the same time it seems to me that we are not under great
pressure to conclude this hearing tomorrow and we are not going
to come to a vote, I would hope, until Tuesday. And it just seems
to me to be reasonable to come to that accommodation.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, we are not going to resolve this
now and we are wasting time, so why don't I just go on with my
questions.
The Chairman. Yes. I think we are sort of at an impasse, but
let us leave as an objective that we will hopefully wrap up tomor-
row. And I would suggest to the ranking minority member that if
he does not want to participate in all the questioning, that he has
valiant members on his side who could fill in for him. We could do
our best to wrap up that way. And for the sake of comity and
health and agreeableness, let us all agree on that and just complete
this cycle of questions.
Senator Helms. Well, I thank the chairman but I will be here,
whatever the hour.
The Chairman. All right. Senator Dodd, please would you pick
it up at this time.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Christopher, on the issue of NAFTA, a lot of it will be dealt
with by the Department of Treasury and you commented on it al-
ready here today and I agree with your comments on it. It is a very
important agreement. There are a couple of concerns that need to
be addressed, and the President-elect has stated those.
One of the concerns that is not being expressed as widely here,
but is throughout the hemisphere and publicly was, I think, men-
tioned in an article of a few days ago about the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, is the concern that this will be the only agreement.
That Mexico and Canada, but particularly Mexico, will be the re-
cipient of a tremendous amount of investment and trade at the ex-
pense of other nations within the hemisphere. The Caribbean Basin
Initiative, obviously, has been of some success.
I think I know the answer to this, but maybe you would just like
to respond to it, about the idea of establishing with the North
American Free Trade Agreement a solid enough set of principles
and guidelines that it would be the hope, as soon as practicable,
to be able to develop similar such agreements with other either na-
tions or groups of nations, be it the Andean Pact, Southern Cone,
or other nations in the hemisphere. We should indicate that it is
not our intent to limit this particular proposal merely to the three
participants who are part of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, but to expand it throughout the hemisphere.
126
I would hope that would be the response. I think it is a very im-
portant message to send. There is a lot of concern throughout the
hemisphere that this is not going to happen elsewhere, as I said
at the outset. I wonder if you might comment on it.
Mr. Christopher. Senator Dodd, that is correct. There may be
differences in countries that require different or slightly modified
approaches. I do not think you can lay a pattern down from the
NAFTA agreement and impose it on or see it fit perfectly in every
other country of South America. But our intention is certainly not
to stop at the southern border of Mexico, but rather to explore the
opportunities for comparable agreements in the remainder of
Central and South America.
Senator Dodd. I thank you, Mr. Christopher, for that answer. El
Salvador, as you know, has been a tragic situation for the last 12
years. Thousands of people have lost their lives.
The good news is that those accords were reached in Mexico last
January. Perez de Cuellar, the former Secretary General of the
U.N., did a remarkably fine job, along with Alvaro de Soto, his
principle negotiator, in those efforts. And I would suggest as well
that the Bush administration made some constructive efforts on
this issue along with others of us who were involved in the issue
of El Salvador over a number of years.
What concerns me at this particular juncture is there has been
some retreat on the last part of the implementation on the ad hoc
committee dealing with the so-called purification of roughly 100
senior officers, that President Cristiani has backtracked a bit on
that. There is a letter, which I would put in the record at this junc-
ture, from the Secretary General of the U.N. expressing concerns
about not living up to or meeting the full compliance in those ac-
cords.
[The information referred to follows:]
[From U.N. Security Council, 9 January 1993]
Letter Dated 7 January 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council
The purpose of this letter is to report to you and through you to the members
of the Security Council on the latest developments relating to implementation of he
provisions of the Peace Accords for El Salvador concerning the purification of the
Armed Forces (S/23501, annex, chap I, sect. 3).
It will be recalled that in my letter to the President of the Security Council of
13 November 1992 (S/24805) I reported on arrangements which had been success-
fully concluded with the Government and the FMLN to bring the armed conflict in
El Salvador formally to an end on 15 December 1992. Those arrangements included
agreement by President Cristiani to complete implementation of the recommenda-
tions of the Ad Hoc Commission on purification of the Armed Forces within a speci-
fied time frame. In particular, President Cristiani had agreed to inform me by 29
November 1992 of the administrative decisions he had taken on this matter. As I
subsequently reported to the Security Council in paragraph 3(d) of my report of 23
December 1992 (S/25006), the administrative decisions were punctually commu-
nicated to me by President Cristiani. In his letter, President Cristiani informed me
that he had adopted administrative decisions concerning all the officers included in
the Ad Hoc Commission's report. These decisions would be made known in 31 De-
cember 1992 at the latest ana would become effective as of 1 January 1993.
On 5 January 1993, in my absence in Africa, the Under-Secretary-General for
Peace-keeping Operations and my Senior Political Adviser received, by hand of Dr.
Oscar Santamana, Minister of the Presidency, and General Mauricio Vargas, Dep-
uty Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of El Salvador, a letter dated 1 January 1993
in which President Cristiani conveyed to me details of the measures adopted to im-
plement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission.
127
The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission concerned 103 officers. One of
these was no longer a serving member of the Armed Forces. Of the remaining 102
officers, it was recommended that 26 should be transferred to other functions and
76 should be discharged. President Cristiani informed me in his letter that the fol-
lowing measures had been adopted in relation to 94 of these 102 officers:
(1) Twenty -five officers had been transferred to other functions;
(2) Four officers had been discharged for disciplinary reasons (one of them
being the 26th officer recommended for a transfer to other functions);
(3) Nineteen officers had been discharged for administrative reasons;
(4) Thirty-eight officers had been placed on leave with pay, pending comple-
tion of the procedures for their retirement which would take place within a pe-
riod not exceeding six months;
(5) Seven officers had been appointed as Military Attaches to Salvadorian
embassies abroad;
(6) One officer had, for personal reasons, been permitted to remain in active
service until he retired on 1 March 1993.
President Cristiani's letter went on to say that administrative decisions relating
to the other eight officers would be deferred during "the period of transition", which
is understood to mean during the remainder of President Cristiani's mandate as
President of the Republic.
Enclosed with President Cristiani's letter were copies of the administrative orders
relating to categories (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) above. I have verified that the names
correspond with those in the report of the Ad Hoc Commission.
Having carefully studied President Cristiani's letter and its enclosures, I have
come to the following conclusions:
(a) The measures adopted in relation to categories (1), (2) and (3) above com-
ply fully with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission;
(b) The measures adopted in relation to categories (4) and (6) also comply
broadly with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission. The officers con-
cerned will not perform any official functions with effect from 1 January 1993,
but their discharge will not become effective until the legal formalities for their
retirement are complete, which could in some cases take as long as six months.
I nevertheless consider that these measures can be accepted as satisfactory in
the circumstances;
(c) The appointment of the seven officers in category (5) to Military Attache
posts does not comply with the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations which
require these officers to be discharged;
(d) The deferral of decisions relating to the remaining eight officers is simi-
larly not in compliance with the Commission's recommendations.
I have from the outset been conscious of the particular difficulty and sensitivity
of this aspect of the Peace Accords. As indicated above, I am ready to accept as sat-
isfactory the measures adopted and implemented by the Government of El Salvador
with respect to 87 of the 102 officers covered by the Ad Hoc Commission's rec-
ommendations, even though a number of them do not conform in all respects with
those recommendations. However, the measures adopted in respect of the other 15
officers do not comply with those recommendations and are thus not in comformity
with the Peace Accords. The mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council re-
quires me to seek full compliance by each side with all the commitments it has en-
tered into in signing the Peace Accords. I have therefore asked President Cristiani
to take early action to regularize the position of the 15 officers in respect of whom
the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations have not yet been fully implemented.
I shall continue to report to the Security Council as appropriate on the implemen-
tation of this and other aspects of the Peace Accords.
(Signed) BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
Senator Dodd. And we have also, which I would put in the
record, Mr. Chairman, a letter from Senator Leahy and myself to
Secretary of State Eagleburger expressing some concerns about
this as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
128
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,
January 11, 1993.
The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington DC
DEAR Mr. SECRETARY: As strong supporters of the UN-brokered peace accords be-
tween the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN which ended a dozen years
of civil war, we are dismayed by President Cristiani's decision not to fully imple-
ment the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission by the December 31 UN
deadline. We believe the implementation of the Commission's recommendations in
a timely manner is crucial to El Salvador's future.
Ultimately, it is up to the United Nations Secretary General to determine that
the peace accords, which every Salvadoran citizen has a stake in, are being complied
with. However, until then, we urge you in the strongest terms to withhold obligation
or delivery of any further military assistance for El Salvador. We believe the United
States must take this step to make it clear to the Salvadoran armed forces that they
cannot expect our support unless they fully comply with the peace accords.
Thank you for you consideration.
Sincerely,
Patrick Leahy,
Chairman, Foreign Operations Subcommittee
Chris Dodd,
Chairman, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
Senator Dodd. I do not necessarily expect that you would be fa-
miliar with all of the details, Mr. Christopher, but I wonder if you
might just comment briefly, if you feel as though you are com-
fortable enough with it, on those deadlines that have been called
for under the U.N.-sponsored agreements.
Mr. Christopher. Senator Dodd, I am sorry to say that I know
only generally what you have just outlined. I nave every reason to
hope that that agreement can get back on track and that the slip-
page is only temporary, because that has been a very positive de-
velopment in the hemisphere. I have to confess I am not up to
speed on the precise U.N. deadlines, and all I can do is express the
hope that we have not gotten off the track in any serious way.
Senator Dodd. Well I appreciate that, and I will say that you
have copies of a letter that Senator Leahy and I have sent, along
with the Boutros-Ghali letter on those issues, and possibly in a
week or so you could have a chance to take a look at it in a little
more detail.
In a related matter, just very quickly, in Nicaragua, the Congress
voted and authorized and the President signed into law assistance
to the Chamorro Government. President Chamorro has had a dif-
ficult time trying to resolve the conflict that ranged in that country
for more than 10 years, a small nation. Not to the satisfaction of
everyone, including this Senator, but nonetheless she is making a
Herculean effort to try and bring her country back together after
10 years of civil war.
Those funds have not been sent to her, despite the fact that they
were authorized, appropriated, approved, and signed by the Presi-
dent. They are just sitting here. I would urge you, as soon as pos-
sible, to see that those dollars that have been appropriated are ac-
tually sent — it is a very important message that this country ap-
preciates what she is going through.
There may be points that you want to express to her, or the
President-elect may want to when he assumes office, on issues that
concern him about the way things are going. But it seems to me
129
unwise to hold back on those funds that she desperately needs. If
forces of the extreme right or left gain a dominant hand in that
country, we may find ourselves back facing a civil conflict.
And I would urge you to look at that, if you could. Again, I am
not expecting that you be familiar with all the details, but to me
it has been a disgrace that we have allowed that to lie there for
these many months and not send an important signal that I think
needs to be sent.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, were part of the funds released re-
cently?
Senator Dodd. They were. Some of the funds were released, that
is true.
Mr. Christopher. You know I am just reading in, and I hope
you will forgive me for the gaps in my knowledge of these matters.
I have been involved in transition matters, as you know, in Little
Rock that had little to do with the State Department.
But as I was reading in on Nicaragua I was very impressed with
the amount of progress that had been made. The free election there
is significant and the other forces of democracy are important now.
You can always see these things, to use a very trite expression, as
a glass that is half full or half empty, but I am quite anxious to
look at this as being a glass half full and would certainly want to
review the retention of those funds in that light.
I do not know what the mechanism has been under which those
funds have been held up. From my prior incarnation here I have
some memory of the way that happens, so I suppose that will all
have to be taken into account. But about all I can say is I have
been very impressed with the progress that has been made toward
democracy. Not perfect, but some really good progress.
Senator Dodd. Well Mrs. Chamorro is a valiant leader and she
has taken on a tremendous responsibility and a tremendously dif-
ficult one, and I would hope we would be able to express our sup-
port for her efforts down there. But I appreciate your response to
the question.
The Andean Drug Initiative is another matter that I would ask
you to take a look at. It has been the source of some significant
debate. President Fujimori has a lot of tremendous problems, many
of them of his own making.
One of the things we have been trying to do is to get the Andean
Pact countries to take more responsibility through their militaries
to become better adept at dealing with the drug proliferation prob-
lem. And, again, I am afraid I am getting micro here with you, and
I do not want to do that to you unless you have some ideas or com-
ments you may want to share with us briefly, to the extent you
have given some thought as to how we might improve that situa-
tion in terms of the interdiction and the antidrug efforts in those
countries.
It is a critical issue to us, obviously, but a critical issue to the
people who live in these countries, not the least of which is Peru
and the problems that they face. It is a staggering problem that
they face.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I have the time-honored response
that I certainly look forward to working with you on that problem
as chairman or that subcommittee.
130
I was really somewhat concerned, maybe even a little depressed,
at some slippage in some of the countries where the drug lords
seem to be maintaining their sway, and I am very worried about
that. There is no use being comparative about this. It is very bad
for us. It is very bad for those countries, too. As I said earlier, a
country with that kind of leadership and management, or that kind
of coercive control has lots of other problems other than just the
drug problem. It is very unfortunate.
Senator Dodd. That is correct.
Mr. Christopher. All of law and order is threatened by that.
The justice system is in tatters when something like that happens.
But you cannot wall off corruption, you cannot have just a little
piece of corruption. We know that from our cities. It is a cancer,
and it is a very terrible thing.
Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate that. And the other question I
had Senator Simon has raised with you dealing with the extra-
dition case in Mexico and I am, like he, very pleased with your re-
sponse to that.
Let me jump last, if I can, very quickly to an area that has al-
ways provoked a great deal of concern in this country, but we have
never really come to terms with it in terms of a public policy stand-
point.
Let me begin the question by just saying to you that I cannot
find the adequate words to express my horror and deplore as vocif-
erously, as strongly as I could, the terrorism that has occurred in
Great Britain recently and elsewhere at the hands of terrorists out
of Northern Ireland.
I would also quickly point out to you, however, that every time
that the United States has played a constructive role to try and
help out in that situation, progress has been made. In recent times,
we have sort of retreated from playing any kind of a constructive
role because of the objections of our ally — arguably our closest ally
in the world is reluctant to have us express any interest in the
issue of Northern Ireland.
Speaker Foley, Senator Moynihan, Senator Kennedy, and others,
we nave formed a group, the Friends of Ireland, to try and play a
constructive role over the years in this area. I would hope that,
again, under the Clinton administration that we would try and find
a way for us to play a constructive role, to try and bring the parties
together. Negotiations among the political parties unfortunately
broke off recently. And I can understand the sensitivities when
your own people auring the Christmas holidays are being subjected
to bombings. But the problem of Northern Ireland is not going to
go away.
And although it involves Europe, and this is traditionally an area
where we feel sensitive about our involvement, I think we can play
a constructive role. There are people here who want to help in that
regard. And I would urge you take a look at that and see how we
can possibly assist in trying to bring about an end to that violence;
3,000 people have lost their lives since 1969. And while it is in the
backyard of an ally, it is something where I think we can play an
important role. I just mention that to you.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
131
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Coverdell?
Senator Coverdell. Well, I guess the quality of patience is al-
ready at work. Mr. Christopher, earlier in the day, repeatedly when
we have talked about Bosnia we have categorized the Serbs. And
when the President of Bosnia was here the other day, even he took
considerable time to point out that there are many Serbs who are
not engaged in these activities; many of them that are citizens of
his own country, Bosnia. In fact, he went to considerable effort to
point out that the reason a tribunal is so important is to not only
adjudicate the guilty, but the innocent.
And I think, for the record, that we should at least acknowledge
we cannot broadly categorize the Serbs in the cloak of atrocity. And
I just wanted to mention that for the record.
Mr. Christopher. I think that is a very fair point, Senator, and
I regret it if I were indiscriminate. It is the Serbian leadership and
the policies that seem to be carried out pursuant to their will or
what they are letting happen that I object to so strongly.
Senator Coverdell. I mentioned to you yesterday during our
discussion
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. I had an opportunity, Senator — I am
sorry to interrupt you, but I thought I might save a few seconds
by saying that I have gotten the memorandum under which Sec-
retary Eagleburger renewed or reconfirmed the earlier statements
by Secretary Shultz with respect to the independence of the oper-
ation of the Peace Corps. And I will be glad to commit to you to
send a comparable memorandum, which I think is the simplest
way to make sure that the independence which you so prize is rein-
forced by the incoming administration.
Senator Coverdell. Well, I appreciate that. If I had a score card
like Senator Simon, I would have a good mark to make there. I
think Senator Dodd would agree with me that that cable is very
important to the relationship between the two agencies.
If I could just make one more comment, so that we might move
on to tomorrow. About midway in my tenure at the Peace Corps I
had a brief opportunity, a purposeful opportunity, to be in India.
As you know, there was an extensive program there at one time,
and it was interrupted by hostilities between the Government of
India and the United States.
I have been struck by the low visibility of the relationship be-
tween these two great democracies. I understand extended and
pointed problems that exist between us, but it seems to me that
there is a lost opportunity. I was struck by the number of Ameri-
cans in India — very, very few studying or otherwise, and the large
number of Indians in the United States. And it seems to me that,
considering the size of that democracy and its role in the region
that perhaps it deserves some more attention that it has received
today.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, there are many important relation-
ships between the two countries. My own impression is that there
has been a very strong improvement in the relationships between
India and the United States following the end of the cold war. I
think that removed a number of tensions that had overlaid the re-
lationship and probably in some respects undercut it.
132
We have one of our most outstanding Ambassadors in residence
there in Tom Pickering, and he tells me that there is a substantial
improvement in the relationship between the United States and
India. And, moreover, I think he is quite optimistic about trend
lines there.
I think, perhaps, the size of their population coupled with tre-
mendous economic success in this country is a major reason that
there are so many Indians attending school here, and so many of
them doing so well. But I really do look for an upturn in the rela-
tionship between the United States and India, and I hope they will
not be set back in any way by the ethnic struggles that are going
on in India at the present time.
Senator Sarbanes. Would the Senator yield for just a moment?
Senator Coverdell. Certainly.
Senator Sarbanes. I want to say I share the reaction that Sen-
ator Coverdell had about our inability to develop a closer relation-
ship with India, which would seem to go along with the fact that
we were the two leading democracies. I do think that it is a very
important question that he put to you, and I thank the Senator for
it.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you, Senator. And with that, Mr.
Christopher, I am going to conclude in the name of the hour, and
look forward to visiting with you further tomorrow.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAffiMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Simon?
Senator Simon. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for asking questions
this late, but the Attorney General-designate is before the Judici-
ary Committee after tomorrow, and I may not have a chance to-
morrow.
Senator Helms does not need me to ask questions for him, but
I think maybe the underlying question that he has is, is Warren
Christopher going to use the office of Secretary of State for par-
tisan purposes?
Mr. Christopher. I assure you, Senator Simon, that I will not.
I think it is one of the most important principles that has devel-
oped over the years, or traditions at least, that the Secretary of
State does not engage in partisan politics. That will be easy, I
think, for me to comply with because, not to be self-complimentary,
but I have never been a very political person. And I think all of
my instincts will be in the position, if I am confirmed, to be very
careful to not be involved in partisan politics.
It is particularly important to be able to develop in this arena
a bipartisanship. We will never reach the millennium there, but I
think if the Secretary of State eschews involvement in partisan pol-
itics, he will be able to establish better relationships across the
aisle. And I commit myself to doing so.
Senator Simon. And that includes, obviously you have said by
implication, you are going to work with Republican members of this
committee as well as Democratic members.
Mr. Christopher. Absolutely, Senator. I very much value my re-
lationship with the Republican members of this committee, several
of whom are at least more than acquaintances; people who I regard
as friends. And I look forward to deepening the relationship with
them because we need to, as I said in my statement, try to build
133
a real consensus on some of these vexing issues that face us. Issues
like the use of force and other issues that are so fundamental.
Senator Simon. And that means, also, you are not going to be
speaking at a Democratic fundraising dinner for any of us, unfortu-
nately?
Mr. Christopher. No, I really think that the Secretary of State
ought to stay out of politics, and I guess I will save the comment
for a private time, but I assure you that if I do go around the coun-
try as somebody suggested, and make speeches, they will be at
world affairs councils or other public forums, and they will not be
at political events.
I cannot promise not to go over to the White House from time
to time. That is where meetings of the National Security Council
are held and I, after all, do work for the President. But I tend to
avoid partisan politics.
Senator Simon. We understand, and I appreciate your answer. I
just have this scatter shot series of things. No. 1, I believe both
Senator Sarbanes and Senator Dodd, as well as Senator Biden
mentioned this — the need for some kind of U.N. authorization for
troops. Senator Biden introduced the bill. I have a bill that I draft-
ed, not knowing that he was interested. And Senator Boren inde-
pendently has drafted legislation.
Mine said that we would have 2,000 troops, volunteers from
among our armed forces, who would be available at the request of
the President. It is very interesting that to get 500 Pakistani troops
in Mogadishu for the Secretary General, it took 6 weeks. Now, you
simply cannot operate effectively that way. There has to be some
kind of U.N. military, a small military, that is available for emer-
gency situations upon the action of the Security Council and the
approval of our President.
Mr. Christopher. I agree.
Senator Simon. Foreign language skills has been mentioned al-
ready. I simply want to underscore that you are going to be getting
a memo from me of some very practical things that I think can be
done in terms of promotions and other things, to emphasize that.
Bosnia, in addition to the no-fly enforcement I think we need —
Senator Biden mentioned the food situation. I think we have to be
able to deliver food, and if there are ground artillery tanks, other
things, that are stopping the delivery of food, then it seems to me
air power can be used against those installations.
No nation is more of an international bandit right now than Iraq,
but we permit, in Iraq, food and medicine to go to Iraq. In your
statement you say: In Cuba we will maintain the embargo to keep
pressure on the Castro regime. Fidel Castro is the greatest violator
of human rights in this hemisphere, no question about it. But if it
is OK to send food and medicine to Iraq, it seems to me that it is
inconsistent to say we are not going to permit food and medicine
to go to Cuba. I would be interested in your response.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, is it called the Cuban Freedom Act
or the Cuban Democracy Act? It does have two sides to it. It does
increase our contacts with Cuba from a standpoint of telecommuni-
cations and mail and so forth. The embargo is one side and the
other side is the improved contacts. I think it is important to try
to pursue both sides of that.
134
But I am not in a position to respond affirmatively with respect
to any change in the embargo at the present time. I understand
your point and appreciate it, and I will just have to say that that
is one that I will take on board and give consideration to, but think
the President has endorsed the Cuban Democracy Act, and I think
we ought to try to explore both sides of that to see if that relation-
ship cannot, over time, improve.
Senator Dodd. Would my colleague yield?
Senator Simon. I would be pleased to yield.
Senator Dodd. And I am not going to ask you to necessarily com-
ment on this, Mr. Christopher, but we had a heated debate here
several months ago, just prior to the election in the fall, on this
question. And no one argues with the embargo as originally estab-
lished— it has lasted for some 30 years. The question I think that
comes up is the secondary boycott which prohibits subsidiaries of
American firms that are doing business in other countries from
doing business. About 90 percent of that is in food and medicine.
We have received some rather hostile comments from allies who
do not like having the U.S. Government tell them what businesses
operating in their countries can do or not do. The Ford administra-
tion dropped the secondary boycott because, frankly, it was a self-
inflicted wound. We were not doing anything to hurt Fidel Castro
and doing significant damage to our own U.S. firms. That has been
the subject of some debate. That is in addition to the traditional
embargo that has existed, and I think making that distinction may
be worth looking at.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you for educating me about that.
Senator Simon. And I would agree with my colleague, and I re-
member his leading the debate on this issue on the floor of the Sen-
ate.
Senator Dodd. Unsuccessfully. I was clobbered, is probably de-
scriptive.
Senator Simon. I recognize the political volatility of this, but for-
eign policy should reflect the national interest rather than the na-
tional passion. And I think this is one that ought to be reviewed.
Would it do any harm to our foreign policy if we could permit the
U.S. Senate to have, and the U.S. House of Representatives, the
American public, to have the figure on what the CIA spends? I
know what that figure is, you know what that figure is. Those in
this audience or anybody watching on television, or the American
public right now is not entitled to know — not the details, obviously
you cannot do that, but the gross figure. Is there any harm to U.S.
foreign policy to have that gross figure be a matter of public
record?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, that question has too many handles
on it for me to want to grab one of them at this hour of the night.
I really think that is a decision that the President has to make,
and I have really not studied the question.
In this new era, and it certainly is a changed era, CIA activities
are so much more transparent than they were before, but I would
need to think about that and be briefed about that before I would
really want to commit to a question that begins "does it do any
harm to our foreign policy to do xT. I am worried about that, about
responding without further study, I am sorry to say, Senator.
135
Senator Simon. You started by saying you were reluctant to an-
swer at this hour of the night. If I asked you tomorrow morning,
am I going to get a different answer?
Mr. Christopher. I might be better briefed by tomorrow morn-
ing.
Senator Simon. The question of the moratorium on nuclear test-
ing obviously involves foreign policy.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Simon. It involves defense policy. It seems to me that if
we were to say we are not going to have any more nuclear tests
as long as other nations do not have nuclear tests, it would be in
our self-interest, as well as in the interests of other nations. I
would be interested in your reaction.
Mr. Christopher. The President-elect's position on that, Sen-
ator, is that we should first move to a much smaller number of
tests, probably smaller in size as well, as a first step. And then as
a second step if that goes well, move to a moratorium. And I think
the general inclination is in the direction that you suggest, but to
do it in two steps.
Senator Simon. There has been some discussion of Eastern Eu-
rope and the countries there. We face a specifically difficult prob-
lem in that Armenia is blocked from receiving a lot of supplies by
Azerbaijan. I would hope that you could instruct someone to work
on this problem and see what we can do diplomatically to improve
that situation. It is a very difficult situation. It is an emotionally
volatile one also.
Mr. Christopher. Yes.
Senator Simon. But I have to believe that with greater intention,
it is one that probably can get resolved.
Mr. Christopher. I will do as you ask, Senator.
Senator Simon. If you could answer that on all my future ques-
tions, I would appreciate it. [Laughter.!
Vietnam, we are moving toward a normalization, in economic
terms at least. It seems to me that is clearly in our national inter-
est. Caterpillar in my State wants to do business. AT&T wants to
do business. Oil exploration is desired by American firms. And it
seems to me we are just hurting ourselves by the economic boycott
there; any reaction?
Mr. Christopher. Well, Vietnam has done a number of things
to bring itself back into the community of nations. It seems to have
performed well enough in Cambodia. The problem remains as to
whether or not we have gotten full cooperation on the MIA issue,
and I do not know what the result of Senator Kerry's announce-
ment on finishing his work today was, but I think that we at least
ought to proceed along the roadmap that was laid out by the Bush
administration. Those steps are quite small, but at least we are
moving. And perhaps it will be possible, if the MIA issue is further
resolved, to move further down that road more rapidly.
It certainly is in the U.S. economic interest. We are missing a
number of outstanding commercial opportunities. When I have
traveled recently in Asia and have seen the amount, for example,
of investment going from Taiwan to Vietnam, countries with quite
different economic systems, you see the opportunities we are prob-
ably missing there, Senator.
136
Senator Simon. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one more question?
I know my time is up.
We were able to get an amendment on the State Department au-
thorization requiring that somebody be designated to look at the
problems of water, and I was interested in your response to Sen-
ator Kerry. You talked about an Assistant Secretary for — I forget
the title you had, but one of the responsibilities would be to look
at the environment and specifically water. Water is going to play
a greater and greater role in the future of world stability.
Mr. Christopher. I share that feeling, Senator.
Senator Simon. It is vital that we find less expensive ways to
convert salt water to fresh water, and that we face some of these
terms that are not in the headlines — problems that are not in the
headlines tomorrow, but will be very very shortly.
And I hope you will designate someone quickly who can — even
before you get that new Assistant Secretary, who can work on
these water problems. And I would like to work with that person,
whoever that designee is.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you. Thank you, Senator, we will do
that.
Senator Simon. I thank you. You have been a very patient wit-
ness today and I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. And you have given won-
derful testimony, precise and very excellent indeed. I think we
should meet here at about 10 a.m., tomorrow morning, at exactlv
10 a.m., and we will proceed as expeditiously as we can. Accord-
ingly, the committee is recessed until 10 a.m., in this room tomor-
row morning.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy of
the day.
[Whereupon, at 7:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10:03 a.m., January 14, 1993.]
NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE WARREN
M. CHRISTOPHER OF CALIFORNIA TO BE
SECRETARY OF STATE
THURSDAY, JANUARY 14, 1993
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Simon, Robb,
Mathews, Helms, Kassebaum, and Coverdell.
The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come
to order.
Yesterday, Secretary-designate Christopher submitted a 5-page
statement to our committee reaffirming his testimony in 1977
when the committee approved his nomination to be Deputy Sec-
retary of State.
At 1 p.m. yesterday afternoon, the committee received a number
of classified documents from the LBJ Library in Austin pertaining
to Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony before our committee. These
documents have been reviewed by the committee's chief counsel
and the chief counsel to the minority, and I have been informed
that none of these documents is inconsistent with either Mr. Chris-
topher's 1977 testimony or his statement and testimony before our
committee yesterday.
I have been further informed that these papers included one doc-
ument— one document classified confidential, which is not only con-
sistent with but totally supports Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony
and his statement and testimony before our committee yesterday.
I have requested that this document be declassified. Without ob-
jection, upon declassification it will be made a part of the record
of this confirmation hearing.
[The information referred to may be found in the afternoon ses-
sion.]
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Now we are resuming the questioning that we
did yesterday. We only got through two rounds in a good many
hours yesterday, so I would hope my colleagues would be as brief
with their questions as you were with your answers.
At the wish of some of the members we are going to the 10-
minute rule, and I, before getting started, will ask the ranking
member if he has a statement to make.
(137)
138
Senator Helms. No, I do not, and I thank the Chair.
The Chairman. The alarm clock should ring. I am starting my
10 minutes right now.
There are just two points I wanted to raise. One is, yesterday
you discussed briefly Tibet. I had the good fortune to be in Tibet
a few weeks ago, and was concerned at the way the Chinese influ-
ence, not violently, was permeating a great deal of the leadership
positions. I was just curious what you saw as a way of preserving
the integrity and — not the sovereignty, necessarily, but the inde-
pendence and autonomy of Tibet.
I know in the legislation we have passed in the past, I have had
legislation passed talking about Tibet and China, which did not
please the Chinese. What other ways are there that we can help
Tibet at this time, in your view?
Mr. Christopher. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to talking with
you about your trip to Tibet. I am sure there is much I can learn
from you about that.
I tnink in many ways this is a human rights situation, a situa-
tion in which the Chinese have not had respect for the Tibetan peo-
ple and their rather unique lifestyle and their unique traditions. I
think that when we meet with trie Chinese we ought to make it
a strong point that they need to have a good deal more respect for
the rights and dignity of the Tibetan people, and to make that a
high priority in our meetings with them.
I think it is one of several problems we have with the Chinese,
but it is certainly one of the most urgent ones, so when I have an
opportunity to meet with the Chinese, I would certainly intend to
raise the Tibetan issue.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Now, I would hope that we could encourage the Chinese to nego-
tiate with the Dalai Lama. As you know, Jiang Zemin, the General
Secretary of the Communist Party, has said that he would talk
with the Dalai Lama but would not include any question of inde-
pendence to be discussed.
The other question I had concerned the relationship with Russia
and START II. As you know, Mr. Yeltsin has come under huge
pressure from opponents in the Russian Parliament. What do you
think we should do to shore up Mr. Yeltsin? We touched on this
yesterday, but I would be interested in any enlargement of your
thoughts.
Also, how soon do you expect to be ready to begin the ratification
process of the START II?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, as I said in my statement yesterday,
I think Mr. Yeltsin is the best hope we have for reform in Russia
both in terms of economic and political reform, so I think that we
ought to do all that we can to support him within the limits of our
own resources. We certainly ought to press our European allies to
be supportive.
I also feel, though, that we ought to be very careful with the situ-
ation with Mr. Yeltsin, and that is to not overpromise and then dis-
appoint his expectations, thus perhaps creating even more prob-
lems for him with his own people.
I think one thing we can do — and this picks up on the second
part of your question — is to move, if this committee and Congress
139
is willing, to consider START II at a relatively early date. I cannot
give you a specific time, but I think that it would be useful from
the standpoint of indicating the seriousness of the United States
for us to move briskly. I think that would enable him to move in
a similar way.
Of course, circumstances are changing so rapidly in Russia. We
did not used to think of a parliament that had an important say
in the Soviet Union, but that is part of the democratization of the
country, and I think we have to accept that, but I feel that Presi-
dent Yeltsin has reached a treaty that is very good for his people,
as well as being very positive from the standpoint of the United
States.
I think it helps him from a financial standpoint, enables him to
turn from heavy defense expenditures to relief from those expendi-
tures so he can concentrate more on an economy which everyone
knows is in very serious difficulty. We will be moving on that as
rapidly as the preparation can be done.
As you know well, the treaties are complex. The surface of them
may be simple and easy to state, but underneath, there are com-
plications and we need to be ready to present it to the Senate as
soon as possible.
The Chairman. Apparently, when you look back on Russian his-
tory, 1917 and what happened then when there was a democratic
revolution the rest of the world did not help it along, and they
waited for a man on a white horse who turned out to be Lenin. We
do not want to see a similar — it will not be communism because
that is being refuted, but some other kind of equally unpleasant
man on a white horse coming down the pike.
Mr. Christopher. Well, that is certainly true, Senator. The cur-
rent evolution, or revolution, is not irreversible, and it certainly
would be a serious setback if Yeltsin were to be removed in favor
of a less Democratic choice. If the forces of repression were to move
back in there, we could — in this new era that we have talked so
confidently about — be very badly tarnished.
The Chairman. I thank you, and I have no further questions at
this time, and I turn to the ranking minority member, Mr. Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, I very much appreciate your com-
ment about the Dalai Lama. Senator Pell and I have worked for
him and with him and visited with him, and I think we share a
common affection, and I perceive that you do as well. It may re-
quire more than just talking to the Chinese, some kind of law has
got to be laid down with reference to what is going on. It is a trav-
esty, the murder of those people and the subjugation of them, but
I appreciate your comment.
Would you like a cup of coffee?
Mr. Christopher. I am just fine with the water, thank you. I
had my share earlier this morning.
Senator Helms. You are welcome to this.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you. I am just fine. Thank you very
much.
The Chairman. This always goes to the ranking minority mem-
ber I think, the coffee.
Senator Sarbanes. Would the Senator yield for iust a moment?
Senator Helms. Would you like to have the coffee?
140
Senator Sarbanes. No, no. I am all right.
Because the question of Tibet has come up, I think we ought to —
if it was not noted by the chairman in his prepared statement, Sec-
retary Christopher in talking about human rights questions made
specific reference to Tibet in his opening statement to the commit-
tee.
Senator Helms. Are you ready for me to begin?
The Chairman. Yes, go ahead.
Senator Helms. Mr. Christopher, I went over last night the text
of a fairly lengthy speech that you made in 1977. You were very
clear in what you said. I think we are going to put it on the board.
I believe you said, we hope to reestablish normal relations with
Cuba. Thorny issues, including the trade embargo and compensa-
tion for our nationalized property remain to be resolved, but in a
measured and reciprocal way we are moving toward normal rela-
tions. Disagreements over Africa — and that means the Cuban
troops in Africa, I presume — may inhibit this process, but we be-
lieve that progress can be made.
Then I compared that with a statement made by Mr. Clinton,
and I can tell you where he made it — in Victor's Cafe in Miami, FL,
during the campaign. He said something to the effect that the Bush
administration — have we got that on the board, too? — the Bush ad-
ministration had missed a big opportunity to put the hammer down
on Fidel Castro and Cuba.
Who is going to prevail in this, Mr. Clinton, or you?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, in that kind of a choice, the Presi-
dent always prevails.
Senator Helms. I understand.
Mr. Christopher. You will notice from my statement yesterday
I indicate that we intend to continue to enforce the embargo. We
will continue to enforce the embargo against Cuba in accordance
with congressional legislation.
I suppose diplomats always hope to be able to resume normal re-
lations with countries. Looking back on my 1977 statement, I
would have to say it was overly hopeful, perhaps even naive.
Senator HELMS. Well, did you — did you and do you think that
any normalization should take place with Castro still in place in
Cuba?
Mr. Christopher. It is very hard to envision it taking place with
Castro still in place. He has such a long history of subjugation of
his people, and the way he has treated them over the years, the
way he has conducted himself in international affairs, I think it is
hard to envisage.
Senator Helms. Well, let me go down a list of things that I hap-
pen to think ought to happen, and I think 100 percent of the Cu-
bans living in this country who are exiled from their own land
would agree with what I am about to say.
Would you agree that at a minimum the following should be re-
quired before normalization? Just answer yes or no.
You have already referred — answered, I think, that Castro
should be out.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
141
Senator Helms. OK Do you agree that all foreign military advis-
ers and intelligence advisers be out? You know what I mean by
that.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, Senator. It seems to me that there needs
to be a major change in those relationships.
Now, I do not want to put myself in a position to say that we
can never have normal relationships with a country that has mili-
tary advisers from another country within its borders.
Senator Helms. I am talking about the Soviet advisers, of course,
who are advising or operating the equipment down there that I am
going to refer to next.
Mr. Christopher. I do not want to — I do not want to even com-
mit myself with respect to Russian advisers. It is no longer the So-
viet Union, but the United States has got advisers around in var-
ious countries of the world, and I would not like to have third coun-
tries of the world refuse to have normal relationships with them
because we have advisers there.
I think we will have to judge the degree of independence of Cuba,
whether it is a fully independent country, or whether it is still so
much under the sway of the former Soviet Union that it would be
undesirable for us to do so.
Certainly, the Russian relationship with Cuba seems to be
changing very rapidly; the Russians cannot afford it any longer.
But I do not want to box myself, or box our country, into a set of
straitjackets as far as dealing with other countries around the
world which might possibly have foreign advisers.
Senator Helms. Well, we will put that in escrow, and I think you
know what I mean.
As far as Mr. Yeltsin is concerned, I like the man. I have visited
with him. I have sat with him, and by the way, when you deal with
him, he understands more English than he puts on.
Mr. Christopher. Many foreign leaders do.
Senator Helms. He sits there while it is being translated, but he
is waiting. That gives him time to think. But he is a smart cookie,
and a nice man I think, and I think he is sincere about his wish
to bring freedom and abundance to the former Soviet Union and
certainly to Russia.
Well, you do agree that the nuclear reactor should be dismantled
before we have any normalization.
Mr. Christopher. I guess I do not know about it in that detail.
Is it a peaceful nuclear reactor, Senator?
Senator Helms. Pardon me?
Mr. Christopher. Is it a peaceful nuclear reactor?
Senator Helms. No, sir. Well, you know, they say it is, but we
are getting into a sort of treacherous thing. If you need for me to
explain it to you, we would have to do that in closed session.
Mr. Christopher. It is not simply a peaceful nuclear plant to
generate electric power as we have here in the United States.
Senator Helms. No. It is kind of like Chernobyl.
Mr. Christopher. Kind of like Chernobyl.
Senator Helms. Yes.
Mr. Christopher. Well, Chernobyl was a plant generating
power. We have a number of those in this country.
142
Senator Helms. Well, it had a dual purpose. Surely we agree
that before any normalization with Cuba takes place, that there be
an absolute respect for human rights, including freedom of speech
and religion, expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly.
Mr. Christopher. I think they would have to make major
changes in their human rights posture and in their governmental
structure.
Senator Helms. And you agree that all political prisoners should
be released.
Mr. Christopher. Yes. I would be strongly in favor of that kind
of an amnesty, but I want to say again, Senator, that the United
States needs to have relations with countries that have less than
perfect governmental structures. I think that normalization with
Cuba is a long ways down the line and very difficult, but I do not
want to establish for them a totally different standard than we
have for the rest of the world.
Senator Helms. Well, you know, given the history of Cuba and
Castro, I think perhaps it would be fair to set them aside and ex-
pect somewhat more rigid requirements than we do of others, be-
cause this Castro has been exporting a revolution throughout Latin
America, and he has been a pronounced enemy of the United
States. Do you think there ought to be legal guarantees for private
property?
Mr. Christopher. I would not say that that was an absolutely
fundamental basis for normalization. We have good relations with
a number of countries around the world who have different views
with respect to private property than we do.
Fortunately, the trend is in the right direction all over the world,
Senator. The trend toward privatization is a very marked one, even
in places like Russia, but I do not want to build a structure in
which we can have normal diplomatic relations only with countries
that are exactly like we are.
Senator Helms. Well, let me focus it a little more narrowly, then.
This past October I think it was — yes, it had to be — the Congress
passed legislation to strengthen the embargo against Castro and
Cuba, and this was signed into law by George Bush and it is called
the Cuban Democracy Act.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. I referred to that yesterday, Senator
Helms.
Senator Helms. I know you did.
Mr. Christopher. And said I fully support it.
Senator Helms. Now, OK, do you think that the Clinton admin-
istration or your own good self will have any intention of modifying
or weakening that act?
Mr. Christopher. I have no such present intention.
Senator Helms. So in that light, I suppose you wholeheartedly
support prohibiting U.S. foreign subsidiaries from trading with
Cuba. Now this was provided by an amendment offered by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Florida, Mr. Mack. Now, do you agree
with the Mack amendment?
Mr. Christopher. That was enacted into law, was it not, Sen-
ator?
Senator Helms. Yes, sir.
143
Mr. Christopher. Well, I do not know about that in detail and
I have heard that there have been objections to that from some of
our principle allies. But, at the present time, I would say that I am
fully supportive of the legislation that has been enacted and do not
have any present intention to seek changes in it.
Senator Helms. The Mack amendment specifically — you can look
it up, have somebody provide it. I think you ought to take a look
at it. It is section 1706A and it provides for civil penalties for viola-
tors of the embargo, which is section 17 IOC. Now these are the two
key provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act.
So you have already said that you support the act but you have
also said you are not familiar precisely with the Mack amendment.
Would you have your staff some time today get you a copy of the
Mack amendment.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Helms. And you will let me know whether or not you
intend to be enthusiastically in support of it, because you will be
speaking for the Clinton administration.
Mr. Christopher. I will try to have that available to me during
the luncheon recess.
Senator Helms. That would be great. And I see the red light is
burning on me and I thank you very much.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. I have just one question. Mr. Secretary, is it
possible that Russian advisers in Cuba today may, in fact, be a re-
straining factor on Cuba?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, we have found that so historically, that
the Russians may be more conservative in the advice that they are
giving than the country would be itself. And if there are dangerous
weapons there, it may be in our interests that there are advisers
there. As I say, historically we have found, I think, that to be true
elsewhere, and it is possible here. I do not have any information
on that that would lead me to conclude that, but it is certainly pos-
sible based upon prior experience, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, my understanding of President Clin-
ton's position and yours is that you support the Cuban Democracy
Act, of which the Mack amendment is a part. And therefore your
position, in effect, is in support of the entire legislation; is that not
correct?
Mr. Christopher. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much. I have no further
questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kassebaum.
Senator Kassebaum. Mr. Christopher, I would like to ask a mo-
ment about the Haitian refugee policy. President-elect Clinton ear-
lier on had indicated that Haitian refugees would be welcome. I
think he has issued some statements since that clearly said he was
reviewing the situation, and there is a story in this morning's
paper about a number of Haitian refugees who are preparing to
come.
I guess I would just like to ask you what your thoughts are on
the situation and what in the next couple of weeks the Clinton ad-
144
ministration might be prepared to do if, early on, the administra-
tion finds that a number of refugees are attempting to come?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, if I could go back to what you said
initially. I certainly do not want to contradict you, but my under-
standing of Governor Clinton's initial position was that he thought
that an opportunity ought to be made available to Haitian refugees
to have their claims or requests for entry processed in a timely
way, that he wanted to make sure that requests for asylum were
not choked off, and that the Haitians could pursue those desires in
a timely and effective way.
Now, that is somewhat different than saying that they would be
welcome in the United States. I think Governor Clinton continues
to feel that it is quite important for them to have that kind of an
opportunity, and thus he will be concentrating on trying to find ad-
ditional processing centers within Haiti which, after all, is the best
place for them to be processed. And also, as I said yesterday, not
to have to go to Port-au-Prince in order to be processed. For many
people in the country that is an almost impossible or very expen-
sive trip.
Governor Clinton's approach to the problem is two-pronged at the
present time. First, to devote a great deal of energy and effort to
encouraging the OAS and the U.N. endeavor. If we both got the
same newspaper story this morning, I think you can see in that
story a considerable effort on our part to move that process for-
ward. That clearly is the long-term solution to the problem.
But it is those two elements of the policy that Governor Clinton
has been emphasizing. First, to provide for adequate processing of
claims for asylum, and second, to try to resolve the underlying
problems so that there can be a restoration of democracy in Haiti.
I do think, Senator, that the Governor will be making a state-
ment on this subject within the next day or two, and so I am a lit-
tle reluctant to go further, because certainly the President-elect is
entitled to say it exactly the way he wants to say it. But I think
you will find it within the same context of my remarks today.
Senator Kassebaum. Well I would agree with that. My concern
has been, to a certain extent, that it may be misinterpreted in
Haiti by those who are feeling very oppressed and, of course, strug-
gling there. And that their hopes maybe far exceed what anyone
is able to do to assist at the moment. And trying to keep it all in
context, it seems to me, is important, and trying to get the message
out so it is clearly understood.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, it is a rather cruel situation if they try
to exercise those hopes by getting in those boats.
Senator Kassebaum. Yes.
Mr. Christopher. And trying to make that dangerous journey.
I read in the paper the other day that a boat apparently had gone
down with between 300 and 400 people on board, and I think some
storms are predicted over the next couple of weeks in that channel.
And so it really would be a cruel process for them to try to proceed
outside of Haiti in the hope of achieving a better life.
Senator Kassebaum. I myself have thought the time has come,
and several months back sent a letter to OAS urging that they re-
view the sanctions — the embargo. Because it seems to me that in
many ways it is hurting those that are most in need of some jobs
145
and employment and income, and it is perhaps working against the
situation instead of helping with that. Have you given any thought
to what your views might be regarding that embargo?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, that is really part of the first prong
of the policy that we are trying to follow, and that is to try to seek
a Democratic restoration there which would enable the lifting of
the embargo, if not all at once at least in stages. And certainly if
you had a return to democracy there, you would have the condi-
tions under which the embargo could be lifted. And I think it may
be possible to have a package of ideas go together that would
produce a political solution which would involve the military in the
discussions as well.
Senator Kassebaum. Thank you very much.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning Mr.
Christopher.
Mr. Christopher. Good morning, Senator.
Senator Kerry. If I could just say for the record that yesterday
there was an effort made in the course of some questions to try to
rewrite history. I would just like the record to be very clear that
I thought the questions asserting that there was somehow a simi-
larity in the policies of the Reagan administration with respect to
arms and hostages and the policies of the administration that pre-
ceded it is just in error.
And I think the record should reflect clearly that there is a dif-
ference between withholding already-purchased and already-owned
materials as a matter of negotiation versus engaging in a secret
new initiative with subterfuge in the movement of money, for new
and sophisticated arms. They are simply not one and the same
thing. And I think that the record ought to reflect that the majority
of the members of this committee are of that view.
In today's New York Times, Mr. Christopher, there is a banner
headline and a significant story from the President-elect with re-
spect to Saddam Hussein in which he says he is not obsessed with
Hussein and in which he also says that if Saddam Hussein wants
a different relationship with the United States, all he has to do is
change his behavior.
The newspaper interprets that as an olive branch. I did not nec-
essarily, but clearly I think some clarification would be important.
If there is an assumption that if Saddam Hussein simply changes
his behavior, he could have a normal relationship with the United
States, I think there would be— certainly this Senator would
have — some problems with that.
Saddam Hussein is a war criminal. He has murdered and tor-
tured people all his life. I think most people would find it very hard
to say that we could have a normal relationship with somebody
who holds absolutely power and exercises it the way he does.
I did not interpret the President-elect's comments to mean what
I think the newspaper may have suggested it meant, and it might
even have created something of a problem. So I ask you if you
could tell us today if there is any clarification to that? Is it, in fact,
an olive branch? Would a different behavior gain Saddam Hussein
146
a normal relationship or would it simply stop the bombing and stop
the response?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I agree with your characterization of
it. I, of course, saw that story this morning and thought that the
writer's interpretation, and particularly the headline, was a
mischaracterization of what Governor Clinton had said.
Governor Clinton did emphasize several times in that interview
that he would continue to judge the behavior and actions of Sad-
dam Hussein. That the sanctions would be continued in full force,
that he would carry out his duties as commander in chief, and that
he was prepared to use force, indeed perhaps even greater force, to
ensure that the U.N. resolutions were carried out.
I thought that the most that could be said was that Governor
Clinton perhaps wanted to keep the feud from being personalized
and it is probably always a good rule, which I try to follow, to im-
personate differences of opinion so that you are free, with cool-
ness and abstractness, to make the best judgments.
I do not think it was anything beyond that, except perhaps there
was a religious quality about it. He talked about his Baptist belief
in redemption. I happen not to be a Baptist and I am not very opti-
mistic about any redemption for Saddam Hussein. Indeed, when
you read of his character and the things he has done over the
years, not only just admitted but asserted that he has done over
the years, I find it hard to share the Baptist belief in redemption.
But I do not want to get into a philosophical or a religious argu-
ment. I would simply say that I see no substantial change in the
position, and a continuing total support for what the Bush adminis-
tration has done. As you know, the Governor fully supported yes-
terday's action, and in the course of the story indicated that he
would be prepared for other kinds of action, if necessary. So I wel-
come the opportunity to agree with your characterization of the
story, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Well, I appreciate that, because I was imme-
diately struck by the leap, if you will, from a statement that you
can have a different relationship — which you certainly can have. I
mean the relationship right now is one of test and countertest and
response, counterresponse. You certainly can have a different rela-
tionship than that, but that is a far cry from asserting or assuming
we can move suddenly to normal relations. And I thought it was
a leap and I thought it was a troublesome leap, obviously.
On another subject, I applaud your response to the Senator from
North Carolina with respect to not getting locked in, setting a rigid
standard for diplomatic relations, generally. It is such a murky
area.
If the Senator from North Carolina starts applying the standard
he seemed to be proposing in his questions, we are going to have
a lot of trouble with an awful lot of countries around the world
where there are political prisoners, where there are not complete
freedoms, where there are, in fact, dictators masquerading as
Democrats. And many of these countries are very close to us, with
whom we have major aid programs and so forth.
Related to this is the contradiction between our attitude toward
Vietnam and our attitude toward China. The very policy that we
espouse toward China, which is to keep it open, to keep talking to
147
its leaders in order to foster change and maximize reform is in its
very neighboring country exactly the opposite policy; we shut them
out, close the door, do not move forward.
One other area of concern, Mr. Secretary, is the tension between
the Commerce Department and the State Department. You have,
I think appropriately, espoused a desire to see the State Depart-
ment become much more aggressive in promoting American busi-
ness interests overseas. But clearly the Commerce Department has
always and wants to increasingly exert what it views as its juris-
diction to promote American business abroad.
Personally, I think this is duplicative, wasteful, and potentially
diminishes the ability of either Department to be effective. Have
you, at this point, either had any discussions about clarifying the
chain of command with respect to this and the priority of Jurisdic-
tion? And if not, do you share with me a sense that we need, to clar-
ify this in the near term?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I welcome that comment. I have only
had, I guess, a brief conversation with Secretary-designate Brown
about that, and we have agreed that this is a subject that we ought
to talk about so that we can harmonize our approach and not be
inefficient and duplicative. So we have not gotten substantive
about it, but we have identified that there is an issue there. This
is an area where there is no need to have a running battle; it is
a place where we ought to harmonize the American approaches.
Senator Kerry. Well, I agree with you, and I just want to assert
on behalf of many members of this committee and myself person-
ally that not because of the jurisdiction of this committee, put be-
cause when you analyze the issue, each and every business interest
that we may push is integrally linked to our larger relationships,
both with that country and in the region. And I think this commit-
tee will press very, very hard to see that the primary jurisdiction
ought to be within your Department. Many of the business inter-
ests we have might run exactly counter to negotiations on either
treaties or other relationships within the region and other pres-
sures that we are trying to bring to bear. And therefore, I think
while there is a very simple, direct purpose and manner with
which you carry out the business piece of it, yours is a far more
complicated set of relationships, and I think you should hold the
primary jurisdiction on it.
Mr. Christopher. Part of the problem I think, Senator, is that
we have not done this very well in the past, so it has been some
temptation or tendency for other departments to feel they need to
get into the picture. If we can do a better job ourselves, then I
think that need may lessen.
Senator Kerry. Oh, I understand.
Thank you very much. I have no further questions at this time,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Simon.
Senator Simon. Thank you. I am just going to take 2 minutes
here, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow on on what Senator
Kerry had to say. I think we get on very shaky ground when we
start listing the criteria. I wish my friend and colleague Senator
Helms were here. Saudi Arabia, for example, clearly does not have
freedom of religion, freedom of the press. It does have what we
148
would regard as political prisoners. I do not think Senator Helms
nor I nor Warren Christopher would suggest that we sever diplo-
matic relations with Saudi Arabia.
I am not suggesting that the King of Saudi Arabia is a Fidel Cas-
tro, but I think we have to be very, very cautious. We have to con-
tinue to push for human rights. But we cannot expect carbon copies
of the United States everywhere in the world and sever relation-
ships when we do not get them.
The second point I would simply like to underscore, and I forget
who mentioned this yesterday, is the Cyprus situation. You men-
tioned that Turkey has been helpful to us. I heard Bill Clinton dur-
ing the campaign mention our long-time ties with Greece. There is
no question that the presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus is an ir-
ritant and that we do not have as happy a situation as we should
there. And my own feeling there is that President Vassiliou and
Mr. Denktash are two personalities who could mesh if they got a
little nudging from Ankara and Athens, and I would hope that the
Cyprus issue could come off the back burner to the front burner.
I do not expect a comment from you, but I would hope that could
be the case.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, since you have not encouraged my
comment I probably should be wise enough to just sit moot, but
President Vassiliou is in the midst of an election campaign, and his
reelection, I guess, is far from assured. I have heard that there are
three factions that are involved there, so in a sense the negotia-
tions have to be on hold until there is a clarification. That is really
the only reason I wanted to respond.
I do, as I have for a long time, hope that there would be more
encouragement, both from Ankara and Athens, and I guess particu-
larly from Ankara, to reach a settlement. Mr. Denktash has been
there for a long time and seems to operate with a good deal of inde-
Eendence as far as these discussions go, and I hope that there will
e a greater effort by all three parties to reach a conclusion.
If I could just go back to the first part of your question, Senator,
I would want to emphasize the importance of not establishing im-
possible conditions for normalization of relations. China is, itself, a
good example. If we had refused to normalize our relations with
China until they had met this set of criteria along the lines that
Senator Helms was outlining this morning, we certainly would not
yet be in normal relations.
Indeed, when a country is coming back from outlaw status, they
may need to be brought Back into the family of nations. They have
to do enough in order to justify recognition, but you probably can-
not expect that they have gone all the way to our system or our
form of government. Certainly, I would not.
Senator Simon. I appreciate that.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much. Senator Mathews.
Senator Mathews. Mr. Chairman, just one question or one com-
ment. And with the committee's indulgence, I have asked my as-
sistant to pass to Secretary-designate Christopher a cartoon that
appeared in a paper from Nashville, TN, a couple of weeks ago
alongside an article by Mary McGrory. She was talking about the
role which this country is playing as a helpmate to others. I think
149
the cartoon is self-explanatory in terms of the situation it depicts.
I would simply ask if you would make a comment on it, Mr. Sec-
retary.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think this cartoon is a reflection of
the changing times, the new era that we are in as far as the obliga-
tions and particularly the use of force by the United States. It was
clearly cartoons like this and television pictures comparable to this
that caused the people of the United States to fully support our
going into Somalia to create circumstances so that the humani-
tarian relief could get through. It is a very compelling picture, and
it is one of those situations where the United States, despite all of
our obligations here in the United States and despite our scarcity
of resources, nevertheless were so moved that we could not fail to
act.
Now, the Bosnian child at the bottom of the picture indicates an-
other very great tug on our conscience and on our resources, if you
will. At tne present time, we do have a commitment to provide hu-
manitarian relief under multilateral forces in Bosnia. That is prob-
ably not being done as well or as fully as it should be because of
the pressure humanitarian organizations are under in Bosnia. The
cartoon demonstrates the need to try to see if we cannot mitigate
in one way or the other the tragedy of Bosnia which has so many
different forms, including mass starvation this winter.
Senator Mathews. Do you see this as another and a further step
that we need to make in terms of developing partnerships as we
attempt to solve problems of this nature?
Mr. Christopher. I certainly do, Senator. I think that Bosnia is
the particular responsibility of the European Governments, and as
I said yesterday, I do not think they have fulfilled it very well. But
it is one, at the same time, that we cannot completely shrink from.
Senator Mathews. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much.
No question at this time, except one comment: I agree with you,
Mr. Christopher, on the importance of China coming in from an
outlaw status. On the one hand we know the dreadful things she
does in human rights and the occupation of Tibet. But we also have
to recognize its 1.2 billion people and her economy — when you are
there, as we were a few weeks ago — you see absolutely exploding
and developing to a remarkable degree.
I have no questions at this time, and I would turn and ask the
ranking minority member for his.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, the point that I was making when
you were out of the room is that if we had established for China
a set of criteria that you were outlining to me for Cuba, we would
probably not have yet normalized relationships with China, be-
cause they fail to meet a number of the tests that you have out-
lined. So I think we have to be quite pragmatic in determining the
time at which we normalize relations and not establish tests that
might be artificial.
We need to do what is in the interest of the United States, and
it certainly was in the interests of the United States to normalize
relationships with China.
150
Senator Helms. Well, I am not sure I agree with you about
China, Mr. Secretary. But in any case, I had to leave to attend a
hearing on Mr. Espy. I am a member of the Agriculture Committee.
As a matter of fact, I am a former chairman of the Agriculture
Committee. And the more I read about Mr. Espy the more I like
him, and I told him that this morning. And I also told him, and
there was a great throng there in the Dirksen theater on the
ground floor, and I told them what you said yesterday about sub-
scribing to Herman Talmadge and his wish that there be an Amer-
ican desk at the State Department. And you got a round of ap-
plause, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
Senator Helms. I thought you might like to hear that.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, very much, Senator.
Senator Helms. Let us revisit the nuclear reactor at Cuba. I am
not sure either one of us made ourselves clear. My problem with
that nuclear reactor is that it is almost exactly like Chernobyl,
with all of its dangers. And the reason that I worry about that kind
of reactor is that it is 90 miles from our shore, and there could be
a nuclear cloud over Miami if anything happened. It is easily with-
in the reach of a large part of the United States.
Now, we also mentioned the intelligence-gathering capability by
what is now a whole lot of countries, what used to be the Soviet
Union. And I do hope that at the first opportunity you will talk to
Mr. Yeltsin, and I believe that the members of this committee will
also talk to Mr. Yeltsin — I will, if you wish for me to do so — about
getting that stuff the heck out of Cuba.
Now, I think that a lot of Americans would be alarmed if they
knew that the Russians — and I am talking about the Russians, not
the Soviets — still have a significant presence just 90 miles off our
shore. It is widely known, and I am sure you know it, that Russia
is maintaining a center for intelligence gathering and espionage
just outside of Havana at a submarine base at Cienfuegos. And
they have military advisers who continue to work with Castro's
army.
Now, I hope that you will take a look at this and make a judg-
ment about whether you ought to talk to Yeltsin. I intend to, and
I hope you will, as well.
The cold war is supposed to be over, and the United States is
spending millions of dollars supporting the Russian Government,
and I just wonder if you are prepared to state what you believe the
position of the Clinton administration with respect to this intel-
ligence presence in Cuba, which is clearly hostile to the United
States?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I will do as you say and take an
early look at it, but I am not prepared to state what our position
is about it.
Senator Helms. Well, when you establish a position, would you
let the committee know?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Helms. Good.
Now, for more than 30 years, Castro has been exporting terror-
ism in our hemisphere. That is well known. What is not so well
known is that within weeks after the U.S. Senate approved the
151
Panama Canal Treaty, Mr. Castro held a meeting of like-minded
people from various Latin American countries, principally Nica-
ragua and El Salvador, et cetera, because they sensed a weakness
on the part of the United States.
But the thing that bothers me, and I hope it bothers you, are the
reports that we are receiving from our intelligence sources — and
from the media, for that matter — that the Castro brothers are up
to their armpits in drug trafficking. Worst of all, Fidel Castro has
taken Cuba away from the Cuban people. I think Mr. Clinton un-
derstood that when he made his appearance and made his state-
ments in Miami and perhaps other places in Florida.
Fidel Castro, in short, is — what? Public enemy No. 1 in the West-
ern Hemisphere, because he has been promoting so much of the vi-
olence and killing throughout the region. Now, if he is not removed,
and I fervently pray that he will be removed one way or another,
and I do not care which way it is, if he is not removed and if he
continues the drug trafficking and all of the other stuff that he has
been doing which is hostile to our country and all other countries
that believe in freedom, can you envision any scenario or cir-
cumstances when you would recommend to your President that
maybe we ought to consider the use of force to support the people
who yearn for freedom in Cuba. Are we going to let it just sit there,
or are we going to do something about it?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, let me take this opportunity to tell
you that I do support the Cuban Democracy Act in its entirety, in-
cluding the Mack amendment, so that issue can be removed.
Senator Helms. Good. Good.
Mr. Christopher. I would say, Senator, that the use of force in
Cuba would have to meet the same test as it would anyplace in the
world. They are quite severe tests, but I do not think we ought to
rule out any of our tools. We ought to keep all of our options open
anyplace in the world.
Having said that, I do not think it is an immediate agenda item,
but I do think it is one of those things that needs to be considered
along with all the other options. But we have an embargo, we have
an act that was passed here by the Congress, and I think those are
the matters to be pursued at the present time. I come into this po-
sition, if you confirm me, wanting to have all the options available
for possible recommendation to the President.
So I certainly would not say to you — I think it would be intellec-
tually unwise to say to you that I have ruled out some option with
respect to any country. But I do not think it is an immediate agen-
da item because we have other tools that are in play.
Senator Helms. I think I understand what you said. You are not
quite saying that you would ever consider the use of force, but you
have not ruled it out. Is that fair?
Mr. Christopher. That is right. That is correct.
Senator Helms. Well, I am sorry to hear that.
Now, yesterday, I believe Senator Dodd asked the question, you
said that there had been progress in Nicaragua. Did you say some-
thing like that?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. I did.
152
Senator Helms. Now, as soon as you have your staff in place, I
hope you will let Bud Nance, Admiral Nance — do you know him,
by the way?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Helms. Well, you need to know him. Bud and I were
born 2 blocks apart 2 months apart down in a little town called
Monroe. And he had 38 years in the Navy, including he was skip-
per of the U.S.S. Forestall, and we say down there in Monroe that
he is a Monroe boy who amounted to something. But he also was
President Reagan's No. 2 National Security Advisor.
I hope you will let your staff and Bud Nance's staff— he is the
chief of staff or staff director for the minority on this committee —
I hope they can get together and talk about what has really been
happening in Nicaragua, because there has been a paper curtain
dropped over that. And I have been highly critical of, "my," admin-
istration. And Larry Eagleburger and I have been up and down the
line, and he kind of agrees with me, but nobody does anything
about it. I expect that if we can have that consultation between
staffs that we are going to agree on a lot of things. And I hope so,
and let us try it.
Now, I am going to talk a little bit about what it means to put
American interests first. I am increasingly concerned about the
problem of confiscation of the property of U.S. citizens overseas and
the lack of attention paid to this problem by the State Department.
Right now we are working with literally hundreds of such cases
in Nicaragua, Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Argentina, Costa Rica, and
Latin America in general. Now let me ask you first, and then we
will get back it — but I see the warning light is on — are you familiar
with the Hickenlooper amendment?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I do remember that from my prior in-
carnation, but I will not be able to follow you very far on it. Would
you tell me the general terms of it if you would like to discuss it
today?
Senator Helms. Well, it simply says, and I am going to send it
down to you, I did not expect you to remember it, because, you
know, it is like a thousand ships passing at night, but it is a very
important piece of legislation that was enacted by Congress and
signed into law by the President. It simply says that the U.S. tax-
payers are not going to be expected to furnish one penny to any
country that allows the confiscation of property owned by U.S. citi-
zens.
Mr. Christopher. I remember running into it in connection with
Ethiopia during my prior tour in Government.
Senator Helms. Well, we have got the red light on. We can re-
visit that when I get back on the next round.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
Senator Helms. Meanwhile, I am going to ask staff to send down
a copy of this so you can look at it.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Christopher.
153
Mr. Christopher. Good morning, Senator.
Senator Coverdell. Good morning.
Yesterday, I think maybe the No. 1 question was the reorganiza-
tion of AID. We talked a lot about it. I thought about that last
evening and decided that I would rather be assigned to the solution
in Bosnia than the solution of the reorganization of a very en-
trenched instrument.
Your commitment to the reorganization is obvious in your re-
sponses and opening statement. Where do you envision assigning
that task? It has been talked about for a long time. It has contin-
ued to resist real attempts for reorganization. Where do you put
the authority to actually have that response begin to occur in a
timely manner?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, this is at least a preliminary answer.
You may or may not know the man who has been designated as
my deputy, Dr. Cliff Wharton.
Senator Coverdell. I do not.
Mr. Christopher. Dr. Wharton is a son of the famous diplomat.
His father was the first African American to become an Ambas-
sador of the United States. He became Ambassador to Norway
after having been a counsel general in a number of countries in Eu-
rope.
Dr. Wharton has had a very distinguished career. He was presi-
dent of Michigan State College, and he is a legend there for the re-
forms that he brought. And then he was president of the State Uni-
versity of New York System, and once again, with a marvelous
record. Most recently, he has been the president, the reform head
of a major pension organization called TIAA/CREF, a very hard
name, but an organization that is very important to almost every-
body who teaches in college because it is the pension organization
for college professors. And he has once again done a wonderful job
there.
As a matter of fact, someone once wrote about Dr. Wharton that
he can do anything well.
Well, after he finished college, he told me that he was planning
to follow his father into the diplomatic service. But the Marshall
plan had just come into existence, and there was heavy interest in
development. So he spent the first decade or so of his life in devel-
opment.
With that background, I intend to rely quite heavily on Dr.
Wharton because of his early expertise in that area and because he
has had such success in reorganizing and reforming institutions. I
intend to rely quite heavily on Dr. Wharton in connection with the
AID organization. And he is very interested in doing that.
Now, of course, we will all take our directions from the Presi-
dent, as far as how this is to be done. But as a preliminary com-
ment, I can tell you that in addition to taking a strong interest my-
self, Dr. Wharton will be actively involved in that area.
Senator Coverdell. It is good to know that.
I think that the statement of your own interest throughout this
hearing, and your continued interest as we pursue this reorganiza-
tion, will be important. Because, as you know better than I, there
are enormous resources there that can resist change.
154
Mr. Christopher, because of your background, I was given some
numbers the other day, and I can directly relate to this problem.
On the country of Belize, when I became Director of the Peace
Corps we had over 100 volunteers in Belize. We almost had a vol-
unteer per inhabitant. There are some 250,000 people there. We
began the process of downsizing the volunteer force in Belize to be
more relative.
Now, I cannot speak to this, but maybe you can. The size of the
State Department and AID mission in Belize seems to be as dis-
proportionate as what I found when I went to Peace Corps. It is
not 100 but one 100-plus in our Embassy and AID mission there.
From your previous experience in the State Department, what
factors would logically call for a contingent of that size in Belize,
or for 204 people in the Bahamas, or any similar case? Is there a
logical response to that, or is it just simply that over the course of
time the bureaucracy has gotten out of synch with reality?
Mr. Christopher. Well, it seems bloated to me, Senator. I have
to confess, though, that although I tried fairly conscientiously, with
some other things I have had, to do to get prepared for this hear-
ing, Belize was not
Senator Coverdell. Not on the top of the list?
Mr. Christopher. It was not a priority.
Senator Coverdell. I can understand that.
But I think that the point that I am making
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Coverdell. You talked yesterday, and we had a series
of questions about the need for new resources and a number of new
priorities. This strikes me as part of the reallocation that might de-
serve some attention.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, Senator. You know, it stands in sharp
contrast, does it not, to the figures I mentioned: that we had only
one commercial officer in Russia and the other countries of the
former Soviet Union. And it does sound to me as if those posts
were certainly bloated, unless they were doing something in adja-
cent countries.
Senator Coverdell. They may have had regional responsibil-
ities, which is why I added that caveat.
Mr. Christopher. Right.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Christopher, yesterday you made a com-
ment— it was mentioned several times that you were in support of
bringing the U.S. arrears payments at the U.N. up to date. I am
not an expert on those deficiencies, although I am aware that they
at least have some historical relationship to discontent in the Con-
gress with regard to the U.N. and its specific support of certain
programs that were thought to be deviant from our foreign policy.
There have been allegations of mismanagement which have been
rather well publicized.
Do you believe that those were legitimate reasons for withhold-
ing funds and that the process of using those resources as an incen-
tive for change is fair or not fair? Should this practice be dis-
regarded?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I am really sort of digging into my
own thinking on this, rather than — this is not a very studied an-
swer. I do think one wants to use carrots and sticks to improve be-
155
havior, and there is no doubt that the U.N. had very great ineffi-
ciencies. But I have some intellectual problem with belonging to an
organization to which you give very large tasks, you depend upon
it enormously, you say in every forum: "Well, we are going to look
to the U.N., we are going to look to this organization to do a great
deal for us, it is going to bear some of the burdens because this is
a multilateral period," and then, despite all of those statements
about how much you are going to rely on it and how important it
is in the world, you do not pay your dues. I think there is really
an inconsistency in that.
So, while I do not rule out using carrots and sticks — and cer-
tainly the U.N. organization does need to be made more efficient,
there are many inefficiencies in it that we ought to address — at
this particular stage, when we are relying so heavily on the U.N.,
putting so much emphasis on the need to use the U.N. as the vehi-
cle to address international problems, I think we ought to pay up.
And that is what I said in my statement.
I do not know enough about what has happened in prior years.
I think, perhaps, Senator Kassebaum, for whom I have such great
respect, may have been involved in efforts to encourage reform by
withholding dues. I hope I am right in saying that.
Does anybody know, is that correct?
So I do not want to criticize something that has gone on in the
past. I just say for myself right now, I think because of the impor-
tance we attach to the U.N., we ought to pay up.
Senator Coverdell. Again, this is a tonal question reaching
from the point which we have just discussed — but when the U.N.
or divisions of it become embroiled in issues that are deviant from
our foreign policy — perhaps dealing with the Palestinian movement
or other — what would be your general attitude about how we
should interlock with them if some division of the U.N. is insistent
on pursuing a course of policy that seems to run squarely against
what we are endeavoring to do?
Mr. Christopher. I think, Senator, that is what we have out-
standing representation at the U.N. for. Certainly, the Secretary
General knows of the importance of the United States, and I think
our capacity to affect behavior there is very great.
If you go to the U.N., people will sometimes complain about the
United States having too much influence. But I think we ought to
exercise our influence in the most direct way through dealing with
the Secretary General and other bodies there if there is something
going on there that we think is against U.S. interests.
Senator Coverdell. I want to return to the statement from yes-
terday. You talked about hoping that you could catch the new Sec-
retary of Defense in a good mood— not to suggest that he only had
those infrequently — to move funding from the Defense Department
to U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Would you elaborate on that? Do you have a view of the size of
what ought to be shifted and any parameters around your thinking
on that statement?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think that would have to be a nego-
tiation within the Government and the Office of Management and
Budget; the White House would be a critical player in that.
156
One of the things you find out when you get into the bureaucracy
is there are certain accounts, like the account number 150.
Senator Coverdell. One-fifty, yes.
Mr. Christopher. I see you are already very familiar with that,
or you are from your days in the Peace Corps. It seems to me that |
the United States responsibilities to the U.N. ought to be borne by
more than one account. And I do not have a particular formula in
mind, but I think that you could certainly rationalize a very sub-
stantial fraction of the U.N. expenditures coming from an account
that is over across the river, rather than one that is on this side.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
I understand that the bell is not working. My time has expired.
I might say that I have trouble hearing anyway; I probably would
not have heard the bell. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. I have no questions.
Senator Sarbanes. Would the Senator yield for just one com-
ment?
Senator Kerry. I would yield to Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Secretary, for the sake of the press and
Belize, I am sure that we ought to recognize that you have crises
on your agenda that have attracted your attention but that we do
attach importance to our relationship with Belize, and we very
much hope that we will continue to have a positive and construc-
tive relationship with them. The fact that was not high on our
agenda is that there are crises, with outbreaks of violence, else-
where in the world, that drew your attention. But Belize, along
with many other countries, certainly remain important in our view.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, Senator. I certainly thank you for that.
You know, any time one takes some refuge in even modest humor
there is a risk. I simply meant to indicate that I did not know the
AID or State levels in Belize. But I certainly do recognize the im-
portance of it as a country. And I thank you for that correction.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Chairman, if I might, as a followup to
the Senator. By using the numbers, I meant no suggestion of our
relationship or the importance of the country. I simply was struck
by the number and sought clarification. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Simon.
Senator Simon. Just one brief comment.
First, I agree with Secretary Christopher on our paying up on
U.N. dues. I hope we will also pay up the U.N. Population Fund,
which I think is important to our future. I would add, I think
Boutros-Ghali is providing the kind of leadership we need at the
U.N.
And I would finally say to my colleague from Georgia, whom we
are pleased to welcome to this committee, the U.N. is not always
going to do what we want, any more than the U.S. Senate is al-
ways going to do what you want.
I hope you do not walk out of the U.S. Senate when we pass a
bill you do not like. And I hope we do not walk out of the U.N. if
they take some action we do not like.
Senator Coverdell. The point is registered.
157
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Mathews.
Senator Mathews. No questions at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I have no questions at this time, and I return to the ranking mi-
nority member, Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. You have not had a chance to look at the
Hickenlooper amendment?
Mr. Christopher. It has not come down.
Senator Helms. Well, what it says, just for the record, and it is
section 620(e)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
It requires that the Government take, "appropriate steps in return-
ing properties, or aid shall be suspended."
There was quite a debate about the thing, but I think the vote
was one-sided in favor of it.
Mr. Christopher. Are you reading at page 216?
Senator Helms. Two-sixteen. It is (e).
Mr. Christopher, (e)(1)?
Senator Helms. Right before. Do you see it on page 216?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. And I see (e)(1).
The Chairman. Excuse me. My recollection is that it was
precipitated by some of the Eastern European countries, whether
they would get aid and what they had done at the time.
Senator Helms. I think that is right. The President shall sus-
pend assistance to the government of any country to which assist-
ance is provided under this or any other act when the government
of such country or any government agency or subdivision within
such country on or after January 1, 1962, and then it goes and
gives a number of conditions, which you will see on page 217.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Helms. Let me tell you where I am coming from on this,
Mr. Secretary.
On a personal note, I hope that when you become Secretary, and
ou will become Secretary, that you will designate a specific num-
er of people, including lawyers of competence, to listen to the
American citizens whose property has been seized. Now, you do
agree that protecting the interests of these citizens should be a pri-
mary objective of our foreign policy?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think we have an obligation to all
of our citizens, and particularly the citizens who have had that
kind of difficulty. I do not have any question about that.
Senator Helms. So, you can see how they feel about their Gov-
ernment when they come to the State Department and tell them,
look, these people down here in x country have seized my property,
and so forth, and so on. There ought to be a sympathetic ear and
a helpful set of hands in the State Department who just will not
shunt them aside and say, we are too busy to do that.
Now, I am talking about, "my," own administration. But the Em-
bassy in Managua has refused to take those steps. Now, we have
heard — is it 554? We have 554 people or families who have con-
tacted us and asked for help saying, in effect, that they have been
turned away by the State Department. Not one, not one of those
554 U.S. citizens have regained possession of their properties or
62-822 0-93-6
I
158
been fairly compensated for them. Now, you would agree that, "ap-
propriate steps," have not been taken?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I do not know that situation. I do
know from other experiences that you have the question as to who
the allegedly appropriating authority was, and whether the current
government has responsibility.
Senator Helms. I am going to give you that information. Now,
I believe it is a fact that under the U.S. Constitution, the 14th
amendment, Mr. Chairman, that native born citizens and natural-
ized citizens have the same rights. You agree with that, do you
not?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I will take your word for that. That
is one of those areas that could have some complexity.
Senator Helms. What I am getting at — I want you to say, I am
going to do something about this. Now, do we have a chart that
might be helpful to the Secretary? I am going to show you what
is happening in Nicaragua. And a lot of the press has been saying,
oh, they are just sitting on that money and all that. Can you read
it?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir. [Laughter.]
I can come close to reading it.
Senator Helms. Well, tell that photographer to move. [Pause.]
Mr. Christopher. Thank you very much, Senator. I can now
read this.
Senator Helms. You need a telescope to read it, and it is unfair
to ask you to read that.
Mr. Christopher. Not being an ophthalmologist — you can read
the top line, and the next line, but you cannot read down below.
Senator Helms. Well, I have nothing in the world against Mrs.
Chamorro. I know she is a nice lady, and the rest of it, and she
is in over her head, and her son-in-law is running the country, and
you know — but for goodness sake, her press office is occupying
seized property. Her Minister of Energy, he has one of the pieces
of property. Her Minister of Agriculture has another one. The
Cuban Ambassador has one.
And, by the way, he is currently under indictment in the United
States on narcotics charges, but he is sitting there in property
owned by U.S. citizens. The chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
Sandinista Army, how do you like them apples, he sits on a piece
of American citizens property seized by either/or the Sandinistas or
the Chamorro Government.
The Libyan Government, if you can believe that, is occupying a
piece of property owned by — seized from American citizens. Rus-
sian Embassy personnel, they have one. The Sandinista Army
spokesman has one. The Managua police chief has one, and on and
on and on.
And I hope that you will tell me that you are impressed with the
situation. I am not going to ask you tell me exactly what you are
going to do about it, but I want to help freedom return. But they
do not have freedom in Nicaragua, they have got a sort of a hybrid
government down there by a lady who means well. But it is worse,
if anything, than it ever was.
159
And I hope you will make it tentative commitment that you are
going to do everything in your power to recover the property of
these American citizens, property that has been seized from them.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I appreciate your saying that you are
not going to ask me to make any commitment other than the com-
mitment to look into the matter, and I certainly will. I am sure I
will.
Senator Helms. Well, I know you are a man of good faith, and
that is satisfactory to me for the time being. But we will revisit it
from time to time, so do not forget it please, sir.
Mr. Christopher. I do not suppose that this is my last appear-
ance in this chair.
Senator Helms. OK Can I get an estimate of how much time I
have remaining on this round? I do not want to start this if I do
not have enough time.
Senator Sarbanes. Why do we not yield? Who is next? Am I
next?
The Chairman. You would be next, then Senator Dodd. [Pause.l
I am informed that you have 6 minutes.
Senator Helms. Six minutes? Well, maybe I could get into it.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the Senator 4 min-
utes of my time. I am next in the round. I have 10 minutes, so I
will yield him 4 to give him 10.
Senator Helms. I appreciate that. I thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and I thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Now, I would like for the Ortega bank account chart to be put
up there, but we have got a problem because you cannot see that
either, particularly if it is upside down. I do have a copy that you
can give the Secretary.
Mr. Christopher, some time back, I think I had just returned
from Washington after my little episode down in Raleigh. Some
high level Nicaraguan Government officials from the Chamorro
Government came to see me, if you could believe that, with first-
hand information about General Ortega's secret bank accounts in
Canada.
They are just so upset about what is going on down there. They
are part of the Chamorro Government. Now, General Ortega, of
course, remains head of the Sandinista Army in Nicaragua, which
is part of the problem.
Now, these officials told me that General Ortega was diverting
Nicaraguan Government funds, and they had documents support-
ing what they were telling me, that the general was diverting
funds to an account in Toronto Dominion Bank. And the account
number was 0690-7349-328. In approximately 2Vi years, Ortega
has funneled almost $17 million into his personal bank account in
Toronto Dominion Bank.
Now, do you understand, even if you do not agree with me? Do
you understand why I said to hell with this? And I used every ef-
fort I could to block any further funds until that was taken care
of. It has not been taken care of.
Now on October 5 and again on October 22 of last year, I wrote
Bill Barr, the Attorney General, a nice guy, requesting an inves-
tigation into this matter. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would ask your
160
unanimous consent that the text of these two letters be included
in the record at this point.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Helms. I thank you, sir.
[The information and charts referred to follow:]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC,
October 5, 1992.
The Honorable WILLIAM P. Bark,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
Dear Bill: In FY 1992, the United States, through the Agency for International
Development (ADD), provided $125,000,000 in cash assistance to the Central Bank
of Nicaragua for balance of payment support for the [Nicaraguan] government's
economic plan by providing financing for key imports, pending the recovery of ex-
ports in response to an improved economic environment" [AID Grant 524-0325,
"Economic Stabilization and Recovery P/"]. AID argues that "disbursement will sup-
port continued progress on reduction of public sector expenditures to a level sustain-
able on a long term basis, further elimination of trading monopolies, privatization
of key state-owned enterprises, and establishment and strengthening of privately-
owned financial institutions".
The Agency for International Development attempts to justify this transfer of
American taxpayer funds to the Central Bank of Nicaragua by claiming that ^he
program is designed to benefit the entire [Nicaraguan] population through its con-
tribution to real economic growth".
However, reliable information has been given to me that a portion of these funds
may have been converted to the personal use of high-level officials of the Nica-
raguan Government, in violation of American laws governing the disbursement of
foreign aid funds.
For example, I am informed that General Humberto Ortega, Commander-in-Chief
of the Sandinista Popular Army of Nicaragua, has been regularly receiving large de-
nomination transfers from the Central Bank of Nicaragua to an account in his name
or his nominee in the Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada. It has been estimated by
sources within the Government of Nicaragua that $1 million was deposited monthly
to this account in 1991 and $500,000 per month in 1992. I am informed that the
bank account number is 0690-7349-328 and that the checks have been signed by
E milio Pereira, head of the Central Bank of Nicaragua.
I will be enormously grateful if you and your associates will begin an investigation
to determine if American foreign aid funds have, in fact, been converted illegally by
high officials of the Nicaraguan government. It may be appropriate to seek the co-
operation of the Government of Canada to place a freeze on any bank account sus-
pected of containing misappropriated funds.
Sincerely,
Jesse Helms,
U.S. Senator
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC,
October 28, 1992.
The Honorable WILLIAM P. BARR,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
Dear BILL: With further reference to my October 5 letter to you I have now re-
ceived additional information concerning the possible misuse of U.S. foreign assist-
ance funds to Nicaragua.
Prior to October 5, 1992, it was reported to me that the Finance Minister, Emilio
Pereira, would become the new President of the Central Bank succeeding Silvio de
Franco. These reports proved false. Instead, Jose Evenor Taboada Arana was sworn
into that position on October 12 — the fourth President of the Central Bank to serve
under Mrs. Chamorro. Mr. Taboada is a prominent Nicaraguan attorney who had
extensive business dealings with the Sandinista regime. He is well connected with
many powerful Sandinistas and high-ranking Nicaraguan Government officials.
161
I am informed that Mr. Toboada once worked directly for General Humberto Or-
tega. He was retained to establish an offshore company called MODERNE
INTERCIONAL SA. on Ortega's behalf in Panama. Until September of this year,
account number 0690-7349-328, in the Toronto Dominion Bank of Canada, was
under this name. I am further informed that $250,000 was deposited into the ac-
count in September of this year.
I am deeply concerned that the new President of the Nicaraguan Central Bank —
responsible for overseeing the use of tens of millions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid —
was directly involved in establishing a front company which served as a vehicle for
the transfer of U.S. foreign aid funds to General Humberto Ortega.
I am confident that this information is accurate and I hope it will facilitate the
efforts of your office to determine whether U.S. foreign aid funds have been con-
verted illegally by high ranking Nicaraguan Government officials.
Many thanks, my friend.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
Jesse Helms,
U.S. Senator
U. S. CONTRIBUTION TO
GENERAL ORTEGA'S RETIREMENT FUND
UNITED STATES NICARAGUAN MILITARY CANADA
Balance of Payments Support Confidential Budget Toronto Dorinion B=-<
\ ....-/ \ /
NICARAGUA PANAMA
Banco Central Modema Interational S A
Nicaraguan Military Front Company
YEAR AMOUNT
1990 $4,900,000
1991 $6,000,000
1992 $6,000,000
TOTAL $16,900,000
ORTEGA'S BANK ACCOUNT NUMBER
0690-7349-328
162
WHO STOLE WHAT FROM U.S. CITIZENS
IN NICARAGUA
CONF1SCATOR OR OCCUPANT
Gen. Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo
Emilio Rappaccioli
Roberto Rondon Sacasa
Amb Fernando Ravelo
Cmdr Lenin Cerna
Alvaro Guzman Cuadra
Col. Antenor Rosales
Lt. Col Ricardo Wheelock
Col Salvatierra
TITLE
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
SandinistaArmy
Minister of Energy
Minister of Agriculture
Ambassador from Cuba •
Indicted in the U.S. on
narcotics charges
Chief, Nicaraguan Intelligence
Managua Police Chief
Chief of Intelligence.
Sandinista Army
Spokesman.
Sandinista Popular Army
Chief Commander,
ORIGINAL OWNERS
Indiana Lacayo Pereira/
Bruce Cuthberlson
Maria Lourdes B Teran
Maria Louisa Davis
Nestor Teran
Ivan Osorio/
Esperanza Tefef
Ulises Carrillo
Fatima Lacayo Saenz
Michael Spencer
Mangui Sengelmann
Ramon Pais
1
1
WHO STOLE WHAT FROM U.S.
CITIZENS IN
!
NICARAGUA
CONFISCATOR OR OCCUPANT
TTTLE
ORIGINAL OWNERS
Chamorro Press Office
The Sengelmanns,
Kettels and Spencers
Cmdr Tomas Borge
One of nine original
Sandinista Commanders
Leandro Marin
Cmdr Bayardo Arce
One of nine original
Sandinista Commanders
Robeno Arguello Tefel
Cmdr Alvaro Baltodano
General Onega's Top Aide
Floyd Jones
=uss a- Embassy Personnel
Mathelda Muniz Molina
Sandr'Sta Army Guest House
Luis Mejia Gonzalez
Sandin.sta Army Protocol House
Elga Vaca Hahn
'- oyan Government
Haydee Marin
-anarranian Embassy
Armando and
Yolanda Fernandez
Ministry of Agriculture/
'•^nistry of tbe Interior
Carlos and
Thelma Knoeppfler
163
Senator Helms. Now, my information I consider to be impeccable
in terms of its credibility. If I were not persuaded of that, I would
not go public with this.
The account is top secret, according to these officials, and I can
imagine why Mr. Ortega keeps it a top secret. And it is a slush
fund for the exclusive use of General Ortega and his comrades, or
whatever you call them. Now, the funds move from the Nicaraguan
Central Bank to a classified Sandinista military account, do you
see, to one of Ortega's front companies in Panama, and finally they
move to Ortega's bank account in Canada, to which I already al-
luded.
Now, in 1991, two-thirds of all of Nicaragua's expenditures were
bankrolled by the American taxpayers. Two-thirds. So, it stands to
reason, at least to this Senator, that approximately two-thirds of
Mr. Ortega's retirement fund is also bankrolled by the American
taxpayers.
Now, this is the kind of disagreement I have had with some of
my friends at the State Department. I say, why in heck do you not
do something about it? And they said, well, you know Chamorro we
have got to help. Otherwise it will go down. Hell, it is already
down. If stuff like that is going on, you take the seized property,
the confiscated property, you take this kind of stuff, embezzlement
by Ortega — how much further down can you go? And I, for one, am
not going to support in the U.S. Senate or elsewhere that kind of
thing.
Now, here is what I would like for you to do, and I may have
caught you unawares on this, and I am not going to expect you to
say, I am going to do this or do that. But I do want you to look
me in the eye and say, this disturbs me and we are going to work
on it.
Mr. Christopher. What you say does disturb me, and we will
look into it, Senator. You know, I am here so you can ask me ques-
tions, but I cannot resist asking you what the reaction of Attorney
General Barr was to this data?
Senator Helms. I have not heard yet, except that he told me that
an investigation has begun. But here we are, in the middle of — you
know, an election occurred, and Bill Barr is not going to be around,
and so forth. So, I am talking to a prime mover in the new team.
Mr. Christopher. There is a career bureaucracy at the Justice
Department just as there is at the State Department. But this does
disturb me, and I will look into it. I think it will be very interest-
ing, the results of the Justice Department investigation, which was
probably conducted by career officials there.
Senator Helms. I thank you, sir. Moving on to another subject,
do I have about 5 or 6 minutes left?
The Chairman. Two minutes, I am informed.
Senator Helms. Oh, well, I think I had better pause then and let
somebody else go. I do not want to start and have to stop.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Dodd?
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just
say, based on what I know about the matter that my colleague and
friend, Senator Helms, has raised regarding properties, that this is
not unique. It has happened. We have had it in a number of other
countries. And I guess back on your watch, these issues came up
164
from time to time. It is not a unique occurrence. At the same time,
it is certainly not one we would like to see.
As I understand it, and maybe my colleague is aware of this, a
process has been established now, I am told, in Nicaragua to begin
to deal with the claims regarding these properties. I certainly
would encourage that process to go forward. Clearly when people's
properties have been illegally appropriated, they ought to be re-
turned and compensation, whatever is appropriate, should be
worked out. But that is underway, and I certainly would encourage
that it come to a conclusion regarding these outstanding claims.
We have dealt with a number of cases like this just in my own
experience. One with the Christiani Government in El Salvador
just a few years ago involved a constituent of Jake Garn's. We were
able to resolve that problem. In Panama, there were a number over
the years that needed to be addressed. Those are just the ones with
which I am immediately familiar or personally involved. But I am
confident that progress in Nicaragua will go forward.
Again, I just want to say to you, Mr. Christopher, that this is a
country of 3V2 million people who went through several years of
civil war and 40 years of a repressive dictatorship. Families, in-
cluding Mrs. Chamorro's have been divided. These were children
who supported the Contra movement very strongly, children who
were working with the Sandinista Government, children who were
neutral. Her family was not unique in that regard.
We know in this country the length of time it takes to recover
from a 4 or 5 year civil war. It takes time. And leaders that try
and engage in reconciliation often suffer. Witness recent attention
to Abraham Lincoln and his efforts at reconciliation and the price
he paid for it.
Mrs. Chamorro is trying desperately to bind up the wounds of
her country. It is not an easy task, and there are problems associ-
ated with it. They are not insignificant problems or ones that ought
to be treated lightly. But she is committed to bringing her country
together again, and on that effort she ought to be supported, in my
view.
So my hope is that we can resolve some of these issues, but not
make her or the people of Nicaragua pay a price because every
issue we would like resolved yesterday has not yet been resolved.
The price we may pay if Mrs. Chamorro fails is far greater than
whatever difficulties individuals may suffer as a result of those
matters not being resolved to their satisfaction in the shortest
amount of time.
Mr. Chairman, there are, obviously, many, many other issues we
could discuss today, but I am very satisfied that our nominee has
tremendous grasp of them. I was very impressed with his ability
to respond to Senator Simon's questions regarding Africa, and
questions involving the Far East, and my questions about Latin
America. The issue here is whether or not our nominee is a person
of integrity, an individual who understands these issues, is willing
to listen, demonstrates patience, and thought. The reputation of
Mr. Christopher certainly recommends him on every one of those
matters. That ought to satisfy, in my view, each and every member
of this committee.
165
He is not going to agree with each and every one of us as matters
come up in the coming weeks and months and years. But the fact
that he will listen, that he is willing to meet with key staff people
or have his staff meet with staff people to talk about these matters
is something that every member of this committee ought to take
great satisfaction in. Tne American public ought to be, in my view,
very pleased with President-elect Clinton's choice and with the
willingness of this nominee to accept the job of Secretary of State.
I intend to support this nomination strongly, and have no further
questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, and amen to what you said. Senator
Coverdell?
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Chairman, I only have a closing com-
ment and question. It comes back to the point we both tangled on
a moment ago on Belize. And the sense of priorities, if you read
through the statements and comments, so much attention has been
directed toward Eastern Europe, the troubles and possibilities
there. But we have new democracies emerging everywhere.
In our hemisphere in particular, we have talked about some of
them. We have just been engaged in discussion about Nicaragua.
In Africa, we have new democracies emerging. I do not think that
I need to say this, but I would hope that despite their size and loca-
tion, we shall keep our attention on all new democracies — wherever
they might be and no matter their size.
I can anticipate your answer, but I did want to underscore that
point because the pressures of the day and time can divert your
meaningful attention. I think that a new democracy, no matter
where it is, deserves our attention and concern.
Mr. Christopher. I agree with that. We need to nurture them
all. I think that that means that I have to try to communicate that
signal, to give that sense of determination to the Assistant Sec-
retaries and the regional bureaus to make sure that we try to nur-
ture and encourage democracy wherever it is. And it can be quite
a fragile enterprise when it first begins, so it needs special nurtur-
ing.
Senator Coverdell. Mr. Christopher, I appreciate your coopera-
tion and attention to my questions. Thank you very much and wel-
come again.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Senator Mathews.
Senator Mathews. No further questions.
The Chairman. I have no further questions.
I will turn now to Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Thank you, sir.
I was deeply touched by Senator Dodd's statement just now
about — he was laying down what he believed to be or should be the
ground rules for interrogation of a nominee. I noticed no such
statement a few years ago when it took 5 days for this committee
to approve a Secretary of State nominee.
Now, as far as Mrs. Chamorro and her government working on
it, they have spent 2V2 years — we know of at least 554 — we have
got it as a matter of record — it is interesting that in 2V2 years not
166
one of these American citizens has been compensated or had their
property returned.
Now, you know, we had a civil war some hundred years ago, and
all that. But the truth of the matter is, if you will look back at the
chart that I had here and the sheet that I gave you, most of this
property is occupied by the Sandinistas or the Chamorro Govern-
ment, or foreign governments.
Now, as a matter of good faith, you would think that at least one
of the claims would have been adjudicated. So I do not think they
give a doodle about it. And that is the reason I have brought that
up. And I think it is a proper line of questioning.
And I might say that I ao appreciate the assurance that you have
given me, Mr. Secretary, that you are going to look into it seri-
ously. And I know that you are not saying, well, I am going to look
into it, and that is the last I will hear of it. Because if that is the
last I hear of it, I will be calling you on the telephone, and we will
have that kind of relationship.
But, anyway, I do not know of a soul in the world who is not in-
terested in human rights. During the past 2 years, in Nicaragua,
more than 200 of the Contras, or freedom fighters, whichever way
you want to describe them, and their leader, Enrique Bermudez,
have been assassinated. And a 16-year-old boy, Jean Paul Genet,
was gunned down by General Ortega's personal bodyguard. A 16-
year-old boy.
And just recently, the head of all the agriculture producers and
head of all the confiscated property owners in Nicaragua, Arges
Sequiera, he was assassinated just outside his farms. And this was
in the past 2 months. And, to date, you know, you cannot get any-
body interested in it down there, over 200 assassinations.
Now, the human rights situation in Nicaragua today is far worse
than it was when you were Deputy Secretary, and the Carter ad-
ministration supported the overthrow of the Somoza Government.
I guess the question I wanted to ask of you, Mr. Secretary, I do not
quarrel about anything that was done with reference to the Somoza
Government, but would it be fair to apply the same standards to
the Chamorro Government that the Carter administration applied
to the Somoza Government while you were Deputy Secretary?
Mr. Christopher. Well, I think the human rights standards are
ones that prevail over time. They do not shift from time to time.
Matters of emphasis may shift, but I think we ought to judge coun-
tries by their overall human rights record.
When I said yesterday, I think you were not here, that there had
been progress in Nicaragua, I stand by that statement. I think the
fact that there was an election held, that there is a freely elected
government in place there, is an indication of progress, certainly
over the days of the Somoza Government.
Senator Helms. Please tell me what the progress is? Yes, they
had an election. But you know who is running the government. Not
the lady who was elected; her son-in-law. What do you define as
progress made in Nicaragua?
Mr. Christopher. I define as progress the fact that they were
able to have an election. It was conducted under circumstances
that were regarded as making it a valid election. And they appar-
ently are going to be in the position to hold another election there.
167
I think that is a big step forward. Elections are not everything, but
elections are a key step toward an improvement in human rights
conditions.
Senator Helms. Well, who runs the army down there, the same
fellow who ran it before?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, countries have a right to choose their
leaders as long as there is
Senator Helms. Do you have some objection to answering the
question? Of course a country has a right to choose, and that is ex-
actly the problem.
Now, what is the difference between who is running the army be-
fore the election and who is running the army now?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I do not know that factual issue. But
I think if there is an election and there is a new President, that
new President, just as he does in this country, has certain rights
to establish who shall be in the key positions.
Senator Helms. Well, I do not want to get into a debate with
you.
Mr. Christopher. I appreciate that.
Senator Helms. But I assume that you are going to look into all
this.
My daddy taught me a long time ago to look a man in the eye,
and you can tell a lot about a fellow. And I think I see you, as you
look me in the eye, that, by golly, I am going to look into this stuff.
I am taking that on good faith.
Well, let me just say this to you. The Sandinistas still control the
police, the army, the judiciary, and just about everything else. Elec-
tions do not bring freedom. And that is the issue.
I do not want to try to require you to commit that you are going
to do any specific thing, but I do want you to tell me, and I think
you have told me, that you are going to try.
Mr. Christopher. I will look into it, yes, sir.
Senator Helms. OK.
I have here an editorial from the Miami Herald, which is one of
the Knight newspapers, as you know, maybe the flagship, which
pleased me very much. It was January 10, this past Sunday. The
Miami Herald came out in strong support of the Bush administra-
tion's freeze on aid to Nicaragua. The editorial said, in part, and
I will send you a copy of it down — did you happen to see it?
Mr. Christopher. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Helms. I absolutely agree — I do not always agree with
some of these newspaper editors, but this one I like. And that is
the reason I want to talk about it.
The Miami Herald said aid should be held up until the Nica-
raguan Government solves property claims and takes action
against human rights violators.
Now, how do you feel about freezing the aid until there has been
substantial visiole, specific progress in the areas that the Miami
Herald talked about?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, that will come under the same head-
ing as the other questions you have asked about this. I gather from
the story here that the outgoing administration released $54 mil-
lion of the appropriated aid. It would be useful for me to find out
the reasons for that. Foreign policy is a continuum. I would like to
168
know what caused that release, what the justification for that was.
And, generally speaking, I would not want to commit myself to any
course of action on a specific item like that at this hearing.
Senator Helms. Do you have a copy of this?
Ms. DeMoss. He has it.
Senator Helms. He has it?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. She brought me a copy of the edi-
torial.
Senator Helms. It says, in part, the editorial: What should the
Clinton administration's position be in the face of Nicaragua's byz-
antine politics? Then, it answered its own question: It ought to re-
affirm the Bush administration's freeze on U.S. aid.
Now, you are exactly right. Larry Eagleburger said 2 or 3 months
ago, he said, you are exactly right, they ought not to get a nickel,
and so forth and so on. Then, all of a sudden, after the election,
pop goes the weasel, you know, and they send $54 million, or what-
ever it is, down there. But, in any case, I do hope you will look at
the editorial and read the suggestion in the last paragraph that
reads that the remaining $50 million — the $54 million is already
gone — that is American taxpayers' money — the Miami Herald says
the remaining $50 million should be held until the Nicaraguan
Government resolves property claims and takes action against
human rights violators.
All right.
Now, we have been talking about Nicaragua. What do you want
me to do, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. I was going on to Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. I will yield 5 minutes of my time and let Sen-
ator Helms do his next line of questioning.
Senator Helms. Well, I think probably we can cover this. We
have been talking about Nicaragua, and I thank the Senator.
I am reminded that Mrs. Chamorro came to power with both
overt and covert funding from the U.S. Government. A lot of people
do not know that. It is also a matter of public record that in 1984
the U.S. Government covertly funded Mr. Duarte's campaign down
in El Salvador. Nobody knew anything about that, and it was in
a free election.
And I remember that I had a very interesting conversation with
Bill Casey about that thing. He did not like the fact that this was
funneled. He did not like the fact that I said publicly that this was
funneled through the CIA. You know, interference in a free elec-
tion.
Now, you have said — I believe you said, certainly by implication,
that we ought to let the people in each country choose their own
leaders without the U.S. Government tilting elections one way or
another. Do you want to comment on this, what is the word, inter-
ference or participation in, maybe illegally, certainly I think it is
sort of unethical, election buying that has occurred too many times
with the CIA and others funneling money covertly to Duarte?
Now, Mr. Duarte was a very charming man, but he had an oppo-
nent who was very charming, and about whom there were many,
many stories charging him with all sorts of mayhem. I remember
pressing your predecessor, your friend and my friend, Jim Baker.
169
There were many utterances saying that he headed a death squad.
I am talking about Roberto D'Aubuisson.
Now, I met D'Aubuisson two or three times. A very attractive fel-
low. He wrote the constitution down there. He was elected the head
of the assembly. One of the most popular fellows in the country.
But there was a persistent drumbeat that he was heading a death
squad. And this bothered me because, you know, I had met the fel-
low. He did not look like somebody heading a death squad to me,
but of course I do not know what a fellow looks like who heads a
death squad.
But I asked Jim Baker, time and time again, I said: What evi-
dence do you have to support this charge? Because I do not want
anything to do with him if he is doing all these terrible things. Fi-
nally, Jim came back and said, we do not have any evidence. But,
even till D'Aubuisson's death — in the obituary they referred to his
heading a death squad, which I think was reprehensible, unless
somebody has some evidence that I do not believe anybody has.
Now, do you think that the U.S. Government ought to use tax
money to tilt elections in foreign countries?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, the covert action issue is one that I
think needs to be addressed in a different committee than this. I
am not in a position to take a categorical position on that subject.
I am quite skeptical about covert action, but I think I would be
going well beyond my proper domain, certainly in this session, to
discuss the covert action policy of the United States.
Senator Helms. Well, let me just ask Warren Christopher, Amer-
ican citizen, what do you think of it?
Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Senator, you know, I think I am no longer
Warren Christopher, American citizen, attractive as that would be.
When I sit here at this table and answer questions like that, I am
here as Governor Clinton's nominee for Secretary of State. And
what I have given up, is the freedom to say in a public forum, with
the press here, exactly what I think on certain subjects.
And if that sounds evasive, I am sorry for it. But, really, it is one
of the things you surrender when you undertake this kind of an as-
signment.
Senator Helms. Well, I am going to let that one lie.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
Senator Helms. I know you appreciate that, too.
All right. I want to talk about drugs, in general. I think you
know that I have a deep interest in, and I have held a number of
hearings, I have chaired a number of hearings, on drug trafficking.
I know you have an interest in it, too. So I am not saying, you
know, I am holier than thou.
Now, I am going to submit to you in writing a number of ques-
tions relating to the drug issue. But there is one question I think
I should ask you now. Do you agree that the U.S. Government
should never turn over narcotics intelligence to a foreign official
who we believe may be involved in drug trafficking activities?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, posed that way, I cannot imagine the
circumstances in which we would turn over intelligence to some-
body whom we had a well-founded belief was involved in drug traf-
ficking. The question is almost rhetorical.
170
Senator Helms. Well, I guess this is something that maybe we
could talk about another time. It involves legislation which I
strongly support, and which I will describe to you in a private ses-
sion.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
Senator Helms. I am a little nervous about getting into it, be-
cause it may involve some classified stuff that neither you nor I
want to get into here right now at this hearing. But, having said
that, you do know that high-level Panamanian Government offi-
cials were involved in illegal drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and
money-laundering activities as early as the 1960's? You are aware
of that, are you not?
Mr. Christopher. As early as the 1960's, you say?
Senator Helms. As early as the 1960's.
Mr. Christopher. I do not know with precision, but I know it
goes back a long, long ways. And, moreover, I do not think it is
much better now, Senator.
Senator Helms. I agree with that.
What should I do now, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. I think you have another half-minute.
Senator Sarbanes. How much more time do you need, Jesse, to
finish this line?
Senator Helms. I cannot estimate. We are moving along pretty
rapidly. I am doing the best I can.
The Chairman. My understanding is that we will go along and
break for lunch. And, hopefully, at that point, there will just be one
major subject that the ranking member wants to discuss. And we
hope to wrap up this afternoon.
Is that correct?
Senator Helms. Did you say we hope to wind up this afternoon?
The Chairman. We expect to wrap it up this afternoon.
Senator Helms. Well, I will agree to the first and, further, we
hope that the second will be the case. But I do not want to give
up any rights.
The Chairman. Well, let us just roll along, and I will recognize
the Senator from Maryland.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I yielded a good part of my
time to Senator Helms, but I do want to take just a few minutes
to pursue a couple of things, and I am sure we will be back to Sen-
ator Helms very shortly so he can continue his line of questioning.
I really wanted to make this observation, Secretary Christopher.
I do not think that you are being evasive in the least when you
take the position that now, as the nominee to be Secretary of State,
and soon to be confirmed, that you no longer have the luxury of
simply speaking as a private individual.
What you say is potentially front page news across the world, not
only in this country, but across the world. And your views and
opinions, therefore, are looked to very carefully, scrutinized very
closely and, by the nature of things, are interpreted to reflect the
position of the American Government or, in this particular in-
stance, the position of the soon-to-be American Government, the in-
coming administration.
Therefore, I do not think you have the luxury any more to simply
sit at the table and give your own personal view, divorced from
171
that responsibility. And, I frankly think it would be not meeting
your responsibilities to start sounding off with, "this is what I,
Warren Christopher, individual, think, unrelated to the context of
speaking for the administration.
I also want to make one other observation. I know Senator
Helms is concerned about the Chamorro Government and some
problems he has had with them. I think some of the matters he has
raised do need to be looked into. As you have indicated you are pre-
pared to do and will undertake to do. But I do want to make the
observation that the alternative in that election, had Mrs.
Chamorro not won, would have been that we would still be con-
fronted with Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas holding full power
in Nicaragua.
Now, Mrs. Chamorro is under a lot of pressures, and I recognize
that. They come from all sides. She has a very difficult task. The
problem of economic reconstruction in that country is not an easy
one. They have suffered natural disasters as well as manmade dis-
asters, and they are trying to come out from under that. I know
she is trying to deal with many difficult problems all at the same
time.
So, while there are things about her administration that one
might criticize, I think we ought to recognize that her election did
supplant Ortega, which I regard as an important step forward. I
think we have to keep that in mind even as we may focus on some
of the problems that her own government is encountering.
Senator Dodd. If the Senator would just yield. There is another
alternative. Had there not been an election, we might have had a
continuing civil war, with thousands of people losing their lives.
Not only has there been an election, but military forces have been
substantially reduced, freedom of the press is the case, La Prensa
is open, and other papers are allowed to express their views.
Senator Sarbanes. Am I not correct that the Nicaraguan under-
writing of the rebellion in El Salvador terminated as well?
Senator Dodd. Totally. And it is no longer a base of operations
for others who are interested in the region. All of that has obvi-
ously come to a halt. I would point out as well, as another example,
President Aylwin. There was a difficult period in Chile, and Presi-
dent Aylwin won an election. And he retained General Pinochet as
the head of the military.
Now, there were many people who did not think that was a sign,
necessarily, of great change but understood the difficulty of build-
ing a country after a period of turmoil. And, certainly, that is a
step that people have taken from time to time.
So, considering the alternatives, the Senator from Maryland is
absolutely correct. And Mr. Christopher is correct when he says an
election is not an insignificant event, when you consider the his-
tory. But also consider what has occurred over the last several
years, despite the very legitimate questions that have been raised
by the Senator from North Carolina. That is progress, significant
progress. And it needs to be nurtured and supported.
I just wanted to comment on that.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I hear from the same people, or some
of the same people.
172
I hear from some of the same people that Senator Helms hears
from on the expropriation issue, and obviously it needs to be looked
into. The United States has traditionally concerned itself about the
expropriation of the property of our citizens in other countries and
has sought some redress. Of course, the Hickenlooper amendment
was but one reflection of that.
But I do not think we should be as condemnatory, perhaps, of
Mrs. Chamorro as one might otherwise be, because a number of
things came out of that election, including the opportunity to re-
store a full range of, not fully done yet, of human rights in Nica-
ragua, the ending of the support that was being given from Nica-
ragua to the rebellion in El Salvador, which has contributed now
to the Secretary General being able to negotiate what we hope will
be a lasting solution in El Salvador, and help to contribute to sta-
bility and peace in the region.
Senator Dodd. The Senator from Maryland is correct.
Senator Sarbanes. I thank the chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. I would defer to Senator Helms.
The Chairman. I could not hear you. Did you say you yielded?
Senator Coverdell. I am sorry. I said I would yield my time to
Senator Helms.
The Chairman. Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. How about Senator Robb?
The Chairman. Well, he comes next. If you yield to Senator
Robb, he comes next.
Senator Robb. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions at this
point. I am personally prepared to report the nomination to the
floor of the Senate for confirmation. I am not indifferent to some
of the concerns raised by our distinguished colleague from North
Carolina.
I wonder if it might be possible, however, to submit some ques-
tions in writing that the Secretary-designate could respond to, so
that there would be a record, so that any of us that had concerns
about some of these areas might be able to look at it? But I would
like to suggest that there might be some fixed time for the conclu-
sion of this process.
As I say, I am personally prepared to do it now, but I certainly
respect the right of the distinguished Senator from North Carolina
to question to the nominees at whatever length he believes is ap-
propriate. I am just, I guess, inquiring if it might be agreeable with
the distinguished Senator to do some of the interrogation in writing
so that we could report out the nomination whenever he is com-
fortable with it.
Senator Helms. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Robb. I would be pleased to yield.
Senator Helms. I will do exactly that, but I still have discussions
and questions that ought to be done here.
Now, I think we are moving on, so we can finish this thing this
afternoon.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I suggest we allow Sen-
ator Helms to proceed with his next round.
173
The Chairman. I would agree. And I would also add in response
to the Senator from Virginia, the record will stay open for ques-
tions until the questioning terminates.
Senator Robb. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to
yield back any time to the Senator from North Carolina.
The Chairman. Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. I thank the Senator.
Now, Mr. Christopher, you were No. 2 man in the State Depart-
ment during the Carter administration, is that not true?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Helms. And I believe you must know that Moises, or
Moses as some people call him, Torrijos, who was a brother of
Omar Torrijos, and Director of Panama's Office of Treaty Informa-
tion, I believe you know he was indicted by a grand jury in New
York as a co-conspirator in a narcotics trafficking case in 1972. Is
that not correct?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I do not know that, but I will take
your word for it if you say it is true.
Senator Helms. Well, he was.
Now, I think it is important to make it a matter of record, just
as it was important and I had no disagreement with it about 8
years ago or 12 years ago, or whatever it was, when it took 5 days
to confirm or report the nomination of a gentleman to be Secretary
of State. And some of the people who were saying, let us go on,
were participating in that, and I had no objection to it and voiced
no objections.
Please believe me that I want to get this thing over with as much
as they do, or you do. But I think it is important to establish, if
possible, whether you and others in your administration did not
know or did know, as the case may be, about the drug trafficking
and other criminal activities of the Torrijos brothers.
Now, you did know, did you not?
Mr. Christopher. I did not, Senator.
Senator Helms. You did not?
Mr. Christopher. I did not.
Senator Helms. Well, you were negotiating with them at the
time. Did you think they were pure as the driven snow? Now, you
were the No. 2 man in the State Department.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. The only Torrijos I knew was the
head of Panama at that time.
Senator Helms. Omar?
Mr. Christopher. Omar.
I did not know him intimately, but I had some professional con-
tact with him.
Senator Helms. Well, you did negotiate with him, as a matter of
fact.
Mr. Christopher. I did not negotiate with him.
Senator Helms. Well, you met with him with respect, say, to the
Panama Canal Treaty.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
But I do not believe I ever met with him alone. They were meet-
ings of substantial size, where he was represented by his Foreign
Affairs Minister and various other people. The direct negotiation
was done between negotiators for the two countries.
174
Senator Helms. And nobody in the State Department cabled to
you and said, Mr. Secretary, you know about this guy? Do you
know about these indictments? Do you know about these activities?
Nobody ever said anything to you about it?
Mr. Christopher. I do not recall that anybody said that General
Torrijos was himself involved in the drug trade, no, sir, I do not.
Senator Helms. Well, we keep pretty good records, and a number
of officials of the administration of which you were a part have
been quoted, time and time again, as saying that the administra-
tion did know about the drug trafficking, and so forth and so on.
Now, just because they said it does not make it so. I acknowledge
that. But it is very interesting. I asked the staff to get up a list
of some of the articles where statements were made to that effect.
Seymour Hersh of the New York Times, on May 4, 1988; John
McLean in 1979, the Chicago Tribune; the New York Times again,
in 1986, the New York Times — two times in June 1986; the Wash-
ington Post, John McGee, in March 1988, and so forth.
That was after the fact of your serving as No. 2 man. But do you
remember any of those articles?
Mr. Christopher. I cannot say I remember any of the articles.
I know there has been a long history of Panamanian leaders being
involved in illegal conduct of one kind or another. And I would
have to say that I think probably we have been, as a country, too
lenient about that, considerably too lenient.
There is always a dilemma, though, when somebody is the leader
of a country and there is an obligation to deal with that country,
you deal with him in the best way that you can.
Senator Helms. I am mystified. When you were negotiating— -dis-
cussing, meeting, whatever characterization you want to give it,
the Panama Canal Treaty, did you know about the murder of Fa-
ther Gallegos, a Catholic priest who was thrown from Noriega's
helicopter? Did you know nothing about that?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I did not.
I might clarify for you, Senator, what my role was in that connec-
tion. I did not negotiate the Panama Canal Treaties. They were ne-
gotiated by
Senator Helms. Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz.
Mr. Christopher. And my role in connection with the Panama
Canal Treaties was in connection with the ratification of those
treaties, or approval of those treaties. And I was only one of many
who were involved in that endeavor to secure ratification.
I am not trying to move away from that, except to try to indicate
to you that I did not go back and forth to Panama. The only time
I was ever in Panama was for the signing ceremonies and I was
one of dozens of American officials who happened to be there for
the signing ceremony.
So I was not intimately involved until after the treaties had been
negotiated and the matter was ready for approval here in the Sen-
ate. Then, I did get fairly deeply involved.
Senator Helms. Well, you are identified as one of the two top ad-
vocates in the State Department of the treaties.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, I certainly was an advocate of the
treaties here in the U.S. Senate.
175
Senator Helms. And Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz were
the negotiators?
Mr. Christopher. They were the negotiators, sir.
Senator Helms. As a little sidebar, I remember — I think I may
have mentioned it yesterday — I was designated by some other Sen-
ators, veterans in the Senate, to go down and meet with President
Carter and deliver a letter signed by four former chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs.
We got up a cover letter, covering that letter, and I made an ap-
pointment, or the President graciously agreed to see me,
unhesitatingly. I remember, when I got there, they took me right
into the Oval Office and I sat down on a little, sort of like what
you call a little love seat. He was not there. He was in a news con-
ference of some sort.
I was going over my papers. I was the new boy on the block. I
saw these two black shoes standing there in front of me and I
looked up and there was the President of the United States.
I jumped up and I spilled my papers all over the floor. And he
and I got on our knees to pick up my papers, which I appreciated
very much, in total embarrassment.
And I was groping for something to say to him besides what I
came for. And I think it must have been a Monday morning, be-
cause there had been a story in the paper that President and Mrs.
Carter went to church on Sunday and she kicked off her shoes.
And I said, Mrs. Helms noticed that because she does the same
thing in church because her feet hurt. She must have the
hurtingest feet in the world.
He said, no, she may be No. 2, but Rosalyn has the hurtingest
feet.
So I thought how that was my big moment, visiting with the
President of the United States and we were talking. And what did
we talk about? We talked about how bad our wife's feet hurt.
But anyway, these Senators who signed the letter covering the
letters from the four chairmen of the Joint Chiefs instructed me to
offer to the President that if instead of, "giving away the Panama
Canal, he wanted to propose an enormous public work project —
that is to work on the locks so that we could get larger vessels
through — that we would support it strenuously in the Senate."
And the President was very cordial about it. And he said, well,
1 cannot give you an answer on that. He said, I am attracted to
your idea and I want you to tell the other Senators that I said this.
But, he said, Ellsworth and Sol will be in here this afternoon at
2 o'clock. And let me broach the subject to them.
And I remember driving back to the Capitol. I said, if I do noth-
ing else, you are a freshman Senator and all the rest of it, if I have
helped divert just giving away the Panama Canal, it will have all
been worthwhile. Of course, I never heard again about it.
But I remember Jim Allen. You knew Senator Allen, did you not,
from Alabama?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I remember him. I did not know him
well, but I do remember him.
Senator Helms. Well, he was one of the great Senators in terms
of knowledge of the Senate and the Senate's rules and so forth.
Mr. CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir. I remember hearing that.
176
Senator Helms. He and Harry Byrd and John McClellan and so
many people on both sides of the aisle, we talked about the char-
acter of the people that the canal was going to be turned over to.
And this worried us. And that's the reason there was great sup-
port for a big public works project that would benefit the United
States. But this fellow Noriega, we later learned and some evidence
existed then, that he was on the U.S. payroll. And I remember, I
could not understand that because I guess I was naive about intel-
ligence and how you assemble it and whom you keep.
But I just wonder, am I too naive when I say that we ought not
to bankroll intelligence assets among people with criminal records?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, let me make a somewhat broader
statement about that. I was aware that there were a number of
people of unsavory reputation in Panama. I don't carry today a
recollection as to who they were or what they had done.
I have heard since then about Noriega and there were suspicions
about Noriega at that time and I think the longstanding relation-
ship between the United States and Noriega is a blot on our histor-
ical record. And it's bipartisan blot because it wasn't just one party.
It went back a long ways.
But I'm not in the intelligence business and I would not be pre-
pared to lay down any absolute rules as to who we use as intel-
ligence assets. It's a difficult, often dirty business. And you're not
dealing with angels in the intelligence business. So as I say, I
would not lay down any rules for them. But I do associate myself
with the view that our longstanding relationship with Noriega was
a serious mistake and a blot on our country's record.
Senator Helms. Well, I appreciate that, because I feel — I am not
a goody-goody two-shoes, but you know, dealing with skunks like
that. It makes me ashamed.
But I will tell you what I am going to do. I am going to submit
the rest of the questions on Panama in writing to you.
Mr. Christopher. I appreciate it.
Senator Helms. And we will not take up your time.
Now, Mr. Chairman, that leaves — I have got over written ques-
tions as well. But that leaves one more subject that is going to take
a little time. And if we can get through with that, I will have — as
they say in North Carolina — shot my wad. And I see you smiling
and nodding your head.
Mr. Christopher. Well, I do enjoy being here, but if it came to
an end, I wouldn't be disappointed. [Laughter.]
Senator Helms. I can understand that. Why do we not break for
lunch now?
The Chairman. We will break for lunch and come back at about
2 o'clock — not about, at 2 o'clock — and then forge ahead.
Mr. Christopher. That would be fine unless the Senator thought
he could finish in due course. I'm obviously here. I'm at your serv-
ice.
Senator Helms. Well, I do not think I can, but we — you enjoy our
lunch.
Mr. Christopher. All right, sir. I will be back promptly at 2
o'clock.
The Chairman. Two o'clock promptly.
177
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee recessed for lunch, to
reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room SH-
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Sarbanes, Kerry, Simon, Mathews, Helms, and
Coverdell.
The Chairman. The Senate has come to order. During the lunch
break, the staff of the Senate committee received a message re-
layed from the Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani, who ex-
pressed much appreciation, Mr. Secretary-designate, for your forth-
right answer on the pursuit of genocide charges against Saddam
for what he has done to the Kurdish people.
They wanted, though, to draw attention to the dire conditions ex-
isting in Northern Iraq this winter. The Congress has appropriated
$43 million for winter relief in Kurdistan. A great deal more is
needed and should be sent. I would emphasize that the situation
is desperate. The money is here and available, but the question is
how best to deliver the relief.
Finally, I am told the Iraq is blocking completely relief to the
Shiites in the villages of Southern Iraq, and to the 500,000 people
living in the marshes there. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you
would look into that when you take over.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, sir. I surely will.
The Chairman. Also, I have one question. President-elect Clinton
said that as President that he will continue American assistance
programs to the Camp David countries, Israel and Egypt, at cur-
rent levels. With regard to Israel, the President-elect has said the
aid encourages long-term stability in the Middle East, and dem-
onstrates the American commitment to Israeli security and sov-
ereignty.
Do you share the President-elect's views on the importance of
continuing aid to Israel and Egypt at the current levels?
Mr. Christopher. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman, both because he is
President and because those are my personal views.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. I have no further
questions. I turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. I am tempted to ask the Secretary where he
wants the Embassy to be placed in Israel, but no, I will not ask
it.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you.
Senator Helms. Yesterday, seriously, Mr. Christopher, I think it
was Senator Simon who asked you whether you thought it was
about time to recognize the MPLA Government of Angola, and you
said, as I understand it, that you were sympathetic to Senator Si-
mon's statement, but were not aware of all of the details of the sit-
uation there.
I thought it might be in order to offer a few details just for the
record. The MPLA Government in recent weeks has launched a na-
tionwide military offensive against UNITA and its civilian political
supporters. And approximately 2,000 people have been killed just
178
in the past 2 weeks. The U.N. Security Council has urged a
ceasefire to no avail.
The U.N. peacekeeping mandate in Angola expires at the end of
this month, and unless there is significant progress toward talks,
the peacekeeping U.N. crowd would like to pull out. And Angolan
law calls for a runoff election between the leaders of the two fac-
tions, but none has been planned.
As a seasoned diplomat, and negotiator, I am sure you know how
important expectation is in any negotiation. And it occurred to me
that perhaps your comments yesterday will lead the hardliner in
the MPLA Government to believe that no matter what it does, the
Clinton administration will extend full diplomatic relations. That
belief is unlikely to lead them to the negotiating table, and I antici-
pate the Angola is, once again, on the brink of civil war.
And I mention all of that thinking that perhaps you might want
to clarify just a bit the statement that I understand you made to
Senator Simon yesterday, but that is up to you.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I think the best thing for me to say
is that we will look at the full facts to try and understand the situ-
ation. And I certainly have not prejudged it. I was simply agreeing
with Senator Simon s comment, I think, which was keyed to the
relatively recent election in Angola, and to indicate that unless
there was some difference in the facts, it would seem that we ought
to be moving in that direction. But I have not prejudged the matter
and I hope that will give reassurance.
Senator Helms. Well, I think it probably will if you are saying
in effect, and I think you just have, that you are going to wait, and
look and see at what MPLA is doing, and UNITA and so forth, and
that you have not really made a judgment.
Mr. Christopher. That is correct. That is absolutely correct.
Senator Helms. OK Now then, I believe you have been the
chairman of the management committee of your law firm.
Mr. Christopher. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Helms. O'Melveny & Myers, and as such I think you
will be able to recognize the law firm's major clients. Now, I think
you see behind you — and have they provided you a sheet as well?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, thank you.
Senator Helms. Does the list of Japanese clients on this chart
look reasonably complete to you?
Mr. Christopher. No, Senator. It is by no means complete.
Senator Helms. Are there more or fewer?
Mr. Christopher. There are many more.
Senator Helms. Many more. Well, anyway, it is the best we
could do. We took it from the latest issue of Martindale and Hub-
bell, and the list covers, as you will see, industries ranging from
automobiles, airlines, oil, steel, banks, insurance, securities trading
companies, advertising, television, broadcasting, and construction.
And you indicated that there are a lot more than that.
And the question I would like to ask of you is which ones of these
firms were your personal clients, assigned to you?
Mr. Christopher. None of them.
Senator Helms. None?
Mr. Christopher. None of them, Senator.
179
Senator Helms. Well, did you have any personal assignments to
you?
Mr. Christopher. Did I personally have any personal assign-
ments?
Senator Helms. Yes.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, I handled a number of matters.
Senator Helms. But none of these?
Mr. Christopher. None of those, sir.
Senator Helms. Well, clients of your law firm, or your former law
firm now, made their payments directly to the firm and not to indi-
vidual partners. That is correct, is it not?
Mr. Christopher. That's correct.
Senator Helms. That is a given. So, your annual compensation
depended on payments made to the firm by all of the clients and
not just your personal clients?
Mr. Christopher. That is correct.
Senator Helms. All right. And, now, let us turn back to the law
firm's client list. The American big three automakers and their
union met with Governor Clinton recently, and made certain re-
quests. If these requests come to the Cabinet level for decision,
would you feel that you should recuse yourself, given that your law
firm had Toyota as a client?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I would not see any basis for doing
so, but if there was ever any question about it I would consult with
counsel at the State Department.
If I might, Senator, could I put this in a somewhat broader con-
text for you?
Senator Helms. Sure.
Mr. Christopher. Well, when I was asked by Governor Clinton
to undertake this assignment and decided to come back here, I in-
structed my representatives to work out a very conservative ap-
proach to the ethics question. I tried to follow on ethics matters
what I understand to be the Bob Jones rule of golf, and that is to
call the close ones against yourself. And my instructions were to
work out a very conservative package. At this stage in my career,
I have very little interest in running any risk on ethical issues.
On the other hand, Senator, there is a responsibility to carry out
your job once you are in government, and I think an excessively
broad recusal policy or a foolishly broad recusal policy might be
comfortable for the person involved, but not in the public interest,
because you would be taking yourself out of so many important de-
cisions. And I think that that would probably be true for the Sec-
retary of State because so many things pass by him.
In accordance with my instructions, I have worked out a policy
of recusal and other divestitures which has had the approval of the
Office of Government Ethics and the approval of the ethics officer
at the State Department. And it complies with existing regulations
and the new set of regulations that are going to be put into effect,
I think, some time early this year.
In the course of this I have, I think, worked out a recusal policy
that seems to me to be consistent with my own sense of ethics, and
it certainly meets all the tests of Office of Government Ethics and
the State Department ethics officer.
180
For example, with respect to O'Melveny & Myers, in which I
have some retirement rights, I will recuse myself for the entire
time I am here. I do not think any of my partners would ever ask
to see me on a business matter, but if they did I would turn them
down. If there was any issue that I recognized where O'Melveny
was representing them, I would take myself out.
I also have very modest retirement rights from South California
Edison, and I would maintain also the same recusal policy with re-
spect to Southern California Edison. The view was that that com-
pany had mainly domestic interests, and it was not necessary for
me to divest completely.
With respect to the two other directorships I had, Lockheed and
First Interstate Bank, I have cashed out. That is, I have sold what-
ever stock I had. They have turned into cash any retirement rights
I had just to be on the safe side, because they obviously both have
some possible international interests. That decision was not with-
out its pain, but one I am very glad to undertake.
I have also divested myself from over 60 individual invest-
ments— not large ones but they were in various partnerships that
might conceivably have involved some ethical problem. And as a re-
sult my assets, such as they are, will be in mutual funds or govern-
ment securities.
In short, Senator, I have gone about as far as one can go to com-
ply. One thing that I am not doing, though, and this really speaks
to your question — I am not planning to disqualify myself from all
of the clients of O'Melveny & Myers. One time we looked, and there
were 10,000 open files. That probably would not mean 10,000 cli-
ents, but it would mean several thousand separate clients. And it
would be, I think, imprudent for me and not in the public interest
to try to discover which of those clients might have some matter
before the State Department or be affected by it where I had no
knowledge of the name of the client.
The reason that I said so quickly this was not the name of all
of our Japanese clients, I happen to recognize most of these, and
there are many others for whom we did a small amount of work
whose names I did not recognize then and would not recognize
now. And there is no way for me to disqualify myself with respect
to them.
But I assure you that if anything comes by where I have some
flicker of memory that this has something to do with the practice
of law or I had something to do with this, I will seek counsel and
I will take myself out, because I assure you I have no interests in
running any risks in this area.
Senator Helms. When you talked to the President about this
nomination, did you describe your plans or what you had already
decided? I guess I am asking, does he know about what you are
doing and has he approved?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Helms. Now, the State Department, of course, is our
lead negotiator on reciprocal airline access. Japan Airlines falls
under the net of what you just said, is that correct? Japan Airlines
is a client, and you do not anticipate any problem with respect to
that one, is that right? Is that what you are saying?
181
Mr. Christopher. I do not anticipate any problem, Senator. It
happens that our law firm also represents most of the domestic air-
lines one way or another, and since I have not worked for them in
recent years, there is no basis for my disqualification there that I
can see, unless — and no one has taken this position that a lawyer
should disqualify himself from all the clients of the law firm, even
though he had not done any recent substantial work.
Senator Helms. All right. Put up the other chart. I got interested
in this, and the further we went, the more interest I had. Now, this
chart shows the Japanese business connection with the incoming
Clinton administration. For example, the NSC Advisor, Deputy Ad-
visor Sandy Burger; and Robert Rubin, the National Economic
Counsel Advisor; and Senator Bentsen and Roger Altman and Ron
Brown and yourself and Mickey Kantor. I think the Japanese must
have been doing handsprings with joy when they saw all of these
selections, but maybe I am wrong about that.
Do you think this system of business ties to foreigners would be
possible in any other country? How about in Japan itself?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I cannot speak to Japan, but I would
suggest that if you bring into government anyone from any of the
major investment banks or any of the major law firms, there would
be some tie between that law firm or that investment bank and
Japan. The Japanese have done a great deal of business in this
country. They have made investments that are very useful for this
country in various ways.
In any event, this chart does not surprise me because the Japa-
nese have been very active in our country, and in some ways very
constructively.
On the Japanese front, Senator, I apologize if this sounds some-
what self-serving, but the first experience I had in foreign policy
was to negotiate trade treaties for the United States against Japan
in the 1960's, when President Kennedy was in office. So, I am quite
familiar with taking positions against the Japanese, and have
never represented any Japanese companies here in the United
States.
So, emotionally I do not have any sense that I will feel some spe-
cial obligation to the Japanese arising out of the fact that they
were CMelveny & Meyers' clients. Quite to the contrary, my main
contact, in a negotiating sense, goes back to the 1960's when I ne-
gotiated textile treaties. And they were tough negotiations.
Senator Helms. Do you want me to stop now? What do you want
me to do?
The Chairman. I think we ought to go on the 10-minute rule
until we are exhausted on this side, and then you can go on.
Senator Helms. Well, I can finish, I think, in the next few min-
utes.
Senator SlMON. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Does my colleague seek recognition?
Senator Simon. I would like to respond just for 2 minutes to the
one comment about Angola.
The Chairman. But then would the rest of my colleagues care to
question?
182
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I will claim my time. I just
have a question or two. Then I will yield to Senator Simon to do
that. We may be able to go right back to Senator Helms.
The Chairman. OK, sure.
Senator Helms. Fine.
Senator Sarbanes. First of all let me say, Mr. Christopher, I
think this is a very broad recusal. I have spent a lot of time looking
at these recusals as they come before the committee. It seems to
me, as you have said, that you have been very careful and very
prudent, very conservative in what you have taken in terms of
moving out of areas which many other nominees who have simply
stayed in and been approved accordingly.
Let me be very clear. You are terminating all relationship with
your law firm as I understand it, except for the retirement plan,
which is a defined benefit plan invested in government securities
and mutual funds. Is that correct?
Mr. Christopher. No, not exactly. I am ending my relationship
completely with my law firm except for the defined benefit plan,
and retirement payments which have been in our partnership
agreement for many years. And mine go back to my return to the
firm in 1981. So, they are not in any way changed by my entry into
government. This is just what I am entitled to under our partner-
ship agreement.
Senator Sarbanes. OK. And you are resigning from SCC Corp.
and Southern California Edison, is that correct?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. You are also divesting yourself of an exten-
sive list of holdings, much of which need not have been done, if I
understand the rules and requirements, but you have done so in
an abundance of caution?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I must say to you, and I looked over
this material carefully overnight, it did seem to me that you were
setting a very high standard here, certainly higher than is required
under existing laws and regulations, and certainly higher than
many if not most nominees who have come before us have done.
I assume some of this is at a financial loss, although I do not
particularly want to belabor that point. But I thank you for being
so careful. I yield to Senator Simon.
Senator Kerry. I would just like to interject, if I may, along the
road downhill here.
Senator Sarbanes. Fine. If I still have time, I yield to Senator
Kerry.
Senator Kerry. I want to join with Senator Sarbanes in recogniz-
ing the breadth of this recusal. I was, frankly, somewhat surprised
by the breadth of it. Pleasantly so, but surprised, when measured
against other nominees we have considered, and particularly recent
times. I say this not to engage with my good friend from North
Carolina in any kind of specific partisanship, but since the admin-
istration preceding is Republican and has been for 12 years, we
have to measure it most recently by that experience.
When I look at either the Secretary of Commerce, most recently,
or the Secretary of Treasury, or even close advisers to the Presi-
dent, one of whom was advising BCCI even while advising the
183
President, this recusal presented to us by the Secretary-designate
is far, far, as he said, more conservative. It is more far reaching.
And so I join with my colleague in saying that I think that, particu-
larly given the fact that none of those firms were, in fact, directly
represented by the Secretary-designate, it is even more so a con-
servative approach, and one that represents the new ethics that
have been described. And I think the committee is pleased to see
it.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Senator Simon?
Senator Simon. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just first
comment. I think you have done the proper thing, and I applaud
you for it.
Let me just comment on Angola briefly. An election was held,
and an election in which if either — any candidate received a major-
ity of the vote, that candidate would become President of Angola.
If no one received a majority, there would be a runoff.
President Dos Santos and Savimbi campaigned throughout An-
gola; a rather remarkable thing considering that they had had a
civil war. President Dos Santos ended up with 49.3 percent of the
vote, not the 50 percent that was necessary. Savimbi at first then
claimed fraud, despite the fact that observers said it was a remark-
ably fine election for a country that had never had elections before.
And then he has been back and forth about recognizing the govern-
ment.
There clearly have been some abuses by UNITA, the Savimbi
forces, as well as by the MPLA, but they are going to be coming
together, as I understand, to try and work out something. But
there is no question that there has been a genuine, free election;
that the government there is moving in a constructive direction.
I hope things can get worked out. I hope Dr. Savimbi can be part
of the government that emerges there, the coalition government,
and that they can go ahead with the runoff that is required under
their law.
I am not asking you, Mr. Secretary, to simply sign a blank check.
I do believe that Angola comes much closer to the ideals that we
profess than a great many countries that we do now recognize. And
so I think it is in order for the new administration to take a good
hard look. And I might add, this is the feeling, not just of Paul
Simon, but of a great many people who in the past have been
strong supporters of Dr. Savimbi.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Simon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Simon.
Senator Mathews?
Senator Mathews. No questions at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I would observe that I
went through your recusal and I congratulate you on its conserv-
ative approach.
I guess we have all had a chance to speak. Now we turn it over
to the ranking minority member until he is interrupted by one of
us, Senator Helms.
184
Senator Helms. Well, before we go too far in a love-in, let us go
a little bit further into what I was trying to discuss with the nomi-
nee.
Every time you have gone into government, you have imple-
mented a recusal schedule. Is that right?
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir. I would say that the strictures are
more extensive now than they were at an earlier time, but I have
always declined to act in matters where O'Melveny & Myers was
involved or where important prior clients of mine were involved.
Senator Helms. Now, it was on December 9 when you announced
Governor Clinton's new ethics package. I believe you referred to the
revolving door, which of course links the public and private sectors.
And you described that revolving door as a vice.
You know, that is another thing we agree on; because I have had
to confront people who have been on the Republican side, who have
been in and out of government, and you find yourself sort of shad-
owboxing. So we do not disagree on that, Mr. Secretary.
But I am bound to oblige — I mean, I am obliged to observe that
counting your time as consultant to the State Department on tex-
tile negotiations in the 1960's, I count at least nine times that you
have gone from the State Department or the Justice Department
to your same law firm or back again. Is that approximately correct?
Mr. Christopher. Nine certainly doesn't sound right to me, Sen-
ator. I was a consultant from 1961 to 1965, and then I was in the
Justice Department in 1967 and 1968 and I was in the State De-
partment for 4 years, from 1977 to 1981.
It is hard for me to get nine out of that.
Senator Helms. Well, back and forth, each time, is two.
Mr. Christopher. That would bring me up to six. But if you are
saying that I've gone back and forth to O'Melveny & Myers in my
career, I would have to plead guilty.
Senator HELMS. Yes, yes. I am not accusing you of a thing. I just
want to get the record straight.
But it looks to me like even in your case, and you and I agree
on this revolving door business, it has been sort of a permanent
swinging job. And I believe that is precisely what Governor Clinton
was complaining about during the campaign.
Mr. Christopher. I'll be bound by all the strictures that were
promulgated and which I announced when I leave government.
Senator Helms. Now, this morning, in the New York Times — I
guess you saw the story, it was on the front page — indicated that
Mr. Clinton is considering whether he should impose more strin-
gent ethics rules on Commerce Secretary-designate Brown.
Now I wonder how your recusal commitment, which you have
just described, and Mr. Brown's commitment, how do they differ,
if at all?
Mr. Christopher. I am not a student of Mr. Brown's commit-
ments, Senator. If some more stringent are promulgated by the Of-
fice of Government Ethics or by Governor Clinton or by the State
Department, I'll be glad to live up to them. I don't intend to be out-
done by somebody on this.
Senator Helms. That is a good attitude. I had somebody who
knows more about it than I do outside the Senate and outside the
staff. And they say that your commitment and Mr. Brown's com-
185
mitment are also identical. But I cannot testify to that as of my
own knowledge.
Now, your statement does parallel Mr. Brown's somewhat. First,
you both pledge to recuse yourselves only in regards to particular
matters. Is that correct?
Mr. Christopher. Well, with respect to O'Melveny & Myers, I
will recuse myself as to all matters that affect the firm and also
will not meet with any client or be involved in any matter where
a client is represented by O'Melveny if I recognize it.
Senator Helms. And Brown's does not do that?
Mr. Christopher. As I say, I am really not a student of his and
not prepared to get into a comparative analysis.
Senator Helms. Well, I am going to be interested in comparing
the two, just as a matter of personal interest.
The New York Times had a right pointed comment about this
thing. Understand, I do not get up every morning looking to the
New York Times to establish my own opinion, because like Homer,
they nod too.
But they talk about an attitude of greed.
Mr. Christopher. Senator, as you have noted, I have gone in
and out of the Government now — it will be 3 times. And I don't
think that anybody would say that after I came back out, I some-
how misused the position I'd been in. I moved back to Los Angeles
and practiced law as a litigation lawyer there, I did not stay
around Washington.
Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, I did not imply such a thing, nor
should you infer it.
Mr. Christopher. You made the analogy and I thought maybe
I ought to clarify what I could.
Senator Helms. That's fine. That's what hearings are all about.
You made yourself very clear.
Now the New York Times — I have got so much paper here — I do
not believe I have this morning's New York Times quote. But it is
in the office.
Let me specify something that I absolutely agree with Governor
Clinton about, just for your information. I have been fussing for
years about the underpayment of taxes by foreign companies oper-
ating in the United States. I have been on that Senate floor— if you
would like a bale of paper, I will give it to you.
It just irritates me beyond redemption that the Japanese Govern-
ment makes a formal complaint to our Government. Based on what
you already said, you will participate in the decisionmaking process
on this issue and you will support President Clinton.
Mr. Christopher. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Helms. And incidentally, Jesse Helms.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you. I will.
Senator Helms. All right. Now, Mr. Christopher, I am going to
be submitting in written form a few more technical questions re-
garding the recusal matter.
Now Mr. Chairman, if I may, Senator Mack asked me to ask
questions of Mr. Christopher which I shall do with your permis-
sion.
The Chairman. Certainly.
186
Senator Helms. In January — this is Senator Mack speaking — in
January 1992, the United States supported a U.N. resolution which
referred to, "occupied Palestinian territories including Jerusalem."
This was the first time the United States has ever supported lan-
guage referring to the territories in such a way. And U.S. policy
has always held that the final status of the territories is to be de-
termined by negotiations.
In a letter to Secretary Baker, which I am submitting for the
record, record Al Gore protested the characterization of the terri-
tories as, "Palestinian," and went on to say, "the United States
should never again participate in the unfair condemnation of any
nation, let alone an ally. Compromising the truths and our prin-
ciples is wrong and diminishes us as a Nation and harms the
peace."
Then he says President Clinton also called for U.S. support for
that resolution. He also called it a mistake.
So the question posed by Senator Mack, will you recommend that
the United States oppose any resolution that refers to the disputed
territories as, "occupied Palestinian territories?"
[The information referred to follows:]
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC,
January 17, 1992.
The Honorable James A. Baker ID,
Department of State, 2201 C Street NW., Washington, DC
Dear SECRETARY Baker: We are very concerned by U.S. support for the harsh,
one-sided, and unprecedented condemnation of Israel by the United Nations Secu-
rity Council on January 6th (UNSCR 726). Following the victory against the infa-
mous Zionism-is-racism resolution, we are appalled that the Administration would
work to strengthen, rather than veto, a resolution employing a blatant double stand-
ard towards Israel.
UNSCR 726 "strongly condemned" Israel's deportation of 12 Palestinians — strong-
er language than the condemnation of Iraq for invading Kuwait. It also referred to
the territories administered by Israel since 1967 as "occupied Palestinian territories
* * * including Jerusalem." The resolution made no mention of the Palestinian vio-
lence that prompted Israel's actions.
Why should Israel's non-violent response to the murder of four Israelis be con-
demned in harsher terms than Iraq's invasion of Kuwait? How could the Security
Council refer to territories that are under dispute according to its own resolutions
as "Palestinian" territories? Why should the United States reward the Palestinians
for conditioning their participation in the peace process on Israeli behavior, while
Israel is expected to accept terrorism against her citizens without recourse?
It would be a sad day lor the United States, for Israel, and for the cause ofpeace
if the U.S. role in drafting this resolution marks an abrupt turnaround in U.S. pol-
icy— from opposing lopsided blatantly anti-Israel resolutions to drafting and sup-
porting them.
UNSCR 726 will harm the cause of peace by encouraging Palestinian terrorism
and by rewarding Palestinian intransigence. It will harm the integrity of the United
Nations by again demonstrating an outrageous double standard towards Israel. And
it will strengthen those in Israel who fear that the U.S. will eventually, through the
UN Security Council, force Israel into concessions that threaten her security.
The United States should never again participate in the unfair condemnation of
any nation, let alone an ally, let alone a small democracy trying to cope, however
imperfectly, with terrorism and threats against her very existence. Compromising
the truth and our principles is wrong, diminishes us as a nation, and harms the
cause of peace.
In order to better understand the process by which U.S. policy was formulated in
this case, we would like answers to the following questions:
(1) By what standard did the Administration determine that it was appropriate
to "strongly condemn" Israel, while Iraq was "condemned" for invading Kuwait?
(2) How can the U.S. support (even with an explanation) UN resolutions that refer
to the territories administered by Israel since 1967 as "occupied Palestinian terri-
187
tories" when U.S. policy is that the status of those territories is to be determined
through direct negotiations between the parties?
(3) Has the U.S. abandoned its long-standing policy of opposing unbalanced reso-
lutions that condemn Israel without consideration or mention of the context of Isra-
el's actions? If not, by what criteria was the resolution determined to be "balanced?"
We look forward to receiving your answers to these questions, and hope that we
will be able to work with you to ensure that United States policy promotes the val-
ues and goals we all share.
Sincerely,
Connie Mack and Al Gore,
U.S. Senators.
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC,
February 12, 1992.
DEAR SENATOR Mack On behalf of Secretary Baker, thank you for your letter of
January 17, 1992, concerning the United States' vote in favor of United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 726 condemning Israel's decision to expel twelve Palestin-
ians from the West Bank and Gaza.
As you know, the United States has consistently opposed the expulsion of Pal-
estinians from the occupied territories as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion. The Administration has urged Israel at very senior levels to discontinue expul-
sions since Israel began to resume this practice in late 1990. Our vote on Resolution
726 was based on this longstanding position, which has been taken by all adminis-
trations since 1967.
We are, at the same time, outraged by Palestinian acts of violence against Israe-
lis. We have made this clear in the strongest terms publicly and privately to Pal-
estinian representatives. In casting our vote at the United Nations, the U.S. con-
demned these attacks, and urged all other countries to condemn them. Such violence
is unacceptable and inexcusable, and can do nothing to contribute to a resolution
of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the achievement of Palestinian rights.
We will continue to oppose gratuitous, one-sided, and wrongful criticism of Israel,
while maintaining fundamental principles of U.S. policy regarding this conflict. We
believe the Resolution was not unbalanced. It was not intended as a blanket con-
demnation of Israel as our ally and democratic partner; it was intended to address
a practice we have continually found abhorrent.
The reference in Resolution 726 to "occupied Palestinian territories" is not new.
It has appeared in other resolutions before United Nations bodies and other inter-
national organizations. We consider this language to be demographically and geo-
graphically descriptive only, and not indicative of sovereignty. As is well known, we
believe that the final status of the occupied territories is a matter for direct negotia-
tions between the parties concerned and we will not support any other alternative.
The language of the Resolution does not prejudge the status of these territories. As
to the word "Palestinian," this term is used for descriptive purposes only. Thus, we
are willing to accept resolutions containing this formulation, if they are otherwise
acceptable. We clearly stated this position in our explanation of vote.
I can assure you that the Administration remains firmly committed to Israel's se-
curity. No one should doubt this. That commitment is based on long and durable
ties and friendship. We believe that a successful peace process will enhance Israel's
security. The President has clearly stated that a settlement must provide for Israel's
recognition and security. Nothing less will be acceptable to Israel, or to the United
States.
The Department appreciates your views, and looks forward to continuing con-
sultation with the Congress as we proceed with our efforts for peace in the Middle
East.
Sincerely,
Janet G. Mullins,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
[Other material submitted for the record by Senator Mack may
be found in committee files.]
Mr. Christopher. Senator, from what you've read and subject to
analyzing it further, I certainly associate myself with the views of
Governor Clinton and Senator Gore.
188
As you read it out, and there's always a certain risk, because this
is a technical area, but as you read it out, it does seem to me to
be the correct position.
Senator Helms. And the second part of the question that Senator
Mack asks of you is, will the new administration oppose U.N. reso-
lutions that condemn Israel's response to violence without specify-
ing or condemning the violence committed against Israel?
Mr. Christopher. Senator, I've always thought those needed to
be balanced. That is, if the actions of Israel were going to be con-
demned, it was very important to describe the provocation or de-
scribe what was being responded to.
So in general terms, I certainly endorse what I understand to be
the request of Senator Mack.
Senator Helms. Very well. And another question — no, this is all.
This is just another copy.
Now, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be submitting, as I said ear-
lier, questions in writing and for the record.
And I would say to Mr. Christopher, we would appreciate your
responses before we are called upon to vote on your nomination.
Mr. Christopher. We will respond just as rapidly as we can.
Over lunch today, I discussed with some of my staff the way to be
a quick response team. We will do our very best to respond to the
questions that we anticipate.
Senator Helms. Since we do not have a majority of the Repub-
licans present, let me speak for the Republicans that I assume
that, as customary, you are going to leave the record open for them
to submit questions, those Senators who are not here.
The Chairman. I said so earlier, yes.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, could I just inquire of Senator
Helms? I assume these questions will be given to Mr. Christopher
now or shortly after the termination of this hearing?
Senator Helms. We are going to give them to him before the Sun
sets. Any problem about that?
An agreement has been made between my folks and his folks
that tomorrow, the cutoff is tomorrow noon.
The Chairman. I would only add that Monday is a holiday.
Senator Sarbanes. I understand that. And I would like to make
some inquiry of, just as a matter of curiosity, how extensive is the
task that is being given to the Secretary-designate? Are we talking
about hundreds and hundreds of questions? Or are we talking
about
Senator Helms. Well, I think it is about the same size as the
questions you have filed with the Republican nominees.
The Chairman. How many was that? I do not recall.
Senator Sarbanes. You mean that I filed with the Republican
nominees? That is fine with me, Mr. Chairman, if that is the stand-
ard. In fact, I am prepared to be more generous if the standard is
the number of questions I filed with Republican nominees. I would
certainly accept that answer.
The Chairman. Good.
Senator Sarbanes. I think that puts it within a very manageable
range.
Mr. Christopher. I do hope that it will be limited to questions
that are ones that you need answers to prior to confirmation.
189
You know, we are in a transition mode and we are dealing with
a still relatively small staff of people who are on the transition. It
isn't as if we had a whole bureaucracy to task these matters out
to. This is simply a plea for restraint on your part for people who
are going to have to be working to respond to these.
Senator Helms. Well, we are not going to ask any questions just
to be asking questions. And I do not think you are going to have
any problem. I never have tried to pin down another Senator about
his questions or the number of them.
The Chairman. I think we should bear in mind, though, that
Monday is a holiday and it will be difficult — I would hope it would
be a reasonable number.
Senator Helms. Well, it will be reasonable. It depends on who
defines reasonable.
The Chairman. I think Senator Sarbanes
Senator Helms. I will bet you $1, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Chris-
topher, just like Jesse Helms and Claiborne Pell will be working
Monday. Would that be a safe bet?
Mr. Christopher. That would be a safe bet from my standpoint?
But obviously this involves other people. All I ask, Senator, is that
you ask your people to show some restraint and ask questions that
are — I know this will be your intention — questions that are rel-
evant to the decision of the committee.
The Chairman. I think Senator Coverdell wants to speak.
Senator Helms. What did you say about relevant to the decision
of the committee? What do you mean by that?
Mr. Christopher. Relevant to the decision as to whether or not
to recommend my confirmation.
Senator Helms. Well, I think it is going to work out. We have
got a right to ask questions in any number that we want to. We
were elected. You have not been elected and you cannot even be —
your papers cannot even be considered until the President is sworn
in.
But we are going to work with you. I mean, there is going to be
no problem about that.
Mr. Christopher. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.
Senator Helms. I mean, we ought not to nitpick with each other.
The Chairman. I think Senator Coverdell wanted to say some-
thing.
Senator Coverdell. I wanted to ask one closing question if it is
appropriate. So that it does not have to be submitted as a written
question, is that acceptable?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Coverdell. It deals once more with the history of this
Peace Corps relationships, Mr. Christopher. During the outbreak of
the new democracies in Eastern Europe, a very broad bipartisan
support emerged for introducing American volunteers to all of
these new democracies.
I think the Friday before I left that post, the Baltic agreements
were announced and subsequently, three or four of the new repub-
lics have entered into agreements to receive new American volun-
teers. And there was enormous enthusiasm throughout the country
for Americans participating in the empowerment program and the
low-cost advantages of such a program.
190
I would hope that you and your administration would continue,
as the sister agencies require and as I have alluded several times,
to be attentive to those new Americans that are going to each of
those new democracies.
Mr. Christopher. I certainly will, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Coverdell. Thank you.
The Chairman. Are there any further questions?
Senator Simon. I just want to comment, Mr. Chairman. I think
Mr. Christopher has handled himself exceedingly well and gives me
confidence about the next 4 years under his stewardship.
Mr. Christopher. Thankyou very much, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I would like to observe that
Secretary Christopher has been before our committee longer than
Secretary Baker and just about the same amount of time that Sec-
retary Schultz was before us, nowhere nearly as long as General
Haig. But that involved other problems that led to lengthy ques-
tioning. So I do think he has had an extensive period of questioning
by the committee and he will get some further questions in writing.
I want to express my appreciation to him for his forthright and
candid responses to the questions. I share Senator Simon's view
that his performance here before the committee has only deepened
our confidence in his ability to discharge this important respon-
sibility.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. And I would like to reaf-
firm or affirm the same. The succinctness and the openness with
which you answered are hugely appreciated and rarely have I
heard a witness just say yes or no. That was always a singular de-
light.
This morning I indicated the committee had identified a docu-
ment classified as confidential which is not only consistent, but to-
tally supports Mr. Christopher's 1977 testimony and his statement
before our committee yesterday.
That document, which is a memorandum from Paul Bower to
Warren Christopher, dated June 10, 1968, has been declassified.
And I would note that this memorandum has Mr. Christopher's ini-
tials on the document.
Pursuant to my statement this morning, this memorandum will
now be an official part of the record of this hearing as it has been
declassified.
[The information referred to follows:]
Declassified Memorandum From Department of Justice, June 10, 1968
army intelligence briefing
TO: Mr. Warren Christopher, Deputy Attorney General
FROM: Paul G. Bower, Special Assistant
This will summarize briefings on two of the Army's three civil disorder intel-
ligence operations.
On April 25, 1968, I received a briefing on Army civil disorder intelligence oper-
ations conducted in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Gen-
eral William P. Yarborough). The briefing was in charge of Col. F.E. Van Tassell,
Director of Security, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The
{>rimary analytic work concerning civil disorders is conducted by the Counterintel-
igence Analysis Branch of the Counterintelligence Division, under the command of
Col. C.R. Home, one of the three divisions under Col. Van Tassell. The Counter-
intelligence Analysis Branch (CIAB) is under the command of Lt. Col. R.J. Brown.
(An organizational chart for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
191
is in mv files.) The briefing took place at the Pentagon (where Col. Van Tassell and
Home nave their offices) and at the Bailey's Crossroad's Office of the CIAB.
The main function of CIAB is production of furnished intelligence; it has no intel-
ligence collecting functions. Instead it relies primarily on FBI reports and reports
submitted by the Army Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird. Also used as
sources of raw data are: local newspapers, newspapers of the new left and Afro-
American movements, university and Government studies, information from the
CIA and State Department, information from other elements of the Department of
Defense, and information furnished by the G2*s in various Army commands through-
out the country. Including the worldwide operations of the CIAB, there are some
78 agencies that submit information — a total of some 35,000 reports per month. The
FBI and Army Intelligence reports are by far the leading source of information on
civil disorders.
The domestic operations of the CIAB date from July of 1967. As of the end of
April there were some 15 people working in the Domestic Intelligence Section. The
intelligence analysts are officers, enlisted men and some civilians, generally with
college backgrounds in political science or the liberal arts.
Processing of the reports goes something like the following: An FBI report, for ex-
ample, comes in, is preliminarily reviewed to see if it pertains to civil disorders. If
so, it is then referred to an officer in the Domestic Section, who further determines
whether it pertains to racial matters, civil rights, left or right wing groups, and
some other breakdowns. The report is then sent to a desk officer of the particular
section involved.
The desk officer or analyst then decides if the report is of permanent value and
is to be kept. If so, a coding sheet is completed for the document. These sheets are
basically the same as those used in our Intelligence Unit, and have spaces for
names, organizations, geographic areas, and other pertinent information.
The code sheet and the original document itself are then sent to a special process-
ing department where the information on the sheet is punched onto an IBM card
for a computerized index system; the source document is microfilmed. By using the
index derived from the punched cards, it is possible to refer back to the original doc-
ument which is stored on microfilm. Hard copies can then be produced from the
microfilm if needed.
The automatic data processing system for the punched cards is not yet in oper-
ation, but is expected to be in operation by August of 1968.
The finished "intelligence" produced by CIAB presently consists of: "yellow cover"
notebooks on organizations and individuals, and special reports, as for example a
report on SNCC.
The analysts also spend a good deal of their time answering questions from var-
ious Army offices, as, for example, a recent request to predict the next ten riots.
As far as I can see, the CIAB is presently attempting to do the same thing that
our Information Unit is in the process of doing. That is, spending much of its effort
on an attempt to develop a computerized index for various information obtained
from FBI and Army Intelligence reports. (The CIAB is actually the source of the
Army Intelligence reports used by our unit, even though the reports are prepared
by the Army Military Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird. I understand there
is some limited screening of the reports sent to us.
The second phase of the intelligence briefing took place on April 29, 1968, at the
Headquarters of the Army Military Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird, Mary-
land. In the absence of the commander, the briefing was supervised by the Deputy
Commander, Col. Cline J. Lampkin. The Army Intelligence Command is a command
separate and apart from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
The Army Intelligence Command is primarily a data collecting organization; its
main function is conducting security clearances for the Army and for a segment of
the civilian contractors with the Department of Defense. (The remaining security
clearances for the DOD are conducted by Navy and Air Force Intelligence.) Informa-
tion relating to civil disorders or potential for civil disorders is collected mainly as
an off-shoot of the collection of information for security clearances.
The Intelligence Command has intelligence agents stationed throughout the coun-
try. There is an Army intelligence agent in practically every city ofsignificance in
the United States. There is also a network of regional and local offices throughout
the country.
The Army intelligence agents obtain their information primarily from local police
departments. These agents maintain a day-to-day liaison with the local police de-
partment, and also with the office of the mayor or other city officials. The Army in-
telligence agents also maintain close liaison with the field agents of the FBI. The
192
primary purpose of these contacts is to obtain information on individuals for secu-
rity clearances.
Information concerning a civil disorder or potential for civil disorder (this means
primarily, if not exclusively, information on certain individuals and organizations)
is obtained as a result of these liaisons. I gather that this information is often ob-
tained on what is really a chance basis, that is, the police intelligence officer may
simply mention in a conversation the recent activities of certain local militants.
When an Army intelligence agent receives information relating to a civil disorder,
he first checks the source of the information with the police department to deter-
mine whether it is generally reliable. The agent will also relay the information to
the FBI. The information is then sent in the form of a spot report back to the Army
Intelligence Command at Fort Holabird. These reports are processed at Fort
Holabird; they are also sent to Col. Van Tassell's group, and then at the discretion
of Van Tassell's group, are relayed to our information unit.
During periods of disorder, the Intelligence Command shifts gears to assist the
task force commander with his tactical intelligence operations. Also, during a dis-
order, military intelligence receives reports from the National Guard, including the
National Guard in state status.
In summary, the main function of Army Intelligence Command is the collection
of data; all data is obtained through overt sources, primarily local police depart-
ments and the FBI. Army Intelligence does not have any undercover operators, nor
does it directly use the services oT informants. If information from informants is ob-
tained, it is through the local police department.
Although the Intelligence Command claims only to be a data collection agency, the
{>rocessing of the intelligence reports at Fort Holabird is essentially what the Bai-
ej^s Crossroads operation refers to as "analyzing" the data. To a very large extent,
the processing also duplicates the work in our information unit.
The process goes roughly as follows:
For each intelligence report, a data sheet is prepared (see the orange instruction
book for preparation of ADP code sheets) which contains certain basic information
extracted from the report, all arranged according to various headings set up in the
instruction book. The code sheets are then sent to a keypuncher who punches the
information onto an IBM card. The cards are then fed into the military intelligence
data bank.
At the apparent discretion of the analysts, (Col. Dougherty's group) a so-called
"Biographical Data Bank Code Sheet" is prepared according to instructions set out
in another instruction book (gold cover). These cards are also keypunched and fed
into the data bank.
Army intelligence thus has the capability to provide the type of data that our in-
formation unit is ultimately programmed to be able to produce. For example, Army
intelligence has a printout sheet showing all of Stokey Carmichael's activities from
the summer of 1967 to the middle of April 1968. That is, whenever a spot report
has mentioned Carmichael, this information will appear on the printout sheet. The
system has the capability of answering a number oi questions; apparently the only
restriction is the amount of data set out on the code sheet. There are either existing
programs to obtain various combinations of data from the sheets (e.g., all members
of a particular group) or new programs can be quickly written to give various com-
binations of the data (e.g., all members of a particular group that travel to a particu-
lar city on a particular date) I was unable to determine the exact parameter of the
existing data retrieval system, but it apparently is almost completely open-ended,
the only limitation being the amount of information that is coded onto the data
sheets.
Perhaps the best description of the Army system is that it is highly sophisticated
(at least by our standards) cross-referencing index for the spot reports submitted by
the Army Military Intelligence agents.
In summary, it appears that the Intelligence Command presently has the capabil-
ity that our system will only have after all the ADP programming is completed,
which will probably be sometime this fall.
The Army Intelligence Command also prepares a summary of the information re-
ceived on spot reports. These summaries are prepared for distribution to a number
of military commanders, some Government agencies outside the military, and a copy
also goes to Van Tassel's group. Van Tassel is to check to determine whether the
Department of Justice also receives a copy of these summaries.
[Note: Harry Bratt, one of the DOD systems analysts detailed to Justice, recently
visited Fort Holabird at my request to attempt to learn more details about the com-
puterized indexing system. His report, which is presently being prepared, may mod-
193
ify some of my conclusions. I will send a copy of the report to you when completed,
or will summarize it and modify, if necessary, any of the conclusions in this memo.]
cc: Mr. John R. McDonnough
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Room 4208
The Chairman. There are no more questions to be asked, I look
forward to our meeting again at 10 o'clock on Tuesday morning, I
hope in our newly redolled-up committee room, S-116, to vote on
your nomination. I know you will be an excellent Secretary of
State.
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
APPENDIX
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Helms
AFRICA
Question. How should the U.S. help facilitate the process of the transition that
many countries are making from one-party regimes to multi-party regimes?
Answer. In the 18 month period between January 1992 and June 1993, 22 African
countries have or will go through a democratic process. Almost all of them have re-
quested U.S. assistance. The Clinton Administration will place special emphasis on
encouraging and supporting these countries during these transitions. For those
countries in the early stages of the process, our support will primarily be directed
toward conflict resolution and support for the electoral process. In the later stages,
our focus will be on ensuring that the transition to democracy is sustainable. Ac-
cordingly, much more attention will be placed on strengthening regional organiza-
tions and coordination with the U.N. We will also support human resource develop-
ment and the promotion of free market economies. In all phases of this transition,
we will place heavy emphasis on education and training so that Africans can one
day be the primary facilitators of this transition.
Question. Do you have any concerns over the continuing prospect of changing bor-
ders in Africa? What are they?
Answer. To the extent that changing borders are the result of force or disrespect
for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, we would have a concern.
Question. Do you believe that the intervention in Somalia is a precedent-setting
event or an isolated situation?
Answer. I refer you to my prepared statement and oral testimony on this issue.
Question. Do you believe that cross-border relief operations are valid even when
the government of the recipient country objects? What criteria should be used to de-
termine whether a cross-border relief operation is justified?
Answer. There may be instances where it is appropriate to have cross border oper-
ations even when there are objections by the recipient country. The criteria for de-
termining whether such action is justified would be based on the specific mandate
and objectives of an the overall operation.
ERITREA
Question. Before any decision is made, it will be important for the U.S. to make
an assessment of the charges of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing that has
been made by many Eritreans and Ethiopians. We will then be in a position to de-
termine how much support the U.S. should give to the upcoming Referendum on
Eritrean independence.
Answer. We will be closely monitoring the vote, and will make a determination
based on our assessments at that time.
SUDAN
Question. How will you approach relations with Sudan?
Answer. We are very aware of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan,
and are sensitive to those aspects of fundamentalism that violate internationally ac-
cepted standards for human rights. We will make future decisions regarding our re-
lationship with Sudan in light of that country's respect for human rights and the
rule of law and its support for terrorism.
Question. Are you concerned that the Khartoum regime may destabilize the entire
region?
Answer. We are concerned and will carefully monitor the situation as it unfolds.
Question. Under what circumstances would you advocate intervening in Sudan
without the permission of that government?
(195)
196
Answer. While we are deeply concerned about the atrocities in Sudan, I think it
is premature to speculate on circumstances requiring consideration of U.S. interven-
tion in Sudan. Right now, we will continue to apply diplomatic pressure and provide
humanitarian assistance to Sudan.
SUPPORT FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN AFRICA
Question. What is the proper role of the State Department and its embassies
abroad in facilitating U.S. business efforts?
Answer. Africa oners tremendous opportunities and challenges for U.S. busi-
nesses. One of the most valuable roles that the State Department and the embassies
can play is to promote and support the development of free market economies in
Africa that would make those countries attractive for U.S. trade and investment.
They can also play a valuable role by working with other Departments, agencies,
and the U.S. private sector to create programs, incentives, and support mechanism
for U.S. businesses abroad. Embassies, in particular, can provide immeasurable as-
sistance on the ground to U.S. businesses.
Question. Would you seek an increase in the number of commercial attaches in
Africa?
Answer. We are currently studying ways to reorganize our missions abroad so
that they can more effectively implement U.S. foreign policy goals. Trade and in-
vestment is a top priority of the Clinton Administration. We will look closely at how
to better promote trade and investment in Africa, including whether there is a need
to increase the number of commercial attaches in Africa.
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA
Question. To what extent and how should the U.S. Department of State promote
good governance in African countries?
Answer. President-elect Clinton has repeatedly stated that the promotion of de-
mocracy including good governance will be a top priority for his Administration not
only in African countries, but around the world. Given the democratic revolution
currently sweeping Africa, it is clear that there is the political will among Africans
to have good governance. What is often lacking is the know-how. Therefore, a major
part of our effort will be in the area of education and training. We also believe that
it is critically important that we encourage and support initiatives by African coun-
tries themselves, particularly in the areas of conflict resolution and democratic insti-
tution building.
ENERGY POLICY IN AFRICA
Question. Does the U.S. have a specific energy policy toward Africa? What is it?
Answer. I do not know whether the Bush Administration has such a policy. How-
ever, the Clinton Administration will pursue a policy of promoting sustainable and
environmentally sound development which includes the prudent use of all resources,
including energy.
AID
Question. Should the Agency for International Development be revamped? How?
Answer. Yes, there is a definite need to revamp the Agency for International De-
velopment. We are currently studying the organizational structure to AID and in-
tend to make changes that will allow the Agency to be more effective and efficient
in providing assistance abroad. We are also looking at how the Agency can best
interface with State and other federal Departments and Agencies.
Question. What are the criteria for prioritizing U.S. assistance to African coun-
tries? What would they be in your opinion?
Answer. There will be a number of criteria that we will use to prioritize U.S. as-
sistance to Africa. Top among these will be whether a particular country has an en-
vironment conducive to the effective and efficient use of U.S. resources. Certainly,
whether a country is democratic or whether it has a free market economy will weigh
heavily on that determination.
ANGOLA
Question. Under what circumstances will the U.S. extend diplomatic relations to
Angola?
Answer. The Bush Administration had said that the U.S. would consider extend-
ing diplomatic relations to Angola once that country held free and fair elections. The
U.N. determined and the U.S. concurred, that the first round of elections was "free
and fair." Although it will be necessary for Angola to have a second round of presi-
dential elections Decause President dos Santos received a plurality rather than a
197
majority, there is currently a Parliament and a cabinet. We should give serious con-
sideration to our earlier commitment to recognize the Angolan government now that
they have held "free and fair" elections.
Question. What do you believe the U.S. should do to facilitate a ceasefire and the
completion of run-off elections?
Answer. The U.S. should certainly continue to support U.N. efforts in Angola. It
might also be useful for the U.S. to send a special envoy to Angola to both assess
the situation and offer U.S. assistance in moving the process forward.
Question. Do you believe the U.S. should play a mediating role in the conflict over
the secession of Cabinda?
Answer. I believe that it is premature for us to consider whether we should play
a mediating role. Our focus right now should only be encouraging and supporting
efforts to get the Peace Process back on track and to have a second round of negotia-
tions.
MOZAMBIQUE
Question. Will the State Department support the large demobilization effort in
Mozambique?
Answer. We support current U.N. efforts in Mozambique. We have also been en-
couraged by the resolve of the warring parties to resolve the current conflict. We
will continue to support the peace process and the U.N. participation in that proc-
ess. We will work closely with the U.N. with respect to what further efforts are nec-
essary to keep the process moving forward.
SOUTH AFRICA
Question. Do you favor a role for international observers in South Africa, even if
the currentgovernment objects?
Answer. From all indications, the parties and the South African government have
been receptive to the U.N. observers currently stationed in South Africa and, in fact,
the number of observers was recently increased. There seems to be a general con-
sensus that the presence of these observers has been a deterrent to increased vio-
lence in South Africa.
SOMALIA
Question. After the transition to a U.N. command occurs in Somalia, do you favor
continued close U.S. involvement in the operation, including the continued use of
U.S. troops? How long will U.S. troops be committed?
Answer. As I indicated in my testimony before the Committee, Governor Clinton
and those of us around him are very supportive of the United States effort in Soma-
lia. Clearly, we want to see U.S. troops out of Somalia as soon as possible, and to
see the U.N. assume a leadership role in this operation. However, the events on the
ground in Somalia will largely dictate when the U.S. will be able to complete our
mission and to withdraw. As the Bush Administration can attest, it is almost impos-
sible to establish a certain date for our withdrawal. The warring factions recently
signed an agreement which we hope will make a swift and smooth transition to
UNOSOM II much more likely, and will enable our troops to come home soon.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. effort in Somalia should contribute to the
U.N.'s financial assessment on the U.S. for peacekeeping operations? How does
President-elect Clinton plan to finance Operation Restore Hope? Will he seek assist-
ance from other wealthy countries? Can you estimate the costs of the Somali aid
project? Have you considered asking the U.N. to design a more equitable cost-shar-
ing proposal?
Answer. We have been very encouraged by the number of countries that have
J lodged either troops or financial assistance to Operation Restore Hope. Recently
apan pledged $100 million for a fund which would support troops from countries
who were unable to finance their own participation. Under UNlTAF, the U.S. has
spent approximately $530 million. Once we move to UNOSOM II there should be
a more equitable cost sharing because the U.S. contribution will be limited to our
normal U.N. assessment for peacekeeping.
NIGERIA
Question. How do you think the U.S. can influence Nigeria in a more effective,
Eositive manner as it relates to its being a major trafficker of heroin entering the
LS. and its doubtful transition to democratic rule?
Answer. Nigeria is moving forward toward democracy, albeit slowly. We must con-
tinue to encourage and support that process and, where necessary, apply diplomatic
pressure to make sure that the process does not come to a standstill. In terms of
198
drug trafficking, it will be important that Nigeria is made a part of our overall U.S.
efforts to halt the entry of drugs into the U.S.
NORTH AFRICA
Question. Do you support independence for Western Sahara?
Answer. The new Administration supports the U.N. position favoring a referen-
dum on the question of whether Western Sahara should be an independent state.
Question. How would you characterize the FLS electoral victory in Algeria?
Answer. We are very concerned about Algeria. The new Administration must give
serious consideration to the issue of how to deal with undemocratic forces when they
are elected through democratic processes.
EAST ASIA
What do you intend to do to encourage other major Asian trading countries (in-
cluding South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) to join us in taking steps to promote
human rights and democratization, especially in countries such as Communist
China, Burma and Vietnam?
Answer. President-elect Clinton has said that promoting democracy and human
rights is not a job for America alone. Our democratic allies around the world have
a common interest in this issue. I intend to work with them to ensure that they
take steps to join us in this important task.
Question. In light of what promises to be a year of dramatic reductions and
reallocations of overall defense spending, what are the most important policy consid-
erations in the debate over funding of the U.S. military presence in the East Asian
and Pacific region?
Answer. That is a question which should be answered after serious discussions
among the President's national security advisers, particularly the Secretary of De-
fense and the intelligence community. Our allies in the region will also need to be
a part of these discussions. But in principle, some of the considerations we should
take into account include an assessment of China's military buildup and the threat
posed by countries such as North Korea. These and other factors will be examined
as the President-elect makes his decisions on defense spending.
Question. How would the U.S. respond to an outbreak of fighting in any of the
islands in the South China Sea?
Answer. I am not prepared to answer a hypothetical question about how the Unit-
ed States might respond to a military incident in the South China Sea. I can tell
you, however, that the United States would take such an incident very seriously and
would work with the countries involved in the dispute to avoid a military confronta-
tion.
THAILAND
Question. Last fall the U.S. Congress voted to suspend International Military Edu-
cation and Training funding to the Indonesians in response to their handling of the
affair. Do you support this decision? How much of a continuing impact will the East
Timor situation have on U.S.-Indonesian relations?
Answer. I am aware of the Congress' decision to suspend IMET to Indonesia be-
cause of the serious situation in East Timor, and we will certainly take that into
account as we develop our policy toward Indonesia. The situation in East Timor de-
serves a fresh look by the Clinton Administration.
BURMA
Question. Would you favor a U.S. ban on private investment in Burma until Nobel
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is released and a freely elected civilian government can
take power?
Answer. Aung San Suu Kyi should be released immediately, and the military re-
gime should honor the results of the elections that were held in 1990. I am not pre-
pared to say that we should impose U.S. ban on private investment, since that is
a policy decision that would have to be made after a review of our policy toward
Burma.
Question. The military regime in Burma has recently carried out a limited num-
ber of moves intended to improve its image abroad including the release of some
political prisoners, allowing Aung San Suu Kyi's family to visit her, and holding a
constitutional convention last week (January 9). What should the U.S. attitude be
towards these actions?
Answer. While we should welcome signs of political opening in Burma, most inde-
pendent observers regard these steps as largely cosmetic. The Burmese regime
199
should take serious steps to improve the harsh conditions in Burma, and not merely
engage in efforts to improve its image abroad.
Question. Since U.S. trade with Burma is negligible, what do you see as the most
effective way the U.S. may influence the Burmese government's treatment of its
own people?
Answer. To the extent that we have influence with the regime, we should use it.
There may be more room for influencing the regime once its current leaders leave
the scene. In the meantime, we should encourage our allies to distance themselves
from Burma's rulers.
Question. Which will be your top priority in Southeast Asian countries like
Burma, halting the flow of illegal drugs or human rights?
Answer. We intend to pursue both issues seriously in Southeast Asia, particularly
in countries like Burma where human rights are routinely abused and drug traffick-
ing has reached dangerous levels.
Question. Do you believe the United States should recognize the Burmese govern-
ment in exile? If not, do you intend to send an Ambassador to Burma?
Answer. I understand that the government in exile contains some members of the
democratic opposition in Burma, and we should offer appropriate support to their
effort to bring democracy to Burma. We currently recognize the government in Ran-
goon, and, generally speaking, an Ambassador can speak with greater authority and
articulate U.S. policy clearly to a regime such as the one in Burma. But we have
no plans at this time to send an Ambassador to Burma, and we will consult with
the Congress before making a final decision on any changes in the current policy.
CHINA
Question. Do you agree with the position taken by President-elect Clinton during
the campaign on MFN for China (quote): "I comment the action taken by the Senate
in passing the U.S.-China Act of 1992 * * * (conditioning) renewal of MFN on Chi-
na's adherence to international norms of behavior regarding human rights, trading
practices and proliferation * * * I believe this legislation will advance our interests
in the region and hasten the dawn of freedom and democracy in China." Would you
favor similar legislation this year?
Answer. Yes I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hear-
ing.
Question. What is your position on future nuclear cooperation with China?
Answer. According to U.S. law, China must provide certain assurances about its
nuclear facilities and the opportunity for inspection where American materials and
equipment are used. We intend to abide by this law.
Question. How is the news of Westinghouse's talks consistent with the require-
ments of Public Law 99—183, which for 7 years has blocked U.S. nuclear cooperation
with China?
Answer. I have not been privy to these discussions. However, there is no presump-
tion that the results of such reported cooperation will be approved by the govern-
ment. We will review any agreement to ensure that it conforms with U.S. law.
Question. If we permit such discussions or cooperation to continue, how can we
hope to persuade other nations not to sell China nuclear technology?
Answer. The fact that discussions may be taking place does not mean that we
would approve whatever may be agreed to. We will continue our efforts with other
countries to stem the proliferation of nuclear technology.
Question. The importation of convict-made goods into the United States is a viola-
tion of U.S. law (19 US Code 1307). As the number of convictions of these types
of cases begins to multiply quickly, how do you expect the United States to respond
diplomatically?
Answer. The Clinton Administration expects the Chinese government to meet its
obligations under the MOU on exports of convict-made goods. We will work to en-
sure that U.S. law is enforced.
Question. What should be done to increase pressure on China to stop these ex-
ports and to fully comply with the MOU on prison labor?
Answer. We place particular importance on gaining access to prison facilities in
China which are suspected of producing goods made by prison labor. We will vigor-
ously seek such access to ensure that the Chinese are meeting their obligations.
Question. What is your position on military sales to China? How does this apply
to dual use goods? Would you have advocated the sale of the Cray supercomputer
to China, a computer 1,000 times more powerful than anything we have ever sold
them before? Or the sale of Garret jet engines, the technology of which is necessary
for the production of cruise missiles/
200
Answer. The Clinton Administration has no plans to resume arms sales to China.
We will be particularly careful in examining the potential for dual use of those
goods and technologies which we do sell to China. With respect to the Cray Com-
puter and the Garret jet engines, these are issues that have rested with the Bush
Administration. Since I have not had the opportunity to review these issues, I can-
not comment on it.
HONG KONG
Question. Do you support the Hong Kong Relations Act?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What do you see as being the most effective way by which the United
States can help Hong Kong's transition towards democracy?
Answer. The current debate about democratic reform in Hong Kong is a matter
between Great Britain and China, although we should be naturally supportive of ef-
forts to encourage greater political participation in Hong Kong, as we would in most
countries around the world.
Question. What will be the U.S. reaction be to additional violations of the joint
agreement between Britain and China?
Answer. Although we have important interests in Hong Kong, the joint agreement
is a matter between Britain and China. We do expect, however, that Hong Kong will
enjoy the high degree of autonomy that the joint agreement provides for after 1997.
TAIWAN
Question. In the case of sudden, decisive Chinese military aggression against Tai-
wan, what would be your response?
Answer. It would be our policy to make sure that such an attack does not occur.
But I am not prepared to discuss how we might respond to a hypothetical situation
of this nature.
Question. Since the sale and transfer of F-16's to Taiwan will not be complete be-
fore the end of the Bush Administration, is your plan to uphold the Bush Adminis-
tration policy and allow the arrangement to run its full course?
Answer. The President-elect said at the time the Bush Administration reversed
its previous policy and decided to sell F-16's to Taiwan that he supported the sale
and would implement it if he were elected. I am confident, therefore, that the Clin-
ton Administration will allow this arrangement to run its full course.
Question. What is your opinion of the Republic of China on Taiwan's admission
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade?
Answer. Although I will need to discuss this with other officials, such as the
USTR, I believe we would welcome Taiwan's accession into GATT as a separate cus-
toms territory when it meets GATTs requirements. It would be in our own interests
to have Taiwan, which is one of our major trading partners, under GATT discipline.
TIBET
Question. Do you believe the people of Tibet have the same right to self-deter-
mination as the people of the Baltic States and other nations of the former Soviet
Union?
Answer. I refer you to my oral testimony on this subject.
Question. Do you agree with U.S. law that Tibet was "invaded and occupied" by
the Chinese? If so, what specific steps do you plan to take with the Chinese to rec-
tify the Tibetan dilemma?
Answer. Again, I refer you to the oral testimony on this subject I gave during the
hearing.
Question. China's threat to Tibetan national and cultural identity is considered
a violation of human rights by the United Nations as well as a violation of inter-
national law. How do you propose that the U.S. move to ensure that these violations
hare halted immediately?
Answer. I plan to raise the issue of human rights violations in Tibet at every
available opportunity.
THAILAND
Question. In the face of U.N. sanctions, the Thais continue their cross-border
trade in gems and timber with both the Khmer Rouge and the Burmese military
regime, raping both countries of many of their natural resources. Do you support
taking action against the Thai government until these atrocities are halted?
Answer. This is an important issue since this cross-border trading is not only cre-
ating environmental devastation in the region, it also provides the Khmer Rouge
201
and the Burmese regime with a source of income. Therefore, we intend to raise this
issue with the government of Thailand and find ways to stop it or reduce it.
NORTH KOREA
Question. What should the U.S. role be in the reunification of Korea? Do you plan
to encourage a move towards reunification? If so, how?
Answer. Reunification must be the result of negotiations between North and
South Korea. We will work with our alties in South Korea to facilitate this process
whenever possible.
Question. Over the last 2 years many people have been vigorously asserted that
the North Koreans are building their own nuclear program. The North Korean gov-
ernment denies any such activity and Western countries have yet to find any evi-
dence to the contrary. If and when concrete evidence does surface, what course of
action do you plan to pursue? If North Korea does become a nuclear power, specifi-
cally how will that affect United States diplomatic relationships with the Koreans?
With the rest of the region?
Answer. North Korea's nuclear program is an issue which the Clinton Administra-
tion will view with the utmost seriousness. A nuclear weapon in the hands of the
North Koreans would be a threat to the entire region. The United States and our
allies in the region should work together to ensure that this does not happen.
SINGAPORE
Question. As one of the world's largest shipping ports, Singapore is a primary tar-
get for the transshipment of weapons, including those involved in illegal inter-
national transfers. What role could the U.S. play in the move to eliminate this prob-
lem?
Answer. I am not sure that we can eliminate this problem entirely. We can, how-
ever, work with the government of Singapore and other allies in the region to stem
the flow of illegal arms transfers.
PHILIPPINES
Question. After losing Subic Bay as a Pacific Basin foothold, do you foresee the
United States negotiating a new military-strategic understanding with the Filipinos
in the next few years?
Answer. The closure of Subic Bay has not adversely affected our overall strategic
posture in the region, which remains strong. We rely on other forward deployed
forces in Japan and South Korea. Moreover, we expect that the government of the
Philippines will cooperate with us on ship visits, joint exercises, and sea and air
transit. Although the Secretary of Defense's views should be heard on this issue, I
am not aware of any need for a new military-strategic understanding with the Fili-
pinos.
STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
Question. Do you believe that the current organization of initiatives under the
Deputy Secretary for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has proven effec-
tive?
Answer. I believe the creation of these special offices, under the Deputy Secretary
of State, to coordinate assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
was an effort to provide a rapid and flexible response to the assistance needs of
these countries and to support their transitions to democracy. At the same time, I
am aware that concerns have been expressed about the actual delivery of assistance
under these programs. Given the importance of this effort, it would be my intention
to examine as a matter of highest priority how our assistance programs might be
made more effective.
Question. Do you plan to reorganize the provision of assistance to Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union within the State Department?
Answer. In view of the great importance I attach to supporting the transitions to
democracy in the former Soviet Union, I think there is merit in designating someone
who can provide effective direction and coordination to these efforts. Although we
have not yet worked out the details of how the job would be structured, I believe
it is the President-elect's intention to name a person to handle this function.
Question. Do you agree that there should be a stark "firewall" in the budget be-
tween the funding of assistance to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?
Answer. As I noted, we have not yet had a chance to discuss in detail how we
should go about structuring our assistance programs to Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. That includes the question of whether "firewalls" should be es-
202
tablished between the funding for these activities and other foreign assistance pro-
grams.
Question. How will you ensure flexibility and responsiveness to changes in East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union within our aid programs?
Answer. I agree that one of our objectives should be to allow as much flexibility
as possible in our programs in order to be able to respond to rapidly changing cir-
cumstances. I consider this one of the advantages of having a special coordinator
who would be able to draw upon and make creative use of the resources and pro-
fams of different U.S. government agencies as well as private sector organizations,
would certainly welcome any suggestions that you or other members of the Com-
mittee may have in this regard.
Question. Do you support a "sunset clause" to end the provision of assistance to
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?
Answer. I would certainly agree with the proposition that our assistance effort
should not be open-ended. The objective of these programs is to support the transi-
tion to democratic, free-market societies, and to help bring about that transition in
the shortest time possible. If that effort is successful, I believe it is possible that
we could begin to see, within the relatively near future, the dividends of that invest-
ment, as the people of Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States learn to
mobilize the tremendous natural and human resources at their disposal.
Question. Will you seek additional funding for aid programs to Russia and the
states of the former Soviet Union?
Answer. I am not in a position at this stage to provide a definitive answer to that
question. That is something that the President will decide, taking into account our
own resources as well as the contribution being made by others, including our Euro-
pean allies. I believe it is important, however, that we honor fully the commitments
already made in this regard, and that we do whatever is needed to ensure that the
funds we are providing are used effectively. I also think it is important to keep in
mind that direct aid is not the only, or even the most significant, aspect of our effort
to help these new republics create the conditions for sustained economic growth and
development.
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Question. Did you agree that the Bosnian President's visit interfered with the
peace negotiations in Geneva?
Answer. No. The fact that what proved to be an important breakthrough in the
talks came soon after his visit makes this clear.
Question. Did you follow Secretary Vance's suggestion on not allowing anyone on
the Clinton transition team to meet with the Bosnian President?
Answer. Secretary Vance made no such suggestion. He has not tried to influence
me in any way.
Question. Did you agree with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft's and
Vice President elect Al Gore's decision to meet with the Bosnian President? Please
explain your rationale.
Answer. Yes. President Izetbegovic represents a government we recognize and
which is suffering foreign aggression that President Bush took the lead in condemn-
ing. It was important to hear first hand the Bosnian President's views of the situa-
tion in his country and the prospects for peace.
Question. In your opinion, will the Russians support U.N. efforts?
Answer. We nope very much that President Yeltsin, as well as our European al-
lies, will support whatever action seems necessary and feasible to end Serbian ag-
gression and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Because of the large number of Russians
who live in other republics and the many minorities in Russia itself, Russia's demo-
cratic forces have an especially strong reason to ensure that Belgrade's way of try-
ing to "protect" the human rights of ethnic Serbs living in other former Yugoslav
republics does not succeed.
Question. How would the Clinton Administration propose to end Russian and
Ukrainian arms sales to Serbia?
How would the Clinton Administration propose to end the growing tide of Russian
mercenary soldiers fighting with the Serbian army?
Answer. While there have been allegations of Russian and Ukranian arms sales
to Serbia and of Russian mercenaries fighting with the Serbian Army, so far as I
know there are no credible reports of either.
Question. Cyrus Vance is seeking Bosnian, Serbian, and Croat agreement to di-
vide Bosnia into loose ethnic regions. Do you believe this arrangement rewards Ser-
bian aggression?
Answer. I do have a personal concern along those lines, but we're not direct par-
ties to the negotiations. The parties to those negotiations are the elements of
203
Bosnia, and some deference has to be given to their point of view. They're the ones
for whom the negotiations are a matter of life and death, not the United States. And
I hope the negotiations will succeed. If they do, if they can bring peace to Bosnia,
it certainly will be a major step forward.
But I don't think we can rely only on those negotiations. We have to have an inde-
pendent position with respect to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia countries. The
stakes are too large for us to rely solely on the negotiations taking place at Geneva,
much as I hope they'll succeed.
Question. Should the United Nations negotiate with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic, a man accused of war crimes?
Answer. Unfortunately, Karadzic's agreement is necessary to end the fighting un-
less the U.S. and others are willing to use large scale forces and risk large casual-
ties to defeat Serbian forces and expel them from conquered territory.
Question. Should the United States seek implementation of Serbia's August agree-
ment through the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia?
Answer. Yes, as President-elect Clinton long has advocated.
Question. Should the arms embargo on Bosnia be lifted?
Answer, As President-elect Clinton said during the campaign, that is one possibil-
ity which should be explored.
Question. Should a Nuremberg-type trial for alleged Serbian war crimes be con-
vened?
Answer. Those suspected of war crimes should be tried and brought to justice.
Question. If aggressions begin in Kosova, how should the United States respond?
Should the United States military train Bosnian soldiers?
Should a U.N. peacekeeping force be sent to Kosova? Please explain.
Do you support the diplomatic recognition of the Albanian government of Kosova?
Please explain.
In your opinion, should sanctions against the former Yugoslavia include edu-
cational exchanges for the innocent victims of Serbian aggression?
Would you support the issuance of J-l visas to Albanians from Kosova?
Would the Clinton Administration support recognition of the Republic of Macedo-
nia?
Answer. These like other specific issues stemming from the Yugoslav tragedy, re-
quire careful consideration. President-elect Clinton will want to explore all these is-
sues fully with his advisors before making decisions.
Question. Did you support Lord Carrington and later Secretary Vance's rec-
ommendation to Western nations not to recognize the independence of Croatia, Slo-
venia, and Bosnia until late last year?
Answer. Neither President-elect Clinton nor I took a position on this issue. While
we always should try to learn from the past, the priority now is to address present
and future issues for decision.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Question. Should the United States uphold Bosnia's right under Article 51?
Should the international arms embargo against that country be lifted? Do you sup-
port enforcement of the "no-fly" zone? Do you intend to work to ensure that those
responsible for war crimes are brought before an international tribunal? Would you
work to seek an increase of the number of Bosnian refugees allowed into the U.S.
and other European countries? Under what circumstances would you support the
use of force in that war-torn country?
Answer. I entirely agree with everything you say about the horrors of the situa-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Bush was absolutely right to take the lead
in having the United Nations Security Council call Serbia the prime aggressor in
that tragic situation. Bosnia does have a right to self-defense and during the cam-
paign President-elect Clinton said that lifting the arms embargo against it should
be considered. We also support enforcement of the no-fly zone, and I believe that
those suspected of war crimes should be tried and brought to justice.
I cannot at this time tell you whether we will increase the number of Bosnian
refugees allowed into the US., or the plans of other European countries in this re-
gard. Nor can I say under what circumstances we would use force in the region. I
can assure you that the range of decisions President-elect Clinton will face about
the former Yugoslavia are very much on his mind and the minds of his advisors.
The new President will want to carefully consider all our views and those of career
civilian and military officials before taking any decisions on these very difficult is-
sues.
204
ROMANIA
Question. Should MFN status for Romania be conditioned upon improvement in
this government's pitiful record supporting human rights and political pluralism?
Will you urge the President to send a trade agreement with Romania to the Sen-
ate?
Answer. While there have been some improvements in the Romanian political sit-
uation including on human rights, we have not yet had a chance to review all the
factors that would enable us to take a decision on this specific issue. We will, of
course, fully comply with the law that links freedom of emigration to the granting
of most-favored-nation status and look forward to consulting with Congress on this
matter.
UKRAINE
Question. What steps should the United States government take to assuage
Ukrainian fears regarding its national security?
Answer. When Ukraine keeps its promise to President Bush to join the NPT as
a non-nuclear state, it will be eligible for security assistances that the U.S., UK, and
Russia have given other non-nuclear signatories.
Question. Do you agree with the Bush Administration's plan to partially com-
pensate Ukraine for the destruction of its nuclear weapons?
Answer. We welcome the Nunn-Lugar initiative to help pay for the safety, secu-
rity, and dismantlement of former Soviet nuclear weapons, including those in
Ukraine.
AZERBAIJAN
Question. Does the Clinton Administration support the continuation of U.S. sanc-
tions against the Government of Azerbaijan as contained in the "Freedom Support
Act"?
Answer. We have not yet had a chance to review all the material relevant to the
Azerbaijan issue, but I can assure you that we will comply with all existing laws.
When and if we believe some law should be changed, we will consult with Congress
and make recommendations to it.
RUSSIA
Question. Do you envision increased armed conflict within Russia itself, between
former Soviet republics, and between Russia and the Baltic states? Please list the
possible conflict zones in your opinion.
Answer. We are acutely aware of the many problems faced by republics of the
former Soviet Union, some of which already have led to armed conflict. Future dan-
ger zones will change with time. I assure you we will be carefully monitoring the
situation and will make a major contribution to international efforts at conflict pre-
vention and, if necessary, crisis management.
Question. If the Russians back -track on substantive economic reform, would you
support initiatives to terminate non-humanitarian assistance to Russia?
Answer. There have been and will be setbacks in Russia's political and economic
transformation, but the important thing is that President Yeltsin's commitment to
keeping the country on the right track remains firm and he has the support of the
Russian people. Of course if a Russian government abandoned the reform effort we
would reconsider our assistance program.
RUSSIAN AND CHINESE MILITARY COOPERATION
Question. Do military contacts between the Communist Chinese and the Russian
military pose a threat to U.S. national security interests?
Answer. Peaceful and cooperative relations between Russia and China are in our
interests. If military contacts between them help lessen tension and prevent mis-
understandings that could lead to conflict, we welcome them.
Question. Would you be prepared to issue a demarche to the Russian and Chinese
governments that military sales and military contacts between these two nations
will result in punitive U.S. actions?
Answer. We will raise any military sales we deem destabilizing at the highest lev-
els of the Russian, Chinese, or other concerned governments.
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR IN CHINA
Question. Would the Clinton Administration support legislation requiring that for-
eign assistance be suspended unless Russia discontinues this sale to China?
Answer. We will look into this sale and consider what means we have of influenc-
ing it, in the context of our overall goals with the former Soviet Union.
205
RUSSIAN-IRANIAN COOPERATION
Question. Will you oppose the sale of Russian nuclear technology to Iran?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what sanctions would the Clinton Administration support against
Russia if it build3 this reactor?
Answer. This is an important question that we will have to consider in the light
of both our overall efforts to stem nuclear proliferation, and the broad scope of our
relations with Russia.
RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
Question. What will the Clinton Administration's policy be concerning the follow-
ing Russian arms sales:
a. diesel submarines and SU-24 and MIG-29 aircraft to Iran;
b. aircraft spare parts to Iraq;
c. T-72 tanks to Syria;
d. rocket boosters to India;
e. SU-27 Flanker aircraft and MIG-27 fighters to China?
Would the Clinton Administration support the retention of sanctions against the
Russian company "Glavkosmos* for its export of rocket technology to India? Would
the Clinton Administration support legislation requiring that foreign assistance be
suspended unless Russia discontinues arms sales to countries supporting terrorism?
Answer. You will understand that each of these issues will require detailed con-
sideration when we are able to draw on all the resources of the Executive Branch.
RUSSIAN DEBT RESCHEDULING
Question. Would the Clinton Administration support debt rescheduling for Russia?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, should the terms be based on Russian economic and political re-
forms?
Answer. Debt rescheduling traditionally had been based on economic consider-
ations and conditions, and these should continue to be key factors. Obviously, our
interest in contributing to a debt rescheduling package for Russia stems in part
from our support of President Yeltsin's reform efforts.
ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY
Question. Do you agree that Russian troops must withdraw from Moldova?
Answer. We agree with the position taken in various CSCE documents, that
troops should be on foreign soil only with the express permission of the host govern-
ments.
Question. How would the Clinton Administration urge the Russian government to
withdraw its troops from the Dniester region?
Answer. We will urge the Russian government to comply with all its international
commitments, including its CSCE commitment to have forces on foreign soil only
with the express consent of the host government. We will look for ways to contribute
to international efforts at conflict resolution and crisis management in CSCE, the
U.N., and elsewhere.
Question. Do you support the use of the Russian army as a peacekeeping force
in the countries of the former Soviet Union?
Answer. Yes, if it is desired by the host state and other concerned parties. I wel-
come the desire of the Yeltsin government for a CSCE or other international body
to play a role in peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet Union. President Yeltsin
obviously understands that it is not in Russia's interest, or good for stability on Rus-
sia's borders, to give the impression that new independent states of the former So-
viet Union are a sphere of special Russian responsibility rather than part of the
broader international community.
RUSSIAN MILITARY REPATRIATION
Question. In your opinion, is the question of the Russian inhabitants of the Baitic
states a legitimate human rights issue?
Answer. How governments treat people under their authority is a legitimate
human rights issue with regard to any country.
Question. Please assess Baltic laws governing citizenship and rights for the Rus-
sian inhabitants of their countries.
Answer. Estonia and Lithuania have passed citizenship laws comparable to those
in several Western democracies. Latvia still is considering the details of its citizen-
ship law. While all three states seem to be moving in the right direction, we will
206
of course remain interested in whether the laws are implemented in a non-discrimi-
natory manner.
Question. Would the Clinton Administration support using United States tech-
nical assistance to Russia to help build adequate housing lor departing Russian
troops?
Answer. This is an interesting idea that we are willing to explore as part of our
overall efforts to help Russia's economic and political transformation and its demili-
tarization. But it should not be linked to troop withdrawals. Russia has made com-
mitments in the CSCE to have troops on foreign soil only with the permission of
the host country. There is a real problem of finding housing, schools, and work for
returning Russian soldiers, but I am pleased to note that the withdrawals are con-
tinuing— albeit not as rapidly as the Baltic States would like.
CONDITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA
Question. Do you agree that Russian and Commonwealth troops must be uncondi-
tionally removed from the Baltic states?
Answer. Yes, as noted above.
Question. If so, will Russian troop removal from the Baltic states be a priority for
the Clinton Administration?
Answer. We will encourage Russia to continue the troop withdrawals, while show-
ing reasonable understanding of the practical difficulties in removing them all im-
mediately. The important thing is that the withdrawals continue.
Question. Do you believe that Russian overflights of the Baltic states constitute
a threat to Baltic security?
Answer. To the best of my current knowledge, at present they do not. But this
is a problem we obviously will keep under careful review.
Question. At what point would you advise President-elect Clinton to suspend as-
sistance to Russia because of the continuation of the overflights and other violations
of Baltic sovereignty?
Answer. It would not be useful to speculate on hypothetical situations that would
have to be judged in light of a range of factors prevailing at the time.
POLITICAL ASYLUM
Question. In what cases should persons from the former Soviet Union be granted
political asylum?
Answer. When they meet the statutory requirements, which are based on the Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. That Protocol indicates that refugees are
those persons who are outside their country of origin, and are unwilling or unable
to return due to a "well founded fear of persecution.
Question. Do you know of any evidence that Russians repatriated to Russia by the
U.S. have suffered persecution and reprisals?
Answer. I am personally unaware of such evidence.
Question. Are you willing to raise this issue with the Russian Government?
Answer. If I received information indicating mistreatment of a person returned to
Russia after being denied asylum in the United States, I would be willing to raise
this issue with the Russian Government.
Question. Will you keep me notified of progress on this case?
Answer. I will inquire about this case, and will keep you informed of what I learn.
LOAN GUARANTEES: RUSSIA, CENTRAL AND SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Question. What is the current status of United States Government guaranteed
loans to Russia?
Answer. The U.S. government has extended loan guarantees to Russia under
USDA, EXIM and OPIC operated programs.
USDA extended $3.7 billion in GSM-102 loan guarantees to the former Soviet
Union (FSU) for the purchase of American agricultural products. With the demise
of the FSU, USDA negotiated a GSM-102 credit guarantee program with the Rus-
sian Federation. The first guarantees were extended in May, 1992. Throughout
1992, USDA made available a total of $1.1 billion in GSM-102 guaranteed credits
to Russia. Until December 1, 1992 Russia met its GSM-102 payments as well as
GSM-102 payments contracted earlier by the FSU. On that date, however, the Rus-
sian government informed the USG that it was no longer able to meet its agricul-
tural guarantee payments; Russia was suspended from the GSM-102 program.
Total Russian defaults as of January 15, 1993 have amounted to $205 million. Be-
cause of its suspension from the guarantee program, Russia has not been able to
draw on $111 million in additional guarantees available in 1992 or $275 million that
was to have been made available in 1993.
207
EXIM Bank has extended some $240 million to export loan guarantees and insur-
ance to Russia, all in 1992. Russia is currently late in meeting a $2.1 million pay-
ment on one of these guarantees. The Russian government has indicated that this
payment will be met shortly and EXIM has agreed to treat this as a delayed pay-
ment for the time being.
In 1992 OPIC extended $150 million in risk insurance to an investment project
in Russia.
Question. What is the current status of United States Government guaranteed
loans to all other former East Bloc countries, including the new countries of the
former Soviet Union?
Answer. Apart from Russia, the only newly independent state of the former Soviet
Union to receive USG guaranteed loans is Ukraine. Ukraine received $178.8 million
in GSM-102 agricultural credit guarantees in 1992. Ukraine is eligible to receive
a further $130 million in such guarantees after February 1, 1993.
Question. What is the status of U.S. guaranteed loans to Central and Southeast-
ern Europe?
Answer. Albania: Eximbank had not opened in this market as of fiscal year end
1992.
Baltics: Eximbank opened for short term cover in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
in April, 1992. Until the respective Baltic governments designate a bank or banks
as full faith and credit agents, Eximbank requires the Minister of Finance to be the
obligor/gu arantor .
Bulgaria: Eximbank opened for short term cover in Bulgaria in September, 1991.
The Bulgarian government has yet to designate a sovereign agent to work with
Eximbank; no transactions will go forward until Eximbank identifies an acceptable
sovereign obligor/gu arantor.
Czechoslovakia: Eximbank opened for general cover in March, 1990. Eximbank
plans to open in both the Czech and Slovak markets following partition. It antici-
pates that the lion's share of its FYE 92 $196 million exposure will devolve to the
Czech Republic following partition.
Hungary: Eximbank opened short and medium term programs in April, 1979. To
date, Hungary has not been a significant user of official export credit support.
Poland: Eximbank re-opened its short term trade credit insurance programs for
Poland in March, 1990. Its medium term insurance program and medium term loan
and guarantee programs were re-opened in May, 1990. A framework agreement be-
tween Eximbank and the Government of Poland provides a Polish Government full
faith and credit guarantee on medium and short term business conducted through
specific Polish banks.
Former Yugoslav Republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-
Montenegro, Slovenia: All Eximbank programs, available in Yugoslavia since the
early 1960s, were closed in June, 1991. Negotiations are currently underway to ap-
portion Eximbank's $640 million in Yugoslav exposure to its successor states.
Romania: Eximbank opened for short term cover in March, 1992. The Government
of Romania has designated four banks to act as sovereign agents.
Question. Does the Clinton Administration intend to extend additional loans to
former East Bloc countries, including the new countries of the former Soviet Union,
which will be guaranteed by United States taxpayers?
Answer. We certainly want to continue helping American investors and others
compete with Germans, Japanese and others for markets and investment opportuni-
ties in Europe's east. As is the case when considering U.S. guaranteed loans in any
part of the world, prospects for repayment will be an important factor in any specific
decisions.
CANADA
Question. What position have you taken on this U.S.-Canada trade dispute?
Answer None.
Question. Have you handled, either directly or indirectly, your former firm's Cana-
dian clients?
Answer No.
Question. Do you plan to recuse yourself from decisions regarding U.S. trade with
Canada? . „, . ,_ t u
Answer. Not unless it involves Pacific Gas and Electric on whose matters 1 have
recused myself.
LATIN AMERICA
Question. Do the operations of the international financial institutions benefit
United States interests in Latin America?
Answer. Yes, they do.
208
Question. Some critics have argued that the stabilization programs the IMF has
mandated for Latin America have lowered local living standards, increased unem-
ployment, and created recessionary economic conditions, do you agree?
Answer. Quite often it seems economic stabilization programs result in hardships
of the nature that you have described. It is therefore important that they be accom-
panied by measures to temporarily alleviate such hardships until the basic economic
reforms which usually are part of the overall program have had time to produce
their beneficial results.
Question. Have these programs hindered growth in Latin America?
Answer. I believe that, over the longer term, such programs have usually resulted
in increased economic growth for those countries that have seriously undertaken
them and seen them through to full implementation.
Question. During the 1980s, did the constant infusions of soft money from the
World Bank and the IMF to the statist governments in Latin America exacerbate
the economic crises in these countries by allowing governments to live beyond their
means and continue socialist policies?
Answer. Senator, I am not familiar with the history of that period regarding
World Bank and IMF lending practices. But I can say that I believe history has
demonstrated that free market economic policies and open and democratic political
systems are the route to economic growth, development and prosperity, not only in
Latin America but throughout the world.
Question. What is your attitude toward the Japanese penetration of Latin Amer-
ican markets?
Answer. Senator, I don't believe we have any objection to competing with the Jap-
anese in Latin American markets, as long as that competition is free, open and fair.
Question. Some argue that Japan is moving into areas of investment that the
United States has been driven out of in recent years. Do you see any merit in the
charge that Japan is moving to take over markets that formerly belonged to Amer-
ican companies?
Answer. I would reiterate that I believe American companies are prepared to meet
the Japanese competition in these markets as long as the playing field for such com-
petition is level.
Question. Do you support prohibiting organizations in the United States from
sending money and/or other support to terrorist organizations in Latin America?
Answer. I can assure you that it will be the policy of the Clinton Administration
to not only oppose terrorism but to actively combat it. How that policy will translate
into new measures, laws or regulations to deal with certain aspects of the problem
is yet to be decided.
Question. How should the United States fight the linkage between narco-traffick-
ers and terrorist organizations in Latin America?
Answer. One of the questions that we will be considering in our review of State
Department operations is how we are organized to deal with countering narcotics
trafficking and terrorism, particularly in Latin America, where the two are often
linked. As we review our options we will be consulting with this Committee to ob-
tain your views.
Question. Do you believe military and economic assistance to the Andean region
will materially aid in combating drug production and trafficking. What funding lev-
els, or increased U.S. involvement, or other approaches, are politically, diplomati-
cally, and operationally feasible?
Answer. As I understand, Senator, the results of our counternarcotics efforts in
the Andean region have been somewhat disappointing, at least in terms of the
amount of drugs still entering the U.S. Given the large sums of money involved in
this effort, we need to review our counternarcotics program there, and consider our
full range of options for trying to increase its effectiveness. We will look forward to
consulting with the Congress on this.
Question. In the wake of the Collor scandal and the frequent allegation of corrup-
tion against Carlos Andres Perez, what role should the United States play in attack-
ing corruption in the region?
Answer. In my prepared statement, I recognized our interest in helping Latin
America consolidate the remarkable progress made towards democracy in the past
decade. Part of that process for some countries will be to deal with the corruption
and governmental ineffectiveness which undermine democracy and foster instability.
Thus as we work with our Hemisphere partners to consolidate democracy and pro-
mote economic growth, I hope we will be able to help them attack corruption.
Question. Would allegations about a high government official's corrupt practices
affect your dealings with that official?
209
Answer. Such allegations, if proven true, would certainly raise serious questions
in my mind as to the reliability and trustworthiness of that official and I would be
extremely cautious in dealing with him or her.
Question. Will you ask U.S. ambassadors to keep you informed about allegations
of corruption involving foreign dignitaries?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Does your definition of promoting democracy in the hemisphere include
a commitment to strengthening independent branches of government?
Answer. Yes, it does.
Question. What will you do to improve reporting on human rights violations com-
mitted by terrorist organizations and drug cartels?
Answer. If our embassies are not already adequately doing so they will be advised
to ensure full coverage of this aspect of human rights reporting. Given the nature
of terrorist organizations and drug cartels, however, much of our reporting on them
must come from other agency intelligence sources.
Question. Does the United States pay enough attention to the threats that terror-
ist groups and drug cartels pose to regional stability and economic development?
Answer. Yes, I believe we pay enough attention. The problem, however, is finding
effective ways and means to cope with these threats.
Question. Would you encourage the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Affairs
to place additional emphasis on the human rights violations of communist terrorist
groups and drug cartels?
Answer. I would certainly encourage the Assistant Secretary to ensure that all
due emphasis is placed on these aspects of the human rights problem.
HAITI
Question. Beyond preventing a mass exodus of Haitians to the United States, do
we have any vital national security interests in Haiti?
Answer. We are concerned about Haiti in a security sense because of its relative
proximity to the United States and the impact which developments there can have
on peace and stability in the region. Our primary interest at present, as I noted in
my statement, is to help restore democracy to that island.
Question. What percentage of Haitians who apply for refugee status in the United
States have legitimate fears of persecution if they remain in Haiti?
Answer. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is in possession of that in-
formation, and I respectfully refer you there.
Question. Has there been any evidence that Haitians repatriated to Haiti by the
United States have suffered persecution or reprisals after their repatriation?
Answer. The Haitian Government does not appear to target people for persecution
simply for leaving by boat, and the vast majority of returnees do not seem to be
subject to persecution upon return. However, some returnees have been subjected
to human rights abuses that would constitute persecution.
Question. What was the "error" in the Bush Administration policy in Haitian refu-
Answer. President-elect Clinton believes that additional efforts need to be made
to protect those who fear persecution in Haiti and, in particular, intends to improve
the opportunities for Haitians to seek asylum.
Question. What percentage of Haitians already in the U.S. have shown up for sta-
tus hearings? How are they tracked in the U.S.?
Answer. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is in possession of that in-
formation, and I respectfully refer you there.
Question. Are you aware that Haitians have been cutting trees and ripping apart
houses to build boats?
Answer. I have seen such reports.
Question. Will the Coast Guard cease to interdict and repatriate Haitians on Jan-
uary 20?
Answer. No.
Question. How many processing centers are you prepared to establish in Haiti?
Answer. No decisions have yet been made on that issue, but it is our intention
to increase the number, and extend the locations, if possible.
Question. How many Haitians testing positive for HIV have been admitted into
the United States or into U.S. custody since the coup?
Answer. The INS should be able to provide that information to you.
Question. Are all Haitians tested for HIV virus before being allowed onto United
States soil or into United States custody?
Answer. The INS should be able to provide that information to you.
210
Question. Will Haitians infected with HIV be admitted into the United States
under the Clinton Administration's new policy?
Answer. The issue of grounds for exclusion will be dealt with primarily by the De-
partment of Justice, and policy decisions on the particular issue you raise have yet
to be made.
Question. How much has Haitian immigration cost the USG?
Answer. I was not able to obtain such information from relevant USG agencies
before close of business on Friday, January 15. I would be happy to provide you with
an estimate of State Department costs if you wish.
Question. Which other members of the Organization of American States accept
Haitian refugees?
Answer. I was not able to obtain such information from the State Department be-
fore close of business on Friday, January 15.
Question. Do you consider Aristide to be a true democrat?
Answer. President Aristide is the duly elected President of Haiti, and the Clinton
Administration will support the reinstatement of his government.
Question. Is the Haitian parliament as legitimate a part of the Haitian Govern-
ment as is President Aristide?
Answer. The Haitian parliament was democratically elected and we regard it as
such.
Question. Do you believe the terms of Article 33 of the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, as applied by the Refugee Protocol of 1967, apply to the actions
of the United States outside the territorial boundaries of the United States?
Answer. There are several legal issues raised by this question, including the
meaning of Article 33 itself as well as whether, by itself or pursuant to U.S. statute,
the Article creates enforceable obligations on the part of U.S. officials, These issues
will be carefully reviewed by the Clinton Administration, including the Justice and
State Departments.
Question. What information do you have about Cuba's continuing links to the San-
dinistas in Nicaragua?
Answer. None, but I assume the two are on good terms with one another.
Question. Do you believe that any agency of the U.S. Government should share
intelligence or law enforcement information with the current government of Cuba?
Answer. I would like to review our current regulations, policies and practices on
such sharingbefore answering that question.
Question. Do you consider Castro's dictatorship to be a criminal regime?
Answer. I agree fully with Governor Clinton that Fidel Castro remains one of the
world's "most ruthless dictators" and his regime stands as "an island of tyranny."
Question. Will you provide this Committee with regular updates of violations of
human rights committed by the Castro dictatorship?
Answer. As a matter of general policy, I believe we should always be as responsive
as possible to the Committee's requests for information. And I can assure you that
the Clinton Administration will vigorously be speaking out on the human rights vio-
lations of the Castro regime.
Question. Will the Clinton Administration press for new United Nations resolu-
tions or actions to punish Cuba for its human rights abuses?
Answer. I expect that we will very actively pursue Cuba's human rights abuses
within all appropriate international fora, beginning with the upcoming annual ses-
sion of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva.
Question. Will you notify this Committee how many Russian technical advisors
and other personnel are still in Cuba working on the nuclear reactors?
Answer. To the extent that such information is available within the executive
branch, it can and should be shared with the Committee if requested.
Question. If Cuba owes Russia $25 billion, will you press Russia to demand Cuba's
sugar as payment for the debt it is owed, and stop giving Cuba military technology
to pay for the sugar?
Answer. I at present have no knowledge of the specific details of Russia's trade
relations with Cuba but I can assure you that they will be carefully considered with-
in the context of our overall bilateral relations with Russia.
Question. What specifically will the Clinton Administration do to halt all tech-
nical, financial, and military assistance by the countries of the former Soviet Union
to Cuba?
Answer. This is an issue that will be considered as we formulate our policies with
regard to these countries in the coming weeks and months.
Question. Can you provide this Committee with information about which coun-
tries, besides Russia, have sent military advisors and/or any other form of military
assistance to Cuba?
Answer. No, because I am not at present in possession of such information.
211
Question. Will you provide information to Congress about which countries are ei-
ther giving economic assistance to Cuba or whose nationals are engaged in business
ventures in Cuba?
Answer. If such information is available to the administration and should the
Congress request it, it would be provided.
Question. What is the Clinton Administration's position with regard to Mexican
businessmen shipping Cuban clothing and textile goods to North America and other
markets via Mexico?
Answer. We have taken no position on this specific issue, but, as I said in my pre-
pared statement, the trade embargo on Cuba and Cuban goods will be maintained
by the Clinton Administration.
Question. In the spirit of the Cuban Democracy Act, will the State Department
under your stewardship pressure every country to end trade and aid to Fidel Cas-
tro's dictatorship?
Answer. Senator, as you know, Governor Clinton strongly supported enactment of
the Cuba Democracy Act and we will certainly be implementing all of its provisions
as well as seeking the support of all countries for the economic sanctions against
Cuba.
EL SALVADOR
Question. What steps should be taken to ensure that the military purge does not
encourage elements of the FMLN to continue to violate the peace accords?
Answer. I am not in a position at this time to speculate on such details regarding
the situation in El Salvador but I have made clear in my opening statement that
the peace accords should be fully implemented, and respected by all parties.
Question. Will you support continued military assistance to the Salvadoran Army?
Answer. We should continue to provide that assistance which furthers our goals
and objectives in El Salvador, especially implementation of the peace accords.
Question. Will you grant FMLN members we believe to be violators of human
rights visas to enter the United States?
Answer. I can assure you that visas to enter the U.S. will be issued in accordance
with all applicable laws and regulations of the United States.
Question. What steps will be taken to ensure that AID monies are accounted for
and do not wind up in the hands of guerrilla forces?
Answer. Senator, I believe that question should more appropriately be addressed
to the new Administrator of AID when he or she appears before the Committee.
Question. Do you favor extending the temporary permits for Salvadorans in the
United States?
Answer. That is a very complex question which I presume we will be addressing
on an interagency basis and on which I would withhold comment until I have the
opportunity to study it.
Question. Did you advocate the aid cut-off to El Salvador in 1979 during General
Romero's presidency?
Answer. I frankly do not recall my specific position on that issue, if it came before
me 13 years ago.
Question. Did Ambassador Robert White have a role in supporting the military
coup against General Romero?
Answer. If my memory serves, I believe Ambassador White was our ambassador
to Paraguay at the time of the military coup against General Romero in El Sal-
vador.
Question. Did you support the military coup against General Romero in 1979?
Answer. No.
Question. What was the United States role in the coup against Romero?
Answer. None that I am aware of.
Question. Did the United States approve the coup in advance?
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
MEXICO
Question. How do concerns about the status of political rights and civil liberties
impact on the North American Free Trade Agreement?
Answer. As you know Governor Clinton nas certain labor rights and environ-
mental concerns relative to the NAFTA, which we will be addressing with the Gov-
ernment of Mexico. . , ., ,_
Question. Should the United States Government push for political and other lib-
erties in Mexico more vigorously?
Answer. As I made clear in my prepared statement, we should encourage efforts
to help others build the institutions that make democracy possible and promote re-
spect for human rights in our relations with all countries, including Mexico.
212
Question. Do you think the Mexican government has been cooperative in resolving
the Camarena case?
Answer. As I understand there has been cooperation between our two govern-
ments in dealing with this case.
Question. What exactly do you disagree with in the Supreme Court decision on
the Alvarez Machain case and do you believe the U.S. should have requested his
extradition before the abduction?
Answer. Obviously, reasonable persons may differ, but I was more persuaded by
the dissenting opinion. Clearly, in any such cases extradition in accordance with ap-
plicable laws and treaties is preferable to abduction.
Question. Are you aware of any trials of any Mexican national in Mexico for their
role in the Camarena murder?
Answer. No.
Question. What steps will you take as Secretary of State to ensure that the killers
of Enrique Camarena are brought to justice?
Answer. The Department of State is not a law enforcement agency of the U.S. gov-
ernment but we will play whatever role in helping to resolve this case that the
President wishes us to play.
Question. Should the United States help finance an environmental clean-up in
Mexico?
We will be addressing how the U.S. and Mexico can cooperate in dealing with our
mutual environmental concerns within the context of our negotiations with Mexico
related to NAFTA.
Question. Will you push for greater access for U.S. investors in Mexico and will
you work to ensure U.S. companies access to the Mexican petroleum market?
Answer. As I clearly stated in my prepared statement, we intend to harness our
diplomacy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers and
to actively assist American companies seeking to do business abroad.
Question. Will the Clinton Administration discuss concerns with Mexico about
drug trafficking during further discussions with the Mexican Government on the
NAFTA?
Answer. As I understand we already have a very elaborate framework and mecha-
nisms for consultation and cooperation with the Government of Mexico in the area
of counternarcotics. I would foresee our relying on this to pursue with Mexico our
concerns in this area.
Question. Will the Administration discuss concerns with Mexico about corruption
and democracy during further discussions on NAFTA?
Answer. I would prefer to not comment on what we contemplate in the way of
the agenda for our anticipated confidential diplomatic discussions with the Govern-
ment of Mexico on the NAFTA. I can say that the promotion of democratic institu-
tions, including accountable government, will be a high priority for the new Admin-
istration.
Question. If the NAFTA is a success do you think it should be expanded? And,
if you favor expansion, which country would you consider next?
Answer. In close partnership with our hemispheric partners, Canada and Mexico,
we should explore ways to extend free trade agreements to Latin American nations
that are opening their economies and political systems.
CHILE
Question. Do you support a free trade agreement with Chile?
Answer. Chile is certainly a serious candidate for possible inclusion in any exten-
sion of free trade agreements to Latin American nations.
NICARAGUA
Question. When U.S. citizens notify the Department of State that a foreign gov-
ernment has confiscated their properties, what specific steps should the Department
take to assist those citizens in recovering their properties?
Answer. I am not familiar with the details of the exact procedures that we follow
in such cases. However, I believe that our embassy in the country involved, among
other things, would assist the citizen in finding legal representation, would provide
information on the country's laws and procedures for pursuing property claims, and
would approach appropriate officials of the government there to make clear to them
our interest in the claim being promptly and equitably resolved.
Question. Do you think that governments who refuse to return properties or fairly
compensate U.S. citizens for those properties should receive U.S. foreign aid?
Answer. As I recall, there are provisions in U.S. laws, the Hickenlooper and Gon-
zalez amendments I believe, which link the question of compensation for American
213
citizens' property seized by a foreign government with the provision of foreign aid
to that country. We would be guided by this legislation in dealing with cases of this
nature.
Question. Do you think governments which make hundreds of millions of dollars
in bad loans underwritten t>y U.S. taxpayers should continue to receive foreign aid?
Answer. In my view, the use which foreign governments make of our economic
assistance is certainly a factor to be heavily weighed in deciding whether to con-
tinue such assistance to them.
Question. Were you aware of the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the Sandinistas
before they came to power in Nicaragua?
Answer. As I recall, we did have some intelligence that there were powerful indi-
viduals within the Sandinista movement who were Marxist-Leninist in their ori-
entation.
Question. How involved were you in formulating President Carter's policy toward
Nicaragua?
Answer. As Deputy Secretary of State, I was actively involved with policy formu-
lation toward Nicaragua, as I was with other areas of major concern to the United
States at the time.
Question. What was your role and the role of the Carter Administration in the
overthrow of President Somoza in Nicaragua?
Answer. The focus of our efforts in Nicaragua at the time was to work within the
context of the Organization of American States to try to bring about a peaceful reso-
lution of the civil conflict raging in Nicaragua. Pursuant to an OAS Resolution, we
joined with the governments of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic to try to
mediate an agreement between General Somoza and the political opposition. Unfor-
tunately, despite long months of effort, this mediation failed and a mass popular up-
rising ensued which drove Somoza from the country.
Question. Why did the Carter Administration support the Sandinista regime and
ask for economic assistance for the Sandinista Government?
Answer. Not wishing to simply abandon Nicaragua and the substantial private
sector and democratic political forces there, the Carter Administration made a good
faith effort to try to work with the new government, which itself initially included
some prominent non-Sandinista figures. This policy and the provision of economic
assistance to Nicaragua was supported by a bipartisan majority in the Congress.
Question. Do you believe the Sandinista Government would have succeeded if the
U.S. had provided more assistance to it?
Answer. Because of the Sandinista Government's support for violence in neighbor-
ing countries, particularly El Salvador, the Carter Administration suspended dis-
bursement of economic aid to it shortly before leaving office. Thus, the Sandinistas
themselves made it impossible for us to assist them further, and it is also impossible
to know if the Government would have succeeded with more assistance.
Question. Do you believe the Sandinistas are contributing to the democratization
of Nicaragua today and that Nicaragua can become a genuine democracy if they
maintain control of the army, police and judicial system?
Answer. Control of critical institutions of government such as the army, police and
judiciary by democratically elected civilian leadership is essential to the functioning
of a true democracy, in Nicaragua as elsewhere in the world.
Question. What steps is the Government of Nicaragua taking to recover misused
U.S. aid funds; how much has been recovered; what has the U.S. Government done
to assist such recovery; and what have we done to ensure that future foreign aid
funds will not be misused by the Nicaraguan Central Bank?
Answer. I do not know Senator, but given the serious nature of these questions,
I assure you I will look into them once I become Secretary of State and have the
information at my disposal.
Question. Should the U.S. Government consider withholding an equivalent
amount of foreign aid funds from the Government of Nicaragua until these loans
are paid?
Answer. I believe that repayment of debts owed to the United States for previous
loans as they become due is an important component of a continuing foreign assist-
ance relationship.
PANAMA
Question. Did you or anyone else in the Carter Administration ever call the
Torrijos Government on the carpet about human rights abuses and the lack of de-
mocracy in Panama? When? And to whom?
Answer. Senator, as you may recall, the Carter Administration was noted for
being forthright and outspoken on human rights and democracy in its dealings with
all governments. Our concerns about human rights abuses in Panama, as elsewhere
214
in the world, were on numerous occasions communicated to appropriate officials of
that government.
Question. Were there any concerns by the Carter Administration about negotiat-
ing away United States territory with Torrijos inasmuch as he had illegally seized
power from a legitimately elected government?
Answer. Our concerns in negotiating the Panama Canal treaty were to protect
and ensure U.S. interests in its efficient operation and our use of the Canal over
the longer term, which the treaty, as ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, accom-
plished.
Question. Did you consider the dictatorship of General Torrijos to be a genuine
democracy?
Answer. No.
Question. Did the Carter Administration ever stop military or economic aid to the
Torryos dictatorship? If not, why not?
Answer. I frankly cannot recall what specific actions we took with regard to mili-
tary and economic assistance to Panama during this period.
Question. Were you for or against the United States military action in Panama —
called Operation Just Cause?
Answer. Senator, as I recall, I had some reservations about that action, particu-
larly with regard to whether it met the very severe tests for use of U.S. military
force abroad which I have described in my prepared statement. I am not certain
that the military action has resulted in improvement of drug trafficking abuses in
that country.
Question. Weren't 80 percent of all United States citizens against the giveaway
Panama Canal Treaties?
Answer. No. Once the treaties were explained to the American people and they
were able to see the facts through the fog of rhetoric, there was majority support
for them. The treaties could hardly have been approved by two-thirds of the Senate
if they had been rejected by 80 percent of our citizens.
Question. Could you explain why the United States Senate was never informed
about Panama's three paragraphs of counterreservation which nullified the DeCon-
cini Reservation?
Answer. As I recall, consultation between the Administration and the bipartisan
Senate leaders involved with the treaties was very close and constant. To my knowl-
edge, the Senate was kept fully and currently informed through its leadership of all
matters relevant to the Senate's consideration of the treaties.
Question. When did you first know about or see these three paragraphs?
Answer. I have no present recollection.
Question. Did anybody in the United States Government see these three para-
graphs before June 16, 1978, the day the protocols were exchanged in Panama?
Answer. I did not, but presumed that the negotiators may have.
Question. Should the Senate have had the opportunity to vote on these three para-
graphs in order to discharge its Constitutional obligation to "advise and consent?"
Answer. I am not an authority on the treaty requirements of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, Senator, but I presume that, if there was a legal or constitutional requirement
for the Senate to vote on these paragraphs, the Senate leadership would have in-
sisted on it.
Question. It is true, then, that Panama and the United States exchanged non-
identical instruments of ratification?
Answer. Senator, it is my understanding that the exchange was properly carried
out in accordance with the constitutional processes of the United States and Pan-
ama and in accordance with accepted international practices.
Question. Isn't it true that the Treaty never would have passed the United States
Senate without the DeConcini Reservation?
Answer. I do not know. The situation was very fluid, and various considerations
affected the voting.
Question. Does the United States today maintain the unilateral right to defend
the Panama Canal by force?
Answer. Senator, I believe circumstances under which the United States may use
force to defend the Canal are clearly set forth in the Treaty.
Question. Did you, or anyone else in the United States Government, ever tell
Torrijos in Panama not to be "overly concerned" about the DeConcini Reservation?
Answer. I did not, but cannot speak for others.
Question. What did you tell the Panamanians about the DeConcini Reservation
during your trip to Panama?
Answer. I did not discuss the issue, during my only trip to Panama during this
period for the signing of the Treaties.
215
Question. Will you initiate talks with the Panamanian Government to discuss ex-
tending United States base rights in Panama?
Answer. The question of whether or not we maintain any U.S. military presence
in Panama beyond the year 2000 is obviously not an immediate one. But, it is one
that I would expect us to address as we review not only our relations with Panama
but also our worldwide base requirements and military deployments.
Question. Do you believe that extending American base rights in Panama is in the
interest of the United States?
Answer. Senator, as I have just indicated, that is something that we would ad-
dress in conjunction with policy reviews that I expect we will be conducting in the
months ahead.
Question. Did you know about General Omar Torrijos' and Noriega's ties to Fidel
Castro in Cuba?
Answer. As I recall, it was generally acknowledged that contacts at least existed
between them and Fidel Castro.
Question. Did Noriega supply intelligence to the Carter Administration on Cuba
and did he ever pass intelligence information that he had received from the United
States to Cuba?
Answer. Senator, even should I possess such knowledge, I would not be able to
reveal such highly sensitive details of sources and methods of United States intel-
ligence operations on this occasion.
Question. Isn't it a fact that Noriega and other members of the Panama National
Guard had received military training and ideological indoctrination in Cuba dating
from at least 1970?
Answer. Senator, I frankly do not know.
Question. Did you know that the Torrijos brothers and Manuel Noriega were sus-
pected of drug trafficking or other illegal activities when the Carter Administration
was negotiating the Panama Canal Treaties?
Answer. I recall that these individuals were being subjected to intense public
scrutiny at the time and that such suspicions were being aired in the media.
SYRIA
Question. What actions does the Clinton Administration plan to take to inves-
tigate Syria's support for drug trafficking and terrorist havens in Lebanon, and
what kinds of action will the Administration take to shut-down these alleged oper-
ations?
Under what specific circumstances do you envision Syria will be removed from the
terrorism list?
Will you consult with Congress before acting to remove Syria from those fists?
Answer. I share your concern about Syria's support for terrorism and its involve-
ment in narcotics activities. Syria will remain on the terrorism list — and terrorism
will remain an important element of our high-level dialogue — so long as Syria gives
support and safehaven to terrorist groups; U.S. export sanctions and prohibitions
against U.S. aid or military sales to Syria thus will remain in effect. I intend to
pursue these issues vigorously with Syrian authorities.
Question. What will you do, beyond the usual diplomatic niceties, to pressure
Assad to allow Syria's remaining 1,400 Jews freedom of emigration?
What resources do you expect to bring to bear on the Assad government to redress
its recent actions and to resume permitting Syria's Jews to travel?
Answer. I am deeply concerned that very few exit permits have been issued to
Syrian Jews since mid-October, despite the policy decision taken in April to permit
Syrian Jews the right to travel. I intend to pursue this issue vigorously with Syrian
authorities.
Question. Will you reopen the investigation into Pan Am 103 and specifically ad-
dress the role of Ahmed Jibril and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine— General Command?
Answer. While I intend to support fully efforts to bring to justice those responsible
for the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103, I am unable to commit to any particular
course of action at this time.
SYRIA AND LEBANON
Question. Given that the United States endorsed the Taif Accords, and is commit-
ted to Lebanese independence, what will you do to see the terms of the Accords ful-
filled?
Answer. I am disappointed that Syrian redeployment, as called for in the Taif Ac-
cords, has not taken place. I intend to press the Syrians to meet their commitments
by redeploying as soon as possible. We will also work with the Government of Leb-
216
anon to encourage economic reforms and further expansion of their authority within
the territory of Lebanon.
Question. Does this Administration intend to continue granting to Lebanon a na-
tional interest waiver from sanctions imposed on countries in non-compliance with
U.S. drug control policy?
Answer. I am unable to answer the question at this time. I can assure you that
I intend to look into this matter once I have assumed the office of Secretary of State
and would be glad to consider your views on the subject as we formulate our policy.
Question. Do you support the Syrian contention that they are not required to
withdraw their troops from Lebanon until Israel complies with U.N. Resolution 425?
Answer. These issues are currently the subject of direct negotiations between the
parties to the Middle East peace talks. I will seek to do all that I can to ensure
the success of those negotiations and the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from
Lebanon.
ARAB LEAGUE
Question. Is the refusal of most Arab League members to sign the Chemical
Weapons Convention on the grounds that Israel has not relinquished its nuclear
weapons credible? Do you believe sanctions should be levied on nations that refuse
to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention?
Answer. I am disappointed that most Arab League member states chose not to
sign the CWC despite the Bush Administration's diplomatic efforts to encourage
them to do so. I will continue to urge members of the Arab League to sign the treaty
and believe that parties to the convention should be held to the terms ofit.
IRAN
Question. Do you believe that the United States should reevaluate its relationship
with Tehran? Could we have more influence if we had diplomatic relations with
Iran? What will you do to confront Iran's massive build-up of weapons of mass de-
struction?
Answer. In my opinion, improved relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are
impossible as long as Iran supports terrorism, actively opposes the Middle East
peace process (especially through its support for groups such as Hizballah), seeks
weapons of mass destruction, and abuses the human rights of its citizens. I share
your concern that the U.S. do all that it can to prevent Iran's acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction. As I understand, the U.S. now controls and generally prohibits,
in accordance with recent legislation, the export of dual-use equipment and tech-
nology that may be used in Iran's WMD or missiles programs. I intend to urge other
potential suppliers, including our allies, to impose and enforce stringent controls as
well.
FUNDAMENTALISM
Question. Could you define your general perceptions about the threat posed to the
United States and its allies by Islamic fundamentalism?
Answer. In very general terms, Islam is one of the world's great religions and its
gractice poses no threat to the United States or our interests. The threat to United
tates interests is posed by extremism of any kind, be it of a religious or secular
bent. We part company with governments or groups who preach intolerance, abuse
human rights, oppress minorities or resort to terrorism or violent repression in pur-
suit of their political goals. We support those who seek to broaden political partici-
pation, strengthen democratic institutions, and ensure respect for the human rights
of all. At the same time, we remain wary of those, whether in government or opposi-
tion, who would exploit the democratic process to come to power only to destroy that
very process in order to maintain power.
JORDAN
Question. Will you support renewing aid to Jordan at original levels?
Answer. I understand that Jordan's participation in the Middle East peace process
and its more rigorous enforcement of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq led the Bush
Administration to restore a close bilateral relationship including the resumption of
aid. I will have to review all the facts before making an informed decision on the
level of assistance.
ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS
Question. What is your view of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza?
What will be your policy toward the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights? What
will be your policy toward Jerusalem? Do you believe that Israel should give up the
217
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem? Is it your view that
Israel must relinquish those territories? To whom? What is your view of Arab de-
mands that Israel return to its pre-June 1967 borders? Would Israel be defensible
from within such borders?
Answer. I support the resolution of these difficult issues through direct negotia-
tions between the parties involved. Both interim arrangements, as well as the final
status of the territories, need to be agreed to by Israel and the Arab states involved.
President-elect Clinton and I are firmly committed to both the Middle East peace
process and to secure and defensible borders for Israel.
Question. Will this Administration recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?
How will you implement the President-elect's wishes on Jerusalem?
Answer. President-elect Clinton has said he believes that Jerusalem is the capital
of Israel, that the city should remain undivided, and that access to the holy sites
should be ensured for all. Since this is a subject of negotiations at the Middle East
peace talks, no action on the part of the incoming Administration is anticipated at
this time.
Question. Will you break with past precedent and support the creation of a Pal-
estinian state?
Answer. No.
ISRAEL
Question. What will your policy be toward Israeli deportations of Palestinians?
Answer. At the time of the deportation of over 400 Palestinians to Lebanon, Presi-
dent-elect Clinton strongly condemned the acts of violence and terrorism directed
against Israel that provoked the deportations but expressed his concern that this
action had gone too far. I do not expect long-standing U.S. policy opposing deporta-
tions and other forms of collective punishment, whicn violate the Geneva Conven-
tions, to change.
Question. Do you view the PLO as a terrorist group?
Answer. Yes. The PLO contains elements that have advocated, carried out, or ac-
cepted responsibility for acts of terrorism.
Question. Do you anticipate any change in U.S. policy toward the PLO?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you believe the PLO has a role to play in the peace process, and if
so, what should that role be?
Answer. No.
Question. What will you do to reduce assistance to Israel?
Answer. I do not contemplate a change in aid levels at this time.
Question. What role do you envision for the United States (in the Middle East
fieace talks) and under what circumstances can we expect to see a higher U.S. pro-
ile at the talks?
Answer. I understand that the U.S. has already been very active outside the con-
ference room — as honest broker, catalyst, and driving force. The Clinton Administra-
tion will also be willing to share ideas and propose solutions to problems and we
will do our utmost to facilitate the success of the negotiations. However, the terms
of reference for the peace process specify that a formal role for any third party in-
side the negotiating room would need the agreement of both sides in the trilateral
negotiations. Should the parties decide to request the U.S. to play such a role in
the negotiations, we will be willing and ready.
deconcini/arab league boycott
Question. What is President-elect Clinton's position on the Arab League boycott?
What specific steps is he considering to get the Arab League to end the boycott?
Does he feel that Israel must make a gesture to the Arab League concurrently
with the League ending the boycott or should the boycott be ended without the need
for any immediate reciprocity on the part of Israel?
Answer. It is longstanding U.S. policy to oppose the Arab League boycott of Israel.
This policy will continue under the Clinton Administration.
Prospects for rolling back the boycott were enhanced by the start of the Madrid
peace process, and UTS. efforts since then have been vigorous. Last fall, the U.S.
urged Arab states to stop enforcing the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott
against U.S. companies. The U.S. subsequently suggested to the Arabs an extensive
list of specific steps which they could take to ease their enforcement of the boycott.
The U.S. initiative attracted wide interest among our trading partners. EC states
have since delivered their own anti-boycott demarche to the Arabs, and the Japa-
nese made their first-ever public call for an end to the boycott in December.
The Clinton Administration will continue to pursue vigorously steps to dismantle
the boycott both with regional states and with our major trading partners.
218
INDIA
Question. Is India's possession of a nuclear device legitimate, and do you intend
to impose sanctions? How will you address India's nuclear status? Do you believe
the Pressler amendment should be expanded to include India? Should India sign the
NPT? Should we link aid through the IFIs to nuclear non-proliferation?
Answer. The Clinton State Department will oppose nuclear proliferation on the
Subcontinent, and seek to engage India in a serious process of dialogue on this
issue. We will urge India to accede to the NPT. In pursuing diplomacy on this issue,
we will review a wide range of incentives to encourage progress with the Indian
Government on this issue.
Question. How will you address violations of human rights in India, and would
you support linking aid (including IMET) to India?
Answer. Human rights issues will be an important issue in our relationship with
India, as it will be throughout the world. I would hope that progress on human
rights would obviate the need to consider measures to link aid to human rights, as
assistance to India serves important U.S. foreign policy and humanitarian interests.
We will, however, review the full range of options to encourage better observance
of human rights in India.
Question. Do you intend to address the Kashmir question in the context of the
Simla Accords or in the context of the U.N. resolutions? Has the Simla process been
a success? Will you work to provide a role for Kashmiri groups in the resolution of
the Kashmir problem? What is your view on the option of independence for Kash-
mir?
Answer. Both India and Pakistan agreed to the Simla Declaration, and I support
the principles of peaceful dispute settlement that it contains. I believe that settle-
ment of differences of this issue should be a product of discussions that include
India and Pakistan, but also maintain a role for all communities in Kashmir. I do
not believe that the USG should dictate the form or the outcome of a settlement.
We will, however, be reviewing ways to facilitate dialogue on this issue leading to-
ward normalization of the situation.
Question. How will you address India's continued military buildup?
Answer. In discussions with India (as well as with Pakistan) on regional security,
we will encourage conventional arms restraint and will implement arms export con-
trol policies to further that goal.
Question. How will you deal with the so-called 80/20 rule governing U.S. procure-
ment of Licit narcotics?
Answer. No decisions have yet been made on this issue, but we will encourage
India to take actions against illicit drug use, drug trafficking and diversion, and
seek to ensure that programs involving licit opiates serve anti-narcotics goals.
Question. What role do you intend to play in promoting India's transition to a
market economy, and what impact do you believe lack of progress in this area
should have on bilateral and multilateral assistance?
Answer. I am encouraged by reforms that have taken place, but share the belief
that reforms should go further. I believe that non-humanitarian assistance pro-
grams should be designed to facilitate the process of privatization and economic re-
form.
PAKISTAN
Question. How do you view Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, and do you believe
there is any justification for Islamabad's nuclear program?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by reports about nuclear-weapons related develop-
ments in Pakistan, and believe that Pakistan should sign and ratify the NPT. I am
aware of claims that a nuclear capability for Pakistan is necessary as a deterrent,
but this justification does not change my position on this question.
Question. What is your position on the scope and purpose of the Pressler amend-
ment?
Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to examine this complex legal ques-
tion, but will certainly do so. I am, however, very much aware that some Senators
claim the Pressler Amendment does not permit the licensing of commercial arms ex-
ports.
As a matter of policy, I understand that the Bush Administration has restricted
licenses of commercial arms exports to preclude the acquisition by Pakistan of new
military capabilities or technology upgrades to existing systems. Even if one inter-
prets the Pressler amendment to permit commercial sales, a policy of prudent re-
strictions on sales seems appropriate, in view of the developments that prompted
application of the Pressler Amendment in the first place, as well as our conventional
arms proliferation concerns in the region.
219
All of these issues will receive careful examination in the Clinton Administration.
Question. How will this Administration work to ensure Pakistan that, were it to
relinquish a nuclear weapon, it would be protected in the event of war with India?
How do you view allegations that the aid cut-off is having the reverse of the effect
intended i.e., pushing Pakistan to depend on a nuclear deterrent?
Answer. I believe that both India and Pakistan should be strongly discouraged
from developing nuclear weapons, and that each state should have the capability to
defend itself adequately with conventional weapons. However, I also recognize, as
do supporters of continued application of the Pressler Amendment, that the VS.
must maintain the credibitity of our commitment to nuclear non-proliferation issues.
The issues you raise are serious ones that will be the subject of careful review in
the Clinton Administration.
Question. How will you approach issues relating to prosecution of Christians
under blasphemy laws?
Answer. While I understand that legal procedures in Pakistan may fairly divert
from procedures we might find in a U.S. court, there are internationally recognized
standards of human rights including freedoms of association and expression — that
all states are obliged to uphold. The Clinton Administration will urge governments,
including the Government of Pakistan, to ensure protection of such freedoms.
AFGHANISTAN
Question. What did you propose to counter creeping Soviet aggression in Afghani-
stan in 1979? Did you believe that Soviet aggression would culminate in the inva-
sion of Afghanistan? Would you agree with Brzezinski's characterization of your re-
sponse?
Answer. Although I originally hoped that SALT talks could be kept on schedule,
I soon realized that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had vastly changed the cir-
cumstances and nature of our relationship with the Soviet Union. At the time of
the invasion, we made strong and vigorous protests to the Soviet Union about their
illegal behavior.
GARY SICK
Question. Has Gary Sick written any foreign policy papers for the Clinton transi-
tion?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Will Sick be given any position in the U.S. foreign policy establishment?
Answer. It has been the pohcy of our Transition Team not to discuss any appoint-
ments until President-elect Clinton announces them. I have no plans to recommend
that he join the State Department.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Question. What standards will you use to formulate U.S. foreign policy if the na-
tional security interests or economic interests of the United States conflict with
human rights concerns?
Answer. The United States has traditionally used the standards established in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the measure to determine a country's re-
spect for human rights. We will seek to apply those standards whenever possible,
recognizing that there may be times, however, when our national security or eco-
nomic interests conflict with those standards.
Question. Foreign assistance is prohibited to countries that violate the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (Section 511 of the Foreign Operations, Export Fi-
nancing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991).
Is the current criteria adequate to decide whether a country is in violation of Sec-
tion 511?
Does the Clinton Administration intend to modify the conditions?
Answer. I refer you to the answer I gave to the previous question. The Clinton
Administration has no plans to modify these conditions.
UNITED NATIONS
Question. Reports by the U.N. Board of Auditors documented widespread waste,
corruption and mismanagement at the United Nations. In fact, last September, The
Washington Post ran a Tour-part series on that subject. What steps will you take
to insure the creation of an independent inspector general who will be charged with
monitoring the operations of the U.N. and investigating cases of waste and abuse?
Answer. The U.S. has been one of the strongest proponents of the proposal to cre-
ate an independent U.N. Inspector General, modeled after the system that exists in
220
most U.S. federal agencies. It would be my intention to pursue vigorously the adop-
tion and implementation of such a proposal.
Question. Do you support the current U.S. position of "no real growth" in the U.N.
Secretariat and specialized agencies budget?
Answer. I believe the "zero-real-growth" principle has served a highly useful pur-
f»ose in restraining U.N. expenditures and obliging the U.N. to redeploy resources
rom marginal activities to those deserving high priority. I would like to see us work
closely with other concerned U.N. members to develop other, more effective mecha-
nisms that will enable us to apply even greater budget restraint in some areas while
allowing for expansion in areas of growing priority, such as peacekeeping, humani-
tarian assistance and support for democracy and human rights.
Question. Various U.N. reformers, including a commission composed of U.N. rep-
resentatives from the Nordic nations, have proposed serious reforms for the eco-
nomic and social arms of the U.N. Specifically, these reformers have supported the
concept of a unitary U.N. wherein the various committees, commissions and agen-
cies are merged into one entity — eliminating overlapping responsibilities. Do you
support the unitary U.N. reform idea? If so, what steps will you take to bring it
about?
Answer. I strongly support the "Unitary U.N." concept, which broadly speaking
aims to address the serious problem of duplication ana overlapping responsibility
among the various agencies of the United Nations system. I know that a number
of specific proposals have been put forward in this regard. I look forward to working
with representatives of the Nordic nations and others in the vigorous pursuit of ef-
forts to strengthen the effective direction and coordination of the full range of U.N.
programs and activities.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING RECUSALS AND ETHICS
This statement will respond to the recusal and ethics questions that you re-
quested I address. As you are aware, my recusal and disqualification undertakings,
as set forth in my letter of January 11, 1993, to the Designated Agency Ethics Offi-
cial at the Department of State, have been reviewed and approved by the State De-
partment and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, after extensive con-
sultation with my counsel. These officials have confirmed that my undertakings
fully comply with all existing legal requirements, including regulations scheduled to
go into effect next month. In the future, of course, I will continue to consult with
appropriate ethics counsel in the State Department and the Office of Government
Ethics to evaluate any specific issues that may arise.
Against this background, and cognizant of the fact that hypothetical questions
often do not contain the full set of factual considerations, that arise in the real
world, I will attempt to respond to the questions that you have raised.
1. I am advised that the term "particular matter" is a legal term which is utilized
in OGE regulations and in the basic federal conflict of interest statute (18 U.S.C.
§ 208(a)), and that such term consistently has been used to define the scope of
recusals for high-level officials in recent administrations. With respect to your un-
derstanding of the term "particular matter" as not including legislation, regulations,
or general policy changes, I am advised that Office of Government Ethics regula-
tions found at 5 C.F.R. Part 2635 (Federal Register, Friday, August 7, 1992) make
clear that "particular matter" may cover matters that do not involve formal parties
and may include government action such as legislation or policy making that is nar-
rowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable person or class of per-
sons.
2. I believe that, under my proposed recusal agreement, I would be recused from
participating in a matter in which I was aware that my former law firm was rep-
resenting Cuba in an effort to lift the embargo against that country. It would follow,
of course, that if anyone from the firm contacted me on the issue, I would recuse
myself.
3. Because DIS regulations governing intra -company, international transfer pric-
ing theoretically affect the interests of a broad range of companies, I am currently
uncertain whether, under existing law, I could participate in Cabinet or Economic
Policy Council deliberations on such issues in the event that my former law firm
were retained by a group of Japanese manufacturers to represent them with respect
to this issue. I suspect that the legal advice that I would receive would depend upon
factual determination as to whether the issue, as formulated, is narrowly focused
on the interests of a discrete and identifiable class of persons or conversely whether
it is directed to the interests of a large and diverse group of persons. If this kind
of issue were to arise, I would not participate in Cabinet or Economic Policy Council
deliberations without consulting the appropriate ethics officials: and I would not
221
meet with representatives of CMelveny & Myers regarding such an issue in any
event. I would also fully adhere to the specific undertakings set out in my recusal
letter.
4. I respectfully disagree that my recusal statement is limited, or that it presents
any concerns over the appearance of a conflict of interest, or that it will in anyway
undermine confidence in government and government officials. My recusal state-
ment has been specifically approved, after substantial analysis, by the Department
of State and the Office of Government Ethics. I have every confidence, moreover,
that I will conduct myself in accordance with ethical standards that will bring credit
to the Department and the administration that I have been asked to serve.
5. As is clear from my recusal letter, my recusals will not be limited to matters
having a "direct and predictable" effect on my law firm's ability to pay future bene-
fits due me. Beyond that, I would also note that "direct and predictable effect" is
defined at 5 C.F.R. §2635 .40 1(b)(1), which provides that a particular matter will
have a "direct" effect on a financial interest if there is a close causal link between
any decision or action to be taken in the matter and any expected effect of the mat-
ter on the financial interest of a person or entity. A particular matter will have a
"predictable" effect if there is a real, as opposed to a speculative, possibility that the
matter will affect the financial interest in question.
6. The definition of this term is set out in the regulations, 5 C.F.R.
§2635.401(bXD, to which I would respectfully refer you.
7. I am not certain what the thrust of this question is, but I generally agree that
a law firm "benefits directly" from fees that it receives.
8. I am not sure of the context in which you are using the term "direct and pre-
dictable" here. My recusal decisions, however, will generally not be affected by the
amount of fees received by my former law firm with respect to any matter.
9. In no instance would the fact that my former law firm's fees might vary based
on the number of hours involved affect my recusal decision.
10. I am unable to answer this question beyond what I have already stated in
my recusal letter, which has been filed with the Committee. As I have indicated
throughout, I will apply the principles set forth in that letter, along with legal ad-
vice that I will secure on a case-by-case basis, to determine when recusal is appro-
priate.
11. My recusal letter states that I will not participate in any particular matter
which in violation of applicable ethics rules would have a direct and predictable ef-
fect on my financial interests "or those of my spouse." I am advised that Office of
Government Ethics regulations make clear that the financial interests of adult chil-
dren who do not live in our home are not covered by the federal conflict of interest
rules. All of our children are grown and live elsewhere. Nevertheless, as stated in
my recusal letter, I will recuse myself on a case-by-case basis from any particular
matter where it is desirable for me to do so in order to avoid the appearance or im-
propriety or impartiality, and that certainly would cover matters in which my chil-
dren or other family members are or represent a party.
12. Yes, copy enclosed.
13. Yes, because my involvement will be unknown to my former agency and there-
fore there is no risk of "undue influence." The one exception to this general rule is
that if I should become personally and substantially involved in trade negotiations
during my tenure at the Department of State, I could not subsequently participate
in any fashion with respect to matters affecting any foreign entity.
14. No, for a period of 5 years.
15. Yes, I could prepare such materials as long as I am not identified before the
State Department as naving been involved. In that way, the risk of any possible
"undue influence" from my former government position is eliminated.
16. During the past 5 years at OMelveny & Myers I have billed the following
hours for legal work done for the following foreign companies:
Axa Midi Assurance — 3 hrs.
DAI-ICI Mutual Life Insurance Co. — 2 hrs.
TRANSFERS AND REPROGRAMMINGS OF 150 MONIES
Question. What is your position on the consultation and notification process with
Congress on transfers and reprogrammings of 150 account monies?
a. Specifically, will you continue the historical practice of consulting with the ma-
jority and minority on reallocation of funds between and among accounts?
b. In addition, will you honor requests for information ana consultation prior to
obligation of funds? Specifically, when senator's concerns occasion a request to
"hold" disbursement of already allocated, authorized or appropriated funds, will you
honor such so-called "holds?"
222
Answer, a. As I have said on a number of occasions, I intend to consult and work
closely with the Congress on matters affecting the conduct of our foreign relations.
That certainly extends to matters involving the budgeting and allocating of re-
sources. I am also prepared to respond to concerns that may be raised by members
of Congress regarding a particular disbursement of already appropriated funds, al-
though I believe this should not occasion indefinite delays in duly authorized actions
that properly fall within the purview of the Executive Branch.
BIODIVERSITY
Question. Will you recommend that President Clinton sign the biodiversity con-
vention?
Answer. The Clinton Administration supports the principles embodied in the
biodiversity convention. We believe that the U.S. missed a golden opportunity to
exert international leadership on environmental issues by failing to reach agree-
ment on the convention. There are some troubling issues with respect to patent
rights and intellectual property rights, particularly in terms of the relationship be-
tween the Convention and the Global Environment Facility, and the transfer of
technology and sharing of benefits of genetic resources under the Convention. I will
recommend to President-elect Clinton that we move expeditiously in trying to settle
these issues so that we can find a basis on which the U.S. can join the Convention
on Biological Diversity.
Question. What are your views on the international carbon tax?
Answer. The international community is deeply divided on the question of a car-
bon tax. Even the proposer of the tax, the EC, has not been able to reach a consen-
sus on this issue. There are a number of questions which must be answered before
we can determine the viability of such a tax. We are studying the issues and will
assess whether it is in the U.S. interest to support the imposition of a carbon tax.
FAMILY PLANNING
Question. Will you support the continuation of the promotion and funding of "fam-
ily planning" programs in developing countries?
Answer. The Clinton Administration believes strongly that family planning is crit-
ical in developing countries and, therefore, will fully support the promotion and
funding of these programs.
Question. Are you familiar with the Chinese practice of forced abortions and steri-
lization and will you support the UNFPA which has programs in China?
Answer. We are aware of the Chinese government's practice of forced abortions
and sterilization. We do not condone or support these coercive policies. However, we
do support voluntary family planning programs around the world, including China.
A recent report indicated that, although UNFPA has family planning programs in
China, none of those programs contribute to or support any coercive family planning
policies in that country. We see no reason why we cannot or should not support the
excellent work that UNFPA is doing internationally.
ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS
Question. Should the United States deny certain U.S. technologies to countries
such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, China, and Russia even if our allies do not take similar
measures?
Answer. This issue must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. While as a general
rule we do not want to penalize American exporters, we now deny certain sales to
certain countries, for instance those that support terrorists, regardless of the policies
of others and will continue to do so. Our preferred outcome will be to get other
major exporting countries to join such denials.
Question. Do you see a continued need for a coordinated export policy under
CoCom?
Answer. CoCom has been adjusting its regulations in response to the changing
international situation and continues to do so. But procedures for coordinating the
export policies of the major industrialized states remain valuable, and CoCom is one
valuable way we have of doing so.
Question. How will you promote the strengthening of CoCom?
Answer. We will review all the nonproliferation instruments of the U.S. Govern-
ment in keeping with the President-elect's commitment to give a high priority to
this problem. That will include consideration of whether any specific additional
changes to CoCom, or to other nonproliferation tools, would be helpful.
223
AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATIONS
Question. Will 85 percent of the Clinton Administration's State Department nomi-
nations be from the Career Foreign Service?
Answer. It is the President, 01 course, who has the authority to appoint ambas-
sadors, with the advice and consent of the Senate. I have not yet had an opportunity
to review this particular question with the President-elect. I know, however, that
he has the highest regard for the Foreign Service and will draw upon the experience
and ability of its career officers. At the same time, I believe the country can be well
served by the appointment of men and women who can bring to the conduct of our
country's foreign relations the perspectives and experience gained in other walks of
life.
NARCOTICS ISSUES
The issues raised in the 40 questions on narcotics matters which I received sepa-
rately from and later than the other questions submitted by Senator Helms were
also addressed in questions submitted by Senator DeConcini. I have taken the lib-
erty of enclosing my responses to those questions for your review.
I believe that the U.S. Government effort to stem the import of illicit drugs and
to combat drug production and trafficking in foreign countries needs to be examined
in light of the many legitimate concerns you have raised. If confirmed as Secretary
of State, I intend to conduct such a review, in close cooperation with the many other
departments and agencies of the U.S. government that are involved, and would
value your views and suggestions.
Question. Do you see illegal drugs as a priority issue in U.S. foreign policy? Could
you please outline what steps you plan to take to elevate the drug issue within the
Department? Do you plan to elevate the top narcotics position at State to an Under
Secretary level that carries greater weight within the Department?
Answer. Clearly, controlling the flow of illegal drugs into the United States is an
issue that deserves to be an important part of our foreign policy. I will be looking
at a number of proposals for restructuring the Department which could give inter-
national narcotics the attention it deserves. But at this time, I have no plans to cre-
ate an Under Secretary for narcotics matters.
Question. In Bolivia, the U.S. has been paying coca growers $2,000 per hectare
to take them out of production. Production continues to increase and those growers
who pocket the $2,000 simply drive up the road, clear a new piece of jungle, and
plant more coca.
This program is a loser and if the American taxpayer were better informed they
would be outraged. Will you discontinue this program of paying growers to take
their coca out of production?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this program. But I appreciate
your bringing your concerns and insights about it to my attention. I will certainly
give it close scrutiny as we review our counternarcotics programs.
Question. In the last 20 years, the two most successful eradication programs (Tur-
key and Mexico) both relied on aerial spraying. Nowhere in Latin America is aerial
spraying currently allowed. Will you attempt to institute aerial spraying in the big
drug producer countries?
Answer. That is an important question that involves delicate diplomatic consider-
ations and will require considerable discussion within the government before a deci-
sion is made. Since I have not had the opportunity to discuss this idea with the
President-elect, I cannot make a such a policy decision today.
Question. If Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia will not allow aerial spraying,
what steps would you recommend the U.S. take to send the message to these drug
producers that we are serious about attacking drug production and we need coopera-
tion?
Answer. As we evaluate our counternarcotics programs and work to strengthen
our efforts to control the influx of drugs into this country, we will need greater co-
operation from the governments of producing countries. Given the gravity of the
threat some of those governments face from drug cartels, it does not promise to be
an easy task. Nonetheless, their cooperation is critical to any success we might
achieve. Therefore, we will work to obtain their maximum cooperation in combating
this serious problem.
Question. In the past, the State Department has always found an excuse to do
nothing when it comes to making corruption a foreign policy issue and demanding
that governments take action. If the State Department has intelligence that senior
government or military officials in a particular government are corrupt what steps
do you plan to take in dealing with that government? Do you plan to address the
224
involvement of Syrian military officials in Lebanon with illicit drugs? What specific
steps do you plan to take?
Answer. Again, these are sensitive and important issues that will require full dis-
cussion among the President's foreign policy and defense advisors. Since those dis-
cussions have not taken place, I cannot respond directly at this time. I can tell you,
however, that the problem of corruption in drug producing countries is a very seri-
ous problem that we must address.
Question. How do you plan to maintain the leadership and the international mo-
mentum against drug trafficking that the United States has fostered over the past
4 years? Will President Clinton continue to meet with the Presidents of drug pro-
ducing countries on an annual or semi-annual basis?
Answer. We would hope to maintain our leadership by giving this issue the high-
level attention it deserves. Without committing him at this time, I am confident that
President-elect Clinton will certainly consider meeting with the Presidents of drug
producing countries as he sees fit.
Question. What will be the Administration's primary foreign policy emphasis in
Latin America? And, how do you see the relationship between anti-narcotics pro-
grams, democracy, and human rights in this region?
Answer. President-elect Clinton has said that he intends to strengthen our eco-
nomic ties with the countries of Latin America as part of his efforts to create new
markets for American exports. He also wants to help strengthen democratic institu-
tions and respect for human rights in these important countries. Since drug traffick-
ing has a corrupting and corrosive impact on democratic institutions and human
rights practices, counternarcotics programs can help a fragile democratic govern-
ment withstand these pressures.
Question. The great majority of cocaine that is smuggled into the United States
transits through Mexico. President Salinas has exhibited unprecedented cooperation
on counternarcotics issues. How do you propose to maintain this level of coopera-
tion? What specific steps will you take to ensure that this issue remains high on
President Salinas' policy agenda? Were these issues discussed during the recent
meeting with President Salinas? What can you tell me about these discussions?
Answer. We will work closely with President Salinas and the appropriate authori-
ties in Mexico to continue the close cooperation we have enjoyed on this important
issue. It is in the interest of both the United States and Mexico to reduce the
amount of cocaine smuggled across our border. I believe this issue may have been
raised during the meeting between President-elect Clinton and President Salinas.
But since this was a private meeting between them, I cannot tell you anymore about
these discussions than what President-elect Clinton and President Salinas said after
their meeting.
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Dole
armenia and azerbaijan
Question. Last month the President of Armenia declared his country to be in a
state of "national disaster" because of the severe shortages of food, fuel and medical
supplies brought on by the 4 year long comprehensive blockade of Armenia by Azer-
baijan. What is the best policy for the U.S. to follow to end the blockade? Would
you support the establishment of internationally supervised aid corridors through
Turkey and Georgia to effect an end to the blockade?
Do you support the granting of Most Favored Nation status to Azerbaijan? Do you
believe the 1992 Freedom Support Act restricts the granting of MFN because of the
blockades? Would you support MFN status for Azerbaijan conditioned on lifting the
blockades?
What more should the U.S. be doing with Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan to per-
mit necessary food and fuel supplies to enter Armenia?
Answer. The situation in Armenia is indeed very serious as is the continuing Ar-
menian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. President-elect Clinton and his advi-
sors will want to study all the information available to the U.S. government and
consult with other interested parties before deciding how we might best contribute
to resolving this tragic problem.
Question. A group oi nuclear experts visited the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant
in Armenia late last year. They concluded that a safe start up of the plant was pos-
sible if recommendation for jplant improvements and personnel training were carried
out. Would you support U.S. technical assistance to Armenia to reopen the plant?
225
Answer. We are very concerned about the safety of nuclear power plants through-
out the former Soviet Union. Whether we should help reopen this particular plant
will depend on a number of factors, including the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Question. On January 3 of this year, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin called for "an
immediate end to the bloodshed" caused by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and
a "drastic turn toward a political settlement" within the context of the CSCE con-
ference. Since it appears that the CSCE process has produce no results so far, how
do you suggest the U.S. reactivate these negotiations?
Answer. United States' participation has been critical in keeping these negotia-
tions alive. I share your disappointment that no settlement has vet been reached,
and assure you that we will remain alert to any opportunity to make progress.
Question. Do you favor greater U.N. participation in the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
Answer. We will want to continually assess the situation and the state of the
CSCE's efforts which, as you point out, have not yet borne fruit. If at any time
greater U.N. involvement seems useful we will support it.
Question. Does the Clinton Administration support a guarantee of human rights
for the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh? How would that guarantee be enforced?
Does the Administration support self-determination for the Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh?
Answer. We support self-determination for all people. But I do not equate that
with every ethnic group's having its own state, or indeed with the principle of states
based on ethnicity. Often the better way, as your question suggests, is for all people
to enjoy the full exercise of human rights in the states in which they live. As you
know, all European governments, the U.S., and Canada have made quite sweeping
commitments on ban rights, including minority rights, in the CSCE, and the CSCE
is acquiring new means for monitoring compliance and for moral suasion. We will
want to do all we can to help ensure compliance.
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Murkowski
china/hong kong/taiwan
Question. As a lawyer, do you believe the renewal of MFN for China, as governed
by the Jackson-Vanik provisions, can be subject to conditions other than free emi-
gration?
Answer. Although President-elect Clinton has said that he supports conditional
renewal of MFN for China, he has not determined when or how he will proceed on
this issue since it will not confront him until later in the year. We will be examining
this issue, particularly with respect to the Jackson-Vanix provisions, in the coming
months.
Question. With the demise of the USSR, do you believe that the Jackson-Vanik
provisions should be the determining factor for renewing MFN to non-market re-
gimes?
Answer. This is a complicated question that would need to be discussed thor-
oughly among all of the President-elect's national security advisors. He has not de-
cided at this point if Jackson-Vanik provisions should or should not be the determin-
ing factor in renewing MFN for non-market economies.
Question. What possible alternatives to conditioning MFN, if any, would you see
as useful policies for deterring China from weapons proliferation or human rights
abuses?
Answer. The President-elect will be considering his policy towards China in a
careful and deliberate manner. We have not fully determined how to measure Chi-
na's progress on these important issues or what alternatives to conditioning MFN
might be available to encourage progress on proliferation and human rights. We will
have more to say about this issue in the future.
Question. What characterization do you apply to Tibet in terms of a geographic/
political entity?
Answer. U.S. policy for some time has been that Tibet is part of China. This is
the position of all United Nations members. Otherwise, I refer you to the oral testi-
mony I gave on this issue during the hearing.
Question. What role do you feel the U.S. can or should play in the current argu-
ment over democracy in Hong Kong prior to 1997? Do you support the Hong Kong
Policy Act passed by Congress and made into law last year?
226
Answer. The current dispute over Governor Patten's proposals for democratic re-
form in Hong Kong is a matter for Great Britain and China to settle in accordance
with the Joint Declaration and in keeping with the views and aspirations of Hong
Kong's people. The U.S. has important economic interests in Hong Kong, and we
should be concerned about the welfare of its people. Governor Patten's proposals are
constructive and deserve serious consideration, particularly since Hong Kong is
promised under the Joint Declaration a high degree of autonomy after 1997.
The Clinton Administration will support the Hong Kong Policy Act.
Question. Do you believe that U.S. policy toward Taiwan is subjugated to our
China policy, and if so, is that always in the U.S. interest? Can you foresee cases
where it is not in U.S. interest?
Answer. U.S. policy is to recognize one China — mainland China — and the Clinton
Administration will continue that policy. We will continue, however, to maintain un-
official relations with Taiwan based on the principles of the Taiwan Relations Act
and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1978 and 1982. We believe these ar-
rangements serve U.S. interests.
Question. Do you support Taiwan's membership in international organizations like
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? Should Taiwan's GATT acces-
sion be in any way linked to China's?
Answer. Although other officials will need to be consulted on this issue, I believe
we would welcome Taiwan's accession into GATT as a separate customs territory
when it meets GATTs requirements. It would be in our own interests to have Tai-
wan, which is one of our major trading partners, under GATT discipline.
The general view has been that China's and Taiwan's accession to GATT should
move along simultaneously. But this is a subject that should be discussed further
with our trading partners in GATT. It also should be part of our overall policy to-
ward China, which we will consider in the coming months.
Question. Will you continue President Bush's recent policy change of allowing
Cabinet level officials to visit Taiwan?
Answer. This is an issue that I have not discussed with the President and, there-
fore, cannot respond at this time.
JAPAN
Question. Do you believe the U.S. should encourage Japan to adopt a policy allow-
ing it to send troops abroad?
Answer. Although this is ultimately a decision for the Japanese government to
make, I believe Japan should be encouraged to adopt a policy that would allow it
to send troops abroad as part of a United Nations peacekeeping force.
Question. What do you see as the role of the State Department in our trade deal-
ings with Japan, specifically in our attempts to open their markets to American
goods, and to lower the trade deficit?
Answer. President-elect Clinton has said that trade and economics should play a
larger role in our foreign policy, and I agree with him. Therefore, we will take steps
to enhance the Department's role in such matters as opening foreign markets to
American products in Japan and other countries with which we maintain trade defi-
cits.
Question. What effects, if any, do you see the current turmoil within the Liberal
Democratic Party having on U.S.-Japan relations?
Answer. Any turmoil within the Liberal Democratic Party is a matter for the Jap-
anese to settle. I am confident, however, that the United States and Japan will con-
tinue our strong friendship, and I look forward to working with the Japanese on is-
sues of mutual concerns.
VIETNAM/CAMBODIA
Question. Do you believe the normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam
should continue to be linked to either Cambodia or the MIA issue? Do you feel the
same way about the U.S. trade embargo?
Answer. I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.
Question. Do you feel that President-elect Clinton's lack of military service in the
Vietnam War will in any way impact on the normalization process?
Answer. No.
Question. Should the United States take a more leading role in the Cambodian
peace process?
Answer. I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.
Question. If elections are held in Cambodia this spring without the participation
of the Khmer Rouge, or people living in Khmer Rouge controlled territory, do you
believe the U.S. can recognize the resulting government?
Answer. I refer you to the oral testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.
227
Question. Can you foresee any pressures being applied by the U.S. on Thailand,
beyond the recent logging embargo, with relation to the Khmer Rouge and the peace
process in Cambodia?
Answer. I refer you to the testimony I gave on this issue during the hearing.
GENERAL
Question. Title III of the Freedom of Support Act, entitled Business and Commer-
cial Development (Sec. 302), calls for a Business and Agriculture Advisory Council
to advise the President regarding assistance programs and how they facilitate U.S.
exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Do you expect to fulfill this
authority and if so, what actions do you deem necessary to form the Council? Do
you see this a role for State, ADD, Commerce, or an interagency group?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this legislation, and therefore
cannot comment on it directly. I can tell you, however, that the President-elect is
committed to facilitating exports not only to the CIS, but around the world. I intend
to ensure that the State Department fulfills its responsibilities toward this impor-
tant goal.
Question. As the Cold War era ends, do you foresee any shift within the State De-
partment from a politico-military emphasis to a commercial and economic emphasis?
Answer. The President-elect has said that he believes economic and commercial
considerations should play a larger role in our foreign policy. I agree with him and
intend to ensure that the State Department fulfills its responsibilities on this issue.
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Coverdell
trade
President-elect Clinton has sent mixed signals on trade issues. For example, he
says he supports the Mexico Free Trade Agreement with the United States, but he
has "some concerns."
Question. What specifically are these concerns?
Answer. The concerns which President-elect Clinton has are that the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement must be fair to American farmers and workers, must
protect the environment, and must require decent labor standards as well as ade-
quate and full funding for worker retraining. We expect to shortly be addressing
these concerns through negotiations with the other parties to the agreement.
Question. Will the Clinton Administration negotiate a free trade agreement with
Chile? Argentina? When will negotiations begin?
Answer. As I indicated in my prepared statement, we hope, in close partnership
with our hemispheric partners Canada and Mexico, to explore ways to extend free
trade agreements to Latin American nations that are opening their economies and
political systems. Argentina and Chile are two outstanding examples of countries
which have successfully opened their economies and political systems.
emerging democracies
Question. In your statement this morning, you expressed your desire to make the
Organization of American States more effective. How can the Organization of Amer-
ican States become more effective as an instrument to preserve and promote democ-
racy in the hemisphere?
Answer. Senator, that is not a question I can answer at this time because we have
not yet reviewed our options for increasing the effectiveness of the OAS. As we do
we would expect to be consulting with the Committee on possible initiatives. I would
note, however, that the present cooperative effort between the U.N. and OAS to re-
store democracy to Haiti, which we strongly support, offers an example of what the
OAS can do to more effectively promote democracy in the hemisphere.
drugs
Question. What is your assessment of the importance of the political and national
will of the drug producing and trafficking countries in the Andean Region — Bolivia,
Peru, and Colombia?
Answer. I am not very encouraged by the political and national will of some of
the drug producing and trafficking countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia,
in combating drug cartels and making counternarcotics a national priority. Part of
this can be attributed to a lack of resources necessary to respond to the threat of
drug cartels. But the problem is aggravated in some countries by the shear size of
228
the cartels and their pervasive control over important sectors of society. It is a seri-
ous problem that will take years to overcome.
Question. What overall priority do you place on fighting drugs in Latin America
in the Department of State agenda?
Answer. Narcotics control should be an important part of our foreign policy be-
cause it reflects the concern of the American people to take concrete steps to
confront this serious threat. The Clinton Administration will give narcotics control
the level of attention it deserves in our foreign policy.
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
Question. Given the services already provided by the United States military to the
United Nations, for example, air lift, rations, etc., do you believe it is appropriate
to impose additional burdens on the Department of Defense budget to pay directly
for U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Answer. I believe this question deserves considered review and discussion. To the
extent that the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts contribute to the achievement of U.S. se-
curity objectives, I believe it is reasonable to consider the use of DOD funds for
those purposes. This is obviously a matter for discussion with the President-elect
and Secretary of Defense-designate Aspin, as well as with concerned members of
Congress.
Question. Given the size of the economies of the major European and Asian coun-
tries, do you believe it's appropriate for the United States to pay 31 percent of all
U.N. peacekeeping operations?
Isn t the second largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping Japan at 12 V2 percent?
Wouldn't it make more sense to make Japan pay more for U.N. peacekeeping ef-
forts in Cambodia, and make European countries pay more for peacekeeping efforts
in the former Yugoslavia?
Answer. I am aware that the current formula for calculating the rate according
to which U.N. member states are assessed for the payment of U.N. peacekeeping
costs is one that has been in existence for some time. I am also aware that, under
that formula, the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council pay a larger pro-
portion of peacekeeping costs than they do of regular U.N. expenses. I believe it
would be appropriate to re-examine that formula to see whether it constitutes a fair
and equitable basis for sharing the burden of these expenses.
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Pressler
united nations
Question. There is no question that the United Nations is in desperate need of
reform. The question is: How can meaningful reform be achieved?
Do you believe that reform should come from within the institution, with the
charge led from the very top leadership?
As the primary source of U.N. support, what kind of role can the United States
play to encourage, or insist upon U.N. reform?
Answer. There is an urgent need to press ahead with the process of reforming the
United Nations and its various constituent agencies. That is the only way of ensur-
ing that the U.N. is capable of assuming the greatly expanded role we and others
would like to see it play, with respect to a wide range of issues. I believe that to
succeed, the impetus for that reform effort must come both from within the organi-
zation and outside. I am encouraged by the steps that U.N. Secretary General
Boutros Ghali has taken to date to streamline and rationalize the U.N., and to co-
ordinate more effectively the activities of the various U.N. agencies. But more needs
to be done, and the Clinton administration is prepared to play a lead role in work-
ing with other concerned member states of the U.N. to define and pursue an agenda
for reform. I know that this will be one of the highest priorities of our next Rep-
resentative to the U.N., Dr. Albright, if she is confirmed.
Question. In your estimation, Mr. Christopher, why aren't such blatant examples
of abuse and fraud vigorously pursued? Is it because the U.N. lacks the will to
change its character?
What would you recommend as a solution to discourage such fraudulent actions?
What can be done? How active do you plan to be regarding U.N. reform?
Answer. I realize that there are serious problems in the way the United Nations
is presently administered, but I believe it would be premature and a mistake to as-
sume that these problems cannot be addressed and corrected. With respect to the
issue of U.N. salaries, the U.S. has long been a proponent of a uniform pay scale
229
covering all U.N. agencies, as well as additional authorities to ensure compliance
by all agencies. I do not expect that position to change.
Question. Why does the U.N. function in this matter? Would you support the cre-
ation of a tough, independent U.N. Inspector General? If so, do you believe that a
U.N. Inspector General is likely to accomplish anything if the current U.N. system
is not reformed?
Answer. I would certainly agree that a concerted effort must be made to dissuade
the member states of the United Nations from viewing the U.N. as a kind of pork
barrel for everyone's pet programs and projects. It seems to me that some progress
was made in the 1987 when, in response to a U.S. initiative, the U.N. General As-
sembly agreed that the U.N. budget must be approved by consensus. That consensus
procedure has allowed major contributors, like the U.S., considerably greater influ-
ence over budget decisions. I believe this procedure should be retained as an impor-
tant base on which to build other budget restraint mechanisms.
Concerning a U.N. Inspector General, I am aware that the United States has been
one of the strongest advocates of the creation of such a post, which would function
in much the same way as the inspectors general found in most U.S. federal agen-
cies. I understand that a proposal to this effect has been made and is receiving fa-
vorable consideration by Secretary General Boutros Ghali, as well as representa-
tives of other nations. It would be my intention to work for the adoption of such
a proposal.
JAPAN
Question. Are you willing to work with and encourage the Government of Japan
to purchase additional U.S. agricultural products for humanitarian relief efforts, in-
cluding programs in Somalia, in Bosnia/Herzegovina, and in the new republics of
the former Soviet Union?
Answer. Increasing our agricultural exports should be an important part of our
foreign policy. As a part of this effort, I would be very willing to work with and en-
courage our Japanese allies to purchase additional U.S. agricultural products for hu-
manitarian relief efforts around the world.
UZBEKISTAN
Question. In light of their gross human rights conduct, should the United States
continue non-humanitarian foreign aid to this country?
Will you urge a continuation of the Bush Administration policy not to invite Presi-
dent Islam Karimov to the United States?
Answer. Promoting democracy and human rights will be a major concern of the
Clinton Administration. I cannot tell you now precisely how we will calibrate its ef-
forts on this issue with regard to any particular country. We will need to consider
the range of factors and assessments available within the Executive Branch and in
many cases consult with Congress. But I assure you that we will make sustained
use of all the political and economic instruments available to us.
KOSOVO
Question. Does President-elect Clinton intend to maintain a strong stand against
Serbian aggression in Kosovo? Is he prepared to use military action? What other
steps outside of U.S. military action can we take to deter Serb violence?
If the Geneva peace talks prove successful, would you support talks to establish
an independent nation in Kosovo?
Do you support the establishment of a multi-national preventative force in Kosovo
to deter possible Serb aggression in that region?
Do you support the establishment of a UiN. war crimes tribunal to try and convict
those found guilty of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia?
Answer. The range of decisions relating to the Yugoslav tragedy are among the
most difficult we face. President-elect Clinton will need to hear from all his advisors,
as well as to draw on the expertise and assessments of the civilian and military ex-
perts in the career services before reaching a decision on any specific issue.
NON-PROLIFERATION
Question. Do you support continued suspension of U.S. assistance to Pakistan be-
cause of Pakistan's nuclear program?
What other actions can the U.S. pursue to exert influence on Pakistan's nuclear
development?
Should we pursue the method of the Pressler Amendment to achieve non-pro-
liferation and nuclear reduction goals in other regions? For example would you sup-
port withholding of financial assistance, international security guarantees, and
230
other aid to the Ukraine and other affected Russian Republics until they comply
with the START, INF, and Non-Proliferation Treaties? It not, how does the Presi-
dent-elect intend to get these treaties ratified by all affected?
What specifically can the new Administration do to block attempts by Iran, Syria
or Iraq to acquire advanced missile technology and weapons capability?
What specific steps will you take to get our European allies, Russia, and the af-
fected former Soviet republics from selling nuclear technology to governments like
Iran, Iraq, or even rogue paramilitary organizations in the region?
Do you Delieve that preserving Israel's qualitative military edge will deter the use
of advanced missile or weapons technology by hostile regimes in the Middle East,
or does our only hope rest with tough non-proliferation policies?
Answer. As I indicated in my testimony, stemming the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will be a top priority of the Clinton
Administration. One of the first things we want to do after taking office January
20th is to review all the policy tools we have available and assess both how best
to use them and whether new tools would be useful. You will understand that I can-
not now anticipate decision that have not yet reached the President's desk, or in-
deed mine. I can assure you that we will consult closely with the Congress on this
critical problem. As I stated in answer to your question I am particularly concerned
about the Pakistan case.
MIDDLE EAST
Question. What do you plan to do to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process?
Will you be directly involved in this effort, or are you considering the appointment
of a special envoy?
Answer. The President-elect and I are personally committed to doing whatever we
can to ensure the success of the Middle East peace talks. The level and structure
of U.S. involvement has not yet been decided although I can assure you that I will
be directly involved in some way.
AGRICULTURE
Question. During your prior experience in the State Department, were you aware
of Department efforts to utilize our Embassies to increase U.S. exports of agricul-
tural products?
Would you be willing to utilize State Department resources, and particularly our
embassies abroad, to increase U.S. agricultural exports? Would you be willing to en-
courage our embassies to promote agricultural trading missions between the U.S.
and our trading partners?
Answer. Senator, when I spoke in my prepared statement of harnessing our diplo-
macy to the needs and opportunities of American industries and workers this clearly
included American agriculture which is one of our most productive and important
industries. And, when I committed to asking our foreign missions to do more to pro-
mote exports and actively assist American companies, I had in mind just the sort
of efforts that you have suggested with reference to agricultural exports and trading
missions.
Question. Do you support continuation of the Export Enhancement Program?
Answer. Yes. I refer you to my oral testimony for further clarification.
CUBA
Question. In your estimation, Mr. Christopher, what will be the Clinton Adminis-
tration's policy regarding Cuba? What can the United States do to prevent a bloody
revolution in Cuba, prevent human rights abuses, and promote free elections?
Answer. As I noted in my prepared statement, we will maintain the embargo to
keep pressure on the Castro dictatorship. The Cuban Democracy Act which Gov-
ernor Clinton supported gives us some new tools to both tighten the embargo and
improve contacts with the Cuban people in humanitarian and communications
areas. We hope we can use this act to help promote democratic change in Cuba.
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Brown
narcoguerrillas
Question. What efforts will you make as Secretary of State to aid governments
threatened by narcoguerrillas?
Answer. Our current efforts to assist governments threatened by nacroguerrillas
have had mixed success. While we should strengthen our efforts to control the ex-
231
port of narcotics from producing countries to the U.S., we should also expand our
efforts to encourage productive economic activity and strengthen democratic institu-
tions in these countries. This should include building independent and functioning
judiciaries and rooting out corruption among the police forces.
DRUG SUMMITS
Question. Does the Clinton Administration plan to continue to foster the impor-
tant dialogue which began with the Cartagena and San Antonio drug summits so
that international anti-narcotics efforts are pursued in a coordinated and coopera-
tive manner? Can we expect future international drug summits?
Answer. Without committing myself or the President to attend drug summits that
may occur in the future, we would welcome the opportunity to foster international
cooperation and dialogue on this important issue. If it becomes clear that a drug
summit would strengthen our efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics, I suspect
we would be pleased to participate.
COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS
Question. During the Carter administration, it was reported that you passed to
the President of PBS a request from Saudi Arabia that PBS not air a film about
the execution of a Saudi Arabian princess for committing adultery. In a cover letter
to the President of PBS, you reportedly noted that the U.S. government could not
attempt to censor PBS programming, but that the film deeply offended the Saudis
and you were hopeful PBS would "give appropriate consideration to the sensitive re-
ligious and cultural issues involved." Apparently, State Department spokesman
Hodding Carter stated at the time that the U.S. government had never before pre-
sented a television network with another nation's complaints about a program be-
fore it aired. Your move was criticized by Members of Congress, the New York Times
and others.
Are these reports of your actions accurate?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If accurate, these actions seem to conflict with your stated commitment
to human rights and democracy abroad. Could you please state for the record
whether you have had any subsequent business dealings with the government of
Saudi Arabia or with any of its members?
Answer. I have not.
Question. If these reports are correct, could you please share your views on this
action and how you reconcile this action and your stated views on democracy,
human rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press?
Answer. When I sent the letter to PBS, I was merely transmitting the concerns
of the Government of Saudi Arabia, concerns I did not endorse but certainly appre-
ciated. I continue to maintain my strong support for the promotion of democracy and
respect for human rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press and
I will pursue these noble objectives as Secretary of State.
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT
Question. Does the Clinton Administration plan to continue these negotiations, or
will the Administration, seeing the negative impact on coffee drinkers here at home,
suspend them?
Answer. The President-elect and I have not had a chance to discuss this issue nor
have I had the opportunity to look into this matter fully. I understand your concern
about the potential for a negative impact on American coffee drinkers. Without com-
mitting myself, I can say that if the negotiations are resumed, we would certainly
avoid entering an agreement that would adversely affect American consumers.
Question. Will the Clinton Administration enter into an agreement that would ad-
versely impact the American consumer?
Answer. No. I refer you to the answer I just gave on this issue.
Question. Will the Clinton Administration commit to submitting any new coffee
agreement to the Congress for formal ratification?
Answer. While being unable to commit myself at this time, I can assure you that
I will fully consult with the Congress on this issue.
232
Responses of Secretary-Designate Christopher to Questions Asked by
Senator Jeffords
guatemala
Question. Guatemala continues to suffer from vast social and economic inequal-
ities and is still wracked by human rights violations. While President Serrano has
indicated his commitment to civilian control of the military, to strengthening democ-
racy and to reform of the judiciary system, he has not succeeded as well as we had
hoped. The State Department has played a constructive role in encouraging reform
but the situation continues to deteriorate. How do you propose to approach Guate-
mala in view of our limited economic aid and military ties with that nation?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to examine the Guatemala situation in
depth, Senator, and thus cannot at this juncture offer any prescriptions for new U.S.
policies or strategies to deal with it. I am aware that the process of reform and de-
mocratization in Guatemala lags well behind that of many other countries in the
region and that our influence there is limited. While exploring other options, I
would expect that we will continue to target our economic assistance on the poorest
sectors and on promoting judicial and economic reforms and will continue to firmly
support the peace process and a negotiated settlement to the 30-year old civil con-
flict.
HONDURAS
Question. I would also like to draw your attention to a country that is often over-
looked in foreign policy overviews — Honduras. As Vermont's partner in the Partners
of the Americas program, I have had an interest in Honduras for some time. In spite
of steady U.S. efforts to aid Honduras in its quest for development, it remains the
second poorest country in the hemisphere. What changes would you propose in U.S.
policy towards Honduras so that we can be more effective in promoting democracy,
respect for human rights and economic development?
Answer. As with regard to Guatemala, Senator, I have not had the opportunity
to seriously examine our relations with Honduras and therefore cannot at this junc-
ture propose to you any policy changes. I appreciate your bringing to my attention
your interest in Honduras. As we review our relations with that country in the
months ahead we will be pleased to consult with you on how we can be more effec-
tive in promoting our interests there.
Prepared Statement of Senator Jeffords
Mr. Chairman: I join my colleagues in welcoming Warren Christopher to this com-
mittee. I also join in congratulating him on his selection by President-elect Clinton
for this critical and prestigious post. His experience in foreign policy matters and
his ability to manage people have clearly earned the deep respect of Bill Clinton.
And on those occasions when our paths have crossed over the years, Mr. Chris-
topher has earned my respect as well.
As the Secretary-designate is well aware, this is a time of great opportunity in
U.S. foreign policy — and also a time of great challenge. For almost half a century
we have carried the burden of world leadership and successfully warded off the
threat of nuclear war. And now that the rivalry of the superpowers no longer domi-
nates our foreign policy, we are suddenly free to put our creative energies to work
in new ways. And I believe we have an obligation to the American people to make
world leadership a positive experience at home. And how do we do this? From my
short conversations with him, I believe Mr. Christopher has some very good ideas
about how we can do this, but let me just stress several aspects that I feel are im-
portant.
First, we have earned the right to concentrate on America. We badly need invest-
ment in our economy, our educational system, our infrastructure and our environ-
ment. Our future as a nation will be determined by how well we accomplish these
tasks. For years I have argued that national security consists of more than just a
strong defense, but also a sound economy and a hopeful citizenry.
Secondly, as the world becomes a smaller place, as the economy becomes more
global ana as grave injustices in far away places demand our involvement, it be-
comes clear that we cannot realize these hopes for America without interacting with
the rest of the world. A sound U.S. economy depends on strong U.S. trade. And a
positive environment for international trade requires greater equality in national
standards of living, in respect for labor rights, in protection for the environment and
investments in the future. The evolution of the former Soviet Union is a vivid exam-
ple of the importance of a level playing field. We have a critical opportunity to en-
233
courage democracy and a free market, not just for them, but for us — to ensure that
we are not undercut in the world economy by new countries whose businesses may
have no obligation to respect the rights of their workers, to protect their environ-
ments or to allow free competition.
And lastly, I would urge that Congress and the State Department combine their
considerable resources to investigate new ways of maintaining international secu-
rity. Several of my colleagues have made reference to a possible new system of col-
lective security. I also am interested in ways of using existing organizations such
as the United Nations more effectively. We cannot take on sole responsibility for
every Somalia, every Yugoslavia or every Iraq. But we can take the lead in develop-
ing creative new ways to deal with international disputes and national tragedies.
I look forward to working with Mr. Christopher and my colleagues on these issues.
Before I enumerate a Tew specific questions, I feel obligated to comment on one
area of my recent involvement with Mr. Christopher that has been discussed in the
gress of late. As the Ranking Member on the Near East and South Asian Affairs
ubcommittee, I was a member of the Senate October Surprise investigation. In the
course of our investigation of the actions of the 1980 Reagan presidential campaign
and the Carter Administration relating to the release of the American hostages in
Iran, we requested the cooperation of Mr. Christopher. Under oath, he shared with
us his recollections of the events of 1980 and early 1981. Mr. Christopher clearly
stated that he had no evidence of any attempt by members of the Reagan campaign
to delay the release of the hostages, and does not now believe that this occurred.
He summarized for the investigation his efforts as President Carter's chief nego-
tiator to obtain the release of the hostages, and we found no reason to doubt the
dedication of that effort. I firmly believe that the insinuations that Mr. Christopher
may have played politics with the hostages situation or offered a quid pro quo of
selling arms to Iran are unfair and unfounded. As far as I know, the House October
Surprise task force shares this assessment. Enough said on this issue.
Prepared Statement of Carl Olson, Chairman, State Department Watch
State Department Watch is a nonpartisan public interest foreign policy watchdog
group. It is our intention to present four issues continuing on from the Bush Admin-
istration which the nominee Warren Christopher should supply views on.
These issues are (I) the ongoing constitutional crisis and the policy questions sur-
rounding the US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement; (II) the failure of the U.S.
government to follow up on the Cold War victory to collect funds owed by the former
Soviet Union to American citizens and to the U.S. government; (III) the problem of
support for foreign slave labor by U.S. companies and the U.S. government; and (IV)
the failure to exert maximum exclusive economic zone jurisdiction for all U.S. terri-
tory.
I. US-USSR MARITIME BOUNDARY AGREEMENT
This agreement was signed by Secretary of State James A. Baker III on June 1,
1990, approved by the U.S. Senate in September 1991, and ratified by President
George Bush in December 1991. It, however, has not been entered into force due
to the failure of the USSR to ratify it, and the dissolution of the USSR government.
The ongoing constitutional and policy problems with it are as follows:
A. The agreement affects the boundary of Alaska and the land and seabed terri-
tory of Alaska. Nevertheless, the negotiations by the Department of State leading
up to the agreement did not include any representative of the State of Alaska, and
the State of Alaska has not been asked to give its consent to the terms. This exclu-
sion of Alaska has created a constitutional crisis in our federal system of govern-
ment, whereby the federal government is asserting the power to set a state's bound-
ary and compromise a state's territory, seabeds, and property without the participa-
tion or consent of the state. A clear precedent of a state's right in this regard was
set in the boundary between Maine and Canada, the negotiations for which required
the participation and consent of both Maine and Massachusetts (which had residual
interests in the area) and ended up as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. This principle
was very strenuously argued by the state legislatures of Alaska (nearly unanimous)
and California (unanimous) which both passed resolutions objecting to this arro-
gance of power (Alaska Senate Joint Resolution 12, May 1988; and California Sen-
ate Joint Resolution 20, September 1991).
B. At the same time of the signing of the US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agree-
ment on June 1, 1990, Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze signed a side agreement as follows: "* * * pending the entry into
force of that (US-USSR Maritime Boundary) Agreement, the two Governments agree
234
to abide by the terms of that Agreement as of June 15, 1990.* * *" Two major con-
stitutional problems are generated by this side agreement:
1. This side agreement was not made public at the time of its signing; it was
not mentioned in either the President's transmittal of the agreement to Con-
gress, the Department of State's testimony to the Senate on the agreement, the
Committee report on the agreement, or on the floor debate on the agreement.
It came to light only after the Senate vote. This omission leads one to question
whether the Congress had been misled by the Department of State.
2. The validity of this side agreement is in question. It would seem that an
agreement solely by the executive branch with a foreign government cannot re-
sult in exactly the same thing that a treaty would be needed for (as was the
case with the US-USSR Maritime Boundary Agreement). Otherwise, what ne-
cessity would the treaty be? Was the debate and vote on the Maritime Boundary
Agreement merely a pointless sham in the eyes of the Department of State,
which appears to have been operating under its own side agreement to accom-
plish exactly the same terms and conditions as the Maritime Boundary Agree-
ment would.
3. The Department of State appears to have been operating under its side
agreement and implementing its terms and conditions from June 1990 to the
present in the absence of a treaty being entered into force. This raises two
major inquiries: (a) exactly what actions and directives have been done to imple-
ment the side agreement by the Department of State and other executive
branch agencies?, and (b) in the event this side agreement is determined to be
unlawful, what personal liability might there be for this misconduct, and what
governmental liability might there be for takings of property of individuals and
the State of Alaska?
C. The maritime boundary line is drawn in the agreement in such a way as to
place eight islands that are arguably part of Alaska on the Soviet side of the line.
These are Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta Islands in the Arctic
Ocean, and Copper Island, Sea Lion Rock, and Sea Otter Rock at the westernmost
end of the Aleutians. Not only does this call into question the wisdom of conceding
so much of the exclusive economic zone to the Soviet side (i.e. the 200 nautical mile
radius from each of those islands), but it also creates doubts about U.S. and Alaskan
sovereignty over these islands and their seabeds. The areas involved are measured
in the tens of thousands of square miles, and the seabeds could well contain vast
resources of petroleum fisheries, and other valuable assets.
D. The agreement has a unique provision in it which allows a foreign government
to exercise its jurisdiction within the United States. In article 3, paragraph 2, it
reads regarding a "western special area" on the U.S. side of the maritime boundary:
" * * * the United States agrees that henceforth the Soviet Union may exercise the
sovereign rights and jurisdiction derived from the exclusive economic zone jurisdic-
tion that the United States would otherwise be entitled to exercise under inter-
national law.* * *" Such a cession of U.S. sovereignty seems to be unwarranted
and violating the principle that foreign government should have sovereign rights in
the United States only on the grounds of their embassies. Moreover, inasmuch as
the Maritime Boundary Agreement has not been entered into force, it bears inves-
tigating to determine how the Department of State has implemented this cession
of sovereignty under its side agreement, what liability has arisen therefrom.
II. FAILURE TO COLLECT DEBTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Inasmuch as the Cold War was purportedly won for the benefit of the American
public, this has not rung true for the American public with regard to collecting mon-
ies owed to it by the former Soviet Union.
A. Debts to Individuals. — Thousands of claims against the former Soviet Union
have been processed through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, but the
Department of State has not aggressively helped to collect them.
B. Victims of Shootdown of KAL007— The Soviets freely admit to shooting down
the civilian airliner, but have ignored any responsibility to compensate the victims'
families for loss of life or the airline for the loss of the aircraft. One of the murdered
passengers was a U.S. congressman Larry McDonald. The Department of State has
not pressed for damages.
C. World War II Lend-Lease Debt to U.S. Government.— According to the 1972
agreement with the Soviet Union, the Lend-Lease debt was compromised by the De-
partment of State down from approximately $11.3 billion (with no interest from
1945) to approximately $931 million. The Soviets paid $275 million, and the balance
was to be paid when the Soviets obtained most-favored-nation trading status. Sev-
235
eral parts of the former Soviet Union have been granted MFN, but the Department
of State has not pressed for payment of this Lend-Lease debt.
D. World War I Debt to the U.S. Government. — The Russian government debt to
the U.S. government during World War I was defaulted by the Soviets in 1918. In
the 1930s the Johnson Anti-Default Act was passed to prohibit a foreign country
from borrowing in the United States if it is in default to the U.S. government. The
Department of State has refused to press for repayment of this World War I debt,
which amounts to about $1 billion with interest. Moreover, it lobbied hard to pass
a special provision in the "FREEDOM Support Act of 1992" which specifically ex-
empted the former Soviet Union (but no other country) from the Johnson Act.
These failures to collect monies for individuals and for the U.S. taxpayer from the
former Soviet Union appear to be a conscious policy of the Department of State. It
certainly does not reflect the ability of the former Soviet Union to pay its debts. The
former Soviet Union has several billions of dollars in saved defense expenditures
now. In addition, several billions of dollars have been sent out of the Soviet Union
in recent years to foreign bank accounts and other investments. The Department
of State ought to be helping to find those funds and attach them forthwith.
m. SUPPORT FOR SLAVE LABOR IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Widespread slave labor exists today in China (with about 15 million in the laogai
facilities) and the former Soviet Union (with about 4 million in the gulags).
As we all know, the U.S. constitution outlaws slave labor in the United States,
and the Tariff Act of 1930 outlawed the importation of goods made in whole or in
part by slave labor.
However, overseas activities of the federal government are not covered by existing
legislation. The Department of State (including the Agency for International Devel-
opment) does not have a policy to avoid buying slave-made goods overseas for use
overseas; nor does it recommend that other federal government agencies (such as
the Department of Defense) implement an anti-slave labor buying policy for over-
seas purchasing; nor does it recommend that U.S. companies adopt anti-slave labor
policies for overseas purchases for overseas use.
Moreover, the Department of State has been lax in regard to the human rights
situation in China and the former Soviet Union to monitor the slave labor facilities
there, and to assist the Customs Service in its role in enforcing the ban on slave-
made goods. Its "agreement" with the Chinese government regarding the slave labor
facilities there lacks any credibility and enforceability. It has no agreement on the
subject with the former Soviet Union.
IV. FAILURE TO EXERT MAXIMUM EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE JURISDICTION
There are several American islands for which the exclusive economic zone has not
been exerted. Failure to assert the EEZ means the United States is denied the utili-
zation of the 200 nautical mile radius from the island, or approximately 125,000
square miles. These islands include the following:
A. Navassa Island (in Caribbean)
B. Washington Island, Fanning Island, Kingman Reef, and Baker Island (in
Pacific)
C. Nassau (in vicinity of Northern Territories of Cook)
D. Peaked Island (west of Attu in Aleutians)
E. Copper Island, Sea Lion Rock, and Sea Otter Rock (at western end of Aleu-
tians, part of Alaska purchase)
F. Wrangell, Herald, Bennett, Jeannette, and Henrietta (in Arctic Ocean)
Washington, DC,
January 14, 1993.
The Honorable Claiborne Pell,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Chairman: I support the nomination of Warren Christopher to be Sec-
retary of State.
As President Jimmy Carter's Deputy Assistant for Congressional Liaison (Senate),
I was involved in a number of foreign policy and national security issues in which
then-Deputy Secretary of State Christophers analyses, decisions and actions had
enormous domestic and international implications. He never faltered or wavered. In
my view, superlatives cannot adequately describe the depth and breadth of Chris's
intelligence, judgment, perseverance and, of course, his personal integrity and sense
of propriety.
236
Finally, a personal note. I shall always treasure my Presidential commission be-
cause of the two signatures it bears — that of Jimmy Carter, whom I was honored
to serve for 4 years, and that of Warren Christopher, the finest person and the most
able public servant I know.
Sincerely,
Dan C. Tate
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen,
Philadelphia, PA,
January 12, 1993.
The Honorable Clairborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
Dear Senator Pell: I ask permission that the following comments be inserted
in the record of hearings on the nomination of Warren M. Christopher for the Office
of Secretary of State.
While I write this in a personal capacity, my own background includes the follow-
ing: former Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under
President Carter, Alternative Representative to the Third Committee of the United
Nations, Senior U.S. Delegate to the CSCE Conference in Madrid (1980) and Public
Member of the CSCE Conference in Moscow (1991).
I am currently a member of the United States Commission on Improving the Ef-
fectiveness of the United Nations, a Member of the Executive Council of the Amer-
ican Society of International Law, Chairman of the International League for Human
Rights and Chairman of the International Bar Association Standing Committee on
Human Rights and a Just Rule of Law. I am also on the Board of Governors of the
American Bar Association with special responsibilities in the field of international
practice, and am a former member of the ABA Standing Committee on the Judici-
ary.
I have been particularly active in the Jewish community having served as Presi-
dent of the Jewish Publication Committee of America, National vice President of
the American Jewish Committee and Chairman of its Foreign Affairs Commission,
Senior Vice President of the American Jewish Congress, Chairman of the Blaustein
Institute for Human Rights and past President ofHar Zion Temple, Philadelphia
and past President of the American Jewish League for Israel in Philadelphia. I am
a Life member of the Board of Governors of Hebrew University and a member of
the International Board of Governors of Tel Aviv University. I mention these affili-
ations as relevant to comments I will make shortly.
I have known Mr. Christopher since the 1960s, when he first served in the De-
partment of Justice. During that time I was involved in the American Bar Associa-
tion and headed its Section of Individual Rights.
Mr. Christopher was deeply committed to civil rights and civil liberties and exhib-
ited his support time after time to those involved in the civil rights struggle then
f'oing on. At the time, I was on the executive committee of the Lawyers Committee
or Civil Rights Under Law, which I helped found. The Civil Rights efforts of that
Committee could not have had a stauncher friend than Warren Christopher.
During the late 1960s and early 1970, Mr. Christopher was on the Council of the
American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights where he was a champion
of pro bono services by lawyers, legal services for the poor and other endeavors fur-
thering human rights. He would have become chairman of the ABA Section had not
the other duties compelled him to refuse that post.
While I was the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and
U.S. representative on the Third Committee of the General Assembly, issues arose
regarding Israel, State Department reports on Israel and U.N. resolutions on the
occupied territories. Based on my own knowledge and discussions with senior State
Department officials, I can affirm that Mr. Christopher was always sensitive to Isra-
el's security needs as well as its aspiration as a struggling democracy. He gave no
comfort to resolutions lacking proportionality or unfairly condemning Israel, and
was mindful of the fact that for so many years Israel has tried to bring about a just
peace in the Near East and has struggled against bellicose Arab states.
I have been involved in working for the creation of the state of Israel and have
supported Israel's democracy all of my life. I believe Mr. Christopher should be re-
garded as a warm supporter and champion of democracy and security for Israel. Any
contrary implications are unfair and unfounded in reason or fact. As an active mem-
ber of the Jewish community, I wholeheartedly welcome his appointment.
I should also mention Mr. Christopher's support of human rights during his ten-
ure as Deputy Secretary of State. I was entrusted with the mission of obtaining con-
237
demnation by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights of Argentina's Junta and its
role in thousands of disappearances. Part of that mission was to establish a Work-
ing Group to investigate disappearances. Within the State Department, some offi-
cials advocated a neutral, if not sympathetic stance respecting Argentina, and op-
posed these human rights initiatives. I am glad to report that Mr. Christopher vig-
orously supported the human rights endeavors I pursued in Geneva and at the Unit-
ed Nations and did not allow them to be subverted by any State Department official.
Mr. Christopher's exceptional judgment, his commitment to democracy, his service
of our nation and his organizational and diplomatic skills have won the admiration
of all who worked with him over the years. He will add luster to the office of Sec-
retary of State.
President Clinton and this nation are to be congratulated on Mr. Christopher's
selection as our next Secretary of State.
Sincerely,
Jerome J. Shestack
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
Washington, DC,
January 11, 1992.
The Honorable Clairborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC
Dear CHAIRMAN PELL: We are writing to commend the qualifications of Warren
Christopher to serve as Secretary of State in the Clinton administration. In our
opinion, Secretary-designate Christopher is a fine choice for this important Cabinet
position.
Secretary-designate Christopher has impressive credentials for the job of Sec-
retary of State, compiled during a distinguished career in public service and law.
He has demonstrated a commitment to fairness and principle — coupled with a high
degree of honesty and integrity in his work.
Mr. Christopher's background and involvements have prepared him well to imple-
ment the foreign policy positions of President-Elect Clinton. We look forward to
working closely with him and urge the Committee and the full Senate to act expedi-
tiously to confirm his nomination.
Sincerely,
Melvin Salberg,
National Chairman
Abraham H. Foxman,
National Director
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05982 016 5
ISBN 0-16-040654-4
9 780160"406546
90
000
!
J
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11