Full text of "Mind"
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MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
THE ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
EDITED BY
G. F. STOUT,
WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR H. SIDGWICK, DR. E. CAIRO,
DR. VENN, PROFESSOR WARD, AND PROFESSOR TITCHENER.
NEW SERIES.
VOL. VIII.-I899-
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON,
AND 20 SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
1899.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII.
(NEW SERIES.)
ARTICLES.
PAGE
BOSANQDET, B. Social Automatism and the Imitation Theory . .** 167
BBADLEY, F. H. Some Remarks on Memory and Inference . . 145
CALKINS, M. W. Time as Related to Causality and to Space . . 216
CABB, H. W. On Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's Metaphysic of Experience 383
HODGSON, S. H. Psychological Philosophies 433
-LATTA, R. On the Relations between the Philosophy of Spinoza and
that of Leibniz 333"
McEwEN, B. Kant's Proof of the Proposition, " Mathematical Judg-
ments are One and All Synthetical " 506
MCTAGGABT, J. E. Hegel's Treatment of the Categories of the Objec-
tive Notion 35
BE, G. E. The Nature of Judgment 176
RASHDALL, H. Can There Be a Sum of Pleasures ? . ^\. . . 357
RAVENSHEAB, A. F. Testimony and Authority 63
RITCHIE, D. G. Philosophy and the Study of Philosophers . . 1
SCOTT, W. R. James Arbuckle and His Relation to the Molesworth-
Shaf tesbury School 194
SPILLEB, G. Routine Process 438
STBATTON, G. M. The Spatial Harmony of Touch and Sight . . 492
TONNIES, F. (trans, by Mrs. B. Bosanquet). Philosophical Termino-
logy (I.) 289
TONNIES, F. (trans, by Mrs. B. Bosanquet). Philosophical Termino-
logy (II.) * 467
WASHBUBN, Miss M. F. Subjective Colour and the After-image :
Their Signification for the Theory of Attention .... 25
CRITICAL NOTICES.
ALEXANDEB, S. T. Lipps, Raumaesthetik und geometrisch - optische
Tauschungen 84
BOSANQUET, B. J. P. Durand (Le Gros), Aperqus de Taxinomie
Generate 531
EDITOB. H. Cornelius, Psychologic als ErfahrungsioissenscJiaft . . 256
GABDINEB, H. N. F. Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologic .... 233
HICKS, G. D. P. Barth, Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie
(Erster Theil) 114
JONES, E. E. C. C. Read, Logic, Deductive and Inductive ... 96
MAcCoLL, H. A. N. Whitehead, A Treatise on Universal Algebra, etc.
(vol. i.) 108
MACKENZIE, J. S. C. v. Ehrenfels, System der Werttheorie . . . 524
MABETT, R. R. H. R. Marshall, Instinct and Reason .... 536
>MOOBE, G. E. B. Russell, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry 397
1 To be concluded in vol. ix., No. 33 (January, 1900).
VI
CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII.
MORRISON, W. D. L. Stein, Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philo-
sophie 91
RASHDALL, H. W. Wallace, Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology,
etc 406
RUSSELL, B. A. Meinong, Ueber die Bedeutung des Weberschen
Gesetzes 251
SCHILLER, F. C. S. F. Podmore, Studies in Psychical Research . . 101
,, H. Miinsterberg, Psychology and Life . . . 540
SHAND, A. F. P. Malapert, Les Elements du Caractere, etc. . . 242
WHITTAKER, T. A. W. Benn, The Philosophy of Greece, etc. . . 410
NEW BOOKS.
ALEXANDER, A. Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy . 270
ALLEN, G. The Evolution of the Idea of God, etc 119
AMBROSI, L. La Psicologia dell' Immaginazione nella storia della
filosofia 422
BALDWIN, E. L. (see Groos).
BALDWIN, J. M. The Story of the Mind (Library of Useful Stories) . 124
BENN, A. W. The Philosophy of Greece, etc. (Preliminary Notice) . 270
BERNARD-LEROY, E. L' Illusion de Fausse Reconnaissance, etc. . 275
BERR, H. L'Avenir de la Philosophic 550
BON, F. Ueber das Sollen und das Gute, etc 420
BON, G. G.The Psychology of Peoples, etc 122
BOWNE, B. P. Metaphysics (Revised Edition) 269
BUELL, G. S. Essentials of Psychology 270
CADET, F. Port-Royal Education, etc. (trans. A. D. Jones) . . 125
CAJORI, F. A History of Physics in Its Elementary Branches, etc. . 546
CARUS, P. Nirvana : A Story of Bitddhistic Philosophy . . . 124
CONKLIN, E. G. (see Jordan).
CORNELIUS, H. Psychologic als Erfahrungswissenschaft (Preliminary
Notice) 133
CREIGHTON, J. E. An Introductory Logic 414
DEXTER, T. F. G., and GARLICK, A. H. Psychology in the Schoolroom 544
DORMAN, M. R. P. Ignorance, etc 120
DUPRAT, G. L. L' Instability Mentale 547
EHRENFELS, C. VON. System der Werttheorie (Preliminary Notice) . 275
FAGGI, A. Principi di Psicologia Moderna criticamente esposti . . 275
FLEURY, M. DE. UAme du Criminel : 419
FHAGAPANE, S. Obbieto e limiti della filosofia del diritto . . . 133
PHASER, A. C. Thomas Reid (Famous Scots Series) .... 123
GARLICK, A. H. (see Dexter).
GERARD-VARET, L. Ulgnorance et L' Irreflexion .... 549
GIDDINGS, F. H. The Elements of Sociology 417
GROOS, K. TJie Play of Animals (trans. E. L. Baldwin) . . . 123
GROSS, H. Criminalpsychologie 422
HIBBEN, J. G. The Problems of Philosophy, etc. .... 416
HOGAN, L. E. The Study of a Child 268
HOLMAN, S. W. Matter, Energy, Force and Work, etc. . . . 417
HUTCHINSON, W. r J.'he Gospel according to Darwin .... 415
IRELAND, W. W. The Mental Affections of Children, etc. . . . 266
JAMES, W. Human Immortality, etc. (Preliminary Notice) . . 123
,, Human Immortality (Full Notice) 261
Talks to Teachers on Psyclwlogy, etc 544
JEVONS, F. B. An Introduction to the History of Religion . . . 120
JONES, A. D. (see Cadet).
JORDAN, D. S., CONKLIN, E. G., MCFARLAND, F. M.,and SMITH, J. P.
Footnotes to Evolution, etc 416
KRAEPELIN'S Psychologische Arbeiten (Band ii., 2 u. 3 Hefte) . . 130
KRUEGER, F. Der Begriff des absolut Wertwollen, etc. . . . 131
LAMPERIERE, A. Le Rdle sociale de la Femme 551
CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII. Vll
PAGE
LANG, A. The Making of Religion 119
LATTA, B. (see Leibniz).
LEE, P. S. (see Verworn).
LEIBNIZ, G. W. The Monodology and other Philosophical Writings
(trans. B. Latta) 263
LEVY, P. L' Education rationelle de la Volonte, etc 273
LEVY-BBUHL, L. Lettres Inedites de John Stuart Mill a Auguste Comte 548
LUTOSLAWSKI, W. Ueber die Grundvoraussetzungen und Consequenzen
der individualistischen Weltanschauung . . . . 552
LUTOSLAWSKI, W. Seelenmacht ; Abriss einer Zeitgemdssen Weltan-
schauung 552
MCFABLAND, F. M. (see Jordan).
MEBCIEB, D. Les Origines de la Psychologic Contemporaine . . 271
MIVABT, ST. G. The Groundwork of Science, etc 269
MOBGAN, C. L. Psychology for Teachers 124
NAEGELI, C. VON. A Mechanico-Psychological Theory of Organic
Evolution 125
NYS, D. La Notion du Temps d'apres Us principes de Saint Thomas
d'Aquin 273
PAYSON, E. P. Suggestions towards an Applied Science of Sociology . 418
PEBES, J. L'Art et le Reel 127
POWELL, J. W. Truth and Error : or the Science of Intellection . . 415
BASIDS, C. E. Rechte und Pflichten der Kritik 132
BIBEBT, L. Essai d'une Philosophic Nouvelle yuggeree par la Science . 274
BOOSA, ST. J. Defective Eyesight, etc 546
BOYCE, J. Studies of Good and Evil 118
SALEILLES, B. L' Individualisation de la Peine, etc 418
SCHOPIELD, A. T. The Unconscious Mind 124
SCHUBEBT, H. Mathematical Essays and Recreations .... 417
SIEBEBT, O. Geschichte der neueren Deutschen Philosophic seit Hegel,
etc f. 553
SMITH, J. P. (see Jordan).
SPENCEB, H. The Principles of Biology (vol. i. revised and enlarged). 545
STABCKE, C. N. La Famille dans les Differentes Societes (Bibliotheque
Sociologique Internationale, xvi.) 272
STUMPF, C. Konsonanz und Dissonanz (Beitrage zur Akustik und
Musikwissenschaft, Heft i.) 128
SUTHEBLAND, A. The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct . . 121
TABANTINO, G. Saggio sulla Volontdf . 133
TABDE, G. Les Lois Sociales, etc 125
j&tudes de Psychologic Sociale- 125
TAYLOB, A. B. The Study of the Child, etc 122
VEBWOBN, M. General Physiology, etc. (trans. F. S. Lee) . . . 545
VIEBKANDT, A. NaturvOlker und Kulturvolker, etc 131
VILLA, G. La Psicologia Contemporanea 554
WALLACE, A. B. The Wonderful Century 121
WATSON, J. An Outline of Philosophy, etc 265
WEIB, J. The Dawn of Reason : Mental Traits in the Lower Animals 546
PHILOSOPHICAL PEBIODICALS.
Philosophical Review (vol. vii., No. 4. vol. viii. No. 2) . 136, 278, 425, 558
Psychological Review (vol. v., No. 5 vol. vi., No. 2) . . 137, 278, 425, 558
American Journal of Psychology (vol. ix., No. 4 vol. x.,
No. 2) 138, 280, 426
Revue Philosophique (October, 1898 September, 1899)
L'Annee Philosophique, 1897
L'Annee Psychologique, 1898
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (September, 1898 Nov
ember, 1898)
Revue Neo-Scolastique (No. 18 No. 20) ...
139, 280, 427, 559
285
283
282,560
140, 282, 561
Vlll CONTENTS OF VOLUME VIII.
PAGE
Zeitschrift f. Psychologic u. Physiologic der Sinnesorgane
(Bd. xviii., Heft 1 Bd. nd., Heft 2) .... 140, 286, 429, 561
Philosophische Studien (Bd. xiv., Heft 3 Bd. xv., Heft 1) . 143, 430, 563
Zeitschrift f. Philosophic u. Philosophische Kritik (August,
1898 November, 1898) 287, 564
Vierteljahrsschrift f. wissenschaftliche Philosophic (Jahrg.
xxii., Heft 4 Jahrg. xxiii., Heft 3) .... 143, 288, 431, 565
Archiv f. systematische Philosophic (Band iv., Heft 4 Band
v., Heft 3) 143, 431, 566
Philosophisches Jahrbuch (Bd. xi., Heft 2 Bd. xi., Heft 4). 143, 431, 566
Pfliiger's Archiv f. d. ges. Physiologic (Bd. Ixvi., Heft 3
Bd. Ixxiii., Heft 2) 567
Bivista Italiana di Filosofia (March-April, 1898 September-
October, 1898) 144, 432, 567
NOTES.
RITCHIE, D. G. Hegel's Early Studies A Correction. . 568
American agent for Mind 568
'1
NEW SERIES. No. 29.] [JANUARY, 1899.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
-3se-
I. PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF
PHILOSOPHERS. 1
BY D. G. RITCHIE.
THOSE who are engaged in the study of metaphysical philo-
sophy often find themselves criticised by those who are
working at the special sciences on the ground that, while
the special sciences are continually adding to the sum of
human knowledge and to man's power over nature, meta-
physical philosophy makes no progress, but consists merely
in a chaos of rival and contradictory speculations. And it
is sometimes said that a clear proof of the barrenness of
the pursuit is to be found in the attention devoted to the
philosophers of the past, and even of a very remote past.
The student of chemistry or biology is referred to the latest
text-books ; the student of metaphysics is sent back to
Locke and Kant, to Descartes and Spinoza, or even to
Plato and Aristotle. Some great scientific workers have
themselves been imbued with the taste or passion for philo-
sophy, and, like Huxley for instance, have been able to
appreciate both the scientific and the philosophical work of
Descartes or Aristotle. Some scientific men also recognise
that in their own special departments a study of the history
of scientific ideas is not an altogether irrelevant part of their
work. Still it remains true, that the average scientific
specialist feels convinced, or speaks as if he were convinced,
of the futility of metaphysics, and regards the history of
metaphysical variations and our occupation with it as a
confirmation of his sceptical attitude.
1 Presidential address delivered to the Aristotelian Society, 4th
November, 1898.
2 D. G. RITCHIE :
Even those who are themselves busied with philosophical
studies at times feel a certain doubt about their own posi-
tion. The uncomfortable suspicion suggests itself that the
great amount of writing and discussion actually going on
upon philosophical subjects may perhaps after all be no real
proof of the vitality of metaphysics ; for a very large and,
as some may think, the most interesting and most valuable
part of it is concerned with the careful exposition and criti-
cism of the great philosophers. Philosophy, especially in
Germany, long the chosen home of metaphysics, appears to
have become very largely the study of its own history. The
age of creation seems at an end, and our days have fallen in
an " Alexandrian " period of commentators and critics. The
biography of metaphysics is being so minutely written that
we begin to fear that metaphysics itself must be dead, and
that what we are studying and elaborating so anxiously is
but a long and not altogether favourable obituary notice.
With such objections and doubts I propose to deal at
present by asking two questions : (1 ) May not the nature
of philosophy itself render inevitable this perpetual recur-
rence to the thought of the past ? and (2) may there not be
special reasons in our own age why this historical interest
should be predominant ? These questions are not new, and
I do not profess to have anything very new to say upon
them ; but they seem to me to be worth discussing afresh
in a philosophical society which devotes no small part of its
time to the study of past philosophy, and which by its very
name professes a permanent debt to him whom several
centuries called " the philosopher ".
I do not think it accurate to describe the progress of the
special sciences as consisting in a continuous accumulation
of facts. An accumulation of facts is never science, but only
the materials for science. Progress in the sciences consists
in the substitution of more adequate concepts or categories
for those by which we have hitherto attempted to unify and
make intelligible to ourselves some parts or aspects of our
experience. New facts are, indeed, the occasion for framing
new concepts, and new concepts aid in the discovery of new
facts ; but the accumulation of facts is not what is essential
in scientific progress. To take a simple illustration, the fact
that the sun is seen on one side of the sky in the morning
and on the other side in the evening can be explained by
the movement of the sun over the earth the theory which
we all use in our " common-sense " thinking and when we
speak of " sunrise " and " sunset ". The fact has been ex-
plained more adequately by the revolution of the earth on
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 3
its axis. So again, while the Darwinian theory of natural
selection has incidentally led to the observation of many
previously unnoticed facts about plants and animals, the
theory itself is not an addition to our sum of facts but the
substitution of a new definition of" species " for an old one.
Indeed the old type of naturalist often collected many more
facts (and specimens) than the new biologist, but his facts
lay simply alongside of one another and were not held
together by a continuous thread of theory.
Now, if the sciences, being, in Mr. Herbert Spencer's
phrase, " partially unified knowledge," have their history
marked by changes in their unifying concepts, much more
must this be the case with philosophy, which attempts to
reach complete unification of knowledge I say " attempts
to reach," for, just as Pythagoras took "lover of wisdom "
and not " wise " for his title, so must we define philosophy,
not as " completely unified knowledge," but as the effort or
endeavour to reach it. A new fact may upset an accepted
scientific theory ; but not merely every new fact and every
new event in the physical universe, but every new scientific
theory (being a new event in the region of mind) is a new
fact for philosophy, and the unifying and systematising con-
cepts of philosophy must therefore be constantly subject to
revision and modification. The main occupation of philo-
sophy comes therefore to be the examination of those con-
cepts that serve well enough for the provisional and very
partial unifications of ordinary life, and of those concepts
that serve well enough for the unification of the special
sciences which deal with particular aspects of the world
taken in abstraction from one another. Philosophy must
primarily and at least be " a criticism of categories ". The
criticism consists in seeking to discover the relations of the
various concepts, which are used uncritically in ordinary
and in scientific thinking, to the ultimate data of experience
(and what these are it is of course the concern of philosophy
to discover, for common-sense and even the special sciences
are alike content to accept as facts what are really un analysed
and unconscious theories) ; but beyond this primary task of
philosophical criticism, it must, in the very effort to be
thoroughgoing, proceed to consider the relation of these
fundamental concepts to one another, and in doing this
even a professedly critical philosophy must to some extent
become constructive and speculative.
If we define philosophy (or metaphysics) as the theory of
reality and its method as the analysis of experience, I do not
think this can bring us to a conception of philosophy and of
4 D. G. EITCHIE :
its relation to the special sciences different from that which
I have just adopted. The reality which philosophy attempts
to understand must be reality as a whole, but as knowable by us.
With the genuinely " unknowable " we can have nothing to
do, and it is waste of words to talk about it. The reality we
deal with must mean the same thing as experience " ex-
perience," however, being taken in its very widest sense.
Each of the special sciences takes up some aspect of reality.
Each of them, therefore, deals with abstractions of varying
degrees of abstractness and not with the whole concrete fact.
It is with the totality, with the concrete, complex whole
that philosophy attempts to deal. If we consider psychology
as one of the special sciences, we must nevertheless recognise
that it divides the field of experience with the other sciences
in a different way from that in which they divide it between
themselves. They are each concerned with some aspect of
the content of experience, some with more abstract, others
with less abstract, aspects ; but all, even the least abstract
of them, e.g., biology and sociology, leave out of consideration
the fact that no reality exists for us at all save as an actual
or possible object of consciousness. Psychology, on the
other hand, makes the opposite abstraction. It is concerned
with experience only on its subjective side, with the mental
process as such, and is not directly concerned with this or
that aspect of the content. Now, philosophy as the attempt
to understand experience as a whole, to get at " the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," must inevitably
take up an attitude of criticism towards the concepts which
the various special sciences, including psychology, use in
dealing with their problems. The thinking of experience as
a whole remains the ideal for philosophy, an ideal which to
different persons may seem more or less attainable ; but the
task which all philosophers must accept includes at least the
criticism of the concepts used in the sciences and in ordinary
thinking. The question which Kant came to formulate ex-
plicitly as the problem of what he called "Transcendental
Logic," "How is knowledge possible?" is a question with
which every serious philosophy deals in some way or other,
however much the particular form and the particular results
of the Kantian criticism be ignored or rejected or superseded.
Only the thoroughgoing sceptic gives up the problem of how
knowledge is possible, and in giving up this, he gives up
metaphysics altogether and cultivates some other intellectual
garden as best he may. Empiricists and idealists alike have
their answer to the question, more or less dogmatic. They
have some account to give of the concepts, such as thing
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 5
and quality, cause and effect, matter and mind, by the help
of which the obscure chaos of uninterpreted sensation or
feeling is arranged into the more or less orderly world of
ordinary and scientific belief. Our ordinary or common-sense
knowledge is full of tacit assumptions and presuppositions,
some of which are retained, while others are discarded, by
the special sciences. However much we try to avoid assump-
tions in speaking about the facts of consciousness, we cannot
do so. The language we have received as part of our social
inheritance is full of idola fori, and (unless we are barbarians)
of idola theatri also. No avoidance of metaphysics, but only
serious metaphysical effort enables us to detect these assump-
tions. " Enough metaphysics to get rid of metaphysical
ideas " means in truth a very thorough metaphysical training,
and, not merely a great deal of logical acuteness in un-
ravelling complex concepts lurking under apparently simple
words, but a knowledge of the history of thought in the past
which has gone to form the intellectual ground on which we
are standing, the intellectual atmosphere we breathe. If
geology and chemical analysis have a scientific interest,
apart from the practical benefits they may bring to the health
and the wealth of nations, the study of the ideas of the past
which have gone to mould our language and our beliefs has
as great, if not a greater, intellectual interest and may have
a very important, even though indirect, influence on the life
of society, especially in the spheres of politics and religion,
where unconscious and therefore uncriticised metaphysics
is apt to cause serious mischief.
Undoubtedly there is a great attractiveness in the seeming
freedom from the burden of historical tradition and from the
dusty toil of historical research with which some philosophers,
and among them some of the greatest, have attacked directly
and single-handed the problems of knowledge and reality.
Why, it may be urged, should we not always discuss our
questions at first hand, with the freshness of a Socratic
dialogue, instead of cumbering ourselves with the opinions
of our predecessors, as Aristotle does in his Metaphysics, the
book in which philosophy seems to lose its primitive direct
outlook on experience and to begin to stiffen into scholas-
ticism ? Undoubtedly a great deal of the prevalent historical
interest in philosophers of the past is not properly interest in
philosophy ; the two interests may even sometimes, as Green
said, be in the inverse ratio. 1 Much of the study of Plato
1 Cf. his edition of Hume, vol. i., p. 4 (" General Introduction," 4). I
suppose he was thinking primarily of G. H. Lewes' biographical History.
6 D. G. BITCHIE :
and Aristotle is scholarship. Much of the minute study
of Kant has been correctly called " Kantphilologie ". The
humanist tradition in education, which has thrown a charm
round the art and the literature and the life of periods that
seem unprofitable subjects of study to those immersed in
practical business or in the sciences that are directly con-
nected with the things of industry and commerce this
humanist tradition is undoubtedly a chief support of the
study of the old philosophers.
Apart, however, from any side interest in such a study,
there are sufficiently strong reasons for it in the nature of
philosophy itself. Bacon and Descartes, Locke and Kant,
each in his turn, thought that he had shaken off the fetters
of the past. Yet each in different degrees and ways shows
that the ideas of the past do not bind us by mere external
fetters, but have grown into the very structure of our minds.
Bacon urges the study of facts without the assumption of
philosophical theories ; but his whole thinking about nature
is pervaded by the assumption of the atomist doctrine, which,
though unacknowledged, lies at the basis of his, as of most
popular philosophy. Descartes, a far greater and more ori-
ginal philosophical thinker, succeeds in clearing his mind
more completely of traditional concepts ; and yet even he
cannot escape from the system against which he rebels, and
he fails to escape just because he turns away from the study
and criticism of older theories. No sooner has he reached
his solid basis, the one indubitable fact of self-consciousness,
on which to rebuild the fabric of philosophy, than the scholas-
tic notion of substance slips unrecognised into his thinking ;
and the self, the ego, becomes " a substance that thinks " set
over against the substance that is extended. The dualism
of popular philosophy, inherited from scholasticism and in-
directly from Platonism, is exaggerated and stiffened in the
philosophy which professed to start clear of all assumptions.
Locke, who in his turn seeks to make an absolutely fresh
start and to interrogate consciousness for himself, retains
this same notion of substance, though he is clearly puzzled
by its strange emptiness of meaning. What is still more
significant, Locke like Bacon assumes the passivity of mind.
It is a mirror or a blank sheet of paper on which things
produce more or less perfect copies of themselves. Plato
and Aristotle had used this picture of the writing tablet, but
had used it in a more careful and conscious way, and a study
of their psychology might have made Locke more cautious
in his dealings with the metaphors of mental " images " and
"impressions". Even Kant, who to escape the difficulties
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHEES. 7
in which Hume's clear-sightedness had placed Locke's em-
piricism, makes his " Copernican " change and tries the
hypothesis of mind acting upon the material given to it
even Kant thinks he is introducing an absolutely new method
into philosophy. Like Locke, though in a less degree, he
tends to ignore his predecessors ; and as a consequence he
carries over into his theory of knowledge the mysterious
" thing-in-itself," which seems to be a mixture of the
scholastic " substance " with the Leibnizian " monad ". He
accepts, moreover, an absolute division between the intelli-
gible and the phenomenal world, which is an inheritance
from the Platonic doctrine that Aristotle had criticised in
the Metaphysics, and that Plato himself had criticised in the
Parmcnides. I do not mean that the thought of the world
would necessarily have gained if Bacon and Descartes,
Locke and Kant, had devoted themselves to writing com-
mentaries on Aristotle. There are times when a violent
revolution seems to be needed in order to effect a reform,
whether in thought or in politics or in religion ; and the
revolutionary leader cannot be expected to be always just to
the past or to see his own work in correct historical perspec-
tive. I have referred to these four revolutionary thinkers
simply as illustrations, to show how difficult or impossible
it is to escape the idola theatri, while attempting to give an
account of experience without a clear and explicit conscious-
ness of the history of the metaphysical ideas which have
become embedded like fossils in the language of ordinary life
and the habits of ordinary thinking.
We may distinguish three main attitudes towards the
doctrines of older philosophers. First, there is the attitude
of submission to authority. Of this the most fully developed
example is to be found in Scholasticism ; but it was a habit
of thought which had already shown itself in pre-Christian
times in the Alexandrian period and even earlier. The
reverence for the written word which contains the doctrine
of the great teacher leads even the most gifted and original
thinkers to put their ideas in the form of commentary on
the sayings of the master. Discussion, however much free-
dom it may actually attain, takes the guise of rival interpre-
tations of the same authority or of disagreement in the
weight assigned to different authorities or to different elements
of the same doctrine. It is a manner of philosophical dis-
cussion which is apt to arise wherever famous names have
won a widespread veneration. Plato makes Socrates use it
ironically when, instead of frankly asserting that Simonides
the poet (and these old poets were the Greek " Bible ") was
8 D. G. RITCHIE :
wrong in his opinion, he argues that the saying of Simonides
must be otherwise interpreted or that the saying was wrongly
ascribed to Simonides. 1 The same habit exists among our-
selves, practised in all seriousness and not only with reference
to the Bible. The discussion between sensationalist and
intellectualist has sometimes taken the form of different
interpretations of Locke, especially where Locke's Essay has
become the traditional student's book. Idealist and realist,
intuitionalist and positivist have each been anxious to invoke
the name of Kant ; and opposing parties have sheltered
themselves under the broad shadow of Hegel, distinguished
as Bight and Left and Centre, like the groups in a French
Chamber of Deputies. Even those who protest against a
dominant authoritative system often do so in the guise of a
return to some favoured doctrine of the past. "Back to
Kant" is one form of the revolt against the post-Kantian
idealists.
The second attitude is that to which I have already re-
ferred as represented by Bacon and Descartes revolt against
authority, assertion of individual independence in thinking.
Earlier philosophies are regarded as false. They are systems
to be thrown aside. If they are dealt with, it is only that
they may be refuted. But if they are dealt with at all, dis-
tinctions have soon to be made. They are not all false in
the same degree. Bacon, e.g., has a kindlier feeling for the
older Greek philosophers, "quorum scripta perierunt" 2 than
for Plato and Aristotle, whose works have floated down on
the stream of time to encumber the intellectual powers of
mankind. If some of the ideas of older philosophers are less
to be condemned, they receive a certain relative approval.
And so this attitude of protest and revolt can only maintain
itself as a purely negative attitude towards the past by ignoring
the study of it altogether. When such study asserts itself,
as it is sure to do wherever humanist studies are not alto-
gether supplanted by the mathematical and natural sciences,
the negative attitude must give way to a recognition that
the philosophical thinking of the past was a preparation for
the better philosophy of the present. A Comtist history of
philosophy is indeed only a history of successive and con-
flicting forms of error ; but these systems which are refuted
one after the other are regarded as preparing the way for the
clear-sighted, disillusioned positivism which has learnt to
escape the metaphysical, as well as the theological, stage of
thought. As we have seen, however, the metaphysical stage
1 Cf. Republic, i., 331-335. 2 Cf. Novum Organum, Praefatio.
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 9
can be escaped by no one except through the careful study
of the growth of metaphysical concepts. We must trace the
antecedents of our own ideas in the thought of the past in
order to guard against the fallacies due to false philosophical
systems. But to see the falsehood of a system clearly we
must seek to understand it fully ; and we can only do so by
studying it in the light of the social and intellectual environ-
ment in which it arose. When we do that, however, we
begin to recognise in it a certain relative truth and value.
A doctrine which is false, if accepted blindly and upon autho-
rity in our age, and w r hich is easily refuted if judged by our
canons of scientific criticism, is seen to have been in many
respects sound and valid when taken in relation to the time
and circumstances of its origin. We may not be prepared to
accept the scholastic philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as
the final word for us ; but we may recognise its great worth
as an expression of the central ideas of the thirteenth century
by a man of much shrewdness, common-sense and modera-
tion. We cannot be Cartesians or Leibnizians now-a-days,
and yet we may acknowledge the great debt of modern
thought to Descartes and Leibniz more easily than was
possible in last century, when Cartesianism and Wolfianism
had become new scholastic systems in those universities
where mediaeval Aristotelianisin had been supplanted. But,
if we have reached this appreciative manner of regarding the
great systems of a sufficiently remote past, we have surely
got beyond the stage of looking on them simply as errors
and the parents of errors against which we have to be on
our guard. When the religious or the philosophical systems
of the past are studied in what we have come to consider
*' the historical spirit," when criticism passes from merely
refuting opinions to showing how and why these opinions
came to be held, above all when the conception of develop-
ment or evolution is extended from the natural world to the
world of human thought, we have left behind the purely
negative attitude to ideas that we no longer accept, and we
come to see the long series of attempts to grapple with the
central problems of knowledge and reality not as stray
opinions with which we do not happen to agree, but as parts
of one continuous movement in which our own thinking
is itself included. The development of ideas is, indeed, in
some respects more intricate and difficult to trace than de-
velopment in the organic sphere. The genealogy of ideas
(as of institutions) is more complex than that of animal or
vegetable species. Still the leading threads can generally be
detected; and just because we are dealing with expressly
10 D. G. RITCHIE :
formulated ideas, the development of philosophical systems
often gives the clearest indication of the relation in which
successive stages of society stand to one another. In other
words, the history of philosophy may often serve as a clue to
guide us in the attempt to reach a philosophy of history.
Plato and Aristotle help us to understand the Hellenic world,
Thomas Aquinas to understand the middle ages and their
relation to the ancient world, Descartes to understand the
period of the Reformation, and so on.
It may be most convenient to discuss this third attitude
towards the philosophers of the past an attitude which I
think is coming to be more and more adopted at the present
day in connection with the views of Hegel, who gave to it
its most prominent expression and who may seem to many
to have exaggerated it into falsehood. Every philosophy,
Hegel admits, has been refuted. The very fact that a philo-
sophy was the philosophy of some past age proves that it
cannot be the truest system for a succeeding age. But it is
also true that no philosophy has ever been refuted. " Every
philosophy has been and still is necessary." There is but
one philosophy manifesting itself in the succession of philo-
sophical systems. The history of philosophy is thus an inte-
gral part of philosophy itself. It is philosophy taking its time. 1
What is usually quoted from Hegel is his saying that the
sequence of philosophical systems is the same as that of the
sequence of the categories in his Logic ; and this is com-
monly supposed to be a dictum which refutes itself by its
absurdity and preposterous conceit. And the dictum is con-
temptuously put aside even by historians of philosophy
who have learnt Hegel's lesson very fully. Let us see first
what Hegel really said and what he meant. Now what he
says in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy 2 is that
" on the whole (im Ganzen) the sequence of the philosophical
systems is similar to the sequence of the categories ". And
again in one of the Zusatze to the Encyklopcedie, 86, he
says : " the relation of the earlier to the later systems is in
general (im Allgemeinen) much like the relation of the earlier
to the later stages of the logical Idea, and is of this kind
that the later contain the earlier sublated (aufgehoben, taken
up, annulled and absorbed) in them ". Hegel does not
assert this as if he had got hold of a magical formula which
saved him the trouble of studying history. He gives the
1 Cf. Encyklopasdie, 86, Zusatz, 2 ; Gesch. der Phil., Einleitung, A.,.
3. (Werke, vi., pp. 166-168 ; xiii., p. 42 seq.)
2 Werke, xiii., p. 43, ed. 1840. This particular sentence was not given
in the edition of 1833.
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 11
reason why we should expect to find such a general corre-
spondence between the logical and the historical order. The
earlier systems are not, as used to be held and as was still
held by many in his day, the depositories of a higher and
purer wisdom to which later generations must look back.
He would indeed agree with Bacon about the reputed wis-
dom of the ancients: " Antiquitas saeculi juventus mundi".
The earlier systems are the poorest, the emptiest, the most ab-
stract. They give crude and one-sided answers to a vaguely
put question about the underlying principle of things, and
it is only through the conflict of opposing systems that the
discussion of the problem gradually became more adequate.
Thus Plato's philosophy is an attempt to get beyond the
one-sided theories of Eleatics and Heracleiteans, while recog-
nising the element of truth in each of these opposing
systems. And it is Plato, too, who calls philosophy " dia-
lectic," and comes in his great metaphysical dialogues to
occupy himself precisely with what Hegel calls logical cate-
gories, while always keeping in view the historical contro-
versies that had preceded him. Hegel sought to arrange
the concepts of our ordinary and of our scientific thinking
in their logical order, i.e., to proceed from abstract to con-
crete, and to show how the dialectical antinomies into which
our reason inevitably falls are no argument for complete
philosophical agnosticism, but only prove the necessity of
struggling to get beyond one-sided and superficial views of
things and of trying to see them in the totality of their
complex relationships to one another. He, therefore, ex-
pected to find traces of a similar dialectic movement in the
long labour of the human mind throughout the ages. Nor
are we to suppose, as the language of many of Hegel's critics
might suggest, that he turned away like Descartes from the
world of books and from the world of men and spun his
complete system of logic out of his own inner consciousness
and then sought with this fanciful cobweb to entrap the
living universe. His early studies were chiefly devoted to
Greek literature ; and it was undoubtedly in the history of
Greek thought, as he read it, that he found a main reason
for rearranging and supplementing and " objectifying " the
categories which German philosophy had inherited from
Kant. Hegel's History of Philosophy and his Logic may both
be open to many criticisms ; but one criticism is quite un-
fair, viz., that he brought a ready-made dogmatic system to
the interpretation of preceding philosophies, enslaving facts
to his logic. His Logic is in great part the outgrowth of his
historical studies, and represents the inferences he had drawn
12 D. G. BITCHIE :
from history as he understood it. His actual procedure was
inductive and experiental as much as any real scientific
procedure can be inductive and experiental. 1 Common-
sense laughs at Hegel for saying that mere Being = Nothing.
But he could find abundant historical evidence for the logical
transition. If the Absolute be thought of as that of which
we may not predict anything determinate, it becomes equiv-
alent to Nothing. Oriental religions and philosophies and
Neoplatonic conceptions of the Absolute confirm his view ;
and did not Eleatic philosophy end in the paradox of Gorgias
who wrote : Trcpl </>i;<re<DS r] rov // O^TOS ?
Hegel and some of his followers have been blamed for
reading his system into Aristotle. The answer is given by
Karl Michelet in his Preface to his Commentary on the
Ethics: " restituit tantum magistro SILO quae ex ipso mutuatus
est ". Scholars have been scandalised by an unhappy mis-
translation which Hegel made of a passage in Plato's Sophistes.
He mistranslated a particular sentence now and then, as
many more special students of things Greek have done ; 2
1 Bosenkranz, Hegel's Leben, pp. 10, 11, 14, supplies evidence that
He,gel was studying not only Euripides and Sophocles, but Thucydides
and Aristotle's Ethics (in 1788) before he studied Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason (in 1789). The first traces of a tendency to philosophy are to be
found in a little note-book which he began to keep in 1785, in which he
collected definitions. The definition of logic (from whatever source de-
rived) is certainly remarkable and significant : " ein Inbegriff der Regeln
<des Denkens, abstrahirt aus der Geschichte der Menschheit" "a sum-
mary of the rules of thinking, abstracted from the history of mankind ".
In 1788 (his first year at Tubingen University), in a dissertation " On
-some of the Advantages of Classical Studies," he speaks of the reading of
Greek and Latin authors as an appropriate preparation for the study of
philosophy. We are exercised in the use of abstract conceptions and we
find the germs of the philosophy of later times. "The many contradic-
tions of the ancient philosophers, especially in their speculations on the
practical part of philosophy, have at least lightened our trouble in finding
the via media where the truth lies " (Bosenkranz, p. 27). By them-
selves such remarks might seem only the conventional apologetics of
classical education, but in Hegel's case they are undoubtedly the germs
of his conception of the relation between philosophy and history. Ueber-
weg in his History of Philosophy (Engl. transl., vol. ii., p. 235) says that
for his master's degree (1790) Hegel wrote an essay "On the Study of the
History of Philosophy ". This is not mentioned by Bosenkranz, who
makes the mistake of supposing Hegel himself to have written the thesis
De limite officiorum humanorum seposita animorum immortalitate,
which he had to defend (see Karl v. Hegel's edition of his father's
Letters, i., p. 16 note). It is quite clear that Hegel had laboriously
-studied history and Greek literature and philosophy before he had de-
finitely arrived at his philosophical system, and certainly before he
elaborated his Logic.
* E.g., Grote and Zeller in their astonishing interpretation of a passage
in Aristotle's will. (Cf. MIND, N.S., vol. vi., p, 565.)
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 13
and since his time the materials for the history of Greek
philosophy have not only increased in bulk but have been more
critically estimated and made more intelligible and accessible,
so that much of what Hegel has to say on the subject is out
of date. Nevertheless to Hegel our whole study of Greek
thought owes an enormous debt ; and his influence may be
traced, not only in his acknowledged disciples like Michelet
and Schwegler, not only among those who came under his
influence and passed out of it, like Zeller, but among many
who have never directly owned allegiance to him and are
even unaware how much of his thinking they have inherited.
That we now study Plato without Neoplatonic and Aristotle
without scholastic glosses is largely due to Hegel's historical
spirit in seeking always to understand a philosopher in the
light of his own particular environment. His wonderful in-
sight into the real significance of the Greek Sophists (an
insight which anticipates Grote without Grote's exaggeration
and one-sidedness) may be taken as a crucial instance of his
objectivity of outlook, freedom from bias and historical sym-
pathy. I do not mean to assert that Hegel's historical^
judgments are always equally sound. Much has been dis-
covered about the origins of civilisation since his days ;
much of what he says about the Oriental world was based
on imperfect knowledge and has lost its interest ; he does
not perhaps sufficiently appreciate the work of the Roman
spirit. Reaction against the unhistorical rationalism of the
eighteenth century x leads him to be somewhat unfair to the
newer type of constructive historical criticism which Niebuhr
represented in his time. Teutonism, as with many of his \
patriotic countrymen, bulks excessively, it may be, in his 1
interpretation of the modern world. But when he is dealing^
with the Hellenic world, he is dealing with what he had
studied carefully and in the ardour of his youth. And I
think, if we were to try to characterise Hegel's philosophical
position briefly, the least inaccurate statement would be to
say, that the main stream of German philosophy, which
descended from Kant though Fichte and Schelling, was met
in Hegel's mind by another and equally powerful current
coming straight from Plato and Aristotle as well as by
1 Yet Hegel was on the whole less influenced by mere reaction than
most of the intellectual leaders of his age. He never disowned the debt
even of Germany to the French Revolution. With all his enthusiasm
for the Greeks he would not assent to Cousin's exaltation of ancient
above modern philosophy (Cf. Briefe, ii., p. 297). Cousin indeed, after
telling of an indignant outburst of Hegel's about Catholic superstitions,
remarks that Hegel had retained the prejudices of an eighteenth century
philosophe (Art. in Revue des deux mondes, August, 1866).
14 D. G. RITCHIE :
smaller side currents coming indirectly from them also but
through Neoplatonic and Christian mystics. It is not only
from Kant's Antinomies and from the philosophical method
of Fichte, but directly from Plato and Aristotle that Hegel
derived his dialectic ; and it was from them, far more than
from any modern philosopher, that he derived his ideas of
the relation between philosophy and its history. None of
Hegel's modern predecessors, except Leibniz, had appreci-
ated the thought of the past in a catholic spirit ; and Leibniz
treats previous philosophical systems rather eclectically,
accepting suggestions from many diverse sources but not
applying the categories of continuity and of organic growth
to the history of human thought in the same thoroughgoing
way in which he applied them to the phenomena of the
physical world.
In his use of the word "dialectic" Hegel may be said to
"bring it back to Plato's signification, in order to escape the
deadlock into which Kant had brought metaphysics. In
Plato the suggestions for a dialectic movement in the history
of thought are slight, but they are not wanting. I have
referred already to the relation in which Plato expressly
puts his own doctrine of ideas to Heracleiteanism on the
one side and to Eleaticism on the other ; and Plato evidently
regarded the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers as a " propae-
deutic " for his own theory. But even in the simpler
"" conversations " of Socrates we may find the germs of what
we may call a dialectical interpretation of the history of
thought. The beginning of the Bepublic seems to me a clear
example of that method of seeking to arrive at truth through
the conflict and clash of preceding opinion which is common
to Plato, Aristotle and Hegel. In the old man Cephalus
and his son Polemarchus, both living in the stage of pro-
verbial morality and submission to the sacred authority of
the poets, in the rhetorical sophist Thrasymachus and Plato's
brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, educated young Athenians
who have come under the sway of the " Sophistic " rational-
ism but are dissatisfied with it in these persons of the
dialogue we have a series of types representing the develop-
ment of Greek thought and the preparation for Socrates.
Against the definitions of Justice which the first two give
very superficial we might say "sophistical" arguments
suffice. The contradictions easily show themselves. The
thesis of Thrasymachus requires a harder struggle before it
can be made to disclose its incoherence and refute itself and,
it is to be noted, the Socratic method is always dialectical, it
is to make an inadequate theory when carried out into its
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 15
consequences lead to its own negation. Glaucon and
Adeimantus have advanced farther ; they have absorbed a
subtler rationalism than Thrasymachus, but have recog-
nised its inadequacy, and so they are fitted to stimulate
and to follow the Platonic Socrates in his constructive
idealism.
This dialectic method is formulated in very simple terms
by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics VII. 1, 5, 1145, b 2,
where he proposes in discussing the subject of dicpaa-ia to
follow his customary plan of stating current opinions (TO,
<j)aiv6fjLeva, ra \eyoneva), going through the objections which
may be made to them (SiaTroprja-avTas), and so arriving at a
solution (\v<ris), which if possible shall recognise the element
of truth in all, or at least in the most important of these
opinions. Here we have the germ of the Scholastic method
of quaestio, objecta, conclusio. But with Aristotle it has not
yet stiffened into a formal and external method ; and his
solutions are not as cut and dried as those of theologians
were expected to be. Many illustrations of this method of
d-TTopiai may be found in the Aristotelian writings, e.g., in the
Ethics in the discussion of pleasure both in book vii. and in
book x. One very conspicuous example on a large scale is
supplied by the Politics. The whole of the second book is
occupied with a criticism of Plato and other political theorists,
and also of actual constitutions which had been held up as
ideals.
In the Metaphysics we have the same method applied to
"First Philosophy" what we call "metaphysics". Aris-
totle thinks it necessary to go through the opinions of his
predecessors. As he was the first to write (or inspire) a
constitutional history, 1 so he was the first to write a history
of philosophy, and he writes it as an integral and necessary
part of his own metaphysical system. Schwegler indeed (in a
note on Met. I. c. 3) holds that " the modern philosophical view
[he means, of course, the Hegelian view] of the history of
philosophy is entirely alien to Aristotle. He sees in it not a
regular process of development going on with logical neces-
sity, but regards it only from the paedagogic side, as a school
1 The recently discovered 'AdqpacW iroXtreia, which if not written by
Aristotle must have been written for his use, is not merely a description
of the Athenian constitution at some particular period, but an account
of its successive forms. It is the first constitutional history ever written.
The other 157 no\tTiat were probably less elaborate documents. But this
extensive survey of the actual political institutions of mankind, barbarian
as well as Greek, shows how Aristotle like Hegel prepared himself for
philosophy by historical study.
16 D. G. EITCHIE :
of exercise for thought." 1 Now, Aristotle's philosophising of
the history of philosophy is certainly very rudimentary com-
pared with Hegel's ; but it seems to me a treatment of that
history essentially the same in kind. The various opinions
are not simply put alongside of one another in scholastic
fashion, as if they were all utterances of persons on the same
mental level and conscious of precisely the same problem.
Aristotle expressly groups them according to the degree in
which they realise the fourfold question that has, in his view,
to be asked about reality. As Hegel sees the categories of
his Logic gradually reached by the successive philosophical
schools, so Aristotle finds his doctrine of the four causes bit
by bit emerging from the progress of Greek thought. The
earliest philosophers, when they asked themselves what is
the underlying principle of things, were content to assign
the " matter," that out of which the world of phenomena
came and into which it returns. Empedocles felt the need
of efficient causes, and " in a stammering way " expressed a
principle of movement in his "love" and "strife," but he
then went on to treat these as if they were simply material
elements alongside of the other four. Anaxagoras made an
epoch by assigning Reason or Intelligence as the efficient
cause which produces order out of chaos, but he did not work
out the principle in detail. Similarly, the Pythagoreans had
advanced beyond the lonians in assigning Number (or rather
we should say " Figure," for Greek arithmetic was geo-
metrical) as the principle of things ; but they went on to-
treat this formal principle as if it were material, as if the
universe were actually pieced together out of geometrical
points, lines and figures. The Pythagorean "number " was
the germ of the Platonic " ideas," which are a formal prin-
ciple clearly recognised as such. And thus there only remains
the final cause for Aristotle himself to put forward as his
distinctive principle, though the germs of that also are to be
found in earlier philosophy and especially in the Platonic.
Now, whatever be thought of this particular interpretation
of the history of Greek philosophy, it seems to me an inter-
pretation of the same kind as that which Hegel applies to
the history of all philosophy. Besides, we find Aristotle ex-
pressly recognising a logical necessity in the transition from
1 Schwegler also thinks that the notion of a cycle in history excludes
the idea of logical development. Aristotle certainly has the popular
Greek notion of a cycle as a background to his thinking now and then ;
but it nowhere prevents him from taking a thoroughly scientific view of
social or intellectual evolution. Contrast Pol. I. 2, with Plato's Laws;
III., 676-680.
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 17
one system to another. Thus in Met. L, 3, 15, 984 a 18, he
writes avro TO Trpdy/J-a (oSoTroir/aev avTois Kal crvirrjvd'yKacre
tyreiv, which amounts to recognising that the individual
thinker is led on to a fresh stage by the logical necessities of
the problem itself. And, again, a few lines farther on ( 21,
984 b 9), VTT' airr% T>7<? aXyOeias dt>ayKa6/j,ei>oi rr/v ^ofj,vijv
efyirrjaav ctp^v, i.e., the principles follow one another in a
necessary sequence (rrjv e-^ofievrjv dp^rjv), and thought is
inevitably led on (dvaytca^ofjievoi) from one step to the next
in logical order. In any philosophical interpretation of his-
tory purely chronological sequence must be put aside for
logical sequence, philosophical history being something other
than annals ; and thus we find Aristotle placing Anaxagoras
after Empedocles as the more advanced thinker, though
younger in age (Met. I., 3, 13, 984 a 12. In the context this
is the only meaning that can be put upon rot? B' 6/370*9 ita-repos
applied to Anaxagoras.)
Hegel's treatment of the history of philosophy is then no
audacious eccentricity of his own, but a development of what
his studies of Greek philosophy and what the example of
Aristotle suggested to him. Moreover, we may say, in Aris-
totle's words, that he was led to it as the inevitable next step
by truth herself, that is to say, by the special truth which it
fell to his age to recognise and proclaim. In passing from
Kant to Hegel we pass from the period which culminated in
the French Revolution to the period of reconstruction after
the abstract and essentially unhistorical rationalism of the
eighteenth century. 1 Hegel's attitude to history is no iso-
lated phenomenon. On his own principles of interpretation
he is significant simply because in the department of philo-
sophical thought he gave express formulation to ideas which
were at work in his age. Goethe and Sir Walter Scott * are
conspicuous representatives of that movement of thought
and sentiment which has made the nineteenth century so
different from the eighteenth. And if we contrast Auguste
Comte with Voltaire, we have another example of the subtle
intellectual revolution which has changed so many of the
categories through which we apprehend the past. We often
1 Though, as has been already pointed out (p. 13, note), Hegel was never
carried off his feet by the wave of reaction, like the Romanticists, Mediae-
valists, and other supporters of obscurantism and absolutism among his
contemporaries.
2 Hegel calls Scott " seichter Kopf" (Bosenkranz's Leben, p. 560),
because of some of his moralisings about the French Revolution.
But it was not by his Life of Napoleon that Scott helped to create the
new historical spirit of studying institutions and ideas.
2
18 D. G. RITCHIE :
speak of our century as specially the century of progress in
natural science. As mathematics gave a special colour or
tone to the philosophical thinking of the seventeenth cen-
tury, so biology seems to exercise the predominant intellec-
tual influence in this century. And there is no doubt that the
categories of " organism " and " evolution " now everywhere
affect our language and make impossible to us many modes
of thinking about human society which were customary and
unquestioned a hundred years ago. But along with the pro-
gress of biological science we must certainly take account
also of the influence exercised by scientific history and the
scientific criticism of documents. This influence has worked
entirely in the same direction with the biological, and has
contributed a great part of what " Evolution " in its largest
sense means. To regard human nature as a constant factor
in all times and places, to which varying circumstances have
simply to be added on, or to believe the history of mankind
to be a degeneration from a primitive state of perfection
these are modes of thinking impossible to the educated man
of our days. Yet they were an accepted part of the Weltan-
schauung, or picture of the universe, which our grandfathers
had before their mental eyes. What considers itself " ortho-
dox " belief and what considers itself " free-thinking "-
except among the most ignorant and backward have both
taken on a different character from that which they had in
last century or the earlier half of this. " The historical
spirit " has penetrated even into the minds of journalists and
popular preachers ; it has become almost a commonplace of
these " sophists" of our day. And a great deal of the best
scientific work which is now being done in the world is in
the region of historical and anthropological investigation, in
the endeavour to get a true understanding of the past of
the human race.
Of this historical spirit Hegel's philosophy was one of the
earliest prominent expressions, and Hegel's philosophy has in
course of time come to contribute greatly to its growth and
diffusion. Hegel sometimes speaks as if the philosopher only
summed up a completed stage of life and feeling ; but the
truth in this does not justify the inference that the philo-
sopher exercises no influence on his age. To give a philo-
sophical expression to the new interest in history was to
promote the passing of the historical spirit into the common
possession of the educated world.
It may, however, be objected that to recognise the import-
ance of history and to study the problems of religion, law,
politics and philosophy in an historical spirit is not the same
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 19
thing as to hold that the stages of historical development
correspond to the categories of any metaphysical system.
Is it not? If the historical spirit comes to be consciously
realised and grasped, then I think it necessarily implies some-
thing like what Hegel holds. If our interest in the past is
more than the curiosity of the antiquarian, if we really mean
what we say when we even put aside the old word " history "
which only signified at first investigation and collection of
materials for science and if in the current cant of the day
we talk about " the development of institutions " and the
" evolution of ideas," we must recognise that the institutions
and ideas of the present are the outcome of the struggle and
conflict that have gone before ; and therefore in our study of
the history of philosophy we must hope to see (however diffi-
cult we may find it to trace the connecting links through the
complex and confused materials) not a mere series of capri-
cious speculations of arbitrary individual intellects but a con-
tinuous discussion, a dialectic movement running through
the ages. And, while we recognise clearly the occurrence of
periods of decline and retrogression, so far as we recognise
progress in philosophical thought, we must admit something
of the nature of a logical process which proceeds from emptier
and more abstract to fuller and more adequate concepts.
If we have given up that fatal method of grouping all philo-
sophers in all ages into two parties, Sensationalists and In-
tuitionalists, like the Whigs and Tories of English political
life, and if we find, as many do, some indication of a better
understanding between different philosophical schools, and
look upon them as complementary rather than rival opinions,
then we have come to see that progress towards truth con-
sists in a reconciliation of opposites and that the truest
philosophical system would, as Aristotle held long before
Hegel, take up all the others into it as elements of one
whole.
It must indeed be frankly admitted that, while we have
before us this ideal of a history of philosophy which should
exhibit all the leading systems as the interconnected members
of one organism or the stages in one process of growth (it
does not matter which metaphor we use, provided that we
take it from no less complex region than the organic), we
must nevertheless be very careful that the details of histori-
cal fact are not distorted for the convenience of philosophical
exposition. In other words, we must fully recognise the his-
torical importance of tracing links of connexion and dis-
covering the psychological sources of theories which may
appear to be merely " accidental " and incapable of being
20 D. G. RITCHIE :
fitted into a scheme of logical development. The " contin-
gent " element, the personality of the individual philosopher,
his particular education and the various influences under
which he came, cannot be safely neglected by the student of
philosophical theories, however anxious he may be to keep
to the main currents of thought and to escape the distract-
ing toil of exploring side-channels and back waters. 1 Too
much may, indeed, easily be made of this "contingent"
element, as is done I think by those who would make a
whole stage in the development of Plato's philosophy depend
upon a supposed visit to Megara. On the other hand, when
an historian or teacher of philosophy gives a complete ac-
count of Hume, based of course mainly on the Treatise, and
then passes on to Kant and considers him as " answering
Hume," accuracy is sacrificed to an appearance of precise
dialectical opposition ; and some misunderstanding of Kant
has been the result of this not infrequent manner of exposi-
tion. In the first place, it might very well be said that
Kant does not " answer " Hume. He appreciated Hume
better than to treat him as Beattie and the other " answerers "
do. But, in the second place, Kant had only read the Essays,
and therefore he only knew of Hume's attack on the neces-
sity of the causal nexus, and he was unaware of Hume's
attempt to base mathematical truth upon experience.
The kind of commentary which we most need now upon
the great philosophers of the past is not so much an exposi-
tion of their doctrines which shall make them more consis-
tent with themselves than they really are, nor a merciless
exposure of the inconsistencies and contradictions which can
easily be found in systems from which we stand at a sufficient
intellectual distance. Both these kinds of commentary are
valuable in their way ; but what is most necessary is a minute
and accurate study of the sources from which a philosopher
derived his ideas and of the particular circumstances which
led to his laying stress on one rather than on another aspect
of the truth as it appeared to him. To understand what the
philosopher meant and in what order his ideas grew is the
first thing; we may then go on to reconcile apparent contra-
dictions or to detect new ones. But to understand a philo-
sopher in this way implies that we study him in his historical
environment. A " psychological" account of the genesis of
a philosophical system, an exact intellectual biography of a
1 It must be understood that I admit the " accidental " or the " contin-
gent " element in history only in the same sense in which the biologist
speaks of " accidental " or " spontaneous " variations. They are names,
for what we do not fully understand.
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 21
philosopher, is not a different method of approaching the
study of a philosopher from the philosophical history of
which I have been speaking, but implies the same principle
carried out into preciser detail. The minute and careful
study of the great leaders of political history does not take
us away from " the spirit of the age " or the tendencies of
" the general mind," but teaches us more about them ; for
no man however "original" we may consider him can do
anything great, unless he finds a suitable time and place for
his special work, i.e., unless in some way or other he repre-
sents and expresses his own age and nation. The old con-
troversy about great men and their importance as a factor
in history was admirably dealt with long ago in the Greek
story which Plato tells at the beginning of the Republic (329
E, 330 A). Themistocles was taunted by a native of the
insignificant island of Seriphos with owing his fame to the
accident of his being an Athenian. " Neither would I," he
answered, " being a Seriphian, nor would you being an Athe-
nian, have attained greatness." In treating of men of action
what we call the " contingent " element, i.e., the element
which we cannot yet and may never be able thoroughly to
know and understand, bulks very largely ; but, as Hegel
points out, in the Introduction to his Lectures, in the history
of philosophy the purely personal element does not come in
to the same degree as it does in political history. The man
who is making a nation may seem to choose sometimes
rather arbitrarily, and perhaps from private motives, whether
he will enlarge his country by quarrelling with his right
hand or his left hand neighbour though such purely personal
motives are always a very trivial part of the explanation of
great historical events. But the really serious philosopher
does not make an arbitrary choice of his problems or of his
point of view. He finds his problems determined for him
by his age and by the special work of his predecessors ; and
his system grows in his mind under the influence of what
he honestly takes to be logical necessity. In one sense the
problems of philosophy are always the same, because they
are simply a few leading questions about the ultimate nature
of things; but the particular form which these problems
take must vary from age to age, and the great philosophers
who serve as landmarks in the course of thought are those
who have grasped most clearly the special aspect which the
problems have assumed for their own time. Those who have
adhered to traditional ways of dealing with the questions or
those whose type of thinking is so peculiar and independent
as to have no affinity to what is seething in the minds of
22 D. G. EITCHIE :
their contemporaries may be interesting as survivals or
as precursors, but they do not help us to trace the main
currents of human thought.
If it is objected that 'we may indeed detect the links of
causal connexion in the rise and fall of particular opinions,
but that that gives us no warrant for seeing any progress
towards truth or any development of one eternal philosophy
amid the changes and chances of mortal speculations to
this objection the only answer can be that all knowledge
rests upon faith, in the sense that a faith in the ultimate
rationality of the universe is the presupposition (however
unacknowledged) of all serious science and of all strenuous
conduct ; and that the very task of philosophy, however
difficult it may be, however unsatisfactory our best attain-
ments, is to make this "faith in Providence" intelligible. 1
Credo ut intelligam is a double-edged motto. And if we can
hope to find a meaning in the course of events in any part
of the universe, most surely it ought to be in the movement
of thought from one clear consciousness to another. A
blind faith and some of those who call attention to our
dependence on faith seem to take for their motto Credo ne
intelligam may be more convenient for ecclesiastical author-
ity, but can only be recognised by philosophy as a sceptical
or ironical device for keeping science free from theological
interference.
Another objection sometimes made to the Hegelian treat-
ment of the history of philosophy is this, that on Hegel's
own principles that method must now be superseded, and yet
if Hegel was right his philosophy is the final truth. The
argument makes a plausible dilemma ; but both horns may
be evaded. In the first place, I do not think that any one,
however much he may feel the debt of the world to Hegel,
will now be found to set up Hegel as a final authority, a
new St. Thomas Aquinas, on whom we must be content to
write commentaries. Hegel's " Encyclopaedic " method of
exposition, like the mathematical form adopted by Spinoza,
has injured his reputation and prevented him being rightly
understood ; but it was due to the influences of his surround-
ings. He lived in a time of audacious system-building.
Moreover he was a professor of philosophy, and had been for
seven years a tutor in private families and for eight years
1 Cf. Hegel, History of Philosophy, Engl. transl., i., p. 35 (Werke, xiii.,
p. 49). " The great assumption that what has taken place in the world
has done so in conformity with reason which is what first gives the
history of philosophy its true interest is nothing else than trust in
Providence, only in another form."
PHILOSOPHY AND THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHERS. 23
the headmaster of a school. If a university professor is apt
to be dogmatic (and the German practice of Dictaten has
something to answer for), a teacher of boys is bound to be
so, and it was during these years of schoolmastering that
Hegel elaborated his logic. We might remember too that
he edited a newspaper for a year, and the journalist inevitably
tends to assume the attributes of omniscience and infalli-
bility. On Hegel's own principles his " finality " is only
provisional ; he sums up the thought of his time as he under-
stands it. Is his point of view then no longer tenable?
What is the system that has superseded his, and what is its
attitude towards the history of philosophy? Great philo-
sophies do not give place to one another like changes in the
fashions. We are apt to think ourselves very new in our
ideas compared with our predecessors of ten years ago ; but
periods in thought cannot always be counted so rapidly. It
will probably take some time yet before Hegel's system is
superseded, because it will not be superseded till it has been
assimilated in the ordinary thinking of the educated world.
Now that is a process which, though slow, has been going
on very steadily and yet to a great extent unconsciously.
And in the region of philosophy, the special characteristics
of our time, the attention given on the one hand to minute
psychological investigation, the endeavour to get a genetic
account of the individual human mind, and on the other
hand the labour expended on the history of institutions and
of ideas these two prevailing types of intellectual activity
mean that the task which Hegel set to philosophy is being
taken very seriously. It is only through more careful study
of " subjective mind" and of " objective mind" that we can
hope to reach a clearer outlook towards " absolute mind,"
which is the distant goal of our systematic thinking.
In this sense we may accept what Green said about
Hegel's work : " It must all be done over again "- 1 And to
recur to my special subject the study of past philosophy
must be as minute, as scholarly, as possible, if we are to
hope to understand the development of thought and to
understand our own problems. This sets us an ideal of
study which is terribly difficult and may seem unattainable.
For we know how we lose sight of the forest in the trees,
and how " philology " or minute scholarship and antiqua-
rian research are apt to be hostile to that looking at things
as a whole which philosophy requires. But we must make
1 1 think he used these very words. The idea, at least, will be found
in his review of Principal Caird's Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion (reprinted in Green's Works, vol. iu., p. 138 seq.).
24 D. G. BITCHIE : PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS.
the best of the inevitable. Here, as everywhere, we have
an ideal of totality which we cannot complete and which
nevertheless regulates our thinking at every step. We each
of us must be content to take a great deal at second-hand.
There is a sentence of Hegel's which even his most adverse
critics may approve. " There are periods," he says, " with
regard to which it is to be wished that others had read the
works of the philosophers and provided us with extracts." l
It is a suggestion that may be applied even to large parts
of Hegel's own works and to most of what was produced
by his contemporaries. Co-operation can certainly in this
way be applied in philosophy, so far as it means a study
of philosophers. And this is a matter in which, if I may
say so, I think a society such as this and the philosophi-
cal journals which are a comparatively new feature in the
English-speaking world may do great service to all students
of philosophy. "Whoever has made a minute study of any
particular philosopher or of any particular philosophical book
should put his results in such a shape as to save others
from the drudgery he has himself gone through, and in
such a shape as to form a trustworthy source of informa-
tion for others. It is one of the saddest things to see labo-
rious research largely wasted through the results not being
put in a convenient and accessible form.
My subject has led me to dwell mainly on one aspect of
philosophical thought its continuity through different ages.
But I should be giving a false conception of what I take to
be the business of philosophical thinking, if I did not, in a
word at least, refer to the other aspect, to what I may call
the subjective or personal aspect of philosophy. Every one
must have his own philosophy. We can only face the prob-
lems rightly if we face them for ourselves. And for that
reason one of the dangers we have to guard against is the
scholastic habit of becoming the mere expositors of any
one master, however great. For that reason we should
welcome the rebels and the doubters, and should value every
opportunity of serious discussion with those who have grown
up under different influences from those that have moulded
ourselves, or who by a long labour of systematic thinking
have reached an independent position from which they criti-
cise our most cherished judgments about the philosophers
of the past.
1 Werke, xiii., p. 128.
II. SUBJECTIVE COLOURS AND THE AFTER-
IMAGE: THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE
THEORY OF ATTENTION.
BY MAEGAEET FLOY WASHBURN.
SOME time ago, while studying what is called the " flight
of colours " in after-images produced by white light, it oc-
curred to the writer that it would be interesting to observe
the effect on this colour series of an effort to alter the colours
subjectively. The following paper is in part a description
of the results obtained in a series of experiments bearing on
this problem, and performed during the winter and spring
of 1898. By " subjective colour sensation," or "subjective
alteration of colour," is meant the effect of an attempt to
call up in the retinal field of the closed eye, or with open
eyes in a dark room, the sensation of a given colour. Prof.
Kiilpe notes in his Outlines, 28, 2, and 74, 3, that it is
possible in a dark room to call up at will patches of various
colours, and that these central excitations sometimes ap-
proach the intensity of peripheral excitations. The problem
here investigated relates simply to the influence of centrally
excited sensations produced by such efforts upon the or-
dinary " ringing-off " of after-images.
It may be noticed at the outset that these experiments
failed to show one hoped for result, which may perhaps
yield itself to further investigation. During some of the \
earlier and less carefully controlled experiments, the effect
of an effort to tinge the after-image with a certain colour
seemed to be an intensification of the complementary colour ;
e.g., a stage which in the preceding experiment had been
whitish or indefinite in colour flashed out into vivid green
when the subject attempted to turn it red. The obvious
suggestion was that this was a contrast-effect, and contrast
of a new order, so far as the writer was aware, where the/
inducing colour was of purely central origin. The supposi-
tion was rendered more plausible by the recollection of an
experience that occurred some years ago. While spending
a few days in an unfamiliar house I noticed from time to
26 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN :
time a bit of vivid red drapery hanging on the wall of a
room. On one occasion, entering the room hastily and
glancing toward the red drapery, I saw a distinct patch of
green on the white wall, and it was a second or two before
I realised that the red cloth had been removed, and that
what was actually seen was the white wall itself. I can
think of no other explanation for this phenomenon, which
was as unmistakable as it was unexpected, than the hypo-
thesis that the green patch was a contrast colour, induced
by the expected, centrally excited, or subjective red. Nor is
this hypothesis really weakened by my failure to find analo-
gous results in the experiments described below. In the
case of a phenomenon which can occur only when favoured
by very complex conditions, one well-marked positive in-
stance should outweigh a number of failures. As a matter
of fact, the apparent contrast -effect in these experiments
turned out later to be due in all probability to alterations
in the brightness of the stimulating light.
The image used as a basis for the following experiments
was that produced in the retinal field of the closed eyes
by prolonged white-light stimulation. The conditions were
carefully regulated in accordance with those laid down by
Helmholtz in the Physiologische Optik. The subjects sat
in a room lighted by the upper half of a window whose
lower half was screened. The eyes were fixed upon one
point of the window-frame for twenty seconds, and were
then closed and covered. Nothing but sky could be seen
through the window, and careful note was always taken of
the degree of illumination. The precaution was, of course,
observed to free the eyes entirely between experiments
from all traces of the previous image. The subjects experi-
mented on were the writer (W.) and three students of
psychology (M., 0. and D.). Of these only W. had general
practice in psychological experiments. Fortunately, how-
ever, a reliable test could be had both of the degree of
special practice attained by the subjects in the course of
the research and of the influence of external sources of
error. This test lay in the uniformity of the colour changes,
observed in the ordinary unmodified image. A wholly un-
practised observer watching the course of an after-image
for the first time reports chaotic results, and no two such
observers agree as to the alterations in colour which occur.
No results were taken account of from* an} 7 subject until
she was sufficiently practised to find the colour changes ap-
proximately uniform or affected only by such fluctuations,
as could be accounted for from external causes.
SUBJECTIVE COLOURS AND THE AFTER-IMAGE. 27
The first point to be determined was the sequence of
colours to be expected from the ordinary image under
these conditions. This was ascertained by a series of forty-
experiments made by W. at the outset of the research ; the
other subjects being then practised as stated above, till
their accounts of the course of the image were consistent..
Throughout the research at the beginning of each hour's,
work, and at intervals during its progress, two or three
observations were taken of the ordinary unmodified image..
The results obtained were almost perfectly uniform. After
the momentary positive same-coloured image which appeared \
immediately on closing the eyes, there was an interval of
five or six seconds, when a positive image came again. "*-
This image was at first rather fluctuating in colour, patches ->
of red and green sometimes appearing on it, but in a second
or two the panes of the window filled out with sky blue,. *f
the window bars remaining dark. This blue stage then .-
passed into a stage of vivid green, the image sometimes but.
not always disappearing between the two stages. The green
image usually disappeared and reappeared five or six times, k
growing paler, almost whitish, in colour towards the end.T
This neutralising of the green tint seemed to be due to the
gradual emergence of the complementary colour, for the//
image next assumed a deep red tone, while the black bars-
became luminous and slightly greenish, the light appear-
ing first as a crack through the length of each dark bar-
Here, of course, was the transition from the positive to the 1
negative image. The red stage, after undergoing several
fluctuations, gave place to a deep blue image with yellowish 10
bright lines, which lasted longer than any of the preceding,
growing gradually darker until it became indistinguishable.. u
By one of the subjects (0.) this final image was described
as dark green, or sometimes as bluish green. No other
important exceptions to this sequence were noticed with
practised subjects, and it corresponds to that observed
by Helmholtz under similar conditions. Experiments made
with ten and fifteen seconds' exposure also confirm Helm-
holtz' statement, that after a certain limit has been passed
the duration of the stimulus does not affect the course of
the image. Variations in the intensity of the stimulating
light did, however, influence the colour changes of the
image. The sequence just described occurred when the
sky was unclouded, or when it was covered with thin clouds
and presented a uniformly white surface. When the illumina-
tion was much diminished, the sky uniformly and heavily
clouded, the blue and green positive images were lacking.
28 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN :
The first image in the regular series was reddish white with
'dark lines. The colour gradually deepened, and the red
negative image appeared, followed after several fluctuations
by a dark blue negative image, very bright and distinct.
The blue and green positive stages were regularly omitted
when the sky was darkened ; and the effect noted above, the
brightened green which appeared several times when the
subject tried to turn the image red, was very likely due
to a brightening of the sky, as it was not observed in the
later experiments, which were never made when the sky
was in a condition to render the illumination variable in
.any marked degree.
When the subjects were sufficiently practised to be familiar
with the ordinary course of the image and to find it regular,
they were told before the experiment that they must by an
effort of will turn the image red all the way through its
course ; that they must force back the other colour stages,
or make them as brief as possible by fixing their attention
i-on the idea of red. It was suggested that this could be
' brought about best by thinking hard of something red, at
the same time trying to call up the colour in the retinal
field ; by fancying, for instance, that the window-panes were
pools of blood. Corresponding suggestions of green and
blue were made in other experiments ; the subjects being
told to think of green grass or blue sky. It soon became
apparent that the carrying out of these suggestions was
/much easier for one of the subjects (D.) than for the other
three. While M., W. and 0. have moderate visualising powers,
D. is a good instance of the predominantly visual type, and
was selected as a subject for that reason. In the case of
the former, intense effort was needed to keep the attention
fixed on the colour to be produced. This effort was mani-
fest in a rigid position of the body, in frowning and biting
the lips, and in a general expenditure of muscular energy,
which became very fatiguing. The subjects often tried to
reinforce the visual excitation by associated sound and
muscular excitations, repeating internally the words ' red '
or ' green ' while trying to call up the colours. The strain
of all this was found by the writer to be so great that the
-conditions of the experiment were altered, and instead of
being required to visualise one colour throughout the whole
course of the image, the subjects were asked in one set of
experiments to turn the image red, blue, or green during the
first half of its course, that is, up to the point where it
passed from the positive to the negative stage ; and in
.another set to wait until the image was entering upon the
SUBJECTIVE COLOURS AND THE AFTER-IMAGE. 29'
negative stage, and then to try the subjective colour. In
the case of the subject D. no such division of the experi-
ments seemed necessary ; much less effort was required to
visualise the desired colour, simply thinking of some red,,
green or blue object being apparently sufficient.
The first set of results to be discussed are those obtained
from the subjects M., W. and 0. Experiments where the-
effect of subjective red on the first half of the image was
studied will be referred to as the E. I. experiments ; those
with subjective green in the first half as the G. I. experi-
ments ; those with subjective blue as the B. I. ; while ex-
periments with subjective red, green and blue in the second
half will be designated as B. II., G. II. and B. II. respec-
tively.
The effect of subjective red in the E. I. experiments was./
manifested in three ways : (1) The blue positive image was I
observed to be strongly tinged with red. This effect was j
never visible on the green positive image, which resisted all
efforts to turn it red. However (2), the dark lines on the /
green positive image were often made to assume a distinctly
reddish tone ; and (3) the blue and green stages were not
infrequently much shorter than in the unmodified image, the
effort to turn them red having apparently the effect of
bringing on the red stage sooner than usual.
In the G. I. experiments the subjects were asked to make-
the image green at its first appearance, shortening or obliter-
ating the blue stage ; to hold the green as long as possible,.
and when the red stage appeared to force it back into green.
It was found (1) that the blue image was tinged with green ;
(2) that its duration was distinctly shortened ; (3) that the
green image was noticeably brighter, and lasted longer than
usual ; and (4) that in some cases the green colour could be
brought back after the image had turned red. The subject
0., to whom the final negative image looked dark green
instead of dark blue, found that the effect of trying to bring
back the green colour after the image had entered the red
stage was to "hurry it on" into the final green negative
image.
The chief results of the B. I. experiment were (1) that
the blue positive stage was brighter and of longer duration
than in the unmodified image ; and (2) that blue patches
appeared on the green image. W. also noticed during many
of these experiments flashes and patches of blue light in the
retinal field near the image.
In the E. II. experiments the effort was made to hold the
red image as long as possible, and when the dark blue or
30 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN :
dark green colour began to appear to force it back into red.
It was found (1) that the red image was brighter and lasted
much longer than usual ; (2) that the red colour would
frequently be brought back even after the image had turned
completely blue or green ; and (3), by the subject 0., that
when the image had become very dark and indistinct, and
was on the point of disappearing, it could be made to look
reddish.
The subjects were told in the B. II. experiments to shorten
the red image and to bring on the dark blue negative stage
as soon as possible. This result was obtained, and the blue
negative image appeared brighter and lasted longer than
usual. The subject 0. found that under these conditions the
final stage of the image was quite distinctly blue instead of
.green.
The attempt in the G. II. experiments was to shorten the
red stage, and to turn the final blue negative image green, if
possible. This latter result was of course most strongly
marked in the case of the subject 0., who found the final
image distinctly green. The dark blue negative image was,
however, noticeably tinged with green for the other two
observers. Another result was that the lines on both red
and blue negative images appeared bright green in colour.
These results were not uniformly distributed throughout
the experiments made in each class. Sometimes only one
effect, e.g., the brightening of the blue or green image, would
be noticed. Sometimes several effects would appear in the
same experiment. In from one to two per cent, of the
experiments the effort to visualise produced no result at all.
The high degree of strain put upon the attention subjected
the results to variations arising from causes too slight and
obscure to be traced or calculated, and a table showing the
relative frequency of the effect described above reveals an
irregular distribution from which no general principles can
be deduced. The results themselves seem to fall, broadly
speaking, into two classes, which, however, are not separated
by any sharply defined line.
The first class comprises cases where the effect of visual-
ising a certain colour was simply to intensify the traces of
that colour already present in the retinal field. Central ex-
citation of a given colour meant in these cases merely " calling
attention " to that colour whenever it was actually present.
In other words, it was an instance of what Prof. James calls
" ideational preparation " for attention ; the facilitation of
attention to a given conscious contents by expectation
The results which fall into this class are : (1) the brightening
SUBJECTIVE COLOURS AND THE AFTER-IMAGE. 31
of a coloured image by central excitation of the same colour ;
(2) the appearance of patches of the visualised colour on
images of other colours. The writer found that in her own
case these patches of red on the blue image or of blue on the
green were not infrequently present when there was no
attempt to visualise red or blue ; and interpreting the reports
of the other subjects from her own experience, concludes
that they were merely not noticed except when the subject
had their colour specially in mind. ^
To the second class of results belong those cases (1) where
the image of the visualised colour was brought on sooner
than usual, the preceding stage being very considerably
shortened ; and (2) where it was held longer than usual, the
succeeding stage being as it were thrust back when it began
to appear. Here we have apparently not merely an in-
tensification of sensations already peripherally excited, but
either the production by central excitation of a sensation equal
in intensity to the peripherally excited image, or the check-
ing of a peripheral by a central excitation. Keally, however,
this second class of results is merely an exaggerated instance
of the same principle manifested in the first class. Here,
too, in all probability, a peripheral excitation is strengthened
by a central excitation, only the former is so faint that the
resulting sensation seems to have been produced wholly
by central excitation. There is always a tendency for
the colour of the after-image to fluctuate between stages.
Some time before the green stage, for instance, actually
passes into the red stage, the red process assumes more or
less prominence, and after the red stage has appeared there
are still traces of the green process surviving. If the
subject is visualising red, the nascent red excitation will be
strengthened and made predominant ; if green, the fading
traces of green will be held and intensified against the
in-coming red.
In the case of the subject D. the effect of centrally excited
colours on the course of the after-image was very striking.
It amounted in many experiments to an entire transforma-
tion of the colour series. The subject's own report of one
or two experiments will give the best idea of the extent of
this effect. The ordinary sequence of colours in the " ring-
ing-ofif " was for D. perfectly regular ; blue positive, green
positive, red negative, dark blue negative. When in the
next experiment, after an interval sufficient to remove all
traces of the preceding image from the retinal field, the
subject was asked to visualise red, the course of the colour
changes was described as follows : First a red image with
32 MAEGAEET FLOY WASHBUEN :
dark lines lasting some time and growing lighter, inter-
rupted once by a momentary green image. The lines then
became bright, and the red negative image remained until
the end of the series, traces of blue appearing from time
to time. After the usual interval, the subject was asked to
turn the image green in the next experiment, and the follow-
ing colour sequence was obtained : A light green image
with dark lines, the lines gradually becoming reddish ; then
a red image with green lines, the lines spreading till the
whole image was dark green, which it remained until its
entire disappearance. Finally, where blue was visualised,
the sequence of colours was : purple positive, light blue
positive, light blue positive with greenish lines, very short
red negative, vivid blue negative with yellow lines.
Such results as these show that for a person with un-
usually vivid powers of visual imagination, central excita-
tion of visual centres, whose peripheral excitation by white
light is so far weakened that the corresponding colour sensa-
tions have quite disappeared from the after-image, may re-
inforce their activity to such an extent as to make their
sensations predominate in the image. We have here an
extreme case of the effect of central reinforcement on weak
peripheral excitation ; an effect which appears to a less
marked degree in the results from the other subjects.
The most obvious theoretical consideration suggested by
these phenomena is one which hardly needs to be dwelt on,
since it has been recognised for so long and is supported
by so many other lines of evidence. I mean the fact that
perception and idea differ ultimately only in the manner
of their production. The after-image, while of peripheral
origin, stands in point of intensity midway between the
two. Here, where the intensity of the peripheral process
is reduced to a minimum, the resulting conscious state is
seen to be practically identical in character with that pro-
duced by central excitation. But the chief interest of these
experiments is their bearing on the theory of attention.
The writer can state from her own introspection that for
the three subjects of moderate visualising powers the effort
to call up subjectively a certain colour meant simply an
unusually intense effort to attend to that colour. That is,
the central excitation of the visual centre was of the same
order as that which occurs when one prepares to attend to
certain conscious contents, e.g., a certain overtone in a
clang. Now if these experiments show anything, they show
that the function of attention is positive as well as nega-
tive, intensifying as well as inhibiting; and further that
SUBJECTIVE COLOURS AND THE AFTER-IMAGE. 33
its positive effects are due to the fact that, whenever we
' voluntarily ' attend to any peripherally excited conscious,
contents, its peripheral excitation is reinforced by a central
excitation, and its intensity is thereby actually increased.
This effect of increased intensity would naturally be espe-
cially well-marked and unmistakable in the case of after-
images, where the peripheral process is of but slight intensity.
Nothing but an actual reinforcement by central excitation
can account for the cutting short or lengthening at will of
the colour stages in the after-image.
The evidence which these experiments afford of the func-
tion of central excitations in attention suggests a criticism
of the reason for assuming the existence of a special ' at-
tention centre ' somewhere in the frontal lobes. Every
function which the attention or apperception centre is sup-
posed to perform can be explained on the hypothesis that
the organ of attention is the cortex as a whole ; or more
definitely, the sum total of those brain centres which are
connected functionally according to the laws of association
and habit with the centre whose accompanying conscious
process is the object attended to. Attention means central
reinforcement of an excitation which may be in the first
instance either central or peripheral in origin. And this
central reinforcement comes not from a single supreme
centre, but from associated centres of the same order aa
that in which the original excitation takes place. The in-
flux of nervous energy which occurs in such a process of
course involves increased intensity on the part of the result-
ing conscious state. It also involves diminished intensity
in the rest of the field of consciousness. For the cortex as.
a whole represents a certain limited amount of nervous-
energy. When the currents of central excitation are de-
termined to a given brain centre or group of centres, the
intensity of nervous processes elsewhere is necessarily di-
minished, precisely as the electric lights in a trolley car
grow dimmer when the car starts. Hence comes the pheno-
menon known as abstraction, which surely needs no such
hypothesis as that of an inhibitory influence exerted by
a special centre.
Although attention is thus seen to involve increased in-
tensity on the part of the mental state attended to, it does,
not follow that the more intense a conscious state is, the
greater the degree of attention to it. The increase in in-
tensity must be of central, of associative origin. Otherwise
an idea could never be attended to in the waking life, unless,
it assumed the intensity of an hallucination. It is not the
3
34 MAEGABET F. WASHBUBN : SUBJECTIVE COLOURS.
fact that a monotonous sound suddenly becomes louder that
constitutes the fact of its being attended to ; it is the
sudden stirring up of associated ideas of its cause and
significance, the ' what's that ? ' not the increase of in-
tensity due to the external stimulus, but that due to the
influx of excitation from associated brain centres. Such,
at any rate, is the view of attention suggested, rather than
proved, by the experiments described above. The writer
hopes that as an hypothesis it is at least worth considering,
if only to be rejected upon other evidence.
III. HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE CATE-
GORIES OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 1
BY J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT.
LAST year I had the honour of laying before the Society an
attempt at an explanation of Hegel's doctrine of the Sub-
jective Notion. In continuing this to the Objective Notion,
I should wish to take up the same position as before. The
views I put before you I believe to be substantially the same
as those of Hegel. But the point on which I would wish
that discussion might turn is the intrinsic correctness of
these views, and not their fidelity to the text.
The Objective Notion does not present so many difficulties
as the preceding division. It is far less elaborately sub-
divided than the Subjective Notion, and (with the exception
of the category of Chemism) it is much less influenced by
attempts to make the development of the Logic correspond
exactly to the divisions of some finite science. We shall,
I think, find it necessary to criticise less, and be able to con-
fine ourselves almost entirely to exposition.
The Objective Notion is the second division of the Doctrine
of the Notion. It is divided into three sections, Mechanism,
Chemism, and Teleology. The subdivisions of Chemism,
which are only to be found in the Greater Logic, we may omit
from consideration, for reasons which will be perceived when
we come to that category. Mechanism is divided into
Formal Mechanism, Mechanism with Affinity, and Absolute
Mechanism. (These are the names given in the Smaller
Lof/ic. The names are different in the Greater Logic, and
each division is again subdivided, but the argument is sub-
stantially the same.) Teleology again is subdivided into the
Subjective End, the Means, and the Realised End. (These
names are only found in the Greater Logic. In the Smaller
Logic no names are given although the divisions are found.)
Two of these categories bear, it will be noticed, the names
of physical sciences. This has the same significance as the
use of the terms of formal logic in the Subjective Notion.
The categories of Mechanism and Chemism do not apply
1 Bead before the Aristotelian Society.
36 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART :
only to the subject matter of Mechanics and Chemistry.
Like all categories each of them is a predicate more or less
accurate of all reality. Still less is it the case that an
attempt is made by pure thought to deduce all the special
characteristics of Mechanics and Chemistry as empirical
sciences. What Hegel means by the names is that the most
striking instances of the uses of the categories which he has
called Mechanism and Chemism are to be found in the
sciences of Mechanics and Chemistry. (We shall, I think,
find reason to doubt this view about Chemism.) The use of
the category is not confined to the science after which it is
named, nor has the category anything to do with the empirical
details of that science, but it is the form of pure thought
which the science most naturally and usually employs.
Why is the part of the logic which we are considering
called the Objective Notion? It is clearly meant as an
antithesis to the title of Subjective Notion given to the
previous division. Now we saw reason in our last paper to
reject the view that Subjective here meant the inner as
opposed to the outer. It must rather mean the particular,
contingent, and capricious, as opposed to the universal,
necessary, and reasonable. And we saw there that the Sub-
jective Notion began by dealing with systems of classification
which were contingent and capricious, and finally ended in
a system of classification which was universal and necessary.
This result is inherited by the next division of the Logic.
All the systematisations made in the different stages of the
Objective Notion claim to be, not classifications we may
adopt, like those in the earlier stages of the Subjective
Notion, but, on the contrary, classifications which express
the whole nature of the reality, and which therefore we must
adopt. It is on this account that it is entitled to the name
of Objective.
In considering the transition from the Subjective to the
Objective Notion, I should wish to refer to my paper on the
Subjective Notion (MiND, 1897, p. 171). The conclusion
there arrived at was that " things are doubly connected by
similarity and by causation. And it is obvious that a thing
may be, and generally is, connected by the one tie to things
very different from those to which it is connected by the
other." I submitted that the dialectic " first takes up the
relation of similarity, and works it out through the course
of the Subjective Notion. Then, in the Objective Notion, it
proceeds to work out the relation of determination not
going back arbitrarily to pick it up, but led on to it again by
dialectical necessity, since the Subjective Notion, when fully
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 37
worked out, shows itself to have a defect which can only be
remedied by the further development of the idea of deter-
mination."
We concluded that the final result reached in the Sub-
jective Notion might be expressed as " the conception of
a regular system of laws proceeding from the more general
to the less general, embracing at the top the whole of reality
111 a single unity, and at the bottom accounting for every
quality in every individual " (MiND, 1897, p. 357).
But now that the Subjective Notion is worked out to its
highest point its inherent one-sidedness comes to the front
namely, its omission of connexion by determination. And
this shows itself in an imperfection which becomes apparent
in the highest form of the Subjective Notion. According to
that form the highest type of knowledge is, Every A is either
B or C. But such knowledge is necessarily incomplete.
For of any given A, we know it is either B or C, but we do
not know which it is. And yet it is certain that it is one of
them, and it is no more the other than it is X or Y. How
is this to be determined? All that the Subjective Notion
can do for us is to class A x under the general head A, and
ex hypothesi this cannot determine whether it is B or C. (If
we put the position, as Hegel does, in the form of a dis-
junctive syllogism, the question will take the form, How do
we get the minor premiss, A is not C '?) We require a
further determination of objects which their inner nature, as
we are able at this stage of the dialectic to understand it,
cannot give us. What can remain ? It can only be deter-
mination from outside. And thus we are naturally led back
at the end of the Subjective Notion to the conception of the
reciprocal connexion of objects by determination that very
conception which we had temporarily ignored while dealing
with the Subjective Notion. Thus the argument takes the
course that, from the nature of the dialectic, might be antici-
pated. When we left one element of Reciprocity behind,
and, in the Thesis of the Doctrine of the Notion, devoted
ourselves to developing the other side only, we could predict
that the incompleteness thus created would require us to
develop the other element of Reciprocity in the Antithesis.
And this is exactly what has happened. We are now on
the point of beginning the Antithesis namely, the Objective
Notion, and the course of the argument has led us back to
the ignored element of Reciprocity.
I am aware that this is not the way in which Hegel him-
self makes the transition from the Subjective to the Objec-
tive Notion (cp. Encyclopedia, section 193, and Werke, vol. v.,
38 J. ELLIS MCTAGGAET :
p. 170.) But it appears necessary to differ from him on this
point, for three reasons. In the first place, this view of the
relation between the Subjective and Objective Notions seems
the only one by which we can account for the difficult tran-
sition between Reciprocity and the Subjective Notion (cp.
MIND, 1897, pp. 170-173). In the second place, Hegel's
transition leaves the special and characteristic defect of the
Subjective Notion its powerlessness to determine which
of the possible alternatives is real unnoticed and untran-
scended. And, finally, Hegel's transition does not seem
convincing in itself. The line of his argument appears to
be that at the end of the Subjective Notion the mediation is
merged, that this produces immediacy, and that this forms
the transition to the Object. But how has the mediation
been merged, so that we can pass to the immediate Object ?
Surely it has not been completely merged. The highest
point of the Subjective Notion, as we saw, is found in the
proposition A is either B or C. This may be said to be an
immediate connexion between A on the one hand, and B
and C on the other. But in any particular object A will be
connected with B or C not with both. A still requires
mediation to determine whether, in this case, it is to be B
or C, and it is rather the necessity of this mediation, as we
have seen, and not the transcending of all mediation, which
takes us on to the Objective Notion.
MECHANISM.
Hegel begins by remarking that the Object, which he
takes to begin with as single, splits itself up " into distinct
parts each of which is itself the totality" (Enc., section 194).
He accounts for this by means of the immediacy which he takes
to be the special characteristic, at this stage, of the Objective
Notion. But, even on my view of transition to the Objective
Notion, the breaking up of the Object remains intelligible.
At the end of the Subjective Notion we had, not indeed a
blank unity, but a system of objects completely united, and
united this is the essential point by their inner natures,
and not by any merely external relation. Now when we pass
from connexion by similarity to connexion by determination,
we leave this union by inner nature behind us. If we look
at things as they determine one another, we find them con-
nected indeed, but, so far, connected only in an external way.
They no longer form a single unity, but, on the contrary, an
aggregate of objects, secondarily connected, no doubt, but
primarily separated.
HEGEL'S TBEATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 39
Of course this does not mean that the union by inner
nature has been disproved or abolished. It is still there.
But we have seen that, by itself, it cannot account for
reality, and that it must be supplemented by the principle
of connexion by determination. The objects which are
determining one another have still their inner natures, as
those have been expounded in the Subjective Notion. But
we are now considering them as determining one another,
and from that point of view they must be looked at as
separate, since their relations are external. Thus the reality,
which was previously looked at as primarily a whole, is now
looked at as primarily a plurality, or, in Hegelian language,
the totality breaks up into distinct parts.
The Objects are, then, at first taken as merely externally
connected. Mechanics is the science which has the strongest
tendency to treat the external relations of objects as entirely
independent of their inner natures and, therefore, Hegel calls
the first division of the Objective Notion by the name of
Mechanism. Of this the first and most extreme form is
FOEMAL MECHANISM.
The definition of this, as often happens in the dialectic, is
identical with that of the larger division, of which it is the
first subdivision. The two other subdivisions modify and
correct the characteristic idea of Mechanism. But in
Formal Mechanism it is given in its full extent. Each
object enters into external relations with all others outside
it, but these external relations are not affected by, and do
not affect, the internal nature of the objects related.
A theory so extreme as this can only be accepted, with
regard to objects of experience, as a methodological ex-
pedient. It may sometimes be convenient to consider
objects, for some particular and limited purpose, as if their
external relations had no influence on their inner nature, or
their inner nature on their external relations. But ex-
perience teaches us, too plainly to be disregarded, that every
external event that happens to any object of experience does
effect its inner nature, and that, on the other hand, the ex-
ternal relations into which objects enter are largely deter-
mined by what the objects are.
Atoms, however, cannot be directly perceived, and in their
case, therefore, empirical knowledge is powerless to check
the errors of theory. And Atomism has got very near, some-
times, to the position of Formal Mechanism. It would not
indeed assert that the inner nature of the atoms was entirely
40 J. ELLIS MCTAGGAET :
a matter of indifference to their outer relations. They could
not, for example, repel one another, except by some property
of impenetrability. But it has been asserted that a change
in their outer relations makes no change in their inner nature,
and that the inner nature, on the other hand, has no in-
fluence in deciding which, of various possible relations, should
be the one into which they actually should enter.
Hegel says in the Greater Logic (Werke, vol. v., p. 183) that
this is the standpoint of Determinism. The name does not,
at first sight, seem very appropriate, since one of the chief
characteristics of the category is that the inner nature of the
thing is not determined by its outer relations. But it is the
determination of the outer relations to which Hegel refers
here, and the significance of the name is negative. It refers
to the absence of any self-determination on the part of the
Object. If we ask why it is determined in this way rather
than that, we can only attribute it to determination by
another Object, which, in its turn, must be determined by a
third, and so on indefinitely. In no case can the Object be
self-determined, because in no case can the inner nature of
the Object have anything to do with its determinations.
Such a determinism would lead to a morality not unlike
that of the Stoics. For morality is in the long run con-
cerned only with the inner states of people though not of
course only with the inner state of the individual moral agent.
If every one was good and happy in himself, all external
relations would be quite indifferent to morality, which only
cares for external things in so far as they affect goodness or
happiness. And if the inner nature of man, as of all other
Objects, was independent of his external relations, then,
whatever his circumstances, it would be in each man's power
to be free, virtuous and happy. Such a view would of course
tend to produce absolute indifference to the affairs of the
outside world, and forms a striking contrast to the despair-
ing Fatalism, which we shall see to be the ethical correlate
of Mechanism with Affinity.
How does this category demonstrate its insufficiency? The
important point for this is the fact that each of these Objects,
which are only externally related, has not only an inner
nature, but an inner nature determined in the way expounded
in the Subjective Notion. It is this which breaks down the
category and carries us on to the next, and I should like to
call attention to this as an incidental confirmation of my view
as to the relation of the Subjective and Objective Notions.
For it fully explains and justifies the postponement of the
consideration of connexion by determination until connexion
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 41
by similarity had been dealt with. It was not merely due,
as might have been previously supposed, to the impossibility
of considering two things at once. On the contrary, there
was the positive and definite reason that, until the inner
nature of objects had been developed, it would be impossible
to pass out of the simplest and crudest form of connexion
by determination.
In the earlier stages of Essence there would have been no
contradiction in such a category as Mechanism. For there
the Essence and the Appearance were conceived as realities
which, though connected, possessed independent qualities.
'To determine the Appearance would not be to determine
the Essence, and thus the inner nature of a thing could
remain unaffected by its outer relations.
Even when the category of Reciprocity was reached, all
we could have said of the assertion of the independence of
the inner and the outer was not that it was false, but that
it was unmeaning. For things, looked at under the category
of Reciprocity, had no inner nature at all. It is true that
they had those relations of Likeness and Unlikeness, out of
which, as the Subjective Notion progressed, an inner nature
developed. But at the end of Essence and the beginning of
the Notion these relations also were purely external. They
did not become an inner nature of the things that possessed
them until the justification of Universal Judgments, in the
course of the Subjective Notion, showed us that they were
not accidents of Individuals, but, on the contrary, essential
to the existence of those Individuals.
At the point which we have now reached, however, the
matter is entirely different. Every Object, the Subjective
Notion has taught us, must have an inner nature. And in
the course of the Doctrine of Essence we learned that, if
anything has an inner nature at all, it cannot be merely inner,
that it, and the whole of it, must be manifested by the out-
side of the object that is, by its external relations. And,
conversely, no outer nature can be entirely outer. There
can no more be anything in appearance which has not its
root in Essence, than there can be anything in Essence
which does not manifest itself in appearance.
And thus the category of Formal Mechanism contains a
clear contradiction. The inner nature of an Object, it de-
mands, shall be indifferent to its external relations of deter-
mination. These external relations belong somehow, and
in some respects, to the Object, or there would be no mean-
ing in calling them the external relations of that Object.
'They are not its inner nature. They must therefore be its
42 j. ELLIS MCTAGGAET:
outer side, or part of its outer side. The category of Formal
Mechanism, therefore, demands an Outer which has no re-
lation to the Inner. And this is just what was proved in
the Doctrine of Essence to be impossible.
If we wish to look at the question in a more concrete way,
we may ask ourselves how much knowledge of the inner
nature of an Object would be left us if we abstracted all
knowledge of the effects which it produced on other Objects,
and of the reactions by which it responded to the influences
exerted on it from outside. The answer would certainly be
that all knowledge of the inner nature would have vanished,,
and the conclusion to be drawn is that it is impossible to
separate inner nature and outer relations. 1
Or, looking at the other side, we may ask what meaning
could be given to the statement that a relation x was a
relation of A and B, if it did not affect the inner nature of
either, and therefore made no difference to either of them.
Why in this case should we call x a relation of A and B
rather than of C and D ? As Lotze points out (Logic r
section 338) a relation of things cannot be merely between
them. It is in them, or it is nowhere.
If then the outer relations and inner nature of the object
are not absolutely independent, how do they stand to one
another? The primd facie assumption, since they at any
rate profess to be different, is that they are two separate
realities, acting on one another. The arguments given above,,
indeed, suggest that the connexion is closer than this, but
Hegel prefers to approach the truth gradually, by stating
and transcending this view of the interaction of separate
realities. This forms the second subdivision of Mechanism,,
and he entitles it :
MECHANISM WITH AFFINITY.
This is a somewhat perplexing title, nor is the original
(Differenter Mechanismus) much clearer. The Smaller Logic
is scarcely of any use here, owing to the very condensed way
in which Hegel treats the subdivisions of Mechanism. By
1 It may be objected that it is possible to form an idea of the inner
nature of the universe, although it has nothing outside it with which it
can enter into relations. But the universe is not a single Object, but a
differentiated unity of parts, each of which is to be regarded as a centre
of reality. It is the relations between these which constitute the inner
nature of the universe. But the Objects which we are now considering
are not systems of centres. They are single centres, and, except for
their external relations, would be blank unities, and therefore non-
entities.
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 4$
the aid of the Greater Logic, however, it is possible to catch
the meaning of the category. The outer relations and the
inner nature influence one another, and the significance of
the name appears to be that one Object is no longer as
suitable as another to enter into any particular relations.
Since the inner nature has some influence on the outer
relations, it is only those Objects whose inner nature is
of a particular kind which are capable of entering into
particular relations.
To this category, Hegel says (Werke, vol. v., p. 192), belongs
the idea of Fate a blind Fate, conceived as crushing and
ignoring the individuals who are in its power. This con-
ception of the sacrifice of the individual to the order of
things outside him could not have arisen in the category
of Formal Mechanism, since there the interior of any
Object was quite untouched by, and could not be sacrificed
to, external circumstances. And in the next category, that
of Absolute Mechanism, the opposition between inner and
outer is replaced by the perception of their unity, and with
it goes the idea of Fate as an alien and crushing power to
return again, on a higher level, in the category of Life, but.
to be again transcended by the category of Cognition. But,
between Formal and Absolute Mechanism, our present cate-
gory is precisely the proper sphere of Fate. For outside and
inside are connected just so much that the former may act on
the latter, just so little that there is no harmony between
them. Fate has the individual Objects in its power,.
" subjectos tanquam SILOS, viles tanquam alienos ".
The Stoicism which is the characteristic moral of Formal
Mechanism necessarily leads on, if we do not refuse to look
facts in the face, to the Fatalism which is characteristic of
Mechanism with Affinity. It is all very well to say that
every man has the power to be free, virtuous and happy
under any circumstances. But the circumstances may in-
clude a badly trapped sewer which sends him out of the world,
or a blow on the head which sends him into an asylum, or
an education which leaves him with a complete ignorance
of virtue, or a lively distaste for it. It is useless trying to
escape from our circumstances. Such an " escape from Fate
is itself the most unhappy of all Fates," as Hegel says. For
the attempt at escape deprives us of our power over them,
while it by no means deprives them of their power over us.
Fortunately this rather depressing category passes like
the rest. If we consider more closely, we shall see that it
is really impossible for the inner nature of an Object to be
crushed. If we call this inner nature xyz, then one of two
44 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART :
alternatives follows. Either the Object has this inner nature,
or it has not. If it has it, it has it, and the inner nature is
not crushed, but, on the contrary, exists in its fulness. But
if it has it not, then this xyz is not the Object's inner nature
at all, and the Object is not in the least crushed or thwarted
because it is not xyz. Why should it be xyz, if in point of fact
it is not ?
(Of course all this would not apply if we were speaking of
self-conscious individuals Objects who were in the fullest
sense for self. In the case of any being with a power of
conscious self-determination, the inner nature will include
an ideal of some sort, and if outside circumstances prevent
that ideal from being realised, then we can intelligibly speak
of the inner nature, being thwarted. For the inner nature
in such a case is not merely a fact, but it is a fact which is
a demand, and a demand can be real and yet unsatisfied.
But we are not here dealing with self-conscious beings, and
therefore the argument of the last paragraph will hold.)
H6w then can we get out of the contradiction in which
this category involves us ? We can be delivered from it by
a line of argument which I have already more or less antici-
pated when criticising Formal Mechanism. There can, in
fact, be no opposition between inner nature and outer
relations, because there is no difference between them. All
we mean by the inner nature of the Object is the general
laws which determine the manner in which it does enter
into relations. The inner nature of glass, for example, is
just that it can scratch wax and cannot be scratched by it,
that it cannot scratch diamonds, while diamonds can scratch
it, and so on. If we try to think of any inner nature of the
Object which is not expressed in the various actions and
reactions, actual or possible, which the Object enters into,
we absolutely fail.
And, while there is thus no inner nature which is not also
outside relations, it is equally true that there are no outside
relations which are not an expression of inner nature. This
is often thrown into the background by the practical utility
of considering one of the two terms in a relation as purely
passive. But this is only a convenient inaccuracy. Every-
thing which, as we say, "happens to" an Object, is really a
manifestation of its inner nature. A tabula rasa is the stock
example of something passive, and the active co-operation
of the wax in the work of writing is not obvious on the
surface. But when we consider how very different the
result would have been if an attempt had been made to
write on water, or on diamonds, it becomes evident that the
HEGEL'S TBEATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 45
wax is really reacting as actively on the pencil, as gun-
powder does on a match.
The result which we thus reach is not unlike the discovery
in the Doctrine of Being, that Being-for-another is really
Being-for-self. The inner nature of each Object is really
identical with its relations to all other Objects, and we thus
pass to the category of
ABSOLUTE MECHANISM.
Since Hegel has correlated Formal Mechanism with De-
terminism, and Mechanism with Affinity with Fatalism,.
we might venture to carry on the process by comparing
Absolute Mechanism with Spinoza's doctrine of Freedom.
According to Spinoza, everything and everybody is free.
For Freedom only consists in acting according to your nature,
and there is, of course, 110 power in the universe (yourself
included) which could possibly make you do anything not
according to your nature.
This is doubtless true as far as it goes. But it does not
go as far as Spinoza thinks, who endeavours to find in it
a basis for resignation, if not for optimism. For this it is
insufficient, for the reasons pointed out above. If we are to
mean by Freedom anything which is of the least value to
spirit, it must mean acting, not merely according to our
nature, but according to our desires and, ultimately, our
ideals. Supposing that I get toothache when I sit near a
window, or feel jealous when I see my superiors, I shall cer-
tainly be acting according to my nature, but that will not
make me feel that toothache and jealousy are desirable or
ideal, and there will be a painfully true sense in which I can
say that my freedom is interfered with by each of them.
The only valuable freedom must be sought elsewhere not
in indeterminism indeed, but in self-realisation. But this,
comes later in the dialectic.
According to the Category of Absolute Mechanism, every
Object is the centre of a system composed of all the other
Objects which influence it. As everything in the universe
stands in reciprocal connexion with everything else, it follows
that each of these systems embraces the whole of reality,
and that they are distinguished from one another by the fact
that each has a different centre.
The central Object in each system is called by Hegel the
Universal. Its best claim to that name seems to be that it
alone in the system is to be looked on as self-determined.
It is determined, in the first place, by all the surrounding
46 J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT :
Objects. But, since these determinations only serve to bring
out its own inner nature, it may be said to be self-deter-
mined. On the other hand, the surrounding Objects are
looked at only as determining, not as determined at all, and
so not self-determined. (Of course this only refers to the
systems in which they are the determining Objects. Each
-of them has its own system, in which it is the central Object
and therefore Universal.) The relations which connect the
Universal with the Individuals are called by Hegel the Par-
ticular.
From another point of view the central Object may derive
the title of Universal from the fact that it is the point of
meeting of the other two terms, since only in that particular
Object would the influence of the surrounding Objects pro-
duce just those actions and reactions. This is what Hegel
iseems to have been thinking of when he remarks that either
the determining Objects or the relations could be taken as the
Universal, as well as the determined Object. For we may
consider the determining Objects as the bond of union
between the central Object and the relations since it is
only these determinants which could enter into just those
relations with that centre. Or we may consider the relations
.as the bond between the determining and the determined
Objects, since those Objects could only be united by those
relations. But this does not seem as deep a meaning for
Universality as the one suggested in the last paragraph, and
the successive transformation of the determining Objects and
the relations into the Universal appears to have no influence
on the general argument.
It should be noticed that the example of this category
.given by Hegel in both the Greater and the Smaller Logic
is misleading. He there makes the State, or the Govern-
ment, take the place of what I have called the central
Object, while the citizens are the determining Objects. Now
the State does not differ from the citizens as one citizen does
from another, but is generically different. And both State and
'Government are, in their own nature, and not merely when
specially taken as centres, realities of a more universal
nature than individual citizens are. And thus the example
would suggest that there are some Objects which are by
their nature fitted to be the central Objects of systems,
while others are assigned to the humbler position of deter-
mining Objects. But this, as we have seen, would be a
mistake. For every possible Object is equally subject to
Mechanism with Affinity, and we saw in the course of
the deduction that every Object subject to Mechanism
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 47
with Affinity became the centre of a system of Absolute
Mechanism.
Indeed we may say that the example, in the form which
it takes in the Smaller Logic, 1 is not only misleading, but in-
correct. For there he speaks of the State as the central
Object. Now the State is not an Object distinct from the
citizens, which can act and react on them, as each of them
does on the rest. It is, as no one realised more thoroughly
than Hegel, a unity of which the individual citizens are the
parts. It is, no doubt, for Hegel, a real unity, not a mere
aggregate, but on the other hand it is a unity which only
exists in the citizens, and not side by side with them. Now
this is a conception too advanced for Absolute Mechanism.
For the conception of a system which is also a unity we
shall have to wait for the category of Teleology, and con-
ceive the State, not as an Object side by side with its
citizens, but as the principle of their unity.
Hegel now passes from Absolute Mechanism to the next
category. In his own words (Enc., section 199) " the immediacy
of existence, which the objects have in Absolute Mechanism,
is implicitly negatived by the fact that their independence is
derived from, and due to, their connexions with each other,
and therefore to their own want of stability". In other
words, the whole nature of each Object lies in the relations
between it and other Objects. But each of these relations
does not belong exclusively, ex hypothesi, to the one Object,
but it shares it with the others. The nature of wax consists,
for example, partly in the fact that it is melted by fire. But
this melting is just as much part of the nature of the fire.
The fact is shared between the wax and the fire, and cannot
be said to belong to one of them more than the other. It
belongs to both of them jointly.
We must notice in passing that this would not be true of
self-conscious beings. Our emotions and perceptions are
the result of the action of outside Objects on us, but there is
a very intelligible meaning in saying that my pain is more
my quality than it is that of the stone which hit me. But
1 The example, in the form in which it is given in the Greater Logic
( HVrfcg, vol. v., p. 197), can scarcely be called positively incorrect. For
Hegel does not speak there, as he does in the Smaller Logic (Enc., section
198), of both Staat and Regierung, but of Eegierung only. And if we take
Regierung, as Hegel probably did, to mean a separate class the king, civil
servants, etc. it would form a separate Object by the side of the citizens,
which could enter into relations of Mechanism with them. But the ex-
ample would still be misleading, as suggesting an intrinsic difference
between those Objects which were fitted to be central Objects, and those
which were not.
48 J. ELLIS MCTAGGAKT :
this is because there is, in a self-conscious being, a principle
of unity higher than anything which we have attained in the
Object. In dealing with simple Objects we must, I think,
admit Hegel's argument that the relation is no more the
quality of one Object than of the other.
The only subject of which the relation can be predicated
will be the system which these two Objects form. The
qualities will belong to this system, and it will be the true
unity. But again, two Objects cannot form a closed system,
since all Objects in the universe are in natural connexion.
Our system of two Objects will have relations with others,
and will be merged with them, in the same way that the
original Objects were merged in it since the relations, which
alone give individuality, are found to be common property,
and so merge, instead of keeping distinct. The system in
which all the Objects, and all their relations, are contained,
becomes the reality the only true Object, of which all the
relations contained in the system are adjectives. The indi-
vidual Objects disappear, and we find ourselves in the cate-
gory of
CHEMISM.
This is a very perplexing category, and I must confess
that Hegel's treatment of it seems to me to require emenda-
tion. There is in it, Hegel says, an oscillation between a
Neutral Object on the one hand, and, on the other hand, two
extremes, separate, but connected and in a state of tension. I
do not think that it is possible to doubt that Hegel intended
to give us here, not an alternation of categories, but a cate-
gory of alternation. It is not, according to him, that we
alternately look on reality as a neutral object and as a tension
of extremes, but that we hold throughout the whole of
Chemism a position which asserts that reality itself con-
tinually passes from one of these forms to the other.
The passage from Absolute Mechanism to Chemism this
appears to be Hegel's meaning gives us the neutral object.
But the neutral object is undifferentiated, " it has sunk back
to immediacy ". It has therefore no true unity. So it splits
up into the extremes. But the extremes, being " biassed
and strained," that is, in connexion with one another, fall
back into the neutral object, and the process goes on ad
infinitum.
To the validity of this line of argument I wish to suggest
three objections, (a) In the first place, what right has Hegel
to make a neutral object the result of the transition from
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 49
Absolute Mechanism ? There was nothing in that transition
to abolish differentiation. The various relations in which
the differentiation consists, were by no means destroyed.
All that was done was that they were lumped together, and
attributed to a single logical subject the system instead
of to the plurality of Objects which had been previously their
logical subjects. This will not give us a neutral object, such
as Hegel requires here.
(6) In the second place, if such a neutral object was
reached, it would not split up into extremes, as Hegel wants
it to do, but would vanish altogether. Such a neutral object
could have nothing outside it, for it is to be coextensive
with a mechanical system, and we have seen that every
mechanical system is coextensive with the universe. And,
again, the neutral object, being undifferentiated, could have
nothing inside it. It would have therefore to be an abso-
lutely blank reality. And the very first step in the Logic
taught us that an absolutely blank reality was equivalent to
absolute nothing. Consequently, even if the dialectic did
get to the neutral object, it would never be able to pass from
that to the connected extremes.
(c) But even supposing that this could be done, and the
perpetual oscillation between neutral and extremes could be
established, where is the contradiction in this that could
take us on to the next category ? It may be said that this
continual oscillation is a False Infinite, and that a False
Infinite is in itself a contradiction. But this, I think, is
a mistake. There is nothing contradictory about a False
Infinite except in those cases where the completion of the
series is required when of course there is an obvious con-
tradiction. It was for this reason that the False Infinite
involved a contradiction in the category of Being-for-another.
A, by the hypothesis, was determined. But it was deter-
mined by B. So it could not be determined till B was
determined. B was determined by C. Therefore, till C
was determined, B could not be determined, nor, as a con-
sequence, A. But C was determined by D, and so on ad
infinitum. A, therefore, could not be determined till an end-
less series was ended. Therefore it could not be determined
;it all. But, by the hypothesis, it was determined, which
gives a contradiction.
Here, however, the infinite series is not wanted to deter-
mine its first members. It can never be completed, but
there is no contradiction if it is never completed. And
therefore there is no ground for the transition to the next
category.
4
50 J. ELLIS MCTAGGAET :
I should venture to suggest a reconstruction of the cate-
gory. The essential characteristic of it should be, I suggest,
not the abolition of all differentiation, but, as appears in the
transition from Absolute Mechanism, the reference of all
the differentiation to a unity which is itself single and un-
differentiated. The emphasis, you may say, is changed.
In Absolute Mechanism we had, indeed, a unity of a sort,
for we had a system. But the fundamental point was the
plurality of objects, with their relations, and the unity was
only derivative an effect of the plurality. And in Chemism,
on this theory, we shall have a differentiation of relations,
but all springing out of, referred to, and dependent on a
unit}^ which is taken as devoid of plurality.
In this form the category, as we have seen, follows quite
naturally from Absolute Mechanism. The latter had at-
tempted to explain reality by the interaction of a plurality
of Objects. But the relations, belonging as they did to the
Objects jointly, so far from distinguishing one Object from
another, rather merged them together, and as the Objects
had no distinguishing qualities except their relations, there
was nothing to keep them apart. They ran together, and
were fused in one single Object, occupying the whole extent
previously occupied by the system of Objects, and of this
Object all the relations became an attribute.
This then would be the process by which we arrived at
the new category. The inadequacy of such a point of view,
and the necessity for transcending it, are obvious. It is
quite impossible that a mere unity, without any plurality
about it, should be able to account for a plurality. This
would involve a spontaneous self-differentiation of the unity
which Hegel, in agreement with common-sense, would hold
to be impossible. If you put nothing but unity in, you can
get nothing but unity out. The growth of the dialectic does
not give an example of the contrary. In the first place
the dialectic, though it develops, never differentiates itself
(cp. MIND, 1897, p. 357). In the second place, as I have
pointed out elsewhere (Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic), the
real spring of the dialectic movement lies in the implicit
concrete truth, which it proceeds to render explicit, and not
in the already explicit abstraction from which it starts.
Thus in the growth of the dialectic, as elsewhere, it remains
true that something can never grow out of nothing. Now
the category of Chemism involves an attempt to get some-
thing out of nothing. The unified plurality of the relations is
to be accounted for by the bare unity of the base. And this
would leave the plurality unaccounted for and illegitimate.
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 51
The undifferentiated unity of the base of the relations can
thus no longer be maintained. At the same time, it is im-
possible to get rid of it by simply taking this base as plural.
For then we should be back in the category of Absolute
Mechanism, and this we have already seen to be unsatisfac-
tory. It is clear that we can only get out of the difficulty
by finding a new category which shall synthesise Mechanism
and Chemism, and remove the defects of both.
This is the argument I should propose to substitute for
Hegel's treatment of Chemism. It so far resembles his that
the abstract and excessive plurality in Mechanism is re-
placed here by an equally abstract and excessive unity. But
it is by no means the same category. It is true that there
seems another resemblance in the way in which, in each case,
the argument ends with an oscillation in Hegel's view be-
tween the neutral object and the extremes, in my view,
between the standpoints of Absolute Mechanism and Chem-
ism. But this resemblance is deceptive, for there is a vital
difference between an alternation of categories and a category
of alternation. Now Hegel's view, as I said before, is a
category of alternation if we look at things by his category
of Chemism we regard the things themselves as oscillating
between different states. The alternation, in my view, on
the contrary, is nothing but that state of perplexity and
contradiction which always arises when a Thesis and Anti-
thesis, which are contrary to one another, have been de-
veloped to their full extent, and the Synthesis, at the same
time, has not yet presented itself for their reconciliation. 1
Each category, because of its inherent contradiction, leads to
its contrary, and rest can only be found in the Synthesis.
With this change there disappears whatever appropriate-
ness the name of Chemism originally possessed. Indeed, it
seems probable to me that the associations of this name are
responsible for Hegel's own unsatisfactory treatment of the
category. Since the category before it was most appropri-
ately named after Mechanics, and its successor was closely
connected with the idea of End, it was tempting to carry the
analogy one step farther, and name the middle category from
Chemistry. And, having done this, Hegel, I venture to
think, for once distorted the category to suit the name.
The conceptions of the neutral object, and of the oscillation
between the neutral object and the connected extremes, have
1 Of course it is not the case that every Antithesis stands to its Thesis
in the relation of a direct contrary. Indeed, a triad of this type is seldom
found so near the end of the dialectic.
52 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART :
nothing, that I can see, to do with the course of the argu-
ment before or after them, but it is manifest at once that
they are closely analogous to chemical processes.
I do not venture to rechristen the amended category. But
I will point out that a good example of it might be found in
Hegel's own exposition of the Hindu religion. Here all the
multiplicity and differentiation of the world is referred to
and accounted for by a unity so abstract as to explain nothing,
and in reality to be nothing for the difference between such
a Pantheism as this and Bouddha's Atheism is infinitesimal.
Such a blank unity is totally unable to explain the plurality,
and accordingly is only really prominent in those moods of
the worshipper when he can fix his entire attention on the
unity of things, ignoring their differences. When the latter
are to be taken into account, he has to regard some sort of
difference as fundamental, thus going back to the category
of Absolute Mechanism. And, because the unity declines to
admit the reality of this difference, it is impotent to control
it in any way. It is, as Hegel points out, for this reason that
a religion which is on one side the most restrained and rigid
monism, is on the other the wildest and most unrestrained
polytheism. 1
We have seen, then, that our attempts to make either
differentiation or unity fundamental by itself have broken
down. Reality is a differentiated unity or a unified plu-
rality, and neither element can be deduced from the other.
We must therefore adopt a theory of reality which puts both
elements on the same level, and makes them both funda-
mental. Reality must be a unity differentiated into plurality,
for which the differentiation and the plurality are as essential
and necessary as the unity. Or it can be expressed from the
other end reality is a plurality combined into a unity, for
which the combination and the unity are as essential and
necessary as the plurality. This gives us the category which
Hegel calls
TELEOLOGY.
The advance in this category on the two which precede it
does not lie in its recognising the existence of both unity
and multiplicity. For Mechanism recognises, admittedly, a
unity as well as a plurality, and I have endeavoured to show
that Chemism recognises a plurality as well as a unity. The
difference is that the two lower categories take, each of them,
1 Philosophy of Religion (Werke, vol. xi., p. 380. Speirs' trans., vol. ii.,
p. 44).
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 53
one of these two ideas to be fundamental, and tries to account
for the other from it, while Teleology recognises both of them
to be equally fundamental.
In doing this Hegel attacks one of the strongest prejudices
of the " non-speculative " mind. There are few things of
which common sense feels more sure than that the same
reality cannot be both One and Many. There may be a
little differentiation in the One, a little unity in the Many.
But that anything should be fundamentally and necessarily
as much One as Many, as much Many as One, seems to it to
be impossible. Against this prejudice of the natural man the
dialectic continually directs its forces, but at this point more
explicitly than ever before. We have here even more dis-
tinctly than at the end of the Subjective Notion the idea of
a self-differentiating unity, by which is to be understood, as
I have explained elsewhere, 1 not a blank unity which pro-
duces differentiations out of its inner nothingness, but a
unity which, not through some external accident, but from
inner necessity, is only to be found in a multiplicity which is
as fundamental as itself. The term self-differentiating unity
is rather misleading. The active participle suggests a logical
if not a temporal process, and so leads us to suppose that
the unity is the agent which produces the difference, and is
therefore prior to it. This might to some extent be remedied
if we were to realise that it would be just as true to say a
self-unifying differentiation as a self-differentiating unity,
though the suggestion of action would still remain inappro-
priate.
This doctrine is interesting as being one which has, mainly
through the influence of Hegel, penetrated from metaphysics
to everyday life. Common sense is not quite so certain as
it used to be, that the One cannot also be the Many. The
idea of a self-differentiating unity, generally under the more
picturesque name of an organic unity, has worked itself into
a place among the furniture of the average mind, and is per-
haps being used with rather reckless freedom. Still it must
be regarded as one of the most valuable of the presents which
metaphysics has made to an ungrateful world.
Hegel departs considerably from the common usage in the
meaning which he gives to Teleology, and still more with
End and Means, which with him signify respectively the
aspects of unity and plurality. What we generally mean by
Teleology is what Hegel calls " finite and outward design,"
in which some independently existing object is used by some
1 MIND, 1897, p. 356.
54 J. ELLIS MCTAGGAET :
self-conscious being as a means for carrying out some plan
which he has conceived. In " outward design " the Means
and the End can exist independently for the End can exist
as a purpose in the mind of the agent, even if there are no
possible Means to carry it out ; while the objects which are
used as Means do not derive their entire existence from that
use, but existed before the End was formed, and would still
have existed if it had never been formed.
It is clear that this is entirely different from the idea of
Teleology at which the dialectic has now arrived, in which
the End has no existence, and indeed no meaning at all,
except in so far as it is manifested in the Means, while the
Means are equally devoid of meaning and existence except
in so far as they carry out the End. Hegel's Teleology
corresponds, as he remarks himself, to Kant's idea of Inner
Design ; the best example of which is the unity in multipli-
city of an organic being.
The use by Hegel of the words End and Means here
seems to me very unfortunate. For, in ordinary language,
the cardinal point in the significance of these terms is that
the Means, as Means, exist only for the sake of the End,
while the End exists for its own sake. The End has ulti-
mate value, the Means only derivative value. Now there is
nothing of this sort in the Hegelian use of the words. The
whole point of the category is, as we have seen, that the
plurality, which he calls the Means, is just as fundamental
and important as the unity, which he calls the End. But
the contrary is almost irresistibly suggested by the associa-
tions of the words, and even Hegel himself seems sometimes
to forget in what a different sense from the common one he is
professing to use them. To his use of the word Teleology
there seems much less objection.
It is to be noted that, using the words in Hegel's sense,
there can be no such thing as an unrealised End, or in-
adequate Means. An End only exists at all in so far as it
is the unity which unites the Means i.e., which is realised
by them, and, conversely, the Means only exist in so far
as they are unified by, and express, the End, and can there-
fore offer no resistance to its realisation.
At the same time we must notice that with this use of
the words the conception of a realised End loses altogether
that implication of value which it has when the words are
used in their ordinary significance. In the latter case, the
conception of a realised End involves value, because, in the
first place, it has a distinct meaning. An End entertained
is not necessarily realised, and the realisation brings in a
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 55
fresh element. And that fresh element is the harmony
between the purposes of a self-conscioijs being on the one
hand, and the surrounding reality on the other. This cer-
tainly involves pleasure, and, if pleasure be taken as the
good, or if the End was in itself moral, it also involves good.
And thus, with " finite and outward " Ends, their realisation
takes us into the world of values, since, at the lowest, the
realisation implies that some sentient being has got what he
wanted.
But with Ends, in the Hegelian sense of the word, it is
quite different. In the first place, to say that an End is
realised is now, as was explained above, a mere tautology.
And, in the second place, an End, in this sense, is only the
inner unity of existence. It has no necessary relation to any
conscious being, and, consequently, no implication of value,
which is an unmeaning term apart from consciousness.
Is there one End in the universe or more ? Are we to
consider all reality as a single system held together by a
single End, or is there a plurality of Ends embracing, of
course, a still greater plurality of Means ? Hegel does not
make this point clear. It seems certain to me, however, that
we must regard all reality as forming a single system with a
single End. In the first place, if there was more than one
End they would be simply juxtaposed, without any con-
nexion, since under this category a plurality can only be
united as Means to an End. But juxtaposition without
connexion is a standpoint which the dialectic has long ago
transcended.
The same view is imposed on us by the manner in which
the idea of End has been reached. Each system of Absolute
Mechanism was transformed into a system of Chemism, and
that, again, into a Teleological system. It would seem, then,
as if there ought to be a Teleological system for each system
of Absolute Mechanism, of which there were many. But it
must be remembered that each of these Mechanical systems
comprised just the same Objects since each of them ex-
tended over the whole universe. The only difference between
them lay in the fact that each of them took a different Object
for its centre. Now the centre of union of a Teleological
system is not one of the Objects which form the system, but
the unity behind it which Hegel calls the End. And there-
fore all these systems of Ends and Means will turn out to be
the same system. For the Means are the same in each case
since each system has the plurality of the whole universe
as its Means and the same Means cannot possibly have two
different Ends. If we call the Means x, and the Ends A
56 J. ELLIS MCTAGGABT :
and B, we see that, A and B being different, x cannot mani-
fest A by the same qualities with which it manifests B.
There must therefore be some part of x which does not
manifest A, and some part which does not manifest B. That
is to say, neither A nor B could be the true End of x, since
neither of them would correspond to the whole of it, and the
part of x which did not correspond to either End would not
be unified by it.
Only one End therefore can be capable of uniting as its
Means all the plurality of the universe, and as no system can
stop short of embracing the whole universe, we must regard
the whole of reality as forming a single system, with a single
End.
The conception of End in the Hegelian sense may
perhaps be profitably compared to Liotze's conception of the
unity which he calls M, by which all the particular Things
in the world are united. At first sight, indeed, it might seem
as if this M could be better compared with a system in
Absolute Mechanism. It is easy to take it as if it were al-
together secondary to the particular Things, and as if its only
function was to pass on to one Thing the impulses received
from another. But we must remember, first, that with-
out M the Things would have no relations, and be absolutely
isolated that is, would not exist at all. Therefore it is
absolutely essential to the Things, and not secondary. And,
secondly, Lotze asks us to " admit the supposition that the
susceptibility, which we had to recognise in every finite
Being a susceptibility in virtue of which it does not experi-
ence changes without maintaining itself against them by
reaction that this belongs also to the one, the truly existing
M" (Metaphysic, section 70). Now this gives M a nature
of its own. No doubt this nature is only expressible in
Things, but still it is not a mere consequence of Things.
The unity is as essential a side of the truth as the plurality.
And this is very like the category of End. (I may be per-
mitted to remark in passing that this ascription of a definite
nature to M seems absolutely incompatible with the view,
sometimes held, that Lotze can be correctly described as
a Monadist.)
SUBJECTIVE END.
The full unity between Means and End, however, is not
attained till we reach the last division of Teleology. At first
they are regarded as of equal importance, indeed, and as
closely united, but yet as being still separate entities in the
sense that each has a nature of its own, though it could
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 57
not exist except in conjunction with the other. This view
dominates the first two subdivisions of Teleology, the first
of which, called by Hegel the Subjective End, regards the
Means as possessing no definite quality of their own except
that they are a plurality. One Object is as good as another
in any place, or for the manifestation of any particular part
of the End. If in an Object A there is manifested the End
in the shape of x, that does not mean that there is any
special fitness in A to manifest x. B, or any other Object,
would have done quite as well. All that the Objects are
wanted for, is to provide a plurality. All the content is in
the End alone.
This is naturally the first form the category would take.
For the immediate cause of the breaking down of the cate-
gory of Chemism was that it was impossible to get the
plurality out of unity. So that it was natural at first to look
elsewhere only for the mere element of plurality, and to
think that that once given, the unity could supply all the
rest.
The contradiction involved in this category is not hard
to discover. For, while it asserts the Means to have separate
natures, apart from that End which they carry out, it defines
the Means so as to reduce this separate nature, and conse-
quently the Means themselves to nothing.
The interconnexions of the various Means with one
another form the End, which the Means carry out. The End
is the unity of the Means, and it is clearly to the End that
these interconnexions, which unite the Means to one an-
other, must be referred. Now the present category asserts
that one Means would always do as well as another in carry-
ing out the End, consequently, that the intrinsic nature of
the Means has no relation to the End. It follows that the
intrinsic nature of the Means has no relation to the con-
nexion between the different Means. These connexions,
however, form the whole of the external nature of the Objects
which are considered as Means, and we saw, when we were
dealing with Absolute Mechanism, that the inner nature
only expresses itself through the outer. Therefore this
intrinsic nature which the Means are asserted to possess
can neither be their outer nor their inner nature and
what else is there left for it to be ? Clearly nothing. To
suggest that anything has a core of its own apart from and
unaffected by its relations to other things would be to go
back to the earlier categories of Essence, whose insufficiency
has been demonstrated much earlier in the dialectic.
The one quality, indeed, which the Means might seem to
58 j. ELLIS MCTAGGART:
possess, apart from the End, was the plurality by which they
were enabled to break up the unity of the End. But, if they
are taken apart from the End, even their plurality vanishes.
For the End is their only unity, and plurality without some
unity is impossible. You can only take things together if
they have a unity, and if you do not take them together,
they are not a plurality. If we consider each of the Means
without the End it is absolutely isolated, and in absolute
isolation it can have no plurality. It is a mere blank unity
i.e., nothing.
To suppose, then, that the Means have no intrinsic adapta-
tion to the End, is to destroy the possibility of their having
an intrinsic nature at all. If, therefore, they are still to
retain any externality whatever to the End, that externality
must be harmonious to the End. The private nature of
each Means must simply consist of its fitness to carry out
the End for we have seen that there is nothing else for it
to be. With this change, it ceases to be indifferent which
Means are employed in carrying out a particular part of the
End. Only those Means can do so which are fitted for the
task by their own nature. We thus approach more closely
in one respect to the ordinary significance of the word
Means, which includes some special capability in the Object
to carry out the End. It is for this reason that Hegel calls
the next division of Teleology
MEANS.
Of course, here as elsewhere, we must remember the
special meaning which End has for Hegel. Though the
Means have a certain externality to, and distinction from, the
End, yet it is not supposed that they could exist apart from
it. The position throughout Teleology is that the Means
could not exist if they did not embody the End, nor the End
if it were not embodied by the Means. Accordingly, to
speak here of the Means as fitted to embody the End may be
misleading. It is not a mere potentiality, as when, in the
non-Hegelian meaning of the terms, we say that a knife is.
the means of committing murder. They would not be
Means unless they did embody the End, and when we speak
of them as being fitted for it, we only mean that their in-
trinsic nature co-operates in the process, and is not to be
considered,- as it was in the last subdivision, as indifferent
to the End.
How, we must now inquire, does this category manifest
its inadequacy? Hegel gives two demonstrations of this,,
the first of which is to be found in the Greater Logic.
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 59
only, while the second is to be found in the Smaller Logic
also. They may be said to be based on the same general
principle, but are perfectly distinct points and must be
treated separately.
In the first (Werke, vol. v., p. 229) he says that if we
accepted the position of this category we should be forced to
insert, between the End and the Means, a second Means,
and then, between the End and this second Means, a third
Means, and so on ad infinitum, and that this involves a con-
tradiction. Let us expand this argument rather more than
Hegel does himself, and examine its validity.
If the End and the Means are to be taken as distinguish-
able entities, then it is clear that each of them must correspond
to all the conditions which are necessary to the existence of
any entity. Now we have seen, over and over again, in the
course of the dialectic, that no entity of any sort can be a
blank or undifferentiated unity. Therefore, the End cannot
be such a unity. It must be differentiated. This, indeed,
has already been admitted, and the work of the Means is to
differentiate it. But and here the root of the contradiction
appears if the End has an existence distinguishable from the
Means, it must have a differentiation distinguishable from the
Means. Now the End is fundamentally a unity, and we
have seen in the breakdown of Chemism that a unity
cannot produce its own differentiation, but must have an
element of differentiation which is correlative to, and not
derived from, the unity.
Within the End, therefore, and apart from the Means,
there must be an element of differentiation. But the defini-
tion of a Means, as we have seen, is just the plurality which
differentiates a unity in this way, and this element of differ-
entiation will be a second Means, between the End and
the first Means. And now that it is a Means, it will, by the
category which we are considering, be distinguishable from
the End. By the same reasoning as before, the End will
require some differentiation independent of the Means, and
this differentiation will become a third Means, between the
End and the second Means. And this process will go on
ad infinitum.
Such an infinite process as this is clearly a sign of error.
By the hypothesis the End and the original Means are united.
But for this union an infinite series of intermediate Means
are required. The End and the original Means can only
be united when this infinite series is completed that is
to say, they never can be united. And so the category is
contradictory.
60 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART :
Hegel's second argument (Enc., section 211, Werke, vol. v.,
p. 230) is that the Realised End will, if we adhere to our
present category, be nothing but a Means, that it will con-
sequently require another Realised End beyond it, which in
turn will be nothing but a Means, and so on ad infinitum.
This also will require some expansion.
When we use the word End in its common and un-
Hegelian sense, there is a clear distinction between the
Means and the Realised End. A saw and a plank may be
taken as Means to the End of making sawdust, but no one
could mistake either a saw or a plank for the actual sawdust
which is the Realised End. But in the Hegelian sense of
End the case is different. For here the Means is not an
Object which might be made to subserve the End. It is an
Object which does subserve it, and subserve it necessarily
and by its intrinsic nature. The Means therefore is an
Object whose nature is such that it manifests the End. (If
we are speaking of a single Object it is better, except for
brevity, to say " which participates in manifesting the End,"
since of course an End can only be manifested in a plurality
of Means.)
Now what is the Realised End? Is it anything more
than this? It can be nothing more. The only form a
Realised End can take is that of an Object whose nature is
such that it manifests the End. And therefore, for Hegelian
Teleology, there is no difference between the Means and the
Realised End.
This conclusion we shall find later on to be the truth.
But it is inconsistent with our present position, and the
attempt to combine the two produces a contradiction. For
the Realised End is the union of the End and Means, and, if
these are taken as in any way distinguishable, it cannot be
the same as either of them. Hence when we find that our
Realised End is identical with the Means, we cannot regard
it as really the Realised End. If it is one extreme of the
relation it cannot be the union of both. We take it then
simply as the Means, and look for another Realised End
beyond it. (We may remark, for completeness' sake, that it
would have been equally possible to take it as the Realised
End, and then to look for another Means to mediate be-
tween it and the End. The course of the argument would
be similar.) But the new Realised End would also neces-
sarily be identical with the Means, for the same reasons as
before, and our search would have to be continued ad in-,
finitum. Such an infinite process would involve a contra-
diction, for it is the whole nature of the End and Means
HEGEL'S TREATMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE NOTION. 61
to be united, and they can never be united, since it would
require the completion of the infinite process.
The category which involves such contradictions must, of
course, be transcended. And we have already seen how this
may be done. The whole of the difficulty arose from the
fact that End and Means were taken as separate realities.
It was this that forced us to insert, between Means and End,
an infinite series of new Means. And it was this which
gave us the choice of either inserting another infinite series
of Means between Means and Realised End, or else of pro-
longing the series of Means forward in the vain attempt to
reach a Kealised End which was different from a Means.
We can get rid of the contradictions only by dropping our
supposition that End and Means are in any way separate
realities. We have known all along that they would only
exist if they were connected. But now we are driven to the
conclusion that they cannot exist if there is anything in
either of them except its connexion with the other. The
whole nature of the End is just to unify those Means, the
whole nature of the Means is just to manifest that End.
With this we pass to the final division of Teleology, to
which Hegel gives the name of
EEALISED END.
The appropriateness of this name lies in the fact that the
Realised End is the unity of the End and Means, and that
we have now come to the conclusion that End and Means
are not two realities connected with one another, but two
aspects distinguishable within a single reality. The unity of
the two sides is not built up, as previously, from their differ-
ence, but the difference is an analysis of the unity. And
thus this category takes its name from the unity of the two
sides that is to say, from the Realised End.
We have thus arrived at the close of the Objective Notion..
We have overcome the unbalanced abstractions of Mechan-
ism and Chemism, and, instead of a mere plurality or mere
unity, have found the basis of all reality in a reality of which
plurality and unity are correlative and complementary as-
pects each without any claim to an existence apart from
its union with the other.
The Objective Notion ends with the conception of a self-
differentiating unity, as the Subjective Notion had ended
before it. But the conception is now a far deeper one. The
self-differentiating unity of the Disjunctive Laws of Nature
only reached the proposition that every A must be either B,.
C or D. But it was still possible that they were all B, and
62 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART : OBJECTIVE NOTION.
that AC and AD were unrepresented species. If all car-
nivora must be lions, tigers, or wolves, that would not prove
that any of them were tigers or wolves. If the world had
been so differently constituted that there were no tigers or
wolves, that would have made no difference to the lions.
(That is to say, it would have made no difference to them
from the point of view of the Subjective Notion. The lions
would not be affected by the disappearance of another sub-
division of the class to which they belonged. In so far as
they were objects in the same world, any change in the tigers
would affect the lions, but that does not belong to the Sub-
jective Notion.)
It is quite different with the self-differentiating unity of
End. There A is B, C, and D not B, C, or D for it is
only in all the Means taken together that the End is mani-
fested. Thus End and Means form a unity whose parts
completely determine one another. The End determines
the Means, since only one particular set of Means could
express a given End. And, no less, the Means determine the
End, since, when the Means are given, there is only one
possible End which can be manifested by them. And, lastly,
the various Means reciprocally determine one another. For
none of the Means could be altered without altering the
End, and this would alter all the other Means.
With this the Objective Notion closes. The next step
will take us into the last subdivision of the Logic the
Idea.
IV. TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY.
BY A. F. EAVENSHEAR.
I. THE CLAIMS OF TESTIMONY.
IN the best scientific work, even as in the worst, much must
be taken upon trust ; on the authority of the competent
observer, skilled instrument maker, or original investigator.
The Chemist, in establishing the existence of a new com-
pound, or defining its properties, relies to a great extent upon
the determinations of others as to the atomic weights,
formulae, densities, specific heats, boiling-points, refractive
indices and other coefficients of the auxiliary substances or
reagents he employs. In much of his apparatus weights,
balances, polarimeters he relies upon the work of the
instrument maker. The Physicist in like manner employs
all such results as are in general repute tabulated densities,
temperature-coefficients, elasticities, weights, resistances.
The Astronomer makes use of the observations of his pre-
decessors, as well as of his contemporaries in distant ob-
servatories. The acceptance of observations and descriptions
in this manner is still more marked in geology, zoology,
botany. The disposition of rocks in various countries and
the occurrence of minerals ; the kinds and distribution of
plants and animals ; all are to any given systematise!" largely
matters of report.
It might indeed seem that, in physical science, time and
opportunity alone are needed to enable a man of sufficient
energy and capacity to do the work of a hundred observers.
But in psychology it is far otherwise ; for, whatever his
capacity, one man knows only one mind. Eeliance upon
others in physical science may be merely unavoidable ; but
to Psychology it is essential.
Inductive Logic, in so far as it claims to be a theory of
Scientific Method, ought then to include a theory of Testi-
mony and Authority. But in the current treatment this
seems to a great degree to be lost sight of. We are presented
with a theory of scientific method conceived as followed out
by an investigator working alone, and almost from the
64 A. F. RAVENSHEAR:
beginning. It is not, indeed, explicitly laid down that every
man must be his own Observer, Speculator, Experimenter,
Calculator, and Critic. The complex interchange of opinion,
observations, experimental results, criticisms the division
of labour that constitutes the life of science, is simply
dropped out of sight.
Testimony finds its chief use in the establishment of in-
dividual facts. A line of reasoning may be reinvestigated ;
an experiment may be repeated. But for knowledge of
specific facts or events in the past, or occurring outside
one's personal range, each is perforce largely dependent on
testimony. Such knowledge must in great part be derived
from persons present at the particular time and place of the
occurrence. In the current descriptions of the method by
which individual facts may be logically proved, the use of
testimony is, however, scarcely referred to. In Mill's Logic,
for instance, the method is thus described : 1 " When the
phenomenon is within the range of present observation, by
observation we assure ourselves of its existence ; when it is
beyond that range and is therefore said to be absent, we
infer its existence from marks or evidences. . . . The simple
existence ... is inferred from some inductive law . . . we
prove the existence of a thing by proving that it is connected
by succession or coexistence with some known thing." It
would be a somewhat forced interpretation of this passage
to suggest that it covers the case of testimony as to a matter
of fact. It might, perhaps, be said that the testimony itself
is some known thing connected by succession or coexis-
tence with the fact it reports ; and that the inductive laws
to which reference is made are laws relating to the condi-
tions of trustworthiness of testimony. But to argue thus
would seemingly be to adopt as a guiding principle the oft-
quoted aphorism that ' language is given us to conceal our
thoughts ' ; for even if enclosed in the passage cited, the idea
can scarcely be said to be disclosed.
In an indirect manner Testimony is doubtless alluded to
in Mill's discussion of the " grounds of disbelief " ; 2 and in
the dictum " whatever contradicts a well-grounded induction
is to be disbelieved ". But this alone is not sufficient. We
ought to determine not only what testimony must be re-
jected, but under what conditions it may be accepted. Be-
tween these two is a broad neutral zone within which we
can do nothing but suspend judgment.
It seems likely too that some logicians have regarded
1 Chap. xxiv., 1. 2 System of Logic, chap. xxv.
TESTIMONY AND AUTHOEITY. 65
testimony as sufficiently dealt with in the discussion of
Observation. In Venn's Empirical Logic, 1 for example, &
passing allusion is made to testimony under the head of
Observation. This is to look upon the acceptance of testi-
mony as observation or experiment by deputy ; but it clearly
results in an incomplete treatment, in so far as it supposes
us already furnished with some means of distinguishing the
deputies that are trustworthy from those that are not.
Still, since the acceptance or rejection of testimony is a
process of selection of the material of knowledge, it would
seem that even though credence in testimony does not fall
wholly under Observation, yet it ranges alongside it. But
while Observation and Experiment are directed towards
phenomena, the selection now in question is from among
statements or assertions.
There is no ground for denying ' credence ' if we may
use this term to denote critical acceptance of testimony or
authority a position co-ordinate with Observation in the
supposition that it must necessarily be less certain than
first-hand observation, or as it might be put less ' logical'.
That testimony may, in certain cases, give even greater
certainty than personal observation must be familiar to
every one who recognises the great inequalities existing
between different individuals in their respective powers.
A person may well derive, perhaps in some unfamiliar de-
partment of knowledge, a degree of certainty from the
affirmation of the qualified expert far surpassing anything
he could reasonably derive from his own imperfect or un-
trained observation.
But Testimony is involved in Inductive Logic in a far more
intimate manner than this. It might almost be said that
Testimony is necessary not only to the establishment of the
universality of the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, but
even to the perception of any uniformity in the bulk of Nature's
activities. Along with clearly exhibited uniformity in cer-
tain respects, Nature presents infinite variety. Some uni-
formities only are patent, most are disguised. We see that
heavy bodies fall when free, but a balloon rises. The same
piece of wood, however often we try it, will always float ;
but that a friend on one occasion, say, took wine is no
guarantee that he will accept the same thing on another
occasion. In such instances it is easy to specify the uni-
formities underlying the apparent irregularities ; and in
doing so we clearly see that in these as in other cases the
1 Empirical Logic, p. 111.
5
66 A. F. RAVENSHEAR :
perception of uniformity is the result of a selection and
emphasis of certain features, commonly not noticed in our
early acquaintance with the matter, which are brought to
light by a comparison of those experiences with others.
This emphasising of certain features and neglect of others
the process of analysis or abstraction is not only a laying
of stress on something in an isolated experience, but is also
a selection and emphasising of other experiences. The bal-
loon an apparent irregularity to the rule that heavy bodies
fall when free is seen to exhibit uniformity when experience
of hydrogen is brought into view ; and the different be-
haviour of our friend under similar external circumstances
shows uniformity when experience of varying bodily con-
dition is brought into line with it. But these other ex-
periences that must be employed to force the given ex-
perience to yield up its uniformity may not be within the
reach of any one individual. The uniformities shown in
the return of certain of the comets are visible only to those
who know how to rely upon records many hundred years
old. The uniformities brought to light by statistics are
nothing to him who cannot depend on an army of co-
^vorkers. If the individual indeed were to confine himself
strictly to his own experience, Nature, far from seeming
universally uniform, would seem infinitely capricious. The
universal uniformity of Nature can be seen only by an
analytical use of the experience of others as well as our
own. Mere addition of obvious uniformities derived from
other persons' experience might perhaps give a restricted
field of uniform action ; but only by an intussusception of
each other's experience does the universal extent of that
field become known.
But in laying stress on some features we ignore others.
What of those we neglect ? the errors of observation, the
individual variations when we are dealing with averages
or elimination of chance, the ' irrelevant ' circumstances
which make up the difference between the abstract concep-
tion and the concrete experience. Is nature uniform only
as far as the limits of errors of observation ? This question
scarcely needs an answer ; but it furnishes an illustration
of the preceding remarks on the use of the experience of
others in the proof of Nature's uniformity. These neglected
things are never intended to be neglected for ever. The
ideally complete theory would take account of them all.
Wherever at present this cannot be done the reason is that
the appropriate experiences by which their apparent irregu-
larity and caprice could be converted into law either have
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 67
not occurred or have not been noticed in the requisite
relation.
The facts capable of introducing order and uniformity
into the irregularities and caprices of our own individual
experience are then so often not facts of that experience,
or are, if there, so often overlooked, that the emphasis and
selection constituting the perception of uniformity must to
a large extent be performed by deputy ; a substitute for
direct experience in the interpretation of other experience
must be found in the use of Testimony.
To this claim a seemingly strong objection, which has
oftentimes been pitted against the empirical basis of Induc-
tion, might be urged thus : How can criteria of testimony
be included among the principles of induction when they
have themselves to be established by induction ? Only
under misconception, perhaps generated by false analogy
to the alternate deduction of premiss and conclusion each
from the other, could this be thought to be illegitimate.
The apparent difficulty disappears as soon as we distinguish
the successive stages in the growth of the power of reason-
ing inductively. First we find the inductive processes im-
plicitly occurring in mental operations long before they
become explicit. On a higher plane there are the explicit
and fully developed processes. Lastly, the organised logical
theory in which the principles are enunciated, their inter-
dependence exhibited, their legitimate extent and necessary
limitations defined ; by which they are reduced to mutual
consistency and precise accordance with experience. The
perfecting of the principles is the proper business of Logic,
not the origination of the processes. Exact principles of
induction result from the working of the primitive processes,
as, in the grinding of lenses, a truly spherical form results
from the mutual attrition of surfaces initially imperfect. If
the relation between inductive processes and logical prin-
ciples were like that between conclusion and premiss the
objection would be fatal. But it is not so : rather does
Logic take the imperfect processes, grind them, so to speak,
one against the other, and hand them back as nearly as
may be in the form of perfected principles.
II. CRITERIA OF TRUSTWORTHINESS.
Excessive credulity and excessive incredulity have each
been fixed upon as the marks of ignorance and simplicity.
Within the narrow circle of personal experience the unin-
formed person exhibits obstinate prejudice ; outside that
circle childlike dependence upon others. A theory of testi-
68 A. F. RAVENSHEAE :
mony aims at showing how to steer an even course between
these two extremes. In a well-informed mind the modes of
belief here seen in sharp contrast both enter in modified
forms. Each is to be seen in almost every estimate of the
truth or falsity of the statement of another.
Every one believes himself to have some sort of justifica-
tion, however obscurely apprehended, in accepting or re-
jecting a statement resting on testimony or authority. The
precise nature of this justification, when valid, is the object
of our present inquiry. In so far as an investigation is
first-hand, the conditions to which the evidence must con-
form in order to constitute proof are those formulated in
Logic. In so far as we depend upon acquaintance with the
subject, grounds of disbelief are also discussed in Logic.
But the questions now proposed relate to inquiries that for
any reason are not first-hand ; to those inquiries in which
either from necessity or convenience reliance is placed upon
the work of others. To what conditions then must testi-
mony or authority conform in order to be reliable ? What
safeguards can be devised in order to lessen risk of error in
judgments as to matters not within our own cognisance ?
These are the questions that must be answered by a logic of
testimony and authority ; and an attempt to give a sketch
of the answer is made in the following pages :
The Legal and the Mathematical treatment of the Subject.
The nearest approach to a consistent body of principles
regulative of the admission and indicative of the trustworthi-
ness of testimony might be expected to be found in the Law
of Evidence. The work on that subject by the late Mr.
Justice Stephen l shows, however, that it is scarcely to be
found in the existing law in this country. Many of the
rules as they stand at present are designed merely to
facilitate the business of the courts to regulate procedure
and forms. Some are to limit the extent of inquiry, and
some to safeguard the interests of strangers. Very few,
strange to remark, aim directly and solely at securing reli-
ability in the witnesses, or at setting up tests of trustworthi-
ness these are matters left to cross-examiners and juries.
The rules, indeed, have mainly been framed to deal with the
exigencies of judicial inquiry; and accordingly are more
often narrower in scope and more often based on considera-
tions of convenience than a purely scientific treatment of
the subject from the point of view of Logic would permit.
1 Digest of the Law of Evidence.
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 69
There are, nevertheless, some few examples of rules that
might be looked upon as having been devised to attain re-
liability. Thus there are rules as to the necessity in a few
isolated cases for corroboration as in promise of marriage,
charges made by accomplices, or in allegations of treason.
There are the rules as to the ' competence ' of interested wit-
nesses, or those labouring under any infirmity. There is also
the rule as to ' directness ' of evidence excluding hearsay ex-
cept in certain very special circumstances. Lastly, there are
the rules as to the sanction under which a witness shall speak.
These as will hereafter be seen are far from constituting
an adequate list of safeguards. But it will be found that all
except the last which has reference to penalties and, there-
fore, does not here concern us readily fall into line with and
find a place among the criteria of trustworthiness indicated
in the paragraphs that follow.
But if the Legal treatment of Testimony is inadequate,
the Mathematical treatment seems positively useless. Prob-
lems relating to the conflict and concurrence of testimony
have commonly been regarded as belonging to the mathe-
matical theory of Probability. The probability of the truth
or falsity of the assertions of the several witnesses being
supposed known, that of any matter which some of them
affirm and others deny is by its aid deducible. The mathe-
matical solution of such a problem is doubtless logically
based upon the data but only when coupled with numerous
restrictions expressed or implied. But these are such as
to make the theoretical witness so highly abstract a per-
sonage as to find no counterpart in nature, unless it be
as Dr. Venn humorously puts it a bag containing black
and white balls.
To apply the method to real witnesses, resuming Dr.
Venn's argument in the Logic of Chance, 1 would require
statistics of mendacity based upon a full classification of
witnesses ; and some means for identifying the class to
which each witness should be assigned. It would also be
necessary to assume ignoring fact that each person has
a definite degree of reliability independently of the subject
of testimony ; or else to base the statistics upon a classifica-
tion of matter as well as of witnesses. There would still
remain even then the difficulty of determining on each
occasion whether the witnesses were or were not independ-
ent or ever could be so absolutely ; and lastly, the surpass-
ing difficulty of deciding in how many ways each witness
might go wrong.
1 Chap. xvi.
70 A. F. EAVENSHEAE :
The mathematical theory makes the evaluation of con-
current testimony depend upon the previous evaluation of
individual assertions. It will, however, be submitted in the
following pages that, to make the most effective use of
corroboration, the reverse procedure should be adopted.
We ought to start from the fact of corroboration, when we
have it, and employ it as a means for distinguishing how
far the conditions of trustworthiness have been satisfied by
the individual witnesses. The inference is to be drawn
from the nature of the corroboration. This method of
dealing with concurrence of testimony, and with conflict,
will, it is hoped, be found to be entirely free from the objec-
tions that may so forcibly be urged against the mathemati-
cal treatment.
Conditions of Trustworthiness. It should be here noted that
although for the sake of brevity the terms " witness " and
" testimony " are employed, they are intended to apply to
the conveyance of information of all kinds and in any form.
The works of authors past and present, the deliverances of
authority, writings and assertions of specialists and other
investigators, the reports and descriptions of travellers, and
recorded information from all quarters is to be kept in view.
It does not seem easy to suggest a pair of terms that will
fairly indicate all this ; and the required extension of mean-
ing must therefore be pressed into the somewhat specialised
pair of terms here proposed. It may further be noted that
testimony and capacity of particularly high value arecommonly
said to possess " authority " ; and in what follows this latter
term and its derivatives will be employed in accordance
with this usage.
The first step, before tracing the bearings of corrobora-
tion, must evidently be to pass in review the conditions of
trustworthiness of ' witnesses ' considered singly. These
conditions are not far to seek ; the only point requiring re-
mark being that the mode of derivation adopted must be
capable of guaranteeing the completeness of the list.
In our examination of 'credence,' or the critical accept-
ance of testimony, we must take account both of the giver
and receiver. Error must assuredly arise unless each of
the two parties, the assertor and the hearer or reader, per-
form correctly the part of the operation that falls to him.
Not only must the assertor speak truly, but the hearer must
rightly understand. A presupposition to a consideration of
the conditions that must be satisfied to justify us in relying
on the statements of others is, then, that the assertor' s
meaning must be correctly ascertained.
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 71
Any discussion concerning possible safeguards against
misinterpretation of the statements of others would take
us into a region of logic bordering on that of definition.
Let it suffice here to say that interpretation must be self-
consistent ; must neglect nothing in the data ; must give
full effect to the context immediate, systematic and his-
torical and must not be limited to mere grammatical or
logical analysis, but must take due account of the style and
intention of the writer or speaker.
Let us turn first to the part taken by the assertor. It is
clear that to impart information implies first the getting of
it. The reliability of testimony depends not only upon the
conveyance of the information being correctly performed,
but also upon its having been correctly obtained ; not only
upon the veracity of the witness, but also upon his cogni-
zance of the matter in hand. Two conditions or groups of
conditions therefore might naturally be expected to unfold
themselves ; one set arising out of the process of conveying
information, and the other from the processes of obtaining
it.
Beyond these we should expect to find another if there
be any influence likely to adversely affect equally both the
acquisition and the conveyance of information. It is uni-
versally recognised that however careful and conscientious
a person may be, yet the effect of interest may be to lead
him unwittingly into error throughout the acquisition, the
retention and the conveyance of information. To be free
from such unseen influence in completeness is the unattain-
able ideal ; but practical freedom from bias with regard to
some particular matter is not so far out of reach. This
relative freedom from bias is then one of the conditions that
an assertor must conform to in order to be trustworthy.
In the process of conveying information there are evi-
dently involved intention and capacity. A person will
speak truly provided he wants to and can. Nevertheless
a witness may be perfectly sincere, and yet fail to recall
accurately the matter asserted ; or even if he can do this
he may still not succeed in expressing exactly what he has
in mind. This factor then gives rise to two conditions one
that the assertor must be sincere, and the other that he must be
accurate in memory and expression.
The great difficulty is, of course, to find out whether
there is bias or insincerity in any given case. To a certain
extent, as we shall see, corroboration deals with it ; but if
we are without corroboration there is nothing but to consider
the circumstances under which the statements are made in
72 A. F. BAVENSHEAR :
relation to the character of the assertor. This does not
amount to saying that every one will be carried away if there
be any inducement to deceit, but merely recognises that as
some undoubtedly will, the evidential value of all uncor-
roborated assertion is thereby depressed.
As regards accuracy of memory and expression, the time
that elapses after an occurrence before it is recorded or
reported is one of the chief circumstances. Care would
seem to be another. But it should be noticed that care-
fulness belongs rather to sincerity than to accuracy. Care
is doubtless necessary to the attainment of accuracy, but
that after all is only the way in which sincerity combines
with ability in the production of accuracy. These two
conditions will not be discussed at this point. The brief
remarks already made are only intended to indicate the
meaning of the phrases condition of sincerity and condition
of accuracy of memory and expression.
The conditions arising out of the processes of obtain-
ing information are also two. The ascertainment of facts,
events and other matters of observation or experiment
demands both means or opportunity for ascertaining them,
and competence in observation, or judgment. The condi-
tions that must be satisfied are then that the assertor must
have had sufficient opportunity or means for becoming acquainted
with the matter asserted ; and that he must be a person of
skill or capacity adequate to the acquisition of the knowledge
professed.
The question is here again : How are we to know whether
some certain matter is or is not within the cognizance of
one whose testimony we are examining ? This may some-
times be difficult to answer ; but need not always be so. If
we are unable in any given case to answer it satisfactorily,
the testimony is of little value ; but if we can, we are on
the way towards its evaluation. In some cases the answer
may be easy. We should naturally hesitate to accept as fact
an account of an occurrence by some one we knew had not
been present ; or in accepting as fact the statements of
some one volunteering to inform us as to what was passing
in another person's mind, or to give us information as to
any other matter that we believed to be beyond human
faculty. Such considerations are summarised in the phrase
opportunity or means for knowing, which is the name by which
this condition will be mentioned in the pages that follow.
Special keenness or genius are of course not demanded
unless the matter testified to renders them essential. But
in many matters it is absolutely necessary to rely on the
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY.
73
expert in the arts of observation and experiment. We must
be satisfied in such cases not merely that there has been no
confusion between true observation and inference but of
much more besides. In scientific experiment we depend
not only on the observer's power of seeing, but on his skill
in doing. We must be satisfied not only that nothing
present was missed, but also that the contriving and opera-
tive skill of the observer were such as to ensure that every-
thing that could possibly be present was present. Natural
endowment of sense counts for much keenness of eyesight,
touch, hearing. But practice and experience are factors
equally important, especially in those inquiries depending
on manipulative skill or on the use of complex instruments
or methods. Facts of this character must be understood
in the following pages by the terms skill or capacity.
The conditions, as we have seen, then, on which the
credibility of a single witness depends, supposing his mean-
ing first to have been correctly apprehended, comprise (1)
his freedom from bias, (2) his sincerity and care, (3) his
accuracy of memory and expression, (4) his opportunities or
means for knowing, (5) his capacity or skill relative to the
matter in question. The relationship of the criteria to each
other may be exhibited diagrammatically thus :
f2. Sincerity and care of the wit-
A. Those relating to the"! | ness (conscientiousness),
conveyance of infor-
mation. 1 3. Accuracy of memory and ex-
l pression.
1. Freedom from bias or un-
conscious influences.
4. Opportunities or means for
knowing.
5. Capacity or skill relative to
the matter in question.
It may be admitted that testimony is of the highest
authority if it is deliberately given by a sincere person
having had opportunities for cognizance of the matter and
adequate powers of observation or judgment, who is care-
ful and capable of accurate memory and expression, and
is free from the influence of bias. But in place of the
apparently simple question, " Is or is not this testimony
xeliable?" there now seems to be a multitude of questions,
Those relating to the
acquisition of infor-
mation.
74 A. F. RAVENSHEAE :
seemingly no easier to answer than the original one. That
there may, nevertheless, be some advantage in thus splitting
up the main question in the hope of some one or more of
the subordinates ones being answerable is obvious. For
unfavourable answers to the questions as to sincerity or
opportunity condemn the testimony without more ado. A
further advantage, however, becomes immediately apparent
when we begin to take into account the subject of Corro-
boration. We may often with the aid of corroboration of
one kind or another draw conclusions as to the component
questions far more certainly than we could as to the whole
question ; and by an aggregate of testimony and other cor-
roboration may in effect ensure that all the conditions have
been satisfied that a single witness would conform to if
perfect.
Corroboration. The conditions of trustworthiness having
thus been briefly enumerated, we are in a position to look
more closely at the subject of Corroboration. This may
take the form of concurrence or conflict of testimony,,
and confirmation by other evidence, which may either be
internal or external. The various kinds of corroboration
will be reviewed in the order named, beginning with con-
currence of testimony.
As we have already seen, it is necessary in estimating the
value of testimony to consider whether there is any want,
of sincerity or anything likely to breed unconscious bias
in the mind of the assertor. To satisfy the conditions of
logical proof on these points in the case of a single witness
might be extremely difficult or quite impossible ; but if the
circumstances and interests of the individual witness, where
there are several, are sufficiently varied, the difficulty dis-
appears. If indeed there is known conflict of interest
between the witnesses with regard to the matter asserted,
and they nevertheless agree, we may safely infer that in-
sincerity has not been operative with the bulk of the
assertors. Since we are given a conflict of interest but a
concurrence in statement, most of the assertors we are
assured must have spoken against interest ; whence bias
or insincerity cannot have been operative in their several
cases. Bias and insincerity may therefore be eliminated by a
concurrence of persons of sufficiently varied interests.
In a less degree concurrence of testimony throws light
on the extent to which others of the conditions of reliability
are conformed to. We have seen that the value of testimony
is largely dependent upon the sufficiency of skill or experi-
ence on the part of the assertor, on his powers of observation
TESTIMONY AND AUTHOEITY. 75
and his opportunities for ascertaining the fact. The more
varied the powers, experience and knowledge brought to bear
on any question the more likely is the judgment to be
well-founded. Any assertion concurred in by persons of different
training, habits, and point of view is likely to be accordant with a
wider aggregate body of knowledge and experience than if made
by one of them alone ; and is accordingly so much the more
reliable than if it had no other support.
It is essential, however, in this case that the variety should
be in knowledge or experience relevant to the assertion.
This is an important part of the independence of the wit-
nesses postulated in the mathematical treatment of testi-
mony, and is perhaps more difficult of attainment than is
a sufficient conflict of interest to eliminate bias and insin-
cerity. Unfavourable cases are those in which it is not
possible to obtain the requisite variety. An example may
be easily imagined. Suppose we had the evidence of a
number of men as to the colour of some object ; and after-
wards found out that they all worked in some industry
productive of colour-blindness. The effect on their testi-
mony would be much the same as though they had agreed
to deceive, and we should naturally refuse to rely on their
assertions even though we saw no appearance of collusion.
The remaining condition of trustworthiness whose relation
to corroboration we have yet to mention is that of accuracy
of memory and expression, and this does not seem to be
touched by concurrence of testimony. On this, however,
as well as on another of the conditions, light may be thrown
by ' internal evidence ' which has been adverted to as
constituting another form of corroboration.
Rigid and thoroughgoing consistency in all parts cogency
of reasoning and absence of confusion raise a presumption
of accuracy and care. Even an occasional lapse as regards
these characters is of no great consequence as invalidating
the remainder ; for wherever consistency and cogency do
appear they are assuredly not the result of chance.
In the same way also that inaccuracy may be disclosed by
inconsistencies of statement, a presumption of imperfect
observation may be raised by a record that fails to distinguish
exactly between results due to observation and those due to-
inference. Where these are not carefully discriminated in
description and discussion there can be no certainty that
they have not been confused in fact ; and accordingly the
work in which they appear cannot be regarded as fulfilling
the condition that has reference to observation.
The third and last form of corroboration is that gained by
76 A. F. RAVENSHEAR:
testing or verifying the statements by extraneous evidence
-experiment or other means. Whenever this is resorted to
we are approaching a new field. Just to the extent to which
appeal is made to extraneous evidence we engage not so
much in a deduction of reliability as in an inductive inquiry.
It is true that a test may be applied merely here and there,
perhaps as to accuracy, perhaps as to meaning, but such
tests if sufficiently multiplied would in reality constitute an
example of the full process of Induction. The hypothesis
being that the evidence is true, it is established or overthrown
.by its agreement or otherwise with the tests applied.
Cross-examination as practised in the Law Courts the
most powerful weapon conceivable for exposing falsification
may indeed be regarded as a special case of this. It is
impossible that any person should be aware, in framing an
untrue story, of every discoverable fact that might have a
bearing on it. Hence however fully he may harmonise his
tale with all he knows, it is extremely unlikely that an ex-
haustive cross-examination would not bring to light some
conflict with matters not known to the witness, although
known to others. The ' verification ' of the story in such
cases fails.
Conflict of Testimony or Authority. Up to this point com-
plete concurrence of testimony only has been dealt with.
But it is commonly recognised that ' substantial agreement
coupled with circumstantial variety ' is of more value than
precise accord between a number of witnesses ; since the
latter imports a suspicion of collusion. Even when the
variety in detail is considerable we may find that as to
those parts in which there is no conflict the testimony is
Teliable. This is not, however, an example of true conflict,
since we here conclude only as to portions in which there is
accord. Cases of true conflict are those in which one of
two inconsistent assertions is preferred on account of the
superior trustworthiness of its source. To illustrate ap-
parent conflict of the former kind, we may suppose that we
have a number of opposing statements easily separable into
allegation as to matters of fact and inferences therefrom.
If then we find that the divergence is wholly or mainly as
to the inferential portions, we have, other circumstances
being favourable, good ground for concluding that the
matters of fact are correctly stated.
In order to deal with true conflict of testimony as dis-
tinguished from apparent conflict that is those cases in
which the divergence is in detail or in matters irrelevant
to what we wish to ascertain we have to determine on
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 77
what conditions the superiority of one source of testimony
to another depends.
Sincerity and absence of bias may belong to any testimony,
but to "authority" or authoritative testimony they must.
The possession of these characters does not alone guarantee
its trustworthiness ; but their absence or a doubt as to their
presence does assure us of its twtrustworthiness. The re-
maining characters (1) accuracy of memory and expression,
(2) opportunities for knowing, and (3) capacity are therefore
those on which the relative value or the grade of trustworthi-
ness of testimony depends. For these may vary in degree
without absolutely invalidating the testimony.
Where, then, there is direct conflict, which of the two
opposing statements is to be preferred must be decided by
determining which of the assertors or groups of assertors-
has been the more accurate in memory and expression, or
has had the better opportunities or capacity for ascertaining
the matter asserted. This account of the procedure to be
adopted in cases of conflicting authority still, however, needs
further amplification ; for there are three characters to con-
sider, and the weight of these perchance in any given case
may not be all on one side.
It may happen for instance that great capacity is found
coupled with small opportunity ; or ample opportunities
with relatively smaller capacity. Granted the bare mini-
mum of each of these characters without which the testi-
mony would i'all into the great class of the unreliable can
we fix the order of precedence, in respect of their authority,
of the several combinations that may occur? An attempt,
to do so soon discloses that ibeir order must vary with the
nature of the subject-matter.
Testimony may broadly be divided into (1) expressions of
judgment or opinion, and (2) assertions of fact ; and the
latter into (a) matters of common observation or patent
facts, and (6) latent facts, the subject of experiment or
research. It is clear that capacity plays a chief part in the
trustworthiness of judgment and research, while in the case
of patent facts the reliability is chiefly grounded on the
assertor's means or opportunities for knowing. Further,,
nothing beyond the bare minimum of accuracy in memory
and exposition adds anything to the reliability in either case.
In expressions of judgment or opinion, and in the descrip-
tion of facts disclosed by research, it would seem, there-
fore, that we ought to give preference to the authority of
capacity, while in regard to patent facts we must conclude
that authority is to be measured chiefly by opportunity.
78 A. F. RAVENSHEAR :
There is a close relation between the subject of conflict
of authority and the further question : What attitude must
we assume towards authorities or groups of assertors that
seem to contradict our own personal conclusions or experi-
ences ? This embodies in another form the main question
that, as it has before been stated, a theory of testimony sets
out to answer, viz. : How shall an even course be steered
between excessive reliance on self, and excessive dependence
on others ? The preceding discussions seem to furnish us
immediately with the answer. We must in thought each
go down into the crowd and deal with the case as one
of conflict of testimony only our own testimony against
that of the others. The question is resolved into one of
comparison of authority ; and the answer depends on rela-
tive opportunities and capacities for ascertaining the matter
in hand, considered with reference to the nature of the
subject in the manner above sketched out.
Authority ; the Expert or Specialist. By the aid of the
conclusions arrived at above we may attempt also to define
the limits within which the argument from authority is
legitimate.
Criteria of testimony, as we have seen, rise into primary
importance in those cases in which reliance is placed on
the statements of others either from necessity or for conveni-
ence. How much we shall concede to convenience in any
given case is clearly not a question for Logic ; and the
logical interest accordingly centres about the claims of
necessity. We wish then to distinguish precisely between
those cases in which we must of necessity rely upon others,
and those in which we may examine the reasoning, criticise
the evidence, and trace put for ourselves the dependence of
the conclusion upon observation and experiment.
This we shall find is easily accomplished by the aid of the
obvious distinction between simple facts of observation or
experiment, and critical judgments formed on complex con-
siderations. The facts of observation cannot from their
nature be repeated and examined at will. We must wait an
opportunity for observing the event ; and that opportunity
may never be ours. In matters of experiment also we are
dependent on laboratories, observatories, and on the skill
and co-operation needed for making use of them. Therefore
must we in matters of simple observation and in matters of
experiments often of necessity rely upon testimony. This
necessity is in general merely practical as regards the results
of experiment, but is absolute as regards specific events in
the past or outside our own range of observation.
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 79
In results arrived at by reasoning on the facts of observa-
tion and experiment we are, however, not under the neces-
sity of relying wholly upon others. The reasoning admits of
being dissected and critically examined. It is not, like an
experiment or observation, an event limited to some par-
ticular place and time ; but is capable of repetition merely
at the expense of intellectual exertion. Yet, even after the
analysis has been carried to its farthest limit, there will still
remain the facts of observation or experiment on which it is
based. And as to these we may still be under the compul-
sion of relying upon the assertions of others.
Our conclusion is then that necessity for reliance on others
exists nowhere except as to certain matters of observation
or experiment ; and as to these only in so far as they them-
selves are unanalysable or simple facts. The critical con-
clus^ons of competent investigators may on certain occasions
be adopted on practical grounds without a sifting of the
evidence ; but to repeat a former remark this can receive no
justification from the point of view of abstract logic. An
assertion being given us, if it can be analysed it should be.
If it cannot we must either suspend judgment or see how
far the assertor satisfies the conditions of trustworthiness.
If we are unable to do this, we finally have no choice but
to avoid coming to a conclusion until we can.
Among the various kinds of authorities the Specialist and
Expert deserve more particular mention. The terms are
perhaps not very sharply distinguished ; but ' specialist '
adverts rather to the attainment of high proficiency by a
limitation in the range of inquiry ; while the term ' expert '
imports the possession of a high degree of skill or capacity.
They seem to differ also in this, that while the specialist
must possess all the qualities of authority the expert
need not. The latter may be an expert in some one or
more of the particular kinds of skill or capacity that go to
the making of authority. Thus we may have experts in
observation, or in experiment, or in some particular variety
of one of these. The two terms, however, are often used
synonymously.
The natural home of the Expert seems to be the Law
Courts, where especially in Patent litigation his habit
is to distribute his favour impartially between plaintiffs
and defendants. This habit of his gives point to the
question : What is the proper way to use him ? How can
he best be made to give reliable assistance IB any inquiry?
We have already seen that the argument from authority
is logically defensible only when no other sufficient evidence
80 A. F. RAVENSHEAE:
is available ; only when either absolutely or practically it is-
a necessity. A slight development of this shows us the
Expert in his proper place he should be employed only in so
far as his assistance is unavoidable. He should, to make the
strictest use of his powers, be referred to only to prove or to
point out unanalysable facts of observation or experiment
not without his aid perceptible to or attainable by the in-
expert. If this rule be departed from in any given case and
the expert asked his opinion on a matter as a whole it should
be clearly kept in view that such departure is justifiable only
as a concession to convenience.
Concatenation of Testimony. It is an obvious conclusion
from the preceding discussion that a mere random assertion
uttered we know not by whom or under what circum-
stances is in general of little value as testimony. State-
ments have weight as testimony only in so far as we already
have information about the assertor independently of the
subject under consideration. Testimony then, in general,
consists in assertions whose trustworthiness can be judged
through the medium of independent information about the
assertor.
The case in which this independent information is obtained
wholly or in part through the medium of other testimony
deserves, on account of its wide occurrence and the import-
ance of its uses, to be especially singled out. Our sources
of testimony need not be known to us first-hand ; indeed,
perforce they are not usually so. By the various ways of
obtaining a knowledge of distant facts, including reliance on
testimony, we may obtain information about persons or writers
at a distance or in the past sufficient to enable us to judge as
to the trustworthiness of any statement that can be properly
attributed to them.
It is of some interest that testimony reached and vouched
for in this manner can be shown to be free from the obvious
objections to statements that have been handed on from
person to person, each relying on his predecessor. The
latter certainly bears a superficial resemblance to the use of
testimony for establishing the credentials of other witnesses,
and is liable to be confused with it. Indeed, in enforcing the
importance of the distinction between the " self-infirma-
tive chain " and the " self-corroborative chain," Bentham l
and those who follow him seem to make no mention of any
other possible way in which the testimony of a number of
persons might be concatenated.
1 Rationale of Judicial Evidence, vol. iii., p. 224, and chap, x., bk. vi. ;
Mill's System of Logic, chap, xxiii., 6.
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY.
81
A " self-infirmative chain" is one in which a statement
passes from mouth to mouth among persons whose credi-
bility in mathematical language is less than unity. The
probability of the truth of the final assertion is then measured
by the product of a number of fractions corresponding to the
number of links in the chain. It, therefore, continually
diminishes as the length of the chain increases. The process
may be symbolised thus where the assertion X passes from
E to A through D, C, B :
X E D C B A.
In the " self-corroborative chain " a number of persons in-
dependently make the same assertion X ; a process which
may thus be symbolised :
The credibility of the assertion in this case is greater than
that of an assertion of any of the witnesses taken separately ;
but the process possesses the disadvantage of carrying us but
one remove from the fact ; it takes but one step.
But if we make use of testimony as to the credentials of
our witnesses, which is the method that our examination of
the conditions of trustworthiness has led us to if we inquire
how far our witnesses satisfy the conditions of reliability
we find that we can retain the advantages of the " self-
infirmative chain" without sacrificing those of the "self-
corroborative chain " ; we can combine the length of the.
former with the strength of the latter.
The process may be represented in a diagram thus :
82 A. F. EAVENSHEAE :
Here we have statements of A, B, C, to show that A', B', C',
respectively satisfy the conditions of trustworthiness with
regard to their assertions about A", B", C" ; and those of
A", B", C", as to the reliability of A'", B'", C'". If, now, the
last three agree in an assertion X we have confirmation of the
same kind as in the " self-corroborative chain," joined with
a number of steps or removes such as we find in the " self-
infirmative chain ". We have constructed in fact what
might be more aptly termed a "bridge" than a "chain".
This process is not a mere conjunction of the two former ;
for the assertion X, it should be noticed, does not pass
through all the groups of assertors. We are supposed to
get that directly from A"', B'", C'". It is the reliability
the opportunities, capacity, sincerity of the various as-
sertors that is vouched for in successive stages. These are
of course quite arbitrarily represented in the diagram. The
number of persons in the different stages might vary largely ;
the contributions of the different witnesses, indicated by the
number of cross-lines drawn from the letters in the diagram,
might be very unequal ; nor need the stages themselves be
so distinctly marked as in the figure.
It is, however, quite unnecessary for the present purpose
to attempt to represent on a diagram the ramifications of
testimony in the full complexity of their actual occurrence.
We may yet keep their variety in mind, and may also add
in thought the further complication produced by the in-
troduction at every stage of corroboration by extraneous
evidence.
After the utmost has been done in the direction of getting
knowledge first-hand, whether scientific or practical, the
evidence in great part finally assumes this form. We can-
not entirely sever any portion of knowledge from its context.
When the historian makes use of the admissions of Claren-
don in favour of the Parliamentarians, he first adduces
contemporary testimony and other evidence to show the
part played by his author in the public affairs of the time.
This comes to the historian largely through manuscripts or
books ; perhaps fortified by the independently established
history of some library of repute, or place of public record ;
perhaps guaranteed by generations of trustworthy editors
and commentators spanning the interval from that time to
this ; possibly even the part taken by famous publishers
may enter into the total sum. In the acceptance of Living-
stone's accounts of the countries through which he passed,
are not the relevant grounds in part the esteem in which
he was held by his contemporaries, coupled with their
TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY. 83
credentials ; in part the credentials of the Societies and
other media of record and publication through which his
work has in successive stages come to the individual reader ?
If I submit myself to the knife of the Surgeon, how have
I assured myself that he will do the right thing, unless by
relying upon a complex tissue of testimony as to the pro-
fessional ability of a large number of individuals ? The
same thing is seen in the employment of mathematical
results by non -mathematical persons ; and, as an attempt
was made to show at the beginning of this paper, cannot
by any process be avoided in even the best scientific work.
The actual occurrence of these " bridges " of testimony,
explicitly set out in the structure of each one's knowledge,
is doubtless rare. The singling of them out must in general
be a process of logical analysis. But a man can so little
divest himself of his social nature that they exist impli-
citly in almost every part of his knowledge. They are
characteristic not merely of loosely and carelessly held
floating opinion ; they chiefly rise into prominence in the
more carefully and exactly ascertained portions of his know-
ledge ; those, indeed, more than in any others, in which he
is apt to take pride for having thoroughly worked out
and sifted them for himself.
V. CEITICAL NOTICES.
Baumaesthetik und. geometrisch-optische Tduschungen. Von
THEODOR LIPPS, Professor a. d. Universitat Miinchen. Mit
183 Figuren und einer Tafel. (Schriften der Gesellschaft
f. psychologische Forschung, Heft 9-11, II. Sammlung).
Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Earth, 1897. Pp.
viii., 424.
THE leading idea of this treatise (a masterly one from any point
of view) is that the aesthetic effect of geometrical forms and the
optical illusions connected with them depend on one and the same
cause, are different aspects of one and the same thing, which Prof.
Lipps in his introduction describes as the relation of these forms
to nature and to living reality. He offers then an identical solu-
tion of two questions. But much the largest part of the five
sections into which the book is divided is occupied with the de-
tailed explanation of geometrical illusions, while their aesthetic
bearing is pointed in short supplements to the various chapters,
which, without being fully worked out, are full of the most
suggestive hints towards the aesthetics of these figures. The
general principle on which, with extraordinary consecutiveness
and unity of thought, every detail is strung is described in the
first section ' on the aesthetics of beautiful spatial forms '. It is a
principle of mechanical or rather dynamical interpretation. Dr.
Lipps follows an instinct both of art and of mercy in preparing
the way for the abstract statement by treating a concrete example,
the Doric column. The tall height of the column suggests a
life which aspires upwards against its own weight. The circular
form suggests a compression which prevents the column from
flattening or expanding horizontally. And these tendencies are
not merely juxtaposed but the one depends on the other. The
column gathers itself together in order to rise. Such inner activity
is the source of pleasure because we sympathise with it. Our
aesthetic pleasure in spatial forms, and, the author adds, all
aesthetic pleasure (p. 7) is " a feeling of sympathy which makes us
happy ". The spatial form (and even in a marble statue it is the
spatial form as such, and not the material which pleases) pleases
because it is regarded as animated with a principle of freedom
like that of natural organisms, only more self-contained. We read
into the figure past experiences of similar movements, and par-
ticularly of movements performed by ourselves. In doing so we
T. LIPPS, Raumaesthetik u. geometrisch-optische Tduschungen. 85
follow the law which Dr. Lipps has expounded elsewhere (in his
Grundthatsachen) that experiences consolidate into a generalised
law of mental working which serves us in fresh experiences which
are only similar to the past ones. An excellent illustration of this
" free movement " is given in the contrast between the unaesthetic
effect of mere regularity as in a series of semicircles placed end to
end with their concavities alternating in direction, and the beautiful
smooth movement of the ordinary sinus-curve.
But the aesthetic effect demands more than the free activity of
mechanical forces. The forces must form a unity, and again we
read this unity into the object from our own personality. Such
unity may be either successive, as in the continuous impulse of
movement in a column, or simultaneous as where a number of
columns spring from the ground together (like an act of will
comprehending many similar parts) or ' central ' where several
activities radiate from the same point, as in a circle, and produce
equilibrium. This last equilibrium is however only a special case
in which the forces are in equilibrium to begin with. There is in
a different sense an equilibrium in all beautiful forms which is of
the last importance, for on it all the subsequent chapters depend.
This is the equilibrium which grows out of the action of the forces
engaged and is thus in any moment being reproduced. If the
column rises it is also depressed by its weight, if the circle is com-
pressed by the circumference it expands against it. Every force
has in fact its counterforce, and in each case one of the two is
primary and the other secondary, the one is described as ' force '
and the other as ' tendency '.
But if there is always this equilibrium of force and tendency,
how can illusion arise ? Dr. Lipps insists (section ii.) that illusion
is not an error of perception (Wahrnehmung) but of judgment. A
line is underestimated, where this is the case, not because we see it
smaller but because we judge it smaller in comparison with a stand-
ard of equal length brought in idea to compare with it. Only the
judgment is so immediate and unreflective that it forces itself upon
us as if it were an integral part of the perception. The illusion is
an affair of ideas only. And we get geometrical illusions because of
the forces we imagine working in the figure, and therefore altering
the figure in idea in this direction. Thus if I imagine a line more
compressed by its ends I judge it smaller than an equal line which
does not suggest so much compression. The reason then why we
can get such illusions in spite of the equilibrium of force and
tendency is that we think of the one coming into play before the
other, or we think of them as acting at different points of the
figure. Hence, an enclosed space, e.g., a square, looks smaller than
an equal space where the vertical sides are undrawn because com-
pression by the vertical lines is primary. But a letter enclosed in
a circle seems bigger than it is because the compressing force acts
at the circumference, while the expansive force belongs to the
whole included surface and is shared by the figure within.
86 CBITICAL NOTICES :
Three different forms of the antagonism of force and counter-
force are recognised : (1) that of contraction, or compression, or
limitation and expansion (Begrenzung and Ausdehnuny) ; (2)
that of gravity and vertical expansion ; (3) that of identity and
change of direction. The mass of the book falls into four sections,
in which these three antagonisms are exhibited, though the divi-
sion does not closely follow this enumeration. Under various heads
an enormous number of illusions are described and arranged
(some familiar, many new and of very ingenious devising), the
mere collection and arrangement of which is itself a work of value,
while their demonstration from a single principle is a wonderfully
educative piece of systematic thinking, even if the reader is not
yet convinced that the last word has been said. It is impossible
to follow the argument closely. It will be best to outline the
method of each section and give a few illustrations which can be
described without diagrams.
Section iii. Expansion and Contraction (or Limitation). In
horizontal or lateral directions, the figure is conceived as com-
pressed (like a spring, I suppose) and then expanding against the
pressure. The compressing force being primary, the figure, e.g.,
a line, is underestimated, the boundaries are pushed inwards. In
general a compressed form is underestimated. So a shilling
looks smaller than its mould in wax because the limiting circum-
ference acts in different directions in the two cases. A striking
illusion (p. 75) is produced by a vertical row of points which have
other 'points placed beside them horizontally, in one group to the
right and in the next to the left, and so on : the points in the
vertical row are deflected out of the vertical towards their com-
panion points. The underestimation may be reduced by diminish-
ing the compressing effect of the limits in degree, e.g., including
the points of a point-distance in circles, which makes them inde-
pendent. According to this the straight line should look smaller
than the corresponding distance, but this is counteracted by the
greater solidity of the line, which gives it more expansiveness,
or elasticity, while, at the same time, it expands only in one
direction, whereas the mere point-distance is free to expand at right
angles to its direction. There are secondary effects of limits on
one another which I must pass over (c. xviii). With forms whose
trend is vertical, the primary force is either gravity or the upward
force according as the figure is viewed from above downwards, or
from below upwards. In the first case the lower limit drops, in
the second the higher limit rises. In both cases the vertical
direction is overestimated (as against an equal horizontal length).
This explains the familiar illusion by which of two oblique lengths
in one straight line the upper seems to be continued above the
lower.
Besides degrees of limitation, an interesting and important use
is made of the notion of stages of limitation, which may be briefly
explained. We may have a series of figures in which the com-
T. LIPPS, Baumaesthetik u. yeometrisch-optische Tduschungen. 87
pressing force is greater and greater. But the narrower figure
may be squeezed more (1) because it is weaker, or (2) merely
because it is more compressed, though it has the same ex-
pansiveness. The results will differ according as we incline to
one or the other view. Thus in the well-known illusions of
' confluxion,' or approximation (Ausgleichung} where a short line
between two long ones looks longer, the same line between two
short ones shorter, the lines in each figure all seem to partake
of a common impulse (case 2), to have the same expansive
force : hence the tendency to equalisation. On the other hand
with surfaces like squares and circles the reverse is the case, for
these figures seem independent, hence (case 1) the small circle
between two bigger ones seems smaller, because of its inherent
weakness. This is how Dr. Lipps explains the ' contrast ' in this
illusion.
Section iv. on Division and Composition is perhaps the best
because the most intricate example of Dr. Lipps' method, and
certainly the most difficult. It deals with the illusions of divided
distances or divided lines (especially the case of symmetrical
division into three), as well as of circles divided by a concentric
circle, and these illusions stand in the closest connexion with
those of approximation just described. They are various and
interacting. Primarily the part is underestimated and the whole
distance overestimated ; but secondarily the reverse is the case.
To explain the primary illusion : take a part, say the middle part,
and compare it with an independent distance of the same length.
This latter distance, by approximation to the whole divided line,
seems bigger; the mere part therefore as a part, and not in-
dependent and therefore not thought of prominently as having
equal expansive power with the whole distance, seems smaller in
comparison with the same independent distance. On the other
hand, the whole line may be considered as made up of inde-
pendent portions which are overestimated, and is therefore itself
overestimated. We may put the same thing from the compres-
sive side, but I fear to encumber the statement. The opposite
illusion arises from considering the part as sharing in the move-
ment of the whole distance, as tending to expand to the limits of
the whole. The bigger the part (still the middle part) is, the
more it seems to break down its own limits ; or, to put the case
otherwise, the more it seems to be compressed by the limits of
the whole distance and to be relieved of the compression of its own
limits. This is beautifully illustrated by the effect of lightness
given to a heavy pillar or cupboard when it supports a light
weight (p. 158). The whole line is for similar reasons now under-
estimated. Owing to the interaction of these two causes the
illusion varies with the size of the middle part, and the character
of the variation is traced with great minuteness in a series of
chapters (cc. xxix.-xxxvi.).
The famous Miiller-Lyer illusions (the ' optical paradox ') are
88 CEITICAL NOTICES :
treated in this connexion. Where the oblique lines attached to
the horizontal line are directed outwards, the horizontal is over-
estimated, because its ends compress the oblique lines outwards,
and so compress the line itself less inwards ( ' coincidence of
activities in opposite directions '), or what is the same thing,
because it forms a relatively independent part of a continuous
though broken line. When the oblique lines are directed in-
wards the compression exerted on the oblique lines as well makes
the compressive force of the ends of the original line seem greater
(' coincidence of activities in similar directions '), and the line is
underestimated.
Section v. treats of illusions of direction, both familiar ones and
also new variations of these. In the Poggendorf figure when
an oblique line proceeding from a vertical seems more oblique, the
illusion arises from supposing that the original movement in the
vertical is deflected by a deflecting force. If we regard the oblique
line as the original direction of the whole figure the vertical may
in its turn appear deflected and hence ' contrast,' a distribution
over both lines of the overestimated obliquity. The bending of
straight lines through the proximity of curved ones, and the so-
called overestimation of acute angles (i.e., small divergencies of
direction) follow here. Another class of illusion is typified by the
Zollner pattern where lines in one direction form a parallel series
across the main line of the series as a whole. Many interesting
variations of this are shown among them, convincingly, the new
Miinsterberg or "Milton-Bradley" one (p. 319).
Section vi. on ' Varying Limitation of Surfaces ' is the most elegant
and convincing part of the whole demonstration in particular
where it deals with illusions of figures which alternately bulge
and contract. A chapter on tapering (Verjungung) describes the
illusions of triangles and trapeziums. I find it difficult to describe
the principles of these sections without the help of actual figures.
But I may refer particularly to the aesthetical conclusions drawn,
for instance to the contrast of Gothic and classical styles (pp. 347-
8) and the treatment of the Spitzenmotiv in the Gothic spire (c.
52). Finally we have a chapter on the illusions of solid figures
contracted in the middle like an hour glass, or bulging like a vase
or the base of a column.
This account (faithful, I hope, though too short for those who
have not read the book and superfluous for those who have) may
give some idea of the way in which a single thought is made to
cover a vast number of phenemona. Besides its admirable sys-
tematic completeness, the book has the signal merit, in such cases
as those of contrast, of attempting an actual explanation of the
phenomenon instead of using the name of the phenomenon to
designate a mysterious cause. The question of whether the figures
in every case verify the theory is a matter for experts in this line,
and I am glad therefore to refer the reader to a discussion between
Prof. Heymans and Prof. Lipps contained in a criticism by the
T. LIPPS, Eaumaesthetik u. geometrisch-optische Tduschungen. 89
former in the Zeitschrift fur Psych., etc., Bd. xvii., pp. 383 ff.,
and a reply by the latter in Bd. xviii., pp. 404 ff., which reaches
me while revising this notice for the press. Some of the figures
in the book are not convincing, and particularly in the elabo-
rate discussion of divided distances in cc. xxix.-xxxvi., which Dr.
Lipps tells us he had not originally intended to print. But
this may depend on the particular selection of figures which as
he says may not be equally convincing to every person. Just
because of this if for no other reason one would think actual meas-
urements such as those made by Messrs. Heymans, Thiery and
others would be so useful. Dr. Lipps has deliberately in his
experiments abstained from such measurements, but the reason
as explained in his recent article (p. 425) that the force which
the ideas of tendencies possess and their relative effects upon us
cannot be measured does not seem very good, for it assumes the
truth of the theory.
But without questioning the completeness of verification by
experience, one may still, on more general grounds, remain uncon-
vinced that the theory gives the primary reason of the illusions
while believing at the same time that it contains an important
result. I will explain my difficulty. The general theory that the
illusions are illusions of judgment would not of itself cause any
hesitation, for by allowing that these judgments are so immediate
as to appear part of the perception the author separates them
from explicit judgments. But the fuller account which Dr. Lipps
gives in his recent article of how the illusion arises, causes me
much difficulty. It appears now that the primary seat of the
illusion is not the illusory figure itself, but the ideal standard with
which it is compared. Thus, in the Miiller-Lyer illusion, the line
B with outward appendages seems bigger than the simple line A,
because A when in idea juxtaposed to B seems smaller. In other
words, we see B bigger because it really is seen bigger than our
idea of A. I confess I had previously misunderstood the meaning
of the process from the book. According to this then A shrinks
in idea because its compression is not relieved as B's is. I find
it hard to see how this applies to the case of deflection. But
in any case I observe, (1) granted that the retinal image of B
undergoes no alteration, there seems to be no greater essential
difficulty in supposing the seen B to be modified in perception than
to suppose the imagined A to be modified in a definite direction by
the addition of a fresh idea, as it must be if the force interpretation
holds ; (2) the content of this elaborate process still has to be taken
up ' immediately ' into the perception of B. And (3) the account
seems to agree ill with my subjective experience. If I first draw
the line A and then add even on one side only the oblique
appendages, I find the line, to use famous words, 'a-swellin'
wisibly under my eyes '. I find it hard to believe that it is only
my idea of the original A which has shrunk. At the same time I
have in my eyes the very marked experience of movement.
90 CKITICAL NOTICES :
This brings me to my real difficulty. One would like to b&
convinced by so comprehensive a theory. The principles employed
are undoubted the law of the unconscious working of mind as
Dr. Lipps understands the phrase the question of the propriety
of names not being raised ; and again, the method of reading our
own personality into objects. But what I miss is a point of
application for these ideas of forces. If I treat an object as one,
it is because the object gives me many and coherent presentations
in a combination familiar to me from my experience of myself.
Before we can apply the idea of force we must feel or imagine
the figures to be the seat of movements, there must be something
in our experience of the figure which either is or suggests an ex-
perience of movement. But where this exists, what need to seek
a further cause (I mean a further consciously entertained cause)
of the illusion ? More movement in a certain direction means
more extension in that direction. If the legs of the Muller-Lyer
figure draw my eyes on really (as seems to me to be often the
case) or in idea, the illusion may in these cases be at once ex-
plained. It is well known that optical illusions are referred by
Prof. Wundt to actual or anticipated eye -movements, and he
has recently restated his view (with additional matter which
does not directly concern us here) in an important treatise
Die Geometnsch-optische Tduschungen, Leipzig, 1898 (repeated
in substance in Phil. Stud , xiv., Heft 1). In some of the cases he
adduces my own feelings of movement in the eyes are so marked
that I find an explanation by reference to the kinsesthetic experi-
ences of the eyes to be the most natural in the world. Dr. Lipps
will have nothing to do with eye-movements as an integral factor
in space-perception. Now, one may confess that no extant theory
of them is satisfactory, and that much which used to be explained
by them may be plausibly explained without them. Still one may
point to exploration and fail to understand the impertinent super-
fluity of the experience of eye-movement if it is only the mere
physical movement which is of use. And again one may urge that
these very optical illusions are an important chapter in the theory
of space-perception, and demand discussion on their own merits.
Consequently I, and perhaps others, feel that it is wiser to be off
with the old love before we are on with the new.
Hence the difficulty which I should like to have removed
before accepting Dr. Lipps' theory of mechanical interpretation
as explaining all geometrical illusions, is that in the present state-
ment his forces seem stuck on to given data, and not an outgrowth
from them, and that when their connexion is realised through
the implication of movement they are, at least in some cases,.
superfluous for the primary purpose. But this would only pre-
vent us from identifying the cause of optical illusions and of the
aesthetic effect of the figures. For this interpretation may be the
analysis of the forces at work in the movements contained or im-
plied in the perception of the figures, and as such would be of the.
LUDWIG STEIN, Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophic. 91
last importance for understanding their aesthetical character, and
in particular cases may perhaps also be required (as, e.g., in the
' contrast ' of the small circle between two big ones) to account
fully even for the purely optical effect. At the same time, if this,
criticism is well-founded, since we may in any case go on explicitly
to conceive of these forces as at work, it is not surprising that all
optical illusions should accord (as we may assume they do) with
the conclusions of the mechanical theory, though that is not
needed to explain the psychological effect.
S. ALEXANDER.
Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophic. Von DR. Luowia
STEIN, Professor der Philosophic an der TJniversitat Bern.
Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1897. Pp. 791.
THIS thoughtful volume is based on a series of lectures on Social
Philosophy delivered by Prof. Stein in the first place at Zurich,
and afterwards in a more comprehensive form at Berne. These
lectures, it appears, were not addressed to an audience of special-
ists, but to the educated public of the university interested in
social questions. The manner in which Dr. Stein's book originated
is more or less perceptible on almost every page. It is vivacious,
rhetorical, expansive ; free from technicalities ; and much more
readable than the majority of German treatises on serious sub-
jects. But it must also be observed that the volume has the
inevitable defects of its qualities. The expository methods of the
lecture-room have had an unfortunate effect on the bulk of the
book. In these days of wide and varied interests it is expecting
too much of human nature to toil through a volume of almost
800 pages, when the burden on the patient reader might have-
been lightened by a process of judicious compression. If Dr.
Stem's book reaches a second edition (and it undoubtedly deserves
to do so), it is to be hoped that he will consider the advisability
of altering the arrangement of the materials, and dividing them
into two volumes. The first volume would deal with the history
of Social Philosophy, which now occupies about one half of the
present book ; and the second volume would be confined to an
exposition of the author's own system.
Prof. Stein's sketch of the history of Social Philosophy from
the earliest times to the present day is very well done. It does
not profess to present the subject to the reader from an original
point of view. Perhaps it is all the better on that account. The
desire at all hazards to be new, which not infrequently charac-
terises German learning, has its dangers as well as virtues.
Measure, balance, proportion are sometimes sacrificed for the sake
of novelty, with the result that instead of a catholic presentment
of the facts we get a sectarian insistence on points of minor im-
portance. In tracing the history of Social Philosophy, Dr. Stein,
92 CRITICAL NOTICES :
takes the opportunity of discussing the materialistic conception of
history as it is set forth in the writings of Engels and Marx. He
admits that among savage and uncivilised peoples the life of the
community was determined by the constant and overwhelming
pressure of material conditions, in the form of economic needs.
But he points out that although the earliest forms of social life
are the historic product of economic evolution, yet the ultimate
origin of economic evolution itself is psychical, and not material.
As social organisation advances Dr. Stein holds that the material-
istic conception of social development becomes less and less
.accurate as a key to the interpretation of the facts. Mental
conditions increase in power and importance; they tend to bal-
ance and finally outweigh material conditions in determining the
structure and functions of society. If we may at this point ven-
ture on a criticism, it will be to say that the battle between the
materialistic and the ideological interpretation of history is per-
haps somewhat profitless. It seems to me that the correlation,
the concomitance, or whatever word we like to use to express the
connexion between man's physical and mental characteristics, is
.so intimate and far-reaching that it is impossible to construct a
theory of the origin and development of society which does not
include them both. The evolution of society is the result of the
combined operation of physical and mental needs, and it is a more
philosophic method to recognise their indissoluble concomitance
than to argue about the insoluble question of precedence.
In the first four chapters or lectures Prof. Stein establishes the
Kjompetence of philosophy to deal with the social question. The
.social question of late has been regarded as lying entirely within
the domain of political economy ; and it is not to be denied that
in so far as the social question is economic in its character politi-
cal economy must exercise a paramount influence in its discussion.
But the solution of the social problem, if it is a problem which
.admits of being solved at all, is a task beyond the powers of the
economist. Centuries before political economy as an exact, or
comparatively exact, science came into existence the social ques-
.tion occupied the attention of philosophy. It was discussed from
this standpoint by the Cynics, by Plato, and Aristotle, and in
modern times by almost all the most important leaders of social
thought. Men such as Morelly, Rousseau, St. Simon, Fourier,
Proudhon, Lassalle, Marx, and Engels were in the first place
philosophers rather than economists. Even Adam Smith himself,
the father of modern political economy, was a teacher of philo-
sophy. But apart from these facts philosophy is entitled to say
the supreme word on the social question, if we accept the defini-
tion of philosophy which has been formulated in recent times by
.such men as Comte and Wilhelm Wundt. According to these
writers philosophy is the highest generalisation of all the sciences
-combined as far as possible into a harmonious whole. The task
of philosophy consists in looking at the social question in the light
LUDWIG STEIN, Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie. 93*
of these generalisations, and if the social question is to be em-
braced in its entirety it must be looked at from this point of
view. When the social question is regarded in this comprehensive
manner it is seen to possess an ethical and religious as well as.
an economic character. The solution of the economic problem
would not put an end to social unrest. Even if Fourier's dream
were realised or the prediction of Siemen's that food will one day
be produced in inexhaustible quantities from inorganic substances
the social question will remain to torment the world if men's
ethical and religious needs are still unsatisfied. In fact, the
satisfaction of our animal needs will be immediately succeeded
by the demand for the satisfaction of our human needs ; and to
assure the material basis of existence for all will be at best an
ineffective step, unless ample nourishment is also provided for the
mental and moral interests of all. In the Middle Ages the Church
provided successfully for the immaterial cravings of the mind and
heart. In a certain degree it does so still. But modern criticism
has laid an unsparing and ruthless hand on the ecclesiastical
synthesis so elaborately constructed by the mediaeval world, and
Dr. Stein considers it is losing its hold not only in educated circles,
but also among considerable sections of the masses as a trust-
worthy or acceptable conception of life and of the totality of things.
" Ni Dieu ni Maitre " is an ominous watchword. It indicates
religious as well as economic bewilderment. The only remedy
for this formidable condition of mind and temper is, says Dr.
Stein, a sound system of social philosophy. At the present time
the word Socialism is beginning to exercise the same electrifying
effect on the popular mind as the word Liberalism used to do-
One of the objects contemporary social thinkers should aim at
is to give the word Socialism a deeper and more comprehensive
meaning. It should be made to mean more than mere economic-
collectivism. It should be construed so as to represent the re-
conciliation and harmonious co-operation of individual and col-
lective interests. It should be a word of the highest ethical and
religious import ; it should stand for the religious as well as the-
economic ideal. In short, the significance of the word should be-
heightened till it becomes a synonym for all the highest material
and ideal interests of humanity.
Dr. Stein attempts to show how this truly gigantic task is to b&
accomplished in the third division of this book. In this division
he lays down the principles of a system of social philosophy in a.
series of chapters on the individual, the state, society, property law
and religion. It would not be fair to Dr. Stein to attempt to
summarise his position on all these important matters. Dr.
Stein's view of property is not what is ordinarily understood as
socialistic. He admits that property was originally held in
common, and that in course of time if a more satisfactory social
organisation does not arise than the present one property may
again be taken possession of by the community. But he considers.
94 CRITICAL NOTICES :
that the time for such a revolutionary step has not yet come, and
need never come if our conceptions of property are modified to
suit the developing exigencies of social life. He even considers
that private property may be made to exercise a moralising effect
on the community. This would no doubt be the case if the ethical
standards of the holders of private property were sufficiently high ;
and it is a part of Dr. Stein's scheme of the social future that the
holders of property shall be so effectively socialised as to realise
all the social obligations which the possession of property entails.
In society as it exists at present the principle on which the owner
of property usually acts is to give as little and to take as much as
he can, and the man who is most successful at this sort of thing
is the man who generally acquires great possessions, and along
with them a vast amount of power over his fellows. It is
certainly undesirable that this type of person should exercise the
dominating influence which is now his. The abolition of private
property would put an end to this undesirable social type ; but it
would be possible to suppress it and also many of the other evils
connected with private property if we had what Dr. Stein describes
as the Socialisation of Law.
According to Stein it is in the direction of the Socialisation of
Law (Eechtssocialismus) that we must move if we mean to
establish a higher order of social justice and social well-being. In
the past law has in too many instances been developed in the
interests of powerful individuals and powerful classes, and it still
retains the stamp of its origin. The immediate task of the future
is to adjust law to social needs and social interests till it becomes
the codified expression of the modern conception of justice. One
of the most potent causes of unrest at the present time is the con-
flict in the existing order of society between the opposing principles
of liberty and equality. The principle of liberty aims at securing
and upholding the interests of the individual. The principle of
equality aims at holding the individual in check, and compelling
him to subordinate his purely personal interests to the interests of
society as a whole. It is unbridled industrial liberty with inequality
on a stupendous scale as its inevitable accompaniment which is
mainly responsible for the present social crisis. This crisis will
continue and tend to become more acute until the conflicting de-
mands of liberty and equality have been adjusted. The only way
in which the process of adjustment can be proceeded with is by
the Socialisation of Law. State socialism cannot harmonise liberty
and equality. In fact State socialism has had its day. Its
principles and methods have been shattered by criticism. Its
prestige is rapidly on the wane in Germany its place of birth.
For the last generation or so the State socialists have had it all
their own way. But they have been unable to formulate any
definite and coherent system. It is on other principles and by
other methods than these that the social question must be ap-
proached. According to Dr. Stein, the social problem in so far as
LUDWIG STEIN, Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophic. 95
it is concerned with the reconciliation of liberty and equality must
be approached from the standpoint of Rechtssocialismus. From
this standpoint liberty is seen to be a relative term. Such a
thing as absolute liberty never has existed and never can exist.
The only liberty we know of worthy of the name is liberty within
the law. In the same way there is not, and cannot be, such a
thing as absolute equality. Equality before the law is the only
feasible form of equality among civilised communities. Both
liberty and equality in so far as they are realities are the creation
of law, and are dependent upon law for their existence. Inasmuch
as their conflicting principles are the creation of law it is only
through the instrumentality of law that they can be harmonised.
Law must develop with developing social requirements. The
lines of its future development must be social lines, and the
conscious aim of law working on socialised principles will be to
secure a maximum of liberty with a minimum of inequality. One
of the means by which this end shall be attained is what Dr.
Stein describes as economic proportionality. Economic equality
is plainly unattainable, but law can secure a large amount of
economic proportionality. The fruits of labour are not distributed
in their just proportions among the people who have co-operated
in producing them. This evil and all the misery which it envolves
is the result of the unbridled liberty allowed to individuals in the
present industrial system. A socialised system of law would put
an end to the evil, by introducing and enforcing the principle of
proportionality in all industrial relationships. In this way the
sentiment of liberty would be respected on the one hand and the
sentiment of equality on the other. But neither would be allowed
an undue dominance.
For an exposition of the various practical developments which
the socialisation of law would involve the reader must be referred
to Dr. Stein's book. Among these developments the socialisation
of law would guarantee the right to exist, and probably the right
to labour. In fact all matters relating to the position of labour
and the labourer, such as the national organisation of labour, the
hours of labour, the protection of the labourer, the organisation of
the labouring classes belong to the sphere of Rechtssocialismus.
But Eechtssocialismus does not seek the solution of this and
similar social problems on the lines of social democracy. Ac-
cording to Dr. Stein the social democratic movement is in the
main merely a class movement. It aims at representing the
interests of the industrial proletariat only, and the accomplish-
ment of its programme would necessitate the destruction of the
modern state. But the programme of the socialism of law
embraces the interests of all classes and sections of society and
aims at conserving the modern state by bringing all institutions
within it into closer agreement with the principles of science,
humanity and justice.
According to Dr. Stein religion requires to be socialised as well
96 CEITICAL NOTICES :
as law. He considers that theism still maintains its hold over
the modern world, and that historic ecclesiastical institutions only
require a clergy in full touch with the age in order to become a
vast socialising power. If ecclesiastical institutions bury them-
selves in the past and refuse to look the problems of the present
unflinchingly in the face they will ultimately become things of the
past. The permanence of these institutions depends on the ex-
tent to which they can make themselves the organs of living issues.
Dr. Stein considers that a movement in this direction is slowly
taking place among the churches of Christendom. If this move-
ment should develop it will have the effect of facilitating the
solution of several grave questions which are at present a danger
and an embarrassment to western civilisation. For Dr. Stein's
views on the socialisation of art, science, education, and on inter-
national peace the reader will have to consult the concluding
chapters of his suggestive book. It would not be difficult to find
fault with some of his conclusions, and perhaps to regard his
judgment as having been somewhat hastily formed on certain
points. In a work covering such a wide field and dealing with so
many complex problems this is to be expected. At the same time
it must be said that Dr. Stein has performed an extremely difficult
task with remarkable comprehensiveness and ability. His work
is loaded with thought on almost every page, and whether we
agree with him or not he seldom fails to help us in clearing our
own minds.
W. D. MOKBISON.
Logic, Deductive and Inductive. By CABVETH BEAD, M.A..
London: Grant Eichards, 1898. Pp. 323.
THIS book may be briefly described as a very compact and con-
venient logical manual, and I know of nothing which seems to
me better for learner or teacher, within the compass of a single
very moderate volume. It challenges comparison with Jevons'
Elementary Lessons on the one hand, and with Mill and Dr.
Keynes on the other, being fuller and more complete than the
former, and much briefer of course than Dr. Keynes and Mill in
the treatment of Deduction and Induction respectively. Yet it
might be said that almost nothing of interest or importance in
Keynes or Mill has been left altogether untouched. That this,
should be so, and yet that the book should be, as it is, lucid,
pleasant to read, and without any appearance of overcrowding^
says a great deal for the writer's judgment and powers of ex-
position. Mr. Eead is never careless, fantastic, dull, or obscure.
He is especially good in illustration (c/., e.g., chapter xvi., The
Canons of Direct Induction, and chapter xvii., Combined Induction
and Dediiction, and the section on Explanation in chapter xix.) ;
and this is one of the strongest points perhaps the strongest
in his book. He never fails to give an illustration where it is
CARVETH BEAD, Logic, Deductive and Inductive. 97
wanted, and the illustrations are never inappropriate or trivial,
though sometimes they seem to be of the nature of a joke.
It has been said by a great writer on ethics that there is
general agreement as to what Virtue is that "there is in reality
an universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that which
all ages and all countries have made profession of in public ; it
is that which every man you meet puts on the show of ; it is that
which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions-
over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavour
to enforce the practice of upon mankind." Yet as a later writer
tells us " on its speculative side it has been, and it still is, the
centre of apparently endless controversy the subject of every
species of confusion ". And mutatis mutandis, the same paradox
seems applicable in Logic, and more especially that core of De-
ductive Logic which has remained in essentials unchanged from
Aristotle to Mill. (How far, apart from the direct acquisition
of fresh information and from metaphysical and psychological
principles, it includes ' Inductive ' Logic is a point which Mr. Read
seems to decide in favour of inclusion cf. p. 193.) Most of us.
know, and are agreed, what good reasoning cogent syllogism or
trustworthy Induction is, but why it is good, what the theory of
valid inference is, is regarded as matter of doubt and difficulty.
Thinkers who believe themselves to base all knowledge upon
' particulars,' and those who start from universal principles, are
equally capable of estimating or discovering scientific truth ; those
who insist upon the importance in logical theory of a careful and
unremitting reference to context, and those who treat propositions
symbolically and thus of necessity leave particularities of context
out of account would for the most part be in entire agreement as
to the validity or invalidity of any clearly understood argument.
And those who appear to "identify" Psychology and Logic, are
just as keen as others to detect an inference that is not logical.
These well-worn reflections are suggested by Mr. Bead's book,
partly because of the list of writers to whom he refers in his
Preface, partly because he succeeds to a great extent in carrying
out his intention of treating the recognised body of logical
doctrine in separation from speculative theory from the more
disputable matter of Psychology and Metaphysics and partly
because they receive interesting though perhaps superficial
illustration from comparison of the present book with the
author's Theory of Logic published in 1878 and reviewed by
Dr. Venn in MIND for that year. Nothing could well be
more striking than the unlikeness between the two works in
many respects in form, in purpose, in statement, in some
theoretical explanations of accepted logical doctrines. But the
logical core of both is essentially the same indeed in this case,
more than the core, since in reality the same matter-of-fact
view is on the whole kept, and the same school of writers adhered
to. And it is further interesting to notice how both books are
98 CRITICAL NOTICES:
marked by similar intellectual characteristics, though the vigour
which in the first was shown in new ways of seeing, expressing
and explaining "old truths," and in an exuberance of new terms
and symbols, is in the latter work apparent in clearness and
freshness of exposition, and abundance of illustration, devoted
to the service of traditional doctrine and expressed in current
terminology.
In the Preface to the present book, Mr. Bead mentions Mill,
Prof. Bain, Dr. Venn and Dr. Keynes as the writers to whom he
is chiefly indebted, and he refers besides to Mr. Bradley, Mr.
Bosanquet and Mr. Alfred Sidgwick (among English authors). To
the latter of these (together with Mr. Thomas Whittaker and Prof.
C.M. Thompson) he expresses gratitude for advice on various points.
In the Deductive part of his book, Mr. Eead has taken advantage
of Dr. Keynes' improvements on preceding Formal Logicians, and
has thus given a much more complete and systematic account of,
e.g., Immediate Inferences than Jevons or any other previous
writer. And that he has not been uninfluenced by Mr. Bradley's
and Mr. Bosanquet's writings, and Mr. Alfred Sidgwick's, may be
inferred from the general effort after continuity and unification
of subject which marks his work, in his references implicit or
explicit to that analysis which must have preceded synthesis in
Logic, to the effect of context on meaning, and to the ' artificiality,'
the relativity to human purpose, of classification, etc. But
wherever the work of the writers referred to has led to discussions
or considerations impossible to be presented without great com-
plexity, at that point Mr. Eead generally ceases to follow them
e.g., in reference to " Predication and Existence," the distinction
between " Conditionals " and " Hypotheticals " as two distinct
kinds of propositions of the form If A, then C, the Quantification
of the Predicate, the liability of human faculties to error in
observation and perception, the relation between Causation and
Co-existence, the interpretation of the Law of Identity, the nature
of mathematical truth, immediacy of succession in Causation.
No doubt there are excellent reasons for this ; a handbook is
not the place for raising doubts that cannot be solved, or at least
laid to rest ; and I think that what can be done in the way of
a brief clearing up of difficulties great or small (often only diffi-
culties on the surface, but none the less puzzling on that account)
and of reconciling apparent contradictions, has been done over
and over again by Mr. Eead in this book with surprising skill
and success. Cf., e.g., his treatment of Inductive Method, chapter
xv., and of the relation between Induction and Deduction, his
recurrence to Suppositio as a substitute for Universe of Discourse,
his explanation of the saying, Exceptio probat regulam ; and the
treatment of Classification, and Nomenclature and the Predi cables,
in chapters xxi. and xxii., though brief is very elucidating. " Let
us," he seems to say, "go as far as may be without plunging
into any metaphysical or psychological quagmire ; let us spare
CARVETH READ, Logic, Deductive and Inductive. 99
no pains to do what we can, but let us also recognise clearly what
we cannot, and cease to waste time upon it." The spirit and
temper of the book in this regard are indicated in a sentence on
p. 194, in which the author is referring to those difficulties of
ascertaining "exact equality" and "immediate sequence" of
phenomena which are due to the limitation of human faculty.
" It is right," he says, " to touch upon this well-known sceptical
topic ; but to insist much upon it is not a sign of good sense."
That this treatment has advantages from some points of view
has just been allowed ; but it must be admitted that in some
cases Mr. Bead's " short way with the sceptics " does not seem
to lead to results satisfactory even from those points of view.
Take, e.g., his account of the relation between Logic and Mathe-
matics, or his treatment of the Laws of Thought, and of the
connexion between Causation and Co-existence. On this view
Mathematics seems to be almost (though perhaps not quite) a
Science co-ordinate with Logic, and is described as dealing through-
out with abstractions. Thus Logic is not all-em bracing, not the
Science of Sciences, after all and Mathematics has the air of
being separated by an impassable chasm from the world of con-
crete fact.
" Mathematics," it is said, " treats of the relations of all sorts
of things considered as quantities," while Logic " treats of the
relations of all sorts of things, but not as to their quantity " (p. 7)
(this is indeed somewhat qualified by the recognition that
" Logic may be said to be in some respects ' prior to ' or ' above '
Mathematics as usually treated," p. 8). Again, " As to Co-existences,
the Geometrical do not belong to Logic" (p. 146), and " Geometrical
Co-existence, when it is not a matter of definition, ... is de-
duced from the Definitions and Axioms " (p. 233). The process of
Geometrical proof " is purely Deductive ; . . . Diagrams are used
not as facts for observation, but merely to fix our attention ; . . .
no inference is required from the special case to all similar ones ;
for they are all proved at once " (p. 166). And we even have the
"falling of absolutely true dice" contrasted as "mere mathe-
matical abstractions " with " concrete events " (p. 248). " The
Mathematical Axioms again," we are told, " apply to Time, Space,
Mental Phenomena, and Matter and Energy ; whereas the Law
of Causation is only true of concrete events," etc. (p. 225).
These contentions (though they certainly stop short of some
obvious difficulties) are at least disputable, and to a large extent
they appear to be even obviously paradoxical. Surely all the
rules of Logic apply in mathematical reasonings if quantities as
such are not subject to logical treatment, it would seem that all
the world of phenomena in some of its aspects (and those the
most definite and precise) is extra-logical. And when it is said
that " the Law of Causation cannot be derived from the Mathe-
matical Axioms, nor these from the Logical " (p. 226), it may be
replied that it is not only Mathematical principles which cannot
100 CRITICAL NOTICES :
be deduced from Logical ones ; the same is true of the rules of
relation in every ' system ' or body of related facts or things of
family and political relationships, of the parts of any organism or
machine, even of the causal relation of succession in time.
It is perhaps partly to this drastic separation from Logic of
Mathematics, with its imposing system of inexhaustible co-exist-
ences, that is due Mr. Eead's slighting treatment of Co-existence
in comparison of Sequence (in which he follows Mill). Dr. Venn
goes far towards recognising that Co-existence is of no less im-
portance for Induction than Succession is ; and it is difficult to see
how it could ever have been seriously doubted that uniformities
of Succession ;nust presuppose uniformities of Co-existence.
The principle of Identity, says Mr. Eead, " assumes that some-
thing is, and that it may be represented by a term . . . further,
it is assumed that of the same thing another term may be predi-
cated again and again in the same sense". How a "principle"
that is fairly expressed as A is A (or even If B is A, B is A which
Mr. Eead prefers) can have any logical connexion with the as-
sumption that " of the same thing another term may be predi-
cated "it is not easy to see ; and indeed it is perhaps too much
to expect that as long as a Law of Identity expressible as A is A is
put forward as a fundamental Law of Thought of Thought which
proceeds by judgments of the form S is P anything satisfactory
should or could be said on the subject. After Lotze's determined
effort and signal failure, the case may well seem hopeless.
The following account of the two other " Laws of Thought,"
the Principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, is interest-
ing but perhaps a little fanciful. They are, it is said, inseparable ;
" implicit in all distinct experience, and may be regarded as indicat-
ing the two aspects of Negation. The principle of Contradiction
says : B is either A or not-A, as if not-A might be nothing at all ;
this is abstract negation. But the principle of Excluded Middle
says : Granting that B is not A, it is still something namely, not-
A ; thus bringing us back to the concrete experience of a con-
tinuum in which the absence of one thing implies the presence of
something else. Symbolically : to deny that B is A is to affirm
that B is not A, and this only differs by a hyphen from B is
not-A. But if any one holds that the hyphen makes all the
difference, I give it up."
To sum up, it may be said that Mr. Eead does not perhaps
undertake to carry us, in Formal Logic, much beyond current
handbooks, nor in Induction much beyond Mill ; and granting
this, he is somewhat better than his undertaking, and though
careful not to innovate, he does his readers the service of putting
them at a point of view from which the ultimate unity of Logic,
and final elimination of contradictions between opposing views,
seem natural as well as desirable. It is difficult without going
into elaborate detail, to convey the impression of compactness,
vigour, keenness, and unsparing pains which a perusal of the
FRANK PODMORE, Studies in Psychical Research. 101
book gives all these working within the limits of traditional
doctrine and terminology, and resolutely trying to make the best
of them. Still I should like to give an extract or two by way of
example, and will take the following brief expositions of (1) the
relation between Induction and Deduction, (2) the non-plurality
of Causes, which seem to me admirable for their purpose :
(1) "In any question of general truth, induction and deduction
are mutually dependent and imply one another. This may be
seen in one of the above examples. A argues that a certain
metal is copper, because every metal is copper that turns green
when dipped in vinegar. So far his proof appeals to a general
proposition and is deductive. But if B asks how he knows the
general proposition to be true, A alleges experiments or facts ;
and this is inductive evidence. Deduction then depends on In-
duction. But when B asks, again, how any number of past
experiments can prove a general proposition, which must be good
for the future as well as for the past, A invokes the uniformity
of Causation ; that is, he appeals to a principle, and that is again
deductive proof " (p. 4).
(2) " A fire may certainly be lit in many ways ; with a match,
or a flint and steel, or by rubbing sticks together, or by a flash of
lightning : have we not here a plurality of causes ? Not if we
take account of the whole effect ; for then we shall find it modi-
fied in each case according to the difference of the Cause. In one
case there will be a burnt match, in another a warm flint, in the
last a changed state of electrical tension. And similar differences
would be found in cases of death under different conditions, as
stabbing, hanging, cholera ; or of shipwreck from explosion,
scuttling, tempest. In fact if we knew the facts minutely enough,
it would be found that there is only one cause (sum of conditions)
for each effect (sum of co-effects), and that the order of events is
as uniform backwards as forwards " (p. 156).
In conclusion, I will quote the following brief reflexion which
seems to me as true as it is fresh :
"It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong. In the
criticism of manners, of fine art, or of literature, in politics, religion
and moral philosophy, what we are anxious to say is often far
from clear to ourselves ; and it is better to indicate our meaning
approximately, or as we feel about it, than to convey a false
meaning, or to lose the warmth and colour that are the life of
such reflexions " (p. 272).
E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.
Studies in Psychical Research. By FRANK PODMORE. London :
Kegan, Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., 1897. Pp. ix., 458.
" PSYCHICAL " phenomena are, as it were, the Dreyfus case of
Science. Their non-existence has to be accepted as a chose jugfa,
102 CRITICAL NOTICES:
without inquiry into the means by which their condemnation
was secured. Public curiosity must content itself with assurances
that all the high priests of Science concur in the condemnation
and regard all discussion of the case as fraught with the gravest
danger to the republic, that their existence is avouched only by a
conspiring syndicate of all the superstitions, and that to doubt the
infallibility of the very summary court martial which relegated
them to the company of Beelzebub in the ' Island of the Devil/
in the time and under the logical auspices of David Hume, is high
treason to Science and subversive of the whole natural order of
the universe. Such are the sentiments of the conservative party
which would rather run the risk of sacrificing a little inopportune
truth than upset men's minds and the authority of Science, and
which, needless to say, is full of honourable men actuated by a
sincere sense of public duty. Yet they would do well to recognise
the existence, on the other side, of a growing number of " intel-
lectuals " who are convinced of the necessity of a revision of the
wholesale condemnation of these phenomena. These 'revisionists'
are not without their internal differences ; some demand revision
as a matter of policy, others as compliance with the principle of
fiat justitia mat coelum (though they probably do not believe that
the heavens would fall or the order of nature be subverted by the
recognition of any fact however strange) ; some believe that much
new truth may be learned from inquiries which others expect only
to extend our knowledge of the nature and possibilities of human
error. But they agree that the doubts which existed in the public
conscience as to the treatment which this side of experience had
received in the past could be removed, not by assertions and de-
nunciations a priori, but only by a serious and sustained investiga-
tion in detail. And so they organised themselves in 1882 into
the Society for Psychical Eesearch, in which Mr. Podmore has
been from the first a most active and valuable member. He is
consequently one of the very few who are (or ever have been)
entitled to speak with authority on the subject, and his pronounce-
ments appear to all the greater advantage by reason of the manner
in which they are put forth. For Mr. Podmore has produced a
singularly interesting survey of his subject, written in a lucid and
effective style and adorned with many terse and caustic phrases.
His results are briefly these Spiritualism is a religious rather
than a scientific movement, and its votaries are in general little
concerned to assist in a scientific study of their ' experiences '.
Their ' mediums' are without exception detected cheats, and more-
over just now hardly any are available, while their exhibitions
do not present even a primd facie case for investigation. The
stronger evidence for past marvels is ingeniously minimised. The
Dialectical Society's Eeport is criticised for not giving the names
of the sub-committee which succeeded in table-turning without
contact. Zollner is regarded as a victim of Slade's conjuring
tricks, and as having given him opportunities for fraudulent
FRANK PODMOBE, Stiidies in Psychical Research. 103
substitutions in the ' test ' objects. Stainton Moses* phenomena
derive their evidential value from the strong presumption of his
honesty, but he may have been a conscious, unconscious or semi-
conscious fraud. Under the circumstances this is perhaps unlikely,
but we have to choose between a moral and a physical miracle
(p. 133). Home's case, supported by much experimental testi-
mony from Sir W. Crookes and the Earls of Crawford andDunraven,
is treated with more respect. Still Mr. Podmore gets over this
mauvais pas also, by supposing that the witnesses were to some
extent hallucinated. Collective hallucinations are possible es-
pecially if we admit telepathy and the conditions of a seance
are calculated to produce them. And Home may have eked out
deficiencies in the actual events by his suggestions. E.g., he
really took live coals out of the fire, and his sitters believed that he
handled them with impunity (and sprinkled them over their hair
and handkerchiefs !), nay he " possibly on some occasions held
them in his hands," protected by " some non-conducting substance "
(what ?) ; " he really stretched himself to his full height " and his
sitters recorded his elongation by ten inches ; " he thrust his head
and shoulders out of the window " and seemed to them to have
floated from one room into another seven feet distant seventy
feet in the air! (p. 121-2). After this, "poltergeists" are easily
ascribed to the trickery of naughty girls helped out by a little
" sensory iUusion conditioned by the excited state of the per-
cipients " (p. 158). An entertaining account is given of the ' theo-
sophic ' career of Madame Blavatsky . The evidence for experimental
thought-transference, on the other hand, Mr. Podmore considers
sufficient to establish the fact, and with its aid he goes on to explain
away ghosts, collective and death-apparitions, considered as proofs
of post-mortem spiritual agency. From the same point of view,
haunted houses are defective ; there is little evidence of identity
and purposiveness, and much to show that the apparitions are
subjective and stimulated by antecedent auditory disturbances.
The evidence for premonitions is disappointing both in quantity
and in quality and may be assumed to be greatly vitiated by
illusions of memory. In chapter xii. the spontaneous phe-
nomena of secondary consciousness are held not to warrant
Mr. Myers' theory of a continuous and extensive ' subliminal self,*
while the distinct personalities of the French experimental casea
are considered to be largely artificial and built up by suggestion.
On the whole, they are " not a prophecy but a survival," restoring
" a more primitive stage of consciousness " (p. 413), which has
ordinarily given way to the more effectual organisation of our
work-a-day selves. Lastly, in his concluding chapter on obses-
sion and clairvoyance, Mr. Podmore comes upon a second set of
phenomena which gives pause to the elan of his scepticism, viz.,
Prof. James' "white crow," Mrs. Piper. The evidence produced
in connexion with her trances proves at least thought-transference,
but requires that theory to be strained to the uttermost. And,
104 CRITICAL NOTICES:
especially in its latest developments, it forms, Mr. Podmore
concludes, " the most important evidence which the Society for
Psychical Eesearch has yet adduced for the existence of some-
thing beyond telepathy ". This will not be esteemed an overstate-
ment by any one who has read the remarkable testimony con-
tained in No. xxxiii. of the Proceedings of the Psychical Society,
and knows how to attribute due weight to the conversion which
it has effected of Dr. Hodgson, the greatest expert in these matters
and the hero of a hundred exposures, to what is substantially the
much decried spiritist theory of the phenomena.
The above abstract of Mr. Podmore's results necessarily fails
to do justice to the ingenuity of his reasoning and the effective
use he makes of the documents collected by the Society for
Psychical Eesearch. But it suffices to show that he is the most
sceptical of psychical researchers. Indeed he sometimes arouses
a feeling that here is scepticism ' strained to the uttermost,' or at
least the high-water mark of reasonable doubt. For my own
part, I should sometimes prefer complete suspense of judgment to
forced explanations which derive their validity only from the
assumed antecedent improbability of the facts alleged.
Nor do I find myself altogether in harmony with Mr. Podmore's
attitude towards the spiritists. It is of course the fashion to
represent them as a body of deluded maniacs, for whom it is
impossible to say a good word without destroying one's reputa-
tion for intellectual sanity. Yet it is undeniable that much of
the best evidence on these subjects concerns some of the most
anomalous spiritistic phenomena. And Mr. Podmore by no
means always succeeds in disposing of it completely. In other
words, spiritism adduces some of the best as well as some of the
worst of the evidence. Mr. Podmore's method is to interpret
the former in the discreditable light reflected on it by the latter.
But it is possible to make too much of the credulity of the vulgar
spiritists. The vulgar are always credulous, and their convictions,
as expressed by themselves, always rest upon inadequate founda-
tions. It ought to be recognised as a general principle that lay
evidence upon a subject of scientific debate can yield at the ut-
most scientific suggestion, but never scientific proof. For all that
the history of science shows that the vulgar beliefs have often
been right (cf., e.g., the belief in meteorites, fire-balls, giant cuttle-
fish, the connexion between barberries and wheat-rust, and the
still disputed existence of ' telegony ' and sea-serpents). It it there-
fore the strongest and not the weakest evidence which must be
considered, and due care must be taken to apply to each sort of
evidence the canons of criticism appropriate to it. It is, for
instance, well known that in ordinary life no two witnesses tell
quite the same tale independently. Hence discrepancies are here a
guarantee of good faith, whereas in scientific observations they
would provoke distrust. Even the credulity of ordinary spiritist
audiences in succumbing to trickery deserves perhaps more lenient
FRANK PODMOBE, Stiidies in Psychical Research. 105
treatment than Mr. Podmore accords to it. It is, after all, largely
the result of the social neglect to examine the facts, of the social
acquiescence in conditions which provoke deception and render it
easy. And if we regard the spiritists, as Mr. Podmore rightly
points out they should be regarded, not as a scientific but as a
religious sect, their credulity will not appear excessive. On the
contrary, it will be seen that they must absorb an unusual amount
of criticism in their faith. For its believers, almost without ex-
ception, are converts, i.e., were originally disbelievers, and con-
vinced themselves by evidence which seemed to them sufficient.
And, moreover, they were convinced not by abstract argument,
but by concrete and somewhat coarsely material facts which
sufficiently explains the philosophic defects in their creed noted
by Mr. Podmore. But once a spiritist is thoroughly convinced
by what he believes to be irrefragable fact, his critical vigilance
towards similar phenomena necessarily relaxes. And why should
it not ? Does not the same rule hold good elsewhere ? If I am
once convinced of the bond fide performance of a scientific ex-
periment, I am not so much interested in its repetition, and so
more easily imposed on by fraudulent imitations. Eumour has
it that this principle is sometimes illustrated also by illegitimate
precautions taken to secure the success of scientific experiments
Jbefore popular audiences. At least there is a tale of a famous
physicist who used to inflame his fire-sticks by friction not with-
out the surreptitious aid of a little phosphorus. Yet had I been
a spectator at such an exhibition I should be a fool, not if I
.ascribed the fraud to the conditions of the performance, but if I
inferred that friction could not produce fire. And the convinced
spiritist may look at the frauds of the mediums in much the same
way. Nor is he unreasonable from his own point of view. But
his point of view is not that of science, and such tainted evidence
is rightly considered to have no efficacy in producing a belief that
lias yet to be established. If the spiritists are indifferent to
proselytism that is their own concern, but they are not necessarily
^beyond the pale of human reason.
Nor, again, is their theory as such logically inadmissible. It is
no doubt often crudely stated by people whose accounts would
state any theory crudely, and, as Mr. Kipling says, would ' dis-
credit the creation '. It is no doubt of exceeding antiquity, and
so susceptible of being construed as "an instinctive utterance of
primitive animism " (p. 18). But the opposition to these super-
normal phenomena is equally antique, and it might as reasonably
be suggested that the attitude of modern science only continues
the instinctive dislike which everywhere has led to the prohibition
of 'sorcery,' to the burning of ' witches,' and to the ascription of
the phenomena generally to the agency of the devil. As Mr.
Lang so well points out, the coincidences in the details of super-
stitions cannot be explained by tradition or collusion. The truth
is that the ' spirit ' theory rests upon spontaneous and persistent
106 CEITICAL NOTICES :
peculiarities of the alleged facts themselves, and forces itself as a
working theory even upon the most cautious and patient observers
(as shown, e.g., by the recent admissions of Dr. Hodgson with
regard to Mrs. Piper's trances). The real offence of the spiritists
with respect to it is that they do not use it as a scientific theory,
as a basis for further investigation, but proceed to get absorbed
in such of its practical corollaries as satisfy their emotional needs.
But this simply shows that their motives are emotional, and not.
scientific.
To pass from a palliation of spiritism to that of the opposite
extreme, viz., of invincible scepticism, I cannot think Mr. Pod-
more' s critical via media is likely to be more acceptable. He
cannot hope to propitiate the implacable, the fanatic of an a
priori scepticism. For in spite of all his scepticism Mr. Podmore
is a revisionist, a man of open mind, a disbeliever in the policy of
the chose jugee. A thoroughgoing champion of science considered
as orthodoxy, therefore, can as little welcome Mr. Podmore's book
as any other ' revisionist ' publication. For he needs no argument
to dispose of the phenomena he rejects. If he is truly logical, he
rejects them a priori. Such phenomena subvert the whole system
of science ; ergo they are miracles ; ergo they are impossible ; ergo
no testimony can in the slightest affect their incredibility. For it
is always more probable that all sorts of improbabilities should
have coincided, that any amount of testimony should be false,
than that ' the thing that couldn't ' should have occurred. Hence
the sceptic a la Hume would make short work of what even Mr.
Podmore would spare. In spite of Mr. Podmore's protestations
(p. 8) that it is only a harmless working theory involving nothing
transcendental, telepathy is just as obnoxious as the most startling
of spiritist wonders. There are no degrees of the impossible.
And with sufficient firmness in assuming hyperaesthesia, halluci-
nation, mendacity and collusion all Mr. Podmore's best evidence
could be got rid of. Indeed my only difficulty is to conceive what,
evidence would not yield to such solvents, what evidence could
ever prove anything but a foregone conclusion. But such scru-
ples would not perhaps perturb the Humian ; he is safe unless
he should be induced to descend into the arena of discussion,
where weakness of the flesh might overcome him and tempt him
to listen to the arguments of others or the testimony of his own
senses.
And yet perhaps there is a logical flaw at the heart of his posi-
tion. That any fact should really subvert the scientific order of
nature seems infinitely more ' antecedently improbable ' than the
weirdest of alleged miracles. Yet the initial assumption of the
Humian position is that certain disputed phenomena really would
subvert the scientific order of experience.
That assumption is one which no ' intellectual ' revisionist,
would accept. It issues from a deep distrust of the scientific
order which it pretends to protect. It is necessarily unwarranted
FRANK PODMOEE, Stiidies in Psychical Research. 107
by the facts which it rejects. For until the facts have been sub-
mitted to dispassionate scientific examination, it cannot possibly
be asserted that they do not connect with admitted truth. As a
matter of fact the connexion has not been made chiefly because
no one has tried to make it. The people who did concern them-
selves with the alleged facts did not pursue scientific ends and so
did not devise scientific theories ; those who did not, made the
indiscriminate ascription of the phenomena to spirits or devils a
pretext for declaring them to be essentially incapable of scientific
investigation. But as soon as any one looks for order, order be-
gins to appear out of chaos, and hence, Sir W. Crookes' recent
declaration in his presidential address to the British Association,,
that he is beginning to see " something like coherence among
the strange and elusive phenomena, something like continuity be-
tween these unexplained forces and laws already known," is highly
significant. The truth is that the true scientific spirit is all-per-
vasive, that the true scientific method is of universal application.
to the psychology of angels, demons and spirits, if such things
there be, as to that of men and beasts what has hitherto been
lacking has been the will to apply it.
But the feeling is growing that the time is approaching for the
extension of science to regions of apparent experience hitherto
abandoned to superstition, and Mr. Podmore's lucid survey of the
field and critical sifting of the evidence cannot but contribute to
strengthen public confidence in the work the Society for Psychical
Eesearch has carried on with so much patience and pertinacity.
A hasty reader might indeed draw the inference that Mr. Pod-
more's results are mostly negative nay, that telepathy itself waa
only a technical term to conceal a negation. But it cannot be
too strongly emphasised that negative criticism like Mr. Podmore's.
is on a totally different plane from that which prevailed twenty
years ago ; it is criticism of the imperfections of a body of evidence
which could not have come into existence but for the labours of
the Society of Psychical Eesearch. And the defects which he
criticises are in most cases such as can be removed by improvements
in the quantity and quality of the evidence. Such improvement
there has been and will doubtless continue to be if the social factor
continues favourable. This indicates a characteristic of 'psychical
research ' which might well have been emphasised by Mr. Pod-
more. So long as the subject is in its observational stage its pro-
gress necessarily depends largely on social sympathy. It is not
enough that society should have desisted from its ancient sport of
eliminating psychical sensitives at the stake. The superstitions,
and social fears which render so much evidence inaccessible or
valueless must be abated, and be succeeded by an interest or co-
operation which will lead to an intelligent observation and adequate
recording of an appreciable fraction of such phenomena as spon-
taneously present themselves. For though we are like astronomers
watching for sporadic comets that flare across the spiritual sky, we
108 CKITICAL NOTICES:
can at least take care that none escape our notice nor fail of proper
record. Of course if means could be devised for making the phe-
nomena more experimental, the rate of progress might be greatly
accelerated. But even so in view of the resistance which the
violent prejudices of the extremists on both sides will continue to
offer to a scientific revision of their beliefs, in view of the emotional
perturbation which the investigation of such delicate matters seems
so often to involve, it would require a sanguine man to expect any
settlement of the subject in the next fifty years.
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
A Treatise on Universal Algebra with Applications. Vol. I. By
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer of
Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge : University Press,
1898. Pp. 586.
IN consenting to review this important volume for the readers of
MIND I fear I have undertaken a task for which I am but indiffer-
ently qualified. My belief, before I received the book, was that
it was almost wholly devoted to a discussion of the general
principles of symbolic reasoning, with occasional appeals to
mathematics and geometrical diagrams by way of illustrations.
But this is not the case. Only a comparatively small portion of
the work is devoted to what may fairly be called the general
principles of symbolic reasoning ; the rest is taken up with ap-
plications of these principles, as the author understands them, to
the elucidation of Grassmann's Calculus of Extension. Now, of
the latter work I know nothing except what I have been able to
learn from Mr. Whitehead's presentation of it, and from a few
references to it by other writers. So far as I can judge from these
data, Mr. Whitehead has rendered great service to science by
reducing to a comparatively simple and workable form a method
of research which, as originally presented by its inventor, was,
from all accounts, extremely obscure and difficult to apply.
In forming an opinion on the first portion of Mr. Whitehead's
work (especially book ii., which treats of Symbolic Logic) I feel
myself on surer and more familiar ground. Yet even here I find
myself somewhat in a difficulty. Mr. Whitehead and I regard
the subject of Symbolic Logic from different standpoints ; and
this fact renders it no easy matter for me to do full justice to his
work. Alone, or nearly so, among logicians, I have always held
the opinion, and my recent studies have confirmed it, that the
simplest and the most effective system of Symbolic Logic is that
whose elementary constituent symbols denote not classes, not
properties, not numbers, ratios, regions, or magnitudes, not things
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Universal Algebra with Applications. 109
of any kind but complete statements. By a ' statement ' I mean
any sound or symbol, or any combination of sounds or symbols,
employed to convey information. A subjectless and predicateless.
sound or symbol, like the warning " caw " of a sentinel rook, or
the national flag of a passing ship, may be called an elementary
statement ; the formal grammatical propositions of ordinary spoken
or written speech may be called complex statements. The ulti-
mate units of expressed thinking, whether those units be indi-
vidually communicated to ear or eye by single symbols or by
many, are statements ; and in no sphere or region of investigation
can reasoning be expressed without those units. Since, therefore,,
statements, and statements alone, constitute the ever indispens-
able elements of all expressed reasoning, we should, in my opinion,
first investigate the mutual relations of these statements, repre-
senting each by its own independent symbol, and call this process
of investigation Pure Logic. The moment we begin (as in
mathematics and in the traditional logic) to represent things
things which are not statements by separate symbols, we are no-
longer in the domain of Pure (or Abstract) Logic, but in that of
Applied Logic. A system of Symbolic Logic thus built up wholly
of statements has one great advantage which no other system can
possibly possess, namely, the advantage of homogeneity of matter.
Mr. Whitehead, who was acquainted with my earlier, but not with
my recent, papers when he wrote, admits (p. 112) that the existing
systems of logic the traditional as well as the modern symbolic
can be thus entirely constructed on a basis of pure statements ;
but he has preferred to follow the method of Boole as simplified
by Venn, Schroder, Peirce and others. In this he was quite
right. For one thing, the principle which underlies my method v
however important, did not come within the scope and purpose of
his work ; and, for another, it did not appear (in my earlier
papers) to lead to any essential difference in the symbolic pro-
cesses. That this is no longer the case my recent papers in MIND
and in the Proceedings of the Mathematical Society will show;
but the new development is still further removed than the old
from the allied algebras which it has been the great aim of Mr.
Whitehead to unite into one general comprehensive system. This
task, judging of the whole from my knowledge of a part, I con-
sider him to have accomplished with rare ability.
His opening chapter, "On the Nature of a Calculus," is very
interesting, and may be understood by any one of ordinary educa-
tion and intelligence. If the reader knows something of common
algebra he will grasp the author's meaning more easily ; but, for
much of this chapter, even this modicum of preliminary knowledge
is not absolutely indispensable. When, however, we enter upon
the second chapter, which treats of Manifolds, we find ourselves
on very different territory. A reader previously unacquainted
with the subject cannot read this straight through, as he would a
novel or a paragraph in a newspaper; he wUl have to make
110 CKITICAL NOTICES:
frequent halts, and sometimes very long halts, in order to reflect.
This is not altogether the author's fault. The truth is that the
subject of manifolds is extremely difficult to understand, and still
more difficult to explain. The meaning of the word manifold, as
defined by its inventor, Eiemann, is so very general, not to say
vague and attenuated, that it may be called the ether of mathe-
matical conceptions. From some point of view or another almost
anything may be regarded as a manifold and resolvable into con-
stituents which are also manifolds. Mr. Whitehead might, I
think, with advantage have restricted his discussion to the general
characteristics of the manifolds which enter into his compared
algebras, and he should have illustrated these more copiously with
simple and concrete examples.
In the third chapter we have an explanation of the principles of
" Universal Algebra ". " Universal Algebra," says the author,
'" is the name applied to that calculus which symbolises general
operations, defined later, which are called Addition and Multi-
plication". From this definition it is clear that the word
universal, as Mr. Whitehead uses it, must be understood in a
somewhat limited sense. We now learn more precisely the
particular lines of investigation which the author intends to
follow, and the order in which he takes the special algebras to
which he limits his discussion. " The Algebra of Symbolic
Logic," he says, " is the simplest possible species of its genus and
has accordingly the simplest interpretation in the field of de-
ductive logic. It is, however, always desirable while developing
the symbolism of a calculus to reduce the interpretation to the
utmost simplicity consistent with complete generality. Accord-
ingly, in discussing the main theory of this algebra, the difficulties
peculiar to Symbolic Logic will be avoided by adopting the equally
general interpretation which considers merely the intersection or
non-intersection of regions of space." Farther on, on the next
page, he says : " This spatial interpretation, which also applies to
the algebra of Symbolic Logic, will in some form or other apply
to every special algebra, in so far as interpretation is possible.
This fact is interesting and deserves investigation. The result of
it is that a treatise on Universal Algebra is also to some extent a
treatise on certain generalised ideas of space."
Now, if Mr. Whitehead, in the preceding quotations, only means
that appeals to diagrams and to spatial problems are of great
utility as particular illustrations of general theorems in Symbolic
Logic, my opinion wholly coincides with his. But, if I under-
stand him aright, he means much more than this. His words
seem to imply that to every valid formula in Symbolic Logic, no
matter how abstract the region of thought, and no matter what
the elementary symbols may be defined as representing, there
always corresponds an analogous formula (symbolically identical)
of which the elementary symbols represent spatial magnitudes;
:so that any argument referring to the non-spatial region of
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Universal Algebra with Applications. Ill
thought has its symbolic double (so to speak) in the spatial region,
and vice versd. A similar assumption appears to be accepted by
the whole Boolian school of logicians as a universal certainty on
which the symbolist may always rely with absolute confidence.
Yet the assumption, like the whole system of Inductive Logic as
Mill understood it, rests upon a fallacy, and reliance upon its
validity has led not only Boole, but (as I have recently shown
elsewhere) some of the ablest living logicians into demonstrably
false conclusions. They found that, in all the numerous cases
t!i('!/ had examined, the formulae of the logic of Pure Statements
had their exact analogues in the logic of Concrete Quantity, and
they inferred, very naturally but quite erroneously, that this must
also hold in the infinite number of cases which they had not
examined. The explanation is this. The Boolian calculus, even
when it deals with secondary propositions, is never a calculus of
Pure Statements. Its elementary constituents, x, y, a, b, etc., as
Boole is very careful to state, never represent statements directly ;
they always represent the fractions of time (referred to some
understood arbitrary whole unit) during which the various state-
ments in question are true ; and it is quite clear from Boole's
language that he considered this convention as a necessary and
fundamental principle. The logicians above referred to have not all
accepted Boole's exact views upon this point, but his quantitative
conventions have, nevertheless, coloured their thoughts and re-
stricted the field of their experimental researches. Within this
field they invariably found symbolic coincidence of formulas com-
bined with divergence of interpretations ; and it never occurred to
them that outside the Boolian boundary there was a far more
extensive region of thought on which they had not yet experi-
mented, and in which the law of symbolic coincidence could no
longer be relied on.
A calculus of Pure Statements bears pretty much the same
relation to the Boolian scheme and its more modern developments
as ordinary algebra bears to geometry. Up to a certain point
there is coincidence of formulae, and then separation. In ordinary
mathematics some algebraic formulae, such as
a 3 - b s = (a - b) (a 2 + ab + 6 2 ),
may, within the limits of certain conventions as to units, etc., be
interpreted in terms of real geometric squares and cubes ; but
this line of interpretation fails for formulae involving higher
powers of their elementary constituents. For these a geometric
interpretation may be still possible, but only on condition that
we make a fresh start and adopt wholly different conventions ;
whereas the purely algebraic interpretation (for the higher as for
the lower powers) remains clear, intelligible and homogeneous
throughout. So with Symbolic Logic. In Pure Logic the symbol
A B , or any arbitrary equivalent, asserts that the statement A be-
longs to the class of statements denoted by B. In Applied Logic
112 CKITICAL NOTICES :
also the symbol A B may be used to assert that the concrete and
material thing denoted by A belongs to the class of concrete and
material things denoted by B. So far there is symbolic coinci-
dence. But now take the symbol A BC , which is short for (A B ) C and
asserts that the statement A B belongs to the class of statements
denoted by C. Here, from the standpoint of Pure Logic, A is a
statement, B is a statement, C is a statement, A B is a statement,
and A BC is a statement, so that we have homogeneity throughout.
But we cannot get this homogeneity in Applied Logic. In Ap-
plied Logic A and B may both denote concrete things or classes ;
but farther we cannot go. By virtue of our definitions, C cannot
denote a concrete thing ; neither can A B nor A BC . These, within
the limits of our definitions, must denote statements, and cannot
possibly denote anything else. Similarly for A BCD and for state-
ments of still higher degrees. Thus, as soon as we pass the
limits of jjrimary statements and get into statements of the second-
ary, tertiary, etc., degrees, we enter an abstract region of thought
(including many important problems in probability) to which none
of the Boolian systems can be applied. Any statement, no matter
what its degree, can be spoken of as true or false, certain or un-
certain, possible or impossible, probable or improbable, within
more or less exact limits according to our data ; but none of these
epithets can be applied to any portion of space or time, or to
any concrete subject whatever; nor can we find any concrete
homogeneous substitutes, so far analogous to these abstrac-
tions as to be interpretable in the same formulae or symbolic
operations.
Of course this criticism in no way affects the value of Mr.
Whitehead's work, even if that work were restricted to that small
part of it on which I may without presumption venture to express
an opinion. On the contrary, he has, I think, done even more
for exact science than he had contemplated when he embarked
upon his arduous undertaking ; he has traced out the line of
analogy running through his compared group of algebras so dis-
tinctly that it enables one to see not only the very large class of
problems to which these algebras can be applied, but also the
limits of their application. This is very important, and its im-
portance must be accepted as my excuse for drawing attention
more to the boundary within which his allied algebras can effec-
tively operate than to the undoubted value of their operations
within that boundary.
Apart from these questions of general principle and of inter-
pretation, on which, perhaps, no two logicians could be found in
complete agreement, I regard Mr. Whitehead's five chapters on
Symbolic Logic as an admirable epitome (with some original
improvements) of the results and processes discovered by previous
writers ; the whole subject being presented as it appeared to him
from his standpoint of comparative algebra. In the matter of
notation he adopts Boole's horizontal bar, and in very much the
ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, Universal Algebra with Applications. 113
same sense, but with some modification in complex cases. Thus
he writes
~ (x + y) = xy
where I should write
(x + y)' = x'y'
One objection to the horizontal bar is that both in actual opera-
tions and on the printed page separate bars are apt to run into
each other, so that they look like one continuous bar. For
example, xy cannot always be easily distinguished from xy, which
has quite another meaning. Mr. Whitehead also adopts Boole's
symbol o to denote what he calls the "null element" ; but he
substitutes the symbol i for Boole's symbol 1 to denote the
uniterse. These symbols correspond respectively to my symbols
r) and e, which denote impossibility and certainty. Mr. White-
head employs no symbol (nor, so far as I know, does any other
writer) corresponding to my probability symbol 6, which I use to
denote a statement that is possible but uncertain. To express " sub-
sumptions," or " regions incident in other regions," he borrows
Schroder's symbols, = and =^=, which correspond to my symbols
of implication, : and ! ; the first or the second symbol being used
in each case, according to the direction of incidence or implication.
For myself, I must own to a rooted prejudice against absolutely
new and strange-looking symbols. When there is no risk of
ambiguity, I think it much preferable to employ an old symbol
(or combination of symbols) in a new sense. Moreover, this
question of the choice of symbols involves an important principle.
The time has come, I believe, for taking a totally new departure.
I see no reason why we should treat our symbols of relation, + ,
:, = , indices, fractional forms, etc., with more respect than we do
the ordinary letters of the alphabet. Just as any letter x may
denote one thing in one problem and quite another thing in an-
other problem, so any symbol of relation, or any combination of
symbols, such as x 4- y, x* , etc., may be defined as meaning one
thing in one kind of investigation, and denned afresh as meaning
quite another thing in another and totally different kind of
investigation. If proper care be taken in our choice of symbols
the context (as in ordinary speech) will prevent all risk of
ambiguity.
Mr. Whitehead 's treatment of the " Existential Import of
Propositions " is interesting and original ; but, unfortunately,
the symbolic process which he here employs is not of a kind that
can, with justice to the author, be described briefly. I was at first
under the impression that his notation and mine in dealing with
this subject were mutually convertible ; but, on closer examina-
tion, I find that they move along different paths and have but few
points in common.
HUGH MAcCoLL.
8
114 CEITICAL NOTICES :
Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. Von Dr. PAUL
BARTH. Erster Theil : Einleitung und Kritische Uebersicht.
Leipzig : 0. E. Eeisland, 1897. Pp. xvi., 396.
DR. BARTH has done himself some injustice by publishing this
first volume of his work before the second was ready. The elab-
orate survey of sociological systems will certainly embarrass the
reader who does not bear in mind that it is to serve as a ground-
work of what is to come, and, even then, he will scarcely avoid
the reflexion that, had the author had the end in sight, a
sense of symmetry and proportion would have forced him to
lighten the present contribution of at least half its bulk. The
hope is expressed in the Preface that the book may not be too
historical for the philosophers, nor too philosophical for the his-
torians. Judging it from the point of view of the former, the
historians seem to have come off decidedly the best. The his-
torical matter, moreover, is given too much in the form of note-
book analyses, and needed much throwing into shape before being
presented to the public.
The Introduction (filling the first thirteen pages) discusses the
meanings to be assigned to the terms " history " and " philosophy
of history," and then the relation of Sociology to the latter. Dr.
Barth thinks a complete Sociology would coincide absolutely
with a Philosophy of History, and would differ in nothing except
the name. Wundt attempted in his Logik to establish a demarca-
tion thus. Sociology was concerned with the conditions (Zu-
stande) of human society, in particular epochs and countries ;
history with the events (Vorgange) through which these conditions
have arisen. It was true that society is an historical product,
never remaining stationary in the stream of development, but for
all that one was compelled, for purposes of historical investigation,
to regard certain definite social conditions, lying between two
rigidly determined time limits, as relatively constant. As against
this view Dr. Barth urges that, admitting the relative stability of
many historical conditions, they are nevertheless only explicable
when account be taken of the way in which they have come to
be, and that the distinction, therefore, between social statics and
social dynamics is untenable. Granting this objection, however,
it is valid only against a separation, like that of Wundt's, of
sociology from the science of history. A philosophy of history,
endeavouring to do for all history what the scientific historian
does only for a particular period, viz., discover the meaning or
underlying principle of the whole development, may or may not
be possible ; in either case it is unaffected by Dr. Earth's argu-
ment. And if he reply, as doubtless he would, that there are
many such principles, the question would still remain whether
then they simply stand side by side as a multiplicity, or do not
rather constitute a hierarchy, leading up to one, which is all-
inclusive and supreme.
PAUL EARTH, Die Philosophic der Geschichte als Sociologie. 115
This, however, is almost the only instance in which the author
comes into conflict with Wundt, and the book may not unfairly
be regarded as the attempt of a disciple to work out the principles
of the Wundtian Psychology on the field of human life generally.
The "Critical Survey" is divided into three sections. The first
deals with the sociological systems ; the second with such " philo-
sophies of history " (using the term in the older sense) as retain
a significance for present-day thinking, but which, in the author's
view, manifest their one-sidedness ; the third with the question
whether human society really lends itself to scientific treatment.
The first section opens with an analysis of the writings of St.
Simon, to whom the origin of sociology as a science is credited.
This is followed by an account of the first system of sociology, that
of Auguste Comte, and the succeeding chapters deal with the three
diverging currents of sociological doctrine that have sprung from
the Comtian system, viz., (1) that based on the method of classifica-
tion (Littre, De Eoberty, De Greef, Lacombe) ; (2) the biological
system (Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schaffle, Fouillee, Worms) ; and (3)
the dualistic system (Ward, Mackenzie, Haurion, Giddings). Of
these, the systems of Comte and Spencer receive the fullest treat-
ment, and the critical remarks of the author are often penetrating
and suggestive.
In reference to Comte, for example, he is particularly successful
in showing how far from being fulfilled is the claim of having pre-
sented a purely objective account of historical development. View-
ing the history of humanity as an immanent teleological process,
subordinate to the attainment of one end, viz., the age of Posi-
tivism, Comte was logically bound to regard the various stages of
the process as means to this end, and the means themselves as a
series of causally (presumably in Wundt's sense of " psychical
causality ") connected factors. As instance of failure to satisfy this
requirement, the unsatisfactory position of the metaphysical, as the
intermediary link between the theological and the positivistic, stage,
in the celebrated " Law," is cited. " The way in which Meta-
physics arises out of Monotheism ought," says the author, "to
have been deduced as a necessary consequence from the nature
of the human intellect. But no such deduction is given. It is
simply contended that intermediary links are necessary, that tran-
sitions do not take place directly, but why exactly metaphysics
should form the link between theology and positivism is left wholly
unexplained."
The chapter on Spencer, for the most part a reproduction of a
review article, published in 1893, contains some interesting criti-
cism upon the carrying out of the biological analogy. The author
contends that Spencer has failed to note both many essential like-
nesses and many essential unlikenesses, of the social and animal
organisms. He has failed to observe that the unit of society re-
garded from the point of view of growth differs from the unit of
society regarded from the point of view of structure. The former
116 CRITICAL NOTICES:
can at no time be other than the family, never the individual, which
Spencer, following Maine, assumes to be the unit of modern so-
ciety. The unit of a social structure, on the other hand, is the
individual, for only as such, and not as member of a family, does
a man enter into the various social organs, such as the army or
that of industrial workers. Again, by treating society purely as a
" Naturwesen," Spencer is oblivious of the vast influence of what
Wundt calls the " Wachstum der geistigen Energie" in social de-
velopment. The essential feature of such development, the emanci-
pation of man from nature and the gradual formation of a spiritual
organism, advancing step by step with the growth of apperceptive,
as distinguished from associative, thinking, is consequently ignored.
Of interest is also the argument of Dr. Barth, as against Spencer
and Fouillee, in favour of the conception of the " self-conscious-
ness " or " ego " of society.
Among the writers dealt with in the fifth chapter is J. S. Mac-
kenzie, of whose Introduction to Social Philosophy a fairly accurate
account is given. This author will, however, scarcely recognise
himself as one of the advocates of a "dualistic sociology" ! Dr.
Barth has evidently failed to realise that in England, at least,
Hegelian modes of thought are still "lebendig ".
The second section of part i, under the heading " Einseitige
Geschichtsauffassungen," consists of seven chapters. The first,
dealing with the individualistic point of view, discusses the " great
man " theory, in connexion with the writings of Taine, Bourdeau,
Odin and Lamprecht, not without adding some useful reflexions
of its own. Especially happy is the author in showing, as against
Bourdeau, that a mere summation of intelligences does not imply
an enhancement of intelligence, that the difference between genius
and mediocrity is qualitative and not quantitative a truth, by the
way, which would bear considerable expansion in view of some
recent metaphysical theorising. The longest, and the most valu-
able, chapter in this section is, however, the last, devoted to the
interpretation of history from the point of view of Economics, as
represented by Durkheim (for whom the animating principle of
historical development is the division of labour), Patten, Karl
Marx, Engels and the followers of Marx. Dr. Earth's criticisms
here are judicious and convincing. He undoubtedly makes good
the position that not only is the method of production not the sole
determining conditions of social movements, but from the first
other factors have been instrumental (in primitive man, e.g., ani-
mistic ideas), and the higher the stage of development reached
and the richer the supply of ideal elements present, the less
decisive in significance for the tendencies of a people and of a pe-
riod does the existing economical situation become. The preced-
ing chapter, which, under the title of " ideological," is concerned
mainly with the views of Hegel, is far too slight and fragmentary.
Whilst admitting a logical necessity working in history and the
soundness of discriminating between epochs of construction and
PAUL EARTH, Die Philosophic der Geschichte als Sociologie. 117
of dissolution, Dr. Earth condemns the Hegelian theory for not
attempting any psychological explanation of the origin, and still
less of the decay, of the ideas, that have been operative in the
evolution of society. The force of this objection depends, how-
ever, upon the assumption that the historical process is primarily
a psychological one an assumption contrary to the spirit of
Hegel's philosophy, and in no way confirmed by Dr. Earth's own
treatment of social development.
In a third section, the author has to face the question, raised by
Dilthey, whether a scientific treatment of history is after ah 1 pos-
sible, and answers it by emphasising the distinction between
the conceptions and the methods of physical science, denying the
applicability of the former but insisting upon that of the latter to
mental phenomena.
The concluding pages give a brief sketch of the author's own
view of the process of historical development, a view which he
promises further to substantiate in a second volume. In regard to
primitive societies, he follows closely on the lines of M'Lennan
and Morgan, making use also of Tylor's researches into the origin
and influence of animistic beliefs. When under the protection of
the gens, the monogamous family arises, and the ancient com-
munism is, on that account, broken up, society is saved from the
dangers of family egoism by the lawgiver, who creates artificial
means (abstract laws, deriving authority from being ascribed to
the commonly recognised Nature-gods, which are thus endowed
with moral attributes) of restoring the threatened unity. The
state arises, and with it the sundering of the artificially formed
society into classes (St&nde) with rights and duties of their own.
The author traces the decay of the " standische Gesellschaft " in
ancient Greece and Rome, the " Auflosung " of that in the middle
ages through the system of absolutism, its reappearance in the
sixteenth century, and the subsequent supremacy of the laisser
e principle. The present age he regards as a period of decay.
Concentrating its strength upon inductive and analytical pursuits,
it has lost the capacity, and has ceased to feel the need, of creating,
and that through its want of faith in the power of spiritual per-
sonality, without which true Art is impossible. Not until a new
sense of the infinite worth of moral and aesthetic ideals is
awakened in all classes of the community will the triviality of
modern life be overcome.
We shall look forward with interest to the completion of a work,
for which the foundations have been so laboriously laid.
G. DAWES HICKS.
VI NEW BOOKS.
Studies of Good and Evil. A Series of Essays upon Problems of Philo-
sophy and of Life. By JOSIAH ROYCE, Professor of the History of
Philosophy in Harvard University. New York : D. Appleton & Co.,
1898. Pp. xv., 384.
" I HAVE called these papers Studies of Good and Evil. The title is in
its nature wide. It commits the essays contained in this volume merely
to one character. They are all, directly or indirectly, contributions to
the comprehension of the ethical aspects of the universe. The papers
are of very various relations to technical philosophical issues. Four of
them are essays in literary and philosophical criticism. One is directly
concerned with the effect of the ' Knowledge of Good and Evil ' upon
the character of the individual man. One is a contribution to the meta-
physical ' Problem of Evil ' in its most general sense. Five, while
dealing with metaphysical and psychological problems connected with
the nature and relationships of our human type of consciousness, are
somewhat more indirect contributions to the ethical interpretation of our
place in the universe. One is an historical study of a concrete conflict
between good and evil tendencies in early California life " (Introduction,
p. v.).
The first Essay, entitled " The Problem of Job," deals with the existence
of evil in the world in relation to the Divine Being. Prof. Royce's
solution of this problem is by him identified with the solution given to
Job himself. The answer to Job is : " When you suffer, your sufferings
are God's sufferings, not his external work, not his external penalty, not
the fruit of his neglect, but identically his own personal woe. . . . The
true question then is : Why does God suffer ? The sole possible, neces-
sary and sufficient answer is : Because without suffering, without ill,
without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life could not be perfected " (p. 14).
All moral development involves the sacrifice of a lower to a higher
interest, and with the necessity for this sacrifice suffering and evil are
essentially connected. The same thesis is developed from the purely
human point of view in the fourth Essay, on " The Knowledge of Good
and Evil ".
The second Essay, on " The Case of John Bunyan," is a most interest-
ing piece of psychological analysis, executed with masterly ability and
sympathetic insight. The third, "Tennyson and Pessimism," treats of
the contrast between Tennyson's earlier and later Locksley Hall. Prof.
Royce points out that the optimism of the first poem is the sort of day-
dreaming which leads to disillusion and melancholy. In the later poem,
Tennyson has become alive to the reality of things, and to the necessary
conditions and limitations imposed by this reality. His later mood is
relatively the saner and truer and, in a sense, the more optimistic, be-
cause it forms a transition to an optimism which will stand wear and
tear. In the fifth Essay, the ethical despair of Huxley in face of the
dominance of non-ethical natural laws is shown to be founded, not in the
NEW BOOKS. 119
nature of things, but in an opposition between two subjective points of
view, the naturalistic and the ethical. In the sixth Essay, " The Implica-
tions of Self-Consciousness," Prof. Royce takes up the old Cartesian
argument, and tries to show, successfully, as we think, that the limita-
tions of our finite self-consciousness imply an all-embracing consciousness,
which in some sense is all that we aspire after. Perhaps this argument
has never before been developed with so much force and lucidity.
The following Essay treats of " Anomalies of Self-Consciousness ". It
is well known that perversions of the concept of Self are produced by dis-
turbing organic changes. Prof. Eoyce most ingeniously suggests that the
strange organic sensations have this effect because they are characteristic
of certain emotions involving specific attitudes towards the social en-
vironment.
The eighth Essay, on " Consciousness and Nature," is of special import-
ance. It treats of the nature of our consciousness of the external world.
According to Prof. Eoyce, those experiences have the stamp of external
reality, which are an intersubjective possession. "What you can ex-
perience as well as I, is as such a physical fact. ... If ten stones lie on
the highway, and you and I count them, common-sense supposes that
though your counting of ten is not my counting of ten, though your per-
ception of the stones is not mine, though your inner life is in no fashion,
here noteworthy, identical with mine, still the real stones that I count
are identically the same as the real stones that you count." Prof. Royce
argues that this common-sense notion of nature is not illusory. We can-
not maintain that in truth each human being is aware of a separate fact
presented only to himself, though it may resemble the objects severally
presented to others. Such an assumption would destroy the basis of
social consciousness ; for it would imply that when many persons sup-
pose themselves to be thinking about the same person each of them is
thinking about a different person. This, according to Prof. Royce, is a
reductio ad absurdum. This discussion of the nature of external reality
is valuable ; but in our opinion it does not go far enough back. The
germ of the distinction between Self and Not-Self lies in the perceptual
consciousness, and precedes the stage of ideal construction and inter-
communication. The external reality of the bird to the cat which hunts
it does not consist in the bird being a common possession of the social
consciousness of cats or other beings.
The book concludes with four Essays, on " Originality and Conscious-
ness," " Meister Eckhart," " An Episode of early California Life," and
" Jean Marie Guyau ". These are very interesting, but not of the same
far-reaching philosophical importance as those which precede them.
In conclusion, we may say that Studies of Good and Evil is a book
which imperatively demands to be read, and that reading it is a keen
pleasure. It is to be commended not only to philosophers by profession,
but to all who are interested in the ultimate problems of life.
EDITOR (G. F. S.).
The Evolution of the Idea of God : an Inquiry into the Origins of
Religion. By GRANT ALLEN. New York : H. Holt & Co., 1897.
Pp. ix., 447.
Thi' Making of Religion. By ANDREW LANG. London, New York and
Bombay : Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Pp. v., 380.
Mr. Allen's work deals with three questions of origin : with the origin of
polytheism, of monotheism and of Christianity. Accepting and de-
veloping Herbert Spencer's ghost-theory, the author maintains that
120 NEW BOOKS.
"corpse worship is the protoplasm of religion, while folk-lore is the
protoplasm of mythology ". The worship of the dead man is thus raised
to a supreme and unique place in the god-making process. The book
is flowingly and interestingly written. The technical journals have pro-
nounced the hypothesis to be one-sided, and the argumentation to be
special pleading. Nevertheless, it is always worth while in science to
work a working hypothesis to its bitter end ; and we hope that Mr.
Allen will not be daunted in his intention of publishing further volumes
which shall treat of the evolution of religion in greater detail.
While Mr. Allen seeks to rehabilitate Euhemerism, Mr. Lang under-
takes the same office for the degeneration theory. His theory is that
primitive man worshipped a single supreme being, who was later ob-
scured by the rise of ancestor worship and the ghost gods. The savage
may have ' blundered ' into a belief in God and the Soul, by observation
of those supernormal phenomena which are still amongst us, under in-
vestigation by the Society for Psychical Research. Unfortunately, the
faith of the ' scientific ' reader in the exhaustiveness of Mr. Lang's
quotations is shaken by his omission of references to the work on tele-
pathy published recently in the Philosophische Studieii, and to that on
crystal-gazing and ' material ' coincidences which has appeared in the
Psychological Review.
An Introduction to the History of Religion. By FRANK BYRON JEVONS,
M.A., Litt.D., Classical Tutor in the University of Durham. Lon-
don : Methuen & Co., 1896. Pp. 443. Price 10s. 6d.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this work is the emphasis which
it lays on totemism. The first deities, according to Mr. Jevons, are
totem deities ; and the ideas and practices connected with totem -worship
colour and determine the whole evolution of religion. In particular, the
idea of communion between the god and its worshippers is initially a
totemistic idea. Hence springs the sacramental view of sacrifice as
establishing union and communion between divine and human beings. The
revival of religion connected with the Eleusinian and similar mysteries
is really a revival of the totemistic point of view.
Another marked feature of the work is the sharp distinction drawn
between magic and religion, even in primitive stages of human develop-
ment. Religion is the attitude of man towards powers which he regards
as uncontrollable by human beings. Magic, on the other hand, is a
mode of procedure by which he thinks he can direct and command
natural forces. The distinction is no doubt justified in principle ; but,
as a matter of fact, we often find the magical and the religious points of
view inextricably blended, and this Mr. Jevons fails to recognise.
The author's treatment of taboo is very interesting. He finds in it
the origin of the conception of property.
On the whole, Mr. Jevons has produced a good and useful book, and
in many points he is original and suggestive. The prominence which he
gives to totemism is one-sided ; but he has certainly succeeded in bringing
out very lucidly its peculiar importance in the development of religion.
Ignorance. A Study of the Causes and Effects of Popular Thought. By
MARCUS R. P. DORMAN, M.A., M.B. Cantab. London : Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1898. Pp. xx., 328.
Pull of interesting matter. The work is divided into three books. The
first treats of " Collective Ignorance " and especially of " emotional
waves " and " democratic delusions ". In book ii. the chief causes of
NEW BOOKS. 121
ignorance are investigated. The psychological causes are grouped under
tin- heads "Mental Grooves," "Misapplied Emotional Forces," and
" Deficient Intellectual Powers". Under the first head, Mr. Dorman is
particularly hard upon metaphysicians. But here the metaphysician will
discern signs of ignorance in Mr. Dorman himself. It may be mentioned
that he groups Huxley with Hume and Kant as a leading representa-
tive of metaphysical thought. Book iii. deals with some of the effects
of ignorance, such as " The Art of the Uncultured," the attitude of the
manual worker to the capitalist, " The Mind of Woman ". Book iv.
contains educational suggestions " founded on the desirability of allowing
every one, as far as possible, an opportunity of becoming acquainted with
the researches of the leading thinkers, and to show the great necessity
for independent thought. The main point is, however, to ensure an equable
'development of all the physical and psychological functions in every
direction " (Preface, p. viii). Mr. Dorman is from the nature of the case
dogmatic. From the nature of the case he must pose as omniscient.
Specialists, judging each in his own department, are likely to find this
omniscience somewhat superficial. But human omniscience cannot be
otherwise than superficial except in the case of a Leibnitz or Helmholtz.
Mr. Dorman's book was worth writing.
The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct. BY ALEXANDER SUTHER-
LAND, M.A. London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. In two
volumes. Pp. xiii., 461 ; vi., 336. Price 28s.
'This is a well-written book, and it is evidently the outcome of much
patient industry. The author has accumulated a vast mass of material
bearing on the development of what he calls " Sympathy " in animals
and man. There is much that is instructive and interesting in his work ;
but taken as a whole it is a failure. Mr. Sutherland professes to trace
"with unbroken continuity" the development of our "moral instincts"
from the lower stages of animal life " through lowliest savage [sic] to
the noblest of men ". It cannot be said that his success is at all pro-
portioned to his industry. Indeed, he seems to overlook the most
elementary conditions of the problem which he seeks to solve. Morality
is for him essentially identified with what he calls " Sympathy," and this
seems to include all instinctive impulses which directly benefit society,
.animal or human. He fails to see that morality and the development
of morality is bound up with personality, with the unification of conative
tendencies in an organised system, and that this again is essentially
connected with the growth of conceptual consciousness. It is his blind-
ness on this point which leads him to think he has traced with unbroken
continuity the unfolding of the moral consciousness from its primitive
beginnings in the lower forms of animal life up to the noblest of men.
The truth is, that he has scarcely touched the development of morality
in the proper sense at all.
Tlif Wonderful Century. By A. E. WALLACE. London : Swan Son-
nenschein & Co. ; New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1898. Pp. x., 400.
This book falls into two parts : a shorter, dealing with the ' successes,'
and a longer, dealing with the ' failures ' of the nineteenth century. The
former, written in a chatty, reminiscent style, is as successful as the
ury itself; in the latter Dr. Wallace mounts his various hobby-
horses, and intermixes much exaggeration and extravagance with his
.-scientific good sense and solidity of judgment.
122 NEW BOOKS.
We are concerned here with only two chapters, those on the neglect
of phrenology and on the opposition to hypnotism and psychical re-
search. The first presents the case for phrenology in a strangely ex
parte way. No one who knows the literature of phrenology will be
able to accept Dr. Wallace's account of it. As for the radical error of
phrenology, it is of course the psychological error of regarding mind
as a bundle of faculties, rather than as a stream of processes or system
of functions. That Huxley should not have seen this (p. 182) is not
surprising to those who have read his little book on Hume, and ac-
quainted themselves with the psychology that underlies it. Nor is Dr.
Wallace happier in his championship of psychical research, to say
nothing of the fact that, with such protagonists as Sir W. Crookes upon
the scientific, and Mr. Andrew Lang upon the literary side, the ' problems '
of psychical research are rather likely to crowd out those of psychology
proper than to be themselves ousted from the field.
The Study of the Child : A Brief Treatise on the Psychology of the
Child, with Suggestions for Teachers, Students and Parents. By
A. K. TAYLOR. International Education Series, No. 43. New
York : D. Appleton & Co., 1898. Pp. xliii., 215. Price $1.25.
The American book market is just now flooded with works, of all degrees
of merit, upon child study and educational psychology. Some, like Dr.
Oppenheim's Development of the Child, possess a permanent value ;.
many have the stamp of the ephemeral clearly upon them. The present
work is somewhat difficult to estimate. The editor (Dr. W. T. Harris)
calls it " sound and wholesome " ; and so, for the most part, it is on its
practical side. The psychology is scrappy and the biology hazardous ;
for proof of the former statement one has only to refer to the definitions
of will, feeling and attention (pp. 106 ft, 114, 124), for proof of the latter
to the discussion of heredity (pp. 182, f). But the author's enthusiasm,
modesty and constant reliance upon his own teaching experience may
go far to recommend him to the teachers and parents to whom he
appeals. The student will pass on to writers of a more severe type.
The book begins with chapters on the senses, apperception (conscious-
ness and attention), symbolism, muscular control, feeling and will. Then
follow discussions of the intellectual functions, habit and character, in-
stincts and plays, manners and morals, normal and abnormal develop-
ment, stages of growth, fatigue, etc. An Appendix gives a selected list
of reference books and papers.
The Psychology of Peoples : its Influence on their Evolution. By G. LE.
BON. London and New York : Macmillan & Co., 1898. Pp. xx.,
236. $1.50.
M. Le Bon is already favourably known to English readers by his
recently translated Psychology of the Crowd. In the present volume he
has gathered together, in brief summary, the conclusions of the various
works in which he has treated of the history of civilisations. The style
is clear and forcible, tending, indeed, at times to an almost brutal frank-
ness ; and the book grows in interest as one reads. The contrast drawn
between the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon races, the pictures of North and
South America and the discussions of Japan and India, are of especial
interest.
The author's central thesis is that chance, environment and institu-
tions play but secondary parts in the history of a people. Character
(race) is the important thing. This character a people's morality and
NEW BOOKS. 12$
conduct is determined mainly by its ancestry. After character, ideas,
and particularly religious ideas, are the most important factors in the
evolution of a civilisation. The possession of a small number of highly
developed minds is what differentiates a superior from an inferior race.
Human Immortality : Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine. By W..
JAMES. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1898.
Pp. ii., 70. 1.00.
This, the Ingersoll lecture for 1898, deals with the two questions: How
can we believe in a life hereafter if our inner life is a function of our
cerebral convolutions ? and : How can we accept the " incredible and
intolerable number of things which, with our modern imagination, we
must believe to be immortal, if immortality be true " ? As for the
former, the brain either produces consciousness or it merely combines or
transmits it. The theory of combination (mind dust) is not here touched
on : the theory of transmission is defended as against that of production-
As for the latter, " the tiresomeness of an over-peopled heaven is a purely
subjective and illusory notion, a sign of human incapacity, a remnant of
the old narrow-hearted, aristocratic creed ". The lecture is written with
Prof. James' accustomed vigour and brilliancy. The book ends with
twenty-four pages of notes and references.
Thomas Reid. By A. CAMPBELL FRASER (Famous Scots Series).
Edinburgh and London : Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1898. Pp.
160. Price Is. 6d.
Not long ago it was very much the fashion to speak disparagingly of
Reid. Now the tide has turned. There is good reason for this change of
opinion. Reid in his life-long battle against the " doctrine of ideas " was
by no means beating the air. It is essentially necessary to emphasise
that our knowledge is a knowledge of objects and not of the states of con-
sciousness which cognise them. By this simple contention, Reid struck
the deathblow of a crowd of fallacies. It is not, however, this part of
Reid's work on which Prof. Fraser appears inclined to lay most stress.
What appeals to him is rather the doctrine of " common sense ". The
appeal to common sense is, as Prof. Fraser points out, a "final appeal to-
the divine in man, latent in each individual man, in and through whom the
universe is gradually interpreted as a revelation of perfect reason or perfect
goodness " (p. 158). No doubt this appeal has a substantial justification,,
though it cannot be maintained in the shape which Reid gave to it.
It seems scarcely necessary to say that the life of Reid is admirably
told by Prof. Fraser. We wish that he had quoted the letter to Dr.
Gregory on the Origin of Language, a wonderful anticipation of the
results of modern research.
The Play of Animals. By K. GROOS. Translated by E. L. BALDWIN,
with Preface and Appendix by J. M. BALDWIN. New York : D..
Appleton & Co., 1898. Pp. xxvi., 341.
^ e are glad to welcome Prof. Groos' already famous work in an English
dress. The text of the present edition is practically that of the German
original, though there are few revisions and omissions. Prof. Baldwin
supplies a Preface, which is for the most part a reprint of his review in
Science, 26th February, 1897, a number of footnote references, and an
Appendix on Organic Selection, reprinted from Science and Nature^
April, 1897.
124 NEW BOOKS.
Miss Baldwin's translation is accurate and fairly readable ; we have
noticed slips only on pp. 24, 106, 108 ("tumbled about some"!). A
humorous printer makes the nurse " scald " the children under her care ;
and modernised spelling tells us that the dog loves the " curb " (kerb).
It is regrettable that many works which are familiar in English trans-
lations should still be cited in German form. The signs that call atten-
tion to footnotes are ingeniously ugly, and very disturbing to the reader.
The Story of the Mind. By J. M. BALDWIN. Library of Useful Stories.
New York : D. Appleton & Co., 1898. 16 mo. Pp. vii., 236. Price
40 cents.
In this little volume Prof. Baldwin has gathered together his views of
psychology at large, quoting freely from his previous works, " relying
frankly on his own experience, and in debatable matters giving his own
opinions". The result is a compendious Handbook to Baldwin, very
useful in view of the magnitude of the author's recent output and the
wide range of periodicals over which his essays are scattered.
The ten chapters deal with the Science of the Mind, What our Minds
have in Common (introspective psychology), the Mind of the Animal and
of the Child, Body and Mind, Experiment, Suggestion and Hypnotism,
the Training of the Mind, the Individual Mind and Society, the Genius
and his Environment. An appendix gives a selected list of works in
English.
The Unconscious Mind. By ALFRED T. SCHOFIELD, M.D., M.R.C.S.
London : Hodder & Stoughton, 1898. Pp. xv., 436. Price 7s. 6d.
'The author truly remarks in his Introduction that his book " well-nigh
appears to be little more than a collection of extracts". It cannot be
said that he has either added to our knowledge of psychology, or pre-
sented what is already known in a specially luminous or forcible manner.
JBut doubtless the work will find a public which will derive instruction
irom it. It is sufficiently readable.
Psychology for Teachers. By C. L. MORGAN. New York : Chas.
Scribner's Sons, 1898. Pp. xi., 240. ft 1.00.
'This is a clearly written little book, in which the outlines of a psycho-
logy are filled out by practical educational suggestions. As Superin-
tendent Jameson's Preface shows, it has already found favour with
American teachers.
Of the psychology, as psychology, little good can be said. It is regret-
liable that Prof. Morgan, like the late Prof. Romanes, is content to spend
his energies upon popularising the older psychology, with its hierarchy
of logical abstractions and its neglect of actual mental processes. Famili-
arity with the books recently published by Jodl and Stout would have
done away, e.g., with the old-time ' impressions of relation ' and with
many another relic of the English psychology of forty years ago.
Nirvana : A Story of Buddhist Philosophy. By P. CARUS. Tokio,
Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co. Pp. 41. Price
$1.00.
'To its other literary enterprises the Open Court Publishing Co. has added
the publication of works on Eastern philosophy, printed on crepe paper and
illustrated by Japanese artists. One of these, Karma : a Story of Early
NEW BOOKS. 125-
Buddhism, has passed through .several editions. The quaint combina-
tion of India, Japan and North America in it and in this volume was a,
happy thought on the part of the versatile editor of the Monist.
The Nirvana consists of a pictorial sketch of Buddhistic psychology.
A curious note of modernity is struck in such sentences as these : " Your
character, your thoughts, your volitions are your soul. You have not.
ideas, but you are ideas. . . . Consciousness originates as a product of
conditions, and disappears when the conditions cease."
Port-Royal Education : Extracts, with an Introduction. By F. CADET.
Translated, with Index, by A. D. JONES. New York : Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1898. Pp. iv., 260. $1.50.
M. Cadet's book consists of a historical and critical introduction of sixty-
seven pages, and extracts from the principal Port-Royal writers Saint
Cyran, Arnauld, Lancelot, Nicole, De Saci, Guyot, Coustel, Fontaine,
Jacqueline Pascal, etc. The translation is well done, and the work
forms a valuable addition to English pedagogical literature. In a future
edition the translator would do well to rewrite the historical part of the
Introduction in somewhat greater detail.
A Mechanico-Physiological Theory of Organic Evolution. By C. von
NAEGELI. Trans, by V. A. CLARK and F. A. WAUGH. Chicago :
Open Court Pub. Co., 1898. Pp. 58. Price 15 cents.
A careful translation of the summary of Naegeli's Abstammungslehre
(1884), which will do good service in calling the attention of English-
speaking biologists to the whole work. An appendix of 9 pp. is taken
up with Translator's notes.
Les Lois Sociales ; Esquisse d'une Sociologie. Par G. TARDE. Paris :.
Felix Alcan, 1898. Pp. 167.
Etudes de Psychologic Sociale. Par G. TARDE, Membre de 1'Institut
International de Sociologie. Paris : V. Giard et E. Briere, 1898.
Pp. 327.
The little volume entitled Les Lois Sociales contains the substance of
lectures given by M. Tarde at the College Libre des Sciences Sociales
in 1897. It is a convenient summary of the sociological doctrines ex-
pounded in his chief works (Les Lois de I' Imitation, L y Opposition Uni-
lle and La Logique Sociale), and seeks not merely "to bring
together the disjecta membra into one body of ideas," but to show the
principles which unite them. The larger volume (which forms one of
the International Sociological Series edited by M. Rend Worms) has
somewhat miscellaneous contents. Most of the essays in it have already
appeared in various periodicals. Though not arranged in a systematic
order, they all help to illustrate the central ideas of the author as a.
sociologist. The last of the papers, dealing with the classification of
crimes and legal offences, is addressed specially to the criminal lawyer,
and appeals only to the criminal lawyer of other countries than France,.
if he has a scientific interest in comparative law. The papers "On
Crime and Social Health" (a criticism of M. Durkheim's view that
" crime is necessary, that it is bound up with the fundamental conditions
of all social life, and is thus useful "), " On the Criminality of Different
Professions," and " On Juvenile Crime," have a wider interest ; but thejr
126 NEW BOOKS.
are special studies in sociology rather than philosophical discussions.
'The article entitled " Souvenirs de transports judiciaires " is a charming
little " causerie," reminiscences of the author's experiences as a " juge
d'instmction ". The title might be paraphrased Scoticd as " Recollec-
tions of a Procurator-fiscal's official journeys". M. Tarde complains
pathetically that criminals have so often chosen such lovely spots for
their crimes. Another essay deals, and seeks to deal scientifically, with
"Graphology". M. Tarde suggests that we may practise the maxim
"know thyself" by studying our own writing; and his "advice to those
.about to marry" more necessary perhaps in France than in this
country is " Never ask the hand of a young person without having
examined some specimens of her writing ". There is also a brief, sym-
pathetic notice of M. Henri Hazel's interesting but rather unscientific
book, La synergic sociale, and a review of Prof. Gidding's Principles of
-Sociology. The other four essays are longer, and occupy nearly all the
first half of the volume. They are entitled "La Sociologie " (an essay
on the nature and methods of the science), " Les deux elements de
la Sociologie " (i.e., the primary social fact and the primary social unit),
"Le transformisme social" (an elaborate review of Prof, de Greef's
work), and " L'idee de 1'organisme sociale ". These four essays go over
much the same ground as Les Lois Sociales, and give perhaps a clearer,
because less abstract, view of the author's theories.
Of the Lois de V Imitation a very full and careful analysis was given by
Mr. Thomas Whittaker in MIND for July, 1890 (O. S., vol. xv.), and a
brief account of La Logique Sociale will be found in the number for
January, 1895 (N. S., vol. iv). Any detailed exposition of the volumes
before us is therefore unnecessary, and a few points only will be noticed.
M. Tarde regards sociology as " collective psychology " ; Comte con-
ceived it as a social physics ; Mr. Spencer has treated it as a social
biology ; but the worst notion (whose the reader is left to guess) is that
which makes it a social ideology (Etudes, p. 92). For the famous meta-
phor of the social organism K. Tarde has little toleration. He calls it
" a notion unanimously discredited" (ib., p. 121). If so, what need to
criticise it so fully ? But the criticisms are very good. It is pointed
out that every individual is the member of several societies at once (ib.,
pp. 122, 187) ; that a society may change its fundamental credo, which,
if it were an organism, wmld mean changing its species (ib., p. 221). It
is noted that terms such as " colony," " parasitism," " division of labour,"
" organisation," were applied to society before they were transferred to
plants or animals (ib., p. 128). Society is, in fact, less obscure and
difficult to understand than life (ib., pp. 11, 99). Such criticisms are
just and valuable ; but does not M. Tarde go too far in denying almost
any value to the biological categories of organism and evolution as
applied to society?
The primary social fact M. Tarde holds to be "imitation" which
is the psychological form of the universal principle of " repetition ".
Sociologists have erred by looking at the general and abstract aspects
of social phenomena, and neglecting the particular and individual.
"Socially everything that is general was at first individual" (ib., p. 32).
All institutions, customs, etc., have originated as individual "inventions,"
and have spread from individual to individual. True ; but does not M.
Tarde, in his horror of biological sociology, fall back upon physical and
even mathematical metaphors ? Ideas and customs are thought of as
* l radiating " from a centre ; they may be met by opposite ideas, radiat-
ing from other centres, which thus " interfere " with them. Out of this
combination of "repetition" and "opposition" comes the "adaptation"
NEW BOOKS. 127
we tind in society. The triple formula has almost a Hegelian look ;
but M. Tarde has given it a somewhat mechanical interpretation. He
confesses, in fact (ib., p. 288), that he distrusts "trinitarian minds,"
like those of Hegel and Comte : he prefers dualist and dichotomist
minds like that of Mr. Spencer. And in spite of his primary triad, and
in spite of occasional limiting statements, M. Tarde shows himself de-
voted to dichotomy. His logic generally brings us to an " either or,"
and his psychology is of an extremely dichotomous kind (c/., p. 264).
The social medium (le milieu) has been used too readily by many
sociologists, but M. Tarde seems sometimes inclined to neglect it all
together (/&., p. 79). " The general mind is a function and not a factor
of individual minds " (Lois Soc., p. 45). But, if we leave out the social
factor, is not the individual mind also an abstraction ? M. Tarde him-
self in dealing with handwriting admits that every one's writing is a
social, as well as an individual, product. To explain the inventions of a
Watt or a Stephenson we must surely consider the social medium as
well as the brain of the inventor. Of course the social medium consists
of other individuals ; but, whereas the individual mind is very difficult to
know, we can know a good deal about the general mind ; and M. Tarde
himself allows that there can be no " science " of individuals as such
(Lois Soc., p. 8). At the basis of his sociology M. Tarde recognises that
there lies a metaphysical monadology. But his metaphysics seems too
merely " pluralist" or atomist to be called Leibnizian (cf. Lois Soc., pp.
20, 16a ;; titudes, p. 76).
Again while pointing out the enormous significance of imitation, and
thus escaping the error of those who, like Mr. Kidd (who is referred to as
a " profound sociologist " in tftudes, p. 282), use the biological conception
of " struggle for life " as a clue to all social evolution, M. Tarde seems
to go to the extreme of denying its real value to the conception of
natural selection. He disposes of Weismann (the name is inaccurately
printed on pp. 118 and 277) too easily when he supposes his arguments
against use-inheritance to be refuted b, cases of "inherited" hand-
writing. Even if imitation be certainly excluded, a resemblance between
the writing of parent and child may be due to both being of the same
stock, and not to acquired characteristics.
M. Tarde's writing is always interesting and suggestive ; and he has
many happy illustrations, which show that he, has a clear eye for the
concrete a great merit in psychologist or sociologist.
D. G. RITCHIE.
L'Art et le reel. Essai de metaphysique fondde sur 1'estheiique. Par
JEAN FIBRES. Paris : F. Alcan, 1898. Pp. xii., 208.
It is impossible to feel that this essay throws much light upon the nature
either of art or of reality. Its obscurities alike of thought and of expres-
sion are such as to defy the best-intentioned reader. The author's drift
appears to be as follows. He sets out with the doctrine that reality is
not co-extensive with existence. Reality, in fact, is existence only in the
fullest sense of the term, as opposed to ordinary finite and contingent
existence. Of reality in this sense, man possesses a special sentiment or
intuition which is blunted by the ordinary routine of life, but sharpened
by notable crises of suffering and of action. Now art is one way, and the
best of all the ways, whereby we apprehend reality. Thus true art is not
concerned with producing ephemeral objects of pleasure. In the things
of beauty which art creates are embodied man's highest characteristics
as a person, as a moral agent, and as animated by a devotion to what is
universal and superior to the category of tune. From an analysis of the
128 NEW BOOKS.
phenomena of art we may get an answer to all the chief problems of
metaphysic.
It is misleading of the author to intimate that his metaphysic is
" founded on aesthetic ". It is assumed without any foundation at alL
We do not get anything about art till after a prefatory section full of
violently mysterious assumptions about reality. " Le r^el est done
mysteVieux dans sa nature," argues the writer, and mystery or fogginess
is the dominant impression of the book. Mr. Peres has undoubtedly a
genuine interest in his subject, but he must study clearness of thought
and expression. It is a mistake to write in sentences longer than those
of the "judicious " Hooker (one in the introduction runs to 140 words),,
interspersed with aphorisms more cryptic than the fragments of Hera-
cleitus.
Beitrdge zur Akustik und Musikwissenscha/t. Herausgegeben von Dr.
CARL STUMPF. 1 Heft, C. Stumpf : Konsonanz und Dissonanz. Pp..
, vi., 108: Leipzig, Earth, 1898.
Prof. Sturnpf tells us in the Preface to this brochure that its appear-
ance is due to a decision which he has formed not to publish the two
remaining volumes of the Tonpsychologie in this form, but in that of
separate investigations. He has done, it would seem, with the psycho-
logical foundations, and will henceforth appeal to a more musical public.
The first number, written by himself, deals with the theory of Harmony
and Discord. Although now and again it makes a pretty lengthy ex-
cursion into the physical side of acoustics, and into the more technical
department of music, this first instalment is in the main psychological.
It grows, indeed, as a kind of natural sequence out of the methodical
inquiry into the analysis by the ear of tone masses which form the main
problem of the second volume of the Tonpsychologie. Its theme may
be described as the theory of fusion and analysis set forth in this volume
applied to the explanation of the most fundamental contrast in modern,
if not in all, music.
The essay begins with a critical examination of some of the more
prominent traditional theories. Here the author deviates from the his-
torical order, beginning with an examination of the latest of the com-
manding theories, viz., that of Helmholtz, according to which dissonance
arises from beats, and harmony means freedom from beats. The criticism
of this hypothesis is particularly searching ; the writer succeeds in
showing that Helmholtz gives two definitions of harmony the beat
theory to fit the case of simultaneous tones or accords, and the theory
of affinity, as determined by the coincidence of partial tones, to fit the
case of the sequent tones of melody. He examines each of these. His
argument is well prepared and forcible. It seems almost incredible that
a great physicist great alike in his mastery of the material and in his
reasoning power as Helmholtz undoubtedly was, could have gone so far
wrong as he must have done if the facts are as Prof. Stumpf here de-
scribes them ; he seeks to show that there is no discoverable relation
between the amount of beat-effect of a pair of tones and its place among
harmonious and dissonant combinations. As a piece of critical dialectic
this sifting of the truth from the error in Helmholtz's explanation is
quite up to the level of the writer's earlier performances. It is penetrat-
ing, unsparing in its thoroughness, finely discriminating, and immensely
convincing.
After examining the ' unconscious arithmetic ' theory of Leibniz, which
places the value of harmony in a sub-conscious apprehension of the
NEW BOOKS. 129
numerical ratios of the tones, the writer opens up his own theory of
fusion. He defines fusion of sense-elements as a tendency to unity
which shows itself as resistance to analysis ; that is to say, the recog-
nition of a plurality of elements. The greater the degree of fusion
the harder will it be to disengage the separate constituents. Hence the
degree of certainty with which the ear can separate out the elements gives
us the measure of the fusion ; the one varying inversely as the other.
Prof. Stumpf here seeks to show by help of experimental investigations
of his own that the degree of fusion as thus ascertained coincides with
the degree of harmonic affinity as recognised in music. The most
striking example of this coincidence is that of the octave. Here there is
the maximum number of errors in answering the question : Is this a
single tone, or two tones ? And it is well known that the octave has in
music by far the closest degree of affinity. This is sufficiently shown
in the familiar fact that we regard two tones forming the interval of an
octave as in a sense the same tone.
The view that harmony is a running together of tones, discord a
standing apart or aloof, is, as the writer reminds us, an old one, having
the weight of authority on its side. He, however, can claim the credit
of having given precision to the idea, and supported it by a methodical
investigation of facts. It will at once be evident that his theory has
this considerable advantage over Helmholtz's theory of beats, that it
appears to assign a positive sensuous basis to the effect of harmony :
for a tendency to fusion looks like a difference in the behaviour of the
sensations. At the same time, as its advocate seems to recognise, it
cannot be said to offer an explanation of the esthetic value of conso-
nance. Indeed, Prof. Stumpf seeks to keep out rigorously all considera-
tion of the affective accompaniment. But he hardly justifies this rather
violent course. The distinction between harmony and dissonance is
essentially, in part, at least, a difference of feeling, even though it be
true that the most obvious harmonies are not necessarily the most
pleasing.
It may be safely said that the value of Prof. Stumpf s investigations
will turn on the adequacy of his theory for the purpose of explaining the
aesthetic impression of harmony. That the series of harmonic combina-
tions answers in general to combinations difficult to analyse is an
interesting generalisation ; but what one wants to know is how this
can be made to explain the fact that art seeks such combinations as
agreeable, and avoids their opposites, save indeed for reasons lying out-
side themselves. If the writer had addressed himself to this aesthetic
question he might have found it necessary to give even yet greater pre-
cision to his idea of fusion. He might have probed the question : What
really happens in the consciousness of a person of ordinary musical
sensibility when he listens, say, to the interval of a fifth ? Does the
' sweetness ' of such a combination which sweetness seems to be the
very soul of its harmony depend on momentary extinctions of a sense
of the duality of the tones ? If not, how does the tendency to fusion
work in differentiating this combination as ' sweet ' ? Unity in difference
is commonly supposed to be the fundamental principle of all aesthetic
combination ; and it may turn out that musical harmony is an example
of it somewhat analogous to certain chromatic effects, as when different
adjacent colours are reduced each to a very small area, so that there is
a ' partial blending '. My difficulty is to understand how such a tendency
to fusion, or muffling, so to speak, of the distinctness of the elements,
can be regarded as a sensuous effect at all. Does it not look more like
the result of supervening intellectual processes, and more particularly of
9
130 NEW BOOKS.
an imaginative process which involves the feeling of mystery, and the
impulse to chase what is fugitive and seems to be disappearing? But
then the ' sweetness ' of the harmony always appears to return on our
hands as a sensuous phenomenon, pur sang. Here is the paradox which
I trust Prof. Stumpf's fine analytical skill will yet help us to resolve.
J. S.
Kraepelin's Psychologische Arbeiten. Band ii., 2 u. 3 Hefte.
We have here, as indeed the title leads us to expect, a record of plenty of
good work. The second Heft gives first an account of a method of measur-
ing Auffassungsfdhigkeit (facility of apprehension) for written characters
and words, and then of some experiments on the psychological effects of
trional, which happens to bear upon the same subject.
To measure Auffassungsfdhigkeit a number of printed words of one
or two syllables were pasted in spiral lines on drums, which were
rotated so as to carry them at a uniform rate past an opening in a
screen, whose width could be varied so as to alter the time of exposure ;
an arrangement which had the drawback that the word while in view
was also in motion, and with long words it even happened that the whole
word was not all in view at one time. An arrangement like that in the
kinetoscope would apparently have been preferable. The words as read
out were taken down by a shorthand writer and the conclusions deduced
from the number and nature of the errors and omissions made. Six
observers took part in the investigation, three of whom were normal
individuals and three patients of Prof. Kraepelin's who suffered from
more or less pronounced mental defects.
Perhaps the most interesting of the conclusions are those the author
draws with respect to the individual differences among his six observers.
One of them apprehended so rapidly that the various lengths of exposure
of the words made no difference to him he made practically no mistakes
in any case ; while the other observers exhibited varying degrees of
facility, down to B. who with a short exposure did not read half the
words correctly. And B. was a dipsomaniac. It is true that S. on
the other hand, whose observations were not sensibly worse than those
of two of the three normal observers, was also subject to attacks of
alcoholism, but these Prof. Kraepelin attributes to an epileptic origin.
But besides these Herr Cron and Prof. Kraepelin draw some further
interesting inferences from a detailed examination of the figures, while
at the same time they are careful to point out that it is absurd to
expect these, or even very much more complicated psychometric ex-
periments to enable us to form a complete estimate of a man's char-
acter or capabilities.
In the next article Herr Haenel gives an account of a series of experi-
ments he made on himself to test the effects of the hypnotic drug
trional ; a drug which one does not often hear of in England but which
is very similar to the more familiar sulphonal, only more rapid in its
action. Herr Haenel took the drug on alternate days during each set
of experiments, in such doses as would be ordinarily used to obtain
sleep, and studied its effects by experiments on reaction, association, dis-
crimination times, and by all those methods which Prof. Kraepelin has
done so much to elaborate, including that described in the last article.
The conclusion at which he arrived is that the drug works chiefly by
reducing the Auffassungsfdhigkeit for external impressions, and to a
less extent by impeding the execution of co-ordinated movements. It
does not seem to affect the inner mental processes such as association and
imagination, with the curious effect that though the number of erroneous
NEW BOOKS. 131
reactions in taking discrimination times was actually diminished by
taking the drug, the number of mistakes in reading was increased,
In Heft 3 we have an interesting paper on the periodic variations in
working power, tested by Prof. Kraepelin's method of continuous addi-
tion ; the period indicated being between two and two and a half seconds ;
which closely corresponds with that found by other observers as the period
of variations of attention. Herr von Vors is inclined to seek for the ex-
planation of this periodicity "m centralen Vorgdngen". It is to be
hoped, however, that this is not merely a counsel of despair, but that he
himself will shortly have something more definite to tell us about it.
The remaining article concerns the alienist rather than the mere psy-
chologist. It describes an apparatus for registering the pressure exerted
and the time occupied in writing, and gives an account of some experi-
ments made with it on healthy and on mentally diseased persons.
EDWARD T. DIXON.
Xiiturvolker und Kulturvolker. Ein Beitrag zur Socialpsychologie.
Von A. VIERKANDT. London : Williams & Norgate, 1898. Pp. xi.,
497. Price 11s.
is is a book of real importance, and we are sorry that we cannot give
the extended notice which it deserves. Its interest is essentially
psychological rather than sociological or anthropological. Its aim is to
analyse and illustrate the contrast and affinity between the savage and
the civilised mind, and the nature of the psychological development
which leads from the one to the other. This transition, as the author
shows, is essentially a transition from relatively disconnected impulse to
organised and systematised mental activity. In the phraseology which
he has adopted from Wundt, the contrast between the civilised and the
savage mind is a contrast between apperception and association. He is
also fond of stating the antithesis in another way. Activity in the savage,
according to him, takes the form of play, as contrasted with the organised
activity of civilisation. This seems only partially accurate. It is quite
true that play is impulsive in its character ; it arises out of the circum-
stances of the moment, and does not form an integral part of the organised
system of life. One game is complete in itself, and, as such, is discon-
nected both with other games and with practical business. So far the
analogy holds. But, on the other hand, it is very far from true that
impulsive activity, as such, is necessarily playful activity. It may, and
most frequently does, arise out of the immediate pressure of practical
needs, such as hunger.
There can be no doubt concerning the soundness of Mr. Vierkandt's
leading idea. It remains to add that he has worked it out in an admir-
able manner. His knowledge of anthropological and other data is very
extensive and accurate, and he applies his erudition with great felicity,
always subordinating it to the main psychological interest. There is
scarcely a page of the work which does not contain something of interest
and value. Compared with it, the defects of Mr. Sutherland's voluminous
book on the Moral Instinct become very glaring.
f/riff des absolut Wertvollen ah Grundbegriff der Moralphilo-
sophie. Von Dr. FELIX KRUEGER. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1898.
Pp. 95.
Tii is is a well-written essay containing much that is interesting to the
English reader. Dr. Krueger's two main arguments are likely to meet
with wide acceptance. He argues, firstly, that moral theory must be
132 NEW BOOKS.
founded on experience, or, as he puts it, on psychology ; and, secondly,
that an appeal to experience will decide against hedonism. His first
position leads him to criticise Kant, who was right in rejecting hedonism,
but wrong in supposing that a psychological moral theory must neces-
sarily be hedonistic. It was the latter mistake that led him to make
the vain attempt of founding ethics on a priori basis.
In regard to his second argument Dr. Krueger lays it down that not
only is it wrong to say " Pleasure is the supreme good " ; it is wrong to
ask what is the supreme good at all. We should not ask what is
supremely good, but what is supremely valuable. Ethics, in fact, is the
study of human values or appreciations, and its central problem is to de-
termine what is absolutely and supremely valuable. In this connexion
Dr. Krueger devotes a chapter to the psychology of value or appreciation,
and criticises the doctrines of Meinong and von Ehrenfels, with whose
hedonistic tendency he disagrees. He concludes that what is absolutely
valuable is the faculty itself of appreciating or forming values, and that
a man is morally good in proportion as he possesses and exercises this
appreciative faculty. "He prayeth best who loveth best all things both
great and small." Finally the author makes some pertinent illustrations
of his own views and criticisms of other opinions. In particular he
remarks that harmony among our various appreciations can never be
the supreme good. Such an ideal would lead one to a mean-spirited
and immoral quietism. In view of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's exaltation
of Harmony as the Moral Criterion these remarks of Dr. Krueger's
are worth noting. The author concludes his essay with a review of
Schuppe's moral theory which has many points of affinity to his own.
Rechte und Pflichten der Kritik. Philosophische Laien-Predigten fiir
das Volk der Denker von C. E. EASIUS. Leipzig ; London : "Williams
& Norgate, 1898. Pp. vi., 171.
The "Volk der Denker" to whom this book is addressed is the German
nation, and the title " Laien-Predigten " was chosen because the author
did not know himself " whether he belonged to the ranks of the laity or
of the philosophers by profession ". This doubt it is impossible for the
reader to share. The author is obviously very much of a layman in
philosophy.
The three sections of the work deal with " intellectual or logical
criticism," " aesthetic criticism," and " ethical criticism ". The first two
are somewhat commonplace. " Intellectual and scientific criticism
has the right to track out mistakes wherever they occur, and to lay
bare remorselessly everything erroneous and self-contradictory. But
criticism has also the duty of setting forth its investigations impartially,
i.e., without any regard for the likes or dislikes of oneself or others," and
so on. The author's aesthetic criticism is not much more electrifying.
But the ethical section contains some pretty considerable paradoxes,
most especially in its practical recommendations. When the author
tells us that truth is man's sole fundamental virtue, the proposition,
though disputable, appears in a measure familiar. But we have never
heard the abolition of capital punishment advocated on the ground that
it is no punishment at all, death being the common lot sooner or later.
Nor do we think, like the author, that a philosopher should be no less
esteemed because he also happens to be a pickpocket. In addition to
some other odd doctrines, of which the foregoing are only samples, the
reader will find much else in the book to reward his curiosity notes on
freedom of the press, antisemitism, the Bible and other topics, all treated
with force and conviction, as becomes the lay preacher.
NEW BOOKS. 133
Ptgehohffie als Erfahrungswissenschaft. Von HANS CORNELIUS.
London : Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. xv., 445.
This is a valuable and important book, marked by lucidity and fineness
of analysis. Critical notice, which owing to unavoidable circumstances
has been delayed, will appear in the next number of MIND.
Saggio sulla Volonta. Per GIUSEPPE TARANTINO, libero docente di
filosofia nella Universitd, di Napoli. Napoli : F. di Gennaro e A.
Morano. London : Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. 130.
This Essay on the Will is mainly concerned with the problem of Free
Will, of which the solution is found in Determinism, reconciled with
moral freedom by the intervention of the ego. The first part of the
book, entitled " An Analytical Examination of the Will," is mainly a
demonstration of the accordance of Aristotle's definition with modern
theories. Signer Tarantino's view is, briefly, that every physical state
tends to pass over into movement. Movement being a primitive fact,
the function of will is essentially inhibitive. Will is the motor reaction
of ideas and feelings. The motor force of an idea depends on the degree
in which it has a sensible content or is connected with feeling, which is
" the subjective consciousness of the objective state of the vital energy ".
Every affective state involves a cognitive element ; but in the primitive
organism this is overpowered by the effective element. The development
of will proceeds side by side with the development of cognition.
The second part of the book deals with the metaphysical aspect of the
question. Without the doctrine of determinism there could be no expla-
nation of human action ; but in accepting this fact we must recognise
two factors in volition, motive and character, of which the latter is the
more important. " An act of will may be considered as the result of the
reaction of the individual character." Consciousness, like movement, is
primordial ; but in animals and young children the conflict of desires is
decided on the principle of the parallelogram of forces, and consciousness
is present, if at all, merely as a spectator. With intellectual develop-
ment, will develops. Ideas are the motive force of action ; and will
depends, not on the number, but on the degree of organisation, of our
ideas. To call the will free in the sense of independent of motives is
absurd, since a causal nexus must underlie all volitional acts. Freedom
consists in the development of character.
The practical aspects of the question have considerable interest for the
author, and he makes some pertinent remarks on education and crimin-
ology.
Obbietto e limiti della filosofia del diritto. Di S. FRAGAPANE. Roma :
E. Loescher, 1897. Pt. i., pp. 156.
This, the first instalment of Mr. Fragapane's work on the philosophy of
law, has a sub-title of its own : / criteri d'una limitazione positiva della
Jil'iaofia del diritto. The second part will deal with the relations of the
philosophy of law to the theory of knowledge and to ethics ; the third
will treat of the phenomenology of law.
The main argument of the present part is a somewhat angry protest
iiist recent methods of dealing with the subject in Italy. The writer
appears to plead for a treatment which shall be less infected with meta-
physics and more in sympathy with sociology. But it cannot be said
that the work leaves a very definite impression on the reader's mind.
134 NEW BOOKS.
Much of the criticism, the sarcastic part in particular, is remarkably
obscure. The author attacks " that antiquated mode of thought which
goes on incessantly frying up the ever-youthful dignity of Vico in the oil
of Hegel, which has learnt to fuse Plato and Savigny into one amphi-
bious and elusive conception of law, or is continually trying to inscribe its
own philosophic hotch-potch on the sacred aureole of Thomism ". Nor
are the generalisations much more lucid. In summing up his views on
the last page, the author remarks : " There results from the phenomena
of law such a specific efficacy operating on the conditions of society as
may give scope in the philosophy of law for a special normative doctrine,
distinct from that which sociology might deduce from the general ap-
preciation of social modifiability ". Criticism and dicta of this pattern
occupy most of the work. An immense number of authors are quoted,
and a vast range of topics dealt with, law perhaps less than most. But
the author in his forthcoming volumes must keep more closely to facts
and indulge less luxuriantly in high abstract generalisation if he wishes
to interest the ordinary student of legal philosophy.
RECEIVED also :
Mrs. B. Bosanquet, The Standard of Life, and other Studies, London,
Macmillan & Co., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1898, pp.
vi., 219. (3s. 6d.)
Leibniz, The Monadology, etc. (translated with introduction and notes
by A. Latta), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1898, pp. x., 437. (8s. 6d.)
J. Watson, An Outline of Philosophy, Second Edition, Glasgow, James
Maclehose & Sons, 1898, pp. xxii., 489.
A. Alexander, Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy, New
York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898, pp. 357.
J. Seth, The Scottish Contribution to Moral Philosophy, Edinburgh and
London, W. Blackwood & Sons, 1898, pp. 43. (6d.)
J. E. Creighton, An Introductory Logic, New York, The Macmillan
Company, 1898, pp. xiv., 392. (5s.)
A. E. Dewar, From Matter to Man, London, Chapman & Hall, 1898, pp.
viii., 289.
A. W. Benn, The Philosophy of Greece, London, Grant Eichards, 1898,
pp. x., 308. (6s.)
W. M. Bryant, Life, Death and Immortality, with kindred essays, New
York, The Baker & Taylor Co., 1898, pp. vi., 442.
W. "Wallace, Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics
(Edited by E. Caird), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1898, pp., xl., 566.
(12s. 6d.)
H. E. Marshall, Instinct and Reason, New York, The Macmillan
Company, London, Macmillan & Co., 1898, pp. xiii., 574. (12s. 6d.)
E. Naville, Le Libre Arbitre, Deuxieme Edition, revue et corrigee, Bale
et Geneve, Georg & C ie -, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1898, pp. xiii., 311.
(5 fr.)
J. Eoux, Psychologic de L'Instinct sexuel, Paris, Librairie J. B. Bailliere
et Fils, 1899 ; London, Williams & Norgate, pp. 96. (1 fr. 50.)
D. Nys, La Notion de Temps d'apres les principes de Saint Thomas
d'Aquin, London, Williams & Norgate, 1898, pp. 232. (2 fr. 50.)
P.-F. Thomas, ^Education des Sentiments, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1899,
pp. 279. (5 fr.)
NEW BOOKS. 135
M. 1'Abbe 1 C. Piat, Destinee de Fhomme, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1898, pp. 244.
(5 fr.)
C. N. Starcke, La Famille dans les differentes Societes, Paris, V. Giard
& E. Briere, 1899, pp. 276. (Broche, 5 fr. ; Relie", 7 fr.)
M. Couailhac, La Liberte et la conservation de I'energie, Paris, V.
LecofFre, 1897 ; London, Williams & Norgate, pp. 324.
L. Ribert, Essai d'une Philosophic Nouvelle suggeree par la Science,
Paris, Fdix Alcan, 1898, pp. 562. (6 fr.)
E. Gyel, UEtre Subconscient, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1899, pp. 191. (4 fr.)
J. P. Durand (de Gros), Aperqus de Taxinomie Generale, 1899, pp. 265.
(5fr.)
Le Dr. Maurice de Fleury, L'dme du criminel, Paris, Fe'lix Alcan, 1898,
pp. xvi., 192. (2 fr. 50.)
F. Raymond et P. Janet, Nevroses et Idees fixes (ii.), Paris, Fe'lix Alcan,
1898, pp. x., 588. (14 fr.)
C. v. Ehrenfels, System der Werttheorie, Band i,, Allgemeine Werttheorie,
Psychologic des Begehrens, 1897, pp. 277; Band ii., Grundziige
einer Ethik, London, Williams & Norgate, 1898, pp. 271.
P. Mongro, Das Chaos in kosmischer Auslese, Leipzig, C. G. Naumann,
1898, pp. 213.
B. Erdmann und R. Dodge, Psychologische Untersuchungen iiber das
Lesen, Halle, M. Niemeyer, 1898, London, Williams & Norgate,
pp. viii., 360. (12 M.)
P. Natorp, Socialpddagogik, Stuttgart, Fr. Frommanns Verlag (E. Hauff)>
1899, London, Williams & Norgate, pp. viii., 352. (6d.)
VII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
PHILOSOPHICAL KEVIEW. Vol. vii., No. 4. J. 'Watson. ' The Meta-
physic of Aristotle. iv.' [Potential and actual reality. To explain
experience, we must grant the distinction of potential and actual reality.
The relation between the two is found by way of a consideration of the
'possible'. The potential is persistent tendency towards the actual.
In knowledge, in time, and in substance, the actual is prior to the
potential, iv. The divine, reason. While there is, within the sphere of
the sensible or transitory, a continual process, the process is not self-
explaining. A true cause must exist as self-dependent, and must
express itself (or be actually originative). But it must not lose itself
in expression ; it must be eternally self -manifesting and self-identical.
Aristotle finds it in the divine reason. " God ... is eternal, unchange-
able, self-dependent, self -originative, self-knowing and immaterial, the
first and final cause of the whole process of the universe."] C. M.
Bakewell. ' Pluralism and the Credentials of Monism.' [A rambling
essay, whose thesis is that " we would (sic) like to be pluralists, if only
we could at the same time satisfy the imperious claims of reason," and
which concludes that " the world must be conceived as altogether
coherent and interdependent in so far as free individuals do not freely
act in it. Such individuals must, however, be conceived as capable of
so acting, capable of interrupting sequences, of changing the history of
the world at least to some extent."] A. H. Lloyd. ' Epistemology
and Physical Science : a Fatal Parallelism.' [Episternology is separated
from the physical sciences by the dualism of mind and matter. But it
retains the same dualism within itself, in the opposition of subject and
object, thinker and thought. And the sciences do the same thing :
chemistry, in its conserved matter and atoms ; physics, hi its matter
as medium and moving particles ; mathematics, with infinite quantity
and finite quantities. The cure is that all alike cease " to divorce form
from content".] W. Q. Everett. 'The Evaluation of Life.' [The
worth of life is ultimately measured in terms of affective process. At
the same time, " over against the peculiarly subjective and passive ele-
ment of feeling, in which all experience is evaluated as good or evil, must
be placed the objective and active phase of conscious life, by which all
experiences are constituted good or evil ". Critique of Alexander and
Schiller.] Discussions. J. E. Russell and J. H. Tufts. ' Episte-
mology and Mental States.' Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles.
Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. vii., No. 5. E. B. Titchener.
*The Postulates of a Structural Psychology.' [The three psychologies,
structural, functional and genetic, and their distribution in modern litera-
ture. Postulates of an anatomical psychology are the processes sensation,
idea, affection, and the attributes quality, intensity, duration, extension,
clearness. Brentano, James, Stout, as psychologists of function.] A. K.
Rogers. 'Epistemology and Experience.' [To the Hegelian position
that "reality is experience and that all the categories of reality are
distinctions within the process of experience " the author opposes the
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 137
view that "reality is definite, concrete experience ; not experience, i.e.,
but experiences. ... To say that all these experiences are brought to-
gether in the unity of experience is either to make experience perfectly
abstract or else it is simply an act of philosophic faith." Reality being
given, in type, in conscious activity, thought is real (or is a representa-
tion of reality) only as it is a reproduction of concrete activity. The
process of judgment is analysed on the basis of this (Dewey's) theory,
with especial reference to Bradley.] E. A. Singer. ' Sensation and the
Datum of Science.' [Science is usually spoken of as constructing a world
from the given : let us ask the counter-question, and try to construct
the ' given ' from the ' world '. Various claimants appear ; sensation is a
typical one. Examination shows, however, that it does not and cannot
stand for an immediate datum of experience. Moreover, logical analysis
of the problem proves that the current method of search leads to meaning-
less results. The key to the situation lies in 'reconstruction'. "The
starting-point for reconstruction we must indeed have ; but it is no simple
datum for construction."] W. G-. Everett. ' The Concept of the Good.'
[The Good is at once happiness and perfection : happiness, as ' subjective,
affective, evaluative,' perfection, in its ' objective, ideational, constitutive
aspect '. That there is no conflict is shown (1) by the verdict of experi-
ence that the ' higher ' pleasures are quantitatively greater than the
' lower ' ; (2) by the two-sidedness of motivation of conduct ; and (3) by
the appeal made to the two faces of the concept in deciding between
certain alternatives of action. The only unity for the double-aspect good
is the concrete moral personality, i.e., the very material which is to be
analysed by moral science. Hence the ' dualism ' is a dualism of facts
directly and organically interrelated.] Discussion. Cfr. H. Howison.
' The Real Issue in " The Conception of God " ' . [Against Royce. The
author holds that " the world of truth [truth of fact and law as well as
of value and conduct] springs . . . from the world of self-active intelli-
gences ; presupposes and in its wholeness is a plurality of such strictly
free minds, and cannot be contained in the unity of any single conscious-
ness". Royce maintains the antithesis.] Reviews of Books. Summaries
of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. v., No. 5. M. W. Calkins. ' Short
Studies in Memory and in Association from the Wellesley College Psycho-
logical Laboratory.' [(lj Immediate and delayed recall of the concrete
and the verbal. The author finds, as Kirkpatrick found, that the concrete
is the better memory material, especially in delayed recall. ' Recalled '
and ' recalled in order ' give different values. (2) Tendency to mental
combinations. A general characteristic, occurring with visual and audi-
tory, verbal and concrete stimuli. Words combine better than pictures.
(3) Associations with childhood experience. As against Galton's 39 per
cent, childhood and 15 per cent, recent associations, students give 15
and 33 per cent., old and middle-aged persons 33 and 31 per cent.]
R. Macdougal. ' Music Imagery : a Confession of Experience.' [The
writer, not a good visualiser, records a series of vivid images which
occurred during the hearing of a musical composition while he was in
a state of fatigue and relief from tension. The derivation of some of the
figures is traceable, as is their suggestion at the time by the music. The
fact emphasised is that here the mood (organic sensations) mediated the
visual imagery.] F.Kennedy. ' On the Experimental Investigation of
Memory.' [A useful resume and bibliography of the experimental work
on memory, with indication of lacunte.] Discussion and Reports. H.
Muensterberg. ' Psychology and Education.' [Reply to Cattell.] C.
L. Franklin. ' The New Cases of Total Colour Blindness.' [On Hess
138 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
and Hering, Pfl. Arch., Ixxi.] G. V. Dearborn. ' The Criteria of Mental
Abnormality.' [" Neither anatomical nor physiological nor psychological
nor yet personal, in a sense, is the deranged person's defect [though some
or all of these abnormalities are usually present], but it is sociological
and against the evolving purpose of the race."] F. C. French. ' The
Place of Experimental Psychology in the Undergraduate Course.' [Main-
tains, against Wolfe, that there is none.] Psychological Literature. New
Books. Notes.
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. ix., No. 4. H. D. Sheldon.
' The Institutional Activities of American Children.' [(1) Study of
children's compositions on the topic of some society or club ; organising
tendencies displayed ; boys' motives more primitive than girls' ; small
part played by secrecy. (2) Reminiscent papers ; answers to question-
naire. Forms of play and organisation ; invention, leadership, discip-
line ; predatory associations. (3} Sketch of adult societies for children.
(4) Bibliography of children's societies.] J. O. Quantz. ' Dendro-
psychoses.' [Study of the influence of trees on human life. Biological
evidence. Psychical reverberations : witness of instinctive fears, of
attitudes in sleep and methods of inducing sleep, of climbing instinct^
of behaviour of idiots and criminals. Tree worship ; the life tree ; the
world tree ; the paradise tree ; the tree in medicine ; the tree in child
life and in poetry. " Man's arboreal life may have evolved certain
intellectual and emotional characteristics, suggestions of which we still
find " in these sources.] N. Triplett. ' The Dynamogenic Factors in
Pacemaking and Competition.' [Theories of the faster time of paced
and competition bicycle races. Apparatus for laboratory study of motor
competition. Results : of those stimulated, some made faster time,
others were inhibited. A few subjects were little affected by the race.
Fluctuations of energy ; effect of age ; sex differences ; influences affect-
ing time of succeeding trials. Effect of idea of movement on movement
itself. General conclusion : " the bodily presence of another con-
testant," the " sight of the movements of pacemakers or other com-
petitors," and the "idea of higher speed," however furnished, are all
dynamogenic factors of consequence.] M. H. Carter. ' Darwin's Idea
of Mental Development.' [For Darwin, mind has a survival value ; by
mind he meant, somewhat vaguely, intelligence, instinct and reflex
action ; he regarded mind and brain as two distinct, interacting, inter-
dependent realities ; he envisaged mental evolution as a progressive
series of mutual (brain-mind and mind-brain) interdependencies. His
position " may thus be summed up in three words, as Cartesianism plus
evolution". Bibliographies.] G. M. Whipple. 'The Influence of
Forced Respiration on Psychical and Physical Activity.' [Marcet's
apnoeic pause ; feeling of dizziness and confusion, sometimes followed
by exhilaration ; greater strength of grip when breathing has returned
to the normal. Rough tests far too roiigh, in view of the appliances
now available show lengthened reaction, decreased memory span, loss
of precision of movement, etc. ; but all these results must be retested.]
E. B. Delabarre. 'A Method of Recording Eye-movements.' [Plaster
cast of cornea, modelled on wire ring, to which writing lever is attached.
Details of use and construction. Very useful.] E. B. Huey. 'Pre-
liminary Experiments in the Physiology and Psychology of Reading.'
[Short words more quickly read in horizontal sequence, long in vertical.
First part of words more important for recognition than last. Move-
ments of eye in reading ; application of a device similar to that of Dela-
barre, and suggested by him and Ahrens.] C. M. gill- ' On Choice.'
[Experiments on ' natural, physical choice '. It is natural to take the
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 139
nearer object, when no other considerations influence choice.] Psycho-
logical Literature. Correspondence. [C. E. Garman on the teaching of
philosophy.] Books received. Index.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. October, 1898. GK Tarde. ' Qu'est-ce que le
Crime ? ' [The author criticises and rejects as inadequate various defini-
tions of crime which have already been offered. In his view crime is the
violation of a right (divine, royal or collective) by a rebel and hostile
will, which excites alarm and indignation in proportion respectively to
the probability of its being imitated, and to the extent of dissent from
established moral opinion on the part of the criminal which it exhibits.]
F. Le Dantec. ' Mimetisme et Imitation.' [Examines numerous cases of
' mimicry ' and ' imitation ' among animals, and concludes that many
cases can be explained by the Lamarckian hypothesis better than by the
Darwinian.] J. Andrade. ' Les Idees Directrices de la Mecanique.'
[Mechanics rests on a metaphysical basis, i.e., the majority of its funda-
mental concepts are denied a priori and not from experience. They are a
means of interrogating experience, not an answer given by experience.
Writer proceeds to prove his thesis by a detailed examination of the
concepts in question.] Notes et discussions. Eevue generale. Analyses
et comptes rendus. November. E. Murisier. 'Le Sentiment Religieux
dans 1'Extase (l.).' [Religious ecstasy is an exaggeration of individual
religious feeling as fanaticism is the exaggeration of social religious feel-
ing. It has its roots in the desire for direction. Mysticism substitutes
an ' idee directrice ' for all external direction. By this means a unifica-
tion and simplification of the personality of the mystic is effected, yielding
the quietude of ecstasy.] F. Evellin et Z. ' Philosophie et Mathema-
tique. L'Infini Nouveau.' E. G-oblot. ' Sur la Theorie Physiologique de
P Association.' [Writer defends the physiological theory of association,
while denying that consciousness can be reduced to an epiphenomenon.
Association must be carefully distinguished from memory, even in its
simplest form of recognition. Essential to recognition is a ' judgment of
pastness,' as a judgment of exteriority is essential to perception and of
interiority to self-consciousness. Now all judgment is intellectual. The
associative mechanism explains the givenness or non-givenness of a
psychical state, but not the intellectual act of judging. " La machine
cerebrale n'est pas une machine k penser mais une machine au service
d'un esprit qui pense."], Eevue generale. Analyses et comptes rendus.
Revue des periodiques Etrangers. December. F. Faulhan. ' Le Developpe-
ment de 1'Invention.' [I. As evolution. Two main types. The first
may be compared to solving a problem. An end is chosen and is led up
to by a process akin to reasoning, e.g., E. A. Poe's ' Raven ' ; in the
second we have a natural power working freely and spontaneously, e.g.,
production of Mozart's compositions. II. As transformation, in which
the original germ-idea in the course of its evolution gathers round it other
elements, one or other of which gradually comes into conflict with the
original idea and finally supplants it. III. As deviation, a combination
of I. and II. In the course of evolution discordant elements develop and
persist alongside of those which are germane to the subject.] Murisier.
'Le Sentiment Religieux dans 1'Extase (Fin).' [An analysis of the state of
mind induced by religious exercises shows that asceticism is valuable as
a means to the mono-ideism in which the state of ecstasy consists. In
extreme cases, however, the idea disappears and consciousness seems re-
duced to a condition of pure feeling. Finally even feeling vanishes and
a state of indifference supervenes. Le'vy.-Bruhl. ' A. Comte et Stuart
Mill d'apres leur correspondance.' Revue generale. Analyses et comptes
rendus. Revue des periodiques Etrangers.
140 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE. No. 18. V. Ermoni (' Le Thomisme et les
Resultats de la psychologic experiinentale ') maintains that while, on the
one hand, ultra-spiritualism fails to account for cerebral phenomena,
materialism, on the other, is in evident conflict with the phenomena of
thought and consciousness ; that, in consequence, for ultra-spiritualism
there can be no physiology, and for materialism there can be no psy-
chology. The theory of St. Thomas on the reciprocal relations of body
and soul, standing midway between these two opposing systems, takes
into full account both the elements of our nature, and forms a complete
anthropology, uniting in one harmonious synthesis, which is justified by
the most recent discoveries of experimental science, physiology and
psychology. E. Fasquier ('Les hypotheses cosniogoniques,' suite), con-
tinuing his series of articles on the formation of the orderly universe,
explains the hypothesis of Laplace, and discusses the chief objections
.advanced by Faye against this hypothesis, together with the reply of
Wolf to Faye's objections. M. de Wulf (' Qu'est-ce que la philosophic
scolastique), criticises the false and incomplete notions of scholastic
philosophy now current. Some of these are merely verbal or even
tautological ; others are absolutely untrue. To say that scholastic phil-
osophy was the philosophy of the Middle Ages will not satisfy M. de
Wulf. Many systems of philosophy existed in the Middle Ages besides
the scholastic, although it be undoubtedly true that the scholastic was
the dominant system of that period. In future articles M. de Wulf will
explain the true nature of scholastic philosophy, and attempt its suitable
definition. C. Besse (' Leon Olle-Laprune ') commences an appreciation
of the philosophical standpoint of Olle-Laprune with special reference
to its bearing on the problems of religion and life. He discusses at
some length the attitude of Olle-Laprune towards the system of Male-
branche. D. Nys (' La Nature du compose chimique '), assuming that
chemical compositions supply material for metaphysical as well as
scientific investigations, sets forth the theories of St. Thomas on the
subject, and maintains that there is nothing in modern science at vari-
ance with these theories. D. Mercier (' La psychologic de Descartes,'
suite et fin) brings to a conclusion his interesting and able criticisms of
Descartes' psychology.
ZtlTSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SlNNESORGANE.
Bd. xviii., Heft 1, 2. P. Schumann. ' Zur Schaetzung leerer, von
^infachen Schalleindruecken begrenzter Zeiten.' [Restatement of the
author's theory of the ' time sense,' in terms of strain of expectation
and sensible surprise. Reply to Meumann (nine arguments), Wundt and
Kuelpe : the general objections to the writer's theory appear to stand,
the detailed objections to have had for the most part something in
them, though Meumann's tone is inexcusable. New results : (1) evi-
dence for the theory from Herbart and from various subjects ; (2) effect
of an unexpectedly strong signal ; " with subjects whose estimation
depends upon adjustment of attention, intensification of the third signal
means shortening of the second interval, while with subjects who tend
to rhythmical apprehension [as Meumann's did] it brings about a
lengthening of this interval " ; (3) the constant time error, as dependent
on adjustment of attention, rhythmical apprehension, or motor auto-
matism ; (4) Meumann's statement that a long series of sounds appears
to run more quickly than a succession of two or three is confirmed only
when there is lapse of attention during the long series, when, i.e., the
subject cannot ' expect ' its individual members ; (5) his statement that
& strongly bounded ' least ' interval seems shorter than an equal but
weakly bounded interval is not confirmed.] W. Wirth. ' Vorstellungs-
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 141
und Gefuehlscontrast.' [The ' law ' of contrast in Hoeffding, Wundt r
Fechner, etc., demands a detailed examination. (1) Perceptual con-
trast. Sense contrasts obtain only in the sphere of vision ; their explana-
tion is physiological. Perceptual contrast is due to the departure of a
perception from the mean of experience ; this produces a ' contrast
feeling,' of surprise or disappointment, which is added to the (unaltered)
perceptual contents. Apparent exceptions are accounted for by modifica-
tion of memory-images. (2) Affective contrast as co-ordinate with colour
contrast. Critique of Hoeffding. (3) Affective and perceptual contrast.
Feeling, as subjective, cannot ' seem ' to be weaker or stronger, as
objective perceptions can ; and, dependent as it is on the total mental
state, cannot come into conflict with a pre- existent feeling-tendency.
The introduction of secondary feelings, resulting from the effort after
feeling, gives no assistance towards the explanation of affective contrast.
But when perceptions contrast, the contrast feeling arises : and this is
a special case of affective contrast at large. When our attention is on
the objects, we speak of perceptual contrast ; when the contrasting
objects are so related as to arouse strong feelings of opposite quality, of
affective : there are all stages.] W. von Zehender. ' Ueber die
Entstehung des Raumbegriffes.' [The ideas of space, time and God are,,
in germ, a priori in human nature ; but experience, outer and inner, is.
necessary to their realisation.] K. Ebhardt. ' Zwei Beitraege zur
Psychologic des Rhythmus und des Tempo.' [(1) If taps are made, or
tones played, in unaccented series, we find the duration of the intervals-
subject to a variable error. Accentuation (rhythm) increases this
variable, and introduces a constant error : the interval following an
accent is made longer than that preceding. Explanation (for
bimembral and trimembral rhythms) in terms of motor adjustment,
change of direction of attention, composition and analysis of groups, and
(in the tonal series) affective value. (2) Compositions are played on a
soundless keyboard most slowly ; next most slowly, on the piano with-
out accompaniment ; most quickly on the piano with both hands.
Explanation in terms of amount of mental work involved (reproduction),
and of relative speed of arousal of expected feelings.] Literaturbericht.
Bd. xviii., Heft 3. O. Abraham und L. J. Bruehl. ' Wahrnehmung kuerz-
ester Toene und Geraeusche.' [A series of siren experiments, notable
for their range (contra to middle of c 4 octave) and for the fact that the
subject is possessed of a reliable ' absolute ' tonal memory, gives the
result that two vibrations suffice for a tone sensation and judgment of
absolute pitch. From the a 4 to the a 5 the number of vibrations rises to
ten. The absolutely least time (g*) is O63<r. The ' clap ' that results
from the blowing of a single hole of the siren disc is a complex noise,
conditioned by the primary wave, the distance of points of reflexion, and
the periods of the after- vibrations.] K. Deffher. ' Die Aehnlichkeits-
association.' [The two types of association : the original, by similarity ;
and the acquired, by ' experience ' or contiguity. Critique of Hoeffding
and Kuelpe. Similarity may obtain between conscious contents (two
colours), or between the unconscious processes underlying these ('deep T
tone and 'deep' colour). Exposition of this (Lipps') doctrine of associa-
tion, with special reference to musical tones. The most convincing part
of the discussion is, perhaps, the criticism of Kuelpe's association by
feeling. Wundt's Bemerkungen should have been taken account of.]
Literaturbericht. Bd. xviii., Heft. 4. H. Voeste. ' Messende Versuche
ueber die Qualitaetsaenderungen der Spektralfarben in Folge von Ermue-
dung der Netzhaut.' [Stimulation for ten sec. From red to 570^, the
colour shifts towards violet ; at 560 pp there is no change ; thence to 500 /i/*.
142 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
the colour shifts towards red ; from 490 to 460 pp. there is no change ; beyond
460 pp the colour again shifts redwards. The degree of qualitative change
is not proportional to intensity of stimulus. Theory follows in a later
paper.] G. J. Schoute. ' Abnorme Augenstellungbeiexcentrischgelegener
Pupille.' [Description of case ; explanation and measurement of anomaly.]
M. Meyer. 'Nachtragzumeiner Abhandlung. "UeberTonverschmelzung
und die Theorie der Consonanz."' C. Stumpf. ' Erwiderung.' [Continua-
tion of controversy. Stumpf holds that clang analysis is rendered more
or less difficult, according to conditions, by consonance ; Meyer that un-
musical persons are readier to say ' one tone ' when the impression of
consonance is present than when it is absent. No new facts are alleged.]
Litteraturbericht. Bd. xviii., Heft 5 und 6. C. Stumpf und M. Meyer.
' Maassbestimmungen ueber die Eeinheit consonanter Intervalle.' [De-
siderata : experiments with successive tones, in ascending and descending
order ; with simultaneous tones ; with simple tones and clangs. Previous
Literature. Chapters i., ii. (S.), Experiments with the major and minor
third. Chapter iii. (M.), Experiments with major third, fifth and octave.
Chapter iv. (S. and M.), Uniformities in the results of these last experi-
ments. Chapter v. (S.), Comparison of the new with older results. Con-
tains a severe criticism of Schischmanow. Chapter vi. (S.), Remarks of the
subjects during the experiments. Chapter vii. (S.), Explanations. (1) The
judgment of purity is based upon a ' feeling for purity,' or rather a ' feeling
for impurity '. With augmented intervals there is a feeling of strain, of
sharpness ; with diminished, a feeling of bluntness, dullness, flatness.
The feeling is now primary, the judgment secondary ; phylogenetically,
.a judgment of deviation from degree of fusion is primary. (2) Impurity
can be cognised earlier than its direction ; evidently, since the unpleasant
feeling is common to both directions. (3) The major third is augmented,
the minor diminished, in judgments of subjective purity. The reason is
the aesthetic need of expression, of emphasising the characteristic. (4)
Fifths and, still more, octaves, are similarly augmented ; especially in
.ascending succession. The reason is that the energy of progression is
thereby emphasised. From successive, this augmentation has passed
over to simultaneous tones. (5) Succession is better than simultaneity
for judgments of purity, because these judgments depend on feeling;
simultaneity reduces distinctness (fusion), and so obstructs the judgment.
{6) Clangs rich in overtones give uncertain judgments of purity. This is
strange only to those who hold Helmholtz's theory of consonance. (7)
The fifth has the advantage over other intervals in these judgments ;
the rest stand on the same level. The current belief to the contrary is
rooted in speculation, not in fact.] T. Lipps. ' Baumaesthetik und
geometrisch-optische Taeuschungen, i.' [Elaborate reply to Heyman's
criticism.] Besprechung. [Martius on Jodl's Lehrbuch.] Litteratur-
bericht.
PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN. Bd. xiv., Heft. 3. H. Bruns. ' Zur
Collect! v-Masslehre.' [Presents and gives numerical tables for an im-
proved method of investigating collective objects (Fechner).] K. Marbe.
* Die stroboskopischen Erscheinungen.' [Historical : the invention of
the stroboscope ; Fischer's investigation and its results (1886). Deriva-
tion of the laws of stroboscopy from Talbot's law. Restatement of the
author's theory of this law, and critique of Witasek (Weber's law may be
employed as explanatory principle) and of Fick and Schenck (eye-
movement theory untenable).] R. Mueller. ' Ueber Raumwahrnehmung
beim monocularen indirecten Sehen.' [Historical : Descartes to Wundt ;
Kirschmann's hypothesis of the function of dispersion circles (parallax of
indirect vision). Experiments with falling balls (black and white, seen
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 143
against a grey background). Control experiments with exclusion of
accommodation (use of atropin and eserine). In both sets, the monocu-
lurly perceived impressions were not spatially discriminated, but referred
i surface at a distance of some 1 90 cm. from the eye. Theory :
moments in the monocular perception of depth: reference to von Beck-
iinghausen'B normal surface (formed by lines of intersection of identical
planes of direction) ; lower of two vertical double images seems nearer
and smaller, in obedience to the empirical constraint of the horopter ;
accommodation alone is sufficient for localisation ; Boettcher's observa-
tion of the stability of the vertical after torsion ; the relation of dispersion-
images to irradiation, size of pupil, closure of lids, regular astigmatism,
experience,' ' psychical suppression '. Conclusion : the " dispersion
circles are not directly perceived, and may yet be of prime importance
for the act of perception ". " The sole function of the images of indirect
vision is to release sharply defined movement-impulses." " Monocular
space perception exists ; but the motives (exposed by these experiments)
are originally those of the binocular act of vision."] R. Schulze.
' Ueber Klanganalyse.' [Experiments of 1891-3 (Wundt, Phys. Psych.,
4te., Aufl. L, 451). Every individual has a normal overtone-clang, which
is difficult of analysis. A given compound clang is analysable in propor-
tion as it varies from the normal clang. Corollaries are : the higher an
interval in the tonal scale, and the wider apart the components of an
interval, given identity of musical relationship, the easier is its analysis.
Under right conditions, small intervals are less readily analysed than
large ; this is in accord with Helmholtz' theory. Hypothesis of analysis
by resolution into a succession of tones, no more than one to two vibra-
tions being necessary for the characterisation of pitch.]
VlERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FUR WlSSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Jahrg.
xxii.. Heft 4. R. v. Schubert Soldern. ' Ueber das Unbewusste im
Bewusstsein.' [ Unconscious must always be taken to mean relatively
iiiii-onscious, viz., unconscious in relation to some higher mode of con-
sciousness. Four kinds of unconsciousness are distinguished from this
point of view.] R. Eisler. ' Ueber Ursprung und Wesen des Glaubens
an die Existenz der Aussenwelt.' [External things are unified groups of
qualities. Their externality consists in their independence of a percipient
subject. They are "transcendent" only in so far as they comprehend
qualities not immediately perceived, but ideally reinstated from previous
experience. We regard external things as existing during the intervals
of perception by an interpretation based on analogy to our own per-
sistence as conscious beings.] Besprechung, etc.
ARCHIV FUR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Band iv., Heft 4. J. Berg-
mann. ' Seele und Leib (l.).' [This first article deals with the general
nature of soul on the one hand, and of material substances on the
other.] P. J. Helwig. ' Die combinatorisch-^esthetische Function und
die Formeln der symbolischen Logik.' Jahresbe.richt ueber die Erschein-
imgen auf dem Gebiete der systeinatischen Philosophie : T. Lipps.
' l>ritter aesthetischer Litteraturbericht (i.).' F. Tbnniea. ' Jahresbericht
ueber Erscheinungen der Sociologie aus den Jahren 1895 und 1896.'
V. Brochard. ' Compte-rendu des ouvrages philosophiques public's en
France pendant 1'annle 1896.' Zeitschriften, etc.
PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Bd. xi., Heft 2. C. Ghitberlet. ' Die
Krisis in der Psychologic.' [This second article, whilst recognising the
ts of Fechner, Lotze and Wundt in experimental psychology, com-
plains that Empiricism, now excluding and now using metaphysical
reasoning, has destroyed the value of their researches. Fechner's law
itself is a great ' sea-serpent '. The writer concludes by protesting
144 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
against the tendency to reduce Logic, Mathematics, ^Esthetics and
Ethics to Psychology, and to attempt pure experimental Psychology
without metaphysic. Such a tendency is fatal to Philosophy.] A.
Seitz. ' Zusammenhang des Leibniz'schen Monadensystems mit dem
Determinismus.' [This paper, after showing the historical evolution of
Leibniz' monad-system, compares his ' prestabilitated harmony ' with the
theory of predetermination of the human will, moved by the First Cause,
and shows that the former contains the latter which amounts to Deter-
minism. Leibniz was much influenced by the system of Jansenius, but
confined himself to the philosophical side of the question without entering
into its theological conclusions as concerns grace.] E. Dentler. ' Der
NoCs nach Anaxagoras.' [Having pointed out in a preceding article
that, according to Anaxagoras, the Novr is intellect and power, the
writer examines whether he ascribes to it absolute incorporeity and
personality. Windelband, Gomperz, Kern and others deny it. Zeller,
Freudenthal, Heinze and Arleth affirm it. From fragments of the
philosopher's works, and quotations from Aristotle and Plato, it seems
certain that the Novr is absolutely incorporeal. As to its person-
ality, infinite intelligence of all things implies self-consciousness ; its
immanence in all beings would indeed contradict personality, but it is
likely that Anaxagoras did not see the contradiction.] Cl. Baeumker.
' Herr Fr. Gundisal Feldner und mem Problem der Materie in der
griechischen Philosophic .' [This is a controversial article in which
the writer protests against an attack upon his book. He is condemned
for what he has not said in a book which his critic has not understood ;
he also complains of his assailant's want of courtesy.]
BIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. March-April. A. Chiappelli ed. Ii.
Serin. ' Una recente Scoperta fatta presso Pompei d'un Musaico rap-
presentante " La Scuola d'Atene ".' [A translation of an article which
appeared recently in the Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic. To the
translation an appendix is added by Sig. Chiappelli, dated June last, in
which he adduces additional evidence in confirmation of the identifica-
tion of the figures appearing in the mosaic.] V. Berini. ' La memoria.
e la Durata dei Sogni.' [A discussion of the views of Bonatelli, Goblot,
Tissie, G. Dandolo and Maury upon the recollection of dreams. The
author is inclined to think that dreams nearest in point of time, and in
general coherency, to waking, are most easily recalled. The duration
and measure of time in dreaming are also discussed.] A. Codara.
' Seneca Filosofo e S. Paolo. [Conclusion.\ L. F. Ardy. ' Dante e La
Moderna Filosofia Sociale.' [Dante's point of view with regard to Social
Philosophy necessarily differed from the modern one. In his writings,
he is deeply impressed by the prevalent social " decadence " of his own
day, which he viewed in close connexion with its ethical root and, from
the religious cast of his mind, attributed to the castigation of Providence.
Therefore the remedies for the ills of the state consisted in the cultiva-
tion of religion, virtue, and wisdom (to be continued)]. CK Passamanti.
' Giovanni Battista Benedetti.' G. Marchesini. ' Oggeto e Sogetto
della Sensazione.' Bollettino. Eivista Straniere, etc.
NEW SERIES. No. 30.] [APRIL, 1899.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
-3SS-
I. SOME REMARKS ON MEMORY AND
INFERENCE.
BY F. H. BRADLEY.
Ambiguity of Memory How do we think at all of the past ? By a
construction This explained and objections answered No merely
successive association Difference between memory, fancy, and
thought Mere imagination, what Inference, what Defect of
internal necessity in the former Superstition about " abstract "
refuted Memory and inference agree and differ, how ? But
memory involves inference Its relation to inference in the lower
sense How is memory distinguished from mere imagination ?
Memory's veracity Memory and belief The meanings of "matter
of fact " in connexion with memory and mere imagination.
MY object in this paper is to discuss certain questions about
the nature of memory in connexion with inference on one
side and mere imagination on the other. I have been led to
write it partly from a desire to explain and justify the position
which I took elsewhere. But the reader need not concern
himself with the matter from this point of view, and I shall
endeavour to treat the subject independently. On the other
hand, even if I were able anywhere to deal satisfactorily with
all the problems involved in the subject, the present limits
are much too narrow. I can offer no more than a discussion
imperfect at the best, and in which the reader must not
expect to find anything really new.
We may notice first the well-known ambiguity of the word
"memory ". I have used, and shall use, the term in what
seems its proper sense, the consciousness of past events as
having been in fact experienced in my past. But memory
is often employed otherwise. It may be taken to embrace
all recognition and sense of familiarity, to cover persisting
after-sensation and resurgent images, sporadic and undated.
10
146 F. H. BRADLEY:
It may be a general head which includes all retentiveness
and reproduction, and may be enlarged to cover every habit,
even where habit rightly or wrongly is applied to a case of
mere physical mechanism. And hence nothing is easier than
to defend memory as basal, if not as quite ultimate, and to
refute the true view that it is a complex and late pheno-
menon. If, however, we keep in mind its various senses,
less labour may be wasted.
Memory in its proper sense seems certainly complex, and
involves a high degree and development of thinking, and
memory for any sound psychology must be derivative and
secondary. We may find it for the moment more convenient
to postulate a faculty inexplicable and ultimate, by which I
know my past events isolated or even in their synthesis with
my present, an organ which gives us really the really exist-
ing past, or somehow immediately reports to us that which
perhaps really does not exist an oracle, which, although in-
explicable or even perhaps because inexplicable, is to be
accounted veracious. But the path which seems easy may
be long in the end when it involves us in confusion, and a
miracle, however cheap, in the end is dear when it entails
the subversion of principle. And if against fact we are led
to postulate the veracity of memory, that postulate, as I
shall show, leads to ruinous scepticism.
Memory is an ideal construction of the past by which the
present reality is qualified, or we know the past as an enlarge-
ment by ideal content of reality beyond the present. In
this respect memory does not differ, it will be urged at once,
from at least some inference and even from fancy. But with-
out at present touching on these differences it will be better
to ask in general how we are able at all to think of the past.
There is, of course, the further question as to what in the
end is the real nature of the past, but that question fortu-
nately does not concern us here. We are to ask about the
past simply so far as it is for us.
Now there are doctrines which I must take for granted
without explanation or discussion, and all that I can here do
is to try to state them so as to avoid unnecessary objec-
tions. If the reader finds that he dissents, I would ask him
to consider this paper as written for others. We must first
of all presuppose retentiveness and the growth of associa-
tions, the formation in other words of special dispositions to
restore elements previously conjoined ; and it is better to
abstain here from the least- attempt further to explain or
formulate these doctrines, since that would involve us in
controversy and in the discussion of some obstinate diffi-
SOME REMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 147
culties. Here I would add merely that I have presupposed
nothing except that which I take to be present in principle
at the very lowest level of mind.
Now, so much being assumed, it is no great step to advance
from it to serial connexions. Wherever A tends to call up B
and B to bring in C, A being present will tend to produce the
series A-B-C. The means and the condition of this mediate
connexion is the identity of B. There is here a common
link which is one and the same, or which at least somehow
behaves as if it were so, and which also again on examination
seems so. Without this identical link there is certainly no
series at all, but how far its identity must be perfect is a
further question to be considered later. And at this point
there arises the difficult and most important problem about
the unity of the whole series, a problem at which I shall be
able to do no more than glance.
But when once we have such series joined by common
links, it seems easy from this point to proceed to the future
and past and to transcend the present. For given the dis-
position to an ideal series such as c-d-e, and given on the
other side a present qualified as A.(b-c), there is, through the
identity of c, a transition from A to e through b-c-d. And
with this transition memory, it might be said, is at once
explained. Now in principle I think memory is so explained,
and the explanation is correct, but it on the other hand is
insufficient, and takes no account of serious differences. For
in the first place memory has perforce to go backwards if it
is to reach the past, while our series, it seems, run all the
other way, and we can only think forwards. And in the
second place memory is certainly not the mere extension of
the present. It gives us rather something which is not the
present, something which is known as different and incom-
patible. I will proceed briefly to discuss these two diffi-
culties, beginning with the second.
To know the past or future as such is a hard and late
achievement of the mind, for it implies an enormous degrada-
tion of the present. We do not properly represent the past
or future until we have gained an order of things in which
the present has become but one thing among others. These
other things, not the present, are not presented, and, if by a
miracle they were so while the present itself still remained
untransformed, the result would be chaos. But past and
future do not and cannot exist for us until reality appears as
ries in which the present has sunk and has become but
one member among others. Such an order is an array into
the ranks of which the present is cashiered, it is an order
148 F. H. BRADLEY :
which is ideal and yet real, which is often not practical
except remotely and indirectly, and which can conflict sharply
with our presented perception and our presented need. The
passage to this new world is the barrier, if there is one,
between the animal and the human mind. The animal
mind (I am here compelled to be dogmatic) has neither past
nor future. It has no world but the reality felt present and
given, a present qualified ideally and qualified incompatibly
with itself, but never transcended and itself degraded to be
but another qualification. It has ideas assuredly and from
the first, and, if it had not ideas, it could most assuredly
have no conation or desire. But the ideas of the animal
mind are but adjectives of the given, ideas that enlarge the
given and may indefinitely distract it, but never set them-
selves up beside it as other and equal realities. Hence the
animal could never say, Yesterday I was sad but I shall be
happy to-morrow. Its present is clouded and is brightened
by the movement of its ideas, but remains always its present;
its revenges are never retribution for the past, and even its
plans, where it has plans, are no forecast of the future. It
has, in brief, no world sundered from the world of its imme-
diate practical interest, and to take an immediate practical
interest in the past as past is surely not possible.
I regret to be unable to explain and defend this brief state-
ment. It may serve, perhaps, to point out the interval which
in my judgment separates memory from the lower level of
mind. How in detail that interval is filled up and crossed
I cannot here discuss. I agree that it is the use of language
for social needs which is the principal agent. It is in this
manner, I agree, that in fact we gain a world of ideas beyond,
and in part incompatible with, our personal world, an ideal
order which seems fixed and independent and which sub-
ordinates the present. On the other hand, I must demur to
the conclusion that without society no such ideal world is
in principle possible or could slowly be fixed by the mind.
But, however it may have arisen, it is this ideal order which
makes memory possible, and apart from this development to
postulate memory is to invoke a senseless miracle.
I will pass next to the difficulty which arises from the
direction of our thoughts. The past lies behind us while, it
seems, we can only think forwards. Given the disposition
to an ideal series b-c-d, then, if X6 is presented, the identity
of b can develop X ideally as ~Kb-c-d. But if, on the other
hand, ~Kd is presented, how are we able to arrive at b-c ?
Our sensations, we may say, come wave on wave out of the
future and disappear backwards into the past, while the
SOME EEMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 149
direction of our ideas is naturally opposite, and our associated
series, usually if not always, run from the present to the
future. We, to maintain our being, must face and must meet
with our ideas the incoming waves, and it is this practical
attitude against the course of mere events which gives the
direction to all our series. I do not, indeed, admit that all
our associations are practical, and that is a question I pass
by. But the rule that usually they are directed forwards
we must admit as true, whatever we may think as to possible
exceptions. The current of our lives and thoughts in short
runs opposite to the stream of mere event.
How then, given the disposition to an ideal series a-b-c-d-e,
and given our actual presence at d, can we arrive at the past?
The result is gained in this way. Our present has a char-
acter associated with a, the beginning of the series, and so, by
means of a, we identify ourselves with and pass through the
series a-b-c-d-e. But this so far is not enough. This series
so far, it will be rightly said, can at best give us a future, and
it will not supply us with a past which lies behind us. Our
explanation, however, so far was incomplete, and our fuller
reply is as follows : (a) In order to perceive the past we
must not merely identify ourselves with the beginning of a
series, but that beginning must, also and as well, be incom-
patible with our present. That beginning must, beside its
identity with our present state, have also a further character
which prevents identification. If our present is Xd, then,
since x is associated with a, we through x ideally reconsti-
tute Xa, but the two,Xd and Xa, are or may be incompatible.
(6) And secondly, starting from this incompatible beginning
Xa, the series leads up to our actual present Xo", and can be
prolonged into the future. And this in principle is the ex-
planation required for our recovery and perception of the
past.
I will illustrate this first by a simple example which in
part is defective. I have seen a stone thrown and now
perceive it at my feet. It is the ideal identity of the stone
which reinstates its existence at the point of departure, an
existence incompatible with the present. And then that
incompatible sameness produces itself in series ideally till
it is one with the actual present perception. The illustra-
tion is, however, imperfect because it presupposes and makes
use of a fixed spatial order, and, whatever may be true of our
actual development, I cannot think that in principle such a
spatial series is involved. Let us then take another illustra-
tion. Let us suppose that in the same locality I am first wet
and cold and then dry and warm. Now my personal presence
150 p. H. BBADLEY:
in this place can by association restore in idea my wet and
cold presence in the same place, the two being both the same
and yet also incompatible and then an intermediate series,
say of lighting the fire, or of the sun's coming out, may unite
by an ideal prolongation the first with the second. It is by a
leap through ideal identity that we make ourselves one with
what is incompatible with our present, and this difference
being then connected by a series with our present, we have our
past, which is thus given both as sundered and as connected.
Such at least is the main principle involved though I cannot
attempt to work it out in its complex detail. The most in-
structive illustration is probably furnished by the fact of
double memory. That past from time to time is remembered
or forgotten which has or has not the special quality which
from time to time distinguishes the present. In this way at
least the facts can in principle be explained, and in some
cases the actual quality appears to have been discovered. 1
The above may be made clearer, perhaps, by a reply to a,
possible objection. You cannot in every case, it may be said,
show that what we remember is thus reproduced from the
present, and memory therefore, it may be urged, is im-
mediate and inexplicable except of course, like everything
else, by physiology. Now I should myself admit that the
reason why I remember this thing and not that often cannot
be found in my present psychical state. One might indeed
urge that the reason is in all cases there and has been
simply overlooked, but I am not myself prepared to en-
dorse this contention. For our present purpose I w y ould
rather take no account of unconscious states of mind,
and the contention seems not warranted by the facts
which we are able actually to observe. Certainly to argue,
on the other hand, that dispositions work without any
kind of support from my present psychical state would be
quite mistaken. The support is there always, though not
always, I admit, the special support to this one disposition
against another. And the cause of this special activity, I
am quite ready to add, is in some cases to be taken as initi-
ated merely cerebrally. But then I object that simply so
far and with no more than this we have no memory at all.
We have no memory until that which is reproduced is ideally
1 By Janet. See his Automatisme. The principle was long ago laid
down by Lotze. I would remark in this connexion that any one who
fails to see that the present character of my feeling is a basis of repro-
duction, and who argues as if that basis must either be something before
the mind, or else not psychical at all, does not in my opinion really
understand the doctrine of Association.
SOME REMABKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 151
separated from and is ideally connected with my present,
and this ideal separation and connexion is and must be
performed always in the way which I have described. 1 In
short, memory as immediate is to my mind a sheer miracle,
and I cannot accept a miracle even where I am assured that
it is due merely to the brain.
The past, we have so far seen, is perceived by means of
serial association, and, before I proceed, it is necessary to
warn the reader here against a dangerous misconception.
We have in the series a-b-c the association of b with a and of
c with 6 ; but we have not merely these separate associa-
tions, and, if we had no more than this, we should have no
series at all. For every series which we know is known by
us as one, and, if it had no real unity, the appearance of its
oneness would be inexplicable. But this unity involves, so
far as I can see, and consists in an ideal identity of character.
There is some one content that is present through and is de-
veloped by the series, and is qualified by and itself essentially
qualifies this series. But, if so, the members of the series
will be joined not merely by association with one another,
for each one must be associated also with one and the same
quality. There will hence in fact be no merely successive
association any more than there is any merely successive
perception. The division of association into that which is
simultaneous and that which is merely successive is in
principle vicious, and any enquiry based on it is foredoomed
to failure. The succession should be represented not as Xa-6
X
but rather as /\ . And so we perceive how the whole
a b
series may thus be thought of as one, and how the idea of
the whole is united with and so may reproduce any of the
members, singly or at irregular intervals, and again in either
direction. For beside the mere association of member with
member we have as its complement in every series the con-
1 If we wish to avoid mistake here, we must beware of confusion. We
must distinguish the exciting cause of a reproduction from the ground of
a memory. The ground of a particular memory is that which places it in
connexion with a certain member of my past series. But it may be
partially excited by that which cannot complete and so date it. A scent
may, for instance, remind me of a certain flower, which then by associa-
tion calls up its adjuncts involving a dated event in my life. The dating
associations here are not those which excite, and the latter may be very
fruil and slight indeed. The reproduced when excited then dates itself
by association with what is constructed from my present. If on the
contrary I go backwards or forwards retracing my life, the exciting cause
of a memory and its ground may be the same.
152 F. H. BEADLEY:
nexion of each member with the idea of the whole. 1 And
with this brief warning on a matter of the greatest import-
ance I must pass on to pursue further the subject of this
article.
We are aware of and think of the past as past always by
an ideal construction from the present, and the immediate
presentation of the past as such would be a gratuitous
miracle. But the past comes to us not by memory alone
but also in mere fancy and again by pure inference, and it
is clear that we are here concerned with serious differences.
I may for instance remember that yesterday I sent a letter
to the post, or I may imagine how I might have done this,
though in fact I know that I did not, or again, while I
cannot remember my act, I can perhaps prove that it
happened. I will now briefly discuss the nature of these
differences, beginning with mere fancy in its contrast with
thought, and taking thought here in the sense of proof or
inference.
How does mere imagination differ from inference ? The
question, difficult in itself, has been obscured by a fundamental
error, a superstition about the abstract nature of thought
proper. Deferring the consideration of this, I will state
briefly the true ground of distinction. In inference there is, or
at least there is supposed to be, a continuous necessity, and
there is necessity because in a word there is identity. The
self-same subject develops itself ideally in the process, and
is qualified in the conclusion. And it qualifies itself through-
out by itself, without the intrusion at any point of an
extraneous connexion. We say that b is c and c is d and d
is e, and each of these is not because of anything outside,
but simply. Hence A.b must be Ae because in the end it is
so. And whatever difficulties may be raised as to the possi-
bility of using in our actual practice this type, this type at
1 This consideration, I need hardly add, should never be lost sight of, as
at times it has been, in investigating the subject of "successive," "re-
gressive," and again "indirect " association. Another aspect of the same
problem is the existence of general forms or schemata of series. It seems
clear from abstract considerations as well as from particular facts that
these must exist and be used in the retaining of concrete series. Our
awareness of gaps and our transition over them, and our power of repre-
senting series in an abbreviated form point in this direction. But these
schemata, being themselves presumably psychical and associative, tend to
confirm the doctrine of our text. There are some results bearing on this
point in the investigations of Schomann and Miiller. The subject is both
very obscure and very difficult, and it deserves more attention than it
appears to have received, a remark which applies emphatically to the
perception of a series in general.
SOME REMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 153
least represents what we aim at and seek to find in inference.
It may help us to perceive this if we suppose that the type
is modified. Let us assume no longer that b is c simply,
but admit that b is c only by the help of x. The premise
must now be written b(x) is c, and the old conclusion will
not stand. We cannot any longer assert that A.b must be
A.e. It only may be so, and, so far as it is so, it is so because
of x. The A.b that is e is now not the A6 with which we
started. We can no longer assert that the subject has been
qualified throughout further without becoming something
else. The subject of the conclusion is A6 together with a
foreign condition x, and the conclusion is therefore con-
ditioned, and, if you assert it of mere A.b, it is conditional or
faulty.
It is a defect of this kind which vitiates the result of mere
imagination. That result we should agree has no necessity.
In my mind's wandering the subject A6 may have actually
now become A.-e, but we cannot add that the thing is so really
and of itself, for A6, also and just as actually, may become
something incompatible and may appear as A6-not-e. In
mere imagination, because the thing may be otherwise, it is
not really what it is. Necessity is not present, and necessity
is absent because there is a breach of identity. The subject
A.b becomes Ae, but you cannot add " of itself ". Something
extraneous has at some point entered in and has vitiated the
process, and you have passed from 6 to c not because b is c,
but only because the passage has happened. An element has
intervened not belonging directly to the pure essence of b, but
attached to b merely as b is now present in psychical fact ;
and it is this unknown addition, this x, which by a chance
association has carried A.b to e. Such is the defect in identity
which distinguishes mere imagination from inference, 1 and
where this defect is remedied imagination becomes at once
the strictest thinking.
It may be instructive to notice here the superstition to
which I referred. The distinction of mere imagination from
thought consists in the absence or presence of logical control,
and that control lies, as we have seen, in the preservation of
ideal identity. But where this principle has not been grasped
most incredible doctrines have found favour. Thought is
abstract, we may be assured, while imagination is concrete. 2
1 Compare my Principles of Logic, p. 410.
2 See for example Prof. Sully, Human Mind, I., p. 384. He finds
himself later in conflict with fact, and admits (p. 395, note) that the de-
marcation is " not to be taken absolutely ". But the real question surely
is whether the very principle of distinction is not false and contrary to fact,
154 F. H. BRADLEY :
Now I might ask if mere fancy may not be itself highly-
abstract, but, passing this by, I will go on to a plainer
objection. To maintain all thought to be abstract is to-
be brought into collision with evident facts. For the lower
animals surely can reason while they hardly are able to
think abstractly, except in certain theories. And in our
own lives the field covered by what is called intuitive under-
standing is certainly not all abstract or again on the other
side devoid of judgment and inference. An obvious instance
is the thinking and judging about spatial arrangements in
an individual case. And the writer who will assert that
such conclusions as He is the guilty man, or That is.
the right way, are either all abstract or are else not acts
of thought, is to my mind past argument. 1 Inference of
course is always abstract if that means that it implies,
analysis and selection, and involves always a principle of
necessity which can, or could conceivably, be abstracted.
But in any other sense judgment and inference need cer-
tainly not be abstract, but may be concrete to an indefinite
extent. In short, to set up imagination and thought as two-
separate faculties, and to speak of one using the other or
again being applied to its service, is from first to last erroneous
and indefensible. Imagination, if of a certain kind, is not
something employed by thought, but is itself thinking proper.
If, on the other hand, by mere imagination we mean our
mental flow so far as that is subjected to no control what-
ever, and is so not "used" at all, this certainly is not,
imagination in the higher sense of the word. Mere imagina-
tion, where regulated logically, itself is inference. And again,,
so far as serving other ends and subjected to other kinds of
control, it becomes and itself is contrivance, fancy and crea-
and, if so, how we can be jiistified in using it. If Prof. Sully's view is that
between thought and mere imagination there is in principle really no-
difference at all, that the distinction drawn between them is merely an
affair of language and convenience, and depends, perhaps usually though
certainly not always, on degree of concreteness, that is a doctrine which,
however unsatisfactory, would be intelligible. But such a doctrine hardly
entitles any one who holds it to speak of these processes as if they really
were two, to lay down a ground and principle of distinction, and to go on
to speak of " a connexion between the two" (p. 381). Such a position
seems quite inconsistent and indefensible, though I fear it is not un-
common.
1 1 am tempted to say this again of any one who can maintain that
thought must depend upon language. There arises here, of course, the
further question, how far thinking, which is not throughout dependent
on language, and which is in this sense intuitional, can be genuinely
abstract. This is an interesting and important question, but we are not
concerned with it here.
SOME REMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 155
tion in various forms, intellectual, practical and aesthetic.
It is the special nature of the end and the special nature of
the control which makes the difference in principle, and in
the case of inference we have seen in what that difference
consists. 1
From this our enquiry may return to the subject of memory.
The mere imagination of the past, we have seen, is, like in-
ference, an ideal construction from the present, and yet it fails
to be inference. Memory is also an ideal construction from
the present, and thus we are led to ask in what way memory
differs from inference and from fancy ; for that there is some
difference seems plain. I may, to repeat our instance, infer
that on last Monday I must have posted a letter, or I may
remember the fact, or again I may merely imagine it, and
these three attitudes are not the same. Now, as against
fancy, it is clear that memory has necessity. It does not
qualify its subject by a predicate the opposite of which can
also be remembered, and which for this reason does not
qualify the subject itself. Memory, in other words, is a judg-
ment and an assertion about its subject. Hence it is often
again said to involve belief, a point which I shall consider
lower down. Thus memory being a judgment is so far the
same as inference, and we must go on to ask if they are the
same altogether.
If inference is understood in the sense in which we have
taken it above, inference and memory certainly differ. For
in memory there is a sequence and a continuity which is
necessary, but on the other hand the necessity is not wholly
intrinsic, or, if wholly intrinsic, is not so visibly. We do not,
as in inference, go from A.b to A.bc, because b is c. The se-
quence in memory cannot be so stated. The premises are
not Ai, be, but must be written as A6, Be. Now certainly
b is contained in and is an element in B, but, with only so
much, the sequence fails to be logical. For you cannot logi-
cally proceed from Ab, Be, to A-c, unless you assume that Be
is equivalent, say, to 6-B-c, and not merely to b(x)-c. The
essential question is as to how the difference, which turns
1 I do not know whether Wundt (Grundzilge, II., p. 490) really means
to say that all imagination involves a plan and an idea which it develops.
Such a statement seems to be in collision with the obvious fact of mental
wandering. The nature of the different kinds of control over mere wan-
dering is, so far as I see, the only ground from which this whole question
could be satisfactorily treated. I certainly could not myself attempt that
treatment, and I do not myself know where to send the reader for satis-
faction. Wundt's exposition seems not only confused in detail but based
on no clear principle whatever. Such principles of division as " passive "
and " active " are, for instance, much worse than merely useless.
156 F. H. BBADLEY:
b into B and which so brings in c, is related to b, whether, in
short, and how far this difference is really accidental. Let
us take once more the example which we used above. When
I remember that on Tuesday last I sent my letter, the send-
ing does not follow of itself from the mere idea of myself on
last Tuesday. Thus I cannot prove that I sent the letter,
and I can even imagine that in fact I did not send it. The
connexion, therefore, between the day and the act is not
visibly logical, and it may be urged further that the connexion
is not logical at all. The predicate, it may be said, does not
in memory truly and really belong to the subject of the
process. The predicate, on the contrary, is added brutally
from without, and is attached by something quite external,
and in memory, therefore, as was the case with mere chance
imagination, ideal continuity is broken.
Now a breach of visible continuity I have agreed must be
admitted, and memory therefore will fall short of inference.
There is no proper inference where you predicate the con-
clusion of the subject because the subject is conditioned by
something not intrinsically developed from its own nature.
But in memory on the other hand the constraint is not
wholly external. For the necessity is taken to lie within
the content of the ideal process which develops the subject.
From the idea of myself on Tuesday I pass to the sending of
my letter because of something which belongs to the nature
of things which is taken as present at that date. The com-
pulsion in other words is assumed to come, not from mere
matter of fact, but from the special character of a certain
concrete fact. 1 We wrote the premises of inference as A6,
be, and of mere imagination as A6, Be, where B was
equivalent to b(x), and where about the x we could say
nothing whatever. But in memory that addition to and
condition of Z>, which constitutes B, is taken not to be a mere
x. The bond of union on the contrary is supposed to fall
within the area of a specified content. The result is there-
fore logical so far and not merely psychical. It is logical in
so far as the x has been partly determined, and so far as the
condition of the result has thus been brought within the
process, and no longer, as in mere imagination, falls outside
in the unknown. On the other hand, because the x cannot
further be specified, the result, though taken as necessary,
still falls short of a logical conclusion. For the condition
1 1 shall add at the end of this article some further remarks on the
logical difference between memory and imagination, and on the ambi-
guity of the term " matter of fact ". Mere imagination gives " matter
of fact," in one sense, more than memory does.
SOME KEMAEKS ON MEMORY AND INFEEENCE. 157
which carries A& to c may qualify A6 beyond its own
nature, and the conclusion therefore may not be true if you
predicate it of A6. And so far as in the proper sense we
remember, this ignorance and this inability is still implied. 1
In memory the predicate somehoio belongs to the subject by
the necessity of the content. The necessity is therefore in-
trinsic so far, since it falls within the process. On the other
hand, because it is not known to belong intrinsically to the
subject itself, we have no inference proper.
But though memory is not inference, in all memory an
inference is involved. To connect my letter with the idea
of last Tuesday I must first of all possess myself of that idea.
But this possession involves, as we saw, a process from the
present to something different, a process made through and
resting on a point of ideal identity ; and a passage of this sort
seems certainly to be an inference. From the present Ac I
go to the past C because of the c within C, and to go other-
wise is not possible. You may object that the initial difference
here between c and C is really external to c, just as again
the further connexions given by memory were admitted not
to be internal. This objection goes deep and would raise
questions which I cannot discuss in this paper, but for our
present purpose it may be dismissed. It would, if admitted,
show that we have a defective inference here, as perhaps almost
everywhere, and it would not show that we use no inference at
all. And the premise which is and must be employed is this
connexion of c with its difference, not taken as subject to the
condition of an individual case but as unconditioned and simple.
The connexion is of course not really simple in an absolute
sense, but it is simple in the sense of being taken as uncon-
ditioned by the present fact as such. And if you do not use
it so, you clearly cannot transcend the present at all. In other
words this connexion is not itself an affair of memory or of
" matter of fact," since it underlies these as their condition.
The connexion is direct, and the process where it is used, even
if it is used unjustifiably, I must therefore call an inference. 2
1 Hence to draw an inference from a recollection as such is not possible.
For the mere recollection implies that we have not got the premise which
we desire to employ. To draw an inference from one individual fact as
such to another fact is as impossible in fact as it would be senseless in
principle. So far as you remember, we may say, so far you are debarred
from reasoning. But on this subject I am confident that better ideas
are beginning to prevail both in psychology and in logic.
2 We see here that inference both logically and in time precedes
memory. I am convinced that, while in fact many or most of the lower
animals certainly reason, perhaps none of them is able to remember in
the proper sense of memory.
158 F. H. BBADLEY:
In the proper sense of inference then memory involves an
inference but itself really is not one. 1 If, however, the term
were used in a looser way, the answer might be different,
and the whole sequence might perhaps be called an inference.
It would be here as in a case which involves observation. I
may see a man and recognise him as a certain person by a
genuine inference, and I then may perceive him to act in a
certain manner. I may, on this, attribute the perceived act
to the inferred person, and this whole process might be
termed an inference. And in the same way memory also
might be called an inference, for the reason beside that it
does not involve perception. I do not think, however, that
we need here consider this looser use. Nor will I stop
here to discuss a possible attempt to confound inference
with memory on the ground that all inference in the end
is irrational habit. For the secondary distinction between
inference and memory proper would still remain, even if
both were in the end mere results of memory in the sense
of habit. I could not in this paper attempt to deal with
such a fundamental question, 2 and must pass on to another
branch of our enquiry.
1 The above and what follows may, I hope, justify the doctrine I have
stated elsewhere, that memory in its essence involves an inference and
so is inferential. I have never said or meant that memory consists in
mere inference, and that you could make the goodness of the inference a
test of memory. The question as to how memory, involving an inference,
differs from inference proper, was not discussed or raised by me at all.
The statement in my Logic, p. 75, as to the want of a point of identity
in mere imagination, is certainly, as it stands, obscure and perhaps mis-
leading. Whether my mind was clear when I wrote it I cannot now tell.
What I should have said is that wherever we take ourselves merely to
imagine, there not only is no intrinsical necessity attaching the result to
the starting-place, but we also recognise that the identity of the subject
is lost and that there is a breach in continuity. In memory, on the other
hand, though the result is not taken as the necessary ideal development
of the subject itself, yet we ignore the doubt as to a solution of con-
tinuity. We connect the end of the process with and attribute it to the
beginning, because the process comes to us from one end to the other
without an apparent break or loss of the subject and without the
suggestion of an alien intrusion, or again of a sufficient competing
alternative. In imagination the connexion between subject and predi-
cate is that of casual occupancy, but in memory we have possession
which to such an extent is de facto that the question of title is not
raised, or, if raised, it is assumed to be somehow satisfactorily settled.
With regard to the distinction between inference and mere imagination
that is given correctly in my Logic, p. 410.
2 A sceptical objection of this kind, if based on a psychological ground,
seems (Appearance, p. 137) inconsistent with itself. The proper way to
urge the objection is to compare the actual inferences which we must use
with that ideal of inference which alone we can take as satisfactory.
SOME BEMABKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 159
A memory, we have seen, is a state of mind which differs
from a mere imagination of the past, and in passing from
one to the other we are aware that we take a new attitude.
But how in the end can we tell that in memory our attitude
ia justified, and that our remembrance really is any better
than mere fancy ? So far, indeed, as we can apply inference
and can rationally construct the past order, we seem to stand
on safe ground. But when we are left at last with an idea
of the past which shows no visible inconsistency, but about
which we are able to find no further evidence, what test can
we apply ? The answer must be that we do not possess any
valid criterion. There are marks which give us a certain
degree of probability, and there are characters which more
or less strongly impel us to take the idea as real, but there
is in the end no criterion which is not fallible. I will briefly
mention the characters which usually distinguish what we
call a memory from a mere imagination. The interest of the
subject is in the main confined to psychology, we should find
some difficulties there into which I shall not enter, and the
order of my statement does not pretend to be systematic.
We may place first the characters of clearness and strength,
and in the next place fulness of detail, a detail which is not
visibly rational. Next may come the sense of familiarity,
and after that fixity of connexion, and I will then go on to
add a few remarks, (i.) I will not venture to ask here what
clearness and strength are to mean, but, whatever they mean,
a mere imagination may have as much or more of them than
a memory, and so much as this seems plain, (ii.) The same
may be said with regard to mere fulness of detail, for a
simple imagination may be very full in comparison with a
memory. The character of the detail is, however, a sign to
be noticed. If the particulars are many and yet appear as
an accidental conjunction, not depending upon any general
idea but all seemingly irrelevant, that, so far as it goes, is
a mark of genuine memory. But this mark of irrational
detail is, however, no test, (iii.) The sense of familiarity is
again deceptive. Its nature has been much discussed, 1 but
I think we may represent it as follows. There is in memory
an absence of strangeness. The detail comes without shock
to a mind which does not expect it and yet is already
adjusted to receive it. And this adjustment points to an
associative disposition set up by past experience, but it
x The word " assimilation " tends to introduce us here, in the pages of
Wundt and others, into a world of what I will venture to call the merest
mythology.
160 F. H. BRADLEY:
points ambiguously. For your present accidental mood
may favour and support strongly some idea about the past,
and this idea may in consequence strike you as natural
and true. And again a mere imagination, if you repeat it,
becomes in this way familiar, and itself thus creates the
inner association which then offers itself as a witness to
independent fact. And there is, once more here, no sure way
of distinction between the false and the true, (iv.) Fixity of
connexion is again not a trustworthy test. Where an idea
is connected with a certain date strongly and fixedly in such
a way that the opposite is maintained with difficulty, and
where in addition this connexion is constantly recurrent, we
tend to take it as memory. And where, besides this, the
detail appears as a mere conjunction of coinciding particulars,
we feel ourselves confirmed. But mere imagination is un-
fortunately well known to present all these features, and it
is impossible to find an infallible criterion or remedy. There
are certain characters which usually are the result of that
past fact to which the present idea refers. Foremost among
these is that fixity and necessity of non-rational but integral
detail which belongs to and points to an individual experi-
ence ; and, when to this is added the sense of familiarity,
then memory seldom fails to appear and is commonly justified.
But the above characters can each, and all together, be pres-
ent in a false imagination.
The veracity of memory is not absolute, and memory itself
is subject to the control of a higher criterion. Our justifica-
tion for regarding memory as in general accurate is briefly
this, that by taking such a course we are best able to order
and harmonise our world. There is in the end no other
actual or possible criterion of fact and truth, and the search
for a final fact and for an absolute datum is everywhere the
pursuit of a mere ignis fatuus. You may look for it in out-
ward perception, or you may seek it in inward experience
and intuition, but in each case you are misled by one and the
same error in a different dress. This is a subject too large
to be dealt with here as a whole, but I will notice before
proceeding a recent instructive attempt to prove that memory
is not fallible.
The position taken by Prof. Ladd on this point seems far
from clear. 1 I understand that for him it is a vital matter
to show that memory is at least in part infallible, but for
the rest his procedure seems obscure and even inconsistent
1 Philosophy of Mind, p. 133, foil. I have at present no acquaintance
with Prof. Ladd's other works.
SOME BEMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 161
with itself. He admits the extreme fallibility of memory in
detail, but contends that at least it cannot be wrong in its
assertion of my past existence. But how far, and in what
sense, when bared of or transformed in detail, my past
existence remains mine, is a matter not discussed, nor,
apart from this, is there any evidence produced for the
truth of the contention. If wherever else a witness can be
tested he is shown to be fallible, you can hardly assume
him to be infallible in or beyond a certain point, simply be-
cause in or beyond that point you have in fact always found
him to be right. And with regard to memory of my past
existence the case stands as follows. All the memories that
we can examine belong to minds which have had some
previous existence, and it is very probable that memory can
exist only as the result of some foregoing psychical develop-
ment, however short. And, if this is so, then memory will
be for this extraneous reason, and will be so far, infallible.
It will be infallible, we may say, accidentally and in fact,
but not in principle. Its evidence will depend on and be
restricted to that which is otherwise known. And such an
infallibility is, I presume, for Prof. Ladd's purpose useless.
And even so much as this can, perhaps, not be demonstrated.
For that memory should supervene suddenly at a certain
point of physiological development in such a way that its
report of a past psychical self would be wholly mistaken,
seems not clearly and in principle to be impossible. If so,
even the limited infallibility of memory seems not proved,
but in any case, even if proved, I have shown its dependent
nature. 1
From this obscure and unsafe position Prof. Ladd passes
to a second, which, itself untenable, seems not even consistent
with the first. All reasoning, he argues, goes from premises
to a conclusion, and our knowledge of the conclusion depends
upon our memory of the premises. Hence, if that is fallible,
every possible act of reasoning is discredited. Far then from
being able to show that memory is fallible, we have even to
assume the opposite if we intend to have any conclusion
whatever. And with this we have a sure and certain remedy,
Prof. Ladd argues, against the disease of scepticism. But
the ground of the argument seems to me incorrect, and the
1 If a man mistakenly remembers events ten years before he was born,
is it satisfactory to add : There you see at once that his memory is really
infallible, for he had, as a fact, some actual past (as you saw) before he
made that mistake about his past '? And even this amount of de facto
infsdlibility rests on the assumption I have noticed in the text. It is
therefore so far precarious, as well as in any case derivative.
11
162 F. H. BRADLEY :
conclusion drawn quite mistaken. The argument should
prove, it seems to me, that memory is not fallible at all.
Hence, when a particular memory is shown by reasoning to
be false, we are left, it would appear, in hopeless confusion.
For we must either accept both contradictories at once, or,
if we select, we select on no principle, and surely this must
be admitted to amount to scepticism. What we are to do
when memory is thus divided against itself, and how mere
memory is to sit in judgment on itself, are matters not
explained. In short, that argument for the supremacy of
reason which holds good against scepticism, becomes, if you
transfer it to memory, wholly and entirely sceptical. 1
Prof. Ladd's conclusion then is really sceptical, but the
foundation of his argument, to return to that, consists in
a mistake. It is not the case that reasoning depends on
memory, and such an idea implies a wrong view about in-
ference. In the first place in inference there need be no
premises drawn out and put before the mind, and a very large
tract of our reasoning must in this sense be called intuitive.
Prof. Ladd has seen this, but without more ado he drives
the evidence bodily out of court. Everything of this kind
is "a merely mechanical movement of the ideas," a con-
clusion which I venture to regard as quite monstrous and a
sufficient disproof of its foundation. That foundation is,
however, in itself untenable. To assume that in an inference,
where I go from premises to a conclusion, I depend upon
memory, is to maintain that in inference I am necessitated
en route not to know what I am about, and arrived at the end
must have forgotten, and so be forced to remember, the start-
1 How is mere memory to be a ruler and judge of itself ? I cannot see
how this is to be possible. If, on the other hand, memory is to subject
itself to the judgment of reason, I cannot see how anywhere it is to claim
independent authority, and to be treated as infallible or as more than
de facto not mistaken . These are points on which I seek enlightenment
so far in vain. If, for instance, it is urged that, in order to make the
world intelligible, I must postulate that memory is right, unless so far as
I have some special reason to think it anywhere wrong, I entirely agree.
Certainly, I reply, and without doubt, we must make this assumption.
But if, on this, I am told that, if so, we have an independent and ultimate
postulate, I am forced to demur. Most evidently not so, I answer, if the
assumption is made in order to make the world intelligible. If you leave
out that, then, I agree, the postulate becomes ultimate, but it becomes
at the same tune arbitrary and, so far as I see, quite indefensible. If
we are to think at all, we must postulate that reason is in principle in-
fallible, and is the ultimate judge of its own errors. But to postulate
that memory is in principle infallible seems to me to be, on the one
hand, wholly unnecessary and, for any legitimate purpose, quite useless ;
and, on the other hand, it appears to me to be in the end really quite
devoid of meaning.
SOME BEMABKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 163
ing-point and the way and this surely is erroneous. The
normal type of inference is surely the unbroken development
of an identical subject, which does not leave the mind by the
way and which, therefore, cannot possibly be remembered.
This is the normal type, and I will add that, so far as this
fails to be present, the operation is really not an inference. 1
With this I must pass from the subject of memory's falli-
bility.
I will add some words on the question which has been raised
about Belief. Memory, we saw, takes its ideas of the past as
real, while in mere imagination there is no such claim. It
is the addition of belief, then, we hear it said, which turns
imagination into memory, and our main task is to find in
what this addition consists, or at least to set it down as " a final
inexplicability ". But the whole question is in this way mis-
understood and the issue radically perverted. To take for
granted the existence of "mere ideas" as self-evident and as a
matter of course, and to treat belief in these as something
supervening, or even adventitious, which we have then got to
explain, is fundamentally erroneous. It is to make an assump-
tion quite false in its principle and in its consequences most
misleading. The presence of and the possibility of these
" mere ideas " is, on the contrary, the very thing which calls
most for explanation. No such ideas, we may say with con-
fidence, can possibly exist in an early mind. To entertain
an idea in which you do not believe, a suspended idea held
in separation from the presented reality, is a late and, when
we reflect, is an enormous mental achievement. It implies
a disruption of that immediate unity of theory and practice
which is at first throughout prevalent and is also necessary.
1 Even in an indirect argument where I divide A into A6 and Ac, and
then by disproving Ac prove A 6, I do not in the operation depend upon
memory. Certainly at the end of my disproof of Ac I may have forgotten
A6, but I then return to the beginning with the knowledge that A is not
c, and now with that in my mind reach the conclusion A6 from A. The
knowledge that A is not c does not here depend on memory. It might
so depend if, e.g., I had merely found in my notes that I had one day
proved Ac to be false, and if I used that bare result. But so far that
result obviously does not pretend to be itself made in my inference at all.
And with direct reasoning it seems clear that, so far as the subject has
lapsed from the mind by the way, there is properly no inference. The
operation, to become an inference, must in some form be repeated without
that lapse. The retention of an identical content before the mind, and
the assumption that where I have seen no difference by the way there is
no difference, can neither of them be called memory except by an abuse
of language. The points raised by Prof. Ladd are certainly well worth
raising and discussing, but his treatment of them seems not satisfactory.
164 F. H. BEADLEY :
At an early stage of mind, every suggestion which does not
conflict with the felt present is appropriated by that present
and is necessarily believed in, so far as we are able as yet to
speak of belief. The suggestion, on the other hand, which
is not believed in, cannot possibly be retained theoretically,
but, apart from appetite or fear, is banished forthwith. It
is not my business here to attempt to show how mere ideas
become possible, and again how far, and in what sense, the
simple entertainment of them still involves judgment and
their reference to a modified Reality. It is sufficient to
have noticed in passing a common mistake and to have
pointed out its nature. The main question, we may say,
is not about the plus of belief, but about the minus of
mere thinking. The main question in other words is, How
is it possible not to believe. Then, when that point is clear,
we may approach with confidence a different and subsequent
problem, What is the difference between primitive belief and
the belief or judgment which comes after doubt, and which
really does supervene upon our " mere ideas " ? And
when we have seen that mere ideas consist in the disruption
of a unity, we shall not find it hard to perceive the nature
of that which supervenes. It is the restoration of those ideas
to the unity from which they were separated, and to which
they are now once more joined in a higher sense. It is in
this restoration that we must seek and find the real nature
of that addition which we observe in belief. But the ques-
tion of the separation is fundamental, and, if it is ignored,
the whole enquiry is wrecked. 1
I should like to append to this paper some remarks on a
point to which I have adverted (p. 156), the question, that
is, about what is to be called " Matter of fact". So large a
1 In this matter Prof. Bain's doctrine of Primitive Credulity has been
of great service to psychology. I must, however, in passing remark that
I am forced largely to dissent from his view as to belief. I dissent further
from the mere identification of judgment with belief, but I cannot enter
here into the difference between them. I would further direct the reader's
attention to the fact that I may disbelieve in that which I certainly
remember. The memory is here a judgment necessary in and on its own
ground, but that region has here been disconnected from the world which
I call my real world. This attitude is, of course, my common attitude
towards the " imaginary ". The judgment will be here a kind of condi-
tional judgment. The difference I have noted between either the theoreti-
cal or practical acceptance of an idea after it has been held as a mere idea
and its acceptance previously, has great importance. There is a re-union
of the element, which was held aloof, once more with the felt reality. And
it is this re-union which gives that feeling of "consent " which has been
found so inexplicable.
SOME REMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE. 165
subject, it is obvious, cannot properly be discussed in passing,
and what follows, though not new, is offered merely in the
way of invitation to further enquiry.
" Matter of fact " seems a highly ambiguous phrase, and
for our present purpose we may distinguish three different
senses, or three aspects of one sense. (1) The word may
stand for that which is merely felt or is simply experienced,
something which therefore excludes, so far, anything like
judgment, truth, or falsehood. In this meaning of the word,
imagination, memory and observation all alike are above, or
if you please are below, matter of fact, for their connexions
are all more or less analytic and abstract. (2) On the other
side, these connexions will be matter of fact in varying
degrees in proportion as they are external and apparently
devoid of any intrinsic reason. (3) And again, they may be
matter of fact as belonging to and as dependent on a certain
point in our "real" series. It is on these two later shades of
meaning that I am about to make some very brief remarks. 1
The "merely imaginary" marks the farthest extreme of
matter of fact in the second of our senses. It is not an affair
of mere sense, since it qualifies a subject by an ideal pre-
dicate ; but its bond of connexion, on the other side, is bare
matter of fact. This connexion or conjunction on the one
hand is actually there, but on the other hand it seems
entirely irrational, since there is no more reason for it than
for its diametrical opposite. The connexion therefore is, but
it is true and real only by virtue of unknown conditions, and
therefore in an unknown form. You pass from subject to
predicate not on any ground which appears as intrinsic, not
because of anything which seems comprised in your content,
but on the strength of what falls outside. This unknown
bond is for you no more than the nature of the universe at
large, and you may call it matter of fact in general. In this
sense of matter of fact memory and observation possess less
of it than does mere imagination.
But if we pass from the second to the third sense of our
term, and understand matter of fact not as general but as
special and individual, the case is altered, and observation
and memory must now be admitted to stand above mere
imagination. For in them the predicate is not attached to
the subject by a merely unknown cause, but is taken as con-
nected with it by the nature of what appears at a certain
1 A man is, I presume, called for good or evil a " matter of fact " person,
according as he confines himself to the actual events of what we call
"our real world," in opposition either to the "imaginary" or again to
wide general principles of truth and conduct.
166 F. H. BRADLEY : REMARKS ON MEMORY AND INFERENCE.
point of our real series. Their truth therefore belongs to,
and is conditioned by, what is known at least in part. The
connexion on the one side remains outward and an unin-
telligible conjunction, so far as its bond, though localised, is
not made explicit. The condition cannot be specified and so
brought within the subject, and the judgment to this extent
remains irrational and mere matter of fact. But on the
other side, so far as the connexion falls within, and is con-
ditioned by, a limited area of content, so far as it belongs, in
other words, to a special matter of fact, it has so far already
ceased to be a mere conjunction, and has become intrinsic
and rational. 1
It is impossible within these limits to attempt to show how
the process once begun is carried farther. The growth of
our knowledge consists, we may say, in the sustained
endeavour to get rid of mere matter of fact, to make the
bond of connexion explicit, and to bring the condition of
the predicate within the content of the subject. A genuine
and complete truth cannot be confined within one part of
our real series, but, to be complete and genuine, must take
in the rest. And observation, if repeated, 2 and in a higher
degree artificial experiment, transcend the individual case
and pass into general truth, truth not conditioned by the
fact of any date. But whether in the end, and, if so, how
far and in what sense, the externality of the predicate can
wholly disappear, is a question which here cannot be dis-
cussed.
1 A mere imagination, if you take it as an occurrence in my history,
belongs to matter of fact in the above sense of limited and individual
fact. But this is because you have taken it not logically but psycho-
logically. If you confine yourself to its logical aspect and consider it
with reference merely to what it asserts, it is of course so far not an event
in my life and a thing which can be observed. It so far is not matter of
fact, but possesses matter of fact in the sense of matter of fact in general.
2 In this respect memory remains inferior. To speak broadly and
apart from a certain qualification, we have in memory a mere result
which cannot be developed, and we cannot, as in continued and repeated
observation, enquire further into the conditions of the result. For in
memory (in the main) we are not in direct contact with these special
conditions.
II. SOCIAL AUTOMATISM AND THE
IMITATION THEORY. 1
BY B. BOSANQUET.
1. IN applying the psychological conception of Automa-
tism to a human community, I have in mind such cases
of secondary Automatism as dressing oneself, walking, read-
ing and writing. It is an analogy drawn from habits of
this type, that seems to throw light on a fundamental
problem of political philosophy.
In the individual life-history, such habits as these, we
are told, subserve the end of an economy of attention.
The greater part of our life depends upon actions which we
have "learnt" with pains and exclusive preoccupation;
but which, when once learnt, we can carry on while giving
the bulk of our attention to something more worthy of a
mature consciousness. Growth and progress of the mind
depend on this relation. If we had never done learning
to read and write, we should never be able to spare the
attention needed to master a science or to compose a
treatise. What can be done by machinery, is progressively
handed over to machinery, while attention busies itself
with the organisation of fresh experience.
If the analogy is sound, which suggests itself between
the individual and the community in this respect, the ideal
of political nihilism is exploded. For our conception would
indicate that social life is necessarily and increasingly con-
stituted by adjustments which have become automatic,
and are in a large measure withdrawn from public attention.
The formation of such adjustments would then appear to
be the condition of social progress. A definite habit of
orderly action, which receives the imprimatur of the State,
and is thus put beyond the range of discussion, effects an
economy of attention. The public mind is no longer pre-
occupied with it ; it becomes part of the rationalised sub-
structure of conscious life, and subserves the social end,
while, so far as it is concerned, setting free the social mind
for new ideas.
1 Read before the Aristotelian Society.
168 B. BOSANQUET :
Now it might be urged that the character of automatism
is even more natural and necessary in social activities than
in those which we primarily regard as individual. For the
condition of automatism is a considerable degree of routine.
And while routine is useful to individual life, in so far as
it takes a definite shape, with activities which repeat them-
selves, it is absolutely essential to co-operative existence.
At every point, in the complicated work of a civilised society,
we have to reckon infallibly upon the action of others with-
out conscious arrangement or special agreement. Once
people walking in the streets fought for the " crown of the
causeway"; then they turned out of each other's way as
chance might dictate ; and then, as Dr. Johnson tells us,
the habit grew up that the pedestrian kept to the right.
This habit has not passed into law in England, but it easily
might do so as foot-passengers over the bridge at Dresden
find that it has done and as the rule of the road for vehicles
has done. The same account may be given of all the daily
conduct of a law-abiding citizen. It moves in certain
routines, determined by habit and sanctioned by law ; and
it is this characteristic alone which enables the enormously
complex life of a modern community to be carried on in
such a way that, so far from absorbing, it progressively
liberates the attention of its members from the maintenance
of its necessary conditions.
It is noticeable that in these habits the work of the best
minds may be embodied ; so that while we economise our
attention we are actually better guided than our own best
attention could have guided us.
When we speak of the State using force or coercion upon
individuals, by far the greater part of what we mean consists
in the fact that each private mind is rooted in the common
life by interlocking adjustments which have become automatic
to all. By being thus rooted, its capacities and faculties are
immeasurably extended ; and this extension of the private
mind, which is a consolidation of it with the social fabric,
must inevitably in certain cases act upon it as force. We
are necessarily under certain circumstances dragged along
with the vast machine whose powers we use as our own.
The intentional and deliberate coercion used by the State
through law and punishment is only a recognition and
regulation of this inevitable situation, on which as we have
seen the possibility of progress depends.
And we are in agreement with the best theory of punish-
ment if we regard it from a point of view in harmony with
this analogy. It is not the furnishing of a new motive to
SOCIAL AUTOMATISM AND THE IMITATION THEORY. 169
make us do or omit, by the weighing of pains against
pleasures, what otherwise we should have violently objected
to doing or omitting. It is not essentially directed against
intentional rebellion, and would not be rendered superfluous
if all men became well-meaning. It is much more analogous
to the start of pain which recalls us to ourselves when an
automatic activity has failed to be self-regulating. We
stumble in walking and hurt our foot ; we pull ourself
together, give full attention for a moment, and see that we
were off the path ; we take care to get on to it again, and
give more heed to our steps in the future. As long as an
imperfect mind has to meet progressive requirements, and
to maintain a complex activity in excess of its powers of
attention, a system of such reminders will be essential to
society.
It must be noted that in a society a great deal of individual
consciousness may be devoted to activities which are in the
social sense automatic. That is to say, when anything has
been reduced to routine by the public will, and handed over
to a special class to carry out, then, as a matter of principle,
it is in most cases withdrawn from the active attention of
the community as such and of the bulk of its members,
although a certain class are continuously occupied with it.
The functions of the police are a case in point. It is plain
that a difference exists between functions to which on the
whole the maximum attention of the community is due, and
functions which demand no attention, so to speak, for their
own sake, but only in as far as is necessary to maintain
order and freedom.
2. With reference to the rank or quality of these automatic
activities a suggestion may be made in connexion with the
biological principle of " short cuts," bearing on the problem
of character and circumstance.
It seems to be an accepted principle 1 that " animals may
perform movements which seem to be voluntary, with a
nervous apparatus which would be inadequate to their per-
formance by the child or man ". The apparatus which
represents a higher stage of mind has so encroached upon
the independence of that which represents a lower stage,
that the latter, in man, can no longer cany out the work
which in the dog, for example, it will be able to take upon
itself. A man, we are informed, can never recover his sight
after the lesion of a certain higher brain centre ; in the dog
a lower brain centre still retains the power of taking over
1 See Baldwin, Mental Development in the Child and the Pace, p. 20 ff.
170 B. BOSANQUET:
the work of vision, and the dog, after the same operation,
may recover his sight. 1
It is not, perhaps, altogether fanciful to trace a transfor-
mation of this kind in the world of volition. It is often
maintained that the simple and sensuous conditions which,
as stimuli to actions, determine the life of primitive societies,
and differentiate the hunter from the shepherd, and the
shepherd from the tiller of the soil, continue to be the essen-
tial determinants of action the true causal factors of the
moral world throughout the life of higher societies. But
development follows a subtler course than this, and the unity
of miud is more thorough than such a doctrine admits. The
simplest life-maintaining activities of civilised man are con-
ditioned by far-reaching ideas, and if the capacity for these
ideas perishes, the simpler stimuli which might have sufficed
in an earlier phase are unable to carry out the task of pro-
viding for existence. The maintenance of material conditions-
has been transferred to the higher moral powers the co-
operative qualities demanded by a complex society. But
by this transference the simple impulses of love and hunger
have become unable to govern the world, as once, perhaps,
they did. An objection may be made to the precise nerve
of the analogy, on the ground that it is one thing to say that
a simple impulse is inadequate to a more complex problem,
and another to say that the simple impulse has lost even the
power which it previously possessed. But tbe two cases are not
really separable. The transference has taken place because the
work to be done came to be beyond the reach of the lower
capacity ; and the disabling reaction upon the lower capacity
itself is a matter of degree, and is always in such cases more
or less evident. It would be easy to show that the motor
effectiveness of the simpler impulses has been greatly im-
paired by the transference of their function to completer
forms of volition. The phenomena of stationary populations
are a case in point.
3. I may now say something of the antithesis of Imitation
and Invention, which, under the form of Habit and Accom-
modation is alleged to permeate man's social being.
It is clear that in analysing the mind or minds of men in
society, with reference to their social character, we have to
deal at once with phenomena of identity and with phenomena
of difference. The minds which form the mind of a given
community have certain features in common as unquestion-
ably as they have certain features which are individual. And
1 See Baldwin, Mental Development in the Child and the Race, p. 20 if.
SOCIAL AUTOMATISM AND THE IMITATION THEORY. 171
it is an elementary fact of psychology that ideas, habits and
actions tend to propagate themselves by suggestion through
a number of minds which have the opportunity of acting
upon each other. We are not therefore surprised to be told
that imitation the tendency to reproduction of suggestion
is a notable fact in the working of social intelligence.
There is an aspect in which one individual may be regarded
as a similar repetition of another, and the propagation of
fashions or impulses throughout a multitude may be regarded
as the imitation of one by others, and the repetition by others
of the suggestion presented by one.
Nevertheless, upon a scrutiny of the true operative nature
of social unity, we find that repetition and similarity are bat
superficial characteristics of it. What hold society together,
we find, are its correlative differences ; the relation which
expresses itself on a large scale in the division of labour, or
in Aristotle's axiom " No State can be composed of similars ".
And we look to our social psychologists for a recognition of
the element of adapted difference apart from which co-
operation and co-existence are impossibilities. But here,
it would almost seem, a technical difficulty bars the way.
Imitation, or the propagation of similarities among simi-
lars, holds the field as an account of the common features
of a society. But no differentiation can be got out of the
tendency to reproduce a copy per se ; and we seem none the
less brought to a deadlock that we are supplied with the
word "invention," to indicate the desired well-spring of
novelty and individuality. Somehow, we are given to
understand, the individual invents, and then, as we can
easily imagine, his invention is generalised by the universal
tendency to " take suggestion as a cat laps milk ".
But here we seem to have an aw r kward dualism. Imita-
tion and similarity divide the province of mind unequally with
invention and difference ; and instead of operating through-
out with the same indivisible nature, intelligence appears to
have an inexplicable preference for creation in some cases
and for propagation in others. And the results are un-
satisfying. The theory of a social mind is reduced by M.
Le Bon to the explanation of impulsive emotion in a mob
the mere propagation of similitudes, as if critical discussion
and the collation of points of view were a thing unknown in
the formation of the social will. Even for M. Durkheim
the spheres of similitude and of difference are wholly dis-
parate ; and the force put upon facts in order to demonstrate
that penal and industrial law (corresponding to similitude
and difference respectively) occupy different regions of the
172 B. BOSANQUET :
social territory is enough to show that some fundamental
assumption is leading us astray.
If we turn to Prof. Baldwin's analysis, we find, as we
might expect, a resolute repudiation of dualism. "We 1
cannot divide the child into two parts, two realities coming
up to the facts of life with different capabilities, one fitted
only to imitate, and the other fitted to invent. Of course it
is the same child whatever he does ; and if he be gifted with
the power of invention at all, this power should show itself
in all that he does even in his imitations." He recognises
that frequently in discussion "the two types of function are
as far removed from each other as the letters vs put between
them would suggest ".
But we have seen protests of this kind before, and we
know that they decide nothing. For, only too often, they
herald no comprehensive principle of unity, but a resolution
of one thing into terms of another, the other being a mere
fragment of the whole in which both should be comple-
mentary aspects. Have we not, I ask with diffidence in
presence of Prof. Baldwin's suggestive and laborious re-
searches have we not, in principle, got a case of this kind
here ? I have heard it said, perhaps too curtly, that Prof.
Baldwin explains invention as the failure to imitate. He
does not use the phrase ; but does not the theory and de-
scription of the child's invention bear it out ? 2 If the
criticism is justified, his theory will remind us of the famous
definition of mythology as a disease of language the work
of poetic imagination being regarded as a degeneration of
the meanings of words. In some degree, indeed, as I under-
stand him, " the valuable variations of thoughts are clearly
more or less determined in their direction by reason of the
particular system in which they occur ". 3 But yet, it would
seem, in the main they have to be picked out by selection, 4
and therefore are conceived as after all mere variations, gene-
rated in an attempted imitation, and presented for a choice of
survivors to be made from them, not thought-products with
an inherent rule and direction which govern the adapted
difference with which they come into being. In as far as
the pregnant passages just alluded to can be shown to
contain the essentials of the view to which I am about to
refer, I shall admit my criticism to have been unjustified.
Subject to this reservation, it appears to me that the whole
tradition of the sociological psychology in question is vitiated
by a fallacy which has its roots in the atomic doctrine of
1 Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, p. 90.
2 16., pp. 105, 107. 3 Ib. id., 96. * 16., 120.
SOCIAL AUTOMATISM AND THE IMITATION THEORY. 173
Association. The importance attached to repetition of simi-
lar units, as an analysis of society, and as an analysis of
habit, betrays this origin. If the unity of the social mind is
primarily a repetition or multiplication of resemblances, and
if the modus operandi of mind as such is primarily the rein-
statement of a perception or idea similar to a copy which
has been previously presented to the mind from without, we
see the ground of the difficulty which has been felt in locating
the origin of difference, 1 which is introduced under the names
of accommodation or invention as against the typical pro-
cesses of habit and imitation. As I read the story, Prof.
Baldwin, having started like others with this impossible
point of view, is working with immense ingenuity to remould
it. In doing so, he strains the idea of imitation, in two
degrees, beyond its normal meaning. Its normal meaning
I take to be the reproduction by a sensitive or conscious
subject of some trait presented to it from without, because
of its being presented. The typical meaning which Prof.
Baldwin assigns to it is however already an extension of
this, including any reaction by which in consequence of a
certain stimulus an organism secures to itself more of the same
stimulus, as e.g., when an organism approaches a source of
light or warmth. It is plain that here we are beyond the
limits of the repetition of a trait or movement presented as a
copy ; and we are taken one more remove beyond this normal
meaning of imitation, when it is suggested that we are
essentially imitating in every act of will. " What are we
really bringing about in willing anything? Are we not
hoping that through us a kind of experience, object, thing,
in the world, may be brought about after the pattern of our
idea or purpose?" 2 Here the origin of our operative idea
is wholly lost sight of, and the imitation lies in the passing
of the idea into fact.
In all this, then, we have got far beyond the reproduction
of a given copy in our operative ideas ; and in being extended
to cover volition the passing of idea into fact imitation
has lost its differentia, and ceases to offer any account of the
relation of action or ideas to previous actions or ideas of
ourselves or of others. For the origin of difference, there-
1 This suggestion is confirmed by the passage quoted from Prof. Royce ;
Social and Ethical Interpretations, p. 233, note. The tendency to find a
special and separate explanation for phenomena of difference really seems
to indicate something fundamentally imperfect in the writer's conception
of unity and identity. I repeat a hackneyed illustration. The type of
co-operative unity is not to be found in such a relation as that between
two similar screws, but only in that between a screw and its nut.
2 Mental Development, etc., p. 382.
174 B. BOSANQUET :
fore, we must look not to this extended account of imitation,
but to the passage in which imitation and invention are
explained and reconciled. And there, as we said above, it
is unquestionable that a strong effort is being made to weld
the two together, but it seems no less unquestionable that
the welding is artificial, and must be so, so long as we start
from the point of view of similarity and imitation, which as
such have no essential aspect of difference. The process of
imitation is to reproduce a copy. In this reproduction we
are told a variation may arise from accessory circumstances,
which may be selected as valuable, and that is an invention.
Can there be a doubt that we are here working with the
machinery of Association by Similarity, and the old notion
of a rack full of photograph slides stored in the mind, each
of which is in the normal case reproduced without modi-
fication? Additional stimuli, it appears to be intended,
may produce additional reactions, which form variations
which have to be reconciled with the imitation-reaction, as
parts of a system ; but this is quite different from saying that
the reaction to stimulus is ipso facto proportional to the place
of the stimulus in a system. I can find in the whole theory
absolutely no suggestion, unless there was some hint of it in
the brief passage referred to above, that the mind can appro-
priate a law or principle the scheme of a whole, and naturally
and necessarily differentiate its reactions in accordance with
the bearing of such a principle on the new situation presented.
And yet to the student of social philosophy such a doctrine
is an absolutely fundamental necessity. Nothing of serious
importance happens by genuine imitation. There is no grain
of truth in the restriction of invention to the individual, as
opposed to generalisation which takes place by a plurality of
individuals copying the one. All the business of society goes
on by differentiated reactions. We never do simply what
another person does. We do something different, which has
a definite reference to it. I do not build my house. I give
instructions and I pay for it; and of all the persons concerned,
no one simply reproduces the action of another ; but all do
different things as determined by the scheme or law of action
which is the universal working in their minds. The house
is an invention, and a joint invention, a universal in which
many minds have met. Pure imitation is an extreme sub-
case of this principle, a sub-case in which differentiation is
at a minimum. But strictly speaking, differentiation is
always there. Even if I buy a straw hat because my neigh-
bour has one, I buy one that fits me, and not one that fits
him. Every man in society is what he is through a law or
scheme which assigns him an individual position, differing
SOCIAL AUTOMATISM AND THE IMITATION THEORY. 175
from all others, and identified with them precisely through
these differences, by which alone he can co-operate with
them. Similarities are superficial consequences of the rela-
tions which identity in difference prescribes.
The error, then, if I am right, springs from working with
Similarity instead of Identity. Directly we introduce Identity,
Difference falls into its place as an inherent aspect of the
principle, and we understand that no reconciliation is needed,
but the universal is unity manifested in difference from the
beginning and throughout.
In the laws of habit, thought and action, Identity exhibits
itself in the shape of Relative Suggestion ; the point of which
is that the mind is reproductive not of a similarity, but ac-
cording to a universal, the more or less systematic scheme of
a whole. I need not enlarge on the conception in question,
which is familiar to readers of Mr. Stout's Analytic Psychology.
I will only insist on two points ; first, that it follows imme-
diately from the substitution of Identity for Similarity in the
theory of Association ; and, secondly, that it at once satisfies
the absolute demand of social experience, for a doctrine that
will show why we never do simply what others do, but always
something different from what they do and definitely related
to it. The whole idea of the social mind has, in my view,
been narrowed and distorted by the failure to grasp the
importance of this principle, and it has not been understood
that all social co-operation necessarily involves a unity of
intelligence and habit which is in its nature logical and in-
ventive ; the invention not being confined within individual
minds, but being simply an aspect of the differentiated
reactions, by which a co-operative body taken as a whole
endeavours to be equal to the situation at a given moment.
Every action, without any exception, is in principle a differ-
ence within an identity. The use of language is a familiar
example. Every application of a word has an element of
originality, and when the slightest difficulty of expression
occurs the aspect of invention becomes emphatic, and is
attended with noticeable pleasure. I have taken this oppor-
tunity of explaining my position towards the Imitation theory,
partly because in a forthcoming work, which afforded me no
space for psychological discussion, I have been obliged to
refer very briefly to the views of Prof. Baldwin and others. 1
1 1 regret that Prof. Baldwin's Presidential Address on " Selective
Thinking," delivered in December, 1897, only came into my hands at the
moment when the present paper was being sent to press. So far as I
can judge, it confirms my view that Prof. Baldwin occupies a position
intermediate between that of Associationism and that of Relative Sug-
gestion, with a tendency towards the latter.
III. THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 1
BY G. E. MOORE.
" TEUTH and falsehood," says Mr. Bradley (Logic, p. 2),
" depend on the relation of our ideas to reality." And he
immediately goes on to explain that, in this statement,
"ideas" must not be understood to mean mere "states of
my mind ". The ideas, he says, on the relation of which to
reality truth depends, are "mere ideas, signs of an existence
other than themselves," and this aspect of them must not
be confused either with their existence in my mind or with
their particular character as so existent, which may be called
their content. "'For logic, at least," he says, "all ideas
are signs " (p. 5) ; and " A sign is any fact that has a mean-
ing," while " meaning consists of a part of the content
(original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the mind, and con-
sidered apart from the existence of the sign " (p. 4).
But Mr. Bradley himself does not remain true to this
conception of the logical idea as the idea of something. As
such, indeed, it is only the psychological idea, related,
indeed, to that which it signifies, but only related to it.
Hence he finds it necessary, later, to use "idea," not of the
symbol, but of the symbolised. Ideas, as meanings, not as
"facts, which have a meaning," "are," he says (p. 8),
" the ideas we spoke of, when we said ' Without ideas no
judgment'". And he proceeds to show that "in predica-
tion we do not use the mental fact, but only the meaning " ;
although, where he did say "Without ideas no judgment,"
his words were " we cannot judge until we use ideas as
ideas. We must have become aware that they are not
realities, that they are mere ideas, signs of an existence other
than themselves." It would seem plain, then, that there
his doctrine was that we do, in predication, use the mental
fact, though only as a sign ; whereas here his doctrine is
that we do not use the mental fact, even as a sign, but only
that which it signifies. This important transition he slurs
over with the phrase : " But it is better to say the idea is
the meaning". The question is surely not of which is
"better to say," but which is true.
1 Bead before the Aristotelian Society.
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 177
Now to Mr. Bradley's argument that " the idea in judg-
ment is the universal meaning " I have nothing to add. It
appears to me conclusive, as against those, of whom there
have been too many, who have treated the idea as a mental
state. But he seems to me to be infected by the same error
as theirs, alike in his preliminary failure to distinguish
clearly whether it is the symbol or the symbolised of which
he is speaking, and in his final description of the " idea, as
meaning," when he has definitely decided in its favour.
"A meaning," he says, as we saw above, "consists of a
part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by
the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the
sign." And again, "an idea, if we use idea of the meaning,
is neither given nor presented, but is taken" (p. 8). If
indeed "the universal meaning" were thus simply a part
of the content of our own ideas, as mental states, and that,
too, a part "cut off" by our own minds, it would be intel-
ligible that " truth and falsehood " should still be said to
" depend on the relation of our ideas to reality ". It will be
our endeavour to show, on the contrary, that the " idea used
in judgment " is not a part of the content of our ideas, nor
produced by any action of our minds, and that hence truth
and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of our ideas
to reality.
I shall in future use the term "concept" for what Mr.
Bradley calls a " universal meaning " ; since the term
" idea " is plainly full of ambiguities, whereas " concept "
and its German equivalent " Begriff" have been more
nearly appropriated to the use in question. There is, in-
deed, a great similarity between Kant's description of his
" Begriff," and Mr. Bradley's of his " logical idea ". For
Kant, too, it is the " analytical unity of consciousness "
which makes a " Vorstellung " or "idea" into a " conceptus
communis" or " gemeinsamer Begriff" (R.V., p. 116 n.).
It is our object to protest against this description of a I
concept as an " abstraction " from ideas.
Mr. Bradley's doctrine, as above sketched, presupposes
that, when I have an idea (Vorstellung) of something, that
something is itself part of the content of my idea. This
doctrine, for the present, I am ready to admit ; my question
now is whether, when I have an idea of something, that
something must not also be regarded as something other
than part of the content of my idea. The content of an
idea is, Mr. Bradley tells us, what the idea is ; it is " a
character which is different or distinguishable from that of
other " ideas, treated as mental facts. Now, before I can
12
178 G. E. MOORE :
judge at all on Mr. Bradley's theory, a part of this character
must have been " cut off and fixed by the mind ". But my
question is, whether we can thus cut off a part of the
character of our ideas, and atttribute that part to something
else, unless we already know, in part at least, what is the
character of the idea from which we are to cut off the part
in question. If not, then we have already made a judgment
with regard to the character of our idea. But this judgment,
again, requires, on Mr. Bradley's theory, that I should have
had an idea of my idea, and should have already cut off a
part of the content of that secondary idea, in order that I
may make a judgment with regard to the character of the
primary idea that is in question. And similarly it is quite
impossible that I should know what the content of my
secondary idea is, until I have made it in its turn the object
of a third idea, by taking part of this tertiary content. And
so on ad infinitum. The theory would therefore seem to
demand the completion of an infinite number of psycho-
logical judgments before any judgment can be made at all.
< jr/bJ* But such a completion is impossible ; and therefore all
judgment is likewise impossible. It follows, therefore, if we
are to avoid this absurdity, that the ' idea used in judgment '
must be something other than a part of the content of any
idea of mine. Mr. Bradley's theory presupposes that I may
have two ideas, that have a part of their content in common ;
but he would at the same time compel us to describe this
common part of content as part of the content of some third
idea. But what is gained by such a description? If the
part of content of this third idea is a part only in the same
sense, as the common part of the other two is a part of each,
then I am offering an explanation which presupposes that
which was to be explained. Whereas if the part, which is
used in explanation, is a part in the only sense which will
make my explanation significant, i.e., an existent part, then
it is difficult to see how that which belongs to one idea can
also come to belong to other ideas and yet remain one and
the same. In short, the idea used in judgment is indeed a
' universal meaning ' ; but it cannot, for that very reason, be
described as part of the content of any psychological idea
whatever.
These difficulties, which are of the same nature as the
famous T/HTO? avQp<t>Tro<; urged against the hypostasised Pla-
tonic ideas, inevitably proceed from trying to explain the
concept in terms of some existent fact, whether mental or
of any other nature. All such explanations do in fact pre-
suppose the nature of the concept, as a genus per se, irre-
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 179
ducible to anything else. The concept is not a mental fact,
nor any part of a mental fact. Identity of content is pre-
supposed in any reasoning ; and to explain the identity of
content between two facts by supposing that content to be
a part of the content of some third fact, must involve a
vicious circle. For in order that the content of the third
fact may perform this office, it must already be supposed
like the contents of the other two, i.e., having something in
common with them, and this community of content is exactly
what it was proposed to explain.
When, therefore, I say " This rose is red," I am not attri-
buting part of the content of my idea to the rose, nor yet
attributing parts of the content of my ideas of rose and
red together to some third subject. What I am asserting
is a specific connexion of certain concepts forming the total
concept "rose" with the concepts " this" and " now" and
"red"; and the judgment is true if such a connexion is
existent. Similarly when I say " The chimera has three
heads," the chimera is not an idea in my mind, nor any part
of such idea. What I mean to assert is nothing about my
mental states, but a specific connexion of concepts. If the
judgment is false, that is not because my ideas do not corre-
spond to reality, but because such a conjunction of concepts
is not to be found among existents.
With this, then, we have approached the nature of a pro-
position or judgment. A proposition is composed not of
words, nor yet of thoughts, but of concepts. Concepts are
possible objects of thought ; but that is no definition of
them. It merely states that they may come into relation
with a thinker ; and in order that they may do anything,
they must already be something. It is indifferent to their
nature whether anybody thinks them or not. They are
incapable of change ; and the relation into which they enter
with the knowing subject implies no action or reaction. It
is a unique relation which can begin or cease with a change
in the subject ; but the concept is neither cause nor effect of
such a change. The occurrence of the relation has, no
doubt, its causes and effects, but these are to be found only
in the subject.
It is of such entities as these that a proposition is com-
posed. In it certain concepts stand in specific relations
with one another. And our question now is, wherein a
proposition differs from a concept, that it may be either true
or false.
It is at first sight tempting to say that the truth of a
proposition depends on its relation to reality ; that any pro-
180 G. E. MOOEE :
position is true which consists of a combination of concepts
that is actually to be found among existents. This explana-
tion was indeed actually used above (p. 179), as a preliminary
explanation. And it may be admitted that propositions with
which this is the case are true. But if this constituted the
truth of a proposition, concepts too might in themselves be
true. Red would be a true concept, because there actually
are red things ; and conversely a chimera would be a false
concept, because no such combination either has been, is, or
will be (so far as we know) among existent things. But the
theory must be rejected as an ultimate one, because not all
true propositions have this relation to reality. For example
2 + 2 = 4 is true, whether there exist two things or not.
\ Moreover it may be doubted here whether even the concepts
I of which the proposition consists, can ever be said to exist.
We should have to stretch our notion of existence beyond
intelligibility, to suppose that 2 ever has been, is, or will be
an existent.
It would seem, in fact, from this example, that a proposi-
f tion is nothing other than a complex concept. The difference
between a concept and a proposition, in virtue of which the
latter alone can be called true or false, would seem to lie
merely in the simplicity of the former. A proposition is a
synthesis of concepts ; and, just as concepts are themselves
immutably what they are, so they stand in infinite relations
to one another equally immutable. A proposition is con-
stituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific
relation between them ; and according to the nature of this
relation the proposition may be either true or false. What
kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot
be further defined, but must be immediately recognised.
And this description will also apply to those cases where
, there appears to be a reference to existence. Existence is
itself a concept ; it is something which we mean ; and the
great body of propositions, in which existence is joined to
other concepts or syntheses of concepts, are simply true or
false according to the relation in which it stands to them.
It is not denied that this is a peculiarly important concept ;
that we are peculiarly anxious to know what exists. It is
only maintained that existence is logically subordinate to
truth ; that truth cannot be defined by a reference to exis-
tence, but existence only by a reference to truth. When I
say " This paper exists," I must require that this proposition
be true. If it is not true, it is unimportant, and I can have
no interest in it. But if it is true, it means only that the
concepts, which are combined in specific relations in the
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 181
concept of this paper, are also combined in a specific manner
with the concept of existence. That specific manner is some-
thing immediately known, like red or two. It is highly
important, because we set such value upon it ; but it is itself
a concept. All that exists is thus composed of concepts
necessarily related to one another in specific manners, and
likewise to the concept of existence.
I am fully aware how paradoxical this theory must appear,
and even how contemptible. But it seems to me to follow
from premisses generally admitted, and to have been avoided
only by lack of logical consistency. I assume Mr. Bradley's
proof that the concept is necessary to truth and falsehood.
I endeavour to show, what I must own appears to me
perfectly obvious, that the concept can consistently be de-
scribed neither as an existent, nor as part of an existent,
since it is presupposed in the conception of an existent. It
is similarly impossible that truth should depend on a relation
to existents or to an existent, since the proposition by which
it is so defined must itself be true, and the truth of this can
certainly not be established, without a vicious circle, by
exhibiting its dependence on an existent. Truth, however,
would certainly seem to involve at least two terms, and some
relation between them ; falsehood involves the same ; and
hence it would seem to remain, that we regard truth and
falsehood as properties of certain concepts, together with
their relations a whole to which we give the name of
proposition.
I have appealed throughout to the rules of logic ; nor, if
any one rejects these, should I have much to fear from his
arguments. An appeal to the facts is useless. For, in
order that a fact may be made the basis of an argument, it
must first be put in the form of a proposition, and, moreover,
this proposition must be supposed true ; and then there must
recur the dilemma, whether rules of logic are to be accepted
or rejected. And these rules once accepted, would seem
themselves to offer a confirmation of our theory. For all true
inference must be inference from a true proposition ; and that
the conclusion follows from the premiss must again be a true
proposition: so that here also it would appear that the nature
of a true proposition is the ultimate datum. Nor is an appeal
to the "matter" of the proposition more useful than the former
appeal to the facts. It may be true that this matter is given
in sensation, or in any other conceivable way. We are not
concerned with its origin, but with its nature ; and its
nature, if it is to enter into a true proposition, must, we
agree with Mr. Bradley, be the nature of a concept and no
182 G. E. MOORE :
other : and then the old conclusions follow. Nor, finally, is a
vicious circle involved in our own attempt to establish con-
clusions with regard to truth, by rules of logic in which that
conception is presupposed. For our conclusion is that truth
is itself a simple concept ; that it is logically prior to any
proposition. But a vicious circle occurs only where a pro-
position is taken as prior to a concept, or a more complex
proposition (one involving more concepts) as prior to one
which is more simple. Valid logical processes would seem
to be of two kinds. It is possible to start from a complex
proposition and to consider what propositions are involved
in it. In this case the latter must always be more simple
than the former ; and they may be true, although the former
is false. Or it is possible to start from a more simple pro-
position and to deduce one that is more complex, by succes-
sive additions of concepts ; which is the properly deductive
procedure exhibited in the propositions of Euclid : and in
this case the premiss must be true, if the conclusion is so.
It may be well to state that both procedures are synthetic,
in the sense that the results arrived at are different from the
premisses, and merely related to them. In a vicious circle,
on the other hand, the two procedures are confused. A
result arrived at by the former of the two processes just
described, is regarded as involving the truth of its premiss.
Thus, when we say that the conceptual nature of truth is
involved in logical procedure, no vicious circle is committed,
since we do not thereby presuppose the truth of logical
procedure. But when an existent is said to be involved in
truth, a vicious circle is committed, since the proposition
" Something is true," in which " Something exists " is
supposed to be involved, must itself be true, if the latter is
to be so.
It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed
of concepts. These are the only objects of knowledge.
They cannot be regarded fundamentally as abstractions
either from things or from ideas ; since both alike can, if
anything is to be true of them, be composed of nothing but
concepts. A thing becomes intelligible first when it is
analysed into its constituent concepts. The material diversity
of things, which is generally taken as starting-point, is only
derived ; and the identity of the concept, in several different
things, which appears on that assumption as the problem of
philosophy, will now, if it instead be taken as the starting-
point, render the derivation easy. Two things are then seen
to be differentiated by the different relations in which their
common concepts stand to other concepts. The opposition
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 183
of concepts to existents disappears, since an existent is seen
to be nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing
in a unique relation to the concept of existence. Even the
description of an existent as a proposition (a true existential
proposition) seems to lose its strangeness, when it is re-
membered that a proposition is here to be understood, not as
anything subjective an assertion or affirmation of something
but as the combination of concepts which is affirmed.
For we are familiar with the idea of affirming or " positing "
an existent, of knowing objects as well as propositions ; and
the difficulty hitherto has been to discover wherein the two
processes were akin. It now appears that perception is to be -
regarded philosophically as the cognition of an existential
proposition ; and it is thus apparent how it can furnish a
basis for inference, which uniformly exhibits the connexion
between propositions. Conversely light is thrown on the
nature of inference. For, whereas it could not be maintained
that the conclusion was only connected with the premisses
in my thoughts, and that an inference was nothing, if no-
body was making it, great difficulty was felt as to the kind
of objectivity that belonged to the terms and their relation,
since existence was taken as the type of objectivity. This
difficulty is removed, when it is acknowledged that the re-
lation of premisses to conclusion is an objective relation, in
the same sense as the relation of existence to what exists is
objective. It is no longer necessary to hold that logical
connexions must, in some obscure sense, exist, since to
exist is merely to stand in a certain logical connexion.
It will be apparent how much this theory has in common
with Kant's theory of perception. It differs chiefly in sub-
stituting for sensations, as the data of knowledge, concepts ;
and in refusing to regard the relations in which they stand
as, in some obscure sense, the work of the mind. It rejects
the attempt to explain " the possibility of knowledge," ac-
cepting the cognitive relation as an ultimate datum or pre-
supposition ; since it maintains the objections which Kant
himself urged against an explanation by causality, and re-
cognises no other kind of explanation than that by way of
logical connexion with other concepts. It thus renounces
the supposed unity of conception guaranteed by Idealism
even in the Kantian form, and still more the boasted reduc-
tion of all differences to the harmony of " Absolute Spirit,"
which marks the Hegelian development. But it is important
to point out that it retains the doctrine of Transcendentalism.
For Kant's Transcendentalism rests on the distinction be-
tween empirical and a priori propositions. This is a distinc-
184 G. E. MOOBE :
tion which offers a striking correspondence to that between
the categorical and hypothetical judgments ; and since one
object of this paper is to combat the view which inclines
to take the categorical judgment as the typical form, and
attempts in consequence to reduce the hypothetical judg-
ment to it, it will not be out of place to discuss Kant's
distinction at some length.
Kant himself offers us two marks by which an a priori
judgment may be distinguished. ' A proposition,' he says,
' which is thought along with its necessity is an a priori
judgment.' And it is absolutely a priori only if it be not
deduced from any proposition, that is not itself a necessary
proposition. The second mark of the a priori is strict uni-
versality. But unfortunately Kant himself seems to admit
the invalidity of this as a mark ; since he immediately pro-
ceeds to state that an empirical universality may hold in all
cases (' for example, in the proposition : All bodies are
heavy ') and hence be strictly universal. 1
It is true Kant states that this empirical universality is
merely arbitrary. We ought, he says, to express our proposi-
tion in the form : ' So far as we have yet observed, there is
no exception from ' the rule that all bodies are heavy. But
it would seem that such a qualification can only affect the
truth of our proposition and not its content. It may be
questioned whether we have a right to assert universality,
but it is universality which we assert. The limitations which
Kant points out as belonging to the proposition, can properly
be expressed only in the doubt whether we have found a rule
at all, not in a doubt whether there are exceptions to it. It
may not be true that all bodies are heavy ; but whether true
or not, it is a universal proposition. There is no difference
between this proposition and such as are a priori, in respect
of universality. And Kant could hardly wish to assert that
the difference lay in its truth. For this proposition, he would
admit, may be true ; and, if so, then it would be a priori.
But he would not admit the suggestion that it may be a
priori : he asserts that it is not so. The difference between
the empirical and the a priori, if there is a difference, must
therefore be in some other mark than in this universality,
which Kant nevertheless asserts to be ' by itself an infallible
criterion ' (ib., p. 35X We may next consider whether such
a mark is to be found in ' necessity '.
In this investigation, too, it may be well to examine his
example 'All bodies are heavy,' since this proposition might
1 R.V., p. 35. ' Hartenstein, ed. 1867.'
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 185
seem to have a claim to necessity also, just as it is un-
doubtedly universal. Kant speaks of it as ' a rule borrowed
from experience ' (ib., p. 34). By this language and by his
use of ' Bodies are heavy ' as convertible with it, he would
seem to suggest that he would not base its empirical
character solely on its extensional interpretation. If, as
seems probable, he would allow ' Body is heavy ' or ' Man is
mortal,' to be equally empirical propositions, then it is plain
that what he calls empirical may involve necessity. It is
certain, at all events, that if we are to understand by em-
pirical propositions only such as experience can justify, such
a proposition as ' All bodies are heavy ' cannot be regarded
as empirical. It is based on the proposition ' Body is heavy,'
with which, if it is to be used for purposes of inference, it
must be regarded as convertible. I assume, therefore, that
Kant would not have refused to regard ' Body is heavy ' as
an empirical proposition. It would seem certainly to come
under his class of ' rules drawn from experience, ' whereas
* All bodies are heavy,' regarded solely as extensional, cannot
be called a rule. The use of this example would seem to lead
to important results with regard to the true definition of
empirical propositions.
But let us first return to ' All bodies are heavy '; since
even this would seem to involve in its very meaning an
assertion of necessity. If it be taken purely in extension, it
must be resolved into ' This body, and that body, and that
body, ad infinitum, are, have been and will be heavy '. It
involves, therefore, the proposition ' This body is heavy '. But
in any proposition of this simple categorical form the notion
of substance and attribute is already involved. 1 Wherever a
predicate is asserted of a subject, it is implied that the subject
is a thing ; that it is something marked by the possession of
certain attributes and capable of possessing others. ' This
body is heavy ' presupposes, therefore, ' Body is a thing, and
heaviness is a mere attribute '. For we could not convert
the proposition into ' Heaviness is corporeal '. But that
' Body is a thing,' and that ' Heaviness is an attribute,' would
seem to be necessary propositions. We may indeed be mis-
taken in supposing that they are true ; but if we were ever
to find that heaviness was not an attribute, we should be
bound to conclude that it never had been and never would be,
not that it was so once but had ceased so to be. All such judg-
ments are truly ' thought along with their necessity '. They
are as necessary as that 2+2 = 4. The difference between
'Cf. R.V., p. 86.
186 G. E. MOORE :
)J^*^ \ "^ 4 1
the two forms of proposition lies not in that the former lacks
necessity, nor even that it implies the proposition ' Heaviness
exists'; for even if heaviness did not exist, the proposition
would be true. The proposition means that heaviness could
not be other than an attribute ; and hence, if Kant's words-
(p. 34) are to be taken strictly, it cannot be empirical. In
this respect, therefore, it is quite on a level with ' 2 + 2 = 4 ';
which also would be true even if there were no two things.
The difference seems to lie rather in the nature of the
concepts of which the necessary relation is predicated.
"' Heaviness ' can exist ; it is not meaningless to say ' Heavi-
ness exists here and now'; whereas 'attribute,' 'two,' and
other like conceptions can only claim a precarious sort of
existence in so far as they are necessarily related to these
other notions of which alone properly existential propositions
can be made.
If, therefore, we wish to find propositions involving no neces-
sity, 1 we must descend to purely existential propositions pro-
positions which do not involve the notions of substance and
attribute. These alone can be truly taught us by experience,
if experience ' cannot teach us that a thing could not be
otherwise' (p. 34). And even these are free from necessity,
only if they are understood to assert something with regard
to an actual part of actual time. They must involve neces-
sity as soon as the distinction between ' This is ' and ' This
was ' is disregarded. It would seem, in fact, to be a mark of
the sort of existence which they predicate that it is in time.
They may affirm ' This exists,' or ' This has existed,' but
if they take the general form ' This is,' that must always be
understood to mean no more than ' This always has been, is
now, and always will be,' and can be strictly analysed into as
many different judgments as time is divisible into separate
moments.
If, therefore, the difference between the empirical and a
priori lay primarily, as Kant implies, in the nature of the
judgment, not in that of the concept, only existential pro-
positions could be empirical. In order to represent even
' This body is heavy ' as an empirical proposition, it would be
necessary to analyse it into the form ' Heaviness and the
marks of body exist here and now '. But this is certainly
not its whole meaning. We must, therefore, suppose that in
order to obtain a clear definition of what Kant meant by
empirical propositions, we must base it upon the nature of the
1 Even these involve the necessary properties of time ; but this point
may be reserved for later consideration.
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 187
concepts used in them. Empirical concepts are those which
can exist in parts of time. This would seem to be the only
manner of distinguishing them. And any proposition into
which an empirical concept enters may be called empirical.
Kant himself does recognise the necessity involved in such
a proposition as ' This body is heavy,' although, for reasons
\vhich will appear hereafter, he states it in a somewhat dif-
ferent way. The main object of his ' Analytic ' is to show
that any such judgment involves a ' synthesis of the manifold
of sense-intuition,' which is ' necessary a priori ' (p. 126).
But he regards this synthesis rather as necessary in order
to bring mere perceptions into relation with the ' unity of
apperception,' than as directly involved in the empirical
judgment. Moreover, in order to explain how the forms of
synthesis can apply to the manifold, he introduces the inner
sense as mediator, and describes the judgment as converting
the psychical connexion of the presentations into an objective
connexion rather than as applying the categories to a mere
manifold, which cannot properly be described as psychical.
Accordingly he gives as the ultimate empirical judgment, out
of which the application of substance and attribute produces
' Bodies are heavy,' the subjective judgment ' When I carry
a body, I feel an impression of heaviness/ instead of that
given above ' Heaviness and the marks of body exist together.' 1
He does not seem to see that his subjective judgment al-
ready fully involves the category in question. A statement
about my feelings is just as ' objective,' in the required sense,
as a statement about what is conceived as in space.
With the above definition, therefore, it is obvious why
' Body is heavy ' should be called empirical ; whereas, if
absence of necessity had been the mark required, it would
have been difficult to find a reason. For this proposition
does not only involve, like ' This body is heavy ' or ' All
bodies are heavy,' the necessary judgments that body is
a thing, and heaviness an attribute ; it asserts a relation
between a ' heaviness ' and ' corporeity ' such as no ex-
perience can prove or disprove. If we found a body which
was not heavy, that would indeed lead us to deny the truth
of the proposition ; but it would also entitle us at once to
the opposite necessary proposition ' Body cannot be heavy '.
And this is just what holds of 2 + 2 = 4. It is perhaps
inconceivable to us now that two and two should not make
four ; but, when numbers were first discovered, it may well
have been thought that two and two made three or five.
1 P. 121, ef. also Prol., p. 54 n.
188 G. E. MOOKE
Experience, no doubt, must have been the means of pro-
ducing the conviction that this was not so, but that two and
two made four. The necessity of a proposition, therefore, is
not called in question by the fact that experience may lead
you to think it true or untrue. The test of its necessity lies
merely in the fact that it must be either true or untrue, and
cannot be true now and untrue the next moment ; whereas
with an existential proposition it may be true that this
exists now, and yet it will presently be untrue that it exists.
The doubt about the truth of ' Body is heavy ' would seem to
proceed chiefly from our uncertainty as to what we mean by
' Body ' and by ' heavy '. We cannot recognise instances
of them with as great precision as we recognise instances
of number ; and hence we cannot be sure whether the truth
of our proposition may not be overthrown. The proposition
is arbitrary solely in this sense. There would seem no doubt
that we mean by it to assert an absolute necessity ; but
between what precise concepts the necessary relation, of
which we are certain, holds, we must leave to experience to
discover.
From the foregoing analysis it would, therefore, appear that
the true distinction upon which Kant's division of proposi-
tions into a priori and a posteriori, necessary and empirical,
is based, is the distinction between concepts which can
exist in parts of time and concepts which seem to be cut off
from existence altogether, but which give rise to assertions
of an absolutely necessary relation. Kant would seem to
include among empirical propositions all those in which an
empirical concept is used ; whether the proposition asserts
a necessary relation between an empirical and an a priori
concept, or between two empirical concepts. What it is
important to emphasise is that these two kinds of proposition
are not distinguished by the absence of the marks which he
gives for the a priori ; they both include both necessity and
strict universality. Empirical propositions would therefore
include a wide range of propositions, differing very much in
the meaning of their assertions. They seem to extend up-
wards from mere assertions of the existence of this or that,
of the type ' Heaviness exists here and now ' ; through pro-
positions of the usual categorical form ' This body is heavy/
which include necessary propositions in their meaning, but
at the same time imply an assertion of existence ; to pro-
positions which assert existence at every time, while still
retaining the element of necessity included in the last, like
' All bodies are heavy ' ; and finally to those propositions,
upon which alone the validity of the last class can be based
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 189
propositions which assert a necessary relation, without any
implication of existence whatever, of the type ' Body is
heavy '. The only common element in all these different
classes would seem to be that they all make assertions with
regard to some empirical concept, i.e., a concept which can
exist in an actual part of time. The second and third classes
are mixed and involve necessity, because there is also included
in them an assertion with regard to an a priori concept. To
all of them Kant would seem to oppose as purely a priori
propositions, those which make an assertion solely with
regard to a priori concepts and which for that reason can
imply no assertion of existence, since an a priori concept
is one which cannot exist in the limited sense above ex-
plained.
The line of division, therefore, upon which Kant's Tran-
scendentalism is based, would seem to fall between proposi-
tions involving empirical concepts and those which involve
none such ; and an empirical concept is to be defined, not
as a concept given by experience, since all concepts are so
given, but as one which can exist in an actual part of time.
This division is necessary in order to include all the various
kinds of propositions which Kant includes under the term
empirical, many of which involve a priori concepts. If the
division were to be based on the nature of the propositions,
as such, as Kant pretends to base it, we saw that pure
existential propositions alone could be thought to have a
claim to form a class by themselves, as empirical propositions.
These do indeed obviously form the basis of the other divi-
sion ; for a simple concept cannot be known as one which
could exist in time, except on the ground that it has so
existed, is existing, or will exist. But we have now to
point out that even existential propositions have the essen-
tial mark which Kant assigns to a priori propositions that
they are absolutely necessary.
The distinction of time was said to be ultimate for an
existential proposition. If this is so, it is obvious that neces-
sary propositions, of the kind which Kant endeavours to
establish in the ^Esthetic, are involved in them. It was
pointed out that a pure existential proposition could only
assert the existence of a simple concept ; all others involving
the a priori concepts of substance and attribute. If now we
take the existential proposition " Ked exists," we have an
example of the type required. It is maintained that, when
I say this, my meaning is that the concept " red " and the
concept " existence " stand in a specific relation both to
one another and to the concept of time. I mean that " Bed
190 G. E. MOORE :
exists now," and thereby imply a distinction from its past
and future existence. And this connexion of red and existence
with the moment of time I mean by " now," would seem to
be as necessary as any other connexion whatever. If it is
true, it is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. If
it is true, its contradictory is as fully impossible as the con-
tradictory of 2 + 2 = 4.
But the necessity thus involved in existential propositions
does not do away with the importance of Kant's distinction
between the empirical and the a priori. So far as he attempts
to base it upon the fact that what is empirical alone is
" given in experience" and may be referred to " sense," it
must indeed be given up ; but as against the English philo-
sophers, who held the same view about sense-knowledge, it
retains its full weight. The Transcendental Deduction con-
tains a perfectly valid answer to Hume's scepticism, and to
empiricism in general. Philosophers of this school generally
tend to deny the validity of any propositions except those
about existents. Kant may be said to have pointed out that
in any of these propositions, which the empiricists con-
sidered to be the ultimate, if not the only, data of knowledge,
there was involved by the very same logic on which they
relied to support their views, not only the uniform and
necessary succession of time, and the geometrical properties
of space, but also the principles of substance and causality.
He does not, indeed, thereby prove the truth of the axioms
and principles in question ; but he shows that they are at
least equally valid with, and more ultimate than, those upon
which empiricism builds. Although, therefore, it seems no
longer possible to hold, as Kant held, that a reference to
existents is necessary to any proposition that is to claim the
title of " knowledge," and that the truth of such propositions
can alone claim immediate certainty ; although, on the con-
trary, it seems that existential propositions are only a
particular class of necessary proposition : yet the transcen-
dental deduction is still important. A deduction from the
" possibility of experience " does not indeed really represent
the nature of Kant's argument. For the possibility of ex-
perience presupposes that we have experience, and this
again means that certain existential propositions are true :
but this does not involve the truth of any particular exis-
tential propositions ; although its truth is involved in theirs.
What Kant really shows is that space and time and the
categories are involved in particular propositions ; and this
work is of greater value than a deduction from the possibility
of experience would have been. He does not indeed recog-
f
THE NATUEE OF JUDGMENT. 191
nise that the propositions from which he is deducing are
themselves necessary, and that there may therefore be other
necessary propositions, with a like claim to certainty, not to
be deduced from them. He therefore imagines himself to
have exhausted the field of knowledge ; whereas in fact he
has only shown certain logical connexions within that field.
But it is not here proposed to dispute the truth of particular
existential propositions ; and though, unlike Kant, we admit
them to be merely assumed, we may be thankful that he has
shown us what can be inferred from them.
Moreover, Kant's distinction between space and time on
the one hand, and the categories on the other, also retains
its value, though we can no longer describe their general
difference as he did. It seems rather to be this : That time
alone is sufficient for some sort of experience, since it alone
seems to be involved in the simplest kind of existential pro-
position, e.g., " Pleasure exists " ; and that again time and
space together will suffice to account for the possibility of
other pieces of knowledge, without the use of the categories.
It is necessary to make a fresh assumption of propositions
such as even Hume recognised, and such as are universal in
physical science, in order to find the principles of substance
and accident and causality implied. In all such propositions
time and space are presupposed as well, but these categories
are not implied in every proposition involving time and
space.
The simplest existential propositions are then to be re-
garded as necessary propositions of a peculiar sort. In one
kind the necessary properties of time are involved ; in
another those of space also. But though this fact, which
Kant points out, is very important against empiricists, we
cannot regard it with him as establishing the truth of
geometry and of the corresponding propositions about time.
For existential propositions which are false, as well as those
which are true, involve the same propositions about space
and time. No existential proposition of any sort seems dis-
coverable, which might not thus be false ; not even the
famous " cogito " is indubitable. We cannot, therefore,
take the " possibility of experience," in any possible sense,
as sufficient warrant for our knowledge of space and time ;
and we must regard the truths of geometry as independently
known for true, just in the same way as some existential
propositions are so known.
Similarly, those propositions which involve substance and
attribute are not sufficient to establish the truth of the pro-
positions thereby involved. The permanence of substance is
192 G. E. MOOEE :
indeed, Kant shows us, as certain as the empirical proposi-
tions which Hume took to be alone certain. But its truth
must be known independently of these, since it is involved
also in false propositions of this type. It would, in fact,
be true, whether any such propositions were true or
not. Kant has only taught us that, if any of them are
true, it must be so likewise. He failed to see that its
truth may be asserted immediately on the same ground
as theirs ; for he was misled by the previous course of
philosophy to suppose that there was something more im-
mediately indubitable in them. Their truth is, in fact,
the last thing which common sense doubts, in spite of
its familiarity with erroneous perceptions. Kant's merit
was in pointing out, what he himself did not recognise, that
their being undoubted does not prove them to be indubi-
table ; or rather, that the doubt which is cast on some of
them proves conclusively, what common sense, in its con-
tentment with rules that have exceptions, does not perceive,
that they are highly doubtful.
Our result then is as follows : That a judgment is univer-
sally a necessary combination of concepts, equally necessary
whether it be true or false. That it must be either true or
false, but that its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its
relation to anything else whatever, reality, for instance, or
the world in space and time. For both of these must be
supposed to exist, in some sense, if the truth of our judgment
is to depend upon them ; and then it turns out that the
truth of our judgment depends not on them, but on the
judgment that they, being such and such, exist. But this
judgment cannot, in its turn, depend on anything else, for its
truth or falsehood: its truth or its falsehood must be im-
mediate properties of its own, not dependent upon any
relation it may have to something else. And, if this be so,
we have removed all reason for the supposition that the
truth and falsehood of other judgments are not equally in-
dependent. For the existential judgment, which is presup-
posed in Kant's reference to experience or in Mr. Bradley 's
reference to reality, has turned out to be, as much as any
other, merely a necessary combination of concepts, for the
necessity of which we can seek no ground, and which cannot
be explained as an attribution to ' the given '. A concept is
not in any intelligible sense an ' adjective,' as if there were
something substantive, more ultimate than it. For we must,
if we are to be consistent, describe what appears to be most
substantive as no more than a collection of such supposed
adjectives : and thus, in the end, the concept turns out to be
THE NATUKE OF JUDGMENT. 193
the only substantive or subject, and no one concept either
more or less an adjective than any other. From our descrip-
tion of a judgment, there must, then, disappear all reference
either to our mind or to the world. Neither of these can
furnish ' ground ' for anything, save in so far as they are
complex judgments. The nature of the judgment is more
ultimate than either, and less ultimate only than the nature
of its constituents the nature of the concept or logical
idea.
13
IV. JAMES ARBUCKLE AND HIS RELATION TO
THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL.
BY W. B. SCOTT.
SIB JAMES MACKINTOSH, in writing of Hutcheson's life at
Dublin, says that Ireland "is truly incuriosa suorum" 1 and
this remark applies with greater force to the work of James
Arbuckle, the contemporary and friend of Hutcheson ; though
in introducing it one is liable to make an Irish " bull," since
Arbuckle, though he lived in Dublin, was of Scotch extrac-
tion, and had been educated at Glasgow.
It would scarcely be necessary to rake together the ashes
of the past to form an estimate of an obscure minor thinker
such as Arbuckle, were it not that his work constitutes a few
pages in what might be described as a lost chapter in the
history of British Philosophy. Whether Hutcheson's title
as " father " or " founder " of the " Scottish Philosophy " be
accepted or not, his connexion with Shaftesbury needs some
fuller explanation than it has yet received. All historians of
Philosophy, who treat of Hutcheson, show that there was a
more or less close connexion between his system and the
ethical " virtuosoship" of Shaftesbury. Now Shaftesbury was
essentially English, by birth, residence and mode of thought,
while Hutcheson was, of course, best known as a celebrated
and influential Professor at Glasgow. Yet Hutcheson's views
are generally taken as having been fully formed prior to his
arrival at Glasgow, and there is abundant evidence to show
that he received his main philosophic impetus while living
as a young man at Dublin. How exactly this came about
could scarcely be explained within the limits of a single
article, and one must be content with a bare mention of the
interesting fact that in Shaftesbury we have the germ of
what is known as the " Scottish Philosophy" that is, the
germ may be said to be English this germ was developed
by Hutcheson and others at Dublin, and the complete pro-
duct gained academic expression and popular recognition in
Scotland. Were we not growing familiar with the somewhat
1 Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, p. 204.
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 195
commercial expression " Philosophy made in Germany," to
say that the so-called Scottish Philosophy was made in
Ireland might occasion something of a mental shock !
The full discussion of the influences to which Hutcheson
was subjected in Dublin would be somewhat lengthy, owing
to the number of events in his life that are difficult to
determine, and also to the fact that his friends are singularly
elusive to a biographer ; for, while all of them were men of
mark and importance, they seem to have been unanimous
in leaving few traces of their thought behind them. It is
for this reason that the history of Hutcheson's early develop-
ment may be said to be almost, if not quite, a lost chapter in
the History of Philosophy, and, therefore, the few pages of it
that can be recovered, which deal with his friend Arbuckle,
gain a reflected interest to which they would scarcely be
entitled upon their intrinsic merits.
The earliest account of Arbuckle is contained, in MS., in
a copy of his poem Glotta, which is preserved in the
Library of the British Museum. It runs as follows : "James
Arbuckle was a native of Ireland, and, after going through
his University course, at Glasgow College, he settled, as a
schoolmaster, in the north of Ireland. He possessed genius,
as his poems show. He was the author of Snuff a Poem
by Mr. James Arbuckle, printed at Glasgow in 1717. 8vo.
He addressed laudatory verses to Allan Eamsay, who, in
January, 1719, wrote an Epistle, in verse, to Mr. James
Arbuckle. (See Ramsay's Poems, 1800, 8vo., vol. i., p.
clxxxiii., and vol. ii., p. 359). Arbuckle projected a transla-
tion of Virgil but did not finish it.
" He died in 1734, aged 34."
Notwithstanding the meagreness of this brief sketch, it is
incorrect in several particulars, more especially in the date
of Arbuckle's death, which, as will be seen below, is ante-
dated by some dozen years. This being so, it is doubtful
whether any reliance can be placed upon the statement that
in 1734 he was thirty-four years of age, but this is the only
clue to the date of his birth, which would thus be assigned
to the year 1730. Failing such untrustworthy evidence,
approximate dates might be mentioned as between 1697 and
1705.
From other sources one gathers that James Arbuckle was
the son of a Presbyterian minister of the well-known Dublin
Congregation of Usher's Quay. 1 Like most of the Presby-
terian clergy in Ireland, he was of Scotch extraction, and
1 Sermons of John Abernethy. London, 1748, i., p. 39.
196 w. E. SCOTT:
looked to Scotland as his home, regarding his position in
Ireland rather as that of a colonist than as that of a native
of the country. Hence it was only to be expected that he
sent his son to Scotland to the University of Glasgow. It
was therefore at Glasgow that James Arbuckle took his
M.A. degree in 1720. 1
Arbuckle may have met Hutcheson at Glasgow, as he
seems to have matriculated just before Hutcheson left to
return to Ireland. He found himself at once plunged into
a scene of turmoil and strife. At this period Stirling was
Principal. He appears to have been a man of slight scholar-
ship, and his influence was rather in the direction of the
academic loaves and fishes, than the maintenance either of
discipline or culture. To increase his own influence, he
represented that, owing to the state of political feeling after
the Rebellion, " it might occasion strife to call the students
together to choose a Rector," and, therefore, he claimed the
right of nominating three names, from which list the Rector
was to be chosen by the Professors (or Regents as they
were then), thereby depriving the students of one of their
most cherished privileges. 2 This led to the outbreak of 1718,
when some of the Professors took the students' side, and
were even accused of exciting the students to riot. 3 Arbuckle
seems to have been prominent in the dispute, and he came
in collision with the Principal, through his writing Prologues
for the students' performances of " Cato " and " Tamburlaine "
performances avowedly designed as a protest against the
Principal. If Stirling was not a scholar, Arbuckle found
him a " good hater," and on several occasions his academic
career appears to have been in danger of sudden curtailment.
In the Students' Pamphlet already mentioned, it is alleged
that Stirling went so far as to obtain an act of the Senatus
" to suppress Immorality," which was really directed against
1 Munimenta Univ. Glasg.
2 A Short Account of the Late Treatment of the Students of the Univer-
sity of Glasgow. Dublin, 1722, pp. 5, 6. The copy of this very rare
pamphlet in the Glasgow University Library is endorsed, " said to have
been written by Mr. Robertson, probably the same who was expelled in
1725, but the sentence taken off by visitation in 1727," and in another
place "sometimes ascribed to James Arbuckle ". Some of the references
to Arbuckle are not such as he would have been likely to have written
himself, nor is the style like that of his prose works. It is very probable
that the pamphlet was the work of several students, and that Arbuckle
bore his part hi its composition. (An account of Eobertson's career at
Glasgow will be found in the Christian Moderator, ii., p. 308.)
3 "Wodrow MSS. (Advocates' Library, Edinburgh), No. 41, Nos. 95-9.
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 197
a literary club of which Arbuckle happened to be a member. 1
When Arbuckle entered as a Theological student in 1721,
he was more in the Principal's power, and his friends asserted
that Stirling endeavoured to damage his character, and
even prevent his obtaining admission to the Communion. 2
Possibly owing to the Principal's condemnation, Arbuckle
changed his mind with regard to his profession, and we
find him gaining the degree of M.D. in 1724.
Not only had Arbuckle taken a prominent part in what
might be called college politics, but, at the same time, he
published several poems which gained him a considerable
local reputation. In 1719 he published Snuff a Poem, also
An Epistle to Thomas, Earl of Haddington, upon the death of
Joseph Addison, and, in 1721, Glotta a Poem, upon the title-
page of which he describes himself as a member of the Uni-
versity of Glasgow. These are written in the metre Pope
had made, if anything, too popular ; and Glotta is the only
one that calls for remark. It is of considerable interest as
giving a description of the University and the teaching of
the time, and it is very creditable to Arbuckle that he does
not introduce any contentious subjects, confining himself to
a description of the University and its scholastic activity.
If any indication of Arbuckle's tastes can be drawn from the
amount of space devoted to the different subjects, it would
appear that he was most impressed by Natural Philosophy.
The lines devoted to the Philosophical department
Or what more nearly touches human kind,
The powers and Nature of Eternal Mind
Which only conscious of its being knows
Th' Eternal Source from which that being floius 3
clearly show that, as a student, Arbuckle was under Cartesian
influence, and this is of interest in view of the fact that four
years later he will be found to have developed in quite a
different direction.
In 1724, then, having finished with the University, Arbuckle
returned to Dublin, though there is a tradition that he taught
school between the completion of his university course and
tis arrival in Dublin, 4 this seems unlikely since we find him
fell established in Dublin in 1725, and having made numerous
riends, which would be difficult if he had only just arrived.
The most important event in Arbuckle's early life, and
1 Short Account, ut supra, p. 24. a Ibid., p. 25.
3 Glotta a Poem, Glasgow, 1721.
4 MS. prefixed to an edition of Glotta, in the Library of the British
[useum, vide supra.
198 w. B. SCOTT :
one destined to have considerable influence upon the history
of Philosophy, was his introduction to Lord Molesworth
perhaps by Hutcheson. Molesworth had been a wealthy
merchant, and had held a diplomatic appointment at the
Danish Court, which occasioned his Account of Denmark as it
was in the Year 1692. This work introduced him to the
notice of Locke and Shaftesbury. He corresponded with
the latter as well as with Toland, 1 and his letters show an
appreciation of philosophic questions and methods. At this
time he was a prominent figure in Dublin society, and, while
still deeply interested in parliamentary affairs, he found a
more congenial occupation in entertaining and conversing
with persons of literary and philosophic tastes. Even Swift,
who was chary of praise, writes: "I am no stranger to his
Lordship, and, excepting in what relates to the Church,
there are few persons in whose opinions I am better dis-
posed to agree ". 2
Molesworth has left no writings dealing with Philosophy,
but it is easy to gather the general drift of his opinions.
Owing to his personal relations with many of the most
prominent thinkers of the day, he was wholly on the side
of what was then the most modern and advanced thought,
and he was most influenced by his friend Shaftesbury. It
is true that Shaftesbury's letters were written some years
before Molesworth met Arbuckle and Hutcheson, but it can
be shown that he rather adopted than diverged from Shaftes-
bury's principles as time went on. As late as 1722, three
years before his death, he wrote to Archbishop King, the
author of De Origine Mali, evidently defending Shaftesbury's
view of moral obligation, which King criticises in a letter
still extant, 3 and, if further proof were needed, it would be
found in the early essays of his followers which, as will be
seen, were published in the Dublin Journal.
It has sometimes been said that Sliaftesbury had a few
isolated adherents but that there was no Shaftesbury-school ;
yet, owing to Molesworth, his Philosophy was perpetuated
and became fruitful amongst a group of earnest young
thinkers at Dublin. Molesworth must have been a man of
singular power in gaining the conviction of others, for,
1 Biographia Britannica. There is an interesting letter from Archbishop
King to Molesworth (preserved in the library of Trinity College, Dublin)
in answer to one of Molesworth's in which he had defended Toland.
Needless to say, King is severe on the " Atheist ".
2 Swift's Works, ed. Sir W. Scott, viii., p. 299.
3 King to Molesworth, 2nd Jan., 1722. King's MS. Letters, ut supra.
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 199
though he himself wrote nothing of a philosophical nature,
his conversations left a deep impress upon the men he
gathered round him. His environment and circle of friends
at Blanchardstown his country-seat near Dublin recall
some of the best traditions of what are often called the
" Greek Schools ". Here we find a man, past the prime of
life, who had spent his youth in travel and the service of the
state, who had come in contact with well-known thinkers of
his day, engaged in the discussion of abstract theories with
younger men probably without any view of teaching as the
word is now understood.
Hutcheson, Edward Synge, a Fellow of Trinity College,
whom Berkeley succeeded as Bishop of Cloyne, as well as
several others, were intimates of Molesworth and partici-
pated in the discussions at Blanchardstown. With the
advent of Arbuckle a desire for literary expression mani-
fested itself amongst the little group of disciples of Shaftes-
bury. At this period the essay was the favourite " literarj 7
vehicle," and, in all probability, Molesworth had sufficient
influence with the proprietor of a new Dublin weekly paper,
called the Dublin Journal, to induce him to accept all 'articles
or letters sent him by Arbuckle, who signed himself
" Hibernicus" and acted as general editor, and later on the
letters of the Molesworth coterie were added to by others
from outside sources. The Dublin Journal was a medium-
sized octavo, a little smaller than the Spectator or Saturday
Review of to-day, consisting of four pages, containing foreign
and local news, with a few advertisements. Arbuckle's
articles, written in the form of letters and addressed to the
" Author of the Dublin Journal," occupied the position of the
leading article. Early numbers of this paper are extremely
rare, a few are preserved in the libraries of Trinity College,
Dublin, of Archbishop Marsh, and of the Royal Irish
Academy, but the best collection is that in the National
Library (Dublin), which begins with No. 125, dated 19th
August, 1727, and contains about 220 numbers extending
with a few gaps till 25th December, 1731.
Arbuckle's first article appeared in the issue of 3rd April,
17-25, and, with the aid of his friends, he contributed weekly
until 25th March, 1727. Had these articles not been collected
and republished by the generosity of the second Lord Moles-
worth, all record of the Molesworth-Shaftesbury school would
have perished.
The first letter, after explaining the general object, adds,
that " several honest gentlemen have resolved to make the
paper a canal for conveying to the public some little essays
200 w. R. SCOTT :
they have lying on their hands ". x When the whole series,
amounting to 102 letters, was published in volume form in
1729, Arbuckle, in his dedication to the second Lord Moles-
worth (the first, who was the friend of Shaftesbury and
founder of the " school," having died in 1725), mentions that
many of his own contributions were composed under " Lord
Molesworth's roof," 2 and this suggests the guess that the
members of the Blanchardstown coterie were in the habit of
writing papers and submitting them to the judgment of the
others.
The greater part of the Essays, which appeared in the
Dublin Journal from 3rd April, 1725, to 25th March, 1727, are
philosophical, and should be compared rather to Coleridge's
Friend than to Addison's Spectator. Many of them were
written by Arbuckle, six by Hutcheson, two by Samuel
Boyse the theologian, and one is given up to posthumous
verses by Parnell. The remainder, with one exception, are
by writers unknown to Arbuckle, and most of these are
deficient both in style and matter, yet these are the only
papers that profess to deal with those topics of general
interest that yielded such admirable results under the treat-
ment of Addison and Steele. Those that emanate directly
from the Molesworth coterie possess some interest as showing
the same Shaftesbury influence, Hutcheson beginning to
advance a little beyond what he had learned from Moles-
worth ; he is academic, thorough, and, it must be admitted,
a little wearisome ; Arbuckle, on the other hand, if less
original, expounds Shaftesbury with something of the bright-
ness and verve that is such a prominent feature of the
Characteristics. He writes freely, pleasantly, with point and
force, and never scruples to drive home his most abstract
theories by plain homely examples.
The death of Molesworth on 22nd May, 1725, removed
one incentive to philosophical inquiries amongst some of his
young friends, and Arbuckle's work in this direction ends
with his publication of his articles in volume form in 1729.
The next year he lost Hutcheson, who was elected Professor
of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow ; and, having met Swift, his
literary energies took an altogether new direction. Swift
had an utter contempt for philosophy, especially modern
philosophy, and, finding that Arbuckle was possessed of a
certain dry humour of his own, he promptly nicknamed him
1 Hibernicus's Letters : A Collection of Letters and Essays lately Pub-
lished in the Dublin Journal. London, 1729, i., p. 4.
2 Hibernicus's Letters, i., p. 5.
ABBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 201
" Wit-upon-crutches ". l It would 110 doubt have been no
small satisfaction to Swift's sardonic spirit to have known
that this nickname is the only record of Arbuckle's personal
deformity.
Owing, too, to the loss of his patron, Molesworth, he was
dependent upon his profession, and this may have placed
difficulties in his way which may have prevented him from
continuing his philosophical work. As a medical man he
seems to have enjoyed a considerable popularity, and it is
pleasant to record the judgment of a contemporary, that
"his charity to the poor in his attendance upon them, was
conspicuous to all. And it is known to such as were inti-
mately acquainted with him that he was industrious in
finding out ways, of serving persons in concealed distress of
circumstances." 2
For the remainder of his life his literary work is to be
found in second-rate verses dealing with the literary and
personal controversies of the day. Some of these are pre-
served in Swift's works, others in rare pamphlets and
probably many more are lost amongst the mass of anonymous
productions of this kind or at least are difficult to trace. 3
Although Hutcheson was several times in Dublin after
his removal to Glasgow, he seems to have been unable to
recall Arbuckle to his early devotion to Philosophy. In the
MS. correspondence of Hutcheson with Dr. Drennan of
Belfast there are frequent references to the philosophical
opinions of almost all his other Irish friends, but Arbuckle's
name only occurs twice once in reference to a remittance
of money for the use of an Irish student at Glasgow and
again in connexion with a sample of Glasgow weaving, 4
which becomes intelligible when one remembers Swift's
1 Swiff 8 Works, Faulkiner's Edition, vol. xvii., p. 1, note.
2 A Sermon from Ecc. vii. 4, on the Death of Dr. Arbuckle, a
Physician and Member of Wood St. Congregation, preached Jan. 4,
1747. Dublin, 1747.
3 During the latter half of the year 1727 Arbuckle still continued to
contribute articles to the Dublin Journal signed by Hibernicus. Nearly
half of these are verses, and most of the remainder deal with popular
subjects. The only one of a philosophical nature is that published in
No. 127, on 2nd Sept., 1727, exposing scholastic quibbling. After 30th Jan.,
1728, there do not appear to be any more Hibernicus letters, though it is
quite possible that Arbuckle may have changed his nom-de-plume and
contributed some of the economic articles.
4 " My wife has troubled you with a little bundle of thread, which she
sent by one Clerk, a lad who deals in Linen cloath, the Thread must be
sent to Dr. Arbuckle by the first safe opportunity."
MS. Letter of Hutcheson to Dr. Drennan dated 81st Jan., 1737 (in
possession of Miss Drennan, Belfast).
202 w. R. SCOTT:
pamphlets on the woollen industries and that Arbuckle was
now in close contact with his views. This incident so small
in itself is very typical of the break-up of the little Shaftes-
bury School ; to his other friends, Synge, William Bruce, a
well-known publisher, Abernethy, a Presbyterian minister,
and Bundle, Bishop of Derry, Hutcheson sends the MS. of
his books ; to Arbuckle his fellow contributor to the Dublin
Journal " a little bundle of thread" !
The closing years of Arbuckle's life are devoid of any
event of importance. He seems to have been a man cursed
by a fatal facility of expression and versatility of talents. A
thinker, something of a scholar, a physician, verse-writer,,
political economist and essayist, yet, with all his gifts, too
indolent for sustained effort, unless encouraged by the in-
fluence of an older man than himself. He had early lost
Molesworth and his philosophical activity ends. Then
under the guidance of Swift, he returns to literature and
verse, and here again, as the tragic gloom of old age
closes round his friend, his work becomes less and less-
and finally ceases some years before his death which
took place either in the last days of 1746 (Hutcheson
died in the August of this year) or very early in 1747.
Much as one may distrust the eulogy of conventional
funeral sermons, there is something that rings true in that
preached on 4th January, 1747, in memory of Arbuckle..
"His openness," the preacher concludes, "frankness and
warm honesty of heart appeared in all his conversation and
behaviour. No man could be more distant from professing
anything he did not believe, or giving up anything he
thought just and right, either from a feeble complaisance
to others or from design. . . . The very man appeared to
you at once without disguise, and one had always the same
character to deal with. . . . His sound understanding and
good sense, joined with largeness of heart, and warm affec-
tion were excellent qualifications for the sacred offices of
friendship, which he discharged with the utmost generosity,,
steadfastness and fidelity." 1
AEBUCKLE'S PHILOSOPHY.
Owing to Arbuckle's thought clothing itself in, what he-
himself calls, the " loose and negligent " undress of the
Essay, it is by no means easy to find the true starting-point
of his theory. He seems to have interwoven his thoughts,,
1 Funeral Sermon, ut supra.
\
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBUBY SCHOOL. 203
and then thrown down a tangled skein from which it is
difficult to unravel the guiding thread.
One of several beginnings may be found in the conception
of Happiness, " the search for which is the business and
study of all mankind, and nothing is of greater importance
to us in life". 1 As Butler proved, a few years later,
Happiness is not to be understood as the " gratification of
our appetites and inclinations," 2 rather it has three essential
elements, "Pleasure," Joy and Tranquillity. The first two
of these are different forms of what is called " Delight "
the object of which is Beauty. "Pleasure" is described as
the effect of "material and inanimate things" that are
beautiful, joy arising similarly from the effect of " living and
social beings ". 3
1. Inanimate Beauty. That this pleasure exists and is
" natural" or underived is proved by the effect of an appro-
priate object upon us, which " is easier felt than described ".
In language anticipatory of Kant's " awe " of the " starry
heavens," Arbuckle bursts into raptures over the beauties
of nature : " We need only reflect on what we feel when we
admire the awful arch of Heaven, either illuminated by one
mighty ball of fire, or sow'd with innumerable stars ; when
we rejoice in the lovely appearance of the morning ; when
we survey the wonderful face of the great Ocean ; or when
we gaze on the milder charms of a rural Landskip, blooming
fields, solitary shades and still waters ". 4 He scornfully asks,
is there anything comparable to this in the feelings falsely
called pleasures of Sense ; and, from the uniformity and im-
portance of the effect, goes on to show that there must be
some standard of Natural Beauty. If it be objected that
the appreciation of it is not original or " natural," upon the
Lockiau grounds of want of universality or the phenomena
of acquired tastes, he replies that none of the pleasures of
sense are universal, and retorts that the loss of the capacity
of perceiving Beauty is universally considered to be one
of the greatest misfortunes. 6 At the same time, men are
1 Hibernicus's Letters, i., p. 37. Cf. Shaftesbury, Moralists, part iii., 3,
and Hutcheson, Inquiry into Original oj our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,
p. ix.
- Jl'hcrnicus's Letters, i., p. 38. Cf. Butler's Sermons, Preface and
non XI.
: H>id., p. 40. It may be remarked that this division gives no place for
the delight due to the beauty of animals.
As will be seen Arbuckle uses pleasure in a special sense, in fact he
denies that sensual pleasures are pleasures at all, and therefore the only
true pleasure is that arising from the recognition of Beauty.
4 I hid., i., p. 40. *Ibid., i., pp. 43-4.
204 w. E. SCOTT :
singularly inconsistent in that, while they jealously cherish
the capacity, they suffer it to be overlaid by lower and
fictitious pleasures which, in time, destroy it altogether.
Further, while the so-called pleasures of sense are individual
and exclusive, the " pleasures " of Beauty are open to all, and
in the truest sense universal negatively because they
cannot be monopolised, and positively because they are
infinite in number.
2. The Beauty of Living and Social Beings. The joy or
"rational delight " due to Personal Beauty is most obvious
in the human form (and especially under the influence
of what has happily been called Shaftesbury's " Weiber-
Cultus " l in woman's beauty) " in man's erect position, his
majestic looks and the expressive disposition of his features". 2
In a thoroughly Greek sense 3 he interprets these as indices
of a beautiful Soul, for which the body is a flexible mask
that takes its shape and form. " When we trace in a man's
Person, his countenance, or his behaviour, the Lineaments
of an heroic undaunted soul, of a kind and generous temper,
or of strong sense and reflexion, we cannot forbear a very
sudden approbation and esteem." 4
Thus personal beauty becomes the symbol of beauty of
the soul or moral beauty, and this is described, after Shaftes-
bury, as being concerned with the social and benevolent
affections, though Arbuckle is careful to state that he is not
prepared to determine the respective positions of Benevolence
and Self-Love. In fact, from his strictly aesthetic point of
1 Gizycki, Philosophic Shaftesbury's, p. 15. Arbuckle gives rather a
humorous turn to this idea by saying that " The Ladies, if they would
preserve then* charms, must, at least, take as much care to adjust their
minds as their dress and look into their bosoms as often as their glass "
adding that this might furnish material for an amusing advertisement
" The only true royal beautifying fluid for the face " ! Letters, i., pj
24-5. This would have given Swift a good example of " bathos ".
2 Ibid., i., p. 49.
3 Shaftesbury is sometimes called a modern Greek, and that, in the
analogy between Virtue and the Arts, he reproduces Plato (Fowler's
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, p. 98). The analogy between Plato and
Shaftesbury (including his followers) may be pushed too far. Plato was
a consummate literary artist, who distrusted his artistic impulses in
Philosophy. Shaftesbury and his followers, on the contrary, far from
distrusting their artistic impulses, excited them as much as possible,
sometimes to the exclusion of reason (cf. Mr. Leslie Stephen on Shaftes-
bury's style, Fraser's Magazine, vol. vii., p. 78). Mackintosh (Disserta-
tion, p. 108) unconsciously hits off Shaftesbury's reproduction of the
Greek spirit by calling it modern antique which is strictly true but
in the sense of the " virtuoso " of the present day.
4 Hibernicus's Letters, i., p. 21.
AKBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 205
view, the beauty of a Benevolent action consists partly in
the peculiar manner in which it appeals to the imagination ;
and partly also in its being an instance of " order, symmetry,
and perfection". In fact, in Arbuckle's frequent refer-
ences to Benevolence, he merely reproduces Shaftesbury
unconsciously, and while Benevolence is not essential to
Shaftesbury, 1 it is still less so to Arbuckle, since, if
morality be no more than the lovely or " comely life," the
exact position of Benevolence is of comparatively little
importance.
If Arbuckle had continued his philosophical work, one
might hazard the guess that Benevolence would have soon
lost much of the apparent philosophic importance it pos-
sessed for him as a young man of five and twenty ; and,
as he concentrated his attention more and more upon the
beautiful life, he would have been forced to choose whether
to make Beauty " natural " and primary and to have estab-
lished Benevolence, as choiceworthy, because beautiful, or,
on the contrary, if he had followed out some of the ad-
missions he makes, when dealing with practical needs, he
might have adopted Hutcheson's position in representing
(moral) Beauty as joy-giving, because arising out of Benevo-
lence. The portions of his Letters, where Benevolence is
introduced, seem to lack cohesion, as if he were repeating
what he had learned, but not digested, unconscious of the
logical incongruity of thought.
3. Tranquillity. Naturally Arbuckle dissents from the Stoic
theory of " apathy," which, he contends, is not tranquil-
lity, but the extinction of all desire " a tranquillity which
stocks and stones enjoy to the highest perfection ". 2 It is
strange that, in this connexion, he is quite silent with
regard to the Epicurean tranquillity, which, though it differs
from his own use of the term, is, at least, much nearer to it
than the stoic aTrddeta, possibly, remembering the popular
audience he supposed himself to address, he was deterred
by the reproach attached to the term " Epicurean," even so
late as the early portion of the last century.
Since the Beauty of objects, human beings and their lives
presupposes external objects, Arbuckle strongly condemns
the self-sufficingness of the Stoic " wise man," and, after
again analysing the temporary nature of " short and unruly
gusts of passion " 3 which end in satiety and disgust, and
showing the unsatisfying character of certain typical in-
1 Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, ii., p. 509.
- Ilibernicus's Letters, ut supra, i., p. 216. 3 Ibid., p. 221.
206 w. E. SCOTT :
stances of the sensual and physical pleasures of his time, 1
he concludes, by a process of exclusion, that it is only in
the delight due to Beauty that tranquillity is to be found,
" for all the pleasures of Sense are short and fugitive ; grow
fainter with age, and duller by repetition ; cannot be revived
but after some intervals ; and must wait the return of
appetite, which are (sic) not always at any man's call, and
seldom at theirs who indulge them most. But the pleasures
of Imagination are free from all those inconveniences ; and
are both of larger extent and longer duration. They com-
prehend, not only all that is beautiful in Nature, but all
that is elegant and curious in Art. Nor are they even con-
fined to objects that have a real existence, but can be
raised by intellectual images, and Beings of the Mind's own
creation. 2 The material and the moral world are equally
the scenes of these refined pleasures ; and the mind receives
the like amiable ideas of Beauty, Order, Harmony, from
the structure and contrivance of both." 3
Arbuckle's treatment of Tranquillity presents two points
of interest. Here, as elsewhere, at times, he is not so opti-
mistic as Shaftesbury. often he writes, not merely in a
tone of world-pity, but almost of despair ; and, while never
doubting the ideal of the "life beautiful," he sometimes
seems to lose hope of its practical realisation. " There
passes not an age," he writes, " wherein starts not up once or
twice some great imperial destroyer, who, to gratify a brutal
pride, and insatiable lust of dominion, lays waste whole
provinces, countries and nations ; invades Nature herself ;
and the more effectually to drown the cries of the universe,
abolishes, perhaps, a whole language in the destruction of
those who spoke it. ... Can the Happiness of Virtue be
perfect and entire amidst a scene so filled with disagree-
able and shocking events?" 4 His optimism, however, is
re-established by the " encouragement he has to look up for
a future place of rest," where a higher and unmarred beauty
will atone for the imperfections of the present.
In the second place, under the head of Tranquillity,
Arbuckle makes some general remarks relative to Con-
1 Hibernicus's Letters, ii., p. 147.
2 Arbuckle here contradicts his previous assertion that Beauty arises
from the appreciation of External objects. The reconciliation of these
inconsistent statements may be found in the theory of the imaginative
dramatisation of the self, which is an eighteenth century approach to
the later problem of the sensibility, namely, how the activity of the self
can become passive for purposes of perception.
3 Ibid., ii., pp. 104-5. 'Ibid., i., p. 228.
AKBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 207
science. The vices of mankind are "infectious to such a
degree" that they depress the individual and make him
doubtful of his right to his own approbation, yet, upon con-
sideration, the man who has fashioned for himself a
thoroughly beautiful life cannot but be conscious of it, for
''there issues from Conscience to the mind its own picture,
pure and unspotted," * and this essentially aesthetic consolation
is reinforced by the religious one of man's relation to the
moral government of God. 2
The slightness of Arbuckle's references to Conscience suffi-
ciently differentiates him from Shaftesbury and, especially,
from Hutcheson. Nowhere in the Letters does the ex-
pression " moral sense" occur. In fact, Arbuckle's general
point of view is exclusive of a moral sense. With him
Beauty, though fundamentally the same, has two species
the one created (as in Nature) and the other creative or pro-
ductive (as in Art, Literature and Morals). Postponing for
the present the discussion of the psychological character of
the appreciation of Beauty, Arbuckle's position may be sum-
marised as presenting points of contact with and divergence
from that of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in his earlier works,
who held such appreciation to be a reflex feeling. Now, if
Arbuckle distinguished his Conscience (in the sense of
Hutcheson's moral sense) from the appreciation of the
Beautiful in Art, it would become a further reflex act, that
is the reflex of an already reflex state.
To Arbuckle, it would appear, man is ethically an artist,
whose work is his own life, which he views as he would a
picture he had painted, and approves it, according to canons
of artistic excellence to modify an expression of Aristotle's,
Virtue is aperr/ rov ev /3t&> KaXov Kayadov.
Such an artistic " taste," however, is oppressed by a latent
" dialectic ". The artist in conduct feels there should be an
inevitableness in the sequence of Happiness upon Virtue. Yet
" no one virtuous action is its own sufficient reward "...
and the solution is found by invoking the Deity as a Deus ex
machina, because, " though Virtue be indeed the direct and
natural road to Happiness, yet it frequently fails of actually
being so, and, for that reason, stands in need of some superior
power to strengthen us in the constant practice of it ". 3
Beauty. It therefore follows that Beauty, being of the
greatest importance to Arbuckle more so than to Shaftes-
bury or Hutcheson deserves a more thorough investigation
1 Hibemicutfs Letters, i., 220. 2 Cf. Butler, Analogy, ch. ii., iii.
3 Hibernicus's Letters, ii., p. 325.
208 w. R. SCOTT :
than it had received from the former. The harmonious and
symmetrical system of Shaftesbury needs to be both explained
and expanded to show how it can apply to both natural and
moral Beauty. Hutcheson, by his express division of the
Inner sense into an ^Esthetic and Moral Sense, is enabled to
give a definition applicable, as he thought, to Natural and
Artistic Beauty namely, the presence of " Uniformity amidst
variety ". l Arbuckle rather shelves the question by saying
that the " inquiry wherein Beauty properly consists is foreign
to the present design". 2 Partly following Shaftesbury, 3 he
makes a start from Bacon's reduction of Beauty to three
characteristics Colour, flavour and motion, which he inter-
prets, in personal beauty, as a fine complexion, regularity of
feature, " and that Je ne sgay quoi which we commonly call a
good air". 4 Of these the latter is the most important, as
being the play of feature, which is the symbol of " that
motion of mind which is necessary to communicate an
agreeable motion to the face and spread itself in those
thousand nameless graces and amiable dimples that strike
the beholder with joy and delight ". 5 Thus, in the outer
world, Beauty consists of Colour, order or arrangement, and
movement, while in the inner world of art and conduct there
is an energy which realises in action a product that shows
similar or corresponding traces of order in relation to its
environment. Elsewhere, Arbuckle seems to incline to the
theory of Leibnitz that this order arises out of minute differ-
ences, for each of which there is a sufficient reason, and
hence the ground of beauty would be a rational appreciation
of the harmony of the universe, consisting of a symmetry
composed of infinite diversities. 6 This view, however, is
mentioned incidentally, and is not developed.
The manner in which Beauty is apprehended. Arbuckle always
uses the greatest reserve in speaking of the way Beauty is
appreciated. As already mentioned, he never uses the ex-
pression "moral sense" in reference to Shaftesbury 's moral
beauty, and as a rule the term " sense " occurs very rarely in
his work. He frequently speaks of "taste," but rather in a
strictly aesthetic signification than as an exact equivalent
1 Inquiry Concerning Beauty, 2-3.
2 Hibernicus' s Letters, i., p. 40.
3 Shaftesbury's Inquiry Concerning Virtue, i., part ii., 3.
4 Ibid., I, p. 23. 5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Ibid., ii., p. 340. It may be noted that Hutcheson (Inquiry Con-
cerning Beauty, 3) instances this theory of Leibnitz as a case of a per-
version of the sense of Beauty what he calls fantastic beauty.
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWOBTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 209
for Shaftesbury's more hedonistic term, " relish". " Taste "
is a natural capacity, but susceptible of cultivation, and even
requiring it. Here he parts company with Hutcheson, who,
sometimes in his earlier works, speaks as if he used the
word sense simply as indicating the passive side of the
mind. 1 Arbuckle's point of view is different, probably as a
poet, he recognises, with regard to works of Art, that any
such account of the appreciation of the Beautiful neglects the
importance of the creative imagination. Under the fanciful
heading of " Castle-building " he vindicates the productive
powers of "fancy," for, he thinks, "whatever may be the
abuses of a loose fancy in its wild rambles after chimerical
pleasure," being a natural faculty, it must have a legitimate
use. This consists in drawing up "ideal memoirs of our
future actions and success," thereby constructing a romantic
liixtory, for, after all, what is history "but Castle-building
backwards, wherein we amuse ourselves with the fortunes
and adventures of other persons as if they were our own?" 2
This exercise of imagination, though common, is productive
or creative, and, under due artistic restraint, becomes the
work of genius. From this point, Arbuckle starts upon the
few hints he gives of his views upon .^Esthetics, as such.
These are very scattered and tend rather in the direction of
literary and artistic criticism than towards the construction
of a theory of Art.
The influence of the artistic imagination upon life and
conduct is more important. Arbuckle appears to have given
Imagination the power of outlining an Ideal of the beautiful
life, for which each separate act constitutes the material to
be worked up as it were, the pigments to be successively
applied to make the complete "picture".
The application of the productive or artistic imagination
to Ethics has an important bearing upon the Psychological
character of Arbuckle's theory. While he strongly contends
that the basis of the delight in Beauty is "natural," i.e., not
wholly the result of education, his theory is more complex
than that of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The delight
derived from Beauty can scarcely be said to be ultimate in
as much as it is conditioned by the artistic idea of a beautiful
personality, which ideal is consciously present in the mind,
prior to the different actions which endeavour to realise it,
1 Inquiry Concerning Beauty, 6, x. " The internal sense is a passive
power of receiving ideas of Beauty from all objects in which there is'
uniformity amidst variety."
a Hibemicus's Letters, L, p. 83.
14
210 W. E. SCOTT :
and which must have some voice in the approving of these
actions. Thus the delight resulting from each step towards
the attainment of this ideal is not merely analogous to (as
with Shaftesbury), but practically identical with the artist's
pleasure in the progress of his work, and, while this is no
doubt a joyful feeling, it is neither unanalysable nor ultimate
and therefore can scarcely be described as intuitive else
every workman's satisfaction in work well done would be
equally intuitive.
In the case of the proper sphere of the artistic imagination
namely, in Literature and Art it would appear from the
hints in the essay on Castle-building that the faculty works
consciously, since it must be watched and its procedure kept
within bounds. It is here where Arbuckle of the Shaftes-
bury writers comes closest to later aesthetic theories, that he
misses the importance of the unconscious element in art.
Nor need one blame him for lack of insight, when it is
remembered that as a verse- writer he was one of the imita-
tors of Pope, amongst whose consciously laboured efforts
one looks in vain for outbursts of " fine frenzy".
Finally, with regard to the Beauties of Nature he would
also have found a place for Imagination here also, since
Nature not only appeals to the natural capacity for ap-
preciating the Beautiful, but rouses the " fancy " to use it
for its own purposes certainly in Arbuckle's own treatment
of Natural Beauty, as well as in his frequent use of per-
sonification, there is much that is the result of the artistic
imagination.
Therefore it would appear that the psychologic order and
values are something as follows : Delight arises immediately
from the appreciation of Beauty : but Beauty itself (at least
in the case of moral and artistic beauty) is the result of
the natural capacity for perceiving beauty modified by the
artistic imagination and its ideals, and this again is influenced
by memory, hope and the effects of education and training. 1
Thus in all cases of joy in the beautiful life, the natural
capacity is modified by external training and also by in-
ternal faculties. It is to this that life and conduct are
presented as an artistic product, the creation of a personal-
ity, which, like the " disappearing gun," sinks momentarily
out of sight, and then the resulting pleasure partakes of
the character of artistic disinterestedness. 2
1 Hibernicus's Letters, ii., p. 324.
2 Thus Arbuckle's Beauty would have three characteristics of Kant's
" Judgments of Taste " Universality, Necessity and Disinterestedness.
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBUKT SCHOOL. 211
THE MODIFICATION OF ESTHETIC ETHICS IN RELATION TO
THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.
Arbuckle's aesthetic morals scarcely bear the strain of the
explanation of every-day problems ; and yet he is above all
things a practical writer. Consequently, when he faces
the theory of government and economics, he falls back
upon Shaftesbury's Benevolence, which he interprets, as
Hutcheson did though not by the same formula as "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number ". With regard
to the theory of the State, Arbuckle was a thorough Whig,
and he endeavours to show the eudaemonistic results at-,
tending the recognition of the liberty of the subject ; indeed,
he devotes considerable space to arguments in favour of its
extension.
As in Moral Philosophy, so in relation to Political Econ-
omy, Arbuckle's position is of interest, through extrinsic
circumstances. The French Physiocrats have claimed
Adam Smith as a disciple, yet it can be shown that Smith
received the impetus that resulted in the Wealth of Nations
from Hutcheson at Glasgow. 1 Now the earliest work of
Hutcheson's that contained economical matter was the
System of Moral Philosophy, which was probably written
between 1733 and 1737, though it was not published until
1755. When the close relationship of Hutcheson and
Arbuckle at Dublin is remembered, the isolated expressions
of the latter upon economical questions, published as early
as 1725 (just thirty years before Hutcheson's System) in the
Dublin Journal, are worthy of mention.
It will be remembered that Molesworth Arbuckle's
patron had been a minister at the Danish Court, and
therefore it is not surprising that, in Political Economy,
Arbuckle should follow Sir William Temple, who had dis-
charged similar duties in Holland. Like Temple, Arbuckle
is an adherent of the mercantile system, though to a less
extent, for he had the important advantage of being able to
see both sides of the balance of exports and imports through
his residence in Ireland, which, he says, is to be looked upon
" as a colony of England ", 2 Therefore, from the mercan-
tile point of view, he has to show how the balance of
trade is to be in favour of Ireland, without prejudice to the
prosperity of England. But, while the balance of trade is
to consist either of specie, " or what will turn to it in the
1 Cf. Life of Adam Smith, by John Rae, p. 15.
2 Hibernicus's Letters, i., p. 297.
212 w. E. SCOTT :
long run," Arbuckle is very far from following the mercan-
tile theorists, either in advocating prohibition or bounties.
Considering the date at which he wrote, he speaks with no
uncertain voice in favour of Free Trade, contending that
" Prohibitions, or high duties amounting to prohibitions, we
daily see have no effect ", 1 They lead to extensive smuggling
and " the exorbitant gains to be made in such cases work too
powerfully upon weak and dishonest minds to hinder them
from supplying our luxury at any hazard to themselves and
to the ruin of the public ". Even bounties " have not fully
answered the ends proposed ". Thus, Arbuckle, while
clinging to the mercantile position regarding bullion as
wealth, and the consequent fallacy of the balance of trade,
is an advocate of Free Trade at least between England
and Ireland. The reconciliation of these two opposing
tendencies in his work comes from a combination of the
opinions of Swift and Shaftesbury. From the former he
learnt to advocate the home-consumption of home manufac-
tures, but he advances beyond what might be called the
patriotic Protection of Swift by an ethical principle borrowed
from Shaftesbury's optimism. He supposes, without ex-
pressly stating it, that most of the goods required in Ireland
can, under natural conditions, be produced inside the
country, and, even under certain circumstances, such pro-
duction would leave a surplus, which could be profitably
exported, and, further, most manufactures can be sold to us
more cheaply by the local producer. To bring about a
return to such "natural" conditions only requires a recogni-
tion of " enlightened self-interest" as opposed to fashionable
caprice. Such arguments are strengthened by purely ethi-
cal ones, such as appeals to Benevolence and the amount
of happiness which would be produced by the increased
amount of labour employed. This, according to Arbuckle,
is the only true charity.
These views are of interest from two quite different
points of view. On the one side, Arbuckle's tentative
economical work constitutes a connecting link between the
Mercantile School and the Physiocrats, while it is important
to note that so long before the publication of the Wealth of
Nations he initiates the postulate of the coincidence of the
individual and general good, as a consequence of " a benefi-
cent natural order" 2 a doctrine commencing in modern
thought with Shaftesbury, and transmitted by Molesworth
1 Hibernicus's Letters, p. 303.
3 Cf. A History of Political Economy, by J. K. Ingram, p. 91.
ARBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH- SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 213
to Arbuckle and Hutcheson, while from the latter it found
its way into the system of Adam Smith. When the popu-
larity of Shaftesbury in France is remembered, it is easy
to see how the same principle results in the conclusions of
the Physiocrats, under different commercial conditions. In
the second place, it is to be noticed that the help Arbuckle
receives from Shaftesbury's principle of Benevolence in
dealing with the practical needs of his time impairs the
consistency of his ^Esthetic Ethics. Theoretically, Virtue
is the Beautiful life : whereas, in dealing with government
and economics, Beauty disappears, and the conclusions are
deduced from Shaftesbury's Benevolence.
ARBUCKLE'S EELATION TO SHAFTESBURY AND HUTCHESON.
Shaftesbury's system gives a double equation for Virtue
on the one side as identical with social good, on the other
with Beauty. But he fails to establish any connexion be-
tween these two synonyms for Virtue. Obviously Beauty
is the wider term of the two, but, in as much as he admits
that some Benevolent actions are not virtuous (and there-
fore not beautiful), it is also true that, in some cases,
Benevolence must overlap Beauty.
Shaftesbury, like every thinker who has exerted any
influence upon the course of philosophical development, had
" incomplete " followers, who make apparent his concealed
inconsistencies. This may even be seen in Hutcheson's first
work, published in the same year (1725) as the first thirty-
nine numbers of the Letters, in which the two subjects
mentioned, Beauty and Benevolence, are isolated, and each
is treated in a separate treatise. Shaftesbury himself never
seems to have decided whether to make Virtue Beauty or
Benevolence ; and we find Hutcheson, in his early works,
developing the Benevolent aspect, by maintaining that
Virtue was Benevolence, and that anything not benevolent
is not virtuous. 1 While Arbuckle represents the opposite
tendency, holding that Virtue is fundamentally of the same
nature as the Beautiful in Art : but, precisely as with
Hutcheson, Beauty is isolated from Benevolence, and the
latter is reintroduced to explain practical needs.
With both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, what is called
Beauty is rather rational symmetry to make it cesthetic
Beauty or Beauty proper, it wants action or movement and
colour, upon which Arbuckle insists. It is thus that we
find Hutcheson speaking of the " beauty of theorems," and
1 Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 3.
214 W. E. SCOTT :
even, in the first edition of his Inquiry, introducing " mathe-
matical calculation " in Ethics, by formulating different
ethical states as equations, e.g., the "moment of evil" is
H H X A. Where H = Hatred and A the ability of the
agent ; l thereby showing the special and mathematical
meaning he gives to Beauty. Therefore, Arbuckle advances
upon both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in so far as he opens
a way to a theory of .^Esthetics, as such. While he thus
advances both upon his master and fellow-disciple, he does
not follow his own thought far enough to reach its due re-
ward in anticipating Schiller's aesthetic morals. The plastic
Imagination Arbuckle's " fancy " hints at the free " play "
of artistic and aesthetic activity in which Schiller finds the
reconciliation of Kant's duality of sensibility and reason.
Upon the other hand, Arbuckle loses, by the special in-
terpretation of Shaftesbury, all the fruitful germs implied in
that side of Shaftesbury's theory which vindicates the right
of the Moral Sense to approve of men's tempers and
characters, or, in other words, the inner side of action.
Arbuckle's aesthetic procedure tends more and more to de-
personalise action which, at first, the creative product of
a conscious personality, is afterwards projected outward and
viewed " as a picture," in fact the agent, as far as possible,
turns his back upon his own act, and, as it were, trying to
forget it is his own, looks upon its outward side and meets it
as a stranger.
This train of thought suggests at once a contrast and a
parallel to the "Impartial Spectator" of Adam Smith,
which the agent temporally projects from himself by
putting away from himself his own reason and sympathy
and retaining his act with Arbuckle, on the contrary, we
have an artistic externalisation of the act, while the rest of
the personality is retained as before. The divergent methods
of both find a unity in an unconscious groping after the
rigour of Kant's Categorical Imperative in Smith's case,
by the disinterestedness of the Impartial Spectator ; in
Arbuckle's by a disinterestedness which is that of the
Esthetic Judgment.
Regarding Arbuckle's relation to Hutcheson, it will already
have been seen that Arbuckle's work is the natural comple-
ment of Hutcheson's early investigations. Though Hutche-
son had much to do with the foundation of the study of
1 Inquiry. First edition, p. 178. It has not been noticed that a
similar " moral algebra " occurs in the Treatise on the Passions (1728),
e.g., L = C x G (p. 304).
AEBUCKLE AND THE MOLESWORTH-SHAFTESBURY SCHOOL. 215
Esthetics, it is strange how far he was from appreciating
the essentials of Art ; and even Literature seems to have
appealed to him from its linguistic and Philological sides
rather than the artistic. It is a strange irony of Philosophy,
that Berkeley, whose letters from Italy teem with apprecia-
tive references to painting and sculpture, degrades Beauty to
the merest utility, 1 while Hutcheson, one of the earliest
sesthetical writers, fails to show any deep understanding or
sympathy with the Beauty of Art. Little as Arbuckle has
written, his isolated expressions show us brief transient
glimpses of his entrance into the spirit of Poetry and Art,
which would have qualified him to do valuable work had he
not deserted Philosophy. As it is, he leaves us a young
man's fragment, and when one remembers that the un-
promising title of Sermons has excluded Butler's ethical work
from the majority of the histories of Philosophy, until quite
recently, it is little wonder that theories disguised under
the title of Hibernicuss Letters should have been hitherto
unrecognised as containing a missing link of the chain of the
British historical development of thought.
1 Alciphron, Dia. 3, 9. Hutcheson, Addendum to fourth edition of
Inquiry.
V. TIME AS RELATED TO CAUSALITY AND
TO SPACE.
BY MAKY WHITON CALKINS.
I. THE PHENOMENAL CATEGOBY OF NECESSAEY
CONNEXION.
Two fundamental errors, one positive and one negative, still
contribute to a radical misunderstanding of the nature of
time. Metaphysicians insist, as they have insisted for cen-
turies, on treating Time and Space as .analogous, and on
attributing to the one the characteristics of the other ; and,
with the same persistence, they overlook the fundamental
and far-reaching likeness between Time and Causality.
This paper aims to suggest the proper relations of time
to causality and to space, and their common reference to a
more ultimate category. Everybody will agree that all three
may be regarded as varying sorts of unification of different
kinds of multiplicity ; causality as a connexion of events,
time as a series of moments, and space as a relation of points
or positions. This unity is, however, phenomenal, not ulti-
mate ; a connexion of facts, 1 that is of relatively separate,
artificially isolated portions of reality qualities, things,
events or moments ' accepted ' without investigation. This
relative separateriess and independence, which is an essential
characteristic of the phenomenon, makes it a convenient
object of scientific observation and classification, but debars
it from the claim to ultimate reality, on any monistic
hypothesis of an absolute unity underlying all multiplicity.
To the idealist, for instance, to whom the universe is
fundamentally the vital unity of individual selves within
an absolute self, the temporal, spatial or causal relation of
phenomena is through and through mechanical, superficial
rather than essential ; a connexion, relatively extrinsic, of
isolated bits of reality regarded as relatively independent.
1 Cf. Bradley's definition of facts, Appearance and Reality, p. 317.
" Any part of a temporal series . . . can be called an event or fact, ior it
is taken as a piece. ..."
TIME AS RELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 217
Yet however he denies its ultimateness, however strenuously
he claims the existence of a deeper unity, monist as well as
pluralist acknowledges the subordinate categories of pheno-
menal reality, that is the unifications of the superficial facts
of experience.
Of these forms of what is at least phenomenal unity, two
may be clearly distinguished : identity, that is the unity of
the ' thing ' or ' quality ' with itself, in spite of the multi-
plicity of its temporal moments ; and necessary connexion
or the unity of the many with each other, that is, the
relation, direct or indirect, of every bit of reality with every
other, just by virtue of their both forming part of the same
world. Such a reduction of the principles of phenomenal
unity is suggested to the careful student by an elimination
of categories from Kant's elaborate table : for the categories
of Quality turn out to be attributes of sense elements, and
not in any true sense functions of unity ; those of Quantity
prove their practical identity with time and space ; and the
categories of Modality are admitted by Kant himself to stand
on quite another footing from the others being virtually,
indeed, mere varying expressions of his insistence upon the
greater reality of the sensuous. The true functions of unity
are evidently, then, to be sought under the head of ' Relation ' ;
and there, we find, Kant recognises substance or permanence
(a modification of identity), Causality or the necessary con-
nexion of the Successive, and Reciprocal Determination, or
the necessary connexions of the simultaneous. So Schopen-
hauer, whose metaphysical doctrine has failed, unhappily, of
its rightful influence, because overshadowed by his ethical
system, Schopenhauer, though he overlooks permanence
and identity, reduces the categories to one, that of necessary
connexion, or, as he names it, Grund, of which time, space
and causality are subordinate forms. " Alle unsere Vor-
stellungen," he says, " stehen unter einander in einer
gesetzmassigen Verbindung, vermoge welcher nichts fur
sich Bestehendes und Unabhangiges, auch nichts Einzelnes
und Abgerissenes Objekt fur uns werden kann. Diese
Verbindung ist es, welche der Satz vom Zureichenden Grunde
ausdriickt." 1
To discuss both sorts of phenomenal unity would lead us
too far afield. We are more concerned with this last named,
so clearly described by Schopenhauer ; the necessary relation
of all the diverse facts of the universe to each other, a
principle of unity manifested in many ways, by the com-
1 Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom Zureichenden Grunde, 16.
218 M. W. CALKINS :
bination of qualities in a thing, by the coalescing of feelings
in a mood, by the grouping of mathematical quantities in a,
series, or by the rhythm which binds together notes in a,
scale. The thesis of this paper is the assertion that Time
and Causality are subordinate forms of this principle of the
Necessary Connexion of phenomena, and that the third and
co-ordinate form of the category is Keciprocal Determination,,
not, as is often stated, Space.
II TIME.
(a) The Temporal Manifold.
The reduction of these categories to the one fundamental
principle of necessary connexion is best justified by a more
detailed consideration of each one of them, and an investi-
gation of the nature of time becomes therefore our immediate
problem. To the question, What is time? the traditional
answer is from the outset unsatisfactory, for it enumerates,
two distinct attributes of time, duration and succession,
without giving an inkling of their relation to each other.
But at the first glance, these so-called time-relations reveal
themselves as directly opposed ; the first is a form of unity,
the second a kind of multiplicity ; and yet duration is in no
sense the unity of the successive, but quite a different sort of
unity ; it is a form of identity which consists in the oneness
of one phenomenon with itself rather than that of many
phenomena with each other. Duration, or permanence, is
identity, regarded in direct comparison with succession and,,
in fact, measured by succession. 1
Now if we are to choose between succession and duration
as expressions of the real nature of time, there cannot well
be any doubt of the decision. Things endure, qualities per-
sist, one experience outlasts several others, but the essence
of time is its restlessness, and the nature of time is the
multiplicity, the succession, of its moments. The temporal
sequence of course implies an enduring permanence, and is
known only by contrast with it, but the succession, not the
duration, is truly temporal. Everyday reflexion has always,
indeed, identified time with succession, and has sharply
emphasised its opposition to duration or permanence ; the
" flight of time," the elusiveness of the moment, the stream
1 Cj. Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 4, p. 11 (8te
Auflage) : " Das Zugleichsein vieler Zustande aber macht das Wesen der
Wirkfichkeit aus, derm durch dasselbe wird allererst die Dauer moglich,
indem diese nur erkennbar 1st an dern Wechsel der mit dem Dauernden
zugleich Vorhandenen ".
TIME AS RELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 219
of time, are all expressions of our ordinary consciousness.
Nor is there wanting the sanction, sometimes perhaps unwit-
ting, of the great masters in philosophy. " Die Succession,"
says Schopenhauer, 1 " ist das ganze Wesen der Zeit." " Time
in its first appearance," Hume declares, 2 " can never be
severed from such a succession of changeable objects."
" Time is nothing," is Berkeley's expression, 3 " abstracted
from the succession of ideas." The theory is sometimes
upheld, even by Kant, though his usual view is that succession
is merely one of the modes of time, 4 while occasionally he
makes the misleading statement that permanence is the
substratum of time, or even identical with time, of which
accordingly succession is denied. 5 Before the appearance,
however, of the second edition of the Kritik, Kant had realised
the inaccuracy of such statements, and a manuscript note
in his own hand makes the comment : " Hier muss der
Beweis so gefiihrt werden dass er nur auf Substanzen als
Phenomena aiisserer Sinne passe, folglich aus dem Raum ". 6
The suggested correction does not, however, appear in the
second edition text of the Analogy, which, on the other hand,
even adds the unequivocal sentence, "Die Zeit . . . bleibt
und wechselt nicht ". But in a new section, introduced in
the second edition the Allgemeine Anmerkung zum System der
Grundsdtze Kant says definitely, "Der Kaum allein bestimmt
beharrlich, die Zeit aber, mithin alles was im inneren Sinn
ist fliesst bestandig "J
1 Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille, u.s.w., i., 4, p. 9.
2 Treatise, book i., pt. ii., 3, Green & Grose, ed. i., p. 343.
3 Principles of Human Knowledge, 98.
4 " Die drei Modi der Zeit sind Beharrlichkeit, Folge und Zugleich-
sein." Kritik der reinen Vemunft, editions A., p. 177 ; B., p. 219.
5 Op. cit. A., p. 183, B., p. 226. "Die Beharrlichkeit druckt iiberhaupt
die Zeit aus. Denn der Wechsel trifft die Zeit selbst nicht, sondern nur
die Erscheinungen in der Zeit."
*Nachtrage, Ixxx.
7 The truth is that there is hardly any part of Kant's teachings so full of
verbal inconsistencies as his doctrine of time. The constant juxtaposition,
in successive paragraphs and even sentences, of glaring contradictions
like those which have been quoted, amply justifies the critical theory of
the Kritik, as written bit by bit and carelessly put together. At least
three positions are assumed : (1) the theory that time is fundamentally
"the permanent," and thus the substratum of succession and co-existence ;
(2) the theory that permanence is one of the modi, attributes or dimen-
sions of time ; (3) the theory which contradicts the permanence of time,
as in the words, " Das Zugleichsein [ist] nicht ein Modus der Zeit, in
welcher keine Theile zugleich sondern alle nach einander sind". Cf.
Reflexionen, pp. 366, 368 and 373.
220 M. W. CALKINS :
The tendency to foist permanence upon the restless nature
of time is clearly the result of the misleading habit of
making time analogous with space. We of modern times
owe much of this misunderstanding to Newton's Principia,
and one can hardly read the Scholia of Proposition VIII.
without realising that this " time absolute, true and mathe-
matical" which "flows regularly (cequaliter fluit)" and which
is nevertheless credited with duration, that is with perma-
nence, is but the pale abstraction from absolute space which
" ever remains like and immovable (semper manei similare et
immobile) ". In the same way, the sections on Time in the
Kritik owe their obvious weakness to the failure inevitably
attending every effort to treat spatial and temporal reality
after the same fashion.
If now succession is admitted to constitute the nature of
the temporal manifold, it must next be distinguished from
other sorts of multiplicity by its characteristic irrevocable-
ness. The moment never returns, the past is gone beyond
recall, the present is always a new phenomenon. More
closely studied the ' irrevocable event or moment ' differs
from the ' revivable ' thing, in that its manifold lacks the
identity which belongs to the latter. The ' moment ' is
precisely such a phenomenon as has no permanence and
will not recur, while the ' position in space ' has an identity
and thus a permanence and unchangeableness, such that
it may be observed again and again. It is for this reason
that Kant, as has been shown, in his later discussion treats
permanence as a spatial relation, while Schopenhauer re-
peatedly emphasises 1 the " starre, unveranderliche Beharren
des Raums ". It will be necessary, later, to widen a little
this distinction between irrevocable and revivable, so as to
include within the latter class mathematical and musical,
as well as spatial, series. At this point of our study we
have to differentiate the abstract from the concrete suc-
cession, that is, moments from events. The distinction is
psychologically an abstraction, since we are never conscious
of empty time, but always of past, present and future events,
but the abstraction is a justifiable one, and we do mean
always, by ' the moment,' the relatively empty unit of a
successive manifold, the event in which the object of our
attention is not any part of the specific content colour or
sound or emotional tinge but just the bare fact of its
being one of an unrecurring series.
1 Welt als Wille, M.S.W., i., 4, p. 11.
TIME AS BELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 221
(b) The Temporal Unity.
Up to this point the temporal manifold has been the topic
of discussion. But time means more than bare multiplicity,
and its moments are regarded not only as many but as
unified or connected. This connexion is moreover con-
sidered to be ' universal,' that is it is predicated of every
possible phenomenon, so that the separateness of the
phenomenon is only relative, and just by virtue of being
' event ' or ' thing ' it is by hypothesis one of a connected
multiplicity. And this universality which is attributed to
phenomenal connexion follows from another characteristic,
its 'necessity. By the necessity of connexion is meant that
the synthesis of the manifold depends on somewhat more
fundamental than itself, that is upon the fundamental
unity of reality which makes it impossible that any un-
connected manifold should exist. This is the sort of
necessary connexion, a phenomenal synthesis, founded
upon an ultimate unity, which Kant shows by his tran-
scendental deduction of the categories ; and the establishment
and explanation of tbis unity form Kant's real answer to
Hume. Only a pluralist, therefore, can deny the necessity
of phenomenal connexion, and conversely no one who
affirms the universality of such a relation can consistently
defend the pluralist metaphysics.
The necessary temporal unity is, moreover, of a particular
sort. Geometrical magnitudes, for instance, are also of
necessity connected, but the relation of one angle to another
differs in one marked respect from the relation of one
moment to another. The temporal series is not only con-
nected but irreversibly connected, that is, past, present and
future must be experienced in the same fixed order. One
may turn one's eyes from east to west or from west to east,
one may ascend or descend the musical scale, and one may
count from 100 to 1 or from 1 to 100, while one cannot live
the future before the present. Past, present and future
must in truth be defined in terms of the irreversibleness of
the necessary connexion. The past is the ' irrevocable '
member of a series, on which another member, the present,
' depends ' with which, that is to say, it is irreversibly
connected. The present is therefore dependent on the past,
and the future on the present, in a sense in which the past
is not dependent on the present nor the present on the
future ; while, on the other hand, mathematical quantities or
planets in the solar system, though in a very real sense
dependent on each other, yet are mutually determined.
222 M. w. CALKINS :
Thus the fundamental distinctions of time are based upon
two sorts of necessity : first, the dependence of synthesis in
general upon Ultimate Unity, and second, the dependence
of the moment upon the preceding moment (which as
' irrevocable ' is regarded as peculiarly real).
This now is the essential truth contained in all assertions
of the oneness of time ; not a unity of one phenomenon
with itself, as opposed to multiplicity the unity of dura-
tion but the unity of the manifold, the related oneness
of phenomena necessarily bound together. Schopenhauer
states the doctrine unambiguously in his explicit teaching
that time is only the " simplest of the forms" of the Law
of Sufficient Reason. Schelling means the same by his
expression, " Die Zeit hebt das Auseinander auf "- 1 Kant
also grows gradually to this view of the essential likeness of
temporal with causal unity. Only the traditional blunder
of co-ordinating space and time, and of assuming that what
is true of one is true of the other, seems to prevent his
discovering that time belongs among the categories. The
permanently valuable part of his theory of time is to be
found, therefore, neither in the Aesthetik, where the dis-
cussion of time follows the outline of the space-doctrine, nor
in those passages of the Analytik which apply to time, in a
matter-of-fact and mechanical way, all the predicates of
space, but rather in the Second Analogy and in portions of
the First and Third Antinomies, where time is treated as a
category by being virtually identified with causality. For
by the words, 2 "it is a formal condition of sense perception
(Wahrnehmung) that the earlier time necessarily determine
the later," Kant indicates that necessary connexion, which
the essential of causality, is also the fundamental char-
acteristic of time.
Time, therefore, or the irreversible connexion of the irre-
vocable, relatively abstract manifold, is clearly a form of the
category of necessary connexion, and is closely related to
causality ; the lighting of the fuse is no more ' necessarily
connected ' with the explosion, than one moment with
another. The only distinction is indeed this, that the
temporal manifold is made up of moments, whereas the
causal manifold is that of events, but the underlying unity
is the same in both cases, that of the irreversible connexion
of the irrevocable.
1 Weltseele, 3te Aufl., p. xxxv.
2 Op. cit., A., p. 199 ; B., p. 244.
TIME AS BELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 223
(c) The Psychology of the Time-Consciousness.
This doctrine of the nature of time, like every philosophical
theory, must meet the test of correspondence with admitted
facts of consciousness. Now the essential of one's conscious-
ness of time that which cannot be lacking, if there is to be
time-consciousness at all is the awareness of more-than-
one, that is of multiplicity, but of a successive multiplicity
distinct from the manifold of the compound or of the ex-
tended. When this realisation of multiplicity is absent,
when one is absorbed in a topic of thought, or in a circum-
scribed portion of one's surroundings, then one is lost to the
sense of time ; but when one wakes up to the fact of change,
when one compares this image or object with another, then
the consciousness of time reappears. The temporality of the
event thus includes its attribute of being one-of-many, and
though every moment always is a filled moment, neverthe-
less one may abstract from its colour or sound or fragrance
and attend merely to its temporalness.
Thus psychological introspection verifies the metaphysical
doctrine of time as an unconcrete, successive manifold.
The emptiness of the time-manifold suggests also an explana-
tion of the length of uneventful periods of time ; the fewer
the interesting events, the greater our attention to the
bare fact of multiplicity as such. Similarly, the observation
that uninteresting and habitual contents of consciousness
notably breathings and muscular contractions form the
measure of time-intervals l is a case in which the material
of consciousness, itself uninteresting, leaves the attention
free to direct itself to the fact of succession. "Awareness
of change" is thus, as Prof. James says, "the condition on
which our perception of time's flow depends." 2
But introspection reveals also that the time-consciousness
is far more than the awareness of unordered multiplicity,
and that rather, as Hoffding states the truth in his admirable
exposition, 3 "inner connexion" as well as "change, transi-
tion and alternation " is an element of the time-consciousness.
Of this inner connexion, psychological theory has taken
little account, and for this reason modern discussions of
time are peculiarly futile and inconclusive. ' Past,' ' present '
and 'future' are distinctions of the moments according to
lr rhis is sometimes incorrectly interpreted as the observation that
breathings and movements form the material of the time-consciousness.
2 Principles of Psychology, i., p. 620.
3 Outlines of Psychology, p. 184.
224 M. W. CALKINS :
the irreversible nature of their necessary connexion, and
must be misunderstood by those who fail to include the
realisation of inner relation as a factor of the time-conscious-
ness. When once, however, this truth is firmly held, then
it is impossible to dispute about the primariness of either
past or present as original time-datum, 1 for it has become
evident that one cannot know the past at all, except as
related to the present, nor the present unrelated to the
past.
The true doctrine of the nature of the psychical present
opposes also the theory that duration is an element of the
time-consciousness either " das elementare, nicht weiter
reducirbare, Zeiterlebniss," 2 or one among the elementary
attributes of the time-consciousness. 3 For, as these state-
ments suggest, duration is regarded as a temporal element
only when it is virtually identified with ' the present '. But
the present is a temporal moment, and is therefore to be de-
fined as ' one of a connected succession ' which obviously is not
the meaning of ' duration '. The awareness of permanence
or duration though unquestionably a factor of consciousness
is therefore not temporal at all.
This refusal to treat duration as a factor of the time-
consciousness is not, of course, a denial that the elements of
the consciousness of time, like all phenomena, psychical and
physical, may be said to ' have duration '. Not only temporal
position but a certain appreciable persistence are involved,
By definition, in the phenomenon or fact, whether elemental
or concrete. But the ' attribute duration ' belongs to the
phenomenon from the realistic standpoint of the observing
scientist and is not a part of the psychic content at all. The
consciousness of temporal position and the consciousness of
duration may be added to sensation complexes and so may
form parts of psychic contents, but neither is a necessary
element. 4
1 Cf. James, op. cit., L, p. 605, where he seems to make the original time-
datum the ' past,' while Strong, Psychol. Review, iii., p. 150, identifies it
with the ' present ' in the words, " The past means that which once was
present ; and the future that which will be present ".
2 Meumann (paraphrasing Nicholls) Wundt's Philos. Stud., viii., p. 503.
3 Cf. Wundt, Kiilpe, Titchener, Ward : also Stern, Zeilschr.f. Psych, u.
Phys., xiii., p. 332.
4 This consideration suggests a criticism upon the ordinary procedure
of co-ordinating duration with quality, extent and intensity, as attri-
bute of sensation. For duration, as has been shown, is an attribute
only from a realistic and reflective point of view, whereas intensity and
extent, as well as quality, are sensational in their nature.
TIME AS RELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 225
Psychology does therefore substantiate our philosophical
doctrine by indicating change and inner connexion as ele-
ments of the facts of time-consciousness. But another
problem remains for psychological theory ; how shall the
time-consciousness be classified, as sensational or as relational,
as direct or as mediate ? To answer the question, there is
needed, of course, a definition of ' the immediate,' and here
we are at once confronted by a variety of meanings. Often
the word is used as precise synonym for ' the present ' (as
realistic attribute of the phenomenon), and from this point
of view every fact of consciousness is immediate since, as
experienced, it is present. A variation of this meaning
makes ' immediateness ' equivalent with ' feeling of present-
ness,' so that immediacy is exactly that which may distinguish
the sense percept from the image. Dr. Strong, adopting
this use of the word, and following in the wake of every-day
realism, is obviously consistent in his refusal to call the
consciousness of time ' immediate,' on the ground that it
includes a consciousness of past as well as of present. But
on this theory of immediacy, it already involves time, and is
therefore useless in describing the time-consciousness. Im-
mediateness if it meant no more than ' present ' would be a
useless distinction, but, as a matter of fact, the word is
ordinarily used in a wider sense. ' The immediate ' is the
fact of consciousness without a history not the syllogistic
conclusion which has been reached by way of ordered steps,
nor the complex emotion which has passed through earlier
and simpler stages, but the simple experience, the instinctive
emotion, the undistinguished feeling of familiarity, or the
single sensation. In their exact meaning, therefore, 'im-
mediate ' and ' direct ' belong to the vocabulary of genetic, as
distinguished from purely introspective psychology, for they
treat the mental state from the standpoint of the reflective
onlooker. On this basis, the consciousness of succession
and of inner connexion are palpably 'direct,' just because
they are unanalysable elements, for only a compound, whose
parts may be traced back to an earlier stage or to a different
combination, can be regarded from the genetic standpoint.
The immediacy of the time-consciousness is often denied,
because it is said to involve what would be the presence in
one moment of a succession of moments. 1 But the existence
of a feeling of 'succession does not imply that a past feeling
has revived and added itself to a present one ; such a hy-
pothesis is an illicit, associationist attempt to reduce ' feeling
1 Cf. Strong, op. cit., p. 155 aeq.
15
226 M. W. CALKINS :
of succession ' to ' succession of feeling,' and is contradicted
by unprejudiced observation, which inevitably finds that the
' feeling of succession ' and the ' feeling of inner connexion '
are unique, unanalysable minima of consciousness.
The reaction against this unjustifiable attack, from the side
of metaphysics, upon the immediacy of the time-conscious-
ness is probably responsible for the tendency to define this
in terms of perception or of sensation. Wundt, 1 following
Kant, speaks of Z eitanschauung and Kiilpe 2 of Zeitwahrneh-
mung; while references to ' time-sense ' or ' time-sensation '
may be found in the writings of Mach, 3 of Meumann, 4 of
James 5 and of Stern (though James speaks also of the ' per-
ception of time,' 7 while Meumann has lately declared for
Zeitbewusstsein, 8 and Stern recently proposes Zeitauffassung 9 ).
Too much emphasis must not of course be laid upon the
expression ' time-sense/ whose traditional meaning is a very
wide one, yet it is not out of place to remark that the com-
plexity of the time-consciousness forbids identifying it with
the sensation, which is a psychic element. The time-con-
sciousness as we have seen, is clearly analysable into the two
factors, feeling of succession and feeling of connexion, and
cannot therefore itself be what Hoffding calls it, 10 a psycho-
logical ultimate. The percept as well as the sensation,
moreover, is distinguished by a certain ' substantive' character,
as James puts it, from the more ' transitive ' elements of
consciousness, like the feelings of identity, of familiarity and
of succession. Even Hume recognises this, though he does
not see how it upsets all his philosophising, and expresses it
very clearly in the words : u " the idea of time arises altogether
from the manner in which impressions appear to the mind,
without making one of the number". The essential meaning of
the teaching that the time-consciousness is immediate, or
even sensational, is however retained in the conclusion that
1 Physiologische Psychologic, 4th Aufl.
2 Grundriss der Psychologic, p. 416.
3 Quoted by Stern, "Psyckische Prasenzzeit," Zeitschr. f. Psych, u.
Phys., xiii., p. 827.
4 " Beitrage zur Psychologic des Zeitsinns," Philosophische Studien, vii.
and ix.
5 Principles of Psychology, i., p. 605 seq. 6 Op. cit. 7 Op. cit.
8 Philosophische Studien, xii., p. 127.
9 Theorie der Verfinderungsauffassung, pp. 3 and 10. Psychologic der
Veranderungsaujfassung, p. 21.
10 Op. cit., i., p. 243.
11 Treatise, bk. i., part ii., sec. 3, p. 343. Italics mine.
TIME AS BELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 227
it is made up of unanalysable and immediate factors, feeling
of change and feeling of connexion. These, as has been
said, correspond exactly with the elements of time, meta-
physically considered with its irrevocable manifoldness and
with the universal connexion of its parts, the moments.
IV. CAUSALITY.
The definition of causality as necessary connexion of
events, though it opposes at once the every-day belief that
one thing or object may be the cause of another, is never-
theless in accord with all philosophic thinking since Hume's
time at least. Not the match, but the lighting of the match,
causes the fire; not the bell, but the motion of its tongue,
causes the sound. Another common theory demands notice;
the doctrine that causality is a category of merely physical
events, not a relation of phenomena of consciousness,
feelings and volitions, percepts and images. On this view
causality is distinguished from temporal unity, not only by
its concreteness, but by the externality of the phenomena
which it unites ; it is therefore an external, as opposed to
time, an internal category. There is no lack of support for
this doctrine. Kant's definite argument against Hume, by
his distinction between objective and subjective causality,
rests upon the assumption that causality is a relation of
the external. Schopenhauer says distinctly 1 that causality
is " der Regulator der Veranderungen der aiisseren Erf ah -
rung," and indeed he makes matter synonymous with
causality: "Ihr Wesen besteht in der Kausalitat ". 2 Modern
thinkers, finally, very generally hold that the only categories
of the inner life are those of worth or value, and that
causality is a physical principle.
Now it is undoubtedly true that causality is a more
important category of the outer than of the inner life, for
every natural science supplements observation of facts by
investigation of their causal connexion, and only physical
causality is capable of exact description and measurement.
But these truths prove only that causality is a particularly
1 Vierfacfie Wurzel, u.s.w., 20.
2 Welt als Wille, u.s.w., L, p. 10; cf. i., p. 13, "Materie oder
Kausalitat, denn beide sind Eines ". A slight modification of this
doctrine is the definition of matter as " objektiv gewordene Kausalitat,"
and this again is expanded into the theory that matter is simultaneity,
a combination of space and time, or " die Wahrnehmbarkeit von Zeit
u nd Raum". Throughout, Schopenhauer's insistence upon the exter-
nality of causation is clear.
228 M. W. CALKINS :
important and fruitful category of the external world, and
not an especially emphasised category of the inner life ;
they do not in the least disprove that the causal is a possible
way of regarding the psychical experience. 1 On the other
hand, in so far as the psychical experience is viewed as
unquestionably it may artificially be viewed as made up
of a series of single states in so far it must be subject not
merely to categories of significance, but to phenomenal
categories, including those of universal connexion. This
view is strengthened by the ordinary doctrine that time is
a category of the inner life, and it cannot be disproved by
the assertion, even if substantiated, that we actually come to
the conception of internal causality through the previous
observation of physical causation. So long as mental facts
may be regarded as necessarily connected, each with each,
so long causality is a psychical as well as a physical category.
Therefore a hypothetical solitary individual, without con-
sciousness of other finite selves, and hence without con-
sciousness of externality, might think of his consciousness
as made up of isolated and independent units. These units
would have gained their permanence, probably, through
repetition ; the necessary connexion would have been
suggested by repeated experiences in the same order.
With physical causality, however, that is, with the appli-
cation of this conception of necessary connexion to events
regarded as common experience of all possible subjects, one
enters the sphere of the universal and the describable, and
there is introduced at once the possibility of verification
through experiences which are readily repeated, imitated
and communicated. Through such verification the empirical
causal propositions arise, the assertions that such and such
an event has such and such a cause. This is the sort of
doctrine of causality which Hume's criticism really touches,
and he is quite correct, of course, in his conclusion that
necessity never can be predicated of any observed connexion,
and that the persuasion of empirical necessity is an effect
of habit. But the assertion of this or that cause has no
relation to that fundamental universality of causal con-
nexion expressed in the proposition : " Every event has a
1 Cf. Hume, who, though he usually treats causality as connexion of
outer events with each other (or of psychic facts with the 'real objects '
which he inconsistently assumes), nevertheless, says distinctly (Treatise,
bk. i., pt. iii., 2, end) that the ideas of cause and effect are " derived
from the impressions of reflexion, as well as from those of sensation.
Passions are connected with one another ... no less than external
bodies are connected together."
TIME AS BELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 229
cause ". For causality is fundamentally, as has been seen,
not the connexion of this or that event with another, but
the necessary, and therefore universal and irreversible con-
nexion of every event with some other event, its cause.
The temporal connexion, that is the necessary relation of
one moment with another, has really, therefore, by virtue
of its abstraction from the concrete a complete universality
which is lacking to any concrete connexion. The irre-
versibleness of causal synthesis implies, further, another
sort of necessity, an unequal relation between cause and
effect. The member of a reversible series is equally depend-
ent on every other member of the series, while any term
of a succession is specifically dependent on what precedes.
This relation of the phenomenal cause to its effect is really
what is meant by the ' power ' of such a cause.
Still another principle has to be distinguished from the
axiom of causality, namely, the proposition : " The same
cause always has the same effect ". Evidently this principle
is of far-reaching use and application in empirical science,
forming the basis of all reasoning about the unrecorded past
and the untried future, but it is not at all a purely causal
principle, since it involves a recognition of identity in the
assumption that ' the same cause ' will recur, and since
identity really is, as has been suggested, a transcendence of
the whole standpoint of fact-multiplicity, not a unity ' of the
manifold,' but rather a unity ' in spite of multiplicity '.
V. EECIPBOCAL DETERMINATION.
To discuss in detail the unity, reciprocal determination, of
the revivable manifold would have led far beyond the
limits of a self-respecting philosophical essay. The terms
of the relation, concrete things and qualities, and abstract
mathematical elements, differ, as has been shown, from
events and from moments, by the fact that each possesses
a kind of unity which these others lack, identity, and
therefore permanence and recurrence. From this follows
the feature which distinguishes the connexion of the reviv-
able manifold from that of the irrevocable ; a reversibleness or
reciprocal relation such that any one of the multiple may be
taken as the starting-point.
The reciprocally determined manifold is often treated as
if completely equivalent with the spatial ; Kant states his
third analogy of reciprocal determination, with express refer-
ence to substances as co-existing in space ; 1 Schopenhauer
1 Op. e/f., A., 211; B.,.256.
230 M. W. CALKINS:
writes, 1 " Der Raum ist durch und durch nichts anderes als
die Moglichkeit der wechselseitigen Bestimmungen seiner
Theile durch einander, welche Lage heisst " ; and Spencer 2
distinguishes coexistence from succession, in that " whereas
the terms of the first can be known in the reverse order with
equal vividness, those of the second cannot ". Yet it is at
once evident that the spatial is, to say the least, not the
only form of the permanent and reversible manifold ; the
notes in a scale and the terms of a numerical series are also
reversible but not spatial, for even if one assert the spatial
character of sounds, it is surely not by virtue of their space
distinctions that the notes are capable of reversal. One is
thrown back upon the question : What is the spatial, since,
at best, it is only one among the forms of the reversible ?
Once more, there can be no doubt of the ordinary answer :
the spatial is the external, and just as time is a category of
the inner, so is space a category of the outer life. But this
doctrine accords ill with the common view that not all sense-
qualities, but only the visual and the tactual, are spatial.
Why should not sounds and odours as well as colours and
surfaces have form and location? Or, if one take one's
stand with the extreme nativists, like James and Ward, and
affirm the spatial character of all sense- qualities, the questions
still remain : What of the mathematical reversible ? is not
that still independent of me and so external to me ? The
true nature, like the invariable test, of externality, is its
superiority to the individual, that is, its universality. The
outer world is the world whose lights and sounds and fra-
grance all men share, while the inner world of my imagination
belongs to me alone ; the external truth is the object of
common conviction, while the illusion is the product of the
individual mind ; in a word, the external world is the world
of society as opposed to the world of the lonely self. This
impossibility of limiting the ' external ' or ' reciprocally deter-
mined ' to ' the spatial,' fairly drives us at length to the
conclusion which psychology has long held before us, that
the spatial means something quite other than the external,
and is itself nothing more than a concrete : a sense-quality
or a complex of sense elements.
The arguments of the Kantians against the sensuousness
of the spatial are not decisive. To urge that Space is re-
cognised as one, in a sense in which ' redness ' and ' softness '
are not called ' one,' is to overlook the difference between
1 Welt als Wille, u,s.w., i., p. 109.
2 Principles of Psychology, third ed., part vi., c. 22, vol. ii., p. 275.
TIME AS RELATED TO CAUSALITY AND TO SPACE. 231
Space, clearly a construct of experience, and the elementary
extension or spatialness from which this Total Space is built
up. The other characteristic marks of the spatial clearly
result from its greater generality, that is from the greater
variety of its combinations with other sense experiences, for
whereas the visual, like the tactual, quality, is always in our
experience combined with the extended, this may be combined
with either of the two. Thus, also, it is easier to abstract
the spatial quality from the complex of sense-experiences, to
shake it free from encumbrances, to make it the object of
more constant attention. It follows naturally that space
distinctions are more delicate and more complex. Finally,
the certainty of the geometrical consciousness, on which is
founded Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Space, is not to
be explained by the ordinary assumption that space-con-
sciousness, because different from sense, must have greater
certainty, but on the ground that the spatial as a more
constant object of attention is more universally appre-
hended.
It is interesting to observe that Kant, whose psychology is
so often better than his metaphysics, possesses a truer insight
into the nature of the spatial than he can force into the moulds
of his philosophical preconceptions. With his distorted notion
of the ultimate distinction between sense-quality and thought,
he cannot include the spatial within the sense-manifold ; yet
he keenly realises its character of immediateness, and can-
not therefore treat space as a category, a principle of thought.
Therefore that anomaly, the ' Form of Sense,' the ' sensible '
which has no sense-attributes, wins its permanent position
in the Kantian hierarchy, because Kant could not blind him-
self to the sense character of space.
We are not here at all concerned with the specific con-
troversy between nativist and empiricist. Whether the
spatial is a combination of motor sense-element with visual
or tactual, or whether it is itself a distinct sense-quality,
matters little, so one realise what the appeal to the ordinary
consciousness of everybody surely shows, that extension is
' sensible,' no less than colour or resistance. The spatial
is then no fundamental category, or uniting principle, but
itself one variety of the manifold to-be-categorised. This
conclusion incidentally explains many of the absurdities
of the theories about time. The tendency to treat the two
after the same fashion has, as we have seen, long been rife
in philosophy, and the efforts to make time, the category,
follow the lead of extension, the sense-quality, or of Space,
the notion elaborately built up from the sense-element, must
232 CALKINS : TIME AS RELATED TO CAUSALITY AND SPACE.
evidently result in hopeless confusion, and in wrong theories
of the two.
The summary which follows includes the chief distinctions
which this paper has tried to justify. Its first section has
been added for the sake of completeness, though it involves
the allusion to certain metaphysical principles which have
not been discussed.
UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY.
A. I. Ultimate Unity. II. Fundamental Multipli-
city.
(Variously stated in different systems.)
(a) Idealistic.
The Absolute Self. Individual Selves.
'Ideas ' of the Absolute Self.
(b) Realistic.
1. Matter or Force, or
2. ' Unknown Reality '.
B. I. The Phenomenal Unity. II. The Phenomenal Multi-
plicity.
(a) Of the many (events or (a) Events (and moments).
things) with each
other ; Necessary Con-
nexion.
(b) Of each of the many (b) Things (and qualities).
(things) with itself :
Identity.
The results of the closer study of the phenomenal category
of necessary and universal connexion may be grouped together
after a similar fashion.
Phenomenal Unity of Neces- Terms of the Connexion,
sary Connexion.
1. Irreversible.
(a) Causality (concrete).
(b) Time (abstract).
2. Reversible, that is.
Reciprocal Determination.
(a) Concrete. (a) External Objects.
(&) Abstract. (b) Mathematical quanti-
ties.
Such a classification may at least suggest the possibility
of a simple and accurate classification of principles often
confused and as often falsely distinguished.
1. Irrevocable.
(a) Events.
(b) Moments.
2. Revivable.
VI. CKITICAL NOTICES.
Lehrbuck der Psychologic. Von FBIEDBICH JODL, o.o. Professor
der Philosophie an der Universitat zu Wien. Stuttgart :
Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1896. London : Williams & Nor-
gate. Pp. xxiv., 768.
THE world is growing a little weary of the multiplication of psy-
chological text-books, and any new candidate for its approval must
possess distinctive merits to be tolerated and very marked ex-
cellences indeed to be welcomed. The present work lays solid
grounds for favour in the thoroughly systematic treatment and
well-proportioned disposition of the material ; in the comprehen-
siveness with which it surveys and the abundant learning with
which it exhibits the whole field of modern normal psychology ;
in the equally broad and, in the main, judicious spirit shown in the
discussion of critical questions ; in the extensive references to the
best literature, of which, besides the citations at the proper places,
there is an alphabetically arranged catalogue of twenty-nine pages
at the end of the volume ; in the clear and vigorous style. The
book is not specially dominated by any particular Tendenz, nor can
it lay any special claim to originality ; it is not a contribution to
knowledge, it will probably not arouse any very lively discussion
on account of new and striking views. But if the student desires
to become acquainted, under the guidance of a master of expo-
sition, with the most generally accepted body of psychological
doctrine at the present time, he will go, if he is wise, to this text-
book as, on the whole, the best for this purpose of all the text-
books which German scholars have provided in recent years. One
feature which strikes the English reader favourably is the frequent
reference to the works of English and American psychologists
and the adoption of many of the special termini and conceptions
which we have become familiar with in our own language, e.g.,
the conception of the sensation and ideation -continuum and of the
extensity of sensations, Stout's definition of apperception, etc. It
is impossible to classify the author as belonging to any " school,"
but as suggesting a direction which he does not follow, his re-
mark may be quoted that " it is the error of all errors in psycho-
logy to suppose that mental development is constructed out of
the elements discovered by analysis " (p. 177).
The book is divided into two parts, a general and a special.
The first consists of three chapters, dealing respectively with the
234 CBITICAL NOTICES :
scope and methods of psychology, the relations of soul and body,
and the nature and general analysis of consciousness (pp. 1-166).
Psychology is defined as " the natural science of the forms and
laws of the normal movement of the phenomena of conscious-
ness ". Objection, I think, may rightly be taken to the introduc-
tion of the word " normal " in the definition, for while it is, of
course, true that normal psychology constitutes the main trunk
of the science, it does not constitute the entire psychological tree.
The author explains the limitation by saying that psychology is
related to psycho-pathology much as descriptive and topographi-
cal anatomy is related to pathological anatomy. But pathologi-
cal anatomy is still a branch of anatomy, and the conception of
psycho-pathology is perhaps not quite the same as that of patho-
psychology. Greater difficulty confronts us in dealing with the
conception " phenomena of consciousness ". What are pheno-
mena of consciousness ? Are they phenomena we are conscious
of ? or are they the ways in which we are conscious ? Will they
include, as Wundt suggests, along with feelings, emotions and
volitions, a book, a tree, a stone, provided only we view these
latter objects in a certain way, viz., as " immediate experience " ?
or will they include, not the " whats," but only the "hows"?
Or, since it is evident that there can be no consciousness which
is not a consciousness of something, will they include the rela-
tions of consciousness to its content ? I find no clear answer
to these questions. On the one hand, we are told that psycho-
logy reflects on the phenomena of consciousness, the forms and
laws of the play of its processes, regardless of the content repre-
sented in these forms (p. 4) ; on the other, we find more than a
fourth of the book occupied with the discussion of sensations,
which no one probably would deny to be conscious co'ntents, how-
ever else they may be regarded. Similar uncertainty prevails as
to whether the process of consciousness is to be viewed anatomi-
cally as structure or physiologically as function. The whole ques-
tion as to the original elements to be distinguished in the process
depends on this and on the determination of what it is we are
analysing in psychology. I do not particularly complain of Prof.
Jodl for not having carefully discussed these questions in the form
here presented ; obscurity in these matters is the common failing
of psychologists. It cannot be said that even yet the field of
psychology has been accurately delimited, and that the concep-
tions in this department content, function, process, etc. have
been scientifically fixed. But when the phenomena of conscious-
ness are marked off from physical phenomena by the outworn
categories of " inner " and " outer " (p. 4), it is time to protest,
particularly when " inner " is taken to mean, not merely having
reference to a subject, but "absolutely unspatial ". How can the
phenomena of consciousness be absolutely unspatial when, as we
are told, the visual sensation contains space of three dimensions ?
The various methods of psychology are critically treated with
FBIEDRICH JODL, Lehrbiich der Psychologic. 235
reference to the aid which each furnishes or may be expected
to furnish to the development of the science. Introspection, of
course, stands first, its importance being neither too meanly esti-
mated, nor too highly. A prominent place is given among the
other methods to experimental hypnotism, which is regarded as
far superior to " the occasional and mostly rather monotonous
observations of psycho-pathology proper'' and as an important
djunct to experimental normal psychology. This estimate rests
on the assumption that hypnotism enables us to bring any feeling,
idea, etc., at pleasure into the centre of the conscious process and
to trace its influence. The subject of hypnotism is referred to in
several subsequent passages, always, however, with stern exclu-
sion of any suggestion of mysticism". It is held, for example, that
the admission of telepathy would split the very foundations of all
our science and lead to a thorough revision of our fundamental
conceptions (p. 125). Much aid is also expected from the study
of language, but little, on the other hand, from comparative or
sociological psychology. As to physiological psychology, the ap-
plication of this method to the entire realm of psychological ex-
perience is held to be at present a scientific Utopia, though the
ideal postulate is that we point out for every psychical pheno-
menon a physiological correlate, and at the same time exhibit the
unbroken continuity of the causal series of the neural processes.
The hypothesis implied in this postulate is developed at length
in the discussion of the following section on soul and body. The
position adopted is that of a thorough-going parallelism in that
form of the doctrine which declares that the two series, physio-
logical and psychological, are " two aspects or two different modes
of manifestation of one and the same process " (p. 57), " the same
content expressed in two different languages " (p. 74). We are
surprised to learn that this to us so familiar hypothesis has hither-
to found but few friends in Germany (p. 75). Jodl rejects any
application of it where the fact of consciousness is not plainly
apparent. Many physiological processes have no psychical as-
pect.
I venture to think that this so popular double-aspect doctrine
holds its position to-day by a somewhat uncertain tenure. Only
the ambiguity of the facts can account for the diversity of intelli-
gent opinion on the subject. No one probably denies that there
is interdependence of some sort between the mental and the
bodily series, and the most obvious reading of the facts would
seem to make this interdependence mutual. That physiological
process influences, i.e., is a condition of the coming to pass of the
psychological process, is admitted, and, apart from methodologi-
cal considerations, no one probably would hesitate to accept the
converse proposition that psychological process influences, in the
same sense, physiological process. In common parlance, the body
affects the mind and the mind affects the body. Such interdepen-
dence of process bears but a faint analogy to the dependent varia-
236 CEITICAL NOTICES :
bility of mathematical functions, for in the former case we have
to do with determinateness of events, of things that happen. But
a conditioned relation of events forms the chief, if not the sole,
content of the causal connexion, and it is difficult to see how, on
any merely logical grounds, a causal conception, in the sense in-
dicated, between the two terms can be denied to be possible.
Cartesian dualism is, of course, not here in question, and the
applicability of the ambiguous and, on a certain interpretation
palpably false, scholastic dictum, catisa cequat effectum, is, to say
the least, extremely doubtful. There remain, however, the metho-
dological considerations derived from the principle of the conser-
vation of energy. Prof. Jodl, indeed, regards this principle, in
connexion with the law of inertia, as the most consistent and
precise expression of the law of causality in natural science (p.
63), and it is on this ground that he denies that there is any
causal connexion between the soul and the body (p. 76). But
so understanding the causal conception, he must either give up
his view of a causal connexion between the terms of the psychical
process (p. 74), or else deny that psychology is a natural science.
He frankly admits, as all must do, the gaps in our knowledge of
the transformation of energy, especially in the nervous system,
and allows that if any one chooses to fill these out by assuming-
that at certain points psychic forces affect the motions of the ner-
vous substance, he cannot be absolutely refuted by facts ; but, he
says, one who does this should take heed lest, in place of an im-
perfection in our knowledge, he substitute a contradiction in our
fundamental assumptions. " For if psychic force is to act on a.
system of material forces, the only way it can do this is by accel-
erating or retarding motion ; '' but how this is possible is more
difficult to conceive than it is to fill out hypothetically the gaps-
in the physical continuity of the neural process (p. 63). This is
not the place, nor is the present writer competent, to criticise in
any detail the principle of the conservation of energy. It is evi-
dent, however, as Mr. Bradley has pointed out, that a distinction
must be drawn between the principle as a postulate of physics
science, in which sphere its utility is undisputed, and as a state
ment of fact concerning the whole physical universe, as which it
as certainly cannot be proved. Moreover, it is obvious to any one
who has followed, however superficially, the course of recent dig
cussion, that the modern doctrine of energy, and with it the whole
of the modern doctrine of matter, is still in process of being de
veloped. If chemical theory should move along the lines sug-
gested by Ostwald and if, under the influence of speculative
physics, the molecular theory of matter, which has so long helc
sway, should be superseded by a theory of interchanging energies
it would be but a step to the conception of psychical energy anc
psychical work as correlated, under the law of conservation itsel
though more universally conceived than at present, with the othe
natural forms of energy ; and this would lead perhaps to
FBIEDKICH JODL, Lehrbuch der Psychologic. 237
realisation of Huxley's dream of a mechanical equivalent for con-
sciousness, just as we now have a mechanical equivalent for heat.
But however this may be, it seems premature, and it is certainly
useless, to attempt to bind psychological science to a particular
theory of the relation of soul and body. No better proof of this
could be found than that which Prof. Jodl himself furnishes. I
do not refer to the frequency with which his language contradicts,
literally taken, his hypothesis ; that he explains as accommo-
dation to popular and recognised modes of speech. Nor do I refer
especially to his positive and eloquent insistence, as over against
an "exaggerated naturalism " that the conscious will is " not
merely a product in the world, but a factor," " a force among
other forces," influencing reality and not to be eliminated from
human evolution language which can hardly be interpreted as
accommodation merely, and which it is quite impossible to recon-
cile with the criticism of similar views on the part of Prof. James
(p. 62) or with the terms of the doctrine here under discussion.
I refer to the fact that Prof. Jodl nowhere makes any special use
of the hypothesis either for the purposes of his psychological
analysis or for the establishment of anything like a psychologi-
cal law. Even he avails himself, on occasion, of the convenient
hypothesis of the " psychical disposition," though carefully ex-
plaining, what is really nonsense, that the disposition " really "
exists only as a physiological disposition in the structure of the
nervous substance. In the end, therefore, his insistence that
even the highest achievements of our conscious intelligence are
not merely correlated with, but are when viewed objectively,
nothing but mechanical processes of release and redistribution of
nervous energy in the brain (p. 119), may either be of profound
speculative significance or may merely express a pious scientific
conviction ; it certainly does not serve to make the course of
psychical events any the more intelligible.
The fundamental relation of consciousness is taken to be the
opposition and mediation of subject and object. This is analysed
into three moments, representing respectively the action from
without inwards, the reaction from within outwards and an inner
mediation between the two. These moments appear in the mutu-
ally implicated forms' and modes of the primary psychical reaction
as sensation, feeling and conation. This division is then crossed
by another, having regard to the different stages of mental develop-
ment. The basis of the latter is the fact that along with the flow
or undulation in which the contents of consciousness arise only to
disappear, there is a summation of their effects : retained in some
manner as dispositions, they reappear in new forms and in their mu-
tual influence on one another and on the primary processes give rise
to the manifold modes of the developing conscious life. The division
from this point of view is into primary, secondary and tertiary phe-
nomena, corresponding somewhat to the more familiar division,
presentative, representative and reflective, but not referring, as
238 CRITICAL NOTICES :
these terms appear to do, exclusively to intellectual development.
The distinction between primary and secondary cannot be scien-
tifically defined ; it can only be experienced. The term which best
designates the secondary phenomenon is " Vorstellung". Any-
thing which we have ever once been conscious of can be afterwards
reproduced. " The reproduction of feelings is an indubitable fact
of the mental life." Eepresentations of feelings, however, are not
feelings, nor are memories of volitions acts of will. Feelings an^
acts of will are primary phenomena at whatever stage of develop-
ment they occur. The " tertiary " phenomena are distinguished
from the secondary as fusions and condensations of primary and
secondary elements to new and unique formations. In this highest
class are included the phenomena of thought and of the constructive
imagination. An extremely vivid impression of the extraordinarily
complicated life which psychology undertakes to exploit is conveyed
by the thirty odd pages or so devoted to the elucidation of these
distinctions and to the exhibition of the rich interdependence of
the elements and processes as they present themselves in the di-
verse stages of mental development.
The divisions thus drawn suggest the scheme for the distribution
of the material in the second "special" part. Two chapters on
sensation and sensations are followed by two on the affective anc
volitional phenomena of the primary stage, and these by two or
the secondary phenomena of reproduction and on the most im-
portant products of the reproductive process, time, space and the
distinction between the ego and its states and the external world
of objects ; then comes a chapter on language and thought, followec
by two concluding chapters treating respectively of the feelings
and of the volitional phenomena of the secondary and tertiary
stages.
The chapters on sensation and sensations, filling more than 200
pages, bear witness to the relatively advanced state of our know-
ledge in this department, of which they afford an admirably clear
and an unusually complete conspectus, combined with a judicious
handling of the most interesting and important matters of contrc
versy. Original investigators may find ground for complaint in
the omission of this topic or that which they may deem important
and in the failure to notice some latest monograph ; the impartu
critic will rather praise the author's learning, the rare good judg-
ment shown in the selection of the matters most essential and the
masterly manner of presentation. The general student will no-
where find the mass of material which in this department has beer
so rapidly accumulating in recent years better disposed to his ser-
vice. It is unnecessary, nor is there here space, to go into details
I will only refer especially to two points, and first, to the excellent
discussion of psychophysical measurements. The technical ques-
tions concerning the methods of investigation, of fundamental in-
terest for the experimentalist, are, to be sure, not entered upon ; the
author contents himself with a more summary exhibition of aims,
FBIEDEICH JODL, Lehrbuch der Psychologic. 239
methods'and results. On the other hand, the questions of principle
are very carefully treated with critically cautious appreciation of
the conflicting opinions. No final conclusion is reached, but inci-
dentally there is some effective criticism of the view which denies
the possibility of any measurement of the intensities of sensations
on the ground that sensations are not multiples, as also of Wundt's
interpretation of the psychophysical law as merely a special case
,pf the law of the relativity of apperception. The other point is
the acceptance of " extensity " as a characteristic of sensations and
the vigorous advocacy, in the elaborate treatment of the visual
sensations, of the essentially intuitive character of our space per-
ceptions as against those who regard them as an association or
fusion of optical with other sensations, or as a product of the
mingling of sensations proper w r ith unconscious inference. The
third dimension is included with the others in the original sense-
datum. Indeed, the author goes so far as to assert that our most
primitive visual sensations are spatially arranged (rdumlich geordnet,
p. 553) and that we have a sensation of our eye as the point to
which ah 1 the perspective lines and surfaces that run out into the
third dimension from the place we happen to be in converge (p.
341). These statements could hardly be supported by facts, nor
are they demanded by the exigencies of theory. The original ex-
tensity of the visual sensations should be by all analogy a latent
or merged plurality out of which the space relations proper are
developed on the basis of many co-operating experiences, not tri-
dimensional space, as such. The implication of the third dimension
in the primitive visual sensation is argued for, however, as a matter
of principle, on the ground of the original opposition in conscious-
ness of subject and object, and the original excentric projection
of sensations : functions, it is claimed, which cannot be learned,
though they may be perfected and developed. If now, it is argued,
the optical impression is necessarily externalised, then there can
never possibly be any moment when the ego and the visual sur-
face so to say coincide, and a reference to depth, however imperfect,
must lie in our most primitive optical experience. This law of
excentric projection is referred to again in the chapter on the ego
and the external world as a refutation, on psychological grounds,
of subjective idealism. But if, as is also claimed, these functions
are the result of a long process of evolution adapting inner to outer
relations, then again, on the general analogy of ontogenetic de-
velopment, we should expect that the human infant would go
through a process, though, to be sure, a relatively rapid process of
acquiring them, and in that case doubt would be thrown on the
original experience, whatever analysis may detect in that which
comes later. But into this later experience enter the residua of
past processes, and in regard to the excentric projection of sensa-
tions especially, whether interpreted as externalisation or as bodily
localisation, there is good reason for believing that, however the
disposition may be preformed in the inherited constitution, its
240 CRITICAL NOTICES :
actual development demands a good deal of assistance from individual
experiences of the most manifold character. So that in the end
we might even admit a primitive but undifferentiated voluminous-
ness in the optical sensations, and yet hold that all consciousness
of spatial differences, and particularly the excentric projection of
sensations, was a function of other contents gradually assimilating
to themselves the visual sensations and not primitive at all.
The affective phenomena are treated as at the primary stage/
sense-feelings and elementary aesthetic feelings ; at the second and
third stages there is a classificatory division into formal and per-
sonal feelings, a section on the dynamics of the secondary feelings
and a further section on the complex aesthetic and ethical feelings.
The fundamental feeling elements at all stages are said to be the
two opposed qualities of pleasure and pain ; complications of these
with other elements in various modes make up the concrete life
of the feelings. Pleasures and pains differ respectively only in
intensity ; qualitative differences are derived from the elements
which they accompany. The real reason assigned for distinguish-
ing the feeling elements from the sensations is that the former can
never in any way be made objective. Just how this statement is
to be reconciled with the doctrine referred to above, that feelings
can be remembered, is not made clear. A distinction is drawn
between Gefuhlsvorstellung and Vorstellungsgefuhl ; but in the
memory of a feeling either the feeling is actually reproduced, in
which case it is by definition a Vorstellungsgefuhl, or it is not, in
which case it is not easy to see how it can be represented. Strange
to say, the author makes no distinction between Unlust&ud Schmerz, i
regarding even cutaneous pain as a purely" affective phenomenon
and not considering the many reasons for the opposite view. The
law of feeling is deduced from a consideration of the relation of
stimulus to capacity : there exists for each sensitive organ and for
the organism as a whole a condition of equilibrium relative to the
incoming stimuli, and this equilibrium is of such a sort that any
departure from the mean whether towards the plus or towards the
minus of intensity and extensity of stimulus, is felt as disagreeable,
while a return towards the mean is felt as agreeable. Neither the
view of Wundt nor that of Horwicz regarding the relation of the
threshold of sensation to the threshold of feeling agrees with the
facts. In the section on the dynamics of the secondary feelings,
there is a criticism of the James-Lange theory which is singularly
ineffective. Its ineffectiveness results from the failure to make any
attempt to exhibit the structure of the emotional process as a whole
or to grasp the unity of its function. It amounts practically merely
to saying that the "Affect" is not the reflex in consciousness of
the bodily resonance because it is a certain state of intensive feel-
ing accompanied by these bodily reflexes. The real questions, of
course, are, into what besides sensations, ideas and feelings of
pleasure and pain can the emotional state be analysed, and what
explanation, apart from that of an instinctive reaction, can be given
FBIEDRICH JODL, Lehrbuch der Psychologic. 241
of the relation which, in this state, these elements bear to each
other. The essence of the " physiological " theory is to find no
elements in the analysis but those mentioned, and no explanation
of their combination but the instinctive reaction on whatever may
serve as the stimulus. So understood the theory loses much of its
paradoxical character ; unfortunately, though referring to James'
later statement, Prof. Jodl seems only acquainted with the earlier
and cruder formulation and not to have followed closely the later
course of the discussion. The best part of the treatment of the
affective phenomena, and one of the best parts of the book, is that
which deals with the aesthetic feelings. There is nothing striking
or original in the views presented ; they are those probably the
most widely current, or at least the best accredited ; but the lines
are drawn with clearness and precision and the whole discussion
is itself a w r ork of art calculated to produce as much conviction as
pleasure.
Perhaps the least satisfactory part of the book is that which
treats of the wih 1 . There are a good many psychologists to-day
who deny that will is an elementary process in consciousness at
all, and it would have been well, no doubt, if their views had re-
ceived more careful consideration, particularly as they can fasten
on the admission that to a more exact observation conation appears
as a sum of minute motor impulses, which they can then plausibly
proceed to resolve into a sum of actual or reproduced motor or
other sensations. I think myself that a sufficient answer to this
objection is to say that the phenomena are here viewed from the
point of view of function, that the attitude expressed in conation
is unique, and that it is elementary in so far as it seems to be a
necessary aspect of all conscious process regarded as not merely
passive, but as reactive, adaptive and spontaneous. All this is
implied, I think, in what is here said of it. But the analysis of a
function consists in the enumeration of all the conditions of its
exercise, just as the analysis of the causal relation consists in the
enumeration of all the circumstances essential to the event ; and
I do not find. that the analysis here given shows sufficient appre-
ciation of the complexity of the problem. There is no adequate
discrimination of the different types of function that are referred
to under the term " will," nor is there any clear exhibition of the
continuity in the development of volition or of its connexion with
the developing content of self-consciousness. For anything that
is expressly stated, self-consciousness might not be implicated in
the process at all. In the discussion of the higher forms of voli-
tion, the emphasis, one might almost say the sole emphasis, is
laid on the motivation of the will in feeling. This is, of course,
in general, correct ; unless the object thought made some appeal
to action, it is impossible to see how it could ever become acted
on. But in what lies this appeal, the felt value which moves the
will ? Ultimately, we are told, in qualities of pleasure and pain,
and as these qualities have only intensive value, the sole measure
16
242 CRITICAL NOTICES :
of value in motivation is quantitative. We are thus in all cases
of conflict of motive thrown back on the hedonic calculus (p. 726).
This theory of value seems to me utterly false to the facts, and I
cannot but think that if will had been treated as a function of the
developing self-consciousness, the result would have been different.
For it would then have appeared, I believe, that at no period of
the development can we separate the function from the content
apperceived and felt as a whole, and that, as we progressively ad-
vance from actions involving the brute sanction of impulse to those
in which the sanction of desire is prominent, and thence to actions
implicating the moral consciousness, we do find in the contents
themselves new elements of value, felt as such, which in the end
completely overshadow in importance as springs of action the mere
feelings of pleasure and pain.
One or two errors may be noted for correction in a second
<edition : 16,000 as the lower limit of audible vibrations, pp. 184
and 357 (correctly given p. 299) ; E. A. Weber p. 244 ; the state-
ment p. 131 that the English word " sentiment" corresponds to
the " Gefiihlston " of the Herbartians. The value of the book
would furthermore be greatly enhanced by a proper index.
H. N. GARDINEB.
Les Elements du Garactere et leurs Lois de Combinaison. Par
PAULIN MALAPEBT. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1897. Pp. xvi., 302.
I THINK that those who compare this important work with the
recent French attempts that have preceded it in the same sub-
ject, will allow that it marks a considerable advance. It
combines much that was valuable in these attempts, escapes
some of their premature generalisations, and shows a more cau-
tious attitude than they always exhibited. It has had the great
advantage of following and not preceding them. And it was
natural that they, pioneers in a new and most complicated sub-
ject, should not all at once succeed in raising it from the bed
of popular opinion.
The problem of Ethology has received substantially the same
interpretation in all the recent works. It is at least to discern, tc
interpret and to classify the fundamental types of human character.
But popular thought has pressed hard on the struggling scientific
intelligence ; and if we were asked what, at the present time, is
the immediate concern of the new study, we should answer that,
whether consciously or not, it is striving to reduce to a scientific
form two disconnected classifications of character which it has
inherited from popular thought. One is the famous doctrine of the
four temperaments, once a learned, now a popular conception.
The other is the threefold classification men of thought, men of
action, men of feeling. The literary man no more than " the
man in the street " knows what relation the first of these classifi-
PAULIN MALAPERT, Les filaments du Caractere. 243
cations bears to the second. The first is called a classification
of temperaments not of character ; that is enough for him : and
he applies a type of the one or of the other, as it suits his pur-
pose. Thus he obtains some central conception, however abstract,
of an individual character ; and if the present inquiry of psycholo-
gists meets with any measure of success, one of its fruits will
be to furnish, in place of incomplete and disconnected classifica-
tions, a single one more coherent and exhaustive.
But the struggle of Ethology with popular thought is not only
shown in the attempt to reach a single and complete classification
but also in the endeavour to interpret its several types. For in-
stance, if it is a type of the second classification, ' the man of action, 5
it is an abstract quality. We are given this quality as a leading
characteristic, and in some sense we are supposed to understand
that it is predominant, but we are not told what are the secondary
characteristics of the type. Here it is the business of psychology
to deduce these secondary characteristics. If, on the other hand,
we take one of the types of the four temperaments, for instance
the sanguine type, and disregard its antiquated physiology, here
we are not given a single abstract quality as predominant, but
several of indeterminate standing. Some of these qualities are
found in most accounts, and we may assume them to be those
which long and repeated observations have found to coexist.
Thus we find it stated that the sanguine man shows quickness
of feeling and thought, but is superficial and inconstant, a lover
of pleasure and very hopeful, and in his will wanting in firmness
and self-control. Here in distinction from the last case as we
are given no leading characteristic it is the business of psychology
to discover it. For where a group of qualities is constantly united
in both sexes, in different races and remarked at long intervals
of time, they must possess some inner bond of connexion. It
is the business of psychology to discover this connexion.
With this conception of the immediate problem of Ethology, let
us see how M. Malapert deals with these qualities, how he inter-
prets their connexion and how far he succeeds in combining the
classifications of popular thought. What is his method ? His
method is to take the three universal functions of mind, Feeling,
Thoughtand Conation (activite), to discover the fundamental varie-
ties of each and afterwards to consider their interrelation. In " a
given individual," he tells us, "feeling, activity and intelligence react
upon one another, so that the particular form of one is closely
connected with the particular form of the others. . . ." 1 It is
perhaps strange to be told that feeling, thought and activity react,
when mental activity presumably consists in this interaction.
But the relation of activity to thought and feeling is so obscurely
presented and little understood in general psychology that it is
inevitably reflected in the applied science and injures its classi-
ications.
1 P. 126.
244 CRITICAL NOTICES :
And here it is as well to remark that the popular types of the
active man, the man of thought and the man of feeling, have been
rather hastily assumed to coincide with a " predominance " of one
of the universal constituents or functions. This assumption is
not peculiar to M. Malapert ; it is common to most of his prede-
cessors. It is assumed by no less an authority than Bain. But
what is ordinarily meant by the active man is one who in com-
parison with other men discovers an unusual degree of physical
activity. There is no statement of the relation of his activity
to other constituents in himself. In the second place, psychical
activity, as understood by psychologists to mean a universal
mental function, is revealed as much in thought, emotion and
will as in muscular action ; and supposing that this activity
were " predominant " in a given individual, it would not follow
that he would be in the popular sense an ' active ' man, or a
' man of action '.
As to the use of this term " predominance " in ethology, I have,
in previous reviews, referred to its vagueness. No term is more
prominent in the French and English works on the theory of
character. It is sufficiently intelligible as applied in the popular
use to signify the superior force of one emotion or sentiment over
other emotions and sentiments in the same individual. But no
one has thought it worth while to inquire what just, precise and
uniform meaning can be attached to the predominance of one of
the universal mental constituents over the rest. These constitu-
ents at least have no resemblance to individual units that act
externally on one another. And if we take one of the metaphors
by which psychologists have endeavoured to express their mutual
implication, how can one " aspect " of a mental fact be predominant
over its other aspects ? Is there any intelligible meaning to the
predominance of thought over activity, when in order to be pre-
dominant thought must be itself activity ?
But M. Malapert, while he bases his classification ostensibly on
this predominance, yet, by the cautious way in which he interprets
the principle and his detailed study of concrete types, escapes
much of the confusion that would seem to follow from it in practice.
Thus in reference to one of his predecessors, M. Fouillee, he pro-
tests against treating the subject as pure logicians ; and we may
commend his wisdom in inquiring, not as to any general predomi-
nance, but " what kind of intelligence or activity coincides with a
given character of feeling "- 1 "To say with M. Fouillee that there
exist people endowed with much feeling and at the same time
with much intelligence and with little will ; others, on the con-
trary, with much feeling, little intelligence and with much will
... is to employ words that have little precision of meaning, and
even to miss the real question. Without any doubt a man who
is very susceptible to emotion may have a highly developed in-
telligence, but it will differ unmistakably both in its character
1 P. 126.
PAULIN MALAPERT, Les filaments du Caractere. 245
and direction from the highly developed intelligence of which an
apathetic man is capable. The biologist does not ask whether a
respiratory system is accompanied by a circulatory system, but
what determinate form of the one is united to a given determinate
form of the other. In the same way the psychologist should con-
sider what determinate form of activity or intelligence coincides
with a given determinate form of feeling." l
I think that if M. Malapert had followed out his own excellent
advice, he would have substituted for the conception of a quan-
titative relation between the inseparable mental constituents the
conception of a qualitative relation, and his work would have
gained in accuracy and clearness.
In the types of ' temperament,' on the other hand, a quantita-
tive relation must be assumed. M. Malapert treats them as modes
of Feeling (sensibilite), and he includes in the meaning of this term
not merely states of pleasure and pain (('tats affectifs), but also
what w r e should call conation impulses and desires (tendances
affectives). 2 His four types of feeling les apathiques, les sensitifs,
les emotifs, les passionnes correspond closely to the characters
commonly ascribed to the phlegmatic, sanguine, nervous and
bilious temperaments. How then does he interpret the connexion
of qualities of each of these types ; what does he regard as the
central or primary quality of each ? Let us commence with the
apathetic. As the name implies people of this type are capable
of little feeling, and we should take this as their central quality.
They are commonly contrasted with the emotional. The one,
says our author, " resist all stimuli, remain indifferent, im-
passible. ... At the opposite extreme are those who feel all
emotions with an astonishing intensity." 3 Let us then suppose
that the central quality of the apathetic is the absence, that of the
emotional the presence, of intense feeling. But another quality is
implied and seems to possess an equal importance. We cannot
refer to the emotional without suggesting the quickness of their
reaction. It seems to be a law, says our author, that " quickness
and intensity are united : the nervous instability of the subject
being the common cause of these two harmonious results''. 4 The
cases of hyperaesthesia, where the intensity of feeling is extreme,
are those where "it is most sudden and instantaneous". 5 But
the apathetic are so slow to feel, that sometimes their emotions
affect them only in retrospection.' 5 It is one of the interesting
points in our author's method to give salience to these types by
instancing their morbid developments. Thus in chorea and in the
stupor of epilepsy, we have an extreme example of the apathetic
type a general depression of feeling and the tendency to move-
ment. These patients are indifferent to everything " persons,
dangers, threats and promises "." In other nervous diseases, as
1 P. 127. " P. 26. 3 P. 29. 4 P. 31.
6 Ibid. 8 P. 80. 7 P. 170.
246 CBITICAL NOTICES:
hysteria and neurasthenia, we have extreme examples of the
emotional type a disposition " to feel emotions whose violence,
frequency and persistence are out of all proportion to their causes " l
This reference to the persistence of feeling introduces us to a
new quality of the emotional type which M. Malapert regards as
essential to it. And here he but follows the general account
in which the persistency of emotion is emphasised quite as
much as its intensity. In one place he seems to derive the inten- f /
sity from the persistence. The prolongation of feeling he thinks
enables it to "excite sympathetically a more or less considerable
mass of other states of feeling . . . ". 2 As a result, the feeling
" acquires a greater intensity ". 3 It is in respect of its great per-
sistency of feeling that the melancholic or emotional type contrasts
with the sanguine. The sanguine is always described as super-
ficial. In the sanguine too we have a combination of qualities
quickness of feeling and instability (sensibilite vive mats assez
passagere). From these opposite qualities of the emotional and
sanguine types, our author deduces the melancholy of the one
and the habitual cheerfulness of the other. The light inconstant
nature of the sanguine " protects him against violent grief and
prolonged dejection ". 4 He is a " born optimist " : 5 his opposite
a born pessimist.
Let us now take the qualities of intellect, conation and will
which our author deduces from these innate qualities of emo-
tional disposition. In respect of the sanguine (les sensitifs) " all
degrees of intelligence are possible, but not all forms ". 6 In this
type there is always " a giddiness (etourderie) and want of re-
flexion ; their multiplicity of sensations, and points of view, their
mobility, counteract prolonged thought and sustained applica-
tion . . ."." Hence too their will is " unstable and capricious " ;
inhibitory or " negative volition is more or less completely ab-
sent ''. 8
What on the other hand are the effects of the disposition to
intense and persistent emotion ? It has been remarked by
Bain, Wundt and Fere, says our author, that this disposition is
accompanied by an " overactive memory ". 9 But the memory is
partial ; it is led to neglect all that has not " an emotional value," 10
" logical and properly intellectual relations are at every moment
modified by emotion ". On the other hand this disposition tends
to produce " a development of imagination ". The images are
coloured with emotion and in their turn tend to " maintain and
renew emotion ". u And where this disposition is united to a high
quality of intelligence it becomes " the intellectual temperament of
the artist ".
But all emotions are not of the same character. Two varieties
are referred to, the stimulating and depressing, and according
1 P. 28. 2 P. 33. 3 Ibid. 4 P. 37. 6 Ibid. 6 P. 140.
T Ibid. 8 P. 173. 9 P. 143. w Ibid. "Ibid.
PAULIN MALAPERT, Les Elements du Caractere. 247
as one or the other is predominant, so is the effect different.
The depressing emotions slow the reaction time : the stimu-
lating accelerate it. And thus we have two sub-types of the
emotional character the melancholy and the irritable (emotif-
int'lancholique, cmotif-irritable). 1 It is one of M. Malapert's
merits to escape, as he progresses in his work, from mere generali-
ties and grapple with the perplexing detail of his subject. But
he sometimes enables us to correct his own premisses. Thus we
had been led to suppose that the melancholy of the emotional
type was the result of -its intense emotions ; but we now see that
it is the result rather of their painful and depressing quality. And
the quickness too which we had supposed to be combined with
intensity is not combined with it when the emotions are of a
depressing character. The intensely irritable, on the contrary,
if quick and intense of feeling, show no disposition to persistent
melancholy. They are always quivering with emotion, palpitat-
ing with anxiety or hope, passing suddenly from enthusiasm to
discouragement, from the most expansive gaiety to the gloomiest
melancholy. 2 It must be admitted that in this sub-type we have
departed far from the emotional character first described. Its
essential quality, its persistency of feeling, is no longer present.
Instead we have a type so unstable, and capricious that it seems
to pass over into the opposite type of the sanguine. This illustrates
the difficulty of fixing the primary qualities of each type. Even
the sanguine man, so uniformly unstable, has at least one emotion
that contradicts this general rule. According to all account she
is persistent in hope a born optimist; and this emotion renders
him phlegmatic to its opposite.
The ancient types of the Phlegmatic, the Sanguine and Ner-
vous are sufficiently coherent, even in the popular description, to
tempt the psychologist to their reconstruction. But the Bilious
presents unusual difficulties. The different qualities of emo-
tional disposition, the quickness or slowness, the superficiality or
persistence, the faintness or intensity of feeling have already been
exhausted in the description of the preceding types. The
phlegmatic are slow and obtuse, the sanguine quick and super-
ficial, the nervous intense and persistent. To these pairs, a third
quality is united. The phlegmatic are, like the nervous, persistent,
so far as any feeling is elicited, the sanguine show considerable
intensity and the nervous are, like the sanguine, quick. What
qualities of emotional disposition or what combination of them
are left to us to differentiate the bilious or passionate type ? In
tlu> common accounts, it approximates to the man of action. The
Napoleons and Caesars are said to belong to it. But M. Malapert
regards the man of action as a distinctive type, nor does he
place the passionate under it, but under the co-ordinate class of
feeling. Hence it would seem to be difficult for him to give any
'Pp. 228, 226. 2 P. 226.
248 CBITICAL NOTICES :
coherent and distinctive account of them. Like the sanguine,
he regards them as quick of feeling (sensibility tres vive encore).
But he cannot define them by such qualities. He reverts to his
distinction between states of feeling (etats affectifs) and ten-
dencies of feeling (tendances affectives). The susceptibility to
intense emotion, he assures us, " is not necessarily united to the
impetuosity of passion . . . ''. l We can therefore distinguish
the bilious type by the intensity or passion of its desires.
We should have expected that M. Malapert would not have
co-ordinated this type with the three with which it is popularly
presented, that he would have classed it, not as a type of feeling,
but of conation (activite), had he not already included conation
in feeling (sensibilite). What intelligible and consistent account
can he give of conation as itself a fundamental function deter-
mining a generic type of character. But admitting his principles
how can he succeed in distinguishing this type by the intensity
or passion of its desire from those which have preceded it?
Desire depends on feeling and this is his difficulty. As are
the feelings of the preceding types, so are their desires. If it
is difficult to arouse feeling in the apathetic, it is difficult to
stimulate desire. If the sanguine are quick and superficial of
feeling, so are their desires lively but inconstant. If the emo-
tional have intense and lasting emotions, the same qualities pass
into their desires. "It seems indeed," he admits, "that weak-
ness of desire is linked and correlated to a kind of torpor of feel-
ing. . . . True apathy is then both feebleness of desire and
feebleness of feeling. However, it sometimes happens that apathy
is combined with intense desire ; which may arise from two
principal causes. Sometimes the tendencies though having a
certain force are deficient in feeling, I mean they are not readily
excited ; their characteristic manner is calm, . . . but if a strong
impression is produced, it may persist and after a period of incuba-
tion produce fiery and impetuous impulses."' Yes; if intense
emotion is at length produced, the desire also will be intense.
But under these conditions, the apathetic type is confounded with
the passionate, if intense desire is the distinguishing quality of
the latter. On the other hand, if we emphasise in the passionate,
the quickness of its desires, how are we to distinguish it from the
sanguine ? Have not the sanguine quick and explosive desires,
intense but unstable ? It is in childhood, we are often told, that
the sanguine type is most purely represented and in which these
characters are most conspicuous. But our author distinguishes
two chief varieties of the passionate, those of unstable, those of
persistent desire (passionnes instabies ; passionnes unifies) ; 3 and
if the former dissolve in the sanguine, how shall we distinguish
the latter from the nervous? Have these troubled natures no
desires corresponding to their intense and prolonged emotions ?
PAULIN MALAPERT, Les filaments du Caract&re. 249
In their griefs have they no passionate longing? Have their
morbid fears no desire to escape from real or imaginary dangers ?
Has their regret no vain yearning ? Does a brooding anger that
"nurses" its wrath cherish no schemes of revenge? But,
says our author, " the religious sentiment of a Fenelon differs
strangely from the mystic impetuosity of a Sainte Therese, the
sensibility of a Kacine or even a Diderot from the insatiable
charity of a Saint Vincent de Paul. In short two natures domin-
ated by an extreme liveliness of feeling are profoundly distinguished
where one is in addition characterised by violent desire (ardeur).''
The emotion of the one is " inward, disturbed and suffering. The
second more vigorous, loving or hating without measure, always
eager to escape from themselves with a need, constantly renewed,
of satisfying their passions." l That M. Malapert is vividly por-
traying real types may be admitted ; but the second does not
correspond with what we had taken to be the essential character-
istic of the passionate. Intense desire is common to both types.
But there are desires which, however noble, are impotent, and
desires which are adjusted to the conditions of life. Consider the
inward and withdrawn character of the one, the outwardly ex-
panding character of the other. There lies their salient difference.
But this difference touches merely the diverse character of their
desires. It will admit of our classing the bilious as a subordinate
type, but offers us no grounds on which to co-ordinate it with the
preceding types.
Such in outline is the interpretation which our author gives of
f hese famous types not ostensibly indeed but they press upon
his thought and force recognition, and beneath their several dis-
guises, as the sensitive, emotional, passionate and apathetic, we
detect their presence and familiar characteristics. If he has not
been uniformly successful in all of them, if their central qualities
have not yet been finally established, we must bear in mind the
difficulty of the task. On the whole he has presented the best,
the most coherent, the most genuinely psychological interpreta-
tion they have yet received. The suggestiveness of these types
is perennial. They could not have survived centuries of use
unless some profound truths were embodied in them. But they
are drawn in waving outlines difficult to seize.
We have now to consider the final classification of M. Mala-
pert, and the relation which the two popular classifications bear
to it. " In a character as in an organism," he says, " there
are dominant systems and others subordinate, there is a main-
spring which impresses on the rest its direction and velocity,
there is a certain function preponderant. . . ." 2 But this func-
tion dominates, but does not exclude. In accordance with this
principle, he counts six generic types ; and each genus has its sub-
ordinate species. These fundamental types are 1, the apathetic ;
1 P. 43. 8 P. 206.
250 CKITICAL NOTICES:
2, the feeling (Us affectifs) ; 3, the intellectual ; 4, the active ; 5,
the resolute (les volontaires) ; 6, the balanced. The first is a.
type of the temperaments. The second contains, as its species,
the remaining three the sensitive, emotional and passionate.
The second, third and fourth genus are the popular types of the
man of feeling, the man of thought, and the active man. We
have thus a synthesis of the two popular classifications. But how
does the first type conform to the author's principle ? What is !
predominant in the apathetic man ? He sins by deficiency of all '
the mental functions, not by excess of any. Nor, as the name
implies, can the balanced show any such predominance ; but
our author contends that the very equipoise in which it consists
is a " kind of dominant character," l and if Will is predominant
in the resolute, as a mode of conation, we should expect this type
to be subordinated to the genus activity instead of co-ordinated
with it.
In the author's treatment of the intellectual genus, we realise
the straits to which his principle confines him. Every type of the
temperaments must be excluded from it, because in them feeling
controls thought. But one species of the intellectual is the
dilletanti, and there is no incompatibility between it and the
sanguine ; the superficial and versatile intellect of the one seems
admirably adapted to the superficial and versatile emotions of the
other. And in the passionate type, is there an essential incom-
patibility between its ardour of desire and the intellectual life ?
M. Malapert is aware that there are men who are possessed of
a genuine passion for knowledge. They are one of his admitted
species. But, he protests, they are not to be confused with the
passionate, properly so called, " their purely intellectual passion "
having particular effects of its own.- And with regard to the
apathetic, as many writers have maintained that the intellectual life
is destructive of emotion, M. Malapert, whilst denying the general
law, is constrained to admit the possibility. 3 The intellectual
man is sometimes, through deadness to emotion, an apathetic.
The active type presents unusual difficulties. For is there not
an activity of thought and are not the intellectual eminently
active ? No ; as M. Malapert understands the term the popula:
sense in which the active man is opposed to the man of thought
they are not. But he also understands by the term ' activity '
a universal mental function and in this sense they are. In this
type we find " a natural and ceaselessly renewed tendency for
action ". And, like M. Ribot, he both regards it as based on the
predominance of a universal function, yet having this con-
tracted outlet that those who belong to it " live above all exter-
nally ". 4 With regard to their feelings they are like the sanguine,
to whom they " sometimes approximate," " expansive and mobile,'
and inclined to look at things on their pleasant side ; but tha
1 P. 208. 2 P. 235. 3 P. 283. 4 P. 235.
A. MEINONG, Ueber die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes. 251
\vliich distinguishes them is that " activity lives for itself, is not
subordinated to feeling ", l With regard to their intelligence it
" sins always by defect of reflexion, has no interest in what is
unattainable in the ideal ". 2
We have now passed in review the main features of M.
Malapert's classification. No one who has experienced the diffi-
culties of the task could expect it to be final. At least it is better
and more complete than any that has preceded it. It is interest-
ing as an attempt to unify the disconnected classifications of
popular thought ; and its success would have been greater had
the author discerned the limits within which alone the quantitative
conception of ' predominance ' is applicable. Constrained by this
conception of his predecessors, his fundamental types sometimes
appear arbitrary, because they are not in harmony with it, and
the arguments to justify their concordance, sophistical.
ALEXANDER F. SHAND.
Ueber die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes. Beitrage zur
Psychologie des Vergleichens und Messens. Von A. MEINONG.
Hamburg und Leipzig : Leopold Voss, 1896. Pp. 164.
THE present w r ork consists essentially of a single thesis proved by
a single argument. The thesis is at once simple and ingenious,
the argument at once lucid and subtle. The author avoids almost
all the mistakes and confusions which beset writers on psychical
measurement, and makes several important distinctions which are
rarely, if ever, to be met with elsewhere.
Herr Meinong's thesis is, briefly, as follows : The true import
of Weber's Law is, that equal dissimilarities (Verschiedenheiteri)
in the stimuli correspond to equal dissimilarities in the cor-
responding sensations ; while the dissimilarity of two measurable
quantities of the same kind may be regarded as measured by the
difference of the logarithms of these quantities. Thus where
sensations are what the author calls extensive, they are directly
proportional to their stimuli, though wherever the sensations are
quantitative, their dissimilarity is proportional, as in Fechner's
formula, to the difference of the logarithms of the stimuli pro-
vided these be measurable quantities of the same kind. This
double contention depends upon the distinction between dis-
similarity (Verschiedenheit) and mathematical difference (Unter-
schied). The use made of this distinction demands a careful
account of quantity and measurement, of indivisible quantities,
and of relations which are quantities. I am unacquainted with
any better discussion of these topics than that contained in the
present volume, and the points where the author appears mistaken
do not, I think, invalidate the most important part of his thesis.
1 P. 286. 2 Ibid.
252 CBITICAL NOTICES:
The first section of the book consists of a discussion of the
nature and range of quantity. It is pointed out that quantities
need not be divisible, since relations may be quantities. Distance
in space, for example, is unquestionably both a quantity and a
relation : to suppose distance divisible, can only arise from a con-
fusion between distance and length (Strecke). In like manner,
the author continues, similarity and dissimilarity are quantities :
two things may be more or less similar, but the similarity is
certainly indivisible.
In this sweeping assertion that similarity and dissimilarity are
always quantities, the author ignores an important controversy.
Had he applied his doctrine to the relations of other pairs of terms
than quantities of the same kind, it would, I think, have led him
into serious errors. If the relations in question are reducible
to identity and diversity of content, they cease to be properly
quantities. Moreover this reduction is certainly valid in some
cases. Herr Meinong asserts, for example, that between a colour
and a tone there is more difference than between two colours (p.
44). It would be truer to say that there are more differences.
Wherever the relations in question are reducible to complete
identity in some points, and complete diversity in others, there
quantity seems not properly applicable. Diversity of content
appears to be incapable of quantity : we cannot say that diversity
in respect of one content is equal or unequal to diversity in respect
of another. But there are other cases and it is to these, fortu-
nately, that the author applies his doctrine where a difference
exists which is not reducible to mere diversity of content. Such
cases are, among others, differences of position and of magnitude ;
and differences of magnitude, naturally, have the chief importance
in discussing Weber's Law.
The second section deals with comparison, especially as to mag-
nitude. Apart from the possible objection that magnitude is a
notion essentially dependent upon comparison, and that the present
section ought, therefore, to have been the first, the account of quanti-
tative comparison is excellent. Likeness and unlikeness are notions
not demanding a definition ; but they are not the only results of
quantitative comparison, which is unique in yielding, not mere
difference of magnitude, but the relations of greater and less.
Whatever appears different, on immediate comparison, is different;
but what is different only appears so down to a certain limit.
Below this limit, a difference is imperceptible. Differences should
not be described by their perceptibility, where such a description
can be avoided ; for our knowledge of the difference perceived is
prior to our knowledge of the perception of difference, and a direct
treatment of differences, where possible, is preferable to the indirect
treatment by means of their perceptibility. Two just perceptible
differences need not be equal ; but we have a well-grounded pre
sumption, in favour of their equality, where there is equal suscej
tibility to differences.
A. MEINONG, Ueber die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes. 253
Comparison of parts and measurement form the subject of the
third section. The author recognises, what is so often overlooked,
that numerical measurement proper depends upon divisibility, and
is therefore inapplicable to quantities which are relations. He
points out, nevertheless, that, where indivisible quantities have
divisible correlates, all the practical advantages of measurement
may often be obtained by means of these correlates. Measure-
ment proper is either mediate or immediate : the latter is only
applicable to space and time. But there is, for intensive quantities,
a third kind of measurement, which the author calls substitutive
(turrogativ), because what is really measured is an extensive sub-
stitute. For example, distance, being a relation, is indivisible ;
but it is always associated with a length, which is divisible.
Distances, therefore, are regarded as measured by means of the
correlated lengths. Similarly velocities are regarded as measured
by means of the lengths traversed in a given time. In such cases,
though another quantity is really measured in place of the quantity
in question, we regard the latter as measured, because the operation
ensures one or more of the three advantages derived from measure-
ment proper. These advantages are : (1) That an element of a
continuum is replaced by a discrete term, namely a number, and
the intractability of the continuum is relegated to the unit ; (2) that
the number thus obtained has the same relation of magnitude to
other numbers as the correlated quantities have ; (3) that the
absolute limits, zero and infinity, which have validity for indivisible
as well as for divisible quantities, are the same for the numbers
and for the corresponding quantities. All these advantages are
secured in measuring distances and velocities ; the first only is
secured in measuring temperature by the thermometer. This last
case illustrates that measurement is not sharply separated from
mere determination without measurement.
This excellent discussion of the sense in which indivisible quanti-
ties can be measured is applied, in the fourth section, to the
measurement of the dissimilarity between quantities of the same
kind. Dissimilarity is a relation, and therefore indivisible. In
the case of two quantities of the same kind, their dissimilarity
appears to be also a quantity. 1 With space and time, the distance
is associated with an intervening length ; but in some cases where
dissimilarity is a quantity there is, according to Herr Meinong, no
intervening length. By an intervening length he means, apparently,
no more than the power of continuous variation from the one term
to the other. As an instance where this is not possible, he gives
the dissimilarity of a colour and a tone. This, however, is not
properly a quantity, but a difference of content. In all cases
where dissimilarity is a quantity, there must be, I think, an inter-
1 ' Dissimilarity " is not quite an adequate translation of Verschieden-
heit, but the word " difference " is required in the mathematical sense, and
'it is necessary to preserve the distinction by using different words for the
two ideas.
254 CRITICAL NOTICES:
vening length in the author's sense. As, however, the subsequent
discussion is confined to the dissimilarity of measurable quantities
of the same kind, the above limitation does not impair the validity
of the argument.
The dissimilarity of two quantities is evidently capable, at most,
of a substitutive measurement. Where the quantities themselves
are measurable, the dissimilarity must be measured, if measurable
at all, by some function of the two quantities. This function is not
the mathematical difference, for the dissimilarity is infinite when
one of the quantities is zero and the other finite. Moreover, the
mathematical difference is a radically distinct idea, dependent
wholly on divisibility. Thus the difference of two lengths is a
length, but their dissimilarity is a relation. The dissimilarity
between 1 and 2 is greater than that between 6 and 7, though the
difference is the same. Also the mathematical differences may
differ when the dissimilarities are the same.
This distinction is certainly of great importance. It is one,
moreover, which mathematics and preoccupation with spatio-
temporal quantities tend to obscure. In finding a function for
measuring dissimilarity, certain requirements are laid down. (1)
The dissimilarity must vanish when the quantities are equal ; (I
It must be infinite when one quantity is finite and the other is zero
infinite ; (3) The dissimilarity between A and B plus that betweer
B and C must be equal to that between A and C. These conditior
are essentially similar to those which, in non-Euclidean Geometrj
regulate the expression of distance in terms of co-ordinates, anc
Herr Meinong might have simplified a needlessly complicated
piece of mathematics by reference to this analogous case. The
conclusion is, that the function required is the logarithm of the
ratio, just as, in non-Euclidean Geometry, it is the logarithm of
the Anharmonic Eatio. 1 To this conclusion, if we remember the
meaning of substitutive measurement, there seems no valid obj(
tion. It must be remembered that, in such measurement, the er
to be attained is mainly practical theoretically, the quantitie
in question are not measured at all. But there is a propositioi
essential to Herr Meinong' s formula, which has great theoretic
importance. If the dissimilarity of A and B is equal to that of
and D, then A, B, C, D are proportionals a theorem which,
correct, throws a new light on Weber's Law.
The fifth section deals with psychical measurement and the
terpretation of Weber's Law. This section is somewhat marrec
I think, by a division of psychical quantities into extensive and
intensive. The author does not accept the view that psychical
quantities must be intensive. He urges, in agreement with Mr.
Bradley, 2 that psychical quantities may be extensive, since the pr
1 Cf., e.g., Whitehead, Universal Algebra, book vi., chap. i.
2 " What Do We Mean by the Intensity of Psychical States ? " Mi
1895.
A. MEINONG, Ueber die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes. 255
sented, as such, is psychical. He does not explicitly proceed, like Mr.
Bradley in a subsequent article, to infer that psychical states may
be extended, but this inference seems irresistible. If the presented,
as such, is psychical, then every possible object of experience is
psychical. This leads either to the philosophy of Berkeley, or to
an unknowable thing in itself. To urge, as Herr Meinong does,
that imagined space is measurable and divisible, though purely
psychical, seems either irrelevant or untrue. For imagined space
is as little mental as real space ; it differs from real space only in
the fact that it does not exist : while the imagination of space,
which does exist, is not divisible. We have an imagination of
something divisible, but the imagination, which alone is mental, is
not divisible. Such an argument, therefore, cannot prove the exis-
tence of psychical quantities which are divisible. This question
is too wide for a review, but I cannot avoid the conviction that to
regard the presented as necessarily psychical must make havoc of
a most fundamental distinction.
The discussion of psychical measurement treats extensive and
intensive psychical quantities separately. In the supposed case
of the former, the author arrives at the conclusion that they are
simply proportional to their stimuli. But his chief concern is
with dissimilarities. Weber's Law is regarded as showing that,
if r^ r 2 r s r 4 be four stimuli, and e l e% e 3 e 4 the corresponding sensa-
tions, then if r x : r 2 = r 3 : r 4 , the dissimilarity of e l and e<> is equal
to that of e s and e v It follows from the previous section that equal
dissimilarities of sensation correspond to equal dissimilarities of
stimulus. No inference is possible, in general, as to the magnitude
of the (intensive) sensations themselves : Fechner's deduction of
the logarithmic formula depends upon a confusion of difference
and dissimilarity. The same confusion underlies the hypothesis,
propped up by a so-called "law of relativity," that the relative
difference of two sensations is to be substituted for the absolute
difference in Fechner's deduction. The discussion ends with a
criticism of J. Merkel's articles on the relation between stimulus
and sensation. 1 Merkel professes to prove experimentally that
the sensation midway between two given qualitatively similar
sensations corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the stimuli
corresponding to the given sensations. On Herr Meinong's hy-
pothesis, it should correspond to the geometric mean, and he
candidly confesses that his theory is incompatible with this result.
But he is amply justified, I think, in holding such experiments to
be inconclusive. Merkel supposed numerical measurement directly
applicable to quantitative sensations, and accordingly regarded the
idea of a mean sensation as perfectly definite. It must rather be
held that such a discussion as Herr Meinong's is necessary before
such a phrase acquires any meaning. Merkel confesses (Phil.
Stud., x., p. 220) that a comparison of feelings of dissimilarity as
1 Phil. Stud., iv., v., x.
256 CRITICAL NOTICES :
such was not attempted, yet such a comparison, difficult as it
would be in practice, is alone relevant to our author's theory.
Many other points, which call for discussion, have been un-
noticed, as not bearing directly on the argument of the work.
There are throughout many subtle and suggestive observations on
quantity, measurement, and relations. The author's contention,
if it perhaps simplifies the question, especially in the interpretation
of Weber's Law, with somewhat excessive optimism, is based on
very close and careful reasoning, and offers, on essentials, very few
vulnerable points.
B. EUSSELL.
Psychologic als Erfahrungswissenschaft. Von HANS COKNELIUS.
Leipzig : Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner. London :
Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. xv., 445.
THE title of this work is somewhat deceptive. It is concerned
more with theory of knowledge than with psychology ; indeed, it
would seem that the author does not recognise the distinction
between the two. He assumes that an account of the way in
which knowledge grows in the individual mind is at the same
time an explanation of its nature and validity. The result is not
good ; both his psychology and theory of knowledge suffer. He
has written a valuable and interesting book, as a man of his
ability could not fail to do. But the confusion between two-
distinct lines of inquiry is a great drawback.
The theory of knowledge advocated by Prof. Cornelius is
clear and simple. He begins by recognising what he calls the
" symbolic function of memory-images " as an ultimate and
inexplicable fact. The present image represents for the con-
sciousness of the subject the previous experience of which it is a
reproduction. It is impossible to say how it comes to play this-
part. Its representative function must simply be accepted as a
final inexplicability (pp. 20-28). On the other hand, he makes ar
interesting attempt to trace all other symbolic functions of presen-
tation to that which is involved in memory. I do not think that
this attempt is successful (pp. 57-62). But this part of his worl
is suggestive. Given a mental image which is symbolic of ar
experience not actually present at the moment, the question of the
truth or falsehood of the symbolism may arise. The test of trutt
is verification by the actual experience of the cognitive subject.
If it is possible for the subject to actualise his symbols by obtain-
ing the experiences symbolised in the order and manner in whicl
they are symbolised, his mental representations are true. The
conception of objective existence is identical with the conceptior
of the possible realisation in terms of individual experience of
what is ideally represented by the cognitive subject.
The author applies this theory to explain the nature of oui
HANS CORNELIUS, Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft. 257
knowledge both of mind and matter. Its application to mind is
the more interesting, but the English reader will be better enabled
to catch the drift of the author if we first refer to his account of
our belief in the external world. In his fifth chapter, which
treats of this topic, he makes no reference to Mill's famous discus-
sion in the Examination of Hamilton, and he does not use the
phrase " permanent possibility of sensations ". Yet his theory is
simply identical with Mill's. Concepts of material objects as
existing independently of the subject which cognises them are for
him, as for Mill, simply concepts of the possibility of obtaining
certain sensations by the observance of certain conditions. He
calls them " concepts of empirical connexion". A material object
is for him simply an organised group of expectations. He does
not deal with the objections which have been brought against
this theory; indeed, he seems to be unaware of them. For
instance, he does not face the difficulty that the order and con-
nexion of physical facts is quite different from any possible order
and connexion of subjective experiences in the way of sensation,
e.g., that though we cannot see or touch simultaneously the
inside and the outside of a solid body, yet both exist simultane-
ously. Nor does he explain how it is that physical science recog-
nises the existence of much which cannot by its very nature be
actually experienced in the way of sensation, e.g., molecules and
their interaction, the luminiferous ether, and so on. It is charac-
teristic of Cornelius's point of view that he refuses to assume the
existence of the material world as a datum for explaining the
process by which the individual mind comes to be aware of such a
world. For him this would be arguing in a circle. He supposes
that the only means of ascertaining the nature and validity of our
knowledge of the external world is by tracing its psychological
growth. If we assume such a world to be given at the outset, we
already prejudge the question which is to be solved. In following
this line of thought, Prof. Cornelius appears to us to place
himself in an altogether untenable position. He confuses two
distinct problems ; on the one hand, there is the question, How
does the apprehension of an external world, such as it actually
exists for ordinary consciousness, come into being ? on the other,
there is the question, whether the view taken of the external world
by the ordinary consciousness is a right one ; and what sort of
correction it requires from critical reflexion. If these two problems
are identified, confusion may arise in two ways. Either pyschology
is substituted for epistemology, or epistemology for psychology.
In the first case, an account of the stages through which the
ordinary consciousness of the external world has arisen, takes the
place of a criticism of its validity. In the second case, an account
is given, not of the processes by which the ordinary consciousness
of the external world arises, but of the processes by which an
author supposes that what he takes to be the true view of external
reality may be obtained. It is the second course which is followed
17
258 CRITICAL NOTICES:
by Cornelius. His doctrine of the nature of external reality is
determined from the outset by his general theory of knowledge ;
and the psychological part of his work simply consists in showing
how an individual mind may attain, not the actually existing appre-
hension of an external world, with all its possible errors and
confusions, but that view of it which, according to Cornelius, is
the true one. The result is that his psychology, so far as regards
this question, is merely his theory of knowledge in masquerade.
We have still to consider the alleged circle of assuming the
existence of an external world when the problem is to trace its
origin. In reality, there is no such circle, so long as we retain the
strictly psychological attitude. The psychologist has to investigate
the processes through which the presentation of an external world
grows up in an individual subject. It would certainly be a circle
to assume that this subject whom he is studying already possesses
a knowledge of the external world, but it is no circle to assume
that he himself possesses such a knowledge. If he did not
possess such a knowledge, the problem could have no existence for
Mm.
The most interesting application which Cornelius makes of his
theory of knowledge is to the nature of psychological analysis.
We may merely by attention, without alteration of other con-
ditions, succeed in discriminating in a presented object constituents
which we have previously failed to discriminate. On the other
hand, so soon as attention is withdrawn, the distinctions which
previously existed disappear. In a musical note, for example, we
only discriminate overtones when we specially attend to them.
The problem discussed by Cornelius is as follows : What sort of
existence, if any, have the discriminated differences before they
are discerned and after they have ceased to be discerned ? In
both cases he answers in accordance with his general theory of
knowledge that undiscriminated differences exist only as per-
manent possibilities of discrimination. If I say that in a complex
of sensible qualities elements exist which I do not distinguish, I
merely mean, or at least ought merely to mean, that these elements
would be discernible by me under certain conditions. This view
certainly evades many difficulties, and it has a neatness which is
attractive. For reasons which I have given elsewhere, I cannot
myself accept it. It has been criticised most thoroughly by Mr.
Shand in his article on " Feeling and Thought " (MiND, N.S., No.
28, October, 1898).
The apparent simplicity of Prof. Cornelius's theory of psycho-
logical analysis is marred by a further development which the
facts compel him to give to it. When differences cease to be
discriminated, they ought, according to the theory, to exist only
as possibilities of discrimination. It is therefore with something
of a shock that we find Cornelius treating them as persistent
agencies determining the whole course of mental life. The total
HANS COBNELIUS, Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft. 259
state of consciousness at any moment has its nature determined
by elements which at the moment are not distinguished. Cornelius
rightly insists on this from beginning to end of his Psychology.
But he never faces the difficulty of mere unrealised possibilities
persisting as operative factors, each contributing its share to deter-
mine the nature of our actual experience. It would certainly seem
that his doctrine requires considerable modification if it is to be
made self-consistent. If we take into account the positive part
played by undiscriminated factors, it is hard to see how the view of
Cornelius differs from such a theory of psychical dispositions as is
advocated by Lipps.
The book by no means wholly consists of theory of knowledge
substituted for psychology, or of theory of knowledge applied to
psychology. It also contains much valuable work of a directly
psychological nature. In particular, attention may be drawn to
the acute and careful exposition of the mode in which dis-
crimination gradually increases in delicacy; to the discussion
of the interesting question whether we can distinguish in the
memory-image what we have failed to distinguish in actual
perception ; to the criticism of atomistic psychology ; and to
the statement of the laws of association.
Much is made throughout the work of the principle of the
" economy of thinking " ; but it is difficult to make out whether
this principle is to be regarded as epistemological or psychological,
or both without distinction. It sometimes seems to figure as an
ultimate test of truth ; but if we inquire what claim it has to this
position, we are left to gather the answer for ourselves. It would
seem that Cornelius regards the principle of the economy of think-
ing as an ultimate test of truth simply because he regards it as a
fundamental law of psychical process. But the mere fact that
we take as little trouble as possible in the attainment of our
ends, whether theoretical or practical, does not seem of itself
to constitute a reason why our mode of procedure should be a
right one. On the whole, the psychological application of the
principle of economy, as it is followed out by Cornelius, is valuable
and suggestive ; but it throws little light on theory of knowledge.
In conclusion, we must refer to the part played in the psycho-
logy of Cornelius by what he calls the " memory-image ". If we
understand him rightly, he regards the memory-image as always
having a certain individuality and independence which make it
separately reproducible apart from actual impressional experi-
ence. At the same time, he regards all recognition as depending
on the memory-image, and the delicacy with which different
objects are discriminated as depending on the delicacy with which
their memory-images are discriminated. This seems certainly
wrong. To refer to no other objections, a man may be able to
discriminate objects perfectly well by sight, and yet have virtually
no power at all of reproducing visual imagery.
Since I have dwelt so much on points on which I am compelled
260 CEITICAL NOTICES : Psychologic als Erfahrungswissenschaft,
to criticise Prof. Cornelius in an adverse sense, I ought to say
that, even where I differ from him most, I find him highly stimu-
lating and suggestive ; and that there is much in his book with
which I thoroughly concur, and which I find most helpful. The
author's style, both of thinking and writing, is distinguished for
clearness, simplicity, and elegance.
EDITOR (G. F. S.).
VII. NEW BOOKS.
Human Immortality : Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine. By
WILLIAM JAMES. London : Archibald Constable. Pp. 126.
IT has become a tacit convention among philosophers to preserve the
loftiest and profoundest silence on the very questions which formed the
first motive to philosophic effort and still form the culmination of philo-
sophic interest. Hence it seems at first to savour of impertinent airai-
8(v<ria that any one should still be found to take so much as 5000 dollars'
worth of (posthumous) interest in the question of his immortality, and it
causes a shock of surprise that a great academic institution like Harvard
University can be found to endorse such a procedure and to supervise
the delivery of an annual "Ingersoll Lecture on the Immortality of
Man ". Perhaps however it may quiet some alarm among those who
dread no worse fate for philosophy than that it should arouse popular
interest, to add that even so there is less money spent on the exploration
of the future life than on almost any other human fad, from arctic
exploration to the recovery of the Lost Tribes, and that the establish-
ment of the Ingersoll Lecture stands alone. Nevertheless the fact re-
mains that even so slight a beginning is calculated to stir up discussion
of a topic which is full of all sorts of scientific and religious taboos.
When moreover a writer and thinker of Prof. James's eminence is induced
to deliver an opinion upon any aspect of such a question, the most jaded
and cynical of sceptics may well be pardoned if he finds the equanimity
of his indifference slipping from him.
Our author himself however appears quite unconscious of his audacity
in braving such prejudices, and handles his thonry subject in a perfectly
straightforward and matter-of-fact way, which cannot but arouse the
admiration of the less courageous. He has a reply to make to two wide-
spread objections to the belief in a future life, and there is no mistaking
the tenor of his answer.
In the first place he will not allow the conclusiveness of the traditional
materialist view which infers from the correlation of physical and mental
phenomena that consciousness is a function of the brain and that a
mental life without a brain is strictly inconceivable. This production
theory of the working of the brain overlooks an alternative interpretation
of the facts. The brain may just as well be regarded as an organ for the
transmission of a consciousness which manifests itself through a brain
with more or less difficulty, but is intrinsically independent of it and
belongs to a different order of existence. Now a transmission theory
obviously will explain all the facts equally well, and can never be refuted
by empirical evidence, for the reason that it simply inverts the causal
interpretation of the same psychophysical concomitance. Logically we
have always the choice of explaining the higher by the lower or the
lower by the higher, and scientifically all we can demand is that their
connexion should not be denied. Prof. James points out that his view
is not altogether novel, although it has never been properly considered
262 NEW BOOKS.
a neglect which can hardly continue after the striking manner in which
he has called attention to it. Nor is the forlorn hope to be envied on
whom will devolve the task of attacking Prof. James's position. For
that, logically, seems well-nigh impregnable.
Among the details of the argument it should be noted that Prof.
James is careful to point out that he leaves the nature of the mind which
manifests itself through the brain- processes an open question, and that
for a good pluralist " there may be many minds behind the scenes as well
as one ". Further he holds that the alternative he supports possesses
great advantages over the materialist theory in the explaining of the
origination of consciousness, and of the shifting of the psychophysical
threshold as well as in the comprehension of supernormal phenomena.
As for the difficulty of explaining " how the brain can be an organ for
limiting and determining to a certain form a consciousness elsewhere
produced," all that is needed is " to retort with a tu quoque asking . . .
how it can be an organ for producing consciousness out of whole cloth ".
Prof. James's second point concerns itself with the objection to an in-
finite multiplication of immortal beings of a lowly and disgusting character.
This objection is rooted in aesthetic sentiment and is answered by an
appeal to religious sentiment. Here, however, Prof. James seems to be
dealing with less crucial matters and to answer in a less conclusive way.
It may be doubted whether the objection to " the incredible and intoler-
able number " of immortal beings is as modern as he supposes, and was
not felt while the world seemed " a comparatively small and snug affair ".
At all events, the theories of pre -existence and metempsychosis are among
the earliest and most universal ingredients in the belief in immortality, and
with a little modernising they even now contain a very complete answer
to the difficulty in question. Prof. James's suggestion, on the other hand,
that God's infinite sympathy transcends ours and embraces even the
humblest creatures in its appreciation, postulates a previous decision of
the question whether sub specie seternitatis individual personalities retain
any value. It may be, of course, that from the point of the whole all its
parts possess an equal value which is infinite rather than infinitesimal,
but the fact remains that most religious and philosophic ' theologies,'
wittingly or unwittingly, render this an uncommonly difficult belief to
sustain. Still Prof. James can hardly be wrong in thinking that the
difficulty he discusses is a real one and that it is a real service to have
ventilated it.
For ventilation by the most approved modern methods is what the
whole subject most sorely needs. At present it forms one of the darkest
and dustiest of the lumber-rooms that are the province of philosophy. It
is a mass of decayed traditions and distorted facts, of half-hearted aspira-
tions, broken beliefs and uncompleted inferences, haunted and defiled by
savage prejudices which cannot bear the light of day. Hardly any attempt
has been made to work out systematically the theoretic possibilities of
the subject. Almost all the relevant facts are bitterly disputed. Even
the psychological facts as to men's actual thoughts, feelings and desires
on the subject are very imperfectly known, and would probably occasion
no slight surprise to those who are content to adopt the literary tradition
that ' man naturally desires to be immortal '. It is only by a complete
change in the social atmosphere which envelops it that the subject can
be rendered fit for really rigorous investigation. No one who has tried
will underrate either the extreme difficulty and delicacy of the task of
rendering the social atmosphere fit for such scientific work or the slow-
ness with which even under the most favourable circumstances it can be
achieved. .But if Prof. James's gallant efforts to introduce some fresh air
NEW BOOKS. 263
and light are seconded by like-minded lecturers in the future, we may
look forward to a time when the work of ventilation will be done, and
that of verification can profitably be begun. Perhaps by that time some
generous donor will have equipped Harvard, or some other university
with a laboratory for the ' psychical researches ' which the current ' ex-
perimental ' methods so conspicuously fail to prosecute.
F. C. S. SCHILLEE.
Leibniz. The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. Translated
with Introduction and Notes by K. LATTA, M. A., D.Phil. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1898. Pp. vii, 437. (8s. 6d.)
This is a book which should be welcomed by many others besides pro-
fessional teachers and students of metaphysics, and may indeed be said,
in the hackneyed phrase, to fill a real gap. It is remarkable, and not
at all to our credit as a nation of educated men, that we have hitherto
had no worthy English version of the philosophical writings of Leibniz.
By his freedom from pedantic technicalities, the extraordinary range of
his studies, and the wonderful suggestiveness of his ideas, Leibniz
appeals, more perhaps than any of the great metaphysicians of modern
times, to the reflective and educated man who, without being exactly
a philosopher, takes an intelligent interest in philosophical speculations,
provided they can be put before him in a language he understands. And
one has only to think of the writings of Prof. James, or of Du Bois-
Keymond, to be reminded that, with the specialists both in Psychology
and in Physics, Leibniz is still a living and potent influence. Moreover
the chief works of Leibniz have what is from the average reader's point
of view the high merit of being as concise and brief as they are free from
wearisome technicality. It may be doubted whether any other man
could have achieved the feat of compressing a system of Philosophy into
a dozen pages ; it is certain that, with the exception of the author of the
M<>,iadology, no one has ever done so or is likely to do so again. Thus
the special characteristics of Leibniz seem to fit him in an uncommon
degree for translation, and in Dr. Latta he has found a translator who
performs his task with as much learning as accuracy. Were it not for
certain translations of other works of Leibniz which have recently been
given to the world, it would be indeed " faint praise " to say that Dr.
Latta's version is everywhere faithful both to the original text and to the
laws of English prose style. As it is, the character of these previous
versions, or rather perversions, makes it necessary to say that the present
translation is one on which a reader unskilled hi French may confidently
rely as correctly conveying the sense of the author. The works selected
for translation have naturally been those which are of chief importance
as containing in a brief compass Leibniz's statement of his characteristic
tenets ; the Monadology and the Principles of Nature and Grace in
the first place, of course, and, as illustrative of these Hauptschriften, the
New System of the Nature of Substances, with the " explanations " called
forth by it, and one or two other minor tracts. The Introduction, which
contains a detailed account of the life and philosophy of Leibniz as well
i critical estimate of his influence on later thought, will henceforth
take rank beside Mer/'s brilliant and all too brief monograph as an
indispensable aid to the English student of the philosopher of Leipzig.
If Dr. Latta is on the whole less fertile in original suggestion than his
predecessor, he is, as would be expected from the scope of his work,
much fuller of information on points of detail. There is hardly any
264 NEW BOOKS.
problem of importance suggested by the philosophical works of Leibniz
which does not receive discussion and illustration somewhere or other
in this admirable introduction. Particularly interesting and valuable is
the elaborate examination of the influence of Leibniz upon later thinkers,
notably upon Kant and Lotze. If there is any criticism one is tempted
to pass upon so learned a discussion, it would be that, in view of English
ignorance, the work of Herbart is scarcely discussed at sufficient length.
After all, Herbart is not only more akin in spirit to Leibniz than most
of his German successors, but may also fairly be said to be the one
German philosopher of the great epoch, besides Kant, who is much more
than a magni nominis umbra to-day. For both these reasons one
could wish that Dr. Latta had treated of him in a way that would appeal
rather to the many English students who are not acquainted with his
works than to the few who are. And while one is about the task of
criticism, there are two other minor matters one might mention in which
Dr. Latta will hardly carry all his readers with him. His treatment of
the relations between Leibniz and Spinoza errs perhaps through a natural
charity to the memory of the author whom he has studied to such purpose.
Nothing in Leibniz's life is less creditable, when judged by the ordinary
standards of honourable men, than his constant endeavours to minimise
the importance of Spinoza as a thinker, and his readiness to acquiesce
in the popular prejudices against so "impious " a writer. On this point,
the language of Mr. Pollock in his Spinoza seems not a whit too
severe, and it is perhaps a pity that Dr. Latta should have repeated
Leibniz's half patronising, half sanctimonious reflexions on his great
contemporary without a word of censure. The other point is one of more
importance. We hear a great deal in Dr. Latta's Introduction, as we
are bound to hear in any account of Leibnitian metaphysics, of " activity "
and " force " as constituting the real essence of bodies. But Dr. Latta,
like Leibniz himself, omits to explain what " activity " and " force "
stand for, over and above certain empirical facts which are ultimately
reducible to terms of extension and rate of change of velocity.
It is of course clear from what Leibniz and his editor say about
Cartesianism that they understand by " force " and " activity " something
very much more than convenient symbols for such facts about extension
and acceleration, but neither seems prepared with an answer to the
question how much more is meant. Yet one cannot but think that, in
view of the loose way in which spiritualist writers such as Prof. James
are accustomed to use these terms, they should either be rigorously denned
or rigorously banished from our philosophical vocabulary. And would it
be hypercritical to suggest that " Leibniz's far-reaching suggestion of
the unconscious petites perceptions," so far from being such a service to
psychology as Dr. Latta maintains, has really proved a damnosa hereditas
of obscurity and confusion ? These are however but points of detail, and
divergence of opinion about them is only to be expected. The fact
remains that Dr. Latta has produced the most elaborate and learned
work on Leibniz in the English language, a work for which all future
students must be profoundly thankful, and which reflects the utmost
credit on the author as well as on the University of Edinburgh, to which
part of the Introduction was submitted as a doctoral thesis, and on the
Clarendon Press which has undertaken the publication.
A. E. TAYLOR.
NEW BOOKS. 265
An Outline of Philosophy, with Notes Historical and Critical. By
JOHN WATSON, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's
University, Kingston, Canada. Glasgow : James Maclehose & Sons.
Pp. xxii., 489.
This is a second edition of the book published by Prof. Watson in 1895
under the title, Comte, Mill and Spencer, an Outline of Philosophy.
The two titles give some indication of the general nature of the book.
As an " outline of philosophy " it has something to say on most of the
chief problems of metaphysics or philosophy proper ; but it does not
directly deal with psychology, logic or economics, and it hardly does more
than touch upon the questions of political philosophy, aesthetics and the
philosophy of religion. Thus it does not profess to give a " complete
system of philosophy," but it is offered as " a manual, which cannot do
more than awaken an interest in philosophical problems, and indicate the
lines on which in the opinion of the writer they may be solved ". It
need hardly be added that these lines are the lines of Idealism as it is ex-
pressed in the writings of Green and of Mr. Edward Caird. The method
of the book is suggested by the original title. The various subjects are
treated in logical order, proceeding from the most abstract to the most
concrete, while the discussion is throughout kept close to the history of
philosophy, each section being developed by exposition and criticism
of some notable thinker. Thus Prof. Watson might have added to the
names in his original title those of Darwin and Kant. In this new
edition the historical element is strongly reinforced by the addition of
nearly 200 pages of " notes historical and critical," dealing with specific
problems in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley,
Hume, Kant, Hegel and Lotze. There are obvious educational advan-
tages in such a method as that which Prof. Watson has adopted. By the
continual discussion of other theories he prevents the systematic exposi-
tion of his own opinions from taking too dogmatic and absolute a form ;
and, on the other hand, as the general plan of the book is not chronological
but logical, the student is enabled to realise the unity of the great philo-
sophical problems much more thoroughly than if he were to read an
ordinary " history of philosophy," which resembles too much a mere list
(or catalogue raisonne) of systems. Yet Prof. Watson's method has its
dangers, and the very excellence of his work may be its undoing by
tempting students to content themselves with his admirably lucid exposi-
tions and to neglect the "first-hand study of the authors" on which he
rightly insists.
The book falls naturally into five main parts, discussing (1) the problem
of philosophy in general, including such questions as the relation of philo-
sophy to the special sciences and the relativity of knowledge (with special
reference to Comte) ; (2) the philosophy of nature, including geometry,
the science of numbers and the physical and biological sciences (with
special reference to J. S. Mill and Darwin) ; (3) the philosophy of mind,
or the problem of the relation between subject and object (with special
reference to Mr. Spencer) ; (4) moral philosophy, including the problems
of duty, freedom, the summum bonum, and rights (with special reference
to Kant) ; and (5) the philosophy of the absolute, including the philo-
sophy of religion and aesthetics (again with special reference to Kant).
Obviously this is an immense deal of ground to cover in a single volume
too much to make a complete success possible. Yet, taking into con-
sideration the magnitude of his attempt, Prof. Watson's achievement is
remarkable : he has certainly succeeded in putting all the main issues
very clearly before his readers. Occasionally, but not often, he allows
266 NEW BOOKS.
himself to commit the sin that doth so easily beset a lecturer, that of
reiteration and labouring his point. And, on the other hand, there are
portions of the book (e.g., the note on the Association of Ideas and the
chapter on the Philosophy of the Absolute) where the discussion is either
too condensed to be useful to the student or too general to be adequate to
the subject. Of course the improvement of the book in this respect
would mean its enlargement, and even the most comprehensive books
have spatial limits.
Without attempting to discuss the book in detail, one may remark
upon the excellence of Prof. Watson's exposition and his acute yet
sympathetic criticism in the chapters and notes which refer to Descartes,
and Kant, and in the notes on " The Platonic and Aristotelian Criticism
of Phenomenalism " and on the views of Aristotle and Hegel regarding
the principle of identity. This last note and the note on Descartes and
Kant are the most valuable parts of the new material in the volume.
The treatment of Mr. Spencer's position is also very clear and fair, and
the exposition and criticism of Mill is on the whole very good, although
on particular points (e.g., the question of the inconceivability of the;
opposite as a test of truth) Prof. Watson's argument seems to some
extent open to objection. In the new matter there are several things,
which, apart from their general value, will be of special interest to
readers of MIND. In a note on " Agnosticism and Scepticism," Prof.
Watson argues acutely against the scepticism of Mr. Alfred Sidgwick,.
as expressed in an article in MIND (N.S., vol. iii.), and in another note
on " The Feeling Soul " there is a very interesting appreciation and
criticism of Mr. Bradley's remarkable article in MIND (O.S., vol. xii.),.
in course of which, with much justice, Prof. Watson suggests that Mr.
Bradley's position seems to imply the introducing into Psychology of
the " preformation " theory of development, which has been discredited
in biology. Again, in an admirable discussion of Lotze's theory of know-
ledge, Prof. Watson traces to the influence of Lotze the distinction
which Mr. Bradley draws between ideas as ' events ' . and as having
' content,' a distinction which, in the form in which it is made, has had
a baneful effect on the argument both of the Principles of Logic and
of Appearance and Reality. Mention ought also to be made of the
note on " The Problem of Human Freedom," in which there is some
excellent criticism of the Kantian element in the work of T. H. Green.
Such discussions as these make the book much more than a mere
manual for students. While the main argument runs on familiar lines,,
it has the freshness that comes of contact with present questions.
E. LATTA.
The Mental Affections of Children : Idiocy, Imbecility, and Insanity.
By WILLIAM W. IRELAND, M.D. London: J. & A. Churchill;:
Edinburgh : James Thin, 1898. Pp. ix., 442.
In his book on the Mental Affections of Children : Idiocy, Imbecility f
and Insanity, Dr. Ireland continues the studies of his former book,
Idiocy and Imbecility, incorporating part of the old material. Like the
earlier book, this is written mainly for the practical alienist ; but it is.
not without material for theoretic study, and Dr. Ireland does " not yet
despair of receiving some little attention from the students of psychology
in Great Britain " (as well as America). He writes out of the fulness of
a long experience among idiots and imbeciles ; his many contributions to
his selected region of studies have found recognition in all the standard
NEW BOOKS. 267
text-books of insanity, and his concrete descriptions here will be ap-
preciated by alienists at a very high value. Now, what has he to offer
to the " student of psychology " ? Directly, not very much that could
be readily summarised ; indirectly, a good deal. " Idiocy " he defines as
" mental deficiency, or extreme stupidity, depending on malnutrition or
disease of the nervous centres, occurring either before birth or before the
evolution of the mental faculties in childhood ". The vagueness of this
definition is only partially reduced in the subsequent exposition. The
"causes" (chapter iii.) of the "malnutrition or disease" are such as
these : heredity, consanguine marriages, scrofula, drunkenness, gynagogy,
fright to the pregnant mother, epilepsy, neuropathic conditions generally.
These terms are all highly general and for the most part vague. The
statements made under these heads do not assist us much to conceive
precisely how the various conditions become ethcient causes. Heredity,
for instance, as indeed the author recognises, cannot well be offered as a
" cause " until some coherent idea of the notions indicated and focussed
by that name is first set forth. For the present, the theory of heredity
is only a working hypothesis. Similarly with consanguinity and drunken-
ness. For the pathology of these we must go to the researches on the
insanities of alcoholism. In this chapter, as in several other parts of the
book, one is disappointed to note a somewhat ill-informed antipathy to
the pathological applications of Darwinism. To Dr. Ireland's numerous
misappreciations, not to say sneers, the Darwinian may retort that
reversion and the other notions included under Darwinism are at least
an effort after a positive causation of positive phenomena, and that words
like " the influence of a formative force inherent in the whole organism
which suits the size of the skull to the size of the brain" (p. 102) are
a mere restatement of the fact, not even a formal explanation. But
to return. The classification of the forms of idiocy (chapter iv.) into
twelve varieties genetous or congenital, microcephalic, hydrocephalic,
eclampsic, epileptic, paralytic, traumatic, inflammatory, sclerotic, syphi-
litic, cretinism, idiocy of deprivation is not altogether congruous with
the definition, nor, even from the standpoint of pathology, is it free from
cross-divisions ; but it is sufficient for clinical purposes. One of the best
parts of the book is the account of the histo-pathology of the brain of
the genetous idiot. The later observers have produced abundant evi-
dence of "arrested development," nerve-cells diminished in number and
abnormal in shape and issuing processes. In some specimens nerve-
fibres were found similarly deficient. But after histology has done all
it can be expected to do, there remains, even in the idiot nervous system,
the " soft play of life," and for further illumination one turns more hope-
fully towards the applications of functional analysis, after the fruitful
methods of Dr. Pierre Janet of la Salpetriere. The discussion on micro-
cephalic idiocy is good, but it would have been better without the useless
girding at the " Darwinians ". The discussions all through are essentially
physical. In the chapter on "Insanity of Children," we have somewhat
more psychology, but it is not correlated systematically with the normal.
There is no sustained attempt, as with Dr. Bevan Lewis, to analyse
ni'-ntal complexes or apperceptions. But the objective material con-
tains many good observations and hints. This chapter and the suc-
ceeding chapter on sensory and mental deficiencies of idiots, suffer from
the want of a vigorous separation of physical and psychical. The
iter mi Methods of Educating Idiots and Imbeciles" contains many
first-hand hints on method the time to begin training, the teaching of
written and spoken words, the development of the senses, etc. Here
functional analysis would be much to the purpose, as has been shown by
Laborde's results with the microphonograph in the education of deaf-
268 NEW BOOKS.
routes (Treatment, 27th Oct., 1898). The object of training is to produce
a citizen, if possible ; short of that, to make the idiot less of a social
burden. This brings us to the legal chapters, which must end in ques-
tions of ultimate ethics. Did space allow, many other points might be
profitably discussed. In a compound book like this, it is impossible
to develop the detailed studies necessary to bring the psychology of
idiots into line with the normal, and we may hope that Dr. Ireland will
find time and energy to elaborate still more in the light of a fuller
psychology his sketch of idiot education. The last chapter on " Wolf
Boys" is essentially anecdotal, and does not pretend to more than
historical interest. It remains to add that the book is written with
great fluency, and has many indications of wide and liberal scholarship.
W. LESLIE MACKENZIE.
A Study of a Child. By L. E. HOGAN. New York and London : Harper
Bros., 1898. Pp. x., 220. ($2.50.)
Miss Hogan gives in this volume selected extracts from the diary of a
boy's life, beginning with fragmentary first-year notes, and continuing
into the eighth year. The topics followed out in greatest detail are
language and drawing ; the work is illustrated by over 500 drawings by
the child.
Miss Hogan is herself more interested in Froebel and moral education
than in psychology. Hence her extracts tend towards illustrations
discipline and conduct rather than towards a child psychology. Probably
the original diary, drawings and cuttings have been preserved ; the;}
would be of greater service to the psychologist than the present book.
Moreover the reader cannot be certain of the accuracy of all the recordec
observations. ' Beceptiveness to sympathy' is not to be dated from the
second and third days ; the average baby, at any rate, does not kiss its
mirror reflexion at three and a half months, though it may try to get
the whole image into its mouth ; humour hardly appears at five months
Again, we are told that baby-talk was never employed (p. 5), while
instances of baby -talk occur later on (pp. 40, 42, etc.). On 18th July of the
second year we read : " He pronounces 1 in clock now " ; on 20th October :
" He pronounced 1 in clock for the first time, and then said it only once ".
After the child has said ' papa ' for some time (7th, 16th Nov.), we find
that the author intended to say merely that the child meant ' papa ' ;
up to 23rd November he had actually said ' baba '. ' Ach, Hirnmel ! '
said on 24th November, and then, for the first time, on 14th December or
later. A word explained on p. 55 is declared inexplicable on p. 63. It
follows from all this that the work cannot be lightly used as a work of
reference. The preparing of an index would have called the writer's
attention to the many slips, and so have saved the reader much trouble
It would be advisable, too, should the book come to a second edition,
state the exact scale upon which the drawings and cuttings are reproduced.
Anthropometric data are conspicuous by their absence.
On the other hand, the child psychologist will be grateful for this
history of language development at large, and for the observations or
instinctive fears, imitation, etc. Nor will he judge that all intrinsically
improbable statements are wrong. The present reviewer can bear out
the fact that "two voices, singing in parts," will soothe a child who is
deaf to the blandishments of a single voice : though accurate harmony is
not essential ! Miss Hogan's plan is quite worth carrying out ; and if she
has not done all that could be done by it, she has nevertheless obtainec
a good share of positive result, besides furnishing a model for futi
' child study in the home '.
NEW BOOKS. 269
'physics. By B. P. BOWNE. Eevised Edition. New York and
London : Harper Bros., 1898. Pp. xiv., 429.
The first edition of this work was issued in 1882. Subsequent editions
have been numerous, but no change has appeared in the text beyond a
new preface, inserted in the fifth edition. In the present edition, the
material is extensively rewrought in order to co-ordinate it with the
author's Theory of Thought and Knowledge (reviewed in MIND, April,
1898). Method and standpoint remain substantially unchanged. The
method is an elaboration of the categories, and the order of arrangement
is the traditional one Ontology (Being; The Nature of Things ; Change
and Identity ; Causality ; The World-Ground), Cosmology (Space ; Time ;
Matter ; Force and Motion ; Nature), and Psychology (The Soul ; Soul
and Body ; Mental Mechanism ; Freedom and Necessity). The most
important new matter is probably that contained in the general con-
clusion and in the discussions of evolution, nature and the supernatural,
and freedom and necessity. The harmony of the author's theistic idealism
with empirical methods in the sciences is emphasised by the frequent use
of a new phrase, " phenomenal reality ". The thought of the whole work
is best summarised, perhaps, in these words: "Mind is the only ontological
reality. Ideas have only conceptual reality. Ideas energised by will
have phenomenal reality. Besides these realities there is no other. This
is what is called my idealism. ... It might be described as Kantianised
Berkeleianism. . . . Intelligence cannot be understood through the cate-
gories, but the categories must be understood through our living experi-
ence of intelligence itself. . . . This may be called my transcendental
empiricism " (pp 423-425).
The Groundwork of Science : a Study of Epistemology. By ST. G.
MIVAET. London : Bliss, Sands & Co. ; New York : G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1898. Pp. xviii., 328. (6s. ; $1.75).
There seems to be a fatal novelty about the study of epistemology.
Prof. Ladd has recently proclaimed himself a pioneer in the epistemo-
logical field ; and Prof. Mivart thinks that a theory of knowledge is
" greatly needed at the present time " and that it is worth while to make
an attempt " to satisfy this rational desire ". That there was an epis-
temology within the circle of the old Greek philosophy : that Locke and
Leibniz are representatives of highly developed epistemological theories,
the empiristic and the rationalistic ; that Kant inaugurated a revolution
in the science, by his appeal to the critical method ; and that there are,
at the present day, some half a dozen epistemological schools, each with
its position well defined and its cardinal tenets embodied in easily
accessible books and periodicals : of all this the reader of the present
work will gain no idea. In place of such knowledge he has Prof.
Mivart's own disquisitions, which are neither very original nor (what
might compensate for lack of originality) very lucid.
The chapters of the volume deal with an enumeration of the sciences ;
the objects and methods of science ; the physical and psychical ante-
cedents of science ; language and science ; the intellectual antecedents
of science ; the causes of scientific knowledge ; and the nature of the
groundwork of science. The author's position is summed up as follows :
' < >nly through the conception of an active causative principle, under-
lying and pervading the material cosmos, together with the recognition
of the dignity of human reason, empowered as it is to perceive self-
evident, universal and objective truths, can we understand the ground-
work of science and attain to a final and satisfactory epistemology ".
270 NEW BOOKS.
Essentials of Psychology. By C. S. BUELL. Boston : Ginn & Co., 1898.
Pp. viii., 238. ($1.10.)
This is an elementary psychology for high-school students. It consists
of twelve chapters, the text of which is interspersed with problems and
exercises. After an Introduction, occupied mainly with the nervous
system and its relation to the mind, come four chapters on the senses.
These are quite good, in spite of minor slips and inconsistencies (pp. 34,
43, 62, 64, 88, 94). Perception is then denned as the localisation and
material reference of sensation. Attention is the intellectual power of
focussing upon selected objects. Memory, imagination and thought are
the three representative powers of mind, developing in this order. The
book ends with chapters upon feeling and emotion and upon will.
While the later chapters are interesting as practical essays, they are
conceived entirely from the standpoint of the faculty psychology, and
are but loosely related to the sense analysis which precedes them.
Attention is divorced from will, interest from feeling. The reader will
therefore gain from the book no connected idea of psychology as a
scientific systematisation of facts.
Comparing the work with others with which it challenges comparison,
the present writer would rank it somewhat above Ladd's, but considerably
lower than Titchener's Primer.
Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy. By ARCHIED
ALEXANDER. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898. Pp. viii
357.
In the main this book is more occupied in giving resumes of the doctrine
of leading philosophers than in tracing the general conditions which
termine the evolution of thought concerning the Will. Greek theorie
are first discussed, with special reference to the antagonism betweer
reason and passion. Then follow theories of the Will in Christian
theology, in which the guiding points of view have reference to the
prescience of God, the predestination of all events, original sin, and grace.
This part of the work is especially interesting. From Christian theology
the author passes to British philosophy from Bacon to Reid. Her
though the influence of theology is still marked, the purely psychologic
analysis of Will is the main feature. The following chapter discuss
the development of continental views during the same period. As cor
pared with British philosophy, purely psychological analysis takes
relatively subordinate position with these thinkers ; their special doctrii
of Will is more determined by their general metaphysical systems. Tl
is still more the case with the German theories from Kant to Lotzt
which are dealt with in the last chapter. On the whole the book
likely to be useful, though it follows too closely the plan of the ordinary
History of Philosophy, and though the exposition in some places lacks
lucidity.
The Philosophy of Greece considered in Relation to the Character and
History of its People. By ALFRED WILLIAM BENN, Author of The
Greek Philosophers. London : Grant Richards, 1898. Pp. x., 308. (6s.)
" The object of this book is to show how Greek philosophy exhibits,
under an abstract form, certain ways of acting and of looking at things
which characterised the Greek genius before philosophy itself begar
how, having come into existence, its evolution was determined by
NEW BOOKS. 271
history and geography of Greece; and how at every stage of that evolu-
tion it was influenced by the political, religious, and scientific culture of
the Greek people ; in a word, to consider philosophy by which I under-
stand a study of the most general relations between the world and
human life as a product not only of certain pre-eminent intellects, but
also and above all as a product of the nation whence they sprang "
(Preface). Mr. Benn is specially fitted for the task he has undertaken, and
the philosophy of the Greeks lends itself to such treatment in a peculiar
\v;iy. Fuller notice will follow. We need here only say that the book
is very able and very readable.
Les Origines de la Psychologic Contemporaine. Par D. MERCIKR.
Paris : F. Alcan ; Brussels : O. Schepens, 1897. Pp. xii., 486. (5 fr.)
Prof. Mercier is Director of the Ecole Saint Thomas d'Aquin and of the
Institut Supe*rieur de Philosophic at the Catholic University of Louvain ;
and his book is naturally a contribution to Catholic philosophy. His
main contention is that true philosophy consists in adhering to the
fundamental principles of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and that the dis-
coveries of modern science, and of experimental psychology in particular,
\vill be found, if rightlj" interpreted, to contribute to the development of
Neo-Thomism. The errors of modern psychology are traced back to
1 >i --cartes and his conflicting doctrines of spiritualism and mechanism.
From Descartes' spiritualism sprang an idealism which, under the
influence of mechanism and sensualism, has resulted in the idealism
characterised by agnosticism which prevails at the present day. As
Descartes reduced psychology to the study of thought, so modern psy-
chologists restrict their investigations to facts of consciousness. The
study of metaphysics has been almost abandoned, and psychology is
moving towards an idealistic monism. On the other hand, experimental
psychology has begun to make rapid progress, and in this fact M. Mercier
finds some hope for the future. After discussing the genesis of idealism
and of the positive character which idealism assumed at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, the author explains its inadequacy to solve the
fundamental psychological problems, and proceeds to deal with the leaders
of contemporary psychology. These are, in his opinion, Herbert Spencer
in England, Fouillee in France, and Wundt in Germany. A long discus-
sion of Mr. Spencer's views ends with the following remarks : " Spencer's
metaphysics and his rational psychology in particular are characterised
by this amalgamation of the various philosophical doctrines which ema-
nated from Descartes and are diffused in the atmosphere of our century. . . .
Spencer is a collector of ideas rather than the creator of a philosophy. . . .
As for his doctrine of evolution, it is merely an analogy audaciously grafted
on a hypothesis. . . . Every one will agree that in this vast conception
tin -re is neither science properly so called, nor true philosophy."
Having thus disposed of English contemporary psychology, M. Mercier
turns to France and to Fouillee's theory of idees -forces. In FouilleVs
appetit he finds an attempt at psychological unity and a vague apprehen-
sion of Aristotle's (vTf\(\fia ; but here again idealism and positivism are
uninant.
For Wundt there is more to be said. He is still enveloped in idealism ;
he has not been able to break his Kantian fetters or to free himself from
metaphysical agnosticism ; but he has the merit of declaring the reality
of the data of experience, and in his doctrine of the will, though it is
carried too far, he has made a stand against arbitrary intellectualism. "If
dt could free himself from his idealistic and positivistic prejudices,
272 NEW BOOKS.
get rid of the false notion of substance which he has borrowed from Kant,
and pursue in freedom the course which his personal researches indicate
to him, he would be logically compelled to adopt the fundamental theories
of Aristotle's psychology."
M. Mercier has set forth his own psychological doctrine in another
work. In the present volume he contents himself with a chapter on
" Psychology and Anthropology," in which he deprecates the arbitrary
restriction which substitutes the study of the soul (I'Sme) for the study
of man as a whole. Three chapters are devoted to the criticism of
idealism, mechanism and positivism, or agnosticism in metaphysics, and
the concluding chapter deals with Neo-Thomism. In M. Mercier's
opinion, the decadence of Scholasticism has been much exaggerated. Its
revival in this century was brought about, not only by the need of
combating the anti-christian philosophies of Germany and England, but
also by the unsuccessful efforts made within the Church to find a refuge
in Cartesian spiritualism or in ontologism. Since the Encyclical of Leo
XIII., Neo-Thomism has made great progress within the Church. It
has a prominent place in the teaching of the Catholic universities, and
seven journals of Catholic philosophy have been founded since 1880. M.
Mercier lays great stress on the importance of scientific and, in parti-
cular, of psycho-physical research, and charges all Catholics to meet
their opponents by a diligent study of science, and a resolute adherence
to Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy.
The book is written for Catholics, and neither its arguments nor its
conclusions are likely to commend themselves to readers outside the
Church.
E. F. STEVENSON.
La Famille dans les Diffdrentes Societes. Par C. N. STARCKE, Privat
docent & 1'Universite de Copenhague, Membre de 1'Institut Inter-
national de Sociologie. (Bibliotheque Sociologique Internationale
xvi.) Paris : V. Giard & E. Briere, 1899. Pp. ii., 276. (Broche, 5 fr.)
Dr. Starcke has already done excellent work on the primitive constitutior
of the family. The present book is ethical rather than sociological in it
aim ; but the author connects these two studies very closely. According
to him we cannot know what life ought to be unless we understand whs
it really is and how it has developed.
The present work contains a full account of existing laws, customs anc
ideas concerning marriage and the family in the various nations of Europe
with sufficient indications of the changes which they have undergone ii
the course of history. In particular, the author brings out clearly the
contrast between the modes of thought of the Latin and of the Teutonic
nations. For the Latins, marriage is primarily an alliance betweei
families, and the claims of the individual are with them subordinat
The Teutonic view is that marriage is primarily a social relation betwee
individuals. Its essential purpose is the full development of the more
and intellectual life of the individual persons who enter into this mos
intimate of social unions.
It is the Teutonic point of view which Dr. Starcke himself favours
For him marriage is a means for self-realisation in the Hegelian sense.
Thus his treatment of the question from an ethical point of view will be
welcome and helpful to the prevailing English school of ethical thinking
as represented by such writers as Muirhead and Mackenzie. The whole
question of the position of woman and the transition which it is under-
going at the present moment is treated from this standpoint. No one
can complain of a lack of chivalry in Dr. Starcke. He holds that wome
NEW BOOKS. 273
under modern conditions are quite as well able to make their way in the
world and in professional life as men. He is none the less of opinion that
their more appropriate sphere is home life ; but the reason is not any
deficiency on their part as regards public life, but a positive capacity
which they possess in a far higher degree than men of lavishing personal
attentions. It is not because they are less fitted to face the world that
they should prefer the home circle, but because they are more fitted for
the duties of home life.
Dr. Starcke treats very fully the whole range of problems, moral and
legal, connected with marriage and the family. We have not space to
follow him here ; we can only say that there is a great deal to be learned
from his book, and that even where it is somewhat difficult to agree with
him, he has much to say which is suggestive and valuable.
L' Education rationnelle de la Volonti ; son emploi thirapeutique. Par
Dr. PAUL-^MILE LEVY, Ancien Interne des Hopitaux de Paris.
Paris : Felix Alcan, 1898. Pp. v., 234. (4 francs.)
To educate the will in a given direction is to give to a certain idea pre-
dominance in consciousness which will make it efficient in determining
conduct. The sole means of producing this result is concentration of
attention on the idea. The special feature of Dr. Levy's book is that he
lays stress on certain peculiarly effective methods of attaining this end.
He takes his cue from the power of suggestion in hypnosis and similar
states. But the education of the will which he has in view is not- educa-
tion by external suggestion, but self-education by auto-suggestion. For
instance, he recommends that the patient should withdraw into quiet
and solitude, and then compose himself as if for sleep.' At the moment
when he is in the transition state between sleep and waking he should
bring before his mind as vividly as possible the idea of himself as acting
in a certain way, or as undergoing some change of bodily condition, and
not merely the idea but the definite affirmation that he is going to act in
this way or to undergo this change. Dr. Levy says that he himself can
pursue this method with success, and that he has found it efficacious in
the case of many patients. Of course an idea dwelt on under these con-
ditions will attain a controlling force and dominance simply because it
has the field to itself, the mind being in other respects dormant. This
procedure is not only an education of the will, but also in many cases a
cure for bodily diseases. The general state of the organism depends to a
very large extent on that most important member of the organism, the
brain ; and so far as this is the case Dr. Levy's method supplies a means
of altering the condition of the body ; for according to the principle of
psycho-physical parallelism, psychical change involves cerebral change,
and cerebral change in its turn determines other organic states. Dr.
Levy gives a number of cases of such cures. Insomnia, tendency to
fainting-fits, paresis, trance, trembling, various kinds of pain such as
headache and toothache, disorders of circulation and respiration, want of
appetite, constipation, etc., have yielded in his experience to treatment
by auto-suggestion. Of course the efficacy of the treatment has definite
limits, but it seems that it is capable of successful application in a large
class of cases. Whatever may be the value of Dr. Levy's results to the
medical man, they are certainly very interesting to the psychologist.
La Notion de Temps d'apres les principes de Saint Thomas d'Aquin.
Par DESIRE NYS. Williams & Norgate, 1898. Pp. '228.
The concept of time is at once amongst the most familiar and the most
obscure of concepts. " What is time ? If no one puts that question to
18
274 NEW BOOKS.
me, I know what time is. But if the question be put, I find that I do
not know." So wrote St. Augustine. A complete study of the notion
of time comprises two fundamental questions, the psychological question
as to the genesis of the idea of time, and the ontological question as to
the objectivity of time. Viewed from the ontological standpoint, the
theory of St. Thomas, as set forth in his various opuscula, notably in the
opuscula ' de tempore,' and 'de instantibus,' may be described as moder-
ate realism. Time has at once its objective and its subjective character.
Abstracted from continuous movement, time possesses in movement a real
being. Nevertheless, movement is not tune, nor can it become time
without the concurrence of mind which breaks up its continuity, and
reunites in a same whole the divers parts which it distinguishes there.
Taken in its totality then, the concept of time designates a real, but
essentially fugitive being, the present, and elements which, as such,
have only an ideal reality, the future and the past. Hence the objective
and the subjective character of time. Such, at least, is the theory of St.
Thomas. In opposition to this moderate realism of St. Thomas stand,
on the one hand, the idealistic and subjective theories which unduly
depreciate, or even entirely suppress, the objective reality of time, and
prominent amongst these are the theories of Kant, Leibnitz, Balmes,
Descartes, Baumann, Locke, and Spencer ; and, on the other hand, the
theories characterised by an exaggerated realism, and among the better
known of these are the theories of Gassendi, Newton, and De San. The
earlier and longer portion of M. Nys' very able treatise is devoted to an
exposition and defence of the system of St. Thomas. The latter portion
explains the various rival systems, and criticises each in detail. M. Nys'
criticism of the Kantian system seems to be particularly good.
Essai d'une Philosophie Nouvelle Suggeree par la Science. Par LEONCE
RIBERT. Paris : Alcan, 1898. Pp. 562.
By far the greater part of this work is taken up with a naive narration
of the mythology of modern science, untroubled by criticism and with
hardly a suspicion of the true nature of the problem which the sciences
bequeath to philosophy. Its only novelty is found in the occasional in-
troduction of a cosmological myth of the author's own (e.g., p. 509), and
in his substitution for the usual ' Force ' of an " infinite potentiality "
(virtualite), described as a principle of activity and supposed to generate
all things by its conjunction with ' Matter '. But such divergences are
neither emphasised nor fully worked out, and the general impression left
by the book is that its author has a mind of the type which in Englanc
finds full satisfaction for its intellectual needs and spiritual aspirations it
the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Accordingly M. Ribert, whose
amiable character is plainly mirrored in his work, is exceedingly we"
pleased with his conclusions, and cannot conceive how any one coulc
wish for anything more. Hence he is much distressed and puzzled bj
the symptoms of soul-sickness he detects around him, and by the pessi-
mistic way in which the ' gospel of Science ' has been received by manj
of the finest intelligences of France. His failure to understand why his
nostrums should arouse only nausea in such minds and why people should
talk about ' the bankruptcy of science,' sufficiently indicates his limits
tions. It should, however, be admitted that his claims are modest anc
that the preface stamps the book as un ouvrage de vulgarisation s
phrase which the English reader is unfortunately too often tempted
translate literally. Yet the style is good and the narrative flows in
smooth and sparkling stream of lucid French ; only it will not be founc
navigable for ocean-steamships.
NEW BOOKS. 275
L 1 Illusion de Fausse Reconnaissance. Contribution a Vetude des con-
ditions psychologiques de la reconnaissance des souvenirs. Par le
Docteur EUGENE BERNARD-LEROY. Paris : Felix Alcan, 1898. Pp.
249. (4 francs.)
Treats of the not uncommon experience in which a situation orj'group of
circumstances or events appears to a person as if he had already been
confronted with them in the past. The main value of the work lies in
the collection of eighty-six cases, thirty-six published previously to the
present work, and the rest gathered by the author himself in answer to
question-forms very carefully drawn up. Dr. Bernard-Leroy brings out
very clearly the distinctive features of the illusion. He fails to find that
it is dependent on any special bodily or emotional conditions. Various
attempts at explanation are criticised and easily disposed of. Among
these the author does not take account of the suggestion of Havelock
Ellis that the false recognition is an inverted hallucination, in which the
sensory centres " receive an actual external sensation in the feebler shape
of a representation" (MiND, New Series, vol. vi., No. 22, p. 286). It is
true that Havelock Ellis connects this with nervous fatigue in the subject,
and Dr. Bernard-Leroy has apparently shown that this is by no means a
frequent accompaniment of the illusion. None the less, it may well be
that the true explanation is to be sought on some such lines as those
suggested by Dr. Ellis. The assumption that the inverted hallucination
is due to fatigue seems to constitute no essential part of his theory. The
author's own explanation can scarcely be regarded as an explanation at
all. He simply says that recognition is accompanied by a feeling which
is difficult to analyse, and that this feeling sometimes arises abruptly
when the experience with which it is connected has not existed before.
This amounts to nothing more than a restatement of the fact to be
explained.
System der Werttheorie. Band L, " Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie des
Begehrens ". Band ii., " Grundziige einer Ethik ". Von Dr. CHRISTIAN
von EHRENFELS, Professor der Philosophic an der deutschen Uni-
versitat in Prag. Pp. xxiii., 277, viii., 270. London : Williams &
Norgate, 1897, 1898. v
This is a systematic treatise on the idea of Value, regarded as the Basis
of a complete ethical theory. Some account has already been given in
MIXD of the point of view represented by the writer (see New Series,
No. 16, pp. 425-449). The present work, however, is considerably more
comprehensive than any of the previous discussions either by him or by
Meinong, and in particular the bearing of the theory of value upon
definitely ethical doctrines is more fully brought out than it has probably
ever been before. Critical notice will follow.
J. S. M.
Principi di Psicologia Moderna criticamente esposti. Da A. FAGGI.
Pp. iv., 134. Palermo : Alberto Beber, 1897. London : Williams
& Norgate.
This book is the second part of Prof. Faggi's Principles of Psychology,
the first part of which was published in 1895. It is not a manual of
psychology, but, as its title announces, a critical exposition of certain
leading principles. The author's object is to make students acquainted
with the methods of modern psychology and its most important problems,
And, especially, to show the application which has been made and that
276 NEW BOOKS.
which, in his opinion, can be made of psycho-physical parallelism and
the law of association. Prof. Faggi anticipates a possible criticism by
remarking that, since scientific analysis has made most progress in the
region of sensations, he has necessarily devoted more space to this
subject than to the higher functions of consciousness. The book is too
short and written too much from the critical standpoint to be an exposi-
tion of the author's own views. It contains four chapters, or, rather, four
separate essays on Time and Space, Association and Apperception, Feelings
and Emotions, Perception and Self-consciousness. In each case Prof.
Faggi indicates the nature and the difficulties of the problem he is
about to discuss, states briefly the views of various psychologists, makes
comparisons and raises objections and, to some extent, explains the
theory which he himself prefers. The reader's attention is drawn chiefly
to the psychology of Wundt, Kiilpe, Ziehen and James, and the differences
between them are clearly brought out.
In a fifth and concluding chapter, entitled "Epilogue and Prologue,"
the author explains his general psychological attitude. The science of
psychology, by the adoption of general principles, of which psycho-
physical parallelism is the most important, has passed from the descrip-
tive to the explanatory stage. Since all facts of consciousness are, as
such, qualitatively diverse, the law of association can only hold good as
a principle of psychological explanation if it is regarded as a manifesta-
tion of physical laws. Movement and sensation are irreducible and in-
commensurable. Consciousness is the limit of the natural knowledge of
phenomena ; and on this side there can be no science, but only narration
and description. To say this is not to advocate materialism. Physiology
is concerned with organic functions in general, psychology with only those
which have a psychical correlative ; and thus the two sciences overlap.
"In spite of what Wundt himself may say to the contrary," Prof. Faggi
remarks, " I maintain that the only scientific interpretation of his theory
of apperception is the psycho-physical interpretation given by Kulpe."
The psycho-physical point of view is, in fact, the psychological point of
view. Psychical processes are conditioned by material changes in the
organism ; but, since the opposition between matter and spirit is not
real, but created by thought, the principle of parallelism is purely
"regulative," and its interpretation has no scientific value. But the
world of science is not the world of consciousness ; and " psychical
materialism," as Prof. Faggi calls it, so far from being inconsistent with
idealism, is rather a starting-point from which to arrive at it. " For the
exigencies of practical life we need the existence of the Absolute, but
Science can do nothing for this need except ascertain its physiological
and psychological conditions."
The book is clearly and concisely written, and should prove helpf
and suggestive to students who have some elementary knowledge
psychology.
EECEIVED also :
G. F. Stout, Manual of Psychology, vol. i. (The University Tutorial Series),
London, W. B. Clive, 1898, pp. xii., 240. (4s. 6d.)
Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1896, Washington, 1898,
pp. 1L, 727.
F. Pollock, Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy, second edition, London,
Duckworth & Co. ; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1899, pp.
xxiv., 427. (8s.)
NEW BOOKS. 277
F. Hueppe, The Principles of Bacteriology (translated by E. O. Jordan),
Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company ; London, Kegan
Paul, Trench & Co., 1899, pp. x., 467. (9s.)
H. Schubert, Mathematical Essays and Recreations (translated by T. J.
McConnack), Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Company ;
London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1898, pp. 149.
C. P. Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, part ii., " Ontological,"
vol. ii., Edinburgh and London, Blackwood & Sons, 1899, pp. vi.,
286. (7s. 6d.)
C. Kenouvier and L. Prat, La nouvelle Monadologie, Paris, A. Collin &
C ie ; London, Williams & Norgate, 1899, pp. 546. (12 fr.)
D. F. Rauh, De la methode dans la Psychologie des Sentiments, Paris,
Felix Alcan, 1899, pp. 305. (5 fr.)
H. Fierens-Gevaert, La Tristesse Contemporaine, Paris, Felix Alcan,
1899, pp. iii., 195. (2 fr. 50.)
L. Levy-Bruhl, Lettres inedites de John Stuart Mill a Auguste Comte,
Paris, Felix Alcan, 1899, pp. xxxviii., 557. (10 fr.)
H. Berr, L'Avenir de la Philosophic, Paris, Hachette & C ie , 1899, pp. x.,
510. (7 fr. 50.)
G.-L. Duprat, L'Instabilite Mentale, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1899, pp. 310.
(5fr.)
L. Gerard- Varet, L' Ignorance et L'lrreflexion, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1898,
pp. 296. (5 fr.)
K. Groos, Die Spiele der Menschen, Gustav Fischer, 1899 ; London,
Williams & Norgate, pp. iv., 537. (10s.)
0. Siebert, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Philosophie seit Hegel,
Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & Euprecht, 1898 ; London, Williams
& Norgate, 1898, pp. vii., 496. (7s. 6d.)
P. Salits, Darstellung und Kritik der Kantischen Lehre von der Willens-
freiheit, mit einem geschichtlichen Ruckblick auf das Freiheitspro-
bhm, Rostock, 1898 ; London, Williams & Norgate, pp. 195.
G. Villa, La psicologia contemporanea, Fraletti Bocca; London, Williams
& Norgate, 1899, pp. 15, 660. (14 lire.)
S. Fragapane, Delia Filoaofia Giuridica nel presente Ordinamento degli
Studi, Rouia, 1899, London, Williams & Norgate, pp. 38.
M. Panizza, Le Tre Leggi, Roma, E. Loescher & Co., 1899, pp. 222.
(4 lire.)
VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
PHILOSOPHICAL EEVIEW. Vol. vii., No. 6. J. Seth. 'Scottish Mora
Philosophy.' [Inaugural lecture at Edinburgh. The three stages in
Scottish ethics : Hutcheson, Hume, Keid. Hutcheson combats the
egoism of Hobbes and Mandeville. Goodness is inherently beautiful ;
the mark of virtue is disinterestedness ; its essence is positive benevo-
lence. Hutcheson " is the founder, in Scotland at least, of Scottish
intuitionism in ethics ". Hume combats the rationalism of Cudworth
and Clarke. He tries to reduce all the deliverances of the moral sense
to the single principle of sympathy ( Treatise), though he finally gives up
the attempt to account for sympathy itself (Inquiry). He furnishes
the classic statement of English utilitarianism ; his analysis of sympathy
brought out Smith's theory of the moral sentiments ; his ethics, like his
metaphysics, was answered by Kant. Eeid combats Hume, and estab-
lishes the common-sense philosophy. " When it left Reid's hands, the
intuitional theory of ethics was finally stereotyped."] E. P. Robins.
'Modern Theories of Judgment.' [The English philosophers have in-
sisted that we know reality (Locke, Reid, Bradley) ; the German, that
knowledge is a mental construction, but that there is a reality behind the
appearance of the world (Kant, Lotze, Sigwart). Bosanquet gives the
synthesis : " he maintains that knowledge is of reality . . . and vindi-
cates the synthetic activity of thought," holding that knowledge is an
intellectual construction. This is the right view. " Mind is an activity
of judgment from the first, and in its earliest experience knows reality,
and is never the spectator of passive states as such."] J. D. Logan.
' Psychology and the Argument from Design.' [The three phases of
modern teleology. God made the world out of nothing ; made it out of
crude matter, by an original act of design ; created it by an act of
design, and thereafter continually sustains its finality. Criticism leads
to the conclusion that "both objectively and subjectively [there is] no
conscious design apart from previous immanent, unconscious design ;
only novel situations and repeated experiences ".] H. M. Stanley.
' Space and Science.' [Space is " appearance produced by the individual
dynamic repulsiveness by which the thing consists and exists. . . .
Everything makes its own spaciousness by its own offensive and de-
fensive force." " The mutually exclusive nature of dynamism gives the
space effect." A phenomenon of the inner and finite life of the infinite,
it may, " as a general mode of the activity of the whole, be termed in-
finite ".] Discussions. J, M. Bald-win. ' Social Interpretations : a
Reply.' J. Dewey. 'Rejoinder.' Reviews of Books. Summaries of
Articles. Notices of New Books.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. v., No. 6. O-. T. W. Patrick. ' Some
Peculiarities of the Secondary Personality.' [Experiments on simple
automatisms are needed. Characteristic of the secondary personality
are suggestibility, fluency, lack of reasoning power, heightened memory,
power of constructive imagination, vulgarity or mild profanity, profes-
sion of ' spirit ' identity and supernormal knowledge, and, occasionally,
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 279
brilliant intuition. All these traits remind us of the primitive mind.
Records of cases.] J. R. AngelL ' Studies from the Psychological
Laboratory of the University of Chicago.' J. R. Angell, J. N. Spray,
E. W. Mahood. An Investigation of Certain Factors Affecting the Re-
lations of Dermal and Optical Space.' [(1) Skin lines (volar forearm) are
underestimated as compared with horizontal visual lines. This under-
estimation decreases within limits with increasing pressure. (2) It is
diminished by the introduction of temperature, becoming overestirnation
when the stimulus is distinctly hot or cold.] M. L. Ashley. ' Con-
cerning the Significance of Intensity of Light in Visual Estimates of
Depth.' [Monocular and binocular experiments, with simple and in-
genious apparatus. Intensity "has been found of marked importance,
even where accommodation, convergence, size of retinal image and dis-
parateness of retinal images could enter to oppose it ".] F. B. Summer.
'A Statistical Study of Belief.' [Results of questionnaire of twenty-five
topics, covering ' nearly every general class of subjects upon which the
average person forms opinions '. Results : a graded arrangement of be-
liefs is possible and real. Characteristic differences appear between the
sexes, and between those who have and those who have not had psycho-
logical training.] G-. M. Stratton. ' A Mirror Pseudoscope and the
Limit of Visible Depth.' [Description of a simple and practical mirror
pseudoscope. Limit of visible depth is at least as remote as 580 m.
The inequality of retinal impressions is here 24" ; points have never
been distinguished when separated by less than 30". The present result
is due to the persistent efficiency of subliminal motives (visual images
and orbital sensations).] Discussion and Reports. H. Muensterberg.
'The Psychology of the Will.' [Defence of Die Willenshandlung against
Pfaender and A. Seth.] "Si. Thorndike. ' What is a Psychical Fact ? '
[Against the position of Muensterberg and Royce that the mental fact
is individual and incommunicable, and therefore unmeasurable.] A.
C. Armstrong. ' Consciousness and the Unconscious.' [Mental life is
a thing of degrees in the scale of complication. Hence we should do
well to speak of psychoses of the first, second, etc., power or potence.]
E. E. Slosson. ' A Case of Retarded Paramnesia.' E. A. Kirkpatrick.
' Memory and Association.' [Comment on Miss Calkins' Wellesley
study.] J. McK. CattelL 'The Psychological Laboratory.' [Critique
of Titchener, French and Scripture.] Psychological Literature. New
Books. Notes.
Mon. Suppl., No. 7. W. Lay. ' Mental Imagery, Experimentally
and Subjectively Considered.' [A somewhat rambling and unsystematic
paper, whose chief value lies in a number of acute introspective records
scattered through it. The author uses 'mental imagery' hi a sense
which excludes active imagination, memory and after-image. He per-
formed five sets of experiments. (1) Passages were read aloud to college
classes, and by them reproduced ; visual imagery proved to be the chief
us of reproduction, the auditory coming in 'to help' when the visual
did not arise. (2) Questionnaire submitted to artists and sculptors ; no
extraordinary visualising power found " some painters seem to have
the imagery developed but little ". (8) Consonants were counted and
classified in passages from Tennyson, Browning, Swinburne, etc. (4)
Images aroused in the author's mind by the reading of Tennyson and
Browning were counted and classified. (5) Introspective record, extend-
ing over two years (2500 images): visual, 57'4 per cent.; auditory (in-
cluding words), 28'76 per cent.; smell, 5'88 per cent.; taste, - 58 per
cent. ; temperature, 2 per cent. ; touch, 3'84 per cent. ; organic, 1*1 per
cent. ; motor (' internal touch '), 0'32 per cent. ; emotive, 0'12 per cent. ;
280 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
pain, 0. The high percentage of olfactory images is noticeable. No
evidence is brought for the existence of the emotive type : the single
instance offered tells directly against it. There follow an analysis of the
writer's word imagery, and a historical note on the literature. A final
section criticises the questionnaire method ; emphasises the value of
imagery, as our means of realising meaning in symbols (words), and
as a source of pleasure in reading poetry ; and raises the questions of
image training, and of discrimination of mental types.]
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. x., No. 1. L. W. Kline.
' The Migratory Impulse v. Love of Home.' [A good, but unnecessarily
long paper. Introduction : factors of psychical differentiation are those
inherent in the life-principle, and the cosmic and social. Example :
relations of life to temperature shown by experiments on tadpoles.
Questionnaire returns ; attunement of life to cosmic and social forces has
led to a rhythmisation of the life processes. Chapter i., Migration of
Animals. Summary of observations and theories. Chapter ii., Migra-
tions of Primitive Man. Ethnological views : illustrations of planomania.
Eesults : animal migration is determined by the procreative function,
modified by cosmic forces ; human migration by more complex condi-
tions, climatology and the cosmic periodicities of the procreative func-
tion playing a large part. Chapter iii., Love of Home. Elements
analysed from questionnaire returns. Conclusion : the migrant is
cosmopolitan, variously interested, plunged in daring and speculative
pursuits ; the lover of home is provincial, plodding, timid, conservative.]
E. A. McC. Gamble. 'The Applicability of Weber's Law to Smell.'
[A strong piece of work, whose condensation and reserve contrast
favourably with the foregoing. Work upon thirteen subjects, with
thirteen liquids and seventeen solids, by Zwaardemaker's olfactometric
method : measure is amount of odorous surface exposed, time of ex-
posure may be disregarded, diffusion-rate of vapour is under control,
subject's breathing is self-regulating. Method of just noticeable differ-
ences employed, and tested by minimal changes and right and wrong
cases. Constant errors : adhesion, exhaustion, movement, unmeasured
increment of stimulus. Results : the difference limen was in 36 per
cent, and \ in 26 per cent, of all determinations. It was \ in 12 per
cent., i in 12 per cent., more than \ in 5 per cent., and no less than \ hi
9 per cent. It follows that the law applies to smell, and that the differ-
ence limen lies between \ and ^.] E. B. Titchener. ' Minor Studies from
the Psychological Laboratory of Cornell University,' xvn. I>. R. Major.
' Cutaneous Perception of Form.' [Work with open angles, triangles,
circles ; filled triangles and circles. Surfaces tested tip of tongue, tip of
finger, lips rank in that order. Open circle is most easily, filled circle
least easily cognised. Liminal open circle has a diameter of about
2 mm.] Psychological Literature. Correspondence. [Lukens on E.
Gates' Laboratory.] Notes and News.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. January, 1899. F. Ie Dantec. 'Les Ne'o-
Darwiniens et 1'herddite des caracteres acquis.' [A long article passing
in review the various theories of human generation which have been pro-
pounded. Those of Buffon, Darwin and Weismann are condemned as
being lineal descendants of the old encasement theory. The writer
supports the hypothesis advanced by the bio-chemical school.] E.
Boirac. 'Les Phenomenes Cryptoides.' [The central postulate of
human science is that things exist in order to be known. Up to Des-
cartes' time it was generally held that the senses are adequate to give us
a complete knowledge of things. This belief is not yet dead. We still re-
gard 'phenomenon' as synonymous with 'natural fact' or 'event'. Science,
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 281
however, is gradually reverting to the Baconian distinction between
' ostensive ' and ' clandestine ' instances. Two sets of causes have drawn
attention to the latter : (1) the extraordinary discoveries of the latter half
of the century, e.g., Pasteur's discovery of microbes, the Rontgen rays ;
(2) influence of the philosophical thought of Descartes, Leibnitz and
Kant. The rest of the article is devoted to an examination and classifica-
tion of the said ' cryptoid phenomena '.] A. Schinz. ' Le Positivisme est
line ine'thode et non un systeme.' [Object alike of philosophy and of science
is explanation. We explain a phenomenon when we determine its cause
or causes, meaning by ' cause ' necessary antecedent. Two kinds of causal
relation are conceivable : (1) between phenomenon and phenomenon ;
{2) between the absolute and phenomena. (1) is 'natural,' (2) 'meta-
physical'. Corresponding to these are the positive and metaphysical
methods. The former alone can give us true knowledge, but our ignor-
ance often forces us to use the latter.] Revue Critique. Tolstoi et la ques-
tion de Fart. Analyses et comptes rendus, etc. February, 1899. J.-J.
van Biervliet. ' L'homme droit et I'homme gauche (i.).' [The writer
having been led to investigate sensibility of right and left side respec-
tively and concludes that there are two distinct normal asymmetric types
* I'hormne droit' and ' I'homme gauche '. The former is the more frequent ;
in the latter the left hand is not always the more adroit but it is the
stronger, and the sensibility of the sense organs on the left side of the
body is more acute than those on the right. The rest of the article consists
of a detailed examination of the motor system of these two types.] Th.
Flournoy. 'Genese de quelques pretendus messages spirites.' [An
analysis of two cases of " automatic writing," in both of which the writer
was deceived ; in both cases the suggestion can be explained as coming
from the sub-consciousness of the individual writing ; hence to assign
it to any other cause is to violate the methodological principle pro-
hibiting the unnecessary multiplication of causes.] P. Tannery.
'La Stylometrie : ses origines et son present.' [' Stylometry ' means
the statistical analysis of peculiarities of style. Employed by Prof.
Lewis Campbell with a view to discovering the chronological order of
Plato's dialogues. Name coined by M. Lutoslawski. This method may
have a future, but as hitherto formulated is too vague to be used scientifi-
cally.] Revue generale. Les Travaux Recents de Psychophysique.
Analyses et comptes rendus, etc. March, 1899. EL Bois. 'La Con-
servation de la Foi (l.).' [Answer to 'La Dissolution de la Foi,' by M.
Dugas in September number of the Review. Starts with exposition
and criticism of ' religious formalism ' given by M. Dugas. The supporters
of this theory maintain that we must distinguish two elements in religion :
(1) its form or spirit which is eternal ; (2) its matter or content which
is temporary. Hence, from this point of view, all religions are false and
all are true. Essence of all is the adoration, under the name of God,
either of the order of the Universe, or the Reason which witnesses to
itself all round us, or human reason. M. Bois entirely rejects theory.
Truth is never relative. God is not a category, but a concrete person,
known by us as concrete persons, and not by any special religious faculty.
Miracles must be conceived as the special operation of the free personality
of God making use of, though not violating, natural laws. Catholicism
is against reason ; Protestantism is conformable to it.] A. Fouillee.
'La Psychologic Religieuse dans Michelet.' [Reviewing Michelet's Le
Pretre, la femme et la famille and Les Jesuites writer points out that he
rightly apprehended the importance of the psychological laws of ' habit '
and ' suggestion ' in forming character, quotes with approval his exposition
of the dangers of auricular confession, his conception of the vocation of
282 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
woman, and his attack on the Jesuits. Goes on to consider present situa-
tion of Catholicism which is characterised by a change of attitude to-
wards (1) philosophy, (2) socialism.] J.-J. van Biervliet. ' L'homme
droit et 1'homme gauche (ll.).' [The asymmetry of the nervous system,.]
Revue generale. Les travaux recents de psychophysique (conclusion).
Analyses et comptes rendus, etc.
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. September, 1898. E.
Chartier. ' Comrnentaire aux fragments de Jules Lagneau.' [This con-
cluding article assigns to metaphysics three guiding ideas. First, the
idea of truth ; that which no mind can refuse to admit, that which is
necessary. Secondly, the idea of a nature that is thinking, absolute,,
universal and necessary. The third belongs to method, the idea of re-
flective analysis. This is described as the search for necessity by simple
and clear definitions and rigorous demonstrations, in short, mathematics
in an extended sense.] A. Lalande. 'Le langage philosophique et
1'unite de la philosophic.' [After expounding the excellence of the end r
the unity of philosophy, and assigning the causes of the existing discord^
the author is sanguine enough to suggest as the means towards realising
his ideal (1) individual research animated by the love of unity ; (2) per-
manent collaboration, say by academies and societies ; (3) international
conventions ; (4) reconstruction of the system of education. The
functions of a philosophical society such as would carry on this good
work are the revision of the philosophical vocabulary, and the publication
of an elementary course of Philosophy. The terminology should be
reformed by definitions, both historical, to give the meanings employed by
the leading writers, and dogmatic, to fix future use.] Elie Halevy.
' Quelques remarques sur la notion d'intensite en psychologic.' [In-
tensity appears in mental phenomena attached to sensation and to belief.
Intensity of belief is measured by a fraction whose numerator is the
number of reasons for the belief, and whose denominator is the total of
reasons for and against. Though the mathematical measure is thus
limited by the two extremes and 1, the psychological value may range
from nothing to the indefinitely great. This arises from the infinite
number of conditions determining everything concretely given in our
experience. Hence we conclude that intensity of belief is not a simple,
subjective element, but complex, the result of a reflective act. With
regard to intensity of sensation, though a confused state of consciousness,
yet psycho-physics measures it and assigns to it its laws. The well-
known law connecting increment of excitation with increment of con-
sciousness has its limitations and exceptions. The analogy betweer
sensation and belief, in intensity, may be illustrated thus : If in a central
telegraph station the wires bring in one after another intelligence that
certain event has happened, the belief of the receiver of the messages in
the truth of the news rises rapidly to the highest pitch of intensity. So,
too, in sensation ; its intensity increases with the number of conditions
of production involved. Thus intensity of sensation is also removed
from the number of simple mental elements. The lesson drawn, in
conclusion, is that the true method of psychology is to decompose, to
analyse the synthesis already made by intelligence.]
REVUE-NEO SCOLASTIQUE. No. 19. C. Besse ('Leon Olle-Laprune/
suite et fin) decides that the philosophy of Olle-Laprune is essentially
a will-philosophy. Will and action lie at the root of everything. There
is an element of will in the operations of mind. When I perceive, I attenc
But what is attention but an act of will ? When I judge, I issue froi
uncertainty and hesitation ; I decide between things compared. How
this possible without an act of will ? Much more is will needed in the
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 283
higher functions of knowledge. Very few things are evident and these
are chiefly of the ignobler kind. We must affirm then more than we see.
To affirm without sufficient reason more than we see is an act of rash
credulity. But to affirm more than we see, with good reasons for our
belief, is an act of wisdom. It is not, however, an act to which nature
constrains us. It postulates the presence of good will. E. Pasquier
(' Les hypotheses cosmogoniques,' suite et fin) discusses the hypotheses
of Faye, Ligondes, and Braun. He believes that in some respects the
hypothesis of Faye is superior to that of Laplace, and agrees with Wolf
as to the modifications which Laplace would introduce into his hypothesis
in the actual state of science. M. de Wulf (' Qu'est-ce que la Philosophic
scolastique ? ' suite et fin) who, in a previous article had rejected various
extrinsic definitions of scholasticism, now sets aside as false, or at least
incomplete, certain intrinsic definitions of that system. A. Thiery
(' Qu'est-ce que 1'art ? ') sets before us the views on art that have been
lately published by Count Leon Tolstoi. Tolstoi identifies beauty with
pleasure. To consecrate art then to the service of beauty is to consecrate
art to the service of pleasure. But this is to assign an ignoble end to
art. Art must then be emancipated from the service of beauty. What
then is the aim of art ? It is " the realisation of the fraternal union of
men ". This is the only true aim of art. But if art be the means of
uniting men, it must appeal not to a class, but to all. It must be simple
then, so that he that runs may read it. What, then, of the Ninth Sym-
phony of Beethoven ? " It is not a work of art," boldly answers Tolstoi.
L'AXNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE, iv. Paris : Schleicher Freres, 1898. Pp.
849. The original papers, twenty-five in number, occupy rather more
than half of the volume. The first twelve contain a report of two series
of experiments by A. Binet and N. Vaschide, which have for their aim
(1) the measurement of various physical properties of the individual, (2)
the investigation of the correlations of these properties. It is explained
that the latter investigation has hitherto received but little attention as
compared with the former, and the authors do not profess to have made
more than a first essay in it. The experiments were carried out with two
groups of subjects, the first composed of boys in a primary school
(average age thirteen), the second of youths in a training college for
teachers (average age seventeen), and there were about forty subjects in
each group. In a preliminary paper the authors explain their reasons for
selecting the primary school as the sphere of their experiments. It has
various drawbacks which limit the character of the experiments, but,
on the other hand, it has the two great advantages of numbers and
discipline. The importance of these two points is illustrated by an
amusing description which the authors give of their troubles with volun-
tary subjects in a private gymnasium. The following notes may serve
to give some indication of the questions investigated and the methods
1. The first set of experiments in the primary school was directed to
testing the muscular strength and endurance of the boj-s, a number of
different tests being employed. In connexion with the test by means of
hand-pressures, the authors find different types of endurance, e.g., a type
in which the force exerted remains fairly steady, a type in which it
diminishes continuously, a type in which it diminishes rapidly and then
remains steady. The influence of rivalry is also studied, and, finally, the
various tests are correlated with a view to determining which is the most
representative. The second set of experiments, " epreuves de vitesse"
includes the following tests: Reaction times, both simple and discrim-
inative ; running ; rapidity of marking a series of dots on paper. As
might be expected, the results of experiments so different in character
284 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
show little connexion with each other. In the reaction experiments,
the authors emphasise the importance of observing the subject during
the experiment. For instance, in the case of a subject who has to check
a tendency to anticipation, the reaction tune may be lengthened if the
signal comes just when he is thus restraining himself. The next set
of experiments is concerned with respiration and circulation. In the
circulation experiments, the authors bring out the interesting result that,
unlike such exercises as running, which accelerate circulation, a brief
and intense localised effort diminishes it quite appreciably. After a
summary of various anatomical measurements, there follows a paper in
which the authors indicate briefly the extent of the individual differences
revealed in the various experiments. And the final paper of the first
series deals with the correlations of the various tests taken together,
two additional tests of a more intellectual character being included,
one a memory test, the other that of the scholar's place in class. Two
methods are employed in the study of the correlations of the tests.
The first is that already employed in correlating the different tests
within each set of experiments. It consists in classifying the subjects
into four groups determined by some standard test (five such tests are
taken), and then comparing the results of other tests in relation to this
classification. The other method (methode du rang] is based on a com-
parison of the places held by the same subject under different tests. In
dealing with a group of subjects, it may be employed to determine either
the mean of individual differences of place or the difference between the
average places of the group under different tests. The method, however,
is not here applied with reference to standard tests, but with reference
to what the authors call a "classification globale " of the scholars. This
classification is arrived at by adding together the places held by the
individual scholar under all the physical tests (the more intellects'
tests are excluded), so that the scholar whose sum of place-marks is
lowest stands at the head. The scholars are then, by means of this
classification, divided into four standard groups, and the method in both
its forms is applied with reference to these. The interesting result is
brought out that two of the respiration tests are decidedly the most
representative for the complex of physical qualities investigated. The
series of experiments carried out with the pupils in the training college
was similar in character, and the parallelism gives an interest to the second
series. Of the remaining papers, several of those written by the authors
above named are more or less directly connected with the foregoing experi-
ments. In two papers the authors examine possible sources of error ha
certain instruments used, viz., the pressure instrument or dynamometer
and Mosso's ergograph. In a third paper they describe a new and improve
form of ergograph in which a spring is substituted for the weight used
Mosso's instrument. In other papers they study some of the physiologies
aspects of the experiments. For instance, in a paper on muscular con-
traction, they find a rather striking difference in the sorts of fatigue
produced by those experiments with the ergograph, which are directed
testing ' force ' and ' vitesse ' respectively. In the former experiment (ir
which a heavier weight is used), fatigue is expressed in an inability tc
contract the finger which lifts the weight ; in the latter experiment (ir
which a lighter weight is used), fatigue is expressed in precisely the
opposite effect of a state of contraction. Two other papers by the same
authors separately deal with certain aspects of the effect of intellectua'
work on bodily functions. A final paper (by B. Bourdon) gives
account of recent work upon the visual perception of depth. The second
half of the volume is occupied by the Bibliography, which includes classi-
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 285
fied notices of recent works and a classified Index of recent publications
and articles.
L'ANN^E PHILOSOPHIQUE (1897). Paris : Felix Alcan, 1898. Pp. 316.
The first article, by M. Renouvier, is entitled ' De 1'ide'e de Dieu '. The
author criticises the first principles of various religious and philosophical
systems, and his conclusion is that the principal doctrines of the theology
of Thomas Aquinas " have exercised an influence over modern Phil-
osophy, down to the time of Kant, upon the a priori school, in all that
relates to the Divine Nature. This Philosophy (i.e., that of Aquinas),
essentially infinite and predeterministic, has overwhelmed the positive
idea of God by definitions of attributes and powers which are peculiarly
appropriate to the realistic idea of the Universal." The same neglect
of the " positive idea of God " continues after Kant, and M. Renouvier
has some caustic criticism of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Spencer. With
rd to the latter, M. Renouvier forcibly contends that "the proof
of the Relativity of Knowledge is, in precise terms, consecrated to the
establishment of a certain number of Absolutes " (p. 27). Therefore, the
dominant note of Philosophy during the present century is, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, the maintenance of the Absolute, which is declared
to be mere "latent Atheism". In reference to this, M. Renouvier
speaks in no measured terms of Hegel. " What an infirmity of outlook,
compared to the teaching of the Ancients ! For God to reach His
accomplishment in man, in the person of a philosopher in that of
Hegel, perhaps ! Truly this is to give the idea of God a beggarly real-
isation ! " (une realisation trop pauvre). Passing the many historical
difficulties in M. Renouvier's criticism, one, not unnaturally, expects
some remarkable excellence in " the positive idea of God," which is
described as the supreme realisation of the ideal of personality intelli-
gence, will, design, and moral perfection. But how is the objectivity of
this idea to be demonstrated ? Partly, it would appear, as being not
repugnant either to reason or to experience ; partly, again, by remaining
the only possible supposition after the disproof of rival hypotheses. M.
Renouvier has not left himself sufficient space to do justice to his
demonstration, and therefore he is scarcely justified in claiming that it
is "rigorously logical". He gives us an ideal of personality or of a
higher self, but this is a far different result from that promised by the
title of his article. It is by no means easy to write, within brief limits,
a review of a review, for, nominally, this is the nature of the second
article that entitled ' La Philosophic de M. Paul Janet,' by M. L.
Dauriac indeed, it would be impossible, in this instance, were it not
that the writer uses the recent appearance of a work by M. Paul Janet
as a text for an interesting discussion of the present position of the
followers of Cousin, or, as he calls them, the ecclectics. Modern Ecclec-
ticism does not merely hold that "all systems are right in what they affirm
and wrong in what they deny," but also, owing to its historical connexion
with Reid, it acknowledges the primacy of Psychological introspection,
and it is therefore met by the consolidated opposition of all systems.
Further, in admitting Belief, thinkers of this school, as M. Dauriac
forcibly puts it, turn their backs upon Ecclecticism, while if, on the other
hand, they hold fast to their Psychology, they must abandon the hope of
establishing a Metaphysic proper. In discussing the ecclectic position
with regard to the relation of Philosophy to other branches of knowledge,
M. Dauriac introduces an important digression as to whether Philosophy
is "a kind of abstract literature," remarkable for the prominence given
to style, and the assertion that a comprehensive philosophical system is,
in a peculiar degree, affected by great waves of emotion, which accelerate
286 PHILOSOPHICAL PEEIODICALS.
the flow of thought, wherefore it is that " great philosophers are generally
great writers " (p. 61). In reference to the relation of Philosophy to
Theology (which M. Janet characterised as so close that hostility to
Theology is treason to Metaphysics), M. Dauriac shows that Theology
is taken in a narrow sense, as excluding all non-Christian religions. In
this connexion, he makes a somewhat striking remark concerning the
discordant elements in Ecclecticism, namely, the influence of the Car-
tesian spirit, which is Catholic, and the Scottish, which is Protestant a
contrast developed with considerable fulness. Under the heading of The
Eelation of Philosophy to Psychology, M. Dauriac urges, with great
force, that a fact of consciousness or natural necessity is not, and cannot
be, accepted as a principle. M. Pillon's contribution to his ' Evolution de
I'ldealism au XIII. 6 Siecle ' is entitled ' La Critique de Bayle : Critique
de 1' Atomism Epicurien,' and one cannot fail to note how little M.
Fillon has left himself to say of Bayle's criticism of Epicurean Atomism
in fact, only a few pages are devoted to Bayle's objections, the bulk of
the article being occupied with a statement of the general Epicurean
position. The most important portion is that dealing with the " swerv-
ing aside " of the Atoms, which comes into contrast with the Idealism of
last century as a contrasted yet not wholly dissimilar tendency. From the
contingency involved in the swerving aside of the Atoms, the Epicurean
developed Free-Will ; while, on the contrary, the Idealist deduces con-
tingency from freedom. At the same time, it is difficult to see how this
contrast, or, indeed, the statement of Epicureanism, applies to M.
Pillon's subject, since Bayle only accepted certain portions of that
theory under a misapprehension, and it would appear that Epicurean
Atomism, not being understood during last century, could have little to
do with the development of thought. Yet M. Pillon's present contribu-
tion is of distinct value as an appendix to the preceding chapters, in
giving additional information, which, if incorporated earlier, would have
involved lengthy digressions. There is no doubt M. Fillon has done
good work in drawing attention to Bayle's constructive work, but its
importance is exaggerated by being brought too near to Leibnitz and too
far from Descartes, and thus the true historical perspective is in danger
of being lost. When allowance is made for Bayle's ecclectic tendencies,
it would appear that his position should be moved forwards or backwards
in the historical sequence, according to the aspect of his subject a writer
has before him at the moment. He marks a development of Cartesianism
opposed to that of Spinoza, who placed the centre of gravity in the supreme
substance, whereas Bayle is inclined to place it in the two subordinate
ones. Thus he emphasises rather than surmounts Cartesian Dualism,
and therefore his " spiritualism " must be held to be less, not more, than
that of other Cartesians. If, on the other hand, we look back from the
individualism of Philosophy, immediately prior to Hume, we see
Bayle's Plurality of animated atoms an advance upon his contem-
poraries ; but it may be doubted whether this advance falls within the
development of Idealism ; rather, despite the superficial resemblance to
Leibnitz, the many realistic characteristics of the Atoms (especially when
brought into juxtaposition with the Locke-Worcester Letters and
Voltaire's popularisation of Locke) would tend more in the direction of
realistic than of Idealistic Individualism.
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANI
Bd. xix., Heft 1. T. Lipps. ' Tonverwandschaft und Tonverschmel-
zung.' [Polemic against Stumpf's theory in the Beitraege. Degree of
fusion for Stumpf is not really degree of approximation to a (numerical)
unity of auditory impression, but degree of possibility or ease of such
PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. 287
approximation. Proof by appeal to unmusical persons, and to conso-
nance of successive tones. But if consonance or degree of fusion is
' fusibility,' that relation of tones to one another which conditions fusion,
there need be no quarrel between the two theories. Stumpf s synergy,
invented ad hoc, makes way for the hypothesis that consonance is an
unconscious coincidence manifesting itself in conscious satisfaction.
Detailed discussion of Stumpf's counter-arguments.] W. von Zehender.
* Die unbeweisbaren Axiome.' [We learn the axioms in childhood ; we
accept them later because of their invariable fulfilment. They are
4 apodictically ' demonstrable, i.e., capable of a demonstratio ad oculos,
and only logically indemonstrable. The meaning of every word depends
on an implicit judgment of invariability.] A. Poetsch. ' Ueber Farben-
vorstellungen Blinder.' [Introspective record, with comparisons, by a
subject blind from her third year. Colours remain as memory images,
with well-marked affective differences. There then occurs a transference
of them, by feeling association, to other contents. Conscious memories
of coloured scenes are wanting, and surrogate ideas take their place.
Clangs are most easily associated with the colour-images ; pressure holds
second place ; temperature associations are rare, and movement associa-
tions unknown to the writer. Smell may connect with colour through
touch ; taste associations are doubtful. There are great individual differ-
ences among the blind in the matter of colour images ; many combat
them of set purpose, as useless in practical life.] J. von Kries.
* Ueber die anomalen trichromatischen Farbensysteme.' [Experiments
to show that the anomalous trichromatic systems are not explicable as
due to unusually intense and widely extended pigmentation. In the two
cases reported, no weakness of the colour sense was found.] Literatur-
bericht. Bd. xix., Heft 2 und 3. S. Witasek. ' Ueber die Natur der
geometrisch-optischen Taeuschungen.' [Attempts, not to give a new
explanation, but to bring out the essential difference between the
* psychological ' and the ' physiological ' modes of explanation. Critique
of Wundt, Einthoven, Stoehr. The judgment hypothesis (psychological
explanation) : neither the judgment of comparison nor that of designa-
tion (the two forms involved) is adequate to the facts of illusion. The
sensation hypothesis (or perceptual idea hypothesis : physiological
explanation), and its relation to the apprehension of two-dimensional
space. Experiments : Stereoscopic examination of Zoellner's illusion ;
the question of subliminal displacements. Result : This and cognate
illusions are 'physiological,' not 'psychological,' in origin.] J. von
Kries. ' Kritische Bemerkungen zur Farbentheorie.' [Criticism of
recent papers by Hering, Hess and Tschermak.] W. von Zehender.
' Vernunft, Verstand und Wille.' [Reason, through the mediation of
sense, furnishes us with knowledge ; understanding discovers likenesses
and differences, and points them out to reason. Will is the executive of
both faculties, and is shaped by experience. Illustration from the child's
acquisition of speech, and of the power to read and write.] Besprechung.
T. Ziehen. 'Kritischer Bericht ueber wichtigere Arbeiten auf dein
Gebiete der Physiologie des Centralnervensystems der Wirbelthiere.'
Literaturbericht.
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. August,
1898. Rudolf Eucken. ' Die Stellung der Philosophic zur religiosen
Bewegung der Gegenwart.' [This has already appeared in French in the
Revue de- Metaphysique et de Morale for July, 1897.1 H. Siebeck.
* Die Willenslehre bei Duns Scotus und seinen Nachfolgern.' [A plain
historical account of the teaching of the School on the will and its free-
dom during that period which is miscalled " the decline of Scholasticism ".
288 PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.
Notwithstanding the numerous passages suggestive of modern thought,
Prof. Volkelt avoids all such comparisons, giving only the data for the
thesis that the germs of our modern doctrines are to be found in the
teachings of Duns Scotus, Occam, and Buridan. The essay represents,
an immense amount of reading.] Johannes Volkelt. ' Beitrage zur
Analyse des Bewusstseins.' [The distinguishing (and misrepresented)
mark of sensation is trans-subjectivity, the seeming independence of
consciousness, the "beyondness" always present in sense-impressions.
Spencer violates his own empiricism in ascribing to sensation originally
a meaning in inner consciousness only, and treating its apparent inde-
pendence as a gradual growth. In experience sensation is never merely
internal, nor of an alleged growth of the illusion can we have experience.
Further, sensation prior to or without this trans-subjectivity would no
more be sensation than a triangle would continue a triangle if a side were
removed. On the other hand, there must be no confusion with Natural
Eealism ; where Hamilton (or German equivalents) say the non-ego is
given, the purely psychological position here maintained is that the non-
ego seems to be given in sensation. This illusion may be termed the
irrational element in consciousness in the sense that human finiteness.
cannot conciliate the illusion with reason. Thus, in opposition to the
teachers of Parallelism, consciousness appears as a manifold of simple,
qualitatively different, underivative functions. The conclusion treats of
the connexion of the trans-subjective element with the ideas of space
and of the external world.] Gregor von G-lasenapp. ' Duplicitat in
dem Ursprung der Moral.' [On the one hand, the rational element of
morality lies in the idea of justice and retribution ; on the other hand,
above and beyond reason, is the astounding fact that moral actions are
performed regardless of recompense, regardless of self-interest. The
article traces the influence of this second constituent in the religions of
the Greeks and eastern nations and in Christianity.]
VlEKTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FUR WlSSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE. Jahrg.
xxiii., Heft 1. J. v. Kries. ' Zur Psychologic des Urteils.' [The author
starts with his distinction between real and relational judgments, which
corresponds closely with Hume's distinction between relations of ideas
and matters of fact. Each of these classes of judgment involves a dis-
tinctive consciousness of validity. The object of the present article is to
distinguish further varieties of the validity-consciousness, as they occur
in the manifold processes of actual thinking, and to connect these with
the main logical types of judgment. The article is interesting and im-
portant, but its value lies in detail which cannot be reproduced in
summary.] E. Posch. 'Ausgangspunkte einer Theorie der Zeitvor-
stellung, I. [Discusses the nature of past time. When we say that some-
thing is past, the meaning is always that some quality in a group of quali-
ties has ceased to belong to that group. Fastness is the non-existence
of what is past.] P. Earth. ' Die Frage des sittlichen Fortschritts der
Menschheit.' [Disputes the thesis of Buckle that ethical principles and
ethical sentiments are unalterable. There is a progess in the direction
of recognising the autonomy of the individual. We must distinguish
between the development in the nature of ethical principles and senti-
ments, and the intensity of the controlling influence which they exercise
under given social conditions. This controlling influence, which may be
identified with conscience, shows a more or less regular rise and fall.
The present period is one of decline, but there is good hope for the
future, based largely on the help to be expected from science and
particular from sociology.] Besprechungen, etc.
NEW SERIES. No. 31.] []ULY, 1899.
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY (I.). 1
BY DE. FERDINAND TONNIES.
(Translated by MRS. B. BOSANQUET.)
CONTENTS OF AETICLE I
I. Signs.
1-11. Natural signs. 12-21. Artificial signs language social will. 22-28.
Individual will forms of will signs through will. 29-39. Customs
and legislation custom in language and legislation in language.
40. Science and language. 41-47. The social will of others in
language. 48-53. Compact connexion of convention legislation
science. 54-55. Analogy of money. 56-60. Classification of the
forms of the social will methods of communication and explana-
tion. 61. Science as form of the social will.
PKEFACE.
The theme for the Prize Essay runs as follows :
" The causes of the present obscurity and confusion in
psychological and philosophical terminology, and the
directions in which we may hope for efficient practical
remedy ".
In explanation of the theme was added :
" The donor of the prize desires that general regard be had to
the classification of the various modes in which a word
or other sign may be said to possess ' meaning,' and to
corresponding differences of method in the conveyance
or interpretation of ' meaning '. The committee of
award will consider the practical utility of the work
submitted to them as of primary importance."
1 The Welby Prize of 50 was awarded to this admirable essay by Dr.
Ferdinand Tonnies of Hamburg (Editor, G. F. S.).
19
290 FERDINAND TONNIES :
The author of this essay has noted that both in the theme
itself and in the explanatory note he is called upon to
investigate anew the nature of signs in general and of
words in particular. He considers himself all the more
justified in this course that in former days several of the
most influential philosophical authors, with the same object
of removing the obscurity and confusion of terminology,
considered it uniformly necessary, in the same way, to give a
thorough account of the nature and origin of verbal meanings
in general.
But the present author believes that by his determination
and division of the concept "Will," more especially by dis-
tinguishing the forms of a social will, he provides a better
basis for such an account.
The "practical utility " of this contribution he finds, in
addition to the fact that every deep inquiry into important
problems may be considered useful, in that it aims itself at
promoting the end in question, i.e. unanimity concerning
concepts and concerning the expressions devised to denote
them. For with a view to this end he holds it to be in-
dispensable to create or confirm for thinkers, especially foi
thinkers at the beginning of their career, a clear and strong
consciousness of their power over their material, of their fret
disposal, not only of sounds and other signs for the notificatic
of concepts, but also of ideas for the formation of concepts.
Owing to the darkness and inadequacy of the concept which
is usually connected with the word "will," this "opening
of the door to choice " invariably leads to the absurc
conclusion that groundless, i.e. irrational, caprice is to reign.
As if in giving a man free disposal over a large property,
thereby 'intended to convey to him that he should waste his
property or lay it out in a foolish manner. No doubt I give
him the right to do so, but I give him also the right to the
wisest disposal, division and determination of every part of
it, and if I have any influence over his will I shall teacl
him to dispose of his means according to clearly conceive
ends ; and if I can further influence him in choosing his enc
I shall teach him to aim at living as far as possible like
noble human being, and not to direct his efforts to sensuo^
enjoyment or idle honours. The freedom of the thinker
must be understood in the same way. It must be assumec"
that his will is directed towards knowing reality in its nature
and connexions, or it must be made clear to him that this
is at least his immediate end. But if he is clear about this,
then at once he has before him, instead of wild dissipation,
a most difficult task : he has to dispose of the powerful means
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 291
of thought in the way which is most real, most useful and
most appropriate ; he has to form the best concepts, i.e. the
concepts which conform most perfectly to that end ; and he
has to coin and connect with those concepts signs, which
shall be the most useful, the most convenient and the most
easily understood. Not every one, not the apprentice or the
journeyman, will feel himself equal to so high an art, and
Goethe's verse of the mason is peculiarly appropriate here :
Wer soil Lehrling sein ? jedermann.
Wer soil Geselle sein ? der was kann.
Wer soil Meister sein ? der was ersann. 1
But all alike must know that they belong to a great alliance
which runs through all nations, the Republic of scholars ; and
to work in and for this, to be recognised in it and to find in
it a following and co-operation, has always been the highest
aim of the master. There at once the individual will, at
the height of its enjoyment of power and of its artist's pride,
finds itself over against a more powerful social will which
commands its respect, and which, forming itself in a council
wherein the most distinguished masters have the greatest
natural weight, and exercising its office of distinction and
selection, determines with decisive sovereignty, what is to
hold universally, what permanently, and what both uni-
versally and permanently.
How little progress we have made in the scientific know-
ledge of man which is the essential business of all Psy-
chology and Philosophy in the modern sense we may
estimate from the fact that we have attained to so extra-
ordinarily little clearness and agreement concerning the
objects and methods of these sciences. At any rate we
shall allow, what we seldom act upon, that we must not
philosophise in words alone, but that the word is a sign
indifferent in itself, the value of which depends entirely
upon its being appropriately formed and upon its serving to
arouse the desired clear and distinct idea, or in proper, that
is abstract, thought to recall the activity whereby we, or
another, or all in common, formed a concept, and thereby to
recall the content of the concept. Much less do we
recognise the possibility and importance of free choice in
the formation of concepts, or we tend to confuse it with the
mere determining of the meaning of a word. And yet we
have here the source of the mastery of the greatest problems.
1 Who must be apprentice ? every one. Who must be journeyman ?
he who can do something. Who must be master ? he who has invented
something.
292 FERDINAND TONNIES :
Conceptual matter is the iron which we, as thinkers, have
to forge. Many kinds of implements must be made thereof ;
for digging, for ploughing, for fighting, for forging itself.
Scientific thought is not a matter of chance. It must be
learned by hard work and practised in persistent endurance
and eager striving ; its rules and methods must be known.
Natural capacity is called for, as for every other art ; but
even the most capable will go astray if he allows himself to
be led by, or encouraged in, the fancy that philosophy must
be characterised by lively intuition, fancy, and poetic diction,
instead of by exact and strict thought.
But we think that an honest endeavour to find a deeper
basis for these branches of knowledge, even though its
success should not be recognised, deserves at least to be
respected as good will, and we venture to appropriate the
utterance of a famous predecessor : " The consideration
then," says John Locke (Essay on Human Understanding,
iv., 21, 4), "of ideas and words, as the great instruments of
knowledge, makes no despicable part of their contemplation,
who would take a view of human knowledge, in the whole
extent of it. And perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed
and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of
logick and critick than what we have been hitherto acquainted
with." And with reference to the utility of the treatise,
again, we may say with him (ibid., iii., 5, 16) : " I shall
imagine I have done some service to truth, peace and learning,
if by any enlargement on this subject, I can make
men reflect on their own use of language ; and give them
reason to suspect, that, since it is frequent for others it may
also be possible for them, to have sometimes very good and
approved words in their mouths and writings, with very
uncertain, little or no signification. . . . And therefore, it is
not unreasonable for them, to be wary herein to themselves,
and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others."
I.
1. We call an object (A) the sign of another object (B), when
the perception or recollection A has the recollection B for its
regular and immediate consequence. By object we mean
here everything which can enter into a perception or recollec-
tion, things therefore as well as events. Perception is all
apprehension through sense ; recollection includes, besides
the reproduction of perceptions, the reproduction of all other
sensations in so far as they have an object, or at any rate a
content which can be regarded as object. Human recollec-
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 293
tion is also thought. Thought, as we understand it here,
is itself for the main part recollection of signs, and by
means of signs of other things which are denoted. In what
follows the name " ideas " is occasionally used to include
both perceptions and recollections, but may also include
feelings.
Some signs are natural signs, i.e., when the sequence to
which they give rise is based upon the natural relation
between sign (A) and object signified (B). Natural relations
of this kind are manifold. They may be derived from an
ideal case in which that sequence is self-evident ; from the
case of the identity of A and B, of the sign and the thing
signified. This identity may (1) be present in the act of
knowing of the perceiving subject ; then B is in no sense
another thing, and the proposition that A is the sign of B,
tells us nothing else than that the perception or recollection
of an object has the recollection of itself as a regular and
immediate consequence. When said of the recollection it
means only that it has a certain duration which may be
regarded as a reproduction of itself; when said of the per-
ception it is true in so far as perception cannot take place
without recollection a judgment of which we must here
assume the correctness. But this reduces the proposition to
the first alternative (that it is said of the recollection) ; but for
a perceiving or thinking subject identity is indistinguishable-
ness. (2) The identity is not present in the act of knowing
of the perceiving subject and is yet capable of becoming
known through a process of thought. Such is according
to a philosophical doctrine which again must be assumed for
the purpose of this conceptual division the identity of the
living organism with its (in the ordinary view " indwelling")
soul; in other words the identity of organic "external"
movements with the " internal " sensations and feelings
expressed therein. For perception according to its con-
cept, sensations and feelings (in future " sensations " will
include both these) are not present as objects they are not
perceivable ; 011 the other hand all bodily movements are
perceivable, yet in reality most movements of the living
organism are not perceived, only a few of those movements
which are also called expressive movements, are uniformly
objects of perception.
But if sensations and movements are thought of as
identical, then it follows that the apprehension of these
(external organic) movements is really also the apprehension
of sensations, though it may be quite indefinite ; and to this
there corresponds the fact that there is sympathy between
294 FERDINAND TONNIES :
organic beings, and that for sensuously perceptive subjects
this sympathy takes place in one undivided act with
sensuous perceptions (in "intuition"). In such cases
e.g., when through the cry of the young sympathy with its
hunger enters into the mother animal we can say : the cry
is the sign of the feeling of hunger which is identical with
it ; and if we divide that undivided act into the two : per-
ception (of the sound, i.e., of a movement) and sympathy
(a sensation), then the invariable and immediate sequence
is jself-evident, i.e. it is explicable by the identity. But in
proportion as the activities of knowledge separate themselves
from the total mass of experiences, i.e., of psychical facts, it
becomes obvious that expressive movements become signs of the
sensations (which are fundamentally identical with them),
i.e., according to our definition, the perception or recollec-
tion of such organic external movements has for invariable
and immediate consequence sympathy, i.e., recollection of a
sensation.
2. But from sympathy arises subsequent feeling, and
ultimately the inference, which is obtained discursively and
therefore the more exposed to error. The inference from
the expressive movement to the " will " remains nearer to
intuition in proportion as the two are unambiguously
connected with each other, and that is more emphatically
the case the less a specifically human "rational" will is
present or developed, so that what may be objectively
comprehended as sign may be forthwith actually and sub-
jectively received as the thing itself by the recipient (person
understanding), or at least as a combination of both the
thing and its sign. So the despot receives and understands
prostration both as the actual submission demanded and as
its sign. In this and similar cases we may see how the
sign arises out of the thing itself, or at any rate separates
itself from it, i.e., the mere sign which is no longer also the
thing itself, although its connexion with the thing itself
was originally the chief element in it. The slaying of
the victim is originally intended quite straightforwardly as
nourishment for the departed spirits, while at the same time
it is meant as a sign to them of the mindfulness, fear and
piety of their relations. Gradually it becomes a mere sign
of these feelings, even for those who make sacrifice ; the
end becomes means and the means becomes more and more
independent of the end, i.e., more and more distinct from it.
3. Thus it is that, in general, organic external movement
becomes for perceiving subjects the sign of sensation and
feeling. And since natural thought is metaphorical, that
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 295
is, translates the unperceivable into sensuous pictures, this
is also expressed by calling it the external sign of the inner,
as if the soul were spatially present in the body, and both
therefore parts of a perceivable whole. And so this case,
which is immediately appropriate to the concept, is reduced
by language (which expresses natural thought) to a more
remote one derived from identity.
'4. The next case which can be measured by Identity is
the sensuously perceivable Similarity of one thing to another,
which in its perfection is called complete likeness. Thus a
portrait is a sign of the original, and is more so i.e., has
the recollection of the original more immediately and in-
variably as consequence in proportion as it is more similar,
or approaches more nearly to complete likeness. But even
the shadow is by its similarity a natural sign of an object,
and in the same way the print of the foot, etc.
5. That the part is the natural sign of the whole, can be
derived from the case of Identity from another point of view.
For it is the nature of recollection to pass from part to whole.
This rests ultimately upon the laws of custom and habitua-
tion, which again regarded from a material point of view are
special cases of " the least expenditure of energy," but arise
psychologically from the impulse to self-preservation (the
will to live) ; the more deeply and closely a perception or
recollection is connected with this impulse, the more easily,
rapidly and frequently is it reproduced, and the more will
it be the case that perceptions of the parts of a whole will
suffice to excite the idea of the whole as present. On the
other hand, this completion becomes more difficult, takes
therefore more the form of an inference, in proportion as the
part is more trivial or less characteristic in comparison with
the whole.
6. In the same way the part is natural sign of another
part, especially of one adjacent in space or in time ; hence
every antecedent may become the sign of a consequent, and
vice versd ; something external the sign of something internal,
etc.,
That is a sign which acts as a sign.
Here there is as much variety as in the facts of the associa-
tion of ideas in general, which are admittedly reducible to
a few fundamental rules. It is rightly taught though not
yet in a definite form that even for the process of simple
cognition, especially for the spatial ordering of sensations as
perceptions, one becomes " sign " for the other, that act of
memory becoming possible for us through the transition
unconscious inferences from the more known to the less
296 FERDINAND TONNIES :
known which we know as orientation. But further, all the
higher kinds of cognition also attach themselves as com-
parisons identification, distinction, inference to .charac-
teristics which lead to reflexion, to expectation, and to
certainty. The judgment is grounded upon signs.
7. Natural signs appear either in that course of nature
which is independent of human will, or they are "made,"
"given," "formed" by men, and these latter again are
either (as such, i.e., as signs) made involuntarily or with
the purpose of "denoting" something, they are to denote
something. A made sign is either intended to serve the
person himself who made it for his future recollection, or it
is to serve others for their present or future recollection.
8. All human expressive movements are, or become, in-
voluntary signs of the psychical states expressed in them.
These signs vary between the limits of that which takes
place contrary to our will or wish (e.g., blushing, growing
pale) and involuntarily (the so-called reflex movements, e.g.,
starting, wrinkling the brow) hence- the signs which
" betray " us and these belong entirely to the independent
course of nature ; and at the other extreme that which is
involuntary as sign, but nevertheless is done with the assent
of the subject, e.g., the cry of joy and springing to embrace
when lovers meet.
9. To make expressive signs is, or becomes, necessary
for any one who desires to impart his sensations and feelings,
especially the wish that another being should do or omit to
do something. Signs which are made for this purpose may
even be understood by many animals ; to them belong more
especially tones and gestures, but also action which affects
the general sense-organ of the skin either pleasantly or
unpleasantly.
10. The use of signs of different kinds, which is so infi-
nitely important for the whole cultured life of humanity,
depends principally upon made signs. Sensation in common,
thought and belief in common, make themselves known in
the use of signs, even when these have no other purpose than
to afford expression to just this feeling and fellow-feeling, to
be " symbols " of the community.
11. But most signs of this kind serve also for mutual
understanding, and are easily understood in proportion as
they are natural signs of the will which "utters itself,"
or "reveals itself" through them. Here then action upon
the sight (gesture-language) is capable of much greater
variety than action upon general sensation, while action
upon the hearing again (sound-language) surpasses this in
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 297
much higher degree owing to the plasticity of the material
in which the signs can be, as it were, coined. It is true
that at first the development of gesture-language is the
easier, just because it deals with a greater number of natural
signs ; hence in the earlier phases of human development it
is only supplemented by sound-language ; a relation which
afterwards reverses itself, until finally the sound-language
as fixed in w r riting acts by itself alone and lacks even the
explanation which the speaker gives to his words by the
modulation of his voice. The progress from sensuous and
particular to conceptual and universal communications
develops itself in general in the same relation.
12. For out of articulate sounds arise almost exclusively
the completely different genus of signs, which we oppose to
natural signs as being artificial signs. Here there is no
longer any natural relation or bond between the sign and
that which it signifies ; it is the human will alone which
produces the relation of ideal association through which the
word becomes sign of the thing, as also the relation through
which writing becomes sign of the word, and the letter-unit
becomes sign of the sound-unit. But the separation of arti-
ficial from natural signs is a process which moves gradually
and in imperceptible transitions ; the memory has to accustom
itself to signs which are more and more unnatural, therefore
more inconvenient ; and which nevertheless are for human
purposes facilitations, because the natural signs do not
suffice, or would cost a far greater expenditure of trouble
to be sufficiently elaborated. The natural signs upon
which linguistic sounds are based are sometimes involun-
tary expressive movements of the vocal organs; sometimes
imitations, i.e., copies, of heard and familiar sounds; and
finally, sometimes they are attempts, formed according to
the principles of analogy and contrast, to reproduce the
impressions of objects, which have then, favoured by rela-
tively fortuitous circumstances, maintained themselves, i.e.,
have entered into a more or less firm connexion with the
ideas (perceptions or recollections) of the objects.
13. A certain word has a certain meaning, i.e., it is sign
of a certain (perceivable or thinkable) object, according to
the will of one or more persons. When it is according to
the will of one person, then either he alone understands the
sign, and then it is a private sign ; or it is understood by
others also, and then it is a social sign. Here again it is a
question of transitions. Understanding is itself a kind .of
willing, it is the will of recognition, of acceptance, i.e., of
I! appropriation, and thus understanding in common is like
298 FERDINAND TONNIES :
possession in common. Thus by understanding a social
will issues from the individual will. But the less social
validity a word has, the more effort it needs for the individual
to make himself understood ; he then strengthens by natural
signs tones and gestures the meaning which he desires to
give to the word.
14. But words are essentially and according to the law of
their development social signs ; and the social will which
expresses itself in them, which settles and gives to them
their meaning, is like all social will of various kinds.
15. Here we must first of all indicate the profound differ-
ence between the social will which has formed itself in a
natural way, and that which is made consciously. From
this difference arises the fundamental difference of the sense
in which a word means anything. But before we can con-
sider this in detail a general exposition must precede.
16. In every case the meaning is a kind of equation ; a
word is equal to one or more other words by which it is
explained, and is thus mediately or immediately equal to the
object of a perception or recollection. But these equations
are not generally thought of as something willed, but as
something actual, which therefore we know or do not know,
and concerning which we can have a right or wrong opinion;
we know or do not know what a word means, i.e., for what
it is the sign, or what a thing is "called," i.e., by what
word it is denoted. The question from what cause a t
is called so and so, is at first as remote from us as tht
question from what cause a thing is green or blue.
17. In every circle of human beings, that which all k
(or at any rate may learn), that therefore to which all feel
themselves bound, is held to be so real (i.e., like the natural),
the connexion between name and thing becomes so firm,
that it is felt and thought of as necessary. The name is
held to belong to the thing, and to have a mystic connexion
with it like that of a picture or a shadow. This is especially
the case with the names of persons, giving rise to the fear
that knowledge of the name gives power over body and soul,
and hence to anxiety to conceal proper names and avoidance
of uttering the names of the dead lest their rest should be
disturbed, and much allied superstition. Even in philosophy
it is not easy to overcome the view that certain names belong
to things by nature ((frvcrei), and the Christian thinkers laid
it down that Adam assigned the right name to things ; even in
the beginning of this century the doctrine that all languages
are to be derived from Hebrew was again received. Nay,
there are still famous authors to-day who regard the posses-
PHILOSOPHICAL TEEMINOLOGY. 299
sion of language, that is of an elaborated system of sound-
signs, as an absolute cleft between man and the lower animals;
a theory which needs for its completion only the other theory
that a new absolute cleft has been opened between men who
possess the sign-system of writing in letters and those who
do not possess it, so that the former cannot be descended
from the latter.
18. Now we know that there are different human
" languages," by which we mean the total systems of
sound-signs which are understood and used in a certain
group of men, in a nation or in related nations. The fact
that within such a group smaller groups are again dis-
tinguished, chiefly with reference to the sound-forms or
"pronunciations" of the same words, but partly also
through a certain number of deviating peculiar word-signs,
is expressed by saying that within a language we find
various "ways of speaking" or "dialects". As a matter
of fact there are in every larger or smaller group of men,
who live together and have common experiences, particular
words which are regularly used, and are often so consider-
able and striking that we speak again of a particular
"language" student's language, sailor's language, "thieves
Latin," etc. Not seldom, again, there is in the narrowest
and smallest groups, as between married people or brothers
and sisters, a private language, i.e., numerous names of things
which they alone understand or use, and which they, or one
of them, have invented ; such a name may be an arbitrary
and otherwise meaningless sound, or a sound which in other
connexions means something else, or a -sound attached to
one which is thus familiar.
19. It is true that for mutual understanding a common
idea-system is as necessary as a common sign-system ; nay,
more so, for if the ideas are there the signs are more easily
and quickly gained, and therefore also substituted ; while
the knowledge of signs is worthless without knowledge of
the ideas to which they are to be referred, and this knowledge
is much more difficult to gain or replace, especially when we
are no longer dealing with perceivable, but only with think-
able objects. Hence the fact that two men speak the same
language is no guarantee for their understanding each other
to any great extent. The question here is not only of
capacity for perceptions (we speak in vain of colour to the
blind), ideas and abstractions, but also of the whole range of
specific technical and scientific "concepts," the names of
which help us nothing unless we are familiar with the
objects. Finally, for an intimate understanding we need,
300 FERDINAND TONNIES
especially when we are dealing with merely subjective feelings
and experiences, a positive (" good ") will to understand,
hence an active sympathy, in so far as this is not replaced by
interests, i.e., by the thought for which the understanding is
means to another end. In every case the understanding of
another's meaning is, as reproduction, a kind of constructive
effort, which is more or less successful, and the success of
which is made more probable by attention and practice, but
also by the knowledge of rules according to which we may
infer the real meaning of the speaker who wishes to impart it,
partly from the phenomenon (the sign used) and partly from
the accompanying phenomena (e.g., of emphasis). It may
be that a stammering or babbling will suffice for the under-
standing of one, which is incomprehensible to all others ; or
there may be needed a long apprenticeship, and even for
learned men the unfolding of a thought in many complicated
sentences.
20. Thus not only mutual, but even one-sided, understand-
ing presupposes a similar knowledge of ideas and signs on
both sides. Signs are themselves ideas, and their connexion
with the ideas signified is that which must be forthcoming
to make an understanding possible. When other than
natural signs are to be understood this connexion can only
be gained by learning, i.e., by increasing and confirmatory
experience, which may be obtained chiefly for oneself or
chiefly by the help of others. In every case the development
of those associations of ideas which are known as habitual
and involve a knowledge (though it may remain latent), is
conditioned by our own practice and the habit which grows
with it. But the habitual and familiar is felt and thought as
natural, hence it is not easy for the naive spirit to raise th<
question why the object has this name or the word this mean-
ing, or the question is answered like similar questions as tc
the origin of modes of action, customs, etc., by reference
common agreement and to tradition from our ancestors. The
power of the fact, when regarded as actual and natural, is
indeed weakened in that there are many languages, and that
it is only in this language of ours that the fact is so for this
leads us to regard the meaning or name as fortuitous instead
of as necessary, to think of it as fixed by human will and
therefore capable of change (vo^w) instead of as natural and
immutable (^>u<ret). But the particular "language" appears
as a natural or supernatural kind of being, it has a " spirit,"
we make use of it as of a living instrument. We use it as
a whole, and it presents itself as a whole because through it
(if we will to use it) the particular words are held together ii
PHILOSOPHICAL TEBMINOLOGY. 301
a logical non-arbitrary manner, and are therefore prescribed
or offered to us in such a way that we must use them ; hence
too there are " rules " for their combination which must not
be " transgressed," if we are not to be guilty of a wrong,
awkward, incomprehensible, or at any rate clumsy, form of
speech.
21. The spirit of language is one of the forms in which we
recognise what we define as the social will. To recognise
the nature of the social will is necessary in order to analyse
the different senses in which it can be said of words or other
social signs that they have a "meaning". It is for this
reason that we have premised the distinction between social
will which has formed itself in a natural way, and that which
is made consciously, we might almost say, arbitrarily. By
social will in general we mean the will which is valid for a
number of men, i.e., which determines their individual wills
in the same sense, in so far as they themselves are thought
of as subjects (originators or sustainers) of this will which is
common to them and binds them together.
22. By individual human will we mean here every existing
combination of ideas (thoughts and feelings) which, working
independently, acts in such a way as to facilitate and hasten,
or hinder and check, other (similar) combinations of ideas
(makes them probable or improbable).
23. In this sense human will may be thought of as the cause
of human activities or conscious omissions ; for activities
and conscious omissions are, from a psychological point of
view, nothing but successions of ideas.
24. In these causal combinations of ideas the relatively
constant elements are the feelings (affirmation or negation),
and the relatively variable elements are the thoughts. The
relation of the latter to the former must therefore constitute
the principle of division and of classification. Upon this
principle is based the dichotomy of the individual as of the
social will. The will in which the feelings predominate we
call natural, that in which thoughts predominate artificial.
That is to say : in the one case the relation to the activities
(to put it briefly) in which will in general " utters " or
"realises" itself precedes more as a feeling this may also
be expressed by saying it is felt as an objectively present
tendency, in the other case it precedes more as a thought.
As a feeling it is by nature indefinite and develops itself from
general to particular relations. As thought, it starts from
particular determinations and passes over into more general
ones combined from them. From this antithesis we get the
following characteristics. In the former the feeling will
302 FERDINAND TONNIES :
the ultimate end rules ; i.e., the idea of a general good directs
feelings and thoughts to the particular good ; in the latter
the thinking will the idea of a particular good (the object)
guides all other ideas and subordinates them to itself, In
the former to point out a still more definite contrast his
task, his vocation, " becomes " manifest (or has become
manifest) to the man, "I ought to do this" ; in the latter
he " makes " (or has made) his plan, " I must do this ".
Finally, to have recourse to current scientific conceptions,
in the former the unconscious predominates in the will, in
the latter the conscious.
25. There is a further classification of the forms of will
which crosses this division, and is guided by that relation to
activities which is common to both types. According as
the sensuous element (sensations, perceptions), or the intel-
lectual element (ideas, thoughts) preponderates therein, i.e.
in the corresponding succession of ideas, there arise in each
instance two chief forms, one of the beginning and one of
the end ; but between these we place the large mass in which
the elements in question appear to be so mingled as to stand
in a relative equilibrium.
26. There arise then six classes of forms of will, each of
which, however, can be analysed again into subdivisions.
We will indicate them here by letters :
WF s WF si WFi
WTs WTsi WTi
How far these conceptually constructed forms are really
forthcoming, or coincide with such as are really forthcoming,
is not the question here ; nor, therefore, whether it is possible
to denote them by words which are otherwise in use.
27. An object (A) becomes by an individual e.g., my will,
sign of another object (B) ; this is, in order to represent the
contrast with natural signs, the next problem. Reduced to
the simplest and natural expression it runs : when I perceive
A although it stands in no natural connexion with B I
will think of B. But this "I will" may refer (in German
literally) both to the present and to the future ; it may imply
a recollection which is to occur once or occasionally, or again
one which is to be uniformly repeated. The recollection
itself is bound essentially either to the perception or only to
the idea, hence is of a more sensuous or a more intellectual
type. But the will which forms the association, or is present
in it, is here divided according to our schejue into its forms.
On the one side stand two "events," which are connected
with each other by the " feeling-tone " of the one, or of both,
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 303
or of a third. The hopeful, courageous man, who e.g. goes
out to battle, easily "accepts" any casual occurrence as a
"" good sign " for himself (accipio omen], the idea of victory
so excites him as to assimilate to itself every other idea ; that
idea combined with the wish is here the will. But the con-
nexion between sign and signified is here only loose and
superficial, it comes into existence and passes away again
easily with the sensuous perception of the sign. A more
permanent connexion is made by a permanent wish, an
" interest " ; there is always as basis the " wish " for favour-
able events, hence for favourable signs ; delight in the former
transfers itself to the latter, and for this reason recollection
is as pleased to "linger" over them as perception. It is
thus that the practical man who is dependent upon accidents,
e.g., a farmer or a sailor, accustoms himself to make many kinds
of observations and to. connect them with the particular
stages of his work in such a way that the recurring percep-
tion invariably is for him a favourable or unfavourable sign.
It is of such habits of thought that the whole mass of tradi-
tional superstition is composed. Finally we may be incited
by just such motives of will to actually learn, whether from
others or from our own experience and reflexion, to " give a
meaning " to events, e.g. to dreams, which stand in no natural
relation with future events but can be brought into arbitrary
connexion with our opinion about them. Here the recollec-
tion itself becomes of a markedly intellectual kind ; e.g. the
" conviction " arrived at by private thought that a dream of
fat cows signifies fortunate years. In all these cases what
we think of is only how something becomes for an indi-
vidual through his will the sign of something else. In reality
such signs generally have also, or obtain, a social significance
preceding or through the individual significance. But this
social significance is only necessary when signs become the
objects of social use.
On the other hand we notice, that the wish for a given
recollection constitutes of this an End and of something else,
which is first connected with the idea of it, a Means, i.e. an
assumed cause of the recollection. The desire may select
for this purpose the natural sign, or a socially valid sign, or
finally and this alone concerns us here it may connect
with the idea a sign which is significant for it alone. The
form of the will may be sufficiently illustrated for our present
purpose by instances. 1. I make for myself a sign to be used
once or upon occasion e.g. a knot in my handkerchief, to
remind me to-morrow of a letter to be written ; marks in a
book, to remind me at the next reading of my pleasure or
304 FEBDINAND TONNIES :
displeasure. 2. I place as permanent memorial (e.g.} a stone in
my field to remind me that in this place I received important
news. 3. I invent a sign, in order that I may recognise some-
thing by it, i.e. to remind me that an object stands in a certain
relation to me, e.g., is my property. It is thus that I " mark'*
my animal in the herd ; the essential point of my act is the
intellectual certainty that I can at any time select it out of
the herd as mine. Here the individual significance of the
sign easily passes over into an exclusive one, i.e. into a.
" secret " one. The sign is to be either comprehensible for
me alone or perceptible for me alone.
28. To show now how the social will variously presents,
itself in an analogous way, we will start from the most
marked and principal types of its two genera, the concepts,
of which coincide almost completely with verbally recognised
social forces. But at the same time we must make the
application to valid meanings of words which are created by
such forces.
29. The type of the former category is custom, of the lat-
ter law, in the sense in which we think of it as proceeding
from deliberations and conclusions of an individual or of an
assembly (" statute "-law).
30. The essence of custom lies in actual practice ; it
corresponds psychologically to what is known in the indi-
vidual as habit, and it is also called expressly Volksgewohnheit
(habit of the people). As will, it is most simply recognisable
in the general ill-will, often indeed anger or horror, which is
excited by its violation ; but also in the forms of speech
which proceed from general thought, such as : custom com-
mands, custom demands, custom is strict and inexorable,
etc.
31. In languages this view of custom is combined with
that of a merely objective activity, of habit as mere usage,
i.e., regular usage. But any one knowing the " spirit " of his.
language will easily note, as by some inward accent, whether
custom is being spoken of in the one sense or in the other;
just as we can distinguish also an individual application of
the word from the social, though in German this is character-
ised by the plural form and by the fact that it corresponds
only to the second and objective application of the social con-
cept (ein Mensch von lockeren Sitten).
32. Synonyms of the word in its social sense are, in Ger-
man, das Herkommen (tradition), der Brauch (usage) ; the
former expression indicates the foundation of custom
through the usage of preceding generations, and the con-
straining power of that which our fathers have done and
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 305
held to be good ; the latter (der Branch) refers more to living
practice.
33. The German language forms for the concept of custom
in its application to the meanings of words, the special word
Sprachgebrauch. In it we are thinking less of tradition
than of actual usage, though of course it is also conditioned
to a large extent by the former and this is sometimes empha-
sised by the expression herkommlicher Sprachgebrauch (tra-
ditional use of language). That the use of language, like
other customs, has also a subjective side is obvious with so
psychical an act as that of speech ; and yet the object is so
far intellectual that deviations and errors ought not to excite
ill-will. Still, in every linguist there is another kind of
dissatisfaction, or at any rate dissent, which makes itself
felt, often only as at something ludicrous, and in less marked
cases simply as the judgment which denies something as
false, and as the wish to correct. But that the actual usage,
by which the individual is guided, and which every one
recognises as " decisive " for the meaning of words, is
based upon something like a general and consentaneous will,
may be seen again from the fact that we are accustomed to
speak of language as a " property," a " national inheritance,"
a " sacred possession," attacks upon which have often led
and still lead to hot combats of speech and weapons. " We
u-iil speak our language" : what does that mean if not "we
will use these signs with these meanings " ? The willing of
the usage involves the willing of the meanings, and that these
are not thought of as included in the will is due to grounds
already indicated. Will is not recognised in habit (though in
language we may find traces of this recognition, which is
lacking to Psychology. Think of the Greek word e'0eX&>, where
the identity is directly indicated, and the corresponding Ger-
men pflegen, where it is indirectly indicated), though it
declares itself strongly enough, especially as resistance.
There is always dimly before us the argument (true enough
in itself) "if this were taking place by my (our) will, then my
(our) will could at any moment change or annul it ". What
<>t true is only the tacit assumption that the (individual
or social) will is something which can come into being at any
moment without sufficient cause. The real fact is, that the
more deeply rooted a habit is, the more improbable and
difficult is its counteraction by our own or another will.
34. It is through Volksgewohnheit, or custom, that the
social forms arise and grow which touch the life of the indi-
vidual most profoundly, and which we call " law " (G. Recht) ;
legislation brings consistency into these manifold forms, and
20
306 FERDINAND TONNIES :
makes law consciously and in accordance with a plan. The
former, the law of custom, appears partly in facts, proverbs,
or rules handed down by word of mouth or in writing ; partly
in the practice of judges, in judicial custom, i.e., in judgments
which are passed invariably, or only once, in a given
typical case. The latter, legislation i.e., the social force
which is capable of carrying out its will, attempts to think
of all possible cases beforehand, and after consideration of
their appropriateness for definite ends, to establish rules
according to which judgments and sentences must be
passed.
35. In its great variety and numerous contradictions cus-
tomary law frequently leaves the " spheres of right" of per-
sons confused, crossing one another, and having common
elements which are difficult to deal with ; legislative law, on
the other hand, endeavours to draw sharp divisions and
limits between the particular spheres, to leave nothing in
common which is not derived, or at any rate derivable, from
individual property or right. Legislative law, when moving
freely on its own lines, is as far as possible rational. In
so far as customary law is contained in propositions or
judgments its language follows general usage, and shares
therefore in the indefiniteness and uncertainty of usage.
36. Customary law always involves a certain usage of
language, in which it makes itself explicit. It is the affair
of the judicial judgment to know whether a thing is so and
so, i.e., whether a certain name belongs to it, e.g., the name
"wine" to a drink, the name "poison" to an addition to
it. It is ascertained whether the thing has the qualities
which customary language intends to denote by the name,
which it takes to be its characteristics.
37. Legislation must concern itself directly with the
determination of the meanings of words. In the penal
code not everything which is called deception or theft by
the people and in ordinary use, is recognised as a crime of
this type and threatened with penalties; what happens is
that definitions of these concepts are laid down, and pre-
scribed as standards of meaning. Modern socio-political
legislation and the regulations depending upon it, cannot
avoid stamping as concepts expressions of daily life such as
workshop, labourer, manual worker ; i.e., it gives them fixed
and easily recognised limits, and indeed different laws,
different regulations, determine these limits in different
ways, and it is then said (e.g.) "manual worker in the
sense of this law means . . ., a labourer in the sense of
this regulation," etc.
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 307
38. But just as to a large extent laws merely fix, extend
or limit, and more especially make consistent the norms
of customary law, so also legal determinations treat the
meanings of words. On the other hand this often occurs
without any respect to customary usage, even in opposition
to it. New concepts are formed, and for them new words
are created or new meanings given to old ones. The legis-
lator disposes freely of the material of language, but always
holds it expedient to respect customary usage, by which
indeed he often remains bound, even when he no longer
feels himself to be so.
39. With exception of the indirect cases we have
mentioned, there is not really any legislation for language,
as opposed to the customary usage of language, which to
so large an extent contains the great mass of social will
referring to the meanings of words that we may almost
always call it simply language. Nevertheless we find an
important analogue in the activity of grammarians and
lexicographers, when provided with social authority by the
state, or able to earn it by personal prestige, the former case
being nearer to legislation. Typical of this is the French
Academy, the dictionary of which has undertaken with so
much success to unify and purify the language ; a satirist
has called the hypercritical founders, " souverains arbitres
des mots ". A much weaker analogy is afforded by the
influence of authors who are accepted as models ; and we
shall revert to this analogy in another place.
40. Like these authorities, and often in direct contact
rith legislation, science also handles and influences language,
[t is legislative for the meanings of the words, which it
ikes from customary language for its own ends and defines
i.e., fixes the meanings as they are to be. Nor is the forma-
tion of new words strange to it words which do not occur
it all in customary language, which it calls into life while
ixing their meaning, either by inventing them, or more
isually by borrowing them from a foreign language. The
leanings themselves, again, it may express either by similar
artificial words (Kunstworter) , or by natural words to which
it has left their ordinary meaning or given a new one. But
it first exerts its complete sovereignty when it makes its
)wn objects ; i.e., when independently of what is already
>resented and thought of, it constructs objects and assigns
them old or new names. Its terms then gain a particular
significance. E.g., the word "circle" (Kreis) has in custorn-
iry language manifold other meanings, by legislation the
rord in German becomes the name of an artificially bounded
308 FERDINAND TONNIES I
administrative district, in science it (and in every civilised
language a corresponding word) signifies the concept of a
thing which is completely possible in no experience, of a
closed line, of which every point is equally distant from a
central point ; and here again the terms line and point have
just such a specific, scientific significance. This again we
sometimes call a scientific " way of speaking " (Sprachgebrauch)
in our customary language. But here we are distinguish-
ing and defining, and take therefore no account of customary
language ; thus affording, ourselves, an instance of scientific
freedom in forming and classifying concepts ; a freedom
limited only by criticism of its conduciveness to the end in
view. (It is in this way that we expect to justify our ideas
in the course of the treatise.)
41. But if we investigate social habit, usage, more closely,
we find that something of the kind always arises where the
living together of men rests upon the bases most natural to
it. Just as the habits of individuals develop most easily
and frequently from original and strong inclinations (tastes,
needs), so also social habits develop from mutual and
common inclination. All inclination reveals itself, and still
more completes itself, in activity, for it is the beginning of
such activity. From the strength and frequent renewal of
the inclination follows a frequent renewal of the correspond-
ing activity; subjectively this becomes a habit, when the
inclination becomes strengthened or even exclusively con-
ditioned through its frequency, since the repeated action
may also proceed from less voluntary sources. Habit is
always a disposition to certain activities distinct from inclina-
tion, and more binding and regulative. The freedom of the
will is determined by it in a particular way, it is felt as
constraining, even as compelling; "man" is the "slave"
of his habits, and yet they are essentially only more fixe<f
forms of impulses which are fluid, but not on that account
less necessary and constraining. Just so usage acts ii
social life and is related to the social instinct, or whatevei
we may call the elementary constraining force, which is
also regulative for the meaning of signs.
42. The understanding of natural signs, e.g., of gestures
and cries, is conditioned by similarity of organs, and facili-
tated by social feelings and habitual living together ; anc"
where these advantages are present artificial signs differ
from them hardly at all. Where the impulse to help-
whether reciprocal or not is strong, there the attempt t(
indicate a certain danger by a sound (even when the sounc
is no longer, or not primarily, imitative or expressive) is
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 309
quickly understood, comes easily into circulation, is taken
up and accepted. Since mutual imitation is the expression
of unanimity, this, the natural harmony of minds, may be
regarded as the first cause of a current meaning of words,
as of other signs. In every nursery, in the bosom of every
happy family, we may see how new names for men and
things are invented and understood, how they are taken up
and repeated from delight in them or in their inventor e.g.,
the child who imitates the sound. It is similar when, in
larger communities of language, orators and authors introduce
new and special words, or new meanings for old words ;
through the fact that they please, or through the im-
pressiveness and influence of the inventor, they become
current for a time at least, i.e., they are imitated, repeated.
And with respect also to the origin of language we must
suppose that these springs of free invention, of attempts at
introduction and at temporary validity, flowed freely when
once the organs were accustomed to form a variety of
sounds. What then maintains itself in permanent use and
is handed down to younger generations, is obtained by
selections from this wealth of original word-germs ; selec-
tions which are themselves being constantly renewed. The
psychological causes of those luxuriantly abounding germs
in which words are created together with their sensuously
felt meaning, we may denote as speech-feeling, or speech-
instinct, or better as the impulse to the formation of speech ;
and this we may then show to be the basis of customary
language. It is well-known that just the crudest languages
are burdened with a superfluity of synonyms, and also that
in them dialects generally vary according to the smallest
local districts.
43. Language, like other systems of signs such as writing,
notes, signals, is handed on by teaching. With reference to
one's native language, it is true that the teaching is gener-
ally mingled with custom and given in imperceptibly small
doses, which act all the more strongly from their continuity.
But it is always the authority of the teacher which com-
municates as a fact that the thing is called so and so, that
the word and the sentence (as unity of several words) have
such a meaning. This statement must be met, not only by
the desire and ability to understand, to impress it upon the
memory and to show oneself as imitative, but also by the
belief of the learner. But everything is easily believed
which finds no psychological hindrances in opposed know-
ledge, in personal mistrust, or in dislike of the subject.
Belief is acceptance and confirmation, as it were endorsement
310 FERDINAND TONNIES :
by signature, and therefore an action of will ; and since the
teacher has also received with belief that which he hands
on, we may claim common belief also as one of the forms
of the social will which give to words as to other signs their
meaning.
44. But this is noticeable in a marked manner when we
are dealing with special signs and special words to which
belief, or allied forms of a feeling will, such as reverence or
inspiration, lend a special and heightened meaning. To a
large extent this occurs with ceremonies and the mystical
words connected with them, which are held to be sacred and
to act in a supernatural manner. Words of which the true
meaning is not understood, e.g., when they are taken from a
foreign language, thus get the significance of containing a
power which far surpasses the power of ordinary words in
arousing human feelings and sensations. Faith declares
that they act upon Nature, or upon gods and demons which
through and for faith are present in Nature. Thus common
superstition has characteristically taken the uncomprehended
words of the Eucharist, " Hoc est corpus meum,." and as
"Hocus pocus " simply made them into a charm, which
belongs like the witches' multiplication-table to the neces-
sary apparatus of those who appear to realise the impos-
sible. So too the theologians do not think of the Creator
as immediate originator of heaven and earth, as it were
through his nature or will alone, but he must speak the
creative fiat (this is in no way peculiar to the Judaic-
Christian idea ; "in the Indian and Persian religious systems
the creative power of the word is placed at the apex of
being " ; the sound is " Brahma," it is said in the Mimansa,
through the spoken word IParabrahma creates the universe.
" When Ahriman, the wielder of death, stormed through
the earth, spoke Ormuzd the Honover, the pure, the holy,
the swift-working word, to maintain and protect creation
(Bastian).). Thus speculation, attaching itself to such naive
ideas, makes the word itself into God, or into the revealed
Son of God ; and as the word can create all and change all
it creates and changes itself into flesh, and moves as man
among men. But even beyond the sphere of the miraculous
a mysterious actual value is attributed to the word, and to
certain words therefore a good or evil significance as omens.
And the power of the spoken word, especially in public
speaking, depends largely upon the fact that certain words
and turns of speech are endowed by the hearer with an
additional meaning which arouses his feelings his love,
reverence, enthusiasm ; his hatred, horror, wrath. Think,
PHILOSOPHICAL TEKMINOLOGY. 311
for instance, of the " charm " in words such as liberty,
equality, fraternity ; and on the other hand of the
gloomy associations which are aroused by the words com-
pounded with "blood," such as blood-guiltiness, blood-
feud, etc.
45. It is a part of the art of the orator, to awaken and to
maintain by the right application, emphasis and accentua-
tion of such words, the " mood " which prepares his hearers
to accept his thoughts and to follow his counsels.
46. Artistic and poetic language is essentially allied to
religious and all ceremonial speech. It, too, gets its original
power and validity from the popular belief for which that is
real and true which endures as image and simile in poetic
language. Credulous imagination fills the world with living
active spirits ; natural man, and the teachers who lead him
priests and poets believe that with all things it is as with
men ; they read human will, human passions into things,
and in this way make them familiar and comprehensible
poesy is also explanation. All remarkable natural pheno-
mena, and also events in human life, are for such modes of
thought supersensuous demons, giants, gods and the like,
or they are caused by these. The inclination and habit
of filling, as it were, every corner with living beings, is
heightened and strengthened by particular stories, fables
and myths, in which it reveals itself ; and there is constant
interaction between these myths and language sometimes
the verbal expression is evoked by the myth, sometimes the
myth by the verbal expression. But the former relation is
by far the most frequent ; the personification of things, or
of the causes of events, is the natural assimilation of the
strange to the familiar, and this naturally happens when
speech is there through the material which it offers, though
this material is modified by the myth for its use. The
stories, as well as the generic modes of expression, are
taught, handed down, and felt in and with the language ;
they grow with the spirit of the people, with custom, with
religion, but they fall apart from it when the common mode
of thought becomes more sober, thoughtful and reasonable,
when poetry elevates itself as art above life. The mean-
ing of many words, once as real as that of statements
about actual experiences, is diminished, they are no longer
regarded as signs of realities, but only as signs of images,
and so " thoughts that had once a more real sense, fade
into mere poetic forms of speech" (Tylor). But on the
other hand, language also makes, first myths, and then at
least sensuous ideas of things which persist much more
312 FEEDINAND TONNIES :
obstinately than the myths. And apart from its personifica-
tions of the inanimate, the economy of language treats all
processes after the analogy of animal activities, all that is
thought after the analogy of what is perceived, all that is
perceived after the analogy of the organic beings to which
the " I " of the speaker himself belongs. But where there
appear to be activities of things an appearance often due to
our mode of speech then the inference is given ab esse ad
posse, from action to the power of action, and thus the
"properties" of the "thing," perceptible and concealed
(occult qualities), become "forces," from which the actual
events necessarily, or, at any rate, in a comprehensible
manner, proceed. We may take it as a familiar fact that
these interpretations through the vehicle of so-called meta-
physics, penetrate deep into the sciences, and can only be
weeded out again with great difficulty. By the attribution
of names, natural thought immediately satisfies the re-
curring need for knowledge and explanation ; and this is
closely connected with that imaginative-poetic animisation
of nature which is always drawing fresh material from it,
even though it becomes gradually drier and more prosaic.
Even after scientific thought has proceeded so far as in our
days among the best educated, that need is still always
satisfied, when the activity of a human being is asserted or
indicated as the cause of a phenomenon ; at most we ask
perhaps about his motives, and these again we refer to
names which denote something familiar to all, e.g. anger,
revenge, love, hate, etc. Natural thought explains every-
thing by this analogy ; and in the form in which it remains
current with us also, outside the sphere of human activi-
ties, it is satisfied by a reduction to the analogy, after we
have ceased to believe in the anthropomorphic interferences
of supersensuous beings. We find an oak-tree shattered.
"The lightning has done that," "the lightning must
have struck here with terrific force " it is something of
this kind which we say when we follow our natural way of
thinking ; the imaginative and superstitious man of earlier
times or of simpler culture says and thinks, " Zeus or God is
angry with the possessor of this plot of ground, so he has
shattered this oak with lightning ". But we may speak in
this or a similar way even when we do not. believe it,
and then it is a poetical or rhetorical figure ; from such a
point of view and fiction there may finally arise a merely
metaphorical expression, e.g. lightning has raged here. All
figures of speech, of which the metaphor is by far the most
important and most characteristic, have this in common,
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 313
that in them the words have a non-literal (uneigentliche)
in addition to their literal meaning the former is as it
were to shine through the latter, in so far as the figure is
to be understood. But it may also happen that the speaker
does not wish to be understood, or at any rate not by all who
hear him ; he is content, indeed he prefers it, if only a few
understand him, perhaps he even wishes not to be understood
at all that is, not in the complete way in which the non-
literal meaning is included. He desires then only to under-
stand himself, and to communicate his real meaning only
partially or apparently, or indeed to communicate only the
exact opposite of it. Thus oratorical diction, e.g. irony, and
especially hyperbole, borders on falsehood, and passes over
into it. Falsehood is a use of words for a private end which
is alien to them (i.e. to the social will contained in them)
for the end of exciting by apparent communication of our
own thought an idea which differs from it, and in extreme
cases is opposed to it. Here again in this special sense it is
the power of belief or as we might say by an obvious
simile, the credit which the speaker enjoys which gives
their true significance to the words. This significance
differs again according to the personality of the speaker and
the words he uses ; the same words have the full weight of
their proper meaning when it is an honest man who has
used them, and are empty words in the mouth of a knave
or a downright swindler.
47. We contrasted with each other as the chief forms of
the social will which gives meaning to words, the customary
usage of language, and legislation in language. We now see
that "popular belief" and "science" correspond to each
other as opposites in a similar manner. Both forms of the
social will may be regarded as delegates, popular belief of
the customary use of language, science of legislation ; i.e. as
deputies which, within the whole sphere submitted to the
formative power of custom or legislation, are armed with a
special mandate, which they fulfil by attaching distinctive
meanings to groups of words. In its application to language
we will call popular belief the genius of language.
48. There is still one important form of the social will to
be mentioned, which is as much the basis of legislation and
science as the natural, we might say, animal conformity,
41 agreement," is the basis of custom and popular belief.
This form we call in its general nature "compact," and in
particular application to the meaning of signs Verabredung
{convention). If we presuppose completely isolated individual
wills, then compact is the natural and necessary form in
314 FERDINAND TONNIES :
which they "come together," the form of their connexion
or union into a social will. This form presupposes the
existence of two or more free persons, i.e. persons who allow
themselves to be determined by their own wish to remain
strangers or to come together. The given matter, i.e. the
conceptually simplest content of the compact, is the exchange
of things. Here two wills, which were before opposed, each
wishing to attach the greatest value to his things, unite in
agreeing that two things shall be of the same value, or where
the expression of value in one commodity is customary, that
a given thing shall be worth so much, i.e., shall be equal in
value to so many units of the standard of value, whether this
value outlasts the act of exchange or not. But in the same
way any number of wills may agree upon a standard or norm
of value, even though the " how much " value of particular
things must be left, either to the comparison, or more exactly
to the measurement, of one or more persons, or indeed to
manifold agreements. (The Greek language denotes such
union best as "composition" ^vvOrjKrj here the common
will arises, as it were visibly, through the fact that several
furnish thereto a contribution of their own will ; and this can
only take place by their " explaining " their will, i.e. making
it known by signs. Such a sign may be the transference of
a thing ; but as an abbreviation, a spoken sentence, or finally
a word may suffice. And it is only in words that the present
will of a future will a promise can be expressed. Only
in words again can an order, in general a proposition con-
taining something willed for a time extending beyond the
moment, be expressed. But such a one is the proposition
about the value of signs, hence possibly also about the
meaning of words. The Imperative concerning it eithei
remains without expression, or it expresses itself in words).
Measures, weights and coins, again, are signs, that is, signs
of a covenanted or otherwise established unit of measurement,
or of a compound of such, which certainly exists primarily
only in thought.
49. Conventional signs between two or more are a mattei
known to every one. They are characterised by the fact that
they may depart to any extent from the nature of natural
signs and as a rule do so depart, more than signs of which
the meaning is based upon the naturally growing social will.
For instance, a stamp placed askew upon the envelope or
yellow rose in the button-hole, has not the slightest similarit]
or other relationship with the announcement " This afternooi
at five, rendezvous in the confectioner's shop " ; and yet
both may serve the purpose of such an announcement
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 315
excellently, if only there has been a previous covenant. The
power of the human will to make something into a sign here
appears in its elementary (socially effective) form. The
convention again about the special meaning of words, even of
otherwise meaningless words, plays an important part in
the social life. Especial occasion for this is afforded by the
speedy but expensive communication between remote places ;
e.g., in the intercourse between England and India there
arises a conventional " cable-language," at first perhaps
within a family or a business, so that the syllable "tar"
may have the meaning given to it beforehand " I have arrived
safely," or the syllable "ver" the meaning "The price of
silver is rising". It is a short step from this to make such
signs as a means of secret, i.e., exclusive, understanding, as
opposed to the public common property of the popular
language. In this sense there is a much older and larger
application of written signs, which get their special value in
the same way as the means of secret notifications and com-
munications. But all such systems of private signs, like
writing itself, presuppose an existing language, and refer to
it, so that they represent signs of signs ; in abbreviated writing,
such as stenography, they are as it were signs to the third
power. The sign-quality of the original sign may be com-
pletely forgotten, and is generally forgotten ; indeed it may
t>e stated as a rule that in so far as they are accredited
through a natural social will, they have never been in clear
consciousness as willed signs. This is quite clear when they
are felt as, indeed taken to be, natural signs ; to which
individual as well as social habituation conduces. On the
other hand, it belongs to the nature of the derivative signs
here under consideration to be thought and willed as signs,
hence as means for common ends, by those who give them
their meaning. Others indeed, who have not been active in
this direction, may accede to the content of such a convention ;
they then take it into their will without needing to reflect
upon the nature and origin of the signs, which may therefore
become as natural to them as the " mother-tongue," and the
habitual forms of intercourse. But not even origin is decisive
for the conventional character of signs and sign-systems.
Whatever their origin, signs may become conventional,
through the fact that they are felt, thought, applied as such,
i.e., essentially as external means. This is clear in the
forms of intercourse themselves. We may maintain a naive
and credulous attitude towards them, taking assurances of
esteem, reverence, sympathy, as sterling coin, and returning
them only when we can utter them with " a good conscience,"
316 FERDINAND TONNIES :
i.e., when our thought assents ; then we have a right to be
wrathful at social lies. Or again we may give and take them
as mere " tokens " ; we know that they are nothing but means
of expressing a readiness for intercourse, and of proving that
we belong to a certain society, especially to that which calls
itself good society. For this, according to its concept, there
is only the one way, that of observing its rules, and one of
these rules is the use of such modes of speech. They are
not meant seriously, they are mere forms, without any content,
or without any corresponding content, " hollow phrases " or
whatever we may choose to call them. But whoever plays the
game must submit to its rules. It is clear how this use of
words is related to that of figures of speech. Here as there,
transitions into the sphere of falsehood are easy. Falsehood
emphasises the ordinary meaning, the literal sense of the
words, and demands that this should be accepted, believed ;
what the liar has in his mind is not the non-literal meaning,
but none at all. But lying is greatly facilitated by the
figurative meaning think of the rhetoric in the oaths of
love and the asseverations of friendship. It is facilitated also
by the social significance, or rather depreciation of words. A
man endeavouring to obtain advantages by the use of flattery
may limit himself to employing turns of speech which are
current in his society ; he merely needs to utter them with a
special accent, with the warmth of tone which is wont to
" come from the heart " ; while if any one should seem to
suspect him he can always take refuge in the plea that he
has only been using the ordinary conventional language.
The variations which may be observed here are manifold.
50. In this sphere, then, portions of the current language
are, as it were, damped and kneaded into a dough ; and it is
possible also to have a whole language in which all word-
meanings would have a conventional character, whether they
refer immediately to objects, or (what is more probable) to
many empirical (natural) languages. Old and new attempts
to construct a universal language correspond to a thoroughly
reasonable and necessary idea, which in the present extension
of intercourse will sooner or later take deeper root and make
rapid growth. We cannot indeed deny that in many respects
it would be better to elevate a given, natural language to the
rank of an international means of communication ; and
towards this end economic and political developments are
pushing powerfully forward. Most indications are in favour
of the English language, which happens to have certain
constitutional advantages for such a universal social use,
advantages which make it also more easy to learn than other
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 317
modern languages. We are to-day inclined to forget that
our life of culture still has all its roots in a condition which
was characterised by the universal predominance of such a
language of Latin ; that many most important remains of
this predominance still exist ; that in certain spheres, i.e.,
as the language of courts and of diplomacy, it was directly
succeeded in the seventeenth century by French, and that
this language also still retains a high degree of international
application. In all these cases we have good ground to speak
of a " conventional " acceptance. The relation which every
one feels to a foreign language, especially when it has not
yet " entered into his flesh and blood," is very different from
his relation to his mother-tongue ; the former resembles
more the use of an instrument, the latter the use of an
innate organ. Hence also when several people together use
such an instrument for their mutual understanding, they are
related to it as if they had established the meanings of these
signs by agreement. At first, indeed, they are chained to
the spirit, i.e., the will or associations of this foreign language ;
but the more they express their particular common affairs
in this material, the more easily they handle it with a certain
freedom, without meeting the hindrances which the
" language-feeling," the habit and memory of the rules of
their own language, opposes. But even in the mother-tongue
there is developed by "business," i.e., by all human inter-
course in which each consciously pursues his own profit, an
invention and use of words and turns of speech having a
specific acceptance, which is similar to a conventional one.
The social will contained therein differs from the na'ive
impulse to form language in its "reflective" nature; it is
conceivable in its ripe form only upon the basis of an old
culture, its language is essentially a written language, its
style a paper style.
51. The free handling of a given material is characteristic
for all forms in which a free social will shapes itself; but
such a one is the will which must be reduced to the acts of
the allied individuals themselves. We include here both
the will which attains to expression in a normal legislation,
and that which attains expression in a normal science. It
is clear how legislation can proceed from convention. When
any society elects a Commission, and instructs it to draw up
the conventional rules accepted in it, altering them as may
seem good, replacing the less expedient by the more ex-
pedient, and determines unanimously to conform to these new
rules then this Commission becomes a legislative body.
Such an origin and authorisation of legislation is here
318 FERDINAND TONNIES :
thought of as a normal case. It is true that in experience
we find individuals and bodies who vindicate their right to
issue laws in quite another way, preferably by a super-
sensuous ordering of things (Jus dimnum). But experience
teaches also that legislations of this kind aim far more at
maintaining given conditions and habits, than at free,
purposive, conscious innovations. They invariably belong
to that form of the social will which we have called popular
belief. This is indeed even in its relation to customary
language formally free to create and to shape ; but it is
avowedly and essentially prejudiced in favour of the old,
as that which is approved and consecrated, without reflecting
upon its utility with reference to particular ends. Even the
speech of religion is archaic, and not seldom uttered in
language which is comprehensible only to the initiated and
learned. Such is the language of the sacred art of pious
song ; elsewhere the development of language, as of all sign-
systems, aims at abbreviations, but here preference is
intentionally given to long stretched-out forms as to those
which are traditionally solemn. Speaking generally, the
"legislation " which is accredited in this way extends more
to the forms than to the content of life. It is thus in close
contact and this is entirely true of popular belief witl
convention, so that the conventional is often " only " anothei
name for that which is held to be sacred. Convention alsc
is primarily, and to a certain extent always remains, "con-
servative," hence the " stiffness " of " etiquette," the circuitous
ceremoniously solemn form of the language of old-fashionec
courtesy, epistolary style, etc. But it is also natural to it to
break away and to become a capriciously mutable, novelty-
seeking "fashion". Law, again, as practised and spoken,
taught and explained, on the basis of customary law, moves
between popular belief and convention with a much stronger
preponderance of that preference for the old. So too the
special language of law, which as technical approaches t(
learned and sacred language, but then as the language of
caste (of an order or faculty) is appropriated and transformed
in a more free, i.e., more conventional way. Then toe
conscious legislation deals with it quite arbitrarily this
we already presupposed as it does with the law itself anc~
in close connexion with it. We have said that in its fre
handling of the given material of thought and speech sciei
resembles convention and legislation. Here again, as witl
legislation and strictly speaking with convention also, it
is our concept of science of which we are speaking. The
which in customary language is called so (at any rate
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 319
German), e.g. Theology, Jurisprudence, political and moral
disciplines, is not (in our sense) free science; it has so far
remained fettered to tradition and popular belief, often also
to convention and legislation. Mathematics and the mathe-
matical sciences correspond most closely to our concept of
science. Everything which is called science, like everything
which is called art, has its terminology, its technical concepts.
But for the most part these are not concepts in the sense
we are now using, but only special names for special objects
things and activities which, in the experience of those
devoted to such arts and sciences, have prominent signifi-
cance. This in no way involves that those things and
activities are not objective, therefore given for every one.
It is different in science properly so-called. It (that is the
mental activity devoted to it) forms its concepts, exclusively
for its own ends, as mere things of thought, indifferent
whether they occur in any experience, even knowing the
impossibility of such occurrence. The natural growth of
universal concepts, better called universal ideas, is not
generally, or at any rate not with sufficient clearness,
distinguished from this artificial, conscious formation of
" abgezogener" (as in the last century "abstract" was translated
into German) concepts. The natural growth of universal
ideas precedes the growth of particular ideas ; the former
is an incomplete "defective idea, with which an appropriate
name is regularly attached to a few or even to one single
prominent characteristic of perceived objects. Character-
istics are, as the word (Merkmale) indicates, marks to help
the memory, and indeed for the speaker they are the
immediate causes of the name occurring. All names are
originally both proper names and generic names. The
often-cited instance of the little child who calls every man
"papa" who does not by a new characteristic excite new
feelings, is typical of the connexion of general ideas with
names. Every apperception-mass (in the sense of Herbart
and Steinthal) which, once connected with a verbal sign,
sets free the idea of this verbal sign when it is excited
by actual perception, is a universal idea. The progress of
knowledge attaches itself to the possession and knowledge
of several names for the same object, to the distinction
between them, i.e., reference to different grounds or simply
to the fact of being so-called ; it is therefore connected also
with the knowledge of different names for known objects in
so far as they differ from each other, as with the knowledge
of like names for the same object in so far as they are in
some way similar to each other. To think of a condition as
320 FEEDINAND TONNIES :
yet untouched by anything which we can understand as
science, the child is taught that this dog is called " Phylax "
(without needing to learn the ground for this name), just
as it is taught that both this animal and those which
accompany its neighbour on the chase "are dogs," i.e.
have this name in common. The difference is, that in
order to apply this name rightly the child must learn to
know the ground for it. We do not call all four-legged
animals "dog," but these with the grave looks, which
attract attention by their "barking"; other larger quad-
rupeds with manes are called "horse," while both dogs and
horses are called " animal ". Upon the ground of this easy
discrimination by rough universal ideas, there begins with
the learning of characteristics which do not force themselves
upon immediate perception, the more specific naming of
particular groups within an already established whole, and
the comprehension of several wholes within the limits of
larger wholes ; for at first it is true that the more universal
the idea the more indefinite. But while all practical know-
ledge consists and develops in the knowing of these specific
universal ideas and names, theoretical interest depends much
more on generalisations and their more accurate grounding
and determination by actual characteristics. Thus side by
side with the universal ideas, such as horse, dog, animal,
which are elaborated into concepts, there arise new concepts,,
which afterwards become universal ideas, such as mammal,
vertebrate mollusc, and finally concepts of living beings of
which not only do the common characteristics remain
unknown without study, but which are themselves imper-
ceptible for the natural senses, e.g., the concept "bacillus".
But in all these actual constructions of concepts nothing
more takes place than the connecting of many presented
objects into a single new apperception-mass, which possesses
fewer characteristics in proportion as it is more universal.
There is no essential difference when the objects or concepts
are not things, but qualities or events. They are always
just particular sensuous or non-sensuous impressions, to
which there is attached a name, which now shows itself to-
be applicable to many such impressions. None of these
concepts, any more than the natural universal ideas, are
"abstract" concepts in our sense, but the names attributed
to them denote many concrete objects in reference to certain
characteristics common to them all. Of course it makes a.
great difference whether we intend to denote objects or ideas ,*
the universal is not in the objects, but in the ideas.
52. We do not form an " abstract " concept until with the
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 321
name there is "invented," i.e. made and constructed, the
object to be named ; so that here idea and object coincide
whether the object is thought of as thing or as event. That
which we desire to say of the concept we must apply im-
mediately in the construction of our concept of the abstract
concept. We define the abstract concept as a work of
art of scientific thought, but scientific thought as an operation
with such creations by comparing them, partly with one an-
other, partly with concrete concepts or with particular ideas.
The abstract concept is an object to which any characteris-
tics are given, whether presentable to sense or not, whether
found connected in reality (" in experience ") or not ; it is de-
termined only by the end which the creation is to serve,
and this end is knowledge of the relations between objects ex-
perienced, and capable of being experienced. There stands
therefore at the head of abstract concepts, the concept of
the simply thinkable, to which any name, e.g. A, may be
attached as representing it. The operations of scientific
thought begin by equating this concept to itself, which takes
place through " words " in the form of the judgment A = A,
the so often misunderstood proposition of identity. The pro-
position signifies the will of the scientific thinker to treat his
concept as equal to itself, i.e. not subjected to change ; and this
will claims to be a valid will, because it is appropriate to that
end within wide limits. For in a certain degree it is true that
all objects of experience are not subject to change, i.e., they
may be so thought of, and this thought again serves an end,
is indeed necessary, because it is only upon this assumption
that we can compare such objects with concepts and therefore
with each other. For the comparison of objects of experience
is completely effected by referring them to the thought-ob-
ject and expressing them therein. The thought-object is a
standard. It may be described as an individual. While the
universal idea becomes poor in characteristics in proportion
as it is wide and more general, the abstract concept, no
matter to how many phenomena it is to be referred, may be
as richly furnished with characteristics as the end demands.
It represents its own idea, the idea of a universal which is
at the same time singular (particular) ; it is itself a sign, a
symbol, and nothing else. It serves its end the better in
proportion as its characteristics are clear and determinate,
and in proportion as they are conditioned by each other and
therefore referable to each other in equations ; on the other
hand it becomes useless if its characteristics are even in
thought mutually exclusive, or what is the same thing
contradict each other.
21
322 FERDINAND TONNIES :
53. Definitions, according to the ordinary meaning of the
word, are nothing but explanations of words which denote
universal ideas. They are then meant to state what is
comprehended in these general ideas. The old rules are
familiar, that this must be done by combining the genus with
the specific difference, and its corollary : that the definition
must not be too wide, nor yet too narrow, hence that it must
exactly cover that which the word really means. The in-
vestigation of the meanings actually accepted, i.e., almost
always in customary language or in some particular branch
of customary language, is in itself an important scientific
problem ; but it has nothing to do with pure scientific
thought. In this application the problem is generally con-
fused with the quite different one which supposes that the
person defining is to state in what sense he wills to use the
general name. We say the problems are confused, for in
the first place we are far from being always conscious of the
difference, and in the second place it is expected that the
scientific subject shall not behave as if he were sovereign ;
i.e., that he should keep as closely as possible to customary
usage. It is even assumed that the person defining appre-
hends his problem best when he really only unfolds the
customary usage, in other words, when he thinks what
every one thinks. If now it happens that a fluid and manifold
usage is brought into a fixed and uniform form, then indeed
such a limitation of the meaning may suffice for many
ends. It is in this sense that laws determine the meaning
of words ; but then the theory breaks down that we are
dealing with the explication of usage ; it is manifest that we
are aiming at establishing indisputable limits within which
the law shall hold. Quite analogous is the end to which
scientific definition must always refer ; the fixing of a mean-
ing within a train of thought, hence within a book, a system,
etc. In coining a scientific concept therefore, we do it upon
our own responsibility and with complete freedom in respect
of customary usage. This is what Pascal means when he
says : " nothing is more free than definitions ". And so the
more acute logicians have always seen that scientific defini-
tions are propositions, the truth of which rests upon the will
of the person advancing them. Even if a name already
denotes a concept in some (e.g.} scientific usage (i.e. denotes
a definitely limited universal idea), still the person defining
must appropriate this concept and the name, if the definition
is to hold in his mental context also, i.e. is to be true for him.
But free definition is completely necessary when we are
operating with those works of thought of the individual
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 323
which we here call abstract concepts. Such a definition is
more than the explanation of what a name ought to mean
(and still further removed from that which it may mean " in
reality ") ; it aims chiefly at describing the matter, i.e. the
object thought of, and then assigns to it, as an abbreviated
mark, a name which is best chosen arbitrarily as one free
from every other meaning. The description is here not
merely a statement of limits, which must essentially refer to
the comprehension of the concept ; but it is as complete as
possible a determination of its content, without regard to
what the comprehension may be. It is only a make-shift
when it is expressed in (not-defined) words of customary
usage ; science avails itself of this when and in so far as it
has no other expressions defined by itself. Sigwart expresses
this exactly in the words: "every definition presupposes a
scientific terminology ".
Note 1. Like other modern logicians, Sigwart distinguishes
from merely analytic definitions " in which the value of a
word is expressed by an equivalent formula," synthetic de-
finitions, "which introduce the term for a new concept".
But he does not notice that all definitions of scientific mean-
ing are, at any rate in intention, synthetic definitions, and
must be estimated by this idea ; nor that in the postulate of
real-definitions we are dealing with nothing else than with
these ; although he speaks in the context of formulae which
" are externally like a nominal definition, but really different
from it," yet he holds (a few pages before) that the concept
of the so-called real-definition "has no longer any meaning
for us in logic ".
Note 2. The doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that nothing
general can be thought, can only be disputed when it has
been agreed what is meant by general and by thinking. But
when he gives as example (and is followed therein by more
recent writers) that we cannot have an idea of a triangle
which is neither equilateral nor scalene, etc., then this is
indeed true, but proves nothing. For no one will maintain
that there is a natural universal idea of the triangle; but con-
2rning the abstract concept triangle this is in fact sufficiently
lescribed as a plane surface enclosed by three straight lines,
" the concepts of straight and of lines have been previously
lefined. The different sorts of triangle which are actual in
idea or in diagram, are not related to the concept as species
to genus, but are copies or realisations of it (in the first and
second degree) and as such are, for and with reference to the
concept, all of one kind. For the rest they are related to it
as isolated experiments to an ideal case thought in abstracto.
324 FERDINAND TONNIES :
54. But how far that which is valid in science is thought
as valid by the social will, we still have to consider briefly,
after we have first dealt with a most important other sign.
55. It is almost traditional in philosophy to compare
words (or " concepts," only then we merely mean the names
of the concepts) with money ; as indeed we have already done
in this essay, when e.g. we said that conventional forms
of speech are sometimes taken for " sterling coin ". The
analogy is really far-reaching. It is essential to the word as
to money that it is a sign, and that it shall be "valid"
(in German gelten from which the word Geld), i.e. that
they shall be through the social will substitutes for the
objects of which they are signs. The word is the sign of
objects as images or ideas ; money is the sign of objects as
values ; i.e. in so far as they are thought of as useful-
agreeable, and therefore make an impression upon what we
may call in men will or endeavour, in short are affirmed. But
we can without difficulty extend the analogy to the different
senses in which money, like the word, has " meaning ". In
case A, it has its meaning through the natural social will,
i.e. all coined money ; in case B, through the artificial social
will, that is all paper money. Just as the names of concepts
may empirically be almost all derived from natural language,
so also paper money has empirically a meaning through the
fact that it is referred to " natural money " ; but as in idea
the names of concepts refer directly to artificial, constructed,
and therefore equivalent objects, so also paper-money may be
necessarily thought of as referring directly to artificial values,
e.g. to equal hours of human labour. The antithesis demands
somewhat closer consideration. As the word develops out of
something which is not yet a word, so money develops out
of that which is not yet money. Money is originally not
different from other values, and then only slightly different.
It is well known that in lower stages of economic develop-
ment many values have the functions of money. "How
quickly the saleability of an object makes it possible to
naturalise it as money, is shown in innumerable instances by
the reports of modern travellers " (v. Phillippovich.) Here
the social will differs little or not at all from social practice,
just as the individual will at its lowest stages is only the
feeling of activity and the feelings necessarily developed from
it of checked activity (pain) and facilitated activity (pleasure).
But (2), "practice and custom have gradually raised the
most saleable commodity (it should be the most saleable
commodities) to a universally used medium of exchange
(rather, to universally, i.e. within certain circles of intercourse,
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 325
valid mediums of exchange) " (v. Phillippovich). These
commodities are the metals, and with increasing property
the precious metals. Then comes the guarantee of the
community for a given weight and given content. In Asia
Minor " coinage developed by marking pieces of metal of a
given weight with the arms of the city community, which
was coining, as with a kind of common stamp" (Nasse).
This guarantee is essentially a moral one, and therefore in
fact always religious. The word Moneta which has gained
universal significance by its passing into English (money),
comes from the temple of Juno Moneta, the original Koman
mint. But with the guarantee of public credit there is
opened the door to deception and falsehood ; here come in the
historical debasements of the currency, which have played
such a discreditable part, chiefly in times of transition to the
modern state. The State, generally represented in its first
phase by princes and their war-chests, lends value to the
coins, not so much by moral guarantee as by force, which
makes the universal medium of exchange into a legal
medium of payment. The nature of this constraint first
shows itself in its pure form in giving value to paper, by
which printed notes are made into legal tender and are
thereby also made current ; their actual value being con-
ditioned not so much by the moral as by the mercantile
credit of the Government. This mercantile credit is the
basis of whatever value substitutes for money may have,
whether they are written, printed, or lithographed paper.
It makes also conventional paper-money (whether so-called or
not) in the manifold forms of circulating credit, and it is
this which we regard as the earlier stage of a state paper-
money. Here belong " bills of exchange, orders, cheques,
coupons, stamps," and characteristically also " convertible
state paper-money "(A. Wagner). Quite similar again is the
bank-note, which is issued by a bank having a monopoly of
notes, when the State has handed over to the bank the
power of regulating the notes. But the management of
every large bank, in a far greater degree than the management
of any State, takes place according to scientific principles,
especially according to the rules of the calculus of proba-
bilities. We may call the bank-note (in accordance with its
idea) scientific money. It is for this reason that philosophical
schemes for a reconstruction of economic society are so often
and easily connected with the thought of a purely credit-
system, which is conceived of as a synthesis of the natural
and the money system. The social value-sign would like
paper-money derive its validity only from the social will ;
326 FERDINAND TONNIES :
but instead of referring to money the half-natural sign of
all values it would refer like money directly to all values.
Values are elsewhere made equal by exchange, in general
therefore by trade; their equality has the conventional
character. Here, on the contrary, an equation of values
would take place according to scientific principles ; values
would all be referred to the necessary work incorporated in
them, while the work again would be most simply referred
to the average time of work. We often find a compromise
between the former real and the latter ideal equation, e.g. in
the legal determination of honoraria, or of official salaries,
and it is also the basis of legal limitations of hours of work,
and other interferences with free contract as the price-
regulator of human labour. But the idea of reference to a
"congealed labour-time" may further be aptly compared
with the titles of property and claims which are both current
in trade and legally valid ; these have a reference indeed to
a sum of money, but in pure titles to property (deeds) this
reference is insignificant compared with its significance as
participation in a capital, which figures only in the account
with its money value.
56. The many senses in which we can say of a word or
other sign that it has meaning, may then be classified as
follows :
1. Meaning according to the intention of the individual
making use of the word or other sign (subjective meaning
which is put into it).
2. But this meaning is essentially conditioned for the
word, as for all socially valid signs, by the meaning which
they have in regular usage (objective meaning). But the
objective meaning is essentially different according as the
social will which we regard as its originator develops this
meaning by creating it together with the sign, or has
assigned it for definite purposes to the sign. We call the
former the natural, the latter the artificial meaning. The
former is modified according to three forms of the will upon
which it is based, and which we distinguish according to a
principle which corresponds in the first genus (A) to the
division of volitional actions into impulsive, habitual,
and reflective ; they were called, natural harmony, custom,
belief, or in reference to language the impulse to form
language, the usage of language, the genius of language.
57. But the forms of the social will of the other genus (B)
were distinguished in an analogous manner according as it :
1. Proceeds at its earliest stage from the individual will
(sensuous stage);
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 327
2. Is represented by a constant recognised (Trager)
wielder ;
3. As thinking is represented by several, even if not re-
cognised, subjects (purely intellectual stage). Thus we dis-
tinguish convention, legislation, science, which in application
to the meaning of words we may call
Agreement Determination Definition.
Now we must briefly show how to the kinds of meaning
which are thus classified there correspond different methods
for communicating and explaining the meaning of words
and other signs. First of communication, and primarily
with reference to words ; here we must observe the speaker
or writer. At the first stage communication, and correspond-
ingly understanding, is easy under certain primitive condi-
tions.
1. It is easy in proportion as there is intimate mutual
affection, sympathy, or even mutual knowledge and famili-
arity. How easily here every sign is understood, every
indication suffices, may be noticed in daily life even where
language is fully developed, e.g. between lovers or married
people, or among intimate friends, etc. The meaning of the
word is here generally allied to and interwoven with the
meaning of the sound, therefore with music, the "language
of feeling".
2. It is easy again in wider range, in proportion as the
vocal signs approximate to the natural signs (expressive and
imitative sounds).
3. It is easy in proportion as they are supported by other
signs, especially by gesture language (demonstrative sounds),
or again as the merely associative sounds are supported by
these and by the two kinds already mentioned. Com-
munication is inversely more difficult, needs therefore the
corresponding aids, where it lacks these. Gesture language
most commonly appears as a substitute understood by every
one where word-language is wanting or defective, or fails
owing to organic defects. But in written communication
the aids mentioned under 1. and 2. disappear ; we can
only indicate the desired intonation, partly by special signs,
partly by the construction of the sentences. The under-
standing of what is written may further be facilitated by
illustrations from which writing is derived as articulate
speech is from inarticulate or under some circumstances
be replaced by them. At this stage therefore communica-
tion is attached to individual and natural conditions. Its
language (which is largely understood) is not yet a complete
social organ, of which any one, born and bred in this
328 FERDINAND TONNIES :
society, makes use with comparative ease and certainty.
This is the case in proportion as the customary usage of
language has become a power. Here a mass of fixed mean-
ings has been elaborated, so that word-idea and object-idea
are regularly blended. Nevertheless, in many expressions,
especially those which are more remote from everyday life
(the expressions of complex ideas) the customary usage is
uncertain, and leaves therefore greater freedom to individual
application. The more this freedom is used, the more the
speaker has recourse to the conditions of the first stage, or
must explain his thought (i.e. the meaning which he desires
to see attributed to his words), in more ordinary words,
hence in words more firmly established in usage, he must
as it were " translate" them (explicate the complex ideas).
The language of customary usage as a universal opposed to
the many dialects, distinguishes itself in advanced states of
culture as the written language from the language of intercourse.
Here the communication of an individual meaning in a
social material is indeed still liable to all the defects which
are inevitable in using signs of signs ; but knowledge of the
language as fixed in writing forces us also to a more
conscious subordination to the norms and rules which are
imparted by teaching, and the observance of which again
facilitates understanding, hence social application. This is
true again of oral communication at the third stage. Com-
munication here takes place to a large extent in fixed forms,
which are consecrated by age and authorities, and are
therefore handed on as valuable inheritances and familiar to
every partaker. Here too the communication of ideas
which predominates at the second stage is connected with
the more easy excitation of feelings which characterises the
first stage : of social feelings of a more differentiated kind,
we may say of festival-feelings. In so far as this is what is
realised, it is not hindered by the language being less com-
prehensible, or even incomprehensible ; it then misses its
proper determination, the words being reduced to the
associations of their sound-meanings. Allied to this again
is poetical language. Although like all art it is originally
strictly fettered by popular intuition, tradition, culture, it
still inclines in obedience to its imaginative inspiration to a
freer use of language, and so becomes more hard to under-
stand, unless this tendency is again frustrated by the
imagination to which it has recourse in figurative expres-
sions, in comparisons, in rhythm and metre. True poetry is
the purest form of the genius of language itself.
58. In written communication again, artistic, elevated or
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 329
beautiful speech lacks the best of its means of expression.
Where nevertheless such speech is to serve for permanent
record, hence for the understanding of later generations, it
has recourse, partly to short comprehensive formulae and to
" symbolic actions, " the meaning of which is more easily
comprehensible and preserves its meaning better ; partly to
diffuse " circumlocutions ". Hence we get the brevity of
the lapidary style side by side with the breadth of the legal
style both aim at a deep impression of the meanings of
their words. The language of writing is considerably influ-
enced by these styles, and still more by all artistic styles in
the use of words ; and thus its reaction upon the oral use
of language is increased.
59. The following stages correspond in a certain degree,
as we have already noticed, to the three first; but they stand
also in a social connexion, in such a way that the fourth in
the whole series attaches itself to the third, the fifth to the
fourth, etc. All three of the later stages presuppose in gen-
eral a high culture, a language elaborated to a manifold use,
hence also a written language. We have already said that
they make free use of language as of an instrument ; the
word is consciously formed as a means to the end of com-
munication. Hence all unessential " accessories " fall away,
which express feelings and excite feelings ; language becomes
prosaic, and the "dry" written expression is therefore
adequate ; the individual element is submerged, and definite
social styles, forms, and methods rule as patterns and this
all the more in proportion as what corresponds to these
ideas presents itself clearly in reality. On the other hand
we find just here a basis of developed individualism or
egoism endeavours which will succeed at any cost, hence
also at the expense of others, and which regard even social
ordinances and rules only as means to their ends, and
subordinate themselves to them only unwillingly and con-
ditionally. Thus the social and individual principles balance
and struggle against each other, the sharp accentuation
of both leading to antagonism. From this it follows for
communication in words that here again understanding is
only easy for one who knows the " language," but also the
ideas ; often indeed it is only possible through a process of
" initiation ". For the rest, it is to a large extent further
conditioned by knowledge of the personality of the man who
is uttering his will or his thoughts. It is from his trust-
worthiness that we must know whether he is concerned to
communicate something real, or whether he desires only to
reiterate meaningless conventional phrases, if not actually to
330 FEEDINAND TONNIES :
deceive or at any rate to express himself ambiguously. In
the same way we must know whether the legislator is laying
traps or snares by using ambiguous words (we remember
the so-called " elastic paragraphs ") ; whether the scholar is
intentionally shrouding himself in obscurity, and increasing
the volume of words because concepts fail him. It is always
here, especially when we have only the written signs of
the words, that the widest field remains for explication
(interpretation). This is essentially always translation into
a more easily understood language or mode of expression.
Generally speaking it is the more difficult within the same
language, i.e. within a formally connected system, in pro-
portion as the words have diverged from the social will
originally contained in them. Hence the methods of
interpretation are, (1) at the first stage Etymology ; (2) at
the second, inquiry into the best, i.e. most fixed and regular
usage ; (3) at the third, the fundamental intuitions, opinions,
comparisons, images, etc., by which we can derive special
meanings from general, higher from simpler, nonliteral
from literal. Such derivation comes into play also at
all the following stages. Here we must investigate, not
only the original but also the most recent, modern sense,
which the words are meant to have according to the intention
of the conventionally bound individuals, according to the
intention of the legislator, according to the intention of
the scientific authors. It is chiefly concepts which are here
denoted, i.e., mental constructions of definite intention,
which can only be explained in the words of ordinary
language (1-3). In proportion as these words are ambiguous,
of uncertain origin, wavering in usage, and figurative, a
clear and certain interpretation is difficult. Hence the
abundance of commentaries and of controversies upon ritual
prescriptions of all sorts, after they have grown conventional ;
upon codes which attain or are to attain the force of law ;
upon philosophical systems in proportion as these are
unhesitatingly recognised as valid, as for so many years
were the Physic and Metaphysic of Aristotle ; as recently
upon Kant and for some time upon Hegel. So too poets
and other authors who are held to be "classic" need
explanations of their use of language. Holy books again
and "oracles," which wilfully make use of ambiguous words.
60. We need only refer briefly to the fact that the analogy
between the sign "money" and the sign "word" may be
also extended to the kinds of communication and explanation,
although this analogy cannot be carried into detail. In
narrow circumstances of life, where needs are homogeneous,
PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY. 331
permanent values are easily accepted as money ; where
development is more advanced only pieces of metal. But
these the individual must test as to content and weight,
until the guaranteeing stamp facilitates currency, and makes
money the equivalent of all values. Generally no doubt is
raised, although forgery endangers every one who partakes
in the interchange. Paper-money is strictly speaking only a
reference to money, thus a sign of a sign, but it may be a
complete substitute for it, hence also it may stand for all
possible values. It is still more exposed to forgery than
coin ; but more especially the danger is heightened of an
injuriously increased output, which depreciates each unit, i.e.,
depresses the actual value which is recognised as reasonable
below its "nominal value". We may compare here the
superfluity of words which is fraudulently or carelessly
issued by orator or writer ; and credulous commentaries
thereon may well be estimated as the simplicity of one who
has let himself be talked into accepting assignats, and thinks
that they must be accepted from him again at their full
value, because this value stands there printed and confirmed
by stamp and signature.
61. In this context it still remains to explain the sense in
which we have determined " science " as a form of the social
will ; the sense therefore whereby conceptual names receive
their meaning, or let us say their currency. For this sense
is in its normal form completely conditioned by the methods
of handing on and interpreting such meanings. At 'earlier
stages this is not the case. It is true that at all stages
teaching is combined with the other ways in which the
public or secret meanings of words are made known or
become known ; but at none does it exclusively form the
essence of the social will, so that this will arises, is main-
tained and propagated by teaching. But of this nature is
science. By teaching a community forms itself, which
shares in the possession of its concepts ; i.e., in knowledge of
their meanings, and in the art of operating with them. We
found that for the (corresponding) third stage also teaching
was characteristic ; but there it is only the appropriate form
of tradition which, in its less developed form, promotes
spontaneous imitation by leading up to it. The social will,
which we there defined as belief, exists before it and itself
conditions it. But here it is thought this again is only an
ideal limiting-case that the social will is primarily repre-
sented only by the individual person of the teacher ; around
him there gather the scholars, who acquiesce of their own
free insight in the recognition of the concepts formed by
332 FERDINAND TONNIES : PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY.
him, and agree that their signs shall hold good. Here
teaching is far from bringing about a belief in the signs,
participation in their special and consecrated or even only
aesthetic meaning. For it the signs are in and for them-
selves completely indifferent, they are nothing but signs, i.e.,
means for naming, without any "inner value". It is thus
that we distinguish the concepts, and we are not inquiring
here how the kinds of teaching are really related to each
other; but we easily see that it presents numerous transitions
from the one genus into the other. On the other hand it is
clear that the " free assent," which Locke so earnestly
recommends those who seek the truth to handle carefully, is
founded more upon doubt than upon belief; but that it must
before all be given to those concepts which are contained in
judgments ; that again it is this free assent which stamps
concepts into conventionally valid means of knowledge. As
a matter of fact free persons can, without being related as
teacher and pupil, come to an agreement as to the validity
of concepts and make compatible the meanings even of these
words. But by the abstraction of science we express the
thought to which a wide reality corresponds that the con-
struction and coining of concepts is always originated by
individuals of genius, who therefore to a certain extent,
and primarily in their own school, occupy the position of
legislators. Though in this sphere as in every other,
tradition and blind belief play an important part, yet in a
period of scientific life the development, transformation, anf
renovation of concepts, like the revolutions of industrial
technics, is most widely open to observation. " The more
of spiritual life a period contains, the more it will change
the received condition of terminology " (Eucken).
II. ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND
THAT OF LEIBNIZ. 1
BY EGBERT LATTA.
IT is not my intention to reopen the purely historical
question regarding the actual intercourse between Spinoza
and Leibniz and the particular ideas or suggestions which
Leibniz may reasonably be held to have directly borrowed
from Spinoza. On this point it would hardly be possible to
add anything to the thorough work of Prof. Stein in his
Leibniz und Spinoza, which seems to me to prove conclusively
that Leibniz was no more a plagiarist of Spinoza than he
was a plagiarist of Newton, but that he was " philosophically
homo sui generis," strongly influenced by thinkers like Plato
and Spinoza, yet in his philosophy neither Platonist nor
Spinozist but always Leibnitian. 2 A few of the historical
facts may, however, be mentioned as having suggestiveness
in connexion with the large problem of the relation between
the two systems. About a year before Spinoza's death
Leibniz saw him at the Hague and had several conver-
sations with him. At this time Leibniz was without a
philosophical system of his own, dissatisfied with Cartesian-
ism and ready to receive suggestions. He had just completed
a long course of mathematical study by discovering the
Infinitesimal Calculus, and on the way to Holland he wrote
a paper on the principle of motion, doubtless with the view
of getting Spinoza's opinion about it. This question of the
laws of motion (in view of the theories of Descartes) was
one of the two subjects which Leibniz mentions as having
been discussed in course of the conversations at the Hague,
the other subject being that of the necessity of the existence
of an absolutely perfect Being. 3 In general it is clear from
the evidence adduced by Stein 4 that Leibniz made a most
careful study of most of Spinoza's writings and that he re-
garded Spinoza's as the best of modern systems with the
1 Bead before the Aristotelian Society. 2 Leibniz u. Spinoza, p. 184.
1 V. infra pp. * Leibniz u. Spinoza, p. 286 sqq.
334 ROBERT LATTA:
exception of his own Monadology. 1 " Spinoza would be
right," he says, "if there were no Monads." 2 And it is
interesting further to notice that the doctrine of Spinoza
which most repelled Leibniz was his denial of final causes,
and that in almost every philosophical letter written by
Leibniz from 1679 onwards the idea of final cause appears.
My purpose in this paper is to consider what light may
be thrown upon the two systems and their relation to one
another by taking account of the general scientific thought of
the time. The dominating science of the seventeenth century
was Mathematics, so that for a seventeenth century writer
exact scientific method was synonymous with mathematical
method. The endeavour to make an exact study of external
nature, which was one of the first fruits of the revulsion
from Scholasticism, led inevitably to the development of
Mathematics as a science of calculation or measurement.
Problems which formerly had merely a speculative interest
now pressed for immediate solution, and the practical neces-
sities of physical science led gradually to the development
of new mathematical methods, such as the introduction of
the notion of " infinity " by Kepler, the Analytical Geometry
of Descartes and the Infinitesimal Calculus of Newton and
Leibniz. Both Spinoza and Leibniz were mathematicians
and as mathematicians they shared the ideal of their time,
that of a mathematically exact and certain system of know-
ledge, a comprehensive " scientific " philosophy. They were
both interested in mathematical problems, but from some-
what different points of view. Spinoza was chiefly impressed
with the certainty and necessity of such geometrical demon-
stration as that of Euclid, which proceeded from self-evident
axioms and unfolded with rigorous truth the attributes of
certain objects from precise definitions of them. Leibniz,
on the other hand, was more interested in the progress of
Mathematics than in the security of its established methods.
He sought to grasp the real nature of matter and he found the
current Mathematics too abstract to be sufficiently service-
able. Atomism (as in Cordemoi, Gassendi and others) ha<f
charmed him for a time, and the metaphysical problems of
the Eucharist (in connexion with the question of the re-
union of Christendom) impelled him from another side to
the study of matter. But Atomism represented matter as toe
absolutely discrete while Cartesianism made it too smoothly
continuous, and some advance in mathematical method
was necessary in order to reconcile the discrete and the
P. 252. z Lettre a Bourquet (1714), Erdinann, 720 ; Gerhardt, iii., 575.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 335
continuous. Thus while Leibniz is at one with Spinoza
in seeking not mere speculative probability but " demonstra-
tion " in philosophy, he is not to be regarded as thinking of
demonstration in exactly the same way as Spinoza did. 1
The form of Spinoza's Ethics makes it evident that he
regarded demonstration in philosophy as a process analogous
to the synthetic method in geometry, which endeavours to
apply a canon of pure self-consistency to a variety of given
geometrical figures. The aim of the inquiry is to ascertain
the properties or qualities of the figures, and a property is
shown to belong to a figure when it is proved to be consistent
with the definition of that figure. Each kind of figure is
treated as a distinct and separate species and their inter-
relations are considered in a purely external way. The
demonstrations are supposed to be pure, direct deductions
from given premisses. But in reality there is a continual
reference to experience, to the system of space, certain of the
relations of which are expressed by the figures. The proof
of each proposition requires a " construction " of some kind
to be made, such as the producing of lines or the superposition
of figures, and this construction is simply a reference to the
unity of the system of space, in which the particular figure
is an element (or combination of elements) related to others,
and by which all the kinds of figures are ultimately deter-
mined. For instance, if you produce two sides of a triangle
in order to prove something about its angles, you implicitly
recognise that the triangle is not a self-complete system, the
properties of which may be directly deduced from its defini-
tion, but that it is an element in a surface and that its
internal properties are logically dependent on its external
relations, or, at least, are in the most intimate connexion
with them. Thus the synthetic method in geometry pre-
supposes the system of space in its definitions and postulates,
without showing how the figures described in the definitions
or the right to demand these postulates follow from the
nature of space itself. Now the mathematical form of
Spinoza's Ethics is modelled upon that of Euclid's Geometry.
There are numerous definitions of more or less independent
things or ideas. Certain axioms are also assumed as self-
evident, and from a combination of the axioms with the
definitions the whole philosophy is regarded as necessarily
following. The definitions are the substantial part of the
1 Spinoza's demonstrations have, for the most part, the character of
reductio ad absurdum. Leibniz writes of them : Ce Spinosa est plein
de reveries bien embarassees et ses pretcndues demonstrations de Deo
n'en ont pas seuleinent le semblant " (Gerhardt, ii., 133).
336 KOBEKT LATTA:
philosophy : the whole truth is an unfolding of what is
implied in them. But the definitions of geometry are
determined by space-experience ; they are definitions of
objects from which all characteristics except those of space
have been thought away. And it is impossible to go a step
beyond the definitions of geometry, to deduce anything from
them, without a reference to the space which is their medium.
Thus, as Tschirnhausen pointed out to Spinoza, 1 from the
definition of a circle taken by itself it is impossible to deduce
any of the properties of the circle except the uniformity of
curvature by which it is distinguished essentially from all
other curves. All the other properties of the circle can be
deduced only through its being brought into relation with
other things, such as radii, intersecting lines, etc. If, then,
Spinoza's definitions correspond to the definitions of geo-
metry, i.e., if his method is a geometrical one, the definitions
presuppose a system in which the things defined are elements,
and apart from a reference to this system there can be no-
legitimate demonstration.
Now while it is legitimate for a special science, which does
not propose to answer ultimate questions, to make postulates
presupposing a system within which the objects of the science
are inter-related, such a procedure is inconsistent with the
purpose of an absolute philosophy. In order to expound the
meaning of the universe ordine geometrico you must begin
with a definition of the universe, just as in order to expound
the meaning of a geometrical figure, you must begin with
a definition of the figure. But while there are other
geometrical figures by the aid of which the meaning of the
figure defined may be further expounded, there is no other
through which the meaning of the universe may be set forth.
Either the definition must already include and express the
whole of the properties of the thing defined, in which case
it must say everything that is to be said, or it must express
some property from which nothing further can be deduced
except by the aid of other considerations, in which case it is
inadequate as a definition. Spinoza, however, contends that
while it is perhaps true in the case of very simple things or
entia rationis (including geometrical figures) that the definition
of the thing, apart from its relation to other things, yields
only one property, this is untrue as regards real things.
" For from this alone, that I define God as a Being to whose
essence belongs existence, I infer several of His properties ;
namely, that He necessarily exists, that He is one, immutable,
1 Ep. 82, Van Vloten and Land (71 in Bruder).
1
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 337
infinite," etc. l But the very terms of this definition imply
a reference to other things. A Being whose essence involves
existence is intelligible only in relation to a being whose
essence does not involve existence ; that which is in se can be
thought only in relation to that which is in olio. And it is
in virtue of this reference that the other properties of the
object are deduced from the definition. Each of the properties
is negatively proved by the use of such disjunctive axioms
as : Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt, 2 and consequently
the properties do not follow from the definition alone, but
from the definition plus the interpretation of the terms of the
definition, which is given in the axiom. That which is in se
is that which is not in alio. If we go on afterwards (as seems
to be the way of Spinoza) to deny the reality of that which
is in alio, we stultify the whole procedure. To deny the
reality of that which is in alio while we continue to assert
the reality of that which is in se, is to alter the meaning of
the axiom, to make it a disjunction, not between two kinds
of things, but between the universe and nonentity. In other
words, the axiom becomes tautologous : that which is in se
is in se, the universe is the universe. Accordingly if the
axiom has any meaning, Spinoza's definition of God implies
that God is an element in a wider system, that He is in se in
contrast with that which is really in alio. And yet Spinoza
means by " God" the universe as one.
This is confirmed by an examination of Spinoza's own
account of Definition in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emenda-
tione, 3 where he gives rules for the definition of a created (in
alio) and of an uncreated (in se) thing. The rules for the
definition of a created thing are (1) that the definition must
include the proximate cause, and (2) that the definition should
be such that all the properties of the thing can be deduced
from the definition, considered by itself and not in conjunc-
tion with others. This is evidently equivalent to saying
that in order to know truly a created thing, we must see
clearly both how it is produced and what it produces (for,
according to Spinoza, the relation of cause and effect is
reducible to that of substance and attribute). The thing
defined must, in short, be removed out of the realm of the
empirical or casual and regarded in its fixed and eternal
relations. It must be perfectly conditioned, put in its own
place in the ordered system of things. Again, for the defini-
1 Ep. 83, Van Vloten (72 in Bruder).
2 Ethics, L, Axiom 1 ; cf. Axiom 2 : Id quod per aliud nonpotest concipi,
per se concipi debet.
3 Van Vloten, i., 29 sqq. ; Bruder, ii., 86 sqq.
22
338 EOBEET LATTA :
tion of an uncreated thing the rules are (1) that it should
exclude all cause, i.e., that the object should need for its
explanation no other thing besides its own being ; (2) given
the definition there should remain no room for doubt whether
the thing exists or not ; (3) it should contain no substantives
which can be used as adjectives, i.e., the object denned should
not be explained by abstractions and (4) we should be able
to deduce all the properties of the thing from its definition.
Now these rules are practically the same as those for the
definition of a created thing. The first and second rules
amount to saying that the proximate cause of the uncreated
thing must be the thing itself, that it must be produced by
no other thing. The fourth rule requires, as in the case of
the created thing, that the idea be tested by its consequences,
in other words, that the thing is real through its necessary
relation to the whole system of things. The third rule is a
caution against abstractions, which is equally applicable to
the definition of a created thing, but is especially in point
here, because in the definition of an uncreated thing proxi-
mate cause becomes causa sui. If it had been possible, as in
the case of the created thing, to refer the uncreated thing
to something else necessarily presupposed in it, there would
have been less danger of abstraction. As it is, it seems to
me impossible to escape abstraction in the definition of an
uncreated thing. The definition of a thing can only mean
a statement of the relations of that thing within some system
of which it is a member or element, and this is virtually
acknowledged by Spinoza in his rules for the definition of a
created thing. But if this is so, every definition must be
adjectival, must be made up of abstractions. In other words,
it is impossible to give a true definition of an uncreated
thing, if by an uncreated thing is meant the universe, the
system of reality itself, which is the presupposition of all
definition. Yet Spinoza bases his philosophy upon the de-
finition of an uncreated thing and believes that he has
deduced all from this definition.
Spinoza's imperfect recognition of the system which is
presupposed in all demonstration appears to me to be due
(in great part at least) to the way in which mathematical
problems were regarded by him as by most of his contempo-
raries. The ancient geometers found that there were many
problems which could not be solved directly by the aid
of Euclid's definitions and postulates. In plane geometi
Euclid postulated the straight line and the circle. But many
problems (such as that of the area of a circle or the relation
of its radius to its circumference) depend for their exact
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 339
solution upon the discovery of a relation between the straight
line and the circle. Somehow it must be possible to express
the circle in terms of the straight line. But you cannot do
it with a ruler and a pair of compasses : you cannot draw
or construct any figure which will solve the problem. The
nearest approach to a solution that can be made is to con-
struct a polygon with so many sides that it will come very
near indeed to the circle. But you can never make the sides
small enough for the figure to coincide with the circle. The
sides will always remain finite straight lines, while the circle
is the locus of a point which is continuously changing its
direction. Accordingly the Greek geometers had recourse
to the method of " exhaustions ". Thus they regarded the
area of a circle as being equivalent to the " limit " area of
a circumscribed and an inscribed polygon, having the same
number of sides, when the sides are made infinitely numer-
ous. The polygons can never actually become the circle, but
the ultimate difference is negligible, being as little as we
like to make it, and accordingly the "limit" area to which
each polygon approaches may be taken as practically equiva-
lent to the area of the circle. Now this method is one of
proof per impossibile or reductio ad absurdum. The area of
the circle must be either equal to, greater than, or less than
the limit area of the polygons. But to suppose it greater or
less would be to suppose that the polygons do not yet coin-
cide, i.e., that the area is not the limit area. Therefore the
area of the circle must be equal to the limit area of the
polygons. But all proof per impossibile is merely a negative
verification. It shows that anything other than the sug-
gested law or truth (the thing to be proved) would be
inconsistent with the general principles or constitution of
some system, such as the system of quantity or the system
of space. But it does not show how these general prin-
ciples apply to the particular case or how the particular case
follows necessarily from them, is an organic element in the
constitution of the system. Thus, in the instance we have
considered, the proof depends upon an actual construction
or picturing in space of two dimensions plus a general refer-
ence to the nature of quantity as being such that every
element in it must be either greater than, equal to, or less
than any other. Space is assumed to be quantitative, and
space of two dimensions is assumed to be such that straight
lines and circles can be drawn in it ; but neither the relation
of space to quantity nor the nature of space of two dimen-
sions as expressing itself in the straight line and circle is
thought out or made an explicit premiss in the argument.
340 BOBEKT LATTA:
The reasoning is grounded on a more or less blind appeal
to a system or systems that are presupposed without being
thoroughly thought out.
A considerable advance upon the ancient methods was
made by Kepler, who introduced the notion of infinity in
connexion with the solution of geometrical problems, and by
Descartes, who invented the analytical geometry or geo-
metry of co-ordinates. 1 The introduction of the idea that
a finite figure or a finite area is reducible to an infinite
j^mbex_of_elements was an explicit recognition of the inade-
quacyoFthe^&sclidean postulates as principles of demonstra-
tion, and it was the beginning of a train of thought which
led inevitably to the Infinitesimal Calculus ; but, as Pascal
pointed out in defending Cavalieri, the geometrical method
which proceeds upon the principle that the infinitely little
may be neglected differs only in manner of expression from
the method of exhaustions used in the Greek Mathematics. 2
Both are ultimately based on reductio ad absurdum. On
the other hand, the general effect of the changes intro-
duced by Descartes was (1) to make the relation between
the system of space and that of quantity in general more
clear and definite, by finding (in the co-ordinates) units
of space-relation, and (2) to substitute for the empirical
reference to space that is implied in the use of a ruler and
compasses a method by which figures and their properties may
be shown by calculation (without drawing or construction) to
follow from the nature of space as extension in three or in
two dimensions. The Cartesian method in geometry is thus
more positive, direct and explicit than the method of the
Greeks. Eliminating the postulates of Euclid, or rather
going beneath them to the grounds on which they rest and
thinking out what they imply, it gives a more perfect demon-
stration of the propositions of Euclid and solves more complex
problems than the Greeks could have attempted. Neverthe-
less, while the Cartesian geometry was much more positive
and thorough in its method of demonstration than was the
synthetic geometry, it still retained the doctrine or hypothesis
of limits in a negative form. It was (considering plane
geometry alone) on the right lines towards a positive solution
1 For a full history v. Gerhardt, Die Entdeckung der h'ohern Analysis,
p. 6 sqq., and Cohen, Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode, 35 sqq.
2 So Leibniz says in a letter to Varignon that the infinitesimal calculus
" donne directement et visiblement, et d'une maniere propre k marquer la
source de 1'invention, ce que les anciens, comnie Archimede, donnoient
par circuit dans leur reductions ad absurdum " (Gerhardt, Math. Schriften,
iv., 92).
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 341
of the problem of the relation between a straight line and a
curve, a problem insoluble by Euclid because he postu-
lated them independently ; but the solution had still to be
worked out, the unity of which the straight line and curve
are immediate differences had still to be determined. The
solution was obtained in connexion with the problem of
drawing a tangent to a curve. If the method of limits is
followed, the tangent is the limit of a secant cutting the
curve in two points, when these two points are brought
infinitely near to one another, i.e., when they are separated
from one another by less than any assignable distance.
But even in the limit case we have still two points and a
line, an infinitely little line, it is true, but yet a line. The
infinitely little distance is regarded as real but as negligible.
Now just about the time of Leibniz another step forward
was taken. 1 In connexion with the fact that finite numbers
may be resolved into infinite series, it was contended that
the finite line rests upon the infinitely little, that the in-
finitely little is really its generating principle. Every line has
length and direction. An infinitely little line has infinitely
little length ; but no reduction in its length can make any
alteration in its direction. Accordingly the infinitely little
line means really the direction, which is the essence or
generating principle of the line. Given the direction, the
line may be drawn to any length, great or small. The
essence of every line is thus its direction, that is its quality
or characteristic and not its quantity as the distance between
two points. The points presuppose the line. Thus, if we
regard a curve as generated by the motion of a point, the
tangent to the curve at any point will simply be the direction
of motion at that point. The direction of the moving point
changes continuously and, in the case of a regular curve,
uniformly, in accordance with a law which is characteristic
of the particular curve. Accordingly, in general, the straight
line and the curve are essentially varieties of direction in
space, the straight line being a continuous uniform direction,
while the curve is a continuously varying direction of more
or less complexity. And the direction of a curve at any
point must be regarded as a ratio between two infinitely
small quantities, because change of direction in a plane is
relative to two axes and continuous change of direction
means infinitely small variation from point to point. It was
the solution of problems resulting from such conceptions as
these that led to the discovery of the Infinitesimal Calculus.
lr The advance was made by Eoberval (1602-1675).
342 BOBEET LATTA:
By this view that the infinitely little is the basis of the
finite the older doctrine of limits is transcended. According
to this negative doctrine of limits, an infinitely little differ-
ence between two figures (say) is negligible. But if an
infinitely little difference is negligible, it must be for some
reason. Infinite littleness is a matter of degree. An in-
finitely small quantity is a quantity less than any that can
be assigned. But such a conception has no meaning unless
we are speaking of an infinitely small thing or unity of dif-
ferences, at the very least an infinitely small element in a
numerical series which is not a bare addition or subtraction
of homogeneous units but has some characteristic law of
increment or decrement. It is the law or principle of the
series, the nature or character of the whole, which enables
us to say that the infinitely little difference may be neglected.
Thus, adopting a phrase from Grandi, Leibniz writes to him
in 1713 : " Infinite parva concipimus non ut nihila simpliciter et
absolute, sed ut nihila respectiva (ut ipse bene notas), id est ut
evanescentia quidem in nihilum, retinentia tamen characterem ejus
quod evanescit ". l Accordingly, when it can be shown that two
things ultimately " run into " one another or are continuous
with one another, that is to say that the ultimate difference
between them is infinitely little, it is presupposed that they are
differences of a unity or that their difference is one of degree
and not of kind. Thus the negative doctrine of limits im-
plicitly presupposes a system within which its various objects
are related, while the positive method, of which the fullest
expression is to be found in the Calculus, explicitly recognises
this system and regards the various objects or elements as
necessarily determined by it. The method of limits was a
true method so far as it went ; but it was inadequate because
it did not think out its presuppositions. The advance that
was made by Leibniz and his contemporaries consisted in
investigating these presuppositions by inquiries (direct and
indirect) into the true meaning of mathematical infinity.
We are now in a position to consider the agreement and
the difference between the scientific standpoint of Spinoza and
that of Leibniz. The mathematics of Spinoza are the mathe-
matics of Descartes. Spinoza is at the negative point of
view implied in the method of limits, while Leibniz is at the
positive point of view implied by the method of infinitesimals.
In mathematics the method of limits is logically dependent
upon the method of infinitesimals ; it assumes, without
1 Gerhardt, Leibniz's Math. Schriften, iv., 218. So also the conception
of "infinities of infinity" is a favourite one with Leibniz, who frequently
argues against the possibility of an absolute quantitative infinite.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 343
justification or explanation, what the method of infinitesi-
mals justifies and explains. The method of limits presupposes*
that the discrete is ultimately reducible to the continuous,!
the finite to the infinite ; but it does not show, as the method
of infinitesimals does, how the continuous develops the
discrete, how the infinite constitutes the finite. Similarly
in the metaphysics of Spinoza the unity of an all-compre-
hensive system is presupposed throughout ; but the varieties
of individual existence are not shown as proceeding from
this system, as its logical development. The finite presup-
poses the infinite, modes presuppose attributes, attributes
presuppose substance ; but the infinite is reached by thinking
away the varieties of the finite, the attribute is that which
is common to all the modes, substantia in se or vere considerata
is substantia depositis affectionibus. 1 Thus for Spinoza " de-
termination is negation," " the determinate denotes nothing
positive, but only a privation of the existence of that nature
which is conceived as determinate". 2 Geometrical figures
as definite figures are unreal, because their definiteness is
dependent on other figures : their reality is indeterminate
extension. And in general, definite quantities of any kind,
separate parts, are unreal: real quantity, "as it is in the
understanding," " as it is in itself," is infinite, indivisible
and single [unica]. 3 The infinite is thus the basis of the
finite, the continuous of the discrete ; but the reality of the
infinite and continuous is conceived in such a way as to
imply the unreality, and therefore the negation, of the finite
and discrete. Not merely is it maintained that the infinite
and continuous are not products of the finite and discrete,
but it is implied that the finite and discrete are not really
(as finite and discrete) products of the infinite and continu-
ous. Now it is interesting to find that, in thus emphasising
the unity of " extended substance " and real " quantity," as
against the variety of finite "bodies" and "quantities,"
Spinoza says that the attempt to show that " extended
substance is composed of parts or bodies really distinct from
one another " is as absurd " as if one were to attempt by the
mere addition and aggregation of many circles to make up a
square or a triangle or something else totally different in
essence " or to make a line out of points. 4 But the mathe-
Hth., i., 5, deinonst. ; cf. Eth., ii., 10, Schol. 2: Res singulares non
possunt sine Deo esse nee concipi ; et tamen Deus ad earuiu essentiam
non pertinet.
8 Ep. 36, Van Vloten (41 Bruder).
Ibid., 12, Van Vloten (29 Bruder). *Loc. cit.
344
ROBERT LATTA:
maticians of Spinoza's own day were showing that rectilineal
figures are not " totally different in essence " from circles
and that finite quantity is the product of an infinite series,
having a definite law or characteristic. The various geo-
metrical figures are, it is true, not products of one another
nor products of discrete quantities of any kind ; but they
are products or expressions of the qualities or characteristics
of extension. Infinite extension is not something totally
different in essence from all finite figures, something to be
obtained only by getting rid of all finite extension. To call
it " infinite " is to insist on its qualities or relations as deter-
mining its quantities, to regard it as a system from which
certain finite figures, in all their finitude, necessarily follow,
or rather a system of which these finite figures are the
expression. And in general " infinite " quantity, in so far
as it is really anything, is a negative name for quality, and
to say that the finite presupposes the infinite is to say that
quantity presupposes quality. This is the truth involved
in Spinoza's account of the Attributes of Substance as
infinite in their kind; 1 but it is a truth which is inconsistent
with Spinoza's other contention that Substance is absolutely
infinite. To think of anything as infinitely great or as
infinitely little is to recognise negatively that the conception
under which we are thinking it is inadequate, that the thing
(as conceived by us) and its other are elements or differences
within a higher unity. A circle, the radius of which is
infinite, is a circle which is not a circle, and when we speak
of it we mean to indicate that the conception of a circle as
an independent finite figure is inadequate and that the
difference between a circle and a straight line is a difference
determined by some higher unity, which (so far) we do not
explain. In the same way, when we speak of infinite space
we mean that the space of mathematics is, by itself, an
inadequate conception and that the system of space must
itself be an element in some more comprehensive system.
And in general, to say that a thing is infinite in its kind is
to say that its kind is relative to some other kind and that
neither is to be fully understood except through that of which
they are both differences. 2 In other words, a thing which
is infinite in its kind is a thing which is to some extent
indeterminate. A thing absolutely infinite will consequently
be a thing absolutely indeterminate. That is to say, a thing
1 Eth., i., Def. 6 ; of. Ep. ii. and Korte Verhandeling, appendix, prop. iii.
2 This, of course, means (what Spinoza would deny) that finite Modes,
as well as Attributes, are each infinite in its kind. Thus, according to
Leibniz, every finite thing " contains infinity," v. infra.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 345
absolutely infinite must be a thing of which we have no
conception whatever, for if we had an inadequate conception
of it, it would be infinite in its kind, and if we had a perfectly
adequate conception of it, it would no longer be infinite in
the sense of indeterminate, it would be absolutely deter-
mined. In short, the mathematical infinite is always the
indeterminate, while the infinite as applied to the real uni-
verse is the self-determined.
Now the characteristic feature of the philosophy of Leibniz
is that, however imperfectly, it endeavours to give a positive
solution of the problem of reality. And this is closely con-
nected with Leibniz's point of view in Mathematics. Instead
of regarding the infinite as the negation of the finite, to be
reached by thinking away the finite, he conceives the infinite
as the reality of the finite, to be reached by thinking out the
nite. Every finite thing, according to Leibniz, " contains
infinity " : it is in some way constituted by the infinite,
made up of infinitesimals. His account of the way in which
the infinite actually constitutes or determines the finite is
far from being perfectly satisfactory ; but he has a sure grasp
of the principle that the determining infinite means quality,
characteristic, relation of some kind, and that it is impos-
sible to get behind relations, behind the world as a system,
or, in other words, to reach substance depositis affectionibus.
Thus in the letter to Grandi already quoted (p. 342) Leibniz
writes : Infinitude vera non cadit nisi in infinitum virtutis omni
parte carens . . . et quantitates illce calculi nostri extraordinaria
sunt fictiones, non ideo tamen spernenda sunt. . . cum in calculo
perinde sit ac si essent vera quantitates, habeantque fundamentum
in re et veritatem quandam idealem ut radices imaginarice. 1
All quantity is accordingly quantity of something non-quanti-
tative, quantity of some quality or characteristic. A finite
straight line is a quantity of uniform direction, a finite curve
is a quantity of direction which varies according to some
law, a finite extension is a quantity of something extended.
" Extension presupposes some quality, some attribute, some
nature in the extended thing, which quality extends or
diffuses itself along with the thing, continues itself." 2 This
quality is conceived by Leibniz as potentiality, not in the
sense of empty capacity (puissance nue), but in the sense of
something which contains implicitly within itself its own
1 Gerhardt, Leibniz's Math. Schriften, iv., 218 ; cf. iiL, 500 : Reale
infinitum fortasse est ipsum absolutum, quod non ex partibus con-
r, sed partes habentia eminenti ratione et velut gradu perfectionis
"Leibniz. Erdmann's ed., 692 b; Gerhardt's ed., vi., 584.
346 ROBERT LATTA :
realisation (entelechy or tendance). The infinite develops
into the finite, the qualitative into the quantitative. The
infinitely little line is a direction, but in the direction there
is contained implicitly every finite line having that direction :
in other words, the line is a development of the direction.
But, as we have seen, all such development is the develop-
ment of a unity, or rather of a system, into its differences ;
it is something permanent unfolding itself in its changes.
Now this implies that reality is not a bare unity, from which
the differences have been thought away, but a system of
differences, a unity which implicitly contains its differences
within itself. This is the principle of the law of Continuity,
which governs Leibniz's mathematics l and which has a
considerable function in his philosophy. According to the
law of Continuity, a thing may (as Leibniz himself puts it)
be regarded as "equivalent to a species of its opposite," 5
e.g., rest may be regarded as a species of motion (an infinitely
little motion), equality as a species of inequality, unconscious-
ness as a species of consciousness, the finite as a species of
the infinite. By this, of course, is meant not that the thing
is a species of which its opposite is genus, but that the re-
lation between them is reciprocal, it being possible to regard
each as a species of the other. But this implies that both
are elements within some unity or system wbich is insepar-
able from them. And it is this that leads Leibniz to insist
so strongly on the explicit recognition of the principle of
sufficient reason as a principle of method. The principle of
sufficient reason is the principle that everything has a ground
or reason which is at once identical with it and different from
it, in other words that nothing is self-evident, purely self-
identical. Thus the principle of sufficient reason is the
principle that the ultimate reality is not a unity from which
the differences have been thought away, but a system of
elements in relation, a unity in difference. And of this
principle the law of Continuity is manifestly a particular
application, for it amounts to saying that, while all the
varieties of things are real, no one of them is independent
of the rest, the world is a system of " compossible " things.
1 Leibniz very frequently speaks of the law of Continuity as derived
from the consideration of " the infinite " and as being the basis of the
Calculus. For instance, in the Specimen Dynamicum (1687) he speaks
of it as principium ordinis generate, nascens ex infinite et continui
notione, accedente ad illud axioma, quod datis ordinatis etiam quxsita
sunt ordinata (Gerhardt, Math. Schriften, vi., 250 ; cf. Cohen, Princip
der Infinitesimal-Methode, 52 sqq.).
2 Math. Schriften, iv., 93. Leibniz says contradictoire, but the context
shows that he means " contrary," opposite.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 347
On the one hand, there is no absolute surd, no purely con-
tingent thing : on the other hand the surd and the contingent
are not absolutely "irrational" or illusory. The surd is
reducible to an infinite series, the contingent is the product
of an infinity of conditions, and thus each is a form of its
other. l
Accordingly we may, I think, put the difference between
Leibniz and Spinoza in this way, that Spinoza expressly
proceeds upon a method of deduction from self-evident first
principles, i.e., from a basis of pure identity, while this pro-
cedure is possible only because a system of identity in
difference is presupposed throughout ; and Leibniz, on the
other hand, explicitly recognises this system as practically
ultimate, while at the same time he professes to give a
shadowy ground for the system itself (a ground of its
existence but not of its essence) in the "choice" of God,
which is rather a negative release into existence than a
positive creation. Thus Spinoza's presupposition of a system
of unity in difference as constituting the ultimate reality of
things appears in his constant references to the " order and
connexion " of things and ideas, to the proximate cause as
giving the essence of a thing and to substance as causa sui>
natura naturans and natura naturata (i.e, substance as cause
and effect, ground and consequent, yet both ultimately the
same), to the conatus, effort or tendency in things, to the
" series of fixed and eternal things" (universal singulars) 2
and to many similar conceptions. 3 And, on the other hand,
Leibniz shows the imperfection of his grasp of the principle
which he himself insists upon, by treating the law of sufficient
reason as an addition to the law of identity and by speaking
of the essences of all abstractly possible worlds as being in
the understanding of God, a regio idearum behind the actual
world. In short the inconsistencies of the two philosophies
1 Vide Leibniz, Erdinann, 83 b ; Gerhardt, vii., 200 : " The difference be-
tween necessary and contingent truths is indeed the same as that between
commensurable and incommensurable numbers. For the reduction of
commensurable numbers to a common measure is analogous to the
demonstration of necessary truths or their reduction to identical truths.
But, as in the case of surd ratios the reduction involves an infinite process
and yet approaches a common measure, so that a definite but unending
series is obtained, thus also contingent truths require an infinite analysis,
which God alone can accomplish" (Cf. Cohen, Infinitesimal- Methode,
43).
2 Vide Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.
3 E.g., Spinoza uses the very terms in which Leibniz states his principle
of sufficient reason : Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio,
tarn cur exi&tit, quam cur non existit (Eth., i., 11, demonutr. 2).
348 ROBEET LATTA:
are similar, but the emphasis is on opposite sides. A com-
parison between Spinoza's "Attributes" and the qualities
which Leibniz attributes to his Monads may serve to illustrate
this. Spinoza speaks of substance as constans infinitis attri-
butis, 1 which means that substance must contain every possible
kind of reality. Each of these attributes " expresses eternal
and infinite essence," i.e., each expresses the whole and in
its own way expresses it completely. There is no degree in
their expression of the whole (as, for example, there is degree
in the perfection with which the Monads express the whole) .
And an attribute is defined as id quod intellectus de substantia
percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens. 2 The human
understanding, because of its finitude, perceives only two
of these attributes, and we are thus left to infer that an
infinite understanding must perceive the infinite attributes.
But the infinite attributes do not limit one another. One
idea limits another and one body limits another ; but thought
does not limit extension nor extension thought. Accordingly
the infinite attributes must mean simply the totality of
abstract possibilities for an infinite intellect. That is to
say, they are very much the same as Leibniz's infinity of
" possible " ideas or essences in the understanding of God.
Ultimately, then, there is no connexion between the attri-
butes. They do not form part of one system ; otherwise
they would limit one another. In Leibniz's language they
would not merely be "possible" but " compossible ". Yet
they are held to be parallel expressions of substance, and
this parallelism seems to imply that they do belong to the
same system, that they are differences within its unity. On
the other hand, when Leibniz attributes to every substance
two fundamental qualities, " perception " and " appetition,"
he is defining substance as system within system. Per-
ception is simply a name for the relation of one term or
element to every other element in the system, while appetition
is a name for the development of the system from within
itself. Ultimately it is implied in Leibniz's view that
appetition means simply change of perception, variety of
relationship. But the perception and appetition are attri-
buted by Leibniz, not to one substance or to one ultimate
system of things, but to each of an infinite number of sub-
stances, which are indeed regarded as related to one another,
but which are so externally related, so independent in their
own being, that each lives its own life as if there existed
nothing but God and itself. Thus the notion of system is
1 Eth., I, 11, and def. 6. 2 Ibid., i., def. 4.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 349
explicitly recognised by Leibniz, without being thoroughly
thought out. His " system " is not all-inclusive. The world
is not the one system of reality, but "the best of all pos-
sible worlds ". The elements of which it is composed are
essentially " possibles," in their own nature completely
independent. Thus the world is the system of the " corn-
possible," resting on the chaos of the " possible ".
The results of this general argument cannot be worked out
within the limits of this paper, but I may take up one or two
special points. (1) In the first place, as most closely con-
nected with the general line of thought we have been
following, let us consider the views of Descartes, Spinoza
and Leibniz regarding extension and motion. According to
Descartes, extension and motion are absolutely given. Ex-
tension is a created substance, in the sense that its existence
presupposes nothing else except the concours ordinaire of God.
Motion is also a direct creation of " God Himself, who in the
beginning created matter along with motion and rest and
now, by His concours ordinaire alone, preserves in the whole
the same amount of motion and rest that He then placed in
it ". 1 From the combination of these two absolutely given
elements given in separation from one another Descartes
in his Principia, part iii., tries to show that the whole material
world in its endless variety comes into being. Ultimately,
then, all matter is space of three dimensions plus motion.
Spinoza, excluding the idea of creation, reduces the independ-
ence of extension, treating it not as substance but as an
attribute of substance, i.e., as something which on the one
hand is not relative to anything else except understanding,
while on the other hand, being relative to understanding, it is
not substance itself. This attribute of extension, however,
is not what we call space of three dimensions, for it is one
and indivisible. 2 In short, extension, for Spinoza, is that
which is presupposed in extended things, that which remains
when all the limits (the finitude) of extended things are
thought away. And thus, of course, Spinoza rejects the
view of Descartes that the essence of matter or corporeal
substance can be an extension that is divisible. Divisible
extension is extension conceived " abstractly or superficially,
as by means of the senses we have it in the imagination ". 3
1 Principia, ii., 36.
2 Extended substance, according to Spinoza, can have no parts ; for if
it had parts, each of them would be a substance and would be finite,
which is a contradiction of the nature of substance as that which is
infinite inasmuch as the conception of it requires the conception of
nothing else ; cf. Ep. 12, Van Vloten (29 Bruder).
*Z/oc. tit.
350 ROBERT LATTA:
Again motion, according to Spinoza, is an infinite mode, that
is to say, it is an immediate modification of the attribute of
extension, " following from the absolute nature of that
attribute "- 1 But he makes no attempt to show how motion
" follows from the absolute nature" of extension. All that
he can really mean is that motion presupposes extension.
Motion is the stepping-stone between finite bodies and the
infinite attribute. The differences of finite bodies all pre-
suppose (or are reducible to terms of) the motion of particles,
this motion of particles as a totality presupposes (when we
think away the finite element in it, the parts or particles) an
infinite motion, which similarly presupposes extension, which
in turn presupposes substance. Each stage is obtained from
that which preceded it by the removing of certain determina-
tions, until we reach the " absolutely indeterminate ". 2 Now
the characteristic feature both of Descartes's and of Spinoza's
view is the negative form in which the relation between
extension and motion is regarded. According to Descartes,
motion comes to extension entirely ab extra : according to
Spinoza, motion, being a mode, presupposes extension, but
extension, being an attribute, must be conceived through
itself alone and is therefore independent of motion. Hence,
when Descartes takes it as the fundamental principle of his
laws of motion that the quantity of motion and rest in the
universe (or in any isolated system of bodies) is fixed and
unchangeable, he leaves out of account the direction of
motion, because that is a quality not of motion per se but of
motion in space. Further it is interesting in this connexion
to recall the fact that Leibniz on his journey to Holland to
visit Spinoza wrote a paper on the principle of motion, and
that one of the few things he tells us about his interviews
with Spinoza is that " Spinoza did not quite clearly see the
defects of Descartes's laws of motion : he was surprised when
I began to show him that they were inconsistent with the
equality of cause and effect ". 3 Now Leibniz's objection to
Descartes's laws of motion is that they are too abstract.
Motion, of course, mathematically considered, must be an
abstraction ; but motion regarded as something given quite
independently of extension is motion considered more ab-
stractly than is necessary. In fact motion and extension
mutually presuppose one another : they are both abstractions
from one reality. This might be illustrated by the fact that
1 Eth., I, 21; cf. Ep. 64, Van Vloten (66 Bruder).
2 Ep. 36, Van Vloten (41 Bruder).
3 Foucher de Careil, Refutation inedite de Spinoza, p. Ixiv.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 351
(as we have already seen) the figures or determinations of
extension are reducible to directions of motion (leaving out
of account mass, or moving body, and velocity). All real
motion, then, has direction ; it is given, not independently,
but in relation to extension. And consequently the motion
whose quantity in the universe is fixed must be motion
having direction : the direction is conserved as well as the
quantity of abstract motion. But the direction of a motion
is not something actual in the sense that it can be seen or
pictured as a whole. It is a quality, a potentiality or partly
hidden tendency in the motion, an infinitesimal, out of which
the finite motion develops. This potentiality or tendency,
which is presupposed by all actual motion when we take into
consideration its direction, is what Leibniz means by Force.
And thus for Leibniz Force, as qualitative, as a potency
passing into actuality, an identity in difference, is the sub-
stance or reality from which actual visible or picturable motion
and extension are abstractions. 1 An infinitely little line is a
direction of motion and an infinitely little motion (or direction
of motion) is a force. Thus the positive interpretation of
the infinitely little means a passing from superficial ideas of
sense and imagination to deeper and more comprehensive
notions of thought, from the abstract to the concrete. But
the attitude of sense or imagination is not absolutely cut off
from the attitude of thought or understanding. Comprehen-
sion by the understanding is a thinking out of what appears
imperfectly in sense.
(2) This leads naturally to a brief consideration of the
difference between Spinoza's theory of knowledge and that
of Leibniz. Spinoza draws a sharp line between opinio or
imaginatio, on the one hand, and ratio and scientia intuitiva,
on the other. Opinio or imaginatio is the cause of falsity,
while the knowledge given by ratio and scientia intuitiva is
necessarily true.' 2 Thus in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emenda-
tione we find Spinoza insisting mainly on the distinction
1 Thus Spinoza and Leibniz are both opposed to Descartes's theory that
extension is the essence of corporeal substance, on the ground that
divisible extension presupposes something omni parte carens. But this
indivisible basis of extension is conceived by Spinoza negatively, as being
entirely without parts in any sense, as being one in opposition to many,
while Leibniz conceives it positively, as something which has degrees or
varieties and thus as one in many. The difference is so considerable
and so closely connected with Leibniz's mathematics that I think it ought
to weigh heavily against the suggestion of Stein (p. 64 sqq.) that Leibniz
was probably influenced by Spinoza in his criticism of Descartes's view
of " extended substance ".
*Eth., ii, 40, 41.
352 EGBERT LATTA :
between the empirical order of events, which is the work of
imagination, and the real order of existence, as it is known
by reason. Mere perception or the history of events which
has no higher principle of order than memory, mere sequence
in short, is dismissed absolutely as illusion. But, on the
other hand, veritas norma sui et falsi est. 1 Falsity presupposes,
truth, imagination presupposes understanding. But there
is no positive relation between them. Without understand-
ing and truth there can be no imagination and falsity ; but
without imagination and falsity there might be understanding
and truth. Leibniz, on the other hand, makes the difference
between sense or imagination and understanding one of
degree. The difference between them is ultimately an in-
finitely little one, or rather they are elements in a continuous
series of perceptions, differing from one another by infinitely
little degrees of clearness and distinctness. And, just as
every finite number may be resolved into an infinite series,
so every finite perception is made up of an infinity of petites
perceptions, which are relatively obscure and confused. Every
perception thus "contains" or "involves infinity," and the
notion of perception is stretched out so as to include every
kind of relation, whether conscious or unconscious. Accord-
ingly the relation between sense (or imagination) and under-
standing comes to be reciprocal. Each presupposes the
other. Understanding is the evolution of sense, while sense
is the involution of understanding. To this extent the positive
view of Leibniz transcends the negative position of Spinoza.
But Leibniz does not see clearly all that is involved in his
method. For instance, the infinity of petites perceptions into
which Leibniz resolves a particular sense-perception is an
infinity of elements, each of which is and is not a sense-
perception, each of which belongs in some way to sense but
does not belong to sense-consciousness. Now (as we saw
when dealing with the relation between the finite and the
infinite) this means that the distinction between the conscious
and the unconscious is not ultimate, that it is an expression
of some deeper unity, that the conscious and the unconscious
are inseparable elements in a system. Consequently in the
petite perception we ought to find that which determines the
distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, i.e.,
the comprehensive unity in difference, which expresses itself
in them. Such a unity would be the unity or system of
reason or of self-consciousness, which reveals itself in the
distinction between conscious and unconscious, subject and
1 Eth., ii., 43, Schol.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 353
object, and which thus transcends that distinction. But we
shall look in vain for any such system in the petites perceptions
of Leibniz. It is true that he regards them as somehow
having order in them, as containing implicitly a law of some
sort ; but in reality he conceives them, not positively but
negatively, as sensations minus consciousness, i.e., as " limits "
of conscious sensations, and thus any order they may be
supposed to have is not an order of their own, but the order
of conscious perception read into them. There must, for
example, be among conscious perceptions an order or system
which is expressed in the distinctions between (say) sensations
of hearing and sensations of sight. A similar order must be
supposed to exist among the petites perceptions. But this
second order is presupposed in a purely negative way. If
we have a conscious perception of the sound of 100,000
waves, we must somehow have perception (though uncon-
scious) of the sound of each ; 1 but Leibniz makes no attempt to
indicate exactly how. His argument here is simply the reductio
ad absurdum, which is the characteristic argument of Spinoza.
And Leibniz's failure at this point accounts for the difficulty
he finds in dealing with the rational or self-conscious soul.
He sees clearly that the conscious in some way presupposes
the unconscious ; but he has not an equally clear grasp of
what is involved in the truth that the unconscious pre-
supposes the conscious. Hence it becomes increasingly
difficult for him to carry out his law of continuity when he
comes to consider the higher parts of the scale of being.
He cannot, for instance, conceive that a self-conscious soul
should ever lose its self-consciousness and permanently
become merely conscious or unconscious. And thus he
hesitates between the hypothesis that rational souls have
been raised from the rank of sensuous souls " by the extra-
ordinary operation of God " and the hypoth'esis that " only
those souls which are destined some day to attain to human
nature contain in germ [enveloppent] the reason which will
Isome day appear in them ", 2 On the whole matter Leibniz
is very inconsistent and unsatisfactory ; but, whichever of
his hypotheses we follow, it is evident that he did not realise
1 Nouveaiix Essais, Introduction (Erdmann, 197; Gerhardt, v., 47).
One might ask why a separate petite perception for each wave and not
for every possible element in each wave ? The single wave is quite an
arbitrary standard for the unit of perception : there is nothing to show why
it should be chosen.
2 Theodicee, 397 ; cf. 91, and Lettres a Arnauld (1686-7), Gerhardt,
ii., 75 and 99 ; also Lettre a des Maizeaux (1711), Erdmann, 676 ; Gerhardt,
vii., 534.
23
354 ROBERT LATTA:
the true consequence of his own principles, viz., that self-
consciousness, as the more concrete principle, is necessarily
implied or presupposed in the continuity of the conscious
and the unconscious, that it is the system in which they are
elements. Such a conclusion would, of course, have destroyed
the monadology by making the universe a single all-compre-
hensive Monad. Accordingly Leibniz at this point falls
back upon the method of Descartes and Spinoza, practically
(though not avowedly) treating the self-conscious soul as
discontinuous with the conscious and the unconscious, as
having some new quality that is a sheer addition to the
qualities of these lower souls.
(3) This beginning of a rift in continuity widens into an
open self-contradiction when we come to Leibniz's account
of God, the highest in the scale of being. The contradiction
consists in regarding God as at once the highest Monad and
the being in whose understanding the essences of all possible
systems are and who by His choice makes the best possible
system real. God is thus both within and without the
system of monads. In so far as He is merely an element in
the system, He is less than God : in so far as He is outside
of the system, the continuity is broken. Leibniz's own
suggestion regarding the proof of the existence of God would,
if thought out, have revealed the contradiction. He says
that the Cartesian ontological proof of the existence of God
is incomplete. It ought, he says, to run : if the most perfect
Being is possible (i.e., if the idea of a most perfect Being is
not self-contradictory), it follows that the most perfect Being
exists. And he argues that, for instance, there is no swiftest
possible motion, because the idea of it can be shown to be
self-contradictory. But Leibniz failed to observe that, if the
most perfect Being is regarded as one of a series, the idea of
it is self-contradictory. For either it contains all the perfec-
tions (i.e. in Leibniz's sense, the positive reality) of the other
members of the series or it does not. If it does, it is no
longer to be regarded as one member of the series ; if it does
not, it is no longer most perfect, for ex hypothesi it lacks
some perfections. 1 Leibniz misses the contradiction by
arguing that the idea of a most perfect Being is not self-
contradictory, for all perfections are mutually compatible.
This argument, however, was made by him long before he
had thought out his monadology, and he tells us that in one
of the interviews at the Hague he submitted it to Spinoza
1 That is to say, we fehould have a " best possible " God, corresponding
to the best possible world.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ. 355
who, though inclined at first to oppose it, ultimately admitted
it to be satisfactory. 1 The fact is interesting when we con-
sider that the contradiction in Leibniz's account of God is
the exact counterpart of the contradiction in Spinoza's view
of substance. Leibniz treats God as at once an element in
the system of things and a Being independent of the
system, but of such a nature that the system itself seems
unnecessary ; while Spinoza, as we have seen, regards
God or Substance as equivalent to the Universe as one, and
yet his definition of God implies that He is an element in
some wider system. From opposite sides Spinoza and Leibniz
fall into the same pit.
In this paper I have been able to do little more than in-
dicate a line of thought which, it seems to me, may be fruit-
fully developed. It is easy, on the one hand, to show that
Spinoza and Leibniz are both inconsistent and, on the other
hand, to maintain that they both say exactly the same thing
in slightly different ways. The armoury of the more recent
philosophy equips us for the one task, and a collection of
parallel passages might fortify us for the other. But neither
of these things profits us a whit. Turning from them, I
have endeavoured to show that what is admittedly implicit
in the philosophy of Spinoza is made comparatively explicit
in the philosophy of Leibniz, although Leibniz does not by
any means thoroughly work out the consequences of his own
method. And the philosophical attitude of each is, I think,
very closely connected with their views of mathematics.
The negative doctrine of limits, when it is thought out, issues
in the positive doctrine of infinitesimals, which it presupposes.
Thus Spinoza argues vigorously against the reality of final
causes as involving the introduction of the negative, the
finite, the determinate into substance, while in his constant
references to the order and connexion of things 2 and to the
conatus or self-preserving tendency in each individual thing,
he presupposes that determinate system of inter-related ele-
ments which his explicit argument against final causes would
exclude. Leibniz, on the other hand, is concerned for
nothing more than for the reality of final cause. It is the
point regarding which he most sharply differs from Spinoza
and in his correspondence he returns to it again and again.
Nevertheless in the end he puts behind his rational or
1 Gerhardt, viL, 261.
"Compare these with the passage in the appendix to part i. of the
Ethics, where Spinoza attributes the belief that there is order in things
to imagination, as distinct from understanding.
356 E. LATTA : THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ.
"inclining" necessity, a necessity of blind fate, behind his
" compossible " system a chaos of empty " possibilities," so
that the real world is practically taken as a creation out
of nothing, a development of that indeterminate capacity,
that puissance nue, which Leibniz himself most frequently
derides.
III.-CAN THERE BE A SUM OF PLEASURES P 1
BY HASTINGS KASHDALL.
THE doctrine that pleasures cannot be summed, that there
is no meaning in the idea of a sum of pleasures and that
consequently the " hedonistic calculus " is impossible and
unintelligible, has long been maintained by a certain section
of anti-utilitarian writers, among whom it will be enough to
mention the late Prof. T. H. Green and Mr. Bradley. It
must be confessed, however, that it is not very easy to
extract from either of these writers the exact grounds or
even the precise meaning of their contention. Prof. Mac-
kenzie in his Manual of Ethics and his Introduction to Social
Philosophy has performed a real service by putting the doctrine
into a form in which it is more easy to subject it to exam-
ination and criticism. In the following pages, however, I
shall not confine myself to what Prof. Mackenzie has ad-
vanced, as what appear to me the misconceptions which
underlie his reasoning are widely diffused and seem often to
be assumed in the language of writers who have been less
explicit. My object is rather to get to the bottom of the
misunderstanding than to criticise any particular writer ; I
do not therefore wish to be understood as holding Prof.
Mackenzie responsible for every argument that I may criti-
cise except where I expressly quote him.
It may be well at the outset to explain that I am not in
the least interested in the defence either of the hedonistic
Psychology or of hedonistic Utilitarianism, both of which
I entirely reject on much the same grounds as those which
would be assigned by the writers I am criticising writers
with some of whom I should largely agree in their general
view of Ethics. This is particularly the case with regard
to Prof. Mackenzie, who is entirely free from that sectarian
prejudice against Casuistry and that dislike to the scientific
treatment of practical problems which are characteristic of
several writers by whom the incommensurability of pleasures
has been maintained. It is unnecessary for my present
1 Read before the Aristotelian Society.
358 HASTINGS BASHDALL :
purpose to indicate in any detail what in my own view is
the place of a hedonistic calculus in Moral Philosophy. It
is enough to say that I do not regard the promotion of the
" greatest quantum of pleasure " as a true or adequate for-
mulation of the moral criterion. I believe that many other
things most of all Goodness, and, in a lower degree, intel-
lectual goods such as knowledge, contemplation of beauty,
culture and the like possess a value which is not dependent
on the pleasure by which they are normally accompanied,
and which very much exceeds the value of the pleasure con-
sidered simply as such. At the same time pleasure does
appear to me to have intrinsic value. I maintain with Plato,
Aristotle, and in fact almost all ethical writers except the
Stoics and their imitators of the Greenian School that
pleasure or rather (since there are bad pleasures) some
pleasure is a good, though not the good. And this asser-
tion seems to me to carry with it the implication that ceteris
paribus the more pleasure the more good ; ceteris paribus the
greater amount of pleasure is to be preferred to the less. I
regard it, therefore, as a part of duty, though by no means
the whole, to promote as much pleasure as possible ex-
cluding, of course, bad pleasures. The promotion of a
" greatest quantum of pleasure " or of a " greatest amount
of pleasure on the whole " does appear to me a possible
object of human desire and human action ; though this aim
should be pursued in due subordination to the higher ele-
ments in of that evScu/Aovia or total Well-being of Humanity
which the good man will regard it as his duty to pursue.
These are the propositions which I understand to be denied
by the writers I have in mind. It will be well to start with
a few specimens of these denials.
(1) The late Prof. Green wrote as follows : "A Summum
Bonum consisting of a greatest possible sum of pleasure is
supposed to be definite and intelligible, because every one
knows what pleasure is. But in what sense does every one
know it ? If only in the sense that every one can imagine
the renewal of some pleasure which he has enjoyed, it may
be pointed out that pleasures, not being enjoyable in a sum
to say nothing of a greatest possible sum cannot be
imagined in a sum either. Though this remark, however,
might be to the purpose against a Hedonist, who held that
desire could only be excited by imagined pleasure, and yet
that a greatest sum of pleasure was an object of desire, it is
not to the purpose against those who merely look on the
greatest sum of pleasures as the true criterion, without
holding that desire is only excited by imagination of pleasure.
CAN THERE BE A SUM OF PLEASURES? 359
They will reply that, though we may not be able, strictly
speaking, to imagine a sum of pleasures, every one knows
what it is. Every one knows the difference between enjoy-
ing a longer succession of pleasures and a shorter one, a
succession of more intense and a succession of less intense
pleasures, a succession of pleasures less interrupted by pain
and one more interrupted. In this sense every one knows
the difference between enjoying a larger sum o 
