Full text of "Mind"
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OP
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
-
I'
/
THE ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
EDITED BY
G. F. STOUT,
WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR H. SIDGWICK, PROFESSOR W. WALLACE,
DR. VENN, AND DR. WARD.
NEW SERIES, VOL. L-i892.
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON ;
AND 20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
1892.
CONTENTS OF VOL. I., N.S.
PAGE
EDITOR. Prefatory Remarks 1
ARTICLES.
ALEXANDER, S. The Idea of Value 31
BAIN, A. Pleasure and Pain 161
DONOVAN, J. The Festal Origin of Human Speech .... 325
EASTWOOD, A. Lotze's Antithesis between Thought and Things . 305, 470
OILMAN, B. I. On the Properties of a One-dimensional Manifold . 518
JOHNSON, W. E. The Logical Calculus 3, 235, 340
MCTAGGART, J. ELLIS. The Changes of Method in Hegel's Dialectic 56, 188
MARSHALL, H. RUTGERS. The Field of ^Esthetics Psychologically
Considered 358, 453
MORRISON, Rev. W. D. The Study of Crime 489
MORGAN, C. L. The Law of Psychogenesis 72
TITCHENER, E. B. The Leipsic School of Experimental Psychology . 206
DISCUSSIONS.
ALEXANDER, S. Dr. Miinsterberg and his Critics 251
BALDWIN, J. M. Feeling, Belief and Judgment 403
DELABARRE, E. B. The Influence of Muscular States on Consciousness 379
FRANKLIN, C. L. Dr. Hillebrand's Syllogistic Scheme .... 527
MARSHALL, H. RUTGERS. The Definition of Desire .... 400
MOURET, G. Sur la Distinction entre les Lois ou Axiomes et les Notions 101
SIDGWICK, H. The Definition of Desire 94
TITCHENER, E. B. Dr. Miinsterberg and his Critics .... 397
VI CONTENTS.
CRITICAL NOTICES.
PAGE
ADAM, J. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 539
BOSANQUET, B. B. Erdmann, Logik 265
EDITOR. J. Sully, The Human Mind 409
FRANKLIN, C. L. E. Schroder, Vorlesungen uber die Algebra der Logik 126
JONES, C. C. F. Hillebrand, Die ncuen Theorien der Categorischen
Schlilsse 276
LOWNDES, M. E. J. M. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology: Feeling and
Will 272
MACKENZIE, J. S. G. Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft . 544
MYERS, F. W. H. A. Binet, Les Alterations de la Personnalite . . 417
ROBERTSON, G. C. F. Picavet, Les Ideologues 118
SIDGWICK, H. H. Spencer, Justice 107
SORLEY, W. R. M. Berendt und J. Friedlander, Spinoza's Erkennt-
nisslehre in ihrer Beziehung zur modernen Naturwissenschaft und
Philosophic ^ 132
,, B. Perez, La Caractere de r enfant a V homme . . 422
WARD, J. W. James, Text-book of Psychology 531
NEW BOOKS.
D' Alviella, Goblet. Lectures on the Origin and Growth of the Conception
of God as illustrated by Anthropology and History .... 140-
Adam, J. The Nuptial Number of Plato 282
Avencebrolis (Ibn Gebirol). Fons Vitce. Ed. Cl. Baumker . . .435
Arreat, L. Psychologic du Peintre 431
Baumker, Cl. Beitrdge zur Geschichte des Afitte! alters. Of. Avencebrolis 435
Bertauld, Pierre Auguste. Esprit et Libertt 288
Boethius. Die dem B. falschlich zugcschricbene Abhandhmgen des
Dominicus Gundisalvi de Unitate. Ed. P. Correns . . . 435
Brentano, F. Das Genie 137
,, Das Schlechte als Gegen stand dichterischer Darstellung . 436
Caird, E. Essays on Literature and Philosophy 426
CatteU, J. McK., and G. S. Fullerton. On the Perception of Small
Differences . 557
Christinnecke, J. Causalitat und Entwickelung in der Metaphysik
Augustins 143
Correns, P. Beitrdge zur Geschichte des Mittelalters. Of. Boethius . 435
Delabarre, E. B. Ueber Bewegungsempfindungen . . . .' 140
Dewaule, L. Condi/lac et la Psychologic Anglaise Contemporaine . . 432
Dixon, E. T. An Essay on Reasoning 285
Dillmann, E. Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen Monadenlehre anf
Grund der Quellen 435
Faggi, A. La Religione e il Suo Avenire. Secondo Eduardo Hartmann . 437
Fonsegrive, G. L. Elements de Philosophic 559
CONTENTS. Vll
PAGE
Fullerton, G. S., and J. McK. Cattell. Perception of Small Differences . 557
Geulincx, A. Opera Philosophica. Ed. J. P. N. Land .... 560
De Greef, G. Les Lois Sociologiques 288
Groos, K. Einleitung in die ^Esthetic 292
Husserl, E. G. Philosophic der Arithmetic 565
Jones, E. E. C. An Introduction to General Logic 554
Kent, G. Die Lehre Hegels der Erfahrung und ihre Bedeutung fur das
Erkennen 293
Land, J. P. N. Of. Geulincx 560
Lietz, H. Die Probleme im Begriff der Gesellschaft bei Auguste Comte im
Gesammtzusammenhan;/ seines Systems 289
Lotze, IL.Kleine Schriften (Bd. iii.) 290
Locke, J.Cf. Russell 431
McCrie, G. M. Of. C. Naden 145
Mitchell, E. M. A Study of Greek Philosophy 145
Mostratos, D. G. Die Pddayoqik dcs Helvetius 144
Muirhead, J. H. The Elements of Ethics 555
Miiller, F. Max. Anthropological Religion 284
Murray, J. C. An Introduction to Ethics 556
Naden, C. Further Reliques of Constance Naden. Ed. by G. M. McCrie 145
Ochorowitz, J. Mental Suggestion 286
Oelzelt-Newin, A. Uber SittlicJie Dispositionen 564
Pearson, K. The Grammar of Science 429
Proal, L. Le Crime et la Peine 139
De Roberty, E. Easai sur quelques Theories Pessimistes de la Connais-
ance 433
Royce, J. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy . . . . . .427
Russell, J .E. The Philosophy of Locke in extracts from the Essay con-
cerning Human Understanding 431
De la Saussaye, P. D. Ch. Manual of the Science of Religion . . 146
Seth, A. The Present Position of the Philosophical Sciences . . .138
Simmel, G. Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft 434
,, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie .... 561
Sidgwick, A. Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs .... 283
552
Sterret, J. M. Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, with a chapter
on Christian Unity in America 285
Sully, 3. The Human Mind 147
Thamiii, R. Education et Positivisme 140
Twardowski, K. Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnisstheoretische
Untersuchuny aus Descartes 290
Varisco, D. Ricerche intorno ai Fondamenti di Pensieri .... 437
Welton, J. Manual of Logic . . 144
Windelband, W. Geschichte der Philosophic (Final instalment) . . 291
Wundt, W. Vorlcsungen uber die Menschen-und Thierseele . . . 562
Worms, R: La Morale de Spinoza 287
viii
CONTENTS.
NOTES AND NEWS.
PAGE
BALDWIN, J. M. Experiments on Colour- Vision 15G
CATTELL, J. McK., and G. S. FULLEBTON. The Psychophysics of
Movement 446
LADD, G. T. Contribution to the Psychology of Visual Dreams . . 299
ROBERTSON, G. C. Helen Keller 574
WALLASCHEK, R. The Origin of Music 154
International Congress of Psychology for 1892 .... 159, 580
Groom Robertson Testimonial . . 452, 588
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS
MISCELLANEOUS
148, 295, 438, 567
160, 304
NEW SERIES. No. i.J [JANUARY, 1892.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
I. PREFATORY REMARKS.
BY THE EDITOR.
WITH the present number, MIND makes a fresh start under
new editorship. This change involves no real breach of
continuity. The leading external features of the old series
will be retained in the new. In this respect there are only
two minor differences worth noting. In the first place, we
propose to give regularly full notices of the more important
articles in foreign periodicals, such as appeared in the early
numbers of the old series, but were afterwards discontinued.
In the next place, we hope to be able to introduce, some-
what more frequently than in the past, reports by specialists
of current work in their several departments.
We shall endeavour to imitate the catholicity and im-
partiality which characterised the conduct of MIND under
its late genial and many-sided editor. Our ideal is to make
it an organ for the expression of all that is most original
and valuable in current English thought, without predilec-
tion for any special school or any special department of
Philosophy or Psychology. What is of prime importance
Z EDITOR : PEEFATOBY REMARKS.
to us is that our pages shall be filled with genuine work to
the exclusion of merely dilettante productions. In general,
we desire to publish only such articles as really advance the
subject of which they treat a step further. Nor ought this
to be considered an extravagant aim for the only English
philosophical journal in existence. But it is certain that we
must fall lamentably short of our ideal unless we receive
the hearty sympathy and assistance of professional students
of philosophy, who have now, we hope, reached such a
degree of mutual understanding as to render co-operation
more easy and discussion more fruitful than they could be
when MIND was first started a result to which MIND itself
has in large measure contributed.
II. THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. I. GENEKAL
PKINCIPLES.
By W. E. JOHNSON.
1. Principles of a Symbolic Calculus. As a material
machine is an instrument for economising the exertion of
force, so a symbolic calculus is an instrument for economis-
ing the exertion of intelligence. And, employing the same
analogy, the more perfect the calculus, the smaller would be
the amount of intelligence applied as compared with the
results produced. But as the exertion of some force is neces-
sary for working the machine, so the exertion of some intel-
ligence is necessary for working the calculus. It is then
important to examine the kind and degree of intelligence that
are demanded in the employment of any symbolic calculus.
It will appear that the logical calculus stands in a unique
relation to intelligence ; for it aims at exhibiting, in a non-
intelligent form, those same intelligent principles that are
actually required for working it.
To some critics this characteristic would appear a ground
of condemnation from the outset. Certainly the unique
position of the Logical Calculus which seems to be trying
to reduce intelligence to non-intelligence demands very
careful treatment, if we are to avoid a purely sterile or cir-
cular exhibition of the processes of thought.
I will attempt to enumerate briefly what appear to be the
principles common to every species of symbolic calculus.
(1) The symbols must be understood to represent without
exhaustively characterising things other than themselves.
(2) Each symbol must have a permanent and unambiguous
import throughout any connected series of operations. (3)
4 W. E. JOHNSON :
It must be possible that different symbols or combinations of
symbols may represent the same identical thing, and that
(4) symbols which represent the same thing may be substi-
tuted for one another. (5) Statements of equivalence must
be understood as having prepositional import, and (6) the
results obtained by substitution must be understood to be
inferences from the statements of equivalence. (7) This
requires also a recognition of the distinction between univer-
sal and particular symbols, and (8) of the principle that a
universal symbol may be replaced by any other symbol re-
presenting an object in the sphere covered by the universal.
And, finally, in order that the replacement of a simple
symbol by a complex synthesis of symbols may be valid, we
require (9) a recognition of the force of the bracket, and (10)
the postulate that the synthesis of symbols shall yield a
product homogeneous with the symbols synthesised. The
intelligence demanded in the employment of a symbo-
lic calculus, then, involves a recognition of (1) the Kepre-
sentativenes-s of Symbols, (2) the convention of Per-
manence of Import, (3) the possibility of Equivalence, (4)
the Method of Substitution, (5) the Propositional Import
of Equivalences, (6) the Inferential relation between
Equivalences, (7) the distinction between universal and
particular symbols, (8) the applicational interpretation of
Universals, (9) the force of the Bracket, and (10) the Postu-
late of Homogeneity.
With regard to (1) the Eepresentativeness of Symbols, it
is important to point out that the symbol must be capable
(2) of unambiguously indicating its object, although it can
never by its own inward construction represent exhaustively
the entire characterisation of its object. This combination
of unambiguous indication and unexhaustive characterisation
is the necessary condition and explanation of the possibility
(3) that different symbols, each of which represents a diffe-
rent aspect or mode of indicating its object, may yet refer us
to one and the same object. This, then, accounts for the
possibility that a system which primarily involves the con-
ventional equivalence a = a, should also have room for the
real equivalence a = b. Now these real equivalences form
the ground for the employment of (4) the Method of Substi-
tution. But to erect this method into the position of the
sole principle for arriving at truth, as Jevons does, is an
error akin to the old nominalists' fallacy. We require, as
basis for arriving at any but mere verbal truth, a knowledge
of the axioms which state what syntheses of symbols are
equivalent to one another, before any use can be made of
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 5
tin- Method of Substitution. The next four principles,
which indicate how the method can he used, are of special
importance in an account of Logic. Tor proposition, infer-
ence, universal and particular are the very elements which
constitute the science. It is, then, essential to point out that
we cannot work any calculus without hcin- conscious that
(5) c<in(itions dir prupuxit'mns, affirming some truth : that
(()) from these propositions other equations arc {."/) red,
wherever we use the symbol /. (therefore)} that (7 and
8) these inferences continually involve the replacement of
universal l>y more particular symbols. Thus, in the equi-
valence (a 4- b)' 2 = a 2 4- *M> 4- 6 2 , the symbols a and 6 are
universal, i.e., replaceable by any other symbols of number,
but the symbols '2 and 4- are particular. Further, these re-
placements often involve the substitution of a complex for a
simple symbol, and this is never legitimate without enclosing
the complex in a bracket or using some equivalent conven-
tion. The mistakes that beginners in algebra make in this
matter are familiar to all teachers of the elements of mathe-
matics. But it is not generally recognised that the principle
of correct bracketing plays as important a part in logic as in
mathematics. Indeed able logicians seem in this matter to
have made mistakes on a level with the schoolboy's mistakes
in algebra. Finally we must recognise explicitly that these
complex combinations of symbols can only be used in a
calculus, if they represent objects in the same sphere, and there-
fore obey the same laws as the simple symbols. The necessity
for this Postulate of Homogeneity restricts the range of syn-
thetic systems of symbolism. For, without it, we should never
be able to reach formulae more complicated than the initial
axioms ; and all possibility of a calculus would vanish. Now
it is the indefinite increase of complication in our results that
gives the unique character to a calculus. The " intellectual
intuition " which perceives the truth of laws in their simple
but absolutely universal form is incompetent to perceive
the same truths in more complicated forms. A symbolic
calculus is an instrument for transcending the limits of
intellectual intuition. But all thinking by help of language
involves the same principle. 1
logical and mathematical symbols are properly re-representative.
That is, the letters a, 6, c . . . are substitute signs for words or numbers,
which are, in their turn, expressive signs for ideas. [See Mr. Stout's
article on " Thought and Language " in MIND, April, 1891.] The symbols
+ and x are, however, simply representative (being mere synonyms for
ordinary words) ; that is, they normally perform their function in thought
only through and by means of attention to their meaning.
6 W. E. JOHNSON :
We have now explicitly recognised certain of the forms
in which intelligence has to be exercised in working a sym-
bolic calculus. We cannot feel sure that all these forms
have been exhaustively enumerated. But such explicit
enumeration as has been offered will give an indication of
the peculiar relation in which the Logical Calculus stands
to thought. For the same intelligent principles have
to be employed in using the calculus as are non-intel-
ligently developed in its results. This must be admitted
once for all as characterising the unique nature of logical
symbolism.
2. The Analysis of System or the Synthesis of Proposi-
tions. The fundamental work of Pure Formal Logic is an
investigation into the principles according to which the
analysis of a system exhibits it as a synthesis of propositions.
The proper procedure of Logic is throughout analytical.
We must begin with an analysis of system, and determine
first how a synthesis of propositions yields a totality of inter-
related elements. This primary analysis must be carried so
far as to resolve any complex into propositions as consti-
tuents. It precedes the analysis of propositions into those
elements that are not themselves propositions, just as the
Physical analysis of a substance into molecules precedes the
Chemical analysis of the molecule into atoms. This formal
analogy will be found not altogether without value. For some
symbolists appear to have introduced confusion by identify-
ing the "Physical" combination of propositions into a system
with the "Chemical" combination of subject and predication
into a proposition. We can best keep clear of this confusion
by first treating the less disputable and more absolutely
formal portion of Logic, viz., the synthesis of propositions
into a system. This will necessitate an inquiry (A) into the
general conception of synthesis, and (B) into the general con-
ception of the proposition.
3. (A) With respect to synthesis in general, we must ob-
serve that every mode of combining propositions is expressed
by a word belonging to the part of speech called conjunction.
There are logical and non-logical conjunctions : but, using
the term in a logical sense, we may regard every conjunction
as expressing some mode of logical synthesis of propositions.
Now r the fundamental mode of logically combining proposi-
tions is represented by the conjunction and. This mode of
combination is called par excellence " conjunction ". It will
be found that all other purely logical conjunctions depend
for their import upon this conjunction alone. It is, there-
fore, important to give a clear indication of its force. The
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 7
relation expressed by and is simply the emptiest of all rela-
tions. It expresses merely the bringing of two propositions
together into one system, without subordination <>r any de-
finable connexion other than is indicated by their being face
to face in one and the same system. It is, therefore, the
conjunction of /mrr synthesis, presupposed in and underlying
all specific syntheses. Its nature will be made more explicit
win -n we come to consider the laws which govern its use.
Meanwhile we may notice some common misunderstandings
on this subject. When we bring together two propositions
a, I), by means of the conjunction and, the result is ' a and
b '. Now this result is itself a proposition : i.e., we may pre-
dicate of it truth or falsity, and it may be combined with
other propositions, in precisely the same way as the (rela-
tively) simple proposition a. This is, perhaps, obvious ; but
logicians have practically neglected or denied it. They would
say that ' a and b ' does not represent one proposition but
two. But such a view involves a disregard, on the one hand,
of the force of bringing the two propositions together ; and,
on the other hand, of the synthesis that is already implicit
in the simpler proposition a. For the conception of a mole-
cular proposition is purely ideal. Any actual proposition is
indefinitely analysable into component propositions somehow
synthesised into a unity. Hence an explicit introduction of
and does not intrinsically affect the character of the proposi-
tion, as single or double. On the other hand, it is essential
to note the reality of the process involved in bringing two
propositions face to face and examining their combined force.
This is shown familiarly in the combination of the two pre-
misses of a syllogism. For here some newly apprehended truth
is often brought out by the active collision of two truths that
have perhaps been long in the possession of the same mind
but never contemplated as belonging to the same system.
Yet the little particle and, which connects the two premisses
of a syllogism, has always been neglected and despised, while
the particle if, which connects the premisses with the con-
clusion, has received its due attention. We see, then, that
the product or resultant of bringing two propositions together
is itself a proposition. The process or operation of bringing
them together may be called Heasoning. Hence Reasoning
should be defined as a process of forming a Judgment.
The traditional way of explaining the relation between
Reasoning and Judgment seems misleading. The difference
is simply that between process and product. There is no
product beyond the proposition and the system of proposi-
tions. The judgment is the final outcome of all logical
8 W. E. JOHNSON :
thought and process. Reasoning is, then, the process of
synthesis not the synthesised product. The inferential
mode of synthesis represented by the conjunction if
has been prominent in traditional logic ; but a more general
view of synthesis is here taken, in which inference will
be shown to be dependent on and subordinate to pure
synthesis.
4. (B) As the conception of system in genera] is indicated
by the conjunction and, so the conception of the proposition in
general(i. e., of the elements whose synthesis constitutes system)
is indicated by the particle not. A proposition is simply the
expression of a truth or falsity. What distinguishes the import
of a proposition from any other combination of w r ords is its
being of necessity true or false. In affirming one thing, it denies
an indefinite number of other things. Hence a proposition
faces two ways. The possibility of its formation depends on
the conception of its contradictory. On the one hand, a
proposition has no meaning for us until we understand what
it denies ; and, on the other hand, denial and contradiction
have no meaning except in reference to propositions. The
mere presentation or impression ' blue ' does not cariy with
it any reference to contrary or incompatible presentations :
but the affirmation or declaration ' blue ! ' involves at least
some such process as ' Bed ? no ! not-red, but blue ' ; ' Green ?
no! not-green, but blue'. This process of bringing up in
idea presentations, which are successively rejected, is that
out of which the judgment emerges as a victorious claimant.
By this reference to a struggle amongst incompatible rivals,
and the supremacy of one over the others, the judgment is
defined. The usual view of the judgment as connecting a
subject with a predicate does not really help us. If we put
the terms man and mortal together we merely get the com-
plex term mortal man, not the proposition man is mortal.
The latter is distinguished from the former by its rejecting from
the system of accepted reality the immortal man : its power of
affirming is explicated by reference to what it denies. We
see, then, that the definition of a proposition as that which
expresses a truth or falsity immediately leads to the re-
cognition, along with any one proposition, of that w r hich
expresses its falsity. Corresponding to every proposi-
tion a, there exists its contradictory not-a. Here again
the exact force of the contradictory relation will be brought
out, when we consider the laws regulating the use of the
particle not.
5. The Conjunction ' and' and the Particle ' not\ All
that formal logic can do in the way of synthesis of proposi-
Till-: LOGICAL CALCULUS,
B contained in tlie laws n-^uhiiin.^ the use <!' fc]
little words and and y/n/. It' this statemenl 18 doubled, it
in:iy be well to point out that the whole of \
of the Mathematics of Number or Discrete Quantity rest
til*' fundamental ideas of distinction and addition iv.
sent -i-ils ' other than' and ' together with '. It
is n, t then remarkable that the sphere < >!' |>uiv In^ie .-h'-uld
be limited to a development of the coiic-ptinn^ of \
Synthesis and pure negation. The 1'imd., mental I
018 that regulate these operations must now l>.
'essary to premise tliat the operation* :
\ to /)r<ij)oxitions not to terms, or classes, or idea
thin
>J C). The I< J u!i(luinc.ntal Laivs of Prepositional Synthesis.
In expressing the axioms, which regulate the synthesis of
propositions, we shall require to denote, in some unam-
biguous way, the following elements : (1) Propuxith > <- : 2
Pure Synthesis or Determination ; (3) Pure Negation or
Contradiction. It will be understood then that proposition*
are represented by letters; that determination is represented
by simple juxtaposition ; and that (so far as is convenient)
negation may be represented by a bar written over the pro-
position denied. Before stating the laws it may be as well
to recur to the general principles of symbolism. The state-
ment of equivalence (symbolised by = ) is common to all
symbolisms, and use is made of it by the Method of Substi-
tution. The laws which we are about to enunciate are both
unircrsal and formal. By being universal, I mean that the
equivalences hold whatever propositions the symbols a, b,
&c., may be supposed to stand for. Thus we may apply
these universal equivalences by replacing the proposition-
symbols by any other proposition-symbols (simple or com-
plex). By being formal, I mean that the equivalences are
stated on the responsibility of Formal Logic that Formal
Logic guarantees their validity. 1 The distinction between
Formal and Non-Formal equivalences is of essential impor-
tance, but it has been generally neglected or obscured by
symbolists. A formal equivalence is not necessarily univer-
sal, for it may involve particular symbols, i.e., symbols for
which no other symbol may be substituted, such as 0, 1,
2 ... in Algebra. Hence the necessity for the distinction
between universal and particular symbols. It may, perhaps,
1 In Mathematics, formal universal equations are called identities.
But this name is obviously unsuitable to describe logically formal and
universal equivalences.
10 W. E. JOHNSON :
be pointed out that universal equivalences always contain
some particular symbols, such as +, x , , +,for which no
other symbol may be substituted. Hence it is better to speak
of the symbols themselves not of the equivalences as being
universal or particular. The propositional import of the
equivalences having been thus made explicit, we must next
note the inferential character of our procedure. This is
indicated by the "therefore" which precedes the derived
equivalences. We need only finally state explicitly that the
operation of pure synthesis or pure negation of propositions
always yields as its result an unambiguous proposition ; so
that the complex synthesis of symbols obeys the same uni-
versal laws as the simple symbols. Thus the Postulate of
Homogeneity is explicitly recognised.
There are five independent laws, which are necessary
and sufficient for propositional synthesis. They are the
following :
I. The Commutative Law : xy = yx.
II. The Associative Law : xy.z = x.yz.
III. The Law of Tautology : xx x.
IV. The Law of Eeciprocity : x = x^_
V. The Law of Dichotomy : x = xT/ xy.
A few words of explanation on each law may be given.
But the whole of the explanation that follows is totally un-
necessary for the icorking of the calculus. The calculus is
only a calculus in so far as the meaning of the letters,
of the bar, and of the synthesis of juxtaposition is tem-
porarily forgotten. On the other hand, the remarks,
which immediately preceded the enunciation of the
laws, must be understood. I hope that I have succeeded
in making clear the distinction between the minimum
of intelligence that is absolutely necessary and the intel-
ligence that is supposed to be laid aside in working the
calculus.
7. Explanation of the Fundamental Laws. The Com-
mutative Law expresses the principle that the order of pure
synthesis is indifferent. The space-order in which the
symbols are written may be taken to indicate the time-
order in which the corresponding judgments are formed.
Time is a condition to which thinking is subject. This is a
psychological law referring to the process of thinking. But
the logical law states the principle that the objects of thought
abstract from this condition under which thinking takes
place, and are related to one another timelessly. Again, the
Associative Law expresses the principle that the mode of
THE LOGICAL CALCULI 11
f/nm/iiii</ in pure .sy//////r.s/.s /.s- indijYcn-nt. For it is to be
r\vd that each step in the process of synihrsising pro-
positions involves firn elements. This merely exhibits a
psychological law of thinking, known as the Law of Duality.
Hut the logical law here affirms thai the objects of tlni,
are not restricted in their inter-relations by any limitation
I Duality. Again, then, thought is seen to abstract fr-iu
the conditions to which thinking is subject. The three re-
maining laws closely correspond to the three Laws of Thought
recognised by Logicians. The first of these the Law of
Tautology expresses the principle that tin- man repetition of
/> proposition ilm-* nut in aiuj ir<<>/ ,/</ to or alter //.s force. The
ordinary form of this law, " Every A is A," or " If A, then
A," expresses the same principle. Having given the name
A, or affirmed the proposition A, a mere repetition of such
statement does not affect its assertory force. 1 The import
of the judgment is independent of the time, circumstances,
or connexions in which it is formed. Its repetition is,
therefore, objectively irrelevant. The first three laws, then,
form a group of principles which declare that thought is
emancipated from the conditions imposed on the thinker.
He forms a judgment once, and perhaps again forms the
same judgment, or forms another and connects this with
the first, and then again forms a third judgment, which he
connects with the result of joining the first two. But all
this time-process and time-sequence and time-repetition are
irrelevant to the import of the objectified judgments. These
are timeless, and related timelessly.
The Law of Reciprocity expresses the principle that the
ill n i<il nf the denial of a proposition is equivalent to its affirmation.
In this principle are included the so-called Laws of Contradic-
tion and Excluded Middle, riz., " If A, then not not-A " and
" If -not not-A, then A ". Of course, here denial means bare
denial or pure contradiction. If in opposition to A we set
up some proposition merely incompatible with A, then the
denial of this last does not bring us back to A. Other alter-
natives are possible. The formal contradictory of a positive
judgment can never be itself a positive judgment. If the
proposed contradictory has any positive element in it, the
alternatives are only exhaustive within the positive hypothesis
1 It should be observed that I distinguish this law of Tautology from
the symbolic convention a -- . The latter is necessarily presupposed
in order to give meaning to the former. The latter, again, is a conven-
tional postulate, common to all symbolism ; the former is a formal law,
exclusively logical.
1*2 W. E. JOHNSON :
common to the two. The logical contradictory, therefore,
is a mere ideal never apprehended in itself which serves
as a warning against the error of supposing that any finite
number of positive contraries can be exhaustive of all possi-
bility. 1 The Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle
have the appearance of being merely verbal. They seem
simply to expound the meaning of not. It is, therefore,
necessary to show how thought comes to have a meaning
for not. We shall find the explanation by recurring once
more to the process which ends in the formation of a judg-
ment. In this process we detect a conflict ending in a con-
quest and ejection. Now the word not has really a double
signification. Sometimes it refers to the conflict, and at
other times to the conquest and ejection. The laws of Contra-
diction and Excluded Middle bring these two significations
into connexion with one another. " If A, then not not- A "
means " The positing of A involves a conquest over and re-
jection of anything that conflicts with A ". The former
41 not " thus means " rejection of" ; the latter means " con-
flicting with ". Again, " If -not not-A, then A " means " The
conquest over and rejection of everything that conflicts with
A involves the instatement of A". As before, the former
"not" means "rejection of," and the latter means "con-
flicting with ". The former is the not of the copula, the latter
of the predicative term. This explanation will, perhaps, make
clearer the statement that the force of a declaration, asser-
tion, or positing is made explicit by reference to denial ; and
the relation between the two and thus the real import of
a proposition is finally made explicit by the laws of Con-
tradiction and of Excluded Middle. The doubt, then,
whether these laws are not after all merely verbal expositions
of ' not ' is answered by the reflexion that, were there not
any real psychological process at the back of the proposition,
there would be nothing for ' not ' to mean. Granted the
reality of the process, the laws may be admitted to be merely
verbal. But the foundation of the verbal laws is just this
reality of the process.
Lastly, the Law of Dichotomy expresses the principle that
the denial of any proposition is equivalent to the denial of its
conjunction with any other proposition together with the
denial of its conjunction witli the contradictory of that other
1 I should maintain that the apparent ultimate antinomies of thought
arise always from the attempt to conceive two alternatives by means of
some positive idea. The Law of Excluded Middle is used to justify
this attempt ; but, in fact, it expressly forbids the attempt.
THE LOGICAL CALCULI U
j)rjiuxttiun. This is ;i further extension of the Law of
eluded Middle, when applied to the comhination <.f proposi-
tion-- with one another. Tin denial that // i.-, conjoin. -<| \vitli
!> coinhined with the denial that <i is conjoined with in>t-l> \^
equivalent to the denial of tt .-'i^olutely. For, if <( were true,
it must he conjoined citlu-r with b or with in>t-1>. This \
wiiich lit must he admitted) looks at first a littl.- compli-
oated, is tlie special instruniciit of the 1
its tneana we may al \\ays resolve a proposition into two
determinants, or conversely we nuiy cMinpoiind certain
pairs of determinants into a single proposition. In this
law we lir.^t lie-in to see the complexity into which the de-
velopment of our axioms will lead us. In a future paper
I hope to show how the whole Boolian Calculus can be
derived in a few steps from these laws. But at present
I wish to examine more closely the relation between the
methods of the calculus and the ordinary forms of speech
and thought.
8. Derivative Modes of Synthesis. All results attainable
by the Logical Calculus are contained in the five funda-
mental laws which regulate the use of the particles "and,"
" not ". But the results can be put into more familiar forms,
and their relations to ordinary processes of thought can be
exhibited by the introduction and definition of new conjunc-
tions and modes of synthesis.
\Ve may, then, observe first that we have two fundamental
types of synthesis which can be best denoted by the words
Conjunctive and Disjunctive. Thus, taking two simple pro-
positions x, y, their conjunction is expressed by xy and their
disjunction by xy. These two propositions xy and xy form
a contradictory pair. The conjunctive xy expresses that x
and y are both true ; while the disjunctive xy expresses that
x and y are not both true. 1 The latter must of course be
distinguished from the conjunctive xy, which expresses that
x and y are both not true. Each of these types has four
nirieties involving x, y, or their contradictories, viz. :
Conjunctives. Disjunctives.
xy xg
xy xjj
xy xji
xy xy
1 The word disjunctive is here taken in its natural sense to mean
joined," and in direct opposition to conjunct
14 W. E. JOHNSON :
\
The double use of negatives in the Disjunctive varieties is
confusing to ordinary intelligence. Hence in popular speech
they are expressed in simpler form. Thus the disjunctive
xy is expressed in the Hypothetical form, ' if x, then y '. And
the disjunctive xy is expressed in the Alternative form, ' either
x or y '. In this way ordinary speech dispenses with double
negatives. We must add that in this view there is no es-
sential difference in meaning between the Disjunctive,
Hypothetical, and Alternative forms, and hence that any
proposition of the Disjunctive Type can be expressed in-
differently in four different forms. Thus, taking the second
variety, the following four propositions are equivalent :
(1) The conjunction of x-true with ^/-false is false.
(2) If x is true, y is true.
(3) If y is false, x is false.
(4) Either x is false or y is true.
Similarly each of the other varieties of Disjunctive can be
expressed in four equivalent ways by use of the Disjunctive,
Hypothetical, and Alternative forms. Moreover any pro-
position of the disjunctive type is contradicted by a proposi-
tion of the conjunctive type. Thus the contradictory of "If
x, then y " is " x is true, but y is false " ; the contradictory
of " Either x or y is true " is " Neither x nor y is true," and
so on.
It is not enough for my purpose to establish merely the
equivalence of the Disjunctive, Alternative and Hypothetical
forms. I would contend that the only natural way of ex-
pounding the force of the Alternative and Hypothetical
forms is to reduce them to the Disjunctive form. The
syntheses ' or ' and ' if ' have been recognised as presenting
peculiar difficulties by all logicians who are inclined towards
an objective interpretation of propositions. The fact or
actuality cannot itself be hesitating between two alternatives.
It cannot determine itself conditionally upon an undecided
contingency. The fact must be a determinate fact. The re-
lation between alternatives or between supposition and con-
sequent cannot be a relation between facts. Hence the
origin of these forms must be looked for in the nature of the
thinker's relation to fact. Now this relation is clearly the
relation of partial or incomplete knowledge (or at anyrate,
more exactly, partial or incomplete statement} about facts.
Now how is this partial knowledge or statement to be exactly
described? Examine the common man and you will see
how he would explain himself if pushed to extremities. He
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 1 ")
will be obliged to explain that by saying that one or other of
two alternatives is true he means that be will not admit th;tt
Ituf/t are false* l'y saying that if one proposition he true
anot her proposition would be true, 1 H- mean-, that he will not
admit that t he _///*/ run be true and the winnl J'nl.w. He thus
recognises that the m///// /<*/// combinatioD of propositioi
a real combination which has obvious objective import.
There is, therefore, a meaning in denying or refusing to
admit any conjunctive combination. The alternative or
conditionally dependent relation cannot be conceived as
objective ; but the conjunctive or determinative relation has
a clear objective meaning. If this be admitted, the real
difficulty of interpreting Hypothetical and Alternatives, as
representing a phase or aspect of actual objective reality, is
shifted to the primary difficulty of interpreting denial objec-
tively. For it may be admitted that conjunction has a real
objective import and yet maintained that a denial of con-
junction (as indeed any denial) cannot be interpreted objec-
tively. The difficulty, then, is reduced to the primary
difficulty of giving objective import to the negative. Now the
occasion of a man's forming a truly negative judgment with
respect to reality is undoubtedly that the suggestion of the
positive is rejected in the conflict by an antagonist who does
not clearly show his face. The antagonist is in reality a posi-
tive contrary, not an indeterminate contradictory. It is only
a positive that has the power to reject another positive. But
that positive may evince its power without being discernible
as a il'-f> run 'tied positive. Hence the occasion for a negative
judgment. Thus the difficulty is solved by the acknowledg-
ment that, while the judgment determines reality, yet it
leaves reality partially undetermined ; while reality is abso-
lutely determinate, it is only as yet incompletely determined.
But why need we have had recourse to the negative judg-
ment to demonstrate this? Does not every positive judgment
equally illustrate the same limitation in our apprehension of
reality? We can never "speak the whole truth," even
though we may swear that we speak " nothing but the
truth ". A proposition, positive or negative, can only select
one from the infinite number of latent specifications of
reality. It does not thereby affirm that it has exhausted
every aspect of the real.
9. Discussion of the above Interpretations. To some readers
all this will appear both true and trite. Others, however,
will strenuously oppose it. I do not think that any logician
except Dr. Keynes has gone quite so far as I propose in
the thorough-going identification of the Disjunctive, Hypo-
16 W. E. JOHNSON :
thetical, and Alternative mode of synthesis, and especially
in the view that the Hypothetical is contradicted by a
Conjunctive, though this view would seem to be the
natural outcome of the symbolic systems elaborated by
Mrs. Ladd Franklin and Mr. Mitchell in the Johns
Hopkins Studies in Logic. The discussion of this view
is necessary, because it throws some light on a good many
controversies in Formal Logic. In debating the point,
one has to face two very different classes of opponents:
the thorough-going symbolists and the thorough-going con-
ceptualists. In the first class I have specially in mind Dr.
Venn, Mr. Peirce, and Mr. McColl. These three writers
identify (for symbolic purposes) the implicational relation
between two propositions with the relation between the sub-
ject-term and predicate-term of the universal categorical.
The first objection to this on symbolic grounds is simply
that the latter has a quantitative element which is altogether
absent from the former. Thus the universal categorical,
"All cases of A are cases of B," contemplates a number of
different cases in which A or B may be found. Hence it is
contradicted by the particular categorical, " Some cases of
A are cases of not-B ". But the hypothetical, implicational,
or inferential synthesis, " If the proposition A is true, the
proposition B is true," contemplates simply the single con-
junction or disjunction of A with B. There is no differentia-
tion of cases or times by which the propositions A and B
can be said to be ' in some cases ' or ' sometimes ' true and ' in
other cases ' or ' at other times ' false. The same proposition
cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false ! l Hence the
hypothetical which denies the conjunction of the truth of
the antecedent with the falsity of the consequent is in its
turn denied by simply affirming that conjunction absolutely,
without distinction of where or when. Using Boole's
symbols, it is clear that if x and y are propositions, x =
and xy = are contradicted respectively by x = 1 and xy = 1.
But, if x and y are class-terms, x = and xy = are contra-
dicted respectively by x > and xy > 0. There is no alter-
native between the truth or falsity of a proposition or a
conjunction of propositions. But between the extension of a
term throughout the whole universe and zero-extension,
there lies the alternative of its extension throughout a part
1 Those symbolists, who deny this, confuse the ' time during which a
proposition is true ' with the ' time to which the proposition explicitly
or implicitly refers'. Propositions referring to different times are
different propositions.
THI-: L<K;ICAL O&LCULUa 17
only of the universe. For tin- pure symbolist the matter
may he clenched by the following observation. There is a
tlioroiiL, r h-^oin^ analogy between tin- combination <>f proposi-
tions and the comhination of terms. Hut just as proposi-
tions are combined to form complex propositions, so terms
are (-(unbilled to form complex terms. Consider the com-
bination of the propositions x, y, to form the complex pro-
positions " If ./-, then //." 1.6. , "y or x". This is precisely
analogous to the combination of the class-term^ ./, //, to form
the complex class-term "class-// together with das.
The analogy is symbolically perfect. Yet the symbolists
to whom 1 have referred appear to identify the latter com-
plex class with the />/vyW///*// that this complex class
exhausts the universe. They actually confuse the r/tt**
II + r, with the />rjnii/i<iti. // -f x = I. 1
Tins error seems to be closely allied to and to have arisen
from a confusion between two kinds of synthesis both of
which are expressed ordinarily by the sign if: one of which
contemplates a conjunction or disjunction of circumstances
in the same case or cases of phenomena, and the other con-
templates a conjunction or disjunction of two propositions
of independent import. The first mode of synthesis I should
propose to call Conditional and the second Hypothetical. [See
Keynes's Formal Loyic, 2nd edition, pp. 64, 65.] For ex-
ample of the Conditional take, " If a child is spoilt, his parents
suffer ". Here the import of the apparent consequent is only
to be explained by introducing bodily the whole of the
apparent antecedent, so that the proposition is really equiva-
lent to a single categorical, namely, " All the parents of
spoilt children suffer". For example of the Hypothetical
take, " If virtue is involuntary, so is vice". Here we have
two propositions of independent import ' Virtue is involun-
tary,' * Vice is involuntary ' which are so related that the first
cannot be true without the second. In this latter instance we
deny the conjunction of the truth of the antecedent with the
julxity of the consequent once and for all without distinction
of case or time. In the former we deny the conjunction of
the circumstances expressed by the antecedent with the absence
of the circumstances expressed by the consequent for >
in I he real universe contemplated. The hypothetical is con-
tradicted by the proposition, " Virtue is involuntary, but not so
1 This confusion is due to the fact that, if x is a proposition, then the
proposition x = 1 means neither more nor less than the proposition x. But,
if x is a class-term, x = I differs from x in toto, inasmuch as the former is
a proposition and the latter a mere term.
2
18 W. E. JOHNSON :
vice". The conditional is contradicted by the proposition,
" Some of the parents of spoilt children do not suffer ". The
conditional form is chiefly used instead of the categorical,
whenever the real -subject-term is highly complex involving
a chain of relations (as in the propositions of geometry) .
In arguing with the symbolist who attempts to identify
two somewhat different forms of proposition one has merely
to point out (as I have done) that the rules of symbolic
operation are actually different in the two cases which he
proposes to identify. But, in arguing with the logician who
adopts what may be called a conceptualist position, the
matter is not so simple. In this case of Symbolism versus
Conceptualism, the Symbolist wishes to unite or identify
what the Conceptualist distinguishes. Now the distinctions
which the Conceptualist urges are of the highest importance ;
the Symbolist has merely to take the modest ground that
his symbols are quite incompetent to deal with these distinc-
tions until they are explicitly formulated. In other w r ords,
the distinctions of the Conceptualist are material or non-
formal to the rigidly formal logician.
The cases we have to consider here are (1) The identifica-
tion of the Disjunctive, the Hypothetical, and the Alterna-
tive forms of Synthesis, and (2) The identification of the
Conditional with the Categorical universal.
(1) The Hypothetical, " If a, then &," might apparently be
written, " The proposition a implies the proposition b ". Its
contradictory would then appear to be, " The proposition a
does not imply the proposition b". This latter would mean
(I presume), " The proposition a might be true without the
proposition b being true " ; in other words, " The conjunction
of a with not-6 may be true ". In my interpretation, on the
other hand, the hypothetical, "If a, then 6," means, " The
conjunction of a with not-6 is false," and its contradictory is
therefore, " The conjunction of a with not-6 is true". The
difference between the two interpretations is, therefore, indi-
cated by considering the contradictory of each, which gives
in the one case tine possible truth and in the other case the actual
truth of a certain conjunctive. Now this is a difference of
modality. There are great difficulties in coming to an agree-
ment on the subject of modality. But perhaps the follow-
ing will be admitted. Modality refers to the grounds on
which the thinker forms his judgment. It, therefore, ex-
presses a relation between the thinker on the one hand and
a certain proposition on the other hand. The real terms,
then, of the modal proposition are the thinker and his rela-
tion to some judgment which is propounded to him. Thus
THE LOGICAL ALCULUS. 19
the proposition, "8 must he I'," asserts (say) that, " Any
rational being is bound by liis rationality 1 to judge that B
P.". Now the contradictory of a modal proposition such as
" S must be P" is always another modal proposition sucl
nay benot-P," which would mean on the above showing,
\ rational being is not bound by his rationality to ji,
that S is P". The modal proposition is, therefore, simply
ssertoric on a different plane concerned with the rela-
tions between different sorts of terms. It follows, then, that
whereas a modal must always be contradicted by a modal.
loric must always be contradicted by an assertoric,
Now to return to the proposition, " If" t lien 6," I propose
simply to regard this as an atstrtoric hypothetical, not as a
hypothetical. In other words, it is taken to assert a
of disjunction between a and not-6, not to awrt ///*
intion to assert this relation. This interpretation is only in
conformity with that of the simple proposition, ' a is true,'
which is regarded as an assertoric categorical, not a mu-I^I
categorical ; it asserts a, it does not assert the obligation to
t a ; it is contradicted by * a is false,' not by ' a may be
false '. In justification of my interpretation, it is only neces-
Bary to urge that the ordinary use of ''if" must at least
include the affirmation of the disjunctive. Of course a
speaker must have some grounds for his statement. But it
is one thing to dispute the validity of his grounds and quite
another thing to dispute his statement itself. Where the
speaker intends primarily to assert his right to affirm the
disjunction not to assert the disjunction itself this mean-
ing has only to be made explicit, and the symbolist will be
able to deal with it. But the change of meaning involves a
reference to new sorts of terms, which cannot without con-
fusion be mixed up with the old terms.
Very similar remarks must be made with respect to the
identification of the Alternative with the Disjunctive. 2 The
proposition "a or 6" might be taken to mean " a and b are
alternatives". Its denial would then appear to be " a and b
are not alternatives". This again would mean (I presume)
that " other alternatives besides a and b are possibly true,"
that " It may be that a and b are both false". Now I
1 Or it may be by his spatial or moral intuitions. In every branch of
necessary thought, the necessity has a different foundation so far as the
Logician at least can see.
- The reader will, of course, observe that I am not exactly following
the common use of the word Disjunctive. The word, as originally
applied to * a or 6,' implied the disjunction of a with 6. I am identifying
' ({ or 6 ' with the disjunction of a with 6.
20 W. E. JOHNSON :
regard the contradictory as being simply assertoric instead
of modal, viz., " a and I are both false ". This is of course
in accordance with common language : "Either-or" is natu-
rally contradicted by " Neither-nor ".
Considering, then, both the Hypothetical and the Alter-
native forms of proposition, I admit that the psychological
occasion for these judgments is a certain relation in which the
thinker stands to reality. But I do not admit that the force
of the propositions is to affirm this relation. On the con-
trary, they must be taken as affirming assertorically a fact,
which is within certain limits left undetermined in the
judgment.
(2) I should wish to identify the conditional proposition,
" If any subject is S, that subject is P," with the categorical
proposition, /'Any or every subject which is S is P," and
this again with the ordinary form, " Every S is P ". It has
been frequently pointed out that the mental attitude in-
volved in these two forms is different. But we must distin-
guish in Logic the mental attitude from the objective
significance of a judgment. Logic is wholly concerned with
the latter. If a mental attitude is intended to be affirmed,
language is capable of doing this explicitly ; and the new
terms in which this new proposition is couched can be dealt
with by formal logic as easily as the old. Other logicians
would rather detect an objective distinction between the above
two forms. But however this objective distinction is ex-
pounded, it is clear that new terms will have again to be
introduced. Some, e.g., might say the conditional means
" it lies in the character of S that P is inseparable from
everything that partakes in it ". [Lotze.] Now as pleading
on behalf of a rigidly formal logic, may I point out the
obvious fact, that in this proposition we have an entirely
new complex of terms? It is not in the spirit of under-
rating the importance of such immensely interesting work
as Lotze has performed in the Philosophy of Logic that I
offer such an obvious reply. My object is rather to magnify
the interest and importance of his and similar work, by
markedly separating it from the dry and narrow field of Pure
Logic. Even in this field there seems to me useful work to
be done not without its own interest. With respect to the
particular point in question, I must urge that if the Aris-
totelian doctrine of syllogism is of any value, it gains its end
entirely by the suppression of all distinctions that are not
explicitly recognised in its S's and P's. Its universal applica-
bility is only attained by demanding that implicit distinctions
shall be voted out as non-formal.
'I UK I. ()(,!< AL CALCULUS. 'J 1
10. The J)<-finltc I n/ ro<l art Ion of Various ('/////'// //</////>* or
<>f Xi/ntkesis. Though tin- calculus can be completely
developed hv use only of the particles ?w and ///>//, yet the
results in this form would appear strangely complicated and
foreign to c< minion speech. Hence it is doirahle to intro-
duce other modes of synthesis. The most corner
synthesis to introduce is the Alternative, indicated hy tin-
word '"/'. 1 have urged that 'or' is most naturally inter-
preted in term* of ' and ' and ' not '. Hence the equivalence :
*a or /' ' nit ans not (a and I). This is, of course, a mere
vcrhal or conventional equivalence not a firs// j'n/i<t/ l<m\
From the definition follows the reciprocal relation between
ml and or which has heeii BO fully worked out by Peirce and
Schroder. It is legitimate, though of course not necessary,
to include further the symhol if. This, again, can he most
simplv defined as equivalent to or-not. Thus ' if I' means
4 a or b\ This is another conventional equivalence. This
definition suggests further the conjunction icif/mnf, which is
defined as meaning and-not. Thus l a without ' means
n hut not b,' i.e., * a and b '.
The two conjunctions " and" " or," were represented in
Boole's system by the mathematical symbols of multiplica-
tion and addition respectively. The words " if" and " with-
out " correspond respectively to division and subtraction, if we
eliminate the uninterpretable and indeterminate character
which Boole gave to the processes. The common words or,
irff/ttuff, <(nd, if thus happen to have some analogies with the
four fundamental processes of arithmetic. The analogies are,
however, far from perfect; and the only legitimate ground for
using Arithmetical symbols is that we are thus saved the
trouble of learning to work with an entirely new set of
symbols. If Boole had not taken advantage of this analogy,
his system would never have taken the hold that it actually
has. But his procedure was in one respect unfortunate. He
Carted with l<j<l>raical formulae, and then investigated
whether these could be interpreted logically. He ought to
have started with the logical formulae, and then, if desirable,
to have examined whether it was convenient that these should
1 >e represented by <i/f/fln-irn/ .s-////>/W.s. However, this error has
been amply remedied in the writings of Dr. Venn. The
question may still be asked, whether the continued use of
Algebraical symbols is necessary or desirable? I hope to
show in a future paper that these symbols are on the whole
rather an encumbrance than otherwise. I think that they
may be used in a modified form by the beginner in logical
manipulation; and that they should be discarded later.
22 W. E. JOHNSON :
This conclusion is partly based on the definite ground that
since our logical system treats and and or as reciprocally re-
lated, it is peculiarly inappropriate to represent these by x
and + respectively, which are not reciprocally related. 1
But a stronger reason is that the plan of notation, which
I hope to expound, actually enables us to solve more directly
and immediately certain problems, which have not at pre-
sent been easily solved. If this is admitted, it will appear
perfectly feasible to drop all mathematical symbols in deal-
ing with complex logical problems. This has of course been
done by Dr. Keynes, though he has not exactly developed
his method into a symbolic calculus. What distinguishes
such a calculus is the application of given definite laws of
combination to results of any degree of complexity, without
any other recourse to intelligent perception of the process
than is involved in the necessary postulates of all calculuses.
The derivation of complex results from highly simple
formulae of combination has been so nearly exclusively the
mark of mathematics, that critics are inclined to disparage
the method on the ground that it degrades logic to the posi-
tion of a mere branch of mathematics. But the method is
not in itself mathematical. Its so-called mathematical char-
acter is neither enhanced by the use of mathematical symbols
nor diminished by their avoidance. The method is simply
the method of non-intelligent combination. And on this ground
only can it be applauded or condemned.
11. The Primary Analysis of Propositions. The letter-
symbols that are used in the foregoing calculus stand for
unanalyscd propositions. The synthesis hitherto considered
is a synthesis of propositions into more complex propositions.
Propositions combined into a system of propositions have
the same properties as the simple propositions out of which
they are constituted. We must now analyse the proposition
into elements which are not themselves propositions, and
examine what further developments arise in the synthesis of
propositions from a consideration of this analysis. Here we
must start with that form of proposition which cannot be
resolved into more elementary propositions. Such a propo-
sition may be called an Individual, Indivisible, or Molecular
Proposition. The Molecular Proposition can only be con-
ceived as an ideal limit, for any actual proposition is potenti-
ally resolvable into an indefinite synthesis of more elementary
propositions.
1 This contention does not, of course, apply to Dr. Venn's system, in
which the two operations are not reciprocal.
Tin-: LOCK AI. CALCULUS. 23
The molecular proposition is found, on a first analyst, to
contain two sorts of elements a singular substantive and a
finite verb. The former is the M////V,-/-/,-/-/// and the latter the
predicative-term. These are the atoms whose combination
coriMitutes the molecular proposition. The usual logical
analysis of the predicative-term mto copula taid predicate-term
is not fundamental and is in some respects particularly mis-
leading. This analysis is generally, in fact, a merely verbal
device, having no logical significance. For consider the pro-
position, " Socrates is mortal ". Here we predicate mortu/i/>/.
If we interpret the predicate-term -win-tid, we should say it is
a name given to any individual of whom mortality can be
predicated. The substantive general name ' a mortal ' is only
definable by means of the conception of predication. By the
device of introducing the name ' a mortal,' we do not at all
obviate the necessity of marking the peculiar relation in
which the predication stands to the subject. It is true that,
starting witli the conception of ' dying,' we may proceed to
form the conception of the class of individuals which contains
nil who must die and none others. But this class is defined
by means of predication thus: "Whoever must die". It
is obviously circuitous to interpret the proposition, " Socrates
must die," to mean, " Socrates is-identical-with one or other
of those who must die ". Besides, we do not in this way get
rid of the peculiar predicative element. For this comes up
again in the definition of our predicate name. To attempt
to do this would involve an infinite process of substitution.
" Socrates is-identical-with one or other of those who are-
identical-with one or other of those who," &c., &c. It is,
therefore, a mistake to suppose that the ' identity ' or ' class-
inclusion ' interpretation of such propositions, which is per-
fectly legitimate in its proper place, enables us to get rid of
the predicative element, which is essential to the proposition.
There is one case, no doubt, in which the copula has a real
logical significance, viz., in such propositions as, ' Tully is
Cicero,' * Courage is Valour'. For here we have two real
subject-terms, and the copula relates them as identical. Here
" is" is a irliitin- jt/n/irtition. The propositions are logically
on a level with " Brutus loves Caesar," " Red resembles purple ".
But these propositions really help to prove my contention.
For the explanation of " Tully is Cicero " would be " Tully
is identical with Cicero". Here the word "is" has fallen
into the position of a mere verbal device, and we see that
what we predicate of Tully is " identity with Cicero ".
All that I wish to contend for here is that subject and
predication are logically distinct categories; and that the
24 w. E. JOHNSON :
device of resolving predication into copula and predicate-
name tends to obliterate the distinction. For the purposes
of Formal Logic, there is one consideration which will estab-
lish this point. With respect to any subject whatever there
must be some predications which can be joined with it, so that
if some are denied, there must be others which can be
affirmed of it. But we cannot say conversely, with respect
to any predication whatever, that there must be some subjects
with which it can be joined. Hence, after denying it of
some subjects, there may be no other subjects of which it
may be affirmed. A subject is that of which something
must be predicable. But a predication is not necessarily
predicable of some subject. Hence the subject cannot be
regarded as a blank form ; it must be filled with predications,
determined or as yet undetermined by thought. On the
other hand, a predication may exist in its own peculiar
realm without ever being found to attach itself to any sub-
ject. The realm of predications and the realm of subjects
are not, therefore, precisely analogous. The former may
exist without the latter, but not conversely.
This distinction is embodied in the common mode of
denying a proposition. In order to contradict a predication
with respect to a subject, we allow ourselves to affirm of that
subject what we call the contradictory predication. This
contradictory predication is of course indeterminate. But, in
retaining the same subject, and affirming something of it, we
imply that it could not be a subject unless something could
be predicated of it. Hence the negation of a proposition
attaches itself to the predication. If we attached negation to
the subject, it would be because, in denying a predication to
one subject, we assumed that there must be some other sub-
ject to which the predication could be attached. We deny
the proposition, " Socrates must die," by affirming at least
that " there is something other than death which is predic-
able of Socrates," not by affirming that " there is something
other than Socrates of which death is predicable ".
The ' existence ' of a subject is then a presupposition of
significant judgment. Also a ' meaning ' to predication is a
presupposition. But the two are not parallel. The subject
is a subject, in so far as something is predicable of it. But
a predication does not lose its meaning, because there is no
subject of which it may be predicated. Having then granted
the reality of subjects and of predications, we may proceed
to give names which stand for one or other of these subjects
or predications. These names refer directly to their objects.
Hence they necessarily have application. Names which refer
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 25
directly to their objects may be called purely denotative
names. To ;i purely denotative single name, then, there
always belongs a corresponding subject or predication
to which the name applies. The application of the name is
to one neither more nor less namable object, whether this
he siihject or predication. I tain' of the subject and
the tin-iiniiif/ of the predication, here, answer to the application
of the subject-name or pl'edica 1 1< .n-iiaine.
\'2. Synthesis <>(' J'ru/H^i/in/^ ax M<><ltji>;l I,// f/n'ir A/n<///*ix.
\Ye may tir>t consider t he synthesis of propositions containing
m inn, i imliriiliKiI < /initiative subject-name. Here in acc'>r-
dance with the mode of denoting the contradictory of a
molecular proposition by contradicting the prr</icnfin, we
also represent the synthesis of propositions containing the
same subject by a synthesis of />r<>/i<-tions. We thus apply the
laws and derivative rules for the combination of unanalysed
propositions to the combination of predications of a common
subject. Nothing further need be said on this point.
\Ve have next to consider the synthesis of singular propo-
sitions, m/atni7&7 a mnunon predication, but different subjects.
Let S,. S,. S 3 . . . SQO represent a number of different
individual subjects ; and let p denote any predication. [It
will be convenient in order to distinguish the predication
from the subject to write the predication in the usual form
" is p".} A term S may be used to represent the aggregate
collection of individuals S^ S 2 , 8 3 . . . SQQ; i.e. :
S means " Sj with S 2 with S 3 . . . with Soo ".
Now there are two fundamental forms of synthesis which we
have noted, viz., "and" "or". These lead to the familiar
abbreviations :
S x and S 2 and S 3 . . . and 800 = Every S :
Sj or S 2 or S 3 . . . or SOQ = Some S.
Thus we arrive at the common logical forms, Every S is p,
Some S is p. The former is an abbreviation for a deter mi-
native, the latter for an alt cnm tire synthesis of molecular pro-
positions. The rules, then, for the synthesis of propositions
may be applied to derive the relations between universal and
particular propositions. These relations all follow from the
consideration of the implied k "//'/ ' and ' or' which are latent
in the quantitative terms '//' and 'some'.
We have, thirdly, to consider the synthesis of proposi-
tions, which refer to the xtmic "/////'''//^/v uj '.S/////V/Y.S, but contain
different predications. This yields six cases, according as
we have a determinative or alternative synthesis of two
2(5 W. E. JOHNSON :
universals, or of two particulars, or of a universal and par-
ticular. The results are all derivable from the analysis of
the universal and particular, as condensed forms of and and
or respectively. The following are the chief results to
notice :
Every S is p and Every S is q = Every S is p and q.
This follows at once from the consideration that, in the given
compound, no mode of synthesis is involved except determi-
nation. Hence the commutative and associative laws im-
mediately justify the equivalence. Similarly :
Some S is p or Some S is q = Some S is p or q.
This follows from the same laws applied to alternation. But
we must observe that in the other cases no equivalence is pos-
sible. Thus w r e have :
Every S is p or Every S is q implies 1 Every S is p or q.
Some S is p and Some S is q is implied ~by Some S is p and q.
Some S is p and Every S is q implies Some S is p and q.
Every S is p or Some S is q is implied by Every S is p or q.
These obvious results are shown to be derivable from the
analysis we have given. The cases of determinative com-
bination of two propositions correspond to the ordinary
combination of premisses in the Syllogism, while the alter-
native combinations are represented ordinarily in Hypothetical
Propositions (for or means if -not). The results lead to some
important criticisms of the systems of other symbolists,
which must be for the present postponed.
13. The Calculus of Multiple Quantifications. We have
now traversed the entire ground of ordinary formal logic.
But our treatment will not be complete without a considera-
tion of the so-called Logic of Relatives. This term is peculiarly
misleading. No Formal Logic really treats of Relatives in
general qua Relatives. It can manipulate complex proposi-
tions involving a double, triple, quadruple, &c., quantification.
And it is this manipulation to which the name Logic of
Relatives has been unfortunately applied. By quantification,
I mean the use of such terms as All, Some. By a proposition
involving multiple quantification, I mean such a proposition
as "All readers find something to enjoy in any volume
1 " Implies" here means "formally implies," i.e., "contains as a deter-
minant ". Formal inference is, in fact, nothing but discovering the
determinants of a given complex. The relations between formal equiva-
lence, implication, or contradiction, and material equivalence, implication,
or contradiction, will be treated in my next paper.
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 'J7
written by c true poet". This involves a //////</////// quan-
tification. The main ground of interest in tin- subje.
that its treatment will conclusively show that the only
instruments in the hands of the formal logician are pure
synthesis and pure negation, For we have already observed
that "all" is a mere abbreviation for "and"; that
"some" is a mere abbreviation for "or"; and that "a or
/' " merely means " not (not-a and not-i) ". When the need-
fid analysis of a proposition involving multiple quantification
is made we shall then see that the resulting calculus [a
merely a complex derivation from the five fundamental law*
of propositional synthesis given above.
In the primary analysis of the proposition, we employ a
N/////A subject-term and a predicative-term to represent the
molecular proposition ; as in " Caesar sleeps ". But a further
analysis may disclose a i/nnh/c subject. Thus " Csesar loves
Brutus " contains the two subjects Cccsar and Brutus and the
relative predication-term loves. Considering, then, two group*
of subjects x l , ^ ... XQQ and y v y., . . . u -^ , we have six
cases of doubly-quantitative propositions. These correspond
to the six cases of combination of two singly-quantitative
propositions. For we may take all the molecular proposi-
tions of the form " .?; loves ?/," and combine them deter-
minatively or alternatively with respect to the #'s and with
respect to the ;>/s. We thus obtain the forms :
I. Every x loves every //.
II. Certain #'s love every ?/.
III. Every x loves certain y's.
IV. Some x or other loves every y.
V. Every x loves some y or other.
VI. Some x loves some y.
The distinction between II. and IV. and also between III.
and V. has to be carefully noted. These forms involve the
same modes of synthesis of the same elements, but dijt't'irnthi
Irni'hrtnl. The word " Certain " is equivalent to " Some the
same"; the expression "Some or other" is equivalent to
"Some it may be different ".
These propositions, and others similar to these, but of any
higher order of multiple quantification, only require a careful
analysis as regards the way in which the " and" and " or"
syntheses are introduced. Under this treatment, the results
will again be seen to be mere complex developments of the
five fundamental laws of propositional synthesis. I hope to
be able to exhibit the calculus of multiple quantifications in
28 W. E. JOHNSON :
a future paper. In the present article, I must return to a
consideration of certain possible criticisms.
14. Criticism of the Preceding Analysis. If the above
analysis is admitted to be correct, it will establish the point
that all the familiar methods of Formal Logic, and the less
familiar results of Relative Logic, depend, not on the pecu-
liar relation of subject and predication, but on the proposi-
tional synthesis involved in the quantitative element of the
universal or particular judgment.
To all this the objection will be raised that it treats the
universal and particular as merely enumerative forms, and
entirely neglects the essential difference between a mere
enumeration of single cases and the true universal which is
controlled by a common nature or limited by the possession
of a common attribute. It is true that this distinction is
partially disregarded, but only in. so far as it is irrelevant to
the interpretational force of the universal. However the
aggregate of things, to which the universal name applies, is
mentally reached, the prepositional force for purposes of
inference or synthesis in general is the same. Just as we
may measure the length of a curve by integration of small
elements, although it is intuitively apprehended or analyti-
cally defined as a whole, so we may estimate the inferential
import of a universal by regarding it as a synthesis of
individual propositions, although the individuals are first
determined by the conception of the universal in its one-
ness.
A further consideration of the import of ordinary quanti-
tative propositions will provide us with a more complete
defence. It is true that the quantified subject-term is not
usually a mere enumeration of individuals first apprehended
and named. But this is because the subject-term is not a
bare subject, but a term having predicative as well as sub-
stantive force. Thus the proposition " All mortals must
suffer " involves two predicative elements dying and suffer-
ing. It asserts some sort of synthesis of these two predica-
tions within the same subject or subjects. The apparent
subject is "Whatever dies". What then is the real or
ultimate subject? It is certain that predication cannot
by itself determine a subject. The application of the term
'mortal' cannot be evolved from the attribute ' mortality '.
In common logical language, the denotation must be fixed
and limited by something independent of the connotation.
That which fixes all denotations is simply the aggregate of all
individual subjects, the presupposition of which we have seen
to be necessary for significant judgment. These subjects
THE LOGICAL CALCULI 29
can never be exhaustively characterised l>y means f predi-
cations. There remains always tlu- stuff, substance, or
matter on which the predications must haiiL;. What are the
hoimdaries of the 'universe of discourse'; whether these
boundaries : uv uniformly the same in all 'discourses' or
differ for every 'discourse'; are questions irrelevant to
nal Logic. It is enough to point out that there can be
no such tliin^ as a specific denotation of terms, unless there
'in. ai^regate of individuals in the barken >und ready to
receive the connotation. With this understanding then we
may resolve the apparent subject into its really substantive
and predicative elements. The proposition ''All mortal.-,
suffer'' thus becomes "Any subject suffers if mortal".
Here the ultimate subject is referred to universally; and
the predication 'suffers if mortal' involves a complex
synthesis of predications. The other cases are similarly
treated. Thus
Every x is // = Every subject is ' x if // '
= Every subject is * x or y '.
No x is // = No subject is * x and y '.
Some x is y Some subject is ' x and y '.
Not-every x is y = Not-every subject is * x if ?/ '
= Not-every subject is ' x or y '.
All propositions, then, involving predicative subjects may
be resolved into propositions having, as common subject-
teim. the aggregate of all individual subjects; and as predi-
cate, a synthesis of the predications involved in the apparent
subject and predicate. This result follows from the neces-
sary reference of the subject-term to denotation. It is clear
that, without a reference to a common aggregate of subjects,
propositions could not be synthesised at all. The ultimate
subject-term is referred to either universally or particular///.
Hence the force of the proposition is brought out (as before)
by interpreting the universal as an abridged determinative
synthesis and the particular as an abridged alternative syn-
thesis.
This interpretation of the universal and particular corre-
sponds exactly to the interpretation given by Dr. Venn and
Mr. Peirce and worked out by Dr. Keynes. In order to
obviate certain objections that have been raised to their
methods and also to show the closeness of the proposed
interpretation to that ordinarily given, I have preferred
to use the term ' denotation ' in place of ' existence,' and
to state the propositions with the same signs of gua/tMy
30 W. E. JOHNSON : THE LOGICAL CALCULUS.
that they originally contained. But my procedure is
essentially the same as theirs. In the interpretation given
of " all x is 2/," I have not assumed that x has any denotation,
i.e., the extension of x may be zero. If, in any given case,
x is known to have extension greater than zero, the scheme
of interpretation is perfectly adapted to express this addi-
tional datum. We have merely to conjoin with the negative
proposition " Nothing is xy " the affirmative " Something is
x ". A proposition is not reduced to insignificance by allow-
ing the possibility that a connotative term such as " Any
subject of which x may be predicated " has extension zero.
This is quite consistent with my former statements that a
purely denotative term must have extension greater than
zero, and that the universe of denotation must itself have
extension greater than zero.
[The statement (on p. 13) that "The same proposition cannot be
sometimes true and sometimes false " must be taken in connexion with
my recognition of propositions involving multiple quantification. Thus
we may indicate a series of propositions involving single, double, triple
. . quantification, which may reach any order of multiplicity: (1)
All luxuries are taxed. (2) In some countries all luxuries are taxed ;
or, In those countries in which all necessaries can be produced, all
luxuries are taxed. (3) At some periods it is true that in all countries
all luxuries are taxed ; or, In all countries, at those periods at which
some necessaries can be produced, all luxuries are taxed. With respect
to each of the types of proposition (1), (2), (3), I contend that, when
made explicit with respect to time or place, &c., it is absurd to speak of
them as sometimes true and sometimes false. And I maintain also that
symbolists are wrong in giving a unique place to time as a secondary
differentiation of propositions. The rules for dealing with multiple
quantification are precisely identical, whether the secondary quantifica-
tion relates to time, place or any other substantive category.]
III. THE IDEA OF VALUE.
By S. ALEXANDER.
AMONG the judgments \\liirh we pronounce concerning
things there is a well-markt'd distinction of two kind
one kind consists of bare statements of fact such as, " The
rose is red," or, " Balbus is building a wall ". These may
refer either to external objects or to internal states of
mil id. The proposition " The tree is green " describes a fact
of external nature ; the proposition " I am cold " describes
ii mental fact. Some psychologists would not admit that
the two propositions are comparable ; but however much
they may differ in character, they may be joined together in
distinction from a second kind of judgment. This second
class consists of moral and aesthetical judgments and of
propositions which do not merely imply but assert truth or
untruth. Such judgments seem to consist of two : they not
only assert a matter of fact, but they go on to assert some-
thing of this matter of fact. They apply to it a certain
measure or rule, called goodness, or beauty, or truth, as the
case may be. They are judgments in a different or rather
in a more complex sense than that in which the other kind
of judgments are ; for they are not merely expressed as
propositions, but they imply that something has been put
on its trial and judged. They contain the sentence of the
judge, whereas the others contain only the report of the
jury. The jury have to decide if a man has committed a
fraud ; the judge thereupon condemns or acquits. We can-
not evade the ambiguity of the word " judgment " in English,
for the word "sentence," which describes the decision of the
judge, describes also the proposition as expressed in language.
The ambiguity is not without obvious reasons ; for the words
" judgment " and " sentence " have been taken by logicians
and grammarians from their popular use in law, and applied
to technical purposes. It is of far greater practical impor-
tance to have a name for the way in which we express appro-
bation and disapprobation in all their various forms, than to
have a name for bare statements of fact, and the use of
judgment as equivalent to the sentence of the judge is there-
fore, the first in time in popular language. We may call the
second class of judgments " normative judgments," because
they apply a norm or standard, or " judgments of value,"
32 S. ALEXANDER :
because they declare something to possess value from the
point of view of truth, beauty or goodness. The German
language, so well adapted for expressing reflective distinc-
tions, hits off the difference of the two kinds of judgments
by calling the first set " Urtheile " or judgments in general,
the second " Beurtheilungen " ; the distinction in this form
has been current in German thought from the time of Her-
bart.
It is in this sense of judgment that I propose to deal with
the subject in this paper to inquire what value means and
upon what it is founded. For the economist value has a
very definite significance the value of a commodity is the
quantity of other commodities which the first can procure.
The economist is well aware that the economic value of an
object is in no way identical with the value which a
moralist or an artist may set upon it, though he is equally
aware that the economic value of an object, being dependent
partly on demand, is affected by every moral and aesthetic
consideration which affects the desires of persons to possess
the object. There would seem at first sight to be only a
superficial connexion between value in economics and value
in morals or aesthetics or in respect of truth. Of economic
value there is a common measure in certain specific com-
modities the precious metals, which form the standard of
price. There is also a currency in which the other kinds of
value are measured, and this currency is one in which three
standards are legal tender. For truth, goodness and beauty
all three seem closely to cohere, and attributes are transferred
from one standard to the other with the utmost freedom.
At one time, as in Greece, the beauty-standard is the supe-
rior, at another time, goodness. But there is this difference
between economic value and what we may call philosophic
value, that value in economics has degrees, whereas here it
seems to have none. We do not call an ugly thing less
beautiful, we declare it not to possess beauty at all ; we do
not call a bad action an inferior kind of good action, we
reject it as of a different character altogether, as having no
community with goodness ; we do not recognise degrees of
truth, but declare what is true to be utterly alien to the false.
When we do make such distinctions of degree, we do so for
various reasons, either to indicate that the thing in question
contains elements which in themselves or out of their pre-
sent surroundings have value ; or we do so in order to miti-
gate the severity of our censure, as when from dislike to
condemn an action off-hand we declare it to be not so good
as it might have been. And yet it may be doubted whether
Tin: [DBA OF VALUE, 33
11 philosophic " value has not after all a closer relation with
economic value than might be supposed. The economic
value of a thing is fixed by answering a question of this
kind : " Is this thing worth the money that is asked for
it ? " or (if we put money out of the question) : " Is it worth
the amount of things demanded in exchange for it ? " Thi*
is tantamount t> asking, " Are the desires of buyers such as
to induct- them to accept the object (and gratify at the same
time the desires of the seller) at the price which is set upon
it ? " The " state of the market " means," We will buy
and such objects at such and such a price ; different objects,
or these objects at different prices, we will have nothing of".
Now this is precisely what the moral judgment says ; the
moral law says, that human beings will have only such and
such actions, performed with such and such frequency and
with such and such intensity ; actions other than these are
had. In other words, economic value represents, and em-
bodies in a particular form, the exchange of desires for
material things : now, it may be maintained, and it will
be maintained here that moral and other ideals represent
equally an exchange as between many persons ; though not
an exchange of desires for material things, yet still an
exchange of mental requirements; and the standards of
truth, beauty and goodness in their different ways represent
the different methods of effecting the exchange.
In what follows I shall principally speak of moral value,
and of the other kinds of value, aesthetic and scientific, only
incidentally and by way of illustration. The exact relations
of the three are a difficult matter ; but any one who has
reflected on the subject knows well that all the problems
which occur in one sphere occur with the necessary varia-
tions in the other. As my object is to deal with the con-
ception of value in itself, it would be mere repetition to
verify statements in all the three possible directions. I
confine myself, therefore, to that with which I am most
familiar.
What then is value ? We began with the distinction
between judgments of fact and judgments of value. Is this
distinction a final one ? That it is final is the belief of a
large number of thinkers. " In morals," they say, " we deal
not with what is, but what ought to be ; not with events,
but with commands which are binding upon events ; not
with the indicative, but with the imperative mood. We
cannot step from the one region into the other. In morals
we deal with ideals, but ideals hold up a standard to which
facts must be made to conform, and they are not in them-
3
34 S. ALEXANDER :
selves facts." Let us look at some of the various forms
which this distinction has assumed. It is implied in the
ordinary intuitioiiist theory that we possess a faculty of
deciding the moral value of a proposed action which is
independent of our other faculties and is in no way derived
from them. This is combined with the belief that moral
judgments have no connexion direct or indirect with con-
templation of the consequences of action. From any such
purely intuitionist view we have carefully to separate a
seemingly intuitionist theory like that of Hume, which also
asserts the existence of a moral sense, but at the same time
declares this moral sense to be determined by a general view
of the nature and effects of the action. No one, not the
most hardened hedonist, has ever doubted the existence of
a moral sense. The only question which has to be solved
is the question whether this feeling is an abstract and brief
chronicle of many simpler sentiments or whether it is
something unique and inexplicable and is concerned with
an object out of line with other objects of experience.
Intuitionism is not, however, the shape in which the con-
trast of " ought " and " is," of " ideal " and " fact " is most
startling, nor is it the theory with which any exposition at
the present time has most need to settle its account. In
the theory of Kant the contrast was marked in the sharpest
outlines, and from him it has been inherited by a large and
influential body of thought in England. With Kant the
moral law was above sense. It proceeded from man in his
rational character, as member of an intelligible kingdom,
subject only to the universal laws of reason. It must be
obeyed by him in his empirical character, and therefore it
presents itself to him as an imperative, but one which he
sets to himself. It borrows nothing from the sensuous
elements of his nature, which it rather humiliates than
seeks to satisfy. It is not contrary to nature, but in so far
as it takes up its sensuous material from human nature it
has none of the marks of morality as such, it has not the
freedom, and with it the universality which belong to the
moral law. Only in God is the union of sensuous perfection
and rational perfection, without stress or strain, effected.
In this famous theory to which no short summary can do
justice, because any such summary must appear to pass over
the permanent elements of value in the theory, " sollen" and
" seyn " stand confronting each other. They react upon
each other, but they exclude each other. And every one
who has kept himself abreast of recent ethical writing in
England knows how, with all its rejection of Kant's cold and
THE IDEA OF VALUE.
Derated formality, this cardinal distinction remain- :
now somethiiiL: iii tin- mind diftnvnt from its ordinary ope-
rations of sense, imagination, and the like is thought to
'(main which ,^ives foundation to the ideas of a "truth" or
( goodness" an "ought") not to be explained us tin-
complicated result of simpler mental operation^.
Before proceeding to the main argument, let us mention
another theory which seems to retain the same distinction
in principle, while it combines the merits of both the
Kantian and the int nit ionist views. Perhaps no modem
philosophy is more interesting in itself or more important in
its consequences than the Herbartian ; and the Herhartian
ethics, however untenable, are full of instruction. Herbart and
his followers assert the existence of a class of feelings called
11 formal " feelings, the characteristic of which is that their
object is some purely formal disposition of objects. Such
feelings are (to take examples which are given by Professor
Steinthal), the pleasure which arises from the mere metrical
arrangement of a hexameter, from the mere contemplation
of the so-called golden section of a line, from the arrange-
ment of tones in a melody. These feelings are not excited
by the sounds themselves or by the different parts of the
line ; they have nothing in common with the ordinary feel-
ings of anger or joy. They are directed upon the relations
which subsist between the lines and the tones or, more
exactly, upon the pure form of this relation. As such they
are not merely subjective feelings, not mere sensuous affec-
tions of the individual mind, they are objective, are directed
upon something objective and have a universal value. Such
are the aesthetic feelings and the feelings for truth, and such
also are the moral feelings. There are certain relations
between the parts of human conduct or relations of will
which excite an immediate pleasure or displeasure. These
relations are drawn out in the Herbartian system. They
are called Ideas and are the standards of moral judgment.
Such are, for instance, the Idea of Personality, the formula of
which is that an action, which a man adopts solely on the
strength of his moral insight, pleases ; or the Idea of Har-
mony, according to which an individual will in agreement
with the general will pleases immediately ; or the Idea of
Good- will ; or of Right ; or of Perfection. The vast supe-
riority of this theory to that of intuitionism is apparent at a
glance. But the reason for alluding to the theory here is
that under the peculiar form of asserting the existence of a
special kind of feeling feelings of formal relations it also
asserts the opposition of what is ideal and ought to be, as
36 S. ALEXANDER :
something universal and absolute, to other facts of mind
or nature.
Such then are some of the forms which the supposed
cardinal distinction of fact and value, of " ought " and " is,"
has assumed. That this distinction is a real one is one of
the prejudices which testify how powerful is the effect of
practical considerations in perverting scientific ideas. It is
of the utmost importance for human welfare to insist on the
sanctity of moral laws. However human institutions may
change, however much our ideas of what is right may
undergo modification or even revolution, to violate those
standards is sacrilege. Yet their paramount importance
does not imply that their authority is unique, and derived
from other sources than the commonest facts of human life.
But this confusion of the practically invaluable with the
theoretically unique is the confusion which is committed by
those who maintain that the distinction of fact and value is
ultimate. The last words (" is ultimate ") are chosen
advisedly. That there is such a distinction is a truth which
is as obvious as the truth that apples and roses are different
plants. But as this last truth is compatible with the truth
that both apples and roses share in one common type, so is
the distinction of fact and value compatible with the pro-
position that value is only a particular kind of fact, a fact of
a higher order, but essentially a thing natural, and in direct
continuity with all other facts. There are two dangers to
which the mind is liable in scientific and especially in philo-
sophic inquiry. One is that which arises from what Bacon
described as the too great aequalitas of the mind, the spirit
which overlooks the patent distinctions of things, and merges
their individuality in one sweeping and vague generali-
sation. Seeing that this gift for perceiving resemblances
is the mainspring of all comprehensive thinking, those who
do not avoid this danger may well be forgiven because they
loved much. The opposite danger is that of hardening the
flexible junctures of things, of digging ditches where nature
has drawn thin lines, of painting in sharply contrasted
colours when in reality one colour shades off by gradations
into another. This is the spirit which loves discontinuity,
which imagines that the cousinship of the more highly and
less highly developed forms reduces both to the same low
level of development. Paradoxically enough, this spirit
often arises from an imperfect success in comprehending
the whole of a subject at once, and hence it is often found
combined with vague and unfruitful generalisation. Such
appears to be the case with the theory that fact and value
THE IDEA OF VALUE.
st;u id upon different levels and are incommensurable.-
Though the chief cause of this illusion is to be found in the
obfuscation of the intellect with the dust which is raised by
practical interests, yet part of the blame is due to the fact
that no attempt is made to discover what value itsel:
'That value exists is certain ; that the value of an &(
different from the act itself is also cerium ; hut to assert
the Around of this that value has a place to itself as some-
thing unique is to fail in seeing the connexion of value with
other facts ,.f the world.
Some of the difficulty might have been avoided in morale
if ;irt and science had been taken into consideration as well.
It is easy to maintain that the feelings which act as arbiters
m moral decision are unlike all other feelings ; but no one
doubts that beauty at least is apprehended in the form of
the pleasure which the mind takes in contemplating certain
colours or sounds or other sensuous forms. But here again
it may be answered, and from Plato onwards this view has
been reiterated, that the beautiful is a sensuous embodiment
of sorne'thing ideal, or rational. Or that truth is the approxi-
mation of human knowledge to an ideal of knowledge, or
perhaps to the ideal constitution of things. In like manner
in morals our judgments have reference to ideals. When
we pronounce an act to be good we mean that such and
such an act accords with the ideal of action. And how
can such a standard be reduced to the level of such facts as
those with which the psychologist deals ?
The answer to this is very simple. Ideals are nothing
but the formulations of desires. The moral ideal is a very
complex and highly organised system of such objects of
desire. Morality consists of certain observances or conduct
upon which the men called good are agreed, or on which
men are agreed so far as they are good men. 1 It represents
the different directions in which the energies of different
members of a society must be expended in order to work
smoothly in connexion one with the other. The moral
order is in its essence something social and implies the
co-operation of the individuals who compose a society.
1 I may as well at once obviate any verbal objection which might be
raised on the ground of the inconsistency with which I speak of the
ideal sometimes as a formulation of desires, sometimes us the object of
desires, sometimes as a mass of sentiments. The ideal is ;i kind of
character, or a number of modes of conduct, and may properly be
designated therefore as a mass of sentiments or desires, which make up
the character ;ind compel to the conduct. Any man who possesses the
ideal makes the character or conduct so described his object.
38 S. ALEXANDER I
They bring to it from their birth and from their training
certain personal endowments, whether mean or excellent,
gifts of body and of intellect or feeling, gifts of fortune, and
gifts of opportunity. As so endowed, they enter into the
social life with forces or weaknesses, which at every turn
come into contact with the forces or weaknesses of other
individuals. The result is a compromise, which determines
not only what powers must be exercised, on what occasions,
but also the extent to which they must be exercised. Each
person in so far as he is a true contributory to this complex
whole of conduct is a reflexion in his own person of the
social order. His own functions are settled by his peculiar
circumstances, and he has to see that in his conduct he
shall so utilise his nature and his opportunities as to be-
come efficient for the social good. If he is a good man he
will make such actions as advance the social good the object
of his desires ; or, in other words, he will desire such things
as are required for the social good. He is himself a complex
mental organism, and his desires are not uniform but multi-
form. Together they form a system or whole which is his
personal ideal, the many-sided object of his desires. The
moral ideal, whether it be taken as the personal ideal of each
good man, or as the ideal of the whole community, is thus
the object of desires.
In what sense then is an ideal raised above the ordinary
range of mental facts '( I put aside as irrelevant to the
matter the question whether ideals are ever realisable,
whether an ideal is something put forward as an end to
which we strive to approximate but know that we cannot
attain. It is certain that we are always projecting in front
of us an improvement on those attainments which we have
effected in the past. But whether we think of an ideal as
something essentially unattainable, or more exactly hold
that the ideal is attained in any good act, but brings forth
other ideals superior to itself; in either case the ideal re-
mains nothing more nor less than the object of desires, an
object which floats before the mind in idea before it is
effected in reality. Such ideals represent sentiments the
love of country, of family, the desire to help distress, the de-
sire to maintain unimpaired our free individuality, the desire
to embody a talent in a work of art or science. To say that
the moral ideal stands alone is to deprive it of its material
character, to suppose it something apart from the particular
duties which it imposes, something other than those exer-
cises of human volition which by experiment or experience
have settled into that adjustment or equilibrium which we
style the moral order.
TUJ-: ii'KA OF VAI.I 39
( >nly in one respect can it be urged that the ideal sta:
by itM-lf -that it is no men- congenea of desires but a sy
malic \\hnle, and can be held before the mind on occasion
as such a single whole of objects of desire. And the same
may be said of the standards of truth and beauty. They
too imply many elements of knowledge or sensuous form,
but these elements constitute one whole or system. H<>\\
is such a system possible? Does it not by its systematic
character not only differ from any desire or perception, but
imply the existence of something which can alone be the
author of systems? There is much force in this contention,
and the questions which it raises cannot be easily disposed
of without attempting a whole philosophy. Nevertheless
the contention is ill-grounded. It is true that the syste-
matic character of ideals separates them from single desires,
but to allow this is to do nothing more than assert the
claim of ideals to be recognised as real and distinctive
mental existences. But their systematic character arises
from the systematic character of society itself, and of the
individuals who compose society. Other systems can be
found in the world than in the region of ideals of value.
These ideals are nothing but organic forms of which the
constituents are human individuals. There is nothing in
a system as such which is not illustrated by any animal or
plant. But no animal, or plant, it will be urged, can think
of its system, its organised form of life, as such : no animal
has a consciousness which can contemplate its end as a
unit ;i. This is true. But the ability of a creature to pre-
sent its end at once to its consciousness is something which
follows from the ability to present any single object to
consciousness at all. It is with a true strategic instinct
that those who find in human intelligence something unique
and inexplicable begin by finding the presence of this
principle in the very beginnings of human intelligence, in
perceptions. Their position is indeed undermined by every
advance which is made in psychology, by all the proofs which
accumulate to show that ideas, which as distinguished
from sensations become the central position of such philo-
sophies, are but impressions recurring in modified form ; by
every step which is discovered in the genesis of the idea of
an < >bject as such. It may be that the gaps have not yet been
satisfactorily filled in the sequence which connects human
consciousness proper with the purely sensitive conscious ne>^
Yet even if we grant to these thinkers this temporary ad van-
it remains certain that the idea of a system as a unity
is explicable by association or other complication of ideas,
40 S. ALEXANDER :
when once it is possible to form an idea of an object at all.
An ideal, as an object of desires, presents therefore no element
which is not presupposed in the whole of human intelligence.
And once again, even if we grant the existence of something
peculiar in human consciousness, no reason exists for ele-
vating ideals, whether of goodness, truth, or beauty, into a
class by themselves as things which exist outside the range
of facts, in the proper sense. Value is, once again, one kind
of mental fact, in whatever sense mental fact is understood,
and, to repeat the assertion with which this discussion began,
ideals are the formulations of desires.
"Sollen" is thus one kind of " Seyn ". That which
" ought to be " represents the sentiments of good men, and
these sentiments are as much facts as hunger or love, and
more powerful. Yet it will be answered that after all this
evades the real issue. ''It is true that the moral ideal is
but a mass of sentiments. But still the sentiments which
are formulated in the ideal are sentiments as to what kind
of action ought to take place." This must be emphatically
denied. The sentiment which prompts a man to do an act
of benevolence may indeed be accompanied by the feeling
that such an act ought to be done, but in itself it is nothing
but a sentiment which drives the person who feels it into
the particular action. The whole standard of what ought
to be done operates upon the minds of good men with this
impelling force, and there is no new quality of duty or
" oughtness " which is contained in the object of all their
desires. What the objection must be taken to mean is that
the " oughtness " of the moral ideal does not lie in the ideal
itself, as such, but in the power or authority of the ideal over
those who are to obey it, and that this " oughtness r> which
attaches to any moral object is something unique or, if the
term be preferred, transcendental. In other words, when
we say. that in morality we are dealing not with what is,
but with what ought to be, we do not mean that there is any-
thing unique or transcendental in the moral law itself, but
in its obligatoriness, and this obligatoriness is either itself
somethiug which has value, or it gives value to the moral
law, and that which has value is no longer simple fact.
But even in this form the distinction of value and fact
breaks down. For what is this obligation, this authority
which attaches to morality ? Take the case of the ordinary
moralised person, and note what happens when he feels
himself bound to do a particular action, say an act of
benevolence. Let us suppose that he has some dislike to
performing the act, would rather keep his money for some
Tin: [DBA 01 VALUE. 41
project nearer his own heart, but duty compels him to do
the act. What happens in his mind is something of the
following kind. The sight of the object requiring relief
rests t<> him the idea of benevolence, but before this idea
becomes powerful enough to pass into action, conflicting
ideas suggested by the idea of the money necessary for^the
act enter i ho field of view. But, at the same time, the idea
<>f the benevolent act awakes by association all the ethical
idea> that is, all the moral sent mieiit s which educatioi !
tuned into such sympathy that they vibrate whenever
any one of them is touched. The whole force of these
moral sentiments supports the idea of the good act, and
repels the idea of the self- indulgence ; and in so far as their
compulsive force restrains the evil sentiment, the good idea
is felt to be invested with the character of duty. Supposing
there were no inclinations which impel against the moral
requirement, the force behind the particular duty would be
felt in the milder form of authority. What then is the
obligation which we attach to any moral ordinance? We
have seen that the moral ideal itself is nothing but a name
for certain sentiments. The upholders of a unique " ought-
ness" or "obligation" which severs " value" from "fact"
evade the force of this truth by seeking refuge in the origi-
nal character of "obligation". But this obligation is itself
nothing but a sentiment. It is the sentiment of approval
in the good man's mind which follows upon his presenting
to himself the idea of the good act, or the sentiment of
disapproval which he feels upon presenting to himself the
idea of the bad act. The pleasure which arises in the
one case and the pain in the other indicate that the un-
generous course is not compatible with the whole mass of
sentiments which are the effective force in determining his
action. These sentiments are, to use the language of
Herbart's school, the apperceiving mass which is employed
in all the good man's conduct.
Something must be added or reiterated to qualify the
naked assertion that that which gives the characteristic
flavour to an act as moral, its obligation, or its goodness, con-
sists in nothing but a sentiment. The sentiment is a
sentiment on the part of the good man. With the bad man
we are no farther concerned. For him duty has no meaning,
in so far as he is bad : he is accessible only to the compulsion
of rewards or punishments. The authority which he recog-
nises is but the seduction of favours to be won, or the terrors
of displeasure to be endured. His apperceiving masses are
different from those which impel to right behaviour ; he
42 S. ALEXANDER :
sees the world with other eyes. He, too, has his ideals ;
they are with him too the formulation of his desires ; he has
too his apparent approvals and disapprovals, but that which
pleases him displeases the good man. His sentiments have
their place as facts in the world of human feelings. But
since they are not the same as the sentiments of the good
man, they are declared by the good man to have no value.
A bad man means, therefore, in the first instance, nothing
more nor less than a person whose sentiments and conse-
quent approbations differ from those of the good man. The
whole fabric of morality reposes upon a difference of tastes.
A certain dislike is felt to accepting the notion that the
goodness of a good act is nothing but the approval of it by
the good man. The doctrine is not indeed in substance a
new one : it is practically equivalent to the doctrine as
understood by Hume that the moral sense decides immedi-
ately upon the goodness of conduct. 1 For the moral sense is
nothing but the mass of moral or, let ine say (to use a
neutral term), " active " sentiments operating in the way of
approval or disapproval. In effect it is a mistaken appre-
hension of this doctrine which lies at the basis of intuition-
ism in morals under all its forms, whether in the naive and
unreflective form of the English intuitionists or the stimula-
ting and suggestive form which it assumes in the already-
mentioned Herbartian ethics. It is because goodness is
nothing but the approval of the good man that there is
plausibility in declaring that certain feelings within us are
the absolute judges of what is right and wrong. The mis-
take of English intuitionism lay in breaking off all inquiry
into the origin of these feelings by declaring them to be
original and inexplicable ; the mistake of the Herbartian
doctrine lay in attributing to these feelings a character and
an object which they do not possess. Still the identity of
goodness with the feeling of approval conflicts with the
feeling that there is something external or objective in right
or wrong, something which can be apprehended in feeling,
but is itself not feeling. Yet if we ask where is this objec-
tive morality of which our moral sentiments are but the
apprehension, we receive an answer which is either intan-
gible or implies the truth of our assertion. If we are told
that morality is some ideal principle, we ask our informants
the meaning of such principle dissociated from moral habits
1 " We do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases ; but
in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner we in effect feel
that it is virtuous." (Hume's Treatise, bk. iii. pt. i. 2.)
THE IDEA OF YA1 .; 43
and aspirations. If we are told that objective morality
consists of the settled modes of behaviour required by a
society of its members, we do but receive corroboration of
tin- suspected theory. For the institutions of society are
not parliaments and churches, town-halls and law-c< >urt-.
. >ls and universities: they are not temples built with
hands: they are the habits of actions which centre round
these "institutions." which find in buildings or written
ordinances their point of attachment; they exist solely in
the feelings or sentiments of men, or what is the same
thm^, in the conduct or volitions which represent the mus-
cular discharge of those sentiments. In morals we are in a
purely mental region : we are dealing with the wishes of
men and women, suggested and modified by all manner of
physical circumstances, but not identical with these. Good-
in ethics is a purely human invention; it implies a
relation between one kind of human volition and a number
of others. In like manner beauty and truth are purely
human inventions : they move in the sphere of human sensa-
tion, or of knowledge, and it is a mistaken view of beauty or
truth which seeks a criticism of them outside the different
elements of aesthetic perception or of intellect! al apprehen-
sion. But the questions raised by the nature of beauty and
truth are too intricate to be discussed further here. For
truth, though it means a cohesion between the parts of our
knowledge, yet has reference to a world which does not
vanish with our knowledge; and beauty, though it means a
harmony between our sensuous impressions, is embodied in
external and permanent forms. But in morals we never
step outside the sphere of human sentiments. The moral
order indeed abides though I disobey it : but it abides only
in the sentiments of those who support it and enforce it
against me. Destroy the good man, and the moral order
perishes too. Where then should authority be found but in
the relation between the wills or the sentiments of those in
whom morality is incarnate? and this relation, being neces-
sarily a mental relation, is experienced as a mental state, and
is that approval or disapproval the more exact psychological
character of which has been described. Nor is it difficult to
iow, the whole having no existence outside the senti-
ments of good men, morality has yet an objective existence.
It is objective in two ways. In the first place, as against
any one particular good man, it is a totality or complex of
good men, of which totality the particular goodness is a con-
trilmtory factor. Its objectivity is not the external existence
of the physical object, but the inclusiveness of the social
44 S. ALEXANDER :
organisation. And, in the second place, as against the bad
man, morality is objective as a truly external force which
excludes him, so long as bad, from participation, and more
than that, proves its own claim to continued existence by
extirpating his bad action.
Goodness or obligation or authority (all of which may for
the present purpose be regarded as identical, for they are
but different shapes of one and the same thing, the relation
of any one part of the moral order to the wiiole) are thus
equivalent to the approbation which is felt by good men for
the action in question ; the " oughtness " of the moral ideal
is resolved into a feeling. It is so far from being a unique
or transcendental phenomenon, that it is but a psychological
fact like others. We can observe these approbations at
different times, and note the different characters of the
objects upon which they are directed. And we have but to
observe their existence in the same way as we note in the
realm of organic nature the actual existence as facts of diffe-
rent varieties of plants. But in thus handling the subject
we are brought a further step in unfolding the idea of value
an advance which we may best begin by considering a
further objection. For it will be said that, convincing as
this reasoning may be, it yet rests upon an assumption.
" In all your arguments you assume the existence of the
good man. You deny the special character of the moral
ideal, because it is but the formulation of desires. But these
desires are the desires of the good man. You deny that
obligation is anything but a sentiment, but that, sentiment
is the approval felt by the good man. But if you assume
the existence of the good man, have you not already assumed
the very element which you are endeavouring to explain ?
You are able to resolve the value of morality into a senti-
ment because the possessor of the sentiment contains already
the quality which gives the sentiment value. Whether the
peculiar essence of morality be described as " oughtness " or
as " goodness " matters nothing : in the good man " ought-
ness " is already existent. Your argument is, therefore,
worthless."
This objection seems at first sight a serious one. But it
really depends upon failure to apprehend the conditions
which determine the existence of morality. The same
objection has been urged against the proposition asserted in
an earlier page, that the goodness of any particular course of
conduct depended on whether such conduct would harmo-
nise with all the other portions of conduct which are required
by society, and depended upon nothing but the possibility
THJ: IDKA OP VAI.I 1.)
of such equilibration. It is asked, " is not this to declare that
the goodness of any particular conduct is determined hy tin-
social order, and at the same time that the rest of the social
order i^ determined by the goodness of this particular c
duct?" Or, to state the same objection in another form,
how can we tell whether any particular conduct will con-
duce, to the social equilibrium unless we know first in what
that equilibrium consists? In reality, however, there is no
circularity in the argument which is impugned, but perha]
a want of power on the part of the impu-iiers to visualise
the scene. The various concordant or discordant forces
which clamour for settlement adjust themselves one aguin-i
the otlu-r. and the whole order or equilibrium is fixed at the
very >ame moment as it is also fixed what particular ele-
ments can enter into this order, and what elements are
excluded. There is no pre-existing whole to which the
parts need to be adjusted the whole comes into existence
with the adjustment of its parts. Suppose that a number
of bodies are endeavouring to form themselves into a com-
pact whole. They are of different shapes and they can
contract or expand by altering their height. But their
capacity for change is not unlimited but restricted. "When
they have formed a compact mass each body will have a
particular shape and height, but some, through inability
to alter their shapes, will not be able to fall into any
place at all where they can remain fitted to the other
bodies, and they will be excluded. This is a coarse
picture of how wishes and sentiments are adjusted to eacli
other in the social equilibrium, and how the individual
element is determined at the same time as the whole order,
and at the same time as the unsuitable elements are rejected.
Here is the necessary justification of seeking for an internal
criterion of right and wrong as against any external criterion.
The same reasoning is valid against the objection that in
treating what ought to be as merely the sentiments of a
good man, and therefore as a mere human psychical fact, we
are assuming covertly the elements we have resolved away.
The class of good men is created at the same time as it is
determined what the moral law and its ordinances are.
Those who fall into the social equilibrium are the good,
those who fall outside it are the bad. Good arid bad, it
must be insisted, are only names : names which are applied
to certain persons who possess certain sentiments, and to
the things which those persons approve. The words are
used in the argument to designate the actual concrete men
and women and their concrete actions ; they imply no
46 S. ALEXANDER :
covert conception of value. The argument describes a fact
that in the endeavour to satisfy the claims of one another,
it is discovered experimentally that a certain arrangement
of observances, or of sentiments, allows a certain number of
persons to live together without disintegration from without,
and without friction from within, while other persons or other
courses of action can neither be got to fit into this arrange-
ment, nor into any stable arrangement. The first set of
persons are good, their approval stamps with the character
of goodness the actions which they themselves practise ;
while they stamp with disapproval the actions which are
practised by those who are not of their number, and these
are the bad. Good men and the moral ideal which formu-
lates their desires are determined together, and the objection
which overlooks this process falls to the ground.
It is evident then that the sharp separation which is made
between fact and value is made by thinkers who have failed
to ask themselves how value itself came to exist, how such
a thing as a standard comes to take its place in the world of
facts. They have been impressed by the patent difference
between the application of a standard to an action, and the
action itself, and they have therefore supposed some new
and peculiar factor, whereas the moral judgment is nothing
but a sentiment which arises when an action comes into
friendly or hostile contact with a mass of sentiments. But
the business of ethics is to verify the growth of masses of
sentiments corresponding to certain social needs. These
are the standards of moral judgment ; according to them
value is allowed to individual actions or persons ; the pro-
nouncement of sentence follows inevitably from the existence
of these standards. A particular action becomes a point of
attachment for the sentiments which compose the standard ;
they embrace it or repel it, in the same way as an animal
assimilates the food which it can utilise, and rejects that
which is distasteful, or as it resists all influences which tend
to impair its vitality. The growth of standards and the
application of these standards is a purely natural process,
and the existence of value depends upon this process.
This will become still clearer by considering briefly in
what way these standards are formed. The standard itself
has been represented as a system of sentiments which have
been determined by equilibration, by a process of give and
take between all the forces which contend for satisfaction
in society. But though the equilibrium is attained experi-
mentally it is not to be imagined that for the formation of
each standard of value all the elements of society are ad-
THI: mi; v or VAI. 17
justed to each other by innumerable trials. This would be
to disregard the historical growth of ideals. In the course
of tin H iu \v ideals arise by the imposition of modifications
upon old ideals. Kadi ideal as it is formed makes an
(.ijiiilibration of the claims of human nature at any one
e of society. As new claims are evolved, this equili-
brium is disturbed, and a new one has to be discovered.
This is effected by a process which passes under our eyes
every time that a reform is carried. Some individual, or
group of individuals, proposes a change, which means some
addition to the existing energies of society and some re-
stitution of its habits of action and judgment upon actions.
This new ideal of social life obtains adherents among the
other members of society, and at last it wins its way into
acceptance. It is found to create a new equilibrium of
social sentiments, and this implies that certain individuals
whose sentiments cannot bend into compliance with the
new order will be excluded from the circle of good men.
The new order is established at the cost of a new demarca-
tion of good from bad. This is the result of a veritable
trial of strength between the new order and the old. The
new order, which on the course of its way to acceptance
has become variously modified through contact with many
minds and their effective desires, has by virtue of its own
inherent suitability to the needs of its society driven out of
the field all rival claimants. Its victory is the separation
of actions which accord with itself, under the name of good
actions, from actions which do not accord with itself, under
the name of bad actions. The power of forecasting the
needs of his society is the genius of the successful reformer.
This success may not be enjoyed by himself, but when it
at last arrives it has introduced a new form of social organi-
sation which has expelled the older form. Something of
what was once good has now become excluded, and there-
fore bad.
The experiment by which social equilibrium is attained
is therefore a process in which many guesses are made at
the future ideal, and some one of these enlists on its side all
the force of public sentiment as the result of a struggle with
all the rest and with existing standards. By perpetual
repetition of this process, as human nature enlarges and
refines, the moral ideal moves on from age to age. At
each step a new standard of value is created by the struggle
between conflicting ideals of social good. It is evident that
this process by which morality changes its standards re-
sembles the process by which in lower forms of life than
48 S. ALEXANDER I
ours new organisms are developed, new forms of healthy
and possible life. Moral ideals are but forms of healthy
social life. But this is not the place either to draw out the
identity at length, or to exhibit those characteristics which
give human history the appearance of utter unlikeness to
the growth of lower forms. That this dissimilarity is only
apparent it would not be difficult to show were this the
proper occasion. One thing only needs special remark :
that the gradual disappearance of brute struggle between
individual men, and its supersession by united action, is not
only not in conflict with the theory of the growth of
morality by perpetual conflict between good and bad, but
is in completest accordance with that theory. For it means
that an order of things which is based on individual
competition is replaced by a new order of things which is
based on co-operation. Love, benevolence, toleration,
humanity, a common science, a common culture all these
are new forces which arise in the growth of human nature,
which can only take effect through a society more closely
bound together, more careful of the single life. It is this
more highly organised form of society which conflicts with
one which allows freer play to the brute struggles of indi-
viduals. The very result of the struggle between different
ideals of social life is to diminish the struggle between indi-
vidual lives.
But these verifications of the central fact are unnecessary
for our purpose. The central fact remains that moral stan-
dards represent a victory gained by persons with one ideal
of social life, one set of desires, over persons with different
sentiments. This is an induction from the facts of moral
life, 110 twisting of moral data into conformity with ideas
derived from other sources. But from this exposition of
the natural growth of standards of value we see more closely
than before, that fact and value do not stand opposed to each
other, that the valuable, or what ought to be, as opposed
to what is valueless, or what ought not to be, is the mere
expression of the fact that a solution has been attained of
the problem how to reconcile certain sentiments into one
organised whole ; is an effect due to the creation of a new
body of sentiments, which has authority over any of its
members and has power to crush by its condemnation all
sentiments which resist.
We are thus brought appreciably nearer the object of our
inquiry. For we see, in the first place, that value is some-
thing capable of explanation, that it is a particular pheno-
menon which arises in the ordinary course of development.
THE IDEA OF VA1J
The mystery which hedges round the names of duty and
right and ideal disaf .hen we h;ive ceased Mind
practical inviolability with scientific uniqueness. These
(1 names are names which attach to sentiments which
have acquired f<>r themselves a position of superiority ii
lict with other sentiments. And, in the second place,
we are able to give a more precise account of what coi.
lute-; value now that we have seen how it arises. For the
.standard of value is the social equilibrium, or, if we prefer to
hiological language, the conditions which make up social
vitality ox social health. The value of any particular action
i any individual is the efficiency of the action or the
individual for the social equilibrium, and depends upon
whether the action is of such a kind as to be adapted to this
equilibrium or, in looser language, to promote it. Morality
any one time an organic whole, all the parts of which
have value as contributory elements. The different things
which have value for morality, have value in the same way
as the parts of a steam engine or of an animal. The object
of the steam engine is to perform a certain work of traction,
the different parts are designed to work smoothly on each
other with a view to this end. Instead of material or merely
vital elements, suppose the elements to be conscious, as they
are in the moral organism, and the efficiency of each part for
the work of the whole takes the particular shape which we
know under the name of value. Value is the efficiency of
an organ which is conscious of its own functions, and on
occasion can be conscious of the functions of the whole
organism which it subserves. It will be understood that in
speaking of an action as a conscious part of the moral
organism I am using a shorthand expression for the agent
as performing the action.
The affinity of value in moral judgments to value in
economics, an affinity which must not, however, be pressed
very far, becomes apparent. Exchange value is the amount
of commodities for which a given commodity will exchange.
A given kind of goods, A, is exchanged in a certain propor-
tion for certain quantities of other kinds of goods, C, D, and
the like. A is worth having and worth exchanging at a cer-
tain price. The moral ideal implies a similar exchange.
There are many individuals who compose a certain society.
Each contributes to the common stock a certain class of
actions determined by his peculiar character and position, on
condition that his fellow-citizens contribute other actions
from their side. Good conduct is an exchange of services.
And just as economical exchange is in principle an attei
4
50 s. ALEXANDER:
to secure to each person the maximum gain, under the limi-
tations which social life imposes, so also does the moral ideal
represent the maximum advantage both of the good indivi-
dual and of the society as a whole to which he belongs.
The argument has attempted to define the value of indi-
vidual actions or persons. Nothing has been said of the value
of the ideal or standard itself. In fact, though we sometimes
speak loosely of moral ideals as possessing value, as being
precious or priceless, the ideal itself does not possess value ;
it constitutes or is value. It is the measure by which value
is determined, but it is itself, as a whole, not subject to
measurement by an external standard. A value, a certain
standard of estimation, is determined by each step in the
history of morality through which good is distinguished from
bad. As the successful organisms in the battle of life are the
fit, the successful ideals in human history are the valuable.
But by this we mean that only that has value which is
comprehended under the moral law ; we cannot go beyond
the record and ask whether there is any value in morality, or
of what use is it to be moral. We cannot do so because it is
morality itself which gives us our idea of what is useful. In
declaring certain actions to be good, or certain types of
character, we exhaust all our knowledge of what usefulness
or worth in human life implies. To ask of what use is it to
be moral is the same thing as to ask of what use is the pro-
cess which creates the distinction of usefulness and worth-
lessness it is to confuse the process with its products.
This remark is not so obvious but that it has escaped the
notice of those who with the pessimists cry out, what is the
use of living ? If you can show me where living competes
with non-living, and on which side the question is decided,
I will allow that life itself can be tried by the standard of
use or value. Till you do so I can attach no meaning to the
question. The question to which I can attach a meaning is
the question, what form of life has use or worth? This
question is answered by the history of morality. Under
given circumstances, the life which has worth is the good
life the bad life is worthless. But this will seem a cold
and comfortless answer to those faithful ones who choose
to labour loyally in spite of suffering ; and there is indeed
more behind, which is already contained in the answer
just given. For the sufferings endured under any social
system may be removable, and may clamour to be re-
moved. Where such a sentiment exists demanding the
mitigation of certain pains, a new moral standard is in the
making. And it is to this new standard that the complaints
THK I!>i:\ OF VALUE. .">!
of life appeal. This appeal corroborates the truth of tin;
ry which is here explained. Morality is no settled
tiling fixed oner and for ever, but is for ever chan
new sentiments arise, between which and those already in
existence ;m e.|inlihnum has to be found. NVhere certain
institutions are felt as intolerable, the new standard says
that this form of life is so far without value : that, which has
value i> a new form which shall do. justice to the later
growths of htunafi nature. But this form of life is still a
form of lift'-. It neither believes nor dishelieves that life
itself has value but it creates a new standard of value.
Pessimism is based on the belief that the worth of life or
<>f any part of life is measured by the pleasure it produces ;
and the mention of pessimism is a natural transition to this
.u'eneral doctrine, which is, at anyrate in this country, per-
haps the most widely entertained of all ethical doctrine-.
Pleasure is always with us in ethics, and many persons will
regard with dismay the prospect of a discussion of pleasure
at the end of a paper which has already reached a consider-
able length. But some discussion is unavoidable, and I will
endeavour to be as short as is possible consistently with not
being dogmatic. I have maintained that the value of a good
act or a good man is measured by its efficiency towards
maintaining the social equilibrium. But this theory would
pretend to go further and to explain the value of an act by
its capacity of producing excess of pleasure over pain, and
therefore adding to the sum of pleasures which is held to be
the end of moral activities. Pleasure has been so long and
so unhesitatingly maintained to be both the aim of moral
action and the criterion of moral value that it is no wonder
if criticism has inclined to the other extreme, and denied to
pleasure any place whatever in these functions. With the
particular shape which this criticism has taken in the
writings of T. H. Green and his followers it is impossible to
a -ree, if only because in their anxiety to point out errors in
the theories of hedonistic writers they have altogether per-
verted the true proportions of the thing pleasure as we know
it in real life. Yet, if I do not mistake the drift of these
criticisms, they have value so far as they tend to make us
see that the true position of pleasure in determining moral
standards must be sought not so much in the sum of plea-
sures as in their distribution. But this needs further
explanation.
Let us begin by making the largest admissions on behalf
of pleasure. It is true that any valuable act produces in the
end an excess of pleasure over pain, and it is true that the
;V2 S. ALEXANDER :
moral order produces the greatest possible sum of pleasures,
in the only sense which can be attached to that phrase. It
is true that the most successful form of social life is that
which produces most pleasure. And it is rightly urged that
this is secured by the machinery of nature, which provides
that lives which produce more pain than pleasure are exter-
minated. It is true also that our desires are directed towards
securing pleasure in so far as that we do not desire any object
without presenting it to ourselves as desirable. All these
truths seem to support the belief that value and pleasure are
identical. But it is one thing to lay down these propositions
which do but represent definite facts, and another thing to
conclude from them that therefore pleasure is the primary
element to which value has reference. It is possible to
measure value by pleasure, while at the same time value
may be founded not upon pleasure but upon something else
of which pleasure is also a necessary attendant. That this
latter alternative is the true one may be seen most simply
from the following consideration. Given the character of a
man or of the society of which he forms a part, the activities
which are most suitable to this character necessarily produce
the greatest amount of pleasure. But the choice of the
activities depends upon the character of the man and not
upon the pleasure which results from gratifying them.
Different men take pleasure in different things ; the good
man in different things from the bad man. But the good
man acts as he does because he must, because his sentiments
are directed to goodness, and he does not do so directly
because of the pleasure which either accrues to him from
the act or is suggested to him by the idea of the act. To
hold that he does so is to confuse an effect with a cause.
Pleasure follows from his act, but his act is of a kind deter-
mined by his character ; pleasure is suggested to him by the
idea of the action, but this pleasure attaches to an action of
a certain kind which is suggested to him by his character.
In every case the character of the man, and consequently
the quality of his actions, is the primary element ; pleasure
arises from the fact that such an action accords with his
character, and it is always experienced in connexion with
the action and has no separate existence apart from the
action or apart from the character to which the action makes
appeal.
The only difficulty which can be raised against this state-
ment arises from the fact that we do learn by experience of
pleasures and pains to modify our conduct, repeating what
produces an excess of pleasure over pain, and avoiding what
THE IDEA OF VALUE. 53
produces an excess of pain over pleasure. But the difficulty
vanishes on considering that pleasure and pain are nothing
hut synonyms for the siie.vssful or unsuccessful, suitable or
unsuitable, exercise of our powers, or at least arise from
these sources. The reason why we avoid what is painful is
not the pain, which is merely the fact that the action is
painful, bat our temperament or character, which seeks
expression in modes which are suitable and therefore cause
pleasure. When we suffer piiin on the whole, that is, when
our pleasure is outweighed by our pain, either somethim
happened whieh is in disaccord with our character, or our
character is itself in the process of change. We have an
instance of the first whenever any bad act is committed.
Tiie pain which the action causes indicates that the action
has on the whole impeded the energies of the society, has
disturhed the equilihrium of society, and this is the reason
why it causes pain. We have an instance of the second
kind when some recognised institution of society begins to
pinch and cause suffering. We avoid the suffering by creat-
ing a fresh institution, and therefore by altering so far the
elements which go to make up the standard of good character
in the society. But the reason why the change takes place
i> the development of these new elements in persons; the
pain which is caused by the old institutions is the revelation
of this new development. Thus the pain which leads to
change of ideals, and the pleasure which leads to persistence
in the old, testify in the one case to the growth of character,
in the other case to its persistence. The point is worth
further consideration, for the belief that pleasure and pain
are the foundation of our moral ideals and therefore of our
standards of value is exactly analogous to the belief that
natural selection in the animal world is the cause of the
growth of new forms of life. As has often been pointed
out. the struggle for survival represents not the cause
of growth but its method. The causes which produce
the origin of new forms are, if we put aside the birth of
variations, the constitution of the contending organisms.
These struggle with each other, the result of the struggle
being determined by the combined action of the combatants'
qualities under the conditions which are supplied by the
environment. The incidents of this struggle are the gratifi-
cations which follow any victory, and the pains which follow-
any defeat. These are the indications that the successful
organism is fit to live. But its fitness consists in the quali-
ties which give it this superiority over other forms. Now
we have seen how the growth of standards of value repeats
54 S. ALEXANDER :
this process. The pains which lead to a new standard mean
that the old standard is being vanquished in the struggle,
but the valuelessness of the old in comparison with the new
depends, as in the case of animal development, on the absence
from the old of those qualities which give the new standard
its utility. Moral ideals conquer, and value, therefore,
arises in virtue of the qualities of the ideal, that is, of the
men who give the ideal its living expression.
Now since it is the constitution of the organism, no
matter whether that organism be the mental organism of
the individual man or the organism of the whole society,
which determines its actions, it is plain that the value of
conduct must depend on the balance between the exercise
of the different parts of its constitution. Undoubtedly the
most healthy exercise produces the greatest possible pleasure,
but that result can only be obtained by the exercise in proper
order and in proper frequency of the various organic factors.
The reason why a factory whose hands are well-paid, well-
fed, and kept in healthy rooms is of greater value than a
factory where hands are overworked, and ill-fed and put to
work in stifling rooms, is not that the output of the first is
greater, but on the contrary the output is greater because
of the excellence of the arrangement. In like manner the
greatest possible pleasure is a measure of value only because
the sum is made up of the pleasures belonging to the
different elements of human nature exercised in proper
proportion and frequenc}^ Given this distribution of the
elements, we have a corresponding distribution of pleasures,
and the sum total of pleasure is a maximum. But this
maximum can serve as a test of value only because of the
real cause of value, the law of distribution.
To investigate more fully the position of pleasure would
require another paper. I have put the matter in the simplest
way w r hich occurred to me as possible without entering into
vexed questions. One such question is the question
whether pleasure can be truly said to be of the same kind
everywhere, and not rather different in kind according to
the different exercise of the human character which it
accompanies. I leave such questions untouched, and found
the case entirely on the secondary position of pleasure.
Pleasure is a vital element of the whole moral life, but it
exists only in combination with other elements. It is a
function of character : character is not a function of pleasure.
Character is the determining cause of our ideals, and on it,
the determining cause, the idea of value is founded.
Not therefore the sum of pleasures is the essential feature
THK IDJ-:A or VALTJ . 55
of morality if \\ I morality from the point of view of
pleasure, hut the particular way in which tins sum is arrived
at by obtaining pleasures fn >in exercising the various elen..
<!' character in a word, what I described above as the
distrihutii.n of pleasures. The distribution of pleasures
corresponds with the distribution of energies in the moral
organism. Now it is this very idea of distribution of
which is covered by the idea of efficiency. In decla;
value to be the efficiency of an act towards furthering
producing the social equilibrium, we are in effect declar
that \alue depends on the distribution of work, the division
of labour required for this equilibrium. A man is valuable
according as he is efficient to promote the work of society,
and on the other hand society, being itself the standard of
value, has the title to be such because it promotes the effi-
ciency of each individual these two results, the equilibrium
of the whole society and the efficiency of each person in it,
being effected at the same moment.
To conclude, I have endeavoured to state and demonstrate
two main principles. The first is that value is nothing but
the efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency
of society, to maintain the equilibrium of forces which that
society represents. This appeared at first directly from
inquiring into what the moral standard was and how it
arose. And it was maintained indirectly in opposition to
the view that value was determined by pleasure. Recog-
nising that pleasure was truly a measure of value, we saw
that it was such only because it itself depended on a true
distribution of portions of pleasure, which distribution was
itself the cause of the prosperity of the moral standard. The
other result at which we arrived was that value is itself
not something separable from other mental facts by a wide
gulf, but was itself a fact of a purely natural order. The
standard of value or ideal we saw to be but the formulation
of desires, and the value of each separate part of the stan-
dard to be in return nothing but a sentiment of approval of
certain actions or certain characters. In this way the idea
of value becomes something which we can describe and dis-
cuss and put into relation with all other facts of organic life,
and the exposition has served to verify that view of the
method of ethics (and with it of aesthetics and the science of
truth) which removes these sciences from the domain of
metaphysics, and classes them as the last or psychical class
of the natural sciences. .
IV. THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL'S
DIALECTIC. (I.)
By J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT.
MY object in this essay will be to show that the method
by which Hegel proceeds from one category to another in
his logic is not the same throughout, but is materially dif-
ferent in the later categories from the form to be found in
the earlier stages. I shall endeavour to show that these
changes can be reduced to a general law, and that from this
law we may derive important consequences with regard to
the general nature and validity of the dialectic.
The exact relations of these corollaries to Hegel's own
views is rather uncertain. Some of them do not appear to
be denied in any part of the logic, and, since they are appa-
rently involved in some of his theories, may be supposed to
have been recognised and accepted by him. On the other
hand, he did not explicitly state and develop them anywhere,
which, in the case of doctrines of such importance, is some
reason for supposing that he did not hold them. Others,
again, are certainly incompatible with his express statements.
I desire, therefore, in considering them to leave on one side
the question of how far they were believed by Hegel, and
merely to give reasons for thinking that they are necessary
consequences of his system, and must be accepted by those
who hold it.
The passage in which Hegel sums up his position on this
point most plainly is to be found in the Smaller Logic,
Section 240, and runs as follows : " The abstract form of
the continuation or advance is, in Being, another (or anti-
thesis) and transition into another ; in the Essence, showing
or reflexion in its opposite ; in the Notion, the distinction
of the individual from the Universality, which continues
itself as such into, and forms an identity with, what is dis-
tinguished from it ".
The difference between the procedure of Being and that
of Essence is given in more detail in Section 3, lecture note.
" In the Sphere of Essence one category does not pass into
another, but refers to another merely. In Being the form
of reference or connexion is purely a matter of our own
reflexion : but it is the special and proper characteristic of
TJII-; CHANC.MS OF MKTHOI) IN BBGBXi'S !>IAI.I.< 1H . 57
iice. Iii the Sphere of Being, when somewhat becomes
another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence:
h< -re there is no real other, but only diversity, the reference
of one category to its antithesis. The transition of Essence
is therefore at the same time no transition ; for in the pas-
of different into different, the different does not vanish :
different terms remain in their connexion. When we
speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so is
Nought. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the
Negative. No doubt these possess the characteristics of
IVin^ and Nought. But the positive by itself has no sei
its whole lu-ing is in reference to the negative. It is the
same with the negative. In the Sphere of Being the refer-
ence of one term to the other is only implicit ; in Essence,
on the contrary, it is explicitly stated. And this in general
is the distinction between the forms of Being and Essence :
in Being everything is immediate, in Essence every thin
relative."
And ;iL, r ain, in describing the transition from Essence to
the Notion, he says (Enc. Section 161, lecture note) : " Tran-
sition into sometliing else is the dialectical process within
the nuige of Being ; reflexion (bringing something else into
light) in the range of Essence. The movement of the Notion
is development ; by which that only is explicitly affirmed
which is already naturally and properly speaking present.
In the world of nature, it is organic life that corresponds to
the grade of the notion. Thus, e.g., the plant is developed
from its seed. The seed virtually involves the whole plant,
but does so only ideally or in thought ; and it would there-
fore be a mistake to regard the development of the root,
stem, leaves, and other different parts of the plant as mean-
in u r that they were realiter present, but in a minute form, in
the germ. That is the so-called ' box-within-box ' hypothe-
sis ; a theory which commits the mistake of supposing an
actual existence of what is at first found only in the shape of
an ideal. The truth of the hypothesis on the other hand
lies in its perceiving that, in the process of development, the
Notion keeps to itself, and only gives rise to alteration of
form without making any addition in point of content. It
is this nature of the Notion this manifestation of itself in
its process as a development of its own self which is the
point noted by those who speak of innate ideas in men, or
who, like Plato, describe knowledge merely as reminiscence.
Of course that again does not mean that everything which is
embodied in a mind, after that mind has been formed by
instruction, had been present to it beforehand in a definitely
expanded shape.
58 J. E. MCTAGGART :
" The movement of the Notion is after all a sort of illusion.
The antithesis which it lays down is no real antithesis. Or,
as it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity, not merely
has God created a world which forms a kind of antithesis to
Him ; He has also from all Eternity begotten a Son, in whom
He, a spirit, is at home with Himself."
2. The result of this process may be summed up as follows :
The further the dialectic goes from its starting-point the less
prominent becomes the apparent stability of the individual
finite categories, and the less do they seem to be self-centred
and independent. On the other hand, the process itself be-
comes more evident and obvious, and is seen to be the only
real meaning of the lower categories. In Being each cate-
gory appears, taken by itself, to be permanent and exclusive
of all others, and to have no principle of transition in it. It
is only outside reflexion which examines and breaks down
this pretence of stability, and shows us that the dialectic
process is inevitable. In Essence, however, each category
by its own import refers to that which follows it, and the
transition is seen to be inherent in its nature. But it is
still felt to be, as it were, only an external effect of that
nature. The categories have still an inner nature, as com-
pared with the outer relations which they have with other
categories. So far as they have this inner nature, they are
still conceived as independent and self-centred. But with
the passage into the Notion things alter; that passage "is
the very hardest, because it proposes that independent
actuality shall be thought as having all its substantiality in
the passage, and in the identity with the independent
actuality confronting it ". (Enc. Section 159.) Not only is the
transition now necessary to the categories, but the transition
is the categories. The reality in any finite category consists
only in its summing up those which went before, and in
leading on to those which come after.
Correlative with this change, and connected with it, is
another. In the categories of Being the typical form is a
transition from a thesis to an antithesis which is merely
complementary to it, and is in no way superior to it in value
or comprehensiveness. Only when these two extremes are
taken together is there for the first time any advance to a
higher Notion. This advance is a transition to a synthesis
which comes as a consequence of the thesis and antithesis
jointly. It would be impossible to obtain the synthesis, or
to make any advance, from either of the two complementary
terms without the other. Neither is in any respect more
advanced than the other, and neither of them can be said to
1 !1K CIIANCJKS OF M IN BBGBIi'fi !>IAl.i:< TIC,
IK- UK >re closely connected with the term in which hnth of
them alike find their e\}>l;m;it inn and reconciliation. I'.ut
when we cmne to Essence the matter is changed. Here the
transition Irmn thesis fcp antithesis is still indeed from p
live to negative, hut it is more than merely tins. The anti-
thesis i- not merely complementary to the thesis, but is a
C MI < ctinn of it. It is consequently more concrete and true
i han the thesis and represents a real advance. And the
transition to the synthesis is imt made so much from tjjL*-'
comparison of the two previous terms, as t'mm the antithesis
alone. For the ant it hesis has not merely the contrary d
to the thesis, hut it has to some extent corrected the mistake,
and therefore has to use the Hegelian phraseology "the
truth " of the thesis more or less within itself. As the action
of the synthesis is to reconcile the thesis and the antith.
it can only be deduced from the comparison of the two. Hut
it the antithesis has as it has in Essence the thesis as part
o! its own significance, it will present the whole of the data
which the synthesis requires, arid it will not be necessary
to recur to the thesis, before the step to the synthesis is
taken.
But although the reconciliation can be inferred from one
term of the pair without the other, a reconciliation is still
necessary. For, although the antithesis is an advance upon
the thesis, it is also opposed to it. It is not simply a com-
pletion of it, but also a denial, though a denial which is
already an approximation to a union. This element of
opposition and negation tends to disappear in the categories
of the Notion. Here the steps are indeed discriminated
from one another, but they can scarcely be said to be in
opposition. For we have now arrived at a consciousness
more or less explicit that in each category all that have gone
before are summed up, and all that are to come after are
contained implicitly. " The movement of the Notion is
after all a kind of 'illusion. The antithesis which it lays
down is no real antithesis." And, as a consequence, the
synthesis merely completes the antithesis, without correct-
ing one-sidedness in it, in the same way as the antithesis
merely expands and completes the thesis. As this type is
realised, in fact, the distinctions of the three terms gradu-
ally lose their meaning. There is no longer an opposition
produced between two terms and mediated by a third.
Kach term is a direct advance on the one before it. The
object of the process is not now to make the one-sided com-
plete, but the implicit explicit. For we have reached a
stage when each side carries in it already more or less con-
60 J. E. MCTAGGART :
sciousness of that unity of the whole which is the synthesis,
and requires development rather than refutation.
That these changes should accompany the one previously
mentioned is natural. For, as it is gradually seen that each
category, of its own nature, and not by mere outside reflexion
on it, leads on to the next, that next will have inherent in
it its relation to the first. It will not only be the nega-
tion of the first, but it will know itself to be such. It will
not only be the complement of the thesis, but it will be
aware that it is a complement, and will know what it is that
it completes. In so far as it does this, it will be higher than
the thesis. For, although each category will see that it is
essential to it that it should be connected with the other,
this can do nothing in the thesis but give a general character
of transitoriness to it, for it only knows that it is connected
with something, but does not yet know with what. But the
antithesis knows with what it is connected, for we have
already passed through the thesis before we can reach it,
and it is through the thesis that we have come to it. And
to know that it is inseparably connected with its opposite,
and defined by its relation to it, is an important step towards
the reconciliation of the opposition. A fortiori the greater
clearness and ease of the transition will have this effect in
the case of the Notion. For there we see that the whole
meaning of the category lies in its passage to another. The
second, therefore, has the whole meaning of the first in it,
as well as the addition that has been made, and must there-
fore be higher than the first.
From this follows the different relation to the synthesis.
For the result of the more or less complete inclusion of the
thesis in the meaning of the antithesis is, as we have seen,
the possibility of finding all the data required for the synthe-
sis in the antithesis alone, while the completely successful
absorption of each term in its successor tends to obliterate
the triple distinction altogether, in which case each term
would be a simple advance on the one below it, and would
be deduced from that one only.
While Hegel expressly notices, as we have seen, the in-
creasing freedom and directness of the dialectic movement,
he makes no mention of the different relation to one another
assumed by the various members of the process, which I
have just indicated. Traces of the change may, however, be
observed in the detail of the dialectic. The three most sig-
nificant triads to examine for this purpose will be the first
in the division of Being, the middle one in the division of
Essence, and the last one in the division of the Notion.
Till-: < HANC;I:S OF MiiTHOD IN HBGBI/fl DIALBOTIC. 61
For, if there is any change within each of these three great
divisions (a point we must presently consider) the special
characteristics of each division will be shown most clearly
at that point in which it is at the greatest distance from
each of the other divisions. The triads in question are those
of r>ein<j, Not-h nd Becoming: <>!' the World of Ap-
pearance, Content and Form, and Katio ; and of Life, Cog-
nition, and the Absolute Idea.
Now, in the first of these, thesis and antithesis are on
an absolute level. Not-Bein^ is no higher than Bein^ :
it does not contain IVin^ in any sense in which Being
does not contain it, it is as easy to pass from Not-
Being to Being as vice versa. And Not-Heing by itself is
helpless to produce Becoming as helpless as Being is. The
hesis can only come from the conjunction of both of
tin in. On the other hand, the idea of Content and Form.
according to Hegel, is a distinct advance on the idea of tin
World of Appearance, since in it "the connexion of the
phenomenon with self is completely stated ". Ratio, a^aii;,
although the synthesis of the two previous terms, is deduced
from the second of them alone, while it could not be deduced
fiom the first. It is the relation of form and content to one
another which leads us on to the other relation which is
called Ratio. (Enc. Section 134.) And, again, the idea of
lit ion is a distinct advance upon the idea of Life, since
the defect in the latter from which Hegel explains the exig-
ence of death is overcome as we pass to cognition. And it
is trorn Cognition alone, without any reference back to Life,
that we reach to the Absolute Idea, which is derived from
the consideration of the perfect form of Cognition proper
and of the perfect form of Volition which latter also foi
part of the antithesis, under the general name of Cognit:
3. Another point arises, on which we shall find but little
guidance in Hegel's own writings. To each of the three
great divisions of the dialectic he has ascribed a peculiar
variation of the method. Are we to understand that one
variety changes into another suddenly at the transition from
division to division, or is the change continuous, so that,
while the typical forms of each division are strongly charac-
terised, the difference between the last step in one and the
step in the next is no greater than the difference be-
tween two consecutive steps in the same division? Shall
we find the best analogy in the distinction between water
and steam. a qualitative difference suddenly brought about
when a quantitative change has reached a certain point
in the distinction between youth and manhood, which
62 J. E. MCTAGGART I
their most characteristic points are clearly distinct, but
which pass into one another imperceptibly ?
On this point Hegel says nothing. Possibly it had never
presented itself to his mind. But it seems to me that traces
may be observed throughout his logic which may lead us to
believe that the change of method is gradual and continuous.
In the first place, we may notice that the absolutely
pure type of the process in Being occurs in the first triad
only. Being and Not-Being are on a level. But if we com-
pare Being an sick with Being for another, the One with the
Many, mere Quantity with Quantum, the Infinite Quantita-
tive Progression with the Quantitative Relation, and the Eule
with the Measureless, we observe that the second category
is higher than the first in each pair, and that it is not merely
the complement of the first, but to a certain degree trans-
cends it. And the inherent relation of thesis to antithesis
seems to develop more as we pass on, so that before Essence
is reached its characteristics are already to some measure
visible, and the mere passivity and finitude of Being itself
is broken down.
If, again, we compare the first and last stages of Essence,
we shall find that the first approximates to the type of
Being, while the last comes fairly close to that of the Notion,
by substituting the idea of development for that of the
reconciliation of contradictions. Difference, as treated by
Hegel, is certainly an advance on Identity, and not a mere
opposite, but there is still a good deal of opposition between
the terms. The advance is shown by the fact that Difference
contains Likeness and Unlikeness within itself (Enc. Section
117), while the opposition of the two categories is clear, not
only in common usage, but from the fact that the synthesis
has to reconcile them, and balance their various deficiencies.
But when we reach Substance and Causality we find that
the notion of contradiction has almost vanished, and that
the notion of development has taken its place nearly as com-
pletely as could happen if we were already in the sphere of
the Notion.
So, finally, the special features of the dialectic in the
Notion are not fully exhibited till we come to its last stage.
In the transition from the Notion as Notion to the Judgment,
and from the Judgment to the Syllogism, we have not en-
tirely rid ourselves of the elements of opposition and nega-
tion. It is not till we reach the concluding triad of the
Logic that we are able fully to see the typical progress of
the Notion. In the transition from Life to Cognition, and
from Cognition to the Absolute Idea, we perceive that the
Tin; CHANGES OF MF.THOD IN HK<;KL'S DIALECTIC,
movement is all but completely direct, that the whole is
in each part, and that there is no longer a contest,
but only a development
1. Much weight, however, cannot be placed on all t
partly because of the extreme difficulty of comparing, <)i.
titatively and exactly, shades of difference so slight and subtle,
and partly because Hegel nowhere explicitly m ntions any
continuous process, and there is therefore some ground tm
supposing that the continuity, if it existed, had escaped hU
notice. But the fact that some traces of such a coniin
development are found in his logic may be some additional
support, it we are able to conclude that such a development
would, in ;i correct dialectic, be continuous.
Before we consider this question we must first i IK pin.
whether the existence of such a development of method of
any sort, whether continuous or not, might be expected from
the nature of the case. We shall see that there are reasons
for supposing this to be so, when we remember what we
must regard as the essence of the dialectic. The motive
power of the whole process is the concrete absolute truth,
from which all finite categories are mere abstractions, and
to which they spontaneously tend to return. Again,
two contradictory ideas cannot be held true at the same
time. If it ever seems inevitable that they should be, this
is a sign of error somewhere, and we cannot feel satisfied
with the result, until we have transcended and synthesised
the contradiction. It follows that in so far as the finite
categories announce themselves as permanent, and as opposed
in pairs of unsynthesised contradictories, they are expressing
falsehood and not truth. We gain the truth by transcending
the contradictions of the categories and by demonstrating
their instability. Now the change in the method, of which
we are speaking, indicates a clearer perception of the truth.
For we have seen that it becomes more spontaneous, and
more direct. As it becomes more spontaneous, as each
category is seen to lead on of its own nature to the next,
and to have its meaning only in the transition, it brings out
more fully what lies at the root of the whole dialectic
that truth, namely, lies only in the synthesis. And as the
process becomes more direct and leaves the opposition and
negation behind, it also brings out more clearly what i>
an essential fact in every stage of the dialectic, that is,
that the impulse of our imperfect truth is not towards self-
denial as such, but towards self-completion. The essential
nature of the whole dialectic is thus more clearly seen in the
later stages, which approximate to the type of the Notion,
64 J. E. MCTAGGAliT :
than in the earlier stages, which approximate to the type of
Being.
This is what we might expect a priori. For the content
of each stage in the dialectic is nearer to the truth than that
of the stage before it. And each stage forms the starting-
point and the premise from which we go forward again to
further truth. And, therefore, as at each step in the forward
process we have a fuller knowledge of the truth than at the
last, it is only natural that that fuller knowledge should react
upon the manner in which the step is made. The dialectic
is due to the relation between the concrete whole, implicit
in consciousness, and the abstract part, explicit in conscious-
ness. Since the second element alters at each step, as the
categories approximate to the complete truth, it is clear that
the relation between it and the unchanging whole alters also,
and this must affect the process. Just as the velocity of a
falling body increases, because (among other reasons) each
moment brings it nearer the attracting body, and increases
the power of the attraction, so every step which we take to-
wards the full truth renders it possible to proceed more
easily and more directly to the next step.
Even without considering the special circumstance that
eacli step in the process will give us this deeper insight into
the meaning of the work we are carrying on, we might find
other reasons for supposing that the nature of the dialectic
process is modified by use. For the conception of an agent
which is purely active, acting on a material which is purely
passive, is a mere abstraction, and finds a place nowhere in
reality. Even in dealing with physical examples we find
this. An axe has not the same effect at its second blow as
at its first, for it is more or less blunted. A violin has not
the same tone the second time it is played on as the first.
And a conception which is inadequate even to the relations
of matter must be still more unfit for application to mind
when engaged on its most characteristic task. Here least of
all could a rigid distinction be kept up between form and
matter, between instrument and materials.
And these arguments for the existence of change in the
method are also arguments for supposing that the change
will be continuous. There is reason to expect a change in
the method whenever we have advanced a step towards
truth. But we advance towards truth, not only when we
pass from one chief division of the logic to another, but
whenever we pass from category to category, however
minute a subdivision of the process they may represent.
It would therefore seem that a change in method is to be
THK CHANGKs OF MI.THol* IN HBGBIi'fi DIA1
expected after each category, and that no two transitions
throughout the dialectic present <|uii- i he same type. How-
ever continuous the change of omcluM<>ns can be made, the
change of result must he equally continuous.
I'., sides this, we may observe that the change <>f method
iimected with the change from one to the other of the
three great divisions of the dialectic, which respectively form
the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of an all-comprehensive
triad. It is thus ih- change from thesis to ant:: :rom
antithesis to synthesis, .r from synthesis to afresh thesis,
which is accompanied by a change of method. But the dia-
lectic within each of the three stages, Being, Essence, and the
Notion, is not looked upon as a continuous flow of thought,
but is broken up again into subordinate triads, and these are
again broken up into others which are still lower. Wherever
the observation of thought and its consequent division are
carried closer than before, we find that it takes place only
by the discovery within each member of a triad of a fresh
subordinate triad, and this only ceases when we have reached
the furthest point of minuteness to which we are able or
willing to carry our scrutiny. Consequently the change in
method which is caused by a transition from member to
member of the dialectic must occur, not twice only in the
whole system, but wherever any step in thought is made,
however minute that step may be. Whether it is or is not
correct to ascribe the change in method to the increasing
truth and adequacy of each category, it cannot be doubted
that in some way or other they are concomitant, and as the
one has many gradations in each of the three largest divi-
sions, we have an additional reason for supposing that such
gradations may also be found in the other.
5. We may, therefore, I think, fairly arrive at the conclu-
sion, in the first place, that the dialectic process does and
must undergo a progressive change, and, in the second place,
that that change is as much continuous as the process of the
dialectic itself. Another question now arises : Has this
change in the method destroyed its validity? The ordinary
proofs relate only to characteristic of Being, which, as we
have now found reason to believe, is only found in its purity
in the very first triad of all. Does the gradual change to
the types characteristic of Essence and the Notion make
any difference in the justification of the method as a whole ?
It would seem that it does not do so, because the force
of the process is the same throughout. It consisted, in the
first division of the Logic, of a search for completeness, and
of a search for harmony between the elements of that com-
66 J. E. MCTAGGART :
pleteness, and these two stages are separate. Later on we
have the same search for completeness and harmony, but
they are combined in a single operation. In Being, the
inadequacy of the thesis led on to the antithesis. Each of
these ideas was regarded as an immediate and self-centred
whole. On the other hand each of them implied the other,
since they were complementary and opposite sides of the
truth. This brought about a contradiction, which had to be
reconciled by the introduction of the synthesis. Now the
change in the process has the effect of discarding the inter-
mediate stage in which the two sides of the whole are viewed
as incompatible and yet inseparably connected. For in the
stage of Essence each category has a reference in its own
nature to those which come before and after it. So far as
the thesis refers to the antithesis which has not yet been
reached, this is a reference to the as yet unknown, and does
not much extend the positive content of the idea. But with
the antithesis, in its reference to the thesis, which is already
known, the thing is different. We have here a sort of
anticipation of the synthesis, in the recognition that the two
sides are connected by their own nature, and not merely by
external reasoning. The result of this is that the harmony
is, to a certain extent, given by the same step which gives
us the completeness, and ceases to require a separate process.
For when we have seen that the categories are essentially
connected, we have gone a good way towards the perception
that they are not incompatible. The harmony thus attained
in the antithesis is, however, merely partial, and leaves a
good deal for the synthesis to do. In the Notion, the change
is carried farther. Here we have the perception that the
whole meaning of the category resides in the transition, and
the whole thesis is really summed up in the antithesis, for
the meaning of the thesis is thus only the production of the
antithesis, and it is therefore summed up and transcended
in the latter. In fact the relation of thesis, antithesis and
synthesis would actually disappear in the typical form of the
process as exhibited in the Notion, for each term would be
the completion of that which was immediately before it,
since all the reality of the latter would be seen to be in its
transition to its successor. That this never actually happens,
even in the final triad of the whole system, is due to the
fact that the characteristic type of the Notion, as the last
stage of the dialectic, represents the process as it would be
when it started from a perfectly adequate premise. When
however the premise, the explicit idea in the mind, became
perfectly adequate and true, we should have rendered ex-
TIM-: riiAXr.Ks OF METHOD IN HBGEL 8 DIALECTIC. I'M
plicit the whole concrete idea, and the object of the dialectic
process would be attained, so that it could go no further.
The typical process of the Notion is therefore an ideal, to
which the process approximates more and more closely
throughout its course, but whieh it can only reach at the
moment when it stops completed.
Thus it will be seen that the change may be expressed as
the gradual disappearance of the explicit synthesis from
without of two complementary truths which apart from that
synthesis would be contradictory. This disappearance i-
due to the fact that the terms are gradually seen with
greater and greater clearness, only to exist, first if related
to one another, and then as related to one another, and
consequently to carry their synthesis and harmony in them-
selves. No element in the original process is left out, and
no fresh one introduced, but the two operations which had
at first to be performed independently, and almost, as it
were, in opposition to one another, the second destroying
the contradictions which it seemed the chief result of the
first to produce, are now seen to be inherently connected.
If, therefore, any proof which may be given of the validity
of the dialectic method in its earlier stages be correct, we
are entitled to say that for the same reasons it is valid
through all its changing forms.
6. From this change in the method some very important
inferences may be drawn. The first of these is one which
we may fairly attribute to Hegel himself, because, although
he does not explicitly mention it anywhere, yet it is clear
from the deduction of the categories as given by him. This
is the subordinate place held by negation in the whole pro-
cess. Independently of this change we could observe that
the importance of negation in the dialectic is by no means
primary. In the first place, Hegel's logic is very far from
resting, as is supposed by some people, on the violation
of the law of contradiction. It rather rests on the im-
possibility of violating that law, on the necessity of
finding, for every contradiction, a reconciliation in which it
vanishes. And not only is the idea of negation destined
always to vanish in the synthesis, but even its temporary
introduction is an accident, though an inevitable accident.
The motive force of the process lies in the discrepancy
between the concrete and perfect idea implicitly in our own
minds, and the abstract and imperfect idea explicitly in our
minds, and the essential characteristic of the process is in
the search of this abstract and imperfect, not after its nega-
tion as such, but after its complement as such. It happens
68 J. E. MCTAGGART :
that its complement was also its contrary, because it hap-
pens that a concrete whole is always analysable into
two direct contraries, and therefore the process always does
go from an idea to its contrary. But it does not go to it
because it seeks denial, but because it seeks completion.
But this can now be carried still further. Not only is the
presence of negation in the dialectic a mere accident, though
a necessary one, of the gradual completion of the idea. We
are now led to consider it as an accident which is necessary
indeed in the lower stages of the dialectic, but which is
gradually eliminated in proportion as we proceed further,
and in proportion as the materials from which we start are
of a concrete and adequate character. For in so far as the
process ceases to be from one extreme to another extreme
equally one-sided, both of which regard themselves as per-
manent and as standing in a relation of opposition towards
one another, and in so far as it becomes a process from one
term to another which is recognised as in some degree
mediated by the first, and as transcending it, in so far the
negation of each category by the other disappears. For
it is then recognised that in the second category there is no
contradiction to the first, because, inasmuch as the change
has been completed, the first is found to have its meaning
in the transition to the second.
The presence of negation, therefore, is not only a mere
accident of the dialectic, but not even an invariable accident.
Its presence, when it does occur, is indeed necessary, but it
vanishes as the process goes further, and the subject-matter
is more fully understood. It has, therefore, no inherent
connexion with the dialectic at all, since its introduction is
due to our misapprehension, in the lower categories, of the
true nature of the movement.
7. Here, however, we come upon a fresh question, and
one of very great importance. We have seen that in the
dialectic the relation of the various finite ideas to one
another in different parts of the process is not the same
the three ideas of Being, Not-Being, and Becoming
standing in different relations among themselves to those
which connect Life, Cognition, and the Absolute Idea.
Now the dialectic process professes to do more than merelj
to describe the stages by which we mount to the Absolute
Idea it also describes the nature of that idea itself. In
addition to the information which we gain about the latter
by the definition given of it at the end of the dialectic, we
also know that it contains in itself as elements or aspects
all the finite stages of thought, through which the dialectic
THE CHANGKS OP Mi: I HOD IN HKOKI/S DIALECTIC. 69
has passed before reaching its goal. It is not something
which the dialectic reaches, and which thru exists inde-
pendently of the manner in which it was at tained. It does
not kick down the ladder hy which we mount fco it. It
I HOIK unices the various finite categories to be partly false
and partly true, and it sums up in itself tin- truth of all of
th.!u. They are thus contained in it as moments. What
relation do these moments bear to one another in the
Absolute Idea?
\Ve may, in the first place, adopt the easy and simple
solution of saying that the relation they bear to one
another as moments in the Absolute Idea is just the same
as that which they bear to one another as finite catego
in the dialectic process. In this case to discover their
position in the Absolute Idea it is only necessary to con-
sider the dialectic process, not as one which takes place in
time, but as having a merely logical import. The process
contemplated in this way will be a perfect and complete
Analysis of the concrete idea which is its end, containing
ahoiit it the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. And this, apparently, would have been Hegel's
answer, if the question had been explicitly presented to
him, which does not appear to be the case. For he asserts,
clearly and undoubtedly, that the dialectic expresses the
deepest nature of objective thought.
But this conclusion seems open to doubt. For the
change of method results, as we have seen, from a gradually
growing perception of the truth which is at the bottom of
the whole dialectic, the unreality of any finite category
against its synthesis, since the truth and reality of each cate-
v consists only in its reference to the next, and in its
passage onwards to it. If this was not true all through
the dialectic, there could be no dialectic at all, for the
justification of the whole process is that the truth of t IK-
MS and the antithesis is contained in the synthesis, and
that in so far as they are anything else but aspects of the
synthesis they are false and deceptive. This, then, is and
must be the true nature of the process of thought forw:
and must constitute the real meaning and essence of the
dialectic. Yet this is only explicitly perceived in the
Notion, and at the end of the Notion or rather, as 1 said
ahove, is never completely perceived, but is only an ideal to
which we approximate as our grasp of the subject incm
ref.>re this the categories appear always as in their own
nature permanent and self-centred, and the breaking down
of this self-assertion, and the substitution for it of the
70 j. E. MCTAGGABT:
perception that truth is only found in the synthesis, appears
as opposed to what went before, and as in contradiction to
it, although a necessary and inevitable consequence of it.
But if this was really so the dialectic process would be
impossible. If there really was any independent element
in the lower categories, or any externality in the reconcilia-
tion, that reconciliation could never be complete and the
dialectic could never claim, as it does undoubtedly claim, to
sum up all the lower elements of truth.
The very existence of the dialectic thus tends to prove
that it is not in every sense objectively correct. For it
would be impossible for any transition to be made, at any
point in the process, unless the terms were really related
according to the type belonging to the Notion. But no
transition in the dialectic does take place exactly according
to that type, and most of them according to types sub-
stantially different. We must therefore suppose that the
dialectic does not exactly represent the truth, since if the
truth was as it represents it to be, the dialectic itself could
not exist. There must be in the process, besides that
element which actually does express the real notion of the
transition, another element which is due to our own sub-
jective mistake about the character of the reality which we
are trying to describe.
This agrees with what was said above that the change
of method is no real change, but only a rearrangement of
the elements of the transition. It is, in fact, only a bring-
ing out explicitly of what is implicitly involved all along.
In the lower categories our data, with their false appearance
of independence, obscure and confuse the true meaning of
the dialectic. We can see that the dialectic has this true
meaning, even among these lower categories, by reflecting
on what is implied in its existing and succeeding at all.
But it is only in the later categories that it becomes ex-
plicit. And it must follow that those categories in which
it is not yet explicit do not fully represent the true nature
of thought, and the essential character of the transition from
less perfect to more perfect forms.
The conclusion at which we are thus compelled to arrive
must be admitted, I think, to be quite un-Hegelian. Hegel
would certainly have admitted that the lower categories,
regarded in themselves, gave views of reality only approxi-
mating, and, in the case of the lowest, only very slightly
approximating, to truth. But the procession of the cate-
gories, with its advance through oppositions and reconcilia-
tions, he apparently regarded as presenting absolute truth
THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEI/S DIALECTIC. 71
as fully expressing the deepest nature of pure them
From this, if T ;un ri^ht, we are forced, on his own premises,
to dissent. For the true process of thought is one in which
each category springs out of the one before it, and not by
c>ntr:i<lii -tin^ it, hut a^ the expression of its deepest nature,
while it, in its turn, is seen to have its deepest reality in
again passing on to the one after it. There is no contradic-
tion, no opposition, and consequently no reconciliation.
There is only development, the rend, ring explicit what was
implicit, the growth of the seed to the plant. In the actual
course of the dialectic this is never attained. It is an ideal
which is never quite realised, and from the nature of the
case never can be quite realised. In the dialectic there is
always opposition, and therefore always reconciliation. We
do not go straight onward, but more or less from side to
side. It seems inevitable, therefore, to conclude that the
dialectic does not completely and perfectly express the
nature of thought. I shall next endeavour to consider the
further consequences of this admission.
V. THE LAW OF PSYCHOGENESIS.
By Professor C. LLOYD MORGAN.
Is there a law of psychogenesis ? Is there a common prin-
ciple which sweeps through the whole range of mental
evolution, alike in the individual and in the race ? A principle
sufficiently general to cover the whole field of consciousness,
and yet not so vague as to be meaningless ? I believe that
there is such a principle ; one which applies alike to the
simpler inferences of perceptual experience, and to the more
complex judgments in matters intellectual, aesthetic, moral.
I shall here endeavour to indicate its nature. But it will be
necessary first to clear the ground at some length.
The Role of Consciousness. Without attempting to enter
upon such vexed questions as, What is consciousness ? and,
What is its relation to man as an organism? I think we may
say without much fear of contradiction that the business (or,
shall we say, part of the business ?) of consciousness is the
control of action. If it be not so, if consciousness has no
such guiding and controlling power (however exercised), then
is it but a by-product; very beautiful and precious, no doubt, but
none the less a by-product, an epi-phenomenon, a mere in-
cident and not a factor in the development of organic life.
Then is all organic response and conduct brought down to
the level of reflex-action. Consciousness is like a little child
on a great ocean steamer coming into port. He sits in the
bows, and whispering his orders to the figurehead, thinks he
is controlling the movements of the great vessel, while all
the time he is a mere passenger witnessing the handling of
the steamer and only fancying he has controlling power.
Such a view seems to me false, if not ridiculous. Conscious-
ness is no mere passenger in the organic ship, but holds the
helm.
There is a tendency among certain nerve-physiologists to
regard all organic response as of the nature of reflex-action,
the differences being only differences of complexity. I
strongly suspect, however, that this procedure ought to be
reversed, and that we ought more clearly to distinguish be-
tween the involuntary reflex-act, properly so called, and a
response under voluntary and conscious control. I will
reduce to its simplest expression, and represent diagramma-
tically what seems to me the essential difference between the
)!' I'SY( I !()<;!:. \HSIS. 73
merely organic reflex and the organic and conscious respo
The reflex-act is initiated by u stimulus which pusses through
one or more nerve-centres a and /;, ;uid gives rise to the
appropriate response
Stimvdws <*< I response,
FIG. I
If consciousness there be in this case it may be regarded as
u inert: by-product, since it does not influence the re.Milting
action. This is the reflex-act. Now let us introduce con-
sciousness as guiding und controlling
FIG. 2
Here consciousness is developed in the loop-line at c, and
according to the nature of the controlling consciousness the
response which flows out from b is either reinforced or in-
hibited through the channel c b. 1 As the consciousness
in c becomes fuller and more complex by the calling into
being of an increasing body of representative states of con-
sciousness, it comes to symbolise in mental terms the occur-
rences both on the side of stimulus and on the side of
response. Thus within the organism which responds in
voluntary activity to stimuli there develops an organ c
which is the material expression of that conscious symbolism
under which the activities of the organism are controlled.
When I say then that the role of consciousness is the con-
trol and guidance of action, I do not mean consciousness as
dissociated from the living organisation, but consciousness
as associated with, and forming the mental aspect of, certain
1 This is not the place to attempt a justification of this view. It is
sufficient to indicate that in man the cerebral hemispheres of the brain
si-mi, in the main at all events, to constitute the organ of control c.
The connexion a c is formed by such tracts as the " optic radiation,"
from the "pulvinar" to the cerebral cortex. The connexion c /> is
largely represented by the " pyramidal tract ". The " motor centres "
mapped out with such success of late years are the centres of conscious
and voluntary control (or, in short, control-centres) within the brain, or
the channels (funnels) through which such control is brought to bear on
lower centres b through the pyramidal tract.
74 C. L. MORGAN :
transformations of energy in the brain or other organ of
control.
The Mechanism of Control. Physiologically control is
effected by augmentation or inhibition brought to bear
through the channel c b and resulting from certain molecular
transactions in c. Psychologically we know these transac-
tions from the aspect of consciousness. From the psycholo-
gical point of view, therefore, we may say, that the impulse
to a given response is checked by the bringing to bear of
other and opposing impulses or motives, or is furthered by
the co-operation of other and reinforcing impulses or motives.
Accompanying the conflict of opposing impulses or motives
there is a more or less painful sense of hesitation, dilemma,
uncertainty, indecision. And accompanying the ultimate
predominance of one impulse or set of impulses there is a
sense of relief, of choice, of decision. Often too there is
a sense of effort. We say that we broke the spell of inde-
cision by an effort of will.
According to this view of the matter the stronger impulses
at length prevail ; in other words, the action takes the line
of least resistance. But this may seem contrary to experi-
ence. As Prof. James has said: " If a brief definition
of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given
which would better fit the appearances than this: It is
action in the line of greatest resistance ". How comes it to
appear to be action in the line of greatest resistance ? Be-
cause of the sense of effort which is associated with the final
decision. Now this sense of effort most markedly ac-
companies the newest and most difficult activities ; it is
distinctively associated with the higher control-centres.
Whatever be the psychology of effort, its association with
the higher control is a fact of common experience. Suppose
that we are drawn towards some natural but immoral action
by our lower instinctive impulses ; but that we resist
the action by a resolute act of will, in obedience to the
prompting of a moral ideal. It is the latter and not the
former, the ideal motive, not the natural propensity, that is
a matter of our control centres. We identify ourselves
rather with the action of our control centres than with our
lower animal instincts, and say that we prevail over the in-
stinctive propensity. This association of the idea of self
with the higher and most individual control-centres, as com-
pared with the lower instinctive propensities, is the basis of
a rational doctrine of free-will. These higher impulses of
the individual control-centres we regard as essentially our
own, we regard as voluntary ; and we associate with them
Till-: LAW <>F 1'SVCIKx, , .')
the motor feelings of effort which accompany the newest,
most difficult, most individual activities. A rational doctrine
of free-will (which may be held by the most rigid determinist)
asserts that the acts we call voluntary are essentially our
own, the outcome of the play of our own control-centres;
and that, being ours, we are responsible for them.
Mental Uymhulism. I said that within the organism which
responds in voluntary activity to the stimuli of the external
world there develops an organ, in us the brain, which is the
material expression of that conscious symbolism under which
the activities of the organism are controlled. What do I
mean by this conscious or mental symbolism '.'
As I write I see before me a table with paper, inkstand,
books : through the window I see trees, houses, living
beings : further off, a rising down, and beyond, a fine back-
ground of English cloud. I feel the peri in my fingers and
the table on which my hand rests. The air is scented with
tobacco smoke. All this is part of the mental symbolism.
The play of impressions on my sensitive organisation evokes
in my brain a series of neural tremors which have for their
mental aspect all that which I have briefly indicated. Thus
in consciousness is symbolically represented that which lies
outside consciousness.
Here it may be asked whether the symbolic representation
can be said to resemble the outside existences which call it
into being. I suggest the question merely to disregard it.
For the answer is wholly immaterial to my present purpose.
Each individual may answer it for himself in accordance with
his philosophy or his common-sense. All that I wish to
insist upon is that the external occurrences must be trans-
lated into consciousness ere they can become part of the
symbolic series.
It is through perception that I become acquainted with
the table, inkstand, books, and so forth ; and the objects as
presented to consciousness are percepts. We often hear it
said that, in the course of evolution, the percepts of living
animals and of men have been moulded to the objects of the
world in which we live, and this is sometimes more tersely
expressed in the dictum that thoughts have been moulded in
accordance with things. But both expressions are apt to be
misleading. Percept does not answer to object in the sense
that the symbol answers to the thing symbolised. For per-
cept and object are alike parts of the mental symbolism.
The percept is one aspect of the several possible aspects
which the external occasion of perception presents in mental
symbolism ; while the term " object " is applied to the sum
76 C. L. MORGAN :
of the perceptual aspects. Even when there is tacit refer-
ence to the external occasion, when we say, for example,
that the same object may give rise to different percepts, or
may be perceived in different ways, we use the word
" object " in shorthand for the phrase " external occasion
symbolised as object ". Even if the object, as part of the
mental symbolism, resembles point for point the occasion of
perception, or what calls forth the mental symbolism (and
whether this is so or not, is, as I need not remind those who
read this journal, a very old bone of philosophical conten-
tion), it matters not. It is with the object as part of the
mental symbolism that we are dealing in all cases of human
perception and observation.
This point is vital to my argument. Suppose that on the
surface of a mirror there is faithfully reflected a landscape.
In that reflexion we may trace the relations in which the
images stand to one another. We may also compare the
images with the things imaged. But the relationship of the
images, inter se, is one thing. The fact that the images re-
semble external trees, houses, and so forth is another thing.
And he who should confuse the two would be committing a
serious blunder. Now the reflexion in the mirror is the
mental symbolism. The several images are the objects in
consciousness, for consciousness is the mirror. All we can
do is to compare the images, and trace out their relationships
to each other. We can never turn round to see whether the
images in the mirror resemble the outside occasion of their
existence, for this would be to turn our backs on the mirror,
consciousness, in which alone we can see anything. Even
if, therefore, we are convinced on other grounds that the
images in the mirror answer point for point in closest
resemblance to their external occasions, it still remains true
that, so far as consciousness is concerned, we are restricted
to the mental symbolism.
This mirror-analogy is a rough one, and must not, of
course, be taken for more than it is worth. It may serve to
illustrate and emphasise the fact that our directest percepts,
not less than our most refined and subtilest concepts, form
part of the symbolic series. Every visible proof and tangible
evidence of the practical reality of the things around us is
given in terms of perception, in terms, that is to say, of what
I have termed mental symbolism. When we wish to verify
the existence of any object or the properties of any object,
we do so by submitting it to the touchstone of perception.
I have laid special stress upon the symbolic nature of per-
ceptual experience, because it is sometimes supposed that in
Till-: LAW (>F I'SYCHOGEXESIS. 77
'hogenesis we have to try and explain two things : I
UK relations of percepts to each other and to concepts ; and,
secondly, the relations of percepts to objects perceive <
external occasions of perception. If what has been urged
< is valid, these two things are so radically and
different that we should n't comprise them under one head,
at least without a very clearly (list in^uishin^ adjective. We
may call psychogenesis within the sphere <>t mental svm
holism "po.-mve psych is," and reserve the term
"metaphysical psychogenesis" for the further and totally
distinct question of the relationship between the symbolic
series as a whole and its external occasion. It is with posi-
tive psychogenesis that I deal.
It only remains under this head to indicate that, in addi-
tion to the percepts und the intelligent inferences on the
perceptual plane which characterise the mental symholi-ni
of man i/mi organism, there are concepts and rational infer-
ences in the conceptual sphere which conspicuously charac-
terise the mental symbolism of man qud social and rational.
Man not only perceives and adjusts his actions to surrounding
phenomena in common with his four-footed companions, he
also analyses these phenomena through the application of his
conceptual thought with the aid of language. He frames
theories of things and interpretations of nature ; he studies
the workings of his own mind and endeavours to explain
them ; he contemplates the beauty and charm of natural
objects and of his own artistic productions, and tries to for-
mulate the principles of aesthetics ; he ponders over his
relations to his fellow-men, and does his best to understand
the conditions of his social existence ; he forms an ideal of
what he himself should be and of what he desires humanity
to become, and endeavours to mould his life and the lives of
his fellow-men in conformity with these ideals ; he feels the
ultimate mystery of the world and of his own being, and
frames conceptions of the underlying Cause in conformity
with his religious tenets. In all this, or at anyrate in most
of it, man differs from all other organisms. And all this, or
at all events the greater part of it, man possesses in virtue
of bis social state, a state in which many individuals are
animated with a common aim, and in which these indivi-
duals are bound together by strands of linguistic intercom-
munication.
Psychogenesis and Experience. We give in general the
name of experience to the process by which the individual
powers of the mind are unfolded. To learn by experience is
essentially a process of trial and error. The child in response
78 C, L. MORGAN I
to certain external stimuli, or perhaps automatically, puts
forth its varying activities. Through the guidance of experi-
ence some of these actions are enforced, some checked.
This, be it noted, is a matter of control. Experience does
not originate the activities ; it guides them into suitable
channels, selecting those which give satisfaction in conscious-
ness and rejecting those which in consciousness are unplea-
sant and distasteful.
That the burnt child dreads fire is a proverbial example
of the teaching of experience. When first the child sees
something bright, shining, alluring to the touch (why it
should be alluring to the touch does not concern us here) he
stretches forth his hand to grasp. The pain he then experi-
ences becomes thereupon associated with the performance of
such action under such circumstances. Subsequently he
again sees the bright, alluring object ; again there is the ten-
dency to stretch forth the hand and touch ; but the repre-
sentation of the associated pain now modifies the former
result. If the memory of the pain be vivid the action may
be arrested ; if weak it will only be partially checked ; pain
will again be experienced, and will become for the future
more firmly associated with the performance of such action
under such circumstances.
Such are the rude teachings of experience in the lower
planes of mental symbolism. More subtle is the guidance
in the higher plane of intellectual, moral and aesthetic con-
trol. But it is the same in principle. Conduct in these
regions, however, is more idealised ; less under the sway of
somewhat rough perceptual inferences ; more under the con-
trol of reason and conceptual thought. The experience is
here more distinctly and obviously subjective. The modest
woman is not pure in act through bitter experience of the
results of an immoral life. She is pure in conformity with
an ideal which is part of her moral nature. Just as the child
avoids the fire because it hurts, so does the pure woman
shrink from the thought of an immoral act because it hurts.
Just as it is part of the child's perceptual nature that he
should suffer from contact with certain objects, so is it part
of such a woman's moral nature that she should be scorched
and burnt by impure thoughts. Experience is self-know-
ledge. Without experience there could be no conscious
selection of those activities which give satisfaction in con-
sciousness, no rejection of those which in consciousness are
unpleasant and distasteful. And psychogenesis in the in-
dividual involves such a selection among the states of con-
sciousness which constitute the mental symbolism.
THK LAW OF I'SYCIKM.KNKSIS. 79
Innate 7V// </ y/r/Vx. But though experience is thus a factor
in the development of individual conduct; the performance
of certain acts giving pleasure while that of others brings
pain, the suggestion of immodest thoughts being found in
rience to be repugnant to the moral nature, tin- ar<|iiiM-
tion of a new truth being found inexperience to give a thrill
of satisfaction to the intellectual nature though, I say, ex-
perience is thus a factor in, or, if it be preferred, a condition
of, the development of individual character and conduct,
many of the activities of organisms, and of man among the
number, are directed to more or less definite ends in the
absence of and previous to individual experience. The
typical instances of these are instinctive activities. An in-
stinctive action is one which is performed prior to and inde-
pendently of experience, though such action may, of course,
be subsequently modified through experience and, in so far
as thus modified, cease to be instinctive. Instinctive actions,
as such, are not subject to control : control, that is to say,
renders them, so far, other than instinctive. In the conduct
of men the lower impulses are largely of this order. In
many cases we are mere spectators, sometimes astonished
spectators, of our own actions. Impulse carries us away,
and we can only watch and wonder whither we are driven
by organic tendencies. The determinate nature of our
actions is by no means entirely a matter of individual ex-
perience and guidance, but is largely the outcome of innate
tendencies. What occurs under experience is a selection
from among the existing innate tendencies of special modes
of response which are in conformity with the individual
nature. These special modes of response, thus selected,
then set and become habitual. A habit is a response well-
organised through the guidance of individual experience.
As the organisation increases the guidance diminishes and
the necessity for conscious control ceases. Thus habits
ingrained by individual repetition may come to simulate
instincts not acquired by the individual but innate.
We next proceed to ask : Whence come the innate tenden-
cies? How comes it that in the individual there already
exist a body of determinate or indeterminate impulses from
among which, through experience, selection is made? In
doing so we pass from development in the individual to
development in the race.
Psychogenesis and Use-inheritance. We have seen that
under the selective influence of individual experience certain
activities are developed and organised and pass into habits.
We inherit the germs, or, one may say, the more or less de-
80 C. L. MOKGAN :
veloped embryos of faculty, and these may be developed to a
greater or less degree through experience. Thus the mus-
cular power of the athlete is increased through training and
use ; and in the mathematician the faculty of dealing with
numerical relations and the symbols by which they are ex-
Eressed. Take any two individuals with similar musical
iculty : the one cultivates the faculty ; the other lets it lie
dormant. In the one the faculty is perfected within its
limits ; in the other it remains comparatively undeveloped.
These are familiar facts ; and we may express their teaching
by saying that, in the individual, use develops faculty.
When therefore we come to ask how innate faculties and
determinate tendencies to activity have been developed in
the race the simplest and most tempting answer is : By
inherited experience. An instinct is thus an inherited
habit. According to this view the increased muscular
power of the athlete, the enhanced mathematical faculty of
the man of science, the developed musical ability of the
pianist, are to some extent handed on as a legacy to their
children. Modified and perhaps enriched by the individual
experience of the legatees, the legacy is again handed on to
succeeding generations ; and thus, through the steady addi-
tion of increments individually acquired and transmitted to
offspring, there is a progressive development of faculty in the
race, and each individual comes into the world with a
greater potentiality for individual development.
This is undoubtedly a very pretty and pleasing scheme.
But of late the actual occurrence, and even the possibility of
any such inheritance of acquired increment of faculty, has
been seriously questioned, and by many able biologists
stoutly denied. No matter by how much the athlete
increases his biceps, no matter how fully the mathematician
develops his splendid faculty, the children subsequently born
to them are, it is maintained, none the better for their pains.
Faculty in general is in the same position as particular
applications of it : the boy does not know his fifth proposi-
tion of Euclid because his father knew it before him ; nor
does he learn it any the easier for his father's long devotion
to mathematics. Had his father devoted his life to billiards
instead, his son would have learnt that proposition none the
less easily.
Which of these strongly opposed views is correct ; whether
" use-inheritance," as it has been conveniently termed, is
fact or fancy, I will not here attempt to decide. It is a
matter that is still sub judice ; one that is very hard to settle
by experimental evidence or direct observation, and one on
TUK LAW ol- ! ^1
which we mu.^t not dogmatise one way or the other. It will
have to be decided mainly on biological grounds, aim
must be eontent to await conclusive biological evidence for
mist it.
In :my case so far as organic evolution is conerrm-d, and
psychogenesis is from our point of view closely associated
witli Organic evolution, this use-inheritanee i^, it esta.bli
admittedly only one factor. Another factor, regarded as
dominant by most biologists, is natural selection.
J'si/r/iiH/i-nfsix and Natural Selection. I need not dr
tin mode of action of natural selection. It is based ujion
the law of increase, the law of variation, ;md the sin;
for existence : the law of increase, that many more ino
duals are born than survive to procreate their kind ; the l;i\v
of variation, that these individual^ ;irc not all alike; and the
stniLi-le !>r existence, by which those who fall below medioc-
rity aiv eliminated, while those who excel, interbrec^
with average individuals, tend to raise the standard of
mediocrity in the succeeding generation. A wolf-spider and
his wife are cunning in their artful stalking of unwary :'
They have a numerous family. Some are inferior in cunning
to their parents, some equal them, a few excel them. But
flies are scarce, and there is not enough food for all. Only
tw<> can jet a living, but these two are just the most cunn in <_;
of the whole brood. Of the numerous family produced by
these selected individuals, only two again survive to continue
the race, and they the very cleverest of the lot. They have
not inherited any cunning individually acquired by their
parents, but they are the terminal products of a series of
fortunate variations in the direction of cleverness.
It is clear that there is no inherited experience here. The
relation of this process of natural selection to experience
seems indeed to be this. Learning by experience in the
individual is a process of trial and error, erroneous response
being checked. Learning by experience in the race is also
a process of trial and error, individuals who failed to
accommodate themselves to their surroundings, as the result
of their individual experience, being eliminated. In the one
case erroneous responses, in the other erroneous respondents,
are eliminated. There is no inheritance of experience, on
the view above indicated, but those individuals who best
profit by experience are selected and transmit their ability
so to do.
Now what is the relation of natural selection to psycho-
genesis or the development of mental symbolism ? If we
say that it has been a factor and a most important factor in
6
8'2 C. L. MORGAN :
its development, we must be clearly understood to mean by
development, guidance along certain lines, not origin or
initiation. Though the struggle for existence may have
caused the elimination of those individuals in which the
mental symbolism was relatively imperfect or deficient,
natural selection does not give us the law of its internal
development.
What is the function, if one may so say, of the mental
symbolism in the animal world ? To enable the organism
so to guide its actions as to resist elimination, to live out its
full span of life, and to procreate its kind. Those organisms
in which this function is performed in the most efficient
manner have survived through the operation of natural
selection. Be it so. But the power of efficient control
must have been there, given in the organism, ere it could be
selected. Every advancing step in the development of
mental symbolism and of the control it rendered possible
must have been presented to natural selection, was not in
any sense evoked by natural selection.
This, it may however be said, is nothing special and
peculiar to the mental symbolism : it is true of every organ
and of every function which has reached excellence or
relative excellence through survival. The fittest survive
through natural selection : but what is the mode of origin of
the fit ? Favourable variations are selected : but how about
the origin of the variations ? These are questions which
are daily asked and can hardly be said to have received
satisfactory answers.
All this I grant, nay more than grant, I am prepared
to urge. But that is perhaps all the greater reason why we
should endeavour to find the law of psychogenesis the
principle which guides and has guided the development of
mental symbolism apart from the physical elimination of
natural selection.
Natural Selection and Social Evolution. Granting that
natural selection is a dominant factor in organic evolution,
is it also the dominant factor in social evolution ? I believe
that in modern phases of social evolution natural selection
holds a quite subordinate place.
So much is said and written about the social struggle for
existence; so largely does competition enter into all phases of
social procedure ; so conspicuously does the principle of
selection, and election, meet us at every turn ; that it may
seem somewhat absurd to contend that natural selection
holds quite a subordinate place in social evolution. If not
natural selection, it may be said, at anyrate a strictly
analogous process is not subordinate but dominant.
TEK LAW OF I'SYrii
Is tlie process strictly analogous ? I think not. Wi
the method by which progress is secured by natural selec-
tion ? The elimination of failures, that is to say of all those
individuals who fall In-low mediocrity, <r their exclusion frm
all participation in the emit inuancr of the race. Is this true
of social evolution regarded as a whole? Are the failures
eliminated ? Are they excluded from all participation in the
continuance of the race '? Do not the BOOial |>rol>l'-m^ <>f the
day largely arise out of the fact that th- social failures are
m>t eliminated but are here in our midst, and that they
multiply exceedingly? Are not the checks to increase
of population mainly prudential? And are not the pruc
those who look before they leap into marriage for t lie-
most part those who are not social failures ? It is just be-
cause natural selection, or the elimination of the unfit, is
not and cannot be the law of development in a civilised
Bociai community, that we are surrounded on all sides v.
the most difficult social problems.
Or look at the matter from a slightly different standpoint.
No account of social evolution would be complete which did
not comprise a consideration of progress in Art, Science,
Literature, Morality. Now I do not believe that anything
analogous to natural selection, any process of eliminating
the unfit . has been the dominant factor in the evolution of
any of these higher phases of social endeavour. An im-
portant factor it has certainly been in preserving some of the
products of these higher phases of human thought. The
works of Shakespeare and Milton, of Hooker and Bacon, of
Newton and Darwin, of Locke, Hume and Berkeley remain,
while a host of inferior writings have been eliminated. But
I question whether the genius of Shakespeare or Milton, the
scientific insight of Newton or Darwin, or the philosophic
penetration of Hume or Berkeley were the outcome of any
process which can with any approach to accuracy be
regarded as analogous to the elimination of the unfit by
natural selection. I fail to see how the Elijah of Mendels-
sohn or the Assumption of Titian could be the result of any
process of physical elimination.
This word " physical " perhaps best touches the quick of
this question. Natural selection through elimination
essentially a physical or organic process ; and my contention
is that in social evolution we are mainly concerned with a
psychical or mental process. Not the law of organic develop-
ment but the law of mental development, of psychogeuesis,
is dominant here.
Psychogenesis and Sexual Selection. Natural selection
84 C. L. MOKG-AN :
proceeds on the supposition that those who escape elimina-
tion in the struggle for existence mate together indiscrimi-
nately. This is not the case in human civilised society.
Whatever may be true of the lower animals, among mankind
selective mating is a fact of the very utmost importance.
And its special importance, in regard to our present theme,
lies in this : that, at its best and highest, it is essentially a
psychical and riot merely an organic process. It is a process
by which man is consciously or unconsciously giving physi-
cal or organic expression through heredity to his highest
ideals. For in marriage at its best and highest the man
selects his ideal woman, her in whom beauty and grace,
physical, moral and intellectual, are embodied ; and the
woman selects her ideal man, conspicuous among men for
beauty and strength of mind and body. Herein lies the
value, from the evolution point of view, of our marriage
system. The more enduring the marriage bond the more
careful will the contracting parties be to select wisely and
well, looking not merely to immediate gratification but to
life-long association. And if there be any truth in heredity
this must have an important effect on the race ; not indeed
on the community as a whole, except in so far as there is
elimination, but on its highest representatives physically,
morally and intellectually.
Sexual selection then differs from natural selection in this :
that whereas natural selection is a process by which is
effected the physical elimination, by death or failure to pro-
create their kind, of those who fall below mediocrity ; selec-
tive mating is the giving expression to certain preferences or
ideals. By natural selection all are plucked in life's exami-
nation who do not reach a certain standard of excellence :
by selective mating particular individuals are picked out by
an act of selective choice. Natural selection has guided the
mental symbolism to certain developments by eliminating
those in whom these developments were absent : selective
mating is a product of the mental symbolism so developed.
It is itself the outcome of psychogenesis. And however im-
portant it may be as a factor in social development it is
rather the result of than the cause of the higher phases of
mental evolution.
The Law of Truth. In seeking an answer to the ques-
tion : What is the law of psychogenesis ? it will be well to
start from the higher and more abstract region of concepts
and work our way downwards to the more practical level of
percepts ; and then, having found certain subsidiary laws or
principles, to see if there does not run through these a single
basal law or principle.
'I Hi: LAW HOGENESIS. 85
\\'h;it is the guiding principle of development in intell.
matters'/ I \v. mid call it the law of truth. I n the cmirse of
my rending and of my converse with my fellow-men I find
the facts i)t' natmv and df human conduct and experience
interpreted in a number of different ways. Son
interpretations 1 unheMtat mgly accept a others with
a^ little hesitation I reject as false ; HIM iore or rele-
to a Mispense account. On what g] do I at once
|.t eel-tain interpret at ions and reject certain "th.
i- often difticul! . off-hand, the speeitic grounds of
acceptance or rejection. I'.ut il practically COIQ68 to |
I accept what is in accordance with my IWI and
theories: I reject what i> contrary t my own scheme, I
relegate to a suspense account, or ignore, wiiai neither
accords fully with my system of interpretation of nature, of
life and of man, nor actually conflicts with that interpre-
tation. I neither accept nor reject what >et-ms to be
irrelevant.
A bare-faced confession of prejudice ! But observe that I
am for simplicity's sake supposing that my interpretation is
constant. I most sincerely hope, however, that it is capable
of development, and that such prejudice as there is is the
healthy prejudice that comes of long and honest sti
Suppose then that I am led to accept a view which is not in
strict accordance with the views I held yesterday. Does not
this imply that my opinions have altered so as to embrace
the new view ? And is it not still true that I accept what is
in accordance with my own theory not my theory of ye-
day, hut my modified theory of to-day ? The very fact that
the new view could not be accepted without modification of
my theory of things, emphasises the point which I desire to
l)i ing out, that what is accepted must be in accord with the
system into which it is incorporated. In every mind, as in-
tellectual, this process is going on. The true i^ ace. -pied,
the false rejected; the rest more or less ignored. No man
consciously accepts the false, or rejects the true.
What, it will be said, no one reject the true, no one accept
the false ! This, at anyrate, is an 'interpretation of the facts
which we may unhesitatingly reject as false. But before you
reject, my friend, be sure that you understand. I do not say
that no one rejects what you regard as true, or accepts what
ami regard as false. That would, indeed, be absurd. 1 say
that no one accepts what lie regards as false, or rejects what
he regards as true a very different matter. To say that
any one believes what he deems untrue is a contradiction in
terms. What, then, in the individual mind, is the criterion
80 ('. L. MORGAN :
of truth and falsity ? I reply, congruity or incongruity to
the existing intellectual system as developed in that mind.
An explanation of a given occurrence which is in congruity
to my system of interpretation of nature I accept. If the
explanation is incongruous, I reject it. If a lady pricks her
finger with a darning needle, and attributes it to having
spilled salt at luncheon and omitted to throw some over her
left shoulder, this explanation is for her, no doubt, the true
one. For me it is false, because it is not in congruity to my
mode of interpreting such occurrences. In different minds
widely different systems of interpretation grow up. The
man of science, as such, the poet, as such, the mystic, as
such, view the world with different eyes. Each has his
special theory of things. But each, as an intellectual
system, is self-congruous. Each has developed by the
selection of the congruous and the rejection of the incon-
gruous.
The Laic of Beauty. In aesthetic matters, what may be
termed the law of beauty is the guiding principle. That
only can be accepted as beautiful which is in congruity to
the aesthetic nature. The aesthetic nature may change ;
what was once regarded as beautiful may in after years make
one shudder ; in what was once regarded as indifferent we
may learn to see a gem of art ; but at any moment in the
process of development, only that could be accepted as beau-
tiful which was in harmony with the individual taste at the
time. It is generally admitted that there is no arguing
about matters of taste. Things are for me beautiful or ugly,
pleasing or displeasing, tasteful or the reverse, according as
they are congruous or incongruous to my nature as aesthetic.
You cannot make a thing beautiful to me as it is beautiful
to you without altering my whole aesthetic nature. You
cannot persuade a man to prefer the third Leonora overture
to The Bogie Man. We agree that there is no arguing about
taste. Why? Because you are not likely by argument to
modify the aesthetic nature. It is nearly, but not quite, as
true that there is no arguing about intellectual matters as
between, for example, a positivist and a Hegelian. You
cannot persuade a poet on the one hand, or a metaphysician
on the other, to accept a scientific interpretation of nature,
because he cannot do so without changing his whole intel-
lectual nature. Both the true and the beautiful are questions
of congruity to the mental nature.
The Law of Eight. In matters of ethics the law of right
is the guiding principle. This is accepted as right, that is
rejected as wrong, according as each is congruous or incoii-
THI: LAW OF i [8, ,sT
to our moral nature. The sense of Con^ruity or
incongruity is what we term the voice of COUSCici
D intellectual matters, ami ;is in questions of 86M
taste, BO boo in ethical problems it is oft.-n exceedi
(lit'ticillt to gi\e a specific aUSWer to the <ji, \\'hy is
this MI- that ri^h; Or WTOHg? Tne \\ . man's ansv. ;iuse
it is, and there's an end on't, is really not far astray. A
tiling is right, for me because it is in accordance with my
moral nature, hecause it is what it is, and I am what 1
and it and I vihrate in unison. The thought pulsates true
with my thought. The act is in harmony with my idea
It is untrue to fact to say that then- [a only on.
self-congruous ethical system. As there are ditTeivni n
pretations of nature, as there are different standards of taste,
so there are different ethical ideas. We cannot frame a
universal scale of right and wrong. Dr. Martineau gives a
hierarchy or ascending scale of passions, appetites, affecti
and sentiments, and says: "Every action is right which, in
presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action
is wrong which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a
lower". The hierarchy expresses his own ideal scale, but,
as a matter of fact, it is individual and not universal. We
cannot frame a universal scale. If we say that our own
scale ought to be universal, we are only expressing our own
ideal. 1 am not, of course, saying that there is not an inter-
pretation of nature truer than all others, an ethical system
nearer than all others to the perfect right. I only say that
we know not at present which interpretation of nature,
which ethical system is the truest and most right ; and that
there are in existence several rival interpretations of nature
and many rival ethical systems, which are perfectly self-
congruous in the eyes of those who hold them.
In opposition to the principle of congruity some one may
lay stress on the constant discrepancy between theory and
practice in matters of right and wrong. " The pity of it is. "
lie may say, " that incongruous as it may be to his moral
nature man is constantly doing that which he knows to be
wrong. It may be true that no one can believe wha:
from his point of view, untrue, or admire what is, in his
eyes, ugly ; but he constantly does what he feels to be
wrong." This is perfectly true. And it is due to the fact
that moral considerations are not, as man is at presi
stit uted, the only, nor always, by any means, the more pov>
ful. incentives to action. The brute performs a number of
actions which are conformable to his nature as sensual ; and
man is still largely a brute. If a man is sensual rather than
88 C. L. MORGAN :
moral his actions will be in conformity with his sensuality
rather than his morality. And this is in complete accord
with the principle I am advocating, that what is congruous
to the mental nature of the individual is selected, and what
is incongruous thereto is rejected.
Moreover, under different external circumstances and
different internal states of the bodily organisation, our
natures fluctuate to and fro within limits which vary in
different individuals. In moments of excitement we are
different beings from ourselves in moments of calm con-
templation. And we therefore react differently. There are
periods when the organisation of the drunkard or the sen-
sualist cries aloud for the satisfaction of the craving by
the performance of acts in conformity with the state of
heightened sensuality. If the sensual desires be satisfied
this element of the nature retires into the background, and
moral considerations gaining predominance, the individual,
reviewing his conduct, is covered with shame and remorse.
The acts in congruity with the heightened sensual state
excite loathing and disgust in the succeeding state of
increased moral sensibility.
Conduct and Verification. Apart from such cases as those
just alluded to, in which there is conflict between moral ideals
and the lower impulses of our nature, there are many cases
in the practical conduct of life when consistently to act out
our highest moral ideal is impracticable. We may feel that
war is repugnant to our moral nature, but at the same time
urge the efficient maintenance of our army and navy and
their vigorous employment in cases of national necessity.
The guiding principle in these cases is practical expediency,
or the congruity of actual conduct to the existing social or
other conditions. The practical reformer is he whose social
ideals are not merely Utopian and subversive of the existing
order of things, but exhibit a graduated series of practically
possible steps from the existing system to an order of things
ideally better. The ideal system 1 must not only be con-
gruous within itself, but must be in touch with the actuali-
ties of life and conduct.
Similarly of intellectual systems or interpretations of
nature. Not only must they be congruous in themselves
and on the conceptual plane of intellectual ideas, they must
1 1 am here speaking of the practical carrying into effect of social
reform. There is a great difference between the ultimate ideal which
we only hope may some day be reached, and the practical ideal which
we may see realised to-morrow.
THE LAW OF PSYCHOGBNEs
be, and are in all cases held to be, congruous to perceptual
experience. The ultimate appeal in nil cases is to perceptual
experience. To tliis plane must conceptual c<.ncl u>ins be
brought down that they may undergo the test of verifica-
tion. Not only must ideas and theories be congruous to
other ideas and theories, hut they must be in coii^nn;
percepts. l-'r<>m percepts have concepts arisen by analysis
and abstract thought and reason; to percept-, must the
results of analysis and al>Miaet thought conform to sat
the final test of congruity.
Here again the principle I am advancing may seem to be
incongruous to actual facts. The eoneepts of primitive folk,
va^es, of the uneducated, of faddists, have certain prac-
tical perceptual implications which we see clearly enoi
and which when submitted to the perceptual touch-tone,
are shown to be false or incongruous. But in these cases
the individual concerned either fails to apply his concepts
to the perceptual touchstone, or fails to see the conflict
between theory and practical experience which is to us so
obvious, or introduces new concepts which make the test
for him of none effect.
The last is a very common case, which I may roughly
illustrate. The individual concerned is, we will suppose, a
spiritualist. At a dark seance, while the medium lies en-
tranced, tambourines are heard, played, it is said, by spirit
i icy. It so happens that a scientific wag has blackened
tin tambourines. And when the seance is over and the
lights turned up, it is found that the medium is all be-
siniidged with lamp-black. The scientific wag regards this
as proof presumptive that the medium played the tambou-
rines. Does this perceptual evidence convince the spiritua-
list ? Not so. A spiritualistic concept is introduced and
the whole affair made congruous to spiritualistic views.
For is it not a well-known law, that anything which
happens to the spirits during a seance is transferred to the
medium through whose agency they were manifested ? By
the introduction of new assumptions it is very easy to make
perceptual experience fit in with any theory which an
individual may chance to hold.
There are, moreover, certain highly abstract concepts and
theories which are very hard to bring clown to the touch-
stone of perceptual experience. Such are the concepts of
metaphysics. And there are certain minds which normally
live and move in an atmosphere of conceptual thought.
They are often impatient of verification, and have little faculty
of testing the congruity of concepts to percepts. I met a
VKJ CT. L. MORGAN:
man of ability some time ago, who had been lecturing to
working-men on physiology. He had scarcely ever seen
a dissection, made an experiment, or examined a microscopic
preparation. He found that doing so only confused his
ideas ! His mind was speculative and metaphysical ; and
he was troubled with Utopian schemes of social reform. Very
different is the scientific mind which is restless in its
endeavour to apply the criterion of perceptual verification.
This constant demand on the part of science for practical
perceptual verification is justified by the essential unity of
consciousness, the solidarity of the mental symbolism, and
the continuity of its development. According to the
scientific interpretation of life and mind (which we must
remember is only one out of several congruous systems) not
only must the conceptual inferences be conformable to each
other but they must stand the test of verification in the
perceptual plane. The congruity must sweep through the
whole range of mental symbolism from the lowest percept to
the highest concept. Any incongruity between concept and
percept is in the eye of the scientific mind fatal to the
former ; in the eye of the metaphysical mind not infrequently
fatal to the latter.
Thus we come down to the practical perceptual plane.
What is the guiding principle of development here ? Many
will answer the congruity between percept and object, using
the word object for the external occasion of perception as it
exists independently of the percipient. If so, we are here
going outside the mental symbolism. But I have en-
deavoured to show that this way of putting the matter is
unsatisfactory and misleading. Not the congruity between
percept and object (so-called) but the congruity between per-
cept and percept is the law of the mental symbolism in this
plane. The percept evoked by the sight of my favourite
pipe suggests certain perceptual inferences which I intend
ere long to submit to practical perceptual verification.
In this perceptual sphere, as indeed throughout the whole
range of mental development, the guidance of pleasure and
pain is of great importance so great that some are found to
argue that in moral matters we are influenced solely by
considerations of happiness. Our nature is not only
intellectual, aesthetic, moral ; it is also sensitive. And as
the false is rejected as incongruous to our nature as
intellectual ; as the ugly is avoided as incongruous to our
nature as aesthetic ; as the wrong is shunned as incongruous
to our nature as moral ; so is the painful, so far as possible,
avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive. Only by
THE LAW OF PSYt !l < iKNESIS.
extruding the meaning of the words pleasure and pain so as
to he coextensivr with what I have hnv term. < IOU8
and incongruous can it he said that all
thoughts an- determined by pleasure and pain.
Tin Lair <>f Psychokinesis. Enough has now been said to
indicate what 1 regard as the law of p- M-. A
the case of natural selection, properly in I, it is a law
of elimination -tin- elimination OX the incongruous. It
;i|>j>lie> not only to the relations of c '>'r se, bu
the relations of concepts to percepts, and of pern-pi
other percepts. It sweeps through the whole gamut of
mental development. It is a law of the a-v-imilatiun or
incorporation of like with like. Progress is effected hy
the elimination of the incongruous.
-i m ilat ion presupposes an environment of that which is
capable of assimilation. And the environment in which
mind develops is a mental environment. That is a fact too
often lost sight of. Consciousness never comes in contact
with aught but other facts of consciousness. The mental
sy m holism is one and continuous and self-contained. There is
no getting outside it. If mind does grow up in correspon-
dence with something that is not mind this is a matter of
metaphysical psychogenesis, not of positive psychogenesis
with which alone I am now concerned. From the positive
point of view mind develops in conformity with a mental
environment and with that alone an environment of per-
cepts directly suggested from without and of concepts
growing out of perceptual experience or suggested through
inter-communication with our fellow-men. And the eiiviron-
iii' ni is not unchanging, but is itself subject to development.
Each thinker not only has his thoughts moulded by the
intellectual environment but reacts upon it, making it for the
hit ure something different from what it was. The thinker in
any department of knowledge brings his mind into contact
with all that is best in human thought and endeavour in
that department. He thus finds his true environment and
endeavours to make it more congruous by further elimination
icongruities. That I feel sure is how science
advanced. First the congruous system is allowed to ;
form in the individual thinker's mind hy tin- assimilation "f
all that is best in the work of his pre< ; hy the rigm
application of scientific method and verification some of the
remaining incongruities are eliminated ; and then through
the thinker's influence the amended and
impressed on the science and philosophy of his time and of all
after time. The environment is henceforward n
92 C. L. MORGAN :
the same. . This I could amply illustrate ; but not here and
now.
The environment is henceforward no longer the same.
This constant change for the better as we hope of the
environment of the developing mind makes it exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to test the truth of the theory of
use-inheritance, already adverted to, in the matter of the
mental faculties of man. Take the case of two men with
equal mathematical faculty, of whom the one develops the
faculty while the other devotes his life to billiards. Putting
aside the fact that this development of the faculty in the one
case and not in the other is very probably itself the outcome
of an innate tendency putting aside this I say, the son of
the former grows up under the influence of a mathematical
atmosphere, the son of the latter amid the clatter of billiard
balls. If then the sen of the former develop into a better
mathematician than the son of the latter, who shall say that
it is the inherited increment of faculty and not the influence
of a mathematical environment that has produced this
effect ? And, in general, if the mean level of intellectual
and moral attainment to-day is higher than it was a genera-
tion or two ago, how can we tell that this is not the result of
development in harmony with a higher intellectual and
moral atmosphere rather than the effect of the inherited
increments of faculty ? Who shall say that this is not how
the acquired increment tells on the race, and not through
direct heredity ? I am not saying that it is so. But I say
that all the facts must be taken into consideration.
It will of course be observed that in contending that the
law of psychogenesis is a law of development by the elimi-
nation of the incongruous, I am not pretending to account
for the origin of the congruous. Just as natural selection
accounts for organic development by the elimination of the
unfit, but makes no pretence, or should make none, to
account for the origin of the fit (which is a distinct problem),
so do I suggest that mental development results from the
constant elimination of the incongruous ; but I make no
pretence that it accounts for the origin of the congruous. It
is a theory of survival, not of origin.
I had intended here to say somewhat further concerning
the relation of physical elimination under natural selection
to the psychical elimination of the incongruous. During
the early phases of organic evolution the two went hand in
hand. In the evolution of man they widely diverge. Phy-
sical elimination, as I have contended, becomes a less
important factor : the elimination of the incongruous (espe-
Till-: LAW OF I'SVCHOCi!
cially that which is incongruous to the social ideal) becomes
more and more the law of progress. I have not space to
trace the matter further ; but I have elsewhere l said some-
what on this head.
Lastly, 1 nniM >ay a word, but not all that I had intended,
on the relation of the law of psychogenesis to the Freedom
of the "Will. The process, as I conceive it, is one of tin-
elimination of the incongruous, a process analogous, though
in a wholly different plane, to that of natural select
Mental development is the result of a continuous process of
selection by the control centres. But I have contended
that we constantly identify ourselves with the special action
of these control centres. We claim such action as especially
and distinctively our own, as the product of our own vli:
of our free-will. Hence we may say that psychogenesis
through selection is the outcome of free-will, as thus re-
</></< i/: a conclusion which ought to, but is not the least
likely to, satisfy both determinists and indeterminists.
Be this as it may, we can perhaps all agree that it should
be our practical endeavour to raise the intellectual ami
moral tone of the community by effecting the elimination
of such incongruities to the social nature as falsity, misery,
squalor, destitution, vice and immorality ; and the assimila-
tion into the social conscience of ideals of truth, justice,
happiness, beauty and purity.
1 Animal Life and Intelligence, pp. 483, 484.
VI. DISCUSSIONS.
THE FEELING-TONE OF DESIEE AND AVERSION.
By Professor H. SIDGWICK.
In an article on " The Physical Basis of Pleasure and Pain "
which appeared in the last number of MIND, Mr. H. E. Marshall
has expressed, briefly but decidedly, a view of the quality or
" feeling- tone" of Desire, Aversion and Suspense. This view
differs very markedly from that to which I have myself been led
by a comparison of my own experience with what I have been
able to ascertain of the experience of others. Mr. Marshall has
taken note of the difference, and subjoined to his brief statement
of his own view a polemical reference to mine, written with a
rhetorical emphasis which indicates a strong conviction that his
view is in harmony with the general experience of mankind. It
is possible that this conviction may turn out to be well-founded :
but I think that at anyrate some further discussion of the point
at issue may perhaps reduce the amount of disagreement between
us. I propose accordingly in the present paper to explain the
grounds on which my opposite view was founded, with more
fulness than I thought appropriate in the treatise to which
Mr. Marshall has referred.
As I shall have occasion to direct close attention to one or two
of Mr. Marshall's phrases, I will begin by quoting in full the pas-
sages in his article that are important for my present purpose.
" The important mental state which we call Desire . . . clearly
involves a very important thwarting of the impulse to go out
towards an object more or less vividly presented. Under such
conditions we should find Desire painful, and there can be no
doubt that it is invariably so. It is a complex state, however,
which involves other elements than those which bring about the
thwarting pain, and these other elements which involve pleasure
often mask the pain. . . . Aversion is a state kindred to Desire.
It involves thwarted impulses relative to our separation from an
object, and should bring pain of a broad kind. This pain is
always found as part of an aversion, although at times difficult to
isolate from other ever-present painful elements ; e.g., the painful
representation of an object which will be painful if realised."
Now if I had had to interpret this passage in its context, apart
from the polemical reference to myself in a note, I should not
have felt strongly moved to disagree with it ; because as I shall
presently explain I should have thought that Mr. Marshall was
knowingly using the terms Desire and Aversion in a narrower
sense than that in which they are ordinarily used. But this
TIN-: PBBLINO-T ANI> AVI-.KSIDN
interpretation seems to be excluded by the following pol.- ::
note :
" 1'n.f. Sid^'wick in his M.thotl* f AV/uVx (4th ed., pi
he reoogniaefl -cravings which ma\ in- powrful M impnlMi i" .
without oeing p&infnJ in any apprtoiftbli <l-^rr. ..tuiill\ -i
IP. is;, ..f k the neutral expitemei
prise*. Coiieeniiiiu' surprise 1 h:i\e a \v..nl Inflow. Here 1 must he
allowed to sav that 1 cannot -ee how a 'rra\m^' rui ! hfid to be
powerful as an impulse to action without hein^' appreciahly painful. A
I analyse such states of mind, the so-called neutral excitement which
makes the fulness of such states i- in mental regions apart from
' cra\ in;.: '. With certain of our most powerful
there are the general conditions of high activity which joy implies |
are certain emotional element, of unrestricted love and t
kindred states \\ e mu-t carefully eliminate in the con-iderat ion oi
fiMvinu' proper. The man who hunt,'- .11 impuUe t->
trom his painful craving, which activities may so far ahsorh attenti
to cover the craving itself entirely. To understand how 1 >
and Suspense can appear as neutral excitements to any man, KM
the post ulat ion of a decree of ' philosophic calm ' which has ], .
in that 'apathy' towards which the (i reeks aimed, which has di-|>
all fear 1>\ nn almost fatalistic trust, and which lias learned to feel that,
whatever the outcome of douhtful conditions, that outcome mu
good."
It is evident from this passage that, in Mr. Marshall's view, tin-
kinds of feeling which common usage denotes by the words De-
sire and Aversion are in no cases "neutral excitements" hut
always painful. It is, then, against this sweeping statement that
I propose now to argue.
Before giving my arguments, I should like to limit the field of
controversy on two sides. In the first place, I am not at pr<
concerned to maintain that there are, strictly speaking, any
" neutral excitements". I am aware that many hold with Mr.
Sully 1 that all feeling is pleasurable or painful in some degree:
and although my own experience leads me to an opposite conclu-
sion, I do not wish to complicate the present discussion with any
controversy on this point. I do not here deny the proposition
that Desire and Aversion, if not at least faintly painful,
must be at least faintly pleasurable: what I am concerned to
maintain is that these feelings are often either neutral or plea^ur-
al)lc, and certainly not appreciably painful. Secondly, in endea-
vouring to observe again the personal experiences on which this
contention is primarily based, in order to ascertain, if possible,
exactly where the disagreement lies between Mr. Marshall and
myself, I have felt somewhat embarrassed by my opponent's
1 See MIM>, No. 50, pp. 248-255. I may say that I am inclin-
adopt .Mr. Sully' s view to a greater extent in the case of Suspense and
Surprise than in the case of Desire and Aversion. It is partly for this
reason that I confine my attention to the two latter in the present
paper.
96 H. SIDGWICK :
qualification of his doctrine, which admits Desire to be a " com-
plex state containing pleasurable elements which mask the pain ".
I do not quite know how far this " masking" is supposed to go :
and whether he conceives it possible for a pain to exist which the
person feeling it does not recognise as such. At anyrate, in the
present discussion I shall assume pain so successfully " masked"
to be non-existent : and, on this assumption, I must affirm that I
still find Desire, in my own case, to be more often than not an
element not itself painful and often a prominent element in a
feeling that as a whole is pleasurable.
I arn inclined to explain the opposing view by a combination
of four different methods. Firstly, I think that there is some
difference in definition; that w r e do not use the term "desire"
in quite the same way.
Secondly, I think that there is a certain tendency to confuse
or too closely assimilate the ideas of Desire and Pain, owing
to a real resemblance between the two, which I will presently
endeavour to state precisely.
Thirdly, I think that my opponents are apt to attend too ex-
clusively to specially marked cases of desire ; for I admit that
when desire is most prominent in consciousness it is most
frequently also painful.
Fourthly, I think it probable that there is a real difference in
the susceptibilities of different individuals ; and that the pro-
position that desire is painful is at anyrate more true of some
persons than of others.
I. First, then, as to the difference of definition. It will be
observed that Mr. Marshall says that desire involves a " thwart-
ing of the impulse to go out towards an object". If this only
means that desire involves the presence of an unrealised idea, of
which the realisation would involve the extinction of the desire, I
should agree that this is characteristic of all desire : but the
phrase may be equally taken to imply that action for the attain-
ment of the desired end is prevented, in which case the
characteristic only belongs to some desires and not to all. I
notice this ambiguity, because I find it also in Dr. Bain's book on
The Emotions and the Will, where it seems to me to lead to a rather
confusing statement of opinion on the present question (p. 423).
Chapter viii. of this book begins : " Desire is that phase of volition,
where there is a motive and not ability to act on it". This cer-
tainly seems to imply that desire is only found where action
tending to the realisation of what is desired is prevented : and
Dr. Bain's illustration suggests the same idea. He says :
" The inmate of a small, gloomy chamber conceives to himself
the pleasure of light and of an expanded prospect : the unsatisfy-
ing ideal urges the appropriate action for gaining the reality ; he
gets up and walks out. Suppose now that the same ideal delight
comes into the mind of a prisoner. Unable to fulfil the prompt-
ing, he remains under the solicitation of the motive ; and his
THi: I'KKLIXG-TONE OF DKSIHK AND AVEKSIoN. 97
state is denominated craving, longing appetite, desire. If all
motive impulses could be at once followed up, desire would have
no place ; . . . there is a bar in the way of acting which leads to
the state of cnnjlict, and renders desire a more or less painful
frame of mind."
This rertainly seems to mean "all desire is painful, because
desire implies a bar in the way of acting".
Hence when Dr. Bain goes on to say that " we have a form of
desiiv in all our more protracted operations or when we are
working for distant ends," it is not clear whether he means to
at'lirm this species of desire to be painful, or, if so, why he means
to atlirm it : yet he goes on to speak of desire generally as a
"form of pain
Now I agree that desire is most frequently painful in
some degree when the person desiring is inhibited from acting
for the attainment of the object desired. I do not indeed think
that even under these circumstances it is always painful :
especially when it is accompanied with hope, and when though
action for the attainment of the desired object is not possible,
still some activity adequate to relieve the strain on the nerves is
possible. Still I admit that when action tending to fruition is
precluded, desire is very liable to be painful.
But it is surely contrary to usage to restrict the term Desire
to this case. Suppose Dr. Bain's prisoner becomes possessed of a
file, and sees his way to getting out of prison by a long process,
which will involve, among other operations, the filing of certain
bars. It would surely seem absurd to say that his Desire finally
ceases when the operation of filing begins. No doubt the con-
centration of attention on the complex activities necessary for the
attainment of freedom is likely to cause the prisoner to be so
absorbed by other ideas and feelings that the desire of freedom
may temporarily cease to be present in his consciousness. But
as the stimulus on which his whole activity ultimately depends
is certainly derived from the unrealised idea of freedom, this
idea, with the concomitant feeling of desire, will normally recur
at brief intervals during the process. Similarly in other cases,
while it is quite true that men often work for a desired end with-
out consciously feeling desire for the end, it would be absurd to
say that they never feel desire while so working. In short, it
must be allowed that the feeling of Desire is at anyrate some-
times an element of consciousness coexisting with a process of
activity directed to the attainment of the desired object, or
intervening in the brief pauses of such a process : and I ven-
ture to think that when the feeling is observed under these
conditions, it will not be found in accordance with the common
experience of mankind to describe it as essentially painful. I do
not affirm that under such conditions it is in itself pleasurable :
I cannot carry my introspective analysis to such a pitch of
refinement as would enable me to affirm this with confidence.
98 H. SIDGWICK:
What I do confidently affirm, as regards my own experience,
is that the feeling of desire under these conditions, while not
itself painful, is often an indispensable element of a complex
state that as a whole is highly pleasurable. And all that I can
learn of the feelings of others would lead me to think that I am
not singular in this experience.
Take the case of an ardent mountaineer who wants to get to
the top of a peak : desire is no less clearly an element of his con-
sciousness when he is walking up the mountain than when he is
kept at home by the weather : but in the former case it is at worst
a neutral feeling and often seems to take on a pleasurable quality,
at any rate the pleasurableness of the whole state of which it is
a part depends upon the presence of the desire : while in the
latter case it is certainly most likely to be painful. Take, again,
the case of hunger : the conscious desire to which we give this
name does not change its fundamental character, does not cease
to be hunger when the hungry man sits down to dinner.
But it would surely be absurd to say that it is then ordinarily
a painful element of feeling : it would only be so after an
abnormally long fast. Perhaps Mr. Marshall would say that
it is "masked" by pleasurable anticipation of proximate satis-
faction : if so, I can only say that the masking is so complete
that my introspective analysis fails to penetrate it.
II. I admit, however, that hunger, and desire generally, have a
certain degree of similarity to pain, in that they are both unrestful
states : states in which we are conscious of an impulse to get out
of the present state into a future one. To use a term of Locke's,
we may fairly say that both desire and pain are " uneasy " states,
and thus under this common notion of uneasiness or unrest we
may be led to confound the two. But I think reflexion will show
the distinction clearly. 1 Both in feeling desire and in feeling pain
we feel a stimulus to pass from the present state into a different
one : but in the case of pain the impulse is to get out of the pre-
sent state into some other which is only indefinitely and nega-
tively represented as " not the present " ; whereas in the case of
desire, the primary impulse is towards the realisation of some
definite future result. One difficulty in seeing this clearly is due
to the fact that when desire is painful a secondary aversion to
the state of desire is generated, which blends itself with the
desire and may easily be confounded with it. But we may dis-
tinguish the two impulses by observing that they do not neces-
sarily prompt to the same conduct ; since aversion to the pain of
unsatisfied desire, though it may act as an additional stimulus to
work for the satisfaction of the desire, may also prompt us to get
rid of the pain by suppressing the desire. And, on the other
hand, when desire coexists with the pleasure that attends the
1 I have discussed this point partly in the same words in my
Methods of Ethics, bk. i. chap. iv. 2.
Till-: 1 -l-i: LING-TONE OF DB8IBB AND AVL1CSION. '.'.'
realisation of what is desired as it often does in a high degree
it seems to me peculiarly easy to distinguish it from pain. I
should ^i\c as a good instance of this the ex p of eating
i an unusually long fast. I often find that in such a case
appetite is very faint hardly a perceptihle feeling before e;i
is began: then, alon^ with the pleasure derived from the satis-
!on of hunger, the feeling of appetite become* distinct and
lull ; and is, as I have said, peculiarly easy to distinguish from pain.
111. At the same time, I quite admit that where desire is a
sperially prominent element of one's mental state, so that it im
periously claims attention, it is in most cases annoying or
disturbing in some decree ; it heroines a feeling of which we
should prefer to get rid, whether by the realisation of what is
desired or in some other way. And this leads me to my third ex-
planation of the tendency to consider desire always painful ;
that the most marked and striking instances of the feeling, those
that have made most impression, and that are therefore naturally
recalled in memory when we think of cases of desire these have
usually been painful in some degree. Of a rcri/ in ten fie desire I
should admit it to be commonly true in my experience that,
even when the state of which it is an element is on the whole
pleasurable, the desire itself is painful in some degree. It is
when the desire, being combined with other prominent element-
of feeling, does not reach this absorbing and overwhelming
intensity that I find it in my experience at best neutral.
It may be said, perhaps, that in these latter cases the d<
itself is viewed as feelimj so faint that it ceases to be within
our power to determine its pleasurable or painful quality by
direct introspection ; while it is illegitimate to draw any inference
as to the " feeling-tone " of this obscure element from the pleasur-
able quality of the whole state of which it is an element : it may
be urged accordingly that such cases should be left out of account
in the present discussion. Now I quite admit that not tin-
frequently during long processes of work for remote ends, the
desire of the end, while remaining sufficiently strong to supply
the requisite impulse to action, ceases to have a percept ible
character as feeling; we only infer its presence from the actions
that it stimulates, and from the satisfaction that follows on the
attainment of some intermediate end which has no significance
for us except as a step towards the ultimate end. But I think it
is easy to give instances of pleasurable processes of activity
accompanied by desires which while not painfully intense are
strongly and distinctly felt ; and at the same time are elements
indispensable to the pleasurableness of the whole complex feel-
ing that accompanies the activities stimulated by them.
Take, for instance, the case of a game involving bodily exercise
and a contest of skill. I am not myself skilful in such exercises,
and when I take part in them for sanitary or social purposes, I
commonly begin without any desire to win the game. So long as
100 H. SIDGWICK I
I remain thus indifferent, the exercise is rather tedious; usually^
however, I find after a time that a feeling of desire to win the game
is excited, as a consequence of actions directed to this end ; and
that, in proportion as the feeling grows strong, the whole process
becomes more pleasurable. If this be admitted to be a normal
experience, I shall be surprised if it is not also admitted that desire
in this case is normally either a neutral or a pleasurable feeling ;
certainly I am unable to detect the slightest quality of pain in it.
And it would be easy to give an indefinite number of similar
instances of energetic activity carried on for an end whether in
sport or in the serious business of life where a keen desire
for the attainment of the end in view is indispensable to a real
enjoyment of the labour required to attain it, and where, at the
same time, we cannot detect any pain fulness in the desire, how-
ever much we try to separate it in introspective analysis from its
concomitant elements. In such cases, it seems to me a peculiarly
unwarrantable hypothesis to suggest that the desire itself is
nevertheless an extraordinarily well-masked pain.
A familiar instance is the perusal of a novel at least of a
novel in which plot is important. It will not be denied that
unless the writer can rouse the reader's curiosity his desire to
know the fate of the fictitious personages the process of reading
will usually be dull, while it becomes pleasurable in proportion as
the desire grows keen. At the same time the strength and
prominence of the desire in the consciousness of an ordinary
reader is unmistakable ; it is shown (e.g.) by the strength of the
misleading impulse which I think most persons who enjoy this
kind of literature often have to suppress by an effort of self-con-
trolto "look on" in order to satisfy curiosity.
IV. This last case, however, leads me to my fourth explanation
of the difference of view between psychologists on this point.
For I find that there is a considerable amount of variation in
respect of the pleasurableness of intense curiosity in different
persons. Several friends have told me that they do not care at
all about the plot of a novel ; that they would as soon read a novel
backwards- way ; that they enjoy a good novel more the second
time of reading than the first. I infer from all this that either no
keen desire to know how the fictitious story will turn out is
aroused in such persons at all, or, if it is aroused in them, it is
disagreeable rather than agreeable.
I think it possible that there may be a similar variation in the
case of the bodily appetites. For instance, many persons treat
hunger as a pain as a matter of course ; e.g., Mr. Marshall says
that " hunger and thirst are typical cases of painfulness ". Now,
according to my own experience, in a state of good health the
desire of food is, in its initial stages and if abstinence is not car-
ried too far, usually not painful at all : I recognise it merely as a
prompting of nature, a felt impulse to change my state, by taking
food, which is strictly neutral as regards its "feeling-tone" though
'Jill; ri.I.I.I\.,--lu\l. OF I'l.MKl. A.M. .YKKSIu.N. 101
it may easily become, according to its conditions or concomitants,
either disagreeable or, as I have before said, at least a prominent
element of a state which as a whole is agreeable. At the
same time, 1 can easily believe that in the experience of others
it may chietly present itself as painful ; because I find that this
is usual!) the case with myself, when 1 am out of health.
So far 1 have spoken of Desire rather than Aversion, although
in some of the instances that I have given the two feelings are
in fact closely blended. I have hern led to do this, because the
painlessness of desire is easier to illustrate; since aversion is
more often an element of a state on the whole painful, 1
normally connected, as we have had occasion to notice, with
actual pains of all kinds; and where it is thus connected we can
rarely carry introspective analysis so far as to distinguish tin-
aversion as in itself a painless element of feeling. At the same
time I think that, if Desire be once admitted to be not always
painful, this will carry with it a similar admission as regards
aversion : since in processes of energetic action for the avoidance
of prospective evils, aversion appears to me to be often a pro-
minent element of a state of feeling on the whole pleasurable, just
as desire is in processes of action for the attainment of prospective
good: and in such cases the painlessness of the aversion itself
s to me often as evident as the painlessness of desire. I need
only refer briefly to the common experience of the pleasurable
excitement of Danger ; since this complex feeling certainly con-
tains aversion as a prominent element.
Here, again, however, I should recognise a large amount of
variation in the experiences of different persons. For instance, I
myself am not ever pleasurably excited by physical danger, but
always simply depressed: but I have had experience of pleasur-
able excitement in the case of danger to social position or reputa-
tion, where aversion has been a prominent element, not discernibly
painful, of a state of feeling on the whole markedly pleasurable.
A contemplation of these differences among human beings -
k r ests a reference to the rhetorical flourish that concludes Mr.
Marshall's polemical note. He says that "to understand how
desire and aversion can appear as neutral excitements to any man
requires the postulation of a degree of 'philosophic calm ' which
has lost desire in that 'apathy' at which the Greeks aimed".
This seems to me a singular view. I should have thought, on
the contrary, that it is the man who regards desire and aversion
as uniformly painful who is likely to aim at and to attain ; if it
be attainable the " apathy" or " philosophic calm " from which
desire is excluded. On the other hand, a man whose ex-
]) rience resembles mine is peculiarly unlikely either to seek or to
tii id this apathy or unperturbedness ; since he is likely to hold, with
1 lobbes, that " the Felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose
of ;; mind satisfied"; and that even if we can conceive a man living
whose desires are at an end, we cannot conceive him living well.
SUR LA DISTINCTION ENTRE LES LOIS OU AXIOMES ET
LES NOTIONS.
Par GEORGE MOUEET.
Dans une recente etude sur 1'Induction et la Deduction, em-
preinte des idees de Mill et de Mr. Herbert Spencer (MiND, No.
64) Mr. L. E. Hobhouse a effleure quelques points qui font 1'objet
d'un article de moi recernment public dans la Revue Philosophique
de France, 1 sur la nature des relations et des concepts, travail dont
M. Hobhouse, d'ailleurs, ne parait pas avoir eu connaissance.
Je suis peut-etre ainsi Justine a intervenir, non pas directement
au sujet des theories soutenues par Mr. Hobhouse, et que je
partage, au moins sous la forme ou elles ont ete exposees par
Mr. Spencer, mais a 1'occasion de ces theories. M. Hobhouse
distingue deux modes de raisonnement. Dans Fun, on conclut
du particulier au general ; c'est 1'Induction. Dans 1'autre, on
conclut d'une serie de relations conjointes A - B, B - C, a une
relation A - C ; c'est la Construction. (Je reproduis ici textuelle-
ment ce que nous dit Mr. Hobhouse: "In the first case, we
generalise a single relation ; in the second, out of several relations,
all general, we construct a whole in which the resultant appears
as part ".) L'etude que j'ai publiee dans la Eevue Philosophique
a traite ces "Constructions" que j'ai appelees " Systemes de
relations," et c'est precisement Paxiome de Mr. Spencer, critique
a tort, a mon avis, par Mr. Hobhouse, qui m'a mis sur la voie
que j'ai suivie. Dans la presente note, je veux appeler 1'attention
sur une distinction fondamentale, relative a ces " Constructions,"
distinction qui ne ressort pas suffisaminent de 1'etude de M. Hob-
house, ce qui laisse planer un certain vague sur les conclusions de
cet auteur, et notamment sur la signification qu'il attache a
1'axiome de Mr. Spencer.
Lorsqu'on nous parle d'une relation A - C, derivant des deux
relations coujointes A - B et B - C, et qui fait partie integrante
du groupe des trois termes, de quelle relation s'agit-il ? Car le
problems que se pose Mr. Hobhouse, a savoir : par quelle raison
devons nous conclure des deux relations composantes a la relation
resultante ? doit etre resolu differemment suivant les cas.
Pour preciser la question que je pose, je choisirai un exemple
simple, emprunte a la Mecanique. Supposons que les termes A,
B, et C soient des forces, et que les forces A et C fassent respective-
ment equilibre a la force B, en sorte que les relations A - B, et B - C
sont des relations d'equilibre. La mecanique nous enseigne que,
dans ce cas, les forces A et C se font equilibre, et que, de plus,
elles sont egales. Or il n'y a pas la une conclusion unique ; il y a.
deux conclusions distinctes, deux jugements different s, car 1'egalite
1 L'Egalite Mathtmatique, l re partie. Rev. Philos. An. xvi., No. 8.
AXIOMES BT LES NOTIONS. 103
Irs forces et 1'equilibre ne sont pas les monies notions; c'est ce
<juc j'ai montrr tout au long dans nion travail sur IV^aliu'-.
AiiiM il -st certain qu'il existe entre A et C, deux relations
distinctcs, rune clY-quilibre, et 1'autre d'6galite\
Mais lu point essentiel, etce qui fait 1'objet de mon intervention
l;ms 1< -s questions souleve"es par M. Hobhouse, c'est oue ces deux
relations, bien qu'elle derivent <hi meme groupe, de la meme
" Construction," n'ont ni la meme origine ni le rneme fondement.
Kn d'autivs mots, il y a deux modes de derivation diff6rents, et
pas consequent la conclusion tiree d'une Construction s'appuie sur
iin principe ou sur un autre, suivant sa nature particuliere.
Kxaminous quels sont ces deux principes. Dans 1'exemple
cite, le fondement de la relation d'equilibre ne repose pas evidein-
11 lent sur la consideration des relations conjointes d'6quilibre.
I/rqiiilibre est connu, en tant que notion, des que Ton a observe*
i leu x forces, c'est <\ dire deux corps conservant un etat de repos,
l>iri i que cbacun des corps ait line tendance a prendre une certaine
accrlrration. En concluant done a 1'equilibre entre A et C, on
rapprocbe un fait deja connu comme fait general, d'un cas par-
tic ulier, qui est le cas de deux forces faisant respectivement
equilibre a une troisieme. Ce rapprochement, ou pour parler
d'une maniere plus precise, cette coexistence entre les trois re-
lations d'equilibre est un fait, une loi, un principe, et la raison
([iii conduit a conclure a 1'equilibre A - C, est celle qui constitue
le fondement de toute Induction, de quelle que nature que soit ce
fondement, qu'il resulte d'un fait d'association, ou d'une neces-
Mtt'- metaphysique.
La seconde relation conclue dans le cas considere, celle
ilitc de force, a une origine moins direct que Pequilibre.
Kllr derive, en effet, du systeme de deux relations conjointes
d'equilibre ; nous disons souvent, il est vrai, que les forces A et C
sont egales, parce qu'elles produisent le meme effet sur la force
B, mais ce "parce que" n'est pas une raison; c'est une maniere
de rappeler la definition de l'egalite\ Par exemple, le cercle est
defini : " toute courbe dont tous les points sont egalement eloignes
d'un inerne point appele centre " ; mais quand nous disons d'une
certaine figure : " c'est un cercle, parce que tous ses points sont
egalement eloignes d'un meme point," le "parce que" n'indique
pas un fait nouveau, mais simplement le rappel d'une definition,
de meme que le syllogisme est le rappel d'un fait deja connu. 1
Dire qu'il y a egalite entre deux forces quelconques, ce n'est pas
dire autre chose, que ces deux forces sont susceptibles de faire
equilibre a une troisieme. Par consequent, conclure des e"quilibres
A - B et B - C a. Pegalite A - C, ce n'est pas exprimer un fait nou-
veau, ce n'est pas atfirmer une coexistence entre des relations
deja connues et d'origines differentes, c'est repeter une definition,
1 Ce rappel, coinme 1'a fort bien montre Mr. Spencer, n'implique qu'une
seule chose : 1'intuition d'une ressernblance ; uucun axiome n'est r^elle-
inent invoqu dans 1'enonce d'un syllogisme.
104 G. MOURET:
ou, si cette association A - B - C se presente pour la premiere fois
ii 1'esprit, c'est commencer a se former une notion nouvelle, qui
n'est pas celle de 1'equilibre, mais qui en est composee. L'egalite
A - C n'est pas une chose distincte du systeme des deux relations
conjointes d'equilibre A - B et B - C ; ce n'est pas un element deja
connuautrement, et qui viendrait s'yajouter. Pour les nominalistes,
dont je suis, ce n'est meme pas un element nouveau, et 1'egalite
n'est qu'un mot commode pour designer le systeme A - B - C et ses
proprietes. Les conceptualistes ne s'en tiennent pas la, il est vrai ;
ils supposent que sur ce groupe, vient se grefi'er un nouvel element
qui est 1'idee abstraite d'egalite, mais cet element se trouve en
connexion intime avec le groupe ; il ne tire pas son origine d'ail-
leurs, et il resulte de la fusion de tous les groupes semblables,
A - B - C.
Par consequent, et quelle que soit la doctrine adoptee, en con-
cluant a 1'egalite des deux forces, on n' exprime pas un fait, une
loi, mais on introduit dans son esprit une notion nouvelle, qui
est celle d'un mode d'assemblage particulier de relations, ou bien
encore Ton se remet en 1'esprit cette notion, deja connue a la suite
de la perception de groupes semblables. Tous ceux qui ne con-
siderent pas les mots comme representant des entites toutes faites
dans 1'esprit seront d'accord avec moi sur ce point.
II y a, en resume, dans les deux conclusions que Ton tire de la
consideration du groupe A - B - C, deux cas bien differents. L'un
est celui qui correspond au jugement synthetique de Kant ; c'est
1'affirmation de la coexistence de 1'equilibre A - C avec les equi-
libres A - B et B - C. L'autre est un jugement analytique, c'est
la perception de 1'egalite entre A - C, c'est a dire la perception
meme du groupe A - B - C. 1
Mr. Hobhouse cite un exemple geometrique emprunte a Mr.
Bradley, celui de trois points A, B, C, situes de telle sorte que A
soit a droite de B, et B a droite de C.
Ici, au premier abord, on ne pent degager de cette assemblage
qu'une seule conclusion, et cette conclusion est un axiome ; c'est le
fait que le point A est aussi a droite du point C. Je montrerai,
dans une prochaine etude sur la grandeur, qu'on peut en tirer aussi
une conclusion analytique, qui est un element du concept grandeur.
J'en viens maintenant a 1' axiome de Mr. Spencer, que Mr. Hob-
house designe sous le nom d' Axiome de Construction, a cet axiome
1 Je simplifie ici la question ; dans mon etude sur 1'egalite, j'ai inontre
que les " Constructions" d'oii derivent les concepts et les relations, sont
soumises & certain es conditions (solidarite, coexistence, abstraction, et
relativite*) que ne remplissent pas necessairement tous les assemblages
de relations, et qui, quand elles sont remplies, le sont en vertu de
certaines lois ou axiomes (principe d'indetermination, et principe d'in-
compatibilite'). C'est pourquoi une notion nouvelle repose toujours sur
certains faits, c'est pourquoi les definitions ne sont pas des operations
arbitraires ; il n'y a d'arbitraire, au point de vue logique, que le choix
des mots.
1 I.I.S N 1<:>
<|ii'- drux rhosrs <jui out une relation dtermin6e avec une troisieme
rhoso ont uno relation determinee entr'elles.
Si Ton se place au point de vue psydiol.^iijur, <jui est celui de
Mr. Spmrrr, il v ;i l.i r.-rtainrm.-Mt mi a ;'ii a de noinbreux
corollaires, entr' a utros cet axiome fondainental que deux rela-
tions semblables (egales, diniit Mr. Spencer) a une troisieme sont
lablrs 1'uiic a 1'autre.
Mais si Ton se place au point de vue ordinaire, qui est celui de
la consideration des phrnomrnrs du monde exterieur, c'est a dire
an point de vue des Sciences, et en particulier de la Logi
1' Ax ionu; de Construction n'est plus un axiome, c'est une drlini-
tion. Toute relation, tout concept, d'une maniere g-nrralr,
ton to notion n'est pas autre chose qu'un assemblage de relations
Onstruction, satisfaisant a certaines regies, et dont le groupe
de deux relations conjointes, signale par Mr. Spencer, n'est qn un
cae partk-ulirr. Co (jiii fait le caractere des notions objeci
telles que le temps, 1'espace, la force, la masse, la longueur, la
valeur, la vertu, c'est precisement cette complexite. Chaque
notion est un edifice construit avec des materiaux qui sont cux-
mrmes des edifices, quoique moins complexes. La nature des
matrriaux et la forme de 1'edifice specifient la notion. Quant ti sa
n'alite, elle n'est pas autre chose que ce qui relie tous les mate-
riaux et en fait un tout, c'est-a-dire la coexistence des elements du
Mir des relations. Ce n'est pas, comme disait Mill, la pos-
sibilite de certaines sensations, ce n'est pas comme disent Irs
sensualistes, des groupes de sensations ; c'est la j>< >.<*/!'//'/>'' elle-
nirine, abstraction faite de la nature particulieres des sensations,
ou si Ton prefere, des etats de conscience.
Kn ) sume, dans la consideration d'une Construction, deux
points de vue interviennent, suivant quele jugement porte repose
sur une /W, ou qu'il constitue la perception d'une nofnm. En
traitant done des Constructions il est essentiel d'indiquer le point
de vue auquel on se placer ; car dans le dernier cas, une seule Con-
struction est en jeu, tandis que le second 9as comporte la con-
sideration iniplicite de plusieurs Constructions, autrement dit,
la coexistence de plusieurs choses.
II est un dernier point sur lequel je voudrais encore faire une
rr marque ; il s'agit de la nature de la deduction. II ne me semble
pas que Mr. Hobhouse ait tout a fait mis en lumiere ce qui en
constitue 1'essence. Sans doute la deduction impliquela generalisa-
tion, mais c'est la un trait commun a tous les actes intellectuels ;
intelligrnce et abstraction sont synonymes. L'essence de la deduc-
tion est tout autre : opposee a 1' Induction, la Deduction est une
restriction de la generalisation ; voila son vrai caractere. Ce n'est
pas, d'ailleurs, 1'acte d' appliquer une verit gen^rale & un cas parti
culier, ce n'est pas simplement un syllogisme, autrement son role
serait insignifiant, et 1'etude qu'en ont faite les moines du
nioyrn-age serait amplement suffisante. La Deduction scienti-
fique consiste dans 1'application de plusieurs verites g^nerales
10() G. MOURET I AXIOMES ET LES NOTIONS.
distinctes, a un cas complexe, et cette combinaison est accompa-
gnee necessairement d'un decroissement de generalite ; sinon il n'y
a pas deduction. Quand je dis que la matiere est inerte, etendue,
et impenetrable, je ne fais pas une deduction, je reunis ensemble
plusieurs verites generales, pour les appliquer a un cas aussi gene-
ral que ceux auxquels ces verites s'appliquent separement. II
n'y a deduction que quand les ensembles d'objets sur lesquels.
portent les verites generales ne sont pas les memes pour chaque
verite ; la conclusion obtenue par deduction n'est alors applicable
qu'a la partie commune a ces divers ensembles. Par exemple,
cette propriete que les angles a la base d'un triangle sont egaux
ne s'applique qu'aux triangles isosceles, mais elles est deduite de
verites qui s'appliquent les unes a tous les triangles, isosceles
ou non, les autres a une figure plane quelconque, les autres a une
figure quelconque dans 1'espace ; d'autres enfin s'appliquent a
tous les objets de connaissance, geometriques ou non.
II est a peine besoin d'ajouter, que contrairement a 1'opinion
commune des mathematiciens, une conclusion obtenue par
deduction n'est pas une verite nouvelle ; elle n'est que 1'expres-
sion, simplifiee, de verites deja connues. La seule chose nouvelle,
c'est le mode d'association considere, c'est a dire les donnees de
la question.
En termes precis, dans la theorie que j'ai exposee sur la genese
des concepts et des relations, la deduction consiste selon sa forme
la plus simple, dans 1'application d'une induction a une partie
seulernent d'un systeme complexe donne de relations. Le syllo-
gisme est 1'application d'une induction & la totalite du systeme,
et c'est pourquoi il n'est qu'une repetition logiquement et
theoriquement inutile.
VII. CRITICAL NOTK I
Jutit ' Par/ IV. of the. Principles of Ethics. By II.
BPBNCEB. Williams A N ornate, 1891. Pp. 292.
Mr. Spencer's hook on "Justice " is stated in his /'/TM<V to be
Part IV. of a comprehensive work on Tin- /'////<//)/<* of Kthl,
which I 'art I. was published in 1S71) as The I tain i Kthirs.
" Led," he says, " by the belief that my remaining energies would
probably not carry me through the whole. I concluded that it
would be best to be^in with the part of most importance. Hence.
passing over Part II., ' The Inductions of Ethics,' and Part III..
The Kthics of Individual Life/ I devoted myself to Part IV..
4 The Ethics of Social Life : Justice '."
The contents of the new book may be summarily docnhed by
saying that the first seven chapters are ethical, the last seven
mainly political, while the intervening fifteen are concerned with
a subject common to ethics and politics the determination on
general grounds of the rights of individuals. In the present
notice, it seems best to direct attention chiefly to the ethical
aspect of the treatise.
Mr. Spencer begins by recalling briefly his general view of
ethics, as given in The Data of Ethics. " The primary subject-
mat ter of ethics is conduct considered objectively as producing
good or bad results to self or others or both." The primary
question, therefore, relates to the determination of the ultimate
end and standard by which "goodness" and "badness" of
results are to be estimated. In The Data of Ethics a double con-
ception was presented of this ultimate end or standard. Re-
garded from a biological point of view the End was recognised as
" Life estimated by multiplying its length into its breadth," /.<-.,
by taking into account, not simply duration, but also quantity of
change. " The conduct called good rises to the conduct conceived
as best," when it " simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of
life, in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men." But regarded from
the point of view of subjective psychology, a different ultimate
end was presented, viz., "desirable feeling called by whatever
name gratification, enjoyment, happiness". Accordingly, Mr.
Spencer's system, as expounded in this earlier book, appeared
open to the criticism that it assumed too easily a practically
complete coincidence between Life and Pleasure; i.e., it assumed
that actions conducive to Maximum Life would always be no less
conducive to Maximum Pleasure, and //,* / , rtd. This funda-
mental assumption Mr. Spencer seems still to maintain ; but,
on the whole, we may say that, in the treatise now be-
fore us, the hedonistic aspect of his system drops somewhat
108 CRITICAL NOTICES :
into the background. Thus in the first chapter, on " Animal
Ethics," the ultimate end not only of human conduct but of
animal " conduct at large " is stated to be " the greatest
length, breadth, and completeness of life " ; while " relatively to
the species " acts are said to be good " which are conducive to
the preservation of offspring or of the individual ". Such acts
may be " egoistic " or " altruistic " : thus there are "two cardinal
and opposed principles of animal ethics : for (1) " within the
family group most must be given where least is deserved," while
(2) " after maturity is reached benefit must vary directly as
worth" " worth " being measured by " fitness for the conditions
of existence ". The second of these principles or laws is limited
by the first ; since so far as adults act for the sustentation of
their children, they do not receive from their own acts " benefit "
in proportion to their worth: and it is further limited by the con-
sideration that " if the constitution of the species and its condi-
tions of existence are such that sacrifices, partial or complete, of
some of its individuals so subserve the welfare of the species
that its numbers are better maintained than they would other-
wise be, then there results a justification for such sacrifices".
This third point, however, is not, in Mr. Spencer's view, an
essential one: he recognises only " tivo essential but opposed
principles of action by pursuance of which each species is pre-
served," and in considering successively (in chaps, ii. and iii.)
" sub-human" and "human " Justice, he concerns himself only
with one of these principles, " passing over the law of the family
as composed of adults and young". It would seem that this
limitation of view is not unlikely to lead to error, when an attempt
is subsequently made to analyse and trace the growth of the
" sentiment " and " idea " of Justice among men, and to determine
its fundamental formula : since the common-sense of mankind
certainly recognises family relations as a part of the sphere of
Justice. And in fact when Mr. Spencer comes in later chapters
(xx. and xxi.) to treat of the mutual rights or claims of husbands
and wives, and of parents and children, the inadequacy of the
principle of Justice formulated in his earlier chapters becomes
manifest.
For the present, however, let us " consider the law of the species
as composed of adults only ". Considering this first in the case
of " sub-human life," Mr. Spencer lays down as the " law of sub-
human justice " that "each individual shall receive the benefits
and the evils of its own nature and its consequent conduct ".
In a certain sense, this law is said to "hold without qualifica-
tion in sub-human life " : in another sense, it is explained that
"sub-human justice is extremely imperfect, both in general and
in detail". In general, it is imperfect "in the sense that there
exist multitudinous species the sustentation of which depends on
the wholesale destruction of other species": which, according
to Mr. Spencer, implies that " the species serving as prey have
11. Sl'KNCKK, JUSTICE, 1"'.'
the relations between conduct and consequences habitually
broken ".
1 * 1 1 1 s u rely the existence of a predatory species is a part of the <
ditions of existence of the species preyed upon ; and if the former
ip the latter, it would seem that the latter's unntness to the
conditions of its existence would be demount rated, and Spencerian
Justice perfectly realised in its annihilation. It may be said, as
Mr. Spencer goes on to say, that enemies are causes of death
which so operate that superior as well as inferior are sacri(i
and that other accidents " " inclemency of weat her," " scarcity
of food," invasions by parasites " fall "indiscriminately upon
superior and interior individuals". Here, however, the term
perior " seems ambiguous: it may mean (1) more highly organised,
or cJ) more qualified to preserve itself and its species under hypo-
thetical conditions *>./., with extremes of frost and heat, excep-
tional famines, foes and parasites left out or (3) morequalifie
live under actual conditions, though not sufficiently vigorous to iv
the destructive forces. The two former meanings seem hardly re-
levant. when we are basing ethical principles on biological laws; for
the adaptation of the species in accordance with biological laws must
be adaptation to an actual, not an ideal, environment. And
if the third meaning be taken, I do not see that "sub-human
justice" can be said to be imperfect, according to Mr. Spencer's
statement of its law, because it is not finely graduated. Suppose
that, in a given region, two-thirds of a certain species of animal
are killed by extreme cold: each individual is none the less
subject to the effects of his own nature" because some are
hardier than others. The point is that no one is hardy enough.
Proceeding, we learn that the individualistic " law of sub-human
justice" is further qualified by the conditions of gregariousness. \
Firstly, each member of a group of gregarious animals receives the
benefits and evils not only of " his own nature and its consequent
conduct " but of the nature and consequent conduct of some or
all of the other members of the group : even " an occasional
mortality of individuals in defence of the species " may further
the preservation of the species " in a greater degree than would
pursuit of exclusive benefit by each individual". This last " limita-
tion of sub-human justice," however, is, in Mr. Spencer's view, solely
due to the coexistence of living enemies of the species in question.
Secondly, a condition " absolute for gregarious animals " is that
" each member of the group, while carrying on self-sustentation
and sustentation of offspring, shall not seriously impede the like
pursuits of others". This condition, in the case of some gre-
garious creatures, even becomes a law enforced by sanctions, as
Mr. Spencer affirms on the authority of observers of beavers, bees,
crows and rooks.
In the illustrations that he gives of this enforcement, however,
Mr. Spencer seems to me to put together cases that should be
carefully distinguished. In some cases abnormal action on the
110 CRITICAL NOTICES I
part of a member of a gregarious group, tending to interfere with
the sustentation of other members, is punished by those other
members as when " among rooks, a pair which steals the sticks
from neighbouring nests has its own nest pulled to pieces by the
rest ". But the case of a class in the gregarious community
only organised for the performance of a certain function, and
destroyed when this function is performed that it may not be a
burden on the community as when the drones of a hive are
massacred by worker-bees is surely quite different. I dwell on
this because " sub-human justice " is introduced to lead up to
" human justice " ; and, while the former kind of repression of acts
inconvenient to the community is certainly analogous to the mainly
individualistic legislation of actual civilised societies, the latter
suggests a drastic treatment of those who neither " toil nor spin "
such as the most bloodthirsty socialist has never yet recom-
mended. Moreover, when Mr. Spencer says that "conditions such
that by the occasional sacrifices of some members of a species, the
species as a whole prospers" are "relative to the existence of
enemies," he seems to ignore this normal destruction of drones by
workers.
I pass now to " Human Justice " ; which Mr. Spencer regards
as a " further development of sub-human justice," the two being
" essentially of the same nature" and forming " parts of a con-
tinuous whole ". Of man, as of all inferior creatures, we are told
that " the law by conformity to which the species is preserved is
that among adults the individuals best adapted to the conditions
of their existence shall prosper most, and that individuals least
adapted to the conditions of their existence shall prosper least. . . .
Ethically considered, this law implies that each individual ought
to receive the benefits and evils of his own nature and subsequent
conduct." But, in the case of man, the operation of this law is
admitted to be modified by the condition of gregariousness in a
manner only " faintly indicated among lower beings ". For " as
communities become developed" the "limits to each man's activi-
ties necessitated by the simultaneous activities of others " become
more and more "recognised practically if not theoretically":
also in the case of this ' ' highest gregarious creature " the
principle of individualistic justice has to be qualified, to a
greater extent than in the case of lower gregarious creatures, by
admitting the sacrifice of individuals for the benefit of the com-
munity. This highest creature is distinguished by the charac-
teristic of fighting his own kind; and "the sacrifices entailed by
wars between groups " of human beings have been " far greater
than the sacrifices made in defence of groups against inferior
animals". But "the self-subordination thus justified, and in a
sense rendered obligatory, is limited to that which is required
for defensive war ". It may indeed be contended that " offensive
wars, furthering the peopling of the earth by the stronger, subserve
the interest of the race ". But, in Mr. Spencer's view, "it is only
H. Sl'KM T.K, JUBTJ( 1 1 1
during the earlier stages of human progress that the developi
of strength, courage, and running an- of chief importance :
jirrival at a stage in which ethical considerations come to be
rt aiiied is the arrival at a stage at which offensive war ceases
to be justifiable . And he holds that even defensive war, an<i
qualifications of the abstract principle of justice which it involves,
belung to a transitional condition, and "must disappear when
re is reached a peaceful state ". Such qualifications :
belong to " relative " not " absolute ethics ". In absolute et \
the law that "each individual ought to receive the benefits and
evils of his own nature" is true without qualification; and Mr.
Spencer atlirms that it is " obviously that which commends itself
to the common apprehension as just ".
It seems ID me that the effects of gregariousness, in the highly
developed form in which it appears in the inn nan race, are too
lightly treated in this argument. It is too hastily assumed that
the necessity for subordinating the welfare of the individual to
that of the species arises solely from war: and in the considera-
tion of war and its consequences Sociology and Ethics are too
much mixed. Granting that it would be for the advantage of the
human race that war should disappear, it does not follow that it
will disappear; it might similarly be better for sub-human life
that beasts of prey and parasites should disappear, but Mr.
Spencer's faith in sub-human evolution does not lead him to
ime that this will be its ultimate result. Granting, again,
that industrialism will put an end to militancy, it is not shown
that conflicts of interest among industrial groups such as we
see at present in apparently growing intensity will not continue,
and that the exigencies of such conflicts will not impose on
individuals a severe subordination to the interests of their
respective groups. Granting, finally, that such industrial con-
flicts are ultimately to cease, it seems rash to assume that when
this consummation is reached, Mr. Spencer's individualistic
principles of justice will be found reigning unchecked : for it
may be that this result will be brought about by an implication
of interests and a development of sympathy which will render all
men "members one of another" to a degree beyond our present
experience : so that when auy one suffers the rest will inevitably
suffer with him and the rule that " each is to bear the evils of his
own nature" will become impracticable or unmeaning. I do not
prophesy that these things will be : but if Mr. Spencer is allowed
to "fancy warless men " and lay down a priori rules of conduct
for a world lapped in universal peace, I do not see why Mr.
Bellamy, or any one else, may not with equal legitimacy fancy
more unselfish men, and construct a still more Absolute Ethics
for a non-competitive Utopia.
And I cannot admit that Mr. Spencer's principle is " obviously
that which commends itself to the common apprehension as just ".
Doubtless the popular phrases that a man " has no one to blame
112 CRITICAL NOTICES :
but himself," that " he has made his own bed and must now lie
in it," or that another has " fairly earned his reward," indicate the
consciousness that justice demands a proportion between effort
and advantage. But we commonly recognise that equal efforts
do not produce equal results: and it is not "obvious" to the
common-sense of civilised men that Justice requires a man to
suffer for failures not due to wilful wrong-doing or neglect. I
agree with Mr. Spencer that it would be practically disastrous to
adopt the communistic principle that " each shall make the same
effort, and that if by the same effort, bodily or mental, one
produces twice as' much as another he is not to be advantaged by
the difference ". Still I think that this principle is in accordance
with the prevalent view of ideal justice, so far as the comparatively
inefficient individual is not to blame for his comparative ineffi-
ciency ; though, as the impracticability of realising the principle
under the actual conditions of human life is generally recognised,
it presents itself as a principle of Divine rather than of human
justice.
Making these reserves, I recognise much truth in Mr. Spencer's
account (in chaps, iv. and v.) of the origin and growth of the
"sentiment" of Justice, and also in his characterisation of the
"idea" of Justice, which the individualistic development of
modern civilised society has tended to render prevalent. He
begins with what he rather strangely calls the "egoistic senti-
ment of justice" the individual's resentment of interference
with the pursuit of his private ends and proceeds to explain
how the "altruistic sentiment of justice" comes into existence
by the aid of a "pro-altruistic sentiment having several com-
ponents". He explains how the egoistic resentment of inter-
ference combines with fear of similar resentment and retaliation
on the part of others if they are interfered with, and also with
the dread of social reprobation, the dread of legal punishment and
the dread of Divine vengeance for such interference : and how,
society being held together by the "pro-altruistic" sentiment
thus compounded, the development of sympathy through gre-
gariousness gradually produces the genuine "altruistic" senti-
ment of justice. In this way the " conception of a limit to
each kind of activity up to which there is freedom to act "
gradually "emerges and becomes definite" in human thought.
The idea of Justice that thus emerges contains two elements.
" Inequality is the primordial ideal suggested. For if the
principle is that each shall receive the benefits and evils due
to his own nature and consequent conduct, then since men
differ in their powers, . . . unequal amounts of benefit are
implied." On the other hand, the recognition- of the need
of "mutual limitations of men's actions" involves the con-
ception of Equality ; since " experience shows that these
bounds are on the average the same for all ". But the
appreciation of these two factors in human justice has long
II. Sl'KNCKU. JUSTICE.
unbalanced. Thus "in the Greek conception of
justice which admitted slavery as just there predominates the
idea of inequality," and "the inequality refers not to the natural
achievement of greater rewards by greater merits but to the
artificial apportionment of greater rewards to greater merits".
On the other hand, in the dictum of Bentham that " everybody
is to count for one, nobody for more than one " the idea of
inequality entirely disappears. It has, in short, been left for Mr.
Spencer to j^'ive the true conception of Justice by "co-ordinating
the antagonistic wrong views," and showing that the ideas of
equality and inequality "may be and must be simultaneously
asserted," being " applied the one to the bounds and the other
to the benefits". The formula of justice, so conceived, may be
precisely expressed as follows : " Every man is free to do that
which he wills provided he infringe not the equal freedom of
another man ".
In an Appendix (A) Mr. Spencer recognises that Kant's
" Universal Principle of Bight " with which he was till recently
unacquainted is closely allied to his own: but he points out
that Kant " enunciates an a priori requirement, contemplated as
irrespective of beneficial ends," whereas Mr. Spencer's " law of
equal freedom" is to be regarded as "the primary condition
which must be fulfilled before the greatest happiness can be
achieved by similar beings living in proximity ". But when the
"greatest sum of happiness" is thus expressly stated to be the
" remote end " to which Mr. Spencer's formula simply prescribes
the indispensable means, I think it becomes clear that his criticism
of Bentham's dictum above quoted involves a misunderstanding.
For, as Mill says, "the greatest happiness principle is a mere
form of words without rational significance, unless one person's
happiness, supposed equal in degree, 1 is counted for as much as
another's ". The dictum, in short, is merely designed to make the
conception of the end precise, not to determine anything as to the
legal rules by which the end may be best attained.
How then is it known that Equal Freedom thus understood is
unconditionally the best means to the attainment of the greatest
sum of human happiness? Several lines of argument in Mr.
Spencer's view combine to give this principle the highest imagin-
able "warrant". First there are the biological considerations,
yielded by a survey of life or conduct at large, which we have
before examined. Secondly, Mr. Spencer tries to show, in the
history of human institutions and ideas, a gradual growth of
this conception into distinctness. I think he has some right to
claim as an example of this the doctrine of natural law, as held
by a succession of jurists from Koman times to the eighteenth
1 Mill here adds " with the proper allowance made for kind ". The
addition seems to me either superfluous or erroneous : bub the question
whether it is so or not is not relevant to the present issue.
8
114 CRITICAL NOTICES I
century ; along this line of thought we may fairly trace a
development towards the modern individualistic ideal. Other
parts of Mr. Spencer's historic argument have less force ; e.g., a
reference to the " Christian maxim Do unto others as ye would
that others should do unto you " is hardly relevant to a definition
of strict Justice. It is not, however, on a biological or a historical
basis alone that Mr. Spencer rests the Formula of Justice.
The Law of Equal Freedom is, in his view, " an immediate
dictum of the human consciousness after it has been sub-
jected to the discipline of prolonged social life ". It is an
ethical intuition, comparable in self-evidence with the axioms of
geometry, though " relatively vague " and needing, far more than
the mathematical intuitions, to be subjected to "methodic
criticism". It does not, indeed, seem to be a dictum of every
developed human consciousness : since, as Mr. Spencer tells us
with much emphasis, the " reigning school of politics and morals"
treat it with scorn, and " daily legislation " serenely overrides it.
Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer maintains (in chap, viii.) that all
" rights truly so-called are corollaries deducible from it " ; and
these corollaries will be found " one and all " to correspond
with legal enactments of modern States.
Then, in ten successive chapters, he works out this corre-
spondence in detail, by deducing from the Law of Equal
Freedom "the right to physical integrity," the "rights to
free motion and locomotion," the "rights to the uses of
Natural media," the rights of property, corporeal and in-
corporeal, the rights of gift and bequest, of free exchange,
free contract, free industry, free belief and worship, free speech
and publication. In each case Mr. Spencer appends a brief
account of the historic process by which, as civilisation has
progressed, these rights have come to be recognised with in-
creasing clearness and fulness. No one is more skilful than Mr.
Spencer in exhibiting the cumulative force of a comprehensive
and complex argument : and many parts of these chapters are
both interesting, though dealing with trite topics, and effective for
Mr. Spencer's purpose. I think, however, that in several cases the
deductions from Mr. Spencer's principle are not performed with
sufficient exactness ; and that, if they were made more exact, the
discrepancy between the results obtained by deduction and the
established laws of modern States would be more marked. This
would not, indeed, necessarily invalidate Mr. 'Spencer's con-
clusions ; since, firstly, actual law may be wrong, and secondly,
it may be right but not ideal, a compromise inevitable at the
present stage of social development : for Mr. Spencer's idea of
Justice, as he is careful to state, is " appropriate to an ultimate
state, and can be but partly entertained during transitional states".
But it would be an advantage to have the three things the ideal
rights of an ideal society, the legal rights as they ought to be
here and now, and the actual legal rights more clearly and fully
H. SPENCKK, JUKT1 115
compared. As it is, I fear that the reader will not always
thoroughly distinguish the three questions : (1) * How far can we
know the relations of members of an ideal society?' (2) ' How
ought we to imitate these relations here and now?' (3) ' What
chunk's in our actual law wotiM this imitation involve?'
tuse of inexactness in Mr. Spencer's deductions lies in
the unpreciseness of his fundamental formula. The simplest
statement of the " Law of Equal Freedom " is that " the liberty
of each" should be "limited only by the like liberties of all".
This, however, as Mr. Spencer sees, might be interpreted as
allowing A to knock B down if he were willing to take his chance
of being knocked down by B. To exclude this, Mr. Spe
define^ the formula as meaning "that each in carrying on the
actions which constitute his life for the time being and conduce
to the subsequent maintenance of his life, shall not be impeded
further than by the carrying on of those kindred actions which
maintain the lives of others ". But he does not seem always to
keep to this definition, vague as it is : for instance, in discussing
the "Rights to the uses of Natural Media " he lays down that "vitia-
tion of air" which is " mutual" "cannot constitute aggression " :
though it would seern that such vitiation might easily impede the
maintenance of the lives of the mutual vitiators. Sometimes,
again, a wider and more purely utilitarian meaning is given to
the formula. Thus we are told that " considered as the statement
of a condition by conforming to which the greatest sum of happi-
ness is to be obtained, the law forbids any act which inflicts
physical pain". But if it is so " considered" why does it take
account of physical 1 pain only, and why does it forbid any act
inflicting such pain, and not merely acts that cause a balance of
pain on the whole? Mr. Spencer would perhaps reply that, in an
ideal society, all right acts cause "pleasure unalloyed by pain
anywhere " : 2 but then such a society is so unlike that in which
our ancestors have lived that their experiences can hardly have
generated any trustworthy intuitions with regard to it.
The vagueness of Mr. Spencer's fundamental formula is
strikingly illustrated by the manner in which he applies it (chap.
xi.) to the burning question of Eight to the Use of Land. For
here the ' ' law of equal freedom " is allowed to drop the idea of
"freedom" : it is converted into the proposition that "men have
equal claims to the use of land ". Equality, not Liberty, is here
the point ; for, obviously, the admission of " equality of claims "
does not in any way determine how much freedom is to be
allowed to any one in using land : indeed, as Mr. Spencer goes
on to argue, the principle is realised by " the people's supreme
ownership of the land " as asserted in the right of " appropria-
1 Of course, in a sense all pain is " physical," but I presume Mr.
Spencer is using the term in a narrower sense.
2 Data of Ethics, p. 101.
116 CRITICAL NOTICES I
tion of land for public purposes " claimed and exercised by
modern Governments. But if the "law of equal freedom" as
applied to the use of land is satisfied by ' ' the people's owner-
ship " of the commodity, it would seem to admit a completely
communistic system, in which all management and cultivation of
land would be strictly public, and private use would only begin
after the product was divided. And in fact Mr. Spencer's
deduction of the Eight of Property (chap, xii.), as established in
modern civilised societies, is singularly the reverse of cogent.
After describing the manner in which private ownership grows up,
he says that, " though we cannot say that ownership of property,
thus arising, results from actual contract between each member
of the community and the community as a whole, yet there is
something like a potential contract ; and such potential contract
might grow into an actual contract if one part of the community
devoted itself to other occupations, while the rest continued to
farm; a share of the produce being in such case payable by
agreement to those who had ceased to be farmers, for the
use of their shares of the land". But he adds that " we
have no evidence that such a relation between occupiers and
the community has ever arisen " ; and merely suggests that
hereafter "there may again arise a theoretically equitable
right of property ". I am therefore unable to see why in subse-
quent discussions he allows himself to treat existing rights of
property as though they had been adequately justified by his.
formula.
In an Appendix (B) Mr. Spencer suggests that in England the
sums paid in poor-relief since 1601 may be reasonably held to
satisfy the just demands of the landless, as they have not an
equitable claim to more than " the original prairie value of
the land ". But, granting that the Law of Equal Freedom
can be properly fulfilled by this method of what has been called
" ransom," it may surely be contended that, on his own principles,
the claim of the landless extends at least to all the present value
of the land after subtracting what would now have to be paid to
bring it from its original condition to its present degree of utility,
i.e., not the prairie value alone, but the prairie value plus the
"unearned increment"; and it may be contended further that
the existing landless ones cannot reasonably be held to have
been compensated by poor-rates paid to their ancestors.
It would, however, be out of place to argue here the economico-
political issue thus raised. I notice it here chiefly in order to
point out how clearly the whole discussion shows the inadequacy
of the single formula of justice offered by Mr. Spencer. When
we are inquiring what compensation is justly due to persons
whose rights have admittedly been encroached upon, supposing
the encroachments have been sanctioned by law and custom and
complicated by subsequent exchange, it is evident that the Law
of Equal Freedom cannot help us ; we want some quite different
principle of Distributive or Eeparative Justice.
II. si-KM 1:1;, JUSTICE, 117
nnilar conclusion is suggested by the discussion, in chapters
\\. and \\i., of the Eights of Women and Children. Firstly, in
considering the position of married women, Mr. Spencer seems to
Assume, without justifying the assumption, that it is not to be
s, -tiled simply hy free contract between men and women. l.ul
surely the question of the Marriage-Law ought to be more frankly
i by a thorough-going individualist pursuing a high priori
toad. If he intends to allow perfect freedom of contract in de-
termining conjugal relations, he ought to admit openly his breach
with the law and morality of all civilised societies; if not, he
ought to make quite clear how he justifies restrictions on freedom
of contract. Again, assuming that the State has to determine a
division of power and responsibility between husbands and wives,
surely it is manifest that this must he done on some principle of
justice quite different from Mr. Spencer's formula. We are told,
tor instance, that "justice appears to dictate " that " the power
of the mother may fitly predominate during the earlier part of a
child's life, and that of the father during the latter part". But
what kind of Justice ? Certainly not the Law of Equal Freedom.
Similarly when we are told that " since, speaking generally, man
is more judicially-minded than woman, the balance of authority
should incline to the side of the husband," the proposition how-
ever sound seems to have no connexion with Mr. Spencer's
Formula : though we may perhaps trace in it a connexion with
the Greek conception of Justice, as " inequality established by
authority," which has been repudiated in a previous chapter.
After civil rights, the reader may perhaps expect to pass, in
chapter xxii., to a discussion of constitutional rights, on the basis
of Absolute Justice. He finds, however, that in Mr. Spencer's view
"there are no further rights, truly so called," than the civil
rights already set forth : "so-called political rights" being "but
an instrumentality for the obtainment and maintenance " of
ihese civil rights. The conception (e.tj.) of the "power of giving
<i vote " as " itself a right " involves a " confusion of means with
ends ". Hence, in the discussion that follows on the structure of
Government, the a priori method is almost entirely abandoned.
Mr. Spencer, indeed, implies obscurely that there is a "constitu-
tion of the State justified by absolute Ethics " ; but he makes no
attempt to determine it otherwise than by the vague suggestion
that it M must be a constitution in which there is not a represen-
tation of individuals but a representation of interests". The
only topic under the head of the constitution of the State, on
which Justice again becomes the governing conception, is the
distribution of State-burdens"; but here again we feel strongly
the need and the absence of some principle other than Mr.
Spencer's formula. For instance, it may be true that " as life and
personal safety are, speaking generally, held equally valuable by
all men," such public expenditure as is entailed by use of these
shall "fall equally on all": but the conclusion is hardly de-
ducible from the Law of Equal Freedom.
118 CRITICAL NOTICES :
The duties of the State, on the other hand, can be simply
determined by the fundamental formula, applied positively and
negatively: it must "prevent interferences with individual
action beyond such as the social state itself necessitates ".
Justice requires it to do this adequately : and Justice requires
it to do nothing further, at anyrate if the further action is
either coercive or expensive ; since either coercion or expenditure,
beyond what is needed for the protection of individual rights, is
itself an infringement of these rights. It would hardly be
suitable in the present notice to discuss adequately Mr. Spencer's
application of this simple principle, which will be, in the main,
familiar to readers of his previous writings. I will only say,
briefly, that the consequences of the political empiricism that
disregards this principle are severely expounded, and impressively
illustrated by modern instances, in the concluding chapters.
H. SIDGWICK.
Les Ideologues. Essai sur Phistoire des Idees et des Theories
scientifiques, philosophiques, religieuses, etc., en France
depuis 1789. Par F. PICAVET, Docteur des lettres, Agrege
de philosophic, Maitre de conferences a PlScole des hautes
etudes, Laureat de PInstitut. Paris : F. Alcan, 1891. Pp.
xii., 628.
The author of this important volume essays a task of no com-
mon magnitude. Barely has there been a greater, or at least a
more varied, intellectual outburst than marked the revolutionary
era of French history. M. Picavet traces its origin, follows it
along the multifarious lines that it took, and seeks to appreciate
the abiding value of its results. The industry he displays is
immense, and hardly less remarkable the historical and critical
insight. Writing also clearly and with force, there is not an
aspect of the movement that he does not effectively portray, not
one of its hundred figures, small or great, that he does not
manage to invest with interest. But it must be added that the
very thoroughness of his work over so wide a field has at times a
somewhat overpowering effect. And when it comes to looking
back upon the whole moving scene, one sighs for index as a
means of keeping hold of it all. Why, with all its fine gift of
exposition, is the French mind hardly more careful than the
German to employ that simple help for making its labours of
ready service to the busy student ?
The revolutionary movement of thought in France, called Ideo-
logical by Destutt de Tracy, one of its chief leaders, has a special
interest for us in this country, as M. Picavet is forward to point
out. If English thinking has in this generation recovered in
France something of the same kind of authority that was yielded
before the middle of last century to the thought of Locke, it has
p. I'lCAYKi. IBS WtiOLOGUl
done so in forms that were moulded not least by influences re-
ceived from Fran* In fact, during the modern period an
alternate process of give-and-take between the two countries has
always hern going on. Locke, who seemed to overcome Descartes
in 1 Vance, had own! more to Descartes than to any other of his
predecessors. So the later Knglish psychology, winch has sup-
plied so manifest a stimulus to the l-'n-nrh activity of mental
research at the present day, had its own line of progress, at an
earlier time, very markedly affected by the Ideologists. Hamil
ton was quite right when he signalised the origin, in D. de Tracy,
of Thomas Brown's theory of external object, taken up after-
wards and developed by J. S. Mill, Prof. Bain and others. The
discovery does not seem to have been made by Hamilton till his
later days (Reid, Note D, p. 868 n.), but already in his early
onslaught upon Brown (Art. " Philosophy of Perception,'' 1830)
there is some general reference to the school which he gives
Cousin, after Royer-Collard, the credit of overcoming. Such
overthrow, in as far as it took place, is but another effect of
the interchange of thought between the two countries, since
Royer-Collard (from 1811) was stirred to his revolt against the
Sensationalist tradition in France by no other than the influence
of Thomas Reid. As for the Hamilton of 1830, it is not out of
place to add that one cannot easily now read without smiling the
tones of portentous solemnity in which he speaks of those high
interests of morality and religion which, under Locke's influence,
had been wrecked for nearly a century in France till the great
Cousin at last stood forth to stay and save. It is not creditable
to Hamilton's discernment that he should at any time have let
himself be imposed upon by that flighty rhetorician. Had he
known, too, a little more intimately the work of those, whether
called Sensationalists or Ideologists, whom at that time, ap-
parently, he was content to take at the estimate of their foes, he
might have recognised that in Degerando and Larorniguiere, then
still active, there was as much concern for religion (not to say
morality) as the belauded Cousin ever showed ; that Cabanis
himself, more than twenty years before, had supplemented his
scientific inquiries into the relations of mind and body by a grave
philosophical argument (Lettre sur les Causes premieres) for
religious interpretation of the universe ; and that in the earlier
generation Condillac, for all his psychological insistence upon
sense, was a most ardent spiritualist and theist.
But wherein lies the distinctive character of the Ideological
movement, as we may now understand it with the help of M.
Picavet's practically exhaustive research? Less in its method,
which had been applied by others before to the investigation of
mind, than in its aims begotten of a time of high humanitarian en-
thusiasm. It was essentially a revolutionary movement. Educa-
tion, government, the whole frame of society were to be recast ;
the renovation being based upon a scientific analysis of " ideas,"
1'20 CRITICAL NOTICES :
or developed human experience, driven, with that all-inclusive
practical purpose, deeper than ever before. The enterprise
indeed, even its practical bearings, was not novel. Locke's " way
of ideas," which remained the whole method of the French revolu-
tionary thinkers, had for him also a practical, quite as much as
a theoretical, significance. And one object, uniting considera-
tions of both theory and practice, namely, the direction and
furtherance of the work of special science, had been as present to
the mind of Hume as of Locke in their new analytic treatment of
human " understanding ". But the progress of the positive
sciences had come, by the end of the eighteenth century, to exert
an ever-deepening influence upon philosophic minds. The French
thinkers who, after Condillac, continued to draw their main inspira-
tion from Locke had it forced upon them to make mental inquiry
more and more expressly scientific in form, on the model of the
other sciences ; while yet contending that these others could be
systematised and co-ordinated only from the point of view of the
mental inquirer. Getting then, after the revolutionary Terror,
the opportunity of building upon a ground that had been swept
bare, they made it their first practical concern to refound the
whole higher instruction of France, and to organise, in the
Institute, the means of universal scientific advance. In both
departments of research as of instruction " Analysis of Sensa-
tions and Ideas " (or other equivalent designation) was put for-
ward to mark the particular line of scientific inquiry and con-
sideration that should henceforth take the place of an arbitrary
" Metaphysic " in relation to all other actual or possible varieties
of human knowledge and endeavour. So may we represent
to ourselves, in general, the nature and scope of the movement.
Leaving aside for the moment M. Picavet's introductory ques-
tion of the " Origins," we may first note the chapter (pp. 20-100)
in which he gives account of the Ideologists' " Relations, political
and private, academic, scientific, and literary ". It is truly a
marvel of painstaking research. The work remained for M.
Picavet to do, and he has done it once and for all. Nothing that
one can desire to know of the new institutions, educational and
other, set on foot from 1796, or of the men, obscure as well as
prominent, who helped in their founding and working, is here
left unelucidated. The class of Moral and Political Sciences,
second of three composing the Institute, had but seven years of
life before Napoleon, who as General Bonaparte could speak
about "ideas" with the foremost (p. 80), abolished it in his
pique at being unable to retain the good opinion and support of
the philosophical leaders who, in their desire for a more settled
political order, had helped him to his supremacy in the State.
From that time it was that " Ideologist " became his favourite
term of contempt for all those whose serious scientific and social
purpose would not bend itself to the service of his personal ambi-
tion, and in a depreciatory sense passed readily enough into
currency with many who had been proud to bear the name. But
Napoleon's impatience of mental independence did not deprive t he
school of its means of official utterance before its work has been
in effect done. And it needs but an unbiassed study of its chief
productions to see that at least the leading spirits, Cabanis and
De Tracy, if over-sanguine in their enthusiasms, had no such
deficiency of practical sense as the title of their choice was made
to imply against them.
The work of the Ideologists is, in effect, summed up in the writ-
ings of the two men, Cabanis and De Tracy, and all the more be-
cause of their complementary relation to one another ; De Tracy
confining himself, for the most part, to properly subjective con-
sideration, while Cabanis made it his business to discover the
physiological conditions of mental process. But with M. Picavet
the work of the two (done within some ten years from 1796) and
of those whom they more especially influenced constitutes but one
of three stages that may be distinguished within the whole
movement. To a later " generation " a.re referred, with others
of less note, Degerando (1772-1842) and Laromiguiere (1757-
1836), who, though already active by the side of De Tracy and
Cabanis in the revolutionary years, did not attain their pro-
minence till a later time, when it was left to them to continue the
Ideological tradition in face of the strong reaction that had set
in against it, but to continue it in a modified form, at once
" spiritualist and Christian ". And a *' first generation " is
made of writers, like Condorcet and Volney, whose work, in con-
ception if not also in execution, reaches back to the pre-revolu-
tionary period and is to be ranked with that of the Ideologists
proper because of a general similarity in method and aim.
M. Picavet gives a very interesting chapter (pp. 101-75) to
these immediate forerunners, who were all in more or less close
relations with Cabanis and De Tracy ; but, for the right under-
standing of the central pair, it is of greater moment to note what
he otherwise seeks to establish concerning the origin of their
thought. The most obvious question is of their relation to
Condillac, the dominant French thinker of the eighteenth century,
and this is a question which M. Picavet keeps in view all through
his exposition and would very decidedly answer. He speaks
with an exceptional knowledge of Condillac, having some years
ago edited with characteristic care a part of the Traitv des Sensa-
tion*. He has, moreover, for the present inquiry, made an
elaborate survey of all prior influences, French or other, that can
have affected the Ideologists ; though in his book, as printed,
some two hundred pages which he had written on this topic have
had to be condensed into an introduction of less than twenty.
In the result, according to him, it is a grave historical mistake to
subordinate the Ideologists to Condillac as master. Though
agreeing with Coudillac in the general psychological method he
had taken from Locke, they criticised him with the utmost
T2'2 CRITICAL NOTICES :
freedom and made claim to have advanced indefinitely beyond his
positions. Neither was Condillac himself, from the middle of the
century till his death in 1780, by any means the solitary thinker
of mark and power in France that he is commonly represented.
And when we go back beyond Locke, to whom the allegiance of
the Ideologists is undoubted, it is to Hobbes and Bacon, outside
of France, that they are seen to stand most near ; while, in France,
it was at least as much from Descartes as[frorn Gassendi or from
the line of sceptics reaching back through Bayle and others to
Charron and Montaigne that they drew. In all this contention
by M. Picavet there is much freshness of historical insight, and
especially noteworthy is the evidence he adduces that never in
the eighteenth century did Descartes cease to be an active
philosophical force among his countrymen. With the Ideologists,
at anyrate, he stood in high credit in higher credit (it is
interesting to note) than with Eoyer-Collard, the initiator in the
second decade of the nineteenth century of that spiritualist re-
action which later on was fain to connect itself with his celebrated
name. As to the Ideologists' independence of Condillac, however,
M. Picavet's proof is not very decisive. It is just as easy to find
in the pages of De Tracy and Cabanis professions of discipleship
as reclamations against this or that shortcoming of their psycho-
logical predecessor. They were in truth very specially beholden
to him ; but, over and above their novel breadth of practical
aim, they had the characteristic in a remarkable degree for
their time of seeking to connect their thought with the best (as
they conceived it) of method or principle that they could find
among all the streams of modern inquiry. They looked upon
themselves as the crest of the whole advancing modern wave.
This confidence is curiously manifested in a criticism on Kant
which De Tracy read to the Institute in 1802. Some of it (as
given by M. Picavet, pp. 347 ff.) is not at all ill-pointed as special
criticism, but more significant is the general judgment passed,
as from a higher level, on " les philosophes allemands " who
retain the prejudices of the old school-doctrine, do not know of
the observations that have been made in France, take no account
of origins, language, method of calculus, but regard the human
mind as an abstract thing, &c., &c.
Cabauis and De Tracy occupy between them more than a third
of M. Picavet's book (pp. 176-398). His plan is to interweave
with accounts of their lives abstracts, more or less critical, of
their writings, in order (as far as possible) of composition. The
work is done with so much intelligence and sympathetic care that
for most readers the abstracts may well supersede the originals,
though some can hardly fail to be led on by them to a direct con-
tact with the writers. Cabanis (1757-1808), the slightly younger
man, was, as long as he lived, perhaps the more prominent or
representative figure of the two, and he lived long enough to
cover not only the period of his yoke-fellow's effective authorship
p, i-icAYKT, LSS TDtOLOGU&S. L23
but also the whole time of their school's undisputed influence. He
had ;tll the Nvjinnth of nature and easy flow of utterance helpful
in the impressing and attaching oi other men. Though philoso-
])hic purpose was never absent, literary production took with him
a somewhat, wide and varied ratine. Of scholarly hahit from
youth, before taking up the medical profession, he wrote early
and late hnth as scholar and as physician; and in his master-work,
the iltippttrts <h( physique etdn >n<>r<il tlf riu'unm; which embodies
much oi his own medical experience, the literary touch is present
in a hi^h decree. It brought together a series of mem<ir> n-ad
to the Institute from 1796, some others being added when the
book was made up in 1802. By that time Cabanis, who had been
very active in support of Bonaparte's coup <T <*tttt in 1799, had his
disillusions ; and, suffering always from most uncertain health,
lie appears to have been anxious not to delay bringing out the
results of his protracted inquiry and reflexion on the mental
relations of mind and body. The book, as it appeared, has much
less of system and orderliness than Cabanis would claim for it ; but
it is more easy to understand the enthusiastic interest with which
it was received at the time than the comparative neglect into
which it lias later fallen. With an expert's knowledge of all that
had been discovered or surmised from Hippocrates downwards as
to the human bodily constitution, Cabanis set himself to bring it
into definite relation w r ith the results of mental introspection
pursued in the scientific spirit of Locke and Condillac. By
analysis of his own, he was able to bring into view, with more
clearness and precision than anybody before him, the whole
range of organic sensibility underlying the external senses.
Completely overlooked by Condillac, these " internal impressions,"
the simplest and most truly primordial of all human experiences,
reaching back as they must do to the period of foetal life, were
first understood by Cabanis in their peculiar psychological signifi-
cance, more especially in relation to the earliest (apparently)
automatic activities. But his merit lies less in a special dis-
covery like this, important as it is, than in his grasp of the
general position that, in their relation to bodily conditions and
processes, the facts of mental experience are to be taken directly
as such, apart from metaphysical construction. The "relations "
to be established are purely phenomenal. His clear perception
of this fundamental condition of scientific treatment lends a value
to his results which is hardly lessened by the imperfect knowledge
of the nervous system which belonged to his time. He distinctly
anticipated the position at which all psychophysical inquirers
now place themselves ; and, though in particular unguarded ex-
pressions, like that when he speaks of the brain as "eu (juc-lquc. sort
digesting impressions'' and as "performing organically the secre-
tion of thought," he lets himself be overborne for the moment by
the obviousness of the physical, yet even in the Rapports, still
more in the later Causes premi&res, he shows himself well aware
124 CRITICAL NOTICES :
of the unique import of conscious sensibility. The "relations "
established are, indeed, for the most part of a very general kind ;
but this was inevitable at starting. As a general basis for the
most developed doctrine of physiological psychology thus far
attained, his exposition may still effectively serve. Certainly, no-
thing in its way so striking has yet been produced by other hand.
Nor, for all the undeserved neglect with which he has been
treated by later inquirers, has even this been unrelieved. An
edition of the Rapports (and Causes premieres), issued in 1844 by
L. Peisse, is a model of careful and judicious commenting, all
the more valuable because of the perfect freedom of animadversion
which the editor feels bound to allow himself. This is the edition
to be recommended to the student who wants to go beyond M.
Picavet's admirable analysis.
Count Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) has had still less justice than
Cabanis from historians of philosophy. Lewes is almost alone in
giving prominence to either, but, while he seizes fairly enough the
importance of Cabanis, says nothing to the purpose in his two pages
on De Tracy. Yet De Tracy was a very remarkable man, and a
thinker whose performance is only less remarkable than his am-
bition. He now stands very well revealed in the biographical
facts and characteristics recorded of him by M. Picavefc, to which
there is only w r anting some more definiteness of detail towards
the end. A self-contained man, of high and strenuous purpose,
he had already been given to scientific study while playing the gay
soldier at court. When the revolution burst, he was forward to re-
sign all aristocratic privilege and range himself with the popular
party, though never exaggerating the social and political evils that
had to be redressed. Not all his patriotic ardour and self-sacri-
fice availed to save him from incarceration and imminent peril of
death at the height of the Terror. When he escaped condemna-
tion by the fall of Robespierre and was set free again, the studies
which he had calmly pursued in prison had brought him so far
as to see, by help of Condillac and Locke, that a " science of
ideas " was the thing above all needful for the advancement of
knowledge generally and for the conduct of life. This accordingly
he proceeded to develop, with gradually widening view, in a
series of Institute-memoirs from 1796, revised and recast for
publication in 1798. He had then hold of his main conceptions,
but their practical applications, educational and other, did not
become clear to him till he was called to act (1799-1800) on the
Council of Public Instruction ; and it was with an educational
purpose that he then gave to his philosophical views their
systematic form in three parts (Ideology proper, Grammar, Logic)
of Elements d'Ideologie, 1801-5. Later on he added a fourth part,
of Economics, and the beginning of a fifth part, of Morals, to-
wards a treatise of " Will and its Effects," as his first three parts
had together made up a treatise of " Understanding"; but,
though he had still, in 1817, some twenty years of life before him,
1 . PICAVET, AA'.V Il>'>L<x;t .
his powers were then confessedly >p -nt, and indeed it is hardly
beyond 1805 thai his philosophical impulse is to be reckoned. Up
to that time it worked with freedom and efficiency. Twofeatnn -s
of his thought are specially to be noted. (1) It is undoubtedly
from him that the import of conscious muscular activity for the
psychological problem of object first got distinct recognition.
('dndillar in l-'rance, Hume and Berkeley in England, had (aft-r
Lock.) each more or less clearly faced the problem ; Rousseau,
whose psychological tact (in milc) deserves more acknowledg-
ments than it has got, had descried the perceptual value of the
motor factor. But it was De Tracy that first put all together and,
though not without some wavering, laid the foundations of a
scientific theory which many hands have since helped to rear. To
the conception of object as primarily obstacle, one finds, on reading,
that he had already given the most definite expression ; and there
an- other points of moment in the theory, as the prior objective
character of the subject's own body in relation to all others,
which he anticipated with equal clearness. (2) Before Comte,
and in a profounder way than Comte, he conceived of human
knowledge as an inter-related system of positive sciences. The
very designation " positive," which has made its fortune in the
present century, is in use with De Tracy and others of the school.
Comte, there can be no doubt, took it from that source, and if he
had learned also the need of starting with what De Tracy liked
to call the "History of our Means of Knowing," his work of
scientific ordering might better have claimed its assumed title of
Philosophy. Particular ideas, too, commonly regarded as most
characteristic of Comte, are plainly foreshadowed in De Tracy or
Cabanis. These M. Picavet does not overlook ; and, altogether,
he is well justified in placing the great Positivist among the
" Auxiliaries, Disciples and Continuers " of the two Ideological
leaders.
The hundred pages under this title (399-497), in which he pro-
ceeds to muster these, with excellent effect, from all departments
of science and literature, can here only be mentioned ; nor can
more be done for his final chapter (pp. 498-570) on the " Third
Generation," in which are grouped round Degerando (Dugald
Stewart's friend) and Laromiguiere a number of minor figures,
spanning the whole time till with MM. Taine, Eibot and others
the movement of scientific psychology in France was started
afresh under foreign stimulus. Among the direct adherents of
Cabanis and De Tracy the man of greatest mark is Maine de Biran ;
the chief interest of his work, however, lying in the extent to
which he afterwards broke away from their lead. Him M. Picavet
leaves here aside (except in the way of frequent incidental re-
ference), but only to reserve him for special study in connexion
with a newly recovered Institute-memoir from the days of his
Ideological enthusiasm.
A few pages of " Conclusion " (571-83, followed by some inedita
126 CRITICAL NOTICES :
as appendix) are the less to be overlooked, because here M.
Picavet does what he can, in other way than by the much-missed
index, to bring together the multiplex threads of his whole
inquiry. In the last paragraphs of all, there is a striking imagina-
tion of the state of mind of an Ideologist transported from the
beginning of the century, when he worked so confidently for
human enlightenment and progress, to the century's end with its
vast increase of scientific knowledge but also increasing sense of
the limits set to positive science and its ever-growing burden of
social difficulties and perils. The Ideologist, it is allowed, would
have to abate much of his practical optimism, and could no longer
deal so lightly as he did with philosophical questionings because
they had failed of decision. None the less he might truly claim
to have done a real stroke of work in his day. He had broken
ground in every one of the lines upon which psychology has since
advanced, an effort only partially recognised in the foregoing
notice but admirably shown in the book itself. He had also had
his own measure of philosophic insight when he proclaimed that
all other human search and all human striving should own the
sway of a science of " Ideas".
G. GROOM KOBERTSON.
Vorlesungen uber die Algebra der Logik (Exakte Logik}. By Dr.
ERNST SCHRODER. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. Vol. I.
Pp. 717.
The appearance of the first volume a very bulky one of Dr.
Schroder's great work marks an important stage in the progress
of Exact Logic. With the exception of the brief former paper of
the same writer (Der Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls) the sub-
ject has hitherto received no presentation in Germany ; and, for
the purpose of making it accessible to the reader who approaches
it for the first time, this presentation is practically the only thing
that yet exists in any language.
Mr. Charles S. Peirce, to whom Symbolic Logic owes its
present state of development, wrote his papers with the brevity
and abstractness that befit a scientific journal. Dr. Schroder's
book will be objected to on the ground that it is unnecessarily
diffuse ; but it should be remembered that the subject has had
hard work to get itself recognised, and that it is a principle of
psychology that a certain degree of voluminousness in a sensation
is essential to the producing of a lasting impression. It must be
admitted that the book is discursive to the last degree. On the
other hand, it is not undesirable that everything that can be said,
by way of elucidation and reinforcement, should once be said ;
coming books can be written with all the greater conciseness. It
goes without saying that Dr. Schroder's book is a work of true
German thoroughness, and patience with teasing details ; it will
I-:. SCHBODBB, ALQJM&A />/-:/: LOOIK, 127
1). impossible hereafter for any one to write upon the subject
without having made himself familiar with the views set forth in
this volume.
The plan of Dr. Schroder in his book follows closely upon
that uf Mr. Peirce as set forth in Vol. III. of the Amrricnn ,////;//!/
</ Mutht'nmticx ; that is to say, all the formulae are established
1>\ analytical proofs based upon the definitions of sum, of pro-
duct, and of the negative, and upon the axiom of identity and
that of the syllogism. (Later it is found necessary to add
another axiom to cover one of the two parts of the distribution
la\v.) The proofs are, for the most part, the same as those ^i\cn
by Prof. Peirce, but frequently alternative proofs are given in
addition, and occasionally the method of treatment varies. Dr.
Schroder considers it an important difference between his treat-
ment and that of Mr. Peirce that with him (in this first volume)
the letters stand for classes (p. 290), while with Mr. Peirce they
stand for statements. This is not a strictly correct account of
Mr. Peirce's treatment. The great effect which that writer has
had in at once simplifying and extending the whole body of
logical doctrine (not merely its symbolic exposition) is based
upon his ulc nt (neat-ion of the proposition with the relation of
illation. It is plain that (provided universal propositions are
taken as not implying the existence of their terms)- there is no
difference between
The statement P implies the statement P lf or, if P then P,,
and
The term t implies the term t lt or, every t is a t lt
as far as the part they can play in a logical structure is concern i'il.
The relation between P and P x and the relation between t and t v
are both sufficiently defined by saying that they are transitive
relations, in the sense in which the term is used by De Morgan ;
that is (if we use a common sign ^ to express the common
relation), we shall have for a (dual) definition of the relation
S <P
(whether s and j9 stand for terms or for propositions), whatever p
is, that s shall also be ; or, whatever is s, that shall also be p. Ex-
pressed symbolically, this will be
s<p
is-the-same-tnmg-as
(*<*)<=(<*) D,
and is-the-same-thing-as
<*<)*.(*<*), D.
where # stands for anything whatever. This is, as it happens, in
strict accordance with Mill's account of the proposition ; he says
(Logic, eighth edition, p. 135) that it asserts that "all things
which have a certain attribute have along with it a certain other
128 CEITICAL NOTICES :
attribute," which is exactly what is asserted in D. Either D or
Dj amounts to a statement of the dictum de omni (in one the
s *\ P pl a Y s ^ ne P ar ^ f a ma jor premise, in the other of a minor
premise) ; 1 and Mill agrees with De Morgan that to give any
real meaning to the dictum de omni, we must consider it not as
an axiom but as a definition. In speaking of the relation
s ^ P m words, it is necessary to use the language either of the
term or of the proposition ; but everything that has just been said
of subject and predicate must be taken as having also been said
in terms of premise and conclusion, or of antecedent and con-
sequent (for it makes no difference for this purpose whether, in
' S-is-f olio wed-by P,' the following is of a logical or of an extra-
logical nature).
While this definition gives all the marks of " all ... is,'' or of
' is-always-followed-by ' that are essential to the building up of
the logical discipline, it does not (nor is it necessary to) dis-
tinguish them from other transitive relations, such as, for
instance, is-an-ancestor-of. It has, I believe, not been noticed
that the non-symmetrical negative copula, ' none but . . . is,' is
also included in the same definition. The proposition " none but
the brave deserve the fair," considered as a statement concerning
" the brave," has a distinctive copula, which I have proposed to
symbolise thus : b < d. Now the syllogism (easy in real life but
without the pale of the ordinary Logic)
None but the brave deserve the fair,
None but those who deserve the fair are happy,
.*. None but the brave are happy
exhibits exactly the same transitiveness as the syllogism in
Barbara. Symbolically expressed, it is
b<f,f<h, . . b < h.
That is to say, the character of transitiveness is possessed by
the negative non- symmetrical copula as well as by the copula
"all . . . is".
To return to Dr. Schroder, it is hence not strictly correct to
say that in the development of the subject by Mr. Peirce the
letters in x ^ y represent statements. After it has been shown
that, for the purposes of Logic, there is no difference between the
transitive relation for terms and the transitive relation for pro-
positions, it is assumed by Mr. Peirce that in x <^ y the letters
stand for either terms or propositions at pleasure. Dr. Schroder,
1 It must be noticed that the dictum as ordinarily stated is a very in-
sufficient description of the syllogism in Barbara, inasmuch as it leaves
out the part played by the minor premise altogether. As it stands, it
covers only immediate inference from the universal to the particular ;
to cover syllogism it should read : " "Whatever can be affirmed of the
whole can be affirmed of whatever can be shown to be a part of that whole,"
i.e., of what the minor has affirmed to be a part of that whole.
CHBdDBB, ./A'//-:///;./ />/:/; I.<;IK. 129
in ln-> -,erond volume (tin- advance sheets of part of which lie be-
fore as), develops tin- transitive relation for propositions, after
having dun.- it in the first volume tor terms. There are marks of
difference between the two owing to his assumption that -
jirii/ioxitioH can have solely tin- values () and 1
that ever] proposition is (during the limits of the discussion)
either always true or always false. But this is a most unfortu-
nate restriction. Why exclude from an Algebra which is in-
tended to cover all possihle instances of (n on -relative) reasoning
such propositions as 'sometimes when it rains I am pleased and
Sometimes. when it rains 1 am indifferent".' This restriction i^
the cause of a distinct error on the part of Dr. Schroder. !!,
considers that
x < y + z
is of a different content, according as the letters stand for term^ or
for propositions. It is true that if // or else z is said to be a loijical
consequence of x, then the logical consequence of a; is either
al\\u\s 'i or always z (or both) ; and it is also true that, on the
other hand, ' men are all either honest or else unhappy ' is satis-
fied by some individuals being honest and other individuals being
unhappy. But so also any unite rial prepositional sequence, such
as ' If it rains, either I stay in or else I take an umbrella/ is
satisfied by some instiiinrs of its raining being followed by my
staying in and all other instances being followed by my taking an
umbrella. Dr. Schroder, in fact, seems to pay too little attention
to material following. Logical following has its exact parallel in
the proposition in the case of the singular subject. ' She is either
a queen or a fairy ' doe not admit of part of her being a queen
and part of her being a fairy. There seems, in fact, to be a close
relationship between the logical sequence between propositions,
and the sequence between terms when the subject is singular.
Again, Dr. Schroder, after showing that, for propositions,
(a < b) = a + b,
that is, that
' If some are not wise, some will be unfortunate ' is-equivalent-
to
' Either all are wise, or else some are unfortunate,' asks, what
could be the meaning of this if a and b stood for terms instead of
for propositions ? The answer is very easy. The last sentence is
an abbreviated form made possible by the accidents of language
(see my paper on " Some Characteristics of Symbolic Logic,"
Am. Jnnr. of Psychology, 1889) for the complete statement,
1 All possible cases are included in cases of all being wise to-
gether with cases of some being unfortunate,' or,
' " The possible " implies that all are wise or else that some
are unfortunate '. That is, the full expression for the equation
written above is
130 CRITICAL NOTICES :
(a<6) = ( oc <a + 6).
When a and b are terms, this is
* All a is b' is-the-same-thing-as ' everything is either non-a or
else &,'
a transformation which is as valid and as simple for terms as it
is for propositions.
In his treatment of the signification of the negative term, a
subject upon which very many logicians have gone astray, Dr.
Schroder virtually sets forth the correct doctrine (for instance, on
p. 337), but not with quite sufficient constancy or clearness. It is
true that there is not much difference between the presence of a
quality and the absence of a quality, and hence that the significa-
tion of a negative term is of very much the same nature as that
of a positive term, so long as the quality which marks its significa-
tion is one and indivisible. It makes no difference whether we
divide numbers up into even and not-even or into odd and not-
odd. But the case is very different when we come to complex
qualities. We may set forth symbolically the two-fold force of
a term in the following fashion : Since the aggregate of objects
to which it applies is of the nature of a logical sum, and the con-
geries of qualities which it implies is of the nature of a logical
product, the full import of a term, as civilisation, c, will be
C = (Cj + C 2 + ) y l y, y s
where d, C 2 stand for all the different instances of its ap-
plication (as the civilisation of the Assyrians, that of the Greeks,
and so on), and y 1} y 2 , y 3 stand for all the elements which
are essential to its signification (as, being in the possession of
good laws, ensuring the safety of the person and of property,
securing a certain amount of happiness to a considerable number
of individuals, &c.), and where each one of the instances has all
of the essential qualities attached to it. What will then be the
negative of the term civilisation ? It will be, in accordance with
the usual rule for taking the negative
C = Ci^Ca (y! + y 2 + y 3 );
that is, the non-civilisations are, at once, not any one of
the civilisations, and at the same time they have the
quality of being deficient in some one, at least, of the qualities
that are essential to a thing's being a civilisation (the qualities,
that is, in the absence of any one of which we should refuse to
apply the name). The intent of the positive term and of the
negative term are therefore extremely different ; the one involves
a combination of quality-elements, the other an alternation of
absences of quality-elements. It is only in the case of terms of
indivisible intent (as hot, cold, blue, heavy, parallel) that the
difference between them becomes insignificant. When, therefore,
B, SCHKODKK, ALQBBRA />/:/; I.<;IK. \:\\
Lotze " wittily" says, as quoted by Dr. Schriider (p. 99), that it
remains a for ever insoluble task to abstract the qualities of tin:
not-man. In- says what is true but unimportant. Not-tnan is not
destitute of intent, as Lotze says it is, but its intent consists in
an alti'nuitiuii <>f fA7/V/Vw/V.s- of sonic 0116, nt //v/.v/, i\f the t'leinents
of the intent of niiin. This Dr. Schroder virtually says when he
Bays that the characteristic group of marks of man do not occur
in not man, "or not completely" (p. 337). But he does not dis-
tinctly state the doctrine that the signification (intent) of a j
tiv< term is of the nature of a logical product, while that of a
negative term is of the nature of a logical sum.
In Dr. Schroder's discussion, twenty pages long, of the im-
port of negative judgments, there is a greater amount of error
mixed up with a large amount of sound and much-needed doctrine.
He shows, with justice, that it is a strange oversight on the part
of logicians to say that * A is not B ' is the denial of ' A is B '. It
is so only in case A is a singular term. ' All A is B ' is denied
either by * not all A is B ' or by 4 some A is not B,' and not by
4 all A is not B '. But it does not follow that the not in a negative
sentence must always be attached to the predicate term. Schroder
would discard from logic altogether such sentences as " geese
are-not swans," and substitute for them " geese are not-swans" ;
that is, he would uniformly interpret the sentence as ordinarily
printed " geese are not swans " (where the meaning is "no
are swans"), in the latter sense and not in the former.
While the mistake of ordinary logicians is due, as Dr. Schroder
points out, to their forgetting, for the moment, the existence of
other-than-singular subjects, he commits himself the corre-
sponding error of neglecting the study of non-simple predicates,
and of predicates separated by phrases from the copula are-not.
Take the first negative sentence I come to on opening a volume
of MIND: " Moral intuitions are not, any more than intellectual
intuitions, simple and original ". Here the effort to think the not
aii attachment to the predicate, simple-and-original, is quite futile.
It is true that such sentences as " All A's are not B's " are am-
biguous, and hence that a strict rhetoric requires us to avoid them ;
and that, moreover, when they do occur they are usually to
be taken in the sense of the particular negative (that is,
with the not attached to the all), as in " All that glitters is not
gold ". Nevertheless they are of frequent occurrence when
the all is not expressed but understood ; and, moreover, a
negative copula is needed for the expression of the proposition
" no A is B ". Far from presenting any difficulties in a symbolic
treatment of logic, the copula " no ... is " or " is-wholly-not " has
two very important advantages over the copula "all ... is" or " is-
wholly ". In the first place, it is not necessary, in solving problems,
to transpose all the terms into the subject, there is no (logical) dif-
ference between subject and predicate. In the second place, the
number of theorems which constitute the body of the doctrine is re-
132 CRITICAL NOTICES :
duced by one half, a single statement with this copula is the
representative of a statement together with its dual opposite in
terms of the other copula. These are advantages which are pos-
sessed by both of the symmetrical copulas, ' no A is B ' and ' all
but A is B ' l ; and by neither of the unsymmetrical copulas, ' all
A is B ' and ' none but A is B '. ' All A is B ' has, of course, a
great superiority in point of naturalness, but the others ought -not
to be treated as if they were non-existent.
When it comes to the solution of problems, Dr. Schroder dis-
cards altogether Mr. Peirce's method, which consists in a con-
sistent carrying out of the properties of the copula ^, for the far
simpler method of first reducing the second member of the state-
ment to " zero," or " non-existent," that is, of transposing all
the terms into the first member of the statement. His treatment
of this part of his subject could not be improved upon.
A number of interesting points we have left ourselves no room
bo speak about. Dr. Schroder proves that subtraction and
division are inexecutible operations, and that the words are pure
nonsense-words in Logic. He also shows that only an historical
interest attaches to the labours of Boole in the field of symbolic
Logic, A particularly interesting passage is that in which he
proves that the second subsumption of the distribution-law, viz.,
a (b + c) <r ab + ac,
cannot be deduced from the other axioms and the definitions, by
showing that in the logical calculus of groups all these other
axioms and definitions hold but that this subsumption is not true.
Into that calculus, however, the idea of the negative does not
enter ; hence it is only proved that the above subsumption cannot
be deduced from the axioms and definitions exclusive of the
definition of the negative.
CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN.
Spinoza's Erkenntnisslehre in ihrer Beziehung zur modernen
Naturwissenschaft und Philosophic. Allgemein verstandlich
dargestellt von Dr. Martin Berendt und Dr. rned. Julius
Friedlander. Berlin : Mayer & Miiller, 1891. Pp. xix., 315.
In spite of ail that has been written about Spinoza, the authors
of this work have contrived to say something new. There are
important differences in the theory of knowledge as set forth in
Spinoza's successive works the Short Treatise, the De Intellectus
Emendatione, and the Etliica and, even in its final form, it is
held to be far from clear by most of those who have expressly
examined it. I know of no other discussion which can compare
1 It is virtually in terms of this copula that Mr. Mitchell has developed
his Algebra of Logic.
8 KKKKNNTNISHl. Mini'..
for thoroughness with that of the present writers. They hold
that Spiiio/a's view hitherto misunderstood or in-elected is not
only perfectly consistent, but of the greatest importance for the
true understanding of his philosophy: showing especially the
harmony of the scientific and idealist aspects of his thought.
Much ingenuity, both of argument and illust rat ion. is displayed by
the authors in defending this position. A concluding chapter
itself occupying more than a third of the volume is devoted to a
controversial vindication of it. The style throughout is clear and
forcible, and the earlier chapters are well adapted to interesl the
educated public as well as professed students of philosophy, lint
why. we may be allowed to ask, do German publishers send out
books in such a 'questionable shape'? Are German readers too
short sighted to notice misprints? Are page-headings of no value
to them? Do they despise a table of contents because they
always unlike Dr. Johnson read books through?
To the authors, Spinoza is the philosopher par excellence. The
content of his teaching apart from its scholastic form is, they
Bay, in immediate touch with all the problems of our time, and
in complete agreement with the results of modern science, the
Mindamental principles of which he anticipated (pp. ix., xiv.). In
works to follow on the Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy of
Spinoxa, the authors seem to contemplate a complete exposition
of Spinoza from this point of view. The present work breaks the
ground by its new explanation and defence of Spinoza's Episte-
mology : especially of the relation between Ratio and the Scicnha
Iiituitini, and of the true meaning and importance of the latter.
Spinoza, they hold, is the true intuitive philosopher.
Spinoza's official statement of the different kinds of knowledge
is given in the second scholium to Eth. ii. 40. There he distin-
guishes the first kind as Imagination or Opinion, got either by the
' experientia vaga,' which determines sense-perception, or from the
spoken or written symbols, which call up ideas of things. To this
kind of knowledge belong all inadequate and confused ideas, and
it is the only source of falsity. Truth and adequate ideas result only
from the second and third' kinds of knowledge ; namely, Keason
and Intuition. Keason depends upon the fact that we have
notions common to all men and adequate ideas of the properties
of things ; Intuition proceeds from the adequate idea of the formal
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of
the essence of things.
If I may put very briefly the authors' interpretation of this
doctrine, I should say that Imagination is the knowledge of
every-day life; Keason, the method of science; and Intuition,
the exercise of scientific and philosophical genius, of artistic
insight and creation. Taken in general, this interpretation seems
to me suggestive and valuable ; but it does not seem to me capable
of being fully reconciled with the spirit or letter of Spinoza's
writings.
134 CEITICAL NOTICES I
With regard to the first kind of knowledge, little need be
said except with regard to its relation to Eeason. Eeason,
according to our authors, investigates the laws of the
material world, seeks a knowledge of the properties not of
the essence of things, and uses the method of experimental
research (p. 40). It is afterwards added that it has to do
with the mental as well as material sciences the attribute of
thought as well as that of extension (p. 178). There is an
attractive boldness in making Spinoza's ' Eatio ' a pattern of
modern experimental method. And the authors have said what
can be said in favour of their view. Spinoza was himself keenly
interested in experimental research ; and the value and necessity
of experiment is pointed out in the De Int. Em. In that treatise
also, the kind of knowledge which corresponds to the ' Eatio ' of
the Ethica is spoken of as twofold in method either proceeding
from effect to cause or drawing a conclusion from some universal.
But this kind of knowledge is still regarded by Spinoza as inade-
quate. The one passage in the Ethica upon which the authors
rely for their doctrine that ' Eatio ' proceeds by observation and
experiment is in ii. 29, schol., where the mind's inadequate ideas
are said to be due to its being determined externally by the play
of circumstances while it has clear ideas when determined from
within ' ' by regarding several things at once to understand their
agreements, differences and contrasts ". But it is not clear that
Spinoza is thinking of experiment here. It is certainly not so
brought out in the sequel to which he refers. He is contrasting
the ideas produced from within w r ith the inadequate ideas pro-
duced by ' experientia vaga ' . Spinoza speaks of this latter in very
similar terms to those in which Bacon refers to the ' inductio per
simplicem enumerationem ' ; but he does not speak of any sifting
experimental process whereby the one knowledge derived from
sense-impressions may rise to rational knowledge. On the con-
trary, adequate ideas can with him only proceed from adequate
ideas. Thus in Epist. 42 (June 10, 1666) he says both that " all
the clear and distinct perceptions which we form can arise only
from other clear and distinct perceptions," and that these per-
ceptions " are in us and do not acknowledge any cause external "
to us. Nor may we forget that in the express definition of Eatio
(where it is made to depend upon the fact that we have notions
common to all men and adequate ideas of the properties of things)
there is no reference to particulars of observation or experiment,
but only to that which things have in common, namely, as regards
bodies, the attribute of extension, and motion or rest (ii. lemma
2). In face of this, I cannot think that the authors make good
their contention that Spinoza's conception of ' Eatio ' coincides
with the modern conception of scientific method.
These points, however, they try to meet. One consideration
which they hardly face is the bearing upon their view of the
eternity which Spinoza ascribes to rational method. They lay
SPINOZA S BRKNNTyi88LXHRX. 135
stress indeed on the point that reason is said to regard its objects
only .--//A </H,ii/(t.in n-frniifiiffx tt/wir : l)Ut in tin- same sentence
S|>inoza says that the objects of reason must be conceived
without any relation to time. If we follow Spinoza's view of
'Katio,' as having only timeless objects, how can we say that it
is the method of modern biology or of modern psycholo^'
Benson may, as Spinoza teaches, lead to a different kind of
knowledge which he calls intuitive; but the nature of this
intuitive knowledge is left almost entirely unexplained by him.
Tli- authors compare it with Habit in the practical sphere, and
point to its activity in speculative genius and artistic insight.
Hut the nature of these activities and the way in which they
arise out of reason are not very clearly explained by the authors.
Nor is it at all certain that Spinoza would have admitted the
identification of his intuitive knowledge with (e.g.) the stroke of
genius by which Kepler reached his conception of the law of plane-
tary motion (p. 58). It would be hard to show that this con-
ception was reached by a different kind of mental process than
the other hypotheses which he successively formed and rejected.
They were rejected by him and it was preferred, not because it
was a stroke of genius, and they were not, but because it ex-
plained the facts and they did not. And yet how could the false
as well as the true conception be the object of Intuition, seeing
that Intuition has only true ideas as its object?
In comparing or identifying Intuition with scientific or philo-
sophical genius, the authors seem to overlook the fact which
they elsewhere lay great stress upon, that the object of Intuition
is the individual. The following passage states their view with
great clearness :
" Whilst the object of rational knowledge is the mechanical
movements of the material world and its laws, on the other
hand, the object of intuitive knowledge is the essence of things,
the real content of nature and its creatures which receives
expression in these mechanical movements. This content we
have recognised to be in Spinoza's view Desire (Cupiditas), the
will of beings and their impulse to self-preservation " (p. 99).
This essence, too, as the authors properly insist, the force to
persist in one's being, is not mechanically determined but pro-
ceeds from the eternal necessity of the nature of God (ii. 43
schol.). As they further insist following indeed closely in
Spinoza's footsteps it must be distinguished from Continu-
ance or Existence which depends on external circumstances.
The essence of man is therefore argue the authors his
character; which is accordingly free and independent. And
thus the authors draw the conclusion that when we look upon
tilings not from the merely rational point of view, but with the
artistic and prophetic glance of intuition, we shall see human
characters and even States constantly reborn : Alexander the
Great, in Caesar and Cromwell and partially in Frederick the
136 CRITICAL NOTICES : SPINOZA'S ERKENNTNI88LEHRE.
Great and Prince Bismarck ; while (amongst States) imperial
Eome, of course, lives again in modern Prussia. In spite of the
length at which and the evident seriousness with which this idea
is developed, only one or two points of criticism upon it can
be suggested here. In the first place, there is no room in
Spinoza's theory for this occasional and spasmodic rebirth.
The immortality which is to be found in Spinoza's view of
things is eternal or timeless being of particular things.
Especially, the idea of a partial reappearance of a particular
thing (or man) is entirely foreign to his view. Secondly,
it is true that character must be constant and unchange-
able, if Spinoza's eternal individuals are characters. It
might have been expected that if this were the authors'
meaning they would not have used the term Character in
its full concreteiiess ; and yet they do use the term so as to
include even the passions of man, which must therefore, in
consistency, be looked upon as unchanging. In the third place,
the basis of the whole speculation is the proposition that the
essence of a thing is its tendency to persist in its being. But
surely this proposition cannot stand by itself. The essence of a
thing is to persist in its being. What then is its being ? The
authors do not answer the question ; but Spinoza's answer is
plain. In asserting that in the human mind there remains
something which is eternal (v. 23), Spinoza at the same time
asserts that this eternal something which belongs to the essence
of the mind is a mode of thinking or idea.
W. E. SORLEY.
Ylll. Ni:\\ BOOKS.
!>.< (Jenie. Vortrag < iehalten ini Saale des In^'-nii-nr und Architek-
tenvereins in Wien \on I-'I:ANX. BfiBNTANO. I.eip.
DunckerA Humblo. i-,,. :is.
This booklet i> worthy of it- author. It i- ;i ma-terpiece of psycho-
logical analysis. Tin- question diseii-sed is whether tin- difference be-
tween grnius and mere talent is one of derive or of kind. In dealing
with it a happy application is made of tin- Cartesian rules to divide
of the difficulties under examination into as many pai -ilil.-
and to ;is,-riid step I >\ step from what is simplest and easiesl to \\ I
mosl difficult and complex. Scientific genius is distinguished from
artistic and the genius exhibited in imitative art is dist in^ui-hed from
that exhibited in creative art. It is easy to show by tlie testimony of the
great masters of BOienoe and 1>\ analysis of their work tliat the intel-
lectual operations of epoch- making disc<>\ erers do notdit'l'er in kind from
tlio-~e of ordinary men. So far all is plain. The iliHiriilty h'.-.^iiis wlien
we turn from science to art. Nearly all great poets, painter-, -culptors
and musicians a^ r ree in ascrihin^ their productions to a kind of inspira-
tion. Is pay obological explanation possible in 6noh cases ? Can the in-
spiration of a (ioethe, no less than the tentative jropini,' of a I.e inu r ,
be accounted for as the result of ordinary mental pr Brentano
thinks that it can. In the case of imitative art the difficulty is com-
paratively slight. What is essential here is vivid and discriminative
vision together with persistent and clear retention of those featur-
natural objects which are efficient in the production of artistic effect,
as distinguished from the irrelevant circumstances by which this effect
is impaired and obscured. But this power of selective insight admits of
all gradations. It belongs in some degree to many persons who po
no extraordinary artistic gifts. It amounts to genius when it is so rapid,
vivid, and complete as to render superfluous the use of rules, and the
laborious groping, which seeks its end by repeated trials and failures. For
imitative art, then, the difference of genius and talent is one of degree,
not of kind. The case of creative art is more complex. But the frequent
union of great creative and great imitative powers in the same person
points to their fundamental affinity. On closer examination we find
them to be connected in so intimate a way that the explanation which
has been given for imitative genius may by a simple application of
psychological principles be extended to creative genius.
The more distinct and vivid a certain class of presentations is, the
more keen and persistent is the interest which they inspire in the sub-
ject, the more frequently will they tend to recur in the train of ideas.
Further, not only is reproduction aided by these conditions, but produc-
tion also of similar presentations is facilitated. Custom dominates all
departments of our mental life. When a circumstance has once made
us angry, we become on that account not only more apt to feel anger on
the recurrence of the same incident, but also more prone to anger in
general. This applies to forms of ideal combination as much as to the
ideas combined. One who enjoys epigrams and eagerly listens to them
hnds that new ones occur to him the more readily for that rt .
Similarly we are apt to acquire something of the style of a favourite
author apart from any express attempt at imitation. This principle
138 NEW BOOKS.
enables us to connect the creative power of an artist with the vividness
of his artistic interest and the keenness of his artistic apprehension.
The same power which enabled Mozart at the age of fourteen, after a
single hearing of the Miserrere Allegris, to write down from memory the
whole complicated work without one error, serves also to account for
his greatness as an original composer, who without thinking of rules
and without tentative efforts commanded an unfailing flow of new, com-
plex and beautiful combinations.
EDITOR.
The present Position of the Philosophical Sciences. An Inaugural Lecture.
By ANDREW SETH, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the
University of Edinburgh. London and Edinburgh : William Black-
wood & Sons.
After a graceful reference to his predecessor, the newly-e]ected Pro-
fessor proceeds to examine the special value of Logic, Psychology and
Metaphysics, respectively, as instruments of intellectual training. He
then considers the "present outlook in the three departments" and
" the way in which a philosophical Professor should shape his work at
the present time". "If we penetrate beneath the surface and examine
the foundations on which Logic rests, it becomes impossible to main-
tain a rigid distinction between it and Metaphysics and Episternology.
For that reason the very conception or definition of the science has long
been matter of keen debate, and at present the aspect of things is con-
fessedly chaotic." But the chaos "is of the kind which portends and
accompanies growth, and bears on it the promise of future order".
Prof. Seth says a good word for " the ordinary formal logic, origin-
ally based upon Aristotle ". It has, he thinks, a distinct educational
value and " its names and distinctions have entered so largely into the
thought, and even the familiar language of the civilised races, that a
certain acquaintance with its forms and processes may well be demanded
in the interests of historical culture ". It is noteworthy that Prof.
Seth ignores symbolic logic. What is said about Psychology is of
especial interest and value. " It is certain that in the near future no
philosopher will speak with authority, or will deserve so to speak, who
does not show a competent acquaintance with the best w r ork in psy-
chology." " The marvellous activity displayed " in this department " is
perhaps the most notable feature in the present state of the philosophical
sciences". Such work as "Mr. Ward's masterly treatise in the Eiicyclo-
pcedia Britcmnica and the rich and stimulating volumes published a year
ago by Prof. James of Harvard" may "not unreasonably be taken
as marking the new departure that has been achieved in psychology
the critical maintenance of a purely psychological standpoint, the
wider range of material, the more minute and experimental analysis ".
Prof. Seth has the courage and the insight to say that the " experi-
mental psychologists magnify their office overmuch". The field of
experiment is necessarily limited to ''those cases where we are able to
manipulate the physical and physiological processes which condition
mental facts". "Within these limits, the results are often so contra-
dictory as to leave everything in doubt ; where definite results are
obtainable, their value is often not apparent." This is indeed a word
in season. Prof. Seth, however, thinks it " impossible that so much
patient ingenuity should be devoted to analysing the sub-structure of
our mental life without ultimately important effects upon our knowledge
of the psychological mechanism ; '. Turning to Philosophy proper,
Prof. Seth declares his opinion that " the outlook is not discouraging ".
M:W BOOKS. 1 -"'.'
'I In- time has gone by in \\hich vi tli<- v;i . science"
diverted men's attentioi] ir..m "tin- problems \\hich lie beneath and
iM-liinil all science. Among tin- point- on \\ln.-h hilo-uphy
should lax i 'i-omiliein Q to tilt- liece- I6O-
1 \i'ew of the universe." "Jt i- onl\ when contemplated in the
light of a realised idea that an\ one -peaks of a series of changed as
iii an evolution: a speculation which does not Bee that evolution -pell-
purpose has not made clear to itself the difference between progress ami
aimle-- variation. 11 On the \\hole this inaugural lecture contain- a mo-t
hiininous and judicious statement of the po-ition and pro
I'hilo-Mph\ .
l.i'lTOR.
Lt Cfinn >'f I" I'l'im: 1'ar l.oris I'HOAI.. Conseiller a la coiir d'
Ou\rau r e Couronne par 1'Academie des Science-, Moral.- et 1'oli-
timies. Paris : Alran. 1891 (dated 1892). Pp.544.
This pri/e essav has been written by a magistrate with some twent\
experience. In a prefatory rapport M. Martha remarks that it i-
a sober ami well-ordered treatise, not brilliant but marked by moral
dignity, elevated sentiments, and urbanity towards opponent-. This is
a verv just appreciation. M. Proal's standpoint is non-scientific and
non-philosophic ; one is at times tempted to describe it as anti-philoso-
phic. The book is an attack on Darwinism and Determinism. With
Darwinism M. lYoal associates the so-called "positive" school of law
connected with the names of Garofalo and E. Ferri, and the Italian
school of criminal anthropology connected with the name of Lornbroso.
With the cause of Determinism, against which the latter half of the book
is directed, he associates the well-known names of Herbert Spencer,
Fouiilee, (luyau, and Tarde. Caro and M. Jules Simon are the writer- to
whom he himself chielly looks for philosophic instruction. M. 1'roal'-
chief characteristic is common-sense a somewhat dangerous charac-
teristic. He demolishes Determinism with the same ease with which
Dr. Johnson demolished Idealism. He illustrates his own remark that
t rates exhibit "an extreme attachment to common-sense, an ex-
love of tradition, and an exaggerated scepticism with respect to
new ideas". His book is certainly free from novelties, dangerous or
otherwise. At the same time, as tin- work of a man who has had a lomj
acquaintance with the more practical sides of the matter he is discussing,
it is not altogether without value, although this value is for tho-e who
an- interested in the medico-legal aspects of criminality rather than in
its scientific or philosophic aspects. His criticism of the exaggerations into
which the criminal anthropologists have sometimes fallen is fn-i|iientl\
just, and his position is very sound in opposition to those who try to
reconcile the old and the new schools by retaining the conception of
penalit y while dropping that of culpability : either the criminal is guilty
and must be punished in a prison, or he is suffering and must be treated
in an a-\lum; to admit that the criminal is a sufferer and then to
punish him is to place the magistrate in an awkward and inconsistent
OH. M. 1'i'oal appear* never to have heard of the experiments that
have been made in the treatment of criminality. He makes no mention
of the indeterminate sentence nor of the Elmira Reformatory. He takes
it for granted that to regard the criminal as a subject for reformation
rather than for punishment is to encourage crime. But in this country
at all events the criminal frequently dreads the asylum and the work-
house much more than the prison, and will not easily consent to a plea
140 NEW BOOKS.
of insanity. The book is chiefly interesting because it expresses with
unusual intelligence and erudition the traditional conceptions of crimina-
lity current among lawyers and magistrates.
H. ELLIS.
Ueber Bewegungsenpfindungen. Von E. B. DELABARRE. Freiburg i. B. :
H. Epstein, 1891. Pp. iii., 111.
This investigation, a Freiburg dissertation, written under Dr. Miin-
sterberg's direction, is a somewhat disappointing contribution to the
literature which deals with the sensation of movement ; although it
contains good experimental work. The author prefaces his book with
a general introduction, which is little more than a reproduction of Dr.
Mtinsterberg's theory of volition. This is followed by a critical dis-
cussion of the nature and constituents of the sensation of movement,
which is in many ways suggestive, but by no means conclusive. But
for a misunderstanding of Wundt's present position, it would hardly
have been necessary to devote two and twenty pages to disproving the
existence of central innervation sensations : for Loeb's recent revival
of the theory has small psychological importance. In the paragraph
which deals with muscle-sensations is to be found the common confusion
between Spannung and Contraction or Verkurzung. It is to be hoped that
the two latter terms will some day be banished from Muscle-physiology, to
be replaced by Erregung, which is clearly and definitely distinguishable
from Spanimng. Dr. Delabarre, again, hardly proves his point that the
sensation of movement is an " unmittelbare Empfindung," and not a
" Vorstellung ". In the second part of the research is recorded the
author's experimentation upon the exactness of our estimation of the
extent of a movement. It was found, in general, that those distances
were judged equal whose "sensory elements" were judged equal. Any
disturbing influence exercised upon the latter judgment, if it were not
apperceived as a disturbance, acted upon the former also. Where the
re-agent was conscious of the introduction of a new factor, he always
made allowance for it : but such correction was not exact. These rules
are valid for the comparison of successive as well as of simultaneous
movements. In the former case, of course, the time-error has to be
taken into account.
It is to be hoped that Dr. Delabarre will continue his work in this
direction. There is much to be gained from such experiments : while
those here reported (as the author admits : pp. 91, 103. 105, 107, 110),
are in many cases not numerous enough to warrant the drawing of a
definite conclusion. It would also be well to put to the test of experi-
mental investigation several points which are taken for granted in the
course of the discussion.
E. B. TlTCHENER.
Jiducatwn et Positivisme. Par E. THAMIN. Ancien eleve de 1'Ecole nor-
male superieure ; charge du cours de pedagogic a la Faculte des
lettres de Lyon, 1892. Pp. iii., 186. Felix Alcan (Bibliotheque de
Philosophic Contemporaine).
As an inquiry into the nature of the influence of Comte and his
disciples upon education this work occupies a unique position. Cornte
himself left unfulfilled the promise made in the < 'ours de philosophic
positive. Only from his remarks upon Gall and from the general prin-
ciples laid down in his own writings can we gather what would have
been the character of his pedagogy. In all probability the master would
NEW BOOKS. 1-11
ha\e hern di--at islied with the attempts of his di-ripl.--> to atone for his
silence. Although Comte would perhap- ha\e acknoulrdu'rd i|,
enc\clop ; rdic s\stem such as hi- "\\n inij,'ht \\rll he te-t.-d h\ tin-
method .if education deducihle therefrom, \-t attempts ti .-xplint |\
formulate such a method ha\e hern singularly feu. This jo\cr:
VlBi pedagogic literature b e. .mim-nt rd on l.\ M. Com-
pa\iv, u ho telU us in his ///s/n/'/v I'flji'/ii, //- x 1 )<! i-i , t , ., ./. /'/-.'./
l''r<in<; that liobin's I.' I n.^rniiinii > t I' Eil in;itinn is the only contribute
an\ importance trom roiit ein| iorarv | >osit I \ i-l -. 'I'o tins may he added
i.allemand's l-jl unit i<,,i /'ill,! i<jii>. \\'e may | a-s over the alt ! npt - of the
triimiN irate, M M. l.ittiv, Uol-m and NN'yroubofl', toeairx their pr-
praet ice, for t he school t he \ started tailed, a- M . 1 .it t iv lament -, for lack of
stinlents, stall', and salaries, 1 1' \\e cast about us for the principle.-, from
Which the po-iti\ist pcda^o.^y may he deduced, \\ e find them ill the
"law" "t the Three States and t he classilicat ion of t lie >ci-in-es. Thr
hypothesis of the Three State- is the parent stock upon which succes-
si\ e authorities ha\e grafted further hypotheses. The clarification of
the BOienoea Wafl snl.jected \>\ Comtr to certain restrictions, \\hich, how-
have heen rejected by his disciples. Jt is the application to educa-
tion of these two dogmas, distorted as they sometimes seem to he, beyond
recognition, that M. Thamin sets himself to discuss. How is the Law
of the Three States applied to pedagogy? According to M. Thamin it
is applied in Spencer's adoption of Pestalozzi's principle that the u r eiiesi-
of knowledge in tlie indi\ idnal must follow the same course as the
^ene>i> of knowledge in the race. There is, he thinks, a fallacy in the
identification of these two processes-, n '.., that of the evolution of the
mind of man throughout the past, and that of the education of the
individual intellect. "Humanity is not a being but a series, several
parallel series of generations, and there are countless interruptions to
the continuity of thought." The positive instinct should have prevented
positi\ Uts from yielding to the temptation to realise abstractions, to treat
collect ixities as pci-ons, to consider humanity as a single being of regular
growth. Tut assuming the application to be legitimate, the question at
once occurs: If heredity marks out the limits and periods of intellec-
tual progress, if evolution does its work as faithfully and inevitably a-
Spencer asserts (Education, p. 76), must not education in most cases be
tantamount to the "unconscious carrying out of a programme the com-
binations in which are anterior to us and escape our influence " ? Per-
haps Mr. Spencer merely wishes to frustrate the premature attempts of
an inexperienced master, and to teach the value of the adage festimi /' nf< .
The danger, however, still remains that masterly inactivity on the
teacher's part may be misinterpreted by his pupil. Silence gives con-
sent, and therefore non-intervention is impracticable. And there is the
yet further danger that the teacher may mistake the course of evolution
and modify the young intellect in the wrong direction. The temptation
to anticipate the future would be sometimes irreMstihle. Why not skip
tlu second state and go on to the third ? An experienced teacher might
well suppose in many cases that pressure on his part would be the exer-
of charitable foresight. Thus, concludes M. Thamin, either the
teacher must abdicate his functions altogether, or he must exercise the
WOIM form of intolerance, i.e., methodic intolerance. I think, however,
that M. Thamin is probably making too much of Mr. Spencer's section
on this point. He evidently has not noticed the remarkable difference
between the forcible preliminary statement : " The education of the
child must accord," &c., and the weaker form of the final summing up :
" In deciding upon the right method ... an inquiry into the method of
14'2 NEW BOOKS.
civilisation will help to guide us '"'. (Education, pp. 75, 77. Italics mine.)
The application of the dogma of the classification of the sciences to
pedagogy by Littre, Narval, and others is ably handled. Attention is
drawn to the wild pretension of the positivists that their system closely
follows nature and confines itself to responding to the secret instincts of
the intellects they are forming. Mr. Spencer presents us with the
paradox that the criterion of any plan of education is that it should
excite pleasure in the child, " for a child's intellectual instincts are more
trustworthy than our reasons ". This, says M. Thamin, is the negation
of discipline, method, and " I may add of all progress ". The author
might have given as the best instance of the concrete results of such a
system the experiments at Yasnaia Poliana. Most teachers will, I
think, be found to agree with Mr. Spencer's " paradox," if presented in a
less dogmatic form. We certainly should be guided to some extent by
the likes and dislikes of a child, but experience shows us that it is easy
and dangerous to attach too much importance to them. But how far is
dislike due to bad teaching ?
Although positivism was powerless to carry into practice its prin-
ciples, it has nevertheless exercised an influence, the more potent be-
cause it has been indirect. The classification of the sciences, incapable
of giving a plan to education, has given it a mot d'ordre science. The
general idea of recent positivism may be summed up as a definition of
end and means. " Science the end and humanity the means." The
main body of Combe's doctrine has been relegated to obscurity. Posi-
tivism was a school ; now it is a mere label. M. Thamin proceeds to
show how an esoteric positivism was formed, and how doctrines anterior
to positivism itself were incorporated by it, thereafter appearing as
ramifications from it. For example, " Comte proclaimed himself a dis-
ciple of Gall. All modern disciples of Gall, in grateful reciprocity, pro-
claim themselves disciples of Comte." The introduction of physiology
into psychology is positivism. Again, positivism "must be utilitarian.
Economists, historians, sensualists and empirics are all affected by the
same influence. " The formula in which is summed up positivism
properly so-called is also a summary of the whole movement of ideas
of which the word positivism is now the clearest symbol."
The rest of M. Thamin's volume is devoted to a detailed criticism of
the pedagogy of Spencer, Bain and J. S. Mill. To the schoolmaster in
this country these studies should be of exceptional interest. In
Spencer's Education and Prof. Bain's Education as a Science we find
laid down general principles, the truth of which has never been overtly
challenged. In fact, with the exception of the late Mr. R. H. Quick, it
may be said that from a theoretical standpoint no criticism of their
doctrines has been forthcoming. Want of space forbids me to discuss
the formidable indictment M. Thamin has drawji up against Mr. Spencer.
Prof. Bain is more gently handled. The copious detail of Education
as a Science would naturally give plenty of opportunity for criticism, but
M. Thamin confines himself mainly to Prof. Bain's treatment of a
few great principles, such as : the doctrine of natural reactions ; the
value of object lessons ; the sketch of secondary studies (pp. 390-396) ;
the classics (pp. 359-387) ; (Bain, pp. 247-268), &c. The chapter on John
Stuart Mill treats of the education of Mill himself, and also of the
educational principles laid down by him in his Logic address at St.
Andrews, &c. An appendix contains a vigorous assault upon the
theoretical and practical positivism which has led to the attack in France
upon the teaching of philosophy even in its universities. To sum up.
As a contributor to the history of pedagogy, M. Thamin is practically on
NK\v BOOKS. 1 !"
untrodden ground. Tin.- influence of po-it i\ i-m tlM l"--n li.uvly touched
upon by either 1'ivnch or Knglish writers. The book therefore fill- a
gap. As a contribution to tin- question of the respective values of the
ancient humanities modern Immunities, and science, as the basis of
secondary education, this volume will be welcomed in France; for it
Appears "at tin- right psyohotogioal moment". Finally, schoolmasters
in this country will find M. Thainin a sate guide. \\V ^hould certainly
he grateful to him for his sane, tempi-rate, and convincii; in of
the virus of the theorists who have exercised most influence OB
educational systems of this country.
\v. -i. ( tara
Causalitiit uml Kntiricklnng in der Metaphysik Augustins. 1. Teil. I
gural nissertation y.ur Krlangung der Doctorwiirde der Philo^oph
isclien Facultat der Universtiit Jena Vorgelegt von Jon
CHKISTINNKCKK: G. Neuenhahn, Universitiits-Buchdr, 1891.
In this little brochure Dr. Christinnecke gives us a brief summary "f
the oosmologioal and metaphysico-theological doctrines of Augustine,
I'.ishop of Hippo. Augustine's mission was to prove that Greek iiietii-
physic and Christian dogma could be united in a rational system of the
universe. He constituted himself the exponent of the natural philosophers
who found themselves at the same time members of the comparatively
new Christian community at the commencement of the fifth century A.I>.
The problem the physicists, or metaphysicists, of the Christian creed
had to face was, how to reconcile the abstract theories respecting the
origin and maintenance of the order of nature with the account of the
]>i\iue procedure of creation found in the Christian Scriptures. The
modern man of science has to harmonise theory with fact, but a Christian
philosopher like Augustine had to harmonise rational theory with Chris-
tian dogma. Of the possibility of the success of such a task he never had
any doubt, his maxim was qui scripturam inspiravit, naturam creavit. The
Author of Nature was the Author of the Scriptures, and, therefore, he
who read the one must be able to interpret the other. Augustine had
in common with the Platonist metaphysicians for the material of his
speculations two orders of being : (1) ideas existing in the Divine
Mind as the types or summa genera of created things; (2) the various
species and classes of the organic and inorganic phenomenal world.
The former had their copies in the human intellect and afforded
the principles by which the latter were interpreted. God created the
phenomenal world. By the creative impulse a chain of necessary
causation was set up. Phenomena classified themselves in accordance
with primordial types. A potential tendency was given to each class
to perpetuate itself. Development is the process by which cau-al
efficiency operates. This potential tendency is the all-pervading
principle in Augustine's history of nature, contrasting strongly with the
conception of adaptive agency dominating modern theories of the origin
and development of species. The acorn develops into the oak, the oak
sheds its acorns and so the species is perpetuated. But whence was the
first acorn and how was it endowed with such potentiality ? Here
the possibility of having recourse to an order of ideal existences stood
the ancient natural philosophers in good stead. Phenomenal classes
(Gattungstypen) are to ideas as the dividing members are to a logical
genus. Dr. Christinnecke considers that Augustine was inclined to
carry his theory of germinal potentiality informing nature into the
Pantheism discernible in the world-soul of Plato (p. 31). Comte and
144 NEW BOOKS.
Mill endeavoured to banish the idea of potentiality from the domain of
science, but it persists. We remember Prof. Tyndal in his Belfast
address to the British Association alluding to the infinite potentialities
of matter. Dr. Christinnecke seems still to cherish this doctrine, which
he says (p. 58) is not even contradicted by the accepted theory of Darwin.
This remark of Dr. Christinnecke scarcely shows much critical acumen,
since the Darwinian theory of the origin of species through the action of
adaptation, selection and survival is in direct antagonism to the principle
of native potentiality. The problems dealt with in this pamphlet are
supremely important alike to scientists and to theologians, and we thank
Dr. Christinnecke for so compendious a presentation of them.
T. WOODHOUSE LEVIN.
University Correspondence College, Tutorial Series. A Manual of Logic.
By J. WELTON, M.A. London, B.A. Cambridge, Late Scholar of
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Vol. I. London : W. B.
Clive &Co., 1891. Pp.536.
Mr. Welton's work is not a Manual of Logic for students, but rather a
compendious book of reference for teachers. Logic is a subject bristling
with debatable points. On these Mr. Welton endeavours to focus a
mass of current opinions, and his task cannot be regarded as untimely or
unwelcome. Mr. Welton has marshalled his authorities with some
attempt at reasoned arrangement, but we think he is more apt at
collating than digesting material, and he has a disappointing habit of
summing up conflicting views with such extreme impartiality that his
verdict is practical^ 7 nugatory.
The scope of Mr. Welton's book does not extend beyond the ancient
syllogism, although some notice is taken of the modern amplifications of
the theory of reasoning introduced by Hamilton and De Morgan.
Mr. Welton does not claim originality for much in his treatise, but a
new method of diagrammatically representing categorical propositions
is suggested (in 106) based on the implications of existence contained in
a categorical proposition. This scheme seems a combination of the exis-
tential theory adopted by Dr. Venn, and Lambert's mode of representing
the extension of a term by a horizontal straight line. In fine, Mr.
Welton's book has a raison d'etre, and although it might have been better
done, it is perhaps better so done than not done at all.
T. W. L.
Die Pddagogik des Helvetius. Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der
philosophischen Doctorwiirde. Von DEMETRIUS G. MOSTEATOS.
Berlin, 1891. Pp. 56.
This pamphlet sketches the history of the theory of education in
France, beginning with the writings of Rabelais, 1495, and Montaigne,
1533. Next, the Method of the Jesuits, 1491, is described, having for
its single aim the maintenance of the authority of the Roman Catholic
Church. Then follow the Jansenists, 1585, or Port-Royalists, who,
although Catholics, had not the domination of their Church so much in
view as the development of the individual. For their system the culti-
vation of the mother-tongue and a knowledge of the contemporary
sciences were made the principal objects of study. The establishment
of the French Academy by Richelieu in 1585 marks an era in the history
of French education. The most notable educationists during the 17th
century in France were Bossuet, Fle'nelon and Fleury, who were sue-
M:\V BOOKS. 1 !-')
led by Kollin whom X'illriiiuin styled the Hi^'li Prie-i of Kdiic
In tin- l*th century ue liiul 1 >iderot propounding T9t to the
question, Who ought to regulate iLii'l underi.,. iuration
Communitx ? Hi- answer was, Tin- State'. Fe"nelon had previously
announced the same opinion and it \va - afterwards warml y siipp i
by Hehetius and liohrspirrrc. In 17<'>'_! EtoOWeaiffl Kiml-- appeared,
-k in which tin- principle propounded was that adnoatfoo should
develop without pervert im,' the child. Helvetius, the
immediate subject of this pamphlet 1 7 1 ." 1771 --formulated a plan ot
Education in conformity with tin- p -ycholo .^\- of Locke. who^- vrien
{\n- on-in and nature of human knowl.'d^,.. had ohtam>-d tlirou-^h tin-
\vritniL 1 - of Condillac wiilf accrptanrc in |-'raiice. Accordinu: to th-
titlml't r<i* i doctrine, the mind received its entire equipment from
rience and as in Childhood this experience must be moulded lv others.
ki., l>.v eduration; the art of education acquired a paramount in:
tanee in the eyes of Helvetius. Dr. Mostraius ^i\c-u- the following:
an:ilv>is of the svstem of education, proposed 1>\ Hi-lvi-tiu-.. (1
vetlUfl coiisiik-rs eduration to In- the art of persuading a ehild to educate
itsrlf. (2) Tlie aim of education should be, that sul>s<'<iiu>ntlv
i-laime<l hy Jeremy lieiitham. the greatest happiness of the
mimher of citi/.ens. (;>) Tlu 1 period of education extends over the whole
of lite, although, of course, childhood and youth are the most impoi
seedtimes. ..[) \ child's most potent instructor is its environment.
The factors of education are: Opportunity, Attention. Self-lo-.
and I'a-^sion. (!) Education must be j>li>i>u'<;il, for the development of
the hody and M<>rol for the inculcation and fostering hal)its of ri^ht
conduct: it must commence in the family but generally be completed in
public establishments.
T. W. L.
.1 St it-Ill <>f U /"/,- I 'It i!,,*,/)/! >i. J'.y ELLEN M. MITCHELL, with an Introduc-
tion bv William Rounseville Alger. Chicago, S. C. CJriu'u^ * Com-
pany, 1891. Pp. lis-2.
Mi Mitchell thinks with her German teachers that philosophy is the
outcome of the evolution of the human intellect striving to know it>elf.
What is the world," she asks, " independent of our thought, our repre-
sentation of it ? Is there any knowledge of it distinct from and indepen-
dent of human self-knowledge?" (Ch. i. p. 3.) On this idealist thread
Miss Mitchell proceeds to string the successive phases of Greek specu-
lation from the Ionics to the Neo-Platonists.
The two leading questions determining the direction of Greek Philo-
sophy were, according to Miss Mitchell. (1) " What lies at the basis of all
the changes which the senses perceive?" i.e., "What is the substance out
of which the world is made ? " (2) " How is the world made ? " These two
questions, she adds, " taken together express the main problem of Greek
Philosophy". " How do matter and form unite ? " (Ch. ii. p. 6.) The
character of the answers given to these questions by the successive
Greek schools Miss Mitchell seeks to interpret in a popular manner.
Her style is easy and graceful.
further Reliques of Constance Naden : being Essays and Trust* for our 7
with Introduction and Notes by GEOK<;I: M. McCuiE. London:
Bickers & Son. Pp. xx., 260.
This volume contains an Introduction comparing Miss Naden with
ral women most eminent in our literature, with a conclusion which
10
146 NEW BOOKS.
must gratify those persons who were her personal friends. Part of the
Introduction and also several Appendices by writers other than Miss
Naden are devoted to expounding and supplementing her own exposi-
tions of Hylo-Idealism. Sixty pages are occupied by her essay on the
Geology of the Birmingham District. There is a paper defending Utili-
tarianism against Mr. Lilly, one on the Evolution of the Sense of Beauty,
and one on Religion, the lesson of which last is that modern science and
Hylo-Idealistic psychology demand that we must " banish all transcen-
dental phantasms from our positive creed to the domain of poetry and
art". Philosophic readers will however be chiefly interested in some
" Philosophical Tracts " explaining more directly her conception of the
mission and result of Philosophy. Philosophy is " the science which
takes for its subject-matter the whole sphere of consciousness, and has
for its object the detachment and systematisation of the ultimate prin-
ciples of thought and conduct, and the exhibition of their point of unity ".
Mental and moral philosophy are one : for the empirical laws of logical
procedure and those which constitute our working concept of duty,
" must be shown to spring from one central law of reason".
In a tract on Transcendental Psychology she criticises T. H. Green's
doctrine that there must be some unit other than feelings and relations
between feelings, namely, the subject. She holds that the complete
synthesis, which from one point of view may be called the universe, from
another point of view the ego, is the only real unit. Further tracts
follow under titles including Scepticism, Cosmic Identity, and Scientific
Idealism. Cosmic Identity she defines as constancy of relation, and
regards as the fundamental truth of philosophy.
The reliques as a whole present the same characteristics as the
volume entitled Induction and Deduction did ; freedom and felicity of
expression, and seriousness of moral purpose. Miss Naden had de-
veloped her style by poetical composition ; and she believed that philo-
sophical doctrine could influence the moral purposes of individuals, and
the course of social movements.
Manual of the Science of Religion. By P. D. CH. DE LA SAUSSAYE, Pro-
fessor of Theology at Amsterdam. Translated by Beatrice S.
Colyer-Fergusson (ne'e Max Muller). Longmans, 1891. Price 12s. 6d.
The Science of Religion as here treated exhibits the human mind in
phases which no mental science has a right to neglect, now that the
historical method has vindicated itself. Professor De La Saussaye has
adopted the method of stating the prevalent opinions upon these general
problems and then adding his own decision These judicial deliverances
lay him open to the charge of usurping a sort of Chief Justiceship, but
they are so modestly stated that we think his procedure justifies itself,
as at least imparting a tone such as is indispensable in any effective
teaching. Amongst the topics which come under brief treatment in this
way are the Sufficiency of the mechanical theory of Evolution as applied
to the history of religion ; the question of the relative priority of morality
and religion ; the relative functions of the subjective and the objective
factors of human experience ; and others. Brief as the treatment is
we think M. De La Saussaye has succeeded in his attempt to give an
intelligible outline to the Science of Religion, coherent in itself and full
of suggestion. After the general outline of the Science of Religion, an
excellent summary of the chief contents of Religious system is given
under the designation Phenomenology, which occupies about one-fourth
of the volume, and deals generally with worship and its objects, Institu-
BO 147
lions, such us Sacrifice, 1' nil :ml Places ami tin- Forms
<if Krligious Doctrine. Here, a^ain, the conclusions of miiifir
in the tii-ld arc ittttad and 1" MOM 0Xt4ttt compared ;ind .
This section is so happy a comhinat ion of raooinotHMI with copiousness
that we are inclined to consider it the part of the work likely to be of
most service to the general student.
Then Infills the treatment, under the title of AV A //"// i/i///V >'///, of
the actual religious systems of history; the lir-t division of this giving
a rapid survey of the religions of oommtmitaei which pre.
civilised nations or which still continue, in independence of them,
is perhaps the least interest in^ section as here treated, for le>^ than a
hundred octavo pa^'es could hardly be expected to do much for so varied
and manifold n subject. The remainder of the volume about one half
occupied with the first instalment of the purely Hixt'>ri'-<il >'<///;/<.
and covers the Religions of China, Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, and
India. So far as it goes the volume is complete, but a gentle threat is
uttered by the Translator, that the remainder of the work will remain
untranslated if this lirst portion does not seem to meet any real demand.
The bibliography of the subject is very amply worked out : not only
before each Section are the general authorities given, but before
several Chapters references are given to the specific authorities. The
contributions of German, French, Dutch and English publishers, scholars.
and anthropologists, are taken impartially into view and a clue is thus
provided to a literature of almost unmanageable extent and variety.
The translation forms a very good scientific style in itself, but we have
not compared it with the original and do not therefore vouch for its
accuracy. A few Germanisms occur, causing some sentences to require
s, second reading : but they are not numerous, and perhaps serve a
useful purpose in reminding us of the authorship of the book. We
would not discourage the preparation of the second volume, but there
can be no doubt that to the general student the continuation of the
historical section will not be of so much interest as the General Intro-
duction and Phenomenology in this volume which, as the Translator
allows, ' forms a book by itself '.
A. CALDECOTT.
The Human Mind. A Text-book of Psychology, by JAMES SULLY. 2
vols. London : Longmans, 1892. Pp. xvit, 601, 390.
" The present work is an expansion and further elaboration of the
doctrine set forth in the author's Outlines of Psychology. Although the
mode of arrangement and of treatment will in the mam be found to be
similar, the book may be described as a new and independent publica-
tion. It is specially intended for those who desire a fuller presentment
of the latest results of psychological research than was possible in a
volume which aimed at being elementary and practical. Hence much
more space has been given to the new developments of ' physiological '
and experimental psychology, to illustrations of psychological principles
in the phenomena of racial and animal life, of insanity and hypnotism.
At the same time, an effort has been made to illustrate the obscurity
and debatableness of many of the problems of the science, and to aid
the reader in arriving at a judicial conclusion on these points by historic d
references to the main diversities of doctrine. In this way it is hoped
that the treatise will find its proper place beside the Outlines." (Com-
municated by the Author.)
IX. PHILOSOPHICAL PEKIODICALS.
PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. This number begins with G. Schneege's
second and concluding article on Goethe's " Verhaltniss zu Spinoza und
seine Weltanschauung ". Goethe like Spinoza regards God as impersonal
and as immanent in the world. But this impersonal immanence is not
conceived by him in a strictly Spinozistic sense. God for Goethe was
not merely the logical ground of all existence, but a creative activity
positively revealed in the concrete variety of the world. Again he
differs from Spinoza in holding God to be essentially unknowable except
as He reveals Himself in nature and in man. This revelation is essentially
teleological. God is in nature as immanent self -realising purpose.
Each individual exists for its own self-development, and its self-develop-
ment is the self-manifestation of God in it. God is unknowable except
as thus revealed in the world which is perpetually created and sustained
by His indwelling purposeful activity. The primal phenomena of nature
and of moral experience are also beyond the range of knowledge. In
this metaphical resignation Goethe approaches Kant as in his ethical
resignation he approaches Spinoza. The consequence of ethical resigna-
tion is with him as with Spinoza inward peace. But the inward peace
of Spinoza was constituted by adequate knowledge, that of Goethe by
unselfish activity in the service of man. " Wilhelrn Wundt's System der
Philosophic, " Johannes Volkelt. Wundt's theory of the primacy of will
is keenly criticised. The derivation of all cognitive and rational con-
sciousness from the interaction of volitional activities which are in them-
selves devoid of all content is rejected as absurd. The individualism of
Wundt is also assailed. Thus his account of the unity of human society
is said to be inadequate, because it leaves no place for laws governing
the spiritual development of the community as such and distinct from
those which govern the spiritual development of the individual as such.
The same criticism is applied mutatis mutandis to Wundt's account of
the ultimate unity of the universe, as constituted by the combination of
an infinite multiplicity of interacting units of volitional activity. It is
urged that the rational order of the world presupposes a universal im-
manent reason, for which there is no place in Wundt's System. In
general the Wundtian philosophy is characterised as not " logistic
enough". It is in fact a monadistic Schopenhauerism. Dr. Lipps in
his " Zweiter asthetischer Littpraturbericht " notices among other works,
" La Morale dans le Drame, lEpopee et le Roman" by L. Arreat ; "L'Art
au point de Vue Sociologique" by Guyau ; " L'Esthetique du Mouve-
ment" by Souriau ; and Richard Maria Werner's " Lyrik und Lyriker".
As against Arreat, Lipps maintains that no peculiar aesthetic effect
is produced by the form as distinguished from the matter of a work of
art. " A painting which stands in a dark corner produces no artistic
effect. I give it a suitable position and place it in a suitable light.
Artistic effect is the immediate consequence. What is it due to ? Is it
to be referred to the appropriate light, or to my art in bringing the
appropriate light to bear upon the picture." The theory which makes
" form of combination the source of distinctively aesthetic enjoyment,
ought logically to adopt the latter alternative. On Guyau's treatment
of aesthetics from a sociological point of view, Lipps observes : " What
is considered and interpreted from the point of view of something else
PHILOSOPHICAL PBBIODK .\ :
ought iii tin- tir-t instance to be considered from its own poi:
view. . . . I'.efore assigning to it it- place in a .-r.-il .-Linl
preheii>i\ e BysteiDt W6 miiM determine uli.it i; own inti.
nature. . . . This IB forgotten by (iuyaii and by many ot hers w ho with
On place all kinds ot ob . .-iaUx llio>,- which belong to
Psychology. in ;i social or sociological, a p-\ cholo^'ical. a liiol
evolutional point ot view. The\ look at llicir object from this or tluit
-tandpoint without knowing what it i- they arc look
his detailed criticism polities this general Soiiri
d lor making detailed studies ot particular ieiiis
instead ot confining himself to the empty ^eiieralit ic -. nrhlfi
many writers. On the other liand he is hlanied for attempting t
plain ps\ chological facts b\ irrelevant ph\ >iol >u r ieal and ph\ Meal con-
siderations. Lipps challenges Sonriau'- \ iew ; ' ill of
effort tor the sake of the pleasure of relief from effort !! m.;.
like Dr. Ward that pleasure has its source in an ecoiiomx <! p^chical
acti\'ity. Successful aetivit\- as such is plea-ant. S> fal
ohstructed h\- ol)^t;nde- which it fails to overcome, it is painful. l>r.
Lipps himself, in conjunction with Kich. Maria Werner, i- issuing a
series of "/;,///-,/,/, -./'/ .fctlH-tik". The first instalment of tin
\\'erner's Lnril; n/t<l A///-/7,v /." which inxcst ii^ate- the stages and laws of
L'rowth of a l\rical poem in the mind of the poet. The data, u-ed are
the poems themselves, the testimony of the poets as ^iven in their
diaries, letters, and eom ci'sation. as well as the repoi'ts and !
of others. The second contribution is l>>r Str<it ii\rdl>' '/'//;/''///., Von
Th. Lipps. It is according to the author's account predominantly
polemical heinu dirt-eted against all attempts to read into tragic poetry
preconceived philosophical theories instead of adopting ;i iu rely objec-
int ot view. Friederioh Jodl'a (iwltii-ht,' /// I-HhiL- in dor
tive point
J'liiloxufiliH' is reviewed by -1. Keryeiibiihl.-- Stein's Liilini: nn<l >/"
is criticised hy .1. 1'. X. Land. The substantial merit of the book is
admitted, but a number of minor inaccuracies are pointed out.
I'liiLosoi'iiist UK MONATSHKFTK. XXVIII. Band., Heft 1 u. 2. 1
Hartmann. y.um Ik-.s^riti' der unbewussten VorKtellun^ M. -L Mminul.
Ueber das Gebet : F. Tonnies, Werke xiir Philosophie des socialen
Lebens und der Geschichte, Erster Artikel (H. Spencer, Sociologie, Bd.
iii.). [An interesting exposition and criticism.] Kecensionen- Litera-
turbericht, etc.
PHII.OSOI-HIS ( MI: Sri DIEN. Bd. vii., Heft 8. \\ . Wundt Bemer-
kuns^en x.ur Associatioiislehre. [An essay caUed forth by the controversy
upon Association of Ideas, which has been racing for the last two years
between Lelimaim and Hoti'ding. The "laws" of Association are
reduced by Wundt to those of Continuity and Partial Identity.] A.
Kirschmann Die psycholonisch-aesthetische Bedeutung des Licht-und
l-'arhen-contrastes. [An in \ estimation into the siurniticance of light-ami
colour-contrast for painting. The skilful use of contrast enables the
painter to reproduce with the nearest approach to truth natural :
which, in their absolute relations, are entirely out of Ins reach.] O.
Kiilpe Das Ich und die Aussenwelt (i.). F. Angell I'liter-iidi'.
iiber die Sehiit/ung von Schalliniensitiitcn nach der Methode der nntt-
leren Abstufungcn. [An important contribution to the discussion of
psychoph\ sical method. The method of doubled stimuli, and the
l'> rhitltuixshypothese of the dependence of sensation upon stimulus
ifl based on the metlioils of mean gradations and of doubled stimuli)
are excluded, it is to be hoped finally, from the sphere of psyohophyeios.
The results of Prof. Angell'- experimentation (obtained with Starke's
150 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
apparatus : Phil. Stud. iii. pi. 3) conformed pretty exactly to the require-
ments of Weber's law.] G. Martins Ueber den Einfluss der Intensitat
der Keize auf die Keactionszeit der Klange. [A continuation of the
writer's previous work " Ueber die Keactionszeit und Perceptions-dauer
der Klange" (Phil. Stud, vi.), prompted by Prof. Stumpf's criticism. The
special question here investigated is the influence on reaction-time of the
strength of the stimulus. It was found that, in spite of differences
of intensity in the stimulus, the time of reaction for practised and atten-
tive observers remained the same within a tolerably extensive portion of
the musical scale.] A fuller discussion of the rirst two and last of these
articles will follow in the next number of MIND.
[E. B. T.]
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. V. Band., 1 Heft. In a
second instalment of his "Beitrage zur Geschichte der englischen Philoso-
phic " Herr Frendenthal gives a most interesting account of Sir William
Temple. Temple was born in 1553 and entered King's College, Cam-
bridge, in 1573. After three years blind worship of Aristotle he became
convinced of the weakness of the scholastic logic and in 1580 he
attacked it in a polemical work directed against his old teacher Everard
Digby. This was followed by a series of other writings in which he
assails the current Aristotelianism. Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics,
and Ethics are criticised with great zeal and acuteness from the stand-
point of Itamus. The fundamental conceptions of the Physics in the
doctrine of causes, the account of privation, the discussion' of motion,
time and space, are according to Temple incoherent and untenable, and
the topics treated in it belong properly to Logic. He deals with the
Met'iphysics in like manner. His criticism of the Ethics is specially in-
teresting because in it he is not dependent on Kamus, who had only
touched on ethical questions in a few scattered remarks not utilised by
Temple. The points assailed are the division of virtues into intellectual
and ethical, the distinction between the faculty which apprehends
necessary and that which apprehends contingent truth, the identification
of the highest good with activity of the intellect, the doctrine of the
mean, and the list of special virtues. We find in Aristotle " pro sumnio
bono summa pene miseria, pro morum probitate singularis impietas ;
pro eleganti prseceptione frigidae qusestiunculae ".
Temple like Eamus believed that he had shaken himself free from the
fetters of scholasticism. But in this they were both self-deceived. It
did not enter the mind of either master or disciple to call in question
the fundamental principles of the system, which they opposed. Thus
Temple holds that the content of the general concept constitutes the
essence and existence of particulars. From the immanent concept of
man, the particular men Socrates, Plato, Cicero derive both matter
and form. The form is the real essence of things. Universals form the
only proper object of science and deduction is the only scientific
method. A is more knowable than B if A is required to explain B
Thus " causa effecto absolute clarior est " ; " sic in physiologia elemen-
tuni notius est quam meteora, metallum, planta, quia declaratio et cog-
nitio ex elementorum doctrina repetitur ". The writings of Temple and
of Digby help in large measure to clear up the obscurity which veils the
beginnings of English Philosophy. On the one hand we find at this
period an attempt to revive scholasticism by the aid of Aristotle, a
scholasticism which was however modified by admixture of mystical
elements. The chief representative of this tendency is Everard Digby.
On the other hand there is the anti-scholastic movement of the disciples
I'lIILOSOl-HlCAL NlKInnK'ALS. 1 ."> I
of Kamns, who attack Ari-tot ] and demand a science of nature and i.t
life instead ot futile (jiiil)l)l< i s. Tlic most important exponent of tin
of thinking was \\'illiam Temple, iiotli l>igby and Temple ^ho\\ |
acquaintance with the contemporary philosophical literal lire ot Murop,-
The works of Temple as well as the letters of .Wham hear eloquent
testimony to the clo->e intercourse then subsisting hetwecn learned
men in Mngland and their confreres on the continent. Temple wa-
iUCCeSSlvely secretary to Sir 1'hilip Sidney, to U-i\i-on. and to the
Marl of Essex, and he was a faxoiirite of Cecil. He therefore be-
longed to the social circle with whom Bacon was most intimateh
net-ted. " No one can now determine who cast the lirst spark of ne\\
philosophical ideas into Bacon's intlammahle mind ; hut it may he safel\
a>sumed that his long intercourse with so clear, learned, and stringent an
opponent of scholasticism a< Temple must have nourished and strength-
ened, if it did not create, his a\ersion to the dominant philosophy.
Dion Chrysostomos als nuelle ,1 ulians. Karl Tra-chter Leihni/. iiher'das
1'rincipium indis t -ernil)ilium. C. 1. Gerhardt. [Contains a hitherto un-
puhlished letter of L. on this suhject.] Zur Ecntheitsfrage des Dialog
Sophistes. Mrnst Appel--- Nachtrage /ur Disposition der Meinorahilien.
A 1 firing ~ Platon and Aristoteles bei Apollinarios. Johannes Di,
Jahreshericlit iiher sammtliche Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiet der
Geschichte de Philosophic.
In the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Oct. 1891), Prof. L. Schmidt
writes on 'The Unity of the Ethics of Ancient Greece' a paper some-
what too slight for the question discussed, which does not admit of a
simple answer and Prof. A. Fairbank writes on 'The Ethical Teaching
of Sophocles'. Dr. F. Adler discusses the practical 'Problem of un-
sectarian moral instruction ' ; his solution is that moral instnictors in
State schools should teach pedagogically and not as the preachers the
rules of duty accepted by "all good men," leaving the question " why
one ought to do what is right " to be answered by philosophers and
theologians. Prof. J. Platter's article, however, on 'the right of pro-
perty in land' reminds us that "all good men" are not agreed on the
practical application of the eighth commandment. Prof. Platter does not
hold with Mr. Henry George that landlords ought to be at once expro-
priated without compensation ; but he has no doubt that private pro-
perty, being the product of " force, war, and oppression," will become
immoral as soon as the productivity of labour becomes sufficiently high.
Prof. H. C. Adams on the other hand, in a politico-economical ' Inter-
pretation of the social movements of our time,' contemplates private
property as stable ; but considers that "the ethical sense of society must be
brought to bear on business affairs, and must in many cases supplant the
competitive principle" ; and he looks forward to the realisation of " indus-
trial liberty" by restraints on the now " irresponsible power" of capital-
ists. From the point of view of ethical theory the most interesting articles
are those on the ' Theory of Punishment ' by the llev. H. Rashdall, and
on the ' Prevention of Crime ' by Dr. F. Tonnies. The former is a lucid
and careful defence of the utilitarian view of punishment recognising
elements of truth in the retributive view. Dr. Tonnies' paper shows
grasp rather than lucidity : but his criticism of existing penal law
whether regarded as retributive, deterrent or reformatory is penetrat-
ing if too sweeping. His view of penal law r as it ought to be, in which
Disablement and Reparation appear to be the main ends, will be more
fully explained in subsequent papers.
1 -V2
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
VlERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FUR WISSEXSCHAFTLICHE PHILO.SOPHIE, XV., anil.
4. H. Hoffding,die Gesetziniassigkeit der psychischen Activitat. This is
a discussion of the free-will question. Indeterminism according to Hofi"-
ding has its source in a psychological illusion and in an ethical fallacy.
The psychological illusion is accounted for by five conditions. (1)
Exclusive interest in a final decision of the will makes us forget the
processes which led .up to it. (2) When our minds are once made up
there follows a sense of inward harmony and freedom from restraint,
which excludes the thought of determining conditions. (3) If, neverthe-
less, we do succeed in recalling our previous state of suspense, we are
apt to realise the past so vividly that rejected lines of conduct again
appear to us as possible alternatives awaiting our decision. We thus
fail to judge them in the light of the event which realised only one of
them. (4) Our mental condition in the moment in which we look back
with remorse to a past deed is widely different from that in which we
framed the resolution to act. It is difficult to identify our present with
our past self. It is often the easiest course to transfer to our past con-
dition some of the characteristics which belong only to our present.
There thus arises a tendency to attribute to the past self at once the
impulse which formerly led to the regretted decision and the impulse
which now leads us to regret it. (5) In deliberation the future appears
to us in a twofold light ; on the one hand as it would be affected by a
certain action ; on the other as it would turn out apart from this action.
Our attention oscillates between these pictures, and this mental oscilla-
tion leads us by a fallacy of confusion to regard the future as really
indeterminate. The ethical fallacy arises from a false view of responsi-
bility. When we say to a man :"* You ought to have decided in such
or such a way,' this deliverance by no means rests on determinist
assumptions. We only represent to the man the contrast between his
actual volition and that which he must himself recognise as the right
volition. In this sharp contrast there lies a spur to the will. Ethical
judgments of approval and disapproval have practical value only in so
far as they become motives. Now determinism is the doctrine of the
complete motivirthcit of the will. It is therefore difficult to see how
determinism can be irreconcilable with ethical principles. E. Grosse
Ethnologic und Aesthetik. A powerful plea for the analysis of the
conditions of aesthetic judgment and investigation of the growth of
Aesthetic activity among primitive races. In this way only, it is urged,
can simple data be found. At present ^Esthetics is baffled by the
bewildering complexity of civilised art. F. Rosenberger Ueber die
fortschreitende Entwickelung des Menschen-geschlechts (erster artikel).
It is contended that as in the individual, so in the race, growth in know-
ledge involves growth in the power of acquiring and extending knowledge.
The whole argument is based on the assumption that acquired modifica-
tion of brain-structure are transmitted by heredity. A. Marty Ueber
Sprachreflex, Nativismus u. Absichtliche Sprachbildung. A severe criti-
cism of Steinthal's account of Humboldt's position and significance in the
development of thought on this subject. M. Offiner Ueber Fernwork-
ung und anormale Wahrnehmungsfahigkeit. An interesting account of
M. Eichet's experiments on clairvoyance. The writer makes out a good
case for the hyperaesthesia hypothesis. H. Hoffding has a long and
interesting notice of W. Bolin's book on " Ludiriy Feuerbach, seiji
Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen'\
PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Bd. iv.. Heft 4. Gutberlet W.
Wundt's System der Philosophic (Schluss). Sinameier S.~ Beleuchtung
,( >S< )1'H It A 1, l'KI:I< >1>1< M.S.
einer phfloeophischec KHtik der optUchen \\eiientheorie. Thill
Pundamentalprinoip alter Wifiseiiscliafi .MI Michel I
imonides nnd des Thomas ron A.piino in ihivn
lumpen. llecrii-ioiiell Illld ! n-rli:m.
cellen mid Naciirichten.
liivi.-TA ITAI.IANA PI FlLOSOFLL Aii. \i., l>it. '1. L. Am
1. nimriu r ina/ione nelle -HC ivl:./.i< mi nonnali mirl>< .;lita.
]'. I ' Kivulr l.orimiie indiana del pitau'orUmo -i-condo. A. 1'iax/i
Vives, pedagogiata del rinaaciinento. s. i-Vrrari Lafilotol
prdo cli-. Mihliu.uratia. I'.ollet t ino pedagOgiCO ' !il<>-
publioazionL
lllVI-TA ll'Al.lAXA 1>1 r'll.OMiHA. All. \ i., Dist. ,'5. \. N
attuale ed i progress! tlrllu lu r ifa. I 1 . D'Krcole Ij'ori^iiic iiuliana il-l
pita^.i'isiiui sccoiulo. L. Amln-oM I /iiiiina^iiia/.ioiie e 1'incon
\ita priitica c nrlla x-icii/a. (i. Fontana Sull' Kstetifii. I'.ililio-
vn: I'liii.o.-niMih.rK Oct. 1891.- 'I'lu- first article i- del
criticism of I'rryrr's "law of the conservation of life" l>v S. llrrera.
Next comes a lonu r aii(l intm-stm^ i-ssav " I )e la Possibility d'unc Mi-thode
dans Ics I'rolilcins du ll.'.-r'. In two previous articles the author had
reached the conclusion that the existence of a sensible phenomenon
implies the existence of a real activity which produces sensation in the
subject to which the phenomenon is presented. Starting from this
standpoint, he IK>\V discnssea the possible methods by which the nature
of these mctempirical realities may be investigated together with the
nature of their real connexion which is phenomenally represented In-
spatial and temporal relations. Only two modes of dealing with this
problem are discoverable. In the first the point of departure is our own
being as revealed to self consciousness. The world is a unity and the
which compose it cannot be absolutely disparate from each other.
Having direct cognisance of one of them, we may therefore hope to gsiin
a clue to the nature of the rest by analogical reasoning. Now what is
most fundamental in our own nature is will. We may accordingly infer
that every reality inwardly consists in some mode or analogue, hov,
rudimentary, of volitional activity. Uut this result, which is all that the
purely analogical method can yield, is vague in the highest degree.
When we have thus denned real being in the abstract, we are still a>
ignorant as ever of the special relations by which real beings are con-
nected with each other. We are as far as ever from any explanation of
the general features of the phenomenal world by reference to the reality
of which it is a manifestation. We have as yet no key to the cosmolo-
j, r ical antinomies and the nature of God, freedom, and duty. The infer-
ence by analogy from our own inward being to other l>ein^s is useful but
it is cpiite insufficient. We must therefore have recourse to another
method. We must cross-question phenomena in order to force from
them the secrets of the real world which they at once reveal and con-
ceal. Analysis of the nature of phenomena leads us to posit a ivalit\
on which they depend. By pushing this analysis further we may
gain a clue to the internal nature of this reality. The author promi-es
to pursue this line of investigation in an ensuing artic! liuon
follows with a short article on - Lcs K-p ;^tri<iues ". After a
compact and lucid explanation of the conception of different kiinK ot
space, of which the Euclidean is only one among others, an attempt is
made to meet some common objections to such generalisations of u r c-
154 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
metry. Here the writer implicitly assumes that there is no essential
distinction between the evidence of geometrical relations as given in the
intuition of space and that of physical uniformities inductively ascertained.
He abstains, however, from the familiar question-begging illustrations.
Next comes an " Enquete sur les Idees Generates " by M. Ribot. " When a
general term is represented, heard, or read, what is there in conscious-
ness besides the word itself immediately and apart from reflexion ? " M.
Ribot has questioned 103 persons in order to obtain a "partial and provi-
sional answer" to this question. He thus describes his method : " I said
to the subject : ' I am about to pronounce a number of words ; I wish
you to tell me, immediately and without reflexion, whether each word
calls up anything or nothing to your mind, and if it calls up anything to
tell me what it is '. The answer was immediately noted down." Out of
upwards of 900 replies the most frequent was " nothing," the only sen-
sory image present in consciousness being the sound of the word. In
other cases there was an image of some concrete example, which was
sometimes accompanied by a visual image of the printed or written
word. Sometimes only this typographical imagery was present. Accord-
ing as this or that class of imagery predominated in each individual, it
was found possible to refer the subjects to three distinct types the con-
crete, the typographic-visual and the audile. M. Ribot is aware that the
method of experimenting with isolated words is somewhat artificial,
because the unit of ordinary discourse is a sentence. He, therefore,
made some trials in which abstract statements were substituted for
abstract terms. The results obtained were exactly the same as in the
case of detached words. It would seem, however, that in the sentence-
experiments, he omitted to investigate what is perhaps the most inter-
esting and important point. He asked his subjects what presentation
each sentence as a whole called up, but he does not seem to have
inquired what presentation this or that word called up at the moment of
its occurrence as a component of the sentence. In conclusion, M. Ribot
rightly points out that the reply "nothing" indicates sub- conscious
mental process. The " nothing." cannot be really nothing, because the
word is understood. It is harder to agree with Ribot when he says that
persons of the concrete type think by means of their mental imagery,
language being with them merely a vehicle of communication. Whether
an image is present or not, the all-important " nothing '' must be pre-
sent, and this nothing is dependent on the word.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQDE Nov. 1891. M. Fouille'e, in an article on " Les
Origines de iiotre Structure intellectuelle et cerebrale," criticises the Kan-
tian philosophy. He interprets it throughout in a psychological sense,
and he easily shows, from an evolutionist point of view, that so inter-
preted it is quite untenable. To those who have studied Kant under the
guidance of Paulsen, Riehl. and Erdmann, such criticism will appear to
be very wide of the mark. M. Gourd follows with a paper on "La
Volonte dans la Croyance ". M. Tarde gives a long report of the recent
literature of criminology, in which he notes progress made in Italy by
the sociological as opposed to the anthropological and statistical school.
The principal books reviewed are Fouillee's " Idees-forces " and Picavet's
elaborate work on " Les Ideologues".
X. NOT MS.
Till! oiJKilN <)F Ml
I AM sorry if my article " On tin <>riijin /M///.V" left it to my readers
to suppose, that Mr. Spencer does not adequately recognise rhythm in
the Ordinary sense of the word us an essential component oi music, and
if I have not been sulliciently explicit in indicating under what -pecilic
meaning 1 wished to speak of it. 1 meant rhythm to include keeping in
time." that is. in the sense of the German Tnkt. Verse and s<mg arc !>oth
rhythmical it is true, but it is only the musician \\lio has to keep time,
dividing his sonant material into equal bars. This time-di\ i-ion
Drives music its essential and indispensable character, and the " time-
Bense" is the psychical source from which it is derived. I never
ventured to say that musical rhythm is developed from rhythm in
spoken verse ; on the contrary, my chief aim was to show that primitive
music is chietly to be found " side by side" with, and quite apart from
any kind of speech, the only thing common to both being that both are
vocal utterances.
Again Mr. Spencer so much objects to his theory being called " speech-
theory," that he treats this phrase of Gurney's as a nick-name, and
assumes I have not read his writings. When making use of it I had in
mind a remark occurring in his article in MIND, Oct. 1890, where he
says, that the " distinct tones music uses might be developed from the
indistinct ones in speech" and again another remark in his Essays (1891,
ii. 406), where he speaks of three subsequent stages of the voice, the
speaking voice, the recitative voice, and the singing voice. Then again,
I remembered how constantly careful he is to quote (in his Descriptive
Sociology) examples and such examples only where 'recitative' is the
primitive form of music, and lastly the passage where he says, that the
emotions from which music arises " comment upon propositions of the
intellect," mentioning intellect as one of the two elements of which
speech is compounded (ibid 421).
Further Mr. Spencer takes objection that I should credit him with
having said, music arises from the intellect, whereas he had named the
emotions as its origin. And in stating this he quotes his own words :
"We may say that cadence, comprehending all variations of voice-, i-
the commentary upon propositions of the intellect". Now it was precisely
to this that I took objection, namely, that the emotions leading to music
(or, as I put it more directly, music) should be held to arise as a com-
mentary upon intellectual propositions; and I pointed to the physio-
logical fact that emotion and intellect are associated with different parts
of the brain and nervous system. The origin of emotions, and conse-
quently of all their resulting products, must be independent of all propo-
sitions of the intellect.
With respect to his remark that it is not true to say speech is an ex-
pression of thought, I must again refer to those cases of aphasia, where
the patient retains the language of the emotions, the power of utter ing
single words and of singing when the power of speaking connectedly has
long been lost. Emotions have unquestionably a language of their own ;
from them single words may arise, but speech, so far as modern physiolngx
and pathology can show, is an intellectual form of expression. Without
156 NOTES.
the aid of the intellect we are unable to express even our emotions in
connected speech, while yet we may command an indefinite number of
single words.
Mr. Spencer concludes : " The whole argument of the (his) essay is to
show that it is from this emotional element of speech (!) that music is
evolved". Certainly, but this emotional element, he says, grows up in
proportion to the intellectual (Essays, p. 422), the changes of voice grow
with the "more numerous verbal forms needed to convey our ideas". It
is this dependence which I call in question ; for the growth of the intel-
lectual and emotional language are, physiologically speaking, in no con-
nexion whatever.
RICHARD WALLASCHEK.
EXPERIMENTS ON COLOUR-VISION.
Fusion of Sensations of Colour. 1 The author raises again the question
of the central fusion of different simultaneous colour- sensations from
the two eyes. He claims to have shown, in opposition to Helmholtz,
and in support of Regnault and Foucault, that such' fusion- is a
fact. This claim is based upon the results of experiments with stereo-
scopic figures whereby different colours perceived, one by each eye, are
superposed upon each other. He finds the resulting image to be of the
colour arising from the mixing of the two. In using the stereoscope for
the purpose, dim light and saturated colours give the effect most clearly
or instantaneous illumination in a dark chamber. The same results
may be secured without a stereoscope by focussing the eyes back of
stereoscopic pictures at such a distance as to secure clear superposition.
The arrangements, precautions, &c., are given in some detail.
Sensations of colour in one eye resulting from stimulation of the retina of
the other eye by coloured light.' 2 In this paper the writer gives an interesting
result arrived at in connection with his experiments on central fusion
noticed immediately above (Comptes Rendus, 1891, xciii. p. 358). Using
the stereoscope with glasses of complementary colours placed before the
lenses (a device to avoid colouring the stereoscopic pictures themselves
and giving the same results) he secured a white central image in relief
flanked on each side by an image coloured like the glass on that side.
Removing the glasses quickly he found that these side images exchanged
colour the ordinary after-result of colour stimulation. He then ban-
daged one eye and after looking into the stereoscope with the other eye,
removed the coloured glasses and the bandage, and looked a.gain with
both eyes. The result was in all respects the same as before when both
eyes had been open before the glasses were removed, i.e., a white image
in relief in the centre and coloured complementary images at the sides.
This shows the presence in one eye of a coloured image due to the vision
by the other eye of the complementary colour : a fact noticed by Fechner
and explained by Helmholtz as a case of illusion coming under the
head of simultaneous contrast. Chauveau holds, however, that this
experiment proves that the image is a real sensation in the bandaged eye,
1 Chauveau, Sur la fusion des sensations chromatiqucs pcrgues isolement
par chacuii des deuxyeux, Comptes rend., 1891, cxiii., 358.
2 Chauveau, Sur les sensations chromatiques excitees dans Pun des deux
yeux par la lumiere coloree qui eclaire la retine de Pautre oeil, Comptes rend,.
1891, cxiii., 394.
NOT: i:,7
.It is the same as when both I ;>< -<MI stimulated by
the t\v> complementary eolour>. In his \ i-\\ tin- result is brought
ahout by "a reaction of the e\ which is -t in iul.it. -d upon the percep
cent t
[[< supports this intcrprctatiiii. farther, I- : -inn-lit uhich offers
additional e\ idence of central fusion. 1 1" tin- 1. -It ivtina \- tat iu'U'-ci by
red light and then both eyes be directe.l into t
e has a uM-ern ea-t and the right image a rose cast, while in relief
between them appears again the pure white image, due to the lii-ion of
^ed and green. Kurt her variation- of this fundamental experini-i:
given. The whole is an important contribution to the main <|ii>-
ntral fusion, and indirectly to the theory ol 06HtnJ dilt'iiMoii
"diffusion of sense imoressions beyond the fun<-tional BOH
part icnlar nerves excited " (p. 394) to which M. ('hauveau i- giving
more especial attention.
Antmnnti*in of the Visual 7'Y'A/x. 1 M. ('hauveau here pursues the
general i|iies;ion of interaction between the hemispheres by asking whv
it i- that antagonism takes place between the two retinal fields. He
ihes this antagonism as " mtluence brought to bear upon the centre
for one retina by stimulations to the other retina". Claiming that this
influence is a central influence and not a matter of the actual stimula-
tion of both retinas, he cites the experiments spoken of immediately
above. In stereoscopic vision the two side images do not antagonise
each other; only the inner half of each, which goes to form the
central image, shows rhythm and variation. If the fact of antagonism
were due to retinal (peripheral) stimulation, the entire side-images would
show it and not merely the adjacent halves where superposition is broughr
ahoiit. He also says that " since the connexions between the two retinas
are established only by means of the central nervous system, we are com-
pelled to hold that the antagonism of the visual fields is a central
phenomenon". What then is the central mechanism of antagonism?
\Ve must suppose connexions between the optic centres, "connexions
which bring identical points of the two retinas into communication with
each other through the nuclei of origin of the optic nerves ". In ordinary
vision there is no apparent antagonism, since the two images are identi-
cal ; but some rhythm is there even then. In the case of non-identical
images there is an alternative and reciprocal inhibition which gives the
resulting image its variable character. In the case of instantaneous
illumination there is no time for this inhibition to change its direction,
and the image appears fixed. By the same hypothesis he also explains
Fechner's experiment, mentioned above. Chauveau's theory of binocular
nervous inhibition suggests the facts of a similar kind cited by Binet
under the head of psychic inhibition. -
Means of Studying Binocular Contrast. 3 A somewhat detailed account
of the arrangement, necessary apparatus, and best plane figures, for re-
peating Chauveau's experiments on binocular contrast. Examples of the
stereoscopic figures are given.
1 Chauveau, Sur la theorit de rantagonisme des champs visuels, Coinpte-
rend., 1891, cxiii., 409.
* // Inhibition dans les phenomenes de conscience, Revue Philosophique,
Aug., 1890.
3 Chauveau, Instrumentation pour Fexecuter des diverses experiences r/7"
l'i'tu<li- tin i-iinf !!(.<(' Irinoculaire, Comptes rend., 1891, cxiii., 1 \~2.
158 NOTES.
Retardation of Luminous Impressions. 1 The author observes that when
a dark object passes quickly across a white background in the field of
vision, bright red colour plays about the edges of the track obscured by
the object. He attributes the presence of the red to the retardation of
the luminous rays which re -illumine the darkened track retardation which
is least for the rays of greatest wave-length, i.e., red. From an acci-
dental experience of driving past a dark tree seen on a ground of white
cloud, he calculates that the red precedes the full white illumination by
about '01 sec.
Retinal Oscillations.- M. Charpentier finds at the beginning (debut) of
every light-stimulation to the retina evidence of certain oscillations of
the retina itself. The negative phase of these oscillations is the more
appreciable and manifests itself after about T V to -^ sec. These oscilla-
tions propagate themselves outward in the retina from the point excited
and give rise to alternate light and dark zones in the field of vision. He
brings out these zones by an experiment by which he gets the persistent
image of a small white object projected through the field of vision on a
whirling disc.
The distance between these bands say between two successive dark
zones enables him to measure " the apparent length of the undulation as
it is modified by the displacement of the object," a case of interference to
which Db'ppler's principle applies : according to which " this determina-
tion varies with the length of the undulation proceeding from a fixed
object, the velocity of propagation on the retina, and the retinal velocity
of the object". These determinations can be made by varying the
velocity of the moving object.
He finds a case of the same negative-oscillation in the double sensation
which follows an instantaneous or very brief light -stimulation say a
single spark from a Euhmkorff coil through a Geissler's tube or in the air.
In another paper 3 M. Charpentier pursues the subject farther, making
various exact determinations. He finds the distance between two suc-
cessive " zones " about ^ : the velocity of propagation of the negative
oscillation on the retina, a mean of 72 mm : frequency of oscillations, 36
a second : length of wave of retinal oscillation from fixed object, about
2mm_
The author farther argues that the phenomenon is due to oscillations of
the retina and not to " essential vibrations of the optic wave," since the
results are the same for coloured objects. He connects the phenomena
in an interesting way with entoptic vision.
Chromoscopic Analysis of White Light 4 The great importance of the
researches of M. Charpentier on "retinal oscillations" becomes apparent
in his attempt in this paper to derive support from them for his theory
of colour- vision, announced some years since (Comptes Rendues, July 20,
1885). He holds that the sensation of colour results from the presence
1 Mascart, Sur le retard des impressions lumineuses, Cornptes rend., 1891,
cxiii., 180.
2 Charpentier, Oscillations retiniennes, Comptes rend., 1891, cxiii., 147.
Of. communication to Socie'te de Biologie, Mai 10, 1890.
3 Charpentier, Relation entre les oscillations retiniennes et certains pheno-
menes entoptiques, Comptes rend., 1891, cxiii., 217.
4 Charpentier, Analyse chromoscopique de la lumiere blanche, Comptes
rend., 1891, cxiii., 278.
TBS. 1-V.I
of "two simultaneous and harmonious retinal < dilferent
periods. One of bhetWOWaVM mid. ru""-- a variable retardation which
has ;i speOUJ value for each colour. In the cane of two compi-
colours tin- difference in retardation i- lialf a wave length, win-
in the extinction of one of the wave- by inter'
that the evidence brought b\ the experiment- cite. I
tinal oscillations and their siil^imipt ion under Doppli-r'- prineipl,-. :
to supplvthc hasis needed to this theory. It. brings colour p
into close analogy with sound perception the spectrum with tin? '..-.uiiut
and explains colour vision on the general theory of the pli\ -
sununation and interference of undulations. Tin- wave movement gets
carried over from the medium into the organ of vision.
In this paper the author presents another phenomenon in support of
histheorx, /.-'.. that luminous excitations of ;t limited portion oi
retina. um>l> /"/ ir/iitf liijltt, appear very clearly coloured . . . pro
the stimulation be instantaneous and of very feeble inten-it\ ".
experiments by which he demonstrates this are given in some detail.
He holds that it can not be due to the simple fatigue which
coloured vision under successive stimulations, for the condition
different in many details. It can not be explained by any theory which
holds that colour vision is due to the stimulation of special nervous
elements, each vibrating to a separate colour (Halmgren, Hehnholtx),
because it holds when a portion of the retina (6 mm - in diameter) is stimu-
lated containing numbers of rods and cones : the " colour remains uniform
throughout the whole extent," although in different experiments this
colour may itself vary. The author explains the phenomenon by the
supposition that the retina is constantly run over by oscillations varying
in its different parts ; the new stimulation comes to be added to 01
these, and, if not too intense, gives the appropriate colour, but only for
an indefinitely short period, for all the other oscillations by which the
retina is agitated come also into play at the point in question, and by
their mutual interferences give white light. The author propounds this
onlv as an ebanche de tkeorie, but it is interesting and important enough to
attract the attention of the disciples of Helmholtz and Herinu'.
JAMES MARK BALDWIN*.
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. The Thirteenth Session was opened on
Jnd November with the usual Presidential address. Mr. Shadworth H.
Hodgson took for his subject " Matter". On 16th November the meet-
ing was held at Jesus College, Oxford Mr. S. Alexander, V.P., in the
chair. The subject was a Symposium on " The Origin of the Perception
of an External World r by the President and Messrs. B. Bosanquet and
1). (i. Ritchie. On 30th November Mr. Arthur Boutwood read a paper
on Dr. Croll's Philosophical Basis of Evolution". The following new
members have been elected: Mr. A. M. Daniell, B.A., Miss MilliiiLrton-
I .at h bury, Mr. Charles J. Shebbeare and Dr. James Ward.
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. The
Honorary Secretaries have sent us the following " Provisional Pro-
gramme : "The Second Session of the above Congress will be held in
London, on Tuesday, 2nd, August 1892, and the three following days,
under the presidency of Prof. H. Sidgwiok. Arrangements have already
been made by which the main branches of contemporary Psychological
research will be represented. In addition to the chief lines of investigation
comprising the general experimental study of psychical phenomena in
the normal human mind, it is intended to bring into prominence such
kindred departments of research as the neurological consideration of the
1(50 NOTES.
cerebral conditions of mental processes ; the study of the lower forms of
mind in the infant, in the lower races of mankind, and in animals,
together with the connected laws of heredity ; also the pathology of
mind and criminology. Certain aspects of recent hypnotic research will
also be discussed, and reports will be given in of the results of the census
of hallucinations which it was decided to carry out at the first Session
of the Congress (Paris, 1889). Among those who have already promised
to take part in the proceedings of the Congress may be named the
following : Professor Beaunis, Monsieur A. Binet, Professor Pierre
Janet, Professor Th. Ribot, and Professor Richet (France) ; Professor
Lombroso (Italy) ; Dr. Goldscheider, Dr. Hugo Miinsterberg, Professor
G. E. Miiller, Professor W. Preyer, and Dr. Baron von Schrenk-Notzing
(Germany); Professor Alfred Lehmann (Denmark) ; Professor N. Grote
and Professor N. Lange (Russia); Dr. Donaldson, Professor W. James,
and Professor Stanley Hall (United States of America) ; and Professor
V. Horsley, Dr. Ch. Mercier, and Dr. G. J. Romanes (England). It is
also hoped that Dr. A. Bain, Professor E. Hering, and others, may be
able to take part in the proceedings ; and that some, as Professor W.
Wundt, who will not be able to attend the Congress, may send papers.
As a specimen of the work that will be done, it may be said that Pro-
fessor Beaunis will deal with ' Psychological Questioning ' (Des ques-
tionnaires psychologiques) ; Monsieur Binet, with some aspect of ' The
Psychology of Insects ' ; Dr. Donaldson, with ' Laura Bridgman ' ;
Professor Stanley Hall, with ' Recent Researches in the Psychology of
the Skin ' ; Professor Horsley, with ' The Degree of Localisation of
Movements and Correlative Sensations ' ; Professor Pierre Janet, with
' Loss of Volitional Power (Faboulie) ' ; Professor N. Lange, with
4 Some Experiments and Theories concerning the Association of Ideas ' ;
Professor Lombroso, with ' The Sensibility of Women, Normal, Insane,
and Criminal ' ; Dr. Miinsterberg, with ' Complex Feelings o'f Pleasure
and Pain ' ; and Professor Richet, with ' The Future of Psychology '.
A Committee of Reception has been formed, which includes, among
others, the following names : Dr. A. Bain, Dr. D. Ferrier, Mr. F. Galton,
Dr. Shadworth Hodgson, Professor V. Horsley, Dr. Hughlings Jackson,
Dr. Chas. Mercier, Professor Crooin Robertson, Dr. G. J. Romanes, Mr.
Herbert Spencer, Mr. G. F. Stout, Dr. J. Ward, and Dr. de Watteville.
The fee for attendance at the Congress is ten shillings. Arrangements
will be made for the accommodation of foreign Members of the Congress
at a moderate expense. Communications are invited, which should be
sent to one of the undersigned Honorary Secretaries not later than the
end of June, and as much earlier than that date as possible. The com-
munication should be accompanied by a precis of its contents for the use
of Members. F. W. H. MYERS, Leckhampton House, Cambridge;
JAMES SULLY, East Heath Road, Hampstead, London, N.W."
We have received notice of a new periodical : The Philosophical Review,
edited by Professor Schurmanof Cornell University. The publishers are
Messrs. Ginn & Co. (Boston, New York, Chicago, and London). The
Review will be issued once in two months, beginning on January 1,
1892. It will contain, " besides original articles, prompt and trust-
worthy accounts, and estimates of the literature of Philosophy, which
will include, not only reviews of books, but condensed summaries of
articles appearing in magazines, journals, newspapers," &c. These
summaries, instead of being thrown together in the order of original
publication, will be classified under the heads : Logic, Psychology,
Ethics, Metaphysics, &c., so that a reader interested in any special
branch of Philosophy will have regularly presented to him a systematic
account of the work done in his specialty throughout the civilised world.
NEW SKRIES. No. 2.J [APRIL, 1892.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY,
I. PLEASURE AND PAIN.
By A. BAIN.
THE exhaustive discussion of Pleasure and Pain, in a general
thesis, needs an ample reference to the examples in detail as
furnished, in the first instance, under Sensation. These
examples are sufficiently numerous in themselves to supply
a test of any theory, while they have the advantage of calling
attention to unquestionably primary modes. The psychical
characters can be so far generalised, and, in connexion with
the generalities, the question may be put, whether there be
anything corresponding in the known physical adjuncts. It
is also possible to theorise upon psychical circumstances
purely, as in the discussion of certain special instances by
Ward and Bradley.
In taking into account the Emotions, there are modes
of primitive feeling no less than in the Senses ; there being
at the same time a wide compass of the non-primitive
modes.
Pleasure, in itself, is of course indefinable ; but individuals
and species may be enumerated. In this enumeration may
be constituted representative groups, on which to base a
theoretical treatment. Even supposing physical concomi-
tance were left out of account, the generalised characters
11
162 A. BAIN :
would still be considerable and important, as for example
in the distinction of massive and acute.
The discussion raised by theorists upon the pleasurable
sensibility of the state of drowsiness points to a mode of
action of the system that may have a wider range of exempli-
fication. Take the case of cessation of pains generally, and
remark that, in some instances at least, there is a notable
reaction or recoil of pleasurable feeling. To pass from a
glare of light into the shade is not merely cessation of pain,
there is also a distinct thrill of grateful feeling. So, to get
out of hubbub into stillness is something more than mere
cessation of auditory pain, or, to say the least of it, it is
something different. We must, however, take account of
the continuance of pain in the idea after it has ceased in
fact. The higher the pain is in the scale of intellectual
retentiveness, the greater would be this persistence, and the
greater the interference with the mental repose. It is in the
case of the acute physical pains, as toothache, that, the per-
sistent memory being feeble, the grateful reaction is most
apparent. The question then arises, does the system provide
for a pleasurable condition which is the consequence of re-
mitting such forms of pain as die away from the memory, when
no longer stimulated by their external causes? If there were
such a law, the pleasure of going to sleep, as the cessation
of conscious activity of any kind and of muscular activity in
particular, would be a marked exemplification. That there
are forms of remission of activity, whether painful or not,
that manifest this reaction only in a slight degree, might
affect the generality of the proposition, but would not do
away with it. There would thus emerge the class of cases
already cited, where the principle is an operating circum-
stance in human pleasure.
Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is, to
take the aspect of congratulation or rejoicing over an escape
or a deliverance from some great evil. This position would
be strengthened, if not created, by our having made up our
minds for a time that the evil was to prove more lasting
than it actually turns out to have been. Such a state of
itself would seem to be necessarily agreeable, in common
with sudden access of good fortune generally. It removes
the case from the situation first assumed, namely, simple
cessation of pain, unaccompanied with reflexion, calcula-
tion, expectation, or dread, and does not therefore give any
insight into that situation. It belongs rather to the wide
department of pleasure and pain in their ideal modes, or as
contemplated in advance or else in retrospect. An extreme
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 163
instance would be furnished by the exultation of victory,
which is a great deal more than the cessation <>i the strain
of fightin- and the sense of danger.
'The designation "Relativity" covers a wide field more
or less allied to the situations now reviewed. As applied to
the example of light and shade, it would signify that the
gratefulness of shade presupposed a certain continuance of
glare, without which it could not exist ; just as the pleasure
of warmth supposes a certain previous chillness. The nice
point to consider here is, whether the previous condition
must be exaggerated to the pitch of pain, in order that the
recoil may be agreeable. This would be decisive of the
problem. Does nature give a pleasure of relief or recoil
after exertion or exercise, although not pushed to the point
of pain ? For if this were so, then the pleasure of muscular
repose or drowsiness would be a positive institution, an
addition to the sum of pleasure, without the cost of previous
pain. No doubt the presence of a certain amount of pain
heightens the relish for the change, yet this needs to depend
upon a distinct law of the system and is not obviously a
consequence of the other. We might hypothetically con-
ceive of it as contributing to the physical stimulation that
underlies the very fact of change, or the remission of one
exercise to assume something opposite or different.
We have to take along with us the circumstance that all
the organs associated with pleasure, and often exercised in
that way, assume periodical conditions of craving, which it
is painful to deny or refuse. Such is the pain of being
immured in the dark, as contrasted with the pleasure of
darkness following on glare. Probably the eye is the
extreme instance of this craving ; there being reason to
suppose that the stimulus of light contributes directly or
indirectly to the healthy organic functions. It may not be
the same with hearing, except that the ear is the medium of
sociability, for which there is a natural recurrent craving.
What is peculiar to Relativity is partly, but not wholly,
included in the general law that every organ needs exercise,
or at all events relishes such, in proportion to its active
endowment. This is adequately expressed by the law of
rotation, or change, from which we can draw numerous
corollaries and find the most abundant exemplifications in
every region of our sensibility. The corollary that comes
closest to Relativity is that, in proportion to privation, or
length of interval of gratification, is the intensity of the
pleasure when it arrives. This principle in appearance
covers our initial instances of drowsiness and the like, but
164 A. BAIN :
only on the surface ; for it would have first to be established
that these are independent sources of pleasurable sensibility.
The indirect operation of pain in contributing to pleasure
has to be exhausted in those more simple aspects, before grap-
pling with its wider developments as seen under the higher
emotions and the intellect. Even the most elementary
of these higher situations, the pungency of a slight shock of
fear, may not be altogether organic, although, if partly so,
it would exemplify a natural tendency that might cover
some of the problematic instances formerly adduced. Yet
nothing would seem to enable us to dispense with the
necessity or propriety of viewing every species of pleasure
or pain on its own merits, after which generalities of greater
or less range might be suggested.
In our farther search for such generalities, we may begin
with a review of the Sensations, as recognised in their proper
hedonic capacity. It is impossible, even at the outset, to refuse
the guidance of certain hypothetical considerations that have
been adduced with reference both to Sensation and to other
modes of Pleasure and Pain. For example, the dependence
of Pleasure upon harmony and Pain upon discord, conflict,
or opposing tension, would seem to require, as an assump-
tion, that perfectly elementary sensibilities, those into which
even our usual sensations may be analysed, give birth to
little or no pleasure. Against this hypothesis is another,
proceeding upon the fact that Sensation, as such, is pleasant,
while susceptible of increase or diminution from a variety of
incidents.
Let us take as a commencement the sense of Hearing.
According to Helmholtz, sweetness in sound is the conse-
quence of a peculiar arrangement of upper tones, being in
fact a case of harmony. As put by Tyndall, a perfectly
simple sound, unaccompanied by upper tones, is insipid.
This is a remarkable admission. It militates against our
supposing Sensation as such to be pleasurable, and this
without reference to intensity, except perhaps in the extreme
forms of acuteness. The insipidity alleged would not ex-
clude the slight beginnings of pleasure, which might become
a perceptible quantity in reference to prior stillness, prior
discord, painful acuteness, or great freshness of the organs.
The case now stated is in some degree illustrated by the
other mechanical sense Touch. Bare touch in its least
complicated form may receive Tyndall's epithet of insipid ;
while there is nothing to constitute the equivalent of har-
monic upper tones. Warmth or coolness is a superadded
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 165
element ; the only favourable situation for touch in its
purity is voluminous softness.
The case of Sight may next he studied. Mere light is
undoubtedly a positive pleasure of considerable amount, and
is not to be treated as coming under the stigma of b<
insipid. The only condition for maximising the pleasure is
a due regard to Belativity, as remission, alternation, varia-
tion, and regulation of intensity. It is known, however, that
light is a compound agent ; we are acquainted with its <
st it units, //:., the colours of the spectrum, and we can test
these individually as pleasurable or painful agencies. In ap-
propriate circumstances, we may derive pleasure from any one
of the colours or shades of colour, while their combination in
particular ways is still more markedly agreeable. The theory
of this effect is burdened with serious difficulties. First of
all, referring to the simple shades and gradations of colour,
some are accounted especially rich in their operation on the
eye, a richness that might partly depend on brilliancy, but
is not fully accounted for in that way. Associations, some
perhaps hereditary, may come into play, but their sources
are at present obscure.
The discussion of Taste and Smell somewhat varies the
illustration, while the two senses are almost on a parallel in
what they suggest. It is here that the difficulties of the
hypothesis of the intrinsic pleasure of Sensation are at the
maximum. Accordingly the resort is to an extreme hypo-
thesis to bring about a reconciliation. At first blush, we are
confronted with certain appearances such as we may interpret
in the following fashion.
The case of Smell is perhaps at once the most simple and
the most suggestive. The generalisation that connects
sweet odours with the hydrocarbons, and malodours with
compounds containing nitrogen and sulphur, would appear
to point to a primitive and inerasable difference in nervous
susceptibility, of a kind that cannot be explained away by
either varying intensity or associated effects. We seem at
once driven upon the hypothesis that a certain class of
chemical agents impart to the nervous substance the atomic
modification that is the sign and adjunct of pleasurable
feeling ; and so with the production of pain. These effects
also appear to begin and end in themselves ; they have
little or no bearing upon the well-being or ill-being of the
system generally. They thus typify to us one of the charac-
teristic sources of our pleasurable and painful sensibility.
Referring now to the sense of Taste, we shall find a
certain amount of agreement with the foregoing hypothesis.
166 A. BAIN :
The sweet and bitter tastes may in all probability be referred
to fundamental differences of chemical agency ; assuming
these to be of the simplest or most elementary kind, as in
the contrast between sugar and bitter aloes. "When tastes
become more complicated, we see the play of opposites, with
the effect of mutual conflict and the right of the stronger.
As regards food, we have the additional circumstance of
relish, which, however, finds its best elucidation when taken
along with the feelings of digestion.
The vast array of Organic Sensations necessarily involves
a wide range of examples illustrative of the causes of
pleasure and pain. It is most convenient, and may prove
in the end most suggestive, to attack these by selection rather
than by systematic review.
The example of alcoholic stimulation is favourable as a
hypothetical study. Upon the common basis of alcohol, in
its absolute character, there is an endless variety of modify-
ing compounds, and the substances that enter into their
composition are, to a certain extent, known and understood.
Looking to the effect of alcohol by itself, we may form some
hypothetical assumption as to its mode of working ; that is
to say, we may take note on the one hand of the subjective
fact of mental elation, and on the other of the chemical agency
of alcohol as a solvent of some constituent of the nervous
tissue : and, however vague this hypothesis may be, we, at
least, see no ground for considering it as otherwise than a
primordial and independent physical influence. Of course,
we are empirically aware, that this is one of the cases where
the nervous system is awakened to a pleasurable response,
while at the same time it is speedily brought into a state of
exhaustion, with debility of function and neural pain.
This general supposition is instructively qualified by what
we know of the concrete alcoholic bodies. We know, for
example, that some of them are especially mischievous, and
that the mischief is due to the presence of impure ingredients
that especially grate upon the nerve substance. These are
found in coarse and inferior types of the alcoholic beverages ;
and it is the object of the manufacturer to arrest or re-
move such agents, while the effect of long keeping is to
bring about their decomposition. On the other hand, it
seems to be determined, chemically, that the choice and
delicate flavour of the most precious varieties of wines and
spirits are due to certain ethers that are evolved in company
with alcohol proper. The case of malt whisky illustrates
both circumstances. The removal of fusel oil is the essential
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 167
puritieation, ami the, presence of certain recognised ethers is
the source of tin- characteristic flavour of the spirit. Now,
when we take into account the extraordinary difference to t li-
st use, and to the limits of endurance without nervous mis-
chief, between alcohol in its plainer forms and alcohol in the
delicate spirits and wines, we have an example of pleasure
produced by complex harmony not improperly comparable
to the effect of sweetness in sound by the presence of upper
tones. Possibly these accessory ethers admit of bein^ both
felicitously and infelicitously grouped or aggregated. At all
events, they induce a wide deviation from the subjective re-
sults of alcohol per se. The example, taken as a whole, is
no doubt representative ; it has parallels, at least, in the
other members of the class of nerve stimulants tea, coffee,
tobacco, and the rest ; while, out of this region altogether,
the principle of action exemplified may be presumed to
hold.
For the next selection we may refer to organic sensibilities
where the mode of operation is more or less mechanical, and
in consequence easily understood. Take, then, the case of
simple injury of a sensitive tissue by cutting, tearing, squeez-
ing, or mechanical violence generally. A certain injury is
done in the first instance to a sensory surface, say the skin ;
the nerve fibres distributed to the surface, are either injured
themselves or receive a shock from the injured part of the
sensory surface. It is clear, however, that they cannot
escape disorganisation on their own account. Here we have
a study of pain in a very intelligible situation. It supplies
us with the inference that, in order to exemption from
suffering, the material of the nerves must be whole and in-
tact, that its disruption or violent compression is at once a
cause of acute suffering, to which pathology adds the farther
injury of inflammatory change. Probably, in all the more
violent forms of painful malady, mechanical or chemical in-
jury or derangement of the nerve tissue is implicated ; it
being a moot point how far the painful derangements of
sensitive organs are operative by inducing a specific derange-
ment of nerve substance, or simply by inducing an un-
favourable type of nerve current ; both suppositions are
admissible.
The study of mechanical effects on the nerve material
may be made to include the operation of Heat and Cold as
sources of sensibility. Either of the two agencies, in the
extreme, is productive of disorganisation of tissue, and
closely resembles, both physically and mentally, the case of
mechanical hurt. The novel point of interest here is to
168 A. BAIN :
take note of the milder applications of thermal agency, in
which are included some of our most habitual pleasures.
The variations of temperature, within the limits of
endurance, include a considerable range of both comfortable
and uncomfortable sensations, the amount being very con-
siderable whether taken as acute or as massive. Simple
increase of temperature might be regarded as one of the
most conceivable types of nervous stimulation, being, in this
respect, at an advantage as compared with chemical agents.
Still the attempt to formulate the precise physical influence
of a slight increase or decrease of warmth on the surface of
the skin, with a view to a theory of pleasure and pain,
cannot at present go very far. It is one of the cases where
a small stimulus can give pleasure, as in the increase of
warmth under certain circumstances, while a limit is very-
soon reached where the pleasure passes into pain. This is
merely one among other examples of a wide-ranging law of
our sensibility. More pointed and specific are the two
following observations.
In the first place, it is under this agency that we have
perhaps the best illustration of the law of Relativity in its
most decided and intelligible form. The transition from
one degree of temperature to another is an essential con-
dition of the sensation of heat or cold. Moreover, the fact
of pleasure, or of pain, is equally a matter of correlation.
A degree of the thermometer that in one circumstance gives
pleasure, in another gives pain ; and this is true of the
agency in itself, or without reference to any other agency
that may be operative at the time. The examples of this
purest type of Relativity are not numerous in the human
system. They are found in connexion with the muscles,
but only in a moderate degree with the five special senses.
The second observation is this : Although heat and cold
are essentially bound up with bodily health and well-being,
and although there is a frequent coincidence between their
pleasurable modes and physical well-being, and the opposite
with pains, yet the concurrence of the two facts does not
hold throughout ; so that we cannot treat this sensibility
under any general law of conservation. It is notorious that
the pleasure of warmth subsists at degrees of temperature
that are unwholesome and debilitating ; and that the pain
of cold goes frequently along with a temperature that is
positively invigorating. Indeed, as far as the health of the
body is concerned, a certain pitch of coolness, such as to tax
endurance, is the most favourable to bodily vigour.
The sensation of agreeable warmth is so far sui generis
1 LEASURE AND PAIN. 169
that it is not mi-taken fur any other; but just as the
extreme hurtful applications of temperature resemble in
]\<-hical tone the woundsandacute injuries of the inflam-
matory type, so the milder forms of warmth have something
in eommun with va^ue sensations of several other organs
when under their healthy manifestations, In the scale of
vagueness, it ranks next to mere nervous elevation, as in
gentle warmth of air or water at blood heat.
The pleasurable results of variation of temperature are
little experienced in tropical regions or in the warm
summers of the temperate zone. The law <>t Kelativity
does not, as Plato supposed, make our pleasures and pains
exactly equal; even in the winter of temperate and cold
climates there may be a very large amount of pleasurable
warmth, while the pains of cold may be few and dist;
The Muscular System. The pleasurable and painful feelings
connected with the muscles, to which allusion has already
been made, while co-operating in some points with the views
already expressed, are suggestive and illustrative of other
important generalities bearing on the present theme. They
put before us, in a palpable shape, the law of exercise of
function as a cause of pleasure, due regard being paid to the
limits of strength ; while pain is the consequence of trespas-
sing those limits.
It is difficult to fix the character of the muscular sensi-
bility under exertion so as to give it in typical purity ; there
are usually accompanying modes of sensibility often more
acute than the simple feeling of muscle. Nevertheless, it is
not impossible to satisfy ourselves as to the precise nature
and possible amount of pleasure attainable under muscular
exercise by itself in certain given circumstances. But what
concerns us here is to detect the conditions of a general kind
that bring the case into comparison with other sensibilities.
For one thing we have already remarked, that the pleasure
of cessation, or repose, after exercise, is a fact empirically
ascertained and not apparently due to any necessity or im-
plication of the pleasure of activity. Probably in no other
part of the system is there such a marked example of a large
volume of gratification arising from mere cessation of active
function. The chemistry of muscular recuperation and
nutrition is partly known and may be suggestive ; but it is
scarcely paralleled by illustrative comparison with the other
organs whose exercise develops sensibility.
Muscular exhaustion and inaction can be studied in one
very important collateral or consequence; viz., the inducing
of sleep, to which perfect muscular quiescence is essential.
170 A. BAIN :
So important is this part of the case, that sleep can be
caused or hastened, out of its natural time or routine, by
unusual muscular expenditure followed by the repose of
exhaustion. Hence the ordinary feeling of drowsiness has
much in common with rest after muscular fatigue, and may
accordingly be viewed as in a measure made up of muscular
sensibility under total remission of active exertion. It seems
hopeless to treat this pleasure as a compound of any known
simples. We may rather accept it as a distinct organic effect
annexed more especially to our muscular system, and partly
statable in terms of chemical and physiological processes,
from which we may draw whatever inference we may see fit.
The grateful feeling of muscular exercise admits of being
given either as a simple quality attaching to the muscular
system, or as one of our Appetites, which is the same fact in
its bearing on the Will. We are said to have an appetite or
craving for action, the motive being in the first instance the
pain of inaction. After an interval of repose and refresh-
ment, the active system is, as it were, wound up to expend
its energy, and for us to be restrained is to undergo a certain
amount of suffering. The consequence is, that the pain
acts as a voluntary motive to put forth exertion ; while, as
in other appetites, the pleasure of the exercise is a farther
motive to continue the state until the craving is fully
satisfied. If, in consequence of extraneous motives, that
is, the urgency of some work to be done, the exertion is still
farther prolonged, the pain of fatigue comes on and consti-
tutes a new motive or craving for cessation or repose. To
all this there applies the remark made with reference to
heat and cold ; viz., that the course of our muscular sensi-
bility promotes, in a general way, the health of the system,
but not to its whole extent. The sense of fatigue, with its
urgency to cessation of exercise, springs up before the full
benefit has been attained in the way of healthy stimulus.
Muscularity is therefore another testimony to the insuf-
ficiency of Sensation as a guide to health and self-conserva-
tion.
The pains specific to muscle are notable and unique.
There may be many varieties of suffering, some common
to the tissues generally, but the pain by pre-eminence is
that expressed by cramp or spasm, and is one of the worst
ills that flesh is heir to. Arising from a conflict of tension
in the muscular fibres, it may be said to be typical of one
wide-ranging generality of pain, the pain of opposition,
contradiction, or collision of hostile promptings. It is,
however, too simple and elementary to throw light upon
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 171
the higher complications coining under tln^ head ; it may be
more properly regarded as a simple incident or ultimate fact
of our muscular system. The physiological fact is tolerably
well known, ;m<l the subjective experience is also known.
We have many kinds of physical pain, but this has a
peculiarity of its own, and could not be understood thnm^h
any of the others. As a nervous phenomenon, we can simply
say that when a muscular fibre is violently contracted by a
morbid excess of motor stimulus, while at the same time
something checks its contraction, the sensitive fibres of the
muscle undergo a violent irritation in the mode that is
specifically painful. Of course there is a certain salutary
efficacy in the stimulus, as doubtless the occasion is a mor-
bid phenomenon that cannot be too soon ended; yet here
too we may say that there is no obvious proportion between
the pain and the derangement to be rectified ; a smaller
amount of suffering would probably induce us to do what-
ever can be done to set matters right. In point of fact,
there may be an equal, but certainly not a greater, pitch of
suffering in any other seat of sensibility. The cramp stage
in Asiatic cholera, affecting both involuntary and voluntary
muscles, could not be surpassed by any known variety of
torture.
Organs of Digestion. In this region also we have a large
volume of sensibility, pleasurable and painful, with specific
characters that are well marked, and exercising a powerful
influence upon the mind. The feelings associated with
digestion include some of the so-called Appetites, being perio-
dic cravings whose gratification belongs to the maintenance
of the human system. The supply of nutritive matter to
the blood as the medium of regeneration of the various
tissues takes place through the stomach, which must first
prepare the food-material for its destination. In so doing,
the stomach with its appendages acquires interests of its
own, and has a set of feelings peculiar to itself. While the
health of the system simply requires that there should
always be nutritive matter in the blood, including also the
removal of what is effete, the stomach settles its own times
of receiving food and of going through its various stages of
manipulation. In all this, it manifests an extraordinary
intimacy with the brain in respect of massive sensation,
agreeable or the opposite. As a guide in the conduct and
economy of life, it has the same merits and defects as warmth
and muscularity ; it keeps us in the proper track of self-
conservation for a certain length, and then deserts us. In
other respects, the chemistry and physiology of digestion
172 A. BAIN :
offer but a very limited insight into the kinds of nervous
stimulation that are accompanied by pleasure and pain.
The characteristic form of pain, viz., sickness and nausea, is
the extreme manifestation of stomachic disturbance, of which
ordinary hunger may be an incipient stage, although perhaps
also allied to the ultima ratio of alimentary cramp. The
appetising force of our digestive states is the antithesis to all
these extremes ; whence we rise up to the genial feeling of
healthy digestion, with its commanding influence over the
entire mental tone.
Respiratory Feelings. The function of Respiration, whose
organ is the lungs, is to supply our aerial food in the shape
of oxygen, and to remove the principal aerial impurity-
carbonic acid. A bellows-like action is sustained for this
purpose by the operation of a group of muscles operating
without intermission through certain known nervous centres.
In ordinary circumstances, little or no sensibility belongs to
the process, the reason being its unbroken continuance. It
is one of the best examples of the law of Eelativity, that is,
the necessity of change as a condition of consciousness.
As with the organs last discussed, the speciality of respira-
tory feeling, when it does arise, is its extreme form of pain,
known as suffocation. The endeavour to restrain the action
of breathing is attended with a distressing sensation that
becomes at last insupportable. As a pain of conflict, it
resembles the muscular pains of spasm, and in fact contains
a muscular element, although this is not the whole. There
is a complex sensibility arising from the refusal to supply
oxygen to the lungs and remove carbonic acid. At the same
time, the pain would seem to be in advance of our positive
wants in these respects. Notwithstanding the urgency of
the respiratory interest, many facts show that, for an interval
of several minutes, the exchange of gases in the lungs may
be suspended without fatal consequences. It would seem,
therefore, that the interference with the established rhythm
of the breathing function is the more immediate cause of the
painful conflict ; the resistance to the nervous discharge
from the respiratory centres inducing the painful sensation
of conflict, muscular and nervous. As in other cases, the
precaution is in advance of the danger, if not excessive in
degree ; that is to say, a smaller pain might possibly keep us
aware of the needs of respiration.
This last remark would appear to be still more applicable
to the special respiratory outbursts coughing and sneezing.
These are produced by painful irritations of surfaces that
need to be kept free from foreign bodies and irritating agents.
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 173
The respiratory spasrn operates as a remedy ; but, so far as
appears, it is greatly overdone, being often prompt..! in
disease when there is nothing tangible to get rid
The pleasurable feelings connected with respiration are
not in themselves pronounced, owing doubtless to the
working of relativity, which requires a change or deviation
from even persistence in order to make us conscious. The
fluctuations of pure and impure air have their effect ; the one
leading to a general exhilaration, the other to the opposite
extreme, and tending at last to a form of suffocation. The
pleasurable side of the case belongs to that wide depart-
ment of pleasure connected with any notable advano-nn-nt
in healthy functions, an effect that in the end must show
itself in raising the normal condition of the nervous sub-
stance, both nerves and centres. The same hypothetical
rendering is applicable to the obverse view, or to the pain
and depression due to deficiency in the exchange of gases in
the lungs. The influence of poisonous ingredients would
naturally have the same interpretation, but, here, as in
other cases, we make a distinction between agents that
interfere with respiration without the warning of pain, and
others that cause irritation while not necessarily mischievous.
Whether chlorine and sulphurous acid are injurious to the
lungs in proportion to their irritative quality, I am unable
to say ; but carbonic acid, carbonic oxide, and carbonated
hydrogen (perfectly pure, which coal gas is not), are all
speedily fatal without the warning of pain.
Electricity. As a physical agent, electricity is tolerably well
understood. It is, at least, as intelligible as heat, or chemical
action. Some help may, therefore, be derived in framing a
hypothesis of the physical side of our simple pleasures and
pains, by remarking the various subjective consequences of
electrical shocks and currents. Hardly any of these can be
quoted on the side of pleasure ; they are mostly indifferent
or else painful, the transition from indifference to pain being
mainly a change of intensity. A simple shock from a Leyden
jar is something of the nature of a stunning blow ; while
the sparks from the machine upon the knuckle are of the
nature of a smart prick. A sustained voltaic current makes
a sensation of heat, and is felt along the track of the nerves
to the brain. The most rousing of all the electrical in-
fluences is the Faradaic current of the magneto-electric
machine, which is known to be an incessant making and
breaking of contact, with reversal of current at each turn.
In small quantities, this is tolerable, and even considered as
a wholesome stimulant or remedy in certain ailments. In
174 A. BAIN :
higher degrees, it amounts to intense agony, proving that its
mode of action on the nerves is of the most unfavourable
kind. After the mental state reaches the point of the un-
endurable, it is just possible that its continuance would be a
destructive disorganisation of the nervous tissue. If this
were not the case, or if the pain were out of proportion to
the injury caused to the nerves, this would be the most
efficient and least objectionable of modes of using corporeal
pains as a moral discipline.
The Nervous System. In making the nervous system, in
its own proper nature, a study, we have to draw a distinc-
tion between the changes in its working caused by the
various sensitive organs operating as stimuli and those
changes due to its own state of nutrition, or integrity, or
the reverse. The line thus drawn is not easy to observe at
all points ; nevertheless, it is sufficiently well known that
the brain and nerves, as a whole, are liable to fluctuations
in their sound or unsound condition, and that well-marked
subjective consequences attend these fluctuations. The
supply of blood, in proper quality and amount, is a part of
the necessary requirements ; and as this changes so does
the nervous efficiency for all leading mental functions.
While the phases of brain efficiency, grounded on inde-
pendent variations in its substance, are numerous beyond
reckoning, it is both safe and sufficient to indicate a few
leading and well-recognised modes of alteration.
First. We can suppose an ideal perfection of the healthy
constitution of the nerve substance in its own proper cha-
racter, and can fairly conclude that the subjective accom-
paniment is a high degree of mental efficiency in other
words, a vigorous response to whatever prompting may be
uppermost. This by no means decides what the outcome
will be ; we must accept as a fact that different brains, in
an equal state of efficiency, differ in the modes of healthy
exertion favoured by them. The emotional tone, or feeling
of hilarious existence, will always gain more or less in the
situation supposed. As a matter of course, the aid furnished
by the prime condition of the various organic functions is so
far contributory to the high nervous condition.
Second. The foregoing assumption implies, as its ob-
verse or opposite, a deficiency or depression in the integrity
of the nervous substance, with a corresponding loss of
mental working power in whole or in part.
Third. The innumerable disorders that affect the nervous
system, while not necessarily affecting its general efficiency,
bring about such changes of tissue as are usually the har-
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 175
binders of pain. The so-called neuralgic affections, involving
inflammatory or other changes in the substance, are illustra-
tive of the modes of nervous alteration that give rise to acute
puint'iil sensibility. Against these we must set off ot
changes damu^in^ to the substance, as shown by the issue,
but not productive of immediate puin. We are therefore
prevented from believing that the many kinds of acute
suffering assignable to nerve ailments are really protective
in the degree of their urgency.
Fourth. As with the muscular system, the instrument of
the brain's activity, there are pleasures and pains of exercise
and rest, so with the brain itself, but with some important
differences. We may hypothetically assign part of the
pleasure of healthy exertion to the nervous centres in their
own separate character; and, in like manner, we may sup-
pose that nervous over-fatigue gives rise to pain on its own
account, whether massive or acute. What seems peculiar
to the exhaustion of the nerves is the occurrence of a point
where cessation does not give the immediate feeling of
repose. Indeed we can hardly trace, in connexion with the
nerves, that luxurious and spontaneous feeling of rest that
distinguishes the muscular system ; we are more familiar
with the morbid continuance of thought-activity, which is as
oppressive as the over-exertion that brings it about.
Fifth. In certain forms of excitement, connected with
pleasurable indulgences to excess, there occurs the feeling of
fatigue or exhaustion, which should be accepted as Nature's
hint to discontinue the stimulation, but, being neglected,
often leads to a revival of the tone of enjoyment. A very
probable explanation is to the effect, that the circulation in
the brain has been unduly increased, and is of the kind that
favours the exaltation of pleasure ; the debt to Nature being
paid by subsequent prolongation of the period of recuperative
rest.
Ancesthetics. The physical causes of pain, as growing
out of our elementary sensibilities, should naturally receive
elucidation from the study of the different anaesthetics. In
point of fact, however, the inferences drawn from these do
not assist us in the study of the special modes of pain.
What is effected by them is summed up in the suspension
of Consciousness as a whole, whatever may have been its
pre-occupation pain, pleasure, thinking, will. Consequently,
the action of the anaesthetic drugs, if we could fathom it,
would be a contribution to our acquaintance with the
physical conditions of consciousness in general. On that
view of consciousness that regards the muscular response
176 A. BAIN :
as the essential complement of every mental situation, the
theory of anaesthetics would involve some means of inter-
fering with the muscular promptings. Lastly, the influence
of persistence and habituation, in modifying both pains and
pleasures, has a like general bearing, and does little to assist
us in giving reasons for the differences between the two
classes.
Tickling. The peculiar sensation of tickling is one of the
anomalies that obstruct our endeavours to arrive at general
laws of pleasure and pain. The slightness of the contact, as
contrasted with the intolerable discomfort, is singular and as
yet inexplicable. Some part of the effect may be due to the
spasmodic reflex actions, which the will cannot control ; but
that merely shifts the difficulty, while it can scarcely be
looked upon as the whole case.
Summing up for Simple Feelings. Before passing to the
complications of pleasurable and painful sensibility, or those
cases where concurrence of a plurality of stimulants is an
essential circumstance, we may at once endeavour to sum
up the conclusions obtainable from the foregoing survey.
The results are apparent from the nature of the running
commentary passed upon the individual cases. They are
negative rather than positive.
First. One general consideration has much in its favour,
namely, that extreme violence or intensity of nervous stimu-
lation, as measured by destruction or mutilation of tissue,
whether of the sense surface or the nerves, is usually
attended with pain. This evidently holds in a large pro-
portion of instances. It is, however, subject to important
qualifications or anomalies, such as beset the whole specula-
tion that we are engaged in. For one thing, destruction or
disorganisation of a palpable kind may overtake the sense
organs, as well as the nervous substance, without any pain.
In the second place, many acute pains attend upon derange-
ments so slight as to have no serious effect upon our general
well-being.
Second. There is a considerable amount of coincidence
between pleasure and the nourishment and vitality of the
system, through the supply of nutrition and the removal of
waste, with the obverse effect of pain in the contrasting
situation. The principal examples of this concurrence need
not be repeated.
Third. There is pleasure in the exertion of all the active
faculties muscles, senses, brain with a painful feeling of
fatigue to determine the limit of active competence. The
test thus supplied is not perfectly accurate for its purpose,
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 1 , ,"
giving a premature indication which has to In- disregarded if
we would ohtain tin- full measure of our capability.
Fourth. The pleasure attached to rest and remission a;
fatigue is somewhat various; being most conspicuous in
id to tin- nniM-les, while wanting in the senses and the
nerves, or attamahle only by careful limitation of the proper
e of exhaustion.
ill. 'The infelicitous arrangement whereby acute pains
attend nervous disorders that are indifferent as regards the
grnrral well-being of the system, is qualified by the important
fact that we have; many acute nervous pletismv> beginning
and ending in the brain it.M-If and neither exulting nor
depressing the organic functions that are the support of life.
This remark will be found especially applicable to the com-
pound forms of pleasure. A certain number, indeed, of these
acute pleasures have the known effect of exhausting by over-
stimulation the nervous vigour.
The pleasures and pains that pass beyond the stage of
simplicity, and owe their character to the fact of union or
comhination, are by far the largest number of our pleasurable
and painful experiences. The circumstance of plurality and
combination assumes two obvious forms, namely, harmony
and conflict.
The study of actual sensations has to be supplemented
by study of the memory or the Ideas of them. The bearing
of this new modification is all-important and wide-ranging,
and contributes its share to elucidate the laws that we are
in quest of. The conditions of harmony and conflict enter
abundantly into the field of Ideas.
Different Aspects of Harmony and Conflict. Here we
must draw, a broad line between two very different classes of
mental facts that receive the present couple of designations.
In the every-day pursuits of actual life, we may have our
aims, expectations, and pursuits either aided, realised,
and fulfilled, or else thwarted and baffled. The one
case is attended with pleasure, the other with pain. The
names harmony and conflict, however, are not the only, nor
the best, modes of describing the two respective situations.
We wish a thing, and endeavour to attain it, because it
would give us satisfaction. To be aided and furthered in
the pursuit is so much gratification already secured ; to be
opposed, contradicted, thwarted, is simply privation of a
looked-for good ; and this species of pain needs no recondite
handling. There can hardly be any fact more elementary
than that the gain of a pleasure is pleasant, and its loss
correspondingly painful. To receive aid and support in our
12
178 A. BAIN :
various endeavours is the same as to be successful in those
endeavours, and obversely. 1
Every circumstance that, on the one hand, lightens or
eases our labours and burdens, or, on the other hand, in-
creases or aggravates them, is pleasurable or painful ac-
cording to the case. This, too, is a mere necessity of our
constitution, and not a separate law of the mind. There is
a pleasure in putting forth a degree of exertion within our
strength and our skill ; the opposite is painful. Vision in a
clear light, our eyes being good, is a grateful exercise ; the
contrary entails suffering. To have the attention distracted
by collateral solicitations is a pain of conflict, otherwise
expressed by loss of .strength and marring of efficiency.
1 Mr. Bradley, in dwelling upon Conflict as a cause of pain, makes
application of it to show that Surprise cannot be a neutral state, that is,
indifferent to pleasure or pain. It seems to me, however, that the facts,
when examined, are against him. There can be little doubt that surprises
are often painful, as well as often pleasurable ; yet, as these effects must
be of all degrees, there ought to be a point in the scale where both kinds
are at zero. Our familiar experience seems to show that surprise, as
frustrating an expectation, has its character determined by what the
expectation is. If I am bent on an important errand, and find my way
blocked by an unforeseen obstacle, I suffer all the pain of being thwarted
in something that I put a high value upon. This is the pain of conflict
as regards pursuit in the objects of every-day life. If, however, I am
out for a walk with no special object in view beyond the mere agreeable
exercise, I may find a stoppage that I did not count upon, and may
mark it as such, without being in the least degree pained or annoyed ;
the reason simply is that nothing depends upon my following any one
particular route. There is a real surprise of the kind that awakens
attention and impresses the memory with a fact of my surrounding, but
the effect ends in this purely intellectual result. If in the supposed
saunter I encountered a sudden shower of rain, that would be a surprise
relevant to the situation ; it would thwart me in the manner that I could
feel, but simply because it interfered with my expected gratification.
Thus it is, that all deviations from our accustomed routine in the course
of things contain the intellectual shock of surprise, while only those that
thwart us in some important end of pursuit can be cited as exemplifying
the pains of conflict.
Intellectual Surprise is to all intents identical with what we term
Novelty, which has an influence of its own partly intellectual and partly
emotional. The intellectual element is the most constant. If a novel
experience does nothing else, it makes an impression and abides in the
memory. When we go into some new place, we count upon and expect
novelties, and therefore cannot be said to be surprised in the sense of
violated expectation. While the intellectual act is thus constant, the
resulting feelings vary with the special incidents of the case. Our
anticipations may be baffled in two different ways : we may find greater
changes than we had been prepared for, or sameness where we expected
change. These are surprises properly so called, but whether they gave
us any degree of pain would depend upon how far we had set our heart
upon our framed expectations.
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 179
Further variety of the same contrast is the difference
between friendly sympathy, on the one hand, and dis-
c.umigement or the counter of sympathy on the other.
The case more immediately suggested by the couple
" harmony" and "discord" is what is commonly called
artistic or aesthetic pleasure and pain. This opens a very
wide department, but if \\v confine our view to its more
essential peculiarity, as distinguished from the wide-ranging
class of facts just alluded to, we find that it resolves it
into the subtle operation of concurrence between effects
differing in their own proper nature while possessing some-
tliing in common. The answering of sound to sense is
;i I'n mi liar example, and is well known to be a cause of
pleasure in proportion to the completeness of the adaptation.
So with harmonies in the different pitches of sound ; and,
likewise, agreeable unions of colour. Many attempts are
made to explain the pleasure of this kind of harmony, but
with very indifferent success. It is a safe assumption, that
if the mind is solicited at two or more different point-,
and if the resulting sensations (being regarded as severally
agreeable) have so much of a common character as to be
mutually supporting, the nervous expenditure required to
maintain the pleasurable states will be reduced, and we
shall be gainers in consequence. Thus it is that a band of
music accompanying a dance, or a march, besides being
pleasant in itself, adds to the pleasure of the active state
by chiming in with its particular pace. Such an assumption
goes a certain way, but the facts very soon outstrip its
capabilities. The notable circumstance in connexion with
harmony is the astonishingly intense pleasure attainable from
its higher modes that is to say, as the harmony increases,
the pleasure also increases out of all proportion. What is
there in a fine voice to make such an extraordinary impres-
sion on the senses and the mind, as compared with a more
ordinary one ? The physical difference of the two is sup-
posed to be resolvable into a readjustment of the over-tones
that make up the special timbre of each; and how such
minute adjustments can suffice to make the difference
between an average singer and Mario, or Jenny Lind, ir>
utterly baffling in our present knowledge. We have already,
had a parallel difficulty in the delicacy of stimulants and
articles of food for which no explanation can as yet be
offered.
The same difficulty appears in aesthetic combinations of a
still higher kind, as in a musical air or a poetical cadence.
That a certain succession of notes, the so-called musical
180 A. BAIN :
sentence or theme, should have a perennial charm to the
human ear, is a fact that has been partly, but not fully,
accounted for. The three circumstances that have been
adduced by Sully and others, viz., musical concord of
successive notes, intellectual unity, and expression of emo-
tion, completely fail when applied to the extreme cases.
For, as shown by Gurney, there is some residual element of
fascination at present beyond the reach of analysis. Possibly
the elements that have been assigned, and more especially
the delicate expression of emotion, might suffice for the
explanation if our means of analysis and verbal definition
were equal to the subtlety of the case. As it is, we find
ourselves face to face with an insoluble puzzle. The felicities
of our poets have been subjected to a critical scrutiny by
Gurney ; and although the constituents are more tangible in
poetry than in music by itself, he maintains, with apparent
success, the inscrutability of the resulting emotion.
To cite another example. The charm arising from the
human form is partly explicable by circumstances that
have been assigned, but with the same residual difficulty in
accounting for the extraordinary rate of increase as the
points of excellence are refined upon.
Elementary Emotions. The illustration of Harmony and
Conflict has carried the discussion beyond the simpler states
of feeling into the higher compounds where Sense and Idea
come together. There still remains, however, a certain
range of feelings not absolutely simple, yet relatively so,
while entering into many important compounds. These are
the more fundamental or elementary emotions of the mind,
which seem to be rooted in organic and other primitive
modes of stimulation. The most prominent and wide-
ranging of these elementary modes of the higher feelings
appear to be Love, Anger, and Fear. They are all associated
with distinct organical changes, seemingly part of their nature
physically viewed. In regard to the love circle of Feelings
there are also specific glandular secretions, through which
the emotions themselves can be awakened. In the case of
the angry or malevolent outbursts, there occur violent
displays of activity, as well as disturbances of the circulation
through the heart's action. In fear also are exhibited dis-
turbances of a specific nature, affecting the muscular system
in the way of depression and producing derangements in the
organs of excretion.
So far as the study of these effects can carry us, the
inferences are at some points confirmatory of previous
PL AND PAIN. 1-M
inductions. The case of Fear as a depressing emotion i.s
most nearly related to our leading genera In.
nexion of pain with Lowering of general vitality, As regards
er, the physical scat must be referred to a regioi
in TV oiis system expressly organised for man
ion. It fraternises \\itii no other mode of mind, and is
sufficiently prominent to stand hy itself; while the indu<
study of its manifestations is the chief source of our ki
ledge respecting it.
The Amirahle emotions, involving the love feeling in
various distinguishable varieties, have likewise definite
vous seats, of which we can give no farther explanation,
being also supported by organic secretions special to them-
selves. Assuming that their pleasurable character ha>
something to do with those purely organic stimulations, we
cap simply remark of them that they have a special efficacy
in iiti'ectiiig the nerves, in the direction of pleasure, and are
not at the same time connected with the furtherance of
vitality.
Pleasures and Pains in Connexion with Ideas. The field
of Ideas is even wider than that of Sense and Actuality, and
introduces an entirely new set of conditions. Ideas being
the traces or surviving impressions of sense, everything
must depend upon the forces that determine the retention
or survival of what has passed out of actual or real presence.
In the first place, from the very nature of the case, what-
ever the actuality was, so is the ideal continuance, with
difference in degree. In point of fact, the idea, while
sembling its original, has certain points of inferiority that
must be allowed for. Still, there is a sameness in 'nature
or kind. Inconsequence, we have to pronounce, generally,
that the idea of a pleasure is pleasant and the idea of a pain
painful. To multiply pleasurable ideas, and to incr.
their representative intensity, must be accounted one of tin-
modes of generating pleasure ; and so with pain.
Secondly. The cessation of a pain as such we have found
to be, in point of fact, a source of pleasure, sometimes of
a considerable amount. Nevertheless, the pain must still
subsist in memory, and the memory of a pain has just been
assumed to be painful. We have here to solve an apparent
contradiction, for which a distinction must be made among
the various kinds of pleasure and pain. 1
1 The recollection of a pain is necessarily of a ////.// churactrr. It may
In- painful, or it may be pleasurable, or it may be both l>y turns; th,-
182 A. BAIN :
It is in regard to the physical pains, especially, that their
cessation is not only the end of the pain, but the beginning
of a pleasurable reaction : the pain is not blotted out from
the memory, but the recollection of it in its painful character
is completely overpowered. An acute physical pain is not
really reproducible in the full strength of the actuality ; for,
although we cannot forget that we have been put to pain,
yet the cessation of the actual leaves us almost in the same
state as if it had never been, not to speak of the pleasurable
reaction that follows in certain cases. Thus the physical
pains that we have passed through do not mar the enjoy-
ment of life after the complete subsidence of the actual.
One qualifying circumstance of an important kind has yet
to be stated. The memory of a pain is very efficient as a
motive to the will in the prospect of recurrence. The
energy of precaution inspired by recollection alone is not
much less powerful than under the actual endurance ;
although circumstances may affect the degree of this energy.
Thus, for the purposes of the will, memory is more nearly
on an equal footing with actuality ; mere retrospect we may
treat as of small account, prospect is very formidable.
When, from the sense pleasures and pains, we pass to
those compounded of emotion and intellect, we find the
character of the survival to be greatly altered. The
pleasures and pains of Affection, Malevolence, Egotism,
and the various Artistic Feelings, do not pass out of being
by mere cessation in the same way. Their memory, while
also operative upon the will, has a more important standing
in the whole life. To have had an acute attack of neuralgia
or other painful ailment, if there is no fear of recurrence, is
not a source of permanent depression when recalled ; to
have had a severe rebuff, or defeat, in some contest, is a
more lasting diminution of the stock of happiness.
Eeverting to the theories of pleasure and pain that have been
current since the time of Aristotle, and more especially to the
physical side of pleasure as concomitant with increased activity,
we may consider, according to the latest views, the capability of
such a theory to represent the various species of pleasure and
pain. Among the most carefully elaborated and fully illustrated
renderings of this view we may quote the two papers by H. K.
Marshall (MIND, Nos. 63, 64). The following is a brief summary
sent mood being a ruling consideration in the case. Both the painful
infliction and the pleasure of cessation are facts for recollection, and are
susceptible of being revived according to circumstances. There is nothing
absolute in the nature of the recuperation.
I'l.KASCKi: AND PAIN.
of the position iiiuintuiiir.!. " Pleasure and Pain are determined
hi/ (lie relation hetireen tin- enenji/ aifi'n out ami the energy received
ill any moment hi/ the jihysical organs which determine the con
of that moment ; Pleasure resulting when the balance is on the
of the enenjH i/iren out, and Pain irlten the balance is on the side of
the ene r</i/ reee/red. \Vliere ///>' amounts received ami airen are
equal, then ire hare the. state of Indifference."
On this statement I would submit the following critical obser-
vations :
(1) Among the cases most fully met by this view, I may refer
first to the pleasures of muscular activity, and the corresponding
pains of muscular fatigue. There is no difficulty in suppo
that the nourished condition of the muscles, coupled with tln-ir
natural vigour in the individual at the time, strictly determines
the intensity of the pleasure accompanying muscular exercise.
It would be inconsistent with our conscious experience, as well
as improbable on physiological grounds, to take up any other
position. In the course of every muscular effort sufficiently
persisted in, there is a gradual diminution of the pleasure,
until we reach first indifference, and then the beginnings of pain.
When the activity is not muscular but nervous, as in our purely
intellectual processes, the principle seems equally justified, not-
withstanding complications growing out of the deeper processes
of the mind. The general fact may be maintained, not simply in
the contrasts of pleasure, indifference and pain, but in the exact
concomitance of amount or degree.
In so far as muscular and nervous energies enter into any of
the higher processes of the mind productive work or emotional
expenditure the law may be presumed to be strictly applicable.
(2) It is very natural to include under the same general state-
ment the wide-ranging property of our constitution, fully recog-
nised by mankind in every age, the law of dependence of pleasure
upon remission or change of stimulus. Remission of stimulus is
obviously a part of the cases just supposed, namely, muscular and
nervous expenditure ; for, without remission, there could be no
recuperation of the tissues involved. In the more vigorous con-
stitutions there is a copious expenditure, with comparatively little
need of repose, and according to the general statement under
consideration, the pleasure would be in full accord with restora-
tion of the vigour of the tissue, however short might be the
interval requisite. The time of remission has no other signi-
ficance than as a condition of the nourishment of the organs
concerned.
. Nevertheless, the law of cessation and change of stimulus, as
culminating in the well-known pleasures of novelty, does not
exactly coincide with the formula as thus explained. Interval of
time according to this farther principle has an absolute value, and
is not simply relative to nourishment of tissue. A week's con-
finement, with privation of all muscular exercise, would impart
184
a peculiar zest or relish to the resumption of the usual activities,
while, in point of fact, the muscular organs would be in a far
worse condition than if they had been put through their accus-
tomed daily exercise. When General Wolseley disembarked in
Egypt, with an expeditionary force, he found his operations
retarded by the inability of the horses to gallop ; yet we may be
quite sure that their enjoyment of the free use of their limbs was
much greater than their ordinary delight in their daily exercise.
There is no necessary contradiction or contrariety between the
law of change for the sake of change and the law of expenditure
of renewed vigour. Nevertheless, the statement of the one needs
to be supplemented, or somehow modified, to include the other.
Only by an independent induction could we ascertain that the
pleasure of a stimulus follows, in the first place, the nourishment
of the organ, and in the second place the interval of remission.
The two facts are distinct in their nature, and each needs to be
studied on its own ground, and not to be inferred from the known
workings of the other. An organ is at its very best, in point of
preparation for activity, by being exercised, up to the proper limits,
without the loss of a single day, as in the training of pedestrians,
mountain-climbers, boxers, or athletes. The high physical con-
dition thus gradually engendered yields its due amount of the
pleasure of exercise ; but, to obtain the other pleasure, there
must be longer periods of remission even at the cost of inferior
vigour in resuming the exertion.
The same line of observations may be taken in regard to the
more purely nervous and mental activities. To keep up the
intellectual energies to their highest efficiency, they need to be
maintained in steady exercise, with due observance of the limits
of over-fatigue. To gain the pleasures of freshness in any one
mode of effort, there needs to be a much greater remission than is
implied in their daily repose ; and when that larger remission is
allowed, as in school vacations, it is found tnat the renewed zest
is accompanied with temporary falling off in efficiency.
(3) The doctrine under discussion is less felicitously applicable,
when we survey as above the pleasures and pains of Sensation, in
its more passive modes. Even such a simple case as an acute
physical smart, although nowise inconsistent with the doctrine,
does not easily lend itself to that mode of statement. The theory
of pain, on the hypothesis in question, is, that an organ is sub-
jected to a stimulus after it has not merely lost surplus vigour,
but has got into an impoverished or deteriorated state, and so
demands a period of reparation corresponding to the loss. Now,
if we suppose the nerves and organ of taste to be in a perfectly
replenished condition, such as to respond, with the highest
relish, to something sweet, the application of the principle would
be consistently made by the gradual decay of the pleasure of
sweetness, until it was as good as totally lost. But going back
to the primary supposition of freshness in the organ, and ad-
I 'IJ A SU RE AN'D PAIN. 185
ministering a very slight. i>ortion of something 1 re comes
!i :it once, notwithstanding the robust condition of tlu: oi
It II:IN always been found extremely emUirra
phenomenon in terms oi tin- theory before us ; while any forced
endeavour to so express it, is felt lo give us no numi sfac-
lion in conceiving the phenomenon. In the case of a sensation
positively injurious to the nerve tissue, as a prick or a sruld of
the skin, or an inflammatory sore, \\e might regard it as an
extreme case of deterioration of an organ hy excessive and pro-
tracted stimulus. Yet the situation is so different, that the n
natural course seems to be to regard destruction of a sensitive
tissue, involving injury to a nerve, as a specific adjunct and
occasion of acute pain. The two different cases are perfectly
compatible and congruous, although neither can be stated ad-
vantageously in terms of the other.
(4) It must be freely granted that a good condition of the
organs generally is an underlying advantage in all kinds of nerve
stimulus that use up force. This is denied only by the
small number of theorists that would disconnect the mental with
the physical at certain points, so as to uphold the position of the
absolute immateriality of the mind. The doctrine thus
generally stated has its practical importance in requiring due
attention to be paid to the nourishment of the bodily system, and
its exemption from causes of deterioration, with a view to mental
efficiency. Of such efficiency, one important region is the main-
tenance of the pleasurable tone under all circumstances. Never-
theless, the anomalies and exceptions already recited reduce the
specific value of the principle in a very serious degree. It is only
necessary to recall the wide region of stimulants, in the shape of
drugs, to show the necessity of qualifying the literal statement of
the doctrine we are discussing. It is too notorious that such
stimulants retain their pleasurable efficacy long after the nerves
affected have sunk below par and are about to commence a
reaction of pain on the way to recovery. This means a giving
out of nervous strength to the pitch of total bankruptcy of the
tissue ; and although there is no inconsistency, on the contrary
a certain congruity, with the principle before us, the fact itself
must be embodied in a supplemental law of Credit, in order to
eke out the theory of physical hedonics.
Another class of examples of a still more anomalous kind may
be recalled from the previous exposition. As if to meet with a
flat denial the statement of the law of pleasure and pain given
by Kant, namely, pleasure the furtherance, and pain the hind-
rance, of vital action, we have the cases of sweetness and relish
that are positively injurious, of bitter drugs operating as tonics,
of cold in painful degrees tending to invigorate the system, of
agreeable warmth tending to debility. The contradiction may
not be so absolute as it seems ; it merely shows the necessity of
one more limitation to the principle we are considering.
186 A. BAIN :
(5) With regard to the applications of the theory to Fine Art, a
preparatory survey of the elements of Art may be of service. In
the first place, Art includes a number of pleasurable sensations of
the two higher senses, sight and hearing. Secondly, it embraces
both higher and lower senses when taken in idea. Thirdly, it
requires a selection and purification of all such pleasures, not
only with a view to omitting pains, but in order to attain a
certain elevation in the shape of freedom from grossness.
Fourthly, the strong elementary emotions are invoked to the full
length of their pleasure-giving character, with the same purify-
ing conditions as in the senses. Fifthly, the multiplication,
variation, and alternation of pleasurable modes, with avoidance
of incongruity or harsh transitions, come within the aims of the
artist in all departments. After allowance for all these sources
of pleasurable stimulation, we come at last to a something specific
and peculiar, the characteristic of Art in itself as distinguished
from the senses and the emotions in their own character. The
general designation HARMONY is appropriated to this class of
effects. It is still sufficiently wide-ranging when we follow it
into all the known departments of fine art. Eecurring to what
has already been advanced on this subject, we came to the con-
clusion that in Harmony there is a case of economising nervous
power as used for pleasure-giving, and a consequent possibility
of heightening a pleasurable response. So far, there is a con-
sistency with the general maxim now before us. It is when we
come to consider the extraordinary increase of pleasurable inten-
sity due to minute adjustments of the combining elements in a
work of Art, that we seem to be in a totally distinct region of
mental production, which, though in no respect contradicting the
present law, needs the aid of an entirely new assumption to give
it hypothetical shape.
The peculiar case of rhythm in Music has been subjected to
much discussion, but without any convincing result. The strik-
ing out of similarities, in the midst of dissimilarities, is partly in-
telligible on the principle just stated, while its higher felicities
appear beyond the reach of such an explanation. The intolerable
pain of the very harsh discords has no special connexion with
nervous exhaustion, being the same under the highest possible
vigour of the nervous tone. An inscrutable variety of molecular
nerve action is set up by such discords, the obverse of some other
mode belonging to the delicate varieties of concord. There is
here a repetition of what occurs in the primary pains and
pleasures of the special senses, and especially those whose action
is chemical, and we are still without a clue to their hypothetical
rendering.
(6) In the general formula of pleasure and pain, as applied to
its most favourable cases, there is a numerical relation between
intensity of stimulus and intensity of the resulting pleasure or
pain. Nevertheless, even in our most elementary modes of
PLEASURE AND PAIN. 187
sensation, this is singularly reversed. Take the cases of tickling
by the slightest conceivable contact on the skin, for which there
is as yet no plausible explanation. On the other hand, the
embrace of living beings, as in the mother and offspring, has a
mysterious intensity of diffused thrill that seems to follow no law
but its own. That there are associations engendered in this
particular situation, and cumulative effects of heredity, may be
allowed, yet the influence is still unique and not an example of
the law in question, beyond the general propriety of a certain
well-to-do condition of the system in order to maintain the thrill.
(7) A theory of pleasure and pain is wanting if it does not
somehow introduce us to the very great variety of modes of both
the one and the other. The science of the human mind is incom-
plete, so long as it fails to classify our hedonic states according to
the closeness of their similarity. The division of our suscepti-
bilities according to our known sense organs is one obvious mode
of effecting such a classification. To this should follow, if possible,
some theory connecting the several species with their sense foun-
dations, and accounting for the distinctive workings of both
pleasure and pain. The theory that we are engaged in discussing
does go some way to meet this want, but leaves a very large
region untouched and inexplicable. I doubt whether it covers
one-third of the ground. As regards the higher emotions, it may
be pressed into the service in accounting for the depression of
Fear, but not for the intense enjoyments and severe pains allied
with the Amicable and the Malevolent modes.
II THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL'S
DIALECTIC. (II.)
By J. ELLIS MCTAGGART.
THE conclusion at which we arrived at the end of the first
part of this article namely, that the dialectic, even if we
assume its validity, does not completely and perfectly ex-
press the nature of thought is startling and paradoxical.
Eor the validity of the dialectic method at all, and its power
of adequately expressing the ultimate nature of thought, are
so closely bound up together, that they may well appear at
first sight to be inseparable. The dialectic process is a dis-
tinctively Hegelian idea. Doubtless the germs of it are to be
found in Fichte and others ; but it was only by Hegel that
it was fully worked out and made the central point of a philo-
sophy. And in so far as it has been held since, it has been
held substantially in the manner in which he stated it. To
retain the doctrine, and to retain the idea that it is of car-
dinal importance while denying that it adequately represents
the nature of thought, appears to be a most unwarranted
and gratuitous choice between ideas which their author held
to be inseparable.
Yet I cannot see what alternative is left to us. For it is
Hegel himself who refutes his own doctrine. The state to
which the dialectic, according to him, gradually approximates
is one in which the terms thesis, antithesis, and synthesis
can have no meaning. For in this state there is no opposi-
tion to create the relation of thesis and antithesis, and,
therefore, no reconciliation of that opposition to create a
synthesis. " Whatever is distinguished is without more ado
and at the same time declared to be identical, one with
another, and with the whole." " The antithesis which the
Motion lays down is no real antithesis." (Enc. section
161.) Now, nowhere in the dialectic do we entirely get rid
of the relation of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, not even
in the final triad of the process. The inference seems inevit-
able that the dialectic cannot fully represent, in any part of
its movement, the real and essential nature of pure thought.
The only thing to be done is to consider whether, with this
all-important limitation, the process has any longer any real
significance, and if so, how much.
Since the dialectic does, if the hypothesis I have advanced
THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HBGBI/S DIALECTIC. 189
be correct, represent the inevitable course our minds are
logically bound to follow, when they attempt to deal with
jmiv thought, while it does not adequately represent the
MM ture of pure thought itself, it follows that it must be in
some degree subjective. We have now to determine exactly
tin- MK'imiMg to be applied to this rather ambiguous word in
this connexion. On the one hand, it is clear that it is not
subjective in the sense in which the word has been defined
as UK aniM^ 4< that which is mine or yours ". It is no mere
empirical description or generalisation. For whatever we
may hold with regard to the success or failure of the dia-
lectic in apprehending the. true nature of thought will not at
all affect the question of its internal necessity and of its
cogency for us. The dialectic is not an account of what
men have thought or may think. It is a demonstration of
what they must think, provided they wish to deal with
Hegel's problem at all, and to deal with it consistently and
truly.
On the other hand, we must now pronounce the dialectic
process to be subjective in this sense that it does not fully
express the essential nature of thought, but obscures it more
or less under particulars which are not essential. It may
not seem very clear at first sight how we can distinguish
between the necessary course of the mind when engaged in
pure thought, which the dialectic method, according to this
hypothesis, is admitted to be, and the essential nature of
thought, which it is not allowed that it can express. What,
it may be asked, is the essential nature of thought, except
that course which it must and does take, whenever we
think ?
We must remember, however, that according to Hegel
thought can only exist in its complete and concrete form
that is, as the Absolute Idea. The import of our thought
may be, and of course often is, a judgment under some
lower category, but our thought itself, as an existent fact,
distinguished from the meaning it conveys, must be concrete
and complete. For to stop at any category short of the
complete whole involves a contradiction, and a contradiction
is a sign of error. Now our judgments can be erroneous and
often are, and so we can, and do, make judgments which
involve a contradiction. But there is no intelligible mean-
ing in saying that a fact is erroneous, and therefore, if we
find a contradiction in any judgment, we know that it can-
not be true of facts. It follows that, though it is unquestion-
ably true that we can predicate in thought categories other
than the highest, and even treat them as final, it is no less
190 J. E. MCTAGGABT :
certain that we cannot truly predicate of thought, any more
than of any other reality, any category but the Absolute
Idea.
This explains how it is possible for the actual and inevit-
able course of thought not to express fully and adequately
its own nature. For thought may be erroneous or deceptive,
when it is treating of thought, as much as when it is treat-
ing of any other reality. And it is possible that under cer-
tain circumstances the judgment expressed in our thoughts
may be inevitably erroneous or deceptive. If these judg-
ments have thought as their subject-matter we shall then
have the position in question that the necessary course of
thought will fail to express properly its own nature.
It is, of course, the fact that we should never know that a
particular judgment had expressed inadequately the nature
of thought unless some other judgment afterwards corrected
it, and enabled us to see where the mistake lay. It would
be, therefore, meaningless to say that our judgments were
always necessarily inadequate to the nature of thought. For
if it were so, we could never find it out. Bat it is quite pos-
sible that, under given circumstances, our judgments may be
inadequate to the nature of thought, and that we may detect
this inadequacy by means of other judgments made under
more favourable circumstances. And this is what I main-
tain with regard to the dialectic. When we are engaged in
actually making the transitions from category to category,
we are compelled to regard the process in a way which we
afterwards see to be only partially correct, when, from the
knowledge gained by the completion of the whole logic, we
look back, and consider what is involved in its existing at all.
The mistake, as we have already noticed, consists in the
fact that whereas the true process, which forms the essence
of the actual process in time, and which alone is preserved
and summed up in the Absolute Idea, is a direct process
from one term which exists only in the transition to another,
the actual process, on the other hand, is one from contradic-
tory to contradictory, each of which is conceived as possess-
ing some stability and independence. The reason of this
mistake lies in the nature of the process, as one from error
to truth. For while error remains in our conclusions, it
must naturally affect our comprehension of the logical rela-
tions by which those conclusions are connected, and induce
us to suppose them other than they are. In particular, it
may be traced to the circumstance that the dialectic starts
with the knowledge of the part, and from this works up to
the knowledge of the whole. This method of procedure is
THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEI/S DIALECTIC. 191
always inappropriate in anything of the nature of an
organism. Now the reality denoted by the Absolute Idea
i iore than an organism. The Absolute Idea contains
within itself the idea of organism, and transcends and com-
pletes it. The form of combination in the Absolute Idea is
even more intimate and close than that of organism, one in
which the parts are still more indivisibly and essentially
related to the whole. And here, therefore, even more than
with organisms, will it be an inadequate and deceptive
attempt if we endeavour to comprehend the whole from the
stand-point of the part. And this is what the dialectic, as
it progresses, must necessarily do. Consequently, not only
are the lower categories of the dialectic inadequate except
as mere moments of the Absolute Idea, but their relation
to each other is not the relation which they have in the
Absolute Idea, and consequently in all existence. These
relations, in the dialectic, represent more or less the error
through which the human mind is gradually attaining to the
truth. They do not adequately represent the relations exist-
ing in the truth itself. To this extent, then, the dialectic is
subjective.
9. And the dialectic is also to be called subjective because
it not only fails to show clearly the true nature of thought,
but, as we remarked above, docs not fully express its own
meaning the meaning of the process forwards. For the
real meaning of the advance, if it is to have any objective
reality at all, if it is to be a necessary consequence of all
attempts at deep and consistent thinking, must be the result
of the nature of thought as it exists. Our several judgments
on the nature of thought have not in themselves any power
of leading us on from one of them to another. It is the rela-
tion of these judgments to the concrete whole of thought,
incarnate in our minds and in all our experience, which
creates the dialectic movement. Since this is so, it would
seem that the real heart and kernel of the process is the
movement of abstractions to rejoin the whole from which
they have been separated, and that the essential part of this
movement is that by which we are carried from the more
abstract to the more concrete. This will be determined by
the relations in which the finite categories stand to the con-
crete idea, when they are viewed as abstractions from it and
aspects of it the only sense in which they really exist.
But the true relation of the abstractions to the concrete idea
is, as we have already seen, that to which the dialectic
method gradually approximates, but which it never reaches,
and not that which it starts with and gradually, but never
192 J. E. MCTAGGART :
entirely, discards. And so the dialectic advance has, mixed
up with it, elements which do not really belong to the
advance, nor to the essence of pure thought, but are merely
due to our original ignorance about the latter, of which we
only gradually get rid. For all that part of the actual
advance in the dialectic, which is different from the advance
according to the type characteristic of the Notion, has no
share in the real meaning and value of the process, since it
does not contribute to what alone makes that meaning and
value, the restoration of the full and complete idea. What
this element is we can learn by comparing the movement of
the dialectic wiiich is typical of Being with that which is
typical of the Notion. It is the element of opposition and
contradiction, the element of immediacy in the finite cate-
gories, and the negation by them of their antitheses, and
(until forced, so to speak, into submission) of their syntheses.
It is, so to speak, the transverse motion as opposed to the
forward motion. The dialectic always moves onwards at an
angle to the straight line which denotes advance in truth
and concreteness. Starting unduly on one side of the truth,
it oscillates to the other, and then corrects itself. Once
more it finds that even in its corrected statement it is still
one-sided, and again swings to the opposite extreme. It is
in this indirect way alone that it advances. And the essence
of the process is the advance alone. The whole point of the
dialectic is its gradual attainment to the Absolute Idea. In
so far, then, as the process is not direct advance to the abso-
lute, it does not express the essence of the process only, but
also the inevitable inadequacies of the human mind when
considering a subject-matter which can only be fully under-
stood when the consideration has been completed.
And, as was remarked above, it also fails to express its
own meaning in another way. . For the imperfect type of
transition, which is never fully eliminated, represents the
various categories as possessing some degree of independence
and self-subsistence. If they really possessed this, they
could not be completely absorbed in the syntheses, and the
dialectic could not be successful. The fact that it is success-
ful proves that it has not given a completely correct account
of itself, and, for this reason also, it deserves to be called
subjective, since it does not fully express the objective
reality of thought.
Moreover, the method in the higher categories is described
as making explicit that which was implicit lower down.
Now the distinction between explicit and implicit is only
that between what is completely and what is incompletely
Till: CHANCES OF METHOD IN HEGEI/S DIALECTIC.
understood. The peculiarities of the method iu the lower
categories, therefore, must be due to the subject being
as yet not fully understood. This defect cannot attach
to finite categories as moments of the Absolute Idea, for
as such, being seen in the light of the whole, they must
be fully understood. And the Absolute Idea, according to
Hegel, is completely true, and adequate to express reality,
and its composition cannot, therefore, be in any way
due to our want of comprehension. Now, as we have
seen, the essential part of the dialectic process depends on
the relation of the finite categories to the Absolute Idea.
The characteristics of method from which the dialectic
gradually works itself free are, therefore, to be looked on only
as necessary confusions of the human mind in beginning its
investigations of the nature of pure thought. And as the
dialectic never quite shakes itself free from these charac-
teristics, it always retains some amount of the confusion, and
can never, therefore, perfectly represent the true nature of
thought.
10. Having decided that the dialectic is to this extent sub-
jective, we have to consider how far this will reduce its
cardinal significance in philosophy, or its practical impor-
tance. I do not see that it need do either. For all that
results from this new position is that the dialectic is a pro-
cess through error to truth. Now we knew this before.
For on any theory of the dialectic it remains true that it sets
out with inadequate ideas of the universe, and finally reaches
adequate ideas. We now go further and say that the relation
of these inadequate ideas to one another does not completely
correspond to anything in the nature of things. But the
general position is the same as before, that we gain the truth
in the dialectic, but that the steps by which we reach it con-
tain mistakes. We shall see that there is no essential dif-
ference between them in this respect if we consider in more
detail in what the importance of the dialectic lies.
This importance is threefold. The first branch of it
depends chiefly on the end being reached, and the second
two chiefly on the means by which it is reached. The first
of these lies in the conclusion that if we can predicate any
category whatever of a thing, we are thereby entitled to
predicate the Absolute Idea of it. Now we can predicate
some category of everything whatever, and the Absolute
Idea is simply the description in abstract terms of the human
reason, or, in other words, the human spirit is the incarna-
tion of the Absolute Idea. From this it follows that the
mind could, if it only saw clearly enough, see itself in every-
13
194 J. E. MCTAGGART :
thing. The importance of this conclusion is obvious. It
gives the assurance of that harmony between ourselves and
the world for which philosophy always seeks, and by which
alone science, morality, and religion can be ultimately
justified.
Hegel was entitled, on his own premises, to reach this
conclusion by means of the dialectic. And the different
view of the relation of the dialectic to reality, which I have
ventured to put forward, does not at all affect the validity
of the dialectic for this purpose. For the progress of the
dialectic remains as necessary as before. The progress is in-
direct, and we have come to the conclusion that the indirect-
ness of the advance is not in any way due to the essential
nature of pure thought, but entirely to our own imperfect
understanding of that nature. But the whole process is
still necessary, and the direct advance is still essential.
And all that we want to know is that the direct advance is
necessary. We are only interested, for this particular pur-
pose, in proving that from any possible stand-point we are
bound in logical consistency to advance to the Absolute
Idea. In this connexion it is not of the least importance
what is the nature of the road we travel, provided that we
must travel it, nor whether the steps express truth fully,
provided that the final conclusion does so. Now the theory
of the subjectivity of the dialectic process leaves the objec-
tivity and adequacy of the result of the dialectic unimpaired.
And therefore for this function the system is as well adapted
as it ever was.
11. The second ground of the importance of the Hegelian
logic consists in the information which it is able to give us
about the world as it is here and now for us, who have not
yet been able so clearly to interpret all phenomena as only
to find our own most fundamental nature manifesting itself
in them. As we see that certain categories are superior in
concreteness and truth to others, since they come later in
the chain and have transcended the meaning of their prede-
cessors, we are able to say that certain methods of regarding
the universe are more correct and significant than others.
We are able to see that the idea of organism, for example,
is a more fundamental explanation than the idea of causality,
and one which we should prefer whenever we can apply it
to the matter in hand.
Here also the value of the dialectic remains unimpaired.
For whether it does or does not express the true nature of
thought with complete correctness ; it certainly, according
to this theory, does show the necessary and inevitable con-
THE CHANGES <1 IK1HOD IN HEGEL* S DIALECTIC. 195
nexion of our finite judgments with one another. Tin-
utility which we are now considering lies in the guide which
tin- dialectic can give us to the relative validity and useful-
! of these finite judgments. For it is only necessar
know their relations to one another, and to know that as tin
series loot's further, it goes nearer to the truth. Both t!
things cm be learnt from the dialectic. That it does not
tell us the exact relations which subsist in reality is un-
important. For we are not here judging reality, but our own
judgments about reality.
The third function of the dialectic process is certainly de-
stroyed by the view of it as subjective which I have expressed.
For Hegel the dialectic showed the relation of the categ<
to one another as moments in the Absolute Idea, and in
reality. We are now forced to consider those moments as
related in a way which is inadequately expressed by the
relation of the categories to one another. We are not how-
ever deprived of anything essential to the completeness of
the system by this. In the first place, we are still able to
understand completely and adequately what the Absolute
Idea is. For although one definition was given of it by
which it was simply the whole series of the categories
gathered into a whole, yet a more direct and independent
one may also be found, by which it is described as " the
notion of the idea to which the idea itself is the object "
as the mind which recognises itself in all things. Our ina-
bility to regard the process any longer as an adequate
analysis of the Absolute Idea will not leave us in ignorance
of what the Absolute Idea really is.
And, in the second place, we are not altogether left in the
dark even as regards the analysis of the Absolute Idea. The
dialectic, it is true, never fully reveals the true nature of
thought which forms its secret spring, but it gives us data
by which we can discount the necessary error. For the
connexion of the categories resembles the true nature of
thought (which is expressed in the typical transition of the
Notion), more and more closely as it goes on, and at the end
of the logic it differs from it only infinitesimally. By ob-
serving the type to which the dialectic method approximates
throughout its course, we are thus enabled to tell what ele-
ment in it is that which is due to the essential nature of
thought. It is that element which is alone left when, in
the typical movement of the Notion, we see how the dialectic
would act if it could act with full self-consciousness. It is
true that in the lower categories we can never see the tran-
sition according to this type, owing to the necessary cou-
196 J. E. MCTAGGART :
fusion of the subject-matter in so low a stage, which hides
the true nature of the process to which the dialectic endea-
vours to approximate. But we can regard the movement of
all the categories as compounded, in different proportions
according to their position, of two forces, the force of oppo-
sition and negation, and the force of advance and completion,
and we can say that the latter is due to the real nature of
the advancing dialectical thought and the former to our mis-
conceptions about it. In other words, the amount of error
in the dialectic is inevitable, but it can be ascertained, and
'need not therefore introduce any doubt or scepticism into
the conclusions to which the dialectic may lead us.
12. What then is this real and essential element in the
advance of thought which is revealed, though never com-
pletely, in the dialectic ? In the first place, it is an advance
which is direct. The element of indirectness which is intro-
duced by the movement from thesis to antithesis, from
opposite to opposite, diminishes as the dialectic proceeds,
and, in the ideal type, wholly dies away. In that type each
category is seen to carry in itself the implication of the next
beyond it, to which thought then proceeds. The lower is
lower only because of the implicitness of part of its meaning;
it is no longer one-sided, requiring to be corrected by an
equal excess on the other side of the truth. And, therefore,
no idea stands in an attitude of opposition to any other ;
there is nothing to break down, nothing to fight. All that
aspect of the process belongs to our misapprehension of the
relation of the abstract to the concrete. While looking up
from the bottom, we may imagine the truth is only to be
attained by contest, but in looking down from the top the
only true way of examining a process of this sort we see
that the contest is only due to our misunderstanding, and
that the growth of thought is really direct and unopposed.
The movement of the dialectic may perhaps be compared
with advantage to that of a ship tacking against the wind.
If we suppose that the wind blows exactly from the point
which the ship wishes to reach, and that, as the voyage con-
tinues, the sailing powers of the ship improve so that it
becomes able to sail closer and closer to the wind, the
analogy will be rather exact. It is impossible for the ship
to reach its destination by a direct course, as the wind is
precisely opposite to the line which that course would take,
and in the same way it is impossible for the dialectic to move
forward without the triple relation of its terms, and without
some opposition between thesis and antithesis. But the
only object of the ship is to proceed towards the port, as the
THE CHANGES OF MllTHOD IN HEGEI/S DIALECTIC. 197
only object of the dialectic process is to attain to the concrete
and complete idea, and the movement of the ship from side
to side of its course is labour wasted, in so far as the end of
the voyage is concerned, though necessarily wasted, since the
movement forward would be impossible without the com-
bination with it of a lateral movement. In the same way
the advance in the dialectic is merely in the gradually
increasing completeness of the ideas, and the opposition of
one idea to another, and the consequent negation and contra-
diction do not mark any real step towards attaining the
knowledge of the essential nature of thought, although they
are necessary accompaniments of the process of giiinin^ that
knowledge. Again, the change in the ship's course which
brings it nearer to the wind, and reduces the distance which
it is necessary to travel to accomplish the journey, will cor-
respond to the gradual subordination of the elements of
negation and opposition which we have seen to take place as
we approach the end of the dialectic.
13. We shall find confirmation for our view of the
gradual change in the method of the dialectic, if we examine
the all-including and supreme triad, of which all the others
are moments. This triad is given by Hegel as Logic, Nature
and Spirit.
If we inquire as to the form which the dialectic process,
is likely to assume here, we find ourselves in a difficulty.
For the form of transition in any particular triad was deter-
mined by its place in the series. If it was among the earlier
categories it approximated to the character given as typical
of Being ; it it did not come till near the end it showed more
or less resemblance to the type of the Notion. And we were
able to see that this was natural, because the later method,
being more direct and less encumbered with irrelevant
material, was only to be attained when the work previously
done had given us sufficient insight into the real nature of
the subject-matter. This principle, however, will not help
us here. For the transition which we are here considering
is both the first and the last of its series, and it is impossible
therefore to determine its characteristic features by its place
in the order. The less direct method is necessary when we
are dealing with the abstract and imperfect categories with
which our investigations must begin, the more direct method
comes with the more adequate categories. But his triad
covers the whole range, from the barest category of the
Logic that of pure Being to the culmination of human
thought in Absolute Spirit.
Since it covers the whole range in which all the types of
198 J. E. MCTAGGAET :
the dialectic method are displayed, the natural conclusion
would seem to be that one of them is as appropriate to it as
another, that whichever form may be used will be more or
less helpful and significant, because the process does cover
the ground in which that form can appropriately be used ;
while, on the other hand, every form will be more or less
inadequate, because the process covers ground on which it
cannot appropriately be used. If we cast it in the form of
the Notion, we shall ignore the fact that it starts with
categories too inadequate for a method so direct ; if, on the
other hand, we try the form of the categories of Being, the
process contains material for which such a method is in-
adequate.
And if we look at the facts we shall find that they confirm
this view, and that it is possible to state the relation of
Logic, Nature, and Spirit to one another, in two different
ways. Hegel himself states it in the manner characteristic
of the Notion. It is not so much positive, negative, and
synthesis, as universal, particular, and individual that he
points out. In the Logic thought is to be found in pure
abstraction from all particulars (we cannot, of course, think
it as abstracted from particulars, but in the Logic we attend
only to the thought, and ignore the data it connects). In
Nature we find thought again, for Nature is part of experi-
ence, and more or less rational, and this implies that it has
thought in it. In Nature, however, thought is rather
buried under the mass of data which appear contingent
and empirical ; we see the reason is there, but we do not
see that everything is completely rational. It is described
by Hegel as the idea in a state of alienation from itself.
Nature is thus far from being the mere contrary and
correlative of thought. It is thought and something more,
thought incarnate in the particulars of sense. At the same
time, while the transition indicates an advance, it does not
indicate a pure advance. For the thought is represented as
more or less overpowered by the new element which has
been added, and not altogether reconciled to and inter-
penetrating it. In going forward it has also gone to one
side, and this requires, therefore, the correction which is
given to it in the synthesis, when thought, in Spirit,
completely masters the mass of particulars which for a
time had seemed to master it, and when we perceive that
the truth of the universe lies in the existence of thought as
fact, the incarnation of the Absolute Idea in short, in Spirit.
Here we meet all the characteristics of the Notion. The
second term, to which we advance from the first, is to some
THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEI/S DIALECTIC. 199
extent its opposite, since the particulars of sense,
wanting in the first, are in undue prominence in the second.
But it is to ;i much greater extent the completion of the
{DM, Mnce the idea, which was taken in the Logic in unreal
i action, is now taken as embodied in facts, which is the
way it really exists. The only defect is that the embodiment
is not yet quite complete and evident. And the synthesis
which removes this defect does not, as in earlier types of the
dialectic, stand impartially between thesis and antithesis,
each as defective as the other, but only completes the
process already begun in the antithesis. It is not necessary
to compare the two lower terms, Logic and Nature, to be
able to proceed to Spirit. The consideration of Nature
alone would be sufficient to show that it postulated the
existence of Spirit. For we have already in Nature both
the sides required for the synthesis, though their connexion
is so far imperfect, and there is consequently no need to
refer back to the thesis, whose meaning has been incorpo-
rated and preserved in the antithesis. The existence of the
two sides, not completely reconciled, in the antithesis, in
itself postulates a synthesis, in which the reconciliation
shall be completed.
14. But it would also be possible to state the transition in
the form which is used in the Logic for the lower part of
the dialectic. In this case we should proceed from pure
thought to its simple contrary, and from, the two together
to a synthesis. This simple contrary will be the element
which, together with thought, forms the basis for the
synthesis which is given in Spirit. And as Nature, as we
have seen, contains the same elements as Spirit, though less
perfectly developed, we shall find this contrary of thought to
be the element in experience, whether of Nature or Spirit,
which cannot be reduced to thought. Now of this element
we know that it is immediate and that it is particular
not in the sense in which Nature is particular, in the sense
of incompletely developed individuality, but of abstract
particularity. It is possible to conceive that in the long
run all other characteristics of experience except these
might be reduced to a consequence of thought. But
however far the process of rationalisation might be carried,
and however fully we might be able to answer the question
of why things are as they are and not otherwise, it is im-
possible to get rid of a datum which is immediate and
therefore unaccounted for. For thought is only mediation,
and must therefore exist in conjunction with something
immediate on which to act. If nothing existed but thought
200 J. E. MCTAGGAET :
itself, still the fact of its existence must be in the long run
immediately given, and one for which thought itself could
not account. This immediacy is the mark of the element
which is essential to experience and irreducible to thought.
If then we wished to display the process from Logic to
Spirit according to the Being- type of transition we should,
starting from pure thought as our thesis, put as its anti-
thesis the element of immediacy and " givenness " in experi-
ence. This element can never be properly or adequately
described, since all description involves the predication of
categories of the subject and is consequently mediation ; but
by abstracting the element of mediation in experience, as in
the logic we abstract the element of immediacy, we can
form some idea of what it is like. Here we shall have
thought and immediacy as exactly opposite and counter-
balancing elements. They are each essential to the truth,
but present themselves as opposed to one another. Neither
of them has the other at all as a part of itself, though by ex-
ternal reasoning it can be seen that one implies the other.
But each of them negates the other as much as it implies it,
and the relation, without the synthesis, is one of opposition
and contradiction. We cannot see, as we can when a transi-
tion assumes the Notion form, that the whole meaning of
the one category lies in its transition to the other. The
synthesis is the notion of experience or reality, in which we
have the given immediate mediated. This contains both
Nature and Spirit, the former as the more imperfect stage,
the latter as the more perfect, culminating in the completely
satisfactory conception of Absolute Spirit. Nature stands in
this case in the same relation to Absolute Spirit as do the
lower forms of spirit as forms equally concrete but less per-
fectly developed.
This triad could give as cogent a proof as the other. It
could be shown, in the first place, that mere mediation is
unmeaning except in relation to the merely immediate,
since without something to mediate it could not act. In
the same way it could be shown that the merely given, with-
out any action of thought on it, could not exist, since
any attempt to describe it, or even to assert its existence,
involves the use of some category, and therefore of thought.
And these two extremes, each of which negates the other
and at the same time demands it, are reconciled in the
synthesis of actual experience, whether Nature or Spirit, in
which the immediate is mediated, and both extremes in this
way gain for the first time reality and consistency.
The possibility of this alternative arrangement affords, as
THI: CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL'S DIALECTIC. 201
I mentioned above, an additional argument in favour of the
view that the change of method is essential to the dialectic,
and th;it it is due to the progressively increasing insight into
the subject which we gain as we pass to the higher cate-
gories and approximate to the completely adequate result.
For in this instance, when the whole ground 1'n.in beginning
to end of the dialectic process is covered in a single triad, we
find that either method may be used, which suggests of itself
t hat the two methods are approximate to the two ends of the
series whicli are here, and here only, united by a single step.
Independently of this, however, it is also worth while to C
sider the possibility of the double transition attentively, be-
cause it may help us to explain the origin of some of the
misapprehensions of Hegel's meaning which are by no
means uncommon.
We saw above that the dialectic more closely represented
the real nature of thought in the later categories, when it
appeared more direct and spontaneous, than in the earlier
stages, when it was still encumbered with negations and
contradictions. Of the two possible methods of treating this
particular transition that which Hegel actually adopted,
and that which we have just seen to be also possible it
would appear beforehand that the former would be that
which would be the most expressive and significant. On
inquiry we shall find that this is actually the case. For
there is no real opposition between thought and immediacy;
neither can exist without the other. Now, in- the method
adopted by Hegel, the element of immediacy comes in first in
Nature, and not as an element opposed to, though neces-
sarily connected with, the mediation of the logic, but as
already bound up with it in a unity, which unity is Nature.
This expresses the truth better than a method which starts
by considering the two aspects as two self-centred and in-
dependent realities, which have to be connected by reasoning
external to themselves. For by the latter, even where they
are finally reconciled in a synthesis, it is done, so to speak,
against their will, since their claims to independence are
only forced from them by the reductio ad absunht/n to which
they are reduced when they are seen, as independent, to be
at once mutually contradictory and mutually implied in each
other. In this method the transitory nature of the incom-
plete categories, and their movement forward of their own
essential nature, are not sufficiently emphasised.
And we shall find that the subject-matter of the transi-
tion is too advanced to bear stating according to the Being-
type without showing that that type is not fully appropriate
202 J. E. MCTAGGAET :
to it. Logic and immediacy are indeed as much on a level
as Being and Not-Being. There is no trace whatever in the
former case, any more than in the latter, of a rudimentary
synthesis in the antithesis. But the other characteristic of
the lower type that the thesis and the antithesis should
claim to be mutually exclusive and independent cannot be
fully realised. Being and Not-Being, although they may be
shown by reasoning to be mutually implicated, are at any
rate primd facie distinct and opposed. But mediation and
immediacy, although opposed, are nevertheless connected,
even primd facie. It is impossible even to define the two
terms without suggesting that each of them is, by itself, un-
stable, and that their only real existence is as aspects of the
concrete whole in which they are united. The method is
not sufficiently advanced for the matter it deals with, which
compels it to modify its form.
15. It is, however, as I endeavoured to show above, a
priori probable that neither method would fully fit this par-
ticular case. And not only the one which we have just dis-
cussed, but the one which Hegel preferred to it, will be
found to some degree inadequate to its task here. The
latter, no doubt, is the more correct and convenient of the
two ; yet its use alone, without the knowledge that it did
not in this case exclude the concurrent use of the latter as
equally legitimate, may lead to grave miscomprehensions of
the system.
For the use of that method which Hegel does not adopt
the one in which the terms are Logic, Immediacy, and Ex-
perience has at any rate this advantage, that it brings out
the fact that Immediacy is as important and ultimate a
factor in reality as Logic is, and one which is irreducible to
it. The two terms are exactly on a level. In point of fact
we begin with the Logic and go from that to Immediacy,
because it is to the completed idea of the Logic that we
come if we start from the idea of pure Being, and we natu-
rally start from that idea, because it alone, of all. our ideas, is
the one whose denial carries with it at once and clearly, self-
contradiction. But the transition from Immediacy to Logic
is exactly the same as that from Logic to Immediacy. And
as the tw^o terms are correlative in this way, it would be
comparatively easy to see, by observing them, that neither
of them derived their validity from the other, but both from
the synthesis.
This is not so clear when the argument takes the other form.
The element of Immediacy here never appears as a separate
and independent term at all. It appears in Nature for the
THE CHANGES OF METHOD IN HEGEL'S I>I.\I.K< IK
time, and here it is already in i-nnibiniitmn with thought.
And Nature and Logic are not correlative terms, from either
of which we can proceed to the other. The tr:msitin >
1mm Logic to Nature from thought by itself, to tin night
combined with Immediacy. It is not unnatural, t
to suppose that Immediacy is dependent on, and drdunl.lr
from, pure thought, while the reverse process is not possihl.-.
The pure reason is supposed to make for itself the material
in which it is embodied. " The logical bias of the Hegelian
philosophy," says Pro. Seth, " tends ... to redur
to mere types or ' concretions ' of abstract formulae."
(Hegelianism and Persvtut/iti/, p. 126.) It might, I think,
be shown that other considerations conclusively prove this
view to be incorrect. In the first place, throughout the
Logic there are continual references which show that pure
thought requires some material, other than itself, in which to
work. And, secondly, the spring of all movement in the
dialectic comes from the synthesis towards which the process
is -.working, and not from the thesis from which the start is
made. Consequently, progress from Logic to Nature could,
in any case, prove, not that the additional element in nature
was derived from thought, but that it co-existed with thought
in the synthesis which is their goal. But although the mis-
take might have been avoided, even under the actual circum-
stances, it could scarcely have been made if the possibility
of the alternative method of deduction had been known.
Immediacy would, in that case, have been treated as a
separate element in the process, and as one which was cor-
relative with pure thought, so that it could scarcely have
been supposed to have been dependent on it.
The more developed method, again, tends rather to obscure
the full meaning and importance of the synthesis, unless we
realise that in this method part of the work of the synthesis
is already done in the second term. This is of great impor-
tance, because we have seen that it is in their synthesis alone
that the terms gain any reality and validity, which they did
not possess when considered in abstraction. In the earlier
method we see clearly that pure thought is one of these
abstractions, as mere immediacy is the other. It is, there-
fore, clear that each of these terms, taken by itself, is a mere
abstraction, and could not possibly, out of its own nature,
produce the other abstraction, and the reality from which
they both come. From this standpoint it would be impos-
sible to suppose that out of pure thought were produced
Nature and Spirit.
Now, in the type characteristic of the Notion, the same
204 J. E. MCTAGGABT :
element appears both in thesis and antithesis, although in
the latter it is in combination with a fresh element. There
is, therefore, a possibility of misunderstanding the process.
For an element which was both in thesis and antithesis
might appear not to be merely a one-sided abstraction, but
to have the concreteness which is to be found in the syn-
thesis, since it appears in both the extremes into which the
synthesis may be separated. When, for example, we have
Logic, Nature, and Spirit, we might be tempted to argue
that pure thought could not be only one side of the truth,
since it was found in each of the lower terms by itself in
Logic, and combined with immediacy in Nature, and hence
to attribute to it a greater self-sufficiency and importance
than it really possesses.
This mistake will disappear when we realise that the only
reason that pure thought appears again in the second term
of the triad is that the synthesis, in transitions of this type,
has already begun in the antithesis. It is only in the syn-
thesis that thought appears in union with its opposite, and,
apart from the synthesis, it is as incomplete and unsub-
stantial as is immediacy.
But the change in the type of the process is not sufficiently
emphasised in Hegel, and there is a tendency on the part of
observers to take the type presented by the earliest categories
as that which prevails all through the dialectic. And as, in
the earlier type, one of the extremes could not have been
found in both the first and second terms of a triad, it is sup-
posed that pure thought cannot be such an extreme, cannot
stand in the same relation to Spirit, as Being does to
Becoming, and is rather to be looked on as the cause of what
follows it than as an abstraction from it.
16. I have endeavoured to show that the view of the dia-
lectic given in this paper, while we cannot suppose it to have
been held by Hegel, is, nevertheless, not unconnected with
his system. The germs of it are to be found in his exposi-
tion of the change of method in the three great divisions of
the process, and the observation of the details of the system
confirm this. But it was not sufficiently emphasised, nor
did Hegel draw from it the consequences, particularly as
regards the subjective nature of the dialectic, which I have
tried to show logically result from it.
But there is, nevertheless, justification for our regarding
this theory as a development and not a contradiction of the
Hegelian system, since some such view is really a condition
of the existence of any dialectic system at all. And we have
seen that it will affect neither of the great objects which
THE CHANGES OP METHOD IN HEGEl/S DIALECTIC. 205
Absolute Idealism claims t<> have accomplished the demon-
stration that the real is rational and the rational is real, and
tin classification, according to thrir n< cessary relations and
intrinsic value, of the various categories which we UBI in
ordinary and finite thought.
Many other questions might be raised, and indeed must
be raised before even the formal validity of the Hegel inn
system could be finally determined. iVrhaps the most im-
portant of these is the relation of the dialectic process to the
movement of time. How far Hegel regarded the Absolute
Idea as already realised and how far only as an ideal, Imw
the fundamental rationality of the universe is related to the
obvious imperfections, either in the world or our judgments
about it, which exist round us, and what amount of objec-
tive or subjective reality can be ascribed to the incomplete
dialectic process these are points of vital importance. Not
less important is the consideration of the nature of the
Absolute Spirit which gives reality to the whole process, and
which is treated by Hegel in a manner which would require
careful criticism. But with these points it is impossible for
me to deal here.
The dialectic system is not so wonderful or mystic as it
has been represented to be. It makes no attempt to deduce
existence from essence ; it does not even attempt to eliminate
the element of immediacy in experience, and to produce a
self-sufficient and self-mediating thought. It cannot even,
if the view I have taken is right, claim that its course is
a perfect mirror of the nature of reality. But although the
results which it attains are comparatively commonplace,
they go as far as we can for any practical purpose desire.
For, if we accept the system, we learn from it that in the
universe is realised the whole of reason, and nothing but
reason. Contingency, in that sense in which it is baffling
and oppressive to our minds, has disappeared. For it would
be possible, according to this theory, to prove that the only
contingent thing about the universe was its existence as a
whole, and this is not contingent rn the ordinary sense of
the word. Hegel's philosophy is thus capable of satisfying
the needs, theoretical and practical, to satisfy which philo-
sophy originally arose, nor is there any reason to suppose
that he ever wished it to do more.
III. THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXPEKIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY.
By E. BRADFORD TITCHENER.
THE object of this article is to give a general survey of the
re^arches carried out in Wundt's Institute, and of the other
psychological contents of the Philosophische Studien, from
the date of Prof. Cattell's paper on " The Psychological
Laboratory at Leipsic " to the present time. The
material with which Prof. Cattell had to deal was
classified by him as convenience dictated. x It has
seemed to me more suitable to follow the divisions of the
Physiologische Psychologic, and to employ Wundt's termino-
logy throughout. I have aimed, so far as space allows, at
giving a critical rather than a merely descriptive account of
the various researches under notice ; although many of the
questions at issue are too complicated to be adequately dealt
with in any other way than by an independent discussion.
I. The Physical Basis of Mental Life. The counter-
criticism of Prof. H. Munk's views upon cerebral localisation
and specific nerve-energy, with which Wundt opens the
sixth volume of the Studien, is interesting both as contain-
ing the latter's last word upon the two questions, and as
showing how dangerous it is for a ' pure ' physiologist to
meddle in psychology. 2 According to Prof. Munk, each
sense-centre is, on the one hand, a projection-sphere for the
peripheral excitations of the sense-organ, and, on the other,
a store-house of memorial representations of such excitations.
Hence the distinction, e.g., between " cortical " and "mental"
blindness. Wundt points out that the psychology of the
latter supposition is worthy of a believer in the ' faculties ' of
the phrenologists. He notices the gradual approximation
of the extreme schools of Hitzig and Luciani on the one
side, and of the followers of Flourens on the other ; and
repeats his conviction that facts and not hypotheses are the
present desiderata.
1 MIND, xiii. pp. 37-51.
2 " Zur Frage der Localisation der Grosshirnfunctionen," Phil. Stud.
vi. pp. 1-25. Phys. Psych. (3te Aufl.) i. pp. 218 ff., 332 ff. H. Munk,
" Ueber die centralen Organe fiir das Sehen und das Horen bei den
Wirbelthieren," Sitzungsbericht derkgl. Preuss. Academic der Wissenschaften,
June 20, 1889.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL <>i BXPBBIMBNTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 207
The doctrine of specific energies, as expounded by J.
Miiller :iiid Helmholtz, had been opposed by Wundt mainly
on two grounds : (1) that in the absence of a particular
-origin the existence of sensations of that sense had
ne\er been observed; and (2) that the assumption of
specific energies presupposes a theory of the constancy of
organic forms. After restating these arguments at some
th, he gives a clear account of his own view that the
central nervous elements were to begin with functionally
indifferent, and only gradually acquired a special function
o\\ ing to internal molecular changes caused by their peri-
pheral connexions. The taking on of vicarious function is
then an adaptation to anew set of functional conditions;
its range of possibility becoming increasingly limited with
increasing complication of brain-structure.
II. Sensation, (a) Intensity. The most noteworthy feature
of Prof. Kraepelin's article on psycho-physical method is his
condemnation of the method of right and wrong cases in its
present form. The difficulty which the judgments " equal "
and " doubtful" present to the application of mathematical
formulae to experimental results gained by this method has
occupied psycho-physicists from the beginning. Fechner
at first halved the offending judgments ; and thus, from
the equation r +f -j- z = n, obtained r l + J l = n (where
r l = r -TV,,/ 1 =/+?)] 5 ?<1 an d f l being alone taken into
^/
account in the determination of the threshold of difference. 1
G. E. Miiller uses them differently. We may regard them
as belonging to a sphere of sensations (T) which lies mid-
way between i l > i and i : < i (^ and i being the stimuli, and
the signs referring to a judgment of just perceptible sensation-
difference) ; and may assume that a definite point of T corre-
sponds to the ideal equality of the sensations called forth by i l
and i the equality gained by the distribution of ?', / and z.
Let 8, denote the portion of T which lies above this point
of equality, and Sn, that which lies below it. Then, accord-
ing to Miiller, the z-cases will be uniformly distributed in T
on either side of the equality-point ; so that the threshold
T
of difference 2 is Si = Sn = <y. Lorenz reckoned judgments of
1 r = right, / = wron^, z = doubtful and equal judgments.
- AVuiult, following Fechner, makes S, and Sj, partial threshold^. T
the total threshold. To S, corresponds the decrease of D (the stimulus-
difference, ii - i) by a value equivalent to the magnitude of S, ; to S,,.
the increase of D by a value equivalent to the magnitude of S,, .
208 E/ B. TITCHENEE I
equality, when \ and i were objectively different, as /-cases ;
but Prof. Kraepelin rightly points out that the psychological
moments in such a judgment are essentially different from
those which characterise wrong judgments properly so-called.
He himself proposes a modification of the method, which
had been independently suggested by Prof. Jastrow ; the ex-
clusion of ^-judgments altogether. Objectively equal stimuli
not being employed, the reagent is simply required to decide
in each case which of the two given impressions is the stronger.
Those who have worked much with the method of right
and wrong cases will, I think, be exceedingly distrustful of
this innovation. The previous state of consciousness (ex-
pectation) exerts a very large influence on the judgment.
I have often noticed that a stimulus-difference which lay
beneath the threshold would appear considerably increased,
and one which lay above it considerably diminished, if the
expectation were wrongly directed before the experiment
took place. It is exceedingly easy always to give the judg-
ment " greater," even when objectively equal stimuli are
employed ; but the psychological conditions are essentially
altered, and a constant error imported into the results, by
the exclusion of z-cases. 1
Starke's research on the measurement of strength of
sound is a continuation of previous work. Within the
limits of experimentation it was again found that the law of
proportionality between intensity of sound and height of
fall, where the fall-weight is constant, and between intensity
of sound and fall- weight, where the height of fall is con-
stant, is valid. Deviations from it, noticed by other ob-
servers, are explained by neglect of various sources of error. 2
1 Wundt, Phys. Psych, i. pp. 353-5 ; Kraepelin, Zur Kenntniss der
psycho-physischen Methoden," P. S. vi. 493-513 ; Lorenz, " Die Methode
der richtigen und falschen Falle in ihrer Anwendung auf Schallempfind-
ungen," P. S. ii. pp. 430 ff. ; Jastrow, " A Critique of Psycho-physical
Methods," American Journal of Psychology, i. 277-291.
2 The law, i = cwh which is only empirically valid has been dis-
cussed by Prof. Cattell, MIND, xiii. p. 42. Starke, " Zurn Mass der
Schallstarken," P. S. v. 157-169. Cf. his original article, " Die Messung von
Schallstarke," P. S. iii. pp. 264 flf. The investigations into psycho-physical
method carried out by Merkel (" Abhangigkeit zwischen Reiz und Ernp-
findung,"P. S. iv. 541-594, v. 245-291, 499-557) and Higier(" Experimentelle
Priifung der psycho-physischen Methoden imBereiche des Raumsinnes der
Netzhaut," P. S. vii. 232-297) I hope to deal with, in a future article, in
connexion with Prof. AngelTs work, " Untersuchungen iiber die Schat-
zung von Schallintensitaten nach der Methode der mittleren Abstufun-
gen " (P. S. vii. pp. 414-468). I must also leave undiscussed here the
article by C. Lorenz, " Untersuchungen ueber die Auffassung von
Tondistanzen"(P- S. vi. 26-103), and the controversy between Wundt and
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 209
(b) ( t )n<iliti/. Dr. Kirschmann begins his article on the
sensibility to light (Hcllif/k<-ih in indirect visi..n with a
record of experiments upon the functional quality of the
fovea ecu trail* and of the lateral parts of the retina. It
was found that, while neither taken alone is at all exact,
central vision surpasses lateral as regards clearness and
quality of the stimulus ; while lateral vision has the advan-
tage as regards its intensity.
The objective brightness of the retinal image decreases
from centre to periphery ; or, in other words, the quantity
of reflected light which affects the lateral parts of the retina
during fixation is less than that which reaches the fovea
ecu trnl is. One would, therefore, expect that laterally seen
objects would appear less bright than those centrally seen.
That this is not the case can be proved in many ways.
Thus, an uniformly bright surface, the centre of which is
fixated, is seen as uniformly bright. A glowing platinum-
wire, just visible with direct fixation, is clearly seen in
indirect vision (Aubert). Dim stars are better made out
when indirectly than when directly observed. Differences
in the brightness of an illuminated surface are more easily
recognised in indirect vision. In the same way, the outer
rings of a Masson's disc are more certainly distinguished
(Helmholtz). After-images in the lateral portions of the
retina are more intense, and last longer than those which
result from direct stimulation. 1 A white disc, so covered
with grey glasses as to be, if directly observed, just below
the threshold, becomes visible if indirectly observed. The
alterations undergone by laterally seen colours are not those
of decrease in brightness, but rather those of increased in-
tensity ; red becomes orange ; violet, blue. A rotating disc,
composed of black and white sectors, which just fuses to
grey for direct fixation, shows the succession of black and
white when indirectly regarded : i.e., the sensibility to quick
movement is greater in the lateral parts of the retina than
at the centre.
Dr. Kirschmann proceeded to determine the quantitative
relations of sensibility to light for the different portions of
the retina. He found that its increase with distance from
Stuinpf which has arisen out of it (Stumpf, Zeitschrift fiir Psychologic,
i. 419 ff., ii. 266 ft, 438 ft Wundt, P. S. vi. 605 ft, vii. 298 ff. Cf.
En<*el, Zeititchr. fiir Psych, ii. 361 ft). The discussion would, of course,
belong to the second division of the paragraph dealing with Sensation.
1 This point requires confirmation. If the rule is as stated, there
are certainly exceptions.
14
210 E. B. TITCHENER :
the centre is far more considerable along the horizontal
than along the vertical meridian ; on the intermediate
meridians it was more or less irregular. The upper half of
the retina is more sensitive than the lower. As regards the
anatomical question, he sees in the cones of the fovea
centralis organs, whose main function is that of distinguish-
ing ; in the rods of the lateral parts, organs especially
sensitive to light.
An appendix discusses the results obtained by A. E. Fick ;
independently of which Dr. Kirschmann had worked. The
greater difference which the former observer found, between
the centre and lateral portions of the retina, is to be ex-
plained by the fact that he employed the adapted (rested)
eye, and just-perceptible stimulus-intensities. 1
An investigation by the same author, into the qualitative
relations of simultaneous light- and colour-contrast, is intro-
duced by an interesting discussion of the phenomena of
pseudo-contrast ; of cases, i.e., in which the physical condi-
tions of illumination are the sole or partial cause of the
observed effect. Such phenomena are the coloured halo,
which in certain circumstances surrounds a shadow ; or the
greater brilliancy of green upon a red ground, as compared
with red seen upon green. Coming to simultaneous contrast
proper (the form of contrast which results, simultaneously
with stimulation of certain parts of the retina, in other not
contiguous parts which are not stimulated), Dr. Kirschmann
distinguishes an intensive and extensive side of the pheno-
menon. Intensively, the strength of light-, colour- and
saturation-contrast depends on the degree of illumination of
the objects regarded ; while that of colour- and saturation-
contrast stands further in relation to the colour-tone and
degree of saturation of the contrasting surfaces. Extensively,
the strength of simultaneous contrast in general depends on
their extent, and distance from one another and from the
eye. The general experimental results (for which, by the
way, finality is not claimed) were as follows. Simultaneous
colour-contrast contains two elements, the influence of
each contrasting surface upon the other, the quantitative
relations of which vary inversely with, though not in a strict
proportion to, the degree of saturation of the two colours.
It is, therefore, strongest when the latter are in a state of
mean saturation ; with as complete exclusion of light-con-
1 Kirschmann, " Ueber die Helligkeitsempfindung im indirecten Sehen,"
P. S. v. 447-498. Fick, " Studien ueber Licht- und Farben-empfindung,"
Pfliiger's Archiv, xliii. pp. 441 ff.
TIM; i, i: n sic SCHOOL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 211
trast as is possible. Simultaneous contrast between a
colour ;u id a grey of like brightness (Helliykfih increases,
probably in a logarithmic relation, with tin- saturation of the
inducing o>l<>ur. The intensity of simultaneous contrast in
< -ral varies inversely with the extension of the contrast-
ing sin-faces. The intensity of light- and, probably, of
colour-contrast is directly proportional to the linear exten-
sion of the inducing retinal surface. 1 Of especial interest
is the author's conjecture that the phenomena of colour-
rnntrast in general are reducible to terms of li^ht -contrast.
This point lie promises to discuss in a future paper.
Kecognising the necessity, for the above contrast-experi-
ment s, ^c., that "white " arid " black " should be more than
indefinite terms, Dr. Kirschmann devised an apparatus for
determining their quantitative relation. He took as unit of
measurement the brightness of ordinary white card ; and
employed for his comparison various " black " surfaces, and
different methods of illumination. The same card paint^i
with " Paris black," e.g., gave a brightness of Ju, in the light
of a paraffin lamp ; of -V in gaslight ; and of V in diffused
daylight.- Dr. Kirschmann has also found it possible to
produce monochromatic light, red, green, and blue, by
combinations of thin aniline-dyed gelatine plates. The
discovery has proved a most useful one for many experiments
in the department of physiological optics. 3 A series of care-
ful photometrical determinations of the relative brightnesses
of " light " and " dark " surfaces is made the basis of a fifth
article, which deals with the importance of a correct hand-
ling of contrast in art, principally in painting. The main
body of the paper is taken up with a discussion of light-
contrast ; but a word is also said upon colour- and satura-
tion-contrast, upon lustre, and upon the tone of feeling
attaching to simultaneous contrast in general. The intro-
duction deals with the three moments which influence an
appreciation of a work of art : the quality of the artist's
work, its position and surroundings, and the mental furni-
ture of the spectator. The author points out and illus-
trates the mistakes that arise from putting knowledge into
sensation. He writes throughout easily and with sound
1 Kirschmann, " Ueber die quantitativen Verhitltnisse des siinultanen
Ilrllujkeits-und Farben-contrastes," P. S. vi. 41f>-4'.
Kirschmann, " Ein photo-metrischer Apparat zu psychophysischen
/weaken," P. S. v. 292-300.
Kiisehmann. Ueber die Herstellung monochroinatischen Lichtes,"
P. ti. vi. 543-551.
212 E. B. TITCHENER :
optical knowledge ; but treats his subject-matter too lightly,
and with insufficient regard of the mass of existing literature. 1
Finally, there is to be noticed here Schischmanow's re-
search on the purity of harmonic intervals. In his Ton-
psychologie, Prof. Stumpf arranges these in the following
series, according to the degree of fusion of their constituent
tones: (1) octave; (2) fifth; (3) fourth; (4) thirds and
sixths; (5) seventh; (6) second, &c. Assuming (what is
very doubtful) the persistence of this order for the corre-
sponding intervals outside the octave, he formulates a
law of tone-fusion, in a form analogous to that of Weber's
law. Schischmanow, whose reagents judged of the purity
of the interval from successive tuning-fork tones, obtained
(within the octave) the series : (1) octave ; (2) fifth ; (3)
fourth ; (4) greater sixth ; (5) greater third ; (6) lesser third ;
(7) second ; (8) lesser sixth ; (9) lesser seventh ; (10) greater
seventh. This is evidently comparable with Stumpf 's re-
sults ; the higher place occupied by the second being
referable to the musical training of the reagents : since
the second is an interval of very frequent occurrence.
Wundt's law, that the judgment of purity depends on the
coincidence of partial-tones, was thus in general confirmed.
Other interesting results of Schischmanow's work are the
facts that our sensibility to difference is greater for decrease
of intervals than for their increase ; and that the raising of
a tone is more readily perceived than its lowering. 2
(c) Tone of feeling. Dr. Scripture's note on "Idea and
1 Kirschmann, " Die psychologisch-aesthetische Bedeutung des Licht-
und Farben-contrastes," P. S. vii. 362-393. Dr. Kirschmann's theory of
painting is a combination of aesthetic Idealism with psychological
Kealism. This seems to me to represent a purely mechanical eclecti-
cism : and, even as such, it is not consequently carried through. For if
one is to take one's optical knowledge to the criticism of a picture, why
not one's physical ideas in general ? The fulfilment of his ideal Dr.
Kirschmann sees in the Sistine Madonna. He takes no umbrage at the
sight of a woman standing on a cloud : though he is hurt if a full moon
subtends a visual angle of more than half-a-degree. But, indeed, a school
of art which strictly satisfied the requirements of Profs. du-Bois Rey-
mond and Norman Lockyer would be no more than a curiosity. Art
must submit to a compromise between scientific exactness and the
aesthetic needs of the average man, who is neither physicist nor physio-
logist.
2 Schischmanow, " Untersuchungen ueber die Empfindlichkeit des In-
tervallsinnes," P. S. v. 558-600. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, ii. pp. 135, 139.
Stumpf 's law is m : n. 2 X (where x is a small whole number, and m and
n vibration-rates of the component tones ; m being < n). The work of
Schischmanow was published before the second volume of the Tonpsycho-
logie appeared.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXI'KKl MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 213
Feeling " was suggested by the outcome of certain of his ex-
periments on Association, to be mentioned below. It was
found that when, e.g., a colour was presented to the reap
the first link in the chain of reproduction was often not
idt-ii, hut a feeling. The question at once presents itself,
whether feeling is, as much as idea, an independent psychical
element ; or whether there are in consciousness only ideas
:u id thi-ir relations. The former alternative is that accepted,
e.g., by Lotze and Wundt ; the latter represents the position
of Her hart, Lipps, Miinsterberg, that idea and feeling are
inseparable sides of one and the same process. To the con-
sideration of these views Dr. Scripture brings the following
facts. A feeling was sometimes associated directly to th
sense-impression, without the intermediation of an idea ;
sometimes the association was that of an idea possessing a
strong tone of feeling ; in the majority of cases an idea alone
arose in consciousness. A feeling can of itself alter the
train of reproduction. In nineteen cases out of every
twenty-one the idea which followed the associated feeling
led directly back to the sense-impression. Of this last fact
more presently.
These considerations show that both of the views stated
above must be modified. The former regarded feeling as an
independent process. It is so, in so far as it can enter alone
into the fixation-point of consciousness. The second laid it
down that idea and feeling are two sides of the same process :
they are rather two sides of mental life in general. Or, to
combine both truths : feeling and idea are co-ordinated par-
tial-phenomena of the train of mental processes, necessarily
and always interconnected. But the degree of consciousness
may vary ; so that either may be apperceived separately, as
well as both together : while, independently of this, either
or both can influence the train of ideas. This latter fact,
though correct, is not proved by Dr. Scripture's experiments.
And generally confirmatory of Wundt's view as his results
are, they would not by any means present an insuperable diffi-
culty to those who hold the opposite theory. For a relation
between ideas can be apperceived as easily as the ideas
themselves. 1
III. The Formation of Ideas. The psychophysic of sen-
sation is unfortunately not yet so far advanced that we can
hope, for some time to come, to see the foundations laid of a
psychophysic of ideation. Some small beginnings have been
1 Scripture. " Vorstelluns nnd Gefuhl. Eine experimentelle Unter-
Buchung ueber ihren Zusamnenhang," P. S. vi. 536-542.
214 E. B. TITCHENER :
made in the way of experiments upon tone-fusion (Stumpf's
view and definition of which, however, undoubtedly require
modification), but the science is almost as much a blank here
as it is, too, in the sphere of feeling. Two articles call for
notice under this head.
By the ' apparent size' of an object is usually understood
the size of the visual angle which it subtends. Dr. Martius
uses the expression, not quite happily, to denote our judg-
ment of the relative size of objects which are at different
distances from the eye. Following a method of experimen-
tation suggested by certain observations of Fechner's, he
inquires what magnitude, at different distances, appears
equal to a normal magnitude at a constant distance ; and
finds that the former increases, though very gradually, with
the distance. Increase of the normal magnitude is accom-
panied by increase of the absolute difference between it and
the magnitude which, at a given distance, appears equal to
it, though it is probable that the relative difference remains
approximately constant. More experiments are wanted.
The method of minimal changes was alone employed ; it
should be tested by that of right and wrong cases. The
constancy of the relative difference between the magnitudes
compared, when the distances are constant, is a tempting
assumption, but one hardly established by Dr. Martius'
results.
The decrease of the apparent size of an object, with
increase of its distance from the eye, cannot be a function of
the size of the retinal image, as the size of objects in general
is. For the former decrease takes place much more slow r ly
than the latter. Doubling the distance halves the size of
the retinal image, while fivefold increase of distance in one
of Dr. Martius' experiments decreased the apparent length
of a rod by only one-fortieth. He further adduces a number
of facts to prove that the same retinal image, projected to
different distances, corresponds to space-images of different
sizes, their increase being approximately proportional to the
distance.
It is not clear that Dr. Martius is not here confusing a
purely psychological process on the one hand with a purely
physical fact on the other. In any case, the immediacy
and certainty which he claims for "size-sensations" or
size-ideas cannot be granted to him on the strength of
this one investigation. The empiricist will still hold with
Hering that the seeing of objects which are given equal
in sensation as different is a secondary process. The ap-
parent size of objects, at different distances, is the result
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF KX 1'KHIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 215
of a compromise, so to sj, t;l k, hetween sense and ex-
perience. 1
In a short paper on the definition of Vorstellung, Dr. Scrip-
tim; argues from \\"undt's standpoint that the specific
character of an idea, genetically considered, is its unity; an
unity consisting in cohesion and interconnexion of parts.
This is, of course, to be distinguished from that unity which
the idea owes to apperception, and which, therefore, does
not characterise those ideas which are only perceived. The
latter is the common use of the term in Wundt's psycho-
. and it is a pity that Dr. Scripture has found it neces-
sary to employ the same word with a different meanii
IV. Consciousness and the Train of Ideas, (a) Consciousness.
A common misunderstanding of Wundt's theory of appercep-
tion represents the latter as a power independent of conscious
content, and acting upon it from without. A controversy
with F. Schumann upon the question of the extent of con-
sciousness is made the occasion of a definite statement as to
the use of the term in the Physiologische Psychologic, in
face of which error should hardly be able to arise in the
future. Consciousness is, according to Wundt, a collective
expression for all conscious content, ideas, feelings, excita-
tions of will, &c., and nothing beyond this. It is the
service of Herbart to have drawn a strict line of division
between the two main characteristics of the inner experi-
ence, which Leibniz had brought together : the possibility
of the renewal of past processes, and the graduation of the
objects of perception in respect of clearness. Their sever-
ance led to the notion of a limit of consciousness ; and so
to that of its experimental determination. The first method
was that of giving the momentary stimulus of a row of
letters, figures, &c. But in this way it is the extent of
apperception, and not that of consciousness, which is
determined. An obvious improvement consists in giving
two successive stimuli (alike or partly different) ; it being
the task of the reagent to judge of their likeness or unliki--
ness. But the method is again unsatisfactory ; for a chance
direction of the attention upon some one part of the im-
pression-complex might considerably influence the results.
To avoid this, the components of the stimuli might them-
selves be successively presented to consciousness ; and best
1 Msirtius, " Ueber die scheinbare Grosse der Gegenstiinde und Hire
Beziehnng zur Grosse der Netzhautbilder," P. S. v. 601-617.
" Scripture, "Zur Definition einer Vorstellung," P. S. vii. 218-2-21.
/'. N v. 428.
216 E. B. TITCHENER :
in the form of a series of sounds. Here the controversy
begins.
Wundt lays it down that we can only judge immediately
of the qualitative or quantitative similarity or dissimilarity
of two complex sense-presentations, when each of them has
been present in consciousness as a simultaneous whole.
He maintains that this is the case with serial sound-impres-
sions ; as is shown, firstly, by the almost irresistible
tendency to group them rhythmically ; and, secondly, by
the fact that a limit is soon reached at which immediacy
and certainty of judgment as to their likeness or unlikeness
ceases. In the moment in which the stimulus ends, i.e., its
whole complex is present in consciousness. This Schumann
denies, on the ground of self-observation ; but, unfortunately,
without giving the time-relations of his experiments. His
view is, that a serial group of similar impressions can be
taken up into the memory, with its number-characteristics ;
and that the reagent, in comparing two such groups,
involuntarily reproduces the group first memorialised along
with the second group ; and, therefore, comes to each
separate stimulus with expectation, till the whole number
becomes equal to the number of stimuli in the first group.
Here, therefore, it is denied that expectation persists ; while
Wundt finds this to be the case. It is a matter of self-
observation against self-observation.
It is, however, hard to find confirmation of Schumann's
view in the known laws of reproduction. If a series of
similar sounds, a, b, c, d, . . . is followed by a like series,
a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , d\ . . . why should a 1 call up the image of a alone,
apart from those of b, c, d ? Wundt's explanation of the
process of immediate comparison as depending on the
accompanying feeling is probably correct ; though this
feeling would seem to be not merely the rhythmical feeling,
but a complex, certainly containing feelings of strain. 1
(b) Reaction-time. Prof. Cattell, writing in 1888, de-
clared that " the [simple] reaction is at first voluntary, but
with practice the process becomes reflex, and the time
shorter". The experiments of L. Lange on hearing and
touch, in part published in the Phil. Studien of the same
1 Wundt, " Ueberdie Methoden der Messungdes Bewusstseinsumfanges,"
P. S. vi. 250-260 ; " Zur Frage des Bewusstseinsumfanges," P. & vii. 222-
231. Feelings of strain accompany all acts of attention, according to
Wundt's exposition in the Phys. Psych. ; cf. ii. p. 240. Schumann,
Zeitschr. fur Psych, i. pp. 75 ff., ii. pp. 115 ff. Cf. Hoffding, Viertel-
jahrsschr. fur wiss. Phil. xiv. Schumann's general theory of Erwartungs-
spannung seems very questionable.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OP EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. '-117
year, showed conclusively that differences in reaction- time
are not to be so explained. The direction of the attention
was proved to be the variable which had expressed itself in
tin 1 results of different observers. All simple reactions
could thus be grouped in three classes: the sensorial, in
which the attention is directed exclusively upon the sense-
impivssion ; the muscular, in which it is concentrated on
the reaction-movement; and intermediate forms, in which
there is vacillation.
Lange was not content to state that the processes were
qualitatively different, without giving some further anal
Unfortunately, he attempted this from the side of anatomy
and physiology, without testing his conclusions psycho-
logically, as the law of psychophysical Parallelism would
i vi pure. None the less, his discussion is suggestive ; and
must be touched on here, that the further course of theory
may be understood.
The sensorial reaction, on Lange's view, may be schema-
tised differently, according as the sense-impression is pre-
ceded or not preceded by a signal. In the former case, the
apperception is active. The sense excitation, on arriving
at its centre, meets with an excitation proceeding from the
apperception-centre ; perception and apperception are,
therefore, simultaneous. In the latter case, the appercep-
tion is passive.
In the case of the muscular reaction, we must take into
account the (previous) voluntary innervation of the group
of muscles concerned. The excitation will then follow a
reflex path from sense-organ to muscle-group, without
touching the centre of apperception. In the lower reflex
centre C there is laid up, in unstable equilibrium, a store of
potential energy, derived (as actual energy) from the centre
of innervation. This lower centre Lange places conjecturally
in the cerebellum.
No theory of the muscular reaction is adequate, which
does not account for its premature and false forms. The
latter of these is explained by the instability of the lower
centre : an excitation proceeding from an irrelevant sensory
surface is sufficient to upset its equilibrium. For the
former we must assume that C is in connexion with corre-
sponding central sense areas. The excitation connected with
a stimulus-idea arising in one of these might travel to C, and
so produce a motor discharge before the advent of the ap-
propriate sense-excitation.
Next in order comes Dr. Martius' investigation into the
nature of the muscular reaction. The first part of this is
218 E. B. TITCHENER :
occupied with a criticism of the experiments published by
Dr. Munsterberg in pt. i. of his Beitrdge. Dr. Munsterberg,
adopting Lange's view that the muscular reaction is a brain-
reflex, seeks to show that it is applicable in the case of com-
pound reactions (reactions involving an act of choice, &c.).
Dr. Martius' results, on the other hand, point unmistakably
to the conclusion that the direction of the attention upon the
reaction movement has here a retarding, not an accelerating,
influence upon the whole process, where there has been no
previous practice on the part of the reagent ; while no con-
stant difference between sen serial and muscular times is to
be found after such practice has taken place. The reaction
process was felt to demand least effort if the attention was
directed upon the sense-impression (word spoken), or on the
co-ordination of the category with the corresponding muscle-
group ("town" with "second finger," e.g.). This latter
form, the' most natural in compound experiments, for
which there has been no practice, Dr. Martius proposes to
term the " central" reaction ; the adjective denoting here, as
in the other two cases, the direction of the attention imme-
diately before the experiment.
The second division of the article deals with the question
whether the simple muscular reaction is a brain-reflex, as
Lange supposed, or a process in- which consciousness is
involved. Wundt, without discussing the matter in detail,
accepted the former explanation as adequate for the extreme
form of the ordinary type of muscular reaction, the reaction
of a practised or "educated" observer. His reasons were,
in the main, those already adduced by Lange ; i.e., the occur-
rence of premature and false reactions. Now the former of
these, Dr. Martius points out, proves nothing for the reflex-
theory. It is certainly itself not a reflex, for there is no
sense-stimulus in the case, w r hile it bears an exact resem-
blance to the true muscular form. The inference is, of
course, that the latter is also no reflex. False reactions,
again, tell directly against the theory ; for it is most improbable
that the wrong stimulus should give rise to an intended
movement, without the participation of consciousness. The
perception of the stimulus, which, according to Wundt,
accompanies the reaction-process, is thus made essential, as
it is adequate, to its explanation. Dr. Martius notes that
the time required for the reaction is three times as long as
that of a cord-reflex. 1
1 Some hypnotic reactions would seem to be really brain-reflexes.
Of. Onanoff, " De la perception inconsciente," Archives de Neurologic,
Mai, 1890.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EXl'KKIMKNTAL I'SYCHOLOGY.
But what of the test of inner observation? Is one's
impression of the simultaneity of his perception of th-
.stimulus ;md response thereto trustworthy? The answer
must he negative. For this impression of simultan.-ity can
exist in cases where the attention is seasonally dn. t. .1 ;
and the evidence of the so-called complication exparim
refutes it. 1 It remains, therefore, to give a positive expla-
nation of the phenomena other than that put f.rward by
Lange, and (with reservations) accepted by \Vundt. For
this, direct experimentation is necessary. A serie.-
reactions was obtained, without previous practice, from
various observers, who were required to control the research
by noting down (1) the direction of their attention at
moment of reaction, and (2) their judgment of the result of
each experiment and of its relative duration. Four varia-
tions of the ordinary method were employed. To do away
with all possible objections, the observers were directed to
react sensorially " as quickly as possible," i.e., without wait-
in- for a full and clear apperception of the sense-impression
which served as stimulus. A time-difference between mus-
cular and sensorial results showed itself from the outset.
The difference must, then, be a consequence of the differ-
ence in direction of attention, a difference in the central
portion, as opposed to the centripetal and centrifugal p. >r-
tions, of the whole process. Alteration in the central condi-
tions is not, however, identical with the disappearance of the
central terms in the reaction series. The necessary concen-
tration of attention upon the movement is an act of conscious-
ness. The necessary perception of the stimulus differs from
its apperception (as all perception from all apperception) only
in its degree of clearness, and in the time it requires. The
shortness of the muscular reaction is due (1) to the prepared-
ness of the movement, and its consequent more rapid comple-
tion ; and (2) to its earlier commencement, the stimulus-idea
not needing to become clear in consciousness, and the atten-
tion not having to pass from this to the idea of movement.-
The third contribution to the theory of the simple reacti- .11
process is furnished by Dr. Kiilpe, in his articles on simul-
1 Cf. von Tchisch, " Ueber die Zeitverhiiltnisse der Apperception
einfacher und znsammengesetzter Vorstellungen, nntersucht niit Hiilfe
der Complicationsmethode," P. S. ii. pp. 603 ff. Dwelshmn :-. " ' "ntrr-
suchun-ji'ii zur Mechanik der activen Aufmerksanikeit," 1\ >'. \i. p -1\">.
Dr. Kiilpe has shown that our whole consciousness of gimultiuu'ity in
co-ordinated voluntary movement is a false one, P. S. vi. pp. 514 IV., vii.
pp. 147 ff.
- The variations noted in the times of muscular reaction are significant
as emphasising the importance of the act of perception of the stimulus.
220
E. B. TITCHENEB :
taneous movement. Taking Lange's results and views as
his starting-point. Dr. Kiilpe proceeds to ask the question
whether the quality of the preceding psychophysical dispo-
sition is indifferent for the time-relations of the various
forms of motor response to stimulus. The first set of ex-
periments, which, as was to be expected, led to far wider
issues than that immediately under consideration, con-
sisted of two-handed reactions (muscular, sensorial, prepared
voluntary, and unprepared voluntary). The results were un-
expected. It was found that right-handed persons did not
necessarily react first with the right hand ; that the numbers
of first right-handed and first left-handed movements did not
compensate one another in the total ; that the difference be-
tween the two hand-movements varied from Ocr to 30<r ; that
one hand, as a rule, was favoured during each series of ex-
periments ; and that the amount of deviation from simul-
taneity depended essentially on the nature of the reaction.
We must attempt to explain these facts, says Dr. Kiilpe,
by a psychological theory of reaction, and not in Lange's
way. The foregoing state of consciousness, consisting
(qualitatively speaking) in expectation, i.e., in the apper-
ceived idea of a more or less definite process, is a factor of
great importance. The more complete the correspondence
between our expectation, and the act of movement or stimu-
lation, the more complete is the preparation for the reaction.
The transition from any one conscious content to any
other is facilitated (1) by the fact of relationship between
the two, and (2) by a favourable state of feeling. In the two
forms of simple reaction, the relationship is very close. The
difference between them is, that in the muscular form the direc-
tion of the attention leads to fusion of the idea in expectation
with the last term of the series ; while in the sensorial, this
fusion is that of expected phenomenon and first term. Add
to this, to explain the difference in duration, the unpleasant-
ness of prolonged expectation in relation to the muscular re-
action ; which gives its movement a mechanical, reflex nature.
We may now schematise the processes as follows :
Muscular Reaction.
E = Expectation.
Sensorial Reaction.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF 1-X 1'HHIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY,
Premature reactions are explicable as reactions to
memorial representations of the stimulus ; false reactions as
IK -ing the answer to the thought " I have to react to a sense-
impression ".
To return to the experimental results. The deviations
from simultaneity may be classed as constant and variable.
The constant preference of one hand requires further experi-
mental investigation ; while the fact that the mean devia-
tion is less in muscular than in sensorial reactions finds its
explanation in the greater variability of the factors in the
latter case. As regards the foregoing psychophysical dispo-
sition itself, it was observed that there always exists a
rivalry between the determination to react simultaneo
and the idea arising in consciousness from the direction of
the attention.
In the second article are communicated experiments upon
the constant deviations from simultaneity already referred
to. A method per exclusionem was followed. (1) Varia-
tions of the sense-impression gave no answer to the main
question. It is interesting, however, to notice that the con-
centration of attention is facilitated if signal and impression
are (qualitatively or quantitatively) different; that the in-
tensity and sharpness of the impression influence the reaction-
time ; and that the general bodily position seems to be of
importance. (2) Alteration of the sensations proceeding
from the organs of movement (by ether, ice, induction-
shocks) gave no results. (3) Variations of the attention,
on the other hand, proved to be of influence. The prefer-
ence of one hand is probably to be explained by the acci-
dental direction of the attention. Alteration in sensation
is, naturally, an aid to such preference. In the sensorial
reaction, less uniformity in the idea of the reaction-move-
ment is attainable than is the case in the muscular : hence
the fact that the mean variation of deviation from simul-
taneity in the former is higher than that in the latter form.
The third part of Dr. Kiilpe's investigation is as yet un-
published ; further experimentation having been found
necessary. 1
A second research by Dr. Martius on the length of reaction
to clangs of different pitch falls under this general head.
"\Vundt had laid it down that since no constantly different
1 Lange, " Neue Experimente ueber den Vorgang der einfachen Re-
action auf Sinneseindriicke " (i)., P. S. iv. 479-510. Martius, " Ueber die
inuskuliire Reaction und die Aufiuerksaiukeit," P. S. vi. 107-216. Kiilpe,
" Ueber die Gleichzeitigkeit und Ungleichzeitigkeit von Bewegungen "
(i)., P. -S. vi. 414-535 ; (ii)., P. S. vii. 147- 16.
222 E. B. TITCHENER :
effects had been obtained by qualitative variation of the
stimulus, in the domain of the three senses which admitted
of exact investigation (sight, hearing and touch), such dif-
ferences might be considered as being too small to require
consideration, in the face of other influences. 1 The experi-
ments which Dr. Martius instituted led him, however, to
the conclusion that the reaction-time to clangs lying within
the six octaves C" and c'" decreases continuously with in-
crease of the number of vibrations ; being in the neighbour-
hood of c"" no longer than the reaction-time to noise. The
form of reaction employed was that empirically determined
as the easiest : an intermediate form, in which the attention
was directed exclusively on the sense-impression, but the
movement followed " as quickly as possible " (i.e., before its
apperception). 2 This general result appeared to confirm the
views of Exner, von Kries, and Auerbach, that a consider-
able but definite number of vibrations (about ten) is neces-
sary for the excitation of the organ of perception. When,
however, this number was calculated for various clangs, it
was seen that the theory did not hold good. 3 There remained
the supposition of Pfaundler and Kohlrausch that only two
to five vibrations are necessary to produce a tone-sensation.
Dr. Martius offers an alternative theory, based upon varia-
tions in the rapidity of the centripetal and central excita-
tion-process, which must be assumed to differ in accordance
with the different rapidity of the impulses.
The investigation, therefore, establishes the fact that the
duration of the perception of tones is, within wide limits,
a function of their rates of vibration. This is proved both
by the continuous decrease of the reaction-time with the
heightened pitch of the clangs, and by the absence of any
variable, other than the vibration-rates, in the reaction-
process. It is to be regretted that a larger number of
experiments was not made ; and that the influence of
1 Phys. Psych, ii. p. 284.
- Cf. above, p. 18.
3 Thus, for Dr. Martius himself, the numbers for C', c', c" and c"",
instead of being approximately equal, were 2, 9, 31 and 47 respectively.
The results were very different for the different observers ; the increase
of the number of vibrations with the height of the tone occurring only in
this case. In his latest paper, Dr. Martius admits Prof. Stumpfs
objection, that these results (which are gained from a comparison of the
reaction-times to noise and tone) may be invalid. He therefore attempts
the calculation of the number of vibrations from intercomparison of
reaction-times to tone alone. The outcome is not satisfactory ; and
one must reserve judgment until the point has been specially investi-
gated. P. S. vii. 484 ff.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL Ol 1 M \L 1'SYCHOLO - ' .'-
practice was not determined. Considering the accuracy and
simplicity of the method which Dr. Martius followed, one is
disappointed at the scantiness of his results. 1
In his review of this research, Prof. Stumpf takes excep-
tion to many points; and in especial raises the objection
that the relative intensities of the stimulus-tones were not
sufficiently taken into account and controlled. To the dis-
cussion of this point Dr. Martius devotes a third paper.
Precisely formulated, the question at issue has two sides : it
is whether the absolute stimulus-threshold is lo\\vr lor high
than for deep tones ; and whether the objective strength of
the stimulus influences the time of reaction. For strength
of stimulus is not to be regarded as equivalent to intensity of
sensation; and the stimulus was kept constant in the ex-
periments communicated in the first article.
Fresh experiments, in which five stimulus-intensities were
employed, led to the unexpected conclusion that for a prac-
tised observer the strength of the clang had no effect on the
length of reaction-time. Hitherto* all observers were agreed
that (within certain limits) the time of reaction decreases
with increasing strength of stimulus. Wundt, judging from
the mass of undifferentiated material which lay to hand, de-
cided that the decrease was very small, so long as the form
of reaction remained the same ; and that a purely physio-
logical explanation was possible. Dr. Martius' more exact
experimentation proved, however, that the general proposi-
tion is not unconditionally true ; that, at least for the ear,
impressions of different intensity are, within wide limits,
reacted upon in the same time. Neither does he assent to a
physiological explanation of the lengthening of the time of
response to weak impressions. Perception is here more
difficult, and the co-ordination of impression and reaction-
movement slower. In the neighbourhood of the threshold
it is probable that no amount of practice or concentration
can overcome these influences. 2
Dr. Dwelshauver's work upon the mechanics of attention
is, unfortunately, too fragmentary to be of much use as
material for theory. The author set out to investigate the
question of the influence on the reaction-process of a signal,
given at a definite interval before the sense-stimulus ; but
was unable to fulfil his intention. He found that the
1 Martius, " Ueber die Reactionszeit und Perceptionsdauer der Kliinge,"
P. S. vi. 394-416.
2 Martins, " Ueber den Einfluss der Intensitat der Reize auf die
Reactions/.eit der Kliinge," P. S. vii. 469-486. Stiunpf, Zeitschr. /. Psycli.
u. Phys. d. Sinnesvgane, ii. 230-282. "\Vundt, I'hys. Psych, ii. 286.
224 E. B. TITCHENER :
advantage obtained by the use of the signal was, in general,
greater for the sensory than for the muscular reaction-
form. Some of the minor observations are interesting ; as,
e.g., that the reagent's judgment of the length of his
reaction is subject to the general psychological law of
contrast. 1 An as yet incomplete research by H. Leitzmann
deals with the alterations in the length of the apperception-
process dependent on the time-relation in which secondary
stimuli (of the ear) and a primary stimulus (of the eye)
stand to one another after their perception. It is interest-
ing as being the work of a trained astronomer. 2 In order to
test the influence of practice on mental processes, Dr.
Berger determined the time required for reading a certain
number of Latin and German words by members of the
different classes in a gymnasium, and by pupils of a pre-
paratory school. He found the time to diminish with
practice, at first very rapidly, then more slowly. Within
his experimental limits, it never became entirely stationary.
Control-experiments proved that this increased facility was
in reality dependent for the main part upon practice, and
but to a small extent upon general mental progress. The
process of reading Dr. Berger analyses into a simple reaction,
and an act of association. Upon the duration of a simple
reaction we know practice to have no effect ; and we are,
therefore, led to explain the experimental results as referring,
almost exclusively, to the central process of association.
By " practice " it becomes gradually possible to apperceive
simultaneously a large number of separate impressions in
their logical connexion, phrases taking the place of words
and the still earlier syllables. 3
Finally, reference may be made here to Prof. Leumann's
article on the relations of mental activity to breathing and
circulation ; in which a special application is given to
"Wundt's general caution as to the choice of reagents. 4
1 Dwelshauvers, " Untersuchungen zur Mechanik der activen Aufmer-
ksarnkeit," P. S. vi. 217-249. Dr. Dwelshauvers has published his results,
together with a statement of Wundt's theory of apperception, in book
form ; under the title " Psychologic de 1' Apperception et recherches
experimentales sur 1'Attention" (Brussels, 1890).
2 Leitzmann, " Ueber Storungserscheinungen bei astronomischer
Kegistrirung" (i.), P. S. v. 56-95.
3 Berger, " Ueber den Einfluss der Uebung auf geistige Vorgange,"
P. S. v. 170-178.
4 Leumann, " Die Seelenthatigkeit in ihrem Verhaltiiiss zu Blutumlauf
und Athrnung," P. S. v. 618-631. In defence of the English anthropo-
metrical method, according to which the reagent is directed to execute
THE IJill'SIC SCHOOL Ol I. \ ! KKIMENTAL PSYCHoi.. ..; Y. '225
(c) Association. Dr. Scripture's \vork on the associative
train of ideas is a notable contribution to tin- experim
literature of association. The author's aim was the itceiimu-
latinii <.f factual material, on the Around of which the pro-
hlcms and laws of association could he formulated anew.
He made no time-measurements ; the investigation of the
qualitative relations of the train of ideas to the object of
sense being his special theme.
The observer sat in a dark chamber, and was subjected to
light-, sound-, touch-, smell-, and taste-stimuli. In'thc first
. the light-impressions (picture, word, colour) appc
before him on the wall of the chamber, and lasted four
seconds. At any moment within this time-limit he could
describe his association. The advantages of the method
are stated as follows : (1) The condition of consciousness
before experimentation was approximately constant ; the
t rain of ideas being interrupted in every case by the " Nov.
of the experimenter. (2) Disturbing perceptions were ex-
cluded by the darkness and qnict. (3) The series of repro-
duced ideas could be exactly controlled and reported by the
observer. The results led Dr. Scripture to the formulation
of four irreducible processes as comprised in the act of
association : preparation, influence, expansion, after-effect.
Preparation is the process whereby an idea becomes capable
of exerting an influence upon the content of consciousness :
its origin lies outside consciousness. The influence is not
necessarily exercised ; the prepared idea may disappear
without effect. In Fechnerian language preparation is
thr.s, more or less, a passing of the threshold. Influence
takes place when an idea causes an alteration in conscious
content, with or without interruption of the stream of
thought. Expansion consists in the addition of ideas (or
constituent parts of ideas) to an idea (or parts of it) already
piv-ent. Sometimes ideas which have disappeared from
consciousness exercise an influence on its later content.
The material illustrative of each process cannot here be
dealt with. But especially to notice are two cases, in
which the influence of unconscious ideas on reproduction is
considered. The first of these is that of mediate reproduc-
the reaction-movement " as quickly as possible," it may be said that the
reaction-time of 'real life' is probably obtained thereby in the great
majority of cases. Lange pointed out that a natural preference of the
muscular, sensorial, or mixed form goes along with difference of tempera-
ment (1\ N. iv. 496). The times could be classified under these three
hea.ls, by comparison with the norms established by a more exact ex-
perimentation.
15
226 E. B. TITCHENER :
tion. An idea, it is maintained, is able to call up another
idea, with which it is unconnected, if each has been at some
time connected with a third idea, not now in consciousness.
Thus, there is shown to the observer a Japanese word-
symbol together with the word written in Latin characters ;
and, after some time, the same symbol with the correspond-
ing German word. If, later, either of the written words
alone is presented to him, the other is associated with it,
without the conscious intermediation of the sign. Only in
"favourable" cases were good results obtained by this
method. Often there was no reproduction, or a wrong one,
or the symbol recurred in consciousness. If all cases were
7"
counted, - = 1*155 ; if those in which the symbol was
T
possibly recurrent were excluded, ^ = 2. These numbers,
besides proving the general position stated above, show
that the general effect of the intermediate (unconscious or
half-conscious) idea is much weaker than that of an apper-
ceived idea. The second case to be noticed is that of after-
effect. Can a not-perceived constituent of a complex idea
have so great an after-effect that, if it alone is later perceived,
it can call up the whole idea ? A picture was shown to the
observer, together with some simple object (colour, letter)
in indirect vision. The exposure time was so short that he
knew no more than that he had seen something indirectly.
When the principal picture had been recognised, the
secondary object was given alone, in direct perception ;
and the observer stated on what principal picture he had
first thought. Thirty-four per cent, of the reactions were
correct.
A theoretical discussion of the results the author reserves
for a future article. Meantime, it is plain that the. four basal
processes above referred to are logical and not psychological.
Logically, they can be separated ; psychologically, they over-
lap one another. Moreover, the observer's inner experience
was, to some extent, neglected to save the processes. Objec-
tion might also be taken to the experimental method. Dr.
Scripture deals only with the reproduction occasioned by
sense-perception. By lengthening the association-time, he
might have also obtained results in pure ideational reproduc-
tion. The sense of sight was unduly preferred ; .that of
smell, so important for association, unduly neglected. Again,
the picture was exposed for the whole four seconds. It
is possible that we have here the explanation of the
fact that the associated feeling led back to the sense-
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF EX 1'KKIMKNTAL PSYCHOLOGY. 'J'-'T
impression. Tn other respects, the four seconds' limit has
no great claim to reality, for the observer could speak wli-n
lie t-hose.
Neither can it be admitted that Dr. Scripture's ex-
]x linu-nts have succeeded in erecting mediate reproduction
to a general law, possible or probable as the process
may be, on other grounds. The only guarantee that,
\\hni the second pair of impressions p iven, the
i<lra of the former pair d x is n>t immediately asso-
ciated with them, is the memory of the observer; and
tli is cannot be always reliable.. Theoretically, too, there
seems no reason for the disappearance of #, unless it be that
a Japanese symbol is difficult to reproduce. It was found
that with complicated geometrical figures there was no
reproduction ; while, if the intermediary was a simple col< >ur.
it invariably recurred in consciousness. 1 As regards the
experiments upon after-effect, a purely physiological explana-
tion is possible. The object seen in indirect" vision would
rxcite a brain-process, even if it did not form part of con-
scious content at the time. The re-excitation of the same
process by the later direct vision of the object would then
bring with it a reproduction of the original direct perception.
There need be no question of the influence of the idea, half-
conscious or unconscious, of the object indirectly seen.
Dr. Scripture's great service to the psychology of associa-
tion is that he has broken ground in the way of exact ex-
perimentation. No criticism of the positive results of his
research can, of course, effect the value of this service. His
criticism of the present association-psychology is interesting
and acute ; but final judgment cannot be passed before the
appearance of the promised theoretical discussion. 2
The object of Lehmann's two articles is less the explana-
tion of the phenomenon of recognition, as such, than the
determination of the number of the fundamental laws of
association ; and, in particular, of the claim of the law of
Similarity to hold its place beside the law of Contiguity.
Hoffding, following Hamilton, J. S. Mill, and Bain, had
1 It is a pity that Dr. Scripture has not given the numerical relations
of liis n-sults in more detail. Could we compare directly the percentage
of cases in which mediate reproduction occurred with the percentage in
whic-li the- symbol undoubtedly recurred in consciousness, a judgment of
probability would be possible.
2 Scripture, "Ueber den association Verlauf der Vorstfllungi-n," /'. S.
vii. f>U-14C>. Mr. Galton is the founder of the experimental psychology
of association: Im/inri>.-< into Unman Faculty^ pp. 185 ff. But valuable
as his results are, his method was not sufficiently exact.
228 E. B. TITCHENER :
declared Similarity to be the primal law ; and the facts of
recognition to be the best proof of this. Every reproduction
by contiguity is preceded by a primitive similarity-association.
He drew a distinction from the outset between immediate and
mediate recognition. The former occurs when a sense-impres-
sion (e.g., a spoken word) appears to us as known, without
our being able to give any reason for our knowledge of it ;
i.e., when no other ideas arise in consciousness to explain
the fact of its identification. Here it is impossible for an
association by contiguity to have taken place. "Bather does
the spoken word call up the idea of its previous occurrence ;
and to this attaches the quality of recognition. The idea
fuses immediately with the present perception, and there are
no other free ideas present in consciousness to bring about
the association. We have a reproduction by similarity.
Mediate reproduction occurs, on the other hand, when the
idea of previous occurrence, called up by the spoken word, is
a free idea beside the present perception. Thus is effected a
primary association, on the foundation of which secondary
contiguity-associations may arise. Bather a difference of
degree, one would think, than of kind.
Lehmann replies by a theoretical discussion of the laws of
association. "Forms "and " laws," he points out, are not
interchangeable terms. That the similarity-form occurs
is undoubted ; but is similarity the cause of the reproduc-
tion? The decisive question is, whether there are facts
which compel us to accept the law of similarity, or whether
the law of contiguity is adequate to the explanation of the
phenomena. If this latter is the case, the law of contiguity
must be unhesitatingly adopted, for association by contiguity
is certainly not explicable in terms of similarity ; and the
logical law of parsimony directs the rejection of needless
hypothesis. Hbffding found the facts he required in the
process of recognition, but his assumption of the original
similarity-association, which precedes all contiguity-associa-
tion, depends on a misapprehension. For no state of
consciousness recurs ; but a state, completely or partially
identical with a former state, may be induced by a present
perception : and in this way there may arise contiguity-
associations which effect the recognition.
Hoffding rejoins, with justice, that Lehmann's experimen-
tal method w T as not exhaustive. The only recognition-
process investigated was that for which consciousness had
been already prepared by expectation, and the question of
immediate recognition was not touched . To which Lehmann
replies by a series of important experiments upon the recog-
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF F.Xl'KK! M F.N' 1 AL PSYCHOLOGY.
nit inn of the smell of chemical compounds, &c. All stages
of recognition, IV.. in the " i in mediate" form up to express
identification, with localisation in time and space, proved
to be explicable by the law of continuity. Especially interest-
ing arc the intermediate cases, in which the manner of the
iations only became clear to the observer after some
thought, or upon suggestion from the experimenter. Lehtm n n
concludes convincingly that there can be no recognition wit h-
out reproduction by contiguity. 1
At this stage of the discussion Wundt intervenes with a
comprehensive article. He points out that of the two
theories which alone remain in the field, the one of which
refers all association to contiguity, while the other calls in
the aid of similarity as well, the former has the methodological
advantage. All explanation of the laws of association must
proceed from the fact that the forms in which it is given
are complex processes, intelligible only in the light of the
elementary processes whose products they are. This thought
is implicit in the controversy between Hoffding and Lehman n :
for both recognise the necessity of setting out from a con-
sideration of recognition. But neither of them has carried
it consequently and radically through.
The elementary processes to be considered are those of
complication and assimilation ; more especially the latter.
Complication forms the basis of the successive association of
disparate ideas ; assimilation that of the successive associa-
tion of ideas within the same sense-sphere. Wundt takes
the latter only, and analyses out from it the ultimate asso-
ciative processes.
Two elementary processes (Verbindungsvorgdnge) are to
be found in that of assimilation. (1) Those constituents
of a perception, which previously have been often perceived,
call up the constituents which are identical with them
(Verb in<1 iiny des Gleichen). (2) Through the intermediation
of the latter, other constituents are called up, which are
absent in the given impression, but which previously were
in temporal and spatial connexion with the intermediaries.
What are, then, the so-called similarity- and contiguity-
associations? The second elementary process is plainly the
most essential factor in the latter form. On the other hand,
association by similarity cannot be explained in terms of the
1 Hoffding, Psychologic in Umrissen, pp. 152-3. Of. his four articles in
the Vitrti-ljuhroMJirift fiir wifaenscliaftlii-ln- Philosophic, 1889; especially pp.
433 ff. Lehmann, " Ueber Wiedererkeimen," 7'. N. v. 96-156 ; " Kritische
iind experimentelle Studien ueber das Wiedererkennen," P. S. vii.
169-212.
230 E. B. TITCHENER :
first elementary process ; for similarity implies partial differ-
ence, as well as partial identity. And in the first process we
were dealing only with the calling up of the identical consti-
tuents. As a matter of fact, both ground-processes enter more
or less into the formation of all complex association-forms ;
and every complex association is explicable as product of the
two processes. If the results of the first process are in the
foreground of consciousness, the product is a similarity-asso-
ciation ; if those of the second, an association by contiguity.
Wundt goes on to show that the different stages of recogni-
tion investigated by Lehmann and Hoffding form a transition
between simultaneous and successive association. They make
clear the temporal disjunction of the constituents of the
former. The importance of recognition for the explanation of
association lies partly here, and partly in the fact that in it
the conditions of the process of disjunction can be examined.
The article concludes with a discussion of Herbart's frei
steigende Vorstellungen. The possibility of their occurrence
is denied. 1
(d) Emotion. The importance of Wundt's essay on the
Emotions, which contains much more than is promised by
the title, has been recognised on all hands. Many readers of
the Phys. Psych, must have felt that while Sensation and Will
came then to their full rights, the one because of the pre-
valent direction of psychophysical investigation, the other
through the apperception-theory and the discussions which
it has called forth, Feeling occupied a more or less
subordinate place in the whole system. This is, of course,
in part conditioned by the nature of the case : the feelings,
and the psychical processes which are developed from them,
are of all conscious content the most elusive and difficult of
derivation. Wundt's present exposition falls under three
heads : (1) a historical survey of German terminology ; (2)
Feeling and Emotion ; (3) Emotion, Impulse, and Will.
In the second section it is shown how empirical psychology
avoids the errors of the extremists, of intellectualism on
the one hand, and physiology on the other. Simple mental
processes can neither be denned nor derived. It is as wrong
to look for the origin of feeling in primitive operations of
thought as to regard the emotions as " disturbances of mus-
cular imiervation, arising by way of reflex ". Feeling and
Emotion are described and distinguished ; feeling being the
1 Wundt, " Bemerkungen zur Associationslehre," P. S. vii. 329-361.
The question of an original similarity, in Hoffding's and James's sense,
apart from partial identity, is not discussed by Wundt.
TJII-: i.Kirsic SCHOOL 01- KXTKIUMENTAI. P8TOHOLOGY. '231
simple, pleasurable or painful state (simple in respect of
quality, not necessarily as is the case with sensation of
origin also) experienced \vhen consciousness is relatively un-
diMurhed ; emotion the more complex condition, which i>
characterised by an interruption (favourable or inliil)itory) of
the course of ideation. Emotion lias, moreover, cer;
physiological concomitants, which themselves react upon it,
rendering it in a still more complicated state. The distur-
bance of the train of ideas is the consequence of an act of
apperception ; the quality of the apperceived object, or the
m;inner of its affection of consciousness, occasioning the
strong excitation of feeling. This relation of Emotion to
Apperception is the key to the fact of the expression of the
emotions in external movements, and the consideration of
these tends (through a short criticism of adverse psychological
theory) to the third section.
The latter opens with a restatement of the author's theory
of ^Vill as simple, original mental process. The common
derivation of will from feeling, through desire, is referred to
an inadequate analysis of conscious content. In the actual
operations of will, feeling and volition are inseparably con-
nected ; and it is owing to the greater intensity of the
direction of will in such a complex process that the simple
Impulse arises. There may, however, be present in con-
sciousness many feelings and different directions of will.
In such a case, either a labile equilibrium results ; or, if one
impulse is the strongest, yet not strong enough actively to
overcome those opposed to it, Desire ; or, finally, if this
stage is passed, voluntary action or "choice". After a
discussion of the psychology of choice, and a reminder to
the reader that the simple processes disclosed by analysis
are artificial products, the article concludes with a detailed
criticism of Dr. Munsterberg's theory of volition. 1
(e) Disturbances of consciousness. The question whether
light or heavy sleepers dream more was made the subject of
statistical inquiry, in Mr. Galton's way, by F. Heerwagen.
Humanity was divided, for the purpose of the investigation,
into men, women, and students. 2 The general results ob-
tained were as follows :
1 Wundt, Zur Lehre von den Gemiithsbewegungen," P. S. vi. 385-393.
Cf. MIND, xvi. p. M'2 ; /> it.-rhr.fifr l^ijch. ii. 316-321. Special attention nuiy
be called to pp. 387-8 of Wundt's essay. Here occurs the most definite state-
ment of his position as regards Innervatiansempfindungen ; a statement wh ich,
but for facts to the contrary, one would have supposed unmistakable.
2 Students were arranged in a separate class, as affording especially good
material for observation, owing to uniformity of life, age, condition.
232 E. B. TITCHEXER :
(1) With increase of age, sleep becomes lighter and
dreams fewer. Children, however, dream but little, if at all ;
the maximum of dream-frequency being reached between
the ages of twenty and twenty-five. The curve of sleep does
not, as might be expected, run parallel to the dream-curve,
but in a straight line : sleep becoming steadily lighter from
childhood onwards. (2) The intensity of dreams increases
with their frequency. (3) Frequent dreaming and light
sleep vary together, but not proportionally. A deep sleep is
attended with but small decrease of dream-frequency. (4)
The more frequent the dreams, and the lighter the sleep,
the better is the waking memory of them. Women form a
possible exception to tin's rule ; though their sleep is light,
not much of dreams is remembered.
There is a very great difference between the sexes.
Women sleep more lightly and dream more than men. In
men, the frequency of dreams has no influence on the dura-
tion of sleep ; whereas this influence is very large in the
case of women, sleep with much dreaming lasting, on the
average, an hour longer than dreamless sleep. Much dream-
ing brings with it, for women, the necessity of a longer period
of sleeping (e.g., of day-sleeping). Women who are light
sleepers require half-an-hour less sleep than heavy sleepers.
On the whole, women's sleep is more interrupted than men's.
A suggested reason for this difference is that women can
gratify their inclination in the matter of sleep more easily
than men. The majority of men in question represented
themselves as feeling tired on waking, the women not.
Factors in the general result are the time required for
getting to sleep, the interruptions of sleep, the ability to
sleep at will, mental disposition during the day, nervousness
(which is greater in women than in students, and in students
than in men), temperament, occupation. 1
V. Will. It is impossible in the space now at command
to give a satisfactory account or criticism of Dr. Kiilpe's
chapters on the place of Will in modern psychology. Dr.
Kiilpe, himself a follower of Wundt, passes in critical review
the chief theories from the time of Herbart downwards ;
concluding with an especially clear and valuable exposition
of Wundt's view. He emphasises the fact that the latter is
strictly empirical. When we have analysed out the con-
stituents of Sensation-complex and Feeling from conscious
content, we are left with a something, which has for its
1 F. Heerwagen, " Statistische Untersuchungen ueber Traiime und
Schlaf,"P. & v. 801-320.
THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL OF KXPKKIMKNT.M. PSYCHOLOGY. 233
chief attributes spontaneity and unity. This ' something '
is the primitive activity of will, apperception: as much a
part of conscious content as is "blue" or "pleasant".
A^ain, \\undt makes apperception the content of the self-
conscious Ego : but self-consciousness originates partly in a
sum of ideas which possess the character of permanence,
partly in the dependence of these upon our volition. Gradu-
ally the half-sensible, half-conceptual constituents fall away ;
and apperception alone takes their place.
I propose to take notice of one portion only of Dr. Kiilpe's
work, his discussion of the relation existing between apper-
ception and feeling. In support ofWumlt's theory of feel-
ing, as set forth in the Phys. Psych, (that it arises as the re-
action of apperception upon sense-impressions), Dr. Kiilpe
gives four reasons. Firstly, in feeling of all kinds we are
conscious of a greater spontaneity, or inner activity, than
is the case in perception, and this spontaneity is one of the
distinguishing characteristics of apperception. Qualities of
sensation we ascribe to objects without us, and this although
many sensations outlast the original external stimulation :
but this is never done with tones of feeling. Secondly, both
will and feeling are blunted by exercise, in the sense that the
voluntary act becomes automatic (the idea that was once
apperceived failing very soon to excite attention), the posi-
tive or negative feeling indifferent. Thirdly, perception
always implies a corresponding stimulus ; feeling is (at least
in developed mental life) bound up with dispositions of con-
sciousness, which have their history. The same holds of
apperception. Fourthly, the most common forms of volition
are so naturally and nearly connected with the feelings of plea-
sure and pain, that trouble is required to separate the two ele-
ments. Aversion and desire seem to the inner perception to be
simple processes. On the other hand, the object (or idea) which
excites these states of mind is comparatively unimportant.
The feelings of sense, pleasure and pain, are the most
frequent motives to voluntary action. It is plain that apper-
ception stands also in close connexion with the elementary
aesthetic feelings, which depend on the temporal and spatial
relations of ideas ; and also with the intellectual feelings,
which accompany the apperceptive association of ideas, and
so appear as its immediate effects. So is it with emotion.
In the simplest case, an emotion is called forth by the action
of an unexpected stimulus upon consciousness. The stimu-
lus is unexpected when the apperception has not been
adapted to it, so that it makes its way by force to the mental
fixation-point. An emotion may also be called into being,
if the stimulus has been apperceived, but is so strong as
234 E. B. TI1CHEKEK : THE LEIPSIC SCHOOL, ETC.
quickly to exhaust the apperception. Finally, impulses are
distinguished from emotions by the fact that in them external
movements enter into the service of the emotional excitations.
This short review may give some idea of the immense
importance in Wundt's psychology of his theory of volition,
and of his view of the constant interaction of two out of the
three ultimates of mental analysis. In the sphere of sen-
sation we are on better-known and surer ground, so that the
function of apperception there need not be discussed. 1
The brief review of psychological researches published in
the Philosophised Studien, which it was the aim of the present
paper to give, is now concluded. It must be remembered
that the Studien has a threefold function to perform :
firstly, as the organ of Wundt himself; secondly, as the
place of publication of the best philosophical work done
under his direction ; and, thirdly, as a journal of experimen-
tal psychology, principally, of course, for the Leipsic labo-
ratory. Several articles, some of considerable importance,
have, therefore, been passed over in the above survey. 2
When the number and quality of the remainder are taken
into account, together with the fact that the Studien forms
only one out of many serial publications devoted mainly or
exclusively to experimental psychology, it seems a not un-
reasonable hope that there will exist, in the near future, a
body of knowledge sufficient to justify the claim of the
science to independence. The names of psychologists will
gradually be subordinated to that of the field in which they
have worked : and the establishment of a Professor of
Psychology as a natural science, beside the Professors of
Physics and Physiology, will then be a matter of course.
1 Klilpe, " Die Lehre voiu Willen in der neueren Psychologic," P. S.
v. 177-244, 381-446. The reader of the above paragraph will have been
reminded of Wundt's relationship to Lotze. In comparing this article
with that of Wundt on the Emotions, it must be remembered that, in
his psychology, the words "will" and "apperception" have a twofold
meaning, (1) as indicating a primitive mental activity, and (2) as ex-
pressing the complex states derived from this in different directions.
2 I subjoin the names of these for the sake of completeness. (1)
Systematic Philosophy. Wundt, " Ueber die Eintheilung der Wissen-
schaften," P. S. v. 1-57. " Biologiscke Problems," v. 327-380. " Was soil
uns Kant nicht sein?" vii. 1-49. (2) Logic. Brix, "Der mathema-
tische Zahl-begriff und seine Entwicklungsformeii," v. 632-677, vi. 104-
166, 261-334. (3) Theory of Knowledge. Reichardt, " Kant's Lehre von
den syiithetischen Urtheilen a priori in ihrer Bedeutung fiir die Mathe-
matik," P. S. iv. 595-639. Kiilpe, vt Das Ich und die Aussenwelt," i., vii.
394-413. (4) Ethic. Schubert, " Adam Smith's Moral-philosophic," vi.
552-604. (5) Miscellaneous. " Drei Briefe von Johann Friedrich Her-
bart," v. 321-326. Wundt, " Zur Erinnerung an Gustav Theodor Fechner,"
iv. 471-478, 640.
IV. THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. II.
By W. E. JOHNSON.
General Aim of the Paper. In offering an exposition of
the Logical Calculus, my aim is not to add one more to the
iiunurous systems of notation and symbolic method that
have already been worked out more or less independently,
but rather to bring out some underlying principles and as-
Mimptions which belong equally to the ordinary Formal
ic, to. Symbolic Logic, and to the so-called Logic of
Relatives. I hope at the same time to be able to present
the work of different writers on different branches in a more
systematic and comprehensive form than has hitherto been
done. My results and methods coincide in their general
bearing with those of the writers who have done most for
Symbolic Logic. But in a general review of the opinions
of others, I am obliged to urge, somewhat at length, what
seem to be errors. Dr. Venn has probably done more than
any other writer to present the Boolian Calculus in a philo-
sophic form ; while Mr. Peirce and Dr. Mitchell have made
the most important extensions or simplifications. And I
shall follow very closely some of the methods of the two
latter writers.
In working out formulae I have tried to keep clearly in
view the distinction and relations between the intelligent
and the non-intelligent processes involved. Only in this way
can we properly appreciate both the power and the limita-
tions of the Calculus. As a matter rather perhaps of detail
than of principle I wish to urge the importance of treating
the synthesis of unanalysed propositions before that of
analysed propositions. There are several grounds for this
order of treatment. Unanalysed propositions may be syn-
thesised on principles independent of the analysis of the
proposition, as is exemplified in the treatment of the pure
hypothetical, alternative, or disjunctive arguments which, in
ordinary logic, culminate in the various forms of the
Dilemma; while, conversely, the analysis of quantitative
propositions (and a fortiori the synthesis which follows from
this analysis) is dependent on the general principles of pro-
positional synthesis. Again, by the procedure that I propose,
we pass by a natural transition from ordinarily quantified
propositions to the Logic of Relatives, and thus reach more
236 w. E. JOHNSON :
and more complex forms in the order of their complexity.
But a stronger ground for my method is that we are led on,
not only to more and more complex forms, but also to more
and more essentially disputable and difficult questions in
carrying out this order of treatment. In brief, my justifica-
tion for the plan adopted is that it is throughout analytic.
The Principle of Formal Inference. The principle of
formal inference is expressed in the formula "(b and c) im-
plies c": i.e., a conclusion, formally reached, is simply a
determinant of the data expressed in the premisses. In the
sense in which factorisation is said to be the inverse of
multiplication, formal implication is the inverse of deter-
minative synthesis. This principle reduces the Dictum de
omni et nullo to its barest and most tautological form. When
we infer from all, i.e., A x and A 2 and ... to a particular
Aj_ contained in the all, we recognise the all as a condensed
determinative synthesis within which the determinant A x
is contained. But a distinction may be made between
immediate and mediate inference. In so-called mediate
inference, two or more premisses are given to be determina-
tively synthesised, although the conjunction and is generally
unexpressed. This determinative synthesis may be put
into a new form, in which we detect a new determinant not
contained in either of the original premisses taken separately.
Mediate inference thus includes two parts : first a syn-
thetic and secondly an analytic operation. The process is,
therefore, identical with that by which we combine 6 and 4
as factors, and in their product detect a new factor 8 which
was not contained in either of the original factors. Of
course there is a selective act involved in the choice of the
determinant which we take as our conclusion. We do not
realise the omitted determinants in the same act of appre-
hension by which we select the determinant needed. But
none the less must we recognise the conclusion to be a
determinant of the data. It is this characteristic which
marks off formal from non-formal inference. In the latter
the conclusion does not appear as a mere determinant of the
premisses : the grounds of our inference are not explicitly
formulated. This broad distinction will be indicated by re-
presenting non-formal implication by a merely operational
symbol, and formal implication by a partial equivalence, as
will be explained in the next section.
Notation for Propositional Synthesis. As determinative
synthesis has always been represented by multiplication, we
shall use the symbol a . b to stand for ' a and b '. The reci-
procal relation between and and or forcibly suggests the use
THE LOGICAL CALCILI S. 237
of the symbol a ' I to stan-1 for 'a or b 1 . For the purposes
of the present article such a notation will In- found useful,
and I shall venture to adopt it in the simple formula
\\ill he introduced, although I fed stn.n-ly the objections
that may he urged against any arbitrarily imposed notat
The separate constituents a, b, are culled the <l< t> rrninnnts of
the determinative synthesis a . 6, and the altt-nmnts of the
alternative synthesis a* i. I shall not introduce any other
sy m ho Is, except such as are naturally suggested or deri\<l
from these. Thus from the symbol of equivalence =, we
may derive two others expressing partial equirah nee. If a
determinant is dropped from one side of an equivalence we
may use the symbol = . . .defined by the convention b.c
= . . . c. If an alternant is dropped, we may use the
symbol = ' ' ' defined by the convention b ' c = ' ' ' c.
These symbols merely indicate the omission of a determinant
or alternant. The calculator will, therefore, understand by
the symbol a = . . . c that " a contains c as a determinant,"
and by the symbol a = ' ' ' c that " a contains c as an
alternant " : i.e., a = . . . c means a = b.c and a = ' ' ' c
means a = b ' c where the b has been dropped.
It will be observed that, if the equivalence a = b . c is
given on the authority of Formal Logic, the partial equi-
valence a = . . . c may be interpreted as meaning "a formally
implies c ". And the reciprocal relation between and and or
will show that, if a = b ' c is given on the same authority,
a = ' ' c may be interpreted " a is formally implied by c ".
And, as I shall only use formal equivalences, these inter-
pretations may be always made. But in the mechanical
operations of the calculator this interpretation will not be
involved. For him, the symbols will mean merely the
omission of determinants or alternants dropped for con-
venience.
In the present paper, I shall not work out any of the rules
that may be derived from the fundamental laws of preposi-
tional synthesis, as these are familiar to any reader of
symbolic logic.
Notation for the Molecular Analysed Proposition. The
molecular proposition which cannot be expressed as a
synthesis of more elementary propositions involves a single
(absolute or relative) predication and a number of intercon-
nected individual subjects. I will adopt a simple notation
suggested by Mr. Peirce's paper on " The Logic of Kela-
tives " in the Johns Hopkins' Studies in Logic. To
indicate the different treatment accorded to the subject and
predication, the former will be written as a suffix to the
238 w. E. JOHNSON :
latter. 1 We then express molecular propositions of any
order as follows : p x , p xy , p xyz , p xyzu , &c. These may be
taken to represent such propositions as " Coal is produced,"
" Coal is produced in England," " Coal was produced in
England during 1890," " Coal was produced in England
during 1890 for fuel ". Here x means coal ; y England ; z
1890 ; u fuel. Again p means ' is-produced ' in every case,
but involves also in the several cases the prepositions in,
during, for the interconnexions of which among the different
subjects are indicated by their order. 2
In this notation, we must point out (1) the relative nature
of the prepositional analysis. The analysis need only be
carried out in so far as it affects the succeeding prepositional
synthesis. Thus any of the four given propositions might
be represented by the single symbol p, if the synthesis of p
with other propositions did not depend on its analysis. Or,
any of them might be represented by p xt if we only required
to recognise the subject x as distinct from other subjects.
In this way, of course, p would have fuller import as we
pass from one proposition to the next. And this shows
that we may drop any subject from the symbol denoting a
proposition, and what remains will denote the full predica-
tion for that particular subject. This has some importance
in the sequel. We must point out (2) the relative nature
of the molecularity ascribed to these propositions. For
symbolic purposes, all that is meant by calling p x molecular
is that p x and p x are to be taken as contradictories. Of
course, if the subject x contained a quantitative element, |fe
and p x would not be contradictories. Hence any latent
quantification must be incorporated in the predication.
Taking Coal as a singular name, standing for a single sort of
substance, the proposition *' Coal is produced" may be taken
as contradicting (say) "Coal is a gift of nature". But the
contradictory of " All (or some) sorts of coal are produced "
1 Since we may give a substantive form to the predication itself by
constructing an abstract name, there would seem to be no need that
our symbols should distinguish between predication and subject. Thus
any proposition might be expressed by a common relative predication
"belongs to" which could be always omitted: e.g., mortality belongs to
Socrates. This expedient would, however, be inconvenient when we
had to combine determinatively and alternatively different predications
some affirmatively and some negatively for the same subject. Even
here, a relative predication is required for the expression of the contra-
dictory " does not belong to ".
2 The order of the subjects (i.e., their prepositional 'interconnexion)
need only be considered when we are dealing with subjects belonging
to the same category or universe.
THE LOGICAL ( AL( 1 LL'S.
is not "All (or some) sorts of coal are gifts of nature". I
mention this elementary point in order to show that an
apparently molecular proposition may often have to be
resolved. 1
Notation for the Synthesis of Ma/<rn/<tr PropORit'mns. The
synthesis of moleculars having the same sul.j. <-t is repre-
sented by a synthesis of the predications. Using the pro-
(1 symbols for and, and or, we write
p.c.y* = (p.q) - </'
The suffixes are, for the symbolist, mere differential
marks of propositions, and he need know nothing of the
nature of the union expressed by p x or (p . q) x . In the
reverse problem of synthesising moleculars, having the same
predication but different subjects, a similar notation might
be employed. But this would lead to ambiguity, if we were
to compound both subjects and predications, or if we were to
negate the predication of a compound subject. The form
" x and y are p or q " is ambiguous. It might mean one or
other of two different statements :
(1) (x is p and y is p) or (x is q and y is q).
(2) (x is p or x is q) and (y is p or y is q).
The difference is a difference in bracketing ; or, as we may
say, in the relative externality of the syntheses involved.
Common speech adopts the convention : " Subjects are ex-
ternally synthesised and predications are internally synthe-
sised," and would, therefore, give the second interpretation.
This at least is clearly the case, when the synthesis in the
subject is expressed quantitatively. Thus the propositions :
(1) Every man is knavish or foolish.
(2) Some men are knavish and foolish,
would mean, if M lf M 2 &c., are the men contemplated,
(1) (Mi is k or/) and (M 2 is k or/) and &C,
(2) (Mj is k and/) or (M, is k and/) or &c.
Thus the subject-synthesis is external to the predication-
synthesis in ordinary speech. 2 Now our symbols must be
chosen so as to indicate in every case the relative externality
of the syntheses involved. This is the main consideration
1 Compare, for example, such occasions for fallacy as are supplied by
" Epimenides is a liar " or " That surface is red," which may be resolved
into " All or some of the statements of Epimenides are false," " All or
some of the surface is red ".
2 This convention of language partly accounts for Hamilton's con-
fusions in quantifying the predicate.
240 W. E. JOHNSON :
in multiple quantification. Adopting the " stop" notation,
we are inevitably led on to represent "Every m" by the
symbol m; and "Some in " by the symbol m. We shall
indicate that the range of determination and alternation is
the same in the universal and particular, by giving the
simultaneous definitions
(1) MJ_ . m 2 . m 3 . . . WQQ m; (2) m l 'm 2 '7n B ' ' ' m^ = m.
The propositions " Every m is p or q," " Some m is p and q "
are written m (v ' q) m and m(p. q) m . These are to be read,
" For every m, it is true that that m is p or q " : " For some
m, it is true that that m is p and q " : and thus the externality
of the substantive synthesis is indicated in our notation. 1
In the simplest cases the suffix may be omitted without
danger of ambiguity, but the necessity for this complete
notation will be seen w T hen we come to complex multiple
quantifications.
The well-known rule for expressing the contradictory
of a compound proposition is : Replace each constituent
proposition by its contradictory and each and by or and
conversely. Hence
mp m is contradicted by mp m :
and mp nl is contradicted by mp m .
Finally, any proposition having a predicatively defined
subject, may be reduced to a form in which the subject
appears as a common universe of subjects. Thus, "Every
subject, that is^>, is g" and " Some subject, that is p, is q"
become
m(p' q~) m and m (p . q) m respectively,
in which the internality of the predication-synthesis and the
externality of the subject-synthesis are made manifest.
The Synthesis of Singly -quantitative Propositions. We
have to combine universals and particulars alternatively as
well as determinatively. This seems to have been first
definitely recognised by Dr. Mitchell [Studies in Logic,
p. 78] . This writer's work seems to me to contain the
most important simplification of the Boolian Logic that has
appeared. The results of this section have been suggested
to me by his work. By the introduction of alternative
syntheses and by the adoption of the affirmative form of the
universe-propositions (instead of Boole's negative form), he is
enabled both to simplify and to extend the range of logical
1 This mode of sj^mbolism is only an abbreviated form of the Mathe-
matical symbols 2 and n ; and is equivalent to that used by Mr. Peirce
on p. 200 of the Studies in Logic.
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 241
symbolism in a most suggestive way. The following six
formulae are nearly the same as those given [on p. 7s; by
Mr. Mitchell. As we are dealing with the same range of
subjects, we may omit the suffix.
1. The Determinative synthesis of Universals.
Foniinlii : (nip) . (mq) = m (p . q).
2. The Alternative synthesis of Particulars.
Formula : (mp) ' (niq) = m(p'q).
The Determinative synthesis of Particulars.
Formula : (mp) . (mq) = ' ' ' ' m(p .q).
4. The Alternative synthesis of Universals.
Formula : (mp) ' (mq) = . . . . m (p ' q).
5. The Determinative synthesis of Universal and Par-
ticular.
Formula : (mp) . (mq) = m(p .q) . mq.
6. The Alternative synthesis of Particular and Universal.
Formula : (mp) ' (mq) = m (p ' q) ' (mq).
Formula (1) (from which the others are derived) gives the
important, though obvious, rule : " Universals may be deter-
in i natively combined without loss of force into a single
universal ". This was one of the principal results attained
by Boole ; though he obscured its simplicity by the negative
t'i 'ini into which he transformed his propositions. The formula
is proved in precisely the same way as the distributive la\v in
the Algebra of Integral Numbers : e.g., (a -f b) x 3 = (a x 3) +
(b x 3). In fact, just as multiplication is a condensed addi-
tion, so is universal quantification a condensed determinative
synthesis. The analogy is more than superficial. Provided,
then, we are dealing with determinative prepositional syn-
thesis only and with universal quantification only, the
quantification m may be omitted : and the predications may
be combined just as unanalysed propositions are combined.
This obvious result partially accounts in my view for Mr.
Peirce's treatment of the universal and the hypothetical as
identical logical forms. At least, I should hold that only in
this limited case is the identification formally valid ; and that
the limitation prevents our accepting any such identification
as fundamental.
The first four formula? give the rule : " A determinant or
alternant of any proposition may be found by taking a deter-
minant or alternant of the predication ". This simple result
16
242 W. E. JOHNSON I
arises from adopting Dr. Mitchell's plan of expressing pro-
positions in the affirmative form. Formula (5) shows how
a more determinate particular conclusion arises from the
(determinative) combination of a universal and particular
premiss. The three formulae (1), (3), (5) for determinative
synthesis thus cover the ground of the ordinary syllogistic
combination of two premisses.
Formulae (2), (4), and (6) relate to Alternative Syntheses.
Now an alternative may be expressed as a hypothetical ;
and, since it is in reference to hypothetical that discussion
has arisen, I w T ill examine these in their hypothetical form.
2. Some S is p if every S is q = Some S is p or Some S is q.
This is equivalent by (2) to
Some S is (p or q) = Some S is (p if q).
4. Every S is p if some S is q = Every S is p or Every S is q.
This, by (4), formally implies
Every S is (p or q) = Every S is (p if q).
6. Every S is p if every S is q = Every S is p or Some S is q.
This, by (6), is formally implied by
Every S is (p or q) = Every S is (p if q).
By contraposition the above hypothetical = Some S is q if
some S is p = Some S is q or Every S is p, which of course
gives the same result.
Summing up for hypotheticals :
2. A universal antecedent and particular consequent is
equivalent to a particular categorical.
4. A particular antecedent and universal consequent im-
plies a universal categorical.
6. A universal antecedent and consequent or a particular
antecedent and consequent is implied by a universal cate-
gorical.
Now Dr. Venn without distinguishing these three cases
of the hypothetical regards form (6), viz., " (Every S is p)
if (every S is q)" as equivalent to the universal categorical
" Every S is (p if q) " ; i.e., " Any S that may be q is p " [see
forms is a distinction of bracketing. Thus :
Symbolic Logic, p. 274]. The distinction between the two
(Every S is p) if (every S is g r ) = (S 1 is p and S 2 is p), &c., if
(Sj_ is q and S 2 is q, &c.).
Every S is (p if q) = (S x is p if S x is g) and (S 2 is p if S 2 is q), &c.
As formula (6) shows, the former is implied by the latter,
but not vice versa. For the former is consistent with the
assertion " Some S is p q" which contradicts the latter.
THE LOi.K AL CALCULUS. ill.".
The essential differences between the three hypothetical
forms and between either of these and the universal t
^rical may be illustrated by common examples. But it is
necessary to point out that the logical force of the word
SUM,' when used in the antecedent of a hypothetical
rxj tressed by the word any. To indicate the correctness of
{la- rules for the tilth-rent forms into which a hypothetical
may be thrown, and to bring out its exact force, I shall give
to each its two contrapositive forms. Let us consider, tln-n.
tin- several positions that might be maintained by a HI.
of compulsory vaccination.
The most timid cU'lt-mlrr would use form (2) thus:
If all are unvaccinated, some will have small-pox = If none
are to have small-pox, some must be vaccinated. This, h\
formula (2), is equivalent to the particular categorical*:
There are some who must be vaccinated or they will have
small-pox.
On the other hand, the boldest would use form (4) thus :
If any are unvaccinated, all will have small-pox = If any
are to be free from small-pox, all must be vaccinated. This,
by formula (4), implies : All who are unvaccinated will have
small-pox. But it is clear that the hypothetical here means
much more than the universal categorical.
But the most probable position for the defender of com-
pulsory vaccination to take is expressed in form (6) thus :
If any are unvaccinated, some will have small-pox = If
none are to have small-pox, all must be vaccinated. This,
by formula (6), is implied by : All who are unvaccinated \\ ill
have small-pox. But it is clear here that the hypothetical
does not mean as much as the universal categorical.
These illustrations fulfil the requirements of Dr. Venn's
universal categorical form. For no assumption is made that
there are any persons unvaccinated either in the categorical
or in the hypothetical forms. When Dr. Venn says -that he
interprets the categorical as a hypothetical, he only means
that he does not assume the existence of the subject-term.
But this does not render the assertion hypothetical. The
assertion of non-existence which remains is made categori-
cally not on the supposition of any other proposition. It
is true that we may write the categorical : " (Even) if there
are any unvaccinated persons, (yet) there will be no unvac-
cinated persons free from small-pox ". But the antecedent
here is superfluous, because its contradictory would formally
imply the consequent. Hence the same meaning is expressed
by the categorical assertion of the consequent by itself.
The above examination shows the necessity of distinguish-
244 w. E. JOHNSON :
ing the conditional form : " If any S is q, that S is p " = Every
S is (p if g)," in which the conjunctive synthesis is external
to the hypothetical S}-nthesis, from the hypothetical form :
" If every S is q every S is p," in which two universals of
independent import are hypothetically synthesised so that
the conjunctive synthesis is internal to the hypothetical
synthesis. This the simplest case directly leads on to
multiple quantifications. Thus take Dr. Venn's example
(p. 329): "If the English harvests are bad, the American
corn-dealers will gain ". It is obvious that this is not a
hypothetical at all. It does not combine two propositions
of independent import : but it identifies all the years in
which one phenomenon occurs with some of the years in
which another phenomenon occurs. It means : " Every year
in which the English harvests are bad is a year in which
American corn-dealers gain"; or contrapositively : "Every
year in which American corn-dealers do not gain is a year
in which the English harvests are not bad ". Of these two
contrapositive forms for expressing the proposition as a
categorical universal, the former is the more direct and
natural, the latter is alone used by Dr. Venn. His symbols
will not allow the former, because they assume that the
terms " English harvests," " bad," " American corn-dealers,"
and "gainers" are fimdamenta divisionis of one and the
same universe of years or cases. But the terms "bad" and
"gainer" are predications qualifying the substantives
" harvest " and " corn-dealers " which belong to an altogether
different category from that of years. We are here, in fact,
in face of a multiple quantification, in which different
categories of things are combined by relative predications.
This further analysis that we may make is only necessary in
so far as we require subsequently to combine the given pro-
position with others, in which harvests in general or business-
men in general are brought into relation with years in
general. The analysis above given in which merely years
are divided according as the English harvests are bad or not
and according as the American corn-dealers are gainers or
not would be sufficient for simpler purposes. This again
illustrates the principle that our prepositional analysis is
relative to the needs of subsequent synthesis.
Transition from the Synthesis of Unanalysed Propositions to
Multiple Quantification. An uiianalysed proposition is of a
single type, say /. Two propositions I and /' may be com-
bined determinatively or alternatively. Thus we have the
two forms :
(1) LI'; (2) I- 1'.
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS.
Now suppose that the propositions /, /' are differentiated
by referring to different subjects. Thus K-t / n r, U
lovable" and /' m an " x z is lovable". Taking an ag.
gate of subjects combined dcb-niiinatively or alternatively
in the forms .' , . 02, '-^ = % and ^ # 2 x^ - a:,
we arrive at the two singly-quantified types :
(1) .?/, ; (2) xl x .
These mean respectively, "All a's are lovable," "Some
#'s are lovable". Again combining, drtrrminatively and
alternatively, two such propositions of similar tyjK-, \\v ha\v
the four forms :
(1) yl y . yl' v ; (2) ///,, ///' ; (;*) /// . ///'., ; (4) ///., .///' .
Now suppose that the predications /, /' are differentiated by
referring to different second subjects ; so that / means " is
loved by x l " and /' means "is loved by /., . Then, com-
bining an aggregate of such predications in the above four
ways, we have the four doubly-quantified types :
(l)?jrtr,; (2)^; (3) ?#,,; (4) ,;/)/,,
These mean, respectively :
(1) All x's love all ys.
(2) Some x's love all ?/'s.
(3) All x's love some y's.
(4) Some x's love some ?/'s.
Here it is essential to observe that (2) and (3) are of
different types. In (2) the alternative synthesis is external
to the determinative synthesis. In (3) it is internal. In
other words, (2) means " Some the same xs love every //" :
but (3) means "All x's love some it may be different ?/'s ".
Hence these forms cannot be converted without ambiguity.
For (2) does not mean "All y's are-loved-by some ^'s," nor does
(3) mean "Some y's are-loved-by all #'s ". I attempted in
my last paper to use the terms "certain" and "some or
other" to indicate the distinction required, so as to give an
Kjijiftrent possibility of conversion. But this method is
perhaps misleading. The forms "All x's love certain y's"
and " Some or other x loves all y's" are likely to be mis-
understood. For the apparent predication " loves certain
y's " is not a real predication, for it would have different
meanings in different contexts. And the apparent quanti-
fication of the subject " Some or other x " is not a real quanti-
fication, for the predication to which it is attached would
not necessarily belong to any one subject in the collection a*.
Out of the four types we thus get six varieties (in which an x
246 w. E. JOHNSON :
is lover and a y is loved) ; i.e., we may add to the four given
types :
(5) ijxl xy and (6) yxl xy ;
where the varieties (5) and (6) are of the same types as (2)
and (3) respectively. These should be read " Some y's
are-loved-by every x" and "Every y is-loved-by some x ".
All the six varieties may be written with a converse predica-
tion symbol /, which would mean is-loved-by, and is defined
by the equivalence l xy = l yx . But in this transformation the
suffixes only must be interchanged, not the order of the quantified
terms (unless these are both universal or both particular).
Whether, then, we read the propositions in the form loves or
in the form is-loved-ly , we must regard the externally quantified
term as the true logical subject and what is left when that
term is dropped as the predication for that subject. Of
course the contradictories of the six varieties may be written
down by the rule of interchanging and and or without viola-
tion of the externality and internality of the syntheses.
The contradictories, taken in the above order, are :
xyl xy ; xtf^; xyl xy \ xy! xy ; yxl xy -, yxl^-,
showing that pairs of contradictories belong to the types (1)
and (4) or (2) and (3).
The four types may be called UU, PU, UP, PP, where U
and P stand for universal and particular respectively. The
most important question to examine here is the rules for
inference by commuting the order of the quantified terms. The
rules are :
A. Two similarly quantified terms may be commuted
without change of force ; i.e.,
xylxy = yxl xy and xyl xy = yxl xy .
This rule is a direct corollary from the associative and com-
mutative laws.
B. Of two dissimilarly quantified terms, the internal has
potency over the external ; i.e.,
xijlvj = . . . . yxlxy and xyl xy = ' ' yxl^.
In other words, the proposition is more or less determinate
according as the more or the less determinate synthesis is
internal to the other. Thus, " Some x's love all y's " implies
" All y's are loved by some IT'S," but not conversely. This
again is a corollary from the Distributive Rules.
Cpnfining ourselves still to a single predicative term, by
the same process according to which we found 4 types for
the doubly-quantified proposition, we shall find 8 types for
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. J17
the triply-quantified, and generally '1 types for the n-j.lv-
quantified proposition. The rules (A) and (B) for c
muting the order of two adjacent quantified terms will still
hold. For the external syntheses are always to be regarded
as subject, and what remains as predication to that subject.
Hence, usin^ the rule: " A determinant of an (affirmatively
expressed) proposition may be found by taking a detenu i
of its pn</ if/i fiun" the general applicability of the rules (A)
and (B) is seen to follow. 1
Complex Combination* Involving Multiple Quantifications.
In the last section propositions containing only one predi-
cative term were introduced. The types that arise when
more than one predicative term is introduced are numerous.
All the, varieties of type depend on the relative int, rnality and
extenmti/i/ J ' thr determinative and alternative syntheses invo/r,,/.
Perhaps the best way of indicating the gradual growth in
complexity is to choose, as far as possible, examples from
ordinary speech and science, so as to show how frequent is
the use of these complex forms of multiple quantification.
The particular form that we choose for symbolising the
propositions will depend, to some extent, on the needs of
subsequent synthesis. We may take as ultimate subject-
term, to which quantification is attached, any term whose
applicability to at least one object is assured. Such terms
may be regarded as purely denotative ; i.e., as reached by a
collective, not a selective, process. On the other hand, a
quantified term which is regarded as defined predicatively,
must be represented by the substantive category from which
its application is selected, as well as a predicative term
which determines how the selection is made.
1. Dr. Mitchell gives two simple examples : " During
some (the same) part of the year all the Browns were ill,"
and " All the Browns were ill during some part (or other)
of the year ". Regarding the name Brown as purely deno-
tative, these propositions would be symbolised yb(ib y ) and
fy/(4 y ) respectively, in which only one predicative term
occurs. But using the predication b to denote is-named-
Brown, and the substantive category p to denote any person,
we must distinguish between the absolute predication 6,
which does not relate to time, and the relative predication i,
1 The six varieties of doubly-quantified propositions are given by Dr.
Mite-hell on p. 87 of the Studies in Logic. The general fomiulte for com-
muting the quantified terms are given by Mr. Peirce on p. '20*2. But
these two writers have not brought their methods here into connexion.
And Dr. Mitchell appears to confine the application of his own method
to double quantification, in which time is the secondary differentiating mark.
248 w. E. JOHNSON :
which means " is ill during". 1 The two propositions may
then be symbolised :
The same two symbolic expressions might be interpreted :
" There are some young writers (y) who imitate every
bad (b) poet (p)" and "Every bad poet is-imitated-by (i)
some young writer or other". The forms of synthesis are
the same here as in Dr. Mitchell's examples though the
substantive categories are different.
2. Dr. Venn's example may be interpreted : " Any year
in which all the English harvests are bad is a year in which
all the American corn-dealers gain". This might be
symbolised :
In this example y means any year ; in the last example y
meant any moment in the given year. Of course the degree to
which we carry the analysis is arbitrary, and the proposition
might be simply written :
where e stands for English harvests and a for American
corn-dealers. The important point to observe is that the
predications b and g are relative to the year in question.
3. Take the definition of a circle. Here we have to express :
" There is some point c and some distance r such that every
point p is either on the locus I and at distance r from c, or is
not on the locus I and is not at distance r from c". This
may be symbolised :
crp{(l p . d pcr ) ' (l p . dpcr)},
where d is the relative predication "is at a distance from
equal to ".
4. Let us symbolise that part of Mill's view of causation,
which may be expressed as follows : " Taking any pheno-
menon 77i there will be found some phenomenon n which is
such that in any instance e in which m appears as antecedent
n will appear as consequent ". This may be symbolised :
mne(d me ' c ne ).
This is the form required for the Method of Agreement.
5. Let us symbolise that other element in Mill's view of
causation, which may be expressed as follows : " Taking
any phenomenon n, any instance e in which n appears as
1 Dr. Mitchell's symbols do not give scope for this distinction.
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. -' 1'J
consequent must have contained some phenomenon w as
antecedent, wlik-h is such tluit in '///// instance e in which m
appears as antecedent n will appear as consequent ". This
must be symbolised :
neme{c n< ' a me . (a m , c^)}.
This is the form required in the Method of Difference. It
is to be observed that in both formulae I have allowed for
the Plurality of Causes. 1
6. Lastly, we must observe that all formulae of a Calculus
such as Algebra or Logic which involve symbols to be
taken in a iinirn-^d sense, are to be interpreted as multiply-
quantified propositions of an order equal to the number of
universalised symbols involved; e.g., the Binomial Theorem
(a + b) n = a n + n.a n ~ l b + .... is a triply-quantified proposition,
for each of the symbols a, b and n here stand for any number
whatever. When such formulae are used for inferential
purposes, the Dictum de omni et nullo is employed in giving
to the general symbols particular values. Or, if we analyse
the universals as condensed determinative synthesis, we
infer by the formula "b and c implies c". We, therefore,
are brought round again to the formulae of Logic with
which we started. And we see that the intelligent employ-
ment of these formulae exhibits the same principles which are
mechanically evolved by the calculus itself.
The final outcome of this method of notation is the same
as that adopted at the end of Mr. Peirce's paper on the
" Logic of Relatives " in the Johns Hopkins' Studies in
Logic. It was this paper that led me to represent the
subject in the form given. The differences between Mr.
Peirce's method and mine are perhaps unessential. He
begins by defining the symbol l x)l as a number. Any complex
proposition (see p. 200) may then be expressed by saying
that "some corn plexus of aggregates and products of such
numerical coefficients is greater than zero". As, however,
the symbol >0 terminates all the propositions so symbolised,
it may be always omitted. And, finally, "the Boolian
calculus is applicable " to all the forms of proposition used.
On the other hand, I begin by defining/^ as a (molecular) pro-
position, and immediately combine such propositions on the
principles of the Boolian calculus. The difference may be in-
1 Forms of this kind are necessary to reduce Induction to a (hypo-
thetically) demonstrative process, such as Mill appeared to regard it.
But I do not wish to maintain the truth or general applicability of these
particular major premisses in reference to phenomenal sequences, although
I believe they indicate the general nature of Formal Induction.
250 w. E. JOHNSON: THE LOGICAL CALCULUS.
significant. But I can see no reason for restricting the use of
these molecular propositions to cases of relative predication,
since it appears to me that any singly-quantified proposition re-
quires the same reference to moleculars in order to expound the
rules for its synthesis with other singly-quantified proposi-
tions. Mr. Peirce appears to use this molecular analysis
only as a last resource, when his highly ingenious calculus,
involving "relative addition and multiplication," breaks down
under the increasing complexity of the propositions treated.
I should prefer to regard these " relative operations " in the
light of condensed forms of the ordinary Boolian addition
and multiplication. Thus the proposition "x loves some
benefactor of y" which involves Mr. Peirce's relative
multiplication, would be symbolised z(l xz .b zy ) ; and the
proposition "x loves all but the benefactors of ?/," which
involves relative addition, would be symbolised z(l xz '~b zy ). In
each case z represents the universe, to which reference is
made in the words some and all. From these forms all Mr.
Peirce's results may be derived without any departure from
the Boolian Calculus. I do not imagine that Mr. Peirce
would deny this. But the particular procedure which he
adopts suggests that the so-called " Logic of Relatives " rests
on a foundation independent of the principles of propositional
synthesis worked out by Boole. My chief object has been
to exhibit the unity of the whole Logical Calculus including
Relative Logic by showing its dependence on the single
group of fundamental laws regulating the pure synthesis and
pure negation of propositions.
(To be Continued.)
V. DISCUSSIONS.
DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS.
By S. ALEXANDER.
Mr. Titckener's article in the October number of MIND for last
year will perhaps have thrown grave doubts in the minds of
iiuiiiy English readers upon the value of Dr. Miinsterberg's work.
A criticism which consists mostly of pointing out real or supposed
errors of detail, even if successful, is calculated to leave the im-
pression that the whole of the work under review is valueless.
Many of his objections refer, indeed, to unimportant points, and
the graver theoretical ones are really groundless. No camli<l
reader can however refuse to admit that he, like Prof. G. 1
M tiller, has indicated real defects in the experimental proof; and
that Dr. Miinsterberg's inquiries need to be carefully reconsidered
and checked both on their experimental and on their theoretical
side. But though he professes to do no more, he has done
more, and he has contrived to give a one-sided judgment by
neglecting the other considerations which give Dr. Miinsterberg's
work its value. In what follows I hold no brief for Dr. Miin-
sterberg ; I desire only to draw attention to the real points at
issue, which, I think, Mr. Titchener very often overlooks. No
comments would be fair which did not also take account partially
of Prof. Miiller's criticism, which has much the same general
tendency as Mr. Titchener's, and is certainly weighty.
There is no necessity, after all that has been written on
Dr. Miinsterberg's work, to speak of its general significance.
I desire only to record my humble conviction, that, even if the
present attacks were more successful than they are, the Beit
remain among the hopefullest psychological work of recent
years. They constitute a thoroughgoing attempt to employ
experiment with a purpose, as a means of testing introspective
analysis, and they have treated the subject with a freedom and
a breadth of conception which of themselves entitle the author to
the gratitude of students. No one, I suppose, is willing to
accept without reservation, or at least without suspense of
judgment, the far-reaching significance which Dr. Miinsterberg
attributes to the muscular sense. Yet here at any rate is a large
body of evidence which seems to admit of that interpretation,
and part of its strength arises from its mass. True, the very
existence, or, at any rate, the effectiveness of a muscle-sense pure
and simple, is being called in question. And it is also true that
Dr. Miinsterberg, while regarding sensations from the muscles,
that is, sensations of contraction or strain, as forming only one
element in a product to which joints, tendons and skin contribute
as well, certainly attaches the position of greatest importance to
252 S. ALEXANDER :
the muscle-sense as such. 1 But in so far as we describe the sense
of movement as muscular sense (a very incorrect description)
evidence accumulated to show its importance remains no less
valid whether we interpret the kinaesthesis as mainly an affair
of the joints or mainly an affair of muscular strains. And so
far as muscular sense means as it should mean the sensation of
strain or contraction, here is evidence adduced in favour of its
importance. If the ' muscular sense ' is treated on a large scale,
so too is the issue between association as the main principle of
mental combination on the one hand, and something, whatever
it is, which is not merely association, on the other hand. For as
to attention, which is sometimes put forward as a process dis-
tinct from association, the author treats it as a part of the sensory
data of mind, and, as I explain below, as following the same law
as other sensory data.
I. The first of the studies, which was an attempt to show that
the most complicated mental processes were only associative
acts, consisted of two parts. In the first part the author claimed
to show that acts of choice could be performed in either the
sensorial or the muscular form. The method was this. In the
sensorial reaction you were told that a word being called, which
should be the name of either animal or plant (there were, in fact,
five categories), you were to listen attentively to the name, and
if it was the name of an animal you were to lift your first finger.
In the muscular reaction you were told : ' If the name of an
animal is called lift your first finger'. In the first case your
attention is directed to the word called, and then the rest follows
according to the prescription ; in the second case you attend to
the task of moving your first or second finger according as the
1 Mr. Titchener does not, I think, accurately represent the state of the
case. Dr. Goldscheider himself claims only to have shown that the
joint- sensations are decisive for minimal excursions of the limbs. He
thinks this probable in large excursions also, but this is certainly not
proved. And it is quite premature to say that the muscle-sense has
been shown to be ineffectual. What has been shown is that it is not the
only factor, and moreover that for sense of movement the joint-sensations
are of vital importance. It was found that when the sensibility of the
joints was suspended by faradisation, the sensibility for movement was
greatly diminished, the threshold raised. This does not prove that
the muscle-sense is inoperative, for even in passive movements the
muscles are contracted, but only that it cannot judge movement without
joint-sensations. Now this is just what upon the ordinary theory should
be expected, if the joint- sensations supply the place of the tactual sen-
sations of the finger-tip in exploring an irregular surface. Like Prof.
Groom Robertson, I find it difficult to conceive how mere sensation of
greater or less contraction of the muscles should give us a sensation of
movement, without help from sensations which can serve as an index of
position. Dr. Goldscheider'^ work appears to me to make this clear for
the movement of the limbs themselves as not used in exploration of
foreign bodies, and I believe that this would be a reasonable corollary
of the usual theory of extension.
DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS. 253
iiuiiie of a plant or animal is called. This distinction being
proved experimentally to be possible, what follows? \\'h\,that
in any case tin- choice involves a train of association, but that, as
in muscular reaction, attention to the movement to he performed
has already set going associations, not only between animal
your second finger, hut bet we -n animal and the particular animals
that are likely to he called, the process of reaction is shortened.
Ami it is not wonderful that, as the principal work is already
done before the experiment, the shortened times should he much
the same, no matter how the different categories in successive
group- rise in difficulty. Whereas, in the other case, the v
tii-M has to excite the mass of ideas involved in the prescription
to attend to it (has to be apperceived), and then the other associa-
tions follow on. The act of so-called apperception is thus one
particular kind of association, which may be rendered unnecessary
by preparing the mind properly beforehand. Then the second
part of the research showed that complicated judgments could be
performed in times which did not allow all the operations,
conscious and unconscious, to be performed in serial order. They
must, therefore, be supposed to overlap, and again the associa-
tive process is shown not always to require conscious appercep-
tion.
Observe that, apart from details, the very argument implied in
the study is this, that the whole process of mental connexion is
associative, because if by altering the attention you alter the
associations which lie most readily at the disposal of the person,
the times of reaction must necessarily be altered, as experiment
shows them to do in fact. And in like manner, in pt. ii., the
associations excited by the form of the question put must alter
the time of answer. Of course it is perfectly legitimate, on the
other hand, to say that any one could see this result without
the experiments. But it is surely a feature of much of the
best experimental work that it puts upon a secure footing, and
formulates as a basis for further development, ideas which are
known introspectively beforehand.
The importance of the main point made it worth while to go
over the ground again. I hope I do not do Mr. Titchener an
injustice in saying that he does not appear quite to understand.
Else he would not think it a "fatal weakness" in the second
part that the process of association should have begun before the
last word of a sentence is called. Certainly it does ; and this is
argued in the interpretation (pp. 173 ff.). This fact may indeed
operate unequally in the different questions of any one group
a difficulty met by the number and variety of the questions.
Some minor points I refer to in a footnote. 1
1 (a) On p. 73 of Heft i. there is no contradiction, as Mr. Titchener
seems to think (MiND, vol. xvi. p. 522). The two statements he quotes
refer to different things : the one to what happened after practice, the
other to \vhat happened before practice. (6) Can there be any real
254 S. ALEXANDEK :
As to the experimental proof, I have no doubt that the figures
given cannot be regarded as absolutely exact. But though this is
so far an imperfection, the figures may be exact enough to support
the conclusion which is based upon them ; and the faults which
can be found with them do not deprive them of their significance
in relation to one another. Mr. Titchener does not mention the
most important point. The error he speaks of which is due to
want of simultaneity between uttering a word and closing the
key, even if not constant, could not affect a result running up to
400o-. The real difficulty lies in the following, as Dr. Martius
points out. There are five categories blended with the ideas of
the movement of corresponding fingers. Now if you happen at
the moment to be thinking of the finger and category belonging
to the word which happens to be called, the time will be short.
If you do not, you must first get your mind away from the idea
on which it happens to be employed. How far this is really
the fact can be determined only by trial. In a rough trial which
I made with keys of a piano, it seemed to me that in order to
prevent my mind from wandering over the five alternatives, I must
deliberately refrain, and this meant in the result that each finger
was strained in anticipation, but the separate ideas of the several
categories with their corresponding fingers dropped into the back-
ground. There was never any hesitation as to which finger
belonged to which category. Perhaps Dr. Miinsterberg will give
some more information. But at any rate, though the possibility
of keeping so many alternatives clear in one's mind is not so
perfect as he seems to suggest, the associative preparation exists,
and it is from this that the conclusion is drawn.
The explanation of the results as due to automatic co-ordination
(MiND, vol. xvi. p. 523) is quite impossible. One set of figures
was indeed expressly excluded, because they might possibly
depend on such co-ordination. But here the same five words
(five cases of lupus) were repeated, and the same word recurred
many times. This was guarded against in the subsequent experi-
ments, and no w r ord repeated. Automatic co-ordination would
not explain why the sensorial times kept on increasing in the
successive groups, while the muscular times remained constant.
The only automatic co-ordination that existed, so far as I can
see, was that of category and finger, and this co-ordination was
necessary for the experiment. Here again the point seems to
have been missed. This co-ordination cannot affect the question
whether the choice-reactions were automatic. How can you
doubt as to which finger the experimentee intended to move, either in
the mind of himself or of the experimenter ? (c) Mr. Titchener objects
to the large proportion of false reactions. But these false reactions
always occur in the muscular method. The large number of them here
shows how difficult the act is, not that the method (which seems the
only one available) is useless. His explanation that the mistakes are
due to imperfect practice contradicts his view that the constancy of the
muscular reactions is due to perfect practice.
DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS.
have automatic co-ordination, when the words which were called
were called only once? Of course, the extent to which par-
tii -uhir words have become favourites of the person reacting, from
education or occupation, does affect the question. But it applies
equally to the sensorial reactions. The suggestion whic-h is
made by Dr. Gotz Martius in his article, that the constancy of
tin- shorter time in all the groups may be due to practice, does
not seem likely. Even if all the "sensorial" reactions in each
group came together at the first, and the "muscular" ones after
them, yet the questions, as shown by the sensorial times, are of
increasing difficulty. Moreover, the explanation of the constancy
is easy. What makes the sensorial reactions differ is the difficulty
of the question put. But in the muscular reactions this in-
equality is removed, because the difficulty is overcome before
the reaction takes place.
II. It is fortunately not necessary to be so long with regard
to the paper on the sense of Time. The explanation there given
is that we measure time by the waxing and waning of muscular
sensation. An interval being begun by an impression, the
accompanying muscular sensations, strong at first, decline from
this moment, and then begin again to increase with the expecta-
tion of the impression which is to conclude the interval. Accord-
ingly a second interval will be judged equal which ends at the
same phase in the upward movement of the strain. If we
assume that attention is dependent chiefly on the sensations of
muscular strain involved in the fixation of a mental state, we
can express the theorem of the essay by saying that it is the
rhythm of the attention which is an index to the length of
tin iu. The author, by an introspective analysis of the muscular
accompaniments of a time-impression, concluded that the chief
modifying element was the breathing, and he endeavoured to
prove his thesis by showing that error in judgment of the equality
of two times greatly diminished when the limits of the intervals
always coincided with the same phase of respiration.
The principal difficulties urged against the work (besides com-
plaint 1 of the inadequate report of the experiments) are of a
theoretical character. One which is strongly urged by Prof.
Miiller, and also in another place by Mr. Titchener (MixD,
p. 533), may be deferred till I speak of the last of the researches,
that on the Intensity of Sensations. It is in substance that the
sensations of strain, the varying intensities of which are declared
in the study on time to be the basis of our measurement of time, are
in the later study declared never to vary in intensity at all. This
would be indeed serious, if it were well founded, as I shall point
out it is not. The other theoretical objection is also at first
sight serious and raises an important point. I will quote the
1 Mr. Titchener's remark (p. 524) that the hammer used in the experi-
ments takes time to fall is perfectly true. But the error is a constant
one and does not affect the result.
256 s. ALEXANDER:
words. " We are expressly told that the direction of the
attention upon a period of time is nothing more than the con-
sciousness of our sensations of strain, and of the alterations in
their intensity during that period, yet the attention is focussed
upon these sensations of strain in order that we may measure
the time. Worse than this, the act of attention is itself ex-
plained by means of muscular sensations : so that we somehow
manage to concentrate a sensation of strain upon another sensa-
tion of strain." All these sentences raise, I suppose, the same
difficulty, but it vanishes after a little reflexion, and arises
apparently from the phrase ' directing or concentrating the
attention upon ' something, which seems to suggest that the
attention is a glass turned on to an object, instead of merely an
accompanying state of mind. ' The concentration of attention '
(regarded as itself a sensation of strain) ' upon a sensation of
strain ' is a phrase which describes that the sensations of strain
are uppermost and that sensations likely to divert from them
are actively suppressed. When at this moment I wish to attend
to a strain of muscle in my arm, I feel that sensation distinctly,
and I feel also other strains both in the arms and in my eyes
and head. To attend to a muscular strain is to have it, and to
take the necessary measures to keep it. This is explained by
Dr. Miinsterberg himself on p. 25 of his essay. " ' Our atten-
tion turns to the sensations of strain ' means of course only this.
The intention to measure the interval of time, and the other
circumstances of the experiment supply the psychophysical con-
ditions in consequence of which the perception of the sensations
of strain increases in clearness, everything else in our conscious-
ness recedes, and by secondary fixation of our organs we, as it
were, turn ourselves towards the strained organ." 1
VI. Perhaps it will be well to desert the order of the essays
and pass on to the research on the Intensity of Sensations (pt.
iii. of the Beitriige), because of the supposed inconsistency between
its view of muscular sensations and the expressions used about
them in the study on time, and it may be added, in the whole of
the rest of the book. The theory which the author advances is
that the intensity of sensations is measured not by anything in
the sensation in itself, which varies only in quality, but by
the accompanying, or let us say implicated muscular sensa-
tions which vary only in quantity and not in quality. I
should be as audacious as Dr. Miinsterberg himself if I
1 One small matter. Why does Mr. Titchener think it strange that
a pause in which there are no sensations of strain should be timeless ?
His remark where it stands is not to the point, for Dr. Miinsterberg is
speaking not of 'a pause,' but of 'the pause 3 between the expiration
and the inspiration, and says that if an impression falls within that
pause you are at a loss to fix its place in time. But how should we
experience time in a pause if the attention were suspended ? The pause
could only be measured by the clock. But we are not investigating
what may be called objective time, but the sense of it.
DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS. 257
regarded this theory as sntliciently proved. The experiments
which tend to show that intn-vals between pairs of impression
derived from different senses can be compared, as ought to be
possible it intensity is but muscular strain, are put forward only
as provisional, and they an- not numerous and varied enough to
be conclusive. The theory itself I regard as a hypothesis, one
which if it could be justified would constitute an immense
simplification in psychology, and one which has much in its
favour, and is as I think untouched by the theoretical objections
which 1 have seen. The point from which it proceeds is certainly
of ^K at importance, namely, that (to speak only of the five senses)
a change of intensity really means a new kind of sensation, and you
cannot add sensations together you cannot say a low sound is part
of a loud sound of the same pitch, or that a slightly sweet sensation
is part of a very sweet sensation. Now this study attempts to
supply an explanation of how, in spite of the qualitative difference
of all sensations, it is still possible to measure their difference
quantitatively. The muscular sensations are held to occupy an
exceptional position. As sensations they are always the same in
quality, and a smaller muscular sensation really is contained in a
larger one you can pass from a muscular strain ab to a strain abc
by adding on the difference c. One fact to which allusion is
made as rendering this assertion necessary is that in judging
weights it is indifferent from which position of the forearm we
start in weighing and yet the arm may start with a considerable
muscular contraction. This certainly does seem to indicate that
the mere change in the muscular strain, the mere addition to the
sensation, is felt and serves to measure the weight.
Now comes the objector and declares this view of muscular
sensation as being always the same sensation and varying only in
its duration and extent (in time and space) to be opposed to all other
assertions about it. But this is a misunderstanding. It seems
to be thought that a large muscular strain would not be felt
differently from a small one. This would be a monstrous asser-
tion to make. But what is meant is not that muscular sensations
cannot be distinguished, but that though it is always one and the
same sensation there may be more or less of it. Muscular sensa-
tions may be properly spoken of as varying in intensity, pro-
vided we do not suppose that their intensity is the same kind of
thing as the intensity of sound or light sensations, which is a,
difference of quality. In the case of these ordinary sensations,
too r it would be absurd to say that intensity is abolished because
it is explained. The case may be illustrated thus : we may have
two pears each weighing a quarter of a pound, and another of
the same kind which weighs half a pound. The larger pear is
quite different qualitatively from the small ones ; it is probably
more luscious, is certainly more interesting, and will cost more.
You cannot get the same kind of satisfaction from the two small
ones as from it. But so far as weight of pear is concerned the two
17
258 S. ALEXANDEE :
small ones are every bit as good, and the unit by which its weight
is measured is the single small pear.
Thus the muscular sensations differ in being different multiples
of the same unit. They are described as differing in respect of
time because any given muscular sensation may be produced by
adding several units together successively. The sensation ac-
companying a large contraction of the biceps differs from that of a
smaller contraction because more units of "strain" have been added.
They are described as differing in respect of space because (at least
I suppose this is the meaning though it is not clear) of the area
over which the sensation extends. And with this explanation the
apparent objection appears to me to fall to the ground.
The other objection of circularity in argument \vhich Mr.
Titchener borrows from Dr. Martius is very easily disposed of,
like most objections from circularity. How, it is asked, can
muscle-sensations which are already different in respect of time
and space be used to measure intensity, when it is only through
them that we know time and space ? How, I ask, could we
know time and space by muscle-sensations if those sensations
were not already different in time and space ? Of course the
objector confuses between time as measured by the clock, and
the sense of time as dependent on muscular sensation. It is not
asserted that in a greater muscular strain you necessarily have
the sense of longer time ; for that you would need to attend to the
change in the amount of the sensation. The theory that
muscular sensations are the basis of our measurement of intensity
is so far from being inconsistent with the theory of the time
sense, that it corroborates that theory. If muscle-sensations
differ in strength according to their objective duration, how should
duration be better observed than by attending to the variations in
the strength of these sensations ? l
Another objection raised is that if the theory were true, all
sensations should form a single intensive series. This is perfectly
right. There would, if I understand rightly, be a single series,
but there would be many qualitatively distinct sensations at each
point. The various sensations would form a column five deep.
That as a matter of fact we are not in the habit of comparing
disparate impressions, equating a definite loudness of sound to a
definite brightness of light, proves nothing against the possibility
of so comparing them, because the comparison serves no practical
purpose. There is no direct comparability between drinking a
bottle of champagne and listening to Herr Joachim ; yet, our
practical interests being appealed to, we compare the amount of
1 As to the assertion that the sensations differ in respect of space
there is some obscurity. Elsewhere (p. 32) Dr. Miinsterberg speaks of
* l the duration of the strain and the range of its extension (Umfang ihrer
Ausbreitung) ". Does this mean simply the inclusion of more muscles ?
Elsewhere (p. 33) he speaks of its " encroachment on neighbouring
areas ".
DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS.
enjoyment they give us, and may equate them by spending ten
shillings for either. The reason assigned by the objector to
show that there is no single intensive series is the arbitrary
starting-point from which the intervals were measured. Now,
in the first place, the starting-points were not arbitrary. Dr.
Miinsterberg says that he chose as starting-points sensations
which on the ground of practice in such estimation seemed to
him equal, " not to prejudge the matter by saying that i
called forth equal impressions of strain " (Heft iii. p. 71). But,
in the second place, supposing the starting-points were quite arbi-
trary, this would not affect the question. The object was to
ascertain whether intensive relations of disparate impressions
could be estimated in any regular way, as should be the case if
intensive change was always measured by addition to the secondary
strains. To have set about comparing different single impressions
diivctly would have added enormously to the difficulty. But now
supposing the ultimate theory to be true, then no matter what
starting-points were taken the resulting law should not be
affected ; though of course the actual numerical additions to the
stimuli would have been altered. It is not impossible that there
may be some confusion between the intensity of the sensation
and the amount of the objective stimulus lying at the basis of the
objection.
Though I cannot regard the theory as at present more than
a hypothesis awaiting more exact and extensive verification, I
think it worth while to point out that it contains no inherent
contradiction, and that it is a theory which, while it raises diffi-
culties, 1 well deserves further work, all the more because of its
extreme audacity. Criticisms of the kind which I have been
considering are apt if unanswered to cut off interest in the matter.
As for the solution which is offered by Dr. Miinsterberg's oppo-
nents of the experimental results, that the intervals between
pairs of disparate sensations are judged equal by the mind's
estimating the number of perceivably different sensations which
can be found in each interval, this seems to me questionable in
the extreme. There would be something to be said for this
interpretation if the intervals had been taken in regular order.
Even then we are assuming a power of mental arithmetic which
seems incredible. And as the intervals are not taken in any
lar order I am unable to imagine it at all. The more auda-
cious theory appears to me much the more natural.
III. The other researches, III., IV., and V., are of a more
special character. They all tend to magnify the muscular sense.
About IV., the study of measurements by the eye, I have no-
thing to say. Dr. Miinsterberg must settle with Prof. Miiller
whether his method is wrong; and on III., which deals with the
1 One of the questions raised by it is how far we can distinguish
between the effect of the natural intensity of a sensation upon the
muscles, and of the attention.
260 S. ALEXANDER :
oscillations of attention, and V., which discusses the determination
of direction by the ear, I feel some hesitation in pronouncing an
opinion, owing to the special character of the investigations. In
neither case is it the experiments themselves which are questioned,
but the theoretical interpretation of them. The experiments
themselves supply valuable material which must be reckoned
with, in the study of oscillations of attention the usual grey
ring just distinguishable on a white disc appeared to vanish and
then reappear. By introducing at intervals various motions of
the eye, making the observer sharply close the eyelids, interposing
prismatic glasses, moving a grey disc in front of the eyes, the
time between two disappearances was made to vary. The
investigator concluded that the oscillations were due to fatigue
in the eye muscles ; the fatigue leads to an alteration either of
the fixation or the accommodation or both ; the grey ring van-
ishes ; the muscles then recover, return to their duties, and the
grey ring reappears. The critics have, I think, given Dr. Miin-
sterberg in respect of this article some very shrewd blows indeed.
But though I cannot see any answer to some of their criticism
of individual links in the chain of his reasoning, I can by no
means think that his explanation is disposed of. One thing the
experiments seem to demonstrate, that the phenomenon is inti-
mately connected with eye-movements (using this term to
include alterations of the lens, as well as movements of the whole
eye). Mr. Titchener's remarks are not clear to me. Has he
demonstrated that no movements actually take place at all, as
he seems to suggest ? If so, I can see no other explanation than
that of Herr N. Lange (the original investigator of the subject
Phil. Stud, iv.) that the phenomenon is central, a case of the
general law of psychical relativity ; and this I confess I do not
well understand, until it is also shown what are the actual
variations which take place in the psychological or physiological
complex indicated by the term 'central'. Nor again does this
explanation account for the new experiments. But a still greater
difficulty would be the actual feelings of movement in the eye,
which in my own case are very marked. The observation is easy
to make and does not require a revolving disc. A pin-head on a
black surface or a small strip of colour on a ground slightly
lighter or darker serves the purpose perfectly well. I felt a move-
ment of divergence when the object vanished and of convergence
when it reappeared, like the movements noticed in the well-known
puzzle diagrams which change their relief at intervals.
The question at issue is whether the ring disappears because
the attention cannot bear the strain required for seeing, or because
there is nothing to see. Is the exhaustion of the organ or of the
muscles ? That there is a great strain of the muscles required in
order to keep the eye so intent on the dimmer colour that it
perceives the distinction of this colour from the background is
plain, and it is natural therefore that any relaxation of the
DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS. 261
muscles should make a difference to the eye's sensitiveness under
the conditions of the experiment. l>i. Miinsterberg holds that
tin- fatigue of the eye brings the difference of the grey rin^ ;in<l
its background under the threshold of difference both by altt ;
th- accommodation and by moving the eye. As to this secon-l
point his reasoning has, I think, been proved fallacious. But
the failure of accommodation is sulVuMt-nt. It is hazardous to
ur^ue that when the eye swerves aside the difference of stimulus
may still be apprehended by the more excitable peripheral spot
upon which the grey now falls. In the passage of Helmholtz
referred to (Phys. Optik, p. 315) l it is pointed out that though
we can sometimes see indirectly a difference not perceptible
directly, this does not happen at once but only after some time
of attentive consideration. And here the attention is relaxed.
To suppose that the phenomenon is merely sensorial is open to
the objection that whether the eye moves or remains still the
stimulus persists; how should the organ recover? This is an
objection to the theory thrown out (merely as a suggestion) by Prof.
M filler, that the sensitiveness of the eye being reduced by the
stimulus, the muscles move the eye by a reflex supervening upon
this sensory exhaustion, and that the movement, by altering the
pressure in the blood-vessels, restores the sensitiveness of the
eye, as investigations by Messrs. Fick and Giirber, which he
quotes, seem to show that it does. For though the movement
may thus be beneficial, the fovea is still turned on to the white
disc, and exposed to an even greater stimulus than before. 2 Nor
do I see how this idea would explain the fact that when a grey
card is moved in front of the revolving disc at intervals the
ring disappears more quickly than before. For the movement
of the eye must so far restore the sensitiveness, and the grey
card does not excite more than the grey ring. Whereas the
additional strain of the muscles in fixing, in spite of the inclina-
tion to follow the moving card, will very well explain the
phenomenon.
On the other hand, the theory of muscular fatigue, though it
does not seem able without further verification to account
definitively for the disappearance of the ring (which might be due
to exhaustion of the sensitiveness of the retina due to changes
in the circulation), is able to account for the recovery of the eye's
sensitiveness and for all the other experimental facts. The
criticism passed upon Dr. Miinsterberg' s assumption that fatigue
of the muscles acts itself as a signal to the contraction of
antagonist muscles, does not seem to me very serious. All that
is meant is, I suppose, that when you are tired of keeping your
1 Of course the greater sensibility of the moving eye will explain, as
Mr. Titchener says, some of the experimental results. But it only
restates them, and is itself in need of explanation.
- This would not, of course, apply to the case of a lighter object on
dark background.
262 S. ALEXANDER :
muscles contracted you unbend them, as you stretch the arm
after exercising the biceps.
It appears to me, then, that a case, though by no means a
conclusive one, has been made out for supposing the muscular
strain to be the chief factor in the production of the phenomena.
But I have dwelt so long upon these points because the
possibility that the state of the blood-vessels may be the
determining factor (apart from change in the retina itself) makes
it natural to say that here is a very important case in which to
try the question, What is the relative proportion of the state of
the circulation and the state of the muscles in determining the
attention? This subject appears to be of the utmost importance
at the present moment, and to be making a larger and larger
claim. The recent work of Dr. Alfred Lehmann on Hypnotism
(Die Hypnose, noticed in MIND, No. 63, by the present Editor) has
revived the theory that the state of the circulation is really the
chief or the only condition of attention itself.
V. It remains to comment on the study of Localisation by the
Ear, which was certainly a fascinating piece of work, because it
seemed to place the ears in the same position for apprehending
direction in space as the eyes and hands for apprehending place.
Dr. Miinsterberg tackled the question by tracing how the sensi-
bility to change of direction changes at different points of the
compass on three different circles, of which the middle point
between the two ears was the centre. The circles were chosen
in three planes : one the horizontal through the tympana,
the other the median vertical (or sagittal), the third the frontal
at right angles to both the first two. By considering what
different sets of muscles were engaged at the different
positions and in what proportions, he concluded that the ear
determined the direction of sound by the perception of the
movements of the head required to bring the ears into the
position of distinctest hearing, that is, with the sound straight
in front. In the same way the popular theory of localisation
by the eye holds that the direction of a visible object is deter-
mined by the sense of the movement of the eye necessary to see
the object with the point of distinctest vision. The stimulus to
these movements Dr. Miinsterberg, following out and improving
upon a theory of Prof. Preyer's, finds in the different distribution
of the impact of the sound waves on the semi-circular canals.
Mr. Titchener points out that the three circles cut one another
in various points, and yet the thresholds are very different at
the same point according as it is regarded as belonging to one
circle or the other, and he adds that the strains cannot differ so
much at identical points. But if he will carefully go through
his formidable-looking equations, and will consider what Dr.
Miinsterberg has shown at length, that according as the head
is moving in one circle or the other the strains are very
differently disposed, his objection will mostly disappear, pending
DE. MUNSTERBERG- AND HIS CRITICS. 263
at least the control of the figures by experiments performed on
other individuals. Thus, for instance, at 90 in the horizontal
circle, the threshold is an angle measured approximately by an
arc of 7*5 cm. on a circle of radius 1 meter. In the frontal
vertical circle at the same point it is only 2 cm. But the strain
in the horizontal direction is very great, that in the vertical
practically nil ; it is natural therefore that the threshold of
difference in the horizontal circle should be large and in the other
small.
A more serious objection is that the results are explain-
able by the usual theory that direction is determined by the
relative intensity of the impressions on the two ears. Prof.
Miiller points out that owing to the shape and position of the
shell of the ear this ratio changes less rapidly the further the
sound moves to the back, and the thresholds would naturally
increase in the horizontal circle from before backwards. That
this is insufficient seems proved by the fact that the ratio changes
from a maximum at 90 to unity at 180 just as it changes from
unity at to a maximum at 90, that is, in a quarter of the
circle. But the experimental figures show that the threshold
rises continually, that is, according to this interpretation the rate
of change of the ratio in the second quadrant is slower and
slower, and yet the ratio arrives at unity in the space of a
quadrant. Mr. Titchener's objection is different : that the change
in the intensity of the impression was taken (under the conditions
of the experiment) for a change of direction, which was what the
subject expected. This is of course only a possibility, and it does
not explain why in the one-ear experiments the thresholds are
higher on the side of the good ear than in the two-ear experiments
performed on the same individual. 1 For in both cases the
absolute intensity changes as soon. The reason must lie in the
relative intensity, and then the other difficulty arises.
It must be admitted that a great deal more remains to be done
before Dr. Miinsterberg proves his point. Yet, so far as I can
see, the experiments indicate some other cause than that
assigned by the usual theory. In fact, that theory is not in any
case final. For we could then determine direction only by
experience derived from touch and sight, experience that when a
sound has struck the two ears with a particular relative differ-
ence it has come in a particular direction. Now it is just this
further question upon which Dr. Miinsterberg's method and
interpretation begin to throw light; because they attempt to
show the existence of a special measuring instrument for auditory
space, and to answer the question why we instinctively turn our
heads towards the source of a sound. It is perfectly true that
the way in which, physically, the different directions of sound
can affect the canals is not explained. Yet fishes, to which
1 Why does Mr. Titchener say (p. 528, note) that the threshold at 90
should be greater in the one-ear experiments than at 180 ?
264 S. ALEXANDER : DR. MUNSTERBERG AND HIS CRITICS.
direction of sound must be important, have canals and no cochlea ;
and besides this we have the connexion of the canals with head
movement and the instinctive movement just mentioned. The
links have yet to be indicated. Prof. Breuer himself, to whom
Mr. Titchener refers in a note, contemplates a theory not unlike
that of Dr. Miinsterberg's, while fully admitting that the physical
conditions are unexplained. He conceives it as just possible
that future inquiry might show that the elasticity of the temporal
bone is different in three different planes. But no one will pre-
tend that the connexion is made out as yet.
Into the question whether the apperception-theory attacked
by Dr. Miinsterberg is identical with the theory of Prof. Wundt,
I have no intention of entering. No such discussion would affect
the question of real scientific interest, w r hether the theory offered
in opposition (not a new theory, be it observed, but an extension
of an old one) is right, whether it succeeds in interpreting the
facts. And such a discussion would mean a great many pages
of criticism, partly literary, for which I have no inclination.
Nor should I have attempted to deal at all with a subject on
which I have no claim to speak as an expert, did I not feel it
desirable as a learner to get the questions at issue clearly before
my own mind and those of other persons. The impression left
upon me both by Prof. Miiller's and Mr. Titchener's criticism
is that it proves too much. The writers have done a service
where they have pointed out real errors, and where they render
suspense of judgment or reconsideration necessary. But they
would have done a greater service if they had also done more
justice to the meaning and the originality of their author's
work, both on its experimental and on its theoretical side. The
new prospects which that work seemed to offer in the subject
constituted its attraction for me ; and I still respectfully maintain
my opinion of its value.
S. ALEXAN T DEB.
VI. CRITICAL NOTICES.
Logik. Von BENNO ERDMANN. Erster Band, Logische Ele-
mentarlehre. Halle : Max Niemeyer, 1892. Pp. xv., 632.
The volume before us contains, we may suppose, all the
decisive factors of the author's logical theory. As "doctrine of
the elements of thought " it contains an account of the objects
with which thinking is concerned, and also of judgment and of
reasoning both deductive and inductive (p. 31). The second
part of universal logic consists of the general methodology of
science (/&.), and is reserved for the second volume of the present
work. The study of special methods peculiar to the special
branches of science does not fall within the province of logic as
such, but is a technical supplement to the separate sciences.
Sir John Herschel's "Preliminary Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy " is referred to as a model of such " technical
methodology". The author does not include this within his
scheme.
In a short Introduction (34 pp.) the relation of Logic to other
mental sciences is laid down. Metaphysic (taken as one and the
same science with "Erkenntniss-Theorie," p. 11) deals with the
material presuppositions of scientific thought ; Logic with its
formal presuppositions (the existence and value of Judgment,
Induction, Deduction, and the like). Psychology deals with
processes in consciousness and their connexions according to
law ; Logic treats of truth and probability as properties of
predication qua issuing from the relations of perceived or
thought content (" aus den Beziehungen des Vorgestellten," p. 18).
But yet Logic builds on Psychology, in so far as we must know
what a judgment is before we can tell how to frame our demands
upon it. "The theory of abstraction from Socrates to Locke,
too often represented in our own formal logic, shows the danger
of ignoring psychological fact in logiccil doctrine." Much the same
is the relation between logic and grammar. Thinking in the
narrower sense (as = Judgment, p. 5) develops i/ari JHWH with
language, though perception, and the train of memory, can go on
without words. In connecting words with thinking, we must
bear in mind that words for this purpose are the actual
images or remembered ideas of words, whether visual or
auditory. But for all this logic is not universal grammar.
Grammar is moulded by practical needs. It develops what is
not essential to logic and omits much that is. Only as a
storehouse of intellectual results it enters into the material of
Logic (pp. 29-30).
After this Introduction, book i., forming about a quarter of
the volume, is devoted to the Objects of Thought, under the
266 CRITICAL NOTICES :
influence, it appears to me, of Mill's discussions upon the
"Things Denoted by Names". As " Vorstellen " includes all
contents of consciousness of which we are aware as objects,
this discussion coincides with a treatment of "Vorstellungen".
These, it will be observed, are on the whole regarded as prior to
Judgment.
In this discussion "objects of the first order" are the content
of perceptions which by the action of appercipient masses and
through a process of positive and negative abstraction (pp. 42-44)
have come to be regarded as single or individual objects, whether
real or ideal, concrete or abstract. In contrast with them the
author treats as "objects of the second order" systems or
aggregates which are held together by the uniformity of the rela-
tions between their members (pp. 100-101). The term " In-
begriffe " (" totalities " " aggregates " or " manifolds ") is expressly
applied by the author to objects of this class, of which a section
of space, a portion of a landscape, or a material body regarded
as a complex of atoms, are given as examples. As discrete,
these manifolds are collective, and are represented by such
instances as the series of positive \vhole numbers, which is quite
independent of the existence of real numerable objects, and by
legal or juristic "persons," i.e., corporations or institutions. As
continuous, the "totalities" are represented by the system of
number, considered from the standpoint of modern mathematics
as capable of embodying continuity.
The second portion of the first book treats of the logical
relations of the objects of thought. The chief of these is the
relation of Genus and Species, with the accompanying properties
of Extension and Intension. It is noticeable that the author
finds a meaning for " contradictory " and " contrary " within the
relations of species among each other, and apart from any framing
by the judgment. The treatment of Intension and Extension
(Content and Area, " Inhalt " and "Umfang") presents no
novelty, although a crude application of the pyramidal ar-
rangement is perhaps intentionally excluded by the words
"in comparison with the less connotative members of the
series " inserted in the ordinary statement that the greater
the intension the less the extension (p. 153). There would
thus be no contradiction in assigning to the genus the same
content as to the species. The arithmetical phraseology of
the "inverse ratio" is rightly rejected (p. 154). But the sub-
sumptive basis of the pyramidal arrangement is as a whole
accepted.
In the concluding chapter of the first book we have a novelty
indeed. The law of Identity is set down as the law of
perception or idea (Vorstellqn). And as such a law it is taken
to represent the fruitless effort to express " idea" (Vorstellen) in
Judgment. It is understood as the limiting case of relation a
relation whose terms are not distinguishable, and therefore form
B. ERDMANN, LOGIK. 267
no relation at all. Partial Identity is inconceivable. There is no
identity but this self -identity, which, excluding all continuity (for
what is presented a second time is not identical with what was
presented before (p. 174)), must, so far as I can understand, be
absolutely atomic. Identity is thus simply "position". It re-
pudiates all intelligible attribution. It is pure momentary being.
By such an interpretation Identity is utterly swept out of the
region of Logic. The result is not fatal, so far as I can see,
because the author seems to use " Gleichheit," sharply dis-
tinguished from " j^Ehnlichkeit," where the work of identity in
binding the different together has to be named. The question
thus becomes verbal. As a synthetic consequence of the law of
Identity the author lays down the law of non-identity. " Every
object, so far as identical only with itself, is different from every
other " (p. 175). " And from itself " needs, I think, to be added,
as there is no self which does not include differences.
The author, however, had a distinct purpose in throwing so
much of his object-matter into the class of "Vorstellen" and
below the synthetic activity which he does not admit to be
synthetic of judgment. The nature of this purpose we shall see
in his theory of judgment. By way of transition, he points out
that ideas tend to pass into judgment both by our tendency to
refer marks through the aid of word-presentations to an object in
course of realisation, and by the condensation of judgments into
complex word-meanings which, in actual consciousness, only exist
as judgments. Such word-meanings are the " notions " (Begriffe)
of traditional logic (p. 184).
The leading ideas of the author's theory of judgment appear
to be two. First, Judgment is predication as against the exis-
tential theory (p. 187) ; secondly, Predication is more than is,
so to speak, on the top of presentation or idea (Vorstellen).
Psychology tells us that the object is given before enunciation
takes place (p. 208) ; the judgment of perception and experience
is merely the predicative expression of an extension which has
already taken place in " Vorstellung ". Now we see why " Vors-
tellung" had a first part of logic and an elaborate analysis to
itself. It, in fact, does the work; Judgment comes after and
stamps it for expressional use. There can be no synthetic
judgment of perception or of experience (p. 211). This is
supported by a careful analysis of the apperceptive process by
which a new property is observed in perception or generalised in
experience.
Thus the separation of Subject and Predicate in language
indicates no separation of their meanings in thought, but,
on the contrary, " logical immanence of the predicated con-
tent in the Subject" (p. 221). The " Vorgestelltes " is not
severed in the Judgment, but preserved. This unity of the
content in Judgment seems to be the idea in Ploucquet
268 CRITICAL NOTICES :
which has fascinated the author, as I judge from a quotation
(p. 222).
Passing from the evidence of Psychology and Grammar, we
come to the Logical theory of Judgment. Theories of Judgment
are divided into Extension-theories and Intension-theories or
Content-theories (p. 246). Extension-theories include the Sub-
sumption-theory and the Identity-theory (p. 252), of which the
Quantification- theory is taken as a form. This Identity-theory
is not that of Jevons, but essentially depends on Quantification.
Intension-theories include Jevons' identity-theory (this classifi-
cation surprises me), Lotze's thorough-going determination of S
by P (p. 259), and the author's theory. According to this
(p. 262) "the judgment is the placing ('Einordnung') of one
object in the content of another, performed by means of the
proposition, conditioned by identity of content (' Inhaltsgleich-
heit'), and represented (' Vorgestellt ') in logical immanence".
The Subject is that element of content in the Judgment in which
a place is found, the Predicate that for which a place is found.
The copula (see p. 189) is the conjunction or relation of the two,
and cannot be expressed in language without the inclusion of
both. In " The dead ride fast " the copula can only be otherwise
expressed by " The fast riding of the dead ". That is to say, it
is such a relation as exists only when this predicate is placed in
this subject.
In harmony with this analysis, and in lieu of the Law of
Identity, we have the principle of affirmation or of Logical
Identity (" der logischen Gleichheit ") : "An object can only be
predicated of another in so far as its content can be placed
(eingeordnet) in the content of that other" (p. 266). From this
arise two corollaries : (a) The law of agreement, viz., that an
object is "gleich" to itself when repeated in thought (p. 269);
and (/>) Objects that are " gleich " can be substituted for each
other.
The validity of judgments is now discussed, and questions are
admitted as a class of judgments without validity. A fully valid
judgment is one of which the object is certain (gewiss) and
the enunciation necessary in thought. Certainty, for logic, is de-
rived from repeated identical (gleich) cognition or apperception
(p. 272). There are judgments of subjective and of objective
certainty, called in brief subjective and objective judgments.
The difference between them lies in the consensus of judg-
ments, and both are therefore ultimately reducible to subjective
validity (p. 274).
On the basis of this view, which analyses the consciousness of
validity in judgment into Certainty and Necessity (p. 282), the
author criticises what may be described as existential theories of
Judgment or as theories of assent. These he finds led up to by
Hamilton (p. 285), and fully developed by Brentano, by the side
of whose doctrine he adduces Mr. Bain's connexion of belief with
B. ERDMANN, LOQIK. 269
the " power which an idea has obtained over the will ". He does
not seem to see any prospect of combining the existential with
the predicative value of judgment, and on the ground of the 1;
he rejects tin- former (pp. V 289-90).
The remainder of the discussion of Judgments is occupied with
their classification. They are divided into Eeal and Ideal ; the
meaning of the latter is, I think, a novelty, being taken to include
the judgment "ought" by predicating its content as a fact, of a
subject n-tjiirili'd in mi /</<'<// //'<//// (pp. 314-319) J and into Judg-
ments of Intension and Judgments of Intension. Beflective
-I udgmeiits (Beurtheilungen) are taken as a further class, including
negation and modality. The negative Judgment is, therefore, as in
Sigwart, the denial of au existing affirmation ; and this doctrine is
subsequently applied, as in Sigwart, to explain the process of
double negation a very doubtful expedient. It is noticeable that
the author is obliged to maintain that no judgment of perception
can be negative (p. 359), that is to say, he deals only with " bare
negation ".
In the theory of Inference the traditional Syllogism is on the
whole maintained in its place as the centre of reasoning, being
treated after the Hypothetical Syllogism which, as a mere affirma-
tion of an element in the major premiss, comes next after im-
mediate inference.
The distinction between Syllogism in the stricter sense, and
Syllogism in the sense that includes Induction, is found in the
difference between the relations of the element common to the
premisses with those elements which are not common to them.
In Deduction the common element drops out, and leaves a
relation between the two elements which are not common ; in
Induction the common element remains and enters upon
a new relation to the elements which are not common
(p. 491). By pronouncing omission of the middle term need-
less in Syllogism we should destroy this distinction. The
traditional Syllogistic forms are given at some length and call
for no remark.
There is a curious defence of the syllogism against Mill's
criticism of it as a petitio ^rinc/p//\ in the case of inductive pre-
misses, by distinguishing the "registering" from the "inductive"
element in the major premiss, and exhibiting the conclusion as
issuing not from the former but from the latter (p. 558). The
distinction as drawn seems to me a lax one, for we surely do not
know except by inference that all men up to this generation
have died; yet this is the element in the major "All men
are mortal" which the author sets down as "registered". I do
not, therefore, see that the author's analysis adds anything to
the ordinary view that the major premiss, in subsumptive
Syllogism, shows the operation of the reason by which we draw
the conclusion.
270 CEITICAL NOTICES :
The general account of Induction is couched in symbols which
allow of only two kinds of terms in each argument
Sj 1 is G, or G is P lf
S 2 is G, G is P 2 ,
but permit the premisses to extend to any number. Therefore,
as it seems to me, there is from the beginning no adequate al-
lowance for the transformation of content by analysis, and the
problem takes a set towards the inference from many to all, which
it cannot shake off. And so we find the principle of Induction
" like causes produce like effects" supplemented by the material
postulate, which in truth has to do only with the degree of
realisation of human purposes, that like causes will in fact be
found (p. 578). Stated as the fundamental principle of Induc-
tion, this takes us at once into questions of probability and the
number of unanalysed instances, and distracts us from the task
of analysing our cases so as to make sure that we can adequately
distinguish the " like " causal relation, if it shall recur in our
experience. Induction does not, in fact, tell us that this causal
relation will recur ; it only ensures that we shall recognise it if
it does recur " In these cases the causes are like," we know from
the law of Causation. How many of these cases there will be,
no power can predict. Therefore the part played in Induction
by number of instances is, in my opinion, wholly misconceived
(p. 605), and Induction is separated from all existing precise
knowledge and restricted to what can be done by instances de
novo. But the moment that, in working thus de novo, it reaches
a scientific stage, the single observation will again become capable
of giving a conclusion, and therefore to deny that it is so capable
is to deny that Induction should be called Induction when it
becomes a scientific method. At this point the question becomes
verbal. It is remarkable that the author himself is forced by his
view to say that " pure conclusions by induction become rarer,
as our knowledge is more developed " (p. 606). He will not admit
Induction to be an inverse process of Deduction, and in this he
appears to be technically right. It is not, I should have thought,
related as division to multiplication, but rather as the establish-
ment of the unit or the numerical series to either of these complete
arithmetical processes.
To sum up, the unity of the object in judgment is the essence
of the author's theory, and is, I believe, a primary truth of logic.
The author is also thoroughly clear that relations in Judgment
are not relations between ideas, but relations within ideal wholes.
His view of the copula is new to me, and emphasises this unity.
The sharp distinction of the judgment from apperception and
1 Sj, &c., are taken as species represented by individuals ; P 1? &c., as
predicates. The conclusion in the first case is from instances to a
common property ; in the second, from properties to remaining pro-
perties.
B. ERDMANN, LO'UK. '11 \
presentation, together with the total repudiation of reference to
reality outside the subject of judgment, appears more doubtful.
With these features are connected the strong antag-
ntijil theories of the judgment. I should have hoped that
on this question a vin /n>'</i>t might have been found. The total
refusal to consider whether a categorical judgment involves the
reality of its subject (p. 418) seems unjustifiable in the face of
recent speculation in Kii.^lsind. The treatment of the Existential
Judgment does not wholly make up for this (p. 310).
It is doubtful whether the author's own theory of judgment
and reasoning really falls outside subsumption. It is entirely
within the relation of subject and attrilmtr, and the ar^ui;
from construction, in which a major premiss is admittedly
superfluous, are not considered at all.
The classification of Judgments is not progressive, but to a
great extent a cross division, and the separation between Ex-
tensional and Intensional Judgment appears unreal.
Probably the most valuable part of the work except the im-
mediate account of judgment is the analysis of apperception and
positive and negative abstraction as furthered by the influence of
language. The conceptions of " abstract objects " could hardly
come into existence apart from the ideas of words, which alone
call attention to the organised relations of such systems (pp. 53 ff.).
It is not likely that I have done complete justice to this
valuable treatise. It is plainly full of all kinds of knowledge
and suggestion, but the novelties in it strike a reader at first
with a certain air of perversity, which a longer acquaintance
might remove. Was it worth while, for example, to say that
the subject determines the predicate, and not the predicate the
subject (p. 251) ? The saying impresses us with the unity of the
object about which we judge, and this is the author's aim. But
has it not always been obvioils that the determination must be
reciprocal ?
The work belongs to the German reaction, and shares with it
the dread of system, the love of psychological learning and
minute distinction, the excellent common-sense, critical sagacity
and freedom from traditional bias, characteristic of the writers
who are taking to pieces the work of the great idealists. As,
however, we are proud to find that Jevons and Mill return upon
us from Germany, perhaps a German thinker may not be alto-
gether horrified if an English reviewer expresses the conviction
that the present movement is doing little more than translating
Kant and Hegel piecemeal into a more modern terminology. I do
not think that in the appreciation of true logical form we are at
any point very far in advance of Hegel though some definite
steps have undoubtedly been made while in our insight into
the spirit and essential connexion of the different forms I am
sure that we are still behind him.
BERNARD BOSANQUET.
272 CRITICAL NOTICES:
Handbook of Psychology : Feeling and Will. By J. M. BALDWIN,
Professor in the University of Toronto. London : Macmillan
& Co., 1891. Pp. 394.
This volume completes the Handbook of Psychology, the first
part of which, on the Senses and Intellect, has already reached a
second edition. It is to be regretted that the first volume has not
been, perhaps could not be, recast in the light of the second, as
several topics which appear now under ' feeling ' would have
been much more in place under ' intellect '. It is true that Prof.
Baldwin's classification is only in name the ordinary tripartite
division, and is based, not on the preponderance of one or other
of three primary and ultimate elements in the states called seve-
rally states of intellect, feeling, or will, but on the admission of
three distinct 'functions ' intellect marked by reference to a thing
or object, feeling by reference to self, and volition characterised by
effort or exertion (i. pp. 36, 37). Feeling, as thus understood, is
not mere pleasure and pain, though pleasure and pain is a constant
feature of it (vol. ii. pp. 86, 87), but is synonymous with sensibility
(ii. p. 84). Even so, however, since sensation in its presentative
aspect, and consequently the qualities of sensations, come under
intellect (vol. i. p. 85), there is no ground for reserving the working
of contrast, or relativity, of sense-qualities, until 'feeling' (vol. ii.
p. 91). Again, ' belief is surely neither sensibility nor feeling in
the sense of pleasure and pain, and to call it ' common ideal feel-
ing' (ii. p. 243) is most bewildering. A still more obvious
defect of arrangement is the awkward interpolation of some
eighty pages on the nervous system at the beginning of
vol. ii., coming thus after 'intellect' and under 'feeling'.
Was it simply forgotten in its more appropriate place at the
beginning of the Handbook?
Looking back to vol. i. for the general conception of con-
sciousness, we find it a little hard to gather, owing to a certain
looseness and irresponsibility of expression which Prof. Baldwin
seems to have inherited from the Scottish friends to whom he owns
obligation, though not allegiance (see preface to vol. i., second
edition). Consciousness, he tells us, is both active and passive.
" The highest " and also " the most comprehensive form of active
consciousness" is apperception, "that activity of synthesis by
which mental data of any kind (sensations, percepts, concepts)
are constructed into higher forms of relation, and the perception
of things which are related becomes the perception of the relation
of things" (i. p. 65). From this and other statements about apper-
ception and active consciousness, we expect the other, the passive,
side of consciousness to be the sense data which are brought into
connexion and unity by apperception. This is, in effect, the con-
ception which seems most in harmony with Prof. Baldwin's
general treatment, and it is sufficiently borne out by his view of
the connexion between mind and body. It is as active in virtue
J. M. BALDWIN, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. JT-i
of the unique character of the synthetic activity, which is without
physiological parallel (p. (1) that mind deserves to be the subject
of a distinct science, and not a men- hranch of physiology. The
' data of sense,' which Prof. Baldwin speaks of at one time as a
.11 manifold" (p. 319), and at another in the phrase much
out of place in his psychology of an " undifferentiated sensory
tinnmn" (p. 118), may, on the other hand, be referred back to,
and causally explained by, physiological processes (pp. 27, 21'
I. A doubt is, however, thrown upon this interpretation
of the two sides to consciousness by the fact that in chapter iv. the
terms (/(///( and passive are used for concentrated and [ con-
sciousness (p. 64). In the diagram illustrating the area of conscious-
ness (p. 68), we pass from the extreme outer circle of consciousness,
1 1 the unconscious I through (2) the sub-conscious, (3) passive
(or diffused) consciousness, (4) active consciousness or attention, to
the innermost circle (5) apperception.
Apperception, or the " Apperceptive Function " rather, plays,
as we should expect, an important part in intellect. It comprises
presentation (sensation and perception) and representation
(memory, association, imagination, and thought). It was a
rather unfortunate oversight in the chapter on classification to
give ' representative ' as the alternative title for intellectual states,
which are now seen to include presentative. The laws of associa-
tion Prof. Baldwin reduces to two : the primary 'law of correlation,'
which is a law of mental activity, and the secondary 'law of
contiguity/ which finds its causal basis in physiological process.
The facts brought under the first are undoubtedly of psychological
value, and have been too little recognised, but it is a doubtful
benefit to make the term association so wide as to cover both
them and the more mechanical, or passive, connexions through
contiguity.
The second volume shows a distinct advance in psychological
insight, in spite of the confusion of arrangement. Prof. Baldwin
has here felt his hand more free, and has made in many respects
a nearer approach to a really scientific analysis of consciousness.
After the digression already alluded to upon the nervous system,
he gives us his general account of sensibility or feeling. It is
defined " as the subjective side of any modification whatever of
consciousness," or " the simple awareness of the unreflecting con-
sciousness ". To the precise mind, more information will be con-
veyed by the statement that " the most general characteristic of
sensibility is pleasure and pain ". " Simple sensibility," indeed, is
"pleasure and pain," while "complex sensibility " is any complex
in which pleasure and pain is an element. Obviously " complex
sensibility " may have a wide range, and in effect we find it to
cover a great variety of mental states from sensations, organic
and special, to logical, moral and aesthetic judgments.
Sensuous pleasure and pain is defined, as might be expected
from Prof. Baldwin's view of the physical basis of sensations,
18
274 CRITICAL NOTICES:
through its physiological conditions. Pleasure is " the conscious
effect of that which makes for the continuance of the bodily life
or its advancement," pain " of that which makes for its decline ".
This is only partially true, for there is never the complete adjust-
ment to environment which would make it applicable to every
case ; and, moreover, it does not help us to a psychological genera-
lisation or explanation. The corresponding account of ideal
pleasure and pains, as " the conscious effect of that which makes
for the continuance of the apperaeptive life or its advancement,"
and for " its decline and limitation " respectively, is similarly only
partially true.
Under complex ideal feelings, Prof. Baldwin treats of
common ideal feeling, viz., interest, reality, belief, corresponding
to organic sensation ; and of special ideal feelings corresponding
to special sensations. These special ideal feelings comprise
"emotions of activity/' w r hether of adjustment (effort and ease)
or of function (freshness, triumph, &c., hesitation, indecision,
&c.), and ''emotions of content," having reference to objects.
This last is the largest class, embracing not only egoistic and sym-
pathetic emotions but also "relational emotions," either logical
or conceptual (systematic, ethical, religious, aesthetic). If we
were to adhere strictly to Prof. Baldwin's own distinction
between feeling and intellect, as having respectively reference to
self and reference to external objects (i. p. 36), all the emotions
of content, except the egoistic, would have to be ruled out of
court.
Among the topics for which Prof. Baldwin claims origi-
nality of treatment, the account of "reality-feeling and belief"
(ii. ch. vii.) is of considerable freshness and interest. He draws a
very just distinction between the two. Eeality-feeling is mere
unchallenged presentation, existence in consciousness. It is
primarily the note or cachet of sensations, the "sensational co-
efficient," because sensations are the primary material or content
of consciousness. Belief is a later and more complex state,
involving conscious reaction. The data for belief are (1) con-
trast between reality and unreality feeling, between presence and
absence of the sensation, (2) need for the sensation and impulse
to obtain it, (3) the gratification of that need, with the accom-
panying sense of security and confirmation. This account serves
to bring out the important fact that the primitive consciousness
does not pronounce judgment on its content everything pre-
sented is at once accepted, and reality is simply presence. It
is from contrast and contradiction within the content that doubt
and belief arise, that consciousness becomes reflective and judges.
Prof. Baldwin does not call attention, as we think he should,
to the part played by the ' representation ' of the absent sen-
sation. It is true that the impulse, the need, may be aroused
without the representation of what will gratify it, but in that
case no conscious affirmation of reality (belief) will follow, but
only a somewhat intensified " reality-feeling".
J. M. BALDWIN, H.lXl>}:o<>K b' PSYCHOLOGY. 275
The "sensational coefficient" is made the basis of the belief in
n ;il nudity. The features of this, as of every reaiity-co-
ctVirient, are intensity and uncontrollableness, and these are best
realist *1 in muscular sensations sensations of resistance. Re-
sistant -c is thus the ground of belief in external i
memory, as the ability to reinstate experiences of resistance
at will, supplies a second criterion. Prof. Baldwin overlooks
tin- part \vhich consistency plays in confirming belief in even
external reality, while in our opinion he overrates its place in
belief in concepts and thoughts. He makes it here the ex-
clusive basis, the "thought-coefficient". It is true that he under-
stands by belief in this connexion only formal, logical assent,
not realisation ; but mere consistency does not yield even this
unless it eventually leads back to premises having their roots in
reality (existence). The effect of emotion, both in constraining
and in colouring belief, is well recognised, and a very just com-
parison drawn between mere intellectual belief and what we call
' realising " (p. 152). It is curious that so true a conception of
this difference did not save Prof. Baldwin from the error of
classifying ' belief ' under feeling.
The " general conclusion " on reality and belief (pp. 168-171),
and the criterion of reality there suggested, possess a con-
siderable interest, though one not purely psychological. It lies
in the hint given of a possible solution of some of the problems
of modern thought. There are many indications that the new
basis of faith, if there is to be one, will be psychological, that it
will be based on the ' needs ' of our nature, and will involve the
recognition of sides other than the rational. The establishment
of such a psychological basis demands, however, a more
thorough criticism and analysis of ' needs ' than we find in Prof.
Baldwin's psychology. The number of ' original tendencies ' and
' ultimate feelings ' must be reduced, or their claims established
instead of taken for granted. Whatever is meant by rational,
moral, or aesthetic intuitions, empirical psychology cannot admit
them as primitive and underived until every attempt to reduce
them to simpler elements has proved futile.
A comparatively brief account of 'will' completes the work.
Here again, though the analysis, and especially the importance
attributed to * reaction,' has its interest, we must take exception
to the large number of original impulses or appetences (p. 322).
Let us recognise the complex impulses, or rather the complex
nature of the objects which arouse impulse in the developed nature,
by all means ; but recognition is not all. The business of psy-
chology is to explain, to reduce to simpler and more general
elements. We miss any adequate appreciation of this duty of
psychology in Prof. Baldwin's work. He accepts the de-
veloped consciousness as he has it, or thinks he has it, and con-
cerns himself with its analysis and description, but entirely
leaves aside the question of its growth and development. This
is a serious defect in a handbook of psychology. A worse one is
276 CRITICAL NOTICES:
the failure to recognise the actual scope and limitation of the
suhject-matter. If, as Prof. Baldwin admits, the method
proper to psychology is introspection, then the subject-matter is
consciousness, not as function but as content. It may be
legitimate and desirable to infer an activity apprehending and
combining this content, and is so if the inference helps us to
arrange and explain the data. But such activity is not itself
given among the data. Introspection knows nothing of con-
sciousness as activity, as "function," and it is a complete inver-
sion of right method to begin a psychology with an assumption
and account of functions, whether intellectual or volitional,
whether apperceptive or rational. We look in vain throughout
this work for any conception of the content of consciousness as a
whole, as the subject-matter of a distinct science. Secure in his
formal 'unity of function,' Prof. Baldwin has no scruple in
admitting a break in the material ' unity of content,' in letting
sensation and feeling pass into physiological process. A notable
instance of this attitude is the way in which he disposes of the
hypothesis of sub-consciousness (i. pp. 45-58), the force of which
as an application of the law of continuity he entirely fails to
appreciate.
In spite, however, of its serious defects, which may be lumped
together as over-hastiness and want of a sound-guiding principle,
these two large volumes give evidence of considerable acumen, of
omnivorous reading, and, in the second volume, of power of
original thought.
MABY E. LOWNDES.
Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schliisse. Von Dr. EBANZ
HILLEBBAND. Wien i Holder, 1891. Pp. 102.
Although, according to its title, Dr. Hillebrand's book is con-
cerned with modern theories of categorical inferences, only about
half of its hundred pages are really occupied with inference,
mediate or immediate. For the theory of Syllogism is, as the
author justly remarks, necessarily dependent on the theory of
Judgment ; hence he devotes the long second chapter to a con-
sideration of the " Nature of Judgments ".
Dr. Hillebrand requires the recognition of Judgment as a
gimitive psychical act ; and this he does not find even in
lime, Mill, and Herbart, whom he regards as coming nearest
to it. In his view, it is Brentano who has the merit of being the
first to discern the real nature of Judgment, and to discover that
not only is it inadequate to describe Judgment as a combination
of ideas, but that this characteristic is not even essential to
Judgment. Brentano is led to this view by a consideration of
so-called Existential Propositions; e.g., There is an A, or A is.
These, he observes, cannot be explained as a combination of the
idea of A with the idea of Existence they indicate simply the
F. HILLEBRAND, DIE XEUKX THK< >1;1K.\, ETC. _'7T
acceptance (Anfrk^nnnnif) of A, and in the acceptance of A
id<M of A's Existence is included hence, since A is is ient,
Ju'l^.nt nt does not necessarily include any combination of ideas.
online to Brentano's psychological analysis, all mental
phenomena may be divided into three classes: Acts of Idea'
Judging, and Feeling (Acte dcs Vorstcllcm, dex L'rthc
Mhsthdtigkeit). These are distinguished from one another
liy different relations [of the mindj to an immanent object. The
difference of relation which constitutes the distinction betv
ideating and judging is that, in judging, the " immanent object"
is so regarded as that it may be accepted in a true statei
(c/. 16, 17). And that which stands in this relation to the
mind is what we call "Existent"; the relation itself in which
j mining consists, being the source of the idea of exist*
\\lu-reas (according to Dr. Hillebrand) other theories of jud^in^'
deduce Judgment from the idea of Existence, and are therefore
incapable of affording any explanation of the /o//s el tn-'njo of this
idea. Since these other theories regard judgments as analysable
into elements which are something other than judgment, they
mny be called Allogenetic, while Brentano's view, which regards
it as ultimate, may be called Idiogenetic.
In Brentano's view, then, the mind in every judgment ac-
cepts some object as existent, and regards the proposition ex-
pressing the judgment as true. The acceptance of the object as
existent, and the truth of the assertion in which there is this
acceptance, are bound up together where there is the one there
is the other. If this might be understood to mean that every
proposition " by its very nature lays claim to truth," and that
every proposition implies the acceptance (as existent) of the
matter referred to, the doctrine seems to me indisputable, though
quite inadequate as a theory of Judgments or Propositions. For
when we ask : What is it which is asserted in this truth-claiming
and existence-implicating form ? we find no answer ; unless it is
to be said that the assertion itself is asserted, or the truth of the
assertion, or the existence of that which is referred to. In-
deed, this last is the answer which is very strongly suggested
by the "Existential" form of Proposition although it is,
with specially good reason, disclaimed by Dr. Hillebrand.
Again, how can we deny the existence of that which, being the
matter of judgment, has that unique relation to the judging
mind in virtue of which we call it " existent "? (cf. p. 27, 17,
and p. 25, line 2). But do we not make such a denial in
e.g., There is no Sp ? If this proposition does not deny the
" existence " of Sp, how is it to be interpreted ? And if we
admit that Existence can be denied, then that which has its
existence denied must be ideated in order that it may be judged
(cf. p. 20). What is it that is so ideated or thought of? Let us,
however, put aside this question, and go on to consider some
developments of Brentano's view as worked out by Dr. Hillebrand.
278 CRITICAL NOTICES :
As a result of examining Existential Judgments, he denies that
in judging we must " put two ideas together " ; hence he holds
that propositions need not be two-menibered (zweigliedrig), and
adopts Existential Propositions as the truest expression of judg-
ment. Thus, instead of A is X, A is not X, he prefers to say,
(1) There is AX or (2) AX is, (3) there is no AX or (4) AX is
not. But the There is in (1) and (3), and the is in (2) and (4) are
ambiguous, and it is a little hard to see what (2) and (4) mean
unless the is = exists ; or what (1) and (3) mean unless the Tliere is
signifies either vaguely (a) AX exists [does not exist] at some time
and place ; or (b) AX exists [does not exist] at a definite time
or place. Dr. Hillebrand, however, emphatically disclaims this
interpretation ; and in the last chapter we find it declared that
the expression This plant is a Judgment (p. 97 top), the pro-
noun this implying that acceptance in which Judgment consists.
But if, e.g., This plant is a judgment, what is to be said of the
sentence This plant is evergreen ? Again, to say that This plant is
a judgment is, of course, to reduce the is and There is of Existen-
tial Propositions to mere signs of Judgment. But such reduction
seems unwarrantable and paradoxical ; and, moreover, if these
are mere signs of Judgment (a Judgment being expressible by a
solitary definite name), what is a Judgment, and in what respects
does a Judgment differ from an idea ?
Again, Dr. Hillebrand says (p. 28), that just as the Existential
Proposition S is expresses the simple acceptance of S, so the
Categorical Proposition S is P expresses the simple acceptance
of the object (Materie) SP. But if it is on the strength of S is P
that we admit an object SP, it seems obvious that S 'is P must
be understood, in the first instance, as an assertion of Identity
in Diversity the numerical identity, namely, of one object, which
both S and P denote or refer to, in the diversity of characteristics
indicated by the diversity of the symbols S and P. But if this
is the force of the copula in S is P, it is wholly different from
that of the Judgment-sign is ; and though S is P may explain SP,
it does not explain SP is.
When from a consideration of the most generalised forms of
Categorical Proposition Sis P, S is not P we pass to a considera-
tion of the more specialised forms, A E I O, further difficul-
ties arise. The classification suggested by the original twofold
division would be into (1) A, I (e.g., A/I R (S) is P, Some R (S)
is P) ; (2) B, (e.rj., All R (S) is not P, and Some R (S) is not P).
But the primary distinction now taken is between A and E
on the one hand, and I and O on the other. A and E are both
regarded as negative, as not "accepting" but denying objects
with certain characteristics; All E is Q = There is no Eq (Eq ),
No E is Q = All E is q = There is no EQ = (EQ ). Both I and O
are regarded as affirmative,
And here again we have to proceed as in the case of S is P,
S is not P (unless indeed we reject altogether the universally
admitted " two-membered " form of Categorical Proposition).
F. HILLEKRAXD, 1>1K Xl-ri-X TBXOM2M& L'TC. 279
In order to extract There is no Rq, There is no RQ, from
A and K respectively, E has to be first understood as a d>
and A as an n^--rfiim t of Identity in Diversity. We can deny
that there is R which is not Q, only because A asserts that
to every R the appellation Q is applicable ; and it is only because
E denies the identity of the objects referred to by R and Q
ctivt ly, that we can refuse to admit objects in which there
is a combination of the characteristics signified by R and by Q.
And similar considerations apply in the cases of I and O.
In the fifth chapter, on Compound or Double Judgments, we
icarn that though A, K, must be treated as pin ative
when they are really Simple Judgments, yet in the ov. r\\h lining
majority of actual cases^ A and E are Double Judgments, and
besides denying Sp and SP respectively, also accept S. The
two so-called assertions are extremely different from each other;
and it does not clearly appear how A (or E) is to be analysed
so as to get the two out of it and further, we are given no test
by which to know the Simple from the Compound Judgments,
though the differences between them are extensive and im-
portant when they come to be used in inference.
It would seem that either Prof. Brentano and Dr. Hille-
brand must reject S is P and S is not P as general forms of
'affirmative and negative propositions, and hold to the traditional
view of Logic as a Logic of Classes; or they must give up the
grouping of propositions into I, O, and A, E, together with the
corollaries involved. But to accept the last alternative would be
to put aside the whole further development of the doctrines of
Opposition and Inference with which Dr. Hillebrand provides us.
As regards Opposition, we learn that the only item of the
traditional doctrine which can be admitted is the theory of Con-
tradiction. A and O, E and I, are still to be regarded as incom-
patible and together exhaustive pairs of propositions. But the
doctrines of Sub-alternation, of Contrariety and of Sub-contrariety
do not hold. A and E may be true together, hence also I and 6
may be false together. In the denial of both Sub-contraries
(Some R is Q, Some R is not Q), as in the affirmation of both
Contraries (All R is Q, No R is Q), the non-existence of R
is involved whence it follows that the universe is r, a
result that is not without difficulty. In these cases what
is it that is denied, what is it that is the matter of the
judgment ? The validity of inference from A to I and from
JS to O is denied. As Dr. Hillebrand declares the Dictum
Ir. mnni ct nullo to be nothing more than the Principle of Sub-
alternation (in which, I think, he is right), this view of Sub-alter-
nation strikes at the root of the whole traditional doctrine of
Syllogism. But something very like what has been rejected as
Sub-alternation is brought back as the second of two ostensibly
new rules of Immediate Inference which are given at the end of
ch. iii. p. 69. This rule is to the effect that any "negat
judgment (A or E) may increase its Matter (Materie) i.e., that
280 CRITICAL NOTICES:
any A or E may admit fresh determinations, positive or negative.
Thus, from any assertions concerning a Class, we may infer a
similar assertion concerning any sub-division of that Class e.g.,
from All Bis Q (There is no Rq), I can infer, All RX is Q (There
is no RXq), EX being a sub-division of E, that is Some E.
Dr. Hillebrand's rules, as they stand, do not appear to apply to
Mathematical Propositions.
Simple Conversion is said to be in all cases possible, but a
merely verbal change, since it cannot matter whether I say, There
is SP or There is PS, There is no SP, or There is no PS. The
legitimacy of such Simple Conversion, however, as a general
logical doctrine, is entirely given up in Anm. iii. p. 63, where it
is said that in certain cases Simple Conversion would be illegiti-
mate e.g., in the case of the proposition, Some man is dead.
Obversion (" ^Equipollence ") is allowed to be possible, but a
mere verbal change, in the case of A and E it is regarded as
illegitimate in the case of I and O. Conversion per Accidens and
Contraposition of E are not admitted as legitimate. Contraposi-
tion of A is allowed, and a (so-called) Contraposition by which
Some S is not-P is changed to Some-not P is S. Dr. Hillebrand's
conclusion is that " of all the Immediate Inferences which have
been set out by logicians, it is only the Inferences ad contradic-
tor iam which deserve the name " (p. 67).
After the doctrines of Simple Obversion and Conversion,
we are introduced in chap. iv. to what are called Immediate
Inferences from two premisses. They are of two forms (cf.
pp. 70, 71) :-
Ab - I ( There is no Ab.
(1) A + > = < There is an A.
f
AB + ) ( There is an AB.
AB - ) ( There is no AB.
(2) Ab - > = J TherejLsji^Ab.
A ) ( There is no A.
Of both of these it may be remarked that the conclusion decidedly
is not obtained from the premisses alone, but from them taken
in conjunction with the Proposition :
A is B or b.
They look like distorted examples of the familiar Disjunctive
Syllogism.
From (1) and (2), by substitution of M P S (and their negatives)
for A B (and their negatives), we obtain twenty-four " Syllogisms
with four Terms " from (1), Syllogisms, having in Hillebrand's
terminology one affirmative (and one negative) premiss, and an
affirmative conclusion (in the traditional terminology, a particular
premiss and conclusion) ; from (2), Syllogisms having (according to
Dr. Hillebrand) two negative premisses and negative conclusion (in
the ordinary use of logical terms, having universal premisses and
conclusion) . In these twenty-four are included all the traditionally
r. im.i.i.r,i;.\M>, i>n: NSUBX Til /:<> /;//::. 281
recognised forms of valid Syllogism, except Darapti, Felapton,
liramantip, Fesapo, which have universal premisses with a
particular conclusion, and are excluded by the view t:
alternation is inadmissible. The nine extra moods are obtained
by substitution of negative for positive Terms s for S, and so on.
Two new rules of M ediate Inference are put forward (1) that all
valid Syllogistic moods must have four Terms, and (2) that ./ irwe
affirmativit nil sci/nidir (which includes that from two negative pre-
misses we get a conclusion, and froi none negative premiss an affirma-
tive conclusion). But these rules, strange as they sound, give us
only Syllogisms which the traditional Logic does (or would) recog-
nise as valid, and (2) proves on examination to be equivalent to the
old rules (7 and 8) about particular premisses; and (1) does not
admit four "Terms" in the sense in which they are excluded by the
first of the old syllogistic rules, as appears from the fact that the
new Syllogisms are all reducible to valid Syllogisms with only
three " Terms" (in the sense of Class-names). And when a pro-
position is expressed as MP - , or SM + , MP and SM being
complex names for some one object or group, the appropriateness
of calling each constituent of either combination a Term is not
quite obvious.
What is really novel in this Syllogistic scheme is the exclusion
of any Syllogism with universal premisses and particular conclu-
sion ; and the substitution for the old Dictum dc omni c.t nullo of
the Laws of Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and of the two
rules of Immediate Inference already referred to above of which,
however, one, as already observed, seems to be closely akin to the
rejected Dictum.
I think that Brentano's view is peculiarly interesting, because
he has felt strongly certain defects of the traditional doctrine of
Judgment and Syllogism, and seems at several points to have
come within measurable distance of remedying them. He feels
that to describe Judgment as the combination of two ideas is un-
satisfactory, because there is one thing or group of things which
is referred to in every Judgment (most obviously in Non-relative
Judgments), and constitutes the Materie of that Judgment. He
sees, again, that the object before the mind in ideating and in judg-
ing is the same that in perceiving, say SP, and in judging S is P,
the same identical thing (or group) is the object of my mental acti-
vity, but that there is a profound difference between ideating and
judging such a difference that Judgment is essentially unique and
ultimate. But he has not succeeded in providing a satisfactory
doctrine of Judgment in the place of those current doctrines which
he so acutely criticises. And since as Dr. Hillebrand has observed
the theory of Inference must depend on the theory of Judgment,
if the latter is unsound the former must be unsound. That this
actually is so in the logical scheme worked out by Dr. Hillebrand
in the present book is what I have tried to show.
E. E. CONSTANCE JONKS.
VII. NEW BOOKS.
Distinction and the Criticism of Beliefs. By ALFRED SIDGWICK. Longmans,
Green, & Co.
In this book, which is in the press and will shortly be published, the
problem how to deal with ambiguity of language is treated in a some-
what special manner. Ambiguity is only effective so far as it is subtle ;
words (like " pound ") which mean widely different things are not in
practice confused, but rather words which cover meanings most nearly
alike ; and accordingly it is in artificial sharpness of distinction (in the
continuity of Nature and the discontinuity of Language) that the source
of the most effective ambiguity is to be found. Common-sense exercises
a kind of tact in using distinctions, treating them with considerable
lightness ; but so unconscious a method is naturally rather haphazard
in its operation, and the main purpose of the book is to supplement
' common-sense tact ' by making it conscious of its reasons. In the
course of the inquiry several other topics of philosophical interest are
discussed ; chief among these are Controversy, the nature of Language,
and the destructive power of Scepticism.
The Nuptial Number of Plato. By JAMES ADAM, M.A. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1891. Pp. 79.
' The present essay claims to be a complete solution of the number of
Plato' (Preface). I must leave the mathematics in it to mathematicians,
and will only ask whether the solution itself, or the general reasoning by
which it is reached, are such as to justify its claim to completeness.
Mr. Adam's view of the main truth which Plato wishes to express seems
to be this : that the maintenance of a perfect human society depends on
the understanding and observance of a law of generation, to which man
along with other animals is subject ; that according to this law there are
certain regularly recurring periods at which sexual union should take
place if it is to produce the best possible offspring ; that not only the
particular organism man, but the whole universe, conceived as one all-
containing organism, has likewise its periodic times of generation, and
that this generation of the universe controls that of all the living things
which it contains. So far as this I go with Mr. Adam, but the details of
his interpretation puzzle me. It is based throughout upon the assump-
tion (for it is an assumption, though Mr. Adam speaks (p. 46) as if he
had proved it) that in determining the right periods for the generation
of children Plato was guided by the period of human gestation. ' What
he did was probably something of this kind. Taking the shortest period
of gestation as his unit of measurement, viz., 216 days, he divided a
woman's life into periods of 216 days, from the day when first she was
able to conceive a child. . . . During the time when Plato allowed
woman to bear children (i e., between the ages of 20 and 40) she would,
as far as the claims of maternity or other circumstances would permit
her, unite with a bridegroom on the first day of each of these cycles, and
possibly on other days within the cycle in which the number 6 pre-
dominated ' (pp. 51-52). But if this is Plato's meaning, why does he say
that human wisdom, however great, will sooner or later fail to calculate
the right times for marriage, and that owing to this failure society must
NEW BOOKS. 283
sooner or later begin to decline ? Given the starting-point suggested by
Mr. Adam, ' the day when a woman was first able to conceive a child,'
the subsequent calculation would seem to be easy. Where then does
Mr. Adam suppose the difficulty to lie ? * The method of fixing the
times of marriage,' he says, 'fails in the end, from no fault of our
rulers, but dia TO p.rj pcveiv p.rj8ev 'aXX' anavra cv TIVI rrepiodto /ifra/SaXXeti' '
(p. 44) : ' Be our archons never so perfect, the ageing world will make
their state decay ' (p. 67) : ' The race of man degenerates as the world
grows old and weary of child-bearing ' (p. 79). Let us then assume with
Mr. Adam that Plato here had in his mind the idea which is developed
in the Politicus, that the universe alternately moves forwards and
backwards, waxes and wanes, for equal periods of time ; let us assume
that each of these pairs of periods is 72,000 years, and that this number
is 'built up from the ivvB^v of the number 216,' which expresses in
days a period of human gestation : what is the import of all these
assumptions? 'As surely,' says Mr. Adam, 'as this goodly universe
is begotten once every 72,000 years ... so surely are there times and
seasons for begetting man ; for what is man but the universe epito-
mised ? And just as the moment of the world's conception is discovered
from its period of incubation, 36,000 years, so the right season for be-
getting children is to be determined from the period of gestation among
mankind' (p. 78). We need not quarrel with the circularity which Mr.
Adam himself admits in this reasoning ; we may agree with him that
* when man discovers, or thinks he discovers, that the conditions which
regulate his own nature are the laws that rule the whole, he realises, far
more surely than before, that the conditions of his own nature are
likewise laws, not to be violated without insult to the harmonies of
heaven ' (p. 78). But how is man to derive this moral support for his
acts from the contemplation of a law of nature, when it is that very law
which ultimately renders nig acts ineffectual ? It is like saying to him :
* If you wish to beget children at the right times, observe the period of
human gestation ; on reflexion you will find that this period is repeated
on a vast scale in the universe ; this discovery will strengthen you to
resist the temptation to unregulated sexual indulgence ; at the same
time I must warn you that, however great your wisdom and self-control,
the periodic changes which occur when the universe issues from and
returns to chaos will baffle all your calculations and produce inevitable
degeneracy in your offspring '. I may not have understood Mr. Adam
rightly, but his conclusion does not seem to deserve the enthusiasm
with which he regards it.
Nor is the reasoning by which he arrives at it convincing. The most
prominent and characteristic idea in his essay is ' that .the Trept'oSoy of
the 6elov yfvvrjTov seemed to Plato to control the yevvr^To. which are within
it ' ; this he considers to be ' the whole point ' of the passage (p. 48,
note 4). On what grounds ? They are to be found partly in his
interpretation of the clause &i/ CTTLTPITOS Trvdp.r)v K. r, X., partly in a
combination of the whole passage with passages in the Politicus and
the Timceus. As regards the former, the following difficulties amongst
others suggest themselves : (1) He purports to have ' shown ' from
Aristotle's Politics that the number intended in the clause ev o> Trpcorep
K. r. X. is 216, taking Aristotle's words Xyo>i> orav 6 TOV diaypdp.iJ.aTos api.dfj.os
TOVTOV yevrjTai orepeoy to be explanatory, not of rpiy avt]6(is, but of the
antecedent implied in o>i/. But if (as is necessary to his argument)
eTrirpiroy 7rv0p.T)v in Aristotle's quotation from Plato means the Pytha-
gorean triangle with its area-number 6, how in Plato himself can it
mean 12 (3 + 4 + 5) ? Has he not first deduced 216 from a certain
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meaning of brtrptrot nvd^v, and then deduced a different meaning of
enirpiTos nvdjirjv from 216 ? (2) What is the sense of saying, as he
supposes Aristotle to do, that the period of gestation is the ' beginning '
of change in the ideal state ? He emphasises a distinction between
' cause of change ' and 'process of change ' (pp. 42 and 68), but he does
not make clear how the two are related. (3) Why should Plato have
said (TrirpiTos when, as Mr. Adam allows (p. 24), the 7rvdp.rjv is really
(TrirpLTos Kai eTriTtrapros ? Is it not a queer way of defining a number to
qualify it by an epithet which is both inaccurate and superfluous (see
p. 25) ? (4) What evidence is there, in Plato or elsewhere, that 7re/x7ra8i
(rvvyfis can mean ' multiplied by five ' ? (5) Is it likely that rpls
avgrjdeis means here ' raised to the fourth power ' when rpirrj avgrj had
* become a stereotyped phrase for third dimension ' (p. 27) ? If the
rpiTT) avtj of 9 in Republic, 587rf, means 9 a , the ' increases ' being
reckoned from unity, why should not rp\s av^rjdfis be similarly reckoned
here ? Some of Mr. Adam's reasoning is ingenious and plausible, but it
does not justify such phrases as * absolute certainty,' ' I have shown,'
* I can prove it to the hilt ' (pp. 22, 24, 25).
As regards the other source of his conclusions, he is doubtless right in
holding that Plato is best explained from himself, but he does not
sufficiently distinguish between illustration and proof. Take, for
instance, his treatment of reXelos apitfftd?. He first ' infers provision-
ally ' (p. 48), from the fact that the same phrase is used in the Republic
and the Timceus, that it means the same in both, promising that this
shall be ' fully established ' later. But the only ' establishment ' that
he gives is an interpretation of the myth in the Politicus, which, though
interesting and suggestive, is certainly not conclusive, ^o mention one
or two difficulties : (1) He makes much of the parallelism between
human and cosmical generation ; but whereas the right period for the
former is supposed to be the period of gestation, the generation of the
universe takes place at periods of twice its period of gestation (p. 77).
(2) He treats the statement in the Politicus that God ' retired to His
watch tower ; as parallel to that of the Timceus that God ' abode in His
own nature ' ; but in the Timceus the work of the secondary divinities
begins with the retirement of the Creator, in the Politicus (2720) they
accompany Him in his retirement. (3) The fanciful interpretation of
dpiBfjios yew/jifTpiKos as the number ' which measures the earth ' (p. 76)
would, if it were true, make the periodic changes of the earth the same
as those of the universe.
It is to be hoped that Mr. Adam will continue to study Plato, but that
while retaining all his enthusiasm he will abate some of his dogmatism.
Anthropological Religion. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the
University of Glasgow in 1891. By F. MAX MULLER, KM.,
Foreign Member of the French Institute. London : Longmans,
Green, & Co., 1892. Pp. xxvii., 464.
The third series of Glasgow Gifford Lectures do not present many
points of interest even to the professed student of comparative psycho-
logy or philosophy of religion, while they make almost no appeal to the
philosophical expert, as indeed the author himself seems to indicate
(pp. 338-9). In two previous courses natural religion generally, and
physical religion the religious ideas connected with the attribution of
causality to external phenomena were discussed. The present work
carries the investigation a step higher. Physical religion leads man to
a " belief in one Superior Agent or God" (p. 181), but it leaves an " abyss
separating God from man" (p. 182). Anthropological religion, on the
NEW BOOKS. 285
other hand, comprehends " the history of the various attempts at dis-
covering something infinite and divine in man or mankind, beginning
with the first surmises of the existence of something different from
the body, and culminating in a belief in the divine son ship of man, the
True Keynote of the religion of Christ ' ' (p. 115). After some general con-
siderations, occupying Lectures I.-IV., this evolution is traced from
ancestor-worship, through animism in its various stages, and finally to
the " apotheosis of the Divine in man ". Throughout, the lectures are
marked by the same wealth of illustration especially from Indian
sources the same abundance of anecdote and reminiscence, and, occa-
sionally, the same poetic fervour (e.g., pp. 107 ff.) which rendered their
predecessors so pleasing to the hearer. They have also similar defects.
The psychology is not always what it might be (e.g., Lect. VIII.).
There are many remnants of Physical religion in Anthropological,
while the latter contains a very great deal of Psychological religion, the
subject which has just been treated in the concluding course. There
are also some curious anomalies of detail. The " revelation of Divine
Sonship in Christ" was hardly reached through Greek stages, as is im-
plied ; and even if it had been, our author would find it difficult to re-
concile this "apotheosis " with the fact, upon which he rightly insists, of
the Jewish aversion to the worship of a Divine which evinced itself in
human form.
Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, with a Chapter on Christian Unity
in America. By J. MACBRIDE STERRET, D.D., Professor of Ethics
and Apologetics in the Seabury Divinity School. London : Swan
Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. xiii., 348.
The general purport of this book is well described in the Preface. " It
is written with faith and in the interests of * The Faith,' though de-
manding an almost antipodal orientation or point of view to that of both
deistic orthodoxy and ecclesiasticism." "It is mere time-serving to
manufacture evidences where there are none." " It is infidel to refuse
to welcome the Light lightening every man and every institution that
comes into the world." " To discover the concrete Infinite immanent in,
vitalising and educating, man throughout his history " is to supply " the
key to the vital rationality of religion, interpreting and vindicating at
their relative worth the many elements which, when put forth separately,
are easily overthrown by scepticism ". The work of Hegel " contains
the philosophical key to the heart of the matter," reconciling " reason
with religion by finding reason in religion and religion in reason". Dr.
Sterret has performed his task well. His exposition of Hegel is accurate,
and for the most part lucid ; and his free adaptations and applications
of Hegelian ideas are always interesting and valuable.
An Essay on Reasoning. By E. T. DIXON. Cambridge : Deightoii, Bell,
& Co., 1891. Pp. 88.
The author of this essay has previously shown great acuteness in
criticism of the procedure of geometricians, and logical thoroughness in
deducing a system of geometry from a few assertions with respect to
direction and position. His Foundations of Geometry present the sub-
ject in a form probably superior to that of any elementary text-book.
In the present work he aims at reinforcing his contention that the funda-
mental assertions of a purely deductive science are Implicit Definitions
not Axioms depending upon our assigning real import to the terms
special to the science. The contention is of course not new, but the
286 NEW BOOKS.
test for determining the logical soundness of such an Implicit Definition
seems ingenious. " None of the assertions must be independent of the
meaning of the term [to be defined], and together they must not imply
anything which is independent of that meaning " (p. 55). But how can we
legitimately make these assertions without first assigning a meaning, i.e.,
at least subjective import (as the author expresses it), to the term ? After
having tested the truth of the assertions, and having found that they
contain no information which does not depend on our giving that
particiilar subjective import to the term, it is true that we can tem-
porarily lay aside all thought of the meaning, and proceed to make
logical deductions. But the arbitrariness of the assertions applies only
to the choice of the term or symbol to denote the particular concept.
That the assertions are true of the concept is not arbitrary.
The rest of the essay appears to me independent of the main thesis, and
to contain much error, confusion, and obscurity. Mr. Dixon expresses
clearly enough the familiar commonplace of Logicians that, if we start
with an arbitrary list of ' attributes,' the list of ' things ' possessing those
attributes is not arbitrary ; and conversely. He, then, appears to
recognise that four cases will arise, according as we have names of
attributes or things whose application is determined directly or in-
directly. But for simplicity he confines attention to the names of things,
and considers throughout the work the two cases in which the applica-
tion of these names is determined directly or indirectly. But by this
procedure he destroys the reciprocal relation that he began by clearly
enunciating. Every parallel that he draws between the two cases,
therefore, breaks down, and the work becomes crowded with errors.
On the treatment of Propositions and Syllogism Mr. Dixon merely
offers a confused rendering of the " Identification " interpretation. His
whole work here is marred by the assumption that in a proposition the
subject and predicate must both be determined denotatively or both
connotatively. His own example (on p. 10), " Aristotle is-identical-with
some man of extraordinary industry," expresses an identity, to which
the most natural way of assigning real import is to define the subject
denotatively and the predicate connotatively.
Mental Suggestion. By Dr. J. OCHOROWITZ, with a Preface by Charles
Eichet. Translated from the French by J. Fitzgerald, M.A. New
York : The Humboldt Publishing Co. ; London Agents : Gay & Bird.
Pp. 369.
This translation may be recommended to English readers who have
interested themselves in the work of the Society for Psychical Research.
The account of the personal experiences which convinced Dr. Ochorowitz
of the reality of "mental suggestion " does not occupy more than a small
part of the book ; but he has judiciously introduced this by two chapters
in which he shows a full acquaintance with the various special causes of
error, against which an investigator in pursuit of mental suggestion or
thought-transference has to guard. Among these may be noted
besides mal-observation and conscious deception the suggestions
given by unconscious indications, natural associations of ideas tend-
ing to cause coincidence between the thoughts of the experimenter
and those of his subject, the hyperaesthesia and hypernmesia that
are sometimes manifested in the hypnotic state, and the specialised
sensibility and peculiar irnitativeness of a "magnetised" subject in
relation to his " niagnetiser ". These and other sources of error Dr.
Ochorowitz illustrates by a number of cases of merely apparent or merely
NEW BOOKS. 287
probable " mental suggestion " drawn from his own experience. Part ii.,
about half the book, contains a critical selection and discussion of facts
recorded by other chiefly French investigators, tending to confirm
and extend the conclusion to which Dr. Ochorowitz's own experiments
have led him. Finally, in part iii., after a full discussion of other
hypotheses, old and new, he concludes by indicating the lines on which
a scientific explanation of his facts is to be sought. To say that the
translator's English is uniformly correct and elegant would be too
indulgent; but it is always readable, and appears to be substantially
accurate.
La Morale de Spinoza. Examen de ses Principes et de I'lnfiuence qu'elle
a exercee dans les Temps 'modernes. Par RENE WORMS, ancien
Eleve de 1'Ecole Normale superieure, Agrege de Philosophic.
Paris: Librarie Hachette et Oie., 1892. Pp. 331.
Spinoza exercises a potent and wide-spread influence on the thought
of the present day. But one part of his teaching is comparatively
neglected, and this is the very part which ought to interest us most
his practical Philosophy. As exhibiting in a clear light the extraordinary
originality and value of this aspect of his system, the present work
deserves cordial welcome. It consists of two parts, the first being a
critical exposition of the ethical doctrine of Spinoza, and the second a
historical survey of the influence of this doctrine on later thinkers. The
exposition is accurate, clear, and extremely well written. M. Worms
holds that Spinoza has combined in a higher unity the three leading
ethical principles, which in other systems are separately emphasised
the egoistic, the altruistic, and the religious or metaphysical. The
egoistic principle is represented in his philosophy by the impulse to self-
realisation which constitutes the essence of every individual; but the
satisfaction of this impulse is not to be found in the pursuit of external
goods which continually leads to limitation, thwarting, and curtailment
of our being by other finite existences, and especially by our fellow-men.
It can only lie in the inner freedom of an activity which has no de-
pendence oil things external to the self. Hence the supreme and
adequate satisfaction of the self-realising impulse is the love of God, as
the immanent cause of our being. But the love of God necessarily
includes the love of our fellow-men ; for the same immanent causality
which constitutes our being also constitutes theirs. In the historical
part of his work M. Worms shows in a very interesting way how now
one and now another of these three aspects of Spinoza's doctrine has
been seized upon and made predominant by subsequent writers. But he
shows a disposition to find Spinozistic affinities where they do not exist.
Helvetius and Benthain remind him of Spinoza, because they erect an
altruistic superstructure upon an egoistic basis. This seems to me to be
entirely erroneous. The self-love which forms the point of departure of
these writers is essentially distinct from the self-realising conatus. It
consists in that very search after external goods which, so far from
being identical with the conatus, is, according to Spinoza, merely a mis-
taken method of attempting to satisfy it. Accordingly, the derivation
of altruism from self-love in Helvetius and Beutham has no affinity
whatever with its derivation from the impulse to self-realisation. Good-
will to our fellow-men is a means of gratifying self-love because it
awakens in them good- will to us with all its manifold consequences. But
good-will is, according to Spinoza, a satisfaction of our highest need,
not because of its external consequences, but by its intrinsic nature
as essentially bound up with the love of God. M. Worms brings into
288 NEW BOOKS.
clear light the contrast between the ethics of Spinoza and the ethics of
Kant. But he fails to see that they are essentially akin, inasmuch as
both regard the free self-realisation of reason as the highest good. This
alone made it possible for the two lines of thought to meet and blend in
post-Kantian philosophy. The mode in which this fusion took place in
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is extremely well brought out by M. Worms.
On the whole he may be congratulated on having produced a very read-
able book, and one well worth reading.
Esprit et Liberte. Par PIERRE-AUGUSTE BERTAULD, Ancien ]leve d 1'^cole
normale superieure, Professeur honoraire du Lycee Condorcet, et
Ancien Mernbre du Conseil aeademique de Paris. Paris : F. Alcan,
1892. Pp. 458.
This book follows the same general lines as the author's Etude Critique
des preuves d V Existence de Dieu. It treats of the controversy concerning
the existence of a soul, in which M. Bertauld takes the affirmative side.
But he is convinced of the utter futility of all attempts to prove abso-
lutely the thesis of Spiritualism by demonstrative argument. Accord-
ingly his work is two-edged. On the one hand, he points out the logical
flaws of the various arguments advanced by Descartes, Condillac,
Jouffroy and others. On the other hand, he tries to show that in many
cases the ideas, which form the basis of their ratiocination, have a value
and relevance independent of the validity of the arguments themselves
considered as formal demonstrations. Descartes and his successors have,
according to M. Bertauld, signalised many facts of consciousness which
point to the spiritualistic view as the most natural and probable hypo-
thesis, although they cannot place it beyond the reach of doubt. In
particular, they have shown that the most favoured alternative
hypothesis, materialism, presents insuperable difficulties. For example,
materialism is, in M. Bertauld's opinion, quite unable to explain the
moral law except by treating it as an illusion. A considerable portion
of the book is occupied in discussing the freedom of the will. The
author identifies freedom with spontaneity or autonomy, and argues
forcibly against indeterminism. His work will be found interesting and
valuable by all who do not regard the question of which it treats as
obsolete.
Les Lois Sociologiques. Par GUILLAUME DE GREEF, x Docteur agrege a la
Faculte de Droit. Lemons D'Ouverture, Ecole des Sciences
Sociales, Universite de Bruxelles. Bruxelles : Librairie Centrale
des Sciences, 1891. Pp. 63.
In this brief Dissertation Dr. Greef (already known as the author of
an Introduction d la Sociologie, and of several other works on cognate
subjects) discusses the place of Sociology among the Sciences and the
method of its study. His point of view is mainly that of Comte, but he
introduces several interesting modifications into the teaching of his
master. In the arrangement of the sciences, for instance, he is much
more prepared than Comte was to recognise a distinction between the
Trporepa rrpos fj^as and the Trpdrepa rfj (pvcrfi between the historical and
the logical order of their development. He insists, further, on a
distinction between both these orders and the educational order (Vordre
dogmatique}, which he considers to partake to some extent of the
character of both. Instruction should proceed partly along the line of
natural historical development, but should at the same time seek to
make apparent the logical connexion and subordination of studies.
NEW BOOKS. 289
While acknowledging these distinctions, however, Dr. Greef seems to
think that the only essential difference between the historical and the
logical order is that, while the latter is strictly serial, the members of
the series in the former are partly simultaneous. The actual classification
which he gives is based on that of Comte, beginning with Mathematics
and proceeding through Astronomy, Physics, and Chemistry, to the
science of life. On reaching this point, however, he introduces con-
siderable modifications. After Chemistry he places Physiology (Vege-
table and Animal), then Psychology (Physiologic psychique) including
Logic (!), then Economics, then Gtfnesique (the science of Population),
then ^Esthetics, then Croyances (Beliefs (a) religious, (6) metaphysical,
(c) positive), then Ethics, Law, Politics. He apparently regards this as
the logical arrangement ; but probably it will strike most readers as
being rather a dogmatic arrangement.
With special reference to Sociology, Dr. Greef considers that its
method of treatment ought to be strictly inductive. He believes that
experiment might be to a large extent used in sociological investigations
for instance, in dealing with the problem of the limitation of the hours
of labour. Unhappily he merely indicates this possibility, without ex-
plaining precisely how he conceives it should be done.
The last 20 pages of Dr. Greef's pamphlet are occupied with illustra-
tions of sociological laws, drawn from the various departments which he
has enumerated Economique, Genesique, &c.
The pamphlet is one of considerable interest, though of course rather
in the way of indicating the lines on which Dr. Greef is working than in
that of supplying a satisfactory discussion of any particular points.
Die Probleme im Begriff der Gesellschaft bei Auguste Comte im Gesammtzusam-
menhange seines Systems. Inaugural-Dissertation der philosophischen
Facultat zu Jena zur Erlangung der Doctorwiirde vorgelegt von
HERMANN LIETZ. Jena : G. Neuenhalm, Universitats-Buchdruckerei,
1891. Pp. 97.
This Dissertation may be taken as one of several indications of an
increasing interest in the work of Comte among German philosophers.
It consists of two parts, one expository and one critical. In the exposi-
tory part a copious and accurate analysis of Comte's sociological opinions
is set forth. But it is naturally in the critical part that the main interest
centres. Dr. Lietz begins by drawing a parallel, which seems somewhat
exaggerated, between Comte and Kant. Then he criticises Comte's
philosophy of History, chiefly on the ground that it represents history
as a more straight-forward series than it actually is. He contrasts it in
this respect with Hegel's appreciation of a dialectic movement in history.
Dr. Greef's pamphlet on Les Lois Sociologiques seems to indicate a partial
recognition, within the Positivist School itself, that Comte's arrangement
of the facts of historical development is too rigidly serial. Dr. Lietz
brings out also some evidences of one-sidedness in Comte's treatment of
history ; e.g., in his disparagement of Protestantism in comparison with
the Roman Catholic Church, without any due recognition of the element
of advance. On the other hand, on Comte's analysis of the social con-
ditions of his own time, Dr. Lietz has nothing but praise to bestow. He
thinks that social and political philosophers have still much to learn
from Comte's diagnosis of the characteristic maladies of our century.
But the piece de resistance in this pamphlet is undoubtedly to be found in
the paragraphs that follow, in which Dr. Lietz deals with the relation
of Comte's view of society to his general philosophical system. The
main point which he seeks to bring out is that Comte is an Idealist
19
290 NEW BOOKS.
against his will. Even in his treatment of the natural sciences, his
strenuous effort to see the world as a whole, his constant endeavour to
apply the esprit tfensemble, is taken as an evidence that Comte, in spite
of himself, was guided throughout by a supersensuous ideal. Dr. Lietz
considers that this idealistic element in Comte comes out still more
clearly in his view of Ethics. " Comte," he points out, " was thoroughly
anti-utilitarian, and took up the standpoint of the moral ought, of uncon-
ditioned duty. Now these conceptions are just as little consistent with
the premisses of Relativism and Positivism as is the conception of
Necessity itself, which also Comte makes use of on almost every page
of his Philosophy of History." But it is chiefly in his view of Society
that the idealistic side of Comte's philosophy comes into prominence.
Having rejected the "entities" God and Nature, he retains, nevertheless,
the great entity Humanity. What Dr. Lietz says on this point may be
profitably compared with the corresponding passages in Caird's Social
Philosophy and Religion of Comte, with which Dr. Lietz does not appear
to be acquainted. At the same time it is well brought out in this
pamphlet (p. 83) that, while Comte is Idealist enough to recognise the
unity of the social organism, the fact that he has no ideals beyond
Humanity prevents him from taking up a sufficiently critical attitude
towards the actual achievements of mankind. He is too much disposed
to " chanter les prodiges de 1'homme . . . les merveUles de sa socia-
bilite ". In this respect Dr. Lietz contrasts him with Kant and Fichte.
These and other points are excellently brought out by Dr. Lietz ; and
his Dissertation altogether, though necessarily somewhat sketchy, is of
great interest and value.
Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnis-theoretische Untersuchung aus
Descartes. Von KASIMIR TWARDOWSKI. Wien : Verlag von Carl
Konegen, 1892. Pp. 45.
This pamphlet deserves attention from students of Descartes. The
author points out that the words perception and idea are consistently
used by Descartes in different senses, perception meaning the subjective
act of apprehension, idea the immanent object of this act. He then
takes up the question : What meaning have the terms clearness and dis-
tinctness respectively, (1) as applied to perception, and (2) as applied to
ideas. A clear perception in Cartesian usage meant one in which the
object was completely apprehended in all its parts. The same predicate
applied to ideas has a different import. A clear idea is one in which is
presented the essential attribute which forms the basis and presupposi-
tion of the rest. A distinct idea is one which is perfectly separated
from, all irrelevant matter, so that nothing is presented as part of its
content which does not really form part of its content. The distinct-
ness of a perception is constituted by the distinctness of the idea which
is its object.
In the Cartesian epistemology clear and distinct ideas do not play
the same part as clear and distinct perceptions. Both help to determine
the validity of judgments. But a clear and distinct idea is only a
condition of the possibility of a valid judgment, whereas the clear and
distinct perception is the immediate cause of it. The pamphlet closes
with a good collection of relevant passages from Descartes. M. Twar-
dowski's results are perhaps stated without sufficient reserve and cir-
cumspection. But he is undoubtedly right in thinking that such work
as his is adapted to throw light on the interpretation of the Cartesian
theory of knowledge.
Kleine Schriften. Von HERMANN LOTZE. Dritter Band. Leipzig : S.
Hirzel, 1891. Pp. Ixx., 960.
NEW BOOKS. 291
This third volume, issued in two parts each as large as either of the
earlier volumes, completes the collective edition of Lotze's scattered
philosophical writings, to which his disciple, Dr. D. Peipers, has been
devoting extraordinary care for some years past. The editorial cha-
racteristics that distinguished the two earlier volumes (1885-6) are even
more strongly marked in the present one. In his anxiety to fix the
writings in pure Lotzian form, Dr. Peipers has made elaborate recension
of the original MSS. and of the author's corrected proofs whenever
obtainable, and he notes, even to the minutest particulars of spelling,
punctuation, &c., the changes he has felt bound to make upon the
previous impression (in this or that periodical) of the different pieces.
Such scrupulosity of restoration he thinks none too great in the case of
a writer of Lotze's classical importance. "Whether with the restoration
there need have been all that detailed specification of it, may be doubted ;
but none can quarrel with the editorial piety that has provided an index
of nearly 400 pages to a collection of writings so varied in character and
subject. An index can never be too detailed, if the right man can be
found to make it. Dr. Peipers has here done all that one man can to
stem the reproach upon German scholarship of launching huge reper-
tories of fact or opinion without clue to their use. The pieces now re-
produced run from 1852 to 1880, just before Lotze's unexpected death in
1881. They include reviews of books, mostly from Gott. gel. Anzeigen,
with the preliminary announcements that he made there of his own
works, and also two or three independent essays. The article on
"Philosophy in the last Forty Years," contributed in 1880 to The Con-
temporary Review, first as it was to be of a series never there carried
further, is, in default of the original, here reproduced in its translated
English form. In all probability, as Dr. Peipers by detailed argument
seeks to establish, it was meant to be followed by the paper which,
under the title "Die Principien der Ethik," saw the light, after Lotze's
death, in a German periodical. This paper (not, by the way, of much
importance) is here given in Appendix, because not published by Lotze
himself ; and is followed by a fragment on Goethe (pp. 542-51) also
found among his remains, giving utterance to an old man's altered feeling
and judgment with regard to the poetic idol of his youth. There are given,
besides, two unpublished pieces from early Leipsic days : one in French
(a la Leibniz), "Pensees d'un Idiote sur Descartes, Spinoza et Leibniz "
(pp. 551-66), apparently written after he had finished his original Meta-
physik (1841); the other, a fragment " Geographische Phantasien" (pp.
567-75), seeking to explain the secret of men's attachment to their place
of birth and early home. It is impossible, with such a varied collection, to
do more than give this external indication of contents. But an expression
of warm thanks is due for all that Dr. Peipers, and previously Prof.
Eehnisch (editor of the Dictate), have done to complete the presentation
of the life-work of the most remarkable of German philosophic thinkers
in the second half of this century.
Geschichte der Philosophic. Von Dr. "W. WINDELBAND, Professor an der
Universitat Strassburg. Vierte Lieferung. Freiburg i. B. : J. C. B.
Mohr, 1891. Pp. 385-516.
This is the final instalment of the novel survey of history of philosophy
to which Prof. "VVindelband has been committed since 1890 (see MIND xv.
430, xvi. 295, 550). A novel survey, both because he had already worked
over great part of the field (in Gesch. d. neueren Phil , 1878-80 ; Grwndr. <l.
dtienPhil., 1888), and because his plan here is to signalise the various
questions that in each successive period exercised the philosophic mind
and to set out the answers given to them, rather than to deal with the
succession of individual thinkers. The present instalment, after com-
292 NEW BOOKS.
pleting the account of the " Philosophy of the Aufkliirung" is mainly
occupied (pp. 417-90) with "German Philosophy". A dozen pages or so
are then added, at the end, upon "Nineteenth Century Philosophy," mean-
ing all thought that is not to be connected directly with the Kantian move-
ment held to have run out in (the aged) Schelling and in Schopenhauer.
Prof. Windelband is not at his best in these concluding pages. The
reason may partly be that he is reserving himself for an extended treat-
ment of the manifold thinking of the present century, to be appended as
third volume to his Gescli. d. n. Phil.; but if he is there going only to fill in
the rough outline now given, some reconsideration of it seems desirable.
Though it is true, as he says, that the century shows no other supreme
philosophical achievement after Hegel's, it is hardly an adequate repre-
sentation of its varied strivings to mark but two questions of " Conflict
about the Soul " and Nature and History ". Nor is this latter question
satisfactorily formulated when "historical" consideration is opposed as
philosophically rational to " natural-scientific ". Prof. Windelband has,
of course, a meaning of his own with this opposition, but, when a place
has to be found under his " History " for the scientific evolutionism of
the period, the antithesis surely loses all point. And it must be added
that his notions as to representative thinkers within the century are
sometimes rather curious. Thus, as regards this country, one is sur-
prised to find T. Belsham, J. Fearn, G. Combe, S. Baley (sic) and H.
Martineau put forward, with Brown, the Mills and Bain, for Association-
psychology ; or to be referred to G. Cogan, with J. Austin and Corne-
wall Lewis, for Utilitarianism ; or under the Scottish school to come upon
the names of S. (sic) Morell and H. Wedgwood. But to dwell longer
on these or other such instances of foreigner's misapprehension
would give an altogether wrong impression of the value of Prof.
Windelband's present handling. His small-type references through-
out the book are, for the most part, as good as they are full ; and his
exposition, within the lines set himself, is in general masterly. The
manner of treatment, by prominent questions, is indeed not always
equally effective or even applicable. It is more suitable for extended
periods, like the pre-Platonic or the Scholastic, where a large number of
more or less like-minded thinkers have to be brought together, than for
times dominated by the personality of this or that philosophic hero.
Accordingly, it is not always adhered to with uniform strictness. But
of the book as a whole, it is safe to say that no other recent compendium
shows the same amount of grasp and insight. And a gust of freshness
blows all through it. If a really competent translator (who could also
make the desirable additions or corrections in the matter of references)
would take it in hand, he would do a real service to the English student,
still left dependent upon foreign guidance (that has any value) over the
historic field of thought.
Einleitung in Die ^Esthetik. Von KARL GROOS, Privatdocent der Philo-
sophic an der Universitat Giessen. Eickersche Buchandlung,
1892. Pp. 409.
The distinguishing feature of this work is the attempt to give a de-
scription, if not an elucidation, of the ^Esthetic Consciousness from a
purely psychological standpoint. The first of the three parts into which
it is divided is devoted to the consideration of the nature of the material
upon which the aesthetic judgment operates, and the region of Conscious-
ness to which this operation is restricted. In Part II. the distinctive
character of the object of aesthetic contemplation is determined. These
three momenta constitute a systematic exposition of the aesthetic doctrine
favoured by Dr. Groos, of which the following is a brief summary. The
object of the aesthetic consciousness is a construction of the productive
NEW BOOKS.
imagination (der asthetische Schein). In this purely mental image
only the internal or intensive relations of its constituent manifold are
envisaged, and these are the only relations by which the aesthetic con-
sciousness is engrossed. To a botanist a flower is interesting as belong-
ing to a certain class, to a florist as having a certain market value, but
a poet only sees the symmetry and harmony of its colour and contour.
Dr. Groos treats in great detail a chief characteristic of the aesthetic
cognition, termed by him die innere Nachahmung. The aesthetic con-
templation of the object in imagination is an activity (Thatigkeit], and
this activity consists in the internal or mental imitation of the object
externally presented. Now, continues Dr. Groos, this process of internal
imitation is the very centre and kernel of aesthetic enjoyment. When
the eye traces the outline of a form, or the ear follows the magic modula-
tions of a melody, there is always an internal imitation of the external
stimulus, and by this act of imitating the aesthetic image is constructed.
But again we have to ask, What there is distinctive in the act of aesthetic
imitation ? To this our author replies (p. 94), following Siebeck, every
object viewed aesthetically presents itself as personified. Now whence
comes this Personification ? In dealing with this question Dr. Groos seems
to quit the comparatively firm ground of psychological analysis, and
ventures on the treacherous quicksands of mystical speculation.
In the Third Part of his treatise Dr. Groos applies the theory previously
established to the analysis and explanation of some of the most salient
modifications of the aesthetic consciousness : (1) The Beautiful, (2) The
Repulsive, (8) The Sublime, (4) The Tragic, (5) The Comic. In discus-
sing these various aspects of aesthetic representation, Dr. Groos touches
upon many questions of supreme interest to the student of the fine arts.
One of these especially has given rise to much controversy ; viz., How
far and in what way the repulsive and unpleasant lends itself to inde-
pendent aesthetic treatment. Dr. Groos defines das Hdssliche as that
which is repulsive to sense in an tfisthetic image, (das sinnlich Unan-
yenehme im dsthetischen Schein} (p. 283). From this definition it ^is
difficult to see how the deformed and repulsive can ever furnish material
for absolute aesthetic construction. The soundest doctrine seems to be
that the function of the hideous in art is to enhance the effect of the
beautiful. Our author will not go to the extreme of maintaining "le beau
c'est le laid," but holds that the aesthetic field has been very much
widenened since "le vrai le beau, et le bien '' have ceased to be identified.
For our part we regard the discords of Wagner, the unwholesome situa-
tions of Ibsen, and the pure filth of Zola as equally aesthetic paradoxes.
Die Lehre Hegels vom Wesen der Erfahrung und ihre .Bedeutung fur das
Erkennen. Von Dr. GEORGE KENT, Pastor an der Johanneskirche in
Christiania. Christiania : Jacob Dybwad, 1891. Pp. 80.
In June, 1881, the Berlin Philosophical Society proposed as a theme
for a prize essay : " A Critical and Historical Account of the Dialectic
Method of Hegel ". Pastor Kent heard of this at so late a date that it was
impossible for him to compete. The subject interested him, however,
and he accordingly wrote the present essay. He declares, at the outset,
that " it is written by a man whose professional work leaves him little
time for philosophical production, but by one who is a decided Hegelian".
The essay is divided into five sections : (1) Hegel's Theory of Know-
ledge ; (2) Hegel's Notion (Begriff) of Experience ; (3) Hegel's Teaching
concerning the meaning of Experience ; (4) Experience and the Hegelian
Method ; (5) The Significance of Hegel's Philosophy. Of these the first
and third form more than three-fourths of the whole. Dr. Kent thinks
that the abstract formalism so often charged upon the Hegelian method
294 NEW BOOKS.
receives little warrant from Hegel himself, but is due to the erroneous
interpretation of disciples, especially of the Left. This he proposes to
prove. The essay is little more than a reiteration of familiar doctrines,
though the prominence accorded to the problem of perception is unusual.
The Encydopddie is regarded as superior to the Phanomenologiethe
theory of knowledge stands out more by itself. By collating selected
passages an account of Hegel's doctrine of perception is given at some
length. This is developed after the orthodox dialectic manner. " The
transition from ' perception ' to ' experience ' takes place when the
actuality of the universal is determined." In the course of his dis-
cussion Dr. Kent animadverts on the empirical or inductive view as
represented by Mill and Jevons. It affords only an abstract account of
knowledge. Hegel transcends and includes this in his discovery of
difference amid identity of the subject and object. Zeller's middle
course between Hegel and the empiricists is condemned as unnecessary ;
Hegel's position is practically the same, and is much more clearly
explained. Dr. Kent admits, nevertheless, that, with the assistance of
modern realistic knowledge, Hegelianism might be largely supplemented
and readjusted, though without alteration of its fundamental tenets.
As a whole, the essay shows considerable familiarity with Hegel's works.
Its chief defects lie in a lack of expository power, and in a want of
appreciation of more recent results of psychology.
RECEIVED also :
W. James, Text Book of Psychology. London : Macmillan & Co. 1892.
Pp. xiii., 478.
J. Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. Boston & New York.
Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1892. Pp. xv., 519.
Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science. London : Walter Scott. 1892.
Pp. xvi., 493.
C.. Secretan, La Civilisation et la Croyance. 2 e edition. Paris : F.
Alcan. 1892. Pp. 396.
E. de Hoberty, Agnosticisme. Paris : F. Alcan. 1892. Pp. 164.
Ch. Renouvier, Principes de la Nature. 2 e edition. Paris : F. Alcan.
1892. 2 Vol. Pp. 299, 407.
G. Rodier, La Physique de Straton de Lampsaque. Paris : F. Alcan.
1891. Pp. 133.
J. Jaures, De la Realite du Monde sensible. Paris : F. Alcan. 1891. Pp.
370.
L. Arreat, Psychologie du Peintre. Paris : F. Alcan. 1892 . Pp. 264.
H. Schwarz, Das Wahrnehmungsproblem. Leipzig : Duncker & Humblot.
1892. Pp. 408.
R. Avenarius, Der menschliche Welibegriff. Leipzig : Reisland. 1892.
Pp. 95.
F. Raab, Wesen und Systematik der Schlussformen. Wien : C. Konegen.
1891. Pp. 52.
E. G. Husserl, Philosophie der Arithmetik. Bd. 1. Halle : C. E. M.
Pfeffer (R. Strieker). 1891. Pp. 324.
E. Dillmann, Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen Monadenlehre. Leip-
zig : Reisland. Pp. x., 525.
Avv. Enrico Piccione, Le leggi biologiche et le leggi giuridiche in rapporto
alia questione sociale. Roma : Forzani. 1892. Pp. 108.
N. R. D'Alfonso, Lezioni elementari di psicologia normale. Milano Roma :
E. Trevisini. 1891. Pp. 148.
VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
THK I'HiLosoi'iii.-.vL UKVIKW. \'.>1. i., No. 1. Prof. .1. WaUon Th*
// I'liilus.ifJiii ami I.lili.in. [l-'.\|>ounds and enforces the system
of idealism edueed from Kant l>y Caird imd-r tin- guidance of Hegel
This article is marked by the lucidity and acumen h.u i t. ri ,tio of
uithor.] Prof. G. T. Ladd Psychology as so-called "Nu-
Seience". [It is pointed out that the real value of Prof. James' great
work lies in its purely psychological matter, not in coed-
ingly thin and dubious diagrammatic representations of brain-pro-
s occasionally interjected into the discussion of psychological
phenomena". Prof. Ladd's criticism seems to us to be just and
effective.] Benj. Ives ( lilman On some Psychological Aspects of
Chinese Musical System. [A careful account of Chinese in
" l>a<ed upon observations of performances by native mu-ician^ ". 1 !;-
\ i. us of books, including a Notice of Spencer's Justice by the Editor.
Summaries of Articles.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. iv., No. 2. Prof. Jastrow
contributes a very interesting series of " Studies from the laboratory
of experimental psychology of the University of Wisconsin'.
What he calls "a novel optical illusion" is worth attention. It was
found that if before a rotating disc composed of a large sector of one
colour and a small sector of another, the two differing considerably in
shade, a rod, held horizontally, be passed up and down, the whole disc
seems broken up by horizontal parallel bands of a colour similar to that
present in greater proportion. If the disc be composed of three or more
colours the bands appear composed of several colours, and this holds
even when there is a perfect fusion of the segmental colours with the
disc rotating at a high rate of speed. By changing the conditions of
the experiment it was found that the bands originated probably " dur-
ing the vision of the minority colour," and Prof. Jastrow puts them down
as due to the persistence of after images. Dr. E. C. Sanford continues
his admirable ''Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology," treat-
ing in this number of taste, smell, and hearing. The further observa-
tions on the brain of Laura Bridgman are described at some length by
Prof. Donaldson, who also, in connexion with J. L. Bolton, contributes
a paper on the size of the cranial nerves in man.
In the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS (Jan., 1892) Brother Azarias
writes on ' The Ethical aspects of the Papal Encyclical,' and the Rev. J.
Macbride Sterrett gives a well written account of the * Ethics of Hegel '.
Mr. J. S. Mackenzie prints the first part of a lecture on " The Three
Religions " : perhaps a more significant title would have been " Religion
and Two Half-religions," since his main point is that " while the Agnostic
Religion is nothing else than worship of the unknown, and the Religion
of humanity is in its essence nothing else than the worship of the moral
power in man," true religion and popular Christianity is its essence is
the faith that there is no real separation of power from goodness. Mrs.
Hertz contributes an enthusiastic review of Frail von Suttner's novel,
" Die Watfen nieder ! " (1891), which is described as " the most forcible
protest ever uttered against the stupendous evils, the egregious madness,
of war " all the more remarkable as written by a German. Professor
H. Nettleship writes judiciously, but without remarkable originality, on
" Authority in the sphere of conduct and intellect ". In the " Discussions"
Mr. James Seth urges familiar arguments in favour of the retributive
theory of punishment, in reply to the papers by Mr. Kashdall and Dr.
Tonnies ; but as he takes the latter's paper as " representative of the de-
296 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
mand for the substitution of the ' deterrent ' and ' reformative ' theories,"
lie can hardly be supposed to have read it ; since it was a main aim of
Dr. Tonnies to bring home to his readers the failure of actual legal
punishments either to deter or to reform, and the necessity of admitting
and acting on this failure.
In the PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHYSICAL RESEARCH (Partxx.)
the most important article is one on " The Subliminal Consciousness,"
by Mr. F. W. H. Myers, in which a comprehensive hypothesis is offered to
explain the recognised phenomena of automatic writing, alternations of
personality, and the hypnotic trance, as well as the more disputed tele-
pathy. Hypnotic experiments have familiarised the world with the fact
that gaps in a man's ordinary chain of memory, such as sleep and trance,
may be filled by psychical activities having a secondary chain of
memory of their own, which is in a sense more comprehensive than
the primary ; since the fully hypnotised subject as a rule remembers
waking life in the hypnotic trance, but not vice versa. It is further
established that the consciousness or cerebration belonging to the
hypnotic state can exercise over the nervous, vasomotor and circulatory
systems a degree of control unparalleled in waking life ; of which Mr. Myers
gives some striking instances, recorded by careful experimenters. To
explain these and cognate facts, Mr. Myers supposes that beyond the
habitual consciousness of any individual there exists a range of conscious
action of unknown extent " forming some part of his total individuality,"
and " included in an actual or potential memory below the threshold of
his habitual consciousness ". This "subliminal consciousness" maybe
supposed to include the psychical counterparts of organic processes be-
yond the control of ordinary volition ; and Mr. Myers would also refer
to it telepathic impressions, which he supposes to be received by " aid
of adits and operations peculiar to the subliminal self". Such "sub-
liminal" psychical activity influences the ordinary or " supraliminal " in
various ways and degrees ; sometimes injuriously, as when its disorders
are manifested in hysteria and self-suggested maladies ; sometimes bene-
ficially, as when the hypnotic trance is therapeutically used.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. 16 e annee, No. 12. L. Dauriac Un probleme
d'acoustique psychologique. [An interesting exposition and criticism of
Stumpf ' s theory of simultaneous fusion. This theory is said to be based
on two postulates : (1) That attention, adding nothing to the content of
consciousness, merely discriminates its constituent parts. (2) That the
range of psychical reality is wider than the field accessible to introspec-
tion. These assumptions are contested by M. Dauriac.] M. Fouillee
Les origines de notre structure intellectuelle et cerebrale. II. L'evolu-
tionnisme. [" The forms of our thought are nothing but the essential
functions of our primitive and normal volition, to which correspond the
essential functions of our physiological life." The principles of identity
and sufficient reason are treated from this point of view in an in-
teresting and so far as concerns Psychology in a convincing manner.]
G. Se'ailles Leonard de Vinci artiste et savant. [An interesting study
of the harmonious fusion of artistic and scientific genius.] J. Passy
Sur les dessins d'enfaiits. [A record of observations possessing both
educational and psychological value.] A. Binet Sur un cas d'inhibition
psychique. [We fail to catch the true expression of a feature when it is
out of keeping with that of the rest of the face. Figures are given in
illustration.] Analyses et comptes rendus, etc.
17 e annee, No. 1. C. H. Dunan Le probleme de la vie. [Organisa-
tion must be regarded as belonging to the world as a whole, not merely
to particular organisms. Universal organisation cannot be explained as
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODIC.* I 297
a product either i if mechanical or of final causes, or m Lined.]
B. Perez La maladie du pessimism. .1 M
espagnols de Cuba: F. Varela, J. de la Lux. [An int. r :.!,.]
looret Lc probleine d'Achille. Analyses et Conipt-
17* annee, No. 2. A. Binet Les uiou\ ;. manege chez let
: s. (The rotatory movements produced in ha n of
tln-ir ganglia are involuntary. They are primarily du.- to tin-" 1-^ on one
side bring more strongly innervated than those on the ,>th,-r, ;md
secondarily to the physiological associations through which all the legs
co-operate in executing the movement, when it is once begun.] <
Dnnan Le probleme de la vie. [The unity of universal organisation is
simple and indivisible like that of universal space and time. The only
admissible conception of it is that of a metaphsical (i.e. hyperphysical)
reality, one in its essence, but evolving itself in time and apace n
the form of an endless multiplicity of movements. Its real unity in the
ground of the formal unity of time and space, and of their connexion
with each other.] J. M. Guardia Philosophes espagnols de (
Belot Justice et socialisme, d'apres les publicati< bet [Includes
a criticism of Spencer's Justice.] Notices bibliographiquefl, etc.
ITSCHRIFT F. PsYCHOLOGIE U. PHYSIOLOGIE D. SlNNESOROAKE.
iii., Heft 1. H. v. Heknholtz Versuch, das psychophysische Gesetz auf
die 1'arhenunterschiede trichromatischer Augen anzuwenden. [A con-
tinuation of the article "Versuch einer erweiterten Anwendung des
Fechnerschen Gesetzes im Farbensystem " in Bd. ii. of the Zeitschrift.
r lli most important points are: (1) The new determination of the three
ground-colours as carmine-red, ultramarine-blue, and yellowish green
n of vegetation). The red end of the spectrum is, therefore, no
longer the starting-point for the Young-Helmholtz theory of colour-
vision. (2) The referring of the perception of colour-differences to a
more original perception of differences of brightness (Hettigktit).] R.
Greeff Untersuchungen liber binokulares Sehen mit Anwendung des
H( lin^schen Fallversuchs. The judgment of distance may depend
tially upon the perspective retinal images of binocular vision
(\Yheatstone, Hering), or upon the muscular movements of the eye
(liriicke). In Bering's FaUversiirJi, the reagent judges whether a ball
falls on the near or far side of the fixation-point, under conditions which
are meant to exclude the possibility of such movements. Dr. Greeff im-
proved the apparatus, to meet the objections of Donders ; and obtained
the following results. (1) The perception of distance is the same when
the visual axes are converged, parallel or divergent : in the latter case,
provided that the double images are still to be combined. (Noteworthy
for the psychology of sensation is the correction of sensation by theoreti-
cal reflexion, p. 33.) Monocular results were correct in 50 p. c. of the
experiments ; as probability would lead one to expect, on Bering's
theory. (2) The Fallversuch gives valid results for greater distances,
where convergence and accommodation do not come into consideration,
provided that the balls are clearly to be seen, and that the distance be-
tween the balls which fall before and behind the fixation-point is large
enough in relation to the remoteness of this point from the eye of the
observer. This relation is definite. Dr. Greeff also experimented upon
binocular vision with monocular reduction of clearness of sight; and
upon binocular vision in cases of squinting.] A. Pick Brmcrkungen zu
dem Aufsatze von Dr. Sommer, " /ur I'sychologie der Sprache ". [In
Bd. ii. Dr. Sommer described a patient who was unable to give the name
of objects presented to him, till he had written them down. It was
proved that the objects did not call up the ideas of their names either
293 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
as heard or seen ; but simply the movements necessary for the writing
of the names. Dr. Sommer asks : What is the connexion between sight
of an object in this case and the graphic movements ? And are there
known physiological or pathological cases in which memory-ideas can
be called up by movements, and in which amnesia results, if the move-
ments are prevented ? Prof. Pick in answer calls attention to the re-
searches of Charcot, Binet and Ballet. It is certain (1) that for many
normal persons the memory-ideas of words consist of ideas of the move-
ments necessary for writing them down ; (2) that in certain pathological
cases words must be written before they can be pronounced ; and (3)
that in all cases where the original constituents of the word-ideas have
been lost by disease a suppleance fonctionelle occurs : other constituents
take their place in consciousness, graphic the place of auditory, e.g.
This was the state of Dr. Sommer's patient. As regards the first question,
Prof. Pick concludes that ideas of graphic movements formed the connect-
ing-link between the sight of the objects and the movements themselves.]
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Bd. v., Heft 2. E. Zeller
Plato's Mittheilungen liber friihere u. gleichzeitige Philosophen. [A
consideration of the different ways in which Plato, by the dramatic form
of his dialogues, is led to take account of his philosophical precursors
and contemporaries. Most of the author's points had previously been
made in the course of his History, but the subject is one that lends itself
with advantage to the present mode of special treatment. Chief interest
attaches, perhaps, to the Protagorean references, here set out at some
length. Noteworthy also is the attempt to connect Antisthenes with
more than, one of the positions successively stated and refuted in the
TJiecetetus ; but how conjectural such attempt is, appears on comparison
with the very different, yet not less confident, surmises of Dr. H. Jackson.
The only point not doubtful and this is well brought out by the vener-
able historian at the close of his article is the wealth of allusion to
contemporaries which lies locked up in Plato's artful exposition.
A. Doring Der Begriff der Dialektik in den Memorabilien. [Shows
that the Xenophontic Socrates understands SiaAe'yeii/, now in a
stricter sense of conceptual determination, and now in a wider
sense of general argumentation.] A. Gercke Ariston. [A careful
discrimination, in respect of their writings and relations to other
thinkers, between the Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos and the Stoic Ariston
of Chios, who from the first were more or less confounded by the ancient
authorities.] P. Tannery Deux nouvelles lettres inedites de Descartes
a Mersenne. [One of them very forcibly confirms what was known al-
ready of Descartes' disgust, in 1646, with the Fundamenta Physices of his
whilom ardent admirer Eegius.] Jahresberichte.
VlERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FUR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Bd. xvi.,
Heft 1. A. Eiehl Beitrage zur Logik, I. [Discusses the nature of
concepts and of judgment. The logical predicate is always either
actuality (i.e., reality for sense) or objectivity (i.e., reality consisting in a
necessity imposed on thought by its objects). This distinction is made
the basis of a division of judgments into two classes. Eiehl thinks that
his view of judgment has most affinity with that of Bradley, although he
inverts B.'s use of the terms, subject and predicate.] Ad. Nitsche
Die Dirnensionen der Wahrscheinlicheit und die Evidenz der Un-
gewissheit. F. Eosenberger Ueber die fortschreitende Entwicklung
des Menschengeschlechts. (Schluss.) B. Seligkowitz Ernst Platners
M issenschaf tliche Stellung zu Kant. I. A. Marty Ueber Sprach reflex,
Nativismus urid absichtliche Sprachbildung.
Some Notices have been unavoidably crowded out.
IX. NOTES.
CONTRIBUTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OP VISUAL DREAMS.
While investigating the general subject of dream-lif< I ha\o become
particularly interested in the influence of the Kiy>-nlicht ot the retina
upon visual dreams. Observations to establish thisinllurnce are, of course,
not iK'\v ; and some writers have perhaps !> 'o set upon it a
sufficiently high estimate. More or less extended and fruitful remarks
are, therefore, to be found in the works of Johannes Miiller (Plianfastiach*
'.irmchrinniuj'-n, lH2(i), (iruithuiscn ( . 1 ntltro/xn',.,/!, , IslO, und tteitriige
i'ltyxiniinosit' nn,l Htautognosie, 181'2), Purkinje' (Beobachtungen *nd
Versncl,. nir rhysiologie der Xinn- . L828 26 . Maury (Le Sommcil et U
, *), Kadestock (Schlaf und Traum, 1879), Wnndt /< der
Pltimiiilutiie), and others. In particular have Von Graefe and Siebeck re-
niarkt-d upon the effects of diseased and over-excited conditions of the
t phosphenes," ^c., in inducing visual phantasms.
Of all these writers the observations of Miiller and Maury, conducted
upon themselves, most resemble my own. It will serve my present put -
highly illumined and coloured images. From his earliest youth he re-
members having noticed these phenomena, and always well knew how to
distinguish them and their rapidly changing forms and movements from
the peculiar images of dream-life. They rarely take the shape of recog-
nisable realities, but customarily form fantastic figures of men, animals,
and what not, such as he never saw before. " I often follow these ap-
peorances,"says he, " for a half-hour, until they finally pass over into
the dream-images of sleep."
In another place (p. 49) Muller declares that certain dream-images
nothing else than the luminous phantasms which appear in the
\ isnal substance, before going to sleep, when our eyes are closed ". The
origin of these phantasms he refers to intra-organic stimulation, especi-
ally in connexion with changes in the blood-supply of the organ.
Maury treats of his experiences of this sort under the head of " hal-
lucinations hypnagogiques ". He affirms (p. 79) that he has " often
established the passing-over of a luminous image, due apparently to the
excitement of the optic nerve, into a clearly denned figure whose forma-
tion it was possible to follow ". It would seem, then, that the confidence
of both Muller and Maury in the theory that "the stuff" of certain
dreams or the material made into many of their visual dream-images,
originates in the scheme marked out in the " retinal phantasms
chance variations in the blood-supply, was chiefly based upon their
ability to follow the retinal phantasms up to, or into, the visual halluci-
nations of dream-life. Now my method of experimenting with in
has been the exact opposite of this. It has, I believe, enabled me to
establish several interesting points of importance not only for the e
theory of visual dreams but also for a better understanding of \\aking
states of perception and of the psycho-physical mechanism employed in
the production of such states. Some of these points will be uiven here,
as established to my satisfaction in my own case. Further evidence and
criticism ore invited before confidence can be established in their validity
in all e
300 NOTES.
But, first of all, let me briefly describe the method of my very simple
experiments. To appreciate them it must be remarked that the retinas
of my eyes are probably somewhat unusually sensitive to excitement
from intra- organic and cerebral stimulation. I have found by inquiry
that a large proportion of persons unaccustomed to observe themselves for
purposes of scientific discovery are entirely unacquainted with the pheno-
mena of retinal Eigenlicht. Ask them what they customarily see when
their eyes are closed in a dark room and they will reply that they see
nothing. Ask them to observe more carefully and describe what they
see, and they will probably speak of a black mass or wall before their
eyes, with a great multitude of yellow spots dancing about on its surface.
Some few will finally come to a recognition of the experience with which
I have long been familiar in my own case. By far the purest, most
briMiant, and most beautiful colours I have ever seen, and the most
astonishing artistic combinations of such colours, have appeared with
closed eyes in a dark room. I have never been subject to waking visual
hallucinations, but I verily believe there is no shape known to me by
perception or by fancy, whether of things on the earth or above the
earth or in the waters, that has not been schematically represented by
the changing retinal images under the influence of intra-organic stimu-
lation. And as Miiller, Maury and others have noticed, any form of
unusual cerebral excitement is conducive to very lively activity among
the retinal phantasms.
Equipped, then, with the instrument of such a psycho-physical
mechanism for the production of visual images, I have been accustomed
to experiment in the following way. I " set " this mechanism so that
it will dip down into sleep and dream-life, with a gradual curvature, as
it were, and then come out of dream-life in an instant ; i.e., by a steep
curve. When I wake in this way, I am ready to do two things pretty
nearly simultaneously namely, to retain in mind the visual images of
the dream from which I am awaking, and also without opening my eyes
(which would, of course, spoil the experiment) to note in terms of
objective waking consciousness the schematic phantasms which are
fading from the retina. Thus a comparison between the phantasm, as
objectively observed and localised in the retinal field, and the visual
images of the dream, as detained and remembered for a brief time,
becomes possible. To set the psycho-physical mechanism of sleep so
that it shall run down, and I awake within from two to five minutes after
falling asleep is much easier for me than to set it so as to wake at any
given hour in the early morning. Indeed, the latter I find it difficult or
impossible to do with much approach to accuracy. I am therefore
inclined to think that with a little effort and practice many will find
themselves able to perform upon themselves my simple experiments.
It will be observed that the method I have employed, when it is
successful, actually catches the retinal schemata as they are vanishing
from the retinal field, and then compares them with the visual dream-
images which they have already produced. The method employed by
Maury watches these schemata as they are engaged in the process of
producing visual dream-images. I arrest the impish phantasms before
they can can get off the stage of my dream. I see clearly what they
have been doing. Maury arrests them rather while they are coming
upon this stage, and endeavours to catch them in the act of beginning
their dramatic transformations. It seems to me that my method is
perferable ; especially since, when it succeeds, it conducts the crucial
part of the experiment under the eye of a clear objective waking con-
sciousness.
NOTES. 301
By this method of experiment, then. I have established as good in my
n oaae, the foBowing oooehudoni,
1. Tin- visual ' :u:i \ th >su dreams which occur soon after falling
asleep is largely, if not wholly, due to excit .ntra-
::!. >tiniiil;itii)n. These - :. are that
dist ingui>hed from those which occur under ordinary circumstances in
the morning hours. The latter are oftener due to external ^timul.uion
i.e., to the rays of light penetrating to the retina through the dosed eye-
lids. Hut inasmuch us the sle*p "f many persons during several boors
of the n ight is a succession of naps interrupted ly m< .re , ,r less partial
awakening, both the retina and the visual centres of the hr.iin may
prove sources of origin for visual dreams. Those visual dreams ho\v-
, which follow almost immediately on going to sleep in a dark room
originate, wholly or chietly, in the AY/. ////. // of th-
action of the retina (and hence the variety and rapid movement and
wonderful transformation of the retinal schemata) diminishes rapidly
with the duration of sleep. The dreams into whieh the retinal phan-
tasms have woven themselves are forgotten beyond recovery before
tin- morning hours. Hence the visual dream-images which are re-
membered on awaking, will IK- more likely to be derived from external
stimulation.
At the same time it must be remembered that, while the threshold of
consciousness rises rapidly, as respects susceptibility to external stimuli,
during the first hour or two of sleep, the relative sensitiveness of the soul
to all intra-organic changes is greatly increased, This fact gives an
enormous influence to the more feeble and slow activities of the retina,
some time after sleep has begun. And, as has already been in-
dicated, partial or complete awaking, if caused or followed by increased
cerebral excitement, will have a tendency to renew the sensitiveness and
more active condition of the retinal field.
-2. Probably few or none, of the visual images of our dream-life are
deprived of all accompaniment and support from an excited retina. But
since the ordinary conditions of normal sleep are such as both to
diminish the intensity of the surrounding light and also to lower the
sensitiveness of the organ of vision to the action of li^'ht, the relative
importance of intra-organic excitement of the retina for all visual dream-
ing, becomes at once apparent. There is probably little such dreaming
that is wholly independent of the arrangements which light and
, dots, lines, etc., in the retinal field, assume under the c ha;
vital conditions of this part of the visual organism. Almost without
exception, when I am able to recall the visual images of my dream and
to observe the character of the retinal field quickly mough to compare
the two, the schemata of the luminous and coloured retinal phantasms
afford the undoubted clue to the origin of the things just s-.-u in m\
dream-life. This is emphatically true whenever the imagery of the
dream is purely imaginative rather than accompanied by memory and
recognition.
It seems to me impossible, then, to make a hard and fast distinction
between visual perception and visual imagination in dream-life so far as
the origin of their sense-elements is concerned. The end-orga
vision is actively engaged in furnishing certain elements of the visual
images, from whichever point of view their combination is to be re-
garded. In saying this, however, I by no means intend to depreciate
the part played in the drama by the psycho-physical a
the central organs. It is to occult processes which go on within the
cerebrum that we must look for the physiological antecedents of the
302 NOTES.
elaborated, associated, meaningful and memorable character of the
visual shapes of our dreams. The data of sense to be discovered in the
retinal field, when considered with a cool, scientific, and objective con-
sciousness, are thin, pale and almost senseless schemata. They are like
the few strokes and dots which my friend, the " chalk-talk " artist,
dashes upon the black-board with his white and coloured crayons. The
draughtsman puts these data upon the black-board ; the retinal activity
copies their outlines ; but it is only on the basis of complicated psycho-
physical activities lying further back and above in the brain that we see
the things which we are invited to see.
What I am inclined to believe, however, is this that, in dreams as
well in all waking perception we neither see nor imagine aught without
participation of the retinal changes in the complex psycho-physica]
process. And if this is so, we are enabled to understand how visual
images in dreams may furnish all the necessary elements of that ob-
jectivity which things seen in dreams certainly possess.
3. The most elaborate visual dreams may originate in intra-organic
retinal excitement. Perhaps a harder problem could not be given to my
experiments to solve than the following : How can one be made by such
excitement to see a printed page of words clearly spread out before one
in a dream ? How can so orderly a visual phenomenon owe its origin
to chance arrangements of the "retinal dust"? But I have several
times verily caught my dreaming automaton in the feat of having just
performed this transformation. On waking from a dream, in which I
had distinctly seen lines of printed letters forming words and sentences
and had been engaged in reading these lines by sight, I have clearly
detected the character of that retinal field which had originated such
an extraordinary hallucination. The minute light and dark spots which
the activity of the rods and cones occasions, had arranged themselves in
parallel lines extending across the retinal field. In other words, the
clearly printed page which I was reading in my dream faded away into
an object tjiat appeared to my waking consciousness like a section of an
actual page of print when seen through an oval hole in a piece of paper
at too great a distance to distinguish more than an occasional fragment
of a word, and even that dimly.
If the superior psycho-physical mechanism of vision can in dream-
life seize upon what is really nothing but rows of meaningless blackish
spots upon the retina and can convert them into imagined pages
of print which may be read with great satisfaction off-hand in a dream,
what is it not capable of achieving ? That it ean cut all manner oi
capers in hermeneutics I know by abundant experience. And the
variety of material in the shape of dots, dashes, splashes, lines and
angles which are furnished by the retinal Eigenlicht is infinite. Some
one has declared that the secret of the painter's art is to represent every-
thing with two strokes and a dot. Whether this be so, or not, in the
finished product of art, when it is to be brought under the eye of the
wide-awake critic, this is indeed the secret of the retina's art in slaep.
Brain and mind are no critics of such arts when they, too, are asleep.
All manner of inanimate things, of animals, plants, and human beings,
seen in dreams, may resolve themselves into the fantastic schemata oi
the retinal field, if we can only manage to surprise these schemata with
an observing critical consciousness.
The data afforded by " retinal dust " may, of course, unite with other
data of sense and products of imagination in the dramatic representa-
tions of dream -life. To illustrate this 1 will briefly recite a dream of
mine which doubtless originated in a combination of visual phantasms
NOTES.
of tin- retina with entotic Bounds. The dreu: i in too much
ishment, ho\\r\cr, t. M Hike it possible for me actually to observe
the retinal Held on waking.
1 was standing in a gloomy grove, regarding fixedly a small black
object 1\ in'..- n the ground, of about the si/.e and V.hupe of a garden slug.
Suddenly the tiling began to swell with a^toimdin iiUOSt
hrt',.re 1 eould get out ol . it had grown tothuii. -of a
large hogshead ; and it had also begun to move with a speed out of all
proportion to its enormoni si/e. From place to place the huge black
thing, or animal (?), darted in the grove ; and each time i, c of
the trees of the grove the unfortunate object of itH attack vam >h d in
smoke. Finally the monster itself exploded into omntl-
and 1 awoke. Doubtless some enlarging and moving dark blotch on
the retinal Held had run its customary course - parallel, h fa the
rhythmic occurrence of certain entotic noi
I. The retinal phantasms, like all the other data dermd by excite-
ment of the end-organs of sense, are, within certain limits under the
influence of fixed attention and volition. It is well known tlmt some
persons ran create for themselves hallucinations of the sense of
which have all the objectivity of things when seen with waking con-
ness and under the clear light of day. As I have elsewhere said :
" In the case of perception with a moving eye, we can, to a certain
extent, decide the area over which the point of regard shall sweep and
tlie relative attention to be given to the subdivisions of this area.
Furthermore, and especially in the case of geometrical figures, it often
lies in our power to decide how we will interpret certain data which
admit of more than one interpretation."
What is true of \ision when it originates in external stimulation of
the ret inal area is true likewise of vision which originates in intra-or.
stimulation of the same area. Within certain limits rather narrow, to
be sure we can see what we look for and wish to see, and we can
choose our interpretation of what we see by the Eigenlicht of the retina
as well as by the sunlight. Very frequently I have only to choose some
simple schema such as would serve as a frame- work for a corresponding
object, fixate it in idea with closed eyes and will steadily to ha
appear, and in due time it will more or less completely construct itself
in the retinal field. Nor do I believe that in such cases the influence
of ideation and volition or, speaking physiologically, of the cerebral
centres upon the intra-organic activity of the retina is altogether
merely selective ; it appears also to be determinative. Idea and volition,
with their correlated psycho-physical cerebral processes, can (to a
certain extent) determine the condition of the retinal field. How we
are to understand the physiology of this influence from the ideational
and voluntary centres of the brain upon the end-organ of sense I do not
know. Of the fact of such influence I am confident.
But in sleep the mechanism of the cerebral centres is the principle
seat of those changes which distinguish dream-consciousness from
waking consciousness. In this truth, then, we have another reason for
the strange, irrational, rapidly shifting and intermingling way, in which
the visual images of our dreams are constituted and interpreted. On
the one hand the data of sense furnished by the end-organ of vision are
changeful and capricious. They are not like the steady stimulations of
the orderly arrangements of light-rays reflected from a real object. On
the other hand the superior psycho-physical mechanism which combines,
elaborates and interprets these data is, for the time being, partially freed
from the laws which control its action in waking consciousness.
304 NOTES.
5. Finally, I have always noticed a marked change in the character
of the muscular adjustment and movement of the eye on passing from
dream consciousness to waking consciousness. Indeed, one chief factor
in converting the passive spectator and unconscious author of the visual
dream-images into the active and critical investigator of the retinal
schemata is just this muscular change. I have had great difficulty in
determining precisely in what the change consists. But of the existence
and distinct nay, decisive influence of such a change, I am perfectly
sure.
I am inclined to think that on closing the eyes for sleep the eyeballs
are, as has been customarily supposed, turned upward and inward.
This position is probably most favourable to the disappearance from
consciousness of all disturbing visual images. Perhaps in deep and
dreamless sleep (and for purposes of my present inquiry " dreamless "
sleep means sleep in which no images of things seen rise above the
threshold of consciousness) this position of the eyeballs is maintained
unchanged. But I am inclined also to believe that, in somewhat vivid
visual dreams, the eyeballs move gently in their sockets, taking various
positions induced by the retinal phantasms as they control the dreams.
As we look down the street of a strange city, for example, in a dream
we probably focus our eyes somewhat as we should do in making the
same observation when awake, though with a complete lack of that
determined teleological fixedness which waking life carries with it.
But what change in muscular adjustment of the eye takes place when
I come out of the dream consciousness and promptly betake myself to
the psychologist's task of studying the fantastic shapes that are fading
from my retina ? Then I focus both eyes for a point of regard as close
as possible in front of the eyes, and in the direction which the phan-
tasms occupy in the retinal field ; and I steadily fixate them there with
that rigidity of muscular control which belongs to waking attention. It
is the marked change in the muscular sensations and in the feeling of fixated
attention which characterises my waking perceptive consciousness. This
change is necessary to the recognition of the schemata in the retinal field
as the components of those fanciful beings with which my " mind's eye "
has held commerce in the dream.
Such are some of the conclusions to which I have been led by my
experimental studies of this very interesting class of phenomena. Need
I add that to me they seem to verify the general theory of perception
which I have elsewhere advocated. This theory regards all seeing as
resulting from a psychical synthesis interpreting data of sense, and
denies the possibilit3 r of drawing any fixed line between illusions and
hallucinations, between what we call imagination and what we call per-
ception of sense.
GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY. The following papers have been read before
the Society : On 14th December, "A Criticism, of Evolutionary Ethics "
by Mr. J. H. Muirhead. On llth January, "The Permanent Meaning
of the Argument from Design " by Mr. B. Bosanquet. On 25th January,
" The Philosophical Pons " by Mr. S. H. Hodgson, President. On 8th
February, "The Meaning of Life" by the Kev. Dr. W. L. Gildea.
On 22nd February, "Theories of Pleasure" by Mr. G. E. Underbill. A
meeting was held at Cambridge on 7th March, when in a symposium the
question, "Is the distinction between 'Is' and 'Ought' ultimate and
irreducible ? " was discussed by Prof. H. Sidgwick, Mr. J. H. Muirhead,
Mr. G. F. Stout, and Mr. S. Alexander. Mr. L. T. Hobhouse, M.A., and
Mr. J. C. Bowen have been elected member?. The Proceedings of the
Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, has just been issued.
NEW SKRIKS. No. 3.] [JuLV, 1892.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY,
I. LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT
AND THINGS. I.
By A. EASTWOOD.
IT is easier to quote Lotze than to criticise him. His
philosophy is composed of so many heterogeneous ingredients
and has so many side issues at stake, that it presents the
appearance of administering to every recognised cult in turn,
from teleological Idealism to scientific Materialism, about
equal shares of favour and abuse. Were a collection made
of isolated passages which one theory or another might
adduce in its support, it would appear that Lotze's writings
wrre a hopeless sea of contradictions. But it would be
obviously unfair to form an estimate of Lotze's worth in
this piecemeal fashion. His admirers have naturally pre-
ferred to dwell on the consistency of his general line of
thought and to exhibit the attractiveness of the ultimate
aims and aspirations which undoubtedly exercise a domin-
ating influence over all the details of his speculations. There
is yet a third method of treatment, to which Lotze has been
subjected by those of his enemies who regard themselves as
staunch Idealists of the " absolute" type; they have simply
ignored him. With feelings of impatience and irritation
they have dismissed him from their minds as a terrible
ample of the ways in which philosophy can be inisuiider-
20
306 A. EASTWOOD :
stood. Even Lofcze's lifelong efforts to officiate as the
peacemaker between philosophies they regard with con-
tempt, under the impression that his achievements in this
vocation are rather of the literary and forensic kind, which
blows hot and cold with the same breath, than possessed of
any healing virtue to permanently close the raptures be-
tween opposing schools. In fact they do not want peace
but war, and hope to find in their own Hegelian theory a
signal example of the survival of the fittest.
But neither by picking holes in a man nor by praising him
can we form an unbiased judgment of his worth. And
Lotze is too important to be ignored. It may be fairly
claimed that, in pure philosophy, he is the last in the field ;
he has pronounced his verdict upon all the most important
problems of speculation ; and so wide is the respect he com-
mands that, as long as his words are allowed to remain the
last, they will continue to gain acceptance as final. His
attitude towards other German thinkers is most precisely
described by von Hartmann in his Lotze's Philosophic.
In that book he shows that it was Lotze's object, by a
reconstruction of Herbart, to arrive at a higher point of view
from which the elements of truth in Hegel and in Herbart
might be blended into one harmonious whole, always pro-
vided that this point of view should be consistent with the
spirit of Weisse. If students of Lotze would take up this
hint of von Hartmann's and bear well in mind the influence
of Weisse, they would possibly understand better what
Idealism, with Lotze, really means. But in England, at
any rate, the niceties of Lotze's position relative to the im-
mediate philosophical atmosphere with which he was sur-
rounded do not excite much concern ; attention is confined
to the broad and permanent outlines of his thought, which
mark the culminating point of the reaction, led by Idealists
with a partiality for " common-sense" and science, against
extreme Hegelianism. Most of our recent metaphysicians
bear strong marks of his influence, and he is also gaining in
favour and importance among that class of religious specu-
lators who view with apprehension the latest and boldest
interpretations of Hegel. For ultra-Hegelianism is bound,
in the first instance, to assume a negative attitude towards
many of the cherished convictions of religious minds ; and,
until it convinces people that it can provide a positive philo-
sophy of religion which shall be adequate to religious needs
a task in which it has not succeeded as yet there are
strong temptations for sober-minded men to throw in their
lot with Lotze, the able champion of Christianity who can
LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. 307
do battle with Ilr^el and Herbart <>n th-ir <>wn grounds,
and yet contrive at the end of the day to bring in victorious
the more characteristic tenets of orthodoxy. If, therefore,
Hegelians wish to check these desertions from their camp,
they ought to take action ; if they do not wi^h tin -ir silence
to in- misunderstood, they ought to clear away those mis-
understandings of philosophy to which they think Lotze
se.
The final goal to which Lotze's thoughts are always
directed is well known and much admired, and the many
grounds on which its attainment is desirable are set forth
with great persuasiveness and plausibility in tin- V/ /ocos-
W//.N-. But I think it is the first duty of criticism to examine
the methods by which this consummation is to be reached
and demonstrated as true; and for this purpose his later
works on Logic and Metaphysic are the most important.
One of the dominating notions, or at least the pervading
perplexity, which is especially prominent herein is the belief
in a relation or antithesis (or both) between thought and
tilings. It is to be noted however that the importance, and
at the same time the difficulty, of this antithesis lies in the
fact that it is impossible to lay our finger on any particular
chapter of Lotze's (as could be done, e.g., with regard to his
views on space) and say " here is his theory on the subject " ;
he does not make it a special problem ; it is rather a vein of
thought, permeating the entire body of his metaphysical
theories, and, to a large extent, supplying the principle on
which their vitality depends. Accordingly, although his
Theory of Knowledge in Logic, bk. iii., is the locus c/asx/
on the matter, in order to appreciate its import and seek its
full justification we must often go further afield.
If we would fix upon the starting-point from which the
antithesis developed in Lotze's mind, I think we must find
it in his steady conviction that philosophy is, in the last
resort, tentative, and is debarred by the frailty of human
knowledge from the possibility of arriving at absolute cer-
tainty.
I readilv admit that I take philosophy to be throughout mrivly ivn
inner movement of the human spirit. In the history of that spirit alone
lias philosophy its history. It is an effort, within the presupposed limits,
even to ourselves absolutely unknown, which our earthly existence im
poses on us, to gain a consistent view of the world. ... An absolute
truth, such as the archangels in heaven would have to accept, is not its
object.
This passage (Met., bk. i. ch. vii.), which is typical of
many, throws a strong light on the characteristic bent of
308 A. EASTWOOD :
Lotze's mind. It betrays at once his recognition of the
finite and human aspect of knowledge and also his firm con-
viction that this is not the whole of the matter, that there
is a sense in which knowledge and reality must be held to be
infinite and divine. I shall try to show later on that Lotze
has made a fatal mistake and caused endless confusion by
not clearing away the ambiguity, involved in the above view,
at the outset, by giving a frank theory of the relation of the
finite to the Infinite mind. At present we must simply note
that his logical and metaphysical speculations suffer from
the absence of some such theory ; they are pervaded with an
unanalysed feeling of uncertainty and of submission to a
higher power, due to a reluctance to close with this ultimate
but fundamental problem, while yet recognising its presence.
He is firmly convinced of the existence of a true Reality, but
seriously doubts whether our human minds .are capable of
cognising it.
We can now understand his attitude when first entering
into the problems of speculation in Logic, bk. iii. He there
disclaims all pretensions to the omniscience which alone
could accomplish the consummation of philosophy as a
" perfected system of connected truths at once ultimate and
concrete". His less ambitious object, at the outset, is " not
to inquire into the content of the principles in question, but
into the grounds on which in a subjective sense their cer-
tainty for us reposes " (p. 412). He realises that the facts of
human cognition, such as it is, are all the immediate data
we have to work upon ; he therefore resolves to make the
best of them, and consequently opens his inquiry with an
examination of "ideas," in which all the contents of our
knowledge must take shape. He does not however think it
necessary to preface his investigations with an examination
into the extent and manner in which an object depends for
its reality on its relation to a mind ; he only recognises the
very obvious, not to say trivial, fact that the reality of an
object is not constituted by its relation to any particular
mind, and thereupon makes bold to treat the reality of ideas
as though it had nothing to do with the reality of objects.
He asks us to concede his very plausible postulate that,
whatever reality there may be behind our ideas, it is always
in the first instance with " mere ideas " that we have to deal.
Of course if" idea " simply = " that which we know," every
one will concede Lotze's postulate, but a moment's con-
sideration will show that, on this interpretation, the postu-
late is quite barren and tautologous. We are thus naturally
led' to ask : Does not Lotze import some additional meaning
LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. 309
into the term " idea"? I think every one who reads him must
perceive that he does. He constantly adopts that "common-
sense " usage of " idea," by which the term is taken to mean
a representation, true or false, of an object ; a " mere idea"
being a representation to which no object corresponds, or a
representation considered apart I'mm its object. Instances
<>f this popular language occur on almost every page of his.
We hear of objects " corresponding " or " not corresponds
with conceptions, of things being " more than " thoughts, of
" the possible," i.e., the world of conceptions, being " wider
than" the real, of "tilings" with no "counterpart" in
thought, and thoughts with no " counterpart " in things.
Such modes of expression are full of metaphysical assump-
tions, the prevailing one being that thought is a subjer 1
and formal activity directed against an alien world of objects.
It is not necessary now to examine these assumptions in
detail or inquire how far they implicate Lotze in the errors
of the Formal Logicians. The point is that they are as-
sumptions which Lotze does not attempt to prove. Uncon-
scious apparently of any prejudices which they may involve,
he imports them bodily, now under one guise and now under
another, into that originally empty and tautologous state-
ment " we know only ideas ". Indeed, this last step is
absolutely necessary for him ; otherwise, his proposal to
" begin with ideas " would not have told him where to begin
at all ; now, indeed, he has obtained a very definite starting-
point, but it is at the cost of converting his primary postu-
late into an assumption which many metaphysicians would
be far from conceding to him. I think it is not unfair to say
that this assumption amounts to a demand that the mind's
ideas shall be grouped into a sort of picture-gallery, round
which it is necessary to make a tour of inspection and com-
parison before it is possible to ask whether the pictures cor-
respond to the objects of real nature from which they are
taken.
It would be highly unjust to charge Lotze with delibe-
rately attempting to conceal the need for a metaphysical
justification of his postulate. On the contrary, he informs
us with inimitable coolness and good faith that his assump-
tion is the necessary basis for every possible metaphysic. It
is the one stable fact of the theory of cognition on which
Idealists and Kealists must find common ground. Thus he
says, on p. 4'21 :
All we know of the external world depends upon the ideas of it which
are within us ; it is so far entirely indifferent whether with Idealism we
deny the existence of that world, and regard our ideas of it as alone
310 A. EASTWOOD :
reality, or whether we maintain with Kealism the existence of things
outside us which act upon our minds. On the latter hypothesis as little
as the former do the things themselves pass into our knowledge ; they
only awaken in us Ideas, which are not things.
Lotze regards the impartiality of the above doctrine as a
sure guarantee for its fairness. It is intended to be a sign-
post erected, on common ground, at the parting of the ways
towards Idealism and Realism. And what exactly is the
''common ground"? It is the belief, to quote Lotze's
words, that " knowledge under whatever form can never be
things in themselves, but only represent them ". Far from
regarding this proposition as at all ambiguous or dangerous,
he holds it to be the statement of a primary fact on which
"thought is perfectly clear, and atone with itself". The
reason of Lotze's confidence is easy to explain. In his
anxiety to find a common point of agreement between
Idealism and Realism, he asks us to choose one of two
alternative propositions, viz. : (1) Knowledge is things-in-
them selves : (2) Knowledge only represents things-in-them-
selves. Naturally every one, be he inclined to Idealism or
Realism, will decide to adopt proposition (2), always pro-
vided that we are compelled to choose either the one or the
other. Now Lotze makes another step which should be
taken in close connexion with the above. He makes
another assumption which he holds must be equally accep-
table to all, viz., that knowledge must at least represent
things. Here, again, in order that this second assumption
may be conceded, he thinks it is only necessary to ask us to
make our choice between the alternatives (1) thought does
not represent things in any way ; (2) thought at least repre-
sents things. Here, too, it is easy to persuade every one
that they must accept proposition (2), always provided that
we are compelled to choose either the one or the other. I
wish to lay particular stress on the fact that the conditions
I have italicised are ignored by Lotze, and tacitly assumed to
be accepted ; I hope to show in the sequel that the supposi-
tion that they are binding is one of Lotze's most fatal
mistakes.
The significance for him of the above view as to the
representative character of knowledge cannot be over-
estimated. It at once provides the justification for his
Metaphysic, and furnishes ready to hand its immediate pro-
blem. For if thought does bring us reports from an external
world of real things, a science of Metaphysic is possible,
and it is the first business of that science to collect all the
data which thought can furnish in answer to the question
"What is a thing?"
LOTZE'S ANTITHKSls BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. 311
The actual steps by which Lotze's theory develops itself
are as follows : Knowledge must in some way be representa-
tive, but we do not yet know in what \vay. We in
therefore, disclaim complicity with two prejudices which
are equally liable to obtrude themselves in the phrase, " we
know only phenomena". \\V must, in thr ihsi place,
steer clear of the unwarranted presupposition that thoi.
18, l>y its limitation to phenomena, thwarted in its purpose,
or tails to penetrate to a real essence of things which exists
in the grandeur of inaccessible solitude behind phenomena.
To keep our minds free from bias, we must, in tin- second
place, take note that there is another supposition equally
possible and equally unproven. "We may at once pronounce
an opposite point of view to be conceivable, which should
regard things as mere means to produce in us in all its
details the spectacle of the ideal world " (Logic, p. 431). It
must be carefully noted here that in the passage from which
this last quotation has been made, Lotze in no way modifies
his view, as we have previously sketched it, of the repre-
sentative character of knowledge. He does not deny that
knowledge is representative ; he does not even deny that it
is representative of the unknowable ; he only admits the
difficulty of knowing the unknowable.
This last difficulty is made by Lotze the occasion for a
new departure. He is not at all disconcerted by the dis-
covery that he has made his " ideas " representative of
something which he does not know. On the contrary, he
seizes on the fact with avidity, and labelling it with the
name " circle of ideas," makes immense capital out of it.
For, if knowledge is only directly concerned with ideas
within this circle, we have every right to neglect for the
time being ugly questions about the relation of thought to
an external reality, and not only can, but must, confine
ourselves to the data which this circle of mere ideas pro-
vides. " Let us leave entirely out of the question the oppo-
sition between our world of ideas and a world of things ;
let us look upon the former alone as the material we have
to deal with " (pp. 431-2). And so, after rehabilitating the
Platonic world of ideas, Lotze proposes to take up the pro-
blem where Plato left it, and discover " what are those first
principles of our knowledge under which the manifold world
of Ideas has itself to be arranged " (p. 449). Thereupon the
candour of Lotze prominently asserts itself. Fully con-
vinced that the contents of knowledge are limited to a
" circle of ideas," he wishes every one to take note of the
fact ; he calls upon us deliberately to watch him as he
312 A. EASTWOOD :
" perpetrates " his surrender to the circle " with his eyes
open ".
The circle is inevitable, so we had better perpetrate it with our eyes
open ; the first thing we have to do is to endeavour to establish what
meaning it is possible for us to attach to knowledge in its widest sense,
and what sort of relation we can conceive to subsist between the subject
which knows, and the object of its knowledge, consistently with those
yet more general notions which determine the mode in which we have
to conceive the operation of anything whatever upon anything else.
"What we have to do is to obtain the last-mentioned conception, which
amounts to a metaphysical doctrine, and to treat the relation of subject
and object as subordinate to it (p. 451).
This passage is highly important as indicating the direc-
tion in which Lotze is driven by his doctrine with regard
to the limitation of knowledge to ideas. He becomes aware
of the deficiency of that doctrine, and strives to supplement
it by supplying to the essentially subjective aspect of " ideas "
a more stable objectivity. Still, since knowledge is limited
to "ideas," this "something more" ought, strictly, to be
unknowable. It is an unknown, however, which plays such
an important part that we cannot get along without taking
it into account ; so Lotze ingeniously proposes that, as we
cannot know it, we must make an assumption or postulate
as to what it would be like if we could know it. In this
way " real things " cease to stand in an external relation to
the circle of ideas ; it is rather the reference of things to
ideas and ideas to things which itself constitutes that circle.
The assumption made, he invests it with the title " meta-
physical," and erects it into the guiding principle which
shall show us, as though by a miraculous intervention, how
to " perpetrate " the circle of ideas. To this principle all
logical inquiry must conform.
This leads us to ask, how far, and with what justification,
does Lotze subordinate logic to metaphysic ? Let us recollect
the meaning of his terms. With him logic = the science of
ideas, as opposed to metaphysic, which the science of
"things". He is not, be it remembered, attempting a
regress to the grounds upon which the antithesis " thought
v. things " is based ; such a task would be equally logical
and metaphysical. On what, then, does the priority of his
"metaphysical assumptions" rest? In the first place, it
cannot rest on their supposed reference to a Real beyond
thought. For, although they be assumptions about that
Eeal, they are yet out and out assumptions of thought ; it
is as thoughts alone, i.e., solely in virtue of their place as
members of the ideal world, that they must establish their
LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS UKTWEEN THOUGHT A 313
truth. He has told us at the beginning of l>k. iii. of the
Logic tliat " Troth and the knowledge ox troth < "iily
in the laws of interconnexion whk :uinl to <>l,t;mi
universally within a ^iven set of ideas ". Accordii
supreme authority of his " metaphysical " assumptions over
the circle of ideas cannot be delegated to them by an unkn
power beyond that circle ; it must consist of their n
i<ti-<il. supremacy, within the circle, over all oth- :hers
of tlie circle. But can the " metaphysical " doctrii..
is to regulate the circle of ideas stand this test ? I
mysterious title " metaphysical " be ruled out of order, what
special claim to sovereignty does the " law of the operation
of anything whatever upon anything else " possess V \\V11.
let us first try to understand Lotze's attitude on the subject.
Eager as Lotze is in his theory of knowledge to b(
with " mere ideas " taken apart from their objects, he soon
reminds us that he has a still more deeply rooted affection
for " things ". While professedly confining his attention to
ideas, at least, we might have expected him to admit that
the dominating laws of his subject-matter are those imposed
by that mind to which the ideas owe their genesis ; but,
despite inconsistencies, he is found asserting at all hazards
the pre-eminence of " things " even here. Why he should
do so it is difficult to say, for he vouchsafes no explanation.
I can only suggest that he has lapsed into a very plausible
prejudice of "common-sense". It is a step which, how-
ever it be accounted for, is sadly mischievous in its results.
His most confusing utterances on the theory of ideas are
prompted by this latent assumption that " things " (what-
ever they may be), in virtue of their properties, produce
modifications, i.e., thoughts, in the cognising subject. He
thinks we can treat the relation of thought to its object as
a particular case to be dealt with by an application of the
general law r s of cause and effect. He, of course, avoids those
coarser applications of these laws which figure in the pages
of " scientific " philosophers ; the way he utilises them is
much more refined. (I shall mention some of these refine-
ments when I come to deal with his use of the term " super-
sensuous ".) Still the qualifications and safeguards with
which he supplements it do not affect the fundamental
import of his metaphysical belief in the causative action of
" things ". Some such belief obtrudes itself, in a variety of
guises, on almost every page. It is a notion almost as
characteristic of Lotze as "thought-relations" are charac-
teristic of Green. Intieed, we might say that the root-
conception from which Lotze's system of philosophical
314 A. EASTWOOD :
argumentation has sprung is the assumption that some
external objective reality distinct from human thought
exercises a causative action on our minds.
It is characteristic of Lotze always to face his difficulties
boldly, until he has explained them away ; they never
induce him to turn back and reconsider his starting-point.
It is now our business to note some of the complications in
which he is involved by the assumption of an active causality
on the part of things in themselves, and to trace the devices
by which he endeavours to extricate himself from his em-
barrassments. He has laid himself open to the charge
to put it in the grossest form of making consciousness,
which can never be anything but the subject for which
objects are, into an object ; for it is only objects which can
stand in the relation of cause and effect. I am quite ready
to acknowledge that in many passages he rises superior to
this debased view of consciousness, allowing that it is some-
thing altogether unique, and admitting, implicitly, its
superiority over the categories of cause and effect. (I do
not allude to Lotze's ascription to consciousness of a sup-
posed indeterministic " freedom ".) But the fact remains
that, instead of discarding utterly the notion that conscious-
ness is a passive thing, he tries to patch it up, as though
any amount of patching up would make what is radically
wrong right.
His first concession with a view to rectifying his mistake
is that thought is, in part, constitutive of knowledge ; the
reason being that each of two objects which act on one
another contributes from its own nature to the resultant
effect. His meaning is made apparent at the point where
(p. 456), after puzzling over the " innate ideas " of Descartes,
he finds the solution of that problem must be prefaced by a
deliberate " assumption as to the mode in which the object
of knowledge may be conceived as operating upon the sub-
ject which apprehends it ". By his own chosen assumption,
which amounts to a rough doctrine of causality amongst
natural phenomena, thought comes under the rule that
" every object is receptive of various kinds of stimuli to its
spontaneity". He then goes on to show that in the re-
sultant effect, i.e., the thought-content, the particular nature
of the spontaneity of thought must be taken into account.
But subsequently Lotze makes a second and still greater
concession to the importance of the work of thought.
Thought always puts its own colour on objects given to it ;
but, in some cases, it does more ; it makes its own objects
entirely out of its own nature. The experience of the mind is
LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. 315
thus of two kinds according as it is (1) made out <>f material
which thought does not make, or rJ made out of material
which thought does make entirely out of itself. \Vhu-h.
with Lotze, amounts to saying that thought is not only a
reality per se, but can per se produce real results. " In an
act of knowledge the direct con tri hut inn from the side of
the object may be absent, hut never that which is furnished
by the subject's own nature" (p. 457). After the original
" stimulus from without " thoughts may " have their source
in the constitution of the mind alone ".
Proceeding on these lines, Lotze half unconsciously permits
himself to widen and widen the gap between thought and
" things," until he gets on the one hand an hypostasised
world of ideas and on the other an unknown world of
11 things ". Once set in motion a " stimulus from without,"
he imagines that thought may call into being a whole world
of " possible" ideas, the private property of the mind itself
and distinctly independent of the world of material objects.
I particularly wish to call the attention of Idealists to this
last point, because I think it will enable them to see what
sort of an Idealist Lotze really is. I would have them
observe that his justification for his " ideal world " is based
on a plausible endeavour to do justice to thought as one
amongst other partially independent and partially causally
interconnected objects. Is such a philosopher, I would ask
them, a safe or a dangerous friend?
The importance of seriously considering this question is
emphasised by the growing habit of accepting Lotze's con-
clusions without taking the trouble to carefully examine
their source. That is what makes his influence on the
philosophy of to-day such a serious matter. And he states
his convictions with such a persuasive air. He coaxes men
to agree with him, who never would agree with him if he
tried to compel them. Indeed, if attractiveness were the
only test of philosophic truth, he would stand easily first.
And nowhere has he done more to popularise his vi
amo?ig those who judge Idealism by its results rather than
by its justifications, than in his brilliant chapter on the
Platonic ideas. I allude especially to his division of Reality
into three unique kinds, viz., Events, which occur ; ihiugs,
which r.r/.sY ; Thoughts, which are valid. There can be no
doubt " validity " is a capital name to conjure with. Whether
it really succeeds in conjuring away all the difficulties of
Platonism I cannot stop to inquire. It is more important
to notice that in Lotze's own work it renders the important
service of reducing to a minimum the friction between factors
316 A. EASTWOOD :
of his thought which would be otherwise incompatible with
one another. And thus he eludes the rude dialectical force
of mere partisan warfare, which, if left to itself, would have
heightened the antagonism between thoughts and things
until they destroyed each other, thereby proving the neces-
sity for their reunion in a higher unity which transcends
their differences. To the outside world "validity" comes
as a message of peace, which looks so temptingly plausible
that they are only too willing to accept it, without bothering
their heads particularly as to what the dispute has been about.
For there is no royal road to Idealism ; and, after their first
laborious efforts in the direction of that goal, people begin
to feel dissatisfied ; unused to the rarefied atmosphere, they
imagine they have left solid ground behind them. Then
comes the arch-tempter and whispers in their ear that
Idealism is a very estimable thing in its way, only it has
a little over-rated itself; let them but endorse this quite
innocent division of Reality into three, for which they have
the authority of Lotze the most scrupulous and conscien-
tious of philosophers and all the dark riddles of philosophy
shall be revealed to them. And those who swallow the bait
remind us thenceforth unceasingly that " thoughts are not
things," and under the spell of that pass-word all the diffi-
culties of philosophy make way before them ; and those of
their former friends who still ascend to Idealism by the hard
and narrow way they never cease to reproach with the taunt
that they " have hypostasised an abstraction ".
I have tried to indicate the groundwork of Lotze's theory
of thought, in the belief that people would do well to pause
before growing enthusiastic over his "world" of "really
valid " thought-concepts, and soberly ask what is the basis
upon which this attractive superstructure rests. But so far
we have been taking a one-sided view of Lotze. That is the
worst of philosophies in two pieces ; they have to be in-
spected twice over. Lotze indeed seems anxious to save us
the trouble by trying to weld the two pieces into one in his
philosophy of religion. But perhaps it would be advisable
to follow him more closely, without anticipating the general
statements with which he concludes ; let us see how far he
avails himself of the advantages of Dualism before he
rejects it.
He constantly sets thought in opposition, latent or explicit,
to " things ". It would be impossible, without unfairly sup-
pressing his meaning, to take his doctrine of thought in
isolation, because the g^as^-independence of the other mem-
ber of the antithesis is for ever asserting itself. That is why
LOT/K'S ANTiTin-:si ir AND THINGS. 317
Lotze is such a formidable opponent to attack. " Thought "
is no sooner demolished than " things " vjiin the ascend*
in this mental see-saw, and shower upon u-
additional reasons why neither term in the antithesis
be disturbed. Popular Knglish writers have tak-n a leaf
out of Lotze's book. They forbid the Idealist to hypostasise
thought, because they have shown thought to be impoi
by investing it with the inane independence of universal
validity; then, when experience testifies to the presence of
soinrthing other than the bare universal in the content of
thought, they triumphantly exclaim: " Behold those Real
things, quite other than thoughts, which your stupid hypos-
tasised thought has left out of the account ".
It is therefore now our business to examine those claims
to be independent of thought which "things" put forth.
Incidentally, I call attention to a preliminary embarrassment
which is apt to throw Lotze's readers off their guard. He
not infrequently changes his antithesis between ideas and
reality into an antithesis between our ideas and God. He
says at the outset that he will not decide whether " things "
or God lie at the back of our ideas ; he takes the benefit of
the doubt, together with the credit for impartiality in do in;:
so. The immensity of the difference between God and
"things" as a substratum to thought is obvious enough ;
but, as I hope to show that his application of the notion of
the Deity in this connexion is one which cannot philosophi-
cally be allowed, I think the ambiguity about the substratum
need not here disconcert us.
And now, to resume, we can boldly ask why are " things "
more than thoughts? without being overawed by fear of the
insinuation that we are asking Why is God more than man?
Lotze's first answer is because they account for a posteriori
knowledge. " The a priori character, however, which we
thus claim in so broad a sense for our knowledge, is only one
side of the matter. If we regard all forms of sensible per-
ception . . . as modes of manifestation innate in the mind,
then and for that reason the ground for this or that particu-
lar application of them, one necessarily excluding the other,
cannot possibly be found in the mind ' (Loijic, p. -100). At
this point Lotze's procedure needs to be carefully observed,
for he is preparing the way for the transition from logic to
metaphysic. Let us recollect that Lotze never saw the
necessity for beginning with an analysis of the conditions of
knowledge and existence. We have already observed how
he takes thought for granted without asking how thought i>
possible ; we must now trace the growth of his complernen-
318 A. EASTWOOD :
tary assumption that "things" exist, and. observe how
strongly and irrevocably that assumption has influenced his
theories, long before he brings himself to deal with the
question What are the conditions of the existence of a
"thing"?
The first step towards the transition is made when he ob-
serves, and rightly enough, that knowledge must have an
a posteriori element. But, as such an element is excluded
from his narrow and formal view of thought, it must be re-
ferred to an unknown outside thought. This is the germinal
conception from which his elaborated doctrine of " things"
takes its rise. For the justification of his procedure we
must look to his chapter on the " Eeal and Formal Value of
Logical Acts". The argument there turns on his view of
the relation between the process and the result of reasoning ;
or, as he puts it, the question is When have our thought-
contents a Eeal significance and when are they the mere
" scaffolding of thought " ? The main conclusion of a long
and intricate discussion is that, regarded as intermediary
links in a chain of reasoning, thoughts are only formal,
whereas the thoughts in which chains of reasoning terminate
have, or ought to have, real objects corresponding to them.
In support of this he shows that judgments and syllogisms
cannot have a "Eeal" significance, because no real object
could possibly correspond, e.g., to a hypothetical judgment.
To adopt the simile which Lotze works out at the end of the
chapter, thought is a spectator travelling by " subjective "
and "formal" routes to an "objective" and "real" hill-
top. Different spectators may ascend by different paths,
but the view from the summit is the same for all. Now
Lotze expects us to read a good deal of meaning in this
simile of his. Amongst other things, he expects us to con-
cede that, although thought in virtue of its " formality " (p.
493) is always, as it were, in touch with objective reality,
yet thought as the universal result or terminus (the summit)
is to be distinguished from and not limited to thought as the
particular or the subjective process (the arbitrarily chosen
path). " Surely," I may be told, " that is a highly plausible
request. What harm can there be in emphasising the very
modest truth that the universal and the particular are not
the same ? " Wait a moment ; turning to the next page we
find the illustration of the difference between universals and
particulars is not as innocent as it appears to be. Lotze
there tells us that in his illustrations the difference
between the " arbitrary path " and the " summit " is
meant to serve as a "preliminary elucidation" of the diffe-
LOTZK'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND T1IINOS. 319
rence between logical and metaphysical reality. I am aware
that he promptly observes : " It will be better to reserve for
the Mft<ij)hi/sic the fuller discussion of this important jmi:
good; let us not forget the "fuller discussion '; hut
above all let us not be hurried away before di the
full importance of the step In- has just takni.
I think that if chapter iv. of Logic, hk. iii., he carefully
read, especially the last three pages, it will be s.-rn that in
the explanation of this last step from logic to metaphysic is
to be found the key which enahles Lotze and his followers
to open out their metaphysical assumptions into a working
theory. We saw a little while ago that the "a poster
element " pointed in this direction, by demanding that
logical ideas must be supplemented from some other source.
1 ut the " a posteriori element " is not enough for them, be-
cause they can only extort out of it a "datum" alien to
thought ; for anything they can show, this datum might be
a flux of particulars ; in which case "things," being void of
permanent qualities, could not be the subject-matter of a
theory. It is therefore necessary to nniversalise " things,"
so that metaphysical attributes may be predicated of them ;
this is done in a most subtle manner in the chapter before
08. Thought had previously been stripped of its concrete
particularity, in order that " things " might be clothed with
reality ; now its universality is borrowed from it, in order
that " things'' may be invested with the only property which
can make them cognisable.
It is on account of this conversion of " things" into con-
crete uuiversals that Lotze is able to make his divorce be-
tween thought and " things " complete and yet not suicidal.
He raises the two into independent entities, and reduces their
connexion from an intrinsic unity to a parallelism. There
are thus (1) thoughts to which no " things " correspond : (2)
thoughts and " things " which correspond to or are parallel
with one another : (3) " things" to which no thoughts cor-
respond. (1) are the outcome of the theory of "mere
ideas " ; (2) owe their existence to the transference to
" things " of those attributes of particularity and universality
which, I take it, should belong to thoughts alone. We have
now to deal with (3) i.e., with " things " which presume to
be " more than " thoughts, with the belief, as English writers
express it, that "existence is one thing, knowledge is
another".
Now is the time to turn to that " fuller discussion " in the
M> tuphysic to which Lotze referred us for an elucidation of
his views. It is to be found on pp. 142-4. He is dealing
320 A. EASTWOOD :
with the difference between relations between the contents
of ideas and relations between "real objects " or "things".
He finds that " if a and b" be " simply contents of possible
ideas like red and yellow, straight and curved, then a rela-
tion between them exists only so far as we think it and by
the act of our thinking it ". It has existence and permanence
" only in the sense of being an occurrence which will always
repeat itself in our thinking in the same way under the same
conditions ". But let a and b indicate expressly Kealities,
Entities or " Things ". Then, although thought can insti-
tute comparisons and relations between a and b as
before, "it is not these relations that we have in view,
if, in order to render intelligible a connexion of the
things a and b which experience forces on our notice, we
appeal to a relation C, which sometimes does, sometimes
does not, obtain between a and b " ; such an " objective
relation C," he goes on to say, " cannot be anything that
takes place between a and b, because it is only thought which
constitutes a ' between ' ". What, then, is it ? Well, the
upshot is : " That which we sought under this name of an
objective relation between things can only subsist if it is
more than mere relation, and if it subsists not between things
but immediately in them as the mutual action which they
exercise 011 each other and the mutual effects which they
sustain from each other ".
Possibly Lotze might have made the above remarks a
little more lucid, but they contain two unmistakable and
vitally important statements. They tell us that we know
thoughts are more than " things," because we are presented
with " variable relations C," i.e., because the facts of our ex-
perience change. They tell us that, as, on the one hand,
thoughts owe their reality to their presence to a mind, so
" things," 011 the other hand, owe their reality to their par-
ticipation in a mutual interaction between each other. The
elucidation of these two points ought, if we wish seriously to
regard Lotze's philosophy as a system, to be placed at the
forefront of his Metaphysic. For his philosophy cannot pos-
sibly be regarded as a systematic whole unless his Metaphysic
can be seen to be connected with and necessarily to flow
from his theory of knowledge. We must carefully keep in
view the reasons why he is justified in saying, in the Intro-
duction to his Metaphysic, that the problems of that volume
centre about the fact of change, taking place amongst real
things.
After having seen how the mind is compelled to seek a
solution of these metaphysical problems, the next step
LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS UKTWKEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. 321
obviously is to ask : What then is meant by " things which
change"? It must here be observed that Lotze is not very
obliging towards his readers. For it is a long time before
any explanation is forthcoming. He refers us, it is true, to our
"common-sense," which never finds the slightest difficulty
in deciding what is a" change" and what is a " tiling". But
re now supposed to be dealing with philosophy, and I
think I am well within the mark in saying that the philoso-
phical meaning of <4 change" and "thing "is very far from
being a matter of common consent. It is therefore Lotze's
fault, and not ours, that we are compelled to turn towards
the conclusion of his speculative theories for the explanation
of those terms which he uses from the beginning. He tells
us on p. 1 of the Metaphysic that " while predicable only by
metaphor of anything that is merely object of thou
change completely dominates the whole range of realii
But that is to assume, without explaining, that we know
what " change " and " reality " are, and, in particular, that
we know in what respects they are more than " mere objects
of thought". Nor again do we get any more light on the
matter from his special chapter on " Becoming and Change ".
He there professes to tell us the precise difference between
metaphysical " things " and thoughts (p. 78). In the world
of ideas " the content of a truth a is indeed founded on that
of another b, but, far from arising out of the annihilation of
b, holds good along with it in eternal validity " ; whereas, in
the world of changeable things, " the reality of the new is
not contained in the reality of the old. It presupposes the
removal of that reality as the beginning of its own." Of
course there is an obvious difference between a valid truth
(e.g., a proposition in Euclid) and an actual fact; but that
does not help us in the slightest to understand the difference
between a thought and a " thing," because a thought, too, is
always an actual fact as the object of the mind which thinks
it, and to that mind the actuality of a new thought always
presupposes the removal of the actuality of the old. Surely
it would be preposterous first to abstract a certain (and
essential) characteristic (viz., their actuality) from ideas, and
then to say that their difference from "things" consists in
their not possessing that very characteristic.
Although I cannot find in the Ontology any explanation
why a "thing" should be more than or other than a thought,
I think I can find the reason why no such explanation is
there forthcoming. Throughout the first book of his Meta-
physic Lotze seems happily oblivious of the fact that Change
implies Time. But our views on the import, logical and
21
322 A. EASTWOOD :
metaphysical, of Change must depend entirely on our theory
of Time. The reasons why Lotze holds that Change draws
the border-line between logic and metaphysic must be found,
if anywhere, in his doctrine as to the relation of Time to
the cognising mind, or, as it is generally, though somewhat
misleadingly, put, as to the question of the subjectivity or
objectivity of Time. His verdict is pronounced on pp. 264-5.
" Time as a whole is without doubt merely a creation of our
presentative intellect. It neither is permanent nor does it
elapse. . . . But the lapse of events in time we do not
eliminate from reality, and we regard it as a perfectly hopeless
undertaking to regard even the idea of this lapse as an
a priori merely subjective form of apprehension, which
develops itself within a timeless reality in the consciousness
of spiritual beings." In short he finds Time or succession
to be transcendentally real. I must point out that this dis-
covery was practically a foregone conclusion, because he has,
throughout the Metaphysic and in the theory of knowledge
in so far as that treatise borders on metaphysic been already
treating change as transcendentally real. Are we then to
charge Lotze with a hugepetitioprineipii ? Without answer-
ing that question, I must insist that, whether consciously or
unconsciously, his justification for treating ' ' things " as " more
than " thoughts is not to be found until we reach his theory
of Time. Here for the first time come to light the full
reasons for his conviction that the Idealist, or, as he often
calls it, the "subjective," view of " real things " is inade-
quate. Even in his doctrine of space, the existence of
noumenal " things " is taken for granted rather than proved ;
it is only out of the dictum " succession is inseparable from
reality " that he is able to form the bridge whereby the mind
may pass from its own world of ideas to an outer world
of things in themselves.
This view of Time, if it be tenable, constitutes the strong-
hold of Lotze's system. For if Time is to be our passport
to things in themselves, we shall carry with us a host of
advantages. Let us recollect that cause and effect differ
from reason and consequence in that the former are in
time, the latter are not. Now if the time-relationship is in
any way applicable to " supersensuous " or "intelligible"
" things," it at once becomes possible to invest those
"things" with a causal activity. And that is why Lotze
holds himself at liberty to disregard the warning of Kant
that the categories of cause and effect are applicable only to
phenomena.
No sooner has Lotze completed his vindication of the
LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THOUGHT AND THINGS. 823
" reality " of Time than he is seized with an uneasy fore-
boding that he has been committing himself to a doctrine
incompatible with the ultimate goal of his philosophy. He
keenly sympathises with " the efforts which are ever being
renewed to include the real process of becoming within the
compass of an abiding reality "(p. '209). Thru he goes on
^ive a highly significant and characteristic hint of the
direction which he considers those efforts ought to take.
" They will not, however, attain their object, unless the
reality, which is greater than our thought, vouchsafes us a
Perception, which, by showing us the mode of solution, at
the same time persuades us of the solubility of this riddl- '
It is to the philosophy of religion, he concludes, that we
must look for help.
It would lead me too far afield to describe the way in
which, in bk. ix. of the Microcosmus and in the Dictated
Portions of the Philosophy of Religion, he strives, by his
theory of the Deity, to render his Kealism compatible with
his Idealism. My special reason for making the last quota-
tion is that it affords an excellent illustration of the way in
which Lotze habitually falls back on " immediate perception"
as a guarantee of the superiority of" real things " over human
thoughts. I briefly note three leading types of these appeals.
Often he appeals to perception (1) as giving assurance of
actual fact. Thought is supposed to be a spider, spinning
an unsubstantial web of ideas ; only when the spider catches
its fly, when the mind immediately perceives something, is
it certain that the meshes of thought are attached to a con-
crete reality. In other passages he seems to make percep-
tion do duty for (2) a miraculous revelation of things in
themselves. He defends his belief by an argument from
analogy. As, for example, the union of Being and not-B
presented in Becoming would be held to be impossible or
miraculous, were it not a matter of everyday perception,
so, he holds, the unverified inexplicabilities of his own
theories might, by a divine revelation or a deeper insight,
be immediately perceived to be established truths. I have
already quoted an example of the sort of revelation he
desires (Metaphysic, p. 269). The fact that the desiderated
perceptions are not forthcoming does not disturb his belief
in their possibility or shake his confidence in immediacy ; it
only induces him to appeal to immediacy under a new
aspect, viz., (3) " faith". The best references are Micro-
cosmus, bk. ix. pp. 660-3, and ch. i. of the Dictated
Portions of the Philosophy of Religion. The ultimate
questions of philosophy, he says, " only the new and
324 A. EASTWOOD: LOTZE'S ANTITHESIS, ETC.
special faculty of Faith is competent to answer". He
particularly relies on religious faith, as distinct from
11 scientific," to give assurances of " realities " and ''facts".
Thus, apart from knowledge originating in external ex-
perience and mediated by the senses, " there are also
inner states which are available as data for the acquisition
of truth ".
I began this sketch by saying that the key to Lotze's
attitude when entering on the problems of speculation
is to be found in his confession of a "feeling of uncer-
tainty," arising from religious grounds. I end it with
the observation that for the ultimate justification for his
views Lotze again resorts to religion this time, however, as
the guarantee for a " feeling of immediate certainty ".
Having first endeavoured to understand the meaning and
justification of Lotze's antithesis, I propose in my next
article to discuss its value.
(To be continued.)
II. THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH.
By J. DONOVAN.
14 WORDS are something," says Lamb, in his Chapter on
Ears, " but to be exposed to an endless battery of mere
sounds ; to fill up sound with feelings, and strain ideas to
keep pace with it ... to invent extempore tragedies to
answer to the vague gestures of an inexplicable rambling
mime these are the faint shadows of what I have m:
gone from a series of the ablest-executed pieces of this
empty instrumental music."
Here is a reflexion of the gap which now exists between
the sounds of music and the sounds of speech. But it could
never have met the eyes of a modern ethnologist without
awaking the thought that it was not always thus ; for, on
the contrary, the habits of music-making are found to have
a closer connexion with speech, the lower down we go in
the scale of human development. With the majority of
modern scholars, no less than with Lamb, the connexion
between measured sounds and speech is lost sight of after
the " perpetual cycle of declensions, conjugations, syntaxes
and prosodies " has ceased to revolve in their memories.
And if it were kept in view, the measured sounds would not
be thought of as belonging to music in any way. Certainly
it might be remembered that (est etiam in dicendo can (us
obscurior) " there is an obscure kind of singing in speech,"
and that prosody means " a singing accompanying the
words," but for all that, words are one thing, and an end-
less battery of mere sounds is another. But see how the
American Indian filled up sound with feeling and made
ideas keep pace with it. " Long before it conies to his turn
to utter his stave or part of the chant, bis mind has been
worked up to the most intense point of excitement. His
imagination has pictured the enemy, the ambush and the
onset, the victory and the bleeding victim writhing under
his prowess. In thought he has already stamped him under
foot, and torn off his reeking scalp. It would require strong
and graphic language to give utterance, in the shape of a
song, to all he has fancied, and sees and feels on the subject.
Physical excitement has absorbed his energies. ...
inspiring drum and mystic rattle communicate new energy
326 J. DONOVAN :
to every step, while they serve by the observation of the
most exact time to concentrate his energy." 1
In this, and in nearly every other report of aboriginal
music-making, one meets with the opposite pole of Lamb's
experience. Here there is an approach to madness from
the very overflowing of thoughts and feelings. Here it is
the battery of sounds that is something ; and the words
almost nothing. Aborigines are found uttering measured
sounds with no meaning at all for hours ; 2 sometimes, the
sounds possess the meaning of a single word ; 3 or, again, the
meaning of a phrase. 4 But in every case the sounds appear
able to fire the imagination with the deepest meanings.
Can this phenomenon be interpreted ? Can it be made
out why feeling and imagination gather around musical
sounds and measured movements, the more freely, the
lower is the stage of human development ? This paper is
written in the belief, and with the intention of showing,
that it can.
It is well known that the conditions of feeling and activity
out of which we find music growing, everywhere partake of
a festal character. In their most exciting and animating
forms these conditions belong to tribal glorification over the
achievements of heroic ancestors or mythical gods ; but
there are scores of smaller inducements to festal excitement.
Birth, age of puberty, marriage, death, the success of a
hunting or marauding enterprise, in short, every event of
life and nature which has awakened the reflexion that
distinguishes man from brutes, is dwelt on through the
means of festal excitement, and is thereby connected with
the measured sounds and movements of aboriginal music.
Now what good were measured sounds amid the wild
excitement of these festal players? They could bring no
distinct messages to the mind, and certainly they brought
no alcoholic fumes to the brain ; although the behaviour of
the festal players under their influence often bears the stamp
of intoxication. What was there in measured sounds which
could so well appeal to the savage nature that they are
found to be deeply engrained in the habits of festal utter-
ance and movement of every known tribe ? Let us return
to the Chapter on Ears.
1 Schoolcraft, Ind. Trib. of N. America, pt. ii. p. 60.
2 Journ. Anthr. Inst., vol. xii. 392, xiii. 441, xiv. 306.
3 Ibid,, vol. xii. 453 ; Schookraft, pt. i. 398.
4 Mem. de la Soc. Eth., vol. ii. pt. ii. 92 ; Schoolcraft, pt. iv. 71 ; Kep-
pel's Ind. Archipel, vol. ii. 164.
THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. 327
" To music it (the ear) cannot be passive. It will .strive
mine at least will spite of its inaptitude, to thrid the
maze; like an unskilled eye painfully poring upon hiero-
glyphio. I have sal through ;in It;ili;in ( )per;i, till, for sheer
pain ;ind inexplicable anguish, I have rushed out into the
noisiest places of the crowded streets, to solace myself with
sounds, which I was not obliged to follow, and get rid of the
distracting torment of endless, fruitless, barren attention ' "
Tins passage tells the truth pitilessly; if one hates and
ourses them lor doing so, musical sounds will, before and
al><> ye all else, attract attention. And if one searched
through a world of possibilities as to what could be the
tir>t impulse of making measured sounds, he would find no
answer at once so simple and so satisfactory as that it was
an impulse to attract and absorb the attention.
But what good was it to our festally excited ancestors to
have their attention absorbed? We might refer to the
Hindu Yogis who have found ecstatic delights in absorption ;
but they had reached a comparatively high stage of human
development. We have to consider a horde of savages in
the unknown time when they first began to form the habits
of festal excitement. Now one of the mental characters
that has given the savage the name " wild " in common
with untamed animals, is the fearful, startful, and untru<t-
ing way in which he directs his attention to his sur-
roundings. And whatever helped to absorb his attention
would help to free the feelings, at the bottom of the festal
excitement, from the small promptings of animal fears and
appetites, and thereby increase, or at least sustain, the wild
pleasures of the excitement. Therefore, if a horde once
acquired the habit of festal excitement, they would have an
inducement to bring regularity into the movements and
sounds produced through the physical energy of the excite-
ment. Without implying anything of the nature of
scious intention or choice, without implying that i
possessed the power of speech, we may fairly assume they
would be driven, at each revival of festal excitement, to feel
out a way of making the sounds more and more absorbing,
Supposing that articulate speech is still only a possibility
of the future, let us ask, what were the means in reach of
the players for promoting the absorbing efficacy of the
impressions coming from the play movements?
They could bring the movements of body, beats of sticks,
stones, &c., and cries, into a more or less regular succession.
But as we are at an exceedingly low stage of mental
development, we must not imply either the will or the way
328 j. DONOVAN :
to make good sounding bodies, i.e., musical instruments.
We must fall upon the means which lie nearest to each
player for making absorbing sounds, namely, their vocal
organs. What a scope of variety and contrast lay in
these ! There were the various changes of stress conse-
quent upon the most trifling jerk of body or of abdominal
muscles ; the changes of pitch and timbre consequent upon
the modification of position in the vocal organs ; and lastly,
but most important of all, the varieties and contrasts of
articulation which lay in the power of fauces, tongue, palate,
teeth and lips.
If the unconsciously working impulse to find as much
absorption as possible through successive auditory impres-
sions is not a fiction, the conclusion is inevitable that
articulation must result from it. And however poor were
the first vague attempts to articulate the uttered cries, the
progress of muscular skill in producing similar checks in
succession would have the same impulse behind it as induced
the articulation to begin. The muscles of the vocal appa-
ratus would gradually habituate themselves to the easiest
manner of checking the vocal sounds ; l and the movement
of lips toward each other, or of the tongue towards palate and
teeth, would get educated to the production of the same checks,
because their similarity for the ear would at first satisfy the
dim, unconscious impulse to obtain absorbing elements of
sensation in conjunction with the play excitement.
In asking what was the next step of development which
an impulse like this could effect, we must not imply that it
had already created any distinct consonantal articulation
before it began to develop other modifications ; for instance,
those of pitch and stress. The principle which embodies
this blind impulse gives us no permission to lay down a
chronological order of development. On that account, in
the above question, "next" only means "another" step.
Again our ethnological facts will guide us. The facts about
the rudest stages of festal play leave no room for guessing
another important direction of development which sounds
took to increase their attention-absorbing power. However
poor, from a musical point of view, be the results of the
beating of the rudest music-makers, they are found modi-
fying some sound in the continuous succession ; and they
bring in this modification at more or less regular intervals
1 Without regarding the fact as important evidence, it may be men-
tioned that savages are found checking the vocal sounds with their
hands "and his yells uttered quick, sharp, and cut 'off by the applica-
tion of the hand to the mouth" (tichookraft, Ind. Trib., pt. n. 60).
THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN Sl'I.I-c H.
in tin* series I mean tin- modification caused increase
Off Stress in the l>l-.w -truck. Tin- dimmr n of
tlii- iiiM.lij'hMl s<im<l in the series would inr.-m ;in ad.
absorbing ei'teet i\ -.-ness ; and this \v.>uld ensure an effort to
maintain the modification and make its recurrence regular.
Beyond a succession of mere units of sound, there would now
be a succession of groups ; the regularly recurring modifica-
tion marking each group of, say, two, three, or four sounds.
To produce a similar iii<>difu-ati<>n in the vocal utterance
rr(|iiiivd only a jerk of the breath, and this means is found
to be employed universally f.>r the function of mar
the ear the accentual groups of speech-sounds.
It is not to be expected that phonetic decay, 1 ter-
in.i: of consonants, the shift ing of accents, and other
inevitable results of the growth of the significant power
vllables, would leave extant many vestiges 01 this
process of the origin of the articulations and stress ace
i >eech. But it is important to observe that ear-absorl
Alliteration and reduplication 1 are most prevalent in
rudest stages of the development of speech ; and with regar
the accent of stress, its ear-attracting function clings to it still.
A moment's reflexion on our everyday speech will show that
the accent of stress calls our attention most pointedly 2 to
the most significant parts of words and sentences.
The notion that the rhythmical and poetical forn.
traditional remnants of savage speech are witnesses of a
higher stage of human development than that which e:
among the savages now, is deeply rooted in popular habits
of thinking, but not more deeply than in the views of
special scholars. But if it is proved that the rhythmic
mould of song is a direct outcome of unconscious attempts.
on the part of a horde that had formed habits of festal \
to feel out a means of preserving or increasing the
pleasure of festal elation, then rhythmic forms may appear
as witnesses of a lower stage of progress than any yet known
to anthropological records, namely, the stage of the passage
between brute and man.
Let us test the account which has already been given of
1 Sir J. Lubbock calculates that in four European languages there are
(inly two reduplicated words in a thousand, whilst in primitive languages,
there are from 37 to 170 in a thousand.
2 Heyse says : " It is a natural law that the more signir.
of our speech should be distinguished from the less significant by a
" (Si/stmi </ r Sfir., :^'. ; <7". I'.rnloru. /'/><(>
'
stronger accentuation
Tlunri,- da Ifniitlun a, p. i:-J ;' Humboldt, PtntkittL dtr Meiuch. Spr., 1880,
ii. 170; Journ. Autlir. In*t.. vi. -l.>9).
330 J. DONOVAN :
the origin of rhythmic and articulate sounds, by asking,
What course of development must the sounds have taken if
they were originated and moulded by festal excitement?
What was there to make them significant?
They would be most generally associated with the con-
fused elements of sensation belonging to festal play. But
to point towards the general emotional states associated
with the vocal utterances gives no satisfaction while the
question before us relates to the particular meanings which
would be fixed upon the utterances. The question to be
answered is : What particular sensations or perceptions
would, by the strength of their interest to the excited festal
players, force themselves first into prominence out of the
confused excitement ?
The more trouble we take in examining the ethno-
logical facts bearing upon the habits belonging to festal
excitement, the more likely we shall be to conclude that
among all the events of life which find a sort of play-
reflexion in festal habits, the actions of war preponderate
immensely. The war-dance is the most prevalent of all
imitated actions, 1 and the feelings manifested surpass those
accompanying any other actions in their realistic wildness.
Besides the guidance furnished by ethnological facts, natural
history has always taught that no actions of any animals
equal those of w r ar in the wildness of the feelings they
excite. As there can be little doubt that the actions of
war w T ere at the root of the earliest festal excitement ;
the perceptions of (1) captured enemies, living or dead;
(2) their possessions, females, food, &c. ; (3) slain comrades
of the victors, must be considered first when we look for
perceptions which would, by the strength of their interest
to the excited players, force themselves into prominence
out of the confused excitement. The hold of such objects
upon the interest of all warlike animals, whether they are
co-operative or not, makes it quite safe to suppose that any
of them might come into prominent notice amid the festal
excitement ; and every moment during which such objects,
connected as they are with the natural appetites of the
1 Even the African Pigmies (the Akka) performed the war-dance most
enthusiastically (Sweinfurth, Heart of Africa, p. 129). The predominance
of the war song and dance long ago made Langsdorff (Washington
Islands) and other travellers think that although many occasions besides
war awoke the excitement of song and dance at the time of their observa-
tions, yet originally the aborigines only danced and sang on their return
from war. And where war-dances are not customary it is generally
known that they have been in the past. (See Crawfurd, Hist. Ind.
Archip., vol. i. p. 122.)
THK FKSTAL oUKHN OF HUMAN SPEECH.
animal, could be dominated by the emotional strength of
I play, and kept, however dimly, m consciousness,
without linn- tin train of passions natural to t >uld
mean tin- melting away of a link in the chain which held
the animals below the possibility of human development.
Before the festal habits obtained the sway which they hold
in savage communities now, how often must the passions of
the lower animal have flooded the yet narrow field of
(destined) human consciousness, and turned tin- activities
of festal habit into the old activities of animal life! i
questionable vestiges of this struggle remain in the t'.
habits of savages, and in the early history of the it
habits of now civilised races. The realistic frenzy with
which imitations of the movements of attack upon enei
imitations of the passionate movements of wild animals,
i.e., sexual, &c., are performed, is certainly a result of tin-
discharge of passions awakened amid the festal habits,
through the nerve centres which rule the actual, appetite-
appeasing movements. But as long as festal excitement
could last, it remained the conquering element of feeling,
and was able to draw all the energy of actual passion to
promote its own inherent tendencies. Some terrible
amples of the moulding of animal-appetites and passions to
the tendencies of festal excitement exist in accounts of the
sacrificial cruelties of early festal celebrations, and revolting
examples of it in accounts of "phallic rites". At whatever
stage the traditional racial habits of festal celebration began
to acquire symbolic meanings in the minds of celebrants,
there can be no doubt, I think, that (1) bloody, human
sacrifices, (2) sacrifices of animals for food, and sacrificial
feasts generally, (3) phallic rites, were in their origin the
results of (1) the passion for slaying enemies, (2) the appe-
tite for food, (3) sexual passion, being drawn into the fire of
festal emotion.
AYhile considering this colouring of festal excitement by
particular animal passions, we must not lose sight of the
absorbing elements of sensation, the regular movements of
body, the rhythmic sounds of sticks and stones, the rhythmic
and articulated cries. It is perhaps impossible to estimate
too highly the value of this absorption for enabling the festal
excitement to mould the natural passions according to its
own tendencies, instead of being destroyed by them.
Besides the perceptions from captured objects of desire,
it was inevitable that the great changes of nature which
intimately affect all animal life, should at one time or
other obtain prominence in festal excitement. How many
332 j. DONOVAN :
circumstances helpful in gaining a victory over enemies or
wild animals, or conducive to the welfare of the horde in
other ways apart from fighting or hunting, would be noticed
occurring in connexion with the changes of light and dark-
ness, summer heat and winter cold, the storms, the rising
and falling of rivers, and fire ?
The answer to the question from which we set out,
namely, What would be the history of the articulated sounds
as they developed in their full rhythmic mould ? may run
as follows. They came into existence through the help they
offered in preserving the elements of feeling belonging to
festal play, and it is impossible that they should not go on
with their function when the elements grew more distinct,
and when the festal excitement was coloured by particular
perceptions now a slain leader, again captured booty ; now
the thunderstorm, again the bright moon. In the early
history of articulate sounds they could make no meaning
themselves, but they preserved and got intimately asso-
ciated with the peculiar feelings and perceptions that came
most prominently into the minds of the festal players daring
their excitement. Articulate sounds could impose no par-
ticular order upon the confused feelings and perceptions of
festal play ; they could only wait while they entered into
the order imposed upon them by the player's wild imitation
of actions, and then preserve them in that order. Articu-
lated utterances, in short, merely took up the acted stories
of deeds of glory which began in wild confusion when festal
play first began, but gradually found order through the
festal impulse to bring all the sensations and perceptions
that asserted themselves repeatedly into the order peculiar
to fighting, destroying, rapacious warriors.
These are the considerations which oblige us to run
counter to the notion that song, or rhythmical and poetical
forms, must be supervening embellishments of speech which
imply a certain height of civilisation. We have tested the
account given of the festal origin of rhythmic forms and
articulations, by leaving sounds aside and following the
inevitable course of cohesive order which would take place
among the sensations and perceptions dominant during
festal excitement ; and we come to the very cohesive prin-
ciple which holds together whatever ideas there are in
aboriginal songs and myths, namely, the principle of action
generally the impulsive action of beings in whom the
lowest animalistic impulses are mixed up with impulses of
a human character. But it remains to be asked whether
there was anything in the festal impulses that will account
I
THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SI
for the power which rhythmical ami artirulatr utterances
acquired in marking the details or relations of the acti'
ample, tlu-ir relation to individuals.
In tin accounts we possess of festal excitement in tin-
tages of human developnn marked by
impulse so universally as by the impulse to glorify tin-
>tivngth and prowess of the community through it> pro-
minent numbers, ancestral or living. How could it be
otherwise with excitement which was made to gather u\>
in itself all the wild communal feeling of a horde in actual
war? If a horde that had begun to acquire the hahits of
nl
festal excitement had in other respects only the i
of wolves or jackals, the excitement must in time give birth
to and nourish a desire to assert at least one grammatical
relation of an action of war, that is, its personal relation.
Whenever a powerful and bold fighter asserted himself in
actual war, the seeds would be sown which must grow into
a desire to assert this fighter and his prowess amid the
excitement of future, festal imitations of the actions of war.
Many circumstances, which must occur at some time or
other, would favour the growth of this desire.
First may be mentioned the self-assertion of the str
individual. (It is a distinguishing characteristic of
savage hero to boast of his deeds during festal excitement.
hing brings the character of Homeric heroes nearer to
that of the leaders among contemporary savages than thi>
personal assertion.)
( '2 ) The absence of the brave fighter at the time of the
festal excitement which followed his brave deeds.
(3) The presence of his dead body. (It is hardly neces-
sary to point to the universal prevalence of funeral dances
and sung praises of the dead hero.)
(4) The imitation of a particularly great feat of a strong
individual by one or more of the players who saw it per-
formed in the battle. Any of these occurrences would tend
to force the image of a particular fighter into the conscious-
ness of the excited players while it was occupied with the
general conception of victorious battle, and thus make their
emotion and its expression in imitated actions and vocal
utterances, an acted song of individual praise.
When a dog rushes savagely upon another and passes
other dogs on his way, he acts upon the principle, " that,
not these," quite as efficiently as if he could utter an articu-
late sound expressing the grammatical relation. A ruffian in
a passion might rush upon another man, and though he
possesses the articulate material and the mind for marking
334 j. DONOVAN :
the personal relation of his intended action, it avails him not
to do so ; he may only growl like the dog. The animal in-
stincts guide to their object as well without the material for
marking personal relations as with it.
This is very obvious, but one who bears it in mind will
better perceive the superiority of the festal impulse over
any Kfe-ca,ring impulses in regard to creating the desire of
marking the personal relations of an action to say nothing
about supplying the vocal material. Without the vestige of
a conscious intention behind it, this impulse induced the
players to dwell on some sort of an image of an individual in
relation to the actions imitated, whilst rhythmical and arti-
culate utterances were absorbing ear and mind, and, at the
same time, getting fixed upon the perceptions which they
were associated with repeatedly.
The fixing of the vocal utterances depended a great deal,
perhaps, upon those who surrendered themselves most com-
pletely to the festal impulses. The impulses to realise the
actions of the mighty members of their horde with all the
detail possible, and to preserve the regularly recurring move-
ments and utterances in their habitual order, would be fol-
lowed with most zest by the specially clever actors and cele-
brants, the prototypes of medicine men, dancing dervises,
shamans and yogis. The ecstatic results of the aural
reverie or absorption would be felt most by these, and lead
them to make the greatest efforts to furnish the sounds to
sustain it. These would most keenly feel the disturbance
caused when a group of syllables which had been associated
repeatedly with one action was produced with another.
The disturbance would consist of an interruption of the
smooth absorption, and those who felt it most would try to
avoid what caused it ; that is to say, they would keep par-
ticular groups of syllables in regular connexion with particular
actions, arid thus, without any object besides the blind fol-
lowing of the pleasure of festal elation, they would be gradu-
ally endowing the syllables with meaning. I will try to
illustrate by such syllables as are met with in savage choruses.
But it must be remembered that in the earliest stages of the
development of articulation, the syllables repeated were not
like the syllables of a savage chorus as they are now known.
If the syllables of a savage chorus were meaningless a cen-
tury ago, the traveller might confidently expect to find them
meaningless now. In fact it would be as great a wonder to
find that they had acquired meaning, as it would be to find
that the syllables Fal-la-la, or Tira-lira ! &c., were now
settled verbs or substantives, because they were used for
THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. 335
refrains in the middle ages. These syllables were not wanted
;gnificance, for language was developed already.
Tin- syllables whose history we have to follow were not
sung l>y developed men in possession of other artu- ,
syllable* with conceptual meanings clinging to them ;m.l
Irring them tit to mark any object they ca
Suppose then, that, with no concept-bearing syllabi*
istence to compete with them
(1) Kui-n /-//-/, -in- ///-/, .HI are repeated during the
wild festal imitation of the setting out of the hero and his
horde, their passage over mountains and rivers, &c.
(J) (fii-ii'im-i/n-gd-wan-yi'-i'-'i-'/K-ya are repeated during the
imitation of their coming in sight of enemies, attacking and
destroying them.
(3) Vi-ni-bt-n-ni-k<t-ini-u<t-ya are repeated during the
imitation of the seizure of the enemies' possessions, eat
and otherwise satisfying appetites.
With each revival of the excitement of this festal play,
the elements of feeling and imagined action must become
more and more cohesive; they must become like a new
instinct or habit, ready to flash into active sympathy in re-
sponse to any impressions of nature akin to them. Thus,
the vague groups of sensations held together by festal ab-
sorption in the actions of the strong fighter, as he fell upon
enemies and destroyed them, must sometime be awakened
into activity by the sight of a ravaging fire or the destructive
overflowing of a river ; and as sure as the group of dramati-
cally cohesive sensations were awakened into activity, the
articulate utterances, which were a part of them in the festal
excitement, would accompany them. In this way, from
being connected, as a sort of aural connecting bond, with the
confused concept of ttrsf /-fit/in;/, f/niranya would become its
vocal mark, and be uttered when any objects of nature gave
impressions which could, however faintly, touch the spring
of the latent mass of sensations belonging to the festal
imagining of the destroying warrior. The same may be said
of the syllables of the other two phrases in the illustration.
A mass of sensations rendered slightly cohesive as a concept
of wandering forth would be ready for sympathetic response
to impressions conveyed by, say, a wandering herd of the
quieter sort of animals, moving clouds, the sun or moon ;
and the syllables /<'///'/// would become their vocal sounding
mark. A vague concept, which we would describe as eating
or cnjui/'uKj, would be ready for sympathetic response to im-
pressions conveyed by, say, animals that were oftenest seen
satisfying their appetites; and pfatfa would become their
vocal mark.
336 j. DONOVAN :
It will be observed that there was plenty of time for any
little affinities of impression to assert themselves in the con-
sciousness of these festal players. For example, if the
affinities between impressions of moving clouds and the co-
hesive group of sensations belonging to the festal imitation
of the setting forth of warriors, did not assert themselves at
once, or were vaguely felt and then lost again, the cohesive
group would be still held togsther, ready for any favourable
circumstances of the future. The festal impulses which
drew the groups of sensations into cohesion did not depend
in any way upon the progress in naming objects of nature
which was made by the syllables connected with the different
cohesive groups. The pleasures which created the festal
habits sustained them by their first blind impulses, quite
independently of this further turn of development ; although
in time the results of naming would enter into the heart of
the festal excitement, and give it an impetus which it could
never receive from the bare rhythmic sounds and move-
ments. Then, the mere ear-absorbing sequences of sound
would have to yield to the interests of significance.
It could never have given much satisfaction to a philo-
logist with modern habits of mind to be told that he may
begin his interpretations at the rudest possible stages of
the development of speech, but he need not think of the
problem of its origin, as that is the rubicon between brute
and man. Ordinary scientific instincts must whisper to
the philologist that the secret of origin would save enor-
mous labours of plausible guessing about those early stages
of development which he is allowed to grapple with. For
instance, if he is invited to consider a root-period of
development, a period of the acquisition of grammatical
forms, and then a myth-making period, he might well feel
that the problem of origin, like a tough weed that ought to
have been cut down at the outset, has sent forth three
branches each as vigorous and obstructive as itself.
Yet the masters of philology who have uttered cautions
against the forming of opinions about origin had good
grounds for doing so. As there was no evolutionistic
view of origin which did not look to some kind of life-
caring impulses, what use would such views be in face,
say, of grammatical forms? What miracles would it require
to bring the broken and separate cares of appetite and
passion to establish these forms, even if the vocal material
and the desire for marking grammatical relations were at
hand, and nobody asked how appetite and passion could
create them?
THE FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH. 337
If festal habits had not been brought forward to account
for the vocal signs of concepts of actions, the problem of the
origin >!' .^raniinatical forms would point direct <*m,
i lu-r to the euphonic aspects of them. One who
glances over the ^rannnatical forms of any primitive Ian-
, and observes the great euphonic variety of sounds
elaborated out of a few simple elements, must be stn
with the fact that a similar phenomenon is displayed by the
ait of music. In respect of rhythmic groin a simi-
larity is complete; and the contrast and likeness between
individual sounds and groups in speech display a strong
musical impulse in "vocalic harmony," as well as in the
contrasts and varieties of consonants. But the guidance
offered by these exterior suggestions is of small value in
comparison with that offered by a simple pursuance of the
principle upon which the articulate sounds acquired meaning.
When particular syllables got fixed upon particular actions
tht \ would be brought up with them, and here two chief
interests of the festal excitement would begin to clash, the
interest of significance, and that belonging to the impulse
to make the vocal apparatus produce the easiest possible
enticements for the ear. As soon as a rudimentary signi-
ficance was felt, that is to say, as soon as it was felt as
wrong or disturbing to use any but a particular few syllables
in connexion with the imitation of a particular action, these
syllables would be brought up with the action, whether
or not their production at this moment disturbed the
absorption of the ear. The impulse to utter sounds which
would attract the ear most easily would be driven to make
the best of it by the easy repetition of the syllables used to
fill up the rhythmic phrase, after the occurrence of the
significant syllables. This filling up of the rhythmic phrase
is suggested by the syllables wd-ya-ya in the above illus-
tration, if such an illustration is necessary for pointing out
facts which are apparent in every stage of the t>rogress of
language. In the familiar observation of travellers about
the " unmeaning interjections scattered here and then
assist the metre" of savage songs, as well as in the most
polished alliterations, assonances, rhymes, refrains and
burthens, there can be no doubt that we behold the demands
for aural absorption trying to make their way among syl-
lables which have been fixed by significance. Of course,
in these later stages of development, we see the simply ear-
atn acting syllables driven out of the significant phrases
altogether, and left to refrains. There could be m:
room nor inclination for them among 3yllables which had
22
338 j. DONOVAN :
the full power of language. But in the earliest stages of
development, when no significance clung to any syllables
besides vague concepts of actions, the still meaningless syl-
lables would fall thick about them and become a ready
material for signifying the personal and temporal relations
of the actions.
With regard to explaining the progress of significance, it
would be an obvious mistake to look exclusively toward the
working of the blind impulses of festal excitement. When
we approach the use of grammatical tools we are certainly
at the confines of what could be effected under these blind
impulses. Indeed it is a question whether the rudest
articulate fixing of concepts of actions would not assert the
communicative utility of the syllables. If the sight of a
lion touched the spring of the latent mass of perceptions
made cohesive by the festal imitation of the destroying
warrior, and caused even a fragmentary imitation of the
action, and the utterance of a little group of the associated
syllables (i.e., c/awanga), the utility of the fragmentary act or
gesture and the utterance must begin to loom in con-
sciousness, however dimly, and make their further use an
affair of intention. I shall make no attempt to show how
impulses of festal excitement came to blend with conscious
endeavours to make distinctions of meaning, or what the
results of the blending would be. But it might be shown
that the syllables used blindly to fill up the rhythmic phrase
after the occurrence of the few syllables which had acquired
a fixed meaning were very apt for the marking of grammatical
relations.
First, the nature of the problem of the origin of gramma-
tical meanings should be made clear. The elements of the
conceptual meanings of actions were held together by the
bodily imitation of the actions ; but there were no imitated
actions to create and combine the vague notion of a personal
or temporal relation of many different actions, and fix it on
a particular few syllables. What was there instead ? The
inevitable growth of a conscious effort to distinguish has
been pointed out already. But how admirably the blind
festal impulses were adapted to meet the conscious efforts
half-way ! Let us take the fixing of a personal relation as
an example.
It is hardly necessary to insist further on the reality of
the festal impulse to dwell on the image of a prominent
member of the horde during the excitement of the play
imitation of the actions of war. The impulse that created
headstones and other rudiments of sculpture is not a thing
THi: FESTAL ORIGIN OF HUMAN SPEECH.
: latii 'ii. The same may be said of refrain-syllables in
a syllables, namely, winch an
up unehaiiLvd for the mere attraction of the ear, for
tilling up of rhytliniic phrases after the occurrence of
lahlrs of tix.-d meaning. At the stage of development \\
i derin^ we have the meaning of different G
cepts of actions fixed upon different little groups of syllables;
ami it is obvious that so far as these syllables predicated
tin- actions at all, th. y predicated them <>f th.- mnnh.
members of the horde whose image dominated the festal
itement. Now what could prevent some of the o
tinually repeated refrain-syllables from fixing themselves
:_:i -a dually upon whatever vague desire existed to assert a
demonstrative or pronominal notion? At any rate (and this
i^ all that is claimed), the refrain-syllables would be a well-
prepared grammatical material when a conscious effort to
murk a personal relation came to be made. Because, just
as the notion of the personal relation floated around succes-
sive and different actions, the auditory impression of these
iii-syllables floated around the successive, and different,
action-predicating syllables.
The permanent use of one grammatical tool would mean
the swift creation of the need of others; and the vocal
material for them would be supplied in plenty always by
the impulse to supply the articulate food for aural absorp-
tion.
One who holds this view of the origin of grammatical
forms will, I think, see no impenetrable mystery in the
wondrous regularity and euphonic adaptiveness of
grammatical forms of primitive languages ; and with regard
to cultured languages, it may be remarked that Prof. Sayce
quotes late studies by Bergaigne and Meyer in support of
his own conviction that a "thoroughgoing examination of
the Aryan declension would show that its origin was similar
to that of the Semitic noun, the cases being differentiated,
as the need of them arose, out of various more or less
unmeaning terminations". 1 And again, he says, "when
the conception of a locative case, for example, first arose in
the mind of the Aryan, he selected some formerly t-xi^tin^
but hitherto meaningless suffixes to express the new relat i
and so turned a mere phonetic complement, a mere formal
sound, into a grammatical inflexion ".
Comp. Phil., 3rd edit,, p. 396.
Ill THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. (III.)
By W. E. JOHNSON.
1. In the two previous numbers of MIND, I gave a general
view of the scope of logical symbolism. In the present
article, I propose to exhibit the working of the calculus in
greater detail. I must begin by recapitulating the points
maintained in my first article. Logic is regarded as con-
cerned primarily with the principles of propositional synthesis.
In the first instance, then, literal symbols will be used to re-
present unanalysed propositions. The fundamental mode of
synthesis called conjunction par excellence I take to be that
indicated by the word and. This mode of conjunction will
be simply symbolised by juxtaposition of the propositions
conjoined. The fundamental relation between proposition and
proposition called contradiction or negation is that indicated
by the particle not. This particle will be represented by a
bar, drawn over the proposition or conjunction of proposi-
tions to be contradicted. It should be explicitly stated at
the outset that the negation or the conjunction of unam-
biguous propositions yields an unambiguous proposition.
Hence the formulae that hold for propositions in general
hold for the negation and contradiction of propositions.
The following are the formal universal laws of propositional
synthesis, expressed by means of = , the symbol of equiva-
lence :
I. The Commutative Law ; xy yx.
II. The Associative Law ; xy.z = x.yz.
III. The Law of Tautology ; xx=?x.
IV. The Law of Reciprocity ; x = x.
V. The Law of Dichotomy ; x = xy ~xy.
In the derivation of rules, it .will be unnecessary to make
explicit reference to the first two laws, as they have their
equivalents in ordinary Algebra. The third law allows us
to repeat, or to cancel the repetition, of any determinant.
The fourth law is chiefly applied to give a reciprocal
form to any equivalence. For instance, since _cc = af, the
reciprocal form of the Law of Dichotomy is x = xy xy. The
Law of Dichotomy itself, which is the chief instrument of
the calculus, may be applied either to resolve any proposition
into two determinants, or to compound a pair of determinants
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 341
into a single proposition. We shall use the terms Resolution
;u id Composition in referring to these two applications of
the law.
The omission of determinants will be indicated by the
symhnl . . ., as explained in my last paper. Hence the
partial equivalence a ... c must be read : " a contains c
as a determinant ". A proposition that denies a con-
junctive will be called a i/iy'ituctive. Disjunctives are
cith- or complex. A simple disjunctive is one that
disjoins single letters or their contradictories, such as
yy, M/Z. A- complex disjunctive is one that contains sub-
disjunction ; i.e., that disjoins a proposition that is itself A
disjunctive, such as xy In 2, I shall deal with simple
disjunctives, and in 3 with complex disjunctives.
2. Rule of Elimination : xa xc = . . . ac.
For xa = Hue X<M by Kesolution ;
and m = xac Icac by Resolution ;
but xac xac = ac by Composition.
This shows that ac is a determinant of the given combina-
tion ; viz., the determinant from which x has been eliminated.
The rule of elimination may be thus rendered : Terms that
are disjoined irith x and with x may be disjoined with one
a/mother. By repeated application of this rule, we may
eliminate ./; from a conjunction of any number of simple
disjunctives. Thus :
xaxcxexg = . . . ac ag ct eg.
The derivation of such results requires besides the com-
mutative and associative laws also the Law of Tautology.
The required determinant is found by disjoining every term
disjoined with x with every term disjoined with x. Again,
we may eliminate in the same way any number of terms,
x, y t &c. Thus :
ax cy xy = . . . ay cy . . . ac.
The derivation of the rule shows, moreover, what de-
terminants have been omitted in arriving at the required
determinant : riz. t in the fundamental formula given above,
xac xac. These, together with ac, make up the full import
of the original combination.
3. In this section we shall show how any complex dis-
junctive may be resolved into simple disjunctives. To
establish this we may first prove two minor rules of simpli-
fication :
342 w. E. JOHNSON :
Rule of Inclusion : acc = c.
For c = dc ac by Resolution.
Hence the determinant ac in conjunction with c is, by the
Law of Tautology, superfluous. Writing c for c, we obtain
the reciprocal rule ac c = c.
Rule of Exclusion : ac c = ac.
For dc ac ac c by Resolution of a,
= ac c by Reci 1 . form of Inclusion.
Writing c for c, we obtain the reciprocal rule ace a c.
By aid of these two subsidiary rules, we proceed to prove the
Rule of Distribution : xac = xa xc.
For xac = xac c xac c by Resolution,
= xac xc by Exc n . and Inc 11 .,
= xdcjjcdc xac by Resolution,
= xa xc by Taut y . and Comp n .
The Rule of Distribution thus enables us to get rid of
all complex disjunction. Hence, after reducing any com-
plex combination to a conjunction of simple disjunctives,
we may apply the rule of elimination.
4. Interpretation of the Preceding Rules. The advantage
of deriving the rules in the above forms is that we may give
a variety of different interpretations to each formula, and
thus bring various logical processes under a common prin-
ciple. We have only to interpret the disjunctive xy in one
or other of its _f our_forms, viz., (1) If x then y ; (2) If y then
x ; (3) Either x or y ; (4) Not-both x and y. Take, for ex-
ample, the Rule of Exclusion, which may be written:
(1) dec = . . . a (2) ace = . . . d
(3) dec = ... a (4) ace = ... d.
This rule gives the formula for any argument involving
a hypothetical, alternative, or disjunctive combined with a
categorical premiss. Thus :
(1) If c then a, but c .'. a (Ponendo Ponens).
(2) If a then c, but c .'. a (Tollendo Tollens).
(3) Either a or c, but c /. a (Tollendo Ponens).
(4) Not-both a and c, but c .'. d (Ponendo Tollens). 1
1 It is clear that the argument " Either a or c, but c, .*. not a" is only
valid in so far as it rests on the disjunction of a and c, not on their alter-
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 343
pin, the Kule <>f Kliminatioii contains the principle of
the middle term ' of syllogistic arguments. Thus :
. . . oc
may be interpreted : " If a thenz, and if a; then r ; . if" then
i the first figure. The same formula rives argum. >\\\
the other three figures, as well as equivalent arguments in
alternative or disjunctive form. The arguments deduced
from this are of the general nature of the dilemma. Thus
the second result deduced above from the rule of elimination
may be interpreted : " If a then x and if c then y ; but either
or not-y ; .*. either not-a or not-c ".
I have given these elementary illustrations in order to
show how the fundamental laws regulating pure synthesis
and negation may be applied in building up arguments of
gradually increasing complexity. It will be seen that a
formally inferred conclusion is always a formal determinant
of the premisses. Arid, if desired, we may introduce the
omitted determinants which, with the conclusion, make up
the full import of these premisses. Thus, in the syllogism
of the_first figure given above, the omitted determinants are
i.e., " If a and c, then x ; and If x, then a or c".
5. The Constant of Prepositional Synthesis. In Algebra
the symbols 1, 2, 3 . . . have constant values, as contrasted
with the letter-symbols a,b,c... which may have different
values in different contexts. Similarly, in Logic, we shall
find that there is one form of proposition which (with its
contradictory) has a constant prepositional value. The
theorem that expresses this principle is the
Rule of Constancy : aa = cc.
For aa = ac ac ac ac by Resolution. And, since cc may be
similarly resolved into the same set of determinants differ-
ently grouped, we have aa = cc. In words : Any conjunction of
contradictories has the same prepositional value, and may, there-
fore, be always expressed by the same symbol. In order to
avoid the numerical implications of the symbols and 1, I
shall use the Greek letters < and r to represent this con-
stant and its contradictory. Thus </> will represent a formal
falsity or falsism, and r will represent a formal truth or
truism. The rules for the conjunction of </> and r with any
other proposition are the following :
nation. Hence the proper form for expressing the argument Ponendo
Tollens is that jivi-n in the text.
344 w. E. JOHNSON :
Kule of Nonsignificance : a^ = (/>.
For acj) = aaa = aa = <.
Rule of Insignificance : ar = a.
For, in the Law of Dichotomy, ac ac = a,
Write a for c, thus : aa aa = a ;
that is ar = a.
\
In this way we have proved our right to introduce these
constants </> and r into the logical calculus, by deducing
their existence and modes of combining with other proposi-
tions from the fundamental laws. The rules of conjunction
may be read : The conjunction of afalsism witli any proposition
is a falsism : and a truism may be omitted as an insignificant
determinant. Regarding determination as analogous to addi-
tion, the Laws a(j> = <p and ar = a are respectively analogous
to the Arithmetical Laws a -f- oo = oo and a + = a. In
other words, <f> is the infinite, and r the zero of determinative
synthesis. This observation shoWs the degree of arbitrari-
ness involved in Boole's plan of representing these symbols
by and 1 respectively.
An obvious corollary from the Rules of Nonsignificance
and Insignificance is that :
ace = r.
For ace = a<$> = < = r.
Interpreted in hypothetical form, this becomes : " If a and c,
then c " is a truism. That is, the formula ace = r in which
the rules of falsism and truism are combined may be inter-
preted as exhibiting the Principle of Formal Implication.
The use of the constants r and < requires some discussion.
Boole used non-formal equations x = 1 and x = to repre-
sent respectively " x is true" and " x is false". But this
procedure appears to suggest an illusory distinction between
the prepositional symbol and the equation. For the for-
mal logician, in admitting into his system the judgment
"x is true" or "x is false," admits neither more nor less
than the judgment x or x. If x is a non-formal proposition,
formal logic cannot guarantee its truth : it can only regard
it as a determinant of the system of . truth obtained from
other than formal sources. Hence instead of using equations
to represent non-formal judgments, I shall use separate
letter- symbols x, x. Instead of distinguishing x from x = 1,
Formal Logic requires to distinguish a non-formal judgment
for which 1 cannot be substituted, i.e., which cannot be
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS.
omitted as an insignificant determinant from a formal
jiul-iiicnt for which 1 //>"// be substituted, /.., which may
be omitted as as insignificant determinant. In my method,
therefore, an explicit equivalence indicated by the symbol
= , must always be understood as a formal equivalence.
(i. General Formula for Expansion and Elimination. By
continued application of the Rule of Distribution, we have
seen that any complex may be resolved into a conjunction
of simple disjunctives. Consider then any leti . The
disjunctive xxa = r maybe omitted as an insignificant de-
terminant. Again, a disjunctive involving neither x nor x
may, by the Law of Dichotomy, be resolved into two dis-
junctives one containing x and the other x. Lastly, by
the Rule of Distribution, the disjunctives containing x may
be compounded into a single disjunctive containing x, and
those containing x into a single disjunctive containing x.
Thus any complex, say/(), involving x may be written :
f(x) = xa xc = . . . ac by Elimination,
where a and c do not contain x and are, therefore, un-
altered when any value is given to x. If then we give
to x successively the values r and <, we have :
/(r) = ra <>c = a
= rc = <>
Hence, by Keciprocity, a = f(r) and c =/(</>).
This result is equivalent to Boole's formulae of Expansion
and Elimination. It also contains the rule for evaluating x,
i.e., for finding what consequent follows on the supposition
of x, and what antecedent must be supposed from which x
will follow. That is, interpreting the two determinants of
/C/-) in hypothetical form, we have :
(1) If a; then /CO = If/(r) then x.
(2) If x then/()= If /(<#>) then x.
It should be explained that the rules of this section are
not intended to be used for working out particular problems.
For this purpose much simpler methods may always be
adopted. The rules give the general form that any solution
of a problem will take, and are, therefore, of considerable
theoretic interest. But they are even less necessary or con-
346 w. E. JOHNSON :
venient for the solution of particular logical problems than
are the general formulae of Algebra for the solution of
algebraical equations. But they have also a definite value,
in that they enable us to prove the validity of general
methods of solution, by supplying us with a form of proposi-
tion which is at once (1) universal, and (2) simple.
7. The Formal Introduction of Alternative Synthesis. We
define (a; or y) to mean the contradictory of (x and y).
Hence, by the la_w of Reciprocity, the contradictory of
(x or y) is (x and y) ; and, by the same law, the contradic-
tory of any combination is found by replacing every con-
stituent proposition by its contradictory, and every and by
or, and every or by and. Now our formulae of equivalence
involve (1) variable symbols, such as x, y, which, being
understood as universals, may be replaced by any other
variable symbols, and (2) invariable symbols (viz., and and or,
(f> and r) which cannot be replaced by any other symbols.
Given any equivalence, then, we may replace each variable
by its contradictory, and then take the contradictory of
both sides of the equivalence. The result of this double
transformation is that every and has been replaced by or,
every < by T, and conversely, while the variable symbols
have remained unchanged.
Every formal equivalence has, therefore, two reciprocal
forms. The several formulae may be simply deduced from
those of (1) Dichotomy, and (2) Distribution : viz. :
(1) x = (x and y) or (x and y).
(!') x (x or y) and (x or y).
(2) x and (y or z) = (x and y) or (x and z).
(2') x or (y and z) = (x or T/) and (x or z).
Thus, in (2), replace z by y, and we have from (1)
(3) x and (y or y) = x.
(3') x or (y and y) = x.
Writing y or y = r ; y and y = <, (3) gives the rule of
Insignificance : i.e., T is insignificant as a determinant, and
cj) as an alternant.
Also, if we express any function of x in the form
(4) f(x) = (a and x) or (c and x) ;
(4') f(x) = (a or x) and (c or x),
we see that a = /(T) and c =/(<)
Lastly, by the rule of distribution, " a or c " is a determi-
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. -U7
nant, "a and c" is an alternant of the above expression,
Th;it is, th- (-liiiiiiKitK.n es these results :
(5) /CO contains/ (T) .or /(<) as determinant ;
(5') /CO contains /(T) and/(<) as alternant.
8. TJie Selection of Determinants or of Alternant*. It has
been already pointed out that any determinant of a given
synthesis is a conclusion that would formally follow from the
supposition of the given synthesis; and that an alurnu
a premiss from the supposition of which the given synthesis
would formally follow. Thus a determinant may be called
implication, and an alternant may be called an //>/ana-
tion. The implication is less determinate, while the ex-
planation is more determinate than the given complex.
Thus the discovery of implications is of the general nature
of Deduction, that of explanations of the general nature
of Induction. The implication or explanation that is
sought is in general of some assigned description. In such
a case we seek the most determinate implication or the most
i ml >t<'r urinate explanation possible under the assigned con-
ditions of the problem. In other words, we make as small
a sacrifice of precision in the case of an implication, and as
small a sacrifice of caution in the case of an explanation.
In particular, our ignorance as to the truth or falsity
of some constituent proposition x leads to the need for an
implication that is independent of #. And a postulate that
reality is not coming -nt upon the truth or falsity of some
constituent ,/ leads to the presumption of an explanation that
is independent of ,>. In both these cases we find a result
that involves the elimination of jr. The general solution of
such problems is given at the end of the last section. Thus,
if /CO is any given complex involving*, the most determinate
implication not involving x is /(T) or/(<) ; the most inde-
terminate explanation not involving x is/(r) and /(</>).
These formulae give the general results of what may be called
the Deductive and Inductive syllogism. Writing a for/(r)
and c for /(<), the synthesis
(If./-, then a) and (If not .r, then nas f r its implication
" a or c," and for its explanation " a and c ".
Applications of the Deductive Formula are familiar to
logicians. But it may be pointed out that the Induct i\v
Formula has some analogy to the elimination involved in the
Method of Agreement. In the simplest form of this method,
we have two premisses, each of which contains a compound
antecedent and consequent. The conjunction of the con-
348 w. E. JOHNSON :
stituents of the antecedent is the condition upon which one
or other of the constituents of the consequent is assumed to
depend. The two cases contain common as well as contrary
elements. They may, therefore, be expressed
(If a and x, then b or y) and (If a and x, then I or y),
= (b or y or a or x) and (b or y or a or x),
= b or a or (y and x) or (y and x) .
Here the alternant or explanation, obtained under the
postulate of independence as regards x, is " b or a, i.e., " If
a then & ".
9. Reduction of Pro-positional Complexes to Alternant or to
Determinant Form. The two forms of the Kule of Distri-
bution, viz. :
x and (y or 2) = (x and y) or (# and z),
x or (y and z) = (x or y) and (# or 2),
should be compared with the Algebraical rule
x X (y -f 2) = (# X ;//) + (a; x ).
The application of this latter enables us to reduce any
expression from factor-form to term-form by a direct process,
but not conversely. In Logic, on the other hand, we may use
precisely the same direct process to reduce any complex
either (1) from determinant-form to alternant-form, or
(2) from alternant-form to determinant-form. Boole's
scheme in which and is denoted by x , and or by H has
rendered the former of these processes familiar to all sym-
bolists. But even those symbolists who have worked out
the reciprocal relation between and and or, appear to me to
be rather hampered in applying this rule of Distribution by
their retention of Boole's symbols. 1
The data of a logical problem are usually given as a de-
terminative combination of so-called premisses. This deter-
minative combination may be transformed into an alternative
combination by the process of " multiplying out ". We thus
obtain the series of combinations, one or other of which must
hold under the given conditions. Even this problem Jevons
preferred to solve by an indirect method. In the converse
problem, an alternative combination has to be transformed
into a determinative combination. This second problem
1 Arithmetical symbols might be used by those unfamiliar with
Logical processes in the following way : When required to reduce to
alternant-form, denote and by x and or by 4- ; when required to reduce
to determinant-form, denote or by x and and by + .
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. Mil*
Jevons called the Inverse Problem, and he held that it could
be solved only by a succession of guesses. In reality, how-
ever, it requires only the same direct process as the li
i In; process of " multiplying out". Thus let the ori{j
o>inl>in;iti<>ii be :
(If x then c) and (If x then a),
= (x or c) and (z or a).
Putting here x for and, + for or, and multiplying out, we
obtain after simplification :
(x and a) or (x and c).
This is the transformation from determinative to alternative
form. To transform back, we put X for or, + for and, and
multiplying out, we obtain ugaiu after simplification :
(x or c) and (x or a).
The equivalence of these two forms which we have
obtained by applying the Rules of Distribution is of great
importance. It illustrates the formula :
/(,) == | x and /(r) j or j x and/(<)
) = | x or /(<) | and j x or f(r) }
where f(r), /(</>) have taken the place of a and c respectively.
The equivalence in question will form the basis of the
method of the next article.
We see now that the dual form of the Rule of Distribution
enables us to pass from a determinative to an alternative
combination and conversely, by a direct process of the nature
of multiplying out. And thus Jevons's so-called Inverse
Problem, however complex, may be solved by a straightfor-
ward procedure. 1
10. Proposed Notation for the General Solution of Logical
ProUems. The process of " multiplying out," suggested in
the last section, would be long and tedious. A very simple
plan of notation will enable us to solve logical problems of
1 Jevons believed that this problem was the basis of Inductive pro-
cedure. But the results obtained by it are neither more general nor
more conjectural than the data. In fact, the series of propositions
derived are the determinants, i.e., the deductively implied conclusions
from the data. They are not alternants or hypothetical ly adopted ex-
planations. The relation between the Inverse Problem and Induction
appears, therefore, to break down at every point.
350 W. E. JOHNSON :
the kind contemplated almost at a glance. The plan I
propose is the following :
Represent and by horizontal juxtaposition, and or ly vertical
juxtaposition.
In this method a bar drawn horizontally or vertically
will serve the purposes of a bracket where necessary. But
in this case Jevons's plan of writing large and small letters
for contradictories may conveniently be adopted. 1 The main
formulae would now appear as follows :
B
b
-A ;
A
Bb
= A
B
C
AB
~AC ;
A
BC
A
"B
A
c-
The application of this last (the Distributive) Rule gives :
AB_A
CD~C
B
D
A I B
D C-
Hence, in general, we should have to distinguish the two
forms :
AB A
CD and C
B
D'
Of these the former contains the latter as a determinant. 2
But, if contradictories are placed in a pair of diagonally
opposite corners, the horizontal or vertical bar may be
omitted. Thus :
X A
C x
is a combination that may be read either in alternants or in
determinants. For :
(X and A) or (C and x} = (X or C) and (A or x),
according to the result of the preceding section.
By adopting the plan of placing successive letter-symbols
1 A more suggestive plan would be to print the letters upright or hori-
zontally, according as they denote any proposition or its contradictory.
On this plan, the contradictory of any complex would be found by the
simple expedient of turning the paper through a right-angle, so that every
and would become or and conversely, while every constituent proposition
would be replaced by its contradictory.
2 In words : Of two combinations involving the same modes of
synthesis of the same constituents, that one is the more determinate
in which the determinative synthesis is internal to the alternative. This
is one of the most important generalisations of the calculus.
THE L0<;
in opposite corners, we may solve the Inverse Problem with
surprising ease. The method of solution closely resembles
the third of those adopted by Dr. Keynes [Formal Logic,
and it was this that suggested mine. 1 will, there-
lore, illustrate by taking Dr. Keynes's three examples, which
are the following :
BC
A/*-
abC
C
\b
B
a
'
Here the columns or determinants may be read off:
(C or Ab) and (B or a or c) = (If c, then AJb) and (If AC, then B).
II. ACe_
Ce c
b
acdE a E
This is read : (If c, then a E) and (If BD, then C), and (If C,
then e).
III. ABC
BCD
aBc
B
C
A
D
a
d
c
A
D
b
a
A D
abCd
That is : (If &. then Crf), and (If W, then a), and (If ABD,
then C), and (If BCd, then A.). 1
The notation thus explained enables us to solve any
problems in a simple manner. The expression in its final
form may be read equally well in columns or in rows, i.e.,
as a determinative or as an alternative synthesis. Of course,
a precisely similar process may be used, if we started with
determinatively given or mixed data.
1 In this last problem, we first place B and 6 opposite ; then for the
B alternants, we place C and c opposite, and for the 6 alternants A and
(i. To get the simplest result, we should aim at dividing the columns
into as equal divisions as possible.
352 w. E. JOHNSON :
The notation partially answers the purpose of diagram-
matic representation. It is, in fact, a sort of cross between
Jevons's " Logical Alphabet " and Dr. Venn's " Departmental
Diagrams ". For the departments laterally adjacent to any
letter represent the divisions of the corresponding class
which are left standing. Hence the notation combines in
one scheme an analytical and a geometrical solution of
logical problems.
11. The Synthesis of Singly -quantified Propositions. When
a proposition is analysed into subject and predication, we
represent the synthesis of propositions containing any the
same subject by a corresponding synthesis of predications.
The rules, therefore, for the transformation of propositions
may be applied to transform the predications of any indi-
vidual subject.
Adopting now the notation of my preceding article, we
write p . q for p and q ; p ' q for p or q. Further, we abbrevi-
ate the universal and particular quantifications (Every m)
and (Some m) respectively by writing :
Hence, by the associative and commutative laws :
(1) mp . mq = m (p . q). (2) mp ' mq = m (p ' q).
In words : (1) Universals may be determinatively com-
pounded or resolved by determinatively compounding or
resolving their predications ; (2) Particulars may be alterna-
tively compounded or resolved by alternatively compounding
or resolving their predications.
Hence, by the law of dichotomy :
mp = m (p q) . m (p'q)', mq = m (p- q). m (p ' q).
mp = m (p . q) m (p . q) ; mq = m (p . q) ' m (p . q).
Observing here that the universals mp and mq contain the
common determinant m (p'q), and that the particulars
mp and mq contain the common alternant m (p . q), we have,
by the rule of distribution :
(3) mp mq = m (p ' q) . \m (p'q)' m (p '
(4) mp.mq= m (p . q) ]m(p. q) . m (p .
In words : (3) The alternative combination of universals
is more determinate than the universal obtained by alter-
natively combining the predications ; (4) The determinative
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 353
combination of particulars is less determinate than the par-
ticular obtained by determi natively combining the predica-
tion^. 1
Observing, further, that the alternant m (p.q) contained
in inp contradicts the determinant m (p' q) contained in mq,
it follows that
(5) mp.mq - m (p.q). mq.
(6) mq ' mp = m (p'q)' mp.
In words : (1) and (5) The predication of a universal may
be determinatively combined with the predication of any
co-determinant ; (2) and (6) The predication of a particular
may be alternatively combined with the predication of any
co-alternant.
12. Synthesis of Multiply-quantified Propositions. In
multiply-quantified propositions, the external quantification
must be regarded primarily as quantified subject, and all
that is internal to it as the predication for that subject. If
this principle is clearly grasped, it will easily be seen that
the rules for the synthesis of multiply-quantified propositions
follow immediately from those for the synthesis of singly-
quantified propositions. E.g. :
miip mn . mn q mn = m (np mn . nq mn ) by (1).
= m [n (p . q) mn . nq mn j- by (5).
The only application of this principle that requires special
notice is that from such equivalences as
(1) mp m .mq m = m (p.q) m .
(4) mp m 'mq m = . . . m (p'q) m ,
we may deduce the rules for the commutation of quantifica-
tions, viz. :
(A) mn p mn = nm p mn ,
(B) nm p mn = ... mn p mn .
In words : (A) Similar quantifications may be commuted ;
(B) The internal -quantification has potency over the
external.
Besides these rules, the following obvious, but important,
observations must be added : I. A quantified symbol attached
1 These rules illustrate the principle : Internal synthesis has potency
over external synthesis. [See note, p. 355.]
23
354 w. E. JOHNSON :
to a molecular proposition that does not contain that symbol
as suffix may be omitted ; thus mp n = p n . Hence II. A
quantified symbol may be transferred across any determinant
or alternant that does not contain that symbol, e.g. :
mn (b m .Jc mn ) = m (b m .nk mn ).
Now two subject-symbols may be called independent of one
another if they are not connected directly or mediately in
the moleculars : thus, in the synthesis p xy ' q yz , x is directly
connected with y and (through y) it is mediately connected
with z. Hence x, y, z are here not independent subject-
symbols. But in the synthesis p xy ' q y ' r s , s is independent
of x, y, z. This leads to a third observation, viz. : III.
The order of externality amongst independent quantifica-
tions is indifferent. Thus :
nm \p m 'q n ) = n (q n 'mpm) = nq n ' mp m = mn (p m 'q n ).
IV. Conversely, then, propositions expressed in independent
subject-symbols may be at once syrithesised into a single
proposition. Thus :
m x u [p] . n v z [q] = m x u n v z [p . q]
= m n v z x u [p . q],
where p and q are any complexes involving the subjects,
m, x, u and n, v, z respectively. In such a combination, we
may arrange the quantifications of one group in any order
amongst those of an independent group, but we must not
disarrange the quantifications of the separate propositions
synthesised.
The simplest example of this procedure is in the determi-
native combination of a universal and particular. E.g., given
the synthesis mp m .nq n = mn (p m .q n ). If now m and n
though explicitly different' symbols really refer to the
same universe, we may drop the internal and universally
quantified symbol n, and replace it by m, so that we have
m (p . q) m as a determinant. This method will be required
in the next section.
13. Method for Selecting Determinants or Alternants. It
has been explained that the general aim in selecting deter-
minants or alternants is to find the most determinate de-
terminant or the most indeterminate alternant of some
assigned description. In solving such problems, the fol-
lowing simple rule has to be adopted : Before dropping any
determinants, internalise every determinative synthesis ; and
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS.
before dropping any alternants, internalise every alternative
synthesis. 1
The explanation of this rule in detail will require us to
take up the three following problems in the order of their
complexity : I. The synthesis of unanalysed propositions;
II. The synthesis of singly-quantified propositions ; III.
The synthesis of multiply-quantified propositions.
I shall refer only to the selection of determinants. '\
principles for the selection of alternants may be derived
lioin those for the selection of determinants by simply
interchanging the terms determinative and alternative,
universal and particular.
I. The Selection of a Determinant from a Synthesis of Un-
it.iiK/i/xrd Propositions. Following the rule " Internalise
every determinative synthesis," we must begin by (1) ex-
pressing the propositional synthesis in a series of propositional
ultt rnants. Thus :
\ (p and u,-) or (q and y) \ and \ (c and #) or z \
becomes
(p and # and z) or (q and y and z) or (q and c and # and ?/)
according to the rule of distribution. [We may here
introduce any simplifications that leave the determina-
tive synthesis internal to the alternative.] A determinant
of the whole complex may now be found by (2) taking a
determinant from every alternant? Thus :
p or (q and y) or (q and c and y) = p or (q and y)
is the determinant from which x and z have been eliminated.
The rule is a direct corollary from the Rule of Distribution
(writing x for 0r, and + for and}. To obtain the most de-
terminate determinant from a synthesis of unanalysed pro-
positions, it is, therefore, only necessary to remember to
express the synthesis in alternants before dropping the
determinants not needed.
II. The Selection of a Determinant from tJie Synthesis of
Singly-quantified Propositions. Here, as before, we first
internalise every determinative synthesis, by expressing the
propositional synthesis in a series of propositional alternants.
1 In accordance with the principle that inttrnal synthesis has potency
over external.
-This rule is equivalent to that given by Dr. Mitchell. [/. H. S.
Studies, p. 80.]
356 w. E. JOHNSON :
Now each alternant will involve determinants, which may
be universal or particular propositions. Now in these alter-
nants we have again to internalise the determinative syn-
theses as far as possible. That is : In each alternant,
combine determinatively the predications of every universal
determinant with those of each co-determinant (in accord-
ance with formulae (1) and (5) of 11). The remaining
processes are merely a repetition of the two processes of L,
working with predications instead of with propositions.
For example :
(Every m is p, or Some m is q), and (No m is q, or
Every m is s).
This must first be expressed in alternants ; thus :
(Every m is p, and Every m is q), or (Some m is q, and
Every m is s).
Secondly, we must combine the predications determina-
tively ; thus :
(Every m isp and q) or< (Some m is q and s) and Every m is s L
Thirdly, supposing the letters p, q, s to stand for complex
predications, we must express the predications' of the above
propositions in alternants. And
Fourthly, we must select the appropriate determinants
from each alternant last formed.
III. The Selection of a Determinant from the Synthesis of
Multiply -quantified Propositions. Here, as before, the first
step is to express the prepositional synthesis in a series
of prepositional alternants. Each alternant may then
be considered separately, as a determinative synthesis
of variously quantified propositions. Of the various ways
in which these propositions may be synthesised into a
single proposition, we must choose according to the fol-
lowing principle : viz., so that the particular quantifica-
tions are, as far as possible, external to the universal. 1
E.g., consider the synthesis :
m x u [p] and n v z [q],
where p is a complex of moleculars involving m, x, u, and q
a complex of moleculars involving n, v, z. In synthesising
here, we must first place the particular m externally to the
universal n. Having done so, we have the choice of placing
1 According to the rule " Internalise every determinative synthesis ".
THE LOGICAL CALCULUS. 357
u externally to n t or of placing v externally to x. The above
synthesis gives then :
m x u n v z [p.q] m n v z x u [p.'q].
These two forms are at present equivalent, because the
symbols m, x, u are independent of n, v, z.
Now the chief consideration required for our present
problem is that different subject-symbols have often to be
used to refer to the same universe or category of subjects.
Suppose, then, in the given problem m and z really refer to
the same universe, although they are explicitly different
symbols. In such a case a determinant may always be
found by the following rule :
Of the two equivalent subject-symbols, the internal one
may be dropped as a quantified subject, if it is universally
quantified, and may be replaced as a suffix by the other
equivalent subject-symbol.
For a universally quantified term may be transferred
externally until it merges with its equivalent. In the given
problem, then, we may drop the quantification z, and replace
the suffix z by m. We thus obtain the two determinants :
ra x u n v [p . q] . m n v x u [p.q],
where z has been replaced by m in the complex q. We have
now internalised the predications p and q as determinatively
as possible. Finally, we must make our selection of deter-
minants from the entire synthesis :
iii ./; u [p] . n v m [q] .m x u n v [p.q] . m n v x u [p . q] .
IV. THE FIELD OF AESTHETICS PSYCHO-
LOGICALLY CONSIDEEED. I.
By H. K. MARSHALL.
1. ^Esthetics may be looked upon as a special branch of
the broader Science of Hedonics, and must be so viewed, it
appears to me, if we are to make satisfactory progress in the
psychological treatment of its problems.
If this be true, the Pleasure-Pain theory which I have
advanced (see MIND, 56, 63, and 64) should find corrobora-
tion in the phenomena which we call ^Esthetic, and the
theory in its turn should aid us in grasping ^Esthetic
principles.
It is probable that some of my readers will be unable to
accept as self-evident my position that the essential
characteristic in ^Esthetics is to be found in the hedonic
effect produced by the work of Art, 1 and therefore before I
can make use of the corroborative evidence or attempt to
indicate the ^Esthetic principles to which the theory seems
to lead it is necessary to ask these readers to review the steps
which lead me to take this view.
It must be stated here that I shall, in what follows, use
the words Art and ^Esthetics in a very wide sense.
Any device of man which serves to produce in any one an
^Esthetic thrill I shall not hesitate to call a work of Art.
When a man is experiencing or has experienced an Esthetic
feeling must be judged by his statement which cannot be
questioned or by some less distinct expression. We must
allow that that object has wrought an ^Esthetic effect which
has produced on general lines the same individual or racial
expression that we accept as evidence of ^Esthetic enjoyment
in ourselves and our own friends with whom we sympathise
fully. I think this wide use of terms will be justified in
what follows.
Comparatively few people in our day, even among those
who claim wide cultivation, realise how much of human
1 This consideration of the effect upon the observer is too often ob-
scured by failure to separate it from the problem concerning the impulse
which leads to Art production, which is on its face an entirely different
matter.
FIELD OF ESTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED. 359
thought has been given in the past to the philosophic C
sideration of ^Esthetics, although the special student of Art
theory soon becomes impressed with this fact; for turn
whither he will, he finds his way blocked by the ruins of
systems which obstruct and obscure his path. That we
have reached very little satisfactory result is indeed true,
and this fact, no doubt, explains the existing inappreciation
of the importance of ^Esthetic Philosophy itself and account >
for the small general interest which is taken in the work of
the ]>a>i in this direction.
However tedious the labour be, the student of to-day who
hopes to advance must necessarily endeavour to gain a com-
prehensive view of what has been done in the past. Our
relatively modern methods of written record have given to
the thought of the past few centuries a retentiveness which
makes it for us a didactic entity, and the historical method
therefore has in these days become of primary importance.
The student of ^Esthetic theory finds his work long and
laborious, and after it all, must admit, I think, on the whole,
that ^Esthetic Psychology has gained little of fundamental
importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past.
This is by no means because ^Esthetic problems have been
left unconsidered by the best thinkers ; rather because they
have looked upon them for the most part as secondary
issues; issues of moment, truly, but subordinate to
systemisation which from other points of view had become
of predominant importance.
It is because of this subordination that we find on every
side presentations of eminently partial views. In some
cases these are held as valid, and made the basis of unsatis-
factory dogmatism. In other cases we find the discussion
carried forward on lines so narrow that the student becomes
doubtful how far the writer has intended to claim his prin-
ciples as fundamental. Note, for instance, the Cartesian
treatment of beauty which limits its range to elements of
sight pleasure ; and the notion of Aristotle as to the relation
of Imitation to Art, to which we refer below : views of
masters these are indeed ; but views which we are unable to
take seriously, now-a-days.
It happens thus that our study brings the masters of
thought before us in most cases as ''prophets," in the old
Scriptural sense, rather than as scientific teachers. They
furnish us with inspiration for our work and with data of
value drawn from their own experience ; of more value indeed,
for the most part, than the theories which they propound.
On the other hand, we find in many cases men of less im-
360 H. B. MARSHALL :
portance in the world of thought touching special problems
of psychologic aesthetics in more satisfactory manner than
the well-recognised master. 1
It seems to me clear that Non-hedonistic ^Esthetic
theories have, from a psychological point of view, re-
sulted in failure.
In the section which follows this I attempt to show the
lines on which these non-hedonistic theories have developed
and the directions in which they fail.
This section may be passed over without break in the
argument by any reader who will allow the points contained
in the paragraphs with which the third section opens.
2. The earliest definite thought centres around objects
which attract attention : nor is this objective reference ex-
clusively a characteristic of crude thinking ; it is natural for
any one whose point of view is cosmological rather than
psychological. We should expect, therefore, to find early
writers, and in later times men for whom the world of ob-
jects is specially important, examining the beautiful object
itself for some quality or qualities which must be present if
it is to appear beautiful ; qualities which will account for the
effect produced by its contemplation!
Aristotle's ^Esthetic theory had evidently a strong objec-
tive bent. Although he held that one of the ends for which
the artist worked was the giving of pleasure, this pleasure
was to be given by the imitation of beautiful objects, and in
these he thought he had found certain distinctly objective
qualities upon which beauty depended; such as* Order,
Symmetry, a certain Magnitude.
Only fragments of his Art theory, however, seem to have
come down to us, and what we have is so evidently incom-
plete that it can only be referred to illustratively.
His principle of Imitation, for instance, casts out of
the ^Esthetic field most of music and practically all of
architecture, and his demand for Symmetry excludes much
which all the world now-a-days agrees to call aesthetic.
Tendencies to objectivism appear in the aesthetic work of
many later writers of the highest authority, e.g., Herbart and
1 The .(Esthetic hedonist does not need to look far for the psychologic
explanation of this fact, for it is well recognised that the psychosis of
thought is not strong in pleasure-pain elements ; men whose lives are
given to thought and who write of thought must expect to lose in them-
selves all predominance of Pleasure and Pain in direct connexion with
the subject-matter of their writing ; and if pleasure be of the essence of.
aesthetics it is but natural that aesthetic problems should be given a
secondary place by such writers.
FIELD OF AESTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED. 361
his followers, and in that of men of less weight from the
psychologists' standpoint. Edmund Murkc, who has givt n
us a work on the Sublime which is valuable in many direc-
tions, shows this tendency. He gives us a set of objects
qualities as necessary to beauty, which art- manit'< stly inade-
quate to cover the ground. 1 The thought of Hogarth as an
active art worker in a certain line is worthy of consideration
as expressing a natural, although superficial, solution of
the ^Esthetic problem. His six elements of beauty, 2 very
different from Burke's, are equally incomprehensive.
This special method of procedure has not often been
seriously carried out, however, and doubtless because the
difficulties which appear soon became overwhelming. The
indefinite variety of those objects which are looked upon as
beautiful makes hopeless the task of enumerating objective
qualities which shall cover all the ground.
Plato's ideas were emphatically objective, and, notwith-
standing assertions to the contrary, modern Idealism itself
has never been able to shake off this objectiveness so far as
aesthetics is concerned. In presenting to us Ideals, Uni-
versals, Absolutes, as fixed aesthetic standards, it has in .this
very fact taken an objective attitude. 3 The value of modern
Idealism in its bearing upon philosophic questions being
granted, we must admit, I think, that psychologic aesthetics
gains very little from it. So far as its tenets are not covered
in what we shall discuss in what follows it gives us little in
this direction which is not psychologic mysticism. It has
had much to say concerning aesthetics, but largely to force
it into line with some preconceived metaphysical system or
to make it fill some gap which otherwise would leave the
thought sequence incomplete. 4 The relation of the Universal
to the Particular ; of the Idea to its objective realisation ;
of the Absolute to the Finite, have been made to account
for aesthetic effects in many different ways, but without
leaving us any help in deciding why objects are beautiful or
which of divergent standards must be accepted. This last
question presents the great stumbling-block to the accept-
1 Smallness of size Smoothness Gradual variation of outline
Delicacy Brightness Purity and softness of colour.
2 Fitness to some design Variety Uniformity Eegularity or Sym-
metry Simplicity Intricacy Quantity.
3 Even those who turn away from an objective search would be likrly
to say that the aesthetic psychosis implied an objective content, but not
even here are thinkers agreed ; Schleiermacher seems to hold the produc-
tive faculty alone to be essential in ^Esthetics.
4 Kant's treatment under Quantity, Quality, Kelativity, Modality.
362 H. K. MAESHALL :
ance of any form of Universal Idealism or Absolutism, so far
as ^Esthetic standard is concerned ; for if there be an absolute
Ideal Beauty, a Universal Beauty, why should any one
differ radically from me as to whether an object before us is
aesthetic or not ? Or again, why should my own change of
mental attitude make me think that beautiful now, which
some years ago I thought worthless ? Perhaps my reader
will say, with Lotze, that development of capacity for the
apprehension of this Ideal is necessary ; that if he thinks the
object before us is beautiful and I do not, it shows that my
capacity to grasp the Ideal is more limited than his own.
But suppose before us an object which you call aesthetic, and
which is not merely negatively indifferent to me, but posi-
tively ugly disagreeable to me ; although I may perhaps be
able to look back to a time when it was aesthetic for me also.
It is not that I find it unaesthetic, but utterly the reverse of
aesthetic ; that is, it is quite opposed to my standard, while it
is in accord with yours ; the standards, therefore, cannot differ
by mere limitation, but are radically contradictory. Bergman 1
suggests the ingenious hypothesis that the difference lies in
actual difference of object grasped ; that you and I think we
grasp the same thing, but really do not. That the Ideals
do not differ, but that we are incorrectly comparing different
Ideals. If this position be accepted, we must, so far as I can
see, acknowledge all taste as equally authoritative in
the positing of a standard, and this takes away the very
basis of the Idealistic position here discussed. Perhaps
it might be maintained that, notwithstanding this diversity
of the appreciation of beauty, the criterion of Universality
is valid, by claiming that that is called beautiful which we
think of as Universal, however far that Universality may be
from being a fact. Such argument, however, will not hold,
for in most cases we are aware fully of the existence of
diverse views as to the object which is beautiful for us, and
notwithstanding this, our feeling is distinct and clear and is
not in its essence changed by any consideration of the fact
that others differ from us in their judgment.
Mr. Begg, 2 who approaches the subject from an intui-
tionist's standpoint, takes a distinct objective position, and
acutely suggests that diversity of standard does not argue
against the objectiveness of beauty but in favour of its uni-
versal distribution. Different people differ in their capacity
1 Bergman, Ueber das Schone, pp. 168 ff.
2 W. Proudfoot Begg, The Development of Taste and other Studies in
^Esthetics, chap. viii.
FIELD OF .ESTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED. 363
to perceive the beauty in some special object, but it is there
for all that, if one single person sees it. He who considers
the object ugly is so constituted that he is affected by other
qualities in the object than its beauty, and these latter draw
his thought away to special ugliness.
Such a position, however, if I understand it, can be main-
tained only by one who has not yet seen the force of the
modern criticism of " faculty psychology". The argument
in favour of beauty as a manifestation of an objective uni-
versality is weakened by the lack of any clear separation of
the character of universality from the non-aesthetic. I,
for my part, cannot agree that the merely agreeable is
not often recognised as non-individual. What others
call pleasure, people as a rule are very ready to class
as agreeable, while they are not at all ready to allow an
objective impression to be beautiful unless they delight
in it themselves. On the other hand, I cannot feel that
the aesthetic thrill is any less egoistic than the most purely
individual sense gratification. Truly the work of art is
realised as giving pleasure to others as well as ourselves,
and this knowledge of sympathy adds keenly to our enjoy-
ment, but mere universality does not raise a pleasure into
the aesthetic field, for were this so, many of those pleasures
which we call the very lowest would be of the very highest
aesthetic value, and much that we hold to be best would be
cut out of the field by the smallness of the number who re-
joice with us. It is patent to all that the world of the artist
who is in advance is small, and yet we cannot on any accep-
tation of terms say that his work is on that account un-
aesthetic. If we gain little else from the study of these
systems, one fact is brought to our notice which is of con-
siderable psychologic importance, and to which we shall
return, namely, that these thinkers find their aesthetic field
not only wide but relatively permanent ; were it not so,
introspection would so clearly deny the conceptions of
Universality and Absolutism that they could not be defended.
Let us now turn to the subjective view of the Esthetic
Field.
Could we go back to the days of the " Faculty Psycho-
logists " our task were simple, for then we, with Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson, might satisfy ourselves by the assumption
of a special internal sense for the perception of beauty ;
modern psychology, however, compels us to discard this and
all kindred views.
Earlier thought of an introspective character, whatever
be its direction, tends to lay especial stress upon (a) Sen-
364 H. E. MARSHALL :
sualism. We see this to-day in the careful work of our
painstaking psycho-physicists and in the thought of those
whom they influence : in fact, we all find it difficult to avoid
over-emphasis of the importance of sense-organ products.
The study of the beautiful from its introspective side has
not infrequently shown this same over-emphasis. 1 The
very term ^Esthetics in its derivation has a sense connota-
tion : Baumgarten first used it because he looked upon the
beautiful as the perfection of Sensuous knowledge, and
Kant's "Transcendental Esthetic" treats of the a priori
principles of Sense. Perhaps the most thorough-going
statement of the Sensualistic position is given in our own
time by Mr. Grant Allen in his Physiological ^Esthetics, but
he himself has apparently lost faith in his own work 2 in
this special direction, and it need not therefore be considered
at length. Although the sense-impressions give the normal
initiative in a vast majority of our aesthetic psychoses, it is
impossible in the field of sense to obtain any satisfactory
solution of aesthetic problems : and men will not accept a
view so narrow ; they recognise at once that the effect pro-
duced upon them by a beautiful object is wider and fuller
than sense-impression.
(b) If the use of terms forms a basis for classification, a
good deal of the theory of the past may be classed as Emo-
tional, and this is true, especially among English thinkers,
of whom we may mention Alison and Jas. Mill. But
" Emotion " is a word of very indefinite meaning when it is
made to describe the sesthetic field. It is either employed
with little departure from the usage of the question- waiving
" faculty psychologists," or else it represents little more
than complexity of Pleasure or Pain. Emotionalism under
the first signification merely restates the questions of
^Esthetics, and under the second throws us back upon
hedonism, which we shall presently consider.
(c) The most emphatic drift of thought in the direction
of the Content is, and has been, towards Intellectualism, and
naturally so. When critical examination fails to show any
special intellectual product which, in width and in nature,
corresponds with ^Esthetic effect, there is a natural diversion
of attention to the examination of the Intellectual processes
1 Burke is quoted by Von Hartmann as a representative sensualist, but
I think it more proper to class him as an Emotionalist. He defines
Beauty as a " quality by which an object causes love or some passion
similar to it ".
2 See MIND, No. 45.
FIELD OF ESTHETICS PSVCIK U.niili ALLY < < >.\ SlDl.KED. 365
themselves, which leads in its extreme development to (d)
Ixi Id Rationalism.
" Harmony " <!' mental action (and cruder notions as to
objective harmony are seldom altogether eliminated) and
tiir process of " Unification of the Manifold" are now and
iigain brought forward as all sufficient to account for
hetic result : but it is easy to show that we live in an
atmosphere of harmonies and are constantly dealing with
unitk's in manifoldness which not only have no marked
aesthetic character, but ordinarily are devoid of all aesthetic
character whatever, and the same argument holds against
other similar principles.
Rationalism even in its crudest form takes a strong hold
upon men's minds, and maintains its ground, especially
among German thinkers, although often too covertly held
and vaguely stated. It is easy to see, however, that no
amount of argument, however conclusive its form may be,
can change our notion of what is, or what is not, beautiful
unless it induce an actual change in the matter which is
presented to thought. No better position is gained by re-
ferring the process to sub-consciousness ; by arguing that
the effect is due to recognition of relations too delicate to
rise above the " threshold," but grasped, for all that, in the
^Esthetic state of mind.
This is a cowardly means of covering defeat which one
with no little surprise finds willingly accepted by thinkers
of the highest rank to this day (e.g., Helrnholtz and his
school), and with the best of authorities in the past to give
weight to such method : for it must be remembered that
Kant was only willing to give Music a position among the
Arts of Beauty because of the fine mathematical relation
betw r een harmonious tones which from other investigations
have been found to exist, and which he supposed to be sub-
consciously grasped in the Esthetic effects of Music.
The vaguer statements of simpler Intellectualism, which
one finds so frequently, merely go to emphasise the fact
that reflective thought is of the greatest importance in the
^Esthetic psychosis. The best work of later writers, as we
shall see in what follows, tends to give value not only to the
Sensual, and the Emotional, but also to the Intellectual, as
all involved in the aesthetic state, as we know it, and this is
the position to which we would be led by our synthetic line
of thought, if no other evidence appeared.
I do not find that the contentions of the Formalist, ex-
cept so far as they are hedonistic, go far to help us psycho-
logically. Concrete formalism fails to give us any unassail-
366 H. K. MAKSHALL :
able criterion of the aest 
