CONFIDENTIAL— FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES ON
RECENT OPERATIONS
JULY, 1917
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1917
6U&7
WAR DEPARTMENT
Document No. 630
Office of The Adjutant General
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July, 1917.
The following notes on recent operations are published for the
information of all concerned.
[ 350.05 A. G.O.]
llY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
TASKER H. BLISS,
Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL:
H. P. MCCAIN,
The Adjutant General.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 19, 1917.
To all officers of the Army:
You are advised that this and all subsequent documents of a
similar character which may be furnished you from this office
are to be regarded as strictly confidential. They are to be kept
at all times in your personal possession and are not to be copied
nor are any parts of their contents to be communicated either
directly or indirectly to the press npr to any persons not in the
military or naval service of the United States. In Europe these
documents are not to be carried into the front-line trenches nor
farther to the front than the usual post of the officers to whom
issued.
Strict compliance with this injunction is enjoined upon every
officer into whose hands any of these confidential documents may
come.
By order of the Secretary of War.
H. P. McCAiN,
The Adjutant General.
B
664361
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Instructions for gunners drawn from the lessons of the
Battle of the Somme 7
Information resulting from the Battle of the Somme 10
Tlie Hindenburg position 14
Notes on the work of an instruction division in the German
Army 17
Estimates by the artillery of the moment when the enemy
will make his attack 20
Lc ssons to be drawn by the infantry from the combats on
right bank of the Meuse 22
E xperience of the recent fighting at Verdun 24
Some tactical notes on the recent operations up to April
7, 1917 33
Assault battalions in the German Army 38
German army orders 42
Experiences of a division in recent fighting 45
Instructions for battle 48
Underground works prepared by the Germans before
falling back in front of the third army 56
Notes on recent operations in front of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth armies 59
Supply of ammunition in the field 68
Information from captured documents 71
Supplementary instructions as to the construction of defenses. 74
Experiences of the German first army in the Somme
Battle 77
Sketch of the organization and defenses of a division
sector -. 144
5
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
G. K. Q. of the North. North and Northeastern Armies.
General Staff.
Second Bureau. •»«*»» »
At G. H. ,Q., 14tfi~ May, 1917-
[Appendix to the Information Bull stir, j
Translation of a German document.
INSTRUCTIONS— ARTILLERY FIGHTING ON THE
SOMME— PART II.
STAFF OF THE HTH A. C.,
H. Q., Sept. 16, 1916.
The artillery power of the English, as well as that of the
French, continued to increase, as during the first month of
the offensive. Each infantry attack was preceded by an efficient
artillery preparation of very large and heavy caliber guns.
Infantry attacks took place immediately after the artillery
preparation ceased; simultaneously a large zone efficaciously
covered by barrage fire on the terrain of attack prevented the
bringing up of any reserves. The first attacking lines often
escaped our (German) barrage fire; only our (German) in-
fantry and machine "gunners could deal with them ; usually
the last waves were efficaciously caught under our fire. When
the enemy was able to penetrate our lines it was necessary to
eject them by energetic and rapid counter attacks.
The ability of the subordinate commanders who found them-
selves in front consisted in being able to hold their troops well
in hand in order to carry out these decisive counter attacks.
A delayed counter attack wasted lives and time and usually-
had no effect. The enemy, by renewed attacks, engaged our
supports. The enemy was able to gain success because our
troops were hard pressed and were not familiar with the ter-
rain.
The greatest attention should be given to the observa-
tions ~by periscopes in the first-line trenches. Complicated ap-
7
8 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS,
paratus are not necessary. A small mirror at the end of a
stick is the best kind, but it is necessary that each observa-
tion post should have a large number of these mirrors m
reserve, a single one being too quickly demolished by fire.
In all severe engagements in trench warfare the important
point is to determine rapidly the position of our infantry in the
first lines of defense during every stage of the action. This
point must never Jbe lost sight of. When the advanced troops
change position,- tie colored panels (light brown on the side of
the enemy) 'miist'alSQ be moved.
Reports by tele^hoife or sketch are at best incomplete. Pho-
tographs from1 'ballo'o'n or, better still, from aeroplanes, have
been successful in determining the position of the first line.
For photographs, the best way to indicate the positions is by
using strips of white canvas and the firing of magnesium lights,
but the latter must be fired everywhere at the same moment,
so far as possible, when they are called for by the balloon or
aviators.
In determining a battery position be sure that it can still
fire on the enemy if he penetrates our lines, and that it will not
have a dead space into which the enemy can penetrate.
The material damage sustained by our field and heavy guns
has here and there been so great that it is beginning to be
difficult to replace the unserviceable parts, or those damaged by
the enemy fire, especially the barrels. The guns' greatest
enemy is not the enemy artillery, but our rapid fire and the
small amount of care taken of the material. It is necessary
that officers and men should take greater ca*re of their guns
than they have done up to the present, fro gun barrel can re-
sist a too prolonged barrage fire. Barrage fire must be rapid,
but it must only last a few minutes; it should not be recom-
menced except in a case of need. (Note circular of chief of
staff in the field Nov. 3, 1915, No. 17, 411 op.) There must be
buckets full of water behind each gun, and wet, solid canvas to
place on the hot barrels.
It is a false idea to think that demolished and unserviceable
guns should be abandoned to the enemy; they must be taken
to the rear as soon as possible, because certain parts of them
can be used again. This also refers to machine guns and trench
mortars.
In case of an enemy attack the artillery must remain in posi-
tion to the last. When all the gun ammunition has been fired
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 9
the guns must be defended by means of carbines and hand
grenades until an infantry counterattack can bring relief.
On the Somme, as well as at Verdun, our infantry complained
of suffering heavy losses from our own artillery. It is abso-
lu;ely necessary that this be remedied by auxiliary observers
and by artillery liaison officers placed in the first line. Barrage
fire must not be lifted and thrown forward on a hasty and ill-
considered request of the infantry. It must be remembered that,
even with a wrell-regulated barrage, some projectiles may fall in
our own ranks. Consequently, only officers should carry signal
pistols and the like. But, in general, it should never happen
that our artillery fire falls destructively on and behind our line
of infantry as a consequence of our artillery being badly in-
formed as to the position of our first line.
During the fighting on the Somme the enemy aviators de-
scended to within several hundreds of meters of the ground and
sv/ept our trenches with their machine guns. Our aviators must
fU;'ht in the same way, with machine guns and bombs. They
mast practice this manner of fighting.
Signs showing the routes to known columns must be coated
with a luminous color, otherwise they are useless in the dark.
These routes must not be used except in important engagements,
otherwise they are spotted at once.
The approach trenches must be laid out across places and
woods which protect them from view and in which, during a lull,
would be quite safe to traverse. It would be very difficult to
do this after a fight.
It was found, during the fighting on the Somme, that can-
noneers wearing masks at their guns had great difficulty in
breathing. During periods of inaction frequent and progressive
drills should accustom the cannoneers to serve the guns while
wearing masks.
(Signed) V. PLUSKOW.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 11, .1017.
General Headquarters of the Armies of the North and Northeast.
General Staff.
Second Bureau.
[Appendix to the Information Bulletin.]
Translated from a German document.
INFORMATION ON THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
418th Infantry Regiment.
No. 133. Secret. MARCH 10, 1917.
This is compiled from information I gathered concerning the
first army in the Battle of the Somme and which seemed to merit
special attention. I submit it to the division commanders to be
reviewed and acted upon.
What was done in the way of equipment (canteens), clothing
(boots, foot bandages, socks), stores, close-combat weapons,
maps, signal apparatus, boundary tapes? Form four sections of
professional workmeji (tailors and cobblers).
The machine-gun officer of the regimental staff takes charge of
all supplies for the machine-gun companies.
Where are the depots? The supply depot of the regiment is
in the engineer garrisons of the regiment. (For further details
see Army Order, order 1/c, IV/a, No. 5,053.)
What are approximately the resources of the supply depots
of the regiment?
Are the commanders of infantry battalions and engineer com-
panies how in the rear, in readiness or in reserve, familiar with
the terrain? Are the information sections organized?
Are the regimental commanders in touch with the barrage
battalions of their sector? Are the troops supplied with signals
for barrage fire, for destructive fire, and are they familiar with
the instructions for their use?
10
NOTES ON ftECENT OPERATIONS. 11
Barrage fire : Yellow ball signal. Should only be given by one
holding the rank of platoon commander or higher.
To lift the barrage fire: Green signal. To be given only by
company commander or higher officer.
Destructive fire: Red star signal. To be given only by bat-
talion commander or higher 'officer, and used only if the tele-
phone is out of order.
Are the commanders of machine-gun companies in reserve
familiar with their probable positions?
Limits of sectors of divisions, regiments, battalions, com-
panies? They should never follow depressions, ravines, sunken
roads, small wood, isolated farm.
How are reinforcements and supplies brought in? Accurate
knowledge of the roads in the sector.
Do not simultaneously relieve the infantry and the machine
gi ns of the first line.
Density of the first line (experience on the Somme), one man
for every Jf to 6 meters.
Where are your immediate supports? (Immediately in the
rear. )
How are the machine guns distributed? First line: In the
rear of the first line (but preferably by sections). Flanking
fire and mutual support.
For each machine gun of the first line, belts furnished with
at least 3,000 rounds for each gun.
For each machine gun in the rear, belts furnished with at least
5,000 rounds for each gun.
Ammunition depots by battalion (if possible, by company).
The machine-gun personnel should know where the regimental
ammunition depots are situated. The machine-gun officer of
regimental staff must see to this.
The improvement of the organization of the positions by a
system of trenches developed in point of depth (front to rear)
and in the form of a labyrinth, which gives a wide zone of de-
fense.
When forming new positions first build the obstacle in front
of the first line of combat, then dugouts in the second. Organize
localities into supporting points. Determine on the garrison,
designate the man in charge of the orderlies, of the clerks.
Put the communication or approach trenches, at least on one
side, in a state of defense ; obstacles, dugouts.
Combats in and around the first line.
12 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
Reserves ready on time.
Build unceasingly new obstacles. Their destruction costs the
enemy much in ammunition. Flank them with machine guns.
For the obstacles in the rear leave staggered passages for the
counterattacks. The following works are specially important:
The trenches in the rear should be supplied with the greatest
possible amount of munitions, weapons for close combat, the
greatest possible food supply (three rations per man), water,
installation of kitchens.
Up to what line can the portable kitchens be brought? How
food is brought up. The troops of the first line require hot
food.
Dugouts for dressing stations. Wide passages.
Craters transformed into positions are inconvenient and should
be improved. First make nests for snipers for one or two
squads with one or two machine guns and surround them with
wire entanglements ; then connect them up in an irregular man-
ner. The nearer they are to the enemy the less they are in
danger from his artillery fire. That is the reason we prefer to
prepare the craters situated in front, rather than those in the
rear. Incessant work on the positions and efficient organization
of the munitions and food supply keep up the morale of the
troops.
To pass each other temporarily, advance ; that is best.
It is not practical for troops to move to the side to avoid a
wide zone of running fire.
If the enemy observes an evacuation, there is great danger
that he will extend his fire and occupy the evacuated position.
To move to the rear is a fatal mistake, the terrain being un-
der the heaviest fire and the troops being soon demoralized.
The French expect to take us by surprise ; therefore extreme
vigilance should be kept at the front, in all positions of readi-
ness, in garrisons of supporting points, and in local garrisons.
Increased vigilance on dark nights.
Vigilance during foggy weather.
Immediate counter attack, without awaiting orders. For
that purpose, proper distribution of all the troops in rear of
the first line, in garrisons, and troops for counter attack (but
not assembled in mass).
Guard against the incursions or infiltrations of small enemy
detachments by saps, which, little by little, draw large de-
tachments after them. Destroy immediately and systemati-
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 13
cally all such nests. Regarding immediate reaction and pre-
pared counter attack, see " Experience of the First Army on
the Somme." Use the Pioneers to the best advantage. Use
light trench mortars for barrage fire. The battalion com-
manders are responsible for their use.
Where should the companies of trench mortars be placed in
line? Asphyxiating bomb fire, destructive fire. Observe care-
frlly. Distribute the companies of trench mortars at large
intervals, echeloned in small groups in the terrain. Prepare
ammunition in time.
General Headquarters of the Armies of the North and Northeast.
General Staff,
Second Bureau.
No. 12,620.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 14, 1917.
HINDENBURG POSITION.
I.
THE WORKS RECENTLY EXECUTED RESEMBLE THE TYPE OF
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN DEPTH APPROVED BY HINDENBURG.
In a survey of March 26, 1917, and according to information
on hand at that date, the conclusion was reached that " the
fortified position of Hindenburg presented, up to this time, a
linear and regular appearance, without great depth, and which
did not correspond to the regulations set down in Hindenburg's
note of December 25, 1916, on the organization of fortified posi-
tions, in which he demanded the construction of positions of
depth, with dugouts far from the first line, machine guns and
obstacles scattered in depth and not regularly aligned on the
front."
From information received since then the conclusion is reached
that the so-called Hindenburg position becomes more and more
an organization of great depth.
In March only the first position was near completion ; the Ger-
mans rushed work to finish it.
At least several positions are known to be in course of con-
struction north of the Oise; they are echeloned in rear of the
first position to a depth varying from 10 to 15 kilometers.
II.
DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION AND CONDITIONS OF THE WORKS,
Hindenburg's system of defensive organization seems to in-
clude—
First. The plan of two positions out of the enemy's direct
sight, one on the descending slope away from the enemy, the
14
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 15
other on the ascending slope, flanking the first from above and
covering the artillery observation posts.
Second. A series of positions intended to form, with the first
two, a deep system, converted into a rather dense network of
coi imunicating trenches and bordered by wire entanglements.
According to the German orders of December 25, 1916, the
whole should form a network with large links, when the at-
tack, after having broken through a part of the network, is
cai:ght in the links that have resisted.
The positions in rear of the first two seem, as a rule, to be
laid out, as far as trace and interior organization is concerned,
like the second position, in the sense that they do not perhaps
present an obstacle as deep as the first, but they are well
supplied with dugouts.
It is quite possible that the positions will be doubled later,
to form a series of consecutive systems similar to that formed
by the first two.
Generally speaking, the works are more or less advanced,
and their trace seems to be well defined. The first positions
may be considered completed. The second positions are already
completely laid out. The third and fourth positions are under
construction ; in some places they are only staked out.
Everywhere one finds they have taken pains to place the
obstacles and to dig the dugouts before constructing the trenches.
According to refugees, they intend to make the maximum use
of the cellars in the village, reinforced by cement, and con-
nected with each other by subterranean passages.
III.
ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS AT THE BEGINNING
OF MAY.
(a) District between Lille and the road to Cambrai : In this
sector there are three positions on a depth of 15 kilometers.
In rear of the above-mentioned Drocourt-Queant line two
positions appear to be in course of construction, one on the
general front Cuincy (northwest of Douai) Goug-sous-Bellonne,
and the other on the Waziers, Arleux, Sains-les-Marquion line.
It is interesting to note that owing to the construction of the
cross trenches (already well advanced) Inchy-Villiers-les Cagin-
court and Bouilon-Marquion the Drocourt-Qu6ant line and the
Wajiers-gains-les-Marquiou line, can, one after the other, ex-
16 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
tend the Hindenburg position, the very important organization
of the Moeweres district serving as a pivot.
(&) District between Cambrai and the Oise: In this sector
there are four positions on a depth of 10 to 15 kilometers.
It is in this district that the organization in depth is the
most evident, as foifr consecutive positions have been made out.
The first position has already been described in detail. Ac-
cording to latest information, it is almost entirely finished.
The second position now exists on the entire front ; it passes
Flesquieres, le Pav6 (north of Banteux), West Aubancheul,
Le Cutelet, Mauroy, Magny-le-Fosse, south of Lenergies, Reman-
court, Fermstilloy, Homblieres, Regny, Sissy. Distance from
the first position, 1,500 to 2,500 meters.
This position is protected along its entire front by wire. The
trenches are almost completed, but the communicating trenches
are shallow. A great many dugouts for the personnel, the ma-
chine guns, and trench mortars are finished or under construc-
tion.
The third position passes to the west of Cambr.ai (information
obtained from returning refugees). It was found by aircraft
from Lesdain, and follows the line of Estries, Fontaine-Uterte,
Fonsomme, Fontaine-Notre Dame. Distance from the first posi-
tion, 4 to 6 kilometers.
It is under construction. The trenches are not continuous.
In only a few places it has a first line, and a supporting line,
usually shallow. A line of wire runs along the entire front.
Only a few dugouts are finished.
Finally, the fourth position passes to the west of Wallincourt
and Malincourt, to the east of Montbrehain, to the southwest
of Fresnoy-le-Grand, to the southwest of Montigney-en-Arrow-
ceise, and ends on the Oise near Macquiny. Distance from the
first position, 7 to 15 kilometers. On the east side of the Oise
it is extended to Sains-Richaumont. This fourth position has
not been completely photographed. It appears to be entirely
discontinuous, shallow, and equipped only in places with wire.
Inside these positions — which may be called the principal
ones — there are sometimes intermediate ones. For example, be-
tween St. Quentin and the Oise a position of this kind follows
the Mezieres-sur-Oise, Ferme de Lonval line, and passes west to
Mesnil-Saint Laurent.
(c) Forest of St. Gobain: Little is known about the works
in the St. Gobain Forest. We only know that the first position,
is completed.
G. a. Q. of the North and Northeastern Armies,
General Staff,
Second Bureau.
At G. H. Q., 19 May, 1917.
[Appendix to the Information Bureau.]
Translation of a German document.
NOTES ON THE WORK OF AN INSTRUCTION
DIVISION.
2l£T Div. INF.
Bb. No. 155. Secret.
H. Q. OF THE Div., 2 March, 1917.
First. INFANTEY. — Organization of combat companies accord-
ing to special instruction and equipment of the men. Only
occupy each position as long as it is necessary to hold it. Study
the defending garrisons, the hidden groups of machine guns,
and the supporting points. Cover the artillery and observing
stations after arriving at an understanding with them.
Second. THE ALARM in case of a gas attack or a serious
alarm does not require a very considerable displacement of
troops. Consequently troops are placed in fighting position dur-
ing a calm period. A serious alarm must be quickly met by
special orders, by the establishment of many advance posts, by
the occupation of machine-gun shelters, etc.
Third. COUNTEBATTACKS are made, whenever possible, by
several columns in line and by enveloping columns. The ad-
vance must be made not only by communication trenches, but
also on the open terrain. As often as possible commence by
placing the special attacking troops in such a way that they
will not be checked by our own obstacles.
Fourth. GROUPS OF RUNNERS at intervals of 300 to 400 meters.
No isolated men. Several groups commanded by a sergeant.
Indicate the roads by means of transparent colored paper.
Fifth. THE RESERVES must constantly make known the points
they have reached. Thus only can the moment of their arrival
and intervention in action be calculated.
Sixth. AUXILIARY DEFENSES must not be placed too near the
supporting points, so as to protect the garrison from grenade
3577°— 17 2 17
18 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
attack. It is important to dispose of the auxiliary defenses in
such manner as to separate the attacking waves of the enemy
into several fragments (chiefly in the zone situated between the
two first positions) and to draw them, without their knowing it,
under the fire of our hidden machine gun posts and supporting
points. In this way the action of the enemy will be seriously
weakened, even in places, annulled, and the support of the
artillery greatly interfered with.
Seventh. MACHINE GUNS. — Light machine guns of model li
have proved themselves to be particularly effective and easy
handle. (Mobile reserve of machine guns.) They use them ii
groups, particularly in the first position. The company of im
chine guns is posted behind them. The infantry (one or two
groups) covers the hidden machine guns (center of resistance).
Eighth. LIGHT TKENCH MOBTABS. — The effects of their bursting
projectiles is excellent. Consequently these weapons are well
adapted to fighting moving objectives and for barrage fire. They
are echelpned in depths the same as the machine guns. They
are under the orderg of the battalion commanders, and, if circum-
stances demand it, the regimental commanders. Light trench
mortars generally come into action with the barrage fire, ab-
staining from firing beforehand and disguising their ranging fire
in that of the artillery. Covered shelters often are not available
and it may be necessary to make use of substitute emplacements
which are open but well masked. The mortars should be utilized
in groups. They have barrage fire tables the same as the artil-
lery. They should strengthen the barrage fire of the artillery
on the particularly important or threatened points. Cooperation
is necessary. If the light trench mortars are also used for dem-
olition fire it is necessary before they join in the barrage fire that
they should change their positions in order to be ready to open
fire and to be efficaciously screened from the enemy artillery.
Ninth. GRENADE THROWERS. — For defense during calm periods
place them at the disposal of the commanders of companies to
execute demolition fire and to check the work on the enemy's
trenches, etc. If the struggle becomes too violent, they are used
by their own officers in groups or in sections, especially for bar-
rage fire. They are used to make the barrage fire denser the
same as the light trench mortars (echeloned in depth). In
the attack place them in the first line or immediately behind it ;
advance them in three or four \vaves to harass every movement
of the enemy, to bomb "the depressions and communication
trenches, etc.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 19
Tenth. DIVISIONAL COMPANY OF TRENCH MORTARS. — They will
be employed under the orders of the commanding officer of the
division pioneers. The medium and heavy pieces will be espe-
cially used in demolition fire against the observation posts, the
mi .chine-gun shelters, the shelters for the troops, and the tanks,
etc. The trench mortar fire is also used to fire on the sectors
which are to be subjected to barrage or annihilating fire. Once
engaged in action, the company is at the disposal of the com-
m? nder of the sector, under whose orders it fires. Its fire must
be coordinated with that of the artillery. Mutual understand-
ing is necessary. Graphic tables of barrage and annihilating
fire must be made. In executing certain duties (preparation of
counter attacks) the company will sometimes be under orders
of the commander of artillery (by special order of the division).
Eleventh. Fire on aircraft with machine guns is carried out at
the same time by several groups of machine guns, which will
change their place immediately, in order to screen themselves
from the fire which will be directed against them by the aero-
planes.
Twelfth. COMMUNICATION. — The commander of the combat
battalion will establish communication by visual signals, not
only with his own regiment, but also with the combat battalion
of the adjoining sector, profiting by the rare moments which
present themselves. With this aim in view, agree on a small
number of important signals, for example, " All is well," "An-
nihilating fire demanded," etc. Signal panels, well stretched
out, should be used, giving the aircraft clearly marked outlines,
in order to make them easily recognizable (canvas on wooden
frames) and in order that the aeroplanes may easily distinguish
mine craters, water holes, etc.
FINAL REMARKS. — The defense is strongly reenforced by trench
mortars, grenade throwers, and light machine guns. — Barrage
fire must not be looked upon as the only means of repulsing an
attack, but the excellent defensive arms of the infantry should
be used normally and thoroughly. Furthermore, confidence
must be developed in rifles, grenades, bayonets for hand-to-hand
fighting, as this is the latest and best method. For the conduct
of the fight and the occupation of posts under heavy artillery
fire of the enemy, see the corrective plan of the defensive battle
sent in on March 1.
S. WENDORFF.
MARCH 3, 1917.
General Headquarters of the Armies of the North and Northeast.
General Staff.
Second Bureau.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 14 May, 1917.
[Appendix to the Information Bulletin.]
Translation of a German document.
HOW THE ARTILLERY MAY ESTIMATE THE TIME
WHEN THE ENEMY INFANTRY LAUNCHES ITS
ATTACK.
APRIL 16, 1917.
Group of regiments of field artillery.
THE ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE GROUPS OF REGIMENTS OF
FIELD ARTILLERY.
I call attention to the fact that, according to the new pro-
cedure of attack of the French, the task of destroying the artil-
lery devolves, the greater part of the time, on the heavy artil-
lery and that of medium caliber, by intensive fire. The enemy
proceeds at the same time with the destruction of obstacles
and defensive organizations by means of mines, plunging fire,
and guns- of small caliber.
When he considers these two objects have been attained he
then begins the attack. It is at this time, as a rule, that he
uses intensive fire with his heavy and medium caliber guns in
order to support the infantry attack immediately, and with the
available batteries of small caliber (75 and 105) he tries to
destroy that part of the artillery that he does not believe to be
entirely disabled.
The cessation of the bombardment by the guns of medium
and heavy caliber is consequently a good indication that the
enemy passes to the attack. This point must not be lost sight
of by anyone connected with the battery, from the battery com-
mander to the youngest gunner. Taking into consideration that
the infantry can not recognize the moment of attack because
of the progressive advance of the enemy fire, and consequently
20
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 21
that we can not count iipon any signal for barrage fire, we
must begin our own barrage fire at the moment indicated above,
and immediately use all our forces and guns capable of being
firod. Every available man jumps to the guns and executes
barrage fire to the fullest capacity of the pieces.
Each officer and each soldier connected with the battery
should realize from the above that at that moment our success
or failure and the issue of the entire battle may depend upon
hi^ acting with initiative and self-sacrifice. The batteries which
have not observed a change of caliber in the enemy artillery
fire or that are still under its fire should also take part in
the barrage fire of the other batteries. We can be sure that
enemy infantry which has ever been subject to our annihilating
acd destructive fire and still retains the memory of its effect
will not leave its trenches if at the right moment we drop our
barrage fire on it.
All the gunners should be informed of this order.
(Signed) BUEDE.
General Headquarters of the Armies of the North and Northeast.
General Staff.
Second Bureau.
AT GENEBAL HEADQUARTERS, Hay 14, 1917.
[Appendix to the Information Bulletin.]
Translation of a German document.
LESSONS TO BE DRAWN BY INFANTRY FROM THE
COMBATS OF THE RIGHT BANK OF THE MEUSE.
Plushon groups.
No. 810.
STAFF OF THE XI ARMY CORPS, March, 1917.
The reports of the army group of the Imperial Crown Prince
have the following lessons for the infantry from the failures
at Verdun:
All infantry officers should be clear in their own minds of
the exact manner in which they desire to conduct an active
defense by infantry. They should prepare themselves by drills
in typical defense works (the lines may be shown by means
of white ribbons). The adopted method should be one familiar
to the infantry and artillery, as the cooperation of the artil-
lery, the intelligence service, and aviation corps are of the
greatest importance in actual combat. This requires practical
exercises and criticisms on the terrain and the map. The
artillery officers concerned should attend.
It is not the material strength of a position but the skill and
spirit of the defense that repels an attack.
The posts of infantry officers, including the brigade com-
manders, are on the battle field, in a position where they can
personally control the tactical situation without being dependent
on their telephone connections. They should choose their post so
as to have their reserves immediately at hand, and they should
transmit to their reserves such combat orders as their own
knowledge of the terrain and tactical observation dictate. As
22
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 23
means of communication between themselves, couriers may also
be used, according to circumstances, and shelters must be pro-
vided for them. A position well echeloned in depth on the
flanks, close communication, and cooperation in the fight with
the neighboring troop should prevent any bending back of the
fla:iks of the sector.
] request the division to notify me whenever any practice of
active infantry defense takes place. I desire that the infantry
commanders, from the brigade up, should ascertain from their
staff officers whether the measures of defense correspond with
the above.
I shall expect a report on this matter by March 27.
The commanding general.
(Signed) KTJHNE.
18:5d Div. IH. 645. Secret.
DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 20 March, 1917.
The brigade will select and organize a command post corre-
sponding as nearly as possible with the requirements expressed
above. The command posts of the regiments and of the bat-
talions will be again inspected. Whenever they are found not
to meet with the above requirements, others must be immedi-
ately constructed. They must make sure to find the regimental
C. P.'s with C. P.'s of the subordinate groups of artillery whose
batteries execute barrage fire in the sector of the regiment.
The brigade will submit a report by the 26/3 on this subject,
and on the state of advancement of the work.
The infantry exercises of active defense, executed by the bat-
talions in billets and by the reserves (where such exercises can
take place) must be reported to the division two days in advance
in the evening report. Each company in billets should, during
its rest period, execute at least one active infantry defense,
using the model defensive work.
Translation of a German document.
EXPERIENCE OF THE RECENT FIGHTING AT
VERDUN.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
25 December, 1916.
Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army.
Il/Ia. Nr. 42728 op.
Secret. T.40.
Not to be taken into the trenches.
The serious and regrettable reverses sustained at Verdun dur-
ing October and December have led me to issue the following
orders :
1. CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSES.
The principles laid down in the textbook "Construction of
Defenses " (Stellungsbau) have proved sound. Single lines of
trenches do not suffice. A fortified zone must be constructed,
organized in depth, allowing of a stubborn defense of an area
even after the capture of fragments of its lines of defense.
The rearward portion of this zone will, therefore, consist of
a system of strong points, machine-gun nests, etc., merging
toward the front into an increasingly closer meshed network of
trenches. The individual trenches, machine-gun nests, etc., must
afford each other mutual flanking support.
Deep mined dugouts in the front-line trench will be absolutely
prohibited. They simply form man traps and will, therefore,
be blown up wherever they exist. The place for the majority
of the dugouts (which should be of concrete and be well dis-
tributed and masked) is in the rearward lines and in the in-
termediate zone. Vast subterranean accommodation is only
admissible for reserves far in rear.
Of greater importance than a wide obstacle covering the front-
line, trench, which will, in any case, always be destroyed in a
serious attack, is the construction of a number of obstacles
within the fortified zone, namely, along the communication and
switch trenches, and farther in rear, forming a part of the
24
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 25
strong points. These obstacles form the meshes in which an
enemy who has broken through is caught, and which prevent
him from surrounding the portion of the garrison which has
hell out in the front line.
Difficulties will be added to the enemy's reconnaissance and
artillery work by the construction of the greatest possible num-
ber of targets and by making them difficult of recognition (also
of dummy defenses).
At Verdun, where there were too many dugouts in the front-
line trench, a proportion of the infantry did not get out of them
quickly enough. A close-meshed network of trenches was lack-
ing, as were also obstacles running perpendicular to the front.
2. OBSERVATION.
Observation both for artillery and infantry must be assured
even under the heaviest fire. This is not the case when, as at
Verdun, observation is mainly carried out from the front-line
treach. It is preferable to construct a network of observation
posts located at points in rear. The view from one post must
supplement that from another.
In addition, constant observation of the enemy's activity,
from balloons and by artillery and infantry aeroplanes (con-
tact patrols), must, of course, be absolutely guaranteed.
Finally, one must insist that infantry quartered in deep dug-
outs and shelters protect themselves effectually against sur-
prise attacks by posting lookout men and by frequent visiting
rounds. The large number of unwounded prisoners shows that
this was not properly done.
3. METHOD OF HOLDING THE POSITION AND THE INFANTRY
BATTLE.
As pointed out in the "Defensive Battle" (AbtvehrschlacJit)1
(see more particularly pars. 6, 13, and 15), a stubborn defense
alone will not lead to the desired result.
The front-line trench can not be too thinly held. Distribution
in depth is essential, even for a company. Each strong point
must have, its definite garrison, which will be responsible for
holding it.
1 Not yet captured.
26 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
Only isolated machine guns will be taken into the front-line
trench; they will usually be kept in carefully selected positions
behind the front line, concealed and posted checkerwise, fre-
quently in hollows, which are difficult to detect from the air and
can not be reached by the artillery ; their main task is to open
a surprise flanking fire on an enemy who has broken through.
The operation of bringing machine guns into position and re-
lieving them will be specially supervised.
Reserves must also know their way about the sectors of the
divisions on their flanks. When fighting conditions permit, a
certain tactical situation will be assumed, schemes will be set,
and maneuvers carried out over the actual ground. Tactical
work in the front-line position and tours of inspection must be
exacted from senior officers, from the battalion commander to
the higher commander or the latter's staff officers. In certain
circumstances, the regimental commander, just like the bat-
talion commander, must personally lead forward his reserves.
No one, from the counter-attacking squads of the front-line
garrison down to the divisional reserves, is to wait for orders
to counter attack, but each will act on his own initiative.
During training the following must be practiced and super-
vised :
The counter attack, from that of the counter-attacking
squads of the front-line garrison to that of the larger
reserves.
The measures to be adopted by the front-line garrison,
while awaiting the counter attack of the formations in rear,
against an enemy who has broken through and is surround-
ing this garrison.
The action of the emergency garrisons posted in machine-
gun nests and strong points.
At Verdun these arrangements partially broke down. Units
in rear showed a lack of offensive initiative. Portions of the
foremost fighting lines, which were gallantly holding out, were
left in the lurch by those in rear and fell victims to the enemy.
4. THE ARTILLERY BATTLE.
As in the preceding case, if proper arrangements are made for
the battle, the enemy's attack can be anticipated.
Nevertheless, at Verdun, artillery support appears to have been
lacking.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 27
It is not quite clear to what extent the enemy's artillery was
engaged by our own. To engage the. enemy's artillery (with the
help of aeroplane observers) is, however, the principal and
most effective means of fighting a defensive battle to a success-
ful conclusion. Should this succeed, the enemy's attack is
absolutely paralyzed.
\Vhen the enemy's infantry attack is imminent, fire must be
more, and more concentrated on the enemy's infantry as well.
1 1 so doing, it is not advisable to direct a destructive fire on
successive portions of the enemy's position chosen arbitrarily.
Piro will preferably be directed on points where work is in
progress and where effect against living targets may be ex-
pected. The same holds good for harassing fire, for which, in
certain circumstances, gas shells are particularly effective.
For both kinds of fire, observation and supervision are the
main factors for obtaining effective results (see above).
Ihe destructive fire to be directed on the enemy's front-line
trenches will be increased, both as regards the number of bat-
teries engaged and the expenditure of ammunition, in propor-
tion to the increase of the enemy's fire on our infantry lines.
It will be increased to annihilating fire as soon as a maximum
rate, of fire on the part of the enemy, or other signs, denote that
the attack is about to be launched. From this time onward the
mass of the artillery, even including the 21-centimeter mortars,
will concentrate fire of the utmost intensity on the enemy's start-
ing points and assembly trenches, so as to annihilate the troops
held in readiness for the attack before they can move to the
assault. Arrangements must be made for annihilating fire to
be broken off like barrage fire, but, in any case, only on re-
ceipt of an order from a senior officer (battalion commander).
During these short phases of the battle there is to be no
thought of economizing ammunition.
This procedure does not debar individual batteries from simul-
taneously continuing to sweep valleys and ways of approach, so
as to prevent reserves from being brought up. At such mo-
ments, also, it is advisable to neutralize sections of the enemy's
artillery by using gas shell.
It is the duty of all artillery commanders to acquire a prac-
ticed eye and ear and to utilize every means of reconnaissance
and observation to gauge accurately the moment at which the
maximum intensity of fire should commence. In no circum-
stances should this increase of fire take place only when the
28 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
infantry ask for barrage fire, as, in that case, the most effec-
tive, period for engaging the enemy's infantry, the period of
assembly, is missed. On the other hand, the duration of anni-
hilating fire will, naturally, always be strictly limited.
When the enemy's attack is launched, barrage fire will finally
be opened automatically. Barrage fire is purely a means to repel
an attack. The artillery must, however, assume the offensive
not only against the enemy's artillery but also against his
infantry. Acting on their own initiative, artillery of all calibers
and also the Minenwerfer will devote their main strength to
seeking and engaging the most favorable targets and not merely
to putting up a purely mechanical barrage.
Well-organized barrage fire, important as it is, does not neces-
sarily by itself afford absolute, protection. The enemy may either
run the gauntlet of our barrage or else draw it before the
attack, and, at the decisive moment, endeavor to neutralize it
by opening fire with gas or high-explosive shell. Or, again,
he may make a detailed study of the lie of our rather mechanical
barrage, with the result that he will find points which are less
heavily shelled than others and will make his way through
them with few casualties.
It thus follows that the barrage must be flexible, i. e., it must
be mobile so as to correspond to the probable movements of the
enemy.
Observation and fire control (cf. par. 2) must be also aimed
at during the annihilating and barrage fire. This will gen-
erally be achieved by transforming automatic and spontaneous
unobserved fire as soon as possible into observed fire. For this
purpose it is often possible for the aeroplane observer to fly at
a low altitude, far behind our own line, and as though perched on
a giant observation ladder, and communicate with the batteries
in action not only by wireless but by means of the simplest
signals. Only thus will it be possible to engage fleeting targets
and to punish immediately any imprudence on the part of the
enemy — batteries moving across the open, infantry advancing
or concentrating without cover.
But even making allowances for considerable improvement in
our artillery work, the infantry must clearly understand that
artillery can only relieve them of a part of the defense, and that,
finally, it is the infantryman who has to repulse the enemy at
close quarters with machine gun, rifle, hand grenade', and trench
mortar.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 29
5. ARTILLERY COMMAND.
The long ranges, combined with the difficulty of obtaining a
general view of the country, necessitate the general allotment
of targets and fire control being carried out by the higher com-
mand, from the group of armies downward, even for artillery
under divisional commands. The higher commanders must issue
precise instructions for the artillery battle and must not hesitate
to £;o into details when it is a question of cooperation between
neighboring sectors. The division, for its part, must daily
define the tasks for its artillery. (See par. 23 of the " Defensive
Battle.") Fire-control practices must constantly be held. If,
in addition to the issue of precise orders, there is a thorough
supervision of the work of all grades (down to and including the
observers), the artillery will prove equal to its task.
6. RELIEFS.
Timely relief is very important (see the "Defensive Battle,"
par;*. 9 and 18) ; it can only take place gradually and requires
the most careful preparation. The infantry has frequently, for
example, to relieve the unit farthest in rear, and then gradually
work forward until the front line is reached. Regiment must
hand over to regiment, and battalion to battalion, etc. The out-
going commander may only leave the position with the consent
of the commander who is relieving him. This method should
insure that during the actual relief there is always one unit in
the position which knows the ground, and that the incoming
unit gradually obtains a knowledge of the position.
The relief of artillery, other than divisional, demands special
attention, and experience shows that this matter often receives
less consideration.
During pauses in the fighting, batteries belonging to armies
and groups of armies must be withdrawn, which will also give
them an opportunity to overhaul their material.
The same principle holds good for pioneers and other auxiliary
services.
7. MORALE, CARE OF TROOPS, AND SUPERVISION OF
COMMANDERS.
The number of prisoners (which was unusually large for Ger-
man troops), some of whom evidently surrendered without offer-
30 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
ing serious resistance and without suffering heavy losses, shows
that the morale of some of the troops engaged was low. The
reasons for this require most careful investigation. The whole
spirit of the German infantry must be revived by means of
training and the strictest drill, as well as by educating and in-
structing the men. It is a matter of vital importance to our
Army that the proper steps be taken.
This question is closely allied to that of looking after the
troops in regard to clothing, food, and quarters, adjustment of
work and rest, equitable allotment of leave, as well as the per-
sonal example of all ranks. I particularly wish to emphasize
the fact that under the extraordinarily difficult fighting condi-
tions at Verdun, this latter point is just as important for fight-
ing efficiency as are correct tactical decisions.
The supervision of officers, particularly of the more senior
officers, must be searching, and the above-mentioned matters
must also be taken into account. Any officer incapable of doing
his work will be summarily removed from his post. Long leave,
given in time, will frequently suffice to enable officers suffering
from nervous strain to recuperate and return to their work.
8. TROOPS AT REST.
Troops which have been withdrawn must be given facilities
for rest and training. The necessity for bringing them up to
dig trenches is an evil which can not be completely avoided.
Training and inspections alike must reflect the spirit of the
foregoing. The attack will also be practiced by higher forma-
tions.
As remarked in paragraph 7, training for battle is not sufficient
by itself, but must be combined with drill. The experience of
war confirms the principles of our peace training.
(Signed) v. HINDENBURG.
PRECIS OF AN ARMY ORDER ISSUED BY THE GERMAN FIRST
ARMY.
An order issued by the German first army, dated 11 January,
1917, with reference to the above, lays stress on the following
points :
(a) The garrison of the front-line trench should be reduced
to a minimum; one man to every 6 yards (see (&) below).
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 31
(&) Only a feiv deep dugouts should exist in the front-line
trench, sufficient to accommodate a minimum emergency garri-
son. The scale should be one dugout every 55 yards, to hold a
group (i. e., one N. C. O. and eight men) or two dugouts every
110 yards to hold two groups each. Larger dugouts to hold
mo:*e than two groups will not be constructed in future in the
fro it-line trench.
(c) The existing dugouts in the front-line trench should be
reduced to the scale laid down above, by dismantling them, by
nailing up the entrances, or by digging a new front-line trench
in iront of the existing one, where the enemy's line is not too
close.
(d) The depth of these dugouts below ground should, if pos-
sible, be reduced by constructing them of concrete, steel, and
girders. In no case may they be a greater depth than that re-
qui red to provide 20 feet of earth cover.
(e) During an intense bombardment, observation will be ef-
fected from posts in rear of the front-line trench or by individuals
momentarily issuing from the dugouts in that trench.
(/) Strong, wide obstacles, arranged checker-wise, must be
erected in front of the second, third, fourth, etc., trenches of the
first-line position, particularly in front of the deep dugouts ;
similar measures must be taken in front of the positions in rear.
(g) Lookout posts must always be manned even in the rear
trenches and positions.
(h) A trench must be provided in front of the deep dugouts
for the supports; this trench must be easily accessible and de-
fended, and should be wired.
(i) The emergency garrison of trenches behind the front-line
trench will not take part in counterattacks.
(;) Machine guns will be sited mainly outside the trenches,
particular care being taken that all hollows running perpen-
dicular or parallel to the front can be brought under fire.
(fc) Every infantry commander must have a reserve at his
immediate disposal, with which to counterattack.
(I) As soon as an attack is expected, all supports and reserves
must be held ready under cover at the points where they are to
be employed in counterattack or defense. They can not be
formed up methodically, and in time, if they are only brought up
after the enemy has attacked.
32 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
In the case of operations of some months' duration, the above-
mentioned information must be constantly maintained, in spite
of the hardships involved.
(m) Arrangements are to be made for switching artillery
fire rapidly onto an enemy who has broken through. This can
be done by direct laying or by fire control from a good viewpoint,
which must be close to the batteries.
(n) Single guns, sections, and batteries will be pushed for-
ward to open harassing fire, and these will also be employed
against " tanks " as required.
GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
28 February, 19111.
SOME TACTICAL NOTES ON THE RECENT OPERA-
TIONS UP TO 7TH APRIL, 1917.
I.
RIFLE BOMBS.
The following extract from the report of a company com-
mander who has been engaged in the recent fighting is circu-
lated as being of interest :
During the recent operations in the Serre-Bucuoy district the
rifle bomb has proved very effective in dealing with machine
guns which, in conjunction with wire, were being used to delay
our advance, and which, unless knocked out very quickly, did
considerable damage.
The rifle bomb, used in cooperation with the Lewis gun, rifle-
men, and occasionally bombers, has been the chief weapon, as it
has been found that, provided cover can be given by the Lewis
gun and riflemen, the rifle bombers can approach to within range
and by a sudden and rapid barrage can knock the gun or team
out, make it withdraw, or enable the Lewis gunners, riflemen,
and bombers to advance.
It has been found that if the Lewis gun opens fire first the
German machine gunner will almost invariably direct his
attention to it, and, owing to the apparently limited traverse of
the German machine gun, the rifle bomber can work around to
either flank and get within range.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
2 April, 1917.
II.
MACHINE GUNS AND LEWIS GUNS.
It is reported that during the recent advance on the Somme
battle front advantage could not be taken of good targets owing
3577°— 17 3 33
34 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
to the range being too great for Lewis guns to deal accurately
with them.
This points to the advisability of some machine guns being
placed well forward in an advanced guard to deal with fleeting
targets. If so placed, they can also be used to hold important
tactical points which may have been gained.
In this connection, attention is directed to "Notes on the
Tactical Employment of Machine Guns and Lewis Guns "
(S. S. 106), page 6, paragraph 4.
GENEBAL HEADQUARTERS,
3 April, 1917.
III.
ADDITIONAL POINTS BROUGHT OUT IN OPEN FIGHTING UP TO
APRIL 7, 1917.
1. CAVALBY AND MOUNTED TROOPS. — (i) Considerable success
was obtained despite action being necessarily restricted.
(ii) Machine-gun fire, like shell fire, can be ridden through, if
it is not intense, and provided no check is allowed to occur.
(iii) Turning movements should be made wide and in some
strength.
(iv) Mounted attack by small numbers of cavalry on similar
numbers of infantry was successful.
(v) During halts as much wire as possible must be cut to
allow of room for maneuver.
(vi) A sound preconcerted plan for the cooperation of artil-
lery and machine guns in the attack is most necessary.
(vii) When possible, long-range guns should be pushed for-
ward in support of cavalry.
(viii) Supporting infantry should, when possible, keep liaison
with attacking cavalry.
2. ARTILLERY. — (i) Teams of guns moved forward should re-
main at hand.
(ii) F. O. O.'s pushed well forward with telephones proved
invaluable, as there was no hostile barrage to cut the lines.
(iii) Covering fire of 18-pounders and 4.5-inch howitzers can
not be too far exploited.
(iv) There was a tendency, due to trench warfare, among
C. R. A.'s to attempt to control individual batteries. Brigade or
group commanders should be given a task and allowed to carry
it out. >
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 35
3. INFANTRY. — (i) Relentless pushing forward of patrols night
and day to occupy points of vantage is the surest means of suc-
cess. Patrols can not be too venturesome or too tenacious of
ground gained. They must cooperate with one another along
the ]'ront, if necessary covering each other's advance by fire.
(i:.) A tactical point is not necessarily held in strength be-
cause a machine gun is located in it.
(i:i) Fire from rifles, machine and Lewis guns to cover
movement is as effective as ever.
(iv) In dealing with tactical points, including villages, the
importance of combined action of all infantry weapons was
clearly proved. Rifle grenades were used with great effect.
The 3-inch Stokes mortars also proved most valuable. These,
like machine guns, can not be used too far forward in an
advance. If even 30 rounds only can be got up to the gun, its
moral effect is often sufficient to induce the enemy to quit his
position.
(v) Visual signaling is of utmost assistance.
(vi) An advance party of Royal Engineers is required well
forward to reconnoiter for removal of obstacles left by the
enemy. This party should be mounted on horses or bicycles.
(vii) Villages should usually be avoided. Their attack in-
volves heavy losses and when occupied they become shell traps.
They are better captured when possible by a turning movement.
(viii) The amount of personal activity required from an
advance-guard commander is very great.
(ix) All ranks adapted themselves readily to open fighting,
despite few opportunities for previous instruction.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
10 April, 1917.
Headquarters of the Armies of the North and Northeast.
General Staff.
Second Bureau.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, April 26, 1917.
[Appendix to information bullentin.]
BATTALIONS OF ASSAULT.
(Based on the Provisional Regulations for the Instruction of Foot Troops in
the Field, of January, 1917, and Information from Other Sources.)
I.
In General.
Battalions of assault have been organized in each army for
the purpose —
1. Of facilitating the special preparation of the greatest pos-
sible number of officers and noncommissioned officers as instruc-
tors in the war of position and, principally, for close combat.
2. In order to work out further improvements in the methods
of attacking fortified positions.
The battalions of assault are not merely instruction battalions,
they are also combat units assigned to the execution of attacks
in which the conditions of execution are particularly difficult.
The instructors of the battalions of assault seem to have been
trained in a common training center for all the theaters of op-
erations (reports from the Russian General Staff). This train-
ing center is said to be near Longuyon in a special camp where
training is carried out by Col. Rohr (mentioned in the exhibit
herewith ) .
So far, up to the present, one or two battalions of assault
have been identified with each army. These battalions had the
same number as that of the army to which attached. But an
order of the seventh army, dated 18 September, 1916, informs us
that the battalion of assault of that army had been abolished on
account of the constant renewal of the elements of that army.
86
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 37
The army corps then received the mission of themselves organ-
izing battalions of assault on the same lines as the army bat-
talion of assault (exhibit herewith). At present the battalion
of j ssault is accordingly not only an element of an army, it may
also be an element of any army corps.
II.
Organization — Composition.
The noncommissioned officers and privates who form a bat-
talion of assault are specially selected. They are young, strong,
single men, or married men without children. Sometimes even
the more unruly or undisciplined men of the company are taken.
(From statements of prisoners.) The drafts from some com-
panies have amounted to 25 men. The best of them have re-
mained with the battalion after a course of training, which lasts
sis weeks ; the others are sent back to their organizations,
where they form platoons of assault or patrols when needed to
execute raids. Under certain conditions these platoons may be
united into one company of assault by infantry brigade; the
companies in their turn may form a battalion of assault for an
army corps.
The composition of a battalion of assault varies. The follow-
ing composition of the second battalion of assault of the third
army is given as an example.
This battalion was commanded in March, 1917, by a captain
assisted by a lieutenant. It was composed of four companies
of assault, each of 100 men and 3 officers ; one machine-gun com-
pany of 6 pieces (model 1908) ; one company composed of
trench mortars and bomb-throwing machines (4 heavy and 4
light trench mortars) ; eight bomb-throwing machines, two
bomb-throwing machines to throw winged bombs ; one company
of flame throwers (4 heavy and 4 light machines for making
flames) ; one battery called an assault battery of 4 pieces (cali-
ber 57 mm., i. e., 2i inches).
III.
Training.
It is both theoretical and practical.
(a) THEORETICAL TRAINING. — Its object is to enable the offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers detached from their organ-
izations to take advantage of the experience acquired in action.
3S NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
This instruction concerns itself chiefly with the following
points :
Instruction of the infantry, especially the groups of assault,
in the methods of the war of position. Employment of the
groups of assault and of the armament placed at the disposition
of the battalions of assault. Cooperation with the infantry by
all the special weapons of the battalions of assault during the
attack. Besides, the noncommissioned officers and men must
understand the effects of the German and foreign arms, the
methods of liaison between the infantry, the machine guns, the
trench mortars, the artillery, and all the means of close fighting
in the offensive and defensive.
( & ) PRACTICAL TRAINING. — Iron discipline, strong professional
pride, great self-confidence mean success in assault troops even
more than in any other troops. In every drill, in every duty, the
object to be attained is to harden the body and stiffen the char-
acter. The noncommissioned officers must confront their 'men
with confidence and bear themselves as superiors, with initiative
in ideas and deeds. The troops of assault must be accustomed
to all the methods used in combat.
Their training will be carried out on special ground. They
are trained to perfection in trench fighting as well as in the
management of German and foreign machine guns.
The different exercises comprise:
Throwing of German and foreign grenades ;
Passage of various sorts of obstacles;
Destruction of barbed wire with cutters and explosives ;
Use of automatic rifles and pistols.
Actual maneuvers with the use of flame throwers.
After a detailed training of the soldier, first individually,
then in groups, drills are carried out with the simultaneous em-
ployment of all the arms used by the assault battalions in order
to increase the men's confidence in each other and to assure in
action an effective support and teamwork.
The following points are especially dwelt upon during train-
ing, making use of works made for the purpose and varying the
details as much as possible:
Attack of an enemy trench ;
Attack through several enemy lines and positions;
Counter attacks;
Cleaning up nests of the enemy ;
Combats between machine guns and small strong points;
Repulse of enemy counter attacks.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 39
It is recommended that these maneuvers be carried out with
the infantry ; if none are available, men can be taken from the
assault battalion to represent them.
Experience acquired in action can be utilized in the organi-
zation of these maneuvers and to serve for the special in-
str action of the assault battalions.
IV.
EMPLOYMENT.
The assault battalion has its definite place in the scheme of a
regularly organized attack. It is under the direct orders of the
commander charged with execution of this attack. It is espe-
cially useful in the struggle for the possession of a fortified po-
sition, but these chosen troops also form a combat unit under
many other conditions. At times it may be expedient to supply
them with bicycles or to transport them by automobile.
When an assault battalion must be employed during a long-
drawn-out action or in a counterattack it must be sent in ad-
vance to the sector where it will be engaged in order to avoid
having its entrance into action delayed by preliminary recon-
naissances and the long march through the approaches which it
would have to make if it started from a rest camp.
The battalion of assault furnishes groups of assault to the
infantry. It must avoid giving whole platoons or companies for
this purpose in order to preserve all its combative power and to
better utilize the individual valor of its men.
Before an attack the officers and group leaders of the assault
battalion make the necessary reconnaissances with the infantry
commanders.
They are responsible for the regular execution of the attack
by the groups of assault.
Preparatory exercises carried out with the infantry, on a se-
lected drill ground, increase the chances of success and give to
the assaulting troops confidence, cohesion, and surety of execu-
tion.
During an attack the groups furnished by the assault battalion
must lead the infantry at the difficult points. They make the
breaches across the enemy trenches, destroy the machine guns
and, strong points, and aid the infantry in the organization of
the conquered position. In their mission they are supported by
the special armament of the assault battalion.
40 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
After the attack the battalion assembles all of its detached
elements and becomes available for new duties. However, it
must not be withdrawn from action except on the order of the
infantry commander who directs the action.
V.
Equipment and armament.
The equipment and arms of the troops of assault have been
prescribed in the appendix of the Information Bulletin of Sep-
tember 23, 1916.
VI.
Employment of the auxiliary arms.
1. Grenade throwers, Model 1916. — Some grenade throwers can
be given to each group of assault. These can be placed either in
immediate rear of the starting position or in the second line. A
short time before the beginning of the assault they should throw
their projectiles on the points where breaches are to be made,
taking them obliquely, if possible.
2. The light trench mortars. — The light trench mortars are
in battery in preference in immediate rear of the position from
which the attack starts. They have the same purpose as the
grenade throwers, model 1916.
3. The light flame throwers. — These pieces of apparatus have
the special mission of facilitating the attack on the trenches and
in attacking the small strong points of the enemy. In the attack
of a trench they spray the parapet before the infantry moves
forward, so as to prevent the enemy from defending himself.
In the attack against a strong place the apparatus must be
brought up as close as possible, and under cover, either on the
flanks or in rear of the work'. In order to reach it the de-
fenders must be held down by a frontal attack of machine guns.
The light flame projectors must be kept under the constant pro-
tection of the assault groups. As soon as the apparatus is in
action the infantry must push forward at once to occupy the
enemy trenches and exploit the success.
4. Infantry guns— The role of the guns of the infantry is to
attack either from the position which the infantry holds or from
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 41
places even nearer them, close the various positions that, either
because of their small size or their location, can not be reached
by the artillery at a great distance. These objectives are
principally given parts of the trenches, cover for machine guns,
flank defenses, posts of sharpshooters, observation stations, etc.
Infantry guns serve also to repulse an assault.
5. Other arms. — The arms of heavier types which also are
placed at the disposal of the assault battalion are employed,
undor normal conditions, which are already understood.
Translation of a German document.
ARMY ORDER.
VII Army, General Staff.
Pi.— No. 717.
Subject: Assaulting elements.
SECRET.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1916.
The frequent changes in the units which form the army,
changes which one must expect to be even more frequent in the
future, rentier it unfortunately impossible to longer maintain the
integrity of the units of assault of the army. On the other
hand, the special training for the " service of assault " is indis-
pensable. The long duration of the war, the development of
technical methods, the undeniable progress of the enemy in-
fantry, and the difficulties which trench warfare impose upon
the instruction of noncommissioned officers and privates, require
the augmentation of the offensive force of a part of the infantry
and of the engineers and the placing at the disposal of the com-
manders of units of a special force most carefully trained.
This special training will henceforth be intrusted to the army
corps.
Accordingly, in canceling the provisions of the order of the
VII army II, 6 Pi 244, Secret, and Pi No. 10535, I order the
following :
1. The assault detachment of the VII army is discontinued.
Its quarters at Mons-en-Laonnois, its drill grounds and buildings,
as well as its instruction materiel, as far as it does not belong
to certain bodies of troops, are to be assigned at once to the First
Bavarian Reserve Army Corps and will be employed by the
assault detachment which will be formed by that corps (see
par. 2). The First Bavarian Reserve Corps will report having
taken it over. The officers, noncommissioned officers, and men
will, as soon as possible, join their own units. They will take
with them the property they brought with them. Capt. Mun-
chau, commanding the assault detachment, will stand available
for further orders on 16th of September, at the latest.
The officer placed in command of the assault detachment of
the First Bavarian Reserve Corps is advised to communicate
as soon as possible, in person, with the commander of the
42
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 43
assault detachment of the army, in order to acquaint himself
with the experience which has so far been obtained.
All returns and papers of the assault detachment, including
the route diary, and the orders and instructions received by
it, must be sent to the Chief Engineer Officer of the Army.
2. The army corps will themselves organize assault detachments
from the personnel which has already been trained in the assault
detachment of the army, from officers, noncommissioned officers,
and men taken from the companies of infantry, engineers, and
mint nwerfer (trench mortar) detachments. It is of utmost im-
portance that this personnel be chosen with great care. The
composition of the assault detachment of the army and its
organization and methods in use may well serve as models for
the assault detachments of the army corps whose effectives
will remain under the control and jurisdiction of the corn-
man lers of the army corps.
As. soon as their degree of instruction will permit, courses of
instruction of the same kinds as those in the assault detach-
men ; of the army will be organized in the assault detachments
of the army corps.
3. The officers, noncommissioned officers, and men who have
taken these courses will form a group of assault in the infantry
battalions, the strength of which will, as soon as possible, be
brought up to that of a half platoon. If circumstances permit,
and the personnel under instruction is sufficient, it will be
possible to make more rapid progress carrying on instruction
also within the regiments and battalions.
In assembling the groups of assault in the interior of the
brigade, a company of assault may be formed provisionally for
special missions; in the same way, a battalion of assault may
be organized for the army corps. Except when a special mis-
sion is assigned, the groups of assault must remain with their
battalions so as not to permanently deprive them of this selected
and trained personnel. Special training of the assault groups
must be constantly continued within the battalions.
The returns of the officers to be assigned individually from the
assault detachments to the Rohr battalion of assault 1 must be
sent on the first day of each month to the general staff of the
army (general of engineers).
4. In all these assault units, instruction must be pushed to its
limit. The greatest possible skill in the utilization of terrain
and in crossing obstacles, as well as complete mastery of all
1 Instruction battalion, organized near Longuyon.
44 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
means of combat (German and foreign arms, machine guns,
grenades, bomb throwers, light trench mortars, etc.), are indis-
pensable factors of success. The cleaning up of the enemy
trenches and their immediate utilization for combat are a par-
ticularly important part of the instruction. In all training
effort must be made to develop in each man the quality of firm
decision and a taste for attack. Cooperation with the sector
garrisons, the trench mortar batteries, the field and the heavy
artillery must be studied in all the training, which will be
executed according to a definite plan.
The men must be taught to feel that assignment to the assault
troops is a high distinction. The man thus assigned may be
aided in feeling this by the fact that his difficult duty excuses
him from the normal fatigue duties of the trenches and secures
him, in addition, good quarters and good food. It is also recom-
mended that he be favored in the distribution of rewards. The
man who has not proved his personal valor and zeal should at
once be relieved from duty in the assault units, without any
personal consideration whatever.
5. As soon as the assault units have been sufficiently trained
they must be given an opportunity to show their value by in-
trusting them with the execution of an operation which has
been minutely rehearsed. As a general rule, the sector garrisons
should take part in them. The directors of the operation decide
whether the control thereof is to be intrusted to the commander
of the assault troops or to the commander of the sector. For
such an operation not only is good instruction required in the
assault units but also the taste for attack and the feeling of
superiority over the enemy must be developed in the sector garri-
sons. The purpose is to cause permanent damage to the enemy
and to find out conditions in his front lines (prisoners). Avoid
any great sacrifice of human life and any great expenditure of
artillery ammunition.
6. All assault units are temporary formations. Their per-
sonnel is considered as on detached service.
7. The commanders of army corps will report to the army
commander the time and place where assault detachments will
be formed ; they will state their strength ; who is designated to
command and when their first course of training will be over.
The contemplated inspections will be announced two days in
advance.
THE ARMY COMMANDER,
VON SCHUBERT.
Issw d down to — Company commanders.
Squadron leaders.
Battery commanders.
EXPERIENCES OF A DIVISION IN RECENT FIGHTING.
ISSUED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, MAY, 1917.
The following extracts from the experiences of a division are
published for information:
1. After the first advance the enemy was particularly quiet.
Men were able to show themselves on the western slopes of the
ridge without being fired at from the neighboring village. It
was also possible to walk up to the tactical point at the tower,
whi^h had been previously strongly held by the enemy as an
observation post.
The commander of the battalion concerned, on hearing of this,
at once went up with a view to advancing his line. On his way
up to the tower he caught sight of the enemy approaching it in
threes and fours by short rushes. Without hesitation he ordered
the nearest platoon to charge the tower and establish themselves
east of it. The platoon dashed at the tower and arrived there
almost simultaneously with the enemy. The platoon established
itself east of the tower, killing about 20 of the enemy and taking
three prisoners.
That night three unsuccessful bombing attacks were made on
the tower. During the battalion relief the next night the enemy
opened a heavy bombardment on the tower and its immediate
vicinity, following it up with an attack by two companies of
infantry. This attack succeeded, chiefly owing to the relief being
in progress. A local counterattack delivered by the incoming
battalion failed owing to the darkness, pouring rain, and lack of
knowledge of the ground.
It was then decided, that nothing could be done till daylight.
All guns were ordered to be carefully ranged on the tactical
point as soon as it was light enough to see. The artillery reported
all ready at 11 a. m. The attack was. ordered for 12 noon. The
batteries opened fire on the enemy at 12 noon on a front of about
200 yards, and two companies of infantry retook all the lost
ground without a single casualty.
45
46 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
LESSONS.
(a) Boldness of action makes for success.
(&) The presence of an officer on the spot who can grasp
a situation quickly is invaluable. Much lies in the hands of
battalion commanders in this matter.
(c) If after a successful attack by the enemy an immediate
counterattack is unsuccessful, it is essential that the artil-
lery shall have sufficient time to register the target care-
fully before further counterattacks are launched.
2. Later a general advance took place. The attack proceeded
satisfactorily, as far as the division was concerned, and the ob-
jective was reached.
During this period four batteries had been sent forward to be
ready to assist in the second phase.
For various reasons, however, by 11 a. m. all the troops were
back in the original line.
It happened that in the arrangements for the advance the
supporting brigade was to take over the defense of the line. It
was, therefore, close up and all the officers and men knew the
ground.
Five and a half hours' notice was given for a fresh attack
and proved sufficient. The artillery barrage needed some slight
adjustment, owing to the absence of the four batteries which had
been sent forward.
The barrage started punctually at 6 p. m., and the infantry
commenced to move forward.
All went well for the first 300 yards, when an enemy machine
gun in a railway cutting opened fire and caused a check ; im-
mediately some rifle bombers fired rifle bombs into the cutting
and the machine gun ceased fire. This enabled the troops to go
forward again, but the barrage had meantime moved away from
them, and machine gun and rifle fire was immediately opened on
them from a trench some distance ahead. The whole line
commenced advancing by section rushes supported by the fire of
alternate sections. In this way the advance continued until the
left of the line had gained the flank of the* enemy, when the fire
of a well-placed Lewis gun caused the enemy to surrender.
The remainder of the advance to the objective was carried out
in a similar manner by short rushes supported by rifle fire. By
the time the troops were established in the objective they hnd
about 50 rounds per man left out of the 170 with which they
started.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 47
The battalion commander accompanied his rear company and
was in conversation with some of his company commanders
during the whole attack. He and the company commanders were
able to employ fire power as the situation demanded and keep a
grip of the fight.
LESSONS.
(a) Supporting troops should be so placed and have such
knowledge of the ground that they can be employed at short
notice.
(&) All ranks must be taught to use their rifles readily
and to employ fire to cover movement. The artillery bar-
rage is to be regarded as a useful adjunct and not a necessity.
(c) In open fighting battalion commanders should go
forward in rear of their battalions so as to be able to take
charge in the later stages.
Issued down to — Battalion commanders.
Battery commanders.
Regimental commanders.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLE.
ISSUED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, MAY, 1917.
Not to be Taken into the Trenches.
1. The Extracts and Summaries, compiled from captured
documents, which have recently been issued from general head-
quarters, as well as other extracts published from time to time
in Intelligence Summaries, are of value as showing the prin-
ciples and methods on which the enemy's defense is based, and
which we have to meet and overcome. Commanders of all
grades should study these extracts thoroughly, and always with
the object of considering, first, how to defeat the enemy's meth-
ods when we are attacking him, and, secondly, what we can
learn from him as regards the strengthening of our own de-
fenses, so as to enable garrisons to be reduced, thus not only
saving casualties, but making it possible to mass larger numbers
for an offensive.
2. The field marshal, commanding in chief, desires to call spe«
cial attention to the following principles which underlie all thy
enemy's instructions:
(i) The constant insistence on the supreme importance of a
spirit of determination to endure and to conquer at all costs.
(ii) Although this spirit of determination is the main factor
in success, no material precaution which skill and foresight can
provide is to be neglected.
(iii) The defeat and destruction of the hostile infantry is tht
aim to be held constantly in view. All means available and all
methods employed must be directed toward this end.
3. These three fundamental principles do not differ from
those on which we also rely. It is on applying them more thor-
oughly than the enemy that we must primarily depend for suc-
cess.
4. Another point of great importance is the advantage of sur-
prise. In some instances the enemy ascribes his failure to this
48
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 49
cause. For example, the following, relating to the Vimy Ridge
attack, appears in one of the captured documents :
"Although the intended attack was well known beforehand,
the reply of our artillery was very feeble during the first days
of the artillery struggle, and its fire was not intensified until
too late, so that at the decisive moment our infantry were left
without the protection of their artillery. It appears that an
art llery preparation of several days' duration on the part of
the enemy was counted on in certain places, and that, in conse-
quence, the fire of our artillery was reserved, with a view to
insuring a sufficient supply of ammunition during the decisive
dajs."
5. In consequence of this and other similar experiences the
enemy prescribes very active counterbattery work in future,
but always with the same ultimate aim — the defeat of our in-
fantry. The different ways in which his artillery is to assist in
this ultimate aim are clearly explained in the captured instruc-
tions, and we must be prepared for the possibility of more active
hostile counterbattery work, more artillery fire on our assem-
bly trenches, and a heavier fire on our advancing infantry in
future attacks.
6. This possibility, however, is nothing new. We know that
the enemy has done his utmost in all these respects already,
and no extraordinary improvement is likely. In guns, ammuni-
tion supply, and observation from the air we have a very
decided advantage, and the skill of our artillery and our air-
craft in combination has been proved more than equal to any-
thing that the enemy can do.
7. We can increase or decrease the duration of our bombard-
ment as we please, and vary its nature, always subject to the
essential need that wire shall be sufficiently destroyed. We can
vary the time and often the place of our assaults, and by these
and the various other means of deceiving the enemy which
have been tried already with good effect — provided secrecy as
to our plans and intentions is maintained — we can always keep
him in doubt as to when — and sometimes as to where — the
assault will start, and so gain at least some measure of sur-
prise.
8. If the enemy enters on an artillery duel our undoubted
superiority in artillery and munition supply will enable us to
exhaust his ammunition and destroy many of his guns; while
such guns as he may still have in action when our infantry
assaults are no more likely in the future, than they have been
in the past, to check our advance across " No Man's Land."
3577°— 17 4
60 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
Once our troops have reached his trenches his artillery fire on
our leading waves is masked for a time, and we know that a
considerable proportion of his infantry then fail in that spirit
of determination to conquer, on which the final decision must
always depend. The number so failing will certainly not de-
crease as the war goes on.
9. Wo have therefore nothing new to expect in these re-
spects, and the methods we have already employed will still
prove effective, so long as they are worked out with the utmost
care and applied with initiative, skill, and determination.
10. The system of defense on which the enemy relies after
our assault has been launched is also explained clearly in the
captured instructions. It does not differ in principle from
what we have experienced and have overcome during the last
few weeks and in the battles of the Somme offensive. To speak
broadly, the enemy depends on several systems of trenches,
each of several lines, with a considerable distance between the
systems ; this intervening space is defended by strong points
and fortified localities flanking each other, giving a cross fire
to the front, and plentifully supplied with machine guns. The
trench lines have strong points at intervals, giving mutual flank-
ing fire, and the garrisons are meant to hold out to the death
to beat off attack, or, failing that, to facilitate recapture if the
position or any part of it is lost. In this system of defenses the
enemy's troops are disposed in depth; the object of the whole
arrangement being first to wear down and then to destroy the
attacking infantry.
11. The Germans lay down that fighting is to be for, but not
necessarily in the first line; but it is clear that this does not
mean that the garrison of the first line is not to defend it to
the last. On the contrary, it is laid down that only army and
corps commanders, and " in most urgent cases " divisional
commanders, may authorize the abandonment of any position,
although under certain conditions a limited degree of move-
ment is permitted — e. g., troops in shell-hole positions may move
in order to reduce losses from hostile artillery fire, but the
movement should be local and forward or to a flank.
12. Ifc is clear, therefore, that in the future, as in the past,
the garrisons of the enemy's first lines will attempt to fight
in them, and when we have captured them the enemy's troops
disposed in rear will fight for them by utilizing any marked
pause in our advance to counterattack without delay. When
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 51
our advance pushes on into the spaces between the lines or
systems of defense, the fortified localities and machine guns in
those spaces are depended on to cause us delay and loss and to
open up further opportunities for counterattack. In short, the
enemy's system is well designed to fulfill the principles on which
it is based, viz, to wear out and then destroy the attacking
infantry; and with this object in view the enemy's infantry is
disposed so that it can be brought into action in successive
bodies, those in front preparing the way for the blows to be
launched later by those behind.
13. The principles of the tactics we have employed hereto-
fore against this system of defense have been proved sound,
although some improvement in details and in execution will
always be possible.
14. Speaking generally, we have only been partially success-
ful rp to date in pressing home the great successes invariably
gainod in our first advance, with sufficient rapidity to derive
full advantage from the demoralization of the defeated hostile
troops^
The exhaustion of the attacking troops, combined with the
greai: depth in which the enemy's defenses are organized and
his troops disposed, render the immediate exploitation of suc-
cess very difficult.
But the strength of the defense lies in the spirit of the
troops ; and by hard fighting we are steadily progressing toward
the time when the morale of the men opposing us will be
broken. Then no system of defense, however sound, will suffice
to check our advance. Meanwhile, any improvements which can
be made in our methods and in the execution of our attacks
will hasten the enemy's downfall.
15. Our chief problem, then, is how to push each advance far-
ther than we have been able to do in the past, while retaining
the power to beat off counterattacks with equal or greater
certainty than before, with less loss to ourselves and with
greater loss to the enemy. The thorough knowledge of the
enemy's principles and methods, gained by experience and by a
study of the documents captured, furnish the data necessary for
the solution of these problems, provided we remember that no
solution can be satisfactory which fails to take into full account
the physical and moral powers of our own men or makes greater
demands on them than they can meet.
52 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
16. From our intelligence service we know before a battle
the strength and approximate fighting value of the troops imme-
diately opposed to us. We have accurate maps of the enemy's
defenses ; we know from his instructions that normally his
troops in these defenses will be disposed in depth, in three bodies
of approximately equal strength. We can calculate, therefore,
with considerable accuracy the strength of the forces to be over-
come by each of our successive waves of assault, and adjust the
numbers we allot to each wave accordingly.
The passage of our rear waves of assault through the enemy's
barrage presents difficulties, but various ways of overcoming
it have been tried with success, and the enemy will always
experience at least equal difficulty in passing his counter-
attacking troops through our barrage, so that he certainly has
no advantage over us in bringing troops from the rear into
action.
17. In short, the principle of successive employment of troops,
in order to wear down the enemy and then throw fresh reserves
in to destroy him, applies to the attack as well as to the defense ;
and as the attack will probably always be considerably superior
in numbers and in weight of artillery fire the advantage lies
with it, provided the strength of each assaulting wave is care-
fully adjusted to its task and no more men are employed in
each than are really required ; and also provided the rear waves
are pushed on in succession as and when opportunity offers or
occasion demands.
18. The enemy's system of local counterattack, as applied by
him, must be regarded as offering us valuable opportunities
of inflicting loss and demoralization. We know by experience
that, in accordance with these captured instructions, local coun-
terattacks are launched at once on the initiative of local com-
manders. We have seen that as a result they are almost in-
variably launched piecemeal, seldom in great strength, and
often with little or no artillery preparation or support, and
they have almost invariably failed, with heavy loss to the
enemy, as they are bound to fail against staunch infantry
(even without artillery support) who have confidence in their
weapons and know how to use them.
19. Each counterattack beaten off means heavy moral and
material loss to the enemy, and. commencing with a considerable
superiority of numbers, a few hours of this style of fighting
must leave us in possession of the last reserves on the battle
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 53
field, provided we have not used up our superiority by making
our leading waves unnecessarily strong. The problem to be
solved is how to bring these reserves into action, under control,
at the right time and place, and, if possible, well supported by
artillery.
Wo have but a few hours at our disposal, since the enemy
only requires time to bring up fresh troops from elsewhere;
and it will seldom be advisable to expose our troops, tired, in
some disorder after their advance, without prepared defenses,
and without efficient artillery support, to the assaults of any
large masses of fresh troops. What profits us most is that
these fresh hostile troops should be hurried into attacks, which
we have made all preparation to meet whilst they are mov-
ing up.
But if our advance has come to a standstill, the enemy will
probably not throw in these troops as they arrive, but will take
time to secure new defensive positions in our front, and to pre-
pare for methodical counterattack. His dispositions to gain the
necessary time for this, as we have seen in all recent battles,
consist of strong points held by his staunchest men, and numer-
ous machine guns very difficult to locate. This is the style of
defense we have to find means to overcome, with as little delay
as possible, on the first day of every battle, after our main
forces have reached their farthest objective and defeated prac-
tically all the formed bodies of trooops immediately oppposed
to them.
20. A study of these conditions makes it clear that, in broad
outline, the general and normal method of procedure should be
as follows in a battle on a great scale :
(i) Close study of the disposition of the enemy's troops up to
the last moment, to determine what hostile forces we have to
deal with during the first day, what forces are likely to arrive
subsequently and how soon, and what their probable line of
advance to the battle field will be.
(ii) Determination of the successive objectives, and of the
final objective to be captured on the first day. The defensibility
of each such objective to be taken into careful consideration,
including facilities for artillery support (although our infantry
must be trained not to regard that as indispensable to the defeat
of a counterattack).
An enemy's trench line is not necessarily a good position to
halt on, even temporarily, though mopping-up parties to deal
54 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
with it are indispensable and must be provided in sufficient
strength and made to understand how much depends on them.
The best objectives to choose will almost always be those be?t
suited to cover the advance of our artillery to more forward
positions, so that infantry and artillery continue to work for
each other, from position to position.
(iii) Very close study of the ground between the enemy's
successive lines of defense, and of the ground beyond our
farthest main objective, so that probable strong points and
machine-gun positions may be located beforehand and artillery
fire concentrated on them in due course.
(iv) Careful adjustment of the strength and number of
successive waves of assault to the tasks allotted to them. Each
stage of the advance to reach a line to be then held against
counterattacks, and garrisons for this purposes to be definitely
allotted. The final stage (for the day) of the main advance to
be on a line chosen for its defensive capacity, especially as
regards giving cover to good artillery positions to which our
guns can advance.
(v) Some troops to be held in hand from the outset especially
to exploit success beyond the farthest main objective. The
theory of their employment being that they will come into action
after the enemy's main forward bodies have already been de-
feated, when the opposition met with will be from small gar-
risons in strong points and scattered machine guns. Their task
will be to overcome these, to capture guns and prisoners, to seize
and occupy strong points themselves well in advance of our
farthest main objective, and to reconnoiter as far as may be
possible beyond them, in order to get touch with the advance
of hostile fresh troops coming up from elsewhere. These cover-
ing troops should act against the hostile reinforcements coming
up on much the same principles as the enemy's strong points
act against us — delaying the advance and causing as much loss
and confusion as possible. If they succeed in seizing and hold-
ing a good general line of defense it will generally be advisable
to reinforce them and fight on that line, if the general situation
admits of this. Otherwise they must fall back if attacked, but
not otherwise — drawing the enemy after them — to the line we
have chosen for defense while preparing for our next advance.
Small bodies of cavalry (corps mounted troops) working in
combination with infantry, tanks, and field guns will be best
for this duty. They can be got forward quickly, and it is un-
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 55
likely during the first day of the battle that masses of cavalry
can be got forward sufficiently rapidly or would find sufficient
room for their action. Their opportunity will come later when,
by a rapid succession of advances, conducted on the above prin-
ciples, open country is reached beyond the enemy's fully pre-
pared systems of defense.
(vi) To permit of the free action of these light troops thrown
boyond our main farthest objective, artillery barrages must be
adjusted to the situation.
This main farthest objective must be chosen with due regard
to the possibility of efficient artillery support against strong
and methodical attacks by fresh reserves in considerable num-
bers. But such attacks can not come (usually) for some hours,
and against such attacks as the enemy is likely to make on the
first day of battle, after our farthest objective has been
reached, our infantry should be able to hold their own, and
must be prepared to do so, assisted by such artillery as can be
lushed well forward, and covered by the light troops thrown
cut in front. Unless this can be done the system proposed can
not be effectively applied.
21. In conclusion, two main dangers to the complete success
of an advance and to the retention of ground require special
notice.
One of these is failure to " mop up " immediately and thor-
oughly behind our advancing lines, with the result of the ad-
vance being checked and perhaps forced to fall back by fire
from the rear. The other is the danger of allowing the enemy
to hold out in "pockets," from which he assists subsequent
counter-attacks and frequently delays and disorganizes our sub-
sequent advance.
Although the leading waves of an assault should not halt
owing to these pockets, provided there is room to pass between
and establish the line beyond, it is important that the enemy
thus left behind should be rounded up by reserves furnished
from the rear without delay, at any rate unless the advance
has swept so far beyond as to render these pockets powerless
for harm. In that case surrender can be brought about at our
leisure.
Tanks, in cooperation with infantry, are very useful for
dealing with such pockets, and it will usually be advisable to
hold some ready for the purpose.
UNDERGROUND WORKS.
Prepared by the Germans Before Falling Back in Front of the Third Army.
(Information furnished by the Engineer Corps.)
I.
IN TOWNS.
Investigations in the towns of Noyon and Roye, with the ob-
ject of discovering underground mines, show that it is especially
in the neighborhood of important crossroads that the Germans
have constructed their works. Most of them exploded, but a
number of them failed to go off. A certain number of timber-
cased branch galleries were found, the work on which was in-
terrupted, either because of the overflow of water in the
ditches or because of deliberate abandonment, due to a change
of program, or because of lack of time, the withdrawal having
been sudden.
IN ROYE.
(a) On the ground floor of a house situated at the corner of
a crossroad it was found by raising the floor and digging that
the Germans had dug about 5 meters below ground to strike
into a sewer (masonry). In a certain part of the sewer, where
the sound made by stamping with the foot indicated a hollow
below, a new well — not deep — was discovered. from which two
galleries, with mine casings of 1.80 meters, led off. At the
bottom were found two mine chambers, each one having a
charge of 75 kilograms. The charges consisted of prismatic
packages of " perdite," each charge having in its center a primed
fuse. It was to be fired by electricity. The electric wires were
cut. According to information furnished by the inhabitants,
this work was done since September, 1916.
(&) In the same town were found, along a boulevard and
at intervals of 40 meters, wooden troughs containing two copper
wires joined together with which the current from a high-ten-
sion transformer was connected. These troughs were level
with the ground.
56
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 57
(c) On one of the corners of the Grande Place (central
square) of Roye, outside the walls of one of the houses, were
found the ends of four wires which pierced these walls. The
enemy did not have time to explode the charges, which were
to be fired by electricity from without.
IN NOYON.
(d) Here all houses, especially their cellars, were thoroughly
explored, and in certain large houses (hotels) listening by
" geophone " was resorted to, which would have revealed the
presence of clockwork in the walls ; but nothing of a suspicious
character, from this point of view, was found. It was seen
that the Germans had excavated the cellars of the cathedral
and of the bishop's palace, as well as those of surrounding
houses, but these excavations were done with an archaelogical
object in view — that of disclosing the- foundations of a Galeo-
Rom in wall — and also for the purpose of discovering the hiding
place • of precious objects.
In the Rue de Chauny several open shafts were found under
the sidewalks, and ending in timber-cased branch galleries with
mine cases. Most of these branch galleries were abandoned
when they became flooded. In one place, where two branch
galleries ended under a crossroads, two charges, one of 100
kilograms and the other 50 kilograms, were taken out. But,
with this exception, neither wire conductors nor explosives were
found anywhere.
Boulevard Mouy also had shafts and abandoned branch gal-
leries. In the Place de la Republique the Germans blew up
some surface sewers with charges of " mine " shells of 240,
inclosed in wooden cases.
II.
ROADS.
Roads were destroyed:
1. Where crossed by trenches. (Excavating the entire width
of the road. Trenches 5 to 8 meters broad ) .
2. At crossroads (very large craters).
3. Crossing streams — the entire width of the road, running
upstream and causing a slight overflow.
In towns, as at the crossroads, the Germans formed craters
by means of two charges, placed either' at the ends of two branch
58 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
galleries leading from a gallery or shaft, or at the ends of two
bores started from both banks of a road.
The following was found at the crossroads Guivzy-Guiscard-
Ugny: A double mine at each entrance of the crossroad. Six
mines, only two of which were exploded, placed two together at
the center of the road by means of bores. Ignited simultane-
ously in series of two mines to each group. Charges inclosed in
zinc envelopes eight-tenths millimeter thick and soldered. Steel
cover with a cap for the charge and priming, and a small steel
cylinder to touch off the mine.
Fired by electricity. The explosive was a dark brown, muddy
consistency and gave a strong odor of nitrobenzine. It was
wrapped in parchment paper. There were two mines of 33
kg. at a depth of 2 meters. Diameter of crater, 5 m. ; that is,
the width of the road.
III.
CANALS.
It was found that the enemy was usually content to blow up
the locks of a canal by charges placed near the hinges, in the
abutments, and in the center pier, so as to make two breaks in
the canal. Serious injury also resulted to the mason work. This
was especially noted at Appilly. Aside from destroying the
locks, the Germans made breaks in the towpaths, which caused
the water to overflow into the low-lying portions of the valley.
One canal was transformed into a river by direct connection
between it and the Oise at Channy.
IV.
INUNDATIONS.
A vast system of inundations was carried out in the region of
Noyon. It included :
1. Two dikes, with joint piles, preventing the rivers from
following their courses.
2. Stopping culverts with cement.
3. Destruction of bridges where crossed by roads and rail-
roads downstream from the town.
4. Upstream, two successive barriers of piers, forming two
jetties at road crossings, were constructed.
5. In the towns the obstruction of all sewers and drains with
paving and other material was carried out.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
On the Fronts of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies.
The following further lessons drawn from the experience
gained from recent operations in trench, open, and village fight-
in:?, deserve careful study.
It is worthy of note that a study of all actions substantiates
th? soundness of prewar methods.
ARTILLERY. — (a) It has been proved that, with deep objectives
aid a tendency on the part of the enemy to employ his bat-
teries at long ranges, strong and continued support of the at-
tacking infantry can best be insured by having the greater part
of the artillery, both field and heavy, placed well forward so
tl at the utmost value can be obtained from its range. The im-
portance of the principles laid down in Artillery Notes No. 4.
Section IV (3) has been emphasized again and again.
(&) It is essential to arrange for cooperation between corps
artilleries, so that every opportunity for enfilade fire, both in
wire cutting, trench destruction, and in counter-battery work,
may be fully exploited.
Barrages and wire cutting should overlap at the junction of
corps for about 100 yards.
(c) Harassing fire by day on unseen communications has
proved to be of great value. (Artillery Notes No. 4, Section
V (2).)
(d) The importance of good counter-battery work can not be
overrated. Early location of hostile batteries, destruction dur-
ing the period of preparation, and neutralization at the moment
of assault, are the main essentials.
The value of gas shells for neutralization is undoubted, and
no opportunity for their employment against an enemy who is
trying to move his guns must be lost.
(e) The importance of the most careful calibration can not be
overstated,
(/) The necessity of care of buffers needs to be constantly
emphasized.
(g) Knowledge on the part of junior officers as to how, what,
and when to report, is much needed. The necessity for early
59
60 NOTES ON EECENT OPERATIONS.
and accurate information from F.O.O.'s can not be too strongly
emphasized.
(h) Whenever an advance is contemplated, early reconnais-
sance of possible routes off the roads should be made. Careful
plans must be made for crossing our own and the enemy's
trench systems; special parties must be detailed for the work
of preparation. The importance and difficulty of a rapid ad-
vance are not yet fully realized.
(i) In any battle where a deep advance is looked for, there
should be one or two brigades R.P.A. per division, ready to move
forward at the earliest possible moment.
(j) It has been found to be advantageous in the first stages
of an advance to make use of single guns, or sections, with
limbers and teams up with them.
Difficulties of supply, chiefly in the matter of ammunition and
water, will usually prevent the similar use of larger units.
(fc) Battery commanders (R.F.A. in particular), must pay
more attention to the use and value of direct observation, and
of control of their batteries by voice or through a short tele-
phone line. There is a tendency to place batteries in fully con-
cealed positions and then to wait while the F.O.O. gets out H
long telephone line.
(0 As the enemy is driven back from his prepared trench
systems, where the general lines of defense have become familiar
to our artillery and are accurately marked on our trench maps,
the importance of careful study of air photos increases. The
enemy dig rapidly and well, and the defenses of positions which
we are going to attack grow quickly day by day. Unless the
most recent air photographs are constantly and carefully studied
before artillery tasks are allotted, there is the danger that a
vital portion of the enemy's defenses may be neglected by the
artillery, with serious consequences to the infantry assault.
ROYAL ENGINEERS. — (a) One or more sections of Royal Engi-
neers should move with the advanced guard to remove obstacles
and to effect such minor repairs as can be carried out with the
stores and tools carried in section tool carts. In addition,
mounted reconnaissance parties of Royal Engineer officers and
N.C.O.'s should be pushed well forward to report on the
nature and extent of damage of a more serious nature, to deal
with which necessitates special arrangements being made.
(&) In country where the wells were normally of great
depth the employment of helical chain or canvas band pumps
has been found of great value.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 61
INFANTRY — Patrols. — The enemy frequently employs strong
patrols. These attack or attempt to cut off our patrols, if
weak, and retire before strong ones. The use of strong patrols
(10 to 20 men) is therefore indicated. Such patrols should
be plentifully provided with S.A.A., and bombers, rifle bombers,
and a Lewis gun should be included in these numbers.
A patrol which has succeeded in penetrating the enemy's line
should establish a post on the enemy's line of retreat.
Advanced posts gained and established by day are often
heavily shelled. It has therefore been found advisable gen-
en illy to reconnoiter by day and gain ground by night.
The normal formation and movements of patrols should be
constantly practiced. Front, flanks, and rear must all be
guarded, and movements must be made by BOUNDS. All
ranks must be taught to realize that information must be got
back to the proper quarter, no matter how heavily the patrol
may become engaged. Relay posts should be formed if neces-
sary.
A valuable lesson is brought home by the difference in con-
duct, and consequently in casualties, of two patrols, each of 12
men, when held up by machine-gun fire :
In one case the men lay down when fired upon, and the
Lewis gun was used to cover the operations of the remainder
of the party. The movement of the Lewis-gun detachment was
then effected under cover of rifle fire. Casualties, 2.
In the other case the patrol made no attempt to open fire
and ran for shelter to a trench. Casualties, 10.
Outposts. — For outposts low-trip wire is preferable to high
wire.
It is often advisable after a post has been dug and wired
to place the garrison by day in a fold of the ground some little
way off.
Infantry iceapons. — The value of the use of fire to cover
movement from the various weapons at the disposal of infantry
has received still further emphasis. As regards the individual
weapons :
The rifle. — Full use is not being made at present, in many
cases, of the rifle. It is necessary constantly to impress upon
troops that the rifle is their principal weapon and must be
regarded and used as such.
Rifle bombs. — These have been found an efficient auxiliary
in dislodging the enemy from behind cover and in street fight-
62 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
ing. Their moral effect is great. It is recommended that half
the bombs carried in the mobile reserve of units should be rifle
bombs.
The Lewis gun has been found invaluable as part of the
platoon. It may be used to engage the enemy while his flank
is being turned or if he opens fire unexpectedly. In some
cases it has proved a useful reserve of fire power for the
platoon commander. With patrols its effect is hard to over-
estimate.
Machine guns. — Every opportunity of overhead, enfilade, and
cross fire by machine guns must be seized. The effect of such
fire is so great that it outweighs the risk of causing casualties
to our own men.
Subsections should not be allotted to lower formations than a
battalion. When so allotted the officer in command should
keep in close touch with the battalion commander to insure co-
operation and to look after the arrangements for the rations,
supply, and comfort of his own men.
Machine guns should move forward by BOUNDS, some being
ready at all times to assist the Infantry by their fire.
The 3-inch Stokes mortar. — This has been found most useful
against strong points or against enemy in buildings. Arrange-
ments should be made for ammunition to be carried either by
pack or by a special allotment of transport. In some cases a
subsection of machine guns and two Stokes trench mortars were
allotted to advanced guard battalions. It was found satisfac-
tory in such cases to detail a limbered G.S. wagon from the
machine-gun company to carry Stokes trench mortar ammuni-
tion.
House-to-house fighting. — In house-to-house fighting, where
cellars of houses are connected underground, parties must be
tolled off—
(a) For underground work;
(I)) To search houses;
(c) To move along outside the houses, both front and
back ;
(rZ) To deal with the outhouses.
When saps run out from cellars under a road it is necessary
to establish blocks at the junction.
Where resistance is met with in houses cellars are usually
barricaded.
Lewis or machine guns should be posted to cover the streets
and fire on any enemy emerging from houses or cellars.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 63
In street fighting the clearance of each house may constitute
a BOUND.
Movement to forming-up place. — Where no natural features
or trenches exist on the ground selected as the forming-up place
for an attack the line should be marked out by tapes.
The movement of troops up to the taped line must rary accord-
ing to circumstances. In some cases movement in single file, in
others in artillery formation, has been found to be the best.
Negotiating hostile barrage. — The formation to be adopted for
passing through a hostile barrage must be suited to the condi-
tions on the ground. On one occasion two battalions passed
throi gh in file with few casualties, on another a battalion passed
throi gh in artillery formation with equally few casualties.
Hoppers up. — It is more difficult to " mop up " in a village or
wood than in an attack on a position in the open, but it is
equally important.
Village and wood fighting. — To delay in a wood or village is
dangerous. Provided sufficient " moppers up" are detailed, the
assaulting troops should pass through and get well clear of the
wood or village as quickly as possible.
Unless the position selected for consolidation is well beyond
the far edge of the wood or village, adequate artillery support
can not be given.
Use of reserves. — It is cheaper to employ troops in sufficient
depth in an initial operation than to have to repeat it in conse-
quence of failure. When the reserve units have passed through
the original assaulting units steps must at once be taken to re-
organize the latter as quickly as possible and form them into
reserves.
INTERCOMMUNICATION. — The use of visual and wireless signal-
ing, including the power buzzer, has- been much neglected, but
where full use has been made of these means important results
have been obtained.
When signalers have been detailed beforehand to work with
advanced troops, visual signaling, both with flag and lamp,
has been successfully employed.
When new headquarters have been established, runners
should not be>sent always to the same destination. It is essen-
tial that they should eventually obtain a general knowledge of
the geography of the occupied area and not only of one par-
ticular run.
It is part of the duty of signaling officers to pass on informa-
tion ; this has been frequently neglected.
64 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
Very incomplete reports have frequently been received. A
card on the lines of Appendix I., S.S. 148, is being printed and
will be issued shortly. It is necessary continually to insist
upon the importance of early and accurate information.
The various means of communication with aircraft require
to be practiced with greater frequency than at present.
Emphasis must again be laid on the necessity of carrying out
the instructions for the use of telephones.
It must not be imagined that because we have driven the
enemy from his front trench systems he can no longer make
use of listening sets. The contrary is the case. It is easier
for him to tap telephone conversations than it was, since many
of his old buried cables run from the area now occupied by us
into his line.
AEROPLANE CONTACT PATROLS. — These were found most useful,
working with both the infantry and mounted troops. They
assisted materially in reconnaissance, and were able to give
valuable information as to the enemy's strength and position.
Messages with this information were dropped at battalion,
brigade, and divisional headquarters.
Care must be taken to insure that infantry and mounted
troops carry flares to assist these contact patrols and under-
stand how and when they should be lighted.
In the pursuit, if the weather is favorable, these patrols
should have many opportunities of harassing the enemy with
bombs and machine-gun fire.
TRANSPORT. — Pack transport is often necessary, but it must
be remembered that this method is wasteful and entails a
greater strain on animals than on wheeled transport for moving
the same quantity of material.
Traffic controls should b.e got forward on the battle field as
soon as possible, but officers commanding transport are respon-
sible for regulating the march of their own transport.
An order of precedence for horsed and motor transport should
be laid down according to the state of the roads, i. e., if roads
are bad, horse transport should be given precedence ; if roads
are good, motor transport, so as to get it off the roads sooner
and leave them free for horse transport.
When ground has been gained, a forward turning point for
all transport, including lorries, must be established as soon as
possible.
SUPPLY. — The following allotment of pack transport was
found to work satisfactorily in one division.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 65
Pack animals were used almost entirely to feed the troops
in the front line, both before and after an attack.
After one attack rations and water were taken up by pack
animals to within 200 yards of the front line.
Practically all the pack animals were mules ; very few horses
were used.
The number of pack animals per battalion was made up to 30.
Fcr one attack these animals were loaded as follows, with a
view to establishing a forward dump as soon as the objective
was gained :
Animals.
100,000 rounds S.A.A 50
200 petrol tins 25
1,440 grenades, No. 5 20
4 boxes Very lights 1" 2
4 boxes red flares 2
200 rifle grenades 5
5,000 sandbags 10
Spare 6
120
These were divided into four sections, each section under a
battalion transport officer, the whole being under the brigade
transport officer.
Each section was further subdivided into four subsections
under an N.C.O.
The same organization was employed for the carrying of
rations and worked well.
The saving of carrying parties by using pack animals is very
great and increases the fighting efficiency of the units consider-
ably.
Each brigade had the same number of animals, which worked
only for their own brigade. In this way both men and animals
got a rest when its own brigade was out of the line.
These animals went up at dusk. The column, which is given
in detail above, was held ready to move up during the morning
if the attack was successful and circumstances demanded their
doing so.
About 40 men were required for loading mules, but in conse-
quence of this use of pack transport carrying parties were few
and small.
3577°— 17 5
66 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
REPORTED TACTICS AND METHODS OF THE ENEMY.
Retirements have generally been carried out by the enemy be-
tween 3 a. m. and 5 a. m. Previous indications have been given
by fires and explosions. An unusual number of Very lights have
often shown when withdrawal was being effected.
Artillery fire has usually increased before withdrawal com-
menced, presumably to use up the ammunition with the gun.
Field guns and howitzers have often been posted in small posts
in advance of the main positions.
Enemy batteries appear to have little cover for their guns,
but good cover for their men and ammunition.
Trees are again being largely resorted to for O. P.'s.
Thick belts of wire are often erected all around a battery's
position.
Machine guns are handled very boldly. The detachments have
appeared suddenly from cover, mounted the gun, fired, and then
returned to cover.
In open fighting machine guns have often been found in sunken
roads and behind fallen trees. In the defense of villages they
have normally been placed well clear of the buildings.
Instances have occurred of the fire of enemy machine guns
being withheld till our troops have passed them, but in the
majority of cases machine guns have opened fire as soon as they
have obtained a target.
MISCELLANEOUS.
(i) Old enemy headquarters should be avoided. They are
generally heavily shelled.
Officers should not crowd together in the same house or cellar.
(ii) A plentiful supply of name boards for use in occupied
enemy trenches is most necessary and should be prepared in
advance.
(iii) Arrangements should be made to send hot food up to
troops in the front line, if possible, once a day.
(iv) In open fighting a continuous line of defense is not only
unnecessary but impossible. It is essential therefore to study
and to practice the method of holding mutually supporting tac-
tical points.
(v) Each body of troops is responsible for its own protection.
Flanks and rear, as well as front, must be watched, however
small the unit,
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 67
(vi) The usefulness of tanks is that of auxiliaries, not prin-
cipals. Reliance on assistance from them must not form the
foundation of any proposed operation.
(vii) Medical officers should carry labels to show whether
wells, etc., that they test are fit for use or not.
(viii) No preparation for an attack is complete which does
not include the steps to be taken to meet the enemy's counter-
attacks that will almost invariably follow any success on our
part.
(ix I Both field glasses and compasses are part of an officer's
kit, and are essential for operations.
(x) Mounted officers must make use of their horses, both to
save time and their own and other people's legs.
(xi) As soon as one objective has been gained, reconnaissance
and preparation for what is likely to be the next objective must
commence at once. If this is done, there will generally be ample
time :?or final preparations when orders are received.
(xii) Guides to take troops to the place of deployment should,
whenever possible, belong to the unit going up. They should
have previously made certain of the road and marked it out
with nape or other means. Troops marching, especially at night,
should send ahead to prevent checks, etc., and to arrange for the
removal, if possible, of any obstacles which are likely to delay
them.
SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IN THE FIELD.
Issued by the General Staff, March, 1917.
1. The old organization for the supply of ammunition in the
field by means of brigade ammunition columns and a divisional
ammunition column was designed to meet the requirements of a
division acting independently, so that the division might be self-
supporting. Owing to the necessity for massing far more troops
on a given front and the consequent increase in depth of our
present organization, the corps has now become the unit for
marching and fighting. A corps, consisting of two or more divi-
sions, must accommodate itself on a front little greater than
that formerly allotted to a division, and may have to move along
one road.
The density of troops on a given front automatically creates
an accumulation of ammunition, and, by the system of " pool-
ing," a considerable reduction may be made in the number of
rounds per gun carried with the fighting formations.
The new organization has therefore been introduced with
the objects —
(a) Of pooling the ammunition carried under corps control
and thereby reducing the number of rounds per gun to be car-
ried.
(6) Of effecting a saving in personnel, horses, and vehicles.
(c) Of reducing the road space occupied by a division.
(d) The experience of the earlier part of the war showed the
necessity for separating brigade ammunition columns from their
brigades and concentrating them under one central control.
2. A further change has recently been made in the organiza-
tion of the divisional artillery to meet the requirements on an
offensive front. One brigade of field artillery has been with-
drawn from each division, and these brigades have been re-
grouped to form " army field artillery brigades." The divisional
artillery will therefore consist of two field artillery brigades,
each brigade having three 6-gun 18-pounder batteries and one
6-gun 4.5-inch howitzer battery,
68
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 69
The army field artillery brigades will consist of three 6-gun
18-pounder batteries and one 6-gun 4.5-inch howitzer battery,
or four 6-gun 18-pounder batteries. These brigades will be
available to reenforce the artillery on any offensive front as
may be required.
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION COLUMN. —
The brigade ammunition columns, as such, have been abolished
for divisional artillery, and the divisional ammunition columns
have been reconstructed into two echelons.
"A" echelon. — Divided into two sections.
It consists of one ammunition wagon for each gun and howit-
zer in the division and S.A.A. carts, etc., to carry the same
quantities of rifle and machine-gun ammunition and grenades
as were formerly carried by the brigade columns.
The sections are equally divided, the number of vehicles to
each section is the same, and they contain the same percentage
of gun, howitzer, and S.A. ammunition.
"j?" eclielon. — Has one section.
It consists of some of the G.S. wagons which formerly car-
ried gun and howitzer ammunition In the old divisional am-
munition column, and G.S. wagons to carry the same amount of
S.A. and machine-gun ammunition and grenades as was for-
merly carried by the divisional ammunition column.
4. ORGANIZATION OF THE BRIGADE AMMUNITION COLUMN. — To
each brigade of the army field artillery will be allotted a brigade
ammunition column. It will consist of one ammunition wagon
for each gun and howitzer in the brigade, with a proportion of
G.S. wagons for baggage, stores, etc.
5. The new divisional ammunition column is directly under
the divisional artillery commander, and forms an integral part
of the divisional artillery. It may still be drawn upon as a first
reserve for the batteries in men, horses, and material in an
emergency.
It will normally march with the division; but, when several
divisions are marching on one road, it may be necessary to
withdraw the " B " echelons, and concentrate them in rear unr
der corps control. The "A" echelons always accompany their
divisions, and will usually march in rear of all the batteries.
The divisional ammunition column commander will remain with
the "A" echelon.
In action, the divisional ammunition column will usually be
concentrated, but, when the wagon lines are a long way from
70 NOTES ON KECENT OPEEATIONS.
the guns, wagons from the "A" echelon may be attached to the
batteries to assist in taking up ammunition.
If the ammunition park is a long way in rear, it may be
necessary to keep back the " B " echelon, and push up the "A"
echelon, but this case will be the exception rather than the
rule.
The normal position of the divisional ammunition column
commander in action will be where he can best control the sup-
ply of ammunition.
The normal chain of supply of ammunition will be from the
subpark (which has now been transferred from lines of com-
munication to corps control) to the " B " echelon, and thence to
any section of the "A" echelon.
6. In the case of the army field artillery brigades, the normal
chain of supply of ammunition will be from the subpark direct
to the brigade ammunition column.
7. As the new organization has reduced the number of rounds
carried in divisional charge, it is essential that the column be
looked upon as a pool from which ammunition can be drawn by
any unit. It is not intended that certain sections of the "A"
echelons should be affiliated to certain artillery brigades, but
the organization is elastic, and permits of the detachment of
such an amount of ammunition as may be considered necessary
for a specific task.
INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.
JULY 3, 1917.
A sergeant major of the two hundred and sixty-first reserve
regiment, seventy-ninth reserve division, was captured in our
raid on the 1st instant southeast of Souchez. His notebook con-
tained a number of entries of interest, and a translation of some
of these is given below. The entries appear to have been made
during a course of training which this officer did* on his first
arrival on the western front from Russia.
A. RAIDS.
1. Accurate knowledge of the enemy's positions through pa-
trols, aeroplane photographs, etc.
2. Destruction of enemy's obstacles; gaps in his wire to be
cut on the previous day ; machine guns to prevent repair of wire.
3. Agree upon signals.
4. Shoot flares from our own trenches.
5. Divide raiding party into assaulting party, blocking party,
mopping-up party, explosives (mobile charges) party, escort for
prisoners, and stretcher bearers.
6. Remove all identifications, viz, letters, sketches, identity
disks, shoulder straps, etc.
7. Make password known.
8. Caps preferable to steel helmets. White brassards are not
practicable because of their visibility.
9. Take sections of tent for booty and wounded.
10. Take flash lamps, luminous watches, tape, wire cutters,
" Very " light pistols.
11. Hang revolver round neck, bombs in handiest place;
daggers and knobkerries are the best trench weapons.
12. Raid with and without artillery preparation.
13. In the former (with artillery preparation) the aim is to
penetrate into the enemy's line. If the area to be raided is
large, heavy artillery and trench mortar fire on the objective,
changing to a box barrage at the agreed hour.
71
72 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
14. In the latter case the aim is to surprise the enemy. All
raids have the object of bringing in prisoners and booty.
METHODS OF WAR ON THE WESTERN FRONT.
B. POSITION.
Three or more lines. Small sectors. Regimental frontage,
1,500 meters.
(a) One battalion in front line.
( & ) A second battalion in reserve line.
(c) A third battalion in rest.
Strong organization in depth. — Two companies in firing line ;
two in second line ; pla-toons in echelon.
Strong points and switches, each with commanders.
Rations must be abundant. Every man self-contained in this
respect.
Transmission of orders. — Runners most reliable.
Machine guns. — Machine guns are mostly kept in the second
and third lines, also in the fourth line. British even have
chained down their machine guns (?).
Trench mortars. — Every company to have trench mortars.
Sentries. — Platoons will place sentries, i. e., stationary sen-
tries. They will be instructed in their duties and with regard to
the situation of their position.
Attack and defense. — The British prefer to attack at regi-
mental or divisional boundaries, even company boundaries.
They seldom attack strong points.
If the enemy has penetrated our front line a counterattack will
be made from the second line. The garrison of the front line
will remain in their dugouts till the counterattack is successful.
Counterattack with artillery preparation, i. e., to regain a
lost section of trench. Stationary sentries will remain in posi-
tion in the trench from which the counterattack is launched to
give information to messengers, to pass on orders, to guard the
trench, and to pass orders to the rear. By day black flags will
be placed at each end of the lost section of trench, by night white.
" Very " lights will be shot up perpendicularly from these points
to show our artillery where to fire.
Means of communication. — Carrier pigeons, runners, telephone,
and chain of relay messengers.
Each commander will have his defense position and will be
in touch with adjoining sections.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 73
Sentries will observe the enemy closely and will report every-
thing they see.
Reliefs take place at night. Entrenching tools are carried,
also methylated spirits for cooking, packs to be left behind, as
a rule, only absolute necessities to be taken into the line. Be-
liefs must take place in silence.
Gas attack. — As soon as the alarm is given shoot up red and
green flares. Our artillery fires into the gas cloud and on the
hostile trenches. The enemy also uses smoke bombs and shells
to imitate a gas attack ; no danger of gas poisoning.
Barrage is often placed immediately in front of our trenches.
No barrage possible where enemy lines only 20 meters distant.
Artillery fire of various kinds. — Barrage, gunfire, destructive
fire, and retaliatory fire.
Tanks. — The British armored cars are not very dangerous but
can only be dealt with by artillery.
Extracts from a German Document, Issued by the Sixth Army
September 27, 1916, Entitled
SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE CON-
STRUCTION OF DEFENSES.
GENEEAL PRINCIPLES.
1. Corps must make the greatest efforts to improve the
defenses in depth, and to provide them with good obstacles
and switches at those parts of the front which are especially
threatened by a hostile attack. All salients and all mining
areas should, as a matter of course, be cut off by retrenchments.
When work on a new line has to be begun, the obstacles should
be erected first ; the concrete structures and shelters which re-
quire a long time for completion should then be proceeded with.
In order to insure that the fire trenches, which may be subse-
quently dug, shall bear the proper relation to the concrete-built
flanking works, the fire trenches should be excavated provision-
ally to a depth of 1 foot, but to their full width. Preparatory
work of this kind will alone enable large working parties to be
taken full advantage of, if they become available, and if opera-
tions are to be carried out on a large scale.
All localities in the lines of the rearward positions should be
organized for defense as strong points.
FRONT-LINE TRENCH.
2. The principal fighting line is the front line; approval of
army headquarters must be obtained if, for local reasons, it is
only intended to treat it as the outpost position.
TRACE OF TRENCHES.
3. In tracing the lines great care must be taken to secure
flanking fire. The flanking defenses form the framework of a
position and should be traced by commanders in cooperation
with the general staff.
74
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 7$
DESIGN OF TEENCHES.
4. Where the widening of existing narrow trenches can not be
done throughout, it should at once be executed at the entrances
to shelters, so as to form courtyards and insure the possibility
of dofense, even if the trench is blown in.
WIEE ENTANGLEMENTS.
5. The trace of the wire entanglements should be entirely inde-
penaent of that of the fire trenches. This will prevent their
bein ? destroyed by the enemy if he relies on the plan of the fire
trenches in aeroplane photographs for their positions.
Entanglements, if destroyed, must be reconstructed at once. —
If the entanglement in front of the first trench has been de-
stroyed, its reerection must take precedence of all other work
on ~:he position, and every means at our disposal must be
employed.
COMMUNICATION TKENCHES.
6. As, in the event of hostile attack, communication and
approach trenches are exposed to heavy fire, cross-country
tracks must be reconnoitered and clearly marked, so as to be
available both by night and by day. They should not be used
during quiet times, or the signs of traffic will betray them to
aeroplane observation.
Care must also be taken, while an action is in progress, that
roads are not used in more than one direction.
DUGOUTS.
7. Concrete shelters are preferable to mined dugouts in all
circumstances.
From our experience on the Somme, mined dugouts require
from 23 to 26 feet of overhead cover in hard chalk and of from
33 to 36 feet in clay. Such dugouts are impracticable in front
line as men can not reach the fire step in time from such depths.
Concrete shelters should be built in future of reinforced con-
crete, 5 feet thick (2 feet 8 inches hitherto).
In a gas-cloud attack, braziers with low fires have kept the
shelters completely free from gas. The shelters should be dis-
tributed over all three lines of trenches of a position, as required
by the distribution of the formations in depth.
76 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
In general, too much can not be done to provide secure shelter
from shell fire on reverse slopes for the reserves. If there is not
sufficient time to make complete dugouts, numerous recesses in
the form of gallery entrances will answer the purpose.
OBSERVATION POSTS.
8. Shell-proof infantry observation posts must be constructed
in all trenches of the first and second line positions.
MACHINE-GUN EMPLACEMENTS.
9. The ruling factor in the siting of fire positions for machine
guns is that they must be echeloned in depth. It is advisable,
therefore, to construct machine-gun emplacements not only in
the trenches but in the spaces between the lines. Machine guns
should only be placed in the first trench when they can bring
flanking fire to bear and when the foreground near the enemy
can not be swept from a machine-gun position on high ground
behind the line.
TRENCH MORTAR EMPLACEMENTS.
10. Trench mortar emplacements may sometimes be con-
structed in the second trench but are preferably placed between
the lines. They should be sited near those points which are par-
ticularly menaced by the enemy or where an increase of the
artillery barrage fire is necessary.
GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
May 5, 1917,
Translation of a German document.
EXPERIENCE OF THE GERMAN FIRST ARMY IN THE
SOMME BATTLE.
JUNE 24 TO NOVEMBER 26, 1916.
By GEN. VON BELOW.
PART I. TACTICAL.
30 JANUAEY, 1917.
A. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE.
1. The Somme Battle did not come as a surprise to the second
army, which, from the 19th July, 1916, onward, was divided into
the first and second armies. As early as February, 1916, our
aeroplanes reported the construction of numerous new hut-
ments in front of the northern wing of the army on both sides
of the Ancre. Shortly afterwards an increase in the number
of divisions on the English front north of the Somme took place.
As a result of successful raids and patrol work, we learned
that these divisions were relieved successively after a few weeks
in line. Toward the end of April the number of English divi-
sions north of the Somme had already increased to 12, opposed
to only 4 German divisions.
The plan which was formed at that time of meeting the enemy's
expected offensive north of the Somme by a counteroffensive
could not be carried out owing to lack of sufficient forces. In
April one division was placed at the disposal of the army as a
reenforcement. This division was put into line north of the
River Ancre, where the English line was most strongly held.
Thus, on the right wing of the army, each division held an aver-
age front of 6 kilometers, while on the rest of the army front
the divisional sectors amounted to 7$ to 9 kilometers.
In May two divisions were withdrawn from the front of the
second army and replaced by one division which, during its
short period of rest, had not yet been able to replace the losses
which it had suffered at Verdun. In addition to this a consider-
77
78 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
able number of heavy batteries equipped with modern German
guns were replaced by batteries of captured guns.
Up to May it was not considered probable that the French
would cooperate in the expected attack.
At the beginning of June the signs of an approaching attack
became more evident. Just north of the Somme two French
divisions took over the sector previously held by the English.
The conclusion at first drawn, that this measure had a defensive
object with a view to giving greater depth to the English
offensive, mounted further north, was rejected as soon as the
specially good Twentieth French Corps, known as a " gladiator
corps," was identified by raids north of the Somme. South of
the Somme, also, preparations for a hostile attack became more
and more apparent, so that during the course of June, the sup-
posed frontage of the enemy's offensive was fairly clearly estab-
lished as extending from the neighborhood of Gommecourt on
the north, to the neighborhood of the Roman Road, about 8
kilometers south of the Somme, on the south.
In June one division and the field artillery of another division
were placed at the disposal of army headquarters. Toward the
end of June a further reenforcement of 17 light field howitzer
batteries was allotted to the army.
2. On the 22d June the enemy's bombardment began to become
intense.
From the 24th June onward the intense bombardment was
continuous. This bombardment comprised a large proportion of
artillery of the heaviest calibers and of heavy, long-range guns.
On the 1st July, about 8 a. m., the great English-French in-
fantry assault took place on a front of 40 kilometers between
Gommecourt and the west of Vermandovillers, while the artil-
lery bombardment was continued on a sector which considerably
overlapped the zone of attack. The assault penetrated our
badly damaged defensive front at a great many points. North
of the Ancre, by the evening of the 2d July, counterattacks were
successful in recapturing the whole of our line, and inflicted
heavy losses in killed and prisoners on the English. South of
the Ancre also, as far as Thiepval, inclusive, the English, who
had captured our trenches, were driven out of them by the eve-
ning of the 3d July. On both sides of the Somme, however, the
English and French had driven a deep wedge into our defensive
front. On this sector our losses were so considerable that there
was no available strength with which to carry out the intended
counterattack.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 79
During the following days and weeks we continued to lose
further ground at this broad breach in our front. The engage-
ment of the reenforcements, which flowed in to the army from
all sides, had to be effected in the most unfavorable circum-
stances. Owing to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy
in aircraft, artillery, ammunition, and men, it was only possible
to stop the most dangerous gaps which had been made in the
German defensive front. Owing to the force of circumstances,
the cohesion of the arriving reenforcements had to be broken
up in order to avoid the danger of the enemy breaking through.
Ur der these difficult conditions the whole organization of the
defense had to be constituted anew. It was only after the
lapse; of long weeks that the defense could be put on equal terms
with the enemy's superiority as regards fighting material of
every kind.
In spite of this, the enemy has not succeeded in achieving the
inter ded breaking through of our western front. His plans
have been shattered by the devoted and untiring courage and
loyalty of our army. Every man who has fought on the Somme
may be proud that he was there, and that the battle, which is
so far the greatest in any war, has, through the failure of the
enemy, ended as a German victory.
B. OBJECT AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE LESSONS LEARNED.
3. The numerous lessons learned from the Somme Battle have
already been dealt with and published in part 8 of the chief oC
the general staff's instructions for trench warfare entitled
" Principles of Command During a Defensive Battle in Trench
Warfare."1 A thorough acquaintance with these instructions
is, therefore, assumed as a preliminary to studying and under-
standing the following remarks, which have been published by
the First Army at the desire of the Crown Prince of Bavaria's
group of armies. In this memorandum, the "Principles of
Command During a Defensive Battle," will only be referred to
in so far as the events on the Somme are concerned ; the organi-
zation, tactical employment, and cooperation of the different
arms will be described in the light of the experience gained dur-
ing a battle in which the forces involved have been on a scale
hitherto unknown.
1 This is being issued separately. — G. S.
80 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
The subject matter has been divided up in such a way that in
Part I (Tactical) the different arms are treated under the fol-
lowing subheadings:
(1) The causes of initial failures.
(2) The measures by which a gradual improvement was
attained.
(3) Experiences and lessons.
In this way a picture of the development of all details of the
fighting during the battle will be obtained, which will perhaps
be of use to a commander who may in future find himself en-
gaged in a battle of similar nature.
Part 2 deals with all questions connected with administra-
tion and interior economy.
C. HIGHER COMMAND— EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS.
4. Before the beginning of the Somme Battle the headquar-
ters of the Second Army, as then constituted, had grouped the
five divisions north of the Somme and the four divisions south
of the Somme under the two corps staffs which were available
in the area, in order to obtain a uniform system of command
throughout the anticipated zone of attack. The battle frontage
of the two corps thus constituted amounted to 22 miles north
of the river and 20 miles south of the river. The initial attack
by the enemy astride the river, and the consequent reentrant
created in our line, increased these frontages considerably.
The divisions sent up as reenforcements by the supreme army
command were only accompanied very gradually by fresh corps
staffs, and these staffs were totally unacquainted with the
Somme battle front. Their entry into line did indeed reduce
the frontages held by formations, but the commanders had to
become acquainted with the ground before they could carry out
their tasks.
The ever-increasing size of the Second Army prompted the
higher command to reorganize the troops engaged on the bat-
tle front in the First and Second Armies. This change took
effect from the 19th July. The First Army took over approxi-
mately the same battle front as had been previously held by the
northern corps of the Second Army. This sector was gradually
divided up between five groups, each under a corps headquarters,
each group commanding two or four divisions.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 81
It was not till the 1st October that the new First Army was
given a separate lines-of-communication headquarters. Until
then its administration was effected by the lines-of-communica-
tion headquarters of the Second Army.
5. The difficulties of command which arose from the constant
change of sectors and staffs were very considerable, and were
still farther increased by the frequent shifting of headquarters,
rende red necessary by the loss of ground ; this had a most dele-
terious effect on the smooth running of telephonic communica-
tion. A rigid system of command, equal to all demands, could
not bo thoroughly established until the organization of the army
was placed on a clear and permanent basis ; unity of command
was then attained by retaining more or less permanent corps
staffs in sectors.
It is evident that an army which is subject during a battle to
constant changes of command is, especially when acting on the
defensive, at a very great disadvantage as compared with an
attacking enemy whose organization has been thoroughly
planned with a view to carrying out his designs. As far as pos-
sible, therefore, efforts must be made, whenever a hostile offen-
sive on a large scale is anticipated, to organize the system of
command in good time and on so firm a basis that the army and
corps headquarters can retain command of their former sectors
during the progress of the battle.
6. The lateral boundaries of the battle sectors of armies,
corps, and divisions are primarily dictated by the ground, and,
above all, by the facilities which they give for the development
of artillery fire and for artillery observation.
7. In the heat of the battle the influence of a well-known
commander plays a great part. Acquaintance with the person-
ality of his subordinates, an appreciation of their abilities, and
a right judgment of their qualities enable the higher commander
to make his decisions as regards the employment of his troops
at the decisive points of the fight. This is especially the case
as regards the divisional fighting units. It is therefore desir-
able that divisional commanders should change with their divi-
sions.
8. As regards corps headquarters, which, during a battle, com-
mand a group of three to four division^, it is desirable that they
retain command of their own original divisions as far as possi-
ble. Within a group, however, the advantage of fighting under
a commander whom one knows is secondary to the consideration
3577°— 17 6
82 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
that the command must be on as permanent a footing as possible.
This condition can only be attained by allotting permanent corps
staffs to sectors.
9. The demands made on the staffs of armies, corps, and divi-
sions by the work and responsibility entailed in the course of a
great battle of long duration are so enormous that the usual
number of officers allotted to staffs is not sufficient. To every
corps headquarters a permanent chief administrative staff officer
was therefore allotted during the battle, principally for duties
of supply, and also a permanent general staff officer ; each divi-
sion was allotted a second (permanent) general staff officer.
Corps and divisions were also allotted permanent pioneer and
communication officers, while, in addition to the above, perma-
nent wing commanders, antiaircraft officers, and wireless officers
were allotted to corps headquarters.
The number of orderly officers, also, required to be increased
in order to provide the personnel for visiting the trenches (a
procedure which demanded much time) and for keeping in per-
sonal touch with the subordinate commanders, as well as to con-
vey to the higher commanders a picture of the events of the
battle independently of the reports received from the troops.
10. It is of much importance to make new formations ac-
quainted in good time with the battle situation. General staff
officers must, therefore, be sent ahead at once to gain touch with
every new corps and division arriving.
Besides the above, during the last weeks of the battle, army
headquarters sent a copy of all orders dealing with general prin-
ciples to the staffs of formations which were earmarked for
future inclusion in the army, through the medium of their old
formations. The higher commanders, as they arrived, were then
interviewed personally by the commander in chief or by the
army commander ; the importance and nature of the Somme Bat-
tle was explained to them, and they were also made acquainted
with the features of the ground in their future sectors and with
the instructions and general principles already issued by the
army for the battle. General staff officers, artillery command-
ers, and pioneer commanders of the relieving corps and divisions
worked for several days, prior to the arrival of their own forma-
tions, with the staffs of. the formations to be relieved; these
latter formations, in turn, left part of their staffs behind for
several days after the relief.
11. It is of great importance for the execution of the com-
mand during a battle that the higher commanders should
NOTES ON RECENT OPEEATIONS. 83
obtain a rapid knowledge of the progress of events which are
taking place in front. This knowledge often forms the only
basis for sending forward and putting in reserves at the right
moment. Army headquarters have, with this object, organized
in each group sector special army observation posts. A similar
organization was formed in all corps and divisions. A special
artillery system of telephonic communication connected to the
headc uarters of the general officer commanding artillery has
frequently provided the most valuable rapid pictures of the
situation.
12. In their conduct of the battle, army and corps headquar-
ters must, in addition to issuing strict orders as regards de-
fensive work, confine themselves principally to insuring clear
and well-defined relations in the grouping of the troops and in
the holding in readiness of reserves behind dangerous points.
Both the commander in chief and the army commanders will
obtai i the best foundations for their decisions by keeping con-
stantly in personal touch with the commanders of the troops.
Verbal discussions are of considerably more value, than tele-
phonic conversations. During the Somme Battle the comman-
der in chief, in company with the army commander, visited
almost daily three or four divisional commanders at their head-
quarters or their battle stations. These interviews, at which
the group commanders were usually present, were of great
advantage to the unity of control in the battle and to the co-
operation of all arms. This procedure was of particular value at
moments when the situation was rapidly changing. After such
conferences, army orders and corps orders were frequently dic-
tated at divisional headquarters and forwarded to the units
concerned by telephone.
13. The real weight of the fighting rests on the shoulders of
the divisional commanders, on whom devolves full responsibility
for the maintenance of their sectors. Divisional commanders
must, therefore, be given control of all the organs of action
available in their sectors, with the exception of guns employed
on special tasks and, in exceptional cases, corps artillery groups
detailed for special long-range objectives. They must at the
right time allot to their subordinate commanders both their
own reserves and the reserves placed at their disposal by supe-
rior authority; these subordinate commanders must, in their
turn, make local arrangements for the employment of these
reserves on the battle field.
84 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
The divisional commander must exert a continuous and keen
influence on the whole control of the action ; this will he insured
by accurate reconnaissances on the ground and by maintaining
daily personal touch with his troops and their commanders.
14. Every higher commander must clearly recognize that every
report from front to rear and every order from rear to front
requires a very long time to reach its destination. During a
defensive battle the fighting zone lies almost continuously under
the enemy's intense artillery bombardment. It Jias been fre-
quently found that orders take 8 to 10 hours to reach the front
line from divisional headquarters. It has often proved of
value to forward orders to reserves by staff officers in motor
cars.
15. To carry out a well-ordered relief, it is of great impor-
tance that accurate and up-to-date maps and plans are handed
over. These maps must show not only the details of the actual
front and the distribution of the fighting material available,
but must also include the area in rear (billeting facilities, con-
dition of the roads and administrative arrangements). It is
desirable that the arrangements for these maps should be con-
trolled by the general staff officers allotted permanently to
sectors.
D. INFANTRY AND MACHINE GUNS.
I. Causes of initial failures.
16. The reasons for our previous failures arose not so much
in the domain of purely infantry considerations as from our
inability at the outset to make equivalent reply to the enemy's
concentrations, more especially of aircraft and artillery.
At the commencement of the battle telephone lines which
worked perfectly well in quiet times were at once cut, and only
a- small supply of apparatus for visual signaling and wireless
was available. The transmission of information was conse-
quently faulty and resulted frequently in the total isolation of
the higher command and in the absence of all cooperation
between the various arms.
The infantry, heavily engaged, were often left to their own
devices for hours and days at a time, or else the front-line
trenches would be crammed with troops owing to the ignorance
of the situation that prevailed in rear. This entailed unneces-
sary casualties, and the moral effect was bad. This state of
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 85
affairs was aggravated by the enemy's superiority in the air,
which at first was incontestable. Not only did the enemy's
airmen direct the artillery fire undisturbed, but by day and
by ni?ht they harassed our infantry with bombs and machine
guns, in their trenches and shell holes, as well as on the march
to and from the trenches. Even although the losses thus caused
were comparatively small, their occurrence had an extremely
lowering effect on the morale of the troops, who at first were
helpless. The innumerable balloons, hanging like grapes in
clusters over the enemy's lines, produced a similar effect, for
the troops thought that individual men and machine guns could
bo picked up and watched by them and subjected to fire with
observation.
17. On long stretches of front the small forces which were at
first available were not distributed sufficiently in depth. The
consequent feeling of uncertainty experienced by commanders
led them not infrequently, in their determination to hold the
front line at all costs, to reinforce the front line prematurely,
to crowd it unnecessarily, and, on the other hand, to leave the
rearward trenches unoccupied.
This failure to distribute the infantry in depth went hand
in hand with a trench system of insufficient depth, a scarcity
of serviceable positions in rear, and a shortage of labor.
The impossibility of regular reliefs made it necessary to
overtax the strength of the infantry.
The first reinforcements to dribble in could only fill the
largest gaps. Even the infantry of freshly assigned divisions
had to be thrown into the fight unit by unit as soon as each
arrived, or else were pushed up to take over in too great a
hurry from utterly exhausted troops. The consequence was
that portions of the positions were not infrequently lost.
18. Many units, more especially those coming from quiet parts
of the front, lacked training and fighting experience. Not in-
frequently the fighting efficiency of the infantry suffered from
faulty arrangements made within the regiments for bringing
up rations, ammunition, etc.
II. Measures by which a gradual improvement wag attained.
19. As the allotment of artillery ammunition, aeroplanes, and
antiaircraft sections increased and steps were taken for ma-
chine guns to engage aviators flying low, the infantryman's
86 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
lot began to improve. His self-confidence returned and his
fighting efficiency increased. Command and cooperation between
all arms were greatly assisted by the provision of large quanti-
ties of means of communication and the reorganization of the
reporting and communication systems.
20. Barrage zones were made deep and narrow, and behind
them the infantry lines could be lightly held. The fact of push-
ing in a number of divisions led to narrower fronts and greater
distribution in depth. The allotment of fresh divisions in
rapid succession made timely and regular reliefs possible, and
finally reached such a point that reserves behind the front
could be trained in the light of the most recent experience and
could be employed on the construction of rearward positions.
21. The progressive completion of positions made it possible
to apply the lessons of recent experience (defense of an area
with numerous trenches and switch lines, rational distribution,
and siting of dugouts).
22. The fact of organizing supplies within regiments before
they went into line, in the light of the experience of troops
already relieved (formation of fourth platoons, organization of
special carrying parties, provision of intermediate depots of
rations, ammunitions, etc.), kept the infantry up to fighting
standard for a longer period when in line and economized the
employment of other units. In this way, again, methodical
counterattacks could be made by fresh troops.
III. Experiences and lessons.
(Based chiefly on reports from the troops.)
(a) GENERAL.
23. Our infantry is superior to that of the enemy. — In the
Somme Battle wherever the enemy gained the upper hand it
was chiefly due to the perfected application of technical means,
in particular to the employment of guns and ammunition in
quantities which had been hitherto inconceivable. It was also
due to the exemplary manner in which infantry, artillery, and
aeroplanes cooperated. After artillery preparation, wherever
the enemy's infantry, following up the last shell, came upon
positions that were still held, the attack usually broke down,
and if the advance was made against positions already de-
stroyed the infantry could be ejected by determined and rap-
idly executed counterattacks.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 87
The duty of every infantry commander is, firstly, to train
and educate the infantry soldier for this hand-to-hand fighting
(which should not be a privilege reserved for assault units,
but should be a universal one) ; next, and more difficult, to
keep him physically and mentally fit to fight both before and
during an engagement; and, lastly, the most difficult of all, to
get liis men out of their shelters and dugouts in time and
launch them against the enemy.
(b) TRAINING.
24. In this war, which is apparently dominated by science and
numbers, individual will power is, nevertheless, the ultimate
deciding factor.
The defense of a position depends more than it ever did before
on the unshakable determination of the subordinate commander
and of each individual man to hold his position.
25. It is a sound principle to keep troops intended for use
on a certain battle front behind this front for about 14 days
to enable them to complete their training. In this manner im-
mediate advantage can be taken of the lessons of the most
recent fighting, while at the same time commanders can famil-
iarize themselves with the ground on which they are to be
employed and with the special features of operations in that
locality.
26. Apart from the general regulations in force, the instruc-
tions laid down for assault formations form the best guide for
the training of the infantry soldier.
Physical fitness and confidence in his arms (rifle, hand gre-
nade, spade, etc.) must be increased by constant practice,
self-confidence and resolute determination are a guaranty of suc-
cess, even against a numerically superior opponent.
27. The education and training of subordinate commanders
is of particular importance.
To come supreme through the crises which even the best-
trained infantry will undergo when suddenly experiencing such
overwhelming mental and physical sensations, especially when
torn from quiet trench warfare and hurled into a battle like
that of the Somme, to combat the demoralizing effect that
results from continuously remaining in shell holes and craters,
requires whole-hearted disinterestedness and self-sacrificing
care for subordinates, particularly on the part of company,
platoon, and subordinate commanders.
88 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS
The fighting value of troops depends on the standard of
training attained by the men and on the military proficiency of
the subordinate commanders.
28. The following are the most important branches of train-
ing:
(a) The education of the group1 commander and of the indi-
vidual private to the highest possible degree of self-reliance.
(In positions which often consist of unconnected shell holes
control by platoon and company commanders is rendered ex-
tremely difficult.)
(&) The training of every single man of the infantry in the
use of all patterns of German hand grenades.
(c) The training of the greatest possible number of men in
the use of captured hand grenades.
(d) An increase in the personnel trained in the use of our
own and of the enemy's machine guns. Every infantry officer
must be able to work a German machine gun. The gun crews
must be drilled until, when prepared for action, they can bring
up an unloaded gun from the bottom of a dugout and be ready
to open fire within 30 seconds. Special practice is required in
the use of improvised mountings and sandbag supports.
(e) Patrol work.
(/) Rapid counterattack across open ground, launched on the
initiative of a subordinate commander, down to a group com-
mander or some stout-hearted man.
(g) Methodical counterattack, following an artillery prepa-
ration.
(h) Rapid organization of shell holes for defense (to be con-
nected as soon as possible by an irregular trench so as to
facilitate command).
(i) The passage of areas which are under heavy shell fire
(in file, lines of skirmishers, small parties).
(k) Behavior under intense bombardment in incompleted
trenches (taking cover in shell holes in advance of the line).
(I) Practice in cooperating with artillery and with infantry
aeroplanes.
(m) Training of regimental and headquarters communication
sections.
Where a unit is to be employed for a special operation, it is
advisable to' train it in specially constructed practice trenches,
and the details of the tasks allotted to it should be thoroughly
practiced.
*A group consists of eight men under a noncommissioned officer. — G S.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 89
(C) BELIEFS.
29. It is often contended that as fresh troops are coming into
the line a relief means a period of increased strength, whereas,
on the contrary, it usually means a temporary weakness. What
really is of vital importance during a relief is not the number
of units in front line, but solely that the arrangements made
for responsibility and command are clearly defined and that
or< er and close supervision are maintained.
For these reasons, reliefs must be organized carefully, thor-
oughly, and in ample time.
oO. The conduct of reliefs must be in the hands of the out-
going staff.
] before moving in units must be provided with everything
(equipment, clothing, rations, close-range weapons, maps, sig-
nal stores, tracing tape, etc.) that they will require during the
time they are employed in the front line.
r?he commanders of incoming troops will be given an oppor-
tunity of getting into touch with the infantry, pioneer, and
artillery commanders of the outgoing troops, and of reconnoiter-
ing the ground.
Advance parties of the relieving troops (including machine-
gun units) must be sent on ahead as early as possible to the
position to be taken over. Rear parties of the outgoing troops
will be retained for at least 24 hours. The chief duty of rear
parties is to insure that no gaps occur in taking over the position
and that touch is maintained with units on the flanks. Both
parties will be commanded by officers.
Depressions, ravines, sunken roads, small woods or isolated
farms should not be chosen as boundaries between sectors, for,
being uually exposed to heavy shell fire, they call for special
precautionary measures (construction of entanglements, dis-
tribution of troops in depth, flanking fire from machine guns).
31. Fresh troops will be led up by the most reliable guides
of the outgoing garrison. These guides must be capable of
making suggestions as to the formation to be adopted at differ-
ent points (file, lines of skirmishers, or small parties). Delays,
crossings and blocks occasion unnecessary losses and have a
depressing influence on the troops.
90 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
Communication trenches are best marked by signboards of
the type shown below.
Triangle Ball Cross Rectangle
trench. trench. trench. trench.
32. If commanders and advance parties have already become
acquainted with the ground, the trenches, and the enemy's char-
acteristics, portions of the front line can be relieved during the
first night without cause for anxiety. This has the advantage
that fresh troops come into the front line. If it has not been
possible to make sufficiently detailed arrangements for the re-
lief, it is advisable to relieve only portions of the supports
during the first night.
Liaison and order are best guaranteed by pushing in the
fresh troops checkerwise among the outgoing troops, thus reliev-
ing during the first night parties on the flanks in the front
line and those in the center in the support line.
Where positions merely consist of shell holes, the front line
and the flanks of the position should be marked out with tape.
It considerably stiffens incoming troops in their first uncer-
tainty if the machine-gun units are relieved 24 hours later than
the infantry.
The exchange of machine guns should be avoided, but am-
munition, water buckets, etc., may be handed over.
33. The nerves and endurance even of the best troops have
their limits, so that timely reliefs are absolutely essential. The
utter exhaustion of troops in action usually culminates in the
loss of the position. Worn-out troops are incapable of strenu-
ous efforts for months afterwards. To rush troops into action
as reinforcements at the last moment is to engage them under
the most trying conditions ; they will generally be used up in a
very short period, without there being any possibility of their
saving the position, owing to their ignorance of the ground.
34. Every endeavor must be made to procure a thorough rest
outside the shelled area for troops that have been relieved.
Only thus can troops regain their fighting efficiency and become
fit for further employment.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 91
(d) DISTBIBUTION.
35. The distribution of the infantry depends on battle condi-
tions and especially on the efficacy of the enemy's artillery. It
is also affected by the ground and by the nature of the positions
available.
3»>. The fire for effect which precedes the enemy's great at-
tacks and lasts for days, frequently rising to an intense bom-
bar ilment, soon converts the front-line trenches into a succes-
sion of shell holes. This becomes a permanent state of affairs
where frequent attacks preceded by violent bombardments fol-
low each other in rapid succession. This hurricane of fire,
which is intended to clear the way for the enemy's infantry,
sweeps right over the area occupied by the supports. The
barrage zone established by the enemy behind his objective adds
to the difficulty of bringing up reserves from the rear. The in-
fantry battle will, therefore, usually have to be decided by the
troops up in the front, who are completely isolated. Hence the
nec9ssity for distribution in depth. To avoid unnecessary losses
from the intense bombardment, the front line will be held as
lightly as possible. One man for every 4 to 6 yards of front
will suffice if the supports can be accommodated close behind
the front line. To compensate for this, the strength of the
defense must lie in distribution in depth.
37. The distribution of the troops must be such that in all
circumstances the struggle for the position can be fought out
in the front line without bringing up appreciable reserves from
farther in rear. Supports, posted behind the front line either
in squads or in open formation, can only reach this line in time
if they are close behind it.
38. If possible, units will not be mixed, for at a critical junc-
ture small forces in the front line led by commanders that the
men know are preferable to a medley of detachments, hurriedly
engaged, who are strange to each other.
It is preferable to engage units side by side, so that they can
be distributed in depth in narrow sectors, rather than engage
them one behind the other. The same system of reinforcing
from the rear applies equally to bringing up supplies and re-
placing casualties. It has proved sound to form for this pur-
pose fourth platoons from the companies engaged and to keep
them in reserve.
39. Machine guns, for the employment of which the infantry
sector commander (battalion or regimental commander) is re-
92 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
sponsible, will be spread over the zone of defense on the prin-
ciple of distribution in depth.
Machine guns should be sparingly employed in the front-line
trench, where they will generally be prematurely put out of
action by the intense bombardment. They will seldom have a
good frontal field of fire in positions which are sited on reverse
slopes ; flanking effect should consequently be employed. Their
effect is to be supplemented by that of machine guns sited in
pairs farther in rear, as far as possible in commanding positions,
in such a manner that zones of fire can be formed both in front
of and within defended area.
40. The experience of the Somme Battle teaches that an infan-
try regiment which has one battalion in front line, one in sup-
port, and one in reserve, can hold a front of about 800 meters for
some 14 days in a defensive battle. After this period relief is
generally necessary.
(6) CONSTRUCTION OF POSITIONS.
41. The measures required in the construction of positions
have as their basis the necessity of having infantry organized
in depth and of maintaining the garrison of the position ready
for action.
42. In laying out new and in improving existing positions the
infantry line must be traced to accord with the situation of the
artillery observation posts. The principal artillery observation
posts must not be exposed to fire directed on the infantry line.
The dust and smoke and the moral effect on the observer, if
posted in the infantry line, render observation in it difficult, if
not impossible. An observer is useless if his means of communi-
cation are broken.
43. The front infantry trenches are well placed if they are
situated on a reverse slope out of sight of the ground observa-
tion of the enemy's artillery and are overlooked directly by their
own artillery observers from a position at least 550 yards in
rear. At the same time these observers should be able to see
well into the ground over which the enemy must attack for at
least 200 yards in front of their own wire, and it should be
possible to overlook, either from the front or a flank, at least
a part of the ground behind this belt over which the enemy must
make his approach marches. A very short field of fire is suffi-
cient for the infantry. A line of this nature in undulating
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 93
country will be generally a reverse-slope position. If the enemy
breaks into such a reverse-slope position, his infantry will have
to fight exposed to our concentric, well-observed, and most effec-
tive1, fire, without the support of artillery which is assisted by
ground observation.
41. For an obstinate defense of the front position it is not
suflicient to dig a few parallel lines of trenches one behind
another; a broad defensive zone must be constructed, com-
posed of a network of trenches disposed in depth, with plenty
of switches and cross trenches. Every fire trench, communica-
tion trench, and approach trench must, no matter in what direc-
tion it leads, be prepared for defense at least on one side, and
be provided with an obstacle and dugouts for its garrison or
assault detachment. An enemy who penetrates the front line
of i;renches must find himself opposed not only in front but in
flank at the next line, and it must be possible to counterattack
him from all sides. If he can not be turned out at once, he
wil at least be bottled up in a pocket, and thus the best condi-
tion for a deliberately planned counterattack will be created.
45. Even a position formed of broad, deep, defensive zones is
not enough to stop the attempts of a strong enemy to break
through, if he has made careful preparations. The power of
concentrated artillery fire is sc great that losses of ground
will be inevitable even in the finest positions. Behind the front
position, therefore, there must be at least two rearward posi-
tions, spaced so far apart from one another that the enemy
will be compelled to change the position of his artillery in order
to attack them. It must be a fixed principle in battle that as
many new positions are organized behind as positions are lost
in front.
46. It is desirable in constructing new positions that have to
be organized during a battle to begin by making an entangle-
ment in advance of the front fighting line, and simultaneously
to commence the dugouts of the second line. From this frame-
work a position of two lines will gradually be developed. The
trenches themselves come last.
47. In addition to the continuous rearward positions, all
localities for about 9 miles behind the front line of trenches
must be organized for defense. In connection with this, all
available shell-proof cellars must be converted into dugouts
and provided with the necessary number of entrances. As far
as possible, machine-gun emplacements should be provided to
sweep the ground between the localities.
94
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
48. In the front trenches of a position only sufficient shell-
proof dugouts are required as will shelter the garrison, which
should be kept as weak in numbers as can be. In the rearward
trenches it is hardly possible to make too many dugouts for
the mass of the infantry. The following conditions have proved
most suitable : 24 to 33 feet of earth or 5 feet of concrete over-
head cover; at least two entrances a good distance apart;
chambers for 10 to 20 men.
The deeper the dugouts the more important are a good, wide
entanglement, continuous observation of the foreground, and
reliable alarms. Dugouts without these precautions are mere
man traps.
The construction of dugouts is absolutely indispensable along
lines of approach for the temporary shelter of reliefs and car-
rying parties if caught by shell fire, in the communication
trenches, for runners, and along the route of cable trenches for
the linemen.
49. Entanglements in advance of the front trenches must be
as strong as possible, must be erected in regular lines, and must
cover wide spaces of ground for 60 to 200 yards in depth. This
will force the enemy to an enormous expenditure of ammunition
to destroy them, and will insure that, even after several days'
wire cutting, he will still find a tangle of wood, wire, and iron
in front of him.
The flanking of the front line of the entanglements by a suit-
able arrangement of machine-gun fire should not be overlooked.
? Mac fit fie (jufis in command my position.
To leave a free field for the counterattacks of the garrison of
the rearward trenches, it is an advantage to arrange the en-
tanglements of the rearward lines checkerwise. There must be
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 95
plenty of material ready to block the gaps (knife rests and con-
certinas).
50. The construction of infantry observation posts, command
posts, and latrines is of special importance, as are also bomb-
proof 1 shelters for ammunition, weapons for close combat
(gronades, etc.), supplies, water tanks, and kitchens in the rear-
war i trenches and support positions.
Built-up machine-gun emplacements are soon smashed to
piecas unless they are shellproof (against heavy artillery). As
a rule, the best course is to provide shellproof1 shelters for the
machine guns in which they are to be kept until required for
action, when they are fired over the parapet.
Covered battle emplacements of concrete or armor plates are
usually only possible on steep reverse slopes. They must not
be conspicuously high.
In view of the importance of signal communications, special
dugouts are necessary for them. These should be suited to their
various natures (telephone offices, visual signaling, trench wire-
less, power buzzer, and listening sets).
Open cable trenches have proved more serviceable than buried
cable, as the difficulty of repairing the latter is very great.
51. A well-considered scheme and plenty of dugout dressing
stations are required for the care of the wounded. For periods
of special activity there must be at least one medical dugout in
each company sector. It should be built in the immediate
vicinity of the second (support) trench, be large enough to
accommodate 14 men lying down, and must be bombproof.1
iln the second edition of " Stellungsbau," dated 15/12/16, T)oml-
cnsicher (bombproof) is defined as proof against continuous bombard-
ment by 8-inch howitzers and heavy trench mortars, and against single
hits by heavier natures; schussicher (shellproof) as proof against con-
tinuous bombardment by 6-inch howitzers. — G. S. I.
96 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
There must also be sufficient space for the Medical Corps per-
sonnel, first-aid dressings, trench stretchers, blankets, mineral
water, disinfecting material, reserve antigas material, supplies,
etc. There should be larger medical dugouts capable of holding
25 to 40 men and a larger quantity of medical stores in the
vicinity of the battalion reserve. In each regimental sector
dugouts should be arranged about 2,000 to 3,000 yards behind
the front line (cellars are most suitable, in each of which about
100 wounded can be accommodated lyiijg down) . The entrances,
of which there should be at least two, of all medical dugouts,
must be constructed so that stretchers can be easily carried in
and out.
52. Defensive positions formed by connecting shell holes,
which are the rule in the front line during heavy fighting, have
the advantage that they are difficult to recognize and are cor-
respondingly less effectively shelled. Infantry, therefore, feels
safe in them, and is disinclined to dig the more easily seen con-
tinuous trenches. The advantages of shell-hole positions are,
however, practically negligible in comparison with the following
disadvantages :
Lack of accurate definition of the firing line ; continual changes
in the position of the line ; uncertainty when arranging barrage
fire ; increased difficulty, if not absolute impossibility, of control
of the men; nearly complete absence of any kind of leading,
which makes itself particularly noticeable as the men are so dis-
persed, and nearly always involves loss of ground and casualties
in missing ; more rapid expenditure of the physical power of the
men, for they can not shelter themselves from weather in the
shell holes, and in heavy rain are often up to the waist in mud,
whereas in continuous trenches some sort of drainage can be
arranged quickly. In shell-hole positions, in which obstacles
are generally lacking, the scattered groups are exposed to any
surprise by hostile patrols, and a counterattack lacks supporting
points and jumping-off trenches.
Rules can hardly be laid down for the construction of shell-
hole positions during the fight. The obvious procedure here is
at once to establish nests of infantry consisting of one or two
groups, supported, if circumstances render it advisable, by one
or two machine guns in or behind the line of shell holes occupied,
and to construct obstacles and dugouts for them. By degrees
these nests are linked up with one another and with the switch
trenches and retired positions behind them.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 97
(f) DEFENSE.
53. An active conduct of the defense is absolutely essential
even against an enemy who is far superior in numbers. Intense
activity of patrols and raids on weak points of the enemy's posi-
tion interfere with his preparations for attack and compel him
to k'iep in a condition of continual readiness for our attacks,
and so to hold his positions more strongly even at times when
he is not contemplating an attack himself.
54. In shell-hole positions, in which the infantry finds but
little shelter from the enemy's fire, an active defense is of
greater importance. Every man must understand that the
losses caused by the enemy's artillery fire diminish, the closer
our ::ront lines are to those of the enemy. The completion of
the position should, therefore, be combined with a pushing for-
ward of our lines where the situation permits.
55. It is the task of the artillery and of the minenwerfer to
nip 1he enemy's attack in the bud as far as possible. If the
eneny none the less succeeds in leaving his trenches for the
assault, it should be possible to repulse every attack by holding
the j'ront line with a weak garrison, provided with some ma-
chine; guns and a large supply of close-range weapons, in com-
bination with well-directed and rapidly opened barrage fire,
and also with machine guns sited on points of rising ground
farther in rear.
56. It is absolutely essential to remember that in spite of
" defended areas " the fighting must take place in the foremost
line and, if this is overrun, for its recapture.
57. The necessary preliminary for the repulse of a hostile at-
tack is that our own infantry, distributed in depth, shall be
kept fit for fighting in spite of effective and intense bombard-
ment for days by the enemy's artillery. Continual work on the
positions, and a good organization of the supply of rations and
ammunition, are the most important points in maintaining their
fighting strength.
58. As a matter of principle, every unit must fight in that
portion of the foremost position which is given to it to defend.
The voluntary evacuation of a position, or of portions of a
position, can lead to most disastrous results for the troops on
the flanks. The voluntary evacuation of positions must, there-
fore, only take place with the express permission of the higher
3577°— 17 7
98 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
commanders, who are in a position to realize its effects on the
troops on the flanks and on other arms (artillery).
59. Such an evacuation can scarcely ever be carried out me-
thodically except by night or in very misty weather, for experi-
ence shows that during the fighting every visible movement by
day is immediately subjected to the most intense fire, and all
movements cause heavy losses owing to the fact that communi-
cation trenches are usually entirely lacking.
60. No objection can be taken to the temporary evacuation in
a forward direction of portions of the foremost line which are
exposed to very heavy shell fire in the case of good troops who
are well trained in initiative and in rapid counterattack. The
movement will then consist in individual groups dashing for-
ward into shell holes which lie in front of their position.
61. A movement to the flank under hostile fire can only be
carried out on a very narrow front, and then by moving quickly
from crater to crater, or by creeping along the remains of the
trenches. During the battle the front covered by the enemy's
intense bombardment will usually be so broad that nothing is
gained by moving the trench garrison to the flank. The maneu-
ver, however, is always exposed to the great risk that the enemy
observes the evacuation, lifts his fire farther forward, and im-
mediately occupies the position which has been evacuated.
62. The risk is very much increased if the garrison of a trench
retires from its foremost line. All intense artillery fire, even
if directed against a narrow front, covers the ground in rear.
As a general rule, all lines which lie behind the foremost
trenches are methodically shelled. If our trench garrison moves
to the rear in the zone of fire, it quickly becomes demoralized.
All experience proves that such troops can no longer be ex-
pected to carry out a counterattack. The result is almost in-
variably the loss of the portion of the position which has been
evacuated and, as a further result, the creation of a very diffi-
cult position for the troops on the flanks. These, if the enemy
attacks on a broader front, are usually attacked frontally and
on the flank, and have to fight under the most unfavorable
conditions.
63. During the Battle of the Somme the. methodical evacua-
tion of portions of the position depended on obtaining permis-
sion from army headquarters, and every evacuation of positions,
even to the smallest extent, carried out on the responsibility of
the individual commander, was forbidden. Every man was
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
obliged to fight at that point at which he was stationed ; the
enemy's line of advance could only lead over his dead body.
Army headquarters believes that it was owing to this firm de-
termination to fight, with which every leader was inspired, that
the enemy, in spite of his superior numbers, bled to death in
front of the serried ranks of our soldiers.
64. If the enemy succeeds in overrunning the front lines in an
attack, he can only be ejected by immediate counterattacks
which must envelop him on all sides. If he has once managed
to consolidate his hold on our positions, a methodical counter-
attack, which takes time, is necessary.
65. Penetration of our lines by the enemy occurs during the
battle not only in the case of attacks, which are carefully pre-
pared, but is frequently effected by patrols or small detachments
with machine guns which penetrate or sap their way into gaps,
particularly in shell-hole positions. These small detachments
are gradually followed by larger forces. This kind of " nest " is
ofte:i scarcely noticed to begin with, or does not have sufficient
atte ition paid to it. The seriousness of the situation is usually
first recognized when it is too late. Instead of cutting off the
" nest " or countering it by a vigorous attack, a methodical attack
has to be made.
The necessary preparations for methodical attacks on nests
of this kind must be made at once, as soon as the nest is dis-
covered. The most important are to reconnoiter the position
as quickly as possible, to block the nest off on all sides, so that
a shell hole is occupied at once as close as possible behind the
breach. A trench should then be dug leading to the shell hole.
Other trenches should be dug in which assault detachments can
be assembled; patrols should feel their way toward the flanks
of the enemy who has penetrated our position and should dig
themselves in. Every available means to assist in the attack
should be carefully concentrated, such as assault detachments,
Flammenwerfer, Oranatenwerfer, light Minemverfer, infantry
gun batteries, etc.
(g) IMMEDIATE AND METHODICAL COUNTERATTACKS.
66. An immediate counterattack can scarcely ever be ordered
by the higher commanders. It must be the result of the quick
initiative of the commanders, subordinate commanders, and
men in the front line. Every man must be trained to eject, on
his own initiative, an enemy who has penetrated our positions,
100 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
and not to rest content until the foremost line has been entirely
cleared. Quick, mobile bombing parties, moving rapidly over
the open or along the trenches, vie with assault detachments
specially distributed and allotted to special objectives. The
commanders of the supports must take in the situation and
make up their minds quickly and attack the enemy, distributing
their groups, platoons, and companies to meet the situation, al-
lotting special tasks to detachments and giving them short and
precise instructions as to objectives. For this purpose it is
necessary that the quarters of supports and reserves, when the
fighting develops its full intensity, should be distributed over
different points in the ground (in trenches and dugouts or on
the slopes of hills). The collection of numbers of dugouts or
camps at one point will not escape the enemy's notice ; by open-
ing heavy fire on such points he puts the massed supports ac-
commodated there out of action at the critical moment.
It is very important that, in addition to, the transmission of
information from front to rear, communication should also be
established from rear to front. Troops which wait for reports
to reach them from the front will always come up too late for
a counterattack. Continual observation of our own and the
enemy's positions is absolutely essential on the part of the
sentries of the supports and reserves. Commanders must keep
themselves continually informed as to the situation and at
critical moments keep a lookout themselves, for only thus can
they have a clear idea of what is happening and come to quick
and correct decisions.
67. The execution of methodical counterattacks can not be
dispensed with even in a purely defensive battle. They are
necessary in order to recapture important points which have
been lost, or at least not to leave the enemy full freedom of ac-
tion. If they are well prepared, they do not involve more
casualties or a greater expenditure of ammunition than do
passive endurance of an intense bombardment and numerous
unnecessary requests for barrage fire, which become more fre-
quent as the self-confidence of the troops diminishes as a result
of adopting a purely passive attitude.
In every attack, rearward positions, strong points, and flank-
ing positions must be held by emergency garrisons as a precau-
tion against possible defeats.
68. Methodical attacks may either be carried out as surprise
attacks without artillery preparation or with the employment
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 101
of intense artillery preparation. A compromise between the
two methods nearly always leads to failure.
69. Surprise attacks should be limited to a narrow front, and
can only be carried out if the habits of the enemy are exactly
known, if the approach to the enemy's position is short and
free of obstacles, and if it is possible to penetrate into the
enemy's position at several points simultaneously and with
practically no casualties. Thorough rehearsals, a detailed al-
lotment of tasks down to individuals, taking full advantage* of
the weather (e. g., mist or twilight)", aM'; simultaneous ;and
rapid action are preliminary conditions' necessary /orj the ,suc-i
cess of a surprise attack. - " >J '. V > /•'
70. Raids on a larger scale will, as1 a rule/ only be successful
after intense artillery preparation. The preparatory measures
to be carried out by the artillery (accurate registration on all
the targets which are to be shelled in the course of the raid)
and the expenditure of ammunition must be so regulated that
the portions of positions to be captured are really shelled into
a condition in which they are ready to be assaulted. It will
often be necessary to evacuate our own front lines during the
fire for effect ; this can be done without hesitation if our artil-
lery fire is properly directed against the enemy's trenches.
71. Troops who have been lying widely scattered in trenches
which have been destroyed and in shell holes, with insufficient
food, and who are longing for the day when they will be re-
lieved, will only be induced to attack cheerfully and resolutely
at a fixed time, without the possibility of being thoroughly in-
structed as to the reasons and objective of the attack, if their
leaders are extraordinarily efficient, and then only, as a rule, in
driblets. A necessary preliminary for a successful attack on a
large scale is fresh infantry to make the assault (a regiment
to every 1,000 yards of front) and the detailing of a relief for
the assault troops. The original troops in the line may be em-
ployed for this purpose if they have not been exhausted by
previous fighting.
72. It is advisable not to relieve the troops who have made a
successful assault immediately, but two or three days later.
Troops who have won ground after heavy fighting will hold the
captured position more tenaciously than new troops who also,
in many cases, do not know the ground sufficiently well.
To avoid any weakening during these two days of the troops
who have made the assault, special parties, commanded by offi-
102 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
cers, must be detailed to evacuate prisoners and wounded, to
clear the ground and, above all, to bring up supplies of building
material. Thorough and special infantry preparations for this
work are necessary, even with well-trained troops.
Machine guns form a support and protection for the assault-
ing troops in immediate and methodical counterattacks and
hold the enemy to his trenches by flanking fire, especially at
the moment when the assaulting troops leave their trenches.
The* section commanders; of the machine guns specially detailed
beforehand 4:i€oJlfvW tig! the assault, advance with the assault-
ing .infantry §9, as to reconnoiter the captured position at once
for diiitatel* gini posjtifyzs, («
Machine guns should be brought up to the captured position
as soon as the infantry has taken it. They must be dug in be-
fore a hostile counterattack is delivered or the enemy's anni-
hilating fire is opened against the captured position. To bring
up machine guns from the lines in rear into the position from
which the attack is to be made, and thence to the captured
trenches, demands thorough reconnaissance and clear orders as
to time, route, objective, and duties.
It is advisable to detail a few infantrymen to the machine
guns to act under the order of the section commander. Their
duties are to protect the machine guns, to defend it in hand-to-
hand fighting (hand grenades), to help in digging in the gun
in the captured trench, and to dig connecting trenches in shell-
hole positions.
73. The basis for the preparations for the attack is thor-
ough reconnaissance of the enemy's position by patrols, ob-
servers, and aeroplane photographs. The nature of the ground,
the trace of the enemy's trenches, the condition and nature of
his entanglements, the situation of dugouts, machine guns and
trench guns, the degree of the enemy's vigilance are factors
which demand thorough reconnaissance and must be taken into
consideration in deciding on the manner in which the attack is
to be carried out.
The well-considered employment of all technical means and
close cooperation of the artillery with the infantry and of the
airmen with the artillery and infantry require the nicest ad-
justment of arrangements as regards both time and space. If
a hostile position has been conquered by technical means, all
the infantry has to do is to occupy it. It is advisable to issue
good maps (1: 5,000), specially prepared for the operations and
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 103
containing all the information gained by reconnaissance, and to
distribute them down to group commanders.
74. While the troops in the front-line trenches are preparing
the starting point for the attack (which is absolutely essential
and should consist, if possible, of several trenches with dug-
outs ) the troops who are to deliver the attack should be kept
in rear, with good rations and quarters, and trained on a prac-
tice defense work which resembles the actual position to be
attacked as closely as possible. The detailing of special as-
sau t detachments which are to deal entirely with machine
guns which have not been put out of action has proved to be
very effective. It is necessary to practice the individual de-
tachments— even the individual men — in the tasks allotted to
them again and again.
Feint preparations for an attack in the neighborhood of the
front which is to be attacked, the employment of gas or smoke
bombs, machine-gun and Flammenwerfer activity, in combina-
tion with bursts of artillery fire and unusual aerial activity,
leave the enemy in doubt as to the actual point to be attacked
am. cause him to distribute his artillery fire.
75. The attack should not go beyond the objective unless a
complete understanding has been arrived at with the artillery.
At the moment for the attack, which, if possible, should not
be made evident by increased intensity of artillery fire, the
most important point is for all detachments and waves of as-
sault to leave the trenches simultaneously and sufficiently rap-
idly to avoid the enemy's barrage fire and to prevent any of the
enemy's machine guns which have not been put out of action
from opening fire. Once the waves of assault have forced
their way into the enemy's first line, they have nothing to fear
from the enemy's destructive or barrage fire, but can deal with
the enemy's infantry without interference.
76. Counterthrusts and counterattacks are still too seldom
employed as a means of escaping from the enemy's fire for
effect and taking advantage of the moral superiority of our
own infantry. Troops who have lain passively under intense
artillery fire leave the first line with a greater loss of moraJe
than a unit which has carried out a counterattack, even if this
is only partially successful.
(h) EQUIPMENT.
77. The steel helmet has proved thoroughly satisfactory and
is very popular. To diminish the polish of the helmet, which
104 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
remains bright in spite of the gray paint, it has been found
useful to smear the helmet with clay and earth.
78. Assault kit must be supplemented by sand bags carried
like a rucksack, which serve to carry up rations and ammuni-
tion in place of the pack, which is too heavy. It is always ad-
visable to take greatcoats and waterproof sheets. Blankets are
only necessary in cold weather.
One hundred and fifty cartridges per man are enough. Be-
fore the men go into action it is necessary to issue large num-
bers of hand grenades in sandbags and to equip every man with
a large spade (every section with a pickax, pioneer, and
building material) as well as with cold rations for three or
four days.
79. On days when there is heavy fighting, the demand for
food is not so great as that for something to drink. It is neces-
sary to equip the men with two water bogles full of tea or
coffee, and to issue several bottles of mineral water, as well as
to avoid all food which causes thirst (no salted or smoked meat).
Bacon, sausage which will keep, bread, rusks, biscuits, chocolate,
tinned meat and tinned fat are recommended. No rations must
be issued in larger packages than half-packages, so as to make
each man independent of the others. Tobacco and cigars in
fairly large quantities are a very welcome supplement, as also
is alcohol in wet, cold weather. To avoid the misuse of con-
centrated alcohol, it is advisable to mix rum or red wine with the
tea. It has proved verj useful to issue solidified methylated
spirits to warm up tinned food and the food sent up from the
traveling kitchens. It is absolutely necessary to issue illuminat-
ing materials such as candles, carbide, and electric lamps with
spare batteries.
80. To keep the rifle from getting dirty, it is a good plan to
wrap waterproof cloth around the breech.
Orderlies, runners, and carrying parties are best armed with
pistols, as the rifle gets in the men's way as they dash from one
shell hole, to another.
81. The issue of light pistols on the establishment scale is not
sufficient for the requirements during a battle. It is necessary
to increase the number of pistols and the amount of light-pistol
ammunition before heavy fighting begins.
82. For machine-gun personnel the following equipment has
proved useful in addition to the sandbag which is used for car-
rying stores.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 105
(a) Gun teams of the strength of one noncommissioned officer
and seven men.
Gun commander. — One water can, telescope attached to the
belt, one reserve barrel in a roughly made wooden bos or
wrapped up in cloth or the waterproof sheet, one condenser tube,
one spare, lock in his trouser pocket, one folding cleaning rod
and a pair of pliers in his sandbag.
No. 1: One auxiliary mounting, one light pistol and cartridges.
AT9. 2: The machine gun itself wrapped up in a tent square,
tool bag attached to his belt, one spare lock in his trouser
pocket.
Nos. 3 and 4- One ammunition box each containing 500 rounds ;
oil, greasej and tow in their sandbags.
Nos. 5, 6, and 7: One ammunition box each containing 500
rounds ; hand grenades in their sandbags.
(?>) Three section commanders with two orderlies each.
Section commander: Light pistol and cartridges, one
water can.
First orderly: One water can and an oil can in his sand
bag.
Second orderly: One water can, a belt filler in his sand
bag.
(c) Company commander.
First orderly with a belt filler in his sand bag.
Second orderly: One oil can in his sand bag.
Third orderly: Tow and a belt filler in his sand bag.
One assistant armorer with a No. 11 tool box in his sand
bag.
(i) SUPPLY.
83. The supply of rations, ammunition, and pioneer material
must be organized down to the smallest details and controlled
by officers. It is extraordinary how far forward wagons (and
also traveling kitchens) can go under skillful and smart leader-
ship without casualties, even on days when the artillery fire is
intense. It has proved very useful to form fourth platoons and
divide them up into carrying parties. All ammunition and ra-
tions which have to be brought up must be packed up by the
carrying parties beforehand in their quarters in packages which
can be easily handled and distributed. It is a good plan to pack
the stores for each group in a few sand bags.
106 NOTES ON EECENT OPERATIONS.
84. The widely spread idea that the troops in the foremost
line do not care for hot food and prefer the cold rations which
they take up with them is erroneous. It is true that the troops
do not care for cooked food when it reaches them as a cold and
greasy mess. On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary for
the maintenance of the health and spirits of the troops, especi-
ally in wet and cold weather, to do everything possible to bring
up something hot to eat and drink to the men in the front
trenches at least once a day. In places where the traveling
kitchens can not come up close enough cooking places must be
provided in the reserve and support trenches in which the food
can be warmed up again en route. From these points the food
should be sent on in handy light mess tins, which retain heat
well and with which the carrier can throw himself down, in case
the enemy opens fire, without spilling the food. Tightly-closing
receptacles, shaped like a vintner's tub and carried like a pack,
are strongly recommended.
85. To make the supply easier it is advisable to establish
depots and intermediate depots of ammunition and rations in
the second and third trenches and with the supports and re-
serves ; these should be established beforehand, while things are
quiet. It is also advisable to establish advanced clothing stores
from which the troops can draw the most necessary articles of
clothing and equipment, such as water bottles, stockings, foot
bandages, and boots as quickly as possible, and to incorporate
the company tradesmen in the fourth platoons (mentioned
above).
86. The machine-gun officer on the regimental staff is respon-
sible for the supply for the whole of the machine-gun units of
an infantry regiment. He must arrange for the replacement
and bringing up of equipment and ammunition and controls the
supply of rations for the machine-gun detachments which, for
this purpose, are best incorporated in the infantry companies
with which they are working.
E. PIONEERS, SEARCHLIGHTS, " FLAMMENWERFER," AND TRENCH
MORTARS.
87. The experience of the Somme Battle shows that the follow-
ing staffs and troops are necessary :
STAFFS.
Pioneer general at army headquarters with one adjutant, one
officer for pioneer services, one officer for Minenwerfer services,
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 107
and one senior officer with three subalterns for the supply of
material.
Stuff officer of pioneers with the groups (corps ) . Pioneer com-
mander with each division ; he also commands the pioneer bat-
talions of the division and is the technical adviser of the divi-
sional commander on all questions of the construction of de-
fenses, Minenwerfer, and the employment of pioneers and
M in c nwerfer.
A senior, permanent pioneer officer with each division. He
should be employed for the most part, under the pioneer com-
mander, on the supply of engineer stores and weapons for the
closo combat, and, when the division is relieved, will disseminate
all the experience gained.
TBOOPS.
Four pioneer companies for each division, one for each of the
three infantry regiments in the position and one at the disposal
of the division for particular tasks. If there is mine warfare
in the divisional sector one or two pioneer mining companies
are also necessary.
One pioneer battalion at the disposal of the group for the com-
pletion of the back lines and for special tasks. A large number
of landwehr and landsturm companies ( about as many as there
are divisional sectors) at the disposal of the army for the con-
struction of additional back lines.
A pioneer park company for every pioneer park and two for
the army pioneer park.
88. Divisional pioneer companies will be relieved with their
divisions. Just as with the infantry, thorough instruction and
preliminary training are necessary before moving into the posi-
tion, which must be carefully handed over, both by means of
maps and on the ground. If the commanders have a good knowl-
edge of the position, the chances of ground being lost during the
period immediately following the relief are minimized. It is,
therefore, essential that the pioneer commander and the com-
pany commanders of the incoming division should be sent on
several days beforehand with small advance parties and that
rear parties of the outgoing division should remain behind in
each regimental sector.
89. One searchlight section per division is sufficient. Detach-
ments can be detailed from these sections for employment under
group or army headquarters.
108 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
90. The attachment of Flammenwerfer to the assault troops is
specially desirable when methodical counter attacks are to be
carried out. Consequently one of the Flammenwerfer battalions
allotted to the army was combined with an assault school, and,
by means of small detachments, trained those divisions which
were behind the front, waiting to act as reliefs, in the technical
use of Flammenwerfer.
91. The requirements of an infantry division in a defensive
battle have, on the whole, been met by the allotment of light
Minenwerfer to infantry battalions, in addition to the divisional
Hinenwerfer company, as long as the army also has at its dis-
posal a few Minenwerfer companies which can be engaged at
decisive points. There is hardly likely to be any occasion to
engage a Hinenwerfer battalion as a complete unit on the actual
battle front, but a vigorous and overwhelming bombardment by
Minemcerfer on portions of the army front where no attack is
being made can do considerable injury to the enemy.
92. In previously prepared positions trench mortars of all
kinds can be employed; on the actual battle field, when there
are no previously prepared positions, heavy and medium Minen-
iverfer can not be employed, owing to the difficulty of ammuni-
tion supply.
Light Minenwerfer can only be employed when cover is avail-
able. Their main tasks are annihilating and barrage fire.
93. Minenwerfer are best employed iu groups of two to four
mortars, in order to avoid overconcentration. The distance be-
hind the front line should be such that they can not be overrun
immediately the enemy penetrates into the position. Conspicu-
ous points are to be avoided and every advantage should be
taken of cover provided by the lie of the ground. Alternative
emplacements are of value, provided ammunition supply is
feasible and covered communications are available. Coopera-
tion with infantry and artillery must be effected in accordance
with a fixed scheme of targets and barrage fire.
F. ARTILLERY.
I. Causes of initial failures.
94. At the beginning of the Battle of the Somme our artil-
lery was far too weak in numbers, in calibers, supply of am-
munition, and means of observation to meet the enemy from the
outset with the requisite counter measures. To this may be
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 109
added the quite noticeable inferiority of our reconnaissance,
especially aerial reconnaissance, for which the enemy produced
a very large number of machines, corresponding to his artillery
equipment, and which doubtless also were well organized and
employed.
£5. Thus our infantry lacked the necessary artillery support.
Th3 result was a retrograde movement under pressure from the
enemy, which made general supervision and a clear system of
command even more difficult and caused the artillery also heavy
losses in men and material. The ground on which systematic
preparations had been made for the massed employment of re-
enlorcing artillery, especially heavy artillery, was partly lost to
the enemy, so that the rapid and smooth carrying out of reen-
f or cement on a very large scale could no longer be insured.
Practically all the reenforcing divisions came without their own
artillery; thus there was a great mixture of formations, and
consequently uniformity of action again suffered.
1»6. Under these difficult conditions the artillery reenforce-
inents which were hurriedly brought up were thrown into line as
they happened to arrive, wherever the situation seemed to be
most serious. The batteries no longer found positions already
du,? and prepared. Under the enemy's fire they had to start
everything from the beginning. Any fresh headquarters that
were allotted had to be employed as quickly as possible wherever
the need was greatest. This produced for a time a confusion
of units, which was bound to react on the command of the
artillery in the battle and necessarily decrease the effective work
of the troops. The artillery was therefore only partially able
to carry out its task in the defensive battle.
97. A systematic engagement of the enemy's artillery, of the
enemy's points of departure, and of the troops waiting for the
assault could not, in most cases, take place. Continual barrage
fire, and nothing else, was regarded by the troops as the only
salvation when on the defensive.
At the beginning of the battle the troops had not been made to
see that barrage is simply a protective measure to hinder the
enemy entering a certain strip of country in front of our own
line, but that it does not do the enemy any damage if he does not
run into this strip or is not surprised there. Thus by continual
barrage fire, with its huge expenditure of ammunition and ma-
terial and human energy, no real damage to the enemy is insured*
110 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
98. Owing to the noticeable lack of long-range flat-trajectory
guns there was, from the outset, no possibility of a well thought
out and systematic interference with the enemy's organizations
behind his front of attack.
II. Measures by which a gradual improvement was attained.
99. An improvement in the situation only became possible after
the arrival of considerable artillery reenforcements (especially
heavy artillery) and of their auxiliaries (aeroplanes and kite
balloons) ; it thus became possible to give the infantry defense
more support. But with the loss of ground still continuing in
spite of these measures, and the necessaray shifting of battle
fronts owing to new divisions being engaged and new army
groups being formed, it was only gradually possible to obtain
an effective organization of the artillery command and intel-
ligence.
100. Attention is called to the following points as the most im-
portant in the organization that arose :
(a) Provision of a separate artillery telephone system.
(&) A large increase of the previously well arranged survey
system by forming an artillery survey section, where all results
of reconnaissance could be sifted and issued on a daily artillery
map, which served as the basis for artillery fire control. Close
liaison with balloons and aeroplanes by connecting them up with
the artillery telephone system.
(c) Equipment of field and heavy artillery with good maps
and reliable battery boards.
(d) Expansion of the means of aerial reconnaissance and im-
provement of the cooperation between aeroplanes and artillery.
Increased barrage protection against the enemy's aerial ob-
servers.
(e) Regulating the ammunition expenditure in accordance
with the possibilities of supply and thus forming an assured
reserve of ammunition.
(/) Employment of the ammunition parks within the groups
to carry out the supply of material as well as that of ammuni-
tion.
(#) More careful supervision of the handling by the troops of
material and ammunition^ The erection of efficient repair work-
shops within the groups and of a large workshop for the whole
army area.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. Ill
( h ) The following were also aimed at, but were obtained only
partially or not at all during the battle, owing to the unfavorable
circumstances :
The formation of a larger reserve of ammunition to
make the army more independent of replenishment from
the rear.
The most comprehensive engagement of the enemy's
artillery and continual attacks on the enemy's rearward
communications and billets.
The building of field tramways right up to the battery
positions in order to insure a smooth ammunition sup-
ply, to spare the horses, and to use fewer motor lorries,
thus saving the roads.
The construction and use of numerous alternative
positions.
101. The results of these measures were soon shown by the
fact that the troops recognized that barrage fire diminishes in
impDrtance if the enemy can be systematically engaged with ar-
tillery ; that is, if proper attention is given to the engagement of
the enemy's artillery and to destructive and annihilating fire.
Thanks to a sharp lookout on the part of our troops, we were
generally able to nip the enemy's attacks in the bud and thus
decreased the number of useless calls for barrage. The more it
was supported by the infantry, especially in exactly determining
our own and the enemy's lines, the better were the results ob-
tained by the artillery. Closer cooperation with the other means
of observation, especially with the air service, produced further
improvement in this respect. A considerable decrease in the
expenditure of ammunition and material was attained, and yet
our reverses diminished and finally ceased almost entirely.
III. Experiences and lessons.
(a) PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE.
102. The employment of artillery reenforcements must be car-
ried out on the basis of a scheme, thought over and worked out
during quiet times, making full use of prepared battery positions,
methods of command and observation, battery boards, and lists
of targets. For this a type of armament plan, similar to those
used in a fortress, must be prepared ; it must include not only
the front but also the back lines.
103. In addition there must be an artillery telephone system
which is quite separate from the general tactical system. Where
112 NOTES ON KECENT OPERATIONS.
the complete construction of such a system, which is desirable,
does not appear to be possible or necessary in a quiet sector, the
whole of the material must be available to be built in. Material
brought by the newly arrived staffs and batteries is generally
quite insufficient and should only be used in cases of urgent
necessity.
Special safety measures are advisable for the most important
communications between command posts and observation posts ;
these include placing the wire in special cable trenches, avoiding
localities and prominent points on the ground which are known
to be much shelled, and laying the double lines of cable, which
must be placed well apart in the form of ladder circuits, etc.
104. All troops as they arrive should, if possible, be tested as
to their fighting capacity. Troops that have suffered severely
and are worn out by their exertions in other theaters of the war
can not do what is expected of them. In general, their move into
line will be hastened and more efficiently carried out if officers
are sent on in advance. These latter can instruct the troops in
the tasks that are allotted to them (battery positions, condition
of the roads, billets), and at the same time hand over the neces-
sary maps and plans.
105. A sufficient supply of ammunition must be kept ready
within armies, and, if possible, within corps (groups) in order
to be able to meet sudden demands quickly.
106. The supply in times of battle must be insured, even in the
case of the roads becoming bad, etc., by the construction of a
large number of field tramways.
107. It is necessary to erect large repair workshops, which must
be able to form branches at short notice with the groups, if neces-
sary, by making use of favorably situated and suitable armorers'
workshops belonging to the troops.
(b) COMMAND.
108. In face of the frequently changing groups a certain per-
manency in command must be maintained if all useful experi-
ences, etc., are not to be lost. The longer the command remains
in the same hands the better.
This also applies "to artillery commanders ; the latter should
not be changed in a shorter period than four weeks, even if their
divisions are withdrawn sooner. A simultaneous change of the
divisional commanders and the artillery commanders must bo
avoided in all circumstances,
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 113
109. The correct employment of the artillery calls for a well-
conceived plan of action, in which the questions of the most
suitable directions of fire and ranges, enfilade and oblique fire,
increasing the density of fire and supporting neighboring sectors,
cover and the state of the roads have all been carefully thought
out and properly coordinated. When the tactical situation
changes, all moves and changes of positions must be carried out
•• in accordance with this plan.
It is often advisable to place batteries outside the divisional
sector; neighboring divisions may only refuse their consent if
they themselves have urgent need of the position.
110. As far as possible artillery brigades and battalions should
only be put into line as complete units. Splitting up into single
batteries doubtless leads, with officers and men of the present
type (little experience, scanty training), to a distinct drop in
fighting power in a battle. In addition, splitting up the units
leads to difficulties of interior economy (preliminary and further
training, clothing, equipment, condition of the horses, etc.).
111. It has proved advisable for purposes of command dur-
ing the battle to concentrate the command posts of the divisional
commander, the artillery commander, and the commander of the
heavy artillery at the same place.
The increased length of the telephone wires from the artillery
commander to the groups (Abteilungen battalions) is of no im-
portance, as experience shows that the lines in the back area
can always be maintained in working order without difficulty.
112. The continual presence of the commander of the troops
at battle headquarters which give a good all-round view has
very great disadvantages from the point of view of command
during the battle. Excluding the fact that it is only in very rare
cases that battle headquarters will allow of a view over the whole
battle field, they entail an increased amount of personnel and
material in buildings, wrhich are generally quite inadequate for
a properly conducted office organization, as the artillery com-
manders with their extensive system of telephone communica-
tions must be at battle headquarters with the commander of the
troops. The shorter distance from the fire zone endangers com-
munications and thus also the continuity of command in the bat-
tle; the latter also suffers from the continual moves between
billets and battle headquarters. It will therefore, as a rule, be
preferable if commanders of troops and their artillery command-
ers direct the battle from their billets, and insure that they are
quickly informed of events ia front line by officer observers
3577°— 17 8
114 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
specially sent out and provided with independent communica-
tions (observing stations).
(C) TKAINING.
113. The training of the troops, especially in the case of the
young officers and battery commanders, no longer reaches the
standard formerly required. In particular, the results obtained
in shooting by officers and acting officers, some of whom are in-
experienced, have been insufficient. It has proved of practical
value, when circumstances have permitted it, to discuss the gen-
eral idea and execution of an important shoot beforehand, as
well as subsequently to criticize the shoots that have been carried
out, on the basis of the rounds recorded.
It is necessary to arrange for further training areas, where
formations stationed in readiness as a reserve in the hands of
the higher command, can stiffen their training. In these areas
artillery schools and practice with live rounds must be arranged
for; individuals belonging to troops in line will be detailed to
attend such courses.
114. There must be a considerable improvement in the knowl-
edge of the capabilities of the artillery amongst infantry officers.
Not only the higher commanders but the subordinate infantry
leaders down to the group * commanders must know the most im-
portant facts about the artillery. Instructions on this subject
must take place during quiet periods, and should consist of
lectures on artillery, the methods of fire and their object, and of
actual examples of gun drill and observing station work. Every
man will take an interest in this ; his interest in the sister arm
will be excited and cooperation between the two arms will con-
sequently benefit.
115. According to our experience, reenforcements asked for
from the depot units at home are very slow in arriving and
sometimes come so late that the fighting power of the troops
is endangered. To obviate this the formation of a special depot
detachment behind the army front has proved valuable. Its
object is to preserve the fighting efficiency of the troops in case
of casualties occurring until the reenforcements from home ar-
rive; at the same time it allows of more opportunity for rest
than is possible in battery billets being given to men who are
worn out or who need a rest, and avoids the necessity for sending
them back to Germany. This depot detachment is also fitted,
4 A group consists of eight men under a noncommissioned officer. — G. S.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 115
on account of its better equipment with modern guns, to carry
out the further instruction of reenforcements, which, according
to our experience, are often quite insufficiently trained.
(d) ORGANIZATION.
113. If it is in any way possible, the fighting sectors of the field
artillery groups should coincide with those of the infantry regi-
ments. For this it is necessary for a group to be able to carry
out all fighting tasks independently, and it must therefore con-
sist of guns and light field howitzers mixed. Difficulties of in-
terior economy must be put up with. A division into flat-trajec-
tory and high-angle fire groups is unsuitable. The strength of a
group must depend on the tactical situation. The formation of
too small groups and the further splitting up into subgroups
makes the issue of orders more difficult and slower.
U7. Fire direction by the artillery group commander must be
car lied out on the actual ground from personal observation.
Whore this is impossible each group must have at least one aux-
iliary observer who can see over the battle field. It must be
left to the decision of the group commander how he will carry out
the various battle tasks allotted him and which batteries and
guns he will make use of for certain tasks. This especially ap-
plies to the expenditure of ammunition. The artillery group com-
mander must try to minimize the expenditure so that he may
always have sufficient ammunition at hand for decisive move-
ments.
118. The closest cooperation with the infantry will be obtained
if the command posts are as close together as possible ; this gives
an opportunity for the two commanders to confer together (artil-
lery group commander and infantry regimental commander).
Such conferences will be supplemented or, in unfavorable local
circumstances, replaced by artillery liaison officers, who must be
provided with direct and safe telephone communications.
This mutual understanding will be increased by a continual
exchange, of observations, by frequent visits of artillery officers
to the trenches, and by frequent visits of infantry officers to
artillery observing stations.
119. The boundaries of infantry battle sectors are weak points
in a position. The artillery must observe past them, and, by the
closest liaison to right and left, must prevent them becoming
actual dividing lines.
116 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
Gross communications are therefore necessary to the neighbor-
ing artillery commanders and group commanders and to their
observing stations. The possibilities of effectice fire from neigh-
boring sectors must be known and made use of for increasing the
density of fire according to some prepared scheme.
Cooperation with a neighboring sector is not a favor but sim-
ply a duty from which only more urgent tasks on one's own
sector can absolve one.
120. The question as to how far the artillery line should, as a
general rule, be in rear of the most advanced infantry line needs
special attention. The question of the most effective distance
for barrage fire lays down a limit for the field artillery ; batteries
must not be more than 3,300 yards from the front line. Special
tasks, such as enfilade fire on certain areas, may necessitate plac-
ing batteries considerably closer up.
121. Heavy artillery, especially when armed with flat-trajec-
tory guns, must not be led away by its greater range into choos-
ing battery positions farther in rear. The object in providing
long-range guns is not to enable such batteries to avoid the
enemy's fire more easily, but to make their effect felt far behind
the enemy's line.
122. The same principles hold good for the employment of the
very heavy flat-trajectory guns, in so far as their dependence on
the railway lines does not from the outset force them into
certain defined positions.
(e) CONSTRUCTION OF BATTERY POSITIONS.
123. A suitable choice of a battery position will save much
labor in construction. A systematic scheme of construction is
necessary; first cover from aeroplanes, then deep dugouts for
the detachments, ammunition pits, communication trenches, and,
finally, wire entanglements and preparations for infantry de-
fense. Special attention must be paid to cover for the ammuni-
tion, which must be made absolutely proof against the enemy's
fire and the weather. The ammunition dumps, which are some
distance from the battery position and have to hold a second
day's supply, will also need sufficient cover.
124. Gun pits require as large an arc of fire as possible. This
must be taken into consideration when they are first built, as
subsequent alterations are difficult and take much time.
125. It is important from the point of view of ammunition
supply and change of position to keep the roads of approach in
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. lit
a good state. The possibility of their being replaced or supple-
mented by means of field railways or tramways must be taken
into consideration as soon as possible. If the ground is bad,
they will have to be worked by men instead of horses to attain
the necessary standard of efficiency.
126. Continual strengthening of the positions makes it pos-
sible for batteries to remain longer in them, even when they
have been located by the enemy and are subjected to heavy fire.
A chai.ge of position, with its disadvantages (loss of registra-
tion records and experiences gained, the necessity for fresh
communications and registration), can thus be frequently
avoided.
127. The construction of dummy and alternative positions is a
valuable means of weakening the effect of the enemy's fire. The
men required for such work can only partly be provided by the
arti.lery and must be reinforced by parties detailed by other
troops.
(f) FIRE CONTROL.
128. The weaker our infantry position is, and the less obser-
vation is possible from the front line, the more important be-
comes thr. watch kept by artillery observation ; the latter must
be able to view the whole area of close fighting. Where this can
not be effected by frontal observation, it will have to be sup-
plemented by observation from a flank. The moment the in-
fantry retires on the artillery observing stations, observation
usually ceases.
129. The general demand that, as a matter of principle, the
observing stations should be near the battery positions in order
to maintain proper communication must be considerably modi-
fied under conditions which actually obtain. In no circum-
stances must a battery commander be satisfied with a battle
station from which little or nothing can be seen. On the other
hand, artillery group commanders must generally be content
with poorer possibilities of observation, especially if their fight-
ing sector is wide. They must, however, always seek to insure
their influence on the battle by controlling the observation. A
concentration of observing stations at any one point must be
avoided in all circumstances.
130. The laying of telephone lines which are most exposed to
destruction by the enemy's fire must be carried out. according
to an exact plan. The avoidance of localities and areas that
118 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
are kept under heavy fire is not usually sufficiently taken into
account. Tins is often clue to the fact that officers with tech-
nical knowledge are not everywhere entrusted with the super-
vision of telephone communications. These officers, with their
subordinates, should be kept as long as possible at such duty.
Large numbers of wires are often run along the same route,
with the result that they mutually affect each other. Lines no
longer required must be removed altogether and as soon as pos-
sible.
131. Communication between infantry and artillery is espe-
cially important It must be the aim of both arms to effect and
maintain the closest mutual cooperation. The continual ex-
change of all observations about the enemy by means of tele-
pone conversations, liaison officers and personal conferences at
battle headquarters is necessary. Every man in the infantry
must be made to understand that his observations regarding
both the enemy and the fall and effect of our own fire provide
the artillery with most valuable supplementary information for
fire control. On the other hand, caution is necessary when the
infantry express an opinion as to the fall of our shell, as it is
a matter of experience that they very often mistake our own
and the enemy's fire, with the result that a battery that is shoot-
ing well is taken off the target by faulty correction.
132. Changes in the distribution of sectors should only be
made if there are urgent reasons for it. Making the artillery
fit in with such changes causes far more friction and upsets
matters far more than it does in the case of infantry, and may
in some circumstances interrupt or endanger effective fire at
the right moment.
(g) FIRE ACTIVITY.
133. In addition to the ammunition allotment, counterbattery
work is to a large degree dependent on possibilities of observa-
tion. It is, therefore, the special duty of all artillery com-
manders to keep the preliminary arrangements for bombarding
the enemy's artillery up to date, so that effective shoots can
start as soon as observation becomes good. Continual active
cooperation with artillery aeroplanes, balloons, and survey sec-
tions is therefore necessary.
134. Weather conditions will often make the employment of
the very heavy flat-trajectory guns against distant targets a
difficult matter. We have, however, learned from experience
that the fire effect of these guns can not be made full use of
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 119
when shooting from the map. In spite of most carefully taking
into account all the influences which are foreseen in the regu-
lations for arranging such shoots, there are generally such large
errors that unobserved shoots are a complete failure. It does
not. therefore, seem justifiable to use these guns for shooting
from the map, when their short length of life and their expen-
sive ammunition are taken into consideration. During battle,
however, it must be possible to employ the fire of these guns
age inst targets close in front of our own line. Their fire should
then be directed mainly on villages, and this must be prepared
for by the arrangement of the requisite observing stations on
the ground.
135. The field artillery, especially with its light field howitz-
ers, can relieve the heavy artillery of some of the counterbat-
tery work, and should in the main be employed against hostile
batteries that have only recently occupied their positions, and
are, therefore, in all probability, provided with less cover. The
former must become accustomed to the fact that all the special
means of reconnaissance and observation, such as balloons and
aeroplanes, are at their disposal just as much as at that of
the heavy artillery and must be made full use of. The necessary
communications must be provided from the outset and must
be maintained.
136. For the purpose of destructive fire, the most careful
observation of the situation and state of construction of the
enemy's front and rear lines is necessary. Every change in the
enemy's positions, recognized from an infantry report or from
a balloon or photographic reconnaissance, will cause an altera-
tion in the basis for destructive fire. The divisional com-
mander, who bears all responsibility for his sector, and under
whose command the whole artillery in the sector is placed, must
therefore daily issue orders to the artillery commander as to the
targets for destructive fire and the ammunition to be used
against them by the artillery. For this purpose it will generally
be necessary for the divisional commander to issue daily two
artillery orders (morning or evening) in writing.
Should the conditions change during the course of any day,
it will be possible to switch the fire over quickly, as the com-
mand posts of the divisional commander and the artillery com-
mander are close together.
137. The best picture of targets for annihilating fire will be
obtained if one puts one's self in the place of the enemy before
120 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
his attack, and paints in on the map the probable formations
which the enemy would adopt before the attack on account of
the peculiarity of the ground and the situation of the enemy's
trenches. From this it will be at once seen that annihilating
fire must not be rigid, but must be -flexible, as it must conform
to all changes in the enemy's position, especially such changes
as imply preparations for an offensive.
138. As annihilating fire must be used not only before an
assault, but also during an assault, at which time the field bat-
teries are employed for delivering barrage fire, it will be ad-
visable to distribute the heavy artillery fire over the most ini-
portant points in the enemy's trenches ; these trenches will thus
be kept under fire when the field artillery passes from annihilat-
ing to barrage fire. For example, it is wrong, during anni-
hilating fire, only to bombard the enemy's front line trenches
with field artillery, for then these trenches would not be fired
at at all as soon as the field artillery passes to barrage fire, and
therefore drops its fire close in front of our own front line.
This front line trench is, however, naturally the starting point
for the assault and also for the enemy's rear assaulting waves,
which up to this point can still make use of their communication
trenches.
139. Annihilating and barrage fire must always be registered
and the registration checked. Just as in the case of barrage
fire, preparations must be made to concentrate annihilating fire
in front of certain sectors, especially in those parts of the front
where signs of any intended attack are increasing. Exact maps
must also be kept for annihilating fire. It will be best opened
on the receipt of short code words, each sector being allotted its
own code word.
140. The use of light signals to call for the opening of barrage
fire has proved the best method, as compared with sound signals
which either entirely failed, or, at any rate, made it impossible
to recognize with sufficient certainty the sector which was call-
ing for fire. The wish for a more frequent change of light
signals is always recurring and is quite justified, as the few sig-
nals so far provided make it easy for the enemy to imitate them
and thus inveigle us into opening barrage fire with its heavy
expenditure of ammunition.
It is, therefore, advisable to order the artillery not to comply
with the light signal for " lengthen the range " during barrage
fire, in order to stop any attempts at deception by the enemy.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 121
Compliance with such a signal sent up by the enemy may make
our whole barrage ineffective and lead to the success of the
enemy's attack.
141. In addition to light signals, which are often useless in a
fog. all other means (horn signals, klaxons, sirens, trench wire
less sets) must be employed for calling for barrage fire.
142. A special light signal has recently been introduced in the
army to call for the opening of annihilating fire. This will only
be sent up from the battle headquarters of battalions in front
line , and then only if the telephone breaks down.
143. The selection of a "directing barrage battery," the coni-
muiications to which from the front and from other units of
the artillery must be especially carefully constructed, has proved
of value. This battery must be known to all other batteries in
the divisional sector, and as soon as it opens barrage or anni-
hilating fire, all other batteries must at once open barrage fire,
that is, if barrage or annihilating fire has not already been
called for by some other means. Inquiries must, however, at
once be made as to whether the directing barrage battery is
del vering annihilating fire; if so, the other batteries will at
once change to this method of fire.
144. Battery commanders must make every effort to pass as
soon as possible to observed fire from annihilating or barrage
fire which has been automatically opened, and is thus at first
not being observed. This is the best means of insuring that an
enemy, \vho has broken through, comes under our fire during
his further advance. It is the special duty of the senior artillery
commanders to make the young battery commanders proficient
in such duties by means of instructional schemes, which should
be discussed on the ground.
145. The field artillery must take an active part in de-
structive fire. For this purpose, it will be advisable to employ
certain batteries which, on account of their positions being as
far forward as possible, are able to make full use of their maxi-
mum range.
The view that the enemy's organizations should only be bom-
barded if he annoys us in the same way (retaliation fire) is
wrong and must be combated emphatically. This applies es-
pecially to the rearward works and billets, where considerable
damage can be done to the enemy. In this sphere also the
initiative must not be left to him.
122 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
(h) ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS.
146. To prepare for attacks and counterattacks, the artillery
must always be given sufficient time for reconnaissance, registra-
tion and fire for effect. Breaches of this rule lead to self-decep-
tion and reverses. It is the duty of artillery commanders to
see that this is taken into consideration. It follows from the
above that shortly before or after daybreak is an unsuitable
time for an assault. Artillery night firing can never be de-
scribed as real fire for effect. It is only a more or less heavy
harassing fire according to the number and caliber of batteries
employed and the amount of ammunition expended.
An unsuccessful attack means greater sacrifice than keeping
the assaulting troops for a longer period in the assembly position.
147. In a methodical attack, registration must be carried out
as unobstrusively as possible and should be distributed over
several days, so that on the actual day of attack it will only be
necessary to check registration. In order to deceive the enemy,
it will be advisable to carry out simultaneous registration
against other positions some distance away.
148. In an assault the artillery should not lift its fire off the
objective until the moment the infantry enters the enemy's line,
and this must be carried out exactly according to the scheduled
time ; fire must not lift the moment the assaulting infantry goes
over the parapet, otherwise the enemy generally finds time to
man his trenches. A certain amount of danger to our own in-
fantry, which can be diminished by the use of shells with delay
action fuzes shortly before the assault, must be put up with.
Similarly, the lifts of the artillery fire during an assault must
not be too large. The fire should be immediately in front of
the advancing infantry. This needs very careful arrangement.
(i) CLOSE DEFENSE.
149. The battery positions must be provided with obstacles;
the guns must be able to fire at once at case-shot distance; to
do this they must be able to be pulled quickly out of their pits ;
hand grenades must be placed in readiness and the gun detach-
ments must be trained for defense at close quarters. An ample
supply of small-arms ammunition must be dumped in the bat-
teries in order to be able to supply retiring infantry with am-
munition, and thus make it more easy to hold these strong points
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 123
until the counterattack is launched. In advanced positions an
allotment of machine guns is desirable ; the field artillery must
know how to use them.
(k) AMMUNITION AND MATERIAL.
]50. The ammunition supply within groups (corps) and divi-
sions must be under central control; a special officer is neces-
sary for this duty, who must remain permanently in the area.
This must be taken into consideration when staffs are being
completed; detailing an officer for this duty from one of the
units permanently weakens the latter to an inadmissible extent.
The same holds good as regards material. Whether one and the
same officer can simultaneously control ammunition and mate-
rial will depend on circumstances.
1.51. Ammunition and material must frequently be inspected
in the battery positions. For this purpose artificers and armor-
ers should frequently be sent to the positions. In addition,
commanders (including regimental commanders) must also oc-
casionally carry out inspections as to the treatment of ammuni-
tion and material, in addition to their inspections of battery
routine, by means of personal visits to the battery positions.
152. For ammunition supply, small ammunition depots on
roads not very far behind the battery positions have proved
useful. It is a matter of the most urgent importance to keep
the roads of approach in good condition, and to have an active
body of road police, especially in villages and at cross roads.
153. It is worthy of remark that our enemy's guns apparently
have a much smaller zone of dispersion than our own. He also
appears to have better and more accurate data for shooting from
the map than we have. This seems to be proved by the fact
that in weather that excludes all possibility of observation, and
under conditions very different from those prevailing during
previous shoots, he obtains hits on small targets with great ac-
curacy.
G. COMMUNICATIONS AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE.
I. Causes of initial failures.
154. The breakdown of the communication service at the begin-
ning of the battle is chiefly attributable to the inadequate pro-
vision of means of communication. These were numerically
much inferior to those of the enemy. Their increase did not
124 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
keep pace with the increase in the number of divisions and
heavy artillery units engaged.
155. Further, there was at the outset no organization which
could make preparations for the ever-increasing engagement of
new formations. It was impossible to control the new forma-
tions from army headquarters and there was no organization for
this purpose at corps headquarters. The organization had first
to be created, instead of the newly allotted communication
troops being able to fit themselves into an existing organization.
A further difficulty was caused by the individual communication
units being allotted, one by one, so that the organization was
merely *patch work at first.
156. On the 22d June the following flights were available,
viz, 3 artillery, 5 reconnaissance, 13 battle plane, and 2 pursuit
flights. These weak forces were unable to play any part against
the enemy, who was able to prevent long distance reconnais-
sances entirely, and almost completely stop our artillery ob-
servation and photographic work. The situation demanded that,
groups (corps) should have been allotted, on a scale correspond-
ing to their frontage, number of divisions, and strength in
artillery, a number of artillery and reconnaissance flights to-
gether with the necessary number of the battle-plane flights.
For this, however, the numbers available were insufficient.
Several divisions had to manage with one artillery flight be-
tween them, and, at the less important points in the line, this
flight was not protected by battle planes, as army headquarters
were obliged to employ these at the most threatened points in
order to be able, there at least, to obtain information.
157. As regards balloon detachments, the army had at its dis-
posal two detachments with a total of five balloons, as against
25 to 30 possessed by the enemy. Inadequate antiaircrafts gun
protection hampered their work. It was impossible to make
use of balloon observation from neighboring sectors, as the
necessary telephone system was lacking and each balloon was
already unable to cope with its own work. The result of this
complete inferiority in aerial observation was that our artillery
was fighting blindfold. No machines were available for the
purpose of communication with the front line, nor were either
the troops or the aeroplanes and balloons prepared for this, as
the army was not yet familiar with the lessons learned at Ver-
dun.
158. The establishment of telephone stores normally allotted
to corps and divisions was not nearly sufficient, and there were
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 125
but few additional motor lorry sections available. The army
telephone detachment was only formed at the same time as the
first army itself. It was quite impossible, simultaneously and
as rapidly as desirable, to meet all the requirements due to the
me vements of numerous headquarters, as well as to the necessity
for new lines for the artillery, aviation, A.A. gun, and balloon
systems.
The leading and fighting suffered, and it was quite impossible
to make full use of even the small available number of aviation,
A.A. gun and balloon units. Owing to the defective organiza-
tion, the experience and knowledge of the telephone system
\v£.s lost when the corps and divisions changed so rapidly.
159. Field signal sections, power buzzer stations, wireless
detachments, and carrier pigeon lofts, which were necessary to
supplement the telephone system in the main fire zone, were
almost entirely lacking, with the exception of the signal sections
wich the divisions and a few pigeon lofts. The small number of
pigeons was insufficient, as " infantry aeroplanes " were not
ye : available, and runners and light signals were the only means
left for communication with the front line. It was unavoidable
that, after heavy attacks, the position of the front line should
often be unknown to commanders and to the artillery for a con-
siderable time.
160. The survey section was also only formed at the same time
as the first army, and was consequently deficient in most re-
spects at first. New surveys had to be undertaken, as our own
line had in- places almost reached the eastern limit of the
mapped area. Owing to the inferiority of our aviators, air
photographs did not furnish, as quickly as was desirable, the
data on which to decide which battery positions and trenches
were still used by the enemy. Our artillery was much handi-
capped on this account.
II. Measures by which a gradual improvement was attained.
INCREASE OF THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.
161. An improvement in these conditions was at once effected,
as soon as the means of communication had been increased to
such an extent that they met the most urgent requirements.
This increase must be considered as a decisive factor in the
whole course of the battle. Only of secondary importance were
the measures which aimed at securing uniformity of control over
the means of reconnaissance, and. the cooperation of all other
126 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
means of communication, as well as insuring that the experience
gained would be available even if there were changes in com-
mand.
162. The whole of the aircraft was employed with a view to
providing observation for artillery and obtaining aeroplane
photographs. All the special duties of the battle plane were sub-
ordinated to this.
The employment of aeroplanes with a view to obtaining a
complete mosaic of aeroplane photographs, and the collection of
information gained by air reconnaissance, were handed over to
the aeroplane group (wing) commanders at corps headquarters.
The cooperation of these commanders with the general staff
officer for intelligence insured coordination of aerial and ground
reconnaissance.
As soon as sufficient artillery flights were available they were
allotted, together with protective flights, to the divisional ar-
tillery commanders.
After infantry aeroplanes had been introduced by orders of
army headquarters on special occasions in the first few weeks of
the battle, an infantry flight was detailed for each group as
soon as the number of reconnaissance flights had been increased.
163. The balloon detachments were connected, by means of
a telephone system of their own, with each other and with a
newly formed balloon central station. The latter collected the
results of reconnaissances with a view to their being collated
by the survey section, and disseminated all the observations
made. This enabled every battery to fire with observation from
the particular balloon which was best able to observe the target.
164. The telephone system was improved by the allotment of
permanent units (communication officers, traffic and construc-
tion sections). This prevented the experience gained and knowl-
edge of the system from being lost.
The grouping of the various means of communication in
" headquarters communication sections " under a responsible
commander insured a better system of tactical cooperation and
mutual assistance.
165. The wireless detachments proved their value. It was
found necessary to control the wireless traffic within groups.
For this purpose group wireless officers were appointed who con-
trolled the whole of the wireless traffic, including aeroplane
wireless. Arrangements were made to use wireless for calling
for barrage, by employing aeroplane receiving stations (ground
stations) for the purpose.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 127
166. The field signal sections, when they were not on the estab-
lishment of the subordinate formations but were army troops,
were relieved from time to time in order to maintain their effi-
ciency. The small number of sections available in the army
necessitated their being relieved by sections from other armies.
167. The number of carrier pigeon lofts was increased.
168. In order to increase its usefulness, the survey section was
reinforced by a special detachment under the staff officer for
survey of the fifth army. Entirely new mapping material was
obtained. All results of reconnaissances were centralized, firstly
at group headquarters and secondly at army headquarters; which
insured that full use wras made of all information. The extent
of this information and the necessity for passing it rapidly to
the troops led to the formation or expansion of the topographical
sections with each group (corps). These sections had also to
keep the maps of our own positions up to date and were made
responsible for all information regarding a definite area in their
front.
III. Experiences and lessons,
(a) EMPLOYMENT.
169. The defensive battle necessitates the employment, on a
very large scale, of means of communication and reconnaissance,
which should be proportionate to the number of divisions and
the quantity of heavy artillery engaged. Whereas a newly
engaged division is at once effective, communication units re-
quire a certain amount of time in which to settle down before
they can develop their full powers. Consequently they should
be engaged as early as possible, and from the outset on a scale
which is based on the number of troops which will be engaged
later on.
170. The following proportion, which was found sufficient on
the Somme, may be taken- as a basis on which to allot artillery
and reconnaissance flights, viz., one artillery flight with a pro-
tective flight for each division, one infantry flight for every
group (corps), and two or three reconnaissance flights, includ-
ing one for photographic reconnaissance, for every group of
three or four divisions. Whether this allotment will suffice in
the next defensive battle will depend mainly on whether the
number and efficiency of our pursuit flights will suffice to
establish superiority in aerial fighting.
171. Early engagement is also necessary for the balloon de-
tachments if the observers are to obtain good results early.
At the same time, sufficient antiaircraft protection must be
128 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
provided. The number of balloons should amount to about two
per division (they need not be placed under the orders of the
divisions), A portion can be detailed as infantry balloons.
Other troops must keep clear of the anchorages of kite balloons.
172. When the reorganization has been completed the tele-
phone units will suffice, as far as can be seen, for the needs of
corps and divisions. A special allotment of these units will,
however, be necessary in order to construct the extensive artil-
lery, aviation, antiaircraft, and balloon systems which become
necessary at the beginning of the battle. It is absolutely neces-
sary to keep these systems separate from the tactical lines and
from the general telephone system. The sooner they are ready,
the sooner will the weapon concerned be effective. Every econ-
omy, especially at the beginning of a battle, decreases the effec-
tiveness of other branches of the service.
When engaging telephone units it must be borne in mind that
the maintenance of the lines in the main fire zone can not be
expected ; but, on the other hand, the importance of this means
of communication demands that everything possible should be
done to repair, at least, the most important lines. With this
in view the number of lines close up to the fighting line should
be strictly limited. They should be laid in special deep cable
trenches, or, at any rate, in shallow trenches to protect them
against the blast of the explosion of the enemy's sheila. Nu-
merous cable repair squads should be quartered in shell-proof
dugouts along the whole line. Roads and villages should be
avoided. The enemy's artillery fire should be continually
watched, so that heavily shelled areas may be avoided when
constructing new lines; existing lines should be removed from
these areas as soon as possible, as it wall be impossible to keep
them in repair.
In the main fire zone the telephone must be supplemented by
other means of communication.
173. Shell-proof dugouts are essential for wireless stations;
when these are provided, wireless proves very useful. As the
number of sets available is limited the forward stations should
be placed near the front line, close to battle headquarters
(battalion commanders), which have as extended a view as
possible over our own and the enemy's front, so that they will
be able to give information regarding neighboring sectors. The
fear of losing a forward station should in no circumstances
act as an inducement to withdraw it prematurely or to place
it in a retired position from the outset. The whole object of
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 129
wireless stations would thus be defeated. Forward artillery
observers can also employ wireless stations with advantage.
Owing to the small number of stations available it wrill gener-
ally be advisable to allot several forward stations to one back
station. It is most desirable to employ the aeroplane fighting
stations with a view to using their wireless for ground com-
munication. The employment of wireless and aeroplane wireless
stations for regulating barrage fire is now being experimented
with. It is for consideration whether each field artillery
Ahteilung should not be equipped with a receiving set, to be
manned exclusively by the artillery, for the receipt of calls
for barrage fire.
174. Power buzzer stations have proved their value. In order
to prevent their disturbing the telephone traffic, telephone earths
should be placed as far away from them as possible (at least
165 yards).
175. Field signal sections, as well as the medium and small
signaling apparatus, have proved their value. All light-signal-
ing communication necessitates an accurate study of the map
and the ground, so that rearward communication may be estab-
lished in cases of necessity by means of the neighboring sectors
when direct communication is no longer possible.
176. Carrier-pigeon lofts are required in large numbers. Every
division should have its own loft. As it is often impossible
to avoid moving divisional headquarters it seems advisable not
to place the lofts at divisional headquarters, so as to obviate
the difficulty of not being able to use the pigeons when head-
quarters are moved, but they should be kept farther in rear at
points provided with direct telephone connection. In order to
get the pigeons forward energetic subordinate commanders are
necessary in certain circumstances.
177. Hitherto runners have proved the most reliable means
of communication in the foremost line.
In order to reduce casualties among the runners it is neces-
sary to introduce a special bullet to carry the messages and to
be fired from a rifle or light pistol with a view to connecting
the front line with the company commanders and the latter
with their battalion commander.
178. The employment of infantry aeroplanes and infantry
balloons has proved very valuable. The infantry aeroplane
will, in many cases, bring the quickest and best information
regarding the situation of the front line. Communication be-
3577°— 17 9
130 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
tween battle headquarters and aeroplanes by means of light
signals is extremely difficult. It is better to send predetermined
signals by displaying various arrangements of the linen signals
at battle headquarters.
Signaling communication with infantry balloons requires
thorough practice.
(b) ORGANIZATION.
179. Now that means of communication are employed on such
a large scale in a defensive battle it is no longer possible to con-
trol them from army headquarters. Consequently the neces-
sary officers for this control must be appointed at corps head-
quarters.
180. The command of the aviation units of each group must
be handed over to an " aviation group commander," who will
arrange for their employment in accordance with orders from
corps headquarters, will collect the information obtained, and
will see that this is supplemented by information obtained by
other means of reconnaissance. Artillery flights are under the
artillery commanders, infantry aeroplanes under the divisions,
and all other aviation units under the corps, unless they are
retained at the disposal of army headquarters.
181. Balloon detachments are under corps, who allot them to
the various artillery groups. In this manner the observations
made in neighboring sectors will be better utilized than if these
detachments were under the divisions. A balloon central sta-
tion has been formed for the whole army area. It disseminates
the information to all groups, collects the results of reconnais-
sances, and is responsible for disseminating them. It can also
take over the supply of material. Infantry balloons are under
corps or divisional headquarters, depending on their employ-
ment.
182. The other means of communication are, for tactical pur-
poses, grouped together in " headquarters communication sec-
tions." which facilitates their proper employment and coop-
eration.
Whereas flights and balloon sections, as army troops, are
stationed permanently in certain areas, a portion of the other
communication units change with their divisions.
1S3. For those units which belong to groups (corps) a special
organisation appears to be neeeaimry. The existemv of many
email units which are distributed throughout the whole array
militates against their being rapidly engaged on the main
!>;ittle front?, Small units are not de*irnW.?, either from an
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 131
administrative or a training point of view, and during a long-
drawn-out battle they can not effect the necessary reliefs. In
the next battle the troops and commanders will make still
greater demands on cable communications, and a still greater
expenditure of ammunition by the enemy, with a corresponding
destruction of the communications in the front battle zone,
must be expected. It appears essential to have large reserves
of communication troops available (telephone, wireless, field
sigaal sections, power buzzer stations, carrier pigeons, and mes-
serger dogs). It will be advisable to form communication units
which comprise all these means of communication in various de-
tachments. The formation of these reserves under general
headquarters would enable as many communication units as
were necessary to be engaged at once at the beginning of a
trench battle. The gradual withdrawal of many small isolated
units from other fronts, which so easily leads to their being
engaged " drop by drop," would be obviated. The formations
would be accustomed to working together and would be able
to effect the requisite reliefs within themselves, the necessity
for which has been so clearly shown. On the other hand, the
majority of these means of communication can be dispensed
with on quiet sectors of the front where telephone communica-
tion is maintained.
184. As regards organization after the units have been en-
gaged the following points have been brought out :
The changes in the telephone units of corps and divisions
lead to the experience and the absolutely necessary knowledge
of the telephone system being lost. Consequently, a permanent
communication officer is necessary for each corps and divisional
sector during the whole period of the battle. The telephone
squads which are necessary for the construction of the special
artillery, antiaircraft, and aviation systems must remain with
corps throughout the whole battle as permanent traffic and
construction personnel. This will obviate the otherwise un-
avoidable friction, with all its disadvantages to the conduct of
the battle. It will be the duty of the communication officer to
keep up maps showing which portions of the battle zone are
heavily shelled or otherwise (communication maps). Many
casualties can be avoided by these means.
185. The wireless units are tactically under the division ;
their technical control, however, must, In view of the jamming
within the group, which would otherwise be unavoidable owing
to, the narrow fronts of the sectors, be exercised by the wireless
132 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
commander at corps headquarters. The allotment of wave
lengths to aeroplanes is also included in this officer's duties.
The organization of the wireless detachment must be such that
there is a reserve station, with personnel, available in case of
breakdowns, or for employment with the forward artillery ob-
servers. In addition, some detachments should, if possible, be
kept in reserve to act as reliefs.
186. The field signal sections and power buzzer stations are
entirely under the control of the headquarters communication
section. Here, too, organization in fairly large units is desirable,
so as to make reliefs possible.
187. Mobile carrier-pigeon lofts should be filled up with fresh
young birds whenever they are moved to a different point, as
the latter accustom themselves to the new place in a compara-
tively short time.
188. The means of communication of the troops in line (tele-
phones, signal apparatus) must remain entirely at their dis-
posal.
189. The survey section, owing to the wide extent of the
battle, is no longer in the position to sift all the information
sufficiently quickly and disseminate it to the troops in the form
of a map. It is essential that each corps headquarters should
establish a topographical section, which will undertake the
sifting of the information received and print maps for a par-
ticular sector both in front of and behind the front of the
group. The topographical sections must be provided with skilled
staffs and plenty of materials.
190. When fresh army or corps headquarters are established
the employment of newly formed telephone detachments, sur-
vey sections, etc.. must, in principle, be avoided. It takes weeks
for the units in question to become fully efficient, a circumstance
which is perhaps unobjectionable on a quiet front, but which
may have very serious disadvantages on a principal battle
front. It seems better to withdraw existing formations from
quiet fronts and to send the new formations to replace them.
(C) PEEPARATIONS ON QTJIET FRONTS.
191. A special aviation telephone system should be prepared,
sufficient for the conditions of a great defensive battle. The
infantry aeroplanes should practice frequently with the in-
fantry.
192. The balloons should practice signaling with the infantry.
A large number of balloon observers from the other arms should
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 133
be trained, so that if new detachments are brought up the neces-
sary number of observers who already know the ground is
immediately available.
193. The system of telephone wires should be relaid, avoid-
ing roads and villages as far as possible, so that telephone lines
f c r use in battle lie entirely outside villages, while several lines
run to the most important points by different routes. Prepara-
tions should be made to enable communications to be quickly
e.-tablished in case fresh divisions are put into the line or the
existing divisional headquarters are moved. (Construction and
alteration of local communications.)
194. The construction of dug-outs for a large number of power
buzzer and wireless stations and field signal sections ; these
should be provided in the rearward positions as well. The
establishment of a large number of light-signal lines.
195. The ground to the depth of about 30 miles behind the
front should be surveyed. Topographical sections should be
established. The personnel should be dispatched to the survey
sections of the principal battle fronts to learn the new require-
n ents which have arisen (e. g., maps in which the enemy's
artillery positions are numbered consecutively become useless
ai: once if the enemy brings up a large number of new batteries,
as it then becomes impossible to find any battery number. They
should be designated by letters within the map squares. Our
own trenches and those of the enemy should be numbered.)
H. THE FIGHTING TASKS OF AEROPLANES AND ANTIAIRCRAFT
ARTILLERY.
I. Causes of initial failures.
196. The beginning and the first week of the Somme Battle
were marked by a complete inferiority of our own air forces.
The enemy's aeroplanes enjoyed complete freedom in carry-
ing out distant reconnaissance. With the aid of aeroplane ob-
servation the hostile artillery neutralized our guns and was
able to range with the most extreme accuracy on the trenches
occupied by our infantry ; the required data for this were pro-
vided by undisturbed trench reconnaissance and photography.
By means of bombing and machine-gun attacks from a low
height against infantry, battery positions, and marching col-
umns the enemy's aircraft inspired our troops with a feeling
of defenselessness against the enemy's mastery of the air.
On the other hand, our own aeroplanes only succeeded, in
quite exceptional cases, in breaking through the hostile patrol
134 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
barrage and carrying out distant reconnaissances ; our artillery
'machines were driven off whenever they attempted to carry out
registration for their own batteries. Photographic reconnais-
sance could not fulfill the demands made upon it.
197. Thus at decisive moments the infantry frequently lacked
the support of the German artillery either in counterbattery
work or in barrage on the enemy's infantry massing for attack.
Heavy losses in personnel and material were inflicted on our
artillery by the enemy's guns, assisted by excellent air ob-
servation, without our being able to have recourse to the same
methods. Besides this, both arms were exposed to attacks from
the air by the enemy's battle planes, the moral effect of which
could not be ignored.
198. The causes of this inferiority on the part of our own
aeroplanes lay, firstly, in their numerical inferiority, which, at
the beginning of the battle, was in the proportion of 1 to 10.
We were also insufficiently supported by our antiaircraft guns,
the small number of which had been reduced still further both
by numerous casualties to equipment caused by the hostile
artillery and by the wearing out of the guns themselves. An
adequate antiaircrift telephonic system was also lacking, so
that the reports about the appearance of hostile aeroplanes
mostly arrived too late. The fact that our battle-plane squad-
rons were stationed far in rear of the front made it difficult
for them to arrive in time, and the fact that the First Battle-
plane Squadron was equipped with " G " machines made its
employment for air fighting almost impossible.
II. Measures by which a gradual improvement was attained.
199. The reenforcement of the air forces which was gradually
effected, and especially the arrival of powerful pursuit ma-
chines, was principally responsible for the improvement of tho
position in the course of the battle.
200. A well-organized grouping of the available aircraft on
the most threatened sectors of the front, as well as our own
counterattacks, enabled us to obtain a local superiority in the
air, at any rate at decisive moments. The distribution of air-
craft units to groups (corps) insured their suitable employ-
ment on the days of ordinary fighting.
201. The organization of defensive patrol barrages, which
only lead to a dispersion of strength, was forbidden.
On the other hand, it was made the duty of every flying officer
to attack the enemy's machines over the enemy's lines in order
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 13$
to facilitate the work of reconnaissance and registration.
Strong fighting patrols of at least three machines were em-
ployed to carry out this task.
202. As soon as sufficient aircraft units were available, bomb-
ing and machine-gun attacks on the enemy's infantry and bat-
tery positions were undertaken.
203. The aircraft units in rear were brought up as close to
the front as the choice of aerodromes and the range of the
enemy's guns allowed. By this means it was insured that they
were always well informed about the situation on the front
and could arrive rapidly on the spot whenever a number of
hostile machines appeared. With the same object, during the
days of heavy fighting, aeroplane liaison officers were sent to
divisional command posts or observing stations.
204. Owing to the extension of the front and the activity of
th 3 enemy's machines, it became impossible to control the strug-
gle for air superiority from one office at army headquarters.
Each group (corps) was therefore allotted a wing commander
(J'.ieger-gruppenfuhrer) corresponding to the allotment of air-
craft units to the groups. This officer controlled the employ-
ment of the available forces, more especially as regards air
fighting.
205. The battle-plane squadrons were split up as protective
flights (Schutzstaffeln) and allotted to the various artillery
flights, their aerodromes being changed at the same time so as
to insure close cooperation between the fighting and reconnais-
sance units.
206. Cooperation with antiaircraft guns, especially as regards
utilizing their observations of the enemy's aerial activity, was
insured by the organization of joint antiaircraft report centers
and of a single aircraft and antiaircraft telephone system. Re-
ports concerning the situation on the front and the demands;
of the troops for antiaircraft protection were collected by these
officers of the antiaircraft service stationed close to the front.
The information was passed on by them to the wing command-
ers of pursuit flights attached to army headquarters, who in
turn could regulate the employment of their units accordingly.
III. Experiences and lessons.
207. In trench warfare to obtain the mastery of the air dur-
ing a battle is an essential condition for long-distance and trench
reconnaissances as well as for artillery registration. Next to
the strength of the artillery and the quantity of ammunition
136 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
available the mastery of the air forms the decisive factor for
success in the artillery combat. The struggle for supremacy
in the air must therefore precede the artillery battle.
Only the early employment of strong air forces is here pro-
ductive of success. These must be supported by a numerous
antiaircraft artillery and the efficient working of a well-or-
ganized telephone system.
The attacker will, by the employment of strong air forces, be
able to acquire the mastery of the air from the outset, but at
the same time will betray his offensive plan. As soon as the
first preparations for hostile attack are recognized it will be the
task of the defender to concentrate rapidly all the air forces
which can be spared from quiet sectors of the front, and par-
ticularly numerous strong pursuit flights, with a view to de-
priving the enemy of the mastery of the air. If he is success-
ful, at all events, in hindering the enemy considerably in his
reconnaissances and in disturbing his artillery registration to
a certain extent, he may then in certain circumstances delay
the attack considerably and gain sufficient time to complete
his other defensive measures. The sooner he can employ strong
aerial forces the better will be his chances of success.
208. The main object of fighting in the air is to enable our
artillery registration and photographic reconnaissance to be
carried out, and at the same time to prevent that of the enemy.
All other tasks, such as bombing raids, machine-gun attacks on
troops, and even distance reconnaissance in trench warfare,
must be secondary to this main object. So long as the execu-
tion of the main task is not insured, all available forces must
be employed for this purpose. All subsidiary tasks must be
abandoned even when the enemy's attacks in the air are caus-
ing us considerable annoyance.
209. So long as our air forces are insufficient to attain a
superiority of this nature upon the whole front endeavors must
be made to obtain superiority at least at the decisive points,
either during the preparation of an attack by ourselves or by
the enemy. For this purpose the aerial forces must be concen-
trated at the right time and the right place, which is best
effected by orders from army headquarters. In other respects
the available aircraft units should be allotted to corps head-
quarters, where their employment during the operations will
be controlled by the wing commander in accordance with corps
orders. On days of ordinary fighting, the most effective em-
ployment of all units will be best obtained on these lines.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 137
210. The employment of numerous single-seater fighting ma-
chines is the best method of destroying the enemy's aircraft.
These units are most suitable for offensive work. Their task
is to attack and destroy every hostile machine which shows
itself. Whether the enemy's machines fall into our hands or
net after they have been shot down is immaterial in estimating
results. The shooting down of machines beyond the enemy's
lilies bears equally good testimony to our superiority in the air.
The number of pursuit flights engaged should be sufficient to
gsin the mastery in the air from the enemy. Their number is
not the only decisive factor, but also their success in action.
Daring the Somme Battle the First Army had attached to it
the Second Pursuit Flight, which now bears the name of its
heroic commander, Capt. Boelcke, who unfortunately perished
too soon. This pursuit flight shot down 87 machines during
the Somme Battle, 21 of these having been brought down and
crashed by the commander alone.
211. In order to carry out their tasks the pursuit flights must
bo allowed the greatest latitude in their employment. A pri-
mary condition is, however, that they are stationed so close to
tie front that they can at once act on their own observations.
There is no truth in the widely spread idea that, owing to the
speed of the machines, the billeting of the unit several kilo-
meters farther back is of no importance, for reports of the
appearance of hostile aeroplanes arrive too late at positions
in rear, and a constant patrol barrage with the object of always
being on the spot involves an unnecessary expenditure of force.
212. Artillery machines are prevented by their functions from
paying sufficient attention to hostile aircraft. Therefore, in
addition to the presence of single-seater battle planes, they re-
quire special protection by escort machines belonging to pro-
tective flights. In order to obtain perfect cooperation it is
indispensable that their protective flights should be housed in
the same aerodrome.
213. The machines detailed for photographic or distant recon-
naissance during a battle are no longer able to carry out their
tasks alone; strong patrols of at least three, machines should
be employed on principle.
214. Attacks on kite balloons are only seldom successful in
consequence of the effective protective measures adopted by the
enemy. Such attacks require thorough preparation and some-
times the assistance of artillery in order to neutralize the
enemy's antiaircraft guns. In offensive operations they may
138 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
be carried out with advantage shortly before an assault in order
to divert the attention of the enemy's artillery.
215. Bombing attacks by single machines have only a small
chance of producing results, even when by frequent repetition
they succeed in making an impression on the enemy's morale.
These attacks are, therefore, only worth while when they are
carried out during the course of other duties and not as a sole
objective.
Bombing attacks by whole squadrons against previously se-
lected targets may produce most successful results, especially
at night, when the enemy's countermeasures are less effective.
The best targets are large camps and ammunition depots known
to be occupied, as well as railway stations.
216. Machine-gun attacks on troops, when carried out fre-
quently, undoubtedly produce great moral effect, especially when
the troops have been previously shaken by a severe artillery
bombardment. This form of attack can not, however, cause
the enemy any considerable casualties.
In any case, the employment of machines for these subsidiary
tasks can only be justified when the main objective has been
obtained ; that is, to enable artillery observation to be carried out.
217. All operations of battle planes must be supported by
numerous antiaircraft guns in order to hinder the enemy's re-
connaissance and artillery observation.
The employment of antiaircraft units is best organized by ar-
ranging a forward line of antiaircraft guns, the individual posi-
tions being on an average not more than 2,200 yards apart. Any
gaps in the front line should be closed by a second back line.
The defense of important railway junctions, ammunition depots,
etc., will also be undertaken by antiaircraft guns in order to set
free the battle planes for operations on the front.
218. In order to engage the enemy's artillery machines, which
work at a low height close behind the enemy's lines, and are
therefore out of reach of our own battle planes, single guns must
be pushed forward as close to the front as possible (say, 2,200
yards). These guns must be placed in concealed positions in
order not to expose them to premature neutralization. Suitable
positions are afforded by large villages, which are easy to get
out of, and where the cellars provide cover for the detachments
in case of emergency.
219. The machine-gun antiaircraft sections may be used with
advantage for the protection of kite balloons. One section should
be permanently allotted to each balloon.
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 13d
220. So long as the antiaircraft guns are stationed within ef-
fective range of the enemy's artillery, three alternative positions
must be prepared for each gun. In the case of motor antiair-
craft guns it is advisable to allot to each gun a small area within
which it can change position as required. It is necessary to
maintain an adequate supply of ammunition (800 rounds per
day) at the positions of the front line of antiaircraft guns.
1:21. Cooperation with aeroplanes, especially with pursuit
flip-Ms, must be insured by setting up a special air-defense tele-
phone system, with which all aircraft and antiaircraft units are
connected. All reports are sent to a central station in each group,
wi :h which the wing commanders and group antiaircraft officers
arc? directly connected. Reports are collected here and forwarded
as required to the units concerned.
222. The establishment of joint observing posts for aeroplanes
anil antiaircraft guns is recommended. The firing of a few di-
rection rounds by antiaircraft guns in order to call the attention
of their own aeroplanes to hostile machines has proved very suc-
cessful.
223. The infantry must always take part in the defense against
hostile aeroplanes by means of machine-gun fire. In many cases
hostile machines which have caused great annoyance have been
successfully shot down by this method.
I. EFFECTS OF GAS AND PROTECTION AGAINST GAS.
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS.
224. The lack of effect of the great British gas attacks at the
end of June, which were delivered as a preparation for the in-
fantry attacks in spite of the unfavorable weather, resulted in
our troops beginning to underestimate the effects of the enemy's
gas. Later gas attacks on a smaller scale, which the enemy de-
livered successfully owing to the weather conditions being favor-
able, caused the same troops losses which were partly due to
carelessness.
225. The enemy's employment of gas shells caused a large
number of isolated casualties, especially when the enemy com-
bined high explosive shell with gas shell. When gas shells were
employed on a large scale by the enemy, the gas was less effec-
tive in causing losses than it was in interfering with our action.
Poisonous gases were employed along the whole front ; lachry-
mators, which had but little effect, were only employed by the
British.
226. The casualties from gas, apart from the usual number of
unavoidable accidents, were for the most part attributable to
140 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
the fact that the individual did not sufficiently understand to
what dangers he was exposing himself in a gas attack if he
waited to put on his mask until the smell of the gas became
intolerable, or if he became excited by the fact that the attack
was over and took his mask off too soon. Disobedience of the
order that in the line gas helmets are always to be carried in the
" alert " boxes on the person was another reason for casualties.
227. The methodical instruction of the men in these matters,
which is obviously very necessary from what has been said above,
is the duty of commanding officers, who must be assisted by
efficient antigas officers.
The training and equipment of fresh drafts must be begun at
the training depots in Germany, and be emphasized when the
recruit joins his unit.
228. Our own gas shells were employed for counterbattery
work against hostile batteries which had been located, and, ac-
cording to prisoner's statements, have often proved effective.
In methodical attacks a bombardment with " green-cross " shell
of the enemy's observation posts and barrage batteries just
before the assault considerably reduced the intensity of his fire.
No experience is yet available of the effect and combining
" green-cross " shell with high explosive shell in harassing and
annihilating fire.
APPENDIX.
PREPARATORY MEASURES BEFORE THE ENGAGE-
MENT OF A DIVISION IN A DEFENSIVE BATTLE.
The following preparatory measures, taken by a particularly
successful division which was three times put into the Somme
Battle, have proved both necessary and suitable :
A. DIVISIONAL STAFF.
Organization of the staff for the increased stress of work
which may be expected during the battle, and attached troops.
An orderly officer for intelligence, maps, and examination of
aeroplane photographs. Office work to be so arranged that the
G.S.O. may always be able to obtain personal knowledge of
the battle field and the tactical situation. Formation of officers'
battery positions. Officers and N.C.O.'s for transport purposes
divisional staff officers.
As soon as it is certain that the division is to be engaged, a
personal reconnaissance should be made of the position, ap-
proaches, existing communications, and distribution of the artil-
lery.
NOTES ON EECENT OPERATIONS. 141
Issue of large scale maps to the troops so that they may be
informed beforehand of the situation. Sketches of the indi-
vidual infantry sectors for advance parties when the relief takes
place. Allotment of motor cars to facilitate personal recon-
naisance on the part of the infantry sector commanders.
B. TROOPS.
I. INFANTEY.
. TRAINING — For the combat. — Bombing, competitions with
live grenades, practice with captured grenades, the best throwers
to be formed in bombing squads; the attack of small parties
with a view to clearing up lengths of trench from front and
flank; training of as many officers and men as possible in ma-
ch ne-gun work ; early allotment of reserve material to the
machine guns and registration of new machine guns ; formation
of a machine gun central depot, to which a sergeant artificer is
allotted, and which is provided with a reserve of material ; later
th s should be moved forward to the neighborhood of the regi-
mental battle headquarters.
instruction as to the general situation and as to when it is
permissible to call for annihilating and barrage fire; practice
with light pistols, signal rockets, and sound signals ; arrange-
ments for obtaining intersections on points where barrage fire
is required ; instruction as to conduct if taken prisoner ; inspec-
tion and instruction in antigas mueasures.
For the construction of defenses. — Construction of deep dug-
outs (every man must have put up at least one frame) ; drainage
of trenches ; construction of portable entanglements.
The division will arrange for instruction in light signaling
(especially 1916 pattern medium signaling apparatus), the em-
ployment of carrier pigeons, telephone, and wireless.
Communication between infantry and aeroplanes is to be car-
ried out practically. For this a short code is necessary, which
comprises all phrases which are necessary for tactical messages.
2. DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES. — With the increasing specializa-
tion in the infantry (light machine guns, light Minenwerfer,
bombing squads, light signalers, etc.), it is essential for a com-
pany commander to detail carefully all his men for duty in the
trenches and allot to each man his particular task.
General. — Formation of a fourth platoon as carriers and to act
as a reserve; only sturdy, energetic men should be selected for
this, and placed under good commanders, Detailing of men as
runners and messengers,
142 NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS.
3. DISTRIBUTION or THE PERSONNEL. — Uniform distribution of
the young drafts ; in every group one experienced soldier, if pos-
sible, to support the group commander ; detail a reserve of sub-
ordinate commanders to the transport ; reserve of telephonists.
The following to be detailed to each company : One company
commander, one company officer, two acting officers or vice ser-
geant majors. The remainder as reserve in rest billets or with
the recruit depot.
Special duties. — Regimental supply officer for bringing up
stores and food supplies (commands carrying parties and ar-
range for transporting stores to the regimental pioneer park
with the regimental baggage wagons).
Superintendent of the regimental pioneer park. — Supervision
of engineer stores and demands on the supply officer.
One orderly officer (reserve of company commanders) to each
battalion and regimental headquarters.
A second orderly officer in the office (reserve of adjutants) ;
regimental machine-gun officer with the support battalion. Two
officers' patrols for infantry brigade headquarters. Officer in
charge of trench construction, so that the trenches of the sector
may be constructed in a uniform manner by the three battalions.
Regimental observation officer, with a relief.
4. Equipment and clothing. — Assault kit ; sandbags for carry-
ing hand grenades and iron rations to be carried slung round
the neck; fitting of steel helmets; second water bottle; large
entrenching tool for every man; working dress (for working
parties of the. battalions in rear) ; improvised puttee for use
over boot and calf of leg in wet and muddy trenches ; protective
coverings for breech and muzzle of rifle to be carried ; as large
a number as possible of food carriers, improvised food carriers,
knapsacks to hold food and water ; white cloths for signaling to
aeroplanes to be carried. For machine-gun units, improvised
mountings.
II. CAVALRY.
Training of officers and intelligent noncommissioned officers
as observers, with a view to employing them at a divisional ob-
servation station. Patrol detachment for every infantry sector,
whose task will be —
To gain information regarding the general situation in the
front-line trench. Transmission of requests of the infantry in
front line. Accurate knowledge of the position of divisional
headquarters. Knowledge of the fall of the enemy's fire and of
the approaches in the sector which are consequently the most
NOTES ON RECENT OPERATIONS. 143
suitable, so that they will be able to lead up reenforcements dur-
ing the battle.
Detailing and instruction of men for police duties. Formation
of one or more parties for work in connection with the tele-
phone service. Their duties are to ride daily along the lines in
the back areas, to put up poles and take measures to prevent
br jakdowns.
The supervision of the whole question of horsed transport in
th>3 divisional sector (the driving of columns and trains to be
properly regulated) to be handed over to the squadron com-
mander.
III. ARTILLERY.
Training, inspection, and further training of the gunners
(layers). Instruction in barrage fire, error of the day, han-
dling and care of the gun, the various natures of ammunition,
care of ammunition. Instruction of observers. Instruction in
intrenching, special attention being paid to cover from aero-
l>h nes. Advance officers to be sent forward in good time, if
possible, to gain a knowledge of the target sectors and of the
ba;tery positions. Officers and N.C.O.'s for transport purposes
(communications to the position, ammunition, engineer stores).
IV. " MINENWERFER."
To be detailed in good time into three Minenwerfer groups,
one group for every infantry sector. Training of the " heavy "
and " medium " platoons in the use of the light Minenwerfer,
as this is the only one which can be used in a long drawn-out
battle. Preparatory measures for the supply of ammunition (a
difficult matter), formation and allotment of ammunition carry-
ing parties by the divisional staff. Equipment, clothing, and
distribution of personnel as in the infantry.
v. PIONEERS.
As in the infantry.
VI. DIVISIONAL TELEPHONE DETACHMENT.
Early reenforcement of the detachment. Training in light
signaling, telephone, wireless. Composition of a code for the
transmission of the most important tactical messages (this code,
which is also used between aeroplanes and infantry, must be is-
sued in good time, and the troops must be perfectly familiar
with it),'
(Signed) VON BELOW,
General der Infantene,
144
NOTES ON KECENT OPERATIONS.
ill
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II B
1361
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